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index of contents
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Box 382, 384 and 385

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Five years have elapsed since Manchukuo founded her country on March 1, 1932, by the hope of thirty million people as a whole as well as the assistance of our friendly country, Japan, getting rid of the Chinese yoke. In this period the administrative and economic system have been rearranged in outline and the second-period Five-Year Plan will be inaugurated in 1937, with which epoch-making construction activity will be commenced dashingly.

Now, in this case, it may be of interest to look back the results of administration of those five years, inspecting how the policies promulgated and promised by the government at the beginning of the foundation have been put in operation, in other words in what degree the proclamation of the establishment of Manchukuo and outline of economic construction have been brought into effect.

I. Policies proclaimed in the Proclamation of the Establishment. These are as follows:
   A. The government must conform to the real will of the people.
   B. There shall be no discrimination with respect either to race or creed.
   C. Dark administration shall be abolished.
   D. Promotion of macro economy.
   E. Able men shall be collected at large and men of talent shall be appointed.
   F. The business shall be encouraged and natural resources shall be developed.
   G. Unification of money market.
   H. Police and soldiers shall be trained and the violence of banditry shall be regulated.

   The education shall be spread and proper courtesy shall be observed. Thus the final purpose was that "statecraft" should be founded upon the principle of Tao or the Way and Tao should be of man or Heaven, and it was designed to give enlightenment to the people who live within the state and maintain the honor of perpetuating the peace of Eastern Asia, thus setting a model example of good government to the world."
A. The government must conform to the real will of the people. Since the foundation of the new State, the government has designed to eliminate the evils of tyrannical administration and to bring into practice of an original Wangtao administration in conformity of government and people which is the reflection of harmony and cooperation among the races and the real will of the people. On July 25, 1932, the Manchukuo Concordia Association was established and discharged the duty of transmitting the Emperor’s wishes to the populace and to prevent the popular will to the superior as an organization of spread of spirit and virtue of the people. It is just the prefectural, provincial or central allied conference which is held every year. In July, 1945, the Concordia Association decisively reorganized its construction on September 18 of the same year elucidated the fundamental ideals of the association, and commenced its positive activity as a political practical body.

B. There shall be no discrimination, with respect to either race or creed. In the Article 3 of Law of Protection of People’s Rights promulgated as the No. 32 of ordinance of the Department of Education on April 1, 1932, it was regulated that “All people of Manchukuo, regardless of the race, shall be under the equal guardianship,” and all people resident in Manchukuo are under the equal treatment and guardianship. In the old regime, Japanese nationals had extraterritoriality in Manchuria, but in June, 1936, treaty between Japan and Manchukuo concerning the Residence of Japanese subjects, taxation etc. in Manchukuo was signed to abolish the right of extraterritoriality and to adjust and transfer the administrative rights over the South Manchuria Railway Zone and from July 1, 1936, Japanese subjects shall agree the application of the laws concerning taxation and further in near future the right of extraterritoriality will be completely abolished and Japanese nations, as a leading element of five races, will be subject to the laws and ordinances of Manchukuo as other races, and work there, consequently this has been a good chance to induce to the withdrawal of the superior position of the third nationals who have enjoyed the right of extraterritoriality formerly.

As you see in the Proclamation of the Establishment of Manchukuo the fact that “There shall be no discrimination among these people who now reside within the territory of the new state with respect to race and creed, including the races of the Hans, Manchus, Mongols, Japanese and Koreans; nationals of other countries may upon application as permanent residents acquire equal treatment with others and their rights shall be guaranteed thereof is really put into effect, consequently there is no discrimination among the people in every occupation, to say nothing of the officials of Manchukuo. At this point, there exists no discriminative treatment of races as in the old regime.

C. Abolition of dark administration. On April 1, 1932, Law of Protection of Human Rights was promulgated and it was regulated that “The Emperor who reign over the Manchou Empire except the case of war-time or emergent incident, shall guarantee the freedom and rights of the people as well as manage state affairs with justice, in accordance with the provisions of the present Law; thus rights for "freedom of body," "fortuna" and "religion" have been established and the foundation of a constitutional
1. Reform of provincial system. In December, 1934, the provincial system was drastically reformed, and the system of former provincial governors was abolished. The government organization was reformed on January 4, 1935, and regulations relative to the application of the same law were promulgated on May 21 and came into force on the first of July.

2. Imprisonment and punishment. In order to protect the rights of judicial officers and to ensure the proper exercise of the judicial power, the government has established the system of provinces. In addition to this, as a means of reform of the provincial system, the government has improved the system of central administration and the organization of local administrative bodies.

3. Penal administration. The government has established a special administrative bureau for the enforcement of criminal laws. In order to ensure the proper execution of the penal laws, the government has established a penal administration bureau, with the aim of strengthening the fundamental policies of the government organization and other laws and regulations. The government has also promulgated the An Act Governing the Organization of Courts on January 4, 1934, and regulations relative to the application of the same law were promulgated on the first of July.

4. Education. Since the foundation of the new State, special attention has been paid to the enforcement of the Penal Code. In order to bring the judicial officers and other administrative officials under the Penal Code, the government has established a special administrative bureau for the enforcement of the Penal Code.

5. Reform of laws. Since the foundation of the new State, the government has formulated important laws such as the Civil Law, the Commercial Law, the Criminal Law, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Code of Civil Procedure. The Criminal Law was promulgated on January 7, 1935, and came into force on the first of March. The Code of Criminal Procedure will be promulgated in the near future, and the Civil Law, the Commercial Law, and the Code of Criminal Procedure are expected to be promulgated till the end of the year.
province, i.e., the independent province was abolished and it was made a province of administrative district of the State; further, for the sake of application of the new law, local expense system was regulated which put on quite a new aspect.

2. Enactment of Special municipality system and common municipality system.

3. Abolition of special district in North Manchuria (January 1, 1936).

4. Firm establishment of prefectural system. The system of independence of each bureau of prefectural office was abolished, all bureaus were controlled unitedly, current system of prefecture was abolished and justice of finance is expected.

5. Preparation for the firm establishment of system of town and village. As the loss local administrative organ than prefecture, the system of town and village is under investigation at present. Definite opinion will be found in near future.

6. Enforcement of pro-chia system. (Put into effect from January 1934). Pro-chia system was established with a view of keeping friendship with neighbors as well as with an object of auxiliary organization of police; in the present time when the local system has not completed, it plays an important part as a foundation of local administrative system.

7. Able men shall be collected at large and men of talent shall be appointed. In order to spread the Wanggong administration, the government took the policy to collect able men, to appoint men of talent, leaving no man of ability in the cold and endeavor to break down the evil customs of factionalism. In the former militarist regime, those who have risen to high positions were only those who had special relations to the administration of the time and consequently men of no ability have risen to high rank, getting high salary, when men of ability were left in poverty, living in seclusion and having no chance to exhibit their ability.

Since the foundation of the new State, our country has designed to appoint men of ability, to suppress the remoncy of faction and clan, to put the right man in the right place in order to bring his ability into full play. The appointment of CHANG Shing-hai to the prime minister of the State in April, 1935 is a very good example. At the same time, the government has paid special attention to the selection and training of young men and also it is endeavoring to the renewal and clean-up of the discipline of government officials.

For such purpose, following facilities have been projected.

1. Establishment of training organizations of government
I. Unification of Money Market. One of the most brilliant performances in those five years in the enterprise of the unification of money market. The Commission of Inquiry, led by a Mr. Linnt as Chairman, dispatched from the League of Nations, at the beginning of the founding of the new State, described in the Chapter VI of the Report "Central Bank more likely to unify the currencies than to make them convertible." Unless the Central Bank can obtain more actual hard money than it now appears to possess, it can hardly hope to unify and stabilize all Manchurian currencies on a convertible-dollar basis. Even if it were to succeed in creating a currency which was uniform though not convertible, it would possibly have accomplished nothing, but even a uniform currency, the instability of which is not guaranteed by conversion, fails short of the requirements of a sound monetary system." Thus the enterprise of unification of currencies seems to be impossible to be carried out.
Nevertheless this great enterprise was accomplished with great success within only three years. 97.2% of ten billion and three hundred million coin of Kirin government notes, eight billion, one hundred and seventy million coin of Heilungkiang government notes, nine hundred and forty million yuan of Mukden notes, which had been called astronomical number, was withdrawn till August 1935, and Nataiyang notes (issued by Ma Chan-ah), Jehol notes, and various other special kinds of notes called "Sutie" have been readjusted and further special currencies as Huoluyin, Chongjin, large and small coins have been also readjusted and thus state currency was unified. At the same time when the monetary system was unified, the government set about controlling currency with a view of stabilizing prices in order to maintain the value of state currency as well as to arrest the rise and fall of prices affected by the change of nonetary value.

In August, 1935, Manchukuo currency reached parity with the Japanese currency and both governments of Japan and Manchukuo issued an important statement with respect to the currency policy on November 4, 1935.

As soon as the Industrial Bank of Manchou was organized in December 1936, the business of three banks in Japan, i.e. Bank of Korea, Bank of Cheng-ling, and Bank of Hanchou was absorbed by the former, the sphere of circulation of paper currency issued by the Bank of Korea is getting smaller and smaller and the notes issued by Yokohama Specie Bank which had long history and credit as for the special transactions, had been stopped of their circulation.

Thus in Manchukuo, state currency was unified in single color and the great enterprise of unification of monetary system was completed.

J. Police and soldiers shall be trained and the calamity of bandit shall be regulated. Recovery, maintenance and preservation of public peace and order were the State policy since its foundation. Since then, as the government made its best exertions for the regulation of the calamity of bandit, the number of bandits which was summed up nearly more than two hundred thousand in the former regime was reduced to less than one tenth at present and these remnants scattered and escaped in the forests or mountains to find the chance to dare counter-attack concealing themselves in impregnable place. But they shall be eradicated in near future. Our friendly country, Japan, based on the spirit of Japan-Manchukuo protocol, arranged Japanese troops at scattered disposition in order to take charge of peace preservation and our government also designed the improvement of nature of policeman and the construction of the national army in order to preserve public peace and order in the country in collaboration with each other.

Chinese proverb says "Gentlemen will not volunteer a soldier." Formerly army and police were kept as object of common hatred. So, in our country, in order to break down this evil custom, the fundamental reestablishment of army and police was carried out.

1. Arrangement of national army.
a. First period of arrangement (from March 1932 till April 1933). Improvement and completion of central training institute.

b. Second period of arrangement (from May 1933 till March 1934). Arrangement of organization (establishment of the Horse Bureau, establishment of military police training organ).

c. Period of arrangement of national army. Self-consciousness of the army under the direct command of His Majesty the Emperor. Enactment of system or administering of an oath and eight articles of oath of military men. Grant of Imperial rescript for military men. Grant of military flag by His Majesty the Emperor. Parade. Special review.

Thus the national army has undergone a complete change and has been led to take on the burden of peace preservation in the country and moved for bandit suppressions frequently with exploit.

2. Improvement of the nature of policemen. With the establishment of police administration, the evil customs of the police system in the former militaristic regime have been broken down, reform of police organization as a whole was carried out and the improvement of the nature of policemen was designed. That is to say, following matters were carried out:

a. Appointment of police leader (police leader of Japanese blood.)

b. Rededication of Manchurian policemen and establishment of training institute. To establish central police school (in Harbin) and policeman training institute in every province and prefecture.

c. To dispatch superior policemen to Japan and let them stay as long as one year in the police training school of Home Ministry of Japan.

K. The education shall be spread and proper courtesy shall be observed. On April 1, 1932, the government proclaimed an ordinance to publish the policy of education, in which the education based on the San Min Principles was prohibited and all schools were instructed to teach the Confucian Scripture. Since then the education based on this principle was designed to spread completely.

1. School education.
   a. Increase of pupils entering a school
   b. Elevation of the general standard of the teachers.
   c. Compiling and distribution of text books.

2. Social education.
   a. Diffusion and development of popular schools, popular educational building and libraries.
b. Diffusion of cultural work, education by cinema, radio lectures, selection of village of establishing culture.

c. Training of leaders of social education.

d. Organization of mental training society.

Organization of Children's Corps, Youth Corps, Woman's Society. New establishment of Manchurian Athletic League.

3. Propag. Courtesy shall be observed (enterprise of social code of etiquette).

a. To restore the Confucius Festival, to repair Confucian Shrine (Tachong-Tien), to respect the social code of etiquette and to give evidence of moral state.

b. Establishment of "Kwool" society.

c. To honor cultural children and faithful wives.

II. How have various policies of outline of economic construction taken concrete shape? On March 1, 1933, the outline of economic construction of Manchuria was published with which the government announced the statement on fundamental policy of economic construction, means of economic control, perfection of means of transportation, development of agriculture, development of mining industry, rearrangement of money market, aids to commerce, improvement of private economy; four years have elapsed since then and these policies have been put into effect one after another with better results than expected. To explain in concrete form, they are as follows:

A. Perfection of the means of transportation.

1. Railroads. "In the construction of railways, the primary object will be the development of the economic wealth of this country; and the safety of national defence and the maintenance of public peace will also be sought for." Under this policy, the total length of railroads, when completed in the future, was designed to reach 25,000 kilometers; especially in the next ten years, 4,000 of new lines were designed to be laid, making a total of 10,000 kilometers by adding the existing railroads. At present (at the end of 1936), the total length reached nearly 9,000 kilometers, of which the new lines were as long as 3,200 kilometers; therefore eighty percent of the new lines of the ten-year plan was completed by the five-year plan, and the total length reached ninety percent.

The management of the important railroads was entrusted to the South Manchurian Railway Co. from March 1, 1933 and the latter reorganized the constitution of Bureau of General Affairs and planned the rationalization of management.

2. Harbors. With the object that besides the harbors in our country, those in adjacent countries will be effectively utilized in order to accelerate the economic development of Manchuria and to effect a more economical connection between the producing districts and sea ports, improvement was made on both harbors of Yingkow and Antung and the harbor works of Halutao is going on.
3. Rivers. In order "to promote the transport facilities over the Amur, Sungari and Liao Rivers, in view of the important nature of rivers," the government not the need of controlling the water transport administration; therefore first of all the government had dissolved or amalgamated those organizations recklessly established in the period of former regime and on July 2, 1933 established a government organization of local navigation administration bureau, established navigation administration bureau in Yingkow, Antung and Harbin; and then on August 1, 1934, established Heiloo branch office of Harbin navigation administration bureau and made it the organization of application of local administration of water transport. Important matters after the foundation of the new Statet—(a) Agreement relating to the improvement of navigation conditions concluded between the Manchurian Harbin Navigation Bureau and the USSR State Land Shipping Bureau. (b) Succession of bureau of progress of work of Lia River. (c) Investigation of waterway of rivers and arrangement of navigational signs in North Manchuria. (d) Reorganization of Navigation Society (Harbin, Yingkow, Antung, Kirin) (according to the Law of navigation society).
4. Roads.

"In order to provide facilities for communication and to preserve public peace and order, the total length of roads of nearly 50,000 kilometers shall be constructed or repaired in ten years, which connect important cities and provincial towns, or which are necessary for the development of a backward region or the national defense."

For carrying out this road program, the Government, in March, 1933, established the Bureau of State Highways, and directed to carry out after the investigation of State Highways Council by the end of December, 1936, total length of nearly 5,000 kilometers were completed which corresponds to 3.3% of the plan. In addition to this, five large bridges to build over large rivers in the country and flood protection works were carried out in Harbin, Yan, Tehan, and some part of which were completed.

"Hereafter on these roads motor traffic shall be developed throughout the country. For this purpose motor cars of State enterprise shall be run on the State Highways and the Bureau of General Affairs, Department of Railway manages it. The number of roads under the management of the Bureau of General Affairs at present is fifteen lines, the total length of which sums up more than five thousand one hundred kilometers. Moreover, the total length of roads under private management is four thousand five kilometers, which are managed by twenty-six companies.

5. Communications.

"Special attention shall be paid to the unification and good service of communications inland and foreign mail service is expected to be completed."

"The wire and wireless electric communication shall be managed with unification, improvement and extension of economic main line and branch-line attached to it as well as telephone facilities in the important cities and also expansion of radio broadcasting facilities shall be carried out."

To meet the need of establishing for that purpose, the Government has decided to establish Manchuria Telegraph and Telephone Company, as a Manchurian-Japanese joint undertaking and to make them manage under the unification of electric administration of both Japan and Manchuria. As for the present company, on March 26, 1933, Agreement concerning the Establishment of Manchuria Telegraph and Telephone Company was established, on August 31, the inaugural meeting was held, and on September 1, of the same year, the service was opened.
In March, 1935, the communication service along this line existing at the time was transferred to Nanchang and at the same time the private telephone was replaced by the unified control of telephone communication in order to direct the control of the pending China-Burma-India wireless service over the China-Burma-India communication service on telephone lines and wireless lines in December, 1935. Furthermore, on account of continuous expansion in China, the service in Nanking and the western distribution in being carried out for the United States of America, Germany and France.

Radio broadcasting is also in the hands of the Nanchang Telephone and Telegraph Company just like telephone and telegraph, and there are four broadcasting stations, at Beijing, Shanghai, Nanchang and Nanking, and there is a central room in Nanking. One hundred kilowatt transmitter was installed in Nanking, opened in November, 1934, and the Nanking broadcasting station has also been re-equipped. In Nanking, radio broadcasting was opened in December, 1936, and the promotion of culture of the people as well as the advancement of the spirit of foundation are since.

6. Air Route

"Taking into consideration of the progressive tendency of the time, in order to promote the development of air transportation, the Government will entrust the management to the Nanchang Aviation Company which has both superior materials and techniques, and for the purpose, the total length of air routes reached nearly 3,700 kilometers of air routes will be developed and further in future air routes between Europe and Asia as well as between various places of Asia will be developed."

The Nanchang Aviation Company, as a Nanchang-Japanese joint undertaking, was established in September, 1932, and the business was opened in November of the same year. The internal air routes connect all important towns, from Great Holio in the north, Nanchang, Kweiyi in Szechwan Province, and Ruilin in the west, to Tunkin in the western border. The total length of air routes reached nearly 3,700 kilometers in 1938, nearly 3,000 kilometers in 1934, nearly 5,000 kilometers in 1934, and nearly 7,000 kilometers in 1925 which is more than twice as long as projected air routes.

7. "Capital Nain'in shall be established as a model city with an area of two hundred square kilometers and five hundred thousand of population."

In accordance with this policy, Bureau of Capital Construction was established in 1932, the first and five-year plan and are to work of the construction of the first portion, the first expectation of the construction in July of this year (1932). The project is expected to be completed in several years ago.

In the past, suddenly, there villages with a few farmers' houses scattered in the area. The capital suddenly developed as a city with a modern cultural background, making the capital in the past a city with a few farmers' houses scattered.
"As for the cities of Mukden, Harbin, Kirin and Tsitihar, modern city plans are expected to be projected in proper time."

Modern city plans have also been projected to the cities of Harbin, Mukden, Kirin, Tsitihar, as important cities of Manchoukuo, and as they are projected one after another, these cities will have aspects of modern cities in the near future.

I. Development of Agriculture

Agriculture is the backbone of our national economy. The objective of national agricultural reform is in planning to become self-sufficient in the produce which at present must be imported from abroad, and in striving to export in greater quantities agricultural produce in general and thereby secure a large measure of happiness and benefit for the rural masses and elevate their standard of living.

1. Farm Products.

According to the said objective, in order to improve the qualities and increase the output of soy beans, kaoliang, millet and maize which constitute the staple products of Manchoukuo, the government took the measure to supply improved seeds so as to exchange the old seeds which farmers possessed with the improved seeds in equal quantity and moreover the government stood the expenses of transport, distribution and disposal of bean exchange. For the sake of experiment, to improve the qualities, an experimental farm station has been established in Koshan and Ningan.

The total cotton acreage should be increased to 300,000 cho (735,000 acres) and the annual output of cotton to 150,000,000 kin (120,000,000 pounds). To attain this objective, in 1933, twenty-year cotton increased output plan was projected, and afterward it was changed to ten-year plan of cultivation of an area as three hundred thousand acres. As an organ of teaching and encouraging of cotton cultivation, Manchoukuo Cotton Association was established in Mukden, and forty-five branch offices are established in both provinces of Fengtien and Chinchow where fifty-eight engineers are stationed who assume leadership of the projects' places of encouragement. On the other hand, the establishment of cotton cultivation union was designed at the end of 1934, thirteen branches were established which control thirty-one places. As an organ to dispose of raw cotton, a special company, as Manchuria cotton joint stock company, was established which was under the control of the government and a subsidy was given. It established thirty-one purchasing shops at various places of the whole Manchuria.

The total future wheat acreage should be increased to 2,300,000 Junsacke (1,645,000 acres), and the total output of the crop to 20,000,000 Japanese koku (99,200,000 bushels)."
metric tons of imported wheat by inland output by the principle of self-sufficiency, increased output is designed and improvement of both quality and cultivation is contrived. Superior seeds distributed since the advent of the new State were as many as one hundred thousand bushels and rest of them were distributed in the area of Pin-Pei line, Tai-Pei line, and the lower reaches of Sungari River. The result is superior.

The government also encourages the cultivation of other special crops, that is to say, tobacco, hemp, peanut, sesame, castor, hop, sugar beet, fruit tree, vegetables, and others, and safeguards and encourages agriculture of wild millet, corn; thus the government is designing improvement of polygonal agriculture.

As the establishment of "promoting the prosperity of agricultural economy," the establishment of agricultural experiment stations (Kochan, Chih-hsien, Ningan, Harbin), posting of agricultural guide stationing in prefectures, education of agricultural guides, organization of farmers' body, establishment of nodal agricultural villages, assistance to agricultural money market, extension of market for special products, establishment of agricultural storehouse, can be mentioned.

2. Stock Breeding.

The chief concern in developing the stock-breeding is "to improve the stock as well as to increase the number of domestic animals," and it is being put into operation.

The objective of improvement and increase of domestic animals is that "the existing breed of horses will be improved, as a result of which two million select breeds," "at least four million of merinos" and "two million, some hundred thousand cattle" are to be obtained and "hogs will be produced to meet home consumption." For this purpose, a merino improvement station was established in Chih-lung, a merino guide was organized in every prefecture of Chih-ku Province, a veterinary surgeon training school was established in Mukden, and a local breeder station was established in every province as an organ of raising of breed of hogs, chickens and honey bees. As for horses, the Horse Bureau takes the charge of improvement of horse breeding from the point of view of national defense, establishing stud-horse station, keeping stud-horses to land, as well as stud-horse raising random with the aim of supplementing these horses. On the other hand, compilation of organisation of prevention of epidemics was projected and a cattle health member was stationed therein.

3. Forestry

The principal object of forestry will be to endeavor to restrict and control "indiscriminate falling of trees, and to prevent and increase the production of trees, as well as to preserve the production capacity of forests through rationalized management." "All existing rights of forest-ownership will be re-adjusted and State forests should be administered by the State."
Public and private forests will be encouraged to conduct rationalized management under Government supervision. Afforestation will also be initiated with the view of developing the industry. These were the policies of designing the development of forestry.

The government designed the readjustment of forest administration organization and established forestry station under the direct control of the Department of Industry. For the readjustment of the rights of forest ownership, in June, 1934, a law of readjustment of the rights of forest-ownership was enacted, right of forest-ownership investigation commission was established, and the readjustment of general rights of forest-ownership was enforced.

To administer and manage the State forests, "felling by the government, felling by groups, establishment of transportation of lum bers (construction of forest roads)," were put into effect. As the facilities of safe-guard of State forests, establishments of forest safe-guard association and fire arresting line may be mentioned.

Further, afforestation, young tree cultivation, establishment of forest laboratory, encouragement of afforestation, education of farmers for afforestation have been brought into practice.

Manchoukoo Forestry stock joint company was established with a view to letting it conduct rationalized management of both public and private forests, and the Yalu Felling Company (Manchoukuo-Japanese joint concern) and other forestry companies are under Government supervision.


As a fishing equipment, a Fishery Bureau was established in Yingkou which carries on general fishery administration and experiment and investigation of marine products and disposal of fishery, establishment of marine products market, enactment of fishery ordinance (projected to be soon promulgated) may be quoted.

With a view of development of salt industry, the Manchuria Salt Industry Company, a joint Manchoukuo-Japan enterprise, was organized on April 2, 1936, and under the supervision of the Department of Industry, the company is engaged exclusively in the production, sale and exportation of Manchurian salt as well as in the working and sale of subsidiary products. The company has improved the former salt fields and produces two hundred thousand metric tons annually, some part of which is exported to Japan and other part is used for the chemical industry of both China and Japan.
5. Land.

"A survey of lands will be started immediately, land system established, and evils which attend the unscrupulous annexation of land will be prevented."

In accordance with this policy, the Land Bureau was established as a subsidiary bureau of the Department of Civil Affairs, which engaged in the investigation, and in March, 1936, the Bureau of Rearrangement of Land-Register was established, which engages in the matters relating to the settlement of land register, inspection of rights of land, and firm establishment of land-system. Furthermore, a land-system investigation corporation was established, which engages in the important matters relating to the land system.

As the ordinances relating to the readjustment of land, "Law of inspection of land" (March, 1936), law of readjustment of rights of borrowing land (September, 1935), and regulations to the law of readjustment of rights of occupying land (September, 1936), were promulgated.

"A special organ will be created for the cultivation of the untried land, and within fifteen years about five million cho of it will be developed by agricultural settlers."

In accordance with this policy, the Government has decided to establish the Manchuria Colonization Joint Stock Company in order to encourage emigration and to promote the development of land and by promulgating the law of the said company in December, 1935, the special company of Japanese-Manchouko joint enterprise was formally inaugurated.

As an organ of colonial administration, a colonial administration section (July, 1935) was established in the Department of Civil Affairs, and colonial administration survey office in Liaoning Prefecture where the business for preparations of transplanting colonists into the colonial soil is managed and the guidance of both colonists and natives is carried out.

Moreover, the Manchouko-Korean Colonization Company was established to treat Korean colonists.


"The policy in regard to these industries will be designed to increase the wealth of this country by enriching the people's economy and increasing the national wealth thorough exploitation of mineral resources, and establishment of basic industries as well as those necessary for national defense."

The Government is designing the plan of development according to this policy.

1. Mining Industry.

The abundance of mineral resources in Manchuria is well known, both at home and abroad, and the useful mineral resources ascertained so far are
Coal and gold (placer). Since the advent of Manchoukuo, the Govern- 
ment recognized the importance of the exploitation of abundant mineral 
resources and promulgated the Mining Law (enforced on September 1, 1935) 
in order to subject under State control or to promote the exploitation from 
the point of view of national defense or preservation of national resources 
in which the term minerals as used in the present law was defined and the 
control of both State and private enterprises has been put into effect.

"In order to the various coal mines and rationalizing production and 
export of coal, efforts will be made to supply the public with ample quantity 
of coal at reduced prices, and also to augment its export."

As the means to carry out this policy, a special company, the Manchuria 
Coal Mining Company, was established (on February 27, 1934), which engages 
control of the coal trade ranking with the Coal Mining Department 
and unifies the coal trade ranking with the Coal Mining Department 
of the South Manchuria Railway Company. Since its establishment, the said 
company has been engaged in a uniform development plan and manages directly four coal 
fields in Fanghu, Fuping, Daqiao, and Manchuria and also has a strong control 
over the coal fields in Haolikang, Hsien and Poipiao, by obtaining 
most part of the shares.

In order to carry out rationalized supply, the Japanese-Manchoukuo 
Trading Joint Stock Company was established as a joint enterprise of the 
Trading Department of the South Manchuria Railway Company and the Manchuria 
Coal Mining Company and started business on October 1, 1936.

As a rule the mining rights of mineral resources essential for 
national defense must be held by special corporations so as to prevent 
reckless and uncontrolled mining operations and facilitate the opening of 
new pits.

"Alluvial gold and gold mines will be classified into two: the one 
owned by the State, and the other privately, the latter to be opened to 
public exploitation."

In accordance with this policy, following special mining companies 
have been established:

Manchuria Gold Mining Company - Special corporation of Manchoukuo 
Capital: ¥12,000,000 
Establishment: May, 1934

Manchuria Mining Company - Special corporation of Manchoukuo 
Capital: ¥15,000,000 
Establishment: August, 1935

Manchuria Oil Company 
Special corporation of Manchoukuo 
Capital: ¥10,000,000 
Establishment: February, 1934
Manchuria Light Metal Company
Special Corporation of Manchukuo.
Capital: NT 25,000,000
Established: November, 1933

As an organ of mining administration, mining affairs section was established in the Department of Industry and as local government, mining inspection offices were established in Harbin, Antung, Mukden, and others which set up the protection of mining industry as well as various businesses according to the enforcement of Mining Law under the control of the section of the government.

3. Manufacturing Industries,

"The conventional industry will be developed by degrees under local control according to domestic demands:

- Coal mine industry, machinery manufacture, Oil milling, pulp industry, sugar industry, alcohol manufacture, tobacco silk industry, spinning mills, flour milling, cement manufacture, brewing and distilling industry.

"Industries not included in the foregoing list will for the time being be permitted to develop freely, but whenever necessity arises in the future they will be properly controlled."

According to this policy, the government adopted the principle of permission for the management of manufacturing industries and the companies already permitted are:

- Oil - 1
- Alcohol - 1
- Cement - 1
- Motor car - 1
- Pulp - 4
- Other industries - 15
- Beer - 1
- Vegetable oil - 2
- Tobacco - 1
- Sugar - 1
- Machine - 1

"Electrical industries will be placed under unified management in order to provide the country with a sufficient supply of power at low cost." For this purpose the Manchuria Electric Company was established in November 1934, capitalized at NT 90,000,000, under joint Japanese-Manchurian investments.

Further the control of technical side and the unification of frequency have been enforced.

4. Industrial districts for industries.

"In order to stimulate a healthy development of industries, and to secure the benefits of concentrated establishments, industrial districts will be established in the following places: Mukden, Antung, Harbin, vicinity of Kirin."
According to the city planning, in the above-mentioned cities, industrial areas were established, facilities for power, fuel, money market and other were provided and the advancement of industries are being promoted.

D. Adjustment of Money

The policies of adjustment of money are:

1. The Central Bank of Manchou will speedily dispense with its subsidiary business and labor to regulate and stabilize the currency, and be exclusively responsible for its control. Among the subsidiary business, printing was transferred to the necessary article station, pawn business to the Peking Company and some part of its business to the newly established Industrial Bank of Manchou.

2. Popular financial organs such as industrial and credit associations, and other general financial establishments will be readjusted, and appropriate measures will be adopted to aid and regulate their business.

As the abovementioned facilities, law of credit guild was enacted and promulgated; the number of guilds established between 1933 and 1936 was 103, the number of members summed up to nearly 142,600 and capital paid to 760,000 yen.

And in order to control the pawn business which plays an important part as a popular financial organ, law of pawn business was promulgated and interest and term of forfeit of pawn were determined in order to safeguard the interests of populace.

3. With the object of encouraging thrift among the people, the system of postal savings will be improved and developed.

The system of postal savings in our country was established in May 1933 and during two and a half years since then, the number of savings depositors were thirty-nine thousand and the total savings deposit was nearly three hundred and twenty thousand yen; furthermore in November 1935 depositors were one hundred and three thousand, and the total savings deposit was 6,725,000 yen.

E. Aids to Commerce

"Every assistance and encouragement will be given to general commerce, and its prosperity will be enhanced by securing smooth transactions, and finding markets for their products in all parts of the world. In this respect, the desirable traits of our merchants will be further encouraged, and old conventions which require reform will be rectified, so as to nationalize business transactions. The supply and prices of the necessities of life, and other articles which have important bearings upon national life will be properly regulated."

The reason why the commerce in our country is still primitive is that, before the advent of the new State, no consideration was paid to
the aide to commerce, or rather the commercial right was exclusively taken
by merchants under government patronage as well as assisted by mili-
talists and also excessive issue of paper money, corner of special pro-
ducts must have prevented the advancement of commerce.

The Government, since the foundation of the new State, decided to
abolish these evils, to promote the wholesome development of commerce and
to supply necessities of life properly.

First of all, in order to rationalize the transaction system, the
organization of exchange was revised and the exchange company was estab-
lished in Harbin in October, 1933.

As for the market, it is being projected to bring up the modern
market systematically controlled out of the let-alone one. For this
purpose, law of central wholesale market was promulgated in February 1934,
p.38, it was opened in Harbin in January 1935 and established successively in
Kirin, Hsinking and Mukden. This establishment underwent a renewal and
purchasers get benefits.

There are nearly three hundred Chambers of Commerce which were
established with a view of safeguard and promotion of interests of
commerce and industry as well as smooth connection of fellow traders
from the time of former militarist regime. And as they are of high
social standing, it is quite necessary to develop them healthily. There-
fore, the Government recognized the necessity of rearrangement of legis-
lation relating to their organization and control and is drafting new
law of Chambers of Commerce and industry of Japanese side.

"Laws governing patents and trade marks will be promulgated, and
right of industrial ownership protected. Regulations governing deposit
or trust and insurance will likewise be enacted, weights and measures
will be unified, the system of productive exchanges will be improved, and
in general advanced facilities in regards commercial transactions will be
instituted." As for the "right of the trade mark, as one of the rights of
industrial ownership, the Trade Mark Law and Detailed Regulations for
the Enforcement of the Law were promulgated in September 1933 and enforced
on November 20, of the same year. The total number of applications for
trademark registration were more than twenty thousand from this enforce-
ment to the end of 1935.

On the other hand, in accompany with the enforcement of the law of
trade mark, law of patent, law of design and associated laws were pro-
mulgated on April 9, 1933 and enforced on June 15 of the same year.
Number of applications on that day was two thousand eight hundred of
patent and more than two hundred of design, which totals more than
three thousand.

Thus the system of protection of industrial ownership in Manchoukuo
was completed. In accompany with the completion of the above-mentioned
legislations, the organization of the former bureau of trademark was
enlarged and renamed patent bureau.
The Government continued the investigation about the unification of the system of weights and measures since the foundation of the new State, and at last in January 1934, the Weights and Measures Law, in February of the same year, regulations for the enforcement of the same law were promulgated whose date of enforcement was determined to be March 1, 1934 when the imperial regime was determined to be put into operation. At the same time, bureau of weights and measures was established. And then the Measurement Law, which has close relation to the Weights and Measures Law was enacted in July, 1935 and the regulations relative to the application of the same law were enacted and promulgated in September of the same year. These were promulgated in the following note: These laws were matters to unify all weights and measures which were issued from the Weights and Measures Law of 1934).

On the other hand, as an organ of supply of all implements for weights and measures under the new system, Manchuria Measuring Implement Joint Stock Company was established as a Japanese-Manchoukuo joint concern under the control of the Government and it was trusted to monopolize their manufacture.

"The tariff policy will be designed to promote foreign trade and international transactions."

As the tariff policy, when the Government took over the custom houses, the tariff rates of the Chinese Republic were adopted, which were abound of anti-foreign color. Therefore, the Government has set about making investigation to revise the rates and in July, 1933, the first custom tariff revision was enforced. That is to say, the new tariff policy was adopted to strengthen the special relation between Japan and Manchoukuo, with the prime object of revision of tariff rates on materials necessary for the construction activities of Manchoukuo as well as her industrial development and also necessities for the livelihood of the people.

Furthermore, before the tariff revision was carried out in November, 1934. The radical change in trade conditions and assuming definite shape of various industrial development policies after the first revision necessitated a fundamental revision. Consequently coming under the policies of revision enumerated 118 for these relating to import duties and 23 for those relating to export duties.

Furthermore, the Government contracted German-Manchoukuo Trade Agreements, denoted the adjustment of foreign trade following Urgent Trade Control Law, established the bonding system and established the custom broker system, which contributed to the promotion of the foreign trade as well as the smoothness of the transactions.
The Government of Manchukuo desires to improve private economy of this country and will not tolerate the occurrence of any crimes of inertia in the country; it will encourage the virtues of self-sufficiency and cooperation with others, for which objects the following measures were adopted:

1. The lives and properties of the people will be safeguarded with all available means.

2. Necessary arrangements will be considered by the Government and people to prepare against famines and other natural calamities, and thereby prevent starvation among the inhabitants.

3. National power will be expanded by readjusting taxation and by rationally dividing and lighten the burden of the people.

4. The necessities of life will be supplied to the people at low prices, and credit associations will be established by effecting a sound rural credit association system.

5. Measures will be provided to give work to the unemployed.

In order to achieve these objects, the Government has taken every means during these years. For the natural calamities and other events which unhappily happened since the foundation of the State, the Government made its best efforts to make the best of them. Among these, the establishment of fraternity societies may be numerated as an example. In the fruits of mutual development of various industries, the Government has taken every precaution to prevent starvation among the inhabitants.

If you compare the above-mentioned results to those of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Republic and investigate how many percents of their policies have been put into execution, you would recognize our splendid achievement.
OUTLINE OF THE SECOND PERIOD CONSTRUCTION PLAN (PROSPECT OF THE SECOND-PERIOD FIVE-YEAR PLAN)

Various Conditions to meet the need of positive
Construction Plan

Having regard to the result of past five years, our
country is going to undertake positively the activity of
positive construction and the outline of the plan was announced
at the conference of Provincial Governors and chiefsof
General Affairs Board held at the beginning of this year.
In carrying out this second period construction plan, the
projected success can not be expected without zealous cooper­
ation of the whole nation. Therefore, we shall explain various
conditions to meet the need of designing the second-period
positive construction plan and of its successful prosecution
surmounting all difficulties and also outline the general
aspects of the second-period construction plan.

The conditions to meet the need of drawing up the second­
period positive construction plan may be summarized into
the following two facts:—

A. Inevitable stage of development of Manchukuo.
B. Strengthening of Japan-Manchukuo economic bloc.

A. Inevitable stage of development of Manchukuo.

It is five years since the foundation of our Manchukuo
and during that time through the wholehearted support and
coopération of Japan, and high moral character of Emperor as
well as unremitting efforts of the Government and people,
the State has succeeded in rearranging the administration and
economy and in laying a solid foundation for their future
developments.

As the administrative course of those five years has
been a fundamental activity for future development, positive
activities in various parts such as finance, economy and
industry has been controlled till present time. In other
words, the financial administration keeps its sound financial
policy, the provincial finance also keeps the same principle;
as for the industrial development, the Government has con­
trolled the drastic measure and endeavored to the fundamental
and real investigation in order to render secure the life of
the nation.

In view of the trends of the people, at the beginning of
the foundation of our Empire, uneasiness and impatience have
been accompanied with the political reform, bandits appeared
and consequently the whole country was busy for the mainten­
ance of public peace and order and stabilizing of popular
sentiment. In addition to these incidents, natural
calamities occurred one after another and flood, bad harvest
and others dealt a heavy blow on economy. On the other hand,
world economic depression affected the economy of Manchukuo,
caused the lowering of the price of special products and
hence the economical circle suffered profound depression.

To get out of this depression as well as to realize the
hope for future development, the Government determined to
surmount all difficulties with patience and succeeded at last
to tide over these difficulties somehow or other. The general
policy of the Government of those five years was the negative
measure of surmounting difficulties and of excluding pressures.
The Government could not take any other means than that in
its situations at that time.

Now our country is repaid for the hard struggle by
completing the fundamental activity anyhow, finding a bright
future and promising to commence positive activity. In
other words, the clothes which Manchukuo put on for those
five years has been too small as the result of the growth of
the country and she is obliged to prepare now one, and
Manchukuo has got sufficient ability to have this new one.


Strengthening of Japan-Manchukuo economic bloc is
necessary even under the peace-time system and it was gradually
carried out since the foundation of the State.

In order to strengthen the Japan-Manchukuo economic bloc
for the sake of maintenance of everlasting prosperity of the
nation taking counter-measures for both the transfer of
present international situations and the change of Far East
situation, it is not sufficient to keep the present condition,
therefore the government designed the second-period economic
construction plan to enable Manchukuo to develop resources
necessary for her national defense and for the eventual
establishment of self-sufficiency of goods for consumption
within the country as well as to supplement the resources of
Japan.
General view of Construction Plan.

The nucleus of this plan is the Five-Year Industrial Plan which aims:

A. To establish and expedite important industries.
B. To promote national economy.

A. Firm establishment of important industries.

For the general purpose of permanently stabilizing the livelihood of the people and of enhancing the relationship of co-existence and mutual prosperity between Japan and Manchukuo, the fundamental prosperity of important industries must be achieved. Consequently the government has designed the plan of the development of natural resources and the establishment of such important fundamental industries as coal mining, iron mining, and coal liquefaction.

(1) Plan of increased production of coal.

Coal, with an estimated deposit of over ten billion metric tons, is one of the most important mineral products of our country. In view of its great value as the principal motive power in modern industry for the development of productive industries, the promotion of engineering industries and advancement of culture, the plan of increased production has been drawn up. That is to say, the Manchukuo Government has decided to raise the capital of the Manchuria Coal Mining Company to 60,000,000 Yen in order to enlarge its organization and to develop natural resources.

(2) Plan of increased production of iron and steel.

Iron and steel manufacturing industry is a heavy industry which makes the basis of national prosperity and the stability of livelihood of the nation and also a necessary industry for establishment and construction of cities and transportation. In Manchukuo, these materials have been imported from foreign countries till now, so the increased production plan has been drawn up for strengthening Japan-Manchukuo economic bloc by making Manchukuo self-sufficient in iron.

(3) Establishment of Liquefaction industry of coal.

As Manchukuo is endowed with an almost inexhaustible supply of coal, it is quite natural to direct her attention to the liquefaction of coal. In view of the rapidly increasing domestic demand for liquid fuel and the dearth of...
petroleum resources in the country, the plan has been drawn up for the production of liquid fuel by liquefaction of coal and the coal liquefaction industry is decided to be established; the coal liquefaction company will be established with a capital of 50,000,000 yen which will take shape within this year, for which various organizations concerned are drafting.

B. Promotion of National Economy.

Agriculture is the backbone of Manchukuo's national economy and greatest number of our nation are farmers; so that it is needless to say that the development of her national economy rests upon the establishment of her rural economy. Consequently, the Government has been exerting every possible effort to rehabilitate the rural communities by increasing the output of agricultural products, improving their quality and farming methods, rectifying rural finances, and reorganizing the rural social structure in general.

The agricultural communities, however, are as yet in an impoverished condition and the second stage construction program has incorporated a five-year agricultural program as a fundamental measure for the rehabilitation of rural commodities.

(1) Promotion of rural economy.

The present plan constitutes the foundation of the stability of livelihood of the nation and has close connection with the qualitative development of self-sufficiency policy of raw foodstuffs; and at the same time it aims to establish the diversified farming in place of the one-crop system of cultivating soya-beans in an effort to resuscitate rural economy. Therefore the rural economy will gradually promote the welfare of the people along the fundamental line of self-sufficient policy of raw foodstuffs based on the increased output of agricultural products and conversion of crops. In the agricultural five-year plan which aims the prosperity of rural economy, the principal agricultural products whose outputs are to be increased are 'heat, rice, oats, barley, kenafe ('Manchurian hemp), flax, castor-beans, cotton, tobacco, sugar beets, soya beans, kaoliang, millet, and meizo.

During this year, i.e., the first year of its operation, it calls for a total expenditure of 5,000,000 yen comprising 3,000,000 yen for the encouragement of increased production and 2,000,000 yen for the prevention of blight, the encouragement of the use of improved farming implements, the establishment of agricultural experimental stations, the cultivation of new farming lands, and the training of agricultural instructors.
The principal agricultural products which were paid attention formerly from the point of view of conversion of crops were wheat in North Manchuria and raw cotton in South Manchuria, both of which are the most prominent articles of all agricultural products as industrial raw materials, so the Government has endeavored for their increased output and their improvement. Therefore it is proper that these two crops are treated as important in the new program.

(a) Increased output of wheat.

The increased domestic production of wheat, demand for which is yearly increasing, is absolutely essential for making Manchukuo self-sufficient in this product and for strengthening the foundation of raw material for expanding the domestic flour-milling industry. The Five-Year Agricultural Plan proposes to increase the 1936 wheat crop by 10 per cent to 1,100,000 hectares during 1937 and some 320,000 M yen have been appropriated by the Government for this purpose.

(b) Increased output of raw cotton.

The cotton cultivation in South Manchuria is determined to be carried out according to a new Five-Year Cotton Cultivation Plan which was launched in 1937 to replace the twenty-year program enforced since 1913 with the object of producing 250,000,000 kin (1 kin equals 1.32 pounds) of unginned cotton annually after 1937 from 180,000 hectares of cotton fields. Special attention will be paid to the cultivation of upland cotton in place of the native variety which is to be replaced by the former eventually as the yield from the former is far greater than that from the latter. In this connection the increasing activity of the Manchuria Cotton Association and the Manchuria Cotton Company looking forward to a complete revolution in cotton cultivation in South Manchuria is anticipated and the conversion of farmers into cotton cultivation will also be smoothly realized.

(c) Increased output of kenafe.

Though new in Manchukuo, the cultivation of kenafe shows much promise of developing into an important industry in the not far off future. In order to encourage its production among the farmers, the authorities of Agricultural Section of the Department of Industry have purchased...
kenafe seeds this year for distribution to farmers of every
preference. The seeds purchased by the authorities of the
Agricultural Section from the state-commissioned seed farms
in Liaoyang-Hsien, Shenyen-Hsien, Yingkow-Hsien, Haichong-Hsien, Keling-Hsien, Fu-Hsien, Hsinmin-Hsien,
Taian-Hsien, Chon-Hsien, sum up about 30,040 kilograms which
are worth some 2,000 yen. It is also planned to increase
seed farm areas to 250 hectares this year.

(d) Increased output of flax.

In order to meet the increasing demand for flax in
Japan and Manchukuo, plans have been drawn up also for boosting
an estimated 1937 flax production of 15,000 tons to
70,000 tons at the end of a five-year period. By the aid of
the increased product of kenafe and flax, the future of hemp
manufacturing industry in Manchukuo is promising.

(2) Agricultural Industry

Now by the aid of the increased outputs of all crops,
the Manchukuo's agricultural economy is:

(a) Establishing the self-sufficiency policy of raw
foodstuffs, and
(b) Completing the consecutive work of agriculture
and industry by the aid of increased output of
agricultural products as raw materials for industry.
Thus Manchukuo is going to show that she is trans­
fering from the former primitive agricultural
country to that of agricultural industry. The
v tendency of production as well as coming to the fore
of enterprises backed by the positive increased
output plan of wheat, kenafe, flax, raw cotton,
tobacco, sugar beets and others can be perceived
by the busy working of flour-milling industry,
advancement of capitals in flour-milling industry
by both ITSUI and ITSUI, establishment of hemp
manufacturing companies, advancement of tobacco
companies, rise of spinning industry and other
enterprises.

III. Outline of various Construction Plans

A. Principle of drawing up budget.

The trend of the second-period positive construction
activities displays itself in the principle of drawing up

Doc. No. 2332
That is to say, the national policy has not been confined to the former principles of securing sound finance, but has moved in the direction of rational and progressive development and aims at laying the foundations to the execution of the second-period construction activities of various departments, organic and effective application of national administration, as well as the provision of stiffness of finance to counteract the present emergency, paying attention to the international situations.

Furthermore, to explain briefly, as for the expenditure, the administrative expense was restricted not to expand, the expense for stabilizing and improving the national economic life of the country was appropriated in as large amount as possible based upon the positive policy in as much as it does not impair the soundness of the national economy as a whole and finally the expense for the development of economic productive industries was provided by bonded borrowings. As for the national revenue, in order to cultivate the elasticity of the financial administration, the internal taxation system, customs tariff system and all the government enterprises have been adjusted both in system and in organization. And in order to make the national management most efficient as a totalitarian country, special attention has been paid to the consolidation and the rationalization of state finance and provincial finance.

P. 41 B. Advancement of administration.
(Matters relating to the Department of Civil Affairs)

Various enterprises under the jurisdiction of the Department of Civil Affairs will also be carried out positively in accordance with the positive national policy and the plan of the first year of Five-Year Plan, i.e., the plan of this year, was drawn up especially to carry out following matters:

1. Exhaustive clean-up of districts in both public peace and order and their restorative activities.
2. Penetration of administration and thorough activities of construction in the districts in good public peace and order — activity for the encouragement and improvement of towns and villages.
4. Full execution of public works administration and public works.
5. Adjustment of both state and provincial expenditures as the result of setting up provincial expense.
6. Facilities in the districts limited public peace and order.

Taking the peace preservation, the first important
matter, to endeavor to settle the foundation of administration, to take fundamental counter-measure for the districts where both political and thought bandits have not been arrested yet, and to take necessary activities for it and also to expand and strengthen various facilities for it.

(2) Activities for the encouragement and improvement of towns and villages.

The administration under the old regime was nothing other than the means of exploitation, and there has been no righteous application of administration; consequently the interests of the nation were far from the administration as the people themselves knew the matter quite well. That is varying a good deal how this bad impression in the past affects the civil administration at present.

Therefore it is an urgent need in our country to apply the administration right musly and to make various facilities for the sake of the stability of people's life.

With such objects, the government is going to penetrate various activities of public peace and order in the districts in bed peace and order, to establish various cultural facilities in the districts in good peace and order, to extend the terminus of administration from provinces to towns and villages, to reorganize the society of mass generated spontaneously to a modern public corporation and to make economical and administrative activities smooth. To attain these purposes, the government is going to undertake to distribute excellent leaders in nearly 3,000 towns and villages of seventy provinces chiefly in South Manchuria and to educate the leading people of these towns and villages as public corporations in collaboration with police overseer, industrial engineers and school inspectors of the prefectures by the assistance of governors and secretaries and also to take leadership of administrative activity, economical activity and "Pao-chia" (translator's note: Vigilance body) system, to rationalize the charge of the people and to make efficient use of the expenses of towns and villages.

(3) Facilities for the emigrants.

As the national policy of both Japan and Manchukuo, in twenty years 1,000,000 households and 5,000,000 Japanese nationals will emigrate to Manchukuo. For that purpose, planting land must be selected and welfare facilities must be expanded.

(4) Unification of public works, administrative organization.
As for the unification of the public revenue, the Department of Civil Affairs and the Bureau of National Road under direct control of State Council, it was investigated beforehand and decided to unite both together to establish Bureau of Public Works as an auxiliary bureau to the Department of Civil Affairs and to take charge of public works administration and public works.

(5) establishment of provincial expense.

From this year, provincial expense will be established which includes business tax and additional tax of corporations and other definite source of revenue as well as the subsidy. In the application of this expense, largest or most part of administration of police, sanitation, public works, education, encouragement of industry, society fund has been executed by the national expenditure, is to be executed independently as well as the provincial government will be empowered to manage the finance of prefectures and cities independently to let it carry out the administration which meet the need of special conditions of provinces.

C. Industrial development.

The Departments of Industry and Mongolian Administration which manage the industrial development have drawn up Five-Year Industrial Plan respectively and started its execution this year.

The outline of this plan has been explained before. In the fields of mining and metallurgical industries, exploitation of new resources and possible expansion of the present facilities will be carried out with the aim of self-sufficiency of iron and steel of both Japan and Manchukuo; and for liquid fuel positive policy is being designed. For the motive power in accompany with the industrial development, new establishment of hydro-power electric station in addition to the coal power plant is designed and its definite plan has been obtained. Further special attention has been paid to mechanical industry and chemical industry.

In the fields of agriculture and livestock, epoch-making advancement is aimed as explained before. As for the fields of agriculture and livestock, the Department of Mongolian Administration, in close association with the Department of Industry, has designed a Mongolia agricultural development plan in order to improve the existing out-of-date and primitive methods of agriculture along modern lines which shall be put into operation this year.
As the measures of announced increased production and encouragement,

1. Establishment of common tribe,
2. Establishment of designated tribe,
3. Promotion of lead organization,
4. Means of encouragement of development,
5. Arrangement of fundamental facilities,

will be taken into consideration.

For the sake of improvement and increased breeding of sheep and goats which constitute the most important source of livestock, efforts will be directed to the improvement and increased breeding of 2,000,000 head of native sheep; and in accordance with the five-year industrial plan, the government plans to produce 2,740,000 head in all of both native and improved sheep and 2,980,000 metric tons of wool after five-year period in Mongolia.

D. Plan of finance and money market.

(1) Internal taxation system.

The internal tax system provides at present with the character of modern taxation system, having completed the nation-wide rearrangement and unification by last year and reformed the out-of-date system.

Furthermore, the Government is designing to rearrange provincial tax system, maritime customs, state monopoly system to investigate closely the real bearer of tax burden, aim to endeavor to lessen and to allot rationally the burden for the livelihood of the nation and the industrial economy and at the same time to establish national and elastic taxation system taking into consideration the case of emergency.

(2) Customs tariff system.

Since the taking control of maritime customs, revision was made many times for the customs tariff which might obstruct the industrial development of Manchuria or oppress the nation's livelihood, and various facilities for the advancement of foreign trade have been provided, with the result the foreign trade increased year by year, the settle accounts of trade was getting better in recent years, revenue from customs is increasing incessantly. All of these facts are really the evidence of the sound development of Manchukuo.
42 (3) The State monopoly system.

The monopoly system of Manchukuo was formerly confined to opium, petroleum, and a part of salt output of the nation, but since this year (1937) the country's entire salt production and matches have been also placed under Government monopoly, and as the result of reduction of price of salt from ¥10.16 per 100 chin (1 chin equals one-half kilogram) to ¥7.96, the burden of the nation is lessened as much as some 6,000,000 yen. Hereafter the application of these monopoly system will be directed to the rational adjustment of price, increase of production, and smoothness of distribution which will accord with the purpose of public interests and also national defense as well as hasten the realization of the purpose of monopoly system.

42 (4) Money market.

In accordance with the fundamental policy of the second-period construction plan, in order to adopt a prudential policy for the smooth action of money market, the Government designed to bring the organization of the new Industrial Bank of Manchou into active play and to leave nothing regretful in the industrial money market in company with the monetary operation of the Central Bank of Manchou; at the same time, the Government laid a plan to rearrange and strengthen the local ordinary banks, to increase rural cooperative credit associations, to establish newly urban cooperative credit associations, to manage to bring these associations into full play, to reduce the rate of interest in order to assist the monetary activities of middle and small scale commercial and industrial men as well as farmers.

(5) Reform and rearrangement of judicial system.

The Department of Justice, which has been pushing on the aim of reorganization and firm establishment of the judicial system, is still endeavoring for the firm establishment of the system and codification or enactment of laws to provide for the removal of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the new criminal law was promulgated in January of this year and shall be put into operation from March 1 on, the Memorial day of the five-year anniversary of Foundation. And now the Department of Justice is still pushing to the prompt enforcement of
following items for the year:

(a) Completion of various codes.

Next to the criminal law, such important laws as civil, commercial law, law of criminal procedure are expected to be promulgated at the middle of this year.

(b) Reorganization of judicial organ in the prefectures.

(c) Improvement of personnel in accompany with it.

(d) New establishment of supreme court, high court, district court, sub-district court and prosecutor's office.

(e) New establishment of Mukden prison for foreigners.

(f) New establishment of procurator's office to the Fushun court.

(g) New establishment of Harbin prison.

(6) Transportation and Communication.

It is the rearrangement of transportation which has developed most remarkably since the foundation of Hanchukuo. The length of railroads, which play an important role in the various construction activities is going to be more than ten thousand kilometers within this year, ten times longer than the one thousand kilometers in 1911 (the time when the South Manchurian Co. started its administration).

The Department of Communication has designed a five-year plan of positive establishment of private railroads and has the policy of granting nearly one hundred kilometers in five years, and for that purpose in three years hereafter the investigation will be made as for the economical value, expense of establishment and transportation capacity of twenty-six lines, total length of which sums up two thousand five hundred kilometers.

As for the motor traffic roads, among ten thousand kilometers of state highways which has been planned to be constructed in five years, those which have direct relations to the local economy will be positively investigated, and those which may be recognized as main lines according to the previous policy, which may be substitute of railroads, or which have close relation with the state railroad shall be
Affairs of Railways. The other roads shall be entrusted to the newly enterprise and the policy shall be taken to ensure one road per one company.

As for the postal administration, Five-Year Postal Administration Plan has been drawn up with an aim of extension of postal organizations and the government is endeavoring to achieve it.

The Postal Law promulgated at the end of last year was put into effect on April 4 of this year, aims at the abolition of money-making management policy of the old regime, insistence of the publicity of the nature of enterprise, and special attention to the safeguards of right of the people, taking the interests of the people into consideration.

(7) Rearrangement of the National Army.

The National Army, as the result of five years effort since its foundation, has been well organized in both form and matter and war confidence of the nation as well as applause of the friendly army, but it is further striving to the completion of the national defence and preservation of public peace and order.

(a) Conscription.

In order to improve the standard of the national army in view of getting strong soldiers, taking after the conscription system of the Senior powers, the details of conscription suitable for the conditions of Manchoukuo have been decided.

(b) Training of youth.

In order to train both mind and body of the youth, to nourish sound nation, and to promote their ability of guard and preservation of national defense, youth training law has been promulgated by the joint ordinance of Departments of Civil Affairs, Mongol Administration and Military Affairs, whose enforcement was entrusted to concordia associations.

(c) Reclamation system.

With a view to give veterans the place for peaceful living to make them good people, and to make those places as the base of local guard, let them reclaim a part of military districts from last year. As it has brought good result, expending this enterprise in future, the government has decided to establish reclamation corps in every military district as well as guard district of Heilung.

(8) Education.

The Department of Education, taking into consideration of the present state of matters, is making its best exertions in order to cultivate patriotic sentiment, to exhibit the true characteristic of national spirit and to
display the true meaning of the foundation of the country.

The policy of education lies in the thoroughgoing of our spiritual and industrial education. It is the fundamental characteristic of our education to promote the business education, to cultivate the industrial custom of fondness of labor, to contribute to the development of industrial economy, and to cultivate of human character and morality.

Based on the announced objectives, following plans are drawing up:

(a) Formulation of education system and various preparations for it.

(b) Arrangements of higher educational organs. Reorganization of Harbin Higher Technological School. Inauguration of Haiping Medical College (transferred from Kirin).

(c) Appointment of Japanese prefectural school inspectors. To distribute them to the special ten prefectures from this year. In future each one will be distributed in each prefecture of the whole country.

(d) Rearrangement and promotion of teachers’ training system. Training of Japanese teachers and business school teachers of middle schools. Examination for the license of teacher.

(e) Establishment of cultural institution.

(f) Compiling of the history of foundation of Manchoukuo.

(g) Enactment of outline of social education.

(h) Matters relating to firm establishment of religion system.
CERTIFICATE

I, Toru Nakagawa, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the capacity of the Chief of the Continental Affairs Section, Overseas Residents Division, Control Bureau, Foreign Office, and that as such official I have seen and know the document attached hereto and described as follows: Official Gazettes of the Manchoukuo Government for February, 1937. I further certify that the attached document is the official publication of the Manchoukuo Government.

Signed at Foreign Office on this 17th day of July, 1946.

/a/ Toru Nakagawa

Chief of the Continental Affairs Section, Overseas Residents Bureau, Control Division, Foreign Office.

I, Robert Teaze, hereby certify that ATIS Document No. 3A 10090, Item 29, described as follows:

"Official Manchuria Government Gazette (MANSHUKU KOHO)", Feb 1937,

was obtained by me in the course of my official duties from East Asia Research Institute and on 11 Jun 1946 was delivered to Mr. T. P. Monaghan of the International Prosecution Section.

Date 18 July 1946

/a/ Robert S. Teaze

ATIS Document Section
Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward E. Loughran, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the attached document, IPS No. 2332, "Manchukuo Government Bulletin, Feb. 1937," was obtained by me from Lt. Robert S. Tease, ATIS Document Section, in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 27th day of August, 1946.

Witness: /s/ R. A. Larch

Name

Investigator, IPS

Official Capacity
Five Year Program of Manchoukuo

(Part 3)
Table showing General View of Five-Year Plan for Industrial Development in Manchoukuo  
(May 1938, Manchoukuo Government)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Initial Plan Production Goal (in 5 years)</th>
<th>Production Goal on the 1st Year</th>
<th>Actual Production in 5 years after implementation of Plan</th>
<th>Production Goal in 5 years after implementation of Plan</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iron and steel</td>
<td>Tons</td>
<td>2,530</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>(kg) 4,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(excluding blast)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Progress of production of iron and steel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel pig-iron</td>
<td>Tons</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>(kg) 3,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,160 (kg)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rolling steel</td>
<td>Tons</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>(kg) 1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special steel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,400 (kg)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron ore</td>
<td>Ton</td>
<td>1,590</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>2,990 (ton)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,000 (ton)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>Ton</td>
<td>21.60</td>
<td>13.558</td>
<td>15.620</td>
<td>14.648</td>
<td>34.910 (ton)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60 (ton)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min-Angua Coal Co.</td>
<td>Ton</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>2,510</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>8,050 (ton)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Manchou Railway Co.</td>
<td>Ton</td>
<td>10,660</td>
<td>10,348</td>
<td>16,020</td>
<td>10,570</td>
<td>10,560 (ton)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panshujia Coal Co.</td>
<td>Ton</td>
<td>3,550</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>2,700 (ton)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Ton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>570 (ton)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Fuel</td>
<td>Ton</td>
<td>800</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,770 (ton)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:  
- Four additional 700-ton steel-melting furnaces are under installation and completion of your additional 560-ton open-hearth furnaces is now under way.  
- Ten new 300-ton furnaces are being installed.  
- Extension of the equipment for steel-rolling amounting to 400,000 tons is also under way.  
- Preparation is being made for installing two additional 600-ton steel-smelting furnaces.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource</th>
<th>Und.</th>
<th>Initial</th>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>Production Goal in 3 years</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fashun</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>250</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Construction of 20,000 tons plant has been completed</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chishon</td>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Construction of 10,000 tons plant has been started</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leping 'en</td>
<td></td>
<td>-100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Construction of 80% has been completed</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shem</td>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinen</td>
<td></td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pinbin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dern</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chembar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shubiasa (not specified goods)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whenie oil</td>
<td></td>
<td>650</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy oil</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shell oil</td>
<td></td>
<td>800</td>
<td>145</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fashun</td>
<td></td>
<td>500</td>
<td>145</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sambalin</td>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dealing with Fashun Coal

Sheet produce gas and coke produce gas and chlorine
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Initial Production (Gnd)</th>
<th>Plan Production (Gnd) on the 1st year</th>
<th>2nd year</th>
<th>3rd year</th>
<th>4th year</th>
<th>5th year</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lignite</td>
<td>1000 Kilo-ton</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Manufactured gnd)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lignite oil</td>
<td>1000 Kilo-ton</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy oil</td>
<td>500 Kilo-ton</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol</td>
<td>Kilo-ton</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>15,080</td>
<td>15,080</td>
<td>4,032</td>
<td>56,690</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Aluminium   | -                            | 20,000                       | ---                                   | ---      | ---      | ---      | 30,000   | Extension of Fresh Plant of Manchuria  
              |                               |                               |           |          |          |          | (as soon as 14,000 kilo-tons of 50,000 are in process) |
| Magnesium   | -                            | 500                           | ---                                   | ---      | ---      | ---      | 3,000    | New under study.  
              |                               |                               |           |          |          |          | Development of Tongshan is now under consideration besides Yangchaochungye and  
              |                               |                               |           |          |          |          | Yangchungye, opening up of which has already been planned.  
              |                               |                               |           |          |          |          | Development of Tongshan and other plants (such as Yangchungye) is now under consideration in addition to  
              |                               |                               |           |          |          |          | Yangchaochungye, development of which is already under way.  
| Copper assy | -                            | 6,600                         | 1,900                                 | 1,900    | 1,643    | 5,000    | 50,000   |
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### Agriculture and stock-raising

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Initial Plan</th>
<th>Actual Production</th>
<th>Improvement in Self-sufficiency</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>(48.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upland rice</td>
<td>109.1</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>78.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rye</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>88.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barley</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>70.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucern</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hemp</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>70.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sesame</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice millet</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>125.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soybean</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karakang</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>359.0</td>
<td>3.439.4</td>
<td>3.198.1</td>
<td>3.622.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corn</td>
<td>220.0</td>
<td>2.124.7</td>
<td>2.100.0</td>
<td>2.127.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Increased production is aimed at for self-sufficiency.
Increased production is aimed at for increased production is considered for the prevention of importation.
Increased production is considered for the acceleration of importation.
Increased production is considered to ensure the supply to Japan and China.
Self-sufficiency of the nation is considered.
Increased production is considered to ensure the supply to Japan.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Expected</th>
<th>Production</th>
<th>Expected</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>10,524</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>39.171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>316,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>9,938</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>90.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary</td>
<td>3,857,000</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>3,090,000</td>
<td>3,061,000</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>4,254,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,202,000</td>
<td>3,012,000</td>
<td>3,112,000</td>
<td>3,081,042</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>4,391,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siqerat</td>
<td>64,200</td>
<td>5,29</td>
<td>3,433</td>
<td>1,987</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>38.651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary</td>
<td>2,238,200</td>
<td>1,898,700</td>
<td>1,727,000</td>
<td>1,947,000</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,238,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,302,400</td>
<td>1,904,600</td>
<td>1,924,300</td>
<td>1,928,987</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,276,851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>1,164,000</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>25,611</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>195,872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siqerats</td>
<td>72,390</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>57,000</td>
<td>29,966</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>297,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary</td>
<td>3,571,000</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>3,050,000</td>
<td>3,061,000</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>4,254,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,751,000</td>
<td>3,037,000</td>
<td>3,117,000</td>
<td>3,116,577</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>4,391,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,044,000</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>38,000</td>
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<td>67</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siqerat</td>
<td>72,390</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>57,000</td>
<td>29,966</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>297,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary</td>
<td>3,571,000</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
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<td>3,061,000</td>
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<td>74</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siqerat</td>
<td>72,390</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>57,000</td>
<td>29,966</td>
<td>130</td>
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<td>297,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary</td>
<td>3,571,000</td>
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<td>3,050,000</td>
<td>3,061,000</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>74</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,751,000</td>
<td>3,037,000</td>
<td>3,117,000</td>
<td>3,116,577</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>78</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siqerat</td>
<td>72,390</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>57,000</td>
<td>29,966</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>297,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary</td>
<td>3,571,000</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>3,050,000</td>
<td>3,061,000</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>4,254,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,751,000</td>
<td>3,037,000</td>
<td>3,117,000</td>
<td>3,116,577</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>4,391,782</td>
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</table>

Remarks:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Initial Production after 8 years</th>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>Actual Production in the 1st year</th>
<th>C/B</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ox-kids</td>
<td>416,000</td>
<td>375,000</td>
<td>379,000</td>
<td>320,000</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk</td>
<td>1,933,000</td>
<td>154,000</td>
<td>304,000</td>
<td>304,000</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>3,250,000</td>
<td>4,806,000</td>
<td>4,821,000</td>
<td>4,821,000</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>5,620,000</td>
<td>5,020,000</td>
<td>5,125,000</td>
<td>5,125,000</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boar</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>9,900</td>
<td>10,050</td>
<td>10,151</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pork</td>
<td>29,294</td>
<td>25,030</td>
<td>24,368</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>152,000</td>
<td>105,600</td>
<td>111,100</td>
<td>144,300</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>192,244</td>
<td>100,530</td>
<td>148,658</td>
<td>143,381</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note**
- Unit: metric
- Hide
- Wool
- Meat
- Kilogram
- Kilo-ton
### Transportation and Communication

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Initial Goal after 5 Years</th>
<th>Actual Production in the 1st Year</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Railroad</td>
<td>Kilometers 11,948</td>
<td>7,686</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private railroad</td>
<td>1,224</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road National road</td>
<td>Construction 13,263</td>
<td>8,992</td>
<td>Construction 2,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor-road</td>
<td>64,463 at the start of 1937</td>
<td>7,249 at the end of 1937</td>
<td>2,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-owned motor-road</td>
<td>51,643</td>
<td>7,249</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private motor-road</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>6,700</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Initial Plan</td>
<td>Actual production in the 1st year</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Goal after 5 Years</td>
<td>Plan Goal in the 1st Year</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashin</td>
<td></td>
<td>9,000,000 Tons</td>
<td>The 1st plan was completely carried out by the end of December 1937.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heilutae</td>
<td></td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>Works for the 1st year plan was completely carried out and works for the 2nd year are progressing smoothly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td></td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>Plan for 1937 has been mostly carried out according to arrangements made for each year under the general plan, and remaining work is being carried on smoothly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50,000,000 Yen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10,000,000 Yen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A separate plan for aviation, harbor, marine traffic and river traffic is being considered in line with the progress of enforcement of the plan for mining and other industries, agriculture, stock-farming and immigration.
## 5. Capital

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification by occupation</th>
<th>Total amount of capital required for initial 5 Year Plan</th>
<th>Capital plan for 1st year</th>
<th>Capital required</th>
<th>Supply Plan</th>
<th>Funds to be raised</th>
<th>Estimated amount of funds to be raised</th>
<th>Amount of funds actually raised</th>
<th>Capital required after 2nd year under revised plan (in ¥ 1,000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mining and other industries</td>
<td>1,391,071</td>
<td>1,600,502</td>
<td>183,073</td>
<td>36,792</td>
<td>146,351</td>
<td>175,716</td>
<td>115,948 (65)</td>
<td>3,880,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron and steel</td>
<td>248,485</td>
<td>360,500</td>
<td>23,290</td>
<td>16,290</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>7,933 (100)</td>
<td>726,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>183,730</td>
<td>45,748</td>
<td>45,748</td>
<td>41,445</td>
<td>41,445</td>
<td>30,410 (192)</td>
<td>315,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal liquefaction</td>
<td>339,000</td>
<td>320,000</td>
<td>27,500</td>
<td>27,500</td>
<td>22,500</td>
<td>22,500</td>
<td>21,000 (79)</td>
<td>936,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shale oil</td>
<td>81,900</td>
<td>83,777</td>
<td>9,500</td>
<td>9,500</td>
<td>9,500</td>
<td>9,200</td>
<td>9,200 (96)</td>
<td>105,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol</td>
<td>15,470</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>600 (100)</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aluminium</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>71,500</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>18,750</td>
<td>18,750</td>
<td>6,250 (33)</td>
<td>79,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnesium</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>— (100)</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead, zinc and Copper</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>5,850</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,500 (100)</td>
<td>29,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>11,250</td>
<td>23,218</td>
<td>1,344</td>
<td>1,113</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>1,350 (100)</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soda ash</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>430 (100)</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical fertilizers</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>— (100)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulp</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>20,681</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>— (100)</td>
<td>194,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold mining, Machine tools</td>
<td>57,325</td>
<td>85,101</td>
<td>13,002</td>
<td>2,629</td>
<td>10,373</td>
<td>10,473</td>
<td>4,825 (46)</td>
<td>120,000</td>
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<td>Automobiles</td>
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<td>20,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>— (100)</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airplanes</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>— (100)</td>
<td>180,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric power</td>
<td>245,958</td>
<td>287,084</td>
<td>40,509</td>
<td>12,207</td>
<td>28,302</td>
<td>33,148</td>
<td>33,150 (100)</td>
<td>495,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>asbestos</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>— (100)</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber and cattle mar</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>9,024</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>— (100)</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rolling-stock</td>
<td>27,813</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>— (100)</td>
<td>28,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grain and seeds</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>— (100)</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classification by occupation</td>
<td>Total amount of capital required for initial 5 year Plan</td>
<td>Capital required</td>
<td>Supply Plan</td>
<td>Funds to be raised</td>
<td>Estimated amount of funds actually raised</td>
<td>Amount of funds actually raised (in $,000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Transportation and communication</td>
<td>778,677</td>
<td>799,984</td>
<td>170,591</td>
<td>170,591</td>
<td>174,341</td>
<td>153,685</td>
<td>644,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Railroad</td>
<td>621,877</td>
<td>631,377</td>
<td>135,219</td>
<td>135,219</td>
<td>135,219</td>
<td>139,133</td>
<td>644,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Harbor</td>
<td>36,500</td>
<td>42,057</td>
<td>10,820</td>
<td>10,820</td>
<td>10,820</td>
<td>10,820</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Road</td>
<td>62,000</td>
<td>69,550</td>
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<td>14,552</td>
<td>14,552</td>
<td>14,552</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and stock-farming</td>
<td>142,927</td>
<td>149,166</td>
<td>36,754</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>36,723</td>
<td>38,857</td>
<td>13,852</td>
<td>135,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>135,427</td>
<td>135,427</td>
<td>35,557</td>
<td>35,557</td>
<td>35,557</td>
<td>35,557</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock-farming</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>11,677</td>
<td>1,197</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1,165</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>274,000</td>
<td>331,273</td>
<td>38,032</td>
<td>9,178</td>
<td>28,854</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td>274,000</td>
<td>331,273</td>
<td>38,032</td>
<td>9,178</td>
<td>28,854</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total</td>
<td>2,578,675</td>
<td>2,877,163</td>
<td>428,466</td>
<td>45,948</td>
<td>382,518</td>
<td>418,314</td>
<td>305,485</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure bracketed under the item of "Amount of funds actually raised" show the percentage of that amount to the estimated amount of funds to be raised.
### Funds classified by sources and Funds classified by means of raising

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Department</th>
<th>Funds classified by sources</th>
<th>Funds classified by means of raising</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japanese Government</td>
<td>Manchurian Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and other industries</td>
<td>51,141</td>
<td>59,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and communication</td>
<td>33,399</td>
<td>53,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and Stock-farming</td>
<td>14,552</td>
<td>146,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>1,375</td>
<td>1,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9,400</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note**

1. With regard to figures given under the item of "Funds classified by sources", the upper ones show the estimated amounts of funds to be raised while the lower ones show the amounts of funds actually raised.

2. The funds raised by the Manchurian state enterprises under the item of "Funds classified by means of raising" mean those provided in the budgets for state enterprises such as hydraulic electricity on the Sungari River and road construction, while the funds raised by the South Manchuria Railroad enterprises mean those provided in the South Manchuria Railroad budget for coal liquefaction, shale oil and coal-mining at Fusun, railroads and harbors.
TO : GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

FROM : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo

SUBJECT : Five-Year Industrial Plan of Manchukuo Government with Revisions thereof

C.L.O. No. 3746(GG) 30 July 1946

1. Reference: SCAP Memorandum AG 004(19 Jun 45) IPS (SCAPIN-1506-A), subject: "Five-Year Industrial Plan."

2. In response to your direction in the above Memorandum herewith are submitted certified three copies in Japanese and three copies in English of the Five-Year Plan of the Manchukuo Government, Parts I, II and III. In this connection your attention is invited to the fact that the original record of the Five-Year Plan of the Manchukuo Government and its revisions were destroyed during an air-raid and that the copies herewith submitted are the only copies of said Plan which the Japanese Government now has. Only one part of the table of Part III has been attached to English versions of Part III.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

/s/ S. IGUCHI

(S. Iguchi)
Director of General Affairs,
Central Liaison Office.

Enclosures: Certified copies of the Five-Year Plan, Parts I, II and III.
AG 004 (19 Jun 45) IPS
(SCAPE - 1598-A)

AFO 500
19 Jun 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
THROUGH: Central Liaison Office, Tokyo
SUBJECT: Five-Year Industrial Plan

It is directed that the Imperial Japanese Government deliver certified copies in both Japanese and English of the Five-Year Industrial Plan which was announced by the Manchuko Government during the latter part of 1934, effective in 1937. All subsequent revisions of the plan will likewise be submitted.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

/s/ A. H. Hersey
for JOHN B. COOLEY
Colonel, AGO
Adjutant General
I, SUZUKI, Masakatu, Chief of the Continental Section of the Economic Department of the Control Bureau of the Foreign Ministry hereby certify the authenticity of the contents of the attached document, the Manchoukuo Five-Year Plan, Parts I, II and III, of which the Japanese Government has no official record because the original records were destroyed by bombing. The same has been certified as correct by persons formerly connected with the ex-Manchoukuo Government, who were familiar with and know the Plan, and that the attached copy is a true and correct copy of Parts I, II and III of said Plan.

/s/ M. Suzuki
Chief of the Continental Section, Economic Department of the Control Bureau, Foreign Ministry.

Tokyo, Japan
July 31, Showa 21 (1946).

I, SUITSU, Risuke, formerly Extra-secretary of the Manchoukuo Government, do hereby certify that I have worked with and am familiar with the Five-Year Plan and its revisions, Parts I, II and III, and that the attached copy of said Five-Year Plan, Parts I, II and III, are true and correct copies of the original Plan, Parts I, II and III, now destroyed.

/s/ R. Suitsu

Tokyo, Japan
July 31, Showa 21 (1946)
Five Year Program of Manchoukuo

(Part 1)

Outline of Five Year Plan for Industrial Development of Manchoukuo.

(January, 1937
Headquarters of the Kwantung Army.)

by Suitu, former Manchoukuo Government Extra-Secretary.

Contents

1. Policy

II. Scheme

1. Mining and other industries
   (1) Objects of development and capital required
   (2) Measures for development

2. Agriculture and stock-farming
   (1) Objects of development, and expenditure and capital required
   (2) Measures for development

3. Transportation and communications
   (1) Objects of development and capital required
   (2) Measure for development

4. Table of allotment of capital required
I. Policy

The five-year program for industrial development has been prepared according to the fundamental principle underlying the measures for economic control over Japan and Manchoukuo, and emphasis has been laid on opening up resources in the latter's territory which may be required in time of emergency. At the same time it is desired to develop various types of industries in accordance with the scheme hereunder given, in order to make Manchoukuo self-supporting and supply the material shortage of Japan as far as possible, and also to establish firmly the foundation for industrial development of that country. All these efforts are naturally directed toward accelerating expansion of the national power and stabilization of the people's living in Manchoukuo.

1. With regard to Mining and other industries,

   a. Munition industries for weapons of warm airplanes, automobiles, and rolling-stock will be firmly established, and

   b. Basic major industries such as those of iron, liquid fuel, coal, and electric power will be developed, and emphasis will be laid especially on the development of iron and liquid fuel industries, which materials are necessary for national defence.

2. In respect to agriculture and stock-farming,

   a. Resorting to all means available, every effort will be made to increase the production of agricultural products required as military stores, such as wheat, barley, oat, hemp, and cotton.

   b. For the plan of increased production of rice, Japanese immigrants are required to play the main part, but the production will be adjusted with due regard to the demand and supply of rice in Japan.

   c. Emphasis will be laid on the improvement and increased production of horses and sheep.

3. With regard to transportation, railways and harbours will be provided with facilities necessary for the industrial development in addition to the transportation program required for national defence, which has already been prepared.
## 1. Mining and other Industries

(1) Objects of development and Capital required

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kinds of Products</th>
<th>Object of Development</th>
<th>Present Capital (in 1,000 yen)</th>
<th>Capital for extension (in 1,000 yen)</th>
<th>Per unit working expenses (in 1,000 yen)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pig iron and steel industries (Ca. 2,000 tons)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>71,000</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel pipes (Ca. 1,500 tons)</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron and steel industries, rolled steel and other</td>
<td>17,085</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>57,065</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 2. Liquid fuel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coal liquefaction</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fushun</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>860</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 3. Alcohol

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>86,510 Under present program</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 4. Electric Power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electric Power</th>
<th>Capacity (in 1,000 kW)</th>
<th>Capital 1,000,000 yen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hydropower</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000,000 yen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,000,000 yen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 5. Rolling-stock

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rolling-stock</th>
<th>Capacity (in 1,000 tons)</th>
<th>Capital (in 1,000 yen)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Locomotive Car</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>28,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locomotive</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locomotive Car</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50,813</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>100,000,000 yen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

## 6. Other Products

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Capacity (in 1,000 tons)</th>
<th>Capital (in 1,000 yen)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Steel pipes</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron and steel industries, rolled steel and other</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 7. Alloys

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alloy</th>
<th>Capacity (in 1,000 tons)</th>
<th>Capital (in 1,000 yen)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aluminum</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnesium</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures bracketed show the capacity of producing new rolling-stock required for industrial development under the five-year plan.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kinds of Products</th>
<th>Object of Development</th>
<th>Present Capacity</th>
<th>Capacity to be Increased by Extension</th>
<th>Capital Required for Extension</th>
<th>Per unit working expenses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pulp</td>
<td></td>
<td>(in 1,000 tons)</td>
<td>(in 1,000 tons)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>120</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td></td>
<td>875</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold Mining</td>
<td>Estimated amount</td>
<td>Annual production of gold in five years</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(in 1,000 yen)</td>
<td>about 200,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coke</td>
<td>ash</td>
<td>(in 1,000 tons)</td>
<td>(in 1,000 tons)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>72</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asbestos</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cattle meat</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Processing</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Automobile</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weapons of War</td>
<td>Qunituple as</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(including Tanks)</td>
<td>Large as the</td>
<td>340</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Airplane</td>
<td>present capacity</td>
<td>340</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>1,391,071</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: With regard to automobiles, weapons of war and airplanes detailed study will be made separately.
1. Iron and Steel Industry.

With an annual output of 1,730,000 tons of pig iron and 6,900,000 tons of steel as the initial step, it will be expanded to 3,000,000 tons of steel and the development of the iron and steel industry will be undertaken as far as possible by operating the iron and steel industries in the Heitoiko Mining Company. At the same time, consideration will be given to the over-supply and under-supply situation in steel.

(a) To manufacture both pig iron and steel at the Heitoiko mining company, and to develop iron ore resources in the vicinity of Kaipu. The annual output of pig iron at Fushun will be increased to 2,000,000 tons, and steel output of 6,900,000 tons per year, which is to be transported to the various iron mills throughout Manchuria to be used by mixed-steel iron manufacture. Also, we are to take an appropriate measure with regard to the mining of the coke coal at Manchuria.

(b) To provide government assistance in order to ensure the realization of the plan for iron and steel production, and in order to manufacture both pig iron and 6,900,000 tons of steel (50% of which are manufactured articles) to be exported abroad, and the mining to be resumed abroad.

The annual output of pig iron at Fushun and Manchuria, and steel, coke coal, and other resources in this region will be expanded to 3,000,000 tons, and steel output of 6,900,000 tons per year, which is to be transported to the various iron mills throughout Manchuria to be used by mixed-steel iron manufacture.

2. Liquid Fuel.

The annual production of shale oil and slack oil will be 200,000 tons, and the annual output of 6,900,000 tons of slack oil and 200,000 tons of shale oil with Fushun and Shenyang will be increased, and 500,000 tons per year of liquefied oils will be produced at Fushun. For the time being, the various methods of manufacturing slack oil, shale oil, and other resources. For the time the various methods, including the use of coke in the production of slack oil, will be investigated and tested at the Heitoiko Mining Company. The above-mentioned measures will be taken with the realization of the comprehensive overall expansion plan, which will be carried out in the future.
At Canhsing the actual condition of the mine will be ascertained, and it will be rapidly developed so as to bring its annual output up to 300,000 tons after 5 years.

(2) As to liquified coal, the realization of the present production plan at Fushun will be followed with a further expansion to 250,000 tons a year. The production plans for 300,000 tons at Kanto will be speedily realized. Besides, the production capacity of the Sapinckal Carbonization Company which uses Suan coal will be increased to 100,000 tons a year.

(3) Alcohol. Under a policy to use alcohol as a substitute fuel to be mixed properly with benzine, the production equipment will be expanded to ensure an annual output of 50,000 tons.

(4) The governments of Japan and Manchukuo will establish a liquid fuel policy in order to realize the above plans, and at the same time take the following steps:

a) The surplus over the demand of Manchukuo will be exported to Japan, in which case the governments will take appropriate measures regarding tariff and other matters.

b) When the Manchukuo government purchases the products, it will fix the prices taking into consideration of the operation of the enterprises and other matters.

3. Coal.

The Manchuria Railway Co., and the Manchuria Coal Mining Co. will be ordered to carry out their production plans already fixed, and at the same time, with the Manchuria Coal Mining Co. as the principal, all coal mining companies will be made to formulate and carry out a further production expansion plan for 5,500,000 tons, so that the annual output throughout Manchuria will reach 25,500,000 tons a year.


With the view of meeting the demands of the general public for electric light and power and of special industries five years from now, a total power plant equipment for 1,405,000 kilowat will be installed. In other words, in addition to the existing coal power generating equipment for 459,000 kilowat, new equipment for 946,000 kilowat will be installed. It is planned to rely upon hydraulic power for the new equipment, but pending the completion of the hydraulic power plants, additional coal-power stations will be constructed to serve the immediate needs and to be held as reserve equipment in the future. Accordingly, the equipment to be installed newly will consist of hydraulic power installations for 950,000 kilowat and coal-power installations for 356,000 kilowat.

5. Rolling Stock.

The current plan for repair capacity (including construction capacity) for 1,414 locomotives, 1,770 passenger cars, 12,750 freight cars, to be attained by the existing plants of the Manchuria Railway Co. and other concerns will be fully executed in order to be prepared for any emergency. Meanwhile, in order
to render possible a smooth exertion of the 5 year Industrial Development Plan, the necessary plants will be constructed, which possessing the construction capacity for 25 locomotives and 350 freight cars and the repair capacity corresponding thereto.

6. Aluminum.

With the Manchuria Light Metals Co. as the principal producer, the equipment for the production of 4,000 tons will be completed as planned, after which further expansions will be effected so to bring up the total annual output to 50,000 tons.

(1) With regard to the 4,000 tons under the production expansion plan, it may be perhaps advantageous from the stand-point of the question of the supplying of electric power, to confine the Fusai plant to the manufacture of alumina, and transport the same to other localities for the manufacture of aluminum.

(2) The Japanese government in connection with the execution of the above plan and the direct importation of the product to Japan is to take appropriate steps with regard to tariff or execution of the customs duty.

7. Magnesium.

The goal set for annual production of Magnesium is to be some 2,000 tons in the future. But for the present, only semi-industrial experiments will be conducted, and on the basis of their results an appropriate policy will be formulated.

The experimental enterprise, which is planned to have a capacity for producing some 200 tons, will be affiliated with the Manchuria Light Metals Co.

8. Pulp.

Following the investigation of the forest resources of North Manchuria, the pulp industry will be developed as swiftly as possible with the annual increase set at 50,000 tons. In view of the pulp demands in Japan, appropriate measures will be taken to encourage pulp manufacture from non-wood materials such as kaolining stalk, soy-bean stalk or reed.

9. Industrial Salt.

The existing Manchuria Salt Company will be made to realize as soon as possible its fixed plan for the production of 1,450,000 tons. Besides, a production increase of 455,000 tons covering the entire Manchukuo will be effected.

10. Gold.

The present gold production amounting to 10 million yen will be stepped up to 200 million yen for five years' total.

The government will for this purpose grant subsidies or take other appropriate measures.


The existing Manchuria Soda Company will be expanded to double its production to 72,000 tons a year.

In view of the demand-and-supply situation in Japan and the military requirement with regard to asbestos and lead, the increase in the production of these items will be realized in Manchukuo. With the Manchuria Lead Mining Co. as the principal producer, the present production capacity for lead of 2,300 tons (20,000 tons in ore) will be expanded to 12,400 tons a year. Civilian mining of asbestos will be encouraged so as to bring its annual production to 5,000 tons.


Busses and trucks will be divided into two main categories of the large size (5 ton class) or the medium type for medium distance transportation and the ordinary type (3 ton class) for short hauls. The existing Down Automobile Co. will be fundamentally reorganized as an independent concern and it will be affiliated with 2 of the representative concerns in Japan engaged in the manufacture of medium and ordinary types of automobiles, and it will be built up gradually into a full fledged automotive concern in parallel with the development of machine industries in general throughout Manchukuo.

14. Ordnance (including tanks)

The existing equipment will be expanded with the view of maintaining and replenishing the amount of ordnance (including tanks), possessed by the army in Manchukuo, in times of emergency. The appropriation for the equipment is to be around 100,000,000 yen.

The major portion of the above cost will be borne by the Japanese Government. Special consideration will be given to such matters of the amount to be ordered in peace time.

15. Aircraft.

An independent company will be established, possessing, a capacity for constructing 20 planes a month and repairing 20 a month. The company will be expanded along with the development of the general industrial power.

Foreign techniques may be adopted by the company, if necessary.


Keeping emergency needs in view, plants will be set up for processing meat with the production set at 50,000 tons a month, to be attained with the increased production of cattle and hogs.
### 2. Agriculture and Livestock Department

#### 1. Production Goals, Costs, and Funds.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Production Present Capacity</th>
<th>Increases Over 5 year period</th>
<th>Costs</th>
<th>Funds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(unit 1,000 tons)</td>
<td>(unit 1,000 tons)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>2,024</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>1,176</td>
<td>4,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barley</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oats</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucerne</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>1,356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jute</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0,7</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flax</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Military Use</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>1,061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soybeans</td>
<td>4,720</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kailung</td>
<td>4,600</td>
<td>4,222</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millet</td>
<td>3,570</td>
<td>3,157</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>2,120</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Equipment for Development</td>
<td>33,024</td>
<td></td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>87,924</td>
<td></td>
<td>155,427</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Live-Stock                   |                             |                              |       |         |
| Horses                       | 2,300                       | 1,900                        | 400   | 5,000   | 7,500   |
| Sheep                        | 4,200                       | 3,010                        | 1,190 | 12,720  |         |
| Cattle                       | 2,744                       | 1,979                        | 765   | 2,951   |         |
| Hogs                         | 5,259                       | 5,000                        | 259   | 1,183   |         |
| Moat                         | 192                         | 141                          | 51    |         |         |
| Basic equipment for development | 21,900                     |                               | 7,500 |         |
| Total                        | 43,754                      |                               | 7,500 |         |

**Grand Total**: 91,678

**Note**: The above table does not include the fund for the importation of horses.
II. Program of Development.

1. Rice

Aiming at an annual production of 518,000 metric tons, an increase in production of 203,000 metric tons is planned. Lowland rice will be chiefly planted by the Japanese immigrants, and the production by Korean immigrants as well as the output of highland rice by Manchurian farmers will be left to the natural increase. The funds required during 5 years will amount to some ¥ 28 million and about half million yen will be the costs.

For the above purpose the Government will take the following measures:

a. Encouragement of increased production by Japanese immigrants.
b. Increased supply and distribution of seeds of superior quality to Japanese immigrants.
c. Introduction of system to control rice and other grains.
d. Local procurement of rice for the Japanese troops in Manchuria.

2. Wheat

An annual output of 2,000,000 metric tons is aimed at and an increase in production of 1,180,000 metric tons is planned. Increased production will be chiefly carried out by Japanese immigrants, and, at the same time, conversion of native farming to wheat, restoration of deserted lands, and reclamation of new lands by Mongolian farmers will be encouraged in the northern Manchuria and in Hainan Province. The funds required during 5 years will amount to some ¥ 25 million, and the costs will be about ¥ 4.7 million.

The Government will take the following measures in order to achieve the above mentioned objective:

a. Increased supply and distribution of seeds of superior quality; loans to provide with funds required for reclamation; preventive measures against diseases.
b. Introduction of systems to control import and export, and also to examine the products; rationalization of the customs tariff and railway freight.
c. Improvement and control of flour mills.

3. Barley

With an annual production of 260,000 metric tons as its objective, the Government will endeavor to increase the output by 70,000 metric tons and will take proper measures to control import and export of this product. The increased production will be chiefly carried out by the Japanese immigrants in the northern Manchuria. The costs for the 5 years are estimated at some ¥ 600,000.
4. Oats.
An increase of 53,000 metric tons is planned to attain the objective of an annual production of 90,000 metric tons. Increase will be sought by means of restoration of deserted land of Manchurians and new cultivation in northern Manchuria and Hsinan Province and also reclamation of new lands by Mongolian farmers. The funds required for 5 years will be ¥ 900,000 and the costs are estimated at some ¥ 400,000.

5. Lucerne.
An increase in output of 190,000 metric tons is planned, aiming at an annual production of 152,000 metric tons. Conversion of farm products and restoration of deserted lands by native farmers throughout Manchuria as well as reclamation of new lands by Mongolian farmers will be resorted to, to realize the increased production. The funds required during 5 years will amount approximately to ¥ 2.8 million and the costs to ¥ 1.4 millions.

An annual production of 40,000 metric tons is aimed at, and an increase of 39,000 metric tons is planned, in order to attain self-sufficiency of gunny bags. Conversion of farming by native farmers will be carried out in southern Manchuria. The costs during 5 years will be about ¥ 460,000.

7. Flax.
An annual production of 230,000 metric tons is aimed at, and an increase of 200,000 metric tons is planned. The increase will be sought by means of conversion of farming by native farmers in northern Manchuria. The costs during 5 years are estimated at about ¥ 390,000.

8. Castor seed
An annual production of 40,000 metric tons being the objective, an increase in production of 10,000 metric tons is planned. Increase will be sought by means of conversion of farming by the Manchurian farmers throughout Manchuria. The costs required during 5 years are estimated at ¥ 170,000.

An annual production of 45,000 metric tons being aimed at, the capacity has to be increased by 30,000 metric tons. Increase will be sought by means of conversion of farming by the Manchurians in the southern Manchuria. The funds required during 5 years are estimated at ¥ 17 million and the costs at ¥ 4 million.

10. Yellow Leaf Tobacco
With the object to attain an annual production of 9,900 metric tons, an increase of 7,500 metric tons is planned, thereby prohibiting the importation of leaf tobacco. Increase in production will be sought mainly by means of conversion of farming by the Japanese settlers and the native farmers in southern Manchuria. The funds required during 5 years will be about ¥ 5.8 million and the costs about ¥ 1 million.
To attain the aim of an annual production of 300,000 metric tons, an increase of 240,000 metric tons is planned. Increase in production will be sought by resorting to conversion of farming by the native farmers throughout Manchuria. The costs estimated for 5 years are about ¥ 160,000.

12. Soya-beans, Kaoliang, Millet, Maize.

a. Increase in the production of soya beans will be limited to such increase as will inevitably result from the increase of other products. More emphasis will be laid on the improvement of the species by means of which increase in output will be sought to enable export for the stabilization of the people's livelihood.

By resorting to such a measure, the annual output after 5 years is expected to amount to 4,720,000 metric tons, representing an increase of 620,000 metric tons. The funds required during 5 years are estimated at ¥ 3.64 million, and the costs ¥ 0.49 millions.

b. With the contemplated increase in the production of other special farm products, the planting areas of kaoliang, millet and maize are expected to decrease. In order to make up for this, amelioration of species will be aimed at to increase the yield per unit area. The annual output after 5 years will be 4.6 million metric tons kaoliang, 3.57 million metric tons millet, and 2.2 million metric tons maize, respectively, which will be slight increases over the present capacities. The costs for these three products during 5 years are estimated at ¥ 280,000.

13. Basic Facilities.
For the agricultural development as enumerated above, the basic facilities such as establishments to give agricultural guidance, associations for agricultural affairs, and the like will have to be either established or developed. The funds required for such purposes are estimated to amount to some ¥ 200 million and the costs to some ¥ 33 million.

14. Horse.
Aiming at 2.3 million head, including 46,000 head of improved breed, to be maintained after 5 years, an increase of 400,000 head is contemplated, in order to provide for emergency supply and also for agricultural use. The estimate after deducting the receipts will amount to ¥ 5 million. The expenses for preventive measures against epedemics will be included in those for basic facilities.

The Government will take the following measures in order to increase the stock:

a. Establishment of stud horse breeding staion, ground, and depot
b. Preventive measures against horse epidemics and encouragement of cross-breeding
c. Importation of foreign breed
15. Sheep

With the objective to maintain 4.2 million head at the end of 5 years, an increase of 1.19 million head is planned. The annual production of wool will be 1,710 metric tons and that of sheepskin will be 1.74 million pieces, an increase of 1,590 metric tons in wool and 220,000 pieces in sheepskin. The funds required during 5 years are estimated at ¥ 7.5 million and the costs ¥ 12.72 million.

The Government will take the following steps in order to attain the objective:

a. In order to improve upon the original Mongolian breed and to increase the stock, "Merino" and "Corridale" from Australia and the United States, original Mongolian breed from North China, and as many breeding rams from Japan as the circumstances permit will be imported.

b. Increase in sheep breeding ground

c. Increase in grazing grounds, and establishment of corporations to raise sheep, etc.

16. Cattle

With the objective to maintain 2.74 million head after 5 years, an increase of 0.77 million head is planned, in order to provide sufficient supply of meat and also that for agricultural use. The output of hides will amount to 410,000 pieces, an increase of 6,000 pieces. The costs required during 5 years are estimated at ¥ 2.95 million.

17. Pig

Improvement of breed will be emphasized. With the objective to maintain 5.26 head after 5 years an increase of 0.26 million head is planned. The costs required in 5 years are estimated at ¥ 1.18 million.

18. Meat

Aiming at an annual production 190,000 metric tons of beef, pork and mutton, an increase of 50,000 metric tons is planned.

19. Basic Facilities

For the development of live-stock farming as enumerated above, the basic facilities such as establishments to give guidance to live-stock raisers, to prevent live-stock epidemics, and the like, have to be perfected. The costs required for such purposes during 5 years are estimated at ¥ 21.9 million.

3. TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION.

I. Objective of Development and the Funds Required Therefor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Remark</th>
<th>Funds Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Railways</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Construction of</th>
<th>Remark</th>
<th>Funds Required (in Y 1,000)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development of</td>
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<td>mining Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>Railways</td>
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<td>Construction of</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cost of purchase of Rolling Stock</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>Construction of Harbors</td>
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<td>etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

*Note* The figure for the harbor construction as listed above is only preliminary which is subject to modification according to the outcome of the preliminary survey on mining, manufacturing industry, agriculture and livestock yields.
1. Railway

As regards railways, besides the lines to be constructed under the 4th program, about 1,500 kilometers shall be built as economic lines in 5 years.

The funds required for the above are estimated to amount to ¥140 million, to which the Manchurian Government as well as the South Manchurian Railways Co. will either make contributions or give guarantee, as the case may require.

2. Highways

The objective in 5 years is to build new highways covering 13,200 kilometers. In addition to this, bridges will be built, and the existing highways will be improved. The costs required for the above will be approximately ¥62 million.

3. Harbors

Rashin, Hultao and, if necessary, Dairen will have their harbor facilities improved and developed, in such a way as to meet the possible increase in requirements of cargo movement, that may arise as the present development plan is put into practice.

4. Aviation.

Except for such lines as are particularly required to be inaugurated, the existing status of inland air lines will be maintained.

5. Communication.

In addition to those coming under the current program, such facilities as are required from the viewpoint of national defense and industrial development will be built. The business funds required for the works will amount to some ¥50 million.

(Note)

1. The present plan merely shows the general lines during the 5 years, which are subject to revision according to the change in the surrounding situation, and also the formulation of practical programs in the respective industries.

2. Aside from the present plan, it is necessary to maintain the various basic survey for the purpose of economic development in the future. With this end in view, various existing institutions of investigation in Manchuria will be integrated to direct their works according to definite guiding principles under priority system.

3. The Kwantung Province will also cooperate in the execution of the present plan.
### IV. Recapitulation of Assignment of Funds Required

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Mining</th>
<th>Agriculture and Stock-raising</th>
<th>Communication and transportation</th>
<th>Immigration</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>770,677</td>
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<td>2,578,675</td>
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<tr>
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<td>770,677</td>
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<td>2,578,675</td>
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</table>

(Note) In the amounts to be invested by the S.I.R., the capital stock payable by the Japanese Government amounting to ¥ 143,792,000 is included.
## Plan for Capital required under Five Year Program for Industrial Development
(In ¥ 1,000)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification by industries</th>
<th>Enterprises</th>
<th>Capital required</th>
<th>Plan for capital</th>
<th>Plan for sharing capital</th>
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<td>Mancoukuo government</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Shares for subscription</td>
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<td><strong>Do (Yalu River)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>S.M.R. (Fushun)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Rolling-stock</strong></td>
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</table>

**Note:** The table details the shares and subscriptions for various companies, including Shale Oil, Alcohol, Coal, Electric Power, and Rolling-stock, along with their respective shares and subscription amounts.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Doc. No. 2542</th>
<th>Barrowing</th>
<th>1,000</th>
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<th>1,000</th>
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<tr>
<td>Garnet</td>
<td>Experimenting plant</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>500</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Pulp**
- **New company**: 15,000 Shares for subscription 15,000 --- 7,500 --- 7,500 15,000
- **Salt**
  - **Manchuria Salt Industry Co.**: 0.75E Shares for subscription 0.75E --- 2,100 1.75E 4,012 0.75E
  - **Private interests in General**: 25,000 Borrowing, etc 2,500 --- 1,000 --- 1,000 2,500

**Gold mining**
- **Gold Mining Co.**: 33,325 Shares for subscription 18,325 --- 8,975 2,300 7,750 18,325
- **New company**: 10,000 Shares for subscription 10,000 --- 5,000 --- 15,000 15,000
- **Private interests**: 8,000 --- --- --- 8,000 8,000

**Soda ash**
- **Manchuria Soda Co.**: 4,000 Shares for subscription 4,000 --- --- 1,000 3,000 4,000

**Lead**
- **Lead Mining Co.**: 4,800 Shares for subscription 4,800 --- --- 2,400 2,400 4,800

**Asbestos**
- **Private interests**: 500 --- 500 --- --- 500 500

**Cattle meat processing**
- **New company**: 7,000 Shares for subscription --- --- --- ---

**Automobile**
- **New company**: 20,000 Shares for subscription 20,000 --- 5,000 5,000 10,000 20,000

**Weapons of war**
- **Government enterprises**: 100,000 --- 100,000 80,000 20,000 --- --- 100,000

**Airplane**
- **New company**: 30,000 Shares for subscription 30,000 --- 15,000 --- 15,000 30,000

**Total**
- **1,391,071**: Shares for subscription 1,391,271 280,543 436,994 244,742 254,892
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>S.I.R. (Rolling Stock purchase)</th>
<th>Debentures</th>
<th>Shares for subscription</th>
<th>Others</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agriculture and stock-farming</strong></td>
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<td>Agriculture</td>
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<td>Debe­neres</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Barrowing</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Cattle Processing</td>
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<th>Category</th>
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<th>Subscription</th>
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(Manchoukuo Government enterprises and those financed by private concerns)
### Transportation

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<th>Item</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Railway</td>
<td>S.M.R. 561,877 (S.M.R. 60,000, including rolling stock purchase)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Harbour</td>
<td>S.M.R. 36,800</td>
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<tr>
<td>National road</td>
<td>Government enterprise 62,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>Telegraph 50,000, Telephone Co.</td>
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<td>Total 770,677</td>
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### Immigration

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<td>Immigrants</td>
<td>Manchuria 274,000, Shares for subscription, Debentures, Others</td>
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<td>Total 274,000</td>
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<td>Grand total</td>
<td>2,578,675</td>
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(A part of business of S.L.I.R.)

Do

(Manchoukuo Government enterprise)

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<th>60,000</th>
<th>56,250</th>
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<td>50,000</td>
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<td>274,425</td>
<td>337,425</td>
<td>1,303,000</td>
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<td>1,802,692</td>
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<td>340,000</td>
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(Amounts of capital and products are shown respectively in ¥ 1,000 and 1,000 tons)

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<th>Classification by industries</th>
<th>Enterprise</th>
<th>Capital required</th>
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<th>Government</th>
<th>S.M.R.</th>
<th>Others</th>
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<th>Remarks</th>
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<td>Coal liquefaction</td>
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<td>Fushun</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>Fushun</td>
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<td>26</td>
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</table>

Extension will be made with the object of producing 1,700 tons of pig iron, 150 tons of rolled steel and others.

Extension
Desired amount of production: 530 tons of pig iron, 500 tons steel ingot and 1,500 ton coal.

New establishment
Desired amount of production: 300 tons of pig iron

Renovation and extension
Desired amount of production: 150 tons of gasoline and 100 tons of heavy oil

New establishment
Desired amount of production: 240 tons gasoline and 45 tons of other materials
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<tr>
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<th>Shares for subscription</th>
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<tr>
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<td>45,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol</td>
<td>New company</td>
<td>1,670</td>
<td>1,670</td>
<td>1,670</td>
<td>1,670</td>
<td>1,670</td>
<td>1,670</td>
<td>1,670</td>
<td>1,670</td>
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<td>1,670</td>
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<td>1,670</td>
<td>1,670</td>
<td>1,670</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>Manchurial Coal Co.</td>
<td>141,210</td>
<td>141,210</td>
<td>141,210</td>
<td>141,210</td>
<td>141,210</td>
<td>141,210</td>
<td>141,210</td>
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<td>141,210</td>
<td>141,210</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric power</td>
<td>State-managed</td>
<td>36,820</td>
<td>36,820</td>
<td>36,820</td>
<td>36,820</td>
<td>36,820</td>
<td>36,820</td>
<td>36,820</td>
<td>36,820</td>
<td>36,820</td>
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<td>36,820</td>
<td>36,820</td>
<td>36,820</td>
<td>36,820</td>
<td>36,820</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Sungari)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State-managed</td>
<td>41,211</td>
<td>41,211</td>
<td>41,211</td>
<td>41,211</td>
<td>41,211</td>
<td>41,211</td>
<td>41,211</td>
<td>41,211</td>
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<td>41,211</td>
<td>41,211</td>
<td>41,211</td>
<td>41,211</td>
<td>41,211</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Yalukiang)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S.J.R.</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Fushun)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Industry Co.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**New establishment**

- Desired amount of production: 150 tons of gasoline and 15 tons of other materials.
- Desired amount of production: 90 tons of gasoline and 12 tons of other materials.
- Desired amount of production: 74 tons of gasoline and 240 tons of heavy oil.
- Desired amount of production: 98 tons of gasoline and 90 tons of heavy oil.

**Renovation and extension**

- Desired amount of production: 90 tons of gasoline and 12 tons of other materials.
- Desired amount of production: 98 tons of gasoline and 90 tons of heavy oil.

**Extension**

- Desired amount of production: 150 tons of gasoline and 15 tons of other materials.
- Desired amount of production: 90 tons of gasoline and 12 tons of other materials.
- Desired amount of production: 74 tons of gasoline and 240 tons of heavy oil.
- Desired amount of production: 98 tons of gasoline and 90 tons of heavy oil.

**Daido Alcohol Co.**

- Will be purchased at the price of ¥1,670; its productive capacity being 560 tons.

**Coal and Iron Co.**

- Will invest ¥5,000, Fushun ¥8,000 and Chientao ¥3,500.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Shares for subscription</th>
<th>Shares for subscription</th>
<th>Shares for subscription</th>
<th>Shares for subscription</th>
<th>Shares for subscription</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rolling-stock</td>
<td>S.M.R.</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aluminium</td>
<td>Light metal co.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnesium</td>
<td>Experimenting plant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulp</td>
<td>New company</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>S.M.R. Salt Industry Co.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold mining</td>
<td>Gold mining co.</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soda ash</td>
<td>Manchuria soda co.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>Lead Lineing Co.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asbestos</td>
<td>Private interests</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heat processing</td>
<td>New company</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobile</td>
<td>New company</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons of war</td>
<td>Government enterprise</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>including tanks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airplane</td>
<td>New company</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** 1,391,071
Doc. No. 2542

Agriculture and stock-farming

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>135,427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stock-farming</td>
<td>(7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>142,927</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Transportation and communications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>S.M.R.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Railway</td>
<td>561,877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rolling-stock purchase)</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbour</td>
<td>36,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National road</td>
<td>Government enterprise 62,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>Telegraph &amp; Telephone Co. 50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total 770,677</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Immigration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Manchuria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants</td>
<td>274,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Co.</td>
<td>Shares for subscription Debentures Others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total 274,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grand total 2,578,675
Renovation and extension

Figures bracketed show amounts increased as a result of the enforcement of the five-year program.
General Principle.

Since 1937 the Five Year Industrial Development Plan has been established and the planned development in the respective fields of industry has been in progress. In the light of the results of the first year and also of the development of international situation, it has been found necessary to re-examine the original plan and, in particular, to make upward revision in the objective of production of mining and manufacturing industry as shown in the enclosure. To the revised plan, new items have been added, still "lower ties between Japan and Manchuria have been aimed at, and the supply of funds, technique, materials, etc., has been minutely studied. Thus it is hoped that the execution of the plan will be ensured.

1. Iron and Steel.

(1) Outline.

1. To meet the increased demand for iron and steel in Japan and to cope with the progress of construction work in Manchuria, the development of the resources will be expedited and the scale of respective corporations will be enlarged.

2. The objective of the equipment capacity in the fifth year has been revised as follows: (in 1,000 metric tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Metric Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Pig iron (including 500,000 metric tons substitute h'com)</td>
<td>4,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Steel ingots (including 160,000 metric tons cast and wrought steel ingots)</td>
<td>3,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Ordinary rolled steel</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Special steel and wrought and cast steel articles</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Iron ores required</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher grade</td>
<td>2,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower grade</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Proportion of various types of steel materials to be produced will be as follows, taking the possible necessity to supply the military demands in the case of emergency.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material</th>
<th>Proportion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small bars</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wire rods</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium bars</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light rails</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy bars</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy rails</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy sheets</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. The objective of supplying Japan with iron and steel materials to be achieved when the plan will be completed is set at the following figures (in 1,000 metric tons):

1. Pig iron (including pig iron containing low percentage of phosphorus amounting to 240,000 metric tons) 1,500

2. Steel strips 1,125

In addition to the above, export of some 400,000 metric tons of steel materials to third countries including China is estimated.

5. Estimated funds required for the second year and onward (in 1,000 yen) 726,000
(2) Objective of Development and Funds Required.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Original Plan</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Revised Plan</th>
<th>Funds required after 2nd year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(in 1000 m. tons)</td>
<td>capacity</td>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Expansion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron &amp; steel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pig iron</td>
<td>2,550</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>(3,500)</td>
<td>(3,500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloom</td>
<td>(200)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel ingots</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>(3,550)</td>
<td>(2,970)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,160</td>
<td>2,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary rolled steel</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>(1,700)</td>
<td>(1,300)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special steel materials and cast and wrought steel articles</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron Ores</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High grade</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>2,590</td>
<td>2,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low grade</td>
<td>6,140</td>
<td>1,768</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>11,232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note) Figures in the brackets show the objectives of the equipment capacities.
(3) Objective of Supply-Demand Relation (in 1000 m. tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Objective of Production</th>
<th>Demand</th>
<th>Import and Export</th>
<th>To Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iron &amp; Steel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pig iron</td>
<td>4,500 (including bloom)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel ingots</td>
<td>3,160</td>
<td>1,875</td>
<td>1,285</td>
<td>1,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Steel strips</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary rolled steel</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special steel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>materials, and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cast and wrought steel articles</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Coal.

(1) Outline.

1. To correspond with the progress of development of various enterprises such as steel-manufacture, liquefaction of coal, exploitation of electric resources, etc., and also to secure the supply to be sent to Japan, the development of the coal-mines will be expedited, in consideration of the quality and quantity of coal deposits at the respective mines, thereby taking the convenience of transportation and other facilities into full account.

2. The output of some 35 million metric tons is aimed at, advancing the objective in the fifth year as follows (in 1,000 metric tons).
The figures in brackets shows those of the original plan.

3. The program of supply to Japan by fiscal year is as follows (in 1000 metric tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1938</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1941</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>4,700</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After 1942, as the liquefaction of coal will be gradually industrialized, the output of coal will have to be further increased, in order to maintain the supply to Japan.

4. Estimated funds required for the second year and onward (in 1000 yen).

315,000

(2) Objective of Development and Funds Required.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Original Plan</th>
<th>Present capacity</th>
<th>Revised Plan</th>
<th>Funds required after 2nd year planned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coal(Total)</td>
<td>27,160</td>
<td>14,648</td>
<td>34,910</td>
<td>20,472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchurian Coal Co.</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>2,740</td>
<td>18,050</td>
<td>15,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. H. R.</td>
<td>10,660</td>
<td>10,570</td>
<td>10,360</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penhsihu</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>1,932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>3,800</td>
<td>3,230</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

54,000

(3) Objective of Supply-Demand Relation (in 1000m. tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1942</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective of output</td>
<td>31,110</td>
<td>17,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(</td>
<td>3,800)</td>
<td>( 700)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchuria Coal Co.</td>
<td>18,050</td>
<td>5,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. H. R.</td>
<td>10,360</td>
<td>10,690</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Liquid Fuel

(1) Outline

1. In respect of both liquefied oil and shale oil the original plan has been partly revised in the light of subsequent survey and study. Efforts will be made to exploit new resources, and in consideration of the quality and quantity of the ores, proper method of treatment will be devised, to expedite the industrialization.

2. Of the original plan in regard to liquefaction of coal, the production at Fushun and Szepingkai (Hsian) will be expedited on an enlarged scale, while Chientao will be substituted for Kirin (Shulan) and Ilan. Thus an annual output of 1.7 million metric tons (1.61 million Kilolitres gasoline and 0.25 million metric tons heavy oil) will be aimed at.

At Anshan, synthetic treatment of high furnace gas and cokes oven gas will be planned to produce 60,000 metric tons.

(1) Fushun (in 1000 m. tons.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>350</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct method</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synthetic method</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tar hydrogenation method</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Chinchou (Fuhain coal)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>700</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Synthetic method</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low temperature carbonization</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct method</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Szepingkai (Hsian coal)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>160</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low temperature carbonization</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synthetic method</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. In reference to shale oil the original plan will be carried out at Fushun, while the plan in regard to Sansing will be abandoned, to be replaced by a new one at Lotzukou (?), aiming at a total annual output of 650,000 metric tons (70,000 Kilolitres of gasoline and 500,000 metric tons heavy oil).

4. The objective of supplying Japan with gasoline and heavy oil to be achieved when the plan will be completed is set at the following figures.

Gasoline 1,453,000 Kilolitres
Heavy oil 710,000 Metric tons.

5. Production of alcohol will be developed according to the original plan.

6. Estimated funds required for the second year and onward (in 1000 yen) 1,056,000

(2) Objective of Development and Funds Required.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Original plan</th>
<th>Present capacity</th>
<th>Revised objective</th>
<th>Funds required after 2nd year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liquefaction of coal</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1770</td>
<td>936,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Plants) Fushun</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinchou</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szepingkai and Hsian</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chientao</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirin</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anshan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Products) Gasoline in 1000 Kilolitres</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1670</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy oil</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(3) Objective of Supply-Demand Relation.

(Original Plan) Original Present Revised Funds required
Classification Plan capacity objective after 2nd year

Shale Oil

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Original Plan</th>
<th>Present capacity</th>
<th>Revised objective</th>
<th>Funds required after 2nd year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shale Oil</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>105,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Plants)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fushun</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>55,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sansing</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lotzhou</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Products)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gasoline</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in 1,000 Kilolitres</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy oil</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,041,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gasoline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Demand</th>
<th>Import and Export</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gasoline</td>
<td>1,770</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>1,513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in 1,000 Kilolitres</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy oil</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in 1,000 metric kilotons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol</td>
<td>56,690</td>
<td>54,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in m. ton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Note)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The following additions are made to the objectives of production assigned to the Manchuria Petroleum.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gasoline (30)</td>
<td>Heavy oil (12)</td>
<td>Others (53)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. &quot;Others&quot; includes kerosene, light oil and machine oil.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IV. Aluminum and Magnesium

I. Principles

1. The production of aluminium should be increased to an annual output of 30,000 metric tons to meet the increase of demand in Japan and Manchuria by utilizing shale produced in Manchuria and North China according to the low-cost and abundant generation of electricity is developed.

2. The aluminium factory at Fushun (present output: 4,000 metric tons) should be expanded to enable an annual output of 10,000 metric tons, and new equipment for production should be installed at Antung to produce the remaining 20,000 metric tons (planned to produce 10,000 metric tons by utilizing hydro-electricity of the Yalu River.

3. The production of magnesium should be promoted to reach an annual output of about 3,000 metric tons by utilizing magnesite produced in the neighborhood of Tashihchiao.
   Researches should be made at the same time into the utilization of brine.

4. Total of Estimated Funds required as from the Second Year: 37,000,000 Yen

II. Plan for Supply and Demand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Planned Output</th>
<th>Demand</th>
<th>Estimated Export &amp; Import (1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Export &amp; Import</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>to Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aluminium</td>
<td>metric ton</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>18,375</td>
<td>11,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnesium</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V. Lead, Zinc and Copper

I. Principles

1. The output of metallic lead should be planned to reach about 29,000 metric tons to cope with the increase of demand. In addition to Yangchiachantze, which is now in operation, the development of Tsingchengtze, Teinpaoshan, etc. should be promoted.

   (1) Yangchiachantze: 19,410 metric tons
   (2) Tsingchengtze: 3,530
   (3) Teinpaoshan: 3,610
   (4) Others: 2,050

   Total: 28,600
2. In order to attain self-sufficiency of zinc in future, the output of metallic zinc should be planned to reach about 50,000 metric tons. In addition to Yangchiachangtze, the development of Tienpaoshan, etc, should be promoted.

   (1) Yangchiachangtze:  36,590 metric tons
   (2) Tienpaoshan:  5,020 *
   (3) Others:  8,020 *
   Total:  49,660 *

3. In order to curtail the importation of copper as much as possible, its output should be planned to reach 3,000 metric tons annually, and Tienpaoshan and others should be developed.

   (1) Tienpaoshan:  1,240 metric tons
   (2) Shihztutze:  720 *
   (3) Malukou:  300 *
   (4) Panling:  360 *
   (5) Others:  360 *
   Total:  2,990 *

4. The amount of supply of lead to Japan to be attained in the fifth year shall be about 20,000 metric tons.

5. Total of Estimated Funds required as from the Second Year: 29,300,000 Yen

II. Objectives of Development and Funds Required

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Output in Original (Figures for '37)</th>
<th>Present Capacity</th>
<th>Revised Plan Output</th>
<th>Planned Expansion</th>
<th>Funds required as from 2nd Year (in 1,000 Yen)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>Metric ton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12,400</td>
<td>1,220</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>27,780</td>
<td>23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zinc</td>
<td>6,600</td>
<td>1,643</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>48,375</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>6,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>29,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The present capacity indicates the amount of refined ore calculated in terms of metal.
### III. Planned Supply and Demand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classifi-</th>
<th>Planned Output</th>
<th>Estimated Export &amp; Import</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cation</td>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Metric ton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>Metric ton</td>
<td>39,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zinc</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>56,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
1. Zinc is supplied to Japan in refined ore until smelting equipment is installed.
2. Figures in parentheses under Planned Output of copper indicate the amount of reproduction through the treatment of used copper at the metal smelting plant.

### VI. Salt and Soda-ash

#### I. Principles

1. In order to cope with the increase of demand for industrial salt in Japan and Manchuria, the output of salt in the fifth year should reach about 910,000 metric tons and the improvement of the existing salt-fields and the construction of new salt-fields by the Manchuria Salt Industry Company should be promoted. The output of salt to be attained when the new salt-fields shall have been matured (in 9 years) will be 1,400,000 metric tons.

   1. **Existing salt-fields:**

   588,000 metric tons
   (In addition to existing 14,100 shaku, an increase of 1,400 shaku will be made by works of improvement).

   2. **Salt-fields of the Manchuria Salt Industry Co.**

   321,000 metric tons
   814,000 * (in 9 years)
   (In addition to the plan now in progress to development 3,550 shaku, 15,000 shaku will be newly developed during the period of the plan).

   **Total:** 715,000 metric tons
   1,400,000 * (in 9 years)
2. The annual output of soda-ash should be increased to 72,000 metric tons according to the original plan.

3. The amount of supply to Japan to be attained in the fifth year shall be as follows:
   - Salt: 450,000 metric tons
   - Soda-ash: 25,000

   As from the ninth year, 700,000 to 1,000,000 metric tons of salt can be supplied to Japan.

4. Total of Estimated Funds Required as from the Second Year: 23,500,000 Yen

II. Objectives of Development and Funds Required

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Output in Original Plan</th>
<th>Present Capacity (Figures for '37)</th>
<th>Revised Plan</th>
<th>Funds required as from 2nd Year (in 1,000 Yen)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>Metric ton</td>
<td>973,588</td>
<td>333,686</td>
<td>910,520</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>376,836</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soda-ash</td>
<td></td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III. Planned Supply and Demand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Planned Output</th>
<th>Demand</th>
<th>Estimated Export &amp; Import to Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salt trial</td>
<td>Metric ton</td>
<td>910,320</td>
<td>136,000</td>
<td>430,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Table</td>
<td>292,750</td>
<td></td>
<td>430,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soda-ash</td>
<td></td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td>47,160</td>
<td>24,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24,840</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VII. Chemical Fertilizer

I. Principles

1. In response to the increase of demand for fertilizers in Japan, Manchuria and China and in consideration of the possibility of an emergency, the chemical fertilizer manufacturing industry should be consolidated.

2. The annual production should reach about 450,000 metric tons of nitrogenous fertilizer.

(1) Manchuria Chemical; 240,000 metric tons
(2) By-product of steel industry; 62,000 *
(3) By-product of shale oil; 14,500 *
(4) Accessory installations of gas works; 617,000 *

Total: 453,000 *

3. Total of Estimated Funds Required as from the Second Year:

Note: The manufacture of chemical fertilizer by the fixation of nitrogen shall be studied separately, taking into consideration the trend of supply and demand within the country and abroad and conditions of domestic production in future.

II. Objectives of Development and Funds Required

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Output in Original Plan (Figures for '37)</th>
<th>Present Capacity</th>
<th>Planned Output</th>
<th>Planned Expansion from 2nd Year</th>
<th>Funds Required from 2nd Year (in yen)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chemical fertilizer</td>
<td>Metric ton</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>202,930</td>
<td>453,990</td>
<td>251,060</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchuria Chemical</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>153,000</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>87,000</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By-product of steel</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>13,460</td>
<td>62,250</td>
<td>48,790</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By-product of shale oil</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>145,000</td>
<td>115,000</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accessory installations</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>6,470</td>
<td>6,740</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III. Planned Supply and Demand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Planned Output</th>
<th>Estimated Export &amp; Import to Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chemical fertilizer</td>
<td>1000 metric tons</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VIII. Pulp

I. Principles

In response to the rapid increase of demand for pulp in Japan, the speedy exploitation of wood pulp of the Greater and Lesser Hsingan Mountains and also the increase of production of reed pulp and bean-stalk pulp should be realized.

Researches should be made at the same time into the exploitation of resources of pulp, such as latifoliato trees, the willow, kaoliang stalk, etc.

1. The output to be attained after the complete execution of the plan shall be 150,000 metric tons annually for rayon and 250,000 metric tons annually for paper, totalling about 400,000 metric tons annually.

(1) Wood pulp:

- Four Companies in Eastern Manchuria: 60,000
- Yalu River Paper Manufacturing Co.: 10,000
- Greater and Lesser Hsingan Mountains: 230,000

(2) Reed pulp:
- 70,000

(3) Bean-stalk pulp:
- 30,000

Total: 400,000

The amount of supply to Japan to be attained after the complete execution of the plan shall be about 300,000 metric tons, including the supply of finished newsprint.

2. Total of Estimated Funds Required as from the Second Year:

194,000,000 Yen

Note: Considerable portion of the equipment for pulp manufacture to be newly installed shall be for ground pulp to manufacture newsprint.

II. Objectives of Development and Funds Required

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Output in Original Plan</th>
<th>Revised Plan</th>
<th>Funds required as from 2nd Year (in 1,000 yen)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pulp</td>
<td>1,000 Metric tons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood pulp</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reed pulp</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bean-stalk pulp</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>120</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Industry</td>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Expected amount of production under original program (total amount of production for five years)</td>
<td>Present Capacity (Actual production in 1937)</td>
<td>Expected amount of production under revised program (in five years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>¥ 1,000</td>
<td>212,000</td>
<td>12,108</td>
<td>304,012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alluvial gold</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>201,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heiho</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>85,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinsamu</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>94,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunchun</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineralized gold</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>102,822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold ore smelting works</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>72,062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yenho</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9,777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchuria Mining Co.</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jehol</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaishantung</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8,021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
X. Machine tools.

XI. Automobiles.

XII. Airplanes.

1. Program.

(1) With regard to machine tools, efforts will be made to extend the producing capacity in order to bring me annual production to the 5,000 mark.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Machine Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lathes</td>
<td>3,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planes</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drilling machines</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaping machines</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharpening machines</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grinding machines and others</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. When the value of the above machines are shown, calculation will be made according to the schedule prices same as those adopted in Japan.

(2) In respect to automobiles, the existing equipment of the Dowa automobile Manufacturing Company will be adjusted in the first place, and further efforts will be made to establish firmly automobile producing industry so as to make the annual production reach the 50,000 mark. Under the present circumstances, however, completion of the equipment capable of producing about 30,000 automobiles will be aimed at, and efforts will be made to accelerate commercialization of this undertaking.

(3) With regard to airplanes, dispersion and extension of the Manchuria Aircraft Manufacturing Works will be attempted and efforts will be made to place this industry on solid foundations with the view to making the annual production reaching approximately the 5,000 mark.

(4) In order to build on an adequate basis enterprises for manufacturing automobiles and airplanes, measures for inviting investments and technical assistance by third nations will be considered.

(5) Rough estimate of capital required in and after the 2nd year is:

¥ 595,000,000
2. Expected extent of Development and Capital required.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kinds of Products</th>
<th>Unit Expected Production capacity</th>
<th>Revised Program Production expected</th>
<th>Capital Extension required in and after 2nd year (in ¥1,000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Machine tools</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Production aimed at</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>under the original plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Production under the original plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Production under the original plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Automobiles

|                   | 4,000                             | 50,000                              | 30,000                                                       |
|                   |                                   | 180,000                             |                                                             |
|                   |                                   | Production aimed at                 |                                                             |
|                   |                                   | under the original plan             |                                                             |
|                   |                                   | Production under the original plan  |                                                             |
|                   |                                   | Production under the original plan  |                                                             |

Airplanes

|                   | 5,000                             | 5,000                               | 500,000                                                       |
|                   |                                   | 500,000                             |                                                             |
|                   |                                   | Production aimed at                 |                                                             |
|                   |                                   | under the original plan             |                                                             |
|                   |                                   | Production under the original plan  |                                                             |
|                   |                                   | Production under the original plan  |                                                             |

Total

|                   | 695,000                           |                                     |                                                             |

XIII. Electric Power

1. Program.

(1) In order to spread the use of electric lights and also to encourage the floating of various types of industries, the equipment for electric transmission and transformation will be extended.

(2) The equipment for generation will be so projected as to generate 2,570,000 kW in the fifth year, and the generation will be made as follows:

- Coal power electricity (814,000 kW) 1,330,000 kW
- Hydraulic electricity (590,000 kW) 1,240,000 kW

Note. Figures in brackets are electricity estimated to be generated under the original program.

(3) As regards the generation of hydraulic electricity, utilization of the Yalu River and its tributaries will be considered in addition to efforts to be made for acceleration and extension of the work already undertaken on the Sungari River No.2, Yalu River and Chinghu Lake. The plan in this respect will be as follows:

- Sungari River No.2: 600 kW
- Yalu River (Shufeng): 360 kW
- Matankiang (Shinghu Lake): 80 kW
- Yalu River and its tributaries: 200 kW

Total: 1,240 kW
(4) Equipment for transmission will be extended over 4,412 KM while the capacity of the equipment for transformation will be made capable of dealing with 2,479 KVA.

(5) The rough estimate of capital required is: ¥ 495,000,000

2. Expected development of undertakings and the capital required.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Expected production capacity</th>
<th>Revised Program</th>
<th>Capital required in and after 2nd year (in ¥1,000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>under original program</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td>Extension Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation</td>
<td>KWH</td>
<td>1,404,600</td>
<td>2,570,550</td>
<td>2,016,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydraulic electricity</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>590,000</td>
<td>1,240,000</td>
<td>1,240,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal power electricity</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>814,600</td>
<td>1,330,550</td>
<td>776,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance covered by transmission equipment</td>
<td>KM</td>
<td>4,815</td>
<td>4,413</td>
<td>4,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity of transmission equipment</td>
<td>KVA</td>
<td>1,965</td>
<td>2,479</td>
<td>2,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>¥1,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Estimated Demand and Supply.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Expected production</th>
<th>Quantity Required (Maximum requirement)</th>
<th>Fifth year(1941)</th>
<th>Sixth year(1942)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electric Power</td>
<td>1,000 KWH</td>
<td>2,570</td>
<td>1,163</td>
<td>1,163</td>
<td>1,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Manchuria</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,163</td>
<td>1,163</td>
<td>1,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Manchuria</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>1,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Manchuria &amp; others</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose for which electricity is required</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Expected production</td>
<td>Quantity Required (Maximum requirement)</td>
<td>Fifth year(1941)</td>
<td>Sixth year(1942)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lighting</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>354</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron and Steel industries</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>466</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light-metal and non-iron metal industries</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>261</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquid fuel</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>305</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical industry</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>253</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

XIV. Weapons of War and Rolling-Stock.

1. Program.

Further detailed study will separately be made in respect to weapons of war and rolling-stock.

2. Expected development of undertakings and capital required.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Production</th>
<th>Present Capacity</th>
<th>Revised Program</th>
<th>Capital</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weapons of war</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rolling-stock</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locomotives</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>1,664 (85)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passenger and freight-cars</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>18,490 (2,150)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Figures in brackets under Rolling-Stock show the capacity of manufacturing new locomotives and other vehicles.
XV. Asbestos and Cattle Meat Processing.

1. Program.
The enterprises concerning asbestos and cattle meat processing will be pushed generally as arranged under the original program.

2. Expected development of enterprises and the capital required.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Production expected under original program</th>
<th>Revised Program</th>
<th>Capital required in and after 2nd year (in ¥ 1,000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asbestos</td>
<td>ton</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle meat processing</td>
<td>tons</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix

Table showing enterprises under the five-year program.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Original Program</th>
<th>Revised Program</th>
<th>Capital required in and after 2nd year</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iron and steel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pig iron</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>2,550</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>(4,350)</td>
<td>320,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloom</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>(200)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel ingot</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>(3,550)</td>
<td>260,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rolled steel</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>(1,700)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special steel</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>27,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron ores</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>Rich ores</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>2,990</td>
<td>118,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Poor ores</td>
<td>1,768</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Original Program</td>
<td>Present Capacity</td>
<td>Revised Program</td>
<td>Capital required in and after 2nd year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>2,740</td>
<td>18,050</td>
<td>230,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>10,660</td>
<td>10,570</td>
<td>10,360</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>29,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(570)</td>
<td>(3,800)</td>
<td>54,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquid fuel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal liquefaction</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,770</td>
<td>936,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factories</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fushun</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinchow</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szeipingkai</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chientao</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chilin</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iian</td>
<td>1,000 tons</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anshan</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufactured goods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benzine</td>
<td>1,000 tons</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,670</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy oil</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shale oil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Factories)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fushun</td>
<td>1,000 metric ton</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>55,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanshing</td>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lotzukou</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Products)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volatile oil</td>
<td>1,000 kilolitres</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy oil</td>
<td>1,000 metric tons</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,041,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Expected Production</td>
<td>Capital required in and after 2nd year</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Original Program</td>
<td>Present Capacity</td>
<td>Revised Program</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volatile oil</td>
<td>1,000 kilo-litres</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,740</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy oil</td>
<td>1,000 metric tons</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>750</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol</td>
<td>Metric tons</td>
<td>56,690</td>
<td>15,080</td>
<td>56,690</td>
<td>78,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aluminum</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>(4,000)</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnesium</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>4,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>12,400</td>
<td>1,220</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shale oil</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>105,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zink</td>
<td>ton</td>
<td>6,600</td>
<td>1,643</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>18,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>6,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>973,588</td>
<td>333,684</td>
<td>910,520</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soda ash</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>72,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical fertilizer</td>
<td>1,000 tons</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>453</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulp</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>194,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood pulp</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>144,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulp in general</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bean stalk pulp</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>¥ 1,000</td>
<td>212,000</td>
<td>12,108</td>
<td>304,012</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine tools</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobiles</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>180,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airplanes</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Original</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Revised</td>
<td>Capital required in and after 2nd year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electric Power</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmission equipment</td>
<td>KW</td>
<td>1,424,600</td>
<td>534,100</td>
<td>2,576,560</td>
<td>347,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydraulic electricity</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>590,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,240,000</td>
<td>225,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal power electricity</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>824,600</td>
<td>534,100</td>
<td>1,380,550</td>
<td>122,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance covered by transmission equipment</td>
<td>KW</td>
<td>4,910</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>5,413</td>
<td>78,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale of transformation equipment</td>
<td>KVA</td>
<td>1,965</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>2,479</td>
<td>76,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asbestos</td>
<td>ton</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>2,500 Same as the amount estimated under the original program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle meat processing</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9,000 Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rolling stock</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locomotives</td>
<td>number</td>
<td>1,664</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>28,000 Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passenger and Freight cars</td>
<td>Do</td>
<td>13,490</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons of war</td>
<td></td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>capacity will be quintupled</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,880,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Gist of the Revised Plan for Financing.  
The Five Year Industrial Development of Manchuria.  

Government of Manchoukuo  

May 1938  

I. Funds Required (as from the Second Year)  

--- see Table No. 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mining &amp; Manufacturing Industries -- Note (1)</th>
<th>Whole Plan -- Note (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Original Plan</td>
<td>¥ 1,500,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revised Plan</td>
<td>¥ 3,800,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>¥ 2,300,300,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (1) From the fund required for mining and manufacturing industries through five years according to the original plan, totalling ¥1,638,500,000, the actual cost in the first year, amounting to ¥138,500,000 is deducted; hence the fund required as from the second year amounts to ¥1,500,000,000.

(2) From the fund required for the whole plan through five years, totalling ¥2,962,500,000, the actual cost in the first year, amounting to ¥323,000,000, is deducted; hence second year amounts to ¥2,582,500,000.

II. Estimated Disbursements from the Required Funds according to Countries in which Payments are made.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mining &amp; Manufacturing Industries</th>
<th>Percent.</th>
<th>Whole plan</th>
<th>Percent.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent. to the total</td>
<td></td>
<td>to the total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Required Funds</td>
<td>¥3,800,300,000</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>¥1,962,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disbursements in the country</td>
<td>¥1,364,300,000</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>¥2,141,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disbursements in Japan</td>
<td>¥1,230,500,000</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>¥1,452,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disbursements in third Powers</td>
<td>¥1,230,500,000</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>¥1,452,500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As shown in the above table, out of the total required funds of about 4,960,000,000 yen, 43% is disbursed within the country, 30% in Japan and 27% in third powers, which amounts to about 1,350,000,000 yen, an increase of about 50,000,000 yen over the estimated disbursements to third powers according to the original plan, which amounted to about 1,300,000,000 yen.

As to disbursements for mining and manufacturing industries, one third of them is paid out within the country, in Japan and in third powers respectively.

III. Plan for Raising Funds.

(a) Funds to be raised in the Japanese Yen
---see Table No.2

The funds in the Japanese Yen accruing to Manchuria from the exportation to Japan of materials produced according to the Five Year Plan are deducted from the total of the payments to be made directly or indirectly in Japan; the remainder should be the amount to be raised in Japan, namely:

Mining & Manufacturing industries:  
approximately Y1,690,000,000

Others:  
Y 620,000,000

Total:  
Y2,210,000,000

If, in order to raise funds in foreign currencies, the 60% now allotted to Manchoukuo in accordance with the existing Japan-Manchoukuo exchange Agreement is raised to 90%, whereby 400,000,000 Yen in foreign currencies can be raised by Manchoukuo, she will have to raise on her part the same amount of funds in the Japanese Yen.

(b) Funds to be raised in Foreign Currencies.

Disbursements to be made in third powers out of the required funds amount, as shown above, to about 1,350,000,000 yen, against which the funds that can be raised by Manchoukuo amounts to about 100,000,000 yen. comprising the estimated foreign exchange fund obtainable in accordance with the Japan-Manchoukuo Exchange Agreement, an increase of foreign exchange fund due to the improvement of foreign trade in future and the new production of gold; hence there is a deficit of 740,000,000 Yen, which amount should be raised according to IV. Plan for Foreign Exchange,

(c) Approximately Y 740,000,000

Domestic Funds

The amount obtained by deducting the amounts of the above two items from the total required funds should be raised within the country, namely:

Approximately Y1,510,000,000
IV. Plan for Foreign Exchange

(1) Payments

(a) Direct or Indirect Payments to Third Powers in connection with Mining and Manufacturing Industries: 1,230,400,000 yen.

(b) Payments to Third Powers in connection with Transportation, Communication, Agriculture, and Cattle-breeding and Emigration: 120,000,000 yen. Total: 1,350,000,000 yen

(2) Funds for Payments

(a) Amount that can be earmarked out of the 60% allotted by the Japan-Manchukuo Exchange Agreement: 140,000,000 yen.

In the plan for Foreign Exchange for the Year 1938, 35,000,000 yen out of the 60% allotted by the Exchange Agreement is earmarked as the fund for the importation of materials required for the Five Year Plan; hence that annual amount for four years has been working out as above.

(b) New Production of Gold: 300,000,000 yen.

In the Revised Five Year Plan, it is estimated that gold will be produced to total 300,000,000 yen through four years as from the second year, and all of the production is planned to be exported.

(c) Through the Curtailment of Import: 50,000,000 yen.

(d) Through the Increase of Export: 120,000,000 yen.

Total: 610,000,000 yen.

(3) Deficit: 740,000,000 yen.

(4) Measures to cope with the Deficit.

(a) Introduction of Foreign Capital in connection with Automobile and Aircraft Manufacturing Industries: 340,000,000 yen.

(b) By increasing the allotment to Manchoukuo now set at 60% according to the present Japan-Manchoukuo Exchange Agreement, to 90%: 400,000,000 yen. Total: 740,000,000 yen.
Table No. 1
List of Funds Required for the Industrial Development of Manchuria as from the Second Year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funds Required</th>
<th>Original Plan (1,000 yen)</th>
<th>Increase (1,000 yen)</th>
<th>Revised Amount (1,000 yen)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Mining Manufacturing Industries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron &amp; Steel</td>
<td>325,500</td>
<td>290,500</td>
<td>726,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquid Fuel</td>
<td>389,000</td>
<td>667,000</td>
<td>1,056,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>146,500</td>
<td>168,500</td>
<td>316,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>242,000</td>
<td>253,000</td>
<td>495,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Metal</td>
<td>69,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>87,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulp</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>173,000</td>
<td>194,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soda</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Fertilizer</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle-meat processing</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold Mining</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead &amp; Zinc</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>6,300</td>
<td>6,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asbestos</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Tools</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>28,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>180,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>470,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,300,000</td>
<td>2,380,000</td>
<td>3,680,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Transportation &amp; Communication</td>
<td>644,000</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>664,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Agriculture, Cattle-breeding &amp; Emigration</td>
<td>438,300</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>438,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,582,500</td>
<td>2,380,300</td>
<td>4,962,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table No. 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Total Required (1,000 yen)</th>
<th>Plan for Domestic (1,000 yen)</th>
<th>Plan for Funds in Japanese yen (1,000 yen)</th>
<th>Funds in Foreign Currency (1,000 yen)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mining &amp; Manufacturing</td>
<td>3,880,300</td>
<td>1,450,300</td>
<td>1,690,000</td>
<td>740,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation &amp; Communication</td>
<td>644,300</td>
<td>426,500</td>
<td>620,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, Cattle-breeding &amp; Emigration</td>
<td>438,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,962,800</td>
<td>1,912,800</td>
<td>2,310,000</td>
<td>740,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (1) Basis for the Amount of 2,310,000,000 in the Japanese yen:

(i) Direct Payments to Japan out of the Required Funds: 1,468,900,000 yen
(ii) Indirect influx into Japan of Payments made in Manchuria: 1,070,700,000 yen (half of disbursement in Manchuria)
(iii) Funds in the Japanese Yen accruing from the increase of export to Japan of Goods produced by the Five Year Plan: 812,000,000 yen
(iv) Indirect Reflux of the above Funds into Japan: 406,000,000 yen (half of the acquiring funds)
(v) Dividends and Interests Payable to Japan in connection with the Five Year Plan: 193,612,000 yen (at the rate of 4% a year on the average)

Total: 2,307,212,000 yen

(2) The amount obtained by deducting 110,000,000 yen which comprises the sum for four years at the annual rate of 35,000,000 yen, which is the amount earmarked for the year 1936 out of the 60% allotted by the present Japan-Manchoukuo Exchange Agreement for the importation of materials and equipment required in connection with the Five Year Plan, the sum of 50,000,000 yen accruing from the curtailment of importation, the sum of 120,000,000 yen accruing from the increase of exportation and the sum of 300,000,000 yen accruing from the new production of gold, from the amount payable direct to third Powers.

The table of the outline of the Five Year Industrial Development Plan of Manchuria and the following has been delayed for lack of time.
Manchuria Five Year Plan

Plan III

(See tables above)

Outline of the Policy for the Second and the Following Years of the Five Year Industrial Development Plan - May 1938

Manchoukuo Govt.

I. Guiding Principle

In view of the actual results attained during the first year of the Five Year Industrial Development Plan, the shortcomings of the plan will be corrected; the whole plan will be re-examined to cope with the existing international situation as well as the actual condition of Japan and Manchukuo; substantial changes will be introduced in the ultimate and the annual objectives; taking Japan and Manchukuo as one organic whole, close interconnection between each sphere of the plan will be maintained; and all the requirements for production will be satisfied so that the execution of the plan may be ensured.

II. Measures

1. Objective of Production

   (1) In order to meet the current international situation and also the demand for increased productive power of Japan and Manchukuo, taken as one whole, and that of North China, the objective of production will be raised thereby taking the natural resources of Manchukuo and other factors into consideration.

   (2) As the study and investigation of the natural resources, supply and demand and other factors make progress after the plan was made, the allocation of the projected production for each year will be re-examined so as to make the plan well-balanced and practicable.

   (3) Following the policy for the general development of various resources, important additions of the mining of zinc and coppers and the
manufacture of chemical fertilizers will be made to the items of the programme made

(4) In view of complexity of conditions and far-reaching effects, agricultural and stock raising industry will be treated separately from mining and manufacturing and other spheres of industries in which the increased production depends more upon human ingenuity, taking into consideration the actual state of farm economy and for the purpose of promoting the welfare of the farmers, the methods of agriculture and animal husbandry will be re-examined; and possible changes will be made so as to avoid placing undue emphasis upon such crops as may be in special demand only.

2. Enterprising Organizations.

In order to increase efficiency of the coordinated and well-balanced activities of the organizations engaged in production, the following will be taken into consideration:

(1) The results in the business operation of the Manchuria Heavy Industry Development Company will be utilized in the execution of the Five Year Plan, to insure this, the executive officers of the said Company will actively participate in the planning as well as in the execution so that the Management of the Company will be properly operated.

(2) Allotment of the projected increase of production and of the equipment and facilities necessitated under the Five Year Plan will be made to each company, and the scopes of responsibility of each company on the one hand, and that of the government on the other, will be clarified based upon a concrete programme for the execution of the plan.

(3) In the execution of the plan, each company is to follow the government policy, and aiming at the independence of the enterprise to rationalize and solidify the business, to be fully prepared for the management on a business basis, and not to convert itself into a mere munition factory, misled by the prevailing state of affairs but to establish business on a permanent basis.

(4) Along with the guidance of the controlled industries, free enterprises in general will be properly directed and encouraged; small factories engaged in the works connected with heavy industry will be developed as a part of the organic whole and will be induced to take part in the execution of the whole plan, if necessary; and the activities of the light industry will be coordinated to make them contribute to the sound and well-balanced industrial development.

(5) To maintain close cooperation between companies engaged in various lines of production in the execution of the plan, regular joint
conferences of the delegates from certain companies will be convened and other necessary measures will be taken.

(6) Establishment of industrial centers throughout Manchukuo will be planned taking into consideration both natural and social conditions.

3. Labour and Technique

(1) Technical men.

Dependence upon Japan for the supply of technicians and skilled labour will be re-examined, and the institutions for the training of skilled labourers will be developed in Manchukuo, especially for the training of Manchurians, and a more concrete programme will be established for the procurement, training and distribution of skilled labourers for each kind of industry, for each year, by race, and with respect to sources.

(2) The entire industrial development plan will be re-examined not only from political considerations but from a technical point of view. The research work done by the Continental Scientific Board, the Geological Survey Institute and other laboratories, research institutes or technological organizations will be encouraged; and the technical knowledge and skill of the government as well as private technical experts will be systematically utilized.

4. Natural Resources, and Machinery and other appliances needed for Production

(1) In order to expedite the development of natural resources, systematic survey will be made, the mining administration will be simplified to increase efficiency; adjustment of organizations concerned will be carried out and in particular the function of the Manchuria Mining Development Company (or Manshu Kogyo Kaihatsu Kaisha) will be strengthened.

(2) Necessary steps will be taken in Japan and Manchukuo to give priority to the acquisition of the equipment, machinery and raw materials needed for the execution of the Five Year Plan and the placing of orders will be controlled, if necessary.

(3) Special arrangement will be made for the acquisition of machine tools and for their equitable distribution among different companies.

5. Funds

(1) In anticipation of the possible rise in prices, the probable speed of circulation of funds, the amount required will be re-examined so that the programme may be established on as concrete an outlook as possible.
(2) Taking into consideration the supplying capacity of machinery equipment and other appliances of Japan and Manchukuo, an appropriate programme for raising the funds will be formulated, according to where the funds are to be used.

(3) In view of the trade relations of Japan and Manchukuo, as constituting an organic whole, and the latest development of relations with North China, the programme as to the foreign exchange funds will be re-examined. Possibility of foreign exchange control, encouragement of exportation and the importation of foreign funds will be considered.

(4) Transfer of factories into Manchukuo as a form of the introduction of capital will be planned.

6. Supply and Demand, and the Transportation of Products.

(1) With a view to consolidating Japan and Manchukuo into one and also to including North China in connection with the distribution of the increasing products, the prospect of supply and demand will be carefully investigated, and the distribution of the products among Japan, Manchukuo and North China and the trade relations with third party countries will also be studied.

(2) Regular demand for the goods which Japan needs from Manchukuo (in quantity and price) will be secured; and new market in China and other regions will be sought.

(3) System of Distribution of the products goods and of the price control will be improved and completed.

(4) Policy in regard to land and water transportation tariff will be minutely examined in connection with the distribution of commodities and the trade.

7. Government Organization in charge of the Execution of the Plan

(1) Economic Planning Commission (tentatively called) will be organized to take charge of the readjustment and coordination of commercial and economic administration belonging to the various government organizations, to insure the collaboration between the government authorities and private firms and to deliberate on the plan and measures for the execution of the Five Year Plan.

(2) Organizations will be reformed or newly established to take charge of the systematic direction of and supervision over the activities of different companies to enable them to secure the projected production, such a manner as to maintain balance among different companies, in the progress of executing the plan.

(3) The Five Year Plan will be examined with respect to each region or district so that well-proportioned accomplishment and the cooperation between the central and local organizations may be insured.
"Industrial Development Plan"

"The five-year industrial development plan has been carried out last four years and it is to end in 1941. A new five-year expansion plan is under contemplation among competent authorities.

"Results of the Fourth Year. In the execution of the five-year plan in 1940 the responsible authorities met with various difficulties arising out of the complicated international situation of the country. The results reaped in the fourth year, however, were much better than in the preceding year. The reports of the Planning Bureau of the practical results compared with the preceding year or the fixed goal for the year follow:

"(1) Iron and Mining Industries. Taking the production in 1939 as 100 the output of pig iron 104, steel ingot 102, steel 110, coal 108, liquid fuel 100.

"(2) Other minerals. Lead 308, zinc 213, copper 196, light metals 200, asbestos 107.

"(3) Electricity. Electric industries have attained the goal fixed for the year under the five-year program.

"(4) Agriculture. Taking the fixed amount for the year under the five-year program as 100, the crop of kaoliang 104, whitened rice 127, barley 122, wheat 75, rice 116, hemp 100 bean 90, cotton 70, oil materials and soya beans 80, groundnuts 50.

"(5) Colonization. Compared with the goal fixed for the year (100), Japanese immigrants 85, Chosenese immigrants 65, volunteers 80. The number of farming households for cultivating new lands since the beginning of the colonization plan reached 30,000 of such households from Japan, 24,000 from Chosen, 20,000 of the country men, 40,000 of volunteers, and 20,000 of seasonal volunteers.
(6) Live-stock. Sheep 100, cattle 80, pigs 90.

(7) Accumulation of Capital. In spite of the unfavorable conditions in the money markets in and out of the country the necessary amount of capital for the expansion of industries has been successfully obtained, 55 per cent of which coming from Japan.

(8) Communications. Facilities for transportation and communications have been improved and enlarged as planned overcoming many difficulties.
I, E. L. Danly, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G.H.Q., U.S.A.R.A., and as such have possession, custody and control of original or copies of captured enemy documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That Document Nos. 1503, 1504, 1505, 1529, 1555, and 1524 were delivered to the Japanese Institute of Foreign Affairs as being an original or copy of an enemy document that had been captured or obtained by military forces acting under the Supreme Commander Allied Forces and such documents have been continuously in my custody since such deliveries.

3. I further certify that:

   Doc. 1503 contains six monthly issues, Jul-Dec 1937,
   Doc. 1504 contains twelve monthly issues, Jan-Dec 1938,
   Doc. 1505 contains twelve monthly issues, Jan-Dec 1939,
   Doc. 1529 contains twelve monthly issues, Jan-Dec 1940,
   Doc. 1555 contains twelve monthly issues, Jan-Dec 1941,
   Doc. 1584 contains three monthly issues, Jan, Feb and March 1942.

Dated: 12 August 1946

E. L. Danly

Doc. No. 2599
CERTIFICATE
re Tokyo Gazette

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, TAKAHASHI, Michitoshi, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of the Cabinet, and that as such official I have charge of the official records. I further certify that the monthly publication of the Tokyo Gazette beginning with the July 1937 issue and ending with the March 1942 issue by the Foreign Affairs Association of Japan and by the Tokyo Gazette Publishing House was at all times supervised by Japanese governmental agencies and that the publication of all articles, statements, reports and other matters which appeared in the monthly issue of the Tokyo Gazette above referred to was authorized and approved by the proper governmental agency and that the same are true and correct statements of the facts and matters therein set forth in the various monthly issues of the Tokyo Gazette.

Signed at Tokyo on this 12th day of August, 1946.

Witness: /s/ T. Sato

Signature of Official

I, T. E. DANLY, Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G.L.C., S.C.A.F., do certify as to the contents of the following documents, which are issues of the "Tokyo Gazette":

Doc. 1505 contains twelve monthly issues, Jan.-Dec. 1939.
Doc. 1529 contains twelve monthly issues, Jan.-Dec. 1940.
Doc. 1555 contains twelve monthly issues, Jan.-Dec. 1941.

Dated: August 15, 1946.

/s/ T. E. Danly
T. E. Danly
Chief
I, MITSUAKI KAKI, do hereby certify:

1. That I am presently employed by the Japanese Government as a non-regular member of the staff of the Central Liaison Office and am engaged with the International Military Tribunal for the Far East as language arbiter. That I worked during the period of June 1937 to December 1938 as an adviser or associate editor of the "Tokyo Gazette", and as editor and publisher of the "Tokyo Gazette" as an employee of the Japanese Government in the capacity of a non-regular member of the governmental agency supervising the publication of the "Tokyo Gazette" from January 1939 to March 1942. That the successive governmental agencies supervising the publication of the "Tokyo Gazette" were as follows: July to August, 1937, Commission of Information; September 1937 to July 1939, Bureau of Information, Prime Minister's Department (one and the same as the Cabinet Information Bureau); August 1939 to December 1940, Cabinet Information Bureau, January 1941 to and including March 1942 Board of Information.

2. That during the period from June 1937 to December 1938 the "Tokyo Gazette" was published monthly by the Foreign Affairs Association of Japan under the supervision of the governmental agencies herein referred to and later by the Tokyo Gazette Publishing House during the period January 1939 to March 1942.

3. That the "Tokyo Gazette" was published monthly under governmental supervision for the purpose primarily of supplying information concerning the multitude of problems confronting the Japanese nation as a whole and of the governmental steps taken to solve these problems.

4. The preparation and publication of the "Tokyo Gazette" was started first on a business basis of meeting expenses by securing collective

M.K.
CERTIFICATE RE: "TOKYO GAZETTE"

Dec. 26, 1949

I, KATSUHARU KAKUSHI, do hereby certify:

1. That I am presently employed by the Japanese Government as a non-regular member of the staff of the Central Liaison Office and am engaged with the International Military Tribunal for the Far East as language arbiter. That I worked during the period of June 1937 to December 1938 as an adviser or associate editor of the "Tokyo Gazette" and as editor and publisher of the "Tokyo Gazette" as an employee of the Japanese Government in the capacity of a non-regular member of the governmental agency supervising the publication of the "Tokyo Gazette" from January 1939 to March 1942. That the successive governmental agencies supervising the publication of the "Tokyo Gazette" were as follows: July to August, 1937, Commission of Information; September 1937 to July 1939, Bureau of Information, Prime Minister's Department (one and the same as the Cabinet Information Bureau); August 1939 to December 1940, Cabinet Information Bureau, January 1941 to and including March 1942 Board of Information.

2. That during the period from June 1937 to December 1938 the "Tokyo Gazette" was published monthly by the Foreign Affairs Association of Japan under the supervision of the governmental agencies herein referred to and later by the Tokyo Gazette Publishing House during the period January 1939 to March 1942.

3. That the "Tokyo Gazette" was published monthly under governmental supervision for the purpose primarily of supplying information concerning the multitude of problems confronting the Japanese nation as a whole and of the governmental steps taken to solve these problems.

4. The preparation and publication of the "Tokyo Gazette" was started first on a business basis of meeting expenses by securing collective

M.K.
subscriptions for the magazine from governmental departments and agencies and private individual subscriptions, but was later regularly subsidized by the various governmental agencies supervising its publication.

5. The material in said magazine was selected mainly from the "Weekly Report" edited by said commission, board or bureau and was published by the Cabinet Printing Bureau after consultation with the secretary of the commission, bureau or board which was in charge of Foreign Affairs as the representative of said governmental agency, subject however, at all times to the approval of the secretary of said commission, bureau or board who was in charge of editing the "Weekly Report."

6. That the translation and editing of the material published in the "Tokyo Gazette" from 1937 to 1942 was entrusted to the editor, subject to the approval of the secretary of the commission, bureau or board who, at that time, was in charge of Foreign Affairs and that the articles and materials which were so published in the "Tokyo Gazette" were at all times authorized and approved by the secretary of the respective commission, board or bureau above referred to at the time of their publication.

Witness/s/ William C. Frout
Aug. 16, 1945

I, E. E. Danly, Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G.H.Q., S.C.A.P., do certify as to the contents of the following documents, which are issues of the "Tokyo Gazette":

Doc. 1505 contains twelve monthly issues, Jan.-Dec. 1939.
Doc. 1529 contains twelve monthly issues, Jan.-Dec. 1940.
Doc. 1555 contains twelve monthly issues, Jan.-Dec. 1941.
Doc. 1534 contains three monthly issues, Jan., Feb., and March 1942.

Dated: August 16, 1945.

/s/ E. E. Danly
E. E. Danly
Ten years ago, the northeastern region of the Asiatic Continent known as Manchuria experienced an upheaval whose full significance at that time was scarcely realized and which proved to have far-reaching results not envisaged even by those closely related to the incident. Before long this had developed into a strong movement for freeing the 30,000,000 people of that region from the oppressive rule of the Chinese warlords as well as from the disturbing influences of the Kuomintang. Thus, in March 1932, six months after the September 18 incident, the new state of Manchoukuo was established, and today she has grown not only into a full-fledged modern State but into one whose enormous wealth of mineral resources has guaranteed her place as a heavy-industry nation. A few months will see this new State entering upon the eleventh year of her life. It may be pertinent, therefore, to give here a cursory view of its development, particularly as an integral part and essential factor in the establishment of the co-prosperity sphere of Greater East Asia.

Iron, coal, oil and electric power may be taken as the four essentials of modern civilization. Japan, leader of the co-prosperity sphere, suffers from lack of at least two of these essentials, iron and coal, and here Manchoukuo is able to make up these deficiencies. In addition to her vast agricultural potentialities, Manchoukuo has abundant deposits of iron, coal and many non-ferrous metals as well as a rich supply of electric power. Indeed, so favourably does she compare with the rest of the world in the matter of natural resources, with the single exception, perhaps, of oil, that Manchoukuo may well be called the second America.

Four years ago, with the object of tapping all available natural resources, Manchoukuo launched upon a 5-year plan of industrial development, a plan which is proving highly satisfactory, especially in the production of light metals, which increased in 1940 by from 50 to 100 per cent as compared with the preceding year. At the same time, projects are now well under way for an industrial and cultural development of the border districts.

Rich veins of iron and non-ferrous metal ores are known to exist in the long strip of territory running from Mount Changpai on the Manchoukuo-Chosen border to Tashihochiao by way of Tunghua, as well as in the mountainous parts of Jehol, and scientific exploitation has now been commenced. These areas are dotted with numerous mines producing iron, copper, lead, zinc, aluminium, molybdenum, vanadium, gold, silver, asbestos, etc. Coal is mined not only in these districts but also in the border regions of Tungan, Sinkiang, Heilungkiang and North Heilungkiang provinces, a portion of the output of which is used in manufacturing artificial petrol at Fushun, Kirin and certain other places. It has been ascertained that there are large deposits of oil at the Fushun coal mine and Chalainoerh, although as yet many difficulties stand in the way of
industrializing that mineral in Manchoukuo. Thus deposits of almost every kind of mineral are to be found in Manchoukuo with the exception of quicksilver and tungsten.

Manchoukuo is also blessed with conditions favourable to agriculture; and farm produce, with soya beans as the chief crop, is an important economic factor. The region lying to the south of Harbin is well known for its abundant crops of kaoliang and peax, the belt between Harbin and Harbin for pax and soyabeans, the one lying to the north of Harbin for soyabeans and wheat, and the northern border region for wheat. Manchoukuo is in fact essentially a farming country and it is expected that the volume of farm products will ultimately be doubled to reach 500,000,000 koku. The new State certainly bids fair to play the role of East Asia's granary with a vast system of foodstuff distribution central in this country, and before long we shall see the day when it can be said that when the crops are good in Manchoukuo the whole of East Asia will be well fed.

With regard to electric power, Manchoukuo has hitherto depended totally on the thermal generation system; but with the completion of the Shifengtung Dam on the Yalu River, hydraulic generation was started on August 1, 1941. And sometime in 1942 the Fongnan Dam on the Sungari River is due for completion so that hydro-electric power will then be available in that part of Manchoukuo. The reservoirs for these two dams are both as large as Lake Biwa, the largest lake in Japan, and the volume of power generated at these two places will correspond to about onehalf of the entire hydro-electric power supply in Japan proper. The topography and the river system in Manchoukuo are such that many more power stations on a large scale may be constructed at various points in the country; the resources for hydro-electric power in Manchoukuo may possibly prove to be the largest in the world. With such an abundant supply of electric power, Manchoukuo has every prospect of enjoying an electrical civilization. The natural resources of Manchoukuo, then, are all but inexhaustible and promise a bright future for the new State, although there still remains much room for investigation and research as to the capital, materials, technique and labour to be employed in developing these resources. Hitherto, Manchoukuo has relied almost entirely upon North China for her labour supply and an influx of labour from that part of China still continues to a considerable extent.

The proportion of the amount of capital for production raised within the country increases year by year, and, if one remembers that at the time of the founding of the new State every bit of necessary capital had to be furnished from the outside, the growth of Manchoukuo's national strength truly deserves admiration. The domestic supply of producers' goods is also improving space with the industrial development of the country. Thus Manchoukuo certainly has good prospects of being able to supply her own requirements of machine tools and other equipment.

In addition to labour, capital and materials, industrial development requires leadership and technical knowledge. In view of the supreme importance of Japanese measure of capacity equivalent to 4,9629 bushels.
of these latter factors, "tanchouko is now hard bent upon shaping the educational system in such a way as to give the training necessary for such requirements.

The following figures will eloquently tell the story of the growth of national life in social, cultural and other phases:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1941</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National budget</td>
<td>¥ 110,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax revenue</td>
<td>¥ 99,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customs revenue</td>
<td>¥ 52,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investments by Japan</td>
<td>¥ 1,750,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto per annum</td>
<td>¥ 57,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Area of land registered | 77,000 square kms. |
| Railway mileage | 10,500 kms. |
| Motor roads      | 60,000 kms.  |
| Railway freight carried | 58 million tons |
| Railway passengers carried | 93,600,000 |

| Post offices       | 1,600      | 2,100      |
| Post office employees | 3,200    | 12,000     |
| Telegraph offices   | 360        | 790        |
| Telephone exchanges | 107       | 440        |
| Telephone subscribers | 35,000   | 100,000    |
| Radio broadcasting stations | 3      | 17         |
| Radio subscribers   | 3,000      | 400,000    |
| Electric lamps       | 1,200,000  | 3,300,000  |
| Waterworks subscribers | 30,000   | 200,000    |

| Primary schools       | 9,600      |
| Primary-school pupils | 500,000    |
| Universities            | 1          |
| University students     | 300        |
| Official textbooks used | 2,200,000 copies |

| Opium addicts        | 1,300,000  |
| Anti-opium hospitals | 500,000    |

| Cases for judicial arbitration | 68,000 |
| Amount of money involved in ditto | ¥ 37,000,000  |

| Bank deposits       | ¥ 271,000,000 |
| Postal savings accounts | 10,600         |
| Total postal savings     | 203,000       |
| Postal savings per account | ¥ 19         |

| Motion picture theatres | 30 |
| Admissions for ditto | 500,000 |
| Salt consumption      | 3,800,000 piculs |
| Sugar consumption     | 1,350,000 piculs |
| Bandits               | 300,000 |

1,250,000,000 piculs
The American Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Japanese
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs (Prince Konoye)

No. 1076

TOKYO, October 6, 1938

EXCELLENCY: On the occasion of the interview which Your Excellency accorded me on October 3, when I had the honor to convey orally the views and desires of my Government with regard to conditions in China being brought about by agencies or representatives of the Japanese Government, which are violative of or prejudicial to American rights and interests in China, I undertook to set forth and to extend those views and desires in a note to be presented shortly thereafter. In fulfillment of that undertaking and under instruction from my Government, I now have the honor to address Your Excellency as follows:

The Government of the United States has had frequent occasion to make representations to Your Excellency's Government in regard to action taken and policies carried out in China under Japanese control of which the Government of the United States takes exception as being, in its opinion, in contravention of the principle and the condition of equality of opportunity or the "open door" in China. In response to these representations, and in other connections, both public and private, the Japanese Government has given categorical assurances that equality of opportunity or the open door in China will be maintained. The Government of the United States is constrained to observe, however, that notwithstanding the assurances of the Japanese Government in this regard violation by Japanese agencies of American rights and interests has persisted.

As having by way of illustration a bearing on the situation to which the Government of the United States desires to invite the attention of the Japanese Government, it is recalled that at the time of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria the Japanese Government gave assurances that the open door in Manchuria would be maintained. However, the principal economic activities in that area have been taken over by special companies which are controlled by Japanese nationals and which are established under special charters according them a preferred or exclusive position. A large part of American enterprise which formerly operated in Manchuria has been forced to withdraw from that territory as a result of the preferences in force there. Arrangements between Japan and the regime now functioning in Manchuria allow the free movement of goods and funds between Manchuria and Japan while restricting rigidly the movement of goods and funds between Manchuria and countries other than Japan.
This channeling of the movement of goods is effected primarily by means of exchange control exercised under the authority of regulations issued under an enabling law which provide expressly that for the purposes of the law Japan shall not be considered a foreign country nor the Japanese yen a foreign currency. In the opinion of my Government equality of opportunity or open door has virtually ceased to exist in Manchuria notwithstanding the assurances of the Japanese Government that it would be maintained in that area.

The Government of the United States is now apprehensive lest there develop in other areas of China which have been occupied by Japanese military forces since the beginning of the present hostilities a situation similar in its adverse effect upon the competitive position of American business to that which now exists in Manchuria.

On April 12, 1938, I had occasion to invite the attention of Your Excellency's predecessor to reports which had reached the Government of the United States indicating that discrimination in favor of Japanese trade with North China was likewise to be ended by means of exchange control and to ask for assurances that the Japanese Government would not support or countenance financial measures discriminating against American interests. Although the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that the Japanese Government would continue to support the principle of equal opportunity or open door in China no specific reply has yet been made by the Japanese Government on the subject of these representations.

The Government of the United States now learns that the Japanese authorities at Tsingtao have in effect established an exchange control, that they are exercising a discretionary authority to prohibit exports unless export bills are sold to the Yokohama Specie Bank, and that the Bank refuses to purchase export bills except at an arbitrary rate far lower than the open market rate prevailing at Tientsin and Shanghai. A somewhat similar situation apparently prevails at Canton. Furthermore, reports continue to reach the American Government that a comprehensive system of exchange control will soon be established throughout North China. Control of foreign exchange transactions gives control of trade and commercial enterprise, and the exacting, either directly or indirectly, by the Japanese authorities of control of exchange in North China would place those authorities in position to thwart equality of opportunity or free competition between Japan and the United States in that area. In such a situation, imports from and exports to the United States, as well as the choice of dealers in North China,
would be entirely subjected to the dispensation of the Japanese authorities. Notwithstanding the short time that exchange control has been enforced in Tsingtao, two cases of discrimination have already been brought to the attention of the Government of the United States. In one instance an American dealer in a staple commodity has been unable to export to the United States because Japanese authorities there have insisted that his export bills be sold to a Japanese bank at a price so far below the current rate of exchange of the Chinese currency in the open market that such transaction would involve a loss rather than a profit; but a Japanese competitor recently completed a large shipment invoiced at a price in United States dollars which was equivalent to the local market price calculated at the current open market rate. In other instance, an American firm was prevented from purchasing tobacco in S'entung unless it should purchase so-called Federal Reserve notes or yen currency with foreign money and at an arbitrary and low rate of exchange, conditions not imposed upon the company's Japanese or Chinese competitors.

The Government of the United States has already pointed out to the Japanese Government that alterations of the Chinese customs tariff by the regimes functioning in those portions of China occupied by Japanese armed forces and for which the Japanese Government has formally assured its support are arbitrary and illegal assumptions of authority for which the Japanese Government has an inescapable responsibility. It is hardly necessary to add that there can be no equality of opportunity or open door in China so long as the ultimate authority to regulate, tax, or prohibit trade is exercised, whether directly or indirectly, by the authorities of one "foreign" power in furtherance of the interests of that power. It would appear to be self-evident that a fundamental prerequisite of a condition of equality of opportunity or open door in China is the absence in the economic life of that country of preferential or monopolistic rights operating directly or indirectly in favor of any foreign country or its nationals. On July 4 I spoke to General Ugaki of the desire of the American Government that there be avoided such restrictions and obstacles to American trade and other enterprises as might result from the setting up of special companies and monopolies in China. The Minister was so good as to state that the open door in China would be maintained and that the Government of the United States might rest assured that the Japanese Government would fully respect the principle of equal opportunity.

Notwithstanding these assurances, the Provisional regime in Peiping announced on July 30th the inauguration as of the following day of the China Telephone and Telegraph Company, the reported purpose of this organization being to control and to have exclusive operation of telephone and telegraph communications in North China. There was organized in Shanghai on July 31st the Central China Telecommunications Company, and
the Special Service Section of the Japanese army has informed foreign cable and telegraph companies that the new company proposes to control all the telecommunications in Central China. According to a semi-official Japanese press report, there was organized at Shanghai on July 26 the Shanghai Inland Navigation Steamship Company to be controlled by Japanese the reported object of which is to control water transportation in the Shanghai delta area. According to information which has reached my Government, a Japanese company has been organized to take over and operate the wharves at Tsingtao which have hitherto been publically owned and operated. Should such a development occur, all shipping of whatever nationality would become dependent upon a Japanese agency for allotments of space and stevedoring facilities. The wool trade in North China is now reported to be a Japanese monopoly and a tobacco monopoly in that area is reported to be in process of formation. Moreover, according to numerous reports which have been reaching my Government, the Japanese Government is proceeding with the organization of two special promotion companies which it has chartered and which it will control with the object of investing in, unifying, and regulating the administration of certain large sectors of economic enterprise in China.

The developments of which I have made mention are illustrative of the apparent trend of Japanese policy in China and indicate clearly that the Japanese authorities are seeking to establish in areas which have come under Japanese military occupation general preferences for, and superiority of, Japanese interests, in inevitable effect of which will be to frustrate the practical application of the principle of the open door and deprive American nationals of equal opportunity.

I desire also to call Your Excellency's attention to the fact that unwarranted restrictions placed by the Japanese military authorities upon American nationals in China— notwithstanding the existence of American treaty rights in China and the repeated assurances of the Japanese Government that steps had been taken which would insure that American nationals, interests and property would not be subject to unlawful interference by Japanese authorities—further subject American interests to continuing serious inconvenience and hardships. Reference is made especially to the restrictions placed by the Japanese military upon American nationals who desire to return and reoccupy properties from which they have been driven by the hostilities and of which the Japanese military have been or still are in occupation. Mention may also be made of the Japanese censorship of and interference with American mail and telegrams at Shanghai and of restrictions upon freedom of trade, residence and travel by Americans.
including the use of railways, shipping, and other facilities. While Japanese merchant vessels are carrying Japanese merchandise between Shanghai and Nanking, those vessels decline to carry merchandise of other countries, and American and other non-Japanese shipping is excluded from the lower Yangtze on the grounds of military necessity. Applications by American nationals for passes which would allow them to return to certain areas in the lower Yangtze valley have been denied by the Japanese authorities on the ground that peace and order have not been sufficiently restored, although many Japanese merchants and their families are known to be in those areas.

American nationals and their interests have suffered serious losses in the Far East arising from causes directly attributable to the present conflict between Japan and China, and even under the most favorable conditions an early rehabilitation of American trade with China cannot be expected. The American Government, therefore, finds it all the more difficult to reconcile itself to a situation in which American nationals must contend with continuing unwarranted interference with their rights at the hands of the Japanese authorities in China and with Japanese actions and policies which operate to deprive American trade and enterprise of equality of opportunity in China. It is also pertinent to mention that in Japan, too, American trade and other interests are undergoing severe hardships as a result of the industrial, trade, exchange and other controls which the Japanese Government has imposed incident to its military operations in China.

While American interests in the Far East have been thus treated at the hands of the Japanese authorities, the Government of the United States has not sought either in its own territory or in the territory of third countries to establish or influence the establishment of embargoes, import prohibitions, exchange controls, preferential restrictions, monopolies or special companies—designed to eliminate or having the effect of eliminating Japanese trade and enterprise. In its treatment of Japanese nationals and their trade and enterprise, the American Government has been guided not only by the letter and spirit of the Japanese-American Commercial Treaty of 1911 but by those fundamental principles of international law and order which have formed the basis of its policy in regard to all peoples and their interests; and Japanese commerce and enterprise have continued to enjoy in the United States equality of opportunity.

Your Excellency cannot fail to recognize the existence of a great and growing disparity between the treatment accorded American nationals and their trade and enterprise by Japanese authorities in China and Japan and the treatment accorded Japanese nationals and their trade and enterprise by the Government of the United States in areas within its jurisdiction.
In the light of the situation herein reviewed the Government of the United States asks that the Japanese Government implement its assurances already given with regard to the maintenance of the open door and to non-interference with American rights by taking prompt and effective measures to cause,

(1) The discontinuance of discriminatory exchange control and of other measures imposed in areas in China under Japanese control which operate either directly or indirectly to discriminate against American trade and enterprise;

(2) The discontinuance of any monopoly or of any preference which would deprive American nationals of the right of undertaking any legitimate trade or industry in China or of any arrangement which might purport to establish in favor of Japanese interests any general superiority of rights with regard to commercial or economic development in any region of China; and

(3) The discontinuance of interference by Japanese authorities in China with American property and other rights including such forms of interference as censorship of American mail and telegrams and restrictions upon residence and travel by Americans and upon American trade and shipping.

The Government of the United States believes that in the interest of relations between the United States and Japan an early reply would be helpful.

I avail myself etc.

JOSEPH C. GREW

* * * * *

The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Arito) to the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[Translation]

No. 102, American I /TOKYO/ November 18, 1938

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that I have carefully perused the contents of Your Excellency's note no. 1076, dated October 6th, addressed to the then Minister for Foreign Affairs Prince Kono, concerning the rights and interests of the United States in China,
In this note, Your Excellency sets forth, on the basis of information in the possession of the Government of the United States, various instances in which Japanese authorities are subjecting American citizens in China to discriminatory treatment and are violating the rights and interests of the United States.

The views held by the Japanese Government with regard to these instances may be stated as follows:

1. According to the information in the possession of the Imperial Government, the circumstances which led to the adoption of such measures as those at present enforced in Tsingtao concerning export exchange, and the present situation being as set forth below, it is believed that these measures cannot be construed as constituting any discrimination against American citizens.

A short time ago the Federal Reserve Bank of China was established in North China. This bank's notes, with foreign exchange value fixed at one shilling and two pence to one yuan, already have been issued to an amount of more than one hundred million yuan, and are being widely circulated. These bank notes being the legal currency required by the Provisional Government, the maintenance of their value and their smooth circulation is regarded as an indispensable basis for the conduct and development of economic activities in North China. Since the Japanese Government has therefore taken a cooperative attitude, all Japanese subjects are using those notes, and accordingly, even in their export trade are exchanging them at the rate of one shilling and two pence. On the other hand, the former legal currency still circulating in these areas has depreciated in exchange value to about eight pence per yuan. Consequently those who are engaged in export trade and are using this currency, are enjoying improper and excessive profits, as compared with those who are using Federal Reserve notes and carrying on legitimate transactions at the legally established rate of exchange. Japanese subjects and others who are using Federal Reserve notes have been suffering unreasonable and excessive losses as compared with those persons who use exclusively the former legal currency although residing and carrying on their businesses in the areas under the jurisdiction of the Provisional Government of North China. Furthermore, the existence of the above mentioned disparity between the foreign exchange value of the Federal Reserve notes and that of the former legal currency, which currency the Federal Reserve Bank has been and is exchanging at a rate almost on a par with its own notes, is bound to exert an unfavourable effect upon the exchange value of the Federal Reserve notes, and eventually also upon the exchange value of the Japanese yen. The Japanese Government therefore can not remain indifferent to such a situation.
In order to place the users of the former legal currency who have been obtaining improper and excessive profits on an equal footing with those using the Federal Reserve notes and at the same time to assist in the maintenance of the exchange value of the Federal Reserve Bank notes, represents an objective of those export exchange measures adopted at Tsingtao. Inasmuch as the application of the measures makes no differentiation according to nationality they are not at all discriminatory. As a matter of fact, it is through these measures that those users of the Federal Reserve notes who had in a sense been discriminated against have been placed on an equal footing with the others, and thus, for the first time on equal footing, are enabled to compete on an entirely equitable basis.

2. Some time ago the new regimes in North and Central China revised the Customs tariff rates seeking to secure a rational modification of the former tariff rates enforced by the Nationalist Government, because those rates were unduly high and not suitable for the promotion of the economic recovery and general welfare of the Chinese people. In any case, the schedule adopted is the one that was readily approved by the Powers in 1931, and was not calculated to inure to the benefit of any particular state. Accordingly no complaint has been heard from foreign residents of any nationality in China. The Japanese Government is, of course, in favour of the purpose of this revision and believes that it will serve to promote effectively the trade of all countries with China.

3. As for the organization of certain promotion companies in China, the restoration and development of China's economic, financial and industrial activities following the present incident is a matter of the most urgent necessity for the welfare of the Chinese people. Moreover, the Japanese Government, for the sake of the realization of a new order in East Asia, is exceedingly anxious for the prompt inauguration and progress of undertakings looking toward such restoration and development, and is devoting every constructive effort to realize this objective. The fact that the North China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company were established represents nothing other than an offer to China of the necessary assistance for this restoration, and at the same time, an attempt to contribute to the development of the natural resources of China. It does not in any way impair the rights and interests of nationals of Your Excellency's country or in any way discriminate against their enterprises. The Japanese Government therefore, of course, "as no intention of opposing, but rather welcomes heartily, the participation of third Powers which intend to cooperate on the basis of the new conditions."
The telecommunication companies in North and Central China, the inland navigation steamship company at Shanghai and the wharfage company at Tientsin have also been established to meet the imperative need of an early restoration of communications, transportation, and harbor facilities which were destroyed as a result of the incident. It is proper that the telecommunications enterprise, not only because of its nature as a public utility but also in view of its relation to the maintenance of peace and order and to national defense, should be undertaken by special companies. However, all other enterprises being ordinary Chinese or Japanese juridical persons, do not have the objectives of discrimination against Your Excellency's country or third powers or of the gaining of monopolistic profits. As regards the wool trade, while the control of purchasing agencies was enforced in the Mongolian region, it now has been discontinued. There is at present no plan of any sort for the establishment of a tobacco monopoly.

4. Concerning the return of American citizens to the occupied areas, in North China there is no restriction on their returning, except in special cases where the personal safety of those who return would be endangered. Your Excellency is aware that in the Yangtze Valley large numbers of Americans have already returned. The fact that permission to return has not yet been made general is, as has been repeatedly communicated to Your Excellency, owing to considerations of the danger involved on account of order not yet being restored, or because of the impossibility of admitting nationals of third Powers on account of strategic necessities such as the preservation of military secrets. Further, the various restrictions enforced in the occupied areas concerning the residence, travel, enterprise and trade of American citizens, constitute the minimum regulations possible consistent with military necessities and the local conditions of peace and order. It is the intention of the Japanese Government to restore normal conditions as soon as circumstances permit.

5. The Japanese Government is surprised at the allegation that there exists a fundamental difference between the treatment accorded to Japanese in America and the treatment accorded to Americans in Japan. While it is true that in this period of emergency, Americans residing in this country are subject to various economic restrictions, these restrictions are, needless to say, imposed not upon Americans alone but also equally upon all foreigners as well as upon Japanese subjects. A statement of the views of the Japanese Government concerning the opinion as set forth in Your Excellency's note, regarding the treatment of Japanese subjects in American territory, is reserved for another occasion.
While the Japanese Government with the intention of fully respecting American rights and interests in China, as has been frequently stated above, has been making every effort in that direction in view of the fact that military operations on a scale unprecedented in our history are now being carried out in East Asia, I am of the opinion that the Government of Your Excellency's country also should recognize the fact that occasionally obstacles arise hindering the effecting of the intention of respecting the rights and interests of Your Excellency's country.

At present Japan, devoting its entire energy to the establishment of a new order based on genuine international justice throughout East Asia, is making rapid strides toward the attainment of this objective. The successful accomplishment of this purpose is not only indispensable to the existence of Japan, but also constitutes the very foundation of the enduring peace and stability of East Asia.

It is the firm conviction of the Japanese Government that now, at a time of the continuing development of new conditions in East Asia, an attempt to apply to present and future conditions without any changes concepts and principles which were applicable to conditions prevailing before the present incident does not in any way contribute to the solution of immediate issues and further does not in the least promote the firm establishment of enduring peace in East Asia.

The Imperial Government, however, does not have any intention of objecting to the participation in the great work of the reconstruction of East Asia by Your Excellency's country or by other Powers in all fields of trade and industry, when such participation is undertaken with an understanding of the purport of the above stated remarks; and further, I believe that the regimes now being formed in China are also prepared to welcome such participation.

I avail myself [etc.]

FACUIRO ARITA

(pp. 820-826)

*** * * *

The American Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Arita)

No. 1153

TOKYO, December 30, 1938.

EXCELLENCY: Acting under the instructions of my Government I have the honor to address to Your Excellency the following note:
The Government of the United States has received and has given full consideration to the reply of the Japanese Government of November 18 to its Government's note of October 6 on the subject of American rights and interests in China.

In the light of facts and experience the Government of the United States is impelled to reaffirm its previously expressed opinion that imposition of restrictions upon the movements and activities of American nationals who are engaged in philanthropic, educational and commercial endeavors in China has placed and will, if continued, increasingly place Japanese interests in a preferred position and is, therefore, unquestionably discriminatory in its effect against legitimate American interests. Further, with reference to such matters as exchange control, compulsory currency circulation, tariff revision, and monopolistic promotion in certain areas of China the plans and practices of the Japanese authorities imply an assumption on the part of those authorities that the Japanese Government or the regimes established and maintained in China by Japanese armed forces are entitled to act in China in capacities such as flows from rights of sovereignty and further in so acting to disregard and even to declare nonexistent or abrogated the established rights and interests of other countries including the United States.

The Government of the United States expresses its conviction that the restrictions and measures under reference not only are unjust and unwarranted but are counter to the provisions of several binding international agreements, voluntarily entered into, to which both Japan and the United States, and in some cases other countries, are parties.

In the concluding portion of its note under reference, the Japanese Government states that it is firmly convinced that "In the face of the new situation, fast developing in Asia, any attempt to apply to the conditions of today and tomorrow inapplicable ideas and principles of the past neither would contribute toward the establishment of a real peace in East Asia nor solve the immediate issues" and that "as long as these points are understood Japan has not the slightest inclination to oppose the participation of the United States and other Powers in the great work of reconstructing East Asia along all lines of industry and trade."

The Government of the United States in its note of October 6 requested, in view of the oft reiterated assurances proffered by the Government of Japan of its intention to observe the principles of equality of opportunity in its relations with China and in view of Japan's treaty obligations so to do, that the Government of Japan abide by these obligations and carry out these assurances in practice. The Japanese Government in its reply appears to affirm that it is its intention to make
its observance of that principle conditional upon an understand-
ing by the American Government and by other governments
of a "new situation" and a "new order" in the Far East as
envisaged and fostered by Japanese authorities.

Treaties which bear upon the situation in the Far East
have within them provisions relating to a number of subjects.
In the making of those treaties, there was a process among the
parties to them of give and take. Toward making possible the
carrying out of some of their provisions, others among their
provisions were formulated and agreed upon; toward gaining
for itself the advantage of security in regard to certain
matters, each of the parties committed itself to pledges of
self-denial in regard to certain other matters. The various
provisions agreed upon may be said to have constituted
collectively an arrangement for safeguarding, for the benefit
of all, the correlated principles on the one hand of national
integrity and on the other hand of equality of economic
opportunity. Experience has shown that impairment of the
former of these principles is followed almost invariably by
disregard of the latter. Whenever any government begins to
exercise political authority in areas beyond the limits of
its lawful jurisdiction there develops inevitably a situation
in which the nationals of that government demand and are accorded
at the hands of their government, preferred treatment, whereupon
equality of opportunity ceases to exist and discriminatory
practices, productive of friction prevail.

The admonition that enjoyment by the nationals of the
United States of non-discriminatory treatment in China—a
genereal and well established right—be henceforth to be
contingent upon an admission by the Government of the United
States of the validity of the conception of Japanese authorities
of a "new situation" and a "new order" in East Asia, is, in
the opinion of this Government, highly paradoxical.

This country's adherence to and its advocacy of the
principle of equality of opportunity do not flow solely from
a desire to obtain the commercial benefits which naturally
result from the provisions of that principle. They flow from
a firm conviction that observance of that principle leads to
economic and political stability, which are conducive both
to the internal well-being of nations and to mutually beneficial
and peaceful relationships between and among nations; from a
firm conviction that failure to observe that principle breeds
international friction and ill-will, with consequences injurious
to all countries, including in particular those countries which
fail to observe it; and from an equally firm conviction that
observance of that principle promotes the opening of trade
channels thereby making available the markets, the raw materials
and the manufactured products of the community of nations on a
mutually and reciprocally beneficial basis.
The principle of equality of economic opportunity is, moreover, one to which over a long period and on many occasions the Japanese Government has given definite approval. It is one to the observance of which the Japanese Government has committed itself in various international agreements and understandings. It is one upon observance of which by other nations the Japanese Government has of its own accord and upon its own initiative frequently insisted. It is one to which the Japanese Government has repeatedly during recent months declared itself committed.

The people and the Government of the United States could not assent to the establishment at the instance of and for the special purposes of any third country of a regime which would arbitrarily deprive them of the long established rights of equal opportunity and fair treatment which are legally and justly theirs along with those of other nationals.

Fundamental principles such as the principle of equality of opportunity which have long been regarded as inherently wise and just which have been widely adopted and adhered to, and which are general in their application are not subject to nullification by a unilateral affirmation.

With regard to the implication in the Japanese Government's note that the "conditions of today and tomorrow" in the Far East call for a revision of the ideas and principles of the past, this Government desires to recall to the Japanese Government its position on the subject of revision of agreements.

This Government had occasion in the course of a communication delivered to the Japanese Government on April 29, 1934, to express its opinion that "treaties can lawfully be modified or be terminated,—but only by processes prescribed or recognized or agreed upon by the parties to them".40

In the same communication this Government also said, "In the opinion of the American people and the American Government, no nation can, without the assent of the other nations concerned, rightfully endeavor to make conclusive its will in situations where there are involved the rights, the obligations and the legitimate interests of other sovereign states". In an official and public statement on July 16, 1937, the Secretary of State of the United States declared that this Government advocates "adjustment of problems in international relations by processes of peaceful negotiation and agreement".

40 See telegram No. 59, Apr. 28, 1934, to the Ambassador in Japan, p. 231.
At various times during recent decades various powers, among which have been Japan and the United States, have had occasion to communicate and to confer with regard to situations and problems in the Far East. In the conducting of correspondence and of conferences relating to these matters, the parties involved have invariably taken into consideration past and present facts and have not failed to perceive the possibility and the desirability of changes in the situation. In the making of treaties they have drawn up and have agreed upon provisions intended to facilitate advantageous developments and at the same time to obviate and avert the arising of friction between and among the various powers which, having interests in the region or regions under reference, were and would be concerned.

In the light of these facts, and with reference especially to the purpose and the character of the treaty provisions from time to time solemnly agreed upon for the very definite purposes indicated, the Government of the United States deprecates the fact that one of the parties to these agreements has chosen to embark—as indicated both by action of its agents and by official statements of its authorities—upon a course directed toward the arbitrary creation by that power by methods of its own selection, regardless of treaty pledges and the established rights of other powers concerned, of a "new order" in the Far East. Whatever may be the changes which have taken place in the situation in the Far East and whatever may be the situation now, these matters are of no less interest and concern to the American Government than have been the situations which have prevailed there in the past, and such changes as may henceforth take place there, changes which may enter into the producing of a "new situation" and a "new order", are and will be like concern to this Government. This Government is well aware that the situation has changed, this Government is also well aware that many of the changes have been brought about by the action of Japan. This Government does not admit, however, that there is need or warrant for any one Power to take upon itself to prescribe what shall be the terms and conditions of a "new order" in areas not under its sovereignty and to constitute itself the repository of authority and the agent of destiny in regard thereto.

It is known to all the world that various of the parties to treaties concluded for the purpose of regulating contacts in the Far East and avoiding friction therein and therefrom—which treaties contained, for these purposes, various restrictive provisions—have from time to time and by processes of negotiation and agreement contributed in the light of changed situations toward the removal of restrictions and toward the bringing about of further developments which would warrant in the light of further changes in the situation, further removals of restrictions. By such methods and processes, early removals upon the tariff autonomy of all countries in the Far
East were removed. By such methods and processes the rights of extraterritorial jurisdiction once enjoyed by Occidental countries in relations with countries in the Far East have been given up in relations with all of those countries except China; and in the years immediately preceding and including the year 1931, countries which still possessed those rights in China including the United States were actively engaged in negotiations—far advanced—looking toward surrender of those rights. All discerning and impartial observers have realized that the United States and others of the "treaty powers" have not during recent decades clung tenaciously to their so-called "special" rights and privileges in countries of the Far East but on the contrary have steadily encouraged the development in those countries of institutions and practices in the presence of which such rights and privileges may safely and readily be given up; and all observers have seen those rights and privileges gradually being surrendered voluntarily through agreement by the Powers which have possessed them. On one point only has the Government of the United States, along with several other governments, insisted: namely, that new situations must have developed to a point warranting the removal of "special" safeguarding restrictions and that the removals be effected by orderly processes.

The Government of the United States has at all times regarded agreements as susceptible of alteration, but it has always insisted that alterations can rightfully be made only by orderly processes of negotiation and agreement among the parties thereto.

The Japanese Government has upon numerous occasions expressed itself as holding similar views.

The United States has in its international relations rights and obligations which derive from international law and rights and obligations which rest upon treaty provisions. Of those which rest on treaty provisions, its rights and obligations in and with regard to China rest in part upon provisions in treaties between the United States and China and in part on provisions in treaties between the United States and several other powers including both China and Japan. These treaties were concluded in good faith for the purpose of safeguarding and promoting the interests not of one only but of all of their signatories. The people and the Government of the United States cannot assent to the abrogation of any of this country's rights or obligations by the arbitrary action of agents or authorities of any other country.

The Government of the United States has, however, always been prepared and is now prepared to give due and ample consideration to any proposals based on justice and reason which envisage the resolving of problems in a manner duly considerate of the rights and obligations of all parties directly concerned by processes of free negotiation and new commitment by and among
all of the parties so concerned. There has been and there continues to be opportunity for the Japanese Government to put forward such proposals. This Government has been and it continues to be willing to discuss such proposals, if and when put forward, with representatives of the other powers, including Japan and China, whose rights and interests are involved, at whatever time and in whatever place may be commonly agreed upon.

Meanwhile this Government reserves all rights of the United States as they exist and does not give assent to any impairment of any of those rights.

I avail myself (etc.)

JOSEPH C. GREW
CERTIFICATE

W.O.C. No. ________
I.P.S. No. 1769

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, KAZUO SUZUKI, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Continental Affairs Section, Economic Affairs Division, Foreign Office, and that the document hereto attached, consisting of 3 pages, dated December 26th, 1934, and described as follows: Imperial Ordinance on the Organization of the Manchurian Affairs Board is a true and correct copy of the original.

Signed at TOKYO on this 1st day of August, 1946.

/s/ K. Suzuki
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ K. Furu
Chief of the Continental Affairs Section, Economic Affairs Division, Foreign Office
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, EDWARD P. McLANHAN, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the attached document, I.P.S. Document 1769, consisting of 3 pages, dated December 26th, 1934, being, Imperial Ordinance on the Organization of the Manchurian Affairs Board, was obtained by me from the signing official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 26th day of August, 1946.

/s/ Edward P. Mc Cannabis
Investigator, I.P.S.

Witness: /s/ Harry Friedman
The Official Organization of Manchurian Affairs Board

(The December 26, Showa 9/1934 )
(The Imperial Ordinance No. 347)

Article I.

The Manchurian Affairs Board falls under the jurisdiction of the Premier, and deals with the following affairs:

1. Affairs concerning the Kwantung Board.

2. Affairs concerning the co-ordination of the administrative businesses regarding Manchuria in every Ministry.

3. Affairs concerning the loading and encouragement of the colonial enterprises in Manchuria, excepting diplomatic matters.


5. Affairs concerning the cultural enterprises in Manchuria.

Article II.

The Manchurian Affairs Board has the following staff:

President

Shinnin Rank

Direct Imperial Appointment/

1 Vice President

Chokunin Rank

Imperial Appointment/

1 Private Secretary

Sonin Rank

Imperial Approval/

5 Administrative Officials

Scrin Rank

(one of them can be of Chokunin Rank)

15 Subordinate Officials

Sonin Rank

Senior Official)
The chair of the President can be concurrently held by an official of the Shinmin Bank.

Article III.

Four administrative officials are to be appointed, in addition to the staff mentioned in the previous Article.

By the Premier's petition to the Emperor, the Cabinet will appoint them from among field and company officers or officers holding a similar rank in the Army, or from among Captains and officers below Lieutenant Commanders of the Navy.

Article IV.

By the Premier's petition to the Emperor the Cabinet can appoint administrative officials from among the higher officials of every governmental offices concerned, in addition to the staffs mentioned in the previous two articles.

Article V.

The Manchurian Affairs Board will appoint a Counselor who will take part in the administration of the Board. By the Premier's petition to the Emperor, the Cabinet will appoint the Counselor from among the officials of Chokunin Rank in all governmental offices concerned.

Article VI.

The President, under the leadership and supervision of the Premier, is to preside over the business of the Board, to command and superintend the staff, and has a sole authority over promotion and discharge of junior officials.

Concerning the business as set down in Item 3, Article 1, the President is to command and supervise Consuls through the Foreign Minister.

Article VII.

The Vice-President is to assist the President and manage the business of the Board.

Article VIII.

The Private Secretary under the order of the President,
is in charge of office affairs requiring strict secrecy.

**Article IX.**

Under the order of their higher officials, the administrative officials are to manage the business.

**Article X.**

The subordinate officials are to be engaged in the general affairs under the order of their higher officials.

**Additional Rule**

This ordinance shall come into effect on and from the date of the promulgation.

I hereby certify the above to be correct in every detail.

SUZUKI MASAKATSU (Seal)
The Chief of the Continental Affairs Section, The Economical Affairs Division, The Foreign Office.
Reorganization of Japanese Jurisdiction

Up to 1931, the Japanese jurisdiction in Manchuria presented a quadruple front, the Kwantung Government in the Leased Territory, the South Manchuria Railway Company in the Railway Zone, the Consulates in various consular districts, and the Kwantung Army. Although each one of these organs had its own special mission, the desire for a unified administration was growing everywhere.

The outbreak of the Manchurian Incident and the subsequent establishment of Manchoukuo helped to materialize this desire in a sweeping change which was effected in 1932. Under the new three-in-one system, the Commander of the Kwantung Army became simultaneously the Governor of the Kwantung Leased Territory and the Ambassador to Manchoukuo. This was an improvement but various difficulties were still felt both in Manchuria and in Tokyo. This was largely due to the fact that the shift was made only on the Manchurian front and no changes were effected at the sources of control in Tokyo.

After a further study, therefore, another sweeping reorganization was effected late in 1934 (For details, see Fifth Report, Section 3). This time, the two-in-one unification was effected by combining the Commander of the Kwantung Army and the Ambassador to Manchoukuo. The office of the Governor of the Kwantung Leased Territory was abolished and a new office was created under the name of the Kwantung Bureau. The General Director of the Kwantung Bureau and the Councillor of the Embassy, both under the direction of the Ambassador, respectively supervised the general Japanese jurisdiction and the diplomatic activities in Manchuria, while the Governor of the Kwantung District Government at Port Arthur, removed to Dairen in 1937, administered the Kwantung Leased Territory under the general supervision of the General Director of the Kwantung Bureau and the South Manchuria Railway Company came under the direct supervision of the Ambassador. In Tokyo, a new office was created under the name of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau under the Cabinet supervision and the Prime Minister supervised the jurisdictional activities of the Ambassador through this office, while the Foreign Minister supervised only the purely diplomatic details of the Ambassador through the Councillor of the Japanese Embassy at Hsinking. Moreover, the Army Minister simultaneously held the office of the President of the
Manchurian Affairs Bureau, thus effecting the coordination between the civil and military administrations. General Jiro Minami became the first Ambassador and Commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army, succeeded in 1936 by General Kenkichi Uyeda who continues to serve in the same office to-day.

The relinquishment of extraterritoriality in Manchoukuo and the transfer of the administrative rights over the S. W. R. Zone as of December 1, 1937, again necessitated a slight reorganization in the Japanese jurisdiction, although the general principle of two-in-one administration remains unchanged. The changes were effected by an Imperial Ordinance dated December 1, 1937, which went into force on the same day. In the Kwantung Bureau, the Police Department was abolished with the transfer of Japanese police forces to Manchoukuo and the Education Department was created to supervise School Associations and Federation of School Associations (See below, Section 14:2) which took over Japanese educational activities in Manchuria. In the Kwantung District Government, all offices including police and postal services which were operating in the S. W. R. Zone were transferred to Manchoukuo, two Departments of Finance and Civil Engineering were added, and the Dairen Civil Administration Office was abolished, placing the City of Dairen under the direct supervision of the Kwantung District Government which was already moved from Port Arthur to Dairen. Moreover, various activities of purely Japanese character which were carried on by post offices in the S. W. R. Zone were entrusted to similar Manchoukuo post offices for the time being (See below, Section 15).

Another far-reaching result of the relinquishment of extraterritoriality, including consular jurisdiction, was the abolition of several Japanese consulates in Manchoukuo. This momentous decision was announced by the Japanese Embassy in Harbin early in January, 1939. The shift included the abolition of Consulates-General at Mukden, Kirin, and Tsitsihar and Consulates or branches at Antung, Chinchou, Chengte, Chihfeng, Peichengzi, and Yench, leaving open for the time being the Consulates-General at Harbin and Harbin and Consulates in Northeast Manchuria. The Mutunkiang Branch of the Harbin Consulate-General and the Mukden Branch of the Yenki Consulate were raised to regular Consulate in view of the growing importance of north-eastern frontiers.
Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the attached document, IPS No. 1801, the Sixth Report on Progress in Manchuria to 1939, was obtained by me from Lt. Robert S. Teaze, ATIS Document Section, in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 10th day of June, 1946

Name: /s/ Edward P. Monaghan

Investigator: /s/ William C. Proctor

Official Capacity: I.P.S.

I, Robert Teaze, hereby certify that ATIS Document No. SA 10090, Item 1, described as follows:

"SIXTH REPORT ON PROGRESS IN MANCHURIA TO 1939", South Manchuria Railway Company, May 1939,

was obtained by me in the course of my official duties and on 10 Jun 1946 was delivered to Mr. E. P. Monaghan of the International Prosecution Section.

Date: 26 Jul 1946

/s/ Robert S. Teaze

ROBERT S. TELE
2d Lt., AUS

ATIS Document Section
Interrogation dated 26 February 1946, File 69, Serial 27:

Certificate of Interpreter

I, Tatsuo Fujii, 39921540, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of eleven pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Tatsuo Fujii

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of Feb. 1946.

/s/ Valentine C. Hanmack

Valentino C. Hanmack, a civilian
Duly Detailed Investigating Officer
International Prosecution Section,

Certificate of Stenographer

I, Ruth F. Anderson, hereby certify, that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Ruth F. Anderson

Certificate of Interrogator

I, Valentine C. Hanmack, a civilian, certify that on the 26th day of February, 1946, personally appeared before me Naoki Hoshino and according to Tatsuo Fujii Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan

/s/ Valentine C. Hanmack

2/28/46

(Date)
TESTIMONY OF HOSHINO

January 28, 1946

Q. Where did you go in 1932, Mr. Hoshino?
A. I went to Manchuria in 1932.

Q. That date, if you remember, did you go to Manchuria?
A. I left Japan on the 12th of July 1932.

Q. Mr. Hoshino, when did you first know that you were going to be sent over to Manchuria?
A. At the end of June.

Q. And who told you?
A. The Private Secretary of the Minister of Finance told me of this trip.

Q. What, if anything, did he say as to why you were going over there?
A. I was considered competent for the position of Chief of the General Affairs Board.

Q. Did you select the men that went with you in your party?
A. The Private Secretary of the Finance Minister consulted with me and competent persons were picked.

Q. When you were Chief of the General Affairs Bureau from 1932 to 1936, during that period of four years, did you have any dealings with the Kwantung Army?
A. There was constant liaison between the two.

Q. What did you have this liaison about?
A. There were many matters that came up for question, and as a result of the Japan Manchurian Treaty, liaison was established with the Kwantung Army to deal with those matters.

Q. Give us some examples of the matters.
A. One instance was in connection with the taxation or taxing of Japanese nationals who enjoyed extraterritoriality in
Manchukuo, also the railway zone which was under direct Japanese control. In connection with the abolition of these extra territorial privileges and special privileges in the railway zone, matters had to be referred to various organizations, and amongst these was the Kwantung Army.

Q. Did the Kwantung Army have jurisdiction over the territory of the South Manchurian Railway, or were they restricted to the Kwantung leased territory?
A. The Kwantung Army had no jurisdiction over the South Manchuria Railway zone, but the Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army was also Chief of the government of the Kwantung leased territory, and in this capacity he had jurisdiction over the railway zone and leased territory.

Q. In such cases as you had to deal with the Kwantung Army, who did you take them up with?
A. This also depended upon the matter under question and the person or persons concerned with these matters and questions.

Q. Who was chief of the Kwantung Army during the period 1932 to 1936?
A. At first it was Lt. General HONJO, followed by Generals MUTO, HIRAI, HIRAI, and UEDA — those four Generals.

Q. Can you give me an example of any time when you personally took any matters up with these Generals or Heads of the Army?
A. For instance, I discussed with General UEDA the question of the abolition of extra-territoriality.

Q. Are there any other cases that you remember?
A. Another instance was in 1932 in connection with the flotation of Manchuko public bonds in Japan and the moral support of the Kwantung Army under General MUTO was requested for the flotation.

Q. Why was it necessary to take the flotation of bonds of Manchuko up with the Head of the Kwantung Army?
A. As Manchuko had just been established as a nation and the people in Japan were not well acquainted with Manchurian affairs, it was deemed advisable to obtain the support of the Kwantung Army who were the most powerful Japanese organization in Manchuria. The support was deemed necessary in order to insure the success of the flotation.

Q. Were these the bonds of Manchuko?
A. Yes.
Did you know Mr. KISHI, Shinsuke?
Yes,

When did you first meet him?
It was either in 1934 or 1935 when he came to Manchoukuo.

Did he have any position or office in Manchoukuo at that time?
He was Vice Minister of the Commerce and Industry Department.

And he came there from Japan for that office in 1935?
Yes about that time. I am not sure about the exact date. I might have met Mr. KISHI before, but I do not remember the occasion.

When he was Vice Minister of Commerce and Industry you were then Vice Minister of Finance. Did your departments have a great deal to do with each other in connection with the government business?
Yes,

Give us examples of matters that you had under consideration?
An instance is the five-year plan. This plan would be formulated by the Commerce and Industry Ministry and assistance on financial questions would be given by the Finance Ministry.

In connection with the five-year plan, did you have a great deal to do with the drawing up of the plan?
Yes. On financial matters,

The also besides yourself and Mr. KISHI took part in the development of the five year plan for Manchoukuo?
There were many people from the South Manchuria Railway Company and the General Affairs Board who took part.

What was the purpose of this plan?
Instead of the haphazard development that took place during the four or five years after the establishment of Manchoukuo, it was deemed necessary that a concrete, co-ordinated plan be formulated. It was thought extremely important that the plans for the development so far as the Manchoukuo government was concerned should be coordinated with the developments that were being planned and carried on by the South Manchurian Railway Company, and in making up this plan it was the purpose to co-ordinate those two different branches so that they would work as an integrated whole.
Q. Mr. KISII was Vice Minister of Industry and Commerce when you were there. Did he ever become connected with the General Affairs Board?
A. Mr. KISII became Vice Chief of General Affairs Board.

Q. Did he work under you as Chief of the General Affairs Board?
A. Yes.

Q. Did you and Mr. KISII work together in working out the economic plans for the development of Manchoukuo?
A. Yes. I worked together with Mr. KISII.

Q. What was the plan that you worked out for the economic development of Manchoukuo?
A. We worked on the five-year plan for the Manchoukuoen industry and the development of Manchurian national resources, and in connection with agriculture, reforming the variety of agricultural crops and the increase in their production.

Q. Did he (General ITAGAKI) work with you in connection with the development of the five-year plan?
A. At the time we worked together.

Q. Who had the final say so far as the Kwantung Army was concerned? What officer? That is in making decisions on matters that were put in the five-year plan or left out of it?
A. The Commander of the Kwantung Army.

Q. Did the Chief of Staff have the final say in most matters?
A. I don’t think so. I think the Commander of the Kwantung Army. The Kwantung Commander had been serving for a long time, so he knew the actual conditions and the situations and therefore he had the final say.

Q. What was the Manchurian Heavy Industrial Company?
A. It was a corporation to combine and develop the heavy industries of Manchukuo.

Q. Do you know when it was formed.
The plan was formulated in 1937, but the corporation was formed in the early part of 1938.

What was Mr. MATSUOKA's position so far as the Industrial Development Corporation was concerned?

The industries of Manchuria were formerly under the South Manchurian Railway, and to form a new corporation brought a certain amount of resistance from Mr. MATSUOKA. However, with the development of railroads in north China, the South Manchurian Railway had to give aid to the North China railways. So Mr. MATSUOKA agreed to the formation of the Manchurian Industrial Development Corporation.

There was no special reason, except as I stated above, the one just mentioned.

Did the Kwantung Army insist upon this plan being carried out?

The Kwantung Army agreed upon this plan and supported the plan.

In December 1937 Manchukuo promulgated the Industrial Development Corporation Administration Act. Do you know why that was promulgated?

The ordinary laws were not appropriate, so they established this special administrative law.

Do you want to establish this company?

This law took in the matters concerning the investments by the government, the profit sharings, and supervision by the government of this corporation.

Did these matters come within the jurisdiction of the General Affairs Board?

The Director of the Industrial Department has the responsibility over this industry. However, the General Affairs Board assisted in making up the laws in the operation of the company.

When did you leave Manchukuo?

July of 1940.
And why did you leave Manchukuo?
A. I left Manchukuo to become the director of the Enterprising Bureau under the Second Kono Cabinet.

Q. Is the Enterprising Bureau the same as the Cabinet Planning Board?
A. It is the same and I prefer "Cabinet Planning Board".

Q. How large a board was the Cabinet Planning Board?
A. About one hundred persons were in the Cabinet Planning Board.

Page 16

Q. Did the Planning Board undertake to work out an economic plan for Japan while you were connected with the Cabinet Planning Board?
A. Yes it made economic plans for Japan.

Q. Did your Board under your direction as Chief prepare an economic plan for business, manufacturing, and industry in Japan?
A. Yes there was a plan made in the Cabinet.

Q. What did the plan provide for?
A. The industries dealing in the same line should organize and make a solid group, and through this group they should undertake to carry on their duties. And the government control should be through this group.

Q. Was the government to appoint the directors and managers of this organization?
A. The government was to nominate the head of the group.

Q. Was this plan after the plan that had been adopted in Manchukuo?
A. This plan was different from the one adopted in Manchuria.

Q. How did it differ from the one adopted in Manchuria?
A. The fundamental difference is that the one in Manchuria was a corporation and not trying to organize all the industries -- just one big corporation by itself -- and aside from that there were other independent corporations. In Japan it was a group, and not a corporation, just an association or a sort of medium for holding together.

Page 17

Q. In Manchuria did the government appoint the President of the big corporation?
A. Yes.
In Japan did the government form a control association and appoint the director and President of that control association?
A. Yes.

Did that association include the corporations in the same line industry as members of the association?
A. Yes.

What did you do in making up this plan looking towards the development in East Asia?
A. It was a plan envisaging the development of the resources of Manchuria, China, and East Asia in general since Japan itself did not have all the necessary resources.

Who was the foreign minister of the second KONOYE cabinet?
A. MATSUOKA.

MATSUOKA announced a new foreign policy after he became foreign minister, did he not?
A. I don't remember exactly.

Do you know that the foreign policy for Greater East Asia of MATSUOKA was, and if so, state what it was.
A. It was pretty much what I have said before - it was to establish cordial relations among the various nations in East Asia.

Did MATSUOKA's plan contemplate more than Japan and Manchukuo?
A. It included China at least.

Did the MATSUOKA plan contemplate treating the new Nanking China Government in the same way as it did Manchukuo which had been established by Japan?
A. No, in a different way.

How?

Well the difference lay in the fact that under the Japanese-Manchuria Treaty very close military and political ideas were formed, whereas the Japanese relations with the Nanking government were not as close.
When were you appointed Vice Minister of the Finance Department; what date?
A. 1936.

Do you remember the date?
A. I do not remember.

When did you become Chief of the General Affairs Board?
A. I became Chief of the General Affairs Board in December 1936.

What were the duties and what did the General Affairs Board handle in connection with the Government of Manchukuo?
A. It was directly under the Premier of the Manchukuo Government. This Bureau took charge of budget enterprise statistics, personnel, legal matters, and information.

Did they have general control and supervision over the affairs of the other bureaus, too?
A. This Bureau under the control of the Premier had some control over the other bureaus. The Premier controls this Board and through this Board controls the other bureaus under the order of the Premier.

It was one of the most important divisions of the Manchukuo government, was it not?
A. Yes.

When you became Chief of the General Affairs Board did you take Mr. SAICIIIMA's place?
A. Mr. SAICIIIMA was Vice President. The first chief was KOKIJI, the next chief was ENDO; following that NAGAKI; following him came ONIKE and I succeeded Mr. ONIKE as chief.

How long did you continue as the Chief of the General Affairs Board?
A. Three and one-half years approximately.

Until the end of 1939?
A. Until July of 1940.

And where did you go?
A. I returned to Japan.

And did you have an office with the Japanese Government then?
A. I was head of the Enterprising Bureau.
Q. Under what department of the Japanese Government or was that a separate department?
A. This Department came directly under the control of the Premier.

Q. Who was the Premier?
A. Prince KONOYE. I became a minister without portfolio under this Department, the Entreprising Bureau.

Q. And did you continue as minister without portfolio to the KONOYE Cabinet from its beginning until the end which would include the second and third cabinets?
A. I resigned April 1941 during KONOYE's second cabinet.

Q. Were you at all times the head of the Entreprising Bureau while you were acting as minister without portfolio?
A. Yes.

Q. Did you have charge of any other bureaus or departments as minister without portfolio?
A. No other bureau.

Q. What did the Entreprising Bureau do, Mr. HOSINO? What was its duties and how did it function?
A. This Department was formed to collaborate the various departments and to make future plans for the coming year.

Q. In so doing did they have any connection with the Manchoukian Government?
A. No connection with the Manchoukian Government.

Q. So that the Entreprising Bureau was making plans for Japan proper?
A. Yes, just plans for Japan proper. It made plans to export and import from Manchukuo; also plans as to just what to send to Manchukuo and what Japan imported from Manchukuo. The General Entreprising Bureau made plans for the coming year only so far as Japan was concerned but there was included necessarily in those plans the relationship between Japan and Manchukuo so far as the importation of goods and raw materials from Manchukuo and what Japan would send to Manchukuo by way of export.

Q. Did any dispute over arise between your Bureau and the Manchoukian representatives as to what these plans would cover - exports and imports?
A. There were no special disputes between the Manchoukian Government and the Entreprising Bureau.
Q. Did the Enterprising Bureau have anything to do with the financing of industries in Manchukuo?
A. There was a financial plan set up within the Japanese plans. There was a certain amount allotted to assist Manchukuo. However, I cannot say that it was directly appropriated to the financing of industries.

Q. Was it loaned or advanced to the Government?
A. In the plan there is a certain amount to be invested in Manchukuo. It does not concern industry alone, but just as much investment in Manchukuo. It included industry and other governmental requirements. There was so much allotted to Manchukuo industry and other governmental functions. However, our Bureau did not concern itself with how it should be used by Manchukuo. It was the Finance Department which took care of such matters.

Q. Was the Kwantung Army separate from the railroad zone?
A. It was separate but the Kwantung Army head was the Governor of the Kwantung territory.

Q. The consulates also had their separate functions at that time, did they not?
A. Yes.

Q. After you went there in 1932 was a change made?
A. Yes, a change was made.

Q. And what did they have then?
A. The Kwantung Army Commander is the ambassador to Manchukuo and the Ambassador controlled the consulate, the Manchurian Railway and the Kwantung Government.

Q. Then did that take place? Was that after you went to Manchukuo?
A. Yes.

Q. In 1932.
A. Yes.

Q. Was there any change in this arrangement in 1934?
A. There were some changes made.

Q. What were the changes? Maybe I can help you by asking you whether in 1934 the Commander of the Army and the Ambassador were combined into one man so that the Ambassador represented the Japanese Government in the carrying on of the functions of Government as far as the Kwantung leased territory and the South Manchurian Railway Company were concerned. Is that...
correct?

A. Yes.

Q. When they combined the Commander of the Army with the Ambassador-ship it became necessary that they always have a military man as the Ambassador to Manchukuo? Is that right?

A. Yes.

Page 13

Q. What did you have to do with the Five Year Economic Plan that was drawn up in 1936?

A. When the Five Year Plan was drawn up I was in the Finance Department, therefore, I was connected on the finance side of the plan.

Q. When did the five year plan become effective; when did it go into effect?

A. From 1937.

Q. As Chief of the General Affairs Board did you have anything to do in connection with it?

A. After I became the Chief of the General Affairs Bureau I had general connection with it.

Q. When did you work with in connection with the five year plan?

A. I worked with Finance Minister and its Vice Minister; the Industrial and Agriculture Minister and its Vice Minister; the head of the Enterprising Bureau, the Communication Minister and the Vice Chief of the General Affairs Bureau.

Q. Did you work with Mr. KISHI, Shinsuke (Nobusuke)?

A. Yes.

Q. What position did he hold then?

A. Vice Minister of the Industrial Department.

Q. At that time GEN. TAGAKI was the Chief of Staff. Did you work with him?

A. I consulted GEN. TAGAKI on various matters.

Q. What matters did you take up with him?

A. I do not remember very clearly but we discussed various matters including the five year plan.
Do you have any knowledge as to how Mr. AIKAI came to come over there at that time to Manchukuo?
A. I believe he was encouraged by the Japanese Government to go to Manchukuo.

Do you know why?
A. Several enterprisers were sent to Manchukuo to study and investigate the economic state in Manchukuo. Mr. AIKAI was one of them.

During that time was there any opposition on the part of the Kwantung Army to the Zaibatsu making an investment in Manchukuo?
A. At first there seemed to have been an opposition from the Kwantung Army but I do not think there was any special objection.

What was the reason that the Kwantung Army made any objection to the Zaibatsu making investments in Manchukuo?
A. The army in general did not oppose the Zaibatsu but there existed such an atmosphere among the Kwantung officers. The Kwantung officers believed that since the Zaibatsu monopolizes industry in Japan such should not happen to the industries in Manchukuo. Therefore, the opposition on the part of the army.

Was there any difference of opinion as to the handling of industries between the Kwantung Army and the South Manchurian Railway?
A. There was no particular difference between the Kwantung Army and the South Manchurian Railway. However, the South Manchurian Railway advocated a Japanese corporation, while the Kwantung Army advocated a Manchoukian corporation.

Why did the Kwantung Army advocate having a Manchoukian corporation rather than a Japanese corporation?
A. The Kwantung Army advocated the Manchoukian corporation because as long as the industry was Manchoukian it should be controlled by the Manchoukians in all affairs. This was not a Kwantung Army policy but a tendency towards that aim.

Was the tendency to develop Manchoukao as a self-integrated unit or a self-supporting unit of government? Was this policy on the part of the army to make Manchoukao self-controlled so far as materials and manufactures were concerned?
Yes, it was. The industries in Manchoukuo should be controlled by the Manchoukians and in order to communicate with Japan, the Manchoukuo-Japan Economical Committee was formed to act sort of as a liaison.

When did you next see Mr. AKAH? I do not remember.

Did you see him more than once in Tokyo? I met him two or three times in Tokyo.

Did you talk with him about the possibility of his coming over to Manchoukuo and interesting himself in the development of the country? We did discuss about such matters.

What particular matters did you discuss? Mr. AKAH stated that in order to develop Manchoukuo Japanese machinery and financial aid was insufficient. Therefore, other foreign investments were necessary in order to establish the industry in Manchoukuo, particularly American aid, investment.

What was Mr. AKAH's plan? In order to develop the industries in Manchoukuo various industries, such as coal, steel and machine industries, must be consolidated. This consolidated industry should be controlled by the Japan Industrial Corporation. Japan alone cannot finance this big project so they need outside help, preferably United States investments.

Was Mr. AKAH's plan in writing? There may have been a pamphlet published by Mr. AKAH.

Did you discuss this plan when you were in Manchoukuo with Mr. KISHI? Yes.

When was the Manchurian Heavy Industries Corporation formed? I believe it was formed in the latter part of the fall of the year 1937.

Did the General Affairs Board have anything to do in connection with the organization of that Corporation?
A. In order to make the special laws or decrees for the Manchurian Heavy Industries Corporation there was the conference of various ministers and the General Affairs Bureau had connections in this conference. In order to formulate a treaty between Manchukuo and China, the Japanese Manchurian Economical Commission has to make liaison between the two countries and the Chief of the General Affairs Bureau is a member of that Liaison Economical Committee, so, therefore, the General Affairs Bureau has connection.

Page 23

Q. You were the representative of the General Affairs Board upon this liaison committee?
A. Yes.

Q. As such representative what did you do with the preparation of this treaty or this agreement?
A. I was present at the conference and I agreed upon the plan.

Q. And did you draw up the agreement?
A. I did not draw up the agreement. I merely agreed upon this.

Q. Did you make any suggestions or changes in it before it was finally signed?
A. I did not make any changes or suggestions.

Q. Was Mr. AHATA at these conferences?
A. No.

Q. Who were present at these conferences?
A. Those present at the conference were Foreign Minister, Finance Minister, Industrial Minister, and Chief of the General Affairs Bureau from Manchukuo. And from the Japanese side there were the Chief of Staff.

Q. Was that YOJO the Chief of Staff?
A. Yes. (resuming) Consular from the Embassy.

Q. Who was he?
A. MORITA or SHIMADA. (resuming) And exports nominated by the Japanese Government and the Governor of the Kwantung Prefecture.

File #69, Serial 27 February 26, 1946
The general duties of the Cabinet Planning Board are mainly in two parts: The general arrangement of the various departments and the formation of yearly plans.

And what do you mean by the formation of yearly plans?

By that I mean the production plans and material distribution plans and various other minor details such as for transportation to carry out the material distribution.

And during that period of time you not only made the necessary plans for the administration of the Empire of Japan but also plans required for the supply of munitions and materials for the Japanese Army in China? Is that not correct, Mr. Hoshino?

In this Planning Board, the only plans made for material distribution is an over-all plan and it does not go into any detail matter. For instance, if the Navy and Army and the civilian populace submit certain plans to carry out their needs, the Cabinet Planning Board makes the necessary plans with respect to the amount of material available. The Cabinet Planning Board is not concerned as to whether the amount of material is to be used by certain forces in China or another certain amount will be used by certain forces in Japan Proper. It only takes in the over-all estimates from the various demands.

And from what source, Mr. Hoshino, would you receive the various demands and estimates of materials and supply that would be needed in connection with your yearly plan?

They are submitted by the various departments such as the Army, the Navy, or the Agriculture, and so forth.

Is it not a fact, Mr. Hoshino, that over the years before you became president of the Planning Board and thereafter that the demands of the Army and Navy had constantly increased?

Yes, it has increased.

And is it not a fact that in 1939 and 1940 and prior thereto the Army and Navy were increasing their demands for supplies not only for the war in China but in contemplation of the possibility of war with other powers?

That I cannot say. The increase in material distribution was for the purpose of carrying on the war in China, however, the exact contents and the reason therefore, was kept a secret by the Army and the Navy and, therefore, the Cabinet Planning Board know nothing as to their use.

But you did know, Mr. Hoshino, did you not, as stated a moment ago that the demands of the Army and Navy for supplies increased each year?

Yes, that is certain.
(Doc. 1915)

CERTIFICATE

I, E. E. Dailey, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G.I.T., S.C.A.P., and as such have possession, custody and control of original or copies of documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That Document 1915 contains seven interrogations of Hoshino, Naoki taken on the following dates:

   28 January 1946
   31 January 1946
   3 February 1946
   7 February 1946
   11 February 1946
   26 February 1946
   1 April 1946

3. That the interrogations of Hoshino, Naoki above referred to on the 28 January 1946, 31 January 1946, 3 February 1946, 7 February 1946 and 11 February 1946 were delivered to me by Henry A. Haukurst, interrogator, duly certified, and that the interrogations on 26 February 1946 and 1 April 1946 were delivered to me by Valentino C. Hamack, interrogator, duly certified, and that the original or a copy thereof has at all times been in my possession as Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G.I.T., S.C.A.P.

7/30/46 /s/ E. E. Dailey

E. E. Dailey
Doc. 1915

HOKUCHE, Naoki Testimony.

Interrogation dated January 28, 1946, File 69, Serial 18:

I, Denis Kildayle, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English, respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of seventeen pages numbered 1 to 17 inclusive, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Denis Kildayle

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 2nd day of February 1946.

/s/ Henry A. Hauxhurst
Duly Authorized Investigating Officer
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP

I, Edna M. Hickam, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Edna M. Hickam

I, Henry Hauxhurst, certify that on the 28th day of January 1946, personally appeared before me and personally swore to Denis Kildayle, interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan
2 February 1946

/s/ Henry A. Hauxhurst

Interrogation dated February 4, 1946, File 69, Serial 18

I, T/3 Ben Oshita, Serial Number 2666666666, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English, respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 17 pages numbered 1 to 17 inclusive, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Ben Oshita

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 6th day of February 1946

/s/ Henry Austin Hauxhurst (Name and Rank)
Duly Authorized Investigating Officer
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP

I, Edna M. Hickam, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Edna M. Hickam
I, Ben Oshita, 38663331, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of twenty-four and one-quarter pages, are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Ben Oshita
(Interpreter's Signature)

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 27th day of Feb. 1946

/s/ Henry A. Hauxhurst
(Stenographer's Signature)

I, Jewel E. Hewman, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Jewel E. Hewman
(Stenographer's Signature)

I, Henry Austin Hauxhurst, certify that on the 31st day of January, 1946, personally appeared before me Henry HOSHINO, and according to Ben Oshita, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

/s/ Henry A. Hauxhurst
(Stenographer's Signature)

2-27-46
(Date)
I, Henry Austin Hauxhurst, certify that on the 6th day of February 1946, personally appeared before KOSHIKO, Naoki, and according to T/3 Ben Oshita, interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan /s/ Henry Austin Hauxhurst
6 Feb 1946


I, ROBERT M. BOYD, Lt. USN, 236713, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of thirty (30) pages, are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Robert M. Boyd
Robert M. Boyd, Lt. USN.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of February, 1946.

/s/ Henry Austin Hauxhurst
HENRY AUSTIN HAUHXURST
Duly Detailed Investigating Officer
International Prosecution Section, GHQ SCAP

I, DINAH BRAUN, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Dinah Braun
DINAH BRAUN

I, HENRY AUSTIN HAUHXURST, certify that on the 6th day of February, 1946, personally appeared before KOSHIKO, Naoki, and according to LT. ROBERT M. BOYD, USN, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, February 12th, 1946. /s/ Henry Austin Hauxhurst
HENRY AUSTIN HAUHXURST
Imperial Ordinance No. 758

REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CHINA
AFFAIRS BOARD

Article 1. During the course of the China Incident, the China Affairs Board, is established under the supervision of the Prime Minister, and has charge of the following affairs, except those concerning diplomacy.

1. Affairs concerning politics, economy and culture which are necessary to be dealt with in China during the course of the China Incident.

2. Affairs concerning the formulation of various policies relative to the affairs mentioned in the preceding item.

3. Affairs concerning the supervision of the business of the companies which have been established with the object of starting an enterprise in China, in accordance with provision of special laws, and the control of the business of those who are to start an enterprise in China.

4. Affairs concerning the cultural enterprise in China.

5. Affairs concerning the maintenance, the coordination of the administrative affairs relative to China, to be conducted by governmental offices.

Article 2. The personnel of the China Affairs Board shall be composed of the followings:

President
4 Vice-Presidents
1 Director-General: of Chokunin rank
3 Departmental Chiefs: of Chokunin rank
1 Private Secretary: of Sonin rank
8 Secretaries of Sonin rank
20 Investigators: of Sonin rank
20 Administrative Officials: of Sonin rank.
10 Technical Experts: of Sonin rank
1 Code Secretary: of Sonin rank.
1 Secretary-Interpreter: of Sonin rank.
3 Secretaries (Fuyiken): of Sonin rank
65 Clerks: of Hannin rank.
11 Assistant Technical Experts: of Hannin rank.
1 Eleven Interpreter: of Hannin rank.

Director-General is accorded the treatment due to Shinnin rank.
Article 3. The Cabinet may, in addition to the personnel mentioned in preceding Article, appoint the administrative officials upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister from among higher officials of the Ministries concerned.

Article 4. The President’s Secretariat and three following Bureaus shall be established in the China Affairs Board.

Political Affairs Bureau.
Economic Affairs Bureau.
Cultural Affairs Bureau.

Especially the Technical Bureau may be established in the China Affairs Board. When it is established, the post of the Director of that Bureau shall be occupied by a Technical Expert of C'okunin rank.

The Prime Minister shall determine the assignment of duties of President’s Secretariat and respective Bureaus.

Article 5. The Liaison Committee shall be established in the China Affairs Board, for the purpose of keeping liaison in connection with the affairs among the Ministries concerned, on the important matter in connection with the affairs mentioned in Article 1.

The Liaison Committee shall consist of a Chairman and some Committemen.

The Director-General shall be appointed to the Chairman, the Cabinet shall appoint the Committemen upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister from among higher officials of the Ministries concerned.

Liaison Committee

The China Affairs Board shall have the Secretaries, and the Cabinet shall appoint them upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister from among higher officials of the Ministries concerned. They shall attend to the management of general affairs under the direction of superior officers.

Article 6. The Prime Minister shall be appointed to the President. He shall preside over the affairs of the Board, and manage the personal affairs of Fennin and lower ranks at his own discretion.

Article 7. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Finance, Minister of War and Minister of the Navy shall be appointe to the Vice-President and they shall assist the President.
Imperial Ordinance No. 759

REGULATION GOVERNING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE LIAISON DIVISION OF THE CHINA AFFAIRS BOARD

Article 1. The Liaison Division of the China Affairs Board shall have charge of keeping liaison in executing the affairs of the China Affairs Board in China.

The Prime Minister shall determine the area where the Liaison Division is to be established and its name and its jurisdiction.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, TAKAHASHI Ichirōshi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of the Cabinet and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 11 pages, dated 16 December 1938, and entitled as follows: Imperial Ordinance No. 750, Promulgated 16 December, 1938, entitled "Regulations Governing the Organization of the Union Affairs Board."

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Cabinet.

Signed at Tokyo on this 10th day of July, 1946.

/s/ H. Takahashi
Signature of Official (SEAL)

Witness: /s/ R. Furiyama
Secretary of the Cabinet
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 10th day of July, 1946.

/s/ Edward P. Monaghan
Name

Witness: /s/ William C. Front
Investigator
I.P.S. Official Capacity
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, TAKAHASHI, Michitoshi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Cabinet and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 3 pages, dated 16 December, 1938, and described as follows:

Imperial Ordinance No. 759, Promulgated 16 December 1938, entitled "Regulation Governing the Organization of the Liaison Division of the China Affairs Board."

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Cabinet.

Signed at Tokyo on this 10th day of July, 1946.

/s/ D. Takahashi
Signature of Official (SAL)

Witness: /s/ R. Furiyama
Secretary of the Cabinet
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

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Signed at Tokyo on this 10th day of July, 1946.

/s/ Edward P. Monaghan
NAME

Witness: /s/ William C. Froot
Investigator
I.P.S. Official Capacity
Excerpts from "Official Announcements Concerning Foreign Relations, Board of Information, Seventeenth Year of Showa (1942)" (Page 22)

"XXI. ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE BOARD OF INFORMATION CONCERNING THE GRANT OF LOAN TO THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA - July 28, 1942

With a view to contributing toward the sound development of the note issuing system of the Central Reserve Bank of China, the Japanese Government have, in response to the desire of the National Government of China, decided to grant a loan of ¥100,000,000 and the contract with respect to the said loan has been signed today between the Bank of Japan and the Central Reserve Bank of China."
XXVI. MINISTRY OF GREATER EAST ASIATIC AFFAIRS AN OUTLINE OF ITS ESSENTIAL PURPOSE, ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

Announcement by the Board of Information

September 1, 1942

I. Basic Policy

For the purpose of bringing the War of Greater East Asia to a successful end and to ensure the construction of Greater East Asia, a Ministry shall be created to take charge of administrative affairs pertaining to the various foreign countries and other areas within Greater East Asia and organs in the aforesaid countries and areas shall be perfected to conform with the policy and functions of the said Ministry.

II. General Principles

A. Central Organization

1. The Ministry of Greater East Asiatic Affairs shall be established to serve as the unifying organ with respect to the conduct of administrative affairs relative to the sphere of Greater East Asia excepting Japan Proper, Chosen, Taiwan and Karafuto. However, all matters of a purely diplomatic nature shall be under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

2. The Ministry of East Asiatic Affairs shall be in charge of the following:

   a. Matters pertaining to the execution of affairs in the political, economic and cultural fields in Greater East Asia, excepting matters of a purely diplomatic nature;

   b. Matters pertaining to Japanese subjects residing in foreign countries in Greater East Asia and matters pertaining to the protection of Japanese trade and commerce in the said sphere;

   c. Matters pertaining to settlers and the development of natural resources in Greater East Asia;
d. Matters relative to the supervision of businesses of the companies established under special laws for the purpose of carrying on enterprises in Greater East Asia;

c. All matters pertaining to cultural activities in foreign countries and other areas in the said sphere;

d. All matters relative to the training of non required for service in the territories in Greater East Asia;

e. All matters pertaining to the Kwantung Bureau; and

f. All matters pertaining to the South Seas Board

Furthermore, in order to cooperate fully with the military command, the Ministry of East Asiatic Affairs shall undertake all administrative work in the occupied areas in Greater East Asia.

3. The work of the Manchurian Affairs Board, the China Affairs Board, the East Asiatic Affairs and South Seas Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Northern Development and Southern Development Bureau of the Ministry of Overseas Affairs, and the South Seas Board will largely be incorporated into the Ministry of Greater East Asiatic Affairs.

4. Military and naval officers and persons from the people at large shall be made appointable as officials of the Ministry of Greater East Asiatic Affairs.

5. A liaison committee shall be created in the Ministry of Greater East Asiatic Affairs to coordinate work with the other Ministries concerned. (Note: The Manchurian Affairs Board, the China Affairs Board, the East Asiatic Affairs and South Seas Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Overseas Affairs shall be abolished following the creation of the Ministry of Greater East Asiatic Affairs.)

B. Organization in the foreign countries and areas in the region of Greater East Asia.
1. All Embassies and legations and other organs in the countries in Greater East Asia shall be incorporated into the Ministry of Greater East Asiatic Affairs and shall be made subject to the jurisdiction of the said Ministry. All matters pertaining to the status of officials in the overseas government agencies above referred to shall be placed under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Greater East Asiatic Affairs. The said officials shall be subject to the direction and supervision of the Minister of Greater East Asiatic Affairs in connection with their duties. However, on matters of a purely diplomatic nature these officials shall receive the direction and supervision of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

2. Officials for the said government agencies in Greater East Asia shall be made appointable from among civil officials of the various Ministries, military and naval officers and from among the people at large.

III. With the establishment of the Ministry of Greater East Asiatic Affairs, the following steps shall be taken in connection with the administration of overseas possessions:

A. The administration of Chosen and Taiwan shall, to the extent necessary, be handled with the view to according the same treatment as Japan Proper. The question as to how this shall be done shall be separately studied and considered. However, the general administration of Chosen and Taiwan shall be conducted as heretofore.

B. Karafuto shall be incorporated in the administration of Japan Proper.
1. All Embassies and legations and other organs in the countries in Greater East Asia shall be incorporated into the Ministry of Greater East Asiatic Affairs and shall be made subject to the jurisdiction of the said Ministry. All matters pertaining to the status of officials in the overseas government agencies above referred to shall be placed under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Greater East Asiatic Affairs. The said officials shall be subject to the direction and supervision of the Minister of Greater East Asiatic Affairs in connection with their duties. However, on matters of a purely diplomatic nature these officials shall receive the direction and supervision of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

2. Officials for the said government agencies in Greater East Asia shall be made appointable from among civil officials of the various Ministries, military and naval officers and from among the people at large.

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B. Karafuto shall be incorporated in the administration of Japan Proper.
XXII. STATEMENT OF THE MINISTER OF GREATER EAST ASIATIC AFFAIRS - November 1, 1942

I am profoundly moved by my unexpected assignment to the heavy responsibilities of the Minister of Greater East Asiatic Affairs with the establishment of the Ministry today.

The main purpose of the establishment of the Ministry of Greater East Asiatic Affairs is as previously announced by the Government. The present War of Greater East Asia means construction itself, and the construction of Greater East Asia is one and inseparable with the prosecution of the war. This war of construction is aimed at establishing a new order based upon morality and righteousness, by realizing on the basis of the fundamental principle which guided the founding of our empire, the great principle of Fakko Ichii, throughout Greater East Asia so as to enable all countries and peoples in the Greater East Asia sphere to have each its proper place with Japan serving as the pivot. For this ideal it is absolutely imperative to perfect a system and structure necessary for winning out the current war, and therefore the speeding strengthening and replenishment of our nation's power to prosecute the war must be said to be of the utmost urgency of the moment. For this reason the Government must, in carrying out the plan of constructing Greater East Asia and other governmental affairs, cooperate increasingly closely with the High Command and at the same time assure a very speedy and precise management of affairs under a unified and comprehensive structure.

The Ministry of Greater East Asiatic Affairs has been established to meet this urgent requirement and I keenly feel the great mission and heavy responsibility of the Ministry. I am determined to do all in my power in serving the State in order to discharge my duties.

Under the August Virtue of His Imperial Majesty brilliant victories have been won by the superb strategem and the courageous efforts of the officers and men of the Imperial forces in the current War of Greater East Asia and our invincible position has already been established on a secure basis. However, the task of successfully prosecuting this war and of constructing the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere is a colossal undertaking which has no precedent in history. For this purpose it is necessary for us externally to tighten our bonds with our allied and friendly Powers and internally further to solidify the unity of the one hundred millions of our people,
giving full play to our total power in our respective occupations with a persevering and indomitable spirit. From this standpoint, I intend to render still closer and stronger, in conformity with the stipulations of treaties, our nation's cooperation with these countries in the sphere of co-prosperity such as Manchukuo, the Republic of China, Thailand and French Indo-China, which have special relations with Japan. At the same time, it is my fervent hope that these countries also, understanding the real meaning of the present war, will extend further their cooperation for the realization of the ideal of establishing the new order of Greater East Asia."
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Michitoshi, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Cabinet, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of [ ] pages, dated [ ], and described as follows: "Official Announcements concerning Foreign Relations. Seventeenth Year of Showa (1942) Board of Information." (in English and corresponding translation in Japanese).

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Cabinet.

Signed at Tokyo on this 29th day of July, 1946.

/s/ R. Furlivama
Signature of Official

/s/ M. Takahashi
(SZAL)

Witness: /s/ R. Furiyama
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan hereby certify that I am associated with General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 29th day of July, 1946.

/s/ Edward P. Monaghan
NAME

Witness: /s/ Richard H. Larsa
Investigator, I.P.S.

Official Capacity
DCC. NO. 2117C

EXCERPT FROM INTERROGATION OF HOSHIKO, Naoki, DATED 19, 22, 26 Nov 45

XXX

Q. During the early period in Manchuria - roughly 1931 to 1936 there was no great change in Manchurian production, especially industrial production. What would you give as the main reasons for the lack of industrial development during those early years?

A. There might be a number of reasons for this; perhaps, the greatest one is that during that period a large amount of preparation was under way, so that there was no large amount of production.

Q. In what specific fields were these general preparations?

A. I don't have the exact figures at hand here, and cannot explore the minute reasons for all of this, but those preparations involved the setting-up of industries such as the Showa Stock Mills, and also involved the location and prospecting of gold fields. Since Japan does not advance as fast as America along those lines, it took considerable time to play the foundation for industrial production.

Q. Was there a shortage of capital during this period for development work?

A. If you think of capital not only in terms of money but also in terms of necessary goods and materials, then surely we can attribute part of the difficulties to a lack of capital in Manchuria.

Q. Where did you look to for the necessary capital?

A. We looked first of all to Japan for capital, but there were not sufficient sources from which to draw in Japan itself, so we looked to foreign countries for the necessary capital. When the Manchurian Industrial Development Corporation was established, we expected to get some capital from America, but due to various circumstances, that did not work out according to our plans and so we were forced to make out with what capital we could develop within Japan itself.

Q. In the early period - in the first period we are referring to before '37 - was invested the capital; where did it come from; was it local capital, or did it come from Japan?

A. It came practically all from Japan; during the period in question the investments from Manchuria was negligible.

Q. What sources in Japan supplied it?

A. As I said, while the capital did not flow the Manchurian in a
great stream, there was some, of course, and this came from various sources - from various industrial associations, from connections with Zhibashu, and from private capitalists and small investors - it was collected from quite a number of sources. In the early period, a great deal of this, of course, was invested through the South Manchuria Railway.

Q. Beginning 1937, you have a much sharper growth in industrial production in Manchuria - what were the reasons for this greater expansion in output?

A. The first explanation for such an increase in production could be attributed to the fact that the various enterprises such as the Showa Steel Works, had been completed, the coal mines had become fully operable, and the period of production had arrived. At the same time, the plans for increased expansion had also been developed, so that from then on we can witness this sharp increase in production.

Q. To what extent was this development based on the bringing in of Aikawa with his industrial experience and equipment?

A. For one thing, the Manchurian Government desired that a more realistic and positive attitude be taken toward the whole matter. That is, they wanted the Japanese capitalists to forget their suspicion and reluctance and really get some capital in and put things on a strong basis.

Q. Aikawa was a very special type of Japanese capitalist - why did they choose him?

A. I am coming to that - I have just started in with the first stop. Then, the Manchurians took an attitude of welcoming help and the Japanese capitalists began to take more of a definite interest in Manchuria, and that led to an infusion of capital. Up to this time, the South Manchuria Railway had been to some extent carrying on various enterprises, but as the enterprises grew, it became too much for the Railway Company and a need was felt to push the whole development to a higher level. At the same time, Manchuria needed more than capital. Administrative ability was also needed. Those reasons for the bringing in of Aikawa at that time. Another reason for calling Aikawa was the feeling that to develop these enterprises in Manchuria to the utmost, the thing should be put somewhat on an international basis so that financial aid could be brought in from outside Japan.

Q. Your first period of service in Manchuria ended in 1929. That was about the end of the first Five-Year plan in Manchuria. In what lines was that plan most successful?

A. Nothing went according to plan exactly and it is difficult for
no to say that we made any great success. However, possibly in the field of coal production and steel works, we made some relatively good progress. In the field of hydro-electric development, while we did not accomplish what we had outlined for the period, still dams were completed and the basic laid for future development so that in that field also it might be said we achieved some success. And, I might as well say that as far as aircraft production or automobile manufacturing was concerned, we did not succeed at all.

XXX

Q. How closely did you, when you were head of the "Manchuria General Affairs Board, keep contact with the Krantung Army?

A. I kept a very close connection with that Army.

Q. How often did you meet with the Commander of the Krantung Army?

A. There were no regular meetings, although we did meet together often. I suppose I met the Commander of the Krantung Army once or twice a month, but I met often than that with other officials.

Q. What was the normal range of subjects that you discussed with the Commander of the Krantung Army? Were they strategic subjects or were they largely economic?

A. There were no discussions along strategic lines at all. We took up certain economic affairs and civil administrative affairs largely.

Q. What problems did you normally discuss?

A. We took up practically all types of economic questions, particularly some of those involving development, i.e., the economic development of Manchuria.

Q. Did that include careful discussion of the progress of such a thing as the Five Year Plan?

A. Yes, of course.

Q. That did you think, in the period when you were there in 1932-1940, were the major obstacles to economic development - what were the limitations?

A. One of the biggest reasons for the lack of development possibly was the lack of good equipment.

Q. Which is machinery and machine tools?

A. Yes.
Can Mr. Hoahino give us a statement in his own words, as to what his conception is as to what Japan went into Manchuria for and what it expected to get out of it?

A. Well, in a word, I would say that after Japan occupied the country, then our policy was to try to build it up, first as a source of raw materials for our industries and second, as a place for our expanding population to go to.

Q. How successful does he feel the taking of Manchuria was for securing a source of raw materials up to the outbreak of the war?

A. Well, I can say I think it was a profitable thing as far as raw materials are concerned; but, it is rather difficult to answer your question.

Q. Well take iron ore specifically?

A. Even the Manchurian iron ore was not enough to satisfy Japan's industrial needs. Perhaps, she could provide up to one-third, however.

Q. That is, assuming they fulfilled their plans, they would still not get more than one-third of what they had planned as a national requirement for iron ore? Is that what you mean?

A. Again, I say it is a little bit difficult to be accurate on that. However, I do feel that even had our plans succeeded, at best we could not have looked for more than one-third of our requirements from that source.

Q. How about coal?

A. As far as coal is concerned, we could probably get all we wanted. In getting coal from Manchuria, the question of whether it would be most advantageous, is another question.

Q. How about food?

A. If our plans were carried out we could get ample food supplies from that source.

Q. Enough to take care of Japan's import needs?

A. I think probably we could have.

Q. Are there any raw materials which they felt they needed which they discovered they could not get in sufficient quantities in Manchuria except iron ore? Any they felt were essential to their national development?

A. There are many, first of all, there is oil and aluminum.
DCC. NO. 2117C  

Q. Didn't they have shale in Manchuria which could produce both oil and aluminum?

A. There are deposits of shale and aluminum producing shale which if exploited, might supply our needs. Of course, it would be possible to produce synthetic oil from the coal, but development of its sources would depend upon a great outlay of effort and expense and could not be realized immediately.

Q. Why did they decide not to make that outlay?

A. Well, they did develop them somewhat but that did not meet the needs. I think at the very last they did produce something like 100,000 tons of shale oil but the plan called for 500,000. It was a very difficult proposition, and, as far as synthetic fuel is concerned, probably altogether they did not produce more than 100,000 tons. In another 10 or 20 years, they might be developed into something, but at the present state it is negligible.

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Q. You say that one of the reasons Japan wanted to take over Manchuria was to get raw materials to use in her own industries.

A. Yes, that is right.

Q. However, instead of that, Manchuria proceeded to set up an industry to process those raw materials on the spot - the raw materials were not sent back to Japan were they?

A. Perhaps I used Japan in a rather limited sense a while ago, and instead, I should have said within the Japanese sphere because I was thinking of Japan and Manchuria together.

Q. Although you had an economy where you had to bring in large quantities of raw materials into Japan and you had processing facilities there, you chose to build up new processing facilities on the continent? Why was that?

A. As I said before, our purpose was to develop the whole Japanese sphere. Therefore, we were not limiting our development to Japan proper. From that standpoint, it was advantageous to us to develop industry where it could make the best use of local raw materials, and for that reason, those industries were developed near the source of the raw materials in Manchuria.

Q. Actually, although the plan for food production would have taken care of Japan's needs, Japan in fact continued to import food from other areas, did it not, prior to Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes, there was considerable of that.
Q. Well, if the purpose in taking Manchuria was to make Japan independent, then it was a failure as far as food was concerned.

A. Under ordinary circumstances and conditions, Japan with Korea and Manchuria, should have been able, by helping each other, to produce all their own required foods. However, crops do not always come up to expectations and for that reason it becomes necessary to import foods. Crops fluctuate a great deal — for instance, I recall in 1934 that Manchuria produced so many soy beans she did not know what to do with them. In fact, they even gave study to the use of soy beans instead of coal for firing locomotives. At that time, there was also some thought of imposing a customs duty on the importing of soy beans into Japan and this became quite a problem to Manchuria.

Q. Now you said that one of the reasons Japan went into Manchuria was to secure additional living space for its people. To what extent did the acquisition of Manchuria accomplish what had been hoped in that respect?

A. I cannot say that any great help has come so far. In fact, just a beginning has been made.

Q. But, as of 1941 it had not accomplished what Japan had hoped and expected?

A. No, it had not proceeded as well as we had hoped.

Colonel Colo

Q. We have heard two reasons for going into Manchuria. I would like to inquire if there were not one or two other reasons — perhaps the Army?

A. I do not know that the military had any other great reason beyond those mentioned.

Q. Well, the Army was very strong at that time in Japan, politically. It was able to implement its wishes. Why did the Army wish to go into Manchuria?

A. Well, it would seem to me, as near as I can analyze it, that their purposes were largely the two that I have mentioned.

Mr. Disson

Q. You mean there were no strategic objectives in going into Manchuria?

A. Wouldn't these things themselves be considered somewhat as
having strategic significance? Outside of that, I do not know of any other specific objectives.

**IX.**

Q. Did that mean the Manchurian Army gave them more control over their investments in Manchuria?

A. What I meant by 'unfo' was from an economic standpoint - i.e., they realized it would be profitable. It was no longer a risk.

Q. Yes, but was there a modification of the exclusive control by the Kwantung Army of Manchurian development?

A. Yes, they somewhat relaxed their controls - eased up on them.

Lt. (JG) Cohon

Q. When he speaks of 'Manchuria wanting things' and 'Manchuria's so-and-so' you mean, of course, the Kwantung Army?

A. When I said the Manchurians, I meant the Manchurian government. Of course, there is a very close connection between the Kwantung Army and the Manchurian Government and usually it represented pretty much the opinion of the army.

Mr. Biscon

Q. You were Chief of the Planning Board from July 1940 to April 1941. In your administration of the Planning Board during that period, what were the major tasks - major activities - as you see then now?

A. At that time, perhaps, the outstanding problem was that of a planned economy for Japan.

Q. In those mobilization plans that the Planning Board drew up, our understanding is they scheduled Manchurian production to fit in with Japanese production. Is that correct?

A. Plans were drawn up for Japan itself of course, but since there was such a close connection between the two countries, the plans usually took in the whole sphere.

Q. Could the Planning Board here change the program adopted in Manchuria?

A. Rather than any idea of a limitation of authority, the plan was to work jointly so that in planning for our needs, we made allocations from Manchuria and, on the other hand, Manchuria...
planned for the importing of Japanese equipment and thus it was necessary always for us to make the plans together, so there was not any modification of each other’s plans.

Q. Who was the final authority who decided how much of each item?
A. Suppose Japan wanted more pig iron than Manchuria wanted to send — how would that conflict be worked out?

Q. Such problems as that were decided in a Japanese-Manchurian Economic Association, made up of loaders in Manchuria and responsible authorities from Japan.

Q. Who would be the loaders in Manchuria?
A. The Minister of Finance and the Minister of Commerce and Industry and such men.

Q. And, on the Japanese side?
A. The Counselor to the Japanese Embassy and the head of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau.

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Q. In the late autumn of 1941, or toward the end of the year, would you say to what extent economic preparations were adequate for the strategic plan that Japan envisaged at that time?
A. This is a very difficult problem. You certainly were not in a very favorable position economically. Certainly there were plenty of difficulties.

Q. Let’s make it specific — on the oil problem — how much did you calculate you had in reserve to cover needs?
A. The Navy, of course, had secret reserves, and probably the military did as well, but we of the Cabinet Planning Board did not know how much, except that they ultimately felt that there was a supply ample enough to take care of their needs until they could obtain oil from other areas. There were evidently ample prospects at that time, as far as oil was concerned.

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Q. Were there any other items which were given special consideration in lieu of this strong possibility of being cut off?
A. Well, we were worried considerably over the lack of aluminum and also of iron ore.

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Q. The question of oil was discussed with the Army and the Navy.
and although they did not state how much they had on hand, they
did state that they were not worried and that they would be able
to take over new sources of oil before they ran out of what
they had?

A. I must have mis-understood, or also you mis-understood me. In
regard to one of the first questions you asked me as to the
shortages or problems in our economy, I mentioned the fact
that oil was the big problem and we were having to do something
to prepare against being cut off from outside sources. At that
time our own production of oil was a mere 300,000 tons while our
needs were two million tons, and that was something that gave
us great concern, and figured large in the work of the Planning
Board. Now, this oil question came up from another standpoint
and was not in connection with my work as Chairman of the Planning
Board. You asked me my opinion as to whether or not the Japanese
military thought they had sufficient supplies of oil for the war
they were planning in the fall of 1941, and I told you that it seemed
to be the understanding that they had ample supplies to
last them until they could get their hands on the oil in the
south. This had no connection whatsoever with my Planning Board.

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Q. What were the specific difficulties that developed in Manchuria
which may have prevented Aikawa from accomplishing his objective?

A. As I have mentioned a number of times, Aikawa's mission in
Manchuria was connected with a plan to bring in capital and all
his ideas were centered around a long period of development.
However, at about this time, the China-Japanese incident occurred,
and it became more and more evident that the situation would not
permit of a long period development but would have to be speeded
up. Aikawa could not see his way clear, apparently, to try to
make such a change in the program; he did not think it was
possible to speed it up as was demanded, and since it was evident
that tasks were close at hand would have to be taken up first
rather than the development of this long-term program, he felt
he was not the man for the job and dropped out.

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Q. Was there opposition to Aikawa because he was a Zainatsu?

A. I don't think there was.

Q. Aikawa was friendly to the Manchurian Army—presumably his
relation with you were also good—yet still there was considerable
difficulty in putting his program into effect?

A. The opposition of Aikawa could probably be divided into two
periods—in the early period the opposition was mainly on the
part of those who felt that international capital should not be brought into Manchuria. In the second place, when the capital did not come, then they began to criticize him severely. This opposition arose on the part of the South Manchuria Railway, since the plan was that much of their work would pass into hands of the Manchurian Industrial Development Co. Then, in the latter part of the period, the opposition arose in the middle ranks of officialdom.

Q. Was that purely the civil officials or was it also the Kwantung Army officials?

A. Those middle-rank officials, mostly civilian although possibly some in the Kwantung Army, opposed the giving of a free hand - they felt direct control would be more efficient.

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Dr. Dorr

Q. I wonder whether you could tell us very briefly and generally what your relationship was with Tojo when you were both in Manchuria?

A. I went to Manchuria in 1932, and at first was Vice-Minister of the Financial Dept. At that time, Tojo was Commander of the Kwantung Army's military police. He was located in Neihking where I was, and I first met him there. However, we had practically no official contacts. Later, in 1936, I was made Chief of the General Affairs Board, and the next year, 1937, Tojo was made Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army. In that capacity, we did have a number of contacts and did work together.

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Q. Was China thought of primarily as a potential market for Japan's manufactured goods or primarily as a source of raw materials?

A. Both.

Q. And, what would prevent Japan from buying and selling in China, even though she did not have her army there?

A. At that time, a virtual state of hostility existed between the two countries and with the situation as it was, Japan was loath to withdraw from China unconditionally.

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Q. If everything had gone better than you expected in taking of the N.W.I. and Malaya and the Philippines, was that your con-
sumption of military products loss rather than you had figured it would be?

A. We did not along very nicely at first and our plans worked out favorably but particularly after the battle of Guadalcanal the interference with our holding of these newly captured resources to Japan was interfered with by submarines and other means, and that is one reason why our plans did not develop as nicely as we had expected. There is another reason and that was this: The battles of Guadalcanal and other battles at that time consumed a great deal more in the line of ammunition and ships, etc. than we had planned.

Q. Was the expenditure of military products in the early campaigns, during which they captured the Philippines, Malay and the N.E.I., greater or less than anticipated?

A. The only thing that exceeded our expectations was the importation of raw materials from newly acquired territory - otherwise, there was no improvement in the war situation over what we had planned.

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Q. Was any consideration given to increasing imports of Manchurian aluminous shale with the thought that bauxite imports might be cut off at some time in the future?

A. We were planning on using Manchurian supplies in Manchuria rather than bringing them over to Japan. We did have a plan to bring this ore from probably Choton, which is in Shantung.

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Q. The expected shortage of bauxite did develop after the fall of Kwajalein?

A. The first plan we laid was to speed up our imports of bauxite from all possible places in the South Pacific to get ahead in supplies and the second plan was to make use of supplies of shale in North China. And, the third plan was to make use of certain low-quantity aluminous shale available in Japan proper.

Q. Was the Cabinet advised by the Japanese aluminum industry that the North China shale could be processed, by them?

A. I think the opinion was in general that it could be used.

Q. That is not quite responsive - was there any official consideration of the matter and an affirmative decision that it would be possible to operate on that basis?

A. Yes, there was such a decision.
Q. What consideration was given to further development of Manchurian shale oil?

A. Previously, a study had been given to this, and while it could not be speeded up overnight, still an increased production was planned through the giving of high priorities to supplies for these developments.

Q. Was the priority given to supplies for Manchurian shale oil changed during the war?

A. This was high on the priority list even before the war, but it was further increased at this time.

Q. During 1944, about 40% of Manchurian-produced pig iron and steel went into the building of new plants and commercial and civilian uses in Manchuria at a time when the Japanese war industries had already been forced to cut down on the production of guns and ammunition. What efforts were made to assure for Japan proper a larger share of Manchurian iron and steel?

A. I don't know about this 40% of which you speak. The use of Manchurian production was generally determined through talks between the two countries and most of Manchurian production would go into the war effort, so I wonder if this 40% to civilian production was not used indirectly also in the war effort so that actually what went into Manchuria was negligible.

Q. Is it your opinion that that is a fact?

A. I think that is the situation.

Q. So far as you know, the Manchurian economy was completely integrated with the Japanese war economy and the distribution of scarce materials was controlled completely from Japan?

A. As the war developed, the integration between Japanese and Manchurian economies became more and more definite, but I would not say that decisions were made arbitrarily in Japan, for these decisions were always reached in conversations between the two countries, but as Japan became more and more pressed, Manchuria would make a greater effort to bear a greater share of war demands.

Q. Did any differences of opinion arise as to the use of Manchurian resources?

A. Yes, there were discussions on this matter, particularly within Japan.
Q. Where a difference of opinion could not be settled by discussion, who had the final word?
A. As I explained the other day, such differences of opinion were settled by the Joint Japanese-Manchurian Economic Conference.

Q. How many votes did each of the parties on the Committee have?
A. Four each.

Q. Were there never times when the vote was 50-50?
A. No, there was not.

Q. Was the vote always unanimous?
A. Generally, the discussions were carried to the point where the final agreement was unanimous.

Q. In other words, there were no issues which arose over the use of Manchurian resources in the war effort which could not be settled by complete agreement of all parties?
A. That is right as far as these deliberations went.

Q. What does the qualification mean?
A. Well, there were, of course, many discussions which led up to those final decisions.

Q. And, you were always satisfied that Japan was getting everything out of Manchuria which could be got?
A. Yes, I was satisfied. I think that Manchuria rendered full help. Of course, Japan was actually in the fighting but Manchuria did what she could from her standpoint.

Q. And, the Manchurian civilian economy was cut down as much as the Japanese?
A. Manchuria probably was not cut down as much as Japan but inasmuch as she was not directly engaged in the fighting, perhaps the extent in which she engaged was all that could be expected. But, it is true, that either directly or indirectly, Manchuria, too, suffered considerably cut-down in her economy.

Q. But, she was not expected to make the same kind of contribution as Japan properly and?
A. Yes, that is right.
Q. My question is—did you believe that if a war came with the United States, you could win such a war?
A. Rather than the thought of whether we would win or not, the big thing was that we would try to settle the issues with America and there was considerable feeling that the thing could be settled. Of course, I suppose we thought if we did go to war we could probably win.

Q. Did you have any exact plan as to how you expected to win?
A. Of course, about those specific things, you would have to talk with the War and Navy Ministers because I was not in on the details or plans they had. However, from my own viewpoint and perhaps others, I felt that in the early stages of the war, Japan would be able to occupy a great deal of the Far East and with the materials such as oil and other things which we would thus acquire, it was felt we would be able to carry the war on for a long time and hold on to the countries we had occupied. There was never any thought of course of gaining a decisive victory over America, i.e., of landing on the American continent and bringing America to her knees—we felt that America, for her part, would be unable to suffer—due to West and that eventually we would work out some sort of an understanding in a sort of negotiated peace.

Q. Would you have felt that such a termination would be possible had you known that Germany would be defeated by Russia and the rest of the Allies?
A. No, I don’t think we would have held the same opinions.

Q. Why didn’t Japan wait until it was clear whether or not the Germans would actually capture Moscow and defeat Russia before attacking the U.S.?
A. I don’t think that at that time Japan was relying too much on Germany and while it is true that plans might have been different had Germany’s defeat been foreseen, the question seemed to center around the issues between Japan and America, and it was accelerated by America’s attitude toward China.

Q. But you did say as I understand it, that had you believed that Germany would be defeated, you would not have believed it possible to bring the war to a successful conclusion through a negotiated peace. Is that so? I will have to repeat my question—Why didn’t you wait and see more? Why did you not wait until you saw more?
A. While it was not felt necessarily that Germany would gain an immediate victory over Russia, neither did anyone think that Germany would be knocked out so easily.
EXCERPT FROM INTERROGATION OF HOSHINO, Naoki, DATED 19,22,23 Nov 45

(Page 21)

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Q. Why didn't Japan wait until it saw whether or not the Germans would actually capture Moscow and defeat Russia before attacking the U. S.?
A. I don't think that at that time Japan was relying too much on Germany and while it is true that plans might have been different had Germany's defeat been foreseen, the question seemed to center around the issues between Japan and America, and it was accelerated by the American attitude toward China.

Q. But you did say as I understand it, that had you believed that Germany would be defeated, you would not have believed it possible to try to win the war to a successful conclusion through a negotiated peace. If that is so, I will have to repeat my question - Why did you wait so long there?
A. While it was felt necessarily that Germany would gain an immediate victory over Russia, neither did anyone think that Germany would be knocked out so easily.
Q. Is it a fact then that you expected there would be a long continued European war which would tend to keep the U. S. worried about the situation in Europe, as well as the situation in the Far East, and thus prevent the U. S. from bringing its full weight to bear against Japan?
A. There was undoubtedly more or less that kind of thinking.

(Page 22)

Q. Was there any other kind of thinking in regard to it also?
I don't want you to say "Yes" because I put the question in that form if you do not really mean that. If you have something else in mind, that is what I would like.
A. Yes, there was undoubtedly that feeling.

Q. Was that an important factor?
A. Yes, it probably was an important factor.

Q. Was it a determining factor? Would they have been willing to go to war had they felt the situation would have been different?
A. I don't think this was a decisive factor. It is true that in any discussions or thought of winning the war, such a proposition would be taken into consideration. I think the question of primary importance was that Japan felt that she was fighting for her own existence and if that were threatened, she would fight regardless of other factors.

Q. That is, whether she thought she would win or lose, she would fight rather than retire from China?
A. Yes, that is the situation.

(Page 25)

Q. You were Cabinet Secretary from the beginning of the Tojo Cabinet until its fall, as I understand it?
A. Yes, that's right.

Q. I wonder if you could give us for each year beginning with 1942, the major problems of the Japanese war economy? In detail - not merely saying shipping or something like that, but what particular thing worried them the most?
A. 1942 was a period of positive advance in the war and our biggest problem during that year was the question as to how we would make the most effective use of the resources that
we acquired in the territories that we occupied. The mobilization of these materials progressed very smoothly in the early stages of that program but after the battles of Midway and Guadalcanal, the mobilization did not progress as smoothly as we would like.

(Page 26)

Q. Were the plans which had been prepared in advance found to be appropriate for the development of those areas - Did you find it was necessary to bring in more resources from Japan or less than you had figured?
A. Up until August 1942 the mobilization of these newly acquired resources exceeded expectations.

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Q. If everything had gone better than you expected in taking over the N.E.I. and Malaya and the Philippines, why wasn't your consumption of military products less than you had figured it would be?
A. We did get along very nicely at first and our plans worked out famously but particularly after the battle of Guadalcanal the interference with our holding of these newly captured resources to Japan was interfered with by submarines and other means, and that is one reason why our plans did not develop as nicely as we had expected. There is another reason and that was this: The battles of Guadalcanal and other battles at that time consumed a great deal more in the line of ammunition and ships, etc. than we had planned.

Q. Was the expenditure of military products in the early campaigns, during which they captured the Philippines, Malaya and the N.E.I., greater or less than anticipated?
A. The only thing that exceeded our expectations was the importation of raw materials from newly acquired territory - otherwise, there was no improvement in the war situation over what we had planned.
Tokyo, Japan
5 August 1946

I, T. A. Bisson, do hereby certify that I was connected with the Headquarters, U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), an agency of the United States of America, and that in such capacity I was present at the interrogations of HOSHINO, Naoki in Tokyo on the 19th, 22nd, and 28th November 1945.

I do hereby certify that I was one of the interrogators and that the attached copy of said interrogations number 505 is a copy of the interrogations now on file in Washington, D. C., with the War Department.

T. A. Bisson
T. A. BISSON

CERTIFICATE

I, E. E. Danly, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G.H.Q., S.C.A.P., and as such have possession, custody and control of original or copies of documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That Document 2117 contains the interrogation, No. 505, of Hoshino, Naoki, by the Headquarters, U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Basic) at Tokyo, Japan, on 19, 22, 28 November 1945.

3. I do hereby certify that a copy of the interrogation above referred to was delivered to me in my official capacity from the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey and that the copy so delivered to me has at all times been in my possession as Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G.H.Q., S.C.A.P.

Dated, August 5, 1946

E. E. DAILY
A central institution to carry on the important work of aiding in the construction of the new China and of realizing a new order in East Asia was created on December 16, 1938 with the inauguration of the China Affairs Board. Need had been felt for a powerful administrative organ to direct the task of development in China, a task with which the very existence of Japan is allied and which naturally includes problems of the utmost importance.

Last year, with the success of the military operations at Hankow, the China Affair entered a new phase wherein the work of reconstruction was to be undertaken side by side with military operations. Previously, concrete plans for the creation of a central administrative organ had been seriously discussed by the Army, Navy and Foreign Departments. Early in October, the Cabinet formally decided on the establishment of the institution now known as the China Affairs Board, which came into being on December 16th upon the promulgation of Imperial Ordinances concerning the Organization of the China Affairs Board and of the Liaison Office of the China Affairs Board, and concerning Amendments on the Organization of the Foreign Office.

As an explanation of the purpose with which the Board was created, we quote here from the address delivered by the then Prime Minister Prince Konoe on the occasion of its inauguration. Prince Konoe stated:

"The ultimate objective of the present hostilities, as has been enunciated on various occasions, does not stop with victory in arms but rather lies in the reconstruction of China and the establishment of a new order in the Far East based on the principle of cooperation between Japan, Manchoukuo and China. The overthrow of the anti-Japanese, pro-Comintern Regime of Chiang Kai-shek must lead the people of China to recognize the rationality and justice of cooperating with Japan, politically, economically and culturally.

"In pursuance of this task the China Affairs Board has been created. The Board endeavours, on the one hand, to coordinate and unify the various forces at home directed toward the consummation of the achievements of the China Affair and, on the other, to keep in close touch through its Liaison Division
with the actual developments in China. Creation of the China Affairs Board will enable the Government to conduct more efficiently the planning and execution of construction work in East Asia and will thereby hasten the attainment of the ultimate objective of the present conflict."

Thus, the China Affairs Board serves as a connecting link between the Government and the operations in China, presenting a united front in the prosecution of national policies. Created in connection with and existing for the duration of the China Affair, the new Board is presided over by the Prime Minister. Exclusive of purely diplomatic affairs, its business comprises (1) political, economic and cultural problems relating to the China Affair; (2) the study and investigation of governmental policies to be taken in regard to the matters coming under the above category; (3) supervision of the operations of the companies established under special laws for the purpose of doing business in China as well as the control of the business transactions in China by persons who are so engaged; (4) the maintenance of unity in the administrative affairs of the different Government Offices relating to China.

Accordingly, the activity of the Board covers a wide field, political, economic and cultural, in which is included the problems of cooperation with the new Governments in China, the supervision of the North China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company and matters relating to the culture and welfare of the Chinese people. In its organization, the Board is divided into various Bureaus, besides the President's Secretariat, including the Political, Economic, Cultural and Technical Bureau. The Prime Minister is the President ex officio and is assisted by the Foreign, Finance, Army and Navy Ministers as Vice-Presidents. The Director-General of the Board is Lieutenant-General Naosuke Yamagawa and under him are fifty officers and sixty clerks.

As the result of the taking over of cultural work in China by the China Affairs Board, the Bureau in the Foreign Office which hitherto had charge of this work has changed its name and will devote itself to international cultural affairs, excluding those in China. Other minor changes took place in the organization of the Foreign Office and of the Department of Overseas Affairs.

As for the place where the Liaison Division of the China Affairs Board is to be established and the area within which it will function, these will be chosen and designated by the Prime Minister. It may be added that there is additionally a Liaison Committee whose duty it is to promote unity among the different Government Departments with reference to the undertakings of the China Affairs Board.
The Japanese Government is resolved, as has been clearly set forth in its two previous statements issued this year, to carry on the military operations for the complete extermination of the anti-Japanese Kuomintang Government, and at the same time to proceed with the work of establishing a new order in East Asia together with those far-sighted Chinese who share in our ideals and aspirations.

The spirit of renaissance is now sweeping over all parts of China and enthusiasm for reconstruction is mounting ever higher. The Japanese Government desires to make public its basic policy for adjusting relations between Japan and China, in order that its intentions may be thoroughly understood both at home and abroad.

Japan, China, and Manchoukuo will be united by the common aim of establishing the new order in East Asia and of realizing a relationship of neighbourly amity, common defence against Communism, and economic cooperation. For that purpose it is necessary first of all that China should cast aside all narrow and prejudiced views belonging to the past and do away with the folly of anti-Japaneseism and resentment regarding Manchoukuo. In other words, Japan frankly desires China to enter of her own will into complete diplomatic relations with Manchoukuo.

The existence of the Comintern influence in East Asia can not be tolerated. Japan therefore considers it an essential condition of the adjustment of the Sino-Japanese relations that there should be concluded an anti-Comintern agreement between the two countries in consonance with the spirit of the anti-Comintern Agreement between Japan, Germany, and Italy. And in order to ensure the full accomplishment of her purpose, Japan demands, in view of the actual circumstances prevailing in China, that Japanese troops be stationed, as an anti-Communist measure, at specified points during the time the said agreement is in force, and also that the Inner Mongolian region be designated as a special anti-Communist area.

As regards economic relations between the two countries, Japan does not intend to exercise economic monopoly in China, nor does
she intend to demand of China to limit the interests of those third
Powers, who grasp the meaning of the new East Asia and are willing
to act accordingly. Japan only seeks to render effective the
cooperation and collaboration between the two countries. That is
to say, Japan demands that China, in accordance with the principle
of equality between the two countries, should recognize the freedom
of residence and trade on the part of Japanese subjects in the interior
of China, with a view to promoting the economic interests of both
peoples; and that, in the light of the historical and economic rela­
tions between the two nations, China should extend to Japan
facilities for the development of China's natural resources, especially
in the regions of North China and Inner Mongolia.

The above gives the general lines of what Japan demands of
China. If the true object of Japan in conducting the present vast
military campaign be fully understood, it will be plain that what
she seeks is neither territory nor indemnity for the costs of military
operations. Japan demands only the minimum guarantee needed for the
execution by China of her function as a participant in the estab­
ishment of the new order.

Japan not only respects the sovereignty of China, but she is
prepared to give positive consideration to the questions of the aboli­
tion of extra-territoriality and of the rendition of concessions and
settlements—matters which are necessary for the full independence
of China.
CERTIFICATE
re TOKYO GAZETTE

I, Z. E. Danly, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, C.H.C., S.C.A.P., and as such have possession, custody and control of original or copies of captured enemy documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That Document No. 1505 was delivered to me from Japanese Institute of Foreign Relations as being an original or copy of an enemy document that had been captured or obtained by military forces acting under the Supreme Commander Allied Forces and such document has been continuously in my custody since such delivery.

Dated: 12 Aug 1946

/s/ Z. E. Danly
Z. E. Danly

I further certify that Document 1505 contains twelve monthly issues of the "Tokyo Gazette", i.e., January to December 1939.

Dated: 15 Aug 1946

/s/ Z. E. Danly
Z. E. Danly
Laws and Ordinances Recently Promulgated

Law Concerning the North China Development Company, Limited
Law Concerning the Central China Promotion Company, Limited

(Laws Nos. 81 and 82, Promulgated on April 30, 1938)

The North China Development Company has been created to accelerate economic development and to consolidate and adjust such undertakings in North China. The business of the company is to invest in and finance leading enterprises in transportation, harbour and port improvements, communications, electric power generation and transmission, mining, production and sale of salt and allied undertakings. The company is capitalized at 350,000,000 yen, of which half is subscribed by the Government and the other half by private interests. The firm is empowered to issue debentures to an amount five times its paid-up capital.

The business of the Central China Promotion Company is to invest in and offer financial accommodations to enterprises in transportation, communications, supply of electricity, gas and water, mining, fishing, and other lines in order to assist the economic rehabilitation and development of Central China. The company is capitalized at 100,000,000 yen, to which the Government subscribes jointly and equally with private interests. This company, also, is empowered to issue debentures to an amount five times its paid-up capital.

The Government recognizes the right of these two companies to declare preferential dividends on shares owned by private interests. It will subsidize the companies for a certain period to enable them to maintain payment of dividends on privately owned shares.
CERTIFICATE
re TOKYO GAZETTE

I, E. E. Danly, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G.I.C., S.C.A.F., and as such have possession, custody and control of original or copies of captured enemy documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That Document No. 1504 was delivered to me from Japanese Institute of Foreign Relations as being an original or copy of an enemy document that had been captured or obtained by military forces acting under the Supreme Commander Allied Forces and such document has been continuously in my custody since such delivery.

Dated: 12 Aug 1946 /s/ E. E. Danly

I further certify that Document 1504 contains twelve monthly issues of the "Tokyo Gazette", to wit, January to December 1938.

Dated: 15 Aug 1946 /s/ E. E. Danly
THE PROGRAMME FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
OF CHINA

Board of Planning

Now that Canton and the Wuhan district, two of the most important military and political bases of the Kuomintang Government, have been captured by Japanese forces, the immediate action necessary to consolidate the achievements of military triumph is the work of assisting in economic reconstruction and development in the occupied areas. In certain areas, the part of Central China with Shanghai as its centre and in the Shantung district where severe fighting took place and where devastation caused by retreating Chinese forces was sweeping, public utility enterprises such as transportation services, communications, power stations and water works as well as industries in general have been utterly dislocated— in a word, the economic structure as a whole has been destroyed. Even in North China and in towns and villages in rural districts in Central China, where damages caused by battles were comparatively slight, conditions of impoverishment, although in varying degrees, also prevail.

On the other hand, there are enormous quantities of natural resources lying undeveloped in these areas, which might have been exploited for the promotion of industries and consequently for the happiness and prosperity of the people. In trying to aid the new China, which is emerging under the rule of the new regimes established in Peking and Nanking, in the work of economic development, Japan must not confine its activities within the domain of reconstruction in its narrower sense. The undeveloped natural resources must be utilized.

The main reasons for the failure of China under the Kuomintang Government to develop the resources lay in its lack of capital and technique and of stability in the political situation. Japan can now bring these qualifications to the new China so that resources necessary for the promotion of economic power and improvement of the general standard of living may be developed in full. And when this state of affairs is realized, the purchasing power of the Chinese people will naturally be increased, bringing about in turn the increase of Japanese exports to China. Thus, development of natural resources in China has far-reaching consequences in realizing the ideal of economic collaboration not only between Japan and China but between the three neighbouring countries including Manchoukuo, which is the basic step for achieving the national purpose of establishing a new, ideal order in East Asia.

It has also an important bearing upon the life of the Japanese nation as the stabilizing force of East Asia in that it can supply Japan with materials such as iron, coal, salt and cotton, for strengthening its national defence and augmenting its productive power. The necessity of reconstructing and readjusting transportation, harbours, communications
and electrical enterprises can be understood in this connection. Sufficient
supply of these necessary materials from a country within the Yen bloc will,
to a considerable extent, decrease Japan's overseas payments, while the
coordinated adjustment of industries within the three countries of Japan,
Manchoukuo and China, eliminating unnecessary competition and friction
between them, will work greatly toward the adjustment of supply and demand
of materials and the balancing of international payments.

These reconstruction activities, again, should not be considered
only as post bellum measures. They are as vital and urgent as military
operations and political activities; they are measures which must be carried
out even while the hostilities are going on. For success in these measures
will doubtless prove, on the one hand, to consolidate the new regimes and, on the
other, to crush the Kuomintang Government.

Establishment of Special Companies

As a concrete step for carrying out measures aiding reconstruction
and development in China two special companies, the North China Development
Company, Limited and the Central China Promotion Company, Limited, have now
been established. They are holding companies for investing in and financing sub-
sidiary companies directly engaging in reconstruction and development
undertakings, as provided for in the Law concerning the North China Develop-
ment Co., Ltd., and the Law concerning the Central China Promotion Co., Ltd.,
proclaimed on April 30, 1938.

The purposes for which the two companies have been established are
not the same. The company for North China is designed, as provided for
in Article I of the special law concerned, to function in accelerating
economic development in North China and in coordination and adjustment of
related undertakings; while the other company is designed according to Article I of
the Law, to function in promoting economic reconstruction and development in Central
China.

Thus, in North China, where destructions caused by the hostilities
have not been so heavy as in Central China and where an abundance of natural
resources, such as iron, coal, salt, cotton, and wool is still undeveloped,
Japanese aid is to be mainly for economic development. In Central China,
forming the centre for Western investments and Chinese industries and the
heart of the economic structure of China, where such development has already
been made to a considerable extent, and where devastation has been as sweeping
as that in the Tokyo-Yokohama districts after the great earthquake of 1923,
the immediate necessity is reconstruction of industries and public utility
enterprises, without which peace and order cannot be established, not to
speak of starting construction and development activities. This is especially
true of the need in Shanghai districts. Accordingly, Japanese aid in that
part of China is to be for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of industries
and public utility enterprises as well as for the further development of
natural resources.

These differences are also reflected in the estimates for funds needed
for their respective undertakings of the two companies. The North China Company
is capitalized at 350,000,000 yen in view of the vastness of its development
programme, while the Central China Company is capitalized at no more than 100,000,000 yen in view of its main objective which is the work of rehabilitation and reconstruction. Both concerns are also authorized to issue debentures up to an amount five times their paid-up capital. These funds together with the capital to be invested in subsidiary companies by the Chinese both in money and goods and that to be invested in them by private Japanese, amount to several billion yen.

Subsidiary Companies

As has been previously stated, the two companies, being holding companies, do not in principle operate directly any business enterprises. Their business will be to organize many subsidiary companies, to invest in and finance them and to coordinate and adjust their operations. In the case of the concern for Central China, however, it can, under some special circumstances, operate business enterprises directly.

What will be the enterprises of those subsidiary companies?

Article 14 of the Law concerning the North China Development Company, Ltd., provides:

That the North China Development Company, Limited, shall invest in and finance enterprises named below, and coordinate and adjust their operations:

1. Enterprises relating to transportation and harbour and port improvements.
2. Enterprises relating to communications.
3. Enterprises relating to generation and transmission of electricity.
4. Enterprises relating to mining.
5. Enterprises relating to manufacture, sale and utilization of salt.
6. Enterprises other than the above-named whose coordination and adjustment are particularly necessary for accelerating economic development in North China.

Likewise, Article 12 of the Law concerning the Central China Promotion Company, Limited, provides:

That the Central China Promotion Company, Limited, shall invest in and finance enterprises named below:

1. Enterprises relating to transportation.
2. Enterprises relating to communications.
3. Enterprises relating to electricity, gas and waterworks.
4. Enterprises relating to mining.
5. Enterprises relating to fisheries.
6. Enterprises other than the above named which are necessary for promotion of public utilities or industries in Central China.

The Central China Promotion Company, Limited, may, under special circumstances, directly operate the above-named enterprises, on approval by the Government.

These subsidiary companies, since they are the concerns operating directly in China, are expected to be established as corporations of Chinese registry under Sino-Japanese joint management. The question as to whether the principle of one company for one class of undertakings will be applied...
here will depend upon the classes of undertakings. As a matter of fact, decision has not been made on this matter.

Coordination and adjustment of the operation of subsidiary companies, as provided in the Law concerning the North China Company, is designed to eliminate the possible occurrence of circumstances which may hinder synthesized growth of various enterprises relating to development of natural resources and other industries which will be started in that area. In the case of the concern for Central China, however, there is no such provision in the Law. This can be accounted for by the fact that in this area Japanese aid, except in a few cases of enterprises to be started, will be mainly directed toward rehabilitation, replenishment and extension of the existing enterprises, which can be effected by controlling important matters of investment and financing and by thus regulating their operation. In both cases, a certain degree of guidance will invariably be given through the power of capital in the hands of holding companies.

Privileges Granted to the Two Companies

The missions of the two companies are highly important from the point of view of the current national purposes. Moreover, their business may not be profitable from the first and many serious difficulties may stand in the way of their successful operation. In view of these positive and negative factors which render the undertakings extremely momentous, the Government, besides making necessary investments in them, grants the two Companies many privileges by way of protection as provided in their respective Laws.

Hence the Government invests in the concern for North China 175,000,000 yen, representing half the total amount of authorized capital of 350,000,000 yen; and in the concern for Central China 50,000,000 yen, representing also half the total amount of its authorized capital of 100,000,000 yen. Of these government investments, certain amounts will be in forms of goods which consist mainly of materials necessary for repair and construction of rolling stock, bridges and rails which have either been destroyed or taken away by the Kuomintang Government. Recognition of the right of these two companies to declare preferential dividends on shares owned by private interests, by which dividends of 6 percent per annum are assured, is another important privilege to be granted to them. For this purpose the Government will grant them subsidies of a certain fixed amount for the period of 5 years, beginning with the first year of their operation. As for the debenture issue, it has already been explained. A privilege to be granted here is that payment of both principal and interest will be guaranteed by the Government.

Privileges generally entail supervision. The two companies do not constitute exceptions to this rule. They are required to get the approval of the Government with regard to raising loans, making changes in the articles of association, carrying out resolutions of merger and dissolution, and disposal of profits. With regard to plans for investment and financing for each fiscal year, also, they are to get governmental approval. Furthermore, the Government may give the companies such orders as are deemed necessary for the purpose of their supervision and of national defence. These and other supervisory measures are provided for in the Laws.
All necessary steps for establishment of the two companies were completed on November 7th. Messrs. Sonya Otani and Kenji Kodama were appointed Governors of the North China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company respectively by the Government. The fact that shares offered for public subscription were over-subscribed indicates the enthusiastic support given to the whole programme of economic reconstruction and development of China by the Japanese people at large. As for the capital paid up, it represents one-fourth of the authorized capital, ¥12.50 per share of ¥50, in the case either of the North China or the Central China Company.

The most vital as well as most interesting part of the whole programme is perhaps the detailed account of how and where reconstruction and development undertakings will be operated—in other words, detailed programmes for the activities of subsidiary companies. These will be given in the January issue of Tokyo Gazette in full.

From Tokyo Gazette, Dec. 1938

(PP. 16 - 20)

STATEMENT OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE FUTURE OF EAST ASIA

Dated November 3, 1938

By the august virtue of His Majesty, our naval and military forces have captured Canton and the three cities of Whan; and all the vital areas of China have thus fallen into our hands. The Kuomintang Government exists no longer except as a mere local regime. However, so long as it persists in its anti-Japanese and pro-communist policy our country will not lay down its arms—never until that regime is crushed.

What Japan seeks is the establishment of a new order which will insure the permanent stability of East Asia. In this lies the ultimate purpose of our present military campaign.

This new order has for its foundation a tripartite relationship of mutual aid and co-ordination between Japan, Manchoukuo and China in political, economic, cultural and other fields. Its object is to secure international justice, to perfect the joint defence against Communism, and to create a new culture and realize a close economic cohesion throughout East Asia. This indeed is the way to contribute toward the stabilization of East Asia and the progress of the world.

What Japan desires of China is that that country will share in the task of bringing about this new order in East Asia. She confidently expects that the people of China will fully comprehend her true intentions and that they will respond to the call of Japan for their cooperation. Even the participation of the Kuomintang Government would not be rejected, if, repudiating the policy which has guided it in the past and remoulding its personnel, so as to translate its re-birth into fact, it were to come forward
to join in the establishment of the new order.

Japan is confident that other Powers will on their part correctly appreciate her aims and policy and adapt their attitude to the new conditions prevailing in East Asia. For the cordiality hitherto manifested by the nations which are in sympathy with us, Japan wishes to express her profound gratitude.

The establishment of a new order in East Asia is in complete conformity with the very spirit in which the Empire was founded; to achieve such a task is the exalted responsibility with which our present generation is entrusted. It is, therefore, imperative to carry out all necessary internal reforms, and with a full development of the aggregate national strength, material as well as moral, fulfill at all costs this duty incumbent upon our nation.

This, the Government declares to be the immovable policy and determination of Japan.

RADIO ADDRESS OF PRINCE FUMIMARO
KONOE, PRIME MINISTER
November 3, 1938

I have the honour to state the views of the Japanese Government concerning the establishment of a lasting peace in East Asia—a task that has been handed down to us by the Emperor Meiji whose illustrious virtues we are commemorating today.

Following upon the capture of Canton, Hankow, the heart of China, was also taken, so that the so-called "Middle Plain" with its seven great cities, which virtually sustain the life of modern China, has now fallen into our hands. There is an old Chinese saying to the effect that "He who controls the Middle Plain controls the whole land." Thus the Chiang Kai-shek government is no longer anything but a local regime. Japan has achieved these results without overstraining her fighting power, which has always been kept at a level sufficient to ward off any intervention from the outside. We are moved, as never before, by the consciousness that this has been made possible by the august virtue of His Majesty, the Emperor, and the heroic efforts of His valiant officers and men.

In thinking of the glorious victories, our deepest gratitude goes our first to the tens of thousands of those who have been killed and wounded. Their noble sacrifices impose upon us, I feel, a two-fold obligation: first, to follow in the footsteps of those willing martyrs, and to achieve at all costs the ends for which they have fought; and secondly, to reply their services by doing all in our power for their families.

The key to China's fate is now in our hands. What, then, do we want? We want not the destruction of China but her prosperity and progress; not the conquest of China but cooperation with her. Working hand in hand with the Chinese awakened to a new consciousness of being people of the Orient, we want to build up an East Asia which is peaceful and settled. Allow me to state that no country is better aware than Japan of the ardent national aspirations of the Chinese, nor feels more keenly the need that China shall vindicate her position as a completely independent state.
It is an historical necessity that the three great neighbour nations, China, Manchoukuo and Japan, while fully retaining their respective individuality should stand closely united in their common duty of safeguarding East Asia. It is deeply to be deplored not only for the sake of Japan but for that of all Asia that the attainment of this goal has been thwarted through the mistaken policy of the Kuomintang Government. The policy of that government was based on the transient tide of the period that followed the Great War. It did not originate in the inherent intelligence and good sense of the Chinese people. In particular, the conduct of that government, which in its efforts to stay in power cared not whether the nation was left a prey to Communism or relegated to a minor colonial status, cannot but be regarded as treason toward those many patriotic Chinese who had risked their lives in order to erect a new China. It was in those circumstances that Japan, reluctant as she was to be involved in the tragedy of two great kindred nations fighting against each other, was compelled to take up arms against the Chiang Kai-shek regime.

Japan fervently desires the awakening of China. It is my hope that wise and foreseeing Chinese will be swift to assume leadership and to guide their nation back to the right path, and lead the rejuvenated state forward in the fulfilment of our common task in East Asia. Already in Peking and Nanking signs of rebirth have appeared. And in the wide plains to the north and west, a new Mongolia is springing to life. Let the Chinese people, who in the past 5,000 years of their history have illumined again and again the annals of civilization, prove once more their greatness by sharing in the stupendous task of creating a new Asia. Participation even by the Nationalist Government need not be rejected if, returning to the true spirit of China, it should repudiate its past policy, rescind its personnel and offer to join in the work as a thoroughly regenerated regime.

The nations of the world must surely be able to comprehend these new developments in East Asia. It is undisputed history that China heretofore has been a victim of the rivalry between Powers whose imperialistic ambitions have constantly imperilled her tranquillity and independence. Japan realizes the need of fundamentally rectifying such a state of affairs and she is eager to see a new order established in East Asia—a new structure of peace based on true justice.

Japan is in no way opposed to collaboration with foreign Powers, nor does she desire to impair their legitimate rights and interests. If the Powers, understanding her true motives, will formulate policies adapted to the new conditions, Japan will be glad to cooperate with them. Japan's zeal for stamping out Communism is well known. The aim of the Comintern is to sovietize the Orient and to overturn the world. Japan is firmly determined to eradicate the communist influence which is behind the so-called "long-term resistance" of the Chiang regime.

Germany and Italy, our allies against Communism, have manifested their sympathies with Japan's aims in East Asia and we are profoundly grateful for the great encouragement that their moral support has given our nation during this crisis. In the present emergency, it is necessary for Japan not only to strengthen still further her ties with those countries but also to collaborate with them on the basis of a common world outlook in the reconstruction of world order.
What the world needs today is a lasting peace based upon a foundation of justice and fair dealing. It cannot be denied that the principles governing international relations in the recent past have in practice tended only to preserve and perpetuate with cast-iron rigidity an inequitable state of affairs. In this irrational arrangement lies the fundamental cause of the collapse of the Covenant of the League of Nations along with many other pacts and treaties. We should not allow international justice to remain merely a beautiful phrase, but we should strive to create a new framework of peace, in accordance with a comprehensive view of all human activities such as commerce, emigration, natural resources and culture; and in keeping with the actual conditions and the progress of events I firmly believe that this is the only way to overcome the universal crisis which confronts us today.

Placing absolute trust in the usa at the front, the Japanese at home are silently engaged in speeding war-time production and in making preparation for protracted hostilities. Here we have a modern reproduction of the old Japanese spirit. History shows that our national fortunes waxed or waned in proportion to the degree in which the whole people were consciously aware of Japan's national policy. Knowing that a lasting peace in the Orient has always been the aim of our Sovereign, we cannot but be deeply conscious of our moral obligations as His subjects. It is high time that all of us should face squarely those responsibilities—namely, the mission to construct a new order on a moral basis—a free union of all the nations of East Asia, in mutual reliance but in independence.

