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
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
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

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



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I N D E X I N G   D A T A

United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC)  
Member Governments, other National Authorities and  
Military Tribunals -  
PAG-3/2.3.3.: 385 - 387

Transcripts of Proceedings and Documents  
of the International Military Tribunal for  
the Far East (Tokyo Trials).  
Court Exhibits

Court Exhibits of the International Military  
Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Trials),  
consecutively numbered. Arranged numerically with  
gaps sometimes, these documents are mainly from  
United States and Japanese sources.

Nos.: 730 - 764  
765 - 840  
841 - 871

--- END OF REEL No. 143 ---

Q 710

DCC. NO. 2364

Page 1

A F F I D A V I T  
of RODZAEVSKY Konstantin Vladimirovich  
of April 11, 1946

K.V. RODZAEVSKY, born in 1907 in the town of Blagoveshchensk, Russian, higher legal education. The former head of the whiteguard organization, "the Russian Fascist Union", in Manchuria.

Q Living in Manchuria you carried on intense anti-Soviet activities directed against the Soviet Union. Tell us about them.

A Having escaped from the Soviet Union to Manchuria in 1925 I created the whiteguard organization "The Russian Fascist Union" (R.F.S.) there. "The Russian Fascist Union", the aim of which was to overthrow the Soviet power in the USSR, counted on Japan which was preparing a military attack against the Soviet Union.

I and other leaders of the Russian Fascist Union were closely connected with a number of Japanese military and statesmen, and also with the Japanese intelligence service in Manchuria, under whose direction we carried on our active sabotage work against the USSR.

Following the task set by the Japanese intelligence service the "Russian Fascist Union", directed by me, trained agents out of the whiteguard emigrants, these agents being smuggled into the Soviet Union for intelligence work for creating fascist underground organizations, for the preparation of an armed revolt and the organization of terroristic acts against the leaders of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) and of the Soviet Government.

At the same time the "Russian Fascist Union" carried anti-Soviet propaganda among the whiteguard emigrants on a large scale and also published anti-Soviet literature for distribution on the territory of the U.S.S.R.

Q When did you establish contact with the Japanese Intelligence Service?

A I established contact with the Japanese Intelligence Service with the aim of joint struggle against the USSR in 1931, through the Japanese secret service agent Osawa, who published in Kharbin the newspaper "Kharbinskoye Vremya" in the Russian

language. In 1932 after the occupation of Manchuria by Japan, I got in touch with the chief Japanese Military Mission in Kharbin, which up to 1945 directed and controlled all the activities of "the Russian Fascist Union" and of other anti-Soviet whiteguard organizations existing in Manchuria as well.

Having obtained control of all the Manchurian white emigrants, the Japanese Intelligence Service represented by the chief Military Mission in Kharbin and Missions in other towns of Manchuria did everything for employing the whiteguards against the Soviet Union, and in the first place, for training them for an attack against the Soviet Union.

I knew of the war which Japan prepared against the Soviet Union, and of the aims she set before herself in this war, from personal talks with representatives of the Japanese military circles.

Q When and with whom had you such talks?

A General HIGUCHI, the chief of the Japanese Military Mission in Kharbin, in a heart to heart talk with me at his private residence in March, 1938, said that Japan strived to turn the Soviet Far East into a buffer-state between Japan and the U.S.S.R. He called this state Far Eastern Russia and demanded that the "Russian Fascist Union" consider its sole aim the struggle for creation of such a state under the guidance of Japan.

General HATA, who had succeeded HIGUCHI at the post of the chief of the Japanese Military Mission and who recently was chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarters, also spoke about the preparation of an attack of Japan on the Soviet Union.

Approximately in September, 1939, HATA, in his directive speech addressed to the employees of the "Russian Emigrants' Affairs Bureau in the Manchurian Empire" created by the Japanese, said that the Kwantung Army would help the white-guard emigrants to realize their anti-Soviet hopes.

Statements to the same effect were made in the directive speeches addressed to the employees of the "Russian Emigrants' Affairs Bureau" delivered by the succeeding chiefs of the Japanese military Mission in Kharbin: General YNANGITA in 1940-1942, and General DOI in 1943. Some leaders of the Japanese military planned to create by their military forces a united "national Russia" which would be under Japan's influence.

Those plans were inspired by General ARAKI, former Japanese War Minister.

In March 1934 during my visit to Tokyo in connection with the affairs of the "Russian Fascist Union" I visited General ARAKI in his flat and forwarded to him a secret letter from Major Akikusa, Assistant Chief of the Kharbin Military Mission. The contents of this letter, as Akikusa told me, was concerned with the activities of secret Japanese organization "The Union of Young Officers" with which both of them were connected. During my talk with ARAKI I told him of the anti-Soviet activities of "The Russian Fascist Union" of which he fully approved and promised to help us. Then ARAKI made a statement that Japan would by all means fight against the USSR to establish, as he put it, "National Russia", which would serve the interests of Japan. ARAKI allowed me to publish this talk in a somewhat milder form, as an interview in the newspaper of the "Russian Fascist Union", "Nash Put" (Our Way), and it was done.

During my second visit to Tokyo in March, 1939 for the purpose of establishing connection with the representatives of governmental circles of Japan as regards "The Russian Fascist Union", I again met ARAKI who at that time was Minister of Education.

Being at my request received by him in the premises of the Ministry of Education I informed ARAKI in brief about the work of the "Russian Fascist Union" and told him about the prospects of this work.

ARAKI promised to help us as before, and wrote in my album his autograph: "An eternal friend of Russia, but not of the Soviets" as a token of his intention to fight to the end for the creation of "National Russia" where Japan would have unlimited influence.

General KOISO, the Japanese Minister of Colonies, who from 1933 to 1935 was Chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarter also told me about the aggressive plans of Japan concerning the USSR. I met KOISO twice during my visits to Tokyo.

When I first met him in the Ministry of Colonies in March, 1939 KOISO promised me his support of the anti-Soviet activities of the "Russian Fascist Union".

I met him for the second time in October 1939 when I came to Tokyo on an excursion organized by the Kharbin Military Mission. KOISO received me in his flat and in our conversation concerning the relations of Japan with the USSR said that Japan strove to drive Soviet Russia from the Pacific Ocean.

After the outbreak of the war between Germany and the USSR, the Japanese were talking not only about the plans of attacking the USSR but about the time of their attack as well.

When discussing with me in October 1941 my proposal to intensify the anti-Soviet propaganda carried on by the "R.F.S.", Lieutenant Colonel NIUMURA, chief of the 3d department of the Japanese Military Mission in Kharbin, stated that Japan had her own plans and that our untimely activity might only disclose these plans.

Japan, NIUMURA went on, would start war against the Soviet Union after the German troops had taken Moscow. Then he added that the aim of Japan was to cut off the Far East from the Soviet Union and to create a new state on its territory under the protectorate of Japan.

Japan postponed the opening of hostilities against the USSR exclusively because the Red Army routed the German troops at Moscow and Stalingrad. Japan, however, did not give up her former plans of territorial gains at the expense of the USSR until recently. In December, 1942, the same Lt. Col. NIUMURA, speaking of the conditions at the Soviet-German front said that the most urgent task of Japan was the straightening of the Manchurian-Soviet frontier line along the Amur river, i.e. the annexation of the Soviet Primorye.

- Q. Tell us what you know about the practical measures taken by Japan with the aim of preparing for war against the USSR.
- A. The occupation of Manchuria carried out by the Japanese Kwantung Army in 1931-32 was a decisive step towards the preparation of Japan for an attack on the Soviet Union.

The editor of the newspaper "Kharbinskaya Vremya" Osawa, who was Japanese secret agent, told me during the offensive of the Kwantung Army troops on Kharbin that if the Soviet administration of the Chinese Eastern Railroad put obstacles in the way of the Japanese offensive, Japan would immediately start a war against the USSR, in case there were no such obstacles, Japan would attack the Soviet Union some time later.

The Japanese had worked out the plan of occupation of Manchuria beforehand, and it was corroborated by their own statements made during their talks with me.

While in Kharbin, I repeatedly met the Japanese NAGAOKA who was personal friend and advisor of General ITAGAKI, the former chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarters.

NAGAOKA's permanent residence was in Dairen, and he came to Kharbin rather frequently. Almost every time when he came there he called on me in my residence and inquired about the activities of the "Russian Fascist Union", which he supported in every way.

In the winter of 1938, during one of his regular visits to Kharbin, NAGAOKA came to my place and on behalf of General ITAGAKI inquired as to my considerations concerning the question of the future reorganization of the "Russian Emigrants' Affairs Bureau".

When talking with me, in reply to my complaints concerning the difficulties which we came across in our anti-Soviet activities, NAGAOKA spoke in the following way: "We, Japanese, for 25 years were preparing to create the "Manchurian State", and, as you can see, have created such a state. Likewise, you, the leaders of the "Russian Fascist Union", should act gradually and follow the plan set beforehand: at first, with the help of Japan, to create your own state extending as far as the Baikal Lake, and then up to the Urals". NAGAOKA told me during the same conversation that the "Union of Young Officers" existing in Japan at that time had played a great part in the preparation and carrying out of the occupation of Manchuria by the Japanese troops. I had previously been informed of the same by the aforementioned OSAWA.

Q Tell us in detail, how the Japanese prepared for the occupation of Manchuria?

A At the beginning of 1932 when talking to me in his flat, Osawa said that he was a member of the Japanese Fascist organization, the "Union of Young Officers", on the initiative of which the invasion of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria was organized, and that General MINAMI, the War Minister of Japan, was well aware of the plan of this invasion.

Further OSAWA told me that the head of this organization, Colonel HASHIMOTO, personally had participated in the clash between the Japanese and the Chinese troops in Mukden area which he, HASHIMOTO, had provoked.



The occupation of the town of Kharbin, which had been held by the Chinese troops till February 1932 also was provoked by the Japanese.

As there were many foreign consulates and settlements in Kharbin, it was of importance for the Japanese to create a formal pretext for the occupation of the town. With this aim in view OSAWA got in touch with me, as the head of the "Russian Fascist Union" and with the whiteguard General Kosmin, who was the head of one of the sections of the anti-Soviet terroristic organization "The Brotherhood of Russian Truth" and set us the task of creating a semblance of disorder in Kharbin. As Kosmin told me in October 1931, he, following OSAWA's instructions, had laid several grenades in the premises of the Japanese Military mission, the Japanese Consulate, the Japanese Military Civilians' Society and of one more Japanese office in Kharbin. This had been carried out through members of the "Brotherhood of Russian Truth" Society. When the grenades were discovered, the Japanese published in the newspapers and through diplomatic channels protested against the alleged attempts of the part of the Chinese to blow up the Japanese officers.

In December of the same year, KOSMIN informed me that OSAWA had instructed him that he open disorderly fire in the central streets of Kharbin at night with the help of the whiteguards.

In the connection with this he asked me to place at his disposal two members of the "R.F.S." to be used for carrying out this task, to which I consented and commissioned TERENTIEV and MANZHEKO, members of the Kharbin affiliation of the "R.F.S." to KOSMIN. The provocation carried out, the Japanese newspapers reported that complete anarchy was reigning in Kharbin, and that Chinese policemen went unpunished firing in the streets and plundering the civilian population.

The Japanese Consulate in Kharbin made a protest to the Chinese authorities concerning the same matter.

At the beginning of January, 1932, a fight between a Russian customer and Chinese salesman took place in one of the Chinese shops in Kharbin.

To aggravate the situation KOSMIN, by order of OSAWA, sent several members of the "Brotherhood of Russian Truth" Society to the said shop who made a pogrom there, which caused a mass clash between Russians and Chinese. As the result of this provocation several men were killed.

To further aggravate this incident OSAWA sent the Japanese newspaperman MANZHEKO and myself in a car with the Japanese Flag to the place of the incident.

Doing so he warned me that fire would be opened at our car. Near the place of fighting some strangers actually fired at us, and the Japanese made another protest to the Chinese authorities and to the Corps of the Foreign Consuls to the effect that the Chinese policemen were allegedly firing at the car bearing the Japanese flag, and in particular, had made an attempt on NAKAMURA and me.

Ensuing these provocations, the units of the Kwantung Army captured Kharbin on February 5, 1932 and commenced the occupation of Northern Manchuria. As soon as the occupation of all Manchuria was completed, the Japanese directly started preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union.

Q What military preparations were made by Japan in Manchuria for an attack on the Soviet Union?

A First of all, the greater part of the Kwantung Army was drawn up to the Manchurian-Soviet border, in the Hailar area, in particular, a whole Japanese division was stationed, another division was at the town of Tsitsikar.

The commanding personnel and the Headquarters of the units stationed along the frontier consisted, as a rule, of former participants of the Japanese intervention in Siberia in 1918-1922 who spoke Russian well. As far back as 1933 Japanese Military Missions were established in most of the Manchurian towns in the frontier area for the purpose of carrying on reconnaissance work against the USSR. The personnel of these missions also consisted mostly of the participants of the Japanese intervention in the Siberia.

Simultaneously intensive construction of fortifications and airfields was carried out along the frontier of the Soviet Union. Powerful fortifications were constructed in the district of the town of Hailar, the Hingan Station and the Pogranichnaya Station. The population were strictly forbidden to come into these districts.

Military airfields were constructed in the border towns of Manchuria: Hailar, Saghalin-Ula, Tsikussy, Lahasusu, Pogranichnaya, Mudantsian.

Along with this in 1932, an intense construction of new railroads of strategic importance was started. Among these railroads there were: Lafa-Kirin RR, which enabled the Japanese to transfer their troops from Southern Manchuria and Korea to Northern Manchuria, to the USSR frontier. The railroad

Kharbin-Saghalin-Ula in the direction of Blagoveshchensk; the railroad line Tsitsikar-Peiang, which made it possible to transfer troops from Tsitsikar in the direction of Sakhalin-Ula.

The so-called top secret railroad leading from the town of Taonan to Halun-Arshan, which made it possible to transfer troops from Southern Manchuria to the Mongolian People's Republic border.

A net of new railroads leading from Southern Manchuria to the Soviet Primorye was also built.

The building of military constructions of various kinds and of railroads of strategic importance, was going on during the whole period following the creation of Manchukuo and became especially intensified during the war of Germany against the Soviet Union.

Thus even in 1945 an intense construction of a railroad leading from Nansa Station (of the Kharbin-Tsiamysinskaya RR) to the North in the direction of the Amur River was being carried on.

During the same period the garrisons in the areas bordering with the Soviet Union were considerably reinforced.

That up to the recent time Japan was preparing for war against the USSR is confirmed by the fact that at the beginning of 1943 General YAMASHITA, who was regarded in Japan as a "blitzkrieg specialist" and who, prior to this was in command of the troops which captured Singapore, was in the area of the northern border between Manchuria and the Soviet Union.

MATSUGA, one of the leaders of the Japanese state organization the "Kyo-Wa-Kai", in March 1943 spoke to me confidentially about YAMASHITA's stay in Manchuria.

The preparation for a war against the USSR was carried out in the sphere of ideological propaganda among the Manchurian population. In order to establish among the population faith in Japan and hatred toward the Soviet Union, the Japanese immediately after the occupation of Manchuria created the state political organization "Kyo-Wa-Kai" (Commonwealth of Nations) which propagated the idea of creating the Greater East Asia and of establishing in this sphere the Japanese "new order". The "Kyo-Wa-Kai" Society carried out intense anti-Soviet propaganda among the Chinese population and then began to spread it over among the Russian whiteguards. The

"Kyo-Wa-Kai" intensely propagated the anti-Soviet ideology at meetings and in press.

The activities were directed by the Japanese Central Headquarters of the "Kyo-Wa-Kai" Society, headed in recent years by MIYAKE, Japanese General, who was chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarters at the time of the occupation of Manchuria.

Beside the "Kyo-Wa-Kai" organization, the anti-Soviet propaganda was carried on by the Japanese military Missions in the towns of Manchuria, through their agents.

- Q. What part was assigned to the Russian whiteguards in the preparation of war against the Soviet Union?
- A. The Japanese had great faith in the whiteguards, who lived in Manchuria, in connection with the preparation for an attack against the U.S.S.R. and therefore tried to activate the anti-Soviet activities of the whiteguards. It was planned that during the war against the Soviet Union, the whiteguards would be used as armed force, and after the end of the war successful for Japan, they were to carry out Japanese policy in the areas annexed from the U.S.S.R. The direction of the Anti-Soviet activities of the whiteguards organizations was carried out by the Japanese military missions, which in their turn were directed by the chief Japanese military mission in Kharbin.

Besides the whiteguard organizations were supported from Japan itself.

General ARAKI and General KOISO personally promised me to render any help in activating the anti-Soviet work of the "Russian Fascist Union."

The "R.F.S." was also supported by the Japanese organization "The Black Dragon" headed by Mitsuru TOOYAMA.

In 1935, the Japanese TOMITA, TOOYAMA's representative, came to Kharbin and brought me a samurai sword as a present from the "Black Dragon" Society. He said that TOOYAMA sympathized with the anti-Soviet activities of "the Russian Fascists" and wished us success in the struggle against the U.S.S.R.

In 1939 being in Tokyo I, with the help of TOMITO, visited TOOYAMA who repeated his wish that we might succeed and had his picture taken with me. His assistant, SUENAGA, in an interview, stated that "through the elimination of communism the ancient Rus (Russia) will emerge in new rimbis."

This interview was published in the "R.F.S." magazine, "Natsia" (Nation). Since the meeting with TOOYAMA I always felt the support of the "Black Dragon" society in my anti-Soviet activities.

You can judge of the role for which the Japanese prepared the white-guards by the statements made by the chief of the Kharbin Military mission, General DWI, in the talk which took place in December 1943 in the train going from Kharbin to the Sungari 2 station, to which we went in connection with the so-called Sungari Russian Military detachment being formed there, told me that "Bureau of the Russian Emigrant's Affairs" created by the Japanese must consider itself to be a future Russian Government.

In several talks which I had in 1934 with Major AKIKUSA, assistant chief of the Japanese Military mission, he told me that Japan was preparing for a war against the U.S.S.R. and in connection with this recommended to me to consolidate contact with SEMENOV, a white-guard ataman, whom the Japanese considered chief of whiteguard emigrants, and whom they proposed as a leader of future "National Government of Russia."

- Q. What was the concrete way of the Japanese military missions in directing the anti-Soviet activities of the white emigrants' organization?
- A. Immediately following the occupation of Manchuria the Japanese Military Mission in Kharbin established control over all anti-Soviet white emigrants' organizations acting in Manchuria, and among them the "Russian Fascist Union" headed by me.

At first counsellors were appointed to each white emigrants' organization from among the employees of the Japanese Military Mission. Major AKIKUSA acted counsellor to the "Russian Fascist Union." The white emigrants organizations: "The Russian Fascist Union," "The Monarchist Association," "The Legitimists," "The Far Eastern Union of the Military," and the "Cossacks Union," under the leadership of the Japanese Military Mission spread among the emigrants large anti-Soviet propaganda and smuggled their agents into the Soviet Union with the task of conducting intelligence work and creation of an anti-Soviet underground organization.

In 1934 the Japanese military mission in Kharbin decided to unite all whiteguard organizations for the purpose of establishing centralized guidance of their activities against the U.S.S.R. In the same year the Bureau of Russian Emigrants Affairs in the Manchuria Empire was created as a united body of all these organizations. It was subordinated to the Japanese Military Mission in Kharbin.

Through "BREM" in Kharbin and its branches in other towns in Manchuria, the Japanese Military missions recruited whiteguard for the purpose of sabotage activities on the territories of the Soviet Union.

A special detachment was recruited in 1936 from the members of the "Russian Fascist Union" according to the proposal made by SUZUKI, a Japanese intelligence officer of the Kharbin Mission. This Detachment was placed under the command of MATVEY PLATONOVICH MASLAKOV, a

whiteguard, my aide.

This detachment armed and equipped by the Japanese was in the Autumn of the same year smuggled across the Amur River onto the Soviet Union Territory for the purpose of terrorist and sabotage activities and also for the establishment of fascist underground organizations. The smuggling was carried out by SUZUKI and by ENOZUKA, a member of the Japanese military mission in Kharbin.

In the same year, i.e. 1936, and in the following years many other agents trained in the Japanese Military Mission were smuggled into the Soviet Union.

In 1937 the so-called secret schools were organized at the "Russian Fascist Union" and "Monarchist Union" in accordance with the order of Major CNCUCHI, chief of the 3rd Department of the Japanese Military mission in Kharbin. These schools trained future organizers of sabotage activities in the U.S.S.R. rear.

I was appointed director of the school at the "Russian Fascist Union". SUZUKI was my assistant. Those who graduated from the schools were sent to work in the Japanese Military Missions.

In 1938 instead of secret schools the Kharbin Military Mission established a special school at the mission training agents for reconnaissance work directed against the U.S.S.R. In this school were trained the organizers of anti-Soviet propaganda who later on would work in Japanese missions in the frontier area.

Whiteguard youth were students of the school. This school existed till the surrender of Japan and it especially extended its work when Germany attacked the Soviet Union.

In 1943 special detachments were formed out of the students of this school; those detachments sent agents to the U.S.S.R. for the purpose of gathering intelligence information. The said detachments were at Shitouheazy station, Imyanpo Station and in the Hailar area.

Along with the smuggling of agents into the Soviet Union, the Japanese military mission in Kharbin carried out a great work of organization of anti-Soviet propaganda among the white emigrants and of training of detachments consisting of white emigrants for a war against the U.S.S.R.

Q. What anti-Soviet armed detachments were formed by the Japanese of the Russian whiteguards in Manchuria?

A. The Japanese started forming the whiteguard armed detachments in 1932.

In the middle of 1932 General KOMATSUBARA, the chief of the Japanese Military mission in Kharbin, entrusted the white-guard General KOSMIN with the task of forming armed detachments out of whiteguards, these detachments were the nucleus which were to be developed into a whiteguard army in Manchuria.

Kosmin told me that according to KOMATSUBARA, this army was intended to be used in the war of Japan against the U.S.S.R.

Fulfilling the task set by KOMATSUBARA, KOSMIN immediately formed two such detachments which performed guard duties on the Mukden-Shanghai-Guan RR and the Lafa-Kirin RR, then under construction.

Beginning from 1933 the Japanese, following the order of the same KOMATSUBARA, began forming Russian police guard detachments, which carried on struggle against the Manchurian guerillas.

Such detachments were subsequently formed at the Mulir coal mines, near the Hailin Station, at the Hendaohedzy station, near the Yablonia station and at other points of Eastern Manchuria.

In 1937, Major ONOUCHI, the chief of the 3d department of the Japanese Military Mission in Kharbin, concentrated the supervision over all previously formed whiteguard detachments by subordinating them to the Hendaohedzy station branch of the Kharbin Military mission. A police school was opened at this branch, where the members of the detachments received military training and were educated in the anti-Soviet spirit.

In 1938, the Kharbin Military mission established at the Sungari Station 2 a secret "RUSSIAN DETACHMENT ASANO" in which the white guard youth were trained for a war against the USSR.

This detachment was considered by the Japanese as a model of all anti-Soviet formations.

General HATA, chief of the Japanese Military Mission in Kharbin while inspecting this detachment said to its members that they formed the backbone of the future Russian Army.

I, personally, several times visited the "ASANO DETACHMENT" to give anti-Soviet lectures. In 1939, several men of the detachment participated in the Japanese provocation in the Nomangan area.

In 1943 the "Asano detachment" was enlarged and transformed into "Russian detachments of the Manchurian Army". In view of this three detachments were formed; cavalry detachment - at the Sungari station, infantry detachment at the Handao-hedzy station and a cossack detachment at the town of Hailar.

The strength of these detachments amounted approximately to 1500 men.

To ensure military training for all whiteguard youth, obligatory military training was introduced in 1942 in all secondary and higher schools for the Russians by order of Lt. Colonel NIUMURA, the chief of the 3d department of the Kharbin Military Mission.



Besides the military training the whiteguard organizations directed by the Japanese Military Mission carried on active anti-Soviet propaganda and published newspapers and magazines.

In 1941 a special propaganda section was established in the Kharbin Military Mission with the aim of intensification of anti-Soviet activities. It had white emigrant newspapermen on its staff.

Besides directing the anti-Soviet propaganda among the Manchurian population this section began preparing anti-Soviet leaflets and booklets in 1941 which were to be distributed after Japan attacked the Soviet Union. I, myself, following the instructions of the Japanese, wrote such leaflets.

Thus, during a number of years and up to recent days, the Japanese Government and the General Staff, carrying out their aggressive plans of seizure of the Soviet territory, turned Manchuria into military base for an attack on the U.S.S.R., constructed fortifications, a net of railroads and highways there, increased the strength of the Kwantung Army and prepared the population of Manchuria, and among them the whiteguards, for war. But the rapid advance of the Red Army deprived the Japanese of the opportunity of bringing their plans into life.

The record is taken down from my words correctly and has been read by me.

Signed: Rodzaevsky.

Interrogated: Counter Intelligence Officer

Major Putintsev

CERTIFICATE

The City of Moscow  
April 11, 1946

I, Rodzaevsky, Konstantin Vladimircvich, sign this certificate to the effect that I promise to testify the truth bearing witness in the case of the main Japanese war criminals.

I was duly warned of the responsibility for giving false testimony as set forth in Article 95 of the Criminal Code of the P.S.F.S.R.

Signed: Rodzaevsky

This certificate is taken by the Counter-Intelligence Officer  
Major Putintsev.

EXTRACTS FROM THE BOOK  
"G R E A T M A N C H U R I A N E M P I R E"  
PUBLISHED ON ACCOUNT  
OF THE LIN-YIANG JUBILEE

BY THE STATE ORGANIZATION KYO-WA-KAI  
AND THE CHIEF BUREAU OF THE RUSSIAN  
EMIGRANTS AFFAIRS OF THE MANCHURIAN EMPIRE

IN KWABIN

1 2 4 2

At present the great ideal of the foundation of Manchoukuo spreads all over East Asia and even has its reflection in Europe. The political system of our Ally Germany is undoubtedly influenced by the ideas of the East.

Our ideal was a reality but not a phantasy, and when there is an ideal, when there is confidence and integrity, there shall be victory. One can say that the creation of Manchoukuo, as it were, brought about spiritual renovation to mankind. (pg. 61)

In April, 1932 (Dha-Tun 1st Year) in Mukden a special committee for the foundation of the Kyo-Wa-Kai was formed. The Committee was composed of: Colonel Itagaki, Captain Katakura and Mr. Sheh, later first Foreign Minister of Manchoukuo, Mr. Yui, Mr. Wen, also Messrs. Wada, Koyama and Yamaguti.

The committee fulfilled their responsible mission with exceptional zeal and successfully accomplished it by elaborating the basic instrument of the Kyo-Wa-Kai and the plan of its activities. (pg. 170)

The supreme ruler, His Majesty Emperor, now prosperously reigning, accepted the post of Supreme President of the Society and the post of Supreme Adviser was accepted by General Nonjo, Commanding General of the Kwantung Army. (pg. 171)

In 1933 (Dha-Tun 2nd Year) the basic principles of the Kyo-Wa-Kai were promulgated.

THE STATE MISSION OF KYO-WA-KAI

According to these basic principles, the main tasks of the Kyo-Wa-Kai's activities are as follows:

The ultimate purpose of Manchoukuo being a State, in the existing international situation, is the creation of a foundation so as to successfully subserve the allied and friendly Nippon in her struggle against the Anglo-Saxon world, as well as against the Comintern aggression.

In this holy struggle all the peoples of East Asia must join to form the united front of the common fight with the oppressors. (pg. 172).

Thus the Kyo-Wa-Kai, as is clear from the above stated, has a special mission of great importance to spread the spirit and the ideology of the State not only among the entire population of Manchoukuo but throughout the world. For the purpose of attaining this great aim the Kyo-Wa-Kai must carry on a permanent ideological struggle for the embodiment of its ideal both inside and outside the state. The Kyo-Wa-Kai is the ideological Centre of this struggle....." (pg. 172)

To establish and consolidate closer bonds with the Nippon state, the Kyo-Wa-Kai Bureau started functioning in Tokyo.

It is necessary to say, that in certain circles of the population there existed the opinion that the Kyo-Wa-Kai was by nature a temporary organization. To dispel this wrong opinion General Hinami, General Nishio and a number of other representatives of higher authorities issued special directives concerning the intrinsic nature of the Kyo-Wa-Kai. (pg. 176)

Imperial Rule Assistance Association in Nippon, the Renovation of Asia Union, the Committee of Mobilization of Spirit in Korea, the Society of Mobilization of Spirit on Formosa, the Renovation of Asia Association in the Kwantung Region, Association for Assisting the Throne on the South Islands, the Orthodox Kuo-Ming-Dan in the Renovated China, Shin-Jing-Khoi, the East Asia people's Union, the Kyo-Wa-Kai of the Manchurian Empire--These constitute the powerful ideological front, which wins illustrious victories on boundless land and sea stretches. It must be said that the Kyo-Wa-Kai is righteously a pioneer of the ideological front of the creation of the New Order and the Renovation of the Great East Asia. (pg. 182-183)

7th ALL-MANCHURIAN CONGRESS OF THE  
KYO-WA-KAI

(pg. 204)

1940 (KHAN-DEE 7th YEAR)

His Majesty and the Commanding General of the Kwantung Army honored with their presence the ceremony of the opening session of the 7th Congress. (pg. 204)

8th ALL-MANCHURIAN CONGRESS OF THE  
KYO-WA-KAI

1941 (KHAN-DEE 8th YEAR)

The 8th All-Manchurian Congress of the Kyo-Wa-Kai held its session in the Central Headquarters Building in Shinjin from October 10 to October 17. (pg. 205)

His Majesty, the Emperor accompanied by the Commanding General of the Kwantung Army honored the opening ceremony with His presence. (pg. 205)

Four delegates of the Russian emigration participated in the 8th Congress for the first time. The twofold reasons for their having been absent at the previous Congresses are as follows:

Firstly, one of a technical nature--language difficulties.

Secondly, at some places there were no special Russian Sections of the Kyo-Wa-Kai. In the course of time these obstacles had been removed and several Russian delegates specially invited for the occasion were able to take an active part in the proceedings of the 8th Congress. (pg. 205)

ALL-MANCHURIAN EXTRAORDINARY CONGRESS OF  
THE KYO-WA-KAI

On February 8, 1942, an All Manchurian Extraordinary Congress of the Kyo-Wa-Kai was called by the Central Headquarters of the Kyo-Wa-Kai. The session was opened in the premises of the Kyo-Wa-Kaikan in Shinjin. The Congress was called in connection with the promulgation of His Majesty, the Emperor's mani-

festos on the collaboration with the allied Nippon Empire in her Holy-War for the Great East Asia. The session was held two days. (pg. 206)

Ensuing His Majesty, the Emperor's departure General Umedzu, the Nippon Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Kwantung Army, addressed the delegates of the Congress with a directive which contained among other things the following:

"His Majesty Tenno Granted his Manifesto on the Declaration of War. On the same day His Majesty, the Emperor's manifesto was promulgated. All this filled our hearts with a special happy feeling.

"The aim of the Great East Asiatic War is to liberate East Asia from the harmful influence of England and the U.S.A. and by joint efforts of the East Asiatic nations to establish the New Order and provide the possibilities for the states of East Asia to bring into life the "Kwankoku Itai" idea and their general prosperity.

"By this day the Nippon Imperial Army and Navy have won a series of brilliant victories in the Pacific Ocean and in compliance with His Majesty Tenno's Gracious Decree, annihilated a number of military bases of the enemy in East Asia, thus making a gigantic stride towards the organization of the New Order.

"However, to ensure the complete realization of the purposes of the war and to secure the prosperity of East Asia, we must go a long way. At such an extraordinary historical moment the present Congress is extremely opportune. The delegates to the Congress must first of all pay their attention to the general situation all over the world, and perceiving the grave significance of the international situation and tasks facing Manchoukuo they must take the lead in the movement of raising the spirit of the foundation of the state. For promotion in every way the idea of sacrifice, for elucidating the masses as to the great cause of the Holy War, for raising the spirit of the masses, in this way helping increase the national production and raise the might of the state.

"On the other hand, basing themselves on the principles of their common struggle and durable relations between Manchoukuo and Nippon the delegates must contribute to the cause of national defense so that Nippon might be sure so far as the rear is concerned.