What does this mean? What sacrifices does this call for? What preparations are required? These are matters of which we must obtain a clear understanding and concerning which we cannot afford to make any mistake. If there is anyone who believes that the fall of Canton and Hankow marks a turning point and that an immediate return to normal conditions is soon to arrive, he simply has not grasped the significance of the present Affair. There could be nothing more dangerous than that. Japan's undertaking to erect a new East Asia implies that she has entered upon a long period of creative work in all the activities of her national life. In that sense the real war has just begun. If we are to make of ourselves a truly great nation, we must stand united as one man and pursue with firm conviction and adamant resolve the task of reconstruction and construction overseas as well as at home.
The Programme for Economic Development of China.

Board of Planning

II

In the last issue of Tokyo Gazette, an outline was given of the China development programme, particularly with reference to functions and operations of the North China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company. In the present article, undertakings for development and promotion purposes to be conducted by their subsidiary companies will be discussed rather fully. And in doing so, those in North and in Central China will be taken up separately.

In North China.

The vital importance of public utility enterprises, such as transportation and harbour and port improvements and generation and transmission of electricity in relation to the general work of development of natural resources, is widely recognized. Naturally, such undertakings will be considered first.

With regard to transportation and harbour and port improvements, an immediate proposal has been the creation of a concern with the operation of railways as its principal undertaking. The question, however, as to the advisability of operating undertakings relating to harbours and ports, which have functions as essential as railways in the economic development of that part of China, under one and the same management is still an open one; concrete plans concerning this company have not been decided on.

In North China there are many railways, including the Peking-Shanhaikwan, Peking-Hankow, Tientsin-Pukow, Peking-Paochow, Shanghai, Chongting-Ch'iayen, Tatsung-Puchow, and Shantung (Kiao-Tai). These lines will be managed by the new railway company and the Tungchow-Kupeikow Railway, constructed by Japanese interests, which connects the Chingtsch-Kupeikow Railway of Manchoukuo with the Chinese line connecting Kupeikow, Tungchow and Peking, can also be thought of as coming under the same management after the termination of the present conflict. Construction of the Tzangchow-Shihkiachwang Railway, which connects Shihkiachwang, Tzangchow and Tientsin, and which was under negotiation between Japan and the Hepo-Chahar Political Council, and of an extension line of the Shantung Railway may be called for in the near future as undertakings of the new concern.

With regard to harbour and port improvements, much is to be done by Japanese aid, since North China harbours and ports, such as Tientsin, Chinhwaipo, Chofoo, Woilinwai, and Lungkow are all far from being satisfactory. In particular, improvement of the port of Tientsin is a matter of urgent necessity.
The port of Tangku, which forms the outer port to the former, is situated a few miles upstream from the estuary of the Pahiya, and vessels over 3,000 tons cannot be laid alongside the wharf on account of the constant discharge of mud, narrowness of the river, and lack of adequate wharf facilities. The case of Tientsin Port, which is in the distance of four hours' cruise upstream from Tangku, has been still worse, particularly in recent years. Thus vessels over 2,000 tons are not navigable, which means that many vessels have, at present, to anchor outside the sand-bank known as the Tangku Bar, and load and unload cargoes by lighters. Such a condition is even further inconvenient with the coming of low tide; not only those vessels but also tug-boats cannot clear this bar except at high tide which occurs twice a day. Such a port as can be made use of only by continually dredging the river-bed can never be improved as the only port for North China. The feasible way of solving this difficulty is to construct a port somewhere outside the mouth of the river, a port which will not be affected by mud discharged from the river. For this purpose export investigations and studies have been conducted. Realization of such improvement and extension or construction of Tientsin Port is urgent, aside from the question as to whether port and harbour improvements to be included in the undertakings of the new railway company.

With regard to communications services, a concern named the North China Telegraph and Telephone Company Limited, was established on July 30, 1939. This concern is capitalized at 35,000,000 yen, which is made up of investments by the Provisional Government at Peking amounting to 10,000,000 yen, including that in the form of equipment and other capital goods, and investments amounting to 25,000,000 yen by the North China Development Company and other companies operating in enterprises closely related to communications. Its main line of business is to construct and operate wire and wireless telegraph and telephone services, including the submarine cable. The successful operation of this new concern is expected to work greatly toward the realization of a communications policy based on Japanese-Manchoukuoan-Chinese collaboration. Needless to say, this concern is operating in communications services not only between different parts of North China but also between Japan, Manchoukuo, and the rest of the world.

Establishment of a concern or concerns for the purpose of generation and transmission of electricity, important as this is, has not as yet been fully decided on. Electric light and power companies operating in North China have not been prosperous. This is due mainly to higher rates of light and power caused by the insufficient amount of capital, the lack of superior technique, and the consequent irrational planning for generation and inefficient management of business. Besides the generating plants of these power and light companies, there are plants owned and operated by important mines and factories, which number over 100 in North China alone. All these generating and transmission systems must be controlled in a comprehensive way with a view to supplying cheap power for the benefit of the mass of the Chinese people and at the same time for facilitating the progress of economic development. In this connection, the questions as to whether the principle of one company for one class of undertakings should be applied to electrical undertakings and whether that of one company each for one district—in other words, several companies for one class of undertakings—is to be applied to them are yet to be decided on. With regard to the system of generation, abundance of coal
resources in that part of China has necessarily made all the generating plants there, as is well known, adopt the thermal generation system. However, the hydraulic system may be adopted by utilizing the water of the Lwanho, which rises in the Chengdeh region in Jehol, Manchouchuo, and flows into Pohai Bay. Investigations are now being conducted by experts. To unify voltage and frequency with a view to the completion of a network of generation and transmission throughout the whole of North China under a unified plan must also be made an objective of the new concern.

Natural Resources.

Enterprises for developing natural resources which will likely be aided and placed under the coordinated control by the Development Company through investment and financing, as have been previously explained, are mines and those relating to the manufacture, sale and utilization of salt. With regard to the former, iron and coal mines will be the first to receive Japanese aid.

Deposits of iron ores in North China amount approximately to 200,000,000 tons, representing more than half of the deposits in the whole of China which are said to be 350,000,000 tons. Of those only a small portion has been developed and produced. The mine having the largest deposits is the Lungyen Iron Mine in Chahar Province. Here the deposits are said to amount to some 90,000,000 tons. For the development of this mine, a semi-official company was established in 1918, and the construction of an iron works with one blast-furnace was started in Shichingshan near Peking. The mine was supplying iron ores to the iron works at Hanyang. However, construction work and the supplying of ores were given up during the World War.

In Shansi Province, 30,000,000 tons of iron ores are said to lie in deposit, and iron works with blast-furnaces, though on a small-scale, have been established in Taiyuan and Yangchwan. A steel plant was even being planned in Taiyuan. All this is a manifestation of General Yen Hsi-shan's policy of autarchy based on the so-called Shansi Monroe Doctrine. Since, however, the ores in the Province are mostly lying dispersed and deeply deposited in the ground, their large-scale and speedy development cannot be hoped for.

In Shantung is the Chinchingchon Iron Mine. This was formerly known as the Tehhwa Company, a Sino-German joint enterprise, and placed, along with coal mines, under the management of the Lutai Company, a Sino-Japanese joint enterprise, as a result of the Shantung Agreement after the World War. As the ores found in this mine, are not suited to the ordinary process of manufacture, and also as the business could not be operated profitably, the mine has not been in operation. The deposits are estimated at between 13,000,000 and 15,000,000 tons.

An iron mine company which is expected to be established soon may centre its operations in the development of the Lungyen Mine. Iron Works at Shichingshan, Taiyuan and Yangchwan may also come under its management. Part of the ores from this mine and the surplus of pig iron produced in these iron works will be exported to Japan, while steel produced will be consumed on the spot. Already the Shichingshan Company is exporting to Japan the ores mined years ago.
Coal is another important mineral product in North China. In Shantung Province, deposits are said to total more than 1,500,000,000 tons. Important coal-fields in the Province are those at Poshan, Tschew, Changtsin and Fangtsae. Their annual outputs amount to 1,500,000, 7,600,000 and 4,50,000 tons respectively. Of these, the Tschew and Fangtsae Mines have been operated by the Lutai Company, which has been referred to elsewhere. And the Poshan Field includes the Heishan Mine, which produces coal of superior quality. This mine, operated by the Potung Company, a Sino-Japanese joint enterprise, produces more than 100,000 tons annually, a certain amount of which has been exported for making coke and for other purposes.

Along the Lung-Hai Railway, to the east of Hsiaow and to the north of Taierchwang, there is the Chonghsing Coal Mine, which, producing coal of superior quality amounting annually to some 1,700,000 tons, has been supplying Central China. Along the Shansi Railway and not far from the Hsiaow-Shansi border is the Taingsing Coal Mine, whose annual output amounts to 700,000 tons. In this neighbourhood also is the Chengfeng Mine, whose annual output is 360,000 tons. The former is owned by the Hsiaow Provincial Government and had been invested in partly by German interests. German holdings, however, were purchased toward the end of last year by the Hsiaow Mining Company. Hsiaow Province has a coal-field also at Montowkow, southwest of Peking. This coal-field, with an annual output of 380,000 tons, has been operated as an Anglo-Chinese enterprise.

Deposits in the Kailan Coal Mine an Anglo-Chinese joint enterprise, are said to be over 300,000,000 tons and annual outputs range from 4,600,000 to 5,000,000 tons. The coal from this mine is of a superior quality and adequate for industrial uses, particularly for the use of the iron industry; Japan is also importing it annually to an amount exceeding 1,000,000 tons. This enterprise will not come within the scope of the Development Company.

The above description of coal deposits in North China is sufficient to give readers an idea of how rich that part of China has been in coal resources. That, however, represents only part of the whole deposit. In Shansi Province the deposits are estimated at twenty times as much as the total amount of the figures given in the foregoing, that is to say, at tons of billions of tons. These resources, fabulously rich as they are, have never been developed as they should be. The only coal-field developed on a relatively large scale is that in the Tatzung district, which is situated at the northern extremity of the Province. Even that is quite insignificant in annual output as compared with the deposits, the former being approximately 50,000 tons and the latter more than 10,000,000,000 tons. Another coal district with huge volumes of deposits is the Fenzin Mine along the Fung River. Deposits in this mine alone are estimated at some 30 billion tons. Other coal fields in North China are: Pingsing and Taiyuan in Shansi; Sintai, Ichwan, Hwafeng and Hwang in Shantung; Tschaisen, Lincheng and Teitang in Hsiaow; and Liuhokow and Chiaoto. The last named is operated by an Anglo-Chinese joint concern. Thus the deposits in all the Provinces of North China are estimated to total to 130-46 billion tons, representing 60-70 per cent of those of the whole of China. The total annual output, however, amounts to no more than some 15,000,000 tons. Here again, the question as to the principle governing the number and distribution of companies to be established for the mining and sale of coal from those widely dispersed coal-fields and its sale has yet to be decided on.
In developing these coal resources, the new company will aim at ensuring smoothness in the domestic consumption of coal in China by carrying out controlled supply, and at the same time meeting its demands in Japan, particularly the urgent demands for cohesive coal for the purpose of manufacturing iron. The volume of coal consumption in Japan will rapidly increase with the development of her industry, while the increase in production of coal is not likely to keep pace with such growing demands. As things stand, it will be necessary, ten years hence, to import annually hundreds of millions of tons. In the light of the current rates of foreign exchange and of transportation charges, not to speak of the programme of industrial expansion in Manchoukuo, which will perhaps demand the greater part of her own coal output, the natural direction to which Japanese industry will turn for the supply of coal must be that of China.

Coal fields in Kailan and in Shantung alone, however, cannot be depended upon for such a purpose, because of their limitations in outputs, natural conditions or ages. The field most suitable for the purpose, in other words, for large-scale new development is held by many exports to be the Tatsuon field, the annual output of which can be made, according to them, to reach the 200,000,000 ton level.

A concern for operating in the production, by liquifying coal, of liquid fuels, in which the three countries of Japan, Manchoukuo and China are suffering from shortage, is also being planned.

As for an enterprise concerned with the manufacture, sale and utilisation of salt, it constitutes an indispensable item in the development programme; and its foundation, of course, is the salt field. Principal fields in North China are the Changlu Salt-Field in the neighborhood of Tangku and along Pohai Bay and the Shantung Salt-Field with Kinshow Bay as its centre. In China, however, the exportation of salt has not only been prohibited except in cases where there are special international agreements, such as the Treaty of Shantung, but also rendered impossible on account of the imposition of the extremely high rate of taxation. Consequently, conditions wherein hundreds of thousands of tons of surplus salt were piled up on the shore had existed. Before the outbreak of the present affair, negotiations between Japan and both the Nanjing Government and the Kopei-Chahar Regime resulted in the lowering of their tax rates and the permitting of the exportation of salt. Accordingly, Changlu salt began to be exported to Japan by the Hsingchun Company. With regard to Shantung salt, Japan has been buying a certain given amount annually at a low tax rate as stipulated in the Treaty of Shantung. The annual demand for salt in Japan, on the other hand, amounts at present to over 2,300,000 tons, comprising 800,000 tons for food and 1,500,000 tons for industries. These figures, however, will be doubled in the near future as soda industries develop. Salt for industrial purposes is used, up to 95 per cent, in these industries, and of the soda products more than half will be used for the manufacture of rayon and staple fibre. Thus, salt for industrial purposes, soda, rayon and staple fibre are closely related, and the supply of salt of this kind has an important bearing upon Japanese industries, particularly upon the textile industry.
Salt imported to Japan from overseas territories and foreign countries, which amounts even today to 1,500,000 tons, can be classified, according to the places of its production, into two kinds, pelagic and coastal salt. The latter kind is imported, excepting the supply from overseas territories, from Manchoukuo, China, French Indo-China and Java; while the former is imported mainly from African Eritrea, Italian and French Somaliland, Egypt, Sudan and Aden. For supplying the growing demands of salt in Japan, it is certainly advisable, for economic and other reasons, to depend as much as possible upon salt from China. Accordingly, the rehabilitation and increase of production of Changlu and Shantung salt by the new concern are urgently called for from the standpoint of the expansion of Japanese industries as well as from that of the domestic consumption in China for food and industries.

With regard to the utilization of salt, the soda factory owned by the Yungli Company and the salt works owned by the China Company, both of which are in Tangku, as well as the salt works owned by the Yungyu Company at Taian, are likely to come under the management of the new concern. A plant for washing salt is also being planned by the same concern.

In Central China.

Industrial promotion in Central China has been planned to include the reconstruction and development of railways centring in Shanghai, bus and communication services, electrical undertakings, waterworks, mining and fisheries. Plans regarding concerns to be established as subsidiary companies of the Central China Promotion Company have been making progress.

Of the above enterprises, the most important are railways. Since Central China is the most densely populated area in all China and since it contains in it Shanghai, the economic centre, and Nanking, the former political centre, the demands for transportation services have been exceedingly great, as has been evidenced by the fact that railways there have a total length of 800 kilomètres despite the growth of water-transportation on the Yangtze and other rivers. Railways in North China are the Nanking-Shanghai Railway; Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo Railway, which connects the three cities, though uncompleted between Hangchow and Ningpo; the Soochow-Kashing Railway; and the Kia-tsing Railway connecting Nanking, Wu-hu and Sunkiang, Anhwei Province. All these railways were greatly damaged by the recent fighting, and are now being operated by the Japanese Army which has repaired them temporarily. It is exigent for the restoration of peace and order and the transportation of goods and passengers that they should be reconstructed and their rolling stock replenished. The new railway company to be established will take up the work of rehabilitation and operation of these lines. Furthermore, it is planning to construct new lines connecting the existing lines with the Woosung and the Hongkow wharf in Shanghai.

With regard to communication services, a concern named the Central China Communication Company, Limited, was established on July 30, 1938. This concern is capitalized at 15,000,000 yen, of which 6,000,000 yen represents an investment by the Promotion Company, 4,000,000 yen that by communications interests in Japan, and 5,000,000 yen that by the New Government at Nanking in the form of existing equipment. The new concern will function for the
unification and operation of wire and wireless telegraph and telephone services between China and Japan and between cities and localities in that part of China, and at the same time for the restoration and operation of wireless communications with the rest of the world and of cable communications with North China. Plans for the improvement and extension of services will also be taken up.

Radio broadcasting, belonging as it does to the same category of undertakings, will not, for the time being, be included within operations of the Communication Company.

A concern, the Central China Electric Company, Limited has also been established for the purpose of operating in electrical and water-supply undertakings. Of its capital of 25,000,000 yen, 7,000,000 yen represents an investment by the Promotion Company, 2,500,000 yen that by Japanese electrical interests, and 15,500,000 yen that by the Chinese in the form of the equipment, comprising 9,000,000 yen for electricity and 6,500,000 yen for water supply.

Operation of the new electric company will be started on the basis of a merger of electric companies at Nantao, Chang, Pootung, Sianghwa, Chonju, and Tachangchon, and also of two water-supply companies in the Shanghai district. The first step in the activity of the concern will be to restore the operations of these old companies on the new basis, and then to try to effect the coordinated development of electrical undertakings in the entire area in Central China under Japanese occupation. Thus, enterprises at Soochow, Wuhai, Hanchow and Nanking will be brought under its management by acts of purchase. On the other hand, the water supply service will be made a separate, independent concern in the future when circumstances become favourable.

Iron Mines.

Central China has also been blessed with iron mines, the most essential natural resource for modern nations. Iron deposits in the Yantso Valley are said to amount approximately to 1,000,000 tons, representing 35 per cent of the total deposits in all China. Favourably situated geographically and producing rich crees, these resources have been developed to a greater extent than those in North China. Viewed as a whole, however, the development of iron resources in the country has been extremely insignificant in relation to the total volume of deposits of the ores, their total annual output being no more than 9,000,000 tons.

In the part of Central China under Japanese occupation, districts lying between Nanking and Ta-Ching-hai, Annwei Province, are rich in these resources. As a matter of fact, the Nanwan, Tawashan, Tangshan and Han-yoirshan Iron Mines, which lie to the northeast of Taipings, have been supplying ore to Japan. Other mines similarly supplying Japan with their rich iron ores are Chon-plah, Tieryushan and Taochun. These and undeveloped mines in the lower Yantso Valley, including those in the neighbourhood of Leke Weishan, are estimated to hold deposits amounting to more than 1,000,000,000 tons.
For the purpose of developing these resources, the Central China Iron Mine Company, Limited came into being on April 8, 1938. This company has not as yet been fully capitalized, the only principal investment in it being 16,400 yen by Japanese interests, including that of 4,500 yen by the Promotion Company. The investment by Chinese interests, other than a negli­gible amount already invested in the form of deposit money, will be made in the form of equipment and goods, when negotiations have been concluded regarding appraisals of their mines. Furthermore, since the Wuhan district has been occupied by Japan, the rehabilitation and development of the Tayooh and other mines in the upper Yantze Valley have now been called for.

Other Enterprises.

A concern for controlling transportation on crooks has also been established as one of the subsidiary companies. Simultaneously, plans are favourably progressing for the creation of concerns to operate in bus services, fisherion, and salt manufacture in the neighbourhood of Haichow.

Thus, through well-planned, thoroughgoing Japanese aid, the economic life of the new China will fast be revived and developed not only for the prosperity of the Chinese people but also for that of all countries in East Asia.

In many of the above-named enterprises foreign capital has been invested. In connection with the further development of the businesses concerned, practical adjustments will have to be worked out with the foreign interests. Study has already been given to this problem and it is expected that local circumstances will soon enable satisfactory solutions to be made. The harmonious collaboration of foreign interests and further investments of capital for the development of China's immense resources will be genuinely welcomed.
INDUSTRIAL RECONSTRUCTION IN CHINA

Cabinet Information Bureau

In China modern methods of industry were first adopted in the latter part of the nineteenth century, but progress along this line has been tardy; for even today two-thirds of the products of Chinese industry are hand-manufactured.

Although no detailed statistical data are available on China's industrial conditions immediately before the outbreak of the China Affair, a survey made in 1934 showed that the total number of Chinese industrial establishments with more than 30 operatives (qualified as factories by the Chinese Industrial Law), was 2,435, with capital investments totalling 400,000,000 yuan. The number of factory operatives was estimated at 500,000, producing about 1,280,000,000 yuan of manufactured goods. This means an average capital investment per factory of less than 170,000 yuan—which shows that the average Chinese factory is small in scale and poorly equipped. On the other hand, there are the British, American, Japanese and other foreign industrial enterprises in China, which are operated with about twice the amount of capital that the Chinese invest in their own industrial enterprises. What is more, the foreign-owned plants have the advantage of possessing modern equipment and a high degree of engineering skill.

Light industries such as spinning, flour milling, oil, tobacco, and match manufacturing occupies about 90 per cent of the Chinese industrial field. As for machine-manufactured goods China depends largely upon foreign-owned factories. Another noteworthy fact is that 80 per cent of all industrial plants in China are concentrated in Shanghai, Tientsin, the Wuhan cities, Canton and Tsingtao, where most of the foreign-owned plants are located, as well as over 50 per cent of Chinese factories operated with purely Chinese capital.

The low productivity of Chinese industry has a cramping effect and does not allow the rich industrial resources of the country to be used for her own advantage. Instead such resources have mostly been exported in the form of raw materials to feed the advanced industries in distant parts of the world, and which in turn necessitated the importation of raw materials required for Chinese industry. Furthermore, this low industrial productivity has at best secured to the workers an extremely low livelihood, with the result that Chinese industry has been unable to separate itself from agrarian economy.
A knowledge of the special characteristics of China’s industrial structure, as described above, is necessary in order to arrive at a correct understanding of her industry, and will, at the same time, be of assistance in forming an idea of the direction in which the construction of a new East Asia will be effected through Sino-Japanese cooperation, that is, the emancipation of the Asiatic peoples from their present semi-colonial status.

Extent of Destruction

As 80 per cent of the industrial plants in China was concentrated in the five industrial centres, direct damages sustained by them as a result of the hostilities were enormous. In Shanghai, according to statistics compiled by the Social Affairs Bureau of the old Shanghai Municipality in November, 1936, 2,998, or about 55 per cent, out of the 5,525 factories in that city were destroyed. Damages increased still further consequent on the fall of Nantao. All in all, damages to factories in the city were estimated at 800,000,000 yuan. The French Concession escaped destruction, whereas in the International Settlement 70 per cent of the factories clustered about the eastern areas of the city under Japanese jurisdiction were demolished. In Puotung and other districts under Chinese jurisdiction, damages to factories did not exceed 50 per cent, while destruction of such establishments in Chapel and Nantao was almost complete, with the result that the number of factories in the whole of Shanghai was reduced to 26.5 per cent of that before the hostilities. Damages to Japanese spinning mills were not as great as those sustained by Chinese mills, but the Toyoda Spinning Mill was more than half wrecked and the Nikka Spinning Mill in Puotung also suffered considerable damage. Factories on the Yangtze delta escaped with less damage than those in Shanghai, but the productive capacity of those at Wush and Changchow was reduced by 50 per cent. Small factory-owners in those districts suffered heavy losses when thieves, taking advantage of the confusion, ransacked their establishments.

At Tsingtao, the greatest industrial centre in North China, all Japanese spinning mills, including the Naigai, Fuji, Kungdah, Mission, Dai Nippon, Shanghai, Tungshing, Toyoda and Kokko Spinning Mills were razed to the ground overnight by Chinese troops. Direct damages to Japanese factories at Tientsin were comparatively small, but most of the spinning mills had to suspend operations, reducing their total output to about 53 per cent by the end of 1936. In the three Wuhan cities 41 per cent of the 515 factories took refuge in the hinterland and about 12 per cent were deliberately destroyed. The remaining 47 per cent more or less damaged factories were restored. Severe fighting was chiefly to blame for these devastations, and if losses due to suspension of work were included, the total setback would amount to a staggering figure.
Rehabilitation

The industrial areas thus affected by the hostilities are the strategic districts under the new Chinese Government. It is necessary, therefore, to undertake first of all the rehabilitation of factories, rescue work and maintenance of peace and order in those stricken cities. For this purpose, all the factories which were deserted by their owners have been placed temporarily under the supervision of the Japanese military, or consigned to Japanese interests. Many Chinese factory-owners were able to reopen their plants by the aid of Japanese capital and engineering skill under Sino-Japanese management. This arrangement has attracted no small amount of Japanese capital to China and has helped many a prostrate Chinese factory to regain its feet.

In Shanghai, factories are gradually being rehabilitated. This is particularly true in the foreign settlements where there is now a greater number of factory operatives than before the clash. Even in the eastern section of the settlement, where destruction was heaviest, about 80 per cent of the factories, chiefly Japanese, have been restored. In the area under Chinese jurisdiction, rehabilitation work in Foochow is being carried out most efficiently, and that in Nantao is also making headway. The Japanese spinning mills which suspended operations at the beginning of the war, set to work to reopen immediately after the Chinese forces were driven back and such plants resumed work late in 1937.

Although the damage suffered by Japanese spinning mills at Tientsin was very great, the first part of the rehabilitation programme was completed early last year, in which roughly 60 per cent of the productive power was restored. The spinning industry in Tientsin, which did not suffer direct damage, has outstripped those of Tientsin in productivity and is now enjoying unprecedented prosperity. In the Wuhan cities, 11 important factories, representing British and Sino-Japanese capital and others, together with 87 small Chinese plants have been restored. The number of small Japanese industrial enterprises in those cities has quadrupled since 1937.

From Restoration to Construction

With the progress of restoration work, Chinese industry has entered a new stage of development and should therefore expand along modern lines. Under Japan's leadership, a plan is now under way for the systematic development of North China, including the Mongolian provinces, with a view to preventing the infiltration of Communism and stimulating China's productive power. Under this plan, various industries such as coal, iron, coal liquefaction, electric power and salt industries have been placed under economic control, while spinning and other industries were allowed to remain as free enterprises. In November, 1937, the Forth China
Development Company was organized as a holding company for controlling various subsidiary companies related to such industries. As for free enterprises, they are to be conducted in accordance with the following three basic principles for the establishment of a new order in East Asia: (1) Japan, Manchoukuo and China must avoid economic rivalry; (2) Any enterprise which may call for dual investments will be restricted; and (3) Indiscriminate duplication of enterprises of the same kind must be avoided. Accordingly, policies based on these principles have been formulated to regulate free enterprises.

This policy of regulating industry is intended to promote a healthy development of Chinese industry, and to encourage Sino-Japanese economic co-operation by affording it political and economic security. The declaration of the commander-in-chief of the Japanese expeditionary forces in China on March 18, to the effect that factories under Japanese military supervision are to be restored to legitimate Chinese ownership is animated with the same spirit. Such is the political, economic and military policy of the Japanese Government in the special areas of North China as it is in Central China. Important industries are controlled by the North China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company, while minor industries may be undertaken as free enterprises.

North China

The method of industrial control is of special interest. Up to the outbreak of the China Affair, a greater part of the iron industry in North China was still undeveloped, and the Shihchingshan refinery had been closed for 20 years. The iron industry is now under the direction of the Lungyen Mining Company, a Sino-Japanese organization established in July, 1939. The Shihchingshan Iron Works has been put into operation since November, 1938, the Yanghuan Iron Works since June, 1939, and the Taiyuan Iron Works since November, 1939, and they are doing very creditably.

As for electric power, up till the outbreak of hostilities, Chinese industry depended upon the local generation of power on a small scale, chiefly for lighting purposes. This is one of the reasons why large electric enterprises did not develop. The electric industry in North China at present is being carried on by the Huapai Electric Power Company, which was established in November, 1939, and commenced services in February this year, as a subsidiary of the North China Development Company. It supplies Peking, Tientsin and the East Hopei District with electric power. The Company is also in charge of the local power houses under military control, and later on it is destined to control the electric power industry throughout North China.
Salt and Soda

Formerly the manufacture of industrial salt in North China was conducted chiefly by the salt department of the Hsingchung Company. The Huapei Salt Company, which was established in August, 1939, as a subsidiary organization, is now engaged in the development of Chanslu salt from the salt-fields near Tangku. The Hsingchung Company operates a soda manufacturing plant at Tangku belonging to the Yungli Chemical Industry Company, which is under military control, but the two concerns are expected to be merged in the near future. Besides this, the Shantung Salt Company, established in February, 1937, is now developing salt-fields in Shantung. All these subsidiary companies are operated either by purely Chinese or Sino-Japanese management.

In Central China, there are 12 subsidiary companies of the Central China Promotion Company. The Huachung Salt Company, established in August, 1939, is developing the salt-fields of Haichou. It also intends to develop new salt fields by directly investing its capital or by accommodating loans. The Huachung Silk-Reeling Company was organized in August, 1939, for controlling silk-reeling and for the manufacture of silk-worm egg cards. It now operates 20 factories in Nusih, Suchow, Hengchow, Faining, Anking and Kashing. Electric power and water supply services are conducted by the Huachung Water and Electric Power Supply Company, which was brought into being in June, 1938. The company supplies electric light to about 60,000 users, electric power to about 3,000 and electric heat to about 500 in Chepeh, the central section, Nantao, Poottung, Chenzhu and Woosung in Shanghai. The company is also in charge of electric plants in Hanking, Hanchow, Chinkiang, Hankow, Anking, Chengchow, Puhn, Sungkiang, Yenchow and Xukiang.

A water supply system is maintained at Chapi, Nantao and Poottung in Shanghai. The total volume of water which the company supplies to the city is over 6,200,000 cubic metres a day. In addition to this, the company is in charge of the water works in Hanchow, Chenkieng, Nanking, Hankow and Yuchang.

The development of free enterprises, such as spinning, flour milling, cement, tobacco, and paper manufacturing, and wool weaving, which are operated by machinery, has been as remarkable in Central China as it has been in North China under Chinese and Sino-Japanese management. In Shanghai, Japanese industrial activity before the China Affair was confined to the spinning industry, but since the outbreak of hostilities Japanese capital has financed all kinds of enterprises from flour milling, silk-reeling, lumbering, the manufacture of tobacco, soft drinks, cement, electric bulbs, rubber, automobiles, tea, pig's bristles, paulownia oil, and the processing of eggs.

This general survey shows the rapid progress that Chinese industry has been making under Sino-Japanese economic co-operation.
Basic Purposes

Now that the fundamental national policy of establishing the Greater East Asiatic sphere of common prosperity, which aims at the construction of a new world order, has entered upon a new phase with the conclusion of the Three-Power Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, the Government, at a recent session of the Cabinet Council, have decided on the Summary of the Programme for Economic Construction Embracing Japan, Manchoukuo and China, with a view to coping with new developments in the situation, and intend hereafter to carry out national policies consistently in conformity with that fundamental national purpose. The objective of the new policy is to realize unprecedented progress in the Greater East Asiatic sphere of common prosperity based upon a comprehensive economic development of the three countries, in accordance with a new outlook on the economic order.

The world economic system of free trade resting upon the basic assumption that peoples and nations everywhere can freely exchange goods is in the process of disintegration. Accordingly, the Japanese system is also called upon to reorganize on a new basis discarding the old structure which is dependent on the old order. In this reorganization, however, Japanese economy must be made a higher, broader and stronger structure, capable of leading the peoples of East Asia to improve their living conditions and to find their respective places in the new world order. What is meant here by "higher" is that the power of life in possession of our nation must be made to create a higher productivity; by "broader" is meant that the sphere of mutual economic dependence must be extended from that of Japan, Manchoukuo and China to that of Greater East Asia and must be firmly established, and by "stronger" is meant that impregnable economic strength able to meet any situation must be maintained by keeping the extent to which Japanese economy is dependent upon other countries to a minimum. To this end sufferings attendant on efforts of renovation must be overcome internally and any pressures and threats from outside be repulsed, by uniting all the forces and resources of the nation and by a determined will. Thus a new East Asiatic economic order under Japanese leadership must be established within about ten years. In this East Asiatic order alone, the economic system not only of Manchoukuo and China but also of other countries of East Asia can be expected to improve and develop to the highest extent.
Essentials of Basic Principles

For the purpose of realizing the task of constructing a new East Asiatic order and thereby ensuring the lasting peace of the world, the processes of the renovation of her internal structure and of the enlargement and organization of her living sphere must be brought into perfect unity. Her basic economic policies must accordingly be established upon the organized planning of the following processes:

1. Perfection of the reorganization of national economy.
3. Enlarged organization of the East Asiatic sphere of common prosperity.

Basic Lines of Policy

1. The objective of the programme for economic construction embracing Japan, Manchoukuo and China is to establish a self-supporting, self-sufficient economic structure within about ten years, in order to strengthen the position of East Asia in the world economy by accelerating the construction of the East Asiatic sphere of common prosperity.

2. Guiding principles on which Japan is to undertake the economic construction programme embracing the three countries lie in the promotion of the general welfare in an ideal state of co-existence and common prosperity through the unitary cooperation of the three countries, in accordance with the high and broad spirit of Hakko Itiu.

3. In order to expedite the economic construction Japan will endeavour to uplift the morale of the nation, renovate the internal structure, augment national strength while rendering assistance to the economic reconstruction of Manchoukuo and China. For this purpose she will strive for the promotion of science and technique and undertake the development of pioneer industries.

4. Manchoukuo, being in an inseparable relationship with Japan, is expected to swiftly perfect and develop important basic industries.

5. China is expected to develop her resources and reconstruct her economic system in collaboration with Japan and Manchoukuo; in particular, progress in communications and transport services, smooth exchange of goods, and development of essential industries and resources are called for. Thus she is expected to contribute to the establishment of the East Asiatic sphere of common prosperity.
6. With a view to adjusting and accelerating the organized planning of economic construction embracing Japan, Manchoukuo and China the administrative machinery relating thereto shall be speedily perfected.

Practical Policies

In view of the fact that Japan, Manchoukuo and China constitute the backbone of the East Asiatic sphere of common prosperity, having thereby the duty to regulate economic relations on the basis of their closest union, the government have decided on essential policies in respect to spheres of industrial activity, labour, finance and banking, exchange, and communications and transport covering the three countries.

Spheres of Industrial Activity

In determining spheres of industrial activity, the conditions peculiar to the three countries and their respective phases of economic development should be considered, thereby effecting decisions from the comprehensive point of view and treating them as an organic whole.

Viewed in that light, Japan should hereafter strive for the promotion of the highest type of precision industry as well as mechanical industry while endeavouring to develop basic industries, such as the heavy, chemical and mining industries.

Manchoukuo is expected to make an epoch-making advance in the mining industry and in electrical undertakings. For the development of her heavy and chemical industries Japan is prepared to offer necessary assistance.

China is expected to develop her mining and salt industries and to undertake large-scale production of raw materials. Since her natural conditions afford much room for the development of heavy and chemical industries, progress along that line is also expected hereafter.

The development of light industries on the Continent must be greatly promoted. In this connection, it is necessary that Japan should readjust her light industries, particularly the fibre and miscellaneous industries. Their removal to the Continent must be seriously considered.

With regard to agriculture in Japan, measures will be taken for the improvement of various systems relating to land, renovation of farm management, betterment and security of the living of farmers and ensuring of the staple food of the people as well as the maintenance of definite numbers in the farm population. Measures will also be taken, in this connection, for the steady development of fishery enterprises and for the rationalization, utilization and conservation of forest resources.
With regard to agriculture in Manchuria, in view of the position that area as a base for the supply of foodstuffs and fodder for Japan, Manchoukuo and China, and as the source of supply to the world of special agricultural products, the increase to the fullest extent of agricultural production is expected. For the purpose of this development, the migration of Japanese agricultural settlers will be facilitated. In respect to agriculture in China, efforts for the assurance of the staple food of the nation must be made. The increase of the production of cotton and other staples is also urgent.

Labour

In order to hold a predominant position in world economy, the place of labour and technique will become increasingly important. For this purpose, their structure in Japan must be radically revised. Moreover, labour power available in each of the East Asiatic countries and regions must be enabled to make its contribution to the improvement of the whole labour force, thereby maintaining the superiority of the East Asiatic sphere in world economy. With this in view Japan intends to perfect a new structure in labour and technique, endeavouring to train and build up the bodies and minds of workers, to provide a thoroughgoing scientific education, to heighten the productivity of labour and to train technicians and skilled workers. Thus the economic construction of Manchoukuo and China will be accelerated and assisted as required by the two countries; Manchoukuo and China will be supplied with technicians and skilled workers capable and necessary for their industrial development and economic construction. Needless to say, the two countries themselves have to train those types of men in view of the importance of technique. It is further required of Manchoukuo that she should plan not merely for the migration to and settlement in the country of labourers from North China but for the establishment of measures for the self-sufficiency of labour as well as for the improvement of its management, in particular, in the mining industry.

Finance and Banking

With a view to expediting the construction of national-defence economy, the function of finance and banking also should be made to conform to the national purpose. In other words, it should so function that the materials required by the State may be ensured in quality as well as in quantity. In order to make possible the execution of an industrial programme embracing Japan, Manchoukuo and China, the distribution of capital must be determined according to an organized plan and a system equal to that task be set up. In that connection, there must be perfected a financial mechanism facilitating the storing of staple goods, in keeping with the progress of technique, along with the creation of spheres of industrial activity, and with changes in industrial equipment. Capital required for the three countries must of course be supplied by their own ac-
cumulation. To this end measures must be taken by the three countries for the increase and efficient utilization of such accumulation. With regard to capital necessary for the development of essential industries, Japan is prepared to give assistance in its supply. And the relationship of mutual assistance in international settlements should be established between the three countries as their economic relations become increasingly closer.

Exchange

In respect to exchange in the coming new world order, the principle of commercial trade of the past must be revised to a considerable extent; there must emerge the principle of productive trade, which enables each country, region and economic sphere to supply to others goods required by them in exchange for the goods necessary for its own planned production; and which regulates trade between those countries and regions, not to speak of that between Japan, Manchoukuo and China, in such a manner as will create a mutual, unitary relationship. In so doing, a special agreement for payments between those countries and regions will be required, with a view to facilitating the closer flow of goods between them.

Communications and Transport

With the closer flow of goods between Japan, Manchoukuo and China as well as between the regions in the sphere of common prosperity, systems of communications and transport between the three countries must be perfected and operated by a comprehensive and organized plan, thereby ensuring the security of the whole of the sphere. Accordingly, the connection between land and sea transport services of the three countries must be expedited; a large-scale increase in shipping, control of and connection between air lines, as well as the perfection and extension of electric communication facilities, must be planned.
CERTIFICATE

TO TOKYO GAZETTE

I, E. E. DANLY, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G.H.Q., S.C.A.P., and as such have possession, custody and control of original or copies of captured enemy documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That Document No. 1529 was delivered to me from Japanese Institute of Foreign Relations as being an original or copy of an enemy document that has been captured or obtained by military forces acting under the Supreme Commander Allied Forces and such document has been continuously in my custody since such delivery.

Dated: 12 Aug 1946

/s/ E. E. Danly

E. E. DANLY

I further certify that Document 1529 contains twelve monthly issues of the "Tokyo Gazette", to wit, January to December 1940.

Dated: 15 Aug 1946

/s/ E. E. Danly

E. E. DANLY
The Provisional Chinese Government

In 1937, following the collapses of TEH-CHOW, SUITUAN, CHANGFU, TAIYUAN, etc., in North China, at the end of November the National Government had broken up and removed to HANKING, CHENGHUA and CHONGHA and finally HANKING collapsed on 13 December, deciding the general trend of war situation. Thus the opportunity to establish a new regime which was pre-arranged among the important men in North China had matured.

The circumstances which WANG KO-MIN consented to become the head of the North China regime are as follows: At the beginning of the Incident he was at HONGKONG. The head of special service facilities in PEKING, major general XITA, eagerly made efforts through Fiji YAMAMOTO, who was in SHANGHAI, to persuade WANG to accept the invitation; meanwhile, staff officers from PEKING and FORMOSA were specially dispatched to HONGKONG for the same purpose. As the result WANG came to SHANGHAI on 24 November, and on 6 December made a flight to FUKUOKA and went to North China with YAMAMOTO and YU CHIH.

It is said that when WANG entered SHANGHAI, he had not yet consented to become the head of the North China regime but on condition that he make an inspection trip he consented to the journey.

The North China army authorities had made great efforts under the plan to establish the North China regime as the Central Government of China in the future and arranged to invite not only WANG but other influential men from South China through YOSHIKI and ITAI (military officers) who were stationed in SHANGHAI. Toward this policy the central army and General TERAUCHI gave approval; however, a section of the military officers in SHANGHAI expressed opposition, especially Colonel KAGAMOTO was opposed to pulling out many influential men from SHANGHAI, on the ground that there is no necessity to determine North China as the political center from the beginning.

After the arrival in PEKING, WANG KO-MIN decided to accept the chairmanship of the North China regime and determined Government organization and fundamental principles. On 14 December 1937, the Provisional Chinese Government was established in PEKING.

The Government organization and the fundamental principles are as follows:
(1) The Government shall be organized, under the head of the Committee, with mutual legislative independence, the executive and the judicial and with the independent committee mentioned below:

(a) The Committee of discussing policies to discuss important national policies and general political affairs.

The head of Committee: TAN Erh-ho
The Executive Committee: WANG Ko-min, CHU SHEN, TUNG KANG, WANG I-YANG, TANG T-SIU-YUN
The Committee: CHIANG Chih-Chu, YAO LING-WEI

(b) The administrative committee (organ which undertakes general administration and is divided into five sections of secretariat, administration, public peace and order, education, legislation and relief).

The head of Committee: WANG Ko-min
The head of 'administrative section': WANG Ko-min
The head of 'public peace order section': CHU HSI-YUN
The head of 'education section': TAN Erh-ho
The head of 'legislative section': CHU SHEN
The head of 'welfare section': WANG I-YANG
The head of PEKING province and the special mayor of TIENTSIN: KAO LING-WEI
The special mayor of PEKING: CHIANG Chih-Chu
The head of judicial committee: TUNG KANG

(2) The national flag: 5 colored flag

(3) The gist of the declaration.

(a) We restore democracy and eliminate unclean party politics.

(b) We absolutely abolish communism.

(c) We enhance the morality of the Far East and promote friendly relations between other nations.

(d) We exploit industries and improve national welfare.

(e) We accept complete responsibilities for the duties declared by the previous Government.

As the result of the new establishment of the Provisional Government, the Committee of maintenance of Peace in Peking district, the Committee of maintenance of Peace in Tientsin and the Federation of maintenance of Peace in Peking had joined end on 30 December the K'ANG regime combined with the new Provisional Government, Jan 1918.
According to the "Fundamental principles to manage the Incident (A)" which was decided soon after the establishment of the Provisional Government at the Cabinet meeting, the Japanese Government will cooperate with the Nanking Government to save the situation if the Nanking Government reconsiders. However, if the Nanking Government does not reconsider and continues the so-called long-term resistance, Japan will not expect to negotiate with the Nanking Government in the future, and furthermore to meet the necessity to manage the vast areas occupied by the Japanese forces, henceforth Japan will take separate measures.

In North China, the main policies are to promote public peace and welfare; politically, to establish a regime which has anti-Comintern aims, pro-Japanese and Manchukuo policies; economically, to establish an indivisible relationship between Japan, Manchukuo and China and gradually expend and strengthen this regime to make the central power of the regenerated China. However, if the negotiation between the old Nanking Government are brought about, this Government shall be adjusted in accordance with the conditions of peace.
Further, based upon the basic policy on the disposition of the China Incident decided by the Imperial Conference met on the 11th of January 1938, our Government has set up its policy to the effect that as regards the Central Government, we reserve a right to negotiate with the old Nanking regime on the basis of the peace terms drawn up separately in case it makes reflection, changes its mind and approaches us with sincerity, seeking peace; that, if on the contrary it makes no peace offer to us we drop our idea to seek a solution of the conflict through further negotiation with it; that we help create a new Chinese regime and cooperate with it to build up a new reform China by making an arrangement with it to regulate the relations between the two countries; that we on the other hand endeavor either to crush the old Nanking regime or to get it merged into a new central regime.

With regard to the peace negotiation which we have so far been taking up through the intermediary of the Germain Government, the old Nanking Government has on January 14th advised us through the German Ambassador in Nanking that in order for it to arrive at a final decision, it desires to have further details of our demand on the ground that this demand is too extensive in scope. We have taken it for granted that the present answer from the Chinese contains no trace of a sincere wish for peace and is designed merely to delay the settlement, since they ought to have a full knowledge through Germany as to the basic peace terms set forth by the Japanese. Thus our government on or about January 15th has ceased to entertain any hope for a peace out of our negotiations with the Nanking Government, and the Cabinet has decided its policy to start the second phase of our measure in line with the policy decided by the Imperial Conference of January 11th, i.e., to take steps to help create and develop a new Chinese regime. In this connection our Government has on the 16th made public a statement domestically and abroad as to the foregoing and at the same time notified the Chinese to terminate our peace negotiation between us.


When the Japanese force crushed the Chinese army in Shanghai and its vicinity, and subsequently on December 13th, 1937, captured Nanking, movements for creating a new regime in the Central China were launched. First of all, the Shanghai Tatao Municipal Government was organized in Shanghai on December 5th. In various places other than Shanghai public order maintenance associations came into being. Among these, the major organs are the Nanking Public order maintenance association and the Hangchow Public Order Maintenance Association established on January 1st 1938. Nevertheless, in Shanghai area the influence of the Chiang regime and the Nationalist Party proved to remain strong, far more than what was anticipated, even after the fall of Nanking.
so, that it was impossible for the pro-Japanese elements to openly attack the Japanese even in the International Settlement. Thus, the notion of building up a substantial regime had long been difficult unlike the case in North China.

The movements for establishing new regimes started during the fall of 1945. Until then, the Restoration Government came into being may be summarized as follows:

1. Shanghai City Taito Government (Taito Municipal Government)

With regard to the above government, it is reported that Colonel T. T. T. of the office of Japanese Military Attaché and Colonel T. T. T. of the Headquarters of General Staff had consulted with each other and helped toward its formation. The naval authorities and the Foreign Ministry officials on the spot were entirely uninformed thereof until the moment when this government started to assume a concrete form. Thus, this government was at the time generally very unpopular (Super SU Kikai no Heninense, a graduate of Waseda University and one time an official of Duties in salt affairs).

This municipal government put under its jurisdiction the following districts: "W. Tung, Paini, Wu Si, Chepe, Chi Lu, the Center of the City, Nusung, Fei Hiao, Kiatun, Feokhian, Pengtao, Kunhui, Chunche, and Guanghwa, and consists of the following: Secretariat office, special district administration office, social affairs section, police section, finance section, education section, sanitation section, estate section, transport section, engineering section, legal board, general rural district administration office.

2. Shanghai "er-Zone Relief and Rehabilitation Association.

The above association, mainly organized by a group of traders headed by Yu Ya-ching and some others, backed by the Taipings controlled by CAGS, seizing attempts to undertake the duties pertaining to the maintenance of public order and rehabilitation of commerce and industry, and all sorts of remedial jobs in the "er-zone of Shanghai. Although it is termed as relief and rehabilitation association, it is rather a political body. A committee system is adopted by it, headed by a chairman nominated by the committee by vote, and it had attempted to take up a representative system. This movement was launched, sponsored by influential members of the inhabitants in Shanghai, but it had, after all, ceased to run without a chance to evolve into a form of government.

3. The movement sponsored by the Chinese faction to uphold TANG CHAO-I.

In the early stage of the warfare in China, Commander CHONG YU council CHONG YU, together with TANG CHAO-I, and tried to have the Chinese faction, including TANG CHAO-I, CHONG CHEN, TAN CHAO-I, to come to Shanghai with him. CHONG YU, together with TANG CHAO-I, TANG CHEN, TAN CHAO-I, and others, form a new regime. This effort, however, made no rapid
progress. On the other hand, the TAO Shao-i group was optimistic and feared that the Japanese might come to a settlement with the Chiang regime in future or might attempt to create a purely puppet government, thus, the attitude of this Chinese group was rather passive. (Later TAO Shao-i and T'Iei-fu started cooperation with each other and their collaboration showed signs of assuming material development, but the Tung-chu coalition, which was to come into power, was frustrated owing to the incident in which TANG fell a victim of assassins, which occurred in August 1929).

(b) The peace movement sponsored by the HUO Yung-hsi group.

Among the HUO Yung-hsi group, HUO T'ia, son of HUO Yung-hsi (assisted by HUO T'ing) was secretly trying in Shanghai to affect the attitude of the Japanese. After the departure to Hongkong of HUO, sec. GIAO Chih-san, secretary of HUO, senior, HUO T'ung-hsi and some others attempted to maintain a liaison with the Japanese, but only in vain.

(c) The movement sponsored by financial and industrialists in Shanghai.

Among the men in the banking and industrial circles in Shanghai, there were a number of persons who also launched a movement, these being CNT Tung-min, HUO T'ing-ling, HUO Meng-tou, HUO Yung and some others. These men are almost of the same origin as those who initiated the movement backed by the T'ing-pen, referred to in one of the preceding paragraphs. CNT Tung-min, in particular, went over to Japan in December, and was reported to have had a conversation with Chiang Kai-shek who was then said to be staying in Shanghai, and thus tried to alter his attitude upon Japan. CNT, presumably, was inclined to negotiate with the Japanese, should there be a possibility of peace. His attempt was also unsuccessful.

(d) The movement of the HUO Hsi group.

HUO Hsi too was active in Shanghai, and is currently trying to cooperate with CNT Yung-chin with a view to rise when the time proved to be ripe enough, and later let us on for which purpose he attempted to form a public order maintenance association in Nanking.

With regard to the movements (2) to (6), it is asserted that the Army as well as the Service organ took the attitude of denunciation of any movement which aspired to come to power under the sponsorship of the old political groups. Thus, nothing else than the State Municipal Government of Shanghai was able to develop into a tangible form of government.

With regard to the TAO Shao-i group, at an earlier stage of development CNT K'ai-Fang Chinese movement-sect of Nanking, TAO Yen-sun, and some others were trying in Shanghai to keep contact with the Japanese. (Furthermore, there were a number of men who maintained the view that the central regime in Nanking should directly from the beginning be one which could deal with the North China regime in Beijing. As a matter of
fect, our central authorities once worked out a "Molding Program on administrative affairs in Central China." (January 27th, 1933), which I believe, might serve to give a hint as to our government's policy to help and control the new regime.)


The movement for establishing a central regime in Central China has progressed to maturity when IJADE Hung-chih, JIN Yuan-tao, CHEN Chun, and WEN Tsung-yo entered the political arena. It was rumored that Major General KAFADA and Colonel LI GEUI of the Army Special Service organ and the Naval Special organ in Shanghai gave assistance to all of these different streams of men in order to expedite collaboration between them. In connection with the establishment of the above government, however, the North China group soon began to create strong opposition.

The major factors in the structure of the Restoration Government and its platform at the time when it was formally established on March 23th may be summarized as follows:

(1) This government was a tripartite coalition in the form of a democratic constitutional government with three councils and seven departments in its formation.

(A) Administration Council:
Chairman of the Administration Council (acting) IJADE Hung-chih
Chief of the Foreign Department CHEN Yu
Chief of the Interior Department CHIN Chun
Chief of the Suit-ching Department JIN Yuan-tao
Chief of the Finance Department CHEN Chin-tao
Chief of the Education Department CHAE Tse-mun
Chief of the Transport Department CHAE Hsing-chih (provisionally)
Chief of the Industry Department "T. Hsu-hui
Secretary-General of the Administrative Council "T. Yung-tei

(B) Judicial Council:
Chairman of the Judicial Council WEN Tsung-yo

(C) Legislative Council:
Chairman of the Legislative Council (nomination has not yet been made)

(2) National Standard: 5-color standard has been adopted.
(3) List of the platform.

(A) A constitutional form of government under trirpartite coalition has been adopted, abolishing the single party resolution.

(B) The government will carry out anti-Comintern measures as far as possible.

(C) As regards foreign relations, the government will endeavor to guarantee equality, preservation of security, neutrality and unity, peace in East Asia and friendly relations with all the foreign nations.

(D) The government will take steps for the relief of war sufferers, to provide aid to the, for their return to normal business life, and for carrying out regional purges.

(E) The government will take measures for the exploitation of natural resources, promotion of agriculture and industry, introduction of foreign capital and economic collaboration with foreign countries which are on friendly terms.

(F) The government will endeavor to develop commerce, industry and banking, thereby to increase the national wealth.

(G) The government will take steps to advance the scientific knowledge of the nation on the basis of its own peculiar culture, and to purge radical education.

(H) The government will rationalize its finance to make it more fit, and take steps to lessen the burden on the people.

(I) The government will open the doors for men of ability, permit freedom of press, speech and criticism of politics.

(J) Abolition of irregular agents and measures to carry out a purge of government personnel.

As a result of the establishment of the aforementioned Restoration Government a number of local governments were then going to be created under its control because the public order maintenance associations in all different places were to be dissolved. Thus, the provincial governments in Hsinan Province, Chekiang Province and Shantung Province, and the Governor's Municipal Public Administration office of Peiping were into being on May 29th, June 20th, July 23rd and April 26th respectively. Till in Shanghai the Governor's Municipal Public Administration office of Shanghai was established on April 26th, taking over the whole organization of the Netro Government together with virtually a nominal change in its formation. This Municipal Government discarded the name of "Metro" and was specially put under direct control of the administration council.
I. General Principles

(1) They shall found a highly pro-Japanese regime, gradually free themselves from dependence on Europe and America, and establish the foundation of a district in China dependent on Japan.

(2) The direction of that regime shall be exercised so that the regime, in the course of its future development shall smoothly amalgamate with the North China Regime. The direction shall stop at general inner direction by Japanese advisors. Detailed direction and interference in administration by appointing Japanese officials shall be avoided.

(3) CHIANG Regime shall be annihilated. At the same time, elimination of Communists and destruction of the Nationalist Party in a short time within the area under Japanese occupation shall be realized. Afterwards similar operations shall be speedily extended to neighbouring areas.

II. Program for Direction

(4) In directing administrative affairs, emphasis shall be placed on the highest political organization, above all, the Legislative Department, and the domestic administration (chiefly peace maintenance), financial, industrial and educational sections of the Administrative Department, which is the executive organ. In and around SHANGHAI, special facilities shall be created, in order to establish the foundation for the economic development of Central China.

(5) In directing Provincial Governments and lesser local governments, participation by Japanese advisors shall be avoided as much as possible, so that directions from upper administrative organs shall be smoothly carried out.

In areas under Japanese occupation, especially in war areas, easing people's minds and giving them employment shall speedily be realized.

(6) The foundation of finance shall speedily be established, banking organs adjusted, and Japan-China economic collaboration in Central China realized. Measures for it are described in another program.
(7) As for armaments, minimum army shall be trained for maintenance of peace and order, and make efforts, under the guidance of the Japanese army, to restore public order. But the navy and air force shall be included in the defence plan of Japan.

(8) Throughout the whole area, police maintenance corps set-up belonging to administrative organs shall be strengthened. For this purpose, several Japanese police officers shall be appointed as instructors in order to establish police administration.

(9) Establishment of special schools to train model officials and promote cultural activities and the creation of a special lateral organ to promote political purge, shall be otherwise planned.

(10) Local autonomous bodies shall be gradually abolished, as administrative organization is improved.

(11) The first-stage administrative area shall be the district under Japanese occupation. The area shall be successively extended.

(Pages 1190 - 1193)

Program for the Establishment of Central China New Regime (in accordance with the program for the administrative direction)

(Tentatively decided on Jan. 27, 1938)

I. General Principles

(1) Name of the New Regime shall be as follows:—
   Central China Provisional Government

(2) Site of the Government shall be as follows:—
   For the time being: SHANGHAI
   In the future: FANKING

(3) National Standard:—
   5 Colour Flag

(4) Form of Government:—
   To be decided separately.

(5) Declaration and Platform as described in a separate copy.

(6) Organization of the New Regime:—
   As shown in the diagram.
(7) The New Regime shall be speedily set up, and, by nurturing it, antagonistic influences shall be destroyed with physical and moral pressure.

For this purpose, local autonomous bodies which are being set up successively in the areas under Japanese occupation, shall be strengthened, and public sentiments desiring the establishment of a New Regime backed by Japan shall be powerfully stimulated. Moreover, in and around SHANGHAI, economic rehabilitation shall be speedily realized, thereby to contribute to the establishment of the New Regime set up.

(8) Of the expenditures in the initial stage of the New Regime, considerable part shall be borne by Japan.

(9) For the relief of war-sufferers, and rehabilitation of industries, emergency measures shall be speedily taken. Especially, agricultural produce shall be smoothly supplied to the market; and farmers shall take to spring farming without uneasiness.

For this purpose, maintenance of local peace shall be undertaken by the Japanese Army to the best of their ability until the establishment of new local government organs.

(10) Order of the establishment of the new administrative setup is as follows:

1. Central Government setup, especially legislative and executive departments,
2. SHANGHAI Special Municipality setup
3. Provincial Governments setup
4. Organization of county autonomous bodies and downwards

(11) In parallel with the execution of 1 and 2, the influence of TSINGPAI and CHIHPAI shall be turned pro-Japanese, end made to assist the New Regime directly and indirectly.

(12) In fixing new administrative districts, former ones shall generally be preserved.

(13) In foreign settlements, with the strengthening of the New Regime, Japanese influence shall be gradually extended, and, after the establishment of the New Regime, the organs of the old regime under the control of Japanese Army and Navy shall be taken over by the New Regime at proper opportunity, causing at the same time outstanding issues to be speedily settled.

(14) TATAO Municipal Government, Citizens' Association, and other
newly-born organs shall be co-ordinated into the new SHANGHAI Municipal Government set-up.

(15) Purely administrative organs of the Province and downwards shall be generally left as they are, but educational system and contents shall undergo wholesale revision, as separately planned.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Takio Oda, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the General Affairs Section, General Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry of Japan and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of numbered pages 1129-1255, inclusive, dated January, 1945 and described as follows: "PART V-CHINA INCIDENT", and part of the records of the General Affairs Section, General Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry of Japan.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): that said document is a true and correct copy of the original records of the Japanese Government which were destroyed by bombing. I certify the authenticity of said document and that it is a true and perfect copy of the original Document and records.

Signed at Tokyo on this 2 day of August, 1946.

Witness:  /s/ Wm. G. Prout

_________________________  ____________________________
Signature of Official  Signature of Official (SEAL)
Chief of the General Affairs Section, General Affairs Bureau
Official Capacity

Statement of Procurement

I, A. Muzzoy, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 2 day of August, 1946

Witness:  /s/ Wm. G. Prout

_________________________  ____________________________
Investigator  Official Capacity
Inv. Div.
The Plenipotentiaries of Japan and China signed today at Nanking the Treaty Concerning the Basic Relations between Japan and China, the Protocol annexed thereto and the Agreed Terms of Understanding between the Plenipotentiaries of the two countries; following which the Plenipotentiaries of Japan, Manchoukuo and China signed the Joint Declaration of Japan, Manchoukuo and China.

By virtue of the above, the Japanese Government have formally recognized the National Government of the Republic of China headed by Mr. Wang Ching-wei, the National Government of the Republic of China have recognized Manchoukuo, and the Government of Manchoukuo have recognized the National Government of the Republic of China.

The documents relating to the above are as follows:

1. TREATY CONCERNING THE BASIC RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND CHINA

The Imperial Government of Japan and
The National Government of the Republic of China:
Being desirous that these two countries should respect their inherent characteristics and closely cooperate with each other as good neighbours under their common ideal of establishing a new order in East Asia on an ethical basis, establishing thereby a permanent peace in East Asia, and with this as a nucleus contributing toward the peace of the world in general, and
Desiring for this purpose to establish fundamental principles to regulate the relations between the two countries, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The Governments of the two countries shall, in order to maintain permanently good neighbourly and amicable relations between the two countries, mutually respect their sovereignty and territories and at the same time take mutually helpful and friendly measures, political, economic, cultural and otherwise.

The Governments of the two countries agree to eliminate, and to prohibit in the future, such measures and causes as are destructive of amity between the two countries in politics, diplomacy, education, propaganda, trade and commerce, and other spheres.
ARTICLE 2

The Governments of the two countries shall closely cooperate for cultural harmony, creation and development.

ARTICLE 3

The Governments of the two countries agree to engage in joint defence against all destructive operations of communist nature that jeopardize the peace and welfare of their countries.

The Governments of the two countries shall, in order to accomplish the purpose mentioned in the preceding paragraph, eliminate communist elements and organizations in their respective territories, and at the same time cooperate closely concerning information and propaganda with reference to the defence against communist activities.

Japan shall, in order to carry out the defence against communist activities through collaboration of the two countries, station required forces in specified areas of Manchuria and of North China for the necessary duration, in accordance with the terms to be agreed upon separately.

ARTICLE 4

The Governments of the two countries undertake to cooperate closely for the maintenance of common peace and order until the Japanese forces sent to China complete their evacuation in accordance with the terms as provided for separately.

The areas for stationing Japanese forces for the period requiring the maintenance of common peace and order and other matters pertaining thereto shall be determined as agreed separately between the two countries.

ARTICLE 5

The Government of the Republic of China shall recognize that Japan may, in accordance with previous practices or in order to preserve the common interests of the two countries, station for a required duration its naval units and vessels in specified areas within the territory of the Republic of China, in accordance with the terms to be agreed upon separately between the two countries.

ARTICLE 6

The Governments of the two countries shall effect close economic cooperation between the two countries in accordance with the spirit of complementing each other and ministering to each other's needs, as well as in accordance with the principles of equality and reciprocity.

With reference to specific resources in North China and Mongolia, especially mineral resources required for national defence, the Government of the Republic of China undertakes that they shall be developed through close
cooperation of the two countries. With reference to the development of specific resources in other areas which are required for national defence, the Government of the Republic of China shall afford necessary facilities to Japan and Japanese subjects.

With regard to the utilization of the resources referred to in the preceding paragraph, while considering the requirements of China, the Government of the Republic of China, shall afford positive and full facilities to Japan and Japanese subjects.

The Governments of the two countries shall take all the necessary measures to promote trade in general and to facilitate and rationalize the demand and supply of goods between the two countries. The Governments of the two countries shall extend specially close cooperation with respect to the promotion of trade and commerce in the lower basin of the Yangtze River and the rationalization of the mutual supply of goods between Japan on the one hand and North China and Hongkiang on the other.

The Government of Japan shall, with respect to the rehabilitation and development of industries, finance, transportation and communication in China, extend necessary assistance and cooperation to China through consultation between the two countries.

ARTICLE 7

According to the development of the new relations between Japan and China under the present Treaty, the Government of Japan shall abolish extraterritorial rights possessed by Japan in China and render to the latter its concessions; and the Government of China shall open its territory for domicile and business of Japanese subjects.

ARTICLE 8

The Governments of the two countries shall conclude separate agreements regarding specific items which are necessary to accomplish the object of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 9

The present Treaty shall come into effect from the date of its signature.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate, in the Japanese and Chinese languages, at Nanking the 30th day of the 11th month of the 19th year of Suewa, corresponding to the 30th day of the 11th month or the 29th year of the Republic of China.

2. ADDED PROTOCOL

In proceeding this day to the signature of the Treaty Concerning the
Basic Relations between Japan and China, the Plenipotentiaries of the two countries have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The Government of the Republic of China, understanding that, during the period in which Japan continues the warlike operations it is at present carrying on in the territory of China, there exists a special state of affairs attendant upon such warlike operations, and that Japan must take such measures as are required for the attainment of the object of such operations, shall accordingly take the necessary measures.

Even during the continuation of the said warlike operations, the special state of affairs referred to in the preceding paragraph shall, in so far as there is no obstacle to the attainment of the object of the operations, be adjusted in accordance with the changing circumstances and in conformity with the Treaty and its annexed documents.

ARTICLE 2

While the affairs previously administered by the Provisional Government of the Republic of China, the Reformed Government of the Republic of China and others have been taken over and temporarily maintained as they are by the Government of the Republic of China, those which require adjustment but are not yet adjusted shall be adjusted in conformity with the purpose of the Treaty and its annexed documents through consultation between the two countries, as promptly as circumstances may permit.

ARTICLE 3

When general peace is restored between the two countries and the state of war ceases to exist, the Japanese forces shall commence evacuation with the exception of those which are stationed in accordance with the Treaty Concerning the Basic Relations between Japan and China signed today and the existing agreements between the two countries, and shall complete it within two years with the firm establishment of peace and order; and the Government of the Republic of China shall guarantee the firm establishment of peace and order during this period.

ARTICLE 4

The Government of the Republic of China shall compensate the damages to rights and interests suffered by Japanese subjects in China on account of the China Affair since its outbreak.

The Government of Japan shall, with respect to the relief of the Chinese rendered destitute by the China Affair, cooperate with the Government of the Republic of China.
ARTICLE 5

The present Protocol shall come into effect simultaneously with the Treaty.

In witness whereof the Plenipotentiaries of the two countries have signed this Protocol and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate, in the Japanese and Chinese languages, at Nanking the 30th day of the 11th month of the 15th year of Syowa, corresponding to the 30th day of the 11th month of the 29th year of the Republic of China.

3. AGREED TERMS OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE PLENIPOTENTIARIES OF JAPAN AND CHINA CONCERNING THE ANNEXED PROTOCOL

In proceeding this day to the signature of the Treaty Concerning the Basic Relations between Japan and China, the following understanding has been reached between the Plenipotentiaries of the two countries in connection with the stipulations of Articles 1 and 2 of the annexed Protocol of the Treaty.

1. With regard to those various organs for collecting taxes in China which are at present in a special condition owing to military necessity, an adjustment shall be made promptly in accordance with the spirit of respecting the financial independence of China.

2. With regard to those industrial, mining and commercial establishments under governmental or private management which are at present controlled by Japanese forces, the necessary measures shall be taken for their prompt transfer to Chinese management in a rational manner, with the exception of those which are of enemy character or under special circumstances of unavoidable character including military necessity.

3. In case any Sino-Japanese joint enterprise requires modification in the evaluation of original assets, the proportion of capital investments and other matters, measures for their rectification shall be taken in accordance with the terms to be agreed upon separately through consultation between the two countries.

4. The Government of the Republic of China shall, in case they find it necessary to institute control on foreign trade, effect such control autonomously. They may not, however, infringe upon the principle of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation mentioned in Article 6 of the Treaty; and they shall consult with Japan with regard to such control during the continuation of the China affair.

5. With regard to matters pertaining to transportation and communication in China which require adjustment, they shall be adjusted, as promptly as circumstance may permit, in accordance with the terms to be agreed upon separately through consultation between the two countries.
4. JOINT DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF JAPAN, MANCHOUKUO AND CHINA

The Imperial Government of Japan;
The Imperial Government of Manchoukuo; and
The National Government of the Republic of China;

Being desirous that the three countries should respect one another's inherent characteristics and closely cooperate with one another as good neighbours under their common ideal of establishing a new order in East Asia on an ethical basis, constituting thereby the mainstay of a permanent peace in East Asia, and with this as a nucleus contributing toward the peace of the world in general, declare as follows:

1. Japan, Manchoukuo and China will respect mutually their sovereignty and territories.

2. Japan, Manchoukuo and China will bring about general cooperation on a reciprocal basis among the three countries, especially a good neighbourly friendship, common defence against communistic activities and economic cooperation, and for that purpose will take all the necessary measures in every direction.

3. Japan, Manchoukuo and China will promptly conclude agreements in accordance with the present Declaration.

Done at Nanking on this the 30th day of the 11th month of the 15th year of Syowa, corresponding to the 30th day of the 11th month of the 29th year of the Republic of China.
II

STATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE SPOKESMAN, ON THE SIGNING
OF THE SINO-JAPANESE BASIC TREATY, AND THE JAPAN-MANCHEOUKO-
CHINA JOINT DECLARATION, ISSUED ON NOVEMBER 30, 1940

In Nanking, at 10 o'clock this morning, a Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty
between Japan and China was signed between Ambassador Nobuyuki Abe and
Mr. Wang Ching-wei, President of the Executive Yuan (Though Mr. Wang became
toward the head of the National Government, he signed the Treaty in the capacity
of President of the Executive Yuan), which means that Japan formally recog-
nized the new National Government at Nanking as the legitimate govern-
ment of China. And at noon General Abe and Mr. Tsang Shih-i, Plenipotentiaries
of Japan and Manchoukuo, and Mr. Wang signed the Japan-Manchoukuo-China
Joint Declaration, by virtue of which Manchoukuo and the National Govern-
ment headed by Mr. Wang Ching-wei recognized each other. It is most
gratifying that the foundation has thus been firmly laid for the construc-
tion of a new order in East Asia through the cooperation between the three
Powers.

Following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese hostilities, and with
the advance of Japanese forces, there sprang up societies for the main-
tenance of peace and order in various parts of China. These were gradually
absorbed by and amalgamated with two regimes—namely, the Provisional
Government at Peking and the Reformed Government at Nanking, paving the
way for the construction of a new China, until finally there appeared the
Peace and National Salvation Movement under the leadership of Mr. Wang
Ching-wei.

This was a movement aiming at the construction of a new order in East
Asia and at establishing for that purpose a government by rehabilitating
the Kuomintang, by rejecting both communism and anti-Japanism and by
joining hands with Japan. On December 18, 1938, Mr. Wang Ching-wei startled
the world by his flight from Chungking.

Prime Minister Prince Konoe's statement (December 22) concerning the
construction of a new order in East Asia was followed by Mr. Wang's declar-
ation for peace and against communism (December 30). A few months later
Mr. Wang arrived in Shanghai from Hanoi (May 8, 1939), where he established
his headquarters for his peace movement. Shortly afterwards he visited
Tokyo (May 31) and conferred with the Prime Minister, Baron Hiranuma,
and also Prince Konoe, from whom he learned the true attitude of Japan
toward his peace movement and decided to proceed in earnest. On August 28
the Sixth Plenary Conference of the Kuomintang was convened in Shanghai,
which adopted the resolutions for the restoration of Sino-Japanese relations
by fundamental adjustment and for the reorganization of the Kuomintang and
the appointment of Mr. Wang as chairman of the Central Executive Committee.
At the same meeting the much-abused Three People's Principles were given
a proper and authentic interpretation. The Peace and National Salvation
Movement now became a "Peace and National Construction" movement, and the orthodox Kuomintang, casting aside its claim of "Rule the country by the Party," embarked upon the establishment of a new Central Government of China through the co-operation of parties and factions and those belonging to no party or faction. The first important step toward the establishment of a new Central Government was the three-day conference at Nanking, attended by Mr. Wang Ching-wei, Mr. Wang Ke-min representing the Provisional Government and Mr. Liang Hungchi of the Reformed Government. Then, on January 23 this year those three leaders met again at Tsingtao. On February 12, Mr. Wang called a meeting at Shanghai, to which were invited men of social prominence as well as representatives of various parties and factions, and at which an agreement of views was reached concerning the general principles for the establishment of a Central Government and its political platform. This led to the opening on March 20 of the Central Political Conference to decide upon the fundamentals for the establishment of the new Government.

The conference was attended by thirty delegates in all, comprising ten from the Kuomintang, five each from the Provisional and the Reformed Governments, two each from the Federated Autonomous Government of Mongolia, the National Socialist Party and the Young China Party, and four men of recognized influence in society. Twelve important matters, such as for instance the proposal for the adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations, the draft principles for the establishment of a Central Government, the platform of the National Government and the regulations for the organization of a Central Executive Committee, were approved, and the conference closed on March 25. On March 30 the rites and ceremonies marking the return of the National Government to its capital were held in Nanking, at which Mr. Wang Ching-wei issued a proclamation. There and there the National Government made the first forward step of historic importance as a partner in the construction of a new order in East Asia.

In parallel and inseparable with the activities for the establishment of a Central Government, there progressed negotiations for the adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations. Those negotiations made especially notable progress on the basis of the three principles of amity and neighbourliness, common defence against the Comintern and economic cooperation, after the Sixth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang which was held at the end of August of 1939; and on December 30 an informal agreement on basic ideas regarding the adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations was reached at Shanghai between the negotiators of the two countries.

Upon the establishment of the new Central Government on March 30 of this year, the Japanese Government appointed on April 1 General Nobuyuki Abe, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, who arrived at Nanking on the 23rd of that month. After this, all preparations were completed with dispatch for the restoration of Sino-Japanese relations. On July 5 the first meeting of the formal conference took place, attended by Ambassador Abe and Mr. Wang as Acting President of the Republic of China. Mr. Wang on this occasion spoke of what China expected of the conference, while Ambassador Abe set forth the views of the Japanese
Government relative to the negotiations that were to begin. Since then
the negotiations were continued for almost two months. It was rather
the zeal on both sides for the construction of the new order in East Asia
than what may merely be termed mutual concession that enabled the delegates
of the two countries to solve the many complex and vexing problems. At
the 15th session held on August 23 they agreed upon a draft treaty, which
was initialled on August 31. Upon examination by the two Governments
from the domestic standpoint of their respective countries, this draft
treaty was found to require partial alterations. Accordingly in the latter
part of September the negotiations were resumed for the necessary revision,
on which an agreement of views was reached, and the treaty in its final
form was initialled on October 10.

On the other hand, with Manchoukuo that had always supported without
reserve the cause of Sino-Japanese cooperation, negotiations were conducted
concerning a Japan-Manchoukuo-China Joint Declaration. Early in November
Mr. Wei Juan-chang, director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of Manchoukuo
arrived in Nanking, and the Declaration as published today was initialled
on November 8 by the plenipotentiaries of the three countries. Meanwhile,
Ambassador Abo, returning to Japan on October 27, met Prime Minister Prince
Konoe on October 29 to report on his mission. Following the Imperial
Conference of November 13, the Treaty was submitted to the Privy Council,
and approved at its full session of November 27. This in brief is the
history of the Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty that was signed today at
Nanking.
I, E. E. DANLY, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G.I.C.P., and as such have possession, custody and control of original or copies of captured enemy documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That Document No. 1584 was delivered to me from Japanese Institute of Foreign Relations as being an original or copy of an enemy document that had been captured or obtained by military forces acting under the Supreme Commander Allied Forces and such document has been continuously in my custody since such delivery.

Dated: 12 Aug 1946

/s/ E. E. Danly

E. E. DANLY

I further certify that Document 1584 contains three monthly issues of the "Tokyo Gazette", to wit, January, February and March 1942.

Dated: 15 Aug 1946

/s/ E. E. Danly

E. E. DANLY
Hi

Excellency, Nobuyuki
Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador
Plenipotentiary of the Japanese Empire

Monseur l'Ami d'Amour,

I have the honor to inform you that today in affixing our signatures to the treaty regarding the basic relations between the Republic of China and Japan the following understanding has been reached between Your Excellency and myself.

I

Since Mongolia (the area north of the Inner Great Wall; the wall itself is not included) possesses the peculiarity of being a highly cohesive area for the both countries of China and Japan from the standpoint of national defense and economy, as per stipulations of the aforesaid treaty, Mongolia shall be an highly autonomous area of highly protective nature against Communism, and comprehensive rights of self-government shall be recognized on the basis of the present condition.

The Republic of China shall stipulate the rights of Mongolia's autonomy by laws and ordinances relating to the autonomy of Mongolia; but, in regard to the enactment of such laws and ordinances, the Government of the Republic of China shall consult the Government of Japan beforehand.

II

(1) In view of the fact that North China (the area in Hebei, Shandong and Shantung, south of the Inner Great Wall; the wall itself is included) is a close collaborative area between China and Japan from the standpoint of national defense and economy, as prescribed in the aforesaid treaty and annexed documents, the Government of the Republic of China has established in North China the North China Political Committee to take over and dispose of the matters that had been managed by the Provisional Government of the Republic of China. The powers and organization of the said Committee shall be speedily adjusted and regulated within the limit, and, with the view of realizing the following item under (2) upon the restoration of general peace between the two countries.
(2) Among the Sino-Japanese cooperative matters in North China, the following are the matters which the North China Political Committee can locally dispose of upon the restoration of general peace between the two countries; and in this regard, the Government of the Republic of China shall make stipulation by laws and ordinances on the basis of its consultation with the Government of Japan.

a. Matters concerning cooperation against Communism and for peace preservation.

(1) Disposition of the matters related to the stationing of Japanese troops.

(2) Disposition of the necessary matters in regard to Sino-Japanese cooperation against Communism and for peace preservation.

(3) Disposition also of the matters related to Sino-Japanese military cooperation.

Moreover, the dispositions with regard to the National defense army shall be made by a military affairs administrative organ to be established by the Government of the Republic of China in North China; and furthermore, as regards the military strength of the Pacification Corps maintained by the North China Political Committee, it shall be prescribed separately.

B. Matters concerning economical collaboration in North China; particularly, the development and utilization of underground resources necessary for national defense, and the supply and distribution of materials among Japan, Manchukuo, Mongolia and North China.

(1) Matters concerning the granting of facilities to Japanese subjects for developing and utilizing underground resources; particularly, the resources necessary for national defense.

(2) Dispositions in regard to the facilitation and the rationalization of the supply and distribution of materials among Japan, Manchukuo, Mongolia and North China.

(3) Dispositions in regard to the cooperation on currency and exchange among Japan, Manchukuo, Mongolia and North China.
(4) Dispositions in regard to the cooperation on railways, airways, communications and the leading maritime transportation.

C. Matters concerning the appointment and employment of Japanese advisors and personnel.

D. Negotiations concerning the matters for purely local disposition with Japan or Manchuko, not enumerated above under A and E.

(5) The North China Political Committee shall be empowered to make dispositions in regard to local contact with Mongolia within the scope determined by the Government of the Republic of China.

(6) Whenever the North China Political Committee has made disposition of the aforementioned matters under (2) and (5), it shall be reported to the Government of the Republic of China.

III

In view of the fact that it has been decided to materialize close economic collaboration between China and Japan in the lower areas of the Yangtse River, according to the stipulations of the aforementioned treaty and the annexed documents, and in view of the fact that Shanghai holds an important position in materializing Sino-Japanese cooperation, the Republic of China shall build a new Shanghai with the cooperation of the Japanese Government and materialize Sino-Japanese cooperation in accordance with the following items to be separately agreed upon.

(1) Both countries shall closely cooperate in matters regarding trade, finance, industry and transportation in the lower areas of the Yangtse River, particularly in Shanghai. There shall be established a Sino-Japanese Economic Council.

(2) Both countries shall closely cooperate in matters regarding thought, education, propaganda, sanitation, police and cultural enterprises in Shanghai.

(3) In regard to the construction of the Shanghai Special Municipality, the Government of the Republic of China shall give due consideration to the source of its revenue and thereby prevent obstruction in its construction; and the Government of Japan shall afford technical cooperation to the above mentioned construction.
(4) In regard to the external negotiations of the Shanghai Special Municipality, both countries shall constantly maintain close contact and shall cooperate together.

(5) Among matters attending the stationing of Japanese troops, those for local disposition in Shanghai shall be handled by the Shanghai Special Municipal Government.

IV

In view of the fact that it has been decided to materialize close military collaboration and economic cooperation between the two countries in the specific islands along the coasts of South China and at points related thereto, according to the stipulations of the aforementioned treaty and annexed documents, the Government of the Republic of China shall take the following measures in accordance with the existing condition and under agreements to be agreed upon separately between the two countries.

(1) A province shall be established, comprising the Keinen Island and adjacent islands.

(2) The Amoy Special Municipality shall be established comprising the Amoy Island and vicinity.

(3) Measures shall be taken so that local dispositions may be made smoothly of matters in regard to military cooperation and economic collaboration among the matters pertaining to Sino-Japanese cooperation in the aforesaid areas.

V

The Government of the Republic of China shall, in accordance with agreements to be concluded separately with the Government of Japan, engage Japanese technical and military advisers, and employ Japanese personnel with regard to the matters of Sino-Japanese cooperation.

The functions and the service regulations of the advisers shall be prescribed by the Government of the Republic of China in accordance with agreements to be made separately between the two countries, and the duties of the personnel mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall be in conformity with the regulations prescribed by the law of the Republic of China.
I wish that Your Excellency will confirm the afore-mentioned understanding.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my high esteem.

WANG CHAOZHUNG
Chief of the Executive Yuan
National Government of the Republic of China

Nanking,
30 November 1940
I, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of [number of pages] pages, dated [date] and described as follows: Note (A) from Chief of the Executive Yuan Wang to Ambassador Abe dated November 30, 1940, annexed to the Japan China Basic Treaty. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 2nd day of August 1946

Witness: /s/ Magaharu Odo /s/ T. Shimoda
Signature of Official
Chief, Archives Section
Official Capacity

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 2nd day of August 1946 /s/ Edward P. Monaghan

Witness: /s/ William C. Prout Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity
EXCHANGED OFFICIAL DOCUMENT (A)

Nanking,
November 30, 1943

His Excellency WANG CHAO-MING
Executive Chief of the National Government
of the Republic of China

Sir:

I have the honour of writing you this letter. Respectfully, I wish to inform you that I have duly noted the contents of your letter of today, which stated as follows:

"In affixing our names today to the treaty regarding the fundamental relations between the Republic of China and Japan, the following understanding has been established between Your Excellency and myself:

First:

Since Mongolia (the area north of the Inner Greet Well; the wall itself is not included) possesses the peculiarity of being a highly cohesive area for the both countries of China and Japan from the standpoint of national defense and economy, as prescribed by the aforesaid treaty, Mongolia shall be an autonomous area of highly protective nature against communism, and the comprehensive rights of self-government shall be recognized which shall be based on the present condition.

The Republic of China shall stimulate the rights of Mongolia's autonomy in accordance with the law and ordinance provided for the autonomy of Mongolia, but, in regard to the legislation of such law and ordinance, the Government of the Republic of China shall consult the Government of Japan beforehand.

Second:

(1) In view of the nature of North China (the area in "wai", Shansi and Shantung, south of the Inn or Great Wall: the wall itself is included) as being a close collaborative area between China and Japan from the standpoint of national defense and economy, as prescribed in the aforesaid treaty and annexed document, the Government of the Republic of China shall establish in North China the North China Political committee which shall succeed and conduct matters that have been managed by the Provisional Government of the Republic of China. After peace in general is restored between the two countries, the authorized powers of said committee can be limited to 8 body the following item (2) and with this in view, adjustment and regulation should be specially affected.
(2) Among the Sino-Japanese cooperative matters in North China, which the North China political committee can locally manage after the restoration of general peace between the two countries are as follows, and in regard to these matters, the Government of the Republic of China shall stipulate them in accordance with the laws and ordinances based upon consultation with the Government of Japan.

A. Matters concerning anti-communism and cooperation in peace preservation.
   (1) Management of matters related to the stationing of Japanese troops.
   (2) Management of requisite matters in regard to anti-communism and cooperation in peace preservation between China and Japan.
   (3) Management of other matters in regard to Sino-Japanese military cooperation.

   However, the management of the National Defense Army shall be conducted by the military affairs management organ that is to be established by the Government of the Republic of China in North China, and furthermore, as regards the military strength of the Chaing army maintained by the North China Political Committee, it shall be prescribed separately.

B. Matters concerning the economic concert in North China; particularly, in the development and utilization of underground resources necessary for national defense, and the supply of materials among Japan, Manchuria, Mongolia and North China.
   (1) Matters concerning the grant of facilities to Japan and the Japanese people in developing and utilizing the underground resources; particularly, resources necessary for national defense.
   (2) Management in regard to the rationalization and expediency in the supply and demand of materials among Japan, Manchuria, Mongolia and North China.
   (3) Management in regard to the cooperation on currency and exchange among Japan, Manchuria, Mongolia and North China.
   (4) Management in regard to the cooperation on railways, airways, communications and the leading maritime transportation.

C. Matters concerning the appointment and employment of Japanese advisors and officials.

D. The negotiations concerning the purely local matters of matters not treated in the aforementioned articles of a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, and M. Japan and Manchuria.

(3) The North China political committee shall be permitted to manage matters in regard to local coordination with Mongolia, provided that it is within the scope decided by the Republic of China.

(4) When the North China political committee manages matters indicated in the aforementioned articles of 2 and 3, they shall be reported from time to time, to the Government of the Republic of China.
Third:

In view of the fact that it has been decided to materialize the close economic collaboration between China and Japan in the lower areas of the Yangtse River, as based on the stipulations of the aforementioned treaty and the annexed protocols; and in view of the fact that Shanghai holds an important position in materializing the Sino-Japanese cooperation; Sino-Japanese cooperation shall be materialized in accordance with the following items separately consulted and decided upon, in order to build a new Shanghai with the cooperation of the Japanese Government.

1. Both countries shall closely cooperate in matters regarding trade, finance, industry and transportation in the lower areas of the Yangtse River, particularly in Shanghai; and furthermore, to establish the Sino-Japanese economic council.

2. Both countries shall closely cooperate in matters regarding thought, education, propaganda, sanitation, police and cultural enterprises in Shanghai.

3. In regard to the construction of the Shanghai Special Municipality, the Government of the Republic of China shall take into consideration the source of its revenue and thereby prevent obstruction in its construction; and to which the Government of Japan shall accord technical cooperation to the above mentioned construction.

4. In regard to the external negotiation of the Shanghai Special Municipality, both countries shall constantly maintain close liaison and shall cooperate together.

5. In regard to the external negotiation of Japanese troops insofar as the local management in Shanghai is concerned, the Shanghai Special Municipal Government shall be responsible.

Fourth:

In view of the fact that it has been decided to materialize the close military collaboration and the economic cooperation between the two countries in the specific islands along the coasts of Southern China and relative spots thereof, as based on the stipulations of the aforementioned treaty and annexed documents, the Government of the Republic of China shall take the following measures in accordance with the current conditions based on agreements that are to be consulted and decided separately between the two countries.

1. A province shall be established from the areas comprising the Hainan Island and the adjoining islands thereof.

2. The Amoy Special Municipality shall be established from the areas comprising the Amoy Island and its vicinity.
(3) Measures shall be taken so that local management could be carried on smoothly on matters in regard to military cooperation and economic collaboration in the aforementioned area, as provided for in the matters pertaining to Sino-Japanese cooperation.

Fifth:

The Government of the Republic of China shall, in accordance with agreements to be made separately with the Government of Japan, engage Japanese technical and military advisers, and employ Japanese officials in order to manage the cooperative matters between China and Japan.

The official power and the service regulation of the advisers shall be prescribed by the Government of the Republic of China in accordance with agreements to be made separately between both countries, and the duties of the officials shall be in conformity with the regulations prescribed in the law of the Republic of China.

I wish that your excellency will confirm the aforementioned understanding. The undersigned herewith confirms the aforementioned understanding.

In answering as above, the undersigned extends his respect to your excellency.

Your cordially,

On the 30th day of November in the 15th year of Showa (1940) a. Ten-ya

Nobuyuki, M.P.

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Empire of Japan.

To His Excellency WAN Chao-Ming, Executive Chief of the National Government of the Republic of China.
CERTIFICATE

I, SîilIXüi, Takeso, in the capacity of Chief of the Archives Section, Foreign Office, do hereby certify that the attached document is a true and correct copy of the original described as follows: Note (A) to Chief of the Executive Yuan Wen; from Ambassador Abe, dated November 30, 1940, annexed to the Japan-China Peace Treaty.

Signed at TOKYO on this 2nd day of August 1946.

/s/ T. SHÔGÔ

Witness: NAGATÔ ODO

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at TOKYO on this 1st day of August 1946.

/s/ EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

Witness: WILLIAM C. PROW,

Investigator, IPS

Official Capacity
CERTIFICATE

I.D.C. No. 

I.P.S. No. 

I, S.C.C.M.A., Inase, in the capacity of Chief of the Archives Section, Foreign Office, do hereby certify that the attached document is a true and correct copy of the original described as follows: Note (I) to China of the Executive Yuan from as of dated November 10, 1940, annexed to the Japan-China Basic Treaty.

Signed at Tokyo on this 2nd day of August, 1947.

/s/ Kenzaburo Oto /s/ T. Shindo
Witness Chief, Archives Section
Foreign Office.

His Excellency Weng Che-ning,
Chief of the Executive Yuan,

Sir,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note of today's date reading as follows:

On signing the Treaty relating to the Basic Relations between Japan and China, an agreement was reached between Your Excellency and myself, with reference to the stipulations of Article 1 of the Supplementary Protocol of the said Treaty, that during the period in which Japan continues in the territories of the Republic of China the warlike operations she is now carrying on, the government of the Republic of China will positively cooperate toward the full attainment of the purposes of the said warlike operations of Japan.

I wish that Your Excellency will confirm the above-mentioned understanding:

It gives me pleasure to confirm the above-mentioned understanding.
In replying to Your Excellency, I avail myself of this opportunity to renew the assurance of my highest consideration.

Nanking
November 30, 1940.

Nobuyaki Abe
Envoy Extraordinary and
Ambassador Plenipotentiary
of the Japanese Empire.

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Honahan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 2nd day of August 1946.

/s/ Edward P. Honahan

Witness: William C. Frout
(Signed)

Investigator, J.P.S.
Official Capacity
ANNEXED SECRET AGREEMENT

The Plenipotentiaries of Japan and the Republic of China, in signing the treaty regarding the fundamental relations between the two countries today have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Governments of the two countries have agreed that, in order to promote the common interests of both countries and to secure peace in East Asia, diplomacy based upon mutual concert shall be effectuated and that no measures, which are contrary to this principle, shall be taken on relations with other third countries.

Article II

The Government of the Republic of China shall comply to the Japanese demands regarding military necessities, in accordance with the agreements that are to be decided hereafter between the two countries, concerning the railways, airways, communications, harbors and waterways located in areas stationed by Japanese troops and in the related areas thereof within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of China. However, the executive and administrative rights of the Republic of China shall be respected in ordinary times.

The Government of the Republic of China agree to grant the aforementioned Japanese troops facilities necessary to station troops in accordance with the agreements that are to be decided hereafter between the two countries.

Article III

The governments of the two countries shall publicly announce, when found necessary, the whole or a part of the articles in this agreement upon consultation.

Article IV

This agreement shall come into effect with the conclusion of the treaty.

As an evidence of the agreement, the Plenipotentiaries of the two countries have signed and affixed their seals thereon.
Two copies of each, one in Japanese and the other in Chinese, have been drawn up in Nanking this 30th day of November in the 15th year of Shuns, or on the 30th day of November in the 29th year of the Republic of China (1940).

s/ MUR, Nobuyuki

Envoi Extraordinary and Ambassador

Plenipotentiary of the Japanese Empire

s/ TANG Chao Ming

Executive Chief of the National Government

of the Republic of China
His Excellency M. NOBUYUKI,
Envoi Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Japanese Empire,

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

I have the honor to inform you that, on signing the Treaty relating to the Basic Relations between Japan and China, an agreement was reached between Your Excellency and myself, with reference to the stipulations of Article 1 of the Supplementary Protocol of the said Treaty, that during the period in which Japan continues in the territories of the Republic of China the warlike operations she is now carrying on, the Government of the Republic of China will positively cooperate toward the full attainment of the purposes of the said warlike operations of Japan.

I wish that Your Excellency will confirm the above-mentioned understanding.

WANG CHAO-NING
Chief of the Executive Yuan,
National Government of the
Republic of China.

NANKING,
30 November, 1940.
I, OTA, Kenichi, in the capacity of Chief of the Translation Section, Foreign Office, do hereby certify that the attached document is a correct translation of a document described as follows: Note (B) from Chief of the Executive Yuan Wang to Ambassador Abo, dated November 30, 1940, annexed to the Japan-China Basic Treaty.
Signed at TOKYO this 12nd day of August, 1946.

/s/ KENICHI OTA
Chief, Translation Section
Foreign Office
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SHINO DA Takeso__, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of ______ pages, and described as follows: Note (N) from Chief of the Executive Wing to Ambassador Ab, dated November 30, 1940, annexed to the Japan-China Basic Treaty. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

_________________________Foreign Office______________________________

Signed at Tokyo on this 2nd day of August 1946. /s/ T. SHINO DA

Signature of Official

Witness: Masaharu Ota Chief, Archives Section
Official Capacity

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 2nd day of August, 1946 /s/ Edward P. Monaghan

Witness: William C. Proct /s/ Investigator, I.P.S.

Official Capacity
I, CHU Ching-ju, hereby certify that I am well versed in Japanese and Chinese, and that, after comparing the Chinese and Japanese texts, I have confirmed that the documents are truly and correctly translated.

August 30, 1946

/s/ Chu Ching-Ju
On signing this day the Pact of Alliance between Japan and China the Plenipotentiaries of the two countries have agreed as follows:

Article 1.

Japan undertakes to withdraw the Japanese forces despatched to the territories of China when general peace between the two countries is restored and the state of war has ceased to exist.

Japan renounces the right of stationing troops she possesses in accordance with the Peking Protocols and supplementary documents relating to the Boxer War.

Article 2.

The present Protocol shall come into force simultaneously with the Pact.

In witness whereof the Plenipotentiaries of the two countries have signed and affixed their seals unto the present Protocol.

Two copies of this in Japanese and Chinese were prepared at Nanking on the 30th of October, 1943 /18th year of Showa/ or 30th day of October of 32nd year of Republic of China.

Ambassador Plenipotentiary of JAPAN
TANI, Iasayuki (Signed)

President, Executive Yuan,
Republic of CHINA
WANG, Chao-Ming (Signed)
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Shimoda, Takoso, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 1 pages, dated __________, 19__, and described as follows: PROTOCOL ANNEXED TO THE PACT OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN JAPAN AND CHINA (Translation)

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is a part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Japanese Foreign Office

Signed at Tokyo on this 10th day of July, 1946

T. Shimoda
Signature of Official

Witness: M. Enura

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 10th day of July 1946

Edward P. Monaghan
NAME

Investigator

Official Capacity
I. P. S.
Letter from Wang to Tani

(Translation)

Sir:

I have the honour to state that upon signing today the Fact of alliance between Japan and China an understanding has been concluded between Your Excellency and myself as follows:

Of the matters of fait accompli existing in China at present, those that require adjustment in the light of the contents of the present Pact, shall be fundamentally adjusted in accordance with the contents of the present Pact when general peace between the two countries is restored and the state of war has ceased to exist.

Even during the continuation of the state of war the required adjustments are to be carried but in accordance with the contents of the present Pact as far as is permitted by circumstances through successive consultation between the two countries.

I shall be glad to receive Your Excellency’s confirmation of the above understanding.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

To Mr. Tani,
Wang, Chao-Ming
Ambassador Plenipotentiary of Japan
President, Executive Yuan, Republic of China

30 October 1943
LETTER FROM TANI TO WANG

(Translation)

Sir:

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note of today's date regarding as follows:

Of the matters of fait accompli existing in China at present, those that require adjustment in the light of the contents of the present Pact, shall be fundamentally adjusted in accordance with the contents of the present Pact when general peace between the two countries is restored and the state of war has ceased to exist.

Even during the continuation of the state of war the required adjustments are to be carried out in accordance with the contents of the present Pact successively as far as is permitted by circumstances through consultation between the two countries.

I shall be glad to receive Your Excellency's confirmation of the above understanding.

I am pleased to confirm the above understanding.

In sending this reply I beg Your Excellency to accept the assurance of my highest consideration.

To WANG Chao-ting
President, Executive Yuan, Republic of China

30 October 1943
Nanking
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SHIMODA Takeo, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity, Chief of the Archives Section, Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 5 pages, dated 19, and described as follows: Notes exchanged in connection with the Alliance Pact between Japan and China.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Japanese Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 9th day of July 1946.

T. SHIMODA
Signature of Official

K. EMURA
Official Capacity

Witness:

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 10th day of July 1946.

EDWARD P. MONAGHAN
Name
Investigator, L.P.S.
Official Capacity

Witness: ROBERT F. MAHON

Official Capacity
FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER

/ / J. W. Mann
for R. H. Pitch, Brigade General, Adjutant General.

TO: CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

FROM: Central Liaison Office, Tokyo

SUBJECT: Annual Reports of Exports and Imports

C.I.O. No. 4283 (T)

27 August 1946

1. Reference: SCAP Memorandum No. 091.31 (4 Jun 46) IPS (SCAPIN-1390-A), subject, as above.

2. Certified copies in Japanese and English of the annual reports of imports and exports between Japan and the countries within the East Asia Sphere covering the years 1931 to 1945 inclusive are submitted herewith.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:
/s/ T. Katsube
("T. Katsube") by F. Suyama
Chief of Liaison Section,
Central Liaison Office.

Enclosure: As stated in paragraph 2, above,
(This enclosure has been submitted directly to the competent official of International Prosecution Section, SCAP.)
特种设备修理与维护

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4 Jan. 1946

J. W. MAN

B. R. Fitch

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V.

J. W. MANN

B. W. FISCHER
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Director of the General Affairs Bureau, of the Board of Trade, of the Commerce and Industry Ministry, certify that the following 5 sheets show the exports and imports to and from Japan to and from Manchoukuo.

Those data are taken from the official records of the Finance Ministry.

Date of certification
19, June 1946.

Signed by

[Signature]

Director, General Affairs Bureau, Board of Trade
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**Experiments**

**Manchoukuo**

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大日本帝国政府

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*Note: The table contains data for sales, value, and quota for the years 1932 to 1939.*
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**总计**：
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销售金额：100000元
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Notes: Further analysis required.
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**Note:** The table data seems to be in Chinese characters but lacks specific context or units. The table is possibly related to mineral or agricultural production figures.
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なお、詳細な解釈や注記は、文脈や背景が必要です。
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注：水口大桥田調查
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Director of the General Affairs Bureau, of the Board of Trade, of the Commerce and Industry Ministry, certify that the following 4 sheets show the exports and imports to and from Japan to and from Kwantung Province.

Those data are taken from the official records of the Finance Ministry.

Date of certification
19, June 1946.

Signed by

T. Okamura

Director, General Affairs Bureau, Board of Trade
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**Note:** The table contains numerical data, possibly representing measurements or values in different years.
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**Note:** The numbers in the table likely represent specific values or measurements. The context of the table is not clear from the image.
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大口买卖国债券

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## Imports

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Director of the General Affairs Bureau, of the Board of Trade, of the Commerce and Industry Ministry, certify that the following 4 sheets show the exports and imports to and from Japan to and from China.

Those data are taken from the official records of the Finance Ministry.

Date of certification
13, June 1946.

Signed by

[Signature]

Director, General Affairs Bureau, Board of Trade
Each number in the value column is equal to the thousand yen.

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<tr>
<td>Cotton towel</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>1.5%</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scrap iron</td>
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N.2
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

注：
- 每列数字代表特定的年度，具体含义需根据上下文或实际背景确定。
- 表格中可能存在一些缺失数据或特殊符号，实际阅读时需注意。
- 上下文信息缺失，无法提供更详细的解释。
<table>
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<td>96</td>
</tr>
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<td>硅</td>
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<td>34</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>锌</td>
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<td>431</td>
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<tr>
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[Table continued...]

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Data for the second column.
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**Note:** The table contains data for years 1940 to 1945.
<table>
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<th>1938</th>
<th>1939</th>
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<td>2.32</td>
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<td>2.01</td>
<td>1.21</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.11</td>
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<td>1.17</td>
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<td>0.30</td>
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<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.58</td>
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<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Income</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>1.27</td>
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<td>1.02</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>2.32</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.37</td>
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<tr>
<td>Note</td>
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Each number in the table corresponds to the thousand yen.
<table>
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<th>1937</th>
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</table>

**Note:**
- The table above shows the values for different years, with each value representing data or information from the specified years.
- The years listed are 1935 to 1941.
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<th>1934</th>
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<td>88</td>
<td>87</td>
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</table>

以下为第二部分的记录：

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>1934</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>放</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
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<td>88</td>
<td>87</td>
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总计：

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<td>186</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>186</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
July 5, 1946

Edward 'Sonaghan, Esq.
Int. Pros. Section

Dear Mr. Sonaghan:

I would like to obtain, properly certified for evidence, a table showing: (separate chart for each item)

a) the foreign trade of Manchoukuo, 1932-1943, inclusive;

b) Manchoukuo, value of exports and imports by countries, 1932-1943, inclusive;

c) Manchoukuo, value of principal articles exported;

d) Manchoukuo, value of principal articles imported;

e) Manchoukuo, mineral outputs, metric tons.

These tables, as far as a), b), c) and d) and e) are concerned, can be based on foreign trade returns, compiled by the Manchoukuo Department of Finance and Commerce, and upon statistics compiled by the Manchoukuo Department of Industry, as to all charts.

These tables have been summarized in the Fifth and Sixth Reports on Progress in Manchuria to 1938, and to 1939, respectively.

Yours very truly,

/s/ H. A. Hauxhurst

H. A. HAUXHURST

P.S. If possible, I would like to have a table showing the importation into Manchoukuo of heavy construction materials, 1932-1943, inclusive.
Certificate

I, SUZUKI, Masakatsu, Chief of the Continental Affairs Section, Economic Affairs Division, Control Bureau, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, hereby certify that these tables are true as well as correct copies of both the tables printed in the Sixth Report on Progress in Manchuria to 1939 and the Toyo Keizai Nenkan published in 17th Showa which were each based upon the statistics for the Manchoukuo Government, and acknowledge the contents of these tables to be true as well as correct.

Tokyo, 10 July, 1946.

/s/ M. Suzuki
(a) The Foreign Trade of Manchukuo (1932-1943)

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(b) Manchoukuo, Value of Exports and Imports by Countries. (1932 - 1943)

(Units: M Y)

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| 379,917       | 8,876,202 |       |       |       |
| 440,274       | 24,825,406|       |       |       |
| 1,928,359,591 |       |       |       |       |
### Manchoukuo, Value of Principal Articles exported (Unit Yuan)

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<td>5,674,924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soya Beans</td>
<td>216,474,556</td>
<td>226,076,194</td>
<td>236,263,310</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others Beans</td>
<td>14,838,428</td>
<td>12,511,819</td>
<td>15,286,626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buck wheat</td>
<td>2,373,283</td>
<td>2,569,927</td>
<td>2,683,950</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kaoliang</td>
<td>11,726,455</td>
<td>9,843,121</td>
<td>18,815,766</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>6,995,450</td>
<td>8,525,859</td>
<td>18,328,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millet</td>
<td>18,318,478</td>
<td>14,196,991</td>
<td>20,260,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans-Cakes</td>
<td>53,126,934</td>
<td>62,335,743</td>
<td>70,575,007</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bean Oil</td>
<td>21,091,362</td>
<td>25,342,831</td>
<td>14,099,414</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barilla Oil</td>
<td>6,764,310</td>
<td>7,314,604</td>
<td>4,616,137</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ground nut</td>
<td>16,109,759</td>
<td>16,369,566</td>
<td>12,115,314</td>
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<tr>
<td>Castor Seeds</td>
<td>3,025,663</td>
<td>4,383,228</td>
<td>2,630,795</td>
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<td>Hemp Seeds</td>
<td>5,593,399</td>
<td>2,269,209</td>
<td>3,305,453</td>
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<td>Perilla Seeds</td>
<td>13,818,145</td>
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<td>7,275,408</td>
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<td>Sesamum Seeds</td>
<td>891,751</td>
<td>2,090,104</td>
<td>3,421,298</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>35,181,459</td>
<td>35,610,491</td>
<td>28,198,127</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wild Silk</td>
<td>6,118,319</td>
<td>8,285,885</td>
<td>11,118,690</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sheep's Wool</td>
<td>1,924,761</td>
<td>2,564,116</td>
<td>2,526,701</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cotton Yarn</td>
<td>6,189,066</td>
<td>4,468,231</td>
<td>665,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceres, Metals</td>
<td>18,598,953</td>
<td>23,613,885</td>
<td>60,354,934</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ammonia Sulphate</td>
<td>11,423,631</td>
<td>9,675,958</td>
<td>16,571,204</td>
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<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>5,072,710</td>
<td>7,236,126</td>
<td>8,256,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>473,020,525</td>
<td>501,765,587</td>
<td>560,898,402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles</td>
<td>(1936)</td>
<td>(1937)</td>
<td>(1938)</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton Piece Goods, Grey</td>
<td>32,048,120</td>
<td>42,771,052</td>
<td>33,983,111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton Piece Goods, White or Lyed</td>
<td>40,769,121</td>
<td>44,825,328</td>
<td>30,691,976</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cotton Piece Goods, Printed</td>
<td>11,788,939</td>
<td>13,934,377</td>
<td>11,061,318</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cotton Piece Goods, Miscellaneous</td>
<td>2,894,756</td>
<td>3,501,039</td>
<td>8,240,632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw Cotton</td>
<td>18,601,923</td>
<td>32,202,253</td>
<td>12,663,803</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cotton Yarns</td>
<td>7,948,579</td>
<td>10,710,379</td>
<td>5,482,181</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gunny Bags</td>
<td>14,025,752</td>
<td>19,273,736</td>
<td>20,909,887</td>
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<tr>
<td>Woolen Goods</td>
<td>21,730,584</td>
<td>35,900,661</td>
<td>23,345,191</td>
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<td>Artificial Silk</td>
<td>15,801,090</td>
<td>2,129,976</td>
<td>38,564,915</td>
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<td>Silk Piece Goods</td>
<td>35,547,213</td>
<td>30,574,447</td>
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<td>Copper Products</td>
<td>2,660,683</td>
<td>6,176,618</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Iron and Steel Products</td>
<td>90,770,895</td>
<td>90,867,760</td>
<td>190,012,739</td>
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<td>Machinery and Tools</td>
<td>39,917,649</td>
<td>65,900,611</td>
<td>121,500,810</td>
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<td>Vehicles and Vessels</td>
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<td>46,406,263</td>
<td>81,733,603</td>
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<td>Electrical Appliances</td>
<td>21,682,443</td>
<td>34,614,327</td>
<td>39,767,207</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marine Products</td>
<td>12,004,364</td>
<td>20,581,790</td>
<td>22,985,279</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tea</td>
<td>3,732,362</td>
<td>4,120,420</td>
<td>6,237,779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice and Paddy</td>
<td>12,591,755</td>
<td>8,754,887</td>
<td>11,335,432</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wheat Flour</td>
<td>27,115,884</td>
<td>13,827,593</td>
<td>47,088,571</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>22,426,980</td>
<td>30,917,586</td>
<td>35,778,943</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wine and Beverage</td>
<td>8,368,111</td>
<td>9,569,193</td>
<td>10,416,561</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>10,851,593</td>
<td>9,950,172</td>
<td>9,427,171</td>
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<td>Paper and Paper Wares</td>
<td>24,251,387</td>
<td>36,423,027</td>
<td>57,742,360</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boots and Shoes</td>
<td>7,959,326</td>
<td>10,737,067</td>
<td>12,288,104</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>486,878,524</strong></td>
<td><strong>625,216,219</strong></td>
<td><strong>871,447,730</strong></td>
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### Manchoukuo, Mineral Outputs (Units: Metric Tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Products</th>
<th>(1934)</th>
<th>(1935)</th>
<th>(1936)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iron Ore</td>
<td>1,133,371</td>
<td>1,477,940</td>
<td>1,795,287</td>
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<td>Pig Iron</td>
<td>475,826</td>
<td>607,949</td>
<td>547,402</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sulphuric Iron</td>
<td>4,250</td>
<td>5,115</td>
<td>5,798</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manganese Ore</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>10,618,961</td>
<td>11,186,632</td>
<td>12,082,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coke</td>
<td>521,253</td>
<td>666,844</td>
<td>711,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Shale</td>
<td>2,105,760</td>
<td>3,227,946</td>
<td>3,648,278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crude Oil</td>
<td>58,238</td>
<td>120,299</td>
<td>123,320</td>
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<tr>
<td>Magnesite</td>
<td>100,329</td>
<td>225,654</td>
<td>191,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Clay</td>
<td>79,457</td>
<td>138,184</td>
<td>147,494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soapstone (Talc)</td>
<td>49,894</td>
<td>69,818</td>
<td>80,326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zechstein (Dolomite)</td>
<td>166,107</td>
<td>170,300</td>
<td>179,493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limstone</td>
<td>419,033</td>
<td>650,662</td>
<td>1,001,726</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asbestos</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silicas</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felspar</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>15,733,301</td>
<td>18,547,852</td>
<td>20,617,439</td>
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Mandoukuo, Importation of Heavy Construction Materials (1932-1943)
(unit: 1,000 Yuan)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iron and Steel Products</td>
<td>22,178</td>
<td>39,997</td>
<td>58,227</td>
<td>51,510</td>
<td>39,506</td>
<td>76,429</td>
<td>122,074</td>
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<tr>
<td>Machinery &amp; Tools</td>
<td>5,113</td>
<td>9,544</td>
<td>28,056</td>
<td>33,510</td>
<td>38,918</td>
<td>65,901</td>
<td>121,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles and Vessels</td>
<td>5,386</td>
<td>22,699</td>
<td>38,946</td>
<td>38,670</td>
<td>44,724</td>
<td>81,724</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical Appliances</td>
<td>2,049</td>
<td>8,115</td>
<td>18,778</td>
<td>21,683</td>
<td>34,014</td>
<td>39,787</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34,726</td>
<td>80,355</td>
<td>131,713</td>
<td>142,299</td>
<td>138,777</td>
<td>221,068</td>
<td>365,076</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goods</th>
<th>(1939)</th>
<th>(1940)</th>
<th>(1941)</th>
<th>(1942)</th>
<th>(1943)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iron &amp; Steel Products</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery &amp; Tools</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles &amp; Vessels</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical Appliance</td>
<td>63,266</td>
<td>55,934</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, S. Suzuki, chairman of the Committee of Conservators for Closed Institutions, do hereby certify under seal that the attached statements, as listed, (pages 1 to 2) are true and correct copies of the original records in the office of the Taiwan Bank Building, Tokyo, Japan, pertaining to the matters certified to:

Page 1 - Compiled from the Annual Reports of the Central China Development Company showing paid-up capital, debenture issued, investments and loans for the years ended December 31, 1938, 1939, 1940 and March 31, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945, inclusive.

Page 2 - Compiled from the Annual Reports of the North China Development Company showing capital paid in, debenture issued, investment and loans for the years ended December 31, 1938, 1939, 1940 and March 31, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945, inclusive.

Dated Tokyo, Japan 22 June 1946.

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Committee of Conservators for Closed Institutions in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 22 day of June, 1946

/s/ Edward P. Monaghan

Witness: /s/ Joe B. Williams

Investigator

International Prosecution Section
### Financial Statistics of the Central China Development Company
(compiled from annual reports of the company)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Paid up Capital</th>
<th>Debenture issued</th>
<th>Investments</th>
<th>Loans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 31 '38</td>
<td>Y 31,382,344</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Y 12,750,123.12</td>
<td>37,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 31 '39</td>
<td>27,202,608</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24,037,623.12</td>
<td>8,681,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 31 '40</td>
<td>45,047,650</td>
<td>Y 40,000,000</td>
<td>51,536,173.12</td>
<td>47,140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 31 '41</td>
<td>45,047,650</td>
<td>40,000,000</td>
<td>54,426,173.12</td>
<td>60,664,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 31 '42</td>
<td>45,047,680</td>
<td>100,000,000</td>
<td>51,704,400.00</td>
<td>108,820,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 31 '43</td>
<td>62,440,596</td>
<td>159,700,000</td>
<td>86,762,100.00</td>
<td>157,551,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 31 '44</td>
<td>62,440,596</td>
<td>228,050,000</td>
<td>83,945,100.00</td>
<td>278,277,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar. 31 '45</td>
<td>110,864,946</td>
<td>352,600,000</td>
<td>144,061,390.00</td>
<td>4,837,651,860</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(SEAL)

### Financial Statistics of the Firth China Development Company
(compiled from annual reports of the company)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Capital Paid in</th>
<th>Debenture issued</th>
<th>Investment</th>
<th>Loans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 31 '38</td>
<td>Y 99,319,622</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20,925,000</td>
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<td>Dec. 31 '39</td>
<td>136,029,660.60</td>
<td>Y110,000,000</td>
<td>Y104,719,187.50</td>
<td>121,891,568.41</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 31 '40</td>
<td>218,461,172</td>
<td>325,000,000</td>
<td>239,349,875</td>
<td>713,217,372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 31 '41</td>
<td>218,461,172</td>
<td>385,000,000</td>
<td>244,339,875</td>
<td>768,096,372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 31 '42</td>
<td>218,461,172</td>
<td>679,400,000</td>
<td>301,048,834.33</td>
<td>595,692,028.99</td>
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<td>Mar. 31 '43</td>
<td>311,750,000</td>
<td>1,013,850,000</td>
<td>517,326,910.39</td>
<td>794,527,609.60</td>
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<td>311,750,000</td>
<td>1,423,700,000</td>
<td>731,454,301.06</td>
<td>1,223,142,000</td>
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<td>Mar. 31 '45</td>
<td>311,750,000</td>
<td>2,130,200,000</td>
<td>908,318,789.50</td>
<td>2,817,312,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(SEAL)
I, S. Suzuki, chairman of the Committee of Conservators for Closed Institutions, do hereby certify under seal that the attached statements, as listed, (pages 1 to 2) are true and correct copies of the original records in the office of the Taiwan Bank Building, Tokyo, Japan, pertaining to the matters certified to:

Page 1 - Compiled from the Annual Reports of the Central China Development Company showing paid-up capital, debenture issued, investments and loans for the years ended December 31, 1938, 1939, 1940 and March 31, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945, inclusive.

Page 2 - Compiled from the Annual Reports of the North China Development Company showing capital paid in, debenture issued, investments and loans for the years ended December 31, 1938, 1939, 1940 and March 31, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945, inclusive.

Dated Tokyo, Japan 22 June 1946.

Committee of Conservators for Closed Institutions

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Committee of Conservators for Closed Institutions in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 22 day of June, 1946

Witness: /s/ Joe B. Williams

Investigator

International Prosecution Section
Also statement of subsidiaries of said companies' ownership of capital and amount of capital.

I, M. TANAKA, Chief, General Affairs Section, Economic Affairs Division, Control Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, do hereby certify under seal that the attached documents, as noted, (Pages 1 to 15 inclusive) are true and correct copies of original documents in the Office of the General Affairs Section, Economic Affairs Division, Control Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pertaining to the matters certified to:

Pages 2 and 3 - Subsidiaries of the South Manchuria Railway Co., Ltd., as of 22 June 1946.
Page 4 - Government investment in stock shares of the Central China Development Company, Ltd., as of 23 June 1946.
Page 5 and 6 - Central China Development Company and its Subsidiary companies, December 12, 1946.
Pages 8, 9, 10 and 11 - Subsidiary Companies of the North China Development Company as of 22 June 1946.
Pages 13 and 14 - Subsidiary companies of the Manchuria Heavy Industry Development Company, Ltd., as of 22 June 1946.

Dated Tokyo, Japan, 22 June 1946.

/s/ M. TANAKA, Chief
General Affairs Section
Economic Affairs Division
Control Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

(P.1)

Government Investment in Stock Shares of the South Manchuria Railway Co., Ltd.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nominal Capital</th>
<th>Paid up Capital</th>
<th>Japanese Government owns</th>
<th>Remark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Yen 1,400,000,000</td>
<td>Yen 1,400,000,000</td>
<td>Yen 700,000,000</td>
<td>50,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I certify that this is a true and correct copy of the original document.

/s/ M. TANAKA
Chief, General Affairs Section,
Economic Affairs Division,
Control Bureau,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsidiary Co.</th>
<th>Paid up Capital</th>
<th>S.M.R. Co. Nom. %</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dairen Steamship Co.</td>
<td>25,700 Thousand Yen</td>
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<td>31 Mar. 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairen Municipal Traffic Co.</td>
<td>26,500 Thousand Yen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kokusai Transportation Co.</td>
<td>25,500 Thousand Yen</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukusho Labor Supply Co.</td>
<td>1,500 Thousand Yen</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairen Dock and Iron Works Co.</td>
<td>10,000 Thousand Yen</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairen Ceramic Co.</td>
<td>2,100 Thousand Yen</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nippon Paraffin Co.</td>
<td>4,000 Thousand Yen</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchuria Mining Co.</td>
<td>10,000 Thousand Yen</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairen Agricultural Co.</td>
<td>5,000 Thousand Yen</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manzen Koboku Co. (Wood for Collier)</td>
<td>2,250 Thousand Yen</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchuria Land &amp; Building Co.</td>
<td>1,500 Thousand Yen</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukin Coal Mining Co.</td>
<td>15,000 Thousand Yen</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan Manchuria Warehouse Co.</td>
<td>7,500 Thousand Yen</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairen Industry Co.</td>
<td>1,000 Thousand Yen</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fushun Cement Co.</td>
<td>3,375 Thousand Yen</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchuria Chemical Industry Co.</td>
<td>12,925 Thousand Yen</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukushu Mining Co.</td>
<td>1,000 Thousand Yen</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokoshi Hot Spring Co.</td>
<td>128 Thousand Yen</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan Manchuria Commercial Trading Co.</td>
<td>10,045 Thousand Yen</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchuria Livestock Industry Co.</td>
<td>1,125 Thousand Yen</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>31 Mar. 1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchuria Business Promotion Co.</td>
<td>2,500 Thousand Yen</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>31 Mar. 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia Engineering Enterprise Co.</td>
<td>1,355 Thousand Yen</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwantung Land Co.</td>
<td>3,750 Thousand Yen</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchuria Cinema Association</td>
<td>4,250 Thousand Yen</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchuria Daily News Co.</td>
<td>894 Thousand Yen</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>31 Mar. 1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchuria Artificial Petroleum Co.</td>
<td>16,500 Thousand Yen</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31 Mar. 1945</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Government Investment in Stock Shares of the Central China Development Co., Ltd.

22 June 1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nominal Capital</th>
<th>Paid up Capital</th>
<th>Japanese Government owns</th>
<th>A:B%</th>
<th>Remark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yen 148,424,250</td>
<td>Yen 110,864,946</td>
<td>99,424,250</td>
<td>86.9</td>
<td>31 Mar. 1945</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I certify that this is a true and correct copy of the original document.

(Signed) M. Tanaka
Chief, General Affairs Section,
Economic Affairs Division,
Control Bureau,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Central China Development Company and its Subsidiary Companies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names of the Sub. Companies</th>
<th>Paid up Capitals</th>
<th>Investment Amounts by C.C.D.C.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cent. China Mining Co.</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
<td>3,500,000</td>
<td>17.50%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cent. China Water Works &amp; Electric Co.</td>
<td>109,440,000</td>
<td>46,694,350</td>
<td>42.66%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai Inland Steamship Co.</td>
<td>6,000,000</td>
<td>2,705,300</td>
<td>45.08%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cent. China Communication Co.</td>
<td>40,000,000</td>
<td>15,600,000</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cent. China Fishery Co.</td>
<td>6,000,000</td>
<td>1,149,000</td>
<td>19.15%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai Real Estate Co.</td>
<td>17,500,000</td>
<td>3,750,000</td>
<td>21.42%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai City Motor Bus Co.</td>
<td>15,563,750</td>
<td>1,213,500</td>
<td>7.79%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai Gas Co.</td>
<td>6,100,000</td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>14.75%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cent. China Railway Co.</td>
<td>64,000,000</td>
<td>45,500,000</td>
<td>71.09%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wai Nang Coal Mining Co.</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
<td>4,150,000</td>
<td>27.60%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cent. China Mail Steamship Co.</td>
<td>17,094,200</td>
<td>3,063,400</td>
<td>17.92%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(P6) Cent. China Transportation Co.</td>
<td>9,000,000</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cent. China Watch Manuf. Co.</td>
<td>900,000</td>
<td>360,000</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cent. China Silk Manuf. Co.</td>
<td>10,800,000</td>
<td>1,499,040</td>
<td>13.88%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chu-Oh Chemical Co.</td>
<td>5,400,000</td>
<td>2,137,000</td>
<td>40.50%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryu-Sen Coal Mining Co.</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>9,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shinko Housing Co.</td>
<td>5,754,000</td>
<td>1,120,000</td>
<td>20.55%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 347,551,950 144,061,390 41.45%

Note:
(1) The above-mentioned Investment amounts are of the March 31, 1945, as we have no report from our Shanghai Head Office since that time, and for reference under 20% investment amounts are also written herewith.

I certify that this is a true and correct copy of the Company's original document.

(Sgd.) M. Tanaka
Chief, General Affairs Section, Economic Affairs Division, Control Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Government Investment in Stock & Co. of the North China Development Co., Ltd.

22 June 1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nominal Capital</th>
<th>Paid up Capital</th>
<th>Japanese Government A:E %</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yen 443,000,000</td>
<td>Yen 311,750,000</td>
<td>Yen 264,250,000</td>
<td>81.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I certify that this is a true and correct copy of the original document.

(Signed) K. Tanaka
Chief, General Affairs Section, Economic Affairs Division, Control Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Subsidiary Companies of the North China Development Company

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Paid-up Capital</th>
<th>of which N.C.D. Yen Co.</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tsingtao Coal Mining Co.</td>
<td>27,460,000</td>
<td>27,460,000</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North China Tungsten Mining Co.</td>
<td>6,500,000</td>
<td>6,500,000</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 90%</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North China Insulator Co.</td>
<td>35,000,000</td>
<td>29,142,200</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 80%</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>3,750,000</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tachingshan Coal Mining Co.</td>
<td>25,000,000</td>
<td>18,750,000</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 70%</td>
<td>67,000,000</td>
<td>50,000,000</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North China Housing Co.</td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
<td>18,750,000</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsehsien Coal Mining Co.</td>
<td>8,000,000</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Over 60% mining Co.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Paid-up Capital</th>
<th>of which N.C.D.</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North China Transportation Co.</td>
<td>398,284,000</td>
<td>229,234,000</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>4,17,1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sintai Coal Mining Co.</td>
<td>23,000,000</td>
<td>13,900,000</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>9,30,1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mengchiiang Electric Co.</td>
<td>66,160,000</td>
<td>36,590,000</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>7,7,1928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shansi Industry Co.</td>
<td>80,000,000</td>
<td>42,113,100</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>4,1,1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(P.9) Changsing Coal Mining Co.</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2,9,1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tawanbow Coal Mining Co.</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2,9,1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shansi Coal Mining Co.</td>
<td>8,000,000</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2,9,1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North China Gold Mining Co.</td>
<td>1,700,000</td>
<td>850,000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4,9,1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North China Iron Mfg. Co.</td>
<td>100,000,000</td>
<td>50,000,000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>12,15,1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsingtao Iron Mfg. Co.</td>
<td>25,000,000</td>
<td>12,500,000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Chemical Industry Co.</td>
<td>18,600,000</td>
<td>9,300,000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3,5,1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 50%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North China Medical Assoc.</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North China Nitrogenous Manure Mfg. Co.</td>
<td>55,000,000</td>
<td>26,500,000</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>9,1,1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North China Electric Co.</td>
<td>305,000,000</td>
<td>143,650,000</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2,1,1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North China Light Metal Mfg. Co.</td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
<td>13,500,000</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>11,20,1913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch’inlingchen Iron Ore Mining Co.</td>
<td>17,000,000</td>
<td>7,500,000</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2,1,1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsingtao Wharf Co.</td>
<td>22,000,000</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>9,26,1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North China Electric Machine Co.</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2,10,1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 40%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Paid-up Capital</td>
<td>of which N.G.D. Co. own.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yen</td>
<td>Yen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shantung Electric Chemistry Co.</td>
<td>6,500,000</td>
<td>2,210,000</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2,14,1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lungyen Iron Ore Mining Co.</td>
<td>108,000,000</td>
<td>36,000,000</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7,36,1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(P.10) North China Electric Wire Co.</td>
<td>12,000,000</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2,15,1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North China Telegraph &amp; Telephone Co.</td>
<td>67,500,000</td>
<td>21,975,000</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7,31,1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North China Cement Co.</td>
<td>13,500,000</td>
<td>3,939,289</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over Tientsin Iron Mfg. Co.</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11,10,1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North China Coal Sales Co.</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
<td>4,350,000</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>10,30,1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tientsin Lighter Co.</td>
<td>14,600,000</td>
<td>4,051,200</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7,10,1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North China Aluminum Mining Co.</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
<td>4,050,000</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12,9,1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shantung Salt Co.</td>
<td>5,500,000</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2,15,1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsingising Coal Mining Co.</td>
<td>21,800,000</td>
<td>5,350,000</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7,23,1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yungli Chemical Industry Co.</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
<td>3,600,000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3,31,1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over Mongolian Mineral Trading Assoc.</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9,2,1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North China Mining Development</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1,15,1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North China Iron &amp; Steel Trading Co.</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>7,500,000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4,22,1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North China Chemical Mfg. Controlling Co.</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1,15,1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North China Daily Necessaries Assoc.</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>2,600,000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4,1,1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(P.11) North China Corn Trading Assoc.</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolian Mineral Trading Assoc.</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10,5,1944</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Remarks refer to the year of establishment or purchase.*
Document No. 2299

Name | Paid up Capital | of which N.C.D. Co. owns | Remarks |
--- | --- | --- | --- |
Mongchian Mineral Trading Co. | unknown | | unknown |
Shansi Daily Necessaries Assoc. | unknown | 140,000 | unknown |
North China Important Goods Controlling Assoc. | unknown | 600,000- | unknown |
North China Laborers' Assoc. | unknown | 2,000 | unknown |
North China Iron Industry Material Assoc. | unknown | 1,000,000 | unknown |

Note: (a) The figures for the paid-up capital and that part of the capital which was owned by the North China Development Company are those at end of October, 1944.

(b) The 1st line in the "Remarks" indicates the date of establishment of the company. The 2nd line represents the total number of the officers of the Company, the figure in brackets showing the number of officers appointed by and representing the North China Development Company.

(c) The Shantung Salt Company and the Shantung Coal Mining Company were established before the outbreak of the China Incident.

(d) As in the case of the Shantung Salt Company, there are companies which were not under direct control of the North China Development Co.

(e) As the exact figures are not available, the figures given above are not guaranteed.

(P.12) I certify that this is a true and correct copy of the company's original document.

(Signed) H. Tanaka
Chief, General Affairs Section,
Economic Affairs Division,
Control Bureau,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Government Investment in Stock Shares of The Manchuria Heavy Industry Development Co., Ltd.

22 June 1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nominal Capital</th>
<th>Paid up Capital</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yen 675,000,000</td>
<td>Yen 506,250,000</td>
<td>Nothing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. 31 Mar. 1945
2. Manchoukouo Government owns Yen 225,000,000

I certify that this is a true and correct copy of the original document.

(Signed) H. Tanaka
Chief, General Affairs Section,
Economic Affairs Division,
Control Bureau, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.

The Subsidiary Companies of M.H.I.D. Co.

22 June 1946
Manchuria Heavy Industrial Development Co., Ltd.

The names of the subsidiary Co. Paid-up Capital M.H.I.D. Co. own Percent Remark

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name of the subsidiary Co.</th>
<th>Paid-up Capital in Yen</th>
<th>M.H.I.D. Co. own Percent</th>
<th>Remark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Manchuria Iron &amp; Steel Work Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>640,000,000</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>25 May 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Kyowa Iron Mining Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Ryuen Iron Mining Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>108,000,000</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Honkeiko Special Steel Work Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Manchuria Coal Mining Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>100,000,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Fu-shin Coal Mining Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>220,000,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Tsuruoka Coal Mining Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>170,000,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Si-An Coal Mining Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>70,000,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Mito-Zan Coal Mining Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>200,000,000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Zaral Coal Mining Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>25,000,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Koikan Coal Mining Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>50,000,000</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Company Name</td>
<td>Paid-up Capital</td>
<td>H.K.I.D.</td>
<td>Owns Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Eijosi Coal Mining Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>8,000,000</td>
<td>6,660,000</td>
<td>83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Konshun Coal Mining Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Briquette Manufacturing Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Manchuria Coal Industry Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Manchuria Light Metal Production Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>140,000,000</td>
<td>138,000,000</td>
<td>98.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Auto Light Metal Production Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>100,000,000</td>
<td>25,000,000</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Manchuria Magnesium Production Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
<td>15,000,000</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Manchuria Light Alloy Industrial Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>12,500,000</td>
<td>6,250,000</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Manchuria Mining Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>150,000,000</td>
<td>150,000,000</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Manchuria Airplanes Manufacture Co. Ltd.</td>
<td>175,000,000</td>
<td>175,000,000</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Manchuria Motor Car Manufacture Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>75,000,000</td>
<td>75,000,000</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Manchuria Arsenal Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>45,000,000</td>
<td>15,100,000</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>South Manchuria Chemical Industry Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>635,000</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Mangyo Mine-pile Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Continental Chemical Industry Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Nissan Steam-ship Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>39,047,750</td>
<td>13,986,375</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Manchuria Yuasa Copper Press and Stretch Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>915,125</td>
<td>45.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Mangyo Coal Mining Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Manchuria Heavy Machine Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>50,000,000</td>
<td>45,000,000</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Manchuria Machine Tool Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
<td>19,231,000</td>
<td>96.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Manchuria Explosives Mfg. Co., Ltd.</td>
<td>14,250,000</td>
<td>2,070,000</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I certify that this is a true and correct copy of the company's original document.

(Signed) M. Tanaka
Chief, General Affairs Section,
Economic Affairs Division,
Control Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Statement of Official Procurement

I, EDWARD P. HADDEN, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the attached document, IPS Document 2299, consisting of certified statements showing Japanese government investments in various developmental enterprises in China, was obtained by me from the signing official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 23rd day of August, 1945.

/s/ Edward P. Hadden

Witnesses:

/s/ William G. Front

Investigator

Official C. E. CITY

I.P.S.
TO: Director of the Economic Division, the Central Liaison Office.
FROM: Director of the Control Bureau, the Foreign Office.

SUBJECT: Japanese Investment in Manchuria and China proper.

In compliance with the request of the General Headquarters dated 17 June, 1946, in regard to the above subject the following data are hereby submitted.

1. Survey of Japanese investments in Manchuria as classified by enterprises (attached Note 1)

2. Survey of Japanese investments in China in respect to private enterprises (attached Note 2) with regard to the investment in China proper "Survey of Japanese investments in China as classified by enterprises" (attached Note 3) and "Development of Japanese enterprises in China" are also presented for reference in company with the above data.

Director of the Control Bureau,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

/s/ T. Yamanaka
Investment in Manchukuo of the Japanese Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Corporation</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Unit ¥1,000</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>South Manchuria Railway Co.</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manchuria Colonization Co. (Manshu Takushoku Koza)</td>
<td>990</td>
<td></td>
<td>990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Manchuria Railway Co.</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Manchuria Telegraph and Telephone Co. (Manshu Denshin Denwa K.K.)</td>
<td>2,813</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Manchuria Railway Co.</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>125,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Manchuria Colonization Co.</td>
<td>8,125</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manchuria Telegraph and Telephone Co.</td>
<td>5,625</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>138,750</td>
<td></td>
<td>138,750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:  
(a) The figures of governmental investments in the fields enumerated in Para. 1d of AG 091.3 (17 Jun 46) 1FS, "Japanese Investments in Manchuria" cannot be shown separately, so we show those figures listed above.

(b) These investments were all made in cash.

/\/

H. Kato

Director of the State Property Bureau,
Ministry of Finance.
### Investment in China of the Japanese Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Corporation</th>
<th>Amount (¥,000)</th>
<th>Total (¥,000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>North China Development Co.</td>
<td>55,570</td>
<td>55,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central China Development Co.</td>
<td>18,882</td>
<td>74,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Central China Development Co.</td>
<td>2,376</td>
<td>2,376</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

/a/ H. Kato

Director of the State Property Bureau, Ministry of Finance.
Survey of Japanese investments in Manchuria as classified by enterprises (in ¥ 1,000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1938</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, forestry &amp;</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>205,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industries in general</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>47,000</td>
<td>67,000</td>
<td>47,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity &amp; gas</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land, buildings</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&amp; public works</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation &amp;</td>
<td>67,000</td>
<td>187,000</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>356,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communication</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance, stock</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dealings &amp; trust business</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundries</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>145,000</td>
<td>164,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>97,000</td>
<td>269,000</td>
<td>439,000</td>
<td>1,002,000</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note
(1) The figures in respect to investments given above show the total amounts of investments made in Manchuria (the Kwantung Leased Territory is included) in each year by the Japanese government and private concerns.

The investment made with capital available in Manchuria, however, is not included in the above table.

(2) Inasmuch as the amount of investments in kind in each year, is not known, the total amount of investments up to the end of March, 1945 as classified by enterprises (investments both in cash and kind are included) is given in an attached table.
(3) The present data for 1932, 1936, and 1938 are based on the results of investigation made by the Manchurian Affairs Board, and the total amounts of investments made respectively in 1941 and 1945 are based on the materials held by the Continental Section of the Economic Division under the Control Bureau, the Foreign Office.

Total Amount of Investments in Manchuria as classified by Enterprises (Up to March, 1945)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification by enterprises</th>
<th>Amount of investment</th>
<th>Investment by Japanese Government</th>
<th>Investment by Private concerns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, forestry &amp; colonization</td>
<td>1,182,141,000</td>
<td>550,000,000</td>
<td>632,141,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>6,181,459,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6,181,459,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industries in general</td>
<td>4,168,319,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4,168,319,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity &amp; gas</td>
<td>1,117,450,000</td>
<td>63,282,800</td>
<td>1,054,167,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public works &amp; buildings</td>
<td>57,169,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>57,169,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation &amp; communications</td>
<td>5,249,104,000</td>
<td>733,375,000</td>
<td>4,515,729,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance, stock dealings &amp; trust business</td>
<td>82,767,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>82,767,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundries</td>
<td>118,838,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>118,838,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18,187,247,000</td>
<td>1,346,651,800</td>
<td>16,840,589,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note
1. In the amounts of investments given above investments both in cash and kind are included.
2. In the amounts of investments given above, investments with capital available in Manchuria are included.
Survey of Amount of Japanese Investments in China in respect to Private Enterprises (in ¥ 1,000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>This is based on the result of investigation by the East Asia Research Institute.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>1,110,532</td>
<td>This is based on the result of investigation by the East Asia Research Institute.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>1,835,572</td>
<td>Do.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>298,378,579</td>
<td>This is the total amount of investments made by 419 business bodies, which have been reported to the Control Bureau of the Foreign Office. The investment has chiefly been made by business companies and only a small portion has been invested by individuals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Survey of Japanese Divestments in China in respect to Private Enterprises (26 June, 1946)
Based on the data of the Continental Section of the Economic Division, under the Control Bureau, the Foreign Office (in ¥ 1,000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branches of enterprises</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1938</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mining</td>
<td>106,975</td>
<td>120,959</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1,541,927</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Industries in general</td>
<td>478,475</td>
<td>579,550</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>9,478,686</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Banking</td>
<td>160,901</td>
<td>330,324</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>259,394,639</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Investments by North China and Central China Development companies</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22,285,838</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Financial enterprises other than banks</td>
<td>41,879</td>
<td>168,054</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>244,071</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Commerce</td>
<td>157,379</td>
<td>344,131</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>4,267,932</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Transportation &amp; communications</td>
<td>93,379</td>
<td>120,899</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>612,797</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Warehousing reality business &amp; building industry</td>
<td>29,683</td>
<td>77,625</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>119,729</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Public utilities</td>
<td>22,640</td>
<td>37,971</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>272,954</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Branches of enterprises 1932 1936 1938 1941 1945

10. Agricultural & marine product industries 7,349 24,116 3 31,250
11. Sundries 10,383 31,944 9 128,706

Total 1,110,533 1,835,573 419 298,378,579

Note

1. The figures for 1936 and 1938 have been quoted from "The Japanese Investment in China" published in August, 1942 by the East Asia Research Institute, and they include the business loans allowed by private business concerns.

2. With regard to the figures for 1945, the following points should be noted:

   a. The amount thereunder given has been worked out by totalling investments made up to the beginning of 1945 by 419 business bodies which have been reported to the Foreign Office. It is, however, thought that there is still a considerable amount of investments which have not yet been reported.

   b. As regards the investments by the North China and the Central China Development Companies, such investments which may overlap same made by affiliated companies, have been excluded.

   c. As the amount of loans to the former "National Government at Nanking" is not known, they have been excluded from the calculation.
(Doc. 2471a)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
STAFF COLONEL FOR THE ALLIED POWRS

Jul 591 (27 Jun 46) IPS
(GLFT 1493-

MEMORANDUM FOR IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

THROUGH : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo

SUBJECT : Japanese Investments in Manchukuo

1. It is directed that the Imperial Japanese Government deliver the following financial documents, each of which is to be certified:

   a. The list of the total investments by the Japanese Government in Manchukuo for the years 1932, 1936, 1940, 1941 and 1945. This list is to include loans, bonds, debentures and shares in companies. The total is to include investments both direct and indirect.

   b. A similar list showing private capital of Japanese invested in Manchukuo.

   c. Similar lists as mentioned in both a. and b. above, covering capital of Japanese Government and of private business invested in China.

   d. Lists showing investments by government and by private business of Japan in Manchukuo in the following fields:

      (1) Mining (coal and iron ore)
      (2) Banking
      (3) Oil
      (4) Communications
      (5) Public Utilities
      (6) Agriculture
      (7) All Others.

   (a) Those are to be in the same years above mentioned.

2. It is directed that this information be furnished at the earliest practicable date.

For the Staff Colonel

/s/ J. V. Y.,

Colonel, A.G.,
Adjutant General.
BRANCH 1st RLY MATERIALS Depot until May 43. Capt. Iwasaki.

Liaison Office
2nd Rly Adm. Depot
(Col Konosawa)

Task:
Contact with Burmese Area Army Rly Supply Depot.

HQ 5th Rly Regt
1st 2nd 3rd Bns & Material Depot
THE BURMA - SIAM RLY (FINISHED ABOUT OCT/NOV 1943)
SURVEYING (6th Coy COMDR)

ROAD CONSTRUCTION 5th Coy CD

BASE CONSTRUCTION (2nd BN)

UPPER PART CONSTRUCTION (1st BN) only

OPERATING and REINFORCING (2nd BN)
4th BNs, later chiefly 13th BN.

Base const (2nd BN) → Base const. of Siam side (except main bridge)

Section (2nd BN)

Singapore Liaison Office 2nd Rly ADM Depot (LtCol Maeda)

Task:
Contact with S.R.A and 25th Army.

WAMPO & TAMAGO

GROUP
1943
Doc. "GO" No. 568  - Dated 11 July 1944

From: Minister SUZUKI (Office for the affairs of Residents in Enemy Countries, Foreign Ministry)

(Foreign Ministry Seal)

To: Chief of Prisoner of War Information Bureau

Subject: Treatment of Prisoners of War in Burma and Siam

Regarding the treatment of prisoners of war interned in the prisoner of war camps in Burma and Siam, His Excellency, Mr. Nipper Hulse, Chairman of the International Red Cross Committee in Geneva, sent us a telegram, as annexed in this report. Please note the translation attached herewith.

Concerning the return of seriously wounded and ill prisoners of war as proposed by the International Red Cross Committee, there will be much difficulty in its execution and therefore an answer will be made that it would be difficult to make such arrangements at present. In regard to the problems of the transfer of POW and transportation and distribution of medical supplies which measures we are now confronted with, we deem it should be considered together with the solution and execution of the problem of transporting relief supplies, which is now being negotiated between Japan and Great Britain and between Japan and the United States.

I would like to send the above reply, and would appreciate your suggestion.

Distribution:
The Ministry
The Prisoner of War Information Bureau
The Navy Ministry

POW INFORMATION
EUREKA
Received 12 July '44
(Translation of Telegram dated 23 June 1944, sent by Mr. Max Huber, Chairman of the International Red Cross Committee to the Foreign Minister)

"Subject: Treatment of Prisoners of War in Burma and Siam

The International Red Cross Committee has the honor to inform the Japanese Government that it requests Japan to give every possible assistance for the well-being of the prisoners who are interned in the prisoner of war camps in Burma and Siam and for the purpose of preparing for the traditional service which is offered voluntarily to all belligerent nations, to guarantee more welfare to the prisoners of war and non-combatant civilian internees. They are suffering from aggravated illness brought about by medical and other causes, especially made morbid by the climatic conditions of the place of internment.

Regarding this matter, the International Red Cross Committee has the honor to propose to the Japanese Government that she give consideration to enter into a reciprocal agreement with the governments of the belligerent nations in reference to the transfer of those coming under Articles 69 and 73 of the Geneva Convention concluded in 1929 concerning the treatment of prisoners of war.

The International Red Cross Committee requests the Japanese Government to consent to the transfer of said prisoners of war to an area with better climatic conditions, and to guarantee better conditions for prisoners of war as a first step until the settlement of such an arrangement. To achieve this objective, the International Red Cross Committee is prepared to collect necessary medical supplies if the Japanese Government will give consideration for their transportation and distribution. The International Red Cross Committee will greatly appreciate any intimation from your Government on this matter.

I take this opportunity to renew assurances of my highest esteem to your Excellency."
Doc. No. 1810 A

POW Supply No. 36

dated 29 July 1944

From: Chief of Prisoner of War Information Bureau

To: Chief of General Staff of the "I" Units
    Chiefs of Staff: OKA, MACI, and TONI Units
    Commander of the Field Railway Unit of the Southern Army
    Chiefs of Prisoner of War Camps in Malaya and Siam

Subject: Treatment of British prisoners of war in Burma

Regarding the above subject, the Foreign Ministry has applied to the Prisoner of War Information Bureau as per enclosed. Please inform me immediately whether such conditions have existed or not, and submit confutation data.

Distribution:
"I" Unit (Refer: OKA, MACI, TONI Units; Southern Army
    Field Railway Unit; P.O.W. Camps in Siam and Malaya)
    Military Affairs Section notified. (S.L.I.)
Names of
Joint Sections or Purposes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Section or Purposes</th>
<th>Department to be routed to or for</th>
<th>P.O.W. Information Bureau</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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Filing Identification
Chief Approval Officer

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Approval Officer

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Author-Authorized

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<tr>
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Execution

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Date of July 29, 1944

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Chief Officer</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 29, 1944</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Chief of General Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chief of General Staff</th>
<th>Chief of General Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OKA, KORI, TAI Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>Chief of General Staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Commander of Southern Army Field Railway Officer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commander of Southern Army Field Railway Officer</th>
<th>Chief of General Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander of Southern Army Field Railway Officer</td>
<td>Chief of General Staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chiefs of P.O.W. Camps in Siam and Malaya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chiefs of P.O.W. Camps in Siam and Malaya</th>
<th>Chief of General Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chief of General Staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Subject

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Chief of General Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Re British Prisoners in &quot;Burma&quot;</td>
<td>Chief of General Staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We have received an inquiry from the Foreign Office concerning the above subject re annexed copy. Please inform us immediately as to whether or not such facts exist, and also we would appreciate any confirmative data.

Distribution:

"I" Unit (Refer: OKA, KORI, TAI Units; Southern Army Field Railway Unit; P.O.W. Camps in Siam and Malaya)
From: Chief of Prisoner of War Information Bureau  
To: Minister SUZUKI, Office for the Affairs of Residents in Enemy Countries, Foreign Ministry  
Subject: Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Burma

In reply to your note, KYO-HI "30" No. 599 regarding the above subject, I beg to reply as follows:

(1) The prisoners of war in question interned in Burma belong to the prisoner of war camps in Siam or Malaya. The names of prisoners of war in Siam and Malaya camps have already been reported, which amounted to 10,000. The names of prisoners of war who died in that area are being recorded successively.

(2) Regarding matters other than the above, I will reply after investigating the facts.

Military Affairs Section notified.

(Seal)
The reply to KYO#599 concernin; the subject is as follows:

(1) The prisoners in question at Burm belong to the Siam or Malaya POW Camp and 10,000 PO's of the Siam and Malaya POW Camps have already been reported. Information of POW deaths in that area is being gradually reported.

(2) Aside from the above-mentioned matters, answers will be given after facts have been investigated.
From: Chief of Staff MORI 7900 Unit (Seal)  
To: Chief of Prisoner of War Information Bureau  
Subject: Reply to the Inquiry re British prisoners of war in Burma

In answer to POW Supply No. 36 (FUGAIKK No. 49) re the above subject, the reply is as follows:

The case was investigated, but since a long time has elapsed since the occurrence, most of the people concerned have died in action or in illness, or have been transferred. Although we cannot investigate in detail, we conclude that the contents of the protest are contrary to the facts and that trivial matters have been exaggerated.

Protest No. 1:

This case rew concern chiefly the prisoners of war interned in the Moulmein branch of the Siam prisoner of war camp who were sent from various districts in the south to construct the railroad between Siam and Burma under command of the headquarters of the Southern Army. However, no facts as stated in the protest are available.

Protest No. 2:

Although we cannot investigate in detail because there are no persons who know the circumstances at that time, the facts are not true.

Addressed to:

Chief of the Tokyo Prisoner of War Camp (for reference, SHIN 1160)  
Chief of the Prisoner of War Camp in Siam)
To: Chief of Prisoner of War Information Bureau

Subject: Report on the investigation re British prisoners of war in Burma

I report as per enclosure with regard to the "I" SAN 3 Secret No. 356.

Reported to: "I" (for reference: CKA Unit, Prisoner of War Information Bureau)

Enclosure

Re: Item No. 1:

It concerns the time of the first occupation in 1942, and we have investigated the MCR1 Area Army but were unable to find any record. The following is a statement of a prisoner who is now interned in branch No. 4 of this camp, and who was in Moulmein at that time:

1. Concerning the Moulmein district:
   A. It is not true that about 30,000 prisoners were interned in or around Moulmein in 1942.

   During March to June 1942 about 120 British prisoners of war, including officers, and about 700 Indian prisoners of war were interned in Moulmein, and about 79 Indian prisoners of war and enemy civilians were interned in Deboli.

   Prisoners in Moulmein were transferred in June 1942, and prisoners in Deboli were transferred in February 1943, to the Rangoon Field POW Camp (opened on March 19, 1942).

   B. No British prisoners of war were left in Moulmein and its neighborhood after June, 1942.

   During the internment period mentioned above, five British (one of them due to wounds received in action) and five Indians died. However, the food supplied to the prisoners in Moulmein prison seemed to be pretty bad. Both British and Indians were said to have been given small amounts of food twice a day, cooked by Burmese. The present treatment was said to be a thousand times better than that compared to Moulmein. In Deboli the provisions were said to have been much better.

   C. Although I have no means to investigate the existence of such facts, I do not believe that prisoners of war were interned in Moulmein at that time.

2. At the front lines: According to reports of the Area Army, no such facts existed.
From: Chief of Staff of the Southern Army (Seal)  
To: Chief of Prisoner of War Information Bureau  
Subject: Information re treatment of British prisoners of war in Burma

In regard to your letter of inquiry POW Supply No. 36 dated 23 July, I hereby submit the following report in enclosure that has been received.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inspection Officer</th>
<th>High in Official Clerk</th>
<th>Seal</th>
<th>Chief Officer Seal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In regard to your letter of inquiry POW Supply No. 36 dated 23 July, I hereby submit the following report in enclosure that has been received.

- Officer in Charge: Investigation, Carried Within Squad  
- Disposition: Personnel in Charge  
- Chief Clerk: Draft for Disposition  
- SEAL: Personnel in Charge
From: Commander of the Southern Army Field Railway Unit (SEAL)  
To: Chief of General Staff of the Southern Army  
Subject: Report re British prisoners of war in Burma

I am sending you a report in reply to "I" SAN 3 Secret No. 336 concerning British prisoners of war in Burma (districts allotted for the construction of railway connecting Sirm with Burma).

1. The number of patients and deceased prisoners of war who were engaged in the construction of the railway connecting Sirm and Burma are as in Tables I and II. The prisoners of war include both British and Dutch and there is no way to investigate the British prisoners of war separately. For strategic reasons the completion of this railway was most urgent. Since the proposed site of the railway line was a virgin jungle, shelter, food provisions and medical supplies were markedly different from those under normal conditions for prisoners of war.

During the rainy season of 1943, transportation was frequently interrupted and both Japanese soldiers and prisoners of war were obliged to put up with much hardship. The Japanese army Medical Corps tried in vain to stem the violent outbreak of malaria and sicknesses of digestive organs. However, with the opening of the said railway in October 1943, both the number of patients and deaths diminished with the completion of provisions and facilities.

2. I know nothing about the insulting of British prisoners of war in Moulmein since it is out of the work area.
Prisoner of War Patients during the period between January, 1943 and July 1944. (Investigated by Siam Prisoner of War Camp)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Total No. of POW Employed</th>
<th>Patients in Siam Ratio to Total No.</th>
<th>Patients in Burma Ratio to Total No.</th>
<th>Total Ratio to Total No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>37,086</td>
<td>18,052</td>
<td>11,496</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>42,337</td>
<td>20,634</td>
<td>12,074</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar.</td>
<td>47,009</td>
<td>21,516</td>
<td>14,987</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr.</td>
<td>49,766</td>
<td>19,892</td>
<td>11,982</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>49,489</td>
<td>18,012</td>
<td>13,288</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>48,832</td>
<td>24,351</td>
<td>19,933</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>48,116</td>
<td>23,107</td>
<td>12,192</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>47,162</td>
<td>23,269</td>
<td>12,538</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>46,103</td>
<td>21,225</td>
<td>13,496</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>45,277</td>
<td>22,001</td>
<td>12,141</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>44,669</td>
<td>19,974</td>
<td>9,619</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td>44,372</td>
<td>19,497</td>
<td>12,350</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>43,695</td>
<td>23,209</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>43,116</td>
<td>22,977</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>43,173</td>
<td>20,427</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>43,116</td>
<td>20,324</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>43,083</td>
<td>20,080</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>43,028</td>
<td>17,418</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>40,960</td>
<td>5,468</td>
<td>13.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>383,613</td>
<td>148,872</td>
<td>532,485</td>
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<td>Month</td>
<td>Total No. of P.O.W. Employed</td>
<td>Deaths in Siam Ratio to Total No.</td>
<td>Deaths in Burma Ratio to Total No.</td>
<td>Total Ratio to Total No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>4,235</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.05 %</td>
<td>0.05 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>4,234</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.05 %</td>
<td>0.05 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>8,711</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.12 %</td>
<td>0.12 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>26,484</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0.20 %</td>
<td>0.24 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td>29,536</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0.23 %</td>
<td>0.27 %</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Total No. of P.O.W. Employed</th>
<th>Deaths in Siam Ratio to Total No.</th>
<th>Deaths in Burma Ratio to Total No.</th>
<th>Total Ratio to Total No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>37,086</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>0.17 %</td>
<td>0.32 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>42,337</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.12 %</td>
<td>0.21 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>47,009</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>0.54 %</td>
<td>0.56 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>49,766</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>0.37 %</td>
<td>0.41 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>49,489</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>0.55 %</td>
<td>0.56 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>48,832</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>1.18 %</td>
<td>1.34 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>48,116</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>1.20 %</td>
<td>1.48 %</td>
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<td>Aug.</td>
<td>47,162</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1.69 %</td>
<td>2.02 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>46,103</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>1.91 %</td>
<td>2.04 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>45,277</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>1.85 %</td>
<td>1.89 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>44,699</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>1.06 %</td>
<td>1.29 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td>44,372</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>0.77 %</td>
<td>0.78 %</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Total No. of P.O.W. Employed</th>
<th>Deaths in Siam Ratio to Total No.</th>
<th>Deaths in Burma Ratio to Total No.</th>
<th>Total Ratio to Total No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>43,695</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>0.87 %</td>
<td>1.53 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>43,316</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>0.96 %</td>
<td>0.96 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>43,173</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>0.34 %</td>
<td>0.34 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>43,116</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0.13 %</td>
<td>0.13 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>43,083</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>0.15 %</td>
<td>0.15 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>43,028</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0.14 %</td>
<td>0.14 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>40,960</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.09 %</td>
<td>0.09 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>40,313</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0.09 %</td>
<td>0.09 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 6,500  | 1,246  | 7,746
9 September 1944

From: Chief of Prisoner of War Camp in Siam
To: Chief of Prisoner of War Information Bureau
Subject: Information re British prisoners of war in Burma /Notification/

I am sending you a report regarding the facts A and B in Item No. 1 of the British protest note as stated in the Prisoner of War Supply No. 36. (Will notify)

This matter concerns the sacrifice of the administration of the prisoners of war for operational reasons temporarily and contains no material for refutation against the enemy protest.

Moreover, Item following "C" has no relation to us.

Branch Camp No. 3 was opened in Burma September, 1942 to intern 9,535 prisoners of war transferred from Java. Branch Camp No. 5 was opened in January, 1943 to intern 1,946 prisoners of war. These camps are under the command of the 5th Railway Regiment and the prisoners of war were engaged in constructing a railway between Burma and Siam. At that time, provisions and rations were scarce. Quarters and establishments were poor and medical facilities were inadequate. Moreover, for operational reasons, it was necessary to complete the railway by August, 1943, and the work was pushed forward at a terrific pace, with the result that many prisoners of war became ill and many died, as per attached sheet.

Following the opening of the railway to traffic in October, 1943, all prisoners of war in Burma were successively concentrated in Kanchana-Buri, Monbok and Trarin (phonetic), except a few who were to assist the Railway Unit. Both the quarters facilities and provisions have been improved at present and both the number of patients and deaths have decreased remarkably.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer in Charge</th>
<th>Investigation Carried Within Squad Person nel in Charge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seal</td>
<td>Personnel in Charge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tag of Disposition</td>
<td>Investigation Carried Outside of Squad Person nel in Charge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk in Charge</td>
<td>Plans for Disposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>We will send a composite reply to the Foreign Office upon receiving reports from the commanders of I unit, OXA Unit, MRAI Unit, TCMI Unit, Southern Army Field Railway, and the Chief of P0) Camp in Malaya.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seal</td>
<td>Personnel in Charge Seal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Prisoner of War Patients during the period between January, 1943, and July 1944.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Total No. Confined</th>
<th>Patients in Siam Ratio to Total No. Confined</th>
<th>Patients in Burma Ratio to Total No. Confined</th>
<th>Total Ratio to Total No. Confined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>37,086</td>
<td>18,052 (48.6%)</td>
<td>11,496 (31.0%)</td>
<td>29,548 (79.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>42,337</td>
<td>20,634 (48.7%)</td>
<td>12,076 (32.5%)</td>
<td>32,710 (77.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar.</td>
<td>47,009</td>
<td>21,516 (45.8%)</td>
<td>14,982 (31.9%)</td>
<td>36,490 (77.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr.</td>
<td>49,766</td>
<td>19,892 (40.0%)</td>
<td>11,731 (25.5%)</td>
<td>31,623 (64.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>49,489</td>
<td>18,012 (36.4%)</td>
<td>13,288 (26.8%)</td>
<td>31,300 (62.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>48,832</td>
<td>24,351 (50.0%)</td>
<td>12,933 (26.5%)</td>
<td>37,284 (76.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>48,116</td>
<td>23,407 (48.6%)</td>
<td>12,192 (25.3%)</td>
<td>35,599 (73.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>47,162</td>
<td>23,269 (49.3%)</td>
<td>12,538 (26.6%)</td>
<td>35,507 (75.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>46,103</td>
<td>21,225 (46.0%)</td>
<td>13,496 (29.3%)</td>
<td>34,721 (75.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>45,277</td>
<td>23,801 (52.6%)</td>
<td>12,141 (26.8%)</td>
<td>35,424 (79.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>44,669</td>
<td>19,974 (44.7%)</td>
<td>9,619 (21.5%)</td>
<td>29,553 (62.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td>44,372</td>
<td>19,497 (43.9%)</td>
<td>12,380 (27.9%)</td>
<td>31,877 (71.8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Jan.    | 43,695             | 23,289 (53.3%)                             | 23,289 (53.3%)                              | 53.3%                           |
<p>| Feb.    | 43,316             | 22,976 (53.0%)                             | 22,977 (53.0%)                              | 53.0%                           |
| March   | 43,173             | 20,427 (47.3%)                             | 20,427 (47.3%)                              | 47.3%                           |
| April   | 43,116             | 20,324 (47.1%)                             | 20,324 (47.1%)                              | 47.1%                           |
| May     | 43,083             | 20,080 (46.6%)                             | 20,080 (46.6%)                              | 46.6%                           |
| June    | 43,028             | 17,418 (40.5%)                             | 17,418 (40.5%)                              | 40.5%                           |
| July    | 40,960             | 5,468 (13.4%)                              | 5,468 (13.4%)                               | 13.4%                           |
| Total   | 383,613            | 148,072                                   | 532,485                                     | 13.4%                           |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Total No. Confined</th>
<th>Deaths in Siam</th>
<th>Ratio to Total No. Confined</th>
<th>Deaths in Burma</th>
<th>Ratio to Total No. Confined</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Ratio to Total No. Confined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>4,235</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.05 %</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.05 %</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.05 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>5,234</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.05 %</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.05 %</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.05 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>6,711</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.12 %</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.12 %</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.12 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>26,184</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0.12 %</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.04 %</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>0.24 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec.</td>
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<td>68</td>
<td>0.23 %</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.04 %</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>0.27 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>37,086</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>0.17 %</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0.15 %</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>0.32 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>42,337</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.12 %</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0.09 %</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>0.21 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>47,009</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>0.54 %</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.02 %</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>0.56 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>49,766</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>0.37 %</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.04 %</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>0.41 %</td>
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<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>49,489</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>0.55 %</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.01 %</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>0.56 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>48,322</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>1.18 %</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0.16 %</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>1.34 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>48,116</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>1.20 %</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>0.28 %</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>1.48 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>47,162</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1.69 %</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>0.33 %</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>2.02 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>46,319</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>1.94 %</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>0.36 %</td>
<td>1,059</td>
<td>2.44 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>45,877</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>1.45 %</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>0.30 %</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>1.83 %</td>
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<td>Nov.</td>
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<td>477</td>
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<td>101</td>
<td>0.25 %</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>1.29 %</td>
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<td>Dec.</td>
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<td>340</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>0.01 %</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>0.78 %</td>
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<table>
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<th>1,246</th>
<th>7,746</th>
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<tr>
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<td>0.87 %</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>0.66 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>416</td>
<td>0.96 %</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>0.66 %</td>
</tr>
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<td>March 43,177</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>0.34 %</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>0.66 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 43,117</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0.13 %</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>0.66 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 43,082</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>0.15 %</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>0.66 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 43,028</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>0.17 %</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>0.66 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 40,960</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.09 %</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>0.66 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 40,323</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0.09 %</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>0.66 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE NO. III

**Cases of Choler Among Prisoners of War**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Camp</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Branch No. 3</td>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branch No. 5</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>39</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Statement of Source and Authenticity:

I, Shibuya Shin hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: the Secretary of Investigation Section, POW Information Bureau and that as such official I have custody of the document here attached consisting of 50 pages, dated Feb 3, 1944, and described as follows: Concerning Treatment of Prisoners of War in Burma and Siam.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): 1st Demobilization Bureau (former War Ministry) Investigation Section of POW Information Bureau File number QA2.

Signed at Tokyo on this 22nd day of August, 1946

/s/ Shibuya Shin
Official Capacity

Witness: Aoyama Yukitaka
Chief of the Section of archives,
POW Information Bureau

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larrah, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 23rd day of Aug, 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larrah
Investigator

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis 2nd Lt. R.I.
Doc. No. 1810 a

Doc. "GO" No. 568 - Dated 11 July 1944

From: Minister SUZUKI
To: Chief of Prisoner of War Information Bureau
Subject: Treatment of Prisoners of War in Burma and Siam

Regarding the treatment of prisoners of war interned in the prisoner of war camps in Burma and Siam, Mr. Max Huber, Chairman of the International Red Cross Committee in Geneva, sent us a telegram, as annexed in this report. Its translation is attached herewith.

Concerning the return of seriously wounded and ill prisoners of war proposed by the International Red Cross Committee, there will be much difficulty in its execution and therefore an answer will be made that it would be difficult to make such arrangements at present. The problems of the transfer of prisoners and transportation and distribution of medical supplies requested should be included, together with the solution and execution of the transportation of relief supplies which is now being negotiated between Japan and Great Britain and between Japan and the United States.

I would like to send the above reply, and would appreciate your suggestion.

Address of this communication:

War Minister
The Prisoner of War Information Bureau
The Navy Ministry.
"Subject: Treatment of Prisoners of War in Burma and Siam

The International Red Cross Committee has the honor to inform the Japanese Government that it requests Japan to give every possible assistance for the well-being of the prisoners who are interned in the prisoner of war camps in Burma and Siam for the purpose of preparing for the traditional service which is offered voluntarily to all belligerent nations to guarantee more welfare of the prisoners of war and non-combatant civilian internees. They are suffering from illness due to medical and other causes, especially made morbid by the climatic conditions of the place of internment.

Regarding this matter, the International Red Cross Committee has the honor to propose to the Japanese Government that she give consideration for entering into a reciprocal agreement with the governments of the belligerent nations in reference to the transfer of those coming under Articles 69 and 72 of the Geneva Convention concluded in 1929 concerning the treatment of prisoners of war.

The International Red Cross Committee requests the Japanese Government to consent to the transfer of said prisoners of war to an area with better climatic conditions, and to guarantee better conditions for prisoners of war as a first step until the settlement of such an arrangement. To achieve this objective, the International Red Cross Committee is prepared to collect necessary medical supplies if the Japanese Government will give consideration for their transportation and distribution. The International Red Cross Committee will greatly appreciate any intimation from your Government on this matter.

I take this opportunity to renew assurances of my highest esteem to your Excellency."
Prisoner Supply No. 36

From: Chief of Prisoner of War Information Bureau
To: Chief of General Staff of the "I" Unit.
   Chiefs of Staff: OKA, MORI and TCHI Units
   Commander of the Field Railway Unit of the Southern Army
   Chiefs of Prisoner of War Camps in Burma and Siam

Subject: Concerning the treatment of British prisoners of war in Burma

Regarding the above subject, the Foreign Ministry has applied to the Prisoner of War Information Bureau as per enclosed. Please inform me immediately whether such conditions existed or not, and to submit confirmation data.
Prisoner Supply No. 35
dated 29 July 1944

From: Chief of Prisoner of War Information Bureau
To: Minister SUZUKI
Subject: Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Burma

In reply to your telegram No. 599 regarding the above subject, I beg to reply as follows:

(1) The prisoners of war in question interned in Burma belong to the prisoner of war camps in Siam or Malaya. The names of prisoners of war in Siam and Malaya camps have already been reported, which amounted to 10,000. The names of prisoners of war who died in that area are being reported successively.

(2) Regarding matters other than the above, I will reply after investigating the facts.
MORI KATA FUKU No. 7

From: Chief of Staff MORI 7900 Unit
To: Chief of Prisoner of War Information Bureau
Subject: Reply to the inquiry re British prisoners of war in Burma

In answer to the Prisoner Supply No. 36 (Prisoner of War Telegram No. 49) re the above subject, the reply is as follows:

The case was investigated, but since a long time has elapsed since the occurrence, most of the people concerned have died in action or in illness, or have been transferred. Although we cannot investigate in detail, we conclude that the contents of the protest are contrary to the facts and that trivial matters have been exaggerated.

Protest No. 1:

This case may concern chiefly the prisoners of war interned in the Moulmein branch of the Siam prisoner of war camp who were sent from various districts in the south to construct the railroad between Siam and Burma under command of the headquarters of the Southern Army. However, no facts as stated in the protest are available.

Protest No. 2:

Although we cannot investigate in detail because there are no persons who know the circumstances at that time, the facts are not true.

Address of this information:

Chief of the Tokyo Prisoner of War Camp (for information, SHIN 1160 Chief of the Prisoner of War Camp in Siam)
From: Chief of Malaya Prisoner of War Camp  
To: Chief of Prisoner of War Information Bureau  
Subject: Report on the investigation re British prisoners of war in Burma

I report as per enclosed with regard to the "I" SAW 3 Secret No. 3:

Addressee of this information: "I" (for information: OEA Unit, Prisoner of War Information Bureau)

Re: Item No. 1:

It concerns the time of the first occupation in 1942, and we have investigated the MOBI Unit but were unable to find any record. The following is a statement of prisoner who is now interned in branch No. 4 of this camp, and who was in Moulmein at that time:

1. Concerning the Moulmein district:
   A. It is not true that about 20,000 prisoners were interned in or around Moulmein in 1942.

   During March to June 1942 about 120 British prisoners of war, including officers, and about 700 Indian prisoners of war were interned in Moulmein, and about 79 Indian prisoners of war and enemy civilians were interned in Daboi.

   B. No British prisoners of war were left in Moulmein and its neighborhood after June, 1942.

   During the internment period mentioned above, five British (one of them due to wounds received in action) and five Indians died. However, the food supplied to the prisoners in Moulmein prison was pretty bad. Both British and Indians were said to have been given small amounts of food twice a day, cooked by Burmese. The present treatment was said to be a thousand times better than that compared to Moulmein. In Daboi the provisions were said to have been much better.

   C. Although I have no means to investigate the existence of such facts, I do not believe that prisoners of war were interned in Moulmein at that time.

2. At the front lines: According to reports of the Army Unit, no such facts existed.
I send you a report regarding the subject mentioned above by the Prisoner Supply No. 36 dated July 29, as I have received the following report:

MAN YA TETSU RO No. 51 — dated 6 October 1944

From: Commander of the Southern Army Field Railway Unit
To: Chief of Staff of the Southern Army
Subject: Report on British prisoners of war in Burma

I am sending you a report in reply to "I" SAN 3 Secret No. 336 concerning British prisoners of war in Burma (districts allotted for the construction of railway connecting Siam with Burma.)

1. The number of patients and deceased prisoners of war who were engaged in the construction of the railway connecting Siam and Burma are as in Tables I and II. The prisoners of war include both British and Dutch and there is no way to investigate the British prisoners of war separately. For strategic reasons the completion of this railway was most urgent. Since the proposed site of the railway line was a virgin jungle, shelter, food provisions and medical supplies were far from adequate and much different from normal conditions for prisoners of war.

During the rainy season of 1943, transportation was frequently interrupted and both Japanese soldiers and prisoners of war were obliged to put up with much hardship. The Japanese army Medical Corps tried in vain to stem the violent outbreak of malaria and sicknesses of digestive organs. However, with the opening of the said railway in October, 1943, both the number of patients and deaths diminished with the completion of provisions and facilities.

2. I know nothing about the insulting of British prisoners of war in Moulmein since Moulmein is out of the work area.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Total No. of POW Employed</th>
<th>Patients in Siam</th>
<th>Ratio to Total No.</th>
<th>Patients in Burma</th>
<th>Ratio to Total No.</th>
<th>Total No.</th>
<th>Ratio to Total No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>37,086</td>
<td>18,052</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>11,496</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>29,548</td>
<td>79.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>42,337</td>
<td>20,634</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>12,074</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>32,710</td>
<td>77.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar.</td>
<td>47,009</td>
<td>21,516</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>14,987</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>36,498</td>
<td>77.9</td>
</tr>
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<td>Apr.</td>
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<td>19,892</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>11,962</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>31,623</td>
<td>63.5</td>
</tr>
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<td>49,489</td>
<td>18,012</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>13,288</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>31,300</td>
<td>63.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>48,323</td>
<td>24,351</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>12,933</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>37,284</td>
<td>76.5</td>
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<td>48,116</td>
<td>23,407</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>12,192</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>35,599</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>23,269</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>12,538</td>
<td>26.6</td>
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<td>13,496</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>34,721</td>
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<td>9,619</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>29,593</td>
<td>66.2</td>
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<td>Dec.</td>
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<td>43.9</td>
<td>12,380</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>31,877</td>
<td>71.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>Total 383,613</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total 532,485</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>43,695</td>
<td>23,285</td>
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<td>23,285</td>
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<td>23,289</td>
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<td>22,977</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>22,977</td>
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<tr>
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<td>20,324</td>
<td>47.1</td>
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<td>20,080</td>
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<td>20,080</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>20,080</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
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<td>40.5</td>
<td>17,418</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>17,418</td>
<td>40.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>40,960</td>
<td>5,468</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>5,468</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>5,468</td>
<td>13.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>383,613</td>
<td>148,872</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>532,485</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>Total No. of POW Employed</td>
<td>Deaths in Siam</td>
<td>Deaths in Burma</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Ratio to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
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<td>----------------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ratio to Total No.</td>
<td>Ratio to Total No.</td>
<td>Ratio to Total No.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Aug.</td>
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<td>0.05</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.05</td>
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<td>Oct.</td>
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<td>0.12</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1,246</td>
<td>7,746</td>
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<td>80</td>
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<tr>
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<td>164</td>
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<tr>
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<td>656</td>
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<td>171</td>
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<tr>
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<td>43,695</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>289</td>
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<td>146</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>416</td>
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<td>145</td>
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<td>145</td>
<td>0.34</td>
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<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>43,116</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>57</td>
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</tr>
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<td>64</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>64</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>60</td>
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<td>60</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>40,313</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0.09</td>
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<td>6,500</td>
<td>1,246</td>
<td>7,746</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Siam Prisoner of War "PU" No. 384

From: Chief of Prisoner of War Camp in Siam
To: Chief of Prisoner of War Information Bureau
Subject: Information re British prisoners of war in Burma

I am sending you a report regarding the facts A and B in Item No. 1 of the British protest as stated in the Prisoner of War Supply No. 36.

This matter concerns the sacrifice of the administration of the prisoners of war for strategic reasons and contains no material for refutation against the enemy protest.

Item following "C" has no relation to us.

Branch Camp No. 3 was opened in Burma September, 1942 to intern 9,535 prisoners of war transferred from Java. Branch Camp No. 5 was opened in January, 1943 to intern 1,946 prisoners of war. These camps are under the command of the Fifth Railway Regiment and the prisoners of war were engaged in constructing a railway between Burma and Siam. At that time, provisions and rations were scarce. Quarters and establishments were poor and medical facilities were inadequate. Moreover, for strategic reasons, it was necessary to complete the railway by August, 1943, and the work was pushed forward at a terrific pace, with the result that many prisoners of war became ill and many died, as per attached sheet.

Following the opening of the railway to traffic in October, 1943, all prisoners of war in Burma were concentrated in Kanchana, Buri, Nonbodog (phonetic) and Termacam, except a few who were to assist the Railway Unit. Both the quarter facilities and provisions have been improved at present and both the number of patients and deaths have decreased considerably.

(Stamp shows receipt by Prisoner of War Information Bureau
4 October 1944)
TABLE II.

Prisoners of War Patients during the period between January, 1943 and July 1944. (Investigated by Siam Prisoner of War Camp.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Total No. of POW Employed</th>
<th>Patients in Siam Ratio to Total No.</th>
<th>Patients in Burma Ratio to Total No.</th>
<th>Total Ratio to Total No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>37,086 18,052</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>79.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>42,337 20,634</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>77.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar.</td>
<td>47,009 21,516</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>77.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr.</td>
<td>49,776 19,892</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>63.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>49,489 18,012</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>63.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>48,832 24,351</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>76.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>48,116 23,407</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>73.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>47,162 23,269</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>75.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>46,103 21,225</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>75.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>45,277 23,301</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>79.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>44,699 19,474</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>66.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>27.9</td>
<td>71.8</td>
</tr>
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<td>23.289</td>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
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<td>53.0</td>
<td>22,977</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>47.3</td>
<td>20,427</td>
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</tr>
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<td>43,116 20,324</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>20,324</td>
<td>47.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>43,083 20,080</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>20,080</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>43,028 17,418</td>
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<td>17,418</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>40,960 5,468</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>5,468</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>383,613</td>
<td>140,072</td>
<td>532,485</td>
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</table>
### TABLE NO. II

No. of Deaths Since Organization, from August, 1942 to August, 1944 (Siam Prisoner of War Camp)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Total No. Deaths in Siam of P.O.W.</th>
<th>Ratio to Total No.</th>
<th>Deaths in Burma</th>
<th>Ratio to Total No.</th>
<th>Total No.</th>
<th>Ratio to Total No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>0.05</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>0.12</td>
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</tr>
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<td>10</td>
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<tr>
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<td>68</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>81</td>
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<td>1943</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>37,086</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>42,337</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>47,009</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>262</td>
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<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>49,766</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>206</td>
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<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>49,489</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>276</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>48,532</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>48,116</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>47,162</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>46,103</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>1,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>45,277</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
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<td>477</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>44,372</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td>43,695</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>43,316</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.34</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>57</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0.13</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.14</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>40</td>
<td>0.09</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
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<td>0.09</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>1,246</td>
<td>7,746</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE NO. III

No. of Cases of Cholera Among Prisoners of War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camp</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>No. of Cases</th>
<th>No. of Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Branch No. 3</td>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branch No. 5</td>
<td>Burma</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>39</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CERTIFICATE

I, Shibuya Shin hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: the Secretary of Investigation Section, POW Information Bureau and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 572 pages, dated Feb 3, 1944, and described as follows: Concerning Treatment of Prisoners of War in Burma and Siam.

I further certify that the attached record and document are an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): 1st Demobilization Bureau (former War Ministry) Investigation Section of POW Information Bureau File number QA2.

Signed at Tokyo on this 22nd day of August, 1946

/s/ Shibuya Shin
Signature of Official
the Secretary of POW Information Bureau

/s/ Shibuya Shin
Official Capacity

Witness: Aryanma Yakitaka
Chief of the Section of Archives
of the Secretary of POW Information Bureau

Statement of Official Procurement.

I, Richard H. Larrish, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 23rd day of Aug., 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larrish
FAME

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis 2nd Lt. M.I.
CERTIFICATE

I, SUZUKI, Sakae, do hereby certify that I am Chairman of the Committee of Conservators for Closed Institutions, having been appointed by the Japanese Government; that among the Closed Institutions under the direction of said Committee are the Central China Development Company, Ltd. and the North China Development Company, Ltd., that said Committee of Conservators has control and custody of such of the original records of said companies as are now or were in Tokyo, Japan and which have not been destroyed by fire; that the explanations of the items in the balance sheets of said companies certified by me on the 11th of September 1946 so far as the details are available and the items are not self-explanatory are set forth in "Exhibit A" hereto attached and made part hereof.

Dated: Tokyo, Japan 12 September 1946.

Chairman

"EXHIBIT A" ATTACHED TO CERTIFICATE OF S. SUZUKI RE. BALANCE SHEETS OF THE CENTRAL CHINA DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. AND THE NORTH CHINA DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LTD. DATED 12 SEPTEMBER 1946.

Central China Development Company, Ltd.

ASSETS:
Investment and Loan Account $4,971,713.25
Issued in Japan
Issued in China
Borrowing Account ¥5,130,420,000
Yokohama Specie Bank, Shanghai $4,339,340,000
Separate Account, Yokohama Specie
Bank, Shanghai $461,330,000
Bank of Chiqa, Shanghai $9,900,000
Life Ins. Association Japan in China $297,100,000
Non-Life Insurance Association $5,000,000
Deposit Department of Ministry of Finance $52,650,000
Japanese Government $53,500,000
Japanese Syndicates $500,000
Industrial Bank of Japan $5,130,420,000

LIABILITIES:
Debenture Account
Issued in Japan $334,500,000
Issued in China $532,600,000
Uncollected dividends on shares held
by the company of subsidiaries
Bills Receivable $8,416,620.00
No explanation available

Chairman

(Seal)
Items Miscellaneous account
- Account payable ¥4,380,349.66 is interest on debentures and other interest due.
- Suspense account ¥5,913,333.49 details not available but is money temporarily received.
- Received interest not due ¥35,001,404.96 is interest received in advance (discounted) from subsidiaries.
- Acceptance and Guarantee ¥10,000,000.00
- Not included in figures of balance sheet either as assets or liabilities.

Explanation Capital account - Authorized Capital ¥143,424,250.00
Less unpaid capital ¥77,559,394.00
Paid-up Capital ¥65,864,856.00

Investment by Japanese Government in Central China Development Co., Ltd. ¥93,424,230.00

NORTH CHINA DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD.

ACCOUNTS:
Investment ¥908,318,789.50 in subsidiary companies.
Loan ¥2,830,328,000.00 to subsidiary companies.
Advance ¥12,309,602,047.62 to subsidiary companies - details not available.
Accounts Receivable - Japanese subsidies not collected and interest on loans ¥95,492,453.10
Deposits Bank - ¥12,643,917.82
Temporary payment - ¥33,074,527.15 for construction wood ships, etc. (c.s.)

LIABILITIES:
Debenture ¥2,130,200,000 - sold to Japanese syndicates.
Borrowings - ¥2,871,900,000. Borrowed in advance of issue of debentures to syndicates. Closed when debentures are actually issued.
Overdraft with banks ¥19,188,575,395.94 only when explanation available is overdraft with the Bank of Chosen in Tokyo ¥56,163,923.27. Other details of this account are not available because records are in Peking, China.
Deposit payable ¥112,350,000.00 due to subsidiary companies.

Capital account
- Authorized ¥443,000,000.00
- Unpaid capital ¥31,230,000.00
- Paid-up capital ¥411,770,000.00

Investment by Japanese Government in North China Development Co., Ltd. ¥254,250,000.

/s/ S. Suzuki

(SEAL)
I, S. Suzuki, Chairman of the Committee of Conservators for Closed Institutions, do hereby certify, under seal, that the attached statements of the North China Development Company and the Central China Development Company are true and correct copies of the balance sheets in the Annual Statements issued by the North China Development Company and the Central China Development Company, as of March 31, 1945, the originals of which are in our control and custody.

Dated Tokyo: Japan 11 September 1946.

COMMITTEE of CONSERVATORS for CLOSED INSTITUTIONS

Chairman
North China Development Co., Ltd.

**Balance sheet**

**As on March 31, 1945**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unpaid Capital</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Loan</td>
<td>¥ 2,817,312,000.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Property as a part of investment by government</td>
<td>¥ 12,378.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Real Estate, Equipments</td>
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<tr>
<td>Securities held by the Company</td>
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<td>Advance</td>
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<td>Account receivable</td>
<td>¥ 95,492,453.10</td>
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<td>Deposits</td>
<td>¥ 12,643,917.82</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>¥ 1,385,910.34</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fund for payment of principal &amp; interest of Debentures</td>
<td>¥ 62,507,295.88</td>
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<tr>
<td>Difference on debentures</td>
<td>¥ 26,662,033.43</td>
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<tr>
<td>Temporary payment</td>
<td>¥ 33,074,527.15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Company's own enterprises</td>
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<td>Government ordered enterprises</td>
<td>¥ 1,035,140,511.08</td>
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<td>Clearing account with Subsidiaries</td>
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<td>Securities against employees Securities in Custody</td>
<td>¥ 364,379.50</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>¥ 18,920,879,427.50</strong></td>
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Capital
Reserve under legal requirement
Employees Retirement allowance
Debenture
Borrowings
Overdraft with Banks
Bills payable
Account payable
Principal & Interest of debentures
Deposit payable
Deposit by Employees
Suspense account
Employees Securities in custody
Profit of this year
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liabilities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y 443,000,000.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Y 1,648,939.69</td>
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<td>Y 164,894.39</td>
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<td>Y 88,904,191.91</td>
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<td>Y 263,895.50</td>
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<td>Y 10,124,817.71</td>
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<td>Y 364,379.50</td>
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<td>Y 18,920,879,427.50</td>
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Central China Development Co., Ltd.

**Balance Sheet**

- **Assets**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Investment and Loan account</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investment</td>
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<td>Loan</td>
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<td>Advance</td>
<td>1,425,693,600.00</td>
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<td>Government ordered enterprise</td>
<td>¥ 283,568,256.16</td>
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<td>Securities held by Company</td>
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<td>Japanese Government Bonds</td>
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<td>Debentures</td>
<td>200,000.00</td>
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<td>Stocks</td>
<td>270,000.00</td>
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<td>Deposits and Cash</td>
<td>¥ 98,064,141.34</td>
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<td>Deposits at Banks</td>
<td>74,108,071.23</td>
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<td>Postal savings</td>
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<td>Building</td>
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<td>Fixture</td>
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<td>Office articles</td>
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<td>Difference on Debenture &amp; Issuing charges</td>
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<td>Investment money</td>
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<td>Advance on Employees' residence</td>
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<td>Paid interest not due</td>
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<tr>
<td>Customer's Liabilities against acceptance and guaranty</td>
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<td>Sub-total</td>
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<td>Share holders account</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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**Central China Development Co., Ltd.**

- **Liabilities -**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Account Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central China Development Co debenture account</td>
<td>¥ 352,600,000.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Borrowing account</td>
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<td>Borrowing</td>
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<td>Miscellaneous account</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Account payable</td>
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<td>Suspense account</td>
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<td>Employees guaranty money</td>
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<td>Deposits by employees</td>
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<tr>
<td>Received interest not due</td>
<td>¥ 35,001,404.96</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acceptance and guaranty</td>
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<td>(40,000,000.00)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
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<td>Share-holders account</td>
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<td>Capital</td>
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<td>Reserve for retirement allowance of employees</td>
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<td>Profit for this year</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>¥ 5,732,846,066.62</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Report by Japanese Government, "Burma-Thailand Railway".


Contents

Preface

Part 1—Protests by Allied Powers.
Chapter 1. Protests by British and Australian Governments regarding Treatment of War Prisoners during Construction of Siam-Burma Railway.
Chapter 2. Treatment of English War Prisoners in Burma (Kualimain District.)

Part 2—Details of Investigations.
Summary

Chapter 1. Outline of Construction Progress
Paragraph 1. Particulars of Construction and Situation early stage. (June 1942 - middle of Feb. 1943)
Paragraph 2. Situation during period of expedited construction (Middle of Feb. 1943 - Middle of July, 1943)
Paragraph 3. Particulars concerning extension of construction and situation during extended period. (Middle of July 1943 - Oct. 1943)
Paragraph 4. Situation after completion of work. (Nov. 1945 - Aug. 1945)

Chapter 2. Effects on Construction and War Prisoners control and measures taken in respect thereto.
Paragraph 2. Measures taken to cope with the above difficulties and subsequent state of affairs.
Summary
(1) General supplies and provisions
(2) Billeting
(3) Sanitation

Chapter 3. Outline of control and employment of War Prisoners
Paragraph 1. Particulars about employment of War Prisoners
Paragraph 2. Relations between controllers and War Prisoners
Paragraph 3. Outline of control and employment of War Prisoners.

Chapter 4. Unfortunate Incidents during Construction.
Paragraph 1. Insult to remains of War Prisoners
Paragraph 2. Other incidents.

Chapter 5. Explanation regarding particular cases in respect to protests by Allied Powers.
Paragraph 1. Questions concerning treatment of War Prisoners during construction of Siam-Burma Railway
Paragraph 2. Treatment of War Prisoners in Maulmein District

Conclusion,

Tables and Sketches,

Table 1. Monthly Statistics of Prisoners Labour Service.
Table 2. Table of Patients Classified by Diseases (Siam District).
Table 3. Table of Patients Classified by Diseases (Burma District).
Table 4. List of Monthly Investigation concerning Patients.
Table 5. Table showing outbreak of cholera cases among War Prisoners.
Table 6. List of Deaths among War Prisoners engaged in construction of Siam-Burma Railway.
Table 7. List of dead War Prisoners classified by races.
Table 8. List of monthly deaths since formation of Prisoners' labor corps.

Sketch: 1. A sketch showing positions of War Prisoners Camps in Siam.
Sketch. 2. Sketch showing Route of War Prisoners March.
Sketch 3. General sketch of Siam-Burma Railway.
1. The so-called brutal treatment of Allied prisoners of war during the construction of the Siam-Burma Railway shall be divided into two categories: (1) Misconduct in the form of direct cruelty to the prisoners of war (the cases known as maltreatment of prisoners), and (2) incidents involving a considerable number of deaths from illness among the prisoners during the work. Cases coming under the first category shall be dealt with as cases of ordinary maltreatment of prisoners, whereas the unfortunate incidents coming under the second were caused under the circumstances that were unavoidable during the waging of war. It should, therefore, be noted that there is a distinct difference in character between cases (1) and (2).

2. In the present report, a plain statement will be made of the actual state of affairs and of the treatment of the prisoners of war which have led to the comparatively large number of deaths from sickness during the construction of the railway under (1).

Under Part 1 of this report the protests made by the Allied Powers will be dealt with; under Part 2 a description will be given regarding the investigations conducted into general affairs relative to the prisoners' treatment and the special cases of those under protest, and finally Part 3 will give the measures taken by the Japanese authorities in respect to the foregoing (2) (judicial decisions).

With regard to cruelty directly inflicted on prisoners under (1), no data are available in Tokyo, and liaison with the Japanese troops on the spot is at the moment virtually impossible, for which reason the cases under (1) are excluded from this report. Accordingly it is hoped that inquiries will be made on the spot by the Allied Powers in respect thereto.

3. Although the construction of the Siam-Burma Railway was completed in October 1943, some of the prisoners were still employed in repair work on the termination of the war, but the present report chiefly describes the situation during the construction of the railway.

Summary of Statement in House of Commons by Sir James Grigg, British Secretary for War, on Maltreatment of British Prisoners of War in Burma and Siam.

Out of some 1,300 English and Australian prisoners of war, about 150 were rescued by a U.S. Submarine and English survivors have recently returned home.

In view of their health conditions, only preliminary examinations have so far been made, but further statements will be made with the progress of the examinations of the survivors.
As a result of the examination, the Japanese treatment of prisoners of war in the southern parts of East Asia, has, for the first time, been brought to light and by this the policy adopted by the Japanese militarists in the treatment of the prisoners of war in Burma, Siam and East Indies has been ascertained beyond any doubt. But it should be noted that the present information has nothing to do with the treatment given to the prisoners of war and civilian internees at the camps in Hong Kong, Formosa, the occupied territory of China, Korea and Japan proper; treatment in those places seems to be comparatively lenient.

The prisoners in Singapore and Java were at the beginning of 1942, transferred to Burma and Siam, and Australian prisoners to Burma by sea. In the transportation, they were crowded into holds of ships, four feet high. The English war prisoners were transported by train from Singapore to Siam and they were so crowded that the men could not lie down during the whole five days of the journey. Then they were forced to march on foot for 80 miles.

They were compelled to work for the railway construction in the disease infected and insect-full jungle area together with natives who were engaged in compulsory labor. The camps were poorly equipped against equalls and heat peculiar to the tropical zone and the Japanese did not replace worn-out clothing. Food was supplied three times a day, each ration consisting of some rice and one pint of water. The labor was continued at the cost of human lives and pains to prisoners no matter how great they might be and no rest was given. The death rate estimated at a minimum was 20%.

As the construction of the railway was completed in October 1943, all the prisoners except those who were engaged in the maintenance work, were transferred to camps in Siam. The camps there could shelter the men from rain and the food situation and sanitary conditions were improved. Those men thought to be suitable for a certain kind of work were removed to French Indies for a time and then transferred to Singapore on their way to Japan. The war prisoners who were rescued, had been on a board a steamer which departed from Singapore at the beginning of September and 1,300 English and Australian prisoners were aboard.

When the steamer was sunk, the Japanese were busy rescuing their own people and the war prisoners were left to their fate; consequently most of them died.

In presenting this to the House of Commons, I would like to express our profound thanks to the U.S. Submarines for efforts they made to rescue our survivors in disregard of the danger to themselves and also for the care they took of the rescued men.

We have asked protecting Powers to make the strongest possible protest to the Japanese.
From the accounts of all the survivors I saw to my surprise that, despite the treatment of the Japanese, the morale of our prisoners of war had been maintained. Especially, our surgeon miraculously achieved a high measure of success in attending to the sick and wounded in spite of the insufficiency of medicines and medical facilities.

I can't express my profound sympathy toward the relatives and friends of the prisoners of war. I regret that the matter has not been publicly announced, but it is necessary to let the Japanese Government know that we have come to possess these facts. We are collecting information from the survivors. All the details of the accounts which they give of other prisoners of war shall be immediately communicated to their next kin -- and, while the present report is in preparation we have obtained from our protecting powers the information that the Japanese Government has not permitted representatives of the International Red Cross or of the protective powers to visit the prisoners of war camps in the areas occupied by Japan.

The above fact explodes the denial by the Japanese Government of the Foreign Secretary's Commons statement regarding the treatment of prisoners of war detained in Burma and Thailand.

This outrageous treatment of prisoners of war constitutes one reason for our continuing warlike endeavors, even after the termination of the war with Germany until we thoroughly crush, in cooperation with our Allied Powers, the beneficent militaristic autocracy which reigns supreme in present Japan.

Tentative Translation of the Oral Message dated July 4, 1944 from Swiss Legation, Tokyo.

By the letter dated September 15, 1944, addressed to His Excellency General Hideki Tojo, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, and by the latter dated December 5, 1944, to His Excellency Masayuki Tani, the Swiss Minister had the honor to communicate the apprehensions which the British Government entertained as to the maltreatment accorded the prisoners of war at the Rangoon Camp. The London Government furnished, at the same time, a certain number of detailed facts relative to the same treatment.

By letter No 32/C R., dated February 1945, His Excellency Foreign Minister answered to the Swiss Minister that the facts as mentioned in the above letter did not exist.

The Swiss Minister never failed to convey the contents of this letter to his Government in behalf of the U.K. Government.

The Swiss Legation has the honor to acquaint the Minister of Foreign Affairs with the fact that the British Government has, in a new communication made the following request to the Imperial Government for information as regards the treatment of the prisoners of war in Burma,
I. First complaint concerns area of Moulmein and falls under three headings:

A. Notifications: According to postcards printed by the Japanese Authorities, about 20,000 British and Allied prisoners of war are detained in or near Moulmein. Transfer of prisoners of war to this camp has never been notified; and it is believed that capture of many prisoners of war now in this and other Burmese camps has also never been notified. Nor has any notification been received of numerous deaths that are known to have occurred there.

B. Conditions: Conditions under which prisoners of war in Moulmein camp are detained are known to His Majesty's Government to be at least as bad as, if not worse, than those which existed in Thailand (c.f. the letter of the Swiss Minister to His Excellency Mamoru Shigemitsu, dated 5 July 1943).

During October and November 1942, prisoners of war in Moulmein are known to have died at rate of approximately 10 per 100; the principal cause of death being dysentery. In other camps administered by the Japanese authorities in or near Moulmein an even more appalling rate of mortality has occurred amongst prisoners of war working on that Burmese railway. These deaths are direct and inevitable result of conditions in camps and in particular of the wholly inadequate rations provided by the Japanese authorities, of the latter's failure to provide medicines or equipment in hospitals, of almost complete lack of adequate clothing or even footwear and of severity of labor exacted from prisoners of war.

C. Exhibition of prisoners: In February of 1944, 25 prisoners of war were paraded through the town of Moulmein. They were in an emaciated condition and were forced to carry notices in Burmese stating that they had recently been captured on the Arakan front (which was not the case.) They were further held up to ridicule and contempt by a Japanese officer who accompanied the parade. Such proceeding are clearly contrary to honorable standards of warfare and unworthy of a nation calling itself civilized, apart from being a breach of Article 2 of the Prisoners of War Convention.

Letter dated December 4, 1944 from Swiss Minister to Minister of Foreign Affairs (Protest by British and Australian Governments)

Tentative Translation of the Letter dated December 4, 1944 from Swiss Minister to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

I have the honor to acquaint Your Excellency with the fact that the British and Australian Governments have requested my Government to convey the following communication to the Japanese Government.

Some 150 Australian and United Kingdom survivors from the Japanese transport S.S. "Rakuyo Maru" torpedoed in South China Sea on September 12, have reached Australia and Great Britain. Following is a brief summary of the knowledge which has consequently come into the possession
of His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom and Australia regarding treatment of British and Australian prisoners of war by Japanese military authorities; all available prisoners of war in Singapore and Java were moved early in 1942 to Burma or Thailand. Australians were sent by sea to Burma crowded into ships' holds which had been horizontally subdivided so that ceilings were no more than 4 feet high. Prisoners from the United Kingdom were sent by rail to Thailand so crowded into steel cattle trucks that they could not even lie down during the journey. They were then marched some 90 miles. All were sent to work on the construction of a railway through primitive disease infected jungle in Thailand and Burma. Conditions under which all these men lived and worked were horrendous; such accommodation as was provided gave little or no protection against tropical rains or blazing sun. Worn out clothing was not replaced and soon many lacked clothing, boots and head covering. The only food provided was a papkin of rice and a small quantity of watery stew three times a day but work had to go on without respite whatever cost in human suffering or life. The inevitable result was a fearful death rate, the lowest estimate being 20 per cent. These conditions continued until the railway was finished about October, 1943, when those not needed for maintenance work were moved to camps in Thailand and later to Singapore en route to Japan.

The rescued men were on a ship which left Singapore early in September 1944. There were probably 1,300 United Kingdom and Australian prisoners of war on board. After she was sunk, the Japanese deliberately picked up all Japanese survivors but left the prisoners to their fate. Statements of our men constitute direct and unimpeachable evidence of the outrageous treatment by the Japanese of defenseless prisoners of war.

I add that I communicated to His Excellency Minister Suzuki in the letter dated November 13, that the rescued men from Gakoyo Maru according to British information, arrived in England and Australia and that a public announcement would be given in both countries on the basis of the accounts of those men as to the maltreatment accorded the prisoners of war in Thailand and Burma.

I hereby express my high regard to Your Excellency.

Swiss Minister
1. By order of the Imperial General Headquarters, the preparations for the construction of this railway were commenced in June 1942 by the South Army with the view of using it as a ground supply route and a trade and traffic one between Thailand and Burma, being urged on by the proposal of the South Army and the construction work was virtually begun in November 1942 in hopes of completing it by the end of 1943. But while counter attacks, particularly bombings, of the British Indian Army rapidly became fierce and the situations in this area considerably serious since the end of the rainy season of 1942, our sea-transportation from Malay to Burra gradually became hard. As there could be found no ground transport route for its substitute, it was clearly estimated that, if the situations were left as they were till the end of the next rainy season, transportation to Burma would be almost entirely interrupted and even the defence of the area, not to mention positive actions, impossible and further work the work itself quite difficult. For these reasons the Imperial General Headquarters ordered early in February 1943 to shorten the term of the work by 3 months. With this the South Army, together with the leading staffs of the General Headquarters, urged the work on, taking the best possible measures and the working troops also did their best, so that the work made favorable progress for the time being. However, as the rainy season earlier than usual set in, in addition to the bad conditions in jungles since April or March of 1943 which the Japanese Army had never encountered before, victims of the work gradually increased, not to speak of the delay of scheduled work. Confronted with these bad conditions, the Imperial General Headquarters ordered at last to postpone the period of the work by 2 months in spite of the fact that this order had a grave influence on the operations in Burma, considering the general situations of Burma front at that time, and that the prospect of communication with Burma was becoming clear with the partial completion of the railway and local employment of newly constructed roads and waterways parallel with the railway.

2. It is not unnatural that a great many persons should be employed in such construction work in order to strengthen operation capacity. Though the South Army levied laborers on the spot and employed them in the work besides Japanese troops, it was so difficult to gather a great many laborers immediately that the South Army asked permission to employ POW's in the work of the Imperial General Headquarters. Considering that the work was carried on in the rear far away from the first front, and that the railway would serve in the future as a trade route between Thailand and Burma, the Imperial General Headquarters complied with the request and sanctioned the employment of POW's. Then the forced construction work was carried out in precipitous jungles spreading over 400 km, conquering natural hindrances such as influence of bad weather, particularly that of the rainy season and the environment injurious to health etc., and surmounting technical hindrances, such as time-limit due to operational needs, imperfect preparation due to it, inadequate accommodations along the L. of C., and inferior technical skill of the Japanese Army. 
3. Though the Japanese Army did its best in taking the best possible measures conceivable at that time in order to improve the treatment of the POW's cooperating with the Japanese troops, laying stress on billeting, ration and health, many POW's fell victim of the work at last much to our regret.

We should like to declare the Japanese troops participated in the joys and sorrows of the POW's and native laborers in the construction work, and by no means completed or intended to complete the work only at the sacrifice of POW's.

(NOTE) The Director of construction cherished the motto "POW's and native laborers are fathers of construction," and consequently endeavored to improve the treatment of POW's.

Chapter 7. GENERAL OUTLINE OF CONSTRUCTION PROGRESS.

Section 1. Details of the Construction and State of Affairs in the Earlier State (from June 1942 to the middle of February 1943)

A. Details of the construction.

1. With the development of the North Burma Operation, to construct a railway connecting Thailand and Burma as an operational supply route and a trade and traffic one between both countries had become so urgent that the South Army proposed its construction to the Imperial General Headquarters. Therefore the latter directed its preparation to the former in June of the same year.

2. The preparations of the constructions are summarized as follows:

   1. Route: About 400 km, from Nonpradoc to Tambisaya, along the River Eleon.

   2. Transportation capacity: About 3,000 tons a day to each direction.

   3. Period: Scheduled to complete by the end of 1943.

   4. Materials: Mainly to use the materials on the spot and a part is transferred from the home islands.

   5. Military strength: The Railway Inspection Office, 2 railway regiments, the Railway Material Depot and some other auxiliary troops.

3. In conformity with the above preparation items, the South Army, setting about survey along the railway, negotiations with Thailand, establishment of construction bases, preparation of construction materials, arrangements for laborers, survey of military geography and sanitary arrangements, moved the railway units in Burma to the construction bases one after another and made them deploy. Thus it prepared for the construction.

As the negotiations with Thailand were concluded at the beginning of November of the same year, the order of the Imperial General Headquarters concerning execution of the railway construction was issued and soon after, in accordance with the above items the order concerning the construction was issued by the South Army.

4. The chief inspector of the Second Railway Inspection Office (staying in Bangkok) took command of the following units of which the South Army Railway Corps was composed. The 5th Railway Regiment (its base was in Taoblaya) was allotted the duty of construction on the Thailand-side, and the 9th Railway Regiment (its base was in Kanchanaburi) that on the Burma-side. The main part of the 1st Railway Material Depot was deployed in Nomradoe and the other part in Rangun. Thus the preparations made progress step by step, and virtual construction work was begun in December, complying with the above mentioned orders.

The South Army Railway Corps.

COMMANDER: The Chief Inspector of the Second Railway Inspection Office Major General Shimoda

The Second Railway Inspection Office
The Fifth Railway Regiment
The Ninth Railway Regiment
The First Material Depot
Two units serving on land
Two building units
Two field well-drilling units
The Field Epidemic prevention and Water-supply Depot Co-operators.
The Thailand Internment Camp
The Field Supply Park.

5. The Thailand Internment Camp, having finished preparations, cooperated in the construction work from the beginning by order of the South Army.

6. Allotment of duties, business system, system of POW's and outline of duties, concerning the construction are shown in Annex 1, 2 and 3.
### Annex I

**Allocation of Duties Concerning the Railway Construction**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office and Unit</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Duty and Business</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imperial General Headquarters, the Railway Construction</td>
<td>Directions concerning estimate and materials.</td>
<td>1. Negotiations with the Ministry of War concerning estimate and materials.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2. Diplomatic negotiations through the Ministry of War.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3. Orders concerning the railway construction (directives of the Imperial General Headquarters).</td>
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<td>4. To help supply of materials necessary for the construction.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>5. Directions of the construction complying with the operational needs.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>6. To decide whether the employment of POW's is appropriate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South General Army, Chief Supervisor of Railway Construction</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. To estimate and concentrate military strength and labor necessary for the railway construction. Supply, maintenance and sanitary arrangements for them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>2. To make POW's cooperate with the construction units or to allot them to the units.</td>
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<td>3. Directions concerning the employment of POW's.</td>
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<td>4. Planning of the railway construction.</td>
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<td>5. To keep harmony between the railway construction units and cooperating attached units.</td>
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<td>6. Maintenance of traffic routes and waterways necessary for the construction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway Inspection Office, Commander-in-Charge of Railway Construction</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Inspection survey and construction of the route according to the railway construction plan.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2. Employment of the railway units and attached units.</td>
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<td>3. To make POW's and laborers cooperate with the railway units or to allot them to the units.</td>
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<td>4. Directions concerning the employment of POW's.</td>
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<td>5. Negotiations with the Internment Camp concerning the employment of POW's.</td>
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<td>6. To take care of billeting, maintenance and health of POW's.</td>
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<td>Office and Unit</td>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>Duty and Business</td>
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<tr>
<td>Railway Governor in</td>
<td>Construction of railway in the allotted district.</td>
<td>1. Construction of railway in the allotted district.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regiment charge of</td>
<td>2. Employment of the allotted and cooperating POW's according to the directives</td>
<td>2. Employment of the allotted and cooperating POW's according to the directives of the commander in charge of railway construction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>railway construction</td>
<td>of the commander in charge of railway construction.</td>
<td>3. Negotiations with persons in charge of supervising POW's.</td>
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<tr>
<td>in the allotted district</td>
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<td>4. To take care of billeting, maintenance and health of POW's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internment To assist and</td>
<td>1. To make POW's cooperate with the railway construction units or to allot them</td>
<td>Internment To assist and control the railway construction in the capacity of the</td>
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<tr>
<td>Camp control the railway</td>
<td>to the units by order of the South General Army.</td>
<td>supervisor of POW's.</td>
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<td>construction in the</td>
<td>2. Negotiations with railway construction units concerning the employment of</td>
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<td>capacity of the</td>
<td>POW's.</td>
<td>3. Chiefly to take care of billeting maintenance and health of POW's and to</td>
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<tr>
<td>supervisor of POW's</td>
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<td>request assistance to the units concerned.</td>
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<td>4. Execution of the business of supervising POW's.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Annex 2

BUSINESS SYSTEM CONCERNING THE RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION.

Chief Supervisor of Railway Construction

Army Dept. Imperial General Headquarters

Commander of South General Railway

Engineer unit

L. of C. troops

Guard unit

Sanitary unit
Annex 3

CHART SHOWING SYSTEM OF EMPLOYING POW's AND ALLOTTING DUTIES FOR THE RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION

Formal Chief Supervisor of POW

Supervisor of Internment Camp

At the beginning: cooperation
After: allotted to ---

Army Dept Imperial General Headquarters

Commander of South General Army Communication

Commander of Railway Construction Intercommunication reference, reply

Ministry of War POW Intelligence Bureau

Supervision Chief Officer of POW Business

Sanitary unit

Engineer Unit A part is allotted to ---

L.O. G. troops

Guard unit

Railway Unit

POW belonging to it.

Branch Camp

Cooperating cooperation a part is in the wor.

Sanitary unit
CHART SHOWING SYSTEM OF EMPLOYING POW'S AND
ALLOCATING DUTIES FOR THE RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army Dept</th>
<th>Imperial General Headquarters</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Commander of South China Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of War</td>
<td>POW Intelligence Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supervision Chief Officer of POW Business</td>
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<tr>
<th>Supervisor of Internment Camp</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formal Chief Supervisor of POW</td>
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<tr>
<th>Chief of Internment Camp</th>
<th>POW belong:</th>
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<tr>
<td>Camp</td>
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</table>

At the beginning: cooperation. After: allotted to — — |

Communication |

Commander of Railway Construction |

Communication intercommunication reference, reply |

Guard unit
CHART SHOWING SYSTEM OF EMPLOYING POW's AND ALLOCATING DUTIES FOR THE RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION

Formal Chief Supervisor of POW

Army Dept
Imperial General Headquarters

Ministry of War
POW Intelligence Bureau

Supervision Chief Officer of POW Business

Commander of South General Army

communication

Commander of Railway Construction

Communication intercommunication reference, reply

Railway Unit

Engineer Unit

L. of O. troops

Guard unit

Sanitary unit

Supervisor of Internment Camp

Chief of Internment Camp

Branch Camp

Cooperating cooperation

a part is in the work allotted to

At the beginning: cooperation.

After: allotted to

POW belongs to it.
(B) State of Affairs in the earlier stage (from June 1942 to the middle of February 1943).

1. In accordance with the above details, the preparatory works such as "survey work, collection of materials" necessary to maintenance of the bases and "part of round-construction etc." were commenced.

The construction was commenced from both sides, Thailand and Burma, and the supply in the rear was assisted by the Army stationing in Thailand in the case of the former and by the Burma Army Group in the case of the latter.

2. Virtual construction work was commenced in November, 1942; an order to put it into practice being given.

3. However, the area where the railway was to be constructed were covered with great jungles and if we had waited the completion of the survey of the whole route, the construction period would have been so prolonged that the work was carried out keeping pace with the survey. Therefore, as to estimation of quantity of labor and materials, sufficient measures could not be prearranged.

4. In January 1943 when the work was smoothly progressing, Major General Shiota, the commander of the construction, while patrolling over the construction area in an airplane, in order to inspect the work, was killed by crashing against a border mountain between Thailand and Burma. Major Irie, the chief staff of the construction, riding with him in the same plane was also killed at the same time.

5. In this period the number of POW's increased by degrees and POW's in Java and Singapore were transferred to the construction areas. The Thailand Internment Camp gradually enlarged itself and assisted the construction work on the Thailand-side with main strength while that on the Burma-side with the other strength.

SECTION II State of Affairs in the Period during which the Construction was urged on.

(From the middle of Feb. 1943 to the middle of July, 1943)

A. How and why the construction period was cut short.

1. Since the end of the rainy season of 1942, the counter-attack on Burma of the British Indian Army became so rapidly violent and the situations in this area so serious; the British Army being steadily reinforced with military strength and goods. Besides, the only transport route by sea became so dangerous as was almost interrupted by the enemy's disturbance both from the sea and air. Hence the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters keenly felt the necessity of completing the railway connecting Thailand and Burma and intended to urge the construction on.
Namely at that time transportation of military strength and goods with which the Burma Army Group was being greatly reinforced to cope with the critical situations in Burma caused by the counter-attack of the British Indian Army, relied on the sea route from Singapore alone. But in addition to the shortage of shipping, this route was extremely menaced both by the enemy planes and submarines and thus the prospects of transportation increasingly became dark. Though we tried to cut a road from Rohing to Moulmein via least, it was unsuccessful as too many trucks were required and the labor was out of proportion to the effect. At last we faced such plight as we had to rely upon forced supply executed by small scale.

This transportation by force could be barely executed by taking advantage of the rainy season and was expected to be available only till September 1943. Under the circumstance that suspension of the sea transport and general counter attack of the British Indian Army were expected immediately after the rainy season, a ground transport route for its substitute was absolutely necessary for the Japanese Army. Moreover, it was expected that unless it was completed by the end of the next rainy season, the Army group operating in Burma would come to a crisis and at the same time the construction of the railway connecting Thailand and Burma would become quite difficult.

The Imperial General Headquarters, not to mention the South Army, were much anxious about the circumstance and discussed the counter-measures and tried to find a break in the deadlock. Finally they could not but conclude that there was no other way than to complete by the end of the rainy season the railway connecting Thailand and Burma under construction at that time and intended to cut short the construction period, having been driven to the last extremity.

Then, the Imperial General Headquarters consulted with the South Army, and being aware of many difficulties such as shortage of military strength, labor and materials, great amount of the work, destructive influence of the rainy season and unhealthy surroundings, yet both agreed upon speeding up of the work by all possible means and shortening of the work, took necessary measures respectively. Viz, estimating the whole amount of the earth-work from the result of the survey executed by that time and prudently examining the military strength, labor and materials the Headquarters lowered the construction gauge (from 3,000 tons a day to each direction to 1,000 tons) and as to military strength, labor and material, took every measure possible in the capacity of the Central office, expecting to shorten the construction period of 4 months and to complete the work by the end of August 1943.

They can be summarized as follows:

(1) To restore the 4th Battalion, the 5th Railway Regiment in Moulmein to the home regiment. To alter the demobilization schedule of the 4th Auxiliary Railway Unit and to prepare for its allotment to the railway construction units.
(2) To deliver 150 km. rails which are under charge of the central office and reserved in the south area, many rock-drills and a large quantity of explosive.

(3) To despatch medical veterans in order to intensify measures against malaria.

3. As the tactical situations in East New Guinea were critical at that time, and breakdown of the fighting front in this area expected imminent, quick reinforcement to the front of East New Guinea and Banda Sea areas was being carried out; transportation units, supply depots and airfield construction units which could be diverted to this purpose, were despatched or were on route to these areas. As to laborers, they were insufficient to a certain degree, owing to the necessity of building up self-support industry on the spot caused by insufficient supply to the South Army, airfield construction for defense and despatching laborers to the above diverted units; shortage of labor was rising even in the over-populated Java. Then the South Army, according to the order to cut short the construction period of the Thailand-Burma railway, diverted the following units which had been by that time employed in urgent operational duties to the railway construction, and at the same time ordered that each sector commander of Burma, Thailand, French Indo-China, Malaya and Java districts should give assistance to the railway construction, and took appropriate measures especially in the systematic supply and maintenance of laborers. As to POW's, they were transferred there all the way from French Indo-China and Java, taking into consideration the above mentioned situation. Thus we tried to increase labor capacity.

(1) The 4th Auxiliary Railway Unit, the 41st Independence Garrison Infantry Battalion, the Imperial Guards Railway Regiment, the 54th Engineer Regiment, the 4th L. of C. Area Unit, the Field Construction Service Unit of the 14th Division, main part of the Epidemic Prevention and Water-supply Depot of the South Army and the Field Hospital of the 21st Division.

(2) Two internment branch camps in Malaya (about 10,000 POW's).

(3) A motor-car company and 700 trucks.

3. Transition of situations.

1. Because of the arrival at the construction spot of the military strength, labor, POW's and construction materials reinforced according to the above measures, the work further progressed since the end of March.

2. After Major General Shimoda's death Major General Takasaka succeeded him as the commander of the railway construction, and arrived at the spot in the middle of February of the same year, and the work was being eagerly carried on as before.
3. Contrary to our expectation, the rainy season set in one April in Thailand and in the middle of April in Burma, which influence upon the work and supply were tremendous.

4. At the same time, cholera which had been prevalent in some areas of Burma, was spread over the border line between Thailand and Burma, and simultaneously with the setting-in of the rainy season, became increasingly prevalent. June was its most prevalent time when there broke out about 6,000 cases (of which 1,200 were the POW's) of which about 4,000 proved fatal (of whom about 500 odd were the POW's). Thus many fell victim of the work in a short time. As this fact inspired fear in the laborers on the spot, many fled away and even some cases stole out of a Hospital. The situations, dangerous both from the viewpoint of epidemic prevention and the work itself, were brought about.

5. As cholera was prevailing, the Headquarters not only dispatched medical authorities there, but sent some staff officers in order to make them take necessary steps, and the South Army, also, often dispatched principal medical officers and some staff officers in order to cope with the situation: the construction units fulfilled their duties, overcoming unfavorable circumstances: the prisoners of war earnestly cooperated with them.

6. On the other hand, as an emergency road for automobiles and the newly constructed railway were often destroyed and the bridges often washed away because of the long heavy rain, the ground transportation was apt to be tied up, and as it was impossible to sail up the Keonoi to the upper reaches for one month, its rising being slow, we were frequently faced with a crisis.

Particularly, the construction unit on the Burma-side, having no parallel waterways, toiled and moiled at the construction of a rain-tight road, by which it could transport necessary materials. For this reason, the railway construction work was inevitably suspended for a while. The construction unit on the Thailand-side, waiting the rising of the Keonoi, made use of it and narrowly escaped starvation. At that time though rations to units in the innermost region was below the standard owing to such circumstances, yet considering the characteristics of POW's food, scores of cattle were driven by land in order to supply them with meat.

7. The above-mentioned difficulty of transportation caused delay of supply and gave rise to malaria, endemic, and gastroenteric disorder, together with malnutrition. Coupled with difficulty in medical supply, the number of the patients increased in spite of the toil of medical units.

It is clear that the prisoners of war who were not used to wild life, would greatly suffer.
8. Towards the end of April, Major General Takasaki, the commander of the railway construction, caught malaria, and yet he continued to fulfill his duty until he fell down on bed. The situations came to the worst.

9. The working units, however, endeavored to fulfill their duty, overcoming all difficulties.

Sect. III How and why the period of construction work was delayed by two months and state of affairs during that period. (From the middle of July to October, 1943).

1. Confronted with the state of affairs above-mentioned, the Imperial General Headquarters dispatched the Director of Transportation and Communication and members of the General Staff to the scene of construction work to observe the state of affairs there, and came to the conclusion that if the forced work were to be continued with the aim of completing the plan by the end of August, nothing but unnecessary sacrifice would follow; and considering the general situations of Burma front at that time, the prospect of communication with Burma becoming clear with the partial completion of the railway, and local employment of newly constructed roads and waterways parallel with the railway, order was at last given to delay the completion of the construction work by two months in order to reduce victims, in spite of the fact that this order had a grave influence upon the operations in Burma area. Major General Ishida was newly appointed to the director of construction for perfect realization of this scheme.

2. Major General Ishida, the new director of construction arrived at his post on the sixteenth of August 1943; He aimed at the completion of the work by the end of October, renewed the organization of the staff, endeavored to stimulate the morale, and was always in the van of the party, the main object of reorganization being in the innovation and improvement of the supervision of working conditions.

He cherished the slogan, 'Prisoners of war and laborers are fathers of construction', corrected the erroneous idea of 'mastership' prevailing among the officers and men, and was foremost in making personal inspection and improvement of the normal life of the prisoners of war.

3. The rainy season which culminated in August, gradually reduced the amount of rainfall, and the working party did their best for the completion of the work, accounting ever increasing difficulties in the innermost regions. The activities of the water line of communications making use of the River Xecnot and the strenuous efforts of the working troops and the cooperating units in carrying on forced work favored the coordination between the preservation of military strength and labor (completion of supply work began at the ending of the rainy season in September at the end in the inner regions) and the execution of tasks,
Thus, on the seventeenth of October, 1943, the two railways, started from east and west, 415 kilometers in length, were joined together at Konkoiter and the formal ceremonies for the opening took place on the 5th of the same month.

Sect. IV Conditions after the completion of the Construction (from Nov. 1943 to Aug. 1945)

1. With the completion of the construction work, the South General Army, in accordance with the general situation at that time, took greatest care in restoring the health of the prisoners of war, enlarged and improved the sanitary arrangement at Thai Internment Camp and endeavored to concentrate prisoners of war at salubrious quarters where billeting and supply are easily accessible; two branch camps of the Malay Internment Camps being merged to the Main Internment Camp in Shonen (Singapore).

2. The railway working troops cooperated in the concentration activities, rendered services in sending back invalid prisoners, in accommodating billet facilities, and employed not more than one thousand healthy prisoners in urgent and indispensable supplementary construction work, the rest being left with lessened labor. By special order of the Director of Construction, a monument was erected each in Thailand and Burma to console those departed spirits of the prisoners of war and ordinary laborers engaged in this construction work, a mass was held and their souls (deeply venerated in the fashion of Imperial Japanese ceremony.)

3. The railway working troops also wheeled round successfully into Burma, and from March 1944 on, the remaining work was carried out entirely by a party mainly composed of the 4th Special Railway Unit, and part of the staffs of the Thai Internment Camp cooperated in the remaining work while the main body tried to regain their physical strength, only making preparations for sending prisoners back to Japan.

4. From that time on, thousands of prisoners of war were employed for maintaining railway services until the end of the war, being taken special care of the preservation and improvement of their health.

During this period, there were no small casualties suffered by the Allied air bombing.

CHAPTER VII

Influence on the Construction and on the supervision of POW's, its countermeasures and their realization.

Section I.

Various factors making difficult the construction and supervision of POW's:
(A) Technical hindrances.

1. Operational demands restricted the term of construction work (V.B. to be completed in about ten months after it was started in earnest). This was a forced construction and there followed many unreasonable demands in various quarters.

2. The inexperience of the Japanese Army in great construction work in the jungle made it especially difficult for them to make fair estimation of their work there, which was the great cause of miscarrying the programme and hampering the execution of construction work, and they found it very difficult to make scrupulous and appropriate preparations beforehand.

3. The Japanese Army were poor in mechanized tools and materials and in the equipment of supply.

They had to accomplish this work with manpower, instead of mechanical power, with no small waste of physical strength which followed.

(B) Natural hindrances.

1. The construction was a hazardous one which had to be carried out through the geographical hindrance of a great jungle belt extending on the border of Thailand and Burma un trodden before, where epidemics and pestilence are prevalent. This construction work was 415 kilometers in length, the total amount of earthwork 4,000,000 cubic meters, rock-clearing about 300,000 cubic meters, the total length of bridging about 15 kilometers.

On the Thai side, there were rather too many spots on the line where rock-clearing had to be done: the River Micron had to be crossed near the base, and excavation of cliffs was necessary in order to go along the Keonoi Valley.

On the Burma side, the two rivers, Shittan and Salwin, hindered supply from the base in Rangoon. (V.B. the iron railway bridge on the Shittan had been destroyed, and the working troops hurriedly constructed a wooden railway bridge 2 kilometers in length, and ten locomotives brought from Burma.)

Roads were the only routes of supply, there were no waterways running in parallel, many rivers intersecting the line of construction.

2. Generally speaking, the temperature is high with high percentage of humidity, but among the mountains, it is chilly in January, and, during the rainy season, the temperature sometimes falls.
In this district, we suffer a good deal from the influence of the rainy season, especially on the Burmese side (Tenasserim District is noted for its maximum rainfall). During the rainy season, hurriedly constructed motor roads and newly built railroads were very difficult to maintain, and were a great cause of hindering supply. On the Thai side, since the middle of May, a through motor car communication was suspended, on the Burmese side, with difficulty kept up by every available means.

When the waters of the Maonci rose, it could be utilized for navigation, serving as a line of communication, but when in flood was rather a hindrance to communication. Also, immediately after the rainy season sets in, no navigation is possible for about twenty days when the waters rise slowly. During this period, there lurks the danger of suspension of through communication both on land and on water. On the Burmese side, both railway bridges and road bridges on the Mezari and Winyau (both rapids, with driftwoods in them) were swept away and the supply was in crisis.

3. Bad sanitary conditions.

Malignant malaria is prevalent in those regions where the construction work was carried on. Moreover such epidemics as cholera, pest, small-pox etc. are raging all the year round. The influence of the rainy season and the native laborers brought into those regions made worse the sanitary conditions there.

Another hindrance to be specially noticed is the fact that the rainy season set in one month earlier than usual. For this reason, various countermeasures against the rainy season had not yet been complete, when we were taken by surprise, with the consequence that most of our utmost endeavor came to nothing. The effect was decisive and fatal to our work, supply and maintenance, to the sanitary arrangement etc., and coupled with the simultaneous sudden prevalence of cholera, the construction work and the superintendence of prisoners became much more difficult, and the number of victims increased.

Sect II. Various countermeasures and their execution.

Summary.

1. The success of this construction solely depended upon the preparedness in the rearward area. Therefore, the South General Army fully acknowledged the necessity of:

(1) Preparation for supply
(2) Measures for sanitary arrangement
(3) Securing and maintaining labor
(4) Securing and pooling of materials of construction, and every endeavor was made for the realization of this plan.

2. In June 1942, at the time when order was going to be given for the preparation of this construction work, the South Army had dispatched line of communication troops, especially transport troops to other front (mainly in Burma) and owing to the scarcity of transportation capacity to send for these troops to the scene, the construction work made no rapid
progress. Moreover, there was a great flood in the autumn of 1942 in the basin of the river Kenam in the central plain of Thailand, and Bangkok, one of the base depots on the line of communications, was under water, became like an isolated island, and greatly hampered the preparations for construction.

3. On the other hand, these preparations in the rear were being made through diplomatic negotiations with Thai Government, and no speedy solution could be hoped for. Under these circumstances various preparations could not be made satisfactorily, and we were obliged to begin the construction work step by step.

4. In February 1943, two months after the construction was started in earnest, the necessity of operations due to the circumstances above mentioned suddenly demanded curtailment by four months of the period of construction, and every measure was taken to cope with the situation. The Imperial General Headquarters and the South Army did their best in lowering the gauge of construction, and in increasing fighting strength and material, the working party was no less active in making desperate efforts for the realization of the plan.

But these counter-measures of shortening the period of construction were not speedily put into execution for various reasons: especially the road for concentrating troops was stretching too far and the transportation capacity too low.

The concentration of fighting troops, labor and supply was at its height during the rainy season (the earlier setting-in of the rainy season cannot be overlooked), and it was our greatest regret that we could not fully display our fighting strength.

(A) Supply and maintenance.

1. With the curtailment of construction period, establishment of supply system became a burning question for securing and maintaining the increased military strength and labor. But in this period, there was a serious lack in the line of communication troops (which were the main force in this area), especially in motor trucks, and it was not before the earlier part of April, 1943 that the deployment was over of the line of communication troops (which had by every means been extracted and allotted to this area and that systematic supply in the construction area was started. The delay of making preparations for line of communication system, coupled with the early setting in of the rainy season, made the general counter-measures for rainy season discordant, followed by the difficulties of supply during that season.

2. Measures taken for the establishment of supply and transportation system were as follows:

(a) Emphasis was laid on the counter-measures for the rainy season, and considering the topographical characteristics, on the Burma side, preparations were made, from the outset, for the construction of
rain-tight roads, and on the side of Thailand, hurried construction of motor roads parallel with the railway was urged. At the same time, we were ready for utilizing waterline of communication along the river Keooni, and negotiations were made for the procurement of barges in large quantities.

(b) As the construction work progressed, the South Army sent two motorcar companies and 500 supply motor trucks and increased motor repair corps (two corps five sections).

E.B. There were no considerable reserve units at that time, and measures were taken for employing war materials in store for use by groups operating in isolated islands.

(c) Plans were made for pushing forward the head of heavy construction train, and on the Thai side, efforts were centered round the spot 90 kilometres from the starting point for cutting through cliffs, and plans were made for the preparation of pushing supply base as far forward as Wanyai (125 kilometres from the starting point). In Burma area, the head of heavy construction train was pushed forward 18 km from the starting point.

(c) Pushing supply point forward.

On the Thai side, a branch office of the freight depot was pushed forward from 'Panpon' area to Kanachanaburi; which was a march of 50 km into the construction area. On the Burma side, supply points were pushed forward from Rangun area to Moulmein area.

3. The above-mentioned counter-measures were put into execution as follows, accompanied by such results as are stated below and influenced by the rainy season:

(a) The hurriedly constructed parallel motor road was completed on 5th April 1943, but on the Thai side, it was nothing more than an improvement of packhorse way with many curves, upon which motortrucks ran at an average speed of about 10 km per hour with an average maximum loading capacity of 1 ton (average — about 500 kg.)

The main part of the newly delivered supply motor trucks (800 cars) were put into active use for only about twenty days before the rainy season set in, and only 40% of these cars were fit for service, many of them often breaking down. Therefore, every effort was made for the supply of fixed rations, and attempts were made to pile up reserve stocks of provision and forage for use in the inner regions during the rainy season, but were not successful. During this period there was no great difficulty in the supply of staple ration, although a certain quantity of supplementary rations were lacking in the inner regions.

The motor trucks were sent there too late; the construction of the motor road was not complete within the appointed time; during the dry season, the road was in active use only for a short time; there was a shortage in transportation capacity; these were the main causes for the lack of rations above-mentioned.
On the Burma side, the road constructed parallel with the railway was comparatively well prepared, and as a whole, there was no difficulty for supply during the dry season.

(b) On the side of Thailand, the head of the heavy construction train reached Wanyai (125 km. from the starting point) about the middle of May, but the rainy season set in May, and the road bed was broken in many places. In July the River Keonoi overflowed its banks, the railway was flooded between Banon and Panpon and trains on the newly constructed line were held up for about twenty days. The stretching work further than Wanyai made but little progress hindered by the difficulty of rock-clearing. On the Thai side, the head of the heavy construction train reached the spot about 40 km. from the starting point by the middle of April, but during the rainy season, it was difficult to stretch the railway of the heavy construction train on account of the soft and weak road bed.

(c) Thus, the supply was comparatively easy during the dry season, but as soon as the rainy season set in, the roads both in Thailand and Burma were full of mud with marshy places here and there, which permitted no motor-car traffic, while the waters in the rivers did not rise rapidly. For a month (in May), through traffic both on land and water was held up, the supply was cut short, and those stationed in the inner regions—100 km. along the line, had to be contented with half or one third of the supply of fixed rations.

But with the rising of waters in the River Keonoi since June, land traffic was superseded by water traffic, the water line of communications was stretched, and by the end of July, establishment of the water line of communications was completed between Banon and Hilee (70 km.) on the other hand, the Government of Thailand was urged to offer ships; from March on, ships were gradually gathered together and by the end of July more than 700 tugboats and 1200 lighters were secured, by which critical situation of supply could be entirely swept away.

During this period, the activities in the upper rapids of the Water Transportation Corps of the Imperial Guard Engineer Regiment, the activities on the water of the personnel from the company serving on land and from the motor car company, the efforts of the line of communication troops in the unified employment of these activities, together with the water transportation supply carried out by the internment camp itself, enabled to discharge the duties of supply work during the rainy season.

(d) During the time when transportation and communication both on land and on water had been suspended, shortage of supply was locally covered by sending and receiving stocks accumulated in various parts of the inner regions. Special consideration was given to the daily food, especially the side dishes, of the prisoners of war, and from the middle of May on, herds of cattle were driven by land into the inner regions every several days. This was successful and nearly one thousand of cattle were secured on the Thai side alone.
(j) On the Burma side, where there were no waterways available, supply had been going on smoothly until the middle of April, but with the rainy season setting in about that time, its influence was considerable, and in June, railway bridges and road bridges on the Masari and Winyau were swept away. The working troops concentrated their efforts on relay intercommunication and maintenance of the road, held to the line of supply desperately and could barely continue supply, but near Miike in the inner regions motor trucks broke down one after another, the supply was suspended and some of the troops were withdrawn from that region. But with the rising of waters, waterline of communications was stretched from the side of Thailand and in July, supply could be made as far as Miike.

(f) As is evident from the above-mentioned circumstances, difficulty of transportation in supply arose from the influence of the rainy season, and distress existed in various parts of the inner regions. All the Japanese working troops and a little less than one third of the prisoners of war were suffering from the influence. Details of supply for the prisoners of war are given below.

(g) Japanese army stationed in Thailand and Burma Army Group were responsible for supply to the internment camps, but since the establishment of line of communications early in April 1943, the task of supplying provisions was assigned to the railway unit.

In supplying provisions to the prisoners of war, special attention was paid for allotting fixed rations in accordance with various prescriptions of the law, and at the beginning of 1943 an addition of 50 gr. in the supply of both staple food and supplementary rations was decided upon by the South Army. Furthermore, provisions were revised and several times the amount of the fixed rations for the POW's was increased on account of their being engaged in heavy labor.

(h) As is mentioned above, the branch internment camps situated in innermost regions suffered from shortage of rations in the same degree as the Japanese soldiers during the rainy season. In order to facilitate the supply work at the ends, executed by the internees themselves, the construction party delivered 30 motor trucks and score of boats successive since the latter part of March 1943.

Besides this, the internment camp had about 50 motor trucks and about the same number of boats, and was actively engaged in transporting supplies.

(i) Acquisition in large quantity of supplementary rations, especially vegetables, was difficult, and during the dry season they were liable to be spoiled while they were being carried a long distance; while during the rainy season, they were always lacking owing to the difficulty of transportation. To cope with these situations, a great effort was made to encourage growing of vegetables so as to be able to do without the supply of supplementary rations, and considerable results were obtained in this way. Fishing in the River Keonoi had to be prohibited for a long time (from May to September) as cholera was prevailing along its banks, which was a great hindrance to better nourishment.
(j) Articles of luxury for internees (butter, cheese, sugar, coffee, black tea, etc.) were specially supplied by the South Army.

(k) Spare suits of clothes were supplied by the South Army, but were not by any means enough.

(l) The difficulties of supply work during the rainy season were as above-stated. Enemy counter-attacks in Burma with the end of the rainy season could clearly be foreseen. Therefore, an army group en route to Burma (two divisions, part of troops under direct control of the Army, individual soldier and civilian employee) marched along the railway under construction from April to September 1943. It was natural that the construction troops assisted them with munitions and there occurred no small shortage in the store of provisions.

To sum up, under the circumstances in that period, billeting and supply could not be anything but unsatisfactory, and both Japanese army and prisoners of war were obliged to endure hardships and privations.

(II) Billeting.

1. Billeting facilities in Thailand were somewhat different from those in Burma.

On the Thai side, the working party had the advantage of utilizing the watercourse for supply during the rainy season, and employed the method of deploying on the whole line and of working all along the line simultaneously; curtailment of the construction period, however, necessitated quick deployment in the inner regions, and there was no time to build enough cottages (a kind of hut made of bamboo poles and 'chaku' — roofplant — called nipper-house) to billet the working party. Tents were generally used, only key points of construction having billeting facilities. The South Army, therefore, issued almost all the campaign tents on hand to the construction party, to accommodate nearly fifty thousand men, and afterwards ten odd thousand for supplementary use.

2. On the Burma side, consideration had from the outset been given to the supply work during the rainy season, and method of working from the ends had been taken in order to steadily push forward working sectors by gradually establishing supply from the starting point. Groups of billeting huts (nipper-houses) were built at intervals of from 5 to 10 km, tents being sometimes used for carrying about during movements.

3. The POW's in the Internment Camp, following the example of the construction party, built huts by themselves, and the construction party cooperated with them when necessary. Considerable working personnel were allotted for the work of the Internment Camp itself and for the improvement of its supervision and maintenance. (cf. Attached Table I)
4. Since May, after the setting-in of the rainy season, camp life proved defective: a wet pit was especially unwholesome; every effort was made to raise floors and spoiled bedding were exchanged for new ones. At the same time, nipper-houses gradually took the place of tents. Only bamboo poles could be obtained on the spot, roof-plant (chaku) being imported from other districts.

But the supply of chaku was not sufficient owing to the difficulties of securing and transporting them in large quantities. Thus, nipper-houses were built almost everywhere excepting the inner regions about 100 km. along the line of construction. But even those nipper-houses were not complete to bear the heavy rain coming down every day.

5. In order to accommodate the marching troops, (into Burma) preparation were made for arranging resting places with tents (standard capacity 250 men) and billeting areas (standard capacity 500 men) were almost completed early in May.

These facilities were utilized by the working party and the prisoners while they were shifting places within the construction area.

(III) Sanitary arrangements.

1. Outline of Medical service.

1. Taking into consideration the characteristics of this construction work area, preservation of health of the working party was a matter of greatest concern, success of this railway construction depending upon it. The South Army, therefore, attached greatest importance to the service of sanitation, and, following the example of building a canal at Panama, made reinforcement in sanitary organization. The main body of the South Army Epidemic Prevention and Water Supply Corps, which was the only standing epidemic prevention water supply corps throughout the South Area, was allotted to the service of sanitation; at the same time almost all the sanitary organizations under the direct control of the South Army were exhaustively concentrated and were placed under the control of the Director of Railway Construction.

Moreover, necessary medical service corps were extracted from the army corps engaged in first line operations and were allotted to the medical organization. Considering the situation of the general operations at that time, this effort can never be underestimated.

2. In taking care of the health of the prisoners of war, the system of the supervising organization of prisoners of war was mainly followed, and about 500 medical personnel of the Allied captives and some of the Japanese medical personnel were engaged in the service. About fifty-five invalids were in charge of one medical personnel, and this ratio was high compared with those of Japanese army (100 cases to one medical personnel attached to a unit) and ordinary working party
(200-300 cases to one medical personnel). But the composition of sanitary corps belonging to the Internment camp was not suited to field maneuverability and could not be made to display its ability to the full.

3. At the outset, the Thai Internment Camp was in cooperating relationship with the construction party, and the service of sanitation was being carried out by the corps itself, Japanese medical corps going to its assistance when necessary. But there rose the necessity of intensifying the general control of the medical service, and in July, 1943 this camp was placed under the control of the Director of Construction, after which unification of medical service was realized, resulting in the innovation of medical activities.

4. The organization of the Railway Medical Corps, South Army, is as is shown in Attached Paper IV.

On the Burma side, medical services were carried out by the medical organs belonging to the Burma Area Army, under the superintendence of the Railway Medical Corps, South Army.

Table of Railway Medical Corps, South Army.
Chief of the Medical Corps — Colonel Kitagawa, A.M.C. (succeeded by Colonel Hayana, A.M.C. after killed on the field).

Main body of the South Army Epidemic Prevention Water supply Corps.

2nd Division Field Hospital (transferred from Shonan)
21st Division Field Hospital (transferred from Malay)
16th Line of Communication Hospital (transferred from Burma)
55th Division Field Hospital (transferred from Burma)
Part of each of 31st Division Epidemic Prevention Water Supply and Medical Corps. (Passing Army Group)
Part of each of 2nd Division Epidemic Prevention Water Supply and Medical Corps (Transferred from Malay)
64th Division Field Hospital (Passing Division)
16th Sick Transportation Section (Transferred from Thailand)
Other medical personnel belonging to railway units and line of communication area troops.
Prisoners of war Medical Service Personnel (special organization) co-operated by
Local Laborer's Medical Corps
2nd army Hospital, South Army (Bangkok)

5. Why there was a difference in the number of casualties between the POW's and Japanese Army.

(a) Japanese army, especially railway units, were only about 4,000 in number, even when two regiments were put together. Naturally enough they were employed mainly for supervision of construction work and in the delicate technical work, POW's being mainly engaged in usual tasks.
The result was that the decline of physical strength on the part of the Japanese army was not so remarkable as in the case of the prisoners of war; this is why some differences is noticed in the figures indicating the results of medical activities under the same conditions.

(b) Compared with the Japanese, prisoners of war were not so well accustomed to the primitive life and had less power of resistance.

(c) Many cases of tropical ulcer occurred on account of their dress (knee-breeches), which accelerated their decline of physical strength.

6. The number of the deaths among the POW's, Japanese army and laborers are approximately as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POW's</td>
<td>about 50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Army.</td>
<td>about 15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers</td>
<td>about 100,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(fugitives include 7)

7. Colonel Hitagawa, Chief of the South Army Railway Medical Corps, was killed by an aeroplane accident while actively engaged in making arrangements for the supply of medical materials.

1. Outbreak of cases and its counter-measures.

(a) How malnutrition occurred.

In November 1942, after the prisoners of war had begun their work, members of the South Army Medical Corps were despatched to the scene of their activity in order to inspect and further improve their treatment in respect of supply and maintenance. Increase of fixed rations was made (50 gr. both in staple food and meat) and additional mosquito-nets and blankets were delivered. But since the setting-in of the rainy season, in May 1943, traffic was sometimes suspended, and in the inner regions fixed rations had to be reduced by half, while the construction work was forcibly carried on. The work made such rapid progress that the workers had no leisure; either time or material was not found enough to complete billeting facilities and sanitary conditions were anything but satisfactory.

Under such unfavorable conditions, and as a result of forced work, since the middle of 1943 decline of physical strength of the POW's was conspicuous, many cases of malnutrition appeared and the number of deaths increased. Therefore, serious cases were gradually transferred to the vicinity of Bangkok to receive treatment. Those who were in a stage of convalescence were assembled near Kanchanaburi, given small work and were allowed to recuperate there. For the rest, less amount of work was allotted, as much ration as possible was provided and every effort was made to restore their physical strength. Thus in 1944, they gradually regained their physical strength and the number of deaths dwindled.
2. How Cholera broke out.

Prevention of acute infectious diseases, together with precautions against malaria, was a most pains-taking task, and in order to prevent infection through water all the sanitation water filters available by the South Army were assembled in this construction area and they numbered 454 (including 7 motor-car filters).

Epidemic Prevention Water Supply Section composed of one Allied medical officer and four non-commissioned medical officers and privates, equipped with a set of sanitation water filter (B or C) and considerable amount of epidemic prevention and emergency sanitary materials, were allotted to every working company of the Prisoners of War and every necessary measure was taken for prevention, medical examination and attendance. The headquarters of the medical corps was at Kanchanaburi, and was active in coaching the prevention, in the examination and disinfection of bacteria and in other precautions.

Every one of those who were going to the construction area, was inoculated against cholera.

Cases of cholera first broke out among the local laborers on the side of Burma in November 1943, and in spite of desperate effort to check it, cases spread into Thailand across the frontier in April, 1943.

At the time of its outbreak, the number of cases among the natives swelled and shrunk with alternating intervals until at last, since May, there broke out cases among the Japanese and POW's. Therefore, the South Army often dispatched medical personnel to the scene to coach prevention. Every working party and sanitary organ did its best in prevention activities, sometimes entirely suspending construction work. At last, by the end of July, the plague quieted down except in some quarters. Although more cases broke out afterwards, they gradually dwindled away and in October completely died down. In June staffs of the medical bureau in the War Department were dispatched to the scene.

Outbreaks of cases by the end of June 1943 are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Period</td>
<td>Nov.- Dec. 1943</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Period</td>
<td>Feb.-Mar. 1943</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Period</td>
<td>Apr.-May. 1943</td>
<td>586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Period</td>
<td>June 3rd - June 30th, 1943</td>
<td>2046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>2723</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The grand total by August 10 was about 6,000, of which about 4,000 died. Among these figures, about 1,200 are the cases of prisoners and it is our greatest regret that about half of them never survived.
The main causes of such raging were:

1. Fugitives among the native laborers suffering from cholera dispersed bacteria.

2. Cases broke out on the upper reaches of the River Keonoi and infected the construction work area.

3. Imperfect prevention instruction on the part of civilian employee in charge of the PO, who was poor in the knowledge and ability and inferior in the quality.

4. Difficulty of supplying epidemic prevention materials due to pressed transportation.

It was largely due to the activities of the Sanitary Organs that the epidemic died down in comparatively short period and that great bursting out could be prevented, in spite of the unfavorable conditions under which they had been placed.

3. How cases of malaria occurred.

Greatest emphasis was laid on the prevention of malaria in the service of sanitation. Malaria prevention party was organized (composed of 341 officers and men, allotted at the ratio of one party to 5,000 laborers) and allotted to each unit, and was controlled by the South Army Epidemic Prevention Water Supply Corps; every possible science and technique was put into active use by them.

The following five items were measures of prevention.

(a) To give complete knowledge and training of malaria prevention.
(b) To prevent biting of mosquitoes, to prepare mosquito-nets and clothing, to fumigate.
(c) To prevent the breeding of mosquitoes and to exterminate them, drainage, oil-sprinkling, cleaning, etc.
(d) To take 45 doses of sulphur-quinine and 3 doses of "Flemohin" internally per capita per month; every Japanese, prisoner and native laborer is required to take the same quantity.
(e) Early discovery and separation of the case and keeper of "malaria protozoan".

Doctor Kimura, Professor in the Research Institution of Tropical Medicine, authority on malaria-prevention, came to the assistance of this service as a non-regular member of the staff of the South Army.

The ratio per month of malaria cases occurring during this construction work is as follows:

- Japanese Army: 1-7\%
- Prisoners: 0-11\%
- Local laborers: 10-20\%

Note: The ratio per month of malaria cases occurring in New Guinea area rose to about 20\%
As is shown above, the ratio of malaria cases occurring among the Japanese army is comparatively low, but by the end of the construction period, the ratio of keepers of malaria protozoan among the Japanese had risen to nearly 100%, and only by internal use of doses could some of the units prevent the attack of malaria. Generally speaking, the ratio of cases per month was about 4% throughout the Japanese and prisoners of war, which was a rather favorable indication compared with those of other theatres of war, and we may conclude that satisfactory results were obtained from the preventive measures.

4. Tropical Ulcer

Tropical ulcer which was prevalent among prisoners of war was incurable and we found difficulty in its remedy. As a precautional measure, we made war prisoners put on leggings made of bamboo and had them wear boots. As a remedy pyreumatic acid salveran were used. In addition to these measures, each unit made ointment from lard by itself, and used it.

Inert skin, bare legs and insufficient auxiliary medicine such as disinfectant due to inexperience of the Japanese Army etc. were the reasons why this disease was prevalent especially among prisoners of war. Though we despatched medical veterans to the infected districts and made them study it, a complete remedy could not be found because of inexperience of the Japanese Army.

5. Other prevailing diseases.

Generally speaking, coupled with malnutrition, many cases of dysentery, beriberi and gastroenteric disorder occurred. Pestilence and smallpox against which great precautions were taken broke out fortunately only a little at the beginning of 1943.

As above mentioned, various diseases were so prevalent that the percentage of the war prisoners in service was from sixty to seventy percent in the average, but it fell to forty percent in the innermost and most unhealthy areas. On the contrary, about eighty percent was maintained in good controlled and healthy areas. Of about fifty thousand war prisoners, about three thousand were in hospital on 8th July, 1943.

(Sound of occurrence of war prisoner cases is shown in Annex 2 and...)

3. Supply of medical supplies.

The South Army laid great stress on supply of medical supplies to those construction units and tried to prepare abundant malaria medicine and materials for epidemic prevention. Though quinine which was produced in Java was sufficiently supplied and materials for epidemic prevention, especially sanitary water-filters, were nearly sufficient, the South Army suffered from shortage of medical supplies in general, as the other medical supplies were all transported from the home islands and quantity supplied from the central office to the South Army was about 50,000 boxes.
(about 7000t) in 1943 and about a half of 1943 in 1944, of which 20 percent were lost as result of sinkings. The Bangkok Field goods Depot eagerly endeavored to supply the construction units; nevertheless it could not supply in so large quantity as was expected because of insufficient stocks and difficulty of transportation. The South Army ordered that ratio of supply to the war prisoners and to the Japanese troops should be equal.

4. To sum u., we took every measure possible under the circumstances and did our best to maintain the health of the prisoners of war. The main reasons why such a miserable result was brought about in spite of our efforts are as follows:

   (1) As a result of the forced construction work, various defects were brewed. Especially, the work was commenced without sufficient sanitary arrangements.

   (3) In addition to bad conditions of the roads, traffic during the rainy season was tied up, so that supply was very difficult and the standard of ration fell down.

   (4) Mixing of the native laborers who had no knowledge of sanitation disturbed sanitary tasks.

5. Main body of foremen were Koreans and their supervision was not proper. Accordingly, hygiene could not be thorough.

   It is quite regretful that in spite of all the sanitary measures, many defects were brewed and many invalids and deaths occurred.

Chap. III Outline of the Supervision and Employment of the Prisoners of War.

Sect. I How the War Prisoners became to be employed.

1. It is natural that the labor which is primary constituent of this building requires an enormous number of the assistant workers, in addition to the troops. Therefore, though the local laborers (Thailanders, Malaysians, Burmese, Chinese, Javanese, Annamese) were raised, it was very difficult to get a large number of laborers without delay, on account of various circumstances, and moreover, those natives who were inferior in their physical conditions and ability could not be made the leading part of the labor for this construction which ought to be completed in a short time.

2. Hereupon the South General Army requested the sanction of the General Headquarters concerning the employment of the war prisoners. The General Headquarters sanctioned the employment of the war prisoners, because this construction was partly a work to be done far from the front, and partly bore the mission of the trade route between Thailand and Burma.
At that time the Army, as a whole, had a view that it is not against the Geneva Treaty on the War Prisoners to employ the prisoners of war in such a work.

3. Consequent to the sanction, in the beginning of the preparation for construction, the South Army ordered the railway troops to supervise a part of prisoners of war and to engage them in the preparation work.

After that, subsequent to the organization of the Thailand camp, the South General Army made those of the camps be engaged in the construction work under their control.

4. And after the considerable progress of the construction, especially as it became more and more indispensable to increase the labor, because the term for the construction was shortened, a great number of war prisoners in Java, Borneo, Singapore and Indo-China were translocated to the Thailand Camp and newly two branches of the Malay Camp were attached to the commander of the construction troops.

5. The prisoners of war in the above paragraphs were transported, those on Thailand side by railway, those on Burma by ships respectively, to the construction area, while their removals within the construction area were done on foot. The details about this transportation will be shown in Chapter V, "Explanation for the Protest".

Sect. II Relations between the Supervising party and Employing Party.

1. Outline of the supervision of prisoners of war and their missions to construct the railway is seen in the annexed paper, III, above.

2. After the Thailand Camp was organized, (August, 1942), it was designed to cooperate with the construction troops about for a year since July, 1943.

3. The delay in the progress of the work owing to the increase of patients due to the influence of the weather and climate made necessary still closer relation between the working troops and the camp, regarding the improvement of supply and sanitation, as well as the working capacity, till at last in July, 1943, the Thailand camp was put under the command of the construction commander. However, a part of war prisoners located on Burma side, (two branches, with about 15,000 prisoners) was since July, 1945 put under the command of the commander of the 5th railway regiment, who was concurrently the commander of the construction work in that area, for the reason of the difficulty of intercourse, the remoteness and the inconvenience of supply. But as to the supervision of the war prisoners in the proper sense, they were under the control of the head of the Thailand Camp. Except in the Burma area, the camps were under the direct management of the construction commanders, but were never put under the direct control of the working troops.
4. The fact that two branches of the Malay Camp were set up in May, 1943, and put under the control of the construction commander was described in the above paragraph.

5. On the employment of prisoners of war, they were not attached separately to working troops on the spot. As regards employing them on the spot, the branch leaders of the camps and the commanders of battalions and companies negotiated together and regulated the working hours of employed prisoners. This means that, after the camps were put under the control of construction commandants, the camps delivered the required number of persons to the required places in accordance with the orders of the construction commandants, who were not entitled to interfere in the business of supervision itself, according to the above-mentioned method of employment, and the construction troops cooperated in improvement of the supervision as far as their circumstances permitted.

6. When some of prisoners of war who have a special ability were to be temporarily detached, they were attached along with the supervising personnel after the negotiation between the camps and the employing parties. For instance, some were employed as chauffeurs for the commissary troops or as technical aid for the material depots.

7. Subsequent to the progress of the work, a special attention was paid at the time of the moving forward of the camps. Their moves were limited only within a small range so that the waste time and the unnecessary establishments might be saved as far as possible. Since August, they were ordered to remove only when the accommodations and food staffs had been completely prepared.

8. As is mentioned above, the close relation was kept or between the supervision party and the employing party, and much attention was paid to the prisoner's health and a special effort was made to improve the situation of supervision on the basis of their customs and manners. This can be seen from many instructions rendered by the commandants of the camps to their men and those rendered on the part of education to the prisoners to be transported, on the occasion of their transportation to the home-land.

Sect. III. Outline of supervision and service.

1. The Thailand Camp completed its organization at Bangkok in the middle of August, 1942. At its opening, the number of the prisoners of war was about 3,000, and they were put into service in the preparation work of each troop located at the bases for the railway construction. After that, from October of the same year to March, 1943, the war prisoners, 50,637 in all (including the dead) were transported several times to Bangkok and Moulmein from the Malay and Java camps, and the rest of them (36,000) were caused to cooperate with the 5th railway regiment whose mission was to work on the Thailand side, while some of them cooperated with the 5th regiment whose mission was to work on the Burma side.
2. Subsequently, in April, 1943, to accelerate the construction work more, two branches of the Malay Camp (about 10,000 war prisoners) were despatched and cooperated in this work, deploying near Mike and Kinsalyork.

3. At the beginning, the equipments of the camps were in so poor state that they had no vehicle, and the lorries for the construction troops were used at the same time for the sake of supplying. For that reason, the war prisoners to be transferred were obliged to march on foot, to deploy in the remote places, walking a long distance under the burning sunshine.

   On their arrival the destination, a little more than 30% fell ill, and in addition to that, the insufficient accommodations and the unsteady supplies by reason of the bad condition of the transportation route, accelerated the increase of patients.

4. In May, 1943, the track was opened to Wanyai, Thailand (at 120 kilometres from the starting point) while in Burma, the head of the upper construction of the track was toward the vicinity of Anaikwin (at 40 kilometres from the starting point). However, as mentioned above, as the rain season set in about one month earlier, and because of the enormity of rainfall, the transportation of supply did not go as it was intended.

   As in remote places, the ration of food stuff was sometimes reduced to a half or one third by the above reason and the temperature was low, there broke out a sudden consumption of energy. But the work was still continued in accordance with the order which commanded to finish it by the end of August working in the rain, the supervision of the war prisoners fell improper. As a result, many patients came out; above all, as unexpectedly cholera became prevalent and cases of tropic ulcer increased, the service rate extremely lowered.

5. At the end of June, cholera broke out in some working troops, and as it threatened to spread over, still more surgeons, medical non-commissioned officers and privates of the war prisoners, 230 in all, were attached to the railway troops from the Malay camp and charged to check the disease.

6. In September, when the rainy season was over, the condition of roads became better, and also in addition to the advance of the head of the upper construction of tracks, the concurrent employment of the water-route of the Keoki River became possible. Therefore as the transportation of supply got better, the regular ration could be given with the aid of the commissary troops and by the great effort of the transportation section of the troops. However, owing to the fatigues accumulated within more than one year past, and the deployment in the remote places insufficiently equipped with the sanitary arrangements, the number of patients and the deceased did not shrink.

7. After the completion of the work in October, 1943, the Thailand camp despatched 1,000 healthy prisoners alternatively from the flat country to the remote places and caused them engage in the reinforcement work of the railway; and at the same time, successively transferred and collected this
2. Subsequently, in April, 1943, to accelerate the construction work more, two branches of the Malay Camp (about 10,000 war prisoners) were despatched and cooperated in this work, deploying near Mike and Kinsaiyork.

3. At the beginning, the equipments of the camps were in so poor state that they had no vehicle, and the lorries for the construction troops were used at the same time for the sake of supplying. For that reason, the war prisoners to be transferred were obliged to march on foot, to deploy in the remote places, walking a long distance under the burning sunshine.

On their arrival the destination, a little more than 20% fell ill, and in addition to that, the insufficient accommodations and the unsteady supplies by reason of the bad condition of the transportation route, accelerated the increase of patients.

4. In May, 1943, the track was opened to Wanyai, Thailand (at 120 kilometres from the starting point) while in Burma, the head of the upper construction of the track was toward the vicinity of Anakwin (at 40 kilometres from the starting point). However, as mentioned above, as the rain season set in about one month earlier, and because of the enormousness of rainfall, the transportation of supply did not go as it was intended.

As in remote places, the ration of food stuff was sometimes reduced to a half or one third by the above reason and the temperature was low, there broke out a sudden consumption of energy. But the work was still continued in accordance with the order which commanded to finish it by the end of August working in the rain, the supervision of the war prisoners fell improper. As a result, many patients came out; above all, as unexpectedly cholera became prevalent and cases of tropic ulcer increased, the service rate extremely lowered.

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7. After the completion of the work in October, 1943, the Thailand camp despatched 1,000 healthy prisoners alternatively from the flat country to the remote places and caused them engage in the reinforcement work of the railway; and at the same time, successively transferred and collected this
main body over the level ground, and endeavored especially to recover the health of the prisoners. The supervision, too, became normal.

Especially many camps were established in the rendezvous, such as Panpon Kanchanaburi and a camp hospital was built at the cost of 1,500,000 yen at Nakonpaye. Besides making such a great effort to give medical treatment to the patients, the supplies were given beyond the regular ration.

So the health condition of the prisoners got better step by step and the number of patients and the dead dwindled.

The two branches of the Malay camp were restored successively to their proper positions by the end of that year and their health condition also recovered.

8. The disposition of the Thailand camp will be shown in the annexed Chart I.

9. An outline of the services of the prisoners and the list of patients and the dead during the construction work can be seen in the annexed Table I and VIII.

NOTE -- To improve the supervision, the camp organized transportation and supply sections and accommodation, building, and special medical sections and so on; and made effort to eliminate inadequate circumstances, allotting a considerable personnel.

(See Table I.)

Chap. IV. Disgraceful Affairs during the construction work.

Sect. I. Insults upon corpse.

1. On a day in June, 1943, there broke out a case that Lieut. Fujii Kiyoshi, commander of the 2nd company of the 9th Railway Regiment, ordered one of the war prisoners to shoot his fellow who was suffering from cholera (dead) in consideration of checking the disease.

2. Fujii was brought to trial in the court martial of the Thailand Occupation Army, but was acquitted of. As for himself, the commander of his own troops gave him a maximum punishment for his improper treatment.

The Army Department suspended him from office and relieved of his post, causing him to return to the home land.

3. The railway construction commander disciplined the commander of the 9th Railway Regiment to which Fujii belonged.

4. The details are not certain, as the documents were burnt down.
Sect. II. Other Affairs.

1. Concerning any other affairs than that in Sect. I, it is quite
difficult for the central authority to search into them. It is desired
the local authorities be investigated.

But there was not such a case as 600 men were pushed down to death
from a precipice.

Chap. V. Explanations on some special items in relation
to the protests of the Allied Powers.

Sect I. On the treatment of war prisoners during the
construction of the Thailand-Burma Railway.

1. Cist.

As for the treatment of war prisoners during the preparatory course
and construction of the Thailand-Burma Railway, it will become clear when
the circumstances and the actual state of affairs at that time are understood,
namely, though the greatest effort at that time was made under the above
mentioned circumstances, many fell unavoidable victims.

Further explanations, apart from the above circumstances, about the
transportations to and the marching within the construction area will be
given hereafter.

2. Railway transportations.

a. Railway transportation of the war prisoners in Thailand, and
Malay at the time of the construction work.

The transportation capacity required from the viewpoint of the opera­
tion and military administration ran short conspicuously, while about
3,500 cars possessed in Malay were reduced to about 1,700 usable cars by
extreme decadence and the means of communication was in a very poor state,
and various kind of cars of French Indo-China, Thailand, Malay, and Japan
were used mixedly. As a result, they had hard work to draw up a transpor­
tation plan and to manage the cars. The 3rd Field Railway Headquarters
took charge of the planning and managing of the railway transportation,
basing on the south army Ordinance on the management of the railway
transportation. In the transportation of the persons, it was not unusual
that one train was limited to take 700 persons on board (25 carriages,
with 28 persons per carriage) in Malay-Sou'ma Thailand line - Punenbon(7).

This standard was adopted indiscriminately for the war prisoners
and the native laborers as well.

The cars used consisted of five uncovered waggons which were used to
put on brake (L3) and other covered ones (G5). These were mainly cars
transporting rice from Thailand to Malay and coming back with no load.)
The transportation of war prisoners was as a whole carried out on this organization. It was owing to such a situation that even Japanese officers as a rule were taken on board the waggons at that time. But in some places there might have been some instances where the rate of covered and uncovered waggons in organizations was subject to a slight alternation in accordance with the car situation at the time or more persons than the full capacity were forced to be taken on board.

Note  The Management of the cars at that time is as follows:

1. Singapore — Bangkok: Two trains 10 days x 25 cars x 2 trains = 500 cars

2. Funonpen — Northern District: One train 15 days x 25 cars x 1 train = 375 cars

3. Singapore — Kura Isthmus terminus: One train 8 days x 25 cars x 1 train = 200 cars

4. Singapore — Awalsta: Coal train Fifteen trains 6 days x 25 cars x 1 train = 225 cars

5. Local military train: One train 6 days x 25 cars x 1 train = 150 cars.

TOTAL — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 1,600 cars

When a necessity for special trains besides these ordinary ones occurred or an incident broke out, the want of cars was felt intensely, and so above mentioned condensed transportation was indispensable on the railway line within an area where an operation was constantly carried out.

2. Supply and sanitation during the transportation.

As for the supply, the staple food was received from the Army in agreement with the South General Army Intendance Ordinance, the side dishes were served after the menu was drawn up. The actual condition was regularly reported to the Army.

The side dishes of fixed quantity were acquired with great pains from all over Thailand, Malay, and French Indo-China and a great effort was made to improve the menu.

Regards to the sanitation during the transportation, an overseer sent from a prisoner camp took charge of it and it was ordered that he would act in concert with medical institution concerned through a commander of the nearest station. As the actual instances show, the commander paid a special attention to keeping up such prisoner's health as it was on his arrival, and inspected the management of transportation of prisoners at the station, and issued orders carefully about the supply, sanitation and treatment.
3. Transportation by ships.

1. Since the beginning of the war, Japan lost rapidly as it is known a large number of vessels.

2. The cause for the want of vessels and the conditions of transportation were as follows:

   A. Countermatters of transportation.

   i. From the beginning to the middle of 1942:
      Tonnage per head — 5 gross tons.

   ii. From about the middle to the end of 1942:
       Tonnage per head — 3-15 gross tons.

   iii. From about the beginning to the middle of 1943:
        Tonnage per head — 1-2 gross tons.

   iv. From about the middle of 1943:
        Tonnage per head — 1 gross ton.

b. Transportation of automobiles and other weapons.

Since the middle of 1942, they were as a rule decomposed and transported. About 70-30 gross tons were utilized for a whole lorry when it was to be transported, but about 20-30 gross tons was allocated for a decomposed one.

c. Transportation of horses.

   i. From the beginning of the war to the middle of 1942:
      Tonnage per horse — 10 gross tons.

   ii. From the middle to the end of 1942:
       Tonnage per horse — 9 gross tons.

iii. Since 1942, it was made a rule that the horses were not transported on account of the want of vessels, though the transportation of them was indispensable for the operation.

NOTE

1. A horse cannot be disemboweled to reduce the tonnage, as a lorry can.

2. A horse cannot be packed up as a person can.

3. The situation of transportation. The condition of the closely packed carrying of the troops, owing to the rapid loss of vessels, can be understood through Foot Note 1. The instances are as follows:
a. One division which was to be transported to deploy in the central part and vicinity consisted of about 75,000 men, about 200 automobiles and munition of about 2,000 tons. For example, the 26th Division was transported by only two ships, each 4,000 or 50,000 gross tons in all (the Akitsu Maru 4,000 tons, the Inako Maru 7,000 tons, and the Hyozan-Maru 6,000 tons).

b. Further in a case of a transportation to be deployed in the Central Pacific, about 2,000 men, about 30 automobiles and other munitions were transported from Hankow. They were to form in a vessel of 6,000 gross tons (the Housan Maru, with additional 600 "toho" accommodation).

c. In the Southern districts (for example, the Fuso-Maru, 1,900 gross tons, which were vessels allotted to the transportation from Singapore to Hankow,) the vessel was made the best use of, by rationing bedding and no couch to avoid cooking in a ship. Such sort of transportation was called a "Serena" transportation. In a "Serena" transportation, the actual situation was about 22 men per "toho", when the whole of men on board is divided by all "Toho" of berths.

d. The equipments for transportation of personnel are as follows

1. Setting aside indiscernible vessels, all were two storied. Still further in every spare room on the decks, two or three stretch beds were equipped so it was called the "Decisive battle transportation". Thus the capacity was increased.

2. The space between the upper and the lower stories was regulated not to touch the head in sitting attitude (about 0.75 metre in minimum.)

3. As the capacity was increased as far as possible, with an equipment of each berth as said in 1 and 2, each person lost the freedom of his motion in a ship when the ship was damaged by a torpedo and any persons and munitions were sunk to the bottom of the sea.

This caused the greatest difficulty in the operation of the Japanese army and the fighting power of long duration. About this matter, it is supposed that your army "toho" well.

The bad ventilation and the bed and inconvenient supply and the loss of sleep (it was impossible to lie down) due to the closest packing caused the conspicuous increase of patients during the transportation.

Even those who did not fall ill during the transportation, must be at rest for a time after landing, or else, they sometimes became unable to fight a severe battle.

For that reason, the shipping space was calculated to economize as far as possible, the water-cloth being put outside gunnel.
C. Transportation of munitions

As the battle became severer and severer, the rapid production of airplanes was desired more and more. Therefore the transportation from the South of bauxite, and other materials indispensable for the rapid production of airplanes grew more necessary in its priority, on account of this.

a. The vessels for the South allotted to carry bauxite were decided to carry nothing but personnel on its outward passage to increase its frequency.

This matter checked very much the transportation of munitions to the troops in the South.

b. On its home passage from the South, bauxite was overloaded to such an extremity that the load-line was ignored.

The home-coming troops from the South and so on were taken on the decks or on the top of the munitions.

c. Instances of counter-measures for transportation and its actual conditions accompanying the want of vessels were as above mentioned. It is desired that you acknowledge the war prisoners were not closely packed up only because they were war prisoners.

That they were kept from coming out on the decks may be from the viewpoint of guarding and preventing of espionage of the voyage of ship groups.

It may be supposed that the war prisoners transported to the Thailand-Burma Railway area were treated better than in any other areas.

An instance of "Decisive battle" Equipment.

1. Two or three-storied equipments in boats, (boats were hung outside gunnel.) By this means, 15 to 20 "tsubo" could be additionally increased in 5,000 gr. t. class ships.

2. Two-storied equipment on both sides of or in rear of the bridge. By this means 5 or 10 "tsubo" could be additionally increased.

3. Two-storied equipment of a half or almost all saloon. For example, in the Nissho-Naru, about 40 "tsubo" was additionally increased.

4. Two-storied equipment of the cabins. For example, in the Nissho-Naru, each cabin was equipped with two stories. The capacity of the cabins became about three times, as much as before.

5. A part of coal-bunker and a store-room was put in order and equipped with berths.
4. How two branches of the Malay camp were removed on foot within the construction area to the spot.

A. Outline

In May, 1945, to promote the work, two branches of the Malay camp were newly attached to the railway regime. One of them was moved to Nippon and the other to Kinsaikyo, being transported by railway from Singapore to Panmon, from where they went on foot.

According to the circumstances at that time, it was the want of the transportation means that forced them to march on foot.

B. Then was just the time to deploy the forces and labor to the remote places accompanying the progress of the work. At the same time, the only means of transportation, that is lorries, were scarce enough to be used for the supply, and rather they were scarce times in want. Therefore, they could not be used for the transportation of persons. Also the water-routes did not exist yet, so that the use of ships were restrained.

C. For that reason, the following action was taken to remove them on foot.

a. At the end of April, the commissary facilities were established along the line of construction, and they were used to give the aid in the accommodations and supplies.

At every 70 or 95 kilometres along the march line, a pavilion (campaing by means of tent) was set up, with a tea supplying place in the interval.

b. The march was as a rule 20 or 25 kilometres a day and made by night to avoid the heat.

c. A great effort was made to check the epidemics on the marching road and stragglers were taken in to the nearest sanitary institution. For this means, motor cars were driven along in order to make liaison and to take stragglers in.

d. In consideration of the supply, a column was made up of 200 or 300 persons. It was as a rule that they should rest one day, when they marched two or three days.

D. And at that time, the 31st Division ("Retor" Division) which were marching to Burma was all walking on foot from the middle of April in the same way as above.

E. In short, the marching on foot was not available, if the circumstances were considered. Even a squad on an urgent operation was, as it really was compelled to march more than 400 kilometres, and we assure that it was decidedly not only on the war prisoners that this was compelled.
Sect. II. On the treatment of war prisoners in Moulmein Area.

1. Gist.

Though researches about this matter have been made into every local authorities concerned from the end of 1944, the details are unknown, for the persons concerned at that time had almost all been dead or transferred, as a long time elapsed since then.

It can be considered that some contents of your protests have discrepancies in the period and the figure, and some are exaggerated and some are not founded.

In the following they will be explained on the ground of the data which are distinct at present.

2. About the report.

A. There is no fact that nearly 20,000 war prisoners were accommodated in Moulmein and its vicinity at the beginning of 1942.

B. In Moulmein and its vicinity, from March to June, 1942, about 120 prisoners of English officers, and about 700 Indian prisoners and in Tavoy 79 Indian prisoners who were interned together with hostile citizens were held.

The war prisoners in Moulmein and those in Tavoy were removed to Rangoon Field Camp (established on the 19th of March, 1942) in June, 1942 and in February 1943 respectively. (The above is the report from the Malay Camp.)

C. Nevertheless, it was decided that the war prisoners should be employed to make good the want of labor when the construction of the Thailand-Burma Railway was discussed, and 9,536 prisoners from Java, and 1946 prisoners from Singapore were removed to the vicinity of Tampi Zaya in Burma (about 50 kilometres south of Moulmein), in November 1942 and in January 1943 respectively.

D. And as they were composed into the Thailand Camp, it must have been reported relating to an opening place of the Thailand Camp.


A. The deceased while being accommodated before the construction of the Thailand-Burma Railway were five Englishmen (one of them on account of the wound caused in the battle) and five Indians. (The above is a report of the Malay Camp.)

And as it was just at the beginning of Burma operation, and it was almost impossible to send the supply the rear, the collecting of materials on the spot was not carried out as it was desired. Consequently the supply may not have been enough, but the same was with the Japanese Army.
B. The number of the deceased prisoners in the district to the east of Tanbizaya after the construction of the Thailand-Burma Railway was begun (about since October 1942), is as shown in the annexed Table VIII.

Even in all Burma to the west of Tanbizaya (at this time there were no prisoners in Moulmein); there was 10 deceased in October and 17 in November, 1942. It is unfounded that at that time so many were dead as in your protests.

C. As the construction of the Thailand-Burma Railway was most urgent for the operation as mentioned beforehand, the work must be forced even with what materials and equipment the Japanese army had.

Moreover, the districts along the projected railway line were the jungle where no man had ever trodden and the accommodations and supplies and sanitary facilities were quite different from the normal life of the war prisoners and the traffic was interrupted frequently during the rainy season of 1943.

On account of these causes, the war prisoners as well as the Japanese soldiers were obliged to suffer great pains.

Especially, though the main forces of the sanitary facilities of the Japanese army were concentrated to prevent the prevalence of malaria and disorders of the digestive system, they could not be checked.

Still more with the civilized prisoners unaccustomed to the wild life.

When the railway was opened in October 1943, every establishment and equipment were made complete and the number of the patients and the deceased remarkably dwindled.

As for the details, refer to the Chapters I and III.

4. Display of the war prisoners.

A. There is no fact that the war prisoners were contemptuously displayed in February 1944 as your protests mention.

B. But it is not certified whether or not some of those who were engaged in the supplementary work were employed in order to transport the foodstuff and materials in the city of Moulmein after the completion of the construction of the Thailand-Burma Railway.

CONCLUSION

1. The foregoing is an explanation of the circumstances which compelled a heavy toll of life during the progress of the construction work. In the final analysis, causes of the tragedy may be traced principally to the placement of a time limit on the construction, the immense difficulty in making thorough preparation and to the precipitancy with which the Japanese soldiers, despite their lack of experience in such large-scale construction work and meagre scientific equipment, dared to carry on their
work in strict obedience to orders which they characteristically regarded as imperative. Thus the occurrence of the casualties, it must be declared, was by no means due to any deliberate intention on the part of the Army authorities.

As regards the employment of prisoners of war in the above construction work, it may be stated that at the time the Japanese Army as a whole entertained the idea that the employment of prisoners of war in any work other than military operations was not a breach of the Geneva Convention. Furthermore, it is to be insisted that the incident was of a radically different character from the so-called maltreatment of prisoners of war.

2. The incident, already stated was an inevitable outcome of the situation then prevailing, and, if anyone is to be called to account for the dreadful death rate, the responsibility ought to be placed on the then Chief of the General Staff (General Sugiyama) who ordered the construction, the War Minister (General Tojo) who sanctioned the employment of prisoners, and the Commander-in-Chief of the South Area Corps (General Terauchi) who was entrusted with the construction on the spot.

3. As regards individual cases of maltreatment of prisoners of war, it is desired that investigation be started upon the further receipt from the Allied Powers of a report of the details, particularly the ranks, and names of the suspected offenders, and if as a result, they should be found guilty severe measures should be meted out to them.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Total Prisoners</th>
<th>Operation on Construction of Railway</th>
<th>Works in Branches</th>
<th>Number of Accidents</th>
<th>Rates of Number of Workers to Total Number of Prisoners</th>
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<td>6,406 0.23</td>
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### List of Monthly Statistics of Condition on Prisoner of War Management

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<th>Month</th>
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<th>Operation on Construction of Railway</th>
<th>Works in Branches</th>
<th>Number of Accidents</th>
<th>Rates of Number of Prisoners to Total Number of Prisoners</th>
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Note: Per Day | Sick | New | Total | Physicians | Treated | Recovered | Died |
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| Total            | 581 | 4417 | 4998   | 19916 | 7455 | 112 | 5716  |

Per day:
- Old Patients: 134
- New Patients: 2,527
- Total: 4,361
- Days for Treatment: 61,181
- Recovery: 2,405
- Dead: 52
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To July 1944 List Showing Monthly Reports (Reports from Prisoners)

From Jan 1944 List Showing Monthly Reports (Reports of Prisoners in Thai)

Note: To July 1944 List Showing Monthly Reports (Reports of Prisoners in Thai)
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<td>Kanchaburi</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mainly broke in July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kinsaiyoku</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tonbi</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Konkoita</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Branch</td>
<td>Takanun</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>Was raging in Takanun Area in May and June and in 1st Attached Branch in June and August.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st Attached Branch</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2nd Attached Branch</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Branch</td>
<td>Wanlai</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Broke in Area 125km from Wanlai mainly June and July, and other areas mainly in July.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>135 km.</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>107</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>140 km.</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>150 km.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hitoku</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>155 km.</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>171 km.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Branch</td>
<td>Hibidato</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital for</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisoners of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>1st Hospital</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2nd Hospital</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3rd Hospital</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Branch</td>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Branch</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>1011</td>
<td>565</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: 1. This list shows total number from May to October 1942.
2. After 6th October 1942, new patient has not been broken out.
3. As far as geographical names these are spelt by Roman letters as there are no detailed maps.
List of Dead Prisoners of War engaged in Construction of the Thai-Burma Railway.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Monthly Number of Dead of Prisoners of War Camp in Thailand</th>
<th>at 4th Branch of P.O.W. Camp in Malaya</th>
<th>at 5th Branch of P.O.W. Camp in Malaya</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1943 Jan</td>
<td>262</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>109</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May.</td>
<td>189</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr.</td>
<td>206 Established</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May.</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>176 Established</td>
<td>276 Established</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June.</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>1,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July.</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>1,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>1,623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>1,059</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>1,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>1,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,359</td>
<td>2,256</td>
<td>785</td>
<td>8,396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1,027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td>384</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944 Jan</td>
<td>679</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td>416</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,547</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>2,006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum Total</td>
<td>7,186</td>
<td>2,646</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>10,692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Non Com</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Note: As far as the geographical maps, there are spelt by Roman letters as there are no detailed maps.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Weekly Total</th>
<th>Weekly Percent</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
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<td>Mar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>May</td>
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<td>Jun</td>
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<td>Jul</td>
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<td>Aug</td>
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<td>Sep</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table continues with more rows of data.
Note
1. Headquarters of Prisoners of war of war about 550,000
2. Branch (Fig. shows no of Branch 10 months
3. Hospital employees about 100,000
4. Lines in operation
5. Lines newly established
6. Parallel Routes by Thai and Burma

We have no chance to ascertain the original
3. Concerning the names of Places, so that we
Spelled to spell them in Japanese fashion.
No one connected to the train in platform position.

We have no chance to ascertain the original.
CERTIFICATE

W.D.C. No._________
I.P.S. No. 1509

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ex-Major General Feruo KONUMA, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Vice Chief of the Legal Research Section of the 1st Demobilization Bureau and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 91 pages and 11 attached tables in the Japanese and 69 pages in the English, dated unknown, 19___, and described as follows: Report by Japanese Government on the Burma-Thailand Railway. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): 1st Demobilization Bureau (former War Ministry).

Signed at Tokyo on this 27 day of Aug, 1946. /s/ Feruo Konuma (Seal) Signature of Official (Seal)
Witness: /s/ K. K. Ishibashi (Seal) 1st Demobilization Bureau Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard P. Larsr, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 28 day of Aug, 1946 /s/ Richard P. Larsr
Witness: /s/ J. M. Curtis, 2d Lt., I Investigator, IPS
The Excerpt from the Diary.

February 18th.

I was appointed the commander of the guards in Singapore and was ordered to command the 3rd Battalion, 11th Infantry Regiment and the 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry, and military police including assistant gendarmes, and to take charge of the defense of Singapore.

At 10 a.m. I reported at the army headquarters and received orders and instructions on defense and also received news of the attachment of the extra staff officer, Lieutenant Colonel HAYASHI.

I have issued orders concerning the general guarding.

February 19th.

I heard reports from the OHASHI unit, military police, which was in charge of guarding and inspection of the city.

The pillaging by citizens is still going on.

Towards evening, the defense headquarters were removed to Fort Canning in the city, the former general headquarters of the British forces.

The same evening, according to instructions, I issued orders requiring the wholesale rounding up of undesirable Chinese residents, which is to be enforced from the 21st.

Especially I urged the gathering of Chinese malcontents in a certain restricted area to be separated from the rest of the citizens.

February 21st and 22nd.

The wholesale round up was enforced.

February 23rd.

At 11 a.m. the meeting of commanders was held and we heard the various reports from each party, on the conditions of arrest and later reported the information to the army commander.
February 24th.

From today, extending over three days, the meeting of the branch directors of the military administrations is to be held. I have today attended the meeting.

February 25th.

The commander of the forces made a round of inspections, and examined the defense situations in the city.

March 1st.

I have received orders to take charge of the guard of Changi district from today. The 3rd Battalion, 11th Infantry Regiment was assigned for this purpose.

March 4th.

I have received an order to take charge of the defense of the entire island of Singapore. In accordance with the instructions of the army, I have issued orders for the refugees in Singapore to go back from where they came from.

March 5th.

I received information from the garrison on Bintan Island, telling of the landing of 1,000 Dutch troops on the neighboring island.

Immediately I dispatched the HAYASHI battalion (the former assistant military police) of the 18th Division.

March 7th.

In accordance with the removal of the Imperial Guard Division, Staff-officer HAYASHI who was attached to us, was ordered to be attached to the Guard Division.

March 8th.

Since the gendarmes were reverted to their original duties we have given orders to both air forces and railway corps for local defenses.

March 9th.

It became clear that the news of landing of enemy on Bintan Island and its vicinity was false. HAYASHI battalion dispatched to the spot returned here today.
March 13th.

The brigade headquarters and the 4th Infantry Regiment have been decided to be used for some other purposes in accordance with the new duties, and today I have received an unofficial announcement to prepare for this.

March 17th.

Handing over the defense duties to the succeeding brigade commander, Major General SUGIURA began.

March 18th.

At noon, the relief of the defense was completed.
Extracts from the diary of Major General
KAWAMURA, the 9th Infantry
Brigade Commander.

February 16.

Despatched Major KOBAYASHI and approximately 100 officers and men under his command as an Emergency MP unit to the Raffles college by 10 a.m.

Got all units to clean the battlefield. This day, despatched the unit under Major MISHIBA's command to handle the PWS' matters.

February 17.

Our headquarters were removed to the Clubhouse for the reason of inconvenience in command.

Late at night I was ordered to take command of both battalions of the 11th and 41st Infantry Regiments and the Emergency MP unit as the newly-appointed commander of the Singapore Guard Force, and to take charge of the guarding of the city.

February 18.

Presented myself to Army headquarters at 10 a.m. to receive the order appointing me to be Guard Force Commander.

At 12 a.m. I went to Raffles College and issued the necessary orders. Staff Officer HAYASHI was assigned to me.

February 19.

Inspected the general situations within the city from 10 a.m. Listened to the report concerning the situations from MP Unit Commander OISHI and his men. (p.1) (Was impressed with the imperfection of the military discipline of our officers and men.)

In the evening, our headquarters were removed to Fort Canning.

Issued an order to make wholesale arrests of delinquent Chinese from the 21st and thereby advocated their assembly in a certain area.
February 20.

Held a memorial service for those who laid down their lives and a ceremony of awarding certificates of merit.

February 21.

Started the wholesale arrests today. Held a memorial service in the Division. Later, inspected the situations of searching by the Central Area Unit.

February 22.

In the morning, inspected the situations of the East Area Unit, the camp for British non-combatants and the North Area.

In the afternoon, attended the memorial service of the OKABE Unit and later inspected the situations of the Central Area Unit.

February 23.

Held a Unit Commander meeting from 11 a.m. and listened to the reports concerning the situations of searching to the effect that those who had been punished numbered approximately 5,000, of which important persons are continuing to be detained and are under investigation.

In the evening, was invited to the dinner in the Division. Heard that the Division will shortly be dispersed to various areas. It was a farewell party for me.

Memory: It is in my memory that on the 23rd I went to the Army headquarters to report after the Unit Commander Meeting had adjourned.

February 24, 25, 26.

Held a meeting of chiefs of the Military Administration Department on 25th, the Army Commander called on us during his inspection tour.

On 26th, the Army Commander gave a speech to the effect that we should take up a far more positive attitude, instead of the heretofore internal guidance.

March 1.

From this day, the guarding of Changi was taken over by the 3rd Division, 11th Infantry Regiment.
March 2.

Inspected the PWs in Changi. Today, concerning the security precautions throughout the Shonan Island, I gave necessary orders.

March 4.

The guarding units throughout Shonan Island were changed, at 12 p.m. today. From this day, ordered the refugees to leave the place.

March 5.

Early in the morning I received information from natives that about one thousand Dutch troops had landed from Bintang Island, so I ordered the increase by half of the HAYASHI Battalion of the 8th Division, in order to prepare for their suppression. On the 6th we learned that it was a false alarm.

March 7.

HAYASHI changed his position as a staff on the Imperial Guard Division unexpectedly.

March 8.

According to the enactment of the M.P. Service Regulations, I ordered that status of M.P.s be changed so that they would be dispatched and hold an additional post in every District detachment.

March 9.

The HAYASHI Battalion in Bintang Island returned.

March 11.

Past 12 o'clock a captured Powder Magazine exploded. To prevent plotting by rebels, we enforced an emergency guard, and did our best to relieve the refugees.

March 13.

Today I and the 41st Infantry Regiment received an Army Order to depart again in the near future to fulfill new duties.

March 14.

For the purpose of gathering the troops together, I issued an order that ICHIKAWA Battalion should substitute in the position of emergency guard from the 15th inst.
March 16.

Major General SUGIURA arrived at Singapore.

March 17.

Transfer of duties.

March 18.

The relief finished at 12, and I reported to the Commander in Chief about it.
February 7.

The army enters at once into the next operation without the ceremony of triumphal entry.

February 18.

1. The army made about three battalions of infantry and the second field gendarmerie under the command of Brigadie KAWAMURA mount guard over the city of Singapore, and the main force located in its vicinity are engaging in cleaning the battlefield and preparing for the coming operation.

2. Each one company of 5 D successfully landed on the islands "Bukum" and "Scobo." /phonetic equivalents/

February 20.

SASAKI Battalion of 5 D landed on Bintang Island without bleeding.

February 21.

There are fairly many volunteers and Malayans who joined the enemy's force as a volunteer army and the fifth column. The army is now in search of them.

Those who were taken in soon after the fall of Singapore: 16 Chinese volunteers, 360 Malay volunteer.

February 24, 25, 26.

On this occasion when the main operation of Malay has come to an end, a meeting of the head officials of the branches of the military administrative department was held.

February 27.

With captives and captured arms was organized the Singapore Island Defense Corps. All of the seventy thousand
of captives cannot be consumed by this army. The army will ... to use them dispersed in each necessary field, and immediate instruction is desired.

February 28.

The state of activities of "de Gaulle" faction here is now being clarified by and by. "Claire," /phonetic/ a Jew, "Remani," /phonetic/ a spy of the military committee of the "de Gaulle" faction and "Causelle," /phonetic/ the Manager of the French Indo-Chinese Bank, have been subjected to internment and inquiry.

March 1.

As it has serious influence on the future action of the army, we wish to know if you have an intention to move the present captives here to any other places than Malay Peninsula. At present, 85,000 captives.

March 3.

The occupation of Singapore is going smoothly and the occupation business by committee members was completed at the end of February. State of affairs in the city of Singapore: Soon after the occupation, we arrested and executed about 5,000 delinquent persons as the first clearing and, further, we are preparing for the next clearing. The appeasing campaign to the citizens is as follows (the following: concerning the currency). The movement of the military administrative organs has been taking its regular course.

March 13.

The main force succeeded in landing at 0700 and YOSHIIDA Detachment, at 0540.

2. The operation ord-r of the Southern General Army No. 85: The head of the T01 corps shall have the 41st Infantry, 2 Section/ 26 Ps under the command of the Chief of 9th Infantry Battalion enter under the command of the head of the NATARI corps.

March 17.

Since the commencement of Malay operation, we have been watching strictly the movement of the Chinese residents. After the capitulation of Singapore Island, their interest in Japan has been intensified. At the same time, rigorous measures were adopted to such anti-Japanese Chinese as the
volunteers. Thus, their movement has taken decisive direction. That is, they take an attitude to submit their lives, properties and all the rights and interests to the Japanese army and to wait penitentially for any orders, keeping these things for themselves. They propose that if the commander of the Japanese army would exempt them from death and would give them a favor to carry on their occupations at ease, they would swear their future faithfulness and economical contribution and would contribute one half of their properties to the Japanese army. As to the offering of one half of their properties, we accept only their spirit and instead of one half we receive cash of fifty million yen. With the foregoing, the first step of the measures toward the Chinese residents in Malay is completed. Next, the second means shall be taken.

March 18.

From Colonel Tsuji:

I intend to take my post there after the inspection of battle condition of Burma and Philippine theatre about the latter part of March.

April 10.

Though the public peace of Malay Peninsula is going to recover by the activities of respective guarding units, still, secret movements of Chinese residents here have not entirely ceased yet.

March 27.

Approximately 1,500 persons in Celenban and Malacca were captured at once and a lot of arms were confiscated, and the majority who were captured were released after investigation.

March 29.

(At the distance of 16 k.m. to the north of Kwantan) The den of communists was crimped entirely and 15 of its members were captured (the leader committed suicide) at the end of March.

At the location of 15 k.m. to the south-east of Magayan, approximately 500 hiding communists are being searched with the attempt of custing.
April 5.

Fifty-three anti-Japanese radicals were captured at Taipin. At Penan, we are to make a round up before long.

April 16.

As the result of the search by our Gendarmerie, we have disclosed the plot movement of British battle beaten remaining soldiers and a certain party of Chinese communists (it seems to be under the leadership of CHENG-CHIEH-MIN). Accordingly, after the further searching out of the location of the wireless apparatus, we expect to capture this group.
SECRET

A proce-verbal concerning the punishment
of Chinese residents in Singapore

By the 4th unit
23 Oct., 1945

1. Circumstances of manoeuvres by Chinese residents in the Malay Campaign

During the MALAY campaign, Chinese residents were very active in
their manoeuvres from the beginning to the end around the battle-fields
and especially in the rear, obstructing our movements and causing us much
difficulty. That is to say, near the battle-fields they chiefly communicated with the enemy, consequently our plan of operations was perceived
by the enemy, placing us in a very disadvantageous position: in areas where our
troops were concentrated were obstructed, thus it was not only once that
our troops had to suffer meaningless sacrifices, or in the rear our commis­sary lines were attacked, lines of communication, military communication lines were destroyed, and our military materials damaged, delaying the
arrival of those materials, especially ammunition, at the battle-fields,
consequently often the MALAY campaign, which necessitated speed, was ob­structed and made difficult.

Examples are as follows:

1. Toward the end of December, 1941, in a battle near KAMPAR /phonetic/, signal bombs were fired at night near our reserve artillery
position, and immediately /our position/ was showed with enemy shells,
causing many useless sacrifices on our side. We searched the vicinity
and captured two Chinese residents at one place, and found out that most
of the activities were done by the Chinese residents, (a part by British
troops).

2. In the above battle, a battalion of the AUDO regiment intending
to cut off KAMPAR /phonetic/ from the west, made a detour at night, but a
signal shell was fired from a village which was passed. Consequently,
not only was our plan discovered, making our rear isolation unsuccessful
but when crossing the river in the southwest of KAMPAR /phonetic/(around
the place were swampy lands) they were met by a fierce enemy counter­attack. Thus our operations went to pieces and we suffered a great loss
immediately after the signal bomb was fired, about one company searched
the village and captured a Chinese who failed to escape. Accordingly we
found that the incident was done by the Chinese residents.

3. At the battles near Cenas /phonetic/ and Segamat /phonetic/ in
the middle of January, 1942; at KULAP /phonetic/, YONG Peng /phonetic/ an
BATU PAHAT /phonetic/ in the end of January of the same year; at Singapoc
in the beginning and middle of February of the same year, signal bombs
were incessantly fired. Artillery positions, reserve units and higher
command posts were suddenly bombarded, causing many meaningless casualties. It was discovered that most of these acts were committed by the Chinese residents.

4. When the enemy attacked Kualarumpin /phonetic/ by air at night in the middle of January, 1942, a signal shell was fired from the aerodrome of Kualarumpin /phonetic/, using this as a target the enemy bombarded /the aerodrome/, damaging several of our planes, and causing many casualties among the troops. As the result of the capture of Chinese residents, it was disclosed that the signal shells were fired by Chinese residents.

5. In the middle of January 1942, when the Imperial Guard Division was crossing the River Mawar /phonetic/, Chinese residents indicated the point to be crossed, and guided the night-bombing of the enemy planes, consequently crossing the river was extremely difficult and with a great loss.

6. Between the middle and end of January, 1942, during the battle around Malacca and Batu-batu /phonetic/, in which the Imperial Guard Division is involved, Chinese residents communicated with enemy submarines on the sea of Malacca and other then assisting the smuggling, guiding and protecting of spies from the submarines, they indicated the location of our units and made it easier and more advantageous for naval bombardment from ships in the straits of Malacca. As a result of the above bombardment the operations of the Imperial Guard Division was not only made extremely difficult and disadvantageous, but also a large amount of munitions and weapons were damaged and many casualties among the troops.

7. While the OGAKI battalion of the Imperial Guard Division was encircling and detouring a rubber plantation to isolate the enemy's rear from the N.W. in the fighting around Batu-batu /phonetic/ toward the end of Jan., 1942, was discovered as a result of the Chinese residents communications with the enemy. Subsequently, they were met by a heavy enemy counter-attack and becoming isolated, the battalion commander and most of the men were killed.

8. In the end of December, 1941, in a forest to the north of Tai-pin /phonetic/, a hundred odd armed Chinese residents were planning to disrupt our supply lines, and burn our munitions. As this was discovered beforehand, /the area/ was cleared of Chinese residents.

9. In the middle and end of January, 1942, the Chinese residents often felled trees and laid them across the road between ORBAK-SEBERGAN /phonetic/ and RAGS-SEGAMAH /phonetic/, so that our vehicle transportation was stopped, and making good use of these opportunities fired from the forests on both sides. As a result many men were killed, the valuable munitions being stolen, thus preventing munitions being sent forward, and made our operations very difficult.