"Thus you must fulfill what you are assigned and at the

same time you will enjoy His Majesty, the Emperor's great benevolence." (pg. 206)

The following principles of work of the Central Headquarters of the Kyo-Wa-Kai for the present time were given in the speech of General Miake, Chief of the Central Headquarters:

(a) To popularize among the masses the significance of the war for the Great East Asia.

(b) To act with confidence in the coming victory bearing in mind that wherever there is justice there is victory.

(c) The population of Manchoukuo must feel grateful to the life of today.

(d) Each and everyone should live inspired by the sentiment of the foundation of the New Order in East Asia.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT.

I, V. A. Kaplan, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated excerpts of the above Document.

Signature: /s/ V. A. Kaplan

Seizure of Documents.

The Town of Kharbin.

September 10, 1945.

I, Lieutenant-Colonel Denshin, Victor Vasilievich, the military prosecutor of the army unit N-35299, went on this day to building N-16 on Tsitsikerskaya Street, which had previously belonged to the Intelligence Department of the Kwantung Army, for examination and seizure of literature which might be used as evidence against the war criminals in Japan. On arriving there I examined the library which had belonged to the Intelligence Department of the Kwantung Army.

During the examination I discovered a book published in the Russian language in Kharbin, in 1942, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of Manchukuo. The title of this book was as follows: "The Great Manchurian Empire." The book contained 416 pages of various articles and photos showing the activities of the Russian Emigrants' Bureau, the Command of the Kwantung Army, the political organization "Kyo-ta-sai" and of number of other public and political societies in Manchuria which had been organized by the Japanese.

Taking into consideration the fact that this book might be used as evidence revealing that the Japanese Government had been preparing the Manchurian military base for a war against the USSR, the United States and Great Britain, and the fact that this book might be needed as evidence by the International Military Tribunal, I, under authority, of art. 175 and 183 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the R.S.F.S.R.

RULES.

To seize the above-mentioned book for forwarding it as evidence to the International Military Tribunal.

Military Prosecutor of the Army Unit N-35299.

Lieutenant-Colonel Denshin.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED

I N. Gildenblat, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature: /s/ N. Gildenblat

CAPTIONS

FROM THE BOOK,

"GREAT MANCHURIAN EMPIRE"

- P. 28 4. General HINAMI.  
6. General UMEZU.
- P. 38 General ITAGAKI, former Chief of the Kwantung Army Headquarters.
- P. 39 General DOHARA.
- P. 36 General TOJO, Prime Minister of Japan and Marshal Tsar-Tsin-Kui, Prime Minister of Manchukuo.
- P. 140 General UMEZU, Commanding General of the Kwantung Army and Special Envoy of Japan reads his address before His Majesty the Emperor, on the account of the 10th Jubilee of Manchukuo.
- P. 142 Parade of 65,000 members of mobilization rally of the Kiowa-Kai youth in Shintsin.
- P. 168 His Majesty the Emperor and General UMEZU at the opening ceremony of the All-Manchurian Kiowa-Kai congress.
- P. 203 (left) General UMEZU, Special Envoy of Nippon and Commanding General of the Kwantung Army makes a directing speech to the participants of the Congress.
- P. 203 (right) L. NEIRCNE, Italian Envoy greets the delegates of the Congress.
- P. 204 The address of welcome of Dr. W. WAGNER, German Envoy.
- P. 214 The Harbin High Courses of the Kiowa-Kai for Russian emigrant youth at the parade.
- P. 215 The Parade of Public Voluntary Detachments of the Kiowa and the High courses of the Kiowa-Kai for Russian emigrant youth.
- P. 217 (left) Cavalry General V. A. KISLITSIN, Chief of Staff of the Main Detachment of Public Voluntary groups of the Kiowa passes by the ranks.
- P. 217 (right) General YANAGITA, Chief of the Japanese Military Mission inspects the training groups, of Public Voluntary Detachments of the Kiowa.



- P. 225 Ataman I.U. SEMENOV visits a camp of Russian  
"Seinendanovites" in Yakagashi. Right -- R. LATO --  
Left -- P. I. GRIBANOVSKIY.
- P. 302 The 1939 Slogans of the "Anti-Cominter Day."  
"Moscow Brings Destruction -- Tokyo brings Renovation"  
"Communism is the Worst Enemy of Humanity"  
"If you Want to Regain Russia Join the Ranks of Anti-  
Comintern".  
"Communism Shall Die, Russia Shall Live."  
"Long Live the Anti-Comintern".

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G.I.,  
 a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do  
 hereby certify that Book "Greater Manchurian Empire",  
published by the "Nio-Wa-Kai" and Chief Bureau of  
Russian Emigrants in Manchuria in 1942  
 was delivered to me by the Military Prosecutor of the  
Zabaikalye-Amur military district  
 on or about May 13, 1946, and that the original of  
 the said document may be found in the document is  
attached herewith.

I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

/s/ Lt. Col. Taranenko  
 (Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan,  
June 28, 1946.

Ex 732

Items Concerning the U.S.S.R. presented at the Conference of Japanese Military Attaches in EUROPE

I. Re: Investigation of situations.

1. Appraisal of conditions in and future of the U.S.S.R. by comparison of foreign with Soviet views of the U.S.S.R.
2. What policy should JAPAN adopt if any future change takes place in U.S.S.R.?
3. A study of sabotage measures to be taken by various European countries in case of war with the U.S.S.R.
4. A survey of the conditions of white Russians in foreign countries and estimate of their future activities.
5. Views on the effect on Soviet-European relations, if in the future JAPAN should end friendly relations with the U.S.S.R.

II. Miscellaneous Items.

1. Opinion based upon past experience as to whether Japanese military attaches in Poland should take additional duties as military attaches in Baltic States.
2. Opinions on intelligence work against the U.S.S.R. conducted by Japanese military attaches stationed outside the U.S.S.R. (The attaches are of the opinion that ENGLAND is spending huge sums in EUROPE for intelligence work against the U.S.S.R.)
3. Opinion as to whether the Conference of Japanese military attaches stationed in different countries should be continued or not.

N.B.

Under the above-mentioned headings detailed mention has been made, but some of it is illegible beyond comprehension.

10. Reliance on foreign newspaper, in particular on White-Russian is misleading as it abounds with propaganda. It should be guarded against. (SUZUKI). According to (T.N. illegible), newspapers published in Russia are, after all, reliable.

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11. Intelligence from Constantinople is mostly British propaganda. (SUZUKI)
12. Latvian policy is always directed by Poland and Britain, and is subject to change from time to time, but it is worthy of utilizing (KOMATSUBARA)
13. Liaison of intelligence from the various attaches in Eastern Europe is important to verify each intelligence report. Hope the Central Department will watch it more carefully. (KOMATSUBARA)
14. TROTSKY now has arrived in TURKEY, and 60 of his subordinates are to be driven out of the country, it is reported. They may be used for our espionage. (HASHIMOTO)
15. Whenever a good spy is found in a country, would it not be profitable for us to buy reports from him by collecting money from all attaches? (HASHIMOTO)
16. Question of sharing important points of espionage intelligence on Russia from TURKEY, POLAND AND VIENNA among the respective (attaches) is now being studied, it seems. (SUZUKI)  
  
(T.N. Paragraph 17 illegible)
18. Much of the espionage intelligence on Russia from Austria is unreliable. It should be guarded against. (KOMATSUZAWA)
19. There shall at least be one conference of attaches of the respective countries in each calendar year, and it is also important that an influential man be sent from the Central (office), and it is preferable that it take place in May or June and be prearranged. (All attaches concord in this opinion).

Doc. No. 1682

Page 1.

CERTIFICATE

I, Lt. Colonel TARARENKO, G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the photocopy of the document in Japanese Items Concerning the U.S.S.R., discussed at the Conference of Japanese Military Attaches in European countries held in Berlin in April 1929 (on 4 sheets) was delivered to me by the records office of the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department, Moscow on or about March 22, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the archives of the Red Army Military Prosecution Department, Moscow.

I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_.

Lt. Col. TARARENKO /s/  
Signature and rank

Tokyo, Japan

October 7, 1946.

EXCERPTS FROM THE MINUTES OF  
INTERROGATION OF THE ACCUSED  
MATSUI

TOKYO.

25 April 1946.

I, military interrogator from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East Senior Counsellor of Justice BAGIMAN, in the presence of Senior Counsellor of Justice P.D. MOLOZOV, with the participation of interpreter Junior Lieutenant E. A. PETROV, and secretary-stenographer L. A. MAMLINA, interrogated the accused named below, who gave the following evidence:

1. Name - MATSUI, IWANE.
2. Age - Born in 1879
3. Occupation up to the time of arrest - President of the League of the Revival of Greater East Asia.
4. Political party affiliation - Belonged to a series of Pan-Asiatic organizations.
5. Address - Tokyo, Sugamo Prison.

-----  
Q. What decisions were accepted in the conference of the Japanese military attaches in Europe, called in Berlin in 1929.

A. In 1929 I, in my capacity of director of the second department of the General Staff, was in America and Europe. During my stay in Berlin, I called a conference of all the military attaches of Japan in European countries. At the conference we considered various current problems. We didn't touch on any political problems at the conference.

. . . . .

Q. Did HASHIMOTO participate in the deliberations of that conference?

A. Yes, HASHIMOTO, being at that time military attache in Turkey, participated in the deliberations of that conference.

- Q. A document is being shown to you which is a photo-copy of notes concerning the work of the conference of military attaches in Berlin in 1929. Were questions given in the document considered at the conference?

(A photo-copy of the said document is being shown.)

- A. Having read the document shown to me, I have come to the conclusion that the notes were made by one of the persons who were present at the conference and apparently reflect correctly the contents of some of the questions which were considered at the conference.

CERTIFICATE

I, A. V. KUNIN, hereby certify that I am fully conversant with English and Russian languages, and the above is a true and correct translation.

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Ex 734

Doc. No. 1989

Page 1

(The Special Secret Report from Turkey No. 5)  
15 Nov. 1929

/Sender/ Artillery Major HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, Military Attache to the  
Imperial Japanese Embassy in Turkey

/To/ The Assistant-Chief of the Army General Staff OKAMOTO, Ren-ichiro

TITLE: SITUATION IN THE CAUCASIA AND ITS STRATEGIC USE FOR THE PURPOSE  
OF SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES

/P. 2/

The Caucasus area, various in race and religion, is affected little by Russian civilization, being located far from the center of Soviet Russia. Considering this, the Caucasus is surely an important area from the standpoint of strategems against Russia. However, because of the fact that the various races in the area are antagonistic to each other and can not cooperate in doing anything, we cannot deny that it will be very difficult to unite the whole Caucasus in rising against Russia unless by the force of military occupation.

/P. 5/

6. It would also be a good scheme to make all races in the Caucasus confront each other and consequently to bring about confusion in the area, by instigating either the idea of Greater Armenia, or the independent inclination of Georgia, or the Mussulman Movement, or the Partizan Movement of the mountaineers, etc. The idea of Greater Armenia is the most promising one as a fuse to give rise to such a situation regardless of its success. In case that this idea is advocated, there would break out a great confusion because of opposition on the part of Georgia and Azerbaijan, and, needless to say, of Turkey.

Document No. 1989

1946 11

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO, G.I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the "Utilization of conditions in the Caucasus for purposes of sabotage activities" was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department, Moscow, on or about March 21, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the archives of the said department, Moscow.

I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_

Lt. Col. Taranenko (signed)  
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan,

May 17, 1946.

JOC  
2307

Ex 735

Numerous facts of intolerable anti-Soviet activities of the Japanese military authorities of Manchuria which are absolutely contradictory to article 5 of the Peking Convention concluded between the USSR and Japan on January 20, 1925, have repeatedly been brought to the notice of the Japanese Imperial government. Below are given new facts which show that these activities have lately been carried on on a larger scale and that intense sabotage work in the USSR has been organized on the territory of Manchuria.

The Japanese military authorities often make use of the Russian whiteguard emigrants living in Manchuria for their anti-Soviet activities, using them directly or indirectly for committing terroristic and sabotage acts on the USSR territory, smuggling them for this purpose to the USSR, etc.

One of the methods of training men for sabotage and terroristic work is that of forming armed military and police detachments of Russian white guards by the Japanese military authorities in Manchuria, which are on the allowance of the Japanese and Manchurian governmental offices. So, there is a special composite detachment of Russian policemen, consisting of about 50 men and receiving systematic training.

At the Pogranichnaya Station, on June 24, 1935 a special group of 32 Russian whiteguards was formed in the body of the "special police detachment for repressing banditry" at the Police Department of the Bitsian province; there is a guard detachment of 50 Russian emigrants on the territory of the Japanese subject Kondo's wood concession which runs along the Eastern line of the North Manchurian Railroad, etc. Finally, the Union of Military Emigrants having at its disposal schools for training the commanding personnel of the Russian white emigrants, military camps, etc., was created in Kharbin with the knowledge and permission of the Japanese-Manchurian authorities.

The systematic anti-Soviet propaganda carried on in the Russian language in the Manchurian newspapers and through the radio stations of Tientsin and Kharbin, calling to commit terroristic and sabotage acts against the legitimate authorities of the USSR, serves the same task of training men for sabotage and terroristic work. As there is the strictest censorship of press and radio in Manchuria, this propaganda may be carried on only with the knowledge and approval of the proper Japanese and Japanese-Manchurian authorities.

Further on, the material of investigation and sentences pronounced by various Soviet courts establish beyond doubt the direct and leading participation of the Japanese military authorities in Manchuria in the organization of sabotage and terroristic acts on the territory of the USSR.

The Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Japan can make reference to following facts:

1. The Assizes of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR in session held in Irkutsk on August 31 and September 1, 1935, established by the investigation of the court following (below an extract from the sentence is given):

"In 1935 the White Guards I. V. Kobylkin and E. L. Pereladov, having secretly penetrated into the Soviet Union territory through Manchuria with the aim of carrying out espionage, sabotage and terrorist acts, were held up at various dates in the East Siberian Region, having arms, incendiary cartridges and counter-revolutionary literature on them.

"Later, at the end of May, 1935, Victor Oleinikov was held up in Zabaikalye while crossing the frontier. He, too, had secretly penetrated into the Soviet territory together with two other terrorists: Michail Oleinikov and Kustov shot when attacking a border guard post. Revolvers, poisons, and counter revolutionary literature were found on the shot men and on Victor Oleinikov as well.

"It is established by the documents of the case and by the confession of the defendants that Kobylkin and Pereladov who turned out to be a white guard colonel and a white guard sub-lieutenant, respectively, living in emigration in Northern Manchuria since the rout of the white bands in the Soviet Far East in 1922 till 1935, and being members of various white guard counter-revolutionary organizations took an active part in their activities in preparing an armed attack on the Soviet Union with the aim of overthrowing the Soviet Power and of restoration of capitalism with the help of foreign intervention.

"Having counter-revolutionary convictions and pursuing these aims of his own free will as one of the chiefs of the Eastern Department of the 'Russian General Military Union', he also received and obeyed instructions of the Secret Service offices of a certain foreign power, being its secret agent.

Besides, Kobylkin holding an official position in police, helped and personally organized the smuggling of armed bands, weapons and individual agents from Manchuria to the Soviet territory to carry out espionage, and sabotage and terrorist acts.

"So, during the time when Kobylkin worked as a police supervisor at the station of Djalaincr, five armed bands were smuggled from Manchuria to the Soviet territory.

"In January, 1935, Kobylkin, following instructions of the secretary of the military mission of a certain power in Kharbin, with the knowledge of the head of the military mission of the same power in the town of Manchuria, smuggled to the Soviet Union territory white guard Pereladov with the task of carrying out espionage, sabotage and terrorist acts.

"Pursuing the same counter-revolutionary aims and following the instructions of the already mentioned secretary of the military mission in Kharbin, Kobylkin himself, with the help of the head of the military mission in the town of Manchuria, crossed the Soviet frontier line with weapons on him in March, 1935, but was held up. There were on him two "Mauser" and one "Astra" pistols, incendiary cartridges to be used for setting on fire stores and constructions of military importance, and a large quantity of counter-revolutionary literature.

"In organization of the transfer of agents of the secret service of a certain power and of representatives of counter-revolutionary organizations into the Soviet territory, and in transportation of weapons and receiving espionage information, Kobylkin was assisted by Victor Oleinikov who, since 1933 maintained through General Shilnikov close contact with the military mission of a certain power in Kharbin. When General Shilnikov who being chief of the Eastern Department of the Russian General Military Union had simultaneously been a secret agent of the said military mission in Kharbin, died in 1934, the direction of the activities of the white guard organization of the "Russian General Military Union" passed on to Kobylkin, and Victor Oleinikov received his instructions, both from Kobylkin and from the secretary of the military mission in Kharbin, directly, and from the heads of the military missions in the towns of Manchuria and Hailar.

"With the help of Victor Oleinikov, who had repeatedly crossed the frontier himself and smuggled Pereladov, Kustov, Michail Oleinikov and even Kobylkin himself, the latter transferred onto the Soviet territory 12 pistols with a large supply of rounds for committing terrorist acts, ten incendiary cartridges for sabotage acts, a camera with films for espionage work and poisons: strychnine and atropine, for same terrorist acts.

"Kobylkin, as it is stated in his confession and in Pereladov's and Oleinikov's evidence, got all these things, intended for fulfilling espionage, sabotage and terrorist tasks on the Soviet Union territory, from official representatives of the Military Mission of a certain power in the towns of Kharbin and Manchuria directly or through the head of the editorial office of the newspaper "Kharbin Time", Osawa.

"The same persons gave Kobylkin money for carrying on counter-revolutionary sabotage work."

On considering the abovesaid the Assizes of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR found I. V. Kobylkin, E. L. Pereladov and V. V. Oleinikov guilty and sentenced them to be shot.

At the closed session of the Assizes the defendants gave following evidence.

Kobylkin said:

"The power to which I and all other defendants have referred to as a 'certain' Power is Japan. I received instructions from the secretary of the Japanese Military Mission in Kharbin, Tsuda, from the Head of the Japanese Military Mission in the town of Manchuria, Sakurai, and also from the Head of the Japanese Military Mission in the town of Hailar Saito and from the head of the editorial office of the newspaper 'Kharbin Time' Osawa."

Pereladov said:

"When I, giving testimony during the investigation in the court, spoke about the dependence of the counter-revolutionary organizations on the military missions of a certain Power, I meant Japan.

"Whenever a band was being formed to be smuggled to the USSR, official representatives of the Japanese military mission

participated in and sanctioned the smuggling. It is confirmed by the fact that when I expressed my wish to cross the frontier and Kobylkin consented to smuggle me, I had to communicate on this question with the secretary of the Japanese Mission, whom I had to promise to carry out a special task of sabotage -- terroristic and espionage nature set by the Japanese Military Mission, and only then my crossing was sanctioned by the mission in the town of Manchuria represented by Sakurai and by the mission in Kharbin represented by Tsuda."

Oleinikov said:

"Being abroad I was connected with the secretary of the Japanese Mission in Kharbin, Tsuda, with the Head of the Military Mission in the town of Manchuria Sakurai, with the supervisor of the Department of Police, Timofeev, who was concurrently secret agent of the Japanese Military Mission, and with the supervisor of the Criminal-Detective Department, Kulikov.

"I passed information to and received instructions from Tsuda and Sakurai who paid me money for it. The 'Mauzer' pistol I got also from Tsuda."

2. On October 26, 1935 an armed group of 6 Koreans who had penetrated onto the territory of the USSR from Manchuria ran across an outpost guard of Soviet border guards on duty in the area of Northwest of the village Peltavka. Trying to put up resistance to the border guards who wanted to hold them up, the bandits opened fire, and as a result of firing two of the bandits were killed and two wounded. The remaining two bandits had managed to disappear during the firing, but were met by another border-guards outpost on duty in the same area. Being discovered, they again opened fire, and when the outpost opened retaliatory fire one of them was mortally wounded, but the other managed to run away. The following things were found on the killed and wounded Koreans: a pile of counter-revolutionary literature, two "Brauning" and two "Mauzer" pistols, two wrenches for unscrewing joints of rails and a small crowbar for pulling out spikes fastening the rails to the sleepers. The held-up wounded saboteurs, who called themselves Kimiseb and Pakenkha, testified that their band had been formed by a special Japanese military organ in Sanchagon which had sent them onto the territory of the USSR with the task of destroying railroads and organizing of railroad accidents. According to testimony given by the same persons this military organ had formed a second band of 7-8 men, which was supposed to be smuggled onto the Soviet territory 5-6 days after the return of the first band.

3. The Military Tribunal of the Separate Red Banner Far Eastern Army, in the session held in the town of Khabarovsk on January 20-25, 1936, heard the case of 21 defendants, and among them of the Russian emigrant, whiteguard Georgy Semen, Koreans Lin Shen-do, Kim I-seb, Pak En-kha, Tiu Hva-sun, O Gui-khen, Li En-gyn, Lin Son-khak and others. The Military Tribunal established that most of the defendants were members of the espionage-sabotage groups, smuggled onto the territory of the USSR from Manchuria in August, September and October, 1935. These groups crossed the border with the aim of carrying on espionage, of planting secret agents in the Ussuri and Primorye districts of the Far Eastern region, and of committing sabotage acts. According to the testimony given by the defendants, the Japanese Military Mission in the town of Sanchagen, and an employee of this mission, Midzuno, in particular, supplied these groups with weapons, means for carrying out sabotage activities, a camera for taking pictures of military constructions, etc. The defendants Kim I-seb and Pak En-kha, for instance, who had twice crossed the Soviet frontier in October, 1935, together with a group of saboteurs, had the task of destroying the railroad track in the important points of the Ussuri Railroad.

All the defendants pleaded guilty and were sentenced by the Military Tribunal of the Separate Red Banner Far Eastern Army to various punishments.

Appendix to the note of the Embassy of the USSR to Japan of May 4, 1936.

Correct: Director of the State Central Historical Record Office

Professor V. Maksakov

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. Gildenblat, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature: /s/ M. Gildenblat



C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARSHANKO, G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the attached photostat of the document in Japanese "A report of the Japanese military attache in Turkey, Major Hashimoto concerning the "Situation in the Caucasus and its strategic use for the purpose of sabotage activities on 24 pages, was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department, Moscow, on or about March 22, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the record office of the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department.

I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_.

/s/ Lt. Col. TARSHANKO, G. I.  
(signature and rank)

Tokyo, Japan,

October 3, 1946.

EX 736

Doc. No. 1968

Page 1

February 16th, 1940

(The Sixth Clause of Inquiry Items) Revision of the Anti-Soviet Sabotage activities and of guidance of White Russians in keeping with the revisions.

Army Special Service  
Organization (TOKU-UKIKUN)  
at Harbin.

1. Reform of the anti-Soviet sabotage activities. The idea we have hitherto had regarding the anti-Soviet sabotage activities was to use the individual sabotage units under the direct leadership of the Japanese military authorities. However, to make this more effective in future, it is advantageous to establish a Far East Anti-Comintern Self-government simultaneously with the commencement of hostilities, to unite various kinds of sabotage activities by this, and to add political meanings to this.

Namely, for the White Russians residing in Manchuria and China, the above mentioned consists in raising their spirit of autonomous, positive co-operation with the Japanese Army by showing the most distinct object at the commencement of hostilities and also, for the population on the Soviet territory, it consists in giving them opportunity to join voluntarily the Anti-Comintern Self-government under the hope of establishing a liberal and peaceful independent state.

For this purpose, it is indispensable, as preparations in peace time, to strengthen what has been carried out hitherto, to complete individually every element to be united to the self-government when establishing it, and at the same time on the one hand to give the White Russians themselves administrative training, and so to give the White Russians entirely satisfactory ability beforehand to execute practical business when they are applied to every organ of the government, and local self-governing bodies and all kinds of economic systems, especially, when applied as responsible persons of the departments contacting with the people on the occasion of the establishment of a self-government.

2. Plan of guidance of the White Russians in connection with charges of sabotage activities. Regarding the former part of the above-mentioned preparations in peace time, it will suffice to follow the plan taken hitherto, however, regarding the latter part it is recognized necessary, to

.. .. ..  
Add some change to the administrative organism of Manchukuo at present.

That is to say, for a measure of administrative discipline for the White Russians, it is now possible to consider dividing it into two categories.

Part I--is to appoint White Russians in important posts of the present administrative and economic systems and to make them undertake practical business. Considering these practical businesses, it is necessary to appoint them on responsible posts and not to confine them to such robot-like beings as former Russian public officials or company employees in Manchuria. For this purpose, special appointments must be opened for them to some extent.

The central government recently enumerated where the White Russians could be used: at least, every local administrative and self-governing systems, military authorities, railway, other special companies etc., under the province, and it is required to assign necessary personnel to all parts, and to engage them in practical businesses of military affairs, police affairs, economy, industry, traffic, correspondence, propagation, judicature, etc.

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However according to the necessity of sabotage activities the existence of the White Russian Emigrant Bureau is important and it is indispensable not to dissolve this Bureau immediately into local administrative systems or self-governing systems, but to keep it existing as an auxiliary system, to utilize it, and to execute practical activities of White Russians through it. Also practicing the activity of the Kyowa-Kai (Manchukuo Fsieh-ho-hui) towards the White Russians without fail through the White Russian Emigrant Bureau, and it is not advisable to divide the forces into two parts.

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I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G.I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that "The conference of chiefs of Army organs in Northern Manchuria."--"Revision of the plot against the U.S.S.R. and the plan of guidance of White Russians in keeping with the revision". (February 1940) was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department, Moscow. on or about March 1, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in The archives of the said department in Moscow.

I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_

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/s/ Taranenko  
Lt. Col. TARANENKO  
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan,

17, May, 1946.

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Page 1

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Dec. No. 1968

Page 11

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Lt. Col. T\*ARANENKO  
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan,

17, May, 1946.



February 16th, 1947

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/s/ Taranenko  
Lt. Col. TARANENKO  
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan,

17. May       , 1946.

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1968-1

昭和十五年二月十六日

( 福地 )

極秘

( 研究項目第六項 )

對「ソ」謀略ノ刷新ト之ニ伴フ日本指導方針


陸軍省陸軍特務機關

一、對「ソ」謀略ノ刷新

對「ソ」謀略ニ關スル從來ノ構想ハ日本軍部直接ノ指導ヲ以テ個々ノ謀略單位ヲ運用セントスルニ在リシカ將來之ヲ一層效果的ナラシムル爲ニハ開戦ト同時ニ極東反共自治政權ヲ樹立シ之ニ各種謀略ヲ統合セシメ以テ之ニ政治的意義ヲ附スルヲ有利トス

即チ之ニ依リ在滿支白系露人ニ對シテハ門閥ニ方リテ最モ明確ナル目標ヲ示シテ日本軍ニ對スル自主積極的協力ノ精神ヲ昂揚セシメ又ハ「ソ」領六衆ニ對シテハ之ヲ驅リテ自由平和ノ獨立國創設ノ希望ノ下ニ進シテ反共自治政權ニ合流セシメントスル契機ヲ與ヘントスルニ在リ

之カ爲平時準備トシテハ從來行ヒタルモノヲ強化



1968-2

シテ自治政權成立ニ際シ之ニ統合スル諸要素ヲ個々ニ完備シ置クト共ニ一方自系露人自體ニ行政的訓練ヲ施シ以テ自治政權ノ成立ニ際シ一洒リノ政府各機關、地方自治體並各種經濟機關ノ構成員特ニ民衆接觸部面ノ責任者ニ自系露人ヲ充テ其際彼等ヲシテ實務ノ遂行ニ遺憾ナカラシムル能力ヲ豫メ附與シ置クコト緊要ナリ

二 諒略刷新ニ伴フ自系指導方策

前記平時準備ノ中前段ノ事項ニ就テハ從來ノ方策ヲ踏襲スレハ足レリトスルモ後段ノ事項ニ關シテハ現下滿洲國ノ行政環境ニ若干ノ變更ヲ加フル必要ヲ認ム

即チ自系露人ニ對スル行政的訓練ノ方法トシテハ今之ヲ二個範疇ニ區分シテ考ヘ得ラル

其一、ハ現在ノ行政並經濟機構ノ要員ニ自系露人ヲ採用シ實務ニ當ラシム而モ其實務シムルヤ從來ノ常職人官公吏或ハ會社員ノ如キ「ロハット」的存存ニ止マラシメス責任ヲ以テ業務ヲ擔任セシムルヲ具ス之カ爲ニハ某程度ノ特別仕給ノ給ヲ拓カサルヘカラス

此範疇ニ屬スヘキ部門トシテハ中央政府ハ之ヲ暫

1968-3

ク措クトスルモ少クモ等以下ノ各地方行政乃至自治機關、軍、鐵道其他、國策管轄等ヲ興ケ得ヘク其各方面ニ亙リ所長ノ人員ヲ配置シ軍實、警務、經濟、産業、交通、通信、宣傳、司法等ノ實務ニ就カシムルヲ要ス

其二、ハ自系露人事務局ヲ活用シ自系露人ニ關スル民政的事項ハ悉ク事務局ヲ通シア之ヲ施行スル如クス即チ登記、配給、社會事業、教育、保健體育、文化啓蒙、兵隊、商工關係等是ナリ

然レトモ自系事務局存立ノ謀略的意義ニ乏キ之ヲ直チニ地方行政機關乃至自治機關内ニ解消セシムルコト無ク補助機關トシテ存在セシメ之ヲ利用シ實務ノミ之ヲ通シテ行フコト緊要アリ又自系露人ニ對スル協和會ノ活動モ同様ニ必ス自系事務局ヲ通シテ之ヲ行ヒ苟モ政令ニ途ニ出テ分裂ヲ來サシムルカ如キコトアルヘカラス

證 明 書

1968-4

ソサイエト社會主義共和國聯邦軍中ノ一員タル  
余即チ陸軍中佐タラネンコ G. I. / FARKHENKO  
G. I. / ハ「北滿洲ニ於ケル陸軍機關長會議」  
及「對ソ謀略ノ修正ト之ニ伴フ自赤軍西兩人ノ指  
導方策」(一九四〇年二月)ガモスコニ於ケル  
赤軍陸軍檢察本部ヨリ余ニ一九四六年ノ四月二十  
一年ノ三月一日又ハ其前後ニ交付セラレタルコト  
並ニ上記文書ノ原本ハモスコニ於ケル右官廳ノ  
公文書類中ニ所在スト看ラル、モノアルコトヲ茲  
ニ證明ス。

タラネンコ / FARKHENKO / 中佐 / 署名 /

(署名及階級)

日本東京 一九四六年五月十七日

Extremely Secret

Instructions pertaining to the Sabotage Activities  
Education and Training for the Year of Showa (1943)

(Takeaka) (Shimoyama)  
(Nakamori)

The 2nd Intelligence Conference of 1943.  
Distribution No.7 extra No.1

(Murazawa)

June 16, 1943.  
Kwantung Army Intelligence Dept.

The Sabotage Activities Education and training for the 18th year of  
SHOWA (1943) should be based on this direction.

(CHYONA 18-6-16 (June/6/1943)

Chief of the Intelligence Dept.,

Kwantung Army, DOI, Akio

I. General Rule.

This direction is based on the Kwantung Army Headquarters Educational directions  
of the 18th year of SHOWA (1943) for the special Corps with consideration of the  
results obtained from the previous trainings.

II. Purpose.

The principal purpose of this is to develop and strengthen the fighting spirit,  
the cogent unity, and also to perfect osmosis of the general training subjects;  
and to teach special training-subjects in a way not to disclose the real object,  
which will meet the condition of enemy, geography, duties (services applied in  
wartime), and especially to strengthen officer's education.

III. Methods

1. The period from Showa 18-4-1 to Showa 19-3-31 (Apr. 1, 1943-March 31, 1944)  
is the Showa 18 year to be the education period of the 18th year of Showa for this  
education and is divided into four periods of three months each.

2. The curriculum will be divided into two, the one being the general training  
and the other the special training for enemy condition, geography, etc. and the  
former shall be repeatedly trained while the latter shall be enforced in a care-  
ful manner so as not to have the object disclosed.

3. The subjects which need completeness as shown in the attached Chart No.1  
of the fundamental points of the enforcement of general common training are as  
follows:

- a. Spiritual training.
- b. Disguise, camouflage, tricks
- c. Information collecting.
- d. Destruction of transportation especially communication.
- e. Propaganda and agitational
- f. "Guerilla" system of fighting.
- g. "Sure-hit" shooting.



4. Special training is as shown in Chart 2.
5. In both cases special stress shall be placed upon staff training so as to give them thorough knowledge and capacity together with the system of division of work such as information collecting, political intrigue, destructive training, communication, etc. and laying stress on team working.
6. In education and training, besides teaching them the fundamentals repeatedly, train them actually, and, to do this, have a short period field camp training frequently, and give them one week or a month's long dated field camp training at least once in each period.
7. At each branch, mobilization training shall be carried on at least for two weeks in each period and staff-training shall be carried on separately for 10 days

Status of each branch, however, shall be taken into consideration and the time and duration of such training may be manipulated accordingly.

8. Education and training especially the out-door training shall be carefully carried on so that the real object of it shall not be noticed.
9. Powder and bullets, explosives, and arms for the training are as shown in Chart 3.

#### IV. Report.

1. Each branch corps shall make a plan in accordance with this direction and report five copies of it by July 15th.
2. The principal function concerning education such as examinations, inspections, long period campings shall be planned and reported ten days before carrying it out and its result shall also be reported as soon as it is over -- also in five copies.

Doc. No. 1962

Page 1,

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO, G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that "The 2nd meeting of the Kwantung Army Information Section" - "Instructions pertaining to armed diversionary activities for the year 1943" was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department, Moscow on or about March 22, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the archives of the said department.

I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_.

Lt. Col. TARANENKO, G. I. /s/  
(signature and rank)

Tokyo, Japan

17 May, 1946.

Ex. 737

Doc. No. 1962

Page 1

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This direction is based on the Kwantung Army Headquarters Educational directions of the 18th year of SHOWA (1943) for the special Corps with consideration of the results obtained from the previous trainings.

II. Purpose.

The principal purpose of this is to develop and strengthen the fighting spirit, the cog natic unity, and also to perfect osmosis of the general training subjects; and to teach special training-subjects in a way not to disclose the real object, which will meet the condition of enemy, geography, duties (services applied in wartime), and especially to strengthen officer's education.

III. Methods

1. The period from Showa 18-4-1 to Showa 19-3-31 (Apr. 1, 1943-March 31, 1944) is the Showa 18 year to be the education period of the 18th year of Showa for this education and is divided into four periods of three months each.
2. The curriculum will be divided into two, the one being the general training and the other the special training for enemy condition, geography, etc. and the former shall be repeatedly trained while the latter shall be enforced in a careful manner so as not to have the object disclosed.
3. The subjects which need completeness as shown in the attached Chart No.1 of the fundamental points of the enforcement of general common training are as follows:
  - a. Spiritual training.
  - b. Disguise, camouflage, tricks
  - c. Information collecting.
  - d. Destruction of transportation especially communication.
  - e. Propaganda and agitational
  - f. "Guerilla" system of fighting.
  - g. "Sure-hit" shooting.

4. Special training is as shown in Chart 2.
5. In both cases special stress shall be placed upon staff training so as to give them thorough knowledge and capacity together with the system of division of work such as information collecting, political intrigue, destructive training, communication, etc. and laying stress on team working.
6. In education and training, besides teaching them the fundamentals repeatedly, train them actually, and, to do this, have a short period field camp training frequently, and give them one week or a month's long dated field camp training at least once in each period.
7. At each branch, mobilization training shall be carried on at least for two weeks in each period and staff-training shall be carried on separately for 10 days.

Status of each branch, however, shall be taken into consideration and the time and duration of such training may be manipulated accordingly.

8. Education and training especially the out-door training shall be carefully carried on so that the real object of it shall not be noticed.
9. Powder and bullets, explosives, and arms for the training are as shown in Chart 3.

#### IV. Report.

1. Each branch corps shall make a plan in accordance with this direction and report five copies of it by July 15th.
2. The principal function concerning education such as examinations, inspections, long period campings shall be planned and reported ten days before carrying it out and its result shall also be reported as soon as it is over -- also in five copies.

Doc. No. 1962

Page 1.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO, G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that "The 2nd meeting of the Kwantung Army Information Section" - "Instructions pertaining to armed diversionary activities for the year 1943" was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department, Moscow on or about March 22, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the archives of the said department.

I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_.

Lt. Col. TARANENKO, G. I. /s/  
(signature and rank)

Tokyo, Japan

17 May, 1946.

TOP SECRET

The Second Intelligence Conference, 1943  
Document for Distribution, No. 6

The directions in relation to the guidance  
of the White Russians.

June, 1943  
KWANGTUNG Army,  
Intelligence

CONTENTS

- No. 1 Concerning general principle.
- No. 2 Extent of those who should be treated as White Russians.
- No. 3 Concerning guiding principle.
- No. 4 Concerning cultivation of the indomitable fighting morale and the sound and healthy spirit.
- No. 5 Concerning reward and punishment
- No. 6 Concerning intensification of anti-espionage arrangements.
- No. 7 Concerning intensification of the training of young men and boys.
- No. 8 Concerning encouragement of national defense physical training.
- No. 9 Concerning diffusion and penetration of the Japanese Language education.
- No. 10 Concerning encouragement of return to farm of the city residents.
- No. 11 Concerning dispersed residents' gathering together.
- No. 12 Preparatory matters for the future reform of the organ to guide the White Russians.
- No. 13 Other matters for instruction

Separate volume

- No. 1 Gist for the intensification of the training for the White Russians young men and boys. (draft)
- No. 2 Gist for the guidance of the White Russians' national defense physical training. (draft)
- No. 3 Gist for the enforcement of the diffusion of the Japanese language among the White Russians.

No. I - Concerning general principle.

1. Whether they are men or women or whether they wish it or not, the White Russians shall be used powerfully and to the maximum degree for the war with the Soviet Union, especially for the secret war with the Soviet Union.

2. Belief to be willing to join the anti-comintern strife with the idea to share happiness and suffering, or life and death with Japan, shall be thoroughly established. Efforts shall also be made for the cultivation of a violent indomitable fighting spirit.

3. Those who are available shall be allowed to retain their racial characteristics and they shall be protected better than before. As to those who are not available, we should not only deny racial consideration, but we must take measures for anti-espionage against them. Bad elements shall be strictly disposed of.

No. II - The limit of those who should be treated as "White Russians."

Those who can be used directly or indirectly for the war with the Soviet Union shall be treated as "White Russians," considering their racial characteristics. They shall be divided as follows:

(1) Those who are being used, at present, directly or indirectly for the secret war with the Soviet Union by the Intelligence or by the other army authorities: those whom we are training and mooring with the intention to make use of in future, and their families (A).

(2) Those who can possibly be used directly for the war with the Soviet Union now or in future and their families (B).

(3) Those who cannot be used directly now and in future, but who may possibly become loyal to both Japan and MANCHUKUO and who can contribute directly to the war with the Soviet.

No. III - Concerning the guiding principle.

Out of the necessity of attaining the special object of the army, we should let the White Russians retain their racial characteristics and lead them to cultivate anti-comintern thought. Though we admit their wish to return to their homeland we should expect them to perform their duty as the nation of MANCHUKUO. At the same time, we should lead them especially to lay to heart the ideal of the establishment of the Greater East Asia based upon the spirit of universal peace and harmony, and to rush toward the destruction of the communist regime with an indomitable fighting spirit, sharing happiness and suffering and life and death with us and wishing for their racial prosperity in the co-prosperity sphere controlled by Japan.

No. IV - Concerning cultivation of indomitable fighting morale and the sound and healthy spirit.

In view of the fact that there are some among the White

Russians, especially among the city residents who are apt to forget the original mission of the White Russians, and wish only for the quiet life to no purpose, without really understanding the situation and not changing their old ways in their daily life and in other things, we must, by every opportunity, try to convince them our guiding principle. We should especially guide them to cultivate the indomitable fighting spirit to be willing to join the anti-comintern strife, excluding their negative attitude. We should lead them to guard against frivolity; discard gayety and be practical instead, and strengthen a sound and healthy spirit.

No. V - Concerning reward and punishment.

Each person shall be given a different treatment in proportion to his available value. Bad elements shall be properly suppressed or disposed of. Reward and punishment shall be given justly.

1. The following arrangement for a good treatment shall be made for those coming under 2 of Article No. II (A)

(1) Increase in rations.  
(2) Reduction of taxes (to be enforced within the limit of the law, keeping in contact with the authorities in the actual place.)

(3) Convenience for children's education (priority for the use of the dormitory and support in tuition).

(4) Gratis for rewriting the foreign residential certificate.

(5) Priority in business, employment, the use of charity and relief facilities.

2. Towards the superior ones among the students and pupils, members of the Young Men's Corps, members of the Volunteer Corps and the Japanese Language School students of 2 of Article No. II proper measures shall be taken into consideration for their good treatment with the object of giving them encouragement.

3. To 3 of Article II, a special good treatment shall not be given, although racial consideration shall be given.

4. Towards the ones who will not follow our guidance and towards bad ones and their families, resolute steps shall be taken when necessary, in addition to the reduction or suspension of ration and other measures of suppression.

No. VI - Concerning intensification of anti-espionage arrangements.

It is needless to say that the White Russians who are the same race as the Red ones and who live among them should be more



prudent than the MANCHURIANS, KOREANS or MONGOLIANS. They should further refrain absolutely from having contact with the Red Russians on their own accord and keep aloof from the company of bad MANCHURIANS. In everything they must not act in such a way as to be observed with suspicion. We must lead them to intensify the system of their mutual watch and joint responsibility, while, on the other hand, strengthening inspection and secret espionage toward them and thus making assurance doubly sure for anti-espionage.

1. Prevention of their having touch with the Red Russians. Though the White Russians shall be lead to try to check themselves from getting in touch with the Red ones, this step must be taken carefully and in a clever manner so as not to excite the Soviet side uselessly.

(1) Strict investigation shall be made to see whether there is any Red one mixing into various arrangements and organizations of the White Russians, and necessary measures shall be adopted, especially as to the matters which may affect the Soviet side, they shall be submitted to the Head Office beforehand, giving the details.

- (a) Ration system and ration station.
- (b) Schools and places where young men and women gather together.
- (c) Temples and charity and relief arrangements.
- (d) Trade union, enterprises and employment.
- (e) Neighbors' Society (TONARIGUMI)
- (f) Residents association.

(2) It is our principle that the White Russians who keep company with the Red Russians shall be strictly punished by oral instructions. It shall be made thoroughly known that this shall be strictly observed thoroughly and the ones who will not stop shall be punished properly.

(3) The White Russians who happen to live next to the Red ones shall be removed to some other suitable places.

2. Intensification of mutual watch and joint responsibility.

(1) The neighbor's society shall be led strongly. The leaders and assistant leaders shall be selected carefully. They shall point out harmful elements by mutual inspection, and establish the system of joint responsibility in each section.

(a) The interior inspection shall be intensified for each residents association and other kinds of associations. Their leaders shall be absolutely responsible for the conduct of their inferiors or the members. Each society or group shall establish the system of joint responsibility.

3. Intensification of general inspection and secret espionage and encouragement of early examination. Inspection and espionage by the gendarmerie and police authorities, not to speak of the special mission shall be strengthened. Suspected persons shall be inspected at an early stage.

No. VII - Concerning intensification of the training of young men and boys.

Concerning intensification of the training of young men and boys, we have made a representation of our opinion to the authorities, based upon the separate volume No. 1 "Gist of Strengthening of the training of the White Russian Young Men and Boys (Draft)." Regarding the application of the Labor Service Ordinance of MANCHUKUO in order to carry out a long term camping, we must put it into operation after a decision is made by the authorities but as to the other matters, the training which are being given now shall be more strengthened and renovated.

No. VIII - Concerning encouragement of national defence physical training.

Concerning encouragement of national defence physical training, we have made a representation of our opinion to the authorities, based upon the "Gist of the Enforcement of the National Defence Physical Training for the White Russians. (Draft)" We are told that it is impossible to carry out this plan as a whole this fiscal year, because of the expenses, materials and other reasons. As for the Intelligence however, it has been decided that the following plan shall be put in operation in each actual place.

1. Measures shall be taken to spread and intensify all the more the training for gliders already in operation.

2. Measures shall be taken to spread and encourage all the more the making and competition of model planes which is being undertaken in some places.

3. Concerning the construction of a parachute tower, we should try to bring about the atmosphere for it, calling to the influential groups or persons in the actual places.

4. From the point of view of anti-espionage, it shall be clearly understood that the above training measures shall not be given to the White Russians only, but to general Japanese, MANCHURIANS and MONGOLIANS.

... concerning diffusion and penetration of the Japanese language education.

Concerning the diffusion and penetration of Japanese language education, we have made a report to the authorities, in accordance with the statement No. 3 "Gist of the enforcement of the diffusion of the Japanese Language. (Draft)" Regarding the matters, depending upon the arrangements of the MANCHURIAN Telephone and Telegraph Company and the South MANCHURIAN Railway Company, they shall be enforced after they have been decided upon by the authorities. As to the following matters, efforts shall be made to intensify and promote them in the actual places.

1. Concerning the Japanese language School already in operation, it shall be intensified all the more.
2. The White Russian residents association and the cultural societies shall quickly undertake the diffusion of the Japanese language according to the principle of the Japanese Language School.
3. Necessary propagation shall be put in practice in order to promote the interest of the general public for learning Japanese.
4. For the students of superior ability, good treatment shall be given concerning employment and allowances.
5. The Japanese language column shall be established in the Russian papers and magazines.

No. X - Concerning the city residents' return to farming.

According to the following principle, the return to farming shall be encouraged in order to lead the White Russians to contribute to food production, as well as to cultivate a sound and healthy spirit and heighten a suitable character for the personnel required for the secret warfare.

1. This shall be carried out for each race in order to facilitate the guidance of the racial movement, based upon political espionage standpoint.

2. This shall be carried out voluntarily, apart from the special emigrants, according to the following principle.

- (1) This plan shall be based upon the city population dispersal plan which is being carried out by the MANCHUKUO Government. It shall be guided in a positive manner by the colonization organs in provinces and "HSIEN" (district).

(2) In order to facilitate the enforcement of the above plan, attention shall be paid to the following details.

(a) Those who have experience in farming and who have financial influence shall be leaders and the White Russian proletarians shall work under them.

(b) Mechanical farming shall be preferred, but it shall absolutely adopt the system using substitute fuel.

(c) Places shall be selected, as best as possible, where building materials can be obtained without difficulty.

(d) Concerning the obtainment of seeds, proper steps shall be quickly taken by the adjustment committee through the relative organs of the province of "Hsien."

(e) The place shall be chosen taking into consideration the guidance of the White Russians and transport facilities. The residents shall be gathered together as best as possible.

No. XI - Concerning the gathering together of the dispersed residents.

In order to facilitate the guidance and training and also inspection and anti-espionage we must try to gather together those White Russians who live dispersed in various places as best as possible. This shall be carried out following the preceding Article No. X.

No. XII - Preparatory matters for the future reform of the White Russians guiding organ (given orally).

No. XIII - Other matters for instruction.

Concerning the enforcement of collective education of the military training instructors.

1. It is scheduled that a collective camping education shall be given by the Head Office for five days from 1 July with the object of convincing the White Russian military training instructors in various places of the guiding principle and instruct them the method of guidance of practical courses. Each branch office shall select the participants as follows, and report to the Head Office by 25 June.

(1) HAILAR Branch Office  
 HAILAR 2 MANCHURI 1 YAKOSHIE 1 SANHO 2

(2) CHANKING Branch Office  
 MUTANKIANG 2 HULUNG 1 HENZHAOHOTZU 1

(3) CHIANGUSSU Branch Office  
 CHIANGUSSU 1

- (4) HEIHO Branch Office.  
HEIHO 1
- (5) MUKUDEN Branch Office  
MUKUDEN 1                      HSINKING 1
- (6) DAI'EN Branch Office  
DAIREN 1
- (7) Head Office  
HARBIN 3      TSITSIHAR 1      APULONI 1

(2) Concerning the transfer of the jurisdiction of the guidance of the White Russians in the HSINKING Special City to the HARBIN Special Mission. It is scheduled that the guidance of the White Russians in HSINKING Special City shall be placed under the direct control of the Head Office from 1 July. Regarding the details, instructions shall be given separately. The MUKUDEN branch office shall take charge, as before, of the guidance of the White Russians in various places in KIRIN Province, and in view of the status quo of KIRIN and the district around the "dam", investigation shall be made so as to have the instructors reside permanently for the guidance of the White Russians around these places. The concrete plan shall be handed in by the end of June.

3. Concerning the tour of inspection to Japan and KOREA or to South MANCHURIA. The tour of inspection to Japan and KOREA or to South MANCHURIA which used to be undertaken by the Japanese Language School, the Concordia (HSEH-HO) Youths' and Boys' Corps, etc. shall not be given this fiscal year. There will be no objection, however, to the Concordia Youths' and Boys' Corps, etc., making use of the HARBIN Exhibition which is to be held from 1 August to 20 September.

4. Concerning the control on the removal of residence of the White Russians in MANCHUKUO. In view of the fact that the ration system is getting complicated and also of the principle of intensifying the city population dispersal plan and anti-espionage arrangements, the change of abode of the White Russians in MANCHUKUO shall be controlled as follows:

1. Removal from farming villages to cities shall be checked.
2. Though the return to farming and the gathering together shall be much encouraged in moving the White Russians into the district belonging to the other secret mission control organ, report shall be made mutually between the organs concerned.

(4) HEIHO Branch Office.  
HEIHO 1

(5) MUKUDEN Branch Office  
MUKUDEN 1 HSINKING 1

(6) DAIREN Branch Office  
DAIREN 1

(7) Head Office  
HARBIN 3 TSITSIHAR 1 APULONI 1

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C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G. I.

a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that  
the "2nd Meeting of the Kwantung Army Information Section."-- The Direct-  
ions in relation to the guidance of the White Russians"  
was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department,  
Moscow.

on or about March 21, 1946, and that the original of the said docu-  
ment may be found in the archives of the said department, Moscow.

I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

/s/ Lt. Col. TARANENKO  
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan,  
17 May, 1946.

F 4731

Document No. 1971

Top secret

PLAN FOR CARRYING OUT THE TRAINING OF  
WHITE RUSSIAN YOUNGS IN THE SPECIAL  
IMMIGRATION SETTLEMENTS, KHARBIN SPECIAL  
SERVICE AGENCY.

CONTENTS

1. Object
2. System of Instruction
3. Training Instructors
4. Personnel in charge of local training
5. Term of Training
6. Outline of types and programs of Training
7. Trainees
8. Funds necessary for Training
9. Outline of Education
10. Methods of Assistance.



DOC. 1971

1. OBJECT.

Training of white Russian youths in the special immigration settlements taking into consideration their characteristics must involve appreciation of the spirit of the foundation of the Manchurian Empire and a heightening of their feeling of reliance on Japan and Manchukuo. At the same time we must promote their anti-communist, anti-soviet feelings and confirm their enthusiasm for the restoration of their fatherland as a means of cultivating personnel for espionage work against the Soviet threat in case of emergency.

2. SYSTEM OF INSTRUCTION.

The commander of the HARBIN Special Duties Organization shall be responsible for the uniform training of the white Russian youths in the immigration settlements. The commander of the HARBIN SPECIAL Duties Organization shall appoint Japanese officers as training instructors for instruction of local training. These instructors will take charge of all planning and leadership after they have fully conferred with group leaders (including all general "ATAKAN" and below) and the head of the local office. Training in TANGYUAN immigration settlement and its execution will be made the responsibility of the commander of the JILINUSSU Special Duties Organization.

3. TRAINING INSTRUCTORS

Training instructors will take charge of military training and civic education and at the same time will be responsible for anti-espionage control. He will also help with the duties of the local office and will submit reports at the appropriate times on their supervision and leadership.

Training instructors will consist of Japanese officers with Japanese non-commissioned officers attached to them. As assistant officers, the Russian officers and non-commissioned officers from the Special ASANO BUTAI will be despatched. Training instructors will draw up a training program for the new term before it begins, and have it sanctioned by the commander of the HARBIN Special Duties Organization.

4. THE PERSONNEL IN CHARGE OF LOCAL TRAINING.

The training school headquarters shall be established in the office of the immigration settlement and the group leader will be in charge of the training.

The group leader shall appoint two white Russians from within the immigration settlement as his assistants in military training and civic education and also shall appoint a number of white Russian leaders in every village for the same purpose.

The assistants and leaders appointed for this military training shall be selected from the personnel discharged from the ASANO Unit and the assistants and leaders appointed for civic education shall be selected from leading members of the local Russian community. Occasionally the HARBIN Special Duties Organization will send out Japanese and white Russian lecturers. All personnel stationed at the local office will assist the group leader in civic education.

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#### 5. TERM OF TRAINING.

The term of training will extend from 1 April to 31 March the next year.

The standard training period shall be 300 hours a year for military training and civic education.

#### 6. OUTLINE OF TYPES AND PROGRAMS.

Training will be divided into two types....training by individual communities and collective training.

##### (1) Training by individual communities.

From 1 April to the end of February the next year, except for the farming season of sowing, reaping and harvesting, the standard period for military training shall be 90 hours a year and for civic education 30 hours. The leaders will be responsible for the execution of the military training and civic education of each community. The personnel in charge of the training shall not only go around to each community to give his personal leadership, but will also post assistant trainer appropriate in each community to give direct instruction. This can be done by combining two or more villages into one according to circumstances.

In connection with this education, the students will have to do appropriate labor service to assist in cultivating their spirit of cooperation. As far as civic education is concerned, we aim to contribute by its means to the enlightenment of the general public as long as there is no interference with the education of the students themselves.

##### (2) COLLECTIVE TRAINING

In March, the last month of the training term, collective training will be carried out for about a month (a period totaling 180 hours). For military training squads and sections will be organized on a village basis for the performance of ceremonial drill, battle drill and field service with the discharged members of ASANO Unit as the staff. The students' aggressive spirit and will to cooperate must be cultivated by drills and battle maneuvers, night actions, field duty, indoor duty life, cooking, games and hunting; leadership and training must be such as will prepare them against bandits attacks and enemy maneuvers from the exterior.

The students' closing ceremony will be held on 31 March (the great Cossack festival day in the Far East) on which occasion the group leader shall publicly honour all those of outstanding merit. School children and all other kinds of corporate bodies will be asked to join and there will be all kinds of sports and games.

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### 7. TRAINEES.

These comprise young immigrants of 18 to 30 and physically fit, who are divided as follows:

1. Trainees discharged from the army who are keeping in practice;
2. Preparatory trainees not yet enlisted (18-23 years old);
3. Untrained students (24 to 30 years old).

### 8. FUNDS NECESSARY FOR TRAINING.

As a rule the funds for subsidizing special settlers and for training will be used to meet the expenses for personnel, equipment, training materials and other sundry expenses; the Commandant of the HARBIN Special Duties Organization will be responsible for checking and apportioning the expenditure of these funds. Other measures in addition to this budget may be taken with the permission of the commandant when recognized as being especially necessary.

### 9. OUTLINE OF EDUCATION.

(1) Spiritual education. The spiritual education imparted by means of military training and civic education shall promote an intensive cultivation of their feeling of reliance on Japan and Manchukuo and their anti-communist urge for the restoration of their motherland. Its main object will also be to accompany the specific military training in cultivating a spirit of fierce aggression and disposition to stand up to hardships and privations. The training items are as given in Appendix No.1.

#### (2) Military Training.

As given in Appendix No.2.

(3) Civic Education....is to give them an understanding of the history of Japan and Manchukuo and of Japan's mission and to cultivate their feeling of reliance on Japan and Manchukuo. At the same time, their anti-Soviet urge for the restoration of their motherland will be cultivated by teaching them the history of the Russian people and the actual conditions in the Soviet; and by exalting their consciousness of their mission as young men who bear the whole burden of the white Russians and their fate. They shall also be given a general knowledge and education in such things as Manchurian laws, economy and geography to make them the backbone and nucleus of the settlement. The training items are as given in appendix No.2.

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#### 10. METHODS OF ASSISTANCE

Outstanding students will be allowed to participate in the KYOSHUKAI Japanese language groups' visit to Japan while outstanding students who are full-grown and of enlistment age shall receive special consideration in their treatment after they have joined ASANO Unit. Tours and similar measures of encouragement will be taken to promote the advancement and improvement of this education.

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#### APPENDIX 2.

#### SPIRITUAL EDUCATION AND CIVIC EDUCATION.

##### CLASSIFICATION

##### SPIRITUAL EDUCATION

1. Greek Orthodoxy.
  2. The traditions and virtues of the Cossack.
  3. The mission of the white Russian Youth.
  4. The Japanese spirit.
  5. The true meaning of the establishment of the Japanese army.
  6. The aggressive spirit and military discipline.  
  
(The most important element of a powerful army).
  7. Exemplary and inspiring tales of bravery and loyalty in Japanese and Russian history.
-

DEC 1941

CLASSIFICATION

CIVIC  
EDUCATION

1. Russian history
2. The new world order and Japan's imperial mission
3. Outline of Japanese history.
4. The history of the establishment of Manchukuo and the Empire-building spirit
5. Outline of the laws and economy of Manchukuo.
6. Their duty to Manchukuo as its nationals
7. Facts about the Soviet.
8. International conditions.
9. Miscellaneous civic morals

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REMARKS

- 1) Military education, spiritual education and civic education shall be separated and in view of the special characteristics of the Russians, spiritual education should rouse their racial ardor.
  - 2) Civic education should augment their quality as citizens of Manchukuo.
-

1. 1. 2  
STANDARD OF REQUIREMENTS FOR MILITARY TRAINING

TYPE OF TRAINING	FOR PREPARATION BY TROOPERS BEFORE PROMOTION TO PLatoon
TRAINING MATERIALS	
INDIVIDUAL DRILL	1. They will perfect themselves in all the basic routine performed by soldiers in battle.
TROOP DRILL	1. They will thoroughly familiarize themselves with all close-order movements. 2. They will perfect themselves in all the movements of a squad warfare and will learn the rudiments of troop drill.
FIELD DUTY	1. They will perfect themselves in the movements and technique of patrols, sentries and liaison-men. 2. They will be trained to carry out route marches, without failing. 3. They will acquire the rudiments of camping out.
TYPE OF TRAINING	TRAINEES DISCHARGED FROM THE ARMY WHO ARE KEEPING IN PRACTICE.
TRAINING MATERIALS	
INDIVIDUAL DRILL	They will review all basic battle movements and at the same time, they will be enabled to perform the function of assistant instructors.
TROOP DRILL	1. They will revise all close-order and battle movements. 2. They will be taught the movements of a squad commander in detail and those of a platoon commander in outline.
FIELD DUTY	1. They will review all the movements of liaison, searching, policing, marching, and camping out and at the same time they will be enabled to perform the function of class teachers.

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TRAINING MATERIALS

FOR UNTRAINED STUDENTS

INDIVIDUAL DRILL

1. They will perfect their knowledge of basic routines performed in battle.

TROOPS DRILL

1. They will familiarize themselves with close order battle movements and be enabled to perform the same under the leadership of their leaders.

FIELD DUTY

1. They will perfect themselves in the movements and techniques of patrols, sentries and liaison men.
2. They will be trained to march on long routes without fatigue.
3. They will acquire the rudiments of carrying out.

TYPE OF TRAINING

FOR ALL THREE TYPES OF TRAINING

TRAINING MATERIALS

MILITARY LECTURES

They will be taught an outline of all essential matters concerning the functions of their branch of the service, and the regulations and manuals of officers' rank.

INDOOR DUTY

The custom of emphasizing discipline and courtesy, and especially that of stressing obedience and harmonious cooperation will be cultivated and their good qualities of leadership developed as the backbone of the settlement.

TRAINING

GYMNASICS

Efforts will be made to develop physical strength and energy or to impart an outline of them and also to train a vigorous personality.

REMARKS

1. The unenlisted preparatory students will be taken as the standard type and additional training and revision shall be given both to discharged veterans and to those without any training at all. The unenlisted preparatory students will be taken as the standard type. Their abilities for every type of leadership will be cultivated.
2. In each type of training emphasis will be laid on action at night.



C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G. I.

a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that  
"the 2nd meeting of the Kwantung Army Information Section"--"The plan to  
carry out the education of White Russian Youths in the special emigrant  
district"

was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department,  
Moscow.

on or about March 21., 1946, and that the original of the said docu-  
ment may be found in the archives of the said department, Moscow.

I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_.

/s/ Lt. Col. TARANENKO  
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan,

17 May, 1946.

Q 740

The Principles of the Japanese Propaganda Campaign against Outer Mongolia

Separate paper No. 3 of distribution document No. 8 related to the second conference of Intelligence Section in 1943.

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- I. Preface
- II. Propaganda Measures Towards Outer Mongolia
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I. Preface

1. In accordance with the point of view of treating the Soviet Russia and Mongolia as one unit, Propaganda in Outer Mongolia should in its fundamental idea conform with the propaganda principles against the Soviet Union; but in actual propaganda the special characteristics of Outer Mongolia must be taken into consideration. This guide will point out only these special points and give necessary explanation thereof. Propaganda towards Outer Mongolia, therefore, shall in general rules follow the propaganda principle towards the Soviet Union and in its expression follow this guide.

2. In executing propaganda according to this guide, contents and methods of propaganda shall be judiciously selected and adjusted within the prescribed limits, according to the existing circumstances.

II. Propaganda Measures Against Outer Mongolia

The same measures shall be taken as towards the Soviet Union except the following unique points:

1. The ultimate objective of propaganda in Outer Mongolia is positively to induce the Outer Mongolians to become anti-Soviet, that is, to cooperate with Japan, and in attaining this final objective the propaganda work shall go through something like the following steps:

Stages	Object	Probable Phenomena	
1st Stage	Frustration of public confidence in the present government	1. Wholesale clean-up 2. Cattle slaughter by the people (Delivery evasion)	Out-break of a Russo-Japanese war at a certain time.
2nd Stage	Opposition of the military and the populace against the present government.	1. Out-break of riots and revolts. 2. Oppression by the Red Army	
3rd Stage	Estrangement from and resistance against the Soviet Union, i.e. cooperation with Japan.	1. Numerous riots & revolts. 2. Birth of an autonomous government under the leadership of the Japanese Army. 3. War against Russia	

In each stage of the propaganda work, attempts shall be made, with a view to the ultimate, as well as the immediate objective, at the attraction of the Outer Mongolians, especially soldiers, towards our camps, that is to say, at the obtention of pro-Japanese and cooperative elements.

2. The Outer Mongolians possess peculiar manners and customs, while the standard of their civilization is generally low, being exceedingly inferior to the Soviet Russians though slightly more advanced than the Inner Mongolians. In our propaganda work, therefore, we must have recourse not only to such expressions and instances as approximate to the actual circumstances but also to novel expressions in order to arouse their curiosity.

3. Since Outer Mongolia is a country of a small and weak race, situated in addition between two great powers, Japan and Russia, the inhabitants have a tendency of worshipping the powerful. With view also to their uncivilized conditions, we should as occasion calls, attempt to show off (plainly display or suggest) our might in connection with our propaganda work.

4. For the sake of propaganda effects, the racial similarity between the Japanese and the Mongolians shall be utilized to direct the Mongolians to harbor racial hatred and hostility against the Russians.

5. The Mongolian race has for all ages been emotionally hostile to the Chinese race. Therefore, in our propaganda work no mention shall be made as to the relations between these two countries.

6. Heed shall be given to the fact that although there is not much difference between the Inner and the Outer Mongolia so far as written language is concerned, there is a great deal of difference in the matter of spoken language.

### III. Chief Items of Propaganda

1. The Outer Mongolians' deep attachment to the government of the people's revolutionary party shall be frustrated.

2. The conception that obedience to the Soviet Union spells a sure downfall of the Outer Mongolia shall be inculcated upon the Outer Mongolians in order to create among them an anti-Soviet atmosphere.

3. An anti-Choibaran atmosphere shall be created among the Outer Mongolians.

4. The hatred and friction between the people's revolutionary party on the one hand, and the military, the government quarters, and the general public on the other shall be intensified; in particular, an armed revolt by the Outer Mongolian Army shall be instigated.