10. There were often destruction of the railroads, but as the destruction of the railroad in the forest south of IBO /phonetic/ and in the
forest between SERENGBAN and GEMAS/phonetic/ happened just at the time when munitions were to be forwarded most urgently for the Singapore campaign, it had a tremendous effect. As a result, not only did the commencement of the Singapore campaign have to be postponed from the 8th Feb. to the 9th Feb., but the forwarding of supplies, especially ammunition, after the commencement of the campaign did not operate as desired. Therefore front line ammunition was so scarce that temporarily the campaign was endangered —/omitted/ — and brought about —/omitted/. In each case of obstruction the offender was captured and it was discovered that this was mainly the work of Chinese residents.

11. There were numerous cases of the destruction of military communication lines that there was no time to arrest the culprits. The aforementioned are only a few examples, the manoeuvres of the insurgent Chinese residents during the MALAY campaign are beyond description and have cut deep down into the heart of our troops.

2. The state of public peace in and around Singapore after the surrender of the British forces.

The British forces in Singapore surrendered on the 15th of February and the island immediately after the fighting actions was covered with uneasy atmosphere. Especially what is to be noted is the fact that there was a two-three day gap between the day of the British surrender and the day of the Japanese entry into that city. Thus, during this interval, implements of war such as rifles, ammunition, machine guns, revolvers, wireless equipment, light automobiles, etc. were moved away and concealed in the houses of Chinese and natives. Such state became clear gradually, and it transpired that frequently the telegraphic wires running between the headquarters of all the army corps in the suburbs and the city were cut off intentionally, rendering it impossible to maintain the communication between them. And it became clear that the Chinese in the suburbs or in the urban districts of the city plundered provisions, clothes and fuel, etc. and concealed those things in their store-houses or above the ceiling or under the floor of individual houses, etc.

In the meanwhile, what constituted our primary consideration was that it was impending to draft a major proportion from our forces to prepare for the approaching operation, and that we were to maintain the public peace in the occupied area with a minor force. The advance towards the south of our army was very speedy. On the other hand, there were still number of bases in the west coast of Malay peninsula left for hostile groups plotting brigandage; on top of this, the hostile Chinese dispersed in the Riau islands, south of Singapore, Linga island and the Anambu islands after the fall of Singapore seemed to be preparing for their future action in cooperation with their comrades in Singapore and Malay peninsula; and the rumors about the British reinforcements to arrive were circulating. For we felt keenly the necessity to secure public peace with some drastic measure and control to check the false rumors in Singapore island. (Reference).
The status of the activities of De Gaulle's group was likely to have been made clear gradually by the 28th of February; Kam /phonetic/, a je. Lomor /phonetic/, a copy of the military commission of the DeGaulle's party, and Coceil /phonetic/, the manager of the French India China Bank, were then arrested and detained.

3. Regarding investigation and execution of Chinese residents in "Singapore".

Under the consideration that simultaneous advance of the various corps of the expeditionary forces into the city of Singapore should rather cause a difficulty in keeping peace and order of the city, the military order was given, on Feb. 17, to detail a force in a size of nearly three infantry battalions plus the 2nd detachment of Field Militia Police /KE-PSHITA/ under the command of Major-General KAMIMURA, commander of the 9th Infantry Brigade; while the major part of the military operation forces was placed back to station at the northern suburb of "S" city, thus to have only small number of the unit put on duty for the gun of the city. The said guard commander, on the following day, viz. the 1 visited the General Headquarters and did the required liaison.

(1) Posting

The posting at the beginning was as shown on the attached map showing the status of disposition, but afterward the guard was extended all over the island on March 2nd with a movement of military strengths occurring since then.

(a) Search for hostile Chinese. The investigation was executed during the 4 days period from Feb. 17 to 20 mainly on the basis of "a list of the anti-Japanese Chinese" which had been secured at "IPOH" and with reference to search materials of the roster of the detective bureau criminal lists of the Police Office and the statement made by rescued Japanese. The police officials of the Malay detective bureau were cause to attend to this occasion.

(b) The number of persons searched during the first series lasting for 3 days, Feb. 21-23, about 5,000 persons; the second series, Feb. 18-March 3, about 1,500 persons; the third series at the end of March, about 300 persons. Among them, about 2,000 persons were released after the investigation.

(c) Reason for the search and the execution. There exists no written order given to the Guard Commander; it is, however, almost clear that the Guard Commander had issued orders to cope with the idea of the Army, and in the light of the situation of the liqueup operation throughout the MALAY peninsula, it is clear that the Guard Commander did not issue orders based on his own personal view. It is, however, very doubtful whether the mass execution of Chinese was due to the order of the commander-in-chief or not.
As Lieutenant-Colonel HAYASHI who was Chief of Staff in charge at that time died on the field, it is impossible to find the fact.

(c) Execution of the punishment. The objectives of the punishment constitute mainly those who communicated secretly with the enemy; those who led the hostile bombing of our airfields; those who did mark targets of artillery gun fire; those who disturbed rear transport lines; those who did not change the attitude of opposition to Japan and self-confessed the continuance of the act to oppose Japan at our investigation. These were the leaders of the Federated Association of Chinese Volunteers to oppose Japan, and member of Communists party in Malay; those who were punished strictly total about 5,000 up to the end of March.

4. The Present Situation of Regulating Operation in MALAYA Peninsula.

(1) The Present Situation of the Public Peace in MALAYA Peninsula.

We have already mentioned the conditions of the Chinese manoeuvring during our MALAYA operation. Even after the surrender of SINGAPORE many anti-Japan Chinese have entered secretly into cities and jungles and declaring communism and communicating with each other, some of them have continued to be active in order to develop the systematic anti-Japan movement under the strict and strong system and try hard to obtain weapon ammunition, provisions, money and members, while looting our stock of weapons obtained in the battle field, killing secretly our soldiers and officers, and were acting independently in destroying the networks of communications and traffic and killing, threatening, looting good citizens. Though the battle was over there was great anxiety about the public peace in MALAYA.

(2) The Present Situation of Regulating Operation.

Our Army has recognized the importance and necessity of subjugation operations after the surrender of SINGAPORE and till nearly the end of February despatched the 18th Division to "JOHORE" Province, the 5th Division to other provices in MALAYA outside of "JOHORE" Province from SINGAPORE Island and made each of them stand guard over the public peace in the district in charge also carrying out the subjugation operation against the anti-Japan Chinese.

The 5th Division divided the districts in its charge into several parts and made detachments take charge of portion.

"MALACCA" Province
"NEGISEREBILAN" Province
"SELANGOR" Province
11th Infantry Regiment
41st Inf. Reg.,
5th Artillery Regiment,
5th Transport Regiment
The 5th and 18th Division commenced the subjugation operation from nearly the beginning of March. Carrying out the research and subjugation of anti-Japanese Chinese in cities and jungles we caught wicked Chinese till the end of April: about 1,000 in "JOHORE" Province, about 1,500 in "SARAWAK", "MALACCA", about 300 in "SELANGOR", about 100 in "PERAH", about 50 in "PAHANG", and about 200 in "KEDAH" and "PENANG", and confiscated many weapons, but after investigation released most of them the same way everywhere. There were, however, many cases in which at the arrest the Chinese resisted by firing guns, which induced us to return fire and persons on both sides were injured and killed. Many people (leaders) were there who committed suicide, recognizing their unfavourable circumstances.
Since the beginning of May also, the anti-Japan Chinese still continued anti-Japan activities, hiding themselves from the eyes of the Japanese, and the public peace was often jeopardized. Our Army carried on subjugations and tried to keep the public peace, often traversing jungles and meeting with great difficulties and suffering considerable damages, but never succeeded in entirely sweeping away the anti-Japan Chinese.

The subjugation which is noted among those since May is that in the forest to the north of KWAHLA LOKPUR. Finding out a report that about 300 anti-Japan Chinese were planning the assassination of Japanese soldiers and the burning of Japanese barracks, we sent a punitive force to subjugate them, taking the initiative against them. After a battle the defeated Chinese fled away deep into the forests. In this battle, the bodies left dead in the field numbered 200.

(3) Conclusion.

In short, the regulating operation in the Malay Peninsula was not only for the Japanese Army itself, but was an action for the purpose of guarding the public peace which was carried on for the protection of the lives and properties of the ordinary citizens (including the ordinary Chinese, Malaysians, Indians, etc.) and though it is to be regretted that the circumstances in details are not clear on account of lack of material it is plain enough that all those dead Chinese died by the bullets during the battles of subjugations. During these difficult subjugations a considerable number of victims appeared on our part also.

V. About the handling of this investigation of punishment of the Singapore Chinese.

I. The enemy's protest has not yet come, but the reports concerning this problem is as follows:

(1) The story by Major Moris Doeton /phonetic/ and Captain Thomas Ellis /phonetic/

"We were pushed into freight-cars and brought to Siam, after the fall of Singapore, and were used in the construction of the railroad between Bangkok and Moulmein. Many died on account of hunger and the tropic diseases, the medicines for which were very scanty. According to the talk of a member of the Australian advance-party, all of 1840 in number except 34 members died before they reached the spot 130 miles off to the west.

(2) The report sent from London on Sept. 5. The announcement of the terrible cruel actions of the Japanese toward the prisoners of the allied powrers and those detained people have caused the anxiety of thousands of families in the world. Every evening papers in London has
reported, "the Singapore radio has said that when a complete document is made public, the civilized world will be against the cruel deeds of the Japanese. A Chinese woman told to give petrolum and a Japanese threw a kindled match into the mouth of the Chinese."

A great massacre of the Chinese troops and civilians by machine-guns took place in Singapore, and Dr. Beiler /phonetic/ the former physician of the Sultan of Johore believes that more than 150,000 Asians (not including military men) were punished or tortured to death by the Japanese secret police. The largest majority of them are Chinese and the doctor said that, in the small area of Dabon /phonetic/ alone, some 30 thousand were killed by the Japanese secret police, and that it was a matter of course that the Chinese hated the Japanese so much.

Telling the story of the ill treatment, the PWs released in Hongkong said that they received only a small portion of the packages sent by the Red Cross. (San Francisco Sep. 5.)

A correspondent on board of an American hospital ship reported the barbarism of the Japanese toward the Australian, British and Dutch prisoners who worked in oil-refineries and machine-factories.

Atrocities committed while the road construction was under way in Burma and Siam were also reported to the effect that "Even invalids were forced to walk to the place of constructional work and break stones." (Sept. 5. Australia.)

According to the report reached the Army Headquartors in South-Eastern Asia, allied POW prisoners were greatly suffering from malaria, beri beri, consumption and dysentery. (Sept. 5. San Francisco.)


A London broadcast reported on Sept. 6, about the Japanese atrocities at the Singapore internment camps as follows:

(1) In Singapore 4,500 persons of all nationalities including men, women, and children were interned, but Red Cross has never been permitted to visit there. All males above 10 years old were compelled to undergo heavy labor and were supplied with rations even less than half of that issued by the "Malay" Prison Bureau as punishment before the war. When the rescue arrived at, all persons have just begun to roast snails.

(2) During the period of more than 3 years, there was only a single period when a logical control was prevailed; this occurred in the period when the commandant was a Japanese "civilian."

3. There existed always the terrors of many atrocities and everybody was beaten day and night for not saluting properly.
4. Spy suspects were especially ill-treated. On October 2nd, 1943, the police started a barbed-wire search to find evidences of spy suspects in the camp. 57 men and women were confined in a small guard-room, and for many hours they were made to sit with their legs bent in Japanese style and without being given even a minimum of decency they were forced to stay there for many months. One European was tortured for 56 hours and the other was struck 144 times. There was a record with the full particulars of the devilish torture, which Richard Sharp, B. B. C. correspondent saw and recorded in which a Japanese poured water into the mouth and nostrils of one of the suspects and then pressed the swollen stomach of the latter with his foot or jumped on the upper part of the stomach. Some of the prisoners of war will bear the scars of the Japanese torture forever.

5. The captives released at Singapore talked of the ill-treatment: forced labor, worst food ration and beating.

(2) Judging from the attitudes adopted by the United States and British especially the public opinion prevailing in those countries the British protest against Japan is not so bitter as the United States at present, but Britain will file a protest on completion of further close investigation after the recovery of the ex-occupation area. It is, therefore, necessary for us to take a measure to cope with the situation.

1. Though it is not necessary to produce these investigation materials at present as long as Britain or the United States does not make any request and yet preparation should be made so as to meet the changing situation.

2. The execution of Chinese residents at Singapore to some extent was unavoidable considering the circumstances which arose at that time, but since the execution had reached a considerable number, Britain, (the United States) and China will announce it as a big massacre and will lodge a protest with us. So that it will also be necessary to make a preparation for the punishment of those responsible.
SECTION III

OUTLINE OF THE INVESTIGATION CONCERNING INHUMANE ACTS (PRINCIPALLY AGAINST THE CHINESE PROBLEM) DURING THE MALAYA (SINGAPORE) OPERATIONS

22 November 1945

Group No. 4

Addressed to: POW Affairs Investigative Dept.
POW Affairs Central Investigative Committee.

I

The Outline of the Protest and Reports by Great Britain on Inhumane Acts in Malaya (Singapore) Area.

Although there were almost no protests from Great Britain, there were some highly exaggerated and superficial reports made in England after the conclusion of the war.

1. On 10 March 1942, British Foreign Minister Eden gave a formal explanation in the House of Commons on the outrageous acts of the Japanese following the surrender of Hong Kong, of which the gist is as follows:

GIST: According to the reports of those who escaped from Hong Kong, prisoners of war and citizens in Hong Kong were treated inhumanly regardless of race. Fifty British soldiers were bound hand and foot and were then bayoneted to death.

Even after ten days from the surrender of Hong Kong, the wounded were left on the battlefields, and the dead were not buried. Europeans and Asians alike were abused and killed without discrimination.

The Chinese quarters of the city became a nest of prostitutes. These outrageous acts can be compared to that of the great Rape of Nanking in 1937.

There were no windows, doors or lights in the prisoners' camps which were mere huts without sanitary facilities. Food was very poor, mortal diseases broke out, and deaths continuously occurred. Pulmonary tuberculosis, the Japanese Government would not allow the representatives of the
Protecting Powers and the International Red Cross to visit the district.

We do not possess any information concerning the prisoners in Malaya. We only know that 75,000 Chinese had been captured in that area.

It is not true that the Japanese army act on the spirit of chivalry.

2. We have been notifying and protesting that we have deliberately studied the great quantity of evidence concerning the treatment of detained British nationals in East Asia which were obtained by the British Government on 2 September 1942 and which hold no ground for refutation, but there is nothing concerning Malaya.

3. Reports concerning Malaya (Singapore) are as follows although there is no protest against this area from the hostile power:

(1) Conversations of Major Morris Dayton and Captain Thomas "Epris":

"After the surrender of Singapore we were crowded into a freight car and were taken to Siam where we were employed in the construction of a railroad from Bangkok to Moulmein, but many died of tropical disease and from scarcity of medicine. According to what was related by the advance party of Australians, all but 34 of 1,840 soldiers died before reaching a point of 130 miles west."

(2) The appalling announcements of Japanese atrocities towards prisoners of war of the Allied Powers and interned civilians, in the reports despatched from London on 5 September 1945 has given anxiety to many thousands of families throughout the world. Every evening paper in London reported that Singapore radio announced that "if the complete document is made public, the civilized world will protest against the atrocities of the Japanese. Chinese were compelled to drink petroleum and the Japanese threw lighted matches into their mouths".

Mass executions by machine-guns of Chinese army units and civilians who survived at Singapore, and Professor "Ferenczy" was the former governor of the Sultan of Johore, believes that over 150,000 Asians...
(not including soldiers) were executed by the Japanese secret police or died of torture in Singapore. The greater part of these people were Chinese, and the professor further states that in the small area of "Dabon" thirty thousand were killed by the Japanese secret police and it is natural that the Chinese should abhor the Japanese as they do.

According to the tales of ill-treatment told by the prisoners set free in Hongkong, they had received only a very small part of the Red Cross parcels. (San Francisco, 5 September).

Correspondents on an American hospital ship have reported on the barbarous actions of the Japanese towards the Australian, British and Dutch prisoners working in oil refineries and machine factories. The atrocities committed on road construction in Burma and Siam were also reported. Even the sick were compelled to walk to the place where the road was being made and to break stones. (Australia, 5 September).

According to reports received at the South East Asia Headquarters, it seems that the prisoners of the Allied Powers had been suffering severely from malaria, beriberi, consumption and dysentery. (San Francisco, 5 September).

(3) London broadcasts of 6 September 1945 reported as follows on the atrocities of the Japanese in Singapore internment camps:

(a) "There were 4,500 men, women and children of every nationality interned in Singapore, but the Red Cross were never allowed to visit them. All men above ten years of age were forced to work but were given less than a half of the amount of food which the Prison Bureau of Malaya has given as a punishment before the war. When rescue came, they had begun roasting snails for food.

(b) "During the three years, it was only once that reasonable administration was exercised, and that was when the commander was a Japanese civilian.

(c) "There was always the constant fear of all kinds of atrocities and they were constantly being beaten for such simple crimes as not bowing correctly."
(d) "Those who were suspected of espionage received worse treatment. On 2 October 1943, the Japanese police commenced barbarous searches as evidence of suspected espionage was discovered in the camp. Fifty-seven men and women were locked up in a small guard room and were deprived of every decency. They were compelled to sit with their legs bent in the Japanese way for a long time and they were confined in that room for several months. A certain European was interrogated for fifty-five hours, and another was beaten a hundred and forty-four times. There is a minute record of the demoniacal tortures, and Richard Sharp, a correspondent of the B.B.C. who had read this record says that the Japanese, after pouring water into the nose and mouth of the prisoner, would press the swelling stomach with the foot or jump up and down on top of it. Some of the prisoners will carry the marks of Japanese tortures throughout their lives.

(e) "Prisoners set free in Singapore tell about their life of forced labour, terrible food rations, blows and ill-treatment.

"In short, this has caused no great problem until today, but considering the tendencies of the U.S.A. and Great Britain, especially the public opinion of both countries, England will thoroughly investigate this matter as soon as she regains her former territories and there is strong possibility of her launching protests against Japan. So we must also investigate and announce the true facts concerning these matters."

II
in Malaya (Singapore)
General Situation and the Management of the Natives by the Military before War

Before the Greater East Asia War broke out, Malaya, Singapore, in particular, was the center of policy and strategy in the south and was the nucleus of pressure against Japan. The activities of the natives in general, especially the Chinese, were very vigorous and the pressure was carried out in every sort of form, such as demonstrations, boycott and threats, so that there were soon more and more Japanese returning to Japan.
Thus Singapore naturally began to draw the attention of all the Japanese.

The military were keenly aware of the necessity of a speedy occupation of Malaya, especially Singapore, and as the operations in Malaya were the first to be started in the Southern operations and in view of the aim of the Greater East Asia War, it was necessary to assume an attitude of endearment towards the natives so as to exalt the justice of the Imperial Army throughout the world, and a determined attitude was taken towards those who interfered with the activities of the army. The military adopted the policy of strictly observing merits.

III

General Situation during the Operations

In our Malaya operations, we at first had nothing to give us trouble in the rear though we had much in China, but from Central Malaya on, Chinese emigrants began to be active in making trouble near battle-fields and specially in the rear and consequently our soldiers were very watchful against them.


Near battlefields, the enemy got to know our plans of operation chiefly through frequent information from the Chinese emigrants, and our troops were placed at a great disadvantage or were shelled or bombed while in mass formation, the result being that we often lost a large number of soldiers to no purpose. In the rear of battlefields, our lines of communications were attacked; our lines of transportation and lines of military communication were destroyed; our munitions were destroyed; and our munitions, especially ammunition were delayed on their way to the battlefields and thus our Malaya Operations, much pressed for time, were often obstructed and beset with difficulties.

Examples are as follows:

(a) At the end of December, 1941, more than one hundred armed Chinese emigrants, assembled in plantations north of Tampeng, attempted to put our line of communications out of order and to burn our munitions, but we got to know of it and dealt with them before
they could try anything.

(b) Towards the end of December, 1941, in a battle near Kanbahr, signal shells were often fired at night near our various artillery positions upon which the enemy concentrated their fire, killing a lot of our soldiers. We made a strenuous search and succeeded in finding two Chinese emigrants and putting them in custody they proved to be guilty.

(c) In the above battle, one battalion of the Ando Regiment took a very circuitous route by night from the west in order to cut off "Kanbahr" from the rear, but a signal shot was fired when they were passing a village and, our plan being thus known to the enemy, we were not only unsuccessful in cutting off "Kanbahr" from the rear, but also sustained a severe counter-attack while crossing the river southwest of "Kanbahr" (the neighbouring basin was swampy), and sustained heavy losses, our operation being a complete failure. No sooner had the signal shot been fired than a platoon was sent to search the village. They caught a Chinese emigrant who had failed to make a get-away, and who proved to be guilty.

(d) In battles near Gomes and Segamet in the middle of January, 1942, in battles near Klang, "Kompon" and Batubahat at the end of January, 1942, and in the battle of Singapore at the beginning of February of the same year, signal shells were very frequently fired and our artillery positions, reserve units and higher headquarters often received concentrated enemy fire and sustained heavy losses. It was found that most of this was the work of Chinese emigrants.

(e) In the middle of January, 1942, when the enemy made an air-raid on Kuala Lumpur, a signal shell was fired from the airfield there; the enemy planes bombed it, the result being that some of our planes were burned out, and a considerable number of soldiers were killed or wounded.

(f) In the middle of January, 1942, when the Imperial Guard Division crossed the river, Chinese emigrants indicated the crossing-point and directed the enemy's night bombing and we consequently had much difficulty in crossing the river and sustained heavy losses.

(g) From the middle to the end of January, 1942, while the Imperial Guard Division was fighting near Melaka and Batucah, Chinese merchants secretly communicated with
enemy submarines in the seas off Malacca. They not only secretly brought in some spies from the submarines, guided and protected them but also made indications of the positions of our troops to make the enemy's ship bombardment easier and more effective. The result was that the Imperial Guard Division had a difficult and disadvantageous operation.

(h) At the end of January, 1942, near a battle near Batubehat, the Okaki battalion of the Imperial Guard Division was taking a roundabout route through a rubber plantation to invest Batubehat with the aim of cutting it off from the rear, when Chinese emigrants secretly informed the enemy, who made a mass counter-attack upon the battalion and completely isolated it; the battalion had the misfortune to be nearly annihilated, the commander and almost all the others being killed.

(i) From the middle to the end of January, 1942, Chinese emigrants felled trees across roads between Gemas and Selempong and between Labis and Segamat, brought our MT to a standstill, and poured a hail of fire upon them from behind the trees on both sides of the roads. As a result, our valuable munitions were plundered and prevented from reaching the fort, and our operation was placed at a great disadvantage.

(j) There were many obstacles to railway transportation, but among others, the railways were destroyed in plantations, south of Ipoh, and between Selempong and Gemas, just when we had to send munitions for our Singapore operations. It had a very great effect upon us, for we were forced to postpone the attack upon Singapore until Feb. 9th, though it had previously been fixed for Feb. 8th. Moreover, after we began to attack, we could not get our munitions in the quantities we required, and for want of ammunition, we were in a very dangerous situation. The criminals who had caused these obstacles were caught and it was found that Chinese merchants had been chiefly responsible.

(k) Our lines of military communication were destroyed on innumerable occasions.

(2) Peace and Order of Singapore after the Surrender of British Troops.

Singapore was captured on the 15th of February, and at first, after action ceased, prospects for the order and
peace of the peninsula looked very good but a rumour spread that the British and Dutch troops would come to the rescue and there was the further agitation of some communists who had been released or escaped from prison and criminals at large which produced an undecidability of uneasiness. In particular, as there was a gap of two or three days between the surrender of the British Troops and the entry of the Japanese troops into the city of Singapore, not only were weapons such as rifles, rifle ammunition, machine guns, revolvers and motor-cars with small type radio sets dispersed and hidden in the houses of Chinese emigrants, but foodstuffs and other materials were stolen, and moreover our lines of communication between our various Corps HQ in the outskirts and the city itself were frequently and deliberately severed, to the great disadvantage of our troops. It was also found that many Chinese emigrants in the outskirts and the center of the city had stolen foodstuffs, clothing and fuel and concealed them in the warehouses of their residence, in the ceiling and under the floor. As our forces were approaching the next stage in their operations and were very soon to withdraw the main strength of their troops, there was only a small number of our soldiers to be responsible for maintaining the peace and order of the city after the occupation. The rapidity of our Army's southward march had left many guerilla bases scattered on either side of the road, along the west coast of the Malay Peninsula. There were clear signs, moreover, that after the fall of Singapore many anti-Japanese Chinese emigrants who were scattered among the Riouw, Lingga, and Anambas Islands situated south of the Peninsula, were making bases of these islands from which they were preparing for future activities in concert with their sympathizers on Singapore Island and the Malay Peninsula. In view of the rumours of British Troops coming to the rescue once more, that kept sweeping the city, our troops felt it very important to strictly suppress all unfounded rumours and wild tales in Singapore Island and maintain the peace and order of the island of Singapore with all possible speed.

(Reference)

Details of the activity of the DeGaulle faction in Singapore since Feb. 28th have been clarified by degrees. Clare, a Jew, and Lumor, an agent of the Military Committee of the DeGaulle faction, and Coceil (?), manager of the Banque de l'Indo-Chine were detained and interrogated.
Believing that it would not only answer the purposes of our "Sacred War", but also bring about good results in further operations in the southern areas especially in the Sumatra and Andamans operations, which were our army's next tasks at that time—to set up a firm military administration in Malaya and especially in Singapore, as soon as possible after the capitulation of the British Army, our army at first stationed only Kempei in Singapore itself and avoided sending big units into the city. Major-General KAMIMURA Saburo was given command of No. 2 Kempeitai (with about 2 companies of auxiliary Kempei and armoured car and tank company from No. 5 and No. 18 Imperial Guards Divisions attached to them, and the necessary troops, and put in command of Singapore city, while the reinforce of the Imperial Guards Divisions were put in Charge of Singapore island (excluding the greater part of the city) and continued their work of clearing the battle fields rapidly and their mopping-up operations. By these means, our army tried to establish public order and at the same time prepared for the next round of operations.

Considering the importance of Singapore to the forces and the fact that it was infested with plain clothes bandits who had obstructed our military operations for the whole period of our operations in Malaya, our army decided on a strict attitude in dealing with the Chinese emigrants. On Feb. 17th, our army issued an Army Order and dispatched Major HAYASHI Tadao, a staff officer to Singapore garrison headquarters, mainly for the purpose of dealing with this matter.

In the latter part of February the main strength of the 5th and the 18th Divisions successively moved to Northern Malaya and Johore State and assumed the same duties as those mentioned above.

1. The clearing of the battlefields and the mopping-up operations on Singapore Island.

Major-General KAMIMURA, Commander of the 9th Infantry Brigade, who had been newly appointed as the commander of the Singapore Garrison Forces, appeared at the army headquarters on the 18th. Besides making the necessary contacts, he issued, in view of the above-mentioned situation, an order to the 2nd Field Gendarme Unit, it mainly to clear the battlefields and mop up the enemies within the city. Moreover, the main strength of the Imperial Guards Division was transferred from its operational area to the key points on the island where it continued the clearing up of the battlefields and mopping-up operations.

(a) Outline of command system and detailing of troops/
Army Commander

Commander of Singapore Garrison Forces

2nd Field Gendarmerie Unit
(Main strength posted in the city, and a portion at key points on the peninsula)

Gendarmerie Unit
(About 2/3 of total strength)

Infantry Unit
(Although the date is unknown, it seems that this unit took direct supervision of the auxiliary gendarmes)

Auxiliary Gendarmerie Unit
(After some period of time the greater part of them were placed under the direct command of the commander of the Garrison Forces)
However, with the participation of the Imperial Guards Division in the Sumatra Campaign, the Singapore Garrison Forces assumed the patrol of the entire island on March 2.

(b) The outline of the clearing up of the battlefields and mopping-up operations.

The battlefields clearing-up and mopping-up operations which the various corps (including those corps subsequently transferred to other areas) conducted on Singapore Island following the surrender of the British Army were mainly as follows:

1. Mopping-up operations on the islands in the vicinity of Singapore Island.
2. The disposition of the wounded and dead of both sides.
3. The collection and arrangement of munitions and Arms.
4. The arrangement and detention of war prisoners and internees totaling about 100,000.
5. Memorial service for the dead.
6. The disposition of enemy Chinese merchants hiding in (and out) of Singapore city.

The search for and the disposition of anti-Japanese Chinese merchants.

1. The army's policy toward the Chinese.

In view of the great obstructions to our operations put up by the anti-Japanese activities of Chinese subsequent to the operations in central Malay, we were obliged to change the original attitude toward the Chinese which we had held at the time of the outbreak of war. We were obliged to deal with the disobedient Chinese in a stern manner.

2. The collection of data concerning anti-Japanese suspects among the Chinese.

On the basis of mainly the register of anti-Japanese Chinese as well as other data as the register of the Detective Bureau, police office register of criminals, advice by rescued Japanese residents, and the information supplied by some of the anti-Japanese Chinese merchants who were arrested, a register of disobedient Chinese suspects was drawn up during the four days from February 17 to 20 and the suspects were detained at several places and detected beginning from the 21st. In making the detections we made sure of obtaining accuracy by using the above-mentioned registers as our basis and also obtaining the presence of the police from the Detective Bureau of Police Office.

The number of persons examined as suspects during the course of detections was roughly as follows:

| First time | Feb 21 to 23 (3 days) | about 5,000 |
| Second " | Feb 28 - March 3 | about 1,500 |
| Third " | End of March | about 300 |
After the examination for the detection of suspects about 1,000 to 1,500 persons were released and about 5,000 persons were apparently punished as anti-Japanese spies (those who guided the enemy in bombing airfields, gave indications of the direction of artillery shelling, attacked or disturbed the rear commissary lines, or guided such activities, the leaders of anti-Japanese organizations, members of the anti-Japanese Volunteer Army, and members of the Malay Communist Party).

(Annex 2)

II. The conditions in Singapore, according to the "Notes on the New Life of Chinese" by HU MAI, were as follows:

1. Field-Marshal Poohan reported on December 22 the war situation. There were criticisms among the inhabitants of Malay against the withdrawal from Penang.

2. Governor-General Thomes called a conference of the Government-General on December 25 and requested the Chinese to display their full strength in resisting the Japanese.

On the basis of this request, the HSING-MIA Anti-Enemy Mobilization General Association was established and held its inaugural meeting on December 27.

Three hundred seventy-two (372) organizations with total representatives of more than 2,000 attended this meeting.

3. Under the direction of the HSING-MIA Anti-Enemy General Association, a volunteer army with the Communist party as its mainstay, and also a defense army under the slogan of the people's three principles were established to cooperate in putting up resistance.

4. The conditions after the entry of the Japanese Army.

(A) Investigation of all Chinese between the ages of 15 and 60 was conducted from February 21.

(B) Governor-General Thomes issued the following proclamation:

Proclamation of the Governor-General of the Straits Settlements and Minister Plenipotentiary for Malay. issued

1. The commander of the Japanese Army has the following bulletin.

(a) All existing administrative organs and economic structure will be allowed to be continued. The personnel of these organs may hold their present positions for the time being.

(b) All enterprises affecting public welfare must be speedily restored and the employees must continue their work as usual.

(c) Communications and broadcasts by means of wireless telegraph and telephones are prohibited.

(d) Air defense regulations must be strictly observed as heretofore. This is particularly as in regard to black-out control.
(e) All communications and connections with outside sources are strictly prohibited.
(f) All public health organs and medical treatment works must be speedily opened and operated. If there are defects, improvements within the extent possible must be made immediately. All employees must carry on their work as usual and give protection as much as possible to the sick, wounded and prisoners.
(g) The Japanese Army will surely protect the inhabitants. All inhabitants except those permitted to move by the Japanese Army must remain at their present place of residence.
(h) All hostile acts against the Japanese Army, such as spying, military secrets and supplying intelligence to the enemy are prohibited.

2. The civil administration organs of this island intend to bring Singapore to a normal condition in cooperation with the Japanese Army. Accordingly, various commissions will be set up to help solve the following matters:

(a) Administrative problems
(b) Public health and sanitation problems.
(c) Economic and financial problems.
(d) War prisoners' problems.
(e) Military administration problems, namely, the problems of peace and order, communications and the requisitioned production of munitions.
(f) Marine problems.
(g) Air-defense problems.

In addition to the foregoing commissions, a liaison commission will be established to handle affairs concerning the transfer of administrative rights over this island.

3. All citizens of Singapore must take the initiative to restore peace and order, hold themselves responsible for the clearing up of the filth, and prevent the spread of epidemics. This is the duty which we must not shirk for the sake of the wounded women and children and those who have no place to wender. I earnestly solicit your cooperation.
4. I hereby respectfully express my appreciation to you who have diligently performed your duties during the past several months and also express my deep appreciation to the citizens who have coped with the situation with calmness.

February 16, 1942 Thomas /s/

(Annex)
(c) The statement of the Commander of the SHONAN/Singapore/Garrison Forces.

The Chinese of SHONAN port have been misled until this day by the propaganda of the Chungking Regime, cooperated with Britain, and continued political and economic assistance to the Chungking Regime. That is, the fact that they obstructed our operations and always played an active part in the front-line of anti-Japanese operations by organizing a volunteer army which joined the British Army and serving as guerrillas and spies, constitutes an obstruction to the construction of Greater East Asia and hence they should be called the traitors of East Asia.

However, upon the fall of Singapore, a part of them fled, but it is quite clear that others disguised themselves as law-abiding citizens and awaiting the chance to conduct guerrilla activities. If they are left as they are, it would be forever impossible to bring about a cheerful Malay. It is most essential at the present time to mop-up these traitorous Chinese and establish peace and order thereby bringing peace and security to the masses.

It is the intention of the Imperial Japanese Army to arrange a new order and establish the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere under the glorious ideal of "hakko ishiu"/universal brotherhood/thereby hoping for the everlasting development of Malay. This is the declaration of the Commander of the Japanese Army. He who obstructs our righteousness is the arch enemy of mankind. Irrespective of whoever he may be, he will be dealt with firmly without mercy. But those law-abiding citizens who repent their past wrong and voluntarily join in the construction of a new order, which is our great ideal, and actively cooperate with us in developing a cheerful, free, and solid Malay, we will always treat them as universal brethren, irrespective of whether they are Chinese or other people. The Imperial Japanese Army will protect their property and is determined to ensure the growth and development of their posterity. Such is the true intention of the Imperial Japanese Army. If there are any persons who conduct undesirable activities, we will not forgive them but punish them sternly, whatever race they may belong to.
The masses should understand Japan's true intentions and engage in their occupations with their minds at rest. At the same time they should observe the following matters and heal the wounds of war to the best of their ability, thereby constructing a cheerful Malay and cooperating in the construction of Greater East Asia of the East Asiatic peoples.

1. Be diligent in speedily resuming work.

2. In case there are any enemy elements and other undesirable elements, they should be immediately disclosed or reported to the Japanese Army.

3. All forms of looting and outrages shall be punished.

4. Any person possessing or discovering arms and ammunition, even a single shot, must speedily hand them over to the Japanese Army.

5. Everyone should cooperate in cleaning the streets and restoring order.

6. Labour should be voluntarily furnished to the Japanese Army.
Commander of the Japanese Garrison Forces

(Annex) The statement of the Commander of the Shonan Garrison Forces concerning the maintenance of peace and order on the island.

The Commander of the Japanese Army has been striving his best to restore and maintain peace and order on the island ever since the capture of Shonan Island. For this purpose, the Japanese Army authorities have permitted no Army to enter the city, but only the gendarmes, who bear the responsibility of protecting the citizens at large and distressed people. However, some rebellious elements disturbed the peace and conducted acts benefiting the enemy. Accordingly, the Army intends to strictly punish these evil and rebellious elements, persons possessing military arms and persons who have committed outrages and looting, in order to maintain the peace of the entire inhabitants. The leader of the rebels who had been arrested, and a certain other person were killed by firing squad at a certain place on the 21st and 22nd, respectively.

The Commander of the Shonan Garrison Forces hereby serve public notice that persons who remain unrepentant and continue their evil acts shall likewise be strictly punished.

(E) The proclamation of the military authorities concerning the return of the distressed Chinese to their homes.

In order to secure peace and order and promote the smooth adjustment of the demand and supply of necessities of life on Shonan Island, all Chinese now taking refuge should return to their original place of residence within 10 days from March 4.

Those who fail to return within this period without good reason shall be strictly punished.

III. The state of purging on the Malay Peninsula.

1. The state of peace and order on the Malay Peninsula.

The intrigues of the Chinese during the Malay campaign were as described already. Even after the fall of Singapore, numerous anti-Japanese Chinese hid themselves in cities and forests. Some of them, standing for communism, and maintaining mutual connections among them, continued active operations under a firm organization in order to carry on a systematized anti-Japanese movement. They made efforts to obtain arms, ammunition, provisions, as well as comrades-in-arms. Meanwhile, they looted the surrendered arms which we had assembled, assassinated our officers and men, destroyed our communication and transportation lines, killed, threatened and pillaged law-abiding citizens at large. Thus the state of peace and order on the Malay Peninsula after the war was still alarming.
2. State of purge.

Recognising the necessity of conducting purging operations of the Malay Peninsular following the fall of Singapore, the Army dispatched from Singapore by the end of February, the 12th Division to Johore State and the 5th Division to the Malay Peninsular other than Johore State, to take charge of the peace and order in the respective districts and at the same time conduct purging operations against the anti-Japanese Chinese.

In the case of the 5th Division, the district assigned to it was subdivided as follows to be placed under the charge of its component units:

- Malacca and Negri Sembilan Province --- 11 I
- Selangor Province --- 41 I, 5A, 5X
- Perak Province --- 42 I
- Pahang Province --- 5K
- Kedr., Perna, Trenganu, and Kelantan Provinces --- 21 I

The 5th and the 18th Divisions generally commenced purging operations from the early part of March, conducting mopping-up operations of anti-Japanese Chinese in the mountains and forests. By the end of April, about 1,000 undesirable Chinese were arrested in Johore State, about 1,500 in Selangor and Malacca Provinces, about 200 in Perak Province, about 100 in Pahang, about 50 in Kedr. and Perna, and about 100 in Trenganu and Kelantan Provinces. Numerous arms were also seized. After examination, the greater part of these persons were released. However, casualties often occurred on both sides at the time of making arrests, since the Chinese fired at us, causing us to return fire also. However, a considerable number (the letter) killed themselves when they realized the situation to be against them.

Even after May the anti-Japanese Chinese continued underground activities, with the result that peace and order remained unsatisfactory. Our forces often penetrated through jungles and with considerable difficulties and damage to our site, carried on the punitive operations in order to secure peace and order, but failed to eradicate the anti-Japanese Chinese.

Of the purging operations after May the prominent one was the punitive operations in the forests north of Kuala Lampur. Upon receipt of intelligence that about 500 anti-Japanese Chinese were planning the assassination of our officers and men and the bombing of our barracks, we suppressed them by a forestalling attack. Following the battle, the remnant Chinese fled further deep into the jungles. About 200 dead bodies were left in the battlefield as the result of this battle.
In short, the purging operations on the Malay Peninsula represented peace preservation patrol activities to protect not only the Japanese troops themselves but also the life and property of the people at large (Chinese, Malaysians, Indians, etc.). Although we regret to say that we have no clear idea of the detailed situation owing to lack of data, the anti-Japanese Chinese who lost their lives were principally those who fell under our bullets, etc., during battle in the course of the purging operations. Our side also suffered considerable casualties in the course of the difficult punitive operations.

(Annex)

The collection of the contributions from the Chinese, which was carried out without reference to the arrests of Chinese in Singapore, seemed to be mainly a countermeasure adopted to cope with inflation following the occupation of Malaya.

Since the currency in circulation reached St. $260,000,000 following the surrender of the British troops as compared with St. $210,000,000 in pre-war days, it was decided to have the difference, St. $50,000,000, donated. The donations were collected about the time of the transfer of General YAMASHITA to another post.

5. Judgments.

In short, it can be understood from the guiding policy of the Army Commander at the beginning of the war that utmost efforts were made to prevent and check the inhumane acts committed during the course of the Malay (Singapore) campaign.

(1). With regard to the question of the disposition of the Chinese in Singapore, it is clear that Commander YAMASHITA, following the surrender of the British Army, issued to the various commanders of the corps and of the Garrison Forces an order concerning the clearing up of battle-fields and purging operations (mopping-up operations) with the determination to eradicate spies and disturbers of peace and order, in view of the intensive obstructive measures and anti-Japanese activities of the Chinese during the campaign. However, no written order for the punishment of the Chinese alone exists. The Commander of the Garrison Forces at Singapore, on the basis of the above-mentioned order and the Army's intention, carried it out as a part of the operations for clearing up the battle-fields and of the purging operations. Judging also from the objective situation at that time and the state of mopping-up operations throughout the entire Malay Peninsula, it is clear that it was not based on the personal view of the Commander of the Garrison Forces. I should judge that, in punishing the Chinese, preparations were made beforehand and various measures adopted after entry into Singapore in order to ensure propriety.
(2) Since the arrests and punishments of the Chinese were conducted during the course of clearing up the battle-fields and woping-up operations following intensive fighting, it is needless to say that it is difficult to judge such acts on the basis of the standard for normal times, even though efforts were made to ensure their propriety. It appears that the reports by enemy newspapers include those who died from war sickness during operations and even civilians who were victims of bombing. They also exaggerate things. Accordingly, it seems proper to estimate the number of spies and anti-Japanese undesirable elements who were punished at about 5,000.

In Hu HSING's "Notes on the New Life of the Chinese" it is written that there was a fairly large number of undesirable Chinese who obstructed operations and instigated law-abiding citizens. This gives an idea of the situation.

(3) Although it is not possible to guarantee that, in making the arrests and punishments, the staff officers concerned did not "overdo" themselves, and although it is difficult to get a clear idea of the situation then because Lt. Col. HAKAMI, who was the staff officer in charge of it (staff officer attached to the headquarters of the Shonan Garrison Forces) and Chief of Staff Lt. General SUMI have died in action, it may become further clear if Major General INMAN, who was the chief of the operations section, and Colonel TSUI, who was the staff officer in charge of operations, are interrogated.
Excerpt from Interrogation of OSHIMA, Hiroshi, 1 February 1946, pages 16, 17, 18, 21, 22.
Q. When did you first become acquainted with RIBBENTROP?
A. In 1935, for the first time.

Q. What was the occasion for these numerous meetings with RIBBENTROP in 1936?
A. In 1936 we concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was finally signed by Ambassador MUSHAKOJI, but I had a good many talks on matters preceding the final settlement.

Q. Had you ever discussed with Mr. HACK the subject matter of this proposed alliance against Russia with Germany?
A. Yes, I had discussed with him, and in this regard, if you desire, I shall tell you of the events leading up to this pact in detail... I shall tell you all I know about this pact, including secret matters pertaining to it. To start with it was in the spring of 1935, in May or June, I believe, that HACK came to me and said the following was RIBBENTROP's own idea and had nothing to do with the policy of the German government, but would there not be a possibility of some sort of defensive alliance against Russia between Japan and Germany. In this regard they knew that the Japanese army had penetrated into Manchuria and might have an interest in such an alliance—the reason for this being that the army was on the borders of the U.S.S.R.

Q. Did you have an idea that probably HACK would carry those ideas back to RIBBENTROP?
A. Naturally, I thought so. However, I could not definitely give any answer, unless I knew exactly how GHQ felt.

Q. Continue with the story.
A. Subsequent to this RIBBENTROP said that he wished to see me and I met him for the very first time at HACK's house in October of that year. At this meeting RIBBENTROP said that this was simply his own idea and he did not know how Hitler or the Government felt about it, and he said further that he believed there would be some possibility of its being put into effect. However, he asked me what the Japanese military would think about it, and I said that there was no way of knowing, so that he asked me to find out exactly how they would feel.
and he asked me to communicate with the Japanese military and find out how they would feel about it. I subsequently sent the telegram to GHQ about the matter. At this time RIBBENTROP stressed the fact that this was his own personal idea and for me not to feel bad about matters in case the German Government did not back him up - I said the same thing in regard to my own Government.

Q. This is the second communication to Tokyo relative to this proposal?
A. Yes.

Q. Continue.

A. (HACK was at this meeting and there were just the three of us.) Following this communication of mine to Japan I received the reply from GHQ that there was no overall opposition to the proposal, but that they wished to look into matters more fully before they committed themselves, and in this regard they would send Lt. Col. WAKAMATSU of the German Division of GHQ. This officer arrived in Berlin in early December 1935, I believe, although I am not too sure of dates. During this interim I did not have any communication with RIBBENTROP.

Q. Did you have any communication with your own Foreign Office relative to this communication?
A. No. This was simply a military matter. Prior to Lt. Col. WAKAMATSU's arriving in Berlin HACK came to see me several times and I told him that he should wait until the arrival of the abovementioned officer. When he came I took the Colonel to see RIBBENTROP and also General BLOMBERG and WAKAMATSU told them that GHQ was in favor of a more or less general treaty, but that it was his duty, as this was still given only as RIBBENTROP's personal idea, to find out what the German Government felt about it. Also WAKAMATSU stated that while the Japanese Army favored it, to bring it into fruition the Government would have to be consulted.
A. I wish to point out to you that the Japanese military and naval attachés are not under the jurisdiction of the ambassador, but are directly responsible to the respective staff headquarters in Tokyo. As far as the embassy goes, they are under the ambassador, but as far as their duties go they are responsible to their military superiors in Tokyo.

Q. Are they authorized by virtue of their position as military attachés to enter into negotiations with the military of another nation, looking toward a pact or a treaty or an international agreement between the two nations?

A. Yes, if it was a strictly military matter they may discuss these matters without going through the ambassador... Before I go any further I would like to stress here that they were sounding out the opinion of the Japanese army and not that of the Japanese government because if they had been that would have been the ambassador's duty.

Q. Is it not also a fact that if Ribbentrop or any one else in Germany could tell the military of Japan on this idea that the military was then probably in a position whereby they could persuade the Foreign Office to go along with the idea?

A. Yes, that is one point and quite true that the army had enough power to very probably sell the pact to the Japanese government. The second point is the one I stressed before that Ribbentrop was not in an official capacity at the time. Particularly, in this point, he had seen how the Japanese army had taken possession of Manchuria and, therefore, naturally, concluded from that that the Japanese army would be in the strongest position to push a treaty of this type... I would say that no treaty could possibly have been made on this if the army had not wished it.
Mr. Ambassador,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's communication of today concerning the secret attached agreement to the Agreement against the Communist International, in which I was informed of the following:

"I have the honour to inform your Excellency, on the occasion of the signing today of the secret attached agreement to the Agreement against the Communist International, that the Japanese Government and the German Government are fully agreed on the following point:

"The 'political treaties' designated in Article II of the above secret attached agreement include neither defence treaties nor treaties concerning concessions, nor treaties concerning border questions between Japan, Manchukuo and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the like, which may be concluded between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

I have the honour to inform your Excellency of the assent of the German Government to the above interpretation.

At the same time I take the opportunity to renew the assurance of my highest esteem for your Excellency.

(signed) Joachim von Ribbentrop

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich

TO

His Excellency
the Imperial Japanese Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Viscount Kintomo Masahikoji
Berlin West 8, 23 October 36
Wilhelmstrasse 64

Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of the German Reich

Mr. Ambassador!

I have the honor to acknowledge to your Excellency the receipt of the communication of 23 inst. I took cognizance thereof as well as of the contents of the telegram to the Foreign Minister, Mr. AHIWA, copy of which was enclosed.

At the same time I welcome the opportunity to renew to your Excellency the expression of my highest esteem.

(signed) VON RIBBENTROP

To His Excellency, the Imperial Japanese
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Viscount MUSHAKOJI
I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's communication of today on the subject of the secret attached Agreement to the Agreement against the Communist International signed today, in which I was informed of the following:

"I have the honour to inform your Excellency on the occasion of the signing today of the secret attached Agreement to the Agreement regarding the Communist International, that the German Government does not regard the provisions of the existing political treaties between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics — such as the RAPALLO Treaty of 1922 and the Neutrality Pact of 1930, in so far as they have not become null and void under the conditions existing at the time of the coming into effect of this agreement — as being in contradiction to the spirit of this Agreement and the obligations arising from it.

I have the honour to confirm to your Excellency, that my Government acknowledges this communication with sincere satisfaction.

At the same time I take the opportunity to renew the assurance of my highest esteem for your Excellency.

Imperial Japanese Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

TO

His Excellency
the Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of the German Reich
Herr Joachim von Ribbentrop
Agreement regarding secrecy of the "Secret Attached Agreement to the Agreement against the Communist Internationale" and inclosures.

Agreement exists between the two High Contracting States in considering the secret attached Agreement to the Agreement against the Communist Internationale as well as the inclosures I to IV as secret.

If it would be at some time in the interest of the two High Contracting States to inform third states about the contents of the secret agreement, then such an information may only take place upon a mutual understanding.

Berlin, 25 Nov. 1936, i.e. 25 Nov. 11 Showa

(signed) JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich

(signed) VICOMTE KINTOMO NUSAKOJI
Imperial Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
SECRET ATTACHED AGREEMENT TO THE AGREEMENT AGAINST THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

The Government of the German Reich

and

The Imperial Japanese Government

In the recognition that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is working toward the realization of the goal of the Communist International and wants to use its Army for this cause,

In the conviction that this fact not only threatens the existence of the High Contracting States, but World Peace in general in a most serious way,

Have agreed for the preservation of common interests as follows:

ARTICLE I

Should one of the High Contracting States become the object of an unprovoked attack or an unprovoked threat of attack by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the other High Contracting State obligates itself, not to carry out any measures which would, in their effect, be apt to relieve the position of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Should the case, mentioned in Clause I occur, the High Contracting States will immediately consult which measures they will use to preserve their common interests.

ARTICLE II

The High Contracting States will during the validity of this agreement and without mutual assent conclude no political treaties with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which do not conform to the spirit of this agreement.

ARTICLE III

The German as well as the Japanese texts will be regarded as the original of this agreement. It goes into force at the same time as the agreement against the Communist International which was signed today and has the same length of validity.

Witness thereof, the signatories, well and duly authorized by their respective governments, have signed this agreement and have sealed it.

Done in duplicate at Berlin, the 25th of November, 1936, i.e., the 5th of November of the 11th Year of Showa.

(signed) Joachim von Ribbentrop
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the German Reich

(signed) Victory Minton Wshinakoji
Imperial Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Mr. Ambassador,

I have the honour to inform your Excellency, on the occasion of the signing to-day of the secret attached agreement to the Agreement against the Communist International, that the German Government does not regard the provisions of the existing political treaties between the German Reich and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics — such as the RAPALLO Treaty of 1922 and the Neutrality Treaty of 1926 — as being in contradiction to the spirit of this Agreement and the obligations arising from it.

At the same time I take the opportunity to renew the assurance of my highest esteem for your Excellency.

(signed) JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP
Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of the German Reich

To:

His Excellency
The Imperial Japanese Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary,
Viscount Kintaro Mushakoji
Mr. Ambassador,

I have the honour to inform your Excellency, on the occasion of the signing today of the secret attached agreement to the Agreement against the Communist International, that the Japanese Government and the German Government are fully agreed on the following point:

The "political treaties" designated in Article II of the above secret attached agreement include neither fishery treaties nor treaties concerning concessions, nor treaties concerning border questions between Japan, Manchukuo and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the like, which may be concluded between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

I should be obliged to your Excellency if I could be assured of the assent of the German Government to the above interpretation.

At the same time I take the opportunity to renew the assurance of my highest esteem for your Excellency.

Imperial Japanese Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

To:

His Excellency
the Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of the German Reich,
Herr Joachim von Ribbentrop
CERTIFICATE

W. D. C. No. _____
I. P. S. No. 1561

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi Kotori hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereon attached consisting of _____ pages, dated _____, 19____, and described as follows: Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan and Germany dated Nov. 25, 1936, with attached protocols and letters relating thereto. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry
Signed at Tokyo on this 22nd day of August, 1946

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: Nagaharu Odo
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard E. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at Tokyo on this 26 day of Aug. 1946

Richard E. Larsh
Investigator I. P. S.
Official Capacity

Witness: Edward P. Monaghan
AFFIDAVIT CONCERNING THE CAPTURE, PROCESSING AND PRESERVATION OF GERMAN DOCUMENTS

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:

1. That I am a commissioned Infantry officer of the Army of the United States of America, and my Serial Number is 0-1332102.

2. That I joined the staff of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality on the 31st of July, 1945, and was made Chief of the Field Branch at the 7th United States Army Document Center, and served in that capacity until the 25th of October 1945. That during said period of time I was in charge of the screening and analyzing of captured enemy documents and the dispatching by courier of pertinent documents to the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Documentation Division at Nurnberg, Germany.

3. On the 25th of October 1945, I was called to the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nurnberg Germany, and appointed Chief of the Translation Branch of said Documentation Division, and served in that capacity until the 3d of December 1945. That during said period of time I was in charge of, and supervised the translation of all documents that were selected for translation by said Documentation Division.

4. On the 3d of December 1945, I was appointed Executive Officer of said Documentation Division and served in that capacity until the 18th of March 1946. That during said period of time I was first assistant to Major Kenneth R. Boyle, who was then Chief of the said Documentation Division, and as such I was in charge of, and responsible for, the operation of said Division subject only to the orders of said Major Kenneth R. Boyle.

5. That on the 18th of March 1946 I was appointed Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel and have continuously since said date acted in that capacity, and as such am in charge of, and responsible for the operation of said Documentation Division.

6. That Colonel Robert G. Storey served as Chief of said Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel from its inception on the 1st of
July 1945 until the 22nd of October 1945, and was succeeded as Chief by Major William H. Coogan, who served until the 28th of November 1945, and who was in turn succeeded by Major Kenneth R. Boyle, who acted in that capacity until the 18th of March 1946, at which time I was appointed Chief, as aforesaid.

7. That the United States Chief of Counsel in July 1945 charged the Field Branch of the Documentation Division with the responsibility of collecting, evaluating and assembling documentary evidence in the European Theater for use in the prosecution of major Axis war criminals before the International Military Tribunal.

8. That I have served in the United States Army for three years and, based on my experience as a United States Army officer and my position and experience as above set forth, I am completely and thoroughly familiar with the operation of the United States Army in connection with the seizing and processing of captured enemy documents and the methods used by the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel in obtaining, processing, filing, translating and photostating all documentary evidence for the United States Chief of Counsel.

9. That as the Army overran German occupied territory, and then Germany itself, certain specialized personnel seized enemy documents, books and records for information of strategic and tactical value. During the early stages such documents were handled in bulk and assembled at temporary centers. However, after the surrender of Germany they were transported to the various document centers established by Army Headquarters in the United States Zone of Occupation. In addition to the documents actually assembled at such Centers, Army personnel maintained and secured considerable documents "in situ" at or near the place of discovery. Then such documents were located and assembled they were catalogued by Army personnel into collections, and records were maintained which disclosed the source and such other information available concerning the place and general circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the documents.

10. The Field Branch of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel was staffed by personnel thoroughly conversant with the German language. Their task was to search for and select captured enemy documents in the European Theater which disclosed information relating to the prosecution of the major Axis war criminals. Officers under the supervision of the Chief of said Field Branch were placed on duty at various Document
Centers, and also dispatched on individual missions to obtain original documents. When documents were located such officers made a record of the circumstances under which they were found. Such documents were further identified by Field Branch pre-trial serial numbers assigned by such officers who would then periodically dispatch such documents by courier to the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel.

11. Upon receipt of these documents they were duly recorded and indexed. After this operation they were delivered to the Screening and Analysis Branch of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, which Branch re-examined said documents in order to finally determine whether or not they should be retained as evidence for the prosecutors. This final screening was done by German speaking analysts on the staff of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel. When the document passed the screeners it was then transmitted to the Document Room of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel with a covering sheet prepared by the screeners showing the title or nature of the document, the personalities involved, and its importance. In the Document Room a trial identification number was given to each document, or to each group of documents in cases where it was desirable for the sake of clarity to file several documents together.

12. United States documents were given trial identification numbers in one of five series designated by letters: "PS", "L", "R", "C" and "EC", indicating the means of acquisition of the documents. Within each series documents were listed numerically.

13. In almost all instances the original captured enemy document was delivered to the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel and processed in the manner herein set forth. In a comparatively few instances, however, the Army Document Centers retained possession of original documents for the reason that various other agencies desired access to said original documents at said Army Document Centers. In all such latter instances true and accurate photostatic copies of such original documents were made by said Army Document Centers and such photostatic copies were transported to said Documentation Division at Nurnberg Germany, and were thereupon processed in the same manner as original documents. It was almost exclusively with reference to captured German foreign office documents that photostatic copies of the original captured documents, rather than the originals themselves, were delivered to said Documentation Division. These original captured foreign office documents were assembled primarily at the Marburg Germany Document Center and were, end still are, in
great demand by many agencies; and as a result, the originals were retained by said Army Document Center and photostatic copies of the originals dispatched to the said Documentation Division at Nurnberg, as aforesaid.

14. After a document was so numbered it was then sent to a German speaking analyst who prepared a summary of the document with appropriate reference to personalities involved, index headings, information as to the source of the document as indicated by the Field Branch, and the importance of the document to a particular phase of the case under investigation. Next, the original document that had been received by said Documentation Division was returned to the Document Room and was then checked out to the Photostatic Department where photostatic copies were made. Upon return from photostating it was placed in an envelope in one of the several fire-proof safes in the rear of the Document Room. One of the said photostatic copies of the document was sent to the translators and the original document received by said Documentation Division thereafter remained in the safe. A commissioned officer or War Department employee has been, and is, responsible for the security of the documents in the safes. At all times when he is not present the safe is locked and a military guard is on duty outside the only door. If the officer preparing the certified translation, or one of the officers working on the briefs found it necessary to examine the original document, this was done within the Document Room in the section set aside for that purpose. The only exception to this strict rule has been where it has been occasionally necessary to present the original document to the defendants for examination. In this case the document was entrusted to a responsible officer of the prosecution staff.

15. That all original documents or photostatic copies of original documents that were obtained and processed by the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel as herein set forth are now located in the safes of the Document Room of said Documentation Division, with the exception of those documents that have been introduced in evidence before the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg, Germany. Such documents that have been so introduced in evidence as above set forth were removed from said Documentation Division and deposited with the General Secretary of said International Military Tribunal, concurrently with their receipt in evidence, and are now in the custody of, and under the control and supervision of said General Secretary.
16. That I make this affidavit for the purpose of establishing the foregoing facts.

/s/ Gerard Schaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 15th day of April 1946.

/s/ John W. Auchincloss

O-2052152
Capt., JAGD
Japanese Embassy
Berlin

Berlin, 23 October 1936

Mr. Ambassador:

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that I sent the attached telegram to Foreign Minister of Japan together with the telegraphic information, that today the signing was concluded.

At the same time I welcome the opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest esteem.

(signed) [Signature]

To His Excellency
Ambassador VON HINDEMITH

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Item IV

Japanese Embassy
Berlin

Ambassador in Berlin, Viscount [Signature],

To His Excellency, Foreign Minister of Japan

Berlin, 23 Oct. 1936

Concerning the inclosures III and IV of the Secret Annexed Agreement to the Agreement against the Communist International I have as a result of my negotiations with Mr. VON HINDEMITH the firm conviction that only the spirit of the above mentioned secret agreement will be decisive for Germany's future policy towards the U.S.S.R.

I showed VON HINDEMITH this telegram and received his agreement.

[Signature]

/13th 24/
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 17, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody as under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 33rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE

LT. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
ON THE JAPANESE-GERMAN-ITALIAN AGREEMENT AGAINST THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

Bureau of Information, Department of Foreign Affairs

The Agreement against the Communist International between Japan and Germany was concluded on November 25, 1936. Since then, during the short space of one year, the international situation as a whole has undergone tumultuous changes, and in East Asia the China affair has broken out. The realization that Communist secret leadership played a highly influential part in the aggravation of anti-Japanese movements which were primarily responsible for the outbreak of the affair, strengthens the conviction of the opportuneness of the conclusion of the Agreement and the momentousness of its purpose.

Just prior to the first anniversary of the Agreement between Japan and Germany, a Protocol establishing the participation of Italy in this Agreement was signed on November 6th, thereby augmenting the power of the anti-Comintern Pact, and creating an invincible entrenchment against the Red menace across the two continents of Asia and Europe.

The original Agreement came into being under the following circumstances. With the consistent national policy of ensuring her security by upholding her firmly established national polity to maintain permanent peace in East Asia, Japan had adopted the determined internal measure of suppressing and eliminating anarchism and Communism which are inimical to her national structure, and the external measure of preventing the eastward penetration of Communist power and influence into the East, which would result in the Bolshevization of China and the disturbance of the peace of East Asia. Germany simultaneously, in view of her past experiences with the Comintern whose underhand activities had proved well-nigh fatal to the national unity essential for reconstructing her national life, in the face of internal and external difficulties and under the unbearable burden imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, had carried out a thoroughgoing policy of promoting and exalting nationalism. She had sought to crush all Communist movements since 1933 when the Nazi came into power, thus successfully driving the Communists from her territories.

In view of these anti-Communist and anti-Comintern activities within the two countries, it was but natural that a united front should be developed. Japan and Germany were convinced that an international organization as powerful and efficient as the Communist International could never be combated effectively without international collaboration on an equally consolidated basis. In fact, the spirit of self-sacrifice and absolute devotion to the national cause which characterize the two peoples have elevated the Agreement above a merely perfunctory political act into a real partnership of the Governments and the peoples. On that community of idealism and devotion, the two nations have now aligned themselves as the vanguards of world forces against the Comintern, overcoming all difficulties in their domestic and international relations.
Importance of the Agreement

The Japanese-German Agreement, as has been enunciated, simply provides for a special type of cooperation between the two countries against the Communist International; as such it is not directed toward any particular country. This true nature of the Pact, however, has not been comprehended by all, and has been subjected to many unfair criticisms.

A few weeks after the conclusion of the Agreement, the Sian incident took place in which General Chiang Kai-shek was detained by the Communists, resulting in the acceptance by him of the three political principles of alliance with the Soviet Union, collaboration with the Communists and resistance to Japan, all of which had long been demanded by the Red leaders of China. This incident and its aftermath proved to have been the beginning of new campaigns on the part of the Comintern against Japan. Incidentally, they form an objective refutation of arguments against the Pact.

Such an ominous development in the Chinese situation has not been altogether unexpected. For the acceptance of the three political principles mentioned above meant that the Dictator of the Nationalist Government had pledged that he would adopt the policy of effecting China-Soviet and Nationalist-Comintern collaboration through the good offices of the Chinese Communists, and further that he would launch new and aggressive action against Japan backed by the forces created by such alliance and collaboration. Thus anti-Japanese activities were fast aggravated and the China of the Nationalist-Communist collaboration prepared herself throughout the country for her intended armed conflict with her friendly neighbour. The outbreak of the incident near Marco Polo Bridge on the night of July 7th, which took the form of an outrage committed by the 29th Army, was simply the culmination of this series of Bolshevization and anti-Japanese developments.

The armed hostilities which started in North China have developed into the present China affair, and it is widely and publicly known that in the present conflict the Chinese forces are aligned with the Communists at the centre, buttressed through Soviet assistance, and directed by the Comintern. Facts have been disclosed which actually show results of the Nationalist-Communist collaboration, or more exactly, of a strong, sinister influence by the Cominter... To cite the outstanding cases, one is the reorganization of the Communist forces within the Central Army and the placing of it at the front; the other is the release of the seven leaders of the anti-Japanese National Salvation movement including Shen Chun-ju, all of whom have been regarded as the most active leaders in the Chinese popular front movement, and of the noted Communist leaders such as Chen Tu-hsiu and Houlen, for the purpose of reinforcing the anti-Japanese united front. The conclusion of the non-aggression agreement between China and the Soviet Union, which was purposely made public in the midst of the present hostilities with the view of creating an exaggerated impression upon Japanese minds of the increasing consolidation of cooperation between the two countries, when taken together with frequent rumours of Soviet military assistance to the Nanking Government, may also indicate the serious nature of the Communist activities in driving the situation from bad to worse.
Hence the importance of the anti-Communist measure is too obvious to be stressed further. The Japanese Government accordingly proposed to the Nationalist Government the adoption of united defence measures against the Red menace. Nationalist leaders headed by General Chiang Kai-shek, however, intoxicated with anti-Japanese sentiment, refused to consider the Japanese proposal. Should the Nanking Government have responded to Japan's proposal, the present state of affairs may have been very different.

All of the foregoing factors collectively form the real significance of the Japanese-German Agreement against the Communist International, which significance has now been brought home to the Japanese public; its purposes and possibilities have been fully appreciated. Out of this appreciation has sprung a sense of confidence and gratitude, which was intensified in an extraordinary degree as time approached the first anniversary of the conclusion of the Agreement.

Significance of Italy's Participation

Article 2 of the Agreement between Japan and Germany against the Communist International provides that the two countries should jointly invite the participation of third Powers. In accordance with this provision, Italy signed on November 6th, at Rome, the Protocol concerning her participation in the aforementioned Agreement, participating as an original signatory—with equal status—with Japan and Germany. The reason for this action of Italy was clearly stated by the Italian Government in the preamble to the aforementioned Protocol:

Considering that the Communist International is endangering the civilized world in the Orient and the Occident and disturbing and destroying its peace and order, convinced that only close collaboration between all Powers interested in the maintenance of peace and order can check and eliminate that danger, has decided to range herself against that common enemy along with Japan and Germany.

Italy's experience in the past in combating the Communist menace is well known. Taking advantage of the post-War economic disorganization in that country the Communists took possession of all industrial establishments in North Italy; it appeared that the whole nation would soon be placed under the sway of the Red flag. This crisis was saved by the Fascist march on Rome, with the result that Communist operations were altogether eliminated from Italian territories. From that time, the iron-handed policy of Signor Mussolini has effectively overcome Italy's economic and political difficulties, and the united endeavours and indomitable spirit of the nation have built up a powerful Corporate State. Thus with an ideal based on the reconstructed Great Roman Empire, and with one of the most powerful air forces, the stalwart figure of the Italian nation is overshadowing the Mediterranean Sea.
The successful building up of Fascist Italy on the principles of anti-Communism simultaneously rendered valuable contribution toward the maintenance of peace in Europe in that it constituted a strong first line of defense against the westward penetration of the Communist International. The subsequent emergence of the Nazi regime in Germany under the leadership of Herr Hitler, the Führer, has greatly strengthened the anti-Comintern camp in Europe. Germany and Italy have since been fighting vigorously as the two leading nations in the united front against the world-wide Red menace. It is entirely natural that Italy should participate in the international cooperative movement for defending world civilization from the destructive international movement.

The Three Power Pact and its Repercussions

The emergence of the Japanese-German-Italian Agreement, as has been pointed out in an American press opinion, has had an important bearing upon world affairs as "giving an example to the European countries which are at a loss which way to turn." Accordingly, the Agreement, despite the plain fact that it has no particular country as an objective, is not exclusive in nature and has no territorial motives, has created unfriendly criticisms in certain quarters of the Western world on the false assumption that the new Agreement has a far-reaching aim of territorial expansion under cover of anti-Communism. The Soviet Government, in this connection, is reported to have lodged a protest with the Italian Government that the conclusion of the new Agreement is an unfriendly act toward the Soviet Union. The Government at Moscow, however, has long been offering the explanation that the Comintern, being merely an international organization with headquarters in Moscow, has no relation whatever with the Government there. Any criticism or protest, therefore, on the part of the Soviet Government along the line mentioned above is altogether unwarranted.

Another view has been expressed that the united front of Japan, Germany and Italy has essential vulnerabilities in German-Italian relations in respect to the Danubian question and in Japanese-German and Japanese-Italian relations in respect to economic interests. This view is apparently based on a lack of comprehension concerning the coherent spiritual union of the three nations which will "prove to be infinitely valuable in international relations," according to an Italian press opinion. "going beyond the defense against the operations of the Comintern and promoting friendly relations between the three countries." The strength of the spiritual union of nations based upon the community of ideas in respect to anti-Communism and nationalism, as it exists now between the three nations, will be attested by future events.

Whatever may be said of the new Agreement, the fact cannot be denied that it has proved to be a serious shock to the Soviet Union which entitles serious concern over any move on the part of Japan and Germany. Repercussions created by the conclusion of the new Agreement are self-explanatory. At the same time, they endorse the power of the new Pact.
The Task of World Peace

The organization of the united front against the Comintern, a line of defence extending from East to West, connecting Tokyo, Rome and Berlin, constitutes an impressive chapter in the history of modern diplomacy. Indeed, this spiritual highway connecting the three great cities constitutes an invincible line of defence for human progress and world peace against the destructive operations of the Communist International. The fact that the new Agreement implies spiritual cooperation on the part of the three nations, based on profound mutual understanding and respect, has already been explained. It should be added that such spiritual union, by nature, cannot be so frail a tie as to be influenced or harmed by internal and external affairs of the countries concerned. In other words, the fact that Japan has a polity totally different from those of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in no way prevents the three countries from being spiritually united. To speak of Japan as being converted to Fascism by the conclusion of the present Agreement denotes either propaganda of a malicious nature or a fallacious viewpoint.

Now that the stronghold against the world's Red menace has been established, the nations of Japan, Germany and Italy are embarking upon the noble task of safeguarding world peace and human culture by checking and eliminating the destructive forces preying upon the whole of the civilized world. Every member of the Japanese nation is called upon to participate in this honourable and serious task as a soldier of peace.
Concerning the conclusion of the Japanese-German Pact, which was referred to by the Throne for our deliberation, we, the undersigned ministers were ordered to form an Investigation Committee, and held meetings on the 13th and the 15th of this month. Realizing that the matter was very important we proceeded to investigate it with great care by hearing all the explanations we could from the ministers of state and government authorities concerned.

According to the explanations of the competent minister, the Soviet Union has in recent years not only zealously pushed on with her internal construction in accordance with the First and Second Five-Year Plans, but at the same time has completed her national defense. Especially in the Far East she laid extraordinary stress on building up huge armaments. Sometime ago she also concluded with various neighboring countries in Europe non-aggression treaties, or special treaties such as those defining aggressor nations. Then she joined the League of Nations and gradually strengthened her international position in Europe by concluding mutual assistance pacts with France and Czecho-Slovakia last year. She has been accompanying this with a very noticeable increase of pressure in East Asia. The Communist International (so-called Comintern), which is inseparably connected with the Soviet Union, has been trying to promote the advance of Bolshevik activity throughout the world. In recent years the chief objectives of this activity has been transferred from Europe to East Asia, and its influence has been particularly extensive in the areas of Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang and the central part of China. In 1931, a Central Government of Chinese Soviet Republics was established at Juichin, Kiangsi Province, and the total number of the communist army reached some 350,000. Although the Kiangsi Soviet was abandoned when Juichin fell as the result of Chiang Kai-shek's punitive invasion in November 1934, the Communist Army still infests the Chensi, Kansa, and Szechwan districts. Not only that, the Comintern, after the 7th World Conference of 1935, has been conducting increasingly vigorous anti-Chinese activities in China, its tactics this time being those of organizing an anti-Japanese popular front through the Chinese Communist Party. In Manchuria, too, despite strict vigilance on the part of the Japanese and Manchurian government authorities, the Comintern, acting through its subordinate, the Manchurian Commission of the Chinese Communist Party, is doing all it can to implant Communist cells everywhere and encourage roving gangs of military, and also paying great attention to guerilla movements wherever they may be. The fact that these red "Partisan" units are now to be found far and wide, shows that the influence of the Comintern's secret activities in the Far East is not something to be taken lightly.

Comintern activity has recently become very pronounced in the popular front movement in Spain. Judging from the true facts of the present civil war there, it can be proved beyond doubt that the Soviet Union and the Comintern, by their permeation into the internal machinery of other
countries, and their skillfully executed Bolshevik activities there, have caused a profound disturbance to internal tranquility as well as international peace.

Since all this armed intervention by the Soviet Union and all this promotion of the Comintern's Bolshevik activities in the Far East constitute a direct threat to the safety of Japan and Manchuria and also a very difficult obstacle to the execution of Japan's East Asia policy, we must recognize that a counter-measure for them is the most urgent and important question among all the various external problems now confronting Japan. Consequently the Japanese Government has made it the pivotal point of its foreign policy to frustrate the Soviet Union's schemes of aggrandisement and to check the advance of Comintern bolshevization in East Asia. Japan has adopted the policy of achieving this objective by including as one of her three principles for Sino-Japanese negotiations, an insistence on China's cooperation with Japan in eliminating the threat of external Red influence in addition to all appropriate diplomatic measures, coupled with the completion of national defence.

In Germany, however, since the establishment of the Nazi Regime headed by Hitler in 1933, a strict anti-communist policy has been adopted, with the result that German-Soviet relations have suddenly deteriorated. In addition, considerable ill-feeling and uneasiness have been created as the result of the conclusion of those mutual assistance treaties between the Soviet Union and France and between the Soviet Union and Czecho-Slovakia. It is also a fact that at the Comintern's 7th World Congress a resolution was adopted making it the duty of the communist parties of the whole world to consider both Japan and Germany as their enemies and to organize a common front against the two countries. For relations with the Soviet Union and the Comintern, therefore, here placed Germany in a position as similar to Japan's, that she finds it convenient to cooperate with Japan in national defense and anti-communist policies. The Imperial government accordingly planned cooperation with Germany as the first step in executing the foreign policy outlined above. As the result of protracted negotiations carried on since last spring between the Japanese ambassador to Germany and the representatives of the German government, the two countries arrived at an agreement to conclude a special convention for such cooperation. Thus it is that the present pact has been concluded.

The present Japanese-German pact comprises two parts: Pact against the Comintern and the Secret Attatched Pact against the Soviet Union, each of which Parts contains a protocol. The gist of the two parts is as follows:

1. Pact against the Comintern.

The said pact has as its object cooperation for defence against the destructive communist activities of the Comintern (so-called Comintern). The signatory powers agree to exchange information on the activities of the Comintern, consult with each other in adopting
necessary defensive measures and achieve these defensive measures through close operation. (Article I)

The signatories further agree to take defensive measures, in accordance with the purpose of the said pact, against third countries whose internal peace is threatened by the Comintern's destructive activities, or invite such countries to join the said pact (Article II). The official text of this pact shall be written in both Japanese and German, the pact shall become effective as from the date of signing by the plenipotentiaries of the two countries, and remain valid for five years, and the signatories shall reach an understanding at a suitable time before the expiration of the period as to the means of subsequent cooperation between the two countries. (Article III)

The protocol attached to this pact provides that the government officials concerned of the two countries shall closely cooperate with each other in exchanging intelligence about the Comintern's activities and in effecting educational and defensive measures against the Comintern, and take strict measures, within the scope of the present laws, against those who, either within or without the country, directly or indirectly work for the Comintern or assist in its destructive operations; and that in order to facilitate the cooperation between the government officials concerned of the two nations, a standing committee shall be established to study and discuss various measures necessary for preventing the Comintern's destructive operations.

II. Secret Fact Attached to the Pact against the Communist Internationale.

This pact has as its object the protection of the common interests of both Japan and Germany against the armed pressure exerted by the Soviet Union. The signatory powers agree that in case one of the signatory powers is attacked or threatened with attack by the Soviet Union without provocation, the other signatory party shall refrain from taking any measure likely to result in any diminution of the burden of the Soviet Union's position, and the two signatories shall immediately discuss measures to be taken for the protection of their mutual interests. (Article I) The signatories further agree not to conclude, during the continuation of this pact, any political treaties with the Soviet Union which contravene the spirit of this pact, without mutual consent. (Article II) The official text of the pact shall be written in both Japanese and German, the pact shall be put into effect simultaneously with, and shall be effective for the same period as that (Article III)

In the Appendix to this Pact, Nos. 1 and 2 of the official notes exchanged between the Japanese and German plenipotentiaries prescribe that the political treaties mentioned in Article II of the pact do not include the Fishery Treaty and the Concession Treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union, the treaty concerning boundary line problems between Japan, Manchuria and the Soviet Union, and also any other similar treaties which may be concluded between Japan and the Soviet
Union. Official Notes No. 3 and No. 4 confirm the German Government's view that the articles in such political treaties as the Rapallo Treaty of 1922 and the Neutrality Pact of 1926 existing between Germany and the Soviet Union do not conflict with the spirit of the Pact nor Germany's obligations arising from this Pact as long as the object is not lacking in the situation at the time of the enforcement of this Pact. The foregoing items of understanding provide that both countries agree upon keeping secret the pact and the attached official notes, and also that even if communication of the contents of the Pact to a third power ever happens to be to the interest of both parties, such notification shall be made only with their mutual consent.

In reply to our questions regarding the object of concluding the Pact and other matters, the competent Minister has given us full explanations, the chief points of which are as follows:

(1) Inasmuch as this Pact has as its object nothing but cooperation between Japan and Germany in defending themselves from the Comintern's destructive activities and in checking the armed pressure of the Soviet Union, Japan's cooperation with Germany for this particular object through this Pact in no way whatever implies that Japan fully approves of that country's principles in respect to her internal affairs or that Japan will act in concert with her. In order to prevent any suspicion and misunderstanding at home and abroad regarding this point, the Government will clarify the purport of the Pact and also do its best to take other appropriate measures at the same time as it publishes such parts of the Pact as are to be made public.

(2) Since the object of this Pact is, as mentioned above, simply to make it an instrument for preparing for the Comintern and the Soviet Union, we on our side should of course refrain even after the conclusion of this Pact, from taking any positive measure which might aggravate relations with the Soviet Union. As to the deceleration of the boundary line, the settlement of boundary disputes, and other matters of negotiation between Japan and the Soviet Union, the Government will constantly give its most devoted attention in order to adjust as may be best the two countries' amicable relations. Moreover, the Government will always do its utmost to maintain and promote amicable relations between Japan and Britain and the United States, especially the cordial relations between Japan and Britain.

(3) It is a matter of deep concern as to what influence the conclusion of this Pact will have on the present Sino-Japanese negotiations. The fact that the conclusion of the Pact will further strengthen Japan's position ought to prove quite effective in making China decide her attitude. We are not without expectations, therefore, of being able to use this situation for promoting developments in the Sino-Japanese negotiations favorable to ourselves. The Government is resolved to leave nothing undone in its means for coping with the situation.
(4) In view of the fact that the conclusion of this Fact is due to the recent political change in Germany and the establishment of the Nazi Regime, the actual effect of the Fact will, of course, depend in no small measure upon the subsequent vicissitudes of the Nazi Regime. However, since the present regime, which came into power only after Germany had experienced all the innumerable tribulations consequent to the World War and after successive governments had won the characterisation of the whole nation, is steadily achieving success in both internal administration and diplomacy, and has won a firm hold on the confidence of a large number of the people, thanks to its unique principle, without resorting to revolutionary behaviour, there is no likelihood of its collapsing easily at least in the near future. Consequently no special difficulty will be felt in securing effective results from the Fact in the future.

(5) The wording of the statements contained in Official Notes No. 3 and No. 4 of the appendix to the second pact mentioned above is, we regret to say, somewhat deficient in clarity. However, they confirm the view of the German Government that among the articles in the Rapidus Fact and the Neutrality Fact existing between Germany and the Soviet Union, those which conflict with the spirit of the present Japanese-German Fact and Germany's obligations arising thereunder will become invalid as the result of the extinction of their object in the light of the situation prevalent when the present Fact is enforced. There is no doubt on this point, as may be judged from the fact that during the course of the negotiations on the present Fact our ambassador to Germany wired the following telegram to our Foreign Minister after obtaining the consent of the representative of the German Government.

"I have the firm conviction that the spirit of this Fact will prove to be the sole basis of Germany's future policy toward the Soviet Union."

It seems to us that this Japanese-German Fact is an agreement, based on the common interest of the two countries, for taking appropriate measures in cooperation for a joint defence of the two countries from the destructive activities of the Communist Internationals, and for maintaining close cooperation between them for a joint stand against the armed pressure of the Soviet Union. It goes without saying that there is very great significance in Japan's conclusion of a special pact such as this one with Germany. Although serious consideration should of course be given to the various probable internal as well as external influences of this Fact, it is rather a timely measure for Japan, in consideration of the present international situation, to conclude the present Fact and cooperate with Germany as one of the counter-measures for defending themselves from and checking the aggressive pressure of the Communist Internationals and the Soviet Union. It, accordingly, recommends that on the whole there is no objection to the
text or to the attached documents. However, since the aim of the
Communist International is to destroy and replace existing nations
by every means it can find, and since its activities in any individual
country certainly threaten the peace of the whole world, as already
mentioned in the introduction to that no. 1, efforts should be made
to achieve fully effective results through world-wide international
cooperation in exchanging intelligence concerning the activities of
the Internationals and in concerted the necessary defensive measures
against them. Accordingly, it is the earnest desire of this committee
that following the conclusion of this fact, the Imperial Government
will, in joint cooperation with the German Government in accordance
with the provisions of Article II, endeavour to induce as many third
powers as circumstances permit to join the said pact or take defensive
measures in accordance with the purport of the said pact, in order to
achieve the desired object. The Investigation Committee unanimously
recommends that this item be approved without any amendment and also
submit the foregoing wishes.

We submit the foregoing report on the results of our investigations.

Nov. 20th, 1936.

Chairman of the Investigation Committee:

ARAII KONTARO, Vice President of the Privy Council.

Members of the Investigation Committee:

KONTARO KONTAII, Privy Councillor.
KNTIIII. " "
WATANABE MIHI, Mikihiro, " "
AGIKA PROTOIII, " "
MATSUJIMA, K. " "
FUJIIIO, SAKII, " "
BARON IMAIHashi CONSUL.

To Baron H.M. KOLLHORIICHIHI, President of the Privy Council.

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Proj. No. 199
S. A. No. 15049
Seek No.
Item No. 15-13-2

EXPLANATION OF THE PRIVY MINISTER (HIMOKA) AS TO THE
CONCLUSION OF JAPAN-GERMANY PACT AT THE INVESTIGATION
COUNCIL, OF PRIVY COUNCIL.

As you know the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as the result
of strengthening of her national defense and the promotion of her inter-
national position in recent years, she has built up her armaments in
the Far East to put heavy armed pressure upon East Asia. On the other
hand, it is quite evident that she is acting to put East Asia into dis-
turbance, mobilizing the Comintern Internationals. These actions
are direct menace to our national defense and also they clearly are very
difficult obstacle to the execution of Japan's East Asia policy, and
since the former government has insisted on China's cooperation with Japan
in eliminating the threat of external Red influence from Outer Mongolia
and others, as one of the three principles of Shangayaki negotiations,
the present government has made it the pivotal point of its foreign policy
to frustrate the Soviet Union's schemes of rearmament, especially to
dissolve the threat to the national defense of Japan by her own armaments
and to check the advance of Comintern Bolshevikism in East Asia.

Also in Europe, Germany has in recent years been placed in a position
so similar to Japan's that she must check the advance of Bolshevikism
and also she is threatened by huge armaments of Soviet Union. Conse-
quently we have found it a good chance to conclude a pact between Japan
and Germany who have common interests with respect to those points,
with a view to common defense against the destructive activity of the
Communist Internationals and check of the armed advance of the Soviet
Union.

According to the present pact, as the text elucidates itself, it is
clear that the third country can be induced in order to take common defensive
measures against the Bolshevik activities, therefore, Japan's cooperation
with Germany for this particular object through this pact in no way whatever
implies that Japan fully approves of that country's principles in respect
to her internal affairs or that Japan will act in concert with her.

Since the object of the present pact is simply to make it an instru-
ment for preparing for checking the armed pressure of the Soviet Union
and Bolshevik activities, we on our side shall of course refrain from
taking any positive measures which might aggravate relations with the
Soviet Union. As to the construction of the boundary line of Japan,
Mandchuria and the Soviet Union, the settlement of boundary dispute,
and other matters of intercourse between Japan and the Soviet Union,
the Government will constantly give its most devoted attention in order
to adjust as best to serve the two countries' diplomatic relations.

Moreover, as Japan will cooperate with Germany by the conclusion
of this pact, the government will always do its utmost to maintain
and promote amiable relations between Japan and Britain and the United
States, especially the vital relations between Japan and Britain.

I hope you would fully discuss and investigate the draft of this
pact.
national position in recent years, she has built up huge armaments in the Far East to put heavy armed pressure upon East Asia. On the other hand, it is quite evident that she is acting to put East Asia into disturbance, mobilizing the Communist International. Since these armors are direct menace to our national defense and also they clearly a very difficult obstacle to the execution of Japan's East Asia policy, and since the former government has insisted on China's cooperation with Japan in eliminating the threat of external bad influence from Outer Mongolia and others, as one of the three principles of Sinophone negotiations, the present government has made it the pivotal point of its foreign policy to frustrate the Soviet Union's scheme of reimbursement, especially to dissolve the threat to the national defense of Japan by her armaments and to check the advance of Communist Bolshevisation in East Asia.

Also in Europe, Germany has in recent years been placed in a position so similar to Japan's that she must check the advance of Bolshevisation and also she is threatened by huge armaments of Soviet Union. Consequently we have found it a good chance to conclude a pact between Japan and Germany who have common interests with respect to those points, with a view of common defense against the destructive activity of the Communist International and check of the armed advance of the Soviet Union.

According to the present pact, as the text elucidates itself, it is clear that the third country can be induced in order to take common defensive measures against the Bolshevistic activities, therefore, Japan's cooperation with Germany for this particular object through this pact in no way whatever implies that Japan fully approves of that country's principles in respect to her internal affairs or that Japan will act in concert with her.

Since the object of the present pact is simply to make it an instrument for preparing for checking the armed pressure of the Soviet Union and Bolshevistic activities, on our side small of course refrain from taking any positive measures which might aggravate relations with the Soviet Union. As to the composition of the boundary line of Japan, Manchukuo and the Soviet Union, the settlement of boundary disputes, and other matters of negotiation between Japan and the Soviet Union, the Government will accordingly give its most devoted attention in order to adjust as soon as possible the two countries' diplomatic relations.

Moreover, as Japan will cooperate with Germany by the conclusion of this pact, so the government will always do its utmost to maintain and promote friendly relations between Japan and Britain and the United States, especially a solid relations between Japan and Britain.

I hope you would fully discuss and investigate the draft of this pact.
EXPLANATION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER (AKITA) AS TO THE OCCURRENCE OF JAPANESE-GERMAN FACT AT THE INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE OF PARTY SCHOOL (NOVEMBER 13, 1936)

I. It is a remarkable fact that in recent years the Soviet Union has not only pushed on with her internal construction in accordance with the so-called Five-Year Plan, but has also conclusively completed her national defense, especially in the Far East, she laid extraordinary stress on strengthening armaments. In Europe, the Soviet Union has concluded non-aggressive treaties or special treaties such as those defining aggressive nations with various neighboring countries successively and joined the League of Nations too. Especially last year by conclusion of mutual assistance treaties between the Soviet Union and France and also between the Soviet Union and Czecho-Slovakia, the Soviet Union has promoted her international position in Europe, and consequently with the aggrandizement of armaments in Far East, the pressure exerted by the Soviet Union upon East Asia district is increasing.

II. Next, it may be needless to say about the inseparable relations between the Soviet Union and Comintern, and the details of Bolshevik activities of Comintern may be found in the separate protocol near at hand. To explain a few of the most remarkable examples, at the beginning of the Russian revolution, the Comintern strived to bolshevize various countries of Europe; but finding that the political and economical foundations of various countries of Europe so solid, it has transferred the chief objectives of this activity from Europe to West Asia and since then its invasion has been particularly extended in the areas of Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang and the central part of China. In 1931, Central Government of Chinese Soviet Republics was established in Kajenta, Kiangsi Province, and the total number of the Communist Army reached one 250,000. Although the Kiangsi Soviet was abandoned when Szechin fell as the result of Chiang Kai-shek's punitive invasion in November 1931, the Communist Army still infects the Chenchin, Man-ji and Shansi districts. Not only that, the Comintern, after the 7th World Conference of 1935, has been conducting increasingly vigorous with Chinese activity in China, its tactics this time being those of proceeding on anti-Japanese popular front through the Chinese Communist Party. In Manchuria, too, despite the strict vigilance on the part of the Japanese and Manchurian government authorities, the Comintern, acting through its subordinate, the Manchuria Commission of the Chinese Communist Party, in doing all it can to Communist cells everywhere and encouraging roving gangs of military, and also paying great attention to guerrilla movements wherever they may be. The fact that these Red "Partisan" units are now to be found far and wide, shows that the influence of the Comintern's secret activities in Manchuria is not somthing to be taken lightly.
As for Europe, the Comintern activity has recently become very pronounced in the popular movements in Spain. Judging from the two facts of the present civil war there, it can be proved beyond doubt that the Soviet Union and the Comintern, by their penetration into the internal machinery of other countries, and their skillfully mounted Bolshevik activities there, have caused a profound disturbance to internal tranquility as well as international peace.

III. As I have told you just now, the armed intervention by the Soviet Union and the penetration of the Comintern’s Bolshevik activities in the Far East constitute a direct threat to the safety of Japan and Manchuria and also a very difficult obstacle to the execution of Japan’s East Asia policy, so we must recognize that a counter measure for this is the most urgent and important question among all the various external problems now confronting Japan.

Since such is the present situation, the present Government has made it the pivot of its foreign policy to frustrate the Soviet Union’s schemes of militarization and to check the advance of Comintern bolshevization in East Asia.

IV. In Germany, however, since the establishment of the Nazi Regime headed by Hitler in 1933, a strict anti-communist policy has been adopted, with the result that German-Soviet relations have suddenly deteriorated. In addition, considerable difficulties and misunderstandings have been created as the result of the conclusion of these mutual assistance treaties between the Soviet Union and France and also between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. It is also a fact that at the Comintern’s 7th World Congress a resolution was adopted asking the duty of the Comintern workers of the whole world to consider both Japan and Germany in their schemes and to organize a common front against the two countries. The relations with the Soviet Union and the Comintern, therefore, have placed Germany in a position so similar to Japan’s that she finds it convenient to cooperate with Japan in national defense and international policies.

7. The Government accordingly planned cooperation with Germany on the first basis in executing the foreign policy I have just explained, and in spring of this year, dopo Ambassador MUSASHI returned to his post in Berlin, the government turned him to find the intention of Germany. Thus we have confirmed that Germany also secretly desired the cooperation with us and as a result of secret negotiations carried on between the Japanese ambassador to Germany and REPRESENTATIVE of the German Government, the two countries arrived at the present draft of agreement. And so Ambassador MUSASHI was expected to go to his post of German ambassador to Berlin, but Ambassador MUSASHI and Ambassador REPRESENTATIVE visited or signed a letter in order to determine the draft before Ambassador MUSASHI went to his post.

The present draft comprises: Pact against Comintern, protocol attached to it, the Secret Attaché Pact, Appendix and Agreements. The pact against the Comintern has its object cooperation for defense
against the destructive communist activities of the Comintern and for this purpose the pact has a provision that the signatory powers agree to exchange information on the activities of the Comintern, consult with each other in adopting necessary defensive measures and achieve those defensive measures through close operations. There is also a provision that the signatories further agree to take defensive measures, in accordance with the purport of the said pact, against third countries whose internal peace is threatened by the Comintern's destructive activities, or invite such countries to join the said pact.

The protocol attached to this pact has its object the concrete measures necessary to the execution of the pact for Comintern and provides that the government officials concerned of the two countries shall closely cooperate with each other, strict measures shall be taken against those who work for the Comintern and a standing committee shall be established.

The secret pact attached to the pact has its object the protection of the common interests of both Japan and Germany against the threat exerted by the Soviet Union. The signatory powers agree that in case one of the signatory powers is attacked or threatened with attack by the Soviet Union without provocation, the other signatory party shall refrain from taking any measure likely to result in any diminution of the burden of the Soviet Union's position, and the two signatories shall immediately discuss measures to be taken for the protection of their mutual interests. And this pact also provides that the signatories agree not to conclude, during the continuation of this pact, any political treaties with the Soviet Union which contravene the spirit of this pact, without mutual consent.

Numbers 1 and 2 of the Appendix to this pact elucidate the understanding of both governments that the political treaties mentioned in Article II of the pact do not include the Fishery Treaty and the Concession Treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union, the treaty concerning boundary line problems between Japan, Manchuria and the Soviet Union, and also any other similar treaties which may be concluded between Japan and the Soviet Union. Official notes No. 3 and No. 4 confirm the German government's view that the articles in such political treaties as the Rapallo Treaty and the Neutrality Pact existing between Germany and the Soviet Union do not conflict with the spirit of this pact and Germany's obligations arising from this pact as long as the object is not lacking in the situation at the time of the enforcement of this pact. The items of understanding prescribe the keeping secret of the secret pact attached to the pact as well as from No. 1 to No. 4 of the Appendix, that is to say, they provide that both signatories agree upon keeping secret the secret pact attached to the pact as well as from No. 1 to No. 4 of the Appendix, and also that even if communication of the contents of the said Pact to a third power ever happens to be to the interest of both signatories, such notification shall be made only with their mutual consent.
VI. In conclusion I should like to add a few words. The Japanese Government should of course refrain from taking any positive measure which might aggravate relations with the Soviet Union, and as to the various questions concerning the demarcation of the boundary line of Japan, Manchuria and Soviet Union, the Government will continue the negotiation with the Soviet Union in order to solve the said questions; consequently in the case of negotiation and conclusion of the present Japanese-German Pact, although it has been contrived most effectively to restrain the Soviet Union by the present Pact, the Government has done its utmost not to irritate excessively the Soviet Union side. In other words, in the Articles of the Pact for the Comintern, no words have been used likely to class the Comintern with the Soviet Union and besides we have kept the Appendix to the Pact as well as the attached official notes secret. These have done with the precautions just mentioned.

I hope you would fully discuss and investigate this matter.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, M. Trksatsuji hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary, Privy Council and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 7 pages, dated 15 Nov., 1936, and described as follows: Proceedings of Privy Council re rectification of Japan-German Anti-Comintern Agreements.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Privy Council.

Signed at Tokyo on this 27th day of August, 1946 /s/ M. Trksatsuji
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Kiichi, Chosekabe
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 27th day of August, 1946 /s/ Edward P. Monaghan
NAME

Witness: /s/ R. H. Larsh
Investigator, IPS.
Official Capacity
Japanese Embassy
Berlin

Berlin, 23 October 1936

Mr. Ambassador:

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that I sent the attached telegram to Foreign Minister ARITA together with the telegraphic information, that today the signing was concluded.

At the same time I welcome the opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest esteem.

(signed) MISHAKOJI

To His Excellency, Foreign Minister ARITA

Item IVB

Japanese Embassy
Berlin

Ambassador in Berlin, Viscount MISHAKOJI,
To His Excellency, Foreign Minister ARITA


Concerning the inclosures III and IV of the Secret Annexed Agreement to the Agreement against the Communist International I have as a result of my negotiations with Mr. VON RIBBENTROP the firm conviction that only the spirit of the above mentioned secret agreement will be decisive for Germany's future policy towards the U.S.S.R.

I showed VON RIBBENTROP this telegram and received his agreement.

MISHAKOJI

/87-21/
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. J. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. J. Cumming

W. J. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATIONS CONCERNING THE CONCLUSION OF THE JAPANESE-GERMAN PACT

Concerning the conclusion of the Japanese-German Pact, which was referred to by the Throne for our deliberation, we, the undersigned ministers were ordered to form an Investigation Committee, and held meetings on the 15th and the 16th of this month. Realizing that the matter was very important we proceeded to investigate it with great care by hearing all the explanations we could from the ministers of state and government authorities concerned.

According to the explanations of the competent minister, the Soviet Union has in recent years not only zealously pushed on with her internal construction in accordance with the First and Second Five-Year Plans, but at the same time has completed her national defense. Especially in the Far East she laid extraordinary stress on building up huge armaments. Simultaneously she also concluded with various neighboring countries in Europe non-aggression treaties, or special treaties such as those defining aggressor nations. Then she joined the League of Nations and gradually strengthened her international position in Europe by concluding mutual assistance pacts with France and Czechoslovakia last year. She has been accompanying this with a very noticeable increase of pressure in East Asia. The Communist Internationale (so-called Comintern), which is inseparably connected with the Soviet Union, has been trying to promote the advance of Bolshevist activity throughout the world. In recent years the chief objectives of this activity have been transferred from Europe to East Asia, and its invasion has been particularly extensive in the areas of Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang and the central part of China. In 1931, a Central Government of Chinese Soviet Republics was established at Juijin, Jiangai Province, and the total number of the communist army reached some 350,000. Although the Jiangai Soviet was abandoned when Juijin fell as the result of Chiang Kai-shek's punitive invasion in November 1934, the Communist Army still infests the Chanshi, Kansu, and Szechuan districts. Not only that, the Comintern, after the 7th World Conference of 1935, has been conducting increasingly vigorous anti-Chinese activities in China, its tactics this time being those of organizing an anti-Japanese popular front through the Chinese Communist Party. In Manchuria, too, despite strict vigilance on the part of the Japanese and Manchurian government authorities, the Comintern, acting through its subordinate, the Manchurian Commission of the Chinese Communist Party, is doing all it can to implant Communist cells everywhere and encourage roving gangs of military, and also paying great attention to guerrilla movements wherever they may be. The fact that there are now to be found far and wide, shows that the influence of the Comintern's secret activities in the Far East is not something to be taken lightly.

Comintern activity has recently become very pronounced in the popular front movement in Spain. Judging from the true facts of the present civil war there, it can be proved beyond doubt that the Soviet Union and the Comintern, by their penetration into the internal machinery of other
countries, and their skillfully executed Bolshevik activities there, have caused a profound disturbance to internal tranquility as well as international peace.

Since all this armed intervention by the Soviet Union and the promotion of the Comintern's Bolshevik activities in the Far East constitute a direct threat to the safety of Japan and Manchuria and also a very difficult obstacle to the execution of Japan's East Asia policy, we must recognize that a counter-measure for them is the most urgent and important question now; all the various external problems now confronting Japan. Consequently the Japanese Government has made it the pivot of its foreign policy to frustrate the Soviet Union's schemes of grandiose ambition and to check the advance of Comintern bolshevization in East Asia. Japan has adopted the policy of achieving this objective by including, as one of her three principles for Sino-Japanese negotiations, an insistence on China's cooperation with Japan in eliminating the threat of external Red influence in addition to all appropriate diplomatic measures, coupled with the completion of national defence.

In Germany, however, since the establishment of the Nazi Regime headed by Hitler in 1933, a strict anti-communist policy has been adopted, with the result that German-Soviet relations have suddenly deteriorated. In addition, considerable ill-feeling and uneasiness have been created as the result of the conclusion of those mutual assistance treaties between the Soviet Union and France and between the Soviet Union and Czecho-Slovakia. It is also a fact that at the Comintern's 7th World Congress a resolution was adopted making it the duty of the communist parties of the whole world to consider both Japan and Germany as their enemies and to organize a common front against the two countries. Her relations with the Soviet Union and the Comintern, therefore, have placed Germany in a position so similar to Japan's, that she finds it convenient to cooperate with Japan in national defense and anti-communist policies. The Imperial Government accordingly planned cooperation with Germany as the first step in executing the foreign policy outlined above. As the result of protracted negotiations carried on since last spring between the Japanese ambassador to Germany and the representatives of the German government, the two countries arrived at an agreement to conclude a special convention for such cooperation. Thus it is that the present pact has been concluded.

The present Japan-German pact comprises two pacts: Pact against the Communist International and the Secret Attached Pact against the Soviet Union, each of which contains a protocol. The gist of the two pacts is as follows:

I. Pact against the Communist International.

The said pact has as its object cooperation for defence against the destructive communist activities of the Communist International (so-called Comintern). The signatory powers agree to exchange information on the activities of the Comintern, consult with each other in adopting
necessary defensive measures and achieve these defensive measures through close operation. (Article I)

The signatories further agree to take defensive measures, in accordance with the purport of the said pact, against third countries whose internal peace is threatened by the Comintern's destructive activities, or invite such countries to join the said pact (Article II). The official text of this pact shall be written in both Japanese and German. The pact shall become effective as from the date of signing by the plenipotentiaries of the two countries, and remain valid for five years, and the signatories shall reach an understanding at a suitable time before the expiration of the period as to the means of subsequent cooperation between the two countries. (Article III)

The protocol attached to this pact provides that the government officials concerned of the two countries shall closely cooperate with each other in exchanging intelligence about the Comintern's activities and in effecting educational and defensive measures against the Comintern, and take strict measures, within the scope of the present laws, against those who, either within or without the country, directly or indirectly work for the Comintern or assist in its destructive operations; and that in order to facilitate the cooperation between the government officials concerned of the two nations, a standing committee shall be established to study and discuss various measures necessary for preventing the Comintern's destructive operations.

II. Secret Pact Attached to the Pact against the Communist Internationale.

This pact has as its object the protection of the common interests of both Japan and Germany against the armed pressure exerted by the Soviet Union. The signatory powers agree that in case one of the signatory powers is attacked or threatened with attack by the Soviet Union without provocation, the other signatory party shall refrain from taking any measure likely to result in any diminution of the burden of the Soviet Union's position, and the two signatories shall immediately discuss measures to be taken for the protection of their mutual interests. (Article I) The signatories further agree not to conclude, during the continuation of this pact, any political treaties with the Soviet Union which contravene the spirit of this pact, without mutual consent. (Article II) The official text of the pact shall be written in both Japanese and German, the pact shall be put into effect simultaneously with, and shall be effective for the same period as that of Pact No. 1. (Article III)

In the Appendix to this Pact, Nos. 1 and 2 of the official notes exchanged between the Japanese and German plenipotentiaries prescribe that the political treaties mentioned in Article II of the pact do not include the Fishery Treaty and the Concession Treaty between Japan and the Soviet Union, the treaty concerning boundary line problems between Japan, Manchuria and the Soviet Union, and also any other similar treaties which may be concluded between Japan and the Soviet
Union. Official Notes No. 3 and No. 4 confirm the German Government's view that the articles in such political treaties as the Rapallo Treaty of 1922 and the Neutrality Pact of 1926 existing between Germany and the Soviet Union do not conflict with the spirit of this Pact and Germany's obligations arising from this Pact as long as the object is not lacking in the situation at the time of the enforcement of this Pact. The foregoing items of understanding provide that both countries agree upon keeping secret the Pact and the attached official notes, and also that even if communication of the contents of the Pact to a third power ever happens to be to the interest of both parties, such notification shall be made only with their mutual consent.

In reply to our questions regarding the object of concluding the Pact and other matters, the competent Minister has given us full explanations, the chief points of which are as follows:

1. Inasmuch as this Pact has as its object nothing but cooperation between Japan and Germany in opposing themselves from the Comintern's destructive activities and in checking the armed pressure of the Soviet Union, Japan's cooperation with Germany for this particular object through this Pact in no way whatever implies that Japan fully approves of that country's principles in respect to her internal affairs or that Japan will act in concert with her. In order to prevent any suspicion and misunderstanding at home and abroad regarding this point, the Government will clarify the purport of the Pact and also do its best to take other appropriate measures at the same time as it publishes such parts of the Pact as are to be made public.

2. Since the object of this Pact is, as mentioned above, simply to make it an instrument for preparing for the Comintern and the Soviet Union, we on our side shall of course refrain even after the conclusion of this Pact, from taking any positive measure which might aggravate relations with the Soviet Union. As to the delimitation of the boundary line, the settlement of boundary disputes, and other matters of negotiation between Japan and the Soviet Union, the Government will constantly give its most devoted attention in order to adjust as may be best the two countries' diplomatic relations. Moreover, the Government will always do its utmost to maintain and promote amicable relations between Japan and Britain and the United States, especially the cordial relations between Japan and Britain.

3. It is a matter of deep concern as to what influence the conclusion of this Pact will have on the present Sino-Japanese negotiations. The fact that the conclusion of the Pact will further strengthen Japan's position ought to prove quite effective in making China decide her attitude, but we are not without expectations, therefore, of being able to use this situation for promoting developments in the Sino-Japanese negotiations favorable to ourselves. The Government is resolved to leave nothing undone in its measures for coping with the situation.
In view of the fact that the conclusion of this Pact is
in the recent political climate in Europe and the establishment
of the Nazi regime, the actual effect of the Pact will of
course, depend on a series of measures from the governments
concerned in the Nazi regime. However, after their
official announcement, while they will be criticized, they will
at least indirectly, in a certain extent, be considered
for their wartime occupation. By means of this
arrangement, the government's strategy, which has
been criticized, will be shifted to an internal
administration and diplomacy, and has been a solution
to the conflict of a large number of people, through
the means of words, without recrimination to revolutionary
behavior, etc. to be established in the following entity
at least in the near future. Consequently, it is not
likely to fail in securing effective results from the Pact
in the future.

The wording of the statements contained in Official Note
No. 3 and No. 4 of the appendix to the second part mentioned
above in, we report to say, somewhat deficient in clarity.
However, they express the view of the Japanese Government that
among the objectives in the Japanese-French and the Neutrality
Pact of Latin America, Germany and the Soviet Union, in which
conflict with the spirit of the present Japan-France Pact and
Germany's obligations, writing France will declare
for theurt to the extent of their objectivity in
the spirit of the convention. At this point, we may say
that it is not only on this point, as may be
expected, the fact that during the course of the negotiations
in the course of which our ambassador to Germany wired the follow-
ing telegram to our Foreign Minister after obtaining the amount
of the representative of the German Government.

"I have informed, in a short statement, that the spirit of this Pact will
provide for the basis of our future policy toward the
Soviet Union."

It seems to be the case that this Japan-German Pact is an agreement,
based on the general view of the two countries, for taking appropriate
measures in international affairs in a joint sense of the two countries for
the interests and objectives of the Bonn-Hamburg International, and for
the present international situation, in order to prevent any joint stand
against the war on the part of the Soviet Union. It goes without saying that
there is very much a difference in Japan's conclusion of a special
pact with France with that. Although various consideration
should be made to the extent of the various historic interests as well as
eventual full course of this Pact, it is rather timely process to
have in mind the present international situation, to
accept the statement of the Japanese-French Pact and the Soviet
Union. Accordingly, we place due on the whole there is no objection to the
We submit the following report on the results of our investigation:

Nov. 20th, 1950.

Chairman of the Investigation Committee:

...Palma... Vice-President of the Privy Council.

Members of the Investigation Committee:

[Names of members are listed here.]

To: Very Hon. Sir Anthony, President of the Privy Council.
national position in recent years, she has built up her armaments to the point where she is now a threat to peace. If she ever really held the hands of the Soviet Union, it is quite evident that she is better to put that fact into the turmoil, subduing the Communist International. Since these nations are direct menace to world peace, the most difficult obstacle to the execution of Stalin's first five-year plan, and since the former government of Japan is changing its foreign policy, especially so as one of the three principles of her foreign policy, the present government has not in the present field of international policy to frustrate the Soviet Union's scheme of the world, especially to dissolve the threat to the national defense of Japan by her own armament and to check the advance of Communist International in these in.

Also in Europe, Germany has in recent years been placed in a position so similar to Japan's that she must catch the advance of Fascism and also she is threatened by war or conflict of Soviet Russia. Consequently we have found in a new source to solidify a pact between Japan and Germany who have common interests with respect to three points, with a view of central defense against the destructive activity of the Communist International and check of the armed advance of the Soviet Union.

According to the present pact, as the text elucidates itself, it is clear that the third country can be attended in order to take certain defensive measures against the Fascist activity. Therefore, Japan's cooperation with Germany is for this particular object through this pact in no way whatever implies that Japan fully accepts if other country's principles in respect to her internal affairs or that Japan will act in concert with her.

Since the object of the present pact is simply to make it an instrument for assisting her check on the dual pressure of the Soviet Union and Fascist's activities, we are sure that even if so, of course refrain from taking any part in any steps which may prejudice relations with the Soviet Union. As for the attempts of the Soviet Union to intervene in the internal affairs of Japan, without being a pretexts for Japan and the Soviet Union, the German pact will show itself to be a most definite action in order to adjust to her own in the common diplomatic solution.

Moreover, we have to cooperate with Germany by the conclusion of this pact, in the prevention of dual pressure on Japan, to maintain and protect her national existence and interests and the United States, especially the United States and Britain.

I hope you would kindly examine and investigate the draft of this pact.
EXPLANATION OF THE POLITICAL MINISTER (NKH) at
TO THEDITION OF JAPAN-CHINA IN 1931 IN THE
INVESTIGATION COURT OF MILITARY ACTION (20-OCT-1933)

I. It is a remarkable fact that in recent years the Soviet Union
has not only pursued a policy of internal construction in accordance
with the so-called Five-Year Plan, but has also steadily completed
national defense, especially in the Far East, she has extraordinary stress;
on strengthening armaments. In Europe, the Soviet Union has concluded
non-aggressive treaties or special treaties such as those defining
aggressive nations with various neighboring countries successively and
joined the League of Nations too. Especially last year by conclusion
of mutual assistance treaties between the Soviet Union and France and
ealso between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union
has promoted her international position in Europe, and consequently
with the armament of armaments in Far East, the pressure exerted
by the Soviet Union upon East Asia district is increasing.

II. Next, it may be needless to say about the inseparable
relations between the Soviet Union and Comintern, and the details
of Bolshevik activities of Comintern may be found in the separate
protocol near at hand. To explain a few of the most remarkable examples,
at the beginning of the Russian revolution, the Comintern strove to
bolshize various countries of Europe; but finding that the political
and economical foundations of various countries of Europe so solid, it
has transferred the chief objectives of this activity from Europe to
East Asia and since then its invasion has been particularly extended
in the areas of Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang and the central part of
China. In 1931, Central Government of Chinese Soviet Republics was
established in Kindsen, Khingan Province, and the total number of the
Communist Army reached some 200,000. Although the Kiangsi Soviet
was abandoned when Kuchin fell as the result of Chiang Kai-shek’s
guerrilla invasion in December 1934, the Communist Army still inflicts the
Cheroi, Ensu and Szechwan districts. Not only that, the Comintern,
after the 7th World Conference of 1923, has been conducting increasingly
vigorous anti-Chinese activity in China, its tactics this time being those of
organizing an anti-Japanese popular front through the Chinese
Communist Army. In Manchuria, too, owing to the strict vigilance on
the part of the Japanese and Manchurian government authorities, the
Comintern, acting through its subordinate, the Manchuria Commission of the
Chinese Communist Party is doing all it can to Communist cells every-
where and encourage roving, gangs of military, and also paying great
attention to guerrilla movements wherever they may be. The fact that
these Red "Partisan" units are now to be found far and wide, shows
that the influence of the Comintern's secret activities in Manchuria
is not something to be taken lightly.
As far as Europe, the Comintern activity has recently been very pronounced in the popular movement in Poland. Judging from the broad face of the present civil war there, it can be noted that the Soviet Union and the Comintern, by their action both in the internal machinery of other countries and their skillfully directed Comintern activities there, have caused a profound disturbance to internal tranquility as well as international peace.

III. In Japan, however, the world interpretation of the Soviet Union and its operation by the Comintern, particularly in the Far East of China, a great harm to the interest of Japan and Manchuria and also a very serious threat to the safety of Japan's Far East policy, so we must recognize that a serious situation for that is the most urgent and important problem of all the various external problems now confronting Japan.

Since such is the present situation, the present Government has made it the pivotal part of its foreign policy to frustrate the Soviet Union's schemes of dominion and to check the advance of Comintern bolshevization in East Asia.

IV. In Germany, however, since the establishment of the Nazi Regime headed by Hitler in 1933, a strict anti-communist policy has been adopted, with the result that German-Soviet relations have entirely deteriorated. In addition, conditions in this country are such that new threats have been created in the shape of the conclusion of three armed assistance treaties between the Soviet Union and France and also between the Soviet Union and Czecho-Slovakia. It is clear that under the Comintern's influence, the government was obliged, making it the duty of the foreign policy of the state itself to conclude both of these three treaties. It is also necessary to preserve the status of Germany and the Comintern which is based in a country so entirely dependent as Germany is so we shall do our utmost to cooperate with Japan in national defense and activities of the same sort.

V. The closest and significantly planned cooperation with Germany on all of these matters was the draft treaty which we have mentioned, and on this draft treaty all of the German officials and statesmen have been agreed to sign, and the intention of Germany is to be understood as having the capacity to control the conclusion of the treaty on the basis of the relations carried out on the Comintern protocol between the Soviet Union and Germany. Mr. KOTJYCH of the Soviet Union has now concluded at the present draft of agreements. It has now been reported to the Führer that the draft was presented to him and that the Führer has placed the protocol, which is the Führer's proposal for the above-mentioned treaty, in Mr. KOTJYCH's hands in order to determine the draft before submitting it to the Führer for his approval.
against the destructive economic activities of the Courinterc and for this purpose the pact has a provision that the signatory powers agree to exchange information on the activities of the Courinterc, consult with each other in taking necessary defensive measures and achieve these defensive measures through close cooperation. There is also a provision that the signatories further agree to take defensive measures, in accordance with the support of the third pact, or other third countries whose internal peace is threatened by the Courinterc destructive activities, or invite such countries to join the said pact.

The protocol attached to this pact has the object of the concrete measures necessary to the execution of the pact for Courinterc and provides that the power that is the aggressor of the two countries shall immediately cooperate with each other, and that measures shall be taken against those who work for the Courinterc and a standing committee shall be established.

The secret pact attached to the pact has the object of the protection of the common interests of both Japan and Germany against the threat exerted by the Soviet Union. The signatory powers agree that in case one of the signatory powers is attacked or threatened with attack by the Soviet Union with or without the provocation, the other signatory party shall start from today, any measure likely to result in any diminution of the power of the Soviet Union's military, and the two signatory powers shall immediately discuss means of taking for the protection of their mutual interests. An this pact also provided that the signatories agree not to conclude, until the continuance of this pact, any political treaty with the Soviet Union which contradicts the spirit of this pact, with mutual consent.

Article 1 and 2 of the secret pact do not eliminate the understanding of both my governments that the political treaty mentioned in Article II of the pact is not included in the treaties made between Japan and the Soviet Union, or treaty concerning the bringing of the peace between Japan, Germany, and the Soviet Union, and between other similar treaties which may be concluded between Japan and the Soviet Union. Official notes to the same effect confirm the further understanding that the articles in such political treaties as the Soviet Treaty and the Ghent Treaty, if existing between Japan and the Soviet Union, are not contrary to the spirit of this pact and German declarations, contrary to the last paragraph, the object in the making of the alliance of the signatory pact of this pact. The item of understanding referred to makes the secret of the secret pact attached to the pact as well as Sec. 4 of the Appendix, that is to say, they provide that each signatory power agrees upon keeping secret the secret pact attached to the pact as well as Sec. 4 of the Appendix, on the understanding that even in communication of the contents of the pact, the third power shall be invited to the information of all the signatories, and that confidentially shall be concluded with their mutual consent.
VI. In conclusion I should like to add a few words. The Japanese Government should, of course, refrain from taking any positive measure which might aggravate relations with the Soviet Union, and as to the various questions concerning the demarcation of the boundary line of Manchuria and Soviet Union, the Government will continue the negotiation with the Soviet Union in order to solve the said questions; consequently in the case of negotiation and conclusion of the present Japanese-German Pact, although it has been contrived most effectively to restrain the Soviet Union by the present Pact, the Government has done its utmost not to irritate excessively the Soviet Union side. In other words, in the articles of the Pact for the Comintern, no words have been used likely to close the Comintern with the Soviet Union and besides we have kept the Appendix to the Pact as well as the attached official notes secret. These have done with the precautions just mentioned.

I hope you would fully discuss and investigate this matter.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Mr. Tatsutsuji hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary, Privy Council and that as such official I have custody of the document here attached consisting of 7 pages, dated 15 Nov., 1936, and described as follows: Proceedings of Privy Council re: ratification of Japanese-German Anti-Soviet agreements of.

I further certify that the cited official record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Privy Council.

Signed at Tokyo on the 27th day of August, 1946 /s/ Mr. Tatsutsuji

Witness: /s/ Kiichi, Chief clerk

Signature of Official

Statement of Official's Office

I, Edward P. Sompling, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on the 27th day of August, 1946 /s/ Edward P. Sompling

Witness: /s/ R. F. Lush

In the presence of — In the presence of — Official Capacity

Official Capacity
Minutes of the Privy Council

Matters pertaining to the conclusion of the Agreement between Japan and Germany.

Council opened at 10.15 a.m. on November 25, 11th year of Showa /1936/

Attended by

President HIRANUMA
Ministers
Prime Minister KOROTA
Navy Minister NAGANO
Commissioners
TOGO Chief of European-Asiatic Affairs
Bureau of the Foreign Ministry

Reporter (ARAI)

We have been ordered members of the investigation committee regarding the Imperial consultation on the conclusion of the treaty between Japan and Germany. Having held meetings on the 13th and the 18th of this month, we have strived to make a full investigation into the matter by having listened to detailed explanations from the Minister of Home Affairs and other officials concerned.

According to explanations by the Minister concerned, the U.S.S.R., lately, is devoting herself to her internal construction as well as to the completion of her national defense through the first and second five year plans. Especially, she has put unusual effort in the establishment of enormous military installations in the Far East. On the other hand, she has concluded special treaties such as the non-aggression pact on treaties defining aggressive nations with neighboring countries in Europe and then entered the League of Nations. Last year, she concluded a mutual-aid treaty with France and Czecho-Slovakia, thereby gradually strengthening her international position in Europe. Following this, she is greatly intensifying her oppression in East Asia. The 'Communist International' (the so-called Comintern) which is inseparably related to the Union of Social Soviet Russia is putting every effort to push forward their operations to communize the whole world. Recently, the object of
Communist operations has been turned from Europe to East Asia and their aggressive hands have extended especially to Outer Mongolia, Khotan and China proper. In 1931, a central government of the Chinese Soviet Republic was established in Juichin, Shanghai Province, and the total number of the Communist Army numbered about 350,000. However, in November 1934, Juichin was captured in an armed subjugation by Chiang K'ai Shek and the Soviet district in Shanghai was abandoned. Remnants of the Communist Army, however, are still rampant in the district of Chou, Kansu, and Szechwan. Following the seventh world conference, Comintern is executing with much vigour her activities against China through a new tactic by constructing an anti-Japanese civilian front among the Chinese Communist Party. Also in Manchuria, the Comintern is supervising the Manchurian Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in spite of strict vigilance by both the Japanese and Manchurian police forces. They are striving to establish Communist organizations in various districts and to encourage various troops and communist bandits, and they are also putting efforts in guerrilla activities in various districts. Red Bartisan Troops are, actually, appearing everywhere, and the influence of the underground activities of 'Comintern' in the Far East cannot be lightly overlooked. The 'Comintern' activities are very notable recently in the so-called civilian front movements in Spain. Considering from the truth in the late disturbances in Spain, it is very plainly evident that 'Comintern' is permeating into the domestic organs of the other countries and is skillfully carrying out communist activities to greatly disturb the domestic security and international peace.

The furtherance of Soviet's military oppression and communist operations of Comintern in the Far East, as I have related, is not only a direct menace to the security of both Japan and Manchuria but is also a great obstacle to the execution of Japan's East Asia policy. Therefor we must acknowledge that the measure to cope with this is the most important and urgent diplomatic problem among those which Japan is now encountering. Accordingly, the main point of Japan's foreign policy will be the frustration of the Soviet's aggressive plans and the prevention of the Red advancement of Comintern. China's cooperation with Japan to exclude the menace of foreign Communist elements, has been mentioned as an article in the Three Fundamental Principles in our negotiations with China. On the other hand, we have established measures to strive to realize the above policy by proper diplomacy, in accordance with the completion of national defense. In Germany, following the establishment of the Nazi Regime in 1933 with Hitler as its leader, a strong anti-communist policy has been carried on; which resulted in the sudden deterioration in the German-Soviet relations. Furthermore, the mutual aid treaty concluded by the Soviet Union with France and Czechoslovakia, as I have previously related, gave rise to much ill feelings and anxiety. At the 7th Comintern World Conference, Japan and Germany, were specially mentioned as enemies, and there has actually been a resolution to the effect that the construction of a united front against these two powers is the duty of the Communist Parties of the whole world. Therefore, Germany—
stands in the same position as the Japanese Empire with relation to the Soviet and Comintern and she is in a convenient position to cooperate with Japan in her national defense and anti-Communist policies. The Japanese Government has planned for a coalition with Germany as a first step in executing the above-mentioned foreign policy. As a result of negotiations by the Japanese ambassador in Germany with the representatives of that country since Spring, it was decided to conclude a special treaty between the two powers for this coalition, and this has lead to the conclusion of the present treaty.

* * *

The minister concerned give explanations in reply to our questions as to the spirit and other matters concerning the conclusion of the present treaty. The main points of the explanation are as follows:

(1) The object of the present treaty is no other than the defense against the destructive Comintern activities in both Japan and Germany and the cooperation in checking armed oppression by the Soviet Union. Therefore, Japan's coalition with Germany for this purpose according to this treaty does not necessarily mean that we entirely approve of Germany's policies in domestic matters and that we will act in concert with her. There should be no doubt or misunderstanding whatsoever on this point. Therefore, in announcing what has to be made public on this treaty, the government should make clear the purport of this treaty and should take other adequate measures.

(2) The purport of the present treaty is, as I have already related, merely to use this as a defensive means against 'Comintern' and the Soviet Union so we should, of course, refrain from voluntarily taking any measures likely to aggravate our relations with the Soviet Union, even after the conclusion of this pact. The Government shall always pay the fullest attention in the decaration of the boundary, the disposal of border disputes, etc. to properly adjust the relations between the two countries. Moreover, we shall hope that the Government will always put the greatest effort in the maintenance and development of friendly relations with Great Britain and the United States, especially with the former.

(3) We must fully consider what influences the conclusion of the present treaty will have on our negotiations with China now being carried on, but the fact that the conclusion of this treaty will further strengthen the position of the Japanese Empire should have considerable bearing on China's decision of her attitude. Accordingly, there are chances of favorably developing the Sino-Japanese negotiations by utilizing such a situation. We shall hope that the Government will not err in their policies.
ABITA: "First of all I wish to say a few words in reply to Councillor ARIMA's remarks and then answer Councillor HARA's question.

"As regards the question by Councillor ARIMA whether there is any fear that Soviet Russia would bring about the worst results to counteract the Japan-Germany Pact if the substance of it became known to Russia, the government's policy is to strenuously avoid any outbreak of an affair with Soviet Russia even after the conclusion of the Japan-Germany Pact. The substance of the secret agreement has considerable possibilities for development depending on the intention of the two countries and if there should arise any danger of an outbreak of war between Japan and Soviet Russia, there is still room to push the discussion beyond the provisions of this agreement. Henceforth, Soviet Russia has to consider the fact that she has to face both Japan and Germany and for that reason I believe that even if Japan's military preparations should not be adequate, Russia will not initiate any affair.

"Next I wish to reply to Councillor HARA's question. As you have stated, it was the plan not to announce the Japan-Germany Pact until the signing of the Russo-Japanese Fishery Treaty was completed. However, even before the signing of the treaty, a rumor about the completion of the Japan-Germany agreement spread from some place. Moreover, a rumor of a coalition among Japan, Germany and Italy appeared in the newspapers and even in Japan some people believe that a Japan-Germany Agreement has been concluded. As the situation was such that we did not know when matters pertaining to the agreement would appear on the newspapers we had to prohibit the printing of any newspaper articles dealing with the topic.

"In spite of this it appears that through the honor of foreign correspondents the rumor of the Japan-Germany Pact was reported from Japan to the United States and that from there the rumor has spread to Europe. It is most regrettable that the secret leaked out in that manner. As a result of these rumors, when the Soviet ambassador called at the Foreign Ministry on the sixteenth, he asked me whether the rumor about the conclusion of some sort of treaty between Japan and Germany was true or not. I did not deny the rumor entirely but explained Japan's policy of defense against Communism. I further stated the aim of the decision made at the Seventh General Meeting of the Comintern and said that in order to defend against this aim, Japan required the cooperation of some other Power, that negotiations were going on at present for this purpose, and that as that cooperation was confined to the checking of Bolshevik operations, it would be no obstacle to the friendly relations of Japan and Soviet Russia. As the Agreement had not yet been made public, I could not tell him fully of its substance. It can be easily imagined that the Soviet Government has conjectured the existence of some form of secret agreement other than that against Communism.

"It was planned to have the Russo-Japanese Fishery Treaty signed on the 20th of this month, but this was postponed by Soviet Russia. The reason, it is said, is that, hearing that an understanding has been made..."
between Japan and Germany against Communism, some people in Soviet Government circles are opposed to the immediate signing of the Treaty. However, I feel that when the Japan-German Agreement is announced, and the fact that it is only intended against the Comintern becomes clear, the treaty will eventually be signed. Should Soviet-Russia decline to sign, there will be no treaty, and there will remain no other way than to fish freely, but Russia, I think does not desire such consequences. For, in spite of hearing rumors for a long time that some sort of negotiation is being carried out between Japan and Germany, Soviet Russia has shown a good deal of sincerity in both the oil and fishery negotiations as also in the discussion of boundary problems.

"As the present Japan-Germany Agreement was not entirely unexpected by Soviet Russia, I believe that one will not assume a provocative attitude towards Japan nor refuse to sign the Fishery Treaty to the very last."

Chairman (HIRANUKA): "As nobody else will speak, the second reading will be omitted, and the draft will be immediately put to a vote. Those who approve the draft will please stand up."

(All stand up)

Chairman (HIRAICUMA): "This draft has been unanimously approved. This meeting is herewith adjourned."

.................
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, K. Tezakatsui, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary, Privy Council, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereinafter attached consisting of 25 pages, dated ____, 19__, and described as follows: Proceedings of Privy Council, Nov. 22, 1936, re (1) "Interpretation of Agreement for Suppression Use of Opium for Smoking," (2) "Kwantung Province Opium Order," (3) "Anti-Ger Internal Agreements.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Privy Council.

Signed at Tokyo on this 27th day of August, 1946. /s/ K. Tezakatsui

Signature of Official

Witness: Kiichi Chosokabe

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 27th day of August, 1946. /s/ Edward P. Monaghan

Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ H. F. Lorr

Investigator, IPS

Official Capacity
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA )

AFFIDAVIT

I, Gardner C. Carpenter, being first duly sworn, do hereby, according to my best knowledge and belief, depose and say as follows:

I am an officer of the Department of State in the Division of Foreign Activity Correlation. As an officer of the Department of State, I was stationed in Marburg, Germany from April 30, 1945 to December 1, 1945.

The documents hereunto attached, listed in the attached list and certified by the Acting Secretary of State, are true prints of microfilms in the files of the Department of State which were made between May 1945 and February 1946 by a joint American-British team in Marburg, Germany, of documents from the files of the German Foreign Ministry then located at the Document Center, maintained by the United States Department of State and the British Foreign Office at Marburg.

These documents had been captured by American military forces in Germany.

The original microfilms thereof, which were made as stated above, were forwarded during the period between May 1945 and February 1946 from Marburg to the British Air Ministry in London, where duplicates were made and forwarded to the Department of State through the American Embassy in London.

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Washington, District of Columbia, this 6 day of Sept 1946

Gardner C. Carpenter

SEAL S-2P-50

J. Bear

Notary Public, D. C.
List of documents from the archives of the German Foreign Ministry captured by American military forces in Germany, the true prints of microfilms of which are hereto attached.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Microfilm Ref.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Telegram dated 11 January 1938 signed Troutman</td>
<td>145604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Memo dated 10 Jan, signed Von Feurath</td>
<td>145607/145607/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Telegram dated 5 Jan 1937, Von Feurath to the Reichsmiinister</td>
<td>145819-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Telegram dated 11 Jan 1938 from Dirksen to the Reichsmiinister</td>
<td>145605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Telegram dated 5 Dec 1941 from Ott to the Foreign Minister</td>
<td>15041-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Telegram dated 20 July 1937 from Weizsacker and a memorandum of the same date by Weizsacker.</td>
<td>145781-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Telegram from Troutman dated 13 January</td>
<td>145791-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Telegram from Dirksen to the Reichsmiinister dated 14 January 1938</td>
<td>145789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Telegram from Dirksen for the Foreign Minister dated 10 January 1938</td>
<td>145503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Telegram from Weizsacker dated 12 January 1938</td>
<td>145800-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Telegram from Foreign Minister of the German Reich dated 15 May 1939 to the Ambassador in Tokyo</td>
<td>135931-35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Telegram from Ott dated 25 August 1939 to the Foreign Ministry for the attention of the State Secretary</td>
<td>136054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Memorandum by Von Feurath dated 25 July 1938</td>
<td>145244-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Memorandum by Weizsacker dated 26 January 1938</td>
<td>145243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Telegram from Dirksen dated 26 January 1938</td>
<td>145242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Unsigned telegram dated 13 January 1938 from Henckow</td>
<td>145786-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Telegram from Dirksen dated 16 January 1938 for the Reichsmiinister personally</td>
<td>145780-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Telegram from Dirksen dated 17 January 1938 for the Reichsmiinister personally</td>
<td>145777-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Report of Dirksen, Ambassador, to the German Foreign Minister dated 26 January 1938.</td>
<td>136070</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

TO ALL TO WHOM THESE PRESENTS SHALL COME, GREETING:

I certify that the documents hereunto annexed and enumerated in the attached list are true prints of microfilms in the files of the Department of State which were made of documents from the archives of the German Foreign Ministry captured by American military forces in Germany.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the Department of State to be affixed at the City of Washington, in the District of Columbia, this fifth day of September 1946.

/s/ G. Clayton
Acting Secretary of State of the United States of America
List of documents from the archives of the German Foreign Ministry captured by American military forces in Germany, the true prints of microfilms of which are hereto annexed.

(1) Telegram dated 11 January 1938 signed Troutman, 145804
(2) Memo dated 10 Jan, signed Von Nurrath 145807/145807/1
(3) Telegram dated 5 Jan 1937 Von Nurrath to the Reichsminister, 145819-20
(4) Telegram dated 11 Jan 1938 from Dirksen to the Reichsminister 145805
(5) Telegram dated 5 Dec 1941 from Ott to the Foreign Minister 15041-4
(6) Telegram dated 28 July 1937 from Weizsacker and a memorandum of the same date by Weizsacker 82119-82122
(7) Telegram from Troutman dated 13 January, 145791-2
(8) Telegram from Dirksen for the Reichsminister dated 14 January 1938, 145769
(9) Telegram from Dirksen for the Foreign Minister dated 10 January 1938, 145803
(10) Telegram from Mackensen dated 12 January 1938 145800-1
(11) Telegram from Foreign Minister of the German Reich dated 15 May 1939 to the Ambassador in Tokyo 135931-35
(12) Telegram from Ott dated 25 August 1939 to the Foreign Ministry for the attention of the State Secretary, 136054
(13) Memorandum by Von Nurrath dated 25 July 1938 81244-5
(14) Memorandum by Weizsacker dated 28 January 1938 81243
(15) Telegram from Dirksen dated 29 January 1938 181242
(16) Unsigned telegram dated 13 January 1938 from Nankow 145786-7
(17) Telegram from Dirksen dated 16 January 1938 for the Reichsminister personally, 145780-1
(18) Telegram from Dirksen dated 17 January 1938 for the Reichsminister personally 145777-8
(19) Report of Dirksen, Ambassador, to the German Foreign Minister dated 26 January 1938 130870

130890
Berlin, 28 July 1937

Diplomats, Tokio
No. 148

Telegram in Ciphers

To telegrams No. 182 and 193

Japanese attempts to base measures in China as fight against Communism on the Anti-Comintern Agreement are devious. As already stated in telegram 140 the agreement has not the objective of fighting Bolshevism in the territory of third states. Rather, Japan's measures may be considered by us as being contrary to the Anti-Comintern Agreement because they obstruct the consolidation of China thus promoting the spread of Communism in China and, in the end, driving the Chinese into the arms of Russia. (To this I note confidentially that in a conversation with Ambassador Trautmann Chiang Kai-shek replied to a question in that regard that one has to count with the possibility of an intervention of Russia into a possible war at a later time. He, Chiang Kai-shek, has made no agreements with the Russians up to now, but the situation is changed.) The Japanese have therefore no reason to expect us to favor their undertaking, rather can we expect of them that they cause no disturbance in China. We remain of the opinion that the so-called "creation of a clear strategic situation" does not mean any facilitation for Japan in regard to a future possible conflict with Russia. It will be necessary to consider the consequences of an increased hatred of the Chinese against Japan for years to come, the more Japan gets a hold in North China. Japan would therefore have to carry on a two-front war in the case in question; this would be the case even if the maximum program of the Japanese military, separation of the Five Provinces, were carried out.

Recently the Japanese have been carrying on radio propaganda in German language directed towards Germany, which continuously is attempting to represent the war against China as a fight against Communism and to force upon us /the necessity of/ taking side at least morally. This propaganda is unwelcome to us.
The Reichsminister informed the Japanese Ambassador before upon his remonstrances that delivery of armaments to China in any amount worth mentioning have not been taking place either now nor earlier. The Japanese cannot reprimand us for the fact that the Chinese bought arms from us in a limited amount. The deal developed on a purely economic basis. We have shown our new arms most willingly to the Japanese and have given the Japanese commissions far-reaching insight. It is not our fault that the Japanese have up to now failed to make any orders, a fact which we are only regret. The German deliveries of armaments to China cannot be made the object of German-Japanese negotiations. Since a situation has now arisen which approximates a state of war further deliveries of war material to China will cease because of our attitude.

Withdrawal of our military advisors in China would at the present moment mean that we are taking sides against Nanking and is therefore out of question. A withdrawal of the advisors could possibly also lead to the vacated positions being occupied by Russians; this is a consequence which is also undesirable for the Japanese. The Japanese Military Attaché has up to now only stated in the war ministry his wish that the advisors may not participate in active combat actions. Advisors have always had a corresponding instruction which recently has been expressly restated. Yushakoji, who was informed of this, acknowledged this measure with thanks.

A remark of the Adjutant to the War Minister that the policy of cooperation of the Japanese Army is endangered by our attitude in the question of the advisors since the already existing opposition of single groups of Japanese officers is threatening to spread to the masses, finds no understanding here.

I have just informed Ambassador Yushakoji in accordance with the above statements in a cordial manner and I request of you to regulate your statements correspondingly and to advise the Japanese emphatically to apply moderation.

/s/ Weizsacker
The Japanese Ambassador visited me today in order to hand me the attached report about the situation which by the way and as far as I know has already appeared in press reports.

The Ambassador then inquired about our conversations with London and Washington regarding the East Asiatic conflict. I outlined to the Ambassador once more our attitude in general terms. Mushakoji was satisfied with this. However, later he continued /to state/ that Japan misses complete German understanding for the anti-Communist achievement which the Japanese action against China constitutes. He tried stubbornly to prove that Japan is doing anti-Communist work in China also /for our benefit/. I replied to him in accordance with the tenor of the wire to Tokyo of today's date. Then Mushakoji described the lack of understanding for the anti-Communist feats of his government which he encounters in Germany as a danger for the continued true existence of the German-Japanese agreement of Autumn 1936, I told him he should not exaggerate. The German-Japanese relationship of parity is quite beyond discussion. However, we can not deduce from our contractual relationship an obligation to approve or assist morally a Japanese action which might easily lead to the opposite of the aim which both of us desire, namely, to a fostering of Communism in China and to driving the Chinese into the arms of the Russians. Mushakoji then talked about the idea to call the secret German-Japanese special committee which up to now has not come into existence, before which committee he could then explain the anti-Communist tendencies which prompted Japan to her present action in China. (Mushakoji mentioned that Herr von Ribbentrop and the Reichsminister are informed about the organization of that Commission.)

Mushakoji received my confidential information that our instructors in China have orders not to interfere in the Japanese-Chinese conflict with thanks. Mushakoji then mentioned briefly the question of transportation of war
material. I declared that a justified claim of Japan for
the cancellation of eventual delivery of arms from Germany
to China does not exist. However, we did not go deeply
into the topic.

In conclusion, Fushaniji used again some partly
plaintive and partly threatening phrases about the failure
of his mission in Berlin. I laughed him off with this.

(signed) Weizsacker
囲まれている「ひらがな」

囲まれていない外

囲まれていない内

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「ひらがな・カタカナ」囲まれていない

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囲まれていない

「ひらがな・カタカナ」囲まれている

「ひらがな・カタカナ」囲まれていない

囲まれていない
CERTIFICATE

I, E. E. DANLY, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G.H.C., S.C.A.P., and as such have possession, custody and control of original or copies of captured enemy documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That the attached document was delivered to me by the United States War Department as being a print of a microfilm in the files of the Department of State, which was made of a German document captured by American military forces in Europe, and such document has been continuously in my custody since such delivery.

E. E. DANLY
With the unsuccessful conclusion of the German efforts to bring the two parties of the Chinese-Japanese conflict to the conference table, a new chapter in the war, with all the foreign political reactions connected with it, especially regarding the relation with Germany, has begun. There is, therefore, little point in analyzing in detail these negotiations which are now closed; it will suffice rather to note that China has not seized the second opportunity to begin peace negotiations, offered to her by Japan; from the fact that Marshal Chiang Kai Shek evaded a definitive discussion of the Japanese terms with Mr. TRAUTMANN and that the Chinese Ministerial Council has not occupied itself in an official session with the Japanese terms and the explanations given to them by us. until within the last few days, it was clearly evident that on the part of the Chinese, there was no decision even merely to seriously examine the Japanese terms. It is to be feared that now blood will be spilt unnecessarily and that the Chinese provinces will be destroyed with the sole result that the Chinese - after the model of the Sibylline Books - will in the end have to sacrifice many times the originally demanded price in order to purchase much harder terms than those offered them by Mr. HIROTA in the beginning of November.
The immediate task which confronts us is to draw the consequences of the resultant situation from the point of view of German-Japanese relations. This is to be tried in the following way on the two-fold supposition that Japan will emerge from the conflict as the military victor, and that China, as far as it does not rely on England and America, will glide more and more into the Russian current.

2. The China-conflict and German-Japanese relations.

Up to now we have laid down our attitude towards the two parties with the declaration of Germany's absolute neutrality. That was no doubt right for the first part of the Sino-Japanese conflict, although non-recall of the military advisors and the continuation of supply of war materials was one-sidedly beneficial to China - that is to say, Nanking Government, which sought connections with our fiercest enemy by conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union, and which moreover leaned on the Western Powers and the Geneva ideology. Thus we have reached a position in relation to Japan which would have become difficult if Japan had vigorously pressed us for a decision. In my annual report I have shown why Japan, for domestic and foreign political reasons, was in an embarrassing situation of having to let Germany shine forth in spotless glory. Thus the revaluation of all values took place; that is, every month the Japanese laid before us with obvious reproach, a review of the considerable German imports of war materials into China, while, on the other hand, the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry coldly declared to English and American journalists, who alluded angrily to these imports, that the German Government had long ago suspended it.

It is obvious that this condition must come to an end, as soon as Japan is out of this embarrassing position. We must take into count the fact that Japan, filled with deep resentment will then bring us to unpleasant decisions at a possibly awkward time. Therefore, we shall do well already now to lay down our standpoint again, just on the most thorny questions of the military advisors and the supplies of war material, and, if necessary, explain it to the Japanese. This task is the more urgent because the fact has to be reckoned with that third countries, especially England, will probably systematically point out the sensitive points of German-Japanese relations out of displeasure at Germany's increasing influence in the Far East (action as mediator), and to cover up their own importing of weapons.
3. Military Advisors.

With the unsuccessful conclusion of Germany's attempts at mediation, the most essential reason which could explain the activity of the military advisors in the face of the ever-increasing pressure from the Japanese for their recall, namely, that such a recall would cost Germany the trust which the Chinese Government had still shown in us up to now, and would therefore from the beginning make hopeless German efforts at mediation, also becomes untenable; this evidence is no longer effective because no peaceful settlement is in the offing, and if peace negotiations should come anyway, then not with the present Chinese Government.

For the same reason we can also no longer take as a precedent the fact that the German military advisors, as impartial experts, can make clear to Chinese military authorities the uselessness of further resistance.

Above all, however, it is to be feared that non-recall of the advisors will be harmful to German prestige. According to reports of the Consulate-General at Canton, Chinese agitators are already daring to accuse German officers of having disclosed plans of operations to the Japanese, while, on the other hand, the Japanese army at the front suspects that the advisors plan the operations of the Chinese army and supervise their execution. In the long run the continuous defeats of the Chinese army will be imputed to the German advisors not only by the parties to the conflict but also by third countries interested in degrading Germany's name in the Far East. It cannot help our prestige either, if General FALKENHAUSEN and his co-workers withdraw together with the Chinese from Coochow to Nanking, from there to Hankow and then further on to Chungking, and still deeper into Inner Asia. In the long run, the advisors will have to share the blame for the Chinese defeats, however much these defeats might be caused precisely by neglecting the counsels given by Germany. Thus the argument given for retaining the advisors – namely that in case of their recall, Russians would replace them, becomes void at the same time.

Of perhaps even stronger efficacy is the simultaneously foreign- and military-political argument that for representatives of the German Army such close cooperation with representatives of the Red Army and Bolshevistic Russia is impossible. That Sino-Russian collaboration did not become much more close long ago, is to be traced, not to reserve on the Chinese part, but to Soviet misgivings – SUN FC's trip to Moscow was meant to remove these misgivings. Nowadays no Russian material aid in
sending Russian airplanes and pilots, which had led to a re-
vival of the Chinese air attacks, is becoming more and more
apparent. That the slogan "German-Soviet collaboration" will
be taken up eagerly by the interested parties is shown in the
enclosed cutting from the "China Weekly Review" of 25 December,
1937.

The course of events in war has itself caused further
evidence which was brought up by the German merchants in China
to support the retention of the military advisors in the field:
namely, that they (the advisors) were the pioneers and path-
finders for a considerable part of our China export to crumble
away. Even if Chinese ability and will to buy further pur-
chases in Germany should combine with the technical possibility
of executing this import, already the geographical changes on
the map of China, caused by the course of the war, would
bring about a considerable shifting of the possibilities for
markets from the standpoint of percentage into the areas
occupied by Japan.

Fully appreciating the importance of our military advisors
for our relations with China, on which I always based my re-
served judgment of this question in the first phase of the
war, I now advocate for the above-mentioned reasons in agree-
ment with the Military Attaché, General OTT, the immediate,
complete recall of all German military advisors still active
in China.


Only short explanations have to be made in favor of the
complete suspension of war material supplies to China. From the
reports from the Embassy it is known how critically this very
question has influenced German-Japanese relations. The moll-
fying effect of the prohibition issued by the German Government
has vanished as a result of the continuation of the supplies.
The pause in Japanese pressure for complete suspension is near-
ing its end; the attitude of the military authorities leaves no
doubt as to that. Possible allusions as to the technical im-
possibility of bringing about the suspension of war material
supplies by German government measures, would not be understood
here - the confidence in the power of authoritarian Germany
vis-a-vis private capitalistic trader-tendacies is too great
for that. In the same way reasons of political expedience and
the necessity of also executing declarations once issued, alike
declare the suspension of war-material-supplies to China; should
there be fundamental differences of opinion about this idea,
clarification should be sought by discussions with Japan.
5. Recognition of Manchukuo.

The adjustment of our relations with Japan and China in view of the balance to be struck at the present moment, should give us occasion to declare our recognition of Manchukuo before Japan's pressure makes itself unpleasantly felt. I regard it as impossible that we can any longer delay this recognition, which, after all, now means no more than the confirmation of an existing condition; the official remarks of the Manchurian Government in Harbin to Counsellor Knoll is the first indication that the recognition must now be effected. Italy's action has, regarding Japan, robbed us of a pretext for further delay and, regarding China, given into our hands a weakening of Chinese sensitiveness - in case this should yet have to be considered in view of the definite Moscow course of the Hankow-Chungking Government. The cream of the economic possibilities of a recognition of Manchukuo has been skimmed by the economic agreement and the establishing of the commercial agency. The opportunity for an extensive economic-political transaction with Japan on the occasion of the recognition of Manchuria would have offered itself if the plans discussed by us a few years ago had been followed up. Now the recognition of Manchuria could, in spite of the Italian action, still serve to make Japan a friendly and hence certainly appreciated gesture if the occasion should arise (anniversary of the founding of the empire).


The recognition of Manchukuo is at least ideistically connected with the further constructive and perhaps most important task with which we will be confronted by the further course of events in China: the necessity to orientate our China policy to a considerable part of North China.

We will have to consider the fact that North China up to the Yellow River and beyond that to the borders of the Shantung Province, will be under the direct Japanese influence for a number of years, maybe decades; that Shanghai and its hinterland to beyond Hankow - in a few months maybe beyond Hankow - will be occupied by Japanese troops for some time. Maybe for a few years, that only behind a wide war gone west of this territory will the undisputed power of the government of Rump-China begin; and that, finally, the conditions in South China, especially in Canton, will be very uncertain at least for the duration of hostilities, because, even if a military advance against Canton is for the present apparently improbable, the connections of this city with the outside world will be hindered by the Japanese as such as possible.
It follows from this that, for a long time, the North China of the five Provinces will be the quietest part of China and the one which will be the first to return to normal life. The further economic function of Shanghai will anyway represent only a fraction of its former significance until the conclusion of peace; what will later become of the trade center on the Yangtze will have to be awaited. The part of South China which is close to the coast will hardly lead a normal political and economic life under the influence of the events of war - at least air attacks. The same will apply to Central China, which is pushed away from the coast.

We will have to draw the conclusion from this, that in our China policy we must at least put the accent more strongly economically and politically on North China; we will have to regard our China problems more from Peking than from Shanghai, Hankow or Chunching.

This by no means necessitates offending the Chinese government forever. Outwardly important change would have to take place. Naturally the allotment of the official representatives of the Reich would remain the same; it would be wrong, too, if German firms should give up their establishment in Shanghai. The fact, beneficial to us, that besides consular representation in North China, a diplomatic office exists in Peking and that furthermore German firms have operated in North China before anyway gives us enough strong points for our new orientation.

The most urgent requisite for this shaping of our interests in North China seems to me to be the establishing of a close connection with the Japanese military and civil authorities. It will not be difficult to achieve this by building up the office in Peking and by appointing to it an elderly official experienced in service in Japan.

The economic shifting of our interests to North China will be already undertaken to a certain degree by the private initiative of our China firms. It will be the task of the organs of the state to promote this development. Above all, however, it seems urgent that the possibilities of an economic opening up of North China, or otherwise our cooperation with the Japanese authorities in this be examined by prominent individuals, German experts or by a small delegation specially set up for this purpose.

It cannot be the purpose of this report to deal definitively with the difficult and complicated questions, which the concept "economic opening-up of North China" contains. But I have thought it my duty to point out, that in the kaleidoscopic happen-
ings of the Japanese-Chinese conflict a decision has now been reached which confronts Germany policy with the necessity of taking a number of different measures in this connection in order to keep up with this development.

The offices in Hankow and Hsinking have received a copy of this report by a safe way.

Signed

Von Dirksen

Certificate:

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 1276.

(signed) Ulrich S. Straus
CERTIFICATE

I, E. E. Danly, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G.H.I., S.C.A.P., as such have possession, custody and control of original or copies of captured enemy documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That the attached document was delivered to me by the United States War Department as being a print of a microfilm in the files of the Department of State, which was made of a German document captured by American military forces in Europe, and such document has been continuously in my custody since such delivery.

E. E. Danly
Chinese Foreign Minister read to me following text of oral statement today, which he requested to convey Japanese Government. "On November 5th, 1937, certain peace terms proposed by Japan were made to us at Hankow through the kindness of Your Excellency. Subsequently on November 28th and November 29th and also December 2nd Your Excellency again communicated to Chinese authorities at Hankow and Nanking the intentions of the Japanese Government and informed us that Japanese authorities had stated in spite of the best military success gained by Japan the terms proposed by the Japanese Government early in November were still to stand. In view of the good offices performed by Germany and the desire for the restoration of peace on the part of Japan we requested Your Excellency to inform Japanese Government that China was prepared to take the points proposed by Japan as the basis of discussion.

"On December 20th and December 27th Your Excellency communicated to us certain 'basic conditions' from Japan saying that the German Ambassador at Tokyo had been informed by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs that those new conditions were proposed by Japan, because of the changing of the circumstances. After due consideration we have found that the altered terms are rather too broad in scope. The Chinese Government desires therefore to be apprized of the nature and content of the newly submitted conditions in order to make a careful examination and reach a definite decision."

Minister told me that the text was already finished yesterday evening but he had to have consent of a colleague. I asked him whether he was not afraid that the Japanese would consider this statement as evasive. Moreover, it seemed to me that the wish for an understanding does not find expression in the statement. Minister answered, the Government could not make any decision and express an opinion before it knew details of the Japanese demands.

Duplicate sent to Tokyo.
Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 16 January 1938
Arrived, 16 January 1938

No. 27 of 16

URGENT!

Secret. For Reich Minister personally.

1.) Foreign Minister handed to me the following text of answer of Japanese Government at 10.30 a.m. today to statement of Chinese Government of 13 January with the request to pass it to Hankow as quickly as possible. HIROTA expressed gratitude of Japanese Government repeatedly and vigorously for efforts of German Government to bring about negotiations for peace. Then, he handed to me a government statement to the Japanese people to be published this afternoon, which will be given to D.F.B. /German News Agency/

2.) Text of answer.

"Strictly confidential.

"I desire to express my sincerest appreciation of the good offices of Your Excellency's Government and the earnest efforts of Your Excellency regarding the question of opening direct negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Japanese affair. However, the Chinese reply concerning the said negotiation, having been postponed several times, failed to reach us even on the 10th January, so that we had to wait a few more days for its arrival. When received at last yesterday, the Chinese reply was found to be merely a perfunctory one, asking for details of our terms. We cannot but conclude that the attitude of procrastination on the part of the Chinese Government reveals no intention to sue for peace by accepting in their entirety the basic conditions for peace negotiations, which I had previously made known. Therefore the Imperial Government have now decided to abandon, much to their regret, the present negotiations for peace between Japan and China undertaken through the kind endeavors of Your Excellency's Government and to deal with the present affair from an entirely new standpoint.

"Let me tender again to Your Excellency an expression of my heartfelt gratitude for the friendly solicitude and efforts of the German Government in connection with the question."
3.) Finally Foreign Minister asked our consent of publication of our assistance to bring about negotiations. I answered I would request instruction of German Government. HIROTA requested as quick an answer as possible. I request speedy telegraphic instructions.

4.) Foreign Minister is informing Italian Ambassador.

Copy sent to Hankow.

DIRKSEI:

/Marginal handwritten note on last three sentences of 3) above/
Yes on the Chinese questions.

/145781/
CERTIFICATE

I, E. E. Danly, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G.H.C., S.O., N.P., and as such have possession, custody and control of original or copies of captured enemy documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That the attached document was delivered to me by the United States War Department as being a print of a microfilm in the files of the Department of State, which was made of a German document captured by American military forces in Europe, and such document has been continuously in my custody since such delivery.

E. E. Danly
Tokyo, 14 January 1938

Arrival 14 January 1938

19.40 hours

TOP SECRET

NO. 22 of 14 January
URGENT
SECRET

For the Reichsmiinister personally:

1. I have handed over to the Foreign Minister the text of the declaration given by the Chinese Foreign Minister to Ambassador TOYODA.

   HIROYA was very angry at the meaningless Chinese declaration,
   considered it as mere evasion and remarked that the Chinese had all the
   necessary bases (Unterlagen) in order to say yes or no. Finally, it was
   China who was beaten and who must ask for peace, and not Japan, who had
   to give information continually.

   I reminded the Foreign Minister that officially the Chinese Govern-
   ment had knowledge of only four fundamental conditions up till now. All
   further communications from him to me had been forwarded, at his wish,
   to the Chinese Government only in a very indefinite form. I advised
   him, either to stipulate the details of these Declarations or to
   announce agreement that they would be now communicated to the Chinese as
   official statements of the Japanese Government.

   HIROYA replied that he would have to ask the cabinet and had prospects
   of speedy reply.

2. HIROYA told me confidentially, in reply to my question, that the
   Chinese attempt to win over the Americans to support them at the peace
   negotiations had failed. Roosevelt had refused any intervention.

3. On the American side, I was told that reports of a $150,000,000
   credit to China in American banks was incorrect.

4. The Italian Ambassador was given information by the Foreign Minister.

Copy to Hankow

DIPLOM

115789/
CERTIFICATE

I, E. E. DANLY, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G.H., S.C.A.P., and as such have possession, custody and control of original or copies of captured enemy documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That the attached document was delivered to me by the United States War Department as being a print of a microfilm in the files of the Department of State, which was made of a German document captured by American military forces in Europe, and such document has been continuously in my custody since such delivery.

E. E. DANLY
TELEGRAM FROM HANKOW TO FOREIGN MINISTRY
IN BERLIN, 11 JAN. 38

(P.1) Telegram.
Hankow
Arrived 11 January 38 3:30 P.M.

No. 16 out of 11/1

Attention!

*I have received telegram No. 17 from Tientsin today. I hesitate to inform the Chinese without instructions from there. The Japanese seem now to be altering the second view their statements which were issued through us, although the telegram is not quite clear.*

"Transmission of such altered statements is considered here as a 'dirty trick' which the Japanese are playing on us, and we are losing face with the Chinese through this."

To:

/a/ Trautmann (145804)

// added is a handwritten note//
Lack of clearness noticed also here. Do not delay transmission if situation is tense. Trust that by regulation language suspicion will be eliminated, as if (4 words illegible) Tokyo.
"The Japanese Ambassador referred to the mediation activities of Germany in the Sino-Japanese conflict, when he called on St. Sekr. today. By order of the Minister HIROTA he expressed his thanks for our activities. Making use of this opportunity I have pointed out to Mr. Togo the danger, which might grow up in Japan on account of the too prolonged war. Mr. Togo has explained on his side, that Japan wishes to work for peace, cooperate with China, and wishes conclusion of the hostilities as soon as possible. But, on the other hand, the Japanese Government is determined to carry on the war to its bitter end and the condition of peace would naturally become the more harder, if the war continue the more longer. Besides, the Japanese Government no longer considers today Chiang Kai-shek as representative of the Chinese Central Government. Japan is still willing to negotiate with him. However, if he would not accept the Japanese peace conditions, the Japanese would make peace with each provincial governors. To believe the military victory of China is a fantasy.

"The Ambassador stressed then in addition, that the Japanese are taking the greatest interest in working hand in hand with the German in China’s economic development. There would be no exclusion of German trade in China, which was sometimes feared by German merchants.

"Then I referred to the recognition of Manchukuo and explained our standpoint in this question to the Ambassador. I pointed out, that for instance our present communication activities between Japan and China would be absolutely impossible, if we would recognize Manchukuo together the Italians. The Ambassador seemed to understand this and did not, for his person, urge a German action in this respect."

Berlin, 10 January 1938

/signed/ Frhr. von Neurath (145807/1)
I. Foreign Minister agrees to the establishment of a more direct connection with the Chinese Government via the German Embassy in Hankow and Tokyo and the more so since he welcomed an instruction received by the Chinese Ambassador here from his government to establish close contact with me and since he answered my request whether he would agree to such an exchange of ideas in the affirmative.

II. In this connection, the Foreign Minister explained with great seriousness and emphasis that Japanese Government must now insist upon a quick reply from the Chinese Government. It has confidential and reliable information that the Chinese Government has informed third governments (England and America) of the peace conditions and has asked for their advice. Conversation in this connection has taken place between Roosevelt and the Chinese Ambassador Wang. Japan could not tolerate that an international discussion develops about the conditions and that China is influenced from the most diverse sides. The indiscretions of the Press are also partly based upon this. The attitude of China is the more open to attack, as Chiang Kai-shek himself demanded unconditional secrecy of the negotiations. Therefore quick reply is also necessary because now military operations are planned.

III. The General Staff pointed out to the military attaché the unfavorable reaction to indiscretions of the press on account of the Japanese domestic political situation. The wing of the cabinet which is interested in a refusal of the four conditions urges the release to the Japanese press of the 'indiscretions of the press' which have been suppressed up to now, in order to kill the prospect of negotiations by the echo of the release. The army will not be able to resist the pressure much longer.

IV. I welcome greatly the participation of General Falkenhausen which was reported here by telegram, Hankow, 31 December. I request consideration whether he could not be instructed to picture the risk of the continuation of the war for China as an expert. Japanese readiness to continuation of the war surpasses considerably the six months of the Chinese mentioned by Falkenhausen which furthermore are dependent on conditions which can hardly be fulfilled. In answer to complaints by the Chinese about hard conditions, it would be effective to point out according to confidential information of the General Staff there that it would not demand any kind of disarmament in spite of strong pressure. It declined to act like the Versailles Peace Treaty.
V. A stronger participation of the military advisor in the initiation of negotiations would be the most effective means for retention of military advisors which, according to statements of military authorities here is not impossible in itself, even after conclusion of peace.

VI. I have the impression that a further delay of the Chinese reply, or at least of a founded inquiry which still exists here now, could turn easily the conciliatory attitude into the opposite.

Copy to Hankow.

DIPLOM
TELEGRAM FROM EMBASSY, TOKYO TO FOREIGN MINISTRY, WASH. D. C., 11 JAN., 38

(P. 2) Telegram.

TOKYO 11 January 1938 1:40 p.m.
Arrived 11 January 1938 9:50 a.m.
No. 14 out of 11.1

TOP SECRET

Attention:

"Secret. For the Minister of the War in person. I have a reliable report, that today's Privy Council is said to have decided upon the following action in case the Japanese conditions are refused:

*Declaration of war, denial of the NANKING government and substitution of the provisional government of PEKING, the continuance of military operations. To support this operation, new supply-shipments are now going to the front.

*Duplicate sent to HANKOW.*

/8/ Dirkson (145805)
Certificate:

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 1269.

/S/ Ulrich A. Strauss

21 August 1946
CERTIFICATE

I, E. E. DAILY, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G.H. ..., S.C.A.P., and as such have possession, custody and control of original or copies of captured enemy documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That the attached document was delivered to me by the United States War Department as being a print of a microfilm in the files of the Department of State, which was made of a German document captured by American military forces in Europe, and such document has been continuously in my custody since such delivery.

E. E. DAILY
Berlin 12 Jan. 1938

To Pol 190 g

Lt. L.
Dir. Pol.
Dig. Pol.

Diplomatar HANKOW
No. 11

Pass through without secrecy classification!

Telegram in Ciphers
(Secret Cipher Process)

In answer to telegram No. 16 from Jan. 11 and No. 18 from Jan. 12. Your wire No. 16 crossed our wire on the same matter. The deviation from the earlier Japanese statements contained in wire No. 13 from Tokyo was also noticed by us. We interpret the statements of HIROTA as follows: Japanese military circles take again a different stand, while the Foreign Ministry apparently remains at its previous standpoint. Considering the fact that the situation has come to a critical point, we did not consider ourselves justified in accordance with our role as "letter-carrier" not to transmit the Japanese statement or to postpone the transmission. I am sure you will have avoided in transmitting statements to the Chinese to give any official or personal interpretation and will surely have spoken in such a manner that there can be no suspicion against us as if we had made ourselves a tool of an unclear or unclean Japanese trick. Tokyo was notified of this.

(signed) MACKENSEN

2. Diplomatar
Tokyo No. ...

Telegram in Ciphers
(Secret Cipher Process)

I wire today to Hankow: "(See item 1)"

(signed) MACKENSEN
CERTIFICATE

I, E. E. D. NLY, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G.H. Naturals, and as such have possession, custody and control of original or copies of captured enemy documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That the attached document was delivered to me by the United States War Department as being a print of a microfilm in the files of the Department of State, which was made of a German document captured by American military forces in Europe, and such document has been continuously in my custody since such delivery.

E. E. D. NLY

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Telegraph
(Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 10 January 1938 19.25 hours
Arrived 10 January 1938 15.35 hours
No. 13 of 10 Jan. URGENT! VERY URGENT! SEKRET!

Secret. For the Reichs Minister personally.

Upon (one group of letters garbled) of today's press reports regarding continuation of war and statement of spokesman in press conference regarding break of negotiations between Japan and China, visited Foreign Minister in order to receive from him a new confirmation that the term of January 16th mentioned by the Vice Minister in telegram # 6 of January 6 is no ultimatum.

HIROTA confirmed this and added that the Japanese Government is expecting Chinese answer, but must insist on utmost speed. The decisions of the Government which were mentioned in the press concern measures for the case of a refusal by China.

Upon the question whether request for clarification from the Chinese Government would not be admissible, HIROTA answered that the military insists upon immediate and clear answer.

In my opinion the pressure of the nationalistic wing has increased to such an extent that the moderate wing will give in if a positive answer of the Chinese Government does not arrive soon.

Identical telegram was sent to Hankow.

DIRKSEN

/145803/
CERTIFICATE

I, E. E. Danly, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G.H., S.C., and as such have possession, custody and control of original or copies of captured enemy documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That the attached document was delivered to me by the United States War Department as being a print of a microfilm in the files of the Department of State, which was made of a German document captured by American military forces in Europe, and such document has been continuously in my custody since such delivery.

E. E. Danly
TELEGRAM
(Secret Cipher Process)

TOKYO  Jan. 17, 1938  16.13 hours
Arrived  Jan. 17, 1938  12.15 hours

TOP SECRET

No. 28 of 17/1  In connection with Tel. of 16 No. 27
Urgent! Secret!

For the Reichsminister personally.

1) In the course of conversation after presentation of Japanese answer I expressed my regret to the Foreign Minister that the decisive statement of the government was published immediately after presentation of answer and that Japanese answer cuts off any future discussion. Even if Japanese impatience over prolonged and unsatisfactory attitude of China is understandable, Japan bears responsibility to the world for breaking off the discussion.

2) Then, I asked HIROTA about the future intentions of Japan. Is a declaration of war intended or advance against Canton and Hainan Island? HIROTA declared both as not being planned for the time being.

3) Then, I expressed my anxiety about threefold unfavorable reaction of the continuance of war on German-Japanese relations.

   a. A danger that the English-Japanese relations become more strained, which is not desirable to us.

   b. Bolshevization of China.

   c. Weakening of Japan toward Russia by tying up Japan's entire strength against China.

Foreign Minister answered to this:

   To a. Every further aggravation against England ought to be avoided. Corresponding severe instructions have been issued to the army for avoidance of incident.

   To b. Chiang Kai-shek is, in any event, falling under the Communist influence more and more. The continuance of operations, therefore, does not mean aggravation.

   To c. My considerations are justified in case of prolonged continuation of the war, but this could certainly not be counted on.

4) The rupture of connection with Chinese government and the severe declaration was decided upon only after violent debate of many hours in which a part of the military authorities supported continuation of the negotiations.

DIRKSEN
CERTIFICATE

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E. E. DANLY
The Japanese Ambassador visited me on the 22nd of this month. The occasion was the return of my official visit with him. The Ambassador transmitted on this occasion the thanks of the Japanese Government for the endeavors of Germany for the re-establishment of peace in East Asia. Upon my question how Japan envisions the further development of the matter in China, the Ambassador declared that the Japanese Government could, after the military defeat of Chiang Kai-shek, no longer recognize him as representative of the Chinese People and that the Chinese Central Government did no longer exist. Japan would now endeavor to negotiate about the end of the state of war with a new Chinese government, which probably would be composed of the already existing governments in Peking and Shanghai. In reply, to my objection that there would then probably still remain a big and not yet pacified area of China, the Ambassador replied that they were prepared for everything in Japan and that they would also know how to carry the burden of a prolonged state of war.

Then the Ambassador mentioned that his government is desirous of expanding the trade of goods with Germany. However, it is of importance for them to obtain long range credits for the receipt of German goods beyond the present volume. I told the Ambassador that he knew our situation and that I could tell him already today that even with the best intentions we were not in a position to grant any bigger long term credits. The Ambassador declared then that Japan does not wish to change the present structure of our economic relations and that she is also ready to make the payments provided in our agreement in foreign exchange /devisen/; but, whatever could be exported to Japan beyond the present volume of the German export would have to be paid by barter with Japanese goods. He, the Ambassador, would get into contact with the economic authorities in Germany regarding the details.


/s/ v. Neurath.

Berlin, 26 January 1938

Memorandum

The Japanese Ambassador just told me confidentially that the British Ambassador visited him this morning in regard to the following matter:

As was already to be seen recently from a French trial balloon, English and French circles have an idea to conduct a joint /step/ in Tokyo in the interest of peace /and to conduct it under inclusion of Germany/. Mr. TOGO was of the opinion that this English intention could be traced to misgivings of the English about increasing Communist influences in China, which might also have an effect upon India. The British Ambassador had asked TOGO to what extent, in his opinion, Germany would react to such a suggestion. He, Henderson, would like to feel out
the Reichsminister tomorrow morning, (the 26th of this month) in this matter, Togo replied to the English Ambassador, as he told me, that it is hardly likely that participation of Germany in such a joint action would be welcomed in Tokyo. Furthermore, it is already too late for such an action. Chiang Kai-shek is, according to Japanese opinion, no longer partner to the negotiations. Rather, it is the Japanese aim to come to an agreement with a new Chinese government friendly to Japan.

In the further course of the conversation which dealt no longer with the supposedly impending British feeler, Mr. Togo mentioned that the moment would soon come when we would have to start talking about German cooperation with Japan in the New China which is to be constructed. Mr. Togo did not talk about the recognition of Manchukuo.

(Frame No. 81243)
/s/ Weissacker

Telegram
(Secret Cypher Process)

TOP SECRET
Tokyo, 22 January 1938, 1430 p.m.
Arrived 29 January 1938, 1145 a.m.

No. 52 of 29 January

Re: Telegram of 25, No. 32.*

*) Pol. I 201 (VIII)

Since the Japanese Government has emphatically fixed its standpoint not only by the well-known declaration, but in the meantime, also repeatedly in reply to interpellations in the Diet, /namely/ not to react under any circumstances to any peace feelers of the Hankow Government, I have misgivings against transmission of the statement of the Chinese Ministry for Commerce since it might possibly be considered as a hidden new attempt of Germany to mediate.

Identical to Hankow.

(/s/ Dirksen)
CERTIFICATE

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E. E. DANLY
Document No. 1276
Pol. VIII
Copy

German Embassy
T. W. O. 3/4/38

Foreign Office
Pol. VIII 336

First Appendix

Contents:
The adaptation of German-Japanese relations
to the current state of the Japanese-Chinese
conflict.

1. The conclusion of the radiation .... 1 to 2
2. The China conflict and German-
Japanese relations ..................... 3 to 4
3. Military advisers ....................... 4 to 6
4. War material deliveries ............... 7
5. Conclusion of Peking-Beijing ....... 7 to 8
6. Conversion towards North-China ..... 9 to 11

To the Foreign Office, Berlin.

1. The conclusion of the radiation.

With the unsuccessful conclusion of the German efforts to bring the two parties of the Chinese-Japanese conflict to the conference table, a new chapter in the war, with all the foreign political reactions, connected with it, especially regarding the relation with Germany, has begun. This is, therefore, little point in analyzing in detail these negotiations which are now closed; it will suffice rather to note that China has not seized the second opportunity to begin peace negotiations, offered to her by Japan; from the fact that Marshal Chiang Kai Shek evaded a definitive discussion of the Japanese terms with Mr. TRAUTMANN and that the Chinese Ministerial Council has not occupied itself in an official meeting with the Japanese terms and the explanations given to them by us. Until within the last few days, it was clearly evident that on the part of the Chinese, there was no decision even remotely to seriously reexamine the Japanese terms. It is to be feared that now blood will be spilt unnecessarily and that the Chinese provinces will be destroyed with the sole result that the Chinese - after the model of the Sibylline Books - will the Chinese - after the model of the Sibylline Books - will
The immediate task which confronts us is to draw the consequences of the resultant situation from the point of view of German-Japanese relations. This is to be tried in the following way on the two-fold assumption that Japan will emerge from the conflict as the military victor, and that China, as far as it does not rely on England and America, will glide more and more into the Russian current.

2. The China-conflict and German-Japanese relations.

Up to now we have had done our attitude towards the two parties with the declaration of Germany's absolute neutrality. That was no doubt right for the first part of the Sino-Japanese conflict, although non-recall of the military advisors and the continuation of supply of war materials was one-sidedly beneficial to China - that is to say, Japanese Government, which sought close connections with our richest enemy by conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union, and which moreover leaned on the Western Powers and the Geneva ideology. Thus we have reached a position in relation to Japan which would have become difficult if Japan had vigorously pressed us for a decision. In my annual report I have shown why Japan, for domestic and foreign political reasons, was in an embarrassing situation of having to let Germany shine forth in spotless glory. Thus the revolution of all values took place; that is, every month the Japanese laid before us with obvious miscalculation, a review of the considerable German imports of war materials into China, while, on the other hand, the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry coldly declared to English and American journalists, who alluded angrily to these imports, that the German Government had long ago suspended it.

It is obvious that this condition must come to an end, as soon as Japan is out of this embarrassing position. We must take into count the fact that Japan, filled with deep resentment, will then bring us to unpleasing decisions at a possibly awkward time. Therefore, we shall do well already now to lay down our standpoints again, just on the most thorny questions of the military advisors and the supplies of war material, and, if necessary, explain it to the Japanese. This task is the more urgent because the fact has to be reckoned with that third countries, especially England, will probably systematically point out the sensitive points of German-Japanese relations out of displeasure at Germany's increasing influence in the Far East (action as mediator), and to cover up their own importing of weapons.
3. Military Advisors.

With the unsuccessful conclusion of Germany's attempts at mediation, the most essential reason which could explain the activity of the military advisers in the face of the ever-increasing pressure from the Japanese for their recall, namely, that such a recall would cost Germany the trust which the Chinese Government had still shown in us up to now, and would therefore from the beginning make hopeless German efforts at mediation, also becomes untenable; this evidence is no longer effective because no permanent settlement is in the offing, and if peace negotiations should come anyway, then not with the present Chinese Government.

For the same reason we can also no longer take as a precedent the fact that the German military advisers, as impartial experts, can make clear to Chinese military authorities the uselessness of further resistance.

Above all, however, it is to be feared that non-recall of the advisers will be harmful to German prestige. According to reports of the Consul-General at Canton, Chinese agitators are already daring to accuse German officers of having disclosed plans of operations to the Japanese, while, on the other hand, the Japanese army at the front suspects that the advisers plan the operations of the Chinese army and supervise their execution. In the long run the continuous defeats of the Chinese army will be imputed to the German advisers not only by the parties to the conflict but also by third countries interested in degrading Germany's name in the Far East. It cannot help our prestige either, if General PAULHAUSS and his co-workers withdraw together with the Chinese from Puckow to Nanking, from there to Hankow and therewith to Chungking, and still deeper into Inner Asia. In the long run the advisers will have to share the blame for the Chinese defeats, however much these defeats might be caused indirectly by neglecting the counsels given by Germany. Thus the argument given for retaining the advisers - namely that in case of their recall, Russians would replace them, becomes void at the same time.

Of perhaps even greater efficacy is the simultaneously foreign and military-political argument that for representatives of the German Army such close cooperation with representatives of the Red Army in Bolshevistic Russia is impossible. That Sino-Russian collaboration did not become much more close long ago is to be traced, not to reserve on the Chinese part, but to Soviet activities - Sino-Red's trip to Moscow was meant to remove these suspicions. However, now Russian material aid in
sending Russian airplanes and pilots, which had led to a re­
vival of the Chinese air attacks, is becoming more and more
apparent. That the slogan "German-Soviet collaboration" will
be taken up eagerly by the interested parties is shown in the
enclosed cutting from the "China Weekly Review" of 25 December,
1937.

The course of events in war has itself caused further
evidence which was brought up by the German merchants in China
to support the retention of the military advisors in the field;
namely, that they (the advisors) were the pioneers and path­
finders for a considerable part of our China export to crumble
away. Even if Chinese ability and will to buy further pur­
chases in Germany should combine with the technical possibility
of executing this import, already the geographical changes on
the map of China, caused by the course of the war, would
bring about a considerable shifting of the possibilities for
markets from the standpoint of percentage into the areas
occupied by Japan.

Fully appreciating the importance of our military advisor,
our relations with China, on which I always based my re­served judgment of this question in the first phase of the
war, I now advocate for the above-mentioned reasons in agree­
ment with the "Military Attacks, General Staff", the immediate,
complete recall of all German military advisors still active
in China.


Only short explanations have to be made in favor of the
complete suspension of war material supplies to China. From the
reports from the Embassy it is known how critically this very
question has influenced German-Chinese relations. The rolli­
ifying effect of the prohibition issued by the German govern­
ment has vanished as a result of the continuation of the supplies.
The pause in Japanese pressure for complete suspension is near­
ing its end; the attitude of the military authorities leaves no
doubt as to their possible attitude as to the technical im­
possibility of keeping about the suspension of war material
supplies by German government measures, would not be understood
here - the confidence in the power of authoritarian Germany
vis-a-vis private capitalist tendencies is too great for that. In the gone way reasons of political expedience and
the necessity of also executing declarations once issued, alike
declare the suspension of war-material-supplies to China; should
there be fundamental differences of opinion about this idea,
clarification should be sought by discussions with Japan.
5. Recognition of Manchukuo.

The adjustment of our relations with Japan and China in view of the balance of power at the present moment, should give us occasion to declare our recognition of Manchukuo before Japan's pressure makes itself unpleasantly felt. I regard it as impossible that we can any longer delay this recognition, which, after all, now means no more than the confirmation of an existing condition; the official records of the Manchurian Government in Rinkiang to Councillor INOLL is the first indication that the recognition must now be effected. Italy's action has, regarding Japan, robbed us of a pretext for further delay and, regarding China, given into our hands a weakening of Chinese sensitiveness - in some this should yet have to be considered in view of the difficult Moscow course of the Hankow-Chungking Government. The cream of the economic possibilities of a recognition of Manchukuo has been skimmed by the economic agreement and the establishing of the commercial agency. The opportunity for an extensive economic-political transaction with Japan on the occasion of the recognition of Manchuria would have offered itself if the plans discussed by us a few years ago had been followed up. Now the recognition of Manchuria could, in spite of the Italian action, still serve to make Japan a friendly and hence certainly appreciated gesture if the occasion should arise (anniversary of the founding of the empire).


The recognition of Manchukuo is at least ideologically connected with the further constructive and perhaps most important task with which we will be confronted by the further course of events in China: the necessity to orientate our China policy to a considerable part of North China.

We will have to consider the fact that North China up to the Yellow River and beyond that to the borders of the Shantung Province, will be under the Chinese influence for a number of years, maybe decades; that Shanghai and its hinterland to beyond Hankow - in a few months maybe beyond Hankow - will be occupied by Japanese troops for some time. Maybe for a few years, that only behind a wide war gone wast of this territory will the undisputed power of the government of Rump-China begin; and that, finally, the conditions in South China, especially in Canton, will be very uncertain at least for the duration of hostilities, because, even if a military advance against Canton is for the present apparently improbable, the connections of this city with the outside world will be hindered by the Japanese as much as possible.
It follows from this that, for a long time, the North China of the five Provinces will be the quietest part of China and the one which will be the first to return to normal life. The further economic function of Shanghai will anyway represent only a fraction of its former significance until the conclusion of peace; what will later become of the trade center on the Yangtse will have to be awaited. The part of South China which is close to the coast will hardly lead a normal political and economic life under the influence of the events of war - at least air attacks. The same will apply to Central China, which is pushed away from the coast.

We will have to draw the conclusion from this, that in our China policy we must at least put the accent more strongly economically and politically on North China; we will have to regard our China problems more from Peking than from Shanghai, Hankow or Chunching.

This by no means necessitates offending the Chinese government forever. Outwardly important change would have to take place. Naturally the allotment of the official representatives of the Reich would remain the same; it would be wrong, too, if German firms should give up their establishment in Shanghai. The fact, beneficial to us, that besides consular representation in North China, a diplomatic office exists in Peking and that furthermore German firms have operated in North China before anyway gives us enough strong points for our new orientation.

The most urgent requisite for this shifting of our interests in North China seems to me to be the establishing of a close connection with the Japanese military and civil authorities. It will not be difficult to achieve this by building up the office in Peking and by appointing to it an elderly official experienced in service in Japan.

The economic shifting of our interests to North China will be already undertaken to a certain degree by the private initiatives of our Chinese firms. It will be the task of the organs of the state to promote this development. Above all, however, it seems urgent that the possibilities of an economic opening up of North China, or otherwise our cooperation with the Japanese authorities in this be examined by prominent individuals, German experts or by a small delegation specially set up for this purpose.

It cannot be the purpose of this report to deal definitively with the difficult and complicated questions, which the concept "economic opening-up of North China" contains. But I have thought it my duty to point out, that in the kaleidoscopic happen-
Today the Chinese Foreign Minister read to me the following text of an oral declaration, which he asked to transmit to the Japanese Government. /Text follows in English/

On November 5th, 1937, certain peace terms proposed by Japan were to us at Nanking under arrangements kindness of your Excellency. Subsequently on November 25th and November 29th and also December 2nd your Excellency again communicated to Chinese authorities at Hankow and Nanking the intentions of the Japanese Government and informed us that Japanese authorities had stated in spite of the best military success gained by Japan the terms proposed by the Japanese Government early in November were still to stand. In view of the good offices performed by Germany and the desire of Japan to resume friendly relations with China, we repute it necessary to inform Japanese Government that China was prepared to take the points proposed by Japan as the basis of discussion.

On December 26th and December 27th your Excellency communicated to us certain "basic conditions" from Japan saying that the German Ambassador at Tokyo had been instructed by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs that those new conditions were proposed by Japan because of the changing of circumstances. After due consideration we have found that the altered terms are rather (1 group garbled) altered terms are rather (1 group garbled) altered terms are rather (1 group garbled). The Chinese Government desires therefore to be apprised of the nature and content of the newly submitted conditions in order to make a careful examination and reach a definite decision. (1 group garbled). The Chinese Government desires therefore to be apprised of the nature and content of the newly submitted conditions in order to make a careful examination and reach a definite decision. (1 group garbled).

The Minister told me that the text was already complete yesterday evening, but that he still had to have the approval of a colleague. I asked him whether he did not fear that the Japanese would consider this communication as evasive. Besides, it seemed to me that in the communication there is no expression of a wish for an agreement. The Minister replied that the government could come to no decision and express no opinion until it knows the details of the Japanese demands.

Copy to Tokyo
CERTIFICATE

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E. E. DANLY
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I would appreciate it if you could provide more context or a translation of the text as it is not clear what the document contains.
ファイルムーノ隠トンシテ米国陸軍省ヨリ余ニ手
交セラレタルモノニシテ右ハ在米国陸軍
ノ接収セル觸逸文書ニ付作成セラレタルモノ
ナルコト且ツ右文書ハ手交セラレテ以来引き
キ余ノ保管ニアルモノナリコト
Doc. No. 1381

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)
Tokyo, 25 August 1939, 8:40 o'clock
Arrival: 25 August 1939, 2130 o'clock

No. 363 of 25 August - Urgent!

In answer to Tel. No. 260 of 22 August
Pol. VIII 1377

For the State Secretary
Secret

Today I visited the Foreign Minister, after the Japanese press and public opinion had been severely shaken by the text of the Non-Aggression Pact. Explained the German desire to further preserve friendly relations with Japan, and the reasons and advantages of the German action, according to guidance given in Telegram No. 260. The Foreign Minister followed with particular attention my explanation of eventual German influence on the stabilizing of Russo-Japanese relations, reserved his/ his/ taking of an attitude for a later discussion.

He handed me copies of the following instructions he had today sent to OSKEL:

1) To inform the German government that the Japanese government had interpreted the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact as finally terminating the present negotiations between Japan and Germany for a Tripartite Pact with Italy;

2) The Japanese government declares that the German act of making a non-aggression pact with Russia constitutes a serious violation of the secret agreement attached to the Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan and Germany. Therefore she files a solemn protest with the German government.

The Foreign Minister added, that Japan had been forced to make the enclosed declaration, but that she was willing to continue friendship for Germany and was seeking a suitable way.
CERTIFICATE

I, E. E. DANLY, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G.H.O. S.C.A.P., and as such have possession, custody and control of original or copies of captured enemy documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That the attached document was delivered to me by the United States War Department as being a print of a microfilm in the files of the Department of State, which was made of a German document captured by American military forces in Europe, and such document has been continuously in my custody since such delivery.

E. E. DANLY
Berlin, 15 May 1939

German Embassy

Tokyo

(Telegrams in Ciphers (Secret Cipher Process)

No. 158

Exclusively for the Ambassador personally in answer to telegram No. 197

The other day I informed Ambassador Ch.I. in agreement with the Italian Government regarding the German and Italian viewpoint as follows:

"(1) The German and Italian Governments are willing to continue political line they had followed up to the present toward Japan unchanged.

"(2) The two Governments have decided to sign a bilateral pact of alliance during this month because they find it proper to counter the political activities displayed by the Western Powers for propaganda purposes with a quick counter-action.

"(3) Tri-lateral negotiations Berlin-Rome-Tokyo are not in any way prejudiced by the anticipated German-Italian pact of alliance. This pact of alliance will definitely prove from a legal point of view the unspeakable firmness of the Berlin-Rome Axis. The Japanese can only welcome it to see the internal relationship between their two European partners cleared of any doubt and to see that any possibility of internal divergences between these partners is excluded, if they want a tripartite pact.

"(4) Moreover the fact that the conclusion of the tripartite pact is delayed so long is not the fault of the German or Italian governments. For a long time I have pointed out to the Japanese that there might be a necessity of a prior conclusion of a German-Italian pact in the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact is postponed for a longer period of time.

"(5) For the Japanese, it is also not a disturbing element that the German-Italian pact will contain in some respects closer ties than the present draft of the Tripartite Pact. It is quite natural that the political and military cooperation between the two European neighboring countries which find themselves directly face to face with France and England is more intensive than the cooperation with the far-
away Japan. If therefore the difference in the two pacts, becomes apparent, it does not mean that Japan is pressed
down politically to a lower level of friendship by Germany
and Italy. The world public for whom the axis Berlin-Rome
has been a firm concept for a long time will feel that such
a difference is a matter of course. Besides, it was Japan
which always urged a cautious formulation of the obligations
in the Tripartite Pact. Germany and Italy would only welcome
it if Japan would participate in the closer connections of the
German-Italian Pact. Japan, however, can not do so and has
no interest in the fact that Germany and Italy accommodate
themselves to the level desired by Japan for the Tripartite
Pact as far as their internal relationship is concerned.

"(6) A parallel existence of the German-Italian pact and
the Tripartite Pact involves no difficulties in the matter
itself or from technical viewpoint. The various provisions
of the present Japanese draft for a Tripartite Pact may remain
entirely unchanged. It is only necessary to insert at the
end an entirely formal article clarifying the relationship
between the two pacts from a legal viewpoint. I handed a
draft of the respective article to Ultili.

"(7) The German-Italian governments have the urgent
wish that the Japanese Government reach its final decision
quickly so that it would be possible to formulate secretly
the Tripartite Pact simultaneously with the signing of the
German-Italian Pact. This wish shows again that any thought
of a political disregard of their relations to Japan is far
from them.

"I request of you to utilize the above viewpoints toward
your confidant and if possible also toward the War Minister
directly and thus to work for a quick and positive decision
of the Government here. In doing so I ask you to mention
casually and in a fitting manner the following: If the
German and Italian governments, as stressed above, are firmly
determined to keep to their previous policy toward Japan, it
is on the other hand, impossible to conceal that the entire
previous attitude of the Japanese government is gradually
beginning to create a certain skepticism in Rome and Berlin.
Mussolini gave expression to anxiety the other day whether
the manner in which the matter was dealt with in Tokyo up
until now should not be interpreted as meaning that the
Japanese Government would in the end not find the strength
for a positive decision. Furthermore, the Fuhrer declared
within the last few days repeatedly in talking to me that
the Japanese attitude was becoming less and less comprehensible
Japan must recognize from her viewpoint that her great political interests conform with those of Germany and Italy and that, therefore, her place was of the side of these two powers.

"Furthermore, I ask you to make it clear to your Japanese partner in conversation that Japan's fear that America might join England and France in the case of war is by no means an argument against the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, since this pact will be the best means to keep America out of the war. On the other hand it must be clear to Japan that the consolidation of her position in East Asia and particularly in China depends first on the superiority of the Axis powers over the Western powers. If this superiority did not exist Japan would soon feel the consequences. It is, therefore, without a doubt completely in Japan's interest to strengthen this superiority by participating and not allowing the impression to rise among the Western powers as if they could count on Japanese neutrality in case of a conflict with Germany or Italy. Text of the draft of the pact and the appertaining papers will be telegraphed to you for your personal information especially.

(Foreign Minister of the German Reich.)
CERTIFICATE

I, E. E. DANLY, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G.C.I.C., S.C.A.P., and as such have possession, custody and control of original or copies of captured enemy documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That the attached document was delivered to me by the United States War Department as being a print of a microfilm in the files of the Department of State, which was made of a German document captured by American military forces in Europe, and such document has been continuously in my custody since such delivery.

E. E. D. RANLY
Q. You have told us about the secret pact and I think you have described it pretty well to us - that was signed between Japan and Germany at the time the Anti-Comintern Pact was entered into. Now, I am wondering if there were any other secret understandings you have not told us about that were entered into between Japan and Germany at or about the same time.

A. Not as treaties, but on this point I would like to tell you some things and if you have any specific questions, please interject them. In 1936, as I stated, the secret pact and the Anti-Comintern Pact were consummated. Following this, while there were no secret pacts in 1937, the German Army and the Japanese Army agreed to furnish each other with intelligence about the Russian military. In this regard it was decided to intensify the use of White Russians who had already been used quite a bit and had been contacted in such spots as Warsaw and Paris. There was no written agreement about this - I believe it was in September or October 1938 - that these discussions came about. With the signing of the Russo-German non-aggression pact there was a temporary cessation of all such activities. These matters were not binding agreements, but more in the form of memoranda.
Q. You have told us about the secret pact and I think you have described it pretty well to us — that was signed between Japan and Germany at the time the Anti-Comintern Pact was entered into. Now, I am wondering if there were any other secret understandings you have not told us about that were entered into between Japan and Germany at or about the same time.

A. Not as treaties, but on this point I would like to tell you some things and if you have any specific questions, please interject them. In 1936, as I stated, the secret pact and the Anti-Comintern Pact were consummated. Following this, while there were no secret pacts in 1937, the German Army and the Japanese Army agreed to furnish each other with intelligence about the Russian military. In this regard it was decided to intensify the use of White Russians who had already been used quite a bit and had been contacted in such spots as Warsaw and Paris. There was no written agreement about this — I believe it was in September or October 1936 — that these discussions were about. With the signing of the Russo-German non-aggression pact there was a temporary cessation of all such activities. These matters were not binding agreements, but more in the form of memoranda.
Q. How, will you tell us how this agreement came into being? Who suggested it and who handled the negotiations for it?

The Japanese military had previously been using White Russians in Warsaw to gather Russian intelligence and following the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact the Russian Section of the General Staff in Tokyo thought that it would be a good idea to further the exchange of information in regard to the Soviet Union. I received orders from the General Staff to approach the Germans and did so. Actual exchange of information was handled by Lt. Col. USUI of my staff.

... After you received instructions to approach the Germans relative to this, whom did you speak to?

Hitel, at that time Lieutenant General.

... After the negotiations had been concluded and this agreement had been reached, what type of organization was set up to handle these activities?

There were many White Russians around Berlin at the time who were willing to sell information and it was simply decided to give them money and procure this information. We were using a Russian from the Caucasus by the name of Bazarov(?) as one of the main sources of information.

I take it then that these activities were conducted out of your office in Berlin.

Yes, except that USUI because he was doing work of this sort, while under me, operated independently.

Did operated under your supervision, did he not?

Yes, however, his job was to gather intelligence only and to communicate with the Russian Division of General Staff.

Those communications would also go through you as the Military Attache?

They would go through my office.
Q. Did you hold any property in Germany?
A. No.

Q. Did you ever have a house or piece of real estate in Falkensee?
A. I understand now what you are talking about. In order to carry on Anti-Soviet propaganda, at one time I negotiated for the purchase of a place where this work could be carried on. This place was not in my name, I believe. However, we did have it.

Q. While this property was not in your own name, did you personally own it?
A. As I said, it was not in my name; the money came from my office.

Q. What type of work did you conduct from this place in Falkensee?
A. They were printing up the propaganda at this place.

Q. But you do know that you had a number of White Russians and they printed propaganda leaflets. Now, tell us what they did with these leaflets.
A. These leaflets were given to Bamard(?), who by some means or other tried to get them into Russia.

Q. General, do you know anything about a Japanese officer that had worked in Afghanistan.
A. Yes.

Q. He was expelled because of suspicion that he had attempted to overthrow the Afghanistan Government, wasn't he?
A. I believe the Japanese officer became friendly with an Afghanistan garrison commander and suggested to him that they carry on Anti-Russian activities. This man evidently passed on this word to the Afghanistan Government and suggested that they get rid of the Japanese officer before they were suspected of doing such things.

Q. That man was working under your direction or out of your office in Berlin, was he not?
A. No. I had no connection with him.
Q. But you intended to send someone there to take his place after he was expelled, did you not?

A. No.
Today I visited General OSHIMA. The conversation ranged over the following subjects:

1) The FÜHRER's speech, which pleased him very much, especially because it had been spiritually warranted in all its features.

2) We discussed the conclusion of the treaty, by means of which the triangle Germany-Italy-Japan would assume an even firmer shape. He also told me that together with German counter-espionage (AWEHR) he was undertaking long range work of disintegration in Russia, emanating from the CAUCASUS and the UKRAINE. However, this organization was only to become effective in the event of war.

3) Furthermore, up to now he had succeeded in sending ten Russians with bombs across the Caucasian frontier. These Russians had the order to kill STALIN. A number of additional Russians, whom he had also sent across, had been shot at the frontier.

4) We then discussed the Mohammedan movement. He said that a Japanese officer had worked in AFGHANISTAN but then had been expelled because he was suspected of wanting to overthrow the Afghan government. I told him that I had a police officer there, and that the two could work together very well once he again had a man there.

5) He told me confidentially that he had bought a piece of real estate at FAIXENSES in the name of a middleman. Six Russians were employed there writing and painting pamphlets which were then conveyed from Poland into Russia by means of small balloons when the wind was favorable. He had received news and proof from Russia that they had arrived well and obviously distributed among the people diligently.

6) He had also bought a motor boat in order to take leaflets from Rumania to the Crimea via the Black Sea. However, this had met with no success in autumn; but he would repeat it during the summer.

Berlin 31 January 1939.

THE REICHSFÜHRER SS:
/s/ H. HIMMLER
CERTIFICATE

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 533.

/s/ ULRICH A. STRAUS
II. (Orig. in Court). AFFIDAVIT

I, GERARD SCHAFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nürnberg, Germany; and that, prior to its introduction and receipt in evidence before the International Military Tribunal or my predecessors in such office had possession, custody and control of the original captured enemy document numbered 2195-PS by said Documentation Division.

2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under command of the Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Forces, from the Office Files of Heinrich Himmler, Reichsfuehrer of the SS.

3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure and capture was delivered to, filed with, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nürnberg, Germany in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 and captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of said original captured enemy document above described and referred to.

5. That said above referred to original captured enemy document has been introduced and received in evidence before the International Military Tribunal in the course of the trial of the case of the United States of America et al against Herman Wilhelm Goering, et al, and was delivered by said Documentation Division to the General Secretary of the said International Military Tribunal concurrently with its said introduction in evidence, and that said original captured enemy document is now in the possession of, and has been impounded by said International Military Tribunal and its said General Secretary, and that a photostatic copy of said original document is hereby furnished because of the unavailability of said original document for the reasons set forth above.

/s/ Gerard Schaefer
Gerard Schaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ John W. Auchincloss
John W. Auchincloss
6-2052152
Capt., JAGD.
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

against

PEL LAI WILLIAM GOERING et al

Defendants.

CERTIFICATE

The undersigned, BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM L.
MITCHELL, hereby certifies:

That he is the duly appointed qualified and acting
General Secretary of the International Military Tribunal,
and that as such he has possession, custody and control
of all of the records of said Tribunal and all documents
admitted in evidence during the trial of the above
entitled cause.

That the document to which this certificate is attached
is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original
document which was heretofore admitted in evidence in the
course of the trial of the above entitled cause and
identified as Exhibit USA 150.

That said original document as admitted in evidence
as aforesaid has been impounded by said International
Military Tribunal through the undersigned as its General
Secretary, and as a result is being held and retained by
the undersigned.

That the undersigned has issued the herein certificate
and caused the same to be attached to said photostatic
copy of said document in order to verify the existence
and contents of said Exhibit, and to further establish
the fact that the original of said Exhibit is unavailable
because of its having been impounded as aforesaid.

DONE at Nurnberg, Germany, this 16th day of
April 1946.

/s/ WILLIAM L. MITCHELL
General Secretary
International Military Tribunal.
Q. Do you know the circumstances incident to Italy becoming a party to the Anti-Comintern Pact. By that I want to know who suggested it and to whom?

A. I am not sure of what the circumstances were, but I believe that there were talks between Italy and Germany which brought it about.

By this time it had gone out of my hands and I can only say that I recollect that there was talk from the German side of recruiting Italy in the pact.

* * * * *
OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS CONCERNING FOREIGN RELATIONS

Sixteenth Year of Shōwa (1941)

Board of Information

LXXXVIII. Announcement of the Board of Information Concerning the New Participants in the Anti-Comintern Pact.

November 27, 1941.

In accordance with the procedure for adherence, newly provided in Article 2 of the Protocol concerning the extension of validity of the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was signed and sealed by the Fuehrer of the six countries, namely, Japan, Germany, Italy, Menchoukoku, Hungary and Spain, at Berlin, on the 25th of November, 1941; and seven countries, namely, China, Rumenia, Bulgaria, Finland, Slovakia, Croatia and Denmark, have joined the Pact under today’s date (November 25).
RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL SESSION

Subject: Conclusion of the Protocol between Japan, Italy and Germany.

The session was opened on the 6th (Saturday) of November of the 12th year of Showa (1937), at 10.10 a.m. in presence of the Emperor.

The members who were present:

Hiranuma, President
Arai, Vice-President

Ministers:

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<th>Name</th>
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<td>Konoye, Premier</td>
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<td>Hiroti, Foreign Minister</td>
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<td>Baba, Home Minister</td>
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<td>Yonai, Navy Minister</td>
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<td>Shiono, Justice Minister</td>
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<td>Sugiyama, Tar Minister</td>
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<td>Nagai, Communication Minister</td>
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<td>Kaya, Finance Minister</td>
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<td>Arima, Agriculture and Forestry Minister</td>
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<td>Yoshibo, Commerce and Industry Minister</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>Makajima, Railway Minister</td>
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<td>Otani, Colonial Affairs Minister</td>
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Privy Councillors:

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<th>Name</th>
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<td>Sakurai, Councillor</td>
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<td>Kuni   &quot;</td>
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<td>Suzuki (Kantaro), Councillor</td>
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<td>Arima, Councillor</td>
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<td>Hara, &quot;</td>
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<td>Motoda &quot;</td>
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<td>Suzuki (Soroku), Councillor</td>
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<td>Ishiakwa, Councillor</td>
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<td>Hara, &quot;</td>
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<td>Araki, &quot;</td>
<td>40</td>
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Members Absent:

Members of the Imperial Family:
H. I. H. Prince Yasuhito Seat No. 1
H. I. H. Prince Nobuhito Seat No. 2
H. I. H. Prince Takahito Seat No. 3
H. I. H. Prince Kotchito Seat No. 4

Minister:
Kido, Education Minister Seat No. 17

Councillors:
Kawase, Councillor Seat No. 19
Kuroda, " Seat No. 20
Ishii, " Seat No. 24
Kurino, " Seat No. 28
Ishiwata, " Seat No. 32
Kamiyama " Seat No. 36

Committee:
Funada, Chief of the Legislation Board
Moriyama, Councillor of the Legislation Board
Eoriuchi, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mitsui, Director of the Foreign Ministry, Treaty Affairs Bureau
Inouye, Director of the Foreign Ministry, Europe and Asia Bureau
Okubo, Foreign Ministry, Secretariat officer
Yamaji, " "
Abe, Director of the Police Affairs Bureau of the Home Ministry
Matsuzaka, Director of the Criminal Affairs Bureau of the Justice Ministry.

Reporter: Arai, Chief of the Investigation Committee

Secretary-General: Murekami
Secretary: Eoriye
Muto

Chairman KIZAWA: I declare the Meeting to be opened. The First Reading is opened and omitting the reading aloud I would like to request the Chief of the Investigation Committee to report on the conclusion of Protocol between JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY. (p. 11)

Reporter ARAI: I have been ordered as one of the investigation committee members to study the subject of conclusion of the PROTOCOL between Japan, Germany and Italy and on the 4th instant I called the committee meeting and heard the explanation of the ministers of state and other officials of competent authorities and the investigation on the subject was duly completed. On November 25, 1936 the Empire had concluded a treaty with Germany against Communist International and had agreed upon exchanging reports on the activi-
ties of the Communist International and to discuss on the necessary defensive measures to be adopted and further to execute such measures by close cooperation of both. Moreover, both nations had consented to take defensive measures in accordance with the signification of the said Treaty against any third power whose internal order is under the menace of the destructive operation of the Communist International and if possible to persuade such power to join the said Treaty. (pp. 11-12)

The said Treaty is valid for five years from the date of signing and both nations agreed that at the appropriate time before the expiration of this period, they could attain understanding on the tone of cooperation of the two in the future. Moreover by attached protocol, it was agreed that the competent authorities of both nations shall have close cooperation on exchanging of information concerning the activities of Communist International and on the defensive and enlightening measures against the same, and in addition it was agreed that to those people who engage directly or indirectly within or outside the nations in works of Communist International, or those who aid its destructive operation, severe measures would be accorded within the limits of the laws currently in force. And for the purpose of easing the cooperation between the competent authorities of both nations, it was also agreed upon to establish a standing committee and let it discuss and study various measures necessary to check the destructive operations of the Communist International.

But immediately after the conclusion of Japan-Germany Treaty, the Italian Government brought forward to the Japanese Government to the effect that it too hoped to conclude similar treaty between Japan and Italy. The formation of such treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy was as anticipated under Article 2 of the above-mentioned Japan-Germany Treaty and the Imperial Government, thinking that it would not only be advantageous to strengthen the preventive measures against Communist International but also would bring about considerable spiritual results on politics due to the promotion of good-will between the three nations and hence and in accordance with the significance of the Article 2 of the aforesaid Japan-Germany Treaty, the authorities of three nations repeated the negotiations and came to the understanding to let Italy join the said Treaty and it was agreed that in matter of form the new Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy be concluded separately from the already concluded Japan-Germany Treaty. In such a way we came to see the definite formation of this Protocol. Therefore, should Italy recede from the Protocol, the Japan-Germany Treaty would not be affected whatsoever. (pp. 13-16)

The essential point of this Protocol shall be that Italy shall participate in the Treaty and attached protocol concluded on November 25 last against Communist International and the original text of the said Treaty and attached protocol shall be attached to this Protocol as supplement and this Protocol shall be made an one with the above-mentioned Treaty and attached protocol. The three signatories of this Protocol shall agree to
It appears to me that the conclusion of this new treaty between Japan, Germany, and Italy would not only contribute to the strengthening of the joint preventive measures against the destructive operations of Communist International but would also give birth to some spiritual effects which would contribute to the international politics by cooperation of three nations.

Therefore, then the conclusion of this Treaty as viewed in the light of the present situation, it could be said as the most timely measure and its provisions too may be deemed as having no grounds for objection and it is my earnest desire that by conclusion of this Treaty the maintaining of order in countries concerned would be carried out to our satisfaction by exchanging information on activities of Communist International and by taking other appropriate measures. Thus I end my report on investigation done on the subject. (pp. 16-17)

Councillor SHIMIZU: Is there any other nation in Europe which would likely participate in this Treaty?

Foreign Minister HEIOTA: At present none has actually been approached as to participation in this Treaty, but in the past when conference was held to discuss the police business of anti-communism in Europe there gathered more than ten representative nations so there would be some nation which may join in the future. When the Japan-Germany Treaty was concluded, there seemed to be certain nations which showed support and appreciation. Today, Italy has already come to participate in the Treaty so I think that gradually there would arise the tendency for other nations to join it. (p. 20)

Councillor SAKURAI: At last year's discussion on the subject of Japan-Germany Anti-Comintern Treaty, there was a question fearing the effects created on the relations between Japan and Great Britain. After that, with the outbreak of the China Incident, there was the sign of worsening the Anglo-Japanese relations and wouldn't there be any fear of further worsening of the relations by the conclusion of this Treaty? And even if there isn't any fear of worsening the Anglo-Japanese relations, what steps would the authorities take to restore the Anglo-Japanese relations? Next I should like to ask that in this Treaty, that each original prepared in Japanese, German and Italian would be treated as its text but if there should exist any misinterpretation among each of these texts, then by which text would the decision be arrived at? (pp. 21-22)
today might cause considerable impulsion, but there isn't any reason to be anxious because it is no other than the extension of the anti-Comintern Treaty. Every one of these treaties is concerned only with the subject of Anti-Communism and it is not the subjects of whole Japanese diplomacy. Therefore on other matters we should give our consideration apart from this and the Government had given explanation again and again. (pp. 23-23)

Later for the purpose of adjusting the Anglo-Japanese relations in East Asia, preparatory negotiation was started but due to outbreak of China Incident, it was cancelled to be suspended for a while. However, Britain desired conference with us on how this incident be solved and United States on the other hand, doing her utmost not to interfere too deeply into other's business by observing the so-called Monroe Doctrine. I firmly believe that it is advisable to settle the present China Incident by direct negotiation between Japan and China and not to open the council for powers concerned because there are few of giving opportunity of starting the interference of other powers. (pp. 23-24)

Owing to the fact that every different language version of this protocol has been declared an official text, there are likely to be several discrepancies in their interpretation. But all political agreements of this sort have hitherto relied for their existence upon unanimity of feeling between the nations concerned, and any disagreement over the interpretation of any part of the text would accordingly involve the complete and immediate cessation of (the treaty's) validity.

Councillor SHINWA: I would like to know the reasons why Manchukuo could not be allowed to participate in this Anti-Comintern Pact. (p. 25)

Foreign Minister HIROTA: I think that as Manchukuo's diplomacy is carried out with Japan as its center, there is no necessity of letting Manchukuo participate directly in the agreement. It is true that Manchukuo is an independent state, but it will require adequate consideration to let her act internationally. However, as a matter of fact, the application of this Treaty on Japan would naturally result in extending to Manchukuo. (p.25)

President (HIRANUKA): As there are no more words to be heard from you, we shall immediately proceed to take a vote, dispensing with the second reading and other processes. I wish you, the members who advocate this proposition, to stand up.

(All of the members stood up.)

President (HIRANUKA): This proposition has unanimously been approved. We shall now adjourn today's session.

The Emperor has left.

(Tho session has been adjourned at 10.45 a.m.)

President Baron HIRANUKA Kitichiro
Secretary-General MURAKAMI Kyochi
Secretary MORIYA Hideo
Secretary MUTS Morio
CERTIFICATE

W.D.C. No. __________
I.P.S. No. 870 __

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, __L. TAKATSUJI______________ hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: __Secretary, Privy Council__

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 27 pages, dated Nov. 6, 1937, and described as follows: Record of the proceedings of the Privy Council Session held Nov. 6, 1937. Subject: Conclusion of the protocol between Japan, Italy and Germany.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (Specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Privy Council

Signed at Tokyo, Japan on this 26th day of August, 1946 /s/ M. Takatsuji Signature of Official SEAL

Witness: /s/ Kichi Chosokabe Secretary, Privy Council Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, __EDWARD P. MONAGHAN______________, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo, Japan on this 26th day of August, 1946 /s/ Edward P. Monaghan NAME

Witness: /s/ R. H. Larsh Investigator, IPS Official Capacity
十月三十日（後日）携帯品の宿泊料金を含めて総計を

（件名等）

（送信日）

（送信者名）

（郵便番号 住所）
千九四十六年／昭和二十一年／八月十六日
日本東京＝於於署名
右ノ者ノ公の資格
備察院登記部

余ノエドワード・ピモナハンハノ余ガ聯合國最高指揮官
職名ハ余ガ公署上ノ日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヲヨリ入手ニタルモノナルコトヲ授ゴ

日本東京＝於於署名

右ノ者ノ公の資格
備察院登記部
PROTOCOL

THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT, THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT, and THE GOVERNMENT OF MANCHUKUO, on the one side, and THE GOVERNMENT OF MANCHUKUO, on the other side, enter into an agreement through their undersigned plenipotentiaries as follows:

ARTICLE I

Manchukuo joins the Pact against the Communist-Internationale, consisting of the Accord and the Supplementary Protocol of 25 November 1936 and the Protocol of 6 November 1937.

ARTICLE II

Methods of bringing about the cooperation of the competent authorities of the participating states, as provided in the above-mentioned Supplementary Protocol, shall be decided in the future by agreement among the authorities concerned.

ARTICLE III

The text of the Accord and of the Supplementary Protocol of 25 November 1936 and also the text of the Protocol of 6 November 1937 are attached as annexes to this Protocol.

This Protocol is written in Japanese, Italian, German and Chinese languages, each of which text shall be considered as authentic. This Protocol shall become effective from the day it is signed.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective governments, have signed this Protocol and affixed their seals thereon.

Drawn up in quadruplicate in Peking on the 24th day of February in the 14th year of Showa, or 1939, corresponding to the 24th day of February in the XVIIth year of the Fascist Era, and the 24th day of February of the 6th year of Kangte.

UDAI KEXIGI (SEAL)
LITTI CORTISE (SEAL)
DR. WILHELM WAGNER (SEAL)
CHANG CHING-HUI (SEAL)

ACCORD AGAINST THE COMMUNIST-INTERNATIONALE

III IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT and THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT, recognizing that the aim of the Communist-Internationale (so-called 'Communist') lies in the destruction and expropriation of the existing states by all possible means,
firmly believing that to overlook the interference of the Communist-International in the domestic affairs of the various countries would not only endanger the domestic tranquility and their social well-being, but also threaten the general peace of the world, have, in their wish to cooperate with each other in defending themselves against the ravages of communism, entered into the following accord:

ARTICLE I

The High Contracting States promise to keep each other informed of the activities of the Communist-International, to consult each other in regard to necessary defense measures, and to achieve these measures through close cooperation.

ARTICLE II

The High Contracting States shall jointly invite third countries, whose tranquility is threatened by the destructive activities of the Communist-International, to adopt defense measures in accordance with the purport of this Accord or to participate in this Accord.

ARTICLE III

This Accord is written in the Japanese and German languages, both of which shall be considered as authentic.

This Accord shall become effective from the day it is signed and shall remain in force for a period of five years. At a suitable time before the expiration of this Accord the High Contracting States shall reach an agreement in regard to the form of cooperation thereafter.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective governments, have signed this Accord and affixed their seals thereon.

Drawn up in duplicate in Berlin on the 25th of November in the 11th year of Showa, corresponding to the 25th of November 1936.

Viscount Kintaro Hatakegawa (Signed and Sealed)
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Imperial Japanese Government.

Joachim von Ribbentrop (Signed and Sealed)
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the German Government

SUPPLEMENTARY PROTOCOL TO THE ACCORD AGAINST THE COMMUNIST-INTERNATIONAL

In signing today the Accord against the Communist-International, the
undersigned plenipotentiaries have entered into an agreement as follows:

a) The competent authorities of the Two High Contracting States shall closely cooperate with each other in regard to the exchanging of information on the activities of the Communist-Internationale and in regard to measures of enlightenment and defense against the Communist-Internationale.

b) The competent authorities of the Two High Contracting States shall take strict measures, within the scope of the existing laws, against those who at home or abroad, take service, directly or indirectly, under the Communist-Internationale, or assist its destructive activities.

c) In order to facilitate the cooperation mentioned in (a) above between the competent authorities of the Two High Contracting States, a permanent commission shall be established. This commission shall study and discuss further measures necessary to prevent the destructive activities of the Communist-Internationale.

In Berlin, the 25th of November in the 11th year of Showa, corresponding to the 25th of November 1936.

Viscount Kintaro Mutsukoji (Signed and Sealed)
Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary of the Imperial Japanese Government

Joachim von Ribbentrop (Signed and Sealed)
Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary of the German Government

PROTOCOL

THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT, THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT, considering the fact that the Communist-Internationale threatens constantly the civilized world in the Occident and the Orient, disturbing and destroying its peace and order, firmly believing that only close cooperation among all the states who are interested in maintaining peace and order will be able to reduce and remove this peril, considering that Italy, which since the advent of the Fascist Regime has combatted with indomitable determination this peril and has driven out the Communist-Internationale from her territory, has decided to fight against this common enemy with Japan and Germany, which adhere closely to the same will to defend themselves against the Communist-Internationale, have entered into the following agreement in accordance with the provisions of Article II of the Accord against the Communist-Internationale, which was concluded on 25 November 1936 in Berlin between Japan and Germany;

ARTICLE I

Italy shall participate in the Accord and Supplementary Protocol which
The Three High Contracting States of this Protocol agree that Italy shall be considered as an original signatory of the Accord and the Supplementary Protocol mentioned in the preceding Article, the signing of this Protocol being equivalent to the signing of the original text of the Accord and of the Supplementary Protocol.

ARTICLE III

This Protocol shall constitute an integral part of the above-mentioned Accord and Supplementary Protocol.

ARTICLE IV

This Protocol is written in Japanese, Italian and German languages, each of which text shall be considered as authentic. This Protocol shall become effective from the day it is signed.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective governments, have signed this Protocol and affixed their seals thereto.

Drawn up in triplicate, in Rome on the 6th of November in the 12th year of Showa, or 1937, corresponding to the 21st year of the Fascist Era.

MUSAKI HOFFA
CIANO
JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kacru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives, Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 19 pages, dated February 24, 1939, between Japan, Germany, Italy, and Manchukuo.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Signed at Tokyo on this 22nd day of August, 1946. /s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: Nagaharu Odo
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 24 day of Aug. 1946 /s/ Richard H. Larsh

Witness: Edward P. Monaghan
Investigator IPS
Official Capacity
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, KAYASHI Kacru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives, Section, Japanese Foreign Office

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of ______ pages, dated __________, 19__, and described as follows: Pact of 24 February 1933 between Japan, Germany, Italy and Manchukuo.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Signed at Tokyo on this 22nd day of August, 1946. /s/ K. Kayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: Nagaharu Code
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard K. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 24 day of Aug. 1946 /s/ Richard K. Larsh

Witness: Edward P. Vanechon
Investigator IPS
Official Capacity
PROTOCOL

THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT, THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT, on the one side, and THE GOVERNMENT OF MUNCHUKO, on the other side, enter into an agreement through their undersigned plenipotentiaries as follows:

ARTICLE I

Manchukuo joins the Pact against the Communist-Internationale, consisting of the Accord and the Supplementary Protocol of 25 November 1936 and the Protocol of 6 November 1937.

ARTICLE II

Methods of bringing about the cooperation of the competent authorities of the participating states, as provided in the above-mentioned Supplementary Protocol, shall be decided in the future by agreement among the authorities concerned.

ARTICLE III

The text of the Accord and of the Supplementary Protocol of 25 November 1936 and also the text of the Protocol of 6 November 1937 are attached as appendices to this Protocol.

This Protocol is written in Japanese, Italian, German and Chinese languages, each of which text shall be considered as authentic. This Protocol shall become effective on the day it is signed.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective governments, have signed this Protocol and affixed their seals thereon.

Drawn up in quadruplicate in Munching on the 24th day of February in the 14th year of Showa, or 1939, corresponding to the 24th day of February in the XVIIIth year of the Fascist Era, and the 24th day of February of the 6th year of Kangto.

UIIA KIKIIGI (SEAL)
LUFT O. ROSE (SEAL)
DR. WILHELM WAGNER (SEAL)
CHIAO CHING-HUI (SEAL)

ACCORD AGAINST THE COMMUNIST-INTERNATIONALE

THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT and THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT, recognizing that the aim of the Communist-Internationale (so-called "Comintern") lies in the destruction and suppression of the existing states by all possible means,
firmly believing that to overlook the interference of the Communist-Internationale in the domestic affairs of the various countries would not only endanger the domestic tranquility and their social well-being, but also threaten the general peace of the world, have, in their wish to cooperate with each other in defending themselves against the ravages of communism, entered into the following accord:

ARTICLE I

The High Contracting States promise to keep each other informed of the activities of the Communist-Internationale, to consult each other in regard to necessary defense measures, and to achieve these measures through close cooperation.

ARTICLE II

The High Contracting States shall jointly invite third countries, whose tranquility is threatened by the destructive activities of the Communist-Internationale, to adopt defense measures in accordance with the purport of this Accord or to participate in this Accord.

ARTICLE III

This Accord is written in the Japanese and German languages, both of which shall be considered as authentic.

This Accord shall become effective from the day it is signed and shall remain in force for a period of five years. At a suitable time before the expiration of this Accord the High Contracting States shall reach an agreement in regard to the form of cooperation thereafter.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective governments, have signed this Accord and affixed their seals thereto.

Drawn up in duplicate in Berlin on the 25th of November in the 11th year of Showa, corresponding to the 25th of November 1936.

Viscount Kintaro Mochide (Signed and Sealed)
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the Imperial Japanese Government.

Joachim von Ribbentrop (Signed and Sealed)
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the German Government.

SUPPLEMENTARY PROTOCOL TO THE ACCORD AGAINST THE COMMUNIST-INTERNATIONALE

In signing today the Accord against the Communist-Internationale, the
undersigned plenipotentiaries have entered into an agreement as follows:

a) The competent authorities of the Two High Contracting States shall closely cooperate with each other in regard to the exchanging of information on the activities of the Communist-Internationale and in regard to measures of enlightenment and defense against the Communist-Internationale.

b) The competent authorities of the Two High Contracting States shall take strict measures, within the scope of the existing laws, against those who at home or abroad, take service, directly or indirectly, under the Communist-Internationale, or assist its destructive activities.

c) In order to facilitate the cooperation mentioned in (a) above between the competent authorities of the Two High Contracting States, a permanent commission shall be established. The commission shall study and discuss further measures necessary to prevent the destructive activities of the Communist-Internationale.

In Berlin, the 25th of November in the 11th year of Shawa, corresponding to the 25th of November 1936.

Viscount Kintomu Mushakoji (Signed and Sealed)
Envoi Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary of the Imperial Japanese Government

Joachim von Ribbentrop (Signed and Sealed)
Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary of the German Government.

PROTOCOL

THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT, THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT, considering the fact that the Communist-Internationale threatens constantly the civilized world in the Occident and the Orient, disturbing and destroying its peace and order, firmly believing that only close cooperation among all the states which are interested in maintaining peace and order will be able to reduce and remove this peril, considering that Italy, which since the advent of the Fascist Regime has combated with indelible determination such peril and has driven out the Communist-Internationale from her territory, has decided to fight against this common enemy with Japan and Germany, which adhere closely to the same will to defend themselves against the Communist-Internationale, have entered into the following agreement in accordance with the provisions of Article II of the Accord against the Communist-Internationale, which was concluded on 25 November 1936 in Berlin between Japan and Germany:

ARTICLE I

Italy shall participate in the Accord and Supplementary Protocol which
were concluded on 25 November 1936 in Berlin between Japan and Germany, the
text of which Accord and Supplementary Protocol are attached as appendices
to this Protocol.

ARTICLE II

The Three High Contracting States of this Protocol agree that it shall
be considered as an original signatory of the Accord and the Supple-
mentary Protocol mentioned in the preceding Article, the signature of this
Protocol being, equivalent to the signing of the original text of the Accord
and of the Supplementary Protocol.

ARTICLE III

This Protocol shall constitute an integral part of the above-mentioned
Accord and Supplementary Protocol.

ARTICLE IV

This Protocol is written in Japanese, Italian and German language,
each of which text shall be considered as authentic. This Protocol shall
become effective from the day it is signed.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective
governments, have signed this Protocol and affixed their seals thereto.

Drawn up in triplicate, in peace on the 6th of November in the 12th year
of Showa, or 1937, corresponding to 27th year of the Fascist Era.

MASAKI HYATA

CICCHIO

JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP
PROTOCOL

The Japanese Imperial Government, the Italian Government, the German Government, on the one side, and the Spanish Government, on the other, enter into an agreement through the undersigned plenipotentiaries as follows:

ARTICLE I

Spain will join in the pact against the Communist Internationale consisting of the Accord and the Supplementary Annexed Protocol of November 25, 1936, and the Protocol of November 6, 1937.

ARTICLE II

The form which will facilitate, as provided in the above-mentioned Supplementary Protocol, the cooperation of the competent authorities of the participating states shall be decided by future agreement among the authorities concerned.

ARTICLE III

The texts of the Accord and of the Supplementary Protocol, of November 25, 1936, and also the text of the Protocol of November 6, 1937, are attached as appendices to this Protocol.

This Protocol is drawn up in Japanese, Italian, German and Spanish, each of which text shall be considered as authentic. This Protocol shall take effect from the day it is signed.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective governments, have signed this Protocol and affixed their seals thereto.

Drawn up in quadruplicate in BURGOS on March 27, Showa 14, or 1929, corresponding to March 27 in the 17th year of the Fascist Era, March 27 of the 3rd year of victory of New Spain.

Makoto YANO (Seal)
Violà di CAMPAITC (Seal)
Ernold von STOKER (Seal)
JOHANN (Seal)

ACCORD AGAINST THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONALE

The IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT and the GERMAN GOVERNMENT, Recognizing that the aim of the Communist Internationale (so-called "Comintern") lies in the destruction and oppression of the existing states by all possible means, firmly believing that to overlook the interference of the Communist-Internationale in the domestic affairs of the various countries, would not only endanger the
domestic tranquility and the social well-being, but also threaten the general peace of the world, have, in their wish to cooperate with each other in defending themselves against the Communist destruction, entered into the following Accord:

**ARTICLE I**

The High Contracting States promise to keep each other informed of the activities of the Communist Internationals, to consult each other in regard to necessary defense measures, and to achieve the foregoing measure through close cooperation.

**ARTICLE II**

The High Contracting States shall jointly invite third countries, whose tranquility is threatened by the destructive activities of the Communist Internationals, to adopt defense measures in accordance with the purport of this Accord or to participate in this Accord.

**ARTICLE III**

This Accord is written in the Japanese and German languages, both of which shall be considered as authentic. This Accord shall become effective from the day it is signed, and shall remain in force for a period of five years. At a suitable time before the expiration of this Accord the High Contracting States shall reach an agreement in regard to the form of cooperation thereafter.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective governments, have signed this Accord and affixed their seals thereon.

Drawn up in duplicate in Berlin, on the 25th of November, in the 11th year of Showa, corresponding to the 25th of November, 1936.

Viscount Kintomo MIHISHIJI (Signed and sealed)
Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary of the Imperial Japanese Government.

Joachim von RIBBENTROP (Signed and sealed)
Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary of the German Government.

**SUFFIXARY PROTOCOL TO THE ACCORD AGAINST THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONALE**

In signing today the Accord against the Communist-Internationals, the undersigned plenipotentiaries have entered into an agreement as follows:

(a) The competent authorities of the Two High Contracting States shall closely cooperate with each other in regard to the exchanging of information on the activities of the Communist-Internationals, and in regard to measures
of enlightenment and defense against the Communist-Internationale.

(b) The competent authorities of the Two High Contracting States shall take strict measures within the scope of the existing law against those who at home or abroad, take service, directly or indirectly, under the Communist-Internationale, or assist its destructive activities.

(c) In order to facilitate the cooperation mentioned in (a) above between the competent authorities of the Two High Contracting States, a permanent commission shall be established. The commission shall study and discuss further measures necessary to prevent the destructive activities of the Communist-Internationale.

In Berlin, the 25th of November in the 11th year of Showa, corresponding to the 25th of November, 1936.

Viscount Kintomo NUSHAKOJI (signed and sealed)
Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary of the Imperial Japanese Government

Joachim von Ribbentrop (signed and sealed)
Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary of the German Government.

PACT

The IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, the ITALIAN GOVERNMENT, the GERMAN GOVERNMENT, Considering the fact that the Communist-Internationale constantly threatens the civilized world in the Occident and the Orient, disturbing and destroying its peace and order, firmly believing that only close cooperation among all the states who are interested in maintaining peace and order will be able to reduce and remove this peril, considering that Italy, which since the advent of the Fascist Regime has combated with indomitable determination such peril and has driven out the Communist-Internationale from her territory, has decided to fight against this common enemy with Japan and Germany which, adhere closely to the same will to defend themselves against the Communist-Internationale, have entered into the following agreement in accordance with the provisions of Article II of the Accord against the Communist-Internationale which was concluded on November 25, 1936 in Berlin between Japan and Germany.

ARTICLE I

Italy shall participate in the Accord and Supplementary Protocol which were concluded on 25 November 1936 in Berlin between Japan and Germany, the text of which Accord and Supplementary Protocol are attached as appendices to this Protocol.
ARTICLE II

The Three High Contracting States of this Protocol agree that Italy shall be considered as the original signer of the Accord and the Supplementary Protocol mentioned in the preceding Article, the signing of this Protocol being equivalent to the signing of the original text of the Accord and of the Supplementary Protocol.

ARTICLE III

This Protocol shall constitute an integral part of the above-mentioned Accord and Supplementary Protocol.

ARTICLE IV

This Protocol is written in Japanese, Italian and German languages, each of which text shall be considered as authentic. This Protocol shall become effective from the day it is signed.

In witness thereof, the undermentioned, duly authorized by their respective governments, have signed this Protocol and affixed their seals thereon.

Drawn up in triplicate in Rome, on the 6th of November in the 12th year of Showa, or 1937, corresponding to the 16th year of the Fascist Era.

Yasaeiki HOKTA
CIANO
Joachim von RIBBENTROP
CERTIFICATE

W.D.C. No. __________
I.P.S. No. 1452

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archive Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of _____ pages, dated 19____ and described as follows: Agreement between Japan, Germany, Italy, and Spain providing for the participation of Spain in the Anti-Comintern Pact signed 27 March 1939.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 22nd day of August, 1946

/sg/ K. HAYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness: /sg/ Megaharu Odo

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard K. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 24th day of August, 1946

/sg/ Richard K. Larsh

Witness: /sg/ Edward P. Monaghan

I.P.S. No. 1452
PROTOCOL FOR THE EXTENSION OF THE PERIOD OF VALIDITY OF THE AGREEMENT AGAINST THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL.

PROTOCOL

The Government of the German Reich, the Royal Italian Government and the Imperial Japanese Government, and further the Royal Hungarian Government, the Imperial Government of Manchukuo and the Spanish Government, in the cognition that the agreements made by the Union for the Defense against the activities of the Communist International have proven most useful, as well as in the conviction that the common interests of their countries necessitate their further close cooperation against the common enemy, have decided to extend the period of validity of the said agreement and for this purpose have agreed on the following stipulations:

Article 1

The pact against the Communist International, which follows from the agreement and the appended protocol of 25 November 1936 as well as the protocol of 6 November 1937 and which was joined by Hungary by the protocol of 24 February 1939, by Manchukuo by the protocol of 24 February 1939, and by Spain by the protocol of 27 March 1939, will be extended for five years, effective from 25 November 1941.

Article 2

The countries, which on the invitation of the government of the German Reich, the Royal Italian Government and the Imperial Japanese Government as the original signatories of the pact against the Communist International, consider joining this pact, will transmit in writing their declaration of accession to the Government of the German Reich, which will in turn inform the remaining contracting countries of the receipt of this declaration. The accession becomes effective on the day of the receipt of the declaration of accession by the Government of the German Reich.

Article 3

The submitted protocol is drawn up in the German, Italian, and Japanese languages, wherein each text is considered as the original. The protocol goes into effect on the day it is signed.
The High Contracting Parties will confer on the future form of their cooperation in time before the expiration of the period of five years stipulated in Article 1. As proof of this, the signatories, well and properly authorized by their respective governments, have signed this protocol and affixed their seals to it.

Thus done in six copies in Berlin, on 25 November 1941, in XX year of the Fascist era, that is on the 25th day of the 11th month of the 16th year of the Showa era.

(L.S.) signed VON RIBBENTROP
(L.S.) signed CIANO
(L.S.) signed OSIMA
(L.S.) signed VON PAPOSSY
(L.S.) signed L.Y. S. TEM
(L.S.) signed SUUMI
APPENDIX

I, W. F. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

That I am an Attorney of the United States Department of State on the staff of the United States Political Adviser on German affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and central files of which I was in charge then came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany foreign office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of April 1946.

G. H. Carde
L.t. Colonel, ASD
acting adjutant General
Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.)


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国的法律问题上，国家强调在维护社会稳定和秩序的同时，也要保障公民的基本权利。这体现在国家制定的法律和政策中。例如，国家通过立法来保护公民的言论自由权，同时也要求公民在行使权利时不得损害国家利益。此外，国家还通过行政手段来管理社会事务，确保社会的正常运转。
答：各条約、相互援助条約

日本、露西亚以外、他国条約に、秘密条約。

一切解釈、完全解釈せん計。

条約に、他方絶対何とし何、何、何。

条約に基づく、條約、何、何。

日本、露西亚以外、他国条約。

条約に基づく、條約、何、何、何。
21 5.6-1

内容

图 2.3.5 直观图

图 2.3.6 抽象图

图 2.3.7 逻辑图

图 2.3.8 结构图

图 2.3.9 流程图
Excerpts of Interrogations of OSHIMA, Hiroshi, dated 4 February 1946, 6 February 1946 and 7 February 1946.

Interrogation of 4 February 1946, pages 43, 44, and 45:

"Q. You may now proceed with your story regarding the Tri-Party Pact.

"A. I shall give you the rough overall picture of how this pact came about. Later, if you wish to question me on specific details, please do so. To start with, I would like to tell you that, as you know, in July 1937, the China incident started. Following this, at one time, you may not be aware, that Japan attempted to use Germany in order to bring this incident to a close. At the time I received orders from the General Staff in Tokyo to try and approach German military leaders and have them in turn approach the German military advisors of Chiang Kai-shek with a view to bringing to a close an incident which was rapidly taking on gargantuan proportions and leading only to a stalemate. As an initial step, I wish to relate how, I believe it was in January 1938, although I am not certain of the date - only that it was early in January, I called upon RIBBENTROP at his villa in Sonnenburg, to pay my New Year’s respects, and at the time he asked me if there was not some way in which Germany and Japan might be brought closer together by means of a treaty or otherwise. I recall that RIBBENTROP spent his Christmas holidays at his villa and my recollection is that I called upon him around the New Year, and I recall passing on the general story of this meeting to General Staff Headquarters in Tokyo. In the same year in June I received a communication from the Division concerned, SHULIEN, of the General Staff Headquarters, informing me that only in so far as the Division was concerned and not speaking for the General Staff as a whole they approved the furtherance of German-Japanese cooperation. Although I do not remember the details of this communication, I remember that the main point was that in this cooperative movement the thing to be kept uppermost in mind should be an agreement to act in accord in dealing with Soviet Russia. At the beginning of July sometime RIBBENTROP was preparing to go to Sonnenburg again for the summer and before he left I saw him at his request and we talked over various matters. At this time without referring to the matter of the communication from Japan - which had come by courier - I asked him what he thought of an agreement of some sort promising to consult with each other before any action was taken in case of an attack by the U.S.S.R. RIBBENTROP asked me to let him have time to think it over - and we parted for the moment. As the
next step in these talks I recall that a few days later
RIEBENTROP returned from Sonnenburg for the express purpose
of talking to me. To the best of my knowledge the following
is more or less what he said on this occasion: (1) that what
he said was not based on talks with HITLER or any other
official, and (2) that he felt that Germany would not particu­
larly approve or like a treaty agreeing to consult only, as
this was somewhat one-sided and not strong enough, and (3)
that he suggested a mutual aid treaty instead aimed not only
at the U.S.S.R., but all countries. In other words, what he
meant was that a German-Japanese pact would, if strong enough,
hope to preserve world peace. Germany was particularly fond
of statements of this sort at the time.

"Q. At this time in what capacity was RIBBENTROP in the German
Government - the Foreign Minister or an official in the office
of the Foreign Minister?

"A. He was Foreign Minister at the time and had been for several
months. I told RIBBENTROP that I thought it would be extremely
difficult for Japan to agree to expand her objectives to a place
where she would agree to a mutual aid pact aimed at the world
in general, as she was only prepared to act against Russia.
RIEBENTROP in return stated that he did not wish Japan to do
anything that was outside her power to do, but that a strong
pact was vitally necessary for the preservation of peace and
hence urged me further upon this point. RIBBENTROP then asked
me to find out how the Japanese Army would feel about such a
treaty, and secondly, requested me to maintain absolute
security - in this regard there had been some leaks in the
previous negotiations leading up to the Anti-Comintern Pact -
and to not communicate by wire or wireless with Japan, but to
send someone back. Because of this I communicated with the
General Staff, simply to get its O.K., and having received it
sometime around the end of July, I dispatched Major General
KASAHARA to Japan by air. This was not all decided at one
meeting. It actually was during two or three meetings.

Interrogation of 6 February 1946, pages 46 and 47:

"Q. General, you may proceed with the recital of the story of the
events relative to the Tri-Party Pact,

"A. I shall give you a general picture of the events leading up to
the Tri-Party Pact, and if you have any questions during my
recital, or afterwards, please interject.

"Q. General, do you remember the point at which you left off when
we met last time?

"A. Yes.
"Q. You may proceed from that point.

"A. Major General KASAHARA arrived back in Japan in August 1930, after having flown as far as Singapore and proceeded from there by ship. Upon his return he spoke to the General Staff, who in turn spoke of the matter to the then Foreign Minister, UGAKI. The Foreign Minister in turn discussed the matter with the five Cabinet members committee. This was a committee among the Cabinet ministers which discussed particularly important matters. A telegram was then received by me from the General Staff stating that they were more or less in accord and that the five-man committee was also agreeable to the suggestion.

"Q. General, can you tell us what ministers these five were?

"A. This is simply from my memory and I am not absolutely certain, but I think the 5-man committee consisted of the Prime Minister, KONOYE, the Foreign Minister, UGAKI; the Finance Minister, IKEDA; the War Minister, ITAGAKI; and the Navy Minister, YOMAI.

"A. My reason for sending KASAHARA to Japan was simply to get the views of the Army, but as I discovered later the Army at this time was particularly desirous of bringing to a close the China incident and they felt that this would be a step in that direction so that they took it upon themselves to speak to the Foreign Minister, who in turn spoke to the committee of five.

(And on page 49):

"Q. If I understood you correctly, General, the reply that you received from Tokyo came to you from the Chief of Staff?

"A. It always comes from the Chief of Staff.

"Q. You may continue.

"A. While there were other telegrams and communications in general, what they said was that they would be willing to conclude a pact in which mutual aid was promised in case one of the signatories was a victim of unprovoked aggression. However, Japan wished to have the pact aimed at Russia primarily, and all other countries would be secondary to this.
A. I began my official duties as Ambassador about the end of October 1939. Following discussions with Ribbentrop and Gaus, the head of the Legal Department of the German Foreign Office, and having decided upon the general outline of the treaty I sent an official communication to the Japanese Foreign Office giving in it the aforementioned outline.

Q. General, according to my information you were named Ambassador on 8 October 1938.

A. Yes.

Q. And you assumed your duties immediately?

A. I stated I began my official duties towards the end of October because it is Japan's protocol not to take up the official duties until the former Ambassador leaves for his next post.

Q. General, I suppose at the time you were named Ambassador the negotiations then with respect to this proposed treaty that had theretofore been carried on through you as Military Attache had now reached the stage where the Foreign Office in Tokyo was carrying on the negotiations through and with you in your capacity as Ambassador?

A. Yes, as soon as I became Ambassador.

Q. You may continue.

A. The first answer from the Foreign Office stated that the Foreign Office and the Government were in agreement regarding a treaty of this sort which would help to conclude the China incident and (1) to clarify the Russian situation so that troops could be deployed elsewhere, (2) to strengthen Japan's international position, and (3) to receive technological and economic aid from Germany. However, regarding the actual wording of the treaty they stated that they were in process of studying it. That was the first answer.

Q. What did the deployment of troops elsewhere have to do with the concluding of the China incident?

A. If the problems along the Siberian border were settled, then those troops, if necessary, could be used elsewhere.
"Q. By that time you mean this, General, that troops that had thence­tofore been deployed along the Russian border could now be withdrawn from that border and used against China?

"A. In case of necessity, yes. Essentially, Japan wished to kill three birds with one stone.

"Q. Continue.

"A. In general, now, to go back over what I have said and to put it into a nutshell KASAHARA, upon his return from Japan, had told me of the view of the Government as he knew them - this was, however, still unofficial because I had not yet started negotiations as Ambassador. Now, following my talks with KASAHARA and RIBBENTROP I sent the aforementioned plan to Japan officially and received a telegram in return. The gist of this communication was that the plan was agreeable, but that they were in the process of studying the ramifications thereof and that they would answer as quickly as possible.

"Q. The views of the Government then are the views that you have just been talking about?

"A. That is correct. I waited for the answer which did not come for a long time so that finally in December I sent another communication to the Foreign Office, asking why I did not receive an answer. In return, I received a communication to the effect that the most pressing problem was the matter of naming Russia as the most important concern or subject and other nations as secondary in importance. In this regard the Foreign Office expressed concern that arguments might occur with Germany and they wished to clarify this point fully before proceeding any further, so that they stated they would send a man from the Foreign Office, ITO, Jusshi, who had the rank of a Minister, one man from the General Staff, Lt. Col. TATSUMI, and one man from the Navy General Staff, Captain ABE (he is in Sweden now as a Vice Admiral). I was instructed to talk with them. These men arrived in Berlin in the beginning of February 1939. To go back a bit, although this does not concern Japan particularly, I know that around September 1938, after having received the unofficial S.K. from Japan, Germany approached Italy to join in the pact. Italy's answer was that while she liked the idea she did not know whether the time was ripe and requested time to think it over.

"Q. Who was the Ambassador to Italy from Japan at that time?

"A. There was only a charge d'affaires at that time.
"Q. Continue.

"A. Germany received no answer from Italy on this proposal so that they asked me to urge Japan to approach Italy with the same proposition and requested me to go to Italy as the Japs had only a charge d'affaires at that time. I dispatched a communication to the Foreign Office requesting permission to do this and received in return an O.K. (the Foreign Minister at this time was definitely ARITA). Upon receipt of this permission around the middle of December 1938, I proceeded to Rome and there met MUSSOLINI, getting from him the same answer that Germany had earlier received. However, very early in January 1939, I heard from the German Government (RIBBENTROP) that Italy had communicated with them to the effect that she was ready to join in at any time.

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Interrogation of 7 February 1946, pages 54 to 59:

"Q. General, you may continue with your recital of your story of the Tri-Party Pact from the point where you left off when we adjourned yesterday.

"A. In regard to what I spoke to you about yesterday, I would like to have you read back to me the portion of the transcript following my dispatching the first communication to Japan as Ambassador.

"Q. The reporter will read that portion of the transcript.

(The same was read by Miss Brunner).

"A. The first telegram was sent to Japan after I took office as Ambassador. While I am not certain what its date was, I believe it was in the beginning of November 1938. The answer did not arrive and I sent another one as I told you. Finally, after I sent the second telegram in December 1938, I received the answer which in general stated that because differences might arise between Japan and Germany upon the question of naming Russia as the principal concern and the other nations as secondary, in order to clarify this they would send a Commission from Tokyo. The Germs spoke to me in December 1938, regarding their wish. They had approached the Italians also. My communication to the Foreign Office requesting permission to proceed on this mission was sent in December 1938, and the answer was received from Foreign Minister ARITA in the same month.

"Q. You may continue, General.
"A. The ITO mission first went to Italy, as it was on their route, and after staying there for two or three days proceeded to Berlin, arriving around the beginning of February 1939. A few days after this Ambassador SHIRATORI also came to Berlin from Italy. ITO had with him the Government's plan and wishes on this proposed treaty. Now, this is a very important point and while I do not remember all the details, I wish to outline the principal wish of the Japanese Government as brought by ITO. That was that, while Russia would be the prime object of this pact the other countries, while remaining secondary, would enter into the matter only if they had gone Communist. In other words, for example, if Japan were to go to war with England, say, this pact would become effective only if England had also gone Communist.

"Q. General, will you clarify what you mean by other countries — do you mean any other country?

"A. I say other countries, because before this pact was drawn up fully in regard to specific nations other than Russia, negotiations ceased. To explain more fully, while there was the intention to go into the matter of specific nations fully at a later date, before we got around to it negotiations were broken off.

"Q. Actually, Germany had in mind the entire world, did they not?

"A. Yes, that is true, although Germany also agreed to delete the Americans in the first statement in the preamble.

"Q. But when the conversations took place between you as representative of the Japanese Government and the German representatives in the very beginning the conversation then pointed to a pact that would be against the entire world, and subsequently those deletions of nations were made?

"A. Yes, the deletions were requested by Japan. Another point was that if Japan were to accept the treaty as proposed by Germany the aid proviso would not work to Japan's advantage because, for example, in case of a U.S.-Japan war, what particular aid could Germany give? Whereas, in case of a German-United States war, as another example, Japan would have to throw in her whole might in the Pacific. These are, of course, only examples that I am giving, and not to be construed as having come from the Japanese Government. Both SHIRATORI and I said that we well understood this feeling upon the part of Japan, but we felt that there would be a danger of rupturing negotiations if at this point Japan were to bring up the matter of it being against nations that had gone Communist only. After all, up to now, there had been no talk such as this. This matter and my thoughts as given above were communicated to the Foreign Office in a dispatch during February 1939.
"Q. Was that dispatch sent while the ITO Commission was still in Germany or Italy?

"A. Yes, while they were in Berlin.

"Q. You may continue.

"A. The answer to this communication arrived around the end of February or the beginning of March, and was roughly as follows: the matter of Japan remained the same; however, in regard to the other countries they would go further than simply stating that the pact would only be aimed at nations embracing Communism, but this aid to be given would consist of military advice — by this I mean the trading of intelligence, the temporary leasing of bases if necessary, export of fuel oil and other commodities, and in general all aid outside actual participation. In other words, this was something like the aid that the United States later gave to England before she actually became involved in the war in 1941.

"Q. Continue.

"A. This answer was passed to RIBBENTROP and the German Government, and I imagine, by SIRACORI to the Italian Government. To digress a moment — in the future, unless Italy looms in the picture as an important figure, I shall confine my narration to Germany. I believe that I was in error when I said the answer came around the end of February — I believe it was the end of March. In any case, Germany through RIBBENTROP told me that there was no argument in so far as Russia was concerned, and also in so far as making the other nations secondary, but that they wished to have a meeting with the Japanese representatives and get down to brass tacks regarding measures to be taken and naming specific nations. To put it differently, they stated that the time for generalities had passed, and they wished to settle details. The Germans also stated that they wished when drawing up the treaty to make no mention of it being primarily against Russia, but to keep it absolutely general, to leave out any details such as non-military aid, etc., which would weaken the pact. They said that some other means could be found to decide upon details.

"Q. General, when you say RIBBENTROP said some other means could be found to decide upon details, what did the two of you have in mind?
"A. To go into this a little further, this means that when the treaty is drawn up it would simply state that in case of an unprovoked attack by any other nation not a signatory to the pact mutual aid would be given by the signatories. On the surface, therefore, this would appear to the world to be a strong and binding treaty. Of course, certain details of the treaty, or for that matter, the whole treaty would be published, but what RIBBENTROP meant was that in regard to Japan’s desire to not give more than non-military aid, if the country concerned was not Russia, the Germans wished to hold a meeting and to mutually agree upon this without including it in the actual treaty. Essentially, it becomes impossible to write up a treaty containing such clauses as what will be done in case it would be Russia or in case it would be some other nation, etc.

"Q. Now, RIBBENTROP’s views, his actual views, were to the effect that he wanted military, as well as the other type of aid from Japan in case of an attack, is that correct?

"A. I will speak to you a little more fully about that now. To go over this once more so that there will be no errors, and so that the matter will be entirely understood by you: (1) In so far as the actual pact to be published goes, there was no argument. This was to be simply a mutual aid pact, with no strings attached. (2) Japan wished in this regard to settle the matter either by secret pact or other means in regard to the other nations besides Russia. That is to say, that the aid to be given them would stop short of military aid. (3) Germany objected to this on the grounds that should such a secret pact be signed and should there be a leak and the existence of this secret pact or agreement become known it would seriously weaken the actual pact. Therefore, her counter-suggestion was that as there would naturally be meetings between the two nations should such a pact be consummated, the matter of deciding what to do against what country should be left until such a moment, and no binding pact modifying the overall treaty be signed.

"Q. General, we have been talking about RIBBENTROP’s views and we have been talking about the views of your Government. I am wondering with respect to how you personally felt about the matter.

"A. I felt it was simply a question of the approach and that the bridge between the two ideas could be easily built.

"Q. Actually, General, you were there on the ground and you knew RIBBENTROP well; you worked very closely with him; were you not as a matter of fact firm in your feeling that the ideas that he advanced were probably the more desirable?
"A. I could not go so far as to say that.

"Q. How far can you go? The other answer seems to me to be extremely general. I want to know what you personally felt.

"A. I repeat that I felt that there was no basic difference; it was simply in the means to be followed. And then arose the problem of what type of treaty or agreement would suit both nations. In order to draw up a plan that would be satisfactory to both Japan and Germany, two men from my Embassy by the names of USAMI and TAKEUCHI met with GAUS from the German Foreign Office and drew up various plans. None of these was entirely satisfactory to either the German or Japanese Governments, but I was continuously trying to find a bridge over which the two might come together and meet. I believe, although, of course, those were only my own thoughts, that Germany began to get suspicious that Japan was attempting to weaken the treaty by a separate secret pact, of which she might in turn inform certain nations of the proposition. Japan on her part might have felt that Germany was attempting to drag her into matters outside the ken of her interests.

"Q. Where is the ITO Commission during all of this?

"A. They were around for sometime and were still there when the Japanese answer was received, but I believe they left sometime after this.

"Q. Had they left before the two members from your Embassy commenced preparing proposed drafts of the treaty?

"A. Yes.

"Q. It is not exactly clear to me now just what the ITO Commission did?

"A. They simply brought me the wishes of the Japanese Government and following that had no duties, although they stayed around in Berlin for a time watching developments.

"Q. Seems to me rather strange it should require that number of men to bring that message.

"A. I believe they were particularly desirous of explaining their position fully, and wished me to understand their ideas completely before proceeding.

"Q. Did it take three men to do that instead of just one?
"A. One could do it, but in Japan it seems to be the thing to send along an Army and Navy man.

"Q. So that actually then they came over to bring the message from the Japanese Government and to also make it definite and clear to you exactly what the Japanese Government wanted and how far they would go, is that correct?

"A. They did not say how far I could go or how far I could not go, but simply said to try to carry out negotiations along this line.

"Q. Do I understand that they wanted you to understand definitely what the views of the Army and the Navy and the Foreign Office in Tokyo were and you were to be governed accordingly?

"A. Yes."
Interrogation of OHIKA, Hiroshi, on 11 February 1946, pages 63 and 64:

* * * * *

"Q. Tell us the circumstances under which you first discussed the matter with SHIRATORI.

"A. I first met SHIRATORI at San Remo, Italy, in January 1939. We had arranged to meet at some pleasant spot in order to talk over the progress in the negotiations for the Tripartite Pact.

"Q. General, this meeting with SHIRATORI in Italy took place very soon after your return from Italy to Berlin, is that correct, is it not?

"A. It was not much over two or three weeks.

* * * * *

(And on pages 65 to 68).

"Q. General, can you tell us when the ITO Commission left Tokyo enroute to Berlin?

"A. They must have left about the beginning of January, as they came by a fast Italian ship and it takes about four weeks, so that it would follow that it would be the beginning of January, as they arrived in Berlin early in February.

"Q. And it would also follow that that was after you had been to Italy and had been unsuccessful in persuading the Italian Government to come along and join in the Tripartite Pact?

"A. Yes, that is correct.

"Q. And while that Commission was enroute to Berlin they stopped in Italy?

"A. Yes, on the road.

"Q. And while they were in Italy they discussed this matter with the Italian Government and also with Ambassador SHIRATORI, is not that correct?

"A. No. They did not speak with the Italian Government - only with SHIRATORI. The events chronologically are more or less as follows: I went to Rome, then later after SHIRATORI arrived, we met at San Remo and discussed the Tripartite Pact. Later, after the ITO Commission arrived in Berlin SHIRATORI came there to speak to me again.

"Q. What was the reason for stopping three or four days in Italy to talk with SHIRATORI when immediately upon the arrival of the Commission in Berlin they had SHIRATORI come up to Berlin to talk about it. Why could not this all have been done in one place?

"A. I believe he wished to hear further details, as the ITO Commission only spent three or four days in Italy on the first meeting.

"Q. General, as a matter of fact this Commission called on SHIRATORI for the same purpose as they called on you, to make it clear to both SHIRATORI and to you exactly what the Japanese Government in Tokyo would do; how far they would go or not go, is that not true?
A. That is correct. I intended to speak to you a little more on this point and if you will permit me to continue my narrative, it will come out, but perhaps you would wish me to tell you about this particular matter now.

Q. I was about to suggest that you proceed with your narrative from the point at which we left off at the last meeting, but I think it would be helpful if you would make such comments now with respect to this particular matter just referred to, as you care to make.

A. As you asked me the other day what the ITO Commission had come for I thought it over and tried to recollect what the communication from Japan stated relative to sending this Commission. As I remember it, the main reason given was that there would be danger of a leak if communications were continued and it would be best to send spokesmen. Of course, later, I heard rumors, which I cannot say are either right or wrong, but which you may also have heard, so that I wish to pass them on to you. They were in effect that this Commission had come to make very clear to SHIRATCHI and myself the Japanese Government's changed stand upon the Tripartite Pact. Of course, they did not say that this was the reason in talking to me, but I repeat I have heard rumors to this effect.

Q. General, tell us a little bit more about how and where you heard those rumors, where they came from?

A. I heard of these matters from some of my subordinates who had probably received the rumor in the mails from Japan—from their friends in the Foreign Office, or their family, or something—I do not know exactly from whom.

Q. Why do you call them rumors if they emanated from Japan?

A. There was nothing on the surface and nothing official, so that they would have to be called rumors.

Q. You call them rumors then because you were not officially told of these things?

A. Of course, I wondered why in answer to a simple telegram they would send three men, but the official reason given was that it was a security measure. Your questioning me upon this point is quite natural, as it does seem strange, but I can only say that I know nothing beyond these rumors that I just related.

Q. General, it is a fact, is it not, that the views of Mr. SHIRATCHI and the views of yourself with respect to this proposed pact at this stage of the negotiations were somewhat different from the views of your Government in Japan?

A. No, I would not say that our views were different from the Government; rather it would appear that the Government's ideas changed about the time they sent the ITO Commission.

Q. That is my point, General, the Government in Tokyo had changed somewhat in its views, but you two gentlemen, one in Italy and one in Berlin, there where you were in communication with those Governments constantly, your views did not change automatically with the change in Tokyo; as a matter of fact you did not even know about it until ITO arrived, did you.
A. We knew of the fact that they wished Russia to be the prime object and all other countries secondary, but we did not know of the point being brought up that other countries would only be included if their Governments become Communist, until the ITO Commission arrived.

Q. So that actually the ambassadors in Italy and Germany from Japan were more enthusiastic for the views that had been advanced by RIBBENTROP, because you had been working along that line all this time?

A. I would not say it was any specific individual's ideas, as up to that time we had been working on the premise that the pact was to be concluded naming Russia as the principal object and the other countries as secondary, and details were to be left until later.

Q. So that then when your Government in Japan changed its position they sent the ITO Commission over to make it clear to SHIRATORI and to yourself of this changed position so that you would not go too far in your suggestions to RIBBENTROP and to MUSSOLINI, is not that correct?

A. I would not say that they were sent so as to be a check on us, for up until this time we had been working as the Government desired - that is to say on this point of naming Russia as the principal object and the other countries as secondary. It is only later, as I told you, through rumor that I heard that the real reason the ITO Commission came was to make clear the change of views of the Japanese Government.

Q. There was no rumor about the fact that the ITO Commission made it clear to you, General, and to SHIRATORI of the changed attitude of the Government in Tokyo?

A. The ITO Commission never stated that these were the changed views of the Government, but that these had been the Government's views all along.

Q. And those views were somewhat different than the course Ambassador OYAMA and Ambassador SHIRATORI had been pursuing, for you, the two ambassadors had been concerned with Russia as the prime object and the other nations as secondary objects without any reference to Communism in so far as the secondary nations are concerned. Now it is changed?

A. Essentially, my point is that this a change that had taken place then or had the Japanese Government always held these views? Officially, there had been no change; it was only that I felt that this was a point that had not been brought up before, so, weighing all the rumors and my own thoughts on the matter I reached the conclusion that it must have been a change.

Q. So that in fact, General, ITO and his associates brought with them to you and to Ambassador SHIRATORI the then views of your Government and said that you must work within these views?

A. That is correct.
Interrogation of 12 February 1946, pages 74 and 75.

"Q. General, if I understood you correctly yesterday when we were discussing the time RIBBENTROP mentioned to you the idea that Germany might seek a non-aggression pact with Russia at HITLER's birthday party, you stated that you had also received information regarding that matter from your intelligence sources. Now tell us, if when you received this information from your intelligence sources, which I assume was before RIBBENTROP told you about it, you communicated the information to your Foreign Office in Tokyo?

"A. The information that I said I received from intelligence sources was not concrete at all and was simply rumors which abounded around Berlin at the time that Germany and the U.S.S.R. were entering into negotiations regarding an economic pact (trade pact). These rumors I did not pass on to my Government in Tokyo. Further, I wish to make it clear that when RIBBENTROP spoke to me at the time of a party in celebration of HITLER's birthday, which was held at the Hotel Adlon in Berlin, RIBBENTROP did not state that he was entering into negotiations with Russia. When he spoke to HITLER and me around one or two A.M. in the morning following the party, he said that if the matter of a pact between Germany and Japan continued in the stage of talks for too long a period it might become necessary for Germany to clasp hands with Russia in one way or another. That was all.

"Q. General, I understood you to say yesterday that RIBBENTROP was very definite in stating that it might become necessary to seek a non-aggression pact with Russia at the time of this party.

"A. Yes, he did say non-aggression pact."
Telegram

(Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 8 September 1939
Arrival 15.25 hours
9.45 hours

No. 417 of 8 September

Ref. Reference No. 261 of 22 August. *)
For the State Secretary. Secret.

At the reception yesterday of the Foreign Minister ABE, I gave my personal opinion to the General, whom I know well, that the continued labours of Ambassador OSHIMA to foster German-Japanese friendship would certainly be very valuable; he had the full confidence of the German Government. The Foreign Minister declared he would examine the question favorably. The Army, on which I had repeatedly worked similarly, and leading quarters of the Foreign Ministry indicated that OSIMA's position was secure for the present. The Ambassador in Moscow, SHIRATORI, will return from Rome, since at that time he had taken up the post of Ambassador, purely in the expectation that he would succeed in concluding an Italian-Japanese-German military alliance.

CTT

TOP SECRET!
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. R. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attaché of the United States Department of State on the staff of the United States Political Advisor on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Karburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Karburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Karburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. R. Cumming

W. R. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE

Lt. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
January 7, 1939

Attolico reports on his conversation with Ribbentrop. He was enthusiastic about our decision. However, Attolico went a bit too far in making the economic question and the question of the Alto Adige appear to be conditions of the alliance. While, in reality, the first question interests us greatly, especially for its political effect on public opinion, the second question must be solved quietly without any excessive and useless publicity. It will suffice that the Germans, who, at this time are hungry for men, take the Germans who do not wish to remain on Italian territory south of the Alpine circle. I telegraphed Magistrati to this effect.

Prepared a very modest welcome for Chamberlain's visit. I do not think that the situation warrants much loss of useless words.

I see the Japanese Ambassador who speaks to me of the alliance. He is afraid that the new foreign minister, Arita, will be rather cold toward the idea, but says that the Premier is openly in favor of it. This will not influence the conclusion of the pact but might postpone the date of the signing. Therefore, the Ambassador wishes to be received by the Duce, so that he can send a telegram promptly. The Ambassador is greatly in favor of the alliance which he regards as a weapon to force Great Britain to concede "the many things she owes to us all." Ribbentrop sends as the text of the pact, as well as the text of the secret conversation for the use of the military commissions.
Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 18 February 1939
Arrival: 18 February, 1939
1410 hours
1310 hours
TOP SECRET!

No. 70 of 18 February

For the State Secretary personally.

In annex to telegram of the first, No. 44.

Further news concerning Anti-Comintern Pact gives the following picture:-

Japanese Cabinet is supposed to have finally decided upon an intensification of the pact, in opposition to the Anglo-philic ideas, especially of the court circle. The British Ambassador, greatly agitated, depicted Japanese pact policy to me recently as the wrong road, which would strain relations with England extraordinarily. Likewise, the former Japanese Ambassador to Washington urgently warned the Government in the Diet of alienating the Anglo-Saxon powers and succeeded in bringing about a one-hour review of Anti-Comintern policy which was not published. Other Diet members, on the other hand, repeatedly strengthened the government in its pact policy.

Consul General ITO is to be sent to Europe with the special mission of instructing the opposing chiefs of /diplomatic/ missions /abroad/.

The Polish Ambassador and Reuters Agency are spreading the news here that a military alliance has been concluded, which I privately considered /to be/ fabricated. These rumors preoccupy diplomatic and Japanese circles as well as the international press, especially in connection with the intensification of the situation in Europe. In this connection the younger officers and active circles are expressing the hope for a conflict in Europe which might remove the pressure of the great powers in the Far East.

OTT

/135899/

GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 18 February 1939 1410 hours
Arrival: 18 February, 1939 1310 hours

TOP SECRET

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OTT

/135899/
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

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2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

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s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
February 6, 1939

Ribbentrop telephoned to tell me that a Frenchman, a certain de Brinon, has been to see him and mentioned the possibility of a diplomatic arrangement between Rome and Paris. It seems that he is also informed of Baudoin's trip. Ribbentrop seemed to wish to encourage us to negotiate. I said that we are not taking any actions of this nature. But this is proof that even this most secret mission of Baudoin is known. It becomes increasingly difficult to work with the democracies. Ribbentrop also speaks optimistically of the triple alliance with Japan, as well as of the Yugoslav crisis. I believe that the new Foreign Minister leans toward the Axis.

At the Nuncio's palace, I see Poncet. He makes some allusions to his unproductive sojourn in Rome, but I give him no encouragement and speak of sports and art. The Japanese Ambassador is sceptical about the possibility of an early conclusion of the triple alliance. He believes that the Japanese counter-proposal will be a compromise proposal which he himself advises us not to accept.

I see the Duce at Palazzo Venezia. He claims that the liquidation of Stoyadinovich was a real coup d'etat by the Regent who wished to prevent the establishment of a Fascist dictatorship in Yugoslavia. I present my point of view to the Duce on speeding up the Albanian action. He agrees. We will begin immediately to recall forces and to concentrate aircraft. We will intensify the preparation for local revolution. Time of action: Easter week.

March 6, 1939

Yesterday evening, in Casa Colonna, a telephone call from Pietroarchi informing me of the revolt of Cartagena and of the flight of the Red Fleet. He also told me of Franco's request for air and naval support from us to find the eleven ships crossing the Mediterranean, and prevent them from going through the Straits of Sicily should they plan to go to Odessa, as has been reported. I gave the necessary instructions to the Air and Navy Departments and this morning at eight informed the Duce who approved what I
had done. During the day the fleet was followed; it tried to put in at Algiers, but was denied a permit. Now it seems to be going toward Bizerta.

A large number of candidates for appointment to the National Council of Corporations. The name is changed but not the spirit, nor is the love of the Parliament suppressed in the heart of the Italian people even though they are Fascist. News from Berlin confirms that the Japanese government objects to the signing of the Tripartite Pact. Oshima plans to resign. He says that the Cabinet would fall. And then what? I do not see clearly. It is really possible to involve distant Japan deeply in European political life, a life which is becoming increasingly complicated and uncertain, and which is subject to change, from one moment to the next, by a simple telephone call?

March 8, 1929

At the Palazzo Venezia, meeting of the Central Corporate Committee for the standardizing of salaries on the twentieth anniversary of the creation of the Fasci. The Duce is very pleased with the measure and tells me: "With this we will equalize the social differences between the classes. Socialism said: All equal and all rich. Experience has proved that this is impossible. We say: All equal and all rather poor."

I see the Japanese Ambassador. He confirms what Attolico wrote concerning the Japanese reply on the Tripartite Alliance. Many reservations and the intention of regarding the Pact as exclusively anti-Russian; a reply so unsatisfactory as to render very doubtful the possibility of actually concluding this alliance. Oshima and Shiratori have refused to communicate through official channels. They asked Tokyo to accept the Pact of Alliance without reservation, otherwise they will resign and bring about the fall of the Cabinet. A decision will be made within the next few days. Shiratori claims that if it is favorable the signing can take place in Berlin during March, otherwise it will all be postponed till doomsday. The delay and the entire Japanese procedure make me very skeptical of the possibility of an effective collaboration of Fascist and Nazi dynamism with the diplomatic slowness of the Japanese.
Berlin, 26 April 1939

To Ambassador personally!

Top secret discussions between Berlin, Rome and Tokyo on the conclusion of a defensive alliance have been in progress for some time. They have for special reasons and in accordance with agreements made with the other partners been conducted outside usual diplomatic channels.

In the summer of 1938 General Oshima, still military attaché at that time, gave the information that the time had come in the opinion of the Japanese army to conclude a general defensive alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan. He gave the contents of the alliance pact as follows:

1) Consultation of the three powers in case one of them should get into political difficulties:

2) Political and economic support in case one of the three powers should be threatened from outside:

3) Granting of help and assistance in case one of the three powers should be attacked without provocation by another power.

At the time of the Munich Conference at the end of September the matter was discussed with Mussolini and Count Ciano. This discussion was resumed during my visit to Rome at the end of October with the result that the Duce declared his fundamental agreement but still made a reservation with regard to fixing the date for the conclusion of the pact. Then the Italian Foreign Minister made clear at the beginning of January that the Duce was now ready for the signing.

The text of the pact was worked out by direct consultation between me, Oshima and Ciano. Besides the above three points it also contained the obligation that in the event of a war waged in common an armistice and a peace would only be concluded jointly, and the duration of the agreement was set at ten years. The treaty draft was further supplemented by the draft of two secret protocols, which provided for immediate consultation on the execution of the obligation of assistance in the various
cases came into consideration and in addition special measures for mutual treatment of questions on propaganda and press. Drafts were sent by OSKIMA to Tokyo by special courier where they were made the subject of cabinet deliberations.

At the beginning of March, OSKIMA as well as ambassador SHIRATORI in Rome received instructions, according to which the Japanese Government agreed, it is true, with the idea of the pact in general, but, wished to limit mutual obligations of assistance only to the case of a war with Russia. Both ambassadors intended to and CIAITO only confidentially and personally of this, but, on the other hand, immediately refused Tokyo on their own accord to present such a fundamental change of the German-Italian draft in Berlin and Rome. They took more stood up for the acceptence of the original conception and declared that they would have to resign from their posts in the event of a different decision of the Japanese cabinet.

Subsequently at the beginning of April a Japanese draft arrived from Tokyo which fundamentally corresponded to the German and Italian draft but, however, reduced the duration of the agreement to five years. The earlier Japanese wish to limit the obligation of assistance only to the case of Russia was, however, still retained in a weakened form, that the Japanese asked for our express approval to be able to give, after the signing and publication of the pact, a declaration to the English, French and American ambassadors with roughly the following contents: The pact had developed from the Anti-Co-Combattant pact; the partners had looked upon Russia as being the enemy; Turkey, France and America had no need to feel that they were meant by it. The Tokyo cabinet gave as a reason for the necessity of such a limited interpretation of the pact the fact that Japan, for political and in particular, for economic reasons, was at the moment not yet in a position to come forward openly as the opponent of the three democracies. OSKIMA and CIAITO have indicated to Tokyo that this wish of the Japanese Government was also impossible and have informed CIAITO and myself again purely confidentially regarding the proceedings. CIAITO as well as I left no doubt that the conclusion of an agreement with this interpretation, which is in direct contradiction to the text of the agreement, is quite out of question for us. Further I have, in order to hasten a final clarification, informed OSKIMA and CIAITO who was in Berlin on the occasion of the Fuhrer's birthday, that I went before the Fuhrer's speech on 28 April, know the final positive or negative decision of the Japanese cabinet. Both ambassadors have wired this to Tokyo.

The above information is meant exclusively for your personal information. I ask you to keep it strictly secret, and for your part, not to allude to this topic in your conversations there until later end, in case you are spoken to by another party about it, not to give any recognition whatsoever of the fact of having been informed of the fact. That applies also to the Italian ambassador there, who according to information given by CIAITO has not been informed up to now. On the other hand I ask you to observe carefully developments there and to keep me continuously informed upon the matter by wire.
AFFIDAVIT

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3. That I was assigned to said document center at Warburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Warburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

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S/ W. F. Cumming

W. F. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

S/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE

Lt. Colonel, AGD

acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Tokyo, 4 May 1939

Arrival: 4 May 1939

No. 194 of 4 May

Top Secret:

For the Reich /Foreign/ Minister personally.

The Foreign Minister called me and communicated the following: The negotiations taking place in Berlin and Rome on the Anti-Comintern Pact came to a deadlock 10 days ago. To continue them, Prime Minister MIRANUMA directed a statement to the Führer and German Chancellor, which the Foreign Minister read and hereewith handed over to me for further transmission. I accepted the statement, compiled in Japanese and French text, with the reference that I would communicate them by telegraph to the German Foreign Minister, and I refrained from giving any opinion. The same statement was previously communicated and just delivered to the Italian Ambassador for MUSSOLINI.

Text in translation:

"I cherish great admiration for the lofty wisdom and the iron will with which His Excellence, Chancellor of the German Government, HITLFR, is working at the noble task of the reconstruction of his country and at the establishment of an international peace founded upon principles of justice.

"I, for my part, as Japanese Prime Minister, am likewise occupied with the strengthening of peace and with the maintenance of a New Order in East Asia founded on the principles of justice and morality.

"In this splendid hour it is a confirmed joy to me how effective the Anti-Comintern Agreement between our two countries proves itself in the execution of the tasks placed before them. And today if I have in view the conclusion of an agreement, to strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact and to make closer the cooperation between Japan, Germany and Italy, this does not occur just out of a consideration of the more expediency/Zweckmaßigkeit/ of it, but in the hope that in that way we may contribute to the consolidation of a world peace founded upon justice and morality in consciousness of our common tasks now. As far as the strengthening of our relations is concerned, I can affirm that Japan is firmly and steadfastly resolved to stand at the side of Germany and Italy even if one of those two powers were attacked by one or several powers without the participation of the Soviet Union and to afford them political and economic aid, to the extent possible to her power, military assistance."
"In spite of this Japan is ready, in accordance with the provisions of such an agreement to take up the military support of Germany and Italy; however, Japan is, in view of the situation in which it now finds itself, neither presently nor in the near future able to extend to them in a practical manner any effective military aid. However, it goes without saying that Japan would gladly grant this support if it should become possible through a change in the circumstances.

"I should especially like to receive Germany's and Italy's express consent to the fore-going point.

"Furthermore, in consequence of the international situation which confronts it, Japan would be compelled to exercise the greatest caution in regard to the explanation which it would give at the time of the publication of this agreement. I would be glad to receive the unequivocal assent of Germany and Italy on this point also.

"I may add that the planned agreement rests upon the foundation of mutual confidence, and that to doubt the sincerity of my country in the slightest would be tantamount to destroying the real basis of the agreement and would make its execution impossible.

"The thoughts which I have just portrayed arise from reflections of a moral and spiritual nature and can not be influenced by reasons of expediency (Zweckmessigkeit). If I undertook to express them with all frankness, it was because I was guided exclusively by the sincere desire to bring out endeavors to a satisfactory conclusion.

"4 May 1939
(without signature)

Close of the statement.

I hear from army circles that the Prime Minister took this surprising course to personally counteract any doubts that may have risen in Berlin and Rome concerning the situation and readiness of Japan and to arrive at a compromise as far as possible.

The Foreign Minister when he handed over the statement was visibly in a bad mood. He will try to clarify unobtrusively the Army's interpretation.
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. F. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

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/s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Doc. No. 4043 C

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 6 May 1939
Arrived, 6 May 1939
No. 187 of 5 May

Top Secret - For State Secretary

Annex to telegram of Fourth, No. 384.

Declarations of various General Staff officers, among them that of my former confidential who is working in direct accordance with instructions from the War Minister, as well as a talk of the War Vice Minister with the Italian Military Attache, reveal the following viewpoint of the army, which I consider official:

The Prime Minister has obtained a compromise, which the army indicates as the highest possible offer under present conditions, in the conflict of the five-minister conference (War Minister and Finance Minister against the Foreign Minister and Navy Minister).

Concerning the main points of the declaration, the army explained:

1) Regarding obligatory aid, the army had further proposed to lay down more clearly the "chance in circumstances" which would later make effective aid possible, and to declare in short that the neutrality of Japan could not in any way enter into the question. The army attributed the present wording to the Foreign Minister.

The War Vice Minister declared that the treaty bound Japan definitely to the Axis Powers. He, however, understood that Japan was isolated in the Far East and was in a considerably worse position than the Axis bloc in Europe which could cooperate directly. In case of war, however, independent of the outbreak and extent of Japanese acts of war, just the plain fact of the treaty would exert effective pressure on the enemy.

2) As the "Explanations," the army explains that the present proposal was more explicit; contained no specific formulation, and left open negotiations for which there were supposed to be favorable prospects, according to OSS's telegram received yesterday.

3) Explanations concerning "Sincerity of my Country" were indicated as a particularly important personal word of honor of the Prime Minister, after I had referred to the wording which could be easily misunderstood.

The whole statement had been delivered to the Emperor by the Foreign Minister, which fact also follows from the indications made in the
press. In case an agreement is not reached, the army expects a resignation of the cabinet, which would be quite undesirable at the present time for foreign and domestic reasons.

Declarations from navy circles not yet obtainable. Main opposition of the navy comes evidently from Navy Vice Minister YAMANO.

From the Foreign Ministry a senior official, who stands especially close to Ambassador SHIRASU, let me know personally that in the entire government a deep split between friends and enemies of the alliance had formed. The situation was very serious and complicated. By his personal initiative, the Prime Minister had achieved a declaration of compromise which accepts the principle of an unlimited alliance, limiting this, however, by two significant reservations. This attitude of Japan, it is true, astonishes the Axis Powers, who are accustomed to unequivocal decisions, but it arises necessarily from the lack of unified leadership. Should negotiations collapse, cabinet crisis is threatening with serious consequences.

General impression is that most active preliminaries of the treaty idea stress extraordinary difficulties and (one word apparently lacking) urgently hopes that KIRAMUKA's declaration would offer the opportunity for the final conclusion of the treaty.
AFFIDAVIT

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s/ W. F. Cumming
W. F. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Heinrich about the conference between the General Field Marshal Goering and the Duce in presence of Count Ciano in Rome on 16 April 1931.

The Duce declared that a rapprochement between the Axis powers and Russia naturally depended on Japan's attitude. If Japan had no objections, such rapprochement could be accomplished with relative ease, as Count Ciano had already said.

Referring to the political situation, the Duce declared in addition that he considered a general war unavoidable. He only asked himself when the most favorable moment for it as far as the Axis powers were concerned would have arrived and who should take the initiative in such a conflict.

Field Marshal Goering was of the opinion that the Axis powers should still wait a bit until their armaments compared more favorably with those of the democracies. The Duce, once again and in a more precise form, asked about the most favorable moment for such a conflict. Upon which Field Marshal Goering pointed out that the armament ratio between Germany and England, in particular in the naval field, would be considerably more favorable in 1942-43, that France's arming was hampered by a shortage of men, so that France's preparations already today were all directed on the defensive side.

The Duce next asked, "What are we to do until this favorable moment for a general conflict?" Field Marshal Goering answered that the Axis powers must arm themselves to the utmost and maintain even now a state of mobilization. This was already the case in Germany. He (Field Marshal Goering) based all his arguments on the supposition that mobilization was already underway, even if it hadn't been publicly announced yet. There were only three limitations on German arming: production capacity, stock of raw materials, and the number of available workers. Germany would under no circumstances abandon (for financial reasons) any armament measure considered essential by him.

The Duce confirmed that the same was true for Italy and summed up his impression of the discussion to the effect that the Axis powers still needed two or three years to be well armed for a general conflict and to be able to enter with prospects of victory.

General Situation: Germany and Italy will not let themselves be provoked into a conflict but will wait for that they consider the opportune moment. They will further strengthen their armaments and with a view to later joint ventures will enter into talks on the synchronization of self-sufficiency as well as the cooperation of air and naval forces. In the meantime they will continue very vigorously their "air in the press," but will not undertake anything bigger. (Then the Marshal said in this
connection that Germany had recently acquired a whole series of territories and only needed peace to digest then, the Duke agreed most emphatically."

To speak of peace and to prepare for war, that is to say, for victory shall be the motto for the behavior of both countries.

On the wish of the Duke the above summation was read out loud once more by me in French and not with the approval of those taking part in the talk.

At the close the hope remained that both countries would maintain a lucid attitude and not be divided anymore and with a superior smile would dispose of all foolish allures to discover disunity among the Axis powers.

Darlan, 15 April 1942

/999
I, Paul O. Schmidt, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That from 1923 to the collapse of the German Reich in May 1945, I was Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office, and as such was personally present and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at all important Foreign Office and other conferences between German Government leaders and representatives of foreign governments.

2. That in addition to being Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office as aforesaid, I was also after the year 1939 the Head of the Secretariat General of the German Foreign Office and that my latest government rank was that of a Minister in the German Foreign Office.

3. That while acting as interpreter and/or secretary at such meetings referred to, it was my official duty to (and I did) take notes concerning the conversations that took place, and at the conclusion of each such meeting, I prepared from such notes a complete and detailed record of what was said and transpired at such meetings.

4. That the records prepared by me became the official German Government records of what was said and transpired at such meetings. That one copy of the record was filed with the Minister's Office Section of the German Foreign Office, which office acted in the capacity of secretary to said Foreign Office. That another copy of the record of each of such meetings was filed with the Private Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister. That a third copy of the record of each of such meetings was retained by me.

5. That said meetings, concerning which I made a record as aforesaid, were of historical importance and that such records were also prepared by me for the express purpose of maintaining and preserving a record of such meetings for historical purposes.

6. That the document attached hereto is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original record, prepared personally by me in the manner herein set forth and concerning a conference held on April 16th 1939 in Rome between General Field Marshal Goering and the Duce in the presence of Count Ciano.

7. That I personally attended and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at the conference last above mentioned and that the record prepared by me, and of which the attached document is a photostatic copy, is a true and accurate account of what was said and transpired at said conference.

8. That I have been advised and am aware of the fact that the herein affidavit and the document attached hereto may be used in connection with the prosecution of Japanese War Criminals and make this affidavit freely and voluntarily and with knowledge of the above facts.

/s/ Dr. Paul O. Schmidt
PAUL O. SCHMIDT

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Nürnberg, Germany, this third day of May 1946.

/s/ Smith W. Brodkart Jr., Lt. Col. IGD
SMITH W. BRODKART, JR.,
LT. COLONEL, IGD
O-506624
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Gumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attaché of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Advisor on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

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W. P. GUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

G. H. GAULBE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Berlin, 18 September 1939

The Japanese Ambassador today told me in detail about the situation, talked about ISHI, ISHI's visit, congratulated us on the progress of the Polish campaign, etc. Finally slightly bashful he came out with the enclosed paper, which is dated 26 August, and regarding which he said the following:

As everybody knows, I dissuaded OSHIMA at the end of August from the idea of sending the sharp protest with which he had been ordered by his own Government, in regard to the inconsistency of the German-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact with the secret treaty between Germany and Japan. He followed my advice out of consideration for the German Government in the critical phase of that time. But it had not been possible for him to act directly contrary to his Government. Therefore, he merely telegraphed to his government, saying he had followed its order. But in fact he - OSHIMA - had postponed the fulfillment of the demarche till now. He had waited until the end of the Polish campaign, and he believed the step would be not so grave any more now, especially after he had arbitrarily deprived the order from Tokyo of its severity. So he asked not to take note of the enclosed memorandum.

I read the memorandum which is indeed no longer very important, but still accepted it only personally and not officially for information. OSHIMA wishes to explain this matter himself if he meets the Reich Foreign Minister in the near future. Then he will add that this paper could disappear in our documents according to our judgment. He thought an explanation, especially of a legal nature would not be good nor well-timed.

Finally, I told the Ambassador that his conception, as everybody knows, does not agree with ours and I had hoped that the matter was finally concluded. However, I am still ready to prepare the Reich Foreign Minister for the fact that he - OSHIMA - considers it his duty to put a formal end to this matter in some form or other.

I did not consider it right to refuse the Ambassador the study of the note since OSHIMA is evidently honestly endeavoring to put an end to the matter.

(signed) WEIZSÄCKER

Document No. 4050
Page 1
AFFIDAVIT

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s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Item 29

Berlin, 27 October 1939

State Affairs - TOP SECRET

DIPLOMACIA: Tokyo

No. 501

Telegram in code
(SECRET CIPHER PROCESS)

For the Ambassador personally:

The Reich Foreign Minister requests to support in all respects Ambassador GSHIMA, who after his return, will work further for German-Japanese friendship. He requests to transmit in code /and/ without changes telegrams, delivered there by GSHIMA to the Reich Foreign Minister personally and to take care of the forwarding of letters addressed to the Reich Foreign Minister, unopened, in so far as they are sealed, by sure and speedy route.

KOERMAANN

Before Transmission

To Reich Foreign Minister's Office for information.

NOTE: On instructions of Reich Foreign Minister.
AFFIDAVIT

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s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22nd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE

Lt. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
The Japanese general, Count TERAOUCHI, was received in Zoppot on 20 September 18 o'clock by the Reichs Foreign Minister and at 18:30 o'clock by the Fuehrer.

I. Conversation with the Reich Foreign Minister.

At first TERAOUCHI expressed his thanks for the invitation to Germany and for the permission to visit the front, and the thanks of the Japanese Army for the understanding attitude of Germany in the China conflict. Then he expressed his hearty congratulations to the German military successes in Poland. The Reichs Foreign Minister regretted not to have been able to welcome the Count in Berlin and Munich, and gave a short description of the course of military events since 1 September.

Going over to the German-Japanese relations, the Reichs Foreign Minister said he had talked over these questions with the Fuehrer last night and the Fuehrer had said:

1.) Germany and Japan were the only two major powers between whom there existed no divergence of political interests.

2.) Moreover these two states were, as well as Italy, young nations striving upwards, whom England grudged the advances. The Reichs Foreign Minister added that it was his firm conviction that Japan was being most strongly influenced by Germany's fate. If Germany fared well in Europe, Japan would also fare well in East Asia, but if Germany was badly off, Japan would also be badly off. On the other hand Germany was equally interested in Japan's prosperity in East Asia. He had (already) had this conviction for a long time and still had it today.

3.) Both peoples were soldier nations and the link of the soldierly spirit facilitated the understanding.

TERAOUCHI was mainly receptive and limited himself to saying that this was also his conviction.

The Japanese Ambassador, the Japanese Military Attaché, Mr. STAHR and the undersigned were present.

II. Conversation with the Fuehrer.

The conversation with the Fuehrer ran quite similarly to that with the Reichs Foreign Minister. In connection with TERAOUCHI's congratulations, the Fuehrer talked more extremely about the reasons for Germany's advance against Poland, about the teamwork of the
various weapons in the Polish war and about the success of the German Army. Regarding German-Japanese relations the Kuhrer said the same as the Reichs Foreign Minister, almost word by word.

The Reichs Foreign Minister and those mentioned under I. were present.

III. Conversation of the Reichs Foreign Minister after dinner.

At 7:40 a.m. the Reichs Foreign Minister gave a dinner for Count TROCZYNEK, at which also Major General HOFFMANN took part. After the meal the German Foreign Minister again took up the political conversation with TROCZYNEK. He alluded upon the statements under No. 1 above, and then spoke about the German-Russian Non-aggression Pact. He said that the recollection of a German and a Japanese understanding with Russia had been closer to him for a long time, and that he would have strived for it even in the case of the conclusion of a German-Japanese-Italian Pact. This he had already said to OSEIMA more than a year ago and he /OSEIMA/ had, probably, reported it to Tokyo. In the meantime he as well as OSEIMA had strained all efforts to bring about the German-Japanese-Italian Pact. That it did not succeed was regrettable but could not be helped; the German on her part had to seek the understanding with Russia by herself, but he was of the conviction that this understanding would also have a favorable effect on Japan, which he had already told the press in Moscow. He had also talked with Stalin about this question, who had answered: "If the Japanese desire war, they can have war, if they desire an understanding, they can have that, too." The situation of the Japanese interests, which the Reichs Foreign Minister again depicted as in No. 1, remained the same. TROCZYNEK confirmed again that he shared this opinion fully. Ambassador OSEIMA, who, before dinner, and until now had only listened, now said he believed that Japan, especially the Japanese Navy, would be perfectly ready for an advance in South East Asia, i.e., also against Hongkong. He himself had also proposed this by telegraph. The Reichs Foreign Minister asked him: "How far can you go?" OSEIMA replied that he believed that Japan could go further in South Asia. He did not go into details concerning a military advance. He was of the opinion that one should try to tear the Netherlands from England and to propose a non-aggression pact to them. Then one could, at the same time, reach an agreement with the Netherlands which would allow Japan to exploit new materials of the Netherlands Indies in an entirely decent way. Japan needed tin, rubber and oil from the Netherlands Indies, cotton from British India, and wool from Australia. If it got all this it would be self-sufficient and very strong. OSEIMA's statements were very unpriest and uncertain. They only put forth his personal opinion. The Reichs Foreign Minister acknowledged.
those statements without commenting on them. He did also not make any proposals on his part, but let it be understood in his further statements that Germany was quite ready and willing to collaborate with Japan against England.

Oshima did not mention the forming of a new Chinese central government.

Berlin 25 September 1939

Herewith presented to the State Secretary according to instructions.

/signed/ KNOLL

Copies received:

U. St. E.
De. Pol.
AFFIDAVIT

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W. F. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
During the trip to the East Front, Count TERAWACHI kept a very reserved attitude towards political conversations. But one remark was noteworthy: on the evening of 23 September, Lieutenant General Count BROCKDORFF and I talked with TERAWACHI about his experiences in the China war and a few military questions connected with it. I asked Count BROCKDORFF of his own accord, as a soldier, to ask, "Wouldn't it then be much smarter from the Japanese standpoint to end the prospective war with China by a bearable settlement and to utilize the strength of the Japanese Army and fleet more in the south, where, in the economic field, there are much greater successes to be gained?" Count TERAWACHI answered as if he regarded this as a consequence of his statements: "Certainly that would be much better." While I had the impression that in TERAWACHI's answers to the statements of the Reichs Foreign Minister and of the Führer he only consented in a polite way to evade a political conversation, I had, at this opportunity, the impression that the Count had really said what he meant.

Berlin, 25 September 1939

Herewith presented to the State Secretary.

Signed/ KNOLL

Copies received:

U. St. S.
D. Pol.
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. F. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attaché of the United States Department of State on the staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such, am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

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/s/ W. F. Cumming

W. F. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Tokyo, 23 February 1940 0645 hours
Arrival: 23 February 1940 1755 hours
No. 143 of 23 February 1940

For the State Secretary personally.

After my arrival here I found such Japanese already known to me as OSHIMA, SHIFATORI, TERAUCHI, ISHI, etc., in an unchanged friendly attitude and ready for every support. I have the following impression of the political situation: at present domestic political difficulties mainly occupy all groups and parties.

In foreign politics the government is trying not to be led into the European confederation. Friendly attitude towards England and America. Before the military actions in Europe have any effect, no important decisions are to be expected.

The influence of the Army, greatly weakened since the last summer session, is already growing again. Further increase may be counted on. Well known pro-German officials of the Foreign Ministry and corresponding officers of the General Staff and the War Ministry have, for several months, been systematically transferred to foreign posts, i.e., China. A cancellation of this measure is being pursued here with all means.

I got into contact with the circles in question and agreed to continue the work after my return from America.

Public opinion is, to a large extent, pro-German and likewise anti-British. Consequently, a favorable basis for our political aims. At present public opinion is not yet too active against court and financial circles. It would be advantageous if Russian readiness for an understanding with Japan could be made more strongly noticeable. Apart from an improvement of the political atmosphere, the endeavors for an improvement of a German-Japanese exchange of goods via Siberia, which are under way, could be favorably influenced hereby.

STAHNKR
OTT
/136247-8/
AFFIDAVIT

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Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

__/ G. H. GARDE

Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
"Official Announcements of Foreign Office, Vol. 18"

"STATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE CONCERNING THE ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION OVER SHINNAN GUNTO.

March 31, 1939.

"Shinnan Gunto (or the Spratley Islands) are a group of small reefs lying in the South China Sea, off the Coast of French Indo-China. These reefs had long been known as ownerless. However, in 1917 Japanese began, before the nationals of any other country, to embark upon the economic development of the reefs, which has continued ever since, by investing a considerable amount of capital and erecting various permanent establishments. The Japanese Government, officially recognizing the activities of these nationals, have on several occasions since sent warships to the reefs and been giving them various aids as occasion demanded. But the absence of administrative jurisdiction over the reefs has caused not only inconveniences with regard to the protection and regulation of the lives, property and enterprises of the Japanese nationals there, but has been liable to give rise to unnecessary disputes with France. Accordingly, the Japanese Government, in order to eliminate such inconveniences and disadvantages, have decided to place the reefs under the jurisdiction of the Governor-General of Taiwan, and having published the fact under date of March 30, 1939, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Renzo Sawada, notified the French Ambassador in Tokyo, Mr. Charles Arsene-Henry, to this effect on March 31."
TREATY BETWEEN JAPAN AND THAILAND CONCLUDING
THE CONTINUANCE OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND
THE MUTUAL RESPECT OF EACH OTHER'S
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan and His Majesty the King of
Thailand,

being equally animated by the earnest desire of reaffirming and
further strengthening the traditional bonds of friendship between Japan
and Thailand, and

being convinced that the peace and the stability of East Asia is
the common concern of the two States,

have resolved to conclude a treaty, and for that purpose have named
as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan:

Hachiro Arita, Senator, Grand Cordon of the Imperial Order of
the Rising Sun, His Imperial Majesty's Minister for Foreign
Affairs;

His Majesty the King of Thailand:

Phya Sri Sena, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Noble Order of the
Crown of Thailand, His Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary at the Court of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan;

Who, after having communicated to each other their respective full
powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following
articles:

Article 1.

The High Contracting Parties shall mutually respect each other's
territorial integrity and hereby reaffirm the constant peace and the
perpetual friendship existing between them.

Article 2.

The High Contracting Parties shall mutually maintain friendly
contact in order to exchange information, and to consult one another,
on any question of common interest that may arise.

Article 3.

In the event of one of the High Contracting Parties suffering an
attack from any third Power or Powers, the other Party undertakes not to
give aid or assistance to the said Power or Powers against the Party
attacked.
Article 4.

The present Treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at Bangkok, as soon as possible.

Article 5.

The present Treaty shall come into effect on the date of the exchange of ratifications and shall remain in force for five years from that date.

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties shall have given notice to the other six months before the expiration of the said period of five years of its intention to terminate the Treaty, it shall continue operative until the expiration of one year from the date on which either Party shall have given such notice.

In witness whereof the respective Pleni Potentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have hereunto affixed their seals.

Done in triplicate, at Tokyo, this twelfth day of the sixth month in the fiftieth year of Kojima, correspending to the twelfth day of the third month in the two thousand four hundred and eighty-third year of the Buddhist Era, and the twelfth day of June in the nineteen hundred and fortieth year of the Christian Era.

(SAIL) /s/ HACHIRO ARITA

(SAIL) /s/ PHYA SUI SENA
CERTIFICATE

W.D.C. No._____
I.P.S. No. 865

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Katru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives, Ministry of Foreign Office, and that as such officer I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of ___ pages, dated ___ , and described as follows: Treaty between Japan and Thailand concerning the continuance of friendly relations and the normal respect of each other's territory, signed at Nara, June 12, 1946. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 22nd day of August, 1946

Witness: Nagaharu Odo

I, Richard H. Larch, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the
Doc. No. 865

Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 24 day of Aug., 1946 /s/ Richard H. Larsh

Witness: /s/ Edward P. Monaghan Investigator, IPS Official Capacity
Secret Telegram No. 255 of 23.3.40

Tokyo, 23 March 1940 09.45
Arrived, 23 March 1940 17.20

The political development of the last few days reveals a certain stiffening between Japan and England, America, which has come to light in an obvious move of protest by the British Ambassador against the formation of the Central Government, the sudden announcement of the American Ambassador's proceeding to America, and a debate in the Diet. Diet members from several parties simultaneously pressed the Foreign Minister to a strengthening of contact with the friendly countries - Germany and Italy. The Foreign Minister emphasized the friendly relations existing towards the Axis powers, but described the solution of the China conflict as a most pressing problem, which necessitated the pursuit of a policy of non-intervention.