5. The racial consciousness shall be excited and directed against the Soviet Union.

6. We should exaggerate the prosperity of the Mongolian race both in Inner Mongolia, which is under Japan's protection, and in Manchuria, and, in particular, the anti-Comintern policy,

protection of religions, and Japan's influence and popularity in those areas, in such a way hinting an eventual complete independence of Outer Mongolia, thereby to plot an estrangement between Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union.

7. By propagandizing the febleness of the Soviet Union, we should encourage the anti-Soviet feelings among the Outer Mongolians.

IV. Explanation of Chief Propaganda  
Items and General Methods of  
Execution.

1. The Outer Mongolians' deep attachment to the government of the people's revolutionary party shall be frustrated. (Corresponding to No. 1 of the Chief Items of Propaganda, in the Propaganda Principles for the Soviet Union.)

(a) Explanation. The Government of the people's revolutionary party is a general term comprising the party government, communism in Outer Mongolia and the socialistic system.

The communism in Outer Mongolia has been imported in its entirety direct from the Soviet Union, and with no great thought foundation, it is nothing more than an incidental by-product of the people's sympathy with the overthrow of the old feudalism. So, there is no zealous devotees of the thought itself, while the majority of the people show no understanding, no interests.

Again, the socialistic system is not necessarily very attractive to the general public. Only the younger generation knows no other system. As for those middle-aged or aged, the attraction of the system does not go beyond the realization that it is slightly better than feudalism; or rather, it may be admitted that they are internally annoyed at the rapid strides of science ever since the socialistic revolution.

On the other hand, the so-called leaders of the "Choi-barsun" Party, which is now in power, are not only exceedingly anxious to keep up their enormous might and influence, but also are well aware that once they lose power they will be immediately and inevitably massacred. Submitting tamely to the command of the Soviet Union, therefore, they are continuing with their desperate efforts,

by fair means or foul, for the maintenance of their power; in the past they completely subdued all the uprisings that broke out in several occasions and now they have installed their followers in all the important positions. So, their party is most anxious to maintain the status quo, while at present there is scarcely any other power to offer resistance.

But since the post-revolution history of Outer Mongolia testifies that racial opposition would inevitably arise within the party or the army, the foremost emphasis should be laid on the propaganda among party members and army personnel.

(b) General Methods of Execution. Almost identical with the corresponding item in the principles of propaganda towards the Soviet Union.

2. The conception that obedience to the Soviet Union spells a sure downfall of the Outer Mongolia shall be inculcated upon the Outer Mongolians in order to create among them an anti-Soviet atmosphere. (Corresponding to No. 2 of the Chief Items of Propaganda, in the Propaganda Principles for the Soviet Union.)

(a) Explanation. Strong in racial consciousness and exclusive, the Outer Mongolians have never liked submission to the Soviet Union; but as a result of their habits for several hundred years, they are prepossessed by the idea of absolute obedience to the powerful (or to the feudal lords, in olden days). If we should enlighten these people in this respect, while at the same time carrying out Nos. 5 and 7 of the Items of Propaganda, we should surely succeed in fostering an anti-Soviet tendency.

(b) General Methods of Execution. Giving familiar examples such as shortage of commodities, conscription of men and live stock, increase in imposition, and so on, we should make the Outer Mongolians realize firstly that all these were the result of their cooperation with the Soviet Union. Secondly, unlimited mobilization of men and materials from the unproductive Outer Mongolian land not only for domestic use but even for the defense and existence of the enormous Soviet Russia or even for sending far west to bear the brunt of the German attack would eventually perish Outer Mongolia altogether.

Thirdly, the United States and Great Britain are at present allied with the Soviet Union solely for the purpose of defeating Germany, and once Germany collapses they would be sure to collide with the Soviet Union. In other words, Outer Mongolia, so long as she remains submissive to the Soviet Union, will be subject to Soviet exploitation. These foregoing ideas shall be propagated.

As for party members and younger generation, our propaganda work shall dwell persistently and with novel wordings on the proposition of whether it was the objective of the Outer Mongolian Revolution to cause the ruin of Outer Mongolia through cooperation with the Soviet Union.

3. An anti-Choibarsun atmosphere shall be created among the Outer Mongolians. (Corresponding to No. 3 of the Chief Items of Propaganda, in the Propaganda Principles for the Soviet Union.)

Explanation and General Methods of Execution. This part should read exactly the same as the corresponding part of the Propaganda Principles for the Soviet Union. In particular, among the intelligent Outer Mongolians including those who have studied in the Soviet Union, there appears to be a tendency of thinking highly of Stalin and comparatively ignoring Choibarsun. It is necessary for us to take advantage of this trend.

4. The hatred and friction between the people's revolutionary party on the one hand, and the military, government quarters, and the general public on the other shall be intensified; in particular an armed revolt by the Outer Mongolian Army shall be instigated. (Corresponding to No. 4 of the Chief Items of Propaganda, in the Propaganda Principles for the Soviet Union.)

(a) Explanation. The party government in Outer Mongolia, it is observed, is an exact copy of that in the Soviet Union, that is, the actual power is in the hands of the party itself although the outward execution is committed to government organs and the like.

In the Mongolian society, however, the power of ostensible organs such as the government, the military, and so on has been so overwhelmingly strong since olden days that every momentous question has had to be decided in the form of a joint conference of responsible representatives of such organs.

No. 105

Also in the Mongolian society there has been traditional oneness of religion, and this is a very important factor in the history of the Mongols. As a proof of this, we have the example of the Mongols who played an active part in the frequent civil wars of Outer Mongolia. Furthermore, the manpower mobilization in Outer Mongolia is getting more and more extensive so that there remain at present only a very small number of men that are purely civilians. Therefore, in order to bring about internal disturbances we must needs approach the army and instigate them to armed revolt (or to semi-bandit activities, to begin with).

(b) General Methods of Execution. As long as the party government continues to exist, bloody clean-ups will never come to an end and it would be impossible to shake off the Soviet fetters. With this theory, side by side with excitement of racial consciousness (Item No. 5), we should instigate chiefly military commanders to armed revolt.

5. The racial consciousness shall be excited and directed against the Soviet Union. (Corresponding to No. 6 of the Chief Items of Propaganda, in the Propaganda Principles for the Soviet Union.)

Explanation and General Methods of Execution. Under this item no special explanation is necessary. Among the items of plotting and propaganda for Outer Mongolia, the one that has the largest scope of application is the excitement of racial consciousness. With view especially to the extreme stubbornness of the Mongolians' racial consciousness, we should tactfully weave this subject into all the other items of propaganda, for that would invariably awake a responsive cord in the hearts of the Outer Mongolians.

In this connection, however, care should be taken to direct their racial strife only against the Russians, and under no circumstances whatsoever against the Japanese, the Chinese, and so on.

In the case of this item, it is also a great advantage to make use of religion, for in the monotonous life of the Mongolians religion is all but the only thing that could offer spiritual comfort.



6. We should exaggerate the prosperity of the Mongolian race both in Inner Mongolia, which is under Japan's protection, and in Manchuria, and, in particular, the anti-Comintern policy, protection of religions, and Japan's influence and popularity in those areas in such a way as to bring an eventual complete independence of Outer Mongolia, thereby to plot an estrangement between Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union.

Note: This item hardly requires a special explanation.

7. By propagandizing the feebleness of the Soviet Union, we should encourage the anti-Soviet feelings among the Outer Mongolians.

Explanation. Utter failure of several rebellions in the past and hesitation thereafter to plot another in spite of the general public's unwillingness to remain submissive to the Soviet Union and to the party now in power, have been due solely to the belief that the Soviet Union is great and invincible.

So, once we have succeeded, with the help of examples, in convincing the Mongolians of the vulnerability of the Soviet Union, rebellions after rebellions would inevitably occur in utter turmoil, and herein lies the necessity of the item.

The fact, it is apparent, that both traffic and communications between the Soviet proper and Outer Mongolia is extremely difficult suits our purpose beautifully.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G.I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the "2nd Meeting of the Kwantung Army Information Section." -- "The Principles of Japanese Propaganda campaigns in relation to Outer Mongolia" was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Prosecution Department, Moscow on or about March 21, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the archives of the said department in Moscow.

I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_

Lt. Col. Taranenko (signed)  
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan,  
17 May 1946.





When the documents were burned. General UMEDZU, Chief of Army General Staff, was in Tokyo.

I do not know whether or not any written or oral orders were issued concerning the destruction of all documents of the Army General Staff Office.

Furthermore, I do not know whether or not any documents of Japanese General Staff have been concealed.

(Signed) Torashiro KAWABE

Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned officer by the above-named Kawabe, Torashiro, at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan, this 5th day of September 1946.

ARTHUR A. SAFDUSKY  
Captain, J.A.G.D.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Raymond K. Nimura, hereby certify that I am fully conversant with the Japanese and English languages, and that this day, the said Kawabe, Torashiro was duly sworn in my presence and signed said Affidavit under oath in my presence; and that all proceedings incidental to the administration of said oath and the signing of said Affidavit were truly and correctly translated from Japanese into English and English into Japanese and fully understood and comprehended by said Affiant.

Dated this 5th day of September, 1946, at Tokyo, Japan.

(Signed by) Raymond K. Nimura  
2d Lt. AUS

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Document No. 1923

Page 1

A M I D A N E T

Name: Simon AMIDA  
Age: 51  
Citizenship: Japanese  
Education: College graduate  
Rank: Major-general  
Last occupation: Chief of the Intelligence Department  
of the Kwantung Army.

Interrogation was done in Moscow on the 22nd of February, 1945. The interrogator was Colonel Rozenblit, C.J., Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

Q. Enumerate posts you have occupied in the Japanese Army.

A. I was graduated from the Military Academy and appointed Second Lieutenant in 1914. Being Second and afterwards First Lieutenant, I served as officer attached to a company in the First Imperial Guard Infantry Regiment in 1918-1923, and I worked as interpreter during the Intervention of Japan against Russia in 1919, being despatched to the Third Division stationed in Chita at that time.

In 1923 I was promoted to Captain and appointed Company Commander, at which post I served for two years till 1925.

In 1925 I entered the Tokyo School of Foreign Languages, studied Russian for one year, and afterwards was ordered to Harbin for one year in order to practice the Russian language, as a trainee of the War Ministry. Then I returned to the First Imperial Guard Infantry Regiment in Tokyo. After serving as extra-staff officer of headquarters of the regiment for one or two months, I was despatched to the General Staff Office. I took the post of officer-interpreter there for two years, and for two years more served there in the General Affairs Section of the Second Department.

In 1932 I was promoted to Major and appointed teacher of the Russian language in the Military Academy in Tokyo and taught the language for one year and then was transferred to the Harbin Tokump-Nikan (the Harbin Special Service Agency), where I assisted the chief of the agency for three years; then I returned to Tokyo, worked in the General Staff Office as officer attached to the Russian Section of the Second Department for one year.

Q. Where did you serve since that time?

A. Since then I served in the War Ministry as Chief of the Administrative Office of the Military Affairs Bureau.

Q. It is not true. Until 1937 you served in the Second (Intelligence) Department of the General Staff, and then were transferred to the War Ministry, served there for three years, and again returned to the General Staff. If so there seems to have been the interval of three years during which period you were not in the position of intelligence officer, but such a case cannot occur usually. What were you doing in the War Ministry for those three years? You were engaged in your speciality, weren't you?

A. Yes, I was a teacher in a school in those three years where reconnaissance officers of the War Ministry were trained.

Q. When were you promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel?

A. In 1936 when I began to serve in the General Staff Office I was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel.

Q. When were you promoted to Colonel?

A. While I was chief of the Reconnaissance Officers' Training School.

Q. In 1940 you were transferred to the Second Department of the General Staff Office. What was your duty and how long did you serve there?

A. At the rank of Colonel I served for two years as Extra Staff Officer in the General Staff. In reality, however, I was ordered abroad those two years. And after returning to Tokyo in 1942 I was appointed Commander of the Fourth Frontier Garrison in Huton, Manchuria, which is situated opposite to the city of Iman and stayed there for more than two years.

- Q. When were you promoted to Major-General?
- A. In 1943 while I was Commander of the Fourth Frontier Garrison I was promoted to Major-General.
- Q. When were you appointed Chief of the Harbin Special Service Agency (Chief of the Intelligence Department of the Kwantung Army)?
- A. It was in February, 1945, and I remained in that post until the surrender of Japan.
- Q. Did you participate directly in the occupation of Manchuria in 1931?
- A. No, I didn't participate in it.
- Q. What do you know about the transformation of Manchuria into a military base of attack on the Soviet Union?
- A. The Japanese Government increased the Japanese troops in Manchuria and newly constructed railways, roads, airfields, various kinds of storehouses and other military equipments for the purpose of turning Manchuria into a military base against the Soviet Union. I saw these facts in person while I was an assistant officer of the Harbin Special Service Agency.
- Q. How many airfields were there in Manchuria in 1936?
- A. There were 9-10 airfields in 1936. In 1942 the number of them increased a little more, but I cannot tell you exactly how many there were.
- Q. How many railways were there in 1933?
- A. In 1933 there were two railways.
- Q. And in 1936?
- A. Before 1936 the third railway was newly constructed and in 1942 the number of the trunk railway lines increased 5-6 times as many as before.
- Q. For what purpose were these equipments in Manchuria constructed?
- A. For the purpose of starting aggressive operation against the Soviet Union.



- Q. You served for three years in the War Ministry as a teacher of the school where reconnaissance officers were trained. Tell me what lessons were taught there.
- A. The foreign states, art of collecting and arranging reports and investigation of foreign languages were the basic lessons.
- Q. What were the supplementary lessons besides these?
- A. The supplementary lessons given to the reconnaissance officers were to learn specially the future intelligence aim and practice radio business, and to study how to keep secrets.
- Q. Were sabotage activities taught?
- A. In these two or three years they have been taught.
- Q. Do you know the names of the officers who taught sabotage activities?
- A. I don't know their names.
- Q. What did you teach yourself?
- A. I taught the art of intelligence.
- Q. Where was your school?
- A. Our school was situated in one part of a building at Kudan, Tokyo, under the administration of the War Ministry, and the school was a small two-storied building.
- Q. By what name did the military call your school for the people near it? Had the school any number?
- A. The school was called the Koho Kimmu Yoin Kenkyusho (The Research Institute for the Rear Service Personnel) for the people.
- Q. What did the ordinary people take the school for?
- A. The ordinary people thought that it was a part of the War Ministry.

- Q. What do you know about the military operations at Changkufeng?
- A. I know that there occurred hostilities near Changkufeng in 1938 and its aim was to reconnoitre in force the real might of the Red Army by fighting. In the encounter participated a Japanese division of the Korean Army and it ended in the defeat of Japanese troops. Two more divisions from the Kwantung Army were dispatched to the place of the encounter, but as the battles ended before their arrival, these two divisions of the Kwantung Army couldn't participate in the encounter.
- Q. By which side was the encounter at Changkufeng started?
- A. The Japanese Government reported that at first firing was opened by the Red Army, but afterwards I could reach the conclusion that the encounter was started by the Japanese Army.
- Q. Do you recognize that the encounter was an aggressive one and was commenced by the initiative of Japan?
- A. Yes, I recognize it.
- Q. Tell me what you know concerning the encounter at Nomonhan.
- A. The incident occurred in 1939 and I think that this encounter was the same as that at Changkufeng. In the encounter participated a division of the Kwantung Army and several other independent forces and the commander of these forces was Lieutenant-General Michitaro KOTSUBARA, the former chief of the Harbin Special Service Agency and the former military attache to the Japanese Embassy in Moscow, and for the purpose of relieving these Japanese forces a division of the Kwantung Army was newly despatched, but as the Japanese Army was defeated before its arrival, it couldn't participate in the battles.
- Q. By which side's initiative was the encounter started and what was its cause?

- A. I think that the encounter was started to reconnoitre the real might of the Red Army. And the encounter at Nomonhan was started by the initiative of Japan, but the Japanese Government, as it did in the case of the Changkufeng Incident, gave a false conception to the Japanese people that the Nomonhan Incident also was started by the Mongolians and that Japan was only obliged to defend its own territory.
- Q. Who do you think are responsible for the encounters at Changkufeng and Nomonhan?
- A. I think that the General Staff, the Kwantung Army and the Japanese Korean Army are responsible for the Emperor and the nation.
- Q. Who was the chief of the General Staff then?
- A. The chief of the General Staff was His Imperial Highness Prince Kanin.
- Q. What do you know concerning the plan of Kan-toku-en (A special grand maneuver of the Kwantung Army)?
- A. From the conversations with Colonel Saburo HAYASHI, Chief of the Russian Section of the Second Department in the General Staff and other officers, I learned that the plan of the Kan-toku-en was quickly drawn up after the start of attack on the Soviet Union by Germany in 1941 and its contents were the plan of preparation of military operations for the purpose of taking military aggression against the Soviet Union by Japan. And in connection with my duties I was personally aware of some measures with regard to the "Kan-Toku-En" plan.
- Q. When did Colonel Saburo HAYASHI speak to you concerning the plan of the Kan-toku-en?
- A. In autumn, 1942.
- Q. Where?
- A. This conversation took place in an office room of the Russian Section of the Second Department in the General Staff.

- Q. Who drew up this plan personally?
- A. The chief of the First Section of the Kwantung Army Headquarters drew it up.
- Q. Was the plan investigated in the General Staff?
- A. Yes, the plan was revised and authorized by the General Staff.
- Q. Who were in reality engaged in the plan in the General Staff?
- A. The chief of the First Department of the General Staff revised it, but his name I forgot, and SUGIYAMA, Chief of the General Staff, authorized it.
- Q. And was TOJO connected with the plan?
- A. As General TOJO was then the War Minister, without his consent this plan could not be drawn up, he was concerned in the plan, of course.
- Q. Do you know yourself anything about the contents of this plan?
- A. I could form the general idea concerning the contents of this plan with the aid of several data investigated by me while I was Commander of the Fourth Frontier Garrison. That in 1942 by the Fifth Army, one part of the Kwantung Army enforced a war game as a means of preparing the realization of the Kan-toku-en plan.
- One of the designs of the war game was as follows: The Fifth Army was to give a blow to the Red Army from the east side of Lake Hanka, interrupt railways and in this way isolate Maritime Province and the south corps of the Red Army from the central part of the Soviet Union.
- Q. Did you see any documents stamped "Kan-toku-en"?
- A. Yes, in 1943 I saw such documents concerning a financial account of the expenditure which was paid out of the Kan-toku-en budget. These documents also testify the active preparations for the realization of the plan.

Q. How do you happen to know about the increase of the number of soldiers in Manchuria, the construction of new roads, etc., responding to the Ken-toku-en plan?

A. I learned about these facts by my own inspection when I arrived at my new post as Commander of the Fourth Frontier Garrison.

Q. You told that you were abroad from 1940 till 1942. Tell me the import of your duty in this period.

A. I was ordered by the General Staff to Europe in order to investigate the administrative organization of the countries occupied by Germany. The object of the investigation was to make my inspections available to the solution of problems concerning the administrative organization of the areas which would be occupied by Japan in the war with Great Britain, China, America and in case of a war against the Soviet Union.

Q. How long did you stay in Europe?

A. I went to Europe in 1940 and stayed there for about two years.

Q. Accordingly you returned to Japan in 1942. What countries did you visit?

A. Yes, I returned to Japan in 1942 after visiting Germany, Italy, Hungary, Rumania, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain and Portugal. And I visited Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and other countries only for the purpose of making an ordinary journey. My duty was done chiefly in Berlin.

Q. Did you send any report from Berlin to Tokyo concerning your duty?

A. Yes, having learned from the attache that the Kwantung Army was preparing for aggression against the Soviet Union, I sent a telegram.

Q. What did you say in that telegram of yours?

A. I wrote in the telegram the data I collected and when I returned to Japan I wrote a report.

- Q. From where did you obtain the data for the purpose of investigating the order and administration for the occupied territories by Japan?
- A. For the purpose of investigating the administrative organization I availed myself of the data obtained from newspapers and magazines and reports from the Japanese officers and civilians in Germany and other countries.
- Q. Did you know that Germany mobilized working power of the occupied territories and directed it to its industries?
- A. I didn't know about it.
- Q. And do you know the fact that Germany used P.O.W.'s in its munition industries?
- A. One of the Japanese nationals saw P.O.W.'s used in the coal-mines in Ruhr when he went there.
- Q. And did you hear many foreign people were massacred in its occupational territories?
- A. I heard that Jewish people were massacred.
- Q. When you returned to Japan, did you propose in your report that such order as Germany held in its occupational areas be applied in Japanese occupational districts?
- A. Only within the bounds of general matters, I concluded my argument that investigation of this problem theoretically be further made in view of the necessity of the investigation of nationalities in the occupied territories and the results of the type of German administration in its occupational countries. It was merely a theoretical conclusion, not touching any actual detail. For I couldn't relate any actual detail on account of the scarcity of my knowledge about it.
- Q. Were you ever connected with White Russian emigrants during your service in the Harbin Special Service Agency?
- A. We used White Russian emigrants as spies and propagandists. the data for the propaganda used by them were printed in the Press "Harbinskol urennya".
- Q. Did you inspect the publication of the data?
- A. Yes.

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- Q. Did you inspect the publication of the data?
- A. Yes.

Q. Do you know the ASANO detachment?

A. Yes.

Q. What was that detachment?

A. As far as I remember, the detachment was organized from White Russian emigrants at the Second Sungari Station in 1938.

Q. What was the number of the members of the detachment?

A. There were 200-300 men in the ASANO detachment.

Q. What was the aim of the detachment?

A. The detachment was enlisted into the Manchurian Army and was to be controlled by a commander of the Japanese Army in case of war with the Soviet Union.

Q. Can you firmly recognize the fact that Japan availed herself of White Russian emigrants in espionage and sabotage activities on a large scale?

A. Yes, I can firmly recognize it.

Q. What do you know about the fact that the Russian emigrants were used in the above-mentioned purposes?

A. The Japanese side used the White Russian emigrants as spies, propagandists and saboteurs, and in order to create disturbance in the Soviet Union territory, Japan organized three detachments of the White Russian emigrants at the Second Sungari Station, Hailar and Hengtaohotsu.

Q. Who was the commander of the Sungari Party?

A. It was Colonel Smirnov. I don't remember exactly who were the commanders of the Hailar and Hengtaohotsu detachments. The commander of one of the two parties was Peshkov, but I don't remember which detachment he commanded.

Q. Do you know yourself Smirnov?

A. Yes, I know.

Q. How were you connected with Russian emigrants while you were an assistant of the Harbin Special Service Agency?



- A. I participated in establishing "the Russian Emigrants Bureau" in Manchoukuo.
- Q. How many Russian emigrants were there in Manchuria?
- A. I think there were approximately 70,000 White Russian emigrants in Manchuria then.
- Q. What was the purpose of "the Brem" (the Russian Emigrants Bureau) in itself?
- A. It consisted in bringing together White Russian Emigrants around Japan for the purpose of widely enforcing anti-Soviet movement.
- Q. Did "the Brem" work under the control of Japan in such a way?
- A. Yes, "the Brem" existed completely under the control of Japan.
- Q. In Harbin there was a school for saboteurs. Who was the director of this school?
- A. Yes, in Harbin existed such a school, and Major MURATA was the director.
- Q. When was this school established?
- A. This school was established in about 1943, and in 1945 still existed.
- Q. What kind of persons were allowed to enter the school as students?
- A. They were officers, non-commissioned officers and privates of the Japanese Army.
- Q. Tell me in detail concerning the "White Russian Emigrants Fascist Party."
- A. Such a party existed in reality, of which leaders were Rozaevoky, Matkovaky and Dolov.
- Q. What was the purpose of this party?
- A. The purpose of the party was to make anti-Soviet and anti-Jews activities.

- Q. What was the role of the intelligence organs concerning the establishment of the Fascist Party?
- A. When I went to my new post in Manchuria in 1933, the Fascist Party (the Russian Fascist Alliance) already existed. While I was staying in Manchuria, the Alliance was given financial assistance by Japan and used in anti-Soviet propaganda. I know well Pozavsky and Matkovsky, the leaders of the Alliance. A general Kosmin participated temporarily in the Alliance, but afterwards quarreled with the other leaders of the Alliance and left the Alliance.
- Q. What kind of assistance was given to "the Brem" in Harbin by Japan?
- A. While I was an assistant of the Harbin from 1933 till 1936, "the Brem" did not receive any financial aid from Japan because it had its own funds, but from about 1937 it began to receive financial aid from the Japanese budget. When "the Brem" was transferred to the Manchoukuo Government in 1944, the monthly sum of financial aid from Japan in Harbin city alone must have been more than ten thousand yen.
- Q. Tell me about "the Intelligence Detachment", which belonged to that Special Service Agency.
- A. The duty of what was called "the Special Detachment" that belonged to the Harbin Tokumu-Kikan, consisted in disturbing the Red Army in the rear in case of war with the Soviet Union.
- Q. How many members were there in this "Special Detachment"?
- A. Approximately 200.
- Q. Was this detachment composed in consideration of its members' quality?
- A. Half of the detachment were Japanese soldiers in active service and another half Japanese nationals subject to the compulsory military service.
- Q. Were there any White Russian emigrants in this detachment?

1. No. but Russian emigrants were united into other sabotage detachments (guerilla warfare) at the Second Sungari Station, in Hailar and Hengtachotsu.
2. Did the Russian emigrant detachments and your "Special Detachment" work positively in 1945?
  - A. With regard to what was called "the Special Detachment" of the Japanese Army, which belonged to the Harbin Special Service Agency, in conformity with the order received from the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army, on the 10th of August, 1945, I ordered Colonel MAKINO, commander of that detachment, to prepare for its activity. Colonel MAKINO divided the detachment into three and posted them to the eastern region of Harbin, but as I received the report of the surrender of the Japanese Army on the 15th of August, I don't know anything about the further movement of that detachment.

As for the Russian emigrant disturbance detachments, I don't know anything.

2. Were there any sabotage detachments of this kind which belonged to the other Special Service Agency in Manchuria?
  - A. Colonel OYOKI, an officer attached to the Second Section of the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army, who had some experience about such a matter gained from his former office in north China by the directions of the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army drafted a plan of the organization of a Peace Maintaining Troop (the Special guerilla detachment) in order to disturb the Red Army in the rear, composed of four kinds of members, that is, of the personnel of the Special Service Agency (its branch alone, with the exception of Mukden), the police, the military police and the Japanese regular forces. But in consequence of the refusal of the police to participate in this Peace Maintaining Troop on the 1st of August 1945, the troop was composed of three kinds of members (the personnel of the above-mentioned Special Service Agency, military police and Japanese regular forces).

This Peace Maintaining Troop was to have the duty of positively taking security precautions against spies in time of peace, and to disturb the Red Army in the rear in time of war as I already mentioned. Such troops were organized in Chichihaerh, Mukden and Hutanchiang.

Each troop had several peace maintaining battalions; the

- A. (continued) Mukden Troop had 8-9 battalions; the Chichihaerh and Putanchiang Troops had 5-6 battalions; that is, there were 20 battalions of this kind in all.

The Commander of the Mukden Troop was a general officer ranking with the commander of a division, whereas the commanders of the other two troops were officers ranking with the commander of a brigade.

- Q. Tell me if there were special units in each battalion.
- A. In each battalion there was one intelligence company.
- Q. Were there any special units of saboteurs in each battalion?
- A. The two companies of each battalion were called peace maintaining companies and it was planned that each battalion should have a detachment for sabotage activities which was to be composed of the native Manchurian people and Russian emigrants. The organization of such a detachment was already started when I was appointed Chief of the Special Service Agency, that is, in February and ended at the end of June, 1945.

The above-mentioned Peace Maintaining Troops had no connection at all with "the Special Detachment" of the Harbin Special Service Agency. The latter had only the duty of carrying out battles in the rear of the Red Army, while the principal duty of the Peace Maintaining Troop was to take positive security precautions against spies to keep order and to suppress riots in the time of peace and to execute sabotage activities in the rear of the Red Army as a secondary duty in the time of war.

The answers to the questions were written by me and I affix my signature hereto.

Shun AKIKUSA (Signature)

The interrogator was Colonel Rozenblit, S. J., Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

S. Rozenblit (Signature)

The military Interpreter - First Lieutenant Tastenko.

A. Tastenko (Signature)

C E R T I F I C A T E

MOSCOW.

February 22, 1946.

I, the undersigned, Senior Lieutenant Dmitry Ivanovich LASTENKO, military interpreter, hereby certify to Colonel ROSENBLIT, Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, that I am thoroughly conversant with the Japanese language to translate oral speech into Russian and that I promise to translate correctly testimony of AKIKUSA, Shun.

I have been duly warned that as an interpreter I bear criminal responsibility for purposely wrong translation under Article 95 of the Criminal Code of the U.S.S.R.

Signed: LASTENKO

Subscribed to before  
Colonel ROSENBLIT,  
Assistant Prosecutor for the  
USSR at the International Military  
Tribunal in Tokyo.

Signed: ROSENBLIT.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. GILDENBLAT, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signed: M. GILDENBLAT

OATH

I, AKIKUSA, Shun, Major-General of the Japanese Army, hereby  
promise to testify only the truth on the case of near criminals of  
Japan, included in the first list.

I give this oath to Colonel ROSEMBLIT, Assistant Prosecutor  
for the USSR at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

I have been duly warned that for giving false testimony I  
should bear criminal responsibility under the Article 96 of the  
Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

Signed: AKIKUSA, Shun

February 22, 1946

MOSCOW

Sworn and subscribed to Colonel ROSEMBLIT, Assistant Prosecutor  
for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

/s/ Colonel ROSEMBLIT

Military Interpreter: Lt. LASTENKO

M. K. LITVINOV'S DIARY.

Talk with Yoshisawa, Japanese Foreign Minister  
over a cup of coffee on December 1931.

Mr. Y. thanked for the courtesy and attention paid to him during travelling and for breakfast arranged for him. I told him that we learnt with satisfaction of his having been appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. He had signed the Peking agreement and in such a way had personally participated in laying the foundation of our present relations, and therefore we were glad that the preservation of those relations was then in his hands. The preservation of peaceful and friendly relations with all our neighbors including Japan is a foundation of our foreign policy.

Mr. Y. replied that he was proud of the role he had played in establishing relations with us.

After his appointment he was not in contact with his Government and therefore could not speak on its behalf, but he personally was in favor of preserving and improving relations with us and therefore he was glad to hear from me of similar intentions on our part.

I concurred with Yoshisawa, that prior to the exchange of opinions with his colleagues in the Government he could not make any official statements on behalf of the Government, but that his personal views of relations between our countries were also valuable. I also concur with Y's supposition of the possibility and desirability of improving these relations, and think that it could be achieved by some new act. We are conducting negotiations with Poland, are starting negotiations with Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Roumania with the aim of concluding pacts of non-aggression and neutrality. We have concluded such pacts with Germany, Lithuania, Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan. The pact with France has been initialled. When these negotiations are completed and the pacts signed, we shall be bound by the pacts of non-aggression with all our neighbors with the exception of Japan.

We consider that this gap should be filled, otherwise there will be a queer situation that Japan will be our only neighbor who has no pact of non-aggression with us. Such a pact expresses the peaceful policy and intentions of the Governments, and it will be well-timed especially now when the future of the Japanese-Russian relations is the subject of speculations in Western Europe and America. The conclusion of this pact would put an end to these speculations. I therefore decided to make use of the opportunity of forwarding through Yoshisawa a proposal, to the Japanese Government to open negotiations concerning the conclusion of the non-aggression pact.

This proposal took Yoshisawa, just as well as Hirota who attended the talk, obviously by surprise. Having inquired in detail about the progress of negotiations with other countries mentioned by me in

the course of our talk, Yoshizawa again repeated that he had been suddenly called from Paris to Tokyo and had, therefore, no time to make the policy of the new cabinet clear to himself, but that he certainly would not forget to forward our proposal to the Government. He asked whether that proposal had been made by us before, through Hirota, or comrade Troyanovsky. Comrade Karahan made it clear to him that in Tokyo in 1928 and even in 1930 there were conversations on the subject. I added that, of course, we did not expect to receive an official reply from Yoshizawa, which we would be forwarded through comrade Troyanovsky, or Hirota, but I was interested to know Mr. Yoshizawa's personal opinion.

Y. refrained from further talk on that subject and asked me whether I wanted to forward anything to Tokyo.

The copy is correct.

DIRECTOR OF THE STATE CENTRAL RECORD  
OFFICE OF THE U. S. S. R.

Professor Maksakov

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, A. V. Kunin, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature: /s/ A. Kunin



Doc. No. 2369

Page 1.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO, G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that a copy of K. N. Litvinov's diary-record of his talk with Oshisawa, Japanese Foreign Minister of December 31, 1931 on 3 sheets was delivered to me by the Central State Historical Record Office of the U.S.S.R. on or about June 7, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the Central State Historical Record Office of the USSR in Moscow.

I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_

Lt. Col. TARANENKO /s/  
Signature and rank

Tokyo, Japan

2 July, 1946.

U.S.S.R. NO. 220-1

Copy from the copy  
of the translation.Verbal Note Delivered by Uchida to Trojanovsky on December 13, 1932STRICTLY CONFIDENTIALVERBAL NOTE

It is clear both from the basic agreement between the two states and from all that has taken place since the conclusion of same, that Japan and the Soviet Union are mutually ready to scrupulously respect the sovereign rights of one another and punctually refrain from any violation of each other's border. Different opinions may be maintained, however, concerning the proper time and methods of bringing these satisfactory relations to the formal conclusion of a non-aggression treaty. Some people are of the opinion that in view of the fact of the existence of different problems of such nature as may lead to differences between the two nations, it would be preferable to clear up the atmosphere and to provide for the settlement of these questions by means of a preliminary conclusion of such a non-aggression agreement. On the other hand the opposite opinion is adhered to by those who believe that first of all efforts should be made to remove the cause of such differences prior to the consideration of problems of a more general nature such as the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement.

To sum up, the formal beginning of the negotiations on the subject between the two governments in this case seem to be untimely.

Perhaps at present it will be preferable to try and achieve the solution of various problems facing both nations; as to the negotiations which were referred to, it will be better to wait for a while and take time until the proper conditions are created. For the time being it will be of avail if both governments will confer together on peaceful methods of preventing and solving locally all sorts of difficulties that may accidentally arise due to the fact that the Japanese and Soviet troops are stationed so close to one another. The creation of a Japano-Soviet-Manchurian committee to prevent border incidents may become one of such means.

The note was delivered to Trojanovsky by Uchida December 13, 1932.

The copy is correct.

Director of the State Central Record

Office of the U.S.S.R.

May 21, 1946

Professor Maksakov.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, Kaplan, B.A., hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: V. Kaplan

Doc. No. 2371

Page 1.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel Taranenko, G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the text of the verbal note delivered by UCHIDA to TROYANOVSKY on December 13, 1932, on 2 sheets was delivered to me by the Central State Historical Records Office of the USSR on or about May 21, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the Central State Historical Records Office of the USSR.

I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_

Lt. Col. TARANENKO /s/  
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan

July 2, 1946.

Document No. 2372

EXHIBIT NO. 746

The note is delivered by Troyanovsky to Uchida of January 4, 1933 about the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Pact of non-aggression, on three sheets.

The government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics became acquainted with the contents of the verbal note of the Japanese Foreign Office of December 13 of this year in which the Japanese Government declined for the present the proposal of the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact, made on December 31, 1931 in Moscow by Litvinov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. Yoshizawa who was returning to his country to occupy the post of Foreign Minister. In the above verbal note is recognized the existence of the opinion in Japan to the effect that "in view of the existence of different problems of such nature as may lead to differences between the two nations, it would be preferable to clear up the atmosphere and to provide for the settlement of these questions by means of a preliminary conclusion of such a non-aggression agreement." This argument reflects the similar viewpoint of the Soviet Government and it was the point of departure in its proposal of the conclusion of the non-aggression pact. The Soviet Government notes with satisfaction that this opinion is shared by the Japanese circles.

Unfortunately, we must state, that the Japanese Government did not find it possible to follow this point of view and adhered to the opposite opinion cited in the verbal note in the following vein: "first of all efforts should be made to remove the cause of such differences prior to the consideration of problems of a more general nature such as the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement."

The consistent development of this argument will inevitably result in the complete negation both of the idea of non-aggression pacts and the refusal of all nations to use war as an instrument of settling controversies, the latter being the essential element of the Briand-Kellogg Pact. The Japanese Government evidently believes that the conclusion of non-aggression agreements is pertinent only between two states which have no controversies. Under the conditions of the present economic and political interdependence between nations such state of affairs is hardly existing, nor is it possible, especially between two states which are more or less close neighbors.

The solution of now existing disputes does not prevent from breaking out new ones in the future, particularly if the policy of the state develops along the line of aggression and extension of its sphere of influence.

It is noteworthy that the states, whether close neighbors or no neighbors at all with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which concluded non-aggression pacts with it, by no means admitted the absence of any mutual claims or controversies. Particularly, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics quite recently gave its consent to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with a neighboring state, with which it has a disputable border and to which it has well grounded territorial claims.

The substance of non-aggression pacts, as well as the substance of the Kellogg-Briand Pact lies in the principle that the states involved, taking into consideration the existence of controversies between them at present, or the possibility of new controversies in the future, refuse to settle them by the use of force. The Soviet Government on its part in no way considers that between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan there are controversies which cannot be settled, or which the Soviet Government refuses to settle by peaceful means. The negation of this would be contradictory to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, to which both the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan are signatories. Proposing a non-aggression pact with Japan, the Soviet Government has in no way ignored that international instrument, but meant to consolidate it by means of bilateral agreement to amplify it and to adapt it to the peculiarities of the relations between both nations. The proposal of the Soviet Government was not called forth by the considerations of the moment, but resulted from all its peaceful policy, and therefore continues in force for the future. On the other hand, it is permissible to doubt that the refusal of one party to conclude the non-aggression pact would contribute to the creation of a favorable atmosphere for the solution of all controversies and the settling of all misunderstandings: ..."

Delivered to Troyanovsky by Uchida January 4, 1933.

The Copy is correct: Director of the State Central Record office of the U.S.S.R.

Professor Maksakov.

May 21, 1946

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, Kaplan, B.A., hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document:

Signature: V. KAPLAN

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TAR.NENKO G. I., \_\_\_\_\_, a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the text of the note is delivered by TROYANOVSKY to UCFID of January 4, 1933 about the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Pact of non-aggression, on 3 sheets \_\_\_\_\_ was delivered to me by the Central State Historical Records Office of the USSR \_\_\_\_\_ on or about May 21 \_\_\_\_\_, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the Central Historical Records Office of the USSR \_\_\_\_\_

I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_

Lt. Col. TAR.NENKO /s/  
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan

July 2 \_\_\_\_\_, 1946

Q. 747

NO. NO. 2373

Page 1

~~U. S. S. R. No. 230-3~~

~~Verbal note delivered on February 13, 1933 by  
Sugosida by the order of Honida Foreign Ministry  
to the Ambassador~~

The note delivered on January 4 to the Foreign minister by the Soviet ambassador in reply to the verbal note of December 13 last year presented by the Foreign Minister to the ambassador on the question of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Japan and the USSR, which was proposed by the Soviet Government, contains an argument based on the misinterpretation of the viewpoint of the Japanese government; besides, it contains expressions hardly desirable in view of the interests of the friendly relations between both countries. In the course of conversation between the Vice-Foreign Minister and His Excellency which took place after that the former brought this fact to the attention of the Ambassador and recommended that the Soviet Government should pay its serious attention to it.

The Japanese government feels it necessary to take the advantage of this new opportunity to propose that the Soviet Government further deliberate this problem.

In the note of the Soviet government dated January 4 it is stated that, "the consistent development of this argument, will inevitably result in the complete negation both of the idea of non-aggression pacts and those contained in the Kellog-Briand pact," and that "the Japanese Government evidently believes that the conclusion of non-aggression agreements is pertinent only between the two states which have no controversies." To refute this idea the Japanese government can only insist upon the Soviet Government's thorough deliberation of the statement contained in the verbal note of the Japanese Government which reads: "To sum up, the formal beginning of the negotiations between the two governments in this case seems to be untimely," and "it will be preferable to try and achieve the solution of various problems facing both nations: as to the negotiations mentioned above, it will be better to wait for a while and take time until the proper conditions are created."

The statement contained in the Soviet note to the effect that "the solution of now existing disputes does not prevent from breaking out new ones in the future, particularly if the policy of the state develops along the line of aggression and extension of its sphere of influence," attracted most serious attention of the Japanese Government.



The Japanese Government accepts the explanation of the Soviet Ambassador to the effect that the phrase "the country" did not imply Japan. Need it be said that following the dictates of her constant feeling of justice, Japan has no designs of armed aggression. Indeed, we must say that in the above verbal note the Japanese Government maintained that "It is clear both from the basic agreement between the two states and from all that has taken place since the conclusion of same, that Japan and the Soviet Union are mutually ready to scrupulously respect the Sovereign rights of one another and punctually refrain from any violation of each others' levier."

It is necessary to add that the Soviet Government published the details of the negotiation prior to having received an acquiescence of the Japanese Government. As a matter of principle the Japanese Government had no objections to this being published since the Government of the USSR would consider it necessary to do so, as vice-Foreign Minister made clear to the Soviet Ambassador. But the fact is that the Soviet Government unexpectedly did it though no definite agreement of the opinions of both governments had been effected as to the time and methods of publishing.

This step on the part of the Soviet Government, contradictory to the international custom, took the Japanese Government un-awares and it must confess, that it finds it difficult to understand what considerations made the Soviet Government do so.

Delivered February 13, 1933 by Sugeshida, Director of the First Section of the European-American Department p. proc. Foreign Minister Uchida to Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy Spilvanek to be forwarded to the Ambassador.

The copy is correct: Director of the State Central Record office of the USSR.

Professor Maksakov.

May 21/1946

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, Kaplan, P.A., hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document . .

Signature s/ V. Kaplan

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G. I., a member of the military forces of the U. S. S. R., do hereby certify that copy of the translated text of the Verbal note delivered on February 13, 1933 by Sugesda by the order of Uchida Foreign Ministry to the counsellor of the Embassy for delivery to the Plenipotentiary, on 3 sheets was delivered to me by the Foreign Ministry of the U.S.S.R. on or about June 7, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the State Central Record Office in Moscow.

I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_

(signed) Lt. Col. Taranenko  
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan,

July 2, 1946.

C. 745

Document No. 2071

Page 1

The CONTENTS OF THE NOTE OF THE DEPUTY  
GENERAL CONSUL OF THE USSR IN KHARBIN  
OF OCTOBER 25, 1934, CONCERNING UNLAWFUL  
ARRESTS OF THE SOVIET EMPLOYEES.

To: Mr. Si-Lui--Ben,  
Special Agent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in North  
Manchuria.

No. 011/39 of  
October 23, 1934.

Mr. Special Agent,

In his numerous talks with you Consul-General Mr. Slavutsky repeatedly called your attention on his own behalf as well as officially on behalf of the Soviet Government, to the condition of guarding the Eastern line of the Chinese Eastern Railroad and requested that you should take measures to ensure the guarding of the line.

I would like to remind you of Mr. Slavutsky's statement made on behalf of the Soviet Government as far back as December 15 of last year in which he indicated that "the Functioning of the Chinese Eastern Railroad has lately been carried on in conditions of incessant violations of exploitation rules, attacks on trains, destruction of tracks, murders of railroad agents, committing violences against them, seizure of railroad property and the destruction of it. Unfortunately, the Manchurian authorities not only have not taken and are not taking sufficient measures to assist the Chinese Eastern Railroad and guard it, but have directly participated and are participating in the activities detrimental to the interests of the Chinese Eastern Railroad as well as detrimental to the USSR rights thereto."

Unfortunately, parallely with the growth of attacks on the Eastern line of the railroad, the guarding of the line, has not improved, but even has gradually assumed a catastrophic character. It came to that, that the Guard Troops Headquarters considered it possible to officially inform in their letter of May 19 that the guard troops had been removed from freight trains to the Eastern line. *EN*

In connection with the foregoing situation and these new measures of the guard troops Headquarters, Mr. Slavutsky made a protest to Mr. Shimomura acting for you, insisting that urgent

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measures be taken by the high Manchurian authorities.

However, I am obliged to state that neither Mr. Slavutsky's protest, nor repeated and almost daily presentations of Mr. Bendura, deputy assistant Chairman of the Board, and later on the presentations of Mr. Kushetsov, assistant chairman of the Board, who came from Tokyo, made to Mr. Li-Shao-Gen, chairman of the Board, gave no results.

-----

I can't but point out that all these acts just coinciding with the actual breakdown of Tokyo negotiations on the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railroad, the breakdown arranged by the Japanese-Manchurian party, are considered by the Soviet Government as disorganizing the functioning of the Chinese Eastern RAILROAD AND AS a grave violation of the treaty rights of the USSR to the Chinese Eastern Railroad, and reflect the aspirations of aggressive elements trying to seriously darken and even upset the relations between the two countries which was repeatedly brought to your notice by Mr. Slavutsky in his talks with you.

I am authorized to make a protest against the said acts of local authorities, and I believe, Mr. Special Agent, that you will take measures to set free Soviet citizens, railroad employees, who were illegally arrested, and to restore normal functioning of the railroad in compliance with existing treaties pertaining to the Chinese Eastern Railroad.

Awaiting your prompt reply, I beg you to accept, Mr. Special Agent, the expression of my profound respect.

N. Raivid,

Consul-General of the USSR in Harbin.

Correct: Maksakov,

Director of State Central Record Office of the USSR.

CERTIFICATE TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, A. Kunin, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: /s/ A. Kunin

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO, G. I. .....  
a member of the military forces of the U. S. S. R., do  
hereby certify that the text of the official statement of  
the superintendent of Consulate-General in Kharbin of October  
23, 1934. was delivered to me by Chief of State Central  
Historical Records Office of the USSR on 4 pages. on or  
about April 28 ....., 1946, and that the original of the  
said document may be found in the Central State Historical  
records Office of the USSR. .....

I do further certify .....

Lt. Col. TARANENKO /s/  
Signature and rank.

Tokyo, Japan

June 14, 1946.

EXHIBIT NO. 748

Doc 2071

在北滿外務省特別代理人ヨイリイ(ニ定見) 特別代理人殿

辱次ニ直ル貴殿トノ合談ニ於テ總領事ヲラツキ  
シ氏ノ個人的ニ自身ノ名ニ於テ且又公式ニソツエトシテ政府  
府ノ本囑ニヨリ再ナラズ東支鐵道ノ東部鐵道線路  
保全ノ状態ニイテ注意ヲ喚起シ此鐵道線路保全  
ヲ確保ナラニ急テ手段ヲ講ズク貴殿ニ懇請シテ

私ノ昨年十二月十五日ソツエトシテ政府ノ本囑ニヨリ十  
カクシテ「スラウツキ」氏ノ五月間書ニツイテ貴殿ノ注意  
ヲ促シ度イソ中テ彼ノ如ク指摘シタ即チ東支鐵  
道ノ經營ノ最近向新テ營業諸規定ノ違反列車ニ  
對シテ經同チ攻撃線路ノ破壞ノ鐵道吏員ノ殺害ト  
彼等ノ暴行、鐵道ノ所有物ノ奪取トシテ破壞ノ状  
態下ニ行ハレテテリ甚濶クテ滿洲官立局ノ東支鐵道  
ニ助力シテ防護スルニ充分ナル手段ヲ講ジカクシ  
又現在モ講ジラカクシテ東支鐵道ノ利益ニイテ  
ハソシテ行スル所ノ權益モ損害ヲ蒙ラシムルニ全ク  
無云現在ヲ通シ國與ニテナシ

遺憾ナク東支鐵道ノ東部鐵道線路ニ對シテ  
攻撃ノ度數ノ増加ニ相応シテ東部鐵道線路ノ守備  
ノ状態ガ改善セラレテラバカリテテク漸次破局的性格  
ヲ示シテ東支鐵道ノ所有物ヲ奪取シ去テ  
通告ニ得ルモ、

NO 1

THE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361

Doc 2071

現下、状態ト守備隊本部、二、新手段ニ国聯ニ  
テ又ラウツキシ氏ハ貴殿代理下村氏ニ意見ヲ提出シ  
緊急ナル対策實施ヲ上級滿洲省當局ニ對シ主張シ  
ニカニテ秋ハ、スラウツキシ氏、抗議書ニ副議長  
代理トシテ下村氏次々ト東京ニヨリ歸來、副議長トシ  
ニ「ス」氏が滿洲省政府及東支鐵道代表本部長  
ニ對シテ再三、殆ド毎日、陳述セテ何レ何レ、結果セテ  
ニ「ス」氏ト「ク」トヲ認認セザルヲ得ナシ

更ニ又、私が貴殿ニ注意ヲ促シ度キコトハ、東支鐵道特  
種ラフニ「ス」氏「ク」氏於テ税関其他、官廳、執リタル諸  
手段ニテ、他、鐵道線路、運行同村、過去現在ヲ通シ  
東支鐵道「ク」氏「ス」氏ト代表連及ビ鐵道職員タル「ク」  
「ス」ト市民達ガ不獲ノ既慮、對象トシテ又ガ停持ニ  
タリタル斯クモ重要ナル實際的意義ヲ有スル鐵道区、  
慢車「ス」ラフ客車、運行可クモ困難ナラニルガ如キ  
貴殿承知、諸手段ニ因ニテナシ。

正ニ之ガ故ニ最近斯クモ無造作ニ「ク」氏「ス」氏ト鐵道職員  
ニ對シテ行ハシルタル若キハ全ク法外ナルモノナリ。若シ  
等再長氣ヲ若キガ公式ニ滿洲當局ニ依リテ支持可ク  
トナシバ、私ハ採ルニ足ラザルモノト考ヘテナラザル。  
既ニ八月二十日附書翰ニ貴殿ニ通知シタル如ク八月十三  
日カラ此等若キ、且實、下ニ鐵道警察ハ本部鐵道及  
ビ「ク」氏「ス」氏ト「ク」氏「ス」氏ト鐵道職員、多數、極東ガ

No 2

Doc. 2071

行ニシテ彼等ノ内ニ、何人カハ殴打ノ愛目ニ選入スル  
此等ノ理由ヲ極東且又階級ニヨリ判断スルニ更ニ強  
期セラレシメ東部鉄道新部ニ対スル所、如キ極東ニ  
日体同鉄道ニ、組織破壊ヲ更ニ強クシテ、  
カ此等極東ヲ正當化セシメテ、鐵道従業員、  
止人等ガ他七列東ニ対シテ、能ハズ組織  
事願復実行ニ掠奪ト殺人ヲ行ヒ、鐵道従業員  
ノ家族ヲ拉致シタリ、如キ、即チ本願ニ於テ已レ  
ノ家族ニ対シテ、是行ヲ計劃シ、中タカ、如キ等  
氣ヲ法外ト告發ガ為ニ出サレシムル

更ニ、馬鹿又々告訴ノ地方官憲ニヨリ直接又、地  
新聞ヲ經テ、滿洲ニ於ケルソレノ上、聯邦、公館及  
式代表ニテ、即チソレノ上、領事館及心算  
取、領事自身ニテ、更ニ特別ニ、極東軍部ニ  
テテ流布セシメラル

コトニ、行動ハズテ東支鐵道讓渡ニ關シ、東支  
日本滿洲側ヨリ、實際的決裂ト全ク符合スルニ  
テ、ソレノ上、政府ハ之ヲ東支鐵道、機能、組織破壊  
ヲテ、又、東支鐵道ニ於ケルソレノ上、條約上、權  
利、甚クシク侵害、見做シ、又、ソレノ上、氏ノ責  
ノ間ニ、交戦シテ、合議ニ於テ、既ニ、及、指摘セシ、兩  
關係ノ、著ク、暗黒ニ、更ニ、破乱セシメ、テ、不  
要素ニ、同ヲ、反映スルニ、テ、テ、テ、テ、テ、テ、  
得テ、

No 3



Doc 2071

私ハ前述、地方官憲ノ行動ニ對シ抗議ヲ提出スル全權  
ヲ具ヘラレタルモノナリ 特別代理人殿 貴殿ニ依リ故  
トシテ檢束セラレタル鐵道従業員ハ一室一ト人ヲ釋放  
スルト共ニ東支鐵道ニ因テ現條約ニ依リテ鐵道ノ正  
常狀態ヲ復舊サセルベキ手段ヲ執ラレシコトヲ信シ度  
イモデアル 貴殿ノ速カナル御回答ヲ期待ス

特別代理殿

在ハルビニシテ聯總領事

又 三ツグイ  
敬具

挿ハ 一頁 一行目 (日附及び番号)

挿ハ 三頁 三行目 (道)

本文、正確ナルコトヲ証明ス

支那中央支使記録文書保管局長

署名

一九四六年四月十七日

No 4

No 5

Doc. 2071

書類第二〇七二號

證

余中山登ハ余ガ日本語及ビ露西重語ニ  
精通セル者ナルコト並ニ露西草書不文及ビ日本語原文  
ヲ対照シ上右ハ本書類ヲ真実ニ且正確ニ翻譯セル  
モノナルヲ確證セルコトヲ茲ニ證ス

署名

中山登 (印)

昭和二年八月十五日

2071 (cert.)

証 明 書

余、中佐 G.I. タラネンコ / TARANEJKO G. I. / ハ 蘇  
合主義ソビエツト共和 國聯邦總算ノ部員ニシテ、  
茲ニ左記ノ如ク 証 明 ス

記

一九三四年ノ昭和九年ノ十月二十三日ノ / KEARBELE /  
ニ於ケル總領事館長ノ公式聲明ノ四頁ヨリ成ル本  
文ハ、一九四六年四月二十八日又ハ其前後ニ於テ  
ソビエツト社會主義共和 國聯邦國立中央歴史記録  
局長官ニヨリ余ニ引渡サレタル事、並ニ該文書ノ  
原本ハソビエツト社會主義共和 國聯邦國立中央歴  
史記録局ニ所在スト看ラル、事、

(署名及階級) 中 佐 タラネンコ / 署名 /

日本東京ニ於テ

一九四六年六月十四日

Q1749

Doc. No. 2146

Page 1

No. 359  
December 15, 1934

TO : Mr. Li-Shao-Gen, Chairman of the  
Board of the Chinese  
Eastern Railroad.

Dear Sir,

The Director of the railroad in his protest of November 20, 1934 No. 111, 9/1009 states that the seizure of offices and premises belonging to the railroad by various institutions in Harbin as well as along the line, has become widespread, especially of late. It may be seen from the Director's protest that in the period from 1930 to October 7, 1934, 101,230 square meters of railroad buildings (29,353 square meters in Harbin and 71,927 square meters along the line) were illegally occupied by the following institutions:

The Japanese military command occupied 299 premises with a total floor space 79,867,36 square meters, guard troops - 132 premises, 9,237,79 S. M., Railroad Police - 19 premises, 1,112,34 s.m., Commander-in-Chief's office - 15 premises, 991,48 s.m., Harbin Post Office - 9 premises, 489, 07 s.m., Ministry of Transportation - 1 premise, 115,30 s.m., Police Department - 4 premises, 143,45 s.m., Village Police - 16 premises, 693,67 s.m., Frontier Police and Police Guard Detachment - 21 premises, 4,932,67 s.m., the Great Harbin Administration - 4 premises, 2,446,86 s.m., Department of Education 8 premises, 986 s.m., Telephone Network - 3 premises, 120, 56 s.m., private people - 2 premises, 173,99 s.m. on the whole 534 premises with a total floor space 101,280,54 s.m. were illegally occupied.

Illegal seizures are distributed as follows:

1930 -	1.687, 99	Square meters.
1931 -	95, 49	" "
1932 -	57.187, 72	" "
1933 -	31.236, 25	" "

Before October 1, 1934 11.073, 09 s.m. It may be seen from these figures that almost all seizures took place in the period of 1932 - 1934.

Further the Director of the railroad points out that appeals to the Railroad Police are to no purpose as the officials of the Railroad Police illegally seize the premises themselves. Smashing locks and doors, opening doors with skeleton keys or with specially selected keys was their usual method of penetration into the railroad flats due to the inactivity of the Railroad Police (the details see in the said protest of the Director of the railroad).

But even after October 1, 1934 the said illegal acts have not ceased, but even increased which is conformed by a number of protests and telephone messages of the Director of the railroad during November and December of this year.

-----

Not only temporarily vacant premises of the railroad are occupied, but often are occupied the premises in which live the employees of the railroad who are forcibly moved into other people's flats or thrown out bag and baggage into the street. All sorts of institutions participate in these illegal seizures of railroad premises. Most of the seizures have been effected by the Japanese military, but not less active in that respect were the institutions which are specially called upon to maintain law and order, and in particular to protect railroad property, viz., guard troops, railroad and general police, etc.

Even the institutions of the Ministry of Transportation and of the Ministry of Education had a hand in this, and, finally, some private offices and people. All this is detrimental to the interests of the railroad and its personnel and stands in the way of its smooth running.

I have already called your attention to the illegal seizures of railroad premises and in particular to the illegal seizures of the living quarters of its personnel, but nothing has been done to protect the rights and interests of the railroad and the seizures are going on and even increasing.

I categorically protest against such illegal acts and insist upon effective measures being taken to clear off the premises which were illegally seized and protect the railroad personnel from the outrages.

Sincerely yours,

Signed: Bandura

"The Copy is correct :  
Director of the State Central Record Office of the U.S.S.R.  
(MAKSAKOV)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT

I, Kunin, A.V., hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature /s/ A. KUNIN

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO, G. I.,  
a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby  
certify that one copy of the letter of the Vice-President of  
the Chinese Eastern Railroad Board of December 15, 1934 No. 359  
about the occupation of the C.E.R. premises by the Japanese  
forces on 5 sheets was delivered to me by the Director  
of the Central State Historical Records Office of the USSR  
on or about 12 May, 1946, and that the original of the said  
document may be found in the Central State Historical Records  
Office of the USSR in Moscow.

I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_

Lt. Col. TARANENKO, /s/  
Signature and rank.

Tokyo, Japan

June 19 1946.

G#750

TABLE OF  
VIOLATIONS OF THE STATE FRONTIER OF THE U.S.S.R. BY THE JAPANESE  
FROM 1932 TO 1945.

Incidents	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	Total
1 Frontier violations by the Japanese military (by units, groups of, single army-men)	-	15	45	130	62	69	124	387	59	136	229	414	144	36	Before 1937-321 cases From 1938 to 1945- 1529 men
2 Violations of the U.S.S.R. territorial waters by Japanese vessels	-	25	48	105	87	215	210	203	120	19	64	123	92	19	1350
3 From among those vessels were held up	-	11	-	-	-	79	22	9	18	7	36	39	23	19	263
4 Violations of the U.S.S.R. Frontier by Japanese aircraft	-	6	32	62	31	43	40	83	56	61	82	119	171	3	789
5 Smuggling of spies over to the U.S.S.R. territory (total of the held up)	-	10	125	108	69	208	1754	217	241	302	222	140	146	124	3666 men
Smuggling of counter-revolutionary literature over to the U.S.S.R. territory	-	-	-	22	19	37	176	222	55	150	61	129	113	-	Before 1940-431 cases From 1941 to 1944- 453 pieces
Captivity of Soviet citizens	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	4
6 Transfer of bands on to the territory of U.S.S.R.	14	-	-	1	1	4	19	14	4	2	-	2	5	2	68
7 Seizure of the Soviet territories	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
8 Opening fire at Soviet territory citizens, borders detachments, vessels, etc.	-	19	51	46	36	51	61	104	65	24	24	24	39	7	551
9 Our losses: (Killed	( 7	-	1	4	10	6	40	12	-	1	2	-	-	-	83
(Wounded	( 3	-	2	1	18	-	58	25	-	11	-	1	1	-	120
10 Taking photos of our territories	-	-	-	-	-	-	26	36	10	-	-	-	-	-	72

Note: Under 1 the number of cases but not of individuals is indicated up to 1937. Beginning from 1938 to 1945 the number of individuals that violated the state frontier is indicated.

February 20, 1946

Peoples Commissariat for  
Home Affairs of the U.S.S.R.  
Chief of the Frontier corps Lieutenant-General Stakhanov.

## EXCERPTS FROM THE

## REPORT

On provocative actions of the Japanese in the lake Hanka area.

1. On October 26 1936, at 8 hours 30 minutes a frontier patrol of the out-post Tury Rog consisting of 7 soldiers being on a no-name hill on the Soviet territory, one km. to the South of the frontier-mark letter "L" and 500 metres to the East of the frontier line, was attacked by two Manchurian-Japanese armed detachments, each equal in strength to a platoon.

The frontier guards retreated 600 metres back on the Soviet territory to avoid encirclement, and the Manchurian-Japanese detachments occupied the hill, left by the frontier guards, and stationed a machine-gun there...

...On October 28, 1936, almost a platoon of the Japanese and Manchurian soldiers were digging trenches on a hill marked 124.5, 700 metres to the North of the frontier-mark letter "L".

On October 29 a lorry drove up from the direction of Sansalatun to the hill 124.5 and a group of soldiers with a heavy machine-gun alighted. On the same day at 13 hours about 36 soldiers with a heavy machine-gun were noticed on the hill 124.5...

...At 16 hours 20 minutes on November 26, 1936 7 Japanese and Manchurians crossed the frontier-line to the South of the frontier-mark letter "L" and penetrated to the Soviet territory about 200 metres deep. As the result of the fire opened by our frontier guards the Japanese and Manchurians fled to the Manchurian territory.

At 16 hours 55 minutes a group of the Japanese and Manchurians, about 20 men strong, attempted several times to cross the frontier line, but each time was forced back to the Manchurian territory by the fire of our frontier guards.

Our casualties - 2 killed, 4 men wounded.

On November 26, when it grew dark, the Japanese and Manchurian group holding positions in front of the mound "Pavlova" was increased up to 3 companies. 9 trucks arrived at the positions of the enemy by the same time. At 23,15 hours on November 26 the Japanese and Manchurians almost battalion strong attacked the mound "Pavlova".

The group of frontier-guards defending the mound, retreated to the South.



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page 2.

It was ascertained that among the troops composing the detachment which attacked the mound "Pavlova" there were the units of the 52d separate Nanshan machine-gun battalion constituting the garrison of the Nanshan fortified district and of the 15th Manchurian infantry regiment.

On November 27 at 17 hours 35 minutes the group of the frontier guards and the Red Army units of support occupied again the mound "Pavlova"...

People's Commissariat for Home Affairs of the USSR

Chief of the Frontier Corps

Lieutenant - General

/Stakhanov/

March "8", 1946.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, V.I. Tarkhov, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translations of the indicated Document.

Signature V. I. Tarkhov

1000

第三號

陸滿宿山 綴

Doc 608  
44 752A

自 至  
昭知 年一月二十日  
一月三十日

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 391

44 752A



標目長嶺子三直間

第四節 中早昇標目長嶺子三直間

標高九百五高地(二門子東南方約十三軒)附近及煙筒高嶺子附近(地形極其錯雜)傾斜急峻(三標登園難充密林地帶之形成)運動(為)大障碍,

然(其)其他國境附近(因)上(於)六嶺峻大山(山地)帶(如)毛(現)地(地)形(平易)且(疎)林(三)至(五)所(部)

隊(行)動(妨)碍

蘇(合)內(通)道(路)自(下)般(三)荒(廢)之(足)以(通)自(類)第(二)交(通)之(以)于(若)干(補)修(行)之(上)依

易(三)車(輛)編(成)部(隊)蘇(嶺)子(進)合(之)得

之(特)最(近)國(境)之(所)有(概)不(河)谷(三)

派(東)方(海)岸(道)方(向)二(回)已(自)動(車)道(路)之(補)修(於)

也(注)自(八)年(東)嶺(三)之(為)國(境)超(越)界(界)

行(動)之(極)其(容)易(也)

長(嶺)子(附)近(平)直(三)之(通)之(確)春(煙)道(道)

諸(兵)之(通)過(容)易(也)

甚(兩)側(出)地(傾)斜(般)三(三)展(望)射(擊)及(路)

外(行)動(於)大(部)隊(以)容(易)二(蘇)合(內)二(進)

攻(不)化(之)得(也)

608 wt-1

證 明

「ワシントン」文書局 第 第 號  
國 際 檢 察 部 第 第 號  
號 號

與 塚 及 び 公 正 三 項 ス ル 以 時

余、石橋兼雄ハ余ガ下記ノ資料ニ於テ、即チ第一  
復員局文書課職員トシテ、日本以テト公的關係ニ  
在ルモノナルコト、並ニ該官更トシテ余ガ茲ニ添  
附セラレタル、頁ヨリ成ル、千九百零六年ノ  
昭和二十一年ノ九月十三日前、下記姓名、即チ  
鹽浦富彦ノ文書ノ保管ニ任ジ居ルコトヲ證ニ證明  
ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書  
ナルコト、並ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ書ハ概屬ノ公文書  
整理及ビ證ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(等シテラバ  
復員局ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類ハ更ニ於テ水野文書ノ成規所  
在ノ公式書籍ニモ特記ス)

608 cert-2

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／九月十三日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官更署名欄

右ノ者ノ公的資格

証人

小 赤 田 功 治  
第一機與局文書課文員  
石 橋 兼 雄 (印)

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、ERIC W. FISHER ハ、余カ 國 際 高 指 揮 官

總司令部ニ關係スルモノナルコト、並ニ上記題名

ノ文書ハ余カ公務上、日本政府ノ上記署名官更ヨ

リ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ説明ス。

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／九月十三日

ニ於テ署名

氏 名

右ノ者ノ公的資格

証 人

ERIC W FISHER  
2-D HEALS

Ex-75A

Doc. No. 608

Page 1

Manchurian Army Secret Files

(Page 39. Secret Document of the General Staff Office in Korea No. 319)

Investigations of materials for tactics in Manchun and South Ussuri Areas. (A statement concerning conditions of topography, communications, positions, etc.)