Noteworthy is the report of strong words by the spokesman of the army in the Diet and statements by the War and Navy Ministers that Japan's progress in China cannot be stopped by the obsolete Nine Power Treaty. This attitude has obviously been influenced by the opposition of the Anglo-Saxon powers to the New Chinese Central Government.

The same message is being sent to Shanghai and Haikou.

OTT
AFFIDAVIT

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s/ W. F. Cumming

W. F. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Item 4

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

TOKYO: 10 May 1940 1327 hours
Received: 10 May 1940 1020 hours

Very Urgent.

No. 416 of 10.5

For the Reich Foreign Minister

Numerous conversations during my fourteen day stay in Tokyo with authoritative personalities in political, military, naval and economic spheres give the following picture:

The YONAI-ARITA government is striving for further agreement with England and America. I consider the realization of this thoroughly unlikely in view of America's stubborn attitude, and the markedly stronger Anti-British opinions in the Army, the people and some economic circles. The most recent German successes have created a great impression here, and have decreased England's importance in the Far East. The Russian ambassador expressed to me his readiness for a Russo-Japanese agreement, but stressed the mutual distrust. Our Embassy is endeavoring to advance personal feelers to overcome this.

As regards domestic politics, difficulties for the cabinet, whose economic policies are inadequate, are increasing again. The conference of provincial governors now in session confirms the widespread distress and discontent. The eventual new government which, it is hoped, will be under the leadership of Prince KONOYE, of the group friendly to us, will have to restrict itself, first of all to the solution of the China conflict, and urgent domestic relief measures.

With regard to foreign policy, apart from an eventual cabinet change, it is to be presumed that the tension with England will increase or at least continue. The same holds good for relations with America, both sides are seeking to avoid their leading to war.

STAFER. OTT (Frame 126304)

GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Item 4

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STAHMER. OTT

(Trans 136304)
AFFIDAVIT

1, W. F. Gumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

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/s/ W. F. Gumming

W. F. GUMMING

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/s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Telegram

(Secret Cipher Process)

TOKYO 12 June 1940 2140 hours
Arrival 12 June 1940 2000 hours

No. 560 of 12 June

Re Telegram No. 483 of the 9th BRA/H/Bureau German Foreign Ministry/ and 477 x) of 3 June.

x) Pf 955

By the known attitude of the YONAI-ARITA Cabinet and press chief Sumatra, who is fully orientated towards China and Japan, the Italian protest will doubtless have a contrary effect. Present Government clique had quietly hoped that as a consequence of the German action against Holland and Belgium, America would enter the war and thereby be forced to alleviate pressure on Japan. As variously reported, this line of thought has also found a place in the press closely connected with the government. The fact that America not only is remaining out of the European war, but has even increased pressure on Japan through maintenance of the fleet at Hawaii, continued financial aid to Chiang Kai Shek and above all through the embargo on material and machines vitally necessary to Japan, has greatly disturbed the government. (Compare telegram No. 548 of 8 June concerning action of KUBARA) and press campaign against America newly stimulated.

Even attempts of certain American politicians to become friendly after the entry of Italy into the war, which was reported in full in the press here, could not, as various leading articles prove, change the suspicious attitude of the press here against American aims in East Asia.

Each German or Italian move which reveals the concern over American attitude in the near future would only be a cue to the government and the press which is close to it to make new courtship of America. The government would further try, as in the case of the Amea Maru, to impute to us the intention of using Japan as a tool of our policy, an argument which would not be ineffective with the known suspicion of the Japanese.

The embassy is still endeavoring to stir up Japanese ill feeling against America by influencing the press and leading political personalities in a way deemed proper. If I have expressed the thought in many discussions with leading political personalities as for example...
KONOYE, SUETSUGU, and KOUCHI that the interests and activity of America... (one group garbled) in the Pacific area and therefore a conflict between Japan and America is in the long run unavoidable.

A confidential cooperation with the embassy, ambassadors GSHAIR and SHIRATOUT/ OSIMA and SHIRATORI/ and circles closely connected with them are operating in the same direction.

Italian charge d'affair will inform his government of the above arguments.

OTT

/136337 - 136338/
AFFIDAVIT

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/s/ W. P. Cumming
W. F. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Berlin, May 1940
German Embassy, Tokyo

Telegram in Code
(Secret Cipher Process)

For Ambassador Ott in answer to telegram No. 450. The following is to be immediately established concerning the declaration of the Japanese Foreign Minister ARITA:

1. According to your report on the conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister he has at that time, merely given you notice of his press interview, without attaching to it any request for the taking of an attitude.

2. It has since been declared in the Japanese press and also in the Foreign Ministry's press conference that a declaration of ascent to the standpoint of the Japanese Government has been given by the other countries, while no expression of attitude by Germany has yet been received.

3. Meanwhile the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin has been in the Foreign Office and has explained that he was called upon by his Government to have a conversation in the Foreign Office on the question of the Netherlands Indies; and in the course of the conversation, which he described as unofficial, he expressed to the State Secretary that his Government would welcome a German declaration on the question.

I ask you therefore to make roughly the following exposition at your next visit to the Japanese Foreign Minister:

The Reich's Government has, at the time, taken note of the interview of the Japanese Foreign Minister, /the account of/ which was given to you by him. As a declaration by Germany has not been requested and there has been no cause for Germany to take up any attitude on this question, such a step has not ensued. It is only from press reports of the last few days and through a visit of the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin to the Foreign Office that the Reich's Government has understood that the Japanese would welcome a German declaration on the question. The Reich Government would therefore like to make the following observations on this affair from their standpoint:

The German-Dutch conflict arose from the fact that Britain and France were planning to carry out an advance on the Ruhr District through Dutch and Belgian territory. This advance had been prepared on the part of the Anglo-French General Staff in conjunction with the Dutch military /authorities/. To meet this threatened invasion, the Fuhrer had quickly decided to occupy Holland and safeguard the defence of Dutch neutrality through the German Wehrmacht against Anglo-French encroachment during this war.
In this German-Dutch conflict, it is a question of an exclusively European affair which has nothing to do with overseas questions. Germany therefore has no interest to occupy herself with such overseas problems, in which she considers herself interested, now as before. For the rest you can interweave into your conversation the statement that Germany thoroughly understands Japan's anxiety over the developments in the Netherlands Indies. The action of the forces of the Western Powers against Dutch possessions in the West Indies has certainly, since the outbreak of hostilities between Germany and Holland, proved ample justification for mistrust of the Western Powers and their collaboration with the United States. In contrast to this policy of the other great powers, Germany has always pursued a policy of friendship with Japan and believes that this policy has been only advantageous to Japanese interests in East Asia in the past few years.

I ask you to give these explanations verbally to the Japanese Foreign Minister. A detailed public announcement is out of place, but with respect to the recent inquiries in the press concerning: there is no objection to the Japanese arriving at the certainty that Germany has declared her disinterestedness in the Netherlands Indies question.

Ribbentrop

/136313-5/
AFFIDAVIT

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s/ W. P. Cumming
W. F. CUMMING

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s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Telegram (Secret Cipher V)

TOKYO: 22 May 1940, 2110 hours

Received: 22 May 1940, 1850 hours

No. 474 of 22.5

Re telegram No. 412 (held by Reich Foreign Minister) of 20 May.

Today I have informed the Japanese Foreign Minister of the operative effect of the latest German victories and in passing, made the previously written explanations contained in the telegram release, concerning the German attitude to the Netherlands Indies. The Foreign Minister requested me to convey his gratitude to the Reich government for this declaration. The spokesman of the Foreign Ministry issued during today's press conference, a communiqué according to which Germany has declared her disinterestedness in the Netherlands East Indies problem.

OTT
AFFIDAVIT

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G. H. GARDE

Lt. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Doc. No. 4026-D

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

TOKYO: 23 May 1940, 0800 hours
Received: 23 May 1940, 1625 hours

No.479 of 23.5 Supplement to Telegram No. 474 of 22 May

All the press has given great publicity to yesterday's communiqué from the spokesman of the Foreign Office on the declaration of German disinterestedness in the Netherlands East Indies question. The papers emphasize consistently that the German attitude is entirely different to the declarations of England, France and Holland, who had given their assent to the Japanese government's viewpoint on the protection of the status quo in the Netherlands Indies. In contrast to this, German disinterestedness is considered as a sort of carte blanche for Japan. Germany has thereby stated that she will also support Japan in the future. See DNB-Tokyo 187 and 191.

OTT

(Frame 136322)
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General
OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
The head of the European Department of the Japanese Foreign Ministry declared confidentially that the Japanese ambassador in Berlin had received the direction today to express congratulatory telegrams to the German government and to point out at this opportunity Japan's special interest in the future fate of French Indo-China. The ambassador is to reiterate Japan's thanks for the friendly German attitude in the China conflict and at the same time stress the fact that Japan believes she has rendered Germany essential service in the European war by tying down American forces in the Pacific Ocean. The ambassador is instructed to suggest that the German government make some friendly gesture on the subject of Indo-China in appreciation of Japan's attitude. Asked what such a gesture might be, the confidant said the Foreign Ministry is thinking of a German declaration according to which Japan would receive a free hand in Indo-China. According to newspapers, the Japanese ambassador had received identical instructions.

Since, as a result of the collapse of France, the pressure of the activistic public opinion on the cabinet became increasingly stronger, the foreign minister evidently decided on this step, in order to save his policy and to keep the cabinet from the otherwise inevitable collapse. There is no doubt about the existence of the danger that the foreign minister would make tactical use of possible German blank authorizations concerning Indo-China in his attempt to bring about a compromise with America. Characteristic for the basically unchanged attitude of the foreign minister is the elsewhere reported fact, that he concluded friendly agreements (one group of letters garbled) . . . at the same day with France and England in Tientsin. As viewed from Tokyo, a strengthening of the Japanese position of power in East Asia through annexation of Indo-China would, in itself, be doubtlessly in German interest. In this way the chances for an early end of the China conflict would be increased on the one hand; and on the other hand, the differences between Japan and the Anglo-Saxon powers would be intensified to such an extent that the danger of an agreement would be eliminated for a long time. If, therefore, a consideration of this Japanese request should be intended, a formula would have to be found which would fix Japan's course definitely along the German lines. This could, first of all, be achieved if Japan would have to oblige herself to the immediate occupation of Indo-China. In this connection, I was confidentially told by army circles that.
there the idea of occupying the strategically important Yunnan railway is being propagated. If the government should evade a correspondingly formulated offer for leaving Indo-China to them, one would have to calculate at least with a severe blow to their position in case this were published and probably with replacement by a cabinet which would be close to us.

GPT
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. I. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

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s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
To be kept in locked file

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Very Urgent!

Item 1

No. 594 of June 19

Secret

The head of the European Department of the Japanese Foreign Ministry declared confidentially that the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin had received the following today to convey congratulatons of the Japanese government to the Reich government, to the German success and to point out at this opportunity Japan's special interest in the future fate of French Indo-China. The Ambassador is to convey Japan's thanks for the friendly German attitude in the China conflict, and at the same time stress the fact that Japan believes she has rendered Germany essential service in the European war by tying down American forces in the Pacific Ocean. The Ambassador is instructed to suggest that the German government make some friendly gesture on the subject of Indo-China in appreciation of Japan's attitude. Asked what such a gesture might be, the confidant said the Foreign Ministry is thinking of a German declaration according to which Japan would receive a free hand in Indo-China. According to newspapers, the Japanese Ambassador had received identical instructions.

Since, as a result of the collapse of France, the pressure of the activist public opinion on the cabinet became increasingly stronger, the Foreign Minister evidently decided on this step, in order to save his policy and to keep the cabinet from the otherwise inevitable collapse. There is no doubt about the existence of the danger that the Foreign Minister would make strategic use of possible German blank authorization concerning Indo-China in his attempt to bring about a compromise with America. Characteristic for the basically unchanged attitude of the Foreign Minister is the elsewhere reported fact, that he concluded friendly agreement on (one group of letters garbled) ..., at the same day with France and England in Tientsin. As viewed from Tokyo, a strengthening of the Japanese position of power in East Asia through annexation of Indo-China would, in itself, be doubtlessly in German interest. In this way the chances for an early end of the China conflict would be increased on the one hand, and on the other hand, the differences between Japan and the Anglo-Saxon powers would be intensified to such an extent that the danger of an agreement would be eliminated for a long time. If, therefore, a consideration of the Japanese request should be intended, a formula would have to be found which would fix Japan's course definitely along the German lines. This could, first of all, be achieved if Japan would have to obligate herself to the immediate occupation of Indo-China. In this connection, I was confidentially told by army circles that
there the idea of occupying the strategically important issues on railway is being propagated. If the government should think a correspondingly formulate offer for leaving Mao-china to them, one would have to calculate at least with a severe blow to their position in case this were published and probably with replacement by a cabinet which would be close to us.
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. F. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attaché of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

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5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. F. Cumming

G. H. Garde
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
NOTE TO TELEGRAM NO. 594, OF JUNE 19
FROM TO TO RE: INDO-CHINA

"Japan's thanks for the friendly German attitude in the China conflict have come pretty late; the sacrifices which we in fact made for Japan (stoppage of sending war supplies to China and consequently sacrifice of supply of important Chinese raw material) have as yet received no recognition from the Japanese, let alone economic compensation. Japan's desire for a friendly gesture from Germany is somewhat strange in view of the attitude Japan has taken re economic relations with Germany during the war.

"If this is to be used in countering the Japanese Ambassador in the forthcoming conversations, the following examples can be introduced:

(1) From the first, Japanese shipping has completely subscribed to the French and English blockade.

(2) For a long time the Japanese Government had not met German wishes for transit of goods through Japan and had only in the dark shown in recent months some obligingness. Thus an assignment of wolfram from Canton and an assignment of tin from Columbia was sent on to Germany. Recently the Japanese Government even offered us 100 tons each of wolfram and tin from its own stocks to be delivered without cost. However, there are still unfilled requests -- e.g. increasing the Japanese shipping service to Vladivostock which is only made the port of call three times a month by one Japanese steamer. Also, further shipment of tin from Columbia has not been possible up till now because of the refusal of the Japanese shipping company.

(3) In January of this year, Japan concluded a monopoly agreement with Manchuria for the supply of soya-beans without telling us anything, although we had been the biggest customers up till then, e.g. 800,000 tons in 1938. After our remonstration, Japan has up till now only released 70,000 tons to be supplied to us from Manchuria.

(4) Japan still refuses to transport home in small groups from America the crew of the Colombus, nearly 500 men, because she regards them as combatants, following
the English interpretation, although in the American interpretation they are styled as shipwrecked survivors.

(5) It is true that Japan supplied us all the whale oil from the last haul of 75,000 tons. However, we know from confidential sources that it first offered half of this to England, and only decided to supply it to us, when it had received no satisfactory English offer.

"Hereby submitted to the State Secretary,
Berlin, 20 June 1940.

/s/ WIEHL."
AFFIDAVIT

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/s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
MEMORANDUM

L. R. KYOLL

On 19 June the Japanese Ambassador drew me into a conversation regarding the future of German-Japanese relations. He began by referring to the expected visit of the former Foreign Minister Nostake SATO and seemed to want to make suggestions for the subject of the conversation with Mr. SATO. The Ambassador did not touch actual questions of German and Japanese policy.

The Ambassador stated somewhat as follows: "The knowledge that Japan's welfare depends not on the Western Powers, but that an approach to Germany is of significance to Japan, broke through even in circles which till then had been strangers to Germany. One indication for this is SATO's wish to come to Germany now. I am glad that he thus takes the opportunity to get to know the new Germany from close by and I am sure that his visit will be further material in the process of winning over the circles which up to now had no interest in Germany to the idea of an approach to Germany. Today the building up of heavy industry is regarded as the most important task in Japan. The light industry is ready for the greater part; where this is not the case its further development is of no considerable political importance and can be put aside. If, in the field of development of heavy industry, a close cooperation between Japan and Germany is possible, which I do not doubt, Japan will gain freedom of action towards the United States. The question of raw material supplies from England and America I do not regard as so dangerous. The raw material countries are under export pressure, especially if England should now blockade Europe. Therefore we need not fear the boycott warnings. But if our economic circles see Germany's great industrial development and realize that Germany is not only not behind the United States, but has overtaken her in many fields, they will, in view of the unfriendly attitude of the United States, gladly switch over to Germany. The improvement of Japanese-Russian relations is, as long as the present war lasts, a pre-requisite for this switching. TOGO and I are favorably working for it, and it becomes more and more clear in Japan that the future of Japan lies in the South, and that the enemy in the North must be made a friend. Certain military circles are opposed to such a turn, but there too OSHIMA will have acted for their enlightenment in the meantime.

"After the war the German-Italian, Russian, Japanese-Chinese and American blocks will remain. It is important for Japan as well as for Germany that close relations between Japan and Germany will then remain or be established. I see the way to that in the first place in the economic field mentioned before. Germany should consign to the Japanese block an equal position in her post war economic program."
Ambassador SATO could be told, in case the conversation with him is held on this or similar lines, that the contribution, which is expected of Japan, is to show a more obliging attitude concerning Germany's wants for raw materials in Japanese (oil-sources) and overseas areas. Especially the argument of the export pressure on the raw material countries points against the reserve in transit questions which Japan showed until now. Japan should not fear boycott warnings or bring forth this fear as an excuse in regard to allowing transit business for Germany.

A promise of delivery for the expansion of heavy industry after the war would today when Japan believes in Germany's victory, very probably lead to considerable giving-in in the then (Manchukuo) and transit questions.

Berlin, 20 June 1940

Signed: KROLL.
AFFIDAVIT

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s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE

lt. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
To be kept in locked file.

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo 26 June 1940 20:10 hours

Central 26 June 1940 00:50 hours

No. 614 of 26 June

I.) The Head of the General Bureau of the War Ministry, General KUTSU, has informed the Military Attache that the Japanese Army would welcome it, if Germany were prepared, to send us, to act as mediator in the already-arranged supplementary talks between Japan and CHIANG KAI-SEK, in order to conclude the China conflict in a way acceptable to Japan. The General declared further that Japan is very much interested in the China war also for this reason. The Military Attache promised to forward this, and broached the question of Russia's attitude to such a development. The General replied that the Japanese Army considered conciliation with Russia to be necessary. General KUTSU's inquiry is to be taken as the official proposal of the Army, according to Japanese custom.

II.) The Minister of Overseas Affairs, General KOISO, asked me in a conversation to which he had invited me, what Germany's attitude would be to the military activity of Japan in Indo-China and Java part of the Netherlands Indies. I replied to the well-known declaration of the Reich Government, according to which Germany is not interested in the question of the Netherlands Indies and asked that we would probably raise no objections to Japanese action in Indo-China, provided that Japan obliges herself to the dominions in the Pacific area, perhaps by a promise to attack the Philippines and Hawaii in the event of America's entry into the war against Germany. The Minister of Overseas Affairs replied that he would be pleased to pursue this idea further. Regarding a possible Japanese Non-Aggression Pact with Russia, the Minister thought that for this Russia would probably ask for certain territorial concessions to a northwestern province of China and Outer-Mongolia, which could be discussed. The Minister admitted that an agreement with Russia and the realization of Japanese colonial wishes in Indo-China and in the Netherlands Indies would not only gradually make Japan economically independent of America, but would offer the expected KONOYE government a promising starting point for an agreement with CHIANG KAI-SEK. I have the impression that the coming Minister of Overseas Affairs wanted to qualify himself for the next cabinet by putting out these feelers.

III.) Also Ambassador SHINODA, who is ever more frequently named as the coming Foreign Minister, advocated a Non-Aggression Pact with Russia in an interview yesterday with the YOMIURI.

IV.) Today's resignation of Prince KONOYE as President of the Privy Council indicates constant internal political developments with the aim of formation of the new government and a new unity party under KONOYE. Since leading personalities of the KONOYE circle are obviously trying to make contact with me, I ask for authorization to discuss with them confidentially the ideas of MUTO and KOISO, in order to establish what power is standing behind them and what possibilities result therefrom. My impression up to now that the possibility of the formation of a Pacific bloc of Japan, CHIANG KAI-SEK, China and Russia in association with Germany, which ties down America in the Pacific sphere and could crippled her freedom of action vis-a-vis Europe is becoming prominent.

OTT
AFFIDAVIT

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s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Lt. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
MEMORANDUM: On the conversation between the Foreign Minister of the Reich and the Japanese Ambassador, SÀTO, in the presence of Ambassador KURUSU and Consul General SÀHÀSHI, 8 July 1940.

After a word of thanks for the hospitality shown by the German Government and congratulations on the victory of Germany over France, Ambassador SÀTO declared that just as in Europe the new order would now be brought about by Germany, Japan on her part had been exerting herself for three years to establish a new order in the Far East and in the South Seas. In these parallel efforts a very close cooperation between Germany and Japan seems to have been in operation. For three years Japan had been holding the attention of the English, the French, and the American Governments and thereby in a certain sense rendered Germany's task in the establishment of the new order in Europe easier. In this manner the Governments of both countries could mutually support each other.

As far as Soviet Russia was concerned, Japan was under the existing circumstances obliged to seek to maintain good neighborly relations with Russia, just as Germany was also obliged to maintain good relations with Russia. In this respect also Japan and Germany could cooperate.

About America, Ambassador SÀTO stated that Japan has drawn the attention of that country to herself since the beginning of the Chinese war and that she tied up the American fleet in the Pacific Ocean. It is Japan's opinion that America must not overstep her zone consisting of North and South America and must not intervene in European or Far Eastern matters. The pursuit of this principle is also in the mutual interest of both countries. Ambassador SÀTO closed his remarks by stressing anew the common interests of Germany and Japan and the necessity of their cooperation. This cooperation must also encompass economic matters.

In regard to China, Ambassador SÀTO added that Japan is at present putting forth strong endeavors to finish the Chinese war, which has lasted now for three years, in order to gain free hands. In this connection he pointed out that public opinion in Japan has become extraordinarily nervous in respect to Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies.
The REIC. FOREIGN MINISTRY noted with satisfaction Japan's wish to cooperate with Germany in all fields. He believed that German-Japanese cooperation in itself represented nothing new. He himself had been one of those who years ago had furthered this cooperation with KURUSU's predecessor, General OSHEMA, and it had already borne fruit for both parties. Germany had made noteworthy use of it in her fight for equal rights, whilst Japan had doubtless drawn considerable advantages throughout the whole period of her struggle for China down to the present day from the existence of a strong Germany. Without the existence of a re-strengthened Germany, Japan could not have been able to penetrate as deeply into English and other spheres of interest in East Asia as it has actually happened. The natural interest of both powers in cooperation arises from these facts.

Plans for a very close cooperation between Japan, Germany and Italy had already been taken into consideration some time before. They miscarried because - as appeared again from the latest speeches of Japanese statesmen - Japan was not interested in European concerns.

As a result of Germany's victory over France, a great revision in all factors of foreign policy would follow. He personally believed that in the future, further possibilities for friendly cooperation with Japan would exist in the framework of the New Order in Europe now taking shape. At the present moment he would say nothing of the details of the form which this cooperation was to take, as he was acquainted with the German intentions but not with Japan's political aims. He therefore asked SATO for a further explanation of the principles of the political line which Japan proposed to pursue. He would be especially interested to hear from the Japanese side what was their thought of cooperation with Germany, whether only in the economic sphere or in which other way.

Ambassador SATO replied that it was comprehensible that for outsiders the Japanese policy had been difficult to understand. For nine years, that is, since the outbreak of the Manchurian conflict, Japan had been trying to orient her policy in a set direction, but had time and again subsequently been forced to moderate this new orientation somewhat. In regard to the new order in the Far East, for Japan it is above all a question of permitting a new China to arise with which it could have friendly relations. The solidarity between this new China and Japan would guarantee peace in the Far East. In order to achieve this aim, Japan had for several
years been fighting obstinately against the so-called regime from Washington which finds expression in the treaties of 1921, especially in the Nine Power Pact. This Washington regime did not give China and Japan but the Anglo-Saxons the predominance in the Far East. Japan did not, however, by any means wish to eliminate the foreigners from the Far East. Quite the contrary. It also wished to concede an appropriate place to economic cooperation with Germany in China.

In its relations with America Japan must of course be very careful.

To the question of the FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE REICH as to what in reality then was the basic reason for the difficulties between Japan and America, SATO answered that this cause lay in the struggle of Japan against the system of the Nine Power Treaty. In this Japan was not fighting against the fundamental principles of this treaty. Politically, it was quite prepared to respect the independence of China. Economically it was likewise in agreement with the so-called principle of the Open Door. It did, however, wish to exchange roles and itself be the host while the other nations would be only guests in East Asia.

When the question by the Foreign Minister of the Reich concerning the deeper reasons for the difficulties which Japan was having with America was interpolated anew, SATO answered that the causes of friction with America lay less in the economic than in the humanitarian sphere. American sympathies were with China. America felt that she was in a way the protector of this country and wanted to extend her police power in the Pacific Ocean with the help of her superiority at sea. Under these circumstances Japan was at pains to end the war with China soon. SATO declared that he personally, perhaps in a certain sense an opposition to the Japanese military authorities, did not believe that Japan could march to Chungking. It was, therefore, necessary to seek a solution of the Chinese question on some other than on a military basis. For this reason Japan had supported the government of Wang Ching Wei and was prepared to conclude a generous agreement with it. Japan absolutely did not wish to meddle in Chinese affairs or force anything upon the Chinese, but on the contrary was prepared to negotiate with Wang Ching Wei on the basis of equality. If the Chinese were sensible, a result would doubtless be achieved, under which China would not lose face. In this case America would also perhaps gradually change its attitude and be more
friendly toward Japan. America's economic interests in China were not large, but just this fact alone did not absolutely tend to help clarify the situation. In view of the considerable economic interests of England in this area, an agreement could much more easily be made with her than with the Americans, who take an entirely different view of things.

At the conjecture of the Foreign Minister of the Reich that perhaps America was uneasy about the rising power of Japan and her ever more powerful fleet, and that the differences of opinion with that country were based on the fact that America, who up to now had been ruling alone in the Pacific Ocean, now found herself in the position of being forced to share this rule with Japan, the Foreign Minister answered in the affirmative and added that the efforts of Japan in particular to achieve naval parity with America, and the fact that Japan was keeping the new additions to her fleet a secret had especially aroused ill feeling in America. For this reason, in particular after the entry of Stimson into the Government, Japan had to be very careful in regard to America in order not to provoke this country into taking severe measures against Japan. To be sure, America had already abrogated the commercial treaty, but an export embargo against Japan had not yet been instituted. Because of the supply of petroleum and iron, the Japanese were still exceedingly dependent on America.

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that he had always held the view that a strong policy also promotes the economy. It would always fare worse as a result of the formulation of a weaker policy. Germany has her own experiences in this sphere. At the time when she was politically weak and the governments at the time maintained that one had to give way for economic reasons, Germany had, in the end, obtained no economic advantages for her conciliatory behavior. Now Germany is strong and her trade is flourishing. She gets all she needs supplied from other lands in addition to all the economic alleviations such as credits and the like.

Even a few months ago Germany had been considered as an encircled country. But now England is as completely encircled as no other land in world history. In gold, which has streamed in such great amounts to America, Germany is no more interested. The German Reich in its thousand years existence would never again build anything on gold. In Germany gold has been dethroned and other countries would
be bound to follow this example. Now, when England is so
menaced, the stores of gold had been transported from there
to the United States, so that about 85-90% of all the world's
gold might be found there. The result of that is that the
United States at the end of the war will be choked by gold
and goods and would be glad to sell to other lands, for
e.g., Japan, under favorable conditions everything that
those lands need.

Germany, economically, is as good as completely in-
dependent. Many things, which were previously imported are
produced by herself or else she has found a substitute for
them. After the war the European economic sphere will be
completely independent. That does not mean that Germany no
more desires any world trade. Quite the opposite! However
this new world trade must run on the basis of the independence
of the participating economic spheres and the exchange of
surplus. The old world trade rested on the possibility,
always, possessed by England, of blockading other countries
and cutting off their raw material supplies. In the New
World Order Japan in East Asia, Russia in Asia, Germany and
Italy in Europe would have the power of decision and also in
Africa would Germany and Italy particularly, perhaps with
some other interested party, exercise predominance.

The foreign minister of the Reich then came to speak
on the attitude of the South American countries. The South
American states, which Roosevelt tried to link economically
with North America, appeared to know that after the war the
United States would not be able to import the South American
raw products and already turned towards Europe in order to
insure the export of their goods after the war. But whoever
wishes to trade with Europe, must in the future turn towards
Germany.

SATO replied that he, not being an economist, could
not express any opinion on economic questions. If, however,
the exchange of goods rested no longer on the gold basis,
then one could not very well turn back to a free exchange
of goods with the rejection of commercial arrangements with
foreign bills of exchange and other trade barriers.

As far as the United States are concerned, Japan was,
possibly, not impressed by the economic pressure as much as
by the American fleet and had to be careful for that reason.
Besides, the United States would not be able to remain
neutral in the European conflict once she came into a con-
lict with Japan.
The Reich Foreign Minister admitted that the Japanese situation was difficult and that Japan had to orient her policy according to the opportunities of the situation. He stated moreover, regarding the gold question that it was not a question of Germany not possessing any gold, but that German economy would never again be dependent on gold, i.e., on international speculation.

As regards Russia, the Reich Foreign Minister referred to the efforts which he had made for some years past to influence Ambassador OSSILA in the direction of an understanding between Japan and Russia. Germany concluded a lasting agreement with Russia and the interests of both countries were very clearly outlined by one another. He welcomed the efforts which Japan had also made, in the previous months, to come to an understanding for her part with Russia.

In conclusion, 3.I.T.O put up one more question which he himself said was a little indiscreet. What does Germany think the future shape of Europe will be?

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the German Government was only busying itself with one question at the moment, namely how is the war to be carried on and how is it to be brought to a victorious conclusion. For that reason he could not yet say much about the political future. The only thing that is certain is that the still remaining enemy of Germany - England - will be defeated.

Berlin, 9 July 1940.

Signed 3C. HDT
Envoy
I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attaché of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said control documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945: and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel ACD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
AFFIDAVIT

I, Paul O. Schmidt, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:

1. That from 1923 to the collapse of the German Reich in May 1945, I was Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office, and as such was personally present and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at all important Foreign Office and other conferences between German Government leaders and representatives of foreign governments.

2. That in addition to being Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office as aforesaid, I was also after the year 1936 the Head of the Secretariat General of the German Foreign Office and that my latest government rank was that of a Minister in the German Foreign Office.

3. That while acting as interpreter and/or secretary at such meetings above referred to, it was my official duty to and I did take notes concerning the conversations that took place, and at the conclusion of each such meeting, I prepared from such notes a complete and detailed record of what was said and transpired at such meetings.

4. That the records prepared by me became the official German Government records of what was said and transpired at such meetings. That one copy of the record was filed with the Ministers Office Section of the German Foreign Office, which office acted in the capacity of secretary to said Foreign Office. That another copy of the record of each of such meetings was filed with the Private Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister. That a third copy of the record of each of such meetings was retained by me.

5. That said meetings, concerning which I made a record as aforesaid, were of historical importance and that such records were also prepared by me for the express purpose of maintaining and preserving a record of such meetings for historical purposes.

6. That the document attached hereto is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original record, prepared personally by me in the manner herein set forth and concerning a conference held on July 8th 1940 between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Japanese ambassador Sato in the presence of the ambassador T u r u s u and the Consul-General S t a h m e r.

7. That I personally attended and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at the conference last above mentioned and that the record prepared by me, and of which the attached document is a photostatic copy, is a true and accurate account of what was said and transpired at said conferences.

8. That I have been advised and am aware of the fact that the herein affidavit and the document attached hereto may be used in connection with the prosecution of Japanese War Criminals and make this affidavit freely and voluntarily and with knowledge of the above facts.

Dr. Paul O. Schmidt

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Nürnberg, Germany this third day of May 1946

Smith W. Brookhart, Jr.,
Lt Colonel IGD O-508524
General Telegram No. 20990

To Foreign Minister ARITA,

From: Ambassador KURISU

No. 901 (Secret Code)

Referring to your telegram No. 455.

Ambassador SATO answered.

(1) It may not necessarily be that Germany does not embrace at all a hidden intention to resolve her noncommittal attitude to the Japan's demand in relation to South Africa, etc., but, judging from the RIBBENTROP's attitude, at least, I did not find such an air to request Japan's participation in the war making a good use of it as a bait. I felt, rather, that Germany did not attach importance to Japan's national power at present, excepting her naval power. I cannot, also, say so far that Germany has already fostered an ambition on the southern colonies. Comparing with the days I sent telegram No. 527, today when Germany won the great victory in European continent, it must not be passed over that pretty large change arose in thought of Germany.

(2) What I said concerning the problem towards America was not intended to restrain Germany's ambition on the South Sea, nor intended to mean what was related to the consumption of the Japanese national power and decrease of Japan's pressure on the USSR. As seen in my telegram No. 870 and its supplementary one, I made RIBBENTROP pay attention, suggesting the possible development of the U. S.-Japanese war to the U. S.-German war. I talked him those, a little in a threatening way, supposing the participation of the U. S. in the war against Germany might be the great pain to her while she was expending in the operations to Britain devotedly and she was endeavoring to avoid the long war. I guessed what he felt then was just this very weak point. However, I avoided to utter such a direct narration as to say it would develop to Japanese-American war, but used the expression seen in my telegram.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi, Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereon attached consisting of 2 pages, dated July 15, 1940, and described as follows: Telegram No. 901 dated 15 July, 1940 from KURUSU to ARITA.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 6th day of September, 1946. /s/ K. Hayashi

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 6th day of Sept., 1946 /s/ Richard H. Larsh

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis, 2nd Lt. Investigator. IPS
EXHIBIT NO. 627

Minutes of the Joint Conference of War, Navy, and Foreign Ministries on Strengthening of Harmony Between Japan, Germany and Italy.

12 July 1940

Those present:

War Ministry
Lt. Col. TAKAYAMA

Navy Ministry
Commander SHIBA

Naval General Staff
Captain ONO

Foreign Ministry
Section Chief ANDO
Section Chief ISHIYAWA
Secretary TOKUNAGA

"ANDO: 'The Foreign Office gave instructions to Ambassador SATO some time ago to confer with German authorities upon strengthening the coalition between the two countries, and Mr. SATO was able to exchange views with Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP. At that conference, RIBBENTROP said that he could not understand in the least what Japan was after. Therefore, it is deemed necessary to draw and present to him a more concrete and further penetrated draft and thereby intensify the coalition between Japan and Germany. The draft distributed among you is only a tentative plan made by our Foreign Office, but I want you to discuss it and let me hear your opinions.'

"(Upon request of Lieutenant Colonel TAKAYAMA, he explains the substance of the draft.)

"ANDO: 'This draft has been drawn with the aim of intensifying the coalition of Japan and Germany upon supposition that Germany will conquer England, have the hegemony of Europe and Africa, and establish New Order there. Regarding our Soviet policy, which is an important problem to us, we want to check Soviet through the influence of Japanese-German coalition. There is a probability of the formation of a U.S.-Soviet coalition, but we hope to check this likewise by Japanese-German coalition. As to the limit of Japanese-German coalition, it is deemed wise for us to avoid to participate in the European War, as is shown in the draft and in view of our present domestic and economic conditions as well as our relations with Soviet and the United States. (We have asked the opinions of the Army..."
and the Navy on this subject, and they both have expressed approval. Our plan is to join hands with Germany to the fullest extent but within the scope of being driven into the war.

"TAKAYAMA: 'Is this plan merely to have the three ministries come to an agreement and to submit their opinions to the higher authorities for discussion?'

"ANDO: 'As this matter needs to be carried out promptly, I want to submit it to the higher authorities and have them put into practice as our national policy as soon as the three ministries arrive at an agreement.'

"(The Army and the Navy gave consent to his proposal, and ANDO goes into explanation of the substance.)

"ANDO: 'A plan has been proposed some time ago to the effect that Japan should have Germany recognize its free hand concerning French Indo-China, Dutch East Indies and other South Sea Islands. But as the meaning of free hand is somewhat vague, if it is expressed more definitely, it will be as drafted. I should like to hear your opinion on this point. The object of this draft is to have Germany understand that Japan has no territorial ambition over these spheres, but Japan wants to firmly establish not only the freedom of economic activities but also political leadership. In order to have this approved by Germany, it will be necessary to choose a form easy for Germany to approve.'

"TAKAYAMA: 'You say you want to make Germany recognize Japan's political leadership in the South Seas, but, what relation does it have with Japan's political leadership in China and Manchuria?'

"ANDO: 'As I regard our political leadership in China and Manchuria as a matter of course, I did not enumerate it here.'

"ANDO: 'Concerning British, French and Dutch territories, we will discuss the details later.'

"ANDO: 'Concerning German support to the settlement of the Chinese Incident, our attitude should be absolutely independent. For instance, concerning such matters as German mediation of the Chinese Incident which has recently almost come into question, we should have Germany mediate from a point of view that as a part of the general problem of Japan-German
coalition, the quick settlement of the Incident and the solidifying of Japan's position will become a favorable factor to Germany. "We should avoid assuming a supplicatory attitude. It is also necessary to study concretely the recognition of the new regime and the prohibition of exports to CHIANG."

"ANDO: 'The question of trade with Europe and Africa and on other economic matters has been raised, because, if Germany should resort to a closed economy in case of forming a block economy in Europe and Africa, Japan would fall into difficulties. To meet this problem we hope to maintain trade between the East Asia and South Seas economic sphere of Japan and the new economic sphere of Germany, and to make clear whether or not other economic relations should exist, as well as the difference of Japan and Germany's position in the two spheres.'

"ANDO: 'The most important problem among Japan's promises to Germany will be the restraint of British activities in East Asia as much as possible in order to facilitate Germany's conquest of England (refer to Article (2)), and on this point I should like to request the Army and the Navy to study what practical measures exist. As far as I am concerned, oppression of British political rights and interests in East Asia or a secret assistance to the native independence movements in India and Burma, in accordance with the changes in the situation, may serve as restraining measures.'

"ANDO: 'Point 3 specifies compensation for Germany's recognition of our political predominance in the South Sea Islands. Germany craves for 'olfram' rubber, and tin from China and the South Seas, and we will supply Germany with them. We will also give favorable consideration to Germany's economic activities (including investment and enterprises) in China and the South Seas. (a) and (b) will keep an even balance.'

"ONO: 'After the conclusion of the war there may be occasions when Germany might carry out active economic operations towards the Dutch East Indies, French Indo-China, and China, and especially after Germany makes France and the Netherlands somewhat like subject states, it is probable that she will dispatch active members of the Nazi Party to French Indo China and the Dutch East Indies and keep these two colonies under her political leadership even if she would not go so far as to make them her own territories. Therefore, Japan's policy toward French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies must be hastened in order to prevent such movement on the part of Germany/ and she must also endeavour to sever French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies from European influence as soon as possible.'
"ANDO: 'As to our Soviet policy referred to in (2), it is equally favorable to both Japan and Germany to maintain peace with the Soviet Union at present. However, we cannot forecast to what direction Germany will turn its relations with Soviet after cessation of the European War. It will be necessary for us to make some sort of arrangement with Germany beforehand as Japan and Germany will be in the same position in their relations with Soviet. However, the relation between Germany and Soviet at the present moment is delicate, and there probably may be something which Germany cannot tell us unreservedly. For this reason, the latter part of article (2) may be dropped according to circumstances.'

"TAKAYAMA: 'Germany would not like to see Soviet penetrate into Rumania. Should Germany request us to check Soviet in the East, what measures could be considered?'

"Concerning the above measures, discussions followed. Then the subject was turned to Japan's U. S. policy, Article (3) of Chapter II.

"TAKAYAMA: 'Does this mean that Japan will not try to reach any particular understanding with the United States after all? For example, if such an agreement as to guarantee the peace of the Pacific should be reached, and if the United States should, as a consequence, no longer sense menace in the Pacific, it may interfere with European affairs, which Germany will no doubt detest.'

"ANDO: 'No! Even if such an agreement should be reached, the agreement will be made in a manner that the United States will confine itself to the American continents and it will not interfere with the affairs of the South Seas and other parts of the world. Recently, Hitler propounded that the United States should mind its own business of the American continents and should not interfere with the affairs of other continents, and RIBBENTROP, in his conversation with our Ambassador SATO, did not seem to hope for the impairment of Japanese-American relation to restrain the United States. Apparently, Germany's wish is to maintain a peaceful relation with the United States at present and in the future, as long as the latter does not take an offensive attitude. Consequently, Germany is not likely to hope for the impairment of Japanese-American relation.'

"TAKAYAMA: 'Will not Germany demand us to take some measures in order to prevent the United States from participating in the war on Britain's side?'
"ANDO: 'Such anxiety was felt in the early stage of the present war, but we have practically no such uneasiness now, for Germany does not anticipate the United States' participation in the war any longer.'

"ISHIZAKA: 'There is one thing that we should keep in our mind in respect of our relation with the United States. After two to three years from now, the U. S. Navy will become a far greater power. Japan and Germany must necessarily check it together.'

"ANDO: 'Both Japan and Germany should not positively be antagonistic to the United States, but should restrain it peaceably.'

"ISHIZAKA: 'Judging from and the United States, there is a considerable difference in opinions between the two, and it will require unusual efforts to adjust it. On the other hand, upon the establishment of the New Order in Europe, the United States will find it difficult to interfere in European affairs, and as a consequence, it will intervene in Far Eastern affairs, with the Philippines and Hawaii as its naval bases. Should a peaceful order be established between Japan and the United States, the latter may insist upon pretty severe conditions to be accepted by Japan. And if we try to make Germany restrain the United States, we may turn out to be a liability to Germany.'

"ANDO: 'However, should the United States put pressure upon Japan, Japan's power of restraining Soviet may be weakened, and Germany would not like it. So Japan's relations with the United States and Soviet and that Germany will eventually become the same.'

"TAKAYAMA: 'Germany has considerably advanced into South America since pre-war time, and won't it be as absolutely necessary for Germany to advance to South America after the war as well? If so, the United States would not approve of this movement and don't you think a conflict will arise between Germany and the United States?'

"Discussions followed.

"ISHIBA: 'According to Helfrich who recently visited Japan, it was said that, contrary to Japan's erroneous assumption, Germany's industrial power which had expanded during and before the war would undertake great economic activities in order to extend the market for German industrial products in post-war time. It is certain that Germany will penetrate economically into China and the South Seas also.'
"ANDO: 'Concerning article (4) of Chapter II, as it was decided, we cannot accept a request to join the war, even if Germany should make such a request to us."

"ANDO: 'Concerning Chapter III, which is the coalition between Japan and Italy, Italy has hitherto reiterated that it would support Japan in her East Asiatic policy. It would be also important that we maintain a friendly relation with Italy to restrain Germany which would pride itself upon its victory. I think it will be an adequate measure to present our coalition proposal to Italy at the same time we do to Germany."

"The Army and Navy approved his suggestion.

"Then someone asked, 'One of the most important matters for Japan in connection with Italy is Italy's relation with Soviet. But, is Italy willing to maintain peace with Soviet?'

"TAKAYAMA: 'As long as the present European War is in progress, Germany and Italy's policy toward Soviet will be more or less the same.'

"After there were some arguments about the formality of the agreement, it was decided that the agreement be written in the form of a diplomatic note, unless the other government is anxious to have it written in the form of a regular pact, as it would take a long time to enter into a formal pact, any how. (However, in a case as 'the recognition of Japan's position in French Indo-China and Dutch East Indies,' it was resolved that the formality of an agreement may be issued.) To sum up, they agreed to carry out the matter quickly. Furthermore, it was unanimously approved that the detail of concrete problems involved in each article be carefully studied."
Plan For Strengthening the Harmony
Between Japan, Germany and Italy.
(Drafted July 12th 1940)

I. The object of strengthening the harmony.

The object is to facilitate, vis-à-vis the present international upheaval, the attainment of our Imperial aim by quickly embodying an intimate cooperative relation between our Empire which is striving to establish a new order in East Asia including the South Seas, and Germany and Italy which are fighting for a new order in Europe, and to strengthen our future international position in the face of the world situation after the European war.

II. Japanese-German coalition.

Principle -- To maintain an intimate connection with each other and to have a concrete political understanding as regards the mutual assistance in diplomatic and economic affairs.

Points

(a) Germany promises Japan:

1) not to interfere with the autonomy or independence of French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies and other races of the South Seas areas, to recognize that the above areas are within the sphere of Japan's influence, and to approve and support Japan's political leadership and cooperation in those areas;

(ii) to give proper support for the disposition of the China Incident;

(iii) to give favorable consideration to Japan's trade and other economic relations with Europe and Africa.

(b) Japan promises Germany:

1) to support German policy in Europe and Africa and approve the New Order in Europe under the German leadership;

ii) to take steps as far as possible to check Britain in East Asia in order to facilitate her surrender;
iii) to supply Germany with essential materials from China and the South Seas and to give favorable consideration to the economic activity of Germany in China and in the South Seas.

(2) Japan and Germany shall cooperate in maintaining peace with the Soviet Union. If by any chance one of the two parties should enter war with the Soviet Union, the other party must not assist the latter, and moreover, the two countries shall confer on what action to take either in the above case or in the event one party should be threatened by the Soviet Union.

(3) Japan and Germany shall cooperate in order that the United States shall not interfere with affairs outside the American continent, and if the United States should put political or economic pressure either upon Japan or Germany, both Germany and Japan shall adopt such a policy as to check the U.S., never supporting her.

(4) Japan shall not accept, at the present stage, Germany's request to join the war, even if Germany should insist upon the duty on our part.

(5) Though it would be good to have Ambassador KURUSU negotiate with Foreign Minister REENTROP, if that is impossible, negotiations shall be conducted at Tokyo.

III. Japanese-Italian coalition.

In parallel with the Japanese-German negotiations, the negotiations with Italy shall be commenced at Rome, and the substance of the former will apply correspondingly to the latter in general. Italian policy in Europe and Africa shall be supported and the new order around the Mediterranean Sea approved, other matters being the same as with Germany.
Plan for Strengthening the Harmony Between Japan, Germany and Italy.

I. The object of strengthening the harmony.

The object is to facilitate, vis-a-vis the present international upheaval, the attainment of our Imperial aim by quickly embodying an intimate cooperative relation between our Empire which is striving to establish a new order in East Asia including the South Seas, and Germany and Italy which are fighting for a new order in Europe, and to strengthen our future international position in face of the world situation after the European War.

II. Japanese-German coalition

Principle -- With the common aim of establishing a New World Order, Japan and Germany shall maintain close liaison with one another and shall in parallel engage in the establishment of the new order respectively in East Asia including the South Seas, and in Europe and Africa, and shall have a concrete political understanding as regards the diplomatic and economic cooperation necessary for the above.

Points:

(1), (a) Germany promises Japan:

i) to recognize that French Indo-China, Dutch East Indies and other South Seas areas are politically and economically within the sphere of Japan's influence and that they shall be able of their own free will to enjoy autonomy or independence in the future, to recognize accordingly that Japan's approval must be necessary for the alteration of their political status quo, and to support the economic development of Japan in those areas, not preventing the implantation of her political power;

ii) to assure Japan of the indiscriminate treatment of her trade with Europe and Africa under the German influence, and to give favorable consideration to her other economic relations;

iii) to have harmony in economy and technique between Japan and Germany.
(b) Japan promises Germany:

1) to support the German policy in Europe and Africa, and to approve the German-directed New Order in Europe;

2) to assure Germany the supply of essential materials in China and the South Seas;

3) to recognize indiscriminate treatment of trade in China and the South Seas, and to give favorable consideration to German economic activities.

(2) Japan and Germany shall cooperate in maintaining peace with the Soviet Union. If by any chance one of the parties should enter war with the Soviet Union, the other party must not assist the latter, and moreover, the two countries shall confer on what action to take either in the above case or in the event one party should be threatened by the Soviet Union.

(3) Japan and Germany shall cooperate to keep the United States from interfering with affairs outside the American continent, and if the United States should put political or economic pressure either upon Japan or Germany, both Germany and Japan must not adopt such a policy as would support the United States. Again, both Japan and Germany shall make common cause with each other against the U.S. in their Central and South American policy.

(4) To contrive the fall of British influence by the partition of her colonies.

In order to facilitate Britain's surrender Japan shall check her as far as possible in East Asia by such measures as the withdrawal of British forces, demand for the disarmament of Hongkong (Singapore), demand for the cession of British territories in the South Seas, independence of India, Burma and others, capture of British ships. For this end, Germany shall give adequate political support for disposition of the China Incident.

(5) Japan shall not accept, at the present stage, Germany's request to join the war, even if Germany should insist upon the duty on our part.

(6) Though it would be good to have Ambassador KURUSU negotiate with Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP, if that is impossible, negotiations shall be conducted at Tokyo.
III. Japanese-Italian coalition

In parallel with the Japanese-German negotiations, the negotiations with Italy shall be commenced at Rome, and the substance of the former will apply correspondingly to the latter in general. Italian policy in Europe and Africa shall be supported and the new order around the Mediterranean Sea approved, other matters being the same as with Germany.

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Between Japan, Germany and Italy.

(Drafted July 12th 1940)

I. The object of strengthening the harmony.

The object is to facilitate, vis-a-vis the present international upheaval, the attainment of our Imperial aim by quickly embodying an intimate cooperative relation between our Empire which is striving to establish a new order in East Asia including the South Seas, and Germany and Italy which are fighting for the New Order in Europe, and to strengthen our future international position in the face of the world situation after the European War.

II. Japanese-German coalition.

Principle -- "With the common aim to establish the World New Order, Japan and Germany shall be engaged in the establishment of the new order respectively in East Asia including the South Seas and Europe and Africa, in parallel and keeping an intimate connection with each other, and shall have a concrete political understanding as regards the diplomatic and economic cooperation necessary for the purpose.

Points:

(1), (a) Germany promises Japan:

1) to recognize that French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies and other South Seas areas are within the sphere
of Japan's influence and that Japan's approval is necessary for any alteration in their political reversion, and support the political guidance and economic aid of Japan toward those areas;

ii) to give adequate political support for the management of the China Incident;

iii) to give favorable consideration to Japan's trade and other economic relations with Europe and Africa.

(b) Japan promises Germany:

i) to support German policy in Europe and Africa and approve the New Order in Europe under German leadership;

ii) to take steps as far as possible to check Britain in East Asia in order to facilitate her surrender;

iii) to supply Germany with essential materials from China and the South Seas and to give favorable consideration to the economic activities of Germany in China and the South Seas.

(2) Japan and Germany shall cooperate in maintaining peace with the Soviet Union. If by any chance one of the two parties should enter war with the Soviet Union, the other party must not assist the latter, and moreover, the two countries shall confer on what action is to be taken either in the above case or in the event one party should be threatened by the Soviet Union.

(3) Japan and Germany shall cooperate to keep the United States from interfering with affairs outside the American continent, and if the United States should put political or economic pressure either upon Japan or Germany, both Germany and Japan shall not adopt such a policy as would support the United States. Again, both Japan and Germany shall make common cause with each other in their policy in Central and South Americas.

(4) Japan shall not accept, at the present stage, Germany's request to join the war, even if Germany should insist upon the duty on our part.

(5) Though it would be good to have Ambassador KURUSU negotiate with Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP, if that is impossible, negotiations shall be carried on at Tokyo.
III. Japanese-Italian Harmony.

In parallel with the Japanese-German negotiations, the negotiations with Italy shall be commenced at Rome, and the substance of the former will apply correspondingly to the latter in general. Italian policy in Europe and Africa shall be supported and the new order around the Mediterranean Sea approved, other matters being the same as with Germany.
Doc. No. 1308

CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi Kono, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 24 pages, dated July 12, 1940, and described as follows: Minutes of the joint conference of the Army, Navy, and Foreign Office authorities for intensifying the coalition between Japan, Germany and Italy, dated July 12, 1940. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this 22nd day of August, 1946. /s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Hayaharu Odo Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 24th day of August, 1946 /s/ Richard H. Larsh

Witness: /s/ Edward F. Monaghan Investigator, IFS Official Capacity
Minutes of the Joint Conference of War, Navy, and Foreign Ministries on Strengthening of Harmony Between Japan, Germany and Italy.

12 July 1940

Those present:

War Ministry
Lt. Col. TAKAYAMA

Navy Ministry
Commander SHIBA

Naval General Staff
Captain ONO

Foreign Ministry
Section Chief ANDO
Section Chief ISHIZAWA
Secretary TOKUNAGA

"ANDO: 'The Foreign Office gave instructions to Ambassador SATO some time ago to confer with German authorities upon strengthening the coalition between the two countries, and Mr. SATO was able to exchange views with Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP. At that conference, RIBBENTROP said that he could not understand in the least what Japan was after. Therefore, it is deemed necessary to draw and present to him a more concrete and further penetrated draft and thereby intensify the coalition between Japan and Germany. The draft distributed among you is only a tentative plan made by our Foreign Office, but I want you to discuss it and let me hear your opinions.'

"(Upon request of Lieutenant Colonel TAKAYAMA, he explains the substance of the draft.)

"ANDO: 'This draft has been drawn with the aim of intensifying the coalition of Japan and Germany upon supposition that Germany will conquer England, have the hegemony of Europe and Africa, and establish New Order there. Regarding our Soviet policy, which is an important problem to us, we want to check Soviet through the influence of Japanese-German coalition. There is a probability of the formation of a U.S.-Soviet coalition, but we hope to check this likewise by Japanese-German coalition. As to the limit of Japanese-German coalition, it is deemed wise for us to avoid to participate in the European War, as is shown in the draft and in view of our present domestic and economic conditions as well as our relations with Soviet and the United States. (We have asked the opinions of the Army..."
and the Navy on this subject, and they both have expressed approval.) Our plan is to join hands with Germany to the fullest extent but within the scope of being driven into the war.'

"TAKAYAMA: 'Is this plan merely to have the three ministries come to an agreement and to submit their opinions to the higher authorities for discussion?"

"ANDO: 'As this matter needs to be carried out promptly, I want to submit it to the higher authorities and have them put into practice as our national policy as soon as the three ministries arrive at an agreement.'

"(The Army and the Navy gave consent to his proposal, and ANDO goes into explanation of the substance.)

"ANDO: 'A plan has been proposed some time ago to the effect that Japan should have Germany recognize its free hand concerning French Indo-China, Dutch East Indies and other South Sea Islands. But as the meaning of free hand is somewhat vague, if it is expressed more definitely, it will be as drafted. I should like to hear your opinion on this point. The object of this draft is to have Germany understand that Japan has no territorial ambition over these spheres, but Japan wants to firmly establish not only the freedom of economic activities but also political leadership. In order to have this approved by Germany, it will be necessary to choose a form easy for Germany to approve.'

"TAKAYAMA: 'You say you want to make Germany recognize Japan's political leadership in the South Seas, but, what relation does it have with Japan's political leadership in China and Manchuria?'

"ANDO: 'As I regard our political leadership in China and Manchuria as a matter of course, I did not enumerate it here.'

"ANDO: 'Concerning British, French and Dutch territories, we will discuss the details later.'

"ANDO: 'Concerning German support to the settlement of the Chinese Incident, our attitude should be absolutely independent. For instance, concerning such matters as German mediation of the Chinese Incident which has recently almost come into question, we should have Germany mediate from a point of view that as a part of the general problem of Japan-German
coalition, the quick settlement of the Incident and the solicifying of Japan's position will become a favorable factor to Germany. "We should avoid assuming a supplicatory attitude. It is also necessary to study concretely the recognition of the new regime and the prohibition of exports to CHIANG.'

"ANDO: 'The question of trade with Europe and Africa and on other economic matters has been raised, because, if Germany should resort to a closed economy in case of forming a block economy in Europe and Africa, Japan would fall into difficulties. To meet this problem we hope to maintain trade between the East Asia and South Seas economic sphere of Japan and the new economic sphere of Germany, and to make clear whether or not other economic relations should exist, as well as the difference of Japan and Germany's position in the two spheres.'

"ANDO: 'The most important problem among Japan's promises to Germany will be the restraint of British activities in East Asia as much as possible in order to facilitate Germany's conquest of England (refer to Article (2)), and on this point I should like to request the Army and the Navy to study what practical measures exist. As far as I am concerned, oppression of British political rights and interests in East Asia or a secret assistance to the native independence movements in India and Burma, in accordance with the changes in the situation, may serve as restraining measures.'

"ANDO: 'Point 3 specifies compensation for Germany's recognition of our political predominance in the South Sea Islands. Germany craves for wolfram rubber, and tin from China and the South Seas, and we will supply Germany with them. We will also give favorable consideration to Germany's economic activities (including investment and enterprises) in China and the South Seas. (a) and (b) will keep an even balance.'

"ONO: 'After the conclusion of the war there may be occasions when Germany might carry out active economic operations towards the Dutch East Indies, French Indo-China, and China, and especially after Germany makes France and the Netherlands somewhat like subject states, it is probable that she will dispatch active members of the Nazi Party to French Indo China and the Dutch East Indies and keep these two colonies under her political leadership even if she would not go so far as to make them her own territories. Therefore, Japan's policy toward French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies must be hastened in order to prevent such movement on the part of Germany, and she must also endeavour to sever French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies from European influence as soon as possible.'
"ANDO: 'As to our Soviet policy referred to in (2), it is equally favorable to both Japan and Germany to maintain peace with the Soviet Union at present. However, we cannot forecast to what direction Germany will turn its relations with Soviet after cessation of the European War. It will be necessary for us to make some sort of arrangement with Germany beforehand as Japan and Germany will be in the same position in their relations with Soviet. However, the relation between Germany and Soviet at the present moment is delicate, and there probably may be something which Germany cannot tell us unreservedly. For this reason, the latter part of article (2) may be dropped according to circumstances.'

"TAKAYAMA: 'Germany would not like to see Soviet penetrate into Rumania. Should Germany request us to check Soviet in the East, what measures could be considered?'

"Concerning the above measures, discussions followed. Then, the subject was turned to Japan's U.S. policy, Article (3) of Chapter II.

"TAKAYAMA: 'Does this mean that Japan will not try to reach any particular understanding with the United States after all? For example, if such an agreement as to guarantee the peace of the Pacific should be reached, and if the United States should as a consequence, no longer sense menace in the Pacific, it may interfere with European affairs, which Germany will no doubt detest.'

"ANDO: 'No! Even if such an agreement should be reached, the agreement will be made in a manner that the United States will confine itself to the American continents and it will not interfere with the affairs of the South Seas and other parts of the world. Recently, Hitler propounded that the United States should mind its own business of the American continents and should not interfere with the affairs of other continents, and RIBBENTROP, in his conversation with our Ambassador SATO, did not seem to hope for the impairment of Japanese-American relation to restrain the United States. Apparently, Germany's wish is to maintain a peaceful relation with the United States at present and in the future, as long as the latter does not take an offensive attitude. Consequently, Germany is not likely to hope for the impairment of Japanese-American relation.'

"TAKAYAMA: 'Will not Germany demand us to take some measures in order to prevent the United States from participating in the war on Britain's side?'}
"ANDO: 'Such anxiety was felt in the early stage of the present war, but we have practically no such uneasiness now, for Germany does not anticipate the United States' participation in the war any longer.'

"ISHIZAWA: 'There is one thing that we should keep in our mind in respect of our relation with the United States. After two to three years from now, the U. S. Navy will become a far greater power. Japan and Germany must necessarily check it together.

"ANDO: 'Both Japan and Germany should not positively be antagonistic to the United States, but should restrain it peaceably.'

"ISHIZAWA: 'Judging from each assertion made by Japan and the United States, there is a considerable difference in opinions between the two, and it will require unusual efforts to adjust it. On the other hand, upon the establishment of the New Order in Europe, the United States will find it difficult to interfere in European affairs, and as a consequence, it will intervene in Far Eastern affairs, with the Philippines and Hawaii as its naval bases. Should a peaceful order be established between Japan and the United States, the latter may insist upon pretty severe conditions to be accepted by Japan. And if we try to make Germany restrain the United States, we may turn out to be a liability to Germany.'

"ANDO: 'However, should the United States put pressure upon Japan, Japan's power of restraining Soviet may be weakened, and Germany would not like it. So Japan's relations with the United States and Soviet and that of Germany will eventually become the same.'

"TAKAYAMA: 'Germany has considerably advanced into South America since pre-war time, and won't it be as absolutely necessary for Germany to advance to South America after the war as well? If so, the United States would not approve of this movement and don't you think a conflict will arise between Germany and the United States?'

"Discussions followed.

"SHIBA: 'According to Helfrich who recently visited Japan, it was said that, contrary to Japan's erroneous assumption, Germany's industrial power which had expanded during and before the war would undertake great economic activities in order to extend the market for German industrial products in post-war time. It is certain that Germany will penetrate economically into China and the South Seas also.'
"ANDO: 'Concerning article (4) of Chapter II, as it was decided, we cannot accept a request to join the war, even if Germany should make such a request to us.'

"ANDO: 'Concerning Chapter III, which is the coalition between Japan and Italy, Italy has hitherto reiterated that it would support Japan in her East Asiatic policy. It would be also important that we maintain a friendly relation with Italy to restrain Germany which would pride itself upon its victory. I think it will be an adequate measure to present our coalition proposal to Italy at the same time we do to Germany.'

"The Army and Navy approved his suggestion.

"Then someone asked, 'One of the most important matters for Japan in connection with Italy is Italy's relation with Soviet. But, is Italy willing to maintain peace with Soviet?'

"TAKAYAMA: 'As long as the present European War is in progress, Germany and Italy's policy toward Soviet will be more or less the same.'

"After there were some arguments about the formality of the agreement, it was decided that the agreement be written in the form of a diplomatic note, unless the other government is anxious to have it written in the form of a regular pact, as it would take a long time to enter into a formal pact, anyhow. (However, in a case as 'the recognition of Japan's position in French Indo-China and Dutch East Indies,' it was resolved that the formality of an agreement may be issued.) To sum up, they agreed to carry out the matter quickly. Furthermore, it was unanimously approved that the detail of concrete problems involved in each article be carefully studied.'
Plan For Strengthening the Harmony Between Japan, Germany and Italy.

(Drafted July 12th 1940)

I. The object of strengthening the harmony.

The object is to facilitate, vis-a-vis the present international upheaval, the attainment of our Imperial aim by quickly embodying an intimate cooperative relation between our Empire which is striving to establish a new order in East Asia including the South Seas, and Germany and Italy which are fighting for a new order in Europe, and to strengthen our future international position in the face of the world situation after the European War.

II. Japanese-German coalition.

Principle -- To maintain an intimate connection with each other and to have a concrete political understanding as regards the mutual assistance in diplomatic and economic affairs.

Points

(1), (a) Germany promises Japan:

1) not to interfere with the autonomy or independence of French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies and other races of the South Seas areas, to recognize that the above areas are within the sphere of Japan's influence, and to approve and support Japan's political leadership and cooperation in those areas;

(ii) to give proper support for the disposition of the China Incident;

(iii) to give favorable consideration to Japan's trade and other economic relations with Europe and Africa.

(b) Japan promises Germany:

1) to support German policy in Europe and Africa and approve the New Order in Europe under the German leadership;

ii) to take steps as far as possible to check Britain in East Asia in order to facilitate her surrender;
iii) to supply Germany with essential materials from China and the South Seas and to give favorable consideration to the economic activity of Germany in China and in the South Seas.

(2) Japan and Germany shall cooperate in maintaining peace with the Soviet Union. If by any chance one of the two parties should enter war with the Soviet Union, the other party must not assist the latter, and moreover, the two countries shall confer on what action to take either in the above case or in the event one party should be threatened by the Soviet Union.

(3) Japan and Germany shall cooperate in order that the United States shall not interfere with affairs outside the American continent, and if the United States should put political or economic pressure either upon Japan or Germany, both Germany and Japan shall adopt such a policy as to check the U. S., never supporting her.

(4) Japan shall not accept, at the present stage, Germany's request to join the war, even if Germany should insist upon the duty on our part.

(5) Though it would be good to have Ambassador KURUSU negotiate with Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP, if that is impossible, negotiations shall be conducted at Tokyo.

III. Japanese-Italian coalition.

In parallel with the Japanese-German negotiations, the negotiations with Italy shall be commenced at Rome, and the substance of the former will apply correspondingly to the latter in general. Italian policy in Europe and Africa shall be supported and the new order around the Mediterranean Sea approved, other matters being the same as with Germany.
Plan for Strengthening the Harmony Between Japan, Germany and Italy.

I. The object of strengthening the harmony.

The object is to facilitate, vis-a-vis the present international upheaval, the attainment of our Imperial aim by quickly embodying an intimate cooperative relation between our Empire which is striving to establish a new order in East Asia including the South Seas, and Germany and Italy which are fighting for a new order in Europe, and to strengthen our future international position in face of the world situation after the European War.

II. Japanese-German coalition

Principle — With the common aim of establishing a New World Order, Japan and Germany shall maintain close liaison with one another and shall in parallel engage in the establishment of the new order respectively in East Asia including the South Seas, and in Europe and Africa, and shall have a concrete political understanding as regards the diplomatic and economic cooperation necessary for the above.

Points:

(1), (a) Germany promises Japan:

1) to recognize that French Indo-China, Dutch East Indies and other South Seas areas are politically and economically within the sphere of Japan's influence and that they shall be able of their own free will to enjoy autonomy or independence in the future, to recognize accordingly that Japan's approval must be necessary for the alteration of their political status quo, and to support the economic development of Japan in those areas, not preventing the implantation of her political power;

2) to assure Japan of the indiscriminate treatment of her trade with Europe and Africa under the German influence, and to give favorable consideration to her other economic relations;

3) to have harmony in economy and technique between Japan and Germany.
(b) Japan promises Germany:

i) to support the German policy in Europe and Africa, and to approve the ‘German-directed New Order in Europe;

ii) to assure Germany the supply of essential materials in China and the South Seas;

iii) to recognize indiscriminate treatment of trade in China and the South Seas, and to give favorable consideration to German economic activities.

(2) Japan and Germany shall cooperate in maintaining peace with the Soviet Union. If by any chance one of the parties should enter war with the Soviet Union, the other party must not assist the latter, and moreover, the two countries shall confer on what action to take either in the above case or in the event one party should be threatened by the Soviet Union.

(3) Japan and Germany shall cooperate to keep the United States from interfering with affairs outside the American continent, and if the United States should put political or economic pressure either upon Japan or Germany, both Germany and Japan must not adopt such a policy as would support the United States. Again, both Japan and Germany shall make common cause with each other against the U.S. in their Central and South American policy.

(4) To contrive the fall of British influence by the partition of her colonies.

In order to facilitate Britain's surrender Japan shall check her as far as possible in East Asia by such measures as the withdrawal of British forces, demand for the disarmament of Hongkong (Singapore), demand for the cession of British territories in the South Seas, independence of India, Burma and others, capture of British ships. For this end, Germany shall give adequate political support for disposition of the China Incident.

(5) Japan shall not accept, at the present stage, Germany's request to join the war, even if Germany should insist upon the duty on our part.

(6) Though it would be good to have Ambassador KURUSU negotiate with Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP, if that is impossible, negotiations shall be conducted at Tokyo.
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, KaYASHI Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives, Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 24 pages, dated July 12, 1940, and described as follows: Minutes of the Joint Conference of the Army, Navy, and Foreign Office authorities for intensifying the coalition between Japan, Germany, and Italy, Dated July 12, 1940. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 22nd day of August, 1946. /s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Ichaharu Odo
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Lersh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 24th day of August, 1946 /s/ Richard H. Lersh

Witness: /s/ Edward P. Monaghan
Investigator, IFS
Official Capacity
"(Part II)"

"MINUTES OF JOINT CONFERENCE OF JAPAN, NAVY, AND FOREIGN OFFICE AUTHORITIES OF INTENSIFICATION OF COALITION AMONG JAPAN, GERMANY AND ITALY.

at the Foreign Office on the 16th July 1940.

"Attendance:"

ANTO - Chief of a Section, the Foreign Office
TOSIZAKI - Chief of a Section, the Foreign Office (withdrew before adjournment)
T. JIJI - Chief of a Section, the Foreign Office
TOKUMUGU, Secretary, the Foreign Office
TAKAYAMA, Lt. Colonel, the War Ministry
TAKEMURA, Major, the General Staff Office
SHIBA, Commander, the Naval Ministry

"ANTO (Foreign Office) utters: For today, I request Army and Navy to give us their opinions concerning the plan (proposal) relating to the intensification of coalition among Japan, Germany and Italy which I gave you on the occasion of the previous conference. Please start with Army.

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): I agree upon this plan as a whole and will give you our opinion in detail: as to the meaning of the word NANYO / T.N. South Seas/ contained in the phrase 'the construction of a new order in the Far East including the South Seas,' mentioned in clause 1, I would like to have it mean as Japan's intention to include the territory extending from Suma and the eastern part of India on the west to Australia and New Zealand on the east, but since there should be a South Seas of first sense and also of the second sense, the South Seas to be expressed as Japan's attitude for the present should be a narrower South Seas excluding Australia, New Zealand and Suma. Nevertheless, I think we should consider as Japan's attitude the NANYO of the older sense.

"ANTO (Foreign Office): As Japan's ideal, Australia, New Zealand and Fiji, of course, should be included, but as a concrete question we should adopt the South Seas of the first sense for the time being. In regard to this point, I am wholly in agreement with Lt. Col. TAKAYAMA.

"SHIBA (Naval Ministry): I agree to that."
"T.K.Y.A. (War Ministry): Next, in regard to the outline of clause (2), I wonder if it isn’t necessary to discuss the point that is to become the basis of the outline, that is the fundamental point, before the outline is decided with Germany.

"NTO (Foreign Office): Since the fundamental point is that since both countries are on a common footing — that is, the establishment of a new order in Europe and Africa by Germany as her sphere of livelihood and the establishment of a new order in East Asia, including the South Seas, by Japan as her sphere of livelihood, does it mean that both countries should recognize and respect each other’s sphere and assist and cooperate in the establishment of the new order within the respective spheres?


"NTO (Foreign Office): I have no objection to the opinion of Lt. Colonel T.K.Y.A. in regard to settling the fundamental point with Germany.

"T.K.Y.A. (War Ministry): That is, in regard to discussing this matter with Germany, the outlines and details should be entered into only after the fundamental point has been discussed first.

"NTO (Foreign Office): I agree with you.

"(Navy agrees)

"T.K.Y.A. (War Ministry): Next, let us go into the contents of the outline. In clause 1, there is a phrase ‘not to interfere with the self-government and independence of the various races,’ but I believe it is not necessary to make Germany express this.

"NTO (Foreign Office): It is there for the purpose of showing that Germany has no intention of acquiring these territories.

"T.K.Y.A. (War Ministry): I don’t think it is necessary to make her say it distinctly. I wonder if it would not be sufficient if we make her recognize the fact that French Indo-China and Dutch Indies are within the sphere of livelihood of Japan and Japan’s political leadership in these areas. After all, it will be ‘recognize the fact that the South Seas area is within the sphere of livelihood of Japan.’"
"Takaya (War Ministry): Next, the question is about the meaning of political leadership. The strongest meaning of this is occupation, but we are not thinking of occupation at present. Anyway, it is necessary that the whole country conspire and unite on the point of political leadership and make Germany recognize as strong a political leadership as possible.

"ANTO (Foreign Office): I think here lies one of the most difficult points in regard to the question of intensification of this problem. As seen hazily by the cable from Ambassador Safo, isn't it the intention of Germany to grasp the political leadership for herself and give Japan only the economic interest in regard to French Indo-China and Netherlands East Indies. In other words, it appears as if Germany will not recognize Japan's right of political leadership.

"Takaya (War Ministry): I feel that way myself, and it is necessary to force Germany to recognize as strong a leadership as possible of French Indo-China and the Dutch Indies.

"ANTO (Foreign Office): I think this point will be the first thing argued when the talk on the question of intensification of this matter is taken up, but according to the cable from Consul-General Yajiaji, the other day, Germany reportedly is willing to offer Japan the eastern part of the Dutch Indies. In another sense, it means that Germany is taking Java, Sumatra, etc.

"Takaya (War Ministry): As to what attitude Germany will take towards Japan in future concerning the Dutch Indies and French Indo-China depends largely upon the attitude she will take towards Soviet Russia after the war. Since Germany has no intention to dispose of Russia immediately after the war, she might leave French Indo-China and the Dutch Indies to Japan easier than expected. But if she were to start with the construction of a new order in Europe, the question of French Indo-China and Dutch Indies will become considerably troublesome, and as for Japan, she should, for the time being, consider that Germany has the intention of politically taking over French Indo-China and the Dutch Indies and should be prepared for it. For that, a considerably firmer determination is necessary.

"ANTO (Foreign Office): I agree with you. We should object strongly to Germany's intention to assume political leadership in Dutch Indies, etc.
"ISHIZAWA (Foreign Ministry): I agree completely.

"TAKAYAMA (General Staff Office): I think the question of French Indo-China and Dutch East Indies depends entirely upon naval power and Germany, who has no naval power, will not be able to oppose Japan within the sphere of Japanese naval influence no matter how stoutly she may resist. Consequently, the question lies solely in Japan's determination.

"ANTO (Foreign Office): I think you are right, but Germany, in such an event, might try to utilize Russia and drive Japan from the north. This, too, is a point to be taken into consideration.

"TAKAYAMA (General Staff Office): I don't think that even Soviet Russia would be a tool of Germany and carelessly meddle into this with the hope of securing the northern section of Manchuria. Soviet Russia would probably seek for the Near East and India.

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): How about setting aside (B) 'to assume a means of checking to expedite the surrender of England' as a separate clause, together with foregoing clause 'to give appropriate support for the disposition of the China incident'? This is because it is a current problem or a matter to be concluded in a short period rather than one that will regulate the future relation between Japan and Germany.

"ANTO (Foreign Office): As this was considered as a compensation for Germany in return for recognition of the New Order in East Asia including the South Seas and for her support in the disposition of the incident, there is no reason for any objection against making it a separate clause.

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): It is stated that a restraining measure will be taken against England, but I wonder if there is any really effective restraining measure?

"SHIBA (Naval Ministry): It's very difficult as a concrete plan.

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): Then, is it not necessary to change the working of this clause?

"TAJIRI (Foreign Office): The newspapers can be utilized.
"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): The checking of England by Japan and Germany's support for the disposition of the incident can be regarded as balancing each other, and in regard to the recognition of the new regime to be considered in connection with the disposition of the incident, the balance can be obtained by the recognition of Poland and so forth, but in regard to obtaining her cooperation in the economic construction of China, I wonder if the check against England can't be regarded as its balance?

"ANTO (Foreign Office): As compensation for her cooperation in the economic construction, the supplying of wolfram and other things, which Germany wants, and her participation in the enterprise to some extent can be considered.

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): I think we should refrain from allowing her to participate in the enterprises in China as much as possible.

"TANEMURA (General Staff Office): In case of the worst, we should show our generosity of allowing her to participate in as much as half of the enterprises.

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): We do that, I want that to be restricted to the minimum.

"TANIZUI (Foreign Office): As for Germany's political support in connection with the disposition of the incident, it probably is her peace mediation for the time being. In regard to the economic problem, it is cooperation in economy and technique, and as compensation, we can give Germany's heavy industries markets in China and the South Seas.

"TAKAYAMA (War Ministry): There is a necessity to consider Italy together with Germany.

"TANIZUI (Foreign Ministry): As compensation, Germany has been conducting coastal trade since the outbreak of the incident, and I believe it better to recognize such things as this coastal trade and industrial technical assistance. I wonder if it isn't necessary for Japan to learn economic technique from Germany.

"ANTO (Foreign Office): It's necessary. America's heavy industry is rich in materials. In other words, it is a heavy industry of the rich, and Germany's is that of the poor. As for Japan, it is necessary for her to learn Germany's poor man's heavy industry.
"TANIMURA (General Staff Office): For Japan, it is extremely important for us to develop the heavy industry in Manchuria. Consequently, if we can't expect to take in anything from America, we must think of taking in those from Germany. If Germany's technique flows into Soviet Russia after the war, it will be a grave problem for Japan. We should consider introducing Germany's technique into Manchuria and China after the war.

"ANTO (Foreign Office): Returning our discussion to the beginning, does it mean, after all, that there is no concrete plan for checking England?

"TJIRI (Foreign Office): England can be checked to a certain extent by utilizing the newspapers.

"ANTO (Foreign Office): The instigation of an independent movement in India and Burma secretly according to the change of international situation can be regarded as an effective check against England.

"TANIMURA (General Staff Office): I think it would be an extremely effective check against England to take a strong attitude in regard to problems against England in connection with the China incident, for instance, taking a strong attitude in regard to problems pertaining to Hongkong, Shanghai and Tientsen.

"TJIRI (Foreign Office): Depending on the occasion, it may be a splendid idea to demand for the disarmament of Hongkong.

"ANTO (Foreign Office): After all, it means firstly to exclude the political rights and interest of England from China and secondly, to instigate the independence of Burma and India.

"YASUDA (War Ministry): These should be executed to the extent of not resorting to arms.

"ANTO (Foreign Office): As for the Navy, couldn't she make use of vessels of unknown nationality?

"SHIIBA (Naval Ministry): That could be done.

"SHIBA (Naval Ministry): Is there any measures to take a step further and strike England rather than to check her?

"TJIRI (Foreign Office): That can be done when Chiang Kai-shek surrenders, but, for the time being, we had better not do it.
"SEIB. (Naval Ministry): Doesn't it mean that we had better participate in the war upon the disposition of the incident?

"T.KAYU. (War Ministry): For the time being, it is best to proceed according to the present degree.

"SEIB. (Naval Ministry): If we discuss this question of checking England with Germany, Germany might start ask us to occupy Singapore.

"TAJIRI (Foreign Office): We can tell her that we will do that when the incident is settled.

"T.NEMURA (General Staff Office): It would be all right if we claim that the attack on Singapore is to be carried out on our own accord.

"T.KAYU. (War Ministry): After all, it would be better to negotiate with Germany with the attitude that Japan will have no responsibility in regard to the question of taking part in the war, but may engage in a war with England independently.

"T.KAYU. (War Ministry): As to the relations with Soviet Russia mentioned in clause 2, it is to keep peace for the time being and eventually to guide Soviet Russia in such a way as to conform to the common standpoint of Japan and Germany. Depending on the occasion, the turning of Soviet Russia's spearhead toward Burma and India can be considered.

"T.KAYU. (War Ministry): Regarding our relations with America, it is possible as a future problem that Japan and Germany may take a joint action in South America against America and that whether Japan should support Germany in her economical policy toward South America may become a problem. Hence, I wonder if it wouldn't be better for Japan to consider now the possibility of taking joint action with Germany against America after the establishment of the new order in East Asia a few years hence?

"ANTO (Foreign Office): In regard to the question of America, there is a necessity of giving it greater consideration. Germany, at present, is quite optimistic about America and concerning the post-war administration. 'Soudt' is thinking of getting American loans, while other Nazis are thinking of depending on the 'barter' system. After all, as to what attitude Germany will take against America, we cannot tell until after Germany has defeated England. At present, Germany's attitude is 'America should not interfere in European problems.' From the Japanese-German discussions, we can't tell anything more than what has been indicated in the plan at present.
Doc. No. 1392

"T.N.YU. (War Ministry): That's right, but as for Japan's mental attitude, it is necessary that she take into consideration those matters heretofore discussed. In this respect, it is proper to have in mind Japanese-German cooperation in the economic expansion into South America.

"T.JIRI (Foreign Ministry): I think Germany is looking down upon American economy as a enemy country in considering her future economic development into South America. As any rate, it is necessary at least to sound out what Germany is thinking of in regard to America and Soviet Russia for the future. For Germany, America's support of Soviet Russia is a great threat.

"T.N. (General Staff Office): From my opinion, a dispute between Germany and America may materialize before long. There is the possibility of a dispute being caused by America's defense against Germany's development into South America. As South America is a very good market for Japan also, I think we should plan to undertake development into South America in cooperation with Germany.

"NTO (Foreign Office): After all, these matters are contained in the policy restricting America to only within the American continent. Although it is necessary to hold, as our mental attitude, the points stated by Lt. Colonel T.N.YU., won't the original draft be enough for the time being as points to be written on paper?

"T.N.YU. (War Ministry): As to the question of our obligation to participate in the war stated in clause 4, Japan as already discussed shall not be bound, but we should keep in mind that we might have to wage war against England independently.

"T.N.YU. (War Ministry): In conclusion, I agree to the original draft in regard to cooperation with Italy.

"T.JIRI (Foreign Ministry): What about drawing up a simpler plan separately with Italy?

"NTO (Foreign Office): We had better to treat Italy in the same way as we did at the same time with Germany.

"T.N.YU. (War Ministry): As to Germany and Italy, we must recognize that there is a difference between their economic and political power heretofore possessed in China.
Doc. No. 1392

"T.K.Y.M. (War Ministry): Regarding the question of Soviet Russia, won't it be necessary to change our proposal to Italy?"

"INTO (Foreign Office): From the latest report of Mr. Chuichi Hashi, Italy is considering the use of Schumachers to advance into the Iran and Tashkent area. Should Soviet Russia advance into Iran, Italy hopes they would have a considerable interest in regard to the question of Soviet Russia. At any rate, Germany and Italy, though different in degree, are in a common position in regard to the question of Soviet Russia. Therefore we could make a similar proposal to both Germany and Italy.

"INTO (Foreign Office): Nextly, I like to hear the opinion of Navy side.

"SHIBA (Naval Ministry): We agree to what Lt. Colonel T.K.Y.M. has already stated. In strengthening the cooperation between Japan and Germany, we should make the recognition of the respective spheres of new order and the cooperation between Japan and Germany the framework of the plan and never to show that Japan wants things. Besides, in strengthening our coalition, I wonder if it isn't necessary to push the discussion further in regard to the American and Soviet Russian problem. There is no real difference between Japan and America. Present oppositions between Japan and America are mostly economical and for the most part emotional. Besides, in regard to the Soviet relationship, it is necessary that Japan and Germany guide it profitably. Only it is a question as to whether these points should be exposed in the text of the treaty.

"T.K.Y.M. (War Ministry): The problem of America and Soviet Russia should not be exposed, but should be dealt with in a secret clause.

"T.K.Y.M. (War Ministry): What kind of steps are you going to take to realize this original draft (plan)?

"INTO (Foreign Office): Perhaps this will be discussed between Japan and Germany and the main points exchanged through official documents.

"INTO (Foreign Ministry): Now the opinion among us officials concerned has been unified. It is essential that no time be lost in its execution.
Doc. No. 1392

"(All agreed.)"

"T.K.Y.C. (War Ministry): I think I could settle with Army along the line discussed heretofore.

"SHIB. (Naval Ministry): It's same with Navy.

"T.KAY.M. (War Ministry): If the discussion is to be held in Germany, it may be necessary for someone to go and explain our intention, as it is impossible to express it thoroughly by telegram.

"(All agreed.)"
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, K. Hayashi, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official, I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 15 pages, dated July 16, 1940, and described as follows: (Part II) Minutes of Joint conference of army, Navy, and Foreign Office authorities of intensification of coalition among Japan, Germany and Italy, Dated July 16, 1940. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 22nd day of August, 1946. /s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo ________________
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Lersh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 24 day of Aug., 1946 /s/ Richard H. Lersh
Witness: /s/ Edward P. Monaghan
Official Capacity
The International Situation and Japan's Position.

(Address of Foreign Minister, Mr. Hachiro AKITA, delivered over the air on June 29, 1940)

Japan's ideal since the foundation of the Empire has been that all nations should be enabled to find their proper places in the world. Our foreign policy has also been based upon this ideal, for which we have not hesitated at times even to fight by staking our national existence.

What the entire mankind longs for is the firm establishment of world peace. But it goes without saying that peace can never endure unless it is a peace in which all nations enjoy their proper places. Unfortunately, however, the establishment of world peace in this sense is difficult of speedy realization at the present stage of human progress. In order to realize such a great ideal, therefore it seems to be a most natural step that peoples who are closely related with each other geographically, racially, culturally and economically should first form a sphere of their own for co-existence and co-prosperity and establish peace and order within that sphere, and at the same time secure a relationship of common existence and prosperity with other spheres. The cause of strifes mankind has hitherto experienced lies generally in the failure to give due consideration to the necessity of some such natural and constructive world order and to remedy the irrationalities and injustices of old. The war in Europe brings home the truth of this with special emphasis. Therefore, in order to establish international peace on a permanent foundation every effort must be exerted for the rectification of the blemishes that have been committed in this regard.

It is in this spirit that Japan is now engaged in the task of establishing a new order in East Asia. It is extremely regrettable, therefore, that there should be those who not only fail to understand Japan's great undertaking based upon this fundamental principle, but on the contrary, obstruct the establishment of peace in East Asia by supporting the regime of Chiang Kai-shek. We have urged them to reconsider such an attitude in the past, and now we intend further to urge their serious reflection. We are determined to leave no stone unturned in order to eradicate all activities for assisting Chiang Kai-shek.

Sometimes there are those who would disapprove a change of the status quo by force of arms regardless of the reasons therefor. It is for the purpose of bringing about a just and permanent peace that Japan has been fighting in China for the past three years. Her employment of armed force is an act looking beyond the immediate present. The sword she has drawn is nothing other than a 'life-giving sword' that destroys evil and makes justice manifest.

The countries of East Asia and the regions of the South Seas are geographically, historically, racially and economically very closely related to each other. They are destined to cooperate and minister to one another's needs for their common well-being and prosperity, and to promote the peace and progress in their regions. The uniting of all these regions under a single sphere on the basis of common existence and the insuring thereby the stability of that sphere is, I think, a natural conclusion.
The idea to establish first a righteous peace in each of the various regions and then establish collectively a just peace for the whole world has long existed also in Europe and America. This idea presupposes the existence of a stabilizing force in each region, with which as a center the peoples within that region are to secure their co-existence and co-prosperity as well as the stability of their sphere. It also presupposes that these groups will respect one another’s individual characteristics, political, cultural and economic, and they will cooperate and fulfill one another’s needs for their common good.

When the present European war broke out, the Japanese Government at once declared their policy of non-involvement and made it clear that this country did not intend to intervene in Europe and at the same time did not want to see the war spread into East Asia. Consequently Japan expects that the Western Powers will do nothing that will exert any undesirable influence upon the stability of East Asia.

Japan, while she is carrying on vigorously her task of constructing a new order in East Asia, is paying a serious attention to developments in the European war and to its repercussions in the various quarters of East Asia, including the South Seas region. I desire to declare that the destiny of these regions—any development therein, and any disposal thereof—is a matter for grave concern to Japan in view of her mission and responsibility as the stabilizing force in East Asia.
CERTIFICATE

W.D.C. No. 
I.P.S. No. 1008

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI KORU hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 6 pages in Japanese, 5 pages in English, dated 19, and described as follows: Address of Foreign Minister ARITA, delivered over the air on June 29, 1940. The International Situation and Japan's Position.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

_________________________Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this 22nd day of August, 1946. /s/ Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Nagahara Odo
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 24 day of Aug, 1946 /s/ Richard H. Larsh

Witness: /s/ Edward P. Monaghan
Official Capacity
Telegram (Secret Cypher Process)

Tokyo, 1 July 1940 1.30
Arrived: 1 July 1940 19.20 hours

No. 642 of 1.7

Ref. D.N.3. Tokyo 482 ff re: Foreign Minister ARITA's radio speech on Japan's attitude in the international situation.

The originally intended attempt of the Foreign Minister to gain contact with internal political development by announcing a more active foreign policy, a shift of aims /Zielsetzungen/ and thereby, to strengthen the cabinet's position; this is being wrecked by protests from the opposition led by the army, which forced the original text to be substantially mutilated. This explains the lack of concrete ideas, a fact which a section of the press too, has pointed out.

The growing influence of the army also results from the stronger military attitude toward Hong Kong and Indo-China. Internal political developments show characteristic signs of initial oppression /Befrueckung/ and indicate an early change of cabinet.

OTF
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

\[s/\] W. P. Cumming
\[W. P. CUMMING\]

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

\[s/\] G. H. Garde
\[G. H. GARDE\]
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Doc. No. 4028B

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo - 3 July 1940  1310 hours
Arrived " " 2305 hours

No. 648 of 3 July

In answer to telegram of 2-7-40 (No. 542), according to a leading article in the 'ASAHI' clearly inspired by the Press Chief of the Foreign Ministry, the Foreign Minister intended to stress in his radio speech that the present government has never deviated from the Axis policy, and has always had full sympathy for the German demand for a New Order in Europe, no much the more since Japan herself is striving for a New Order in Asia. The government is determined to consolidate Axis friendship. The army protested against this attitude on the grounds that in reality the above policy of sympathy for the Axis is not compatible with the policies hitherto pursued by the cabinet and because the army wanted to avoid the YONAI-ARITA cabinet using a sudden stress on friendship with the Axis as a chess move to take the wind out of the sails of the opposition, which is close to us and to save its own existence.

The action of the Press Chief of the Foreign Ministry, who disclosed the original text of ARITA's speech to 'ASAHI' and announced the army's protest publicly in a press conference, caused great indignation in army circles.

As I have learned confidentially, the Press Chief was arrested and grilled by the military police on account of this indiscretion.

OTT
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

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5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Telephone calls at 7:30 AM, from both the Director of the Police Bureau and the Chief of the Metropolitan Police. The gist of the story is as follows:

Since secret information was obtained relative to the carrying out from 7:00 AM this morning of a direct action, which had for sometime been planned by the MAZDA faction, arrests were begun from 5:30 AM at several rendezvous places in the city. Their proposed objectives were Premier YONAI, Mr. MACHIIDA, Count MAKINO, Baron HABADA, Baron ICHIKI, Mr. IKEIDA, Admiral OKADA, Mr. YUASA and Household Minister MATSUDAIRA. Besides nine pistols, two hand grenades, thirty swords and thirty beer bottles of benzine, many copies of a prospectus, stating why they were aroused to act, were confiscated.

Went to the office at 10. Former Lord Privy Seal, YUASA proceeded to the Imperial Palace and being received in audience by the Emperor and Empress, expressed his thanks to their Majesties. He was not quite well yet.

Was received in audience at 11:40. I reported on the MAEDA affair and answered various questions put by the Throne. I also stated to His Majesty that their actions were to blame but as to their motives, the administrators must reflect seriously upon them. Withdrew from the Palace at 12:15.

At 1:30 visited the residence of Prince KAYA, who received me in audience.

YUKIKO, accompanied by KOZUO and MORIKO, came up to Tokyo by the train which arrived at Tokyo station at 5:20. It is decided that they are to take rest at AKASAKA for the time being. TSURUKO and ENIKO also returned to Tokyo together with them.

Went to the Palace at 6 P.M. and participated in the court dinner given in honor of the former and the new presidents of the Privy Council, KARA and KONOE.
After that, exchanged frank opinions with Prince KONOYE in my room regarding the prospect of the campaign to strengthen the new political structure and the measures to be taken in case of a cabinet change. We talked from 7:40 to 8:20, and parted.

7 July (Sunday) Fine

At 9 A.M. MATSUI called on me. Had a talk with him.

At 10:15, visited the Crown Prince's temporary residence and was received in audience by the Crown Prince.

At 11, went to ASAKA with Marquis INCUE and we played golf with Marquis HOSOKARA.

In the evening, Nobuo visited me. He started for OSAKA tonight.

At 7:30 ABE, Chief of the Metropolitan Police Board, visited me, and I heard from him about the situation after the arrest of MAEDA.

At 8:30 PM, Kozo OTA visited me and brought a message from Baron HIRANUMA to the effect that he thought that at this time when rumors of a political change are rife there is no other person so suitable for appointment as Prince KONOYE.

8 July (Monday) Fine

Went to the office at 9 A.M. to accompany the Emperor to HAYAMA.

Vice-War Minister AKAMI called and expressed himself as follows:

"Now when a political change may be unavoidable within the next four or five days, and the military have been perfecting preparations to meet the abrupt changes in the latest world situation, the character of the TONAI cabinet is not at all suitable for making negotiations with Germany and Italy and it might even cause a fatal delay. The conclusion is that a cabinet change is inevitable in order to face this grave situation. The army unanimously will support Prince KONOYE's candidacy. Upon meeting Prince KONOYE after his return to Tokyo, the War Minister will take the opportunity to submit an important proposal to Premier TONAI."

Upon my mentioning that the selection of a Foreign Minister would be most difficult, he replied that the Army would leave such a question entirely to Prince KONOYE.

At 10 A.M., the Emperor left the palace and I accompanied him to HAYAMA. In the car on the way, the Chief Aide-de-Camp told me as follows:
"In the Army General Staff Office in recent days, the officers forming the central core have presented their opinions to the leading staff members from the viewpoints of both political and military policies, as they anticipate that the personnel of the present government will never be able to sufficiently cope with the latest world situation. As a result, it is understood that the Chief of the Army General Staff, Prince KUNI, told the War Minister about the matter, and the War Minister has been much concerned about what measures to take. Such being the case, the expression of resolute determination by the War Minister may well depend upon the behavior of the Cabinet itself. And so on . . . ."

Received in audience by the Emperor from 1:40 to 2:30. Answered the Imperial questions about Prince KUNI's new political structure campaign and other matters.

Left the Imperial villa at 3 P.M., and entered my villa at ZUSHI.

16 July

Went to the office at 11 A.M. Telephone call from Chief Secretary MATSUEDAIRA.

Chief Cabinet Secretary ISHIWATA telephoned this morning as follows:

"War Minister HATA met Premier YOSHI after 9:00 A.M. this morning and submitted his resignation. When told by the Premier to produce a successor, he replied that an answer may be expected by evening and left. As the Army cannot be expected to produce a successor, the Premier, after calling an extraordinary Cabinet meeting today, will probably have to go to the HAYAMA Imperial villa to submit a mass resignation."

Thereupon, I immediately requested the Grand Chamberlain, Chief Aide-de-Camp and HIROHATA the Lord Steward to Her Majesty the Empress to assemble in my room. I told them of the foregoing matter and we consulted about the Emperor's return trip and other matters. We made a provisional plan but decided to wait for the arrival of the Imperial Household Minister from Tokyo before making the final decision.

Upon the Emperor's return from the sea, was received in audience at 12:10 and reported to the Throne about the above matters.

Was again received in audience at 1:45, fully explained the procedure of selecting the leader of the incoming cabinet, which had previously been studied and decided upon and got his approval. The summary is as follows:
1. The Emperor requested the Lord Privy Seal to ask the President of the Privy Council and the former premiers about the selection of the head of the incoming cabinet and to report their answer after consultation with the Elder Statesman.

The Emperor will at the same time order the Grand Chamberlain to make arrangements to assemble the said personages in the Palace.

2. The Lord Privy Seal will arrange the council of these personages in the Palace and he himself will participate in it.

3. Further, the Lord Privy Seal himself will call on the Elder Statesman or will have the Chief Secretary do so to consult about the matter and report the result to the Throne.

The following information has been received from the Chief Aide-de-Camp: He received a phone call from Vice-Minister ANAMI of the War Ministry, according to whom the state of affairs leading to the Minister's resignation, is as follows: Several days ago a memorandum containing the army's opinion on the present situation was submitted to the Premier, who summoned the War Minister this morning, and telling him that the army's idea was different from that of the present cabinet, asked him bluntly to resign in case of inconvenience. Thereupon the War Minister at once submitted his resignation. As the Premier further asked him to recommend his successor, the Three Chief Officers' Meeting was held from 2:30 P.M. but because of the foregoing situation it was extremely difficult to make any recommendation.

At 2:30 Imperial Household Minister MATSUDAIRA arrived from Tokyo. Conferred with him. The ceremony of the Italian Ambassador's presentation of credentials to the Throne has been postponed and it has been decided that the Emperor will return to Tokyo tomorrow accompanied by the Empress.

Premier TOYAI came to Hayama from Tokyo at 6:40 P.M. and explained the details of the resignation en bloc. It was about as I have set it down. As a result of the conference of the three Chiefs it was said that although the selection of a successor was not being refused, it was difficult to choose one and no forecast was possible.

Premier YOHAI in announcing to the Cabinet his decision in favor of a resignation en bloc did not as was usual in the past call each minister separately to his room and talk to him. Instead he assembled all the members in the cabinet meeting room and stating first that this was not a cabinet meeting, expressed his decision. At this, War Minister HATA scowled, but straightway stood up and made a speech. That is the story.
At this time I communicated to the Premier His Majesty's opinion which I had previously learned and the Premier was deeply moved.

After supper the Premier was received in audience by the Emperor and tendered the resignation.

I was received in audience at 7:40 P.M. and was requested to choose a successor. To this I replied that in response to the order I would request a council of the Senior Statesmen tomorrow in the Palace to discuss the matter.

In the course of my audience with the Emperor, the Emperor told me the circumstances surrounding his summoning of War Minister HATA at the time when the Imperial order for cabinet formation was given to Admiral YOSHI.

The Emperor said that he had not shown him any special favor, although there was a great misunderstanding about the matter. He had been told that KONOYE also was of the opinion that it would be well to question HATA and that IMASA, too, thought that questioning would be all right. He had called HATA and had asked him whether the Army was willing to cooperate with YOSHI, to whom he, the Emperor, had given the Imperial order. HATA had replied that the Army would cooperate, the Emperor had said that that was fine and had not given any orders.

After having received the Emperor's permission, I decided to come back to Tokyo tonight. I left at 8:30 P.M. and stopped at my villa in ZUSHI. After having a short talk there with Mr. KOZEMATSU, who had called on me just then, I left for Tokyo by car at 8:45 P.M. Five newspaper cars followed me. I reached home at 10:15 P.M. 
17 July, Wednesday

Mrs. Keiko SOMA called. After a short talk with her I went to the office at 10. Before 1 o'clock, in response to the invitation telegram from Grand Chamberlain KO'O OTAKE, President PARA of the Privy Council and six former Premiers, WAKATSUKI, OKADA, PIROTA, PAYASHI, KONOYE and PIARUNA, assembled in the "East Ante-Chamber of the Palace, and from 1 o'clock a meeting was held in the "East No. 2 Room to select the head of the incoming cabinet following the presentation of resignation by Premier YONAI.

The meeting was opened with a speech by Assistant Grand Chamberlain KYUSHI, who acting in place of the Grand Chamberlain conveyed His Majesty's opinions and thoughts.

Then I stated to them that I had been told by the Emperor to consult the Elder Statesmen about the matter to report the result to the throne; that the meeting had been called today to enable a frank exchange of views on the subject; that the meeting, because of the nature of the matter to be discussed, could not be called a conference, and consequently the decision would not be put to such a formality as voting; and that their informal talk and free and frank exchange of views were requested so as not to leave anything undone regarding the selection of the succeeding premier.

KARA—All I know about the reason for the resignation of the YONAI Cabinet is from the newspapers. If you know the truth I would like to hear about it.

Lord Privy Seal—I don't know the details but the gist of what I learned of the situation from Premier YONAI yesterday at HAYAMA is as follows: The Army thinks that the present cabinet is not adequate to carry out a policy which will suit the present ever-changing world situation and which will not be regretted later. It seems to show also a tendency to favor a political reapproachment with Germany and Italy. It also feels that even in domestic affairs the government, being separated from the people, will be unable to obtain satisfactory results in a number of policies, and that unless the political structure is strengthened, the government will be unable to cope with the present emergency. In a word since the War Minister's opinion is different from that of the present cabinet, he cannot fulfill his duty as the leader of the Army. Hence he has come to the point of resigning.
WAKATSUKI: I feel that there is no one fit for the Premier's post at this time except Prince KONOYE. I hope Prince KONOYE will take the field.

FIRA: It would be fine if Prince KONOYE took the field.

FIRANUMA, FAYASY, OKADA: We quite agree with Baron WAKATSUKI's opinion.

Prince KONOYE: In view of the circumstances leading to the general resignation of the YONAI cabinet, the one to take charge of the present situation should be well versed in military affairs with a full understanding of them. As I do not have such ability, and have made no preparations for it, I would like to see someone more fit for the post selected.

Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal: I have heard that the views of the military leaders are overwhelmingly in favor of Prince KONOYE's taking the field. Besides, there are points in the present actions of the army which may be understood as having been based on the assumption that Prince KONOYE would rise. I do not think that there is any other person fit for the post. I earnestly hope that Prince KONOYE will come forward.

FIRANUMA: It is a bad example that the cabinet should fall on account of the War Minister's resignation, and it is regrettable that we have often had such examples. It should be that a successor would be found and the cabinet be able to continue. However, because in practice the custom has come about of having the three chiefs make the recommendation, such situations as today's arise. It is reasonable that Prince KONOYE is concerned over this point, and I feel sorry for him trying to take the field at this time. However, since we cannot find anyone else fit for the post, there is nothing for it but to earnestly ask Prince KONOYE to come forward. Moreover, since we are in this difficult position it is needless to say that every quarter not to speak of ourselves should endeavor to make it easy for the Prince to manage his task.

FIROTA: It seems the China Incident cannot be easily settled if the cabinet is as weak as it has been, and there is no other way but to continue the present state of affairs. Judged from this viewpoint, it would also be a good thing to have a suitable military man capable of working closely with the Army and Navy. However, there is no such man. Besides, since the military themselves wish it there is no problem about asking Prince KONOYE to take the field.
Lately we have had all kinds of rumours. The Lord Privy Seal must have made quite an investigation of them.

Lord Privy Seal: As I have said before, according to the information we have received, various rumors are prevailing, but generally speaking, there is a strong hope that Prince KONOYE will take the field. Also at this time when the end of the China Incident is gradually approaching, I feel that a large section of the public is of the opinion that there is no suitable person other than Prince KONOYE to form a strong cabinet.

Lord Privy Seal: I can easily see that you generally agree upon Prince KONOYE. After consulting the Elder Statesmen, KIDO will report the reply to the throne.

Things took place as I have noted and the meeting was closed at 1:30 p.m. I sent Chief Secretary HATSUDAIA to OKITSU by the 3:00 p.m. train to see Prince SAIONJI. Their Majesties returned from FAYAMA at 5:10 p.m. At 6:36 Chief Secretary HATSUDAIA telephoned me from Prince SAIONJI's villa at OKITSU that as the old prince was not only sick at that time but also knew little of the political situation, he could not take the responsibility of replying to the throne. So I answered that I understood. I was received in audience by His Majesty at 7:00 p.m. I informed Him of the result of the meeting and of Prince SAIONJI's reply. Although Prince SAIONJI's reply to the throne was inevitable because of advanced age, His Majesty in order to show his respect wishes to ask the Elder Statesmen Peresafter also. However, as I felt sorry to see the GENRO pressed for a reply, I asked the Emperor to call Prince KONOYE leaving that matter as it was. His Majesty gladly accepted my request. Accordingly the Emperor had the Grand Chamberlain summon Prince KONOYE by telephone. Again I was received in audience by His Majesty. I reported the details of this afternoon's meeting. At that time the Emperor spoke as follows:

"When War Minister HATL came to FAYAMA today to report to the throne on personnel, he told me that the opinion of the army is. Generally it was the same as that which KIDO had heard from FOMI yesterday. I told Him that this business was very regrettable, but I felt it was one consolation that we could see where the responsibility lay, although there had been up till now many uncertain attitudes. HATL who was once Chief Iide-dc-Camp and who knows how busy I am at such times, was extremely sorry and had tears in his eyes."
I retired from the Imperial presence at 7:40 p.m. On that occasion the Emperor asked me whether he might give KONOYE some advice, it being of a simple matter, which KIDO also had once mentioned. That is, that KONOYE should be prudent especially in the choice of Foreign and Finance Ministers at this time when the situation at home and abroad is grave.

Of course I replied that it would be a good idea to do so.

Prince KONOYE came to the Imperial Palace at eight. After having talked with me for a short time, he went into the Imperial presence and received the Imperial command. I was told that on that occasion the Emperor gave him the foregoing advice. He, after having retired from the Imperial presence, again talked with me. He told me that he would go to the Peers' Club after that on that day and would invite the War and Navy Ministers. He intends to ask the War Minister to select a person who can cooperate with the Navy and the Navy Minister, to choose a person who can cooperate with the Army. He will wait till the selection is made and on the next day or the day following he will have the Foreign Minister join them for a full discussion of national defense, diplomacy, cooperation between Army and Navy and the relation between the Supreme Command and the Government. And only after they come to an agreement in their views will he begin selecting the other Cabinet Ministers. He said that he wished to have KOKUTSU as his secretary and asked me to use my influence for that purpose. He left at 8:40.

I was summoned by His Majesty and received in audience at 8:45. I reported on Prince KONOYE's policy in regard to the formation of the cabinet. The Emperor seemed to be satisfied with it. I retired from the Imperial presence at 9:10. I reached home at 9:30. I received a treatment from Doctor YATANABE.
Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo 17 July 1940 24.00 hrs.
Arrival " " 21.05 hrs.

For General Staff, Army Attache Division
No. 697 of 17.7

1) In accordance with the Cabinet change, forced by the Army, a speedy Japanese transition to a more active anti-English policy is to be expected. I have, strictly, confidential information from Japanese General Staff that siege batteries have been already mobilized for attack on Hongkong in the case that it might be necessary.

2) To 240-46gk there: Senior Attache Admiral Wennecker. Execution is fraught with difficulties as question of military questions such as military policy and war economy in Japan, were herefore predominantly the business of the army.

3) Japanese Army asked through a mediator, if it can count in the future on delivery of captured arms, possibly in settlement for Japanese delivery of raw materials. Reference to Foreign Office W2568 of May 15th according to which discussion by Wehrmacht Attache's on delivery of implements of war is forbidden.

4) For O.K.W.WiRu: Re: inquiry 9563/40g of June 6.

"Japanese army ready to deliver; request information re amount. As Nitro-Glycerine and T.N.T. are dangerous to transport as finished products, request information re raw material needs."

5) Can a visa for Inf/Captain TANAKA for a two-year stay as a student in Germany be obtained? Supplement to Tel. N. 645, July 2nd."

JAKI
OTT

Note: Passed on through teletype office to O.K.W. Secret teleprinter. Tel. Control. 16.7.1940.
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
"Entry from Marquis KIDO’s Diary, 14 July 1940"

14 July Sunday Cloudy

Went to the Imperial Villa at 3 PM in response to the Emperor's request and was received in audience at 3:15. Was asked by the Emperor whether an order (which had been secretly reported by the Prince, the Chief of the General Staff, for heavy artillery mobilization for the purposes of the South China campaign) had been fully cleared with the Government. I replied that I would ask the Chief Aide-de-Camp to inquire of the War Minister regarding the liaison on this matter, and if the liaison had not been sufficient, I myself would ask the Premier.

Left the Emperor then and at once got in touch with the Chief Aide-de-Camp on that matter.

Learned from the Aide-de-Camp that he had heard as follows from the War Minister: At the Four Ministers’ Conference on the 12th (which the Finance Minister was specially invited to attend) the results of a careful study were that since in any case any preparations at all would require a month and a half, they had agreed to push preparations. It was decided at a cabinet meeting that a further cabinet decision would be required if actual operations were undertaken. After inquiring by phone as to Foreign Minister ARITA’s opinion and receiving the same sort of answer as that from the War Minister, I reported in person to the Emperor to the above effect at four o’clock, and the Emperor was pleased to hear my reply.

At that time the Emperor said one thing and another about the changes in the government. He said that he still today had faith in the Yonai Cabinet, and that though a change of Cabinet was inevitable in view of domestic and foreign conditions, he wished to have his feelings conveyed to YONAI. I said that I would arrange to have the Emperor’s feelings conveyed to YONAI at the proper time.

Left the Imperial Villa at 4:20, and came home with Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA, who had come down from Tokyo. Mr. HARADA of 0:SO called on me, and we three talked quietly for a while. Received a call from and was interviewed by Mr. WATANABE, a reporter from the KOKUKIN. After 6 Emiko arrived here. After 7 Tsuruko and the others left for Tokyo.
Telegram
(Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 13 July 1940 7.20 S
Arrived: 10 * * 14.40 o’clock
No.699 of 18.7 very urgent.

Appendix to telegram of 17th No. 696

MATSUOKA just told me through Admiral GODO confidentially that he accepted position of Foreign Minister and asks for friendly cooperation.

OTT

/136353/
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. F. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

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s/ W. F. Cumming
W. F. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Doc. No. 4028 E

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo: 20 July 1940  5.00 hrs.
Arrival: 20 "  "  14.35 " .

No. 708 of 20.7 - Appendix to Telegram No. 699 of July 18th.

Prince KONOYE is building his government in sections. Up till now, in addition to the appointment of KATSUOKA as Foreign Minister, it is certain that Lieutenant General TOJO has been called as War Minister and Admiral YOSHIYA retained as Navy Minister. Yesterday there was long discussion between them and KONOYE re the fundamentals of future foreign and domestic policies, where, according to a press announcement, KONOYE obtained agreement. Details not yet known. MATSUOKA's appointment was generally approved by the press, as a new orientation of Japanese foreign policy is expected from him with certainty. OSHIMA and SHIKATORI... (1 group garbled) expressed themselves in a similar vein at press interviews.

GT

/136359/
AFFIDAVIT

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                             s/ W. P. Cumming
                             W. F. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

                             s/ G. H. Garde
                             G. H. GARDE
                             Lt. Colonel, AGD
                             Acting Adjutant General

                             OFFICE OF MILITARY
                             GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Berlin, 22 July 1940

"The Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy told me today that during the as yet unfinished creation of the New Japanese cabinet, there was an unusual procedure, viz., that before the completion of the cabinet, 4 of its members—Prime Minister KONOYE, Foreign Minister KATSUOKA, War Minister TOJO together with, member of the previous cabinet, Navy Minister YOSHIDA, came together and drew up an authoritative foreign policy program for the future cabinet. These 4 men have the decisive positions in the cabinet. Among other things, their foreign policy program contained a rapprochement with the Axis powers.

WOZUMANN"
AFFIDAVIT

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s/ W. F. Cumming

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 2 August 1940 19.55 hours
Arrival " " " 18.55 hours

No. 770 of 2.8

1. A member of the Manchurian State Council and former Manchurian Vice Foreign Minister, OHASHI, has been appointed Vice Foreign Minister. He is known in Berlin because of his visit in 1937. OHASHI stepped forward repeatedly as a convinced adherent to the "right" course of Japanese Foreign Policy. His appointment signifies the further strengthening of the influence of the Manchurian group in the new government.

2. Ambassador SHIRATORI informed confidentially that he had declined the post of Vice Foreign Minister. It is to be considered that he will now be appointed permanent advisor to the Foreign Minister. He believes he can exercise a far-reaching influence in this capacity.

OTT
AFFIDAVIT

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s/ W. I. Cumming

W. I. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE

Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 18 July 1940

18 July 1940

Mr. HIRAGA came to see me at 9:00 A.M. and talked with me.

I asked Mr. KOREMATSU to come and see me at 9:30 A.M., and I conveyed to him that I was asked by Prince KONOYE to use my influence in urging him to become the Prince's private secretary. As I could not obtain his consent, I promptly telephoned to Prince KONOYE and told him so.

I began work at 10:30.

I was received in audience by His Majesty at 10:40 A.M. and he talked of various things. I finally retired from the Imperial presence at noon.

War Minister HATA came to pay his respects a little after 2:00.

I was again received in audience this afternoon from 2:25 to 2:50. The Emperor stated that the War Minister had just secretly recommended TOJO for War Minister and TOYODA YAMAUCHI for Inspector-General of the Air Force but that he thought the procedure was wrong, for Prince Kono was still in the midst of forming a cabinet and had not yet accepted TOJO for the post, and, as he thought that the action was rather over hasty, he had asked the War Minister whether he did not think the action as being out of order.

Being impressed with the reasonableness of the Emperor's opinion after I had left the palace and on the occasion of my talk with the Chief Aide-de-Camp, after expressing my idea, I told him that I hoped for liaison by the War Minister in order that the present instance might not set a precedent.

Furthermore, the Emperor spoke of the CHUNG-KING policy as follows: that the above policy was very hopeful and that information had been received that if CHIANG himself could not come out, he would at least send HOYING-Chin or KUNISLANG-hai.
图4

图中描述了四种不同类型的图像分析方法，分别是：

1. 图像分类
2. 图像识别
3. 图像检索
4. 图像生成

每种方法的具体实现细节如下：

- 图像分类：通过特征提取和分类算法，将图像分为不同的类别。
- 图像识别：利用模式识别技术，识别图像中的特定物体或图案。
- 图像检索：基于内容的图像检索，通过相似度匹配找到与查询图像最相似的图像。
- 图像生成：通过深度学习模型，生成新的图像。

图5

图中展示了三种不同的图像处理过程，分别是：

1. 图像增强
2. 图像去噪
3. 图像压缩

每种过程的具体步骤如下：

- 图像增强：通过调整图像的亮度、对比度等参数，使图像更清晰。
- 图像去噪：使用滤波器去除图像中的噪声，提高图像质量。
- 图像压缩：通过减少图像的存储空间，便于传输和存储。

图6

图中列出了三种不同的图像应用领域，分别是：

1. 医学图像处理
2. 人脸识别
3. 无人驾驶

每种应用的具体场景如下：

- 医学图像处理：用于诊断疾病，如CT扫描、MRI等。
- 人脸识别：用于身份验证，如安全门禁系统、刷脸支付等。
- 无人驾驶：通过视觉传感器获取道路和周围环境信息，实现自动驾驶。

图7

图中展示了两种不同的图像处理技术，分别是：

1. 深度学习
2. 传统算法

每种技术的具体优势如下：

- 深度学习：通过多层神经网络，自动学习图像特征，适用于复杂场景。
- 传统算法：基于数学模型，适用于简单场景，算法稳定，易于实现。

图8

图中比较了两种不同的图像处理方法，分别是：

1. 端到端方法
2. 分层方法

每种方法的具体比较如下：

- 端到端方法：直接将输入映射到输出，处理速度快，但模型复杂。
- 分层方法：通过多层网络，逐步提取图像特征，模型简单，但处理速度较慢。

图9

图中列出了两种不同的图像处理工具，分别是：

1. 图像处理软件
2. 图像处理API

每种工具的具体特点如下：

- 图像处理软件：适用于个人使用，功能丰富，操作简便。
- 图像处理API：适用于集成到其他系统，功能灵活，可定制性强。

图10

图中展示了两种不同的图像处理流程，分别是：

1. 离线处理
2. 实时处理

每种流程的具体应用场景如下：

- 离线处理：适用于处理大量图像，如数据集训练。
- 实时处理：适用于处理实时图像，如监控系统。

图11

图中列出了两种不同的图像处理技术，分别是：

1. 神经网络
2. 支持向量机

每种技术的具体应用场景如下：

- 神经网络：适用于复杂图像处理任务，如图像分类。
- 支持向量机：适用于分类和回归任务，如图像分类和物体检测。

图12

图中展示了两种不同的图像处理方法，分别是：

1. 传统的图像处理方法
2. 新的图像处理方法

每种方法的具体比较如下：

- 传统的图像处理方法：基于规则和算法，处理速度快，但精度受限。
- 新的图像处理方法：基于深度学习，处理精度高，但计算资源需求大。
Outline of Japan's Basic National Policy

Cabinet Decision of July 26, 1940
Outline of the Basic National Policy

The world is now on the threshold of a stupendous historic change. New political, economic and cultural orders are in the process of creation on the basis of the growth and development of several groups of nations. Japan is also faced by a great ordeal unparalleled in history. At this juncture, if we are to carry out a national policy truly in consonance with the lofty ideal on which our nation is founded, it is of the most urgent necessity to effect a fundamental renovation of the government administration along all lines, and to march forward toward the completion of a national defense structure, by surmounting all difficulties. The general principles of the basic national policy have been therefore formulated as follows:

1. Basic Policy

The fundamental aim of Japan's national policy lies in the establishment of world peace in accordance with the lofty ideal of Hakko Ichiu on which the Empire is founded. First of all, it is directed toward the construction of a new order of Greater East Asia built upon a firm solidarity of Japan, Manchoukuo and China with this Empire as the center. We will therefore speedily secure for herself an unshakable national structure such as conforms to the new world situation and march forward toward the realization of the national policy by mobilizing the total strength of the nation.

2. National Defense and Foreign Policy

In the light of the new external and internal circumstances of the Empire, we will so amplify armaments as to ensure the execution of national policy on the basis of a state structure for national defense through manifestation of the nation's total strength.

The fundamental aim of Japan's foreign policy at present lies in the construction of a new order of Greater East Asia. Attention will be focussed upon a successful settlement of the China affair, while, by taking a long-range view of the great world change, constructive and elastic measures will be adopted in order to advance the national fortunes of the Empire.


The urgent task concerning the country's internal administration is to renovate all branches of the government in accordance with the fundamental principle of the national polity, and to lay down a firm foundation for a national defense state structure. For this purpose, we will aim at the realization of the following items:

1. In parallel with the renovation of the educational system in full accord with the fundamental principle of the national polity, we will establish national morality which attaches the first importance to the idea of service to the state by rejecting all thoughts of selfishness and material gains. And we will aim at the encouragement of scientific spirit.
ii. We will strive for a coordinated unity of government by setting up a new national political structure.

(a) Organizing the nation anew on the basis of cooperation between government and people, and of service to the state, every man according to his occupation.

(b) Reform of the Diet system so as to conform to the new national political structure.

(c) Creation of a new government service system through fundamental renovation of the administrative methods with a view to effecting unity and expedition.

iii. Establishment of the foundation for a national defense economy on the basis of autonomous construction of the economies of Japan, Manchoukuo, and China, with this Empire as the center.

(a) Establishment of Japan's economic self-sufficiency policy, making Japan, Manchoukuo, and China as a single unit, and embracing the whole of Greater East Asia.

(b) Execution of a planned economy through cooperation of government and people; especially perfection of a unified control system over production, distribution and consumption of vital commodities.

(c) Establishment of a financial plan aimed at the development of coordinated economic powers; also, strengthening of financial control.

(d) Renovation of the trade policy in line with the new world situation.

(e) Establishment of the measures for self-supply of the nation's daily necessities, especially staple foodstuffs.

(f) An epochal expansion of important industries, especially heavy, chemical and machine industries.

(g) An epochal development of science, and rationalization of production.

(h) Improvement and replenishment of transportation and communication facilities in line with the new world situation.

(i) Establishment of a land development plan aimed at the development of the coordinated national strength of Japan, Manchoukuo, and China.

4. Establishment of the permanent policies for the enhancement of the mental qualities and physical powers of the people which constitutes
the motive force for the execution of national policy, and for the increase of population; and especially fundamental policies for the stabilization and development of agriculture and agricultural communities.

5. A decisive measure will be taken to rectify the inequality of sacrifices on the part of the people, attendant upon the execution of the national policy. Welfare measures will be fully carried out, and the living conditions of the people renovated, so as to ensure a living standard truly befitting a stout-hearted and strong-bodied people capable to survive ten years of trials and hardships and surmount the national crisis.
"Telegraph

"St - S. No. 309

Berlin, 1 August 1940

The Japanese Ambassador, with whom I carried out current business today, in the end brought the talk to the role that the new Japanese cabinet would have to play in its politics. KIYOSU declared from the beginning that he had not yet received any instructions from his new government; he was of the belief that they should not wait too long for the definition of the general lines of the new Japanese foreign policy. For him, KIYOSU, with whom our methods might be considered: either he in to wait until his government gave his instructions, or he is to take up a position in accordance with the outlook here so as to advise his government, according to the role (its position). In both cases a talk with us in the matter either it be with the Foreign Minister of the Reich or with me.

The Ambassador did not go into details but gave some of his own observations which might correspond to his personal view of the situation. He believed that Japanese politics must now be orientated by taking a long view. Apparently KIYOSU is not thinking of a speedy end to the war and reckons at any rate on a state of tension which has to be estimated to last for years in which the relations of Japan with Russia and the USA are naturally most important. The Ambassador told me that he is conscious of the fact that the Foreign Minister of the Reich had suggested repeatedly to Japan a certain agreement with Russia. Such an action as well as the Japanese attitude towards USA should be harmonized with the German and also Italian intentions. The Ambassador reminded of the fact that the Reichs Foreign Minister, on the occasion of the visit of Minister SATO, had pictured the German-Japanese friendship and cooperation as being very important.

Nevertheless, as KIYOSU, did not know exactly how this cooperation is pictured by us in detail, especially if and at what time we wish to see the separate weight thrown on the scale of the present conflict. If, for instance, Japan would push, on her part, towards a war and enter into the war against America, while, on the other hand, Germany believed the end of the war near, expecting a quick victory, Japan would, probably, be acting contrary to German wishes. If, however, Japan would not intervene now, the factor Japan, now, especially her fleet, in the triangle Berlin-Pompeii-Tokyo would by all means have great potentialities in the future.

I had the feeling that KIYOSU expects of the new course in Tokyo a tendency towards intervention in the war but wished to hear from me, that this intervention would not be quite timely according to German opinion.
"The Ambassador would certainly be grateful if he could obtain a hint in the near future - either through the Reichs Foreign Minister personally or through me - as to which advice he should give his government. He is clear about the fact that his advice must fully lie within the framework of the German-Japanese policy of friendship. He may not be quite certain, however, whether we still regard the Japanese-Russian rapprochement as equally important as hitherto and whether the new Japanese cabinet should follow its anti-Anglo-Saxon course with an accelerated or, possibly, at first with a moderate speed.

"Fundamentally, I just accepted the statements of the Ambassador and did not anticipate a reply, to be given to them. I opposed his opinion that the war may still last a very long time and may be followed by a still longer period of tension.

"To The Reichs Foreign Minister

Signed WEISAECKER
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

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s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
William P. Cumming

For the purpose of this discussion, let us consider the following scenario: [description of scenario]

In this context, it is important to note that [additional points or details].

Furthermore, it is crucial to understand that [further elaboration or implications].

As such, we can conclude that [summary or conclusion].

References [or sources of information].
In addition to the memo:andum concerning my talk yesterday with the Japanese Ambassador, I would like to add the following: KURUSU's words expressed his hope /aus KURUSU sprach die Hoffnung/ that Japan may belong to the New Order after the war and that /Japan/not be forgotten in the new apportionment of the world.

Hereby /submitted/ to the German Foreign Minister.

(Signed) WHIZCACKER

Copy for:
U.St., – S, Pol.
Dg. Pol.
Ambassador Ritter
Director F.
U., St. – C, Recht
Chef A. C.

1 Copy given to Chef AG

136386/
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Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General
OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
On 1 August (St. - S. No. 609) the Japanese Ambassador suggested an exchange of points of view with the German Foreign Minister concerning the entire political orientation of the new Japanese cabinet. His two questions at that time were, whether we still consider the Japan-Russia rapprochement as important as formerly, and also whether we desire a share or perhaps more moderate tempo in the anti-Anglo-Saxon policy of the new cabinet.

Today the Ambassador spoke of the conversation between Foreign Minister TSUOBA and Ambassador GIT (Telegraphic Report Tokyo No. 765). In this conversation, according to TGSU's information, Ambassador GIT had again clearly stated that between Soviet Russia and Germany a conflict can also now be expected in the future. Japan may - if necessary with German help - also arrange its differences with Russia.

The specific point, however, with which TGSU concerned himself for the longest period of time at his present visit today, was not Japan's relationship to Russia, America, or England, but the new order in the so-called Great East Asia sphere, which Japan is aiming at. Ambassador GIT also touches this subject in his telegraphic report, but JUSS repeatedly restated TGSU's statements in greater detail, in the following way: Japan wants to organize the East Asia sphere, including the South Seas, on a broad basis. TGSU mentioned to GIT that Japan wants to create in this area a situation in which there would be no conquest, no oppression, and no exploitation. Everybody should come to his rights there. Japan for her part would adhere to these three basic principles, but would then expect that no European or American country would violate those principles. The matter concerns itself with ideals, which if correctly understood, lie in the common interest. TGSU named Japan, America, and China as the core of the Great East Asia sphere, for which he used the term "East Asia Axis".

JUSS went on to say that, though Minister SATO had received the impression of an unchanged friendly German attitude toward Japan here, he was not quite clear on the ways and means of enlarging upon this friendship, and now would be the time to learn the German conception of these Japanese aims for the East Asia sphere.
The Ambassador went so far to say that JAPAN and
KOREA, in order to adjust their foreign general policy and
the corresponding cabinet talks in Tokyo would first have to
clearly see how we stand regarding the above. "KOREA did not
refer to the desinterested on these overseas problems, which
we expressed to the Japanese in May of this year, but it was
clear - and he obviously spoke under orders from Tokyo - what
he was aiming at.

According to the description by KOREA, JAPAN did not allow
himself any more than I today to be drawn into this field of
discussion.

At the end, KOREA expressed the hope, to be able to dis-
cuss these far-reaching problems soon with the .weic. Foreign
Minister.

Lerewith

To the Reich Foreign Minister.
AFFIDAVIT

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G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Foreign Minister MATSUOKA invited German Ambassador OTT and they had a conversation between 5 and 6:40 PM on August 1, 1940, the gist of which is as follows:

MATSUOKA: "I informed you the other day that no talking would be necessary between Japan and Germany, nor you and me. My feeling, however, is not as you know, and as I mentioned it the other day, I am neither pro-German nor pro-British, but, so to speak, pro-Japanese. So that I dare to oppose the fact of leaving our destiny to any foreign country or foreigner. But I think that Fuhrer HITLER and Foreign Minister of the Reich must know the fact as well as Your Excellency knows it, that I am one of the proposers and originators of the Japanese-German Anti-Comintern pact. Later, when the problem of the Japanese-German Military Alliance occurred, you saw my attitude and I think it is unnecessary to explain neither my feeling nor my standpoint for Germany and Italy repeatedly. As you may find out easily, both the government and the people have inclined to strengthen the power of the Axis, but it is not decided yet in the cabinet council. I cannot persuade Premier KOKUSA and other members of the cabinet, unless I know at least the outline of Germany's intention or attitude to the thought I embrace before it will be carried out. In other words, I am very anxious to know what the German attitude is on my point of view, or I am sorry to say that I can hardly carry it out."

OTT: "It may be natural but I want to know what Japan is going to do. Without knowing it concretely, I think Berlin cannot answer you."

MATSUOKA: "I hate, as you know, to use diplomatic or suggestive terms and I now express my thought freely. Japan is intending to establish a new order of Greater East Asia, as made already public by the Japanese Government, in a circle of Japan, Manchoukuo and China including the South Seas, and wishes the liberation and freedom of all nations and races in the sphere, and thus is planning to increase their mutual and common profit aiming at co-prosperity. Hence, in the other way, I oppose subjugation and exploitation. I object to them even if made by Japan. Of course, some Japanese may be planning to subjugate and exploit these regions, but they are taught to do so by some Europeans and Americans, and so, they are those influenced by America and Europe. I oppose absolutely these whether they might be done by Japanese or European and American powers. I have determined to resist and dispute if Japan would dare to commit such deeds. There are fairly many Japanese who have the same opinion as mine, that is, to wish all the people to get mutual and common advantages and to attain mutual prosperity. Japan does not refuse to have these regions entered by Europeans and Americans, nor will expel them from the sphere. I believe this very principle will bring immediately a large profit to Americans and Europeans too. You may have some doubt in what I said, surveying the present China Incident superficially, but if enough time is given, Japan will realize surely this idea as well in China."
"Now, as I believe, Japan can manage by herself in what concerns China, and I didn’t question Germany about it. But I would like to know what attitude Germany will assume towards the aforecited Japanese ideal or course on the South Seas? What will Germany want to gain in the South Seas? And what does Germany want and what can it do regarding Russo-Japanese relations? As for the American-Japanese relations, I always think the future world civilization will belong to the Pacific civilization in which, I believe, both Japan and America will play great roles, and so the relation between both countries is an important matter affecting a serious influence on tomorrow’s known beings. I wish to know what Germany wishes to do toward what she can do and what she requests of America or Japan from this overall view. But, excepting this for the present, as it is a too large and too distant a problem I want to know what Germany wishes to do toward America and what she can do for the sake of Japan in the present situation in the relation between Japan and America which you well know.”

OTT: “It is quite natural of your opinion, but I want to know, first of all, of your meaning of the bounds of the South Seas”.

MATSUOKA: “In my personal opinion, I include as far as Siam for the present in the sphere, but it may be extended by and by in the future according to any change of circumstances.”

OTT: “This is my personal opinion too. As to the South Seas, Germany has three big viewpoints. Germany is now in the war against Great Britain, but there is a possibility of developing into a war against whole British Empire (war of destroying the British Empire) in the future. The South Seas, for Germany, must be seen from this point of view. This is (1) Germany must consider what should be done for her, with the South Seas, when the war develops to such conditions, (2) just what things and how much should be necessary to be required, (3) after all, the problem depends upon the German attitude of how to settle and how to keep herself with Japan and the South Seas. Looking from such a broad standpoint at the war against Britain, the China Incident is simply an incident, isn’t it? And I think, too, apart from this worldwide confusion and movement, the China Incident cannot be solved. Don’t you think so?”

MATSUOKA: “I think I can agree with the last part of your personal opinions, and once sent a discourse of that fact to a magazine. At present, as you know, most of our people regard the China Incident as one of the most urgent matters to be settled. I, as Foreign Minister, cannot help considering the opinion of our people. The China Incident forms a part of the world-wide confusion indeed. However, it is the grave question for Japan to dispose of.”

OTT: “How does Japan intend to settle China?”

MATSUOKA: "To knock CHIANG KAI-SEEK down completely is intended".
(The Ambassador seemed a little startled.)

OTT: "It must be a means; but are there not any possibilities of consulting with CHIANG? I think it is a wise means to consult with him."

MATSUOKA: "I do not entirely refuse to confer with CHIANG, but there is no other means than to knock him down because of the Japanese characteristic viewpoint. I think, at present, he has to be subjugated thoroughly. Of course, means of arms is not the only one. At any rate, however, I believe that Japan, by her power alone, is able to settle the China Incident."

OTT: "But, in managing the China Incident, I think Japan should lay emphasis in taking Soviet-Russia as a reasonably grave problem. From the point of view of Soviet-German relation, Soviet Russia does not seem to be dangerous to Germany any more."

MATSUOKA: "I have also the same perception. Perhaps, one of the important motives, at least, which made HITLER, the "Kampf-fuehrer", determine to intrude like the wind into Denmark, Belgium and Netherlands or to carry out the lightening operation on the field of Flanders, might have been that he had apprehended inconstant movements of STALIN which were unable to be foreseen in the morning: how they would be in the evening. (The Ambassador nodded.) When the German Army entered Prin, I thought HITLER conquered STALIN. On that instant, I concluded that Germany needed no longer to worry about the Soviet-Russia."

OTT: "So did I. If Japan wishes, Germany will offer good offices of Japan and the Soviet-Russia and I think it is clever to open negotiation between Japan and the Soviet-Russia. As far as I believe, HITLER has no intention to have dispute with the Soviet-Russia and Germany can do without dispute. As for the American problems, Germany does not think the United States would participate in the war. At this moment I hope you would pay special attention to the fact that Germany does not intend to dispute with America in the future, but, rather, wants to come into mutual understanding which is believed to be possible. In short, the German main interests in the Western hemisphere lie in South and Central America. In order to trade with South America and to develop economically, friendly relation must be contracted with the United States. Moreover, trade and other economical relations with the United States herself must be promoted. If the relation of Japan with America (South and North) is the same as that, the interests are also the same. In Germany and Japan must assume the similar attitude toward the United States as Germany does. If such is the case, Germany will be able to offer good offices to Japan to restore and promote close and friendly relationship with America."

MATSUOKA: "As for the United States, South and Central America or Canada, the problem is entirely economic for Japan; especially Japan has recently taken the policy to promote commerce with Central and South America
and wishes to develop enterprises there. Therefore, in this respect, Japan is placed in the same position and has the same idea as Germany. However, in the newspapers these last two or three days there is news stating as if the Americans are in a high passion to participate into the war. What is your opinion about it?

OTT: "Germany has collected authentic information about the United States; so it is groundless that the Americans are in a high passion to participate into the war. Recently President ROOSEVELT has been brought to bay. I think Your Excellency has read the interview of Führer HITLER with WIELAND; from Germany's point of view, the reason why HITLER has given him an interview was that, as the American people are getting still more opposed to the policy of the President who wishes to have the United States participated into the war and to keep away of the President's policy, HITLER has given an interview to an American correspondent with the view of enlarging the gap between the President and American people. The relation between Germany and the United States is not necessarily deteriorated; it will be rather improved.

MATSUOKA: "By the way, regarding your request through Mr. X bearing on (1) transportation of goods through Manchukuo, Siberia and Soviet Russia to Germany, (2) the earliest settlement of the Germans' damages in China, (3) the control of anti-German articles in newspapers written in English, at today's cabinet council, all the ministers concerned decided to meet your wishes in principle. And so, you needn't to go back to Berlin. However, 'Red Tape' is inevitable in every country and there may be delay in bringing it into effect, and I wish you will understand that. I will manage for myself the items (1) and (2) especially (1) and, as to (3), my under-officials have entered into consultation with those of other ministers concerned."

Ambassador OTT has brought the German Memorandum bearing on those three cases and handed it over to MATSUOKA and at the same time another memorandum concerning Japanese officials in American continent who hesitate to give certificates to the German nationals who have no connection with German military to repatriate to Germany and asked MATSUOKA to take friendly measures. MATSUOKA replied that he would soon take measures to do his best by conferring with fellow members of the cabinet, especially with the Minister of Communications and also give instruction to the authorities concerned abroad.

Furthermore, in reference to the Italian Mission, Ambassador OTT said: "I am displeased with this Mission, as I firmly believe that it has been sent by Japan to alienate Germany from Italy. It is quite natural that Ambassador SATO, who has been thought unfriendly towards Germany, should not be treated well in Germany, when he dropped in there on his return from Italy". MATSUOKA said that he himself heard such a rumor but he did not believe it and that he laughed it away ridiculous when he heard that rumor. But OTT did not seem to be convinced of MATSUOKA's denial.
And Ambassador OTT said "Since I have arrived here as Ambassador to Japan, what I had felt has been entirely unpleasant. Until now KASUMIGASHIKI has disregarded Germany and never given settlements to the question German Embassy had turned over. For some of them, even a reply has not been given. This may be sufficient reason to be called back home by my government. And you have never given me the chance to see you except on business and I have been treated inferior to British and the United States Ambassadors: I take this for an unendurable insult. In spite of such conditions the German Government has still a little hope in me and has not called me back home till to-day".

Furthermore KATSUOKA said to OTT that he told Ambassador HIRI the Japanese request for French Indo-China which is absolutely necessary and urgent matter for the military operations in the borderland of French Indo-China and as he supposed that the French Government might refer this matter to the German Government, he asked OTT to cable to the German Government to persuade the French Government to accept the Japanese request without hesitation in that case, or if not referred, to send the intention of the German Government to the French Government.

Ambassador OTT replied that he would soon teletype so.
CERTIFICATE

W.D.C. No.____
I.P.S. No. 1590A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 12 pages, dated August 2, 1940, and described as follows: Outline of the conversation on August 1, 1940, between Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and German Ambassador OTT.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this 6th day of September, 1946. /s/ K. Hayashi ______________ Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo ______________ Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 6th day of Sept., 1946. /s/ Richard H. Larsh ______________ NAME

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/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: J. A. Curtis, 2d Lt.
Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity
"According to reliable information, the Japanese action against the British Spy Service, organized all over the land, was carried out at the demand of the new War Minister, Tojo. The War Minister is hereby pursuing two aims.

1. Acute aggravation of Anglo-Japanese relations, to drive them as much as possible to a breaking point and to hasten the action against British possessions in East Asia desired by the Army.

2. A blow against the influential pro-British groups—viz court and economic circles—which, impressed by the energetic action, will be dissuaded from further pro-British activity. The greatest sensation was caused by the arrest, which has in the meantime become known, of leading British business heads in Kobe, in particular, of the Swedish honorary consul, James, who, since the beginning of the war, has appeared as a carrier of hate propaganda against Germany in press and economic circles, using all means."

OTT
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s/ W. I. Cumming
W. I. CUMMING

Affidavit subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
TELEGRAM
(Secret Cipher Process)

TOKYO: 31 July 1940, 1150 hours
ARRIVAL: 31 July 1940, 2300 hours

No. 751 of July 31.
Annex to telegram No. 746 of July 30.

"According to reliable information, the Japanese action against the British Spy Service, organized all over the land, was carried out at the demand of the new War Minister, Tojo. The War Minister is hereby pursuing two aims.

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OTT

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361
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Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 15 August 1940 1900 hours
Arrival 15 August 1947 1720 hours

Fo. 823 of 15.8 Appendix to Tel. No. 813 of 14.8

URGENT!

The Foreign Minister sent just now the head of the European Dept. to instruct me about the following:

The French Ambassador had today changed the previously announced basic acceptance of the three Japanese demands regarding Indo-China /to the attitude/ that France wanted first a Japanese guarantee for renunciation of all territorial claims and only then would she decide about the considerations of the Japanese demands. The Foreign Minister had urgently demanded the French Ambassador to advise his government to maintain their previously announced basic agreement. The question of territorial guarantee could be adjusted based on the demanded declaration by the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister requests the German government to support the Japanese demands by influencing the French government. (I group garbled) Ministry Director promised, but it was pointed out that with reference to legalistic statements in Telegram No. 654 dated from August 12 that our influence on French policy is limited.

OTT

/136410/
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. F. Cummimg, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. F. Cummimg

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Berlin, 23 January 1941.

Today the Japanese Ambassador mentioned to me the conversation between Ambassador Ott and the Japanese Vice Foreign Minister re Indo-China. (Tokyo Telegram Report No. 85).

Kurusu gave me the background to the Japanese desire for Germany's influencing of/Viehzahl/me Vichy as follows:

1. Japanese advance southward in the direction of Singapore was unthinkable without using the land bridge of the Malacca peninsula. For this Japan has to pass through both Indo-China and Siamese territory. Therefore, any British influencing/Einflussnahme/ in Siam must be prevented.

I fully agreed with the Japanese Ambassador up to this point.

Then Kurusu tried to make me understand that a German advice /Rat/ in Vichy would surely be sufficient to make the French Government fall into line with the Japanese proposals.

I did not deduct anything from the expected /Vorgreifen/ answer from the German Foreign Minister on this matter, but mentioned to Kurusu that the Vichy Government would probably not like to give up rather large pieces of the French colonial possessions before the general settlement at the peace conference; also, the British mediation proposal reported to us from Tokyo was more favorable for Vichy than the Japanese.

/z/ WEIZSÄCKER

Foreign Minister
Under State Sec'y, Pcl.
Dg. Pcl.
Certificate:

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4025E(5).

/s/ Ulrich Straus
Tokyo: 23 Aug., 1940 0200 hours
Arrived: " " " 11:00 hours

No. 853 of 23 August

1. The Government announces an extensive retirement of the Foreign Service. Renounced are the Ambassador of the U.S., Ambassadors of France, Turkey, Brazil and also nineteen ministers, among them representatives in Hungary, Spain, Finland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Argentina, Egypt, Canada, besides, three abroad councillors among them the commissioners from England and Russia and finally eleven Consul Generals, among them the Consuls from New York, Chicago, San Francisco, London, Paris, and Prague. The Foreign Minister declared to the press, that this action had become necessary in order to secure the new foreign policy introduced by him and to bring the Japanese Foreign Service into coordination with the new Japanese conditions. For this reason it is also necessary to replace most of the division heads of the Foreign Ministry with new personalities. Publication of these changes will soon take place. The whole press of today is governed by this radical and, in Japanese history, unique retirement, which is called a 'coup d'Etat' in several papers. The drastic action of the government evidently intends in the first place to render harmless the exponents of pro-Anglo-Saxon courses. This is also strongly underlined by the press. Only a few of the recalled officials will be used in other posts.

2. With the aim of further preparation of suitable actions for the adjustment of State affairs on an authoritarian model, the government had formed a commission of 24 leading personalities. Ambassador SHIRATORI was appointed the representative for foreign political matters in the commission. The commission consists mostly of followers of the reform movement and of the policy of cooperation with the Axis powers which is constantly demanded by this movement.

3. Both the diplomatic adjustment and the composition of the commission, show again the efforts of the government to follow a new course.
Oath

I, W. I. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, do solemnly and truly swear that I am an Attaché of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Advisor on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

W. I. Cumming

[Signature]

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3rd day of April 1946.

G. H. Gaede

Lt. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (U.S.)
"SOME OF THE SALIENT POINTS IN THE INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN MATUSUKA AND STAHLER. WITH THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR ASSISTING.

1. Germany does not want the present conflict develop into a World War, and wishes to bring it to termination as quickly as possible. She particularly wants the United States to stay out.

2. Germany does not look for Japan's military assistance at this juncture in connection with her war with England.

3. What she wishes of Japan is to have Japan play the role of restraining and preventing the U.S. from entering the war, by all means. Although Germany thinks at present that the U.S. will not enter the war, she cannot take chance.

4. Germany hardly thinks that she and the U.S. will come to blows in the near future, but that the clash and war between Japan and the U.S. cannot eventually be avoided.

5. It is, so Germany believes, to the mutual advantage of both, Japan and Germany (of course Italy to be included) to enter into an understanding or agreement, whereby they will be thoroughly prepared effectively to meet emergency, at any moment. This can only prevent, if anything can prevent America from entering the present war, or entering into an armed conflict with Japan in the future.

6. A strong and determined attitude, unequivocal and unmistakable, on the part of the three nations, Japan, Germany and Italy, and the knowledge of it by the U.S. and the world at large at this juncture, that all can only be of a powerful and effective deterrent on the U.S. A weak, lukewarm attitude or declaration at this juncture will only invite derision and danger.

7. Germany hopes Japan will also seize up the situation and will realize the magnitude and the reality of the potential (may be impending, who knows) danger coming from the Western Hemisphere, and will not quick and decisively to forestall it by reaching an agreement between the three (Japan, Germany and Italy) of such a nature that neither the U.S. nor the rest of the world would be left in doubt, conjecturing.

8. Hardly necessary to say that Germany (and Italy) will do everything in her power to restrain the U.S. on the Atlantic and will at once start supplying Japan with as much of the war equipment (such as aeroplanes, tanks and other war tools with men even, if Japan wishes it) as she can reasonably spare, and will otherwise help her in every possible way. (MATUSUKA remarked that these things might and in fact will have to be left to a sort of mixed military and naval commission of the Axis, granting that Japan joins the Axis in the sense and in the way Germany wants.)
"9. Of course, Germany recognizes and respects Japan's political leadership in Greater East Asia. All she wants in these regions is of economic nature, and she is ready to cooperate with Japan to further her aims. Naturally she looks to Japan to do her best to accommodate German enterprises and to enable Germany to obtain in these regions materials she needs and may need.

"10. Better to reach agreement between Germany, Italy and Japan first and then immediately to approach Soviet Russia. Germany is prepared to act part of an honest broker on the question of rapprochement between Japan and Soviet Russia, and she can see no unsurmountable obstacle on the path may be settled without much difficulty. German-Soviet relations are good contrary to what the British propaganda tries to represent, and Russia is carrying out to the satisfaction of Germany all her engagements.

"11. Despite the fact that the Axis (including Japan) must be thoroughly prepared to meet the worst emergency, Germany will on the other hand, make use of every means in her power to prevent the clashing between the U.S. and Japan, and even to improve the relations between the two, if it is humanly possible.

"12. Germany, in asking Japan to join the Axis in the fullest sense of the word and that quickly, before the war against England closes, is taking a long view of carrying on stupendous struggle against the British Empire, not to say the Anglo-Saxon dom including America. (In short, he is indicating that this war is destined to develop into a strife against the Anglo-Saxon dom.) The present war may end before long, but this great struggle will go on for tens of years yet, in one form or another. (KATSUOKA emphasized this phrase). Let the three (Germany, Italy and Japan) stand together knitted very closely until the great aim is finally achieved.

"13. As to when Italy should be asked to join in the present discussion, the German Foreign Minister will consider and let the Japanese Foreign Minister know. The German Government has not yet conferred with Italy. Neither STAHR nor anyone on the German side has seen the Soviet official on the matter.

"14. STAHR's words may be regarded as coming directly from Ribbentrop.

"15. The Japanese Foreign Minister also made observation on several points, but they are not noted here."
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 5 pages, dated Sept. 9 and 10, 1940, and described as follows: Some of the salient points in the informal conversations between MATSUOKA and STAHLER, with the German Ambassador assisting, Sept. 9 & 10, 1940. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 22nd day of August, 1946

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 24 day of Aug., 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: /s/ Edward P. Monaghan Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity
RECORDING CONCLUSION OF THE TRIPARTITE Pact

*strictly confidential*

Subject: The Conclusion of a Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy
(Subject of the Imperial Conference)

In order to strengthen the Japan-Germany-Italy Axis we will negotiate with Germany and Italy and conclude a pact between Japan, Germany and Italy.

The gist of the Pact.

(1) That Japan will recognize and respect the leading position of Germany and Italy in the building of the new order in Europe.

(2) That Germany and Italy will recognize and respect the leading position of Japan in the building of the new order in Greater East Asia.

(3) That Japan, Germany and Italy will co-operate with one another in the efforts based on the above principle, and that, in case one of the three is (publicly or secretly) attacked by a power not involved at present in European War or China Incident, the three countries will aid one another by every means, political, economic and military.

(4) That Japan, Germany and Italy believe that they can create the fair and lasting foundation of peace only through the establishment of world new order, which is in keeping with the changing world situation, by their mutual assistance, and that they will adjust and combine their efforts for its realization.

(5) That Japan, Germany and Italy confirm that the above items do not in any way affect the political situation now existing between each of them and U.S.S.R.

Foreign Minister's (ATSUO) explanations regarding the conclusion of Tripartite Pact.
(Council in the Imperial presence)

A. Development

The present minister thought of strengthening Japan's relations with Germany and Italy, on the principle just stated by the Prime Minister, since
the formation of this Cabinet in the last decade of July. At that time, Germany had conquered France, and Britain, too, seemed to be easily conquered in less than a decade. So German enthusiasm for co-operation with Japan was generally at a very low ebb. But even if Germany and Italy could oppose British efforts now, the war for the destruction of the whole British Empire would be no easy matter. Moreover, they would have to cope with two great influences, what may be called Angli-Saxon kingdom or bloc, consisting of America and surviving parts of the British Empire, and Soviet Russia strengthened still further by the present war. In that case, Japan, geographically blessed, and possessing a race in a peerless body politic, would be great in her strength. Even at present Japan has such a strength as is able to tip the balance of the world as she likes. This is the present minister's forecast and opinion. Hitler and at least a few persons near him was aware of this, so I imagined. Nay, I even saw some signs. Even at that time they seem to have had considerable enthusiasm for co-operation with Japan. Such being the case, I thought it unnecessary to ask Japan for German co-operation, though I was prompted to do so by various international situations. I decided then to postpone the negotiation until after the surrender of the British Isles, if I was obliged to do so, and that in that case I would take my own time. To show impatience would have been a taboo diplomatically for us.

I believed that Japan must show the attitude that she would stand on her independent position, that she had no need to co-operate with Germany and Italy, and that she would join hands with America, or even dare to save Britain, if it was necessary or convenient for her existence and mission. Then, first of all, I had to begin reconnoitering throughout the world about this matter. The present minister had done so about the time of his appointment, and now to acquire a little information about world affairs. So I went a step further, invited Ambassador Ot to tea on August 1st, and told him that, as he knew, strengthening of the Asia was a desire of both our government and our people, and that the Cabinet had not come to concrete decision yet. Then, I continued and informed him that Japan was seriously determined to realize the ideal of HAKKO-IKUI (the whole world-one house), which was her traditional ideal since her foundation, and that she was going to try it first within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. I went on to say that, even though the British Isles might succumb shortly, it would be only the beginning of the collapse of the British Empire, not the end. (The German Ambassador, too, said so of his own accord.) I then concluded that Germany should decide on the problem of Japanese-German co-operation from the above long-range viewpoints, and asked him (1) what attitude Germany was going to take regarding above-mentioned Japan's realization of her ideal within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, how Germany could assist Japan, whether Germany intended to assist Japan or not, what Germany desired within this sphere, (2) what Germany thought about Soviet-Japanese relations, what Germany could do about the situation, (3) what Germany thought about Japanese-American relations, what Germany could do about the situation. Lastly I requested him to wire the above-mentioned 3 items immediately to Fuhrer Hitler and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and get their answer.
The German Minister seemed to think it no easy matter, and was unwilling to wire to Berlin. I also expected that I should not get the answer quickly. It turned out as I expected, but I left the matter to take its own course, without pressing him. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Koken present General Heinrich Stahner, reportedly his right-hand man in Oriental problems, to the post of Minister, and ordered him to start from Berlin on Aug. 23rd, and quickly come to Japan via Moscow. The present minister showed no sign of impatience to see him. Then on 9th he asked for an interview. So I met him and Ambassador Ott at my private residence for the sake of secrecy. Then on the 10th we met for the second time, and on the 11th for the third time. At the last meeting we came to agree on a draft treaty. After exchange of opinions between the German government and the present minister, we decided upon something like the draft now submitted to you for approval. Regarding various points in this draft, and the present minister's questions which had been wired to Berlin through Ambassador Ott on Aug. 1st, Stahner expressed his opinions clearly and frankly. The present minister is satisfied with this. Therefore, I am going to carry on negotiations and hope to come to compromise with this draft as the basis.

B. The Explanation of the Gist of the Pact.

Item 1 says that Japan will recognize and respect the leading position of Germany and Italy, in the building of the New Order in Europe. I thought Germany would speak of the building of the new order in Africa, but the German Ambassador did not speak of it, so this item was confined to the recognition of the position of Germany and Italy in Europe. The "Greater East Asia" in "the building of the new order in the Greater East Asia" of Item 2 means for the present French Indo-China, Thailand, Burma, Strait Settlement, and Oceanic islands as New Guinea, New Caledonia and C. At that time it was expected that the meaning would be gradually changed in keeping with the change in East Asia situation and with the development of world situation. So I spoke broadly to the German Ambassador on purpose, and told him that, though Greater East Asia did not at present contain Australia, New Zealand, and areas to the south, it will gradually extend itself with time. I did not refer to India. The German Ambassador did not ask any detailed questions and agreed with the present minister.

The German Ambassador said in reply that Germany recognised Japan's political leadership in the above area, but that Germany might be given as many facilities as possible in economic field, in trade, enterprise, and acquisition of materials, for instance. I told him that Japan also expected the cooperation of Germany and Italy in the economic exploitation of that area.

The "one power" in Item 3, "in caso 'publicly or secretly' attacked by one or more powers . . ." implicitly and chiefly means America. If one of us three were attacked by that one power, the other two would be automatically obliged to participate in the war. That is, our country will enter into a military alliance with Germany and Italy, with America as the objective. "Publicly and secretly" was inserted by Germany, but Minister Stahner and Ambassador Ott agreed to striking out the expression
for the time being, and wired to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop for instructions. For the German Foreign Minister may insist on its being left as it is. It is pretty difficult to interpret it correctly, and I asked the German envoy what was meant by "secretly attacked." He replied that what America had done up to then did not come within the meaning of this expression. This expression means such cases as America using important British bases in the Pacific under a secret Anglo-American treaty, or American fleet directly entering Singapore, and it was inserted rather with Japan's interests in mind, — so said the German envoy. Then the present minister asked, "How about Germany and Italy?" The German envoy replied it probably meant such cases as Britain allowing America to occupy some strategic British bases in a region near the European battlefield, for example, in the Mediterranean Sea. Whether attack is to be divided into the above two categories, or whether the expressed is to be simply "attacked," the decision upon whether an action or a chain of actions by America or another third power would be regarded as constituting "attack," shall only be decided by a consultation among us three powers. We agreed to make the point clear in one form or another. So, which expression may be used, I think there is little cause for anxiety.

Regarding Item 4, I think I need not explain. I am now negotiating with the intention of making this item the preamble of the pact, and the German envoy has agreed in a general way. The phraseology has been carefully polished, taking in the principle of Hakko Ichiu (the whole world — one family), which was enunciated in the Imperial Rescript at the time of the foundation of our State, the principle that every nation and every race shall find its right place in the world.

Item 5 stipulates that this pact is not directed against the U.S.S.R. As the U.S.S.R. is supposed not to be involved in the war of Germany and Italy against Britain and France, there is room for doubt if "one power" in Item 3 may not apply to U.S.S.R. So this item makes it clear that there is no possibility that Japan, Germany and Italy will make an enemy of U.S.S.R. in building world new order. Especially this item makes it clear that the present pact in no way affects the existing agreements, views or situations between the U.S.S.R. and Germany, regarding Poland and other European countries. So this item purports to relieve the apprehension of the U.S.S.R., and to prevent Soviet-American rapprochement. Apart from this, I want to draw up notes annexed to the pact, and stipulate that, after the conclusion of this pact, joint military and economic committees shall be formed immediately in Tokyo, Berlin and Rome, which shall study detailed arrangements regarding the carrying out of this pact, based upon its purport; and that the agreed arrangements shall be submitted to the government for approval. I think Germany and Italy will promise to offer their good offices to make the U.S.S.R. attune herself with the purport of the present pact, and to adjust Soviet Japanese relations. I think, too, Germany will promise to supply us with war materials and technique, and, at our request, technicians and other personnel. Germany will also promise to help us to acquire oil from the U.S.S.R. and other countries. We, on our part, will promise Germany to supply war materials, foodstuffs and other necessaries of life, and technique, if we are able to do so. Meanwhile, the phraseology of the pact will have to be reciprocal in form for the time being.
Moreover, the purport of this gist may be changed more or less by the development of negotiations, or expressions and form may be revised. Regarding these points I hope I may be allowed to exercise my discretion which is necessary in Germany. I am determined not to change the fundamental purport of the gist in any case, but if it should ever become necessary to change the fundamental purport, I shall take necessary steps anew. I wish you to understand that.

C. Conclusion

The fundamental principle of the recent negotiations with Germany is entirely different from that of the HIRAKUNA Cabinet's days. That is, as may be known from the fact that Germany has explicitly said Japan need not participate in the European War, Germany and Japan has a common aim in concluding this pact. Germany wants to prevent American entry into the war, and Japan Japanese-American conflict. Accordingly, the non-intervention policy, which the Imperial government has maintained up to now, will be continued for the time being, with the reservation that it may be influenced by this pact in future.

Shortly after the American-Canadian joint defense plan was decided upon, America has begun to assume an attitude hardly bearable even in trifling problems between Japan and America. So the present minister was obliged to demand the reconsideration of American President and Secretary of State.

Judging from the recent movements, America, in addition to the military establishments which she has already built or is building both in the Pacific and in the South Sea, may now be trying to acquire strong military bases, in great numbers and in a hurry, within important British possessions in Australia, New Zealand, India, Burma and other regions, and may be preparing a battle array for encircling Japan. The present minister thought of this at the time when the conclusion of the above-mentioned American-Canadian joint defense agreement was announced. As I expected, even the press has come to report a news, which seems to be pretty trustworthy, that negotiations are going on among the British Empire, Australian Government and America. There is some reason to suppose that America, considering that Japan has suffered greatly through war of attrition in China Incident, and that her strength has suffered remarkable decrease, may use intimidating language. Whatever may be the cause, I think Japanese-American relations now face little room for improvement through courtesy or direct for friendship. I rather fear such an attitude on Japan's part may only aggravate the matter. Is there a measure to improve the situation even a little, or prevent its further aggravation? I think there is at present nothing left for us to do but to stand firm. If it is so, we must cope with America by firmly joining hands with as many countries as possible, to back up our firm attitude, and by making the fact known at home and abroad as quickly as possible. I believe this to be an urgent diplomatic move. The present minister will watch the repercussions or effects of such a measure on the one hand, but, on the other hand, will always be careful not to overlook an opportunity to improve relations with America. For all that, we must, first of all, show a firm coping attitude with a steady resolve to all the world, so explicitly that there will be no room for doubt. This is the most important point in concluding this pact, so I repeat this in conclusion.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, K. FAYASHI hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief, Archives Section, Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 22 pages, dated _______ 19__ and described as follows: Foreign Minister's (HATUSUKA'S) explanation regarding conclusion of the Tri Partite Pact, reference paper for the committee (Subject of the Imperial Conference). I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 27 day of Aug., 1946
/s/K. Fayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Nagaheru Odo Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Longeron, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 27 day of Aug., 1946
/s/ Edward P. Longeron
NAME

Witness: /s/ Richard F. Lesh Investigator, IPS Official Capacity
September 18th, 1940.

(Question) No. 1 ..... /F.N. asked by a councillor /

"Is there any danger of extreme intensity of economic pressure by the United States upon Japan, as a result of the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact?"

(Question) No. 2 ..... /the same? /

"What preparation have you to deal with, should the worst case (the commencement of war against U.S. A.) happen?"

(Answer)

"We should be ready for that case. And, our preparations shall be (1) to strengthen our international standpoint by the conclusion of this pact, and (2) to take diplomatic, economic and military measures for the purpose of procuring necessary natural resources for national defense from the South Seas and other places, which we have procured hitherto from the United States."

(Question) ..... /asked by the Army.

"What effect will the Three Power coalition have upon the disposal of Sino-Japanese conflict?" /F.N. The answer is not given in the notes available. /

(Questions) ..... /asked of the government by the Supreme Command of the Navy. /

No. 1 "To what degree will this pact contribute to the adjustment of Japan-Soviet relations?"

No. 2. "By concluding this pact, Japan's trade relations with Britain and U. S. are doomed to deteriorate and the acquisition of resources now dependent upon the outside is doomed to become more difficult, should the worst conditions come to exist. And, Japanese-Americans war will be probably a prolonged one. In consideration of the present condition of our country in which our resources have been considerably used up on account of the still existing Sino-Japanese conflict, what are the prospect forecasts and precautions taken by our government in order to maintain our resources?"
No. 3. "It is imperative that preparation of our navy for Japanese-American war be accelerated and strengthened. And this matter will be impossible to be realized, unless our government give serious consideration and cooperation with the Navy. What principle does our government have in this regard?"

No. 4. "Even if Japan should be compelled to participate in the European war from the participation of the United States in it, we (the Navy) would wish to choose the time of outbreak of hostility independently. What measure does our government have in this regard?"

(answer) "... given by the War Minister.

"It is the United States that is encouraging Chungking government or anti-Japanese movement at the present time. Should a solid coalition come to exist between Japan, Germany and Italy, it will become the most effectual expedient to restrain the United States. The more effectually we restrain the United States, the more likely and quickly we shall be able to dispose of Sino-Japanese conflict. On the other hand, if we can bring about appeasement between the Soviet Union and our country as result of Tri-Partite coalition and through the good offices of Germany and Italy, we shall be able to spur the quick ending of Sino-Japanese conflict."

(answer) "... given by the Minister of the Navy.

(To Question No. 1) "Should this Tri-Partite alliance come to exist, Germany and Italy - especially Germany - will use its good offices with pretty firm self-confidence in ironing out Soviet-Japanese relations. In view of the present amicable relations now existing between Germany and the Soviet Union, it must be far easier to iron out, with the aid of Germany, the difficult problems which involve Japan and the Soviet Union."

(To Question No. 4) "In the event Japan was compelled to participate in the European war, the time to start the war will be virtually decided in the following manner: First, the Army and naval authorities set a question at rest. Secondly, our government bring the matter to a settlement, basing upon the opinions of the Army and naval authorities and other circumstances. Thirdly, our government confer with German and Italian governments. In this regard (choice of time to start war) the standpoint of our Army and Navy will be held independent, as a matter of fact."
"SALIENT POINTS OF QUESTIONS (PRIVY COUNCIL)"

September 16th, 1940.

No. 1

"Is not there any danger of extreme intensity of economic pressure by the United States upon Japan, as result of the conclusion of Tri-Partite Pact? What would be our counter-measure in such a case?"

No. 2

"What preparation have you to deal with, should the worst case (the commencement of war against U.S.A) happen?"

1. "We should be ready for that case. And, our precautions shall be (1) to strengthen our international standpoint by the conclusion of this pact, and (2) to take diplomatic, economic and military measures for the purpose of procuring necessary natural resources for national defense from the South Seas and other places, which we have procured hitherto from the United States. In deciding upon the present matter this very point was most carefully investigated.

Question.

"What effect will the Three Power coalition have upon the disposal of Sino-Japanese conflict?" /T. I. The answer is not given in the notes available./

Questions asked of the government by the Supreme Command of the Navy at an Imperial Conference regarding the military alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy, Sent. 16, 1940.

No. 1 "To what degree will this pact contribute to the adjustment of Japan-Soviet relations?"

No. 2. "By concluding this pact, Japan's trade relations with Britain and U.S. are deemed to deteriorate and the acquisition of resources now dependent upon the outside is deemed to become more difficult, should the worst condition come to exist. And, Japanese-American war will be probably a prolonged one. In consideration of the present condition of our country in which our resources have been considerably used up on account of the still existing Sino-Japanese conflict, what are the prospect foreseen and precaution taken by our government in order to maintain our resources?"
The conclusion of the present alliance it becomes imperative that proportion of our navy for Japanese-American war be accelerated and strengthened. And, this matter will be impossible to be realized, unless our government give serious consideration and cooperation with the Navy. "What principle does our government have in this regard?"

No. 4. "Even if Japan should be compelled to participate in the European war from the participation of the United States in it, we would wish to choose the time of outbreak of hostility independently. "What measure does our government have in this regard?"

(War Ministry)

"It is the United States that is encouraging Chungking government or anti-Japanese movement at the present time. Should a solid coalition come to exist between Japan, Germany and Italy, it will become the most effectual expedient to restrain the United States. The more effectually we restrain the United States, the more possibly and quickly we shall be able to dispose of Sino-Japanese conflict. On the other hand, if we can bring about approach between the Soviet Union and our country as result of Tripartite coalition and through the good offices of Germany and Italy, especially of Germany, we shall be able to spur the quick ending of Sino-Japanese conflict."

(Navy Ministry)

No. 1. "Should this Tripartite alliance come to exist, Germany and Italy—especially Germany—will use its good offices with pretty firm self-confidence in ironing out Soviet-Japanese relations. In view of the present amicable relations now existing between Germany and the Soviet Union, it must be far easier to iron out, with the aid of Germany, the difficult problems which involve Japan and the Soviet Union."

No. 4. "In the event Japan was compelled to participate in the European war, the time to start the war will be virtually decided in the following manner: First, the army and naval authorities set a question at rest. Secondly, our government bring the matter to a settlement, basing upon the opinions of the Army and naval authorities and other circumstances. Thirdly, our government confers with German and Italian governments. In this regard (choice of time to start war) the standpoint of our Empire will be held independent, as a matter of fact."
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 6 pages, dated Sept. 16, 1940, and described as follows: Salient points of discussions made at a Privy Council in the Imperial Presence, regarding Tripartite Pact - September 16, 1940.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 22nd day of August, 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Kosaharu Odo
Official Capacity

STATEMENT OF OFFICIAL PROCUREMENT

I, Hickard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on the 24th day of August, 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: /s/ Edward P. Monaghan

Investigator
Official Capacity
CONCLUSION OF THE TRIPARTITE PACT BETWEEN JAPAN, GERMANY AND ITALY

Subject: Conclusion of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy.

The Investigation Committee

The President and the Vice-President of the Privy Council and its members met on September 26 (Thursday) Showa 15/1940/ at 10 A.M. in the ante-chamber East-3 in the Imperial Palace, and soon after the introduction by His Majesty of the draft pact for review, President HARA opened the conference, designating the set-up of the plenary session of the Committee. The persons who attended are:

President HARA
Vice-President SUZUKI, the Chairman of the Investigation Committee

Privy Councillors: KAWAI, ISHII, ARIMA, KUBOTA, ISHIZUKA, SHINIZU, MATSUMI, KARI, ARAKI, MITSUI, SUGAWARA, MITSUURA, USHIO, HAYASHI, FUKAI, MATSUMI, WANO, OSHIMA, OBATA, TAKEMOTO, KURODA

State Ministers:
Premier KONOYE
War Minister TERAH
Foreign Minister and concurrently Minister of Overseas Affairs MATSUOKA
Finance Minister KAVADA

Explainers:
Chief of the Planning Board HOSHINO
Chief of the Legislation Board MORIYAMA
Councillor of the Legislation Board MORIYAMA
Director of the Treaty Bureau of the Foreign Office MATSUOKA
Director of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry Major-General KUNO
Director of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry Rear-Admiral ABE
Director of the Supervisory Affairs Bureau of the Commerce and Industry Ministry TSUJI
Director of the Finance and Management Affairs Bureau of the Finance Ministry AIDA
Director of the Banking Bureau of the Finance Ministry MATSUOKA
Director of the Foreign Exchange Bureau of the Finance Ministry HARA

(Excerpts from the meeting)

SUZUKI, the Chairman of the Committee, called the meeting to order.

Premier KONOYE and Foreign Minister MATSUOKA delivered explanations respectively as on separate leaf, following which interpellations and answers were exchanged between the members of the Committee and State Ministers the gist of which is as follows:

Councillor KAWAI: "The supplementary documents accompanying the treaty which has been exchanged concerns the relations between our empire and the State of Germany but they do not touch upon Italy. What is the reason for this?"

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: "The German Foreign Minister RIBBEKFROP previously advised us that, as far as Italy is concerned, he himself..."
will take care of everything, and he desired that we refrain from even having an interview with the Italian Ambassador for the time being. That is why I had an interview with M. Sabetti on the first day yesterday (the 25th). On that occasion, he stated that all affairs pertaining to Italo-Japanese relations had so far been entrusted to Germany, and that the conclusion of a treaty such as the present one was what Italy had been looking forward to for some time. Moreover, in the documents exchanged between the German Ambassador and myself, we touched upon our relations with Italy to the effect that Italy in all probability would fall in line with Japan and Germany."

Councillor KAMAT: "How about our preparations to meet the situations when the worst turns up?"

War Minister TOJO: "As far as the Army is concerned, only a part of its strength would be employed in case of war with the United States. Therefore, there is nothing to be worried about. Relations with Russia in such case, I believe, would be advantageous to us because the present Treaty acts as a check. But as long as Russo-Japanese relations are not satisfactorily adjusted, we of course cannot afford to delay preparations. Concerning the China Incident, it is necessary that we bring a speedy end to it and prepare ourselves for the worst."

"Moreover, as regards supplies, we have enough reserves to last for quite a while."

Navy Minister OKAWA: "Preparations of our ships for battle have already been completed. Regarding war materials, crude oil in particular, we have enough to last us for quite awhile. If, however, the war becomes prolonged, we may be faced with a major difficulty in the way of replenishment. In order to meet such possibilities, we will take the best means possible to expedite facilities for the production of synthetic oil."

Chief of the Planning Board, HOSHIKIO: "We are as yet not complete in the matter of self-supply and self-sufficiency of resources. According to our resources mobilization plan for this year, out of the total amount of ¥3,000,000,000,000 worth of material necessary, we must depend on ¥2,600,000,000,000 from abroad out of which we must depend on the United States and Britain for ¥1,900,000,000,000 worth. However, we are already quite prepared. Regarding petroleum, particularly gasoline for airplanes with which we were most acutely concerned in the past, we have done a great deal in securing them from various countries with the result that we have a considerable amount in stock. In case the war becomes prolonged, the prospect of obtaining supplies from the Dutch Indies, Spegelien, etc., are quite good."

(Recess from noon to 1:10 p.m.)

Councillor ISHII: "(1) The treaty under review does not contain a clause for non-separate peace. What is the reason for this? (2) What is the meaning of New Order in Europe referred to in Article 1 of the treaty?"

Foreign Minister KATSUKA: "With regard to the clause for non-separate peace, we did not touch upon it at all since the treaty under review aims, in principle, at prevention of war. If war should break out we would immediately come to an agreement on this subject between the three countries."

"As regards the New Order, I interpret it as a materialization representing the preface of the treaty which embraces the spirit of 'Hakko-jiu' (all the world under one roof) recommended by the Imperial Empire."

Councillor ABIMA: "If Japanese-American hostilities are at all events unavoidable, I believe it best to avail ourselves of the present opportunity. There is, however, one thing of which I cannot but
fool scenario. That is the scarcity of petrol. If war is once started between Japan and America, it will not end in a year or two. Even if we are with a good supply of oil in stock at present, we may become short of it. I would like to know what measures are being considered to meet such outcome."

Navy Minister OKAWA: "The production of synthetic oil is a recent undertaking. We can hardly expect much here. I, however, believe that there is still a possibility of importing oil in quantity from the Dutch East Indies and Northern Sakhalin through peaceful means. I feel we can cover our needs for a good length of time with our present stock of oil plus what we will obtain in the future. Furthermore, our production of aeroplane gasoline is now reaching a substantial volume. We are not feeling the dearth which we experienced for a time."

Councillor MINAMI: "(1) Judging from what is stipulated in Article 3 of the treaty, the Soviet can be considered as standing under the category of a state which is at present moment participating neither in the European war nor the Sino-Japanese conflict. What is the view with respect to this? (2) Are there no signs that STAHN, the special German envoy, discussed this question with some Soviet authorities on his way to Japan? (3) The proposition in view is liable to prompt a collaboration between the United States and the Soviet. What are the views of our authorities concerned?"

Foreign Minister KATSUOKA: "Specifically for the purpose of making it clear that the treaty under review has nothing to do with the Soviet, Article 5 is provided, while it is indicated in the supplementary documents to the effect that Germany shall take the trouble of mediating Russo-Japanese relations. (2) STAHN said that he had no talk with any of the Soviet authorities in relation to this proposition. I, however, can hardly believe it. Rather I take it that much negotiations have taken place between Germany and the Soviet. (3) With regard to the supposed collaboration between the United States and the Soviet, our Foreign Office authorities are keeping close watch. We are convinced that so far nothing has been done by them in this connection. We will continue to be on the alert and watch their doings. Rather we intend to take the initiative in adjusting Russo-Japanese relations."

Councillor ISHIKU: "In the light of various bygone facts, I fear that we can hardly expect the fulfillment of the treaty on the part of Germany. In putting the treaty into effect, we must prove to her our sincerity; at the same time we must also ask for sincerity on the part of Germany. I hope that our government will make due efforts especially regarding this point."

Councillor SHIKU: "(1) What are the facts regarding Germany’s assistance to the Chungking Government? (2) What are the contents of the talks regarding the mandatory areas, the former German colonies?"

War Minister TOJO: "According to reports, German technicians have made their way into Chungking. There is another report that the Chinese Ambassador in Germany is busy in an attempt to purchase the arms which Germany seized from France in the current European warfare. However, both informations are unauthentic."

Foreign Minister KATSUOKA: "With regard to the mandatory areas under our control, the former German colonies, I wish to dispose of it in line with the supplementary documents we exchanged in connection with this proposition. In other words, we wish to hold the former German colonies included in our Empire just as heretofore by making some compensation to her. And the word 'some' means very little, almost tantamount to nominal."

Councillor MINAMI: "What is the real meaning of Greater East Asia, which recognizes the leadership of our Empire? I fear that a lack of understanding between the three states with regard to the
concrete demarcation of such area would give rise to an undesirable outcome in the future. (2) Who is the author of the treaty under review, Japan or Germany? According to rumors, there are some who say that the treaty was proposed by Germany, whose military operations turned out contrary to what she expected at first, for the purpose of utilizing Japan as a check upon the United States due to the fear that possibility of America's participation in the war would increase when the presidential election is over if the German-British war lasts. I wish to hear from our Foreign Minister his view in this respect.

"(2) Relations between Britain and America are very close. The latter is vitally interested in the Greater East Asia sphere whereupon it is inevitable that relations between Japan and the United States grow worse. On the other hand, there are possibilities of improvement in relations between Germany and America. Is there no fear of Japan alone drinking from the bitter cup?

"(4) In the event of war between Japan and America, the attitude of Russia would have a serious bearing upon us. Why did not your government make any effort to reach an agreement with the Soviet also when we negotiated with Germany? Has there been anything done between Japan and Germany with a view to cause the Soviet to drop assistance to Chiang?

"(5) What is the meaning of so-called 'participation' contained in Article 3 of the treaty under consideration?"

Foreign Minister Katsuoka: "(1) By 'Greater East Asia' I mean the area which includes French Indo-China, Thailand, Burma, the Straits Settlements, and the Oceanic Group comprising the Dutch East Indies, New Guinea, New Caledonia, etc. Regarding this sphere we have made an understanding that this sphere could be automatically broadened in the course of time. This point is already stated in the records of the treaty negotiations.

"(2) The treaty under review was proposed by Germany. The rumors in circulation contain a half truth, but nevertheless the German Foreign Minister's view as given in the documents exchanged between us is no empty word.

"(3) Our Empire should at this moment ally itself with Germany and Italy and adopt its international relations with the Soviet Union in the event of an international situation inimical to us and thereby do our utmost to avoid an outbreak of hostility between Japan and America. Even if Japan and America should unfortunately come to fight against each other, I consider it advisable for us after all to maintain friendly terms with America. Also from such a viewpoint, I consider it very advantageous for us if we ally with Germany and manipulate to our interest Americans of German descent, who number in the neighborhood of 20 millions and who already hold an influential position in the United States. Further, I fear that if we do not bind us in an alliance with Germany, it would be possible that in future Britain and Germany might conclude peace between themselves, create a new situation in Europe, and attempt to rule over the South Seas area and other regions for their own purpose. It is necessary to show at this time Japan's determination.

"(4) A Soviet-Japanese Pact had been already planned by the preceding cabinet. The Soviet, however, made excessive demands which were a violation of our proposal. As the bond of the existing between Germany and the Soviet Union is considerably strong and firm, it is difficult for us to arrive at any arrangement with the Soviet Union unless we first reach an understanding with Germany. In other words, the Pact under review forms the basis of the future foreign relations of our Empire. Further, although the German Ambassador, in the course of our negotiations, proposed to me to have the Soviet Union abandon her pro-Chiang regime policy, and to mediate between the Chungking government and Japan, I deliberately told him that
our country itself would dispose of such problems.

"(5) For instance, if our country cannot sit idle watching in case a powerful American fleet enters Singapore. I believe that we may then get help from Germany; conversely, a U.S.-Canadian common defense can hardly be construed as 'participation,' since the present Pact aims to avoid war. I feel that everything has been decided on the basis of the relevant conditions."

Councillor VIJ: "With regard to the situation concerning the supply of materials, petrol in particular, I wish to be given an explanation sufficient to set our minds at ease."

President HOSHIKO of the Planning Board: "We have a considerable stock of petrol, but difficulty is inevitable if worst conditions prevail for a long period. We will in this connection endeavor to ensure its supply by utilizing various domestic installations and also by establishing connections with overseas sources."

War Minister TOJO: "As for the Army, the supply of oil on hand would be enough to cover our operation for sometime to come, but I have no confidence in this respect if war should continue three to four years further. I feel there will be no alternative other than to strive for a way out of the desperate situation."

Navy Minister OIKAWA: "For the use of the Navy, we have sufficient stock of petrol to cover our requirements for a considerable period. Assuming that our yearly requirement equals to our estimated maximum consumption of oil for a series of full scale fleet-to-fleet clashes, I do not think that our stock will be exhausted in the course of half a year or one year. If the war is protracted for a long period, say five to ten years, the frequency of battles would automatically drop, and it is our intention to take steps to adjust our consumption so that our stock can be consumed during an extended period."

Councillor MIKAWA: "How about our finance when hostilities between Japan and the United States break out before the China Incident is ended?"

Finance Minister KAWAGUMI: "It will be quite natural that our financial distress will increase more than ever, but I do not think that there will be no measures available with which to meet the situation. As for the source of our revenue, we may look to bonds and taxes. In either case, we have no alternative but to rely upon the saviness of the people. If the situation should progress in the present state for another few years, we would possibly meet no major difficulty in finance. If the situation should grow still worse, we must try to raise funds enough to cover the war expenditures by exercising utmost economy in the general expenditures. The difficulty in the field of national finance would almost be the same as that in the domain of materials."

Councillor AZAKI: "With the development of the situation, will there be no shortage of troops? Besides, I have lately been informed that among the returnees from the battle fields there are many who are suffering from tuberculosis. What is the true state of affairs?"

War Minister TOJO and Navy Minister OIKAWA: "Since the manpower needed by our Army in the war against America will be comparatively small in number, while Naval personnel is by its very nature limited in size, we feel no concern in respect to number of personnel. There are among the returnees a considerable number of tuberculosis cases, but the military authorities in charge and the Ministry of Public Welfare are doing their best in the way of medical facilities for these patients."
Councillor SUSUMU: "(1) What is the relationship between the treaty under review and the anti-Comintern Pact? Moreover, Germany seems to be the only party with whom we have negotiated this treaty, and likewise in the supplementary instruments exchanged between the contracting parties Germany appears to be the only other party. Thus, there is concern with regard to our relation with Italy. How about this point? (2) What is the resolve of our government with regard to the finance to meet with the outbreak of a Japano-American war?"

Foreign Minister KATSUOKA: "The Anti-Comintern Pact shall be retained. As to the adjustment of our relations with the Soviet Union, I believe that we can consider it separately. The reasons why Germany is the only party with whom we negotiated the treaty under review and with whom we exchanged the relevant documents, are that the treaty was negotiated at the request of the German government, and also that what is being sought by our Empire is principally related to Germany. With regard to our relations with Italy, we will endeavor to leave no cause for any regrets."

Finance Minister WAKATA: "With regard to our finance, doubtless the burden on our people will grow heavier. I wish to arrange various measures so that the whole nation can bear the increasing burden."

Councillor WATANABE: "With the conclusion of the Alliance under review, the future of the Soviet Union will greatly affect the future destiny of our Empire. Hence I hope that our government authorities would direct their efforts especially on this point."

Councillor USHIKI: "The conclusion of the treaty under review will naturally result in increasing difficulties to our country. I feel it essential for our government authorities and also the leaders of our people to harness themselves with a renewed resolve and to arouse the people's spirit. As the dearth of civilian consumption goods will engender unrest in the people's thought, at least the supply of requisite items for sustaining the civilians' living should be given adequate consideration, so as to leave no cause for any regrets. What is the government's intention in this respect?"

President HISAMICHI of the Planning Board: "In our commodity mobilization program, the center of gravity is laid on the items for military purposes. We have, however, paid a good deal of consideration to secure also the necessities for the civilians' living."

Councillor HAYASHI: "In the light of the address made by STALIN before the Communist Party members after the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression agreement, it appears that his basic policy of launching a movement to Sovietize Germany and Britain at such a moment when their strength is spent, and likewise to Sovietize Japan and China, remains unchanged. If this be the case, rapprochement between Japan and the Soviet Union would be a task very difficult to accomplish. What is the view of the Foreign Minister in this respect?"

Foreign Minister KATSUOKA: "In my opinion, pessimism and optimism are divided on a fifty-fifty basis. Therefore, we intend to utilize Germany to bring the situation to an optimistic view. It is still not certain to what extent Germany will work upon the Soviet to adjust Soviet-Japanese relations. If, however, the Soviet Union is afraid of Germany, the latter would make considerable efforts to mediate between Japan and the Soviet Union."

Councillor FUKAI: "(1) In what way will Germany give us military assistance in the event of a Japanese American war? (2) I learned that a protest was made in connection with the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty on the ground that this infringes on the secret anti-Comintern Pact between Japan and Germany. How has this turned out? (3) In the preface of the treaty under review I find a passage which reads: 'This enables each nation of the world to have a proper place in the world,' but in Hitler's own language, he says 'against
other races the virtual of the fittest is the grand high-road of heaven and earth. These two clearly contradict each other. Is there no cause for unrest? If a Japanese-American war is unavoidable, as Foreign Minister said, his assertions might be justified; if, on the contrary, it is not unavoidable, there must be room for maneuvering behind the scenes.

"In the event of a war, there will be the utmost in respect to the supply of civilian necessities, and also unrest in thought. Has the government any conviction that it can still overcome the situation without the occurrence of a serious state of affairs? I wish to ask the Premier's resolve on this point."

Foreign Minister MATSUOYA, War Minister TOJO and Premier KONOE:

"(1) German assistance will consist of the supply of superior arms and matériel. This, however, will depend upon an understanding being reached with the Soviet Union,

"(2) It is open to question whether the protest was made to Germany officially. No answer has been received from Germany;

"(3) Any race that dies out under the rule of the survival of the fittest is not worth existing on this earth. If we fail to accomplish our great mission of spreading the Imperial way at the time it should be done, then it can't be helped even if we go out of existence. The fact that we succeeded in placing these words in the preface is a victory of our diplomacy,

"(4) as to whether we shall be able to avert a crisis by courting America, such idea is wrong. In order to avoid a crisis, we must take a firm stand and nothing else. By this we will prevent an unfortunate situation to arise. Our government has come to a decision to conclude the treaty under review with an unusual determination, by taking into consideration from all conceivable angles the conditions of our country, the living conditions of the people, red propaganda, etc., in case of the worst situation. The Emperor himself gave an unusual resolve granted us his gracious words. We were deeply impressed at this as it reminded us of the resolve of the Emperor MEiji at the time of the Russo-Japanese war. We are now determined to lay down our lives to serve the Throne."

Councillor FURUMOTO: "(1) Did His Majesty consult us on the treaty alone? Or are both the treaty and the exchange instruments involved? (2) Does the passage in Article 3 which reads: 'The European war or the China dispute' mean that no participation is made in either of these? (3) What is meant by the mixed expert commission? (4) There exists a non-aggression treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union. Hence, does Article 5 mean that Germany will not attack the Soviet Union even when the latter assaults Japan? Further, is Japan bound to fight against the Soviet Union if a Soviet-German hostility breaks out? If this were the case, would not such an arrangement be unilateral. Does the word 'existing' mean the date of signing?"

Foreign Minister MATSUOYA: "(1) What we had submitted to the Emperor for review was the draft for the treaty; and we have here presented to you the draft of the exchanged official documents for your reference.

"(2) Yes, that is just what it means.


"(4) Although there exists a non-aggression treaty, Japan will aid Germany in the event of a Soviet-German war, and Germany will assist Japan in the event of a Russo-Japanese war."
"With regard to the word 'existing', if you mean to ask if the present status of the Soviet Union cannot be modified, I say no; I mean that it will not be modified by the treaty under consideration. It will be well to readjust Japan's relation with the Soviet Union hereafter."

Councillor OSHIMA: "(1) To what extent does the Greater East Asia include? (2) Three or four years later, when Germany will have recovered from her scars of war she may get herself involved in hostilities with Russia. Has there been any talk about Japan and Germany combining to cope with Russia?"

Foreign Minister MATSUOXA: "(1) This question has been mentioned before.

"(2) We do not anticipate a war with Russia. Even though the Russo-Japanese relation may be readjusted it will hardly last for three years. After two years, it will be necessary to reconsider the relations among Japan, Germany, and Russia."

Councillor OHATA: "Although we have heard explanations on the necessity of concluding the treaty in question, it does not mean that insecurity has been obliterated. Since we have decided upon this matter with great determination, unerring insight, and solemn formality, we shall hope that it will not bring about the worst situation.

"Article III, externally, seems bilateral, but the United States is about to participate in the European war, while on the other hand it does not consider Russian aid to Chang Kai-Shek an act of participation. Therefore, in reality, is it not unilateral? It appears that Japan alone is bound to a great sacrifice, while the burden on the part of Germany is hardly conceivable."

Foreign Minister MATSUOXA: "STAHMER maintains that the United States' participation in the war is not desirable and that there is no fear of such a possibility.

"A Japanese-American war will be fatal. There is just as much danger of a Japanese-American war as there is in the United States' participation in the European war. The situation of the presidential election will have great influence upon it. In connection with this election we must not ignore the influence of Germans residing in the United States, as these Germans will be a potent factor in preventing the United States' participation in the war."

Councillor TAKEKOSHI: "In the event of the worst situation, will Japan be able to choose the time and place to let the Japanese Navy participate in the war?"

Foreign Minister MATSUOXA: "As it is to be decided by the three powers whether the exchanged official documents will prescribe obligations for participation in a war or not, your opinion in the case just mentioned is true."

Chairman of the Committee SUZUKI: "Irrespective of whether this pact will be concluded or not the Japanese people, must realize the inevitability of a Japanese-American war. Both the Japanese and American Navies will not be able to challenge each other. If they should fight in the Western Pacific the Japanese Navy will be able to annihilate the American Navy. The Americans also may think the same way. The United States is now going through a naval-expansion program, but I believe that Japan will be able to fight with its present strength in the course of the next year or two. What is the opinion of the Navy Minister on this point?"

Navy Minister OKAWA: "For the time being, if we presume that the United States will challenge us to a short and decisive war, I have full confidence of victory. With regard to future plans I wish
to improve the quality of our Navy and expand our armaments as much as possible."

Councillor ISHII: "I have some doubts regarding the disposal of Japan's mandated areas as stated in the exchanged official documents. May I have the opinions of the authorities?"

Foreign Minister MUSASHI: "I wish to have it arranged at this moment, that we shall have these mandated islands seized from Germany, to avoid any controversies in the future."

Councillor HIGUCHI: "(1) As the consequence of the signing of this pact, American economic pressure upon Japan and the internal economic difficulties to follow will be to some extent inevitable. To meet with such a situation, it will be necessary to control the various phases of economic life within our nation. As a result, some of our people will lose their ability to procure their necessities of life. What are the Government's measures to cope with such a situation? (2) The Japanese people have an aptitude to look upon the signing of an alliance treaty as an assurance of perpetual amicable relations, and to consider the nations who oppose it as enemies. I wish to ask our government, in making the announcement of this treaty, to emphasize that our people should be careful not to be captivated by Germany and Italy, and also not to have hostile opinions against the United States and Great Britain."

Chief of the Planning Board SINOSE and Prime Minister KANSUI: "(1) With regard to the Anglo-American pressure, we agree with you. As a result, there concerned with export and import will have to suffer. We are now settling up this aspect with a view to obtain some adequate means to deal with it. (2) We entirely agree with your opinion on controlling the anti-Anglo-American movement."

Chairman of the Committee SUGIN, considering this the end of interpellations, ordered the State Ministers and the explainers to leave.

(The State Ministers and explainers retire.)

Then, deliberations were started among the committee members, every member exchanging his opinion on the formality and substance of the pact.

Finally, it was decided to avoid any incitement that may develop from this prosecution against the United States and Great Britain; and to strengthen Japan's relations with the Soviet Union; and moreover, demanded the Government authorities not to engage preparations for the possible worst situation. Thus, the pact was unanimously approved.

Chairman SUGIN adjourned the session.

(Session adjourned at 8:30 p.m.)
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, I. Takatsuki, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary, Privy Council, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 41 pages, dated Sept. 26, 1940, and described as follows: Minutes of conference of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council relative to the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy, Sept. 26, 1940.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Privy Council.

Signed at Tokyo on this 26th day of August, 1946  
/s/ I. Takatsuki  
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Kichi, Chosokabe  
Secretary, Privy Council  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward F. Meneghini, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo, Japan on this 26th day of August, 1946  
/s/ Edward F. Meneghini  
Witness: /s/ R. V. Larsen  
Investigator, IFS  
Official Capacity
RECORD OF THE MEETING OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Conclusion of a Three-Power Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy

The meeting is opened on Thursday, September 26, 1940 at 9:40 a.m.

His Imperial Majesty enters.

Present:
President IARI
Vice-President SUZUKI

Ministers:
Prime Minister KONOYE (No. 5)
War Minister TOJO (No. 6)
Foreign Minister - Overseas Minister MATSUDA (No. 7)
Education Minister HASUDA (No. 8)
Finance Minister KANADA (No. 10)
Justice Minister KAZAMI (No. 12)
Communications Minister - Railways Minister MURATA (No. 13)
Agriculture & Forestry Minister ISHIHARA (No. 14)
Navy Minister OKAWA (No. 15)

Privy Councillors:
Councillor KAWAI (No. 18)
Councillor ISHI (No. 19)
Councillor ARIDA (No. 20)
Councillor KUOTO (No. 21)
Councillor ISHIHARA (No. 22)
Councillor SHIITZU (No. 23)
Councillor MINAMI (No. 24)
Councillor NANA (No. 25)
Councillor ISHI (No. 27)
Councillor MATSUI (No. 28)
Councillor SUGAWARA (No. 29)
Councillor ISHIHARA (No. 30)
Councillor UCHI (No. 31)
Councillor HAYASHI (No. 32)
Councillor FUJI (No. 33)
Councillor TAKAHASHI (No. 34)
Councillor MASA (No. 35)
Councillor OSHIMA (No. 36)
Councillor SATO (No. 37)
Councillor TAKAFUSHI (No. 38)
Councillor TSUCHI (No. 39)

Absent:
Imperial Princes:
Prince YASUHITO (No. 1)
Prince NOBUHITO (No. 2)
Prince TAKAHITO (No. 3)
Prince KOTOHITO (No. 4)
Dec 15
Pago 2

Ministers:
Commerce & Industry Minister KOBAYASHI (No. 9)
Home Minister - Welfare Minister YOSHII (No. 11)

Privy Councillors:
Councillor KASUI (No. 17)
Councillor NAKAGAWA (No. 25)

*Committee Members
President of the Planning Board KOSHINO
Director of the Board of Legislation MORI
Councillor of the Board of Legislation KURATA
Director of the Treaty Bureau, Foreign Ministry MATSUMOTO
Director of the Control Bureau, Commerce & Industry Ministry TSUJI
Director of the Finance Bureau, Finance Ministry NAKAYAMA
Director of the Banking Bureau, Finance Ministry NAKAGAWA
Director of the Exchange Bureau, Finance Ministry NAKAGAWA

*Reporting Councillor: Chairman of the Investigation Committee SUZUKI

*Chief Secretary: Chief Secretary HIRATA
*Secretary: Secretary MORIISHI
Secretary TAKATSUJI

*FRESOEN (IIDA): The meeting is called to order.

The matter of the conclusion of a three power treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy is submitted as the subject for discussion.

I now open the first reading. Commencing the reading I immediately call for the report of the Chairman of the Investigation Committee.

*REPORTING COUNCILLOR (SUZUKI): Recently the conclusion of a three power treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy was referred to this Council for deliberation. Today I and all other councillors present received the command to serve in the Investigation Committee. We immediately opened the committee meeting and thinking of the great importance of this draft, we listened minutely to the explanations given by the ministers of state and various officials concerned and gave the matter careful consideration. Moreover as the matter was urgent there was no time to issue a report on the investigation. I ask for your understanding concerning the above.

According to the explanations of the ministers of state, at this time when the China incident is still unresolved the recent attitude of the United States towards our country had gradually stiffened. The attitude of the Chiangkei Government and other countries antagonistic to our country have also been influenced by this attitude; the international position of our country has become more and more difficult; and we cannot but be gravely concerned over the future. How the only way to surmount this crisis
and strengthen our international position is to strengthen our cooperation with countries having the same interests as ours. How Germany and Italy are eager to prevent the entry into the war of the United States, while our country also is desirous of avoiding a crisis with that country, so that our interests coincide. Therefore the Government has made zealous efforts in this direction ever since its formation. Recently, based on a German proposal, the opportunity for us to strengthen our cooperation with Germany and Italy without entering the present European war has arrived. For this reason we planned to conclude a treaty, opened negotiations with these two countries, and after many conferences finally reached a conclusion on the twenty-fourth of this month. This is the treaty now placed before this Council for deliberation.

I shall now give the substance of this treaty. First, in the preamble, the Governments of the three countries of Japan, Germany and Italy recognize that the prerequisite for eternal peace is the enabling of every country to have its own place, and therefore, their basic principle is the construction and maintenance of a new order sufficient to show the fruits of co-existence and co-prosperity of various races in Europe and Greater East Asia. They have decided to act in harmony and cooperation regarding the efforts to be based on this object (aim), and furthermore they will give unstinting cooperation to countries in every part of the world who desire to make the same efforts. In this way the three countries hope to realize their ultimate aspirations regarding world peace. Next, in the body of the treaty, the following points were decided: (1) Japan recognizes and respects the leading position of Germany and Italy in the construction of a new order in Europe while Germany and Italy recognize and respect Japan's leading position in the construction of a new order in Greater East Asia.

(2) The three countries of Japan, Germany and Italy will cooperate with each other in their efforts based on the above-mentioned line of policy. When one of these three countries is attacked by a country not at present involved in either the European war or the Sino-Japanese hostilities the three countries will aid each other with all political, economic and military means.

(3) In order to carry out this treaty, a mixed special committee composed of members appointed by each of the Governments of the three countries shall be assembled without delay.

(4) The three countries confirm the fact that the articles of this treaty shall in no wise affect the existing political situation between these three countries and the Soviet Union.

(5) This treaty shall take effect simultaneously with its signing and shall be effective for ten years. At an appropriate time before its expiration, upon the demand of any of the contracting powers negotiations shall be opened regarding the renewal of the treaty.
we think that the proposed Japan-Germany-Italy Three Power Treaty is based on the common interests of the three countries of Japan, Germany and Italy, and will strengthen all the more the cooperation of the three countries in working together and pressing forward in constructing a new order respectively in Greater East Asia and Europe. Furthermore it is proposed that the three countries promise to aid each other in every way against the attack of another country not at present in the war. This is indeed a matter of unprecedented gravity for our country and hence is need for deep and mature deliberation on the influence it will have on our national destiny. Nevertheless, in view of the present situation, we are forced to recognize that it (the treaty) was truly unavoidable. But there is need to take steps to prevent, as far as possible, the inciting of Great Britain and America as a result of the conclusion of this treaty. At the same time, we must also make ample preparations in case by any chance war should come to war. The Government has said it will make ample efforts concerning these several points. Also, as to our country's relations with the Soviet Union, we need to make special efforts for smooth relations, and on this point also the government has declared it will exert itself for the accomplishment of its objective through Germany. Hereupon I and my colleagues place our trust in the government's declarations and furthermore earnestly desire the government to do its utmost. Thus I and my colleagues unanimously voted that this draft should be passed as it stands, together with the above-mentioned requests.
"I hereby report the results of the investigation.

"No. 19 (ISHII): I believe that the proposed draft (this matter) is one of the most important problems since our country opened up diplomatic relations. I hereby make clear that in the final analysis I agree with the proposed draft. Because I deeply fear that the enforcement of this alliance is apt to invite grave disasters I wish to give a few outspoken opinions concerning this draft and thus urge the careful attention of the government authorities.

"To begin with, modern international alliances are different from those of olden times, which gave birth to very intimate relationships comparable to those of husband and wife, or of brothers, for they constituted simply a union (partnership) of one country with another. Furthermore in the operation of a treaty of alliance, one ally tries to gain exclusive benefits for his own country at the sacrifice of the other. It is because of this that diplomatic relations between allied countries are particularly difficult. With this actual fact as a premise, let us consider the national character of the two countries of Germany and Italy. It is a conspicuous fact that there is not a single country that has gained any benefit from allying itself with Germany and her predecessor Prussia. Not only so, but there are countries which because of this alliance have suffered unforeseen disasters and have finally lost their national entity. Chancellor BISMARCK of Germany once said that in international alliances one horseman and one donkey are required, and that Germany must always be the horseman. Sure enough, just as he had said, in the last European war, her attitude towards Austria and Turkey was as that of a horseman shouting at and whipping a donkey—she made these two countries endanger their very existence, so that even onlookers (outsiders) could not help shuddering. But of course those were events concerning Imperial Germany, and there are people who will say that the newly-arisen Nazi Germany will not necessarily follow in the tracks of the Imperial Regime. In spite of this I believe that Chancellor HITLER of Nazi Germany is a character of no little danger. He is said to have taken MACHIAVELLI as a model and always has his book Il Principe at his right hand. Verily, he has declared that international alliances are a temporary expedient, and has publicly stated that one should not hesitate in breaking them as soon as the time comes. For instance the conclusion of the German-Soviet pact last August, which clearly conflicts with the anti-Comintern pact that country had previously concluded with us, should from the first have occasioned no surprise. From early years he (HITLER) had studied about the Orient, and held from the first that Japan should not be allowed to become a strong power, and it is said he often spoke of this to those close to him. From whatever angle we view it, we cannot believe that Nazi Germany under the leadership of HITLER can be a loyal friend of Japan for a long time. Next, when we consider Italy, we find her national character just as unreliable as that of Germany. From early days she has thought of herself as being the king (queen) of power politics among the European powers. Probably this is why she received no heavy damage from Germany in the last European war."
"To sum it up, both Germany and Italy should not be trusted too much. Then what is my reason for agreeing to this draft, the purpose of which is to conclude an alliance with these two untrustworthy countries? In spite of the reasons I have here stated, I believe that the proposal of allying ourselves with these two countries is opportune. When one thinks of the position of Germany and Italy in recent years, from the economic viewpoint of have and have-nots, or from the condition of the balance of power, it may be considered that there are no countries whose interests are as similar as those of Japan, Germany and Italy. The alliance can be said to be based on common national interests, rather than on their national character of the personality of their leaders. Thus the Germany of today must be called a truly invaluable ally for the Japan of today. However as I have said before, as the national character of Germany is such as would suck the blood of others, we must pay deep attention lest she should boast of being the only horse rider. Both in modern science and in her capacity for the production of munitions Germany shows a degree of progress one step ahead of ours. Since we are concluding an alliance with her we should of our own accord make efforts to take advantage of these points in which she is superior. I am in favor of the conclusion of this treaty of alliance as a timely step, but in the light of past history, I earnestly hope that when this treaty is realised, the honorable members of the government will not neglect to take exhaustive and scrupulous care so that we need have no future regrets. It is a matter for rejoicing that our isolated and friendless country has here unexpectedly received a hand from strong other countries, and I fervently pray that my fears may prove to be groundless. But if by any chance even a part of my fears should be realized it will lead to serious consequences. It is for this reason that I have taken it upon myself to give some outspoken advice to the government, and have hereby stated my inmost thoughts so that they may be of reference to you.

"PRESIDENT (HARA): As no other opinions are voiced, I shall omit the second reading and so forth and immediately call for a vote. I ask all those in favor of the draft to rise.

"(The entire body rises.)

"PRESIDENT (HARA): The draft has been passed by a unanimous vote. The meeting is adjourned.

"His Imperial Majesty leaves.

"(Meeting closed at 10:15 P.M.)

President: Yoshizichi HARA (Signed)
Chief Secretary: Suoo MORIE (Signed)
Secretary: Yuzuru MOROHASHI (Signed)
Masani TAKATSUJI (Signed)"
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, _______ M. TAKATSUI _______ hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: _______ Privy Council _______ and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of _______ pages, dated _______, 1940, and described as follows: _______ Record of meeting of the Privy Council _______ held _______, 1940, at _______ PM regarding conclusion of _______ Three Power Treaty between Japan, Germany, and Italy _______.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): _______ Privy Council _______.

Signed at Tokyo, Japan on this _______ day of August, 1946.

/s/ M. Takatsuji
Signature of Official (Seal)

Witness: Kichi, Chosokabe _______ Secretary, Privy Council _______ Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, ______ EDWARD F. MONAGHAN ______ hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo, Japan _______ on this _______ day of August _______, 1946. /s/ Edward F. Monaghan _______ Name

Witness: _______ R. H. Lash _______ Investigator, JFS _______ Official Capacity
The enhancement of great righteousness in the eight corners of the world, and the unification of the world under one roof has been the great instruction given to us by our august Imperial forefathers, which we have never neglected. The disturbances in the world situation today are being endlessly aggravated, and the disasters which would be inflicted upon humanity would be immeasurably great. As we earnestly desire that no time will be lost in overcoming all the troubles and restoring peace, we have ordered our government to discuss the matters concerning coalition and collaboration with Germany and Italy, who have similar objects with the Empire. Accordingly, we are deeply pleased to see the conclusion of the pact between the three countries.

When we think of it, we realize that we still have a very long way before we accomplish the unprecedented task of enabling all the nations to have their own proper places and to live in peace and security. Ye, our subjects, guard and maintain the prosperity of our Imperial Throne which is eternal as Heaven and earth, by overcoming the critical situation of today with united will and strength and with far-sighted wisdom and clearer concept of the national polity.

The Imperial signmanual and seal,

27th September, 15th year of Showa (1940).

Prime Minister
Prince KUNO, Fumimaro
War Minister
TOJO, Hideki
Foreign Minister and Minister
of Overseas affairs
MATSUOKA, Yosuke
Education Minister
HoshiDA, Kunihiko
Acting Minister of Commerce
and Industry

Financial Minister
Kanai, Retsu
Home Minister

Welfare Minister
YASUI, Eiji
Justice Minister
KAZAMA, Akira

Communication Minister

Railway Minister

Minister of Agriculture and
Forestry

Navy Minister

President of Planning Board

AOGA, Koshiro

GAO, Koshiro
CERTIFICATE

J.D.C. No. ________
I.P.S. No. 2600a _______

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Takahashi Michio ______ hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Cabinet ______ and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 2 pages, dated 27 September, 1940, and described as follows ______ Imperial Rescript ______

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): ______

Cabinet ______

Signed at Tokyo ______ on this 20th day of August, 1946, /s/ M. Takahashi ______

Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ K. Kuriyama ______ Secretary of Cabinet ______

 Officials Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan ______ hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo ______ on this 20th day of August, 1946 /s/ Edward P. Monaghan ______

Witness: Ruth F. Anderson ______ Investigator, I.P.S. ______

Official Capacity
Tokyo, September 27, 1940

The German Ambassador.

G No. 1001

Strictly confidential.

Excellency:

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Letter Jyo - ni Nr.133 of this date with the contents as follows:

"I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that, the Japanese Government earnestly share the hope with the Governments of Germany and Italy that the present European War will remain limited as far as possible in its sphere and scope and will come to a speedy conclusion and that they shall on their part spare no effort in that direction.

However, the conditions actually prevailing in Greater East Asia and elsewhere do not permit the Japanese Government to rest assured in the present circumstances that there is no danger whatever of an armed conflict taking place between Japan and Great Britain, and accordingly they desire to call attention of the German Government to such a possibility and to state that they feel confident that Germany will do their utmost to aid Japan in such eventuality with all means in their power."

I take this occasion to note the contents of Your Excellency's letter.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the highest consideration.

signed: Ott.
CERTIFICATE

W.D.C. No.
T.P.S. No. 940A, B & C

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, K. Hayashi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 7 pages, dated Sept. 27, 1940, and described as follows: Three letters from German Ambassador OTT to the Imperial Japanese Foreign Minister, dated September 27, 1940, and numbered G1000, G1001, and G1002, respectively. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 24th day of August, 1946 /s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official
Witness: /s/ Nagabaru Odo
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 24th day of August, 1946 /s/ Edward P. Monaghan
NAE

Witness: /s/ R. H. Larch
Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity
Tokyo, September 27, 1940

Mr. The German Ambassador.

Excellency:

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's letter Jyo-ni Nr. 134 of this date and to confirm the oral declaration made by me concerning the former German colonies in the South Sea contained in Your Excellency's letter under reply.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the highest consideration.

signed: Ott.
CERTIFICATE

W.D.C. No. ______
I.P.S. No. 040A, B & C

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, K. Hayashi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 7 pages, dated Sept. 27, 1940, and described as follows: Three letters from German Ambassador OTT to the Imperial Japanese Foreign Minister, dated September 27, 1940, and numbered G1000, G1001, and G1002, respectively. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 24th day of August, 1946 /s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official
Witness: /s/ Nagabaru Odo
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 24th day of August, 1946 /s/ Edward P. Monaghan
Witness: /s/ R. H. Larch

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity
The German Ambassador
Tokyo, September 27, 1940.
Strictly confidential.

Excellency:

At the moment when our conversations, begun on the 9th instant at Tokyo, are about to eventuate in a successful conclusion of the Three Powers Pact, it is Minister Stahmer's and my sincerest desire to tender to Your Excellency the expression of deepest appreciation for the principal part Your Excellency has played throughout in a most generous and accommodating spirit.

We wish to take this occasion to state once more in this letter some of the salient points reiterated in our conversations with Your Excellency which are as follows:

The German Government are convinced that the Contracting Parties are about to enter into a new and decisive phase of world history in which it will be their task to assume the leadership in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia and Europe respectively.

The fact that for a long time to come their interests will coincide and the unrestricted mutual confidence of the Contracting Parties form the solid foundation on which the Pact is built.

The German Government firmly believe that the technical details concerning the execution of the Pact will be settled without difficulties and that it would not be in keeping with the far-reaching importance of the Pact and it would be practically impossible to anticipate all possible cases which might arise in the course of its application; they can only be dealt with in the spirit of mutual confidence and helpfulness as they arise from time to time.

Conclusions of the Technical Commissions stipulated in Article 4 of the Pact shall be submitted to the respective Governments for approval in order to be put in force.

It is needless to say that whether or not a Contracting Party has been attacked within the meaning of Article 3 of the Pact shall be determined upon consultation among the three Contracting Parties.
If Japan, contrary to the intentions of the Pact, should be attacked by a Power so far not engaged in the European War or the China Incident, Germany will consider it a matter of course to give Japan full support and assist it with all military and economic means.

With regard to the relations between Japan and Soviet Russia, Germany will do everything within its power to promote a friendly understanding and will at any time offer its good offices to this end.

Germany will use her industrial capacity and other resources technical and material as far as possible in favour of Japan in order both to facilitate the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia and to enable her to be better prepared for any emergency. Germany and Japan will further undertake mutually to aid each other in procuring in every possible way raw materials and minerals including oil which they will have been in need of.

The German Foreign Minister implicitly believes that Italy will of course act in concord with Germany and Japan when and where assistance and co-operation by Italy is sought in reference to the matters above enumerated.

I have the honour to present to Your Excellency the above expose as the views of the German Foreign Minister conveyed personally by his special delegate, Minister Stahmer, and repeatedly transmitted to me from my Government.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

signed: Ott.
CERTIFICATE

I, K. Hayashi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 7 pages, dated Sept. 27, 1940, and described as follows: Three letters from German Ambassador OTT to the Imperial Japanese Foreign Minister, dated September 27, 1940, and numbered G1000, G1001, and G1002, respectively. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 24th day of August, 1946 /s/ K. Hayashi

Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Nagabaru Odo

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 24th day of August, 1946 /s/ Edward P. Monaghan

Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ R. H. Larch

Investigator, IPS
Tokyo, September 27, 1940.

DEUTSCHE BOTSCHAFT.

G No. 1001

Strictly confidential.

Personal letter of the German Ambassador to His Excellency the Imperial Japanese Foreign Minister.

Excellency:

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Letter Jyo – ni Nr.133 of this date with the contents as follows:

"I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that, the Japanese Government earnestly share the hope with the Governments of Germany and Italy that the present European War will remain limited as far as possible in its sphere and scope and will come to a speedy conclusion and that they shall on their part spare no effort in that direction.

However, the conditions actually prevailing in Greater East Asia and elsewhere do not permit the Japanese Government to rest assured in the present circumstances that there is no danger whatever of an armed conflict taking place between Japan and Great Britain, and accordingly they desire to call attention of the German Government to such a possibility and to state that they feel confident that Germany will do their utmost to aid Japan in such eventuality with all means in their power."

I take this occasion to note the contents of Your Excellency's letter.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the highest consideration.

signed: Ott.
Letter from the Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador.

Excellency:

I have the honour to ask Your Excellency to confirm the following oral declaration which was made by Your Excellency on behalf of the German Government:

"The German Government agree that the former German Colonies actually under Japan's Mandate in the South Seas shall remain in Japan's possession, it being understood that Germany be in a way compensated therefor. In regard to other former Colonies in the South Seas, they shall be restored automatically to Germany upon conclusion of peace ending the present European War. Afterwards the German Government would be prepared to confer, in an accommodating spirit, with the Japanese Government with a view to disposing of them as far as possible in Japan's favour against compensation."

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the highest consideration.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, K. Pryoshi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 2 pages, dated 19,, and described as follows: Letter from the Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 24th day of Aug, 1946 /s/ K. Pryoshi

Signature of Official

Witness: Nageraru Odo Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 24th day of Aug, 1946 /s/ Edward P. Monaghan

NAME

Witness: /s/ Richard F. Lersf Investigator, IPS Official Capacity
日本語のテキストを読み込んだり、翻訳したりする場合、具体的なテキスト内容が不明瞭であるため、正しく読めないことがあります。
2.61 - 5
2561-7
外国の研究の役割について

John B Pritchard

Contemporary Japan

The three power part and
the world of Tomorrow
In point of importance to the future of mankind, the Japano-German-Italian tract concluded in Berlin on September 27 must be considered of epoch-making significance. As clearly stated in the preamble, the three signatory powers intend by this treaty to set up a permanent world peace by enabling all the nations to take their proper places under the sun and thereby translating into fact the principle of co-existence and common prosperity among them.

Peace is a natural desire of mankind and for its fulfillment repeated attempts have been made ever since the dawn of history. No religion worth the name has ever failed to profess as its primary object the realization of peace and tranquility among men. There is, for example, a Biblical teaching, intended, no doubt, to work out the salvation of man, "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's." It has become clear, however, by what has transpired since that no salvation of man, with human nature as it is, can be accomplished by such methods as the Scripture enjoins us, making as it does a distinction between what is God's and what is Caesar's and separating as it does flesh and spirit and substance and mind from each other, not only that, but it has become increasingly clear that the course of international politics, based upon the principle of rendering unto Caesar that is Caesar's, has developed into sheer materialism, allowing the strong to prey upon the weak in denial of God's injunctions of justice and fraternal love for mankind. It is clear that such a system can produce nothing other than confusion and conflict in the world. In view of these failures in the past, Japan, Germany and Italy have come out to solve this all-important problem confronting mankind by an entirely new and hitherto untried means. Herein lies the fundamental idea which has motivated the conclusion of the tripartite treaty.

The new world order, to which reference is made in the treaty, has been conceived with such a motive. But as things stand today, with armed struggles raging in Europe and Asia, it would not be quite reasonable to expect the intentions of the signatory powers to be evaluated readily at their full and proper significance by other powers. This is especially true when many of them are either directly or indirectly involved in these struggles and are either aroused with feelings of hostility and hatred or are experiencing extreme uneasiness over their own future. Considering moreover the fact that the great historic change which is now taking place under our eyes requires of many powers the abandonment of views of a world and life to which they have been accustomed for past centuries, it obviously would take a considerable time for the real meaning of the new world order to be generally understood and much more accepted. This means that the interim years which will intervene between now and the time when the fullest
significance of the instrument will be understood can by no means be peace­ful ones, yet probably, therefore, a long period of perseverance and strenuous endeavor is in store for the three signatory Powers, which will do well to be fully prepared to meet adequately these eventualities.

Despite this fact, Japan, Germany and Italy are far from being eager to welcome a new struggle. Japan, for instance, has for the past three years of the China affair consistently demanded that China reconsider her attitude, understand Japan's real intention, grasp fully the spirit of the new times and take advantage of it. In Europe, too, the leaders of Germany and Italy have since before the outbreak of the present war, continued to make great Britain and France proposals for a similar peaceful understanding. Unfortunately, the opposition and antagonism between the new and old ideolo­gies in both the East and the West was so profound as to render it essen­tially impossible to find a middle course of reconciliation, the result being the continued life or death struggle between them which we witness today. The issue of the war in Europe as well as in Asia is clear beyond doubt; and the sooner the final submission of the vanquished comes, the less will be the tribulation of mankind. The present wars in the East and West are fundamentally different in character from those of the past. Although they entail a tremendous amount of destruction, their primary object is construction, as witnessed in the gradual emergency of a new order out of the ruins, and reconstruction there destruction has taken place. The three victorious nations, despite their immense sacrifices incurred in waging war, are steadily growing in power both materially and spiritually. This has been made possible due to the real strength of those who create, not destroy. But to those who hold to conventional ideas, who are prone to judge everything in terms of materials and figures, this would seem quite fantastic. In fact, it is for this reason that there are a number of people who have not yet awakened to the reality of the situation which is looking straight in their faces. This testifies incidentally to the great difficulty with which the hard crust of conventionalism can be broken through. This type of people fail to discover where the real source of strength and power which Japan, Germany and Italy are at present display­ing lies. Clapping eyes or only the superficialities, they seem to be entirely ignorant of the great fact that the principle for which the three Powers stand cannot be overcome by mere material strength. Blissful in their ignorance, they continue their stubborn resistance against the three Powers in the hope of conquering the new order or at least of pro­longing the tenure of life of the old one. But theirs is a vain effort. To protect what is naturally doomed to downfall in a historical process is nothing short of tragic. In truth, it is because of the existence of many such people that Japan, Germany and Italy have found it necessary to enter into this treaty. In this respect the treaty is bound to wield immense power and influence, and no doubt constitutes a menace in no small measure to those who cling to the old order of things. This may be called
the negative side of the treaty. The true purpose of the tripartite treaty, however, lies in its positive side. It contributes toward the construction of a new world order as the primary object which the three powers desire to establish under the pact, and it is solely in consideration of its operation in such a positive sense that the writer emphasized at the outset of this article the importance of this treaty from the viewpoint of world history.

What, then, is the new order which Japan, Germany and Italy intend to bring about, first in their respective spheres and ultimately throughout the world, as stipulated in the instruments? To give a clear-cut answer to this question is difficult at the present stage; but in view of the fact that the three powers, discarding the ideologies of individualism and democracy, have adopted the principle of dealing with human society from the totalitarian point of view, the character of the new order to be created under their leadership must for the most part be clearly perceived.

From the time of ancient Greece down to the modern age, Western civilization has undergone various changes in form, but the basis upon which it has developed has consistently been the individualistic view of the world. It was the movement for Kultur staged in various fields of activity by the German people with the rise of Prussia to power which revolted for the first time against this conception of civilization. Yet because of the structures of her state and society as well as the thoughts of her people not yet being entirely free from liberalism and individualism, Germany was ultimately defeated in the last European War, and the German term Kultur was accordingly made the butt of ridicule and contempt by the conquerors. By its subsequent development, however, Kultur Kampf has proved that, though its steps may be temporarily interrupted, it is after all in line with the inevitable course of progress which mankind is destined to take. The totalitarian movement, started by the Fascist Revolution in Italy and now about to reach its zenith in the National Socialist Revolution in Germany, is spreading like a prairie fire, leaving no room for doubt that the world of tomorrow will be thoroughly permeated with this new concept of world and man.

The writer understands the totalitarian movement to mean, in the west, a return to that simple but virile human instinct which characterized the German and Latin peoples of more than a thousand years ago. Simultaneously with the appearance of such a movement in Germany and Italy, there also arose in Japan a similar movement for going back to the intrinsically Japanese way of ancient days. In Japan, however, no such drastic change as warrants being called revolutionary was necessary, as was the case in Germany and Italy. For Japan’s polity has since the foundation of the Empire been established and maintained upon a permanent and unchanging basis, and the pure and unadulterated totalitarianism embodying the unity of sovereign and subjects as one organic body has always been the
The immutable faith of the Japanese people, but it would be untrue to say that the evils of liberalistic civilization have not for the past half-century poisoned her ancient tradition. Indeed, the accumulation of its harmful influences had become so intolerably large in both internal and foreign affairs that at last the nation revolted and its dissatisfaction found expression in the form of the Manchurian incident of 1931. This incident meant the bursting out of the thitherto suppressed healthy, racial instinct of the nation, in challenge externally of unjust conditions long forced upon mankind by the democratic powers and internally of all alien ideas and thoughts grafted upon the people. It called for a re-examination and a return to what is really Japanese in politics, economics and indeed in all activities of the people. The characteristics of this movement in Japan have become even more accentuated in the current China affair, in which the classic expression, Hikko Jishu, has been adopted as the national slogan, and the ultimate object of the affair, in consonance with the spirit of the slogan, is to be the establishment of a new order in East Asia. The controversies of the past ten years in the Far East, therefore, may well be called the racial revivalist-reform movement of the Japanese people, chief obstacles to which have been offered by the machinations of the democratic powers who have clung to the old order as the best purveyor of their own interests. The war in Asia can thus be regarded as essentially a conflict between the view of the world as represented by these democratic powers and the Yoko spirit which has consistently been protected and fostered by the Japanese nation since the foundation of the Empire. Since the current war in Europe is, fundamentally speaking, a struggle between two different ideologies and a clash between old and new civilizations, it may safely be said that in this sense the wars in the East and West are essentially the same.

Unless one views the present wars in the above light and takes into consideration the fact that the so-called new order movement is ultimately an ideological and cultural movement for a return to man's innate character, one will never be able to understand correctly the real nature of the new world order of tomorrow which is to be established through Japanese-German-Italian co-operation.

Before a new world order is fully established, there must first of all be effected a radical change in the thought of the people in general. In other words, the mental habit must be broken which has for past centuries controlled mankind. Everything requires reappraisal, and even the essential qualities of God and men must necessarily be re-examined. In this process many a dogma and prejudice will have to be wiped out, for in order to achieve the contemplated change, such things as freedom and equality of individuals, the inherent rights of man, the absolute sovereignty of a state and the right of self-determination of the people must be viewed from a completely different angle from that of the past. In the new world,
many things which formerly were highly evaluated as making this earthly life worth living may lose their value, for it must be emphasized that the very things which the old forces in the world have specially prized constitute the sources of injustice, irrationality, tyranny, and exploitation. It is not expected, of course, that such a tremendous reformation which has no parallel in world history can be accomplished in a brief space of time. But now the trend of the age is definitely in that direction. Not only that, but the construction of a new order is in fact already progressing over wide areas of Asia and Europe and promises to be greatly accelerated hereafter.

In view of this epoch-making movement now under way in Europe and Asia, there should be no doubt as to the reasons for the birth of the treaty among Japan, Germany and Italy or as to the duty with which it has been charged.
AFFIDAVIT

City of Tokyo, Japan

I, the undersigned, Katsuji INAHARA, being first duly sworn before John R. Pritchard, deuso and say as follows:

That I have been editor of the publication "Contemporary Japan" since its foundation until the present day; that I was serving in this capacity in December 1940 when the article "The Three Power Pact and the World of Tomorrow" by Toshio SHIRATORI was published; that I recall the publication of this article; and that said article was published without change of context at the instance of Toshio SHIRATORI in the December 1940 issue of the said publication.

Given under my hand this 5th day of September, 1946.

/s/ Katsuji Inahara
Katsuji INAHARA

Sworn and subscribed to by Katsuji INAHARA before the undersigned this 5th day of September, 1946.

/s/ John R. Pritchard
Captain, Infantry
Summary Court
OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS CONCERNING FOREIGN RELATIONS

Sixteenth Year of Showa (1941)

Board of Information

pp. 130-133

10. TOAST SPEECH OF DR. KOKUYI ITO, PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF INFORMATION IN COMMEMORATION OF THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE CONCLUSION OF THE THREE POWER PACT BETWEEN JAPAN, GERMANY AND ITALY

September 26, 1941.

Exactly a year has elapsed since the Three Power Pact was concluded between Japan, Germany and Italy on September 27 last year. Following its conclusion Hungary joined it on November 20, last year, followed by Rumania on the 23rd of the same month, and Slovakia, on December 24. On March 1, this year, Bulgaria participated in the Pact and on June 15, Croatia followed suit. In such a manner the Pact has gained successively new participants and all the signatory Powers in the East and West have been exerting themselves to their utmost for the construction of the new world order. We, the people of Japan, must bear in mind that tomorrow's anniversary is the day to be heartily felicitated.

The real meaning of the spirit of the Three Power Pact is clear from the Imperial Rescript granted on the day of its conclusion and from the message of Prime Minister Konoye. In the Imperial Rescript is stated, "We fervently hope that the cessation of the disturbances and the restoration of peace will be realized as swiftly as possible", and in the Prime Minister's message, also, the same sentiment is expressed. As stated in the Prime Minister's message, it goes without saying that the maintenance of world peace as well as the stabilization of East Asia are attributable to the spirit of the founding of our Empire and constitute our immutable policy. The Three Power Pact is nothing other than a concrete expression of this spirit which constitutes the basis of our foreign policy at present.

The situation prevailing at the time of its conclusion was such that more than a year had already passed since the outbreak of the European War with the hostilities steadily expanding in scope and warlike clouds appearing to spread over the whole world. Ever being solicitous of the maintenance of world peace, the Japanese Government, considering it to be of urgent necessity for the welfare of mankind to forestall the spread of the war, concluded the Pact. Expressed in other words, the Three Power Pact is not one like military alliance of the past which were made for the purpose of acquiring advantages for the prosecution of war.
The fundamental purpose of its conclusion lay in the prevention of world-wide conflagration and the establishment of world peace on a firm foundation. It was this spirit which largely motivated the conclusion of the Three Power Pact.

The second point is the fact that by this Pact the leading position of Japan in the establishment of the new order in Greater East Asia was definitely recognized. The very fact that Japan, with a view to bringing about the permanent stabilization of East Asia has already ended wars from four years of hostilities for the overthrow of the Chiang Kai-Shek regime which is the cat's paw for the defense of the countries clinging to the old order, can be considered as one of the great movements for the change in the world at present. It is indeed regrettable that the real intentions of our country have not yet been fully understood throughout the world. Some think mistakenly that to proceed to maintain the old order means peace, and some, although they recognize the necessity of change, still cling to the status quo; and thus they are prone to oppose the construction of the new order in Greater East Asia by Japan. Under such circumstances, it is quite natural that Japan should co-operate with Germany and Italy, which share with us the same ideals and aspirations.

In the region of Europe, Germany and Italy have, with irresistible power, made signal progress towards the establishment of the new order since the conclusion of the Pact. It needs not be elaborated here what a strong encouragement it has been to Germany and Italy that Japan, as one of the signatory Powers, has maintained in the meantime a firm attitude in East Asia. In East Asia the first forward step was made for the construction of the new order with the three countries—Japan, Nencouko and China—serving as its pivot following the recognition in November last by Japan of the National Government of China under H. T. Ching-wei. Not only that, our country mediated the border dispute between Thailand and French Indo-China in the early part of this year and successfully settled it, and, in July, concluded the Agreement for the Joint Defense of French Indo-China under which our forces made a peaceful entry into that country. Thus, the construction of the new order is also making steady progress in Greater East Asia where our country is shouldering her responsibility in this part of the world.

As I have already said, a year has passed since the conclusion of the Three Power Pact with new participants increasing, and in East Asia as well as Europe each signatory Power has steadily marched forward for the construction of the new order. There are undoubtedly many difficulties lying in the path of our country as is mentioned in the Imperial Rescript in which His Imperial Majesty graciously stated, "The task of enabling each nation to find its proper place and all individuals to live in peace and security is indeed one of the great magnitudes, unparalleled in history. The goal lies still far distant." As for us, it is my belief that we must be strongly determined to exhaust all peaceful means possible in accordance with
the spirit of the Pact, and if there be any interference by a third
party, to adhere absolutely, and to go forward with steady steps
toward the peaceful realization of the new world order.

In welcoming the first anniversary of the Three Power Pact, I
congratulate upon the various accomplishments of the past year.
Whatever changes there may be hereafter in international situation
and whatever difficulties we may encounter, there will not be any
change whatever in the fact that the spirit of the Three Power Pact
constitutes the key-note of our diplomacy and that it will not be
affected in the least by the activities of third Powers to alienate
the three countries from each other. This point I wish specially
to emphasize in view of the present delicate international situation.
The governments of Japan, Germany and Italy have reached an agreement regarding the mutual technical commission provided for in Article IV of the Tripartite Pact concluded in Berlin on 27 September 1940.

Upon instructions from their governments, the Imperial Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Yosuke MATSUOKA, the German Ambassador, Mr. Eugen Ott, and the Royal Italian Ambassador, Mr. Mario INDÉLLI, met in order to confirm and sign the agreement which had been reached. The text agreed upon has the following wording:

A general commission and two technical commissions (a military and an economic one) are to be formed in each of the three capitals—Tokyo, Berlin, and Rome.

The general commission to be formed in Tokyo is to consist of the Imperial Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (as chairman), the German Ambassador and the Royal Italian Ambassador.

The general commissions to be formed in Berlin and Rome respectively are to consist in Berlin of the German Reichs Minister for Foreign Affairs (as chairman), the Imperial Japanese Ambassador, and the Royal Italian Ambassador, in Rome of the Royal Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs (as chairman), the Imperial Japanese Ambassador, and the German Ambassador.

The members of the general commission can, if necessary, take into consultation military, economic, or other technical experts for their sessions.

The general commissions have the task of executing the Tripartite Pact. For this purpose they can claim the support of the military and economic commissions.

The military and economic commissions are to consist of permanent members appointed by the governments of the three countries.

The military commission in Tokyo is to be composed of the representatives of the Japanese Army and Navy as well as of the Military, Naval and Air Attaches of the German and the Royal Italian Embassy.

The economic commission in Tokyo is to be composed of the number of experts found necessary by the Japanese Government, and the German and the Royal Italian Embassy.
The military as well as the economic commissions may, if necessary, take into consultation also non-permanent co-workers and technical experts.

A number of secretaries are to be appointed for every commission.

The military and economic commissions in Berlin and Rome are to be composed in a similar way as they are in Tokyo.

The chairman of each commission is principally appointed by the government of the country in which the commission is formed.

The military and economic commissions convene either upon invitation from the appertaining general commission, or when the necessity arises to discuss questions which come up. In each case they will submit their proposals to the general commission.

All proposals of the general commission will be submitted to the governments of the three powers for the final approval.

Drawn up and signed in three copies in the Japanese, the German, and the Italian language.

Tokyo, 20 December 1940

/s/ OTT
/s/ INDELLI
/s/ MATSUOKA
CERTIFICATE

I, X. Hayashi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 10 pages, dated Sept 27, 1940, and described as follows: Memorandum Agreement dated 20 Dec 1940 between Japan, Germany and Italy regarding the mutual technical commission provided for in Article IV of the Tripartite Pact of 27 Sept. 1940. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 24th day of August, 1946

X. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: Haruharu Odo
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above named official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 24th day of August, 1946

Edward P. Monaghan
NAME

Witness: R. H. Lesh
Official Capacity
Tokyo, 13 December 1940

Arrival, 13 December 1940

Subject matter delayed due to garbling

No. 1389 of 13 December

Most Urgent

Secret

The Foreign Office reports that Ambassador KURISU is commissioned to seek an agreement for General OSHIMA as Ambassador in Berlin. For the previous history, I know that the Foreign Minister has repeatedly offered the Ambassadorial post in Berlin to OSHIMA, who, however, declined it in order to be able to continue his politically active work for the Tripartite Pact in Japan. After the appointment of Admiral NOMURA as Ambassador in Washington, the Foreign Minister put renewed pressure on OSHIMA who thereby wanted to avoid the appearance of a weakening of his Tripartite Pact policy. At the same time, the army, supported by important navy circles, urged OSHIMA to accept, in the endeavour to have a completely reliable protagonist of the Alliance policy with Germany occupy the most important ambassadorial post in Europe, especially since the newly appointed Japanese Ambassador in Rome is primarily a parliamentarian prominent in domestic policy who has little experience in foreign policy and since the former press chief SUMA appointed as envoy to Spain is widely known for his leanings toward America. Also Ambassador SHIRATORI, who is at present indispensable here as a leading figure in a Japanese pro-German rejuvenation movement, has emphatically supported the candidature of OSHIMA.
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attaché of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

\[\text{Signature: W. P. Cumming}\]

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

\[\text{Signature: G. H. Garde}\]

Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General
Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.)
The Japanese Ambassador looked me up today to repeat to me in outline what he had said at his last visit to the Foreign Minister of the Reich: that is, that, on account of the peace-feelers between Japan and China, it is necessary at first to wait to see what instructions the Chinese Ambassador will now receive from CHIANG KAI-SHEK. KURUSU indicated that the simplest complete solution (which, however, had supposedly not been given to him by his Foreign Minister) for a settlement between Japan and Russia would be the conclusion of a Russo-Japanese neutrality pact with the simultaneous Japanese renunciation of her oil concessions in North Sakhalin, with, however, the guarantee of the exportation of 200,000 tons of Russian oil to Japan. Territorial questions should at that time be completely left out of the picture. The publication of the neutrality pact and the oil arrangements were to be arranged in such a manner in regard to time that the Japanese population would not take offense at it.

KURUSU described the conclusion of these two agreements (the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese) as the desired and at the same time required prerequisites for a Japanese advance through the regions south of China (including Siam), without the use of which Singapore could hardly be brought to fall. KURUSU portrayed the latter idea also as his private strategy.

(Signed) WEIZSÄCKER

Hann R.M.
* U. St.-S. Pol.
* Dg. Pol.
* Ges. Stahmer

RUSIA
AFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Warburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Warburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Warburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

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5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

 /s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Gardes

G. H. GARDES

Lt. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
To he kept in locked file

Tokyo, 31 January 1941
Arrival: 31 January 1941
No. 146 of 31 January

For the Reich Foreign Minister.

Sharpened attitude of American Government has heightened the political tension of Japan considerably and has brought conflict with America closer.

Unity of government and nation behind the Tripartite Pact has been unmistakably proved in the Diet negotiations, economic circles are also decreasing their resistance. The government is trying to scare America from entering the war by threatening attitude, armament measures, and sharp speeches in Diet and press.

In contrast to this, activistic circles demand preventive attack on Singapore as the key position in the West Pacific Ocean. They expect to deprive America by a surprise action of the possibility of military warfare in the Pacific Ocean or to render it difficult. This minority group is under the leadership of Admiral SUMISUGU, Ambassador SHIRATORI, and has the support of the young officers' corps and individual high leaders of the Army and Navy.

In two days' research with the attaches of the armed forces, and the officials in charge of policy and economic policy at the Embassy, I examined in detail the prospects of an attack on Singapore with the following results:

1) Chances of success of an attack against Singapore, in which case, however, Japan for the first time meets with a European opponent of full quality /vollwertig/, are favorable; it will have to be carried out in steps by occupying Saigon and landing on the Malay Peninsula. At present British forces of any kind are far inferior to available Japanese offensive forces and cannot be increased decisively in a short time. The same holds true for addition of American forces of the West Pacific Ocean, in case America automatically renders military support. Japanese Navy does not consider complete activation of American Pacific Ocean Fleet. It could easily be detected on the overly long approaches /Anmarschweg/ from Hawaii and would be endangered to the point of annihilation.
2) As a consequence of the capture of Singapore, Japan will have to expect:

a. Achievement of the claim for leadership in the Great East Asia Sphere. The Netherlands Indies would no longer be able to resist Japanese pressure.

b. Speedy conclusion of the China conflict. Chiang Kai Shek's position would be much weakened by Japan's gain of prestige and the breakdown of supplies.

c. Acquisition of war economically necessary raw material sources. However, Japan's well known unmethodical exploitation would limit planned production for a long time.

d. Lessening of tension of inner political pressure by categorical actions.

Against these advantages stand the disadvantages of a continual state of war with England and America's entry into the war, which will probably occur. Both states will carry on mostly economic war against which Japan can stand up with approximately one year's war supplies.

Summarized the advantages for Japan prevail if the war does not last longer than one year. Thus there are chances for the idea of a Japanese preventive attack to be also successful in soberly weighing economic circles. Experiences in history teach, however, that Japan would choose as moment for action least (one group garbled), and, therefore, will try to await the German attack on England which will seek the decision.

3) Judgment from the German-Italian standpoint. All advantages enumerated above strengthen the Japanese partner in the area of the Pacific Ocean and are, therefore, indirectly in our interest. The Netherlands Indies will hardly be able to maintain their independence in the course of the war, but are endangered by the grasp of Japan or America. The Japanese invasion to be mentioned would, therefore, be the lesser evil. Especially favorable would be a Japanese pressure from Singapore on the Indian Ocean and India, the main British reinforcement area to Africa and the Mediterranean Sea, especially from Australia and New Zealand - the development of the Italian war situation has raised the importance of Singapore extraordinarily. Main disadvantage lies in an extension of the war, against the endeavors we made up till now, by the nearly certain entry of America into the war, which cannot permit dominating position of Japan in the Pacific Ocean. New theater of war in the Pacific Ocean would be largely removed from our influence and would complicate a conclusion of peace.

Furthermore Japan would be cut off for transit trade from and to Germany and she herself is in need of raw materials and would no longer...
transit to overseas countries. Whether Russia's attitude unfavorably influenced, cannot be judged from here.

When it is essential to unify all forces to a decisive blow against England, this attack on Singapore might be useful. The Japanese Government will, in view of the increasing pressure of the minority group, orientate itself widely in accordance to the plans of Germany and will have to be influenced accordingly. The role of intermediary between Thailand and Indo-China gives Japan (one group garbled) possibility to establish herself in Saigon militarily as guarantor of peace, as the first politically unimpeachable step towards the action against Singapore. In case the Japanese government and political circles should be influenced in the sense of the preventive action against Singapore, I would ask for instructions.
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming

W. F. GUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE

Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Tokyo, 21 November 1940
Arrival, 21 November 1940
1110 hours
2315 hours
No. 1285 of 21 November
Annex to Telegram No. 1272 x) of the nineteenth.
Urgent!
x) with Pol. VIII.

Secret.

I. The Vice Foreign Minister informed me today regarding the situation in Thailand, that the Thailand Prime Minister, as well as the American Government have denied alleged negotiations for an alliance. However, British and American Ambassadors in Bangkok are working energetically to win over Thailand for the Anglo-Saxon Powers. The Japanese Government has today proposed to Thailand that she limit her territorial claims on Indo-China in some points, and would then be ready to mediate between Thailand and Indo-China. Should the occasion arise, Japan will request the support of the German Government in dealing with the French Government.

II. The Vice Foreign Minister informed me most confidentially that the Japanese Government intends to send warships to Saigon. The French Government will be informed that this will be a friendly visit, but it will be, in fact, aimed as a demonstration against Thailand.

III. In the opinion of the Vice Foreign Minister, if Thailand were to turn towards the Anglo-Saxon camp there would be no considerable military harm to Japan in consequence. This move could be countered by the occupation of Saigon, and thereby be compensated.

OTT

/136473/
AFFIDAVIT

1. I, W. L. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

That I am an employee of the United States Department of State on the staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945, and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, or which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

W. L. Cumming

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 2nd day of April 1946.

G. H. Garde

Lt. Colonel, AGD

acting adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Tokyo, 6 February 1941, 9.40 S
Arrival: 6 February 1941, 21.55
No. 175 of Feb. 6
Cito!

Secret.

Vice Foreign Minister informed me just now that Japanese Government intends to obligate France and Thailand by a secret agreement, during the negotiations beginning here on February 7 concerning settlement of boundary disputes of France and Thailand, to make no political or military agreement with a third power. Vice Foreign Minister added that this obligation, as far as it concerns France, would, of course, apply only to Indo-China. He supposes that the Government of the Reich welcomes the Japanese action because, in the spirit of the Tri-Partite Pact, it is directed towards eliminating the British-American influence in an important area of the Greater East Asia sphere, as much as possible. The Vice Foreign Minister requested notification of the Reichs Government, particularly for the reason that the French Government might possibly raise objections by referring to the German-French Armistice Agreements.

The Vice Foreign Minister will give the same information to the Italian Ambassador.

OTT

/136552/
Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)  To be kept in locked file

Tokyo, 6 February 1941, 9:40 S
Arrival: 6 February 1941, 21:55

No. 175 of Feb. 6
Cito!

Secret.

Vice Foreign Minister informed me just now that Japanese Government intends to obligate France and Thailand by a secret agreement, during the negotiations beginning here on February 7 concerning settlement of boundary disputes of France and Thailand, to make no political or military agreement with a third power. Vice Foreign Minister added that this obligation, as far as it concerns France, would, of course, apply only to Indo-China. He supposes that the Government of the Reich welcomes the Japanese action because, in the spirit of the Tri-Partite Pact, it is directed towards eliminating the British-American influence in an important area of the Greater East Asia sphere, as much as possible. The Vice Foreign Minister requested notification of the Reichs Government, particularly for the reason that the French Government might possibly raise objections by referring to the German-French Armistice Agreements.

The Vice Foreign Minister will give the same information to the Italian Ambassador.

OTT

/136552/
AFFIDAVIT

1. W. F. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

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s/ W. F. Cumming

W. F. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE

Lt. Colonel, AG

Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 17 February 1941
Arrival: 17 February 1941 10:00
No. 229 of February 17.

Citisima

For the Reichs Minister personally
To telegram No. 59 of 15th yellow

Foreign Minister MATSUCKA, to whom I forwarded approval from there to his planned trip, asked me to express to the Reichs Foreign Minister his sincerest thanks for the report which had pleased him very much. He repeated that the time of the departure would depend on the progress of the Thailand-Indo-China negotiations, but would in any case take place at the end of this month. Negotiations proceeded not without difficulties on account of the excessive demands of Thailand. The Japanese Government is at present working on a proposal of a compromise which through me will be placed at the disposal of the Reichminister in the next few days with the request to influence the Vichy regime in the direction of acceptance of the proposal through mediation of the Reich Government.

Draft of the press communiqué about MATSUCKA's trip will follow separately.

OTT

/136566/
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. F. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

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s/ W. F. Cumming

W. F. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Tokyo, 12 March 1941 - 5.25 & hours
Arrival, 12 March 1941 - 15.55 hours

No. 376 of March 12

Foreign Vice Minister OHIASHI just visited me and asked me to convey to the Reich Foreign Minister the sincere gratitude of the Japanese Government for the extraordinarily valuable and effective support of the Japanese mediation in the dispute between Thailand and French Indo-China.

BCLTZE
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attaché of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

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____________________________________
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

____________________________________
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Tokyo, 19 December 1940
Arrival: 19 December 1940
11.30 hours
22.15 hours
No. 1425 of 19 December
Most urgent!

For the Reichsminister

The Foreign Minister is considering, so he told me, to accept in the near future the invitation of the Reich Foreign Minister to come to Berlin. He is thinking of arriving there in the second half of January, to make a short visit to Rome from Germany, if possible stay in Moscow and return to Tokyo at the end of February. Prime Minister approves plan and would like to obtain the Emperor's sanction for a longer absence of the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister emphasized to me his need to make a strong gesture in favor of the Tripartite Pact and if possible, to personally overcome the deadlock in the negotiations with Russia and China. The Diet/session/beginning in January could postpone its foreign policy debate until the return of the Foreign Minister.

I have the impression that the Foreign Minister would like to enhance the weight of his policy and himself through the conversation with the Reichs Foreign Minister and an eventual reception by the Führer and hopes with German help to set into motion the stalled negotiations with Russia. In my opinion his plan is entirely in our interest. The journey would make a strong impression on world politics, add weight to the Tripartite Pact centered in Berlin, would strengthen the attitude of the Foreign Minister towards America through the conversation in Berlin, and strengthen the German impression and would open up the possibility of a conversation with Moscow. Against this advantage, in my opinion, the extended absence of the leader of the Japanese foreign policy would not be of consequence since the armed forces, especially the army, will meanwhile reliably heed the policy of the Tripartite Pact. The Foreign Minister would presumably be thankful for German encouragement of his plan. I, therefore, suggest to empower me to transmit a corresponding attitude of the Reichs Foreign Minister.

OTT
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

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3. That I was assigned to said document center at Warburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Warburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

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S/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

S/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Tokyo, 31 December 1940
Arrival, 31 December 1940
9.16 hours
16.55 hours
No. 1459 of 31 December
Most Urgent

Re telegram No. 1171 x) of the thirtieth

For the Reichsminister,

I transmitted to the Foreign Minister on 24 December according to instructions No. 1154 x) the information of the Reich Foreign Minister, x) HAE 381 which visibly delighted himself, and asked for a speedy reply. The Foreign Minister today, after the conclusion of the cabinet changes of the last few days, made a report to the Emperor, who received the plan kindly but reserved his decision. The Foreign Minister, who again assured me what great store he sets by the accomplishment of the journey, plans to get himself given the most far-reaching possible authority from the cabinet, and above all the War Minister. He held out the prospect of a final answer in the middle of January.

The Foreign Minister holds it expedient that before his arrival in Berlin Ambassador GS?MA should have already presented his credentials. As GS?MA informs me, he will probably arrive in Berlin at the end of January. The Foreign Minister would then follow after an interval of 7 to 10 days.

OTT

Chef AO
U. St. S. Pol.
U. St. S.R.
Ambassador Ritter
Dept. Chief Pers.
" " W.
" " Kult.
" " Press
" " Germany
Chef Pror.
Dg. Pol.
Arb - Expl. bei.
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. F. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

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s/ W. F. Cumming

W. F. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Tokyo, 10 February 1941
Arrival, 10 February 1941

Telegram to the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs,

No. 196 of 10.2.41

Most Urgent

For the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs,

x) at the Reich Foreign Minister's office,

xx) at the Reich Foreign Minister's office.

TO Telegraph No. 77 of 19th x) and with reference to /Tokyo/ Tel. No. 146 from here xx)

Foreign Minister MATSUMiya has just told me with obvious joy that
the Emperor, on the Prime Minister's representation, granted him permission
for the Reich Foreign Minister's invitation to /visit/ Berlin. He
intends presuming an agreement to this from the other side to depart
after the conclusion of the Thailand negotiations about 25 February and
to reach Berlin between 12 and 15 March. He has set aside 12 days in all
for the conversations in Berlin and a supplementary visit to Rome and
Moscow. Consequently he would arrive in Tokyo again about April 10. If
need be, his stay in Europe could be prolonged a few days. However, the
Foreign Minister would have to be in Tokyo again at the latest by April 15

He will probably be accompanied by the head of the European Division,
Ministerial Director, SAKUYO, Director NAKANISHI, of the South Man-
churian Railway Co., whom he knows intimately, further by the Legation
Secretaries KUSE and HOGEN, Attache SUGIMOTO, grandchild of the last GENRO
who died recently, one younger officer from the army and the navy each,
as well as two cipher operators.

The Foreign Minister gave me the following details re the most
important questions which he would like to discuss in Berlin:

1. Attitude of the partners of the Tri-Parteit Pact towards
America.

1.) Diplomatic influence against entry into war.

The Foreign Minister is endeavoring to prevent America's entry into
the war in the spirit of the pact. To this end he has instructed
Ambassador NOMURA to dwell most emphatically on Japan's unconditional
loyalty to the pact and her military and economic might /in talks/ with
President ROOSEVELT, and point out the senselessness of an American entry
into the war. America could not stop the defeat of England by entering
the war, on the contrary, by fighting Germany and Japan, who alone could create an order in Europe and East Asia necessary even for America in the long run, she would not against her own interest.

2.) Preventative attack against SINGAPORE.

Should, in spite of this, America's entry into war appear unavoidable, the Japanese government considers a preventative attack against Singapore to remove or make difficult the possibility of America's waging a military war in the Pacific Ocean. In view of the far reaching political and military consequences of such an action, the Foreign Minister explained that Japan would undertake such a decision only in complete agreement with the Reich. In the meantime, the armed forces are taking the measures necessary to be ready for war.

II. Termination of the China conflict.

The Foreign Minister has continued his highly confidential sounding of CHIANG-KAI-SHEK. The latter was showing signs of greater readiness for an understanding with Japan, to avoid increasing danger from the Chinese Communist Army. The Foreign Minister expects favorable progress in his secret negotiations with Chiang-Kai-Shek from the Berlin conversations, although Japan had to decide to recognize WANG-CHING-WEI.

III. Relations to Russia.

As the result of a surprise agreement with CHIANG-KAI-SHEK, the Foreign Minister expects an important strengthening of his hand in the negotiations with Russia.

The Foreign Minister declared he had informed Ambassador OSHIMA of the questions, but had taken it upon himself to carry on the negotiations.

The Foreign Minister requests that his intended journey be treated very confidentially. He proposes to publish simultaneous communiques in Tokyo, Berlin and Rome, shortly before his departure. Draft of text will follow, as soon as approval of the plan of the journey has arrived from there.

In view of the importance of the decisions to be made I request to be called to Berlin at the same time as the Foreign Minister to be able to report about the situation here from my side and to receive personal instructions for the execution of the decisions reached there.

OTT

/136556-8/
AFFIDAVIT

1, W. F. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

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s/ W. F. Cumming
W. F. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
W. F. Cumming

The text on the page is not legible, and cannot be transcribed accurately.
1

(W P. Cumming)

G H. Garde

Lt Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

(Ex Officio)
Teletype to Reich's Foreign Minister

Berlin, February 22, 1941

Secret

(To be presented before OS"H A's arrival)

The Japanese ambassador visited me this morning. He briefly developed his viewpoints regarding the future Japanese foreign policy. OS"H A arranged the three tasks of Japan in East Asia according to their urgency from north to south.

1.) Russia

OS"H A emphasized the emotional side of this question with the Japanese public. The latter would not admit an agreement (non-aggression pact) with Russia if real sacrifices were to be brought for this. But perhaps a nodus vivendi with Russia could be reached without sacrifices and would also be sufficient to relieve Japan in the north.

Speed is required.

2.) China

OS"H A deplored that Japan had not settled matters with C'IANG KAI-S'EK long ago. A settlement should now be found. There were two schools at present in Tokyo, one which would directly agree with C'IANG KAI-S'EK, the other which would put pressure on C'IANG KAI-S'EK by giving preference to WANG C'IMG-WEI. OS"H A himself inclines toward the latter process.

3.) British Possessions in East Asia.

In this connection OS"H A made military statements concerning which it may be sufficient to mention that OS"H A considers it necessary to take Hong Kong first, which should not be very difficult. Singapore has to be seized in grand style from the sea and from the land.

I expressed doubts to OS"H A whether the order of the problems which he had mentioned, fits the demand of the historic one which would probably never return. OS"H A replied that he had energetically advocated the point of view in Tokyo that one should not let slip by opportunities that would determine the fate of Japan for centuries.

I suppose that OS"H A's trend of thought when he visits Fuschl will be within the framework depicted above.

WEIZSACKER
I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

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s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMINGS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General
OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Special train, 28 February 1941 at 01.45 hours in Oshino (Seelet Gin/..r P.c).

*)Marine notes
Transmitted under O. 233 to Tokyo.
Tel. Ktr. 26.3
9.30, 9.45, 10.30
Secret note for department head.

For your purely personal information:

The Japanese Ambassador arrived in Tokyo on February 23.
The discussion, as always, proceeded particularly friendly and intimate;
As regards details, it took the following course.

To start with, I made a review of the general political situation.
After war with England had become inevitable, the Führer decided upon an
agreement with Russia to avoid a war on the fronts. In the long run, the
agreement also lay in the interests of Japan, which is interested in the
speediest possible victory for Germany. After the conclusion of the German-
Japanese alliance, the further development of this agreement must follow.
For Germany, there was no need for military actions of any kind on the con-
tinent. Germany would not tolerate England obtaining a firm foothold anywhere
on the continent — in the Mediterranean, Greece or elsewhere. England's
hopes for blockade, anchor and unrest were in vain. England must be forced
to realize that she had no prospects of victory and must ask for peace.
Germany was closely watching developments in Greece, was not interested
in occupying the whole country, else lost Greece—Africa should fall to
De Gaulle. France's might was broken for all time, Gerswin; the
Occupied Countries were merely a police function. Peace reigned everywhere
and there was no lack of food. Germany herself had sufficient food;
occasional short supply of raw materials had no practical significance.
In spring 240 divisions, including 186 first-class offensive divisions
were ready for use. Greece, Hungary and Yugoslavia had already entered the
Tri-Potent Pact. Bulgaria's entry was very close at hand. The Turkish-
Bulgarian declaration demonstrated a definite Turkish withdrawal from
military developments in the Balkans and from England. Neither Turkey
nor Russia would take any action in the event of a German intervention
in Greece. Yugoslavian statesmen had recently expressed their desire for
peace in their visit to Germany. Yugoslavian must come over to our own
sooner or later. Consequently the Reichs were in our hands. The English
would have to evacuate Greece. Italy had suffered reverses. She had attacked
Greece without our knowledge and with poor military preparation. However
the Italian front in Greece was now stable. General WISZL's advance in
North Africa was to be explained by the fear of tanks among the Italians,
who had not been sufficiently schooled for fight against tanks. We had now
sent a unit /Verband/ to Libya, to bring about a chance there if possible.
The Italian people stood firmly behind the Duke: we were helping with the supply of raw materials. We stood on good and intimate terms with Spain. Sooner or later she would come over to us openly: she hesitated still at present because of the difficulties of her food supply. With Russia relations were good. Moreover, in view of our military strength, she would have no reason to take any action against us! Stalin was a cool and clever politician. Germany was viewing matters in the East with supreme care. A Russo-German conflict - not wished by us - would mean a gigantic German victory and an end to the Soviet regime.

In the war against England our bombs had created serious destruction, despite bad weather, which was having a strongly retarding effect on English war production etc. We hoped to continue to destroy much more with our bombardment than America could replace. From the end of March onward the use of U-boats will be increased many times. We would then deliver fearful blows on England through a combination of the Luftwaffe and U-boats. English imports must be reduced to a definite point below the minimum subsistence level, through sanctions, to render the situation catastrophic. Invasion of England was prepared, but depended on various factors. ROOSTER was the most bitter opponent of Germany and Japan. However it was in our interest to keep America out of the war. If America did come in to the war despite this, she could not wage it militarily. The vast extent of the oceans lying between us and America made this impossible. Practically it would amount only to the building of American air bases in England. However in air warfare we were in a strategic position for a combination of the British and American air forces superior at any time. The number of pilots was unlimited, likewise aircraft production potential. Giant reserves of material were stored up, likewise munitions. Production would be concentrated on bomber fleets, air fleets and flak. The war was won to-day, militarily, economically, and politically: we wished, however, to end the war quickly, and force England to ask for peace soon. In this connection cooperation with Japan was important. In her most personal interest she should attack as soon as possible. The decisive blow would be an attack on Singapore, to eliminate England's key position in East Asia and to assure for Japan a position in East Asia which it could only win in war. The occupation of Singapore must take place with lightning speed if possible without a declaration of war and in the middle of peace, - to contribute to a speedy termination of the war and to keep America out of the war.

Ambassador OSIMA replied, that preparations for the occupation of Singapore would be complete by the end of May. For safety's sake preparations must be made not only for war against England but also against America. Japan's supply of raw materials, especially coal and iron, was difficult. Construction of 48,000 ton ships had been suspended and instead they were building submarines, torpedoes and speed boats for the defense of the islands. The moment for the occupation of Singapore must be coordinated with operations in Europe. The attack must come from the land, as it was too difficult from the sea. The occupation of Hong Kong and the Philippines had also been provided for in case of need.
I remarked that it would be better to carry the Philippines project and to proceed with the surprise capture of Singapore alone. With an adequate explanation and motivation of the occupation, America would stay out of the war. Three reasons for speedy action were of importance:

(1) Occupation of Singapore would be decisive blow against the core of the British Empire.

(2) America would remain out of the war, as she was not yet armed, and would not risk her fleet west of Hawaii. If American interests were respected even ROKST.LL's argument re: prestige for entering the war would also be eliminated. If she did enter the war, America would otherwise have to look on powerless, how Japan would take away the Philippines from her.

(3) Japan must secure for herself for the coming New Order in the world that position which she hoped to have at the conclusion of the peace. England would never give up Singapore through negotiations, but rather continue fighting to the last. Ambassador OCHINA agreed completely with this line of thought. He declared himself willing to do everything to execute this policy. He remarked that he had asked the Japanese Foreign Minister to go to Berlin with the most concrete possible proposals. I told OCHINA it would be good, if the Japanese Foreign Minister brought with him a final decision to attack Singapore soon, so that we could then discuss all the details here. I explained further that the closest co-operation in all spheres, particularly re: news service and the press, was necessary for the common prosecution of the war, such as had already been arranged with Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria in an exemplary manner. The Ambassador intends to set up a program with our representatives for the intensification of Japanese propaganda. Concerning the U. S. A., I remarked that blunt speaking should be employed appropriately vis a vis them. The U. S. people did not like National Socialism, but on the other hand, were against entering the war, so as not to sacrifice their sons. The U. S. People felt instinctively that NAZISM and the Jewish wire pullers wanted to pull them into war without reason. Therefore a clear and strong, but not aggressive, policy should be pursued toward the U. S. A. The U. S. people must know that if they had aggressive desires, an iron front of determined peoples, which practically embraced the whole world, would oppose them. We must meet the English propaganda of misrepresentation with the closest co-operation. For this a continuous exchange of ideas in speeches and utterances about principles was necessary. In this connection I referred to MATSUOKA's recent statement on Japan's readiness for mediation for peace and the declaration of the Her. Ambassador in Washington, YOKIO, on Japan's attitude in the event of America entering the war. To my reference that we had already made a great contribution to the suffering of the fate of the Allied Nations through the victory on the continent, also that in the future, or account of geographical factors, we would have to bear the brunt of the war, while Japan would only have to fight against the periphery of the British Empire, and that Japan must now seize the gigantic opportunity being offered her, and should not evade the final consequence -
OSHIMA replied that Japan was determined to maintain her Imperial position. As he confidentially told me, NOTOKE and KATSUO thought as he did and were for an early attack on Singapore.

I then discussed the terms of concluding Europe and East Asia after the war for the powers of the Tri-Parteite Pact. Over centralization was to be avoided, and in the economic sphere, a solution on the basis of equality must be found. A free exchange of commerce on a grand scale must take place between the great spheres of interest: the European-African sphere of power under the leadership of Germany and Italy and the East Asian sphere of interest under the leadership of Japan. Japan could conduct direct trade and conclude trade agreements with the independent states of the European hemisphere as before, and likewise Germany and Italy with the independent countries in the Japanese sphere of power, such as China, Thailand, Indo-China etc. In both economic spheres, preferences should be given over third powers. Ministerial Director OSHIMA’s task was limited to concluding a trade agreement. The general outline of the new trade policy would be determined in Berlin according to agreement, by the Economic commission of the Tri-Parteite Pact. Following this up, I pointed out the possible necessity on the grounds of recent U.S. insinuation for common action to open the eyes of the U.S. people to the situation and possibly bring about a change in public opinion in favor of isolation. I indicated the problem expressly as being theoretical and in no way acute at present. A common break in diplomatic relations with the U.S. by the partners of the Tri-Parteite Pact was to be considered should the occasion arise in the course of this action.

From other individual problems touched upon special attention is to be paid to:

A (1) OSHIMA promised to get into contact immediately with Toko to get things speeded up re: Supply of rubber from Indo-China to Germany. We are trying at present to accommodate his wish to modify the decision of the Armistice Commission whereby 23,000 tons of rubber have been released to the French for supply to third powers, so that the rubber will be placed at the disposal of Japan through the proper committees.

B (2) On the question of the transfer of patents in the economic commission, I requested that Japanese patents be put at our disposal in return.

(3) On OSHIMA’s asking whether we had spoken with the Russians about joining the Tri-Parteite Pact, I answered in the affirmative. Russia had expressed her willingness in principle under certain preliminary conditions; among them were Russian interest in Finland, creation of closer relations with Bulgaria and the Straits problem. Conversations were still pending. If there were further developments in the Balkans, they could be continued as occasion arose. The Axis guarantee for Rumania had not been very sympathetic for the Russians, however they had resigned themselves to it in view of our strong economic interests in the Balkans particularly in Rumanian petroleum. On his side, OSHIMA declared that Russia was ready to conclude a pact with Japan, on condition that the North Schelkin concessions be returned. Relations were in general good, the Russians were supplying CHING KAI-SHÉN with relatively little and only on payment.
(c) With regard to Chiang, Oshima declared that there were to courses: the one wished to strengthen Wafo Chiang Wei, the other attempted to come to an understanding with Chiang Kai-Shek. I advised waiting until the German army was again in action before attempting a new understanding with Chiang Kai-Shek, so that with the influence of these military successes, the most comprehensive consolidation of relations with Chiang Kai-Shek might be achieved, and I also declared myself ready to strengthen Wafo Chiang Wei's position, if desired.

C (5) The ambassador requested support for the acceptance of the Japanese mediation proposal in the Thailand-India-China conflict. This wish was fulfilled.

D (6) Rendering over of Oshima's credentials to the Fuhrer will take place on 28 February at the Berghof.
Telegram from Ribbentrop dated 28 Feb. 1941.

To be kept in locked file

Telegram

(In the Clear)

Special train, 28 February 1941 01.45 hours
Arrival --- " --- 03.00 "

No. 120 of 28-2
Ciphers (Secret Cipher Process) RAM - 51/R

Fuschl 27 February
Diplogerma Tokyo*

Secret note for department heads.

For your purely personal information:

The Japanese Ambassador OSMMA visited me at Fuschl on February 23. The discussion, as always, proceeded particularly friendly and intimately. As regards details, it took the following course:

To start with, I made a review of the general political situation. After war with England had become inevitable, the Führer decided upon an agreement with Russia to avoid a war on two fronts. In the long run, the agreement also lay in the interest of Japan, which is interested in the speediest possible victory for Germany. After the conclusion of the German-Japanese alliance, the further development of this agreement must follow. For Germany, there are not more military problems of any kind on the continent. Germany would not tolerate England obtaining a firm foothold anywhere on the continent - in the Mediterranean, Greece or elsewhere. England's hopes for blockade, hunger and unrest were in vain. England must be forced to realize that she had no prospects of victory and must ask for peace. Germany was closely watching developments in France, was not interested in occupying the whole country, also lost French Africa should fall to de Gaulle. France's might was broken for all time. Garrison the Occupied Countries was merely a police function, Pomez reigned everywhere and there was no lack of food. Germany herself had sufficient food; occasional short supply of raw materials had no practical significance. In spring 240 divisions, including 186 first-class offensive divisions were ready for use. Rumania, Hungary and Slovakia had already entered the Tri-Partite Pact. Bulgaria's entry was very close at hand.
Special train, 28 February 1941

Arrival

--- " ---

01.45 hours
03.00 "

No. 120 of 28.2

Ciphers (Secret Cipher Process)

R A M - 51/R

Fuschl 27 February
Diplomats Tokyo*)

Secret note for department heads.

For your purely personal information!

The Japanese Ambassador OSFIMA visited me at Fuschl on February 23. The discussion, as always, proceeded particularly friendly and intimately. As regards details, it took the following course:

To start with, I made a review of the general political situation. After war with England had become inevitable, the Führer decided upon an agreement with Russia to avoid a war on two fronts. In the long run, the agreement also lay in the interest of Japan, which is interested in the speediest possible victory for Germany. After the conclusion of the German-Japanese alliance, the further development of this agreement must follow. For Germany, there are not more military problems of any kind on the continent. Germany would not tolerate England obtaining a firm foothold anywhere on the continent - in the Mediterranean, Greece or elsewhere. England's hopes for blockade, hunger and unrest were in vain. England must be forced to realize that she had no prospects of victory and must ask for peace. Germany was closely watching developments in France, was not interested in occupying the whole country, also lost French Africa should fall to De Gaulle. France's might was broken for all time. Garrison the Occupied Countries was merely a police function. Peace reigned everywhere and there was no lack of food. Germany herself had sufficient food; occasional short supply of raw materials had no practical significance. In spring 240 divisions, including 186 first-class offensive divisions were ready for use. Rumania, Hungary and Slovakia had already entered the Tri-Pertite Pact. Bulgaria's entry was very close at hand.
The Turkish-Bulgarian declaration demonstrated a definite Turkish withdrawal from military developments in the Balkans and from England. Neither Turkey nor Russia would take any action in the event of a German intervention in Greece. Yugoslavian statesmen had recently expressed their desire for peace by their visit to Germany. Yugoslavia must come over to our camp sooner or later. Consequently the Balkans were in our hands. The English would have to evacuate Greece. Italy had suffered reverses. She had attacked Greece without our knowledge and with poor military preparation. However the Italian front in Greece was now stable. General Wavell's advance in North Africa must be explained by the fear of tanks among the Italians, who had not been sufficiently schooled for fight against tanks. We had not sent an organization /verband/ to Libya, to bring about a change there if possible. The Italian people stood firmly behind the Duce: we were helping with the supply of raw materials. We stood on good and intimate terms with Spain. Sooner or later she would come over to us openly; she resisted still at present because of the difficulties of her food supply. With Russia relations were good. Moreover, in view of our military strength, she would beware of taking any action against us! Stalin was a cool and clever politician. Germany was viewing matters in the East with supreme ease. A Russo-German conflict - not wished by us - would mean a gigantic German victory and an end to the Soviet regime.

In the war against England our bombs had created serious destruction, despite bad weather, which was having a retarding effect on English war production etc. We hoped to continue to destroy much more with our bombardment than America could replace. From the beginning of March onward the use of U-boats will be increased many times. We would then deliver fearful blows on England through a combination of the Luftwaffe and U-boats. English imports must be reduced to a definite minimum, below English subsistence level, through sinkings, to render the situation catastrophic. Invasion of England was prepared, but depended on various factors. Roosevelt was the most bitter opponent of Germany and Japan. However it was in our interests to keep America out of the war. If America did come into the war despite this, she could not wage it militarily. The vast extent of the oceans lying between us and America made this impossible. Practically it would amount only to the building of American air bases in England. However in air warfare we were in a strategically more favourable position vis-à-vis England. We were not only equal to a combination of the British and American air forces but superior at any time. The number of pilots was unlimited,
likewise the aircraft production potential. Giant reserves of material were stored up, likewise munitions. Production would be concentrated on U-boat fleets, air fleets and fick. The war was won today, militarily, economically, and politically; we wished, however, to end the war quickly, and for England to ask for peace soon. In this connection cooperation with Japan was important. In her most personal interests she should attack as soon as possible. The decisive blow would be an attack on Singapore, to eliminate England's key position in East Asia and to secure for Japan a position in East Asia which it could only win in war. The occupation of Singapore must take place with lightning speed, if at all possible without a declaration of war and in the middle of peace, to contribute to a speedy termination of the war and to keep America out of the war.

Ambassador Oshima replied, that preparations for the occupation of Singapore would be completed by the end of May. For safety's sake preparations must be made not only for war against England but also against America. Japan's supply of raw materials, especially rubber, steel and iron, was difficult. Construction of 45,000 ton ships had been suspended and instead they were building submarines, torpedo boats and speed boats for the defense of the islands. The moment for the occupation of Singapore must be coordinated with operations in Europe. The attack must come from the land, as it was too difficult from the sea. The occupation of Hong Kong and the Philippines had been provided for in case of need.

I remarked that it would be better to delay the Philippines project and to proceed with the surprise capture of Singapore alone. In case of a corresponding explanation and motivation of the occupation, America would stay out of the war. Three reasons for speedy action were of importance:

1. Occupation of Singapore would mean a decisive blow against the core of the British Empire.

2. America would remain out of the war, as she was not yet armed, and would not risk her fleet west of Hawaii. If American interests were respected, even Roosevelt's argument re: prestige for entering the war would be eliminated. If she did enter the war, America would have to look on powerlessly, how Japan would take away the Philippines from her.

3. Japan must secure for herself for the coming New Order in the world that position which she hoped to
have at the conclusion of the peace. England would never give up Singapore through negotiations, but rather continue fighting to the last. Ambassador OSPIMA agreed completely with this line of thought. He declared himself willing to do everything to realize this policy. He remarked that he had asked the Japanese Foreign Minister to go to Berlin with the most concrete possible proposals. I told OSPIMA it would be good, if the Japanese Foreign Minister brought with him a final decision to attack Singapore soon, so that we could then discuss all the details here. I explained further that the closest cooperation in all spheres, particularly re: news service and the press, was necessary for the common prosecution of the war, such as had already been arranged with Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria in an exemplary. The Ambassador intends to set up a program with our representatives for the intensification of Japanese propaganda. Concerning the U.S., I remarked that blunt speaking should be employed appropriately vis a vis them. The U.S. people did not like National Socialism, but on the other hand, were against entering the war, so as not to sacrifice their sons. The U.S. people felt instinctively that ROOSEVELT and the Jewish wire pullers wanted to pull them into war without reason. Therefore a clear and strong, but not aggressive, policy should be pursued toward the U.S.A. The U.S. people must know that if they had aggressive desires, an iron front of determined peoples, which practically embraced the whole world, would oppose them. We must meet the English propaganda of misrepresentation with the closest cooperation. For this a continuous exchange of ideas in speeches and utterances about principles was necessary. In this connection I referred to MATSUOKA's recent statement on Japan's readiness for mediation for peace and the declaration of the Jap. ambassador in Washington NOMURA, on Japan's attitude in the event of America entering the war. To my reference that we had already made a great contribution to the shaping of the fate of the Allied Nations through the victory on the continent, also that in the future, on account of geographical factors, we would have to bear the brunt of the war, while Japan would only have to fight against the periphery of the British Empire, and that Japan must now seize the gigantic opportunity being offered her, end should not evade the final consequence - OSPIMA replied that Japan was determined to maintain her imperial position. As he confidentially told me, KOKOYE and MATUSUKA thought as he did and were for an early attack on Singapore.

I then discussed the tasks of reconstruction in Europe and East Asia facing the powers of the Tri-Pertite
Pact after the war. Over centralization was to be avoided, and in the economic sphere, a solution on the basis of equality must be found. A free exchange of commerce on a grand scale must take place between the great spheres of interest, the European-African sphere of power under the leadership of Germany and Italy and the East Asian sphere of interest under the leadership of Japan. Japan could conduct direct trade and conclude trade agreements with the independent states of the western hemisphere as before, and likewise Germany and Italy with the independent countries in the Japanese sphere of power, such as China, Thailand, Indo-China, etc. In both economic spheres preference should be given over third powers. Ministerial Director SOFTAT's task was limited to concluding a trade agreement. The general outline of the new trade policy would be determined in Berlin according to agreement by the Economic commission of the Tri-Partite Pact. Following this up, I pointed out the possible necessity on the grounds of renewed U.S. impudence for common action to open the eyes of the U.S. people to the situation and possibly bring about a change in public opinion in favour of isolation. I indicated the problem expressly as being theoretical and in no way acute at present. A common break in diplomatic relations with the U.S. by the partners of the Tri-Partite Pact was to be considered should the occasion arise in the course of this action.

RIBBENTROP

*** ***
AFFIDAVIT

1, W. P. Gumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Gumming

W. P. GUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

To be kept
in locked file.

Fuschl, 27 February 1941
Arrival, 27 February 1941 23.30

R.A.M. 49/R to Foreign Office Berlin

1. Diplomgerma Tokyo
2. For Cipher Bureau.

No. 119 of 27.2.

Secret note for department heads (M.B.D. 36 III)

For the Ambassador personally

I ask you to work with all the means at your command to the end that Japan takes possession of Singapore as soon as possible by surprise. You will learn everything else from the information telegram dispatched today, at the same time.

RIEBENTROP

Note: Transmitted to Tokyo at 23.50 27.2.1941 with No. 232

Cipher Bureau
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. F. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

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s/ W. F. Cumming
W. F. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General
OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
High Command of the Armed Forces
Fuehrer Headquarters, 3 March 41

VIII/Abt, L (I. C/2)
No: 44 282/41 (K. Chiefs)

Top Secret
Only through Officers
14 Copies
4th Copy

Concerning Collaboration with Japan

The Fuehrer has issued the following directives for the cooperation with Japan:

1. The aim of the cooperation based on the Three-Power-Pact, must be to bring Japan, as soon as possible, to active operations in the Far East. Thus, English forces will hereby be immobilized, the center of the U.S.A. interest will be diverted to the Pacific.

In view of the still underdeveloped state of war mobilization on the part of her opponents, the prospects of success for Japan will be the greater, the earlier she intervenes. The "Barbarossa" enterprise provides especially favorable political and military prerequisites for this purpose.

2. For the preparation of the cooperation, it is necessary to strengthen the Japanese war potential by all means.

For this purpose, the High Command of the branches of the Armed Forces must meet in a comprehensive and generous way, the demands of the Japanese concerning the communication of German warfare and combat experiences and assistance in matters of war economy and techniques. Reciprocity is desired, but must not render negotiations more difficult. These requests by the Japanese which might affect the conduct of the war in a short time must naturally be put in the foreground.

In special cases the Fuehrer reserved the decision for himself.

3. The alignment of the mutual plans of operation is a matter for the High Command of the Navy.

For this, the following guiding principles are to be followed:

a. It must be emphasized that it is the common goal of the war to force England down rapidly in order to keep the USA out of the war. As for the rest, Germany has neither political nor military or economic interests in the Far East, which might give rise to reservations with regard to the intentions of the Japanese.

b. The great successes achieved by Germany in economic warfare, makes it particularly advisable to employ strong Japanese forces.
for the same purpose. Moreover any possibility of assistance for German economic warfare must be utilized.

c. The new material situation of the Treaty Powers requires that Japan seize those territories which she needs, especially if the US intervenes, for the continuation of the war. The deliveries of raw materials must be continued even after Japan enters the war, since they are of vital importance for Germany.

d. The conquest of Singapore, England’s key position in the Far East, would mean a decisive success for the active warfare of the Three Powers.

Besides, attacks on other centers of bases of the English sea power - of the American sea power only if the entrance of the USA into the war cannot be avoided - will serve to shake the enemy’s power system there as well as in the case of attacks on the sea lanes, will bind essential forces of every kind. (Australia).

A date for the beginning of discussions on operational matters cannot as yet be set.

4. The military committees are to be formed in accordance with the Three-Powers Act and are to deal only with such questions which concern equally the three participating powers. In the first place the tasks of economic warfare will belong into that group. It is up to the ‘Chin Comittee’ assisted by the High Command of the Wehrmacht to make decisions in individual cases.

5. No hint must be given to the Japanese concerning the operation “Barbarossa”.

The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht

Draft signed by Keitel

Certified by

(Signature illegible)

Lieutenant Commander,

Distribution

Chief of War (General Staff of the Army)

Commander in Chief of the Navy (1st Skl.) 2nd copy

Commander in Chief of the Air Forces (Air Forces Operations Staff) 3rd copy

CC:

Wehrmacht Operations Staff

Office of War Stats. - Intelligence (Führer) (M. W. H.)

Chief, Foreign Intelligence (Hauptstabschef der Auslandshauptamt)

Economic Assistant to Office (Hemetscher)

I. N. T.

Liegen Lf

Doc. No. 4003

Page 2
AFFIDAVIT

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nürnberg, Germany, and as such have possession, custody and control of the original captured enemy document, numbered 384-PS by said Documentation Division.

2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from German Foreign Office Files and Archives.

3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure and capture was delivered to, filed with, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nürnberg, Germany, in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 and captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents", and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of said original captured enemy document above described and referred to.

5. That said above referred to original captured enemy document is being held by me for possible use in connection with the trial of alleged war criminals before the International Military Tribunal, and that a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original document for the reasons above set forth.

                      /s/ Gerard Schaefer
                      Gerard Schaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 16th day of April 1946.

                      /s/ John W. Auchincloss
                      John W. Auchincloss
                      O-2052152
                      Capt., JAGD.
Examination No. 2


Japan must take steps as soon as possible to eliminate Singapore since the opportunity will never again be as favorable (whole English fleet contained; unpreparedness of the USA for war against Japan; inferiority of the U. S. fleet to the Japanese fleet). Japan is making preparations for this action, but according to all statements made by Japanese officers she will carry it out only if Germany proceeds to land in England. Germany must therefore concentrate all her efforts on inducing Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore, all other East Asiatic questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby solved (Guam, Philippines, Formosa, Dutch East Indies).

Japan wishes to avoid war against the USA if possible, she can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore soon.

According to a statement of Admiral Nomura, Minister Matsuoka has great misgivings about the Russian question and will make inquiries particularly about that.

The A-in-C of the Navy recommends (in a personal conversation with the Fuehrer) that Matsuoka be advised regarding the designs on Russia.
II. (Orig. in Court). AFFIDAVIT.

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, deposite and say:

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nurnberg, Germany; and that, prior to its introduction and receipt in evidence before the International Military Tribunal I or my predecessors in such office had possession, custody and control of the original captured enemy document numbered C-152 by said Documentation Division.

2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from the Office Files of the German Navy.

3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure and capture was delivered to, filed with, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nurnberg, Germany in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 and captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of said original captured enemy document above described and referred to.

5. That said above referred to original captured enemy document has been introduced and received in evidence before the International Military Tribunal in the course of the trial of the case of the United States of America et al against Herman Wilhelm Goering, et al, and was delivered by said Documentation Division to the General Secretary of the said International Military Tribunal concurrently with its said introduction in evidence, and that said original captured enemy document is now in the possession of, and has been impounded by said International Military Tribunal and its said General Secretary, and that a photostatic copy of said original document is hereby furnished because of the unavailability of said original document for the reasons set forth above.

/s/ Gerard Schaefer
Gerard Schaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ John W. Auchincloss
John W. Auchincloss
0-2052152
Capt., JAGD.
IV.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNION
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

against-

HERMAN WILHELM GOERING et al

Defendants.

CERTIFICATE.

The undersigned, BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM L. MITCHELL, hereby certifies:

That he is the duly appointed qualified and acting General Secretary of the International Military Tribunal, and that as such he has possession, custody and control of all of the records of said Tribunal and all documents admitted in evidence during the trial of the above entitled cause.

That the document to which this certificate is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original document which was heretofore admitted in evidence in the course of the trial of the above entitled cause and identified as Exhibit CB 122.

That said original document so admitted in evidence as aforesaid has been impounded by said International Military Tribunal through the undersigned as its General Secretary, and as a result is being held and retained by the undersigned.

That the undersigned has issued the herein certificate and caused the same to be attached to said photostatic copy of said document in order to verify the existence and contents of said Exhibit, and to further establish the fact that the original of said Exhibit is unavailable because of its having been impounded as aforesaid.

DONE at Nurnberg, Germany, this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ William L. Mitchell
WILLIAM L. MITCHELL
General Secretary
International Military Tribunal
Confidential

Regarding the memoranda concerning MATSUKA's visit I note the following:

1. The most important topic is naturally the time of Japan's entry into the war against England.

   In order to expedite this decision we still have valuable concessions in our hands.

   (a) Our renunciation of claims to the Netherlands East Indies.

   (b) Our renunciation of claims to our former possessions in the South Sea, including those under British mandate.

   (c) Increased support of Japan's policy in China (either attempts at mediation, or the recognition of MANCHUKUO).

   But I have the impression that Japan's entry into war against England depends basically on our further successes against England, and that the above mentioned concessions would not play any great part in it.

2. MATSUKA is still following the line of an understanding with Russia and claims German encouragement for this. A clear statement, which course our relations to Russia may take is unavoidable in order to protect him from surprises, and in order to control Japanese policy through him after his European journey. Private conversations with other Japanese sources should be deferred.

   To the Reich Foreign Minister,

   (Signed) \*\*\*\*\*

   24 March 1941

   /136700/
I, W. F. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attaché of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. F. Cumming
W. F. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
W. P. Cumming

G. H. Garde.

Acting Adjutant General

(For Sec'y)
Minutes of the conference between the "Fuehrer" and the Japanese Foreign Minister in the presence of the German Foreign Minister as well as Ambassadors Ott and Odil on 27 March 1941.

* * *

America has three alternatives: She can arm herself, help Britain or wage war somewhere else. If she would help Britain she could not arm herself. If she would neglect Britain, this country would be knocked out and America would find herself alone opposed to the powers of the Tripartite Pact. But in no case could America wage a war somewhere else.

Therefore, a better opportunity for a joint action of the Tripartite Power than the one established today will in all human possibility never again arise. On the other hand it is clear to Him that with every historical act a risk has (Page to be taken into consideration. Rarely in history, however, has the risk been less than at present while war is being waged in Europe, Britain is tied up there, America is still at the beginning of her armament, Japan is the strongest power in the East Asia sphere and Russia could not act since there are 150 German divisions standing at her Western border. Such a moment will never occur again, it is unique in history. He (the Fuehrer) admits that there is a certain risk involved, but it is an exceptionally small one at a time when Russia and Britain are eliminated and America is not yet prepared. If this favourable moment would pass by and the European conflict would possibly end in a compromise, France and Britain would recover in five years. America would join them as Japan's third enemy and Japan would sooner or later be faced with the task after all of defending the security of her living space (Lebensraum) in a battle against those three nations.

Page Militarily, too, there has not been since the memory 12 of men a situation relatively as favourable as now, although orig) the military difficulties resulting from action should not be underestimated.

Especially favorable is the fact that there exist no conflicts of interests between Japan and her Allies, Germany, which wear satiated her colonial demands in Africa, is just as little interested in East Asia as Japan is in Europe. This is the best basis for cooperation between a Japanese East Asia and a German-Italian Europe.

On the other hand the cooperation of the Anglo-Saxons never meant a real coalition but always only a playing off of one against the other. Just as much as Britain does not put up with the hegemony of one nation in Europe, she would in East Asia play off Japan, China and Russia against each other to promote the interests of her own empire. The United States would act just like Britain, she would inherit the empire and replace British imperialism with American imperialism.

A better situation for joint action would hardly ever again exist for a personal reason also. He (the Fuehrer) has full confidence in himself, the German nation stands unitedly back of him as with nobody also in her previous history. He has the necessary power of resolution in critical situations and, finally, Germany is experiencing a tremendous series of successes which is also unique in the world but not be repeated.
In conclusion the Fuehrer pointed out that his attitude toward Japan did not originate in the year 1941. He has always been for cooperation with this country. Ambassador OTT knows that he (the Fuehrer) has worked unflinchingly toward this goal for many years. He is determined never again to deviate from this line. As already mentioned, especially favorable for cooperation is the fact that there are no conflicts in interest between Japan and Germany. For interests in the long run are indeed stronger than personalities and the will of a Fuehrer, therefore they always endanger the cooperation between nations if they are turned in opposite directions. In the case of Japan and Germany, therefore, one can plan for the longest time on account of the non-existence of such conflicts. This has been his firm conviction since earliest youth. The Japanese, German, and Italian nations would be highly successful if they would draw the consequences from this present unique situation.

MATSUOKA thanked the Fuehrer for his frank statements which made the whole situation very clear to him. Although he already has occupied himself thoroughly with the arguments advanced by HITLER, he would once again consider most thoroughly the arguments mentioned.

On the whole he agrees with the views mentioned by the Fuehrer. Especially he is also of the opinion that any resolute action involves a certain risk. MATSUOKA declared with reference to the report of Ambassador OTT and the German Foreign Minister through which the Fuehrer will probably be accurately informed about the present situation in Japan, that he wants to present the situation personally and very frankly. There are in Japan, as in other countries, certain intellectual circles which can be kept in check only by a strong man. This is the type which although he would like to have the cubs of the tigress, is, however, not prepared to go into the cave to snatch them away from their mother. These trends of thought were presented by him using the same picture at a conference at headquarters in the presence of two princes of royal blood.

It is regrettable that Japan has not yet rid herself of these circles; indeed that some of these people are even in influential positions. Confidently, however, he can say that, after a violent discussion, he prevailed with his view at the conference at headquarters. Japan will act, and that decisively, when she has the feeling that she would otherwise lose a chance which might only return after a thousand years; and that Japan will advance regardless of the condition of her preparations, because there would always be some people who would consider the preparation insufficient. This point he, MATSUOKA, carried successfully also against both the princes. The timid politicians in Japan would always hesitate and would act partly because of a sympathetic pro-British or pro-American attitude.

MATSUOKA then pointed out that he had advocated the alliance already long before the outbreak of the European war. He greatly exerted himself at that time on behalf of its conclusion, but regrettably had had no success. After the outbreak of the European war he personally held the view that Japan first should attack Singapore and put an end to British influence in this district, and only then should conclude the Tripartite Pact, because the thought of
Japan joining the alliance without simultaneously making a contribution toward knocking-out Britain was unpleasant to him. Because, while Germany has already waged a gigantic battle against Britain for a year, Japan, at the time of the conclusion of the Pact, had not yet contributed anything. Therefore, he had very strongly insisted on a plan of attacking Singapore, but did not push it through and then, by force of circumstances reversed his program and put joining of the pact in first place.

He did not have the least doubt that the South Sea problem could not be solved without the capture of Singapore by Japan. One has only to intrude into the cave of the tigress and take out the cubs by force.

It is only a matter of time until Japan will attack. According to his opinion the attack should ensue as soon as possible. Unfortunately he does not govern Japan but has to convert the rulers to his opinion. He will surely also succeed in this same day. But at the present moment he cannot, under these circumstances, assume any obligation to act for his Japanese nation.

Upon his return, he would give these matters his most serious attention after his conference with the Fuehrer and the German Foreign Minister and after having personally examined the situation in Europe. He could not praise anything definite but promises that he will personally advocate to the utmost the goals indicated.

MATSUOKA then also urgently requested the statements just presented by him to be held strictly confidential because upon their becoming known in Japan the members of the cabinet differing in opinion would probably turn pale and try to get him out of his office.

While endeavoring to bring about the pact, he had also kept strictest silence until the very last moment and frequently and purposely created the impression of a pro-American or a non-British attitude for the deception of his adversaries.

Shortly before conclusion of the pact it was reported to him that the British Ambassador made strong propaganda among the Japanese that Japan was playing a very risky game by joining the Tripartite Pact. The American Ambassador also expressed himself similarly. A few days after conclusion of the pact he asked the American Ambassador whether the reports about the propaganda were based on fact. The ambassador admitted everything and, moreover, stated that every Japanese he had met since publication of the conclusion of the pact, had expressed the opinion that Germany would win the war. This, according to the opinion of the American Ambassador, is untrue, Germany has no chance to win the war and therefore it would be in his (the American Ambassador's) opinion actually a very risky game for Japan if she had concluded the pact perhaps with the assumption of a German victory.

"MATSUOKA declared further that he had thereupon replied to the American Ambassador that only God knows who would win the war in the long run. But he (MATSUOKA) did not conclude the pact on the basis of the victory of this or that power, but based on his vision of the new order. He had listened with interest to the statements of the Fuehrer about the new order and was fully and entirely
convincing by them. If he would for once, assume purely hypothetically, that the fortunes of war would turn at a given moment against Germany, he must state to the American Ambassador that Japan would then immediately come to the assistance of her ally.

His visions of the new order were laid down by him in the preamble of the Tripartite Pact. That is an ideal which has been transmitted from one generation to another since time immemorial. For him, personally, the realization of this ideal is his life objective to which he has devoted all his labor up to now, in order to make a small contribution on his part toward its realization. This Tripartite Pact, Berlin-Rome-Tokyo, is also a contribution toward this realization. The execution of these trends of thought, MATSUOKA emphasized further, stands moreover with the motto: "No conquest, no oppression, no exploitation." This was not yet understood everywhere in Japan. However, if Japan should ever deviate from this line, he (MATSUOKA) would be the first to fight against it.

In this connection MATSUOKA also reminded of the other principle of the preamble to the Tripartite Pact according to which every nation was to take the place due it. Although Japan, too, will proceed by force, if necessary, in establishing the new order, and although she sometimes would have to load with a strong hand the nations affected by this new order, she nevertheless keeps the previously quoted motto constantly before her eyes: "No conquest, no oppression, no exploitation."

During the further course of the conversation MATSUOKA came to speak about his discussions with Stalin in Moscow. As an ally he owes an explanation about it to the German Foreign Minister and would have given it at the morning conference if the German Foreign Minister had not been called away prematurely. Now he intends to give this information to the leader.

First of all he intended to pay a complimentary visit to Molotov on his trip through Moscow. After some reflection however, he decided to ask the Japanese ambassador to find out in a mild way from the Soviet government whether there exists any interest in a conference between Stalin and him. However, before the Japanese ambassador could follow his instructions with the Soviet government, the proposal was made by the Russian government itself for a meeting between Stalin, Molotov, and Matsuoka. He spoke with Molotov for about 30 minutes, Stalin for one hour, so that due to the necessary translations he spoke perhaps 10 minutes with Molotov and 25 minutes with Stalin.

He had explained to Stalin that the Japanese are morally communists. This ideal had been passed on from the fathers to the sons since time immemorial. But at the same time he stated that he does not believe in political and economic communism and rather assumed that his Japanese ancestors had already early given up every attempt in this direction and had devoted themselves to moral communism.
For that which he called moral communism, MATSUOKA then quoted some examples from his own family. This Japanese ideal of moral communism had been overthrown by the liberalism, individualism and egoism introduced from the West. At present the situation in Japan in this respect is extremely confused. However, there is a minority which is strong enough to fight successfully for the resurrection of the "old ego" of the Japanese. This ideological struggle in Japan is extremely bitter. But those who fight for the restoration of the old ideal are convinced of their final victory.

The Anglo-Saxons are basically responsible for the penetration of the above-mentioned prevailing ideology; and for the restoration of the old traditional Japanese ideal, Japan is compelled, therefore, to fight against the Anglo-Saxons just as well as in China she is fighting not against the Chinese but only against Great-Britain in China and capitalism in China.

MATSUOKA stated further that he had explained to Stalin his ideas about the New Order and thereby emphasized that the Anglo-Saxons constitute the greatest obstacle to the establishment of this order and Japan, therefore, of necessity has to fight against them. He explained to Stalin that the Soviets also on their part are advocating something new and that he believes to be able to settle the difficulties between Japan and Russia after the collapse of the British empire. He pictured the Anglo-Saxons as Japan's, Germany's and Soviet Russia's common enemy.

Stalin held out the prospect of an answer when he should travel through Moscow on his return to Japan, but immediately added after some deliberation that Soviet Russia never was friendly with Britain, nor ever will be.

MATSUOKA, in the further course of conversation, made some remarks about the nature of the TENNO. The TENNO is the state, and the life as well as property of each Japanese belongs to the TENNO, that is the state. This is so to speak the Japanese version of a totalitarian state structure.

In conclusion MATSUOKA spoke admiringly about the way in which the Fuehrer is leading the German nation, which stands behind him in complete unity, with determination and power through this great time of revolution unequalled in history. Each nation has such a leader but once in a thousand years. The Japanese nation has not yet found its Fuehrer. But he would surely appear in the hour of need and take over the leadership of the nation with determination.

Berlin, 1 April 1941

signed: SCHMIDT
Ambassador
AFFIDAVIT

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nuremberg, Germany, and as such have possession, custody and control of the original captured enemy document, numbered 1878-FS by said Documentation Division.

2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from German Foreign Office

3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure and capture was delivered to, filed with, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nuremberg, Germany in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 and captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents", and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of said original captured enemy document above described and referred to.

5. That said above referred to original captured enemy document is being held by me for possible use in connection with the trial of alleged war criminals before the International Military Tribunal, and that a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original document for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ Gerard Schaefer
Gerard Schaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 3rd day of May 1946.

/s/ Smith W. Brookhart, Jr.
Lt Col IGD

SMITH W. BROOKHART, JR.,
Lt Col, IGD
0-508524
AFFIDAVIT

I, Paul O. Schmidt, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That from 1923 to the collapse of the German Reich in May 1945, I was Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office, and as such was personally present and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at all important Foreign Office and other conferences between German Government leaders and representatives of foreign governments.

2. That in addition to being Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office as aforesaid, I was also after the year 1939 the Head of the Secretariat General of the German Foreign Office and that my latest government rank was that of a Minister in the German Foreign Office.

3. That while acting as interpreter and/or secretary at such meetings above referred to, it was my official duty to and I did take notes concerning the conversations that took place, and at the conclusion of each such meeting, I prepared from such notes a complete and detailed record of what was said and transpired at such meetings.

4. That the records prepared by me became the official German Government records of what was said and transpired at such meetings. That one copy of the record was filed with the Minister's Office Section of the German Foreign Office, which office acted in the capacity of secretary to said Foreign Office. That another copy of the record of each of such meetings was filed with the Private Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister. That a third copy of the record of each of such meetings was retained by me.

5. That said meetings, concerning which I made a record as aforesaid, were of historical importance and that such records were also prepared by me for the express purpose of maintaining and preserving a record of such meetings for historical purposes.

6. That the document attached hereto is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original record, prepared personally by me in the manner herein set forth and concerning a conference held on March 27th 1941 between the Fuehrer and the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Matuoka in the presence of the Reichminister of Foreign Affairs and the ambassadors Ott and Cahine.

7. That I personally attended and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at the conference last above mentioned and that the record prepared by me, and of which the attached document is a photostatic copy, is a true and accurate account of what was said and transpired at said conference.
8. That I have been advised and am aware of the fact that the herein affidavit and the document attached hereto may be used in connection with the prosecution of Japanese War Criminals and make this affidavit freely and voluntarily and with knowledge of the above facts.

/s/ Dr. Paul C. Schmidt
PAUL C. SCHMIDT

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Nurnburg, Germany, this third day of May 1945.

/s/ Smith W. Brookhart, Jr. Lt Col IGD
SMITH W. BROOKHART, JR.
LT Colonel, IGD
O-508524
(请根据上下文调整)
（提稿図く用語解説）

添 結

（提稿図く用語解説）

PM Paul O. Schmidt

4005 005

（提稿図く用語解説）
China Charges Japs Kill 2,700 in Manchuria

BY JOHN POWELL.

[Chicago Tribune From Service]

SHANGHAI, Nov. 18 [Friday].-Japanese troops killed 2,700 Chinese men, women, and children, the inhabitants of the three Manchurian villages of Pingtingshan, Chinchipao, and Litaekou, about 15 miles northeast of Fushun [east of Mukden], according to an official report issued by the Nanking foreign office last night. The report caused great excitement here.

A Japanese detachment visited each of the villages searching for concealed Chinese rebel "volunteers," according to the foreign office, and ordered the villagers to assemble in a ditch near Pingtingshan while the search went on.

Ordered to Kneel.

To prevent the villagers from escaping or communicating with the alleged rebel volunteers, the Japanese compelled them to kneel, meantime placing behind them ten machine guns some 70 yards distant, the report asserted. When the villagers started to run the Japanese opened fire, the dispatch continued, and the stampeding mass of screaming men, women and children were mowed down.

Between 60 and 70 were reported killed by the first fusillade. About 100 escaped, but refugees claim that the remainder were wounded or bayoneted, the communiqué stated. The bodies were collected on pyres, covered with fuel oil and burned, it was said.

The Chinese declared that similar outrages occurred in the villages of Tiheken and Wangzha, southwest of Mukden.

The Japanese foreign office in a message received last night here denied the massacre report and stated that the Fushun area has been quiet. The Japanese claim the report is a complete fabrication for the purpose of "concealing Crimes."
The Reich Foreign Minister welcomed MATSUOKA with cordial words as a man who has shown by word and deed that he has the same attitude toward the problems of his country as the Fuehrer and his co-workers must have for Germany, and who made possible the conclusion of the pact with JAPAN as the responsible Foreign Minister of his country. The Tri-Partite Pact is a very important instrument for the future of the three countries, and represents the foundation on which the future of the three nations can be assured in a manner that has always been imagined by German and Japanese patriots.

In this connection, the Reich Foreign Minister gave a survey of the situation as it appears from Germany's point of view.

In reference to the military situation, he pointed out that Germany today is in the final phase of her fight against England. During the past winter, the Fuehrer prepared everything further so that Germany stands today completely ready for deployment in order to meet England everywhere she can be reached. The Fuehrer has at this moment at his disposal perhaps the strongest military might which has ever existed in the world. Germany has ready to strike 240 divisions, 166 of which are first class attack divisions of young soldiers, 24 of them are armored divisions to which must be added more motorized brigades.

The Luftwaffe has increased greatly, and has introduced new models so that in the future as in the past it will be a match for any combination, that is, Germany is not only a match for England and America in this field, but is absolutely superior.

The German navy owned at the outbreak of the war only a relatively small number of battleships. In any case, the battleships under construction have been completed so that even the last one of them could be commissioned within a short time.

In contrast to the world war, the German navy does not stay in port this time, but has been committed against the enemy from the first day of the war. MATSUOKA probably saw in the news of the last weeks that German dreadnoughts disturbed the supply routes between England and America with extraordinary success.
The number of submarines, committed until now, is very small. At most 2 or 9 boats have been in contact with the enemy each time. In any case, these few submarines in cooperation with the Luftwaffe during January and February sank 750,000 tons per month, exact proof of which Germany can show any time.

This figure, however, does not include the great additional losses which England suffered from floating and magnetic mines. At the beginning of April, the number of submarines will increase 6 to 10 fold so that 60 to 80 submarines could then be in contact with the enemy constantly. The Führer here followed the tactics of committing only a few submarines at first, and to use the remaining ones for training the personnel necessary for a larger fleet in order then to attack the enemy like a stroke of lightning by the commitment of a larger number of units. Therefore, the expected number of sinkings by German submarines would in the future probably be considerably above that has already been reached. Under these circumstances, the submarine arm alone can be described as absolutely deadly.

Turning to the military situation on the European continent, the Reich Foreign Minister remarked that Germany practically had no longer any enemy worth mentioning because of the subjugation of the countries of the continent, except for the small English forces in Greece. Germany will repulse every attempt by England to land on the continent or to gain a foothold there. She would therefore not tolerate for the English to remain in Greece. Viewed militarily, the Greek problem is of secondary importance. The only factor of practical importance is that the danger toward Greece which probably will become necessary, will attain a dominating position in the Eastern Mediterranean which will be of considerable importance for the further development of operations in these areas. In Africa, Italy has had bad luck during the past months because the Italian troops there were not familiar with the modern methods of tank fighting and were not prepared for anti-tank defense so that it was comparatively easy for the English armored divisions to capture the rather unimportant Italian positions. A final obstacle has been placed in front of further advance by the English. The Führer has sent General RAMER, one of the most capable German officers, to Tripoli, with sufficient German forces. Unfortunately, the hope that General WILHELM would attack was not fulfilled. In several outpost skirmishes, the English encountered the Germans, and then gave up all further offensive intentions. Should they still undertake an attack against Tripoli, then they would meet an annihilating defeat. Here as well, the tables certainly will be turned one of these days, and the English will perhaps disappear from North Africa even faster than they came.

In the Mediterranean area, the German Luftwaffe has accomplished good work now for two months and has inflicted heavy shipping losses on the English who had dug themselves in there. The Suez Canal has been blocked for a long time and would be blocked once after removal of the obstacles. It is no longer a pleasure for the English to be obliged to stock it out in the Mediterranean. He (the Reich Foreign Minister) believes that the Mediterranean would still be blocked off during the course of this year in such a manner that the English would no longer represent practically any danger. Their fleet would be tied down for the protection of their position in Africa.
If one calculates the sum total of the military situation in Europe one arrives at the conclusion that the Axis is practically master of the situation in all of continental Europe in the military field. A gigantic army is at the disposal of Germany, which is practically unemployed and can be committed at any time at any place where the Fuehrer deems it necessary.

The political situation is characterized by the adherence of almost all the Balkans to the Tri-Partite Pact. News about a putsch and a change of government arrived from Belgrade this morning, however all details are lacking so far. Also the political situation in Europe and in the whole world has contributed to the strengthening of the Tri-Partite powers. Germany continues to strive to win over this or that state which still stands outside of the pact, to the cause of the three powers. He (the Reich Foreign Minister) can inform MATSUKA confidentially that Spain at least in spirit is in the Tri-Partite Pact. Of the two or three countries remaining, Sweden and Turkey are especially interesting. He can tell MATSUKA confidentially that here too, attempts would be made to win these countries for the Tri-Partite Pact.

Certain feelers have already been aimed at Turkey. Even if this country formally has an alliance with England, it is at least not entirely impossible that Turkey will in the future perhaps draw closer and closer to the Tri-Partite Pact.

* * *

During the further course of the conversation, the Reich Foreign Minister spoke about the economic and the food situation. Although it is possible that individual food items are temporarily scarce, yet he could report that regardless of how long the war lasts no food difficulties would arise in Germany. Germany has enough space to produce in her own area the necessary food for the duration of the war.

In regard to raw materials, there are certain bottlenecks, as shown by the raw rubber negotiations with Japan. Fundamentally, however, one must say here as well that serious danger to the Reich is completely out of the question. The Fuehrer has accumulated war materials to such a great extent that German economy would proceed to reconversion. The German armament stockpile is so full that not the slightest shortage would arise for years. Therefore, during the next months, a great reconversion process would be carried out in the economy, and the main power of the German war potential would be used for the production of submarines and airplanes. Since the German army with the possible exception of Russia, practically has no more opponents on the continent, a high percentage of the German productive capacity can be used for these two weapons.

In summary, the Reich Foreign Minister stated that the war has already been won for the axis without doubt. In any case, it can by no means be lost any more. It is only a question of time until England will admit having lost the
war. When this will happen, he can naturally not predict. This time under certain circumstances could, however, occur very quickly. It depends on the events of the next three or four months. However, there is the greatest probability that England will capitulate in the course of this year.

In this connection, the Reich Foreign Minister spoke about America. No doubt exists that the English would have given up the war a long time ago if ROOSEVELT had not given GREYdt's new hope. There is precise and clear information about this from Germany to England. It is hard to say that ROOSEVELT ultimately has in view. It is not clear whether he wants to enter the war or not. It is only certain that the apparent assistance promised to England, cannot be provided now of thin air. (es nicht aus den Boden gestüppft werden) It will take a long time until thin hole will actually become effective. But even then, the question of quality will be very problematical, especially in the country of airplanes. The individual models become obsolete very rapidly during present developments. Improvements on German models are made from month to month on the basis of daily combat experience, and it is certain, whether a country, remote from the war, can produce the highest quality in airplanes. In any case, whatever German flyers have not so far of American mechanics, they designated as "old junk" (alte Klammotten). Therefore, he (the Reich Foreign Minister) believes that a very considerable time would pass before the American help for England could even take effect. Germany in any case, also in the interest of her allies and friends is striving to finish the war as quickly as possible.

The Tri-Partite Pact has followed mainly the aim of frightening America from continuing on the course taken, and to keep her out of war. This goal is absolutely clear and appropriate. Furthermore, the Tri-Partite Pact is to serve to secure the cooperation of the signatories in the new order, in case of Germany and Italy in Europe, and the case of Japan in East Asia, for the future. The main enemy not in the establishment of the new order, in England. She is in the same manner the enemy of Japan as she is the one of the axis powers. America must be prevented by all means from entering the war actively or from helping England too actively.

Examining the possibilities which exist for further cooperation between Germany and Japan, the question was again and again during conversations with the Führer whether in view of the new order, that is the defeat of England which is necessary for the establishment of the new order, an active participation of Japan in the war would not be useful. The Führer has thought about this question in detail, and he believes that it actually would be very advantageous if Japan would arrive at the decision to participate actively in the war against England, as soon as possible. Germany believes that for instance an attack against Singapore in the near future would be a very decisive factor for a rapid overthrow of England. He (the Reich Foreign Minister) believes it would be possible to root out these bases more closely with Japan in the maritime and other fields. It is also certain that the seizure of Singapore would be a very serious blow to England. This is especially of importance in view of the already rather bad moral state of the British Isles. H. also believes that
the seizure of Singapore would perhaps be most appropriate to keep America out
of the war because the United States could hardly risk sending her Navy into
Japanese waters. If Japan today would succeed in a war against England with
a decisive blow, such as attack on Singapore, ROOSEVELT would be in a very
difficult position. Practically it is difficult for him to attempt anything
against Japan. If he were to do it anyhow and declare war on Japan, then he
must realize that for instance the solution of the question of the Philippines
would take place in accord with Japanese intentions. This would mean a serious
loss of prestige for the President so that he would probably think about an
action against Japan for a long time.

On the other hand, Japan, by the conquest of Singapore would be put in a
position to operate in an entirely different manner than until now, since she
will then have the absolutely dominating position in East Asia. Thus Germany
believes that, if Japan can decide on such an action, this would mean the
solution of the Gordian Knot in East Asia.

In summary, the Reich Foreign Minister stated that in case of an action by
Japan in this direction, the war against English tonnage can be waged with
much greater force in East Asia as well, that by the courageous step of Japan,
America will probably be kept out of the war, that Japan can secure her
position in East Asia from which, according to German opinion, she cannot
restrain in the long run in the new order of the Greater East Asia Area. In
this connection, a number of other questions will certainly arise for the
discussion of which he would be available at any time.

In conclusion, the Reich Foreign Minister stated that the Tri-Partite Pact
could do justice in the best manner to its true idea, that is, to prevent the
spread of the war or in other words the entry of the United States into the
war, that the parties to the treaty conclude at the proper time mutual
agreements for the final suppression of England in addition to the present
assurances. In this manner, the spirit of the pact can be proven by deed in
the next apocalyptic manner by all participants.

At this moment, the Reich Foreign Minister was called to the Reich Chancellery.
Contrary to his original assumption that it would only be a question of a
brief absence, the conferences were prolonged for a longer time so that the
conversations with MITSUBISHI were not continued any more before breakfast.

In connection, the breakfast provided on the program took place in the small-
cut circle, at first in the absence of the Reich Foreign Minister, who only
appeared later.

Berlin 31 March 1941

Signed: SCHMIDT.
III. (Photostatic cy in Doc. Rm.)

AFFIDAVIT

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nurnberg, Germany, and as such have possession, custody and control of true and accurate photostatic copies of a certain original captured enemy document. That said photostatic copies have been numbered 1946-FS by said Documentation Division.

2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from the German Foreign Office Files and Archives.

3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure was retained by the United States Army Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and such above mentioned photostatic copies were delivered to, filed, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nurnberg, Germany, in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents", and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of said original captured enemy document above referred to.

5. That said above referred to original captured enemy document is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, being held and retained by the United States Army Document Center Sub-Section in charge of captured German foreign office papers and now located in Berlin, Germany, for inspection by various authorized agencies, and that a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original document for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ Gerard Schaefer
Gerard Schaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ John W. Auchincloss
John W. Auchincloss
O-2052152
Capt., JACD.
AFFIDAVIT

I, Paul O. Schmidt, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That from 1923 to the collapse of the German Reich in May 1945, I was Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office, and as such was personally present and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at all important Foreign Office and other conferences between German Government leaders and representatives of foreign governments.

2. That in addition to being Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office as aforesaid, I was also after the year 1939 the Head of the Secretariat General of the German Foreign Office and that my latest government rank was that of a Minister in the German Foreign Office.

3. That while acting as interpreter and/or secretary at such meetings above referred to, it was my official duty to and I did take notes concerning the conversations that took place, and at the conclusion of each such meeting, I prepared from such notes a complete and detailed record of what was said and transpired at such meetings.

4. That the records prepared by me became the official German Government records of what was said and transpired at such meetings. That one copy of the record was filed with the Ministers Office Section of the German Foreign Office, which office acted in the capacity of secretary to said Foreign Office. That another copy of the record of each of such meetings was filed with the Private Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister. That a third copy of the record of each of such meetings was retained by me.

5. That said meetings, concerning which I made a record as aforesaid, were of historical importance and that such records were also prepared by me for the express purpose of maintaining and preserving a record of such meetings for historical purposes.

6. That the document attached hereto is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original record, prepared personally by me in the manner herein set forth and concerning a conference held on March 27th 1941 in Berlin between the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Matsuoka in the presence of the ambassadors Ott and Oshima.

7. That I personally attended and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at the conference last above mentioned and that the record prepared by me, and of which the attached document is a photostatic copy, is a true and accurate account of what was said and transpired at said conference.

8. That I have been advised and am aware of the fact that the herein affidavit and the document attached hereto may be used in connection with the prosecution of Japanese war criminals and make this affidavit freely and voluntarily and with knowledge of the above facts.

/s/ Dr. Paul O. Schmidt

PAUL O. SCHMIDT

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Nurnburg, Germany, this third day of May 1946.

/s/ Smith W. Brockhart Jr., Lt.Col. 107

SMITH W. BROCKHART, JR.

LT COLONEL, 107

O-508524
Notes on the conversation between the German Foreign Minister and the Japanese Foreign Minister, MATSUOFA, on 28 March 1941.

The German Foreign Minister expressed his satisfaction at being able to speak with Matsuoka a second time. The Führer would have liked to express his attitude to the questions at hand more fully, but was much occupied for the time being with the developments in Yugoslavia. The details, however, were not so important. The essential part was the question of possibilities and prospects of closer cooperation between Japan and Germany, that is, concerning the transition from the passive to the active cooperation of Japan in the common task. The Germans had heard with great satisfaction how spiritedly Matsuoka was proceeding on this matter. It was actually the best opportunity that had ever been granted /Japan/ to achieve her objectives, and it would be better to make use of this opportunity before it slipped away. The Tripartite Pact was one of the most important agreements and it formed the basis of relations between Japan and Germany for centuries. There were no clashes of interest.

The situation was such that a new order could only be established if Great Britain were utterly defeated. This was true in even greater measure for Japan than for Germany, which already dominated the European continent and which would within this year draw into her dominion the Mediterranean area and Africa, insofar as she had interests. Germany would then have all she needed. She did not seek world domination as Roosevelt had falsely asserted. The Führer wanted to get the war over with as soon as possible in order to turn back to his task of construction. The goal which he had assigned himself, namely to assure the Reich the utmost security, had really already been achieved.

In contrast, the new order in the Greater East Asia sphere could only be achieved if Japan also controlled the south. For this, however, the capture of Singapore was essential.

Regarding Russia, the German Foreign Minister declared that the Germans did not know how things would develop in this direction. It was possible that Russia might take the wrong course, although he really didn't expect this of Stalin. No one could know. At any rate Germany would instantly strike if Russia undertook anything against Japan and would thereby cover Japan's rear with respect to Russia. In this fashion the first of the misgivings of the Japanese statesmen, and especially of the Japanese army, reported by Ambassador Ott, would be set at rest by the help of the German army. The second misgiving,
which the Japanese Navy in particular had expressed with regard to the English Home Fleet and the English Mediterranean Fleet, he (the German Foreign Minister) could answer by saying that both these English fleets would be contained by Germany within European and Mediterranean waters. Finally the Japanese anxiety regarding America had been expressed. The United States, however, would not risk her fleet against Japan, and she would not send it out farther than the Hawaiian Islands. A great Japanese success at Singapore would, on the contrary, strengthen American neutrality. Roosevelt would then hesitate to undertake anything at all imprudent.

Although he (the German Foreign Minister) thoroughly understood the situation in Japan, which Matsuoka had illustrated by his tale of the tiger and her young, yet he must allude again to the fact that two of the strongest countries in the world, who are possessed of a youthful, powerful, and fearless spirit, had been granted by Providence an opportunity that perhaps recurs only once in a thousand years. Germany's great opportunity lies in her Fuehrer, whose co-workers are merely implements to carry out his will. He (the German Foreign Minister) had again and again explained to the English and French Ambassadors that they must never fall into the error of comparing the Germany of Today with the Germany of 1914 and 1918.

Even then the Reich had stood up for four years against a world of enemies, and only through its disunity and its inner weakness had it lost the war. Now, however, it was unified and had thereby double strength, which, through the highly gifted leadership of Adolf Hitler, would be redoubled so that henceforth Germany must be regarded as having four times her strength in the First World War. The ambassadors had thrown this warning to the winds. However these predictions had been fulfilled and there was nothing in the world which would stop Germany and Italy from ruling absolutely the European-African hemispheres. If such an opportunity should present itself to Japan under such circumstances, she must consider these things very carefully and not let the opportunity slip from her grasp.

To be sure when the present war would end, could not be prophesized with certainty, but the German Foreign Minister had the feeling that perhaps England might collapse sooner than was generally expected. If the English were to beg suddenly for peace, it would be most desirable if Germany and Japan were able together to determine that peace.

The German Foreign Minister then spoke of his family traditions, which had always been pro-Japanese. Moreover he had already in 1934 had an important talk with the Fuehrer on German-Japanese collaboration. The Fuehrer's high respect for Japan had begun with the Russo-Japanese war. Now the most important thing was not to let slip the joint
opportunity which offered itself in 1941.

Matsuoka replied that he was of the same opinion. He too believed on the basis of reason and intuition that 1941 would appear in history as a decisive year. In it the greatest tragedy, the collapse of the British Empire, would take place. He felt that the German nation in Europe and the Japanese nation in the Far East acted almost under a divine order to break up the British Empire and to establish a New Order.

Matsuoka then asked what attitude Germany would assume toward the United States if England were brought to her knees in summer, but America were not as yet at war.

The German Foreign Minister answered that this depended on the attitude of the United States herself. Of course, the possibility of an occupation of the British Isles required a good-weather period, and the British might possibly try to set up a new government in the United States. But in his opinion this could not be carried out.

Matsuoka thereupon made his question more specific in the following way: If England were beaten to the ground, the United States would not, in his opinion, go on supporting the British Empire. Canada would be merely more or less annexed. Would Germany, under these circumstances, leave the United States alone? The German Foreign Minister replied that Germany had no interest whatsoever in a war against the United States. Matsuoka acknowledged this with satisfaction and the remark that one had to reason with the Anglo-Saxons as a whole; if we did not succeed in converting America to our ideas, a New Order could not be established. The German Foreign Minister replied, that each would exercise control in his own sphere. Germany would do this, together with Italy, in the European-African sphere, the United States would have to limit herself to the American continent, and the Far East would be reserved for Japan. As regards Russia, she would have to be watched closely and revolutionary propaganda would not be permitted on any account. In the future only the aforementioned three spheres of interest would remain as great centers of power. The British Empire would disappear.

Matsuoka replied that the only great problem that would remain thereafter was Russia. Japan was ready to let Russia get to an ice-free sea via India or Iran, but would not tolerate the Russians on the Chinese coast. Matsuoka then asked whether the Fuehrer had ever considered the possibilities of a Russo-Japanese-German Pact. The German Foreign Minister denied this and dubbed closer co-operation with Russia an absolute impossibility, as the spiritual bases of the army as well as the rest of the nation were completely opposed. The Soviet Union was still internationally inclined while Japan and Germany thought nationally. Russia undermined the family, Germany stood up for it. Here, as between fire and water, a union was
impossible. Stalin was very skillful and had therefore under the circumstances prevailing at that time, concluded the pact with Germany.

Russia would also have joined the Tripartite pact, but her terms could not be met. The whole affair was being treated dilatorily by Germany, as he could tell Matsuoka confidentially. Besides that, Germany was watching the Soviet Union closely, and -- this Matsuoka must know at all events -- she was prepared for any eventuality. Germany would not provoke Russia, but if Stalin's policy was not in accord with what the Fuehrer thought right, he would shatter Russia. Matsuoka replied that Japan was now avoiding irritating Russia. Japan was waiting for Germany to complete its victory in the Balkans. Without the good services of Germany and without her strength Japan would have no chance to completely improve Russo-Japanese relations.

Matsuoka furthermore talked of the long-term commercial treaty, which would be concluded with Russia. He then put before the German Foreign Minister the question, if he should on his return trip stop over a little longer in Moscow, to negotiate with the Russians regarding the Non-Aggression Pact or the Neutrality Pact. Here he emphasized that immediate admission of Russia to the Tripartite Pact would never be allowed by the Japanese people. It would on the contrary cause one cry of indignation to arise throughout Japan. The German Foreign Minister replied that such an accession of Russia to the pact was out of the question and suggested to Matsuoka, if at all possible, not to touch on the aforementioned questions in Moscow, as it was not apt to fit quite into the framework of the present situation.

Upon a further remark by Matsuoka, that the conclusion of a fishing and of a commercial agreement would improve the atmosphere between Russia and Japan, the German Foreign Minister replied that there were no objections to the conclusion of such purely commercial treaties. In this connection, Matsuoka further mentioned that America was closely watching Japanese-Russian relations and for her part was trying to conclude an agreement with Russia against Japan.

Matsuoka then again came to speak of Singapore. The Japanese were not worried about the British navy. However, there were Japanese circles which looked with great misgivings upon a conflict with America, as they presumed that in such a case it would mean a five-to-ten year war with the United States. He immediately admitted that America would not stake her fleet in a war against Japan, but for that very reason these Japanese circles were worried because under these circumstances the war would last for years. The German Foreign Minister replied that in his opinion Roosevelt would never let it come to a war, as he was fully aware of the impossibility of an advance against Japan. Japan for her part, would, however, occupy the Philippines and thus deal a severe blow to Roosevelt's prestige. If Japan conquered Singapore, the greater part of the world would thus be under the control of the Tripartite Pact powers anyway and America would find herself in an isolated position.
Matsuoka was personally strongly in favor of the German Foreign Minister's line of thought. If Japan did not run the risk connected with the conquering of Singapore, it was his opinion that she would become a third-rate power. Therefore, in any case, the blow would have to be dealt one day. If he succeeded at the same time in keeping the United States quiet for six months, all difficulties would be overcome. A nation which hesitated in a matter of such fundamental national importance would only prove that it lacked the most important characteristic, the capability of decision.

Berlin, 31 March 1941
AFFIDAVIT

I, Paul O. Schmidt, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That from 1923 to the collapse of the German Reich in May 1945, I was Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office, and as such was personally present and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at all important Foreign Office and other conferences between German Government leaders and representatives of foreign governments.

2. That in addition to being Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office as aforesaid, I was also after the year 1938 the Head of the Secretariat General of the German Foreign Office and that my latest government rank was that of a Minister in the German Foreign Office.

3. That while acting as interpreter and/or secretary at such meetings above referred to, it was my official duty to and I did take notes concerning the conversations that took place, and at the conclusion of each such meeting, I prepared from such notes a complete and detailed record of what was said and transpired at such meetings.

4. That the records prepared by me became the official German Government records of what was said and transpired at such meetings. That one copy of the record was filed with the Ministers Office Section of the German Foreign Office, which office acted in the capacity of secretary to said Foreign Office. That another copy of the record of each of such meetings was filed with the Private Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister. That a third copy of the record of each of such meetings was retained by me.

5. That said meetings, concerning which I made a record as aforesaid, were of historical importance and that such records were also prepared by me for the express purpose of maintaining and preserving a record of such meetings for historical purposes.

6. That the document attached hereto is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original record, prepared personally by me in the manner herein set forth and concerning a conference held on March 28th 1941 between the Reichminister of Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Matsuoka.

7. That I personally attended and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at the conference last above mentioned and that the record prepared by me, of which the attached document is a photostatic copy, is a true and accurate account of what was said and transpired at said conference.
8. That I have been advised and am aware of the fact that the herein affidavit and the document attached hereto may be used in connection with the prosecution of Japanese War Criminals and make this affidavit freely and voluntarily and with knowledge of the above facts.

/s/ Dr. Paul O. Schmidt

PAUL O. SCHMIDT

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Nurnburg, Germany, this third day of May 1946.

/s/ Smith W. Brookhart, Jr. Lt Col IGD

SMITH W. BROOKHART, JR
Lt COLONEL IGD

0-508524
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Gumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attaché of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Warburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Warburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Warburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/S/ W. P. Gumming
C. P. GUMMING
subscribed and sworn to before me this 1st day of April 1946.

/S/ G. H. Garde
C. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General
OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
The R.A.M. resumed the preceding conversation with MATSUOKA about the latter's impending talks with the Russians in Moscow, where they had left off. He expressed the opinion that it would probably be best, in view of the whole situation, not to carry the discussions with the Russians too far. He did not know how the situation would develop. One thing, however, was certain, namely that Germany would strike immediately, should Russia ever attack Japan. He was ready to give MATSUOKA this positive assurance, so that Japan could push forward to the South on SINGAPORE, without fear of possible complications with Russia. The largest part of the German army was anyway on the Eastern frontiers of the Reich and fully prepared to open the attack at any time. He (the R.A.M.) however believed, that Russia would try to avoid developments leading to war. Should Germany however enter into a conflict with Russia, the USSR would be finished off within a few months. In this case, Japan would have, of course, even less reason to be afraid than ever, if she wanted to advance on Singapore. Consequently, she need not refrain from such an undertaking because of possible fears of Russia.

He could not know, of course, just how things with Russia would develop. It was uncertain whether or not STALIN would intensify his present unfriendly policy against Germany. He (the R.A.M.) wanted to point out to MATSUOKA, in any case, that a conflict with Russia was anyhow within the realm of possibility. In any case, MATSUOKA could not report to the Japanese Emperor, upon his return that a conflict between Russia and Germany was impossible. On the contrary, the situation was such that such a conflict, even if it were not probable, would have to be considered possible.

Next, the R.A.M. turned again to the Singapore question. In view of the fears expressed by the Japanese of possible attacks by submarines based on the PILIPINAS and of the intervention of the British Mediterranean and Home fleets, he had again discussed the situation with GENERAL-ADmiral RUEDEM. The latter had stated that the British Navy during this year would have its hands so full in the English home waters and in the Mediterranean that it would not be able to send even a single ship to the Far East. General-Admiral RUEDEM had described the U.S. submarines as so bad, that Japan need not bother about them at all.

MATSUOKA replied immediately that the Japanese Navy had a very low estimate of the threat from the British Navy; it also held the view that in case of a clash with the American Navy it would be able to smash the
latter without trouble. It was afraid, however, that the Americans
would not take up the battle with their fleet; thus the conflict with
the United States might perhaps be dragged out to five years. This
possibility caused considerable worry in Japan.

The RAM replied that America could not do anything against Japan
in the case of the capture of Singapore. Perhaps for this reason alone,
ROOSEVELT would think twice before deciding on active measures against
Japan. For while, on one hand, he could not achieve anything against
Japan, on the other hand, there was the probability of losing the
Philippines to Japan; for the American President, of course, this would
mean a considerable loss of prestige and, because of inadequate rearma­
ment, he would have nothing to offset such a loss.

In this connection, MATSUOKA pointed out, he was doing everything
to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted as if Japan had no
intention at all regarding this key position of England in the East.
Therefore it might be possible that his attitude toward the British
would appear to be friendly in words and in acts. However Germany
should not be deceived by that. He assumed this attitude, not only in
order to reassure the British, but also in order to fool the pro-British
and Pro-American elements until one day he would suddenly open the attack
on Singapore.

The RAM declared that, in his opinion, Japan's declaration of war on
England should take the form of an attack on Singapore.

In this connection, MATSUOKA stated, his tactics were based on the
certain assumption that the sudden attack against Singapore would unite
the entire Japanese nation with one blow. ("Nothing succeeds like suc­
cess," the RAM remarked.) He followed here the example of the words
of a famous Japanese statesman, addressed to the Japanese Navy at the
outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war; "You open fire, then the nation
will be united". The Japanese need to be shaken up to awaken. After
all, as an Oriental, he believed in fate which would come, whether you
wanted it or not.

Later on, the discussion turned to the question of the transportation
of rubber. The RAM asked Matsuoka to see what the possibility was of
transportation by one or two Japanese auxiliary cruisers to Lisbon or to
France.

Matsuoka replied that, immediately after the steps taken by Ambassa­
dor Ott in connection with the rubber question, he had interceded in
favor of Japan delivering certain quantities to Germany from her own
rubber stocks, and later on making up the resulting deficit in rubber
from Indo-China.
The HAM pointed out in this connection that communication via the Siberian railway was insufficient and that, moreover, 18,000 tons of French rubber from Indo-China would be delivered to Japan through German intervention. He here asked about the size of the auxiliary cruisers possibly to be used for the transportation of the rubber. Matsuoka, who stated that he was not precisely informed, estimated the size of 10,000 tons.

Then the 841, referring to the discussion with Reich Minister Funk, turned the conversation to the future trade relationship between Japan and Germany. He amplified here the idea that trade between the big economic areas of the future, i.e., Europe and Africa on one hand and the Far East on the other, must develop on a comparatively free basis, whereas the American Hemisphere, at any rate as far as the United States was concerned, would remain self-sufficient, as she had everything that she needed in her own territory, and, therefore, did not come into question in connection with exchanges with other economic areas. In South America, however, things were different. Here exchange possibilities with other economic areas actually presented themselves.

Matsuoka replied that she needed cooperation with Germany for her own reconstruction and for the development of China. He had already some time ago given written instructions to the Japanese missions in China to grant preferential treatment to German and Italian economic interests, similar to what was already carried out in Manchukuo and North China. Japan was not in a position to develop the extensive areas in China without the assistance of German technical science and German enterprise. Outwardly she will, of course, declare the open door policy, in actual fact, however, she will concede preferential treatment to Germany and Italy.

He must moreover admit openly that Japanese business circles feared their German competitors, whom they considered as very competent, whereas they were only amused at British and American competitors. German business circles had much the same opinion about the Japanese, which resulted in complaints from both sides. He was, however, of the opinion that the interests of both sides could be brought into harmony and told Japanese industry not to be afraid of German competition but rather to attempt to solve the problem by equal efficiency. In any case, the Japanese Government would do everything in order to equalize the interests of both sides.

Following this, Matsuoka once again turned the conversation to Japanese-Russian relations. He pointed out that he had proposed a Non-Aggression Pact to the Russians, to which Molotov had replied with a proposal of a neutrality agreement. Therefore, during his stay in Moscow, he must adopt the attitude of having been the one to make
the original non-aggression proposal. He also wanted to take this opportunity to try to induce the Russians to forego the Northern half of the Sakhalian Peninsula. There were important oil resources there, against the exploitation of which the Russians were making every conceivable difficulty. Matsuoka estimated the total maximum quantity which could be obtained from these oil resources at 2 million tons. He would make an offer to the Russians to acquire North Sakhalian by purchase.

To a question by the RAM whether the Russians would be prepared to sell these territories, Matsuoka replied that this was highly doubtful. Molotov had asked the Japanese Ambassador, on a suggestion to this effect, whether "this was supposed to be a joke". Japan was in any case prepared to make other agreements as the equivalent of the Portsmouth and Peking Treaties and also to give up her fishing rights. In any case he would have to take up these matters and, above all, the question of the Non-aggression Pact during his stay at Moscow. He asked the RAM whether he should deal with these questions very deeply or only just touch on them.

The RAM replied that he was of the opinion that these points would be dealt with only in a purely formal way and would not be gone into deeply. The question mentioned by Matsuoka regarding Sakhalian could be settled even later. Should the Russians follow a stupid policy and compel Germany to strike, he would, in view of the temper of the Japanese Army in China, consider it right if this army were prevented from acting against Russia. Japan was helping the joint issue best if she did not allow herself to be diverted by anything from the action against Singapore. With a joint victory, the fulfilment of the aforementioned desires would in any case fall into the lap of Japan as a ripe fruit to a large extent.

Matsuoka then introduced the subject of German assistance in the blow against Singapore, a subject which had been broached to him frequently, and mentioned the proposal of a German written promise of assistance.

The RAM replied that he had already discussed these questions with Ambassador Gushima. He had asked him to procure maps of Singapore in order that the Führer - who probably must be considered the greatest expert on military questions at the present time - could advise Japan on the best method of attack against Singapore. German experts on aerial warfare, too, would be at her disposal; they could draw up a report, based on their European experiences, for the Japanese on the use of dive-bombers from airfields in the vicinity against the British fleet in Singapore. Thus the British fleet would be forced to disappear from Singapore immediately.
MATSUKA remarked that Japan was less concerned with the British fleet than with the capture of the fortifications.

The NAM replied that here, too, the FÜHRER had developed new methods for the German attacks on strongly fortified positions, such as the Maginot Line and Fort Eben Emael, which he could make available to the Japanese.

MATSUKA replied in this connection that some of the younger, expert Japanese Naval officers, who were close friends of his, were of the opinion that the Japanese naval forces would need three months until they could capture Singapore. As a cautious Foreign Minister, he had doubled this estimate. He believed he could stave off any danger which threatened from America for six months. If, however, the capture of Singapore required still more time and if the operations even dragged out for a year, the situation with America would become extremely critical and he did not know as yet how to meet it.

If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherlands East Indies, since he was afraid that in the event of a Japanese attack on this area the oilfields would be set on fire. They could be brought into operation again only after 1 or 2 years.

The NAM added that Japan would gain decisive control over the Netherlands East Indies simultaneously with the capture of Singapore.

Matsukka then further mentioned that the desire for airbases in French Indo-China and Thailand had been divulged by Japanese officer circles. He had, however, denied this, as he in no way wished to undertake anything which could in any way disclose Japanese intentions regarding Singapore.

Finally the NAM once more reverted to the question of Germany's help to Japan. Perhaps something could be done also here. Japan had, however, to bear in mind that, in this war, the heaviest burden was resting on Germany's shoulders. The Reich was fighting against the British Isles and was tying up the British Mediterranean Fleet. Japan, on the other hand, was fighting only on the surface. Apart from that, Russia's main weight lay on the European side. These facts the gallant Japanese Nation would certainly acknowledge.

Matsukka finally agreed to this point of view and gave an assurance that Japan would always be a loyal ally who would devote herself entirely, and not just in a lukewarm way, to the joint effort.

(Berlin, 31 March 1941.)
III. (Photostatic cy in Doc. Rm)

AFFIDAVIT

I, GERARD SHAFTER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nurnberg, Germany, and as such have possession, custody and control of true and accurate photostatic copies of a certain original captured enemy document. That said photostatic copies have been numbered 1377-PS by said Documentation Division.

2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from the German Foreign Office Files and Archives.

3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure was retained by the United States Army Document Center at Harburg, Germany, and such above mentioned photostatic copies were delivered to, filed, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nurnberg, Germany, in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents", and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of said original captured enemy document above referred to.

5. That said above referred to original captured enemy document is, to the best of my knowledge and belief,
being held and retained by the United States Army Document Center Sub-Section in charge of captured German foreign office papers and now located in Berlin, Germany, for inspection by various authorized agencies, and that a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original document for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ Gerard Shefber
\*\*\*\*
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ John W. Auchincloss
\*\*\*\*\*\*
John W. Auchincloss
0-2052152
Capt., JAGD.
I, Paul O. Schmidt, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That from 1923 to the collapse of the German Reich in May 1945, I was Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office, and as such was practically present and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at all important Foreign Office and other conferences between German Government leaders and representatives of foreign governments.

2. That in addition to being Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office as aforesaid, I was also after the year 1939 the Head of the Secretariat General of the German Foreign Office and that my latest government rank was that of a Minister in the German Foreign Office.

3. That while acting as interpreter and/or secretary at such meetings above referred to, it was my official duty to and I did take notes concerning the conversations that took place, and at the conclusion of each such meeting, I prepared from such notes a complete and detailed record of what was said and transpired at such meetings.

4. That the records prepared by me became the official German Government records of what was said and transpired at such meetings. That one copy of the record was filed with the Ministers Office Section of the German Foreign Office, which office acted in the capacity of secretary to said Foreign Office. That another copy of the record of each of such meetings was filed with the Private Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister. That a third copy of the record of each of such meetings was retained by me.

5. That said meetings, concerning which I made a record as aforesaid, were of historical importance and that such records were also prepared by me for the express purpose of maintaining and preserving a record of such meetings for historical purposes.
6. That the document attached hereto is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original record, prepared personally by me in the manner herein set forth and concerning a conference held on March 29th 1941 in Berlin between the Reichminister for Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Matsuoka.

7. That I personally attended and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at the conference last above mentioned and that the record prepared by me, and of which the attached document is a photostatic copy, is a true and accurate account of what was said and transcribed at said conference.

8. That I have been advised and am aware of the fact that the herein affidavit and the document attached hereto may be used in connection with the prosecution of Japanese War Criminals and make this affidavit freely and voluntarily and with knowledge of the above facts.

/s/ Dr. Paul O. Schmidt
PAUL O. SCHMIDT

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Nurnburg, Germany, this third day of May 1946.

/s/ Smith W. Brookhart, Jr., Lt. Col., IGD

SMITH W. BROOKHART, JR.,
LT COL., IGD
0-308524
Report

of the discussion between Reichsmarschall Goering and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in the presence of Ambassador Ott at Karinhall on 29th March 1941.

Reichsmarschall Goering first of all expressed his satisfaction at being able to greet at his country residence the man who had successfully acted as a strong representative of his country in co-operation between the Japanese and German nations. As Reichsmarschall, he was able to tell him that cooperation between the Japanese and the German States was popular not only in the nation itself but above all among the German Army, the Navy and particularly the Air Force. This strong and consciously positive attitude to the alliance with Japan has its roots moreover in the recognition, which the great military traditions of Japan as well as the sense of sacrifice and the readiness for action of the Japanese people, found in Germany.

Matsuoka expressed his sincere thanks that the Reichsmarschall, despite the heavy claims made upon him, had found time to receive the Japanese Foreign Minister at his country seat. Already the journey through the big forests had been for him (Matsuoka) one of the finest experiences of the journey he had so far made. The feelings of respect for Japan of which the Reichmarschall had just spoken were fully reciprocated by Germany's Japanese allies. Japan moreover was prepared to fulfil wholly and entirely the obligations of her alliance, even in the war, and was thus conscious of fighting not only for the allied countries but for the whole of humanity.

In the further course of the discussion, the Reichsmarschall mentioned that naturally all experiences which Germany had made during the course of the war would be made available to the allied Japanese Armed Forces. This was particularly important in the domain of the Air Force, which had acquired a new technique and new tactics, without being able in this connection to refer back to earlier examples. It was important to apply these experiences rightly so as to always remain fit for fighting and to avoid unnecessary losses. These experiences were particularly important in connection with a category of the aircraft which was actually developed only in Germany, namely the dive-bomber. These could render particularly valuable service to Japan in the conquest of fortifications.

If Japan would march towards her destiny as a Great Power in the Far East, she would, like all politicians who desired to achieve great aims, only attain her final goal by battle. These aims had already been very clearly discussed, so that he (the Reichsmarschall) could confine himself
to stating that Germany would give Japan her share of help by placing at the disposal of her Ally her previous experiences, as in the past so in the future.

Matsuoka replied that he did not need to tell the Reichsmarschall how very much German assistance in this field had been valued in Japan so far and would be valued in the future. He was expressing the sincere thanks for this, in the name of his own Government, to the Reichsmarschall, the German Government and the German Armed Forces, that Germany made available, in such a magnanimous way, the results of her experiences which had been obtained with much sacrifice of personnel and material. The great assistance which Germany had given in this way would be of inestimable value to his country if she followed the call of destiny of which the Reichsmarschall had spoken. Japan would thus fulfill the duties incumbent upon her within the framework of the alliance in their entirety.

In addition the Reichsmarschall spoke in his capacity as the highest responsible economic authority of Germany as the Head of the Four Year Plan, on the question of crude rubber. Each day on which Germany could receive these deliveries earlier and every increased quantity she could receive were of the utmost importance. Without failing to realize the difficulties which Japan herself had, he (the Reichsmarschall) would, however, be grateful if the increased quantities which had been agreed upon would soon actually materialize. Moreover, sea transportation had to be mutually considered in the event of difficulties in the Russian area and communications via the Siberian railway being no longer in operation.

The quantity of crude rubber which Germany needed was comparatively small in relation to its population, as the rubber was only required as an admixture for the manufacture of the synthetic rubber Buna.

Matsuoka replied that he wished to do everything within his power to meet German wishes in this matter. Ambassador Ott had already previously raised this question and he (Matsuoka) had immediately recognized its urgency and importance and had taken the necessary steps to hasten the solution of the question. He had asked the competent authorities to make available immediately a part of Japan's own rubber stocks so as not to have to wait first for the quantities expected from Indo-China. He did not know how the matter stood at the moment as he was not the Minister responsible for these matters. He had only forwarded an urgent request to the competent Department. He had also already thoroughly considered the question of sea communications. From a long term point of view, Germany and Japan could naturally not remain dependent upon the railway communications through Siberia.

* * * * *

Berlin, 31 March 1941

(signed) Schmidt.
AFFIDAVIT

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nuremberg, Germany, and as such have possession, custody and control of true and accurate photostatic copies of a certain original captured enemy document. That said photostatic copies have been numbered 1879-PS by said Documentation Division.

2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from the German Foreign Office Files and Archives.

3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure was retained by the United States Army Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and such above mentioned photostatic copies were delivered to, filed, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nuremberg, Germany, in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents", and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of said original captured enemy document above referred to.

5. That said above referred to original captured enemy document is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, being held and retained by the United States Army Document Center Sub-Section in charge of captured German foreign office papers and now located in Berlin, Germany, for inspection by various authorized agencies, and that a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original document for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ Gerard Schaefer
Gerard Schaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ John W. Auchincloss
John W. Auchincloss
C-2052152
Capt., JAGD.
AFFIDAVIT

I, Paul O. Schmidt, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That from 1923 to the collapse of the German Reich in May 1945, I was Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office, and as such was personally present and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at all important Foreign Office and other conferences between German Government leaders and representatives of foreign governments.

2. That in addition to being Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office as aforesaid, I was also after the year 1939 the Head of the Secretariat General of the German Foreign Office and that my latest government rank was that of a Minister in the German Foreign Office.

3. That while acting as interpreter and/or secretary at such meetings above referred to, it was my official duty to and I did take notes concerning the conversations that took place, and at the conclusion of each such meeting, I prepared from such notes a complete and detailed record of what was said and transpired at such meetings.

4. That the records prepared by me became the official German Government records of what was said and transpired at such meetings. That one copy of the record was filed with the Ministers Office Section of the German Foreign Office, which office acted in the capacity of secretary to said Foreign Office. That another copy of the record of each of such meetings was filed with the Private Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister. That a third copy of the record of each of such meetings was retained by me.

5. That said meetings, concerning which I made a record as aforesaid, were of historical importance and that such records were also prepared by me for the express purpose of maintaining and preserving a record of such meetings for historical purposes.

6. That the document attached hereto is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original record, prepared personally by me in the manner herein set forth and concerning a conference held on March 29th 1941 at Karinhall between the Reichsmarschall Goering and the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Matsouka in the presence of Ambassador OTT.

7. That I personally attended and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at the conference last above mentioned and that the record prepared by me, and of which the attached document is a photostatic copy, is a true and accurate account of what was said and transpired at said conference.

8. That I have been advised and am aware of the fact that the herein affidavit and the document attached hereto may be used in connection with the prosecution of Japanese War Criminals and make this affidavit freely and voluntarily and with knowledge of the above facts.

/s/ Paul O. Schmidt

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Nurnburg, Germany, this third day of May 1946.

/s/ Smith W. Brookhart, Jr., Lt Col IGD.

Smith W. Brookhart, Jr.,
Lt Colonel, IGD
0-508524
"Notes on the Conversation between the Fuehrer and the Japanese Foreign Minister "ATSUKA in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister and the State Minister Raissner in Berlin on 4 April 1941.

"At first "ATSUKA thanked the Fuehrer for the presents handed to him in the latter's name which he would always consider a permanent treasure, and honor as a constant souvenir of his stay in Berlin. At the same time he expressed his gratitude for the friendly reception which he had received in Germany from the Fuehrer, the Reich Foreign Ministry and of the entire German people. As long as he lives he would never forget the friendliness shown him here from all sides. Upon his return to Japan he would endeavor with all his powers to convince the Japanese people of the fact that the latter are treated by the German people with honest friendliness and respect.

"ATSUKA then also expressed the request, that the Fuehrer instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as generously as possible the wishes of the Japanese Military Commission. Japan was in need of German help, particularly concerning U-boat warfare, which could be given by making available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as the latest technical improvements and inventions. Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United States. In case the country should decide to attack Singapore, the Japanese navy, of course, had to be prepared for a struggle with the United States, because in that case America probably would side with Great Britain. He ("ATSUKA) personally believed, that the United States could be restrained by diplomatic efforts from entering the war on the side of Great Britain. Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worst situation, that is with war against America. They were of the opinion that such a war would extend for five years or longer and would take the form of guerilla warfare and would be fought out in the Pacific and the South Sea. For this reason the German experiences in her guerilla warfare are of the greatest value to Japan. It is a question of how such a war would best be conducted and how all the technical improvements of submarines, in all details such as periscopes and the like, could best be exploited by Japan.

"To sum up,"ATSUKA requested that the Fuehrer see to it that the proper German authorities place at the disposal of the Japanese those developments and inventions concerning navy and army, which were needed by the Japanese.

"The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, but that it had already made allowances for such a contingency. In Germany one was of the opinion that America's contributions depended upon the possibilities of transportation, and that this again is conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany's war against tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening not merely of England, but also America. Germany has made her preparations so that no American could land in Europe. She would conduct a most energetic fight against America with her U-boats and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience, which would still have to be acquired by the United States, she would
be vastly superior, and that quite apart from the fact that the German soldiers naturally rank high above the American.

"In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer emphasized, that Germany on her part would immediately draw the consequences, if Japan should get involved with the United States. It did not matter with whom the United States would first get involved whether with Germany or with Japan. It would always try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an understanding with the other country subsequently, but to liquidate this one just the same. Therefore Germany would strike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of a conflict between Japan and America, because the strength of the tripartite powers lies in their joint action. Their weakens would be if they would let themselves be beaten individually.

"ATSUOKA once again repeated his request, that the Fuehrer give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German authorities place at the disposal of the Japanese the latest improvements and inventions, which are of interest to them. Because the Japanese navy had to prepare immediately for a conflict with the United States.

"As regards Japanese-American relationship, ATSUOKA explained further that he has always declared in his country, that sooner or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable if Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His argumentation went on, why should Japan, therefore, not strike decisively the right moment and take the risk upon herself of a fight against America? Just this way would she perhaps avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan many who hesitate to follow those trends of thought. ATSUOKA was considered in those circles a dangerous man with dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated, that, if Japan continued to go along her present path, one day she would have to fight anyway and that this would then be under less favorable circumstances than at present.

"The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand ATSUOKA's position, because he himself was in similar situations (the clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of military sovereignty). He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit favorable conditions and accept the risk of an unavoidable fight at a time he himself was still young and full of vigor. He thought right he was in his attitude was proven by events. Europe was now free. He would not hesitate a moment to reply instantly to any extension of the war, be it by Russia, be it by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers come to them, but who will bravely face them.

"ATSUOKA replied, that the United States or rather their ruling statesmen had recently still attempted a last maneuver against Japan, by declaring that America would not fight Japan on account of China or the South Seas provided that Japan gave free passage to the consignment rubber and tin to America to their place of destination. However, America would war against Japan the moment she felt that Japan entered the war with the intention of assisting in the destruction of Great Britain. Such an argumentation naturally did not miss its effect upon the Japanese, because of the education /oriented/ on English lines which many had received.
"The Fuehrer commented on this, to the effect that
this attitude of America meant only that the United States
had the hope, that, as long as the British World Empire
existed they one day could advance against Japan together
with Great Britain whereas, in case of the collapse of the
World Empire, they would be totally isolated and could not
do anything against Japan.

"The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the
Americans precisely under all circumstances wanted to main­
tain the position of power of England in East Asia, but that
on the other hand it is proved by this attitude, to what
extent she fears a joint action of Japan and Germany.

"IATSUOKA continued that it seemed to him of impor­
tance to give to the Fuehrer an absolutely clear picture of
the real attitude inside Japan. For this reason he also
had to inform him regretfully of the fact that he (IATSUOKA)
in his capacity as Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs
could not utter in Japan itself a single word of all that
he had expounded before the Fuehrer and the Reich Foreign
Minister regarding his plans. This would cause him serious
damage in political and financial circles. Once before,
had committed the mistake, before he became Japanese
Minister for Foreign affairs, telling a close friend some­
thing about his intentions. It seems that the latter had
spread these things and thus brought about all sorts of
rumors which he as Foreign Minister had to oppose energeti­
cally, though as a rule he always tells the truth. Under
these circumstances he also could not indicate, how soon
he could report on the questions discussed to the Japanese
Premier or to the Emperor. He would have to study exactly
and carefully in the first place the development in Japan,
so as to make his decision at a favorable moment, to make
a clear breast of his intrinsic plans towards Prince KONOYE
and the Emperor. Then the decision would have to be made
within a few days, because the plans would otherwise be
apololed by talk.

"Should he, IATSUOKA, fail to carry out his inten­
tions, that would be proof that he is lacking in influence,
in power of conviction, and in tactical capabilities. How­
ever, should he succeed, it would prove that he had great
influence in Japan. He himself felt confident that he would
succeed.

"On his return, being questioned, he would indeed
admit to the Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers of the
Navy and the Army, that Singapore had been discussed; he
would, however, state that it was only on a hypothetical
basis.

"Besides this, IATSUOKA made the express request that
nothing be cabled in the matter of Singapore because he had
reason to fear that by cabling something might leak out. If
necessary he would send a courier.

"The Fuehrer agreed and assured for the rest, that
he could depend completely on German reticence.

"IATSUOKA replied he believed indeed in German reti­
cence, but unfortunately could not say the same of Japan.

"The discussion was terminated after the exchange of
some personal parting words.

Berlin, the 4th of April 1941.

Signed: SCHMIDT
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNION
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

against-

HERMAN WILHELM GÖRING et al.

Defendants.

CERTIFICATE

The undersigned, BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM L. MITCHELL, hereby certifies:

That he is the duly appointed qualified and acting General Secretary of the International Military Tribunal, and that as such he has possession, custody and control of all of the records of said Tribunal and all documents admitted in evidence during the trial of the above entitled cause.

That the document to which this certificate is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original document which was heretofore admitted in evidence in the course of the trial of the above entitled cause and identified as Exhibit USA 33.

That said original document so admitted in evidence as aforesaid has been impounded by said International Military Tribunal through the undersigned as its General Secretary, and as a result is being held and retained by the undersigned.

That the undersigned has issued the herein certificate and caused the same to be attached to said photostatic copy of said document in order to verify the existence and contents of said Exhibit, and to further establish the fact that the original of said Exhibit is unavailable because of its having been impounded as aforesaid.

DONE at Nurnberg, Germany, this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ William L. Mitchell
WILLIAM L. MITCHELL
General Secretary
International Military Tribunal
I, GERARD SCHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nurnberg, Germany; and that, prior to its introduction and receipt in evidence before the International Military Tribunal I or my predecessors in such office had possession, custody and control of the original captured enemy document numbered 1881-PS by said Documentation Division.

2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from Foreign Office Files and Archives.

3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure and capture was delivered to, filed with, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nurnberg, Germany in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 and captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents", and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of said original captured enemy document above described and referred to.

5. That said above referred to original captured enemy document has been introduced and received in evidence before the International Military Tribunal in the course of the trial of the case of the United States of America et al against Herman Wilhelm Goering, et al, and was delivered by said Documentation Division to the General Secretary of the said International Military Tribunal concurrently with its said introduction in evidence, and that said original captured enemy document is now in the possession of, and has been impounded by said
International Military Tribunal and its said General Secretary and that a photostatic copy of said original document is hereby furnished because of the unavailability of said original document for the reasons set forth above.

/s/ Gerard Schaefer
Gerard Schaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ John W. Auchincloss
John W. Auchincloss
0-2052152
Capt., JAGD.
AFFIDAVIT

I, Paul O. Schmidt, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That from 1923 to the collapse of the German Reich in May 1945, I was Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office and as such was personally present and acted as interpreter and or secretary at all important Foreign Office and other conferences between German Government leaders and representatives of foreign governments.

2. That in addition to being Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office as aforesaid, I was also after the year 1939 the Head of the Secretariat General of the German Foreign Office and that my latest government rank was that of a Minister in the German Foreign Office.

3. That while acting as interpreter and/or secretary at such meetings as above referred to, it was my official duty to and I did take notes concerning the conversations that took place, and at the conclusion of each such meeting, I prepared from such notes a complete and detailed record of what was said and transpired at such meetings.

4. That the records prepared by me became the official German Government records of what was said and transpired at such meetings. That one copy of the record was filed with the Ministers Office Section of the German Foreign Office, which office acted in the capacity of secretary to said Foreign Office. That another copy of the record of each of such meetings was filed with the Private Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister. That a third copy of the record of each of such meetings was retained by me.

5. That said meetings, concerning which I made a record as aforesaid, were of historical importance and that such records were also prepared by me for the express purpose of maintaining and preserving a record of such meetings for historical purposes.

6. That the document attached hereto is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original record, prepared personally by me in the manner herein set forth and concerning a conference held on April 4th 1941 in Berlin between the Fuehrer and the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Matsuoka in the presence of the Reichminister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of State Meissner.

7. That I personally attended and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at the conference last above mentioned and that the record prepared by me, and of which the attached document is a photostatic copy, is a true and accurate account of what was said and transpired at said conference.

8. That I have been advised and am aware of the fact that the herein affidavit and the document attached hereto may be used in connection with the prosecution of Japanese War Criminals and make this affidavit freely and voluntarily and with knowledge of the above facts.

/sg/ Dr. Paul O. Schmidt
PAUL O. SCHMIDT

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Nurnburg, Germany, this third day of May 1946.

/sg/ Smith W. brothart, Jr., Lt. Col.
SMITH W. BROOKHART, JR.
LT. COLONEL, IGD., 0-508524
"Notes on the talk between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Japanese Foreign Minister KATSUOKA in Berlin on 5th April 1941.

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"The Reich Foreign Minister first expressed the hope that KATSUOKA's visit - the first ever paid by a Japanese Foreign Minister to Germany - would have a good general effect. KATSUOKA had been thoroughly informed of the German point of view. He would certainly have gained the impression that Germany was full of vitality and absolutely certain of her victory. The Reich Foreign Minister expressed the hope that their Japanese friends would deduce the inferences of this clearly recognized situation and thus participate in our victory.

"KATSUOKA replied that he had been more than rewarded for his long journey to Europe by getting into personal touch with the German and Italian statesmen. That he had seen in Germany and Italy had far exceeded his expectations. It was really hard for him to take his departure.

"Although he had had no doubt about it before, he was now thoroughly convinced after his journey to Germany and Italy that these two countries were united and would always remain so.

"KATSUOKA then spoke of the general high morale in Germany, referring to the happy faces he had seen everywhere among the workers during his recent visit to the Borsig works. He expressed his regret that developments in Japan had not as yet advanced as far as in Germany and that in his country the intellectuals still exercised considerable influence.

"The Reich Foreign Minister replied that at best a nation which had realized its every ambition could afford the luxury of intellectuals, most of whom are parasites anyhow. A nation, however, which has to fight for a place in the sun must part with them. The intellectuals ruined France; in Germany they had already started their pernicious activities, when National Socialism put a stop to these doings. They will surely be the cause of the downfall of Britain, which is to be expected with certainty.

"In answer to a remark by KATSUOKA that Japan was now awakening and, according to the Japanese character, would take action quickly after the previous lengthy deliberations, the Reich Foreign Minister replied that it was necessary, of course, to accept a certain risk in this connection, just as the Fuehrer had done so successfully with the occupation of the Rhineland, with the proclamation of sovereignty of armament, and with the resignation from the League of Nations.

* * *

"In answer to a question by KATSUOKA regarding the Fuehrer's intentions concerning the smaller States, the Reich Foreign Minister replied that the smaller States would be incorporated in the European whole; they would have their independence and would undoubtedly live more happily under the New Order than formerly. Great Britain, however, would..."
never again be allowed to meddle in the affairs of the small States, whilst the latter would never be allowed to take part in any military alliance against Germany. They would be absolutely independent, it is true, and even allowed to maintain small armies and police forces, but their protection and their general policy in the sense of the European continent would be looked after by Germany.

"In this connection HATSUOKA repeated the explanations he had already given the Reich Minister of Economics as regards the cause of the present difficulties. He attributed them to the clash between old traditions and the conditions of living brought about by modern inventions. One of the basic mistakes of Versailles was to increase the number of European states, whereas they should have been decreased in consequence of the new conditions of life caused by the development of technique. The great problem was to coordinate conditions created by modern inventions and old traditions, but taking care to leave a certain play for old traditions.

"The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the new German Reich would actually be built upon the basis of the ancient traditions of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, which in its time was the only ruling power on the European Continent.

"In conclusion the Reich Foreign Minister once again summarized the points he wanted HATSUOKA to take back to Japan with him from his trip:

1) Germany had already won the war. By the end of this year the world would also realize this. Also England would have to concede it, if it had not already collapsed before then, and America would also have to resign herself to this fact.

2) There were no conflicting interests between Japan and Germany. The future of both countries could be regulated in the long run on the basis that Japan should predominate in the Far East, Italy and Germany in Europe and Africa.

3) Whatever might happen, Germany would win the war. But it would hasten victory if Japan would enter the war. Such an entry into the war was undoubtedly more in the interest of Japan than that of Germany, for it offered a unique opportunity which would hardly ever recur for the fulfillment of the national objectives of Japan, a chance which would make it possible for her to play a really leading role in Eastern Asia.

"HATSUOKA replied that he himself could only repeat that he had long been of the opinion that every nation was offered an opportunity only once in a thousand years. Japan was offered such an opportunity and she would have to assume the risk connected with it. She would have to act decisively at the right moment in order to take advantage of this unique opportunity.

"In addition he asked about the Fuehrer's intentions as to the conclusion of peace. Would a general peace conference take place or did Germany intend to negotiate peace terms with each of her opponents separately?
"The Reich Foreign Minister replied that he did not know anything about that. The whole matter appeared to him to depend upon the manner in which Great Britain collapsed. In any case, there could be no question of anything but a peace by capitulation, if a new British government came into being.

"To that IATSUOKA remarked that that meant there could be no peace based on compromise.

"He then requested the Reich Foreign Minister to assist on his part the Tripartite Pact Commissions, and especially the Economic Commission in which he (IATSUOKA) was chiefly interested.

"The Reich Foreign Minister took the occasion to stress the fact that the military sub-commissions were no special institutions; they had to be subject in all matters to the Chief Commission.

"IATSUOKA then added that the Japanese officers who were at present in Germany were very pleased indeed with the assistance they had received from the German officials. He thanked the Reich Foreign Minister for this attitude of the German authorities.

"Later, IATSUOKA spoke about the conference of the Japanese heads of missions in Europe, which he had called to Berlin. Unfortunately the ambassador to London had not appeared, owing to difficulties in flying; he certainly would have brought some interesting news. IATSUOKA emphasized that he had told the Japanese diplomats they would suffer no disadvantages if they were against the conclusion of a Pact of Alliance, provided they were so before Japan adhered. Now that a decision had been made he would unhesitatingly recall any Japanese diplomat who did not work loyally with the new policy and co-operate to the closest extent with the German and Italian representatives.

"Furthermore, he had told them they must be prepared for some critical moments which were close at hand. Japan was face to face with a serious situation.

"The Reich Foreign Minister replied that there had also been diplomats in Germany who had taken a different attitude to certain questions. It was characteristic of great times that they were not understood by many.

"Directly after this interview IATSUOKA was handed a talkie-film apparatus as a present, and a luncheon-party was held among a small circle of people.

Berlin, 7th April 1941.

(signed) SCHIDT"
AFFIDAVIT

I, Paul O. Schmidt, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That from 1923 to the collapse of the German Reich in May 1945, I was Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office, and as such was personally present and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at all important Foreign Office and other conferences between German Government leaders and representatives of foreign governments.

2. That in addition to being Chief Interpreter for the German Foreign Office as aforesaid, I was also after the year 1939 the Head of the Secretariat General of the German Foreign Office and that my latest government rank was that of a Minister in the German Foreign Office.

3. That while acting as interpreter and/or secretary at such meetings above referred to, it was my official duty to and I did take notes concerning the conversations that took place, and at the conclusion of each such meeting, I prepared from such notes a complete and detailed record of what was said and transpired at such meetings.

4. That the records prepared by me became the official German Government records of what was said and transpired at such meetings. That one copy of the record was filed with the Ministers Office Section of the German Foreign Office, which office acted in the capacity of secretary to said Foreign Office. That another copy of the record of each of such meetings was filed with the Private Secretariat of the German Foreign Minister. That a third copy of the record of each of such meetings was retained by me.

5. That said meetings, concerning which I made a record as aforesaid, were of historical importance and that such records were also prepared by me for the express purpose of maintaining and preserving a record of such meetings for historical purposes.

6. That the document attached hereto is a true and correct photostatic copy of the original record, prepared personally by me in the manner herein set forth and concerning a conference held on April 5th 1941 at Berlin between the Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Matsuoka.

7. That I personally attended and acted as interpreter and/or secretary at the conference last above mentioned and that the record prepared by me, and of which the attached document is a photostatic copy, is a true and accurate account of what was said and transpired at said conference.
8. That I have been advised and am aware of the fact that the herein affidavit and the document attached hereto may be used in connection with the prosecution of Japanese War Criminals and make this affidavit freely and voluntarily and with knowledge of the above facts.

/s/ Dr. Paul O. Schmidt
PAUL O. SCHMIDT

Subscribed and sworn to before me at Nurnburg, Germany, this third day of May 1946.

/s/ Smith W. Brookhart, Jr. Lt Col
SMITH W. BROOKHART, JR., IGD
LT COLONEL, IGD
0-508524
CERTIFICATE.

The undersigned, BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM L. MITCHELL, hereby certifies:

That he is the duly appointed qualified and acting General Secretary of the International Military Tribunal, and that as such he has possession, custody and control of all of the records of said Tribunal and all documents admitted in evidence during the trial of the above entitled cause.

That the document to which this certificate is attached is a true and correct copy of the photostatic document which was heretofore admitted in evidence in the course of the trial of the above entitled cause and identified as Exhibit USA 153.

That said photostatic document so admitted in evidence as aforesaid has been impounded by said International Military Tribunal through the undersigned as its General Secretary, and as a result is being held and retained by the undersigned.

That the undersigned has issued the herein certificate and caused the same to be attached to said copy of said photostatic document in order to verify the existence and contents of said Exhibit, and to further establish the fact that the original of said Exhibit is unavailable because of its having been impounded as aforesaid.

DONE at Nurnberg, Germany this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ William L. Mitchell
WILLIAM L. MITCHELL
General Secretary
International Military Tribunal
I, GERARD SCHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nurnberg, Germany, and as such have possession, custody and control of true and accurate photostatic copies of a certain original captured enemy document. That said photostatic copies have been numbered 18C2-PS by said Documentation Division.

2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from the German Foreign Office Files and Archive.

3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure was retained by the United States Army Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and such above mentioned photostatic copies were delivered to, filed, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nurnberg, Germany, in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents", and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of said original captured enemy document above referred to.

5. That said above referred to original captured enemy document is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, being held and retained by the United States Army Document Center Sub-Section in charge of captured German foreign office papers and now located in Berlin, Germany, for inspection by various authorized agencies, and that a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original document for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ Gerard Schaefer
Gerard Schaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ John W. Auchincloss
John W. Auchincloss
0-2052152
Capt., JaGD.
The Vice Foreign Minister expressed to me today his vivid satisfaction on the conclusion of the neutrality pact with Russia. He declared that Russia, under the impression of powerful German successes had found herself ready to conclude a pact. Therefore Russia decided on going hand in hand with the powers of the Tri-Partite Pact. The Tri-Partite Pact has only now become the sterling instrument of the policy of the Axis Powers and Japan through the long sought for Russo-Japanese agreement.

Japan in particular expects substantial advantages for the termination of the China conflict from the Neutrality Pact. Even if, as the Vice Foreign Minister declared, the China problem had not been the subject of the Moscow negotiations, in any case CHIANG KAI SHEK's hope of eventual warlike entanglements between Japan and Russia, which would have meant a substantial relief for him, have come to naught with the conclusion of the pact. Moreover, Japan believes that by calling on the pact she can achieve a gradual separation between Moscow and Chungking. Furthermore, as all CHIANG KAI SHEK's support from the Anglo-Saxon powers has more moral than material significance, Japan hopes that the Marshal, now after the conclusion of the pact, will be ready for the dictation of a peace which preserves Japanese prestige.

The Vice Foreign Minister further declared that the Neutrality Pact would substantially facilitate Japan's expansion policy in the South of the Great East Asia Sphere and in particular would facilitate an eventual Japanese advance on Singapore.

The Vice Foreign Minister said regarding the realization of the Neutrality Pact that the beginning of negotiations brought considerable difficulties as MOLOTOV had held fast to the original Russian demand by which Japan, before the conclusion of the pact, should make certain concessions in the sense of a revision of the Treaty of Portsmouth. KATSUOKA explained that he was neither ready nor empowered for such concessions. In a personal conversation with STALIN, KATSUOKA had finally accomplished that Russia would renounce the concessions and would declare herself ready for unconditional conclusion of the pact. This decision took place on 12 April, that is, one day before the
arranged departure of MATSUOKA from Moscow. In order to empower MATSUOKA's signing of the pact in time, the Prime Minister, without the participation of the cabinet or Privy Council, effected the Imperial sanction for the signature by immediate audience with TSKRO. Agreement of the Cabinet and Privy Council, which could not be doubted after the Imperial sanction, will be obtained before the shortly expected ratification. The Vice Foreign Minister emphasized that it was unprecedented in Japanese history that an agreement of such significance should be concluded within a few days. In this connection, Japan has learned much from the "lightning diplomacy" or "blitz-diplomatic" of Germany.
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. F. Curwling, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the staff of the United States Political Adviser on German affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Warburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Warburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Warburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. F. CUMMINS
W. F. CUMMINS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. GARDE
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
W. P. Cumming

G. H. Garde

Lt. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General
SECRET INSTRUCTION
MOST IMPORTANT
ONLY BY HAND OF OFFICER

24 May 41

Foreign Section /Defence/

To be presented to the Chief of the Supreme Headquarters of the Army.

The Military Attache, Tokyo, reports with No. T47g of 23 May:

AKITA's answer regarding the handling of Japanese-U.S.A. relations in the press gave cause to the wish to hear OKAIO.OTO on the form of the Japanese opening of the war in case of a war between the U.S.A. and Germany. Instead of a reception by OKAIO.OTO, visit by AKITA was stated:

To be presented to the Chief of the Foreign Section/ABW (at the same time for 2L)

1) In case the U.S. enter into the war Japan at once acknowledges casus foederis. But will not yet start hostilities. Surprise attack on Singapore, Manilla remains prepared.

2) Possible war between USSR and Germany causes U.S.A. to enter into war. Therefore Japanese attitude remains as under 1) with additional preparations for a possible attack on Vladivostok and Blagovec'ensk.

3) Conclusion of China conflict before new tasks for the Japanese Army is important. In the first place I emphasize that the Japanese acknowledgement of a casus foederis requires strengthening through immediate opening of hostilities.

Staff of sir comand /signed/ Brueckner

Vh IL

Copy:
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3. SKL.
Special Staff. "WK.

SCM:ID 24/5
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
THE BOSNIA REPUBLIC, THE UNITED
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNITEO OF
SoviET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

-against-

HERMAN WILHELM GÖRTZ et al

Defendants.

CERTIFICATE
WILLIAM L. MITCHELL

The undersigned, BRIGADIER GENERAL L. MITCHELL, hereby certifies:

That he is the duly appointed qualified and acting General Secretary
of the International Military Tribunal, and that as such he has possession,
custody and control of all of the records of said Tribunal and all documents
admitted in evidence during the trial of the above entitled cause.

That the document to which this certificate is attached is a true
and correct photostatic copy of the original document which was heretofore ad­
mitted in evidence in the course of the trial of the above entitled cause and
identified as Exhibit USA 164.

That said original document so admitted in evidence as aforesaid
has been impounded by said International Military Tribunal through the
undersigned as its General Secretary, and as a result is being held and retained
by the undersigned.

That the undersigned has issued the herein certificate and caused
the same to be attached to said photostatic copy of said document in order to
verify the existence and content of said Exhibit, and to further establish
the fact that the original of said Exhibit is unavailable because of its
having been impounded as aforesaid.

DONE at Nurnberg, Germany, this 16th day of April, 1946.

/\ William L. Mitchell
"WILLIAM L. MITCHELL"
General Secretary
International Military Tribunal
II. (Orig. in Court). AFFIDAVIT.

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division in the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nürnberg, Germany; and that, prior to its introduction and receipt in evidence before the International Military Tribunal I or my predecessors in such office had possession, custody and control of the original captured enemy document numbered 1538-PS by said Documentation Division.

2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from the Office Files of the German Air Ministry.

3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure and capture was delivered to, filed with, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nürnberg, Germany in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 and captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of said original captured enemy document above described and referred to.

5. That said above referred to original captured enemy document has been introduced and received in evidence before the International Military Tribunal in the course of the trial of the case of United States of America et al. against Herman Wilhelm Goering, et al, and was delivered by said Documentation Division to the General Secretary of the said International Military Tribunal concurrently with its said introduction in evidence, and that said original captured enemy document is now in the possession of, and has been impounded by said International Military Tribunal and its said General Secretary, and that a photostatic copy of said original document is hereby furnished because of the unavailability of said original document for the reasons set forth above.

G. Gerard Schaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 16th day of April 1946.

John Y. Auchincloss

John Y. Auchincloss

9-2052152

Capt., JAGD.
II. (Orig. in Court). AFFIDAVIT.

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division in the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nürnberg, Germany; and that, prior to its introduction and receipt in evidence before the International Military Tribunal I or my predecessors in such office had possession, custody and control of the original captured enemy document numbered 1538-PS by said Documentation Division.

2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from the Office Files of the German Air Ministry.

3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure and capture was delivered to, filed with, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nürnberg, Germany, in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 and captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.

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/s/ Gerard Schaefer

Gerard Schaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ John V. Auchincloss

John V. Auchincloss

O-2052152
Cpt., JAGD.
Berlin, 10 June 1941

EXKET

The Japanese Government or as he said correcting himself, the Japanese Army had the desire to obtain bases for the fleet and the Navy in southern French Indo-China. Kaise added, he personally believed that this wish could be traced back to the fact that the Japanese Armed Forces /Wehrmacht/ would like to create for themselves a favorable strategic position vis-a-vis JINCA. Furthermore Ambassador Kaisse would like to talk with the Reich Foreign Minister more generally about the German-French and French-English relations.

Herewith presented for the Reich Foreign Minister

Signed Jaeger

Copy to St. J. After return of Ambassador Pittro
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. F. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attaché of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. F. Cumming
W. F. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Resolutions Concerning the Japanese-American Negotiations Adopted Through the Conferences in the Imperial Presence.

1. Through the Imperial conference on July 2, 1941.
2. Through the Imperial conference on September 6, 1941.
3. Through the Imperial conference on November 5, 1941.

Proposition (A)
Proposition (B)

4. Through the Imperial conference on December 1, 1941.

1. RESOLUTION adopted through the Imperial conferences on July 2, 1941.

A summary of the Empire's POLICY according to the changes in the situation.

I PRINCIPLE.

a. Regardless of any change in the international situation, Japan will adhere to the principle of establishing a "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere", and accordingly contribute to the establishment of world-peace.

b. Japan will continue the disposition of the Chinese Incident, and will step up the Southward advance in order to establish for herself a basis for self-existence and self-defense. The Northern problems will be dealt with according to the changes in the situations.

c. Japan will remove all obstacles for the achievement of the foregoing purpose.

II SUMMARY.

a. In order to hasten the surrender of Chiang's Regime, further pressure through the Southern regions will be strengthened to the changes in the situations, we shall execute our rights of war against the Chinkiang Regime at the proper time, and shall confiscate the enemy concessions in China.
For the sake of her self-existence and self-defense Japan will continue necessary diplomatic negotiations with relevant nations in the Southern regions and will also promote other necessary measures. For this purpose we shall make preparations for a war with Britain and the United States. First, we shall accomplish the execution of our schemes against French Indo-China and Thailand following the "Principle Policy toward French Indo-China and Thailand," and "Matters concerning the Promotion of our Southern Policy," thereby stabilizing our structure for the Southern advance. In order to achieve the above-mentioned purpose, Japan will not hesitate to have a war with Britain and the United States.

Though the spirit of the tripartite axis will form the keynote of our attitude toward the German-Soviet War, we shall not intervene for a while, but take voluntary measures by secretly preparing arms against the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, diplomatic negotiations will be continued with detailed precautions; and should the conditions of the German-Soviet war progress favorable to Japan we shall execute arms to solve the northern problems, thereby securing stability in the Northern regions.

In the accomplishment of the above, all measures, especially in the case of execution of arms, must be decided so that there will be no great difficulty in maintaining our basic posture for a war with Britain and the United States.

We shall do our utmost in preventing the United States participation in the war through diplomatic measures in the pre-arranged programmes, and every other possible way, but in case she should participate, Japan will act according to the Tripartite Pact. However, the time and method of military action will be decided independently.

We shall shift promptly to the complete stabilization of internal war-time structures, particularly we shall strive for the stabilization of national defense.

As to the definite measures we shall decide separately.

2. RESOLUTION adopted through the Imperial conference on Sept. 6, 1941.

Summary: Execution of the Empire's Policy.
In view of the present acute situation, especially the aggressive movements the United States, Britain and the Netherlands have assumed; the situation of Soviet Russia; and the suppression of our national power; Japan will execute her Southern advance policy, related in the "Principle of Japan's Policy According to the Change of Situations," as follows:

a. In order to secure self-existence and self-defense, Japan, with a determination for a war with the United States (Britain and the Netherlands), will have completed her preparations by the end of October.

b. Meanwhile, in pace with the above, Japan will strive for the fulfillment of her demands through diplomatic measures with the United States and Britain.

The minimum matters of demand to be accomplished in Japan's negotiations with the United States (Britain), and the limit Japan is able to come to an agreement in this connection will be stated on another sheet.

c. If, through the above negotiations, our demands have no hope of fulfillment by the beginning of October, we shall immediately determine to wage war against the United States (Britain and the Netherlands).

All measures, save for those concerned with the South, will be executed according to the pre-arranged national policy, and we shall particularly endeavour to check the formation of a Russo-American combined front against Japan.

ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Japan's minimum demand to be fulfilled in her negotiations with the United States (Britain), and the limit Japan is able to come to an agreement in this connection.

Sect. I. Japan's minimum-demand to be fulfilled in her negotiations with the United States (Britain).

(1) Matters concerning the CHINESE INCIDENT.

The United States and Britain will neither meddle in nor interrupt the disposition of the Chinese Incident.

a. They will not interrupt Japan's attempt to settle the Incident in accordance with the Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty and the Japan-Manchukuo-China Tripartite Joint Declaration.
"Burma Route" will be closed; and the United States and Britain will give Chiang's Regime neither military nor economic support.

REMARK -- The above does not obstruct Japan's existing contentions in the disposition of the Chinese Incident in Plan N. However, particularly regarding the stationing of the Imperial forces under the new arrangements made between Japan and China, we shall adhere to its necessity.

Following the settlement of the incident, we may assert that we have the intention of withdrawing, as a rule, all other forces except those mentioned above that have been sent to China for the disposal of the Chinese Incident.

It may also be affirmed that Japan has no intention to place any restrictions on American or British interests in China, provided that they will understand the new East Asia, and act accordingly.

(2) Matters concerning the security of Japan's national defense.

The United States and Britain will not take such action in the Far East as to threaten Japan's national defense.

a Recognition of the special relations existing between Japan and France based on the Japan-French Agreement.

b They will not establish any military interests in Thailand, Dutch East-India, China and far-eastern Soviet territory.

c They will not further strengthen their present armaments in the Far East.

(3) Matters concerning Japan's obtaining necessary materials.

The United States and Britain will cooperate with Japan in obtaining her necessary resources.

a They will restore their commercial relations with Japan and will supply Japan from their territories in the South-Western Pacific, with resources indispensable for her self-existence.

b They will gladly collaborate in Japan's economic cooperation with Thailand and French Indo-China.
Sect. II. The Limit Japan is able to come to an agreement.

If the United States and Britain will consent to our demands in Section I:

(1) Japan, with French Indo-China as a base, will make no military advances into any of the adjacent areas except China.

(2) Japan will be ready to withdraw her troops from French Indo-China after an impartial peace will have been established in the Far East.

(3) Japan will be ready to guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines.

(NOTE)

a. In case of an interrogation as to Japan's attitude toward the Tripartite Alliance, it will be affirmed that there will be no changes in Japan's execution of her obligations to the Axis Agreement. "We shall not discuss, of our own accord, either our attitude toward the Tripartite Pact or the attitude of the United States toward the European War."

b. In case of an interrogation as to Japan's attitude toward Soviet Russia, it will be replied that Japan will not take the initiative for military action as long as Soviet Russia will respect the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact and will not threaten both Japan and Manchuria.

3. PROPOSITIONS (A) and (B), adopted through the Imperial Conference on November 5, 1941.

PROPOSITION (A)

(1) Problem of Commercial Indiscrimination.

In case our proposition of September 25 will have no hope of compromise, it will be revised, "If the principle of indiscrimination is to be universal the Japanese Government will accept it to be enforced in all the areas in the Pacific, including China."

(2) Problem of Interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Treaty. "We shall further make it clear that we have no intentions, without good reason on our part, of expanding the meaning of our rights of self-defense; and that at the same time,
we shall act, as we have often explained, according to our own decision concerning the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact. We shall reply that we feel this point has already had the acknowledgement of the United States.

(3) Problems of Withdrawing Troops.

This problem will be eased as follows:

a Stationing and withdrawing of troops in China.

Among the Japanese troops despatched to China for the disposal of the Chinese Incident, those in the designated areas in North China and Mongolia and on Hainan Island will be stationed there for a certain necessary term after the establishment of peace between Japan and China. Simultaneously with the establishment of peace we shall commence to withdraw the rest according to a separate agreement between Japan and China, and with the stabilization of public order this will be completed within two years.

(Note) If the United States should make an inquiry as to the necessary term, it will be replied that our aim will be approximately 25 years.

b Stationing and withdrawing of troops in French Indo-China.

Japanese government will respect French Indo-China's sovereignty upon her land. The Japanese troops now despatched to French Indo-China will be withdrawn immediately after the settlement of the Chinese Incident, or after an impartial peace will have been established in the Far East.

Moreover, every effort will be made to avoid including the Four Principles in the formal agreements between Japan and the United States (both understandings and other statements).

PROPOSITION (B)

(1) Both the Japanese and the United States Governments will firmly agree not to make military advances into areas in Southeast Asia and Southern Pacific, excluding French Indo-China.

(2) Both the Japanese and the United States Governments will mutually cooperate to guarantee the obtaining of necessary resources from the Dutch East-Indies.
(3) Both the Japanese and the United States Governments will restore their mutual commercial relations to the conditions before the freezing of the assets.

The United States Government will promise Japan her necessary supply of petroleum.

(4) The United States Government will not take such action as to obstruct Japan's efforts for a peace with China.

(REMARKS)

(1) If necessary, after the conclusion of this agreement, it may be promised that the Japanese troops will be withdrawn after the establishment of peace between Japan and China, or after an impartial peace will have been established in the Pacific area.

(2) If necessary, the regulations for commercial indiscrimination, and the prescriptions for interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact, both included in Proposition A, may be additionally inserted.

4. RESOLUTION adopted through the Imperial Conference on December 1, 1941.

Our negotiations with the United States regarding the execution of our national policy adopted on November 5 have finally failed. Japan will declare war on the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands.
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archive Section, Japanese Foreign Ministry, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 16 pages, dated Sep. 2, 1941, and described as follows: Resolutions concerning the Japanese-American negotiations adopted through the conference in the Imperial presence on July 2, 1941; Sept. 6, 1941; Nov. 5, 1941; and Dec. 1, 1941, respectively. I further certify that the attached record and document is an officially document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 5th day of Sept., 1946. /s/ Z. Hayashi

Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard K. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 5th day of Sept., 1946 /s/ Richard K. Larsh

NAME

Witness: /s/ Douglas L. Waldorf

Investigator, I.P.S. 2nd Lt., Inf. & P.I. Official Capacity
Marginal Note
I have reached an agreement with Ambassador OSHIMA that he will influence his government
in the direction of a speedy military action against Soviet Russia, and I ask you now to utilize on your part all the possibilities that pre-
sent themselves to influence the government of 28 June 1941, 2130 hrs. in such a direction. In this connection I ask you to
make use of the following points:

1.) War between Germany and Soviet Russia will not only bring with it the solution of more or less limited individual problems, but will bring as a consequence a solution by final war of the Russian question in its enti-
tirety.

2.) The destruction of the Russian power, expected within a comparatively short time by our military move, will also make Germany's victory over England an irrevocable fact. If Germany is in possession of the Russian oil wells and grain fields a sufficient supply for the whole of Europe will thereby be ensured so that the English block
ade will on the whole be of absolutely no avail. The direct land connection with East Asia will likewise be
brought about on this occasion.

3.) In this way all the preconditions are given which will render possible the New Order in the European sphere as intended by the Axis Powers.

4.) For Japan also a unique chance is presented by the present situation. As Germany does this for Europe, so can Japan now through a military action against Soviet Russia create the prerequisites for the New Order planned by her in East Asia. After the removal of the Soviet power in the Far East also, the solution of the Chinese question will be achieved in the way desired by Japan without running into any more difficulties.
5.) From the standpoint of Japanese interests, the idea of a drive towards the South in the direction of Singapore is and remains very of great importance. As Japan has not yet been prepared on this point and a possibility for such a drive has not yet been presented in the present phase of the war, it lies in the urgent interest of Japan not to leave unused this chance now offered to her for solving the Russian question in the Far East too. Thus she would be left free in the rear to make a drive towards the South.

6.) In view of the speedy course of events to be expected, Japan should come to a decision regarding the idea of a military action against Soviet Russia without hesitation. A Japanese action against a Soviet Russia already beaten to the ground would be quite prejudicial to the moral and political position of Japan.

7.) It can therefore be considered that the swift overpowering of Soviet Russia, especially if Japan participates in it from the East, is the best means to convince the United States of the absolute foolishness of entering the war on the side of England, then completely isolated and set against the biggest combination in the world.

RIBENITROP
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Minutes of Conference on the Conclusion of Agreement for Cultural Cooperation between Japan and Germany

November 22, 1938 - Original

Minutes of the Privy Council on the Conclusion of Agreement for Cultural Cooperation between Japan and Germany.

* * *

Members present:
Chairman: HIRANUMA

* * *

Ministers:
No. 8 Minister of Education - ARAKI

* * *

No. 15 Minister of War - ITAGAKI

* * *

Chairman HIRANUMA: The conference will open from now on. The topic of discussion is the Conclusion of Agreement for cultural cooperation between Japan and Germany. The reading aloud and first reading will be omitted and I request for a report from the Chairman of the Investigation Committee immediately.

Report Committeeeman HARU: On the inquiry concerning the Conclusion of Agreement for Cultural Cooperation between Japan and Germany, we officials who were recently appointed as an investigation committee, held a committee meeting on the 16th day of this month. After hearing the explanations of the minister and various officials concerned, we have concluded the following strict investigation results:

For many years, on cultural matters concerning medicine, literature, legislation and various other fields, a mutual and close relationship existed between the two nations of Germany and Japan but with and after the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Agreement in November two years ago, national intercourse between the two nations entered into a renewed amity. On the later part of September of this year the German Government proposed for a conclusion of a cultural agreement between Germany and Japan, a recent practice prevalent between the various countries of Europe, so as to legalize the enlightenment of cultural relationship between the two nations, thus leading to furthering the promotion of the cause and provoking to strengthen all the more our tie of friendship. Our Imperial Government approved this proposal. Thereafter the authorities of both parties concerned have conducted numerous negotiations and the arriving at an agreement led to the realization of this definite plan of a pact. However this does not mean that our Imperial Government prefers such an agreement with Germany alone. If conditions permit, similar agreements should be concluded with
other nations also, as this cultural intercourse has a tendency to contribute valuable service to achieve the general aims of diplomacy. This was voiced by our authorized minister concerned.

"This agreement lays down provisions and fundamental rules to legalize cultural relation between Japan and Germany, and as stated in the introduction, both nations by conviction should seek relations key-noting the characteristic spirit of Japan and the racial and national life of Germany, which respectively form the essence of each nation's culture. It will not only help to deepen relations with all forms of culture but also enhance the interweaving of mutual knowledge and understanding to a better state so that the friendship and mutual trust already existing between the two nations will be ever firm. In the text, Article I provides that the two nations, Germany and Japan, with close mutual cooperation will put in every effort to establish cultural relation on a solid basis. Article II provides for this purpose, the two nations will systematically promote cultural relations in all fields as science, fine arts, music, literature, motion pictures, radio broadcasts, movement of child and youth, sports, etc. Article III provides that the detailed necessary means of putting this into practice will be left with and decided upon by negotiation between the responsible authorities of the two nations. Article IV states that this agreement will come into effect from the date of signing and it could be abrogated at twelve months notice from either party of the two nations.

"Our investigation observes that a conclusion of such an agreement is an actual plan to develop cultural relation and promote a friendly relationship of more sincerity between the two nations. This agreement will also contribute to uplift the culture of both nations and at the same time aid to a marked degree in fostering the goodwill of national intercourse. For these reasons it is a pertinent principle and also we see nothing to fear which may be of any hindrance of any kind. Hence, the decision of the investigating committee by unanimous vote is that the plan should be adopted as it stands.

"The foregoing is a report on the result of our investigation.

"No. 28 (I3HIZUSA).

"In its introductory provision, which I take forms the basis of this agreement, it is said that the essence of the culture of Japan and Germany as consisting of the characteristic spirit of Japan on one part and the racial and national life of Germany on the other. This seems somewhat out of coordination, but since it is so designated, I want to hear the reason, and what is embraced in the term, 'the racial and national life of Germany.' According to German nationalism or Nazism and a current conception of the present day, the German race is attempting to unify and assimilate even those people who inhabit other nations while banning another race even though living in her own country. Whereas the characteristic feature of our spirit holds equality on all races without prejudice. This exemplifies the differences in view between this and that nation. Although directly nothing is stated relative to politics, this agreement may bring about some kind of influence politically. So I deem it important that special precaution be taken so that the people may not be misled. However, I wish to hear the government's comment on this aspect.
"No. 17 (ARITA):

"In short, the racial and nationalistic life of Germany is none other than the singular spirit of Germany. The reason for the adoption of the term was because of the firm insistence on the part of Germany at the outset of negotiations, explaining that their characteristic spirit being phenominized in the racial and national life of Germany, it should be made the essence of her culture.

"On the second point this agreement proposes to aid in the liaison and systematic uplifting of the culture of the two nations. It recognizes that cultural relations of Japan and Germany form the basis of the characteristic spirits of each respective nation. Therefore it is unlikely that there will be any influence politically. However, if there are such opinions of fear in the carrying into effect of the agreement, sufficient precaution shall be taken.

"No. 28 (I3HIYUKA):

"On the whole I understand, but it is conceivable that during the long life of this agreement there is a possibility that politics will be influenced. In particular, a tendency to go with the German stream is not at all deniable in this country of late. In view of this fact, I repeat and hope that there should be some means to guard against all possible mistake on the part of our nation before this agreement is concluded.

"Chairman (HIRANUMA): Since there are no other questions, we shall or it second reading and procedures and directly take a vote. Those who approve the project, please stand up.

(Everybody present stood up)

"Chairman (HIRANUMA): Decided in favor of, unanimously. This closes our meeting today."
CERTIFICATE

W.D.C. No. 956B
I.P.S. No. 956B

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, M. TAKATSUJI, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary, Privy Council and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 22 pages, dated Nov. 22, 1938, and described as follows: Minutes of the Privy Council on the conclusion of Agreement for Cultural Cooperation between Japan and Germany, Nov. 22, 1938.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number of citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Privy Council

Signed at Tokyo, Japan on this 26th day of August, 1946. /s/ M. Takatsui

Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Kichi, Chosckabe Secretary, Privy Council

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo, Japan on this 26th day of August, 1946 /s/ Edward P. Monaghan

NAME

Witness: /s/ R.H. Marsh Investigator, IPS

Official Capacity
Program for the Opening Session of the
German-Japanese Culture Committee
and the tea reception in the
Hotel Kaiserhof.

1. The opening session takes place in the Federal
Council Hall of the Foreign Office. The guests arrive
at about 1600 hours. The session begins at 1615 hours.
It is introduced by a speech of welcome from Freiherr
von Weizsaecker. His Excellency the Imperial Japanese
Ambassador replies to it. Ambassador von Twardowski
speaks last.

Following that, the participators in the opening
session go to the Hotel Kaiserhof, where a tea reception
takes place.

2. The guests arrive at about 1700 hours in the Hotel
Kaiserhof. After taking off their overcoats in the cloak­
room, they meet in the Yellow Room. After arrival of the
State Secretary, the guests seat themselves at the tables
set up in the Great Hall. Tea and cake is first served,
which takes about a quarter of an hour. The distribution
of the guests at each of the tables is effected so that a
prominent participant is named for each table, while the
remaining guests freely apportion themselves to the various
tables.

After the guests have been served tea and cake, the
State Secretary greets those present at about 1730 hours and
thus introduces a speech which Ambassador von Twardowski
will give. At the end of the speech, a brief, noncompulsory
meeting follows.

Berlin, 3 April, 1940

/Signature illegible/
Your Excellency, Gentlemen. It is a pleasant duty to me to welcome you all today on the occasion of the meeting of the German-Japanese Culture Committee.

And my special greetings go to you, Your Excellency, Ambassador KURUSU. Your presence here proves again your active interest in the Committee, which represents a further, and in many respects a new kind of, connecting link between Germany and Japan and has been called upon to play a significant part in the spiritual exchange between our two nations. You have, we know, besides your political and economic professional questions, occupied yourself most deeply with German philosophy and literature. For us, therefore, you are, as a personal expert in German spiritual life, the best guarantee for the advancement of the cultural correlation of our countries.

The formation of the German-Japanese Culture Committee, proposed from the German side, has met with the agreement of the Imperial Japanese Embassy. The Berlin Committee, just like the corresponding committee in Tokyo is composed equally of five Japanese and five Germans.

I warmly welcome the fact that Envoy USAMI, as advisor in the Japanese Embassy has undertaken the leadership of the Japanese group in the committee, and that the other Japanese gentlemen happily represent all Japanese life in Germany. I thank you, gentlemen, for your readiness to undertake the office proposed to you, and gladly count on your lively participation in our common task.

I thank you for your presence, State Secretary ZSCHINTZSCH, as representative of the Reich Ministry for Science, Education and "National Education," and you, Ministry Director GREINER, as representative of the Reich Ministry for National Enlightenment & Propaganda. In relations between Germany and Japan we cannot be satisfied that knowledge of each other's country should be confined to a small circle of experts. Rather must a real mutual understanding between the nations be extended to the widest possible circle in the nations concerned, by means of real knowledge and comprehension. National education and national enlightenment are the most important means for the attainment of the high goal we have in mind. Your presence bears witness that you will do your part in the spheres of your respective ministries to crown these efforts with success.

Following the precedent in Tokyo, it seemed suitable to us that the Foreign Office should itself be presiding over the committee. Therefore the head of the Cultural Political Department, Envoy Doctor Von T'VARDOWSKI has been entrusted with this task.
Just in the last few years relations between organization and societies in the Nazi Party /NSDAP/ and Japan have developed very gratifyingly. As examples of this I mention the fact that the Reich Board of Health has concluded an agreement with the Japanese-German Medical Society and that the Reich Youth Board is permanently represented in Japan by OBERGEHEITES-FUEHRER SCHULTZ. As the utilization of the organizations and societies of the Nazi Party /NSDAP/ should follow a unified point of view, the Foreign Office has asked the Fuehrer's deputy to send a representative to the Committee. I am glad that this proposal has been complied with, and heartily welcome Herr SCHULTE-STRATHAUS to this circle.

This, like the addition of advisors and experts, is an innovation in the sphere of Culture Committees. I expect much for the activity of our committee from the effectiveness of these co-workers. I thank the parties here concerned for the fact that they are willing to fit their work abroad in their occasional special spheres into the great frame of our efforts and tasks in linking our peoples together. Through your share in the committee you, the advisors and experts, will be currently informed of the whole picture of the German-Japanese Culture Committee and be put in a position to adopt suggestions and possibilities, which arise in the one sphere, in your own spheres of work in the same way. In this way every fruitful thought and every show of initiative must be made available to all concerned, and a maximum of achievement be obtained by systematic work which is only possible through the fitting of individual enterprises into the general frame.

The German-Japanese Culture Committee is a working committee which, in accordance with the German-Japanese agreement on cultural cooperation of 25 November 1938 will discuss and advise on practical measures, the achievement of which will be suited to systematically furthering German-Japanese cultural relations.

The activity of the already existing committee in Tokyo is above all serving the deepening of the knowledge of German culture in Japan. Similarly I see the task of the committee here as lying in the main in the direction of Japan-Germany, that is as working for the spread of the knowledge of things Japanese in Germany. The agreed and stimulated systematization of our efforts demands, however, that the activities of both committees are coordinated and that each committee for its own part furthers the enterprises of the other. This will be one of the essential tasks of the Foreign Office.

From what has been said, our Japanese friends may see that we have tried to create all the technical prerequisites for a close practical cooperation.
A fundamental prerequisite, however, for the deepening and broadening of mutual international intercourse is the readiness of the nations themselves to give spiritually as well as to take. This readiness is in existence in wide circles of the German nation. To spread it ever wider is the task of this committee and the circles represented in it.

A second, just as important, fundamental of international cultural work has been expressed in the preamble to the German-Japanese culture agreement. Both governments have there declared that they are impressed with the realization that the German and Japanese cultures have their true basis in the German national and racial life on the one hand and the innate Japanese spirit on the other, and that the cultural relations between the two countries are to be built hereon.

For the first time in the history of international agreements the spiritual basis on which the goal set by the agreement is to be worked for has been expressed and unalterably defined: the clear consciousness of each party of its racial and national self and the mutual recognition of this self. This is the true reciprocity, such as is only possible for nations that are self-conscious, national and self-contained, and just on that account capable and ready to understand other nations.

The work of this German-Japanese Culture Committee will have to be steered along these supreme spiritual guiding lines.

Gentlemen, to our universal satisfaction and joy, there has arisen in this committee a new, effective instrument which shall and will ever strengthen the traditional close spiritual bonds between Germany and Japan. I am however convinced that the political friendship which so fortunately unites our countries will also be further deepened, and that Germany and Japan will set an example in the cultivation of peaceful international intercourse.

I declare the German-Japanese Culture Committee established.
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. F. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attaché of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Warburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Warburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Warburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. F. Cumming

W. F. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
In the repeated discussions which Foreign Minister for Foreign Affairs von Ribbentrop had with the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, Kogo, over the economic construction of the railway in China, the foreign minister recognized the special position which Japan holds in China and shared the view with the ambassador that Japan and Germany must cooperate economically still more closely in China in the spirit of the Anti-Comintern Pact which had been concluded between the two countries. Accordingly, the foreign minister declared to the ambassador the willingness of the German Government to try to do its best for economic and technical cooperation with Japan in China. At the same time expressed the wish that the Japanese Government for its part would proceed in the same manner and that in particular it would take an especially generous and considerate attitude especially as regards German foreign trade in China.

After the ambassador had informed the Japanese Government of the course and result of the conversations as depicted above, the ambassador was then instructed by the Imperial Government to communicate the following to the German Government:

The Japanese Government is agreed with the points mentioned in I. and accordingly intends, with regard to the economic activity concerning Germany's foreign trade in China to observe the following lines in future.

a.) In future the Japanese Government will consider Germany particularly benevolently in all economic activities in China and will at least grant her the most favorable treatment that third powers, excluding Manchuria, will enjoy, and is accordingly prepared in individual cases, in which future proposals will be made by Germany with a bearing on this, to promote German interests where possible. This covolent treatment of Germany of course does not exclude Japan's economic cooperation with third powers.

b.) The Japanese Government is of the opinion that German foreign trade in China has to stand fundamentally on the same footing with the Japanese. It will consequently do its best for both countries to enjoy the same treatment as regards customs and accordingly in the event of any special
import and export regulations, management of foreign bills of exchange or other means for the control of goods and payment arrangements being met with, which make the position of equality of Germany practically impossible, for example concerning the different nature of German or Japanese currencies. German interests will be particularly concomitantly considered and at least the most favorable treatment, that other powers, excluding Japan and China, will be granted to her.
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. I. Cushing, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the staff of the United States Political adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/\ W. I. Cushing
\.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22nd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
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日本製造の高性能機材は、現在の技術リードを追求しています。特に、次世代の技術を駆使した最新型機材は、業界リーダーとしての位置を占めています。この機材は、高精度、低消費電力、長寿命といった特性を持っています。さらに、ユーザーのニーズに合わせたカスタマイズが可能です。

また、この機材は、環境への配慮も考慮されています。持続可能な生産を可能にするための技術革新を行っています。これにより、地球環境への負荷を低減することができ、持続可能な製造業を実現することができると言えます。
W. P. Cumming

G. H. Garde

Lt. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General
The Japanese Ambassador TOGO, who had announced himself, visited me today at 13.30 hours.

He handed me the Pro memoria attached in the enclosure. As an explanation he added that the Japanese Government would like to avoid the expression "North China" in such a Pro memoria and would like to put "China" in its place. Furthermore the Japanese Government was not able to assure Germany a better position than all other powers in a treaty form. Therefore the formula mentioned at the end of the Pro memoria had been chosen in order to meet our wishes as far as possible. I declared myself not satisfied with the formula.

Among other things I explained to the Japanese Ambassador whether the formula in paragraph a.) of the Pro memoria could not be changed in such a way so that it would read: "to further German interests to a specially great degree" instead of "to further German interests as far as possible."

The Japanese Ambassador seemed to consider a change of that sort possible.

After that no one more emphasized in this veracity that the Japanese Government would do everything necessary to secure the German interests. The idea of his statements seemed to be that one was to be sure, in practice willing to grant Germany a better position than all the other nations and to express this in the text as far as possible, but that one would not agree to commit oneself in a definite treaty form. The Japanese Ambassador further declared that he would also willingly accept further German proposals for modifications regarding the Pro memoria.

I explained to the Japanese Ambassador that at present I could not take up a standpoint regarding the text of the Pro memoria. It is it seems that the grant did not go further than the most preferential treatment which, in view of Germany's special situation, was not satisfactory. However I would now this plan thoroughly examined and would then give him a report regarding the outcome of this examination.

The Japanese Ambassador then briefly mentioned the present situation of the Germany-Japanese negotiations for the commercial treaty. Unfortunately Japan was at present not capable of paying foreign bills of exchange to a greater extent.
I declared that I was not informed about details and referred him to .in. Dir. UTHL.

The Japanese .ambassador then expressed his thanks for the support which .in. Dir. UTHL had given him at the whaling conference in London.

I then informed the Japanese .mbassador that our military advisors would probably leave Harrow on 3 July. It had not been altogether easy to effect their departure. In connection with the recall of .mbassador TRAVAN a number of combinations regarding severing of German-Chinese relations and the recognition of the Hankow Government had been in the Japanese press. I would be thankful if the Japanese press could be influenced in such a way that it would refrain from such combinations.

The Japanese .mbassador then expressed himself optimistically regarding the further development of the military operations. After a capture of Hankow the position of CHING KAI-SHI seemed to him untenable.

Berlin, 29 June 1938

Signed HIBLNTROP

/1353:4-6/
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. F. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

__ s/ W. F. Cumming

W. F. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

__ s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Doc. No. 4031C
Page 1

Berlin, 6 July 1938

TOGO, who had announced himself, made reference to the fact that the Minister in the conversation of 29 June had referred him to me regarding details of the pending economic negotiations. At first he spoke about the present situation of the German-Japanese negotiations for the trade agreement and said that, in the last conversation of his Commercial Attache J. UDO with H. D. WELTE and L. A. VOGT, we had expressed certain wishes for the acceptance of German goods by Japan up to the amount of 160 million yen, suggested by Japan, for normal export, and had declared ourselves willing to take into consideration the Japanese suggestion for an agreement regarding an additional export of 150 million yen, half against Japanese goods, half on credit, in the event of the Japanese Government considering our wishes favorably. He had telegraphed this outcome of the conversation of his Commercial Attache to Tokyo and had recommended consideration of our wishes. After having received instructions he would again contact me.

Then the ambassador again spoke about the protocol on German-Japanese economic cooperation in China and insisted particularly and obstinately on his counterplan which he had handed to the German Foreign Minister on 29 June and which the Reichsminister had already declared unsatisfactory. The differences of opinion referred to the following points:

1) According to our suggestion the protocol was to refer to "the areas of China which are under Japanese influence." The ambassador wishes to replace these words throughout merely by "China" and brings up as a reason that the Japanese government hoped to extend its influence over all of China, therefore it was for general reasons undesirable to acknowledge in this document the possibility of a division of China into areas which either were or were not under Japanese influence. In answering this I stressed that, with our stipulation of text, we merely wished to clarify that the agreement did not apply to such areas which finally would remain of China without being under Japanese influence. In itself this was natural because the Japanese government could of course only take over responsibilities for such areas in
which it had influence. Therefore I was willing to ask for the Reichsminister's decision whether he approved of the Japanese suggestion, to put only "China" in the parts of the Proviso concerned.

(2) The Japanese counterdraft wishes to put the words "German foreign trade" where, in various parts, it says "German trade" in China. I declared to the Ambassador that we could not agree to this. The reconstruction and securing of the commercial activity of German firms in China was for us an unavoidable prerequisite for the economic cooperation in China desired by both governments. This commercial activity, however, not only consisted of the import and export of German goods by these firms to or from Germany, but also of trade within China and of mediation for export of Chinese goods to third countries, for instance America and England. At last the Ambassador conceded this and consented that at the end of (1) and in (II) before the letter (a), just "Germany's trade in China" should be put in place of "foreign trade".

(3) The Japanese suggestions for changes under the letters (a) and (b) present the main difficulty. The Ambassador persisted that the Japanese government could not promise us a better position than third powers and equal treatment with Japan regarding taxes, revenues, duties, traffic fees, etc. In answering I declared to him again and again that, in view of our support of the Japanese action in China rendered with considerable sacrifices, we felt entitled to a better position than such powers which not only did not support Japan out laid, wherever they could, obstacles in her way. In any case I did not have the right to leave off from this demand in view of the binding instructions of the Reichsminister. Still the Ambassador asked us to again obtain the opinion of the Reichsminister and also referred to the fact that Yen Ambassador had promised him another examination, from the legal standpoint of the suggestions which differed from our version. At last I declared myself ready to report to him the final attitude of the Reichsminister and the eventual outcome of this legal examination.

(4) Finally the Ambassador told me that he had been empowered by his government to give the planned pro Ismeria a legally more binding for a mutual provisional signing. I responded that I would bring this to the notice of the
Reichsminister but pointed out that the Reichsminister, as was known, had proposed through VO. I RHEA the form of an exchange of notes. The ambassador was of the opinion that his government considered the form of an exchange of notes impractical on account of the necessary but difficult and time-consuming consent of the Privy Council.

Signed: [signature]

/135851-3/
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

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/s/ W. P. Cumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
On 27 July 1938 I went to see the Japanese Ambassador and told him on instructions of the German Reichs Minister, that the Reichs Minister, even after another thorough deliberation, did not find satisfactory the last Japanese proposal for the wording of the "Pro Memoria" regarding North China, according to which Germany was to be promised only an "especially favorable" treatment and that he stands on the demand for a promise for "preferential treatment over against third states." This demand was merely the natural consequence of the special relation between our two countries and the great sacrifices with which we were supporting the Japanese advance in North China. A treatment which is only "especially favorable", however, did not sufficiently do justice to this situation.

Several reports from our representatives in China had contributed to the decision of the German Reichs Minister, from which it could be seen that also in the already peaceful part of North China every foreign trade was being ruthlessly eliminated in favor of the Japanese, and that thereby any more favorable treatment of the German trade was in no way taking place. This action induced the impression, that the long range Japanese economic policy in North China systematically lead to principally eliminating every foreign trade, even the German, and only permitting it in so far as Japan itself was not capable of delivery or receipt. As evidence of this I presented the ambassador the note enclosed in copy, in which five cases of complaint are presented and made supplementary oral explanations based on a detailed memorandum regarding the situation of German economic interests in North China, especially regarding the complete exclusion of Germany which has set in since the Japanese occupation in two fields in which we have had a leading position for many years, namely, in the delivery of railroads and the hydro-electric field. It followed from all of this that it was not a question of an especially favorable treatment, not to speak of a preferential treatment of Germany in North China.

I added, that Ambassador OTT would be commissioned to present these complaints in Tokyo and to ask the Japanese government for information regarding its intended future economic policy in North China. Ambassador OTT, during his presence here, had also been informed of the course of the discussions here regarding economic cooperation in North China and informed of the differences of opinion which still exist regarding the wording of the Pro Memoria and would, when the opportunity presented itself, on his part inform the Japanese government in Tokyo of the concept of the Reichs Minister.

Especially the latter statement was obviously extremely disagreeable to Mr. TOGO and upon my report on the commissioning of ambassador OTT, which were at first more indicatory, he posed several counter questions, until I made this commissioning more precise in the manner shown above.
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I added, that Ambassador OTT would be commissioned to present these complaints in Tokyo and to ask the Japanese government for information regarding its intended future economic policy in North China. Ambassador OTT, during his presence here, had also been informed of the course of the discussions here regarding economic cooperation in North China and informed of the differences of opinion which still exist regarding the wording of the Pro Memoria and would, when the opportunity presented itself, on his part inform the Japanese government in Tokyo of the concept of the Reichs Minister.

Especially the latter statement was obviously extremely disagreeable to Mr. TOGO and upon my report on the commissioning of Ambassador OTT, which were at first more indicatory, he posed several counter questions, until I made this commissioning more precise in the manner shown above.
Impartially (speaking), Mr. TOGO objected that he had always done his best to do something about such German complaints re: North China, and in two instances he had even succeeded in the (later findings showed that he had actually gone to some trouble regarding Point 2 of the Appendix, that, however, the Japanese assent which had been given to it was not sufficient). He would now report to Tokyo the complaints enumerated in the appendix and in my oral statements. If up to now no especially favorable treatment of Germany in North China has taken place, then this was related to the fact that an agreement could just not be reached on the Pro Memoria in which this especially favorable treatment was to be agreed upon.

I expressed my astonishment at this remark, pointing out that from general circumstances alone, such an especially favorable treatment even without agreement was understood to be a matter of course. After a few excuses the ambassador admitted this, maintained, however, that the stopping of war material delivery to China and especially the recall of the military advisors had only come about such a short time ago that the effect of this gesture of friendship could not yet have carried through to (change) the attitude of the Japanese authorities everywhere in North China. He, too, presumed that on account of this gesture of friendship much would now improve of its own accord along the lines of our wishes.

Finally the ambassador made remarks concerning other details of the wording of the Pro Memoria, from which I could surmise that he was, nevertheless, very much interested in a further discussion also here on this subject, and that he possibly still has one or another concession on hand, which up to now, he has not brought forth. He also inquired as to what attitude the German Reichs Minister had taken to the form of the Pro Memoria, namely execution by mutual signing.

I answered that the Reichs Minister had not taken any attitude towards these other details, as it was of no use to go more deeply into these questions, as long as the main point, namely the demand for preferential treatment was rejected by the Japanese side. But since Mr. TOGO insisted, and as it could be of advantage to find out something about other possible Japanese concessions, and as he seems to be somewhat under pressure by the parallel action of our Ambassador in Tokyo, I at last promised him that I would get the decision of the Reichs Minister regarding continuation of the discussion.

signed WIBHL.

To be submitted to
the Reichs Minister
the Secretary of State
To be submitted to the Reichs Minister, via the State Secretary, with the request for a decision on the last sentence of the memorandum.

Ambassador OTT has been informed by telegraph and asked to raise complaints in the same direction with the Japanese Government.
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. F. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

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5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

_________________________
W. F. Cumming

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

_________________________
G. N. Garde
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
解：(\because 0 < x < 1)

\begin{align*}
\sqrt{\frac{1 + x}{1 - x}} &= \sqrt{\frac{1}{(1 - x)^2}} \\
\log_{10}(1 + x) &= \log_{10}\left(\frac{1}{(1 - x)^2}\right) \\
\log_{10}(1 + x) &= 2 - \log_{10}(1 - x) \\
\log_{10}(1 + x) &= 2 - \log_{10}\left(\frac{1}{1 - x}\right) \\
\log_{10}(1 + x) &= 2 - \log_{10}(1 - x) + \log_{10}(1 - x) \\
\log_{10}(1 + x) &= 2 - \log_{10}(1 - x) + \log_{10}(1 - x) \\
\log_{10}(1 + x) &= 2 \\
1 + x &= 10^2 \\
1 + x &= 100 \\
x &= 99
\end{align*}
很多内容不可识别，可能需要进一步的处理。
大使顧問フランシス・ミッチェルが、日本首相の立場から、日本政体の重要性を強調し、日本の内政問題を力強く提起した。
(W. P. Cumming)

C. H. Garde

St. Colonel, A.G.D
Acting Adjutant General

(2nd ed.)
Concerning the situation of German Economic Interests in the parts of China occupied by Japan.

I.

In view of the reactions which the Japanese-Chinese conflict inevitably exercises upon foreign economic interests in China, the Japanese Government has repeatedly declared its intention to respect these foreign interests and to maintain the principle of the Open Door and the principle of the equal possibilities.

In addition to that the Japanese Government has promised our economic interests in China a preferential treatment in consideration of the special relations existing between Germany and Japan and the great friendship which Germany has shown since the conclusion of the anti-Comintern agreement, through the recognition of Manchuria, the recall of military advisors and the suspension of all war material supplies to China.

One could not see clearly what practical consequences these Japanese promises for the German economic interests had as long as the area of TIENTSIN, PEKING and TSINGTAO in North China, and the triangle Shanghai-Nanking-Hangchow in Middle China were battle areas as long as there was fighting, it was doubtful whether the measures of the Japanese military authorities were conditioned by war and temporary or whether they were the expression of a policy calculated to be permanent. Now that these territories are for the great part pacified and opened for the admission of Japanese civilians (peddlers, traders and manufacturers), the German authorities could gain a clearer picture of the Japanese economic policy in China and its reactions on the German interests. They confirm in numerous reports that the Japanese military authorities are striving to subjugate the Chinese economy under Japanese domination, to use this economy exclusively in the Japanese interest, and to push aside and eliminate all foreign interests.

In this the German interests are treated no better than any other foreign interests. Principally, Japan wants to exploit China only in her own interest. Foreign cooperation only comes into the question where the Japanese means do not suffice, but even there only in a way which guarantees Japan's leadership (Japanese majority in mixed enterprises). Considerable orders are to be given internationally, whereby Germany does not possess any
special advantage over others. Although the attitude of the Japanese military authorities in North and Middle China is basically the same towards German economic interests, a certain difference is shown in the atmosphere's mood. The Japanese army which protects the Japanese flank in MANCHURIA and Inner Mongolia, shows a certain willingness for cooperation with Germany whereas they consciously prejudice themselves over against the English. On the other hand, the commercial expert reports about the Japanese attitude in Middle China (II VII 1731 of 23 June):

"Whereas the German merchants in North CHINA are shown a certain consideration, the Japanese military and official sources here are apparently ashamed of this friendship, especially over against the English. Instead of avowing oneself openly to it by permitting the German merchants something which one wants to refuse to the others, one only always makes about cooperation with Germany, and this as much as possible in private circles, that is, for the purpose of reproaching us or to demand something from us."

Consul General FISCHER has referred the Japanese Consulate General in Shanghai, with which he was negotiating about a few factories which are under German influence, to the assurance of the Japanese Government to treat German interests preferentially. The Japanese Consul General answered to this that the Japanese Consulate had not received any such instructions and that it was impossible to make a distinction in the treatment of the members of the various foreign nations.

Consul General FISCHER - who was specifically characterized by Lt. General OSHIMA as a person approved of by Japanese military authorities - comes to the conclusion that the military authorities "up to now have not allowed themselves to become discontented by all the statements from Tokyo about the respecting of foreign rights and interests in the ruthless utilization of their position of power and have not taken cognizance of the fact that German interests should be treated with care in the strangulation of foreign commerce."

-2-

The Japanese economic policy aims at the control of all the important industries of North and Middle China. As objects of this national-Japanese policy are, amongst others: shipping railways and other communications, undertakings, mines, salt-production, mills, colliers and weaving mills, cement, chemical factories, the wool and silk industries.
In practice it has proceeded in the following way: All public or semi-public installations of the Central Provincial Government and the local administrations: railways, telephone, telegraph and wireless stations, arsenals and workshops, mines and salt-fields naturally have been seized by the Japanese military authorities.

The greater part of factories of private industry have been destroyed. The machines have been taken apart so far as they were still useful and the rest has been sent to Japan as scrap metal. As Consul SCHE imparted to the German Consul General, Japan wants to retain the power for the decision whether the development of certain industries in China should be permitted at all, which would be regulated according to the requirement of the Japanese economy.

As far as the Chinese factories are still existing, they will be taken over by the Japanese. For instance, the cotton spinning industry of Middle China has thus been taken over by Japan and has been divided up for management by Japanese Spinning mills.

Usually this happened in such way that one day Japanese engineers, most of the time with military escort, appeared, hoisted the Japanese flag and put up signs on which it was announced that the factory was now a Japanese enterprise. The Japanese emphasized that they only aspire to "cooperation" with the Chinese owners who are invited to bear the repair expenses, which are usually considerable, to agree to the appointment of a Japanese manager and a technical advisor and to be content with a partition of the net proceeds (W VII 1876).

Should the Chinese owners object, then they are put under pressure either by refusal of admission to the factory building and other administrative measures or the resumption of the management takes place without Chinese consent. In this procedure it is not the arbitrary acts of individual military authorities, but they are the systematic attempt, which is approved by the Japanese Government to manage Chinese industry - as far as it is permitted - in "cooperation" with the Chinese as a Japanese monopoly. That Japanese enterprises in China are to be erected on the basis of special privileges also follows, among other things, from article 11 of the Japanese law concerning the North and Central China Development Co., which states:

"The Government shall make efforts to make the new Government of China consider granting special treatment to the proposed company and its affiliates."
The results of this Japanese policy are very serious for the German commercial activity in China. How incisive they are, is already shown by contemplating two fields which the Japanese want to reserve for themselves, Railways and Electricity.

In the field of railway construction, Germany has always been active and has participated to a great extent since the building of the SHANTUNG and the Tientsin-Fukow railway. Germans were the first who again took up the railway enterprise after the establishment of the Chinese national government and who, with the assistance of middle term delivery credits made possible the building of the Hanchow-Yushan-Nanchang-Pinghsia railway. It was expected that in a nationally united China a grand development of communications would take place and that Germany, together with England, would take a prominent part in it.

On 15 June of this year, 7,000 kilometers of the estimated 11,000 kilometers of the railroad lines were under Japanese control. Now they are run by the South Manchurian Railway Co. The Japanese saw themselves forced to procure an "Ersatz" because the Chinese could have taken with them nearly the entire rolling stock, and have ordered first of all 250 locomotives and 10,000 coaches in Japan. The orders went exclusively to Japan. It is to be expected that the future orders will also go to Japan and that we will lose the old Chinese railways as customers.

In addition to this the receipts of the Tientsin-Pukow line for the loans of 1908 and 1910 and the receipts of the Peking-Hangkow line for a number of middle term delivery credits were mortgaged to us. These lines at present have no receipts. In order to maintain our rights, after the English had availed themselves of the use of the Tientsin-Pukow and Hukuang loans from Japan on the 2nd of May of this year, we have demanded the same treatment for the German shares of these loans as well as the advance (3670,000) on the Tientsin-Pukow lines. The Japanese Government up to now has not answered this demand.

In the field of Chinese hydroelectricity the SIEMENS company has had a leading position for many years. According to what the firm reports now, one can already clearly see today that Japan is not going to draw any non-Japanese firms in the future into the Chinese territories occupied by Japan, and that she is going to let the Nihon Boshin Koji Kabushiki Kaisha (half national and half pertinent industry) carry out all supply and construction jobs. Examples of the Japanese advance already exist:
a) At the time of the outbreak of the conflict, a delivery of enlargerent equipment had just arrived for the automatic telephone exchange which had been built by Siemens and Halske. The Japanese did not accept these, but ordered a new automatic exchange from the Nihon Denshin Denki K.K. in Kalkan.

b) The same firm received orders for deliveries for two public automatic telephone exchanges in Shanghai.

c) The same firm participated in the founding of a company for news exchange in Kalgan together with a "Mongolian Government" (Kwantung Army) and received the order for a public automatic telephone exchange.

d) Up to now Siemens and Halske was almost exclusively the only firms supplying telephone and telegraph equipment for manifold utilization of overland wires. In the territories occupied by Japan such orders are only given to Japanese firms from now on. (Up to now two three-channel telephone constructions for North China and one one-channel do for Tientsin-Peking).

From the examples given above one can clearly see that the German firm has been entirely pushed out by the Japanese from fields, which in the past have been its steadily huge customers.

It is to be feared that we will make the same experience on all fields where Japanese monopolies prevail, until finally Japan occupied China will be just as closed to our commerce as Korea or Formosa.

B. Outside of the official offices which ordered railways, hydro-electric and water power plants, mines and arsenal equipment in Germany the Chinese private industry was our best customer.

Due to the Japanese action in the industrial field described above, the Chinese private industry is mainly ruined. German trade has been heavily damaged by the fact that many Chinese factory owners became unable to pay, so that they could not accept ordered goods and could not pay for them and that for the future they have been eliminated as customers. Most of them will be forced to buy in Japan in the future if they want to continue working.

In a few cases where long-term business relations existed and where the German demands on Chinese undertakings were especially large, the German firms had constituted liens for
themselves in the understanding that they are themselves for security. Their number is not large, because the Consul General in Shanghai watched carefully that such cessions were "bona fide" and that they were commercially justified and not fictitious bargains. In the main it concerns the following cases:

**German Paint-Trading Co.**

Five dye-works. They were established by Chinese who are close to DEFAG, in order to introduce new dyeing methods, and were technically taken care of by the DEFAG. The DEFAG had high claims on all of them. In order to secure these, DEFAG took a mortgage on the dye-works in the summer of 1937 and in December had it transferred for security's sake. The Japanese do not want to recognize the transfer. Furthermore they prevent the resumption of work of the 2, 4 and 5 works.

**WAIBEL & CO.**

Shanghai Portland Cement Works. Many years of close business contacts and high claims by SIESSSEN. Transfer for security's sake on 27 October 1937. The Japanese have removed the inventories of goods and part of the machines; they do not recognize the transfer. SIESSSEN fears that it will be taken over by force by the Japanese.

**SIESSSEN & CO.**


**CARLOWITZ & CO.**

The mortgaging and transference, respectively, of these works has been reported to the Japanese Consulate General in each case, with the result that there systematic plundering generally stopped in front of those enterprises under the German flag. When the German firms wanted to start running these enterprises again, it was not possible to get the necessary permission from the Japanese Consulate General, and the Japanese Military Authorities began to get serious about the seizure of these works. Therefore, the German Consulate General found itself forced to take up negotiations with the Japanese Consulate General. At this occasion the Japanese Consul SOME took the following attitude:

a) No distinction would be made in Germany's favor in the treatment of the various foreign nations;
b) The efficacy of the transfer of property from Chinese to German nationals depends upon recognition by the Japanese.

Japan was in a position to enforce its will by refusing work permits or other measures, which, if necessary, could be taken by the newly set up Chinese Government. The lack of a judicial foundation for this procedure was expressly confirmed. As reason for Japan's attitude Consul Sonz stated that the sought-for Chinese-Japanese "Cooperation" would be hindered if the Chinese would find safety behind foreign firms.

Councillor of Embassy Fischer defended the judicial standpoint that German firms, even if they possessed no claims against a Chinese firm, were entitled to acquire property from same, and that for this no Japanese permission was necessary; however, declared himself willing to enter into further discussions with the aim of finding a solution locally. In view of the well known economic policy of the Japanese military authorities he is, however, convinced that in the long run a basic discussion is unavoidable with the Japanese Government regarding the conflicts with legitimate German interests, arising from their economic policy.

c) The German economic activity in the Japanese occupied territories is generally encroached upon in that the Germans, just as the rest of the foreigners, are prohibited from entering into the territories already pacified, whereas they are visited by groups of Japanese peddlers, traders and other civilians. This applies to North China along the Peking-Pao-tou railway as well as to the triangle Shanghai-Nanking-Hangchow.

In Inner Mongolia, the Kwantung Army has ordered the representatives of the firm MELCHERS & CO. to leave the area at once "as this was necessary for the personal safety of the employees", although Japanese businessmen go on working there as before. Thus the buying organizations of the German firm, which for many years has bought wool and skins there are paralyzed, and the business has been concluded into the hands of a Japanese monopoly Company. The same measures have been taken in Manchuria where the MANCHURIAN LIVESTOCK CO. has received a monopoly.

The provisional government in PEKING has further declared that the export of skins and furs from the ports of TIENTSIN, CHEFOO, and TSINGTAO is prohibited, on 30 June of
this year. The German firms, which have about a 50% share in this export, are heavily dependent upon circumstances to the Empire of Germany in peacetime. Consequently, the German Government, as this measure was taken at the inducement of the Japanese in the interest of Japanese war economy. A prohibition of the export of cotton is said to be imminent.

-3-

All in all, the reports of the German officials in North and Middle China show that the German economic interests in China are worse off in the Japanese occupied areas than was the case in national China, even at the time of the sharpest anti-imperialistic Kuomintang propaganda. This fate is shared by the Germans with all other foreign interests. However, no signs of a preferential treatment of the German interests by Japan are to be found.

Part of the injuries under which the German economic interests suffer are certainly to be traced to the war situation and the urgent critical situation, which forces Japan to take measures which otherwise it would not take. In the main, however, it concerns measures which originate from a consequent economic policy of Japan and aim at the abolition of all foreign influences in China. The example of Korea and Formosa shows where this development will lead to if we do not defend our interests with all our vigor.

The Japanese have promised us, at the very least de facto, a preferential position. The facts give us the right to ask Japan in what respect it has carried out these promises and how it intends to carry them out, and what the attitude of this preferential position will be toward the status quo ante.

Hence, with respectfully submitted to Ministry Director Wisch.

Berlin, 24 July 1933.
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. I. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attaché of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
1st Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Extract from a letter of Ambassador OTT - TOKYO - of 15 March, 1939 to Ministerial Director WIEHL.

In the question of our preferential treatment in China I was able to gather from conversations in the Foreign Ministry that Ambassador OSHIMA has actually telegraphed repeatedly in accordance with our interests /in Unserem Sinne/. Generally I have the impression that one is not inclined to admit in writing the preferential treatment. As a way out, one is thinking of a de facto preferential treatment which is to be confirmed solely by actual deeds without written fixation. However, the actual deeds offered by Japan up to now are not very encouraging.......

Signed OTT

Copy to:
Bureau RAM
ST.S. FOL VIII
U.S.T.S. W VII
Dg. POL
Dg. W

signed WIEHL
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. F. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

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\[\text{Signature:} \ W. F. \text{ Cumming}\]

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

\[\text{Signature:} \ G. H. \text{ Garde}\]

Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General
OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Berlin, 8 October 1940

LEGRUND

I informed the Japanese Ambassador on 4 October that we would like to make use of his offer, that Japan could buy raw materials from Netherlands East Indies for us, in excess of her own demands and pass them on to us. Regarding details of our wishes I handed him a note with the following contents: 3 million reichsmark in foreign bills of exchange for tin, rubber and castor-oil plants' seeds or castor oil. 1 million reichsmark in foreign bills of exchange for about 1,000 tons of spices. In the first place information is requested on the quantities that can be delivered, and the time of delivery. The amounts of foreign bills of exchange could be paid in full to the working association of the three biggest Japanese business concerns for a receipt and a declaration of obligation that the goods concerned would be handed over within a period of two months to the confidant on the German side in Dairen (Panchukuo). In the event of a part of the goods not being delivered before the expiry of the period of time, the firms promise to pay back the equivalent of the undelivered parts immediately in foreign bills of exchange according to German choice.

The Japanese Ambassador promised to telegraph my information to his government. He remarked, he would then suggest to his government that on acquiescence of our proposal on its part, it expresses the desire to obtain an enlarged market in Germany and the countries occupied by Germany or those economically dependent on Germany for such Japanese products, which Japan, due to the reaction to the Tripartite Pact, will probably not be able any more to sell in countries of English-American influence, to the previous extent. With regard to this I told the Ambassador that we would be pleased to examine such wishes.

(signed) WIEHL

Copies to:

St. S. Uct. S. vol, pol VIII, DG W, W VII with the request to inform the departments and the Embassy in Tokyo.

/136434-5/
AFFIDAVIT

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s/ W. F. Cumming
W. F. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General
OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
SECRET STATE AFFAIR

Dir. Ha. Pol. 102
Berlin, 28 April 1941

DRAFT

Work Program for the Economic Subcommission of
The Tripartite Pact in Berlin.

I) The economic subcommission has the task of advising what
can be done between the countries belonging to the Tripartite Pact
in order to secure mutual support, especially in the economic field,
in war and in the postwar period. It lays down the results of its
deliberations in pronouncements to the main commission. The individual
negotiations necessary for the execution of the pronouncements after
these have been approved by the main commission, will be conducted
directly between the participating governments.

II) The economic subcommission will be charged with examining the
possibilities of an accord and mutual support at first in the following
fields:

1) In waging the commercial and economic war by economic
measures (military measures are dealt with by the military subcom-
mission).

2) In the procurement of raw materials.

3) In construction and extension of plans for military and
defense economy preparations.

4) In the utilization and extension of trade routes.

5) In the promotion of economic combinations between the
states belonging to the Tripartite Pact.

III) The examinations and proposals are at first to include the
measures practicable and necessary for the period of the present war,
but should also already now extend as far as possible to the prepara-
tions for the postwar period.

IV) In the beginning the possibilities existing between the three
main powers are to be examined, but already now, as far as it is possible
and necessary, the participation of the other states which have joined
the Tripartite Pact is to be considered.

Internal Explanations

On 1) to 5)

On 1) Meant is, for instance, exchange of economic information be-
tween the governments and their representatives in neutral countries,
supervision of the trade of neutral countries with enemy countries, control of interference purchases in neutral countries, common economic pressure on neutral countries, economic measures to deprive the enemy of shipping space, measures against enemy property, common economic defense against foreign measures such as freezing of credit, confiscation of ships, etc. Whether joint measures for the running of the enemy blockade should be dealt with by the military or economic subcommission remains to be decided.

On 2) Mutual support in the procurement of raw materials will have to extend to purchasing, transporting and financing. Regarding transport measures compare No. 4).

On 3) Meant is mutual transmission of patents and licenses, granting of technical assistance, partnerships regarding capital.

On 4) Meant is:

a) Questions concerning railways, for instance synoptization of negotiations with Soviet Russia regarding use of the Siberian railway. In doing this the keeping secret of our arrangements with Russia must not be endangered. Therefore Italian procurements from the Far East by the Siberian railway must not come to light.

b) Questions of shipping, for instance improvement of the Japanese shipping lines to Vladivostok, the transport of raw materials from the Netherlands-Indies, Thailand, Indo-China, and China to Japan; later on also accord in the operation of the main routes of world shipping.

c) Questions regarding air transport, for instance establishment of the air-route Rome-Berlin-Tokyo, later on also accord regarding the main routes of world air transport.

On 5) Meant is, for instance, removal of orders and measures hindering or limiting exchange of goods; setting up of principles for future loan and currency policy, etc. To put the promotion of commercial intercourse also between the countries and areas under the de jure or de facto supremacy or the influence of Germany, Italy, and Japan, already now on the order of the day is not recommended, because that might lead to the discussion of questions not yet ripe for judgment, as, for instance, incorporation of the Netherlands Indies in the Great East Asia Sphere, direct trade of Germany with the countries of the Great East Asia Sphere, etc.
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. I. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

__________________________
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

__________________________
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
ADOLF HITLER, German Chancellor to,

His Majesty,
The Emperor of Japan,

Your Majesty.

Prompted by the desire to fill again the post of German Ambassador in Tokyo which was vacant owing to the recall of Ambassador Dr. Von DIRKSEIN, I have resolved to confer this post on Major General EUGEN OTT.

His tested qualities entitle me to expect that he will succeed in presenting to Your Majesty this letter which is to accredit him as my envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary.

I beg you to receive him with good will, fully trusting everything that he will be called upon to state in my name or on orders of the German Government.

I avail myself of this opportunity to assure Your Majesty of my complete respect and sincere friendship, at the same time expressing my best wishes for the well being of Your Majesty and the happiness and welfare of JAPAN.

FUNDBRUCK, 5 April 1938.

/s/ A. Hitler
Ribbentrop
CERTIFICATE

W.D.C. No. 
I.P.S. No. 2670

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO Nagaharu, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document here-to attached consisting of 7 pages, dated 5 April 1938, and described as follows: German Embassy, Eugen Ott's letter of Credentials to the Japanese Government. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Archives Section, Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 26th day of Sept., 1946, /s/ Nagaharu Odo
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ T. Sato
Asst. Chief, Archives Section
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, John Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 26th day of Sept., 1946 /s/ J. L. Curtis, 2d Lt.

Witness: /s/ T/4 T. Tomuchi
Investigator

Certificate:

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 2670.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus
東京新聞

「大正四十年四月一日」

日本大正四十年四月一日早報

「大正四十年四月一日」

東京新聞
2471-3

J. A. Curtis 2×14

Investigator

T/4 T. Toguchi
Ulrich A. Strauss
Tokyo, 5 March 1941

To the Vice Foreign Minister:

Sir,

I am honored to inform Your Excellency that I will leave Tokyo today and will go to Germany for a short time in order to take part there in the conversations of the Imperial Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, with the Fuehrer and Chancellor and the leaders of the German Government.

During my absence the plenipotentiary minister Dr. Erich Bolte will conduct the business of the Embassy in the nature of a temporary charge d'affaires.

I avail myself of this occasion for again assuring Your Excellency of my high esteem.

Yours,

His Excellency
The Imperial Japanese Vice Foreign Minister

M. GIKAWA

Tokyo
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO Nagaharu, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity, Assistant Chief of the Archives Section -- Foreign Office — and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of one page, dated March 5, 1941, and described as follows: Temporary Leave of Absence of the German Ambassador to Japan, Message from His Post -- Minister Belzze named to fulfill the post temporarily.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files); Archives Section, -- Foreign Office --

Signed at Tokyo on this 26th day of Sept., 1946.

Nagaharu ODO
Signature of Official

Witness; /s/ T. Sato

Last, Chief, Archives Section
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, John Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 26th day of Sept., 1946 /s/ J. E. Curtis, 2nd Lt.

Witness; /s/ T. Toguchi

Investigator
Official Capacity
Certificate

I, Ulrich Strauss, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 2671.

/\/ Ulrich A. Strauss
Westphalia, 21 Nov. 1941

Diplomats

Tokyo

No. 2136

Telegram in Ciphers

(Secret Cipher Process)

(Secret State-Matter)

In regard to telegram No. 2472 of 18 Nov.

I ask you to inform verbally the leader of the division of Foreign Armies yourself, or, if you consider it to be more correct, through the military attaché, of the following in regard to his remarks:

You had made a report on this statement to Berlin and you were told that the idea there of concluding peace or armistice only jointly in case Japan or Germany becomes involved in war against the United States, no matter for what reason, is looked upon as natural and that one would be entirely willing to put down a corresponding /statement/ in an agreement to be made for this case.

Telegraphic report on execution.

RIBBENTROP

/60879/
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo
Arrived
23 Nov 1941
24 Nov 1941

10.00 s
3.00 hours

No. 2526 of 23 Nov 1941

For the Reich Foreign Minister.

x) RAM 230

I first informed General OKAMOTO orally through the military attaché of the above telegraphic instructions, adding that I was myself prepared for discussions any time.

General OKAMOTO then asked to be received by me and in a subsequent conversation made the following statement.

The Japanese Minister of War expressed his deepest gratitude for the statements made through the Military Attaché. He, OKAMOTO, was very pleased to find the fact once more confirmed that Germany would not leave Japan in the lurch in case of a conflict with the United States. He asks for information whether, in my opinion, Germany would likewise consider herself to be at war with the U.S. in the event of a Japanese commencement of war against her. I referred to the formulation of the above mentioned telegraphic instructions and to our readiness to conclude a reciprocal agreement on this matter.

OKAMOTO declared the army Wehrmacht as assumed that a decision would soon be made on an advance in the South. To be sure, the result of the KURUSU talks would have to be awaited first. Even if no final time limit had been set for these discussions, the army surely insists on speeding up since the season favorable for an operation in the South was imminent.

With regard to operational intentions, I got the following impression from the conversation. A surprise occupation of Thailand about as far as the Kra Isthmus seems to be planned. At the same time seizure of the oil wells of North and East Borneo should take place. It seems not yet to have been decided how the Philippines should be dealt with. I explained, in connection with earlier instructions that, with the presupposition of the preparation of sufficient forces, in view of American weakness, a hesitant attitude would be initially possible and suitable, in order to drive the U.S. to a decision, difficult from the domestic political standpoint, on entry into the war. I further pointed to the necessity of stopping American supplies to Vladivostok, which appeared to be obvious to OKAMOTO.
CKAICTO expressed his thanks for my statements, and declared he hoped to be able to inform me soon of the result of further deliberations of the army. He requested me to treat the conversation confidentially and in the first place to confine it to army/Wehrmacht/ channels.

I got the impression from the conversation that discussions within the army/Wehrmacht/ had become much more concrete, but that a decision on the question of an advance in the South had not yet been reached.

OTT
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

W. F. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
From: Berlin  
To: Tokyo  
29 November 1941  
#1393 (in 3 parts, complete)  

"By his request, I was supposed to have called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop during the evening of yesterday, the 28th. Suddenly, however, he requested that the time be postponed and it was not until 10:30 at night that I finally saw him.

"This delay was occasioned by the fact that a long conference of the bigwigs of the government and military, from Goering down, was being held at the official residence of the Fuehrer. The war against the Soviet Union has now taken definite shape and the outcome can be unerringly foretold. Next year's campaigns were mapped at this conference, taking into consideration the points brought up at the conference of the various Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of Europe. It is an absolute certainty that Japan's moves were also given discussion at this conference.

"1. Ribbentrop opened our meeting by again inquiring whether I had received any reports regarding the Japanese-U.S. negotiations. I replied that I had received no official word.

"Ribbentrop: 'It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in East Asia without losing this opportunity. There never has been and probably never will be a time when closer cooperation under the Tripartite Pact is so important. If Japan hesitates at this time, and Germany goes ahead and establishes her European New Order, all the military might of Britain and the United States will be concentrated against Japan.

"'As Fuehrer Hitler said today, there are fundamental differences in the very right to exist between Germany and Japan, and the United States. We have received advice to the effect that there is practically no hope of the Japanese-U.S. negotiations being concluded successfully, because of the fact that the United States is putting up a stiff front.

"'If this is indeed the fact of the case, and if Japan reaches a decision to fight Britain and the United States, I am confident that that will not only be to the interest of Germany and Japan jointly, but would bring about favorable results for Japan herself.'
"I: 'I can make no definite statement as I am not aware of any concrete intentions of Japan. Is Your Excellency indicating that a state of actual war is to be established between Germany and the United States?'

"Ribbentrop: 'Roosevelt is a fanatic, so it is impossible to tell what he would do.'

"Concerning this point, in view of the fact that Ribbentrop has said in the past that the United States would undoubtedly try to avoid meeting German troops", and from the tone of Hitler's recent speech as well as that of Ribbentrop's, I feel that German attitude toward the United States is being considerably stiffened. There are indications at present that Germany would not refuse to fight the United States if necessary.

(Fast 2)

"2. I made inquiries as to the future of the war against the Soviet Union.

"Ribbentrop: 'The Fuehrer has stated that he is now determined to crush the Soviet Union to an even greater extent than he had planned at first. He is now bent on completely wiping out that state and went on to announce that practically all of the main military objectives had been attained and that a greater part of the German troops would shortly be brought back to Germany.

"Following up those campaigns, the Caucasus campaign will be launched in earnest. Next spring, Germany will advance to and cross the Ural Mountains and chase Stalin deep into Siberia.'

"I: 'Approximately when do you expect that?'

"Ribbentrop: 'The campaign will be launched in about May of next year, according to present schedules.'

"I: 'According to what you say, Germany is apparently preparing to gamble quite a bit in her Russian campaign. We hope that air connections between Germany and Manchukuo can be established at an early time.'

"Ribbentrop: 'That is an item that Germany has been considering for some time. By summer of next year I do not believe that air connection from the Ural area to Manchukuo will be an impossibility.'
"3. I then asked him about the campaign against England proper to which he replied that before launching landing operations against England, Germany will probably completely wipe out Britain's influence in the Near East, Africa, Gibraltar and the Mediterranean Sea. I got the impression that more emphasis is being placed on this area than heretofore. So, I asked whether it was Germany's intention to conclude the war without attempting to go through with a campaign against England.

"Ribbentrop: 'Germany has, of course, made all necessary preparations for this campaign. However, Germany is in receipt of intelligences which would seem to indicate that all is not well within England herself. For example, we hear that there is a split within the ranks of the Conservatives; that Churchill's influence is on the wane; that Bevin, Chief of the Labor Party, is advocating revolutionary measures. All of these are tending to make the preservation of order there increasingly difficult.

"Of course, I am not one to implicitly believe all of this. However, I am convinced that things are getting bad in England. Under these circumstances, it may be that Germany's various other campaigns may cause England to fall even without our going through with our landing operations against England herself.

(Part 3)

"In any event, Germany has absolutely no intention of entering into any peace with England. We are determined to remove all British influence from Europe. Therefore, at the end of this war, England will have no influence whatsoever, in international affairs. The Island Empire of Britain may remain, but all of her other possessions throughout the world will probably be divided three ways by Germany, the United States, and Japan. In Africa, Germany will be satisfied with, roughly, those parts which were formerly German colonies. Italy will be given the greater share of the African colonies. Germany desires above all else, to control European Russia.'

"4. In conclusion, I said: 'I am fully aware of the fact that Germany's war campaign is progressing according to schedule smoothly. However, suppose that Germany is faced with the situation of having not only Great Britain as an actual enemy but also have all of those areas in which Britain has influence and those countries which have been aiding Britain as actual enemies as well. Under such circumstances, the war area will undergo considerable expansion, of course. What is your opinion of the outcome of the war under such an eventuality?"
"Ribbentrop: 'We would like to end this war during next year. However, under certain circumstances, it is possible that it will have to be continued on into the following year."

'Should Japan become engaged in a war against the United States, Germany, of course, would join the war immediately. There is absolutely no possibility of Germany's entering into a separate peace with the United States under such circumstances. The Fuehrer is determined on that point.'

"In closing this conference, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop requested that the contents of our talks be kept a strict secret. Please, therefore, exercise particular caution in handling this message.

"I have shown copies of this message to the military and naval attache's It.-Gen. (Vice Adm.?) Nomura, and Maj.-Gen (Rear Adm.?) Abe. Please show a copy to the Army and Navy authorities in Tokyo, too,

("In the last section of the first part of this message, we wrote *** 'the U.S. would undoubtedly try to avoid meeting German troops' *** That should have read: 'the U.S. would undoubtedly try to avoid war'.")

25556
JD-1: 6942
*See end of message. (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (7)
Doc. No. 2593

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke
CARTER W. CLARKE
Colonel, G.S.C.
"From: Berlin
"To: Tokyo
"Subject: November
"Date: 1943 (in months of the year)

"By Premier Tojo,

Minister of War,

Suddenly, I received a report that it was not a war council which had been convened at Tokyo.

"This was quite unexpected, as I was in the midst of the conference of the Axis leaders at Berlin. I was told that the Fuehrer, Premier Tojo, and other leaders had met at an ad hoc conference to discuss the situation of the various fronts.

"As Premier Tojo has stated, there is an absolute certainty that Japan cannot continue the war.

"1. As Premier Tojo has stated, there is a frontal military situation in which Japan is alone. The war is inevitable, and the United States is putting up a stiff front.

"2. If this is indeed the case, and if Japan reaches a decision to fight Britain and the United States, I am confident that that will not only be to the interest of Germany and Japan jointly, but would bring about favorable results for Japan herself."
"I: 'I can make no definite statement as I am not aware of any concrete intentions of Japan. Is Your Excellency indicating that a state of non-aggression is to be established between Germany and the United States?"

"Ribbentrop: Roosevelt is a fanatic, so it is impossible to tell what he would do."

"Concerning this point, in view of the fact that Ribbentrop has said in the past that the United States would undoubtedly try to avoid warring German troops", and from the tone of Hitler's recent speech as well as part of Ribbentrop's, I feel that Germany's policy toward the United States is being considerably stiffened. There are indications at present that Germany would not refuse to fight the United States if necessary.

(Foot 2)

2. I made inquiries as to the future of the war against the Soviet Union.

"Ribbentrop: The Führer has stated that he is now determined to crush the Soviet Union as far as the greater extent upon he had planned at first. He is not bent on completely wiping out that state and going on to eliminate practically all of the main military objectives had even then, and that a greater part of the German troops would shortly be brought back to Germany.

"Following up these campaigns, the Caucasus campaign will be launched in the spring. Germany will advance to and cross the Ural Mountains and chase Stalin deep into Siberia."

"I: 'Approximately when do you expect that?'"

"Ribbentrop: 'The campaign will be launched in about May of next year, according to present schedules.'"

"I: 'According to what you say, Germany is apparently preparing to gamble quite a bit in her Russian campaign. We hope that air connections between Germany and Manchukuo can be established at an early time.'"

"Ribbentrop: 'That is an item that Germany has been considering for some time. By summer of next year, I do not believe that air connection from the Ural area to Manchukuo will be an impossibility.'"
"3. I then asked: 'Is it proper to which h.
broken relations again? The reply was no. cut Britain's ev-... and the whole emphasis was to ab-
cept another move without attempting to reestablish broken rela-
ions.

"Ribbentrop: 'Germany is not going to make any new preparations for this. The British Ministry of Intel-
ligence, which was particularly well in-
formed, informed us that there is a split within the Labor Party, and that Chamberlain's influence is entirely negligible. All of the Labor Party is opposing the Labor Leader, the History Party, in opposition to Britain and France. All of these are tending to make the situation there increasingly difficult.'

"Of course, I do not entirely believe all of
this. However, I have continued that this is likely to be so in
England. Under these circumstances, it is as though Germany's
various other campaigns have come to an end. I will not enter into any discussions with the
Labor Party, to make them interested in
our going through with our future operations against France or
herself.'

"In any event, Germany's absolutely no intention of
entering into any peace with Britain. She is determined to
remove all British influence from Europe. Therefore, at
the end of this war, England will have no influence whatsoever,
in international affairs. The island empire of Britain may
remain, but all of her other possessions throughout the world
will probably be divided three ways by Germany, the United
States, and Japan. In Africa, Italy will be satisfied with, roughly, those parts which were formerly German colonies.
Italy will be given the greater share of the African colonies.
Germany desires above all else, to control European Russia.'

"4. In conclusion, I said: 'I am fully aware of the fact
that Germany's war campaign is progressing according to sche-
dule smoothly. However, suppose that Germany is faced with the
situation of having not only Great Britain as an actual enemy
but also have all of those areas in which Britain has influence
and those countries which have been aiding Britain as actual
enemies as well. Under such circumstances, the war area will
undergo considerable expansion, of course. 'But is your opinion
of the outcome of the war under such an eventuality?'}
"Ribbentrop: "We would like to end this war during next year. However, under certain circumstances, it is possible that it will have to be continued on into the following year."

"Should Japan become involved in a war against the United States, Germany, of course, would join the war immediately. There is the belief that possibility of Germany's entering into a separate peace with the United States under such circumstances. The Führer is determined on that point."

"In writing this note, the Foreign Minister Ribbentrop requested that the contents of our talks be kept a strict secret. Please, therefore, exercise particular caution in handling this message.

"I have shown copies of this message to the military and naval attaché's Lt.-Gen. ('Ace Adm.') Furuno, and Maj.-Gen. (Rear Adm.) Abe. Please show a copy to the Army and Navy authorities in Tokyo, too.

"In the last section of the first part of this message, we wrote: 'the U.S. would undoubtedly try to avoid meeting German troops'. That should have read: 'the U.S. would undoubtedly try to avoid war'."

25576
M-1: 4912
Foot end of message. (P) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (7)
July 1st

1. The power of theft to of
.....

2. It is extremely likely to be

3. The presence of an

4. It is barely possible for an

5. July 1st, 19--
"General, I have some questions on these matters to ask, but I think we will defer those for a time and let you proceed with your narrative.

"The no-separate peace pact was first brought up around the first or second of December 1941, by a telegram from the Japanese Government to me. The gist of this telegram was as follows: that the Japanese Government in case of a United States-Japanese conflict desired Germany's participation in this war, and further that the Japanese Government desired that a no-separate peace pact be signed. In this regard I had heard sometime in November and had conveyed this news to Japan, from a man named Dietrich, the Reichspreusschef (head of the German press under Goebbels, the Propaganda Minister), that Hitler would be in favor of entering the conflict in case a United States-Japanese conflict started. Based on this information the Japanese Government in this telegram to me stated that they were desirous of having me approach Hitler in regard to Germany's entry in case of war with the United States.

Interrogation of OHTU: Hiroshi dated 27 February 1946:

"General, you may proceed with your narrative at the point where you left off yesterday.

"To clear up this before I go any further: almost since the beginning of United States-Japanese talks I had received absolutely no information concerning their progress from the Japanese Government, nor had I received any information about relations with the Soviet Union. The main reason for this, I believe, was that formerly we had used couriers to carry information of this sort, but due to the difficulties because of the German-Soviet war this became impossible, and for security reasons no communications of this sort were sent. Around the 29th or 30th of November 1941, I received word from Japan to the effect that Secretary of State Hull's reply of November 26, to Japanese proposals was extremely severe in tone. Not knowing much about what the negotiations had covered, I was not able to make an analysis of the situation, this being the first communication regarding United States-Japanese
negotiations that I had received. Following this, I believe it was around the end of November or the very beginning of December, I received another communication to the effect that the Japanese Government had issued an order to its Consulates in the United States to burn all but a very small portion of their codes.

Q: Did these communications all come from the Foreign Office?

A: Yes. Now, these were the two communications that I had received before the orders from the Government regarding the no-separate peace pact, of which I have told you.

Q: This message that you referred to yesterday that you got on the first or the second of December 1941 came from the Foreign Office also, did it?

A: I am not absolutely certain whether this communication regarding the no-separate peace pact came before or after the one that told me of the orders to burn code books. In any case I may be a couple of days off in my dates and I have the feeling that this one regarding the no-separate peace was around the third of December - I just wish to clear up this matter of dates.

Q: These telegrams or these despatches that you received from the Foreign Office, I suppose, were all signed MATSUOKA?

A: MATSUOKA was no longer Foreign Minister at this time. In any case, signature or no signature, all these despatches came from the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister at this time was TOGO.
Referring to your telegram No. 1401:

(1) In accordance to his request, I visited the Foreign Minister Ribbentrop again at 7:00 P.M. of the 1st (Gaus in attendance). Foreign Minister Ribbentrop stated that, much to his regret, he has been unable to contact Chancellor Hitler today, due to the location, but believes that he might be able to contact him the following day or probably the day after tomorrow, and since the German side fully understands the haste on the part of Japan, utmost efforts shall be exerted to contact Hitler.

(2) On that occasion Gaus asked me, in regard to the question of immediate participation in wars against America, whether it would be proper for him to interpret the aforementioned obligation as being mutual; to which your Ambassador gave affirmative answer. Furthermore, in regard to the "draft of the declaration providing for non-conclusion of separate peace", I stated that in my opinion it would be better for the three countries of Japan-Germany-Italy to issue a joint declaration since a Japanese-German and a Japanese-Italian declaration issued separately would be too juridical and feared to produce less political effects. However, since Foreign Minister Ribbentrop earnestly requested me not to despatch any telegram to Japan to that effect as the matter has not yet received the approval of the Chancellor, I request that you will take this matter into consideration.

(3) As mentioned previously, I have not yet succeeded in contacting Chancellor Hitler. However, as soon as it become possible, your Ambassador shall meet him and directly suggest to him the import of your instructions.
CERTIFICATE

W.D.C. No. 
I.P.S. No. 1532A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, FUKUSHI Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document heretofore attached consisting of 4 pages, dated , 19 and described as follows: Telegram from Ambassador Oshima despatched 2 Dec 1941 to Foreign Minister Togo, rec'd 3 Dec 1941, No. 1405. (Gen. No. 37421) I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 3rd day of Sept., 1946 /s/ K. Kayashi Signature of Official SEAL

Witness: /s/ Takegoro Sato Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 3rd day of Sept., 1946 /s/ Edward P. Monaghan NAME

Witness: /s/ Richard H. Lesh Investigator, IPS Official Capacity
SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke
CARTER W. CLARKE
Colonel, G.S.C.

SECRET
"From: Rome
"To: Tokyo
"3 December 1941
(Purple-CA)

"#985

"Re your message #985* to Berlin.

"On this day, at 11 o'clock in the morning, I accompanied by Ando, called on Premier Mussolini, (Foreign Minister Ciano was also present). I described the developments in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations in accordance with the contents of your message #986** to Berlin.

"Mussolini: 'I have been carefully watching the progress of the Japanese-U. S. talks from the very beginning and therefore am not at all surprised to receive your report. As a matter of fact, in view of the utter bull-headedness of the United States and the meddlesome nature of President Roosevelt, I should say that the outcome was nothing but what should have been expected. One of the aims of the United States is to make the Far East her own, from an economic standpoint. I have felt from the beginning that if it was the intention of the United States to separate Japan from the Axis first and then intervene in Europe, the United States was doomed to fail because of Japan's loyal and sincere nature.

"As Your Excellency and Your Excellency's predecessor know, I wholeheartedly endorse Japan's policy of creating a New Order in East Asia. This has been true in the past, is true now and will be so in the future. I am one who is firmly convinced that Japan has every right to be the leader of the Great East Asia area.'

"I continued by relating to him the contents of your message referred to in the heading, (with regard to paragraph 3 of that message, I said that I had been advised that some arrangements were being made between our Ambassador in Berlin and Ribbentrop.)

"With regard to paragraph 2, Mussolini said that should war break out, Italy would give every military aid she had at her disposal, i.e., that she would make every effort to keep the British navy checked in the Mediterranean."
"Mussolini: 'Recently, the formation of an Italian-German air force bloc was discussed so as to afford closer cooperation between the two to apply further pressure on the British in the Mediterranean. The negotiations on this proposal have progressed to a point where it may be signed any day now.'"

"Regarding paragraph 2 again, should Japan declare war on the United States and Great Britain, I asked, would Italy do likewise immediately? Mussolini replied: 'Of course. She is obligated to do so under the terms of the Tripartite Pact. Since Germany would also be obligated to follow suit, we would like to confer with Germany on this point.'"

"With reference to paragraph 3, I submitted the French text of your message 7987***, as one proposal, and asked him whether he preferred it to be separately or jointly. He replied that as long as it was done simultaneously with Germany it did not make much difference to him, but if it were done jointly he thought it would give the impression of more strength. He said he would confer with Ambassador MAIKENZEN.

"Mussolini failed to bring up the subject of Soviet Russia, so the matter was not brought up at all.

(Translator's note: Up to this point, message was in Purple-CA. The following paragraph was not encoded in the CA. Cannot find phrase referred to, in the text)

"In the first part of this message, please correct 'N-HEKHA' to 'KHEKHAWA.'"
December 3, 1941

Sensational move by Japan. The Japanese Ambassador asks for an audience with the Duce and reads him a long statement on the progress of the negotiations with America, concluding with the assertion that they have reached a dead end. Then, invoking the opposite clause in the Tripartite Pact, he asks that Italy declare war on America immediately after the beginning of hostilities between Japan and America and that Italy and Japan sign an agreement not to conclude a separate peace. The interpreter translating this request was trembling like a leaf. The Duce gave fullest assurances, reserving the right to confer with Berlin before giving a reply. The Duce was pleased with the communication. He said: "We are now on the brink of the inter-continental war which I predicted as early as September 1939." What does this new event mean? In any case, it means that Roosevelt has succeeded in his maneuver. Since he could not enter into the war immediately and directly, he has entered it indirectly by letting himself be attacked by Japan. Furthermore, this event also means that every prospect of peace is becoming further and further removed, and that it is now easy - much too easy - to predict a long war. Who will be able to hold out longest? It is on this basis that the problem must be considered.

Berlin's answer will be somewhat delayed, because Hitler has gone to the southern front to see General Kleist, whose armies continue to give way under the pressure of an unexpected Soviet offensive.

December 4, 1941

Berlin's reaction to the Japanese move is extremely cautious. Perhaps they will accept because they cannot get out of it, but the idea of facing America's intervention pleases the Germans less and less. Mussolini, on the other hand, is pleased about it.

I receive a message from Gambara. Naturally, he is offended by the fact that the command was given to Rommel, but aside from this he regards the situation as difficult and full of unknown factors. Nistri - who is an ardent Fascist and an intelligent officer - is very pessimistic and adds verbally the things which Gambara was unwilling to put in writing. He says that the exhaustion of our troops is considerable, that the enemy has infiltrated all parts of Cyrenaica and, finally, that we are not in a
position to withstand an early resumption of the British offensive. "We shall make it a glorious fight to the end," he concluded, "However, this will not prevent it from being the end."

December 5, 1941

A night interrupted by Ribbentrop's restlessness. After delaying two days, now he cannot wait a minute to answer the Japanese and at three in the morning he sent Mackensen to my house to submit a plan for triple action on Japanese intervention and the pledge not to make a separate peace. He wanted me to awaken the Duce, but I did not do so, and the latter was very glad I hadn't.

I gave Mussolini a copy of Gambara's letter, from which, however, I had removed the anti-Rommel points. The Duce is so proud of having given the command to the Germans that he would have been furious with Gambara. All the more as Cavallero is working toward this end; he has no love for Gambara. Their characters differ: one is a soldier, the other a scheming politician.

December 6, 1941

I write a few lines in answer to Gambara's letter - lines of friendship and good wishes. But the situation is not improving in Libya, and I am afraid that we are facing bitter days.

December 7, 1941

Bad news from Libya. Our forces are no longer able to attempt a prolonged resistance; it will be necessary to break off contact with the enemy and break it off decisively in order to attempt a defense of the Djibel. Mussolini is calm and even talks of the possibility of rallying. Cavallero, on the other hand, is gloomy, and he regards everything as dependent on French concession of the harbor of Bizerte. He thinks I should discuss this with Darlen on Wednesday. However, in the evening Mackensen comes to tell me in Ribbentrop's name that I must not start any definite negotiations with the French on this subject. This is Hitler's exact wish of which Mussolini had already been informed through Rintelen. Hitler is right. Tunis is 101 percent de Gaulle; any inopportune pressure would serve only to hasten the separation of the French Empire from the Vichy Government. But, according to Cavallero, without Bizerte, Libya is lost.
This morning the Duce was much irritated by the small number of casualties in East Africa. Sixty-seven men were killed at Gonder in November; 10,000 were taken prisoner. It does not take any long reflection to understand what these figures mean.

December 8, 1941

A night telephone call from Ribbentrop; he is overjoyed about the Japanese attack on America. He is so happy about it that I am happy with him, though I am not too sure about the final advantages of what has happened. One thing is now certain: that America will enter the conflict, and that the conflict will go so long that she will be able to realize all her potential resources. This morning I told this to the King who had been pleased about the events. He ended by admitting that in the "long run" I may be right. Mussolini was happy too. For a long time he has wanted the real relations between America and the Axis to be definitely clarified.

In Libya things seem to be going a little better. In the Duce's opinion, the danger of the last forty-eight hours is past. Both Cavallero and Admiral Riccardi inform me that there will be a great naval operation to force the blockade on the 12th, 13th, and 14th of this month. All the ships and all the admirals on the sea. Heaven send us good luck!

Mackensen gives an account of the conversations between Goring, Petain, and Darlan. No facts; words, suggestions, and advice. I do not think that my interview will have any better results.

December 9, 1941

At Turin to await the arrival of Admiral Darlan.

December 10, 1941

I have made a verbal transcription of the meeting with Darlan. He makes a favorable impression: a little man, energetic, willful and somewhat abrupt, who talks without beating about the bush and tells a spade a spade. He is a soldier who is having a taste of politics, and since he is a Frenchman he manages it with a certain finesse. Sincere? I would not like to commit myself except on one point: he is sincere in his hatred of the British. Certain words and certain expressions cannot be feigned. Furthermore, he declares that for him, personally, there is no choice; if the British were to win the war, his fate would not be pleasant.
Results of yesterday's meeting: None, except for an improvement in relations with the French, which, in any case, is not difficult to achieve. It is enough for us to see each other. Relations deteriorate when we do not see each other. And this has always been the recipe used by Mussolini when he desired a break. When he has talked to them, he himself has not been able to prevent a rapprochement. Even the population of Turin was cordial toward the guests; applause, though scattered, was not lacking.

Amazing reports of the Japanese naval victories continue to arrive. The military situation, however, in Libya and Russia, is not very good. These are the incredible surprises of this war.

December 11, 1941

Mussolini takes very little interest in the Darlan conversation. He is occupied with thoughts of war against America. At 14:30 I receive the Charge d'Affaires, a nice, rather timid man with whom I have never had much contact. He thinks that I have summoned him in order to discuss the arrest of some journalists but I immediately set him right. He pales as he hears the declaration of war. He says, "It is very tragic." Then he gives me a personal message from Phillips who, realizing that the zero hour was near, had telegraphed to express his gratitude and extend his good wishes to me. Phillips is a fine man, and he loves Italy; I am sure that this is a sad day for him.

Mussolini spoke from the balcony. A short and cutting speech which fell upon a square overflowing with people. Demonstration showed much pro-Japanese sympathy; the news of the naval victories has excited the imagination of the Italians. On the whole, however, the demonstration was not very enthusiastic; it must not be forgotten that it was three o'clock in the afternoon, the people were hungry, and the day was rather cold. These are factors which are not conducive to arousing enthusiasm.

In the evening Ribbentrop asks us to join a German move to urge the countries of the Tripartite Alliance to declare war on the United States. What about Spain?

December 12, 1941

The Vichy press speaks of the cordiality of the reception in Turin and this has made the Duce nervous. I gave Møckersen the report of my talk with Darlan; I emphasized the advisability of sending a political representative to Vichy. This would also deprive the Armistice Commission of the political functions it is not competent to carry out and which generals do not always handle very successfully.

* * *
Tokio, 5 December 1941, 0100 hours

Arrived, 6 December 1941, 0255 hours

No. 2657 of 5 December 1941

MOST URGENT!

For the Reich Foreign Minister

In strict confidence I was informed from a Foreign Ministry source that the Japanese reply to the American note of November 26 has not been sent yet. The reply is expected to be composed, but firm. It will declare that American principles are not applicable to the Far East. It is expected that then the United States will break off the negotiations. Upon an oral inquiry by Secretary of State Hull to the two Japanese Ambassadors as to the aim of the Japanese preparations in Indo-China, they have been instructed to reply that the Japanese Government is making preparations which have become necessary in view of Chinese massing of troops in Burma. The preparations are, furthermore, being kept within the limits of the contracted stipulations with France, as has been declared by Vicom. The confidante notices in this connection that a limitation of the number of troops to 25,000 exists only for Northern Indo-China, while no maximum limitation has been stipulated in the agreement for the South.

The Foreign Ministry is at the moment endeavoring to stress vis-a-vis us the determination of Japan to take measures against the encirclement. For instance it was intimated to Italian Embassy which apparently has not been notified about the Imperial Conference at the end of last week about which OSIMA will have informed Berlin, that Italy must start considerations to which other power she wishes to transfer the handling of her interests in the future.

A leading official of the Foreign Ministry stated in a conversation that Japan has always been of the opinion as already announced by MATSUOKA, namely, that article III of the Tripartite Pact is to be considered as applicable in any conflict between one of the three powers and the United States except in the case, for example, that one of these powers would for instance attack without reason the American Continent. I took proper cognizance of this.

SHIRATORI explained to me that the leading circles of Japan have come to the conviction that Roosevelt wants now to enter the war by means of a conflict in the Far East. From various sides the opinion has been advocated that the United States are now sure of the coalition of the A B C D States and Russia, which has
been striven for for more than ten years. Therefore, Roosevelt believes that the moment for a settlement has come, since one cannot be certain of the adherence of these states in the future.

Deliberations are under way in the Foreign Ministry in which manner Japan should open a conflict which cannot be avoided. They hold to the opinion that for reasons of interior politics it is unavoidable to declare the existence of a state of war or to declare war on America simultaneously or after the beginning of hostilities. I have, in accordance with the hitherto existing indications about official statements advocated the opinion that in a direct attack is avoided, (the clear text of the cable is missing) . . . could be put upon the United States for this difficult decision regarding entrance into the war. In view of the important role which this point might play in the gradual aggravation of the situation and in the conflict between the groups which I have frequently mentioned I would appreciate an early instruction.

(signed) CTT
CERTIFICATE

I, E. E. DAILY, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G.H., S.O., and as such have possession, custody and control of original or copies of captured enemy documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That the attached document was delivered to me by the United States War Department as being a print of a microfilm in the files of the Department of State, which was made of a German document captured by American military forces in Europe, and such document has been continuously in my custody since such delivery.

E. E. DAILY
Reception of the Japanese Ambassador, General Oshima, by the Führer on 14 December 1941, from 1300 to 1400 o'clock in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister.

First the Führer presents Ambassador Oshima with the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the German Eagle in gold. With cordial words he acknowledges his services in the achievement of German-Japanese cooperation, which has now obtained its culmination in a close brotherhood of arms.

General Oshima expresses his thanks for the great honor and emphasizes how glad he is that this brotherhood of arms has now come about between Germany and Japan.

The Führer continues: "You gave the right declaration of war!" This method is the only proper one. Japan pursued it formerly and it corresponds with his own system, that is, to negotiate as long as possible. But if one sees that other is interested only in putting one off, in shaming and humiliating one, and is not willing to come to an agreement, then one should strike — as hard as possible, indeed — and not waste time declaring war. It was heartwarming to him to hear of the first operations of the Japanese. He himself negotiated with infinite patience at times, for example, with Poland and also with Russia. When he then realized, that the other did not want to come to an agreement, he struck suddenly and without formalities. He would continue to go this way in the future.

The Japanese Government did indeed not act thoughtlessly; it had, he must say, shown angelical patience toward that ruffian, Roosevelt. There is a German proverb, saying: "The most virtuous cannot live in peace if his evil neighbor dislikes it". These are words containing a bitter truth. If the neighbor is unwilling, one just has to destroy him.

The entry of Japan into the war was a great relief to Germany. He must freely admit having been worried about the prospects for success of the submarine war. How could a commander tell when he could torpedo and when not? American ships went in convoys and under dimmed lights, and besides the Americans had delivered to the English 80 destroyers of a type of which they themselves had 80 more. One could not expect a U-boat commander to work through an entire book before each torpedoing in
order to establish whether the ship were English or American. The U-
boat commanders had been under an intolerable psychological strain,
for in the last analysis each one of them felt the enormous responsi­
bility at the thought that he might bring his country into a new war
by a misjudged torpedoeing. These days were now definitely past. He
had given the German U-boat commanders orders to torpedo everything in
sight. The German surface naval forces could also feel more free to
operate. U-til now American ships had stood nearly and radiated until
the British naval forces arrived, without any possibility for the
Germans to defend themselves against this. He would now send the U-
boats up to American zones and would not have to take the three-mile
zone into consideration any more.

He, the Fuhrer, was convinced that Roosevelt must be beaten. It
was a great feat of the Japanese that they had destroyed at the very
start the notion of American superiority. Then he tells of the American
fighting capacity, which he does not consider high, and gives examples
from the year 1913. At that time the German troops were exhausted and
tired and the American ones fresh and well fed. Nevertheless, wherever
Germans met Americans, the latter were so thoroughly beaten that they re­
quired weeks before they could be sent into action again. How could
troops whose God is the dollar hold firm to the last?

Clear conditions had now been created. A weight had been lifted
from the minds of the German U-boat commanders. All the Jewish con­
cepts like "western hemisphere", "300-mile zone", etc., had become un­
tenable. Germany would make the ocean insecure.

In 1939 he had faced an important decision. He would either have
had to send the German U-boats into combat and would then have had no
more crews for the subsequent mass production, or he would have had to
use the greatest part of the available U-boats for training purposes,
in order to have sufficient submarine personnel for the future.
Thank God, he had decided to adopt the second solution, and this would
now have its effect, since 12,20 even 24 U-boats would be put into ser­
vice monthly. The number of our U-boats would increase enormously each
month, especially since, on the average, we had hitherto lost less than
two U-boats a month.

General Oshima tells the Fuehrer that Japan had fought under
similarly difficult conditions, when Hanko was bombed and the pilots
had orders to spare the foreign legations under all circumstances. This
was an impossible restraint for the pilots. It was infinitely fortunate,
the Fuhrer continues, that now he could relieve the men in the submarines
of the resp nsibility and now once more bore it hemselves.
On the remaining front there now came the winter standstill.
Unfortunately a temperature drop of 38° had occurred right in the
middle of the development of a big operation. Any operation ceases at
such a temperature. Besides the burden for the individual man of fight-
ing in this cold weather, there is the trouble with the motorized
vehicles. Above all, however, the automatic weapons would not operate
any more. Of course, some operations would be completed. First,
Sevastopol must be taken; the preparations for this were almost con-
cluded. Then, the siege of Leningrad would be continued, and third,
he hoped soon to be able to resume the operations in the direction of
the Caucasus. He must align the remaining sectors of the Eastern front
on an short a line as possible, corresponding approximately to a straight
line from Leningrad to Taganrog. This would then give him the possibility
of withdrawing the motorized and armored units and the best infantry
divisions, in order to freshen them up during the winter. Large-scale
operations would then be resumed in the spring.

In the meantime he would now take strong action in the Mediterranean.
Next week 51 German U-boats would be in the Mediterranean, and in the
meanwhile a large number of motor torpedo boats had also arrived there.
The Luftwaffe was moving an entire air force (Luftflotte) under the
command of General Kesselring there. In the end the English would
have to pay dearly for their stay in the Mediterranean. In this con-
nection he recalls the Norway undertaking, where the English fleet suf-
f ered such losses through the action of U-boats and Luftwaffe that it
finally had to withdraw.

His major objectives at present were the destruction of Russia,
the southward drive over the Caucasus, and the torpedoing of the Anglo-
Saxon navy and merchant marine. Today the tonnage of the Anglo-Saxon
nations was already too small to carry an expeditionary force to the
continent.

Above all, the aerial torpedo weapon must be further developed.
In this regard the Japanese Government was of great assistance by
supplying Japanese torpedoes. The fact that we are still backward with
this weapon was due to the mistake that the torpedoes were constructed
and tested by the Navy, while the planes designated to carry them were
constructed and tested by the Luftwaffe. The development was parallel
but was not carried on in unison. General Oshima asks whether these
Japanese torpedoes could not be utilised soon. Germany now had 70 of
them and also the corresponding drawings. He is convinced that Germany
could have great success with it, since the training was not too diffi-
cult and the German pilots were very valiant. The English did not know
that Germany had Japanese torpedoes, and so a surprise would be possible.

The Fuehrer agrees with Oshima and says that he would make use of the
torpedo weapon soon. For quite some time now an entire wing (Geschwader)
had been training with aerial torpedoes exclusively. He would make a
concentrated surprise attack, an attack on which everything would be
staked.
General Oshima now spread out a map and gave the Fuehrer a comprehensive lecture on the war situation in the Pacific and the Archipelago area. He told the Fuehrer of the successes of the Japanese air force and fleet and about the advance of the Japanese land forces in the Philippines and the Malay Peninsula. At the conclusion of his report on the situation, Oshima says that after the capture of Singapore Japan must turn toward India. In this connection he considered it important that German and Japanese operations should be synchronized. It would be very advantageous if when Japan attacked India from the East, the German troops would threaten India from the West. The Fuehrer again explains to Oshima his plans for the Spring and says that first he intends to attack in the South, since a thrust to the Caucasus, also with regard to oil, and an advance to Iraq and Iran -- which also implies a threat to India -- would be of primary importance, to begin with. Only then would he resume operations in the center of the Eastern front. The Russians thought we would want to take Moscow first, but this was of lesser importance to him.

Meanwhile, he would turn his entire attention to North Africa. We would furthermore, as he had already mentioned, torpedo every ship we encountered, and he believed that thereby heavy damage could be inflicted on the Anglo-Saxon fleet. Oshima expresses his great desire that in all these German and Japanese undertakings the operations should be synchronized: if this were done cleverly and if the method of operations worked as a sort of lever or exchange action, this would inevitably lead to the ruin of the Anglo-Saxon powers. To this the Fuehrer agrees and declares further that November and December are always the worst months to carry on warfare. As soon as the weather improved he would again ruthlessly attack English ports and dockyards. The Luftwaffe had already made extensive preparations for this. With the English ports and docks ruined, England would be helpless.

Then General Oshima spoke about landing warfare, which had been greatly developed and practiced in Japan during the past 30 years. On the island of Hainan, which was occupied by Japan, the attempts and exercises had been carried out with great energy. The necessary landing boats had also been extensively developed. He suggests that as soon as contact has been reestablished between Germany and Japan -- which is possible by air and surely will soon be possible by long-distance U-boats -- delegates of the German Wehrmacht should come to Japan to study the methods developed by the Japanese.

The Fuehrer briefly mentions the necessity of stopping American shipments to Vladivostok. Oshima says that it would be an easy task to halt American shipments to Vladivostok, since, in order to get there, American ships have to pass through straits which could be covered by artillery; besides, he is of the opinion that America would not make any more shipments to Russia.
III. (Photostatic cy i. . Doc. Km.)

AFFIDAVIT

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nürnberg, Germany, and as such have possession, custody and control of true and accurate photostatic copies of a certain original captured enemy document. That said photostatic copies have been numbered 2932 KS by said Documentation Division.

2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from German Foreign Office Files and Archives.

3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure was retained by the United States Army Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and such above mentioned photostatic copies were delivered to, filed, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nürnberg, Germany, in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents", and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of said original captured enemy document above referred to.

5. That said above referred to original captured enemy document is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, being held and retained by the United States Army Document Center Sub-Section in charge of captured German foreign office papers and now located in Berlin, Germany, for inspection by various authorized agencies, and that a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original document for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ Gerard Schaefer
Gerard Schaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 16th day of April 1946.

/s/ John W. Auchincloss
John W. Auchincloss
0-2052152
Capt., JAGD
(Chicago Daily Tribune)

「draw a line」

(John Powell)

「draw a line」
2632-3

入射光の入射角を増すと、反射光の角度も増すことが知られています。

入射光の入射角を増すと、反射光の角度も増すことが知られています。
JAPANESE ADMIT KILLING 350, BUT DENY ‘MASSACRE’

Chicago Consulate Tells of “Fushun Incident.”

An official explanation of the “Fushun incident” on Sept. 18, when Japanese soldiers were reported to have slain 2,700 Chinese men, women, and children at Chenochinpan, Manchuria, was issued yesterday by the Japanese consulate in Chicago. There was no massacre, the statement said, but about 500 “bandits and the unruly elements associated with them” were killed. It was admitted, and the village of Fushun virtually was destroyed by fire.

“On the afternoon of Sept. 18,” the statement said, “about 120 Japanese, including some of the insurgent elements who had been active along the Ilinoua-Hedong railroad, advanced to attack Fushun. They set fires at various places along their route of march and attacked the Japanese garrison stationed at Fushun. The bandits were found to have made their headquarters at two villages, Chenochinpan and Liuchiao, near Fushun.

Claims Chinese Fired First.

“On the afternoon of Sept. 18 a section of a Japanese army company, commanded by Lieut. Inouye, was dispatched to Chenochinpan to search out the bandits. As the troops approached the village they were fired upon. They returned the fire, using a small trench mortar. The fighting lasted about thirty minutes, the bandits being defeated. In the meantime most of the village had caught fire and was destroyed. About 360 of the bandits and the unruly elements associated with them were killed.”

After stating that Japanese soldiers aided inhabitants of the village who had been wounded or rendered homeless the communication closed by terming the massacre story “Chinese propaganda.”
China Charges Japs Kill 2,700 in Manchurian Villages

BY JOHN POWELL

[Chicago Tribune News Service]

SHANGHAI, Nov. 25 (Friday).--Japanese troops killed 2,700 Chinese men, women, and children, the inhabitants of the three Manchurian villages of Pingtungshan, Chenchiping, and Litzekou, about 15 miles northeast of Fushun (east of Mukden), according to an official report issued by the Nanking foreign office last night. The report caused great excitement here.

A Japanese detachment visited each of the villages searching for concealed Chinese rebel "volunteers," according to the foreign office, and ordered the villagers to assemble in a ditch near Pingtungshan while the search went on.

Ordered to kneel.

To prevent the villagers from escaping or communicating with the alleged rebel volunteers, the Japanese compelled them to kneel, meantime placing behind them ten machine guns some 70 yards distant, the report asserted. When the villagers started to run the Japanese opened fire, the dispatch continued, and the stampeding mass of screaming men, women and children were mowed down.

Between 60 and 70 were reported killed by the first fusillade. About 149 escaped, but refugees claim that the remainder were wounded or bayonetted, the communiqué stated. The bodies were collected on pyres, covered with fuel oil and burned, it was said.

The Chinese declared that similar outrages occurred in the villages of Thennanao and Wangshapa, southwest of Mukden.

The Japanese foreign office in a message received last night here denied the massacre report and stated that the Fushun area has been quiet. The Japanese claim the report is a complete fabrication for the purpose of inflaming Chinese prejudice.

China Charges Japs Kill 2,700 in Manchuria
EXHIBIT NO. 611-A

(Chicago Daily Tribune)

(John Powell)

FILE COPY

[Text appears to be in Chinese or another East Asian script]
Pingtungsan (Pingtungsan)
Excerpt from "Important Decisions Regarding International and National Policies — August and November 1938"

Despatched to the Foreign Ministry
November 26th at 1 p.m.

Top Secret

Section 7

The agenda introduced by the Navy Minister and agreed at Five Minister Conference on 25th November 1938, upon the decision on the principle for adjusting new Sino-Japanese relationship.

While the main purpose in settling the present incident is the establishment of a new order in East Asia, based on the security gained by military victories, we must also guard against a third power checking our activities.

However for this purpose our attitude towards a third power should be defensive at present, meanwhile without neglecting to supply our army and navy with necessary armaments. Backed by this potential force we must exert our effort in the diplomatic field.

Above mentioned points are only an outline of our present policy for adjusting the Sino-Japanese relationship and may be regarded as a part of our national policy. But there is an urgent need at the present juncture to reinvestigate with the basis of our national policy for both defensive and diplomatic fronts in order to establish a policy capable of coping with the new situation.

The agenda introduced by the Navy Minister and agreed at Five Minister Conference on 25th November 1938, upon the decision on the principle for adjusting new Sino-Japanese relationship.

As for the Hainan Island, it will be captured by military action in case of necessity.

(Note) Exclusively for Five Minister Conference.
It is natural that the economic activities and interests of a third power in China should be affected to some extent by the strengthening of economic ties between Japan, Manchuko and China. But, I understand that this cooperation should not extend to the limit imposed by the necessity for national defense and existence and the activities and interests of a third power should in no way exceed accordingly. Otherwise, it would not only complicate the international situation unnecessarily but would also check Japan's economic expansion elsewhere outside of China and considering from the wider point of view it would be a great disadvantage to Japan.
I.P.S. No. 2577

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section Japanese Foreign Office

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 12 pages, dated Nov., 1938 and described as follows: Sections from handwritten, typewritten and mimeographed binder re. "Important Decisions regarding international and national policies" November 1938.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

__________________ Foreign Ministry ________________________________

Signed at Tokyo on this 21th day of Sept., 1946. K. HAYASHI

Signature of Official SEAL

Witness: Nagaharu Odo Chief Archives Section Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above-signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 25 day of Sept., 1946. RICHARD H. LARSH

NAME

Witness: T/4 Taguchi Investigator, IPS Official Capacity
February 10
Hainan Island, off the South China coast, is surprised by the Japanese landing forces under Vice-Admiral Nobutake Kondo, Commander of the Imperial Naval Forces in South China. Kiungchow and Haikow fall into the hands of the Japanese.

Japanese Consul-General Miura lodges a protest with the Shanghai Municipal Council in connection with continued terrorism.

H. H. Pope Pius XI passes away.

February 13
The House of Representatives of the Imperial Diet consents to Budgetary Bills for 1939, including the Budget for the General Account amounting to 3,694 million yen.


A treaty of commerce between Germany and Italy is concluded.

American naval manoeuvres commence.

February 14
British Ambassador Sir Robert Craigie makes representations to the Japanese Government in connection with Japanese occupation of Hainan Island.

A Japanese naval force occupies Sarah, Yulinkan and Ai-hsien in Hainan Island.

The House of Representatives of the Imperial Diet adopts decision to maintain Japan's fisheries rights in Russian waters.

February 17
American Ambassador Joseph C. Grew adopts steps similar to those taken by the French and British ambassadors regarding Japanese occupation of Hainan Island.
On the 12th of June, this year, the Japanese expeditionary forces in South China issued an announcement in which they pointed out the fact that the greater part of the weapons and war materiel purchased abroad by the Chiang Kai-shek regime were still being transported from Haiphong to Chungking by the Haiphong-Kunming railway, and that they could not overlook such action of the authorities of French Indo-China in aid of the Chiang regime.

Further, on the 16th of the same month, the Japanese forces again called the attention of the French authorities to the matter, expressing their firm resolution to put an end to this hostile action on the part of the French colonial authorities.

Through the Japanese Ambassador at Paris, Mr. Renzo Sawada, and the French Ambassador at Tokyo, Mr. Charles Arsene-Henry, the Japanese Government also had frequently requested the French Government to reconsider the matter, and on the 19th of June the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Masuyama Iato, made a strong representation with regard to the prohibition of transportation through Indo-China of materials and goods in aid of the Chungking regime, requesting at the same time that the French Government consent to the dispatch of Japanese inspectors for the purpose of making investigations of actual conditions on the spot. On the 20th the French Ambassador called on the Vice-Foreign Minister and stated that the French Government had, since the 17th of June, prohibited the transportation of such commodities as gasoline and trucks to China, but that in view of the repeated representations of the Japanese Government it had decided to forbid the transportation of an extremely wide range of materials and goods and that it had no objection to the sending by Japan of inspectors to French Indo-China. Thus one of the important routes over which war materials were supplied to Chungking has been entirely severed.
RECENT POSITION OF FRENCH INDO-CHINA.

Since the Canton-French railway was intercepted and Canton, the only seaport then remaining in the hands of the Chiang regime, was captured by the Japanese forces in 1938, Haiphong and the surrounding areas in French Indo-China where Chinese residents had a powerful influence have become the most important supply bases, next only to Hongkong, for Chungking’s resistance to Japan. As a result the activities of the Chinese merchants resident in Hongkong have increased remarkably in Indo-China, many of them attempting to open trade with the interior of Southwestern China through Haiphong and Hanoi. Dealings in foreign exchange in French Indo-China had been confined to the Bank of Indo-China, but after the fall of Hankow and Canton the Bank of China was permitted to establish a branch office at Hanoi. Chungking’s desperate desire to make the French territory another source of supply for its resistance to Japan and the French authorities’ ambition to develop Southwestern China have thus coincided. Besides the Haiphong-Yunnan railway, a motor road has been constructed from Tienen, northeast of Haiphong, to Chungking, while another is said to be in course of construction parallel to the above mentioned railway. By utilizing these arteries of traffic the Indo-Chinese authorities are reported to have been increasing their aid to the Chungking Government.

FOREIGN TRADE (pp. 65, 66)

The foreign trade of French Indo-China developed rapidly after the last Great War, the peak year being reached in 1927 with an aggregate value of 5,600,000,000 francs. Owing to the general business depression and fall of prices it has since continued to decline, diminishing to 1,900,000,000 francs in 1933. Although 1936 saw a rally with 2,700,000,000 francs, the value was only half the record figure. The balance of trade has always been favourable, except in 1931. For instance, the ratio of exports to imports was 144 to 100 in 1935, and 172 to 100 in 1926. The staple article of export is rice, amounting to 46 per cent of the total value, followed by maize with 17 per cent and rubber with about 15 per cent. Coal takes up about 9 per cent and fish and tin 3 per cent respectively, among the exports cotton fabrics head the list with 14 per cent of the total value; mineral oils (6 per cent) and hemp fabrics (5 per cent) come next, followed by iron ore, cotto
Classified according to countries or ports the value of trade is mainly distributed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Export (Per cent)</th>
<th>Import</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands East Indies</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As may be seen from the above table, the greater part of the trade of French Indo-China is carried on with France. Up to 60 per cent of its exports and 56 per cent of its imports are accounted for by France and her possessions.

At present the Japanese residents in that French colony number only 350. Compared with the 7,500 Japanese in British Malaya, the number is insignificant, a fact which may be attributed to strict restrictions which the French authorities have been placing on the enterprise of foreign nationals in Indo-China.

ATTITUDE TOWARD JAPAN (pp. 68, 69, 70)

As a centre for collecting information, French Indo-China has likewise been of great service to Chungking. Complying with the latter's request to station a Chinese staff liaison officer in Tongking, permission was duly accorded to Chungking's military representative to reside there from February 1940. His sole purpose was the gathering of information of military importance in close collaboration with the French colonial authorities. The local press, which had adopted an attitude of strict neutrality toward Sino-Japanese relations prior to the outbreak of the China affair, turned anti-Japanese thereafter, broadcasting and disseminating news fabricated by the Chiang Kai-shek regime deriding Japan and to the advantage of the Chinese. Moreover, the colonial authorities have been instigating the natives against Japan so that some 300,000 Chinese settled there are greatly encouraged in their anti-Japanese attitude.

Nor can the fact be overlooked that in the construction of railways by the Chungking regime the Government of French Indo-China has been giving valuable assistance either through a syndicate or through the French owned Yunnan Railway Co. The syndicate has in fact behind it the guarantee of the French Government to the extent of 100,000,000 francs.
The construction of the Chengtu-Chungking line was commenced last February, and was to be completed within 20 months. Work on another railway between Chungking and Kunming by way of Soo-chow in also going on steadily with the aid of French capital represented by a loan, amounting to 480,000,000 francs, advanced by the Government of French Indo-China secured on the customs surplus revenue. In return, French financial interests have been granted mining rights along the railway. Furthermore, the French colony has acceded to Chungking's request to multiply the freight capacity on the Yunnan Railway so as to expedite the transportation of goods stored at Haiphong and Hanoi.

It is obvious that Japan, determined as she is to wipe out, at any cost, all obstructions to the building of a new order and the establishment of lasting peace in East Asia, cannot tolerate such acts as those described, which are detrimental to the high purpose for which her armies were sent to the Asiatic mainland. Accordingly the Japanese Government filed energetic protests with the French Government through the Japanese Ambassador in Paris, Mr. Renzo Sawada. To this France replied through her Ambassador in Tokyo, Mr. Charles Arauca Henry, stating that no arms were being supplied to Chungking and that gasoline and trucks could not be regarded except as merchandise for non-military use. However, immediately following the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, gasoline and trucks were declared contraband of war by the British Government in direct refutation of France's claim.

Exhausted in her patience by this unfriendly course of action so persistently pursued by the French colonial authorities, Japan ordered her air-arm at the end of 1939 to bomb the Yunnan Railway. France protested; but Japan insisted that, as she considered gasoline and trucks in the same category as other war contraband, there would be no cessation of the attacks upon that section of the French Railway in enemy territory until Indo-China showed unmistakable signs of stopping the arms traffic across her borders.

As the French attitude appeared to persist, Japan was obliged in February this year to explicitly demand the discontinuance of the transportation of war materials making at the same time a proposal to appoint a number of officers-inspectors to Hanoi and the Chinese boundary to observe the transit of goods from French territory into Yunnan. Negotiations on this basis were evaded through some subterfuge or other by the French authorities and the assistance complained of continued as of yore.
On June 4, Vice-Foreign Minister, Mr. Masayuki TANI, made another strong representation to the French Ambassade in Japan but with no greater success than hitherto.

However, the recent collapse of French arms in the hostilities appears to have had considerable effect in correcting the attitude of Indo-China, so that by special agreement concluded between Japan and the Government of that territory, the latter undertook to cease all aid to Chiang Kai-shek. A Japanese military mission under Major General Fumio HISHIHARA was at the same time dispatched to Hanoi, the members of which were to be stationed in that capital city, at Haiphong, and at various points along the territorial borders to see that the understanding was observed. A solution has therefore been found at least for the time being to the very serious problem that arose between the two countries which at times assumed proportions that threatened to aggravate the tense feeling between the two countries.
"Business Report of 1939 published by the Board of South Seas 1941".

Section 3. The China Affair and French Indo-China.

Item 1. The readjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and French Indo-China in regard to the bombing of the Yunnan Railway and the transport of munitions via French Indo-China.

(a) Japan's decision to bomb the Yunnan Railway.

Our negotiations with France for prohibiting the transport via French Indo-China of munitions destined for Chiang Kai-shek were continued from the previous year. Our side patiently and prudently urged time and again reconsideration of the matter by the French so that the issue might be settled peacefully by voluntary measures from the French. However, the French while speaking of maintaining strict neutrality in the China Affair and of enforcing a policy of prohibiting the transportation of arms destined for Chiang Kai-shek, tolerated the transportation via French Indo-China of large quantities of arms for Chiang Kai-shek, which would promote Chiang's resistance powers on the pretext that such goods had been already contracted for. To our representations of displeasure of October 26 of the previous year, the French not only denied the fact of arms transportation, but also refused to adopt the measures we demanded, declaring that this was a definite answer. In the final analysis, the situation was such that our side had no alternative but to bomb the Yunnan Railway. In the beginning of December 1938 the Japanese authorities, stating that, whereas they had recognized some time ago the operational necessity of bombing the Yunnan Railway, asked for this Ministry's opinion in order to draw up a united plan of the Navy and Foreign Ministries in regard to this case on the occasion of the transfer of the high officers of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in South China. Thereupon we immediately studied the various conditions, such as the legal question of defending this bombing, the efficacy of the bombing, and its influence on our international relations, especially on the attitude of France. As the result of inquiring into its advantages and disadvantages, we reached the following conclusion: that the fact that the Yunnan Railway is being used for the military purpose of aiding China justifies under international law its bombing by our side, and, our country will not be liable to indemnity for its destruction; that the operational and political effects of the bombing will be very great; and that the influence it will have on France and also Britain and the United States will not necessarily be alarming. After obtaining the approval of the
of the Minister, Chief ISHIZAWA of the Third Section of the European and Asiatic Bureau replied orally on December 9 to Lt. Commander YAMI of the Navy Ministry as follows: "As for the Foreign Ministry, it considers that there is no objection to the bombing of the Yunan Feilwny within Chinese territory in so far as the Army and Navy require it from an operational standpoint." At the same time SUGIMURA, Ambassador to France, was advised by telegraph to that effect and instructed to explain the justification for the bombing and make appropriate rejoinders to any protests which the French might make in case the bombing was carried out.

/rep 33-35/ (b) The growth of opportunity for adjusting Franco-Japanese relations in the light of the serious war situation in Europe.

As stated above, the Franco-Japanese negotiations regarding the issue of the transportation of arms via French Indo-China had come to a standstill. Moreover, the relations between the two countries had been lacking in harmony over various issues which had been pending since the outbreak of the China Affair, such as the French rejection of the agreement of our Ambassador to France, our occupation of Hainan Island, the declaration of our possession of the SHINHAN GUNTO, our territorial claim on the Paracel Island, and the prohibition of the export of iron ore from French Indo-China. However, since the conclusion of a Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, and especially after the outbreak of the European War, the attitude of the French Government and people toward Japan had greatly improved. This tendency was manifested not only in the editorial tones of the French press, but in the acts of the French Government, which at the end of August hastily acceded to our demands on the three pending issues, namely, the export of iron ore from French Indo-China, the establishment of a Japanese consulate at Poimen, and the passage through French Indo-China of the regular air-line between Japan and Thailand. Furthermore, in the early part of September France, saying that she heartily wished to arrive at an understanding with Japan on the basis of their traditional peaceful policy, sounded our opinion about the initiation of Franco-Japanese conversations for the purpose of settling all pending issues. Moreover, the acting Governor-General of French Indo-China stated to Consul-General SUZUKI at Hanoi that, if Japan would really pursue a policy of non-intervention in the European War, France would respond to it by adopting a conciliatory policy toward Japan. Thus the French Government gradually began to address itself actively to the adjustment of Franco-Japanese relations.
Our first proposal regarding diplomatic rapprochement.

(Conversation between Minister NOMURA and French Ambassador

To take advantage of this tendency, Minister NOMURA decided to
solve favorably at a stroke the various problems pertaining to the

French dependencies, especially French-Indo-China, which had
important bearings on the disposition of the China Incident and the

establishment of the East Asian New Order. On Nov. 30, he summoned
the French Ambassador in Tokyo and told him as per the following:

(A) Of our intentions concerning Japan-French diplomatic rap­
prochement desired by the French, and also as per the following

(B) pertaining to the dispatching to HANOI of a Staff member of
our home department and an army expert for liaison and
negotiation in connection with the suspension of acts to help
Chiang through French-Indo-China. The French Ambassador promised
to transmit the matter to his home Government and give a definite
answer later on, as we could not reply on the spot.

(A) Since the outbreak of the China Incident, Japan-French diplomatic
relations have lacked amicability, but the fact that the French
recently complied with our requests in regard to a few pending matter
is greatly appreciated by us. We thoroughly sympathize with
recent French expressions of desire to readjust mutual relationship
between the two countries.

However, it is a matter beyond our comprehension that the French,
while desiring diplomatic rapprochement on one hand, is assisiting
the Chiang regime on the other, for the overthrow of which we are
straining every effort. If diplomatic rapprochement with us
is actually desired, we consider that the French should give up
such dubious attitude and break with the Chiang regime and also take
a sympathetic attitude toward our settlement of the China Incident.
Further, it is a well-known fact that the French dependencies in
the South Seas and Oceana, especially French-Indo-China are main­
taining various economic barriers against us. Unless such fundamen­
obstacles for mutual friendly relationship be actually removed, we
do not it impossible to bring about the realization of mutual
diplomatic rapprochement.

Regarding the acts of aiding Chiang via French-Indo-China,
large quantities of munitions destined for the Chiang regime are
still being transported via French-Indo-China despite our repeated
requests to stop them. Traffic of anti-Japanese Chinese with
military and political objectives is frequent, with the result that
French-Indo-China has apparently become the base of aid-Chiang and
anti-Japanese activities. The French-Indo-China authorities explain
that although traffic of regular arms and armaments is prohibited,
other commodities cannot be barred even if they are serviceable
for military purpose, so long as they are transported as general
merchandise. But the fact is beyond doubt that even regular arms
and armaments are being transported as heretofore. With regard
to foodstuffs, trucks, petroleum and various machinery, although they do not fall under the category of regular arms and ammunitions, they invariably tend to keep and enhance the anti-Japanese fighting strength so long as they are applied to the Chiang regime.

This argument is quite warrantable when we review the list of war contrabands promulgated by France in her war against Germany. In this connection, it is of no practical consequence whether war has been declared or not. Should France discard the argument of legal technicalities and take a decisive step from the viewpoint of practical politics to bar all freight traffic destined to the Chiang regime which is detrimental to the settlement of the China Incident in which Japan is now engrossed, and should she further convince the Japanese people by some adequate measures to intercept the aid-Chiang route with concrete results, it would undoubtedly contribute to no small degree the enhancement of Japan-French friendship.

Our current military operation in KUANGHSI is due to the continued transportation of munitions and other commodities destined to KUANGHSI, despite our frequent protests. The reason for the trespassing of the French-Indo-China border line and the dropping of bombs by Japanese military aircrafts, as frequently protested by the French during the past few months, is that CHINA has become the distribution center of munitions consigned to the Chiang regime transported via French-Indo-China. For strategic military reasons, there was no alternative but to resort to bombing with the result that some of our military aircraft may inevitably have trespassed the border or accidentally dropped bombs. Such undesirable affairs would cease to happen, should the French stop aiding Chiang.

Concerning the anti-Japanese economic barriers set up in the French dependencies in South Seas and Oceania, especially in French-Indo-China:

(a) The French-Indo-China authorities impose heavy duties and import quotas on Japanese merchandise which is in contradiction to the spirit of the current commercial agreement. It is unsatisfactory and we request its abolition or alleviation.

(b) heretofore, as in the French-Indo-China iron ore embargo case, which was recently settled, French authorities in French-Indo-China and Caledonia have frequently barred the supply of resources to us, restricted the entry of our nationals, and obstructed the business operation of Japanese. We hope that in the future, similar cases will not recur but also further conveniences and assistances be positively afforded.

(5) In connection with our current KUANGHSI operations, it appears that the French authorities are entertaining uneasiness and suspicion in view of our army's sphere of activity extending near
the border of French-Indo-China. In order to dispel the uneasiness or suspicion, and also for liaison and negotiation between the Japanese consul-general in HANOI and the French-Indo-China authorities, we wish to dispatch to HANOI within a few days an official-in-charge for the Foreign Ministry for a few days. He shall be accompanied by a military expert of field officer class to inform the French authorities of our military activities in South China and to hear the French viewpoint regarding the situation in the border districts. We thus hope to come to a better understanding. We therefore hope that the Ambassador would consent to our intention and transmit the matter to the French Local authorities so that necessary conveniences and assistances would be offered.

(4) The French interim reply to our proposition (the conversation between Minister NOMURA and French Ambassador HAPI of Dec. 12)

At the second interview of the two on Dec. 12, the French made the following intermediate reply.

(1) The French Government deeply react to that the Japanese Government again gave vent to dissatisfaction at the alleged transportation via French-Indo-China of munitions destined to China, which report was previously denied and proven as entirely groundless by the French.

(2) Regarding the various pending matters such as the occupation of HAINAN island, the annexation of SHIPAN archipelago, the obstruction of navigation on the YANTZE River, the infringement on commercial freedom in the occupied territory, and all the other damages sustained by the French interests in China, the French Government has no objection in the intention of the Japanese Government to have a conference with the French Government to exchange frank opinions.

(3) Inasmuch as there is a Japanese consul-general stationed in HANOI, it is beyond apprehension that there should be any necessity of specially dispatching a staff member of the Foreign Ministry and a military expert to French-Indo-China. Needless to say, the French Government would have no objection to the Japanese Government dispatching couriers in order to arrange for special contact with the consul-general in question.

(4) The military operations of the Japanese Army in KUANGHSI districts are liable to contradict the political equilibrium, which was the object of the Japanese-French agreement of 1907. The French Government wants the Japanese Government's explanation on the object, nature and the duration of the operations. In reply to the above proposition, Minister NOMURA told the French Ambassador as follows:

(1) According to information received by us, it is a plain fact that munitions are being transported via French-Indo-China. For instance, the information recently received from reliable sources in China confirms the fact that the CHUNGKING Government, in view
of our military operations in KUANGHSI requested French assistance to have its military material and other stuff stocked in that district sent back temporarily to French-Indo-China. The source confirms that the French promised to make favorable arrangements to a certain extent.

(2) The Japanese Government is fully aware that since war has not been declared by neither Japan nor China, the French is not legally obligated to suspend traffic of commodities consigned to China. But the Japanese Government earnestly hope that the French would recognize the extensive hostilities now under way between Japan and the CHUNGKING Government and take steps to suspend the freight traffic via French-Indo-China, which tends to help the CHUNGKING Government.

(3) The military operations in KUANGHSI are executed in parallel with the blockade of the Chinese coast line to bring about the collapse of the CHUNGKING Government by cutting off the commissary line. Consequently until these aims are realized, the duration cannot be definitely stated. Notwithstanding the foregoing explanations, the French Ambassador repeatedly emphasized the absence of munitions traffic to China via French-Indo-China. Since the premise of solving the Japan-French diplomatic rapprochement was the suspension of munitions traffic, a divergence of opinions already existed.

(4) Interview between Minister NOMURA and Ambassador HETRI of Dec. 21.

On Dec. 21 the French ambassador called on Minister NOMURA and conferred chiefly on the opening of YAPTZE River traffic. At that time, the French ambassador voiced his Government's hope that in view of the urgent necessity of opening orleas regarding Japan-French diplomatic rapprochement, negotiations on the TENSIN problem should be started in parallel with the Japan-British parley. Minister NOMURA replied that the French views regarding the Japan-French diplomatic rapprochement are now under consideration by our authorities and that in the near future negotiation could be opened on an equitable basis. Minister NOMURA added that the negotiation should be carried on a constructive basis.

item 2. The dropping of bombs on THA KHE, French Indo-China by Japanese Navy Planes.

When Acting Consul-General URABE at HANOI called on Chief Administrator DE TASTE in the afternoon of August 26, 1939 /SHWA 14/ at the latter's request, the Chief Administrator informed him, after remarking that the protest was being made under instructions from the Home Government, that about 11:00 a.m. of the 26th Japanese seaplanes flew over French-Indo-China territory from the direction of the Chinese border and that one of these planes dropped two bombs in the vicinity of THA KHE near the border of French Indo-China and China, causing about thirty casualties.
With reference to this, Consul-General SUZUKI, in an interview with the Governor-General of French Indo-China on September 25, expressed the Japanese Government's regret and its desire for a local settlement of the incident. The Governor-General appreciated it and requested that negotiations regarding indemnity be conducted with the Director of the Political Affairs Bureau.

According to the report of the Consul-General of October 14, the Governor-General made a written demand for indemnity as follows:

1. 50,000 piastres for 76 persons killed (about ¥ 650 per person)
2. 10,417 piastres for 34 wounded persons (about ¥ 300 per person)
3. 650 piastres for 55 lightly wounded persons (about ¥ 12 per person)
4. 1,570 piastres for burial expenses, survivors' relief fund, and damage compensation.

Total 62,550 piastres.

On November 17 the above total indemnity of 62,550 piastres was advanced by the Foreign Ministry and remitted by telegraphic transfer to Consul-General SUZUKI. Subsequently the Consul-General reported that the Governor-General, in a letter dated November 29, acknowledged receipt of this sum and recognized the incident as closed.
CERTIFICATE

W.D.C. No. 
I.P.S. No. 1027

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Koro hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section of Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 134 pages, dated Dec. 1941, and described as follows: Business Report for the year 1939, published Dec. 1941 by the South Seas Bureau.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Foreign Office

Signed at Tokyo on this 20th day of Sept., 1946

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official
Chief of Archives Section of Foreign Office

Witness: Nagashu Odo
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 23 day of Sept., 1946

RICHARD H. LARSH
Name

Witness: J. A. Curtis, 2d Lt.
Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity
"Business Report of 1939 published by the Board of South Seas 1941".

Section 3. The China Affair and French Indo-China.

Item 1. The readjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and French Indo-China in regard to the bombing of the Yunnan Railway and the transport of munitions via French Indo-China.

(a) Japan's decision to bomb the Yunnan Railway.

Our negotiations with France for prohibiting the transport via French Indo-China of munitions destined for Chiang Kai-shek were continued from the previous year. Our side patiently and prudently urged time and again reconsideration of the matter by the French so that the issue might be settled peacefully by voluntary measures from the French. However, the French while speaking of maintaining strict neutrality in the China Affair and of enforcing a policy of prohibiting the transportation of arms destined for Chiang Kai-shek, tolerated the transportation via French Indo-China of large quantities of arms for Chiang Kai-shek, which would promote Chiang's resistance powers on the pretext that such goods had been already contracted for. To our representations of displeasure of October 26 of the previous year, the French not only denied the fact of arms transportation, but also refused to adopt the measures we demanded, declaring that this was a definite answer. In the final analysis, the situation was such that our side had no alternative but to bomb the Yunnan Railway. In the beginning of December 1938 the Japanese Naval authorities, stating that, whereas they had recognized some time ago the operational necessity of bombing the Yunnan Railway, asked for this Ministry's opinion in order to draw up a united plan of the Navy and Foreign Ministries in regard to this case on the occasion of the transfer of the high officers of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in South China. Thereupon we immediately studied the various conditions, such as the legal question of defending this bombing, the efficacy of the bombing, and its influence on our international relations, especially on the attitude of France. As the result of inquiring into its advantages and disadvantages, we reached the following conclusion: that the fact that the Yunnan Railway is being used for the military purpose of aiding China justifies under international law its bombing by our side, and, our country will not be liable to indemnity for its destruction; that the operational and political effects of the bombing will be very great; and that the influence it will have on France and also Britain and the United States will not necessarily be alarming. After obtaining the approval of the
of the Minister, Chief ISHIZAWA of the Third Section of the European and Asiatic Bureau replied orally on December 9 to Lt. Commander KAMI of the Navy Ministry as follows:

"As for the Foreign Ministry, it considers that there is no objection to the bombing of the Tunan Railway within Chinese territory in so far as the Army and Navy require it from an operational standpoint." At the same time SUGIMURA, Ambassador to France, was advised by telegraph to that effect and instructed to explain the justification for the bombing and make appropriate rejoinders to any protests which the French might make in case the bombing was carried out.

/op 33-35/ (b) The growth of opportunity for adjusting Franco-Japanese relations in the light of the serious war situation in Europe.

As stated above, the Franco-Japanese negotiations regarding the issue of the transportation of arms via French Indo-China had come to a standstill. Moreover, the relations between the two countries had been lacking in harmony over various issues which had been pending since the outbreak of the China Affair, such as the French rejection of the agreement of our Ambassador to France, our occupation of Hainan Island, the declaration of our possession of the SHENAN JUNTO, our territorial claim on the Paracel Islands, and the prohibition of the export of iron ore from French Indo-China. However, since the conclusion of a Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, and especially after the outbreak of the European War, the attitude of the French Government and people toward Japan had greatly improved. This tendency was manifested not only in the editorial tones of the French press, but in the acts of the French Government, which at the end of August heartily acceded to our demands on the three pending issues, namely, the export of iron ore from French Indo-China, the establishment of a Japanese consulate at Noumea, and the passage through French Indo-China of the regular air-line between Japan and Thailand. Furthermore, in the early part of September France, saying that she heartily wished to arrive at an understanding with Japan on the basis of their traditional peaceful policy, sounded our opinion about the initiation of Franco-Japanese conversations for the purpose of settling all pending issues. Moreover, the actin-Governor-General of French Indo-China stated to Consul-General SUZUKI at Hanoi that, if Japan would really pursue a policy of non-intervention in the European War, France would respond to it by adopting a conciliatory policy toward Japan. Thus the French Government gradually began to address itself actively to the adjustment of Franco-Japanese relations.
(3) Our first proposal regarding diplomatic rapprochement.

(Conversation between Minister NOMURA and French Ambassador HOII, of Nov. 30)

Taking advantage of this tendency, Minister NOMURA decided to solve favorably at a stroke the various problems pertaining to the French dependencies, especially French-Indo-China, which had important bearings on the disposition of the China Incident and the establishment of the East Asiatic New Order. On Nov. 30, he summoned the French Ambassador in TOKYO and told him as per the following:

(A) Of our intentions concerning Japan-French diplomatic rapprochement desired by the French, and also as per the following (B) pertaining to the dispatching to HANOI of a Staff member of our home department and a military expert for liaison and negotiation in connection with the suspension of acts to help Chiang through French-Indo-China. The French Ambassador promised to transmit the matter to his home Government and give a definite answer later on, as he could not reply on the spot.

(A) Since the outbreak of the China Incident, Japan-French diplomatic relations have lacked amicability, but the fact that the French recently complied with our requests in regard to a few pending matters is greatly appreciated by us. We thoroughly sympathize with recent French expressions of desire to readjust mutual relationship between the two countries.

However, it is a matter beyond our apprehension that the French, while desiring diplomatic rapprochement on one hand, is assisting the Chiang regime on the other, for the overthrow of which we are straining every effort. If diplomatic rapprochement with us is actually desired, we consider that the French should give up such dubious attitude and break with the Chiang regime and also take a sympathetic attitude toward our settlement of the China Incident. Further, it is a well-known fact that the French dependencies in the South Seas and Oceana, especially French-Indo-China are maintaining various economic barriers against us. Unless such fundamental obstacles for mutual friendly relationship be actually removed, we deem it impossible to bring about the realization of mutual diplomatic rapprochement.

Regarding the acts of aiding Chiang via French-Indo-China, large quantities of munitions destined for the Chiang regime are still being transported via French-Indo-China despite our repeated requests to stop them. Traffic of anti-Japanese Chinese with military and political objectives is frequent, with the result that French-Indo-China has apparently become the base of aid-Chiang and anti-Japanese activities. The French-Indo-China authorities explain that although traffic of regular arms and ammunitions is prohibited, the other commodities cannot be barred even if they are serviceable for military purpose, so long as they are transported as general merchandise. But the fact is beyond doubt that even regular arms and ammunitions are being transported as heretofore. With regard
to foodstuff, trucks, petroleum and various machinery, although
they do not fall under the category of regular arms and ammu-
nitions, they invariably tend to keep and enhance the anti-
Japanese fighting strength so long as they are applied to the
Chiang regime.

This argument is quite warrantable when we review the list of
war contrabands promulgated by Franco in her war against Germany.

In this connection, it is of no practical consequence whether
war has been declared or not. Should France discard the
argument of legal technicalities and take a decisive step from
the viewpoint of practical politics to bar all traffic destined to
the Chiang regime, which is detrimental to the settlement
of the China Incident in which Japan is now engaged, and
should the French people by some adequate measures to
intercept the aid-Chiang routes with concrete results, it would
undoubtedly contribute to no small degree the enhancement of
Japan-French friendship.

Our current military operation in KUANGSI is due to the
continued transportation of munition and other commodities destined
despite our frequent protests. The reason for the
transported via French-Indo-China. For strategic military
reasons, there was no alternative but to resort to bombing
with the result that some of our military aircraft may inevitably
have trespassed the border or accidentally dropped bombs. Such
undesirable affairs would cease to happen, should the French stop
aiding Chiang.

Concerning the anti-Japanese economic barriers set up in the
French dependencies in South Seas and Oceania, especially in
French-Indo-China:

(a) The French-Indo-China authorities impose heavy duties
and import quotas on Japanese merchandize which is in contradiction
to the spirit of the current commercial agreement. It is unsatis-
factory and we request its abolition or alleviation.

(b) heretofore, as in the French-Indo-China iron ore embargo
case, which was recently settled, French authorities in French-
Indo-China and Caledonia have frequently barred the supply of
resources to us, restricted the entry of our nationals, and obstructed
the business operation of Japanese. We hope that in the future,
similar cases will not recur but also further conveniences and
assistance be positively afforded.

(2) In connection with our current KUANGSI operations, it appears
that the French authorities are entertaining uneasiness and
suspicion in view of our army's sphere of activity extending near
the border of French-Indo-China. In order to dispel the uneasiness or suspicion, and also for liaison and negotiation between the Japanese consul-general in HANOI and the French-Indo-China authorities, we wish to dispatch to HANOI within a few days an official-in-charge for the Foreign Ministry for a few days. He shall be accompanied by a military expert of field officer class to inform the French authorities of our military activities in South China and to hear the French viewpoint regarding the situation in the border districts. We thus hope to come to a better understanding. We therefore hope that the Ambassador would consent to our intention and transmit the matter to the French Local authorities so that necessary conveniences and assistances would be afforded.

(4) The French interim reply to our proposition (the conversation between Minister NOMURA and French Ambassador VINCI of Dec. 12)

At the second interview of the two on Dec. 12, the French made the following intermediate reply.

(1) The French Government deeply regrets that the Japanese Government again gave vent to dissatisfaction at the alleged transportation via French-Indo-China of munitions destined to China, which report was previously denied and proven as entirely groundless by the French.

(2) Regarding the various pending matters such as the occupation of HAINAN island, the annexation of SHIMAN archipelago, the obstruction of navigation on the YANTZEE River, the infringement on commercial freedom in the occupied territory, and all the other damages sustained by the French interests in China, the French Government has no objection in the intention of the Japanese Government to have a conference with the French Government to exchange frank opinions.

(3) Inasmuch as there is a Japanese consul-general stationed in HANOI, it is beyond apprehension that there should be any necessity of specially dispatching a staff member of the Foreign Ministry and a military expert to French-Indo-China. Needless to say, the French Government would have no objection to the Japanese Government dispatching couriers in order to arrange for special contact with the consul-general in question.

(4) The military operations of the Japanese Army in KUANGHSI districts are liable to contradict the political equilibrium, which was the object of the Japan-French agreement of 1907. The French Government wants the Japanese Government's explanation on the object, nature and the duration of the operations. In reply to the above proposition, Minister NOMURA told the French Ambassador as follows:-

(1) According to information received by us, it is a plain fact that munitions are being transported via French-Indo-China. For instance, the information recently received from reliable sources in China confirms the fact that the CHUNGKING Government, in view
of our military operations in KUANGSHI requested French assistance
to have its military material and other stuff stocked in that
district sent back temporarily to French-Indo-China. The source
confirms that the French promised to make favorable arrangements
to a certain extent.

(2) The Japanese Government is fully aware that since war has
not been declared by neither Japan nor China, the French is not
locally obligated to suspend traffic of commodities consigned to
China. But the Japanese Government earnestly hope that the
French would recognize the extensive hostilities now under way
between Japan and the CHUNGKING Government and take steps to sus-
pend the freight traffic via French-Indo-China, which tends to help
the CHUNGKING Government.

(3) The military operations in KUANGSHI are executed in parallel
with the blockade of the Chinese coast line to bring about the
collapse of the CHUNGKING Government by cutting off the commissary
line. Consequently until these aims are realized, the duration
cannot be definitely stated.

Notwithstanding the foregoing explanations, the French Ambassador
repeatedly emphasized the absence of munitions traffic to China
via French-Indo-China. Since the premise of solving the Japan-
French diplomatic rapprochement was the suspension of munitions
traffic, a divergence of opinions already existed.

(5) Interview between Minister NOMURA and Ambassador HENRI of
Dec. 21.

On Dec. 21 the French Ambassador called on Minister NOMURA and
conferred chiefly on the opening of YANTZE River traffic. At
that time, the French Ambassador voiced his Government's hope
that in view of the urgent necessity of opening parleys regarding
Japan-French diplomatic rapprochement, negotiations on the
TEXTILE problem should be started in parallel with the Japan-
British parley. Minister NOMURA realized that the French views
regarding the Japan-French diplomatic rapprochement are now under
consideration by our authorities and that in the near future
negotiation could be opened on an equitable basis. Minister
NOMURA added that the negotiation should be carried on a
constructive basis.

Item 2. The dropping of bombs on THA KHE, French Indo-China
by Japanese Navy Planes.

When Acting Consul-General URABE at HANOI called on Chief Adminis-
trator DE TASTE in the afternoon of August 26, 1939 /SHWA 14/
at the latter's request, the Chief Administrator informed him,
after remarking that the protest was being made: Under instructions
from the Home Government, that about 11:00 a. m. of the 26th
Japanese seaplanes flew over French-Indo-China territory from the
direction of the Chinese border and that one of these planes
dropped two bombs in the vicinity of THA KHE near the border
of French Indo-China and China, causing about thirty casualties.
With reference to this, Consul-General SUZUKI, in an interview with the Governor-General of French Indo-China on September 25, expressed the Japanese Government's regret and its desire for a local settlement of the incident. The Governor-General appreciated it and requested that negotiations regarding indemnity be conducted with the Director of the Political Affairs Bureau.

According to the report of the Consul-General of October 14, the Governor-General made a written demand for indemnity as follows:

1. 50,020 piastres for 76 persons killed (about ¥ 658 per person)
2. 10,410 piastres for 34 wounded persons (about ¥ 306 per person)
3. 550 piastres for 55 lightly wounded persons (about ¥ 100 per person)
4. 1,570 piastres for burial expenses, survivors' relief fund, and damage compensation.

Total 62,550 piastres.

On November 17 the above total indemnity of 62,550 piastres was advanced by the Foreign Ministry and remitted by telegraphic transfer to Consul-General SUZUKI. Subsequently the Consul-General reported that the Governor-General, in a letter dated November 29, acknowledged receipt of this sum and recognized the incident as closed.
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Koro hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section of Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 134 pages, dated Dec. 1941, and described as follows: Business Report for the year 1939, published Dec. 1941 by the South Seas Bureau.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Office

Signed at Tokyo on this 20th day of Sept., 1946

[Signature of Official]

[Name of Official: Nagaharu Odo]

Witness: J. A. Curtis, 2d Lt.

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 23 day of Sept., 1946

[Signature of Official]

[Name: Richard H. Larsh]

Witness: J. A. Curtis, 2d Lt.
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昭和十一年

昭和十四年度

業務報告

南洋局

第三課
トノ、結論立、右三栄太、処裁ヲ経タルノ，五月九日
かれ、外務省トミハ、陸軍又ハ海軍並ハ作戦上要トセ
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（昭和十四年八月欧州政局緊迫行八件）

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（海南島ヲ於テ、新設ヲ行ハ）
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(Translation)

在本次会议上，各国代表一致认为，应加强国际间的合作，以实现全球和平与安全。各国应共同努力，克服全球经济危机，促进可持续发展。我们呼吁所有国家共同努力，为了未来的和平与繁荣而共同努力。
10278

中文文言文，内容涉及历史、哲学、文学等多个领域，具体含义需要结合上下文进行解读。
外文不全，无法提供自然文本内容。
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透過人事官士之建議，概要解開自稱為金佛、國文等，

問題：

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僧侶會談中開始

問題：

佛為僧侶解開等八議解

違約

於八議中開始

僧侶會談中開始
您提供了中文文本，但没有提供任何问题或请求。如果您有特定的查询或需要帮助的方面，请详细说明，我将尽力提供帮助。
II. RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE ASSEMBLY ON OCTOBER 6TH, 1937

The Assembly:

Adopts as its own the reports submitted to it by its Advisory Committee on the subject of the conflict between China and Japan (documents A. 78, A. 79 and A. 80, 1937, VII)

Approves the proposals contained in the second of the said reports (document A. 80, 1937, VII) and requests its President to take the necessary action with regard to the proposed meeting of the Members of the League which are Parties to the Nine-Power Treaty signed at Washington on February 6th, 1922;

Expresses its moral support for China, and recommends that Members of the League should refrain from any action which might have the effect of weakening China's power of resistance and thus of increasing her difficulties in the present conflict, and should also consider how far they can individually extend aid to China;

Decides to adjourn its present session and to authorise the President to summon a further meeting if the Advisory Committee so requests.
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无有效内容可供阅读。
中に存在する仏側に従来、議論を繰延ばすが、議論は理論に過ぎず、実際の解決のためには、実践が必要である。この仏側は、仏教の教えを信じ、実践を進めることが必要である。政治的解決は困難であるが、誠意を示し、協定を結ぶことが重要である。雲南鉄道爆発事件に関しては、我方は対応を怠らない。我方が仏側の措置を理解し、協定を履行することにより、問題を解決することができる。
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3. 你有遇到过哪些问题，是如何解决的？
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5. 你对加速服务的期望是什么？
合同の総合府より、荷田機関宛本件八分在仏日本大使館

本件は政付公間、交涉を俊ひげアインヨリ国

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据《资治通鉴》记载，三国时期吴国的孙权利用“奇计”破敌，获得了胜利。孙权针对敌方的漏洞，采用了巧妙的战术，最终取得了成功。这一事件成为后世人们学习和借鉴的典型例子。
Excerpts from "Business Report of South Seas Section in 1940"

Section 3. The embargo on supplies aiding the Chiang regime and the matters concerning the occupational forces in French Indo-China.

(1) The suspension of transportation of munitions via French Indo-China and the dispatch of the Japanese observation party.

Despite the notification forwarded to us by the French Indo-China authorities in October, 1937 stating her decision to suspend the transportation of weapons to China via French Indo-China, according to information obtained the transportation /of weapons/ was continued as before, therefore we often filed protests against the French.

However, every time the French denied our information always giving us deceptive answers saying that there was no change in their policy to stop transportation and the transportation of weapons now being continued was the fulfillment of a contract made between China prior to 14th July 1937. Japan, therefore, resolved early in 1939 to resort to force to carry out the interception of the transportation of weapons.

However, since the outbreak of the European War, France's attitude toward Japan showed some improvement. As she showed signs of her desire to adjust the relations between Japan and France by solving the pending questions, we, therefore, replied that we would negotiate to adjust the diplomatic relations provided France would be ready to stop the transportation of munitions, gasoline, trucks and all other commodities which might increase the resisting power of the CHIANG regime via French Indo-China. France (A) denying our information, stated that she had prohibited the transportation of genuine weapons and ammunitions, though she had no legal obligation to do so, and actually there was no truth of the transportation of the said supplies and, (B) not responding to our desires stated it regrettable that Japan should demand France to stop the transportation of such commercial goods as gasoline, trucks and others despite the fact that there was no declaration of war between Japan and China ever. Japan replied that (a) our information was obtained through a reliable source reveals that weapons and ammunitions have sometimes been sent to CHIANG KAI-SHEK by way of French Indo-China and that a large amount of such munitions other than genuine weapons and ammunition, as gasoline, trucks and airplanes have been transported. (b) The Japanese forces in the KWANGSI Campaign captured a large amount of
arms, ammunition, gasoline and other munitions apparently from French Indo-China, (c) the amount of the transpor-
tation by the YUNNAN railway approximately doubled after
the interception of the NANKIN route as a result of the
KWANGSI Campaign. (d) In modern warfare, gasoline, trucks
and airplanes like weapons and ammunition are munitions
that increase the fighting power (e) in the CHINA in-
cident, Japan refrained from placing any limitation upon
the ships and cargoes bound for French Indo-China in view
of the friendly relations between Japan and France, how-
ever, France in the European War in which she was a belli-
gerent, afflicted upon us great losses in the various
measures toward Japanese ships bound for Europe by extend-
ing the items of contraband of war. (f) The French author-
ities have roused resentment among the Japanese people by
declaring they would aid CHIANG KAI-SHEK at the League of
Nations and on various other occasions, and actually con-
ducted acts of assisting CHIANG by transporting munitions
and granting railway loans. Japan furthermore, notified
France of her desires that she recognize the present sit-
uation of the large-scale hostilities existing between
Japan and China, and that France voluntarily take resolute
steps, to stop the transportation of war materials from
the political standpoint and the general situation ir-
respective of legal argument as to the existence of a
local obligation to stop the transportation of munitions
or the existence of a declaration of war. As France,
however, reiterated what they had said before and did not
show any sincerity to achieve a political solution of the
matter, Japan was obliged because of strategic necessity
to bomb the YUNNAN Railway in Chinese territory since the
end of 1939. Concerning the bombing France filed protests
against Japan several times and demanded compensation.
Japan, however, answered that the bombing was a self-
defense measure and that as Art 24, clause 2 of the Sino-
Japanese agreement concluded in 1903, concerning the
construction and management of the YUNNAN Railway, stipu-
lates that the railway shall lose its neutrality in the
case CHINA becomes belligerent, there is no necessity
for Japan to indemnifying France.

Before long, the repair of the YUNNAN Railway was
completed and freight transportation became possible,
thereby necessitating our Army to once more resort to
armed force. However, as negotiations for the adjust-
ment of general diplomatic relations between Japan and
France had at last just begun, it was preferred that
France be persuaded to suspend the transportation of war
materials to CHIANG voluntarily, instead of resorting to
brute force. Then, in the middle of March, 1940, Japan
proposed that France suspend the transportation of arms,
gasoline and trucks destined for CHIANG KAI-SHEK during
the time when the negotiations to adjust the general
diplomatic relations between Japan and France were being
conducted and Japan shall also refrain from using military force during that period, and continued negotiations. France, however, failing to appreciate Japan's efforts showed such an undesirable attitude as to say that though she shall suspend the transportation of gasoline and trucks during the month of March, thenceforth, she shall decide on the matter of transportation in relation with other important problems. Therefore, Japan concluded that it would be impossible to continue further negotiations any longer even as a temporary measure as long as France adheres to such an attitude and instructed the Japanese Ambassador in France to notify the French authorities to the above effect. Thus the negotiations were suspended for a while (during which period the transportation of munitions to CHIANG was still continued while Japan also bombed the YUNNAN Railway late in April). In the meantime, with the advance of the German attack against France, the French Government, since the latter part of May, asked Japanese companies for airplanes and large amounts of various ammunition. Japan replied that she would endeavor to meet France's desire as far as possible if France would accept Japan's request of the pending Franco-Japanese problems, especially the suspension of transportation of munitions to CHIANG via French Indo-China. Since, the war situation in France proper showed a rapid progress, Japan notified France on June 19 through the French Ambassador in TOKYO, Mr. HENRY that Japan could no longer overlook the continuation of the transportation of munitions to CHIANG via French Indo-China, because of the growing dissatisfaction toward France among the Japanese people. The Ambassador replied that the Governor-General of French Indo-China decided on 17th June to suspend with his own authority the transportation of not only arms and ammunition to CHIANG but trucks and gasoline. When we requested the acceptance of our proposal concerning the corroboration of the said decision, the Ambassador answered that as he had advised the Governor-General to enforce the complete blockade on the frontier between French Indo-China and China, the Governor-General had decided to corroborate this, and also decided to accept the dispatch of military experts for inspecting the circumstances regarding the transportation of supplies via French Indo-China.

Consequently, Japan requested France to maintain strict control over the activities of China, and the Chinese who appear to be planning the concealment and smuggling of stored supplies in French Indo-China as a result of the Governor-General's decision, and moreover requested that Major OBANAP in HANOI who was to be sent as a temporary
expedient prior to the arrival of the military experts in order to hurriedly inspect the circumstances of the suspension of transportation /of munitions/, be afforded /necessary/ facilities.

Simultaneously, on June 22, Japan proposed to France the following three items /pertaining to the dispatch of the Japanese observers/.

(a) As we desire to dispatch thirty military experts and ten Foreign Office officials (three of whom shall be the staff members of the Japanese Consulate-General in HANOI), and several interpreters to French Indo-China to inspect the circumstances the suspension of the transportation of supplies, it is desired that an easy entrance and all necessary facilities for execution of their respective duties be afforded to the dispatched personnel and those liaison officials who may be sent to French Indo-China at any time from Japan or China.

(b) As we desire to dispatch an advance party of about seven army and naval officers and non-commissioned officers from China by a mine-sweeper, it is requested that similar facilities are afforded them.

(c) The list of the materials that Japan will request of the French Indo-China authorities to suspend the transportation to China, will be decided after the inspection on the spot by the said party, and up to that time, the French Indo-China authorities are requested to continue a complete blockade of the frontier between French Indo-China and China.

France accepted the above requests and the inspectors were dispatched as per schedule.

Subsequently Japan requested France that: (a) As far as the transportation of supplies for China via the leased territory of the Bay of K'ANGCHOW are continued, the effects of the measures taken by France to prohibit the transportation of supplies to China will be greatly diminished, therefore Japan had previously requested the prohibition of the above route. Also although it is expected that steps to prohibit the above have been duly taken, Japan desires to dispatch two or three Imperial Japanese Naval officers and non-commissioned officers to that area from China in order to inspect the measures of prohibition, as well as liaison personnel who will be sent at any time from China in small war vessels, it is desired that easy entrance and all facilities necessary in exercising their duties be afforded them. (b) The French Indo-Ch'na authorities are desired to ban the
importation of all materials from China for a period of one month starting 7 July.

The above mentioned requests were also accepted by France.

(2) The advancement of Japanese forces into northern French Indo-China.

The observation party previously mentioned consisting of forty officials of the Army, Navy and Foreign Ministry headed by Major-General ISHIMARU arrived at MANGI on the 25th June and started their work. The French authorities enforced the blockade on the frontier with sincerity.
The bombing of the passenger-train on the YUNNAN Railway.

Regarding the negotiations adjusting the diplomatic relations between Japan and France, which have been continued since last year, we were studying various counter measures.

At that time when the YUNNAN-Railway was bombed for the second time by our naval planes, a bomb made a direct hit on a passenger train, which happened to be on the railway killing five French (two women and two children) and killing or injuring many ANHANSE and Chinese. The French Prime Minister requested the Japanese Ambassador in Paris, Mr. SAVIDA, to make a satisfactory explanation as to this incident, saying that, since 1937 the French Government had never transported arms upon the honour of France, however notwithstanding this, Japan had often bombed the railway without giving any evidence of the transportation of arms, and moreover, to even injure the lives of women is very regrettable from the standpoint of our diplomatic relations. On the assumption that he was not in a position to explain the incident since he had not yet received any official report, the Ambassador repeatedly explained Japan's policy toward the bombing of the YUNNAN-Railway and suggested the necessity of a voluntary suspension of all transportation of supplies to CHIANG via the YUNNAN-Railway to avoid the recurrence of such an unfortunate incident.

Moreover, from the outset the French publicized that the bombing of the YUNNAN-Railway was conducted by the forces on the spot, not according to the orders from headquarters, and articles concerning the bombings appeared in the SHANGHAI newspapers, irritating the feelings of the Japanese forces on the spot. Therefore, Ambassador SAVIDA was instructed to explain to the French authorities that the bombings of the YUNNAN Railway were not, as already often explained, only the activities of the forces on the spot, and hitherto it was decided that as a principle the bombing target was limited to railways or railway bridges, and so long as trains were not used for a military purpose they would not be bombed; this policy was adhered to by the forces on the spot. However, the bombing of the train was due to a mistake resulting from bombing in very difficult conditions while resisting heavy defense-fire from enemy fighter planes and the anti-aircraft batteries on the ground in that neighbourhood. None of the pilots had admitted the existence of a train in the vicinity of the targets, only later on, after examining the aerial photograph with magnifying glasses that an object similar to that of a stationary train in the direction of the tunnel to the north of the central part of the bridge, was distinguished.
On February 5th, the French Ambassador in TOKYO called on Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, TAIJ, and handed the following protests:

(1) The French Government shall lodge a protest against the act of damages inflicted upon French property through the recent bombing of the YUNIA—Railway.

(2) As a result of the bombing the casualties known are 40 killed (including 5 Frenchmen) and 84 ANVANESE, and Chinese wounded.

(3) The French Government shall reserve the right to demand compensation as soon as the circumstances of the damages are clarified.

Simultaneously stated that this incident will have a very bad influence on American public opinion, and similarly French opinion is greatly enraged. In reply vice-Minister, TAIJ, stated that as details have not yet been clarified Japan is ready to take fair and reasonable measures, after investigation, however, according to the information obtained, it is said that there are traces of the train being used for military purposes, and citing the following points, called attention of the Ambassador:

(1) As far as the transportation of munitions and other supplies are continued, from the strategic standpoint, Japan shall be obliged to bomb the YUNIA—Railway.

(2) France seems to be restrained by the "non-existence of a declaration of war", however, Britain has formally recognized that large-scale hostilities are going on between Japan and China, and though for the purpose of improving Franco-Japanese relation, discussions as to the separate problems which successively occur (for example, the joint investigation of the booty in KWANGSI) have been held, but with little avail. Therefore, it is necessary that France, too, like Britain, recognize the existence of hostilities between Japan and China, and considering all problems from this standpoint we believe that today is the time to adjust the diplomatic relations between the two countries, basing such on a broad minded viewpoint.

(3) Although France has hitherto advocated her neutrality toward the China Incident, the Japanese people believe that France is adopting a pro-CHIANG policy in consideration of her official announce­ments at the League of Nations and at other places, or in her actions of granting credit to China, aid given in the construction of railways in China and the transportation of supplies to CHIANG, etc. Japan shall not ignore France's considerations toward her domestic relation or the third-countries relations, and not request France's official announcement as to the suspension of the pro-CHIANG activities. Japan will be satisfied with the actual suspension of all such pro-CHIANG activities, such as refraining from the repair of the damaged railway and report to CHIANG kai-sek or the third powers that the repair of the railway is impossible, and so forth.
Although Japan originally desired the transportation of all supplies to CHANG to be suspended, however, when that is difficult, at least the suspension of the transportation of those articles mentioned below, which are already listed as "contraband of war" by France is desired:

1. Arms and ammunitions.
2. Airplanes and parts thereof.
3. Trucks, other automobiles, and parts thereof.
5. Metals, machines, and other metal goods.
7. Chemicals.

If France takes effective and appropriate steps toward our demands Japan will negotiate with the military authorities to stop the bombing of the YUNAN Railway and moreover there is ground for consideration of not only the maintenance but also the promotion of French interests in both the new Chinese Government's and Japanese Army's sphere of influence. In reply Ambassador HENRY stated that the Japanese Government seems to be recognizing the actions of the militarists one after another, however, such an attitude will have a bad influence on American public opinion and that despite the denial of the French Government, the Japanese authorities make announcement as though the French authorities were transporting munitions to the CHANG regime, however, it is regrettable, that the Japanese authorities do not present any evidence. Vice-Minister TAKI retaliated that, the former was without basis and as to the latter, our information was obtained through reliable sources and according to information from the various sources we are aware even of the existence of an entente concerning the supply of goods between France and China.

Due to the comparatively slight damage of the railway itself and the few casualties among French nationals as well as the maintenance of the policy by the French Government to avoid the aggravation of the public opinion toward Japan, the bombing of the YUNAN Railway in the past did not became a problem of public interest in France, however, as French nationals, especially women, were killed public discussion of the problem has been permitted. But in handling this matter the Government seems to have unofficially instructed the newspapers the following points:

1. It is surprising that the bombings were repeated while negotiations concerning the YUNAN Railway were being held between the Japanese authorities and not only French Indo-China, but also the French home Government;
2. According to the impression obtained in TOKYO, the bombings seem to have been conducted by the unilateral decision of the forces on the spot.
3. However, the French Government intends to maintain the hitherto friendly relations between France and Japan.
The comments of the various papers were based on the above points in general and no specially radical comments were noticed. The criticism of the "TEMPS" concerning this issue was that although the matter was of a very important nature, great attention must be focused on the matter to prevent it becoming worse. Public opinion in Japan is easily aroused and moreover we must not forget that there are some who are plotting to stir up Japanese public opinion against Britain and America. France can expect a fair resolution of the matter through diplomatic measures without injuring the dignity of a great power. While in French Indo-China the "VOLONTE" (phonetic) strongly advocated that a strong protest be filed (with Japan), and not only is there a necessity to demand compensation for the casualties sustained by French nationals and ANHANSE, but also a guarantee for the future. Although the President of the YUNAN-Railway Company made an address, stressing the same points, at the funeral of the French nationals killed, which was pompously held in HANOI, in general there was no radical opinions, thus reflecting the cautious attitude of the authorities toward this matter.

Concerning this matter, the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. SAVADA, called on Vice-Minister, Mr. REDIE (phonetic) and stated that as long as the transportation of the munitions is continued Japan shall be obliged to bomb the railway, and that Japan heartily hopes France will recognize, like Britain, the existence of hostilities between Japan and China, and to stop at least the transportation of those above-mentioned items which were pointed out by Japanese Vice-Minister, TANI. Vice-Minister, REDIE (phonetic) replied that although the French authorities had already voluntarily stopped the transportation of arms, it is unreasonable of Japan to make such a demand equal to suspension of all traffic on the railroad. As this was only a repetition of the old argument, the Japanese Ambassador emphasized that it was not the time to adhere to legal theories, and of the necessity for France to make a decision for a political solution. The Vice-Minister, Mr. REDIE, replied that in view of the fact that in the past France had persevered and only being flatly refused by Japan (literally translated as hit on the head), and out of consideration of domestic opinion, it is impossible to make such a resolution, in any case, France will reconsider the matter on receiving a formal reply from the Japanese Government as to their recent proposal.

On February 20th, Vice-Minister, TANI, asked the French Ambassador in TOKYO, Mr. HENRY, to visit him and handed him the following memorandum: "Railway bridge No. 7 was the main target of the bombing on February 1st and the bombing of the train was by no means planned from the outset. The bombing on that day was conducted under the most difficult conditions, of running the risk of unfavourable air currents and avertting the attacks of enemy planes and anti-aircraft gun barrage from an altitude of 3,800 meters. And due to the railway-bridge, other constructions and shadows, none of the pilots were able to identify the train which was stationary on the railway-bridge at that time. It was entirely an accident that the bomb dropped..."
dropped by a plane of the Imperial Army Forces
hit the train, however, the Imperial Japanese
Government regrets that as a result of the
bombing there were French and Annamese casualties,
and is willing to pay a reasonable sum of condol­
ence money to the French nationals."

On May 7, Ambassador HENRY replied by letter that
upon notifying the Governor General of the decision
of the Japanese Government, he instructed him to
request a compensation of 175,030 pesos
(120,000 pesos for the 5 French nationals, 55,030
for the Indo-China victims), explaining that in
determining the above, the social-standing of
the victims were considered, and to obtain a
thorough investigation several months have been
required; and at the same time presented an
explanatory note.

The authorities concerned were instructed to
investigate as to whether this sum demanded was
appropriate or not, while on the other hand
this matter was being studied in connection with
the French attitude toward the illegal firing
on Japanese fisherman at French NEW CALEDONIA.
However, on October 28th, the Ambassador repeatedly
demanded the Japanese Government to pay the sum,
saying that the compensation-money was urgently
needed by the victims.

The bombing by the Japanese plane in HAI PHONG
At the time of the entry of the Japanese forces
into French Indo-China, on September 20th a
Japanese bomber dropped 4 bombs on the city of
HAI PHONG killing 15 and injuring 18 persons and
causing other material losses. On October 7th
the Councillor of the French Embassy in Tokyo
notified the Chief of the 3rd section of the
Eurasian Bureau, Mr. ISHIZAKA the contents of
the case. However, as it became evident that
this bombing was due to the carelessness of the
pilots, the forces on the spot expressed their
regret and settled the matter by paying 33,000
pesos as compensation money.
The dispatch of a cruiser of the Imperial Japanese Navy to SAIGON.

A telegram was received from the Consul General in HANOI Mr. SATOH stating that to assert Japan's power in southern French Indo-China and to control anti-Japanese activities by the Chinese residents in the SAIGON district, to facilitate the purchasing of rice and to prevent manoeuvres by Britain and America, an Imperial Japanese cruiser was scheduled to be despatched to SAIGON (expected around the middle of Dec.). Upon receiving approval from the Vichy Government as the Governor General had already agreed to it as a result of negotiations between the organ SUMIDA who had previously planned the despatch of a Japanese warship to SAIGON and the Government-General, and using this opportunity an exchange of good will was going to be held for about one week. However, later on the Government-General informed the organ SUMIDA that they had received instructions from the Vichy Government that this matter should be negotiated between the Japanese Ambassador in France and the French Home Government, and in view of the current situation believe it to be inappropriate to enforce the program immediately and that they wish to postpone it for a while. As the organ SUMIDA accepted this proposal, the plan was naturally not realized.

The dispatch of the French Indo-China military delegation to America.

The French Indo-China authorities dispatched a military delegation consisting of infantry brigade commander, Colonel JACOBY, Major BEITZRON and two others, to the U.S. in order to obtain support of America to resist Japan. The party arrived at San Francisco on July 21st. When it became apparent that they were endeavoring to purchase 200 military planes etc., the Chief of the Third section of the Eurasian Bureau Mr. ISHIZAWA invited the Councillor of the French Embassy in Tokyo, Mr. FAN phonetic on Dec. 3rd and orally proposed that although Japan appreciates the efforts taken by the French Home Government to maintain and promote friendly relations toward Japan, it is most unwarrantable for the French Indo-China authorities who are supposed to be under the control of the Home Government, to conduct such anti-Japanese manoeuvres, so in the future ask them to refrain from such enfriendly
acts. Simultaneously he instructed the Charge d'Affaires to the Vichy Government, Mr. HARADA to propose the same to the French authorities.

On October 8th, the Chief of the Asiatic Bureau of the French Foreign Ministry explained to the Charge d'Affaires to the Vichy Government, Mr. HARADA that the military delegation was dispatched to U.S. prior to the conclusion of the truce-agreement between Germany and France and the supplies to be purchased were scheduled to be transported to France, and later, on October 11th, as the director stated that in view of the attitude of the third powers, especially THAILAND, the French authorities are considering of transporting the supplies to French Indo-China according to the original plan, the Charge d'Affaires Mr. HARADA called attention of the French authorities concerning the bad influence the dispatch of the said delegation has made on Japan.

The French Ambassador in Tokyo also proposed to Vice-minister OASHI, with a verbal note, to a same effect and at the same time the Governor-General of French Indo-China stated that he only carried out the order of the Home Government and stressed that the sincerity of the Governor-General and his cooperation with the Japanese authorities be not obstructed because of unreliable information and continued that in order to check the menace of THAILAND, French Indo-China asked Japan to take suitable measures, however, despite our request, Japan refused to intervene so it is not comprehensible why French Indo-China is earnest in securing supplies necessary to defend herself by herself against attacks from THAILAND. However, if Japan were to take any measures as a mediator between THAILAND and French Indo-China, the concern of the defense of French Indo-China will not be so urgent and strong, and suggested Japan's assistance in the improvement of the tense relations between French Indo-China and THAILAND. (The verbal note of the French Embassy in Tokyo, dated on December 2.)
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On October 9th, the Chief of the Asiatic Bureau of the French Foreign Ministry explained to the Charge d'Affaires to the Vichy Government, Mr. HARADA that the military delegation was dispatched to U.S. prior to the conclusion of the truce-agreement between Germany and France and the supplies to be purchased were scheduled to be transported to France, and later, on October 11th, as the director stated that in view of the attitude of the third powers, especially THAILAND, the French authorities are considering of transporting the supplies to French Indo-China according to the original plan, the Charge d'Affaires Mr. HARADA called attention of the French authorities concerning the bad influence the dispatch of the said delegation has made on Japan.

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The frontier dispute between Thailand and French Indo-China.

After the revolution of 1932 and 1933 in Thailand, the racial consciousness of the people became outstanding and the re-construction movement in the country developed into the demand of the recovery of natural power or lose territory.

Furthermore, in June, 1939 the name of Siam was changed to Thailand, and the movement of the recovery of lose territory developed more and more. In order to maintain neighborly friendship between Thailand and French Indo-China, the principle for opening negotiations about the non-aggression pact was recognized in October of the same year and on July 12th, 1940 the French-Thai non-aggression pact was concluded, so both governments appointed its commissioner to discuss the revision of the border of the Lekong River which was a condition of the pact. However, the French situation was extremely weakened owing to the defeat in the war against Germany in Europe, meanwhile, Japan's predominant interests in political and economic circles in East Asia were recognized by the ATSUCHI-HENRY Agreement concluded on Aug. 30, 1940. Thailand, stimulated by a sudden and serious agitation and change in international relations demanded in a memorandum dated 13 Sept., as a condition for the exchange of ratification of the non-aggression treaty, the revision of the Lekong River frontier according to the deepest part of the river principle stipulated by international law, and the recognition of the Thai-French Indo-China boundary along the R. Lekong north and south of Cambodia,
and south of Cambodia,

by insisting that the circumstances in French Indo-China were no longer normal. This demand meant the cession of the areas along the right bank of River Mekong across from Luang Prabang and Bakuse (Note: ceded from Siam to France by 1904 Treaty) to Thailand. Thailand, in addition, expressed her hope to obtain a guarantee from the French that the territory of Cambodia and Laos would be returned to Thailand in the case when France renounces her sovereignty over Indochina.

The French Government replied in a memorandum dated 19th Sept, stating that although she will agree to establishing a committee for the resolution of the pending questions, she will not be able to respond to any demand that may alter the territorial integrity of French Indo-China as there has been no change in the status thereof; thus flatly refusing Thailand's demands. Therefore the Thailand Government again submitted a memorandum on the 28th Sept, repeating the above demands advocating that the R. Mekong constituted an appropriate and natural boundary between French Indo-China and Thai. But, in regards to Laos and Cambodia on the left bank of the R. Mekong she was satisfied in demanding these when the position of French Indo-China is altered.

However, as the French authorities again refused these demands 11 Oct, asserting that they, like the previous demands were without legal or factual basis, Thailand's recovery of lost territory through direct negotiations between French Indo-China and Thai were, for the time being discontinued. Thus the situation between the two countries became tense, as a result Thailand concentrated troops along the French Indo-China border, while French Indo-China also increased her garrisons along the frontier, the tension being so great that it was on the verge of explosion. But as the advance of Japanese forces into French Indo-China being limited to the northern district, and the remainder of French Indo-China being guaranteed by Japan, the ensuing chaos which Thai anticipated did not occur, consequently Thailand was placed in a dilemma, and compelled to depend on Japan in the achievement of her aims.

In the beginning, Japan did not like Thai to adopt such an attitude regards the recovery of her lost territory when we were negotiating to enter French Indo-China. We did not think it the best policy to assist Thai in her demands for the recovery of lost territory immediately after we had entered French Indo-China and had to obtain the cooperation of the French. When in Sept and Oct 1940 the
Thailand Government sent a friendly delegation headed by Col. Plomu, Vice Minister of the Dept. of Defense to sound our new foreign policy and intentions towards the problem of the recovery of lost territory we adopted a neutral attitude.

The problem of the entry in Thailand being settled it was essential that Thailand cooperate with Japan and an economic agreement be concluded for the acquisition of rice and other important raw materials and furthermore, to separate Thailand from Britain in consideration of the southern problems of the future. As the U.S. and Britain have actively commenced maneuvers vis-a-vis Thailand, it is necessary that they are prevented. Therefore, it was decided that to take up the problem of the recovery of lost territory which Thailand earnestly desired would be to draw her on our side, and at the same time would stimulate the French Indo-China problem. At the Four-Ministers Conference held on 5th Nov., it was decided to agree to assist Thailand in her recovery of lost territory and plan to make Thailand cooperate both politically and economically in the establishment of the New Order in East Asia. This was conveyed to Thailand. Following, at the second Four-Ministers Conference held on the 21st Nov., it was decided that when Thailand accepts our demands we would immediately assist her in the recovery of LUANG PRAEBANG and PAKUSE. When we proposed this to Thailand, Prime Minister PIBUN completely accepted our demands, therefore we decided to assist her in the recovery of lost territory.

Prior to this, PIC-Thailand relations had gradually become tense regarding the problem of lost territory. Both countries gathered troops on the border, and airplanes infringing upon another's territory became frequent, in the end, on the 28th Nov., both forces clashed in the LAOS border district. Since then, both sides have clashed on a small scale, consequently, making use of this opportunity Foreign Minister MATSUOKA unofficially stated to the French Ambassador in Tokyo Mr. HENRY that he was with the intention of a peaceful arbitration in regards to the recovery of lost territory of 1904 which Thailand desires. On the 19th Nov., the French Government replied that they greatly appreciate Japan's good intentions but from the standpoint of territorial integrity will not be able to make any cessions of territory. Consequently, we only requested the French Government to reconsider her unwise firm attitude as it would not be to her advantage, and observe the trend of events for awhile.
ノ回答ヲ待テ處理スル答ナリ

十時半時従タ面談後相ノ問題小川

平吉ノ問題ソヲ話ス

一時廣報太夫来室義官様

尋ニ相談ス

三時歸宅

三時半山口恭助氏五時原田男五時半

山下勉三郎氏卜各面談
Worshipped at Meiji Shrine at 9:00 a.m. and at Yasukuni Shrine at 9:30, and reported the receipt of the Imperial appointment. The Foreign Minister came to the Palace at 10. Had a talk with the Foreign Minister before and after he was received in audience and discussed the two plans which were debated at yesterday's Four Minister Conference relative to the French Indo-China situation:

(1) That a request be submitted regarding the pro-Chiang acts, and in case the request is refused by the French that force be employed;

(2) That force be employed at once from the beginning on the idea that negotiation is unnecessary.

The military ministers wanted the second plan not to be adopted at present. It was their idea to have the first part of the first plan put into effect at once, and to decide, after waiting for a reply, whether to resort to force or not. The above policy was decided upon.

Italy and Germany have been informed that our country is gravely concerned with the French Indo-China question both from the political and economic standpoints.

England and America are to be dealt with after receiving the replies from Germany and Italy.

Conferred with the Grand Chamberlain at ten thirty about the president of the Privy Council [T] and Mr. Heikichi Odawa.

At one, Grand Steward HIROHATA called and discussed with me the matter of selecting a person to instruct Prince YOSHI.

Returned home at three. Saw and talked to Kyosuke YAMAGUCHI at three thirty, Baron HARADA at five and Kamesaburo YAMASHITA at five thirty.
水温（水槽内の環境に応じて）

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Phan Đăng Tường là 'Hà Nội'. Phan Đăng Tường là tên một chính trị gia và nhà thơ nổi tiếng của Việt Nam. Tên này được sử dụng phổ biến trong nhiều tác phẩm văn học và lịch sử. Hanoi, với địa danh này, là thủ đô của Việt Nam và là một trung tâm văn hóa và kinh tế quan trọng.
The circumstances surrounding the conclusion of agreement between Japan and France concerning the advancement of the Japanese army into French Indo-China.

(July - September 15 Showa /1940/)

2nd section, South-Sea Bureau of the Foreign Ministry.

1. The political agreement/concluded between Japan and French Indo-China by CATROUX, the Governor of the same.

Statement regarding hopes for its conclusion.

Since the arrival in French Indo-China of the observation party consisting mainly of our military exports who were sent in the latter part of June, 15 Showa /1940/ in order to inspect the situation of the embargo on materials intended for CHANG KAI-SHEK via French Indo-China, the Governor, CATROUX, and the military commander of French Indo-China repeatedly announced with sincerity that they would enforce the said embargoes and cooperate in the execution of the duties of the observation party.

According to the reports from the observation personnel sent to various parts in French Indo-China, the embargoes were actually being carried out. The French Indo-China authorities furthermore endeavored to show us their good offices to the utmost by (a), prohibiting the inflow of Chinese exports into French Indo-China for one month starting July 7th, and (b), recognizing the construction of a submarine cable between HAI PHONG and HAI KOW, and the installation of wireless machines for our observation party.

The Governor who thus assumed a conciliatory attitude toward us, furthermore proposed to Major-General NISHIFARA who was the head of the observation party that if Japan respects the territorial integrity of French Indo-China, she shall be ready from the military standpoint to conclude with Japan a defensive treaty against CHANG KAI-SHEK and shall be able to cooperate with Japan in a wider sphere than at present, and at the same time from the economic standpoint are prepared to adopt friendly measures in regard to Japan's expansion in enterprises and promotion of exports into French Indo-China, therefore request that a proposal for the conclusion of an agreement of the above nature be made by the Japanese Government. However, regarding the passage of the Japanese army and the use of aerodromes in French Indo-China to which our army attaches great importance in operations toward China, he stated that these matters exceeded the authority of the Governor of French Indo-China and requested that negotiations be formally opened between the Japanese and French Governments.
2. The attitude of the French Government concerning the action taken toward Japan by the Governor of French Indo-China.

On July 15th, the French Foreign Minister told Mr. SAWAIDA, the Japanese Ambassador who called on him as requested, the following: When Major-General NISHIKARA and Governor CATROUX met recently, discussion was completed and they mentioned the political alliance relations between France and Japan. However, Major-General NISHIKARA is understood to have been sent for the purpose of observation over the embargoes on the materials to be transported and as the Governor of French Indo-China also has no authority to discuss political problems of the above nature, I feel that both sides have gone a little too far. But, by saying this I have entirely no intention of expressing dissatisfaction, rather I feel pleased to know that both sides were able to talk so candidly and freely. From my relation with the French Indo-China Bank, I have hitherto advocated that in so far as the Far East is concerned, France cannot but cooperate with Japan. But for the last two or three years the Japan-France negotiations have been complicated by theoretical disputes far from actual reality and I believe today is the time to discuss frankly in order to unfasten the complication, namely (1) to make the economic relations of ministering each other's wants closer between Japan and French Indo-China, and (2) to promote more intimate political relations. The resolute steps taken by French Indo-China to enforce embargoes on the transportation of weapons via the YUNNAN railway enduring great losses of the railway company are the expression of my hopes to accomplish my belief that we can confer with only Japan in the Far East and not minding China's enmity, which we may incur. However it is impossible to allow the losses of the company to continue without limitation. I hope that you will make some consideration to compensate these losses. Therefore I hope my candid opinion will be conveyed to the Japanese Government and hope you will make sure of Japan's views.

The Japanese Ambassador said that concerning the NISHIKARA-CATROUX meeting he had not yet received any official information, but in view of the recent talks between Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs TAMI and French Ambassador HENNY regarding economic problems to be negotiated on the spot, I understand the Japanese Government is intending to dispatch delegates to French Indo-China in order to confer with the French Indo-China authorities. And asked, that, in spite of the above, do the French authorities intend to negotiate at the French home/government/?

The Foreign Minister replied that as to the details they can be left to the authorities on the spot, but the vital problems relating to politics and economics he wishes to negotiate at the French home/government/.
3. The decision of our policy toward this problem.

Concerning this, our Government, after consulting with the army and navy, reached a definite plan to propose to the French Government but it was decided that after the approval of the succeeding Foreign Minister concrete negotiations, in regard to political and military agreements will be held mainly in Tokyo, while those of an economic nature, in Hanoi. For the time being, in the latter part of July, the following instruction draft and explanation draft were sent to consul-general SUZUKI in Hanoi, and at the same time instructed Ambassador SAWADA to report to the French Government that Japan’s attitude shall be determined as a result of the decision of the foreign policy by the new cabinet (on July 22nd, the YOSAI cabinet was succeeded by the second KONOYI cabinet).

(i) The instruction draft.

Concerning the political, military and economic agreements with French Indo-China.

1. Policies concerning the political, military and economic agreements with French Indo-China.

As a result of consultation with the army and navy authorities, our Government has decided to propose to France the conclusion of political, military and economic agreements which contain the following contents and that the negotiations concerning the political and military agreement will be held in Tokyo with Ambassador HENRY, and the negotiations for the economic agreement between you and the Governor of French Indo-China. Therefore, upon understanding the explanation detailed in the attached (otsu)/B/ sheet you are to commence negotiations directly with the Governor, and in connection with the military agreement assist Major-General MIYAHARA in order to permeate our views to the Governor and endeavor to make him suggest to the home Government to accept our requests.

II. The contents of the agreement.

(1) The political and military agreement.

(a) French Indo-China shall cooperate with Japan in the construction of a New Order in East Asia and especially, for the time being, recognize the passage and the utilization of aerodromes (including the stationing of ground forces for guard purposes) in French Indo-China by the Japanese Army which has been sent for the China operations, and provide the various facilities which are necessary for the transportation of arms and ammunition and other materials of the Japanese army.
(b) Japan shall respect the territorial integrity of French Indo-China.

(2) The economic agreement.

As stated in the attached sheet (ko) /A/ of the "trade and economic negotiations' policy toward French Indo-China", which is in the possession of secretary HAG* (the "business" stated in paragraph 1 in the said attached sheet includes banking business.

The Circumstances Surrounding the Conclusion of Agreement between Japan and France.

(2) Draft of Explanation re Political and Military Agreement and Economic Agreement with French Indo-China.

1. Considering the present position of France and the relation between Japan and France, the Japanese Empire expects to make French Indo-China, at this time, not only promise to co-operate in establishing the New Order of East Asia, and in settling the China Incident, but also have her support the Empire in both military and economical lines by, at the moment, for the sake of the afore-mentioned object, accede to the Empire's demands forming the contents of the political and military agreement and economical agreement.

Strategically, we shall place our demand before French Indo-China as mentioned in attached sheet number A-2, Article II, not only with the purpose of making her suspend the transportation of goods for the Chiang regime so as to destroy the Ch'ungking Government, but from the standpoint of strategical necessity against the Ch'ungking Government.

(II) Considering the fact that French Indo-China has been eagerly wishing to secure a pledge from us regarding the integrity of her territory as she is apprehensive of the security of her territory, we shall prove her our just and upright attitude in giving her our pledge to that effect in some appropriate manner, and that would be by declaring that we have no intention of invading the territory of French Indo-China, but that we shall not hold any responsibility for protecting the integrity of French Indo-China even from invasion by Third Powers. As an invasion of French Indo-China by a Third Power, however, would be an obstacle in establishing the New Order of East Asia, needless to say, we could not disregard such a matter, but the measures to be adopted against same shall be decided from our own independent standpoint.

(III) In case France brings up the questions about Hainan Island, Spratley Islands, Hai Ski Islands, etc., we shall, of course, reject her objection flatly by pointing out the fact that same have no direct relationship with the present agreement relative to French Indo-China.
(IV) Should, by any chance, the French Government reject all our demands which are to be the contents of the Political and Military Agreement, we shall, obviously, have no reason to give her any pledge respecting the integrity of her territory, but our attitude to be then in such a case shall be decided after careful study by taking her attitude and the international situation, etc., into consideration.

(V) The Economical Agreement is aimed at the establishment of economical co-operation between Japan and French Indo-China, and we have no intention of monopolizing the economical interests relating to French Indo-China by totally ignoring the interests of France and other countries. As we shall demand being treated in the same way as France, the French people and French commodities in regard to matters pertaining to commerce (trade), enterprises, and entry into the country, etc., we believe that French Indo-China will show her disapproval on account of our foregoing demand exceeding the contents of ordinary commercial agreements, but, as we, on our part, are even going to pledge our respect for the integrity of French Indo-Chinese territory by virtue of the Political and Military Agreement, it will of course be necessary to realize our economic demands to the utmost limit. The negotiations for the Economical Agreement shall, in view of its nature, be conducted separately from the Political and Military Agreement.

(VI)(a) As far as the persons in charge of the negotiations of the Political and Military Agreement are concerned, the conclusion of the agreement shall, as per the request of the Governor-General of French Indo-China, be affected after the negotiations between our government and Ambassador Genri at this place as this agreement includes such an important political problem as integrity of territory. As regards the formality, same shall be considered later on.

(b) The negotiations regarding the Economical Agreement shall be conducted between Your Excellency and the Governor-General of French Indo-China, and on the satisfactory conclusion of same, in view of the relationship with the Privy Council, the formality shall be adopted whereby you shall have the Governor-General of French Indo-China notify you one-sidedly of the measures taken by the French Indo-China authorities, by his letter addressed to you, and you shall then only "take note" of it.

All further procedures shall be transferred to this place, where proper steps shall be taken.

(Remarks)

The attached documents regarding the concrete details of the Economical Agreement are omitted.)
Commencement of negotiations with France regarding a political and military agreement.

(Meeting between Minister Matsuoka and Ambassador Henri on Aug. 1st. The first Franco-Japanese Meeting)

On Aug. 1st, the Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, asked Henri to visit him, and as a preliminary statement told him that the Japanese Government highly appreciated the measures taken by the French authorities to prohibit the transportation of materials to the Chiang Regime through French Indo-China, and that Japan desired that the French Indo-China Government cooperate more extensively with Japan in political, military and economic affairs for the establishment of Japan's New Order in East Asia and to foster the settlement of the China Incident. Matsuoka then requested as the concrete contents of the political and military cooperation, (note: as for the economical co-operation, refer to the separately drafted "resume" of the negotiations on economic relations between Japan and French Indo-China) recognition of the passage through and the utilization of air-bases (including the stationing of ground forces to guard them) in French Indo-China by the Japanese army which has been dispatched for operations against China, and the provision of all necessary facilities for the transportation of arms, ammunition and other materials for the said troops. He also added that these requests were for the solution of the China Incident, and all measures being limited to within the scope necessary for the frustration of the Chiang Regime, but noted on the intention to violate intrusion upon her territory. Furthermore, he stated that he wished to hold the negotiations at Tokyo as it was so important a political problem, and in consideration of the urgency of the affairs, desired to get the reply of the French Government as to this question. To which the ambassador replied that Japan's request was equal to demanding France, which was in a neutral position, to declare war against China, even though Japan herself had not done so yet. The minister said that it was not a question of whether war was declared or not. France was requested to understand that hostilities were going on in large scale in China, and as for Japan, we have no intention to violate French neutrality, but as this request was a result of absolute necessity from the military standpoint it might happen that French neutrality may be infringed upon even though it may be in formality, if France did not accept this request. Therefore as Japan did not wish to have such an occurrence this proposal was made. Moreover, we want the
French to accept our request with the same spirit that Japan accepted 1907 Franco-Japanese agreement in spite of the benefits enjoyed by France in comparison with almost none on our side. This measure was not taken because Japan preferred it so, but as a result of circumstances she was obliged to make such a request. Finally, MATSUOKA explained that as in those days unexpected and strange things often took place, there is no necessity to think that to accept Japan's request must necessarily mean the declaration of war against China. The Ambassador answered that although there were several comprehensible reasons in MATSUOKA's explanation, Japan's requests as to French Indo-China were only becoming greater and greater each time, and it could not be estimated what requests Japan would make of French Indo-China if this request was accepted. Saying that he said he would transmit the request to the French Government, he took his leave.

The Answer from the French Government to the 1st Japanese proposal of Aug. 1st (Conversation between Mr. MATSUOKA, the Foreign Minister, and Mr. HENRY, the French Ambassador Aug. 6th, the second Franco-Japanese Meeting).

The French Government, becoming enlightened as to the contents and subject matter of the request of the Japanese Government, expressed their attitude, through Mr. SAWADA, the Japanese Ambassador to France, in the following manner. The present Japanese request, which further pins down France which has suffered a severe defeat in the war against Germany and also lost her prestige, cannot be accepted as it stands now. The reason being, not in the contents of the request but its diplomatic formality. That is to say, France has no objection as to the contents, but wishes it to take the form of an agreement reached by neutral agreement; rather than it being one forced upon France by Japan. France does not expect a large compensation from Japan. At any rate France is ready to conclude an agreement quickly if it is in the form of respecting French sovereignty and honour; for instance, Japan should promise that the stationing of Japanese troops in Tungching in only a temporary measure, or that Japan wishes to promote economic and political neighborly relations with French Indo-China for Japan is anxious for friendly relations with France.

Nevertheless, on Aug. 6th, the French Ambassador in Tokyo visited Mr. MATSUOKA, the foreign minister, bringing with him the reply which the ambassador received from the French government and read the attached document no. 1, by which it is understood that France accepted the Japanese proposal, but desired that Japan does not injure her prestige in the form of the agreement, and further stressed that he desired to negotiate with the vice-minister in regard to the form of the agreement. To which the minister gave his consent. Moreover, as the ambassador repeatedly stated that Japan's request was trampling on France's prestige, it was similar to that of an ultimatum. The Foreign Minister explained that Japan has no intentions at all to injure France's prestige, and because she wished to avoid this and prevent the occurrence of such even in formalities, Japan made the above request.
Draft for the First Official Exchange letter regarding the political and military agreement presented by Japan to the French Authorities.

(Conference between the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and the French Ambassador to TOKIO on Aug. 9th and 10th).

In accordance with the result of the conference between Matsuoka, the Foreign Minister and "Henry", the French Ambassador, and on Aug. 9th the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs requested the ambassador to visit him, and upon handing him the draft of this exchange of notes relating to political and military affairs which correspond to the attached documents Nos. 1 and 2, held the following meeting.

The Vice-Minister: This request of ours is according to absolute military necessity, and in consideration of the urgency of the request wish to obtain your approval as quickly as possible.

The Ambassador: As the Japanese request is so vague it would mean handing over a "blank cheque" if it were accepted as it is.

The Vice-Minister: The contents of the request is clear. It is clearly stipulated "for operations against China"; there is nothing to be doubtful about.

The Ambassador: There would be no end to requests being brought forward under the cloak of operations. It is clear that our Government will not agree with it absolutely as it is, although I may transfer this draft to our government if you wish.

The Vice-Minister: Do you mean that you are doubtful about the non-aggression of your territory?

The Ambassador: No; As the draft stands at present there is a danger the utilization of air-fields and passage of troops anywhere in French Indo-China may be requested. /Japanese Troops/ may land about "Cambodia" Saigon. That is why I wish to state clearly the places /Japan/ desires.

The Vice-Minister: This draft only stipulates the general principle and as to details they may decided through negotiations on the spot.

The Ambassador: It is not desirable to leave the decision of details to negotiations on the spot. Although, according to your plan the Japanese Army makes repeated demands and Indo-China is disposed of, that could not be helped.
The Vice-Minister: It is clearly stipulated "for operations against China". Needless to say that we have no intention to abuse it.

The Ambassador: In regard to this point the Foreign Minister has told me that, and I also understand that Japan has no such an intention, but as a practical question, if we agree to the agreement as it stands it cannot be said what requests, one after another, Japan may make. Nobody can guarantee this point. Upon reporting the result of today's conversation to the Foreign Minister please reconsider the matter. As a result, if you desire me to send the draft as it is to my government, I will. However, I think that my government cannot accept it unconditionally.

(Conversation regarding economical problems omitted).

On the following day, the 10th, the Vice-Minister again requested Ambassador HENRY to visit him, and presented him a revised draft which was rewritten as "Passing through the Province of "TONKIN", French Indo-China, and utilizing aerodromes in the same province" in the draft of the exchange of notes of the 9th; and the conversation exchanged was as follows:

The Ambassador: Although the province of "TONKIN" may be stipulated from our point of view, it is equal to issuing a "blank cheque" for the province of TONKIN; and we will not be able to oppose anything the Japanese forces might do. That is not "fair-play". If you are going to make such a request, please make yourself a little clearer.

The Vice-Minister: Although I understand your feeling, as to what points will be passed or what air-fields are to be utilized, they are military secrets, therefore cannot be announced beforehand. No matter how earnestly you may insist, from the maintenance of secrecy of the operations against China, we will not be able to answer by any means.

The Ambassador: Do you not trust the French Government?

The Vice-Minister: This subject differs from the ordinary items of secrecy, for no one other than the military authorities are aware of it. However, when the Japanese Army enters French Indo-China, unless cooperation of the FIC authorities is obtained matters will not progress smoothly, therefore discussion as to the details will be held between the Japanese and FIC authorities. [For instance], if your excellency asks what places the Japanese Army will pass through or what aerodromes they will utilize, and if your government state where is good or where is unsuitable, then this will make our military operations impossible; and the value of France accepting our request
as a principle will become nothing; and in so far as it
has been accepted as a principle, to ask of military
secrets is going a little beyond the point, and if you
still persist, it will be useless to argue with you any-
moro, so please transfer our request as it is to your
home government.

The Ambassador: (After agreeing with the above). The Japanese
request is one-sided.

The Vice-minister: That is natural. That is why we are able
to negotiate. There is one thing to which we wish to draw
your attention, that is Japan is doing her best to establish
a new order in East Asia.

The Ambassador: By the words a new order in East Asia, what do
you concretely mean?

The Vice-Minister: To make this clear a detailed explanation
would be necessary, but if summed up in a few words, it means
to establish a stable and dominant position of Japan in East
Asia. As you know Japan and China should maintain friendly
relations as neighborly countries, but as long as the CHING
regime exists it forms an obstacle, and we are earnestly over-
coming all obstacles and pushing forward towards the downfall
of the regime. And for this reason, hope for the co-operation
of France with settling the China Incident as quickly as possible
and establishing a permanent peace in East Asia, France has no objection. For that purpose it is necessary to
annihilate the Chiang regime as quickly as possible, and wish
to use French Indo-China as a means to achieve that objective.
If the Chiang regime had already been overthrown, we would not
demand of you such a request. But as the same regime is con-
tinuing resistance, very reluctantly we have been obliged to
make such a request. We hope you will especially consider this
point.

(By this explanation, it seemed the Ambassador understood well).

Our present request is based on the above circumstances and
have no intention at all of transgressing on FIC territory.
When you transfer this official draft, will you also transfer
the several points I have explained. I hope that the French
Government will accept our request as it stands.

The Ambassador: (He agreed to transfer the above request).
France's reply to our first draft of the exchange of Notes. (Conference between Minister MATSUOKA and Ambassador ESTRY on August 15th).

On August 15 Ambassador ESTRY visited Minister MATSUOKA, and after having read a document corresponding to attached document no. 3 as a reply to the said first draft of the exchange of notes according to the instruction from the home government, the following conference was held between the Ambassador and the Minister.

Minister: Didn't you say to me the other day that France would, as a principle, accept Japan's demands?

Ambassador: I didn't say that all Japan's demands would be accepted.

Minister: I think I am sure you told me the other day to the effect that although the French Government is willing to accept the military demands of Japan concerning French Indo-China as a general principle, but such measures as would not injure France's prestige be considered by Japan.

Ambassador: That is a misunderstanding. I meant to say that Japan's military demands would be accepted within the limits that France would be able to. Japan's military demands are concerned with the passage of troops, usage of airfields and other provision of facilities, therefore to accept these demands as they are would be equal to giving Japan a blank cheque. France wishes to accept the Japanese demands which are acceptable to France, after having obtained security and a promise as to territorial integrity.

Minister: Concerning these points, I said clearly the other day that Japan's military demands are not based on the intention to invade the territory of French Indo-China.

Ambassador: Without obtaining the promise of territorial guarantee and deciding upon, beforehand, clearly what the contents of Japan's demands are, all French Indo-China will be at the mercy of the Japanese army once it enters, even though that may be only the Tongking province.

Minister: In our demands it is clearly stated "for the operations against China", and it should be evident as to what points the Japanese army will pass through. Therefore it is unnecessary to worry that whole French Indo-China will be occupied by the Japanese army.

But if France doesn't believe my affirmation, and continues to assume such an attitude as to prolong all decisions,
it is useless to consult further, and as our military demands are so urgent, it may happen that we may have to discontinue negotiations and execute necessary military actions.

But convey to the home government that such is not what the Japanese army as well as the Japanese government desires.

Ambassador: If we accept Japan's demands, Chiang's army will also come into French Indo-China, which will be turned into Sino-Japanese battle-field. This would be a great nuisance.

Minister: It is hard to understand why you say such a thing now. When you accepted in principle the passage of the Japanese army, you must have supposed that there is a possibility of the Japanese and Chinese armies clashing in French Indo-China.

We are doing our best to overthrow the Chiang regime, which is an obstacle in the establishment of a permanent peace in the Far East, and as the establishment of a lasting peace is also advantageous to France, we ask your cooperation to overthrow the Chiang regime, which is necessary for that purpose.

In short, whether the contents of our present demands are accepted by France or not, there is still the necessity to carry out this urgently. But as it is not agreeable for us to take military action without agreement, I wish you to consider that I am trying to achieve the objective by consulting with you. From a general point of view, I want you to persuade the home government to accept our demands as they are as soon as possible.

Ambassador: (Understanding fully the above, he took his leave).

(In a chat the Minister said that originally the security of French Indo-China territory had long been preserved in fact by the Japanese-France Pact of 1907, and if Japan didn't comply with the conclusion of this Pact, it is impossible to guess what would have happened to the territory of French Indo-China, but Japan complied with the conclusion of it, therefore it is France's turn to respond to our demands.)
8. France's first counter-plan to the First Draft of our Exchange of Notes and the Second Draft of our Exchange of Notes (Conference between Foreign Minister Matsuoka and Ambassador Henry on 20 Aug.)

On the 20th August, the French Ambassador in Tokyo called on Foreign Minister Matsuoka and furnished to him, in accordance with instructions from the home government, the attached document No. 4, and draft of exchange of notes corresponding to attached document No. 5 and which is based on the purport of the above-mentioned document. In regards to the above, the Minister expressed his gratitude for the efforts taken by the French Government and the Ambassador, and at the same time stated that as to France's proposals Japan would reply upon consideration of the document and draft. But one thing I would like to mention is that although economic problems are included in the above proposals we wish to resolve the military problems prior to economic problems as the former are of an urgent nature. However, it will be alright to discuss the details of the military problems on the spot. And as to the particulars of the form of the agreement with the vice-minister to negotiate with your Excellency within today. Furthermore, when the draft of the exchange of notes No. 1 and 2 of attached document No. 6 in regards to the military question problem and which was prepared by us was submitted, the French Ambassador stated that the French proposal did not injure their prestige and also was fair. Furthermore, the Minister stressed the necessity to separate the economic problems in order to save time to solve the military problems. According to the French proposal, in regards to the economic problems only the recognition of Japan's predominant benefits in the Far East, and also a predominant position over the 3rd Powers in FIC is mentioned and is far from our request of French homeland treatment. If France persists in her proposals the negotiations are bound to reach a deadlock again. In regards to economic problems I think that you could reply that negotiations on the spot be instructed in order to respond as much as possible to the French homeland treatment request. Anyway the necessity to decide in advance on the military problem was advocated.

9. The third(draft of)the exchange of notes. (Conversation on the night of August 20th between Vice-Minister CHASHI and Ambassador HENRY).

After immediate investigation of the French counter-draft, Vice-Minister CHASHI asked Ambassador Henry to visit him on the night of the 20th, and the following conversation was held between the Vice-Minister and the Ambassador with the chief of the Western-Asia Bureau /SEIKAYOKUCHO/ attending.

Vice-Minister: In the French proposal the Japanese-French Fact is introduced, but the situation has greatly changed compared with
that time when this Pact was concluded, therefore it is only complicating the settlement of this matter, to bring up such a Pact today.

Ambassador: Concerning the above, because /Foreign/ Minister MATSUMOTO first mentioned it, we drafted this proposal with that /Pact/ as the basis.

Vice-Minister: The Minister only referred to the Pact in the course of his discussion, because he intended to show that it was evident Japan had no territorial ambition towards French Indo-China from the standpoint of the spirit the Pact was concluded in the past. In the French proposal, all military problems are left to the negotiations on the spot, and the passage of troops and two other items have not been given approval as a principle. /We/ object to this point. Moreover, what is the meaning of limiting the providing of facilities to the border zone between French Indo-China and China?

Ambassador: It is impossible to promise vaguely the provision of facilities over such a vast area like the Tongking Province, therefore, we limited it to the border line which is not so narrow. We cannot permit the stationing of garrisons in the air-bases which the Japanese forces may use.

Vice-Minister: Thus the provisions of facilities according to the French will be meaningless. And so we wish to settle the problem according to our plan, and to manage the economic problem separately.

Ambassador: As the French proposal was made after considering the objections of the Japanese (it is necessary to quote the Japanese-French Pact, and also, the economic problem may be compromised after some additional words are added to the French proposal), if you still object to this, it suggests that there are some oppositionists in the Japanese Government who are against settling the French Indo-China problem with the French Government and they are trying to postpone the settlement purposely.

Vice-Minister: That is a great misunderstanding, on the contrary, we suspect that the French are trying to delay the settlement. After that we took into consideration the desires of the French again. The Minister informed us this morning, that this military demand was of a temporary and exceptional character, all the expenses of the military action shall be charged to the Japanese /Government/ and concerning the details of the military action and expenses, the Japanese and French authorities on the spot shall consult secretly. We believe that there will be no other way to settle this matter than to add these above-mentioned points. Therefore I hope you will
lindy convey the amended draft handed over French translation of letter received and sent, Nos. 1 and 2 of attached document No. 7, to the French Government and endeavour to persuade the Government. In case France should further postpone the settlement /of the matter/ the responsibility will be with the French should an unforeseen incident occur in French Indo-China.

Ambassador: Anyway, I will convey your proposal to my home government.

10. The concrete military requests which were unofficially presented to the French -
(The conference between Ambassador Henry and Chief of Western Eurasian Bureau, held in the evening of August 21).

On the night of the 21st, the Chief of the Eurasian Bureau visited the French Ambassador in Tokyo and stated that although, actually, to notify /you/ of our secret military items is not preferable, and as we observed that the French were very doubtful — much more doubtful than we expected — as to our military demands, we conferred with the armed forces authorities, and as a result to speedily resolve the matter and dissolve the French suspicion we have decided to unofficially notify you the outline of the contents of our request. Saying this, he handed the following /to the Ambassador/ and said, as we have done all we can regards this matter we only hope that you will transmit our request to your home government and obtain the approval of it quickly without any alterations. Then, the Ambassador promised that he would transmit the above to his home government.

(a) The number of air fields in Tonkin, province which shall be utilized by the Japanese army and navy forces.

For the time being one place around the districts of Hanoi, Phamlung Thuong and Phutho respectively shall be used as permanent air-fields. But according to the situation other air-fields near the FIC-China border may be utilized.

(b) The approximate number of Japanese forces to be stationed in TONKIN province. The units necessary for the guarding of the above-mentioned air-fields, the air force unit to use these air-fields and the supply units, (including guards for transportation) engaged in transporting supplies to the above-mentioned respective units and Japanese units in Chinese territory adjacent to French Indo-China, the total no. of Army and Naval units not exceeding 5,000 — 6,000.

(c) The route of passage for the Japanese forces in the Tonking province. According to the necessity of operations against China, the zone along the Haiphong, Hanoi and Langson line and Hanoi and Langson line may be used for the passage of Japanese troops. The strength
(including that of the units necessary for the transportation of the above units and supplies to the same and guarding of the transportation) of the units shall be other than those mentioned in (b) but their number cannot be stated at present.

Note I: For the transportation of the Japanese Army or supplies or for guarding the transports several ships of the Imperial Japanese Navy may enter HaiPhong.

Note II. Communications equipment (mainly wireless) for exclusive use of the Japanese Army and Navy shall naturally accompany the above.

11. The 2nd French counter-proposal in regards to the draft of the exchange of notes (Conference between Vice-Minister OKASHI and Ambassador HENRY on August 25th).

On August 25th, Ambassador HENRY called on Vice-Minister OKASHI and according to instructions from his home government he presented the French draft concerning the military, political and economic matters as attached document No. 8 and asked our approval. The Vice-Minister pointed out that the acceptance of Japan's three military requests (1) the air fields in the Tongking Province to be used by the Japanese Army, (2) the number of Japanese troops to be stationed in the Tongking Province/which are such units as the air-force units, the maintenance corps and other units to use the airfields and the supply units for Japanese troops now in Chinese territory near the frontier, (3) the course of passage for the units, had not been clearly mentioned. Though the Vice-Minister insisted on specifically mentioning the above, the Ambassador stated clearly that to specify the above in an official letter is impossible from the French prestige point of view, but actually this is recognized at negotiations held on the spot, and insisted on the agreement as it stands.

The ambassador stated that he wished to keep in absolute secrecy and not to announce the agreements after the negotiations have succeeded to which the Vice-Minister gave his consent. Therefore, as a result of consulting with the military, it was decided to accept it in order to settle this matter quickly, and when in the night of the same day the Chief of the Eurasian Bureau showed to the Ambassador our draft letter which is attached document No. 9 vis-a-vis the French draft letter, the Ambassador had no objection, and to make sure wired it back to the home government for instructions.

12. August 30th. The exchange of official notes and the oral application offered from Foreign Minister TSUJIKI to Ambassador HENRY to supplement the exchanged official notes.

Based upon the results of the negotiation between OKASHI and HENRY on the 25th, an exchange of official notes such as Appendix No. 10 (I) and (II) was made on August 30th, at the Foreign Minister's
official residence between Foreign Minister HISHI and Ambassador HENRI, and the present Franco-Japanese negotiation which saw much complications, came to a conclusion two months after the opening of negotiations.

Moreover, for the purpose of promoting an immediate agreement concerning our military requirements in French Indo-China, Foreign Minister HISHI made an oral statement to Ambassador Henri at the time of the aforementioned official note exchange, as follows:

1.) In your letter there is no clear statement that France would accept our military requirements; the outline of its tangible contents was privately revealed to you by HISHI, the director of the Europe-Asia Bureau. But it seems that you have clearly stated on the 25th to Vice-Minister OKUTA that although France cannot clearly specify the aforementioned purport in writing from the standpoint of dignity, actually she has the intention of accepting all the aforementioned requirements. However, as far as the Imperial Government is concerned, she will place confidence upon the aforementioned statement of the French Government and will accept your letter.

2.) The Imperial Government feels that our military requirements can be filled immediately in French Indo-China. The Japanese troops is hastening to fulfill the requirements under pressure of various situations and the High Command has decided to designate Major-General NISHIURA, who is the chairman of the Inspection Committee observing the situation of banning transportation of goods destined for the Chiang-Lai-Shek Government via French Indo-China, to become the representative of the Supreme Commander of the dispatched Army and Navy; combining both posts. They issued instructions to the said General to conclude a spot agreement at HANOI with the Commander of French Army so that our aforementioned requirements can be filled as quickly as possible, and, if circumstances allow, that this task be accomplished within the fortnight. Therefore, it is desired that the French Government inform the Governor-General of French Indo-China that France has substantially accepted the military requirements of Japan revealed privately to you by NISHI, the director of Europe-Asia Bureau, and issue instructions to conclude the aforementioned agreement immediately.
13. The 1st negotiation for agreement on the spot.

On August 31 Major-Gen. NISHIHARA called on the Governor General of French Indo-China and proposed to commence military negotiations according to the aforesaid MITSUOKA-HENRY Agreement, to which the Governor General did not respond, saying that he had not received any instructions from the home government. Thereupon, NISHIHARA decided to evacuate all the observation personnel and Japanese residents if the French /authorities/ failed to agree to our requests by the evening of Sept. 2nd, and in regards to the above asked the understanding of our Consul General. At noon the following day, the 31st, the Maj.-General called on the Governor General again, but found no way to commence negotiations. As there were various conditions, strategically and diplomatically, which necessitate immediate opening of negotiations, this ministry /the Foreign Ministry/ wired to Ambassador SAWADA in France to urge the French Government to give instructions to the Governor General of French Indo-China to commence immediately the negotiations on the spot. (Telegram received from Hanoi 2nd Sept. 1940/ No. 197, 198 and Telegram sent to France 2nd Sept. 1940 /No. 401). In the night of Sept. 2nd, Maj.-Gen. NISHIHARA again called on the Governor General, who stated that although he received instructions from the home government that evening, the message was rather long and had many points which were incomprehensible, so desired the negotiation to be postponed until the morning of the 3rd. Although the Maj General demanded the immediate commencement of negotiations, the Governor General declined to accept it. Therefore the Maj. General handed the notification previously prepared as to the withdrawal of Japanese residents and the stationing of troops after Sept. 5th /to the Governor General/. Thereupon the Governor General stated that some reply shall be given in one hour's time, so the Maj.-General temporarily withdrew his notification. But at 10:30 P.M. a note from the Governor General was sent in which it was stated that the contents of the instructions from the home government as to the proposal for an agreement on the spot differed to quite an extent with that of ours, and advocated a revision and desired to commence from the 3rd. Major General NISHIHARA, judging that if the negotiation were commenced under such conditions, no conclusion could be attained in a short period, immediately proposed to the Governor General that the Commander-in-Chief of Japanese Expeditionary Force in South China has decided to advance his Army into French India after Sept. 5th. At the same time he also notified the Consulate-General of the above circumstances, consequently Consul-General SUZUKI immediately took steps on the 4th to retain the Bangkok Maru and the Saigon Maru which were at that time in Haiphong and Bangkok respectively and prepared for evacuation on 4th. (Tel. rcc. from Hanoi 3rd Sept. No. 197, 198. Tel. sent to Hanoi 3rd Sept. 1940/ No. 405 as the endeavors of both governments have come to naught, again at Tokyo, Ambassador SAVADA was instructed to persuade the French home government to give instructions to the Governor General to accept our demands (Tel. sent to France 3rd Sept. 1940 /No. 405; Tel. Rec. from France 4 Sept. No. 715, 717) at the same time, when the French Ambassador in Tokyo came to see
Vice-Minister Ohashi, he also requested that instructions be given to the Governor General of French Indo-China for the conclusions of agreements on the spot by the home government. Thus the Ambassador accepted. (Tel. sent to France 3rd Sept. No. 406).

On the other hand, Major Gen. Nishihara met with the Commanding General of the French Indo-China Army at 10 A.M. on the 3rd, at which time the Commander said that as he had wired to the Vichy Government yesterday evening that the negotiations had ended in failure, he has now no authority to negotiate, and that as a counter-proposal is being drafted, meeting with the Governor General is desired. Waiting for the said counter-proposal it was sent in the evening of the same day. Therefore Major Gen. Nishihara again requested to meet the Commanding General, to which he replied that he wished to postpone the negotiations until 9 A.M. of the 4th, because he was tired. (Tel. Rec. from Hanoi 4th Sept. No. 195). At 8 P.M. on the 4th an Agreement on the spot (Attached document No. 11) was signed between Major General Nishihara and Marten, the Commanding General. (Tel. Rec. from Hanoi 4th Sept. No. 200, 5th Sept. No. 201, Tel. sent to France 7th Sept. No. 411).