20 Dec 1933 - The Chief of Staff of Korean Army, OGUSHI, Keikichi.

To the Vice-Minister of War, Y. NAKAMA, Heisuke.

Taking advantage of the time from the middle of October to the end of November, when our Manchun Detachment made the autumn subjugation, we had the detachment search for materials for tactics in the Manchun and South Ussuri areas, especially in the area of the Soviet-Manchukuo frontier, in consideration of the time when we open hostilities against Soviet Russia.

I submit a separate report combining this with the result of the previous information.

Page 105. Section IV. From the boundary marked "P" to Changlingtzu.

In the vicinity of the 965 meter hill (situated to the southeast of Tumentsu, about 13 kilometers from the village) and Yentung Leitzki, there are dense forest areas which are great obstacles to movement, and the land is extremely rough there, forming a very steep slope difficult to climb. The figure may indicate that other places near the boundary also form a steep mountainous area, but actually they are plain in their geographical features and are thinly wooded; so the action of troops is not anywhere blocked. Although roads leading to Russian territory are now generally in disrepair, units with formations of vehicles could easily penetrate into Russian territory after some repairs are made, for there was once frequent traffic on the road. It should be noticed that a motor road has been constructed along the river valley, extending from the border station of GPU to the direction of the east coast road. Owing to this new road, our action after we have crossed the border is very easy.

In the vicinity of Chang-Iing-Tzu it is flat, and it would be easy for the various troops to pass over the Manchun-Yuenchow which crosses this area. Mountainous districts on either side of the road are generally in gentle slopes, giving freedom to visibility, firing, and off the road action. We shall easily be able to penetrate into Russian territory with large forces.

C E R T I F I C A T E

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Kaneo Ishitashi, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Corresponding Secretary of the Army Secret Files, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereinafter described consisting of ..... pages, dated 27-30 Jan., 1934, and described as follows: .....

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Document Procurement

Signed at Tokyo on this ..... day of Nov., 1946.

/s/ Kaneo Ishitashi  
Signature of Official

Name of Shiroki Kobayashi

SEAL  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Requirement

I, Lt. Eric N. Fleischer, hereby certify that I am associated with the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this ..... day of Oct., 1946.

/s/ Eric N. Fleischer, Sig Lt AUC  
NAME  
Investigator IPS  
Official Capacity

Name of .....



MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT : Japanese Provocative Acts in the Area of the Lake Hassan

The State border between the U. S. S. R. and Manchuria in the area of the Lake Hassan is defined by the Peking Additional Agreement in 1860 and then two sides changed the maps - scale 25 versts in one English inch - which were attached to this agreement in 1861.

As the passing of the State border line in this area was not quite clearly defined by the Peking Additional Agreement in 1860 and the map in 1861, then bilateral demarcation of territories of the two States was performed in 1886 and the results are fixed in the protocol "About thorough checking of the first section of the border between two States" from June 26, 1886.

In this protocol the following is written:

"From Letter T the border is running to the North-West, following the line of the mountains, west side of the Lake Hassan and reaches the north end of the sandy ridge where the second-rate sign N1 is set. The distance is eight versts and one hundred sadgens. Further in the same direction it runs for one verst and sixty-five sadgens, then turns and runs for four versts and one hundred and thirty-five sadgens along the sandy ridge to the cape of E - Gana where the sign N2 is set."

This is picturesquely confirmed by the map scale 1 versta in one English inch, taken with the help of instruments in 1884. (Photostat is attached.)

October 11, 1936, a Japanese detachment, 35 men strong with machine guns, crossed the State border in the area which is 2.5 km. north of the Zaozernaya Hill, penetrated into our territory 100 meters deep, in view of capturing the land sector with the square of 150 desyateens, but it was driven out from our territory.

Beginning from July 1938, the Japanese began concentrating large forces in the area of the Lake Hassan. Up to July 29, 1938, these forces systematically violated the U. S. S. R. border in this area, but each time the Japanese were driven out from our territory. On July 15, 1938, on the southern slopes of the Zaozernaya Hill a group of Japanese gendarmes

violated the border and penetrated deep into our territory. Our frontier guards opened fire and as a result one gendarme was killed on our territory and the corpse was taken by us.

On July 16, 1938 the Japanese demonstratively captured the border hill 406.1 (mt. Shirani).

On July 25, 1938, in the area of border sign 177 our detachment was provocatively fired at with rifles and machine guns by Japanese from the Manchurian territory. The border guards did not open fire.

On July 26, 1938, while we handed two trespassers to Japanese authorities on the border line, a Japanese detachment demonstratively captured the border hill "Mt. Chortova".

On July 29, 1938, early in the morning under the cover of dense fog a Japanese company attacked our border patrol on a nameless hill (area of the Lake Hassan).

From July 29 to August 5 Japanese made several intense attacks on our border guards, who were on the Zaozernaya Hill and on a number of nameless hills, which were occupied by the Japanese.

As a result of putting into action of the Red Army troops on August 11, 1938 the Japanese were routed and the U. S. S. R. territory was liberated.

The State border in this sector has been guarded and is being guarded by border troops in accordance with the protocol of 1886.

APPENDIX: Copies of reports of the chief of Border Troops of People's Commissariat for Home Affairs in the Far Eastern District and photostatic copy of the map of 1884 of the sector of the border in the area of the Lake Hassan.

Home Ministry of the U. S. S. R.;  
Chief of the Frontier Corps

Lieutenant-General

STAKHAILOV

March 21, 1946

Copy Correct:

GOLUBEVA

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, Menshova M. S., hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: Menshova

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Home Ministry of the U. S. S. R.;

Chief of the Frontier Corps

Lieutenant-General

STAKHANOV

March 21, 1946

Copy Correct:

GOLUBYEVA

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, Menshova M. S., hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: Menshova

Report by Telegraph  
Moscow, People's Commissariat for Home Affairs  
to Kovalov

Map 100.000. Sheets K-52-45 and K-52-56-70.

According to the Posyet frontier guard detachment report of July 27, 1938.

1. At 11 hours 30 minutes the reconnaissance party under senior lieutenant Efromov reported from point at the mark, 5, 0 / co-ordinate 2820/ that the "Tshortova" hill was occupied by the Japanese 60 men strong. One circular trench is dug out on the hill and two trenches are laid out with stones. The trenches are surrounded by wire entanglements in four rows.

According to lieutenant Efremov's estimation the wire entanglements are advanced from the frontier line 50-60 metres deep onto our territory. The fact that the wire entanglements were constructed on our territory is being verified.

2. At 14.00 hours 20 Japanese and Manchurians soldiers armed with rifles arrived at the Siruni hill. Apparently these are the reinforcements.

3. A cargo was brought on two trucks and three carts to Aupsarai village from Kefun. Five loaded trucks arrived at the "Malaya Tchertova" hill and "Malaya Savelovka" village from Khunchun. Apparently the supplies are being brought to the troops stationed on the frontier.

N702038

Sokolov.

Correct:

People's Commissariat for Home Affairs of the USSR Main Department of the  
Frontier Corps, 1st Department, Chief of the 1st Section,  
Major-General

/Rindzjunsy/

March, 8, 1946

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, VI Tarkhov hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature Tarkhov

Report by Telegraph  
Moscow, People's Commissariat for Home Affairs  
to Kovalov

Map 100,000. Sheets K-52-45 and K-52-58-70.

According to the Posyot frontier guard detachment report of July 27, 1938.

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N702038

Sokolov.

Correct:

People's Commissariat for Home Affairs of the USSR Main Department of the  
Frontier Corps, 1st Department, Chief of the 1st Section,  
Major-General

/Rindzjunsky/

March, 8, 1946

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, VI Tarkhov hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature Tarkhov

COPY  
TCP SECRET

REPORT BY TELEGRAPH

Moscow, People's Commissariat for Home Affairs to Kovalev  
"Map 100,000, sheet 52-45. According to the report of the Posyet frontier guard detachment, on July 25, 1938 at 13,45 hours a frontier-guard patrol of the Hunchun out-post, being in a dell near frontier-mark 17 was fired at by the Japanese and Manchurians from rifles and machine-guns. Altogether 40 shots were fired at the patrol. The fire was conducted from a no-name hill / co-ordinate 3414/. The bullets hit our ground. No casualties. In the said co-ordinate the Japanese are digging trenches. Altogether 50 men are at work. 1701959

Sokolov

Received: July 25, 1938

Correct:

People's Commissariat for Home Affairs of the USSR Main Department of the Frontier Corps

1st Department

Chief of the 1st section

Major - general

/Ridzjunsky/.

March 8, 1946.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, V I Tarkhov hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature Tarkhov

EXTRACT

Top Secret

from the report of the Chief of the People's Commissariat for Home Affairs Frontier Corps of the Far Eastern District No. 702065

Map 100,000 sheet K-52-58-70. According to the Posyet frontier guard detachment report on July 29, 1938 at 16,00 hours the Japanese and Manchurians launched a two group offensive against a no-name hill, on the frontier line 2 km north of the hill "Zaozernaya".

The first group - 50 men strong with a light machine -gun:

The Second group- nearly a company, attacked a no -name hill 1000 metres north-west of the hill "zaozernaya".

As observation from the hill "zaozernaya" showed, our frontier guard patrol withdrew.

A group from the garrison on the Zaozernaya" hill and a second group from the Pakshekori out-post marched out to support it.

The group advancing from the "Zaozernaya" hill is engaged in a skirmish with the group of Japanese soldiers on our territory

The observation is made difficult by dense fog

The extract is correct:

People's Commissariat for Home Affairs of the USSR

Main Department of the Frontier Corps

1st Department

Chief of the 1st section

Major General

(Rindzjunsky)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT

I, V I Tarkhov, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature Tarkhov

C O P Y

TOP SECRET

REPORT BY TELEGRAPH  
MOSCOW PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT  
FOR HOME AFFAIRS

TO KOVALEV.

"Map 100,000 sheet 52 45 Situation in the sector of the Posiet Frontier guard detachment on July 23, 1938 at 12.00 h.

On July 23, 1938 at 5 00 h. a frontier guard patrol 5 men strong under the section leader Zhaygorodnin with a light machine gun, located on our territory 4 Japanese and Manchurian soldiers with a light machine gun. A cavalry platoon under Captain Mergalov was sent forward from the out-post. Having noticed the movement of the platoon the trespassers escaped deep on to their territory. Mergalov discovered at the spot on our territory 120-150 m. from frontier line where the trespassers were seen one telegraph pole was pulled down and 14 meters of wire was carried away (left angle of co-ordinate 3418.) There were revealed foot prints as well leading to the adjacent territory. In this place white flag and a letter written in the Korean language of the following contains:

"On July 16 a letter was sent in the district of the long island:

- 1) Immediately answer this letter.
- 2) Immediately withdrew from our territory in the lake Khassan area, if not situation will become grave
- 3) The questions which recently arose between us is becoming tense, we are always ready to start negotiations on the frontier line of our post Khunchun. I want to know your opinion".

The letter is neither dated nor signed.

H.701943

FEDOTOV"

Received: 23.7. 1938. 17:30 h.

Correct:

People's Commissariat for Home Affairs

of the U. S. S. R. Main Department

of the Frontier Corps, 1st Department

Chief of the 1st Section

Major-General:

RIFDZYNSKI.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, Pilkovsky, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature: Pilkovsky

Report by Telegraph,  
Moscow People's Commissariat for Home  
Affairs to Kovalov.

Map 100,000. Sheet K-52-58-70. As the Posiet frontier guard detachment reports on July 24, 1938, at 13.00 hours in the district of a hill, 600 metres North-West of Zaoznaya, 12 Japanese and Manchurian soldiers were noticed. From this hill 4 men wearing civilian clothes with leather cases slung over shoulders came to the village of Khomoku, and having guarded 38 inhabitants of this village staged a demonstration of "indignation" at occupation of the hill by the Soviet frontier guards. This demonstration was filmed. Only men took part in the demonstration. The shooting of the film was, to be part of the campaign of slander. From Kenfun to the South and back a movement of loaded trucks covered with canvas is being observed. No. 701973. Fedotov.

Received 24/7/1938 at 13.00

Correct: People's Commissariat for Home Affairs of the U. S. S. R.  
Main Department of the Frontier Corps, the 1st Department;  
Chief of the 1st Section. Major-General.

Rindzyunsky.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, Pilkovsky, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature: Pilkovsky

E X T R A C T

From the report of the Chief of the Frontier Corps of People's Commissariat for Home Affairs of the Far East district.

No. 701964

Map 100,000. Sheet K-52-58-70 and 52-46.

Situation in the Posiet Frontier Guard Detachment on July 24, 1938 at 3h. 25m.

Opposite the sector of the Commandant's Office of Zarechye the appearance of new garrisons and a concentration of large infantry units have been noticed.

Intelligence service and army observation found out that:

First - An infantry battalion, 600 men strong is in Kenfun. On July 28, 1938 another infantry regiment, 14 trucks, 4 cars, and great number of horses, and transport arrived.

Second - The garrisons of the Malaya Savclovka and Malaya Chortovo are 200-220 men strong.



Third - 300 men with artillery (the number of guns is unknown) are in the village Komurukahi and on the hill Shiruni.

Fourth - A mixed company of 140 men strong is in Montkusan.

Fifth - 50 men in Khomaku

Sixth - 40 men are in 600 metres North-West of the Hill Znozernaya.

Seventh - Over 1,000 men are on the station Shioho.

Eighth - 300 infantry men are in the village Yapkhendon; altogether, more than 3,000 Japanese troops with artillery are concentrated opposite the Commandant's Office of Zarockye.

On July 21, 1938, the inhabitants of village Khomoku, Tkhori were turned out and sent to the rear of Korea.

The Traffic for the civil population over the Tyumen - Ula river is closed. In the inhabitant point, adjacent to the frontier line meetings were held by the Japanese to mobilize opinion of the population in favor of capturing the Hill Znozernaya by force.

Extract is correct.

People's Commissariat for Home Affairs of the U. S. S. R.  
Main Department of the Frontier Corps, the 1st Department;  
Chief of the 1st Section

Major-General Rindzyunsky.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENTS:

I, Pilkovsky, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated excerpts of the above Document.

Signature: Pilkovsky

C E R T I F I C A T E


I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO, G.I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that Report of the Chief of Frontier troops of the U.S.S.R. Home Ministry on the Khassan Lake Incident in 1938 with attached photocopy of a map, attached to the Hunchun agreement of 1896 and 6 copies of reports of the frontier detachments about the violation of the frontier and conduct of the Japanese troops, on 8 Sheets was delivered to me by the Chief of the Frontier troops of the U.S.S.R. Home Ministry on or about March 21, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_

Lt. Col. Taranenko (signed)  
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan,  
June 24, 1946.



Secondary boundary marker #3 III  
Вспомогательный пункт №3 III  
界标第三

The village of Oshurkov  
с. Ошурков  
(Korean)

The village of Zarechye  
(Korean)

М.И.Е.П.

Гора Баранов  
巴拉諾夫山  
Mount Baranov

Mount Barabasha  
巴拉巴沙山  
HARABASHA

42

Chinese houses

Boundary marker  
分界点


Маяк Н-1

Cape Kang


Chinese houses

Chinese houses





都察院在副都御史 張華



Village

Mountain  
Cape

Boundary signpost Letter F  
Pungchadi sub-district num. 30.

Posternum  
Village Podgornia

Village

River Sumer-illa

Village Gradly  
Verkhovsk (Gardes)

Ching-lan-shi

Astonsan  
temporarily

Village Kasing Jar  
Kasing Jar  
(Korean)

Village

St. Works  
Kungmin



Doc. No. 191

From M.M. Litvinov's Diary

Extracts from the

Record of the Talk with Mr. Nishimatsu,  
Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, of July 23, 1938

SHIGEMITSU: On July 11, the Soviet troops unexpectedly occupied the Chang-glu-Feng district west of Lake Chang-Chi and began to fortify it. In view of this Charge d'Affaires Nishi made a protest to Mr. Stomonyakov and demanded that an immediate evacuation of the Soviet troops from that district be effected. Stomonyakov declared the protest groundless and declined it on the basis of the Khunchun agreement and the maps attached to it.

On having studied the question the Imperial Government wired me and instructed to state the following:

According to the data founded on the agreements between China and Russia, the border is established in this region and likewise according to the data of the Zarist regime which are at the disposal of the Manchurian Government this territory belongs to Manchukuo. Besides, in the Khunchun agreement mentioned by Mr. Stomonyakov, it is said, that from letter "T" the frontier line runs north-west, follows the line of the mountains on the western side of Lake Khassan, and reaches the northern end of the sandy ridge, etc.

Therefore it is clear that the western coast of Lake Chang-Chi forms the border.

The fact that the Manchurian population have their religious rites on this mountain is another proof of this area being Manchoukuo possession.

It follows from the above that there is no doubt whatsoever that the territory belongs to Manchoukuo and the Japanese army in virtue of its obligations to Manchoukuo might take measures ensuing from these obligations

-----X-----

LITVINOV: During his conversation with NISHI, STOMONYAKOV presented quite official documents, i.e., the Khunchun Agreement and the maps attached to it.

The frontier on those maps is defined quite clearly, and the maps are signed by the Chinese representatives. On this map the frontier runs west of Lake Khassan, which you call Chang-Chi. It seems to me that the

presentation of these documents should have put an end to all sorts of talk on the subject, and I was glad to learn from the Ambassador that the Japanese-Manchurian party had studied all the documents and I expected to learn from him that the Japanese-Manchurian party had come to the same, i.e., the only possible conclusion, that the lake and the adjacent hills belong to the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the Japanese government insists upon its previous incorrect viewpoint. The Ambassador has mentioned certain data, yet he did not say what data were meant by him.

He has mentioned certain religious rites which cannot be checked upon by anybody. We know and have always considered the hill in question to be on the Soviet side of the frontier. Our border guards always discharged their duties there. Therefore we must categorically decline every protest and demand, because we are dealing with the Soviet territory, and no claims on it of another power are acceptable.

-----X-----

".....The Ambassador has mentioned certain data, that are at the disposal of both parties. We presented our data to the Japanese Embassy represented by NISHI. I am ready to present them also to the Ambassador. If the Japanese party produce their data, we are willing to study them, but so far we have only heard unfounded statements and groundless demands.

-----X-----

SHIGEMITSU: My opinion is that the Japanese government will not be satisfied with your reply. Firstly, you are speaking about the map as serving as a legal basis of the argument, but the map, which Mr. Stomonyakov showed to NISHI, had never been published, and, to my mind, at this critical moment speaking of some map is unreasonable. This will only complicate matters.

-----X-----

LITVINOV: I must say I am greatly surprised at hearing you, an old and experienced diplomat, speaking so slightly about official maps and calling them "some maps". You must know that maps are the only means of establishing frontiers.

SHIGEMITSU: "...Japan has the rights and obligations to Manchoukuo to use force and make the Soviet troops evacuate from the territory of Manchoukuo, unlawfully occupied by them.

-----X-----

LITVINOV: The Ambassador has not said anything new. The only new thing was that he threatened us with the use of force. The Ambassador



evidently considers the tactics of threats a sound diplomatic means. Unfortunately, there is quite a number of countries that are susceptible to being frightened and threatened, but the Ambassador must know that this means cannot be successfully used in Moscow.

-----  
Signed: LITVINOV

The copy is correct:

Director of the State Central Historic Record Office of the USSR.

Professor V.Maksakov.

-----X-----  
CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, KAPLAN V., hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated excerpts of the above document.

Signature: /s/ V. Kaplan  
V. KAPLAN

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-----X-----  
Signed: LITVINOV

The copy is correct:

Director of the State Central Historic Record Office of the USSR.

Professor V.Maksakov.

-----X-----  
CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, KAPLAN V., hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated excerpts of the above document.

Signature: /s/ V.Kaplan  
V.KAPLAN

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TAJANENKO G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that extract from the record of the talk of Litvinov and Stigenitsu on July 20, 1938 in Moscow concerning the Khassan Lake incident, on 10 sheets was delivered to me by the Central State Historical Records Office of the U.S.S.R. on or about 13 March, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the Central State Historical records office of the USSR in Moscow.

I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_

/s/ TAJANENKO

Lt. Col. TAJANENKO  
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan

June 24, 1946.

Ex 754  
FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM

2241-1

同志 M・M リトヴィノフ ノ 日記 ヨリ

一九三八年七月二十日モスコイ駐在 日本大使 重光

氏トノ談話ノ記録ヨリノ抜萃

重光 一 七月十一日ニソ聯ノ軍隊ハ突然 Changhai-Chi

湖西方ノ Chang-Shu-Feng 一帯ヲ占領シ之

ヲ兵燹化シ給メタ。之ニ鑑ミ、西代理大使

ハ「ストモニヤコフ」氏ニ對シ異議ヲ申立

テ、コノ地方ヨリソ聯軍隊ノ即時撤收ヲ要

求シタ。 「ストモニヤコフ」氏ハソノ抗議

ハ根據ノナイ事デアルト言明シ Kharukhu

協定及ビソノ附屬地圖ニ差キ此ノ要求ヲ拒

絶シタ。

新ニコノ問題ヲ研究シタ後、帝國政府ハ私

ニ電報ヲ打ツテ次ノ事ヲ述べル様ニト指令

シテ來マッタ。

此ノ地方ノ國境ヲ定メテキル中ソ協定ニ差

ク資料ニヨルモ、亦滿洲國政府ニアル帝政

ロシヤ時代ノ資料ニヨルモ、コノ領土ハ滿

洲國ニ屬シテキル。ソノ上「ストモニヤコ

フ」氏ノイハレタ Kharukhu 協定ニ於テハ、

丁字カラ國境ノ線ハ北西ニ走り Khasan 湖

ノ西側ニアル山脈ヲ通ツテ砂丘ノ北端ニ及

ンテキル云々、ト。

2241-2

デスカラ Ohaaga'ohai 湖ノ西岸ガ因境ヲナ  
ツテキル等ハ此ノ點カラモ亦明ラカニ看取  
セラレマス。  
箱淵ノ徑民ガ毎年彼等ノ崇敬儀式ヲコノ  
山ノ上テスルトイフ事實ハ、コノ土地ガ箱  
淵ノ所有テアレ等ノモウ一ツノ證明ニナ  
リマス。

以上ニヨリ、此ノ領土ガ箱淵ニ屬シテ然  
毛淵ニ屬スル義ヲニヨリ日本軍ハソノ義  
ヲヨリ生ズル指圖ヲトリ待ベキ等ハ疑ヒラ  
ズハ余地ガナク。

X

リライフ。ラストモニヤニフ一氏ハ西氏トノ合談ニ  
於テ空ク公式聲明テアル Ohaaga'ohai 協定ト  
稱置地圖ヲ出ツマツタ。コレラノ地圖ノ上  
テハ國境線ハ空クハツキリト確定サレテ居  
リ、支那代表ノ署名ガアリマツタ。コノ地  
圖ノ上テハ國境線ハアタナクノ籍スル Ohaaga'  
ohai 湖即チ Ohaaga'ohai 湖ノ西ヲ走ツテキマス。  
私ニハ、コレラノ地圖ノ製出ニヨツテ、コ

ノ閣下ニ臨スル會談ハスベテ終ルモノト思  
ハレマシタ。ソシテ私ハ大使カラ日、歸朝  
ハ誓類ヲ全部ヨク研究シタトキイテ嬉シク  
思ヒ、大使ガ日滿ガ可能ナル唯一ノ結諭即  
チ溯トソノ附近ノ山脈ハソコニ屬スルモノ  
トイフ我々ト同一結諭ニ到達シタト爾カシ  
テ異レルダラウト思ツテキマシタ。不幸ニ  
モ日本政府ハ前ノ間違ツタ見地ヲ圖執シマ  
シタ。大使ハ我々ノ資料ニ就イテ述ベマシ  
ダガソノ資料ガ如何ナルモノデアルカイヒ  
マセシマシタ。

彼ハ誰モ調査シ得ヌ我々ノ宗教、儀式ノ事  
ヲ述ベタノミデアリマシタ。私達ハソノ間  
題ノ正ガ國境ノソビエツト例ニアルト何時  
モサウ思ツテキタ事ヲ知ツテキマス。我が  
國境守備兵ハ常ニソコヘ派遣サレテキマシ  
タ。チスカカラ私達ハ固乎トシテスベテノ異  
議莫クシリゾケネバナナリマセシ。何故ナ  
ラバ、私達ハソビエト領土ヲ扱ツテキルノ  
ダシ、之ニ對スル他ノ強國ノ權利莫クハ永  
認出來ルモノデアナイカラデアリマス。

X

2241-3

2241-4

〃：大彼ハ爾方ノ自由ニナル爲種ノ資料ニ就キ論ベマツタ。私達ハ私達ノ資料ヲ西ニ従ツテ代表サレテ居ル日本大使館ニ提出シマツタ。私ハソレヲライツデモ閣下ニモ亦提出スル事ヲ出来マス。モソ日本側ガ其ノ資料ヲ提出スルナラバ私達ハ喜ソデソレヲ研究シマセウ。ツカシ今迄ハ私達ハタゞ根據ナキ陳述ト恣横ノナイ要求バカリヲ聞イテ居ルダケデス。

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重光。私ノ考ヘテハ日本政府ハアタノオ答ヘテハ満足シナイダラウト思ヒマス。先ヅ第一ニアタハ地圖ガコノ證據ノ法學的根據トシテ役立つテモルヤクニオツツヤツテキマス。ツカシ「ストモニヤコフ」氏が西氏ニ示サレタコノ地圖ハ未ダ嘗テ公表サレテナイッ、私ノ氣持トシテハコノ危急ノ際ニ何カノ地圖ノ事ナドモ話スノハ不合理ダト思ヒマス。ソレハ只事情ヲ複雜ニスルバカリデス。

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2241-24

“：大彼ハ爾方ノ自由ニナル環境ノ資料ニ就キ辯ベマツタ。私達ハ私達ノ資料ヲ西ニ使ツテ代表サレテ居ル日本大使館ニ提出シマツタ。私ハソレヲライツチモ閣下ニモ承提出スル事ヲ出察マス。モソ日本側ガ其ノ資料ヲ提出スルナラバ私達ハ喜ソデソレヲ研究シマセウ。ツカシ今迄ハ私達ハタゞ根據ナキ陳述ト基礎ノナイ要求バカリヲ閣下ニ居ルダケデス。

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2241-5

リク。 アナタノヤウナ熱線シタ極東豊カナ外  
交官ガ公式ノ進口ノ事ヲ「何カノ地國」ダ  
ナド、輕蔑シテオツシヤルノヲ聞イテハ全  
ク驚クヨリ外アリマセン。御存ジノ通り國  
境ヲ定メルニハ地圖ニ依ル事ガ唯一ノ方法  
デアリマス。

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譯者。 ” . . . 日本ハ滿洲國ニ對シ、不法ニ七占  
領サレタ滿洲カラソビエト軍ヲ撤退サセル  
タメ實力ヲ行使スル權利ト義ヲ持ツテキ  
マス。

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リク。 圖下ハ何モ新シイ事ハオツシイマセ  
ンデシタ。唯一ツノ新シイ事ハ彼ガ實力ヲ  
行使スルトイツテ私通ヲ脅カシタ事デス。  
大使ハ明ラカニ脅迫狀符ガ從益ナ外手  
デアルト考ヘテキマス。遺憾ナガラ世界ニ  
ハ彼カサレタリ脅迫サレタリスル國々モ多  
クアリマス。シカシ大使ハ去スゴトハ脅  
迫手段ヲハ成功出來ナイトイフ事ヲ知ラネ  
バナリマセン。

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2241-6

寫シニ聞達ヒナシ。

署名 リトヴィノフ

ソビエツト聯邦中央歴史記念保存所長

V・マクツコフ 敬授

証 明 書

2241 (CERT)

余、中佐 G. I. タラネンコ / TARARENKO G. I. / ハ社  
會主義ソビエツト共和國聯邦陸軍ノ部員ニシテ、  
茲ニ左記ノ如ク證明ス

記

一九三八年ノ昭和十三年七月二十日モスコイニ於  
テナサレタル「リトヴィノフ」及「重光」間ノ「  
ハツサン湖事件」ニ就テノ合談ノ拔萃十枚ハ、一  
九四六年三月十三日又ハ其前後ニ於テ社會主義ソ  
ビエツト共和國聯邦ノ中央國立歴史記録局ニヨリ  
余ニ引渡サレタル事、並ニ該文管ノ原本ハ在モス  
コイ社會主義ソビエツト共和國聯邦ノ中央國立歴  
史記録局ニ所在スト看ラル、事、

(署名及階級) 中 佐 タラネンコ / 署名 /

日本東京ニ於テ

一九四六年六月二十四日

DOCUMENT NO. 1992

Page 1

Affidavit of witness Chernopyatko, an eye-witness of  
the Khassan Lake of February 26, 1946.

A F F I D A V I T

OF THE WITNESS INTERROGATION

Moscow, February 26, 1946.

I, military interrogator for the U.S.S.R. in the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, Colonel Dolitsky examined and warned of the responsibility for false testimony under article 95 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code, the witness mentioned below, who testified:

Chernopyatko Ivan Davidovitch, born in 1914, in Voroshilovgradsky District, Kaganovitch region; rank-major, Hero of the Soviet Union, address:- Moscow, 5 Jamskoye Polye street; 19/21, flat 356.

The certificate of the witness duly warned of the responsibility for false testimony is attached.

In 1938 I was a platoon commander of the 59th frontier detachment.

From the 29-th of July to the 31-st July, 1938, I took part in the battles against the Japanese troops who attacked the Soviet frontier patrol on the Hill Zaozernaya.

Some time before the 29th of July 1938 for two weeks the Japanese troops were seen from the Hill Zaozernaya to be concentrating in this area, occupying the commanding hills where the artillery was being mounted and other fire nests were being built.

To my calculation by the 29th of July the Japanese had drawn up about an infantry regiment strengthened by artillery and mortars. There were 2 artillery divisions.

We, Soviet frontier troops on the Soviet part of the Hill Zaozernaya, were about 30 men. One night we heard noise and screams of women and children coming from the village Khamoki situated at the foot of the Hill Zaozernaya on the Manchurian territory. In the morning it turned out that there were no local inhabitants, and the village was occupied by the Japanese soldiers.

The Japanese carefully watched the Zaozernaya Hill and sent single scouts to our territory.

In the area of the Zaozernaya hill during the 18-th through the 20th of July, 1938 at different times our frontier outpost guards captured two local

civilians with letters from the chief of the Japanese detachment at Kuanchun addressed to the Chief of the 59th frontier detachment demanding to clear all the territory of the Zaozernaya Hill including Lake Passan, otherwise threatening to occupy this Soviet territory by force. We did not answer and went on guarding the state frontier, running atop the Zaozernaya Hill, staying all the time on the Soviet territory.