14. The Second negotiation for agreement of details on the spot.

Concerning the military pact which was signed on 4 September, agreement of details was expected to be concluded within the 6th, but a unit of the Japanese Army crossed the border at Liang-shan district in South China on the morning of the 6th, and on the following day, the Governor General proposed to Maj. General Nishihara to drop the negotiation on the pretext that the above incident was a contravention of the pact. In regards to the aforesaid, Maj. General Nishihara explained in length that it was an arbitrary decision taken by a front line unit which did not know of the conclusion of the military agreement and was by no means the intention of the Japanese military authorities. However, the Governor General would not change his attitude at all, and it seemed as if he were postponing the negotiations purposely. (Telegram from Hanoi: 8th Sept. No. 205, 9th Sept. No. 206. Telegram to Geneva 8 Sept. No. 84)

Therefore, the Japanese Government sent instructions to Ambassador Sawada in France to propose to the French Government that in case the settlement of this problem should be postponed any longer, some unforeseen incident may happen, so the French Government should give instructions to the Governor General of French Indo-China to settle the negotiation with Japan immediately. (Telegram to France, 10th Sept. No. 417 Telegram from France, 13th Sept. No. 736).
After that, on 11th, the French Ambassador in Tokyo visited Vice-Minister OHASHI, and said that he had received information that the Thailand Army was also likely to invade French Indo-China, coordinating with the advance of the Japanese Army. Then the matter would be a hopeless case so he proposed that Japan stop Thailand's plan. On the 12th, the Vice Minister asked the French Ambassador to visit him, and told him this issue was one between France and Thailand and Japan had nothing to do with it, moreover, that the French proposal was nothing but her policy to postpone the negotiations. ISHIZAWA, the Chief of the Third Section of European Affairs, too, proposed to the French Embassy Secretary Dangeran (selling approved by French Division) to the same effect. (Telegram No. 2018 to Hanoi and Bangkok on Sep. 11; Telegram No. 194 to Bangkok on Sep. 12. Gist of the talk between Vice-Minister and French Ambassador on Sep. 11, Gists of the telephonic conversations between Chief of the Third Section of European Affairs and the French Secretary on Sep. 12. Gist of the talk between Vice-Minister and French Ambassador on Sep. 12).

On 13th, Maj. Gen. NISHIHARA had an interview with the Governor-General, who told him that in accordance with the instructions from the French Government to continue the negotiations, the Headquarters of the French Indo-Chinese Army was earnestly studying the details. The negotiations, nevertheless, have shown no progress since that time. (Telegram from Hanoi, Sep. 14, No. 212). In TOKYO, the French Ambassador called on Vice-Minister on the 16th and said again that the Japanese were responsible for the delay of the negotiations and that Thailand's movements were backed by Japan. The Vice-Minister contradicted and told him the actual situation on the spot is very serious, and as our army may commence advancement into FIC at any moment without waiting for an agreement of the details, therefore wish the French Government to instruct the French Indo-China authorities to conclude the agreement of the details. (Telegram to France and Hanoi on Sep. 16, No. 2057).

On the 17th, the Governor-General and the Commanding-General of the Army gave us their general consent to our request. But even after the conclusion of an agreement and the Japanese Army makes a peaceful occupation some clashes with the French Indo-China forces are unavoidable so, for the time being, it has been decided to evacuate all Japanese residents on the 20th. (Telegrams No. 215, 216, 217 and 219 from Hanoi, Sept. 18. Telegrams No. 229, 233, 237, and 240 to Hanoi, Sept. 18. Telegram No. 81 from Saigon, Sep. 20.) The next day, the 18th, Commander of the French Indo-China Army replied, but, there existed a wide difference of opinion between the two. As it was deemed useless to continue the negotiations, Maj. Gen. NISHIHARA notified the French authorities that all the members of the Japanese Observation Party would leave Hanoi on the 20th. In TOKYO, too, the Vice-Minister informed the French Ambassador on the 19th that the Japanese forces would advance into TONKIN Province at any time after zero hour of Sep. 23rd, whether the agreement on details will be concluded or not. (Telegram No. 220 from Hanoi, Sep. 20. Telegram No. 235 to Hanoi, Sep. 19. Telegram No. 87
to Geneva, Sep. 19. Telegram No. 2080 to our offices in America, Thailand, and 8 other countries, Sep. 19. Telegram No. 433 to France, Sep. 19.) On the same day, several negotiations were held on the spot but without any results. The Japanese residents in the Hanoi area and most of the members of the Observation Party arrived at Hai-phong and embarked on the HAKKAI-KARU and the SURABAYA-MARU, and those in the Saigon area embarked on the ARIZONA-MARU. (Telegram No. 233 from Hanoi, Sep. 20. Telegram through Navy from Hanoi, Sep. 21.) As soon as the ships started for HAIPHO at noon of the 22nd, the Japanese troops in CRENHAIWANG area began to advance. At 14.30 hours of the same day, they (the French authorities) suddenly adopted a compromising attitude and, at last, the agreement on details, as per attached document No. 12, was signed. (Telegram through Navy from Hanoi, Sep. 22, Telegram from HAKKAI-KARU, Sep. 21. Telegram No. 155 from HAIKOW, Sep. 23. Telegram No. 2125 to our offices in Britain, U.S. and 11 other countries, Sept. 22nd, Telegram No. 429 to France Sept. 22nd).

On the 24th, final agreement was reached in regards to the military agreement between Major-General NISHIHARA and the representative of the Commander of the French Indo-China Army on board the battleship KAWACHI. It was decided that the main part of the expeditionary force will enter Hai-phong harbour on the 25th and land on the 26th. (Telegram sent by Consul-General SUZUKI through Navy on 24 Sept.).

1. "Particulars concerning the evacuation of Japanese residents."

Consul-General SUZUKI in HANOI, who has been preparing the evacuation of the Japanese residents in view of the strained condition of negotiations between Japan and French Indo-China, issued private evacuation orders on the 18th to all Japanese residents. At the same time, he has reached an agreement with the Governor-General of French Indo-China as to the method of protecting the lives and properties of Japanese residents in the course of evacuation. Residents under the jurisdiction of the Consulate-General at HANOI reached HAIPHO at 7 A.M. on the 20th by special train, and at noon boarded the HACHIKAI MARU (chiefly old people, children and women) and the SURABAYA MARU (chiefly men in the prime of life) and awaited development. Also, the Japanese residents under jurisdiction of the Consulate-General at SAIGON boarded the ARIZONA MARU on the same day at SAIGON. (Telegram No. 213 from HANOI dated September 16, No. 217 dated September 18, No. 219 dated September 19; telegrams No. 80 and No. 81 from SAIGON dated September 18; telegrams No. 229 and No. 233 to Hanoi dated September 18, and No. 237 dated September 19).

Various meetings were held concerning the execution of the HACHIKAI MARU and the SURABAYA MARU departed at 10 A.M. on the 22nd for HAIKOW. On the 20th, the ARIZONA MARU left SAIGON. (A telegram from HANOI via the Navy, dated September 21; a telegram from the HACHIKAI MARU at
HANOI dated September 22: a telegram from the ARIZONA MARU at SAIGON dated September 21; a telegram to HANOI via Navy dated September 21; telegram No. 240 to HANOI dated September 21.

All the members of the Consulate-General at HANOI and the Japanese residents totaling approximately 300 persons arrived at Kaikow at noon of the 23rd aboard the HACHIKAI MARU and the SURABAYA MARU. Members of the Consulate-General at SAIGON and the Japanese residents totaling 117 persons arrived at Kaikow at 4 P.M. of the 24th. After confering with the Central authorities and with military circles, it was decided that the Consul-General and a part of his staff were to return to HAI PHONG aboard the SURABAYA MARU on the 25th. The HACHIKAI MARU departed for NAGASAKI and the ARIZONA MARU for Moji via KILUNG. (Telegram No. 155 from USA dated September 23; telegrams No. 157, No. 158, No. 161, No. 162, dated September 25; telegram No. 98 to KAICOW on September 24.)

The HACHIKAI MARU arrived at NAGASAKI on September 30, and the ARIZONA MARU arrived at KOBE on November 2. Thus, the evacuation matters were completed. Requests for facilitating the customs clearance of the evacuees had been made previously to the authorities concerned. (Telegram No. 5366 to Finance, Home and Welfare Ministry dated September 26; telegram No. 135 OSAN to Railway Ministry; telegrams to HACHIKAI MARU and ARIZONA MARU dated September 29; a telegram from ARIZONA MARU on September 29; telegrams from Vice-Consul URABE at NAGASAKI on September 29, 30; telegram to Vice-Consul URABE at Moji on October 1; telegram No. 1187 UN from Railway Ministry on October 1; telegrams Nos. 43 to KOREA on October 1; telegram from Vice-Consul WATANABE at NAGASAKI on October 1; telegram from Vice-Consul URABE at KOBE on October 2.)

On the other hand, Consul-General SUZUKI and his party arrived at HAI PHONG on the 28th, and returned to KOREA on the 29th, and resumed duties. Members of the Consulate at SAIGON that returned once to Japan, have gone back to SAIGON again, and resumed duties formally on October 20. (Telegram No. 226 from HANOI on September 29 and 30, telegram No. 228 on November 2; telegram No. 260 to HANOI on October 9, telegram No. 257 on October 10; telegrams Nos. 248 from HANOI on October 2, telegrams Nos. 33 and 84 from SAIGON on October 29.)
Mr. Ambassador:

The Government of Japan being desirous of promoting friendly relations between French Indo-China and Japan and wishing to do their utmost for this purpose, I have the honour of notifying your Excellency that the same desire, that the Government of France with a spirit of cooperation to restore peace and establish a new order in East Asia, will allow Japanese troops to be sent for operations against China, to pass through Tonking Province of French Indo-China and recognize the use of the airfields in that province (including the stationing of necessary guards), and to furnish sufficient facilities for transporting arms, ammunition and other necessary materials of the Japanese Army.

I have the honour to be

Your Obedient Servant.

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Attached No. 2

Exchanges of Notes (Draft of) (Letter received).

I have the honour of acknowledging the following letter from Your Excellency.

The Government of Japan being desirous of promoting friendly relations between French Indo-China and Japan and wishing to do its utmost for this purpose, I have the honour of notifying your Excellency that the same desire, that the Government of France with a spirit of cooperation to restore peace and establish a new order in East Asia, will allow Japanese troops to be sent for operations against China, to pass through Tonking Province of French Indo-China and recognize the use of the airfields in that province (including the stationing of necessary guards) and furnish sufficient facilities for transporting arms, ammunition and other necessary materials of the Japanese Army.

I, according to instructions from the home government, have the honour of replying that the Government of France well understand the spirit of goodwill expressed in your Excellency's letter cited above and also accept the desires of the Government of Japan.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your Obedient Servant.
A tentative translation of the memorandum about the French Indo-China problem which was handed to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA by Ambassador Henry on August 15th (already corrected).

The French Ambassador has conveyed to the home government the demands recently submitted by the (Japanese) Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, and has received instructions from the home government to notify the (Japanese) Foreign Minister, in regards to the problem thereof, the following:

The French government has fully understood with satisfaction the desire of the Imperial Japanese Government to open negotiations to deal with the problems which are important in view of the interests of both countries and not adverse to their happiness and prestige.

The French Government hopes the fact that, since the end of 1937, it has given Japan very important "concessions" with a friendly spirit to Japan without receiving any compensation will be recalled, that is, France has prohibited the transportation of war materials and munitions to China via Tonking province and this has been executed notwithstanding the fact that there exists no declaration of war and such a prohibition must be an infringement of formal agreements. Afterwards, the French government has, according to the new demands of Japan, added other materials and goods to the contrabands for China, has agreed to close the French Indo-China frontier completely and finally has consented to the dispatch of a Japanese observation committee to the actual place /frontier to investigate whether the French authorities have taken the required measures or not.

In conformity with all the evidence which proves friendship and goodwill, the French government demands that the Japanese government promise, before any further negotiations, to respect the status quo and territorial integrity of Indo-China, and other interests of France in the Far East. The French government will recognize in return, the special importance of Japanese interests in this part of the world. According to the opinion of the French government the interests of the two countries can be completely harmonized, which would be to the greatest advantage to both countries. There is another reason why France was convinced of the opinion of his Excellency MATSUOKA, in expressing in his conference with Mr. Arsene Henry on 26th of July, that he was considering an economic coalition between Japan and France which could be applied not only in Indo-China, but to whole China and MANCHUKUO. Anyhow, the primary result of the recognition by France of the special importance of Japanese interests in the Far East can appear as the realization of close economic coalition between Indo-China and Japan. The French government thinks that no negotiation can be held effectively as long as the above declaration is not exchanged.

Especially concerning the military demands, the French government desires to discuss the above after a formal recognition of French sovereignty over Indo-China and the territorial integrity of French Indo-China by the Japanese Government.
The tentative translation of the memorandum concerning the political and military problems in French Indo-China, handed to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA by the French ambassador in Tokyo on Aug. 20th.

The French government is greatly satisfied to acknowledge the following assurance given through the French ambassador by your Excellency the Foreign Minister.

Your excellency MATSUOKA has asserted that Japan desires to be faithful to the policies adopted since the conclusions of "the agreement" of June 10th, 1907. Those policies are, according to the text of the agreement, based on the maintenance of the position and territorial right of two high contracting Parties in the continent of Asia. Your excellency KATSUOKA has stated that Japan wishes to arrange and settle by negotiations the military facilities which she demands of the French government. This demand has as its only object the settlement of the hostilities between Japan and the CHIANG Kai-shek government, being cancelled after the said settlement is achieved and also is to be limited to the border between Indo-china and China.

Accordingly the French government considers that the Imperial government will not find difficulty in confirming to the French government the assurances and especially the acknowledgement of French sovereignty in Indo-China, which resulted from the agreement of June 10th, 1907. When Japan will give this confirmation to the French government, the same will be ready to acknowledge the predominant rights and interests of Japan in economic and military affairs in the Far East.

Concerning the end of the above-mentioned paragraph, the French government is ready to discuss without delay the method of assuring the superior position of Japan and Japanese in Indo-China compared to that of other foreign countries, according to the spirit of "the Declaration" of June 10th, 1907.

But the position given to the Japanese as a result thereof, cannot be the same as that of French nationals who have built the present prosperity of Indo-China through their efforts of more than sixty years.

Concerning the military problems, the French government agrees to both home governments issuing general instructions to their respective dispatched military commanders to hold meetings between themselves on the spot. When the Imperial government will accept this procedure, both countries shall send to their military commanders the following necessary instructions simultaneously.

The military commanders of both Japan and France, after declaring upon their word of honour as soldiers, shall exchange information which shall enable them to judge correctly the method through which the demand
of the Japanese Army may be carried out satisfactorily.

The above demand shall be connected only with the execution of operations in the border territory between Tonking and China.

The military commanders of both countries shall, as a result of the exchange of secret information, frankly confer in regards to the provisions of facilities which are considered to be necessary for the Japanese army.

The Japanese army and those serving with the army shall respect the regulations of hospitality given by a friendly country. All expenses shall be charged to the Imperial Japanese Government.

Movement and transportation shall be strictly limited to the necessity of military action, this being guaranteed and under the effective direction of the French military authorities.

(Attached Document No. 5)

Tentative translation of the draft of the Exchange of Notes concerning the French Indo-China issues, which was presented by the French Ambassador in TOKYO to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA on August 20.

The French Government proposes that military and economic negotiations, and the various assurances as to the respect of French sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of Indo-China shall be given in the form of an Exchange of Notes. The French Ambassador has the honour of inserting the following draft of the note to be sent from your Excellency, the Foreign Minister to the French Ambassador. The French Ambassador, in reply to the aforesaid note, shall send a note citing the original as it is and giving the approval of the same.

The Draft of the Letter

Kr. Ambassador,

I, /the Foreign Minister/ have had the opportunity of conveying to your Excellency, in the course of repeated conferences, that Japan desires to abide by the Franco-Japanese Agreement of June 10th, 1907, and maintain the policy decided and carried out since that day.

The objective of the above-mentioned agreement is in the maintenance of mutual position and territorial rights of both High Contracting Parties in the Asiatic Continent. Therefore, it is easy this day, to give
to Your Excellency the assurance that the Japanese Government desires to respect the territorial integrity of Indo-China and the sovereignty of France in the whole area of the Union of Indo-China.

On the other hand, I acknowledge your Excellency's letter to the effect that the French government recognizes Japan's predominant interest in the Far East in both the political and economic fields.

In the economic field I state that the French Government is prepared to consider a method to assure the predominant position of Japan and its nationals compared to that of other countries in Indo-China, according to the spirit of the announcement of June 10th, 1907, made by the French Government.

In regards to the provision of military facilities for which the Japanese Government intends to negotiate with the French Government to obtain their recognition, I deem it necessary to call to the Ambassador's attention that this request is based entirely on the desire to settle the dispute between the Japanese Government and Generalissimo Chiang-kai shek and that this exceptional and temporary provision of facilities will disappear in the event of the settlement of the above dispute, Furthermore, limited to the Indo-China and Chinese border zone.

The Japanese Government is prepared to instruct the Japanese army staff to negotiate with the French Indo-China Army staff in HANOI in regards to military problems.

The above negotiations shall be conducted under the following conditions:

Declaring upon their word of honour as soldiers the aforesaid military authorities shall exchange information enabling them to judge correctly the needs of the Japanese Army and the method to execute the same satisfactorily. The above requirements shall be confined to military operations in the TONKIN and Chinese border zone.

In order to provide military facilities deemed necessary as a result of the above exchange of information, mutually trustworthy relations between Japanese and French military authorities shall be established.

It is needless to say that the Japanese Army which enjoys the aforesaid facilities shall respect the rules of cordial treatment which the friendly nation may offer without shouldering any financial expenditure; and that the above facilities shall be strictly confined to the necessity of Japanese military operations and assured under the supervision of French military authorities.
Exchanges of Notes (Draft of)

Mr. Ambassador. The Government of Japan being desirous of promoting friendly relations between French Indo-China and Japan and wishing to do their utmost for this purpose, I have the honour of notifying your Excellency that the same desires that the Government of France with a spirit of cooperation to restore peace and establish a new order in East Asia, will allow Japanese troops to be sent for operations against China, to pass through Tongking Province of French Indo-China and recognize the use of the air-fields in that Province (including the stationing of necessary guards), and furnish sufficient facilities for transporting arms, ammunition and other necessary materials of the Japanese Army.

Furthermore, I wish to state that Japan has no intention at all to infringe on other territory of French Indo-China.

I have the honour to be Your Excellency’s Obedient Servant.

* * * *

Exchanges of Notes (Notes received).

I wish to state that France has no intention at all to infringe on other territory of French Indo-China.

I have the honour of replying that, according to instructions of the home government, the government of France together with approving the predominant position of Japan in the Far East and well understanding the spirit of goodwill expressed in Your Excellency’s letter cited above, do hereby accept the desires of the Government of Japan.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant.
Mr. Ambassador: The Government of Japan being desirous of promoting friendly relations between French Indo-China and Japan and wishing to do their utmost for this purpose, I have the honour of notifying your Excellency the same desires that the Government of France with a spirit of cooperation to restore peace and establish a new order in East Asia, will allow Japanese troops to be sent for operations against China, to pass through Tongking Province of French Indo-China and recognize the use of the airfields in that Province (including the stationing of necessary guards), and furnish sufficient facilities for the transportation of armament and other necessary materials of the Japanese Army.

In regards to the above problem, I wish to add that the said desires voiced by the Government of Japan are based on the necessity from standpoint of operations against China; the contents of which are of an exceptional and temporary character; Japan has no intentions whatsoever of infringing upon the territory of French Indo-China; when the government of France approves the above desires of the government of Japan, the same shall shoulder the expenses resulting from military action taken by the Japanese Army in Indo-China; and wish the Japanese and French authorities on the spot to confer secretly as to the details of military action to be taken and the responsibilities of the expenses resulting from the said activities.

I have the honour to be

Your Excellency's Obedient Servant.

* * * * *

Mr. Minister: I have the honour of acknowledging the following letter from your Excellency.

The Government of Japan being desirous of promoting friendly relations between French Indo-China and Japan and wishing to do their utmost for this purpose, I have the honour of notifying your Excellency the same desires that the Government of France with a spirit of cooperation to restore peace and establish a new order in East Asia, will allow Japanese troops to be sent for operations against China, to pass through Tongking Province of French Indo-
China and recognize the use of the airfields in that Province (including the stationing of necessary guards), and furnish sufficient facilities for the transportation of arms, ammunition and other necessary materials of the Japanese Army.

In regards to the above problems, I wish to add that the said desires voiced by the Government of Japan are based on necessity from the standpoint of operations against China; the contents of which are of a temporary and exceptional character; Japan has no intention whatsoever of infringing upon the territory of French Indo-China; when the Government of France approves the above desires of the Government of Japan, the same shall shoulder the expenses resulting from military action taken by the Japanese Army in Indo-China; and wish the Japanese and French authorities on the spot to confer secretly as to the details of military action to be taken and the responsibilities of the expenses resulting from the said activities.

I have the honour of replying that according to the instructions of the Home Government, the Government of France fully understanding the friendly spirit expressed by the Government of Japan in your Excellency's letter, do hereby recognize Japan's dominant position in the Far East, and at the same time accept the afore-mentioned desires of the Government of Japan.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant.
China and recognize the use of the airfields in that Province (including the stationing of necessary guards), and furnish sufficient facilities for the transportation of arms, ammunition and other necessary materials of the Japanese Army.

In regards to the above problems, I wish to add that the said desires voiced by the Government of Japan are based on necessity from the standpoint of operations against China; the contents of which are of a temporary and exceptional character; Japan has no intention whatsoever of infringing upon the territory of French Indo-China; when the Government of France approves the above desires of the Government of Japan, the same shall shoulder the expenses resulting from military action taken by the Japanese Army in Indo-China; and wish the Japanese and French authorities on the spot to confer secretly as to the details of military action to be taken and the responsibilities of the expenses resulting from the said activities.

I have the honour of replying that according to the instructions of the Home Government, the Government of France fully understanding the friendly spirit expressed by the Government of Japan in your Excellency's letter, do hereby recognize Japan's dominant position in the Far East, and at the same time accept the afore-mentioned desires of the Government of Japan.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant.
Tentative translation of the letter received from the French Ambassador concerning the French Indochina problem, which was presented to Vice-Minister Ohashi by the French Ambassador in Tokyo on 25th August.

Mr. Minister:

I have the honour of notifying Your Excellency that the Government of France recognize the predominant interests of Japan in the economic and political fields in the Far East. Therefore the Government of France expects the Government of Japan will give assurance(s) to the Government of France that Japan is with the intention of respecting the rights and interests of France in the Far East, especially the territorial integrity of Indochina, and the sovereignty of France in all parts of the Union of Indochina.

In regards to problems in the economical field, France is prepared to negotiate speedily as to the method of assuring the most advantageous position possible, (and superior compared to that of other foreign countries) to Japan and its nationals.

As to the provision of special military facilities which Japan has requested of France, the same understands that the said provision of facilities is completely based on Japan's desire to resolve the conflict between Generalissimo Chiang-Kai-shek, consequently the aforesaid is temporary and will cease in the event such a conflict is resolved, and shall be limited to the boundary province(s) of Indochina facing China.

Under the above-mentioned conditions, the Government of France are prepared to order the commander of the French Army in Indochina to settle the said military problems with the Japanese commander. Demands submitted by the Japanese government shall not be excluded a priori from the said agreement, and orders issued to the French military authorities shall not, in regards to the above points, restrict the competence of the aforesaid authorities.

The negotiations shall be carried out under the following conditions.
Both military commanders shall upon their word of honour as soldiers exchange information which would correctly clarify the necessity of the Japanese army and the method by which the same may be satisfied.

The above-mentioned desires /literally translated "necessity"/ of the Japanese army shall be limited to military operations in boundary province(s) and of Indochina facing China. Following the exchange of information, mutually reliable contacts shall be made between the French and Japanese military authorities to provide the military facilities to the Japanese Army. The Government of France shall not take any financial
responsibilities concerning the various facilities provided to the Japanese Army. These facilities provided shall be strictly limited to strategic necessities and shall be conducted under the superintendence and intermediation of the French military authorities.

Lastly, the Imperial Japanese Government shall promise to take the responsibility of compensating for damages sustained by Indo-China through the act of war of that enemy which may be drawn into the territory of Indo-China because of the presence of, and also by the act of war of the Japanese Army itself.

* * * * *

(Attached Document No. 9)

(Draft of the letter, relating to the French Indo-China Problem, to be sent by the Minister of Foreign Affairs).

Mr. Ambassador: I have the honour of acknowledging the following note dated month day from your Excellency.

(Insert herein the complete letter of the French Ambassador).

I have the honour of notifying your Excellency that the Government of Japan anticipating a speedy achievement of Japan's desires in the negotiations which are foreseen in your Excellency's letter do hereby accept your aforesaid proposals and simultaneously request that the Government of France urgently issue necessary instructions to the authorities on the spot.

I have the honour to be,

Your Excellency's obedient servant.
responsibilities concerning the various facilities provided to the
Japanese Army. These facilities provided shall be strictly limited to
strategic necessities and shall be conducted under the superintendence
and intermediation of the French military authorities.

Lastly, the Imperial Japanese Government shall promise to take the
responsibility of compensating for damages sustained by Indo-China
through the act of war of that enemy which may be drawn into the terri-
tory of Indo-China because of the presence of, and also by the act of
war of the Japanese Army itself.

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(Attached Document No. 9)

(Draft of the letter, relating to the French Indo-
China Problem, to be sent by the Minister of Foreign
Affairs).

Mr. Ambassador: I have the honour of acknowledging the following note
dated month day from your Excellency.

(Insert herein the complete letter of the French Ambassador).

I have the honour of notifying your Excellency that the Government
of Japan anticipating a speedy achievement of Japan's desires in the
negotiations which are foreseen in your Excellency's letter do hereby
accept your aforesaid proposals and simultaneously request that the
Government of France urgently issue necessary instructions to the auth-
orities on the spot.

I have the honour to be,

Your Excellency's obedient servant.
(Attached Document 10 - 1)

(Translation of letter from the French Ambassador)

20 August Showa 15 /1940/

Mr. Minister.

I have the honour of notifying your Excellency that the Government of France recognize the predominant interests of Japan in the economic and political fields in the Far East.

Therefore, the Government of France anticipates the Government of Japan will give their assurance to the Government of France, that Japan is with the intention of respecting the rights and interests of France in the Far East, especially the territorial integrity of Indo-China, and the sovereignty of France in all parts of the Union of Indo-China.

In regards to the economic field, France is prepared to negotiate speedily as to the promotion of trade between Indo-China and Japan, as well as the method of assuring the most advantageous position possible, and superior compared to that of the Third Power, to Japan and its nationals.

As to the provision of special military facilities which Japan has requested of France, the same understands the purport of the Imperial Government to be completely in the settlement of the conflict between Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, consequently the aforesaid is temporary, ceasing in the event such a conflict is resolved and shall be applied to only that province of Indo-China adjacent to China. Under the above-mentioned condition the Government of France are prepared to order the commander of the French Army in Indo-China to settle the said military problems with the Japanese commander. The demands submitted by the Imperial Japanese Government shall not be excluded a priori, and orders issued to the French military authorities shall not, in regards to the above points, restrict the competence of the above authorities.

The negotiations shall be carried out under the following condition.

Both military commanders shall, upon their word of honour as soldiers, exchange information which would clarify the necessities of the Japanese army and the method by which the same may be satisfied. The above mentioned desires of the Japanese army shall be limited to military operations in those provinces in China adjacent to Indo-China.

Following the exchange of information, mutually reliable contacts shall be made between the French and Japanese military authorities to provide the necessary military facilities to the Japanese Army.
Government of France shall not take any financial responsibilities concerning the various facilities provided to the Japanese Army. These facilities provided shall not be of a military occupational nature, but strictly limited to strategic necessities and conducted under the superintendence and intermediation of the French military authorities.

Lastly, the Imperial Japanese Government shall promise to take the responsibility of compensating for damages sustained by Indo-China through the act of war of that army which may be drawn into the territory of Indo-China because of the presence of, and also by the act of war of the Japanese Army itself.

I have the honour to be with the highest consideration,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,
Charles Arsene HENRY
French Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.

His Excellency
Yosuke MATSUOKA
Foreign Minister.

* * * * *

(Attached Document No. 10 -2)

(Copy of letter to be sent by the Foreign Minister)


30 August 15 Showa /1940/

Mr. Ambassador.

I have the honour to acknowledge the following letter from your Excellency, dated 30 August 15 Showa /1940/.

I have the honour of notifying your Excellency that the Government of France recognize the predominant interests of Japan in the economic and political fields in the Far East.

Therefore, the Government of France anticipates the Government of Japan will give their assurance/s/ to the Government of France, that Japan is with the intention of respecting the rights and interests of France in the Far East, especially the territorial integrity of Indo-China,
and the sovereignty of France in all parts of the Union of Indo-China.

In regards to the economic field, France is prepared to negotiate speedily as to the promotion of trade between Indo-China and Japan, as well as the method of assuring the most advantageous position possible, and superior compared to that of the Third Power, to Japan and its nationals.

As to the provision of special military facilities which Japan has requested of France, the same understands the purport of the Imperial Government to be completely in the settlement of the conflict between Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, consequently the aforesaid is temporary, ceasing in the event such a conflict is resolved and shall be applied to only that province of Indo-China adjacent to China. Under the above-mentioned condition the Government of France are prepared to order the commander of the French Army in Indo-China to settle the said military problems with the Japanese commander. The demands submitted by the Imperial Japanese Government shall not be excluded a priori, and orders issued to the French military authorities shall not, in regards to the above points, restrict the competence of the above authorities.

The negotiations shall be carried out under the following conditions.

Both military commanders shall, upon their word of honour as soldiers, exchange information which would clarify the necessities of the Japanese army and the method by which the same may be satisfied. The above-mentioned desires /literally translated 'necessity'/ of the Japanese army shall be limited to military operations in those provinces in China adjacent to Indo-China.

Following the exchange of information, mutually reliable contacts shall be made between the France and Japanese military authorities to provide the necessary military facilities to the Japanese Army. The Government of France shall not take any financial responsibilities concerning the various facilities provided to the Japanese Army. These facilities provided shall not be of a military occupational nature, but strictly limited to strategic necessities and conducted under the superintendence and intermediation of the French military authorities.

Lastly, the Imperial Japanese Government shall promise to take the responsibility of compensating for damages sustained by Indo-China through the act of war of that enemy
which may be drawn into the territory of Indo-China because of the presence of, and also by the act of war of the Japanese Army itself.

In reply to your letter cited above, I have the honour of notifying your Excellency that the Government of Japan are with the intention of respecting the rights and interests of France in the Far East, especially the territorial integrity and sovereignty of France in all parts of the Union of Indo-China; accept those proposals made by the Government of France; and desire that negotiations, with the objective of satisfying Japan's demands, be commenced without delay and anticipate the speedy achievement of the objective as well as the Government of France to issue, hereafter necessary instructions to the Indo-China authorities for this purpose.

I have the honour to be, with the highest consideration,

Your Excellency's obedient Servant,

Yosuke MATSUO
Foreign Minister.

His Excellency
Charles Arsene KEHAY
French Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.
The circumstances surrounding the conclusion of agreement between Japan and France

Attached Document No. 11 (Translated by the Army)

Basic data for the purpose of concluding the military agreement between the representatives of the commander-in-chief of Japanese Army and Naval forces despatched to South China and the commander-in-chief of the French Indo-China Army.

These basic data originate from the instruction issued by the French Government and was communicated to the representative of Japanese military and Naval forces on September 3, 1940.

(1) General Remarks

The negotiations about to be opened should be conducted in a most amicable atmosphere. Particularly whenever the French Military authorities show any sign of friendliness towards the Japanese Army of assist in protecting Japanese Army establishment, Japan on the other hand will full appreciate the French intention of carrying out the terms of the agreement.

Regardless of the situation, whenever the French authorities give any facilities to the Japanese army it will not bear the nature of compulsion through military occupation. The convenience thus afforded to the Japanese Army will be strictly limited to the demand of strategical and tactical situation and it will be performed under the supervision and administration of the French Military authorities.

From the position on the seacoast selected as a landing place to the strategic zone transit is free but on no account troops should be stationed for any length of time between the landing place and the strategic zone.

(2) Basic Data

No Japanese troops whatever arms they may belong to are permitted to enter "HANOI" without the special authorization of the French Commander in Chief. Movements of Japanese troops are limited to the north side of River Ruje (phonetic).
In strategic zones both French administrative and military organs will remain in their place and retain their old authori-
ties. Whenever there arises the necessity of Japanese Army coming into contact with the natives, it will be done through the intermediary of the former.

The numerical strength of the Japanese ground forces existing in the district of Tonkin including both its com-
batant and non-combatant personnel must not exceed more than two thirds viz - 25,000 of the mobilized forces in the district of Tonkin.

The Japanese Army promises the following items:

1. It will bear all expenses arising from transportations of men and material, billeting and any other establishment.

2. It will compensate both the Indo-China government or any private individuals with regard to the damages accruing from the presence of the Japanese Army establishment or through the belligerent actions of both Chinese and Japanese forces in the Indo-Chinese territory.

(3) Strategic Base

The Japanese Army will select one or more bases for strategical purposes in the aforementioned strategical zone.

The positions of strategical bases are as follows:

The district of North and North East of the line (including the native settlement) connecting İHEU (phonetic), BÜCHTÜEN (phonetic), KAI (phonetic), TAI (phonetic), KÜKAI (phonetic) and KEK (phonetic).

(Pages 112 - 115)

The Japanese military authorities have complete freedom for the purpose of selecting one or several strategical bases which are to be chosen under the following conditions; that is, the French authorities will superintend the bases, strictly restrict the losses to be sustained by individuals and make requests for compensation for losses immediately.
The selected landing point is to be "HAI-P'ONG". This port cannot be used as a strategical base. The landing point is to be one, and is to be released in as short a period as possible after the landing of troops and military supplies.

(4) Lines of Communication

The Japanese authorities may use the following lines for military operations:

**Railroads**

| HAI-P'ONG | --- | GIA-LAM |
| GIA-LAM | --- | LANG-SON |
| GIA-LAM | --- | LAOKAY |

**Roads**

| HAI-P'ONG | --- | GIA-LAM |
| GIA-LAM | --- | LANG-SON |
| GIA-LAM | --- | THAI-PAY |

According to circumstances the following line can be made available, after obtaining the special consent of the French military supreme commander.

| GIA-LAM | --- | THAI-NGUYEN | --- | CIO-BUANG | --- | TUYEN-QUANG | --- | HAI-QUANG Road |

However, the abovementioned roads are to be used only according to the requirements of military operations and only during the period necessary for the operation of transport troops.

The method of carrying out this transportation is to be regulated by the agreement between the Japanese and French army authorities.

It is only the French military supreme commander who is qualified to determine the abovementioned course and to grant permission for the sake of reaching one or several strategical bases. The guarding of the communication roads shall be undertaken by French or Japanese troops according to the districts decided.

On principle the guarding of the port from "HAI-P'ONG" to the selected strategical bases is to be undertaken by the French troops.
(5) Air Force

The three air-fields situated to the north of the "ROUGE" River (that is, "THU-TAO", "THI-VEN" and "LIOKAY") can be used and equipped by the Japanese air force.

The military personnel applied for the guarding of these air-fields is to be reduced to the strictest possible minimum and the number of such personnel is to be decided by mutual agreement between the Japanese and French military authorities.

The French authorities are to decide the area where aviation is forbidden as well as aviation regulations in the territorial sky.

The French military authorities are to be informed of the movement of airplanes without the district of military operations 24 hours in advance.

(6) Warships and Transportation

The landing of the personnel and supplies of the Japanese military forces must be carried out only by transports. The warships conveying these transports must not enter within six nautical miles of the line connecting DOSON /phonetic/ and APOYANG /phonetic/. However, one Japanese warship not bigger than a torpedo-boat may enter the port of HAI-PHONG and stay there on the aforementioned conditions.

The French authorities must be informed of the arrival of all groups of Japanese transports and also of the number of soldiers to be landed at least 24 hours in advance.

The number of ships to be moored alongside the wharf will be limited by mutual agreement with the Japanese authorities. The number of the port establishments will likewise be limited and it is a matter of course that the use of these establishments will not be permanent.

(Pages 116 - 118)

The anchoring positions of the Japanese transport ships will be decided by mutual consent.

The refuelling of ships along the coast of Indo-China must be strictly limited and carried on only in those anchorage harbors determined by mutual consent of both parties.
(7) Wireless telegrams

Powerful fixed wireless installations, excepting for field wireless apparatuses shall not be established in Indo-Chinese territory. This does not apply to ship wireless. The question of laying a submarine cable between the coast of TONGKING and HUHN will be studied separately.

(8) Important matters that demand special attention.

Unless the final agreement is signed by both parties and unless the date of the coming into effect of this agreement is determined, the Japanese military, naval, and aerial forces cannot enter the territory or the territorial airs of Indo-China. In accordance with the consent given by the representatives of the Japanese Army and Navy no action whatsoever of any threatening nature may be resorted to.

The following will be considered as threatening actions:

- Any attempt to cross the border.
- Any gathering of troops near Indo-Chinese territory.

(Note) This implies that more forces than at present shall not be gathered for the purpose of the invasion of French Indo-China.

- Actions of warships or transport ships in the offing.
- Flying in the territorial airs. This does not apply, however, to cases where special permission has been obtained.

Unless the abovementioned conditions are observed by the Japanese forces, the French supreme commander shall suspend the negotiations already commenced and resort to freedom of action.

It goes without saying that the various basic items decided in these precautions must be kept in utmost secrecy until the time of signing of the final agreement.

Any breach of this secrecy by the Japanese authorities will be considered as a threatening measure by the French authorities and is liable to bring about the various abovementioned results.
Sept. 4 15th year of SHO\textsuperscript{A} at HANOI

(Signed) The representative of the supreme commander of the Japanese Army and Navy dispatched to South-China.

Major-General NISHIHARA,
The supreme commander of the French Indo-China forces.

General MARTIN

Attached Document No. 12 (Translated by the army)

(Pages 119 - 121)

Agreement Concluded between the Commander of the Indo-Chinese Army and the delegates of the Japanese Army and Navy in Indo-China.

The following are dealt with in this Agreement.

(1) Use of several air-bases in TONG-KING Province.

(2) Stationing of a certain number of Japanese military forces.

(3) Passing of Japanese troops through TONGKING Province in necessary cases.


(1) Use of several air-bases

Japanese air forces can use the following air-bases:

GIA-LA'
LAI-KAY or PHU-LING-GUONG
P2U-TO

Japanese air forces can equip the said air-bases in conformity with the terms set forth in the agreement of September 4.
The number of military personnel for the guarding of the said air-bases shall be fixed by the mutual agreement of both Japanese and French authorities, and shall be limited to the irreducible necessary to carry out their duty.

(2) Stationing of a certain number of Japanese military forces.

The strength of the various Japanese troops whose duties are given as follows shall be fixed by the mutual agreement of both Japanese and French military authorities.

(a) Guarding of the air-bases referred to in item (1).

(b) Use of the said air-bases (fliers and ground force belonging to the Japanese air corps).

(c) Transportation and guarding of supplies for the following Japanese troops.

The troops at the air-bases specified under paragraph 1 and those now in operations in Chinese territory near the border-line between China and Indo-China.

(d) Transportation through YUMBONG Harbor and management of hospitals to be established in that district.

The said personnel strength shall be limited to the minimum degree necessary to accomplish the above duties and shall under no circumstances exceed 6,000.

The stationing areas of the said personnel shall be decided with the joint consent of the Japanese and French military authorities.

A part of the said force limited to the irreducible minimum, as fixed by the agreement of both Japanese and French staff-offices, may utilize villages directly adjoining the air-bases.

This, however, is not applicable to H'

Neither the Japanese military headquarters nor any troops shall station at or pass through H'. This is not applicable, however, to the liaison officers between both staff-offices.
Equipments for the Japanese air corps and their guards at the various air-bases shall be installed by the Japanese military authorities.

KIPFO'G shall be used as a landing spot under the terms which shall be settled by the joint consent of both Japanese and French staff-offices.

(Pages 122-124)

(Page 122)

In any case, the warships shall not be permitted to approach within 6 nautical miles from the line which connects FONU (phonetic) and ABON (phonetic).

One warship not exceeding the class of torpedo boat, shall be permitted to anchor in KIPFO'G Harbor.

(3) The passage of the Japanese forces through TONG-KING State.

In case the commander of the Japanese forces wishes to conduct the attacking operation with his ground forces, starting from the northern boundary of TONG-KING State (the said commander is not considering this at present), or conduct replacement movement of the forces necessitating embarkation from KIPFO'G Port, the several traffic roads, decided by the commander of the French Forces, shall be utilized by the Japanese forces according to the operational needs.

The methods of executing the aforementioned transportation shall be prescribed according to the clauses provided in the "Fundamental Matters of Agreement," signed on September 4, 1940.

The strength of the passing Japanese troops will be decided upon later according to the degree of necessity. However, the total strength of the passing troops and the troops described in the second clause will not exceed the number established by the "Fundamental Matters of Agreement," signed on September 4th, 1940.

(Pages 123-124)

(Page 123)

(4) The entrance of the Japanese vanguard unit (into the country).
In view of the fact that 2200 hours on 22nd September is due to be observed strictly by the Japanese authorities, the first shipload of troops shall be authorized to enter HUYEN's Harbor on the fixed time mentioned above, forever, unless special agreements as to the debarkation clauses of the landing troops and clauses concerning movement to the station points are concluded, the troops shall be detained within the ship and other transport vessels shall not enter the harbor.

(5) The transportation of the Japanese forces passing through TONG-KI'G State.

The Japanese forces now stationed in the vicinity of the border between China and Indo-China are permitted to be transported through the territory of Trench Indo-China for the purpose of embarkation at TONG-KI'G Port, in accordance with the request of the Japanese authorities.

Since the transportation of these forces necessitates detailed studies, a special agreement is necessary between both General Staff Offices.

And unless this agreement is concluded, no Japanese corps forces will cross the Trench Indo-China border.

(Pag 124 (5))

General Matters

Except for the various matters prescribed in this agreement, it is only natural that all of the "Fundamental Matters of Agreement," signed on September 4th, 1940, be effective.

Henceforth, in order to decide the methods of executing this agreement, the two General Staff-Offices will constantly keep in touch with each other.

September 22, 1940,

in HANOI.

Second Lieutenant UNTU'IRI, "Cor-General
General Officer "ARTAI". (phonetic)

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のちの成績について

不具合は、下記の通りです。

1. 地形
2. 距離
3. 時間

以上を参考に、改善のための策を講じたいと考えております。
The Foreign Office Statement, September 23, 1940

With a view to settling the China affair and thereby facilitate the establishment of a new order in East Asia, the Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka, held conversations in a friendly spirit with the French Ambassador, Charles Arseno-Henry, on basic matters regarding the question of French Indo-China at Tokyo during the month of August of this year.

As a result of these conversations, France agreed to afford in French Indo-China all such facilities of a military nature as are required by the Japanese Army and Navy for executing their campaign for the settlement of the China affair.

On the basis of this agreement, negotiations were conducted on the spot—at Hanoi—for the purpose of deciding upon concrete matters between the Japanese and French military authorities, which resulted in an agreement in the afternoon of September 22.

The Foreign Office Spokesman's Statement, September 23, 1940

Despite the understanding reached between Japan and France with regard to French Indo-China after prolonged negotiations in which Japan manifested consistent patience and forbearance, a local skirmish has occurred in the border region of French Indo-China. This is entirely due to a misunderstanding on the part of French Indo-China. Therefore, it is expected that the agreement concluded between Japan and France will be smoothly and peacefully carried out with the French misunderstanding naturally dispelled.

Inasmuch as the present agreement between Japan and France has been based on peaceful talks between the two countries, there could be no objection to it from any other foreign country.
CERTIFICATE

P.S. No. 39

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document here attached consisting of 1 pages, dated 23 Sept. 1940, and described as follows: The French Indo-China Negotiations.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 20th day of Sept., 1946. K. HAYASHI

Signature of Official

Witness: Nagahara Odo, Chief, Archives Section

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, RICHARD H. LARSH, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 25 day of Sept., 1946. RICHARD H. LARSH

NAVE

Witness: T/4 Taguchi, Investigator, IPS

Official Capacity
Ulrich Straus
Adjutant

G. H. Garde

Lt. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

(W. P. Cumming)
Doc. No. 4025E(1)  
Item 5  
Telegram (Secret Cipher Process) To be kept in locked file  

TOKYO, 2 August 1940  
Arrival 3 " 8.40  
No. 765 - 2 August Urgent!!

To the State Secretary

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA yesterday invited me to the first political conversation, informing me that upon a talk with the departmental minister, the first three Embassy requests out of its continuously collected material, which I had transmitted to him through a confidant, would be compiled with:

1. Transit Shipments. The Foreign Minister stated that he had heard with regret that the former government had failed to show sufficient consideration for Germany in transit shipments. He had immediately caused the appertaining ministry to take the German requests into ample consideration.

2. Damages in China. The Foreign Minister promised to work hard for a finally satisfactory settlement of the matter.

3. Press. The Foreign Minister confirmed that the constant anti-German inciting carried on by certain English language newspapers here was absolutely intolerable and promised more efficient control by the Ministry of the Interior.

Furthermore, the Foreign Minister assured me that the difficulties made of late by Japanese overseas authorities re. the repatriation of German nationals from American countries would be removed.

The Foreign Minister, touched upon the soy beans problem of his own accord, saying he was ready to actively support our wishes. I have asked Legation in Hsinking to report on the present state of the matter.

The Foreign Minister then turned to general questions concerning German-Japanese relations, carrying on the conversation in a most cordial manner; he asked, notably, what attitude Germany would presumably adopt towards Japan's well-known economic Grossraum/Grant Sphere plans in the East. I showed a receptive attitude towards these utterances, explaining that a German point of view could only be expected if Japan presents a concrete plan which must assure Germany of tangible and valuable advantages. The Foreign Minister recognized the justifiability of this point of view.
In this connection the Foreign Minister gave as the reason for the lack of substance in yesterday's government declaration and of his own mediation proposal (cf. DNB TOKYO 199 to 204), the impossibility to reveal already now the real intentions of the government. In the meantime the severe action against the British propaganda organization in Japan has already proven by deeds which course Japan is navigating. MATSUOKA asked me to tell the German Foreign Minister that ever since Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations he had maintained the point of view that Japan's continuous self-isolation is impossible and that consequently an association with Germany was the only right course; he was therefore glad to be able to realize this idea now as Foreign Minister. He expressed his wish to maintain the closest contact with me at all times.

I left no doubt with the Foreign Minister that Japan had much to catch up with to bring about even a state of truly benevolent neutrality towards Germany.

The Foreign Minister told me at the end of the conversation that he had just received the French ambassador, asking him to obtain the consent of the French Government for the passage of Japanese troops through North Indo-China and the establishment of two airfields since an attack on the Yunnan railway and Kunming was possible in no other way. He had assured the French ambassador that Japan has no territorial ambitions in Indo-China and would later evacuate the area again. The Foreign Minister hoped that the French government would see the point of these demands so as not to put the Japanese army before the necessity of enforcing the passage by violence. The French ambassador had promised to pass this on, pointing out that France could not decide for herself after the armistice negotiations, and that the matter will have to be referred to the Armistice Commission for a decision.

The Foreign Minister said he would be grateful if the German Government would not object to the Japanese wish and would likewise influence the French Government in this sense. I promised to transmit this without committing myself.

Certificate

I, ULRICH STRAUS, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4025E(1)

/S/ ULRICH STRAUS
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. I. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. I. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

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s/ W. I. Cumming

W. I. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
中国の国際放送事業

219R-1

E×623
日本軍ハノ入シ、侵略行動ヲ通ジテ武力占領ヲ

トシテハノ発表シテリタル政策、単に英圧が独立

ノ同盟国ノ侵略ニ何ノ自弁ヲ為シ、自弁ヲ防衛スルヲ援スノ必要ヲハルノ為メ、必要ヲ為ス

ノ武力ヲ占領スルヲ決定ス。
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (elles) September 20, 1940

The Japanese Ambassador called to see me this afternoon at my request. I handed the Ambassador the "oral statement" which the Far Eastern Division had prepared as a reply to the memorandum which the Ambassador had left with me on August 23.

The Ambassador read the memorandum very attentively, but before he had an opportunity of commenting upon it, I told him that, as he would see from the last paragraph of the statement handed to him, I had found it necessary to express regret for the tone of the language used in the document which the Ambassador had left with me and I felt that it was necessary to emphasize the fact that I did not believe that the friendly and equitable solution which the ambassador and I both desired of the questions at issue between the two Governments could be advanced by the employment of the kind of language employed by the Japanese Government in this recent communication.

The Ambassador immediately said that if the tone or the language employed seemed to me discourteous, this was far from the intention of his Government and that it should be attributed solely to the faulty vocabulary and knowledge of the English language of those responsible for the drafting of the document. I told the Ambassador that I was very glad to accept this explanation.

The Ambassador then said that he noted with great regret that no progress was made in the solution of the July 7 incident or in the adjustment of the Sector question. He stated that in his opinion both of these questions were of relatively minor importance and that he could not but feel that a satisfactory compromise could be found should the Government of the United States desire to find it. He stated that he was informed that in 1931 and 1934 the commanding officers of the International Settlement Forces had recommended that Sectors D and B be policed by the International Police Force with the temporary assistance from time to time of the Volunteer Forces should these additional services be required. He urged that a compromise of this nature now be agreed upon.

I told the Ambassador that I was not prepared to make any comment upon this suggestion beyond saying that this suggestion had not been found acceptable by our authorities in the past because of our belief that it was not a practical suggestion, but that I would convey the Ambassador's remarks to the appropriate authorities of the Navy Department.
The Ambassador then said with regard to the July 7 incident that it seemed to him that all that was required was an agreement on the language of some expression of regret on the part of the American authorities.

I called the Ambassador's attention to the fact that in the oral statement which I had just handed him, it had been made entirely clear that the United States did not believe that any apology from its officials was called for.

I then said that to my very great regret, the Ambassador's mission in Washington was soon to terminate and that I wanted to tell him again how sorry I was to see him leave because of my recognition of the constant efforts which he had made to work towards an improvement in the relations between our two countries.

I said that as he was now leaving, it was all the more regrettable to me to note that the divergences of opinion between the two Governments and the serious misunderstandings which had arisen between Japan and the United States were not only not diminished in scope, but appeared, unfortunately, to be increasing materially both in volume and character. I said it must be evident to him as it was to me that no matter how much men of good will in both countries might try to prevent it, if this situation continued no one could prophesy with any assurance that the result might not be of a very serious character.

I said that the Ambassador was undoubtedly aware of the information which had reached this Government that the Japanese military representative in French Indo China, General Nishihara, had been instructed yesterday to present an ultimatum to the French Governor General making demands which were tantamount to a demand for complete occupation of French Indo China, with the threat that if these demands were not accepted before ten p.m. Sunday, September 22, the Japanese military forces would at once invade Indo China. I said the Ambassador was likewise in all probability further informed that the French Governor General had refused the demands in question. I said that therefore the civilized world was confronted with a spectacle which in all probability meant that in the immediate future the Government of Japan, in addition to the acts of aggression which it had committed against the Government of China during the past nine years, especially during the past three years, was now about to commit an act of aggression on a colonial possession of the Government of France.

I then read to the Ambassador from a memorandum which had been prepared by the Far Eastern Division the various official utterances of Japanese statesmen and the spokesmen during the past six months in which they had repeatedly reiterated as the official position of the Japanese Government the desire of the latter to maintain the status quo in the Far East and in the course of which statements they had upon repeated occasions indicated their entire concurrence with the United States in the expressed desire of the letter that the status quo be maintained. I said that here was once
more presented a flagrant case where the official announcements of the Japanese Government were completely counter to the policies and acts of its military authorities, and I concluded by saying that I was, of course, fully aware that the Japanese Ambassador himself could be under no misapprehension as to the very serious disquiet and very open opposition which the action threatened by the Japanese Government would create in the minds of the members of the United States Government and on the part of public opinion in general in this country.

The Japanese Ambassador at first attempted to say that all that the latest demands made by General Nishihara amounted to was compliance with the agreement reached on August 30 between the Vichy Government of France and the Japanese Government. I immediately stated that this obviously was not the case since the demands had been rejected by the French Governor General of Indo China on the specific ground that they were entirely outside of the scope of the agreement of August 30. The Ambassador then said that he had not been informed of the exact terms of the ultimatum presented and that he had not been advised of the confirmation of this information which had been given to Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister Matsuoka the night before.

The Ambassador said that I should bear in mind the fact that there was a very great likelihood that Japan was undertaking the occupation of French Indo China not only as a means of expediting a conclusion of the hostilities in China and solely as a temporary measure with no thought of a permanent occupation of the colony, but also as a means of preventing the German Government, should Germany now prove victorious in her battle with Great Britain, from occupying the French, British, and Dutch possessions in the Far East.

To this I said that it would seem to me obvious that if the Japanese Government found it necessary, for reasons of which we were not aware, to consider taking precautionary measures as a means of preserving, rather than disrupting, the status quo in the Far East, this Government would not only have been willing, but glad, to discuss these possibilities with the Japanese Government since, as I had said before, it had repeatedly been stated by this Government as its considered policy that it would support the whole structure of international treaties and agreements covering the maintenance of the stability and the status quo in the Far East, except insofar as modifications thereto might be agreed upon through negotiation and peaceful processes. I said that I could hardly accept with any sincerity the argument that Japan was now occupying French Indo China solely in order to prevent Germany from undertaking such occupation.

The ambassador then said that this Government only recently, as a means of insuring its own security, had obtained air and naval bases on British possessions in the western Hemisphere.

I said to the Ambassador that I was sorry to have to say that I could imagine no parallel less well chosen than that he mentioned for the action which the Japanese Government contemplated in French Indo China. On one
side—the Anglo-American side, we had an agreement freely entered into on a basis of give and take, and reached because of the belief of the two Governments that the bargain so consummated enhanced the security of the two nations involved; whereas on the other hand, we had a demand presented by Japan to French Indo China stating that if the local authorities would not immediately pave the way for complete occupation of the entire territory by Japanese troops, the Japanese troops were going to walk in and take charge by force through acts of aggression. I said I could not for the moment accept any parallel between the two questions.

In conclusion I said that I felt it necessary for me to remind the Ambassador of the policy which this Government had publicly announced as the policy which it would pursue with regard to Great Britain, namely, a policy of furnishing to the utmost measure of its ability all material supplies, munitions, et cetera, to Great Britain in order to assist the latter nation to defend herself against the aggression of Germany and her allies. I said that in the Pacific region where this Government likewise desired in its own interest to see peace maintained, the United States was confronted by a series of acts of aggression committed by Japan against her neighbor China, and now in all probability, against the adjacent colony of Indo China. I said that I would be lacking in candor if I did not make it clear to the Ambassador that, consistent with its policy with regard to Great Britain, the United States would likewise feel it necessary to furnish such means of assistance in the way of supplies, munitions, et cetera, for these victims of aggression in the Pacific area as might be required. I said that in view of the violation by Japan of the structure of international law in her dealings with her neighbors in the Far East and her infringement of the legitimate rights of the United States and of American nationals, the Government of Japan could certainly have no ground for complaint because the United States lent assistance of the character I had indicated to China, and to Indo China in the event that the latter was attacked.

S(sumner) W(elles)
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

(TOKYO,) September 20, 1940.

An appointment was made with Mr. Matsuoka on the afternoon of September 20, after the Department's telegram (367, September 19, 9 p.m.) had been received and decoded, and I precisely acted upon the instructions of the Department.

Mr. Matsuoka in reply said that apart from some minor changes, the particulars of which were not mentioned, the reports are correct that an ultimatum had been presented to the Governor General of Indochina by General Nishiara. The situation was then explained to be as follows, by the Minister:

The French Ambassador, under instructions of the French Government, and the Japanese Government on August 30 had signed an agreement in Tokyo. Provisions of the agreement were inter alia for the movement of troops of Japan through Indochina and the use temporarily of airports. The Governor General of Indochina was on September 6 ready to sign an agreement which would have implemented the agreement signed in Tokyo on August 30, but he refused for reasons not evident to the authorities of Japan and obstructed the implementation of the agreement signed in Tokyo. The Japanese Government felt obliged, although with reluctance, to ask the French Government whether the actions of the Governor General were subject to control by the French Government, since the Governor General continued to be uncooperative, and whether on the basis of the agreement signed in Tokyo the French Government was exhibiting good faith. The French Government said that it was, and as evidently the Governor General was not acting in good faith and as the Japanese authorities were aware that to foreign Consuls stationed in Indochina the Governor had boasted that he was using obstructive tactics, the Japanese ultimatum reported was necessarily presented.

The purpose of the measures taken was, said the Minister, to enable the Japanese forces to attack Chiang Kai-shek and to bring peace to China. As soon as hostilities have ceased, he said, the Japanese forces would be withdrawn at once; the integrity and sovereignty of Indochina would be accorded full respect, and as a consequence there would be no interference in East Asia with the status quo. The Minister said that he, Prince Konoye, and other
Government members were representative of a minority opinion in Japan and that it was their determination that Japan should not oppress, exploit or interfere with other countries' integrity. He said that a struggle was taking place against extreme elements within the country on this issue. My interruption at this point was to the effect that clauses pertaining to commerce and economics in Indochina were within the scope of the agreement. No denial was made to my statement but I was assured that exploitation would not ensue.

The terms of the agreement between France and Japan signed on August 30 were confidential, said the Minister, and their divulgence by either of the signatories would nullify them. He said he could confidentially tell me, however, that France had broached the subject first and a request was made for a renewal of guarantees pertaining to the integrity of Indochina based on the agreement between France and Japan which was negotiated at approximately the same time as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was concluded. He did not recall the exact date but said that the agreement was in effect and registered with the League of Nations. (This presumably is the agreement of June 10, 1907, between France and Japan.) The Minister was interrupted with my question as to that country's encroachments France desired guarantees against. Mr. Kafuruoka said that this was a moot question. He went on then to say that permission had been asked by Japan for the movement of forces across Indochina and for the use temporarily of airports as "compensation" for complying with the French request. This information was given me in confidence, he emphasized, and its accuracy would of necessity be denied in event of publicity.

The Minister talked lengthily, but in spite of this and his illogical reasoning the meaning of his remarks is reported to the Department with all possible precision. The Minister upon the conclusion of his remarks left at once to fulfill another engagement and I could say only that if Japanese troops moved into Indochina my Government would regard it emphatically as an infringement of the status quo which the Japanese Government had already pledged to preserve, and that a further statement of the attitude of my Government was reserved until consideration had been given to my report.

I presented to the Minister the substance of the Department's 355, September 13, 6 p.m., which recited to the oral statement of the Vice Minister to me of September 14, before I left.

(Joseph) C. G(rew)
German Armistice Commission, STUBELNAGEL

Information by telephone, 20 September 1940, 2300 hours.

The chairman of the French Delegation to the Armistice Commission, General DEAC, sent the following note to the Chairman of the German Armistic Commission, General VON STUBELNAGEL tonight:

General!

In orders of my government I have the honor to inform you of the following. Since the beginning of September negotiations have been under way in HANOI between the Governor General and a Japanese military delegation, regarding alleviations to be granted the Japanese troops in Indo China for marching through. A basic agreement was reached on 5 September, determining the details of such a passage. When the technicalities of this agreement seemed thus settled, the Japanese delegation brought forth a series of completely new demands. Under the pretext of air bases to be established, the Japanese now demand, as a matter of fact, the permanent stationing of 32,000 troops in Indo China. The acceptance of this demand would actually amount to the military occupation of TCHING, likewise bringing on the danger of serious reactions on the part of the population.

Since the Japanese military authorities have in the meantime stated that they would have their troops march into TCHING at midnight, 22 September, whatever the state of the negotiations may be, the French government has ordered Admiral DECCU to inform the Japanese military authorities of the desire of the French government to speed up the termination of the pending negotiations as much as possible: that, however, extension of the time-limit was necessary for factual reasons, owing to slow communications. In case the Japanese threat is carried out, Admiral DECCU is to resist it by force, while endeavoring to localize the incident. The French Ambassador in TCHING has been ordered to inform the Japanese government accordingly.

Transmitted to Embassy Rome on 21 September 1940, 1,30 hours by Telegram No. 1319 for the information of the German Foreign Minister.

Tel. Control
Certificate:

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4025E(2).

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus
AFFIDAVIT

I, W. F. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. F. Cumming
W. F. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General
OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
(Extract)

The Chief Aide-de-Camp reported that the military agreement
parley, which had been making smooth progress with the Governor-
General, had taken a turn for the worse since the advance of one
battalion or so of our troops into French Indo-China.
Extract from Diary from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 14 September, 1940

14th September, 1940 - Extract

At 11:00 a.m., Foreign Minister MITSUOKA met me before and after being received in audience and said that he was going to send an ultimatum to French Indo-China.

After MITSUOKA, both of their Highnesses the Chief of Staff submitted reports to His Majesty. In this connection, I was immediately received in audience and was told by His Majesty to the effect that MITSUOKA's statement and that of the General Staff did not seem to coincide exactly, but there would be no other way except to let the government carry out its policy under the present circumstances. On being asked my opinion, I said to His Majesty that if we let matters continue without doing anything, the mischief making of England and the United States would become more and more serious and an opportunity might be given for them to cooperate with French Indo-China and China. I replied that I should like to request that His Majesty direct us to be careful before taking any action, and to give his approval even though matters stand as they do.

At one o'clock I heard from the Grand Chamberlain about the Emperor's visit to the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the Diet, etc.

At 1:30 I talked to the Chief of Staff and I heard about the progress of the report by their Highnesses the two Chiefs of Staff to the Emperor concerning the sending of troops to Indo-China. At 2:30 I returned home. At 3:00 Mr. Yokota visited me; at 4:00 Mr. Kurokawa came. I had a talk with each of them.

At 6:30 I visited the palace of Prince Kitashirakawa. I kept death watch until 11:00 o'clock.

War Minister TOJO, who also kept the death watch, secretly told me that today the Army and Navy and arrived at an agreement concerning relations with Germany and Italy.

A little after nine in the evening, Prince KONOIZU phoned and asked me what should be done about Foreign Minister MITSUOKA's suggestion to include the senior statesman (Jushin) at the Imperial conference in connection with the strengthening of relations with Germany and Italy. I consulted the War Minister and Vice Minister of the Navy Toyoda, both of whom happened to come to the death watch at the residence, on the matter, but both were against letting
Then attend the Imperial Conference.

As a result of various talks we agreed that the Premier should invite the ex-premiers to walk with him. Accordingly, after my return home I telephoned the Prime Minister and reported the gist of the aforementioned. The Premier also agreed, but when it got to be 12:00 o'clock, he telephoned me again saying that it had been decided to cancel the proposal since Foreign Minister M.TSUZUKI said that if the ex-premiers were not allowed to be present at the Imperial Conference, he would withdraw the proposal.
A. Policy.

We must promptly strengthen the coalition between Japan and the German-Italian Axis based on the world policy, and make, furthermore, a rapid improvement in and adjustment of the Japanese-Soviet diplomatic relations. At the same time we must make effort to realize the general peace between Japan and China by making use of the pressure of Germany and the Soviet Union, and, thereby, promote the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Giving pressure, in this way, to the Anglo-American Axis, accompanying the intensification of Japan's diplomatic machinery, we should offer our good offices at a proper time to Britain in order that she may make peace with Germany, and, moreover, we should carry out an epoch-making adjustment of Japanese-American diplomatic relations. Thus we expect to establish a peaceful system among Japan, Germany, Italy, the Soviet Union, America and Britain for the reconstruction of world peace.
B. Outline of the Plan

I. Strengthening of coalition between Japan and the German-Italian Axis.

Should be carried out according to the decision made by the council in the Imperial presence on Sept. 18, and the Tripartite Alliance among Japan, Germany and Italy on Sept. 27.

II. Adjustment of Soviet-Japanese Diplomatic Relations.

Should be carried out according to "Draft Plan for Adjustment of Soviet-Japanese Diplomatic Relations" in the accompanying paper.

III. Establishment of general Peace between Japan and China.

Should be carried out according to "the Policy of Rapid Disposition of the China Incident" in the accompanying paper.

IV. Establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

(1) In the regions including French Indo-China, Dutch East Indies, Strait Settlement, British Malaya, Thailand, the Philippine Islands, British Borneo and Burma, with Japan, Manchukuo and China as centre, we should construct a sphere in which politics, economy and culture of those countries and regions are combined.

(a) French Indo-China and Dutch East Indies.

We must, in the first place, endeavor to conclude a comprehensive economic agreement (including distribution of resources, trade adjustment in and out of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, currency and exchange agreement, etc.), while planning such political coalitions as the recognition of independence, conclusion of mutual assistance pact, etc.

(b) Thailand. We should strive to strengthen the mutual assistance and coalition in political, economic, and military affairs.

(2) Towards the countries outside the Co-Prosperity Sphere, we must take every measure so that those countries will admit the establishment of our "Co-Prosperity Sphere" and co-operate with it.
V. Mediation of Peace between Britain and Germany.

(1) By making most of the pressure brought about by the coalition among Japan, Germany, Italy, and Soviet Russia, we should, at an appropriate time, mediate so that Britain will make peace with Germany.

(2) If Britain recognizes the establishment of our "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" and cooperates with it, we should consider the adjustment of Anglo-Japanese diplomatic relations according to the following plan.

(a) We promise the preservation of the British Empire, including Australia and New Zealand.

(b) We promise to co-operate in general economic matters.

VI. Adjustment of Japanese-American Diplomatic Relations.

(1) Maintaining a firm attitude toward the United States, and taking advantage of the coalition among Japan, Germany, Italy, and Soviet Russia, we should, in accordance with the attitude of America, open negotiations from our side concerning the adjustment of Japanese-American diplomatic relations.

(2) Policy for adjusting diplomatic relations is generally as follows:

(a) Assuming that both countries will recognize the division of the Pacific Ocean into the eastern and western spheres of influence, we should conclude a mutual non-aggression pact. (It includes also the non-aggression of Philippine territory and respect for Philippine independence.)

(b) We should conclude an agreement pertaining to economic coalition, development of trade, and the adjustment of the problem of entry into the countries.

VII. Establishment of World Peace.

Peace treaty which includes the following provisions should be concluded among the six countries of Japan, Germany, Italy, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain.
(a) Respect of each country's co-prosperity sphere.
(b) Respect and non-aggression of territorial rights.
(c) Development of trade and economic co-operation.
(d) Reduction of armaments.
(e) Racial equality.

Very Secret

Tentative Plan for Policy towards the Southern Regions

October 4, 1940

Although the objective of Japan's penetration into the Southern Regions covers, in its first stage, the whole area to the west of Hawaii excluding for the time being the Philippines and Guam; French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies, British Burma and the Strait Settlements are the areas where we should first control. Then, we should gradually advance into the other areas. However, depending upon the attitude of the United States Government, the Philippines and Guam will be included.

(1) French Indo-China.

(a) We should maneuver an uprising of an independence movement, and should cause France to renounce its sovereign right. Should we manage to reach an understanding with CHIANG Kai-shek, the TONGKONG area will be managed by his troops, if military power is needed. However, Japanese military advisers should be appointed to the positions which cannot be ignored by the operations section. According to circumstances, we should let the army of Thailand manage the area of CAMBODIA.

(b) The foregoing measures must be executed immediately after a truce has been concluded with CHIANG Kai-shek. If we do not succeed in our move with CHIANG Kai-shek, these measures should be
carried out upon the accomplishment of the adjustment of the battle line in China. However, in case the German military operations to land on the British mainland, which is to be mentioned later, takes place, it may be necessary to carry out our move towards French Indo-China and Thailand regardless of our plans for CHIANG Kai-shek. (This is to be decided according to the liaison with Germany.)

(c) If military and economic alliances are concluded between Japan and China, and Japan and Thailand, the TONGKING area shall be subjected to China, the CAMBODIA area to Thailand, and the other areas shall be independent. Between Japan and these areas, a protective treaty under the title of military and economic alliance shall be concluded so that we can hold the real power. However, steps shall be devised to enable Japan to hold strategic points in every area.

(d) In the new independent States, the right of enterprise for the nationals of the third countries with which we are at peace will be recognized. But, they will have to follow the Government's instructions in developing important resources, and in disposing of the products.

(2) British Burma.

(a) In case our plans in regard to CHIANG Kai-shek are achieved, we should immediately cause an independence movement to rise. And under the pretext of supporting the movement, we should make CHIANG's army march into the said area under the secret assistance of the Japanese army, and make Burma detach from British sovereignty.

(b) In case our move in regard to CHIANG Kai-shek fails, we should make an independence movement start after we establish real Japanese power in the Singapore area, and thus make Burma detach from British sovereignty.
(c) In case we make use of CHIANG's army, we should transfer the specific areas in upper Burma to China and make the rest independent. In case we do not use CHIANG's army, we should make the whole area an independent country and conclude with it an economic and military alliance.

(3) British Malaya and the Strait Settlements.

(a) To avoid the danger that the natural resources in the Dutch East Indies may be destroyed, within the possible limits of war strategy, we should use military power in these areas prior to using it in the Dutch East Indies. (There is a necessity that we investigate the strength of Singapore, and also in case we lay our hands on one of the British territories, whether or not we are strategically forced to extend to the other British territories immediately after.)

(b) We should conclude a military alliance with Thailand, and use Thailand as a rear base. However, in order to delay her in making preparations, it is well to pretend that the diplomatic relations between Japan and Thailand are not secure until we start military action. (In case we consider that the military alliance cannot be kept in strict secrecy because of the internal affairs of Thailand, there is room for consideration that we should set up a secret committee based on the non-aggression treaty between Japan and Thailand to enable us to enter into a military alliance as soon as we start military action.)

(c) Military operations shall be started simultaneously with German military operations to land on the British mainland or after the lapse of a proper period. However, we must maintain close contact with Germany, keeping her to act in concert with us.

In case Germany gives up her intention to land on the British mainland, we, maintaining liaison with Germany, should start our military operations at the time when Germany carries out her most severe battle, or when an appropriate period
has passed after that. In case Britain should yield to Germany prior to the common cement of our military action, even though the internal situation is not favorable to Japan, we must at least by diplomatic means, on the occasion of peace between Britain and Germany, make Britain remove the defense installations on Singapore and make her conclude an economic treaty with Japan which will be advantageous to Japan.

(d) In case we are forced to act without relation with our plans in regard to CHIANG Kai-shek, by using the pretext that Britain is aiding CHIANG Kai-shek by the Burma route, and in case the plans have proved to be a success, by using the pretext that we cannot stand the Oriental peace being threatened by the British military force based in Singapore, we should request Britain to return Hong Kong, British Malaya, and the Strait Settlements (including British Borneo depending upon the circumstances) to the races in East Asia and upon her refusal, start war. (The above pretexts hamper in some ways our relations with the United States, but it is likely that something which we can use as a direct reason, will rise by that time.)

(e) Following the case of French Indo-China, the former territory of Thailand shall be returned to Thailand and the other regions shall be made protectorates. But the Strait Settlements must be placed under the direct rule of Japan.

(f) In the newly established independent countries the enterprise rights of the nationals of the third countries with which we are at peace shall follow the case in French Indo-China.

(4) Dutch East Indies.

(a) While the attack on Singapore is going on, or immediately after it, by showing at the proper time our state for attacking the Dutch East Indies, we should present the following requests, and if they are not admitted, we should use military power.
(i) As the Dutch Government in England, which the Dutch East Indies considers to be its suzerain, does not exist according to international law, the Dutch East Indies shall at once declare its independence for the peace of Greater East Asia, and announce an appropriate name for itself.

(ii) The sovereign and the constitution shall be decided by a committee consisting of several Japanese, Dutch people born there, natives, and Chinese. (It must be so arranged that the total number of the Japanese and natives number more than half of the committee.) Until the sovereign and the constitution are decided, this committee shall carry out the administration.

(iii) The Governor-General and all other Dutch officials of the highest rank shall be forced to resign. But their official titles, honors and pay should be left as they are. The position of the Dutch people other than the aforementioned will be recognized as they are.

(iv) If any of the important natural resources should be destroyed, all the persons connected with the raw material, ten government officials concerned, shall be severely punished as being the responsible persons. (This matter should be announced widely beforehand by radio and other means.)

We should, if possible, at a proper time before presenting the aforementioned requests, cause an independence movement to stir up among the natives.

(b) If it is considered a better plan from the viewpoint of strategy that we act first with the Dutch East Indies, the time to start the activity against this area would be at the same time as the opening of Germany's military operation to land on the British mainland, or after the lapse of a proper period.
In case that Germany gives up her intention to land on the British mainland, we should start action, choosing an appropriate time before Britain and Germany cease hostilities.

(c) After the Dutch East Indies become independent, we must conclude a protective treaty under the name of military alliance, and make her appoint Japanese military and economic advisers who will be in powerful positions. We must lease the places which are important from the military point of view.

(d) The enterprise rights of the nationals of the third countries with which we are at peace shall follow the case in French Indo-China.

(5) British Borneo and Others.

(a) After we have grasped real power in the Dutch East Indies and Singapore, we must take proper measures to get hold of real power in other British territories.

(b) Hongkong is to be returned to China. (However, if it is important strategically, it shall be reconsidered.)

(c) Following what has been stated about French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, etc., we shall consider locally the administrative system in each place.

(6) Australian Territories.

To be considered separately.

Very Secret

Re: The Recognition of the New National Government and the Conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance
(Oct. 25, 1940 - Asia No. 1)

Introduction.

It is the fixed policy of the Imperial Government to recognize the New National Government led by WANG Ching-Wei by
bringing it up and strengthening it and by concluding with the said Government a treaty for the adjustment of new diplomatic relations. The Imperial Government has firmly maintained a stand that it will negotiate peace with the Chungking Government only when it accepts the policy of our Empire regarding the establishment of the said new Central Government, and when it advances through the Wang Ching-Wei regime to negotiate with the Imperial Government.

The above is the policy of our Empire. And at present, as long as there are no charges, it is possible to say that the development of the international situation caused by the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance should be of practical use for splitting Chungking through the strengthening of the Wang Ching-Wei regime. "The policy towards Germany and Soviet Russia" is considered, for the time being, to be as follows:

I (1) Giving instructions by cable to the Ambassador in Germany, we shall make the Foreign Minister Ribbentrop propose to Chen Chieh the following points.

As is obviously shown by the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance, both the German and the Italian Governments will support the policy of the Japanese Government in regard to China, the policy of which is to support and strengthen Wang's regime to the last and to split the Chungking regime. The Japanese Government is now endeavoring for the recognition of the New National Government according to its fixed policy, and upon the recognition of the Wang Ching-Wei regime by the Japanese Government, not only Germany and Italy, but also Spain, Rumania, Hungary, France and others will recognize it. And thus, the foundation of the new government will be made more and more solid. Under such international circumstances if the Chungking Government will not discontinue the useless war against Japan as soon as possible, and amalgamate with the Wang Ching-Wei regime, it is inevitable that it will be left behind in the advance of the new world situation.

(2) Furthermore, depending upon the circumstances, it is another idea to ask Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to add the following when he makes the above-mentioned proposal.
"However, if owing to past circumstances, it is most difficult for the Chungking side to amalgamate suddenly at this date with the WANG Ching Wei regime, depending upon the sincerity on the part of Chungking, it is likely that there is a way by which Chungking can, without going through the WANG Ching "ei regime, negotiate directly with Japan. If the Chungking side so desires, I am ready to act as an intermediary."

II. The greatest obstacle to the rise of the influence of the advocates of peace in CHUANG Kai Sha's camp is the existence of the Chinese Communist Party. To remove the aforementioned interference by the Chinese Communist Party, using our past studies as the basis, it is of the utmost importance that we start adjusting the diplomatic relations between Japan and Soviet Russia. For this purpose, we must begin our activities immediately to act through Germany.

III. We must promptly appoint and despatch an Ambassador to France and let him act so as to make the Vichy Government keep pace with the policy of our Empire in regard to China formed after the conclusion of the above-mentioned Tripartite Alliance.

Instructions to be given to Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary, HONDA, by the Foreign Minister (draft)

In carrying out your duty as Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary in China, I should like to ask you to pay special attention to the following points:

I. The Imperial Government has now recognized the New National Government and has entered into formal diplomatic relations with it. However, in view of the fact that not only is the Incident still going on but also that we have decided, at last, to adopt the state for a long term warfare, I hope that in carrying out your duty, you will, noting this point, exert yourself for the attainment of the purpose of the Incident, and that you will follow the established policy of the Empire, especially the "Outline for the Management of the China Incident" which was decided at the council in the presence of the Emperor on November 13, 1940.
II. You should, needless to say, co-operate positively with the military operations, and in regard to public peace follow the directions of the commanders-in-chief of the army and the navy in the area. As to the management of important policies, you should always negotiate with them frankly, and I hope that you will pay utmost consideration not to allow any gap whatsoever to exist in respect to the co-operation between the political and the military strategies.

III. In order to adjust and organize the various organs dealing with China and synthetically unify the policies towards China, we have now reached such decisions as are given in the plan of the annexed paper, and I hope that you will exert for the systematic management of the departments under your control, while attaining a still closer contact with the organs concerned in accordance with these decisions.

IV. As to instructions concerning the management of various departments of politics, economy and culture relating to the management of the Incident, you are requested to refer to "Collection of the Important Decisions" given in the separate volume. I hereby give you the above instructions.

Very Secret

Instructions to be given to Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary, HONDA, by the Foreign Minister (draft) (December 11, 1940, Asia No. 1)

In negotiating with the National Government as Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary in China, I should like to ask you to pay special attention to the following points:

I. The Imperial Government has now recognized the National Government and has entered into formal diplomatic relations with it. Moreover, in view of the situation that not only is the Incident still going on, but also that we are, at last, going to adapt the state for a long term warfare, you should try to radically bring up and strengthen the National Government, in accordance with the established policy of the Empire and the provisions of the New China-Japanese Treaty. At the same time, leading the third
powers, you should exert yourself to save the current situation as a whole, in accordance with the changes of the world situation. Regarding the matters mentioned above, you should follow the decisions made in the past, especially "The Outline for the Management of the China Incident" which was decided at the council in the presence of the Emperor on November 13, 1940.

II. In order to adjust and organize various organs dealing with China and attain the unified management of our policies towards China, we have now reached such decisions as are given in the outline of the annexed paper, and I hope that you will exert yourself for the systematic management of the departments under your control, while attaining a still closer contact with the organs concerned in accordance with these decisions.

III. The co-operation between political and military strategies being particularly important, I hope that you will maintain close contact with the Commanders-in-Chief of the Army and the Navy in China, and frankly-negotiate with them in regard to the matters concerning the management of the important policies and the public peace.

IV. As to instructions concerning the management of the various departments of politics, economy and culture related to the conduct of the Incident, you are requested to refer to "The Collection of the Important Decisions" given in the separate volume. I hereby give you the above instructions.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 5 pages, dated 4 Oct., 1940, and described as follows: Tentative Plan For Policy towards Southern Regions (2d part of file entitled "Japanese Foreign Policy").

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 26th day of August, 1947

Kaoru HAYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness: K. Urabe
Chief Archives Section
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Lersh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 26th day of August, 1947

Richard H. Lersh
NAME

Witness: Edward P. Monaghan
Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity
I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief, Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 4 pages, dated 25 Oct., 1940, and described as follows: Concerning Recognition of the new National Government and Conclusion of the Tripartite Pact (3rd part of file entitled "Japanese Foreign Policy").

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 26th day of August, 1947

Kaoru HAYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness: K. Ueba

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Lash, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 26th day of August, 1947

Richard H. Lash

Witness: Edward P. Monaghan
4628C
CERTIFICATE

W.D.C. No.____
I.P.S. No. R 37-D

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity:
Chief Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 4 pages, dated 11 Dec. 1940, and described as follows:
Instructions from the Foreign Minister to the Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary, HQ:DA (a draft) (4th part of file entitled "Japanese Foreign Policy"

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):
Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 26th day of August, 1947

K. Urabe
Official Capacity

Witness: ___ Kaoru HAYASHI ___
Signature of Official

Chief Archives Section

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the course of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 26th day of August, 1947

Richard H. Larsh
NAME

Witness: Edward P. Monaghan
Official Capacity
TELEGRAM (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 21 February 1941
Arrived 21 February 1941
10:05 o'clock
20:45 o'clock

No. 250 of 21 February

MOST URGENT

In connection with Telegram No. 241 of 19th with Pol. VIII.

Today the press further occupied itself with the alleged Japanese proposal for peace mediation. Judgment is generally reserved, emphasizing that it was in no way definite that the press reports from London are correctly repeating Butler's declaration in the Lower House. "HOSHI" warns against the danger that Japan's peace gesture would be propagandistically misused by opposing powers to Japan's disadvantage.

The Japanese Government spokesman declared in today's press conference that he could not make more detailed statements regarding the substance of MATSUOKA's answer to EDEN, but that he had the impression that Butler's Lower House declaration had been incorrectly repeated by the press. MATSUOKA's answer to Eden had not contained a concrete proposal for mediation, but had merely, in general phrase, touched upon the fundamental attitude of Japan toward the question of world peace.

Continuing, the spokesman repeated yesterday's MATSUOKA's press-dementi having the following content: "As Foreign Minister of the Japanese Government I have never offered to any nation of the world mediation for the reestablishment of world peace. I answered an inquiry from Eden regarding Japanese mediation activity between Thailand and Indo-China. Although I expressed my opinion regarding the reestablishment of world peace in their answer, I have never sent to any nation a message the subject of which was Japanese mediation for world peace, as is rumored."

I also refer to the detailed statement of D.N.B., Tokyo No. 602, 603, 604. For obvious reasons I have advised the D.N.B. representative here against detailed reporting for the present.

OTT
TELEGRAM (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 9 February 1941
Arrived: 9 February 1941

No. 192 of 9 February 1941

SECRET.

MOST URGENT.

Ha. Pol. 536 g

In answer to telegram No. 123 of the 3rd.

The Vice Foreign Minister personally handed to me a memorandum in the following content:

1. Japan is honestly willing to support Germany in the procurement of rubber and other raw materials from the South-East Asian Sphere.

2. The Japanese Government has taken notice of the fact that Germany has concluded a contract for the purchase of over 25,000 tons of rubber from Indo-China and prepares the transport of this amount from Indo-China to Dairon.

3. Instruction requested as to what the total amount of raw rubber is, which Germany (aside from Indo-China rubber) still wants from South East Asia this year.

4. As it is to be expected that the export of raw rubber from the Malayan States and the Netherlands Indies to Japan will be made difficult, Japan will only be able to cover its current necessary requirements with difficulty there. In consideration of this circumstance it will be necessary to reach a compromise between the amount of raw rubber desired by Germany and the amount actually able to be delivered. The negotiations concerning this are to be made ex-direct, through diplomatic channels, not, however, as has happened several times until now, through military authorities.

5. The Japanese Government requests information as soon as possible as to what raw materials (kind and amount) besides rubber, Germany wishes to obtain from the South East Asian areas still in this year.

The commercial execution of the business will be taken over by Showa TSUSHU (compare Report No. 220 of 3 August 1939 and following /acts/). As representatives of the Foreign export in question, KUNOSHIH, Dairon, shall for the German, together with SHOWA, undertake the internal winding up. For this purpose I have requested KUNOSHIH to come here at once. I request that he be given the necessary instructions via the Embassy.
Berlin, 17 February 1941

Diplomats TOKYO
No. 179

TELEGRAM IN CIPHER
(Secret Cipher Process)
(Secret Appendix to Secret Matters b)

URGENT

To telegram No. 175 of 6 February.

I request that you inform the Japanese Government that the German Government welcomes the Japanese intention that Thailand and France reach no political or military agreements whatsoever with a third power, whereby this obligation, as far as it concerns Franco, was to apply only to Indo-China. I request that you add that the armistice treaty, of course, applies to Franco with all her possessions, colonies, protectorates, so that we remain interested, if only for this reason, in the further development of affairs in Indo-China and therefore were awaiting current information on affairs in Indo-China.

WEIZSAECHEK
TELEGRAH (Secret Cipher Proces)

Tokyo, 19 February 1941
Arrived, 19 February 1941
10:30 o'clock
20:15 o'clock

No. 241 of 19 February

MOST URGENT

In addition to telegram No. 235 (with Pol. VIII) of 18,

1. During my visit today, the Foreign Minister at once approached me on /the subject of/ his instruction to the Japanese Ambassador to London, reported yesterday by a preceding telegram, and regarding yesterday's statements by the press chief of the Japanese Government. The Foreign Minister declared that Eden, in his recent answer to the Japanese Ambassador to London, had bluntly imputed that Japan, in her mediation action between Thailand and Indo-China, merely aims at the oppression of small nations in the Great East Asia Sphere. He had refused to enter into a discussion with Eden regarding this local Japanese act of mediation, and had preferred to make clear Japan's altruism by the declaration of a general mediation /and/ the willingness to reestablish world peace. Of course, he had left no doubt at this that those applications had sprung solely from his own initiative.

2. The Foreign Minister further reported that he had declared in a secret --- session of the Upper House on the occasion of a discussion on the Tripartite Pact that he was firmly convinced of the victory of the Axis Powers, since he had absolute confidence in the Fuehrer. The effect of these words had been very strong and had even visibly impressed opponents of the Governments.

OTT
Addition to F.I.I. No. 56/A

Top Secret.

Excerpt from the Record Concerning the Discussion of the German Foreign Minister with Ambassador OSS-IV in Posen on 23 February 1941

** * * * * * * *

The friendship of Japan, as continued the Foreign Minister of the Reich, had rendered for Germany the possibility to arm, after the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact. Japan, in her part, been able to penetrate deeply into the English sphere of interests in China. The victory of Germany on the continent now brings to Japan also great advantages after the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. France is eliminated from the position of a power in East Asia (Indo-China), England is likewise greatly weakened already, and Japan has been able to advance closer and closer to Singapore. Germany has already tremendously contributed to the formation of the fate of the life of both nations. Also in the future we would bear the main burden of the fight to the finish by reason of our geographical position. Should it still come to an unwanted collision with Russia, we would in this case too, bear the main burden. Should Germany ever become weak, Japan would shortly find herself standing opposite a world coalition. We are sitting in the same boat. The fate of both nations would now be decided upon for the next centuries. The above mentioned was also true for Italy. The interests of the three countries would never intersect. A defeat of Germany would also mean the end of the Japanese imperial idea.

** * * * * * * *

FUSEL, 23 February 1941.

Certification:

I, Ulrich Strauss, herby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 224.

/s/ Ulrich Strauss
図面案内「トランシ−」学習区段階計画（合計計画）
（「へ」学習区段階計画～編集者にゆきまわる）

（説明）
図面案内「トランシ−」学習区段階計画（合計計画）
（「へ」学習区段階計画～編集者にゆきまわる）

800A-1

6 x 633
800A - 3

(参考文献)

参考文献


Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, OTO, Kagaharu, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Acting Chief of Archives Section, Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 3 pages, dated 11 March, 1941, and described as follows: Letter from Minister MATSUKA concerning mediation of the Thai French Indo-China Dispute to French Ambassador Henry. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this 12th day of November 1946.

/s/ Kagaharu OTO

Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Motonori Fujita

SEAL

acting Chief, archives Section, Foreign Office

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Henry Shimojima, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 12th day of November, 1946.

/s/ Henry Shimojima

Witness: /s/ Richard E. Lasher

Investigator, IFS

Official Capacity
Exchange of Letters Between Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and Ambassador HENRY (Re: Proposal of Mediation Plan for the Thailand-French Indo-China Dispute)

11 March 1941

His Excellency Charles Arène HENRY
French Ambassador Plenipotentiary

Dear Sir,

It is an honor for me to inform you that the Imperial government attaches extreme importance to the maintenance of peace in Greater East Asia. According to the agreement of 30 August 1940, special relationship between Japan and French Indo-China has been agreed upon. It is with anxiety that the Imperial government observes the development of the dispute to which French Indo-China is a party.

In view of the fact that peace must be preserved in Greater East Asia and remembering our peaceful and friendly intentions upon which we concluded the above treaty, the Imperial government proposes mediation to the governments of France and Siam in order to end the dispute between French Indo-China and Siam. The Imperial government has drafted a mediation proposal as per enclosure, to which we expect the French government to accept unconditionally. If the French government accepts this proposal, the Imperial government is prepared to guarantee the French government that the decision of the dispute in the mediation proposal will be final and unalterable.

On the other hand, the Imperial government believes that the French government will profess to maintain peace in Greater East Asia; especially to establish good neighbor friendly relationship and also to promote close economic relationship between Japan and French Indo-China. The Imperial government also believes that the French government will proclaim not to conclude any treaty or agreement between French Indo-China and a third power that will presuppose the nature of political, economic or military cooperation to oppose Japan directly or indirectly.

It is comprehended that the aforementioned guarantee of the Imperial government and declaration of the French government should be confirmed by a formal note at a later time when the treaty to settle the dispute between France and Siam is concluded.

I, Foreign Minister, avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

Yours respectfully,

Foreign Minister Yosuke MATSUOKA.
To His Excellency
Yosuke MITSUOKA, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Tokyo, 11 March 1941

No. 21

By a letter of even date, Your Excellency has informed me of the following:

The Imperial Government, attaching the highest importance to the preservation of peace in Great East Asia, has witnessed, with anxiety, the development of a conflict involving French Indo-China, with which it maintains particularly close relations which were further tightened by the agreement of 30 August 1940.

Looking toward the preservation of peace in Great East Asia and taking its inspiration from the same peaceful and friendly spirit which presided over the establishment of the above-mentioned agreement, the Imperial Government offered its good offices to the Governments of France and Thailand so as to put an end to the conflict between French Indo-China and Thailand. Therefore, the Imperial Government offers, for unconditional acceptance by the French Government the plan of mediation annexed hereto. In the case of an affirmative answer, the Imperial Government will be prepared to guarantee to the French Government at the final and irrevocable character of the settlement achieved by such plan.

Besides, the Imperial Government is confident that the French Government will work towards the preservation of peace in Great East Asia, and in particular towards the establishment of friendly good-neighborly relations and towards the progress of close economic relations between Japan and French Indo-China, and that it will declare to the Imperial Government that France, in regard to French Indo-China, does not intend to enter into any agreement or entente providing for political, economic or military cooperation directly or indirectly opposed to Japan.

It is understood that the above-mentioned guarantee of the Imperial Government and statement of the French Government will be confirmed later on in a solemn document at the time of the establishment of the Treaty on the settlement of the conflict between France and Thailand.
I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of this communication and to inform Your Excellency that the French Government, although neither the local situation, nor the fortunes of war compel it to renounce the benefit of treaties freely negotiated and included with the Government of Thailand, is prepared to yield to the instances of the Japanese Government, by its acceptance of the plan of mediation annexed hereto. The French Government, which has constantly proved mindful of the preservation of peace in East Asia and never entered upon any course of action that might disturb such peace, affords new proof of its fidelity to the spirit that inspired the agreement of 30 August 1930. In this same spirit and desirous, moreover, of avoiding all engagements of such a nature as to involve its Far Eastern possessions into a conflict between third powers, it declares that it does not intend, in regard to Indo-China, to enter with a third power upon any agreement or entente providing for political, economic or military cooperation directly or indirectly opposed to Japan. It anticipates, moreover, that the Japanese Government will be anxious to assure the strict observance of the agreement of 30 August 1930 and of the subsequent military arrangements.

Please accept, Monsieur le Ministre, the assurances of my highest esteem.

Charles Arsene Henry
Ambassador Plenipotentiary
of France
CHO Isamu, Chief of Staff of the French Indo-China Expeditionary Force.

To: Vice Minister of War, KIMURA Heitaro.

We shall inform you as follows our secret agent's report (accuracy A) on the aforementioned subject:

The incident causing injury to a Japanese military employee by a French Indo-Chinese soldier in an Annamese house of prostitution, Citadel Street, Hanoi, on the night of the 24 April caused a great shock to the French Indo-China authorities. At present there exist both a pessimistic and an optimistic view among the officials concerning this matter. But the majority of them possess pessimistic views and generally look upon this affair as a regretful event that would bring about a grave crisis in the friendly relations between Japan and French Indo-China.

They are possessed with the credulous thought that this affair might serve as a fuse giving possibility of opening hostilities between the two countries, or the presentation of grave demands by the Japanese to French Indo-China. They are in a state of panic and are giving sincere efforts to bring about an amicable settlement of this affair and at the same time fear the retaliatory actions of the Japanese. They strictly forbid the French in general, notably the military service men, to visit the Japanese streets and areas where the Japanese frequent, especially near the houses of prostitution and liquor serving places. In this way they are only endeavoring to avoid unforeseen accidents in the future. The state of affairs is as follows:

Actions of the French Indo-China authorities, according to the views taken by the French Indo-China authorities:

(1) Pessimistic views

They consider this affair as a fuse with probabilities of inciting a war between Japan and French Indo-China, judging from the example which gave cause to the outbreak of the China Incident, incurred through the kidnap and murder of a Japanese soldier by the Chinese Army near the Marco Polo Bridge in July (SHOWA 12) 1937.
On the other hand, anticipating that the Japanese Army might demand expansion of the rights of self-defense, using this affair as a pretense, and with such wording as "necessary for the self-defense of the army", or to make a demand to increase additional forces, they are racking their brains to find means of establishing counter-measures.

In order to prevent aggravation of the situation they have adopted policies in which they are ready to give sacrifice, to some extent, for an amicable peace settlement of the affair. They are trying to moderate the firm attitude of the Japanese by resorting to policies of coquetry, such as the arrest of the offender, his strict punishment, the condoling of the victim and the consolation and favours to be extended to the bereaved family. Thus, they are trying to lead the affair to a friendly settlement. Anticipating that the Japanese side will take retaliatory measures, the Bureau of Administrative Affairs of the Governor General's Headquarters gave orders to the Hanoi Detective Bureau to compile and submit a list of the houses of prostitution and bars which the Japanese frequent, directly after the said incident. At the same time they strictly forbade the French, in general, especially military men, to enter the zones where the Japanese gather and places near the houses of prostitution, and thereby avoid unforeseen occurrences.

(2) Optimistic Views:

There are some among the French who point out and refer to the changed international situation since the previous year, especially on the recent increase of crises in the Far East, emphasizing the aggravation of American-Japanese relations.

They maintain that as the Japanese Army is now in a position where it is being forced to reorganize its troops in preparation against the extreme aggravated situation prevailing in the relations between Japan and America, it is impossible for the Japanese to carry out positive military policy in French Indo-China availing itself of the said incident. They advocate the optimistic view that it would be very easily settled on friendly terms.

The views maintained by the Army regarding the above:

The views maintained by the French Indo-China authorities are as above-mentioned and they are extremely in fear of the expansion of this incident and the action of the Japanese Army on the right of self-defense.
Since the actual state of affairs is one in which they are desirous of having an amicable settlement, regardless of the cost of compensation, we think that it is only fair for us to demand the investiture of power from the French Indo-China authorities, as the following, with a firm attitude and a definite purpose:

1. The increase and strengthening of the rights of stationing troops. Despite the fact that the number in military force amounts to 6,000, according to the current Japanese-French agreement, the Japanese Army shall station the required additional number of forces and expand the area of stationing troops to the whole of Tongking if found necessary for the solution of the Sino-Japanese conflict.

2. The enlargement of the area of action of the Japanese Army. The Japanese Army will be given the right to act freely within the Province of Tongking when required from the point of military operation and educational training. Despite the fact that at present the Japanese civilian populace, excepting the military men, are permitted to travel in Chuong Binh and Lang-son areas, which are considered most important from the standpoint of military official duties, the military men are forbidden to travel. Moreover, when a small unit is to engage in manoeuvres, negotiations must be done beforehand with the French Indo-Chinese authorities. The situation is that permission by the Governor-General is required, with condition that a French military officer be allowed to study and observe the manoeuvre. In manoeuvres where many secret matters are involved we had to suffer special disadvantages.

3. Freedom in selecting housing. For Japanese Army barracks the Annamese primary schools are chiefly provided, which offers but narrow and unsanitary places. They intend to gain two advantages, - killing two birds with one stone that is, of alienating Japan from Annam and that of distressing the Japanese Army. Furthermore, they have set up a new police sub-station near the officers' billet to keep eyes on the movements of the officers. They are also secretly oppressing the Annamese, who show favours to the Japanese Army, and in this way they are trying to force out pro-Japanese tendencies. They are by no means friendly.

It is necessary that they provide appropriate buildings that could be used for headquarters and barracks of the Japanese Army.

At present we have to file an application to the Governor-General requiring his permission, and even if we receive permission, they would always attach a Frenchman to go with us, thus restricting our freedom of actions. It is necessary that we acquire the rights of freedom to travel, like the French-Indonesians, except in zones where no trespassing is allowed because of military reasons.

5. We demand the free use of airfields. Despite the fact that the Army is installing new facilities such as runways, etc., at the Haiphon airfield, now being used by the Japanese troops, the amount in rent charges demanded by the French Indo-China authorities amounts to ¥35,000 annually. When we add the rent charges of the Gia-lam Airfield the amount rises to a considerable sum. On this occasion we demand free use of them.


Reference: To the Vice-Chief of the General Staff; Vice-Minister of War.
CHO Isamu, Chief of Staff of the French Indo-China Expeditionary Force.

To: Vice Minister of War, KIMURA Heitaro.

We shall inform you as follows our secret agent's report (accuracy A) on the aforementioned subject:

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They are possessed with the credulous thought that this affair might serve as a fuse giving possibility of opening hostilities between the two countries, or the presentation of grave demands by the Japanese to French Indo-China. They are in a state of panic and are giving sincere efforts to bring about an amicable settlement of this affair and at the same time fear the retaliatory actions of the Japanese. They strictly forbid the French in general, notably the military service men, to visit the Japanese streets and areas where the Japanese frequent, especially near the houses of prostitution and liquor serving places. In this way they are only endeavoring to avoid unforeseen accidents in the future. The state of affairs is as follows:

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They consider this affair as a fuse with probabilities of inciting a war between Japan and French Indo-China, judging from the example which gave cause to the outbreak of the China Incident, incurred through the kidnap and murder of a Japanese soldier by the Chinese Army near the Marco Polo Bridge in July (SHOWA 12) 1937.
On the other hand, anticipating that the Japanese Army might demand expansion of the rights of self-defense, using this affair as a pretext, and with such wording as "necessary for the self-defense of the army", or to make a demand to increase additional forces, they are racking their brains to find means of establishing counter-measures.

In order to prevent aggravation of the situation they have adopted policies in which they are ready to give some sacrifice, to some extent, for an amicable peace settlement of the affair. They are trying to moderate the firm attitude of the Japanese by resorting to policies of coquetry, such as the arrest of the offender, his strict punishment, the condoling of the victim and the consolation and favours to be extended to the bereaved family. Thus, they are trying to lead the affair to a friendly settlement. Anticipating that the Japanese side will take retaliatory measures, the Bureau of Administrative Affairs of the Governor General's Headquarters gave orders to the Hanoi Detective Bureau to compile and submit a list of the houses of prostitution and bars which the Japanese frequent, directly after the said incident. At the same time they strictly forbade the French, in general, especially military men, to enter the zones where the Japanese gather and places near the houses of prostitution, and thereby avoid unforeseen occurrences.

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There are some among the French who point out and refer to the changed international situation since the previous year, especially on the recent increase of crises in the Far East, emphasizing the aggravation of American-Japanese relations.

They maintain that as the Japanese Army is now in a position where it is being forced to reorganize its troops in preparation against the extreme aggravated situation prevailing in the relations between Japan and America, it is impossible for the Japanese to carry out positive military policy in French Indo-China availing itself of the said incident. They advocate the optimistic view that it would be very easily settled on friendly terms.

The views maintained by the Army regarding the above:

The views maintained by the French Indo-China authorities are as above-mentioned and they are extremely in fear of the expansion of this incident and the action of the Japanese Army on the right of self-defense.
Since the actual state of affairs is one in which they are desirous of having an amicable settlement, regardless of the cost of compensation, we think that it is only fair for us to demand the investiture of power from the French Indo-China authorities, as the following, with a firm attitude and a definite purpose:

1. The increase and strengthening of the rights of stationing troops. Despite the fact that the number in military force amounts to 6,000, according to the current Japanese-French agreement, the Japanese Army shall station the required additional number of forces and expand the area of stationing troops to the whole of Tongking if found necessary for the solution of the Sino-Japanese conflict.

2. The enlargement of the area of action of the Japanese Army. The Japanese Army will be given the right to act freely within the Province of Tongking when required from the point of military operation and educational training. Despite the fact that at present the Japanese civilian populace, excepting the military men, are permitted to travel in Chuong Binh and Lang-son areas, which are considered most important from the standpoint of military official duties, the military men are forbidden to travel. Moreover, when a small unit is to engage in manoeuvres, negotiations must be done beforehand with the French Indo-Chinese authorities. The situation is that permission by the Governor-General is required, with condition that a French military officer be allowed to study and observe the manoeuvre. In manoeuvres where many secret matters are involved we had to suffer special disadvantages.

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It is necessary that they provide appropriate buildings that could be used for headquarters and barracks of the Japanese Army.

At present we have to file an application to the Governor-General requiring his permission, and even if we receive permission, they would always attach a Frenchman to go with us, thus restricting our freedom of actions. It is necessary that we acquire the rights of freedom to travel, like the French-Indonese, except in zones where no trespassing is allowed because of military reasons.

5. We demand the free use of airfields. Despite the fact that the Army is installing new facilities such as runways, etc., at the Haiphon Airfield, now being used by the Japanese troops, the amount in rent charges demanded by the French Indo-China authorities amounts to ¥35,000 annually. When we add the rent charges of the Gia-lam Airfield the amount rises to a considerable sum. On this occasion we demand free use of them.


Reference: To the Vice-Chief of the General Staff; Vice-Minister of War.
Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

To be kept in locked file.

Tokyo, 21 June 1941 1030 hours
Arrival, 21 June 1941 2015 hours
No. 1009 of 21 June

For German Foreign Minister.

HATSUOKA, who had invited me, told me the following information during a long conversation:

1) Renewed negotiations between Japan and the Netherlands Indies is not to be expected. Existing tension unbearable in the long run. For occupying Netherlands East Indies, air and naval bases must be set up in French Indo-China. Hence he had asked through ambassador OSHIMA whether French consent to this could be obtained by Berlin, otherwise he would take up the matter with VICHY directly.

I have the impression that the activistically minded Congress of the Unity Party /Einheits/ partei/, and the attitude of public opinion towards the problem of the Netherlands Indies, enable the government to enforce an energetic stand against the Anglophilic circles by pointing to public opinion.

2) Regarding WANG CHING EI's visit, HATSUOKA observed that Japan would not accept any solution of the China conflict without Wang Ching Wei. Ching King had previously been approached to this effect with Wang Ching Wei's consent. These efforts must be regarded as having failed.

He intends to seek the recognition of Wang Ching Wei by Germany and Italy, should this be confirmed during another conversation with Wang Ching Wei. He is certain that the Axis powers will consent to this, since the German Foreign Minister had recently replied to a question by Ambassador OSHIMA that he was ready, as heretofore, and as recently agreed upon in Berlin, to strengthen the position of Wang Ching Wei; however, with the postscript that the Fuehrer had not yet taken up the matter.

3) The United States of America had not yet replied to the Japanese communication of 12 May. A report from Ambassador MONTE showed that HULL wanted to make his last anti-German declaration a firm, constituent part of an American-
Japanese agreement. Such a nonsensical proposal will only prove that the United States of America wishes to cause the negotiations to fail while holding Japan responsible. He would try to act in such a way that this blame is unequivocally with the United States; this would be useful for inner political reasons.

Upon my question MATSUOKA confirmed that Ambassador GREW had recently forwarded a sharp note of protest concerning the shelling of an American gunboat near CHUNGKING and the damage caused to the American Embassy there. Actually the gunboat had not been hit and no personnel casualties had occurred in the American Embassy. He had drawn the attention of the American ambassador to the exposed position of the American craft, promising, in addition, an investigation of the case. He presumed that this had settled the incident.

Since the protest by the American ambassador was neither mentioned in the Japanese nor in any other press, I take it that both sides are striving for a settlement without any publicity.

4). MATSUOKA further informed me that he knew of the development of German-Russian relations through concrete news from OCHIYA. He repeated his previous declarations on this subject. He hoped that in the future handling of this matter a way may be found which would ease his own position, and that of the Japanese government. Japan would under no circumstances allow shipments of war-essential materials of the United States from America to Siberia. He was certain that the measures taken by the Japanese Navy would hold back the United States of America from a utopian beginning.

MATSUOKA was pointedly positive and cordial during the conversation. He intentionally stressed that the army and navy agreed with his policy, evidently in order to counter rumors concerning the difficulty of his and the Cabinet's position.

OTT

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4081-E.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus
Tokyo, 21 June 1941  1010 hours
Arrival, 21 June 1941  2015 hours

No. 1009 of 21 June

For German Foreign Minister.

MATSUMOTO, who had invited me, told me the following information during a long conversation:

1) Renewed negotiations between Japan and the Netherlands Indies is not to be expected. Existing tension unbearable in the long run. For proceeding against the Netherlands East Indies, ady and naval bases must be set up in French Indo-China. Hence he had asked through Ambassador OSIMA whether French consent to this could be obtained by Berlin, otherwise he would take up the matter with VICHY directly.

I have the impression that the anti-socially minded Congress of the Unity Party (Drang nach Osten), and the attitude of public opinion towards the problem of the Netherlands Indies, enables the government to enforce an energetic stand against the Anglo-Germans by pointing to public opinion.

2) Regarding WANG CHING WEI's visit, MATSUMOTO observed that Japan would not accept any solution of the China conflict without Wang Ching Wei. Ching Wei had previously been approached to this effect with Wang Ching Wei's consent. These efforts must be regarded as having failed.

I intend to seek the recognition of Wang Ching Wei by Germany and Italy, should this be confirmed during another conversation with Wang Ching Wei. It is certain that the Axis powers will consent to this, since the German Foreign Minister had recently replied to a question by Ambassador OSIMA that he was ready, as heretofore, and as recently agreed upon in Berlin, to strengthen the position of Wang Ching Wei; however, with the postscript that the Fuehrer had not yet taken up the matter.

3) The United States of America had not yet replied to the Japanese communication of 12 May. A report from Ambassador OSIMA showed that HULL wanted to make his last anti-German declaration a firm, constituent part of an American-
Japanese agreement. Such a nonsensical proposal will only prove that the United States of America wishes to cause the negotiations to fail while holding Japan responsible. He would try to act in such a way that this blame is unequivocally with the United States; this would be useful for inner political reasons.

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/ / Ulrich A. Strauss
ULRICH A. STRAUS
東京 一九四一年七月一日 三時五十分

電報（秘密遂行）

一九四一年七月三日九時三十分

要人赴前方幹部

日本外務大臣 声明書

 vết

第③④号

下長送

一九四一年七月三日付

秘漲

口頭宣示

（訳)

No. EXHIBIT NO. 636

Doc. 4062 A
Ulrich A. Strauss
Of the two protocols, the first states in its preamble, that the Japanese and French governments, desiring to maintain peace in East Asia, recollecting the peaceful and friendly spirit which led to the establishment of an agreement through official documents exchanged on August 30 of last year between Foreign Minister Matsuoka and French Ambassador Henri, and prompted by the sincere desire to uphold this spirit, desire to secure the stabilization of the friendly relations which have been restored between France and Thailand. In its body the protocol provides:

(1) That the Imperial Japanese government guarantees to the French government that the settlement of the dispute between France and Thailand resulting from Japan's mediation and as embodied in the aforementioned peace treaty and in the annexed documents is definite and unalterable;

(2) That the French government accepts the above guarantee, and will strive to maintain peace in East Asia, and especially to establish good neighborly, friendly relations and to promote intimate economic relations between Japan and French Indo-China; that furthermore, the French government declares that it has no intention to conclude with third powers any agreement or understanding concerning French Indo-China which anticipates political, economic, or military cooperation of a nature which directly or indirectly opposes Japan. In addition, the protocol fixes the ratification procedure and the date of the enforcement of the protocol.

The contents of the second protocol are the same as those of the first protocol, except that it cites in its preamble the treaty concluded on 12 June last year between Japan and Thailand concerning the continuation of friendly relations and mutual respect of each other's territorial integrity, and places no special regional restriction on the arrangements with third powers, in the declaration contained in the second paragraph of the body of the protocol.

It seems that these various arrangements aim to secure the fulfillment of the stipulations of the peace treaty which had been concluded as the result of the settlement of the dispute between France and Thailand through the Japanese Imperial Government's mediation and also to promote good neighborly, friendly relations between Japan and French Indo-China, and between Japan and Thailand. Inasmuch as these instruments will maintain the peace of East Asia and contribute to Japan's establishment of the New Order, their objects may be regarded as proper, and the clauses contained therein deemed to involve no special difficulties. Hence the Judging Committee has unanimously decided that each of the items of the bills under review be either approved or ratified as drafted without any amendment. We hereby report our findings.
No. 10. (MATSUOKA): I have something to say here as the responsible minister concerning this subject. The subject should have been laid before the plenary session, of the 18th of last month, but was postponed for the convenience of the session. Subsequently, however, in view of the fact that we learned through the reports of our Ambassador to France and also the representations of the Vichy Government during the course of the treaty negotiations, that the Vichy Government held many opposing views and the Treaty was signed almost solely on the responsibility of Delegate Roban /?/. I came to entertain the fear that the French Government might not ratify the subject treaty and also the Economic Agreement between Japan and French Indo-China. Accordingly, I requested a further postponement of the decision on this item. However, having received from our Ambassador to France at the end of last month that the French government had finally decided to ratify the two treaties, I decided to submit them for your deliberations here. I trust that you would appreciate the circumstances responsible for the postponement.

No. 22. (ISHII): Once, on the occasion of the deliberation for the ratification of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty, I asserted that the conclusion of that treaty was not only a success of Japanese diplomacy, but also a great victory. Probably the word "success" was not sufficient to show the whole state of affairs. I called it a "victory", because at that time there was an intense secret strife between Japan on the one side and Britain and America on the side centring around the Soviet Union. And yet Foreign Minister MATSUOKA successfully overthrew Chamberlain and Roosevelt and concluded a treaty with the Soviet Union. The same applies to the various items now under consideration. It is the victory of our diplomacy that through the success of our mediation in the dispute between Thailand and France, we have caused a peace treaty to be concluded between them. That is, Britain, looking upon Thailand as if it were its own sphere of influence, had carried on secret activities in various directions under the leadership of Minister Crosby, who has been a resident of Thailand for the past twenty years, and had schemed to settle the dispute between the two countries to its own advantage when the opportunity presented itself. It is very gratifying that Japan availed herself of the opportunity and finally succeeded in placing Britain in the shade. Well, it has been advocated by our government and people in every way that our country is the stabilizing force of East Asia, but now in the opportunity that has presented itself for the first time we have been able to truly prove our position. Especially, the point which I welcome with satisfaction is the fact that our country's right to mediate, and hence our position of leadership, has been acknowledged by the provisions of Article 10 of the Franco-Thai Peace Treaty, which provisions are, moreover, permanently effective since the treaty is valid for an indefinite period of time. Probably, this advantage is more valuable than any other advantages to be derived from both of Thailand and France. If our country had obtained the cession of a district or a province, it would no doubt become the cause of enmity toward us in the future, but the disposition made by our country at this time has all the more enhanced the reputation of our country by an unselfish, fair act, seeking nothing whatever for ourselves.

It should be called the fruits of our so-called Imperial Way diplomacy. From these points of view, I wish to express my respect and congratulations to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and the other members of the present Cabinet.
No. 26 (SHIMIZU): Recently several countries of Europe have recognized the National Government at Nanking, but what is the attitude of Thailand towards that government?

No. 10 (MATSUOKA): On the one hand, from the standpoint that Thailand is farther from Nanking than from Ch Hank, she is in a delicate situation; and on the other hand, even though Japan's mediation has proved successful, British influence in Thailand remains unshakable. Therefore, it is very difficult to expect Thailand to recognize the Nanking Government. When our country's political and economic power has steadily penetrated into that country and when the Thailand Government authorities will not find themselves in a perplexing position should they recognize the Nanking Government, we shall grasp the opportunity then to take proper measures.

No. 26 (SHIMIZU): In spite of the existence of a treaty pact of non-aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union, war has broken out between the two powers. Whom should we regard as the breaker of the treaty? Japan has concluded an alliance treaty with Germany and a neutrality treaty with the Soviet Union. For our information, please let us know our country's future attitude in this connection.

No. 10 (MATSUOKA): Two years ago Germany, facing the imminent crisis of a war with Britain, concluded a treaty with the Soviet Union as a temporary expedient lest the latter should be won over to Britain's side. At that time Germany explicated to Japan that this was an unavoidable disposition, and explained that her real intention was to detect and suppress, when opportunity presented itself, not only the Soviet Union's aggressive principle, but also the ideology embraced by that country. It seemed that the Soviet Union also knew the circumstance very well and planned to strike Germany after waiting for a favorable time. The reasons for starting the war have been published by both governments, but, after all, the Non-Aggression Treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union was but a temporary expedient to both of them.

No. 35 (FUKAI): Since I share in general the opinion of Councillor ISHII, I am glad to offer my congratulation to the government authorities. However, I think there is one point in the subject item which deserves consideration. Perhaps third powers might take it as a symbol of our aggressive policy if we look upon ourselves as the stabilizing force of East Asia. For instance, in regard to the documents dated August 31 of last year which were exchanged between Japan and France, our Price Minister explained that he was unable to take the formalities for the submission of the documents for the deliberation of the Privy Council, because he had to seize a moment when France was fearful of our country's actions. Although I think that such a measure is sometimes necessary and should not be reproached, yet, insofar as our purpose is to become truly the stabilizing and guiding force of East Asia and to show the world our Imperial Way, we should have the fundamentally required attitude of mind. That is, on the occasion of the deliberations on the Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty, the Privy Council made it clear that the cardinal point is to win the sentiments of the Chinese people. I think the same can be said in our relations with French Indo-China and Thailand. Unless we succeed in winning the sentiments of the people, it cannot be said to be perfect. In my opinion this deserves full consideration. It is under such a state of mind that I support this subject item.
President (HARA) As there are no further remarks, we shall immediately take a vote. All those in favor, please rise.

President (HARA) It has been carried unanimously.

President (HARA) Next we shall take up for deliberation the item of the ratification of the Franco-Japanese Treaty of Residence and Navigation concerning French Indo-China, and of the Franco-Japanese Agreement concerning the customs system, trade and the modalities of settlement of accounts between Japan and French Indo-China. / pp.47-85/

Omitting the reading, we shall confine it to the outline, and omitting the oral reading, we are now ready to hear immediately the report of the Chairman of the Judging Committee.

Reporter (ISEIZUKA): Having been appointed as judging committee members on the item submitted for deliberation, we held a committee meeting on June 16 and completed our examination.

According to the explanation of the State Minister, on the occasion of the conclusion of the Franco-Japanese Agreement of June, 1907 (Meiji 40), the French and Japanese Governments declared, with reference to French Indo-China, that until a commercial treaty shall have been concluded in future, Japan and French Indo-China would accord to each other the most favored nation treatment in regard to the protection of the lives and property of each other's nationals. When the Franco-Japanese Commercial and Navigation Treaty was concluded in August, 1911 (Meiji 44), Japan wished to apply that treaty to French Indo-China also, but France refused it and merely declared that she reconfirmed the declaration of several years ago. Since then Japan took every opportunity to conclude a commercial treaty concerning French Indo-China, but failed because France opposed it, fearing extremely the penetration of Japanese and Japanese goods in that area. At last in August of Showa 2 (1927) we came to an agreement on the matter of residence and navigation, and a protocol providing for the system of residence and navigation between Japan and Indo-China was provisionally concluded. But as regards commercial matters, the negotiations proved very difficult and a compromise could not be easily reached. Meanwhile, France further strengthened the measures against the importation of Japanese goods, while Japan, on the other hand, was about to impose a retaliatory duty on coal, which was the main export of French Indo-China. Therupon France finally reconsidered the matter and thus a commercial treaty provisionally stipulating trade regulations between Japan and French Indo-China was concluded in May of Showa 7 (1932). In the previously mentioned protocol of Showa 2 (1927), Japan and French Indo-China guaranteed to accord to each other the treatment of the most favored nations in respect to residential matters of both natural persons and juridical persons, and the treatment of domestic vessels or of the most favored nation's in respect to shipping. Nevertheless, the protocol was not only a provisional agreement which could be abolished at any time after January 1, 1928, (Showa 3), by giving three months' advance notice, but also lacked concrete provisions concerning entry into the country, business, the ownership of immovables, etc., with the result that it failed to achieve the expected results.
In the Commercial Treaty of 1932 (Showa 7), Japan and French Indo-China granted to each other the advantage of customs, but this, too, was a provisional agreement, placing numerous items of our important exports beyond the scope of its application and making no provisions whatever in respect to the prohibition and restriction of exports and imports, import quotas, and the modification of the rates. And so, by the raising of the custom tariff by France, the advantages of the agreement were greatly reduced, and by the reinforcement of this quota system, the enforcement of exchange control, etc., our trade with French Indo-China fell into a slump again. But the change in the general situation due to the surrender of France to Germany caused a change in the French attitude towards Japan, giving Japan an opportunity to settle various pending questions concerning French Indo-China.

Page 53. As the result of our negotiations on economic problems, the French Government acknowledged on August 30 Japan's political and economic supremacy in East Asia, and, besides pledging the grant of military facilities, acknowledged by document that she would begin negotiations with Japan to promote the trade between Japan and French Indo-China, and to give to Japan as much as possible an advantageous position in French Indo-China superior to that enjoyed by any other states under any circumstances. Thereupon it was decided to have the delegates of the two countries start negotiations on the economic problems of French Indo-China and Japan. The conversations commenced on 30 December. First of all they discussed the problem of buying Saigon rice, which Japan urgently needed at that time. As soon as the two parties reached an agreement of views, they proceeded to negotiate on the remaining problems. After a lapse of considerable time due to the aggravation of the border dispute between French Indo-China and Thailand and the mediation by Japan, the conference at last completed the negotiations at the end of April. Accordingly they drafted the treaty, protocol, agreement and other related documents, which were signed and sealed by, or exchanged between, the delegates of the two nations on May 6.

Following is the outline of each of the arrangements:

1. Franco-Japanese Treaty of Residence and Navigation concerning French Indo-China. I will omit the explanation of the whole because this treaty has the same content as the Franco-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, except that part in the latter concerning commerce, and because it is made up of only traditional provisions. The treaty is to be enforced from the day the ratifications are exchanged, to remain valid for five years. If neither side has notified the other one year before the expiration of the treaty its intention to abrogate it, the treaty shall continue to be valid for one year from the day the treaty was denounced by one of the parties.

This treaty supersedes the declarations of 1907 (Meiji 40) and of 1911 (Meiji 44) concerning French Indo-China, and also the protocol of 1927 (Showa 2) providing for the system of residence and navigation between Japan and French Indo-China.
2. The Protocol.

This protocol, together with the above-mentioned treaty, forms an inseparable whole, and has the same term of validity. It is composed of several clauses defining Japan's special position in French Indo-China. That is, the treaty provides as follows: (1) The fees for foreigners' identification cards shall be reduced in the case of Japanese nationals; (2) Japanese nationals shall be specially permitted to engage in certain occupations which are prohibited to foreigners now; (3) the maximum percentage of employees who may be employed in Japanese enterprises shall be raised up to a specified percentage; (4) the acquisition by Japanese of the ownership of immovables in Annan and Tonkin shall be given consideration, subject to the consent of the king of the protectorates; (5) concessions in agricultural, mining, and hydraulic power enterprises shall be granted in Indo-China to Franco-Japanese joint concerns under special terms; (6) Japanese nationals shall be permitted under fixed conditions to open and manage Japanese schools for giving Japanese education; (7) to discuss economic problems of both countries, an economic conference composed of the government and civilian representatives of the two countries; (8) the problems concerning coastal trade in Indo-China, navigation and fishing in the inlend seas or territorial waters, and problems of aviation, wireless stations, and undersea cables, shall be settled through consultations between the two governments; as regards the problems of marine transportation, the governments of the two countries shall encourage their solution through the cooperation of the shipping interests. And this protocol is not to be published, lest third powers will share equally with us the above-mentioned various privileges by virtue of the most favored nation clause.

3. Franco-Japanese Agreement concerning the customs system, trade and the modalities of settling accounts between Japan and French Indo-China.

Following is the explanation of the main points of the body of the agreement according to the order given:

(A) The customs system.

(1) Goods of Japanese or Indo-Chinese origin, on being exported or imported between the two countries, shall enjoy the most favored nation treatment in respect to taxes, fees, and other levies, and also all matters concerning rules and procedures relating to exportation and importation.

(2) Goods of Japanese origin, on being imported into French Indo-China, shall in general be subject to import duties of the minimum tariff rate, but those which are listed in the annexed List A shall be either exempted from duties or given reductions from the minimum tariff rates. Likewise, goods of Indo-Chinese origin which are listed in the annexed List B, on being imported into Japan, shall be either exempted from duties or given reductions from the statutory tariff rates.

(3) As regards those goods which are listed in the annexed Lists A and B, no raise in the duties on them shall be permitted during one year after the enforcement of this agreement. Provision is made for the necessary procedures to be taken for giving advance notice to the other party in case the duties must unavoidably be raised. The raising of the duties through the alteration of the table of customs tariff goods and of the classification of the customs shall not be permitted.
(4) In order to receive the above-mentioned advantages in respect to
customs, direct shipment shall be an essential condition, in addition
to a certification of origin. However, certain exceptions shall be
recognized. Provision is made for the issuance of certificates of
origin. As a principle, invoice certified by a special organ should
be attached to the customs declaration.

(5) The products of the other party shall be exempted from all taxes and
fees in respect to their transit, trans-shipment, storage in a bonded
warehouse, warehousing, temporary suspension free of duty; or their
re-exportation. In respect to all regulations and procedures concerning
such goods, the treatment of the most favored nation shall be accorded
to them. In respect to the levying of domestic taxes on the goods
imported by the other party, the same domestic treatment or the treat­
ment of the most favored nation shall be accorded to them.

(6) In respect also to the prohibition and restriction of the exportation
and importation of goods between the two countries, the treatment of
the most favored nation is guaranteed as a general principle, with
certain exceptions which are provided for.

(7) In respect to the grant of special privileges on all other items
relating to commerce, the treatment of the most favored nation is
guaranteed. However, exception is recognized in respect to Japan's
interests, etc. in Manchukuo.

(B) Trade:
(1) Every year the government authorities of the two countries shall
determine by agreement:
(a) the articles of Indo-Chinese origin and their quantities which are
to be imported into Japan in the following year;
(b) the import quotas to be allowed to Japan on goods which are placed
on an import quota basis in French Indo-China;
(c) the articles of Japanese origin and their quantities which are to
be imported into French Indo-China during the following year.
The list which as the agreement for the current year, was drawn up
simultaneously with the signing of the subject agreement, gives a
total of 22 items, including rice and crude rubber, of Indo-Chinese
origin referred to in (a) above, and also their quantities. The
French Government especially guarantees to Japan a supply of 700,000
metric tons of polished rice and 15,000 metric tons of crude rubber.
Provision is made as to the way this is to be carried out. In respect
to goods of Japanese origin referred to in (b) above, a total of 49
items, including margarine, cheese, and their quantities are listed on
an annual quota basis, and a total of 17 items, including sweetened
condensed milk, etc., and their quantities are listed on a quarterly
basis. Provision is made for the way those are to be carried out. In
respect to articles of Japanese origin referred to in (c) above, a total
of 108 items, including oysters, potatoes, fruits, etc., and their
quantities are listed.

(2) Concerning the agreed articles referred to in (a) and (c) above, the
governments of the two countries are bound to mutually grant to each
other import and export permits up to the quantities agreed between
them. Friendly consideration is to be given to the exportation and
importation of the agreed articles in excess of the agreed quantities,
to the exportation and importation of goods other than those agreed upon, and to the granting of additional quotas for goods of Japanese origin in case the total quota is raised for goods referred to in (b) above, which are subject to the quota system. The quota for goods of Japanese origin in case of the expansion of the quota system is to be decided by common agreement between the government authorities of the two countries.

(3) The protocol also provides for the duty of the government authorities of the two countries to notify each other the method of certifying the origin of goods, the list of import permits, and the statistics of exports and imports.

(c) The mode of settling trade accounts.

(1) The payment of the proceeds of all goods, other than specially exempted goods, and of the freights, insurance premiums, and other charges on such goods, shall be made, not in foreign currencies, but in Indo-Chinese Piastres in case of goods of Indo-Chinese origin, and in yen in the case of goods of Japanese origin. These yen and piastres may be acquired only from the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Banque de L'Indo-Chine, respectively. The specially excepted goods for the current year is crude rubber, payment for which is to be made in American dollars.

(2) The Yokohama Specie Bank and the Banque de l'Indo-Chine may raise piastres or yen necessary for making the above-mentioned payments by offering to each other an equivalent in yen or piastres. The yen acquired by the Banque de l'Indo-Chine is to be paid into two special accounts, A and B (B Account for the purchase of rice and A Account for the payment of other items) which will be established on the books of the YOKOHAMA Specie Bank in the name of the Banque de l'Indo-Chine. The piastres acquired by the Yokohama Specie Bank are to be paid into a special piastres account (to be called C Account), which will be established on the books of the Banque de l'Indo-Chine in the name of the Yokohama Specie Bank. The funds in Accounts A and C are to be appropriated for the payment of the trade between the two countries and also incidental expenses, but the funds in Account B, namely, Rice Account, is to be left intact for one year and transferred to A Account in the following year.

(3) In case the difference between the balances of Account A and Account C at the end of each month exceeds ¥ 5,000,000 or its equivalent in piastres, upon request of the creditor bank, payment is to be made in gold or in other foreign currencies convertible into gold for the full amount of the excess amount in case it lies to the credit of the Banque de l'Indo-Chine, or for an amount which the excess amount further exceeds the balance of Account B in case the excess amount lies to the credit of the Yokohama Specie Bank.
(D) Others.

The agreement designates the area of its application, and provides that in case it becomes impossible to carry out the agreement owing to the occurrence of unforeseen incidents during the term of the agreement, the governments of the two countries shall begin negotiations to solve the difficulties. This agreement requires ratification, becomes effective from the day the ratifications are exchanged, and remains in force till Showa 18 (1943). If no denunciation is made by either one of the two countries six months before the expiration of the term, the term of validity is extended for another year, and so on, by tacit renewal. The agreement supersedes the Franco-Japanese Commercial Agreement of 1932 (Showa 7) and annexed documents, which provisionally set up regulations for the trade between Japan and French Indo-China.

There are two tables, A and B, attached to the agreement, but I will omit their explanations here because of the complexity of their contents.

4. The Exchanged Official Documents.

In order to fix the treatment to be accorded to the commercial firms in both Japan and French Indo-China, these documents, in the form of documents exchanged between the representatives of the Japanese and French Governments, provide as follows: (1) The French Government sanctions the admission into the French Indo-China Import Association of not more than ten Japanese commercial firms which, under the existing trade control law of French Indo-China, are disqualified from joining that association. These firms are to be granted permits to import a specified quantity of Japan-made goods. Moreover, one or two of these firms are to be granted export permit for the exportation of specified quantities of French Indo-Chinese corn to Japan. (2) The Indo-Chinese commercial firms may be admitted into associations and other trade control organs, or receive approval of them, in accordance with the control regulations of Japan, and they are not to be subjected to discriminatory treatment by these organs in comparison with Japanese commercial firms.

These documents are not to be published.

It seems that the subject arrangements stipulate the rules which should govern the various relations regarding residence, navigation and commerce between Japan and French Indo-China, which have been long pending questions to Japan. The enforcement of these arrangements will promote greatly our economic penetration into French Indo-China and will contribute in no small degree to the development of our commercial trade. Especially, it will bring many advantages in the acquisition of materials urgently needed by our country. Accordingly, we consider it proper to approve all of the treaty, agreement, and annexed documents. However, in view of the developments in the international situation, we hope that everything possible would be done to avoid friction with the other party and to realize actual results in carrying out the arrangements. Therefore, the Judging Committee has decided unanimously to recommend that the treaty and agreement under review be approved for ratification. We hereby report our findings as above.
No. 22. (ISHII): I am not opposed to the subject bill, but I must hear further satisfactory explanation, from the Minister concerned before I can give my hearty support to the bill. There is room for many arguments on this bill, but out of deference to His Majesty's presence, I shall only ask one question. The economic agreement included in this bill has its origin in the official documents exchanged between the Japanese and French Governments on August 30 of last year. In these exchanged official documents, France acknowledged Japan's political and economic supremacy in East Asia and also pledged to give Japan the most advantageous position possible in French Indo-China, which was superior to that of any third power under any circumstances. In this connection, I recall that years ago when I was sent on a mission to America and negotiated with Secretary of State Lansing in regard to Japanese interests in China, the side proposed the use of the word "superior" /"yuetsuteki"/, but the other side refused. So at last we negotiated direct with President Wilson, but it was flatly rejected. Under the circumstances we were obliged to use the word "special" /"tokushuteki"/. Since the word "superior" /"yuetsu"/, which has a very important meaning, is used in the foregoing document, I had hoped for great results, remembering that our plenipotentiaries went into the negotiations of this agreement with this as a basis. To my surprise, however, a look at the definite program here, shows that the terms are generally reciprocal and there is nothing specially favorable to Japan. Although there are some benefits, these are beneath our notice. Nevertheless, I think that somewhere in it there is probably something which embodies Japan's superior position. Hence, I ask for explanation.

No. 10. (MATSUOKA): Looking back at the circumstances surrounding the exchange of the official documents on August 30 of last year, Japan made France acknowledge our political superiority and at the same time, as the result of it, to agree to the advance of Japanese forces into French Indo-China. Later on France submitted herself to our mediation in the dispute with Thailand. These two points are the most conspicuous embodiments of our country's political superiority. Concerning the economic problem, which constitutes the substance of this draft, our people are able to enjoy in French Indo-China the same treatment as French nationals in respect to specially designated matters. That is, these are the results of the acknowledgment of our superiority. We find almost no example of it in the history of colonization. In respect to other points, I cannot say that they are always satisfactory. However, my reason for considering this draft as satisfactory is based on the fundamental diplomatic concept which demands the retrieval of our international reputation which has been completely lost since the Manchurian Incident.

Inasmuch as France, in view of the fact that she had been defeated in the war against Germany, already recognized last year our superior position and agreed to export to Japan the full quantity of polished rice as demanded by Japan, which is a matter of life and death to Japan, I thought that it would enhance our country's reputation if we were satisfied with half of our demands in respect to other matters. Through the efforts of my subordinates, we finally succeeded in getting 80% of our demands. While on the one hand I appreciated their services, I reproached them for not stopping at a point where 50% of our demands had been accepted. On reflection, I observe that the fact that France recognized our leadership in East Asia is in itself alone a very
important matter. We will do our best to expand and embody it in the future. It is impossible to realize all of the items in a short period of time. Considering from the foregoing circumstances, I think the agreement, as it is, gives us more than we should expect.

No. 22. (ISHII): I am very surprised at your explanation. I did not discuss the exchanged official documents of August last year, but I asked how the content of the said official documents, that is, the recognition by France of our country's superior position, has been utilized and how it has been embodied. Now that France has recognized our superior position, we do not by any means lose our prestige if we make her offer the real substance of this recognition. While on the one hand I do not grudge due admiration and praise for the fact that, in mediating between Thailand and France, we did not demand for ourselves any cession of a district or a state, on the other hand I cannot but regret that you consider that we obtained more than we should expect when we obtained 80% of our demands in concluding the economic agreement under review. Although we obtained the necessary quantity of polished rice, it is only a normal dealing and nothing strange for us to purchase the surplus rice left after filling the requirements of France and her colonies.

As to rubber, whereas Germany is already getting 25,000 tons from French Indo-China, we have obtained only 15,000 tons. In spite of the fact that we should be given a superior position as compared with third countries, we are placed in this inferior position. However, since the agreement, in spite of the above-mentioned points, is several times superior to the past treaties, I do not dare oppose it. Though I will vote for its approval, I am not satisfied with it, in the light of the official documents of August last year. According to recent telegraphic dispatches from French Indo-China, the attitude of the French Indo-China authorities towards Japan is more often than not at odds with us. So long as France violates what she pledged to us in the official documents, there is no reason for us to be diffident. I hope that due efforts would be made in the application of the agreement under review in the future.

No. 10. (MATSUOKA): Though I refrain from arguments in the presence of His Majesty, I would like to remove a misunderstanding. I am by no means satisfied with the agreement under review. I explained my state of mind toward the negotiation of the agreement under review. It was under this state of mind that I tried to utilize the official documents and obtained the results contained in the agreement under review. Though I take note of your wishes that efforts be made in the future, I regret I cannot agree with your view on the agreement under review. The unsatisfactory condition of shipping native products from French Indo-China is due to difficulties of execution. This fact is counter-evidence that we obtained many things in the agreement. In future we will do our best to carry out this agreement with certainty.

President. (EARA): As there are no further remarks, we shall immediately take a vote. All those in favor please rise.

(All rise.)
President (KABA): It is carried unanimously. The meeting is adjourned.

The Emperor retired.

(Adjourned 15.45)

Signed: President KABA, Yoshimichi
Secretary MORIYAMA, Hideo
MOROASHI, Jo
TAKATSUJI, Masao.
CERTIFICATE

I.P.S. No. 1077

I, T. Suzuki, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Privy Council.

and that as such official I have custody of the document here attached consisting of ________ pages, dated 3 July, 1941, and described as follows: Privy Council Proceedings (1) Recognition of protocol on constitutional and functions of Security Disarmament Commission (Sign) and regulations of demilitarized zone. (2) Protocol between Japan and United Nations on mutual understanding and pact between Japan and Sign, dated 3 July 1941.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Privy Council

Signed at Tokyo on this 23 day of Sept., 1946.

Witness: /s/ J. Curtis

Second signature of official capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard L. Marsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of an official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 23 day of Sept., 1946.

Witness: /s/ Richard L. Marsh

Investigator, U.S. Official Capacity
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (br)

FROM (Paris) Vichy

Dated January 28, 1941
Rec'd 6:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

117, January 28, 5 p.m.

Admiral Platon, Minister of Colonies, told me today that the Germans have now refused the removal of any troops to Indochina. He said that this includes not only the Senegalese battalions at Djibouti for which the English had previously refused permission but also the transfer of any troops from Dakar to that area. In other words, he said, the Germans definitely do not wish to see French defenses in Indochina strengthened.

Leahy
昭和三十七年

三月二十一日

大日本帝国

総理大臣

昭和三十七年

親受秘書

大日本帝国

陸相

昭和三十七年

親受秘書

大日本帝国

海相

昭和三十七年

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大日本帝国

内閣総理大臣

昭和三十七年

親受秘書

大日本帝国
不知如何理解。

Doc. 1077

5
这一页的文本内容无法清晰辨认，可能是由于图片质量或排版问题。建议尝试使用更清晰的图片或重新获取文档内容。
第三章

本文要旨

本文主文由三部分组成，即：第一部分为总则；第二部分为商品适用范围和税则；第三部分为附则。

税则的适用范围

一、日本国和印度支那

二、日本国和法属印度支那

三、日本国和暹罗

四、日本国和马来亚

本文的税则制度

本文的税则制度适用于日本国和印度支那、日本国和法属印度支那、日本国和暹罗、日本国和马来亚。
ザキタトス

売出

第2章

貿易関係

(2) 事業

(1) 貿易

(2) 事業

(3) 事業

(4) 事業
関税制度の場合は、関税を課し、輸入を抑制する。他の場合も、原産地証明書を必要とする輸入を許可する。書面による輸入許可が求められる。貿易の見通しは、関税の影響を受ける。
电影《阿甘正传》讲述了一个智商只有75的男孩阿甘・汤普森，他用自己纯真的心，坚韧不拔的精神，创造了一个又一个奇迹。阿甘的人生充满了挫折和波折，但他从未放弃，始终以积极的态度面对生活。他的朋友珍妮则是一个充满激情和梦想的女孩，她和阿甘一起经历了许多风风雨雨。影片通过阿甘的视角，展现了他与珍妮以及其他朋友们之间的深厚友谊，以及他们面对生活挑战时的勇气和决心。
(未完待续)

第十四章

(待续)

(待续)

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(待续)

(待续)
Richard H. Larch

Investigator I.P.S.

J.A. Curtis 2nd Lt.
Tokyo: 4 July 1941  10.30 S. hours
Arrival: 5 July 1941  0.55 hours
No. 1350 of 4 July  Post urgent!

((Military attaché reports following personal impression from conversation with Japanese General Staff:

Japanese Army is zealously preparing and under emphatic secrecy))

1.) The occupation of Saigon in the not too distant future. It is the preliminary condition for an eventual further southward move for which, however, there are as yet no tangible footholds discernable.

2.) (& surprise, - though not rush - commencement of hostilities against Russia, with the seizure of the coastal province as the first goal) For this reason General YAVASHTA was remaining with the Kwantung Army for the time being in order to impart his experiences.

CTT
Certificate

I, Ulrich Strauss, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 40628.

/s/ Ulrich Strauss
TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY

TELEGRAPH
(Secret Cipher Process)

Bangkok, July 4, 1941 - 1:05 o'clock
Received July 4, 1941 - 20:10 o'clock
No. 169 of 7/4 Urgent

Secret Affairs of the Reich

Likewise for the Attaché Division of the High Command of the Army and Naval High Command.

The Japanese Secretary of Embassy, Furuuchi des Gaimusho, who is on an orientation journey, confidentially informed the Military Attaché:

1) Japan's entry into the war against Russia with a view to gaining the coastal provinces, including North Sakhalin, is imminent. It is to be carried out by means of the Kwantung Army and the home forces without any weakening of the China front.

2) There is no prospect of overcoming Chiang Kai Chek within a reasonable length of time, and therefore military operations are not to be carried any further. For the future Japan will content herself with holding the key points in North China and on the China coast in her possession at the present time.

3) Failure of Japan's economic negotiations with the Netherlands-Indies would oblige her to take over the oil resources there by force, since her fleet would otherwise be incapable of action. Prior to this there is to be a Japanese military occupation of Indo-China in order to procure a concentration area and jumping-off ports against the Netherlands-Indies. The occupation of Thailand is not envisaged. The preparation and the carrying out of the operations is to be made by the staff of General Ushiroka on the South China Front, in Canton. Conduct of the English forces in Singapore is considered to be purely defensive.
The entry of America into the war against Japan and the interruption of Japanese troop and reinforcement transportation by American naval forces is expected. A telegram of the same tenor was sent to Tokyo.

Schol

Thomas

Note:

Through the telegraph office expedited to the Code Sender of the High Command of the Wehrmacht and the Naval High Command.

Telegram Ktr. - July 5, 1941

Certificate:

I, Ulrich Strauss, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 11A(2).

(Ulrich Strauss)
TELEGRAM
(Secret Cipher Process)

Bangkok, July 4, 1941 - 1:05 o'clock
Received July 4, 1941 - 20:10 o'clock
No. 169 of 7/4

Urgent

Secret Cabinet of the Reich
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versant with the German and English languages, and as a result
of the comparison between the German and the English texts,
I have established that this is a true and correct transla-
tion of International Prosecution Document No. 11A(2).

(3) Ulrich J. Straus
Telegram
(Secret Cipher Process)
To be kept in locked file

Tokyo 10 July 1941 11:50 S.
Arrival 11 July 1941 12:35 hours Most urgent!

No. 1181 of 10 July.

All symptoms are pointing to the fact that the Japanese move against Indo-China is now imminent; I reported on it already; in MATSUOKA's message to The German Foreign Minister it was described as a move for securing bases (points d'appui). According to confidential information at least three divisions are scheduled for action in order to get a firm hold on the most important towns and establishments including Saigon. According to confidential information from a reliable source the key-day for action is to be 17 July.

Utterances by M. T. TOKA (cf. telegram of 21 June, No. 109) showed that Japanese government intended at first to ask German government to obtain Vichy's consent to the move. As I was told confidentially, Ambassador OISHI was informed by German authorities that mediation between Tokyo and Vichy on the Indo-China problem was not advisable. Now Japanese Government intends, before the action, to propose to the French Government military co-operation for the joint defense of Indo-China, demanding immediate occupation of the said bases. The announcement of the move was made only shortly beforehand because it was intended to preclude a possible -- though not likely -- intervention of the Anglo-Saxon countries. Should these resort to military measures, contrary to expectations, Japan would fight. Preparations were made accordingly. Certain measures regarding maritime transport have also been ordered. No serious resistance is expected from the French.

The British ambassador has made inquiries at the Japanese Foreign Office about Japanese intentions, pointing to certain press reports saying that a Japanese move against Indo-China would take place in about 14 days; such intentions on the part of Japan were flatly denied. The American Embassy received a similar reply.

As reported, the Japanese government will probably for the time being content itself with the securing of Indo-China, soothing the (1 group missing in telegram) who are pressing for further action by pointing to the time necessary for preparation.
Director of the European Section, Japanese Foreign Office, stated that with regard to Indo-China Japan had to beat all others to the punch in order to get the start on action initiated by the Anglosaxons and DeGaulleist. Besides, French Indo China must substitute economically after the breakdown of the economic negotiations with the Netherlands Indies.

In view of the political significance of the occupation of Indo-China for the further development of the Southern question, the cohesion of the French Colonial Empire and also for direct German economic interests (raw rubber question, etc.) I would be thankful for an instruction as to what to say /sprach regolung/ as well as for the information whether the German Government was consulted.

OTT.

Certificate:

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 11A(3).

/S/ Ulrich A. Straus
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I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 11A(3).

/S/ Ulrich A. Straus
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(独へ差電アリ未シ)
Telegram No. 273, addressed to Ambassador KATO in France, sent July 12, 1941.

1. In order to meet the serious international circumstances of the recent days and to make headway to establish the East Asia Co-prosperity sphere, the Japanese Government has decided in the Cabinet Council to take possession of military bases and to dispatch Japanese forces to South French Indo-China. And now we are going to make a proposal to that effect to the French Government. This decision was made by the Japanese Government with firm determination to realize it in spite of any hinderances by Britain and America and even if the French Government or the authority of French Indo-China oppose it, we are to force carrying it out.

2. Though the relations between Japan and French Indo-China have been improved gradually since last year, they are not yet satisfactory. And when Britain and America are going to enforce their boycott against Japan, unless we secure solid ground in South French Indo-China on this very occasion, it will be impossible, after all, to have her act entirely in concert with us. We feel that our requirement at this time to press her again to do the difficult thing in spite of her repeated conciliation, and we truly do not want this, and taking into consideration the recent attitude of France in approaching the axis powers, there might occur delicate relations. For all these facts, Japan is compelled to take this measure for her self-existence and self-defense and for pursuing her Southern policy.

3. I wish you, (Ambassador KATO), to open negotiation at once with the French. Once, in a general explanation covering the joint-defense to the advance of the Japanese forces, you will make the proposal of telegram No. 274 and receive her answer, yes or no, during the 20th, Japanese time. In various relations, it is most preferable for us that France give her consent to our requirement enabling us to dismount military forces in the form of peaceful occupation. However, if we do not make haste, it will give her a chance to prolong the negotiation and in the meanwhile Britain and America will make a fuss about it, which we must avoid to the utmost. We wish you to negotiate with her as fast as possible to force her to give a yes or no by the above-mentioned date at the latest. When she agrees to it you will exchange immediately with her the document shown in separate telegram No. 276. (Now, the military authority is gradually preparing to start on about the 20th, which date, in relation to strategy, is absolutely impossible
to be changed. If France agrees to it by that time, it will become a peaceful advance, and if not, a military occupation. I inform you just for your understanding only.)

4. This requirement of ours is done with an extraordinary firm resolution. You shall have France recognize thoroughly that if she refuses it and Japan has her troops advance from her own standpoint, it is possible that a grave change might occur to the situation of French Indo-China. It is needless to mention, if she gives consent to it, we are ready to secure solemnly the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and sovereignty of France over it. Even this proposal in itself, from another angle, is made from our inmost feeling to fulfill this responsibility. You may utilize fully this point in persuading her. When she consents to it, of course, we shall kindly afford facilities to supply goods and arms to French Indo-China as well as to axis powers.

5. From the conclusion of MATSUOKA - "Henri" Agreement last year until the recent conclusion of the Franco-Japan Protocol and Economical Agreement, France has sincerely been endeavoring to approach Japan. But now, again, with such a military requirement being proposed, France will probably feel it as beyond her expectation. It is, however, the necessary measures due to the said serious circumstances of the recent days and you will have it understood fully by France that it is not because we intend to infringe boldly upon her sovereignty.

5. "Henri", the Ambassador to Tokyo, is suspected to belong to the "deGaulle" faction and it is a fact that contents of negotiation between the Japanese Government and him are secretly being informed immediately to the American and to the British Ambassadors to Japan. Therefore, this time, the negotiation is to be made at your place. As the matter is of great importance, I wish, you will negotiate directly with Marshal Petain. Of course, according to the conditions in the French Government, it cannot be helped that you may have to negotiate with Darlan. Further, if this proposal leaks out to British-American side, only involved difficulties are feared to take place uselessly, I wish you will give strict notice to the French Government to take full caution. Please telegram message to Germany, too.
CERTIFICATE

I.P.S. No. 1333

STATEMENT OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YAFFU, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 12 pages dated 12 July 1941 and described as follows: Telefax No. 274, No. 274 dated 12 July 1941 from Foreign Minister MATSUMOTO to Ambassador IKORO in France. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Foreign Ministry
Signed at Tokyo on this
27th Day of Sept., 1946

Signature of Official

STAL

Chief of the Archives

Official Capacity SEXTIA.

STATEMENT OF OFFICIAL PROCUREMENT

I, JOHN A. CURTIS, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above named official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
27th Day of Sept., 1946

Signature of Official

J.A. CURTIS

Official Capacity.
I.

The seriousness of the situation caused by sudden changes of recent international state of affairs, together with the military and political aggression of a Third Power in the South Seas, which is a part of the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, is obliging Japan to resort to all necessary and effective means of self-existence and self-defense. Furthermore, the situation in French Indo-China, especially in the southern part, is such that a clique who doesn't want to cooperate with Japan together with Frenchmen of the "DE CUPPLE" party is collaborating with England and America much to the anxiety of Japan. If as a result of this, French Indo-China joins the Anglo-American anti-Japanese encirclement policy and estranges herself from the mother country, France, as in the case of "SYRIA", it is not only a great loss to France, but also a matter of great concern to Japan. To prevent such a situation, thus assuring security to French Indo-China against aggressions of a third power, and perfecting the cooperation between Japan and French Indo-China, is not only the duty of France, but also the duty of Japan who is anxious to stabilize Great East Asia. Moreover, the situation is now so urgent that we cannot afford to allow it to take its own course even for a day. (If they deny the existence of such a situation, I want you to answer to the effect that even if the situation may not be so at present, in view of England's intention, it is clear that such a situation will inevitably arise sooner or later.)

In order to attain the aforementioned objective, the political understanding which came into existence in the past is insufficient, therefore Japan actively desires military cooperation with France for the purpose of the joint defense of French Indo-China.

2.

In view of the recent situation which makes it very difficult for the French motherland alone to effectively defend her colonies all over the world, and when the situation of French Indo-China is so urgent as mentioned above, it is impossible for Japan who is attaching importance to French Indo-China as an essential part of the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere to remain an indifferent spectator. Therefore, if France truly places the security of Indo-China, it is considered necessary to come to a complete concert and cooperation with Japan, not only in the economic field but also in the military sphere.
believe that the only way for the French Government to really save French Indo-China from disorders is for her to have a clear picture of the state of affairs of the world, and to accept this proposal candidly, placing her utmost confidence in Japan.

3. Therefore, the Japanese government requests the French government to consent to the following items for the concerted defense of French Indo-China and immediately take necessary measures.

The following:

(a) Dispatch of necessary military strength, several ships, and necessary air force to the southern sector of French Indo-China.

(b) As air bases, the following eight places, "SITI-KOK" /phonetic/, "PRC-PTEK" /phonetic/, "TOURAGE" /phonetic/, "HIA-TRANG" /phonetic/, "SIEF-HCA" /phonetic/, "SAIGON", "SCORTAN" /phonetic/, and "COLTCC-TRAC" /phonetic/ are to be used, and as sea transport bases the following two places "SAIGON" and "CHANG" Pay, are to be used and we are to set up the accompanying facilities.

(c) To recognize the freedom of maneuver, residence, and movement of the stationed troops and to confer special conveniences to it. (including abolition of items concerning the restriction of residence and movement of the stationed troops mentioned in the NISHIKAR-R-MARTIN Pact)

(d) To take suitable steps such as the temporary withdrawal of French Indo-China garrison forces and air forces from the vicinity of landing areas which will be indicated by another telegram, so that the French Indo-China army will not clash with the Japanese army.

(e) To recognize the fundamental principles concerning the actions of dispatched troops (landing points and landing troops are the same as those of the above-mentioned item d.)

(However, since these matters belong to important military secrets, they must not be submitted until acceptance and recognition on all the aforementioned points are made. These matters will be clearly revealed to them together with the disposition of military strength after the troops are dispatched, and after a telegram to that effect reaches you.)
(f) Regarding the details of the movement of dispatched troops, a conference is to be held between the General Headquarters of the place (the SVNICA organ) and French Indo-China after the French consent. However, if the agreements of the details are not completed when the troops reach the landing point, it will be held after the landing.

(g) To offer the currency used by the dispatched troops. (Details are in separate telegram No. 275)

Desire the transmission of wire to Germany.
From: Canton
To: Tokyo
July 14, 1941.
Purple.

#255

To be kept secret within the Department.
Re my #253.

Subsequent information from military officials to the Attache is as follows:

1. The recent general mobilization order expressed the irrevocable resolution of Japan to put an end to Anglo-American assistance in thwarting her natural expansion and her indomitable intention to carry this out, if possible, with the backing of the Axis but, if necessary, alone.

Formalities, such as dining the expeditionary forces and saying farewell to them, have been dispensed with. That is because we did not wish to arouse greatly the feelings of the Japanese populace and because we wished to face this new war with a calm and cool attitude.

2. The immediate object of our occupation of French Indo-China will be to achieve our purposes there. Secondly, its purpose is, when the international situation is suitable, to launch therefrom a rapid attack. This venture we will carry out in spite of any difficulties which may arise. We will endeavor to the last to occupy French Indo-China peacefully but, if resistance is offered, we will crush it by force, occupy the country and set up martial law. After the occupation of French Indo-China, next on our schedule is the sending of an ultimatum to the Netherlands Indies. In the seizing of Singapore the Navy will play the principal part. As for the Army, in seizing Singapore it will need only one division and in seizing the Netherlands Indies, only two. In the main, through the activities of our air arm (in your city, the Spratly Islands, Paro, Treise Singora, Portuguese Timor and French Indo-China) and our submarine fleet (in the South Seas mandate islands, Veinon Island, and French Indo-China) we will once and for all crush Anglo-American military power and their ability to assist in any schemes against us.

3. The troops soon to occupy French Indo-China will be reorganized as the 25th Army Corps (one Army Corps consists of four divisions) and also the 30th Army Corps, consisting of the South China forces, which will be assigned
to special duty with airplanes, tanks, and howitzers. General IIDA (the IIDA Army mentioned in preceding telegram has been changed to the Nishimura detachment) will be placed in command and general military headquarters will be set up in Saigon. All preparations have been made. The ship fees have been paid and the expedition will soon proceed from here.

J/US French-Indo-China, Army NEL

- Not available.
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TELEX

(Secret Cipher Process)

The German Foreign Minister (Konigburg) July 19, 1941;
arrest July 19, 1941; 1:25 a.m.
No. 679 of July 19.

(a) Diplomats Tokyo
(b) Diplomatic Paris

Note: Transmitted to Tokyo under No. 1694 and to Paris under No. 3712.
Tel. Ktr. 19, 741

Ambassador G Shimah handed to the Foreign Minister the following memorandum
with an appendix concerning the Japanese demands on France regarding Indo-
China, on the 17th of this month:

The Japanese Government has started negotiations with the French govern-
ment with a firm decision in order to secure for herself, among other things,
naval and air bases in Indo-China. A proposal made in this connection from
Japanese side is attached in the Appendix. The realization of this plan is
the first step for our push to the South. It will undoubtedly play an
important part as a diversion of the English-American forces. In this
sense the Japanese government believes that in pursuing this aim she is
giving valuable assistance to Germany and Italy, loyal to the spirit of
the Tripartite Pact. She therefore believes to be able to assume that the
German government will not only refuse any entreaty of the French government
or mediation or mitigation of the Japanese proposal but will also
stand at the side of the Japanese government by endeavoring to convince the
French government of the appropriateness of its acceptance.

End of the memorandum.

Appendix follows:

Confidential

1. France and Japan undertake the obligation to cooperate militarily for
the common defense of French Indo-China.
2. For this purpose the French Government will authorize Japan to adopt
the following measures:

(a) despatch of the necessary number of Japanese troops, fleet units
and air units to South Indo-China;
(b) use of the following eight localities as air bases: Siem reap,
Phnom Penh, Torano, Mekong, Seinac, Saigon, Socotr and
Kampot Troch.

CAM RAN

Use of Saigon and the Bay of Cam Rahn as naval bases; the Japanese
forces will bring the necessary installations.
(c) These forces will have all freedom regarding billeting, maneuvers and movements. Special facilities for the fulfillment of their task will be afforded to them. This also includes the rescission of the limitations provided in the Nishihara-Martlin agreement.

(d) The French Government will deliver to the Japanese forces the required amount of foreign bills of exchange; the Japanese government is willing to pay for these in accordance with modalities mutually determined.

The French government will agree to a general plan of entry of these forces. The modalities of entry will be the topic of consultation between the local Japanese and Indo-Chinese authorities. In order to exclude the possibility of a conflict the French authorities will adopt appropriate measures such as the removal of Indo-Chinese forces from the neighborhood of landing points of the Japanese forces.

End of Appendix.

The Foreign Minister of the German Reich requests to use restraint in the matter.

(signed) Rintelen
TRY FROM MARQUIS KIDO'S DIARY, 26 September 1940

Went to the office at 9:30 a.m. Prince KONOYE came to the palace and had an audience with the Emperor after which I had a talk with him. Imperial Sanction has been obtained to refer the draft treaty with Germany and Italy to the Privy Council. From ten to day a full committee meeting was held.

Conferred with Imperial aide do Cemp about certain matters relative to the Imperial Rescript to His Excellency the Chief of Staff.

Audience with Emperor 10:30 to 11:10. Reported to the Emperor regarding the matter of Imperial worship and formally arranged with the Imperial Household Minister.

At 11:30 called in Yasuo YOSHIDA and conferred re the Imperial Rescript. Officer SAMEJIMA came in at two and reported as follows: The NISHIHARA unit which was to have advanced peacefully into French Indo-China returned, despite the advice of the Commander of the Navy support force, to carry out a landing in the face of the enemy to carry out air bombardment of Yalchep. It is reported that the NISHIHARA organization was incensed at these wrongful measures and left the spot. I understand that His Majesty, since this is such an important matter, ordered that a report should be made also to the Lord Privy Seal. It is indeed regrettable that such measures are taken by those in the field who do not understand the general situation. It is people like this who make the grave blunders.

Navy Vice Minister TOYODA visited me at three o'clock. He talked on general policies, and the Fren ch Indo-China situation. At six Prince ITC came and dined with me. I was informed that the Privy Council began two which started sitting this morning finished finally at 7:30 p.m. after which at 9:30 the full council was convened. On leaving this I went to the Palace. When I heard that the council had finished unanimously at 10:20 I left the Palace.

Having been notified that the committee meeting of the Privy Council which had been in session since this morning at last adjourned at 7:30 P.M., I knew that the plenary session would convene at 9:30. I went to the palace at 9:15. Upon learning that it had adjourned at 10:20 and that everything went well I retired from the palace.

*substitution:

The NISHIHARA unit which was to have advanced peacefully into French Indo-China boldly carried out a landing in the face of the enemy and bashed Haiphone from the air, despite having received a communication from the Navy Support Command.
Entry from Marquis AINO's Diary

26 September 1940

Went to the office at 9:30 a.m. Prince KONOYE came to the office and had an audience with the Emperor after which I had a talk with him. Imperial sanction has been obtained to refer the draft treaty with Germany and Italy to the Privy Council. From ten today a full committee meeting was held.

Conferred with Imperial Vice-Admiral concerning certain matters relative to the Imperial Rescript to His Excellency the Chief of Staff.

Audience with Emperor 10:30 to 11:10. Reported to the Emperor regarding the matter of Imperial worship arranged with the Imperial Household Minister.

At 11:30 called in Yosozu YOSUDA and conferred re the Imperial Rescript. Officer SIEBEU came in at two and reported as follows: The NISHIMURA unit which was to have advanced peacefully into French Indo-China returned, despite the advice of the Commander of the Navy support force, to carry out landing in the face of the enemy to carry out bombardment of Haiphong. (Translator's note: The enemy makes men coast defenses.) It is reported that the NISHIMURA organization was incensed at these wrongful measures and left the spot. "I understand that His Majesty, since this is such an important matter, ordered a report should be made to the Lord Privy-Sec. It is indeed regrettable that such measures are taken by those in the field who do not understand the general situation. It is people like this who make the grave blunders."

Vice-Minister SOGOL visited me at three o'clock. He talked on general policies and the French Indo-China situation. At six Prince ITO came and dined with me. "I was informed that the Privy Council committee which started sitting this morning finished finally at 7:30 p.m.; after which at 9:30 the full council was convened. On leaving this I went to the palace." When I heard that the council had finished uneventfully at 10:20 I left the palace.
Ulrich A. Streets
(W. P. Cumming)

G. H. Garde

Lt. Colonel, AGD

Acting Adjutant General

(印紙) 皇室監督
Newly appointed Foreign Minister Admiral Toyoda has just asked me to see him and received me in the presence of the former Vice Foreign Minister Chashi.

Toyoda explained to me that he had considered it important, as one of his first official acts, to invite the German, and thereafter the Italian Ambassador in order to hand them a declaration on the change of government and the future policy of the government. Translation of the statement, couched in the Japanese language, will follow by special telegram.

I thanked the Foreign Minister for his statement, saying I would not fail to transmit the statement to my government immediately, which had been taken unawares by the sudden change and would welcome a statement by the new Foreign Minister.

I then asked whether the Indo-China action is influenced by the Cabinet change. This was denied by the Foreign Minister. Chashi added that the Japanese Government had pressed Vichy for a reply to their measures. Darlan had promised to take a stand speedily so that a telegraphic report from the Japanese Ambassador was expected hourly. Should the French answer not be in the affirmative, the Japanese government would resort to force. It was, however, hoped to come to terms with Vichy on the modality of the occupation.

OTT

Certificate:

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4052E.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus
I, W. P. Gumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attaché of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Advisor on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is herewith furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Gumming

W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde

G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)
Doc. No. 4052E

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process) To be kept in locked file

Tokyo 20 July 1941 1.45 hours
Arrival 20 July 1941 3.05 hours
No. 1245 of 1st July

Most urgent!

Early appointed Foreign Minister Admiral Toyota has just asked me to see him and received me in the presence of the former Vice Foreign Minister Chashi.

Toyota explained to me that he had considered it important, as one of his first official acts, to invite the German, and thereafter the Italian Ambassador in order to hand them a declaration on the change of government and the future policy of the government. Translation of the statement, couched in the Japanese language, will follow by special telegram.

I thanked the Foreign Minister for his statement, saying I would not fail to transmit the statement to my government immediately, which had been taken unawares by the sudden change and would welcome a statement by the new Foreign Minister.

I then asked whether the Indo-China action is influenced by the Cabinet change. This was denied by the Foreign Minister. Chashi added that the Japanese Government had pressed Vichy for a reply to their measures. Darlan had promised to set his views speedily so that a telegraphic report from the Japanese Ambassador was expected hourly. Should the French answer not be in the affirmative, the Japanese Government would resort to force. It was, however, hoped to come to terms with Vichy on the details of the occupation.

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 40522.

/s/ Ulrich ... Straus
EXHIBIT NO. 645

No

Dec. 4, 52

Sec. 21

Doc. 525

1914
左

右
Doc. No. 4052 J

Telegram
(Secret Cipher Process)

Bangkok 18 July 1941
Arrival 18 July 1941

1415 hours
1440 hours

Urgent!

No. 150 of 16 July
Secret Reich Matter

at the same time to (one groupe garbled) the Navy General Staff attacke group.

Japanese military attaché group garbled reports:

To carry out the planned Siberian operation Japan, is erecting a defensive front against America, England, China and Netherlands Indies, aimed at the same time at the suppression of the de Gaulle movement, through the occupation of Indo-China. Deployment in Indo-China/interindien/ shall be finished at the beginning of August. The continuation of the southward advance after the conclusion of the Siberian operation. By the obtaining of Northern Sakhalin a lightening of the oil situation is hoped for.

The strength of English forces on the southern border of Sia.: is estimated at thirty thousand, without Singapore garrison.

Identical to Tokyo.

SCHOLL

Note: Passed on through teletype office to secret cipher of Navy General Staff. Tel. Ktr. 18.7.41
Certificate:

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4052.

/s/ Ulrich ... Straus
Doc. No. 40273(7)  
Item 13

Telegram (Code Clark)  
To be kept in locked file.

PARIS 21 July 1941  
16.20 hours

Arrival 21 July 1941  
17.20 hours

No. 2166  
Post urgent!

(Seeret matter of State)

Re: Your Telegram No. 3712 of 19 July 41, special train 678

Today at noon admiral DARIAN handed me a verbal note through State Secretary BEAUCHESNE. Wording as follows:

"On 14 July 1941 the Japanese Government handed a verbal note to the French Government containing the following demands."

The following is the text as attached to the Japanese memorandum as per your telegram 3712. The French note then continues as follows: This note was accompanied by a personal message from Prince KOKUNI to Marshall PÉtain. In this message the president of the Japanese Privy Council states:

"I wish to emphatically assure you of JAPAN's firm determination to carry out the duties and to bear the responsibilities resulting from her solemnly undertaken obligation regarding the respecting of the territorial integrity of Indo-China and the sovereignty of FRANCE over that Union. JAPAN in no way intends to shun this obligation." The French Government has drawn to the attention of the Japanese Government that apart from the grave risk resulting from such action as far as the native population is concerned:

1) The acceptance of the Japanese demands, in the form of military co-operation would unavoidably be interpreted as a hostile action against ENGLAND and the UNITED STATES, which would imply a risk for the French Government of bringing on reprisals upon themselves.

2) Owing to the armistice France is not in a position to decide upon such an important decision without previously approaching the German Government.
As a result, the French Government has requested the Japanese Government in a note from 19 July to grant them the time required for an exchange of opinions on the matter with the German and Italian Governments.

Despite this argument, the Japanese Government insisted on receiving the reply of the French Government before 1800 hours, Tuesday, 22 July, noting that the Japanese troops would enter Indo-China with no respect for the contents of this reply.

In view of the gravity of the situation created thereby, the French Government has replied to the Japanese that they could not help but give in to violence. They still, however, asked the Japanese Government to consent in advance to the following points:

1. The sentence in Prince CHYEE's letter concerning the respect of French sovereignty will be made into a public declaration of which the French Government may make use of in dealing with Admiral TOGOUTH the French administration, the native population, and, generally, with public opinion in FRANCE and Indo-China.

2. French troops in Indo-China will continue to guard all points where no Japanese forces are stationed, notably in the North, in order to prevent reprisal attacks from the Chinese Government.

3. The Japanese occupation is only temporary and strictly limited by the duration of the operations for which it is destined.

4. French-Japanese military cooperation is purely defensive in character.

5. The defensive military measures resulting from the new situation created in Indo-China by the stationing of Japanese land-, air-, and sea fighting forces will be taken by agreement between the French military authorities and the Japanese General Staff.

With the knowledge that they are defending in Indo-China, an area of the highest significance for the future of the European Commonwealth and loyal to her policy of Franco-German cooperation (Coopération France-Allemagne) the French Government regrets that circumstances beyond
her control have not enabled them to have the German Government participate in time in the Franco-Japanese talks. She expressly declines all responsibility as to the future political and economic consequences which the acceptance of the Japanese demands may have on the entire field of Franco-German relations.

The fact that under present circumstances submitted note has merely the characteristic of an information, does not in any way weaken 'the desire' of the French Government, as soon as possible, to establish contact with the German Government in order to explain in detail her opinions on the question, and to jointly examine the political and other measures which appear suitable for protecting the European interests."

End of the wording of the note.

Regarding the possible economic consequences mentioned in the last passage of the note, BECISTELCHIN pointed out that JAPAN could conceivably seize the raw rubber production of Indo-China and that FRANCE was not in a position to carry out her obligations. According to instructions, I abstained from committing myself in any way.

SCHLEIER
By order of my Government I have the honour to present for Your Excellency's consideration the following proposals:

1. France and Japan engage to cooperate for the joint defence of French Indo-China.

2. To this end the French Government shall grant to Japan the right to take the following measures:

   (a) The dispatch to Southern Indo-China of the number of troops, naval, units, and air formations judged necessary.

   (b) The use as air bases of the following localities: Siemreap, Phnom-penh, Pursara, Phnompenh, Saigon, Soetran, and Camarot-trach; as naval bases, Saigon and Camand Bay. The necessary installations shall be set up in those places by the Japanese forces.

   (c) These forces shall be granted facilities for billeting, carrying out manoeuvres and training. Their liberty of movement shall be recognized.

   They shall also be accorded the special facilities necessary for the accomplishment of their task; this entails the suppression of restrictions provided in the Ishihara-Martind agreement.

   (d) The French Government shall provide the necessary currency to the Japanese forces up to an amount of twenty-three million Indo-China piastres for the current year, or four million five hundred thousand Indo-China piastres monthly; this sum does not include the currency which have to be provided to the Japanese forces in Tonking in accordance with previous agreements. The Japanese Government is prepared to pay for the above mentioned currency at the choice of the French Government either in convertible yen, in U.S. dollars, or in gold.

3. The French Government shall agree to the general terms of the entry of the Japanese forces and take all pertinent steps to avoid the possibility of a chance clash with Indo-China Forces, such as the temporary withdrawal of these latter from the neighbourhood of the points of disembarkation of the Japanese forces.

4. The details concerning the movements of the Japanese forces shall be drawn up by agreement with the Japanese military authorities on the spot. I take the liberty of vigorously stressing to Your
Excellency that the French Government has an earnest desire to record its adherence to the above-mentioned proposals with the least possible delay, as the understanding arrived at ought, in the opinion of my Government, to be made the object of a formal agreement as soon as possible.

In presenting the above I beg once more to express my highest respect to Your Excellency.

Excerpts translated from incoming letter:

The first part of Foreign Minister Darlan's reply acknowledges receipt of the letter from the aforementioned ambassador Leota. The latter part of the latter appears the following reply on the part of the French. At the same time by another communication the aforementioned Foreign Minister expresses certain wishes under the headings A, B, C which appear below:

1. The French Government takes note of the new step taken on 20 July by the Japanese Ambassador which demands a formal reply before 6 o'clock Tuesday, 22 July, to the memorandum sent on 14 July.

2. Although it understands the necessities which bring about this step, the French Government must once more, earnestly draw the attention of the Imperial Government to the gravity of the consequences of the putting into operation of the plan announced in the memorandum of 14 July.

3. However, the circumstances are such that, taking into account the firm assurance given by His Excellency, Prince Konoye, in his letter of 13 July addressed to Marshal Petain, it has no other course than to bow before the insistence of the Japanese Government.

4. It is in this spirit, that, in cooperation with the Japanese Government, the French Government, true to the policy which it has always, professed, will guarantee the defense of Indo-China against any attack and will share in defensive action having as its object such security, all offensive operations being excluded, in accordance with the agreement of French and Japanese local headquarters.

5. It must be well understood, on the other hand, that the presence of Japanese forces on the territory or in the waters of the Union shall be of only a temporary nature and that the Imperial Government will proceed to the total withdrawal of its forces as soon as the danger, in view of which they were admitted, has been removed.

6. Referring to the letter written by His Excellency Prince Konoye to the Marshal, the French Government is anxious to underline the fact that such a defensive cooperation does not imply any renunciation nor any limitation of the political rights of France once the
territories of the Union. Dominant considerations compel the French Government to demand of the Imperial Government to be good enough to demonstrate clearly in a public statement, in terms similar to those which appear in the message of His Excellency Prince Chono the firm determination of Japan "to fulfill the duties to shoulder the responsibilities flowing from the solemn promise made by him with regard to the territorial integrity of Indo-China and of French sovereignty over this Union.*

The French Government urges the extremely pressing necessity for such a declaration which is indispensable in the new circumstances for the maintenance of order in Indo-China and for the proper execution of the first steps rendered necessary by the arrival of Japanese armed forces.

A. (1) The French Government, intending, under the terms of its communication of today's date, to participate in the joint defence of Indo-China territory, relies on the Imperial Government supplying to the French Armed Forces in Indo-China supplementary means of defence of all kinds which the present urgency has not permitted France to obtain elsewhere. The French Government will be happy to know with the least delay the feeling of the Imperial Government on the preceding suggestions.

(2) In the same spirit the French Government will give to the Government-General of Indo-China all necessary instructions so that all military organizations actually on the spot shall remain available for defense, especially all coast defence works.

B. (1) The French Government emphasizes the extreme importance which it attaches to the public statement relative to the respect for the integrity of Indo-China and for the sovereignty of France over this Union.

(2) In the absence of such a statement neither French public opinion nor the troops stationed in Indo-China themselves would not understand and consequently would not admit the arrival of foreign forces into territories which are precisely those they are there to guard.

C. As regards arrangements of a technical nature which figure in the Japanese proposals announced in the Japanese Ambassador's letter of 21 July, the Japanese Government will doubtless realise, as does the French Government, that their putting into execution must be the occasion for an examination by competent authorities, more particularly as regards the suggestion put out in Article 3 (at the end) relative to "the temporary withdrawal of Indo-China forces from the neighbourhood of the points of disembarkation of the Japanese forces."
By order of my Government I have the honour to present for Your Excellency's consideration the following proposals:

1. France and Japan engage to cooperate for the joint defence of Indo-China.

2. To this end the French Government shall grant to Japan the right to take the following measures:

(a) The dispatch to southern Indo-China of the number of troops, naval units, and air formations judged necessary.

(b) The use as air bases of the following localities: Siem reap, Phnom Penh, Tournai, Phatang, Bienhoa, Saigon, Soc Trang, and Campong tracer; as naval bases, Saigon and Camgrand Bay. The necessary installations shall be set up in those places by the Japanese forces.

(c) These forces shall be granted facilities for billeting, carrying out manoeuvres and training. Their liberty of movement shall be recognized.

They shall also be accorded the special facilities necessary for the accomplishment of their tasks, i.e. entails the suppression of restrictions provided in the Ishihara-Martin agreement.

(d) The French Government shall provide the necessary currency to the Japanese forces up to an amount of twenty-three million Indo-China piastres for the current year, or four million five hundred thousand Indo-China piastres monthly; this sum does not include the currency which have to be provided to the Japanese forces in Tonkin in accordance with previous agreements. The Japanese Government is prepared to pay for the above mentioned currency at the choice of the French government either in convertible yen, in U. S. dollars, or in gold.

3. The French Government shall agree to the general terms of the entry of these forces and take all pertinent steps to avoid the possibility of a chance clash with Indo-China Forces, such as the temporary withdrawal of these latter from the neighbourhood of the points of disembarkation of the Japanese forces.

4. The details concerning the movements of the Japanese forces shall be drawn up by agreement with the Japanese military authorities on the spot. I take the liberty of vigorously stressing to Your
I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the French Government has an earnest desire to record its adherence to the above-mentioned proposals with the least possible delay, as the understanding arrived at ought, in the opinion of my Government, to be made the object of a formal agreement as soon as possible.

I am presenting the above and once more to express my highest respect to Your Excellency.

Excerpts translated from Incoming Letter

The first part of Foreign Minister Durian's reply acknowledges receipt of the letter from the afore-mentioned ambassador Hato. The latter part of the letter appears the following reply on the part of the French. At the same time by another communication the aforementioned Foreign Minister expresses certain wishes under the headings A, B, C which appear below:

1. The French Government takes note of the new step taken on 20 July by the Japanese Ambassador which demands a formal reply before 3 o'clock Tuesday, 22 July, to the memorandum sent on 14 July.

2. Although it understands the necessities which bring about this step, the French Government must once more, earnestly draw the attention of the Imperial Government to the gravity of the consequences of the putting into operation of the plan announced in the memorandum of 14 July.

3. However, the circumstances are such that, taking into account the firm assurance given by His Excellency, Prince Konoye, in his letter of 13 July addressed to Marshal Foch, it has no other course than to bow before the insistence of the Japanese Government.

4. It is in this spirit, that, in cooperation with the Japanese Government, the French Government, true to the policy which it has always, professed, will guarantee the defence of Indo-China against any attack and will share in defensive action having as its object such security, all offensive operations being excluded, in accordance with the agreement of French and Japanese local headquarters.

5. It must be well understood, on the other hand, that the presence of Japanese forces on the territory or in the waters of the Union shall be of only a temporary nature and that the Imperial Government will proceed to the total withdrawal of its forces as soon as the danger, in view of which they were admitted, has been removed.

6. Referring to the letter written by His Excellency Prince Konoye to the Marshal, the French Government is anxious to underline the fact that such a defensive cooperation does not imply any renunciation nor any limitation of the political rights of France once the
territories of the Union. Dominant considerations compel the French Government to demand of the Imperial Government to be good enough to demonstrate clearly in a public statement, in terms similar to those which appear in the message of His Excellency Prince Konoe the firm determination of Japan 'to fulfill the duties to shoulder the responsibilities flowing from the solemn promises made by him with regard to the territorial integrity of Indo-China and of French sovereignty over this Union.'

7. The French Government urges the extremely pressing necessity for such a declaration which is indispensable in the new circumstances for the maintenance of order in Indo-China and for the proper execution of the first steps rendered necessary by the arrival of Japanese armed forces.

A. (1) The French Government, intending, under the terms of its communication of today's date, to participate in the joint defence of Indo-China territory, relies on the Imperial Government supplying to the French Armed Forces in Indo-China supplementary means of defence of all kinds which the present urgency has not permitted France to obtain elsewhere. The French Government will be happy to know with the least delay the feeling of the Imperial Government on the preceding suggestions.

(2) In the same spirit the French Government will give to the Government-General of Indo-China all necessary instructions so that all military organizations actually on the spot shall remain available for defense, especially all coast defense works.

B. (1) The French Government emphasizes the extreme importance which it attaches to the public statement relative to the respect for the integrity of Indo-China and for the sovereignty of France over this Union.

(2) In the absence of such a statement neither French public opinion nor the troops stationed in Indo-China themselves would understand and consequently would not admit the arrival of foreign forces into territories which are precisely those they are there to guard.

C. As regards arrangements of a technical nature which figure in the Japanese proposals announced in the Japanese Ambassador's letter of 21 July, the Japanese Government will undoubtedly realize, as does the French Government, that their putting into execution must be the occasion for an examination by competent authorities, more particularly as regards the suggestion put out in Article 3 (at the end) relative to "the temporary withdrawal of Indo-China forces from the neighbourhood of the points of disembarkation of the Japanese forces."
Doc. No. 11a(5)

Telegram (Secret-Upper Process)

Tokyo 22 July 1941 - 6:40 hours
Arrival 22 July 1941 - 17:40 hours

No. 1317 of 22 July - Most Urgent!

Secret! Re Telegram No. 1304 of 20th, pol VIII

When paying me a farewell visit former Vice Foreign Minister Ohashi told me today that Ambassador at Vichy had just wired that on the basis of unofficial information he was expecting today or tomorrow the unconditional acceptance of the main points of the Japanese demands re Indo-China by the French Government.

The Vice Foreign Minister commented that the commencement of the maritime transports was definitely to take place on 24 July, involving approximately 40,000 troops. It is estimated that it would take several weeks before the planned naval and air bases were completely set up and the troops quartered.

He had denied the intention, on the part of Japan to take military steps in Indo-China when the British Ambassador asked him fourteen days ago. The United States of America has so far made no inquiries.

OTT
Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 11a(5).

/\Ulrich A. Straus

The Inquiry Committee on the exchange of the official documents regarding the conclusion of Protocol between France and Japan in connection with common defence of French Indochina, and military cooperation.

On July 26th (Monday) of Showa 16 (1941) at 10 AM, the President and the Vice President of the Privy Council and the Privy Councillors assembled in the East 3rd room of the Palace, and as a bill of inquiry was handed down by His Majesty, the Emperor, at 9:40 AM of the same day, a general committee was appointed by President HARA for considering the above subjects.

Those present:

President HARA

Chairman of the Committee
Vice President SUZUKI

Members of the Committee
Councillor KAWAI
" ISHII
" ARIMA
" KUBOTA
" ISHIZUKA
" SHIMIZU
" MINAMI
" NARA
" ARAKI
" SUGAWARA
" MATSUURA
" USHIO
" HAYASHI
" FUKAI
" FUTAKAMI
" OSHIMA
" OSHI
" TAKEGOSHI
" MITSUCHI
" IWAMA
Cabinet Ministers
Prime Minister KONOYE
Home Minister TANABE
War Minister TOJO
Education Minister HASHIDA
Communication and Railway MURATA
Navy Minister OIKAWA
Finance Minister OGURA
Foreign Minister and
Minister of Overseas Affairs TOYODA
Minister of Agriculture
and Forestry INC
Minister of Commerce and
Industry SAKONJI
Welfare Minister KOIZUMI
Justice Minister IWAMURA

Explainers
President of Legislative Bureau MURASE
" " " MIYAUCHI
" " " MIYAUCHI
President of Cabinet Planning
Board SUZUKI
Vice President of Cabinet Planning
Board MIYAMOTO
Research Officer, Cabinet Planning
Board UYEHARA
Head of South Seas Bureau, Foreign
Ministry SAITO
Head of Treaty Bureau, Foreign Ministry
MATSUZAKI
Head of Commerce Bureau, Foreign
Ministry MIZUNO
Head of Europe and Asia Bureau,
Foreign Ministry SAKAMOTO
Head of American Bureau, Foreign
Ministry TERAZAKI
Secretary of Foreign Ministry NISHIMURA
" " " CTA
" " " TOYODA
" " " TOKO
Commissioner, Foreign Ministry HAGA
Major General MUJO
Rear Admiral OKA
Head of Foreign Exchange Bureau,
Foreign Ministry HARAGUCHI
Vice Minister, Commerce and Industry  
Ministry COKIMA  
Head of Ship Control Bureau,  
Communication Ministry COKA  
Sea Transportation Controlling Officer,  
Communication Ministry YOMECA  
Chief Secretary of the Cabinet HOBIE  
Secretary of the Cabinet MOURASHI  
" " " " TAKATSUJI

The Chairman of the Committee SUZUKI declared the opening of the meeting. Chief Secretary of the Cabinet HOBIE roughly explained the differences between this final draft and the preliminary draft as per measure previously distributed.

Foreign Minister TOYODA explained the progress and the contents of the measure and War Minister TOJO on the actions to be taken by the Army forces in accordance with this measure.

Committeeman KAWAI inquired as to the effects these measures will bring upon Thailand /Siam/ and the future attitudes to be taken toward her by our government. Foreign Minister TOYODA replied that when Premier PIBUL of Thailand was informed unofficially beforehand of the measure to be taken in this plan through the Imperial Minister in Thailand, he was exceedingly calm. The Foreign Minister further stated that the measure taken would rather serve in pacifying the unrest of the people of Thailand, that the Imperial government should be more careful in watching the movements of Thailand in future, and be prepared to take appropriate measures according to the situation, and also that the Imperial Government was prepared to raise the legation to an embassy at an opportune time, the choice of candidate for the post of ambassador being already under way.

Committee Member ISHII inquired on the validity of the preamble of the protocol in regard to the articles of Protocol No. 3; the degree the Government pressed upon French Government for concluding this protocol; and whether the government's foreign policy hereafter would be to push to the south while defending the north, or to push to the north while defending the south.
To the first inquiry the Foreign Minister replied to the effect that Protocol 1 and 2 would lose their validity as soon as the situation which necessitated the adoption of the same ceased to exist, and therefore the protocol itself would lose its raison d'être, but the various agreements referred to in the preamble of the protocol will continue to exist regardless of whether or not this protocol exists.

With regard to inquiry 2, we gave an intimation to the French Government in submitting this proposal to Vice President DARLAN, through our Ambassador in Paris, that an undesirable situation was liable to develop if it failed to accept our proposal, and the Foreign Minister added that the Government had already requested the governments of Germany and Italy through our envoys to cooperate with us in realizing the conclusion of this protocol in case the French Government sought their advice in the matter.

With respect to inquiry 3 the Government was already prepared to face with any situation in accordance with the resolution made at the conference in the Emperor's presence on July 2, and was ready to take appropriate action in accordance with the changing phases of internal and foreign situations.

Committee Member KUBOTA inquired about the concrete meaning of "state of affairs" (JOSEI) in the articles of proposed Protocol No. 3. SAITO, the Head of the South Seas Bureau of Foreign Ministry, answered that the so-called "state of affairs" in this bill referred to the objective situations which compelled our country to take measures as proposed herein; that is, Great Britain and the U.S.A. had gradually aggravated their economic pressure upon Japan, and had tried to prevent not only the establishment of the Co-prosperity Sphere of East Asia which we had planned, but also the conclusion of the China Incident.

Politically, both countries had held conferences repeatedly and had designed to blockade Japan by means of the so-called ABCO line in order to check our advance to the south. In view of this fact it was imperative for us to take certain counter measures or even counter attacks. Also, as to France, the DE GAULLE Party in the southern part of French Indo-China still kept up its activities in cooperation with Great Britain and U.S.A., and we were forced to take an effective and forcible step against them.
Committeeman ICHIZUKA inquired about our foreign policies in future and the expected measures that would be taken by the third powers against us /after the conclusion of this protocol/.

Foreign Minister TOYODA answered that this measure was chiefly intended for carrying out the war against China in our favor by threatening the Burma Route which was the important road for transporting supplies to CHIANG's Government, also for shutting off the activities of the CHIANG regime in French Indo-China, and for conciliating or making the 400,000 Chinese subjects living in the southern parts of French Indo-China and those in Singapore to cooperate with us, and thus give a smashing blow to the CHIANG regime. That the expected measures which might be taken by the third powers would be considered as:

1) The intensification of military cooperation between Great Britain, USA, Holland and China.
2) The redoubling of the defences of Malay and Singapore.
3) Intensified pressure upon Thailand by the third powers.
4) The freezing of our capital and properties in the territories of Great Britain and U.S.A.
5) The restriction or prohibition of export of staple materials to Japan by Great Britain and the U.S.A.
6) Pressure upon our ships.

As for relations with the Soviet Union, while the negotiations re the revision of the treaty is interrupted at present, the relationship between the Tripartite Pact and the Neutrality treaty between Japan and Soviet Union must be noted carefully. The Government is going to rig up a certain measure against the Soviet Union after renewing prudent investigations.

Subsequently War Minister TOJO explained that the measure in this plan was one of the measures which had been resolved at the conference in the presence of His Majesty on July 2, based upon the result obtained at the liaison conference between the Government and the Imperial General Headquarters on June 25, that the
Government and the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff were united into one and were holding liaison conferences almost every day in the Palace in order to take appropriate measures under a definite policy, in accordance with the national as well as foreign situation, and that they expected to carry out our national policy in perfection.

Committee member KIHAMI made various inquiries which were answered as follows:

1) Questioned on the decisions made at the conference in the presence of His Majesty on July 2, War Minister TOJO answered that matters regarding the movements of the forces were not touched, that they resolved to hold on firmly to the policy of establishing the Co-prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia, and to settle the problem in the north in accordance with the advancement to the south for bringing about a favorable conclusion of the China Incident and also with the change of the situation.

2) Questioned as to the Government's diplomatic policy towards the U.S.A., Premier KONOYÌ answered that the Government was anxious to adjust the relations between both countries but so far it was not realized.

(The Committee took a recess from 12:05 PM to 1:30 PM.)

3) Questioned as to the relation between Japan's foreign policy, and the Government's declaration re the conclusion of the common defense made on the 26th ult., Foreign Minister TOYODA replied that the recent declaration made by the Government had given the impression to the third powers, especially to the U.S.A., that Japan had penetrated into French Indo-China by force. In order to prevent the U.S.A. from taking unjust measures, the Government wished to make it clear quickly that it /penetration into French Indo-China/ was made upon mutual agreement, and therefore made an announcement that an understanding had been made between the two governments.

4) Questioned upon the relationship between our penetration into northern French Indo-China last year and the present measures, War Minister TOJO answered that the penetration of last year was concerned with the CHIANG regime, its aim was different from that of the present measures, and although we would be made responsible for
common defence with French Indo-China by the present agreement, the area of our military activities should not be restricted.

Committeeman NARA inquired that under the arrangement made regarding the currency to be placed at the disposal of our forces as provided in the articles of exchange official note No. 1 of this proposal, would not the size and the action of our forces to be used in French Indo-China be restricted by having the expenditure limited. War Minister TOJO answered that the amount of money was estimated with an ample margin to cover the necessary expense (all accounts were to be settled by piaster except for the pay to the soldiers, etc.) for the forces of about 40,000 which are at present planned to be sent over, and therefore there would be no fear of restriction of the size and action of our forces on account of the expense.

Committeeman SUGAWARA inquired upon the nature of the 'KISHIHARA-MARTIN agreement' which was referred in the articles of the exchange official note No. 1 of this proposal, and whether it was not a matter to have been submitted to the Privy Council, to which Foreign Minister TOYODA and War Minister TOJO explained that the agreement referred to was a military agreement involving the Supremo Command, although it was based on the "MATSUOKA-HENRY agreement," and therefore they did not take the step of referring it to the Privy Council. To the above Committeeman FUTAKAMI added that he understood the agreement referred to was a thoroughly international agreement concluded between the Commanders-in-Chief of the armies of both countries under the authorities granted by the "MATSUOKA-HENRY Agreement," and that it was same in nature as the exchange official note of this proposal. However, the matter of affairs was so urgent that there was no time to submit it to Privy Council, as had been explained by the Premier at that time. Committeeman KIMAMI suggested that the fact that such explanation had been made by the Premier at that time be clarified, but the Chairman of the Committee SUZUKI ruled that this question should be left to the investigation of some later date.

Committeeman USHIO inquired re the articles of Protocol No. 3 in reference to the way of judging the existence of a specific "state of affairs." Foreign Minister TOYODA answered that it should be decided by the concurred opinions between the two parties and that after all it would be a matter of strength.
Committeeman FUKAI inquired how far the Government would consider its financial affairs in carrying out the national policies. Premier KONOE replied to this that the Government should always consider the limits of the national /financial/ capabilities in carrying out its national policies and that it would never be disregarded.

Committeeman FUTAKAMI inquired as to the date of signature of this proposed protocol and the Head of the Treaty Bureau of the Foreign Ministry MATSUMOTO answered that it should be the date of actual signing and sealing after the approval by the Throne.

Committeeman OBATA inquired:

1) What was the existing conditions of the blockade against Japan by Great Britain, U.S.A. and China?

2) What menace would there be on our importation of rice from French Indo-China in case war broke out between Japan and the U.S.A.?

War Minister TOJO replied to 1) that the Government was in possession of some informations regarding the Tripartite Pact among Great Britain, U.S.A. and China, the combination of Great Britain and China in a guerilla warfare and the collaboration of U.S. and Chinese air forces.

Naval Minister OIKAWA answered question 2) that the menace must be cleared off by any means.

Chairman of the Committee SUZUKI ruled that the inquiries were over and requested the Cabinet Ministers and the Explainers to retire.

(Cabinet Ministers and Explainers retired.)

The Committeemen conferred among themselves and resolved unanimously that these measures should be passed as proposed.

Chairman of the Committee ruled to adjourn the meeting. Adjourned 3:30 PM.)
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Committeeman NAKA inquired that under the arrangement made regarding the currency to be placed at the disposal of our forces as provided in the articles of exchange, official note No. 1 of this proposal, would not the size and the action of our forces to be used in French Indo-China be restricted by having the expenditure limited. War Minister TOJO answered that the amount of money was estimated with an ample margin to cover the necessary expenses (all accounts were to be settled by pliers except for the pay to the soldiers, etc.) for the forces of about 40,000 which are at present planned to be sent over, and therefore there would be no fear of restriction of the size and action of our forces on account of the expense.

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(Cabinet Ministers and Explainers retired.)

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Chairman of the Committee ruled to adjourn the meeting. Adjourned 3:30 PM.)
EXHIBIT NO. 643
セラミックスの研究

以下、セラミックスの研究について述べます。

（研究内容）

（研究目的）
图 1031

"畏体"的含义与应用

在实际应用中，"畏体"的含义往往涉及到多个方面。例如，在物理学中，"畏体"可能指代一种特殊的能量传播方式。它在一些特定条件下能够实现超折射现象，从而使得光或其他电磁波能够以非直角的方式传播。这种特性在天文学中特别有用，它能够帮助科学家们更好地理解宇宙中物质的分布和运动规律。

在技术领域，"畏体"的概念也被广泛应用于计算机科学和信息技术中。例如，在数据传输和处理过程中，"畏体"的特性可以用来优化算法的运行效率，从而提高整个系统的性能。

此外，在医学领域，"畏体"也可能指代某种特定的物质或化合物，它在治疗某些疾病时具有显著的效果。通过深入研究"畏体"的性质和作用机理，医学科学家们可能能够开发出更加有效和安全的治疗方法。

总之，"畏体"的含义与应用广泛，它在不同领域都有着重要的作用和价值。通过不断的研究和探索，人类有望进一步发掘"畏体"的潜力，从而推动科学技术的发展和进步。
東京都

當談宮及署名

石原人公的資料

樋家院產務室

公式入力＝因スル證明

余り中

余が聯合國最高法院

官署

余が公務上日本政府上記署名二箇

九百零六年/昭和二年/九月二十三日

東京

護照

志着人公的資格

在國租用照

護照

丁・A・カーティス少尉
Minutes of the Privy Council Meeting at the Conclusion of the Protocol between Japan and France for a Common Defense of French Indo-China and for an Exchange of Official Documents Regarding Military Cooperation

The meeting was held at 4:50 p.m., July 28, (Monday) 1941.

It was honoured with His Majesty's presence.

Members present:

President HARA  Vice-President SUZUKI

Ministers:  (Sec't No.)

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<td>Home Minister T. MINBE</td>
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<td>War Minister TOJO</td>
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<td>Welfare Minister KOIZUI</td>
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<td>Justice Minister T. A. URA</td>
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Councillors:

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<td>S. K. NARA</td>
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Embers absent:

Princes:
- H.I.H. YASÜHITO No. 1
- H.I.H. TAOBÜHITO No. 2
- H.I.H. T.K.PITOC No. 3
- H.I.H. K0TÔHITO No. 4

Councillors:
- HAKAO No. 18
- HATSUI No. 28
- AZIO No. 35

Committee:
- KUR..SE, Director of Bureau of Legislation
- IKI, Councillor of Bureau of Legislation
- YUSUCHI, Councillor of Bureau of Legislation
- SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board
- IY.AT3ÜI, Vice-President of the Planning Board
- S.I.ITA, Director of South Sea Bureau of Foreign Office
- KASUKOTOC, Director of Bureau of Treaties of Foreign Office
- HIY.CUCHII, Director of Exchange Bureau of Finance Office
- CHOKCA, Director of Ship Controlling Bureau of Communication Office
- YOKEDA, Controlling Officer of the Marine Transportation Bureau
- OKA, Chief of Military Bureau of Navy Office
Reporters:

SUZUKI, Chairman of Investigation Committee

Chief-Secretary:

HORIE, Chief-Secretary of Privy Council

Secretaries:

LURGBASHI, Secretary
TSUCHI, Secretary

H.RA, President of Privy Council, states:

We will open the session and discuss the conclusion of the protocol between Japan and France for a common defense of French Indo-China and the exchange of official documents regarding military cooperation. The First Reading Committee shall be organized, and the contents of the subject shall not be read.

The report on the subject shall be delivered by the Chairman of the Investigation Committee immediately.

Reporter SUZUKI states:

We, the attendants today, have been appointed the Investigation Committee men by the Emperor's order to discuss the conclusion of the protocol between Japan and France for the common defense of French Indo-China and the exchange of official documents on military cooperation. We have held the committee meeting immediately to hear explanations from the ministers and other officers concerned and we have deliberated on the subject. I ask favour of your acknowledgment that I cannot find any time to deliver reports for discussion as the subjects are very urgent.

According to the ministers' explanation, the relations between Japan and French Indo-China have become gradually better since last year,
(1940) and the success of the economic negotiations between Japan and French Indo-China and of the border-dispute-mediation-conference between Thailand and French Indo-China in Tokyo this spring has given impetus to the better friendship between Japan and French Indo-China. However, the tendency of dependence upon Anglo-America still remains in French Indo-China.

The so-called ATSUUKA-HERRI Agreement dated August 30, 1940 and the Economic Agreement concluded on the substance of the same have brought considerable fear for the expected success in its enforcement, and lately the Anglo-American economic encirclement against Japan in East Asia has become gradually characteristic of a military cooperation of Britain, U.S.A., Holland and China.

Both in the interior of French Indo-China and, especially, in the southern region there are some who do not like to cooperate with Japan; and de Gaul and his party are trying to collaborate with Anglo-America.

Japan can never feel easy. If, as a result of it, French Indo-China cooperates with the policy of Anglo-American's encirclement against Japan and breaks away from France as Syria, it is not only a great loss to France, but also a serious problem to Japan. Therefore, to prevent such critical situations and to keep French Indo-China secure from invasion by third nations and simultaneously to bring about cooperation between Japan and French Indo-China smoothly are very important from the points of self-existence, self-defense and of Japan's southward drive policy.

The existing political understanding between the two nations cannot be sufficient for them. The Japanese government has realized that it is very necessary for Japan to make France closely cooperate with us in the military field.
Therefore, Japan ordered the Japanese envoy to France to negotiate with the French Government. The negotiations were concluded amicably. The protocol on the subject and the definite plan for exchange of official documents were obtained. The gist of the above-mentioned arrangements is as follows:

No. 1 The Protocol

In the preamble of this protocol, the Japanese and the French Governments insist that in view of the present international situation, in case the security of French Indo-China is threatened, they shall recognize the reason to think that Japan's general peace and the security of the Far East also are not free from danger, and in this opportunity to renew the promises made by Japan (toward the French Government) to respect the rights and interests of France in the Far East, especially the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and the French sovereignty over the Indo-China Union, and the promises made by France (toward the Japanese Government) not to conclude any agreement or understanding which forecast political, economic and military cooperation opposing directly or indirectly against Japan, with any third nation.

And in the text the two governments (1) agree upon military cooperation for the purpose of joint defense of French Indo-China, (2) the necessary steps for the said cooperation shall be decided in a special agreement, (3) and decided that the provisions above mentioned shall be in force only during the period in which the situation which prompted the motive to adopt this agreement continues.

No. 2 The Official Document Exchanged

The object of this document is to conclude an agreement concerning the measures to be taken for the concerted defense of French Indo-China based on the provisions in the above mentioned Protocol with the form of reciprocating documents between the representatives of the two nations.
and the following clauses decided in this document:

I. Toward the Japanese Government, the French Government shall admit

A. The dispatch of a necessary force of Japanese army troops, war vessels and air forces to the southern Indochina.

B. The use of Siemreap and seven other places as air bases, Saigon and Camrang bay as naval bases and to provide equipments for military purposes.

C. The right of quartering, manoeuvres and training of Japanese army, the freedom of action, and to award special conveniences for the performance of their duties.

D. And the French Government shall offer to the said Japanese army 23,000,000 Indochina piastre in currency for this year namely about 4,500,000 Indochina piastre monthly, (however the Japanese Government is prepared to repay with free yen, U.S. dollar or gold).

II. The French Government shall approve the fundamental principles of the Japanese army's advance and in order to avoid occurrences of contingent clashes between the Indochina army shall take all effective steps.

III. The details concerning the activities of Japanese army shall be discussed and decided between the Japanese and French authorities at the actual place.

It seems to me, that with this matter, we aim to conclude an agreement which is necessary for the two nations in order to engage in the defense of
French Indo-China in unanimous cooperation and for the self-defense of Japan, and furthermore it is indispensable for the stability of the Far East and the co-prosperity of Japan and France, so the conclusion of this agreement may be said to be an opportune measure, in view of the present strained international situation. Therefore, this matter was unanimously approved to be passed without amendment by the Investigation Committee. I report the result of the investigation.

Chairman (KARA):

As there is no special comment, I want to omit the reading under the second (reading) and instantly have a vote taken. I ask for a standing vote of those who support this.

(All members stand up)

Chairman (KARA):

It passed unanimously. I close the meeting today.

Emperor leaves.

(Closed at 5:10 p.m.)

Chairman:
Secretary-General
Clerks

Yoshimichi HARAJ
SUO
HORIE
JIO
SACAI
T.M.TSUJI
Minutes of the Privy Council Meeting at the Conclusion of the Protocol Between Japan and France for a Common Defense of French Indo-China and for an Exchange of Official Documents Regarding Military Cooperation

The meeting was held at 4:50 p.m., July 28, (Monday) 1941.

It was honoured with His Majesty's presence.

Members present:

President NIARA    Vice-President SUZUKI

Ministers: (See list No.)

Premier C. GUO   No. 5
Home Minister T. M. SE   No. 6
War Minister TOJO   No. 7
Education Minister H. D. IDN.   No. 8
Communication & Railway Minister U. M. I.   No. 9
Navy Minister CHIY.   No. 10
Finance Minister C. G. URA   No. 11
Foreign & Overseas Minister TOYODA   No. 12
Agricultural Minister INO   No. 13
Commerce & Industry Minister S. KIH.   No. 14
Welfare Minister KOJ. I.   No. 15
Justice Minister I. A. URA   No. 16

Councillors:

K. AI   No. 19
ISII   No. 20
M. A   No. 21
SHOYA   No. 22
ISHIZUKA   No. 23
SHI. IZU   No. 24
I. I. I   No. 25
I. A   No. 26
R. AI   No. 27
S. G. URA   No. 28
I. Tsubura  
Usui  
Fuyoshi  
Funaki  
Kikuchi  
Kikuchi  
Uetake  
Tanaka  
Tahata  
Hattori  
Ichii  

Members absent:  

Princes:  

I. I. H. Y. Suhito  No. 1  
I. I. H. T. H. Suhito  No. 2  
I. I. H. T. H. Suhito  No. 3  
I. I. H. H. H. Kihito  No. 4  

Councillors:  

I. I. M. O.  No. 18  
I. I. M. S.  No. 28  
I. I. M. O.  No. 35  

Committee:  

HARASE, Director of Bureau of Legislation  
IYIE, Councillor of Bureau of Legislation  
IYABUCHI, Councillor of Bureau of Legislation  
SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board  
IYABUCHI, Vice-President of the Planning Board  
SUZUKI, Director of South Sea Bureau of Foreign Office  
SUZUKI, Director of Bureau of Treaties of Foreign Office  
HARASECHI, Director of Exchange Bureau of Finance Office  
SUZUKI, Director of Ship Controlling Bureau of Communication Office  
SUZUKI, Controlling Officer of the Marine Transportation Bureau  
SUZUKI, Chief of Military Bureau of Navy Office
Reporters:  
SUZUKI, Chairman of Investigation Committee

Chief-Secretary:  
HORIE, Chief-Secretary of Privy Council

Secretaries:  
LOROBASHI, Secretary  
T. TSUCHI, Secretary

H.R., President of Privy Council, states:

We will open the session and discuss the conclusion of the protocol between Japan and France for a common defense of French Indo-China and the exchange of official documents regarding military cooperation. The First Reading Committee shall be organized, and the contents of the subject shall not be read.

The report on the subject shall be delivered by the Chairman of the Investigation Committee immediately.

Reporter SUZUKI states:

We, the attendants today, have been appointed the Investigation Committee men by the Emperor's order to discuss the conclusion of the protocol between Japan and France for the common defense of French Indo-China and the exchange of official documents on military cooperation. We have held the committee meeting immediately to hear explanations from the ministers and other officers concerned and we have deliberated on the subject. I ask favor of your acknowledgment that I cannot find any time to deliver reports for discussion as the subjects are very urgent.

According to the ministers' explanation, the relations between Japan and French Indo-China have become gradually better since last year,
(1940) and the success of the economic negotiations between Japan and French Indo-China and of the border-dispute-mediation-conference between Thailand and French Indo-China in Tokyo this spring has given impetus to the better friendship between Japan and French Indo-China. However, the tendency of dependence upon Anglo-America still remains in French Indo-China.

The so-called TSURUKI-HENRY agreement dated August 30, 1940 and the Economic agreement concluded on the substance of the same have brought considerable fear for the expected success in its enforcement, and lately the Anglo-American economic encirclement against Japan in East Asia has become gradually characteristic of a military cooperation of Britain, U.S.A., Holland and China.

Both in the interior of French Indo-China and, especially, in the southern region there are some who do not like to cooperate with Japan; and de Gaul and his party are trying to collaborate with Anglo-America.

Japan can never feel easy. If, as a result of it, French Indo-China cooperates with the policy of Anglo-America's encirclement against Japan and breaks away from France as Syria, it is not only a great loss to France, but also a serious problem to Japan. Therefore to prevent such critical situations and to keep French Indo-China secure from invasion by third nations and simultaneously to bring about cooperation between Japan and French Indo-China smoothly are very important from the points of self-existence, self-defense and of Japan's southward drive policy.

The existing political understanding between the two nations cannot be sufficient for them. The Japanese government has realized that it is very necessary for Japan to make France closely cooperate with us in the military field.
The Japanese envoy to France to negotiate with the French Government. The negotiations were concluded amicably. The protocol on the subject and the definite plan for exchange of official documents were obtained.

The gist of the above-mentioned arrangements is as follows:

No. 1 The Protocol

In the preamble of this protocol, the Japanese and the French Governments insert that in view of the present international situation, in case the security of French Indo-China is threatened, they shall recognize the reason to think that Japan's general peace and the security of the Far East also are not free from danger, and in this opportunity to renew the promises made by Japan (toward the French Government) to respect the rights and interests of France in the Far East, especially the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and the French sovereignty over the Indo-China Union, and the promises made by France (toward the Japanese Government) not to conclude any agreement or understanding which forecast political, economic and military cooperation opposing directly or indirectly against Japan, with any third nation.

And in the text the two governments (1) agree upon military cooperation for the purpose of joint defense of French Indo-China, (2) the necessary steps for the said cooperation shall be decided in a special agreement, (3) and decide that the provisions above mentioned shall be in force only during the period in which the situation which promoted the motive to accept this agreement continues.

No. 2 The Official Document Exchanged

The object of this document is to conclude an agreement concerning the measures to be taken for the concerted defense of French Indo-China based on the provisions in the above mentioned Protocol with the form of reciprocating documents between the representatives of the two nations.
and the following clauses decided in this document:

I. The French Government shall admit

A. The dispatch of a necessary force of Japanese army troops, war vessels and air forces to the southern Indochina.

B. The use of Sienneap and seven other places as air bases, Saigon and Chung may as naval bases and to provide equipments for military purposes.

C. The right of quartering, manoeuvres and training of Japanese army, the freedom of action, and to award special conveniences for the performance of their duties.

D. and the French Government shall offer to the said Japanese army 23,000,000 Indochina piastre in currency for this year namely about 4,500,000 Indochina piastre monthly, (however the Japanese Government is prepared to repay with free yen, U.S. dollar or gold).

II. The French Government shall approve the fundamental principles of the Japanese army's advance and in order to avoid occurrences of contingent clashes between the Indochina army shall take all effective steps.

III. The details concerning the activities of Japanese army shall be discussed and decided between the Japanese and French authorities at the actual place.

It seems to me that with this matter, we aim to conclude an agreement which is necessary for the two nations in order to engage in the defense of
French Indo-China in unanimous cooperation and for the self-defense of Japan, and furthermore it is indispensable for the stability of the Far East and the co-prosperity of Japan and France, so the conclusion of this agreement may be said to be an opportune measure, in view of the present strained international situation. Therefore, this matter was unanimously approved to be passed without amendment by the Investigation Committee; I report the result of the investigation.

Chairman (H.I.R.):

As there is no special comment, I want to omit the reading under the second (reading) and instantly have a vote taken. I ask for a standing vote of those who support this.

(All members stand up)

Chairman (H.I.R.):

It passed unanimously. I close the meeting today.

Emperor leaves.

(Closed at 5:10 p.m.)

Chairman: Yoshimichi HARA
Secretary-General: Suo HORIE
Clerks: KOROHASHI
Izumi TSUJI
CERTIFICATE

I.P.S. No. 1165

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, T. Suzuki, hereby certify that I am an official connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Privy Council and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached dated __________, 1941, and described as follows:

Minutes of Privy Council at conclusion of protocol between Japan and France for the common defense of French Indo-China and for exchange of official documents regarding military cooperation, 1941.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files:

Privy Council ________.

Signed at Tokyo on this 23 day of Sept., 1946, T. Suzuki

Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: J. A. Curtis, 2d Lt. Secretary of Privy Council Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certificate was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 23 day of Sept., 1946 Richard H. Larsh

CERTIFICATE
I.P.S. No. 1165

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, T. Suzuki_________ hereby certify that I am associated with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Privy Council ______ and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached dated_________. 1941, and described as follows:
Minutes of Privy Council at conclusion of protocol between Japan and France for the common defense of French Indo-China and for exchange of official documents regarding military cooperation. 1941.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files:
Privy Council ______

Signed at Tokyo on this 23 day of Sept., 1946. T. Suzuki_________ Signature of Official SEAL

Witness: J. A. Curtis, 2d Lt. Secretary of Privy Council Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh ______, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certificateion was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 23 day of Sept., 1946 Richard H. Larsh ______

Witness: J. A. Curtis 2d Lt. Investigator, IPS Official Capacity
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%30
Your Excellency:

With regard to the protocol signed today by our two governments, I beg to request Your Excellency to confirm to me the agreement of the French Government to the following proposals:

(1) The French Government grants to Japan the right to take the following measures:

(a) The despatching into South French Indo-China of Japanese troops, naval craft and air forces in a number judged necessary.

(b) Use of the following 8 places: SIEMREAP, PHNOMPENH, TCHURANE, NHATRAUG, BIENTHOA, SAIKON, SOTOUM and KOPONGTHACE as airbases; and SAIKON and the Bay of CAIRANH as naval bases. The Japanese forces shall construct necessary facilities at the above-mentioned places.

(c) The above-mentioned Japanese troops shall be given the right of quartering, maneuvering and drilling and the freedom of their movement shall be recognized. Similarly, they shall be given special facilities for the accomplishment of their tasks. This includes the abolition of various restrictions stipulated in the NISHIHARA-MARTIN agreement.

(d) The French Government shall furnish the necessary currency to the above-mentioned Japanese troops according to the modalities to be decided in common. For this year the amount of this currency shall reach 23,000,000 Indo-Chinese piastres, or about 4,500,000 Indo-Chinese piastres monthly. This amount shall not include the currency to be furnished to the Japanese troops in TONKIN, as stipulated in the previous agreements. The Japanese Government is ready to pay for the above-mentioned currency, at the choice of the French Government, in free Yen, American dollar, or in gold.
The French Government shall give its consent to the general principles of the entry of the above-mentioned Japanese troops and take all effective measures for avoiding the occurrence of any unexpected conflict with the Indo-Chinese troops.

(3) The details concerning the movements of the Japanese troops shall be discussed and decided between the Japanese and French military authorities on the spot. I take this occasion to pay again my respects to your Excellency.

Yours sincerely.

Checked by: SAD'YASU Titoichi.

Translated by: Y. SCA.

Protocol between France and the Japanese Empire concerning the Joint Defense of French Indo-China.

Signed at Vichy on 29 July, (1941), the 16th year of SHO"A, put into effect on the same day of the same year Promulgated (in the August 2nd issue of Gazette) on the 1st August, (1941), the 16th year of SHO"A.

The Imperial Japanese Government and the French Government

Taking into consideration the present international situation:

Recognizing that in consequence, in case the security of French Indo-China is menaced, Japan will have the reason to consider that the general tranquility in East Asia and her own security are in danger.

Renewing on this occasion the engagements taken, on the one hand by Japan to respect the rights and interests of France in East Asia and especially the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and the sovereign rights of France in all parts of the Indo-Chinese Union, and on the other hand by France not to conclude in respect to Indo-China any agreement or understanding with a third power anticipating political, economic and military cooperation of a nature opposing Japan directly or indirectly.

Have concluded the following arrangements.
(1) The two governments promise to cooperate militarily for the joint defense of French Indo-China.

(2) The measure to be taken for the purpose of this cooperation shall be the object of special arrangements.

(3) The above arrangements shall remain effective only as long as the circumstances which constituted the motive for their adoption exist.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Protocol which shall be enforced from this day, and have affixed their seals.

Drawn up in duplicate, in the Japanese and French languages, at Vichy, 29 July, 1941, corresponding to the 29th day of the Seventh month of the 16th year of Showa.

KATO Shōtatsu (seal)
F. Darlan (seal)

Ie, after consultation with the Privy Councillors, sanction and hereby promulgate the Protocol between Japan and France concerning the Joint Defense of French Indo-China, which was signed on July 29, 1941, at Vichy by our Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and by the representative of France.

August 1, 1941

His Majesty the Emperor

Counter-signed by:
Premier Furimaro KONOYE,
War Minister Hideki TOJO,
Navy Minister Koshiro OIKAWA,
Foreign Minister TajiRO TOYODA.
VICHY, 29 July 1941

Your Excellency:

With regard to the protocol signed today between our two governments, I have the honor on confirming to Your Excellency the agreement of the French Government to the proposal included in the letter which Your Excellency addressed today and which is reproduced below.

With regard to the protocol signed today between our two governments, I beg to request Your Excellency to confirm to me the agreement of the French Government to the following proposals:

(1) The French Government grants to Japan the right to take the following measures:

(a) The despatching to South French Indo-China of Japanese troops, naval craft, and air forces in a number judged necessary.

(b) Use of the following 8 places: SIEÌ3U3AP, PHNOMPENH, TOURANE, NHATRANG, BIENHOI, SAIGON, SOCTRANG and KONPOFO-FRACH as air bases; and SAIGON and the Bay of CAMRANH as naval bases. The Japanese forces shall construct necessary facilities at the above-mentioned places.

(c) The above-mentioned Japanese troops shall be given the right of quartering, maneuvering and drilling, and the freedom of their movement shall be recognized. Similarly, they shall be given special facilities for the accomplishment of their tasks. This includes the abolition of various restrictions stipulated in the NISHIHARA-MARTIN Agreement.

(d) The French Government shall furnish the necessary currency to the above-mentioned Japanese troops according to the modalities to be decided in common. For this year the amount of this currency shall reach 23,000,000 Indo-Chinese piastres, or about 4,500,000 Indo-China...
piastres monthly. This amount shall include the currency to be furnished to the Japanese troops in TONKIN, as stipulated in the previous agreements.

The Japanese Government is ready to pay for the above-mentioned currency, at the choice of the French Government, in free Yen, American dollar, or in gold.

(2) The French Government shall give its consent to the general principles of the entry of the above-mentioned Japanese troops and take all effective measures for avoiding the occurrence of any unexpected conflict with Indo-Chinese troops.

(3) The details concerning the movements of the Japanese troops shall be discussed and decided between the Japanese and French military authorities on the spot.

I take this occasion to pay my respects to Your Excellency

Yours sincerely.
不完全可读的中文手写文字
Which A. Strauss
Item 15.

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

BANGKOK 1 September 1941   1200 hours
Arrival: 1 September 1941   1830 hours
No. 373 of 1 September 1941
SAIGON, no number, no date.

The Japanese invasion of Indo-China has all the signs of an occupation calculated to last for a long period of time. The total strength of troops thus far landed in South Indo-China is 25,000. An additional 20,000 will follow in the coming weeks. Not only the seven towns and airfields named in the July note from the Japanese Government to the Embassy in Tokyo are occupied, but all strategic points, large towns and settlements in Cochinchina, Kambodia and Southern Annam including a part of the fortifications of Cape St. Jacques, where landing maneuvers were pitiful, as Admiral Berenger, victor of the naval battle against the Siamese fleet in Siam Bay, told me. The landing was protected by strong Japanese naval forces stationed between Cape St. Jacques and Poulo Condore (3 aircraft carriers, 2 battleships, 10 cruisers) which have since left for the North. In and before Cam Bonh there are no Japanese warships thus far and only a weak landing detachment, as I was personally able to see with my own eyes.

The deployment is obviously directed against Siam. The president of the Chamber of Commerce told me he had been informed by General SUMITA, head of the Japanese mission to Indo-China, that Japan was considering the dispatch of an additional 150,000 troops. This is believed probable here since the troops landed thus far are insufficient for further offensive operations. The attack on Siam is at the earliest possible only after the end of the rainy season, in November.

The Japanese are entirely acting as masters here. A great part of Saigon's public buildings including the Chamber of Commerce, hotels and private houses have been ruthlessly requisitioned for military purposes, resulting in a great scarcity of homes. Otherwise the behavior of the Japanese is correct, although the unmilitary attitude, especially of the officers, is conspicuous.

The only incidents concern Annamite civilians who are maltreated and run away after employment by the Japanese for improving airfields.
The workers needed by the Japanese will in the future be recruited in Formosa. Parallel to the military occupation is the economic and other seizures, especially of all valuable raw materials.

The Indo-Chinese-Siamese border commission, presided over by a Japanese, consists of 93 Japanese, 14 Siamese and 4 Frenchmen. At present the commission sits at Saigon; there are already serious differences of opinion, and friction between the Japanese and Siamese, who otherwise completely stand aloof from the Japanese. In Saigon there are twenty Japanese newspaper correspondents. There are 24 Japanese firms as compared with 14 before the war. Competition between the new and the old Japanese firms has already set in.

Japanese agents swarm over the country in all directions. There is marked economic espionage, e.g., careful inspection of rubber plantations. In Cambodia the Japanese now buy rice fields and kapok plantations. Attempts to buy small rubber plantations in the vicinity of Saigon from Annamite and Chinese owners have failed thus far. It is, however, foreseeable that in case of a continued worsening of the market, the Japanese will obtain large rubber plantations, even from French owners, since the economic agreement with Indo-China stipulates them unlimited right of settlement as well as the right to acquire real estate. According to information there a Rubber Syndicate has been formed or is forming in Japan, chiefly supported by MITSUI, for buying rubber plantations in Indo-China.

Identical Telegram to Tokyo and Bangkok.

NEUMANN:
Certificate

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4025 E (8).

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus
SAIGON, 12 October 1941 1350 hours
Arrival 12 October 1941 2145 hours

No. 10 of 11 October 1941

Secret documents which have fallen into the hands of the French police throw light on activity of the Pan-Asiatic League as a tool of Japanese expansionist policy in Indo-China.

According to this, the League's branch offices in Hanoi, Haiphong and Saigon were ordered towards the end of June:

1. To train instructors, teachers and propagandists for agitating for the Annamite independence movement.

2. To train a squad of native agitators who are to propagate anti-French uprisings at the proper time.

3. To form special units among the Japanese occupation troops who are to foster a pro-Japanese sentiment through blameless behavior.

4. To place suitable observers at all important centers of production and communications by making use of the provisions of the trade agreement between Indo-China and Japan. Their task would be:

   a) To report on all French troop movements.
   b) To locate the storage places and the quantity of all raw materials important for Japan, including foodstuffs.

Such information is termed necessary for the preparation of uprisings. According to the intentions of Imperial General Headquarters the most suitable time for striking will be the end of this year or next spring. For this purpose contingents of Annamites trained in Japan will soon be incorporated into the Japanese occupation army as liaison men and interpreters.

According to Japanese source there are nine Annamite fighting units in Saigon and over twenty rather large Annamite fighting units in Hanoi. The French say that the leaders and a great part of the members are previously convicted criminals.

It is significant that as early as 1935 Prince CUONG DE presided over the Pan-asistic Congress. The prince is a descendant of Emperor GIÀ LCHOOL and has been recognized as the sole lawful successor to the throne by Annamite
legitimists; he had fled to Japan at the beginning of this century.

/S/ NEUMANN

Identical telegram to Tokyo

Certificate

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4025E(10).

/S/ ULRICH STRAUS
PARIS, German Armistice Commission for Economic Affairs.

1 Oct 1941 - 2100 hours

Arrival: 1 October 1941 - 2300 hours

Economic Delegation No. 467 of 1 October 1941

Re. Telegram No. 152 of 22 September 1941, fa Pol 6075 eg1

Re. Interim Report on Indo-Chinese rubber; Japan/U.S.A.

Negotiations have been conducted with the French delegation, presided over by DE BOISANGER, in line with orders as in the above telegram. At the outset DE BOISANGER expressly confirmed the order, reported by me in telegram No. 454 of 22 September 1941, to the Governor-General of Indo-China to release the 5,000 tons which the Japanese had requested for September. He then stated the request of his government for German support of the French efforts to obtain Japanese approval for delivery of 5,000 tons to the U.S.A.

Indo-China urgently needed the proceeds from such sales for buying vital goods obtainable nowhere else, and declared in answer to a question from the German side, that in payment of the said goods the U.S.A. would neither unfreeze French blocked accounts nor accept Martinique gold.

French request was turned down as not in accord with instructions. Concerning our demand which was presented in the session, DE BOISANGER replied to me yesterday on behalf of his government that it appreciated the German attitude and would take the German point of view into consideration during the pending negotiations with Japan. He was not authorized to give a more extended declaration. I pointed out to him again that the German request was urgent and again brought forth that not only the Japanese, but also the German Government would not countenance further export of raw rubber from Indo-China to the U.S.A.

The German Commissioner, JEHLE, has by now left for Berlin. He suggested that at the French delegation, an additional release of 5,000 tons, as requested by Japan, first of all for October, be secured. We are continuing to urgently attend to the matter and may further report on it.

HEM EN
TELEGRAM (Open)

PARIS - 6 October 1941 - 2045
Arrival, 6 October 1941 - 2330
No. 3031 or 6 October 1941

State Secretary, BENOIST-MECHIN, today revealed during a conversation, that considerable difficulties with Japan are occurring daily in Indo-China, while Japan, apart from a few exceptions, observes the Treaty's military provisions, she is violating France's economic and political sovereignty more and more.

At the time, Darlan had, in the Vichy Cabinet, personally and very strongly supported the solution sought by Japan with Indo-China since he feared that a different policy would furnish the Anglo-Saxon fighting forces with a pretext for interference and besides he desired to establish good relations with a state that had signed the Tri-partite Pact.

Owing to the aggressive behavior of the Japanese against France's sovereignty in Indo-China, doubts have been expressed within the French Government as to whether Darlan's conception was right; furthermore a stiffening on the part of the adversaries of his policy among French military and administrative circles in Indo-China is to be feared.

I was receptive in regard to Benoist-Mechin's information, the aim of which evidently was German intervention in Tokyo.

ABETZ
Secret State matter - to be kept in locked file.

TELEGRAM

(Telegraphic Cipher Process)

TOKYO, 15 October 1941 - 0600 hours
Arrival," " 1520 "

No. 2095 of 14 October

Re. Telegraphic orders dated 8 October, No. 1775 - Pol II

Observations here confirm the description of conditions as reported to Berlin from Saigon by Councillor of Legation, Neumann during the last few days. As was to be expected, the occupation of Indo-China did not proceed without friction.

I heard from the Foreign Ministry that there are numerous points in dispute concerning the interpretation of the defense agreement. The controversy concerns the treatment of the Chungking-appointed Chinese consul, the handing over of certain airplanes, the seizure of quarters and goods, anti-French propaganda disseminated by the Japanese army among the native population, and so on.

The French ambassador has lodged a number of protests, and has pressed hard the removal of matters of complaint. The Japanese government intends to increase the occupation forces, at present being 25,000, according to a report from Saigon, to 40,000. I was assured by the Foreign Ministry that the French-Japanese agreement does not provide for a maximum limit for Japanese occupation troops.

The Japanese Government seems to intend to wrest a number of concessions from the French Colonial administration through local military authorities. Only after the creation of a fait accompli will former Foreign Minister YOSHIWA, apparently slated for handling questions relating to Indo-China, leave for Saigon. I understand that this will not materialize before the beginning of November.

I am under the impression that both parties will not let it come to an open conflict. The Japanese government is endeavoring to keep up the outward appearance of a defense alliance and, furthermore, is afraid of diminishing the economic utilization of the country in case of an open clash, through passive resistance of the colonial administration and the native population. The Deputy Foreign Minister told me that the rice quota, amounting to 700,000 tons and urgently needed this year, was secured on the strength of the agreement concluded by MATSUOKA. It is, however, hoped that even greater quantities will be obtained.
owing to better prospects for the harvest.

The Foreign Ministry denied that there had been a Japanese-Siamese argument in the Border Commission concerning the supervision of the demilitarized zone. The Border Commission was only just starting out on its tasks. Identical telegram to Saigon.

CERTIFICATE

I, ULRICH STRAUS, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4065B.

/s/ ULRICH STRAUS
EXHIBIT NO. 1

No. 1

1941年10月10日付
電報

[本文は日本語であり、内容が理解できないため、直接的な翻訳はできません。]

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着

電報
（秘密晩号）

秘密

東京
五月二十五日付第一○五四号

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摩損ナリ

No.3
Doc 406518
PARIS, German Armistice Commission for Economic Affairs.

1 Oct 1941 - 2100 hours

Arrivals 1 October 1941 - 2300 hours

Economic Delegation No. 67 of 1 October 1941

Re. Telegram No. 152 of 22 September 1941, ka Pol 6075 gill

Re. Interim Report on Indo-Chinese rubber; Japan/U.S.A.

Negotiations have been conducted with the French delegation, presided over by DE BOISANGER, in line with orders as in the above telegram. At the outset DE BOISANGER expressly confirmed the order, reported by me in telegram No. 454 of 22 September 1941, to the Governor-General of Indo-China to release the 5,000 tons which the Japanese had requested for September. He then stated the request of his government for German support of the French efforts to obtain Japanese approval for delivery of 5,000 tons to the U.S.A.

Indo-China urgently needed the proceeds from such sales for buying vital goods obtainable nowhere else, and declared in answer to a question from the German side, that in payment of the said goods the U.S.A. would neither unfreeze French blocked accounts nor accept Martinique gold.

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/s/ ULRICH STRAUS
EXHIBIT NO. 955

11A (6) — 1
サレ顆海面アナ地デダゲダ要緊化

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東京陸戦大使報告記録ト共二報添えサレカル

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サレ顆海面アナ地デダゲダ要緊化
小さい下水道整備を進め、市街化促進の一環として整備を進めている。
ULRICH A. STRAPS
Doc. No. 11a(6)

Berlin, November 17, 1941

Telegram

Code - Sender

To the Foreign Minister of the Reich

Via the Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In accordance with instructions I conferred today with the Japanese Ambassador in regard to the possibility of Japanese action in a northern or southern direction.

General Oshima remarked that he had no information whatever concerning the intentions and deliberations of his Government and therefore could give only his personal opinion.

He is of the opinion that in view of the time of year, military operations against the Soviet Union could take place only on a limited scale. It probably would not prove too difficult to occupy the northern (Russian) part of the island of Sakhalin. In view of the severe losses which the Soviet troops have suffered at the hands of the German troops, they could also probably be driven away from the border. However, any attack on Vladivostok or even any advance toward Lake Baikal at this time of year was scarcely possible and would under present circumstances have to be postponed till spring.

In view of the grievous economic losses which Japan has suffered in the long war with China, as well as in view of the economic boycott of the Anglo-French powers, an advance by Japan toward the South was in the opinion of the Ambassador unavoidable, especially because of the pressing need for petroleum. To this question as to what in particular was to be understood by an advance toward the South, Mr. Oshima made the following reply:

For the security of petroleum, the securing of the island of Borneo was above all necessary. Japan has no petroleum principally from the ports of Tarakan and Balik-Tapan in Dutch Borneo. According to his knowledge there were also petroleum resources in British Borneo. He estimated on the map that Borneo was 100 kilometers distant from the coast of Indo-China occupied by Japanese troops. It was of course
theoretically possible for Japan to take possession only of Dutch Borneo and leave British Borneo alone. It was, however, probably, though not certain, that the English would react the same way to a Japanese attack on the Netherlands-Indies as they would to an attack on English territory.

The ambassador is of the opinion that an attack on Java is unnecessary and is not worth considering. An attack on Borneo could be easiest; an attack on Singapore would be most effective. In his opinion, in connection with an advance on Borneo, in view of the close proximity of the island to the Philippines, it would be advisable to declare that it was the desire of the part of the Japanese to respect American possessions in West Asia. Of course, the action would have to be prepared for in advance, so that in case of need, should there be a corresponding American attitude, one could proceed against the Philippines simultaneously. It would scarcely be possible for the Americans to defend them effectively. The distance from Borneo to Manila is only 600 kilometers.

According to Wilson's opinion, the United States gets principally tin from Sumatra and rubber from the Malay archipelago as well as Indo-China. American deliveries from Indo-China are not blocked.

Upon being questioned further, the ambassador remarked that the American power ought perhaps just as well with a Japanese invasion of Thailand. Such an invasion should be possible to undertake after prior agreement with the Thailand government. In order to prepare for the Japanese government in its efforts at mediation in the conflict between Indo-China and Thailand, an act now favorable to the latter, of course there was very active English and American propaganda in Bangkok, so that the attitude of the government there has become irresolute. In his opinion the Japanese troops in South Indo-China should be still further increased before an invasion of Thailand can be made. The only purpose of such an invasion would be to secure Thailand as a springboard for Singapore. It is not very likely that the English in that case would invade South Thailand, since they would then expose themselves there as well as on the narrow Malay Peninsula to a Japanese flank attack in landing maneuvers northwest of Singapore. It is so suddenly not easy since the jungle would have to be surmounted there.
Only the immediate area around Singapore was fortified, especially strongly fortified is the area facing the sea. Strong naval forces which could match their strength with the Japanese fleet were not present there. Several battleships as well as the English aircraft carrier Eagle left Singapore after the outbreak of the war. The Dutch fleet was very weak. Of American naval forces there were in Singapore at the last only light cruisers and several destroyers. The unlikely possibility that the Americans would send stronger naval unit would only be desirable for Japan, since such forces would then have to operate far from their bases and be exposed to Japanese air attacks. Ambassador Uchima is assuming that the three Japanese infantry divisions on the island of Hainan are being trained for landing operations and combat in tropical regions. He is of the opinion that a Japanese advance against Singapore is to considered in conjunction with a German advance in the Middle East.

The speeches of Tojo and Togo in Parliament were known to the Ambassador. He does not expect any decision concerning the Japanese attitude to be made until it has become apparent what success is attained by the special mission of Ambassador Kurusu.

The strength of the Japanese Army units in South China as well as their distribution in the different areas is made known by the report of the German Military Attaché in Tokyo, transmitted together with the telegraphic report of the Ambassador in Tokyo, No. 2439 of November 13. According to that report, there are four infantry divisions in north Indo-China and a motorized brigade, which would have to furnish the protection against a flank attack by Chiang Kai Shek through the province of Yunnan in the event of a Japanese advance being undertaken against Thailand. In South Indo-China there are up to now three Japanese infantry divisions.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister of the Reich

Ludmannsdorff
Certificate:

I, Ulrich Strauss, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 11a(6).

/S/ Ulrich Strauss

General Principles

(1) The French authorities shall collaborate with all their resources with the Japanese Army in the defense of French Indo-China in conformity with agreements drawn up between France and Japan.

(2) For the duration of the operations carried out by the Japanese Army, the Indo-Chine Authorities shall ensure public order in all Indo-China territories in such a way as to secure the rear of the Japanese Army. The Japanese troops shall be able eventually to cooperate to this effect with the French Indo-Chine authorities.

(3) The Indo-Chine authorities shall grant to the Japanese Army on Indo-China soil, all facilities for its movement, subsistence and for the installation of its military establishments.

(4) The defense will, in principle, be divided up thus:

Japanese Army -
Southern Indo-China and eventually other regions where it takes up positions

Indo-Chine Army -
Northern Indo-China and other regions where Indo-Chine troops are stationed. In instances where both Japanese and Indo-Chine troops might be stationed at the same point a special agreement would govern the details of the joint defense at this point.

(5) Separate agreements shall govern the collaboration as far as it concerns

Anti-aircraft defense
Coastal defense
Sea and air navigation
Utilization of means of transport
Communications
Medical Service
Employment of material and labour
Anti-Espionage
Control of Information
Local Military Agreement between the French Authorities and the Japanese Army regarding the Joint Defense of French Indo-China

Detailed Provisions

(1) Air Defense.

The air defense of Indo-China territories is guaranteed by the French authorities who hold themselves, in this respect, in close liaison with the corresponding authorities of the Japanese Army.

The latter can require the French authorities to put into action their means of defense, it being understood that these will be employed primarily in the defense of Indo-China civil and military installations.

(2) The measures for air defense shall come into force immediately.

(3) Orders relative to air alerts (including light control) shall be given in each locality by the Japanese and Indo-China commanders on their own respective initiative under the stipulation that one shall warn the other without delay.

(4) The extinguishing or lighting up of lighthouses, beacon lights, etc., shall be carried out on the demand of the Japanese authorities.
(5) For air look-out and communications between the Japanese and French anti-aircraft defenses the existing network shall be used primarily. Other networks shall be established according to necessity and materials available.

II. Coast Defense

(1) In cases where war or merchant ships or planes belonging to countries at war with Japan approach the coasts of Indo-China, the French authorities shall inform the Japanese Army of it immediately and shall make all dispositions to repulse their attacks.

(2) The defense of the coasts of Indo-China (including laying of mines or the high seas) shall be secured in agreement with the Japanese Authorities.

(3) The moment at which this defense shall come into force shall be fixed by understanding between the French and Japanese authorities.

(4) Liaison personnel may be stationed by the Japanese Army with the command of the fortified zones of CAMRANH BAY, DOSON and CARSAINT JACQUES and other coast batteries.

III. Ship Movements

(1) The Japanese Navy shall be consulted before any movement by French war or merchant ships.

(2) Access to CAMRANH BAY is not allowed without the permission of the Japanese Authorities.

(3) In exceptional and urgent cases Japanese warships and transports may be relieved of the necessity of taking on an Indo-China pilot.

IV. Movement of Planes

(1) French military aviation shall concentrate all its units in the North of Indo-Chine.

(2) French military aviation shall effect preliminary coordination with the Japanese Army for the anticipated modifications of its disposition. These modifications may always be carried out without preliminary consultation in cases of necessity for air defense, on condition that the Japanese Authorities be informed of them without delay.
(3) The installations guaranteeing the safety of air navigation shall operate equally for the benefit of the Japanese Army.

(4) The service "AIR FRANCE" shall be suspended in the meantime.

(5) The Japanese Army may use, in case of urgent need, all aerodrome and sea plane bases (including places suitable for aviation) under the reservation that French aviation is free to make use of areas which it is actually occupying and which are indispensable to it. In case of joint-occupation, local agreements will be made guaranteeing the use of the landing ground to French planes.

(6) The air forces of the two armies stationed in North Indo China shall mutually exchange liaison officers if the need to do so makes itself felt.

V. Traffic and Transport.

(1) The French Indo-China authorities shall satisfy, as far as possible, demands made necessary by the operations of the Japanese Army as regards the carrying out of transportation. In regard to demands which envisage the use of transport installations, there must be a specific request in each particular case and such demands will be completely met as far as the safety of traffic and the carrying out of the transportation permit.

(2) Where military operations might involve transportation over the Cambodian railway, such transportation will be made, as a general rule, by special through trains.

(3) If, in the course of Japanese military operations there is any risk that the transportation required by the Japanese Army may be subjected to delays and difficulties, the Japanese Army, after giving sufficient notice, may, for the time being, assume control of the use of railways.

(4) All matters relating to the use of the railways by the Japanese Army must be kept strictly secret.

(5) The total indemnity arising from the relevant clause of the present agreement will be finally settled after calculation.

(6) In cases of destruction of railroads, roads, bridges, etc., repairs shall be rapidly carried out by the personnel normally responsible for such repairs. The Japanese Army shall have the power to take part in such repairs with the object of speeding up their completion.
(7) When operations make it necessary, the Japanese Army shall have the power, after giving notice to the Indo-China authorities, to limit or forbid, land, sea or river traffic within the bounds of Japanese military installations and in certain zones reserved for military operations.

In each case, an agreement with the French authorities shall specify the modifications to be applied to the proposed measures in order to guarantee the needs of the administration and of the existence of the population.

VI. Communications.

(1) In case of pressing need of operations and after it has been demanded by the Japanese Army, the Indo-China Authorities will have certain radio sendings and certain international communications by cable, stopped.

(2) Messages relating to air defence shall have priority over all others.

(3) In case of necessity, the Japanese and Indo-China armies shall have the power to attach liaison agents to their radio stations.

(4) The Indo-China Authorities shall give to the Japanese Army the use of the installations mentioned below. The Japanese Army in using these installations must take into account the rightful needs of the Indo-China Authorities, giving priority to Indo-China official telegrams.

(a) Transmission by wire (actual lines)

1. Sector SAIGON - FRONTURE - PURI - T
   - Telegraph: 2 lines
   - Telephone: 1 line

2. Sector SAIGON - Cape Saint Jacques
   - Telegraph: 1 line

(b) Wireless and Radio Transmission

1. Radio Sending Station of FU TWO
   (Commander General of Wireless Transmission)
   - One (12 KW) short wave sending set
   - Two (3 KW) short wave sending sets
   - One (3 KW) broadcasting set.

An agreement shall be made on the spot for the sharing and use of the sending stations mentioned above, sending stations corresponding to these senders, installations assigned to the operation of these sets and microphone rooms.
It shall be the same for the following stations.

2. Station PTU TFO (radio service)
   1 (5 KW) wireless set

3. Station PHU QUOC
   1 (5 KW) wireless set

4. Station TANOI
   Agreement to be made for the use of the
   one sender, of 5 KW, in existence there.

5. The use of the broadcasting station (12 KW)
   of PTU TFO (Company General of wireless trans-
   mission) shall be the object of a special
   agreement.

6. The electricity centres of SAIGON and TANOI
   shall satisfy to the limits of their power,
   the needs of the Japanese Army, which shall
   have the power, if the necessity makes itself
   felt, of attaching liaison agents to them.

7. If events make it necessary, the Japanese Army
   may be compelled to present fresh demands re-
   lative to the control of radio-electric waves.

VII Medical Service

(1) The Indo-China Government shall afford to the Japanese
Army all possible facilities for the hospitalization and
medical treatment of sick and wounded.

In the last resource and on demand, establishments,
medical instruments and appliances and medicines, not in-
dispensable to the needs of the population, may be lent to
the Japanese Army.

A total of 6,000 beds divided among the establishments
of the regions, SAIGON - CIES SAINT JACQUES, TOURANE, DALAT,
etc., shall be reserved from now on, for the use of the
Japanese Army.

In addition to the 6,000 mentioned above, the Indo-China
authorities shall make every effort to accommodate a number
of wounded as nearly as possible up to a total of 19,000
until the Japanese Army can construct field hospitals.
(2) The Indo-Chine Government shall grant to the Japanese Army all facilities for its studies in tropical hygiene.

VIII. Use of Materials and Labour

(1) The Indo-China Authorities shall comply as far as it is possible with the requisition of war materials and the recruitment of labour demanded by the Japanese Army.

(2) They shall lend their aid for the repair of ships, vehicles, and other Japanese military material.

(3) They shall satisfy as far as possible the demands which the Japanese Army may present to them in the way of workshop arsenals, magazines, cold storage, etc.

IX. Counter-Espionage Measures.

(1) The Indo-China Authorities shall collaborate with the Japanese Army in its efforts against espionage and activities liable to endanger its security on Indo-Chine soil and will lend it their support in the matter of counter espionage.

They shall, without delay, exchange with the Japanese Authorities all information which they may be able to procure on this subject.

(2) The competent Indo-China Authorities shall take the necessary steps against foreigners of every nationality, whose activities might endanger the security of the Japanese forces.

(3) The Indo-China Authorities must recognize how very important secrecy is in the operations undertaken for the joint-defence of Indo-Chine. With a view to preserving this secrecy, the Japanese Army will place liaison agents in each of the Indo-Chine control commissions of telegrams, telephone conversations, and with the censorship of reviews, newspapers and postal delivery.

X. Control of Information

(1) The Indo-China Authorities shall jointly decide upon measures which might be necessitated by the exigencies of the joint-defence of Indo-Chine, for control of Indo-Chine information both outward and inward.

(2) The Japanese Army will proceed to the establishment and utilisation of Japanese organizations for radio broadcasting to foreign countries after having informed the Government of Indo-Chine of its intentions.
(3) If events make it necessary, the Japanese Army shall have the power eventually to attach liaison agents to Indo-China broadcasting organizations.

XI. Miscellaneous

(1) The air services of Indo-China and Japan shall request each other of the identification marks of their respective planes.

(2) The Indo-China Authorities shall procure geographical and hydrographical maps and charts for the Japanese Army.

(3) The present agreement shall come into force counting from the day it is signed.

Indo et the Government General of Indo-China at HANOI on 9 Dec. 1941.

Squadron Vice-Admiral J. DECOUX
Governor-General of Indo-Chine
Signed

Ship-Captain FOLKWEB
Representing the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Squadron.
Signed.

Major-General TYO
Representing the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Army
Signed.

APPENDIX

Squadron Vice-Admiral JEAN DECOUX,
Grand Officer of the Legion of Honor
Governor-General of Indo-Chine

TO

The General
Ford of the Japanese Mission
HANOI

Dear General,

I have the honour to send to you herewith the text of the Agreement established between the French Authorities and the Japanese Army with a view to settling the joint-defence of Indo-China.
As I stated to you this morning, it is the intention of the Government-General to do nothing which can harm in any way the operations of the Japanese Army.

In order to confirm this immediately as you have asked me, I have put my signature at the foot of this Agreement.

It goes without saying that the French Authorities will give to the Japanese Authorities the facilities for the conduct of the operations which the latter may ask. It must, however, be understood that in any eventuality the sovereign of France over Indo-China shall be respected and the operations of the Government Services assured.

I have not always been able to effect direct contact with the French Government and the latter may have already entered into engagements with the Japanese Government in the name of Indo-China, which I am ignorant of.

If I should receive instructions from my Government, I might be prevailed upon to impart them to you with a view to eventual new discussions.

Signed: J. DECOUX
Note (5) The packing of the produce shall be included in the assessment value of the contents. However, the declarant has the right to demand that the packings be taxed at the duty provided for the tariff position to which they belong.

The products of Indo-China which on their importation into Japan enjoy the percentages of reduction or exemptions of custom duties prescribed in Article 3 and also the consolidation of duties according to the conditions prescribed in Article 4.

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京津冀三地结成‘三元’区域协同发展

交涉谈判‘三元’区域协同发展，各地区依据国情、地

据制定具体政策，推动三地协同发展。

京津冀三地结成‘三元’区域协同发展，旨在实现三地的

资源整合、优势互补，共同推动区域经济、社会

协调发展。

三地将按照‘三元’区域协同发展要求，做好政策

衔接，协调推进重大项目建设，加快交通、通信

基础设施互联互通，推动生态环境联防联治，提

高公共服务水平，促进产业协同发展，努力形成

区域协调发展新机制。

京津冀三地结成‘三元’区域协同发展，是推动区域

协调发展、实现共同富裕的重要举措。
【題】
松岡大臣は昭和二年八月七日、観光米大

【内文】
本件に関して、八月九日、報道を報し

【署名】
松岡大臣
我们是中华民族的子孙，为自己是中国人感到自豪。
図1. 本図は、...

測定した結果、...

これにより、...

以上のことから、...
D 解

(1) 360° ÷ 8 = 45°

(2) 45° × 3 = 135°

(3) 45° × 5 = 225°

(4) 45° × 6 = 270°

(5) 45° × 7 = 315°

(6) 45° × 8 = 360°
多言过必有我师，少言过必有我耻。
11.2

11.1.4

图中四棱柱的顶点

利用计算机的数据处理方法，分析四棱柱顶点的分布情况。
篇幅过长，无法准确识别出具体的文字内容。
「……」

不要只看到表面，要深入了解。"如来会开示，法相庄严。"

「……」

不要只看到表面，要深入了解。"如来会开示，法相庄严。"

「……」

不要只看到表面，要深入了解。"如来会开示，法相庄严。"

( direkt 翻譯及文字)
第二章

这是一个包含数学内容的段落。请注意，由于图像的不清晰，内容可能不完整或难以阅读。
第二章

内容待定
鎖骨凹陷

D

鰓
航路に八共和爆発が起こりました。二等兵士官が武器を指揮し、爆発を避けるため、甲板に突入したところ、重傷を負った士官が倒れました。その時、甲板に突入したまま爆発が起こり、全船員が一斉に倒れました。\\n\\n重傷を負った士官が倒れました。甲板に突入したまま爆発が起こり、全船員が一斉に倒れました。
氏名
逮捕日
検事側
検定日

N.J. チー氏
七月三十日
八月三十日

アール村
宿舎
元末
移転

非田
移転

No. 31

doc 772
Intervention by Britain and America as regards
the question of the occupation of Northern
Indochina by the Imperial Forces

After the outbreak of the China Incident, the French Indochina Government initially resisted us in October 1937 to prohibit the transportation of arms to China via Indochina. But, in spite of the resistance, the transportation of the arms sent to China via French Indochina was really continued after that, so the Imperial Government had to earnestly continue the negotiations in order to put a stop to it. The French authorities, however, were so lacking in sincerity as to insist that there was no fact of such transportation, and therefore, we were obliged to resort to such self-protection measures as the bombing of the French railway. But, upon the surrender of France to Germany on 17 June, 1940, a proposal was made to us to suspend the transportation of the aforementioned materials, and we sent the personnel required for supervising this to the place in question.

However, from the viewpoint of the necessity of our operations against China as well as the promotion of the disposal of the China Incident, it was considered imperative, on the occasion of sudden change in the international status of French Indochina, not only to prohibit the transportation of the materials for aiding China, but also to establish our military, political and economical supremacy over French Indochina. So, we started preliminary negotiations in July at the place in question, and on 1 August we began formal negotiations in Tokyo with the French Ambassadors there.

The negotiations were extremely difficult as the French Government took a stiff attitude toward the above request of the Imperial Government, but by dint of our efforts at mediation an agreement between the parties was at last reached on 30 August.

Based upon the above, in French Indochina, talks were begun between the Japanese and French military authorities on practical matters, but they were too reluctant to accept our requests, inventing various reasons.

On 4 September, however, the military agreement was concluded, and detailed negotiations were made as to its enforcement. Meanwhile, due to mutual misintelligences, some local battles were engaged between the two armies, and the Japanese residents were restricted, for a time causing the threat of a rupture in negotiations. But after many consultations on 22 September the detailed arrangements were at length concluded at the place in question, enabling our forces to successfully occupy northern French Indochina from the 23rd on.

The negotiations as above with French Indochina attracted the attention of Britain and America, and in the course of the negotiations, the British and American Ambassadors in Tokyo officially expressed the concern of their respective governments as listed below. And each time we refuted them. But the French Indochina authorities, on the other hand, were contriving to bring about American intervention while the Chungking Government took such steps as inciting Britain and America, and concentrated a big force on the French Indochina border, and making propaganda to the effect that they would take counter-measures, doing their utmost to prevent the conclusion of the negotiations. We, on our part, endeavored to settle the negotiations quickly so as to forestall a conspiracy of the powers.
List

America

7 August 1940 - Talk between Minister MATSUOKA and U. S. Ambassador GREW.
4 September 1940 - Talk between Vice-Minister OHASHI and U. S. Ambassador GREW.
14 September 1940 - Talk between Vice-Minister OHASHI and U. S. Ambassador GREW.

(our answer to America)
20 September 1940 - Talk between Minister MATSUOKA and U. S. Ambassador GREW.
22 September 1940 - Talk between our Ambassador to America HORIGUCHI and Vice-Secretary NAKAO.

Britain

10 August 1940 - A letter to Vice-Minister MATSUMIYA from British Councillor DODDS.
4 September 1940 - Talk between Vice-Minister OHASHI and British Ambassador CRAIGIE.
16 September 1940 - Talk between Minister MATSUOKA and British Ambassador CRAIGIE.
18 September 1940 - Talk between Vice-Minister OHASHI and British Ambassador CRAIGIE.
27 September 1940 - Talk between Vice Minister OHASHI and British Ambassador CRAIGIE.

Gist of Talk concerning the French Indochina problem between Minister MATSUOKA and U. S. Ambassador GREW on 7 August 1940 (from 5:00 P.M. to 5:30 P.M.)

The U. S. Ambassador, by way of introduction said, "I should like to relay an oral message to you, the minister, on instructions from the U. S. Government, as regards the various reports and press news concerning the Japanese Government's secret demands toward French Indochina," read the attached document and handed over it and its attached papers, the copies of statements by the Secretary of State on 17 April and 11 May 1940.

In answer to this, Minister MATSUOKA said in introduction, "I will reserve comment and observation upon this proposal of the U. S. Government, but I shall tell you the following," and continued, "I know that American newspapers contain various accounts about this matter, but some of them are exaggerated and some others are unfounded. Next, as for our démarche in this matter, though this minister is today not as yet in the position to speak a word about its nature, I shall say for the strictly confidential information of the U. S. Government that the démarche was already approved and agreed on by the French Government on principle."

The minister insisted that he wished this last point to be kept in absolute secrecy so as not to leak out.

/Memorandum pertaining to the French Indochina question given by the American Ambassador in Tokyo to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA on August 7, 1940./
List

America

7 August 1940 — Talk between Minister MATSUMIYA and U. S. Ambassador GREW.
4 September 1940 — Talk between Vice-Minister CHASHI and U. S. Ambassador GREW.
14 September 1940 — Talk between Vice-Minister CHASHI and U. S. Ambassador GREW.
20 September 1940 — Talk between Minister MATSUKA and U. S. Ambassador GREW.
22 September 1940 — Talk between our Ambassador to America HIRUGAKI and Vice-Secretary TAKEDA.

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/Memorandum pertaining to the French Indochina question given by the American Ambassador in Tokyo to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA on August 7, 1940./
Howe Agencies are carrying various reports in effect that the Japanese Government has made to a secret demarche concerning French Indochina. It is reported that the demands under reference include, among others, the right for Japanese military forces to make use of air bases at certain places in French Indochina, and the right for Japanese naval forces to be transported through French Indochina.

There was set forth in the statements issued by the Secretary of State on April 17 and May 11 the belief that any intervention in the internal affairs of the Netherlands Indies or the change of their status must be by peaceful processes which would favor the cause of peace, security and stability in the entire Pacific area as well as in that of the Netherlands Indies. The American Government was likewise set forth that the United States believe in the doctrine which possesses universal validity and in support of which the United States stand unequivocally. The foregoing belief and observation have thus a natural application also to French Indochina. The démarche reported to have been made by the Government of Japan to the French authorities has, under these circumstances, seriously perturbed the Government of the United States.

August 7, 1940.

/ Japan's Reply to America concerning the French Indochina question. (Reply made orally to Ambassador Giffen by Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs on 9th September 1940) /

In the course of the conversation I had with Your Excellency on August 7, 1940, Your Excellency stated, referring to a newspaper report that the Japanese Government has presented certain demands to France concerning French Indochina, that the United States Government could not note the report without concern.

Accompanied by the task of establishing a new order in East Asia, the Japanese Government has formerly entered into negotiations with the French Government with regard to French Indochina. The discussions have since been going on with the authorities on the spot and are making satisfactory progress.

Japan, while bent on the settling of the China Affairs and determined to assure for herself a minimum of existence, has no intention to resort to compulsion and exploitation in order to attain these ends, taking care to regulate her action by considerations of mutual prosperity and brotherly love among the peoples of the regions concerned. She has exerted and is exerting her utmost efforts to avoid any unfortunate changes in the status quo of these regions in so far as such policy does not render it impossible the realization of the above objects.

In face, however, of the present world situation, which is changing hour by hour, it is obvious that mere observance of old criteria, which may become inapplicable to the actual state of affairs, is not the way to safeguard world peace. It is mainly for this reason that Japan has hitherto strictly refrained from expressing her opinion via-a-via the epoch-making changes which are actually taking place in the Western Hemisphere.
I may be permitted to point out that any action by the United States Government which may be interpreted as an undue interference in matters pertaining to a region so far away from America like the present matter is bound to have undesirable repercussions upon the sentiments of the Japanese people exactly in the same manner as a similar attitude on the part of a third power would affect the public opinion of America were such third power to take an interfering attitude toward an American policy pertaining to the territories of a third power in the Eastern Hemisphere.

Re: Protests filed by American and British Ambassadors to Vice-Minister OKUKI, regarding the French Indochina question.

1. On the 4th (inst.) the American Ambassador visited Vice-Minister OKUKI and stated that the home government had ordered him to inquire into the reasons why this country had made various military demands on and delivered an ultimatum to French Indochina.

Accordingly, the Vice-Minister answered that no ultimatum was sent so far, but negotiations with regard to French Indochina seemed to be under way.

Then the Ambassador questioned whether such actions did not go counter to the Japanese declaration relating to the SALT JO in the Far East. The Vice-Minister answered that although he, being uninformed of the statement, had no knowledge of it, he considered the present troubles temporary ones; and asked whether the fact that the U.S. Government put stress upon the matter, could be construed that the U.S. Government was going to take some action if occasion requires.

The Ambassador said that the U.S. Government has no such intention, but that it is concerned for the situation of French Indochina where the U.S.A. had interests in various senses of the word; and that he, therefore, would like to know how negotiations between Japan and French Indochina were going on as much as possible. Then he left.

2. The British Ambassador also visited Vice-Minister OKUKI on the same day and asked the same kind of a question. The Vice-Minister refused to answer, saying that there might be something to it but not to ask him because he was an uninformed person. British Ambassador was said to have retired without making any further question.

American Ambassador residing in Tokyo, at 5:00 P.M. 20 September, visited Foreign Minister MATSUOKA. He read the annexed note "A" to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and said that he would be very happy if he could get an assurance that the report concerning the important demands on the part of the Japanese Government to French Indochina was groundless and did not represent neither the intention of the Japanese Military Authority in Hanoi nor that of Japanese Government.
After an introductory remark to the effect that the presented note would be carefully studied by the concerned officials, he stated that Japan and France had reached an agreement and that talks relating to a detailed agreement were begun on the spot for the execution of the contents of the above, and that they had progressed to the point where the military authorities of both countries were on the verge of signing the agreement on the 6th of this month. But that the Governor-General of French Indochina for some reason had assumed the attitude of postponing the conclusion of the agreement as long as possible and of trying to nullify it. Thus Japan was compelled to deliver a final note to both France and to French Indochina, the contents of which were almost the same with that note which the Ambassador had just read.

The Governor-General of French Indochina should assume the responsibility for all these, for Japan had no alternative but to resort to these measures on account of the insincere procrastinative policy of French Indochina. Japan, pressed by the urgent necessity of her military operation against China which could not be postponed any more, had taken the above mentioned steps.

The Governor-General of French Indochina was said to have boasted to a certain foreign consul that he was checking the fulfillment of the demands of Japan. This country thought such an attitude of the Governor-General unjustifiable and felt that it would be due to the fact that Vichy Government had no control over him. Je, therefore, filed a protest to Vichy Government to ascertain the fact. But Vichy answered that the rumor concerning the Governor-General was not true and he was under its control. Hence the minister (1) could not but understand that all was due to a third power which played an active part in the background.

No further problems in connection with the lodging of the "Note" was made and the talk continued.

By way of introduction the Minister said that he would like to talk to the Ambassador in extreme secrecy about our fair intentions for the purpose of removing unnecessary misunderstanding on the part of the U.S. Government. Then he stated that the true aim of the present Japanese demands to France was only to obtain military facilities in French Indochina necessary for the furtherance of our military operations against China. Je, therefore, had made it clear that utilization of the military facilities there was of a temporary nature. Furthermore we gave assurance to France in compliance with the letter's desire to have freedom from care that we would respect the territorial integrity and French sovereignty in French Indochina. Under these circumstances, it was beyond our comprehension why the U.S. Government should find fault with this French Indochina question.

The Foreign Minister said that he had confided our secret to the U.S.A., and that if their talk should leak to France or any other power, the complete agreement between France and Japan would be nullified. So, should such a thing happen, he said, he would call the U.S. Government "a liar."

The Minister added that our protest against French Indochina had been presented with the great objects of accelerating the settlement of the China incident and of bringing peace between Japan and China; and so they
Doc. No. 772

wore thinking that the U.S.A. should help us so as to advance the conclusion of the French-Japanese agreement instead of complaining, if she does not want to hinder peace between China and Japan, because to bring cease to all East Asia was a contribution to the world peace.

Lastly the minister said that Japan would never take a policy of subjugation or exploitation, but would adhere to friendly mutual understanding in our attempt to solve this international problem. Prince KCMST and the minister are a minority, but that they would uphold this policy even at the risk of their lives.

Thus the Foreign Minister concluded his explanation.

Ambassador Crow filed "Soto" as his reply to Vice-Minister OHSII's answer made a few days ago. To this the Minister said that he thought that his answer would cover the above and closed their conversation.

Oral Statement of the American Ambassador on his visit at 5:00 P.M., September 20, 1940/

My government has received from an authoritative source information to the effect that the Governor General of French Indochina has been presented by General Nishihara at Hanoi with demands that Japanese military forces occupy Hanoi, Hai Hong, and five airports. My Government is further informed by the same source that General Nishihara has stipulated that Japanese armed forces intend to invade Indochina on September 22 unless the Japanese demands are accepted.

I am instructed by my Government to convey this report to you. The American Government is greatly surprised that the Japanese military authorities in French Indochina should have taken action giving rise to this report in the light of all circumstances, as well as the voluntary Japanese gesture, previously expressed, to conserve and keep the status quo in the Pacific area. My Government assumes that this report, provided it is based on facts, reflects action taken locally and in excess of instructions from the Japanese Government, as was reportedly true when a previous ultimatum was presented by the Japanese military authorities. The Government of the United States would appreciate receiving assurances from the Japanese Government that this report is not warranted and that it does not represent the intentions of the Japanese military authorities at Hanoi nor the intentions of the Japanese Government.

September 26, 1940/

Statement given by the American Ambassador on his visit at 5:00 P.M., September 26, 1940, as the reply to Vice-Minister OHSII/

My Government has instructed me to make the following observations in reply to the oral statement which was handed to me by the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs on September 14:

It is the opinion of my Government that the status quo of a third country is seriously affected when one of two countries which is engaged in hostilities with another insists, in order to attack the other, upon the right of the use of airfields and the right of passage for troops through the third country. In the light of the Japanese Government's announced desire that the status quo be maintained in the Pacific area...
there appears to be an inconsistency in connection with the stimulations of this nature which are being made upon the authorities in Indochina by the Japanese Government.

The American Government urges upon all governments the employment of peaceful means only in their relations with all other governments and with all other regions. The attitude of my Government toward the unwarranted use of pressure in international relations is global.

September 19, 1940.

Public Statement by the American Secretary of State on May 11, 1940

I have no full report about the matter referred to in the press despatches from Tokyo. During recent weeks a number of governments, including Great Britain, Japan, and the United States, have made clear in official public utterances their attitude of continued respect for the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies. This was in harmony with definite commitments formally made in writing in 1938. This Government assumes that each of the Governments which has made commitments will continue to abide by those commitments. On April 17, 1940, in a public statement, I said: "Intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any alteration of their status quo by other than peaceful processes would be prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace and security, not only in the region of the Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area." In view of these facts, commitments and expressions of interest to respect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies cannot be too often reiterated.

Public Statement by the American Secretary of State on April 17, 1940

I have noted with interest the statement by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs expressing concern on the part of the Japanese Government for the maintenance of the status quo of the Netherlands Indies.

Any change in the status of the Netherlands Indies would directly affect the interests of many countries.

The Netherlands Indies are very important in the international relationships of the whole Pacific Ocean. The islands themselves extend for a distance of approximately 3,300 miles east and west astride of the equator, from the Indian Ocean on the west far into the Pacific Ocean on the east. They also are an important factor in the commerce of the whole world. They produce considerable portions of the world's supplies of important essential commodities such as rubber, tin, quinine, copra, and cotonera. Many countries, including the United States, depend substantially upon them for some of these commodities.

Intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any alteration of their status quo by other than peaceful processes would be prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace and security not only in the region of the Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area.
This conclusion, based on a doctrine which has universal application and for which the United States unequivocally stands, is embodied in notes exchanged on November 30, 1908, between the United States and Japan in which each of the two governments stated that its policy was directed to the maintenance of the existing status quo in the region of the Pacific Ocean. It is reaffirmed in the notes which the United States, the British Empire, France and Japan — as parties to the treaty signed at Washington on December 13, 1921, relating to their insular possessions and their insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean — sent to the Netherlands Government on February 4, 1922, in which each of those governments declared that "it is firmly resolved to respect the rights of the Netherlands in relation to their insular possessions in the region of the Pacific Ocean."

All peaceful nations have during recent years been earnestly urging that policies of force be abandoned and that peace be maintained on the basis of fundamental principles, among which are respect by every nation for the rights of other nations and non-intervention in their domestic affairs, the acceding of equality of fair and just treatment, and the faithful observance of treaty obligations, with modification thereof, when useful, by orderly processes.

It is the constant hope of the Government of the United States — as it is no doubt that of all peaceably inclined governments — that the attitudes and policies of all governments will be based upon these principles and that these principles will be applied not only in every part of the Pacific area, but also in every part of the world.

1940, No. 39891/cipher/ Sent from JUSHL TOE on the morning of September 21, Received by FOREIGN MINISTRY on the night of Sept. 31.

TO FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA
FROM AMBASSADOR HOREIUCHI

No. 1513-1 (urgent) (Secret)

On the 22nd I had a talk with Assistant-Secretary WELLS on the problem concerning American rights and interests in C.I.N. After that the Assistant-Secretary, in a solemn attitude, said that it was very regrettable that he had to talk with me on an important subject in view of the fact that I was to leave here in a few days. With this as an introductory remark, he said that it was really a problem relating to C.I.N. but that since this spring, the Japanese Government, as I well know, had given statements on the maintenance of the status quo of the "C.:IN." Then he read aloud the summaries of the statements that had been made by our Foreign Ministers and Chiefs of the Intelligence Board since the last cabinet, and read out the notes that had been taken of the conversation between the Secretary of State and myself. He then said that although the U.S. Government had been placing full confidence in these words of the Japanese Government, Foreign Minister MATSUOKA told Ambassador GRAY in Tokyo on the previous night that Japan had sent an ultimatum to the Government of French Indochina. The items of the Japanese demands, it was reported, contained many important items such as the occupation of the City of Hanoi and of the airfield by the Japanese military forces, and that the occupation would be carried out on and after the 23rd. The American Government, he
This matter, he said, must be considered the climax of the many problems which had arisen between America and Japan for the past three years and more. Should that fact become known to the American people, public sentiment would surely turn worse against Japan. The American Government, which was obliged to respect public opinion in deciding its policy, would be forced to consider some sort of necessary measures for the present situation. (continued)

The Japanese Government, I told him, had lately made some demands...
necessary for its military activities in the Southwest China area, regarding which some basic understanding had already been reached between Japan and France together with French Indochina. Only, negotiations were being made on the spot with regard to the details. However, because of the recent standstill, (in this negotiation,) the Japanese authorities seem to have been forced to take the present step. I considered, I told him, that the Japanese Government had not yet given up hope of reaching some sort of agreement. In short, the Japanese Government had no other intention than to settle the China Incident as soon as possible and prepare against the disadvantages effect on East Asia that would be caused in the future by the European War.

To this statement WILLES answered that, though he ardently hoped, of course, to see some understanding reached between Japan and France and a crisis avoided, he could not but recognize it as aggression in case Japan should on the contrary send military forces into French Indochina against the latter's will. Then I told him that Japan had to take suitable measures to cope properly with the effect of the European War which might be brought upon East Asia just as much as America would, if necessary, take measures such as military supervision over the possessions of European countries in the Caribbean Sea. He said that as America was not yet being menaced by any aggression, it had not taken such an action, and that America would proceed to protect common interest through consultation with other countries concerned, which step, he said, could not be regarded in the same light as that of Japan which was going to take an independent action against French Indochina. At any rate, he said, he had frankly expressed his point of view in anxiety over the difficulties that stood in the way of American-Japanese relations.

This copy has been forwarded to Washington. Please forward from Washington to Britain, France, Germany and Italy.

/Memorandum regarding the French Indochina problem delivered to Vice-Minister MATSUMIYA by the Councillor of the British Embassy, DC1D, on August 10, 1940 /

Reports have come to the notice of His Majesty's Government that demands have been made upon the Government of Indochina by the Japanese Government. The Japanese Government will recall that on April 26th the Parliamentary Under Secretary expressed to the Japanese Ambassador His Majesty's Government's full agreement with the Japanese Government as to the maintenance of the status quo in the Netherlands East Indies. His Majesty's Government attach similar importance to the maintenance of the status quo of Indochina and other countries in the Far East.

Summary of the conversation between Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and British Ambassador CRAIGIE in Tokyo

(16 September 1940. Second Section of the European and East Asiatic Affairs Bureau)

1. The problem of the arrest of Britishers. Ambassador CRAIGIE after having expressed his desire for the release of the two Britishers, Capt. RAINE and WOOLLEY, who had been arrested about the end of July,
as per annexed paper A, stated that the above-said had been transferred
and were now in the hands of the public procurators, and that, though the
following remark of his was only for the Minister's personal reference,
there was a rumor that the Englishman were observed to be acquitted soon
because theirs was slight offense against the military police. He then
asked the Minister to make efforts to release them.

In this regard, the Minister immediately telephoned to the Justice
Minister for the information thereof and though he received a report a
little later from the Director of the Criminal Affairs Bureau of the
Justice Ministry, he told the Ambassador that he would answer one way or
the other at a later date.

2. The French Inco C-mine Problem. The Ambassador presented an
oral statement as per attached paper B, instead of an oral explanation
and stated that the British Government was very anxious about this
matter. To the above the Minister reasoned that an agreement had
already been reached between Japan and France, the content of which he
will he was not in the position to disclose, that Japan had been going
ahead with everything under the friendly understanding with France, and,
that therefore, there was no reason for a third Power to have anything
to say about it. Ambassador CRAIGIE stated that Britain feared lost
her interests should be damaged and also lest this matter should entail,
for example, Chinese invasion of French Indochina. Whereupon the Minister
stated that it was for the very purpose of preventing such a situation from
arising that Japan desired that a detailed agreement between the authori­
ties on the spot would be speedily concluded. Nevertheless, the French
authorities were only disobedient to the instructions of the mother country and in opposition to the will of the Vichy Government, but
also through the officials of the British, American and Chinkiang Govern­
ments expected aid from those governments and were striving to put off
the solution of the situation as long as possible, that such an attitude
of the French Indochina authorities was aggravating the situation and
also that the Japanese side had not changed in the least the original
desire to solve the question amicably under mutual understanding bet­
 tween the governments of both states. Then, Ambassador CRAIGIE denied the
alleged fact that the third Power officials were striving to postpone
the solution of the situation in conspiracy with the French Indochina
authorities. To this denial the Minister stated that he had grounds to
confirm such facts and further emphasized that he was not of such
temperature as to talk of a non-existent matter as though it existed.
Then the Ambassador hinted at the passing of troops through French
Indochina as being an infringement of the sovereignty of French Indo­
china, the Minister contradicted that there was no such reason; assuming
that an Anglo-Japanese agreement had been reached regarding the passage
of troops through India or Burma, and if some third Power protested it as
violation of British sovereignty, "would this be considered reasonable?"

3. The Bombing of the "Empress of Asia" Incident. The ambassador
presented the annexed paper C, concerning the above incident with the
promise that he was not going to make any protest or representation,
requesting that, as the conditions would possibly give rise to a doubt
that the bombing had been done purposely, he desired to be given some
written document which, describing the situation in detail, would specifically enable him to fully realize that the alleged action had not been done purposely, which request the Minister promised that he would consider.

4. The Hongkong and Burma question. Ambassador CRAIGIE, after a remark that the following was according to the instruction from the home government, stated that the British Government had accepted with forbearance, despite various unfavorable discussions within the country, the agreement concerning the cutting off of the Hongkong and Burma Transport Routes, and he asked the Minister if Japan had lost hope of restoring peace, Japan's endeavor for which was specified in the stipulation of the agreement. Thereupon the Minister reminded the Japanese Government was doing its utmost to restore peace; that the treaty negotiations then in progress with the Nanking Government were solely for that purpose. The Minister continued that it was true that Japan had some hope in regard to CHIANG'S Government too, though he could not tell about the terms for peace and that the Japanese Government of course would strive for peace, the ardent desire of the Japanese people. Then, CRAIGIE asked if the negotiation with the Nanking Government would not become the cause of breaking peace with the Chinkiang Government. The Minister explained some people argued in this way, but he had long been in China and on spot terms with CHIANG KAI-SHEK, and, further, that he was on such terms with CHIANG KAI-SHEK as to have held a six hour consultation with him on one occasion at Nanchang; therefore, he believed there was a possibility.

CRAIGIE then proceeded to ask the Minister if Japan did not wish the mediation of Britain for peace restoration with CHIANG, to which the latter answered that he found no necessity of the British good offices as he knew CHIANG so well, and CHIANG also knew the Minister was a man who would never make unreasonable demands nor use tactics and he had assumed the cost of Foreign Minister recently; he thought that......

Then, Ambassador Craigie asked the Minister if he had any idea as to what should be done with regard to the Hongkong-Burma problem after the expiration of terms of the agreement, after which everything was to be left to the free decision of Britain. The Minister answered to the effect that this question would be left at the disposal of the British Government and that he might at some later date have occasion to talk about it when necessary.

Telegram sent on September 20, Shown 15, 1940, to Ambassador CRAIGIE in England by Foreign Minister MATSUKA

An interview with Ambassador Craigie by the Minister and Vice Minister with regard to the problem about French Indochina and Burma. Coded No. 757

1. Ambassador Craigie called on this Minister on the 16th inst. and requested an answer which would satisfy the British Government re the problem about French Indochina, saying that he could not help feeling as if the Imperial Government, taking advantage of the plight of France
and French Indochina, were trying to sound problems of political and strategic importance upon the various powers which are interested in the Far East, not alone French Indochina and China.

To the above, this minister replied that the third powers should have no cause for complaint as the whole matter is carried on with friendly understandings on the basis of the treaty concluded between the Governments of Japan and France, and confided that it is regrettable to see that the representatives of Britain, U.S.A. and the Chungking Government are delaying the settlement of the issue by instigating the French Indochina authorities against the will of the French Government.

2. Ambassador Craigie in the above interview asked as to the intention of the Imperial Government about one of the stipulations concluded between Japan and Britain in regard to the suspension of traffic via the Burma Route, which clearly states Japan should endeavor to arrange peace with China. This minister answered that the Japanese Government is endeavoring to bring about peace between Japan and China, when questioned further by the ambassador whether Japan desired British mediation to negotiate peace with the Chungking Government, this minister answered that Japan did not so desire.

3. Then, on the 18th inst. Ambassador Craigie called on the Vice-Minister C-inohl saying that after the above-stated interview with this minister he had received a telegram from his government as to its views. Ambassador Craigie said that the demands by Japan upon French Indochina would seem to facilitate an attack upon China from a new direction, and that the demand would be contrary to the spirit of the agreement concerning Burma which stipulated the efforts of Japan to restore peace. When the Vice-Minister asked if this protest meant that Britain would recon the Burma Route, in case Japan should execute her plan upon French Indochina, the ambassador replied that it did not necessarily so mean but was intended to urge Japan to reconsider the affair as it was considered to be contrary to the spirit of our hitherto mutual understandings.

As protests of Britain and U.S.A. against the occupation of Southern French Indochina by the Imperial Forces.

The relations between our Empire and French Indochina had been gradually improved since the conclusion of the MATSUEKA-Hinai Agreement on August 30 Showa 16 (1941) and furthermore it seemed as if the amelioration was spurred by the successes of the economic negotiations between Japan and French Indochina and of the arbitration conference for the dispute between Thailand and French Indochina in regard to their boundary which was held in Tokyo in the Spring of Showa 16 (1941), but the situation is as yet not satisfactory.

On the other hand the then attempted siege of Japan by Britain and the U.S.A. in East Asia was gradually turning into a military cooperation between Britain, U.S.A., the U.S. fleet and the Chungking Governments; moreover, the situation in French Indochina, especially in its southern
area, caused grave anxieties on the part of our Empire. As it would be a serious matter for our Empire if French Indochina should consequently secede from its mother country of Japan in compliance with the siege by Britain and America, it became imperative for the existence and self-protection of our Empire to prevent such a turn and safeguard French Indochina from encroachment by third powers, perfecting the cooperation between Japan and French Indochina.

Therefore the Imperial Government decided to demand of the French Government the co-defense of French Indochina and permission for the stationing of our forces and the use of the naval and air bases in its southern area. Considering that there would be a leak in the secrets, a delay in negotiations or some other obstacle if we held the talk in Tokyo, on July 12th we instructed KATO, the Ambassador to France, to make the proposal at Vichy.

The negotiations were mostly conducted with Vice-Premier Darlan and the official documents were formally exchanged on July 22.

Consequently on the 23rd a detailed agreement on practical matters was concluded between the authorities of Japan and French Indochina at the actual time, and more army and naval forces were sent in French Indochina beginning July 29.

As it was anticipated that the British and American Governments would protest against this issue, we instructed NOJURA, Ambassador to America, to make an offer as our separate paper at the same time as the occupation; while in Tokyo Foreign Minister TOYODA explained the true intention of the Imperial Government to the Ambassadors of Britain and United States separately.

In contradicted a protest presented by Britain at that time, but we simply ignored the arrogant proposal made later by the U.S.A. as to the actions of our occupation forces, and did not reply.
CERTIFICATE

I.D.C. No. ____
I.P.S. No. 772

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, H.Y.BHI Xuee, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 34 pages dated Aug., Sept., 1940, and described as follows: Anglo-American Intervention at time of Imperial advance into northern French Indo-China, a booklet.
I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 27th day of Sept., 1946.

K. H.Y.BHI
Signature of Official
SE.I

Witness: H.O.O. COO
Chief, Archives Section
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, John J. Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above named official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 27th day of Sept., 1946

J.J. CURTIS 2nd Lt.
MC.S

Witness T/4 T.TOGUCHI
Investigator
Official Capacity
Franco-Japanese Accord Concerning the Customs System, Trade and the Forms of Payment Between Japan and Indo-China.

Signed in Tokyo May 6, 1941
Ratifications exchanged in Tokyo July 5, 1941
In Force from the same day.
Promulgated July 9, 1941
(Gazetted July 10, 1941)

Having consulted the councillors of the Privy Council, we ratify and hereby promulgate the Franco-Japanese accord concerning the Customs System, Trade and the Forms of Payment Between Japan and Indo-China, signed and sealed in Tokyo by the Japanese delegate together with the French delegate on May 6, 1941.

The Imperial Seal
July 9, 1941

Prime Minister
Prince FUMIMARO
Foreign Minister
KATSUMO, Yosuke

Treaty #13

Franco-Japanese Accord Concerning the Customs System, Trade and the Forms of Payment Between Japan and Indo-China.

The Japanese Government and the French Government, desiring to obtain a closer economic relation between Japan and Indo-China, to assure the equal development of trade between the two countries, and to facilitate the payment for it, have agreed on the following provisions:

Article 1

All natural products or manufactured goods, produced originally in or coming from one of the two countries, shall receive on their importation into the territories of the other country, most favoured nation treatment on all matters concerning taxes, fees or other assessments, and regulations and formalities pertaining to importation.

All natural products or manufactured goods produced originally in or coming from one of the two countries, shall receive on their exportation to the other country, the treatment accorded to similar goods destined to the most favoured nation for all matters concerning taxes, fees, or other assessments, and the regulations and formalities pertaining to exportation.
Article 2

Without prejudice to the provisions of the preceding article the import duties applicable in Indo-China to the natural products or manufactured goods originally produced in and coming from Japan, shall be those of the lowest tariff.

Furthermore, the natural products or manufactured goods originally produced in or coming from Japan enumerated in Table A attached to the present Accord, shall enjoy, on their importation into Indo-China, the reduced rates on the duties of the lowest tariff or the exemption of duties, listed in that table.

Article 3

Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 1 the natural products or manufactured goods originally produced in or coming from Indo-China, enumerated in Table B attached to the present Accord, shall enjoy, on their importation into Japan, reduced rates on the duties of the national tariff or exemption of the duties listed in that chart.

Article 4

When one of the two countries finds it necessary to raise, for any one of the products enumerated in Table A and B, the customs duties applicable to the date of signature of the present Accord, it shall notify the other party its intention in writing at least two months before putting the new customs duties into effect. In order to indemnify in friendly fashion the disadvantages which may accrue to the other country by this raising of tariff, a conference may be held, at the request of the other party.

No raise in the customs duties applicable to the products enumerated in Tables A and B shall be made before the expiration of one year from the date of enforcement of this present Accord.

Article 5

The advantages prescribed in the preceding articles shall remain as acquired advantages, regardless of any change that may be made in the list of articles or the classification of customs duties.
Article 6

The enjoyment of the tariff advantages prescribed in this Accord is subject to the dual condition of direct shipment and certification of origin.

However, notwithstanding the regulation of direct shipment, the products enumerated in Table A and B attached to this Accord, when transhipped in the ports of Hongkong, Manila, Shanghai, or Canton, shall enjoy the tariff advantages prescribed in the above Charts, under the following conditions:

1) The shipment should receive a through bill of lading from the country of origin to the port of destination.

2) The bill of lading should be endorsed by the consular authorities of the country of destination at the port of transhipment, who will attest that the transhipped merchandise has not undergone at the port of transhipment any transformation or manipulation of this nature as to lose its identity.

3) The transportation between the port of transhipment and the port of destination prescribed in the bill of lading shall be made by Japanese or French vessels.

Article 7

The certificate of origin shall be issued either by the customs authorities of the country of origin, or by qualified organizations of the country of origin which have been approved by the country of destination. In the former case, visas by the consular officials shall be exempted. Shipments by parcel post, ordinary mail, or air-mail shall be exempted from certificate of origin.

When one of the two Governments notifies the other that fraudulent acts were committed in the issuance of the certificate of origin, the Government which received the notification shall immediately begin the investigation of the contravention and communicate the results to the complainant Government, if necessary, take every possible step for preventing the continuance of such fraudulent acts.
Article 8

For the application of ad valorem, duties at the time of importation, the customs declaration should be accompanied by an invoice certified by the consular authorities of the country of destination or by the customs authorities of the country of origin. However, for shipments by parcel post, ordinary mail, or air mail, and also for all shipments the value of which does not exceed one hundred yen or its equivalent piastres, no certified invoices are required. A single deed (mixed document) may be produced in place of a certificate of origin and a certified invoice. This single deed must satisfy the conditions imposed on each of the documents for which it is a substitute.

Article 9

The natural products or manufactured goods originally produced in and coming from one of the two countries shall be exempted, in the territories of the other, from all taxes and fees for transit, transhipment, storage in bonded warehouses, warehouse entry, temporary duty-free importation and re-exportation. They shall receive for all regulations and formalities pertaining to these operations the most-favoured-nation treatment.

Article 10

The natural products or manufactured goods produced originally in and coming from one of the two countries and imported into the territories of the other country shall not be subject to finished product tax, city admittance tax, or consumption tax collected for the account of the state province, towns, villages, or public or private authorities, higher than those which are being levied or may be levied on similar goods produced at home, or if there are no such products, on similar products of the most favoured nation.

The natural products or manufactured goods originally produced in and coming from one of the two countries and imported into the territories of the other for the purpose of being stored in bonded warehouses or of transit, shall not be subjected to any internal tax whatever.
Article 11

The prohibitions or restrictions on the importation or exportation which are being enforced or may be enforced in the territories of one of the two countries for whatever reason it may be, shall be applied to the trade of the other country only in the case where these prohibitions or restrictions are applied to all foreign countries. They shall be applied in such a manner as will not result in any arbitrary discrimination to the detriment of the other country.

Article 12

The engagements stipulated in the preceding article shall not constitute an obstacle to the measures of prohibition or restriction which one or the other of the two countries might be led to take, provided that these prohibitions or restrictions are at the same time applicable to all countries coming under the same conditions and provided that they are justified by any one of the following reasons:

1) Prohibitions or restrictions concerning public security;

2) Prohibitions or restrictions concerning transactions in arms, ammunition, and war materials, or in exceptional circumstances, all other war supplies;

3) Prohibitions or restrictions enacted in order to protect public health or morality, or to insure the protection of animals and plants against disease, vermin and harmful parasites;

4) Prohibitions or restrictions on the exportation of national, artistic, historical, or archaeological property for the purpose of protecting such property;

5) Prohibitions or restrictions which have as their object the protection of foreign products the system established for the country concerning the production, selling, transportation, and consumption of similar home products;

6) Prohibitions or restrictions applied to products which are or may become the objects of state monopolies or monopolies exercised under state control within the country in respect to their production or sale.
Article 13

The two Governments agree that, in all matters concerning commerce, all privileges, favors, or immunities which one of the two countries has accorded or may accord to a third country, shall be extended immediately and without condition to the other country, their intention being that the most-favoured-nation treatment will be assured, in all relations, to the other country.

Article 14

The stipulation of the present Accord concerning the most-favoured-nation treatment shall not be applicable to the following matters:

1) Special advantages which are accorded or may be accorded to Manchuria by Japan;
2) Special advantages based on Customs Union;
3) Special advantages which are accorded or may be accorded to adjoining countries in order to facilitate border trade;
4) Special advantages which are accorded or may be accorded to domestic fishing industry and to fishing industry similar to domestic fishing industry.

Article 15

The competent authorities of the two Governments shall decide upon mutual agreement, each year for the following year the list of the products of Indo-Chinese origin and the quantities thereof to be imported into Japan, and on the other hand, the list of the products of Japanese origin and the quantities thereof to be imported into Indo-China, and also the allotment to be given to Japan for the products which are subject to allotment in their importation into Indo-China.

In the same way they shall decide, by mutual agreement, the conditions of application of the foregoing provisions.

Article 16

The Japanese Government shall permit the importation into Japan of the products of Indo-China origin prescribed in Article 15 in the quantities agreed upon in accordance with the same Article.
The French Government shall permit the exportation of the said products to Japan.

The two Governments shall consider favourably the importation into Japan and the exportation from Indo-China of the products of Indo-Chinese origin prescribed in Article 15 in quantities exceeding the agreed quantities, and also the importation into Japan and exportation from Indo-China of the products of Indo-Chinese origin other than those prescribed in Article 15.

Article 17

The French Government shall permit the importation into Indo-China of the products of Japanese origin prescribed in Article 15 in the quantities agreed upon in accordance with the said Article.

The Japanese Government shall permit the exportation of the said products to Indo-China.

In case the system of allotment of imports into Indo-China is extended during the course of the year to products other than those which are subject to this system of allotment at the time of the grant of the allotted quantities prescribed by Article 15, the allotment granted to Japan for these products shall be, fixed by mutual agreement between the competent authorities of the two Governments.

In case the total allotment of the products subject to the system of allotment for importation into Indo-China is increased during the course of the year, the French Government shall consider favourably the grant to Japan of additional allotments.

In the same way, the two Governments shall consider favourably the importation into Indo-China and the exportation from Japan of the products of Japanese origin prescribed in Article 15 in quantities exceeding the agreed quantities, and also the importation into Indo-China and the exportation from Japan of the products of Japanese origin other than those prescribed in Article 15.

Article 18

The place of origin of the products shall be evidenced by the presentation of the certificate of origin drawn up in accordance with Article 7 of the present Accord.
Article 19

The competent authoritative officials of the two Governments shall communicate to each other every month a list of the import licenses issued by each of the two countries for the products originating and coming from the other and also statistics of imports and exports between the two countries.

Article 20

With the exception of the products for which exceptions have been specially agreed upon between the two Governments, the amounts due to creditors in Indo-China in payment for the imports into Japan of the products of Indo-Chinese origin shall be paid in Indo-Chinese piastres, and the amounts due to creditors in Japan in payment for the imports into Indo-China of the products of Japanese origin shall be paid in Japanese yen.

The provisions of the preceding article shall be applied to the payment of freight, insurance and various other charges connected with the trade between Japan and Indo-China.

The Japanese yen and Indo-Chinese piastres prescribed in the two preceding articles shall be acquirable respectively at the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Banque de l'Indochine.

Article 21

The Banque de l'Indochine shall place at the disposal of the Yokohama Specie Bank, as the counterpart of their equivalent in yen, Indo-Chinese piastres necessary for the payments prescribed in the preceding article.

The Yokohama Specie Bank shall place at the disposal of the Banque de l'Indochine, as the counterpart of their equivalent in Indo-Chinese piastres, yen necessary for the payments prescribed in the preceding article.

The exchange rate between the yen and piastres to be applied to the operations prescribed in the present article shall be determined by mutual agreement between the two Banks on the basis of the gold value of the two monies, such as result from the quotations by the said Banks for these monies in the same foreign money convertible into gold.

Article 22

The yen acquired by the Banque de l'Indochine in accordance with the provisions of the preceding article, shall be paid into two special yen accounts, which will be opened in the books of the Yokohama Specie Bank in the name of the Banque de l'Indochine; these accounts shall be designated in the present Accord under the names of account A and account B.
To the credit of Account A shall be carried the yen acquired by the Banque de l'Indochine as the counterpart of the piastres placed by it at the disposal of the Yokohama Specie Bank for the payments made by application of the present Accord, with the exception of those prescribed in the following paragraph.

To the credit of Account B shall be carried the total in 1941, 70% in 1942, and 55% in 1943 of the yen acquired by the Banque de l'Indochine as a counterpart of the piastres placed by it at the disposal of the Yokohama Specie Bank for the payment of the white rice purchases made by Japan in Indo-China. Account B shall bear interest at the rate to be fixed by mutual agreement between the two Banks.

The Piastres acquired by the Yokohama Specie Bank in accordance with the provisions of the preceding article shall be paid into a special Piastre account to be opened on the books of the Banque de l'Indochine in the name of the Yokohama Specie Bank; this account is designated in the present Accord under the name of Account C.

The Piastres and Yen respectively possessed by the Yokohama Specie Bank by the Banque de l'Indochine at the time of the enforcement of the present Accord shall be carried to credit of Accounts A and C.

Article 23

The funds in Accounts A and C shall be appropriated exclusively to the following:

1. The payment of the products traded between Japan and Indo-China.

2. The payment of freight, insurance and other incidental charges related to this trade.

The funds in Account B shall not be used directly for any payment. The sums which will have been carried to the credit of this account in the course of one month shall be transferred to Account A at the end of the corresponding month of the following year.

Article 24

Accounts A and B shall be settled at the end of each month after affecting the operation of transfer prescribed in the preceding article. When a comparison of the two accounts shows in favor of one of the Banks a credit balance in excess of 5,000,000 yen or its equivalent in piastres, the amount in excess of the 5,000,000 yen or its equivalent in piastres shall be paid, upon demand by the creditor Bank, in gold or foreign currencies convertible into gold.

However, if a credit balance exists in favor of the Yokohama Specie Bank, the payment prescribed in the preceding paragraph shall be made only for that part of the balance, evaluated in yen, which exceeds the balance
of "account B as of the same date after the addition of 5,000,000 yen.

Article 25

On the expiration of the present Accord, Accounts A and C shall be settled and offset against each other.

If the credit balance resulting from the offsetting of Accounts A and C is in favour of the Banque de l'Indochine, it shall, in the absence of a contrary convention previously arranged between the two Governments be immediately paid in gold or in foreign currencies convertible into gold; Account B shall be paid in gold or in foreign currencies convertible into gold, in twelve monthly instalments, the first payment of which shall be made on the last day of the month following the expiration of the Accord.

If the credit balance resulting from the offsetting of Accounts A and C is in favour of the Yokohama Specie Bank, it shall be offset against the balance of Account B. If the credit balance resulting from this second offsetting is in favor of the Yokohama Specie Bank, it shall, in the absence of a contrary convention previously arranged between the two Governments, be immediately paid in gold or in foreign currencies convertible into gold. If the balance is in favor of the Banque de l'Indochine, it shall be paid in gold or in foreign currencies convertible into gold, in twelve monthly instalments, the first payment of which shall be made on the last day of the month following the expiration of the Accord.

Article 26

In case of an alteration of the gold value of yen or of piastres as fixed in Article 21, a revaluation of the balances of Accounts A, B, and C shall be made, by mutual agreement, on the basis of the new gold value of the two monies.

Article 27

The Yokohama Specie Bank and the Banque de l'Indochine shall decide between themselves the technical methods necessary for the enforcement of the present Accord.

Article 28

In the application of the present Accord, the following terms shall be understood:

1) The terms "the two countries", "each of the two countries" shall be understood as Japan and Indo-China; the terms "either of the two countries", "the other country" shall be understood as Japan or Indo-China.

2) The term "State", when applied to France, shall be understood as the French Government, or the Government-General of Indo-China.
3.) The terms "the products of domestic production," "domestic products," when applied to Indo-China, shall be understood as products of Indo-Chinese origin.

Article 29

The provisions of the present Accord shall be applicable to all the territories or possessions belonging to or under the jurisdiction of Japan and in all the territories constituting the Government-General of Indo-China.

However, the provisions of articles 15 to 27 shall not be applicable in the Kwantung Leased Territory.

Article 30

If during the duration of the present Accord, one of the two Governments finds it impossible to perform any of the provisions owing to unforeseen incidents, the two Governments shall enter into a negotiation for the solution of the difficulties thus arisen.

Article 31

The present Accord shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Tokyo as soon as possible. However, the French Government, in case of unavoidable circumstances, may substitute for this instrument a written notice of ratification, in which case the French Government shall forward to the Japanese Government the instrument of ratification as soon as possible.

The present Accord shall come into force from the day of exchange of the instruments of ratification and shall be effective until December 31, 1943. It shall be extended by tacit renewal year by year unless one of the two Governments notifies the other six months before the expiration of the accord of its intention of ending the accord.

The present Accord replaces the commercial agreement dated May 17, 1932 entered into between Japan and France, which temporarily fixes the provisions of trade between Japan and Indo-China, and the documents attached thereto.

In witness thereof, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed and sealed the present Accord.

Drawn up in Japanese and French, in Tokyo, on the 6th of May, in the 16th year of Shōwa corresponding to May 6, 1941.

/s/ Yosuke IeTSUoka
/s/ Jun TSUMiya
/s/ Charles Arsene Henry
/s/ Rene Robin
### TABLE A

Japanese products which on their importation into Indo-China enjoy the advantages of reduction or exemption of customs duties prescribed in Article 2 and also the advantages of fixed tariff in accordance with the conditions prescribed in Article 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of the Tariff of Indo-China</th>
<th>The Name of Merchandise</th>
<th>The Reduction Rate of the Customs Duties of the Unit of Lowest Tariff</th>
<th>Applicable Levy</th>
<th>Tariff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ex. 17-Ex. 17:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ham</td>
<td>ad valorem</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Canned meat</td>
<td></td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Cocoon, silk for spinning</td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>duty-free</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Silk refuse</td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>duty-free</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 35, 5</td>
<td>Milk, cream, condensed milk, and powdered milk</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Cheese</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Butter, fresh or melted</td>
<td>35.33%</td>
<td>5.66%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Salted</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45A and B</td>
<td>Honey</td>
<td></td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Fresh, (refrigerated or frozen) Fish</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Dried, salted or smoked fish</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Fish conserved naturally, pickled or processed by other methods</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49(1 to 3)</td>
<td>Oysters</td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>duty-free</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49(4 to 6)</td>
<td>Shells, fresh or kept in a fresh condition</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Molluscs, conserved naturally or processed, dried shrimps, dried tropang and dried shark fin</td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>duty-free</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Sea mussels and other molluscs in shells or dried</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of the Tariff</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Reduction Rate of the Customs Duties of the Unit of Merchandise</td>
<td>Applicable Tariff</td>
<td></td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Pearls</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>Fancy biscuits or high grade biscuits without sugar</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>Kneaded noodles and Italian noodles</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the so-called Chinese noodles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>80-80.2</td>
<td>Dried vegetables and powder of dried vegetables</td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>duty-fr</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>Irish Potatoes</td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>duty-fr</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84A and B</td>
<td>Fresh table fruits and other kinds of fruits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1 to 5)</td>
<td>Citrus fruits</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>Almonds</td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>duty-fr</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7 and 8)</td>
<td>Pineapples and bananas</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>Cherries</td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>duty-fr</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>Dates</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11 and 12)</td>
<td>Figs and strawberries</td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>duty-fr</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(13 to 18)</td>
<td>Persimmons, loquats, mangosteens, mangos, betel nuts and coconuts</td>
<td>lowest</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(19 to 22)</td>
<td>Peaches, apricots, apples, pears, plums and grapes</td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>duty-fr</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>Other kinds of fresh table fruits not specified above</td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>duty-fr</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>Dried or crushed and dried table or other kinds of fruits</td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>86A, 3 and C</td>
<td>Pickled or conserved table or other kinds of fruits</td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93,2</td>
<td>Confectionaries, bonbons, etc.</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of the Tariff of Indo-China</td>
<td>The Name of Merchandise</td>
<td>The Reduction Rate of the Customs Value of the Unit of Sale</td>
<td>Applicable Tariff</td>
<td></td>
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<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>Sugared biscuits</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>Jams, jelly, marmalade, etc. containing sugar or honey</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15%</td>
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<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>Brick, bar or other forms of chocolate</td>
<td></td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98.2</td>
<td>Confectionaries containing cocoa, cocoa butter or chocolate</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>30%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td>Tobacco, tobacco leaves</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>Manufactured tobacco</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110-110.2</td>
<td>Fat oils: pure, boiled, oxidised or perfumed</td>
<td></td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111,2 (I)</td>
<td>Flible vegetable oils</td>
<td></td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111,3</td>
<td>Sulphurated oil</td>
<td></td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112 (1-2)</td>
<td>Benzine or essences</td>
<td></td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112 (3 to 6)</td>
<td>Rose, geranium-rosa and ylang-ylang</td>
<td></td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Citron, orange, bergamot, mandarin, citronella, eucalyptus, camphor</td>
<td></td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>112 (7)</td>
<td>Peppermint and saffrol oil, de-turpentinied oil</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112 (9)</td>
<td>Menthol crystals</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>112 (10 to 12)</td>
<td>Thymol, Santalol, anethol</td>
<td></td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112 (13)</td>
<td>Saffrol</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112 (14)</td>
<td>Resinoides, saffrol, isafrol, turpentinied carbide</td>
<td></td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112,2</td>
<td>Artificial arom, vanilla and its derivation or substites</td>
<td></td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>Vegetable wax</td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>duty-free</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114</td>
<td>Vegetable tar</td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>duty-free</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>Camphor</td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>duty-free</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126(1)</td>
<td>The roots of ginseng</td>
<td></td>
<td>50%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126(2)</td>
<td>Roots other than those of ginseng</td>
<td></td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Exempted values are duty-free.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Unit of Measure</th>
<th>Lowest Tariff</th>
<th>Levv</th>
<th>Rate of Reduction</th>
<th>Applicable Customs Duties of the Unit of Ability</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>187,2</td>
<td>Vermifuge chrysanthemum (rinds, flowers, leaves, stems, and roots)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>duty-free</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>188,0-10</td>
<td>Vegetables, fresh, salted, pickled, conserved or dried</td>
<td></td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td>duty-free</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>170,2(1)</td>
<td>Edible seeds etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>duty-free</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170,2(2)</td>
<td>Vegetable products or refuse not mentioned here</td>
<td></td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>duty-free</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>172,3</td>
<td>Beer</td>
<td></td>
<td>Reserved (Note 1)</td>
<td>duty-free</td>
<td>Reserved (Note 1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>173,2</td>
<td>Japanese liquor</td>
<td></td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>duty-free</td>
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<tr>
<td>174,4</td>
<td>Natural mineral water</td>
<td></td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>duty-free</td>
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<tr>
<td>185</td>
<td>Cement, white others</td>
<td></td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>duty-free</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>lowest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189</td>
<td>Sulphur</td>
<td></td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>duty-free</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>190</td>
<td>Coal</td>
<td></td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>duty-free</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>205a</td>
<td>Ordinary pig iron for casting</td>
<td></td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>6%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>205b</td>
<td>Hematite pig iron (phosphorus not exceeding 0.15%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>205e-205</td>
<td>Steel pig iron, ferro-alloy, and iron or steel ingots</td>
<td></td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>6%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>207</td>
<td>Iron or steel rolled into bars, blooms or billets</td>
<td></td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>207,2</td>
<td>Iron or steel rolled into bars less than 3 millimetres</td>
<td></td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>207,3-5</td>
<td>Tempered steel for implements, special steel and bars or smelted special steel</td>
<td></td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>6%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>203</td>
<td>Iron or steel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>209-209, 23</td>
<td>Scrap iron or hoop steel rolled by heating or cooling</td>
<td></td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>6%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item Number</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Lowest Rate</td>
<td>Duty-Free</td>
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<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210-212</td>
<td>Thin plates of iron or steel, broad iron plates, tin plated, copper plated, lead plated or zinc plated iron and iron or copper wires</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Duty-Free</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212, 2-217</td>
<td>Iron or steel waste, rails, wheels and axles</td>
<td>Duty-Free</td>
<td>Duty-Free</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>011-012</td>
<td>Potassium nitrate, natural or transformed</td>
<td>Duty-Free</td>
<td>Duty-Free</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>045, 046</td>
<td>Hydrochloric acid, ordinary or commercially pure</td>
<td>Duty-Free</td>
<td>Duty-Free</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>048</td>
<td>Blood-lead powder</td>
<td>Duty-Free</td>
<td>Duty-Free</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>052, 2</td>
<td>Red phosphorus</td>
<td>Duty-Free</td>
<td>Duty-Free</td>
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<tr>
<td>073</td>
<td>Sulphuric acid</td>
<td>Duty-Free</td>
<td>Duty-Free</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>076</td>
<td>Sodium bisulphite</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>081</td>
<td>Sodium sulphide</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>087</td>
<td>Aluminium sulphate</td>
<td>Duty-Free</td>
<td>Duty-Free</td>
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<tr>
<td>0110</td>
<td>Antimony chloride</td>
<td>Duty-Free</td>
<td>Duty-Free</td>
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<tr>
<td>0114</td>
<td>Potassium thallium and potassium thallous chloride</td>
<td>Duty-Free</td>
<td>Duty-Free</td>
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<tr>
<td>0115, 2</td>
<td>Chromium trioxide</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>0123</td>
<td>Copper sulphate</td>
<td>Duty-Free</td>
<td>Duty-Free</td>
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<tr>
<td>0124 and 0131</td>
<td>Copper sulphate of iron and sulphate of iron</td>
<td>Duty-Free</td>
<td>Duty-Free</td>
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<tr>
<td>0163, 0165</td>
<td>Bicarbonate or soda</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>0166</td>
<td>Sodium sulphate</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>0175</td>
<td>Zinc oxide</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>9%</td>
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<td>0173</td>
<td>Lithopone</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>0180, 0181</td>
<td>Asphodelene, (1) coarse</td>
<td>Duty-Free</td>
<td>Duty-Free</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Powder, lump or plate</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of the Tariff of Indo-China</td>
<td>The name of the merchandise</td>
<td>The Reduction Rate of the Customs Duties of the Unit of able</td>
<td>Lowest Tariff</td>
<td>LevY Tariff</td>
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<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0300</td>
<td>Acetone</td>
<td>40%</td>
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<tr>
<td>0379</td>
<td>Phosphatic manure</td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td></td>
<td>duty-free</td>
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<tr>
<td>0380</td>
<td>Nitro-lime</td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td></td>
<td>duty-free</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>0381.5</td>
<td>Insecticides made from materials other than copper</td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td></td>
<td>duty-free</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>01 to 0392</td>
<td>Chemical products not mentioned above</td>
<td>lowest</td>
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<tr>
<td>0394.5</td>
<td>Dyes made from coal-tar</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>298</td>
<td>Varnish and other similar paints</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>298.3</td>
<td>Liquid polish for metals</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>299</td>
<td>Ink for writing or drafting</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td></td>
<td>10%</td>
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<tr>
<td>299.2</td>
<td>Printing Ink</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1-2)</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>Coloured ink which contains more than 3% of pigments obtained from coal-tar</td>
<td>system of the concern pigment</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(4-5)</td>
<td>Other coloured ink</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
<td>Black cosmetics</td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>duty-free</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301</td>
<td>Pencils, pencil lead, and pastels</td>
<td>60%</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>208</td>
<td>Cosmetics, knapped with oil</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>208.2-3</td>
<td>Colours</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td>lowest</td>
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<tr>
<td>310</td>
<td>Cosmetics not mentioned here</td>
<td>lowest</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>311</td>
<td>Perfumes</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td>lowest</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>312.2</td>
<td>Soap other than perfumed soap</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td></td>
<td>24.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>314</td>
<td>Seasonings</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td>lowest</td>
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<tr>
<td>316</td>
<td>Compound medicine not mentioned here</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Number of the Tariff</td>
<td>Description of Merchandise</td>
<td>The Reduction Rate of the Customs Duties of the Unit of Levy</td>
<td>Applicable Tariff</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td>All kinds of candles</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15% lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130(147)</td>
<td>Wax, cream, paint or paste for shoes</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15% lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>331-332</td>
<td>Fireproof bricks and other fireproof products</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>15% lowest lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>336-337</td>
<td>Other pottery made of ordinary clay</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>15% lowest lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>338-341</td>
<td>Pottery made of grit</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>9% lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>341,2</td>
<td>Ceramics or grit pottery for sanitary use</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15% lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>342</td>
<td>Tiles</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>10% lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>343-344</td>
<td>Ceramics made of ordinary potter’s clay or of clay containing tin</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>10% lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>345-346,3</td>
<td>High-grade ceramics and majolica ceramics, high-grade clay potteries, earthenwares and imitation porcelains</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>10% lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>347,4</td>
<td>Porcelain, tea and coffee sets of porcelain, porcelain wares</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>10% lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>347,2</td>
<td>Electrical wares made of pottery, porcelain, grit pottery or glass</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>10% lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>348</td>
<td>Plate glass</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15% lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>348,2-5</td>
<td>Frosted glass, opaque glass, coloured glass, etc.</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15% lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>349,6</td>
<td>Mirrors</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15% lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>349-349,4</td>
<td>Cast rough glass</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15% lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>350</td>
<td>Glassware</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15% lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>351</td>
<td>Window glass</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>15% lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>351,2-4</td>
<td>Stained glass, triplex glass and safety glass</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>15% lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>352-354</td>
<td>Glass for clocks and watches</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>15% lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>355-356</td>
<td>Glass for spectacles</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>15% lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of the Tariff</td>
<td>The Name of Merchandise</td>
<td>The Reduction Rate of the Customs Duties of the Unit of the Lowest Tariff Applicable to the Tariff Levy of Indo-China</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>357</td>
<td>Optical glass</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>358</td>
<td>Small glass articles</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>359-359, 2 to 5</td>
<td>Bottles</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>359, 6</td>
<td>Vacuum flasks and other vessels for keeping water hot</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>361</td>
<td>Incandescent electric bulbs</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>361, 2</td>
<td>Other electric implements (i.e., vacuum tubes)</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>361, 3</td>
<td>Dry plate for photography</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>360-373</td>
<td>Pure or mixed cotton yarns</td>
<td>Yarns not arranged for retail sale arranged for retail sale or for embroidery</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>372-375</td>
<td>Pure or mixed woolen yarns</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>379, 380, 381</td>
<td>Silk or spun silk yarns, refuse of silk threads</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>381, 2</td>
<td>Rayon yarns, refuse rayon and fibre</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>385-385, 2</td>
<td>Oil cloth and linoleum</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>404-406, 3</td>
<td>Pure cotton cloth (raw, refined, bleached, dyed or mercerized, plain, twilled or drilled fabrics, fabrics for bandage, and rubber cloth</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>407(1-4)</td>
<td>Printed cotton handkerchiefs, comforters, mufflers, scarfs and sheets</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>407(5-7) to 410, 2</td>
<td>Pure cotton cloth (printed, plain, twilled or drilled fabrics - coloured lining cloth for binding books-coloured cloth-velvet-tulle)</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Case Tariff of India-China</td>
<td>The Name of Merchandise</td>
<td>The Reduction Rate of the Customs Duties of the Unit of able Lowest Tariff</td>
<td>Levv Tariff</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>411A-E</td>
<td>Pure or mixed plain, twilled or drilied cotton cloth woven with bleached, dyed or mercerized yarns</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>411F-J</td>
<td>Pure or mixed figured cotton satin or figured cotton textures woven with bleached, dyed or mercerized yarns</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>411,2 to 418</td>
<td>Pure cotton cloth (crepe for sanitary use, figured satin, or figured texture (curled texture) wanaori or texture woven in Jacquard style, pique or pique blankets-damask, tulle bobbinote-blankets</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>419A-D</td>
<td>Cotton hosiery</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>420</td>
<td>Machine knitted cotton lace</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>420,2</td>
<td>Handmade cotton lace</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>420,3,421,2</td>
<td>Pure cotton texture (Braided to 422(1-22) texture-ribbons, ribbons dyed with ink or dyes, plain tulle</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>422(23) to 426</td>
<td>Pure cotton texture (embroidered tulle, woven embroideries, interlaced weavings-curtains, of muslin or fancy tulle, embroidered curtains, embroidered muslin</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>427-431</td>
<td>Pure cotton (without special tariff) wick for lamps and braided wick for candles-incan-descent mantel soko of twisted thread for textile use oilcloth</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>432-433 (1 to 3)</td>
<td>Mixed woven cotton cloth in which cotton weighs the heaviest (velvet, plush and semiskin) textures excepting crepe for sanitary use</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>433(2)</td>
<td>Mixed woven cotton (crepe for sanitary use)</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of the Tariff of Indo-China</td>
<td>The Name of Merchandize</td>
<td>The Reduction of the Customs Duties of the Unit of Levy Tariff</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>434</td>
<td>mixed woven ribbons in which cotton weighs the greater part</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) mixed with silk, spun silk or rayon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>435</td>
<td>mixed braided cotton in which cotton weighs the heaviest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) mixed with silk, spun silk or rayon</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Others 28%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>436</td>
<td>other mixed cotton cloth in which cotton weighs the heaviest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>437</td>
<td>fishing net</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>438-441,3</td>
<td>pure woolen cloth, woolen cloth, padding, muslin, dyed plain wool</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>442-443</td>
<td>pure woolen cloth (carpets)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>444-447</td>
<td>pure woolen cloth (hosiery)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>448-449</td>
<td>pure woolen cloth (braided wool, ribbons, berets, Turkish hats, tapestries and Shawls)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>448-449</td>
<td>pure woolen lace and net lace</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>450-451</td>
<td>woolen nets and blankets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>452</td>
<td>woolen slippers with trimmings and the so-called Strausburg slippers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>453</td>
<td>frills of woolen texture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>452</td>
<td>woolen velvets for upholstery, mixed woolen cloth (Berry, Sarge)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Exempted: Duty-free
- 15%: Duty at 15% of the lowest rate
- 21%: Duty at 21% of the lowest rate
- Tax number 45: 15% according to species
- Tax number 482: 2 according to its kind
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>The Name of Merchandise</th>
<th>Lowest Tariff</th>
<th>Low Tariff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>54(10)</td>
<td>Mixed woolen carpets</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54(11)</td>
<td>Mixed woolen hosiery</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54(12)</td>
<td>Mixed woolen texture (crepe for sanitary use)</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>tax of pure woolen texture according to its kind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54(13)</td>
<td>Other mixed woolen textures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59A</td>
<td>Special silk cloth of Asia</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59B</td>
<td>Pure or mixed silk or spun silk without metallic admixture in which silk weighs the heaviest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-6)</td>
<td>Crepe (figured or unprinted)</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-11</td>
<td>braided thread, plain serge</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-15, 17</td>
<td>Velvet and plush (not figured)</td>
<td>38.75%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3, 28-29</td>
<td>Net cloth (not figured), plain, gauze, thick cloth (unrefined)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Thick texture, light silk and other kind of texture not mentioned here weighing over 100 grams per 100 square metres (refined, bleached or dyed)</td>
<td>42.86%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7, 12, 16,</td>
<td>Crepe (figured or printed) velvet</td>
<td>46.56%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19, 22, 26</td>
<td>or plush (figured) net cloth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>(figured or printed) heavy texture weighing over 100 grams per 100 square metres (figured and unrefined) below 100 grams (figured or printed)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Thick texture foulard, etc. weighing over 100 grams per 100 square metres (figured and refined, bleached, dyed or printed)</td>
<td>46.56%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20, 21</td>
<td>Lace</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>Waste of pure or mixed silk</td>
<td></td>
<td>system of spun silk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of the Tariff of Indo-China</td>
<td>Number of Merchandise</td>
<td>The Lowest Tariff</td>
<td>Levy Tariff</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>459, B, 31, B2, F</td>
<td>Pure or mixed silk, spun silk, waste of spun silk, rayon texture with metallic admixture</td>
<td>10% added to tax of the texture heaviest in weight (Note 2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>459, C</td>
<td>Pure or mixed rayon in which rayon weighs the heaviest without metallic admixture</td>
<td>not 10 francs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>459, A1, B2, I, J, K</td>
<td>Silk, spun silk, rayon mixed with other fibres (wool, horsehair, animal hair, cotton, etc.) and in which the mixed fibres weigh the heaviest and without metallic admixture</td>
<td>45% ad valorem</td>
<td>70.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>459, A4</td>
<td>Silk, spun silk or rayon carpets or gauze carpet</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>70.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>459, P</td>
<td>Lozirory</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>70.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>460-460, 6</td>
<td>Garments and other ready made articles</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>461</td>
<td>Paper (excepting 461, 0)</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>461, 02</td>
<td>Fascia made paper weighing over 35 grams per 1 square metre</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>461, 3</td>
<td>Special paper called chemical paper</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>461, 4A-B</td>
<td>Paper for photographing and films</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>462a</td>
<td>Rough cardboard and glossy paper called &quot;press pan&quot;</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>462, 8</td>
<td>So-called &quot;Fancy board&quot;</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>462, C, 462, 2</td>
<td>Processed cardboard and artificial felt, cardboard cut in sizes</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>463, 12</td>
<td>Cut or processed cardboard</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>463, 1</td>
<td>Valucnized fibre</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>464</td>
<td>Cardboard boxes</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of the tariff of Indo-China</td>
<td>The Name of Merchandise</td>
<td>The Reduction rate of the Custom duties of the Unit of able Applicable Tariff</td>
<td>Levy Tariff</td>
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<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>464,2</td>
<td>Bobbins and tubes of cardboard</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>464,3</td>
<td>Superior cardboard products, boxes and others</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>465-465,2</td>
<td>Type or lacquered cardboard or fibre products</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>465,3</td>
<td>Cardboard or fibre products ornamented with pictures or damascene</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>465,4</td>
<td>Mounts for photographs</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>465,5</td>
<td>Notebooks, memorandum books, small pocketbooks, account books</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>466,466-2</td>
<td>Books</td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>duty-free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>468</td>
<td>Newspapers, periodicals, old newspapers</td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>duty-free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>469</td>
<td>Colour prints, semi-coloured photo prints, lithographs</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>469,2(1)</td>
<td>Photographs of artistic or record keeping value</td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>duty-free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>469,2(2)</td>
<td>Other photographs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>469,3</td>
<td>Photograph type-founding and other similar articles</td>
<td></td>
<td>system of lithograph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>469,4</td>
<td>Films for motion pictures</td>
<td></td>
<td>lowest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>469,5</td>
<td>Transcribed pictures and printed matter</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>469,6</td>
<td>Post cards</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>470</td>
<td>All kinds of printed matter specified above</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>481-483</td>
<td>Footwear made of leather, cloth, etc.</td>
<td>Products of morocco leather</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>491,2-3</td>
<td>Albums and album covers</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Lower Tariff</td>
<td>Levy Tariff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Bags, satchels, handbags, etc.</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.92</td>
<td>Leather belts</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.92.5</td>
<td>Leather products not mentioned</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>Small clocks</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>Gauges for rotations, electricity, water, gas, etc., electric gauge</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>Large clocks, besides gauges</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td>lowest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>Machinery</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td>lowest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>Wash basins made of moulded iron</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.58D</td>
<td>Enamel wash basins of thin steel plate</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>Lamps and tin products</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>Batteries</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.57-579.2</td>
<td>Metalwares not mentioned above</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td>lowest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>Gunpowder</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.94</td>
<td>Dynamite</td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>duty-free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.852</td>
<td>Detonators for mines</td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>duty-free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.38</td>
<td>Fuse for mines</td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>duty-free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.93, B</td>
<td>Wooden boxes for coffee packing, &amp;c.</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.92-605</td>
<td>Musical instruments excepting gramophones</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td>lowest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60. (52-56)</td>
<td>Gramophones and similar articles</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.09</td>
<td>Fancy cutlery</td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>duty-free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.14</td>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>duty-free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.14(2)</td>
<td>Bicycles, autocycles, tricycles</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.14(2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.17</td>
<td>Accessories and parts of bicycles</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td>lowest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of the Tariff</td>
<td>The Name of Merchandise</td>
<td>Applicable Duties of the Unit of Ability</td>
<td>Levy Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>614, 3</td>
<td>Automobiles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-11, 13-16</td>
<td>Chassis for buses and sightseeing cars. Trucks with equipment for gas generation</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-5, 6-11, 12, 13-16</td>
<td>Motor cars for riding, trucks excepting those with gas generating equipment</td>
<td>20%; 40%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The import duty on beer shall be fixed by mutual agreement in case a quota is granted to foreign countries.

**Note (2)** For the application of the provisions of Tables 459D to 459F and Note 2 of Table 8 of the customs tariff of Indo-China, the duty applicable to rayon cloth is fixed at 70.27 ad valorem after making 46 per cent reduction on the duty of the lowest tariff.

**Note (3)** The enjoyment of the benefit of a specific duty of ten francs per kilogram net is permitted under the conditions that the control of the price of rayon cloth, established according to the methods fixed by the competent authorities of the two Governments, shall assure between the import price of rayon cloth and the import price of rayon yarns a difference which corresponds to the manufacturing costs of the handicraft of Indo-China less the above duties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Lowest Tariff</th>
<th>Levy Tariff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>556-40</td>
<td>Fountain pens, sharp pencils</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Spectacles</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>811-2</td>
<td>Fines, pipes made from materials other than ivory, mother of pearl, tortoiseshell, amber and ambroid</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>812</td>
<td>Pipes, pipes for cigars, etc.</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>844(4-8)</td>
<td>High-grade brushes</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>844(1-3)</td>
<td>Ordinary brushes, writing</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>844</td>
<td>Brushes and other brush products</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>845(1-13)</td>
<td>China or porcelain buttons</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>845</td>
<td>Ordinary metal buttons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>845(1-36)</td>
<td>Buttons made of pressed cardboard, wood, ivory or hemp palm</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>846-646(2)</td>
<td>Recreation implements and parts</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>846</td>
<td>Intestinal or artificial intestinal strings, treads and plaited cord</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>848</td>
<td>Lighters</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>552</td>
<td>Umbrellas, parasols, etc.</td>
<td>lowest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>560</td>
<td>Glass stoppers</td>
<td>Exempted</td>
<td>duty-free</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I have the honour to submit to Your Excellency the following proposals in view of the necessity of setting up a new method of settlement of payments concerning the territories of East Asia.

(1) The "special yen" only shall be used for settlements to be effected between Indo-China on the one hand and Japan, the territories occupied by Japan and all the regions in which the system of settlements in yen is in force, on the other hand.

(2) French Indo-China shall supply against special yen the piastres which Japan needs for payments to be made in Indo-China.

(3) The payments indicated in the preceding clause include commercial payments, the expenses of maintaining the Japanese forces in Indo-China and all other non-commercial payments.

(4) For the operations outlined above, the rate of exchange between the yen and the piastre shall be that of 1 January 1943. Contingent variations in this rate shall be regulated by agreement between competent Japanese and French authorities.

(5) The provisions of the Franco-Japanese Agreement of 6 May 1941 applying to the customs system, to commercial exchanges and their methods of settlement between Indo-China and Japan which are at variance with those of the present exchange of letters are replaced by the latter.

(6) The details relative to the application of the present exchange of letters are fixed elsewhere.

(7) The provisions of the present exchange of letters come into force on 1 January 1943. The two governments will come to an arrangement about the date on which they will cease to have effect.
I shall be glad to get Your Excellency's agreement to the above-mentioned points and beg you to accept, Monsieur le President, the renewed assurances of my highest esteem.

Takenobu Miteni
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan

To His Excellency,
Monsieur Pierre Laval
Vice President of the French Government
Minister, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Vichy, 20 January 1943

My dear Ambassador,

By letter of today's date, Your Excellency has been good enough to inform me as follows:

"In view of the necessity of setting up a new method of settlement of payments concerning the territories of Great East Asia

(1) The "special yen" shall be used for settlements to be effected between Indo-China on the one hand, and Japan, the territories occupied by Japan, and all the regions in which the system of settlements in yen is in force, on the other.

(2) French Indo-China shall supply against special yen, the piastres which Japan needs for payments to be made in Indo-China.

(3) The payments indicated in the preceding clause include commercial payments, the expenses of maintaining the Japanese forces and all other non-commercial payments.

(4) For the operations outlined above the rate of exchange between the yen and the piastre shall be that of 1 January 1943. Continent variations in this rate shall be regulated by agreement between competent Japanese and French authorities.

(5) The provisions of the Franco-Japanese Agreement of 6 May 1941, applying to the Customs system, to commercial exchanges and their methods of settlement between Indo-China and Japan, which are not verified with those of the present exchange of letters are replaced by the letter.

(6) The details relative to the application of the present exchange of letters are fixed elsewhere.

(7) The provisions of the present exchange of letters come into force on 1 January 1943. The two governments will come to an arrangement about the date on which they will
cease to have effect.

I shall be glad to get Your Excellency's agreement to the above-mentioned points and remain

Yours etc.

I have the honour to acknowledge to Your Excellency, receipt of this communication and to inform you that it meets with the assent of the French Government.

I remain,

Yours, etc.

Pierre Level

Head of the French Government, Minister Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

To His Excellency,
Mr. Takeo Miki
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan

Method of Application of the details in the exchange of official letters dated 20 January 1943

At the moment of proceeding to the exchange of letters concerning the methods of settlement between Japan and French Indo-China, His Excellency Mr. Takeo Miki, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan and Mr. Pierre Level, Head of the Government, Minister Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs are in agreement on what follows:

(1) There shall be opened in the name of the Bank of Indo-China, in the Yokohama Specie Bank of another bank to be designated by the Japanese Government an account called Special Yen Account.

(2) The equivalent for piastres to be sold by the Bank of Indo-China under the present regulations shall be credited to the "Special Yen Account." The account shall carry interest at a rate which shall be fixed by agreement between the banks concerned. This agreement shall be
submitted for the approval of the competent authorities of the two governments.

(3) The amounts in yen which, by the terms of Articles 24 and 25 of the Franco-Japanese Agreement of 6 May 1941 relative to the Customs System, to commercial exchanges and to their methods of settlement between Indo-China and Japan, must be settled on the request of the Bank of Indo-China, in gold or in foreign currency, convertible to gold, shall be turned into the "Special Yen Account."

(4) Beginning 1 January 1943 the whole of the payments provided for by the foundation Agreement of 13 June 1942 for the requisition of French merchant ships by the Japanese Government, shall be turned into the "Special Yen Account."

(5) As far as non-commercial payments are concerned, paragraph 2 of the letters exchanged today must not be understood to imply that the Bank of Indo-China is obliged to provide an unlimited amount of piastres, beyond actual needs.

(6) The amounts in yen, fixed on 31 December 1942, which, under the provisions of the Franco-Japanese Agreement of 6 May 1941, regarding the Customs System, commercial exchanges and their methods of settlement between Indo-China and Japan, would have had, before 1 January 1943, to be settled in gold or in convertible foreign currency, that is to say, in actual fact the excess over five million yen of the amount arrived at by the comparison between the A and C accounts, provided for in the Agreement indicated above, shall be settled in gold after 1 January 1943. This gold shall be considered as exportable gold under the conditions laid down in paragraph 10 below.

(7) Amounts in special yen, received in exchange for piastres by the Bank of Indo-China from the Yokohama Specie Bank before 1 January 1943 shall be turned into the "Special Yen Account."

(8) The credits in so-called "free" yen belonging to the Bank of Indo-China at 1 January 1943 shall be carried in special yen to an account which shall be opened with the agent of the Bank of Indo-China in Japan. These funds in special yen shall be subject to provisions relating to the control of exchanges and of the employment of funds in the bank.
(9) The credits in U.S. dollars belonging to the Bank of Indo-China lodged with the Yokohama Specie Bank, although not be affected by the provisions of this letter exchanged this date.

(10) The credits in gold in Japan belonging to the Bank of Indo-China on January 1, 1943 shall retain their exportability, that is to say that the amounts of gold in question shall be freely exportable out of Japan, that while writing export they shall be earmarked in favor of the Bank of Indo-China, and that as soon as their transport out of Japan becomes possible the Japanese Government shall give all the necessary authorizations for this exportation.

(11) The banks concerned shall settle between themselves the technical provisions for the application of the preceding paragraphs. These provisions shall be submitted to competent authorities of the two governments for approval.

(12) As soon as circumstances permit the disposable funds of the "Special Yen Account," can be settled in gold or in foreign paper convertible to gold.

(13) The disposable funds of the "Special Yen Account" can be used by Indo-China for payments of any kind to be made to Japan in the territories occupied by Japan and in the regions where the system of settlements in yen is in force subject to provisions regarding the control of exchange.

(14) The disposable funds of the "Special Yen Account" can be made available by Indo-China to persons living in third countries for the purpose of being used by these persons in payments of any kind to be made to Japan in the territories occupied by Japan and in the regions where the system of settlements in yen is in force, after being authorized by competent authorities in conformity with provisions relating to the control of exchange and under the conditions laid down by these authorities.

(15) The Japanese Government accepts the principle of the utilization by France and French possessions other than Indo-China of the disposable funds of the "Special Yen Account" for their payments to Japan, in the territories occupied by Japan and in the region where the system of settlements in yen is in force, as soon as an agreement concerning the settlement of reciprocal payments has been concluded between Japan and France. The Japanese Government
will forthwith facilitate the use, in the territories indicated above, of these disposable funds, for the expenses of missions and French Official Services, as well as for the expenses of French works which the French Government will have to undertake.

(16) The Japanese Government will facilitate to the utmost possible degree the use, by Indo-China, of the disposable funds of the "Special Yen Account." For this purpose it will, in particular, provide, to the utmost degree that circumstances will allow, facilities for the purchase of merchandise, by Indo-China in Japan, in the territories occupied by Japan and in the regions where the system of settlements in yen is in force as well as for the export and transport of this merchandise.

Made in duplicate, in the French language, at Victory, on 20 January 1943.

Tokekoro Hitomi
Pierre Laval
doc 1267

[手写内容未翻译]
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...
Investigation Committee of the Privy Council on the Treaty between Japan and France for residence and navigation relating to French Indo-China and on the Treaty between Japan and France concerning the tariff system and trade and method of its settlement between Japan and Indo-China, presented for ratification.

Held on June 16 (Monday) 1941 at the office of the Privy Council.

Attended by: President: HARA

Committee Chairman
and Councillor: ISHIZUKA

Committeemen and
Councillors: SHIMIZU, Matsui- MATSU
SUGAWARA, Fukai- FUKAI
TAKEGOSHI, Mitsui- MITSU

State Ministers:
Foreign Minister MATSUOKA
Finance KAWADA
Commerce & Industry Minister TOYOTA
Agriculture & Forestry INO

Explainers:
Director of Bureau of Legislation MURASE
Councillor of the Bureau of " " MORTYAMA
Councillor of the Bureau of " " MIYAUCHI
Director of the Planning Bureau TAKEUCHI
Director of the Treaty Bureau,
Foreign Office MATSUMOTO
" " Trade Eureau " " MIZUNO
Foreign Office Secretary NISHIMURA
" " Administrative official HAGA
" " NAGAI
" " MITSUTO
Director of Taxation Bureau,
Finance Ministry MATSUKAWA
Engineer of the Finance Department HIRAGUCHI
Agriculture & Forestry Vice-Minister MIURA
Secretary of the Foodstuff Control Bureau of the Agriculture & Forestry Department ISHIKAWA
Director of the Trade Bureau ISHIGURO
Commodities Adjustment Official of the Commerce and Industry Department UEMATSU
Director of the Southern Area Colonization Bureau of the Colonial Dept. KAWAMURA
Secretary of the Colonial Department KAWAMOTO
Chief Secretary MORIE
Secretary MOROHASHI
Secretary TAKATSUJI
The meeting sat at 10:05 AM. The Chairman announced the opening of the session. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA explained about the circumstances which have led the various engagements in question to the conclusion.

Committeeman SHIMIZU inquired of the following points: First, whether shrines can be established in French Indo-China; second, whether there are any rights and interests granted to foreigners living in French Indo-China.

About the first question Foreign Minister MATSUOKA replied, "It will be practically decided with the change of circumstances". About the second question, Director of the Foreign Office Trade Bureau KIZUNO replied, "No rights and interests are permitted generally to foreigners; the only interest so far granted is the one for collecting rubber to an American; consequently there is only a limited room in which the most favored nation clause can be applied but as the conditions for establishing a company with Franco-Japanese joint investment has been used it would be possible to operate special enterprises thereby".

Committeeman MATSUI expressed his hope to the effect that Japan might take a lenient attitude toward French Indo-China and contribute to a rapprochement between the two countries in putting into effect the engagements in view.

Committeeman SUGAWARA inquired of whether there is any necessity of exerting Japanese political power, especially over the south of French Indo-China, in executing the arrangements covered by the Treaty in question and Foreign Minister MATSUOKA replied, "I have been considering it carefully".

Committeeman FUKAI inquired of whether the shrine Shintoism/Jinja comes under the category of what is termed religion in this Treaty, and on this question Foreign Minister MATSUOKA replied, "On the part of Japan we believe we can take the position to regard the shrine as sort of religion no matter what its nature is and, I advocate, its believing in is quite free to any one but I hope this problem should be solved without making recourse to such allegation".

Committeemn TAKEGOSHI and MITSUCHI inquired of whether there is any anxiety in performing her duty which French Indo-China owes to Japan concerning the supply of rice and rubber, etc. to Japan, and on this question Foreign Minister MATSUOKA replied, "She will perform her duty as arranged, without fail, unless some unexpected situation happens".

Committeeman MITSUCHI also inquired of the influence which will be brought about upon French Indo-China and Thailand by the interruption of Japanese-Netherlands negotiations regarding Dutch East Indies, and on this question Foreign
Minister MATSUMO replied, "There will be no special influence but we will pay full attention to it".

Recess from 0.05 to 1.40 p.m.

Committeemen SHIMIZU and MATSUMI inquired of the future prospect about the development of Japanese trade with French Indo-China, and on this question Director of the Foreign Office Trade Bureau, FIZUNO, replied, "French Indo-China is being affected by the European War and her materials which had been imported from her homeland and other countries have considerably decreased; therefore by the arrangement of this Treaty the supply of commodities from Japan such as cotton yarn and cloth, as well as dry goods, etc. will be remarkably increased so as to reach a total of 70,000,000 or 80,000,000 yen. FIZUNO also replied, "Because the products excepting rubber which grow in French Indo-China cannot be exported generally to third countries their export to Japan will be carried out smoothly and among these exports rice will amount to 80,000,000 yen and the others to 80,000,000 yen".

Committeeman SUGAWARA inquired of the rice circumstances in Japan in connection with its import from French Indo-China, and on this question Agriculture and Forestry Minister INO explained, "The shortage in the supply of rice for the current fiscal period on rice was at the outset estimated to be 12,000,000 koku. In view hereof, we have made a plan to cover this shortage of these with 9,000,000 koku to be imported from French Indo-China, Thailand and Burma, the rest by making a cut of the consumption or by decreasing the quantity of rice to be carried over to the next year; and this plan is proceeding nearly as arranged, so we feel no more worry about the rice circumstances of this year".

Committeeman FUKAI inquired of the meaning of the word "perfection", as is employed in Article 1, paragraph 9 of this Treaty, and on this question Director of the Foreign Office Trade Bureau FIZUNO replied "The word 'perfection' was only 'used following the traditional usage and it meant, as indicated in the text of this Treaty, that we should adhere to the law of the respective countries concerned".

Committeeman MITSUCHI inquired of the future outlook about the rice problem, and on this question the Agriculture and Forestry Minister INO explained, "The rice consumption in Japan being increased, it became impossible to meet the demand for two or three years hereafter with the rice produced in Japan, so Japan must take steps on the one hand to ensure the import of foreign rice, and on the other hand by establishing a ten year's program, with the object of increasing rice and wheat production and through the application of arable land development law, etc."
Japan will be able to make the demand and its supply properly balanced approximately four years later.

President HARA inquired of the marine transport program and Commerce and Industry Minister TOYOTA replied, "The marine transportation is in a critical state owing to the marked decrease of charter ships (chartered shipping facilities amounted to a total tonnage of 9,000,000 tons annually up to last year but will not exceed 100,000 tons this year) increase in the number of ships commandeered for military purposes and decrease in newly built ships; and we are now exerting all our efforts in transporting chiefly rice, coal and iron".

Chairman ISHIZUKA inquired of the relationship between the reason why this protocol should not be officially announced and the actual effect, and on this question Director of the Foreign Office Trade Bureau MIZUNO replied, "We intend to gradually enforce the purports of this protocol and to extend Japanese influence by degrees and it will be inevitable that this protocol will eventually come to the knowledge of third powers".

At this stage the Chairman, considering the interpellations as having come to an end, requested the Ministers and Explainers to withdraw. The State Ministers and Explainers retired. And then after consultation among the Committee men it was decided to give a unanimous approval to this proposition as it is in anticipation that the Government should exert sufficient efforts in obtaining the desired results.

It was decided to entrust the Chairman with the drawing up of a report on this investigation.

Chairman ISHIZUKA thereupon declared the meeting as having come to an end. (The meeting closed at 3:25 PM).
THE SURFACE WAR-LEADERSHIP COUNCIL DECISION No. 16

REGARDING MEASURES TOWARDS FRENCH INDO-CHINA TO MEET THE SUDDEN CHANGE IN THE SITUATION.

February 1, 1943

I. Principle

1. In view of the change in the war situation and the attitude of French Indo-China, the Japanese Empire, based on the absolute need of self-existence and self-defense, shall resort to timely independent military action.

The time for resorting to military measures shall be determined separately.

2. Our plans are to be kept in strict secrecy until the time of launching military measures.

II. Essential Points

1. Prior to the exercising of military force, we shall first of all have our ambassador, with a time limit, demand the following points of the Governor-General of French Indo-China, in order that the diplomatic procedure may be completed as quickly as possible.

In view of the general situation, especially of the fact and tendency of exercising of military power by the American forces against the territory of French Indo-China, the Japanese Empire, in order to perfect the defense of Indo-China, shall request the Governor-General of French Indo-China to agree to the following, as the materialization of his definite resolution to collaborate with the Japanese Empire against the exercising of military action by the U.S. and Britain towards Indo-China and do their utmost to defend Indo-China, on the basis of the fundamental spirit of the joint defense of Japan and French Indo-China.

a) So long as the present situation continues, the military and armed police forces of French Indo-China should be placed under the joint command of the Japanese Army, and shall act, one and all, according to the orders of the Japanese Army in regard to organization, allotment and movement etc., of units, arms and materials, and such organs as railways...
shipping, communications etc., which are of strategic necessity shall be placed under the control of our Army.

b) Immediate orders shall be given to all organs in French Indo-China to co-operate fully and loyally in accordance with the requests of the Japanese Empire.

c) The aforesaid two items shall be accepted in toto within 6 hours.

Upon the lapse of the aforementioned time limit, the Imperial Forces shall by considering the French Indo-China Governor General as lacking in sincerity as regards joint defence, resort to necessary measures.

2. Even in the event of French Indo-China accepting our demands in toto, the French Indo-Chinese military and armed police forces shall be reorganized.

3. Should French Indo-China refuse to accept our demands, the Japanese Empire shall deal with French Indo-China with military force and place same for the present under military control.

4. The measures towards Annam etc., shall be as follows:

a) The Japanese forces on the spot shall elevate and support the independent positions of Annam etc., as they deem fit, and devise plan so as to make them co-operate with us actively.

b) The independence of Annam etc., shall be recognized after taking the general situation into consideration.

As regard the time and manner etc., of recognizing independence, same shall be determined separately.

5. Along with the Military disposition, the Imperial Government shall issue a communiqué at an opportune moment.

6. The Japanese Government shall, depending upon the necessity, explain its true intentions - especially its non-aggressive intentions to Soviet Russia.

7. The Japanese Government shall report to Germany its true intentions as regards the disposition of French Indo-China and make her follow on along the same course as Japan.

8. The French Military forces etc., in the Kwangtung-San Landed
Territory and other areas are to be dealt with similarly to French Indo-China.

Note:

The rights and interests of the French people in general shall be treated as leniently as possible.
No. 52962

From: Saigon on March 3, 1945, at 1930 hours
To: This Ministry on March 3, 1945, at 2100 hours.

TO GREATER EAST ASIA MINISTER SHIGEMITSU
FROM AMBASSADOR KUTSUZAKO.

TO GREATER EAST ASIA MINISTER
TO FOREIGN MINISTER

No. 21 (Directors Code, Very Urgent)

(French Indo-China Disposition Problem)

Referring to your wire No. 24,

1. This Ambassador is now under consultation with the military authorities and the final decision has not yet been made, but we shall call on the Governor-General at his official residence toward evening to-day. After explaining the general situation, we will tell him that under the spirit of co-operative defense, the Japanese Government must request the Governor to make a grave decision. Then we shall read "Aide memoire" (without recording any time limit) which was made up from the gist of paragraph 1, outline I of the Outline of the Supreme Council's Decision and will request him to think about it. In case the Governor accepts the request on the spot, we shall ask his signature on the declaration as indicated on the separate telegram director's code Number No. 22, and leave. If he does not seem to accept, we shall give him two hours for consideration, and tell him that if he fails to answer by the time, we must take necessary measures; and then we will come back to my official residence and wait for the answer. This is my intention.

2. In regard to the disarmament that is provided in Outline II of the Outline of Decision, if Outline I is accepted without the Army Commander’s explanation of the same, some complications will arise in carrying out the Outline II. Not only that, but they earnestly request that the expression of the Governor’s intentions be made before carrying it out. Therefore, we have decided to explain in case the Governor-General consents, that to must disarm the French Indo-China forces in order to reorganize them, and we will have the Governor-General make this point clear in his declaration.

3. An agreement has been made with our Army Commander that he would carry it out after making full contact with the Government. Therefore, we hope you will set up a complete liaison with the military authorities. (End).
(2667-4)
2667-6


あなたの言葉を繋げるのは、ただ愛をしただけの事ではない。しかし、それは、あなたに愛をし続けるための唯一の方法である。
（編輯）長崎瑞一·木下有作
（西村十光、今村一之助）

長崎公認記念康々収集

昭和四十四年秋

（編集）長崎瑞一·木下有作

長崎公認記念康々収集

昭和四十四年秋
二年次に一部研究した（略記して記録を省略）

研究結果（略記にしたがって略記して記録） 2年次に一部研究した（略記して記録を省略）
Document No. 2667

HEADQUARTERS SUPREME ALLIED COMMAND

SOUTHEAST ASIA

CONFIDENTIAL No. 1 SADON

17th December 1945

My Dear Admiral,

I enclose herewith a copy of the history of the Japanese 26th Army produced by the JAPANESE SOUTHEAST ASIA ARMY HQ. It may be of interest to you.

Yours sincerely,

S/ GRAHAM

Admiral THURSTON D'ARMENDAIRE
Chief of the Federal War Crimes Commission

Certified true copy

SIGNED

STEAL
1) Following the transfer of the Japanese South Area Command from Saigon to Singapore in December 1942, the 33th Army was formed and installed its headquarters in Saigon, for the defense of Indochina, according to the Japanese-French protocol signed in August 1941, and was put under the command of the South Area Command.

   The main dispositions of troops at that time was as follows:
   - South Indochina Area.............................. 32nd Infantry Regiment of the 21st Division (Saigon)
   - North Indochina Area.............................. Main forces of the 21st Division (Hanoi)

2) Later, with the developments of general situation in the Southern area, the 34th Independent Mixed Brigade (formed in Japan proper) was stationed in Turaum District in March, 1944, and, in December 1944, the 70th Independent Mixed Brigade (formed by surplus troops in Indochina) was quartered in Saigon District, thus enforcing the Japanese-French defence power in Indochina, and increasing the total reserve troops of the South Area Command.

3) In December 20th, 1944, the troops stationed in Indochina were reformed under the 33th Army Command, which gave the 33th Army the character of an operation army.

   The main disposition of troops at that time was as follows:
   - North Area............. Main force of the 21st Division
   - Central Area........... The 34th Brigade
   - South Area............. Part of the 21st Division and the 70th Brigade

4) In February 1945, the navy units which were stationed in the operation zone of the 33th Army, were put under the command of the Army Command so far as ground defense was concerned. The main navy units thus put under the army command were, the 11th Navy Base Unit.

5) Since December 1945, the 33th Army under the above-mentioned formation, took the responsibility for the common defense of Indochina, based upon the Japanese-French Protocol, though once engaged in minor operations in the north frontier districts.
6) Judgement of the general war situation in January 1945.

As the U.S. Army main forces attacked Luzon in the beginning of January, the next points of disembarkation were judged to be either South China (including Hainan Island, and Loi-Chou peninsula), Central China, or Okinawa. The 38th Army prepared the necessary counter plans, forecasting a landing in North Indochina, in case of an attack to South China.

8) According to the forecast and scheme as stated above, the troops were concentrated as follows:

a) The 37th Division was transferred in the middle of February from South China (11th Army) to North Indo-China.

b) The 22nd Division was transferred in the beginning of March from South China (23rd Army) to North Indo-China frontier Districts.

c) The 2nd Division was transferred gradually from March to June from Burma to Saigon District.

9) The incident of March 9th (details apart).

Troops used in March 9th incident were as follows:

- North area........21st - 22nd, 37th Divisions,
- Central area......70th Brigade and part of 4th Division (T),
- 1 Regiment of 20th Division.

10) Transfer of Army Headquarters to Hanoi.

The 38th Army advanced its commanding-post from Saigon to Hanoi in May 1945, to facilitate the command of troops concentrated in North Indochina.

11) Forecast of war situation in May 1945.

With the landing of the U.S. Army main forces on Okinawa, the possibility of an attack to South China or to Indo-China much diminished, the chief enemy of the South area Command shifted from the U.S. Army to the British Army, and the strategic object was judged to be Singapore.
12) With the above judgement, the troops stationed in Indochina were transferred in the following way, according to the orders of the South Area Command:

a) The 70th Brigade from Saigon districts to the central Malay, in the middle of May.

b) The 37th Division to Bangkok District in the middle of May to be used either in Burma Front or in Malay zone.

c) The 22nd Division, since the end of May, to North-Eastern China.

13) Main operations executed by the 30th Army.

Co-operation with the China Area Command in the operations joining Central and South China (under separate cover).

14) Situation at the time of surrender.

Following the rapid development of war situation in Burma, the South Area Command established plans to make French Indochina and Malay the defence centre of Southern Area. Accordingly, the 30th Army was planning to enforce the defence of Hanoi and Saigon districts in the following manner, when the war ended:

a) Formation of defence units of Hanoi and Saigon
b) Strengthening of the organisation of the 34th Brigade,
c) Strengthening of the organisation and equipment of the 2nd Division.
d) Reconstruction of the 55th Division.

15) The purpose of the disposition of French Indochina.

The attitude of the French authorities towards the Japanese-French common defence of Indochina were rapidly lacking sincerity in accordance with the general war situation, especially with the American progress in the Philippines. In spite of the repeated expostulations of the Japanese authorities, the French at last came to prevent the Japanese war preparations in Indochina in every sphere, and it became evident that, if the Japanese left the situation at that, they would find themselves in quite a difficult position: between the devil and the deep sea, in case of the landing of American Forces.
Thus, the disposition of French Indochina was attempted to make the
certainty of the French authorities and to make them contribute to the
full extent to the Japanese war preparations.

2) The general policies of the disposition.

The Japanese Government, in order to apply to the changed
situation decided, at the Supreme War Council Conference in February
1945, the following policies concerning French Indochina:

Japanese authorities, taking into account the general situation,
especially the American progress to and Indochina regions, and in
order to accomplish the defence of Indochina, will demand that the
Governor General of French Indochina should consent to the following
propositions, as a concrete token of the determination to defend the
Indo-China territory against the eventual American operations towards
it, in collaboration with the Japanese, according to the fundamental
spirit of Japanese-French common defence of Indochina (See the appendices
No. 1 - Protocol concerning Japanese-French common Defence of Indochina;
No. 2 Local treaties based upon the preceding.

a) As long as the present circumstances last, the French troops and
armed police will be put under the Japanese control and will act solely
according to its directions for the organization, disposition and movement
of the troops, arms, and munitions, and materials.

b) The organizations and facilities necessary for the war conduct, such
as railways, sea transportations, and communication, will be put under
the Japanese controls.

c) The Governor General will immediately give instructions to all
the organizations in French Indochina to collaborate fully and
faithfully with the Japanese upon their demands.

(The above tretian were in fact presented officially
in the General High Ambassador KAJI YODO made to Governor General DOUX
on March 9).

In case the Governor General accepts fully the Japanese
de anda, the Japanese will not go beyond the reorganization of the
French troops and armed police. If not, the Japanese will be obliged
to appeal to arm and resort to military control. In that case, the
following principles will be adopted:
a) Even if the French rejects the Japanese demands, the relation between the two countries will not be considered as being at war. However, Japan will not be bound by the existing treaties, concerning French Indo-China.

b) Japan will not admit the execution of functions to the Governor General and his leading staff of the Government, but their personal treatment will be as moderate as possible.

c) The lower organizations of the Government will not be touched and will be utilized as they are.

d) The French troops and armed police will be disarmed and reorganized. Those who resist at the disarmament, however, will be treated as prisoners.

e) The French civilians and their properties will not be treated as for enemy nation, but will be treated as moderately as possible. However, in the case of military necessity, the Japanese may proceed to the control of private properties and the restriction of habitation and movement.

3) The development of the disposition.

On March 9, 1945, at 1900 (Japanese time) Ambassador MATSUDANO visited Governor General DOUCO at his official residence in Saigon, according to the instructions of the metropolis. They talked about the general war situation, and after the various discussions, the Governor General admitted the possibility of American Forces’ landing in Indo-China. Hence the Ambassador requested him in the authority of Governor General invested with full powers to manifest his sincerity towards Japan in strengthening Japanese-French common defence in the present circumstances. He explained the above-mentioned conditions which the Japanese Government had instructed him to propose to the Governor General, and asked to give reply by 2200. He took leave after having warned that the Japanese Army would be obliged to take necessary measure if the reply was not favourable.

About 2220 Captain RAHI brought the reply of the Governor General to the Ambassador, which was found qualified and which the Japanese authorities could not help considering as rejection.
On this, the Commanding General of the 33th Army found himself under the necessity of taking decision to appeal to arms, according to the instructions which had been given him by the General Headquarters, and ordered all this forces immediately to disarm the French troops and armed police.

b) The Japanese forces succeeded in disarming the main forces in a few days, though they met some resistance in Hanoi, Saigon, Annam-Phench and Batavia. However, the Japanese paid considerable sacrifice in disarming the French troops which resisted in the strong fortresses in the north frontier regions, such as Lanson, Dong Bang, and Dongay.

Then the Japanese army proceeded to suppress French detachments stationed in the remote countries and tied out French contingents who had escaped into mountains, while endeavouring to re-establish the public order and to revive the administration. In about one month's time, public order was gradually re-established, except in the remote centres, public feelings were reassured, and various organizations generally recovered their former activities.

It took a considerable time to clear the mountain range of Annam, Chinese frontier, mountainous regions of Laos of the remnants of French troops and it was May 15 that the Japanese army finished its armed operations.

Meanwhile, the activities of Viet-Can Party in the Northern Hindo-Chine became more and more vigorous, and especially its disturbance of public security, aiming to disband Japanese forces in order to accomplish the full independence of their people, who were in a Japanese army was compelled to continue to employ a considerable strength in maintaining security of towns and cities, in protection of life and property, until the cessation of hostilities of August 15.

c) The French troops disarmed were divided into the Frenchmen group and the native group; the former was concentrated and informed chiefly in Saigon and Hanoi, and for the latter, a part of it was adopted in the Japanese army as auxiliaries, and the rest as planned to be recognized into the voluntary and the national armies, but that plan was not achieved, though preparations were being made.

d) Armed police are indispensable for the maintenance of public order, the Japanese army rearmed the administrative policemen, excluding French ones, and distributed them to each province. But the total numerical
strength of them was below the half of the former one,

e) As for French civilians, the Japanese army, both on military necessity and for safe-guarding sake, restricted their residence in Hanoi, Tihon, Dou, Fautang, Srique, HanoiEnv and X Viet.

f) Administration organizations were left intact, and though a small number of Japanese officials took charge of some important positions, almost all officials, both French and Annamite, were permitted to remain at their posts. Thus the Japanese army arranged to re-establish public order as soon as possible, preventing social uneasiness and disorders and to take all Indo-China co-operate with the Japanese in war preparations.

h) As a logical result of Japan's disposition of French Indo-China, Annamite and to other nations proclaimed their independence for themselves and were realizing their independence almost instantly. The Japanese army took the attitude not to interfere in the internal affairs and left them free to do what they wished. Meanwhile the Japanese army kept their actions always under eye lest they should be off the rails, hidden by a mistaken sense of independence and race-consciousness, and always paid utmost attention not to make them repeat the same un-cooperative attitude as the French regime.

i) The progress of battle at the moment of the disposal of French Indo-China is shown in the appended plan No.1.

4. The conclusion.

Japan's disposition of French Indo-China was really inevitable step as the result of the fact that, facing eventual American invasion, the French authorities could not be hoped to correct their unfriendly attitude and to co-operate with the Japanese in rapid war preparations and to facilitate the operations. It was not that Japan regarded the French as enemies, or attempted to occupy the Indo-China territory, or tried to get the Annamite on the French.

Moreover, the disposition of French Indo-China was based upon the directives of 2.2.40, and was not an arbitrary decision of local Japanese army. All the Japanese troops, military, officials, civilians however humble their posts might have been, always acted solely by orders of superior commanders, and fulfilled their responsibilities most faithfully according to each given duty.
PROTOCOL

BETWEEN JAPAN AND FRANCE - CONCERNING

THE JOINT DEFENCE OF FRENCH INDO-CHINA.

The Government of Japan and
The Government of France.

Taking into consideration the actual international situation;

Recognizing that in consequence, in case that the security of
French Indochina will be menaced, Japan will estimate that the general
tranquility in East Asia and her proper security will be in danger;

Renewing at this occasion the engagements, of one party, by
Japan to respect the rights and interests of France in East Asia and
especially territorial integrity of French Indo-China and the sovereign
rights of France on all the parties of the Union of Indo-China, and of
the other, by France not to contract at the subject of Indo-China any
agreement or understanding with a third Power anticipating political,
commercial or military co-operation in the nature to oppress directly or
indirectly to Japan;

(1) The two Governments engage to co-operate militarily for the joint
defence of French Indo-China.

(2) The measures to be taken with the view of this co-operation will
be the object of special arrangements.

(3) The above mentioned agreements shall be in force only as long as
the circumstances motivating their adoption will exist.

In witness whereof, the Undersigned, duly authorized by their
respective Governments, have signed the present Protocol which shall
come into effect on this very day and have hereunto affixed their seal.

Done in duplicate, in Japanese and French, at Vichy, this twenty
ninth day of the seventh month in sixteenth year of Shōwa, corresponding
to the twenty ninth day of July in the Nineteen hundred and forty
first year.

Signed: SOTÔMATSU KITO.
F. DARLIE.

(Proclaimed on the first day of the eighth month in sixteenth year of
Shōwa).
1) The purpose of the co-operation.

To facilitate the co-operation of Hanoi and Heng-Hing by the China Area Command, thus securing the land route between Indo-China and Heng-Hing, in order to enable the transport of important materials from the Southern Region to Japan, supplementing sea transportation which was getting gradually difficult at that time.

2) General Plans of Operation.

a) Since April 1944, the Japanese China Area Command started attacks from the Mekong River and Canton district towards Chuang-chou, Meiling, and Heng-Hing, in order to connect Central and South China.

b) The troops stationed in Indo-China will facilitate this operation, co-operating with the China Area Command in the siege of Heng-Hing, while repairing and securing the land route. The date of starting operations is fixed to be the latter part of November.

(It was the beginning of September that the Japanese Command in Indo-China received orders to begin to prepare for the operations).

c) The Commanding General of the troops stationed in Indo-China gave orders in the beginning of September 1944 to the Commanding General of the 21st Division stationed in North Indo-China to prepare for the operations, which were due to start towards the end of November 1944. Later, many orders were issued that a powerful unit should move secretly from Lao to join Lanson district at the beginning of November, in order to be able to enter into actions any time after the latter part of November.

d) The formation of the unit for this operation (UXACTU Unit of the 21st Division) was as follows:

- Infantry: 4 battalions
- Artillery: 1 battalion
- Engineers: Main force of engineer regiment, 21st Division.
- And other necessary supply corps.
3) General Progress of the Operation (See annexed plan).

a) The 32nd Division (main forces of the 32nd Regiment of the 31st Division) started to move secretly from Landi in the middle of November, and completed concentration & advance towards the 25th November.

b) The Army issued orders to the Command, General of the 21st Division to start attack in the direction of Langhun, crossing the frontier on the 2nd of November.

c) The 32nd Division commenced the attack on November 29th, from east and west side of Landi, in keeping with the orders given that the unit shall cross the frontier at 00.00 of November 29th, march first towards the line connecting Langhun and Longchou then towards that of Shuiou and Chaoshan, and prepare for the siege of Hang-ning while repairing and securing all the routes south of the above-mentioned line.

d) That same day, the 32nd Division unit was put under the command of the 5th Army Corps Command of the China Area Command.

e) In the beginning of December, the 32nd Division unit reached the line connecting Langhun and Longchou. Then the unit pursued the co-ordination of roads, while sending a contingent towards the line joining Shuiou and Chaoshan. Next day, the unit advanced a penetrating corps along Shuiou-Hang-ning road, which succeeded in getting contact with the 5th Army Corps that had captured Hang-ning in the middle of December.

f) The 32nd Division unit continued to secure and repair roads around Langhun, Longchou and Shangnan, until the middle of January 1945, when the advance troops of the 5th Army Corps pushed southward of Hang-ning. Accordingly the 32nd Division Unit began to retreat gradually, and in the beginning of February came back to its original posts, thus completing the operations.

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Certified true copy
Chief of the Federal War Crimes Commission.

SIGNED
PROCLAMATION No. 1

TO ALL THE PEOPLE OF INDO-CHINA.

The Japanese Army declares that, so as to preserve its own existence and insure peace in Great East Asia, it intends to abolish the present government of Indo-China.

The Japanese Army fights against no one but the present government of Indo-China and particularly its troops, and not the natives serving in it, and will, consequently, cause no harm to peoples. Since, however, unforeseen accidents are always liable to happen, on the fighting grounds, the population is invited to take all necessary precautions so as to avoid becoming victims of such accidents.

The population must, therefore, while they remain quiet and refrain from any unconsidered action, do their utmost to perform their usual duties.

Anyone hampering in the least degree the operations of the Japanese Army will be prosecuted and punished according to martial law.

10 March 1945.

The Commander-in Chief
of the Japanese Army.
PRONUNCIATION No. 2
TO THE FRENCH POPULATION OF INDO-CHINA.

The Japanese Army regrets to declare that the friendly relations which existed between Japan and French Indo-China can no longer be maintained as a result of the change in circumstances.

However, the Japanese Army only fights against those who, upon the order of the present government and its troops, oppose the Japanese Army, and it retains its friendship towards the French people as heretofore.

The French population may, therefore, trusting the Japanese Army, and refraining from any unconsidered action, continue to live in peace and security.

It must, to this end, observe the following rules:

1. Those who desire to remain in their present position and collaborate with the new government must, without delay, present themselves to the respective offices and state their intention.

2. It is forbidden to travel or move house without permission.

3. Fire arms, ammunition, radio sets, cameras, binoculars, typewriters, must be handed, without delay, to the Japanese Army on the spot, or to the Liaison Headquarter. Sale or transfer of such articles is forbidden.

4. It is forbidden to go out during the night (i.e. between sunset and dawn).

5. It is forbidden to hold meetings of more than three persons; to walk in groups of more than three persons.

6. The doors of houses, compartments and apartments must be left open.

10 March 1946
The Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Army.
To all Government Officials, as well as Technicians of French administration, who desire to remain in their present position and collaborate with the new government, must, without delay, state their intention to their respective administrations.

Government officials or technicians whose request to retain their position is agreed upon will receive the same salary as before.

The same rule will apply to technicians or experts of private factories or firms.

March 10, 1945

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF of the JAPANESE ARMY

PROCLAMATION No. 4

To All Indo-Chinese Police Officials:

The Japanese Army declares that it has just been compelled to carry out the disarming of the police forces with the only aim of putting an end to the activities of the French Police officials.

The Japanese Army intends, by granting Indo-Chinese police officials the same treatment as before, and by protecting them, to re-establish as soon as possible the operation of the various police organisms and to institute "Indo-Chinese Police organisms".

The preservation of public order being mainly dependent on the activities of the police organisms of the Indo-Chinese members of the Police Force are invited to show their confidence in the Japanese Army to return to the competent police office immediately and carry out their work as previously.

March 10, 1945

Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Army
The Supreme Commander of the Japanese Armed Forces considering the present situation orders that the operations of the Bank of Indo-China be temporarily suspended but intends that they should be resumed as soon as possible.

Among the personnel of that bank all those who wish to collaborate with the Japanese Army will be authorized to keep their position as before. They must, therefore, be present at the office without being alarmed.

March 10, 1945
Supreme Commander
Japanese Army.

PROCLAMATION No. 7

Every person committing the following actions will be put to death or severely punished according to martial law:

1. Any action of treachery towards the Japanese Army.
2. Espionage,
3. Any destructive or harmful action to railroads, telephone, telegraph, canals, installations, factories, buildings, etc. used by the Japanese Army.
4. Any action prejudicial to the personnel of the Japanese Army.

   Destruction of weapons, ammunition or all other property of the Japanese Army.
5. All actions like the illicit profit or unlawful profit, blackmarket, etc. which are contrary to the principles of the Japanese Army and are liable to disturb the economic system.
6. All other actions contrary to the prohibitions promulgated by the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Army.
7. All actions, attempts or accomplices in the above mentioned activities.

10 March 1945
Commander-in-Chief,
Japanese Army.
The Supreme Commander of the Japanese Army orders that the operations of the Bank of Indo-China, which had been suspended, be resumed as of March 15th.

The operations of that bank will be carried out under the conditions of the moratorium hereafter mentioned. The conditions of the moratorium are:

1. Each client 200 piastres maximum per day.
2. Each client 2,000 piastres maximum per month.

15 March 1945
Supreme Commander,
Japanese Army.

I. All French Nationals (except those who are authorized to remain in their present position) will have within the next 10 days (from the date of the present proclamation) to remove themselves and their property to one of the seven (7) towns here mentioned and cohabitate in the houses of the French inhabitants:

- Hanoi, Vinh, Hue, Nha-trang, Saigon (with the exception of Cholon), Phnom-penh and Vientiane.

II. The following regulations will be observed at the time of the removal above mentioned:

1. Only one servant will be allowed.

2. Any person in a serious state of illness, together with the person nursing him or her, may, with the permission of the local authorities, postpone her departure until she is able to travel.

3. The inhabitants of the seven towns above mentioned must, without delay, have the members of their families, as well as their servants (only one is permitted), registered at the local office of the Liaison Headquarters.

Persons moving to the seven designated towns must register in the same way when they arrive in the town.

Commander-in-Chief
Japanese Army.
The steps taken recently by the Japanese Army, as it has been clearly stated in the official communique of the Government of Japan, are the consequence only of the lack of sincerity of the French authorities in Indo-China in the carrying out of the agreement for the common defense of the country.

The Japanese Army, in view of the present military situation, is fully prepared to insure or assume the total responsibility of the defense of Indo-China in collaboration with the peoples of Indo-China.

Our first task, therefore, is to reassure the population and re-establish public order so that the defense of Indo-China be thus quickly strengthened.

It goes without saying that the Japanese Army in no way intends to change the autochthonous organization of the government, that it will respect all decrees and decisions in force, that it will maintain the administrative organisms in existence and will protect without discrimination all government employees who wish to work with it.

Consequently, government employees, and members of the Council of Notables, must endeavor to discharge their duty at all times with reference to the principles mentioned above and trusting the Japanese Army entirely.

As to the inhabitants in general who collaborate with it, their lives and property, as well as their rights and interests, will be protected. They may, therefore, have entire confidence in the Japanese Army and devote themselves to the work of reconstruction of the new Indo-China, together with government personnel and members of the Council of Notables.

The Japanese Army will support any endeavor to satisfy the eager desire of independence, so dear to all the peoples of Indo-China. It declares at the same time that it is its firm intention to fulfill the duties incumbent upon it for the defense of Indo-China, in collaboration with the above-mentioned peoples, and to help their sincere national movement in conformity with the fundamental principles of the declaration of Greater East Asia.

March 12, 1945
Commander-in-Chief,
Japanese Army
The Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Army, in view of the new state of affairs created in Indo-China, and responding to the aspirations of the population, plans to carry out the necessary reforms in the administrative, economic and other fields. Such an enterprise will require time.

Even though the administrative organization, the laws and regulations in force must be reformed, their instant nullification, before the contemplated changes are realized, will cause an immediately interruption in the functioning of the administrative organization of Indo-China. In consequence, chaos and disorder will follow, endangering the security of the population.

Therefore, as it has been said in the previous proclamations, it is confirmed that:

The existing administrative organism, the laws and regulations are, in principle, and for the time being, maintained such as they are.

All government officials, whoever they may be, who collaborate with the Japanese Army will be protected and kept on active service.

Order is given to all government officials now on duty, as well as to all notabilities, to fulfill their task assiduously, each at his post. Consequently government officials and notabilities who loyally discharge their functions, and act in conformity with the spirit of the Japanese Army, as well as the civilian population, both native and French, who collaborate with them, are considered as collaborators of the Japanese Army, which spares no effort for the building of the new Indo-China.

Every one must set aside every personal feeling and group loyalties; all government officials and civilians must melt into a unified bloc in the pursuit of their own tasks, according to the present organization and hierarchical order.

Those who, imbued with their personal feelings, act contrary to that spirit; those who slander others, or who act irresponsibly, thus hampering the restoration of all administrative, economic and other organisms, and disturbing order and security, will be severely punished in conformity with military discipline.

April 11, 1945

Commander-in-Chief Japanese Army.
AFFIDAVIT

I, Saburo Iwamura, certify that I was Chief of Staff of the Japanese Forces in French Indo China from December 1942 to May 1945 and that I recognize the attached International Prosecution Section documents, 2634-A through 2634-J, as being the proclamations issued in Indo China between 10 March 1945 and 11 April 1945 in the name of the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Forces, General Yukitsu Tsubokawa. I further certify that these proclamations were issued with the approval of General Terauchi, Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Army and were the result of an overall order from Tokyo.

/s/ S. Iwamura
Saburo IWAMURA

Witness: Eric V. Fleisher
ERIC V. FLEISHER
2nd Lt, AUS

Sworn before this 15th day of September, 1946, at Tokyo, Japan.

/s/ Reed Lawton
REED LAWTON Summary Court
1st Lt, FA
Warning to the Japanese Government

The Provisional Government of the French Republic having serious reasons to fear for the security of the French and Indo-Chinese populations living in the Indo-Chinese Union or residing in the Chinese territories occupied by the Japanese Forces as well as for the security of Allied nationals present in Indo-China, solemnly reminds the Japanese Government that any violence or brutality or any reprisals exercised towards its nationals or tolerated as a result of the tacit consent or passivity of the Japanese authorities charged with the preservation of order constitute the gravest violation of international laws.

Therefore, it holds responsible not only the Japanese governmental authorities and the High Command of the Japanese army, but also enemy nationals, civilian and military personnel of all ranks who, charged with administration, protection or supervision, exercise, or permit to be exercised under any pretext, acts, even though unaccompanied with violence, inimical to the existence or the security of the French and Indo-Chinese populations.

The Provisional Government of the French Republic declares moreover that any individual whether or not entrusted with responsibility, who may be convicted of having injured or having permitted injury to the security of its nationals will be considered as a war criminal and treated as such.
To: Monsieur le Procureur de la République, International Military Tribunal, Tokyo.

I have the honour to send to you a certified copy of the warnin; addressed on April 11th 1945, to the Japanese Government by the Provisional Government of the Republic.

Signed: PECHLOFF

General PECHLOFF
Ambassador of France
CERTIFICATE

I, Lt-Colonel Kurkov, Chief of the Secretariat of the Office of the Member for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Allied Council for Japan, hereby certify that the Map of the Soviet Far East and Northern Manchuria has been prepared by the Office of the Member for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Allied Council for Japan and for this purpose was used part of the Administrative Map of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which is an official publication of the Department of Topographical Survey and Cartography under the People's Commissariat of Home Affairs of the U. S. S. R., of 1937.

September 13, 1946

Allied Council for Japan
Office of the Member
for
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republic

Chief of Secretariat Kurkov

CERTIFICATE ON TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, V. A. ZAPLAT, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated excerpts of the above Document.

September 13, 1946
Signature: V. Zapol
MAP

AND THE NORTHERN PART OF MANCHEIRA

Dobromirov Andrey Borisovich

Harmo
Talks Between General ARAKI and ISHIWATA, Secretary General of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.

From the "Kokunin Shinbun" of August 14, 1941

Looking back at the Siberian Expedition, I feel that the plans were complete, but it seems there had been considerable regret on account of the failure to make the expected last stroke. There is a proverb, 'History repeats itself,' and I believe this principle is still the same today.

"What will happen if we shall be satisfied by merely looking on with folded arms without dispatching troops or doing anything?

Next, we shall deal with the Siberian Expedition. Unqualifiedly, we simply call it the Siberian Expedition, but there were many very complicated circumstances lying in its background. Japan's present ambition to dominate the Continent may fully be said to have germinated in the Siberian Expedition. Unfortunately, however, I feel that, in the execution of this expedition, there had been lacking in contemporary internal situations, the courage and the determination to strive for the calculated ends by deciding on a Cabinet resolution under a firm and resolute policy. With a very complicated and congested environment as its background, it had been very cleverly planned. However, it is exceedingly regretful that we had met with various obstacles which had arisen at home and abroad and that we had been unable to carry this plan to perfection.

The first foundation of the Siberian incident, thus looking from all angles, has been justified as an impartial and proper measure. So at that time if our country had held strict confidence, had not hesitated to carry out a national retaliatory measure to return for the violation of international agreement law under the guarantee of real ability, and had proceeded resolutely for the stability of East Asia, presenting a common front with the countries with goodwill for us, such a movement as the establishment of new order which is also the heaviest task up to the present would have been set about already and made progress. How I am thinking about it thus and am full of deep emotion.
CERTIFICATE

I, E. E. DANLY, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G. H. Q., S. C. A. P., and as such have possession custody and control of original or copies of captured enemy documents obtained by the said section.

2. That Document No. 2367 was delivered to me by the Russian Division of International Prosecution Section as being a file of the Japanese Newspaper "Kokunin Simbun" for 1941 including the issue of 14 August 1941, and such document has been continuously in my custody since such delivery.

9 September 1946

/s/ E. E. Danly

E. E. DANLY
CERTIFICATE

I, SOKICHI ISFIGURO, Chief of Section II of the Imperial Library do hereby certify the following, viz:-

The book

Title: "KOKUIN SHI'ID BUN" of July and August 1941 (incl. Issue No. 17867 of Aug. 14).

Publisher: KOKUIN SHI'ID BUN SFA

Year of Publication: 1941

No. of Volumes: One

Book-shelf No. 501

owned by the Imperial Library, was at the request of the International Prosecution Section, Supreme Command of the Allied Powers, loaned out to the said Section on June 12, 1946.

Dated the 28th day of September, 1946.

SOKICHI ISFIGURO
(sign and seal)
Talks between General ARAKI and ISHITATA, Secretary General of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.

From the "Kokumin Shimbun" of August 14, 1941

The Last Stroke is the Key to Success or Failure.

The Unforgettable "Siberian Expedition"

Stripped of the ceremonial dress.

Every movement by "War Minister General ARAKI, who stands at the head of such emergency movements of Japan, say of the world, as the Manchurian Incident and the May 15th Incident is now the focus of the attention of the world rather than that of domestic concern only. He had been leading a retired life for four years, but once he staged a comeback as Minister of Education in the first KONOYE Cabinet and the HIRANUMA Cabinet, sure enough, he made a dash toward educational reformation in the Imperial University Purge Incident. His footsteps may give us nothing but the impression of a chivalrous and militarist general.

On the other hand, when we speak of ISHITATA, Sotaro, the Finance Minister, the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet and the Secretary General of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, we are liable to misinterpret him as being an outsnoken and rigid general manager of a bunch of clerks, and who always has to supply the kitchen of a great big family. However, a world glanced through a curtain is often greatly different from the actual world. Those who have seen ARAKI and ISHITATA stripped of their ceremonial dresses and exchanged wine cups with them will be surprised that they are so full of humanity and entertain a liking for them. What the readers may grasp from the free and cheerful conversation of ARAKI and ISHITATA, which is full of humor and satire, and keeps the listeners interest, can make them regret the short suru event so, I leave to my readers to perceive.

Discussion with Col. UCHIDA

ARAKI in and out distinctly the Manchurian Incident, I recall my experiences in serving in the 1st World War and in participating in the Siberian Expedition. However great the aspiration and administrative ability may be nothing complete shall be accomplished if we are lacking in the finishing stroke. And this last stroke will be the key to success or failure to anything that requires great determinations. Looking
back at the Siberian Expedition, I feel that the plans were correct, but it seems there had been considerable regret in account of the failure to make the expected last stroke. There is a proverb "History repeats itself," and I believe this principle is still the same.

At that time, I was at the front, so I knew quite well that it was the desire in Russia for Japan to dispatch troops to European Russia, and rumors were circulated that Japanese soldiers had come to their aid and that they had been seen actually fighting at the fronts. And it was even said among the intelligent class that if the Japanese soldiers came to their aid, victory would surely be theirs, and that the Maritime Province would be ceded to Japan. This may be a problem which can be applied to the present, but is not at all necessary to get excited in all directions just because the world is over-changing. We must look clearly into our own selves and seek a center within ourselves. The present worldwide upheaval rather began after the Russian Revolution. If we do not plunge into this whirlpool of upheaval and smear ourselves with blood we are bound to be left behind. Now, in order to decide whether we should or should not plunge into this whirlpool, it will be necessary not to err in our world observation from a general point of view. At that time, I discussed the pros and cons of an European expedition with Count UCHIDA, then the Japanese Ambassador to Russia, and my opinion was as follows:

Every country has wasted war expenditures and is utterly exhausted, and what would be proposed in the peace conference would, anyway, be within the limits of common sense formulas. And formulas made by man would not be worth considering. It might be foolish, but let us take a child for an example. Suppose a child of eighteen would inherit his father's fortune, and does nothing with the money; it will naturally increase. On the other hand, let us suppose he spends ten thousand yen in some business, and goes in a debt another ten thousand yen. He becomes wise and progresses for having worked hard. When he becomes thirty, what kind of a man do you think he would be? In the same way, what would happen if he attempts no venture and runs no risk but becomes a foppish man. In other words, if we al-ne shuld avoid the risk of nicking chestnuts amidst a fire and solely live in ease and avail
ourselves of good opportunities, what would be the result?

If we shall compare the people who will have faced the crisis that will decide the destiny of the nation and will have undergone sufferings of life and death and opened the way for their country through unprecedented difficulties, to those who will have lived in temporary ease and idleness and trusted to chance, it is expressly clear which will be better fitted to stand the trials of racial conflict which might follow the war. In this sense, it is wrong that our opinion, to plunge bravely into the whirlpool of trial to gain experience, should not be adopted. What will happen if we shall be satisfied by merely looking on with folded arms without dispatching troops or doing anything? But this doesn't mean that we should be foolhardy. There should naturally be a method of doing things. This has been my cherished opinion, and the argument for mass expedition of artillery was a part of it.

Various Tragedies and Comedies.

Next, we shall deal with the Siberian Expedition. Unqualifiedly, we simply call it the Siberian Expedition, but there were many very complicated circumstances lying in its background. Japan's present ambition to dominate the Continent may be said to have germinated in the Siberian Expedition. Unfortunately, however, I feel that, in the execution of this expedition, there was lacking in contemporary internal situations, the courage and the determination to strive for the attainment of the calculated ends by adopting a Cabinet decision under a firm and resolute policy. With a very complicated and congested environment as the background, the expedition was planned by very clever means. However, it is exceedingly regretful that we met with many obstacles at home and abroad, and that we were unable to carry this plan to perfection.

In short, it is needless to say that in order to administer statecraft and bring the national enterprises to a successful issue, it is most important to select cheerful, honourable measures based on a firm policy and unshakable iron rules and to indicate a cheerful objective, thereby manifesting the fundamental national policy and assuming an unhesitating attitude under the Imperial standard. When I look
back to that time, I recollect various tragedies and comedies. It was after Lenin had concluded a separate peace, following the Russian Revolution. It was on my way back from European Russia that a group of army deserters seized the locomotive of our train. When we arrived at the station master, the Russians felt quite sorry for us and explained that they would get the locomotive back immediately. They sent a telegram and recaptured the locomotive which had gone ahead. The band of army deserters who had seized our locomotive attempted to resist recapture of the locomotive, but were finally defeated. As the recaptured locomotive was fully loaded with looted goods, the railway station employees received unthought of by-products. Now, at that time, Ataman Serynov rose up in the Far East with a burning passion against Comintern. He was a young captain of only twenty-eight years age. With twenty-five followers, he raised the standard of anti-Comintern and of Independence at Manchuli Station. He was the courageous forerunner and the vanguard of those who publicly and actively opposed the Lenin Regime. Since the allies were still at war with the Germans then, Russia's attitude was clearly a violation of her public pledge of not concluding any separate peace. In other words, inasmuch as all the other powers possessed the right to publicly reprove Russia who had concluded a separate peace with Germany, they had the right to impeach the Lenin Regime from the standpoint of not only anti-communism but also the violation of international treaty. Therefore, the allies, especially England and the United States of America, were greatly in favor of aiding the Sermonov Regime which had taken the initiative to overthrow the Lenin Regime. They further willingly cooperated with Japan and showed their intention of doing all they could to assist the establishment of that regime and its military strength.

An Impartial Measure.

The first foundation of the Siberian Incident, even if looked thus from all angles, was justified as an impartial and proper measure. So if at that time our country had firm conviction and, without hesitating to carry out the guarantee by actual force as a retaliatory measure against the violation of international agreements, and had proceeded resolutely for the stabilization of East Asia, in
concert with the Entente Powers, such a move-ment as the establishment of a new order, which is the greatest task of the moment, would have been fairly under-way and expedited by now. As I think of it now, I am freshly filled with deep emotion.

However, the objective circumstances at that time were very complicated and mysterious, and the powers also were hindered by various cir-cumstances of national interests, such that perfect concerted action to aid the new anti-Soviet movement of Semyenov's faction could not be attained. In spite of the successive rise of anti-Soviet movements, such as the Kalach-k and the Harvat Derber regimes, the common object could not be attained. Our country, too, although having a fair and square ground of claim, lacked the resolution to carry things out to the end. In deference to the feelings of the United States of America, we failed to assume a definite attitude. And finally, to our greatest regret, all was lost when it was decided to send a joint expedition under the name of aiding Checho-Slovakia. When I look upon the present decline of the Far East, I cannot forget it however much I try to forget it.
QUESTION: During the Civil War in Russia and later on, during your stay abroad, you actively fought against the Soviet Power. Who supported you financially and directed your anti-Soviet activities?

ANSWER: During the period of 1918-1920, I received pecuniary subsidies, weapons and equipment from the Japanese Government. The main role in intensifying my anti-Soviet activities was played by the then Japanese Prime-Minister, Count TERAUCHI and War Minister Baron TAKAKA.

I was personally connected with SATO, the Japanese Consul-General in Harbin; Colonel Kuranawa, Chief of the Harbin Military Mission; and Major KUROKI, representative of the Japanese Army General Staff. From them I learned about the decision of the Japanese Government to support me in every way; they also informed me that both Count TERAUCHI in the capacity of the Premier of the Japanese Cabinet and Baron TAKAKA as War Minister, persistently strived with the help of Japan to secure by force the outcome of the 1918-1920 events in my favor.

QUESTION: Why were the Japanese Government, Count TERAUCHI and TAKAKA in particular, interested in the initiating of the hostilities in the Far East?

ANSWER: I was informed of the Japanese plans providing for the seizure of the territory of the Soviet Far East. In 1918, 12 Japanese divisions encroached into the Russian territory and completely occupied the Primorye and the Eastern…
THE AFFIDAVIT

OF SEMIONOV, GRIGORI MIKHAILOVICH OF APRIL 1946.

SEMIONOV, G. M. born in 1890 in the
Sevsek village Durulkeveskaya of
the Zabalkalye Region; Russian, a
non-country citizen. Former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
the Russian Eastern Frontier Area;
a white-guard army general.

QUESTION: During the Civil War in Russia and later on, during your
stay abroad, you actively fought against the Soviet Power.
Who supported you financially and directed your anti-Soviet
activities?

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QUESTION: Why were the Japanese Government, and TERAUCHI and TANAKA
in particular, interested in the initiating of the hostilities
in the Far East?

ANSWER: I was informed of the Japanese plans providing for the
seizure of the territory of the Soviet Far East. In 1918,
12 Japanese divisions encroached into the Russian terri­
tory and completely occupied the Primorye and the Eastern
part of the Amur Region. Concurrently, the Japanese started negotiations with KOLCHAK and with myself promising the support of their expeditionary army.

The aim of Japan was to achieve the annex of the Primorye by cutting it from Russia at any cost and to incorporate it with Japan. This was disclosed to me by the Japanese themselves.

In autumn of 1918 in Vladivostok I met KATO, Navy plenipotentiary of the Japanese Government, who later on became Vice-Foreign Minister of Japan. KATO was sent by Japan to meet KOLCHAK and to hand in the proposal of the Japanese Government concerning joint actions against the Red Army.

KATO informed me that the Japanese Government was desirous to come to terms with KOLCHAK on the Japanese occupation of the territory of Siberia up to the Urals. This would secure the safety of the rear of the KOLCHAK Army; in exchange KOLCHAK must give his consent to recognize the right of the Japanese to colonize the Soviet Primorye.

In the beginning of 1920 the Japanese Government endeavored to create a puppet Government in Primorye under its control. They reckoned that under the disguise of the supposed independence of that Government Japan would make the Soviet Primorye serve her interests.

On November 20, 1920, when I, and my Staff were at the Station of Manchuria, Colonel ISOBE, representative of the Japanese General Staff came from Vladivostok and informed me, that the Japanese Government was planning to create an independent Government in the Primorye and was ready to support me as a candidate for the post of the head of this Government.

With the view of continuing the negotiations on the subject, I arrived at Vladivostok at the end of November, 1920, where I met Major-General TANAKA, chief of the Headquarters of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in Siberia.

On behalf of the Japanese Government, TANAKA assured me that ISOBE had correctly presented the Japanese view point on the destiny of the Primorye, and I gave my consent to become the head of the future government in the Primorye.

After that, to define more accurately and fully the conditions offered by Japan, I met Major-General HASHIMOTO, Commanding General of the Kwantung Army, who was soon appointed to the post of the Commanding General of the Japanese Occupational Forces in Siberia. I also met his successor, General KODAMA, the future Chief of the General Staff; I was similarly justified by them as to the desire of Japan to see me at the head of the Primorye Government.

The final conditions proposed by the Japanese Government on the Primorye issue was forwarded to me by Count KATSUKAWA, the Head of the Japanese Mission in the Soviet Far East, who later on, prior to the surrender of Japan, was Imperial Household Minister.
QUESTION: On what conditions did you settle the question of capturing the Soviet Primorye with the Japanese?

ANSWER: The Japanese conditions were as follows: Japan took upon herself to place at my disposal the necessary loan in cash, weapons, and ammunition.

I, on my part, had to do away with all so-called frontier formalities between the Primorye and the territory under the Governor-General of Korea, as soon as I became the head of the Far Eastern Government.

In other words, according to this condition set forth by MATSUDAIRA, I agreed to the annex of the Primorye by Japan. I also agreed to take all decisions pertaining to the questions connected with the possible extension of the territory under the Primorye Government, only together with the Japanese representative.

Along with that I was obliged to make a statement to the effect that I agreed to leave Japan the right to freely carry on the immigration of the Japanese and Koreans to the territories of the Soviet Far East and the Soviet Sakhalin.

QUESTION: Was it only the Soviet Primorye and Northern Sakhalin that the Japanese territorial claims were limited to?

ANSWER: No. The seizure of Northern Sakhalin and the Soviet Primorye was only part of the Japanese plans, which provided for wider territorial gains at the expense of Russia; Japan planned to seize the whole of Eastern Russia as far as the Baikal.

In 1920 I conducted negotiations on this issue with General TOCHIBANA, who at that time was promoted to the post of the Commanding General of the Japanese Occupational Forces in the Far East, and with Colonel UEDA who later on was in the rank of General and commanded the Kwantung Army.

TOCHIBANA and UEDA invited me to come to Vladivostok and informed me that the Japanese Command was preparing an offensive into the depth of the Russian territory from the Khabarovsk district in the direction of the F.C.R.R.

As a result of this offensive, TOCHIBANA told me, the Japanese troops would carry out the full occupation of the Soviet territory up to the Baikal.

TOCHIBANA and UEDA also informed me that the Japanese Government was planning to create an independent Government under me in the Zabaikalye and to completely annex the Primorye.

Japan failed to carry out the plan of seizing the Zabaikalye and the Primorye, yet she kept her forces on the Soviet territory until 1922, reckoning that she would succeed somehow to annex the Primorye from the Soviet Russia by force.

[Question: What]
QUESTION: What was the Japanese's attitude towards the population of the Soviet Primorye and Eastern Siberia during the intervention?

ANSWER: Throughout the period of the Japanese occupation in the Far East, the Japanese troops treated the local population most inhumanly. The regime established by them in the Primorye and Siberia was a combination of plunder, coercion and unheard of atrocities. Upon entering Khabarovsk the Japanese troops went looting throughout the town. They broke into the houses, stole valuables, raped women, and there were cases when earrings were torn off the ears of Russian Women. I also know that by personal order of the Japanese General Goi, all cattle and horses were taken away from the population of the town of Khabarovsk. A great amount of railroad equipment, captured by the Japanese in the stores of the Ussuri Railroad, was shipped to Japan. At the same time threatening the local population of the Primorye with repressive measures, the Japanese took away their land allotments and settled colonists from Korea and Japan on them.

As a result of the Japanese policy of colonization, the Russian population of the Primorye and Eastern Siberia was placed in an exceedingly hard situation. As far as I know the Japanese went on preparing for attacks on the Soviet Union, pursuing the same aim of territorial seizure even after the Japanese intervention in the Soviet Far East was over.

QUESTION: What do you know about the Japanese preparations for military aggression against the Soviet Union?

ANSWER: Upon the failure of the Japanese intervention in the Soviet Far East, they started working out new aggressive plans in Japan. In 1927 the so-called "TANAKA MEMORANDUM" was published in the world press. The Japanese tried to refute the existence of that document through their press, but I was personally informed by TANAKA himself that the said plan actually existed. In 1926 when it became known in Japan that the "GENRO COUNCIL" took the decision to offer TANAKA to form a new Japanese Government, the Minseito party accused TANAKA of having allegedly bought for himself the leadership in the Seiyukai party for 20 million yen, which funds had been assigned by the Diet for the expenditures on the military operations during the Japanese intervention in the Soviet Far East and were entrusted to TANAKA, who was War Minister at that time. This question was investigated by Prosecutor-General of the Tokyo prefecture, and in December 1926 I was summoned by him to bear witness in the case.
At the Tokyo Station I was met by General YAMANASHI, TANAKA's closest friend, who took me to TANAKA's private residence.

TANAKA welcomed me and speaking fluent Russian told me that he knew I was summoned by the Prosecutor; he also told me about the alleged crimes he was being accused of and asked me to speak in his favor before the Prosecutor, when giving my testimony concerning the 1918-1922 events.

TANAKA recommended that I ground the expenditure of the 20 million yen by persuading the Prosecutor that the War Ministry supported financially not only myself but the white-guard generals KHORVAT, KOLMYKOV and KUSNETSOV as well.

At that time TANAKA corroborated the information of the "GENRO COUNCIL"'s decision to entrust him with the formation of a new Japanese Cabinet.

TANAKA said that when he became the Premier he would direct the Japanese Government to carry out his plan of the annex of East Siberia from the U.S.S.R., that plan having been elaborated by him long before, and he said he would carry out the creation of a liminotope state on that territory.

During the conversation TANAKA promised that I should be appointed the head of the Far-Eastern State to be.

TANAKA went on developing his ideas and stated that the realization of the plan would be effected in a somewhat different way, as compared with that of the period of the intervention in Siberia.

As TANAKA put it, his plan was as follows: Japan would seize Manchuria and proclaim the creation of a separate state on the Manchurian territory, and then she would attack the U.S.S.R., and seize Eastern Siberia up to Lake Baikal.

TANAKA proposed to create a government which would please the Japanese on the annexed Soviet territory, and then to declare the independence of the annexed Soviet Far East. The next day I called on the Prosecutor-General and in accordance with TANAKA's request testified that the 20 million yen had positively been spent on the military needs connected with the intervention.

Ensuing my calling on the Prosecutor I was invited by TANAKA to dinner with himself, General YAMANASHI and SHOODJI, the interpreter.

At dinner I asked TANAKA what Japan was going to do with Manchuria in case China protested against turning it into a separate state.

TANAKA replied that he was speaking quite frankly with me and then told me that the creation of a separate state in Manchuria would be just the first step which would be immediately followed by another, to wit, the complete incorporation of Manchuria with Japan and the subjugation of the former to the purpose of Japan.
I asked TANAKA whether Japan would attack the U.S.S.R. if the plan of the seizure of Manchuria failed due to some or other cause. YAMANASHI answered this question saying that following TANAKA's coming to power, TAMANASHI would be appointed Governor of Korea and, if the realization of the plan of attacking the U.S.S.R. through Manchuria failed, the Korean territory would be used as a military base for the attack on the Soviet Primoryo.

TANAKA corroborated YAMANASHI's statement and said that when a final scheme of attack against the U.S.S.R. was chosen, the advantage of using the Russian whiteguard emigrants, residing in the sphere of the Japanese influence would be taken into consideration.

TANAKA recommended that I should intensify the preparation of whiteguard emigrants for war against the U.S.S.R. so that they might play a definite role in it.

Towards the end of our conversation it was decided that I should maintain a close contact with YAMANASHI and TANAKA's closest associate - TANAKA SHASHIN, one of the leaders of the "BLACK DRAGON" society.

In 1928 when the "TANAKA MEMORANDUM" became known and the Japanese refuted the existence of that document, I still had an opportunity to convince myself that the Japanese were intensely preparing for the realization of that plan.

In 1928 I met TANAKA SHASHIN in Tokyo and asked him to elucidate me as to Baron TANAKA's future plans. TANAKA SHASHIN told me that Baron TANAKA's plans were not changed and to confirm this he showed me a scheme of the railroad construction in Manchuria, provided the occupation of Manchuria were effected by the Japanese troops.

The existence of TANAKA's plan became quite indisputable when the incident of 1931 took place and when the Japanese occupied Manchuria as was set forth in the plan.

Did you participate in the seizure of Manchuria by the Japanese?

Yes I did. I personally took an active part in the preparation for the occupation of Manchuria. As far back as 1926, in Tyentsin, I established a personal contact with PU-YI through my old acquaintance, the Chinaman LO-DZU-YUI, who was PU-YI's tutor. At that time PU-YI lived on the territory of the Japanese concession in Tyentsin. First LO-DZU-YUI and then PU-YI himself intimated to me that negotiations had been started between PU-YI and the Japanese on the restoration of PU-YI's claims on the Imperial Throne in Peking.

The Japanese had promised PU-YI their support but delayed the solution of the question.
PU-YI asked me to assist him in his negotiations with the Japanese. I gave my consent, and arriving in Tokyo met with Count OKUDAIRA and TOYAMA KITSHA who was at that time a well known politician. I asked both of them to use their influence and assist in the quick solution of this question.

After that, during the period from 1929 to 1930 I several times entered into negotiations with the representatives of the Japanese Government on behalf of PU-YI, and in March 1931 I succeeded in having Lt. Gen. NINOMIYA, then Deputy Chief of the Japanese Army General Staff, state that PU-YI would be rendered a substantial assistance by the Japanese.

General NINOMIYA asked me to forward his request to PU-YI to send his representative from among the Chinese.

I got connected with LAO-MOU-YU, and PU-YI's private secretary LU arrived in Tokyo. General NINOMIYA received him and informed him of the firm decision of the Japanese Government to assist PU-YI in the restoration of his Imperial prerogatives.

Presently the Japanese staged the Chinese General WAIT's aggression against the Japanese which served as a pretext for the opening of hostilities which ended in the occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese.

Then a government was formed in Harbin— which would please the Japanese, and PU-YI was placed at the head of the Government.

QUESTION: Who of the Japanese military leaders played the most active role in the seizure of Manchuria.

ANSWER: General DOJO the Commanding General of the Kwantung Army directed the operations of the seizure of Manchuria. Besides, an active role in initiating war in the Far East was played by the group of the so-called young officers. Among them were Colonel ITAGA, who occupied the post of Deputy Chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarters, Colonel DOHARA, Chief of the Japanese Military Mission in Mukden, Colonel SHIMAMOTO, Chief of the Mukden garrison, and Maj. Gen. KACHIBOTO, Chief of the Japanese military in Manchuria.

As a pretext for attacking Manchuria, the Japanese staged the notorious "Mukden Incident", the preparation for which had been conducted since July 1931.

At the time I was in Mukden, I met ITAGA, DOHARA, SHIMAMOTO and KACHIBOTO there, and was aware of the provocation that was being traced by them.

I was beforehand personally informed by SHIMAMOTO of the plan of the Japanese in which the objectives that were to be taken first were shown, as well as artillery positions for opening fire at the Chinese barracks were prepared.
At the same time another division of the Japanese troops was brought into Mukden in smaller units. Later on this division participated in disarming the Chinese garrison.

At that time DOIHMURA was conducting an active political preparation selecting his agents from among the Chinese who further on constituted the backbone of the administrative body created by the Japanese in Manchuria.

Among the Chinese selected by DOIHMURA for the collaboration with the Japanese there were ZAIN, the first Premier of Manchouko, ILO, the second Premier of Manchouko, and many others.

On September 17, 1931 under the supervision of SUMMOTO and DOIHMURA a railway bridge of no significance near Mukden was blown up by the Japanese. The Japanese press published a report of the Chinese soldiers having allegedly blown up the bridge, ensuing which the Japanese opened hostilities which resulted in the attaining of their aim— the seizure of Manchuria.

Having accomplished this part of their aggressive plan, Japan started intensive preparations of the Manchurian military base for their attack on the U.S.S.R.

In their plans the Japanese emphasized the significant role that the whiteguard emigrants were to play.

**QUESTION:**

What role were the Russian whiteguard emigrants to play according to the Japanese military plans?

**ANSWER:**

Soon after the occupation of Manchuria, in 1931, I was called to Colonel ISHIMURA, Chief of the Second Section of the Kwantung Army Headquarters to confer on the question concerning the Russian emigrants. ISHIMURA informed me that the Japanese Government in virtue of its benevolent attitude towards the whiteguard emigrants, was desirous to help us realize our long cherished dream—to return to the Fatherland. When I asked him to explain what he meant by saying it, he replied that the Japanese General Staff was working out a plan of invasion of the Japanese army into the territory of the Soviet Union with the whiteguards playing an important role in that operation.

Then ISHIMURA suggested that I start preparing armed forces composed of whiteguards and said that I should report to him about the measures taken, as soon as possible.

When we met next I reported to ISHIMURA my proposal as to the necessity of uniting the whiteguard emigrants in China and Japan and Manchuria into one organization giving it the name of the Russian Whiteguard Emigrants Affairs Board under the Ministry of the Interior of Manchouko. ISHIMURA agreed with me and said that I should be at the head only of that part of
the Russian emigrants that lived on the Manchoukuo territory, as to the other emigrants' settlements, they would be supervised respectively by the headquarters of the Japanese Army in the areas of which they resided.

In 1934 as a result of negotiations between me and Major General ANDO, Chief of the Japanese Military Mission, the question of the creation of the whiteguard emigrants' organization in Manchuria, was finally decided.

When in 1934 ANDO and I met in the "Kaguya Hotel" in Harbin we composed a draft of the whiteguard emigrants' organization to be in Manchuria, and came to an agreement as to the nominees for the leading posts in the organization.

In the same year, 1934, the organization of the Russian emigrants in Manchuria was created and by suggestion of the Kwantung Army Headquarters was called the "Russian Emigrants Affairs Bureau", abbreviated "BRE".

I must say here that the creation of the "Russian Emigrants Affairs Bureau" must in no means be considered as an expression of the Japanese' care for the Russian emigrants.

Although they needed the whiteguard emigrants as an instrument for carrying on work hostile to the Soviet Union, they did not at all care to give them any rights whatsoever. Quite the contrary, the Japanese encouraged all sorts of manifestation of ill will against Russians as the representatives of the white race.

General KIISO was the ideological leader in the sphere of racial discrimination, as well as religious persecution policy. He was chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarters from 1933 to 1935 and later on Prime-Minister of Japan.

On KIISO's urgent request an instruction of the Japanese Ministry of Education found its application in the Japanese schools, that instruction prescribing the teachers as a matter of obligation to inculcate in the Japanese children hatred towards Russians, Americans and English and to imbue them with the idea of the Japanese being a higher race in comparison with the other nationalities.

Also it was on KIISO's initiative that in 1940 in Manchuria was published PU-YI's manifesto which prescribed the entire population of Manchuria, regardless of the religious convictions of these or those national groups, to worship the Japanese goddess Amaterasu.

The persecution of Russians became still worse following the beginning of Japan's war against the U. S. A., and Great Britain, when one could see Russians beaten openly by the Japanese in the streets of Harbin and Dairen.

These facts prove that Japan needed the "BREm" only in view of her war against the U. S. R.
QUESTION: What specific tasks were given the "Russian Emigrants Affairs Bureau" in Manchuria by the Japanese?

ANSWER: By the creation of "EREm" were pursued the aims of the consolidation of the anti-Soviet ideology among the emigrants and of the preparation of them for war against the Soviet Union on the side of Japan.

The work of the "EREm" was carried on in accordance with these tasks. The "Chief Russian Emigrants Affairs Bureau" was in Noykin. At the beginning General HILLOV was at the head of it, Major-General MAZHNENKO, who was later appointed by the Japanese to the post of the Chief of the "EREm", was my personal representative in the Chief "EREm".

There were five sections in the chief EREm:
1st—Propaganda;
2nd—Military training of the ultraguard emigrants;
3rd—Intelligence and counter-intelligence;
4th—Economic;
5th—Charity.

Besides, the council of nationalities was organized in the EREm. It was composed of the chairmen of the national communities: Dr. ZAGIANO of the Jewish Community, Professor KULZENKO—KOSZANZY of the Ukrainian Community, and also the representatives of the Tauric-Tatars and Armenian groups.

The council of nationalities periodically held conferences with the Chief of the "EREm" and decided questions concerning contact of the national organizations with one another.

Anti-Soviet propaganda was widely disseminated among the emigrants. Upon my approval KOSZANZY—KULZENKO, who escaped from the Soviet Union in 1925, was appointed the Chief of the propaganda section. He started intensive anti-Soviet activities.

On the initiative of AMARCH, Deputy Chief of the Japanese Military Mission, a print-shop was equipped in Noykin in 1934. KOSZANZY supervised the publishing of the newspaper "Nash Put" (Our Way) and the Magazine "Natsia" (Nation), which were printed in that print-shop.

At that time was also started the printing of pamphlets and leaflets which were widely spread in Manchuria, and part of these publications were printed on especially fine paper to facilitate their smuggling to and scattering throughout the U.S.S.R.

Prior to the transfer of the E.C.R. into the hands of the Japanese, KOSZANZY told me that they managed to smuggle their pamphlets and leaflets into the U.S.S.R. with the assistance of the railroad employees.

In 1941, when the U.S.S.R.—Japanese Pact was concluded, the Kwantung Army Headquarters ordered that they should change the
tone of their publications with regard to the U.S.S.R., but it was pointed out that the anti-Soviet propaganda should not be checked altogether and that it should be conducted by publishing and spreading pamphlets and leaflets among the emigrants.

The newspaper "Kuo-Pu" office was transferred to Shanghai, whereas the cover of the "Kuowin" Magazine began to carry an inscription of allegedly being also published in Shanghai, though it was still being published in Harbin.

Along with all that the Japanese instructed that oral propaganda should be intensified through various literary and historic circles. The sole aim of such circles was conducting anti-Soviet propaganda.

It was at that time that the young emigrants began to be drawn into the created by the Japanese "Kyo-Wa-Kai" association (Commonwealth of Nations), where they were to familiarize themselves with the Japanese politics.

The "Kyo-Wa-Kai" was created in 1932, by the Japanese pursuant to Emperor H.II's special manifesto. The "Kyo-Wa-Kai" was an organization spread widely among all the strata of the Manchurian population including the whiteguard emigrants. The aim of that organization was to implant in the minds of the population the ideas requisite to the Japanese and justifying Japan's aggressive designs.

The "Kyo-Wa-Kai" also preached the idea of Japan's domination over the other nations of East Asia.

The Kwantung Army Headquarters supervised the activities of the "Kyo-Wa-Kai" and its directives were obligatory for the leadership of the society.

Maj.-Gen. Furukawa, Prime Minister CHANG-CHIN-KUI was the President of the "Kyo-Wa-Kai", but its actual supervisors were the Japanese "Kwai-Cha" and MIAI, former Chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarters.

The Central Office of the "Kyo-Wa-Kai" was in Changchun, and there were the local branch offices of the "Kyo-Wa-Kai" in other towns, which supervised the network of the primary nuclei among the population.

In 1938 I published a book under the title of "About Myself" in which I described the progress of my struggle against the Soviet power during the Civil War, and pointing out to the mistakes made by the whiteguard army. I developed the idea of the necessity of uniting the whiteguard emigrants with the view of overthrowing the Soviet power.

In 1942 I wrote another book following the suggestion of General DI, Chief of the Harbin Military Mission. The title of the book was "Thoughts on the New Era"; I handed the manuscript to the Japanese.
In this book I advocated the idea of Japan's being the leader of East Asia, and suggested that an authoritative body be established in Japan which would represent the block of the states of East Asia.

I proposed that the whiteguard emigrants be given a separate territory in Inner Mongolia.

In addition to these, on the order of Colonel VLAI and Major-General KIMARU, the Chiefs of the Military Mission, I wrote articles directed against measures carried out in the Red Army.

In this way the ideological preparation of the whiteguard emigrants for war against the U.S.S.R. was combined with military training, carried out on a large scale.

**QUESTION:** How was the military training of the whiteguard emigrants conducted?

**ANSWER:**

"The Whiteguard Emigrate Affairs Bureau" included military training in the curriculum of the emigrant schools, and beginning from 1939 special military detachments were organized.

One of these detachments, 500 men strong, was stationed at Hantacheta, the second 500 men strong at the railroad station Sungari 2. Throughout the existence of both detachments 4,500 emigrants were given complete training, and subsequently they were mustered every summer for additional training.

In Zakhinganye Area (the area beyond the Khingan Mountain Range), where the whiteguard emigrants were mainly occupied in agriculture, and it was not profitable for the Japanese to have them interrupt their work, the young emigrants were mustered for a three-week period of military training every year.

Colonel PORINSTU's detachment was stationed in Khailar and another, under the command of Cossack Captain FESKOV, was stationed in Yakki. Each of these detachments was 1,200 men strong. During the summers the said detachments were used for military operations against Chinese guerrillas.

All these military detachments were trained to be ready for military operations together with the Japanese against the U.S.S.R.

**Question:** What was your particular role in the Japanese plans of attack on the Soviet Union?

**Answer:**

In 1936, I was called by Major-General ANDO, the Chief of the Japanese Intelligence Service in Manchuria who informed me that he wanted to initiate me into the military plans of the Japanese
Japanese, ANDO started that the Japanese Government had planned for the nearest future to effect the invasion of the Japanese troops into the Soviet Primorye, where it was planned to create a limniprope state of Manchoukuo type, in which I should play the leading role.

In the same year 1936, I met General OKAMURA, Chief of the Kwantun Army headquarters. I learned from him, that according to the Japanese plan of invasion, the Ussuri region was to be incorporated into Manchoukuo, and a buffer state was to be created extending from Lake Baikal to the East, with myself at the head of the Government.

**QUESTION:**
Tell the names of the Japanese politicians and military war lords, who initiated those aggressive plans.

**ANSWER:**
War Minister General ARAKI most strikingly expressed the Japanese aggressive aspirations at that period. We were friendly, General ARAKI and myself, since the 1918-1922 Japanese intervention. In that time ARAKI was chief of the Japanese Military Mission in Harbin.

When from 1931 ARAKI became War Minister and then a member of the Supreme Military Council of Japan I repeatedly went to see him in Tokyo and had long talks with him.

In 1936 ARAKI told me that Japan was striving at the creation of heavy industry in Manchuria, in as short time as possible, with the task of partial provision of the Kwantung Army needs.

Having the creation of this industrial base Japan would begin war against the Soviet Union. It was then that I learned for the first time from ARAKI that AKAWA, a representative of the industrial circles, was appointed to supervise the creation of the Manchurian industrial base for the army. ARAKI characterized AKAWA as one of the official industrial leaders.

At that time under the supervision of AKAWA the intensive construction of an iron- and- steel plant was started in Southern Manchuria, as well as the reconstruction of the Anshan and Mukden works.

When enlarging on the question of war against the U.S.S.R. ARAKI told me that the Japanese plan at that time essentially was to effect the annexation of Eastern Siberia and the Primorye from the U.S.S.R. by the use of force and to create a limniprope state on that territory.

Along with that ARAKI stated that only the seizure of the Primor'e might be effected by Japan at first, which would in no way mean the cessation of the further advance into the core...
of the U.S.S.R., the ultimate aim of Japan, ARAKI concluded, for all times being the territory immediately East of Lake Baikal.

Towards the end of our conversation ARAKI suggested that I should maintain a close contact with the Kwantung Army Headquarters, whose immediate task it was to carry the plan of the seizure of the Soviet Far East into effect.

When later on ARAKI and I met, he was always true to his word and confirmed his previous statements to the effect that the preparation for war against the U.S.S.R. was the main purpose of his activities.

In 1933 the Japanese General Staff decided to reconnoitre the power of the Red Army in the Far East by battle, and opened hostilities in the Lake Harsan district. Major YAMAOKA, a General Staff Officer, came to Dairen from Tokyo to see me, with a special task to inform and have me prepared for the events which were taking place. YAMAOKA warned me that I with the whiteguard emigrant units had to be ready to participate in the operations as, provided the operations in the Lake Harsan district progressed successfully, large forces of the Japanese Army would be thrown into the Soviet Primorye, and the whiteguard emigrants units would be used for the consolidation of the occupied territory.

When the Red Army liquidated the Japanese break-through into the Soviet territory in no time, and peace negotiations were started, the Japanese Command initiated the preparation for a new diversion in the direction of the M.P.R. and the Soviet Zabaikalye.

I was to take part in this operation, and, in case of a successful break-through, I, with the whiteguard emigrants units, had to begin an advance in Inner Mongolia through the M.P.R. into the Soviet Union. The Japanese pointed out that the main strategic direction of the Japanese blow was the Zabaikalye which in the opinion of the Japanese was the narrow outlet thru which went the supplies for the Soviet Primorye.

Major-General ANDO in his talk with me said that the Japanese reckoned that in case they succeeded in intercepting the Red Army communications at Lake Baikal, the Soviet Far East would be annexed from the Soviet Union.

Although the Nomongan Incident ended in a defeat for the Japanese they went on drawing plans of war against the U.S.S.R. and M.P.R.

I was included in this work as well.

At the end of 1941, by order of Colonel UKAI, Chief of the Dairen Military Mission, I worked out a plan of the formation of Mongolian units, taking into consideration the modern technic and the peculiarities of the Mongolian armed forces.
With the view of the utilization of the Mongols in the war against the U.S.S.R. and the M.P.R., the Japanese were deciding the question of what particular type of units would be most suitable for them and sought my collaboration in the working out of this plan.

I handed in my plan of the formation of Mongolian Units to Colonel UKAI in November, 1941, when the battles between the German troops and the Red Army were raging on the approaches to Moscow.

Colonel UKAI, who had the right of direct contact with the Japanese General Staff and was always informed about the decisions, taken in the General Staff, told me that the time was approaching when Japan would enter into the war against the U.S.S.R.

I reminded UKAI of the existing peace treaty between Japan and the U.S.S.R. To this UKAI replied that the Japanese General Staff had already taken the decision to launch an attack on the Soviet Union and would certainly realize it as soon as the fall of Moscow became known.

The Army General Staff's attitude to the peace treaty between Japan and the U.S.S.R., UKAI went on, was as follows: if the Japanese are benefited by the observance of the treaty, it should be observed; if, on the contrary, gains may be obtained by violating the treaty—violated it must be by all means.

The following fact is worth one's attention, though Japan went through great military hardships in 1944-1945, the Japanese military circles did not give up their designs of attacking the U.S.S.R.

In 1944 I was called by Major-General AKIKUSA, Chief of the Kharbin Military Mission, who informed me that the Japanese units would possibly soon retreat from their positions in China, and if this was the case, the Army General Staff would not consider the possibility of Japan's war against the U.S.S.R. fully eliminated; therefore it was necessary to consolidate the Inner Mongolian military base by means of forming new Mongolian Military Units. I was commissioned by the Japanese Army General Staff to lead these formations.

In connection with this decision, the Manchurian detachment formed by the Japanese under Lieutenant-General GARKAEV-USMAN and consisting of six cavalry regiments and an artillery division, which were to constitute the backbone of the Mongolian Army to be, were transferred from Khailar to Khingan.
In June 1945 I had a talk with Major-General KUBO, Chief of the Japanese Military Mission in Mukden. He said that if Japan succeeded in coming to terms with China on the conclusion of peace, Japan would be able to transfer her troops now engaged in China to Manchuria, and then she would have her hands free to begin war against the Soviet Union.

Saying this KUBO referred to the alleged decision of the Japanese Government on this question. From that conversation with KUBO I came to the conclusion that the Japanese Army General Staff had a specially worked out plan of an attack on the Soviet Union.

I personally witnessed how throughout 1944-1945, in view of the realization of that plan, the Japanese actively consolidated the Kwantung Army and prepared for the invasion into the territory of the U.S.S.R. But the offensive operations of the Soviet troops in Manchuria smashed all their military plans.

The record is taken down from my words correctly and has been read by me.

Signed /SEMENOV/

Interrogated: Counter-Intelligence Officer

Lieutenant-Colonel /SOKOLOV/
CERTIFICATE

The City of Moscow. April 11, 1946.

I, Semenov, Grigory Mikhailovich, sign this certificate to the effect that I promise to testify the truth bearing witness in the case of the main Japanese War Criminals.

I was duly warned of the responsibility for giving false testimony as set forth in Article 95 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

Signed: /SEMEENOV/

The certificate is taken by the Counter-Intelligence Officer

Lieutenant-Colonel /SOKOLOV/

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, V. A. Kaplan, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: V. Kaplan
"Conference on the Limitations of Armaments in 1922" (Izono Shidehara's statement).

THE CHAIRMAN (speaking in English): I am directed by the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions to report to the Conference that in the discussion of matters relating to Siberia the following statement was made to the Committee by Izono Shidehara on behalf of the Japanese Government. The statement is as follows:

"The military expedition of Japan to Siberia was originally undertaken in common accord and in cooperation with the United States in 1918. It was primarily intended to render assistance to the Czecho-Slovak troops who, in their homeward journey across Siberia from European Russia, found themselves in grave and pressing danger at the hands of hostile forces under German command. The Japanese and American expeditionary forces together with other Allied troops fought their way from Vladivostok far into the region of the Amur and the Trans-Baikal Provinces to protect the railway lines which afforded the sole means of transportation of the Czecho-Slovak troops from the interior of Siberia to the port of Vladivostok. Difficulties which the Allied forces had to encounter in their operations in the severe cold winter of Siberia were immense.

"In January, 1920, the United States decided to terminate its military undertaking in Siberia, and ordered the withdrawal of its forces. For some time thereafter, Japanese troops continued alone to carry out the duty of guarding several points along the Trans-Siberian Railway in fulfillment of interallied arrangements, and of affording facilities to the returning Czecho-Slovaks.

"The last column of Czecho-Slovak troops safely embarked from Vladivostok in September, 1920. Ever since then, Japan has been looking forward to an early moment for the withdrawal of her troops from Siberia. The maintenance of such troops in a foreign land is for her a costly and thankless undertaking, and she will be only too happy to be relieved of such responsibility. In fact, the evacuation of the Trans-Baikal and the Amur Provinces was already completed in 1920. The only region which now remains to be evacuated is the southern portion of the Maritime Province around Vladivostok and Nikolait.

"It will be appreciated that for Japan the question of the withdrawal of troops from Siberia is not quite as simple as it was for other Allied Powers. In the first place, there are a considerable number of Japanese residents who had lawfully and under protection of treaty established themselves in Siberia long before the Bolshevik eruption, and were thereafter entirely welcomed. In 1917, prior to the joint American-Japanese military enterprise, the number of such residents was already no less than 9,717. In the actual situation prevailing there, these Japanese residents can hardly be expected to look for the protection of their lives and property to any other authorities than Japanese troops. Whatever districts those troops have evacuated
in the past have fallen into disorder, and practically all Japanese residents have had precipitately to withdraw, to seek for their personal safety. In so withdrawing, they have been obliged to leave behind large portions of their property, abandoned and unprotected, and their homes and places of business have been destroyed. While the hardships and losses thus caused the Japanese in the Trans-Baikal and the Amur Provinces have been serious enough, more extensive damages are likely to follow from the evacuation of Vladivostok, in which a larger number of Japanese have always been resident and a greater amount of Japanese capital invested.

"There is another difficulty by which Japan is faced in proceeding to the recall of her troops from the Maritime Province. Due to geographical propinquity, the general situation in the districts around Vladivostok and Risok is bound to affect the security of the Korean frontier. In particular, it is known that these districts have long been the base of Korean conspiracies against Japan. Those hostile Koreans, joining hands with lawless elements in Russia, attempted in 1920 to invade Korea through the Chinese territory of Chihli. They set fire to the Japanese Consulate at Hunchun and committed indiscriminate acts of murder and pillage. At the present time, they are under the effective control of Japanese troops stationed in the Maritime Province, but they still no doubt renew the attempt to penetrate into Korea at the first favorable opportunity that may present itself.

"Having regard to those considerations, the Japanese Government have felt bound to exercise precaution in carrying out the contemplated evacuation of the Maritime Province. Should they take hasty action without adequate provision for the future, they would be delinquent in their duty of affording protection to a large number of their nationals resident in the districts in question and of maintaining order and security in Korea.

"It should be made clear that no part of the Maritime Province is under Japan's military occupation. Japanese troops are still stationed in the southern portion of that Province, but they have not set up any civil or military administration to displace local authorities. Their activity is confined to measures of self-protection against the menace to their own safety and to the safety of their country and nationals. They are not in occupation of these districts any more than American or other Allied troops could be said to have been in occupation of the places in which they were formerly stationed.

"The Japanese Government are anxious to see an orderly and stable authority speedily reestablished in the Far Eastern possessions of Russia. It was this spirit that they manifested a keen interest in the patriotic but ill-fated struggle of Admiral Kolchak. They have shown readiness to lend their good offices for promoting the reconciliation of various political groups in Eastern Siberia. But they have carefully refrained from supporting one faction against another. It will be recalled, for instance, that they withheld all assistance from General Razumow against the revolutionary movements which led to his overthrow in January, 1920. They maintained an attitude of strict neutrality, and refused to interfere in those movements, which it would have been quite easy for them to suppress, if they had so desired.
"In relation to this policy of nonintervention, it may be useful to refer briefly to the past relations between the Japanese authorities and Ataman Semenoff, which seem to have been a source of popular misgiving and speculation. It will be remembered that the growing rapprochement between the Germans and the Bolshevik Government in Russia in the early part of 1918 naturally gave rise to apprehensions in the Allied countries that a considerable quantity of munitions supplied by those countries and stored in Vladivostok might be removed by the Bolsheviks to European Russia, for the use of the Germans. Ataman Semenoff was then in Siberia and was organizing a movement to check such Bolshevik activities and to preserve order and stability in that region. It was in this situation that Japan, as well as some of the Allies, began to give support to the Cossack chief. After a few months, such support by the other Powers was discontinued, but the Japanese were reluctant to abandon their friend, whose efforts in the Allied cause they had originally encouraged, and they maintained for some time their connection with Ataman Semenoff. They had, however, no intention whatever of interfering in the domestic affairs of Russia, and when it was found that the assistance rendered to the Ataman was likely to complicate the internal situation in Siberia, they terminated all relations with him and no support of any kind has since been extended to him by the Japanese authorities.

"The Japanese Government are now seriously considering plans which would justify them in carrying out their decision of the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Maritime Province, with reasonable precaution for the security of Japanese residents of the Korean frontier regions. It is for this purpose that negotiations were opened some time ago at Dairen between the Japanese representatives and the agents of the Chita Government. Those negotiations at Dairen are in no way intended to secure for Japan any right or advantage of an exclusive nature. They have been solely actuated by a desire to adjust some of the more pressing questions with which Japan is confronted in relation to Siberia. They have essentially in view the conclusion of provisional commercial arrangements, the removal of the existing menace to the security of Japan and to the lives and property of Japanese residents in Eastern Siberia, the provision of guarantees for the freedom of lawful undertakings in that region and the prohibition of Bolshevik propaganda over the Siberian border. Should adequate provisions be arranged on the lines indicated, the Japanese Government will at once proceed to the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Maritime Province.

"The occupation of certain points in the Russian Province of Sakhalin is wholly different, both in nature and in origin, from the stationing of troops in the Maritime Province. History affords few instances similar to the incident of 1920 at Nikolaitte, where more than seven hundred Japanese, including women and children, as well as the duly recognized Japanese Consul and his family and his official staff, were cruelly tortured and massacred. No nation worthy of respect will possibly remain forbearing under such a strain of provocation. Nor was it possible for the Japanese Government to disregard the just popular indignation aroused in Japan by the incident."
Under the actual condition of things, Japan found no alternative but to occupy, as a measure of reprisal, certain points in the Russian Province of Sakhalin, in which the outrage was committed, pending the establishment in Russia of a responsible authority with whom she can communicate in order to obtain due satisfaction.

"Nothing is further from the thought of the Japanese Government than to take advantage of the present helpless condition of Russia for prosecuting selfish designs. Japan recalls with deep gratitude and appreciation the brilliant role which Russia played in the interest of civilization during the earlier stage of the Great War. The Japanese people have shown and will continue to show every constructive interest in the efforts of patriotic Russians aspiring to the unity and rehabilitation of their country. The military occupation of the Russian Province of Sakhalin is only a temporary measure, and will naturally come to an end as soon as a satisfactory settlement of the question shall have been arranged with an orderly Russian Government.

"In conclusion, the Japanese Delegation is authorized to declare that it is the fixed and settled policy of Japan to respect the territorial integrity of Russia, and to observe the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of that country, as well as the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in every part of the Russian possessions."

I, E. E. Danly, do hereby certify that the foregoing extract is a true and correct copy of the statement of Baron SHIDEHARA which appears on pages 340 to 346 of the volume "Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington, November 12, 1921, February 6, 1922", published by the Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., and is in my custody.

/s/ E. E. DANLEY

E. E. DANLEY
Chief, Document Division, IPS
"Conference on the Limitations of Armaments in 1922" (Baron Shidehara's statement).

THE CHAIRMAN (speaking in English): I am directed by the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Questions to report to the Conference that in the discussion of matters relating to Siberia the following statement was made to the Committee by Baron Shidehara on behalf of the Japanese Government. The statement is as follows:

"The military expedition of Japan to Siberia was originally undertaken in common accord and in cooperation with the United States in 1918. It was primarily intended to render assistance to the Czech-Slovak troops who, in their homeward journey across Siberia from European Russia, found themselves in grave and pressing danger at the hands of hostile forces under German command. The Japanese and American expeditionary forces together with other Allied troops fought their way from Vladivostok far into the region of the Amur and the Trans-Baikal Provinces to protect the railway lines which afforded the sole means of transportation of the Czech-Slovak troops from the interior of Siberia to the port of Vladivostok. Difficulties which the Allied forces had to encounter in their operations in the severe cold winter of Siberia were immense.

"In January, 1920, the United States decided to terminate its military undertaking in Siberia, and ordered the withdrawal of its forces. For some time thereafter, Japanese troops continued to carry out the duty of guarding several points along the Trans-Siberian Railway in fulfillment of interallied arrangements, and of affording facilities to the returning Czech-Slovaks.

"The last column of Czech-Slovak troops safely embarked from Vladivostok in September, 1920. Ever since then, Japan has been looking forward to an early moment for the withdrawal of her troops from Siberia. The maintenance of such troops in a foreign land is for her a costly and thankless undertaking, and she will be only too happy to be relieved of such responsibility. In fact, the evacuation of the Trans-Baikal and the Amur Provinces was already completed in 1920. The only region which now remains to be evacuated is the southern portion of the Maritime Province around Vladivostok and Nikolsk.

"It will be appreciated that for Japan the question of the withdrawal of troops from Siberia is not quite as simple as it was for other Allied Powers. In the first place, there are a considerable number of Japanese residents who had licitally and under guarantees of treaty established themselves in Siberia long before the declaration of war and were there entirely welcomed. In 1917, prior to the joint American-Japanese military enterprise, the number of such residents was already 9,771. In the actual situation prevailing there, these Japanese residents can hardly be expected to look for the protection of their lives and property to any other authorities than Japanese troops. Whatever districts these troops have evacuated
in the past have fallen into disorder, and practically all Japanese residents have had precipitately to withdraw, to seek for their personal safety. In so withdrawing, they have been obliged to leave behind large portions of their property, abandoned and unprotected, and their homes and places of business have been destroyed. While the hardships and losses thus caused the Japanese in the Trans-Baikal and the Amur Provinces have been serious enough, more extensive dangers are likely to follow from the evacuation of Vladivostok, in which a larger number of Japanese have always been resident and a greater amount of Japanese capital invested.

"There is another difficulty by which Japan is faced in proceeding to the recall of her troops from the Maritime Province. Due to geographical propinquity, the general situation in the districts around Vladivostok and Nikolai is bound to affect the security of the Korean frontier. In particular, it is known that these districts have long been the base of Korean confronaderies against Japan. These hostile Koreans, joining hands with unlawful elements in Russia, attempted in 1920 to invade Korea through the Chinese territory of Chantsu. They set fire to the Japanese Consulate at Bunchun and committed indiscriminate acts of murder and pillage. At the present time, they are under the effective control of Japanese troops stationed in the Maritime Province, but they will no doubt renew the attempt to penetrate into Korea at the first favorable opportunity that may present itself.

Having regard to these considerations, the Japanese Government have felt bound to exercise precaution in carrying out the contemplated evacuation of the Maritime Province. Should they take hasty action without adequate provision for the future, they would be delinquent in their duty of affording protection to a large number of their nationals resident in the districts in question and of maintaining order and security in Korea.

"It should be made clear that no part of the Maritime Province is under Japan's military occupation. Japanese troops are still stationed in the southern portion of that Province, but they have not set up any civil or military administration to replace local authorities. Their activity is confined to measures of self-protection against the menace to their own safety and to the safety of their country and nationals. They are not in occupation of these districts any more than American or other Allied troops could be said to have been in occupation of the places in which they were formerly stationed.

"The Japanese Government are anxious to see an orderly and stable authority reestablished in the Far Eastern possessions of Russia. It was this spirit that they manifested a keen interest in the patriotic but ill-fated struggle of Admiral Kolchak. They have shown readiness to lend their good offices for promoting the reconciliation of various political groups in Eastern Siberia. But they have carefully refrained from supporting one faction against another. It will be recalled, for instance, that they withheld all assistance from Gen. Rodianow against the revolutionary movements which led to his overthrow in January, 1920. They maintained an attitude of strict neutrality, and refused to interfere in these movements, which it would have been quite easy for them to suppress, if they had so desired.
In relation to this policy of nonintervention, it may be useful to refer briefly to the past relations between the Japanese authorities and Ataman Semenoff, which seem to have been a source of popular misgiving and speculation. It will be remembered that the growing rapprochement between the Germans and the Bolshevik Government in Russia in the early part of 1918 naturally gave rise to apprehensions in the Allied countries that a considerable quantity of munitions supplied by those countries and stored in Vladivostok might be removed by the Bolsheviks to European Russia, for the use of the Germans. Ataman Semenoff was then in Siberia and was organizing a movement to check such Bolshevik activities and to preserve order and stability in that region. It was in this situation that Japan, as well as some of the Allies, began to give support to the Cossack chief. After a few months, such support by the other Powers was discontinued, but the Japanese were reluctant to abandon their friend, whose efforts in the Allied cause they had originally encouraged, and they maintained for some time their connection with Ataman Semenoff. They had, however, no intention whatever of interfering in the domestic affairs of Russia, and when it was found that the assistance rendered to the Ataman was likely to complicate the internal situation in Siberia, they terminated all relations with him and no support of any kind has since been extended to him by the Japanese authorities.

The Japanese Government are now seriously considering plans which would justify them in carrying out their decision of the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Maritime Province, with reasonable precaution for the security of Japanese residents of the Korean frontier regions. It is for this purpose that negotiations were opened some time ago at Dairen between the Japanese representatives and the agents of the Chita Government. Those negotiations at Dairen are in no way intended to secure for Japan any right or advantage of an exclusive nature. They have been solely actuated by a desire to adjust some of the more pressing questions with which Japan is confronted in relation to Siberia. They have essentially in view the conclusion of provisional commercial arrangements, the removal of the existing menace to the security of Japan and to the lives and property of Japanese residents in Eastern Siberia, the provision of guarantees for the freedom of lawful undertakings in that region and the prohibition of Bolshevik propaganda over the Siberian border. Should adequate provisions be arranged on the line indicated, the Japanese Government will at once proceed to the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Maritime Province.

The occupation of certain points in the Russian Province of Sakhalin is wholly different, both in nature and in origin, from the stationing of troops in the Maritime Province. History affords few instances similar to the incident of 1920 at Nikolaievsk, where more than seven hundred Japanese, including women and children, as well as the duly recognized Japanese Consul and his family and his official staff, were cruelly tortured and massacred. No nation worthy of respect will possibly remain forbearing under such a strain of provocation. Nor was it possible for the Japanese Government to disregard the just popular indignation aroused in Japan by the incident.
Under the actual condition of things, Japan found no alternative but to occupy, as a measure of reparation, certain points in the Russian Province of Sakhalin in which the outrage was committed, pending the establishment in Russia of a responsible authority with whom she can communicate in order to obtain due satisfaction.

"Nothing is further from the thought of the Japanese Government than to take advantage of the present helpless condition of Russia for prosecuting selfish designs. Japan recalls with deep gratitude and appreciation the brilliant role which Russia played in the interest of civilization during the earlier stage of the Great War. The Japanese people have shown and will continue to show every measure of interest in the efforts of patriotic Russians aspiring to the unity and rehabilitation of their country. The military occupation of the Russian Province of Sakhalin is only a temporary measure, and will naturally come to an end as soon as a satisfactory settlement of the question shall have been arranged with an orderly Russian Government.

"In conclusion, the Japanese Delegation is authorized to declare that it is the fixed and settled policy of Japan to respect the territorial integrity of Russia, and to observe the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of that country, as well as the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in every part of the Russian possessions."

I, E. E. Danly, do hereby certify that the foregoing extract is a true and correct copy of the statement of Baron SHIDERPA which appears on pages 340 to 346 of the volume "Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington, November 12, 1921, February 6, 1922", published by the Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., and is in my custody.

/s/ E. E. DANLY
E. E. DANLY
Chief, Document Division, IPS
DOCU'ENT No. 2239

Affidavit of the "Witness
KHABAROVSK
26 March (SHQ 21) 1946

I, Colonel of Justice BAGINYAN, Military Interrogator for
the USSR at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East
in Tokyo, with Lieutenant Petrov as interpreter, interrogated,
having warned of the responsibility for giving false testimony
according to Article 25 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.,
as a witness the below named, who testified:

1. Name - TAKEZOE, Rokuzo
2. Age - 54
3. Name of Profession - Former Chief of General Affairs
   Department of the Manchurian Government.
4. Kind of Political Party - None.
5. Present Address - Khabarovsk.

The certificates of the witness being warned of the responsi­
bility for giving false testimony and of the interpreter for
the certificates of the witness being warned of the respons­
giving false translation are attached to the affidavit.

Interrogation was done in Japanese.

Q. Mention the names of persons among the leaders of Japan with
   whom you had close relation.
A. My acquaintances or those whom I met are the following:
   GENERAL TOJO; Former Prime Minister KOISO; Former Prime
   Minister SUZUKI; Former Prime Minister ABE, Nobuyuki;
   Generals UESU and YAMATA; Lieutenant-KMRA; Former Com­
   mander of the Kwantung Army UEDA; Former Commander of
   the Kwantung Army NITATA; Former Minister of Greater East
   Asia Affairs ASHI; Former Minister of Greater East
   Asia Affairs ASHI; and ODATE, Shigeo, and
   Former Minister of Home Affairs and Former Head of General
   Affairs Bureau during GEKKA 41-32 (1936-1937), and Chief of
   General Affairs just before my installation; HOSHIINO, Naoki;
   and Former President of the South Manchurian Railway and
   Former Transportation Minister KONIYAMA, Naoto.

Q. What was the purpose of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria?
A. The most important aim of the Japanese occupation of
   Manchuria was to build up a military base on the continent.

Q. Against what country was this base built?
A. Mainly against the U.S.S.R. and China.

Q. Where did you find out that the aim of the Japanese occupation
   of Manchuria was to make Manchuria a military base
   against the U.S.S.R. and China?
A. This was the opinion of the Japanese political leaders and
   the Kwantung Army. I know that the problem of preparing
   for a war against the U.S.S.R. was discussed at the head­
   quarters of the Kwantung Army. I heard about it from the
   Commanders of the Kwantung Army, Generals UKEU, UEDA,
   MINASHITA, and Lieutenant-General IKEI. I have attended con­
   ferences held at the headquarters of the Kwantung Army when
   I held high positions of leader in Changchun.

Q. What was the fundamental mission of the Kwantung Army?
A. The purpose of the Kwantung Army being stationed in Man­
   churia was for defense, and it maintained an offensive
   stand to attain this purpose. In Shim-ria 19 (1944) the
   Greater East Asia War became very difficult and disadvan-
The Kwantung Army changed its attitude to a defensive one. Until the Manchurian Incident, the Kwantung Army had taken an offensive stand towards the U.S.S.R., but after the above incident it changed to an attitude of aggressive defense. After ShOJA 19 (1944) it became absolutely on the defensive.

Q. From whom and what kind of orders did you receive concerning the operation of the base of operation against the U.S.S.R. within Manchuria?
A. The Kwantung Army kept its military plan secret, but it demanded the government to take up many kinds of measures in political and economical administration.

Q. From whom and what kind of orders did you receive?
A. First I received orders from the Kwantung Army concerning the first and second plans on developing Manchuria. The main points of this plan are to develop industry, to supplement the demands of the Kwantung Army, to set up railways and roads which can be useful in the case of a war breaking out against the U.S.S.R., and to prepare a food base.

Q. The ultimate aim was for Japan to prepare an economical base for operations against the U.S.S.R., wasn't it?
A. Yes, it was for an attack against the U.S.S.R.

Q. Then and from whom and what kind of orders did you receive concerning the first and second plans?
A. I received documentary orders through the secretariat, and I met the Commander of the Kwantung Army to talk it over. Also, every year I went up to Tokyo to report and received orders concerning my future work.

Q. From whom and what kind of orders did you receive concerning the preparation of the base for a war against the U.S.S.R.?
A. After all the political and economical demands of the Kwantung Army to the government were the preparation for a war against the U.S.S.R. I received orders from the Commander (Generals of the Kwantung Army UBAZU and YAMADA), Chiefs of Staff (Lieut. Generals KIMURA, YOSHIBEKO, KASAHARA, and HATA), Assistant Chief of Staff (Lieut. Generals HATA and YAMADA), and Chief of the Fourth Section (Colonels KUNOKITA and OZE).

Q. Have you ever talked with the Japanese War Minister?
A. Yes, I have.

Q. What kind of orders did you receive from the War Minister?
A. I didn't receive any concrete orders from the War Minister. For instance, the situation just after the beginning of the Russo-German War not being clear, I went to TOKYO by aeroplane to make sure whether reinforcement of the Kwantung Army meant the opening of a war against Soviet Russia. War Minister TAKA said only that it was necessary to reinforce the Kwantung Army and didn't explain the reason.

Q. What was the reason for the reinforcement of the Kwantung Army which began about the summer of ShOYA 16 (1941)?
A. The reinforcement of the Kwantung Army began just after the beginning of the Russo-German War, and its purpose was to complete the preparation for the war against Soviet Russia.
Q. What do you know about the measure by the "Kwantung Special Manoeuvre, the plan called "Kantokuen"?
A. The "Kwantung Special Manoeuvre" was a name for keeping secret the actions of the Kwantung Army. Actually the Kwantung Army was reinforced by this plan. According to this plan there were orders concerning the delivery of food and other things, supplying laborers, and transportation of goods.

Q. When and by whom were you made to know the existence of the "Kantokuen"?
A. I heard about it at the beginning of July SHOWA 16 (1941) from KUROKAWA, Chief of the Fourth Section of the Kwantung Army Headquarters, and also from UMEZU, Commander of the Kwantung Army.

Q. What kind of concrete things did UMEZU say concerning the "Kantokuen" plan?
A. During his talk with me, UMEZU told me about the increase of the troops of the Kwantung Army and demanded the delivery of food for these troops.

Q. Under your command what measures should be taken by the Manchurian Government regarding the "Kantokuen" plan?
A. First of all, the delivery of goods necessary for the reinforced troops, transportation of these goods, the mobilization of laborers, and anything else necessary for the Army.

Q. When were the measures of the Manchurian Government according to the Kantokuen plan to be realized?
A. Its measures were to be realized within six months.

Q. As food to be replenished with the crop of SHOWA 16 (1941)?
A. At the beginning food was prepared with the crop of SHOWA 15 (1940).

Q. It proves that the measures had to be realized in a very short time, doesn't it?
A. Yes, there was no time to wait for the crop of SHOWA 16 (1941), and we had to prepare it with the crop of SHOWA 15 (1940).

Q. What really did the head of the Fourth Section of the Kwantung Army inform you concerning the plan of the Kantokuen plan?
A. He informed me of two things. One is that the troops of the Kwantung Army would be greatly reinforced, and the other is the delivery of goods for the Army must be increased.

Q. What kind of steps did you take towards the organs under you in the Manchurian Government to realize these measures?
A. Conferences which I attended were held many times.

Q. To whom did you report about the demands concerning the Kantokuen plan? And in what way did the actual realization of the plan begin?
A. I informed the Prime Minister of all the demands of the Kwantung Army, and also the vice-chief. I also held meetings of the vice-chiefs of each section.

Q. Was the military mobilization of the government officials to be prepared by the Kantokuen plan?
A. Yes, I relieved the officials so that they might be mobilized by the army by the Kantokuen plan.
Q. What do you think is characteristic of the political and military actions of TOJO?
A. I think that TOJO should take the responsibility of preparing for the attack on Soviet Russia, and also of starting a war against America and England in the South.

Q. What part did TOJO play in the war against China in SHOYWA 12 (1937)?
A. At that time TOJO was the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, and I think he is responsible for leading the troops of the Kwantung Army into a certain district of China and also, after he became War Minister and Prime Minister, for the whole management of the China Incident.

Q. Was the National Service Law of SHOYWA 14 (1939) in Manchuria proposed by the Japanese?
A. The National Service Law was proposed by the Kwantung Army, and it was made by the demand of UEDA, Commander of the Kwantung Army.

Q. What was the reason for this demand?
A. The reason was that it was necessary to have a large army for the war against the U.S.S.R.

Q. By whom was the mobilization of laborers enforced in Manchuria?
A. The mobilization of the laborers was enforced in compliance with the Kantokuen plan according to two ways. One was by supplying in the administrative way, and the other was supplying by the Labor Service Law. More than a million people were mobilized every year.

Q. How long was the term of this mobilization? And in what way was it realized?
A. The mobilization of laborers was compulsory. They were mobilized for from 4 to 6 or 8 months. By the Labor Service Law youths of 21 to 23 years of age were mobilized and by executive order people were mobilized regardless of age.

Q. By whose proposal was the mobilization carried out?
A. It was carried out by the proposal of UMEZU.

Q. When was mobilization by the Labor Service Law enforced in Manchuria? And what was its purpose?
A. The mobilization of laborers by the Labor Service Law was enforced in Manchuria in SHOYWA 18 (1943). Its purpose was mainly to fill deficiency of laborers in the military production factories.

Q. What do you know about the KYOWA KAI?
A. I myself was a member of this association, and also a member of the Central Headquarters Committee. The leader of the KYOWA KAI was Prime Minister CHANG, and the actual leader Lieutenant-General MIYAKE, Chief of Central Headquarters. The Central Headquarters Committee held a meeting once a month. At this meeting the problems concerning guidance of the Manchurian people were discussed. For instance, the problem of the mobilization of laborers: the Chinese disliked the law of Labor Mobilization, so the mobilization of the laborers had to be carried out with the aid of the KYOWA KAI.
Q. By whose proposal was the KYOWA KAI organized?
A. The KYOWA KAI was established by the proposal of the Japanese, especially General HONJO, former Commander of the Kwantung Army. In this association, the Japanese held the position of leaders and through this association the Japanese thoughts were made known.

Q. How was the KYOWA KAI made use of for the preparation of the war against the U.S.S.R.?
A. As mentioned before, the government received orders concerning this from the Kwantung Army, but the KYOWA KAI cooperated in making Manchuria a base for preparations for a war against the U.S.S.R.

Q. Mention the facts of the cooperation between the KYOWA KAI and the Japanese Government in preparing for the war against the U.S.S.R.
A. The KYOWA KAI did not cooperate directly with the Japanese Government but only through the Kwantung Army. Lieutenant-General MIYAKE, representative of the Kwantung Army, appointed the leaders of the KYOWA KAI. Also, officers of the Kwantung Army often attended the conferences and took the lead in its actions.

Q. How many members were there in the KYOWA KAI?
A. There were more than 4,000,000.

Q. What do you think is distinctive of the activities of AYUKAWA in Manchuria?
A. He played an important part in developing the heavy industry in Manchuria according to the first 5-Year Plan. Almost all of his activities were concentrated upon the establishment of the munition industry. He directed the production of coal, iron, light metals, aeroplanes and motorcycles. He established the Manchurian Heavy Industry Development Co., Ltd., and directed it from December of SHOWA 12 (1937) to SHOWA 17 (1942).

Q. Did AYUKAWA'S activities in Manchuria bring forth great profit?
A. All the industries under AYUKAWA'S direction showed a deficit.

Q. Who supplemented the losses?
A. The Manchurian Government granted a subsidy. From SHOWA 12 (1937) the total subsidy came to be about 500,000,000 yen.

Q. Was the compulsory mobilization of the laborers mainly for AYUKAWA'S work?
A. The laborers who were mobilized were in the field of developing heavy industry, used for AYUKAWA'S work.

Q. Have you ever heard ARAKI's speeches?
A. When I was the governor of Akit Prefecture around SHOWA 8 or 9 (1933, 1934), I heard ARAKI's speech at a meeting of prefectural governors. He was at that time the War Minister. ARAKI hung up a map of the U.S.S.R. and Manchuria, and explained the necessity of the Maritime Province of the U.S.S.R., Siberia and Zabaikaiya (Phonetic) for Japan. SUZUKI, Teiichi also spoke on the same thing as ARAKI did.
Q. What did you learn from OSHIMA, former Japanese Ambassador to Germany?

A. I have never met OSHIMA personally, but I have heard of him from MORISHIMA, Japanese Minister at Moscow. According to MORISHIMA, OSHIMA trusted the ability of Germany and Hitler, and he always reported to the Japanese Government that Germany would surely win. Last year, when the Japanese residents of Germany passed CHANGCHUN, I heard from them that OSHIMA had prohibited them from reporting to Japan the actual circumstances in Germany.

(Signature) TAKEBE, Rokuzo

I prove by my signature that the above answers are written in my own handwriting.

(Signature) TAKEBE, Rokuzo

Interrogator: Military Interrogator for the U.S.S. at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo, Colonel of Justice BAGINYAN.

Interpreter Lt. Potrov

Secretary-Stenographer Timoloeva

Beginning of Interrogation 11:35

Close of Interrogation 17:15

CERTIFICATE

At Khadarovsk, 26 March 1946

Swearing that I, former Chief of General Affairs of the Manchurian Government TAKEBE, Rokuzo, will, as a witness, make only true statements concerning the chief war criminals to Colonel of Justice BAGINYAN, Military Interrogator at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo, I deliver this certificate.
CERTIFICATE

I, Lt. Colonel G. I. TARANEIKO, a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that this photostat is a true copy of the article appearing in July 11, 1938 issue of "Japan Advertiser"; was delivered to me by the library of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section on or about July 26, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, the Far East.

(Sgd) Lt.Coi. TARANEIKO

Tokyo, Japan.

ARAKI CHIDES NATION FOR EXTREME ECONOMY: CAN'T GO WITHOUT SHOES FOR 20 YEARS, HE SAYS.

Government officials and the people at large are going too far in their efforts to support the campaign in China, Education Minister General Baron Sadao ARAKI told members of the Politics and Economics Study Society in Osaka yesterday. Since Japan is determined to continue the war for 20 or 30 years if necessary, emergency measures and stringent savings cannot be continued indefinitely, he insisted.

"In today's economy, national attention is concentrating more on materials than on money, on men rather than materials and on thoughts instead of men", the retired general pointed out, according to Domei. "Japan's determination to fight to a finish with China and the Soviet Union is sufficient to carry it on for more than a decade. In spite of this circumstance, however, the nation seems to be carrying its sacrifices to extremes. To me, seeking a quick victory seems too hasty. It is contrary to the
real trend of events. People are being encouraged to wear "geta" rather than shoes. If the war ends in a year or two, this is all right, as the public can go without leather footwear for a while, but we cannot be shoeless for 20 or 30 years.

"I want to call to the attention of both officials and citizens the need for re-examining their basic ways of thinking about the war. The Japanese have a habit of respecting the occupations handed down by their ancestors. However, the idea that unemployment can be solved merely by putting the jobless to work on tasks for which they are not equipped is a mistaken one."
I, Sokichi Ishiguro, Chief of Section II of the Imperial Library, do hereby certify the following, viz.:

The book,
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Dated the 28th day of September, 1946.

Sokichi Ishiguro (Sign. & Seal)
VO Ultra Secret Urgent

TO: Vice-Minister and Vice-Chief of General Staff
FROM: Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army
9 June 1937

1. Judging the present situation in China from the point of view of military preparations against Soviet Russia, I am convinced that if our military power permits it, we should deliver a blow first of all upon the banking regime to get rid of the menace at our back.

If our military power will not permit us to take such a step, I think it proper that we keep a strict watch on the Chinese government that they do not lay a single hand on our present undertakings in China until our national defence system is completed. We will thus wait for the Chinese government to reconsider.

We should not take the initiative to become friendly with the banking government, which has no intention whatsoever of adjusting diplomatic relations with Japan, for, judging from their national characteristics, such a step will only aggravate their disdainful attitude toward Japan.

2. As for Japan's policy toward China, as stated in the telegram from Shanghai (No. 121) and Hankow (No. 159), we of the Kwantung Army are entirely of the same opinion. For further particulars, I shall report to you myself when I go to Tokyo.

But I hope for the present that a deliberate scrutiny will be added to the practical plan toward China and the leading policy in North China which were made public at the time the cabinet was changed some time ago.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, K. Hayashi, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section of Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of pages, dated 1937, and described as follows: File of telegrams.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named Ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 30th day of August, 1946. /s/ K. Hayashi
Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 30th day of Aug., 1946. /s/ Richard H. Larsh
Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis

2nd Lt. M.I.
What is it that has been influencing Europe, which is a peninsula of Asia, and the whole world, if not the propellant force of Japan in the far distant East. Has not Japan been the actual, the only motivating power in modern world history?

Sino-Japanese War
Russo-Japanese War
World War I
Manchurian Incident
The Nazi Regime in Germany
The Annexation of Ethiopia
The Spanish War
The Occupation of the Rhineland
The China Incident
The Annexation of Czechoslovakia, Austria and Albania

Thus, the fall of modern Europe will mean the rise of Asia, and great propaganda for the Imperial way in which all races will be unified. Develop the European Incident into a world-wide incident!

The Japanese-English-Chinese War

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Author: Shigeki Kamuji

Publisher: Research Institute on Chinese Problems

Year of Publication: 1939

No. of Volumes: One

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Dated the 28th day of September, 1946.

Sokichi Ishiguro (Sign. & Seal)
CERTIFICATE

I.F.S. No. 2724

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Shibata, Krasaburo, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Police Affairs Section, in charge of Library of Home Ministry, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of ___ pages, dated Nov-Dec, 1941, and described as follows: Printed Journal "HAIZU" (Reconstruction), Vol. 23, No. 21.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Home Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this ___ day of Sept., 1946
(signed) Krasaburo Shibata
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) C.H.C. Norton
(Police Affairs Section, Home Ministry, Second Class Secretary, Official Capacity)

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard R. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this ___ day of Sept., 1946
's/ Richard R. Larsh
Investigator, IFS

Witness: 's/ J. A. Curtis
2d Lt. IFS
Investigator, IFS

Official Capacity
Hitler's speech on the night of Oct. 3 was a declaration of German victory over Russia, and the world soon came to know this concretely.

The Soviet-German front, for a long time stable, had turned active in the area of Vyazma east of Smolensk with a death struggle of 7 million men, and the last Timoshenko army 70 divisions was being encircled and annihilated.

While Russia was proudly showing her tough power of resistance in the siege battles of Leningrad and Odessa, Moscow and Donetsk industrial zone have approached the crisis.

The attack on Moscow, which appeared impossible before the end of year, seems to have become an accomplished fact during these ten days.

Before the arrival of "German Winter" the firm resolution of the German army will make impossible the recurrence of "Napoleon's defeat" which the Anti-Axis countries are expecting.

The faces of America and Britain, so long self-satisfied, have assumed wry expressions. Here again has began another agony for Churchill and a worried look for Roosevelt. Thus we may say that the worldwide struggle between the Axis and the anti-Axis is gradually approaching its turning point.

How should Japan move at this time? Japan's standpoint is definite. Japan rejoices in and hopes for the victory of Germany, her confederate.
Needless to say Japan should make efficient use of the world situation created by the victory of Germany in order to achieve her primary great mission. However, this does not mean that Japan depends upon German victory, nor should our attention be drawn to a single phase of battle or to one isolated diplomatic battle.

What we should do is to plan to be ready for a fight when opportunity knocks and to take what measures are necessary for the three principles which have been repeatedly advocated during these 5 years of the China Incident, that is, respect for the Tripartite Fact, the settlement of the China Incident, and the establishment of the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

What does that mean on this occasion? It means to see into the essence of America, to resolve not to rely upon what can not be relied upon, and to give concrete form to what follows from the above.

In disposing of the China Incident and establishing the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere as well, we must first clearly grasp what is the real enemy and consider him as an enemy. It is only in compliance with the above that our position as the leader of the East Asiatic races will be confirmed, the only way in which the areas vital to the establishment of the Co-prosperity Sphere will be prevented from falling away from and rebelling against the Co-prosperity Sphere Construction Camp. Moreover, we can expect active establishment of the cooperative relation between us and those races. A truly moral state with all its hardships can be expected to proceed with vigorous strides, while if a state should tend too much to profiteering, there would be the danger of her losing the lucid impulse for racial progress.

However, what must be borne in mind here is that no matter how much the lowering of the power of resistance of the Soviet Union, no matter how much the decline in the weight of Far Eastern Army appears to be a fact, it is extremely dangerous to place too much simple faith in England’s impotence and the U.S.A.'s dilemma but we must not be over discreet in grasping the opportunity, and get ourselves farther into a predicament.
What is necessary for the establishment of the Co-prosperity Sphere and the adjustment of China Incident? And what should we do about it? For one thing should we not be brave to take the necessary steps—based on independent necessity and on virtue— to make the places within the Co-prosperity Sphere feel deeply that their scope is really an essential element of the Co-prosperity Sphere; and must we not consider how to express our wisdom?

Including the above-mentioned, the American-Japanese negotiations and the new situation created by a German victory in the Russo-German war should be considered by carrying out more thoroughly the three great principles, namely the Tripartite Alliance, the disposition of the China Incident and the establishment of the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Shibata, Kosaburo, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Police Affairs Section — in charge of library of Home Ministry — and that as such official I have custody of the document here attached consisting of ______ pages, dated Nov. 15, 1941, and described as follows: Printed Journal "KAIZO" (Reconstruction) Vol. 23 No. 21. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Home Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 3 day of Sept., 1946. /s/ __________________________
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ ________________
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larah, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 3 day of Sept., 1946 /s/ Richard H. Larah

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis
2d Lt. M.I.

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity
計算

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Excerpts from the Article entitled "A MESSAGE TO YOUNG MEN" ("Seinen Chiashi Nigai Tsugu") by Kiagoro HASHIMOTO, published in the "TAIYQ' 17 Dnamr/hnr IQ._________________—

"This August I retired from active military service and entered with high spirit the front line of the renovation movement. When one is in the military profession, the prosecution of his own aspirations is restricted in no small degree, but when one retires from public life, he finds himself in the happy situation of being able, if he would only try, to work fully from a broadminded, high viewpoint. I decided at once to begin a new action for the next generation and organized the Greater Japan Young Men's Party (DAI NITON S2IIIO)."

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"Our aim is renovation. In order to effect renovation, blood and enthusiasm are absolutely essential. The blood and enthusiasm thus required are the possessions of young men."

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"From the physical point of view, old people never can accomplish such a great work as the second creation of the world. For the sake of the renovation I hope that pure, sincere and ardent young people will surely succeed in it. To make young men become the framework of New Japan and to unite the whole strength, both tangible and intangible, of the Japanese race in our Emperor, is the way to be loyal to our country, and that is also the spirit of the DAI NITON S2IIIO."


"Responsible government - Party Cabinet system - runs absolutely counter to the Constitution. It is the democratic government which ignores the "TENO" government."

Then what is the nature of state ministries? The above mentioned 'Exposition of the Imperial Constitution' says: 'The way for state ministries to serve the Throne is to strive to encourage good and correct wrongs, and if they commit any mistakes, they shall not evade responsibility under the pretence of having made them under Imperial command.' It further says: 'According to the Constitution, state ministers have the heavy responsibility of assisting the Throne and possess great administrative powers. They not only occupy posts of making decisions on their own responsibility, but also have the duties of correcting wrongs. Hence, they should themselves bear responsibility for them!"

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"To matter how much the existing political parties, imitating the constitutional system of Europe and America, might try to make it the basis of party government under the pretence of responsible government, it is very clear that it runs counter to the "TENO" government, which has been established firmly since the founding of our Empire, and which remains solemnly unshaken in the constitution granted by the Emperor."
"Dissolve the Political Parties at Once.

They who destroyed the national structure, desecrated the Constitution and corrupted the government, not realizing their faults, are now bewildered by the demand for the rejection of party government and the reformation of the parliamentary system and are trying their best to glorify their own rule by deceiving the people in the name of 'movement for the defense of the Constitution.' When we consider their dangerous anti-national structure, political ideology and their aggressive evils, we believe it most urgently necessary first of all to make a scapegoat of the existing political parties and destroy them for the sake of the construction of a cheerful new Japan."

* * * * *

"Prohibit Party Cabinet by Enacting a Political Party Law or a State Ministers' Limitation Ordinance.

That is, we subjects cannot know to whom His Majesty orders to form a new cabinet since this is divine will, but whoever becomes a State Minister must, on entering the cabinet, renounce membership in a political party and also resign from the Diet."

* * * * *


"In the present 70th session of the Imperial Diet, liberalists who stand for the maintenance of the status quo, are busily denouncing the military for mixing in politics. This is a subtle trick on their part to spread anti-military thought among the people through the Diet, thereby separating the people from the military and obstructing the military's movement for political renovation. We must watch closely their speech and conduct. The liberalists cry aloud against the mixing in politics by the military, quoting the Imperial Descript wherein it is gracefully commanded, 'Do not be misled by public opinion and do not meddle in politics, but devote oneself solely to the performance of official service.' But we interpret the Imperial words, 'do not meddle in politics' to mean 'not to be a stickler for politics.' Needless to say, not only soldiers, but also other persons, whether they be physicians or merchants, have their own works according to their occupation. However, is there any reason why, because of this, soldiers, physicians and merchants should not mix in politics? There is no reason why politicians should be taboo and entrusted only to professional politicians."

* * * * *

"In comparison with such desperate efforts of the powers to enlarge and reinforce their air forces, Japan is in a vitally poor condition at present. If we allow things to remain in their present state, it is certain that there will be an irretrievable handicap between Japan and the other powers in the future. Especially how shall we be able to battle against the Soviet Union which is not making irresistible progress?

The declaration by Kengo HASHIMOTO says: 'Make an invincible air force the mainstay of armaments, get rid of the concept that the air force belongs to the army and foster instead the concept that it is the air force of the State, the same as our ancient concept of the sword.' In other words, the strongest and most promising air force should constitute the mainstay of armaments, with which we intend to complete an invincible structure."

Excerpts from the Article entitled, "The Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence (The Tale of Koka Ken)" by Kengo HASHIMOTO, President of Dai Nippon Sekisai Zai, appearing in Taiyo Dai Nippon, January 5, 1942, Page 1

"The war to bring an end to the Euro-American culture which has dominated for several centuries the peoples of the whole world, has been started. The blow struck in the Pacific on the 8th of December, 1941, is a blow of initiation of the movement for the turning of world history. The world culture based on the old principle of domination will probably meet doom with a violent crash.

The utmost efforts of the leaders of the world to avert such a situation were all in vain. History, like the universe, revolves in a stately form. It is beyond the power of man to control it. Why does history revolve so? People may say: 'from liberalism to totalitarianism; from national economy to regional economy: from the old order to the new order.' But there are merely superficial views of the matter. The world is striding forward as if it were the Divine will, toward a greater, higher and truer principle of governing mankind.

The present great world upheaval is a scene of strife where we are groping for a high philosophy and principle of governing mankind. Seeing this scene of strife, "AMANO HIKAMUSHI TO KAMI" (the creator of the universe) must be very anxious to make us grasp the highest principle of guiding mankind. "Tell, then, what is the highest principle of mankind? That is our national structure. It is the great ideal of 'Hakko Ichiu' (universal concordia)."

"Such capitalism and communism have no significant philosophy, nor any humanitarianism, and yet Britain, America and U. S. S. R. have theologized these shallow principles, and have tried to exploit the people of the world. But they have now reached their last days in the present great world war. Hitler said that the present great world
war was a war of the outlook of the world. I would like to say that it is a war for the establishment of a guiding principle. It should be called a war for the establishment of the great ideal of 'Hakko Ichiu.' Whether we like it or not, the world is progressing steadily toward the above-described guiding principle.

The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and the European Co-Prosperity Sphere of Germany and Italy are the manifestations of this process. The North and South American Co-Prosperity Sphere is, in its pattern, a similar manifestation, although it is still bearing the name of old capitalistic guiding principle for co-prosperity, it is certain that it will have to rely on our guiding principle someday in the future. Among these three regional blocks, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere possesses the highest and most philosophical guiding principle. By guiding principle, I mean the principle of 'Hakko Ichiu,' a principle similar to that of the human body. And that is why I call this sphere 'Dei Toa Yoko Ken' (The Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence). That is, in the 'Toa Ken,' the constituent countries form an organic whole, with Japan as the brain, growing and developing as one living substance under the august virtues of His Majesty the Emperor. If it is only a horizontal federation of the countries of Greater East Asia, it not only lacks life, but is also very far from the ideal of 'Hakko Ichiu.'

* * *

It follows that, as the first cardinal point of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere under Imperial Influence, the races of Greater East Asia must religiously grow the above-described principle. Otherwise, it would be meaningless. In order to achieve this, first of all the Yamato race must be fully imbued with this principle and disseminate and inculcate it into other races. The Yamato race must be fully imbued with and practice this principle. This is Shova Renovation. Without this, it is not possible to establish the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence.

In fixing the limits of the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence, we must turn our attention first of all to national defense, because however abundant our resources may be, and however solid the political combination of the various races may be, we shall be very easily destroyed by outsiders if our national defense is deficient. From the national defense point of view in the light of the present world situation, it is absolutely necessary to include the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean in our national defense sphere. This is because we shall automatically be able to control the countries of the Sphere if we gain control of the seas. Little consideration needs to be given to the armaments with reference to countries within the Sphere, but armaments against those outside the Sphere are necessary. The mainstay of our national defense is our invincible air force. From this standpoint the minimum requirement is the inclusion of islands within the line extending in the west from Hawaii and New Zealand, and in the
West from the Persian Gulf eastward. In the north it is necessary to take possession of the Aleutian Islands. I refrain from saying here about the U.S.S.R. sector, but you can imagine what I want to say. Besides these, Japan, Manchuria, China and other countries on the continent should be added of course, and further, great naval ports are necessary in the northern part of Japan, Singapore, the southern point of India, Sidney and Hawaii. With these places as operational bases, it is necessary to establish many air bases and bases for minor war vessels in the neighboring islands. By means of a series of operational spheres of our air forces, we should ensure the safety of the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial influence, and at the same time post a considerable army on the continent and other countries of the Sphere under Imperial influence.

Next the Japanese army and navy as the axis should supervise local armaments and defend the Sphere under Imperial influence. The military expenditures should be borne jointly by all the constituent countries. This is only proper from the ideology of co-existence. Time will come in the future that minor weak countries will not be allowed an independent existence. Already, the time has arrived when there is no other way than to extend a nation's own existence under the protection of a great power. That does not mean, however, that the independence of minor weak countries will be impaired. It is true independence to maintain independence under the protection of a great power just as a child grows up freely and safely under the protection of his father. There is no room whatever to doubt this feeling, if we become thoroughly imbued with the principle of the Sphere under Imperial influence.

Then I should like to think that the Greater East Asia Sphere includes the undermentioned countries. With respect to the western boundary line especially, this is the time to fix the line of demarcation from the U.S.S.R. Co-prosperity Sphere, Japan, Manchuria, China, the Soviet Far East, French Indo-China, Burma, Malay, the Dutch East Indies, India, Afghanistan, Australia, New Zealand, France, Philippines, and the islands of the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean.

We cannot yet decide whether all these countries should be incorporated at once into the Sphere under Imperial influence, but it is at least absolutely necessary to include for the sake of national defense these countries in the sphere of our influence.

Although full studies are necessary and careful considerations should be given to the racial, historical, economic, military and other factors in deciding how these countries should be divided and administered. I think it appropriate to apply the following general principles:
1. Give independence to each race and give each its proper place.
2. Incorporate completely into Japanese territory those areas where the inhabiting races have no capacity for independence, or areas which are strategically important.
From this standpoint, Greater East Asia may be divided administratively as follows:

1. Districts which are to be Japanese territory:
   a. Hainan Island and Hong Kong.
   b. Malaya, Sumatra, Borneo and Celebes.
   c. Ceylon Island and the opposite coast of India.
   d. Australia, New Guinea and New Zealand.
   e. Other islands in the Pacific and Indian Oceans (excluding Madagascar)

2. Independent Countries:
   Manchukuo, China (special areas to be designated in North China and Fukien), Burma (including Bengal area of India), French Indo-China (French control to be withdrawn in the future), India, Philippines, Afghanistan (to be given Baluchistan), Siam (to be given portions of Malaya and Burma), and Java.

   Territories incorporated into Japan should be administered by Governor-Generals, while Japanese advisers should be appointed for independent states. Military and diplomatic affairs should be placed absolutely under Japanese guidance. Other matters also should be controlled by Japan.

   A Supreme Council for the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence should be set up in Tokyo, under which there should be set up a Planning Board for the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence in order to handle business affairs.

   In the Greater East Asia War, the most important matter in the future will be economic warfare. From this point of view, Greater East Asia has great significance. The following is an enumeration of various things to be done in respect to the economy of Greater East Asia:

   1. Greater East Asia should have a self-sufficient economy, doing away with gold economy as a whole and replacing it with community economy.

   2. It should exchange goods with the European Co-Prosperity Sphere but not with the American Sphere, thereby bringing to submission the American Co-Prosperity Sphere in respect to material resources. Although decision should be made in the light of the future situation in respect to whether
the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea or the Suez Canal should be made the point of contact with the European Co-Prosp-
erness Sphere, it would be advantageous to make it as close to Europe as possible without considering the sacri-
ices on our part.

3. With respect to currency, the note-issuing banks of each locality should be taken over and other paper currencies should be additionally issued. The exchange rate between the local currencies and the yen should be based on the exchange quota-
tions prevailing at each time. A greater East Asia Central Bank should be established in Tokyo to effect financial control.
4. Resources in stock should be immediately recovered in order to replenish as quickly as possible the war attrition of Japan.

5. In the early stage of government, the local states should be so guided as to concentrate their efforts on economic activities. With the vast resources to be made available from such activities, we should improve to the greatest extent Japan's heavy and light industries.

6. Therefore Japanese people in their status of officers in the direction of economic affairs, should grasp only the main lines of economy of the various countries, and not interfere with minor details.

7. Of course, economic plans based on geographical, economic and other relevant factors should be drawn up for each country, and their industries appropriately distributed. In making this distribution, attention should be paid with a view to making the countries incapable of separating from Japan politically.

8. In respect to economy, Japan should plan and supervise the main points, and make each country proceed toward laissez-faire economy.

9. From the point of view of the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Rule, Japan's industries should be re-examined and reorganized with a high measurement.

10. Australia should be mapped up as a heavy industry district in the future.

11. In order to supplement the labor power in the districts with scarce population, Chinese, Indians and some of the local inhabitants should be migrated. Only those Japanese who are left over after the adjustment of internal industries should be migrated. Furthermore, Japanese should be migrated in the capacity of officers, as much as possible.

12. With respect to shipping, enemy ships in the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence should be seized as much as possible, and new ships constructed with great speed.

Education and Religion

1. The cardinal principle is to spread and inculcate the ideology of the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence.

2. The spirit of labor should be cultivated.

3. Anti-American and Anti-British movements should be launched and solidarity sought.

4. Culture should be improved and guidance given so as to develop superior races. This is to prepare for the great future fight between the white race and the colored races whose culture is inferior to that of the European races.
5. There should be freedom of religion, but Christianity should be destroyed step by step, while "TEITIFU" teaching should be disseminated and thoroughly inculcated step by step.

6. The Japanese language should be the common language in the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence.

Let’s become a great Yamato race!

The Yamato race is no longer an island race as before. It is the Yamato race of the world, the leader of the race. It is necessary for us to be broadminded and to have the magnanimity worthy of a great race.

Furthermore, the Greater East Asia Sphere under Imperial Influence which we are going to establish has no precedent. In this age, the old rules, customs and manners no longer count. The bureaucratic spirit is taboo. Matters should be discussed only by creative power. It is necessary for us to be broadminded enough to adopt "Kakko Ichii" as our rule. At the same time, we should place analytic studies into secondary importance and devise a system of synthesised studies of national defense, politics and economics.

Excerpts from Article entitled "Clear the Clouds from the East Asia Sky" by MAEZUMI, Kinugasa, which appeared in the 1 May 1939 issue of the Taiyo Doi Hannen:

"On coming back to the homeland from the battlefield, the first pledge I made is to 'pay homage to the soldiers.' We can pay no higher homage to them in leading the China Incident to its solution, and the cardinal point of the solution lies in solving the problems in connection with England and the Soviet Union who assist Chiang Kai-shek. Without solving these problems, all our efforts in destroying Chiang Kai-shek would be fruitless. The longer we fight, the firmer the Chinese people will unite, adoring Chiang as their hero. Chiang Kai-shek is a puppet fed and manipulated by England and the Soviet Union. Therefore, the key of solving the Chinese problem lies in the destruction of those supporters of Chiang.

The chief supporter in England rather than the Soviet. She has great interests in China, and as her retreat from China leads necessarily to her retreat in India and in her other territories in Asia, it is perfectly natural that she is making desperate efforts to stick to China.

When we overthrow England, the Soviet Union will be left alone. To begin with, it is unnatural and impossible for the Soviet Union to make an alliance with England. Communism, which is the fundamental principle of the Soviet Union, advocates a challenge to capitalism. It was the failure in our foreign policy to have made Russia intent on the oriental affairs. If we show our decision to retake England, the Soviet Union will immediately turn the point of her spear toward India, the treasure house of capitalism. We must defend on the north and advance toward the south. Our destiny will be decided in the south."
I have heard recently of the need of strengthening Axis collaboration. From the viewpoint that the success in solving the China Incident depends entirely upon the expulsion of England, the policy of Germany and Italy to destroy England and France are on the same foundation with that of Japan. Accordingly, we must instantly expand and strengthen the hitherto superficial Tri-Partito Pact, including democracy as well as communism as the object of attack. If we strengthen our collaboration, it is easy to put an end to England and France. In Europe, Germany and Italy will consolidate communism and democracy, the two enemies of human civilization, and in Asia, in the area east to India at least, Japan will expel those countries which are founded upon communism and democracy."

Excerpt from Article entitled, "Expel the British Influence from the Far East" by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, which appeared in the 15 May 1939 issue of Taivo Dai Nippon:

"Under the present condition, it is very easy to beat England. We have only to say decisively that we will occupy Hong Kong and her concession in Shanghai. How can the British troops come to the Far East? The British fleet will not be able to enter Singapore. For we have our peerless aviators in addition to the fleet! Even though England is wealthy, she will suffer greatly if her warship which costs 100,000,000 yen will be sunk by our 300,000 yen airplane. Even if we need 100 airplanes to sink a warship, the account is entirely on our side."

Short Cutting Remarks on the Present Situation by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro which appeared in the 1 June 1939 issue of Taivo Dai Nippon:

"It is a humiliation to have a talk with England."
"Define England as the enemy!"
"Our way is one: Expulsion of England."
"Arm the Axis!"
"The enemy that blocks our way to the South of England."

Excerpts from the article entitled "The Solution of the Incident Depends upon the expulsion of England" by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, which appeared in the 22 June 1939 issue of the Taivo Dai Nippon:

"If it had not been for the support of England, the Chiang Government would have been already destroyed. It is clear that if we attack England, the Incident will be brought to an end immediately.

The Premier and the Foreign Minister have told us that it is necessary to strengthen the Axis collaboration, but they have been hesitating to conclude the Military Alliance. It is because they are afraid of England. If the Tri-Partito Military Alliance is useful in solving the Chinese problems, we must instantly proceed toward it.

The Foreign concessions in Tientsin are blockaded. This is an opportune moment to start the attack. Because the whole nation has recognized its necessity, the Government should avail itself of this opportunity and attack..."
instantly. The attack should, not be stopped at Tientsin, but extended to Shanghai and to Hong Kong. This is the only possible solution of the China Incident. We have no choice. Fight England!"

Excerpt from an article entitled, "Organize A Class A Wartime Cabinet that Has no Fear of England and the Soviet Union" by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, appearing in the 10 July 1941 issue of Taiyo Dai Nippon:

"Now our real opponents are England and the Soviet Union. When there is only one way ahead of us, why are we hesitating? Are we afraid of economic blockade? Even if it should be enforced, it is only a group of plutocrats that suffer. Japan as a whole can make her way through with a complete war-time system in which every subject returns his property to the Emperor.

A Government without policy and decision is a great obstacle in the way of the nation. It is passion, power and blood that matters. We have nothing to fear. What we need now is a war-time cabinet with the highest authority."

Excerpt from an article entitled "Build a State Union of China and Manchukuo with Japan as its Leader" by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, which appeared in the 20 July 1941 issue of Taiyo Dai Nippon:

"The public opinion of the whole people has taken an anti-British turn. This is natural and satisfactory, but a deplorable fact is that we Japanese do not know what to do with China. My opinion is as follows:

1. The thorough destruction of the old order is necessary. We must destroy the Kuo-ming-tang Government, and the economic, political and ideological influences of England and Russia.

2. China and Manchukuo should organize a state union with Japan as its leader. We must organize a self-supplying bloc within the Far East, and that economical, defensive block must be led by Japan, the savior of East Asia. We should then have friendly terms with those countries that recognize our union state, and allow no commercial relations with other countries."

Excerpt from an article entitled, "No More Compromise!" by HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, which appeared in the 25 September 1941 issue of Taiyo Dai Nippon:

"I have often pointed out that England and America have been hostile to us throughout the China Incident. The Government authorities also have recently warned the nation of this fact. Moreover, have they not been taking such challenging attitudes as to give birth to the term "ABCD bloc"? The abolition of the commercial treaty by England, America's freezing of our funds and Anglo-American economic embargo of Japan is a declaration of war. There is no hope of re-establishing the friendly relations between Japan and the two countries. Germany and Italy have already gone into a state of war with America. What Japan should do now is clearly expressed in the Tri-Partite Pact.
The Incident will come to an end when the leaders of China become aware of the true facts and become oriental again. If we should put an end to the Incident now, by compromising with England and America, China will be left as she has been - dependent on England and America. If this should happen, how could we apologize to the war dead who have sacrificed themselves for the cause?

The Government seems to be taking the attitude of an opportunist. It is not a good attitude. We Japanese must decide by ourselves. It is up to us to create our own victorious history.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, SHIBATA, Kosaburo hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Librarian, Home Ministry and that as such official I have custody of the documents hereto attached consisting of _______ pages, dated 17 Dec. 1945 - 25 Nov. 1946 and described as follows: Magazine entitled "TAIYO DAI NIPPON" an organ of the "DAI NIPPON SEI HEN JO" later called "DAI NIPPON SEI KAI" (2 volumes)

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Home Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this day of Sept., 1946. /s/ (In Japanese) Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ T. K. Mortor

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this day of Sept., 1946 /s/ Richard H. Larsh NAME

Witness: /s/ Robert F. Mahon

Investigator, IPS Official Capacity
a GREAT UNION OF ASIA by TAJIKA HAMOKIJI

The Meiji Renovation, Showa Renovation and the World Renovation form together a consistent highway of the world history. Because on the first step a modern Japan has been established by the Meiji Renovation in opposition to the fate of the poor colonized Asia, secondly, a great union of Asia is to be completed after the expulsion of the imperialistic influences of Western powers by the Showa Renovation, and further through the next closing war in the World we will be able to realise our great idea of "The World of One Family" cherished since the beginning of our nation.

Thus the present is the epoch of the Showa Renovation progressing steadily through the Manchurian Incident, Sino-Japanese Incident and Greater East Asia War. In fact, we are living in the great epoch-making period in the world history, the mission of which consists in the extension of the ideal of Meiji Renovation into Asia for the purpose of re-establishment of a modern Asia. This is nothing but the union of Asia directed by the moral league or organization of nations through the emancipation of the Asiatic nations from the fetters of European and American Powers, thus preparing ourselves for the certain victory in the closing war in the world.

We have been calling the east region of Singapore "East Asia", and emphasized to unite East Asia immediately through the emancipation from the imperialistic influences of the Western countries. And the Sphere of this union should be extended steadily according to the development of might of Japan. The first cornerstone for this union was laid when Manchukuo has become an independent state through Manchuria Incident which has been made identified with Japan. China, however, had advocated the chauvinism against Japan so loudly without any recognition of the direction of the world history, that China conflict has broken out finally. But out of this rebellion in East Asia our proclamation of establishment of a new order in East Asia has been explicated home and abroad, the new national government founded, and the movement developed between Japan, China and Manchukuo to form a moral league in East Asia.

Chungking Regime has continued the anti-Japanese conflict aided by America and Britain, whose defeat of this time has given so great a shock that it is expected the Chiang Regime will surrender and participate in the co-prosperity sphere of East Asia in a short time.

Now that the might of Japan has been rapidly extended to the south according to the south of Great East Asia War, Thailand declared war upon America and Britain after the conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance between Japan, and France Indo-China co-operating with Japan as a member of our union. At the 79th diet session Premier Tojo stated that Japan would warrant the independence of P. I. and Burma if they co-operate with Japan. The very mission charged on Japan, who occupies
the position of a senior in Asia, consists in the countenance of independence of Asiatic Nations, who have their proper culture, through the emancipation out of the fetters of the whites. Thus, the day might not be far distant when Thailand, Annam, P. I., Burma, etc. will become members of one family in East Asia directed by Japan.

Besides, if the influences of our enemy, Mexico and Britain, are swept away from the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean by the Great East Asia War, the freedom of Australia and independence of India will be realized, and the release of Eastern Siberia may be attained with a fundamental adjustment of relations between Japan and Russia. In that way, the East Asia co-prosperity sphere will develop into the union all over Asia, as well as the sphere under the real power of Japan will extend.

As above mentioned, for the purpose of great union of Asia, it is to be the first step to unite morally Japan, China, and Manchuria, under the leadership of Japan; the second is a participation of Thailand, Annam, P. I., and Burma in this union and the third to effect the emancipation of Australia, India, and Siberia. We have expected that the league of Japan, Manchuria, and China would develop into the cooperation of Great Asia, but judging from the bright triumph of our troops, it might be possible for us to expect the accomplishment of the third step almost simultaneously with those of the first and second. The Great East Asia War which is being waged by us at present is the one that is to determine Japan's fate and Asia's destiny. It must be a great achievement of the establishment of Asia.

Therefore, it is required for us to continue our advance towards our ideal of great union of Asia, never relaxing our war spirit and solidifying our footing ground step by step.

(The writer is a professor of the Ritsumikan University).
CERTIFICATE

I, E. E. DANLY, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, G.I.T.C., S.C.A.P., and as such have possession, custody and control of original or copies of captured enemy documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That Document No. 1955 was delivered to me from the Imperial Library of Tokyo as being a file of the Osaka Jiji Shimbun for January 1942 including the issue of 31 January 1942 and such document has been continuously in my custody since such delivery.

9 September 1946 /s/ E. E. DANLY

E. E. DANLY
CERTIFICATE

I, Sokichi Ishiguro, Chief of Section II of the Imperial Library, do hereby certify that one copy of the "Osaka Jiji Shinpo" dated January 31, Showa 17/1942/ year owned by the Imperial Library was, at the request of the International Prosecution Section, SC/P, loaned out to the said Prosecution Section on May 24, Showa 21/1946/ year.

Dated this 20th day of September, Showa 21/1946/ year.

/s/ Sokichi Ishiguro

(Scel)
CERTIFICATE

I, Sokichi Ishiguro, Chief of Section II of the Imperial Library, do hereby certify that one copy of the "Osaka jiji Shinpo" dated January 31, Showa 17/1942/ year owned by the Imperial Library was, at the request of the International Prosecution Section, SC/F, loaned out to the said Prosecution Section on May 24, Showa 21/1946/ year.

Dated this 20th day of September, Showa 21/1946/ year.

/s/ Sokichi Ishiguro (Seal)
Imaginary map of New East Asia Federation.

There is a small island called "Greenwich" situated, one minute and so many seconds North Latitude in the southern extremity of the territories governed by the great Japanese Empire. If we draw a circle like the rising sun with this small island as the center and its radius extending to Lake Baikal, to the north of Manchoukuo, it will include the Maritime Provinces, Kamchatka Peninsula, the Alcuitan Islands and the Hawaiian Islands in the North, India in the West, Australia and New Zealand in the southeast and thousands of islands scattered in the Southern Pacific like big and small stars.

The creation of New East Asia is certainly nothing but the realization of a great ideal which embraces the Great South Seas. This as has been stated in our announcement is to be economic, geographic and racial unity with Japan as its leader. This will be the way to freedom from past aggressive exploitations and the utilitarian white evils.
Certificate

I, Sokichi Ishiguro, chief of Section II of the Imperial Library, do hereby certify that the book entitled "Thailand," Volume IV of the Southward Advance Series, author: Southward Industrial Research Society ("Nampo Sengyo Chose Kei"), published by Nanshinsha in Showa 17 /1942/ year, book-shelf number 919/131, was, at the request of the International Prosecution Section, SCAP, loaned out to the said Prosecution Section on June 13, Showa 21 /1946/ year.

Dated this 20th day of September, Showa 21 /1946/ year.

/s/ Sokichi Ishiguro

(Seal)
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

United States of America, et al. )

vs. ) SS AFFIDAVIT

ARAKI, Sadao, et al. )

I, KSUO YATSUO, state as follows:

I was born in KISHIKI, SAGA Prefecture in 1899.

I held the office of the Chief of the Business Bureau of National Policy Investigation Association (KOMSAKU KENKYUKAI JIKUKOKU cho) from February 1937 to June 1945. At the same time I was entrusted with the business of the Research Section of the War Ministry from December 1938 to the end of 1944.

During the above period I was made to know and did the following which I am going to testify to, according to my duties.

The National Policy Investigation Association was instituted by Baron KINIO OKURA, a member of the House of Peers, myself and others in 1937 with the purpose to investigate the graver political problems of immediate attention to our country and to submit the resulting reports to the Japanese Government and to the public.

1. The number of individual members of this Association was approximately 2000 and the number of the juridical persons about 150, all of them paying a subscription.

Among the members of this Association, there were included Japanese Statesmen, political leaders, high officials, retired officers who had formerly held positions of leadership, representatives of the learned class, some Japanese concerns, the representatives of industrial companies as well as banking facilities, etc.

A list of some juridical persons who were members to the Association is as follows:-
1. Prime Minister's Secretariat - Yearly subscription ¥3,000
2. War Ministry " " ¥3,000
3. Naval Ministry " " ¥3,000
4. Home Ministry " " ¥1,000
5. Oversea Affairs Ministry " " ¥500
6. Foreign Ministry " " ¥1,000
7. Communication Ministry " " about ¥1,000
8. The Mitsubishi Concern " " ¥5,000
9. The Aikawa Concern " " ¥5,000
10. The Mitsui Concern " " from ¥3,000/ to ¥5,000
11. The South Manchurian Railway Co. " " ¥1,000
12. Other big companies and banking facilities also subsidized the Association. The annual fee of an individual member was from ¥50 to ¥200.

The annual budget of this Association was ¥170,000/180,000 for the purpose of carrying out specially important investigations, it received extra contributions. For instance, we received ¥300,000 to cover the special expenses of planning a ten years' programme for the construction of the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, including ¥100,000 which was received from the Governmental organizations (viz. ¥20,000 from the Cabinet Information Board which was under the direct control of Hideki, TOJO, ¥20,000 from the War Ministry through Akira, TUTO, ¥20,000 from the Foreign Ministry through the Vice Minister, the then Minister being TOGO, ¥20,000 from the Naval Ministry, and ¥5,000 from the Greater East Asia Ministry, etc.

2. ¥100,000 was contributed by the big companies (including ¥20,000 from MITSUI, ¥10,000 from the SUMITOMO through Keijiro KITAZAWA, a director to the company, and large sums of about ¥10,000 to ¥20,000 each from some other companies.

The above stated ¥300,000 was received in response to a letter addressed to the above named Government office and the brains of the public concerns in which we explained the ways the money was going to be spent.
¥240,000 out of the above-mentioned sum was spent in making the plan for the ten years' programme. The document was issued by this Association in April 1943 and sent to the Greater East Asia and Foreign Ministries. I assure you that the document written in Japanese entitled "The Plan for the Measures for Constructing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" in four parts which you showed (and which had been seized when the residence of Baron Okuma was searched) is the very document for which compilation this Association received the above stated subscription of ¥300,000.

The Board of Managing Directors which assumed leadership in the Association had ten members including:

1. Kinmochi Okuma (Member of the House of Peers)
2. Ichio Yuzawa (Prior to his taking the Portfolio of Home Minister)
3. Hiroshi Shiroma (Later took the Office of Minister without Portfolio and in the Suzuki Cabinet was appointed Chief of the Information Board)

I, as the Chief of the Business Bureau, which consisted of 30/40 clerks, was looking after the affairs of the Association.

The work of the Association was sometimes participated in by those who were qualified as not the members of the Association. (For instance, Lt. Gen. Akira Itô who was in active service not only made speeches two or three times in the interest of the Association but gave financial support as stated above. Lt. Gen. Kenyo Sató also made speeches more than once. Besides the above, some influential Japanese statesmen who were not members participated in the important works of the Association.)

The reports, documents and plans which were made by the Association on the most important problems were submitted to the Government (The Premier's Secretariat) and the Ministers concerned on the instructions of the Board of Managing Directors.

The Governmental Organizations furnished us with necessary materials and data (including those of top-secret character) for investigating important problems regarding national policies and presenting our opinions about them.
In October of the 16th year of Showa (1941) when it seemed definite that Japan should enter a war in the near future, the Board of Managing Directors of the National Policy Investigation Association instituted a Committee for Administrative Measures with the purpose of working out a plan to be submitted to the Government in preparation for wars in the North and in the South.

This Committee consisted of a fine set of men, such as former ministers and generals who were in close connection with the Government and military authorities, including the following principal figures:

Nobuyuki, ABE, Premier in Showa 14/15 /'39/'40/, President of Imperial Rule Assistance Association in Showa 17 /'42/.

Fumio GOTO, A member of the House of Peers, Acting Premier in Showa 11 /1936/, Minister without Portfolio in TOJO Cabinet, President of Imperial Rule Assistance Association in Showa 18 /1943/.

Seizo KOBAYASHI, Admiral. Vice Minister of Navy. Minister without portfolio in Koiso Cabinet.

Sankichi, TAKARASHI, Admiral. A war councillor.

Shinsuke, KISHI. The Commerce and Industry Minister of TOJO Cabinet. Since Showa 18 /1943/, "Minister without portfolio, Vice Minister of Munitions, and others.

I affirm that the document you showed to me entitled "The Report of the Committee for Administrative Measures" is the very report that was made by the above-mentioned committee and submitted to the Premier, Army, Navy, and Foreign Ministers in October 1941.

During the war, three men of the Committee for Administrative Measures were appointed by the Government to be administrative leaders in the Southern occupied areas, viz. Lt. Gen. Rensuke ISOQAI to be Gov. Gen. of Hongkong; Shigeo OTATE to be Mayor of Singapore and Kyozoro SAKURAI to be political advisor to Burma.
CERTIFICATE

I, Lt. James MURAKAMI, hereby certify that I am fully conversant with the Japanese and English languages, and that this day, the said YATSUGI, Kazuo was duly sworn in my presence and signed said Affidavit under oath in my presence; and that all proceedings incidental to the administration of said oath and the signing of said Affidavit were truly and correctly translated from Japanese into English and English into Japanese and fully understood and comprehended by said affiant.

Dated this 30th day of August 1946, at Tokyo, Japan.

/s/ James MURAKAMI, 2nd Lt., U.S.
Lt. James MURAKAMI

Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned officer by the above-named YATSUGI Kazuo, at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan, this 30th day of August, 1946.

/s/ Arthur A. SANDUSKY
ARTHUR A. SANDUSKY
Capt., J.A.G.D.
This is a tentative plan drawn up by the Secretariat as a reference material for discussion concerning the scope and the structure of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, which is to be discussed hereafter by a small committee of the Investigation Committee on the Problems of Greater East Asia.

For convenience' sake, this tentative plan was drawn up by dividing the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere into Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Further, the tentative plan leaves behind many problems concerning the scope and composition of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. We should appreciate hearing especially the views of each member of the committee in regard to these points.
I. The scope of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

A. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

1. The inner sphere.

Inner and Outer Mongolia, China, French Indo-China, Thailand, Malaya, Burma, Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, other Oceanic Islands, and Hawaii.

2. The border and the neutral zones (including unfortified areas).

a. The border zones

   Islamic zone in the Near East, and Alaska.

b. The neutral zones.

   Parts of Africa bordering the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, the southern part of South America, land and sea of the North and South Poles.
B. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

1. The Inner Sphere.

The zone along the Sea of Okhotsk and Bering Sea, Inner and Outer Mongolia, China, French Indo-China, Thailand, Malaya, Burma, the Philippines, the Bismarck Archipelago and New Guinea, and New Caledonia. (Should we include the eastern part of India?)

2. The border and neutral zones (including unfortified areas.)

a. The border zones.

Australia, other Oceanic Islands, and India.

b. The neutral zones.

Hawaii, the Islamic zone in the Near East, parts of Africa bordering on the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, the southern part of South America, the land and sea zones of the North and South Poles.

c. Unfortified areas.

The Aleutian Islands.

C. The points to be discussed.

1. The counter-plan for preventing the concentration in Siberia of the Slavs who are being driven away from the European part of Russia.

2. The areas (Islamic zone, the Indian Ocean Coasts, Africa and the southern part of South America) where we should demand the establishment of emancipated zones in the Euro-American Co-Prosperity Sphere in return for our emancipating India and Australia as our border zones.
3. Matters concerning the sea fishery rights which should be secured from the standpoint of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

II. The composition of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

A. Independent states.
   1. Existing independent states.
   2. The areas which should be made newly-independent.

B. Protectorates.

C. Areas under direct control.
   (What should be their positional relation with Chosen and Taiwan?)

D. The disposition and the status of the European and American possessions in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

III. The kernel zone of the Co-Prosperity Sphere.

A. The kernel area from the standpoint of national defence against countries outside the Co-Prosperity Sphere.
   1. The plan for the northern frontier under the threat of a powerful Russia.
   2. The plan for preparing against America.
   3. The plan for preparing against the strong powers of Europe.

B. The kernel zone from the standpoint of securing peace in the Co-Prosperity Sphere. (Specifically, the standpoint of completely shutting out any possibility of another war against the Chinese.)
   1. The formation of the satollitic countries to check the Chinese in the Co-Prosperity Sphere.
b. Northern area...Manchukuo, Inner and outer Mongolia.

b. Southern area--Burma (?) Annam (?)

2. The division and the independence of China herself. For example, whether China should be divided up into North, Central, South and Interior China, with North China as the kernel zone.

3. Plans for controlling the fate of China or of checking her resistance power through economic measures.

C. The kernel zone from the standpoint of securing and developing the superior characteristics of the Yamato race.

D. The actual composition of the kernel zone combining the foregoing points.

IV. The problem of forming states which are to assist the leading power for the smooth management of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

A. A-Class states (Director-class).

1. The satellitic states of the leading power. Large states, under direct control, such as Manchukuo and Malaya. (Should Hongchiang be included?)

2. Powerful independent states.

   China (should it be divided into independent states and made into separate units?), Thailand, Burma (?).

3. Problems.

   a. The problem of whether many satellitic states should be selected as director-states.
b. The problem of how to manage such colonies as French Indo-China.

c. The problem of what consideration should be given to the construction or selection of Director states from the standpoint of checking the Chinese.

B. B-class states:

1. Other independent states.

2. 3-class states under direct control.

C. C-class states.

1. Protectorates and C-class states under direct control.

2. Problems.

a. How to deal with Chosen and Taiwan in respect to their status in the composition of the Co-Prosperity Sphere.

V. The status of the border zones.

A. The problem of what relation should be established with the outer zones.

1. Positive demands.

2. Passive demands (such as demilitarization and special treaties with third countries.)

B. What treatment should be given in the Co-Prosperity Sphere to the states in the border zones.

* * * *
Seizure of Evidentiary Documents

On 3 June 1946 this Agent, together with five other Counter-Intelligence Corps representatives, three language officers and one representative of the G-2 Section, entered and seized from the home of YATSUGI, Kazuo, Shibuyaku, Sakuraguoka, No. 5 a number of documents among which were the following:


The aforementioned seizures were made under authority given in AG 200.2, 10 November 1945, CIS, SCAP Index No. 261.

I hereby certify that the action described herein and the document described above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

/s/ James Williamson
Special Agent, CIC

Hereby I acknowledge that the documents described above were among those obtained at my home.

/s/ YATSUGI, Kazuo

CERTIFICATE:

I, Junior Lieutenant BORIS ALECSANDROVICH PETROV, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with Japanese and English languages to do oral and written translations.

Today YATSUGI, Kazuo in my presence signed the above said document and I certify that this document has been correctly translated from the English language into Japanese and was correctly understood.

I am duly warned that for the false translation I bear responsibility according to Article 92 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code.

Signature: B. Petrov
BORIS PETROV, Junior Lt.

The Certificate is taken by
Military Interrogator Major BASENKO.
EXTRACT FROM THE BOOK "KAUMEBIRO HIBARI JARAJI" REVEL BOOK & LIST OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SOCIETY "KOKUSAI KENKYU-KAI" IN JAPANESE

Page 8
AOKI, Kazuo, Minister of Home Affairs, Member of House of Peers.

Page 13
ITO, Rokuro, Executive Director of the Sogo Hoppu Kai (Society for the Systematic Study of North-east Japan).

Page 14
ISHIGURO, Tadatsugu, Chairman of the Manshu Iji for Immigration into Manchuria.

Page 19
OKURA, Kinminochi, Baron, Member of the House of Peers.

Page 21
OTA, Masataka, Doctor of Economics, Member of Representatives.

Page 22
OKUMURA, Kiyao, Vice-President of the Board of Kenkyu Society.

Page 23
KATA, Okinobu, Minister of Finance.

Page 28
KIYOSHI, Ichiro, Doctor of Law, Member of the Representatives.

Page 32
GOTO, Fumio, Administrator General of the Yakuza House of Peers.

Page 46
TOGO, Shigenori, Member of the House of Representatives.

Page 55
HIBINO, Masaharu, Vice-Admiral, President of the Koki (Industrial Union Central Society).

Page 56
HIRAO, Shosaburo, Member of the House of the Iron and Steel Control Society.

Page 58
FUJIVARA, Ginjiro, Member of the House of the Sangyo Setsubu To-dan (Industrial Organization).

Page 163
Members which are legal persons lod

Page 165
The Bank of Chosen (The Tokyo Branch)

Page 167
The Nippon Kogyo Bank
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Page 32  GOYO, Funio, Administrator General of the Yacht Racing Club of Japan, Member of the House of Peers.

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Page 58  FUJII, Ginjiro, Member of the House of Representatives.

Page 163  Members which are legal persons lodging.

Page 167  The Bank of Chosen (The Tokyo Branch).
Doc. No. 2302A

Page 169 The Mitsubishi General Headquarters
The Mitsubishi Head Office
The South Manchuria Railway Company, Ltd.

Page 172 The Sumitomo Head Office (A joint stock company)

As of October, Showa 17 /1942/

"Kai-in Mei-bo Harabini Yoran" (Register of Members with Particulars)

Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai (Society for the Study of State Policies)
Seizure of Evidentiary Documents

On 3 June 1946 this Agent, together with five other Counter-Intelligence Corps representatives, three language officers and one representative of the G-2 Section, entered and seized from the home of YATSUGI, Kazuo, Shibuya, Sakuraguoka No. 5 a number of documents among which were the following:


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I hereby certify that the action described herein and the documents described above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

/s/ Janes Williamson
Special Agent, CIC

Hereby I acknowledge that the documents described above were among those obtained at my home.

/s/ YATSUGI, Kazuo

CERTIFICATE:

I, Junior Lieutenant ECRIS ALEXANDR-VICH PETROV, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with Japanese and English languages to do oral and written translations.

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Signature: E. Petrov
ECRIS PETROV, Junior Lt.

The Certificate is taken by
Military Interrogator Major BASEIKO
REPORT OF THE SOCIETY "KOKUSAI KENYUKAI"

CONTENTS

1. List of policy for management of the southern areas occupied as a result of the Greater East Asia war. (December 1941).

II. Plan for management of territories in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere. (December 1941).

III. Report of the Committee for administrative measures. (October 1941). (Including the register of the Committee members, the reference materials and the circumstances of the Committee meetings.)

II. Plan for management of territories in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

Chap. 3. Future of Soviet territories.
Though this problem cannot be easily decided at present inasmuch as it is to be settled in accordance with the Japanese-German Pact, the Maritime Province shall be annexed to Japan, the district adjacent to the Manchurian Empire shall be put into the sphere of influence of that country, and the Trans-Siberian Railroad shall be placed under the complete control of Japan and Germany with Omsk as the point of demarcation.

Chap. 5. Independent states in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and their defense.

The problem as regards Siberia as a whole cannot be decided this instant; it will be influenced by the Japanese-German Pact as well as the extent to which the Soviets survive.

Members of the Committee for Administrative Measures, in the National Policy for the Investigation of the Society (KOKUSAI KENYUKAI):
CONTENTS

I. Gist of policy for management of the southern areas occupied as a result of the Greater East Asia war. (December 1941).

II. Plan for management of territories in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere. (December 1941).

III. Report of the Committee for administrative measures. (October 1941). (Including the register of the Committee, the reference materials and the circumstances of the Committee meetings.)

Plan for management of territories in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Chap. 1. Fixture of Governmental lines.

Though this problem cannot be easily decided at present inasmuch as it is to be settled in accordance with the Japanese-German Pact, the Maritime Province shall be annexed to Japan, the district adjacent to the Manchurian Empire shall be put into the sphere of influence of that country, and the Trans-Siberian Railroad shall be placed under the complete control of Japan and Germany with Omsk as the point of demarcation.

Chap. 5. Independent states in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and their defence.

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Members of the Committee for Administrative Measures, in the National Policy for the Investigation of the Society (KOKUSAI KEIREIYUKAI):

The Administrative Office of the National Policy Investigation Society.

Chap. I. The purpose of establishing this Committee.

Assuming that Japan will inevitably expand in the near future either southwardly or northwardly, if our measures are taken without any preparations, it is probable that we shall simply repeat what we are experiencing in the administration of Manchuria and North China. To be unprepared is hazardous. Therefore, our Society is establishing this Committee for administrative measures with the purpose of studying and discussing without delay many sorts of problems forwarding the results to the Government and requesting the Government to make the necessary preparations.

Chap. II. The original plan with an epitome of each member’s opinion.

1. The original plan.

As to this point we must need pay different heed to different cases, that is, for permanent occupation (suppose the Soviet Maritime Province, and in the other events (suppose the Dutch East Indies). For example in the above two cases we are required to think how to make use of the Soviet people, the Indonesians and the Dutch according to the case. Is it good or bad to make use of the natives? If we do, what will be the highest position they can get? Is it proper or improper to place Japanese in the regional
prefectural and village administrations. (of course, in order to watch the others)?

How ought we manage the native officers who were popular or unpopular among the native people?

Is it good or bad to have the system of G.P.U. propped by the natives? Specifically in the case of the USSR, is it advisable to employ White-guard Russians, or not? Especially in Dutch East Indies, is it good to employ Indians, Burmans, Malays, Chinese, etc., or not?

2. Every member's opinion about the original plan.

Member A. "Needless to say natives should not be used in the Dutch East Indies. Inhabitants of the Dutch East Indies should not be employed either, except special persons. In the case of the USSR I think it would be good to make use of the "White-guard Russian emigrants."

(7) Is it advisable or not to send colonists to the actual places?

1. The original plan.

It may be considered as a good plan for expanding the influence of Japan and at the same time supplying the vegetables and other things that the army needs that we send the simple armed cultivators immediately after the first four months of occupation. This might be necessary in the Dutch East Indies, but in the case with the U.S.S.R., it may be worth even more serious consideration.
CERTIFICATE

I, Lt. Colonel G. I. TARAPENKO, a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the document "List of Policy for Management of the Southern Areas Occupied as a Result of the "Greater East Asia War," on 58 sheets, was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department, Moscow on or about March 22, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the record office of the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department.

I do further certify that this document was found by the Red Army forces in 1945 in South Sakhalin in the files of Karafuto Co. Ltd.

Lt. Col. TARAPENKO
(signature and rank)

Tokyo, Japan,

May 29, 1946.
SEIZURE OF EVIDENTIARY DOCUMENTS

On 4 June this agent and E. O. Kittleson, Special Agent, C.I.C. and Mr. J. Wada accompanied by OKURA, Kinnochi entered the latter's office, East Asia Research Institute (Dai Towa Konkyu Kai), Surugadai, Kanda-ku, Tokyo and removed therefrom a number of documents among which was the following:

1. Draft of Measures for the Building of the Great East Asia Co-prosperity sphere. Top Secret. (published in April 1943 by the Commission for studying the problems of Great East Asia of the "Kokusaku Konkyu Kai" Society; in 4 parts.)

The aforesaid seizure was made under authority given in A G 200.2, 10 November 1945.

C.I.C. SCAP index No. 211.

I hereby certify that the action described herein and the document described above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

/s/ James Williamson
James Williamson
Special Agent, C.I.C.

Hereby I acknowledge that the document described above was among those obtained at my office.

/s/ OKURA, Kinnochi
OKURA, Kinnochi
2. "The reasonable scope of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

In the foregoing part we have considered the scope of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere from various viewpoints along the line of requisites of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. But the scopes required by each point of view are not always in accord as already stated.

By putting together these demands, the scope of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere will be decided, but the nation which decides it is after all the leading country, Japan. If we put together the above mentioned demands and consider the geographical outline which is as a reasonable scope of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere at the present stage, the scope of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere includes the land, air and water of the following:

(a) All of the areas that are generally recognized as self-evident components of the Co-Prosperity Sphere including those under military occupation.

(b) The ALKUTIANS ISLANDS and ALASKA (but ALASKA is regarded as a non-fortified zone).

(c) All the eastern region of the Soviet Union including LAKE BAIKAL.

(d) All of OUTER MONGOLIA, SINKIANG, TIBET, TSINGHAI, etc.

(e) All the Indian region east of the demarcation
line which runs southwestward from TIBET to the INDIAN OCEAN (DELHI and CEYLON ISLAND as well as other islands in the INDIAN OCEAN are included. The concrete location of the line shall be considered separately.

(f) AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND and all other islands in the SOUTH PACIFIC OCEAN (excluding those which are very close to the coast of the American Continent).

(g) All of islands in the NORTH PACIFIC OCEAN including HAWAII ISLANDS (excluding those which are very close to the coast of the American Continent).

(pp. 51, 52, 53)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>日期</th>
<th>月份</th>
<th>工作内容</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10月</td>
<td>23日</td>
<td>上班</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10月</td>
<td>24日</td>
<td>上班</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10月</td>
<td>25日</td>
<td>上班</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10月</td>
<td>26日</td>
<td>上班</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10月</td>
<td>27日</td>
<td>上班</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10月</td>
<td>28日</td>
<td>上班</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10月</td>
<td>29日</td>
<td>上班</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10月</td>
<td>30日</td>
<td>上班</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

注：
- 上班时间为：
  - 上午：9:00 - 12:00
  - 下午：13:30 - 18:00
- 工作内容包括但不限于：
  - 客户服务
  - 产品展示
  - 市场调研
  - 后勤支持
- 其他注意事项：
  - 每日工作结束后，务必清理桌面，保持工作区域整洁。
  - 每周五进行一次部门会议，总结本周工作计划及下周工作安排。
  - 定期进行员工技能培训，提升个人能力。

(签名)：

(日期)：

(部门)：

(负责人)：

(审批)：

(日期)：
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(一)</th>
<th>(二)</th>
<th>(三)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(注) 1. 请根据实际情况填写。
2. 具体内容请参照相关文件。
第四节 讨论

一、前篇复习

二、演讲内容

三、讨论

四、总结

参考文献
台灣人，中國人，兩者是一樣的。
16.22 B

\[ V \]

\[ X \]

比例 (\(X = x \), \(X = x^n \))
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>月</th>
<th>六</th>
<th>五</th>
<th>四</th>
<th>三</th>
<th>二</th>
<th>日</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 &amp; 7</td>
<td>8 &amp; 9</td>
<td>10 &amp; 11</td>
<td>12 &amp; 13</td>
<td>14 &amp; 15</td>
<td>16 &amp; 17</td>
<td>18 &amp; 19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(具体日期内容未翻译，需结合实际上下文理解)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>日期</th>
<th>时间</th>
<th>内容</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9月11日</td>
<td>08:00</td>
<td>营运前会议</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9月12日</td>
<td>08:00</td>
<td>营运前会议</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9月13日</td>
<td>08:00</td>
<td>营运前会议</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9月14日</td>
<td>08:00</td>
<td>营运前会议</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9月15日</td>
<td>08:00</td>
<td>营运前会议</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9月16日</td>
<td>08:00</td>
<td>营运前会议</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

注：以上为示例内容，实际内容根据实际情况填写。
1608

1608

1680

1680
昭和十六年八月三十一日特急文

第三回経済戦争実施計画

昭和十六年八月三十一日

懸案

昭和十六年八月三十一日

経済戦争実施計画

昭和十六年八月三十一日

懸案
16228
第三
武力幹指導方針

一対

対AB戦

対A戦

対B戦

万万一心

N0.15

1622 B
對 A B

A 對 X 作 我 場 合 A 對 N 這 面 的 補 輔 斷 計

音 執 行 "AB 場 合 我 上 軍 頭 當 然 是 A 避

難 了 我 方 吃 場 合 這 P Q 反 E 場 合 我 我

的 惡 頭 的 恐 劇 才 強 化 攻 兩

五 計 D 圖

D 對 李 合 A 對 E 陰 平 弱 化 E 陽

方 處 理 這 種 與 古 無 力 我、避 武 X

我 對 D 被 攻 頭 時 機 當 接 放 棄 圖

進 出 A 合 B 東 頷 合 B 陰 等 其

用 我 必 場 三 頭 時 B 頭 機 當 合 之

決 行 A R 我 路 的 面 占 領
1622 B

10.17

表一

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>项目</th>
<th>数量</th>
<th>单位</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>项目一</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>个</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>项目二</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>个</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

备注：

此表仅供参考，具体数据以实际情况为准。
1622日
1.62 2

1.62 2
1622

2

\( x^2 + 2x - 3 = 0 \)

\( (x+3)(x-1) = 0 \)

\( x = -3 \) or \( x = 1 \)

图

国际学校
1622 B

1621 BC

对 ABC 进行分析

根据 A、B、C 的位置进行判断

通过比较 A、B、C 的值来确定关系

结果为 A=B

根据 A=B 进行推断
需要注意以下问题：

1. **问题一**：
   - 文字内容：
     - 方式一：
       - (详细内容)
     - 方式二：
       - (详细内容)

2. **问题二**：
   - 文字内容：
     - 方式一：
       - (详细内容)
     - 方式二：
       - (详细内容)

3. **问题三**：
   - 文字内容：
     - 方式一：
       - (详细内容)
     - 方式二：
       - (详细内容)
千九四十六年／昭和二十一年／九月六日

東京ニ於テ署名

当該官吏署名

栗山康平／署名及官印／

余／B.W.フライシャハ／余ガ聯合國最高指揮官總司令部

ノ公務上ノ日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入手シタル

モノハルコトガ兹ニ証明スル

東京ニ於テ署名

氏／名

米陸軍情報部少尉／フライシャ

関係官署見合

右ノ者ノ公的資格

／J.W.フライシャ
Document Relative to the Maneuvers for Total War.

August 1941

No. 98 of 120 volumes.

The Total War Research Institute.
Theoretical Maneuvers for Total War, No. 2
11 June (16 SHINO) 1941

Supervisor of the theoretical maneuvers for total war, IIIUR, Yuzuru

We have decided on the enforcement plan of the first theoretical maneuvers for total war for 1941 as per the attached.

(partly revised on 11, July)

Attached List of the first theoretical maneuvers for total war, No. 2.

The Enforcement Plan of the First Theoretical Maneuvers for Total War.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Imaginary Operations</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Delivery of problem</td>
<td>The inter-</td>
<td>The following personal work will be di-</td>
<td></td>
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<td>rected most:</td>
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<td>Exter-</td>
<td>by the assistant super-</td>
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<td></td>
<td>nal</td>
<td>visor MATSUDA.</td>
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<td>of all of the</td>
<td>2) Each mem-</td>
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<td></td>
<td>maneuvers</td>
<td>ber of the</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Bureau will</td>
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<td>give neces-</td>
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<td>sary in-</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>structions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>first</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. strateg-</td>
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<td>ic plan-</td>
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<td>ning for total warfare.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3. The judg-</td>
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<td>ing of situa-</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>tion necessary for the above.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>Delivery of end problem.</td>
<td>The principle</td>
<td>All the mem-</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>second</td>
<td>bers of the</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>phase</td>
<td>Blue land Bureau will</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>of</td>
<td>participate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>maneuvers</td>
<td>in directing</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the maneuvers</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and they will</td>
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<td>be re-</td>
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<td></td>
<td>quired to do</td>
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<td></td>
<td>the following</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>work: 1. The</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>and</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The principle organs of Blue land Bureau will constitute the maneuvers and be required to do the following work: 1. The
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 4</td>
<td>Thursday Judgement Third Period</td>
<td>The period of trained national relations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Term of train ed national relations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Fri­</td>
<td>Manoeu ral Vers. Rela tions.</td>
<td>Imaginary situation is given to the principal organs of Blue land, &amp; the management of the situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Satur­</td>
<td>Judge ment Off Fourth Period of Manoeu ral</td>
<td>Henceforward the manoeuvres will be directed under the following organis ation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>day</td>
<td>Vers. Relations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Sun­</td>
<td>Holiday</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>day</td>
<td>Phase of Manoeu ral Vers. Rela tions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Mon­</td>
<td>Vers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Tues­</td>
<td>Judgement Fifth Period when Manoeu ral</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>day</td>
<td>Vers is Inevi t able.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Wed­</td>
<td>Manoeu ral Vers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nes­</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Thurs</td>
<td>Judgement Half a Sixth month</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>day</td>
<td>Phase of out break Vers. of war.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Fri­</td>
<td>Manoeu ral Vers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Satur­</td>
<td>Judgement The Sev enth period off</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>day</td>
<td>Phase month of of total war</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Sun­</td>
<td>Holiday</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>day</td>
<td>Phase month of of total war</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Mon­</td>
<td>Manoeu ral Vers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Tues­</td>
<td>Judgement Eighth months after Phase</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>day</td>
<td>Manoeu ral Vers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Wed­</td>
<td>Manoeu ral Vers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nes­</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Thurs</td>
<td>Judgement Ninth months after Phase</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>day</td>
<td>Manoeu ral Vers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Fri­</td>
<td>Phase</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Satur­</td>
<td>Day off</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Planning of total war strategies.

1. Preparations for the review period.

Development of total war strategies.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sept.</th>
<th>21 Sunday</th>
<th>Holiday</th>
<th>Tenth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22 Monday</td>
<td>Judgment</td>
<td>Phase</td>
<td>1) Drafting of criticism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Tuesday</td>
<td>Holiday</td>
<td>Maneuvers</td>
<td>2) Preparations for the Research Meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Wednesday</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1) Research outside meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Thursday</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2) Criticism will be after this requested to participate in concluded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Friday</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The arrangement of the results of the maneuvers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Saturday</td>
<td>The arrangement of the results of the maneuvers.</td>
<td></td>
<td>The arrangement of the results of the maneuvers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Sunday</td>
<td>Holiday</td>
<td>Results of the maneuvers.</td>
<td>2) Research and the arrangements for the arrangements of the results of research by each member of the Bureau.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Monday</td>
<td>Maneuvers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Tuesday</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remarks:

(1) Judgment stands for judgment conference.

(2) Graph shows the operation of all the members concerned.

(3) The prescriptions for the carrying out of maneuvers and the principles of instruction (items for investigation) will be decided separately.
Prescriptions for the Execution of the First Theoretical Maneuver for Total War.

Part I. The Object of the Maneuvers

Article I. The object of this maneuver is to let the first term post-graduates of this Research Bureau practice definite measures for total warfare, as well as to make fundamental and thoroughgoing researches on it as superior executives.

Article II. The following are the principal items which should be studied and practiced during the maneuvers:

1) The national policy and object which should be propagated within and abroad.

2) Strategies for total warfare to be adopted by our Empire.

3) The points in drafting part of the various plans necessary for the execution of total warfare.

4) The main points of consolidating and strengthening positions for total warfare.

5) The outline for directing total warfare.

6) Part of a definite policy for the execution of psychological, economic and diplomatic wars against a specific country.

7) Directing organs for total warfare, and directing organs for psychological, economic and diplomatic warfare.

8) Other matters recognized as necessary for the execution of total warfare by Japan.

Article III. The particulars of items for investigation and practice mentioned in the preceding articles are prescribed separately in the outline of maneuver instructions.
Section IV.

Article 9. When the research meetings on the tenth term maneuvers are over, the Supreme Commander will comment on it for the benefit of those who participated in the maneuver.

The main points on which comments will be made are approximately as follows:

1. Whether the plans set up beforehand were suitable or not.
2. Whether the maneuvers execution of the plans were carried properly or not.
3. Whether ex post facto research was carried out properly or not.
4. Whether proper discipline was maintained during the maneuvers or not.
5. Instructions for the future.

Article 10. Following actual maneuvers carried out under estimated situations (or after the conclusion of the ninth term maneuvers), each umpire department shall submit materials for comment to the Supreme Commander. Each umpire department, however, must adjust beforehand the opinions of the umpires belonging to that department regarding the materials for comment.

The draft of the comments shall be made by the critics' council. The members who are to attend the council meeting shall be specially designated.

Section V. - Gathering the Results of the Maneuvers.

Article 11. Each staff member of this Institute shall, depending on his assignment, arrange and preserve the records of the maneuvers as well as the opinions, etc., on the items for research and matters which should be improved concerning the plans of the maneuvers, or report them to other organizations which require such information.

Section VI. - Specific Symbols.

Article 12. In order to preserve secrecy, specific symbols given in the following list shall be used in place of the names of the nations and places, etc., which will be used in the maneuvers:

A. U. S. A.  B. Britain  C. China
D. The Soviet Union  E. Dutch East Indies  F. French
G. Australia  H. Hawaii  Indo-China
J. Inner South Sea  K. Canada  L. India
M. Manchukuo  N. Japan  O. Borneo
P. Philippino Islands  Q. Malay  R. Far East-1
S. Singapore  T. Thailand  Regions of
U. Vladivostok  V. Burma  the Soviet
W. Alcutian and X. The Axis Powers 
Alaskan regions  X1: Germany 
                  X2: Italy.
                  X3: Russia
                  X4: China

(Pages 11-13)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The term of maneuvers</th>
<th>Date of maneuvers</th>
<th>Date (Day)</th>
<th>Functions for directing the maneuvers</th>
<th>The assembled empires</th>
<th>The principal maneuver items</th>
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<tr>
<td>Third Term</td>
<td>August 16th 1941</td>
<td>Wednesday 03:30</td>
<td>The opening of the maneuver. The supervisor's address. The explanation of the situation for the third term. Explorations concerning the empires will follow in the same way.</td>
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<td>(1) Negotiations with A and the economic de-ends thereof.</td>
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<td>September 6th 1941</td>
<td>Friday 06:30</td>
<td>The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of August. The criticism regarding this. Analysis and exploration of the situation for the fourth term. Secret report to the supervising section of the D scope.</td>
<td>C scope</td>
<td>(2) The reply to A and D</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3) The presentations of C against D and (A).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth Term</td>
<td>September 11th 1941</td>
<td>Friday 06:30</td>
<td>The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of September. The criticism regarding this. New measures and explanations of additional situations.</td>
<td>C scope</td>
<td>(1) Continuation of No. 1 in the preceding term.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2) The response to concerning the C treaty.</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(3) Measures against the stiffening attitude between A and C.</td>
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<td>(4) The preparations of D against C.</td>
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**Program for directing the Third to Ninth Term maneuvers, inclusive, in the First Theoretical Maneuvers for Total Warfare.**

- The term of maneuvers
- Date of maneuvers
- Date (Day)
- Functions for directing the maneuvers
- The assembled empires
- The principal maneuver items
### The Fifth Term (cont’d)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Tuesday</td>
<td>14:30</td>
<td>The announcement and explanation of the situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15:00</td>
<td>C scope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>13 Wednesday</td>
<td>09:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14:00</td>
<td>D scope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15:00</td>
<td>The presentation of measures to be taken until 20 October. The criticism thereof. The announcement and explanation of additional situations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>14 Thursday</td>
<td>08:30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10:30</td>
<td>A scope</td>
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<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>16 Saturday</td>
<td>08:30</td>
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<td></td>
<td>10:00</td>
<td>C scope</td>
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<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>18 Monday</td>
<td>10:00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14:00</td>
<td>D scope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>19 Tuesday</td>
<td>08:30</td>
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<td></td>
<td>10:30</td>
<td>A scope</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### The Sixth Term

### The Seventh Term

### The Eighth Term

### (1) The reply to X.

### (2) Measures against the suspension of the commercial relations with K, E, and H.

### (3) Measures in regard to the revision to charter after L.

### (1) Resolution to hasten actions against E.

### (2) Negotiations with D.

### (3) Measures for commencing the advance into E.

### (1) The resolution for V operations and the measures thereof.

### (2) Measures against B and D.

### (3) The measures in accordance with the outbreaks of war between K and N, B.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Scope</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>15:00</td>
<td>The announcement and explanation of the situation of the eighth term.</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 March</td>
<td>10:00</td>
<td>The report to the supervising section on the general policy of the Blue country.</td>
<td>D scope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 April</td>
<td>14:00</td>
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<td>B scope</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 April</td>
<td>11:00</td>
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<td>A scope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 April</td>
<td>09:00</td>
<td>The announcement and explanation of the situation of the Blue country.</td>
<td>C scope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 October</td>
<td>08:30</td>
<td>The presentation of measures to be taken until the end of the B scope.</td>
<td>D scope</td>
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<tr>
<td>09:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>The announcement and explanation of the additional situations.</td>
<td>B scope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>The presentation of the works of each participant.</td>
<td>B scope</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- A scope: all the judges if possible.
- B scope: the principal judges of each section.
- C scope: the concerning judges of each section.
- D scope: judges having special concerns.

(1) The measures against the air-raids on Tokyo.
(2) The measures towards the Diet.
(3) The measures towards D and L.
(4) The economic and political measures towards F, T, D and L.

The assembled judges: A scope - all the judges if possible. B scope - the principal judges of each section. C scope - the concerning judges of each section. D scope - judges having special concerns.
The Theoretical Maneuvers for Total Warfare, No. 6 — 3

No. 028 of the 100 volumes

24 July, Showa 16, 1941

Supervisor of the theoretical maneuvers for the total warfare:

"Hura", Yuzuru

(1) The Situation. As a result of the liaison conference with the Supreme Council of the Government on July 24th regarding the strategy of total warfare, we have agreed on the following unanimously.

1. Blue land, from necessity, will promote all preparations for the object of advancing into E on a favorable occasion, if no special circumstances arise.

The Theoretical Maneuvers for Total Warfare, No. 6 — 5

(Secret) No. 98 of 120 volumes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designated Distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Maintenance of Secrecy</th>
<th>only for those concerned with the maneuvers.</th>
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</table>

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<tr>
<th>Disposal</th>
<th>To be returned on conclusion of the maneuver</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The 1st Theoretical Maneuvers for Total War for 1941 (SHOWA 16).

The Report on Activities in regard to the Subjects Given for the Second Term of the Maneuvers.

Part I. The national policy of Blue land to be propagated internally and abroad.

Part II. A part of the plan for total warfare by Blue land.

Presented on 30 July 1941 (SHOWA 16)

The Government of Blue land

(or the Total Warfare Research Bureau)
TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Part I. The national policy of Blue land to be propagated internally and abroad.
1st Item - The statement of Blue land
2nd Item - The conversation of the Prime Minister of Blue land

Part II. A part of the plan for total warfare by Blue land
Classification I - Tactics of total warfare of the Blue land plan
Classification II - A part of the plan for the Blue land's army and navy

Item I. Matters concerning the army.
1. The classification and numbers of necessary personnel
2. The amount of important necessary materials
3. The classification and number of requisitioned ships necessary
4. The productive power of war materials to be demanded of the civilian factories
5. Summary of the military budget

Item II. Matters concerning the navy.
1. The classification and number of the necessary personnel
2. The amount of necessary important materials
3. The classification and number of requisitioned ships necessary
4. The productive power of war materials to be demanded of the principal civilian factories
5. Summary of the military budget

Item III. The outline of plan for defense against air raids throughout the nation.

Item IV. The plan for defense against air-raid in the Kanto District

Item V. The plan for maintenance and control of marine transportation

Classification III - The outline of foreign policy for Blue land

Item I. The plan for diplomatic warfare
Item II. The policy for the disposal of the China Incident
Item III. The policy towards Manchuria
Item IV. The plan for administration of the occupied territories
Classification IV - The plan for psychological warfare of Blue land

Classification V - The plan for economic warfare of the Blue land

Item I. The principle of repletion of the economic power of Blue land

1. The policy of expanding the productive power
2. The policy of expanding and strengthening the economic co-prosperity sphere
3. The commercial policy (the exchange of materials)
4. The policy for replenishing deficient materials

Item II. The outline for mobilizing the economic power

1. The policy for the mobilization of materials
2. The policy for the mobilization of capital
3. The policy for the mobilization of labor
4. The policy for the mobilization of transportation
5. The policy for financial plans

Item III. The plan for the execution of economic warfare

3 of No. 13 — Total War Table Top Maneuvers (plan) August 23, 1941 (submitted at 0830) Superintendent of Total War Table Top Maneuvers JIMA, Minoru

Additional Situations and Problems of 9th Period Maneuver of First Total War Table Top Maneuvers.

I. Situations up to the latter part of September 1942.

1. The Cabinet meeting of July 10 decided on the opening of war against D and the military operations were commenced on August 1. Substantial fighting occurred in many places along the W-D frontier, but thereafter there has not been a great resistance. As a result of speedy pursuit by N army, a greater part of the Far Eastern army and a large part of its navy and air forces were destroyed and the important area of "A" was occupied and secured by the latter part of September.

D retired its front and has declared long-term resistance, but its sustaining power is doubtful. (pp. 13-10 - 13-11)
7. The great offensive by X against D and B since the spring gained conspicuous effects correlative to N's operations, but is not yet decisive. The present situation does not allow anyone to make any assumption as to the conclusion of the world confusion. (p. 13-12)

Part II Plans for Total Warfare for Blue land

Classification I - Programme for Total Warfare for the Blue land (plan)

No. 1 - The object of total warfare

(1) The object of total warfare is to securely establish the existence of Blue land as well as to exclude the influence of all hostile powers interfering with the establishment of a new order in East Asia.

(2) The present principal hostile countries shall be A, B (including E) and C (Chungkiang Regime), and the secondary hostile country shall be D.

(3) The center of the Greater East Asia Sphere is comprised of K, N and C, R, V, and the areas east of them, also the areas north of G (G itself exclusive), and those west of 130° East Longitude enter into the Greater East Asia sphere. (p. 21C01)

No. 2 - Guiding Principle for Total Warfare

(1) Every effort shall be made for the complete execution of the C Incident according to established principles; while at the same time, our position for total warfare shall be completed and strengthened so as to be able to cope immediately with other hostile countries.

(2) Our present object in the south lies in the securing of materials and positive advancement shall be projected through political measures.
However, every possible preparation must be made with the determination to resort to arms whenever the circumstances demand. When a war with A and B becomes inevitable, we will take the initiative and declare war. We will exclude their influences in East Asia, and at the same time endeavor to make them give up their hostilities against us.

(3) Regarding the North, we shall by force of arms facilitate X's disposal of D; and supervise the fulfilment of the neutrality pact between N and D. We shall devise economic advancement by diplomatic means, and avoid armed warfare as far as the situation allows. However, if it is inevitable according to the situation, we shall resort to arms.

(4) Through cooperation with X, we shall strive to realize the plan for an alliance treaty with her, while completing every possible preparation for an initiative war against A and B as a precaution against A's participation in a war with X.

(5) Thereafter, we shall decide on our different plans in accordance with the transitions in the situation, thereby anticipating the achievement of the purposes of total warfare.

The Guiding Principle of Armed Warfare

1. Against C. By avoiding the expansion of occupied areas, we shall execute repeated and active armed actions against the Chungking Regime to destroy her armed power. At the same time, we shall take measures to deprive her people of their will to fight by destroying her establishment and strengthening our economic blockage of her. In the presentation of war against other hostile countries, the principles enumerated in the preceding article shall be strongly maintained in the hope that the consequences will contribute to the surrender of Chungking Government.

2. Against F and T. The spirit of joint defense with F will be strengthened. When the attitude of T is unfriendly towards N, and she does not comply with our demands, and also when A and B try to exclude our influences in T we shall make military advances into T.

3. Against E. If E's attitude towards N is to be aggravated and especially if she refuses to supply us with the necessary materials, we shall make military advance on a favorable occasion with a resolve for war with A and B. In case a war with A and B is inevitable, we shall advance into E.

4. Against A and B. If a war with A and B becomes inevitable, in the event of, for instance, A participating in the war against X, or A completely cutting off all commercial relationship
with N, or danger of armed collision with A and
our country, or N being threatened with military
invasion by A, we will take the initiative in
starting a war and immediately occupy P, Q and
E, thereby strengthening our strategic and
economic situation; and at the same time, we shall
plan to destroy the enemy's military power and to
make them abandon their hostilities towards us.

5. Against D. We shall strengthen our defense
against D in North M. Although we shall avoid
as far as possible any armed warfare until our
move in the South is finally concluded, we shall
occupy the strategically important areas in R by
executing armed warfare at a favorable occasion;
that is, when D is near collapse in the D-X war,
or when D is about to take hostile action against
N, or when A tries to make military advances
into R, or whenever war becomes inevitable
under any other condition.

The Theoretical Maneuvers for Total 'war, No. 10

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14 August 1941
(SHOWA 16)
(delivered at
1430)

Maintenance of secrecy - only for mem-
ers concerned in the maneuvers.

Disposal - to be returned on the conclu-
sion of the maneuver.

Supervisor of the Theoretical Maneuvers
for Total 'warfare

IIMURA, Yuzuru

The circumstances and subjects for the Sixth Phase of
Theoretical Maneuvers for Total 'warfare.

(1) The circumstances in the middle and end of November.

A. The international situation.

1. With the approach of the severe cold of winter,
the D-X war is gradually nearing a stalemate in
the areas east of the river Don, Moscow and
Leningrad.

2. There is not much change in the R-X war except
that there is an indication of advance towards
the Suez and Gibraltar.

3. There is also no great change in the A-X war.
It seems part of A's forces in the Atlantic
seen to have commenced a move to the Pacific.
A declared war against X on the 1st of November.
4. Although the A, B and (E) troops in the East show no signs as yet of increasing their strengths, they have commenced speedy and large scale defense programs with what troops they have stationed in these areas, while A and B are executing threatening propaganda activities to divert N's movements. Part of Blue land's plans seem to have been interrupted by A, B and E.

5. As the activities of N's army in the area of C becomes more active, C is also carrying out antagonistic propaganda activities. There is a reliable report that a military treaty has been concluded among A, B and C.

6. Although conditions in the R district are still strained, there is evidence that troops in this area are decreasing. All is quiet on the D-M border. D shows no definite attitude either toward.

B. The conditions of the supreme command and the army.

1. The supreme command of Blue land desires to carry out the actions already planned against E as early as possible.

2. The preparations of the supreme command for action against E is now under progress, and all preparations are expected to be completed temporarily by the middle of November.

The Theoretical Maneuvers for Total Warfare, No. 10-3

No. 96 of the 120 volumes

15 August 1941
(SHOWA 16)

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Supervisor of the Theoretical Maneuvers for
Total Warfare — ITNURA, Yuzuru

Supplementary situations for the sixth phase of the first
tactical maneuvers for total warfare.

Supplementary situations for the middle and last part of Novem-
ber.

(1) The troops of the Blue land commenced to move on 15 Novem-
ber; and after making sudden attacks, they have secured
effectively several important areas in E. (Names of
places and the war situation stated orally, now and here-
after.) The casualties of the Blue land are slight.
(2) E has declared she will "resist to the utmost the invasion of N", and is asking for the aid of A and B. Although B's garrison troops are withstanding the attack comparatively well, they are gradually being pushed back by Blue land's army. Of the economic installations in the territories of E country, only a part of those in the Maritime Province, which has been exposed to surprise attacks by troops of Blue land had been destroyed; but those in the other areas are being destroyed to quite an extent.

(3) The articles known for sure to have been seized in the E operations are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vessels</td>
<td>20,000 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crude oil</td>
<td>210,000 kilolitres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary benzine</td>
<td>97,000 kilolitres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy-oil</td>
<td>186,000 kilolitres</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) A and B have stigmatised the actions of Blue land as an illegal aggression, and they have united to declare the severance of economic relations with N as well as to demand the closing of the N consulate in A. It seems that a part of A's naval forces in the Atlantic are being rapidly transferred to the Pacific. Although public opinion in A is for war with N, the true intention of the government is not clear.

(5) Though the A and B forces in East Asia are showing extreme tension, they have not yet taken any action of their own.

(6) ________ thousand soldiers and _________ thousand tons of vessels have been newly mobilized in preparation for operations against A.

The Theoretical Manoeuvres for Total Warfare, No. 16

No. 98 of the 100 volumes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disposal - to be returned on the conclusion of the manoeuvres</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

28 August, 1941
(SHOWA 16)

Supervisor of the theoretical manoeuvres for Total Warfare -- TITOMA, Yuzuri

The Criticism of the First Theoretical Manoeuvres for Total Warfare.

In concluding the first theoretical manoeuvres for total warfare, I shall hereby state my opinions regarding the important matters in the manoeuvres, and thereby contribute to future researches by participants.

The first term of the manoeuvres

(1) Although I acknowledge generally the efforts of the respective participants in their presentation of their
studies in the national policy, the tactics to be taken by our country for total warfare, and the necessary judgment of the situations. I find not a few instances of lack of understanding in the fundamental nature of war and the principles of total warfare, and also there is a certain immaturity in their contemplation and consideration.

At that time, the participants lacked basic knowledge, the working hours were short, and there had been unavoidable circumstances, but in view of the actual results of the maneuvers, I feel it necessary to further continue our studies.

(11) In the third period of the maneuvers the diplomatic policy of the government of Blueland is to take advantage of the noticeably easier contemporary international situation to manifest the elasticity of the measures for total warfare, and I am aware of the necessity of doing our best to attain the object of the measures by diplomatic means. For instance, in our relation with A and B, I think it was a failure of ours to have taken a diplomatic policy aimed at evading war with them.

(12) In the third period of the maneuvers, I think the judgment that the proposition of A resulted from its weakness is appropriate, but I cannot approve of a passive diplomacy based on the propositions of A. We should possess enough spirit to ignore the hostile feelings of A by taking advantage of her weakness and presenting positive proposal of our own. Therefore, to realize this we must observe the necessity rather of further strengthening the relations with N and X.

(14) In the fifth period of the maneuvers a more careful and deeper consideration will be necessary in the advance into E. For instance, we should not concentrate merely on the period concerning the completion of preparations. It will be necessary to make a thorough-going investigation into our knowledge of the general trend, the limit of our present aim, the mutual cooperative relations of the political and military strategies just before the advance, the actual domestic situation and the policy concerning them, etc.

(15) Concerning the judgment on the ability to execute war against A, B and E, it was an attempt at a partial outline only as it was restricted by shortage of materials and time, but, to this extent I acknowledge it to be a comparatively fair work, and I especially approve of the sincere attitude taken in the investigation.

However, in reality, we must carefully study the material scope and connection of military and civilian needs in all phases, such as labor and material, static or dynamic, as well as to plan all these as an overall geographic unity involving N, M and C, and from the standpoint of time including the whole length of the war. Moreover, the assessment of the period until the commencement of all the activities in the above plan is insufficient and is altogether too short.
(16) The cooperative activities of the political and military strategies prior to the advance into E are gravely insufficient. After the decision is made for the military advance, all measures concerning diplomatic, psychological and economic warfare should be actively developed under a single policy so as to facilitate operations. That is, to put A and B off guard, to facilitate their individual destruction, and to catch E napping, to get a chance for a sudden attack. In particular in order to complete the concentration of the nation's total power by keeping the plan secret and imaginary, it will be necessary to develop for a plain and definite object all the activities of the total power of a united nation.

(18) It is wrong to have treated lightly the matter of declaring war on A and B under the circumstances in the last stage of the sixth period. It will be necessary to study carefully whether there can be no last measure to avoid war with A and B, and to consider prudently the serious results arising from the outbreak of war, although it must always be kept in mind that there is advantage in taking the initiative in declaring war on A and B when they are still unprepared.

(Note) In order to facilitate study, we have executed this maneuver on the supposition that N's participation in the war by virtue of the N-X treaty is not automatic.

(19) However, I regret that there was no decision to start a war against A and B even under the circumstances detaining in the early stages of the seventh period maneuvers. There has been a rapid development in the situation, and the intentions of A and B towards N have become clear. The general situation demands our finding independently a way out of our impasse. Moreover, we have never before felt so secure on the northern borders as we do today. This must be considered a good chance to make our decision for starting war against A and B.

(20) The measures taken by the Government of Blue Land on the basis of the studies made beforehand by the Second Committee about the measures to be taken toward foreign countries in connection with the outbreak of war, were as a whole quite suitable.

However, there is still room for study in regard to war aims against A and B (the pretext for despatch of troops and peace terms) and representations to X about not concluding a separate peace.

(25) In the ninth period of the maneuvers when A and B influence had been generally expelled from the EPQ districts and the main force of A's army had been destroyed, I think it was necessary to study and determine the policy for the subsequent direction of the war against A and B.

(26) It is good to note the improvement in the way you assessed the national strength in the war against D compared with that of the war against A and B, but I desire to see further creative studies and more ingenuity in devising emergency measures to cope with the situation at a time when the national existence is at stake.
Statement of Source and Authenticity.

I, Renpei Kuriyama hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Cabinet Secretary and that as such official I have custody of the document here attached consisting of ___ pages, dated August, 1941, and described as follows: File re "First Table Top Maneuvers", published by Naval War Research Institute and marked "Top Secret". I further certify that the attached record and documents is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Cabinet Secretariat.

Signed at Tokyo on this 6 day of Sept., 1946

/s/ Renpei Kuriyama
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Hiramatsu, Kajumichi
Officer of Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, [Name], hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above named official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 6 day of Sept., 1946

/s/ [Name]

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis

Official Capacity
The First Meeting of the Investigation Committee concerning establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry and eight other items.

Meeting held on 3 October 1943 (Friday) at Privy Council Office

Attendance:

President of Privy Council: HARA

Chief of Investigation Committee, Vice-president of Privy Council: SUZUKI

Members of Investigation Committee:

Councillor: ISHII
Councillor: MINAMI
Councillor: USHIO
Councillor: FUTAKAMI
Councillor: OKADA
Councillor: TAKAZOE
Councillor: MATSUSHI
Councillor: IIDA
Councillor: IKEDA
Councillor: NISHI

State Ministers:

Prime Minister concurrently War Minister: TOJO
Agriculture and Forestry Minister concurrently Overseas Affairs Minister: ITO
Home Minister: YUZAWA
Foreign Minister: TANI

Exponents:

Chief Secretary of Cabinet: MOKOTO
Chief of Legislative Bureau: HAYAMA
Councillor of Legislative Bureau: SASA
Councillor of Legislative Bureau: ISHI
President of Planning Board: SUZUKI
Chief of 1st Section, Planning Board: ARAI
Vice-Chief, Manchurian Affairs Bureau: TAKAMACHI

Chief Secretary: MORI
Secretary: MORIYASHI
Secretary: TAKATSUJI

(Meeting
Mooting called to order 1:30 P.M.

Chief of Investigation Committee calls meeting to order.

Premier Tojo made an outline explanation regarding the purport and the contents of the draft.

Committee Member IS:II inquired that:

(1) The establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry will excite suspicion as though Japan will consider the hitherto friendly countries in the East Asia Sphere as Japan's colonies. It may lead to such that both material and spiritual cooperation cannot be expected. Consequently, would the enemy countries not take advantage of this and would it not cause concern in bringing about an unfavourable effect in the attitude of India? Would it not be better to establish a combined organization of East Asia countries than risk such disadvantages?

To this inquiry, Premier Tojo replied:

"In order to achieve victory, which is an absolute necessity for Japan, the combined fighting power of East Asia must be strengthened. However, the various organs of Japan in the Co-prosperity Sphere at present are confusedly set up and find difficulty in maintaining unified and active measures. Therefore, it is desired to establish a ministry and to appoint a responsible minister, thereby establishing an appropriate national policy in achieving the aforementioned aims, and to be sure of a swift and decisive execution of this policy. Moreover, Japan has already openly declared to the world the construction of Greater East Asia, so there is no need of restraint in using the term 'Greater East Asia Ministry' at this time. It is preferable to use this term voluntarily. In regard to the effect it may have toward foreign countries, the countries within the Co-prosperity Sphere all have ties with Japan and since after all, the object of this draft is to plan for the benefit of the Co-prosperity Sphere, this misunderstanding will be solved. In regard to other third countries, it is sufficient if counteracted with propaganda and therefore, will not be grounds to hesitate on this plan. In regard to the attitude of India, no reaction is noticed. The East Asia Combined Organization Proposal will be studied hereafter as a political problem and has no relation to the establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry."

Committee Member Kinomi (Hirosi) inquired:

(2) In treating the independent countries within the Greater East Asia Sphere as annexes of Japan or as occupied territories, the question
was asked whether this would not be the cause of uneasiness of these countries and the cause of alienation of the people.

Premier Tojo replied that this draft, from the viewpoint of achieving victory, is intended to establish an organization for the construction of Greater East Asia. In its operation, close attention should be paid in regard to the alienation of the relative countries.

The question of the extent of pure diplomacy and of the relation between the Greater East Asia Minister and Foreign Minister when concluding a treaty was brought up.

Premier Tojo replied that the exchange of diplomats and consuls with countries in the Greater East Asia Sphere, and other matters concerning international formalities, the signing of international treaties between Japan and these foreign countries, official negotiation in regard to these treaties, are examples which show the extent of pure diplomacy. This scope will be decided at the Cabinet meeting.

In regard to the treaty proposal, Chief of Legislative Bureau Morioka replied, that the executive administrations which are in charge of the contents will participate in its discussion and will become a concrete plan through the Treaty Bureau of the Foreign Office and then transmitted to the Cabinet. The relation between the Greater East Asia Minister and the Foreign Minister in the sphere of this administrative business is similar to the relation between the Agriculture and Forestry Minister and the Foreign Minister in the hitherto fishery treaties. Furthermore, the authority to conclude a treaty belongs to the sovereign authority of the Emperor and although the authority of signing the treaty is invested in the delegate plenipotentiary, in the approval of the treaty draft beforehand and in the ratification of the treaty afterwards, the Greater East Asia Minister and Foreign Minister as well as the other State Ministers, are equally charged with the duty of assisting.
The Second Meeting of the Investigation Committee Concerning the Establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry and Eight Other Items.

Meeting held on 12 October 1942 (Monday) at Privy Council Office.

Attendance:

President of Privy Council: HARA

Chief of Investigation Committee, Vice President of Privy Council: SUZUKI

Members of Investigation Committee:

Councillor: ISHII
Councillor: MINAMI (Hiroshi)
Councillor: USUI
Councillor: FUTAGI
Councillor: ORATA
Councillor: TAKEO
Councillor: MITSUO
Councillor: IIDA
Councillor: KINAMI (Jiro)

State Ministers:

Premier concurrently Tar Minister: TOJO
Agriculture and Forestry Minister concurrently Overseas Affairs: INO
Home Minister: YUTAKA
Foreign Minister: TAMU

Exponents:

Chief Secretary of the Cabinet: KOSHINO
Chief of Legislative Bureau: KISHITAN
Counsellor of Legislative Bureau: SATO
Counsellor: MIYASAKI
Counsellor: AKIYAMA

President of the Planning Board: SUZUKI
Chief of 1st Section, Planning Board: AKELGA
Vice-Chief of Manchurian Affairs:

Secretary: TAKAMACHI
Chief Secretary: KIYOTE
Secretary: MAOKISHI
Secretary: N. TSUJI

State Ministers:

Premier concurrently Tar Minister: TOJO
Agriculture and Forestry Minister concurrently Overseas Affairs: INO
Home Minister: YUTAKA
Foreign Minister: TAMU

Exponents:

Chief Secretary of the Cabinet: KOSHINO
Chief of Legislative Bureau: KISHITAN
Counsellor of Legislative Bureau: SATO
Counsellor: MIYASAKI
Counsellor: AKIYAMA

President of the Planning Board: SUZUKI
Chief of 1st Section, Planning Board: AKELGA
Vice-Chief of Manchurian Affairs:

Secretary: TAKAMACHI
Chief Secretary: KIYOTE
Secretary: MAOKISHI
Secretary: N. TSUJI
Chief of Investigation Committee SUZU calls meeting to order.

From Committee Member USUI:

(1) He asked whether it was not necessary to have a powerful liaison organ between the Greater East Asia Minister and the Ministers of the other offices, besides the Liaison Committee. Prime Minister TOJO replied that since war guidance is a problem of the entire state the Government and the Supreme Command have already set up a liaison conference and is now deciding the basic policy. Foreign Minister TANJ stated that, in regard to the relations between the Foreign Office and the Greater East Asia Ministry, there is a direct mutual exchange of important foreign information, and besides, with the shifting of personnel, and etc., practical liaison will be effected.

(2) He queried into the relations of the Greater East Asia Ministry with the administration of the Southern occupied zone, and stating in effect that it would be better to have administration in occupied zones in the interim replaced immediately by a permanent Greater East Asia Administration, and thereby create a fait accompli. In reply to his query made to the views of the Government authorities, Prime Minister TOJO stated that the Southern Occupied Areas are now under military administration and, therefore, the authority of the Greater East Asia Ministry is excluded; but eventually full preparations will be made providing for the time when the Southern Occupied Areas are detached Administration; and eventually full preparations will be made for the time when the Southern Occupied Areas are detached from military administration and, therefore, the military is desirous of having the military administration in the Southern Occupied Areas be speedily replaced by civil administration; and even now designs are being made to have the Inspector-General and the Inspectors of the Military Administration gradually replaced by Civil Service Officials.

(5) He inquired as to the scope of the Greater East Asia Sphere. Prime Minister TOJO replied that it will include the KANTUNG PROVINCE, SOUTHERN ISLAND GROUP, KANCHURA, CHINA, S.E. INDIA, FRENCH INDO-CHINA, and the newly occupied areas brought about by the Greater East Asia War. Consequently, with the increase of occupied areas, its scope will be enlarged; thus each gave their reply.

Then following from Committee Member FUKUMI:

(Recast from 12.10 p.m. to 1.30 p.m.)
(3) He queried as to the purport in specially providing a provision (Article No. 19) for concert and cooperation in the Greater East Asia Ministry legislation. Chief of Legislation Bureau HORYA replied that although the military administration zone within the Greater East Asia Sphere should, as a matter of fact, be dropped from the supervision of the Greater East Asia Minister, it was specially decided to have the Greater East Asia Ministry handle matters connected with administration of occupied zone in order that fruits be borne of unified war and administrative policies and also, in preparation for the time those areas will become free of military administration.

(4) He queried on the matter regarding the appointment of Commissioned officers on active service to civil service posts in the Greater East Asia Ministry, as stipulated in the separate plan, and the reason for having superb commissioned officers to handle civil service matters in time of war. Prime Minister TOJC replied that since military administration is now affected in Southern Occupied Areas and that in view of the fact the actual state of affairs in CHINA also requires a strict view in the maintenance of public security, it necessitates the civil service officials of the Greater East Asia Ministry to have thorough knowledge and experience in regard to the Army and Navy.

From Committee Member O.B.J.

He asked whether there is any fear in the establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry causing injury to the prestige of independent nations in the Greater East Asia Sphere, and eventually causing weakening in the mental and material cooperation as requested by our Empire; and on the other hand, causing enmity powers to commit malevolent propaganda.

Prime Minister TOJC replied that military operations during the early stages of the Greater East Asia War have, as a whole, made favourable progress and nearly all the strategical key points in East Asia have been occupied. But the question of vital importance at present is in the construction of a Greater East Asia with these points as its foundation. The future operations of enemy countries will be a demonstration of their materialistic power in the highest degree and, counter-attacks will be made by them from footholds now remaining in their hands. It could be deemed that the aspect of war, hereafter, shall display a much intensified situation. Therefore, it is urgently necessary that plans be made for the construction of Greater East Asia by a single effort at this moment, utilizing the advantage, when the enemies have not yet begun their counter-attacks; and thus provide for the winning of victory which is the first requisite today. For this matter, adjustment for the necessary organization shall be made with this plan. Furthermore, the influence affecting a third power belongs to the problem of secondary significance and does not become a reason for hesitating the construction of the Greater East Asia. Suppose it did give rise to misunderstanding among the various countries in the East Asia Sphere, a proper employment of the new organization would, eventually, give understanding to the various countries in the East Asia Sphere that the construction of East Asia would be to their own advantage.
The nations of the world will be divided into two groups; of which the state affairs of one group will be handled not by the Foreign Office but by the Greater East Asia Ministry. The question was asked whether there would not be consternation that the countries under this category would treat Japan as a colonization ministry.

Foreign Minister Tani replied that Japan has special diplomatic relations with the various independent countries in the Greater East Asia Sphere. Since internal guidance of their diplomacy is also being conducted, there is no need of apprehension. It is similar to the special agreement existing between France and Indochina. Since France respects the intentions of Japan regarding French Indochina, actually it is impossible to believe that France will deal with Japan as a colonization ministry. On the part of Japan, the French ambassador has conferred with the Foreign Minister concerning the local problems of French Indochina, but no objections were made. Replies to this effect were respectively made.

Committee Member Tanaka stated that when Japan holds East Asia in its power as in the present, there is no necessity in establishing the Greater East Asia Ministry which will only help to raise a problem. Furthermore, in order to make the South in Occupied Areas constructive, it is better to change the military government immediately to civil government.

In asking the opinions of the respective authorities, Premier Tojo replied that since determining the essence for the construction of East Asia and conceiving a unified policy are pressing necessities of the moment, the unification of various organs to arrange for a new organization requires immediate attention. Regarding the question of changing the military government to civil government, the reply was that it will be immediately carried out, even before the war is concluded, when peace and order is established and when the situation is normal.
The Third Meeting of the Investigation Committee regarding
Establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry and Other Items.

Meeting held on 14 October 1942 (Wednesday) at Privy Council Office.

Attendance:

President of Privy Council
Chief of Investigation Committee
Vice-President of Privy Council

Committee Members
Councillor
Councillor
Councillor
Councillor
Councillor
Councillor
Councillor
Councillor
Councillor

State Ministers:
Prime Minister concurrently
Home Minister
Foreign Minister

Counsellor of Legislative Bureau
Secretary
Secretary
Secretary
Secretary
Secretary

(Meeting called to order 10:00 a.m.)
Chief of Committee S.T.T.I. calls meeting to order.
Committee Member IIZA'A asked: 

(2) Committee IIZA'A pointed out the fact that in Formosa, only few native Formosans were being accepted as government and municipal officials. He then asked how can one expect to assimilate the different peoples of the Greater East Asia Sphere in order to bring about the sound establishment of Greater East Asia when even in quasi-homeland TOUSA, such discrimination exists.

TOUSA replied that the establishment of Greater East Asia is based on the spirit of SATO Ji (T. Y. Gathering the eight corners of the world under one roof) and that it would not be difficult to assimilate even the different peoples if dealt with that spirit.

TOUSA continued that subjects of territories should not purposely be excluded from being accepted as government and municipal officials and that it should gradually be reformed in accordance with the aforementioned spirit.
The Fourth Meeting of the Investigation Committee concerning the Establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry and eight other items.

Meeting held on 15 October 1942 (Thursday) at Privy Council Office.

Attendees:

President of the Privy Council SUZUKI
Chief of the Investigation Committee, Vice-President of the Privy Council SUZUKI

Committee Members:
Councillor ISHII
Councillor UMINI (Pirosi)
Councillor USHIO
Councillor FUTAGAMI
Councillor OIDE
Councillor TAKIGOYI
Councillor ITSUGI
Councillor IZUMI
Councillor INUMI (Jiru)

Ministers of State:
Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, concurrently Minister of Overseas Affairs INO
Minister of Overseas Affairs TAMI

Exponents:
Chief of the Legislative Bureau INOYAMA
Councillor of Legislative Bureau SATO
Councillor of Legislative Bureau TAKAYAMA
President of the Planning Board SUZUKI
Secretary of the Planning Board YASUI
Vice-Chief of the Planning Bureau TAKAYAMA
Chief of the Legislative Bureau, Ministry of Overseas Affairs USHIKI
Chief of the Treaty Bureau, Foreign Affairs Ministry MATSUZAKI
Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Ministry KIDOYAMA
Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Overseas Affairs UEKI
Chief of Colonial Bureau, Ministry of Overseas Affairs UYOSHI
Chief of the Superintendence Bureau, Ministry of Overseas Affairs UKAI
Chief of the Industrial Bureau, Ministry of Overseas Affairs TAKEMOTO
Secretary of the Ministry of Overseas Affairs NAKAMOTO
Chief Secretary "OHARA
Secretary "OIRI
Secretary TAKATSUJI
SUZUKI, Chairman of the Committee, called the meeting to order. Letters concerning the establishment of Greater East Asia Ministry and the revision of some general rules of other ministries were presented before the Committee.

HORIYAMA, Chief of the Legislation Bureau, briefly explained the aforementioned two subjects.

Committee Member HIRASHI (Mitsuo) inquired: Are there any intentions to change the name of Greater East Asia Ministry? Since there is a distinction between custom diplomacy and extraterritorial diplomacy, is it not preferable to consider the relations with other countries and not use the word custom diplomacy to dispense of it in actual practice?

Minister of State SUZUKI replied that he considered the name Greater East Asia Ministry proper because the name bespoke straightforwardly the consistency of establishing Greater East Asia and that he had no intention to change it. Chief of Legislative Bureau HORIYAMA said that since the jurisdiction of the Greater East Asia Minister consisted in the performance of administration duties in various fields, it would not be proper to exclude custom diplomacy in practice.

(2) Committee Member HIRASHI (Mitsuo) inquired why was it necessary to have the Greater East Asia Minister supervise extraterritorial diplomacy with countries within the Greater East Asia region. Chief of Legislative Bureau HORIYAMA replied that countries in the Greater East Asia Sphere are mutually in a family relationship. Therefore, the diplomacy between those countries and the diplomacy between other independent countries differ in character markedly. However, since there is an intimate and inseparable relation in between foreign policies and extraterritorial diplomacy in the Greater East Asia, it was decided to leave the Greater East Asia Minister in charge.

Committee Member FUTAGAKI (1) asked whether India and Australia should be included within the sphere of territorial jurisdiction of the Greater East Asia Ministry.

HORIYAMA, Chief of the Legislation Bureau replied that they were not included, at present, within the sphere of Greater East Asia. KATSU OZAWA, Chief of the Treaty Bureau, Foreign Affairs Ministry, ensured that the so-called Greater East Asia in the Tripartite Pact did not include them at the time of its conclusion.
The Fifth Meeting of the Investigation Committee Concerning the Establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry and Eight Other Items.

The meeting was held at the Privy Council office on 19 October (Monday), 1942.

Attendance:

President of the Privy Council HAMA
Chief of the Investigation Committee SUZUKI
Members of the Investigation Committee
Councillor ISHII
   "  MINAMI (KIROSHI)
   "  USHIO
   "  FUTAGAMI
   "  ORATA
   "  TAKEGOSHI
   "  KITSUCHI
   "  IZAKA
   "  IEDA
   "  MIKAMI (Jiro)

State Ministers:
   Minister of Agriculture and Forestry and concurrently Minister of Overseas Affairs IKO
   Minister of Home Affairs UEDA
   Minister of Foreign Affairs TANI

Exponents
   Director of the Legislative Bureau MOMIYAMA
   Advisor to the Legislative Bureau SATO
   Advisor to the Legislative Bureau MIYAUCHI
   Secretary of the Planning Board HAYASHI
   Vice-Chief of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau TAKEUCHI
   Chief of the Economic Section, China Affairs USHII
   Chief of the Treaty Bureau, Foreign Office MITSUKOTO
   Secretary of Foreign Office MADOYASHI
   Vice-Minister of Overseas Affairs Ministry UEDA
   Chief of the Colonial Bureau, Overseas Affairs Ministry IMAYOSHI
   Secretary of Overseas Affairs Ministry KAMIMOTO
   Chief Secretary of the Cabinet MORI
   Secretary HOKOHASHI
   Secretary TAKATSUJI

(Neeting convenes at 10:10 A.M.)

Chairman SUZUKI announced opening of the meeting.
Committee member Futagohi stated: (1) The overseas organs of the Greater East Asia Ministry are officially under the control of the Foreign Minister concerning those of customary diplomacy, and under the control of the Greater East Asia Ministry on those of extranormal diplomacy. Furthermore, since the distinction between customary and extranormal diplomacy is not clear, they overseas organs receive orders separately from the both ministers of the central government on the same issue. He asked whether or not there is fear of this giving cause to bewilderment so that they would not be able to act properly. Foreign Minister Tani replied that the relations of our Empire with the countries in the Greater East Asia sphere are somewhat the relations between relatives and it is the ideal of our Empire to have this further strengthened and developed into the relations of a single large family, and that during this period it could be eventually led to a point where diplomacy would not be needed any more. But at the present stage, due to need for respect of dignity and the exchange of documents, it is necessary that customary diplomacy be continued. Within this extent the overseas organs come under the superintendence of the Foreign Minister.

(1) Committee member Hitsuji asked the reason why it was inappropriate to have extranormal diplomacy come under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office, and customary diplomacy under the Greater East Asia Ministry, respectively, in regard to our foreign relations with the independent countries in the Greater East Asia Sphere.

Foreign Minister Tani and the Chief of the Legislative Bureau Nokura realized that the Greater East Asia Ministry, after all, assumes charge of affairs on the establishment of the Greater East Asia, and since its contents cover the various fields in politics, economy and culture, extending over the whole area of Greater East Asia, it is necessary to have all the various items of diplomatic policy toward independent nations in the Co-Prosperity Sphere be charged to the care of Greater East Asia Ministry. Moreover, it would be appropriate to have international courtesies and conclusion of international treaties, etc., which are customary diplomacy, be charged to the care of the Foreign Ministry.
(II) Chairman FAKA inquired as to the jurisdiction of negotiating duties concerned with matters of Greater East Asia with third power countries outside the sphere of Greater East Asia, for instance, with GERMANY and ITALY.

Foreign Minister TAI and the Chief of the Legislative Bureau, HONIYAMA replied that, even matters concerning the Greater East Asia Sphere may, if it concerns negotiations with third power countries outside the Greater East Asia Sphere, be properly construed that it will be under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office. Moreover, this shall be clearly settled by Cabinet decision.
The Sixth Meeting of the Investigation Committee for the Establishment of Greater East Asia Ministry and Eight Other Items.

Meeting held on 20 October 1942 (Tuesday)
at the office of the Privy Council

Attendants:

President of Privy Council: HATA
Chairman of Committee: SUZUKI
Vice President of Privy Council: CHIDAMBARANATH

Committee Members:

Councillor: ISHII
Councillor: MIYADA (Hiroshi)
Councillor: USHIO
Councillor: FUTAOKA
Councillor: OSHATA
Councillor: TAKAHASHI
Councillor: MITSUCHI
Councillor: ISHI'A
Councillor: INADA
Councillor: OCTO

State Ministers:

Agriculture and Forestry Minister:

Minister: IFO

Law Minister:

Home Affairs Minister: YUZUKA

Foreign Affairs Minister: YAMAT

Counsellors:

Chief of Legislative Bureau: MATSUMOTO
Councillor of Legislative Bureau: SATO
Councillor of Legislative Bureau: MIYANAGI

Chief of Economic Section:

Chief of Affairs Bureau: USUKI

Chief of Treaty Bureau, Foreign Affairs Ministry:

Chief of Naval Affairs, Navy Ministry:

Vice Minister of Overseas Affairs Ministry: OSA

Chief of Colonial Bureau, Overseas Affairs Ministry:

Chief of Superintendence Bureau, Overseas Affairs Ministry:

Chief of Industrial Bureau, Overseas Affairs Ministry:

Secretary of Overseas Affairs Ministry: KAWAMOTO

Administrative official of Overseas Affairs Ministry: IIJIMA

Chief Secretary: MORI

Secretary of Cabinet: MORISHIYAMA

Chief of Cabinet: III

(Meeting called to order 1:30 PM)

Chairman SUZUKI calls meeting to order. Committee Member MITSUCHI questioned:*****
(2) In the Southern occupied territories, what military-government-administered areas will the army take charge?
Is there any intention of changing the military government to civil administration before the war ends?
Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau OTA replied that the area in charge of the Navy are principally 30° T0, 0° 30′ N and 160° 0′ W, in-cluding Sulu, Indan and N. Borne.
Navy Minister SHIBA answered that in consideration of the tendency of public opinion, and the original duty of the armed forces, the military government shall be changed to civil administration as soon as the situations permit.
Meeting held on 20 October 1942 (Tuesday) at the Privy Council Office.

Attendance:

President of the Privy Council: HIRO
Chief of Investigation Committee, Vice-president of the Privy Council: SUZUKI

Members of Investigation Committee:

Councillor ISHI
Councillor (Hiroshi) "H" YU-I
Councillor "SHI0
Councillor FUKAGI-I
Councillor ORI
Councillor TAKEO SHI
Councillor MITSU
Councillor TAKA
Councillor INDA
Councillor (Jiro) "IMAI

Ministers of State:

Agriculture and Forestry Minister concurrently with the Overseas Affairs Minister: INO
Navy Minister: SHIMADA
Home Affairs Minister: YU-IWA
Foreign Affairs Minister: TANI

Exponents:

Chief of Legislative Bureau: "OYAMA"
Councillor of Legislative Bureau: SATO
Councillor of Legislative Bureau: HIYAMA
Chief of Treaty Bureau, Foreign Affairs Ministry: "ATSUYO"O
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Ministry: "KIDO"XI
Chief of Naval Affairs, Navy Ministry: OKA
Vice-Minister of Overseas Affairs Ministry Ueba
Chief of Colonial Bureau, Overseas Affairs Ministry IyoSHI
Chief of Superintendence Bureau, Overseas Affairs Ministry INAGA
Chief of Industrial Bureau, Overseas Affairs Ministry TAKAGI
Secretary of Overseas Affairs Ministry KAWASAMA
Chief of Economic Section, China Affairs Bureau USA
Chief Secretary HAYAMA
Secretary KOSHI
Secretary TSUKU

(Meeting called to order at 10:05 a.m.) Chief of Investigation Committee SHUANN announced that the meeting was called to order. In view of the matters which had been questioned in the past in this committee in regards to the draft of the establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry, since it seems that each member of the committee entertains the strong opinion that the draft should be revised but on the other hand the government desired the immediate execution of this draft, SHUANN said that it would be better to immediately report to the government of the existence of such opinions and request for its consideration, and asked that each member of the committee express his views. Committee member SHII, saying that the draft cast unreasonable suspicion on our allied countries and other friendly countries, proposed the following revisions:

1. That the name "Greater East Asia Ministry" be changed.

2. That diplomacy be left under the complete control of the Foreign Ministry as before.

To the above-mentioned proposals, especially to the second point, Committee members UMAI (Hiroshi), OKIWA, and TAKEKOSHI each expressed his respective approval.

Committee member KITA, stated that he was anxious about the political situation which might arise in case of opposition to the draft, and for that reason, stated that he would reserve his approval or disapproval.

Both committee members SHII and OKIWA expressed the view that the Privy Counsellors must, as a duty, express their beliefs without reservations according to the dictates of their consciences in replying to the Imperial Inquiry and that after considering the
trend of the political situation, they must not retreat from their beliefs.

Committee member ITSUCHI said that since the government and the Privy Council have a common desire, it would be desirable for the President of the Privy Council and the Chief of the Committee to informally report the tendency of the Investigation Committee to the Prime Minister and request his consideration.

In response to this, Committee member FUTAGAI stated that the best policy would be to deal with the government after the opinions of the committee had been unified.

Committee Chief SUZUKI stated to the effect that this draft is not based upon the rules of righteousness but on the rules of might, and for the reason that it would be unsatisfactory as a far-sighted national plan, if there is unity of opinion in the committee, he could assume the responsibility of the negotiations and in all frankness, endeavor to have the government listen to this, but if there is lack of complete unity in the committee, it would be difficult to accept this responsibility.

In connection with this, Committee members ISHII, USHIO, and IKEDA said to the effect that even though there was a lack of unity in the committee, it would be advisable to have the Committee Chief take the trouble of negotiating with the government and requesting its consideration if there existed a majority opinion. To this, Committee member IZAWA concurred.

(Recess from 12:00 noon to 1:05 p.m.)

Committee Chief SUZUKI, in response to the request of each Committee member, stated to the effect that he would assume the responsibilities of the negotiations since there is the approval of each committee member in regard to negotiating with the government. He announced the adjournment of the session.

(Meeting adjourned at 1:20 p.m.)
The 8th Meeting of the Investigating Committee Concerning Establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry and Eight Other Items.

Meeting held on 4 Oct. 1942 (Wednesday) at Privy Council Office.

Attendance:

President of the Privy Council HARA

Chief of Investigation Committee, Vice-President of the Privy Council SUZUKI

Committee members:

Councillor ISHII
Councillor MINAMI (Hiroshi)
Councillor USHIKO
Councillor FUTAKA
Councillor OBATA
Councillor TANIGAOE
Councillor MITSUCHI
Councillor IZUMI
Councillor IKEDA
Councillor MINAMI (Jiro)

Ministers of State:

Prime Minister concurrently War Minister TOJO
Minister of Agriculture and Forestry concurrently Minister of Overseas Affairs INO
Home Minister YUZAWA

Exponents:

Chief of Legislative Bureau MORIYAMA
Counselor of Legislative Bureau SATO
Counselor of Legislative Bureau IRIE
Secretary of the Board of Planning YAMASHI
Vice-Minister of Home Affairs YAMAZAKI
Secretary of the Home Ministry IRIE
Chief of the Bureau of Military Affairs SATO
Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs OKI
Vice-Minister of Overseas Affairs UEBA
Chief of Bureau of Superintendence, Ministry of Overseas Affairs MAKINO
Chief of the Industrial Bureau, Ministry of Overseas Affairs TAKEUCHI
Secretary of the Ministry of Overseas Affairs
KITAOTTO
Secretary to the Korean Government-General USUI
Secretary to the Formosan Government-General HONDA
Chief Secretary HORIE
Secretary KOPOHASHI
Secretary TAKATSUJI

(Meeting called to order at 10:35 a.m.)

Committee member, MINAMI (Hiroshi), requested an explanation of the purport of Art. 19 of the Establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry.

Chief of the Legislative Bureau, MORIYAMA, explained that the administration of the occupied territories in the south is at present conducted according to the prerogative of the Supreme Command, and, therefore, lies beyond the scope of the Greater East Asia Ministry. However, in substance the military administration falls under matters of state, and at present various matters, such as the laying of plans, actually come under organs of state in many cases. This Article was inserted in order to provide that the disposal of such cases would be the responsibility of the Greater East Asia Ministry. "SAKUO" /T.N: Concert/ means compliance with the wishes of the army, while "KIYOFUKU" /T.N: Cooperation/ means non-interference in military administration.

Chairman SUZUKI proceeded to give an account of his interview with Prime Minister TOJO concerning the negotiations for the amendment of the original proposal agreed upon at the previous Committee meeting. He said that the Prime Minister was firmly determined to adhere to the original proposal, and could under no circumstances agree to the amendment, and that the Committee, therefore, had no choice but to express its views frankly when reporting the results of the investigation. All committee members expressed thanks to the chairman and decided to drop the problem.
Excerpts from the
Proceedings of the Privy Council Investigation Committee
"Organization of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere"

p. 17

The Second Meeting of the Investigation Committee for
the Government Organization of Greater East Asia
Ministry and eight other items.

Meeting held on October 12, 1942 (Monday) at Privy
Council Office.

Persons present:

- President HARA
  Chief of Investigation Committee; Vice President
  SUZUKI

Investigation Committee members:

- Councillor ISHII
- Councillor MINAMI (Hiroshi)
- Councillor USHIJO
- Councillor FUTAGAMI
- Councillor OBATA
- Councillor TAKEGOSHI
- Councillor MITSUCHI
- Councillor IZAWA
- Councillor IKDA
- Councillor MIYAMA (Jiro)

Ministers of State:

- Premier concurrently War Minister TOJO
- Agriculture and Forestry Minister concurrently
  Overseas Affairs Minister INO
- Home Minister IZAWA
- Foreign Minister TANIG

Exponents:

- Chief Secretary of the Cabinet HOSHINO
- Chief of Legislation Bureau MIRYAMA
- Counsellor of Legislation Bureau IRIYE
- Counsellor of Legislation Bureau SATO
- Counsellor of Legislation Bureau MIYACHI
- Counsellor of Legislation Bureau NAKAI

- President of Planning Board SUZUKI
- Chief of 1st Section, Planning Board AKINAGA
- Vice-Chief, Bureau of Manchurian Affairs TAKEUCHI
Chief Secretary HORII
Secretary HCHI
Secretary TAKATSUJI

(Opened at 10 a.m.)

Chief of Investigation Committee SUZUKI announces the meeting open.

To the question from Committee Member USHIO: . . . . .

... Regarding the inquiry about the limits of the Greater East Asia Sphere, Premier TOJO has replied that it includes KUANTUNG Region, South Sea Islands, Manchuria, China, Siam, French Indo-China and new occupation zones resulting from the Greater East Asia War, and therefore, the limits would expand together with the extension of occupied territories.
CERTIFICATE

W. D. C. No.
I. P. S. No. 10867

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Shuzo Jimbo hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary to the President of the Privy Council and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of ______ pages, dated 9-14 Oct., 1942, and described as follows: Proceedings of the Privy Council Investigation Committee “Organization of the Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Privy Council in Palace ground.

Signed at Tokyo on this 4th day of September 1946. 

/s/ Shuzo Jimbo
Signature of official

Witness: Kiichi, Chosokabe
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 4th day of September 1946

/s/ Edward P. Monaghan
Investigator, JPS

Witness: Richard H. Larsh
Official Capacity
Excerpt From

The Proceedings of the Privy Council Investigation Committee

"Organization of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere"

Committee Member Ishii inquired into the Constitutional doubt that, in spite of diplomacy's being within the prerogative of the Emperor with the Foreign Minister bearing the responsibility for assistance to the Throne, the present plan seems to assign to the Greater East Asia Minister the responsibility for assistance to the Throne in connection with diplomacy except for the so-called "pure diplomacy". Director Moriyama of the Legislation Bureau replied that all State Ministers bear the responsibility for assistance to the Throne in connection with the prerogative of diplomacy, but that the organ to execute policies in connection with diplomacy is decided in accordance with the government organization. He further made the point clear that it is the designation of the Minister who shall have charge of the administrative execution, and does not mean the limitation of the scope of responsibility for assistance to the Throne, that the present plan assigns the pure diplomacy of the Greater East Asiatic area to the Foreign Minister, and places under the superintendence of the Greater East Asia Minister all diplomatic affairs exclusive of those which fall within the category of pure diplomacy.

Committee Member Ninomi (Hiroshi) inquired for the reasons of Foreign Minister Tōjō's resignation, concerning which the nation entertained doubts. Premier Tōjō replied that it was for personal reasons that he had resigned, but that he believed that it was not proper to give detailed explanation of them.
Excerpts from
"Plan for Establishment of Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere"

"Secret"

Series 45  
Date Jan. 27, 1942  
Number of Copies - 150  
Disposition - Inside the Institute  
Outside of the Institute to be returned as soon as through.

Chapter I.

Outline of Construction

II. Forms of the East Asia Independent Co-prosperity.

Within the limits of the area formed by the Pacific Ocean, Central Asia and the Indian Ocean are brought together nations, peoples and their resources, and here are established areas of independent co-prosperity for East Asia nations and peoples. (P. 1)

The area including Japan, Manchukuo, North China, the downstream region of the Yangtze River, and the Soviet Maritime Province should be made the central zone for the East Asia Union, and Japan has the leading mission for the East Asia Union.

III. The territorial boundary in the East Asia Union and the Japanese national defense sphere.

Central Sphere. It is the sphere of existence of Japan and it is the area including Japan, Manchukuo, North China, the downstream region of the Yangtze River and the Soviet Maritime Province.

Smaller co-prosperity sphere. It is the East Asia smaller self-supporting sphere and it is an area including the central sphere, Eastern Siberia, China, Indo-China and the South Seas. (P. 2)

Greater Co-prosperity Sphere. It is the East Asia greater self-supporting sphere and it includes the smaller co-prosperity sphere, Australia, India and the islands of the Pacific Ocean. (P. 3)

II. Political Forms of the East Asia Areas for the next Twenty Years.

1. Manchukuo.

Manchukuo will develop steadily following the ideal of the establishment of the State; the unification of Japan and Manchukuo
will be realized and also, Manchukuo will be fortified as a military base for military operations against the U.S.S.R. The immigration policy will be furthered and the promotion of the harmony of the peoples is expected. (P. 10)

2. The East of the Soviet Union.

(1) The Soviet Maritime Province will be annexed to Japan as soon as possible.

(2) Territories besides the above will belong either to Japan, or depending on the circumstances to Manchukuo, and will be treated as special military regions. (P. 19)

II. Diplomatic.

4. The East of the Soviet Union.

(1) The main principle of the construction will be satisfying the demands of the State defense of Japan and Manchukuo. Japan will hold military power in her hands.

(2) After the complete eradication of the red influence of the Soviet Union, a system of self-government of the lowest degree may be established if necessary.

(3) Adequate policy of developing natural resources and national policy will be adopted, thereby fortifying substantially those areas as a defense wall against the U.S.S.R.

5. Emissaries.

(1) The ultimate object will be establishing a defense wall against the U.S.S.R. and the degree of self-government will gradually be promoted according to the standard of the people, but military and diplomatic matters will be protected and guided by Japan to the last. (P. 96)
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Rempoi Auriyama hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Cabinet Secretary, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of ______ pages, dated 27 Jan., 1942, and described as follows: Draft of Plan for Establishing the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere compiled by Total War Research Institute Stamped "Top Secret". I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Cabinet Secretariat

Signed at Tokyo on the ______ day of Sep., 1946.
Witness: Hiramatsu, Kazumichi

Statement of Official Procurement

I, ______________, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this ______ day of September, 1946
Witness: J. . . . Curtis (stamped)
SEIZURE OF EVIDENTIARY DOCUMENTS

On 4 June this agent and E. O. Kittleson, Special Agent, C.I.C., and Mr. J. Wada accompanied by OKURA, Kinmochi entered the latter's office, East Asia Research Institute (Dai Towa Kenkyu-Kai), Surugadai, Kanda-ku, Tokyo and removed therefrom a number of documents among which was the following:

1. Draft of Measures for the Building of the Great East Asia Co-prosperity sphere. Top Secret. (published in April 1943 by the Commission for studying the problems of Great East Asia of the "Kokusaku Kenkyu-Kai" Society; in 4 parts.)

The aforementioned seizure was made under authority given in A G 200.2, 10 November 1945.

C.I.C. SCAP Index No. 261.

I hereby certify that the action described herein and the document described above are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

/s/ James Williamson
James Williamson
Special Agent, C.I.C.

Herewith I acknowledge that the document described above was among those obtained at my office.

/s/ OKURA, Kinmochi
OKURA, Kinmochi
TOP SECRET

Report of Study, April, Showa 18/1943/ PART I.

Draft of measures for the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

First Chapter:

Introduction to the basic plan.

Greater East Asia Problems Investigation Committee,
National Policy Inquiry Section.

2. "The reasonable scope of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

In the foregoing part we have considered the scope of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere from various viewpoints along the line of requisites of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. But the scopes required by each point of view are not always in accord as already stated.

By putting together these demands, the scope of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere will be decided, but the nation which decides it is after all the leading country, Japan. If we put together the above mentioned demands and consider the geographical outline which is as a reasonable scope of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere at the present stage, the scope of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere includes the land, air and water of the following:

(a) All of the areas that are generally recognized as self-evident components of the Co-Prosperity Sphere including those under military occupation.

(b) The ALEUTIAN ISLANDS and ALASKA (but ALASKA is regarded as a non-fortified zone).

(c) All the eastern region of the Soviet Union including LAKE BAIKAL.

(d) All of OUTER MONGOLIA, SINKIANG, TIBET, TSING-HAI, etc.

(e) All the Indian region east of the demarcation
line which runs southwestward from TIBET to the
INDIAN OCEAN (DELHI and CEYLON ISLAND as well as
other islands in the INDIAN OCEAN are included. The
concrete location of the line shall be considered
separately.

(f) AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND and all other islands
in the SOUTH PACIFIC OCEAN (excluding those which
are very close to the coast of the American Continent).

(g) All of islands in the NORTH PACIFIC OCEAN
including HAWAII ISLANDS (excluding those which are
very close to the coast of the American Continent)."

(pp. 51, 52, 53).........................
**Doc. No. 1621**

**Page 1**

**TOP SECRET**

1. **Outline of the First Period of the Total War for the Establishment of East Asia** (draft)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document number</th>
<th><em>Total War Research Material No. 46</em></th>
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<tr>
<td>Reel number</td>
<td>No. 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of compilation</td>
<td><em>February 16, 17th Year of Snow (1942)</em></td>
</tr>
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<td>Number of copies of Compilation</td>
<td>150 copies</td>
</tr>
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<td>Disposition</td>
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2. Compiled by the Total War Research Institute.

2.1. Compiled by the Total War Research Institute.

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2. **Compiled by the Total War Research Institute.**

2.1. Compiled by the Total War Research Institute.

2.1.1. **Scope and Main Points of Occupation (semi-occupation).**

2.1.1.1. In the north, we must strive to establish a national defense base and to maintain a superior strategic position, as well as to take no miscalculation in the acquisition of strategic war materials. The main points to bear in mind in effecting occupation are given in *Annex No. 3* attached herewith.

2.1.1.2. *Annex No. 3.*

2.1.1.2.1. The main points of Eastern Siberia which are to be occupied.

2.1.1.2.1.1. The Maritime Province of the Soviet Union.
Doc. No. 1621

(a) Vladivostok, Harinsk, Nikolozsk, Petropavlovsk, and other important strategic points.

(b) Important for natural resources:
    Taschue - iron
    Cha and Dhabi - oil
    Su-cheng, Artiuc, Veroshilov, Tuvrichanka) coal

II. Khabarovsk Province

(a) Khabarovsk, Blagoveschensk, Rukhlovo, and other important strategic points.

(b) Important for natural resources:
    U.dita - molybdenum
    Novda, Ruchinek - coal

III. Chita Province

(a) Chita, Karinsk, and other important strategic points.

(b) Important for natural resources:
    Charekinsky - iron
    Darasun - lead, zinc
    Gultii - molybdenum
    Buhachach, Chernoovsky)
    Turbozatai, Arbagar) coal

IV. Buriat-Mongol Province, Ulan-Ude and other important strategic points.

/p.32/ Section 4. The idea of waging war.

/p.78/ 4. Against the Soviet Union.

(a) Armed warfare.

1. Our policy is to speedily complete our war preparations against the Soviet Union and, together with our victories in the Greater East Asiatic war, overawe the Soviet Union, and, by making active use of our power and force according to the circumstances, cause the Soviet Union to conclude peace with Germany, thereby avoiding war for the present.
But if there should be a specially good change during this war, or if a Soviet-American alliance against Japan is formed, we expect to resolutely invoke armed force against the Soviet Union.

2. In waging war against the U.S.S.R., we should utilize the strategic situation on the enemy's main theaters of war, the great distance that separates the enemy from its main bases in the home country, and deal the enemy a smashing blow at the outset, speedily destroying its forces on the field and the reinforcements with a view to settling the war in a short period of time. Thereafter a protracted war will be carried on, the important strategic points having been captured by us.

3. As our enemy will seek to directly attack the center of our sphere with a superior air forces and also with submarines, we must carefully prepare counter-defense measures and seek to destroy the enemy in a single stroke at the beginning of the war.

4. Although the strength of enemy forces to be directed to the East Asian will vary especially according to the development of the Soviet-German war, it should be taken as a standard that one-third to one-half of the enemy's total strength will be directed to East Asia.

/p.30/ (3) Diplomatic war.

1. The prevention of the war.

In order to make the Soviet Union remain neutral in the Greater East Asiatic war for the time being, we should mainly bring pressure to bear upon her by completing our arrangements, but, in addition to it, the following means will be considered:

(1) With our arrangements against the Soviet Union as a pressure, it is necessary for us to show no such attitude as to wish her neutrality against Japan. However, we must avoid any useless provocation and maintain an attitude of remaining neutral against the Soviet Union so long as she keeps hers.

(2) While making the Soviet Union understand that Japan is determined to surely resort to force against the use of East Siberia by the United States and Britain, we may, under certain circumstances, conclude a
Doc. No. 1621

Page 4

pact with the Soviet Union for the reinforcement of treaty of neutrality. (In this case, we may consider supplying the Soviet Union with certain quantities of the commodities of the Southern Regions as a compensation.)

(3) There may be cases where we, while prohibiting navigation in Japanese coastal waters and the shipment of contraband goods in the Indian Ocean area, we may consider an agreement to actually supply certain specified articles and thereby conceive a relation of Soviet economic dependency on Japan.

2. Conclusion of peace between Germany and the Soviet Union.

If there should arise a prospect that peace between Germany and the U.S.S.R. would cause Soviet alienation from America and Britain and reduce the threat against Japan, we shall meditate for peace between Germany and the Soviet Union by bringing, if necessary, pressure to bear at a period when the war situation is favorable to Germany.

I. When the war situation is favorable to Germany.

(1) To force peace on the Soviet Union by issuing at a declaration of war against her if she should refuse to suspend hostilities.

(2) In this case we will obtain from the Soviet Union a promise that she would not land any military base to America, and a substantial guarantee for the fulfillment of this promise.

II. When the war situation is unfavorable to Germany.

When the war situation is unfavorable to Germany, it shall be the general rule that no efforts will be made to bring about peace between Germany and the Soviet Union. However, we must be prepared to exert great pressure on the Soviet Union in case of unavoidable necessity, and to expect a peace which may not be necessarily satisfactory.

(1) We will make the Soviet Union agree to the cessation of hostilities by promising to give her certain economic benefits, such as the supply of goods, after the conclusion of peace, or to support her demands against Germany to some degree in the peace negotiations.
(2) Efforts shall be made to obtain from the Soviet Union a promise to maintain neutrality in Japan’s war against America and Britain, especially not to lend any military base to the.

(3) It shall be necessary to have Germany recognize a great concession in respect to the recovery of former Soviet territories, etc.

III. When a war breaks out between Japan and the Soviet Union.

Though we do not propose any special diplomatic measures until we have driven out Soviet forces from Eastern Siberia in an armed warfare, the following measures shall be considered:

(1) For the time being, Japan and Germany should lay stress on a war against the Soviet Union and cooperation between them in guiding operations shall be effected as soon as possible.

(2) By the active use of the alliance thought warfare shall be reinforced in order to bring about the collapse of the Soviet Union.

(3) After the rout of the Soviet forces in Eastern Siberia, there may be a case where Japan and Germany, according to the circumstances, shall make peace with the Soviet Union on very lenient terms, and strive to lay their stress again on the war against America and Britain.

(4) In case Germany makes peace with Britain (and America) after the outbreak of war between Japan and the Soviet Union, Japan, too, according to the circumstances, may at the same time try to make peace with Britain and America and try to successfully prosecute the war against the Soviet Union.

/p.133/ Chapter 3. The Construction of War Areas.

/p.190/ Section 3. The North. (This section is based on the supposition of a war against the Soviet Union.)

I. Military affairs.
(1) In the period of the enforcement of military administration in the first stage of military operations, the main aim shall be to secure freedom of operational replenishment. Especially in the Maritime Provinces of Soviet Russia, we must not overlook anything in securing strategic naval and air bases against America and also maritime bases. As for the bases against the Soviet Union, we will strive to push them as much as possible to the western part of the war area in accordance with the progress of the war.
CERTIFICATE

W.D.C. No._____
I.P.S. No. 1621

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, TAKAHASHI, Michitosh, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Cabinet and that as such official I had custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 390 pages, dated 18 Feb 1942, and described G.T. as follows: Outline of the national policies in the first period of the general mobilization war for the establishment of East Asia. I further certify that the attached document was issued by the Total War Research Institute, for the study of its members and that it was in the custody of the Cabinet Secretariat by the request of the prescribed Institute.

Signed at Tokyo on this 17th day of September, 1946 /s/ M. Takahashi

Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ R. Kurivama

SECRETARY OF CABINET

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larn, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 17th day of September, 1946. /s/ Richard H. Larn
SUMMARIZED RESEARCH PAPERS
For the Year of 1942

Extremely Secret

Published by the Research Institute of Total War

No. of Document : So, KEN. B No. 4
Series No. : No. 5
Date of Publishing : 30th March 1943
Number of Copies : 100
Pages : 544 Sheets
Disposition : Inside the Institute, to be returned as soon as through
Outside of the Institute, to be returned after the fixed period.
Part II. Chapter 5. The plans to govern Sinnaia. (including Outer Mongolia).

1. General course of policy.

(1) The object of government, in general, is in the preparing and adjusting of defensive areas in the northern orders so as to establish defense for the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. For this purpose, a military administration in the occupied areas should be secured; thereby enabling the occupation troops to enjoy convenience in their activities; and, at the same time, basic preparatory policy for governing those areas which comprise one ring of the co-prosperity sphere should be established.

In accordance with the above point of view, each area should adopt policies which is in accordance to their characteristics.

(2) After the communistic ideology and organization have been swept away, a new ideology of the new order in East Asia shall take its place, and the freedom of worship shall be permitted.

(3) All old laws and ordinances shall be declared void, and simple but powerful military orders shall be enforced instead. Under the powerful leadership of the empire, the natives shall not be allowed, in principle, to take part in any politics. If necessary, a lower grade self-government shall be allowed.

(4) The revival in the system of private ownership of property shall be enforced in principle; but the time and its methods shall be decided according to the circumstances.

(5) The development of resources shall be aimed at mineral resources deemed specially necessary, and emphasis shall be directed at the exploitation of food and metal resources which aims at the maintenance of self-sufficiency.

(6) The present planned economy shall be reorganized as to form one ring of the greater East Asia Co-prosperity Planned Economy.
If found necessary from the national defense and economic point of view, Japanese, Korean and Manchurian colonists shall be sent there.

If occasion demands, compulsory emigration of the natives shall be effected.

2. Politics and Thoughts.

It is aimed that Northern Sakhalin, the Soviet Far East, and Kamchatka shall be turned into a Japanese territory, to serve as military bases of the Empire's northern boundary.

As far as the Mongolians are concerned, racial demand shall be taken into consideration and, at the same time, shall be so led as to serve as barriers against Soviet Bolshevization of Manchuria, Mongolia and China. The safeguard and promotion of this cause shall be centered upon religion, such as Lamaism, etc. Efforts shall also be made for establishing strong political control in other areas. For measures thereafter, separate consideration shall be given.

Chief political measures to be taken simultaneously with occupation.

(A) Declaration abolishing the various communist institutions.
   (a) Revival of the private ownership of property, in principle.
   (b) Thorough demolition of the communistic political system and its form of application.
   (c) Strict prohibition of all political organizations and political movements.

(B) Securing of North Sakhalin, primary population as labor power for the exploitation of mineral resources.

(C) Control over Japanese, Koreans and Manchurians entering the U. S. S. R.

Military administration shall be enforced throughout the whole war period according to the following purports.

(A) Racial policy.
   (a) The superiority in leadership of the Japanese race shall be clearly established in all fields.
   (b) In so far as there is no hindrance in the carrying out of military administration, racial and local manners, customs and cultures shall be respected.
(c) Freedom of worship shall be recognized positively, and such religions as the Greek Church and Lamaism shall, if necessary, be encouraged by adding appropriate changes. However, the political activities of religious organizations shall not be tolerated.

(d) Mixed blood among various races may be left to take its own course, but pure blood of the Japanese race shall be maintained.

(B) Administration and Thought Policy.

(a) Permeation of our might shall be our aim, and we shall approach them with stringent power, not inclining into the so-called paternalism.

(b) Under the strict and fair military discipline of the military administration authorities, and through the concrete practice of the austere military administration, their anti-Japanese conception which they had hitherto embraced shall be swept away, and they shall be so led as to recognize the ideals and the actual circumstances of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, with Japan as its centre.

(c) The communists, and others who were formerly of the leading class, shall be swept away. All creations, such as publications, dramas, cinemas, songs and ballads, etc. rich in the communist thought shall be forbidden strictly.

(d) All the government and public-owned property in the occupied territory shall be confiscated and the military shall assume control.

(e) Security of life and property shall be, in principle, guaranteed.

(f) For the lower system of the local administration, self-government necessary to the military administration shall be approved, and those based on old racial customs shall be respected.

3. Economy.

(1) General principles.

The socialistic planned economy shall be swept away and a new control economy, which, as one ring of the Greater East Asia Sphere, that is in accordance to the Japanese economic conception, shall be established as its object. The very urgent matters at present, namely the military needs, the security of the natives, livelihood, etc., shall be practised
with each enterprising opportunity. In these cases, the lack of stimulation to individuality, which is the weak point of the socialistic planned economy, shall be corrected and utilized. (pp. 235 - 238)

Reference (No. 1.)