On the 29th of July 1938 at 16.30 hours the Japanese troops, 100-120 men strong made a surprise attack under the cover of fog on the adjacent Soviet frontier patrol, consisting of 11 frontier guards. We heard rifle and machine-gun fire and watched the development of fighting. Some advance movement of the Japanese on the Soviet territory on the hill Bezymyannaya, became noticeable.

The frontier guards retreated into the depth of our territory. Our reinforcement four men strong were sent out under the command of the section commander Batarshin, stopped the Japanese and after that the latter retreated beyond the State Frontier.

Shortly afterwards, 5 killed and 6 wounded soldiers of the Soviet frontier guards were brought from the hill Bezymyannaya to the place where my patrol and I were stationed. All of them were cut with sabres and had bullet wounds.

On the night of the 31st of July 1938 I was sent on a reconnaissance party into the depth of our territory for guarding the flank and rear of our disposition. About 12 o'clock at night I heard noise in the grass and Japanese speech. This was on the Soviet territory 200 meters deep of the State Frontier.

The Japanese also caught sight of us and opened fire. In a few minutes the Japanese batteries from the adjacent hills opened hurricane artillery and mortar fire on the Zaozernaya Hill.

After a short artillery preparation the Japanese troops simultaneously began attacking Zaozernaya Hill from all sides going deep into the Soviet territory everywhere. In the battle, at about 6 o'clock in the morning I was badly wounded and carried away from the battlefield, and then evacuated to the hospital.

I may testify that during the whole time of my service in the 59th frontier detachment there was not a single case of breach of the State Soviet-Manchurian frontier by the frontier guards of our detachment, in spite of a number of provocations on the part of the Japanese-Manchurian troops.

Of the participants in the defence of the Hill Zaozernaya besides Batarshin I remember the chief of the outpost Peter Fedorovich Tereshkin from Moscow now in the rank of Lt.-Col.

DOCUMENT NO. 1992

Page 3

I have nothing else to testify. My testimony has been written down and read to me, to which I sign my name

The Investigator of the Prosecutor at the International  
Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

Colonel Dolitsky.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. Menshova, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature:           /s/ Menshova

AFFIDAVIT OF WITNESS BATAKSHIN, AN EYE-  
WITNESS OF THE BATAKSHIN LAKE INCIDENT OF  
FEBRUARY 26, 1945.

EX. 756

I, military investigator for the U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo colonel of the Judicial Corps, Dolitski having duly warned of the responsibility for giving false evidence under art. 95 of the Criminal code of the R.S.F.S.R. examined the following witness, who stated:

Batarshin-Bilfen Abukharovitch born in 1914, in the Denez Basin at the Golchevskii mine. Military rank-major, hero of the Soviet Union. Address: Moscow, Bolsheya Kalujskaya ulitsa 25 flat 47.

A signed paper of the witness being warned of responsibility for giving false evidence, is attached to the minutes of the examination. In the period 1936-38 inclusive I served as section commander of 50 frontier detachment, that guarded the section of the Manchurian Soviet state frontier which included the Lake Hassan area.

From July 29 till August 12, 1938, I took part in military operations to defend the Soviet territory against Japanese armed forces, that unexpectedly attacked the Soviet frontier patrol on hills Zaozernaya and Bezjimjannaya.

Earlier on July 15, 1938, while being in the frontier patrol directly on the hill Zaozernaya I personally observed the Japanese troops concentrating in the vicinity of the Hill Zaozernaya.

In the course of 10-12 days troops and guns were brought up in trucks toward the state frontier in front of hill Zaozernaya. In my estimate in this section there were concentrated by the Japanese about 600-700 soldiers; two Japanese Batteries were mounted on each of the two hills. To these hills shells were carried daily by soldiers; the shells were passed from hand to hand as the hills did not allow any motor transportation.

At that time there were only 30 frontier guards on hill Zaozernaya. There were no other Soviet troops stationed even in the vicinity.

The concentration of Japanese forces in the area of hill Zaozernaya pursued the object of attacking the Soviet territory; not only was the concentration of troops and mounting of artillery by the Japanese itself a proof of it, but the



direct declarations of the Japanese command, made through their emissaries, as well.

Twice during this period local Manchurians were sent to our frontier guard detachment by the Japanese command and they brought letters from the commander of the Japanese detachment in which an immediate withdrawal of the Soviet frontier guards from the hill Zaozernaya was demanded. In the letters it was pointed out that hill Zaozernaya was to be occupied by the Japanese troops. A threat to start military operations against the Soviet troops in case they did not withdraw from hill Zaozernaya was added to it.

The Soviet frontier guards did not give any reply to the demands of the Japanese Command and remained on hill Zaozernaya on their territory.

On July 29, 1938, at 16 hrs. the Japanese troops suddenly attacked a neighbouring frontier guard patrol 11 man strong. There were about 100 Japanese soldiers armed with rifles, medium and light machine guns. Having attacked the frontier guards, the Japanese opened fire. The battle was taking place at a distance of 700 metres from us.

The commander of our outpost watched the battle and sent me with four frontier guards to help. Having taken a light machine gun, I approached the place of the battle and saw the following scene. All the Soviet frontier guards were lying wounded, unable to put up resistance; whereas the Japanese, with blades drawn, slashed the wounded and tried to drag some of them away on to their territory.

I immediately opened fire after which the Japanese started running towards their territory, leaving on their way, corpses and wounded frontier guards.

On the battlefield I found five corpses of our frontier guards whose bodies were slashed with blades from head to foot. The other six frontier guards were badly wounded and all of them had slashed wounds.

On the night of July 31st 1938 approximately at midnight large Japanese forces attacked hill Zaozernaya that was guarded by our frontier guard patrol.

The Soviet frontier guards had given no reasons for an armed conflict either in the abovementioned Japanese attack against hill Bezimiannaya or in this case.





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On the night of July 31st 1938 approximately at midnight large Japanese forces attacked hill Zaozernaya that was guarded by our frontier guard patrol.

The Soviet frontier guards had given no reasons for an armed conflict either in the abovementioned Japanese attack against hill Bezimiannaya or in this case.



In general I don't know of a single case of trespassing the state frontier by the Soviet frontier guards during the entire period of my service in the 59 frontier guard detachment.

According to my observations the hill Zaozernaya was attacked by approximately one infantry regiment of the Japanese forces with a simultaneous use of artillery and mortar fire.

At the moment of the attack of the Japanese forces there were about 30 frontier guards; besides there was a platoon of field forces also 30 men strong.

Until dawn we held hill Zaozernaya. During this time we suffered losses; 15-20 men killed and the rest wounded I personally, was slightly wounded and remained on duty until our units arrived.

We left the hill Zaozernaya at 6 o'clock in the morning. At that time I watched the Japanese soldiers come onto the crest of the hill and wave blades.

In the following days the Japanese soldiers were building fortifications on our territory: barbed wire entanglement, artillery and machine gun defended posts trenches, a net of firing trenches.

From August 6th 1938 our units launched an offensive and by August 12, 1938 had driven the Japanese off our territory and stopped on the former state frontier.

Of the frontier guards, who together with me defended hill Zaozernaya, I remember Ivan Chernonjatko a major at present, living in Moscow and Peter Treshkin, former chief of the frontier guard outpost, whose section included hill Zaozernaya. He also lives in Moscow and, as I have heard, has the rank of lieutenant-colonel.

I want to add that in the period during which the Japanese concentrated their forces toward the hill Zaozernaya I observed that the Japanese turned the inhabitants out of the village of Hamok which is situated at the foot of hill Zaozernaya on the territory of Manchuria and stationed their troops in it. It was approximately between July 20-25, 1938.

I have nothing else to state.



My testimony has been written down and read to me, to which I sign my name.

G. BATARSHI .

Military Investigator of the Prosecution for the U.S.S.R.  
at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

Colonel of the Judicial Corps Dolitzki

С Е Р Т И Ф И К А Т

Moscow.

February 25, 1946.

I undersigned Batarshin, Ghilfan Abubukurovich pledge to tell the truth in my testimony in the trial of the War Criminals.

I am duly warned of responsibility for giving false testimony provided for by Article 95 of the Criminal Code of the U.S.S.R.

This certificate is signed by me in the presence of Colonel of Justice Dolitzki.

G. BATARSHIN.

The certificate is taken by:

Colonel of Justice DOLITZKI,  
Military Attorney for the USSR in the International  
Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

I, KAPLAN, V.A., hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature /s/ V. Kaplan



Ex # 751

U.S.S.R. No. 185

Extract from a journal of battle actions of the Red Army General Staff concerning the incident in the Lake Hassan area in 1938.

"....On July 24, 1938 at 00.25 hours the Military Council of the front reported the situation on the frontier as it was on July 23, 1938 at 19.00 hours (see entry 482/336 of July 26, 1938)...."

On July 22 a number of violations of the frontier occurred. At 08.30 hours 10 Japanese and Manchurians armed with a light machine-gun violated the frontier 1 km. south of Hozyatwandi; at 12.50 hours on July 22 4 men in civilian clothes violated the frontier, penetrating 50 meters deep into our territory 1/2 km. northwest of Diasheli Zaozernaya. Besides, the Japanese 270 men strong were digging trenches 4 km. southeast of Tunsinachan, and a group 40 men strong deployed 600 metres west of the Zaozernaya hill. In some places the population of certain inhabited points was transferred to the points deep in the territory.

In the area 1 km. south of Kemurukuhif (west of Kenfun) a temporary stable arrangement for 100 horses was discovered at 18.00 hours on July 22.

In the area 2 km. east of Hatuheza a letter was found demanding the withdrawal from the Zaozernaya hill and threatening with serious complications if the demand is not fulfilled. On July 23, during the second half of the day the Japanese concentrated in the Kenfun Area nearly an infantry regiment. According to the report of the Posyet frontier guard detachment the Japanese during July 23 and night of July 24 concentrated on the front Zaozernaya, Kenfun, Kemurukuhi more than 3,000 Japanese troops with artillery and tanks.

On July 24 at 23.10 hours the Military Council of the Far Eastern Front reported under N 12/002881 the reconnaissance information on the concentration of the Japanese troops. According to the military observation by the frontier guards on the front of Zarechye, on the Zaozernaya hill, on the Korean and Manchoukuo territory there were about 3,800 men. The Japanese moved the population out of Homoka and Tariton. They held meetings among the population calling upon them to seize the Zaozernaya hill. A unit of the 19th Infantry division arrived and detained in Sisoevo at the station Zahve (Sikai) of the Uki-Tumen railroad.

July 25, 1938. On July 25 at 14.25 hours the Military council of the front under N 5991 reported on a number of violations of the frontier by the Japanese planes in different places and at different height. The Japanese planes penetrated 1-1/2 km. deep into our territory (in the Novo-Alekseevka area heading toward Grodekovo) 6 km. deep (in the area 2406). Heights - 4, 5, 6 metres; and at 12.50 hours a plane appeared over the town of Medvezhya at the height of 9,000 metres.

Days of the Battle in the Zaozernaya Area.--  
August 2, 1938.

At 3.12 hrs July 31, the shooting began, grenades are going off on the southern slopes of Zaozernaya hill; 4.00 hrs. the battle is going on. A company of the 118th rifle regiment with tanks attached was thrown into an attack from the direction of Podgorneya. The battalions and a tank company of the 119th rifle regiment are concentrated at hill 62.8 4 20. A group stationed between Zaozernaya and Bezymannaya hills commanded by Katnic has entered into action.

New Examples of Concentrating Japanese.

First--from the direction of Ahoguskanry in the direction of frontier mark N5 -- a battalion strong and 10 - 12 tanks for the purpose of occupying hill 80.7.

Second -- just as strong appearing on the frontier between frontier marks N7 and N8 are constructing defenses on the hills....

Situation on July 31, 24.00 hours and  
August 1, 1938, 2.00 hours.

1. The enemy supported by heavy artillery fire moving from the area Chismut - Seotsin, Homoku, hill 653, 4 town of Sirumi at 20.00 hours seized the hills 68.8; 86.8; 64.8 (all of them northeast of the Hassan lake).
3. Nearly one enemy division is concentrated in the area of the Bezymannaya hill, Homoku.
4. Nearly one infantry battalion with artillery is concentrated in the area of the town of Sirumi, Komarukuki.
5. Nearly an infantry battalion with artillery in the area of Malaya Savelovka, south slope of the Malaya Novaya hill.
6. In the area of Panzan, frontier mark N2--nearly an infantry battalion. Arrival of the enemy infantry and artillery was observed at the stations of Agotch; and Sikai. Enemy armoured trains kept heavy artillery fire from the area of Sikai.

According to the reconnaissance information of July 31;

- (a) 2 infantry columns came out of the Pogranichnaya station on July 31, at 12.00 hours. Probably these are the units of the 8th infantry division, which are transferred to Dunnin.
- (b) Infantry with artillery and tanks detrained at the stations of Sikai (Sahve) and Aodi (Agochi), strength unknown presumably new units, arriving to the north Korean ports or the units of 120th infantry division, transferred to the north.
- (c) In the actions the following units may take part on the side of the enemy; Unknown part of the 19th infantry division, stationed in the area of Eun-Chun, the 120th infantry division and new units almost a division strong, arriving from the North to the Korean ports.

Total number about 3 infantry divisions.

Battle report N II/7

Army Headquarters I.

Received 19.30 hours

August 1, 1938

Voroshilov 23.30 hours

August 8, 1938

Map 1:100,000

1. The enemy about an infantry regiment strong supported by two artillery divisions at 20.00 hours launched an offensive and at 20.00 hours July 31, 1938 seized the hills: 84, 8; 85, 2; 86, 2.

Battle Report of the Army Headquarters of  
the 1st Far Eastern Front at 16.00 hours.

August 2, 1938.

Map. 1:100,000

No. 1

the General Staff 13.15 h.

August 2, 1938.

The enemy more than infantry regiment (with artillery) strong stubbornly defends the Zaozernaya hill, and created strong flanking artillery and machine-gun fire, in this way holding up the offensive of our troops. The enemy probably plans strong defense of the Zaozernaya hill. The enemy acts in a beguiling way not putting into action its entire fire power.

Reconnaissance Reports NM 1 and 2 of the Army Headquarters Town  
of Voroshilov.

By 2.00 hours, August 8, 1938 and by 20.00 hours August 4, 1938

Map 100,000

Received at 11.20-11.50 hours and at 15.00 hours August 4, 1938

1. According to the reconnaissance reports it may be seen that: On July 30-31 about 800 cavalymen and 200 Japanese and Manchurian infantry arrived to Zhaohe from the area of Hulin, apparently these were the units of the 28th infantry division and of the 32d cavalry regiment of the Manchoukuo troops. Earlier the transferring of the 8th and 4th infantry regiments had been observed. On August 3 the 4 cavalry regiments of the 4th cavalry division arrived at the frontier in the area of Danbichzen Dalinchi. The garrison of Urnanshan consists of the 52d separate battalion and an artillery division of 3 AP. Military observation found that 350 infantrymen were deployed in Danbichzhan. 500 men of the Japanese infantry arrived there from Mishan and deployed 300 metres from the frontier.

2. On August 2 the arrival of an infantry battalion, an artillery division and 80 trucks to Bantzen was observed. Military observation found that a column of infantry, almost regiment strong and two cavalry squadrons came out of Dunnin and marched in the southern direction, at 16.00 hours the head of the column was entering Vanbabotzi. One cavalry regiment and one infantry regiment were in Hanchun. Almost an infantry regiment and an armoured motor detachment were in Satahe. An infantry battalion in Malaya Savielovka. Almost an infantry regiment with artillery in Kenhin Kemurukihi. About two infantry regiments and an

artillery regiment in Mantokasan-Zachernaya, Hotoku. The arrival of 7 echelons with Japanese troops at the station of Sahoi was observed. About thirty transport ships with military cargoes were observed to arrive to the Korean ports Yuki-Kashan-Seichin-Genzan. Some artillery in the area of the lake "Bezinyanoe", southwest of Mantokasan, the Chaochi lake and Homoku.

3. From July 22 to July 28 the 8th infantry division concentrated in the area of Pogranichnaya, Suopusan, Suanno. The units of the 2nd infantry division were observed to concentrate in the area Mudantzin-Khoan, the units of the 12th infantry division concentrated in Dumin, a motor regiment of the Guntzulin motor brigade arrived there. (This information requires verification). August 1 the arrival of 8,000 Japanese troops is observed in Dumin.

On August 3, at 10.45 hours the movement of 40 tanks is observed from "Verhnya Pad Samnaye" in the direction of the Suifunzka hill. 10 transport ships taking troops on board were observed in the Ataru port. Several transport ships sail at 12.00 hours August 4.

44 carriages arrived at the Vantzche area; 96 trucks were observed; the materials were being brought by trucks.

(p.8-10)

Correct:

CHIEF MILITARY PROSECUTION SECTION  
OF THE RED ARMY

CHIEF OF THE SECRETARIAL MAJOR OF  
JUDICIAL CORPS.

/Bobovsky/

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, V. TARKHOV, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated excerpts of the above Document.

Signature: /s/ V. Tarkhov



C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Col. TARANENKO, G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that extract from a journal of battle actions of the Red Army General Staff concerning the incident in the lake Hassan area in 1938, on 13 sheets was delivered to me by the Chief Military Prosecution Department of the Red Army on or about 13 March, 1946. and that the original of the said document may be found in the Chief Military Prosecution Dept. of the Red Army.

I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_

Lt. Col. TARANENKO /s/  
Signature and rank

Tokyo, Japan

June 14 1946.

G. # 758

Doc. No. 2243

Page 1

U.S.S.R. No. 189

Extract from the record of the talk between  
Litvinov and Shigemitsu on August 7, 1938

From

M. M. Litvinov's Diary

An Extract from the Record of the Talk with Shigemitsu  
of August 7, 1938.

As I pointed out last time, we do not object to the redemarkation of this sector. But I call your attention to the fact, that we do not mean the establishment of a new frontier, but the redemarkation of the frontier, established by the Khunchun agreement. Therefore it will be useless to commence this work unless the recognition of the Khunchun agreement with the map and the protocols attached, is set as principle of it.

The Copy is correct:

Director of the State Central Historic Record  
Office of the U.S.S.R., Professor V. Maksakov.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, (Kaplan, V), hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated excerpts of the above document.

Signature Kaplan V

G. # 758

Doc. No. 2243

Page 1

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The Copy is correct:

Director of the State Central Historic Record  
Office of the U.S.S.R., Professor V. Maksakov.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, (Kaplan, V), hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated excerpts of the above document.

Signature Kaplan V

Doc. No. 2243

Page 2

From

M. M. Litvinov's Diary

An Extract from the Record of the Talk with Shigemitsu  
of August 7, 1933.

I point out to Shigemitsu that, when we speak of the frontier, we mean the existing frontier established by the Khunchun and other agreements and it is the only frontier we can speak of.

Shigemitsu's reply is, that according to their interpretation of the Khunchun agreement, the Japanese party considers that the frontier before July 11 should be the one between Manchukuo and the U.S.S.R.

It means that the Chankhufing hill is a Manchurian territory. Therefore, it is desirable that the Soviet party should not attack the Japanese troops even if Chankhufing were now in the hands of the Japanese.

I say to Shigemitsu, I am afraid there is no use of conversing any longer and we had better discontinue the talk. We have shown the frontier on the map. The Bezimayannaya and Chankhufing hills are on the Soviet territory. We shall defend them at any cost and we shall not yield an inch. If the Ambassador does not agree with me, we had better discontinue the conversation.

The copy is correct:

Director of the State Central Historic Record  
Office of the U.S.S.R. Professor V. Maksakov.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, (Kaplan, V.), hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated excerpts of the above document.

Signature Kaplan V

Doc. No. 2243

Page 3

From

M. M. Litvinov's Diary

An Extract from the Record of the Talk with Shigemitsu  
of August 7, 1938.

I said to Shigemitsu that I wanted to take advantage of his visit in order to express my surprise at the fact that the Japanese troops continued their attacks and artillery fire after he had proposed the cessation of hostilities and I had replied that we would cease hostilities if the Japanese troops ceased their attacks and fire from the Manchurian side of the frontier. I said that we were forced to counteract and even bring our aircraft into operation. Although the Japanese attacks were repulsed, the Japanese Government was responsible for the casualties.

The copy is correct:

Director of the State Central Historic  
Record Office of the U.S.S.R. Professor V. ILKSAKOV.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, (Kaplan, V), hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated excerpts of the above document.

Signature Kaplan V

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TERENENKO G.I., a member  
of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify  
that extract from the record of the talk between Litvinov  
and Shigemitsu on August 7, 1938 on 3 sheets  
was delivered to me by the Central State Records Office of  
the U.S.S.R.

on or about 12 March, 1946, and that the original  
of the said document may be found in the Central State  
Historical Records Office of the U.S.S.R. in Moscow.

I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_

Lt. Col. TERENENKO  
(Signature and rank.)

/s/ Terenenko

Tokyo, Japan

June 24, 1946.

Doc. No. 2230

18 6 2

From the diary of  
comrade M.M. Litvinov

Extract from the Record of the Talk with  
SHIGEMITSU  
August 31, 1958

SHIGEMITSU stated that the Japanese party has no objections to setting the treaties concluded by the representatives of China and Russia as principle of the work, but the Japanese party understands that additional documents may be submitted to the committee, and they will be considered by the committee, to make its work more successful.

SHIGEMITSU said that on the whole he had no objections to leaving point 4 in the version of the Soviet party. But as to the additional documents, of which he spoke, he thought there were no objections to using them.

I stressed this only as an argument. Whether the committee would accept them or not, is for the committee to decide. SHIGEMITSU repeated that he has no objections to leaving the contents of the point 4 in its present version, but speaking of the submission of the additional documents he repeated that he meant what I said to him last time and that which results from the contents of today's talk. Thus he, SHIGEMITSU, thought that both parties understand this point in the same way.

I replied to this: "Let us hope that both parties understand this point in the same way."

Here I added that to make it clearer I would make this point more precise. The Hunchun agreement and other documents signed by the representatives of Russia and China should be necessarily considered by the committee. The Japanese and Manchurian party cannot say: "We cannot accept this or that treaty." As to the other documents submitted by one of the parties, the opposite party may say that she does not accept this or that document. In this lies the difference between the nature of the agreements signed by the representatives of Russia and China and other documents. I think I made myself clear and the Ambassador probably understood me.

SHIGEMITSU answered that he understood it in the following way: The treaties and agreements concluded between Russia and China are set up as principle of the committee work, and other additional documents are taken into consideration—this is for the committee to decide in what manner to take them into consideration. Considering all that he stated that we had no differences.

The extract is correct:

Chief of the State Central Historic Record Office of the USSR

Professor

V. Maksakov

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel Taranenko, G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that extract from the record of the talk between Litvinov and Shigemitsu on August 31, 1938 in Moscow on 2 sheets was delivered to me by the Central State Historical Record Office of the USSR on or about March 13, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the Central State Historical Records Office in Moscow.

I do further certify .....

Lt. Col. TARANENKO /s/  
Signature and rank

Tokyo, Japan

June 24, 1946.



Excerpt from "Japan's Mission in the Showa Era."

by Sadao ARAI War Minister

Published by the Social Education Association

Next we must think of a country far way, Mongolia. What kind of a region these days is Mongolia? Is it a Chinese territory --- a Russian territory --- or an independent country? Perhaps no one in the world can give a definite answer. Neither can China herself make any affirmation. If peace in East Asia is to be an important problem the will of Mongolia must, first of all, be clarified.

Japan does not want such an ambiguous area as Mongolia to exist next to her sphere of influence. Mongolia, by all means, should be Mongolia of the East, and she should be given independence, peace and tranquillity. It would be outrageous to leave her to be preyed upon by other countries. The ambiguousness of Mongolia's position will be the source of troubles of the whole East. The problem of Mongolia may become a far greater obstacle to the proclamation of the Imperial Way than the Manchurian problem. Therefore, it will be necessary to make it clear at this point, that we have a resolute determination to crush any country that turns against the Imperial Way.

Q. 76

1927

Page -

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Doc. No. 2627 A

Page 2

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO, G. I.,  
a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R. do here-  
by certify that the book "Miscellaneous People Literature"  
"Minao - Bunko" No. 516- 1933 with Araki Sadao's  
article under the title of "Japan's Mission of Showa Era"  
was taken from the Imperial Library in Tokyo.  
on or about August 20, 194 6, and that the original  
of the said document may be found in \_\_\_\_\_.

I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_.

's' Lt Col Taranenko  
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan,

23 August, 194 6.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Sokichi ISHIGURO, Chief of Section 2 of the Imperial Library do hereby certify as follows:

That the book described as,

Title: "Minshu Bunko" /Popular Library/  
from Volume No. 55 to Volume No. 71

Author and Publisher, "Shakai Kyoiku Kyokai"  
/Social Education Association/

Date of Publication, from Oct 1931 to Jan 1933

Number of Volumes: One  
Case-56  
Case-57

belongs to the possession of The Imperial Library,  
and that the book was loaned out to the International  
Prosecution Section, of the Headquarters of the  
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, at the  
request of the said International Prosecution  
Section, on the 19th day of August, 21st Year of  
SHOWA /1946/.

Signed and sealed on this 20th day of September, 21st  
Year of SHOWA /1946/, by

Sokichi Ishiguro

Doc. No. 2627 A

844  
62768  
Page 1

Excerpt from "Japan's Mission in the Showa Era."

by Sadao ARAKI War Minister

Published by the Social Education Association

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Doc. No. 2627 A

Page 2

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on or about August 20, 194 6, and that the original  
of the said document may be found in \_\_\_\_\_.  
I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_.

's' Lt Col Taranenko  
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan.

23 August, 194 6.

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Case-Shelf Miscellaneous <sup>56</sup>  
57

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Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, at the  
request of the said International Prosecution  
Section, on the 19th day of August, 21st Year of  
SHOWA /1946/.

Signed and sealed on this 20th day of September, 21st  
Year of SHOWA /1946/, by

Sokichi Ishiguro

~~850~~

761

Part 2.

EXTRACT FROM CONVERSATION ITAGAKI SEISIRO WITH  
AMBASSADOR ARITA OF 28 MAR. 1936

THE PROBLEM OF OUTER MONGOLIA

Outer Mongolia is a secret zone. The Czarist Regime had already stretched out its evil hand and had made this secret zone a protectorate.

Since the revolution the Government of Soviet Russia has adopted the same policy and succeeded in winning over this country. As is quite evident if we look at the map of East Asia, Outer Mongolia is of importance from the point of view of Japanese-Manchukuoan influence today because it is the flank defence of the Siberian Railroad which is a connecting line between Soviet territory in the Far East and in Europe.

If Outer Mongolia be combined with Japan and Manchukuo, Soviet territory in the Far East will fall into a very dangerous condition, and it is possible that the influence of the Soviet Union in the Far East might be removed almost without fighting. Therefore, the Army aims to extend Japanese-Manchurian power into Outer Mongolia by all means at hand and as its first step, to establish normal and complete diplomatic relations between Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia regarding the latter as an independent country, without considering Soviet Russian will. They are furthering their work against Western Inner Mongolia, to be explained next, to conciliate the Outer Mongolian race.

But if Outer Mongolia should set it at naught our moderate intentions as stated above and should invade Manchukuo with Soviet Russia, the Imperial Army is ready to hold fast to each foot and inch of territory with firm resolution in light of the spirit of the protocol between Japan and Manchukuo.

THE PROBLEM OF INNER MONGOLIA

Part 3.

Western Inner Mongolia (Chehar and Suiyuen Province) and the zone to the west of these are of great value for executing the continental policy of Japan.

Should the said zone be placed in the sphere of Japanese and Manchurian influence, it means that will be a base for pacification of their brothers of the same race in Outer Mongolia, moreover that the influence of Soviet Russia which comes from HSING-KIANG, as well as a land link between Soviet Russia and China, will both be blocked, fundamentally frustrating the plan of the Third International movement against China. In a passive sense the said zone will be the shield against Communization of the establishment of peace and order in Manchukuo.



If the said zone should not be placed in the sphere of Japanese and Manchurian influence, but left to natural tendencies, it is obvious that Bolshovization will immediately close in on the western frontier of Manchukuo through Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang district.

From the above standpoint the Imperial army has been furthering its work with regard to Western Inner Mongolia for several years. The conditions in the past and at present are described in a separate sheet. The Imperial Army is resolved to further its work overcoming all sorts of obstacles.

Document No. 1466

Page 1.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.I.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. 1466

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, K. Hayashi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section of Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of \_\_\_\_\_ pages, dated 1935-1936, and described as follows: Manchurian Incident -- Reference Material and Protocol on the North China Problem "1. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this

30th day of August, 1946.

(signed) K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

Witness: Nagaharu Odo (signed)

SEAL  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
30th day of Aug., 1946

Richard H. Larsh (signed)  
NAME

Witness: J. A. Curtis (signed)  
2d Lt. M.I.

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

DOC.751-C

(P 40 of original Doc)

KWANTUNG ARMY, MANCHUKUO

Staff Headquarters  
24 January, 1938

To: Gen. SUGIYAMA, War Minister  
From: Kenkichi UEDA, Commandant KWANTUNG ARMY  
NO.138 (Staff Hdqtrs, Kwantung Army, Manchukuo)  
Subject: Representation of Opinion concerning Establishment of a  
New China

In accordance to the new situation, we hereby submit to you,  
as per attached sheet, our opinion in regard to the establishment of a  
New China as seen from the standpoint of our Army.

RECEIVED: (Manchukuo-War Ministry Secret: File No. 101  
(27 January 1938, War Minister Secretariate  
(  
STAMPED: ( Military Affairs Section, War Ministry  
Perused: YOSHIDA, SHIBATA, MIYAMOTO, KAWAHIGASHI  
Perused by: Vice War Minister, UMEZU  
ODAJIMA, KAWAMURA.

DOC. 751 C

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

(Cover)

NO.5 of 20 copies

OUTLINE OF THE POLICY  
for the Establishment of a New China

HEADQUARTERS OF THE

KWANTUNG ARMY

JAN. 22, 1938

OUTLINE OF THE POLICY FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF  
A NEW CHINA

GENERAL POLICY

1. Now that a new starting point for our attitude toward the National Government has been formed by resolution of the Cabinet Council, a definite aim has already been given generally. From this point of view, we hold the unification of Japan and Manchukuo to be the fundamental policy of our Empire, and, furthermore, by cooperating with a new China we shall maintain the principle of progressing towards stabilization of East Asia. At the same time, we must not be stopped merely by forms and arrangements as belong to a centralized and unified government, but, as a first step, we must try to strengthen and connect the influential regimes existing in the various localities. Thus, by achieving unification through so-called administration of the local governments, we save the Chinese people from the maladministration of a country split by factions, and from the disaster of Bolshevization. We make it a fundamental policy to carry out an administration as will realize the co-prosperity of Japan and Manchukuo, especially the strengthening of the national defence power in time of emergency.

We especially must dispel any doubt as to our moral spirit of anti-communism and relief of the people which are desired by our Empire. We shall acquire the friendship and trust of the 400,000,000 Chinese people at home, and clear up suspicions and correct misconceptions held by the great powers abroad. At the same time we try to destroy the National Government completely by taking various measures.

GENERAL OUTLINE OF ADMINISTRATION

A Guide to the Establishment of a New China.

Although the establishment of a new China lies ultimately in organizing a central government in North China, we shall respect the wishes and conventions of the native people exclusively and make them contribute to the preparation for the fast approaching war with Soviet Russia. At the same time we shall make them concentrate on post-war adjustment made necessary by the Incident. Thus, it is our main purpose to build an ideal self-governing body of the united provinces which will be fit for the present state of affairs and suitable for the demands of national defence, peace and order, and the political situation of various provinces. Especially, we shall avoid hurrying the establishment of a centralized government as a formal so-called modern nation, adherent to the manner of Europe and America, so that we may not unnecessarily irritate the local regimes. We shall accomplish unification through the so-called administration of local governments and endeavor to achieve our purpose.

2. GENERAL OUTLINE FOR GUIDING THE ADMINISTRATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.

(a) By adopting a positive policy, accompanied by the military action of the Imperial Army, we shall cause the establishment in the various provinces of self-governing regimes, and at the same time we plan to strengthen thoroughly each powerful regime already born in Mongolia-Siankiang etc. and to invigorate the Central China regime now coming into existence. Thus, we let every regime embody national prosperity, acquiring its confidence in the Empire tranquilly, and consequently we conduct the operation so as to have the 400,000,000 Chinese people come under their own regimes gladly.