(1) "Siberia" which we mean here refers the area east of Baikal (except Yakutsk Autonomous Republic). When referring to the administrative section of the U. S. S. R., as of July, 1941, it corresponds to the Soviet Far East and Eastern Siberia (except Irkutsk Province).

Far East. (p. 248)

1. Primorskaya District
   (a) Direct Control District (Former Primorskaya)
   (b) Ussuri Province.

2. Khabarovsky District.
   (a) Direct Control District.
   Former Khabarovsky Province
   (T.N. Direct Transliteration)
   Former Khorima Administrative District.
   (b) Judea Autonomous Province.
   (c) Amur Province
   (d) Northern Sakhalin
   (T.N. Direct Transliteration)
   (e) Nizhniiasur Province
   (f) Kamchatka.
I, TAKAHASHI Ichitosh, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Cabinet and that as such official I had custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 537 pages, dated 30. March 1943, and described as follows: "Shoku Jishihon-to Saro-Lenkuy 1444. I further certify that the attached document was issued by the Rekshikan Research Institute, for the study of its members and that it is in the custody of the Cabinet Secretariat by the request of the prescribed Institute.

Signed at Tokyo on this 17th day of September 1946.

/r/ Takahasi
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ R. Kurita
Secretary of Cabinet
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard F. Lash, hereby certify that I was associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 17th day of Sept., 1946

/s/ Richard F. Lash

Witness: /s/ C. Front

Investigator, JCO Official Capacity
REPORT OF INSPECTION TOUR IN MANCHURIA AND KOREAN ISLANDS
May 1931

Colonel SUZUKI, Shigemori

Preface

I made a tour to Manchurian and Korean areas for about two weeks from the middle of March, in accordance with the instructions that appeared in Appendix No. 1.

I am hereby presenting a report on the following information that I gained on the tour:

My travel routes are shown in Appendix No. 2.

I. Comparison of strategic advantages between the western line of the Chinese Eastern railway and the SUBERING-TAONJIN Railway from the standpoint of transportation of Japanese main forces in "E" plan of operation.

Decision:

Judging by the comparison of strategic advantages between both railways in consideration of the natural features of the zone along the aforesaid railway lines, from the standpoint of transportation of Japanese main forces in "E" plan of operation, it is easily found that there are any differences between them.

However, considering the recently increasing development of conditions in the SOLAI area (plain at the eastern foot of the SHING-MAK-SANG range north of S.SUAI) in connection with strategic advantages, it is proposed acknowledged to advance Japanese main forces towards the SUBERING-TAONJIN Railway.

III. Consideration of tactics of Japanese occupation army in Northern KOREA.

Consideration:
(1) Concerning tactics of 19th Division in the present "B" plan of operation, it is advisable to concentrate the whole power for use at HUNGUN and the Southern area of the place. Regarding the tactics of the same Division in "C" plan of operation, it is suitable to use a majority or the complete force in CHIENTUO.

(2) Regarding tactics of the army forces in the MANSHURING province in the "B" plan of operation, the principal aim is that the main forces will land on the coast to the east of VLADIVOSTOK. It is suitable that the Japanese occupation army in Northern KOREA would act separately from the main forces taking into consideration the operations of the latter. Therefore, special attention should be paid to make the equipment perfect in the occupation forces in order to make a separate operation possible.

Reason:

1. On II at the present plan, the main purpose of Japanese operation forces in the MANSHURING province is to facilitate operations by the Manchurian army. In this connection, special attention should be paid to the occupation of the eastern line of the Chinese Eastern Railway by the advance of the main forces in the area north of NICOLSK-Ussuzisk, if possible. It is desirable that this attempt would be realized as soon as possible.

Judging by the above-mentioned standpoint, it is properly recognized that the main forces of the operation army in the MANSHURING Province go into an outer line action with the Japanese occupation army in Northern KOREA through landing in the area east of VLADIVOSTOK and through advancing towards NICOLSK-Ussuzisk and the city of NICOLSK-Ussuzisk. And it may be said that this operation will be easier because the main forces of the army are composed of the pack-horse division.

Appendix No. 1

March 10, 1931

Instruction:

1. You shall make a tour of inspection regarding general conditions in MANSHURING, above all the zone along the
SZERINGKAI-TAONAN Railway Line, as a matter of your principal duty. As to the details, you shall have suggestions from the chief of the First Department.

2. A period of tour there and back shall be about two weeks. You shall start from TOKYO about the 16th of March.

3. In executing your duty, you shall be in connection with both the headquarters of KHANTUNG army and occupation army in KOREA and their controlled organs.

4. You shall present a written report in two months after you return home.

March 16, 1931

Suggestions

You shall investigate and consider the following items, in accordance with Instruction No. 1.

Items:

1. General consideration concerning tactics in Northern MANCHURIA for the guidance of "B" plan of operation. Above all consideration regarding strategic advantages of the zones along the SZERINGKAI-TAONAN and the Chinese Eastern Railway Lines.

2. Consideration concerning the airports in MANCHURIA.

3. Concrete consideration concerning tactics in Northern KOREA in "B" and "C" plan of operation.

Chief of the First Department.
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Masakazu, Anono hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Historical Section Secretary 1st Demobilization and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of _______ pages, dated May, 1931, and described as follows: Carbon copied bound "Report of Inspection /Tour/ in Manchurian and Korean Areas", by Colonel Suzuki, Shigeyasu Stamped "Military Top Secret"

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): War Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this _______ day of Sep., 1946 /s/ Masakazu, Anono
Signature of Official

Witness: Hasavashi Ishil

Statement of Official Procurement

I, 2d Lt. Eric W. Fleisher, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this _______ day of Sep., 1946 /s/ Eric W. Fleisher 2d Lt. AUSMI

Witness: Richard H. Larsh

Investigator

Official Capacity
The article written in Japanese on the other side of this photograph was recorded by me in my own handwriting, fifteen years ago, in 1931 (Showa 6), when Major-General HARADA was in Moscow. It contains the gist of the conversations between Ambassador HIROTA and Major-General HARADA. I hereby certify the above with my own signature.

Sasuo /TM: or Yukio/ KASAHARA
Sept 3rd, 1946

(Translation of handwriting on back of an-ended photostat)

CERTIFICATE

I, Lt. Colonel TARANEXKO, G.I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the photocopy of the Record of the talk between Ambassador HIROTA and Major-General HARADA, 1931, was delivered to me by Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department, Moscow, on or about March 22, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the archives.

I do further certify

s/
Lt. Col. TARANEXKO
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan
September 15, 1946.
CERTIFICATE

I, Colonel 'FOROSOV', the investigator of the Soviet Division of the IPS, hereby certify, that on September 3, 1946, in the office of the Soviet Division of the IPS I presented KASA'ARA, Yukio, former Lt. General of the Japanese Army, a photocopy of the document in the Japanese language under the title:

"The Talk between Ambassador 'IRO''A and Major General HARA'DA."

and the said KASA'ARA, Yukio made the following inscription at the back of the photocopy of the said document in my presence:

"The Japanese text written at the back of this photograph is the record made by me in my own hand 15 years ago (in 6th year of Showa) during Major-General HARADA's stay in Moscow. The main contents of the negotiations carried on between Ambassador 'IRO''A and Major-General HARADA are given in the same text. I testify to the above said in my own hand.

KASA'ARA, Yukio
September 3, 1946"

This was done in the presence of interpreter A. M. ROFTSKII, who translated the contents of the inscription from Japanese into Russian. Interpreter's certificate of responsibility for correct translation is attached herewith.

s/ Colonel 'FOROSOV,
Investigator of the Soviet Division of the U.S.S.R.

September 3, 1946

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, F. GILDEPIAT, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: s/ F. GILDEPIAT
CERTIFICATE

The city of Tokyo
September 3, 1946.

I, the undersigned, ROJETSKIN, Alexander Michailovich hereby certify to Colonel MOROsov, the Investigator of the Soviet Division of the I.P.S. that I am thoroughly conversant with the Japanese Language to translate printed or written text into Russian, and that I promise to translate correctly the inscription made by the witness KASAHARA, Yukio, on the photostate copy of the document "Talk between Ambassador Ishio and Major-General Harada," which had been presented to him.

I have been duly warned of the responsibility for purposely wrong translation under article 92 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

s/ A. ROJETSKIN.

Subscribed to before

s/ Colonel Morosov,
The Investigator of the Soviet Division of the I.P.S

September 3, 1946

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, Y. Gildenblat, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: s/ Y. GILDENBLAT
I, Lt. Gen. Yukio KASAHARA of the Japanese Army, do hereby certify under oath as follows:

That the photostatic copy of the document in Japanese under the title of "Conversation of Ambassador HIROTÀ and Maj. Gen. HARADA" is the photographic copy of the record of the outline of conversation of Ambassador HIROTÀ and Maj. Gen. HARADA which took place while the latter was in Moscow in 1931, fifteen years ago.

This record is in my handwriting, written at the request of Maj. Gen. HARADA. The contents of the document are as follows:

Concerning the Conversation of Ambassador HIROTÀ and Maj. Gen. HARADA.

In reference to the national policy of x x to be transmitted by Ambassador HIROTÀ to the Chief of General Staff.

1. Desire the following matters be especially transmitted to the Chief of General Staff.

Aside from whether Japan will wage a war against Soviet Russia, it is necessary for Japan to have strong policies against Soviet Russia being ready for war at any time. Its principal purpose is not defense against Communism but rather the conquest of Eastern Siberia.

2. x x stated by Ambassador HIROTÀ on the disarmament problem. Generally speaking, more than half of the diplomats of the world are in favor of military disarmament. However, since this refers to the general theory of disarmament, if it becomes clearly known that the military preparation of Japan is for use against Soviet Russia, it is only natural that she cannot reduce her armaments; and the world powers also (the remainder of the sentence was not submitted to me).
In the above mentioned photostatic copy of the record, however, there are two letters each on lines 15 and 21 of the first page too indistinct to be read. Therefore, marks "x x" were inserted.

I have no recollection as to the recorded items in the remaining portion which was not presented to me.

I hereby identify this affidavit in my own handwriting and that it is true.

\( /s/ \) KASAHARA, Yukio

Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned officer by the above-named Kasahara, Yukio at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan this 6th day of September, 1946.

JOHN F. HUMTEL
Major, J.A.G.D.

CERTIFICATE

I, 2nd Lt. Murakami James, hereby certify that I am fully conversant with the Japanese and English languages, and that this day, the said Kasahara Yukio was duly sworn in my presence and signed said affidavit under oath in my presence; and that all proceedings incidental to the administration of said oath and the signing of said Affidavit were truly and correctly translated from Japanese into English and English into Japanese and fully understood by said Affiant.

Dated this 6th day of September, 1946, at Tokyo, Japan.

\( /s/ \) MURAKAMI JAMES
2nd Lt. Central Interrogation Section
CONCERNING THE RUSSO-JAPANESE FISHING PROBLEMS

February 9, 1931

General Staff Headquarters

"Scorot"

Concerning the Russo-Japanese Fishing Problems

Index

I. Preface

II. History

A. Up to the Russian Revolution
B. During the Russian Revolution
C. The Renewal of the Fishing Treaty

III. Sudden Increase in Russian Strength

A. Measures
B. Results

IV. Lack of Unity among Japanese Parties Concerned

V. Recent Fishing Problems

VI. Counter-Measures Japan Should Adopt
I. Preface.

Recently, between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, there are arising some troubles regarding negotiations about ruble exchange rates due to the closing of the branch office of the Bank of Korea in Vladivostok, and in connection with this, there are trends toward the denouncement of the fishing contract. Thus, complications of the fishing problem are going to be repeated.

Fishing in the Far East was established not only by our senior's efforts, but it is one of the important industries, exporting at present an amount valued at 20,000,000 yen out of our annual production of 40,000,000 yen. Therefore, we are going to recall circumstances of the past and investigate our attitudes for the future.

II. History

A. Up to the Russian Revolution.

As Japan is surrounded by sea, at a glance it seems to be suitable for fishing. Actually, however, it is not blessed at all. Since it requires a depth of not more than 100 fathoms for fishing, and along the Japanese coast, there is an area of only 100,000 square miles which meets this condition, Japan is obliged to advence to the Soviet coast in the Far East where there is a suitable area of 200,000 square miles.

In this connection, Japanese fishermen have been advancing into this area since the days of the Shogunate and secured it as a national right as the result of the Russo-Japanese War. Since then, it has prospered through the years.

On the contrary, though Russia devoted herself to eastward invasion, she had little interest in fishing, so that the catch was on a small scale and the technique was primitive. Even at the time of the first Russo-Japanese Fishing Agreement, she was very inferior when compared with Japan. For example, in 1903, Japan had 116 fishing areas while Russia had only 14. Though there were some variations since then, the (then the Russians) were extremely inferior in the number of fishing areas, in amount of catch, in amount of production, in techniques of fishing, in manufacturing industries, and in all other points, compared with our rapid development. The amount of catch by the Japanese occupied 70 to 80 percent of the total, with the Russians having about 20 to 30 percent. It is needless to say that during the Russian Revolution, this tendency toward decline increased more and more.
During the Russian Revolution

Thus, the beginning of the termination period of the agreement was reached in 1919, but since at that time Russia was in the confusion of a revolution and we could not find the proper officials with whom to negotiate, our fishermen were compelled to fish freely without license or else bravely continue fishing under unsanctions and inconvenience under an agreement with the provisional government in Omsk. After that, in 1923, as soon as Russia was unified under the proletarian government, our fisheries association in the territory dispatched representatives to Vladivostok before the revival of diplomatic relations between the two countries and the Fisheries Association received a lease on the fishing territories from the Russian Far Eastern Fisheries Bureau. Soon after that, by the efforts of Viscount GOTO and Mr. Yoffe, a temporary agreement of three years was concluded and we could finally fish in peace for the time being.

C. The Renewal of the Fishing Agreement.

On January 20, 1925, the diplomatic relationship between Soviet Russia and Japan was renewed, and based upon this, the two countries began negotiating for the new fishing treaty.

In these negotiations, although Japan insisted upon her legitimate privileges under the Portsmouth Treaty, Soviet Russia tried to upset and place herself in the dominating position held by the Japanese. Therefore, a wide gap developed in which the negotiations reached a standstill, which lasted two years and one month. Thus the gloomy prospects of success was indicated. Fortunately, however, under the efforts of Viscount GOTO, who went to Russia, the deadlock was broken, and finally, on the 28th of January, 1928, the treaty was signed. The treaty consists of the text, together with the A, B, C, and final protocol, and stipulates the area to be leased to our fishermen after an auction within the fishing grounds, and also the special rights to fish. In matters concerning the execution of these privileges, the treaty indicates various stipulations. Of course, as a principle, they confirm special rights of Imperial Japan based upon the Portsmouth Treaty, but the biggest difference is in the recognition of the preferential rights of the enterprises of the Soviet Government.

The agreement is effective from May 28, 1928, and our fishermen, who suffered from unsanctions during the past ten years, have somehow or other revived, and our interests seem to have a brighter outlook.
III. Sudden Increase in Russian Strength.

A. Measures.

However, Soviet Russia, before and after the negotiations of the above treaty, that is, from the time her national foundation was finally becoming strengthened, has suddenly become increasingly alert and has aimed at competing and surpassing of Japanese fishing in the Far East. On one hand, they established government trusts or government corporations as management organs, and subsidized industrial loans and purchasing of fish to private enterprises. Furthermore, they recently set up the Five Year Plan to try to make great progress. On the other hand, by taking advantage of our weak diplomacy and utilizing defects in the text of the treaty, they began to oppress the Japanese and to seize the preferential position of the Japanese.

Since the time of the negotiations for the new treaty, they took the following measures for the above purposes:

1. Concerning the conclusion of the new fishing agreement.

The Russians insisted on the reduction of the auction area, the employment of Russian laborers, that "all marine products" be restricted in meaning to "fish", and the recognition of the preferential rights of Soviet government enterprises, that is, because of the Soviet principle of rationalizing industries, they insisted that it was proper that the fishing industry and certain fishing areas be nationalized, and the rest of the fishing areas be distributed equally between Japan and Russia. Regarding the rationalization of the fishing industry, equal treatment was basically given to nationals of both nations in the fishing agreement based on the Seventeenth Treaty. This time, however, for the reason that the government stands superior to the people, the preferential rights of the governments are recognized. Only in the areas exempted from preferential rights are open equally to the nationals of both countries. Since the October revolution had its foundation in the rationalization of industries, the Russian government operated the crab-canning industry, and it is the insistence of the Soviet government that if Japan wishes to operate the crab-canning industry, she must make a formal application to obtain that right. In other words, they tried to make no concessions exceeding the former treaty. This insistence, of course, is an utterly unfair demand which would violate our interests. Although they realized and corrected most of their errors on matters other than those of nationalization, they held fast on the important preferential rights of nationalization without making any concessions, and
2. In 1929, the first year of the enforcement of the new treaty, and just before the departure of our fishing fleet, they made proposals in violation of the treaty and in contradiction to traditional customs.

(a) In Violation of the Treaty.

1) Concerning the use of the coastal areas, they added restrictions not specified in the treaty.

2) The 50 percent bond required to be posted for the lease of the fishing grounds was deliberately increased to 65 percent.

3) They compelled us to make applications for permission regarding the export of marine products, for which there should have been no restrictions in the treaty.

4) Ignoring the stipulations in the protocol which states clearly that no duty, assessment, and commissions be imposed, they demanded that we pay a tax for the protection of propagation in the fishing area.

(b) Concerning Contradiction to Traditional Customs.

1) Many of our present excellent fishing areas were included in the Soviet nationalized fishing areas.

Our people were very anxious for a long time concerning this problem, but since the Russian attitude was so firm at the time of the treaty negotiations, Japan could not state clearly in the treaty whether or not her superior fishing grounds for which she paid a big sacrifice to equip, would be included in the Russian nationalized fishing areas.

It may fairly be said that the greatest cause of the more than two years required to conclude the treaty was for the above reason. However, by the efforts of Viscount GOTO, who went to Russia, we obtained a memorandum from Russia stating, "The importance of Japanese interests will be recognized. Considerations would be given not to destroy these interests." Although Japanese fishermen requested that this be accepted as the golden rule, the Russians flatly violated this rule and included these superior fishing grounds in their nationalization program.
(2) Of the establishment of 300 fishing areas desired by the Japanese, Russia, without indicating any reasons, announced but merely 190 sites.

(3) Concerning Later Developments.

During the negotiations concerning the problems mentioned above (Item (2)), the Russians announced the date of the auction of the fishing areas as February 28. However, our fishermen felt uneasiness about the problems under negotiations, and fearing trite measures that would ignore their interests by the Russians at the critical moment, refused to participate in the auction. Therefore, our Foreign Affairs authorities requested Russia to postpone the auction. However, the Russians rejected this request, and without the participation of the Japanese, carried out the auction as per scheduled. Therefore, the fishing areas under Japanese management have fallen successively into Russian hands. At the same time that Japan notified Russia that the auction was invalid, she demanded a second auction. As a result of this demand, the Russian possession of Japanese fishing grounds became nullified and a second auction was to be held. On May 5, an auction with Japanese participation was held.

B. Results.

An examination of the following distribution of the fishing areas will show the nature of the surprisingly outrageous and selfish demands and unfair oppressions by the Russians.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1930</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Before Treaty</td>
<td>1st Year of Treaty</td>
<td>2nd Year of Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAPAN</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUSSIA---Private Enterprises</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enterprise</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Nationalized Enterprises</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear at a glance how suddenly Soviet Russia increased their strength. The reason why there is no change in the number of nationalized fishing areas during 1929-1930 is that the number was limited by the agreement. However, this was compensated by the better
fishing grounds gained by the individual enterprises. However, among the latter group, private enterprises in its real sense are very few. Almost all of them belong to a co-operative, and special attention is required because these are almost of the same nature as nationalized fishing.


In addition to suffering under Soviet Russia's intolerable tyranny, under the surface, there is a great lack of unity among the Japanese, and finally, at the time of the auction mentioned in Chapter III, the immoral intrigue of the party belonging to SHIMA, To'cuzo, Russia was given an important gap to breach. Mr. UDA, supported by Mr. SHIMA'S party, aimed to profit by the slump in the price of the shares of the Japanese-Russian Fishing Company, one of the leading fishing firms in Japan, and dealt the company a blow by successfully bidding for its 72 fishing areas at an extravagant price.

This event has exposed the scandalous behaviour among the Japanese, and in the end, Mr. UDA, at a great profit, has transferred the fishing areas to the company. For this reason, the lease of the fishing grounds has suddenly increased as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of UDA'S Intrigue:</th>
<th>No. of Fishing Areas</th>
<th>Rent Paid for Fishing Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>1,729,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>5,089,162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>6,078,896</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V. Recent Fishing Problems.

In August and September of last summer, Soviet authorities made an inspection of the Vladivostok branch of the Bank of KCP which extended for over forty days. As a result of this inspection, they finally ordered us to close the bank in December on the pretext of having evidence of free trading in rubles. No answer has yet been received to our demands for nullification of the order except for their dismissal of our demands with a laugh.

The rent paid by Japanese fishermen for the leased fishing ground amounts to 10,000,000 rubles a year. Although the official quotation of rubles is almost at a parity with our yen, the international market quotation at that time was twenty to thirty sen. Japanese fishermen accumulated rubles at this price at the Vladivostok branch, and actually
paid about 2,500,000 yen. Actually, the rent for the leased fishing areas was decided anticipating the international market quotations, and if we are obliged to pay at the official rate, our burden will increase by three or four times, and the foundation of our management would definitely collapse.

As the natural result of the closing of the Branch office of the Bank of KOREA, it became impossible to obtain rubles. To relieve this critical situation, Japan proposed the establishment of the exchange rate between rubles and Japanese currency, and at this time, negotiations are being carried on in Tokyo between our Foreign Affairs authorities and Soviet Ambassador Yosoyanov. This is the Russian-Japanese negotiations appearing from time to time in the newspapers.

At the negotiations, Russia insisted upon the exchange rate of 30 sen and Japan insisted on 40 sen in accordance with international quotations.

In view of the fact that at the exchange rate of less than 30 sen, Japanese fishermen could barely continue their business, they decided that the rate of less than 30 sen to be their final proposal. As the negotiations progressed, they made concessions from 25 sen to 27½ sen. However, our Foreign Affairs authorities, without consulting the fishermen, on their own judgment, made a proposal of 25 sen and requested their consideration of that rate. The Soviet Ambassador replied that it was absolutely difficult to agree to that level of 30 sen but at the level of 40 sen, the Russian Central government might be persuaded.

Notwithstanding our repeated concessions, the Russians would not concede from their own insistence, and as yet, no decisions have been reached.

It was ruled that the rent for the fishing grounds be paid for the first half of this year on January 2. However, since it was necessary to wait for the settlement of the above-mentioned exchange rate, the payment was postponed for one month with Russian understanding. But no settlement was made up to that date, and therefore, the Japanese-Russian Fishing Company, the leading fishing company of Japan, continued operation without payment of rent. Thereupon, under the pretext of the expiration of the time limit, Russia is trying to abrogate the contract, and in relation to this, the Japanese government is strongly protesting that there is an inseparable relationship between the payment of the rent and the establishment of the exchange rate.

Although it seems that Russia does not intend to deprive us immediately of our fishing interests, no doubt she intends to advance her self-development by reorganizing the fishing areas of the Japanese-Russian Fishing Company and making a bid for those areas, transferring the better fishing grounds to nationalized enterprises, and raising
the bids for these better areas.

One thing we must note here is that the unity among Japanese fishermen has again been revealed. Eighty percent of the fishing industry is in the hands of the Japanese-Russian Fishing Company, and the balance divided among several small individual enterprises. Since the number of the fishing areas of these small firms are so exceedingly few, their rent is insignificant. They can not only accumulate rubles easily from the Chinese in Vladivostok, but since the rubles dropped to 6 or 7 sen after the closing of the Bank of NEKA, it was very profitable for them. Therefore, they paid their rents without cooperating with the Japanese-Russian Fishing Company.

VI. Counter-Measures Japan Should Adopt.

The reason for the firm Russian attitude and their sudden increase in strength is solely due to the conservative diplomatic policy of Japan, and the situation is similar to the encroachment on the rights of the Manchurian Railway. If the situation is left as it is, we cannot help but finally lose our rights.

We must not forget that behind our fishing interests are the sacrifices of our precious blood. Without any reasons, we cannot stand in anyway the loss of these rights.

We must not permit such outrages as the attempt of the Russians to deprive us of our rights by endangering our interests, and without coolly reflecting, pretending that we violated the treaty. Only making compromises and not knowing how to defend one's own interests are not true diplomacy.

Japan must be convinced of the urgent necessity of considering the reason by which her interests in Russia is elucidated, and with the determination to make the unlicensed fishing absolutely safe in the future, firmly and boldly push through her insistence during the negotiations.

Judging from the internal and external state of Soviet Russia, if we showed our determination to obtain unlicensed fishing, they will have no courage to maintain their insistence. However, if we carried out our insistence in spite of Russian recalcitrance, by force of circumstances, the result be the severance of diplomatic relationship with Russia, and it will give us the opportunity to promote our sincere desire of executing our basic national policy against Russia.

From the standpoint of the nature and motives for acquiring fishing interests, it must not be monopolized by individuals. If our competitor, Russia, has government enterprises and agencies enterprises similar to those government enterprises, the best way for Japan to compete with them is to nationalize her own fishing industry. We should learn our
lesson not only from the immoral intrigue by SHIMA'S group, but also
is it not so, that Russin took advantage of the exposure of the disunity
among the Japanese?

Such being the case, it is necessary to utilize this opportunity
and also as in the case of the Manchester Railway Company, we should
semi-officially nationalize the farming interests and the government
enterprises.
I, Lt. Colonel T.H.M.N.:M, (G.I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the photocopy of the secret document in Japanese published "Concerning the Russo-Japanese Fishing Problems", dated January 9, 1931 was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department, Moscow, on or about March 22, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the archives of the said Department.

I do further certify ____________________.

Lt. Col. T.H.M.N.:M
(Signature and rank).

Tokyo, Japan,
October 7, 1946,
I, Lieutenant-General Yukio KASAHARA, state under oath as follows:

During my service as a military attache to the Japanese Embassy in Soviet Russia from 1930 to 1932, I came to know the following matters through my duties.

1. In 1931, when Major-General HARADA of the Japanese Army passed through MOSCOW on his return trip to Japan from Europe, he had a talk regarding the situation in the Soviet Union and Japan's policy toward Soviet Union with me and Japanese Ambassador HIROTA.

2. The photostatic copy of the document in Japanese entitled "Outline of the Talk to his Excellency, General HARADA" which is now presented to me, is the one in which the matters that I told Major-General HARADA during his stay in MOSCOW in 1931 was correctly recorded, as far as its contents are concerned. I think the matters in pages 1 to 9 of the document are in Assistant Officer Michitake YAMAOKA's own handwriting. The last page is written in my own handwriting. In order to affirm the said facts, this day I subscribed my signature on the back of the said photographic document and the date on which the document was presented to me.

3. The photostatic copy of the document in Japanese entitled "Matters concerning the talk between Ambassador HIROTA and Major-General HARADA" is the one in which the outline of the talk between Major-General HARADA and Ambassador HIROTA was recorded, during the former's stay in Moscow fifteen years ago, in other words, 1931.

This record was made by me at Major-General HARADA's request.

I certified the above fact in my own handwriting on the back of the said document.

s/ KASAHARA, Yukio
The words "the said document" was inserted into the 22nd line of the first page.

The date "1931" was inserted into the third line of the second page.

KASAHARA, Yukio

Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned officer by the above-named Kasahara, Yukio at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan this 3rd day of September, 1946

ARTHUR A. SAVDUSKY
Captain, J.A.G.D.

CERTIFICATE

I, 2nd Lt. John Hattori, hereby certify that I am fully conversant with the Japanese and English languages, and that this day, the said Kasahara, Yukio was duly sworn in my presence and signed said Affidavit under Oath in my presence; and that all proceedings incidental to the administration of said oath and the signing of said Affidavit were truly and correctly translated from Japanese into English and English into Japanese and fully understood and comprehended by said Affiant.

Dated this 3rd day of September, 1946, at Tokyo, Japan.
SUMMARY OF AN ADDRESS MADE TO HIS EXCELLENCY HARADA BY
LT. COLONEL KASAHARA

1. General State of Conditions in Soviet Russia

Soviet Russia, as is universally known, is pushing resolutely her 5-year plan to establish a new social structure. This plan is directed chiefly toward heavy industries, especially industries concerning the production of national defense, which forms the basis of the future development of the state. Consequently, the industries directly related to the people's living is considered of secondary importance. Everything is being sacrificed for the development of the heavy industries and the plan is now in its third year. Generally speaking, up to now, the object has been realized but hereafter, various barriers will be met and it is judged that the execution of the original plan will be difficult.

Although the people's standard of living has been sacrificed for the sake of policy and has been lowered extremely, the following features peculiar to Soviet Russia compared with the other powers must be taken into consideration:

1. Since the policy of Soviet Russia is actually a dictatorship, she can concentrate on matters of secondary importance and concentrate her finance and manpower on matters of primary importance.

2. Compared with capitalistic countries, the efficiency is inferior, but funds, finance, etc., in capitalistic countries are used for private interests, Soviet Russia can invest her finance and manpower for national development.

3. The people in Soviet Russia can endure blind obedience and poverty.

4. Soviet Russia is rich in natural resources.

5. Soviet Russia has been so far behind in industrial development that even by small effort, the development is greatly speeded up.

6. The supervision is so strict that a unification for reactionary movement against her is not possible.

Therefore, although the merits or demerits of the 5-year plan is indifferent to the happiness of the people, it is surmised that the essential spheres have reached this stage.

The people's living, however, is not expected to be readily improved, even after the completion of the 5-year plan.

Such is the picture concerning the economic conditions. From the thought point of view, those who occupy important posts at present are veterans who have experienced all sorts of troubles and difficulties. Therefore, it may be foreseen that when these veterans are gone in the future, the spirit of the communists may wither away; but on the other hand, after another decade, those who have been educated since the revolution under the Communist regime will start their activities in society. Therefore, together with the above-mentioned national economic repletion, it is surmised that a certain degree of stability will be attained although the policies may shift a little to the right or to the left later on.

However, as to her interior problems in the future, the racial independence movements (Ukraine, Caucasus and Turkestan) and the internal conflict among Communists will become her source of trouble, especially critical in terms.
3. National Defense of Soviet Russia

a. Principle

Soviet Russia at present is not offensive but defensive and is particularly afraid of foreign invasion. The opinion that Soviet Russia is emphasizing the perils of national defense to divert the people's attention to external affairs and is really an internal policy may be reasonable, but it seems that Soviet Russia is really afraid of foreign invasion.

b. It is needless to say that the main purpose of the 5-year plan is in the completion of national defense. On every occasion the leaders openly emphasize the peril in her national defense area. The Communist Party is the most ardent advocate for the repletion of armaments.

Since 1927, four infantry divisions and one cavalry division have been increased. Equipment and armament have made great progress.

c. The key point of the repletion of armament is in the mechanization of the army. There are about 500 tanks and in the past half-year, 150 tanks have been increased.

In mechanized units, there are four independent mechanical brigades, besides five mechanical units that are attached to the infantry divisions.

As to the poison gas, the repletion in every sphere is appalling. Moreover, military and civilian personnel cooperate in training in regard to poison gas.

d. Aviation

The number of planes is between 1,700 to 2,000. The goal is to maintain 200 companies, but at present, the number of companies is estimated to be about 180. Reconnaissance and chase planes are almost depleted and her efforts are directed towards the repletion of bombing planes. Most of her planes are made in Russia but a considerable portion of them seem to have been made in Germany and Italy (naval planes). The wartime aircraft production capacity is surmised to be about 15 per month.

Marked efforts are exerted to the development of civil aviation, especially in the extension of her air routes.

e. War Budget

Compared with her war budget two years ago, it has doubled in amount. The following facts must not be overlooked. Expenditures for munitions are included in industrial expenditures, armament expenditures are included in munitions industry expenditures, GPU and other special troops are not included in the army and navy budget, and expenditures for barracks and field maneuvers are included in provincial expenditures. Therefore, there is a substantial difference between its superficial figures and the actual contents thereof.

Furthermore, there is considerable contribution by the civilian populace. Last year the total number of planes contributed by civilians were about 5,000 planes.

f. Militarization of the people

All of her efforts are bent on the militarization of the public.
CocaBayum (Oso&bcahem) - Society for Aircraft Lookout and Gas and Chemical Lookout.

In January the year before last, 3,0°0,000, in January last year, 5,000,000, in January this year, 9,000,000.

The effect is infiltrated even into the kindergarten.

3. Conclusion

In short, it is self-evident that Soviet Russia will change her policy from passive defense to aggression in the future as her economic power and defense are completed. At present, however, in view of her national powers in general, it is judged that she has not enough strength to execute a war.

There is never a better time than now for Japan to solve her Far East problems. The western neighboring countries (Poland, Rumania) are able to rise now in unison with Japan but as the years pass, it will get more and more difficult. If we are determined to solve the Far East problem now even at the risk of waging war, it may be solved without a war, although there is no objection even if by chance a war should be waged.

4. Disarmament Problem

Owing to circumstances peculiar to the Red Army in its formation, compilation of budget, etc, it is extremely difficult to restrict them. Moreover, it is almost impossible to supervise against their schemes which intend to delude, legally or illegally, the armament limitation. If the supervision of armament limitation is not carried out appropriately, it will only result in exposing our own military secrets.

Anyhow, I believe that in the discussion of disarmament problems, the Empire must not follow the beaten track of Britain and France, but should direct her attention toward the Red Army.

This is a common idea entertained among all military attaches from respective powers in Moscow. This observation, therefore, is fair and just and we need not restrain ourselves in the affirmation of this fact. The assertion that the Soviet Army be considered our enemy will not be rejected by other powers, since the case is different from the naval problem.

5. Matters which the Imperial Army must take into consideration:

a. In military training and military researches, the objects and the topography thereof must be clarified.

b. It is recommended to study the tactics and strategy against Soviet Russia, particularly the mechanization of the army.

C. The standardization of training and armament in divisions should be abolished and altered to be adaptable as the situation requires.

d. Large number of "pooor troops" are necessary in addition to "picked troops."

e. Special attention should be paid particularly towards poison gas and aviation.

f. In training troops their strong points or merits should be maintained and further developed.

6. Chances of victory against Russia seem to lie most of all in higher quality leadership. Efforts must be exerted to leadership of a large
force (with Russia as objective.)

Based on this view, field maneuver research by officers of general's rank is important.

h. In view of the expense and the time required for training, the improvement of our army organization, equipment and training to the satisfaction of all cannot be expected. Therefore, the anticipated battle field and the special characteristics of the strategy against the Red Army should be carefully studied, and equipment and training should be directed toward the most essential matters.

i. The importance of organization and training for winter operation.
CERTIFICATE

I, Lt. Colonel TARAKINO G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the photocopy of the document "Main contents of the Report made to his excellency Harada," was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department Moscow on or about March 22, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the archives of the said department.

I do further certify___________________________

I, Colonel Morosov, the investigator of the Soviet Division of the I.P.S., hereby certify that on September 3, 1946, in the office of the Soviet Division of the I.P.S., I presented to Kasahara Yukio, former Lt. General of the Japanese army, a photocopy of the document in the Japanese language under the title:

"Main contents of the report made to his Excellency Harada,"

and the said Kasahara, Yukio made the following inscription at the back of the last (10th) page of the photocopy of the said document in my presence:

"The record at the back of this sheet was made by me in my own hand. September 3, 1946, Kasahara, Yukio."

This was done in the presence of interpreter A. M. Rozetskin who translated the contents of the inscription from Japanese into Russian. Interpreter's certificate of responsibility for correct translation is attached herewith.

/s/ Colonel Morosov,
Investigator of the
Soviet Division of the I.P.S.

September 3, 1946
the city of Tokyo.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. Gildenblat, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages, and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: /s/ M. Gildenblat
The city of Tokyo  
September 3, 1946.

I, the undersigned, Rojetskin Alexander Michailovich hereby  
certify to Colonel Morosov Platon Chitrievich, Investigator of the  
Soviet Division of the I.P.S., that I am thoroughly conversant with  
the Japanese language to translate printed or written text into Russian,  
and that I promise to translate correctly the inscription made by the  
witness Kasahara, Yukio, on the photostate copy of the document,  
entitled: "Main contents of the report made to his Excellency Harada",  
which has been presented to him.

I have been duly warned of the responsibility for the purposely  
wrong translation under Article 92 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

/s/ Rojetskin  
Subscribed to before

September 3, 1946

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. GILDEBLIT, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant  
with the Russian and English languages, and the above is a correct and  
true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: ___________________________
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

The United States of America, et al) vs. Sedao ARAKI, et al

Affidavit

I, Lt. General Yukio KASAHARA, state under oath as follows:

I was the Chief of Russian Section of the 2nd Bureau of the Japanese General Staff in 1928. I certify that I obtained knowledge of the following matters during the said period, through my duties.

In 1928, Major Masatone KANDA was on special duty with the Harbin Special Mission. He served in the Russian Section of the 2nd Bureau (Intelligence Bureau) of the Japanese General Staff Office a little previously. In the photostatic copies of the Japanese document consisting of 50 pages, entitled "Military Materials for the operations against U.S.S.R." which were shown to me I saw the following three items.

1. Outline of sabotage activities against U.S.S.R.
2. Important sabotage activities matters that would be carried out east of Siberia.
3. Facilities to be stationed for the sabotage purposes east of Siberia and their operations.

I saw the documents containing these three items 18 years ago. In other words, I saw that part of the document beginning from the 1st to the 16th page. That document was drawn up by Major Masatone KANDA who was on duty in the said Harbin Special Mission mentioned above.

I saw the aforementioned part of that document during the period when I was the Chief of the Russian Section of the 2nd Bureau of the General Staff Office; in other words, in 1928.

In order to certify the above mentioned matter, I put my own signature and date in my handwriting on the backs of the photostatic copies of the portion of the said document which I saw in 1928.
This affidavit is signed by me in my own handwriting and it is true and accurate.

Yukio KASAHARA

Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned officer by the above named Yukio KASAHARA at the Jfr Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan this 6th day of September, 1946

/s/ John F. Hurrel
John F. Hurrel, Major J.A.O.D.

Certificate

I, 2nd Lt. Jere MURAKAMI, hereby certify that I am fully conversant with the Japanese and English languages, and that this day, the said Yukio KASAHARA was duly sworn in my presence and signed said affidavit under oath in my presence, and that all proceedings incidental to the administration of said oath and the signing of said affidavit were truly and correctly translated from Japanese into English and English into Japanese and fully understood and comprehended by said affiant.

Dated this 6th day of September, 1946, at Tokyo, Japan.

James Murakami
2nd Lt.
Central Interrogation Section
Colonel KAWAMOTO
Attached to New Port Arthur
Kuan-Tung Army Headquarters

Dear Major KASAFARA:

I wish to ask you to please send me a receipt for this letter. This will conclude our research concerning materials for military operation against Soviet Russia.

KANDA Masatane
No. 103 Yuseigai Minamioka Harbin
Telephone No. 4222

Dear Colonel KAWAMOTO:

I wish to ask you to please send me a receipt for this letter. This will conclude our research.

KANDA Masatane
No. 103 Yuseigai Minamioka Harbin
Telephone No. 4222

CONTENTS

I. General outline of sabotage activities against Soviet Russia.

II. Principal matters of sabotage activities planned to be executed in the east of Siberia.

III. Organisations to be established for the purpose of sabotage activities in the area east of Siberia and their tasks.

IV. Sabotage activities in connection with the line of transportation in North Manchuria.

V. Sabotage activities in connection with the collection of goods in North Manchuria.

VI. Collection of reference materials.
Additional explanation:

Peace time establishments in the Far East areas necessary for our sabotage work against Soviet Russia.

GENERAL OUTLINE OF SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES AGAINST SOVIET RUSSIA

The position of sabotage activities in future wars is very important. Particularly when we are unable to bring about the final decision in our operations against Russia by force of arms, most part of the war, from beginning to end, shall be a war of sabotage.

The affairs included in our sabotage activities against Russia are many and their activities will extend throughout the whole world. Now, I shall mention the general outline of affairs to be executed, as follows:

1. In the light of the present situation in the Soviet Union, various strifes concerning race, thought, and social classes shall be aggravated, especially the internal strifes among the Communist Parties shall be invigorated in the hope of destroying the national structure. Above all, it is necessary to unite the states of Asiatic races in the Union in opposition to European Russia.

2. In relation to the preceding article, anti-war spirit will be instilled among the Russian Army, especially among troops of foreign race, so that the Russians will commit errors in their plans of operations in the Far East.

3. Threatening the Soviet Union by inducing the neighboring countries in the East and the South, we shall make it impossible for her to move large troops to the Far East. Through economic blockade the import of goods, especially of war materials, will be checked.

4. By destroying the transportation system we shall delay the mobilization and concentration of troops; and by creating disturbances in munition plants we shall obstruct their manufacture of war materials. The Siberian Railway is the most important point.

5. We shall isolate the Soviet Union by destroying the communication facilities and through wireless competitions; special attention should be paid to the Far East areas.

6. Should any regime connected with the Soviet Union exist in China, it shall be destroyed.
II. PRINCIPAL MATTERS OF SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES PLANNED TO BE EXECUTED IN THE EAST OF SIBERIA

Russian territories east of Siberia, Manchuria, and Mongolia will be the zones of military operations or form the background areas for both armies, so there are very many matters for sabotage activities in these areas. I shall now outline the important matters as follows:

1. Propaganda activities and instigation will be executed in Russian territories east of Siberia to instill anti-Communist and anti-Jewish spirits among the inhabitants and troops, and anti-war movements shall be provoked.

2. As the situation becomes acute, the principal railways east of Siberia will be destroyed, and strikes will be instigated in coal mines in Siberia and the Maritime Province to bring hardships in railway transportations. Farmers will be made to oppose to the collection of grains.

3. Anti-Communist organizations will be set up in South Manchuria, Korea, and Sakhalin, and will be made to advance into North Manchuria and Far-East Russian territories at favorable opportunities to hamper operational activities of Russian troops. In connection with the development of the general war situation, an anti-communist regime will be established within the Russian territory, and we shall contemplate the overthrow of the Communist Government both in the Siberia and Caucasus areas.

4. We shall hope to make Outer Mongolia anti-Soviet.

5. Should any pro-Soviet regime exist in South China, we shall scheme to destroy it. Above all, we shall be careful not to let Shanghai become the base for Communist intrigues. It is also necessary to break up the troops of Feng Yu-Hsiang’s factions. Should any pro-Soviet government be established in North Manchuria, we shall first of all scheme to overthrow it.

6. Regarding the stealing and interrupting of telephone and wireless communications, the wireless communication post at Hubarowsk shall be destroyed.

7. Especially in North Manchuria, the protection or destruction of the transportation system; collection of materials; or preventing the enemy from willering them etc., all must be executed by maintaining close relations with military operation.
III. ORGANIZATIONS TO BE ESTABLISHED FOR THE PURPOSE OF SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES IN THE AREAS EAST OF SIBERIA AND THEIR TASKS

As the sphere of sabotage activities against Russia extends throughout the world, its organization should also cover both continents. We shall here speak how the organizations will be established and how they will carry out their activities in the Russian territories east of Siberia and in Manchuria.

1. Siberian Organization

Far before the outbreak of hostilities (it will be desirable to arrange from peace time) a military officer disguised as a member of the consulate at Novosibirsk shall be posted to study the conditions of the people and the military situation in Siberia and to frame up anti-communist movements. For this purpose, several officers with funds disguised as merchants having business relations with the farming classes will be attached to him.

With the development of situations, anti-Communist and anti-war movements shall be instigated chiefly among the farming classes in coordination with the Far Eastern, Uro-Russian, and the South Russian districts. Strikes will be started in the Kuznetsk and Chomorsky coal mines and the farmers shall be incited not to sell their crops. After instructing the destruction of the Siberian Railway, they will gradually withdraw to the East.

The existence of Japanese merchants who purchase wheat, butter, and live stocks and sell miscellaneous goods and farm implements in the Siberian area is not necessarily illogical. If they are properly instructed, they should be able to bring about great results. Therefore, if we advise something like an export union toward Russia and have them extend their commercial field in those areas, the execution of our intrigue will become very convenient.

2. Chita Organization

Chiefly coordinating with the North Manchurian organization, this organization shall be a guiding and liaison organ for the anti-Communist movements in the Gabaikalie areas. In addition, it shall have connections with the Siberian organization, and with the purpose of spying on military situations in the Zebikalie areas, an organization consisting of Russians, (It will be best if we can get members of the Communist party with hostile opinions against the present government. Otherwise, they shall be merchants who do not belong to any party) shall be stationed. It is desirable that this organization, too, be arranged from peace time.
3. Blagoveschensk Organization and Heiho Organization

In accordance with the outline for the Siberian Organization, a disguised military officer shall be stationed at the consulate in the respective areas. He shall stay at Heiho and shall cooperate with a military officer disguised as a merchant engaged in smuggling in Russian territory, in planning for anti-Communist movements mainly among the farming classes in Heilungchou. Furthermore, he shall make connections with the anti-Revolutionary Army, (shall relate later), which will penetrate along the Amgun valley from the district of Nikolaevsk. The Heiho Organization shall be left in the hands of bandits maneuvering in the Northern part of North Manchuria.

4. Habarovsky Organization

Disguised military officers (including one naval officer) will be posted at the consulate in Habarovsky, and in offices of other representatives of our fishery and forestry rights, if such representatives are to be stationed. They will take charge of liaison and supervision business for the anti-Communist movements by the farming class in the areas of the Maritime Province and Heilung Province. They also shall cooperate with the Blagoveschensk Organization to destroy and disturb rail and water transportations, and to cut off the communication lines. Especially, they shall plan to destroy the wireless station in Habarovsky. They shall contact with the bandits to be employed in the lower regions of the Sungari River.

5. Vladivostok Organization

Several military officers disguised as members of the Vladivostok Consulate, merchants, or persons concerned with fishery and forestry businesses, shall be posted. They shall plan to supervise the anti-revolutionary movement in the southern regions of the Maritime Province and to appease or annihilate the rebellious Korean organizations. They shall also instigate strikes in the Sucheng coal mines. They shall take measures to contact with the anti-revolutionary organizations that will advance from the Northern Korea regions. In view of the geographical situations, all the organizations in the Maritime and Heilung Provinces shall strive to instill the anti-war spirit among the Russian troops and to make them join the anti-revolutionary organizations.

6. Sapphalien Organization

With its base either in Southern Sapphalien or Hokkaido, this organization will instigate the petroleum mine-workers in Northern Sapphalien and lead them into anti-revolutionary movements. Simultaneously
with the outbreak of war, they shall occupy Northern Saghalien in collaboration with the anti-revolutionary army to be organized in Japan proper. They shall continue to proceed to Nikolaevek, then to Habarowsk regions along the Heilung River. Another group shall advance along the Amgun River to the Heilungchow regions and check the Russian Army. Even before the outbreak of war this organization shall make connections with the gold mines in Kailungchow Province, and shall plan routes for importation of explosives to be used in destroying railways.

7. The North Korean Organization

An organization shall be established at Lonan, and this will organize a Russian Army of anti-revolutionary faction; which, in cooperation with bandits, will maneuver in the regions of Chientao and Southern Ussuri, annihilating rebellious Korean organizations and destroying the railways. Then, with the development of the situation, they shall advance into Southern Maritime Province, and in collaboration with the anti-revolutionary army advancing southward from Northern Saghalien, they shall try to induce the people in that region to give up communistic ideals.

2. The North Manchurian Organization

Besides adding the Hells Organization to the present organization, a formal military official or a disguised military official shall be stationed in Tsitsikar. Several military officials shall be stationed in Haller disguised as merchants and shall engage in fur trades and Outer-Mongolia commerce. They shall corner all furs and live-stocks; and shall disturb the independence movement in Hulunpeterh, (planned by the Soviets), and shall support the movements to break away from Communism in Outer-Mongolia. Letting fur traders engage in business in Hallar from peace time will have greater probabilities than those are in Siberia.

The sabotage activities of the North Manchurian Organization based in Hells is complicated and divergent. I shall state the important matters as follows:

a. To completely seize the Chinese political power. If a pro-Soviet government shall be established, it shall, first of all, be overthrown.

b. To get rid of all members of the Soviet managing staff from the Chinese Eastern Railway, thereby repulsing all red influence from North Manchuria.
c. Manipulation of anti-revolutionary Russians and bandits, and destruction of rebellious Korean organizations.

d. Protection and destruction of communication lines.

e. Collection of materials and preventing their utilization by enemies.

f. Intercepting, disturbing, and protecting communications.

g. Obstructing the activities of Russian intelligence organizations.

9. Taonan Organization

Formal military officials will be stationed, to hold in command the Chinese Army in this area. They shall also organize and control bandit organizations and Russian Army. They shall maneuver in the districts of Salun and Tuchiian with the purpose to cope with the enemy's irregular army and shall strive to make connections with the Hulunpeierh regions. Protection of the Taonan-Anganch railways, especially that of the Saupingkai-Taonan Railway shall be important duty.

IV. SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE LINE OF TRANSPORTATION IN NORTH MANCHURIA

If the lines of transportation in North Manchuria can be utilized effectively by our army, it will be an important matter having very close relations with military operations which is part of our sabotage activities against Russia. Furthermore, there will be a difference in this intrigue according to the international relations among Japan, China, and Russia at the time of the outbreak of war. For instance, if the relation between Japan and China is good and is in a situation where these two countries are able to mutually cooperate in coping with the Russian Army, the various transportation systems in North Manchuria should be protected for our use, and the main point is to prevent the enemy's destructive activities. If, on the contrary, the relation between Russia and China is close, and these two countries shall mutually coordinate in opposition to Japan, we shall take measures to destroy the transportation systems to check the rapid advancement of Russian troops into Northern Manchuria. At the same time it will be necessary to strive to maintain, at all cost, the portions of the railways necessary for the advancement of our troops. In the former case, the mission will be accomplished relatively without
difficulty as we can have the Chinese as collaborators, but in the latter case we shall encounter great difficulties. Therefore, considering the present changing Chinese political situation, we must be prepared that future wars will inevitably be started under such conditions. So, as a study, importance will be placed in the latter case. Thus, as it is no other than the East China Railway that forms the main transportation system in North Manchuria, I shall here make the most concrete description of this railway.

A. Sabotage activity on the Eastern China Railway

1. Destruction of the railway

In case the Russian Army should advance into the plains of North Manchuria before us, we shall take measures to destroy the East China Railway to interrupt them. Following is an outline for such measures.

a. Eastern Line

Points to be destroyed (only important points will be mentioned).

- Fomentian bridge 305 Sajeng in length 13 " in width
- Chalantun station and the train depot.
- Puhedu station and the train depot.
- Hsingan-ling tunnel 1442.25 sajeng in length
- Petorya station and the curved railways near-by.

b. Methods of destruction

1. The troops of Russians and bandits organized at Taonon shall guard important places at Tuchiian, Solun and Hsinpan-ling; and disguised engineers and Russian soldiers will be employed under their protection. With the Hsingan Mountainous regions South of the East China Railway as their base, they shall make frequent attacks along the railway lines and destroy them. The employees of Dzaiaien Company and Japanese residents in Bukedu will be utilized in scouting on enemy situations. Necessary tools and explosives shall be carried from the district of Mukden.

2. If necessary, men will be secretly sent from Harbin separately for the destruction of the Fomentian bridge.
3. The Harbin and Manchuli organizations shall bribe and instigate White Russian employees in a plan to derail and capsize the trains.

**Eastern Line**

a. Places to be destroyed (only important places shall be stated).

- Mutanchiang Iron Bridge, 195 sajeng in length and 13 sajeng in width.
- Three tunnels between Harbin and Tumenkwa, 75 sajeng, 35 sajeng, and 135 sajeng in length respectively.

b. Methods of destruction

1. Troops of Russian soldiers and bandits organized and armed in Northern Korea shall be made to maneuver in the mountainous regions east of Mutanchiang and Homeng, and disguised engineers and Russian soldiers under their protection, shall make frequent attacks on the railroads and destroy them. Japanese residents in Poyavichiraya and Japanese employees of the Melting Sino-Japanese Lumber Company shall be utilized to spy on enemy situations. Necessary tools and explosives shall be supplied from North Korea.

2. The Poyavichiraya and the Harbin organizations shall bribe and instigate White Russian employees in a plan to derail and capsize trains.

**II. Protection of the Railway**

**Southern Lines**

Every effort shall be made to protect this line for the purpose to collect goods and to bring them southward, and to allow our troops to assemble in Harbin by utilizing the materials transported by the East China Railway.

a. Points to be protected

- No. 2 Sungari Iron Bridge
  245 sajeng in length and 17 sajeng in width.
- Linho Iron Bridge
  125 sajeng in length and 8 sajeng in width.
- Inaho Iron Bridge
  135 sajeng in length and 9 sajeng in width.
b. Measures for protection

In relation to the establishment of the Pro-Japanese Chinese government in North Manchuria, we shall bribe and appose the military authorities on the Southern Lines to collaborate with us in the protection of railways.

2. Disguised Japanese soldiers will be made to join the troops of Russian soldiers organized in Fukuia, and they shall maneuver in the regions of the Southern Lines. Then, in case the Sino-Japanese coalition mentioned in clause 1 should be completed, a part of them will supervise the Chinese Army in the protection of important areas, and the rest will maneuver outside of those areas to cope with the Russian irregular army. In case our plans for coalition with the Chinese Army should fail, at least the No. 2 Sungari Bridge and the railroad south of it shall be protected by force in the vicinity of Harbin.

In case the Sino-Japanese coalition should be completed, the Chinese Army and the Chinese Police Forces shall be utilized for the strict protection of Harbin Station and its factory and the Sungari Bridge. Also, all employees of communist faction shall be dismissed.

III. Collection and destruction of rolling stocks.

It is most desirable that we collect as much rolling stocks from the East China Railway as possible to facilitate our army's future operations, and to prevent the Russian army from utilizing them. For this purpose:

1. Funds shall be supplied to the International Transportation Company and Japanese merchants in its connection, and they shall compromise or compete with the Chinese official merchants. They shall plan to corner all the special products of North Manchuria and transport them to the south. Therefore, all rolling stocks available shall be assembled on the Southern Line.

2. When the situation allows us to cooperate with the Chinese Army, the rolling stocks in Harbin and chief stations along the railway shall be guarded and prevent them from being stolen or destroyed.

3. By proper destruction of the tunnels east of Keingan-ling and Knachin, we shall prevent the rolling stocks from being stolen and taken outside of the border.
4. In case our cooperation with the Chinese army is impossible, we shall immediately dispatch a regular army to Harbin, and it shall be necessary at least to confiscate all the materials south of Harbin.

In case of military operation in North Manchuria by the Japanese army, a rough estimate of necessary rolling stock is as follows:

(a) Twenty trains will be necessary each day to operate on the Port-Tokto Line and the Southern Line, both east of Tsitsikar. The particulars are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locomotives</th>
<th>Freight Cars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Ten trains will be necessary each day to operate between Tsitsikar and Manchul. The particulars are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locomotives</th>
<th>Freight Cars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total (a) and (b)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locomotives</th>
<th>Freight Cars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>354</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Presuming that we shall have been able to confiscate all rolling stocks between Anta, Harbin and Funchang, the estimated number of cars (cars in good condition) will be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locomotives</th>
<th>Freight Cars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>3,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is to be understood that the collection of rolling stocks, as mentioned above, will have important effect on our execution of future military operations.

If the advancement of our troops should be delayed and the Russian Army should be in a position to utilize the rolling stocks at their will, we shall attempt to destroy and burn the materials everywhere by using employees and secret agents, and at the same time, prevent the enemy from removing them into Russian territories by destroying the railways as mentioned before.

B. Sabotage activities on the Taonan-Anganch and Huhai Lines

1. Taonan-Anganch Line

We shall employ the Chinese regular army, bandits, and troops of Russian soldiers, all under the power of our organization in Taonan to execute the following:
1. If the Russian army should try to advance southward to the vicinity of Taonan before our army gets there, we shall delay their advance by destroying the Khalkningol railway bridge and at the same time make their maneuvers difficult by disturbing them from the side and the rear.

2. The rolling stocks shall be collected to the south of Taonan prior to the outbreak of hostilities, to make it impossible for the Russian army to utilize them.

3. In view of the difficulty of water supply in that area, water facilities at stations shall not be destroyed by our own hands, but they shall be protected to the best of our abilities.

4. If the situation allows our army to advance to the north of Taonan before the Russian army does, we shall maneuver with the purpose to at least maintain the railway south of Taonan.

5. In the regions of the Sapingkai-Taonan Railway, the Liao-He Bridge and water facilities at stations north of this bridge shall be protected under cooperation with our railway garrison troops and by supervising the Chinese regular army.

II. The Huhai Railway

The Huhai Railway shall be extended to Hailun in the near future. Then it will be of great importance to our military operations in the districts of Heihe. However, if the Russian army should advance to the vicinity of Harbin before our troops get there, the railway will inevitably be destroyed. However, this railway was built with funds invested by the Chinese officials and civilians of Heilungkiang Province so they have far greater devotion to it than the East China Railway. By taking advantage of this feeling of the Chinese, we may be able to teach and instigate them to protect the railway with their own hands.

 Needless to say, our troops will guard this railway immediately, should they advance into Harbin.

3. Sabotage activities on the waterways

1. The Sungari River

For the purpose of obstructing the entry of the Russian Heilungkiang fleet into Sungari River and collect materials in North Manchuria by waterways, we shall bribe and instigate the captains of Chinese steamers, who are mostly former Russian skippers, to explode
and sink their own steamers in shoals like Sanchun, Sankung, Fuchin, and Tangyuan, thereby blocking the waterways.

V. SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE COLLECTION OF GOODS IN NORTH MANCHURIA

Collecting of materials or disturbing the enemy from utilizing them in North Manchuria, the treasure land of grains, is an important matter of intrigue to be exercised toward the war. Let us now study the Russian Army’s policies on this matter.

1. If the Russian Army will be in a situation where they can concentrate their main force in the vicinity of Harbin, they will spare the railway transportation power and procure their provisions from goods on the spot. Therefore, at least, they will strive to collect the grains and livestocks in the regions north of the West Railway lines and all the grains available in Harbin area for the use of their own army.

2. If the main force of the Russian Army should be retreated and concentrated at Zabaikaliya and only the vanguards are made to maneuver in North Manchuria, the materials to support the main force may be procured from Siberia. Therefore, if a part of the materials in North Manchuria can be transported east to supply the army in the regions of Maritime Province, the rest will be transported to the regions of Zabaikaliya. The main purpose of the Russians will be to strive to prevent the Japanese Army from collecting them.

If the main force of the Japanese Army is to concentrate in North Manchuria, it will be just as necessary to depend on local materials for supplies as in the case of the Russian Army. As a measure against both cases of the Russian Army, mentioned above, we shall have to corner all materials for our use and prevent the enemy’s utilization. Now I shall state some studies I have made into this subject.

1. Necessary rations for the Russian Army when they gather their main force in North Manchuria

In case the Russian Army should concentrate a large troops in North Manchuria with the 30th Infantry Division and 4th Cavalry Division as the main force, an annual quantity of rations necessary will be 28,000,000 pounds for 760,000 men and 40,000,000 pounds for 400,000 horses.

2. Surplus grains in the regions west and north of Harbin

According to investigations in 1924 by the East China Railway, the surplus grains in the regions of Harbin, Aka, Chinchurin, and the lower regions of the Songari River show a total of 87,500,000 pounds (including an estimated 2,500,000 pounds of wheat).

3. The ratio of grains in North Manchuria sent to the East and to the west:
and sink their own steamers in shoals like Sanchan, Sinksing, Puchin, and Tongyuan, thereby advancing the waterways.

V. SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE COLLECTION OF GOODS IN NORTH MANCHURIA

Collecting of materials or disturbing the enemy from utilizing them in North Manchuria, the treasure land of grains, is an important matter of intrigue to be executed prior to the war. Let us now study the Russian Army's policies on this matter.

1. If the Russian Army will be in a situation where they can concentrate their main force in the vicinity of Harbin, they will spare the railway transportation power and procure their provisions from goods on the spot. Therefore, at least, they will strive to collect the grains and livestocks in the regions north of the West Railway lines and all the grains available in the province for the use of their own army.

2. If the main force of the Russian Army should be retreated and concentrated at Zabaikalie and only the vanguard is made to maneuver in North Manchuria, the materials to support the main force may be procured from Siberia. Therefore, if a part of the materials in North Manchuria can be transported east to supply the army in the regions of Maritime Province, the rest will be transported to the regions of Zabaikalie. The main purpose of the Russians will be to strive to prevent the Japanese Army from collecting them.

If the main force of the Japanese Army is to concentrate in North Manchuria, it will be just as necessary to depend on local materials for supplies as in the case of the Russian Army. As a measure against both cases of the Russian Army, mentioned above, we shall have to corner all materials for our use and prevent the enemy's utilization. Now I shall state some studies I have made into this subject.

1. Necessary rations for the Russian Army when they gather their main force in North Manchuria:

In case the Russian Army should concentrate a large troop in North Manchuria with the 30th Infantry Division and the 6th Cavalry Division as the main force, an annual quantity of rations necessary will be 23,000,000 pounds for 780,000 men and 40,000,000 pounds for 429,000 horses.

2. Surplus grains in the regions west and north of Harbin:

According to investigations in 1924 by the East China Railway, the surplus grains in the regions of Harbin, Anta, Chichihara, and the lower regions of the Sungari River show a total of 87,900,000 pounds (including an estimated 2,500,000 pounds of wheat).

3. The ratio of grains in North Manchuria sent to the East and to the west:
4. As the time for the outbreak of war draws near we shall make it impossible for the outflow of grains by destroying the Eastern Railway. And we shall dispatch secret agents to burn the grains collected at Arto, Hunkou and Chichihaorh.

5. To provide against the destruction of the Southern Railway and also to collect local transportation vehicles, coach transportation between Changchun - Harbin, Changchun - Fushun, and Changchun - Puchung shall be commenced or increased. For the protection of this transportation, an irregular army, organized either in Changchun or Mukden, shall be accompanied, if necessary.

Therefore, such a policy of cornering grains and transporting them southward will naturally concentrate the East China Railway's rolling stocks on the Southern Railway. The Taonan-Anganch Railway has not shown any effect as yet in collecting goods, but by competing in the same manner, it shall specially prevent the grain crops in the regions along the railway from being removed to the north.

VI. A COLLECTION OF REFERENCE MATERIALS

1. White Russian organizations in North Manchuria and the important personages.

The organization of White Russians in North Manchuria are centered around Harbin. At present, though they have not been oppressed by the Chinese officials like the Red organizations, it is a long time since they left their country and their funds and members have been so scattered, there is no organization worthy of demonstrating its powers. However, the spirit of unity is comparatively active among young men, so they are being regarded as worthy of being considered as characters to be utilized by us. Following are the main organizations:

1. Refugee's League
   (a) Representative - Bzojilovskii. At the time then Japanese soldiers were despatched, he was the governor of a garrison at Nikolovsk.
   (b) Number of members - about 8,000. However, this number is a little doubtful. This organization is not strongly united.

2. Ex-officer's League (The Tsarist Army Officers' League)
   (a) Representative - Bzojilovskii.
   (b) Number of members - about 800.
3. Young Men's League. It is divided into the following organizations:

(1) The Holy Cross Organization
(2) The 13th Party
(3) Motor-car Driver's League
(4) White Eagle League
(5) Russian Students' League

President - General Osipov. Number of members total about 2,700. Members are further expected to increase.

Besides these, there is the East China Railway's Chinese Employees' Cooperative Society, the chief purpose of which is to cope with the Red Labor Union. It is said that about 1,500 Russian employees have participated in this society. This organization shall need much attention in the future.

2. The names of important characters in North Manchuria are:

Gondachi
Purosikov
Hozwatt
Bzojilovskii

Gondachi no longer retains his former influence and popularity because of his cunning; and Purosikov and Hozwatt are non of the past and we can have no hope in then. Bzojilovskii is presently the representative of the Refugees' League and the Ex-officers' League and he is a character who may be considerably valuable to us, but he shall never be able to control all the White Russians. In our future utilizing of White Russians, it will be advantageous to pay our attention to the younger generations as has been stated above, so I think it proper that their leaders also should be selected from among them.

3. The connection between the White Russian organizations in North Manchuria and the Far Eastern Russian Territories is in a very difficult situation. However, the ex-soldiers in the region of the Maritime Province seem to be comparatively maintaining contact with the Usuri Kossacks. So, if we wish to organize anti-revolutionary organizations within the Russian territories, it will be best to contact chiefly with White Russians if it is in the Maritime Province, and chiefly with the farming class if it is in the regions of Heilung and Labaikala. The connection in the latter case can be made through the Khabarovsky Organization, Manchurian Organization and the Hoipo Organization. (They shall be established before the outbreak of war.)

2. Kunghutzo in the region on the Eastern line of the Chineso Eastern Railway and the connection with them.
1. Bandit activities these days are not confined to a single area. They can evade pursuits by government authorities and are able to move to any area, so their investigation is made very difficult. However, the bandit organizations in the regions of the eastern lines of the Eastern China Railway in about November 1926 are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Leaders</th>
<th>Number of Members</th>
<th>Arms</th>
<th>The Seat of Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meng Cheng-Chun</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>Nearby Yapuli-Tashukwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tien I</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Nearby Shaho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fei Zung</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Nearby Washaho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tien Peng</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Nearby Taungah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hung Yang</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Nearby Chou-kin-yuan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kung Ping</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Nearby Erh-chen-shun-T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erh Tai-Hao</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Wuchang, shchangtso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsi Tung</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Shihouhotzu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>Hongteokotsu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Bandit organizations in the vicinity of the Sino-Russian border that have not yet completely been bribed by the Russians are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Leaders</th>
<th>Number of Members</th>
<th>Arms</th>
<th>The Seat of Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tai Lin</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>Paiskoaken, North of Hunchun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wulung</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shuanglung</td>
<td></td>
<td>700</td>
<td>450 Southern East of Mishan nearby Hinglungkou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shuangyang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lulin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuanzung</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>720</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Japanese nationals who have full knowledge of the bandits described above and who may be called upon to lead the bandits in time of emergency are as follows:

(1) Persons who have connection with the Hunghutze on the China Eastern Railway: - Seisuke MAKINO, 7 Donchi-Gi Puto-ku, Harbin.

This man originally has had connections with the Jinggun Hunghutze in Kitin-sheng. He had once headed those Hunghutze by request of the Governor-General of Korea and at present he is connected with a representative of the Governor-General of Korea in Harbin. He also has intimate relations with members of the "Black Dragon Society". Presently, he has a vocation of repairing arms in Harbin. At present he is employed by the Sino-Japanese Wood Company at Hailin.
and he is now out to manage some Chinese at Linyang. He is not well off. Concerning his relations with the army, he does not voluntarily try to come in close contact because of his natural character, but his relation is not bad. Yoshiharu KONDO, President of the Russian Correspondence Company in Harbin, Major IIMURA, formerly stationed at Pogranichraya, and Lieutenant Commander OKANO, formerly attached to the 3rd Section of the Naval General Staff and present Captain of the warship Hoku, anchored at Chungking, all have special connections with him.

(2) People having connections with Unghutso in the regions of the border: - Bunroku NOGUCHI - stationed at Sanchakow.

This man had been a sheep merchant for a long time at Sanchakow and was a spy for the Special Service Agency at Nikolayevsk at the time of the Siberian intervention. Since then he is still keeping contact with the Pogranichraya Japanese Agency. He is of an inflexible nature and has many acquaintances among bandits and he is a person that we may use with confidence. However, he is dissatisfied with the army's careless ways of using people, and he especially has ill-feelings towards staff officers who indulge in impracticable arguments, so much care will be necessary in managing him. Major IIMURA who formerly served at Pogranichraya has special relations with him.

Other people who have connections with Unghutso in other regions and in the Russian territories are: - Yasaburo FUKUDA; Masuo OYA (Alias - Tadayuki YAMANAKA, a reserve cavalry sergeant). Their residences are uncertain, but we can contact with them through NAKANO, who has been mentioned before. FUKUDA knows Major General MATSUI of Mukden and Major IIMURA.

Additional descriptions: - Peace-time establishments in the Far East areas necessary for our intrigue against Soviet Russia.

The sabotage activities against Soviet Russia must depend on research establishments from peace-time. Therefore, from the standpoint of sabotage activities, the various present establishments are very insufficient. I shall state the main reasons as follows:

1. Not having any intelligence organization in Siberia and within the Far East Russian territories.
For this reason, the real conditions of the people and the military necessary for supervising our intrigues are entirely unknown. If it is impossible to establish formal organizations, men should be made to enter Russian territories as diplomats. If this measure is also impossible, disguised officers should be made to enter Russia. Of course, it will be difficult for them to get the full results but it will be far better than having nothing accomplished. Likewise, it will be greatly necessary to let them make often trips in these regions.

2. Lack of institutions for retaining and training anti-revolutionary elements and lack of anti-revolutionary propaganda establishments.

In supervising our intrigue against Russia, the most important duties must not be entrusted upon anti-revolutionary Russians. Therefore, due to the present lack of institutions for retaining these old elements and for training the younger generations for anti-revolutionary organizations, their attitudes towards Japan are gradually getting colder. And if this should continue as it is, we shall find great difficulty in utilizing them in the future.

To organize and maintain Russian troops in our Mukden Army will be greatly advantageous for us in using them. Furthermore, execution of anti-revolutionary propaganda activities in Russian territories should be made an important matter for the peace-time institutions for our intrigues. Of course, several of these matters are presently under consideration and are being established but greatly to our regret, they are being financed by partial expenditures of small funds. So, no matter how hard we strive we shall never be able to compete with Russia, England or the United States. This is why I hereby wish to have this reconstructed.

As I described at the beginning, our war of intrigue will be specially important in a Russo-Japanese war, so these peace-time establishments as preparations for war, must be considered with the same importance as arms and munitions. Moreover, Soviet Russia, having unified her diplomatic, military and commercial organizations, is setting up her intelligence systems to perfection in all important cities in China and Japan to say nothing of North Manchuria which is expected to become the main battlegrounds. (Lashevich, Vice President of the Eastern Railway is an ex-Army and Navy Vice Minister and Koker, President of the same railway is an ex-military attache at the Consulate in Peking.) Russia is also supervising an intense thought-warfare in the above areas. To cope with
this present situation it will be all the more urgent to organize our establishments promptly.

Besides this, it will also be necessary to establish research organizations or intermediate organizations for trade with Siberia and Outer-Mongolia by inspiring the leading government and private organizations at the influences of the military. The advantages that will be brought about by these establishments upon our operations against Russia can never be neglected.
CERTIFICATE

I, Lt. Colonel TARASENKO C. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the photocopy of the "Materials for Military Operations against the USSR"

was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department, Moscow, on or about March 22, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the archives of the said department.

I do further certify

/s/ TARASENKO

Lt. Col. TARASENKO
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan
Nov 17, 1946
CERTIFICATE

I, Colonel Morosov, the Investigator of the Soviet Division of the I. S., hereby certify that on September 4, 1946, in the office of the Soviet Division of the I. S., I presented to Kasahara, Yukio, former Lt-General of the Japanese Army, a photocopy of the document in the Japanese language, on 50 pages under the title: "Materials for Military Operations against the U.S.S.R.", and the said Kasahara, Yukio, put his signature and date at the back of each of the first 16 pages and made the following inscription at the back of page 1 in my presence:

"I, Kasahara, Yukio, Lt-General of the Japanese Army testify the following:

I saw 3 chapters of the document in the Japanese language, on 50 pages under the title: "Materials for Military Operations against the U.S.S.R.", photocopies of which were presented to me this day.

These chapters are:

1. General outline of sabotage activities against Russia.

2. Chief matters of sabotage activities on the territory East of Siberia."
3. Organizations to be established for carrying on sabotage activities on the territory East of Siberia, and their tasks.

In other words, I saw the first 16 pages of this document. It was drawn up by Major Kanda, Masatomo, who at that time worked at the Kharbin Special Service Agency. I saw the said part of the document at the time when I was Chief of the Russian Section of the Section of the 2nd Department of the General Staff, i.e., in 1928.

To certify the said fact, I have put my signature and date at the back of the photocopy of the part document which I saw in 1928.

Kanburae Yukio, September 4, 1946.

This was done in the presence of interpreter A.J. Rojetskin who translated the contents of the inscription from Japanese into Russian. Interpreter's certificate of responsibility for correct translation is attached herewith.

Colonel T. Morosov,
Investigator of the Soviet Division of the I.S.

September 4, 1946
Tokyo, Japan

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE INDICATED DOCUMENT.

I, I. Gildenblat, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: I., Gildenblat /s/
CERTIFICATE

I, the undersigned, Alexander Michailovich Rojetskin, hereby certify to Colonel Taton Dmitrievich Korosov, the Investigator of the Soviet Division of the I. S., that I am conversant with the Japanese language to translate printed or written text into Russian, and that I promise to translate correctly the inscription made by the witness Kosakura, Yukio, on the photostate copy of the document, entitled: "Materials for Military Operations against the U.S.S.R.," which has been presented to him.

I have been duly warned of the responsibility for purposely wrong translation under Article 92 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

/s/ A. ROJETSKIN

A. M. ROJETSKIN

Subscribed to before
Colonel T. D. KOROSOV

Investigator of the Soviet Division of the I. S.
The City of Tokyo, September 4, 1946.

CERTIFICATE OF CORRECTNESS OF THE TRANSLATION.

I, L. Gildenblat hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: L. Gildenblat /s/
Colonel KAZAMOTO
Attached to New Port Arthur
Kuan-Tung Army Headquarters

Dear Major KASAHARA:

I wish to ask you to please send me a receipt for this letter. This will conclude our research concerning materials for military operation against Soviet Russia.

Masatomo KANDA
No. 103 Yuseigai Minamioka Harbin
Telephone No. 4522

Dear Colonel KAWABE:

I wish to ask you to please send me a receipt for this letter. This will conclude our research.

KANDA Masatomo
No. 103 Yuseigai Minamioka Harbin
Telephone No. 4522

CONTENTS

I. General outline of sabotage activities against Soviet Russia.

II. Principal matters of sabotage activities planned to be executed in the east of Siberia.

III. Organizations to be established for the purpose of sabotage activities in the areas East of Siberia and their tasks.

IV. Sabotage activities in connection with the line of transportation in North Manchuria.

V. Sabotage activities in connection with the collection of goods in North Manchuria.

VI. Collection of reference materials.
Additional explanation:

Face time establishments in the Far East areas necessary for our sabotage work against Soviet Russia.

GENERAL OUTLINE OF SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES AGAINST SOVIET RUSSIA

The position of sabotage activities in future wars is very important. Particularly when we are unable to bring about the final decision in our operations against Russia by force of arms, most part of the war, from beginning to end, shall be a war of sabotage.

The affairs included in our sabotage activities against Russia are many and their activities will extend throughout the whole world. Now, I shall mention the general outline of affairs to be executed, as follows:

1. In the light of the present situation in the Soviet Union, various strifes concerning race, thought, and social classes shall be aggravated, especially the internal strifes among the Communist Parties shall be invigorated in the hope of destroying the national structure. Above all, it is necessary to unite the states of Asiatic races in the Union in opposition to European Russia.

2. In relation to the preceding article, anti-war spirit will be instilled among the Russian Army, especially among troops of foreign races, so that the Russians will commit errors in their plans of operations in the Far East.

3. Threatening the Soviet Union by inducing the neighboring countries in the West and the South, we shall make it impossible for her to move large troops to the Far East. Through economic blockade the import of goods, especially of war materials, will be checked.

4. By destroying the transportation system we shall delay the mobilization and assembling of troops; and by creating disturbances in munition plants we shall obstruct their manufacture of war materials. The Siberian Railway is the most important point.

5. We shall isolate the Soviet Union by destroying the communication facilities and through wireless competitions. Special attention should be paid to the Far East areas.

6. Should any regime connected with the Soviet Union exist in China, it shall be destroyed.
II. PRINCIPAL MATTERS OF SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES PLANNED TO BE EXECUTED IN THE EAST OF SIBERIA

Russian territories east of Siberia, Manchuria and Mongolia will be the zones of military operations or form the background areas for both armies, so there are very many matters for sabotage activities in these areas. I shall now outline the important matters as follows:

1. Propaganda activities and instigation will be executed in Russian territories east of Siberia to instill anti-Communist and anti-Jewish spirits among the inhabitants and troops, and anti-war movements shall be provoked.

2. As the situation becomes acute, the principal railways east of Siberia will be destroyed, and strikes will be instigated in coal mines in Siberia and the Maritime Province to bring hardships in railway transportations. Farmers will be made to oppose to the collection of grains.

3. Anti-Communist organisations will be set up in South Manchuria, Korea, and Saghalion, and will be made to advance into North Manchuria and Far-East Russian territories at favorable opportunities to hamper operational activities of Russian troops. In connection with the development of the general war situation, an anti-communist regime will be established within the Russian territory, and we shall contemplate the overthrow of the Communist Government both in the Siberia and Caucasus areas.

4. We shall hope to make Outer Mongolia anti-Soviet.

5. Should any pro-Soviet regime exist in South China, we shall scheme to destroy it. Above all, we shall be careful not to let Shanghai become the base for Communist intrigues. It is also necessary to break up the troops of Feng Yu-Hsiang's factions. Should any pro-Soviet government be established in North Manchuria, we shall first of all scheme to overthrow it.

6. Regarding the stealing and interrupting of telephone and wireless communications, the wireless communication post at Hubarovsk shall be destroyed.

7. Especially in North Manchuria, the protection or destruction of the transportation system; collection of materials; or preventing the enemy from utilizing them etc., all must be executed by maintaining close relations with military operation.
III. ORGANIZATIONS TO BE ESTABLISHED FOR THE PURPOSE OF SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES IN THE AREAS EAST OF SIBERIA AND THEIR TASKS

As the sphere of sabotage activities against Russia extends throughout the world, its organization should also cover both continents. We shall here speak how the organizations will be established and how they will carry out their activities in the Russian territories east of Siberia and in Manchuria.

1. Siberian Organization

Far before the outbreak of hostilities (it will be desirable to arrange from peace time) a military officer disguised as a member of the consulate at Novosibirsk shall be posted to study the conditions of the people and the military situation in Siberia and to frame up anti-communist movements. For this purpose, several officers with funds disguised as merchants having business relations with the farming classes will be attached to him.

With the development of situations, anti-Communist and anti-war movements shall be instigated chiefly among the farming classes in coordination with the Far Eastern, "uro-Russian, and the South Russian districts. Strikes will be started in the Kuznetzk and Chornorveyskiy coal mines and the farmers shall be incited not to sell their crops. After instructing the destruction of the Siberia Railway, they will gradually withdraw to the East.

The existence of Japanese merchants who purchase wheat, butter, and live stocks and sell miscellaneous goods and farm implements in the Siberian area is not necessarily illogical. If they are properly instructed, they should be able to bring about great results. Therefore, if we advise something like an export union toward Russia and have them extend their commercial field in those areas, the execution of our intrigue will become very convenient.

2. Chita Organization

Chiefly coordinating with the North Manchurian organization, this organization shall be a guiding and liaison organ for the anti-Communist movements in the Schekhalie areas. In addition, it shall have connections with the Siberian organization, and with the purpose of spying on military situations in the Zabeikalie areas, an organization consisting of Russians, (it will be best if we can get members of the Communist party with hostile opinions against the present government. Otherwise they shall be merchant who do not belong to any party) shall be stationed. It is desirable that this organization, too, be arranged from peace time.
3. Blagoveschensk Organization and Heiho Organization

In accordance with the outline for the Siberian Organization, a disguised military officer shall be stationed at the consulate in the respective areas. He shall stay at Heiho and shall cooperate with a military officer disguised as a merchant engaged in smuggling in Russian territory, in planning for anti-Communist movements mainly among the farming classes in Heilungkou. Furthermore, he shall make connections with the anti-Revolutionary Army, which will penetrate along the Amur valley from the district of Nikolaeiev. The Heiho Organization shall be left in the hands of bandits maneuvering in the Northern part of North Manchuria.

4. Habarovsk Organization

Disguised military officers (including one naval officer) will be posted at the consulate in Habarovsk, and in offices of other representatives of our fishery and forestry rights, if such representatives are to be stationed. They will take charge of liaison and supervision business for the anti-Communist movements by the farming classes in the areas of the Maritime Province and Heilung Province. They also shall cooperate with the Blagoveschensk Organization to destroy and disturb rail and water transportations, and to cut off the communication lines. Especially, they shall plan to destroy the wireless station in Habarovsk. They shall contact with the bandits to be employed in the lower regions of the Sungari River.

5. Vladivostok Organization

Several military officers disguised as members of the Vladivostok Consulate, merchants, or persons concerned with fishery and forestry businesses, shall be posted. They shall plan to supervise the anti-revolutionary movement in the southern regions of the Maritime Province and to appease or annihilate the rebellious Korean organizations. They shall also instigate strikes in the Sucheng coal mines. They shall take measures to contact with the anti-revolutionary organizations that will advance from the Northern Korea regions. In view of the geographical situation, all the organizations in the Maritime and Heilung Provinces shall strive to instill the anti-war spirit among the Russian troops and to make them join the anti-revolutionary organizations.

6. Sakhalien Organization

With its base either in Southern Sakhalien or Hokkaido, this organization will instigate the petroleum mine-workers in Northern Sakhalien and lead them into anti-revolutionary movements. Simultaneously
with the outbreak of war, they shall occupy Northern Sakhalin in collaboration with the anti-revolutionary army to be organized in Japan proper. They shall continue to proceed to Nikolaevsk, then to Habarovsk regions along the Heilung River. Another group shall advance along the Amgun River to the Heilungchow regions and check the Russian Army. Even before the outbreak of war this organization shall make connections with the gold mines in Heilungchow Province, and shall plan routes for importation of explosives to be used in destroying railways.

7. The North Korean Organization

An organization shall be established at Lonan, and this will organize a Russian Army of anti-revolutionary faction; which, in cooperation with bandits, will maneuver in the regions of Chientao and Southern Ussuri, annihilating rebellious Korean organizations and destroying the railways. Then, with the development of the situation, they shall advance into Southern Maritime Province, and in collaboration with the anti-revolutionary army advancing southward from Northern Sakhalin, they shall try to induce the people in that region to give up communist ideals.

8. The North Manchurian Organization

Besides adding the Heiho Organization to the present organization, a formal military official or a disguised military official shall be stationed in Tsitsikar. Several military officials shall be stationed in Heihe disguised as merchants and shall engage in fur trades and Outer-Mongolia commerce. They shall corner all furs and live-stocks; and shall disturb the independence movement in Hulunpeierh, (planned by the Soviets), and shall support the movements to break away from Communism in Outer-Mongolia. Letting fur traders engage in business in Heihe from peace time will have greater probabilities than there are in Siberia.

The sabotage activities of the North Manchurian Organization based in Habarovsk is complicated and divergent. I shall state the important matters as follows:

a. To completely seize the Chinese political power. If a pro-Soviet government shall be established, it shall, first of all, be overthrown.

b. To get rid of all members of the Soviet managing staff from the Chinese Eastern Railway, thereby repuling all red influence from North Manchuria.
c. Manipulation of anti-revolutionary Russians and bandits, and
destruction of rebellious Korean organizations.

d. Protection and destruction of communication lines.

e. Collection of materials and preventing their utilization by
enemies.

f. Intercepting, disturbing, and protecting communications.

g. Obstructing the activities of Russian intelligence organiza-
tions.

9. Taonan Organization

Formal military officials will be stationed, to hold in
command the Chinese Army in this area. They shall also organize and
control bandit organizations and Russian Army. They shall maneuver
in the districts of Solun and Tuchiian with the purpose to cope with
the enemy's irregular army and shall strive to make connections with
the Hulunpeierh regions. Protection of the Taonan-Anganche railways,
especially that of the Ssipingkai-Taonan Railway shall be important
duty.

IV. SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE LINE OF TRANSPORTATION
IN NORTH MANCHURIA

If the lines of transportation in North Manchuria can be utilized
effectively by our army, it will be an important matter having very
close relations with military operations which is part of our sabotage
activities against Russia. Furthermore, there will be a difference in
this intrigue according to the international relations among Japan,
China, and Russia at the time of the outbreak of war. For instance,
if the relation between Japan and China is good and is in a situation
where those two countries are able to mutually cooperate in coping
with the Russian Army, the various transportation systems in North
Manchuria should be protected for our use, and the main point is to
prevent the enemy's destructive activities. If, on the contrary, the
relation between Russia and China is close, and those two countries
shall mutually coordinate in opposition to Japan, we shall take
measures to destroy the transportation systems to check the rapid
advancement of Russian troops into Northern Manchuria. At the same
time it will be necessary to strive to maintain, at all cost, the
portions of the railways necessary for the advancement of our troops.
In the former case, the mission will be accomplished relatively without
difficulty as we can have the Chinese as collaborators, but in the latter case we shall encounter great difficulties. Therefore, considering the present changing Chinese political situation, we must be prepared that future wars will inevitably be started under such conditions. So, as a study, importance will be placed in the latter case. Thus, as it is no other than the East China Railway that forms the main transportation system in North Manchuria, I shall here make the most concrete description of this railway.

A. Sabotage activity on the Eastern China Railway

1. Destruction of the railway

In case the Russian Army should advance into the plains of North Manchuria before us, we shall take measures to destroy the East China Railway to interrupt them. Following is an outline for such measures.

a. Western Line

Points to be destroyed (only important points will be mentioned).

Nontsian bridge 305 Sajeng in length
13 " in width
Chalentum station and the train depot.
Puhedu station and the train depot.
Hsingan-ling tunnel 1442.25 sajeng in length
Petrya station and the curved railways near-by.

b. Methods of destruction

1. The troops of Russians and bandits organized at Taonan shall guard important places at Tuchiian, Solun and Hsingan-ling; and disguised engineers and Russian soldiers will be employed under their protection. With the Hsingan Mountainous regions South of the East China Railway as their base, they shall make frequent attacks along the railway lines and destroy them. The employees of Dzaiaien Company and Japanese residents in Mukden will be utilized in scouting on enemy situations. Necessary tools and explosives shall be carried from the district of Mukden.

2. If, necessary, men will be secretly sent from Harbin separately for the destruction of the Nontsian bridge.
3. The Harbin and Manchuli organizations shall bribe and instigate White Russian employees in a plan to derail and capsize the trains.

Eastern Line

a. Places to be destroyed (only important places shall be stated).

- Hutaenchang Iron Bridge, 195 sajong in length and 13 sajong in width.
- Three tunnels between Harbin and Tunui, 75 sajong, 35 sajong, and 125 sajong in length respectively.

b. Methods of destruction

1. Troops of Russian soldiers and bandits organized and armed in northern Korea shall be made to maneuver in the mountainous regions east of Hutaenchang and Homeng, and disguised engineers and Russian soldiers under their protection, shall make frequent attacks on the railroads and destroy them. Japanese residents in Fovravichiraya and Japanese employees of the Moiling Sino-Japanese Lumber Company shall be utilized to spy on enemy situations. Necessary tools and explosives shall be supplied from North Korea.

2. The Fovravichiraya and the Harbin organisations shall bribe and instigate White Russian employees in a plan to derail and capsize trains.

II. Protection of the Railway

Southern Line

Every effort shall be made to protect this line for the purpose to collect goods and to bring them southward, and to allow our troops to assemble in Harbin by utilizing the materials transported by the East China Railway.

a. Points to be protected

- No. 2 Sungari Iron Bridge
  245 sajong in length and 17 sajong in width.

- Linho Iron Bridge (Unlegible)
  125 sajong in length and 3 sajong in width.

- Imaho Iron Bridge
  135 sajong in length and 9 sajong in width.
b. Measures for protection

In relation to the establishment of the Pro-Japanese Chinese government in North Manchuria, we shall bribe and appease the military authorities on the Southern Lines to collaborate with us in the protection of railways.

2. Disguised Japanese soldiers will be made to join the troops of Russian soldiers organized as Mukden, and they shall maneuver in the regions of the Southern Lines. Then, in case the Sino-Japanese coalition mentioned in clause 1 should be completed, a part of them will supervise the Chinese Army in the protection of important areas, and the rest will maneuver outside of those areas to cope with the Russian irregular army. In case our plans for coalition with the Chinese Army should fail, at least the No. 2 Sungari Bridge and the railroad south of it shall be protected by force in the vicinity of Harbin.

In case the Sino-Japanese coalition should be completed, the Chinese Army and the Chinese Police Forces shall be utilized for the strict protection of Harbin Station and its factory and the Sungari Bridge. Also, all employees of communist faction shall be dismissed.

III. Collection and destruction of rolling stocks.

It is most desirable that we collect as much rolling stocks from the East China Railway as possible to facilitate our army's future operations, and to prevent the Russian army from utilizing them. For this purpose:

1. Funds shall be supplied to the International Transportation Company and Japanese merchants in its connection, and they shall compromise or compote with the Chinese official merchants. They shall plan to corner all the special products of North Manchuria and transport them to the south. Therefore, all rolling stocks available shall be assembled on the Southern Line.

2. When the situation allows us to cooperate with the Chinese Army, the rolling stocks in Harbin and chief stations along the railway shall be guarded and prevent them from being stolen or destroyed.

3. By proper destruction of the tunnels east of Hepingan-ling and Hotanching, we shall prevent the rolling stocks from being stolen and taken outside of the border.
4. In case our cooperation with the Chinese army is impossible, we shall immediately dispatch a regular army to Harbin, and it shall be necessary at least to confiscate all the materials south of Harbin.

In case of military operation in North Manchuria by the Japanese army, a rough estimate of necessary rolling stock is as follows:

(a) Twenty trains will be necessary each day to operate on the Harv-Hutres Line and the Southern Line, both east of Harbin. The particular is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locomotives</th>
<th>250</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freight Cars</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Ten trains will be necessary each day to operate between Tsitsikar and Henchow. The particular is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locomotives</th>
<th>82</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freight Cars</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total (a) and (b)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locomotives</th>
<th>336</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freight Cars</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Presuming that we shall have been able to confiscate all rolling stocks between Anta, Harbin and Kun shops, the estimated number of cars (cars in good condition) will be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locomotives</th>
<th>250</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freight Cars</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is to be understood that the collection of rolling stocks, as mentioned above, will have important effect on our execution of future military operations.

If the advancement of our troops should be delayed and the Russian Army should be in a position to utilize the rolling stocks at their will, we shall attempt to destroy and burn the materials everywhere by using employees and secret agents, and at the same time prevent the enemy from removing them into Russian territories by destroying the railways as mentioned before.

B. Sabotage activities on the Taonan-Anganch and Huhai Lines

I. Taonan-Anganch Line

We shall employ the Chinese regular army, bandits, and troops of Russian soldiers, all under the power of our organization in Taonan to execute the following:
1. If the Russian Army should try to advance southward to the vicinity of Tumen before our army gets there, we shall delay their advance by destroying the Nakhimov railway bridge and at the same time make their maneuvers difficult by disturbing them from the side and the rear.

2. The rolling stocks shall be collected to the south of Tumen prior to the outbreak of hostilities, to make it impossible for the Russian Army to utilize them.

3. In view of the difficulty of water supply in that area, water facilities at stations shall not be destroyed by our own hands, but they shall be protected to the best of our abilities.

4. If the situation allows our army to advance to the north of Tumen before the Russian army does, we shall maneuver with the purpose to at least maintain the railway south of Taiko.

5. In the regions of the Seupingkai-Taeman Railway, the Liao-Ho Bridge and water facilities at stations north of this bridge shall be protected under cooperation with our railway garrison troops and by supervising the Chinese regular army.

II. The Huhai Railway

The Huhai Railway shall be extended to Hailun in the near future. Then it will be of great importance to our military operations in the districts of Heho. However, if the Russian Army should advance to the vicinity of Harbin before our troops get there, the railway will inevitably be destroyed. However, this railway was built with funds invested by the Chinese officials and civilians of Heilungkiang Province so they have a greater devotion to it than the East China Railway. By taking advantage of this feeling of the Chinese, we may be able to teach and instigate them to protect the railway with their own hands.

Needless to say, our troops will guard this railway immediately, should they advance into Harbin.

3. Sabotage activities on the waterways

1. The Sungari River

For the purpose of disturbing the entry of the Russian Heilungkiaans fleet into Sungari River and collect materials in North Manchuria by waterways, we shall bribe and instigate the captains of Chinese steamers, who are mostly former Russian skippers, to explode
and sink their own steamers in shoals like Sanchan, Sankin, Puchin, and Tangyuan, thereby blocking the waterways.

V. SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE COLLECTION OF GOODS IN NORTH MANCHURIA

Collecting of materials or disturbing the enemy from utilizing them in North Manchuria, the treasure land of grains, is an important matter of intrigue to be executed earlier to the war. Let us now study the Russian Army's policies on this matter.

1. If the Russian Army will be in a situation where they can concentrate their main force in the vicinity of Harbin, they will spare the railway transportation power and ensure their provisions from goods on the spot. Therefore, at least, they will strive to collect the grains and livestock in the regions north of the West Railway lines and all the grains available in Hartunquen for the use of their own army.

2. If the main force of the Russian Army should be retreated and concentrated at Zabaikali, only the vanguard will be able to maneuver in North Manchuria, the materials to support the main force may be procured from Siberia. Therefore, if a part of the materials in North Manchuria can be transported east to supply one army in the regions of Maritime Province, the rest will be transported to the regions of Zabaikali. The main purpose of the Russians will be to strive to prevent the Japanese Army from collecting them.

If the main force of the Japanese Army is to concentrate in North Manchuria it will be just as necessary to depend on local materials for supplies as in the case of the Russian Army. As a measure against both cases of the Russian Army, mentioned above, we shall have to corner all materials for our use and prevent the enemy's utilization. Now I shall state some studies I have made into this subject.

1. Necessary rations for the Russian Army when they gather their main force in North Manchuria:

In case the Russian Army should concentrate a large troop in North Manchuria with two infantry divisions and one cavalry division as the main force, an annual quantity of rations necessary will be 28,000,000 pounds for 70,000 men and 40,000,000 pounds for 400,000 horses.

2. Surplus grains in the regions west and north of Harbin:

According to investigations in 1924 by the East China Railway, the surplus grains in the regions of Harbin, Anha, Chichihara, and the lower regions of the Sengari River show a total of 87,900,000 pounds. (Including an estimated 2,500,000 pounds of wheat).

3. The ratio of grains in North Manchuria sent to the East and to the west:
Out of the total produce of 120,000,000 pounds of grains in North Manchuria, the ratio transported to Vladivostok (for use by the Russian Army), via the Eastern Railway and those transported to South Manchuria via the Southern Railway have become equal, as the amount going east has had a gradual rise in recent years.

When we study the figures above, the conclusion will be that:

1. If the Russian Army should make a perfect collection of grains in the regions to the west and to the north of Harbin, and if the men and horses should be satisfied with a mixture of various grains, additional transports of staple foodstuffs will not be necessary.

2. However, the amount bought by the Soviet during peacetime is only about 62,000,000 pounds, and it will be necessary to buy about 20,000,000 pounds more in order to meet their plans to collect the necessary amount prior to the outbreak of war.

Accordingly, if the time for the outbreak of war is forecasted, it will give rise to competition in the purchase of materials far before that time between Japan and Russia.

Therefore, the most influential members, recently in the field of special products, are the authorities of Chinese official merchants, and it is said that they have cornered eighty per cent of the total product. They have purchased the special products of North Manchuria with the almost valueless inconvertible paper currency, and are selling them at Talien end Vladivostok. The Chinese authorities will never forget the profits in trading Japanese goods to other countries. As this tendency is expected to continue indefinitely in the future, our policy on collecting grains will be as follows:

1. Prior to the outbreak of war, the freight rate of the South Manchurian Railway shall be specially reduced so that the amount going to the south will inevitably be increased.

2. Funds will be supplied to the International Transportation Company in a plan to corner the grains and to send them south. The rise in prices through cornering will naturally make Russian competition difficult.

3. The Chinese official merchants, especially the Kwangsin Company having power in the Heilungkiang Province, shall be appeased to send their purchased grains to Dairen. (While the present governor of Heilung Province is in office, bribery will be comparatively easy.)
4. As the time for the outbreak of war draws near we shall make it impossible for the outflow of grains by destroying the Eastern Railway. And we shall dispatch secret agents to burn the grains collected at Anta, Hankou and Chichihaorh.

5. To provide against the destruction of the Southern Railway and also to collect local transportation vehicles, each transportation between Changchun-Harbin, Changchun-Potuna, and Changchun-Yaomang shall be commenced or increased. For the protection of this transportation, an irregular army organized either in Changchun or Mukden, shall be accompanied, if necessary.

Therefore, such a policy of cornering grains and transporting them southward will naturally concentrate the East China Railway's rolling stocks on the Southern Railway. The Taonan-Angchun Railway has not shown any effect as yet in collecting foods, but by competing in the same manner, it shall specially prevent the grain crops in the regions along the railway from being removed to the north.

VI. A COLLECTION OF REFERENCE MATERIALS

1. White Russian organizations in North Manchuria and the important personages.

The organization of White Russians in North Manchuria are centered around Harbin. At present, though they have not been oppressed by the Chinese officials like the Red organizations, it is a long time since they had fled from their country and their funds and members have been so scattered, there is no organization worthy of demonstrating its powers. However, the spirit of unity is cooperatively active among young men, so they are being regarded as worthy of being considered as characters to be utilized by us. Following are the main organizations:

1. Refugee's League
   (a) Representative - Bzojilovskii. At the time when Japanese soldiers were dispatched, he was the governor of a garrison at Nikolaevsk.
   (b) Number of members - about 8,000. However, this number is a little doubtful. This organization is not strongly united.

2. Ex-officer's League (The Tsarist Army Officers' League)
   (a) Representative - Bzojilovskii.
   (b) Number of members - about 800.
3. Young Men's League. It is divided into the following organizations:

(1) The Holy Cross Organization
(2) The 13th Party
(3) Motor-car Driver's League
(4) White Eagle League
(5) Russian Students' League

President - General Osipov. Number of members total about 2,700. Members are further expected to increase.

Besides these, there is the East China Railway's Chinese Employees' Cooperative Society, the chief purpose of which is to cope with the Red Labor Union. It is said that about 1,500 Russian employees have participated in this society. This organization shall need much attention in the future.

2. The names of important characters in North Manchuria are:

Gondachi
Purosikov
Hozwatt
Bzojilovskii

Gondachi no longer retains his former influence and popularity because of his cunning; and Purosikov and Hozwatt are non of the past and we can have no hope in them. Bzojilovskii is presently the representative of the Refugees' League and the Ex-officers' League and he is a character who may be considerably valuable to us, but he shall never be able to control all the White Russians. In our future utilizing of White Russians, it will be advantageous to pay our attention to the younger generations as has been stated above, so I think it proper that their leaders also should be selected from among them.

3. The connection between the White Russian organizations in North Manchuria and the Far Eastern Russian Territories is in a very difficult situation. However, the ex-soldiers in the region of the Maritime Province soon to be comparatively maintaining contact with the Ussuri Kossacks. So, if we wish to organize anti-revolutionary organizations within the Russian territories, it will be best to contact chiefly with White Russians if it is in the Maritime Province, and chiefly with the farming class if it is in the regions of Heilung and Labaikal. The connection in the latter case can be made through the Habarovsk Organization, Manchuli Organization and the Hoiho Organization. (They shall be established before the outbreak of war.)

2. Kunghutzo in the region on the Eastern line of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the connection with them.
1. Bandit activities these days are not confined to a single area. They can evade pursuits by government authorities and are able to move to any area, so their investigation is made very difficult. However, the bandit organizations in the regions of the eastern lines of the Eastern China Railway in about November 1926 are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names of Leaders</th>
<th>Number of Members</th>
<th>Arms</th>
<th>The Seat of Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meng Cheng-Chun</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>Nearby Yapuli-Tashukwo'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tien I</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Nearby Shachotzo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poi Zung</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Nearby Washahco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tien Fung</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Nearby Tsungsha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meng Yang</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Nearby Chou-kia-yuan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kung Ping</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Nearby Erh-chen-shun-T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erh Tai-Hao</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Wuchang, shachongtzo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tai Tung</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Shihouhetsu, Hengtaokotzu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>600</strong></td>
<td><strong>U 5</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Bandit organizations in the vicinity of the Sino-Russian border that have not yet completely been bribed by the Russians are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names of Leaders</th>
<th>Number of Members</th>
<th>Arms</th>
<th>The Seat of Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tai Lin</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>Paiskoaken, North of Hunchun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shuanglung</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shuangyang</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>Southern East of Mishan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lulin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>nearby Hinglungkou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuanwang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>720</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Japanese nationals who have full knowledge of the bandits described above and who may be called upon to lead the bandits in time of emergency are as follows:

(1) Persons who have connection with the Hunghutzo on the China Eastern Railways: Soisuko NAKANO, 7 Donchi-Go-i Futo-ku, Harbin.

This man originally has had connections with the Janggin Munghutso in Kitir-sheng. He had once headed those Hunghutzo by request of the Governor-General of Korea and at present he is connected with a representative of the Governor-General of Korea in Harbin. He also has intimate relations with members of the "Black Dragon Society". Presently, he has a vocation of repairing arms in Harbin. At present he is employed by the Sino-Japanese Wood Company at Hailin.
and he is now out to manage some Chinese at Linyang. He is not well off. Concerning his relations with the army, he does not voluntarily try to come in close contact because of his natural character, but his relation is not bad. Yoshiharu KONDO, President of the Russian Correspondence Company in Harbin, Major IIMURA, formerly stationed at Pogranichnaya, and Lieutenant Commander OKANO, formerly attached to the 3rd Section of the Naval General Staff and present Captain of the warship Hoku, anchored at Changking, all have special connections with him.

(2) People having connections with Chinozo in the regions of the border: - Bunroku NOGUCHI - stationed at Sanchakow.

This man had been a sheep merchant for a long time at Sanchakow and was a spy for the Special Service Agency at Nikolavsk at the time of the Siberian intervention. Since then he is still keeping contact with the Pogranichnaya Japanese Agency. He is of an inflexible nature and has many acquaintances among bandits and he is a person that we may use with confidence. However, he is dissatisfied with the army's careless ways of using people, and he especially has ill-feelings towards staff officers who indulge in impracticable arguments, so much care will be necessary in managing him. Major IIMURA who formerly served at Pogranichnaya has special relations with him.

Other people who have connections with Chinozo in other regions and in the Russian territories are; - Yasunori FUKUDA; Masuo OYA (Alias - Tadayuki YAMANAKA, a reserve cavalry sergeant). Their residences are uncertain, but we can contact with them through NAKANO, who has been mentioned before. FUKUDA knows Major General MATSU of Mukden and Major IIMURA.

Additional descriptions: - Peace-time establishments in the Far East areas necessary for our intrigue against Soviet Russia.

The sabotage activities against Soviet Russia must depend on research establishments from peace-time. Therefore, from the standpoint of sabotage activities, the various present establishments are very insufficient. I shall state the main reasons as follows:

1. Not having any intelligence organization in Siberia and within the Far East Russian territories.
For this reason, the real conditions of the people and the military necessary for supervising our intrigues are entirely unknown. If it is impossible to establish formal organizations, men should be made to enter Russian territories as diplomats. If this measure is also impossible, disguised officers should be made to enter Russia. Of course, it will be difficult for them to get the full results but it will be far better than having nothing accomplished. Likewise, it will be greatly necessary to let them make often trips in these regions.

2. Lack of institutions for retaining and training anti-revolutionary elements and lack of anti-revolutionary propaganda establishments.

In supervising our intrigue against Russia, the most important duties must not be entrusted upon anti-revolutionary Russians. Therefore, due to the present lack of institutions for retaining these old elements and for training the younger generations for anti-revolutionary organizations, their attitudes towards Japan are gradually getting colder. And if this should continue as it is, we shall find great difficulty in utilizing them in the future.

To organize and maintain Russian troops in our Mukden Army will be greatly advantageous for us in using them. Furthermore, execution of anti-revolutionary propaganda activities in Russian territories should be made an important matter for the peace-time institutions for our intrigues. Of course, several of these matters are presently under consideration and are being established but greatly to our regret, they are being financed by partial expenditures of small funds. So, no matter how hard we strive we shall never be able to compete with Russia, England or the United States. This is why I hereby wish to have this reconstructed.

As I described at the beginning, our war of intrigue will be specially important in a Russo-Japanese war, so these peace-time establishments as preparations for war, must be considered with the same importance as arms and munitions. Moreover, Soviet Russia, having unified her diplomatic, military and commercial organizations, is setting up her intelligence systems to perfection in all important cities in China and Japan to say nothing of North Manchuria which is expected to become the main battlegrounds. (Lauchovich, Vice President of the Eastern Railway is an ex-Army and Navy Vice Minister and Kekler, President of the same railway is an ex-military attaché at the Consulate in Peking.) Russia is also supervising an intense thought-warfare in the above areas. To cope with
this present situation it will be all the more urgent to organize our establishments promptly.

Besides this, it will also be necessary to establish research organizations or intermediate organizations for trade with Siberia and Outer-Mongolia by inspiring the leading government and private organizations at the influences of the military. The advantages that will be brought about by these establishments upon our operations against Russia can never be neglected.
CERTIFICATE

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the photocopy of the "Materials for Military Operations against the USSR" was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department, Moscow, on or about March 22, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the archives of the said department.

I do further certify

/s/ TARANENKO

Lt. Col. TARANENKO
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan

May 17, 1946
CERTIFICATE

I, Colonel Yerovoy, the Investigator of the Soviet Division of the I.S., hereby certify that on September 4, 1946, in the office of the Soviet Division of the I.S., I presented to Kasahara, Yukio, former Lt-General of the Japanese Army, a photocopy of the document in the Japanese language, on 50 pages under the title "Materials for Military Operations against the U.S.S.R.", and the said Kasahara, Yukio, put his signature and date at the back of each of the first 16 pages and made the following inscription at the back of page 1 in my presence:

"I, Kasahara, Yukio, Lt-General of the Japanese Army testify the following:

I saw 3 chapters of the document in the Japanese language, on 50 pages under the title "Materials for Military Operations against the U.S.S.R.", photocopies of which were presented to me this day.

These chapters are:

1. General outline of sabotage activities against Russia.

2. Chief matters of sabotage activities on the territory East of Siberia."
3. Organization to be established for carrying on sabotage activities on the territory East of Siberia and their tasks.

In other words, I saw the first 16 pages of this document. It was drawn up by Major Kenda, Masatomo, who at that time worked at the Kharbin Special Service Agency. I saw, the said part of the document at the time when I was Chief of the Russian Section of the Section of the 2nd Department of the General Staff, i.e. in 1928.

To certify the said fact, I have put my signature and date at the back of the photocopy of the part document which I saw in 1928.

Kasahara Yukio, September 4, 1946.

This was done in the presence of interpreter A.I. Rojetskin who translated the contents of the inscription from Japanese into Russian. Interpreter's certificate of responsibility for correct translation is attached herewith.

Colonel V. MOROSOV, Investigator of the Soviet Division of the I.N.R.

September 4, 1946
Tokyo, Japan

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE DOCUMENT.

I, ..., hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages, and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: Gilonblat /s/
CERTIFICATE

I, the undersigned, Alexander Michailovich Rojetskin, hereby certify to Colonel Ivan Dmitrievich Morosov, the Investigator of the Soviet Division of the I.S.S., that I am conversant with the Japanese language to translate printed or written text into Russian, and that I promise to translate correctly the inscription made by the witness Kasahara, Yukio, on the photostate copy of the document, entitled: "Materials for Military Operations against the U.S.S.R.", which has been presented to him.

I have been duly warned of the responsibility for purposely wrong translation under Article 92 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

/s/ A. ROJETSKIN

A. M. ROJETSKIN

Subscribed to before
Colonel D. D. MOROSOV

Investigator of the Soviet Division of the I.S.S.
The City of Tokyo, September 4, 1946.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE DOCUMENT

I, L. GILDENBLAT hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

'Signature' L. GILDENBLAT /s/
昭和24年

問 貴方之計画「一般攻撃」計画六年及戦時機より

答 一九三一年一般緊急作戦

間 一九三五年満洲作戦（何時）始

問 元負及満洲作戦（何時）始

答 元三月

間 十三年度作戦

答 元三月

間 作戦

答 元吹

間 破壊

答 元進行

間 命令

領信

間 動機

答 金城 quantity 及文部人

間 動機

答 貴方之計画「一般攻撃」計画六年及戦時機より

回答 貴方之計画之史及文部人

破壊

進行

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The Affidavit of IYAKE ITSUHARU

IYAKE ITSUHARU was born at SHIRAKO-I-AKI, Japan proper, in 1890, a Japanese national. Graduated from the Military Academy, a reserve Lieutenant General in the Japanese Army. Held the position of Chief of the "KAMTO GUN" (KWANTUNG ARMY) from July 1928 to May 1932 director of the central head-office of KYOWA-KJI (The Coalescence and Harmonization Council) since December 1940.

It was Colonel S. Y. ROSENBLIT, Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, who interrogated IYAKE in OSCEC Feb. 22nd 1946.

Que: Where were you educated and which official rank did you hold in the Japanese Army?

Ans: In 1940 I graduated from the Military Academy in Tokyo and as a first step I served as an official of Mobilization Department of the War Ministry in Tokyo. After that became a Private Secretary to the War Minister. In 1918 I was dispatched to ENGLAND to collect secret materials concerning modern devices of war.

Que: How many years did you spend in England?

Ans: In England I stayed for about half-a-year, after that I lived for 1 year at VIEN, then for more than one year at BUDAPEST where I served as a Japanese Representative member on the Committee to Supervise the Execution of the Peace Treaty by AUSTRIA and HUNGARY.

Que: Check the number of your official positions after 1922, please.

Ans: After my return to JAPAN I was in command of several military units; and from 1923 I was commander of 4th Regiment of the Imperial Guards.

Que: What rank did you hold then?

Ans: I was a Colonel in the Japanese Army.

Que: How long did you hold that position?
Doc. No. 1950

Ans: Up to April 1925. This regiment is located in TOKYO, but after 1925 I was appointed Chief of Staff for 4th Military Division located at CSAKA, and in August 1926 I was promoted to the rank of Major-General, and I was appointed Commander in Chief of 5th Infantry Brigade at NAGOYA. In July 1928 I was appointed Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG ARMY and remained in this position until May 1932.

Cue: And the occupation of MANCHURIA took place just at the time you were the Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG ARMY?

Ans: MANCHURIA was occupied during the time of my being Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG ARMY.

Cue: What did you do after 1932?

Ans: In April 1932 I was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General and was appointed Chief of Military Transportation Department of the War Ministry, but in February 1935 I was appointed the Commander in Chief of the 20th Division of KEIJO (SEOUL, KOREA).

Cue: You were the Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG ARMY and after that you were appointed a Commander of a Military Division -- what was the reason for this demotion?

Ans: The position of a Commander of a Military Division in JAPAN is esteemed higher than the post of a Chief of Army Staff. I remained as Commander of the Division for about two years, but in December 1936 I was placed on the reserve list.

Cue: From what time did you take on the duties of Director of the Central Head-Office of KYOWA-KAI?

Ans: From December 1940.

Cue: Who was it who recommended you to take on the duties of Director of the Central Head-Office of KYOWA-KAI?

Ans: I was recommended by the President of KYOWA-KAI -- the Prime Minister of MANCHUKUO, Dr. CHANG-CHING-HUI.

Cue: From what time did Dr. CHANG-CHING-HUI know you?

Ans: From the very beginning of Manchurian Incident, that is from 1931.
Who was the direct leader of Manchurian occupation affairs? You, being the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, know that very well, I think.

In 1931 during the occupation of Manchuria, the Japanese Army was under direct leadership of the Commander of Kwantung Army, Lieutenant-General Honjo.

Which were the leading instructions from Tokyo concerning military operations in Manchuria during 1931?

The operation plan of the Japanese Army was delivered to General Staff Headquarters of Tokyo in July 1931 from the Headquarters of Kwantung Army. This plan considered the occupation by Japanese troops of all strategically important cities and other places in Manchuria, and if successfully carried out, Manchuria would be occupied completely.

Who was the author of this plan?

The plan was devised by myself, as a Chief of Staff according to orders from Army Commander Lieutenant-General Honjo, but in general, this plan was outlined by my predecessor Major-General Saito. In devising my own plan I used the part of that plan received from Major-General Saito.

Was the strategical plan of occupation of Manchuria delivered to you in July 1931, approved by Japanese General Staff Headquarters?

That plan of operation was signed in Manchuria by Lieutenant-General Honjo, the Commander of Kwantung Army, by me, and my assistants, Colonel Itagaki and Lieutenant-Colonel Ishikawa. That plan, as I have mentioned, was submitted to the Army General Staff of the Japanese Army in July of 1931. Chief of General Staff Kanaya Hanzo gave his approval in the same month. As far as I know, that plan for the occupation of Manchuria was an important part of the general plan of the operations of Japanese forces against the Soviet Union and was drafted by the General Staff of Japanese Army. It was then, when I started out for my new post as Chief of Kwantung Army Staff, in July 1938, that I found out the existence of a plan to attack the U.S.S.R. Our functions to participate in that plan were known by the Staff of the Kwantung Army. Some parts of that plan were modified in later years.
Doc. No. 1950

Cua: What time did you schedule for the beginning of the military actions in MANCHURIA in the plan you devised?

Ans: The general situation in 1931 did not allow fixing a definite date to start the military operations: it was proposed to start them at the first opportunity.

Cua: What was the actual cause of the start of the military operations by Japanese Army in MANCHURIA in 1931?

Ans: 18 September 1931 at half past 10 in the afternoon, Chinese troops blew up a certain portion of the South MANCHURIAN Railway line and simultaneously opened fire against Japanese troops. The Japanese Army could not tolerate such actions, and according to order from Lieutenant-General KANG, our detachment at UREK attacked CHINESE military barracks and occupied those. That was the beginning of the military operations there.

Cua: Did you know for certain, that this explosion affair was actually done by CHINESE troops?

Ans: No, I did not. I was not certain. I suppose that this Chinese action was done under provocation from Japanese.

Cua: How it was done actually?

Ans: I do not know, how it was arranged actually: I questioned my subordinates concerning the matter, but no one of them know. My personal opinion is that the actions were provoked by Japanese: when I asked about the matter, Commander of Kwantung Army, Lieutenant-General HUANG, told me that he was of the same opinion too. It was possible to suggest that the Japanese battalion in UDEK area, clad in Chinese military uniform, took up the opportunity to provoke further actions.

Cua: Who was in command of this battalion?

Ans: The battalion commander was Lieutenant-Colonel SHIA CTG and the commander of 25th Infantry Regiment was Colonel HIRATA.

Cua: Were they both i.e., Colonel HIRATA and Lieutenant Colonel SHIA CTG subordinate to the Kwantung Army Headquarters?
Yes, they were both subordinate to the Kwantung Army Headquarters.

Was it possible for those officers to take such provocative actions without any orders from the Kwantung Army staff?

It was possible. They were capable of doing such a thing.

By their personal decisions too?

Oh, yes.

When did Manchuria become to be regarded as a base for attack on the U.S.S.R.?

As far as I understand, these activities were to begin immediately after the occupation of Manchuria in 1931. I left Manchuria in 1932 and came back there in 1934 as mentioned in the declaration.

What particular changes did you observe in Manchuria in connection with preparations to use it as a military base, when you returned there?

Those changes are as follows: a remarkable increase of Japanese troops in the districts near the Soviet frontier, the establishment of new railroads and highways toward the Soviet frontiers and the construction of airfields, military warehouses and barracks in such regions of operations as were regarded important for the waging of a war against the Soviet Union.

Did the Kyowa-Kai being under your leadership, make any preparations to participate in war against the U.S.S.R.?

The chief functions of the Kyowa-Kai were to mobilize all Manchurians so that we might secure the regime established by Japan after the occupation of Manchuria in 1931. It was required of all Manchurians to work hard, to make Manchuria an important foundation for Japan in the continent, especially to strengthen it as a base against the Soviets. For that purpose Kyowa-Kai made widespread propaganda, gave military training to its members, especially to the youth, made positive efforts for the development of Manchurian Industries especially that of munitions, participated in the construction of military installations under the direction of the respective military headquarters and organized special military groups for war-time operations named "Se-Po D.N" (The Vanguard of the Army).
Cue: From which person did you receive instructions concerning your activities?

Ans: The activity of the KYCWA-KAI in general was outlined in its program; but on certain occasions I received direct instructions from the Commander in Chief of the KWANTUNG ARMY.

Cue: Who offered the original principles of the KYCWA-KAI organization?

Ans: The idea of this Society was first disclosed in 1931, the organizers of which were the KWANTUNG ARMY Staff, especially the Commander HOJO, and me, the Chief of Staff at the time. And so I was asked to become the head of the Central Head-Office of that organization in 1940. I accepted the call from CHANG SHING-HUI, the Prime Minister of LANCHOU and Major-General HATA, the Vice-Chief of the KWANTUNG ARMY in October 1940. Receiving the written engagement, I visited ANAMI, the Vice-Minister of War, who persuaded me to become the leader of that Society to strengthen the activities concerning the maintenance of Japanese influence in MANCHURIA.

Cue: In 1940, when you became the Chief of the KYCWA-KAI Headquarters, what was the number of its membership?

Ans: About three million.

Cue: How many were the members of the KYCWA-KAI in 1945, about the time of war with SOVIET UNION?

Ans: There were 4,500,000 men.

Cue: Is it possible to take for certain that during the period when you were the Chief of KYCWA-KAI Headquarters, the membership of the Society increased from 3 million men to 4,500,000 men?

Ans: Yes.

Cue: Is that your own success?

Ans: No; this result was not my own success.

Cue: Then, who was he, and what measures has he taken to increase the membership of KYCWA-KAI?
Ans: We, the Japanese, broadly propagated the idea that to reach our victory we had to spend all our powers and insisted that Manchurian people be greatly interested in becoming members of the KYOWA-KAI. This is the reason for the increase of the membership of the KYOWA-KAI.

Que: Did you direct these propaganda actions?

Ans: Yes, I gave the proper instructions. The members of KYOWA-KAI received military training and took part in the construction works of fortifications against the SOVIET UNION.

Que: Did you often deliver public speeches as the Chief of KYOWA-KAI Headquarters?

Ans: Yes, I often lectured personally too.

Que: What was the content of your speeches?

Ans: The speeches delivered by myself, in general, were of the following meaning: At present our JAPAN is fighting against BRITAIN and AMERICA, but if JAPAN is defeated in this war, the KANCHEHUKO will be defeated too. But if JAPAN wins the Victory then KANCHEHUKO too, shall be victorious. Therefore the Kanchukuan people must too do their best to help JAPAN to win the Victory. In other words in order to furnish the war supplies for JAPAN they have to produce in ample quantities the foodstuffs, clothing and other manufactured supplies.

Que: Did you appeal to people in your speeches, calling towards the war against SOVIET UNION?

Ans: In my speeches during the period from 1941 to 1944 I emphasized that war with the SOVIET UNION might occur therefore the Kanchukuan people must prepare for war sufficiently, to avoid defeat in war-time.

Que: Did the said KYOWA-KAI publish some printed matters like pamphlets, posters, etc.?

Ans: Yes. Pamphlets, posters and magazines were published in great quantities.

Que: Of what nature was the content of those printed matters?
Doc. No. 1950

Ans: The contents of all of them were saturated with enmity towards the SOVIET UNION.

Que: Was there established any training school for preparing propagandists?

Ans: Under supervision of KYOWA-KAI Headquarters there were in existence some special training schools for preparing the propagandists and lower organization instructors.

Que: Do you know of the existence of the "KANTOKU-EN" plan?

Ans: A document was delivered from the KWANTUNG ARMY Headquarters to the Central Headquarters office of the KYOWA-KAI late in 1941: on the cover of the document there were written the words: "KANTOKU-EN".

Que: What was the content of those documents?

Ans: It was stated in this document that 300,000 laborers for military construction were demanded by the KWANTUNG ARMY Headquarters from the MANCHUKUO Government.

Que: You have already stated, that in the KYOWA-KAI there was established one organization known as "SEMPO DAN". Please give a concrete explanation about it:

Ans: The general functions of the "SEMPO DAN" groups in ordinary times was to watch over the Manchurians, to encourage them to work hard, and to supervise those persons possessing anti-Japanese feelings and in this way assist the MANCHUKUOAN Government, while the chief duties during war-time were such positive operations behind SOVIET lines as terrorist acts, the executions of plots, stratagems, the explosions of Railway lines, bridges and military warehouses and killing and wounding of SOVIET troops.

Que: Was the "SEMPO DAN" a military unit?

Ans: No; it was not a unit. These were only groups which existed in many inhabited points in MANCHURIAN.

Que: Was the "SEMPO DAN" included as a part of the KYOWA-KAI?
Ans: Of course it was a part of the whole KYOWA-KAI organization.

Que: When was the "SEITO DAN" organized?

Ans: The "SEITO DAN" was organized in the middle of December of 1944 in accordance with order received. But its structure from then and up to the recent times was continuously in process of formation.

Que: Who gave the orders to organize the "SEITO DAN"?

Ans: The orders to organize the "SEITO DAN" were devised by the Chief of General Affairs Bureau of KYOWA-KAI Headquarters, TAKEOKA KIICHI, and signed by myself.

Que: Of what kind of people was the "SEITO DAN" organized?

Ans: "SEITO DAN" members were selected from people of robust completion with chivalrous spirit, sound-minded and capable of doing two or three times as much work as ordinary people.

Que: What was the attitude of the KYOWA-KAI towards the "WHITE" Russians?

Ans: The "WHITE" Russians in general were concentrated at HARBIN. They were led by the "White Russian Emigrants Office" in the Empire of MANCHUKUO and the Army Special Service Agency at Harbin. They were supplied with food, clothing and other facilities by our KYOWA-KAI.

Que: Were the "WHITE" Russians entered as members in the KYOWA-KAI?

Ans: Yes, they were. The "WHITE" Russians too had a membership in KYOWA-KAI.

Que: How many "WHITE" Russians in the KYOWA-KAI?

Ans: 3 or 4 thousand, I think.

Que: Had the members of "SEITO DAN" any military training?

Ans: Yes, they had. They received military training in regions where Japanese military units were stationed, as well as in other places where such units were not located.
Who instructed them in their training?

They were taught by officers of the Imperial Japanese Army as well as by officers of the Imperial Manchukuoan Army.

Was the "SEITO DAN" intended for action with the beginning of war with the Soviet Union?

31 July of 1945 in the Session of the "Pan-Manchurian Unified Congress" (ZENROU FUMOKO KYOGIKAI), when I executed my duties, I summoned the chief-clerks of the head-office of "KYWA-KAI" Departments for every Province and instructed them that the "SEITO DAN" too, must develop its activity in the regions of dispositions of Japanese Troops and that they had to coordinate their activity with the Japanese Military Commanders, and I gave orders to carry out the preparations for such activities.

Did you receive any instructions from the staff of the Kwantung Army, concerning "SEITO DAN" activities?

18 July of 1945 when I conferred with the Commander of the Kwantung Army, General YADA and his Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General HATA Hikozaburo, General YADA told me that in any case the "SEITO DAN" must be prepared, therefore the preparations for its practical actions had to be strengthened.

To whom did you report usually, concerning KYWA-KAI activities?

I presented my reports concerning KYWA-KAI activities to two persons: the Emperor of MANCHUKUO and the Commander of the Kwantung Army.

Did you present written reports concerning your own duties?

Every year at the end of December I had an audience with the Emperor of MANCHUKUO, to whom I presented my written report concerning the work done by KYWA-KAI during the year.

Did you present any written reports to the Commander of the Kwantung Army too?

At the same time that I presented my written report to the Emperor of MANCHUKUO, I presented the same written report to the Commander of the Kwantung Army too.
Q: Do you bear, too, responsibility as one of the representatives of the Japanese Government for the preparations for the war against the UN?

A: Yes. Then I was the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army. I knew the plans for the occupation of Manchuria. During the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese troops, I was one of the leaders of the Japanese army. After that, when I accepted my duties as a leader of W.W.K., I bore responsibility for practical preparations for the against the UN.

The answers to the questions were written and signed by myself.

(signed) MIYAKE Mitsuharu

Colonel S. Y. ROSENBLIT, Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal did the questioning.

(signed) S. ROSENBLIT

The Army Interpreter was 2nd Lt. KUHAREVSKII.

(signed) E. KUHAREVSKII

A WRITTEN CATH

Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Army MIYAKE Mitsuharu. In connection with the trial of the Japanese principal war criminals, hereby I promise to give the pure truth in my verbal evidence. I swear the above before Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, Colonel ROSENBLIT that I received the warning that in case I give false evidence I shall bear of criminal responsibility according to the article 95th of the Criminal Code of R.S.F.S.R.

22 February 1946
MOSCOW

(signed) MIYAKE Mitsuharu

This written cath was received by Colonel ROSENBLIT, Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

(signed) S. ROSENBLIT

Army Interpreter 2nd Lt. KUHAREVSKII

(signed) E. KUHAREVSKII
Doc. No. 1513

From CHENG, Consul General in Harbin, to CHIIHUI, Foreign Minister

Sent 7 Nov 1931 in the afternoon
Received 8 Nov 1931 in the morning

Telegram No. 516-1 (Code, Urgent and Secret Telegram)

Concerning telegram No. 1213 sent to the minister from Pukden

I unconditionally approve of Consul-General H.Y. CHIN's viewpoint concerning the advance to Chichihar. I hope that the army, taking advantage of this opportunity will resolutely complete the plan which they hope to realize. If they do not do this, it seems impossible that they will allow only CHING CH'I-PING's neck troops to advance in Chichihar, even if CHING CH'I-PING's army should have been greatly demaged. As I have telegraphed repeatedly, even TUN CHI, who has not always appeared hostile to us lately, seems to have been sending his soldiers in order to aid CHING CH'I-PING's army. As consul telegraphed repeatedly, even if CHING CH'I-PING's troops should advance in Chichihar, they will have difficulty in holding their position unless our army supports them. It is not impossible to win over CH CH'I-HUN by any means, and even if we were able to win him over, we could not control CH CH'I-HUN's army which is not under the direct control of CH CH'I-HUN, and which is in a unique position among Chinese troops. Therefore, I think there is only one way to complete the policy for the control of North Manchuria. There is nothing else to do but install our own puppet in Chichihar after the army attacks and thoroughly defeat CH CH'I-HUN's army and allies there.

From CHENG, Consul General in Harbin, to CHIIHUI, Foreign Minister

Sent 7 Nov 1931 in the afternoon
Received 7 Nov 1931 in the afternoon

Telegram No. 516-2 (Code, Urgent and Secret Telegram)

It is hard for me to approve of the plan for the independence of Manchuria which the government secretly seems to permit. I think it would be fairer, more correct and complete for us to adopt the policy of carrying out the guarantee occupation of all Manchuria and administer it ourselves for the time until all pending problems with China are solved. If we do not do this, everything will or at best incomplete, and the policy for the control of North Manchuria will become useless.

Although it would have been better to have left North Manchuria alone from the beginning, it could be much more damaging to all policies to leave things half way, since we already have meddled with Manchuria.
The things that must be considered concerning the invasion of Chichihar are relations with the League of Nations and the USSR. There are other reasons but, the first and foremost point concerning these relations is that we will persist in our opinion that this invasion was done because of the necessity to protect the repair of bridges.

The second point is that if USSR should dispatch troops, we will be stimulated by this. It will then be the most favorable opportunity which we have hoped for for a long time, in fighting to repulse the attack of this enemy of humanity and thus settle eternal peace in the Orient.

I, many Japanese and foreign travellers present, are in agreement with the view that when we consider the internal conditions of USSR along with her complicated relations with neighboring nations, even if Japan takes any action in Manchuria at this time, the USSR will probably not have the strength to fight us. However it is hard to say when she may commence hostilities.

From OKISHI, Consul General in Harbin, to SHIBAURA, Foreign Minister

Sent 7 Nov. 1931 in the afternoon
Received 7 Nov. 1931 in the afternoon

Telegrm No. 516-3 (Code, Urgent and Secret Telegram)

There is also a rumor that Chinese troops have been constructing third line trenches and are planning to induce our army to destroy the Chinese Eastern Railway and then demand that USSR send her troops. Therefore, when the army "crosses" the Chinese Eastern Railway, the army must have enough preparations made to defeat twenty or thirty thousand soldiers, supposing that USSR should dispatch them.

MR. ARBET and other foreign journalists who are now staying here seem to have a similar view that, considering the present world situation which has been going through an extreme depression, and the fact that China has never experienced the loss of credit with Europe and America as today, even if Japan takes any action in Manchuria, the League of Nations, not to mention America, may censure Japan with words, but they probably will not carry out such interferences as economic blockade or the use of force. When our army takes action against USSR, England with the Conservative Party in power, and America which is extremely afraid of the five year plan will never foster an attitude of interference but will sympathize with us. They also will have the view that the policy of joint control over China will be taken due to Japan's action, and this will be the only way to save China. If their views are reliable, I hope that you will take advantage of this opportunity and take a resolution to thoroughly solve the Manchurian problem. The invasion of Chichihar is absolutely necessary for this. I think that if you hesitate at this time, the secret
blood that was shed in Manchuria, especially in the neighborhood of Chinghiao, will have been in vain.

This telegram was also dispatched at the same time to Peipings and Mukden, China.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kazuo, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 193 pages, dated 22 Oct., 1931, and 8 Jan., 1932.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 10th day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the general Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 10th day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
Signature

Witness: /s/ Edward P. Monaghan
Investigator, I.P.C.
Official Capacity
[Text content in Japanese]
年次によります。所管の範囲を広げて、支店に任せることを hommes
今後も対面の日程を厳密にすることを要望しております

以上、ご参考までと存じます。
The exploitation of Manchuria and Mongolia aiming at the guarantee of the nation's economic life, security of our national defense and maintaining the foundation of existence and progress of our Empire is the urgent task of the present and the most memorable achievements ever known. So the whole nation must exert utmost efforts whole-heartedly.

For this purpose, we must externally try as far as possible to avert the outbreak of international troubles and internally making our resolutions more stable, realize the national unity and proceed to the speedy accomplishment of the great task.

As to the obstacles such as a dozen measures, constrains by the League of Nations, acts of America and Russia, etc., against the accomplishment of the great task, we should employ proper diplomacy and endeavor to exclude the obstacles as well as avoiding making matters worse, but it is necessary for us to be ready to appeal to arms against Russia, China and under certain circumstances against America if it is inevitable. Therefore, the emphasis must be laid on the repletion of military armaments against Russia.

As our Empire's military power as compared with those of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. will be put at a disadvantage gradually, we must strive to set up as soon as possible the foundation of our exploitation of Manchuria and Mongolia, especially the general principles of the task that will become the important factor of the national defense, while we must strengthen our military power so that we may reject other countries' intervention flatly.

Counter-measure against the U.S.S.R.

A Russo-Japanese War in the future is unavoidable. Considering the military power of the U.S.S.R. only, it seems to be advantageous for us to make war with her as soon as possible, but as we are now facing the great task of exploitation of Manchuria
and Mongolia in the world situation, especially those in America and China, and it is not for us to cause Russo-Japanese War by our initiative, but also refrain from stimulating him as much as possible. It is true that postponement of war will increase our military power of the U.S.S.R., but our military power also will be increased.

But in case the U.S.S.R. abducts positively our exploitation of Manchuria and Mongolia or threatens the soil tenure of Bolsheviks to those areas initially and then not later in our territory, we must not only be ready by force fundamentally the Korea problem at once, but we must have nothing to be decided. In view of the fact that with a little possibility of causing trouble due to unexpected causes prevail in the margin of strength between Japan and the U.S.S.R., has become very little and the Far Eastern forces of the U.S.S.R. are being reinforced.

(1) As to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact proposed by the U.S.S.R., we must be non-committal and reserve our freedom of action.

(2) Regarding the construction of transportation networks in Northern Manchuria, we must take into consideration the drain of the east coast railway and strategy towards the U.S.S.R.

(3) We must pay deepest attention to the prevention of Bolshevik movement towards Manchuria, Mongolia, and, furthermore, towards Japan. Especially we must guide Mongolia, leaving nothing to be desired, do our best to obtain actual proof of Russian propaganda and intrigue, and endeavor to prevent her complaints.

Though we shall not support the political activity of White Russians residing in Manchuria, with a view to make use of them when necessary, we must carry out complete investigation and control of them.
CERTIFICATE

I, Lt. Colonel TAPAENKO G. I._______________
a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do
hereby certify that the photocopy of the "Report of
Japanese military attache in Moscow Lt. Colonel Karabo__
made on July 14, 1932."

______________________________________________

was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military
Prosecution Department, Moscow

on or about March 27, 1946, and that the original
of the said document may be found in the archives
of the said department.________________________________________

I do further certify.________________________________________

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/s/ TAPAENKO

Lt. Col. TAPAENKO
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan

Nov. 27, 1946
Septmerber 3, 1946

Tokyo.

Colonel Ivanov, Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R., at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, in the presence of interpreter Major Tashkovsky, in the presence of the I.R.S., has presented to Kawabe, Torashiro, former Lt-General of the Japanese Army, a photocopy of the document in the Japanese language containing 5 pages and a photostate of the envelope, being the Report, sent by him on July 14, 1932 from Moscow to Tokyo.

Having personally read the document presented to him, Kawabe has made the following inscription at the back of each of the 5 pages of the photocopics of the document in his own hand:

"I hereby certify that this photocopy is a copy of the document written in my own hand.

September 3, 1946
Kawabe, Torashiro."

Interpreter, Major Tashkovsky, who was present there, translated the contents of this inscription from Japanese into Russian.

Interpreter's certificate of responsibility for correct translation is attached herewith.

This interrogation is drawn up in confirmation of the above said.

Colonel IVANOV, Assistant Prosecutor, for the U.S.S.R., at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.

Major TASHKOVSKY, Interpreter.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, K. GILDENBIAT, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: K. GILDENBIAT
CERTIFICATE

The city of Tokyo
September 3, 1946.

I, the undersigned, Major Pashkovsky Alexey Antonovich, hereby certify to Colonel Ivanov, Assistant Prosecutor for the USSR, that I am thoroughly conversant with the Japanese language to translate printed or written text into Russian, and that I promise to translate correctly the inscription made by the witness Kavabe, Torashiro on the photostate copy of the document, the Report sent by him from Moscow to Tokyo on July 14, 1932, which has been presented to him.

I have been duly warned of the responsibility for the purposely wrong translation under Article 92 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

/s/ PASHKOVSKY

ASHKOVSKY.

Subscribed to before:

/s/ Colonel Ivanov,
Assistant Prosecutor for the USSR
At the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. Gildenblat, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: M. GILDENBLAT
A. A message of Lt. Col. KANDA (July 15th)

On August 16th, Kawa...out of necessity...after that...

B. Message of Lt. Col. Kanda

1. From Lt. Col. Katahara

It was decided that the (army and navy's) preparations for waging war against Russia should be completed before the middle of 1934. However, it does not mean that hostilities will be opened immediately after the preparations have been completed. In order to consolidate Manchuria, the war against Russia is necessary for Japan. This is, however, not the intention of the entire (army).

T.N. Could possibly mean forces.

2. The aliases under which men entered the consulates in Russia are:

- Capt. SUMIBE to Vladivostok
- Capt. FUKICHI A. to NOORE BURUSUKU

3. /Courier/ published in June, August, October, December, and February.

4. In the increasing of the monthly reserve fund, it is thought that such increments are possible if the corresponding activities increase.

5. Although men will not be forced to enter the MANCHURIAN Consulate, they will be sent to CHITA. /T.N. Locality in Siberia/

6. If possible, 10 men for China and from 4 to 8 men for Russia will be trained to investigate Russia. /T.N. Text ambiguous here/

7. Residents in Europe shall be increased and for those in the armies of Germany and France, their investigating activities shall be increased.

8. It is proposed that advisers be sent to Poland.
9. Military officers shall be posted in Rumania.

10. Students and ex-soldiers shall be posted in Persia and Afghanistan for long terms. This shall also be done in the Siberian Area.

11. On the method of the corp's secret information. In order to make the investigations, newspapers and magazines shall be collected. For this purpose officer-interpreter personnel shall be increased. This must be realized to a certain extent.
CERTIFICATE

I, Lt. Colonel TARAPN'TC G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the photocopy the "Message forwarded to military Attaché Dazabe by Lt. Colonel Kanda" on July 16, 1932, was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department, Moscow on or about March 22, 1936, and that the original of the said document may be found in the archives of the said Department.

I do further certify ____________________________

__________________________________________

Tsaranenko
Lt. Col. TARAPN'TC
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan
May 17, 1936.
CERTIFICATE

I, Lt. Colonel TARASENKO G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the photo copy the "passport forwarded to military attaché Pavlov by Lt. Colonel Zarda" on July 16, 1932, was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military Procurement Department, Moscow on or about March 22, 1936, and that the original of the said document may be found in the archives of the said Department.

I do further certify ____________________________

(s) Tarasenko

Lt. Col. TARASENKO
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan
May 17, 1936.
September 3, 1946.

Tokyo.

Colonel Ivanov, assistant prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, in the presence of interpreter: Major Pashkovsky, in the premises of the I.M.T. has presented to Tawabe, Torashiro, former Lt-Gen. of the Japanese Army, a photocopy of the document in the Japanese language containing 4 pages and being the record of the message forwarded to him by Lt-Colonel Kanda on July 16, 1932, on behalf of Lt-Colonel Hasahara, of the General Staff.

Having personally read the document presented to him, Hasahara has made the following inscriptions in his own hand:

a) At the back of page 1 of the photocopy of the document:

"I hereby certify that this photocopy is a copy of the document written in my own hand.

September 3, 1946

Tawabe, Torashiro."

b) At the back of page 2 of the photocopy:

"I hereby certify that this is a photocopy of the record of the message which was forwarded to me by Lt-Colonel Kanda, in Moscow, on July 16, 1932, on behalf of Lt-Colonel Hasahara, of the General Staff.

Tawabe, Torashiro."

c) On the 3rd and 4th pages there is his signature:

"Tawabe, Torashiro."

Interpreter, Major Pashkovsky, who was present there, translated the contents of these inscriptions from Japanese into Russian.

Interpreter's certificate of responsibility for correct translation is attached herewith.

This interrogation is drawn up in confirmation of the above said.
"s/ Colonel IVANOV,
Assistant Prosecutor for the
U.S.S.R. at the International
Military Tribunal for the
Far East.

"s/ Major PASHKOV, Interpreter

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT.

I, I. GILDENBLAT, hereby certify that I am thoroughly
conversant with the Russian and English languages; and
the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated
document.

Signature: /s/ I. Gildenblat
CERTIFICATE

The city of Tokyo
September 3, 1946.

I, the undersigned, Major Pashkovsky Alexey Antonovich, hereby certify to Colonel Ivanov that I am thoroughly conversant with the Japanese language to translate printed or written text into Russian, and that I promise to translate correctly the inscription made by the witness Kawabo, Torashiro on the photostate copy of the document—the Record of the message forwarded to him by Lt-Colonel Kanda on behalf of Lt-Colonel Kasahara of the General Staff on July 16, 1932, which has been presented to him.

I have been duly warned of the responsibility for purposely wrong translation under Article 92 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

Fashkovsky.

Subscribed to before

Colonel Ivanov,
Assistant Prosecutor for the USSR
At the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.

/s/
Colonel Ivanov

CERTIFICATE OF THE TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, I. GIL'ENBLAT, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages, and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: /s/ I. Gilenblat
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解决方法一：

1. 尽量使用有效的关键词搜索。
2. 了解关键词的近义词和同义词。
3. 利用搜索历史提示，避免重复输入。
4. 尝试其他搜索引擎。
5. 使用专业的学术搜索引擎。
6. 增加搜索的相关性。
7. 精确输入问题。
8. 使用语言模型改进。
9. 检查拼写错误。
10. 尝试使用其他语言。

解决方法二：

1. 使用上下文帮助理解。
2. 查阅相关文献。
3. 利用专业词汇的定义。
4. 通过图片和图表理解。
5. 充分利用网络资源。
6. 提高搜索技巧。
7. 注意信息的准确性。
8. 使用语音助手。
9. 尝试使用社群。
10. 寻求专家帮助。
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AFFIDAVIT
OF A WITNESS

KHABAROVSK

MARCH 29, 1946.

I am Colonel ROSTØIT, assistant prosecutor for the U. S. S. R., at the International Military Tribunal, Tokyo.

I interrogated the following person as a witness through the interpreter MAJOR PASKOVSKY, with previous notice that the said person shall be held responsible under Article 95 of the Criminal Code of the R. S. F. S. R., in case of false statement.

1. **Name**
   **USHIROKU Jun.**

2. **Age**
   Born in 1934.

3. **Occupation**
   Commander in Chief of the 3rd Area Army, of the Kwantung Army.

4. **Political Party**
   None.

5. **Present address**
   Khaborovsk.

A certificate of the witness of his responsibility for false statement and a certificate of the interpreter for false interpretation are attached hereto.

Interrogation carried out in Japanese under the interpretation of Major Paskovsky.

**State your personal history.**

I graduated from the military academy in 1905 and was appointed Sublieutenant, promoted to Captain in 1915, to Major in 1921, to Lieutenant Colonel in 1925, to Colonel in 1929, to Major-General in 1934, to Lieutenant-General in 1937, to full-General in 1942.

**Were you connected with the Siberian Incident since 1918?**

Yes.

**What was your position at that time?**

Chief of the 5th division staff.

**Where did you serve at the time of Japan's occupation of Manchuria in 1931?**

Chief of the 4th division staff in Osaka.
Where were you transferred since then?

In February, 1932, I was engaged in the Railway work as Kwantung Army Staff Officer. From Aug. 1st to Aug. 1935, I served as Chief of the 3rd Department of the General Staff, from Aug. 1935 to Oct. 1937 as the head of both the Bureau of personnel of War Ministry and the Bureau of military affairs, from Oct. 1937 to Aug. 1939 was at the front of Kwantung in North China as commander of the 26th division, from Aug. 1939 to Sept. 1940 served in Poi'an as commander of the 4th army in Manchuria, from Sept. 1940 to July 1941 served in Kwantung in South China as commander of the Kwantung Army Group; from July 1941 to Aug. 1942 in Hankow as Commander of the Expeditionary Army Headquarters in China. Then Commander-in-Chief of the army was Full-General K.I. Shunroxs. From Aug. 1942 to Feb. 1944 served in Venice as Chief of the Middle Army Group; from Feb. 1944 to July 1944, I was a Vice-Chief of the General Staff and from April 1944 to July held an additional post as the Inspector-General of air force which was under direct control of the Emperor. From Aug. 1944 up to Japan's surrender of Aug. I served as Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Army in Manchuria. The Headquarters of the 3rd Army was located in Chichiheo till May 1945, and since June in Manchuria.

Where were you at the time of the dispatch of troops to Siberia.

In Chita, surbikalyo.

What railway was being built when you were in charge of Railway superintendence in Manchuria during 1932 to 1934?

Constructions were begun in 1932 on the Da'lin-Pei-min-Tai'an Railway, Lueh-Carbin and Tunhun-Tumukiuang Railway; I do not remember the exact date of their completion, but I think they were completed, in about two years.

Did these railways have any strategic value?

They had strategic value.

Give detailed account of the strategic value of these railways.

These railways for the viewpoint of strategy, were directed against the Soviet-Japan and contributions towards troop movements and smooth transportation of munitions very effective.

Were you connected with the operation plans of the General Staff at the time when you were the Chief of the 3rd Department of the General Staff during 1934 to 1935?
A. Setting the operation plans was assigned to the 1st Department, but, as Chief of the 3rd Department I was engaged in managing the railway, shipping and communication affairs and was connected with considerably many parts of the 1st Department affairs. For example, I took suitable measures to comply with the request of the 1st Department to inform the transportation of Troops (the number of divisions), the point and date of their destination.

Do you know anything about the operation codes KIO, OTSU and OTST in the General Staff Headquarters?

I know that KIO means the war against the U. S. ... OTSU against U. S. and R. and OTST against China.

Describe the outlines of the OTSU plan at the time when you were the Chief of the 3rd Department in the General Staff Headquarters during 1934 to 1935.

Concerning the Plan of 1935, I know the following facts. The list of it is in connection with the affairs of the 3rd Department in the General Staff Headquarters, to carry on mass transportation of troops from Japan proper to Northern Manchuria and the transferring of main forces in Manchuria from central areas to Northern Manchuria.
The main portion of troops was concentrated to the cast, i.e., the Liaotung area and the other portions were respectively concentrated to the north, i.e., South of Heiho and to the vicinity of Harbin. The above-mentioned is all that I know of the OTSU plan of that time.

Was the OTSU plan of 1935 the plan of a war against USSR?

Yes.

How many divisions intended to be transported from Japan Proper according to the above plan of the General Staff Headquarters?

Twenty Division.

Were you requested as Chief of the 3rd Dept., to transport by ship the above division from Japan Proper to Manchuria and Korea and afterwards by rail from the ports of Manchuria and Korea to the destination?

Yes.

From what ports of Japan Proper to what ports of Manchuria and Korea did you intend to transport twenty divisions?

I chiefly used the port of Osaka and partially the ports of Ujina and Kobe.
What part of the Continent did you intend to land the troops?
I intended to land the troops on Pusan, Korea, and Shiron, Manchuria.

How many tons were requested to transport the troops from Japan Proper to Manchuria?
120,000 to 150,000 tons were requested per division.

How many days does it take to transport twenty divisions?
Two months and a half to concentrate them into North Manchuria.

What kind of attack plans did you make up according to the OTSU plan of 1935?

It was planned that the main attack should be directed to the east, i.e., to the Peipuschanye and that in the Hailar area we should be on the defensive. But, afterwards in 1939, I knew in the OTSU plan that a supplementary attack should be carried out in the north and south of the main attack line. Yet, the attack areas changed with year.

Was it contemplated to carry out landing operation with ships according to the OTSU plan of 1935?

When success was achieved in the main attack in Manchuria (airforce operation) a landing operation was planned to land one division in STRIKE Bay to divert the Russian army and to facilitate the operations in the main attack area.

What was the aim of the war according to the plan of 1935?
I did not know the true aim, but its operational aim was to occupy Maritime Provinces and to eliminate air-raids upon Japan Proper by the airdoms of the Soviet Union army.

Who drew up and who approved the OTSU plan of 1935?
This plan was drawn up by Lieutenant-General KYOSHII Imai, Chief of the 1st Department in the General Staff Headquarters, and approved by Field-Marshal Prince KIN-IN, Chief, of the General Staff.

When was this plan submitted to and sanctioned by the Emperor?
In March, 1935.

What kind of plans of operations against U.S.S.R. was laid down in 1939, when you were Chief of the Army in Pusan?
The aim of the 4th army under my command was to defend the Sunui, Sigun and Hailar areas by one division and the frontier guards. In case of the outbreak of war, one division was to be reinforced in the 1st month of war, and one more, in the 2nd month. But, in fact, at the beginning of war we had troops only capable of defending the above-mentioned areas.

What kind of plans of operation was laid down in 1944, when you were the Vice-Chief of the General Staff?
The operation against USSR at the time when I was the Vice-Chief of the General Staff were planned to be defensive ones in each front.

Do you know anything about "Kun-Ta-mu" plan?
In Sept. 1944, in Chichihara I knew of it for the first time from Chief of the 3rd Arm. Army Staff, Major-General WATANABE, Hiroshi, "Kun-Ta-mu" meant the reinforcement of the 13 divisions stationed in Manchuria and the transferring of the 51st and 57th divisions into Manchuria. I myself was then in Kumating and knew of the above.
State the process of the reinforcements of Manchurian aviation from the standpoint of ex-Inspector-General of Aviation in Japan.

The airforces of Manchuria immediately after the Manchurian Incident was very weak, but, by the commenced large reinforcement in 1937, the strength of the 1st line was 24 flying companies (240 aeroplanes) in 1938, 34 companies (339 aeroplanes) in 1941, 49 companies (about 600 aeroplanes). The whole aviation corps belonged to the 2nd and 5th aviation divisions.

State the kinds of aeroplanes concentrated into Manchuria. Which kind of aeroplanes was many in number, fighters, bombers or scout planes?

Fighters were the greatest in number and bombers were the next, but, I can not tell you exactly the number of them.

State the plan of employing the aviation corps of 1941 in Manchuria.

In case of the outbreak of war, the main forces of them would be to proper the operations of the Japanese army by means of making an attack and of bringing a pressure on the east, i.e., the Soviet Union army stationed in Maritime Province.

How was the plan of operations at the time when you were Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Area Army of Manchuria?

Concerning the plans of employing the 44th Army at the time when I was Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Area Army, between the 1st and the 2nd plans was found a quite difference. The 3rd Area Army contemplated enforcing defensive operations in the Heicho, Sairan, and Kunchakow areas till May 1945, that is, the 4th Army was planned to occupy Juna, Sairan and Heicho areas, the 11th Division, to occupy the Sairan area and the 17th Division, the Kunchakow area. Since the beginning of June, 1945, these plans were completely changed. The Area Army Headquarters had a new command upon the 30th and 44th Divisions, having been transferred from Chiuhahaerh to Mukden and the 44th Army was engaged in defending the Kunchakow-Tsama-Rugelina line, the Army Headquarters was located in Mukden and the 30th Army took the defensive in the Kilia, Changchou and Wusunjichan areas.

How was the plan of operations at that time?

The plan of operations made the 44th Army bound to stand on the defensive in the vicinities of Kunchakow, Tsama and Rugelina.

How was the process of the operations of the 3rd Area Army at the beginning of war between Japan and U.S. in 1945?

At the outbreak of Russo-Japanese War in 1904, having made the 44th Army retreated from the already occupied positions to the Heicho and Sairan areas and by so doing established a secret connection with the 30th Army, I placed the 3rd
...see why on the defences in the Liliu-Changchun-Mukden-Liaoyang line. Particularly I made the 108th division retreat from Jeho to Chinkou and then retreat to the south (Liaoyang) in view of the difficult defence. The defences line of Liliu-Changchun-Mukden-Liaoyang was not the last one of the Japanese army. In the war would turn unfavourable for our army, we should intend to retreat to the Jungfu and Shantung provinces, where our final resistance would be tried against the Soviet Union army. This was to be the very last defence line in Manchuria. This plan of operation, however, was not put in practice, i.e., a mere plan of retreat. Therefore, on August 15th, 1945, the toko was signed by the Emperor ordering to disarm our army unconditionally was sent to me, the 3rd army was still stationed in the Liliu-Changchun-Liaoyang line.

...when the army under your command was dissolved.

...from the 19th to the 25th I hereby certify with my signature that the aforementioned answers were made in my own hand.

WIT: CHERNO

INTERROGATOR: ISHIKAWA, ATT (Sign)
      Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo

INTERPRET: MAEHIKO (Signature)

SUNLEY OF THE RECORDER: ISHIKAWA, ATT (Sign)


Interrogation finished: 00:30, 30 March 1946.
March 29th, 1946
in Saburovsk City

The undersigned, Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Army of the Chinese Army, Full-General Jun Usihoku, made oath for only true statement about the top war criminals as a witness and gave this certificate to Colonel YOSHIKAWA, Assistant Prosecutor for the 5th S. H. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

I was previously warned that I shall be held responsible under Article 52 of the Criminal Code for A. S. H. in case of false statement.

Full-General JUN USIHOKU

The acceptor of this certificate Assistant
Prosecutor for the 5th S. H. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo,

Colonel YOSHIKAWA.
Doc. No. 18573

Foreign Policy of the Empire
Decided among the Four Ministers, Premier, Foreign, War and Navy, on August 7, 1936

Strict
Secret

Foreign Office
Highest Confidential

Text  Cover
Back

Five each
Sheets one sheet
Decision of the Conference of Four Japanese Ministers of August 7, 1936, under the title of:

"Foreign Policy of the Empire"

7 August 1936

In order to observe and achieve the national policy, we establish foreign policy, and expect complete control on diplomacy, we intensify close relations between military and civil officials dispatched abroad, and we lead the people positively and appropriately for the purpose of adapting practical measures to the established policy.

And in protection and propulsion of our just and appropriate rights and interests, we must be careful not to yield and retrogress spontaneously out to maintain always positive attitude and at the same time we must try to offusc suspicion or apprehension of other countries towards the Empire.

No. 1 General Plan

We render it the basic policy of diplomacy of the Empire to effect the true aim of Japan's being stabilizing power in the East Asia, by means of fostering Manchukuo and strengthening more and more the special unseparable relations with her in order to secure eternal peace in the East Asia and to execute the existence and development of the Empire, and also, seeing from worldwide viewpoint, by means of adjusting for ourselves the relations with the Soviet Union and China and of planning simultaneously, peaceful development and advancement in the South Sea regions.

Recently, the Soviet Union, according as her situation in national defense and international relations has been intensified rapidly, has increased her pressure of armed-revolution on the East Asia, disposing too large military preparations, and has been intending Bolshevikization penetration in all directions, driving the Empire into more disadvantageous situations. This fact not only threatens directly the national defense of the Empire but gives a grave hindrance to Japan in achieving its East Asiatic policy. Therefore, laying the chief object of foreign policy for the time being on frustrating Russia's aggressive plan into the East Asia, especially on offuscating the threatening military preparations and on interrupting the penetrating Bolshevikization, Japan must try to attain this end through diplomatic measures accompanied by improvement of national defense.
accordingly, the Empire must put its diplomatic function into full swing, in considering synthetically the present international situations in adjusting the relations with the leading powers and in inviting an situation internationally favorable to Japan.

No. 2 Gists of measures

1. Taking consideration of the present international and internal conditions, Japan must be strictly cautious towards the Soviet Union not to give rise to further troubles of its own accord, but to endeavor to solve pending problems by means of peaceful measures exclusively.

   a. Establishments of two committees, one for:
    - The demarcation of the border line in the region from the Lake M.L.N.K. to the river Tumen and the other for solution of troubles along the border line, as well as the establishment of similar organs dealing with the frontier of other regions
      between Manchukuo and the Soviet Union and Manchukuo and Mongolia shall be designed.
    - At an appropriate opportunity the establishment of a non-agreed zone shall be proposed.

   b. Furthermore, when the Soviet Union manifests her wish to conclude a non-aggressive treaty, Japan shall state plainly that it would rather welcome such treaty provided that the numerous pending problems of importance between Japan and the Soviet Union including such a readjustment of the Soviet war preparations in the Far East as would give a balance of power between the two countries would be settled.

   c. And we shall take adequate measures to defend Japan, Manchukuo and China from the Soviet thought-obstruction.

2. Towards the Chinese central and provincial regimes, Japan shall always hold a sound attitude and adopt just measures and combined with a economic measure for the Chinese masses, Japan shall lead those regimes in such a way so that they may correct spontaneously their attitudes towards Japan, thereby neutralizing the conflict between Japan and China based on the principle of live-and-let-live. In North
China, Japan shall plan its economic and cultural fusion and concert between Japan and Manchuria, and shall endeavor simultaneously, to make it a special region by which Japan, China and Manchukuo may unitedly defend themselves against the Bolshevizing intrusion of the Soviet Union.

As for another provincial regime, Japan shall not take any measure which as a result of its adaptation may either help or hinder the unification or segregation of China.

The aforementioned is a basic principle of Japan's Chinese policy (of Decision concerning Chinese policy, dated Oct. 4, 1935). But at present taking into consideration today's state of the relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, it is rendered the important point in the practical scheme for China, first to make the North China immediately a special district of pro-Japan-and-Manchukuo and anti-Communism, to obtain resources for national defense and to extend traffic establishments as well as to make whole China anti-Soviet and pro-Japanese. (Measures which should be carried out practically for the present shall be made up separately.)

3. Increase of friendly relation between Japan and America is of great assistance in restraining the Soviet Union and Britain. America magnifying zealously her military preparations, watches the cause of the policy of the Empire with much interest, from a view point of traditional Far Eastern Policy; and so, according to Japan's future attitude towards China, not only there is a danger of America's assisting China, in inducing her to adopt policies depending upon Europe and America, but also, it can't be denied that there might arise matters disadvantageous to Japan's policy towards the Soviet Union. Therefore, the Empire should render effort to let America understand its fair attitude by respecting America's profit in her Chinese trade, and at the same time to make her not to hinder the achievement of East Asiatic policy of the Empire, promoting the friendly relations with her on the keynote of the economic interdependency between Japan and America.

4. The developments in the European political situation have a great influence on the East Asia, and so Japan must exert every effort in bringing European powers to its advantage, especially in restraining the Soviet Union.
a. As for Britain, though she has not a few interests in all aspects which conflict with the ones of Japan she has the largest rights and interests among the European Powers in the East Asia; and moreover the attitudes of European countries are largely affected by that of Britain. Taking consideration of these facts, it is of particular necessity for the Empire to make Britain adopt an attitude in favor of Japan in the relations between Japan and the Soviet Union through its positive effort in promoting the friendly relations with Britain, so as to restrain the Soviet attitude towards us and to mitigate and eliminate, simultaneously, the obstacles on the course of Japan’s overseas development. To readjust the relations between Japan and Britain in China is of much effect, and therefore, combined with efforts to readjust the general relations between both countries, we must try to take the fittest measures to give a good turn to the relations of both countries in China, by means of making Britain respect that Japan possesses special and important interests in China and also by means of our respecting her rights and interests in China.

We must be particularly cautious on this point however, as there is an apprehension of Britain adopting an oppressing policy towards Japan, inducing the great Powers, especially America, Soviet and China.

b. As to Germany, since she has generally the same interests as that of the Empire in the relations with the Soviet and also, from the special relation between the Soviet and France, she is in a position to find convenient in her national defense end in counter-measures against Bolshevization to maintain harmony with us, we shall promote the friendly relations with her, and in case of necessity we shall adopt some measures to realize the accord between Japan and Germany and further by extending this relation shall promote the goodwill of Poland and other countries thereby restraining the Soviet Union further. We shall pay attention to and try to promote the friendly relations with the countries neighboring the Soviet Union in Europe and Asia and with other Mohammedan peoples.

5. The south seas area is a key point of the world commerce, and, as it is the sphere necessary and indispensable in the industries and national defense of our Empire as well as the natural sphere of development of our people, we must secure our footsteps for further advance. However, we should be
discreet not to stimulate the Powers concerned but try to efface their apprehension towards our Empire, and we have to endeavor to make our progress gradually and peacefully.

As to Philippines, we expect the realization of her perfect independence and, if necessary, we shall not hesitate to assure her neutrality.

As for our development in Dutch East Indies, it is of the first necessity to eliminate her apprehension towards us and make her take a turn for pro-Japan. For this end, we must adopt suitable measures and, if necessary, we shall not refuse to conclude a non-aggressive treaty with Holland.

As to Siam and other un-advanced peoples, Japan shall lead and assist them properly based upon the principle of live-and-let-live.

6. Foreign trade is not only indispensable to maintain and improve the economic life of our people, but also helpful in betterment of finance and internal balance, and our Empire, when we consider the present international and internal situations, must pay efforts to extend it especially. Therefore, we need to try to develop reasonably our foreign trade and we must simultaneously, adjust interests between us and other countries and secure and gain important resources, effecting cultivation of our economic energy.

Cabinet secret no. 2073 Separate volume

Military Secret 9/20

Foreign Policy of the Empire decided among Prime, Foreign, War and Naval Ministers on August 7, 1936
C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARASENKO, G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the photostat of the document "Decisions of the Four Japanese Ministers of August 7, 1936 entitled Foreign Policy of the Empire" was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department in Moscow on or about March 22, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the record office of the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department.

I do further certify ____________________________________________

Lt. Col. TARASENKO, G. I. /s/
(Signature and rank)

Tokyo, Japan
October 3, 1946.
AFFIDAVIT

TOUZHAMA Kyoji was born on Goto Island in Nagasaki Prefecture in 1894. He is a Japanese, a graduate of the Military Staff College and of the rank of Lt.-General.

He was interrogated in Moscow on 21 Feb., 1946, by Col. S. Y. Rosenblit, the Assistant Prosecutor for U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

Q. Tell all your posts, which you have had, ever since you entered in the Japanese Army in addition to your affidavit dated 11 Feb., 1946.

A. After graduation from the Military Academy in 1913, I began my service in the Japanese Army as a platoon leader of 23rd Infantry Regiment of 6th Division and was in service of this regiment till 1921. This division was situated in Kumamoto, Japan. I learned in the Military Staff College from 1921 to 1923. After the graduation, I was promoted to the rank of Captain.

In 1924 - a company commander in 23rd Infantry Regiment.
In 1925 - an officer attached to General Affair Department of General Staff Headquarters.
1926-1927 - the Chief of Special Service Agency at Hankou Station.
1928 - again an officer attached to General Affair Department (Captain, later Major).
1929-1930 - the assistant of Military Attache in Moscow (Major).
1931 - became a member of the Preparatory Committee for Disarmament Conference of League of Nations.
In 1932, I attended at the Conference of League of Nations at Geneva and after that I attached to 1st Department of General Staff Headquarters and then to General Affair Department (Major and promoted to the rank of Lt.-Col. in 1932).
In 1935, by the order of General Staff I was sent abroad to France to investigate the state of Russian emigrants at the aim of utilizing them against U.S.S.R. in the future.
In autumn of 1935, I became an officer of the rank of Lt.-Col., attached to 2nd Imperial Guard Inf. Regiment.
At the end of 1936, I became an acting chief of a section of General Air Department of General Staff Headquarters.

From March of 1937, I became the Chief of 2nd Section of Staff Headquarters of the Kwantung Army.

In October of 1937, I became the Chief of 1st Section of Staff Headquarters of the Kwantung Army.

(In 1936 I was promoted to the rank of colonel.)

From March of 1938, I became the Commander of 2nd Imperial Guard Infantry Regiment in Tokyo.

In March of 1939, I was promoted to the rank of major-general and appointed Chief of 4th Department of General Staff Headquarters.

In September of 1939, I was appointed Chief of 1st Department of General Staff Headquarters and remained with this post till September of 1940.

In December of the same year, I was appointed Director of Tank School.

In 1941, I was appointed Chief of Personnel Bureau of War Ministry and promoted to the rank of Lt.-General in November of the same year.

In March of 1943, holding the post of the Chief of Personnel Bureau, I was appointed Vice-Minister of War.

At the end of August of 1944, I was appointed Commander of 4th Air Force.

In January of 1945, I was ordered to await further orders, owing to my illness, and was placed in the first reserve list in April of the same year.

In July of 1945, being called out by the Army, I started for my post in Kwantung Army and was appointed Commander of 139th Division.

Q. Who was War Minister at the time when you were Vice-Minister of War?

A. When I was Vice-Minister of War, the War Minister was TOJO.

Q. Tell how and by whom the occupation of Manchuria in 1931 was organized.

A. At that time the Kwantung Army was under the command of Lt.-General HONJO Shigeru, by HONJO's orders the Japanese troops invaded Manchuria without declaration of war. Among the officers of the Kwantung Army, those who played the most active roles in Manchurian occupation were Col. TAGAOKA and Lt.-Col. ISHIHARA attached to Kwantung Army Staff Headquarters. In a few years after the invasion of
the Japanese troops in Manchuria, the Japanese Government took all kinds of measures in order to convert Manchuria into the military base for aggression against U.S.S.R.; the number of the Japanese troops in Manchuria was continually increased; new railways and auto-roads leading to Soviet borders were constructed; munition factories were built and managed; a large number of farmers were transmigrated in Manchuria from Japan for the recruitment of the Kwantung Army; there were also constructed new ammunition dumps, barracks, hospitals, etc.

Q. Can you tell concretely how many troops there were in Manchuria in the past and how they gradually were increased?

A. By the Manchurian incident in 1931, there were one division and 6 infantry battalions. During the occupation a vast number of troops were sent into Manchuria from Korea and Japan. Before the formation of Kan-Toku-En plan (by 1941), the Kwantung Army had 400,000 soldiers and, at the beginning of the war with U.S.S.R., had more than 700,000.

Q. How many aerodromes were constructed?

A. There were more than 100 aerodromes only along the borders of the U.S.S.R.

Q. How many railways were there in 1931?

A. In 1931 there were only 2 railways in Manchuria. Since 1931 more than 10 railways leading to U.S.S.R. borders have been constructed. Auto-roads were also constructed along the directions of those railways.

Q. What was the purpose of Manchurian occupation?

A. First, for the purpose of transmigration of surplus population. Second, for the purpose of aggression against the U.S.S.R. As an outbreak of conflict was expected sooner or later, it was prepared to utilize Manchuria as a military base for aggression against U.S.S.R.

Q. Did you yourself take part in Nomonhan incident and who was the projector of these military actions?
A. I myself did not take part in Nomonkhan incident, but I investigated the incident as the Chief of 4th Department (War history) of General Staff Headquarters. The military actions were begun by the Japanese troops and had the purpose to provoke a war against Mongolia.

Q. Being clear that Mongolian National Republic formed an alliance with U.S.S.R., Nomonkhan aggression was also a provocation of war against U.S.S.R. You knew it, did not you?

A. Yes, I did. The Japanese Government manufactured a public opinion, as if Outer Mongolia had occupied the Manchurian territory in Nomonkhan area, namely, Mongolia had begun the war, in consequence the military actions of the Kwantung Army were carried on only for the sake of recovering Manchurian right on the occupied territory. And they expressed in that way.

Q. Do you think who was personally responsible for Nomonkhan incident?

A. I think that Commander of the Kwantung Army Ueda and Chief of Staff Headquarters Isogaya were responsible for Nomonkhar incident. Immediately after this incident, both were ordered to await further orders.

Q. Did you yourself take part in drawing military operation plans against U.S.S.R. at General Staff Headquarters?

A. I, as the Chief of 1st Department of General Staff Headquarters, drew an aggression plan against U.S.S.R. in 1940. According to this plan, the main attack should be operated from Lake Hanka area in the direction of Khabarovsk to separate the Maritime Province from U.S.S.R. For this purpose 12 infantry divisions, as main forces, and 2 artillery brigades, 3 tank regiments, 2 cavalry brigades and 5 bombardment groups, as auxiliary forces, were to be applied. After attacking Khabarovsk and occupying Vladivostok plain, the Northern Front Forces, formed from 7 divisions; an artillery brigade and other units were to begin attack. In case of success, the Western Front Forces were also to open their attack, having a main attack in direction of Chita, with the attention to occupy Soviet territory extending to Lake Baikal.
Q. To whom did you report this plan?
A. I reported it to Prince KIN, the Chief of General Staff Headquarters.

Q. Was there anybody else to whom you reported this plan?
A. I, myself, reported this plan to His Majesty the Emperor in company with Prince KIN.

Q. Did the Emperor sanction the plan?
A. After a few days the sanction to this plan was given by the Emperor.

Q. How did you know that the plan was approved by the Emperor?
A. The plan was returned to 1st Department, after obtaining the Imperial sanction.

Q. When was the time of aggression against U.S.S.R. by the plan?
A. In this plan the time of opening war was not indicated, because it should be decided by the Emperor, after discussion in the Supreme Council.

Q. Where was the plan preserved after the Imperial sanction?
A. It was preserved in Operation Section of 1st Department of General Staff Headquarters.

Q. To whom was the copy of the plan sent?
A. The copy of the plan was sent to the Kwantung Army.

Q. What kinds of measures were taken to carry this plan into practice?
A. A senior officer (whose name I forgot) went with this plan and handed it over to the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army to put it into practice.

Q. In what month was the plan sanctioned?
A. It was in March of 1940.
Q. When was it sent to the Kwantung Army to put into practice?
A. At the beginning of April of 1940.

Q. When did you leave the post of the Chief of 1st Department of General Staff Headquarters?
A. In September of 1940.

Q. You said that the number of the Kwantung Army was remarkably increased, especially after the formation of Kan-Toku-En plan. What do you know about this plan?
A. Kan-Toku-En plan was formed by Major General TANAKA Shirichi, the successor of my post of the Chief of 1st Department of General Staff Headquarters in the middle of 1941. (I don't know exactly in what month it was.) About September of 1941, I knew about this plan at the time, when I was ordered by War Minister TOJO to appoint the committee for setting up the way of governing of the Soviet territory to be occupied by the Japanese army.

Q. Explain why Kan-Toku-En plan was formed especially in 1941?
A. The Kan-Toku-En plan was elaborated in the middle of 1941, as war broke out between the U.S.S.R. and Germany. The war situation was not favorable for the Red Army and we expected that the U.S.S.R. would transfer her troops from the Soviet Far East to the western front. On account of this, we supposed that we could easily occupy the Far East.

Q. What were the basic contents of this plan?
A. The "Kan-Toku-En" plan was based upon the operation plan of the Army General Staff, drawn out by me in 1940. As I have mentioned before, according to the former plan, the attacks on all fronts were supposed to be brought about in turn with rather long intervals between them; but according to the "Kan-Toku-En" plan all the blows were to be dealt simultaneously.

Q. In what work did you take part in connection with "Kan-Toku-En" plan?
A. In the connection mainly I took part in formation of the committee for setting up the way of governing the occupied Soviet territory, recruitment of the unit officer staff to
the Kwantung Army and formation of 2 front army staff Headquarters.

Q. What role did TOJO play in the matters of "Kan-Toku-En" plan?
A. TOJO approved the plan and he was its central figure.

Q. How did TOJO explain to you about enforcement of preparation of the war against U.S.S.R.?
A. In 1941, TOJO said to me in a conversation: "The present time is very suitable for an aggression against the U.S.S.R. because we can carry on war without encountering any strong resistance from the Soviet Army." He further said, "The Japanese Army would gain a great prestige by attacking the U.S.S.R. at a time when it is ready to fall to the ground, like a ripe persimmon." TOJO also said that it was necessary to increase the number of present units in Manchuria, as a way of prompt mobilization of the Kwantung Army.

Q. Do you confirm that TOJO had a strong intention of aggression against the U.S.S.R. at that time?
A. Yes, I do.

Q. You stated that you formed the Committee for setting up the way of governing the occupied territory. Tell the organization of that Committee.
A. The Chief of the Committee was Lt.-General UKEDA, the former Assistant Chief of the Staff Headquarters of the Kwantung Army and its members were Col. ARAO, attached to 1st Department of General Staff Headquarters, Lt.-Col. OGOSHI, attached to 2nd Department, and 2 others, names of whom I cannot remember.

Q. Do you know OSHIMA?
A. Yes, I know.

Q. What role did he play in the matters of aggression against U.S.S.R.?
A. I myself, as the Vice-Minister of War, read OSHIMA's telegram from Berlin dated December of 1941. In this telegram reporting about his conversation with Hitler, OSHIMA said
that Hitler stated to him in conversation, "As U.S.S.R. troops were already demoralized, if Japan should not take up this chance for aggression against U.S.S.R., she would be regretted about it later." In Spring of 1943, OSHIMA telegraphed, "The German Government wishes Japan to quicken opening the military actions against U.S.S.R." In this telegram bravery of the Japanese Army was praised and they sympathized with Japan in difficulty of the military actions in China and Burma. In conclusion of this telegram, they hoped that Japan would immediately open aggression against U.S.S.R. in the Far East and at the same time would enforce the military operations against India.

Q. "What role did you play in workers' supply of Munition industry in Japan?

A. I reported to War Minister TOJO that it was necessary to mobilize school boys as workers of munition industry, having closed middle and high schools. This proposal was approved by the Cabinet Council and brought into practice.


A. In the first period of military actions in China, I was the Chief of 2nd Section of Kwantung Staff Headquarters. My main work was the intelligence service against U.S.S.R., but I myself began to command operations, taking part in the military actions in North China, when the incident broke out in North China in 1937. I conducted by the orders of UEDA, the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army. UEDA ordered me to command operations with TOJO, the Chief of Kwantung Army Staff Headquarters. I took part in the operations of capturing Changchun and other areas in North China. As for the military operations against the U.S.A. and Great Britain, I played the role, mainly, in formation of new units, which acted in the Southern areas, in recruitment of their members and in establishment of Armies' Headquarters. I, as Vice-Minister of War, prepared and formed so-called forlorn hope staff, amounting 4,000 persons, who blew up American warships and transports in Pacific Ocean by means of specially equipped machines (controlled mines). Then I commanded 4th Air Force, acted on Philippines for 4 months of 1944. My Force acted against U.S. air forces and fleet. 3 divisions out of my Force were consisted of so-called forlorn
hope members, who had a task to annihilate the enemy by
thunder crashing themselves to him. Consequently, both
pilots and aircrafts perished and pilots, who died during
execution of their operation tasks amounted to 1,000.

Q. How many U.S. warships and transports did they sink?
A. I think they sunk a great many of them. But I can not
tell how many, because my pilots did not return, having
started with their tasks.

Q. Why were you dismissed from the post of Vice-Minister of
War?
A. I was released from the post in connection with TOJO's
resignation from the post of War-Minister. In Japan it is
very often that in case of resignation of War-Minister,
Vice-Minister of War also resigns. I resigned from the
post of Vice-Minister nearly a month later than TOJO left
his post.

I wrote the answers to the above questions in my own hand-
writing and signed them.

Signature /Lt. General Tominaga/

Questioned by the Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at
the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, Col. S.Y.
Rosenblit.

Signature /Rosenblit/

Army Interpreter Lt. Zlomnov

Signature /Zlomnov/
ОБВИНИТЕЛЬ ОТ СОЮЗА ССР
в Международном Военном Трибунале в Токио

Таблица роста сильы Квантонармии и Японской армии как целое в период с 1931 по 1945, на одном листе с пятью диаграмами.
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<td>17</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>2,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 1945</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>860,000</td>
<td>5620,000</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix: To the text 5 charts

Deputy Chief of Department of the General Staff of the Red Army Colonel (Tsagichko)

January 30, 1946

Certificate of translation of the above document.

I, [Signature], hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages, and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature: [Signature]
Diagram

Роста численного состава Квантунской армии и всей японской армии за 1932-1945 гг. (в тыс. чел.)

Increase of the strength of the Kwantung army and Japanese army for the period of 1932-1945 (in thousands of men)
Diagram.

Chart.

Increase in the total number of tanks of the Kwantung army and Japanese ground forces for the period of 1932-1945 (in units)

Diagram shows the increase in the total number of tanks of the Kwantung army and Japanese ground forces from 1932 to 1945. The vertical axis represents the number of tanks, while the horizontal axis shows the years from 1932 to 1945. The chart compares the number of tanks between the Kwantung army and Japanese ground forces.
Increase in the total number of infantry divisions of the Kwantung army and Japanese ground forces for the period of 1932-1945.
Диаграмма

Рост численности артиллерий парка Квантунской армии и японской армии в целом 1932-1945 гг (в единицах)

Increase in the total number of artillery pieces of the Kwantung army and Japanese ground forces for the period of 1932-1945 (in units)

Всё японское арм. 20200

Японские японские

Всё японское арм. 12270

Японские

Квантина армия

Всё японское арм. 5000

Квантина армия

Всё японское арм. 2700

Квантина армия

На Январь 1932г On January 1, 1932

На Январь 1937г On January 1, 1937

На Январь 1945г On January 1, 1945

В 1945г in 1945
Диаграмма
роста численности боевых самолетов авиации
Кванлунской армии и общей численности авиации
Японии с 1932 по 1945 г.

Chart
Increase of the number of the Kwanlung army air force planes and the total strength of Japanese air forces from 1932 to 1945.

Условные обозначения: Conventional signs:

- Сухопутная авиация Кванлунской армии Kwanlung army air force
- Сухопутная авиация Японии Japanese army air force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Год</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Высота</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Высота</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>2600</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>5400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CERTIFICATE

I, Lt. Colonel TIRANUMRO E. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that Doc. #3:

2237 "Table of the increase of the strength of the Kwantung Army and the Japanese Army on the whole from 1931 to 1945."

2073 "Report. Organization of Division of Kwantung Army."

2236 "Table of the growth of technical equipment in the Kwantung Army and in the Japanese on the whole from 1931 to 1945."

2130 "Report concerning Japanese Troops created by the Japanese in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia."

1879 "Table increase of Hungary river war flotilla from 1931 - 1945."

2151 "Report on the growth of the network of railroads and automobile roads in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."

2134 "Report on the increase of the airfield system in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."

2148 "Report construction of fortified districts in Manchuria from 1934 to 1945."

1977 "Report concerning construction of ammunition depots in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."

1831 "Report on the increase of the barracks facilities in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."

2133 "Report Concerning Japanese military settlements in Manchuria."

1633 "Report on the growth of Carports of Korea and Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."

1985 "Table on the increase of the strength of the Japanese troops in Korea in the period 1931-1945."

2129 "Report on the increase of construction of a network of railroads and highways in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

2122 "Report on the increase of the airfield network in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

2131 "Report on construction of fortified areas in Korea from 1931 to 1945.

- 1 -
"Report on construction of military camps in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

"Report on the increase of the barrack facilities in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

was presented by the Red Army General Staff in Moscow, on or about January 30, 1946.

LT. COL. TAFMERO
CHIEF OF THE USSR
dOCUMENT SECTION.
Organization of Division of Kwantung Army

From the very beginning of occupation of Manchuria the Kwantung Army was always manned by regular reinforced Infantry Divisions consisting of 24-29000 men, while on the other theatres of war operated divisions consisting 13-16000 men.

The number of personnel and the armament of the reinforced Division of the Kwantung Army was twice as much of a normal Japanese Infantry Division.

In 1942 there were 17 Infantry Divisions, out of them 5 Divisions of (type A-l: 1, 8, II, 12 and 23 Infantry Division) consisting of 29000 men and 12 Divisions (type A: 2, 9, 10, 14, 19, 20, 24, 25, 28, 29, 57 and 71 Infantry Division) consisting of 24000 men.

These Divisions were disposed in the districts adjacent to the frontier of the U.S.S.R. in the most important operation directions. Some of these Divisions had taken part in the operations against the Red Army at the Lake Hassan (1938) and at the river Khalhin-Gol (1939).

Strength and Armament of Reinforced and Normal Infantry Divisions.

**COMPARATIVE TABLE.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Reinforced Division type A-1</th>
<th>Reinforced Division type A</th>
<th>Normal Division</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Man-power</td>
<td>29,400</td>
<td>24,600</td>
<td>13,000 - 16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piece of ordnance (all calibres)</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the whole Pacific Ocean war 1941-1945 the Kwantung Army consisted of the most efficient and best equipped units and formations of Japanese Army.
Reinforced Infantry Divisions in the Japanese Army as a whole and in the Kwantung Army.

Comparative Table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total in Japanese Army</th>
<th>In Kwantung Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reinforced Infantry Divisions type A-I</td>
<td>5 &amp;</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforced Infantry Divisions type A</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix: 1. Scheme of organisation, strength and armament of Japanese reinforced Infantry Division type A-I in Manchuria.

2. Scheme of organisation, strength and armament of Japanese normal Infantry Division.
Deputy Chief of Department of the Red Army General Staff.

January 1946.

Colonel (Tsirichko)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. Menshova, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature Menshova
ORGANISATION, STRENGTH AND ARRANGEMENT OF REINFORCED
INFANTRY DIVISIONS IN MANCHURIA

Division Commander

Headquarters 465

Detachments

Artillery 150
Veterinary Supply 160
Decontamination 190
Medical 1065
Signal 285
Tank 720

Groups

Infantry 17240
Artillery 3490

Headquarters 70

Headquarters 70

Signal Detachment 110

Regiments

Infantry regiments

5685
5685
5685

Field Hospitals

200
200
200

TOTAL IN DIVISION:

Man-power 29400
Machine guns 517
(Tanks and tankettes 81
(all calibres) 148)
### ORGANISATION, STRENGTH AND APPEARANCE OF INFANTRY DIVISIONS

**Acting on the other theatres of war**

#### Hospitals
- Vets.  500
- Decon. Water.  500
- Decon Water.  60

#### Detachments
- *Men in men*: 967
- *Men in men*: 300

#### Division

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commanders</th>
<th>Headquarters</th>
<th><em>Men in men</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Regiments

**Infantry**
- Reconnaissance 2650 men
- Light 2650 men
- Tanks 550 men

**Artillery**
- 4 batteries
- 3 companies

**Details**
- Men-power - 14,800
- Machine guns (all calibres) - 348
- Guns (all calibres) - 75
- Tanks - 24

**Mixed batteries**
- Howitzer batteries

**TOTAL IN DIVISION:**

- 450
- 450
- 450
- 450
- 75
- 6 x 105
- 9 x 105
- 9 x 105
- 9 x 105

---

Page 4
# Table of the Growth of Technical Equipment in the Kwantung Army and in the Japanese Army on the Whole from 1932 to 1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the Units and detachments</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tank divisions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank brigades</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separate tank regiments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery regiments in GHQ reserve</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-aircraft artillery regiments</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer regiments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal regiments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Deputy Chief of Department of the General Staff of the Red Army
Colonel

January 30th, 1946

Certificate of Translation of the Above Document:

I, V. T. Tarkhov, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages, and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: V. T. Tarkhov
CERTIFICATE

I, Lt. Colonel TARAIKEKO G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that Dec. # 3:

2237 "Table of the increase of the strength of the Kwantung Army and the Japanese Army on the whole from 1931 to 1945."

2073 "Report, Organization of Division of Kwantung Army."

2216 "Table of the growth of technical equipment in the Kwantung Army and in the Japanese on the whole from 1936 to 1945."

2130 "Report concerning Gurmat Troops created by the Japanese in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia."

1979 "Table increase of Hungary river war flotilla from 1931-1945."

2151 "Report on the growth of the network of railroads and bacteriological poisons in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."

2134 "Report on the increase of the airfield system in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."

2148 "Report construction of fortified districts in Manchuria from 1934 to 1945."

1977 "Report concerning construction of ammunition dumps in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."

1831 "Report on the increase of the railway facilities in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."

2133 "Report Concerning Japanese military settlements in Manchuria."

1533 "Report on the growth of fortresses of Korea and Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."

1387 "Table on the increase of the strength of the Japanese troops in Korea in the period 1931-1945."

2127 "Report on the increase of construction of network of railroads and highways in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

2132 "Report on the increase of the airfield network in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

2131 "Report on construction of fortified areas in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

- 1 -
"Report on construction of military dumps in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

"Report on the location of the Korean facilities in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

was delivered to me by the Red Army General Staff in Moscow, on or about January 30, 1946.

LT. COL. TARAKEMLO
CHIEF OF THE USSR
DOCUMENT SECTION.
CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT

I, Gildenblat, M., hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature: /s/ M. Gildenblat
Concerning Puppet Troops, created by the

JAPAN in MANCHURIA and INNER MONGOLIA

1. ARMY OF MANCHUKUO

The Army of the puppet state "Manchukuo" was created by the Japanese after the occupation of Manchuria from the remainder of Tshen Sun-Lyan troops.

The guidance of this army was in the hands of the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army, which realized it directly through many Japanese military advisors in the Army of "Manchukuo" and through the military administrative staff of this "State" which mostly consisted of the Japanese.

For the purpose of using manpower resources of Manchuria in preparation for a war against the U. S. S. R., the Japanese began accumulating the military trained reserves and in 1940 a conscription law was issued in "Manchukuo".

Besides, in 1940-1945 Japanese reorganized the puppet army of "Manchukuo" to bring it nearer to the level of modern armies for using it in a war against the U. S. S. R.

Formations of the same branches of service and special units were created in the army. They were re-armed with the Japanese type weapons. Measures were taken to raise their battle efficiency by means of manning them with the Japanese officers and the pro-Japanese local Chinese officers.

All the measures taken to strengthen the Manchurian army and also its dislocation in the definite operation directions showed that the Kwantung Army Headquarters planned to use this army in a war against the U. S. S. R.
2. **THE ARMY OF INNER MONGOLIA**

The puppet army of Inner Mongolia was formed in 1935 after the Japanese occupation of the Chahar province. The Army of Inner Mongolia, as well as the Manchoukuo Army, was supposed to carry out the aggressive plans of the Japanese Command, and therefore was filled with Japanese military advisors, and armed with Japanese type weapons.

The Army of Inner Mongolia as a component part of the Japanese troops was supposed to invade the Mongolian People's Republic.

In 1945 the army of Inner Mongolia had:

- **Divisions**.......................... 8
- **Separate Regiments**................. 4
- **Manpower**.......................... 12,000
- **Pieces of Ordnance**.................. 60

The Map of the Manchoukuo Army dislocation in 1945.

Deputy Chief of Department of the Red Army General Staff

Colonel /TSIGIYEO/

30 January, 1946

**CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:**

I, K. MONSHOVA, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: Monshova
Дислокация армии Манчжу-го в 1945г.

Stationing of the Army of Manchukuo in 1945.

In the Manchukuo Army, on the whole:

1. Headquarters of the military districts - 11
2. Divisions - 4
3. Brigades - 41
4. Separate regiments - 9
5. Artillery regiments and detachments - 18
6. Number of men - 73,000
7. Pieces of ordnance - 800
8. Planes - 200
To secure battle efficiency of Sungary river flotilla against the Soviet Union, the Japanese Command, on inner and frontier river systems, created five military river bases: the main base - in the town of Sharbin (on the river Sungary), the operation base in the town of Tzianusi (on the river Sungary) and the manoeuvre bases in the towns of Funtzin (on the river Sungary), Sakhalin - Ula (on the river Amur) and Kutow (on the river Ussuri).

1) Out of these more than 60 landing motor boats.

APPENDIX: 1. Chart of the increase in the total number of personnel of the Sungary river war flotilla.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Boats</th>
<th>M.O.T.E</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935-37</td>
<td>about 700</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-43</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DEPUTY CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT OF THE RED ARMY GENERAL STAFF, COLONEL. (Tsiginchko)

January 30 1946.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT.

I, M. Menshova, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature: /s/ M. Menshova
Chart

Increase in the total number of craft of the Sugamush River war flotilla from 1931 to 1945.
ОБВИНИТЕЛЬ ОТ СОЮЗА ССР
в Международном Военном Трибунале в Токио

REPORT
CONCERNING CONSTRUCTION OF AMMUNITION
DUMPS IN MANCHURIA FROM 1931 TO 1945
REPORT
concerning construction of ammunition dumps
in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945

Before the occupation there were only 7 ammunition dumps in Manchuria.

During the Japanese occupation of Manchuria the Command of the Kwantung Army undertook a vast scale construction of dumps and accumulated in these big supplies of ammunition and equipment. Disposition and capacity of constructed funds of dumps was coordinated with the intended offensive operations with large forces in war against the USSR.

A vast construction of new dumps was begun in 1933 in Northern and Eastern Manchuria. The places of disposition of new dumps and their capacity were in accordance with purely operational considerations and war-time needs. Bases and first-line dumps for war against the Soviet Union were built beforehand.

In central districts strategical bases were being constructed in such points as Harbin, Tientsin, Mukden, etc. The forward bases were being constructed in districts of Sensus-Takensai, Mudantsyan-Minguta, Hailar, Beyanchen, etc.

The first-line dumps were constructed in Hunchun, Yantsi, Malin, Lishutchzen, Putsin, Sakhalin-Ola, etc.

By the beginning of 1937 total number of dumps in Manchuria reached 80 with the following capacity.

1. Ammunition dumps - about 30-35 divisional sets of ammunition rounds (about 14,000 tons).
2. Bomb dumps - about 7,000 tons.
3. Fuel depots - about 10,500 tons.

In the following years (1938 - 1945) together with the increase of number of Japanese troops in Manchuria and mere active preparation for the war against the U.S.S.R., construction of dumps became more intensive.

Alongside with the enlargement and improving of existing dump buildings, was performed the construction of new bases in regions adjacent to the frontier and accumulation of big supplies of ammunition and military equipment in fortified points at the frontier of the U.S.S.R.
Main attention was paid to the equipment of regions against the Soviet Primorye, where, according to offensive operations of Japanese army, were main operational directions.

By the beginning of 1945 number of dumps in Manchuria reached 370 with the following capacity:

1. Ammunition - more than 700 sets of ammunition rounds (about 300,000 tons).
2. Aviation bombs - about 12,000 tons.
3. Fuel - about 250,000 tons.

By this time in Manchuria was already constructed a dense system of dumps, filled with mobilisation supplies, which was in accordance with the plans of large scale offensive operations against the Soviet Union.

Appendix: 1. Map, "Ammunition dumps in Manchuria in 1931 (before occupation)."

DEPUTY CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RED ARMY.

Colonel /Tsigichke/

30th January 1946

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT

I, V. TASSHWY, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

V. TASSHWY
Военные склады Маньчжурии
в 1936-37 гг.

Military Dumps in Manchuria
in 1936-37
The barracks facilities in Manchuria in 1931, just before the Japanese occupation, consisted of the barracks built by Russian Tsarist government and the Chinese, with general billeting capacity for 7.5 divisions (100,000 men). All the barracks of that period were concentrated in South Manchuria and along the line of the former Chinese Eastern Railroad.

In 1937 the billeting capacity of the Kwantung Army barracks facilities was increased for receiving 12 reinforced infantry divisions, about 50% of the whole barracks facilities being built in the districts adjacent to the Soviet Primorye.

The number of the barracks in Manchuria was increased three times as much from 1937 to 1941.

In 1941 the billeting capacity of the barracks facilities in Manchuria was already for 39 infantry divisions, from which about 8 divisions were in the Western Manchuria and the Inner Mongolia; about 8 divisions in the district adjacent to the Amour; about 13 divisions in the Eastern Manchuria; about 10 divisions in the Central Manchuria—totally, about 39 divisions (about 800,000 men).

The main part of the barracks facilities (about 75%) was concentrated in the main operation directions.

During 1941-45 the Japanese command did not cease the construction of new barracks and enlargement and repair of the old ones.

In 1945 the billeting capacity of the barracks facilities in Manchuria increased up to 55 divisions, and under the condition of condensed quartering it could have been increased to accommodate 17 divisions more.

Creation of large barracks facilities planned for 50-70 divisions (about 1.5 million men), shows that the Kwantung Army was not preparing for a defensive war in Manchuria, but planned large scale offensive operations against the Soviet East.

Appendix: 1. Map "Barracks facilities in Manchuria in 1931 (before occupation)."
3. Map "Barracks facilities in Manchuria in 1941-45."
on the increase of the barracks facilities
in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945.

The barracks facilities in Manchuria in 1931, just before the Japanese occupation, consisted of the barracks built by Russian Tsarist government and the Chinese, with general billeting capacity for 7.5 divisions (100,000 men). All the barracks of that period were concentrated in South Manchuria and along the line of the former Chinese Eastern Railroad.

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Creation of large barracks facilities planned for 50-70 divisions (about 1.5 million men), shows that the Kwantung Army was not preparing for a defensive war in Manchuria, but planned large scale offensive operations against the Soviet East.

Appendix:
1. Map "Barrack facilities in Manchuria in 1931 (before occupation)."
3. Map "Barrack facilities in Manchuria in 1941-45."
January 30, 1946

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, V. TARKHOV, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English language; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated excerpts of the above document.

Signature: Tarkhov
Казарменный фонд Манчурин
в 1931 году
(до оккупации)
Number of Barracks in Manchuria
in 1931
(before the occupation)
Казарменный фонд Маньчжурии
в 1936-37 гг.

Number of Barracks in Manchuria
in 1936-37
Казарменный фонд Маньчжурии
в 1941-45 гг.
Number of Barracks in Manchuria
in 1941-45.
Казарменный фонд Маньчжурии в 1931 году
(до оккупации)

Шеф-штаб Красной Армии
Начальник 6-го отдела
(Соколов)
Казарменный фонд Манчжурии в 1941-45 гг.
REPORT

Concerning Japanese military settlements in Manchuria.

In 1938 the Japanese government commenced to colonise Manchuria, beginning with districts which were of greatest military importance. The first to settle in Manchuria were reserve men, who had finished the active service in the Army, by means of which was reached the accumulation of cadres for mobilization deployment of the Kwantung Army, with the purpose of preparation of war against the U.S.S.R.

Militarized camps were organized for settlers where they received 3 years' training and were used for guard service.

After the 3 years' training in camps the settlers quartered in special militarized settlements.

The main districts of settling the colonists were organized in the areas adjacent to the Soviet Primorye.

By the beginning of 1936 the whole number of Japanese settlers in Manchuria was above 300,000 men.

From 1936 to 1940 about 221,000 Japanese arrived in Manchuria, of whom about 150-160 thousand were fit for military service.

By 1945 the whole number of Japanese settlers reached about one million people, of whom the adult men were used to men new divisions of the Kwantung Army in 1945.

DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RED ARMY
Colonel (Tsivichko)

30 January 1946
Document No. 2133

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT No. 2133

I, V. T. TARKHOV, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the attached is a correct and true translation of Document No. 2133.

V. Tarkhov (signed)
REPORT

On the Increase of the Airfield System in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945.

Beginning from 1932 and during the following years of occupation of Manchuria the Kwangtung Army Command undertook a large-scale construction of air-bases, airfields, and landing fields preparing a military base for the operations of the Japanese Air Forces against the U.S. A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Air Bases</th>
<th>Airfields</th>
<th>Landing Fields</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Beginning from 1937 the Japanese Command paid greatest attention to the construction of air-bases and airfield groups, to the improvement of the existing airfields and to the construction of hangars and runways.

Beginning from 1941 the work of improvement and extension of airfield system in Manchuria greatly increased and continued until the capitulation of Japan.

Appendix:

Deputy Chief of Department of the General Staff of the Red Army.

/s/ Jeitchkov

Colonel.
Doc. No. 2134

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, V. Tarkov, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: /s/ V. Tarkov
Диаграмма
роста аэродромной сети в Маньчжурии
с 1931 по 1945 гг.

Chart
Increase of the air field system
in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945.

Условные обозначения:
conventional signs:
Airfield System in Manchuria in 1931
(before the occupation)

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6th Department
Lieutenant-Colonel

Conventional marks
- Airfields

The total
Airfields

Аэродромная сеть Манчuria в 1931 г.
(до оккупации)

Кланняе обозначения
Conventional marks
- Airfields

The total
Airfields
Аэродромная сеть Маньчжурии
в 1941 году

Airfield System in Manchuria
in 1941.
ОБВИНИТЕЛЬ от СОЮЗА ССР
в Международном Военном Трибунале в Токио

ABOUT THE CONSTRUCTION OF FORTIFIED
DISTRICTS IN MANCHURIA IN THE PERIOD
FROM 1934 TO 1945 ON TWO SHEETS WITH
FOUR MAPS IN TWO COPIES.
REPORT
CONSTRUCTION OF FORTIFIED DISTRICTS IN MANCHURIA FROM 1934 TO 1945.

The construction of fortified districts in Manchuria was begun by the commanding authorities of the Kwantung Army in 1934 and was continued through 1945.

The disposition of the fortified districts was clearly indicative of their aggressive nature because all of them were shallow in depth and were built in Zones facing directions leading to very important operation objectives on the Soviet territory.

From 1934 to 1937, seven fortified districts were built, extending 150 km. along the frontier and including 300 permanent fortifications for different purposes.

From 1937 to 1940 the construction was extended over additional frontier districts, with general length of 300 km, and 800 different permanent fortifications were built. By 1941, 13 fortified districts had been constructed, extending more than 700 km, along the front. The total number of permanent fortifications was more than 1200.

From 1941 to 1945 there was further improvement of old, and construction of new, fortified districts. By 1945 had been constructed 17 fortified districts on the frontier of the Soviet Union and in the immediate rear of it.

The total length of fortified zone along the state frontier of Manchuria in 1945 was about 800 km, where there were built more than 4,500 permanent fortifications.
Appendix:

1. Summary Table of different types of fortified districts in Manchuria up to 1945.


3. Map "Fortified constructions of Manchurian Military base in 1936-37".

4. Map "Fortified constructions of Manchurian Military base in 1941".

5. Map "Fortified constructions of Manchurian Military base in 1945".

DEPUTY CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT OF THE RED ARMY GENERAL STAFF.

January 30, 1946.

COLONEL /TSIGICHKO/

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. MENSHEVA, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: MENSHEVA
## APPENDIX I.

**SUMMARY TABLE**

**GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF FORTIFIED DISTRICTS IN MANCHURIA UP TO 1945.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Fortified Districts</th>
<th>Extension in Klm Along the frontline</th>
<th>Area in sq. km</th>
<th>Year of constr.</th>
<th>No. of construct.</th>
<th>Perm. others.</th>
<th>Total.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Halun-Arshansky</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>8-20</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>789</td>
<td>1078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Jalaiynor-Manchurian</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Hailarsky</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Sahaliansky</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>10-20</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Tsikaiivsky</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10-40</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Tuksky</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Sinshangensky</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3-7</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Sungarysky</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>3-6</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Puntsinysky</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Djaoheksky</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Hutoussky</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Mishansky</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10-20</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>725^7/2</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Pogranichnensky</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Dunninsky</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>1239</td>
<td>1830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Dunsinichjensky</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Hunchumsky</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>4-12</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>878</td>
<td>1425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Kenhinsky</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2-6</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chief of the 6th Department of the General Staff of the Red Army
LIEUTENANT COLONEL SOKOLOV.

January 30, 1946.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. MENSHOVA, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: [Signature]
Fortifications of the Manchurian military Base in 1931 (before the occupation)

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the G-8 Department
Lieutenant-Colonel

Conventional marks - Field fortifications
Фортificaционное оборудование МанчжурскоG плацдарма
в 1936-37 гг.
Fortifications of the Manchurian military Base
in 1936-37

Условные обозначения: Conventions used:
Понесенные минирования - Field fortifications
Укрепленные полосы - Fortified districts.

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6th Department
Lieutenant-colonel
Sokolov
ФОРТИФИКАЦИОННОЕ ОБОРУДОВАНИЕ
МАНЧАУРСКОГО ЛАПАДАРМА
в 1941-42 гг.
Fortifications of the Manchurian
Military Base
in 1941-42

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6th Department
Lieutenant-colonel
Sokolov
Фортификационное оборудование Маньчжурского плацдарма
в 1945 году
Fortifications of the Manchuria military Base
in 1945
### PORTS: Short characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1935-1937</th>
<th>1941-1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yuki</td>
<td>Fishing port of local significance</td>
<td>Seaport, Shipping capacity 320,000 t. per year. Train capacity 4 trains per day round trip.</td>
<td>Seaport and port for disembarkation of troops. Base for maneuvers of light navy forces. Shipping capacity 300,000 tons per year. Train capacity, 12 trains per day round trip.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasin</td>
<td>Fishing port of local significance</td>
<td>Seaport and port for disembarkation of troops. Shipping capacity 3-4 mln tons per year. Train capacity about 30 trains per day round trip.</td>
<td>Base for maneuvers of heavy naval forces. Seaport and port for disembarkation of troops. Parking base (Harbor Yudzin) for light forces of the navy. Shipping capacity 6 mln tons per year. Train capacity 42 trains per day round trip. 13 ships of 5000 tons displacement each could be moored at the piers of the port.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seisin</td>
<td>Fishing port of local significance</td>
<td>Seaport and port for disembarkation of troops. Shipping capacity about 1.5 mln tons per year. Train capacity of the port 12 trains per day round trip.</td>
<td>Seaport and port for disembarkation of troops. Navel base of light navy forces, fortified district, hydro-aviation base.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genzen</td>
<td>Inner Port of the Japanese Sea</td>
<td>Seaport. Shipping capacity about 400,000 tons per year. Train capacity 4 trains per day round trip.</td>
<td>Seaport and port for disembarkation of troops. Naval base of light navy forces, fortified district, hydro-aviation base.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Short Description</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fusian</td>
<td>First class seaport</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seaport and port for disembarkation of troops. Freight turnover about 3 mln tons per year.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Train capacity 20-25 per day round trip.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support and main port for disembarkation of troops. Fortified district. Naval base.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shipping capacity more than 6 mln t. per year.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Train capacity of the port 54 trains per day both directions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity in ships, 15 ships of 80,000 tons total displacement at the moorage and 13 ships of 65,000 tons total displacement on the roadstead.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tzinkel</td>
<td>Naval base</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Large construction works were being performed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andun</td>
<td>Fishing port of local significance.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shipping capacity 850 tons per year.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairen</td>
<td>First class seaport</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seaport, shipping capacity 11,600 t. per year.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Train capacity 80 trains per day both directions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support and port for disembarkation of troops.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shipping capacity 7 mln t. per year.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Train capacity 8 trains per day round trip.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Main port of transportation of troops to Manchuria and Northern China and cargoes from Manchuria to Japan. 30 transports of 200,000 tons displacement could simultaneously be unloaded at the pier and on the roadstead. Equipment of the port allowed simultaneous unloading of troops of about two infantry divisions. Train capacity of the port 128 trains per day round trip.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Short characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ports</th>
<th>Naval Base</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1935-1937</th>
<th>1941-1943</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Port Arthur</td>
<td>Fishing Port</td>
<td>1,8 mln tons per year</td>
<td>Sceport end port for disembarkation of troops</td>
<td>Sceport end port for disembarkation of troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inkom</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Shipping capacity 1,600,000 t. per year</td>
<td>Shipping capacity about 5 mln tons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulundro</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Sceport. Construction begun in 1936</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Train capacity 12 trains per day both directions</td>
<td>Train capacity 12 trains per day both directions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Appendix:**

1. Map: "Ports and Naval bases of Manchuria and Korea in 1931" (before occupation of Manchurir).
2. Map: "Ports and Naval bases of Manchuria and Korea in 1937".
3. Map: "Ports and Naval bases of Manchuria and Korea in 1945".

**DEPUTY CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT OF THE RED ARMY GENERAL STAFF**

January 30, 1946

COLEONEL TSIGITCHKO
CERTIFICATE

I, Lt. Colonel TANASEKO G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that Doc.#1:

2237 "Table of the increase of the strength of the Kwantung Army and the Japanese Army on the whole from 1932 to 1945."

2073 "Report, Organization, of Division of Kwantung Army."

2236 "Table of the growth of technical equipment in the Kwantung Army and in the Japanese on the whole from 1932 to 1945."

2130 "Report concerning puppet Troops created by the Japanese in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia."

1379 "Table increase of Manchurty river war flotilla from 1931 - 1945."

2151 "Report on the growth of the network of railroads and automobile roads in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."

2144 "Report on the increase of the airfield system in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."

2148 "Report construction of fortified districts in Manchuria from 1934 to 1945."

1377 "Report concerning construction of ammunition dumps in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."

1381 "Report on the growth of the barracks facilities in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."

2139 "Report Concerning Japanese military settlements in Manchuria."

1383 "Report on the growth of Seaports of Korea and Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."

1385 "Table of the increase of the strength of the Japanese troops in Korea in the period 1931-1945."

2127 "Report on the increase of construction of network of railroads and highways in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

2122 "Report on the increase of the airfield network in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

2131 "Report on construction of fortified areas in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

- 1 -
"Report on construction of military camps in Normandy from 1931 to 1945."

"Report on the increase of the German casualties in Normandy from 1931 to 1945."

was delivered to us by the Red Army General Staff in Moscow, on or about January 30, 1946.

LT. GEN. T. E. CONNOLLY
Chief of the War
Department.
Порты и военно-морские базы Маньчжурии и Кореи в 1931 году (до оккупации Маньчжурии)

The ports and the naval bases in Manchuria and Korea in 1931 (before the occupation of Manchuria)
Порты и военно-морские базы
Манчжурии и Кореи
в 1937 г.

The ports and the naval bases
in Manchuria and Korea
in 1937.

Legend for the map:

- Морской порт (Sea port)
- Морская база (Naval base)
- Железнодорожная станция (Railway station)
- Аэропорт (Airport)
- Географическая отметка

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6th Department
Lieutenant-colonel.

Maps and graphics were drawn with the help of images and data from the collection of the Russian State Library.
Порты и военно-морские базы
Манчжурии и Кореи
в 1945 г.

The ports and the naval bases
in Manchuria and Korea
in 1945
ПОРТЫ И ВОЕННО-МОРСКИЕ БАЗЫ
МАНЧЖУРИИ И КОРЕИ

в 1931 г.

(до оккупации Манчжурти)

- Город и железные станции
- Военные базы
- Морские порты
- Герби

(Герб Манчжурского княжества)

(Герб Корейского княжества)
Порты и воронно-морские базы Манчжурии и Кореи в 1937 г.

Информация на карте отсутствует.

Подпись на карте:

[писать на карте]
Document No. 1883

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1883

I, M. Menshova, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the attached is a correct and true translation of Document No. 1883.

Menshova (signed)
E. MENSHOVA
Title: Plan of Stationing Meteorological Service System in Chahar-Suiyuan

1. Object

To establish promptly a general and aeronautical meteorological service system in the Mongolia area north of the Inner Great Wall and thus enable more accurate weather forecasting service in Japan and Manchuria and especially to strengthen aeronautical meteorological service system in preparation for war with Soviet Russia.

2. Outline

For the time being, have them controlled directly by the army and allocate stations by taking into consideration military operations, position of troops and special agencies. Upon completion, gradually transfer the control to the local government and make them permanent establishments.
Secret telegram: 11 Feb 1938 -- No. 172 addressed to the Viceminister and the Vice-Chief of the General Staff by the Chief of Staff of Kantung Army. (p.60)

The establishment of anti-Soviet fortifications is scheduled to be made during 1938 and 1939 on the spots not yet started as well as the spots regarded as specially important among the locations of fortifications mentioned in Special Order No. 301. (Necessary funds will be provided by the budget.) The outline of the plan will be submitted to the General Staff office within four days. In order to execute this plan, moreover, since the increased number of men attached is remarkably insufficient in view of the present fortification work, I beg you to inquire immediately into the ways of making the following temporary increases for about ten years from March 1938 in the number of men attached.

Four Field Grade Officers, Engineer; six Company Grade Officers, Engineer; four Field (Company) Grade Officers, Artillery (Skilful Marksmen and men experienced in putting guns in position are preferred); three warrant officers, Engineer; eight non-commissioned officers, carpenter; four non-commissioned officers, artillery (observers); four non-commissioned officers, Intendance; twenty-four Assistant-Engineers; forty civilian employees.

Dispatch 12 Jun 1938 -- KUNSAN SHI No. 23 (TN No. of dispatch) addressed to Vice-Chief of the Far Office UMEI, Yoshihiro; by Chief of Staff of the KUNSAN SHI; TOJO, Hideki; requesting consideration of the establishment of meteorological organs in the KUNSAN and MONOLI districts. (p.11)

Because the new establishment of meteorological observation organs is of vital importance from the standpoint of the CHIN Incident and anti-Soviet strategy, it must be promptly completed based on the plan separately bound. I beg you will immediately consider the following items of the plan in question and understand, furthermore, that after the start of work in the actual place where the troops are stationed in MONOLI, this plan will transfer control to the same troops.

1. Increase of officers in charge of the meteorology attached to the headquarters of troops stationed in MONOLI.

2. Provision for the budget required (special military expenditure).

3. Induction and education of the following number of men.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Persons required for chief of the observatory</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Fully experienced men, three of whom must be of considerable dignity (persons required for the chief of the observatory in CIA, Chian, Taung, and Kiang).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation assistant-engineer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Superior persons who are capable of becoming engineers in the future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation men</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Seven of whom are soon to come from the Artillery and Engineering school and three having the same ability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wireless operators</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Persons who have been educated for meteorological wireless and general wireless.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note**

It is hoped that in the dispatch of the above persons, travel expenses to CIA will be paid.

4. Equipment

If possible, they must be supplied with the actual articles.

Draft for code telegram, 24 Jan. 1935—reply to Kwantung Army dispatch—addressed to the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army by Vice-Chief of the 'ar Office, relative to the prohibition of newspaper articles concerning the opening of air-routes between EURP and Asia.

Regarding the prohibition of publications in papers concerning the air-line connections between JAPAN and EURP, I beg to inform you that the Home Ministry authorities, having the view that the parties concerned in the negotiation, the plans for regular air service, the aviation companies, etc. are contained within the scope of the prohibition, are taking efforts in order that everything may be done well. Furthermore, I caution you that the purport of your telegram has been brought to the attention of the Home Ministry.

Secret telegram, 17 Jan. 1935—Kwantung Army telegram No. 1 addressed to the Vice-Minister by the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army. (P. 13)
Regarding air-line connections between JAPAN and GER. ANY genera. prohibition cannot be fully expected, because the publication of newspaper accounts is prohibited only as regards the negotiation itself in spite of agreement that the absolute secret should be strictly kept from other countries. Therefore, I hope that this matter will be corrected as follows, and be immediately corrected in KAIKIDO.

(Including everything except the announcement by the Japanese Foreign ministry relating to the regular air-line connections between EURCFL and ASIA.)

Dispatch.

12 Jan. 1938—KAN SAI CHI No. 20 (TH No. of dispatch) address. to the Vice War minister; T. EZU, Yoshijiro; by the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung army; TCU, Kidoki; relating to the presentation of topographic materials for strategic areas of far eastern Soviet territory and OUTER I.O.C. GOLIA. (F. 19)

The above is submitted as follows:

1. Topographic materials for strategic areas for far eastern Soviet territory and OUTER I.O.C. GOLIA. No. 302
   1. Map of news gathering organization in eastern Soviet dis­tricts.
   1. Map of news gathering organization in northern Soviet dis­tricts.
   1. Map of news gathering organization in western Soviet dis­tricts.
   1. Map of news gathering organization in OUTER I.O.C. GOLIA dis­tricts.
   1. Map of wireless networks in the U.IO. OF S.S.V.I.T SOCIALIST REPUBLIC.

Draft of inquiry, 25 Jan. 1938—RII. AY. IISU No. 25 (TH Dis­crepancy in dispatch numbers exists here.) addressed to Vice-Chief of Staff by the Vice-minister with regard to the extension of the term of military service of enlisted men of 1935 belonging to the units in .anchuria. (F. 35)
I beg you to extend for the time being the term of service of the enlisted men of 1935 who enlist in March in units under the commander of the Kwantung Army. Furthermore, I beg you for the time being to continue extension of the term of service of the enlisted men of 1935 attached to the Third Railway Regiment and to the 1st and 2nd Motor Regiments whose period of service has at present been extended. If there are no objections, I should like you to inform the M. G. Army unofficially, and also inform me of the schedule for release from the extended term of military service.

(After no objection was received)

Draft of reply, 21 Jan. 1936--RL.G. Amt. IFSU No. 32 addressed to the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army by the Vice-Minister. (P. 35)

In reply to your inquiry dated 11 Jan--KAI SAM No. 36, 1--I beg to inform you that the term of service of the enlisted men of 1935 who enlist in March attached to units under the commander of the Kwantung army is, for the time being, scheduled to be extended.

Furthermore, the enlisted men of 1935 attached to the 3rd Railway Regiment and the 1st and 2nd Motor Regiments, who have at present had their term of service extended, will be, for the time being, subjected to further extension of service.

Dispatch 11 Jan. 1936--KAI SAM No. 36, 1--addressed to the Vice-Chief of Staff Office U. EIU, Yoshijiro, by the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army T.C.I, Kidoji; pertaining to the extension of military service of troops in Manchuria. (P. 37)

In view of the purport of the Ordinance 41 of War Ministry dated September 1937 I consider that the soldiers in active service belonging to the units in Manchuria whose service will expire at the end of Feb. this year, ought to have their services extended according to Ordinance No. 5 of the War Ministry as long as the present situation continues; but I wish to get your unofficial report as early as possible, as this decision has influences upon various matters.

In addition to this, I beg to inform you that it is desirable that the conscripts of 1937 be educated in Manchuria and I believe in the possibility of their accommodation by means of making some supplementary establishment.
Reply 27 Jan 1938—SAI, ITSU, No. 293-2 of Army Dept. in Imperial Headquarters—addressed to the Vice-Chief of War Office U.S.ZU, Yoshijiro by the Vice-Chief of the Staff TADA, Shuji relating to the extension of military service of the conscripts of 1935 belonging to the units in Manchuria. (P. 35)

I have no objection about your inquiry of R.I.U.A., ITSU No. 25 concerning the above. I wish to add that it is difficult in the present situation to schedule the time of release from the extension of military service.

Dispatch 25 Jan. 1938—SAI, CHI, No. 47—addressed to the Vice-Minister of War, U.S.ZU, Yoshijiro; by the Chief of Staff of the Manchurian Army, TAJI, Katsuki; relating to the presentation of a rough sketch. (P. 45)

The above is submitted as follows:

1. Rough sketch of far eastern Soviet territory, one five-millionth.

2. Rough sketch of western Siberia, one five-millionth.

To the Chief of Army Ordnance Central Depot, dated 20 Dec. 1937—R.I.U.A., ITSU, No. 619. (P. 84)

Arrange for the Kwangtung Army to be supplied as per enclosure; the expenses will be drawn from the Manchurian Incident Fund.

Directive dated 20 Dec. 1937—R.I.U.A., ITSU, No. 619—addressed to the Chief of Staff of the Manchurian Army by the Adjutant-General. (P. 84)

Pursuant to orders, I notify you that your army will be supplied as per enclosure.

UTILE OF KUANTUNG AR'TY'S COLLECTIVE MEASURES IN UNITING EAST KOREA CT. W. THE NORTH CHINA CT. TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF KUANTUNG ARMY 18 Jan. 1938. (P. 42)
--- POLICY ---

In uniting the EAST KOPPE Govt with the new NORTH ChIA Govt, let us have a special regard for past circumstances and endeavour to cement more closely the ties of friendship existing among JIFAN, I.A., CHUNOU, and CHUIN.

--- A.M.I. D ---

1. The truce will be effective until the conclusion of a formal agreement and in case of future dissolution, the establishment of non-fortified zones and other substantial provisions favorable to us, based on the truce and on accompanying arrangements, will be secured as before.

2. We will endeavor to make the EAST KOPPE Govt remain as one special ward in KOPPE Province, acknowledging its peculiarity and not making any radical change in the staff hitherto concerned with the EAST KOPPE Govt.

3. The agreement on Ti LING region in NORTH CHIA between the Northung Army and the EAST KOPPE Govt. and the agreement on the management of Ti LING region in NORTH CHINA between CHUNOU Govt and EAST KOPPE Govt will be succeeded to by the new Govt.

4. The agreement and contract which has been made between EAST KOPPE Govt and CHUNOU will actually as a principle be succeeded to by the new government and several sort of benefits and facilities actually enjoyed hitherto by CHUNOU which the EAST KOPPE Govt has recognized will be acknowledged by the new government.

The concrete contents are generally as follows:

a. The agreement of 12 April 1934 on friendship between I.A. and EAST KOPPE Govt will be generally recognized, provided that I.A. retains the right to demand the necessary revision in accordance with the changes in the situation.

b. CHUNOU Govt officials hitherto dispatched to the EAST KOPPE Govt will be succeeded to by the provisional government with the same condition and method as that of the EAST KOPPE Govt. And furthermore, after taking over, the provisional government will handle the exchange of staffs with I.A. and other matters in the same manner as in the EAST KOPPE Government.
c. The existence and functions of MANCHUO's organs (custom office, police office, and communication bureau) existing in border region of EAST HUPEH Govt. will be recognized as they are.

d. The compensation case for damages caused the MANCHURIAN people by the MANCHUO Govt. will be succeeded to by the Provisional government in the event that the negotiation had not been completed before the annexation of the EAST HUPEH Govt.

e. The total amount of the ¥1,250,000 loan of MANCHURIAN Central Bank to EAST HUPEH Govt., dated 14 September 1934 will be succeeded to.

f. The total amount of the ¥2,000,000 loan of MANCHURIAN Industrial Bank to the EAST HUPEH Govt., dated 18 May 1935 will be succeeded to.

g. The total amount of the ¥300,000 loan of the East Asia Industry Association to the EAST HUPEH Govt. will be succeeded to.

h. The credit of the MANCHURIAN Teleggraf and Telephone Co. Ltd to the EAST HUPEH Govt. will be succeeded to.

5. The Provisional Government of Chinese Republic must be made to newly acknowledge or agree upon the following matters:

a. The 1... deputy dispatched to the EAST HUPEH Govt. will leave there simultaneously with the annexation of the same government and shall newly reside in FUKIPI.G.

b. Matters relating to the ark of the boundaries.

c. Arrangement relating to anti-comintern.

d. A close police connection will be conducted between the MANCHURIAN Government and the Provisional Government. Actual connection which is now established between both governments will continue to exist until formal agreement is reached.

e. The garrisoning of MANCHURIAN troops at FUKIPI.G (GUARD) shall be recognized.

f. The use and passage of EAST HUPEH region for the movement and supply of MANCHURIAN troops in the border district of southern MANCHUO shall be recognized.
6. In connection with the guard of J.A.I area, the search within EAST H.P.E.H. areas shall be recognized.

h. Matters relating to the connection of transportation, communication, and aviation.

i. Matters to help each other in connection with circulation of money and exchange.

j. In revising the custom duties' rate and other custom systems in the hold of CHI, after the unification of EAST I. C.H. Govt. with the new N. C. I. I. A Govt., they will be adjusted in relation with A.C.H.I.U.

k. To recognize the operation of gold fields in EAST H.P.E.H. region by the T.C.L.C.H. C.H. E.T.

l. The harnessing of hydro electric power of DAI-HU will be a joint enterprise with the C.H.I.C. Government.

m. To conclude and carry out a lease of land 523.53 (321,185 sq. meters, chiefly for Japanese military use) in KUPEL CU, I.T. Province.

6. Concerning the necessary matters on every preceding paragraph, the A.C.H.A.I.U. Govt. shall make the necessary agreement with the new N. C. I. I. A Govt.
Statement of SOURCE and AUTHENTICITY

I, Kanee Ishibashi, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Corresponding Secretary, 1st Demobilization Bureau, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached JAC, dated 9 Feb., 2 March, 1938, and described as follows: "Manchurian Daily Confidential File.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): 1st Demob. Bureau (War Ministry).

Signed at Tokyo on this 20th day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ Kanoe Ishibashi
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Shinobu Kobayashi
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, John A. Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 20th day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ J. A. Curtis 2nd Lt.
Investigator

Witness: /s/ T/4 Toruchi
Official Capacity
NOTIFICATION OF THE SUBMISSION OF MATERIALS ON THE
MILITARY TOPOGRAPHY OF SOWIET-occupied TERRITORY IN
THE FAR EAST AND OF OUTER MONGOLIA.

29 / Jan / 38

From: TOJO Hideki, Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG Army
To: UMEZU Yoshijiro, Vice-Minister of War

I herewith submit to you the following item:

DETAILED MAP OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF OUTER MONGOLIA.
From: - TOJO Hideki, Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG Army
To: - UMEZU Yoshihiro, Vice-Minister of War

I herewith submit to you the following item:-

DETAILED MAP OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF OUTER MONGOLIA.
CERTIFICATE

I, Maurin A.I., Chief of the Document Room, Soviet Division, I.P.S., hereby certify that the attached excerpt from the document 751 is a copy of a portion of the map entitled, "Detailed administrative map of Outer Mongolia" which was made by the Staff Office of the Kwantung Army in December 1937.

/3/ Maurin A.I.

Maurin A.I.,
Chief of the Document Room
Soviet Division I.P.S.

Tokyo, Japan
May 22, 1947
Document #751

CERTIFICATE

I, Maurin A.I., Chief of the Document Room, Soviet Division, I.P.S., hereby certify that the attached excerpt from the document 751 is a copy of a portion of the map entitled, "Detailed administrative map of Outer Mongolia" which was made by the Staff Office of the Kwantung Army in December 1937.

/\ Maurin A.I.

Maurin A.I.,
Chief of the Document Room
Soviet Division I.P.S.

Tokyo, Japan
May 22, 1947
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(2)
Chronological File of Documents
Received from MANCHUKUO - Secret

Sheewa
13/1933/

W.W. Ministry

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TELEGRAM

Dispatched: 10:20 A.M. May 11, 1938
Received: 11:15 A.M. May 11, 1938

Addressed to: Director of the Military Affairs Bureau

From: Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army

"Kwan-san-man" Telegram No. 700

With reference to the donation to the East Asia Research Institute by the South Manchuria Railway Company, we regret to say, as we have already expressed in "Kwan-san-man" Telegram No. 567, that we cannot agree to it, because it is undesirable to have the South Manchuria Railway Company make the donation from the same standpoint as that of an ordinary private corporation since it is not only a national policy company different from an ordinary private company, but also related to the army in that it is receiving the army's guidance for cooperating in the enforcement of the national policies of Manchukuo and also in the operational preparations, etc., against the Soviet Union. According to a recent private communication from Col. IKEDA of the Planning Board, the Government and the army would be put out of countenance should the South Manchuria Railway Company refuse to make the donation, but we think that the army's face would be saved if the Government would give a subsidy on this occasion. We should be obliged if you would formally negotiate with us in regard to this case.

(End)
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Kaneo Ishibashi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Corresponding Secretary 1st Demobilization and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of _____ pages, dated 15 May, 1938, and described as follows: "Haruchuku Joining the Anti-Comintern Pact".
I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): War Ministry
Signed at Tokyo on this 9 day of September, 1946 /s/ Eric W. Fleischer 2d Lt. AUS
Witness: J. A. Curtis 2d Lt. Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, 2d Lt. Eric W. Fleischer, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.
Signed at Tokyo on this 9 day of September, 1946 /s/ Eric W. Fleischer 2d Lt. AUS
Witness: J. A. Curtis 2d Lt. Official Capacity
[Image of the page]
Doc. No. 2550

Military--Topographical Data (Informations) for the Purpose of Landing Operations in the Northern Sea. Vol. II.

Secret! 1741 March
Prepared by Shipping Transport Headquarters, CTARU Branch.

Contents

Vol. 2

Chapter I Investigation of the Region of "Parana".

1. Geographical Features
2. Inhabited Area
3. Roads
4. Communications
5. Harbors
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation
7. Meteorological Observations
8. Military Affairs
9. Customs
10. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities

Table of the Meteorological Statistics No. 1

Chapter II Investigation of the Region of "トルコヤ".

1. Geographical Features
2. Inhabited Area
3. Roads
4. Communications
5. Harbors
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation
7. Meteorological Observations
8. Military Affairs
9. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities

Map No. 1
Bird's-eye View No. 1.
Chapter III  Investigation of the Region of "SCROCHINAYA".

1. Geographical Features
2. Inhabited Area
3. Roads
4. Communications
5. Harbors
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation
7. Meteorological Observations
8. Sanitary Conditions
9. Military Affairs
10. Customs
11. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities

Map No. 2
Bird’s-eye View No. 2

Chapter IV  Investigation of the Region of "IHCHA".

1. Geographical Features
2. Inhabited Area
3. Roads
4. Communications
5. Harbors
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation
7. Meteorological Observations
8. Military Affairs
9. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities

Map No. 3
Bird’s-eye View No. 3

Table of the Meteorological Statistics No. 2.

Chapter V  Investigation of the Region of "CEURHCINA".

1. Geographical Features
2. Inhabited Area
3. Roads
4. Communications
5. Harbors
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation
7. Meteorological Observations
8. Military Affairs
9. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities
Chapter VI Investigation of the Region of "YUNUTO KOROWA".

1. Geographical Features
2. Inhabited Area
3. Roads
4. Communications
5. Harbors
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation
7. Meteorological Observations
8. Military Affairs
9. Customs
10. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities

Chapter VII Investigation of the Region of "KCIIPA".

1. Geographical Features
2. Inhabited Area
3. Roads
4. Communications
5. Harbors
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation
7. Meteorological Observations
8. Military Affairs
9. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities

Chapter VIII Investigation of the Region of "ORCSMCI".

1. Geographical Features
2. Inhabited Area
3. Roads
4. Communications
5. Harbors
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation
7. Meteorological Observations
8. Sanitary Conditions
Chapter VI Investigation of the Region of "Puerto Korowai".

1. Geographical Features
2. Inhabited Area
3. Roads
4. Communications
5. Harbors
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation
7. Meteorological Observations
8. Military Affairs
9. Customs
10. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities

Chapter VII Investigation of the Region of "Korfa".

1. Geographical Features
2. Inhabited Area
3. Roads
4. Communications
5. Harbors
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation
7. Meteorological Observations
8. Military Affairs
9. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities

Chapter VIII Investigation of the Region of "GRGSL:CI".

1. Geographical Features
2. Inhabited Area
3. Roads
4. Communications
5. Harbors
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation
7. Meteorological Observations
8. Sanitary Conditions
Chapter IX  Investigation of the Region of "KEFUTA".

1. Geographical Features  
2. Inhabited Area  
3. Roads  
4. Communications  
5. Harbors  
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation  
7. Meteorological Observations  
8. Military Affairs  
9. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities  
10. Etc.

Chapter X  Investigation of the Region of "KIKUCHI\'U".

1. Geographical Features  
2. Inhabited Area  
3. Roads  
4. Communications  
5. Harbors  
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation  
7. Meteorological Observations  
8. Sanitary Conditions  
9. Military Affairs  
10. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities
Chapter XI Investigation of the Region of "UTCNA".

1. Geographical Features
2. Inhabited Area
3. Roads
4. Communications
5. Harbors
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation
7. Meteorological Observations
8. Sanitary Conditions
9. Military Affairs
10. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities
11. Other Informations

Map No. 10
Bird's-eye View No. 10
Table of the Meteorological Statistics No. 4.

Chapter XII Investigation of the Region of "NORTH KISHIKA".

1. Geographical Features
2. Inhabited Area
3. Roads
4. Communications
5. Harbors
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation
7. Meteorological Observations
8. Sanitary Conditions
9. Military Affairs
10. Customs
11. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities

Map No. 11
Bird's-eye View No. 11

Chapter XIII Investigation of the Region of "SOUTH KISHIKA".

1. Geographical Features
2. Inhabited Area
3. Roads
4. Communications
5. Harbors
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation
7. Meteorological Observations
8. Sanitary Conditions
9. Military Affairs
10. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities

Map No. 11
Bird's-eye View No. 11
Chapter XIV Investigation of the Region of "OPARA".

1. Geographical Features
2. Inhabited Area
3. Roads
4. Communications
5. Harbors
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation
7. Meteorological Observations
8. Sanitary Conditions
9. Military Affairs
10. Customs
11. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities

Map No. 12
Bird's-eye View No. 12

Chapter XV Investigation of the Regions of "YAINA" and "OZERUKI".

1. Geographical Features
2. Inhabited Area
3. Roads
4. Communications
5. Harbors
6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation
7. Meteorological Observations
8. Sanitary Conditions
9. Military Affairs
10. Customs
11. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities

Map No. 13
Bird's-eye View No. 13
Table of the Meteorological Statistics No. 9.

Chapter I. Investigation of the Region of "PARAINA".

1. Geographical Features

(1) Location:
It stands near the point of Long. 160° 00' E, Lat. 50° 20' N.

Fishing Block No. 565

(2) Coast:

In "PARANA" District there are ranges of mountains running from north down to south and at the front of them there is a valley which meets the seashore.

At the both corners of valley there are hills which project into the sea and make cliffs. In the distance of about 6 kilometers south to the PARANA River there is a sandy beach, and the district north to the PARANA River there is a cliff which is difficult to climb up.

(3) Rivers:

(a) The PARANA River: The mouth of the river is about 70 meters wide in case of the low tide and about 300 meters wide in case of high tide. The bottom of the river is consisted of sands and gravels. The north bank of the river makes a sand-hill, while south bank a cliff. The depth of the river is about 1 meter in case of low tide. There are some spots where it is possible to wade. In case of high tide a launch can go up against stream. The velocity of stream is rapid in case of low tide, while slow in case of high tide.

(b) Lakes:

There is a lake of elliptical shape, its long diameter being 9 kilometers and short diameter 4 kilometers, at about 80 kilometers upper reaches of the PARANA River.

(4) Forest:

Around this district there is a stepp and forest. The interior may be found, but the details remain unknown.

2. Inhabited Area.

The PARANA Village:
It stands on about 6 kilometers upper reaches of the FARATA River. It has a population of about 600, and the number of houses is about 120. The inhabitants are fishers in the river, hunters and farmers on a small scale.

3. Roads

(1) Railway: None

(2) Roads:

The north coast is not good for passing, while along the south coast there is a way for passage.

4. Communications

(1) Wired Telegraph and Telephone:

Details are unknown.

(2) Wireless Telegraph:

They have one in the FARANA Village and one at the station of State Political Department which is on the south bank of the mouth of the FARANA.

(3) Post Offices:

There is one in the FARANA Village.

5. Harbors

(1) Anchorage:

It is about 2,500 kilometers off the coast.

(2) Difference between the ebb and flow of tide:

8 meters at its highest, 5 meters at ordinary times.

(3) Depth of Water and Nature of the Bottom:

It is about 7 meters deep at the spot where is 500 meters off the cost. The bottom is consisted of rock, but covered with sands.
(4) Sunken Rocks:

There is a line of sunken rocks in the distance of about 300 meters off the cape which is on the right hand in the NO. 56 Fishing Block. On the left hand there is a line of sunken rocks in the distance of about 200 meters off the coast.

6. Resources used in Maritime Transportation

(1) Coal and Petroleum: None

(2) Clear Water: The water of the PARANA River is available for drinking.

(3) Resources:

It is possible to send adrift the lumber down from the upper stream of the PARANA River. The remaining fishers' boats of NIKIRO are as follows:

The Boats with Three Wings — 2

7. Meteorological Observations

In general it has many fair days and a little rainfall. From the end of July to August, it is foggy. In September stormy weather comes very often. cf. The Table of the Meteorological Statistics No. 1.

8. Military Affairs

(1) Military Powers:

The Frontier Guard stations on the south bank of the mouth of river. The members of this guard including the commander are 8. These members come together at CHIGIRI, about 50 kilometers south to their station, after the fishing season is over.

(2) Airplanes: None

9. Customs

(1) As for the education and cultural institutions of the inhabitants, no details are known.
(2) Industry

The aquatic industry consists mainly in fishing, while the agricultural industry in raising vegetables and potatoes. Fur industry is most prosperous.

10. Arrangements and Dispositions on the part of U.S.S.R. Authorities

Same with 8.
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I.P.S. No. 2550

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Michinori Ureshino __________ hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Official of the General Affair Division of the 1st Demob. Bureau __________

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of ________ pages, dated ________, 1941, and described as follows: File of "Investigations Re Maritime Provinces for Purposes of Landing Operations" prepared by Shipping Transport Headquarters. Grace French __________

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Asahigawa __________

Signed at Tokyo _______ on this _______ day of Sept., 1946. /s/ Michinori Ureshino __________

Signature of Official __________
SEAL __________

Witness: /s/ Yoohifusa Anono __________

Official Capacity __________

Statement of Official Procurement

I, 2nd Lt. Eric W. Fleisher __________, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo _______ on this _______ day of Sept., 1946. /s/ Eric W. Fleisher, 2nd Lt. AUS __________

Investigator I.P.S. __________

Witness: /s/ Richard L. Lash __________

Official Capacity __________
第九十八六五四三一

第一章

军港通道

地面条件

第二章

联侧装备配置

军事气象

海洋资源
八○一年十一月

東海表達過往地

說明

東海表達過往地

說明
地勢

第一章 パラナ地方

(1) 位置
東南より北緯五九度二三分

(2) 沿岸

(3) 河川

(4) 森林
如图所示，水○○○○○○○○

1. 选项 A
2. 选项 B
3. 选项 C
4. 选项 D

水的最后状态为：

(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4)
七気象

概観
天気：陰天
雨量：少無
七月末より八月に
気象統計表第一

八軍事

国境警備隊八二
河口南岸

九月八荒大連
気象統計表第一

八南方約五十

(2) 露

(1) 河

八南方
農業

(2) 河

八南方
農業

(1) 教育

産業

八南方
農業
AFFIDAVIT OF A WITNESS


I, Military Interrogator for the U.S.S.R., at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, Major Paskovsky P. K., with Major Paskovsky A.A., as an interpreter, interrogated and warned of the responsibility for giving false testimony according to Article 95 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R., as a witness named below, who testified:

1. Surname, name, father's name — Kharshovski
   K. K. Lieutenant-General

2. Age — Born 1889.

3. Position held — Commanding General of the 2nd Army.

4. What political party belongs to. — Does not belong to any political party nor any society.

5. Address — Khabarovsk.

The certificates of the witness being warned of the responsibility for giving false testimony and of the interpreter for giving false translation are attached to the affidavit.

Q. Do you speak Russian?
A. Yes.

Q. Do you agree to give testimony in Russian?
A. Yes, I agree. But I request certain difficult or unfamiliar expressions to be translated into Japanese.

Q. It is possible to arrange, Mr. PASKOVSKY, an interpreter, takes part in the interrogation. Does it suit you?
A. Yes. Perfectly.

Q. Tell your service record?
A. In 1910 I graduated from the Military Academy, was promoted to the rank of sub-lieutenant and appointed a commander of a platoon of the third infantry regiment of the guards division. In 1912 I was promoted to the rank of lieutenant and entered the military college. In 1916 I graduated from the college and returned to the regiment where I served before the college. In 1917 I was appointed an officer of the War Ministry Department for Research of the World War I. In 1919 I was sent on mission to Europe (Poland, Latvia, Germany, France) where I studied military history for three years. In 1920 I was promoted to the rank of captain. In 1922 I returned to Japan and was appointed an instructor of military history. In 1925 I was promoted to the rank of major. In 1927 I was appointed an officer of the Training and Maneuver Department of the General Staff.

This department was responsible for the organization of the Imperial maneuvers and for the training of the Staff officers. In 1929 I was again appointed an instructor of tactics at the military college and was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel. In 1931 I entered the
War Ministry as an officer of the Section of the General Department. In 1933 I was promoted to the rank of Colonel and appointed the commander of the 34th Infantry Regiment in Shizuoka. In 1934 I was transferred to the Infantry Academy as a commander of a training regiment and also as an instructor of field service. In 1935 I was appointed the chief of the War Ministry section for organization of military educational establishments. In the same year I was transferred to the post of the chief of the War Ministry General Department. In 1936 I again returned to the Military College as an instructor of military history. In 1937 I was promoted to the rank of major general and in 1939, I was sent on mission to Manchuria as a commander of a temporary brigade in the Northeast of Manchuria invaded at the time by units of the Chinese Army from the South China, and the task of my brigade was to restore order there. I commanded this brigade for a year. In 1939 I was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general and was appointed commander of the 35th Division quartered in Central China in the town of Hankow.

In 1941 I was appointed director of the Institute of Military Science and Technique which was under the Inspector of troops training. In 1943 I was appointed director of the Research Institute of Total Mobilization and Warfare. In the same year I was again sent on mission to Manchuria as the Chief of the Military Academy where battalion commanders and regimental commanders were trained in questions of coordination of arms. In 1944 I was appointed Commanding General of the 3rd Army and there I stayed up to the capitulation.

Q. Tell what was the method of teaching history of wars at the College. What main ideas were put into teaching of History?

A. The lectures dealt with the following questions:

1) Power of the Russian Army and 2) organization and structure of this army, study of training of the Russian Army in detail. The following ideas were developed in this course of lectures -- ideas of expanding Japanese influence onto the continent, ideas of the occupation of Korean and Manchurian territories for the purpose of maintaining our nation, obtaining raw materials for industry and for the purpose of obtaining markets.

Q. So the aim of teaching history of wars was to inculcate the officers with the idea that Japan needed territories which she had to conquer in future wars?

A. Yes.

Q. The characteristic feature of the Russo-Japanese War is, that for the first time in history Japan attacked Russia without declaring war. I am interested in the following; how you, as a teacher of History of Wars, explained the students this attack on the enemy without declaring war. Did you consider this attack to be right and explained it as a certain achievement of Japanese strategy and tactics or did you explain this fact differently?

A. This action contradicts the international law. Up to the present time it has been explained as follows: On February 5, 1904 Japan sent an ultimatum to the Russian Government. It meant cessation of peaceful relations. I understand that strictly speaking, an ultimatum is not a declaration of war, but from the point of view of morality the attack on the enemy after presenting an ultimatum may not be considered as a crime. It seems that in this ultimatum it was stated that if Russia did not fulfill the demands of Japan, Japan would take measures at her will.

Q. Did you explain it in this way to your students?
A. Everybody in Japan understood it so and therefore I had no need to explain this fact. We did not consider this question to be serious and therefore during the war against America we repeated the same mistake, having attacked the American Fleet in Pearl Harbor on December 8, 1941.

Q. What military aims had Japan, and how these aims reflected in teaching of history?

A. Japan occupies a very small territory which does not provide vitally important resources. Therefore it was necessary to occupy the territory of Manchuria, a part of China and the islands in the South, to extend our territory. This idea was reflected in teaching of history.

Q. What do you know about the "Red Book" and its contents?

A. This book was composed in the Chief Training Inspection Department under Marshal MITO and KURIBA, the predecessors of YAMADA. As material, two Soviet books were used: Field Service Regulation and Battle Service Regulation of the Infantry of 1926.

Q. For what purpose was the "Red Book" published?

A. The Japanese Army regarded the Red Army as the future enemy. The Red Army had its own organization and its own tactics. Therefore the Japanese tactics had to be adapted to that of the Russian Army to be able to fight against the Red Army. This book gave some instructions to the Japanese officers what tactic methods had to be applied by Japanese in order to conquer Russians and to oppose our own tactics to that of Russians.

Q. Was there an order to the Army which obliged all the officers of the Japanese Army to study the "Red Book"?

A. There was an instruction of the Chief Training Inspector that all the officers should study the "Red Book" thoroughly.

Q. While being the teacher of tactics did you give to the students lessons on tactics on the map of the U.S.S.R.?

A. Yes.

Q. Often?

A. Yes.

Q. Why were the tactic lessons in the Military College given on the maps of the Soviet Union?

A. It was supposed that war would not take place on the territory of Japan proper and therefore all the lessons on tactics were given on the maps of territories of other states, the Soviet Union and Manchuria in particular.

Q. What parts of Manchuria were chosen as objectives for practical lessons on maps?

A. Mostly the lessons dealt with the map of Eastern Manchuria bordering with the Soviet Primorye.

Q. How do you explain that the lessons were mostly conducted on the maps of Eastern Manchuria, bordering with the Soviet Primorye?

A. We considered that most probably the war would break out just on this frontier between Manchuria and the Soviet Union.

Q. What were the tasks of the Research Institute of Total Mobilization in 1943?
A. First, we were interested in the maximum increase of the production of aircraft and factories, and we set ourselves the task of producing forty thousand aircraft a year. Second, we were occupied with the problem of increasing the production of sea vessels. We set ourselves the task of producing vessels with the total tonnage of one and a half million tons a year. Third, we were interested in exports of products from Manchuria, Korea, and from the Southern regions (Anna, Sin) to Japan. We had a shortage of 1,500,000 tons of rice a year. Fourth, the question of dispersion of the population and industry in case of invasion was studied. Fifth, the sphere of foreign policy we set ourselves the task of studying the problems of consolidation of the bloc of Eastern Asia countries under Japanese hegemony.

Q. What do you know about the preparations of the Manchurian military base for an attack on the Soviet Union?

A. I know that in 1942 there was a plan of an attack on the Soviet Union from the Manchurian military base. The strength of the Kwantung Army had been increased beforehand for this purpose, highways and strategic railroads had been constructed, about two hundred airfields had been constructed, as well as fortified areas, ammunition dumps, navy plants. As for instance, in Mukden, a tank, an automobile and an aircraft plant, in Zeigang - a plant for production of explosives.

Q. From what sources do you know about the preparations of the Manchurian military base?

A. I made my conclusions about the preparations for war from my personal observations when I was Commander of the temporary brigade and later on Commanding General of the 3rd Army in Manchuria.

Q. In what direction were the military operations against the Soviet Union to be conducted from the Manchurian military base?

A. Offensive operations were supposed to be conducted in the direction of the town of Voroshilov.

Q. How do you know about it?

A. I myself did not see the operation plan, but heard from General HAMOTO, my predecessor in the post of the Commanding General of the 3rd Army, that the eastern part of Manchuria in the direction of Voroshilov was considered the main direction of the offensive.

Q. What directions did you, as Commander of the 3rd Army, receive from the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army, concerning the operation plans of a war against the Soviet Union?

A. While I was Commander I got the instructions only on defence but I knew about the offensive plans from my predecessor.

Q. When was the plan of offensive changed into the plan of defence?

A. The plan of offensive was changed into the plan of defence in 1944.

Q. What were the subjects of the training of the officers while you were the Commander of the 3rd Army?

A. The practical lessons with officers on the defence of the frontier fortified areas, were conducted on the maps and in the field. Then in April - May 1945 we received an instruction from the Kwantung Army Headquarters saying that the defence should be planned deeper into the country, approximately in the Muiin area. After that we conducted training in the said area.
Q. To what period belong the v*v military operations were directed towards Leningrad, Speasak and Voroshilov?

A. In 1937 we chose areas East of Pjorevolnoaya Station for our tactical exercises.

Q. Why did the Japanese provoke the Manchurian conflict with the Red Army?

A. There was a desire to demonstrate the strength of the Japanese Army and to test that of the Red Army. From the general point of view it was to no purpose. At that time I was a brigade commander in Southwestern Manchuria and participated in conferences in Yenning in April, 1939. General Miura, Commander of the 23rd Division gave instructions not to yield an inch to Soviet border-guards as far as the questions of determining the frontier were concerned. He said that if frontier was not definite, it should be determined independently in favor of Japan. Commanding General of the 23rd Division, Komorenko followed Miura's instructions to the letter. I consider both the Manchurian Army Headquarters and Miura, who gave the instructions to independently decide any alterations in favor of Japan, responsible for that incident.

Q. And what is your own estimation of the causes of Japan's defeat in this war?

A. First, the war was beyond the strength of Japan in all respects, and in the first place because its industry was too weak and could not satisfy military needs. Second, it can be explained by an error in strategy. The area of military operations was too extended, instead of being fixed to one place. Thirdly, there were some diplomatic errors. The alliance with Germany was disadvantageous for Japan. It would have been far more advantageous to enter into an alliance with Great Britain. Besides, Japan did not succeed in preventing Germany from fighting against the Soviet Union, and when the war broke out could not make Germany cease fighting before the defeat of the German Army. The second diplomatic error was the war with America.

The spring of 1941 was the most convenient time for conciliation with America. The American Government's reply was favorable for Japan, but instead of agreeing with it, Japan started war. Then the capture of Singapore was the proper moment to bring the war with Britain to an end, but it was not done either. The invasion of atomic bombs and radio location played a great part in the surrender of Japan. Our Navy was strong enough, it had many ships and aircraft, but as soon as the Americans started using radio location, our battleship and submarines were located beforehand, and the Japanese Armed Forces lost their advantage of surprise. Even in the night the Americans located the Japanese Navy and carried accurate fire.

There were also some smaller factors: poor organisation of economy, it was necessary to coordinate the work of various branches of industry, but we were late in doing it.

Q. Whom do you consider to be the most important war criminals?

A. Lord Privy Seal, Marquis KIDO, who was the chief advisor to the Emperor and was obliged to submit the name for premiership. Marquis KIDO made a bad choice. Then Prime Minister and War Minister Tojo who started the war against America. Navy Minister, Admiral SUZUKI who attacked the American Fleet in Pearl Harbor. Chief of the General Staff, SUZUKI. Thead) Chief of the Navy General Staff MAGARE who was the Emperor's adviser on the questions of Navy operations. Together with SUZUKI he bears responsibility for the attack on Pearl Harbor. Foreign Minister Togo who negotiated with America, then broke the negotiations and gave consent to declaration of war on America. HIRAKI, Dairo - Member of Privy
Council. He was preparing a base for a war against the USSR, the Manchurian military base in particular. 

ULAN was the Manchurian Army Commander in 1941 and at the beginning of the Nippon-Chinese war developed and extended the Chinese Incident, turning it into a big war. After Germany attacked the USSR, he concentrated large armies on the frontier and was preparing for a war against the Soviet Union, threatening the Red Army. 

OSHIKA Hiroshi is greatly responsible for the war. On his proposal, Japan concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact and later the Tripartite Alliance. He did not follow the situation of Germany, and did not prevent Germany in due time from attacking the Soviet Union. 

TAJIMA Masayuki who was Foreign Minister in Togo Cabinet and as such is naturally responsible for the war. He had been Ambassador in Hankow and supported the Provisional Government of CHI-JU-MEI. The minutes of interrogation are read by me personally, are quite clear to me, are written down from my words correctly and to this I sign my name.

WITNESS: 
Lt. Gen. MURAKAMI KISAKU.

INTERROGATOR: 
Acting Military Interrogator of the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo

Major POGRANITSKY.

INTERPRETER: 
Major PASHKOVSKY.

SECRETARY-STENOGRAPIST: 
Miss KATSIKAYA.

The interrogation began 13:15 and finished 17:00. On page 5 of the minutes, I made a correction, read: 1,500,000.

Signed: MURAKAMI KISAKU.

Major POGRANITSKY.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. MENSHOVA, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: Merishova (signed)
CERTIFICATE

March 23, 1946

The Town of Khabarovsk.

I, the undersigned Major A.A. Pashekovsky hereby certify to the Acting Military Interrogator for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo Pashekovsky that I am well conversant in the Japanese language to make oral translation into Russian and that I give my promise to translate the testimony of Murakami Keisaku correctly.

I am duly warned that as an interpreter I bear criminal responsibility for purposely false translation according to Article 92 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code.

Pashekovsky.

The certificate is taken by acting Military Interrogator for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

Pogranitsky.

CERTIFICATE


I, the undersigned Julia Georgievna KRZHYKHVISKAYA, hereby certify to the Acting Military Interrogator for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo Pogranitsky that as a secretary-stenographer I promise to take short hand notes of the minutes of the interrogation of MURAKAMI KEISAKU correctly and decipher them correctly.

I am duly warned that for the purposely false minutes I bear criminal responsibility according to Articles 16 and 133 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code.

KRZHYKHVISKAYA.

The certificate is taken by Acting Military Interrogator for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

Pogranitsky.

CERTIFICATE

The town of Khabarovsk March 23, 1946.

I, the undersigned Murakami Keisaku hereby certify to the Acting Military Interrogator for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo Pogranitsky that I as a witness to the case of the principal war criminals promise to tell only the truth.

I am duly warned that for giving false testimony I bear criminal responsibility according to Article 95 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

Signed: Murakami Keisaku

The certificate is taken by Acting Military Interrogator for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

Pogranitsky.
Affidavit of Genzo YANAGITA

Name: Genzo YAPAGITA

Age: 53
Nationality: Japanese
Education: Received higher military education
Rank: Lieutenant General
Last position: Commander of the Kwantung Province Defense Army

Colonel S. Y. ROSEBLIT, Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, conducted the interrogations in Moscow on February 27, 1946.

Genzo YAPAGITA's

When were you promoted to a commissioned officer?

A. I was commissioned a sublieutenant in 1914 'Taisho 3/', which is the starting rank of officers.

Where did you start your military service?

A. I assumed the post of a platoon commander of the 18th Infantry Regiment, the 15th Division (Japanese Army).

How long did you stay in that regiment?

A. I had four years' service in that 18th Infantry Regiment before I was promoted to lieutenant and attached to the 3rd Section of the 1st Department of the Army General Staff Headquarters. After ten months' service with the Army General Staff Headquarters I entered the Army General Staff College in 1919 'Taisho 8/.

In what year did you graduate from the Army General Staff College?

A. I graduated from the college in 1922 'Taisho 11/ as a lieutenant and returned to the 16th Regiment. I was promoted to captain in the summer of 1923 'Taisho 12/' and was appointed company commander. At the end of 1923 'Taisho 12/ I was attached to the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, taking charge of military budget affairs.
After serving in the War Ministry until 1927 (Showa 2), I was appointed a resident-officer in Europe for the purpose of studying life in Europe, Russian language, and military science.

I arrived at Riga at the beginning of 1927 (Showa 2) and remained there for about one year, during which time I mastered the Russian language and read books on the Soviet Union.

Then I travelled in Europe for several months and was in Estonia for two months. As I had no concrete duty, I pursued mostly my own studies. In 1929 (Showa 4) I went to Poland and served for three months with the 15th Infantry Regiment at Tobin. During that time I familiarized myself with the general conditions of the regiment. In the spring of 1930 (Showa 5) I came back to Japan by way of Germany, France, Great Britain and U.S.A.

I was again attached to the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry and served in the military affairs section until 1932 (Showa 7).

Q. In what year were you promoted to major?

A. I was promoted to major in 1930 (Showa 5) before I returned to the War Ministry. In 1933 (Showa 8) I was appointed a military attaché to the Japanese Legation in Poland and held the concurrent post of military attaché to the Japanese Legation in Romania. I was promoted to lt-colonel in the summer of 1933 (Showa 8).

In 1934 (Showa 9) I came back to Japan and was appointed Assistant to the Chief of the 2nd Section (the Intelligence Section) of the Kwantung Army. I held this position till the summer of 1935 (Showa 10). Then I returned to the War Ministry and was appointed Assistant to the Chief of the Conscription Section of the Military Affairs Bureau. I became the chief of this Section in the summer of 1937 (Showa 12) and was promoted to colonel at the same time. After a service of one year, I was appointed the Regimental Commander of the 1st Infantry Regiment of the 1st Division at Sinjuri, Manchuria, which post I held for a year.

In 1935 (Showa 14) I was promoted to major-general and appointed Deputy Chief of Staff of the 11th Army at Hankow, Central China. I was appointed the Commander of the Army Special Service Agency at Harbin, which position I held for three years.
Later in 1943 /Showa 18/ I was appointed the Divisional Commander of the 33rd Division in Burma. I was promoted to lieutenant-general at the end of 1942 /Showa 17/. In the summer of 1944 /Showa 19/ I was attached to the Army General Staff Headquarters and retired from military service. It seems to me that I was attached to the Army General Staff Headquarters because of the failure of the Burma campaign.

The War Ministry had me appointed President of the Taiwan Iron Industry Control Association. I went to Taiwan in 1944 /Showa 19/ and during my service /with the Association/ I endeavored to heal the wound, which I had received during my military service. This post was under the direct command of the Governor-General.

In April of 1945 /Showa 20/ I was brought back to Tokyo and appointed the Commander of the Iwantung Province Defense Army. I was taken prisoner on the 22nd of August of that year.

What did you know in 1931 /Showa 6/ about the occupation of Manchuria?

A. I did not expect at all the occupation of Manchuria, but later I understood that the occupation was not an unexpected occurrence to the military.

Who among the military do you think were in favor of the occupation of Manchuria?

A. The persons who played the active role in the Iwantung Army were Colonel So Ishiro ITAGA, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iwantung Army, and Lt-colonel Kazui ISHIHARA, his Assistant. These persons had a strong influence in the Iwantung Army as brave and energetic officers, although their ranks and positions were not necessarily high and important. Later ITAGA became War Minister, ISHIHARA, Chief of Operations Section of Army General Staff. As for the officers who were active for the occupation of Manchuria among the military authorities in Tokyo, I name ARAKI, then War Minister, Major-general SUGIYAMA, then Director of the Military Affairs Bureau (later became Chief of Army General Staff and War Minister twice), Colonel NAGATA, then Section Chief of the
War ministry (assassinated later), Colonel C. BATA, and major-general TATEKAWA. To this group belonged General Isao WATSUI (later president of the Greater East Asia Federation) and General TATEKAWA.

C. Can you name persons who as individuals took part in developing Manchuria as a military base?

A. First of all, the commanders of the Manchuria Army took part in this affair. At the time of the Manchurian occupation, General HONJO was in command of the Manchuria Army. Next was the army of General TSUJI (who died soon thereafter), General HISHIKAWA (till 1936), General SHINTA (till 1937), General USA (1936-1939, assigned, taking to himself the responsibility for the NOE PLAN Incident), Lieutenant-general UTSU, who was appointed as Ueda's successor, served until 1944 (summer) when he was appointed chief of the army general staff. His successor, General YAMADA, filled the post till the unconditional surrender.

C. What kind of agencies took the leadership in establishing military base in Manchuria?

A. The army general staff, the war ministry and the greater East Asiatic affairs ministry.

C. What were the parts played by ANUWA and IATSUKA in converting Manchuria into a military base?

A. ANUWA was the leader of all industries in Manchuria and under his leadership, an army arsenal and aviation factories were built in Manchuria. In addition, heavy industries of Manchuria started their development under his leadership. On that occasion Japanese capitalists invested large amounts of capital in heavy industries. The development of heavy industries in Manchuria played a great role in preparing for the war against Soviet Union.

IATSUKA was the president of the South Manchuria Railway Company "MANTSU". His role was to extend the network of railways and to take an active part in developing industries belonging to that company.
0. How did the Japanese military officers prepare for the war against U.S.S.R.?

A. The answer is as follows: All instructions on tactics, as well as on topography, were given chiefly on the materials concerning U.S.S.R.

In military training and military publications, a great deal of attention was paid to the problem of tactical study on U.S.S.R.

Moreover, a book named the "Red Book" was issued about 1937 (Showa 12) for the use of the Japanese Army. The book contained materials regarding the tactics of the Soviet Army and the means necessary in fighting the Soviet Army.

In the military Academy the students studied the Russian language chiefly.

A. The "KANTOKUEN" plan was drawn up as preparation of the Kwantung Army for the war against the U.S.S.R. Therefore, it was necessary for the Intelligence Section of the Kwantung Army to prepare necessary materials for carrying out the "KANTOKUEN" plan. That is, supplementation of the enumerated intelligence duties, training of intrigue units and scouting units, and drawing up a plan for strengthening the propaganda against U.S.S.R. As for the propaganda, the victorious offensive of Germany against U.S.S.R. should be reflected therein.

In the same manner, the staff of the Intelligence Section of the Kwantung Army was strengthened in order to strengthen the intelligence duties and
to win over to our side those who had charge of 
Russian military duties, so as to have allies 
in the Russian Army.

It was directed that these plans be carried out 
and the preparations be completed by the end of 
September or the beginning of October of 1941  
/Showa 16/.

Q. From whom did you receive those directions?
A. I received them from General UKEZU, the Commander  
of the Kwantung Army.

Q. Were you given leaflets for strengthening the  
propaganda?

/Qage 7/

Q. Yes, I received from the Army General Staff 
Headquarters some leaflets for strengthening  
propaganda. Others I prepared myself. Thus we 
received several times from Tokyo leaflets which 
were prepared by the Army General Staff Headquarters. 
In addition, directions concerning the contents of  
leaflets were given through the Kwantung Army 
Headquarters, by the Army General Staff Headquarters. 
We drew up these leaflets and expanded them. In  
the third instance, we ourselves designed the  
contents of the leaflets and expanded them in  
accordance with the plan of propaganda.

The general contents of these leaflets were:  
firstly, anti-Soviet and defeatist propaganda; 
secondly, propaganda for the consolidation of the  
various classes of the Manchurian inhabitants with  
the Japanese people.

Photographic illustrated charts of the above-  
mentioned contents were sent to Harbin from the  
Army General Staff Headquarters.

Q. From whom did the Army Special Service Agency  
receive the directions on propaganda?
A. From the Commander of the Kwantung Army.

Q. Did you have anything to do with the White Russians  
while you were the Commander of the Army Special  
Service Agency at Harbin?
A. Yes. By orders from the commander of the Kwantung Army, we had to train White Russians as instigators, propagandists, scouts, and saboteurs. White Russian forces were disguised as forces in the Manchurian Army.

Some of the White Russians worked in the Army Special Service Agency, performing propaganda and scouting functions.

Q. Name those Commanders of the Army Special Service Agency of Harbin whom you know.

A. I succeeded Lieutenant General Hitosaburo HATA as Commander of the Army Special Service Agency. The Commander before Lt-General HATA was General HIGUCHI. General DAI succeeded me, and was in turn succeeded by General AKIGUSA.

Q. Did you have close contact with the leaders of the White Russians in Manchuria?

A. KISLICHIN, Secretary-General of the White Russians, also XILENCO, KHATCHINSKY, ROZANSKY, SHEFRINSKY, GARESEV (phonetic).

Q. Was there any school for the training of White Russians as scouts, saboteurs and propagandists, at the time you were the Commander of the Army Special Service Agency at Harbin?

A. As I have already stated, by command of General TIFUE, Commander of the Kwantung Army, the Army Special Service Agency was responsible for preparing and training White Russians as future propagandists and scouts. In the Japanese Army Special Service Agency, the Sixth Section, under Section Chief Colonel Suzuki SHIFAI, was in charge of this business. Major TURASA was his assistant.

In the training course under the charge of the Sixth Section between 20 to 30 propagandists and between 10 to 15 scouts were trained at the same time. The term for the training of propagandists was three months and for the training of scouts, eight to ten months (on the last occasion, it was six months).

I attended each time the special ceremonies which were held at the beginning and at the end of the training course. I gave them words regarding the performance of their future duties.
Q. What is the ASANO Unit?
A. It is a unit composed of White Russians for sabotage activity.

Q. Tell me by whom it was organized.
A. It was organized by the Kwantung Army Headquarters about 1936. Lieutenant-Colonel YALACXA, as Assistant to the Chief of the Second Section took charge of it.

Q. Was the ASANO Unit still in existence at the time you were the Commander of the Army Special Service Agency?
A. Yes, it was.

Q. Did the Kwantung Army Headquarters know of its existence?
A. Of course. In general, we did nothing without the directions of the Commander of the Kwantung Army. By his command the ASANO Unit was included in Kanchoukuo Army. The members wore the uniforms of the Kanchoukuo Army.

Q. How many soldiers were there in the ASANO Unit?
A. It was composed of five companies. Most of them were posted in the neighborhood of the Second Sungari Station and the rest in Hengtaokotzu and Hailar. The unit had about 700 soldiers in general.

Q. What was the duty of the ASANO Unit?
A. The duty of the ASANO Unit was to train sabotage units in case of war against Soviet Union. The commander was Colonel ISANC (a Japanese) of the Kanchoukuo Army.

Q. What agencies paid money to it?
A. The Kanchoukuo War Ministry paid the money until 1941, but it was paid by the Kwantung Army Headquarters since the special plan of the Kwantung Army manoeuvre "PANTOKUEN" was drawn up.
Did the Army Special Service Agency store military uniforms of the Soviet Russian Army for the ASASU Unit?

A. Yes, the Special Service Agency had a number of complete sets of the uniforms of the Red Army soldiers (military uniform) prepared for the ASASU Unit in case of war.

C. For what purpose was the military uniform of Soviet Russian soldiers stored?

A. To have the saboteurs of the ASASU Unit put them on in order to deceive the Red Army.

C. From the standpoint of international law and customs of war, what do you think of the preparation of this intrigue unit whose members are to wear Soviet military uniforms in order to be dispatched into the Soviet Union?

Of course, it is wrong in a little way, and I think it proper not to resort to it.

C. For what purpose did you do it?

A. These articles (Quantity: 20-30) were sent from the Army General Staff Headquarters in Tokyo.

C. Who sent them?

A. They were sent by the 2nd Section of the Army General Staff Headquarters, but I don't know the individuals who sent them.

C. Do you know Higashi HASEKICHI?

A. Yes, I know him.

C. Can you state anything about him?

A. He retired from active service in the Army in 1937 (Show 18) with the rank of lieutenant-colonel. I was a graduate of the Military Academy of the 26th Term Class, while he belonged to the 23rd Term Class. After graduation from the Army General Staff College, he worked in the Infantry Division of the Army General Staff Headquarters, and later became Chief of that
division. He was the most intimate friend of Fikosaburo KATA. A short time before retiring from active service, HASHI:OTO was transferred from the Army General Staff Headquarters and became the Commander of the army Special Service at anchuli. He was the military attaché to the Japanese Legation in Turkey in 1933 (Showa 8).

Do you know the reason why HASHI:OTO retired from the army?

A. In February, 1936 (Showa 11) the so-called "February 26th Incident" occurred in Japan, in which the young officers presented their demands. HASHI:OTO had close contact with groups of these young officers and so he was defamed by this incident, although he was not arrested. He retired two years after this incident.

What did HASHI:OTO do after his retirement?

A. HASHI:OTO organized the Loyal Association "SHAJSU-I-AI".

What activities did the Loyal Association "SHAJSU-I-AI" organized by HASHI:OTO do?

A. This had a leaning toward fascism after the model of Hitler's and mussolini's parties, he presented to the masses the problem of fascist propaganda.

Do you know anything about the organization organized by HASHI:OTO under the name of Japan Youth Party /"KAI-KIFCH-SEINEN-TC"/?

A. He had as his own aim the unification of young people. The system of the organization was just identical to that of Hitler Jugend of Germany. The members of the party, however, were older than those of the Hitler Jugend.

I wrote this statement — Genzo YANAGITA /

The interrogator: Colonel ROSENBLIT, Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Tribunal in Tokyo.

The Military Interpreter: Lieutenant DIBSCHKICH
Cath

Japanese Army Lieutenant-General Genzo YANAGITA

I swear to testify nothing but the truth concerning the trials of Japanese Class-A war criminals. I swear this before Colonel ROSENBLIT, Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

I have been warned that if I give false evidence I shall be held responsible under Article 25 of Criminal Code R.S.F.S.R.

In Moscow, Feb. 27, 1946 /Showa 21/

Genzo YANAGITA /s/

Administered by:

Colonel S. Y. ROSENBLIT, Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo. /s/

Lieutenant DRYWICK, Military Interpreter. /s/
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Deputy Chief of the General Staff Department

COLONEL TASHITCHED

January 30, 1946

CERTIFICATE OF THE TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT

I, S. Bronstein, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

SIGNATURE: /s/ S. Bronstein

J. BRONSTEIN
I, Lt. Colonel TARASENKO G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that Doc. #2:

2237 "Table of the increase of the strength of the Kwantung Army and the Japanese Army on the whole from 1932 to 1945."

2073 "Report, Organization of Division of Kwantung Army."

2236 "Table of the growth of technical equipment in the Kwantung Army and in the Japanese on the whole from 1932 to 1945."

2130 "Report concerning Armistice Troops created by the Japanese in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia."

1879 "Table increase of Hungarian river war flotilla from 1931 - 1945."

2151 "Report on the growth of the network of railroads and submarine roads in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."

2134 "Report on the increase of the airfield system in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."

2148 "Report construction of fortified districts in Manchuria from 1934 to 1945."

1977 "Report concerning construction of ammunition troops in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."

1831 "Report on the increase of the barracks facilities in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."

2133 "Report Concerning Japanese military settlements in Manchuria."

1927 "Report on the growth of barracks of Korea and Manchuria from 1932 to 1945."

1985 "Table of the increase of the strength of the Japanese troops in Korea in the period 1931-1945."

2129 "Report on the increase of construction of network of railroads and highways in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

2132 "Report on the increase of the airfield network in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

2131 "Report on construction of fortified areas in Korea from 1931 to 1945.

-1-
2127  "Report on construction of military dumps in
    Koro, from 1931 to 1945."

2150  "Report on the increase of the barrack facili-
    ties in Koro, from 1931 to 1945."

was delivered to me by the Red Army General Staff in Moscow,
    on or about January 29, 1946.

LT. COL. TARMILO
    CHIEF OF THE USSR
    DECORAT SITUATION.
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January 30, 1946

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION C1
THE ABOVE DOCUMENT

I. K. BRENSTEIN, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

M. BRENSTEIN

Deputy Chief of the General Staff Department COLONEL TSIGITCHIRO

RETURN TO ROOM 361
Appendix:

1. Map "Railroad lines in Manchuria in 1931" (before occupation).
2. Map "Railroad lines in Manchuria in 1936-1937".
3. Map "Railroad lines in Manchuria by 1941.
4. Map "Railroad lines in Manchuria by 1945."

DEPUTY CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT OF THE
RED ARMY GENERAL STAFF.

Colonel (Tsigichko)

January 30, 1946.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, V. Tarkhov, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature: V. Tarkhov
Железные дороги Маньчжурии
в 1931 г.
(до оккупации)

Railroads in Manchuria
in 1931
(before the occupation)

Условные обозначения:
Conventional marks:
- железные дороги (однорельсовые)
- Railroads (single track)
- двуколочные железные дороги
- Double track railroads

Общая протяженность - 6140 км
The whole Length - 6140 km

Характеристики:

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6th Department
Lieutenant-colonel

Sokolov
Железные дороги Маньчжурии
в 1941 г.
Railroads in Manchuria
in 1941.

Общая протяженность: 8785 км.
The whole Length - 10,735 km.
Железные дороги Маньчжурии

c 1945 г.

Railroads in Manchuria

by 1945

Условные обозначения

Conventional marks:
Релейные станции (Закрыты)
Relay stations (Closed)
Двойные железные дороги.
Doubt truck railways.

Общая протяженность: 15700 км
The whole length: 15700 km.

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6th Department
Lieutenant-colonel

Sukhov
Железные дороги Маньчжурии

к 1945 г.

Railroads on Manchuria

by 1945.

Условные обозначения

Conventional marks:

Railroads (single track)

Double track railroads

Длина пути, измеренная в 13700 км.

The whole Length - 13700 km.

The Red Army General Staff

Chief of the 6th Department

Lieutenant-colonel

Sukhov
Автомобильные дороги в 1931 г.
(до оккупации)

Automobile roads in Manchuria
in 1931
(before the occupation)

Условные обозначения:
Conventional marks:

Автомобильные дороги
Automobile roads

Границы государственные
State borders

Дороги для движения автотранспорта
Roads for traffic

Асфальт
Asphalt

Колейные пути
Railway tracks

Использованные
Used

Roads, which can be used for automobile traffic only in wintertime

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6-th Department
Lieutenant-colonel

Zabudov
АВТОМОБИЛЬНЫЕ ДОРОГИ
в 1936 г.

Маркировка:

Название местности:

Инструктивные пометки:

Географические обозначения:

Топографические элементы:

Legende des Plans:

Logistikpunkte:

Randmerkmale:

Legende:

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Randmerkmale:

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Legende:
Automobile roads in Manchuria in 1936-37.
Automobile roads in Manchuria in 1941-45

The Red Army General Staff, Chief of the 6th Department, Lieutenant-Colonel (Sokolov)

General extend of automobile roads 22000 km

Conventional signs
Automobile roads

Conditions of indication
Automobile roads

22000 km

(Vladivostok)

Khabarovsk
ОБВИНИТЕЛЬ ОТ СОЮЗА ССР
в Международном Военном Трибунале в Токио

REPORT ON THE INCREASE OF THE NET-WORK
OF RAILWAYS AND HIGHWAYS IN MANCHURIA
IN THE PERIOD FROM 1931 TO 1945 ON
FOUR SHEETS WITH SEVEN MAPS.
REPORT
on the growth of the network of railroads
and automobile roads in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945.

At the time of the Japanese occupation in 1931 the whole network of railways in Manchuria was 6,140 km. in length (including the Chinese Eastern Railroad).

There were no automobile roads in Manchuria, except in the Kwantung region where there were several dozens of kilometers of asphalt automobile roads. The rest of the roads were at best unpaved highways, in some places improved by means of fascines and supplied with primitive wooden bridges.

Upon the occupation of Manchuria the command of the Kwantung Army began intensive construction of railroads and automobile roads.
By 1936 the railroad network of Manchuria was already 8,336 km. in length, and the directions of the newly built railroad-lines and railroad lines in process of construction showed clearly aggressive nature of these constructions aimed to equip the Manchurian base with communications against the U.S.S.R.

Thus from 1932 to 1936 there was constructed a railway line from the district of Tchangchung through Taran (Rychantzi) to Halun-Arshan (at the frontier of the Mongolian People's Republic), the road leading to Primorye (Kailun - Sungkian - Haia) was completed, construction of a railway line to the frontier of the U.S.S.R. in Primorye was completed, (Tumin-Mudantzjan) Tynkory Dunan, a new railway line was built from the Korean port of Yuki to the town of Tumin other railway lines were being built to other points of the Soviet-Manchurian frontier (Buton, to the lower reaches of the Sungari river, the new road through Mergen to Amur etc.) It must be stated that all these railroads were of no economic significance, as they passed through thinly populated and uncultivated districts, where there were no industrial enterprises and were no enterprises were being built.

Together with the building of railroads, automobile roads were
rapidly being built as well. The network of automobile highways was 9,000 km. in length in 1936. The building of automobile roads was mainly accomplished in districts adjacent to the frontier of U.S.S.R. (in Barga, in Primorje, along the Sungari and in the districts near the Soviet Primorye).

By 1941 the length of railroad lines in Manchuria had already reached 10,735km. The railroad communications in the west were extended: from Halun-Arshan to Handagai, in Priamurje from Nehe to Hokunmin (second main line to the Amur), from Boli to Tzyamusi, from Dunan to Hutow. And along the river a railroad from Suihua to Lyantzyankow was built; The building of the second railway line from Mukden to Chanchun was already completed and the construction of the second track on lines as Chanchun-Harbin, Harbin-Pogranichnaja, Linkou-Dunan and Mukden-Andun started to develop.

By the end of 1941 the Japanese had built in Manchuria 18,460 km. of automobile highways, and in addition 20,665 km. of local
roads were reconstructed and improved. The total length of all auto-truck roads by the beginning of 1942 in Manchuria was about 60,000 km.

By the beginning of 1945 the railway network of Manchuria was about 13,700 km. By this time the Japanese completed the second railroad from Central Manchuria to the north in Primorye from Holunmin to Sakhalin and completed laying a second track on the following lines: Chanchun-Harbin, Harbin-Pogranichnaya, Linkow-Dunan, Mukden-Andun, Tumin-Vantzin, Continuing the building of a second route from Vantzin to Mudantzyan and from Dunanto Hutow.

The building of automobile roads was performed by improving the passability of roads, mainly in districts adjacent to the frontier.

The total length of automobile roads in Manchuria at the beginning of 1945 reached 22,000 km.
REPORT ON THE INCREASE OF CONSTRUCTION OF
NETWORK OF RAILROADS AND HIGHWAYS
IN KOREA FROM 1931 TO 1945

The general length of railroads in Korea at the beginning of 1931 was 3,865 km; they were single lines and partially narrow-gauge railroads. The main railroads were:

- Singisyu - Seoul - Pusan
- Haynai - Gonzan - Ryusan
- Taedon - Hapye.

The length of highways by the beginning of 1931 was about 17,000 km, out of them 6,000 km, of automobile roads.

In 1941 the general length of railroads in Korea was 2,000 km more and the length of the highways increased - more than three times, and amounted to about 5,800 km, of railroads and to about 53,000 km, of highways (half of them automobile roads).

In 1941 three new railway lines were constructed leading from Korea to the borders of Manchuria to the towns of Manpotsin, Kaisantin and Tuman: the connecting line Khidzino-Kogen (213 km), was built; the construction of the second gauge of the railway Pusan-Seoul-Singisyu was started as well as the construction of new lines: from Keisyu to Seoul (via Eisan, Koibukunato and Teisen), and the Tokay Railroad Eusan-Santyoku-Pan (along the eastern coast of Korea).

The intense construction of highways was also carried out, mainly in northern Korea and particularly in her northeastern part, near the U.S.S.R. territory. By the beginning of 1945 the railway network in Korea reached the length of 6,600 km, (i.e. 7900 km of single lines) that added more than 4,000 km of railroad network compared with 1931.

The length of highways by the same year reached about 60,000 km (one-half of them automobile roads).

From 1941 to 1945 the laying of the second line of the railroad Pusan-Seoul-Singisyu, was completed, the building of the railroad Keisyu-Eisen-Koibukunato-Teisen-Seoul finished and the construction of the coastal Tokay railroad, which was built in its northern part from the Pan to Santyoku continued.
Thus, from the time of Manchurian occupation the Japanese had intensely equipped Korea with railroads and highways, particularly in her northern part, preparing to use Korea, in addition to the Manchurian military base, for an attack on the USSR.

Appendix 1 Map, "Railroads in Korea in 1931-1932".
2 Map, "Railroads in Korea in 1941-1942".
3 Map, "Railroads in Korea in 1945".
4 Map, "Automobile roads in Korea in 1931-1932".
5 Map, "Automobile roads in Korea in 1941-1942".
6 Map "Automobile roads in Korea in 1945".

DEPUTY CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT OF THE
PEOPLE'S ARMY GENERAL STAFF

COLONEL /TSEIGICHUK/

January 30, 1946

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, S. DOLITSKAYA, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: /s/ S. Dolitskaya
CERTIFICATE

1, Lt. Colonel TARANTOLO C. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., hereby certify that Doc. #1:

2237 "Table of the increase of the strength of the Kwantung Army and the Japanese Army on the whole from 1932 to 1945."

2073 "Report, Organization of Division of Kwantung Army."

2236 "Table of the growth of technical equipment in the Kwantung Army and in the Japanese on the whole from 1932 to 1945."

2130 "Report concerning Support Troops created by the Japanese in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia."

1879 "Table increase of Sungury river war flotilla from 1931 - 1945."

2151 "Report on the growth of the network of railroads and automotile roads in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."

2134 "Report on the increase of the airfield system in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."

2148 "Report construction of fortified districts in Manchuria from 1934 to 1945."

1977 "Report concerning construction of ammunition bases in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."

1831 "Report on the increase of the barracks facilities in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."

2133 "Report Concerning Japanese military settlements in Manchuria."

1933 "Report on the growth of barracks of horses and Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."

1985 "Table on the increase of the strength of the Japanese troops in Korea in the period 1931 - 1945."

2149 "Report on the increase of construction of a network of railroads and highways in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

2132 "Report on the increase of the airfield network in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

2131 "Report on construction of fortified areas in Korea from 1931 to 1945.

- 1 -
"Report on construction of military camps in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

"Report on the increase of the barracks facilities in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

was delivered to me by the Red Army General Staff in Korea, on or about January 30, 1946.

LT. COL. TANAIKRO
CHIEF OF THE USSR
DOCUMENT SECTION.
The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6th Department
Lieutenant colonel
Sokolov
The 8th Army General Staff
Chief of the 6th Department
Lieutenant Colonel
The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6th Department
Lieutenant-colonel
REPORT

On construction of fortified areas in Korea from 1931 to 1945.

Prior to the occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese there were in Korea a few coast fortifications in the Henzan and Zinkai areas.

After the occupation of Manchuria and in connection with the preparation for a war against the Soviet Union by Japan, the Japanese command started a large scale construction of fortified areas directed toward Vladivostok on the north-east and west coast of Korea.

In 1936 the Japanese started construction of the Rashin fortified area, that covered the whole coast from Yuki up to Selshin inclusive. From 1940-1 the Japanese started the construction of the Kenkin fortified area, which was a continuation of the Rashin fortified area, northward and which included the right bank of the river Tumintayan from its mouth to the town of Kenkhin.

By 1945 the Rashin and Kenkhin fortified areas were equipped with a ramified net of permanent and field constructions. In the Rashin fortified area there were up to 15 batteries of large calibre artillery and in that of Kenkhin - up to 55 guns and over 100 machine guns in pill-boxes.

In 1936-37 an intensive construction of the Genzan fortified area was started, which covered the entire coast of the Ziko Bay and the islands in this bay.

In 1945 the Genzan fortified area was equipped with 40 calibre guns.

From 1943 the construction of the fortified Tsinkai area was started which by 1945 covered a large territory including Fusan, and the islands adjacent to the coast of Korea in the areas of Fusan and Tsinkai.

Besides the fortified areas of Rashin, Kenkhin, Genzan and Tsinkai, a construction of fortifications in the areas of Tsinnampo and Reisui, was started in 1941-45, these fortifications were to be turned into a large fortified area.

Appendix: 1. A map "Fortification in Korea in 1931-32".
2. A map "Fortification in Korea in 1945".

DEPUTY CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT OF THE
RED ARMY GENERAL STAFF

COLORED /TSIGITCHKO/

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, Z. BRONSTEIN, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: S. BRONSTEIN
Fortification of Korea
in 1931-32.
Fortification of Korea in 1944-45

Корейская оборонительная линия

Forts, gun positions, and fortified districts

- Machine guns - 100
- Guns - 55
- 15 Batteries heavy calibre of Artillery

Legend:

- Fortified districts
- Separate fortifications
- Conventional marks
ОБВИННИТЕЛЬ от СОЮЗА ССР
в Международном Военном Трибунале в Токио

REPORT ON THE INCREASE OF THE NET-WORK OF
AIRFIELDS IN KOREA IN THE PERIOD FROM
1931 TO 1945 ON TWO SHEETS WITH THREE
MAPS IN TWO COPIES.
REPORT

on the increase of the airfield network in Korea from 1931 to 1945

Beginning in 1931 and during the following years, the command of the Japanese Army in Korea undertook a vast-scale construction of land and sea air bases, airfields and landing fields, preparing a military base for the operations of the Japanese Air Forces against the USSR.

Table of the increase of the airfield system in Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Air Bases</th>
<th>Airfields</th>
<th>Landing Fields</th>
<th>Total Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931-32</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-42</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Beginning in 1932 the Japanese command paid the greatest attention to construction of air bases, airfield groups, to qualitative improvement of the existing airfields and to construction of hangars and runways.

Beginning in 1942 the work of improvement and extension of airfield network in Korea continued up to the moment of the capitulation of Japan.

Appendix: 1. Map "Airfield network in Korea in 1931-1932".
2. Map "Airfield network in Korea in 1941-1942".
3. Map "Airfield network in Korea in 1945".

DEPUTY CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RED ARMY
Colonel /Tsigaiko/

January 30, 1946. /Translated V. Turchak/
Аэродромная сеть Кореи в 1931-32 гг.

Airfield System of Korea in 1931-32.
The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6th Department
Lieutenant-colonel
The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6th Department
Lieutenant-colonel

The total:
1. Air bases 4
2. Airfields 28
3. Landing fields 24
Аэродромная сеть Кореи в 1945 году

Airfield System of Korea in 1945

(Версия на англ. языке)
REPORT

On construction of military dumps in Korea from 1931 to 1945.

The general capacity of military dumps in Korea up to 1931 did not exceed:

- Ammunition dumps for 10-15 division sets of ammunition.
- Fuel dumps for 15,000 t.
- Food and forage dumps, commissary, chemical and other property - 40-50 depots.

After the occupation of Manchuria, Korea became a rear supply base for the Kwantung Army; in connection with preparations of Japan for a war against the USSR the number and capacity of dumps in Korea, and the accumulation of war supplies, there, were rapidly increasing.

During the period 1931-1941 Korea, and particularly, her Northern part, was covered by a dense net of different military dumps. Large ammunition dumps, fuel and other war materials depots were built, in the towns of Khoiren, Yuki, Rashin, Seishin, Ranan, Kanko and Genzen. Old dumps in towns: Keijo, Seoul, Fusan, Chinkai and others were considerably enlarged.

In 1941 the general capacity of military dumps in Korea was:

- Ammunition dumps for 50 division sets of ammunition.
- Fuel dumps for 60,000 t.
- Food, and forage dumps, commissary and other property - about 200 depots.

From 1941 to 1945, in connection with considerable increase of the Japanese troops in Korea (concentrated for an attack on the USSR), the amount of dumps was still being increased by building new dumps, enlarging existing ones, and by turning civilian warehouses into military dumps.

In 1945 there were in Korea:

- Ammunition dumps with capacity for 150 division sets of ammunition.
- Fuel dumps for 130,000 t.
- Food, and forage dumps, commissary and other property 336 depots.
Appendix: 1. Map "Military dumps in Korea in 1931-32".
2. Map "Military dumps in Korea in 1941-42".
3. Map "Military dumps in Korea in 1945".

DEPUTY CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT OF THE
RED ARMY GENERAL STAFF

COLONEL /TSIGICHKO/

30 January, 1946.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, S. DOLITSKAYA, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: S. Dolitskaya
CERTIFICATE

I, Lt. Colonel TARANSKO C. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that Doc. #: 2237

"Table of the increase of the strength of the Kwantung Army and the Japanese Army on the whole from 1932 to 1945."

2073 "Report, Organization of Division of Kwantung Army."

2236 "Table of the growth of technical equipment in the Kwantung Army and in the Japanese on the whole from 1932 to 1945."

2130 "Report concerning Japanese Troops created by the Japanese in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia."

1879 "Table increase of Sungary river ver flotilla from 1931 - 1945."

2151 "Report of the growth of the network of railroads and automobile roads in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."

2134 "Report on the increase of the airfield system in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."

2148 "Report construction of fortified districts in Manchuria from 1934 to 1945."

1987 "Report concerning construction of ammunition dumps in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."

1831 "Report of the increase of the barrack facilities in Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."

2133 "Report Concerning Japanese military settlements in Manchuria."

1932 "Report on the growth of Settlements of Korea and Manchuria from 1931 to 1945."

1985 "Table of the increase of the strength of the Japanese troops in Korea in the period 1931-1945."

2119 "Report on the increase of construction of network of railroads and highways in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

2132 "Report on the increase of the airfield network in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

2131 "Report of construction of fortified areas in Korea from 1931 to 1945."
"Report on construction of military camps in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

"Report on the situation of the military units in Korea from 1931 to 1945."

was submitted by the Red Army General Staff in Moscow, on or about January 30, 1946.

LT. GEN. TUKHACHEVSKY
CHIEF OF THE RED
DEFENSE STAFF.
Военные склады в Корее
в 1945 году

Fortification of Korea
in 1945.

Конвенционные обозначения:

1. Склады боеприпасов
2. Склад горючего
3. Склад продовольствия

Ammunition dumps
Fuel dumps
Provisions dumps
Начальник 6 отдела
Генштаба Красной Армии
подполковник

The Red Army General Staff
Chief of the 6th Department
Lieutenant-colonel

Соколов
Военные склады в Корее
в 1931-32 г.

Military Dumps in Korea
in 1931-32

Инженерные основания:  
1. Склады боеприпасов  
2. Склады горючего  
3. Склады продовольствия и интендантского довольствия

Conventional marks:
1. Ammunition Dumps
2. Fuel dumps
3. Equipment Dumps
朝鮮ニ於ケル軍需品倉庫建設ニ関スル件

一九四五年昭和二十一至二十二年期間中

燃料

食糧

弾薬

倉庫

十円至十五円

弾薬間

備

倉庫

滿洲及朝鮮関東軍

聯合邦

二

弾薬

倉庫

二百トン

燃料

倉庫

五円

師団分

燃料

倉庫

六〇〇〇〇トン

他

物品

倉庫

約〇〇箇所

倉庫

朝
Dec 2127

言語

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2. 川 (日本)
3. 川 (台灣)
4. 川 (香港)
5. 川 (澳門)
6. 川 (澳門)
7. 川 (內地)
8. 川 (台灣)
9. 川 (澳門)
10. 川 (內地)

名 

C2 = x + y
\( a = 2 \)

\[
\begin{align*}
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\text{Case } 2: & \quad a + b = 1 & \Rightarrow & \quad a + b = 0 \\
\text{Case } 3: & \quad a + b = 1 & \Rightarrow & \quad a + b = 0 \\
\text{Case } 4: & \quad a + b = 1 & \Rightarrow & \quad a + b = 0 \\
\text{Case } 5: & \quad a + b = 1 & \Rightarrow & \quad a + b = 0 \\
\text{Case } 6: & \quad a + b = 1 & \Rightarrow & \quad a + b = 0 \\
\end{align*}
\]
ОБВИНИТЕЛЬ от СОЮЗА ССР
в Международном Военном Трибунале в Токио

REPORT ON THE INCREASE OF BARRACK CAPACITY IN KOREA IN THE PERIOD FROM 1931 TO 1945 ON TWO SHEETS WITH THREE MAPS IN TWO COPIES.
REPORT

on the Increase of the Barrack facilities in Korea from 1931 to 1945.

By the time of the occupation of Manchuria the total billeting capacity of the barrack facilities of the Japanese troops in Korea was for two infantry divisions with support units. The barracks and the military settlements were as a rule situated in big towns of the country: Seul, Kheijo, Ranan, and Tsinkai. After Manchuria had been occupied by Japan, a rapid increase of the barrack facilities in Korea began to show itself, and barracks and even whole military settlements were built as a rule in Northern Korea, mainly on the areas bordering with the U.S.S.R.

From 1931 to 1941 the barrack facilities in Korea increased more than three times with capacity of seven infantry division could have been billeted there, five of which could have been billeted in Northern Korea. From 1941 to 1945 the Japanese continued to build barracks and military settlements all over the country. During this period the billeting capacity of the barrack facilities in Korea was increased for receiving about twelve divisions together with support units. Thus, the construction of a great number of military barracks in Korea, especially in its northern part, shows that the Japanese Command planned to transform Korea into a military base for attacking the Soviet Primorye.
2. Map. "Barracks facilities in Korea in 1941-1942".
3. Map. "Barracks facilities in Korea in 1945".

DEPUTY CHIEF OF DEPARTMENT OF
THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE RED
ARMY

Colonel /Tsiganchko/

January "30", 1946.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, V. I. Tarkhov, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: /Tarkhov/
Казарменный проезд в Куре

Number of Barracks in Kure

in 1931-32.
Диаграмма показывает общую емкость казарменного фонда Кореи 45,000 men.
The total billeting capacity of the barracks in Korea... 45,000 men.
Казарменный пункт в Корее
в 1941-42 гг.

Number of Barracks in Korea
in 1941-42
Оценивающая способность казармённого
фонда Короы - 140,000 men.
The total billeting capacity of the barracks
of Korea - 140,000 men.
United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC)
Member Governments, other National Authorities and
Military Tribunals

Box 383, 384 and 385

Transcripts of Proceedings and Documents
of the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East (Tokyo Trials).
Court Exhibits PAG-3/2.3.3

Court Exhibits consist of a wide variety of published
and unpublished documents mainly from United States
and Japanese sources. The Japanese items are generally
accompanied by English translations (arranged
numerically, with gaps)

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