(b) Although the various local regimes shall unify their course of administration according to the policy established by the central government, the substance of it shall be limited to the mere outline. We shall have the various local regimes adopt in their administration the principle that the natives shall be given first consideration, which is appropriate to the actual conditions of the specific localities, and thus the extreme formalities shall be avoided in leading the regimes.

Especially, administration with the Japanese at its nucleus is extremely inadvisable.

c. The following articles shall be the common aim throughout the various local regimes in order to establish new China and shall be administered uniformly by the proper management, according to circumstances and relative importance.

1. The establishment of national defence and public order.
2. Stabilization of popular sentiment.
3. Improvement of national life.
4. Adoption of anti-communistic policies and pro-Japan-Manchukuan policies.
5. Intellectual movement for the exaltation of Oriental morale.

d. To each of the following articles special attention shall be paid, in view of the extraordinary situation of the local regimes.

1. Mongolia-Siankiang District.

As a base for invading Outer Mongolia and as a mutual bulwark between Japan, Manchukuo and Mongolia against communism in Ningsia and its western parts, this district shall satisfy its demands for national defence, At the same time we will not let this district fail to secure the resources for national defence while we have them (the people of this district) promote the establishment of new China in accordance with the development of Manchukuo.

2. NORTH CHINA DISTRICT

Geographically and economically, this district shall be a bond which unites Japan, Manchukuo and China, and at the same time, as a stabilizing zone at Manchukuo's back door, it shall specially satisfy the demands for its national defence and public order.

For the time being, we will try to find our market there in order to make it contribute to the expansion of the productive power of JAPAN and MANCHUKUO, besides we expect to secure the resources of national defence for the future.

3. CENTRAL CHINA

The unreasonable European and American influence, centered at Shanghai and the Yangtze River, shall be driven out and we will carry out our policy so as to try to establish the political and economic power of our Empire there.

For the present, first consideration shall be given to post-war recovery and to winning the hearts of the people.

4. South CHINA

The first principle is friendship between Japan and China and economically let it coordinate with the advance of the great powers.

- 3) ORGANIZATION OF THE NEW REGIME.

a. The new central regime shall hold sovereignty over China and by representing China centrally undertake negotiations with foreign countries. Besides, its system shall be something like a general united committee of China consisting of the representatives of the various local regimes, and, especially with regard to France, economic, communication, etc., it shall adjust the interests of the various local regimes and be responsible for the control and guidance of them.

b. Every regime shall be managed so that the organs concerned with the Japanese Army may be able adequately to lead it internally.

The duty of the Japanese navy is restricted to the sea exclusively and thus in leading the new regime we may adopt a single policy.

c. In order to make the above mentioned central control easier and more advantageous, the political system of each local regime shall have freedom in the management of official business and in the adjustment of the interests among the various local regimes. Also, it shall be appropriate to the actual conditions of the various localities. One instance of its plan is as follows:

**MONGOLIA-SIANKIANG REGIME.** We will strengthen it on the basis of the present situation and extend it to Ningxia and farther west.

**NORTH CHINA REGIME.** This governs principally the inner parts of the Great Wall and further south, the provinces of Shansi, Shantung and Hopei, respectively.

**The Liberal City of Shanghai.** Besides establishing a Shanghai in the north district of Chap, we shall set up a neutral area generally along the line of Taihu and its east to Chinshan and lead it under the power of the Empire.

**CENTRAL CHINA.** One regime shall be established along the banks of the Chongkong.

d. With regard to the leading of policy and economics, we shall try to achieve the purpose by employing Japanese advisors who have a lofty character and a wise view and fit for settling a matter properly.

Also, persons of moral influence and of pro-Japanese leanings, or young men of pro-Japanese leanings and with new ideas shall be selected and used in each regime. The former military clique and politicians shall be cleared away at one stroke and shall not be made use of.

#### 4. FINANCIAL POLICY OF THE NEW REGIME.

The financial policy of the new regime depends upon the principle of unification through the local governments and in every influential local regime (Mongolia-Siankiang, NorthCHINA, Central CHINA etc) we shall establish a bank of issue with an independent system and control it properly through the central regime.

#### 5. INTELLECTUAL POLICY IN THE NEW REGIME.

a. Intellectual policy shall be reduced, for instance, to such a unified idea as the new principle of royalty (the essential parts of its substance consist of pro-Japanese and Manchukuan ideas, the spirit of anti-Bolshevism, exaltation of eastern morals, etc. Thus, the new regime shall not fail to hold and govern the hearts of the people.

b. The system of the operation of the thought policy shall be for the present, localized according to the special conditions of the respective province of each local regime and we unify it according to intellectual content.

Hasty formal unification through societies like the New People's Society, (SHIMMIN-KAI) etc. shall be strictly avoided.

#### 6. Policy of the New Regime Towards Public Order.

The new regime does not organize a systematic army under centralized control, but, as a principle, each local regime keeps the least number of peace preservation units necessary for securing public peace.

But the Inner Mongolian Army shall be strengthened as an expeditionary army.

b. Every regime shall be managed so that the organs concerned with the Japanese Army may be able adequately to lead it internally.

The duty of the Japanese navy is restricted to the sea exclusively and thus in leading the new regime we may adopt a single policy.

c. In order to make the above mentioned central control easier and more advantageous, the political system of each local regime shall have freedom in the management of official business and in the adjustment of the interests among the various local regimes. Also it shall be appropriate to the actual conditions of the various localities. One instance of its plan is as follows:

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The Liberal City of Shanghai. Besides establishing a Shanghai in the north district of Chap, we shall set up a neutral area generally along the line of Taihu and its east to Chinshan and lead it under the power of the Empire.

CENTRAL CHINA. One regime shall be established along the banks of the Chongkong.

d. With regard to the leading of policy and economics, we shall try to achieve the purpose by employing Japanese advisors who have a lofty character and a wise view and fit for settling a matter properly.

Also, persons of moral influence and of pro-Japanese leanings, or young men of pro-Japanese leanings and with new ideas shall be selected and used in each regime. The former military clique and politicians shall be cleared away at one stroke and shall not be made use of.

#### 4. FINANCIAL POLICY OF THE NEW REGIME.

The financial policy of the new regime depends upon the principle of unification through the local governments and in every influential local regime (Mongolia-Siankiang, NorthCHINA, Central CHINA etc) we shall establish a bank of issue with an independent system and control it properly through the central regime.

#### 5. INTELLECTUAL POLICY IN THE NEW REGIME.

a. Intellectual policy shall be reduced, for instance, to such a unified idea as the new principle of royalty (the essential parts of its substance consist of pro-Japanese and Manchukuan ideas, the spirit of anti-Bolshevism, exaltation of eastern morals, etc. Thus, the new regime shall not fail to hold and govern the hearts of the people.

b. The system of the operation of the thought policy shall be for the present, localized according to the special conditions of the respective province of each local regime and we unify it according to intellectual content.

Hasty formal unification through societies like the New People's Society, (SHIMMIN-KAI) etc. shall be strictly avoided.

#### 6. Policy of the New Regime Towards Public Order.

The new regime does not organize a systematic army under centralized control, but, as a principle, each local regime keeps the least number of peace preservation units necessary for securing public peace.

But the Inner Mongolian Army shall be strengthened as an expeditionary army.



The Japanese Army stations at the spots necessary for taking counter-measures to the National Government and for securing public peace, and fortification shall be set up.

7. Policy Towards the National Government.

We are prepared for a thoroughly prolonged war against the National Government, and we shall speed up the various policies, while at the same time we plan the utter destruction of the National Government by taking all measures such as politic, diplomatic, economic and so on.

However, concerning the expansion of the area of military operations we carefully consider the matter.

8. POLICY TOWARDS THE NEW CHINA

Japan and Manchukuo will support the establishment of new China and let her assume a definite attitude. Thus in the first place we foster regimes in various localities and, in trying to adjust relations between them, we promote the growth of the new central regime and gradually we shall come to recognize it formally.

Doc. No. 1858

E. 763

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO, G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that "The Map of Mongolia from the Chinese Postal Album", on 2 sheets was delivered to me by the Director of the Moscow Lenin Library on or about March 20, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the Moscow Lenin Library.

I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_

/s/ TARANENKO  
(Signature and rank)

Tokyo, Japan,

May 22, 1946.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt.Colonel Francisco L. ...,  
a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do here-  
by certify that "The Map of Mongolia  
from the Chinese Postal Album"  
on 2 sheets  
was delivered to me by the Director of the  
Library  
on or about March 2, 1947, and that the original  
of the said document may be found in the Moscow  
Library.

I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Francisco L. ...  
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan,  
May 22, 1947.

# CHINA

## POSTAL ALBUM

POSTAL ESTABLISHMENTS AND POSTAL ROUTES  
IN EACH PROVINCE

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PEKING

DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF POSTS

1910

一 直隸省西北郵  
 二 直隸省東部  
 三 直隸省東南部

Doc 1858

# 中華郵政輿圖

## 列明各省郵務局暨各郵路


### 輿圖總目

二一	直隸省西北部	二五	湖北省東部
二二	直隸省東北部	二六	湖南省
二三	直隸省南部	二七	江西省
二四	山西省北部	二八	安徽省
二五	山西省南部	二九	浙江省
二六	河南省	三〇	福建省
二七	陝西省北部	三一	廣東省
二八	陝西省南部	三二	廣東省西部
二九	甘肅省西北部	三三	廣東省東部
三〇	甘肅省東北部	三四	廣州市
三一	甘肅省東南部	三五	廣西府
三二	甘肅省西南部	三六	廣西省
三三	新疆省東部	三七	廣西省東部
三四	新疆省西部	三八	廣西省西部
三五	東三省東部	三九	雲南省東部
三六	東三省南部	四〇	雲南省西部
三七	東三省北部	四一	雲南省東南部
三八	山東省東部	四二	青島
三九	山東省西部	四三	安徽省
四〇	山東省東北部	四四	安徽省東部
四一	山東省東南部	四五	安徽省南部
四二	四川省東北部	四六	安徽省前線
四三	四川省東南部		
四四	四川省西東部		
四五	四川省西南部		
四六	湖北省西部		

中華民國八年

交通部郵政總局印行

Doc 1858



古  
分  
**MONCO**  
EAST SECTION

例  
CONVENTIONAL SIGNS

- |   |             |                        |
|---|-------------|------------------------|
| ● | 區郵局         | District Head Office   |
| ● | 一等郵局        | First Class Office     |
| ● | 二等郵局        | Second Class Office    |
| ● | 三等郵局        | Third Class Office     |
| ● | 代辦所         | Agency                 |
| ● | 村鎮信局或村鎮郵局之類 | Rural Box Office       |
| — | 每日信件往來郵路    | Daily day-and-night    |
| — | 隔日信件往來郵路    | Bi-Daily day-and-night |
| — | 每日郵路        | Daily Service          |
| — | 隔日郵路        | Bi-daily Service       |
| — | 每三日或次數較少之郵路 | Tri-daily Service &c.  |
| — | 郵路或水陸郵路     | Postal Connection      |
| — | 界線          | Limit of Province      |
| — | 鐵路與車站       | Railway and Station    |


此圖所繪之郵路與字號之郵路距離等項均  
 遠近之標明等項  
 The actual distances between postal establishments are given in Chinese li, li  
 by water, the black figures indicate the actual distance  
 Les distances effectives entre chaque bureau sont données en li chinois, les chiffres  
 par eau, les chiffres noirs indiquent les distances effectives



PART OF  
MAP OF MANCHURIA

滿洲全圖

1754



昭和九年三月調製  
MADE IN MARCH 1934

關 東 廳  
KWANTUNG GOVERNMENT-GENERAL

Scale 1:2,500,000  
一之分万十五百二尺縮







Doc. No. 1754

Page 1

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Sokichi ISHIGURO, Chief of Section II of the Imperial Library, do hereby certify as follows:

That the book described as,

Title: "Map of Manchukuo"

Author and Publisher, Kwantung Government-General

Published in the 9th Year of SHOWA /1934/

Number of sheets: One

Case-shelf No.  $\frac{672}{69}$

belongs to the possession of The Imperial Library, and that the book was loaned out to the International Prosecution Section, of the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, at the request of the said International Prosecution Section, on the 24th day of May, 21st Year of SHOWA /1946/.

Signed and sealed on this 20th day of September, 21st Year of SHOWA /1946/ b.

Sokichi Ishiguro

Q. 765

Doc. No. 1505

Page 1.

TOHYO GAZETTE


A Monthly Report of Current Policies  
Official Statements and Statistics

Volume III

No. 1

July, 1939


Doe 1505



Disputed Border Area

Where Soviet and Japanese troops clashed recently following violation of the Manchoukuo frontier by Outer-Mongolian Communist troops.

Doe 1505



Disputed Border Area

Where Soviet and Japanese troops clashed recently following violation of the Manchoukuo frontier by Outer-Mongolian Communist troops.

No. 1

Doc 1505

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「トナシヨ—カセツ」

OFFICE

RESEARCH TO ROOM 1001


第三卷

一九三九

時事政策・公報・統計

目次

Doc 150E



No. 2

= 紛争国境地帯

外蒙古共産軍，滿洲国侵犯=次ギ最近  
日ソ両軍，衝突セシ所

## M E M O R A N D U M

ON THE PROVOCATIVE ATTACK OF THE JAPANESE IN THE NOMONGAN  
AREA IN 1939I. The nature of the aggression

Military actions in the Nomongan area, which took place on the territory of the Eastern bulge of the Mongolian People's Republic, were initiated by the Japanese and they were responsible for them. After the unsuccessful attempt to seize the Soviet territory in the lake Khasan area in 1938, the Kwantung Army Headquarters began a planned preparation for the attack against the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR). The Tantsaksky bulge of the MPR territory, east of the Khalhin-Gol river was chosen as the objective of the attack.

The Japanese and Manchurian authorities in their press bulletins claimed that the Khalhin-Gol river was the actual frontier between the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchuria in the area east and southeast of the Puir-Nur lake. This was done in order to justify their provocative and aggressive actions against the Mongolian People's Republic.

In reality, according to the official maps, the frontier between MPR and Manchuria ran in this area not along the Khalhin-Gol river, but east of this river along the line Khulet-Uliyn-Obo and Nonon-Kan Burd Obo.

This is also confirmed by Map N 43 of the Chinese album, published in 1919 in Peking by the Post-Master general of China (the copy of map N 43 was published in the central Soviet press on July 14, 1939) and by the Japanese secret outline map captured in the area of battle activities together with the Yamagata separate detachment (see Appendix N I).

From the day of the formation of the MPR the outposts of the MPR frontier corps were stationed along this line. Prior to the outbreak of the incident this frontier between MPR and Manchuria, east of the Khalhin-Gol river, had been disputed by nobody, including the Japanese and Manchurians.

Thus the claim of the Japanese and Manchurians that the frontier between the MPR and Manchuria runs along the Khalhin-Gol river is not confirmed by any documents and actually is a sheer fabrication of the Japanese military clique done with the purpose of justifying their provocative and aggressive actions.

II. The preparation of the aggression by the Japanese

The Japanese carried out all-round and thorough preparation for the attack, using their customary method of provocations. Since January 1939 the Japanese armed detachments began to systematically violate the state frontier of the MPR.

There were about thirty violations of that kind.



Simultaneously a large group of regular troops of the 23 infantry division and Bargut cavalry regiments was concentrated on the sector of the frontier in this area, which from the Mongolian side was guarded only by a small frontier outpost, stationed west of the Khalhin-Gol river (see Appendix N 3 and N 4).

In January the Japanese and Manchurians several times opened fire at the patrols of the Mongolian outpost. And in February groups of the Japanese nearly platoon strong several times crossed the frontier, penetrating deep into the Mongolian territory.

On March 17, 1939 at 13 hours the frontier guards killed a Japanese bargut on the Mongolian territory. Judging by a visiting card and a photo found on him he was a Japanese-Kawano-Kan'sira, chief of a police department of the town of Tu-Tsuan.

Seeing no back-action from the part of the MPR forces and not being satisfied that it was a mere frontier incident, the commander of the 23d infantry division lieutenant general Komatsubara Mititaro on May 1, 1939 issued order N 22 (see appendix N 5) as a guide to large-scale operations.

In this order he refers to the instructions given in "Measures of settling conflicts on the Soviet-Manchurian frontier" (see Appendix N 6). These instructions recommend to the troops to cross into the Soviet territory or to lure the Soviet soldiers onto the Manchurian territory and at all costs to try to capture prisoners of war and also the corpses of the killed and under no circumstances to leave evidence on the Soviet territory.

At the beginning of May the enemy began to act in a challenging manner. On May 11 from 4.00 to 5.00 hours the Japanese and barguts about 200 men strong armed with light machine-guns and mortars, violated the MPR frontier in the district of Nomun Khan Burd Obo, attacked the Mongolian outpost (20 men strong) and pursued them to the Khalhin-Gol river, penetrating 20 km. deep into the Mongolian territory. Simultaneously the Japanese aircraft started flying over the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic.

On May 14 at 6 hours the mounted Japanese and barguts 300 men strong violated the MPR frontier in the district of the 7th outpost, seized Jungur-Obo and came onto the eastern bank of the Khalhin-Gol river. During this day the Japanese constantly appeared over the MPR territory.

On May 15, at 12 hours 45 minutes five Japanese light bombers made a raid on the 7th outpost. They dropped 52 bombs from the height of 800 metres and fired from machine-guns during low flight. As a result 2 tsiriks were killed and 19 wounded. Prior to the raid three planes conducted air reconnaissance. The frontier guards saw that 700 cavalry men and 3 trucks with infantry soldiers were concentrated on the eastern bank of the Khalhin-Gol river. Thus beginning from May 11, 1939 the Japanese actually started hostilities using regular Japanese and Bargut units to this purpose.

All these provocative actions showed clearly that the Japanese were preparing the large-scale operations and were striving to seize the territory of the MPR.

In the second half of May 1939 the Japanese concentrated the units of the 23d infantry division, three (1, 7, 8) Bargut cavalry regiments and about 40 planes in the area of the Khalhin-Gol river. On May 28, 1939 the enemy troops suddenly attacked the MPR cavalry guard detachments on the territory of the Outer Mongolia. Thus the Japanese started large-scale military operations.

The Japanese beforehand had built a railroad line leading to the area where it was planned to begin the attack. For the purpose of carrying out the military-topographical preparation of the battle area, the Japanese as early as in the middle of April 1939 sent a topographical detachment of the Kwantung Army Headquarters to this area.

The 23d infantry division had to ensure the work of this detachment. (see Appendix " 7, order N I to the 64th infantry regiment dated April 13, 1939).

The large-scale preparatory measures taken by the Japanese for the purpose of attack in the area of the Khalhin-Gol river were vividly described in the report of the 1st Army group Military Council dated November 15, 1939, N 0037 addressed to the Chief of the Red Army General Staff. (see Appendix N 8 - extract from the said report).

In order to justify their adventurous actions before the public opinion and with the purpose of finding a pretext for the seizure of territories, the Japanese actually forged the Manchukuo frontier marking it on their topographical maps along the Khalhin-Gol river, thus moving it 18-20 km. forward. The Japanese command were striving to support by this their false statement that the MPR troops and not the Japanese forces had violated the frontier.

The documentary evidence to this provocation is contained in order N 1532 issued by UEDA, the Commanding General of the Kwantung Army, who in the second paragraph of the order, issued in Tchang-Tchung at 14 hours of June 20, 1939 said the following:

"The Army is to prepare for the rear operation in order to wipe out the army of the Outer Mongolia, which crossed the frontier" (see Appendix 9 - copy of the translation of the order to the Kwantung Army N 1532).

### III. Progress of aggression

Fulfilling the Treaty of mutual assistance between the Soviet Government and the Mongolian People's Republic and instructions given by Comrade Molotov, the head of the Government, that the Soviet Union would defend Mongolian frontier as if it were its own frontiers, the Command ordered the transferring of the Red Army units to the Khalhin-Gol river area.

During the battles which took place in May, the Japanese could not attain their aims and, having suffered great losses, strengthened their preparation for a still larger operation, striving to seize territory and wipe out the Soviet and Mongolian forces. By the end of June 1939, the Japanese concentrated all the units of the 23rd Infantry Division, part of the 7th Infantry Division, two tank regiments and Bargut cavalry regiments in the battle area. All these units were reinforced by artillery taken from other units of the Kwantung Army. Not fewer than 150 airplanes of the Japanese Air Forces were also concentrated in this area.

The enemy planned to smash our defense suddenly and quickly and to break with its main forces through to our rear lines of communication.

To carry that into effect the forces of the 23rd Division were ordered to force the Khalbin-Gol river and to capture and rout the Soviet and Mongolian troops. (see Appendix N 10, copy of the translation of order to the 23rd Division N 105, June 30, 1939).

To camouflage the expansionist aims of Japanese militarism the Japanese command used the method of political shop practice and under the cover of this directed the actions of the armed forces to realize their aggressive strivings, calling these large-scale battle actions a mere "incident on the frontier between Mongolia and Manchuria" (see Appendix N 11 - a copy of translation of the 6th Army commander declaration dated August 10, 1939).

As a matter of fact the Kwantung Army command in close contact with the command of the 6th Japanese Army did not cease the preparation for another still larger Japanese offensive in the fall of 1939.

Expansionist aims and purposes of this offensive and preparatory measures taken by the Japanese which were connected with them are documentarily proved by the declaration of the Commander of the 6th Army in September 1939 (see Appendix N 12 - a copy of translation of the 6th Army Commander's declaration in September 1939).

The enemy failed in carrying out their criminal plans. Instead of the triumphal march, which the Japanese counted upon, they paid a high price for their adventure.

The Japanese committed many atrocities, like their friends the German fascist brutes. During the battles near the Bain-Tsagan mountain political instructor Victorov, who fought bravely, was wounded. He was surrounded by the enemies and tortured to death; the brutal samurais cut out his tongue and heart, put out his eyes and stabbed him with knives.

Our troops, launching an offensive in August 1939, routed the Japanese invaders, cleared the MPR territory of the enemy and took on the defensive along the frontier line.

On September 16, 1939 the hostilities ceased in accordance with the Treaty between the Soviet Government and the Japanese Government and the order of the People's Commissar for Defense.

Appendix to the text MN 1-12.

The Red Army General Staff  
Military History Department  
Deputy Chief  
Major-General  
Correct: Signed

(Zaryatin)

March 12, 1946.

---

Page 17 of the 1st Army group Military Council on the actions in the Morongan area in 1939

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT

I, L. Tarkhov, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant in the Russian and English languages; and above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature: L. Tarkhov

Cory

APPENDIX No. 12

Translation from the Japanese.

PROCLAMATION OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE 6th ARMY

Although the order to reform the 6th Army was issued before, I must now state with sorrow that the realization of the glorious task of defense of the North-west area failed because the order was not carried out. The Army was cast into a whirlpool of irregular war on the frontier between Manchuria and Mongolia. Such control of actions on the front continued for more than ten days into the present. Due to the brave and resolute actions of all the units under lieutenant-General Kamatsubara chaos in the course of battles was diminished. Now the Army is preparing in the Dzindzin Sune area for a new offensive.

The Commanding General of the Kwantung Army decided this autumn to help us by sending the well trained troops stationed in Manchuria, he transfers them to the place of the future battle, places them under my command and plans urgent measures to be taken to settle the conflict. The circumstances are now such that it is clear that the matter is beyond the limits of a mere frontier conflict. We are now waging a sacred war in China and any changes in the conflict under the circumstances of the complicated inner and outer situation acquire great state importance. The army has only one way to carry out its actions, that is to make the army unanimous and consolidated and immediately strike a crushing blow at the enemy to annihilate its growing insolence. At present the preparation of the army is being successfully carried on. The Army will meet the coming autumn by finishing with one blow this mouse-stirring and will proudly show to the world the might of the selected Imperial troops. The officers and soldiers have a deep understanding of the present circumstances. All men of the army from privates to high level are full of brave and decisive spirit and are sure of victory. The Army is always ready to crush and destroy the enemy anywhere having a deep faith in its first marshal the Emperor. |  
September 5, 1939. The commanding General of the 6th Army.

Translated from Japanese:

Senior political instructor Pavlov Supply  
Officer of the 2-d rank Selyarinov  
September 9, 1939.

DOC. 2231

Page 7

The present copy of the translation attached to the report of the 1st Army Group Military Council of November 15, 1939 N 0037 addressed to the Chief of the Red Army General Staff on the results of the operation in the Monongan area is correct:

The Red Army General Staff  
Military History Department Research Officer

Colonel

/ Vakhterov/

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, V. Tarkhov, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature:       V. Tarkhov      

5 ex.

7. Y.Be.

EXH.#766

Doc. # 2231

CERTIFICATE

I, Maurin A.I, Chief of the Document room of the Soviet  
Division of the I.P.S. hereby certify that the map attached  
hereto was copied from the photostat map " Outer Mongolia"  
annexed to Doc. # 2231 (Exh. 766)

\_\_\_\_\_  
Maurin, A I.  
Chief of the Document Room,  
Soviet Division I.P.S.  
I.M.T.F.E.

Tokyo, Japan  
23 May 1947

**FILE COPY**  
**RETURN TO ROOM 361**

Doc 2231  
S.M. 966




圖)地家外心廣通院喇殿文經公

201



AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USSR AND  
THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN OF JUNE 9, 1940 ON THE DEMARCATED  
FRONTIER LINE BETWEEN THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC AND  
MONGOLIA PROPER IN THE NOMONGAN AREA (MAP ATTACHED)

As the result of the negotiations which were recently carried on between V. M. MOLOTOV, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR and Mister TOJO, the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, the following agreement on the precise establishment of the frontier between the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchoukuo in the area of the last year incident was concluded.

On conclusion of the agreement which is given below V. M. MOLOTOV, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs stated that the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic gave its consent to this agreement and Mister TOJO, the Japanese Ambassador stated that the Government of Manchoukuo gave its consent to this agreement.

1.

The frontier line between the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchoukuo in the above mentioned area runs as it is shown on the map published by the Red Army General Staff in 1935, scale 1:200,000, which is attached to the present agreement.

It must be understood that from the northern shore of the Buir Nur Lake, approximately 4,5 km. south-west of Khalkhin-Sume, the frontier runs along the conventionally established straight line up to Mukherobo.

From that point, crossing the rivers Urshin-Gol and Sharildgin-Gol near the obo, east of Mukherobo, the frontier runs in the north-eastern direction crossing the Bukhin Tlogoy tumulus to the point approximately 800 metres west-south-west of Ovdik-Sume;

From this point the frontier runs along the conventionally established straight line in the south-eastern direction to the western curve of the northern bend of the Khalkhin-Gol river, north-west of the town of Tsagan-Khoshu. From this point the frontier runs up the Khalkhin-gol river to the obo, approximately 8,5 km. south-west of Silin Khuduk;

From this place the frontier runs east to the obo, approximately 7 km. south west of Silin Khuduk;

From this obo the frontier runs along the conventionally established straight line in the east-south-east direction to the point, approximately 2,5 km. south of Silin Khuduk.

From this point the frontier runs south-east along the conventionally established straight line to Nomongan Burd Obo;

From Nomongan Burd Obo the frontier runs along the conventionally established straight line in the south-eastern direction to Khulat-Uliyn-Obo

Ex. # 767

DOC 2147

Page 1

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USSR AND  
THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN OF JUNE 9, 1940 ON THE DEMARCATED  
FRONTIER LINE BETWEEN THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC AND  
MONGOLIA PROPER IN THE NOMONGAN AREA (MAP ATTACHED)

As the result of the negotiations which were recently carried on between V. M. MOLOTOV, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR and Mister TOJO, the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, the following agreement on the precise establishment of the frontier between the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchoukuo in the area of the last year incident was concluded.

On conclusion of the agreement which is given below V. M. MOLOTOV, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs stated that the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic gave its consent to this agreement and Mister TOJO, the Japanese Ambassador stated that the Government of Manchoukuo gave its consent to this agreement.

1.

The frontier line between the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchoukuo in the above mentioned area runs as it is shown on the map published by the Red Army General Staff in 1935, scale 1:200,000, which is attached to the present agreement.

It must be understood that from the northern shore of the Buir Nur Lake, approximately 4,5 km. south-west of Khalkhin-Sume, the frontier runs along the conventionally established straight line up to Makhrobo.

From that point, crossing the rivers Urshin-Gol and Sharildgin-Gol near the obo, east of Makhrobo, the frontier runs in the north-eastern direction crossing the Bukhin Tology tumulus to the point approximately 800 metres west-south-west of Ovdik-Sume;

From this point the frontier runs along the conventionally established straight line in the south-eastern direction to the western curve of the northern bend of the Khalkhin-Gol river, north-west of the town of Tsagan-Khoshu. From this point the frontier runs up the Khalkhin-gol river to the obo, approximately 8,5 km. south-west of Silin Khuduk;

From this place the frontier runs east to the obo, approximately 7 km. south west of Silin Khuduk;

From this obo the frontier runs along the conventionally established straight line in the east-south-east direction to the point, approximately 2,5 km. south of Silin Khuduk.

From this point the frontier runs south-east along the conventionally established straight line to Nomongan Burd Obo;

From Nomongan Burd Obo the frontier runs along the conventionally established straight line in the south-eastern direction to Khulat-Uliyn-Obo

and then along the conventionally established straight line in the south-south-eastern direction to Iris-Uliyn Obo. From Iris-Uliyn Obo the frontier runs in the south-eastern direction along the conventionally established straight line to Kharat-Ulain Obo.

From Kharat-Ulain Obo the frontier runs south-west crossing the western intersection of the roads, approximately 8,5 km south-east of Khalkha obo and 6 km. north-north-west of Shiren obo up to the Khalkhin-Gol river; the so-called hill 872, marked on the Japanese map of the Kwantung Army headquarters, scale 1:100,000; published in 1935, is left on the territory of Manchoukuo;

From this place the frontier runs up the Khalkhin-Gol river to the mouth of the Mumurgin-Gol river;

From the mouth of the Mumurgin-Gol river the frontier runs up; to the Mumurgin-Gol river to the tributary, which is approximately 8 km. of the mouth of the said river.

From this point the frontier runs up this tributary, and when the tributary dries, the frontier runs up its bed to the place of the intersection with the frontier, marked at the attached map in the point, approximately 11 km south-west of the Rossien-Gol river mouth.

From the said point the frontier runs south and south-east up to the hill marked 1075, according to the attached map, and farther on.

NOTE: When a river serves as the state frontier, the said frontier runs along the middle of the main stream of the river.

## II

The representatives of the Mongolian People's Republic and the representatives of the Manchoukuo Government will take necessary measures in the shortest possible time to have the frontier line marked on a detailed map and to have it marked clearly on the territory itself.

The above said work must be confirmed by an agreement between the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic and the Manchoukuo Government, which will be concluded immediately the said work is accomplished.

/Drawn up in 4 copies, 2 of them in the Russian language and 2 in the Japanese language, in the city of Moscow, on June 9, 1940./

CORRECT: SIGNED

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, V. I. TARKHOV, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature: /s/ V. TARKHOV

C E R T I F I C A T E


I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO, G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that text of the agreement between the governments of the U.S.S.R. (Molotov) and Japan (Tojo) of June 9, 1940 about the line of demarcation, between Mongolian People's Republic and Manchuria in the area of the Khalhin-Gol river on 3 sheets and 1 map attached was delivered to me by the Foreign Office of the U.S.S.R. on or about March 12, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the Records Office of the Foreign Office in Moscow.

I do further certify .....

Lt. Col. Tararenko /s/  
Signature and rank


Tokyo, Japan

September 26, 1946.



КОПИЯ с карты местности топографическая, государственная, № 3. Копия of the map (scale 1:200,000) attached to the  
 (Территория Манчжоу-Го) on 8 August 1940. Molotov-Gojo Agreement of 16 June 1940  
 No. 1702/1703, dated 20/21 January 1940. on precise establishment of the frontier bet-  
 8. between the Mongolian People's Republic and  
 Manchukuo in the Momansan River area

The state frontier between the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchukuo



The state frontier between the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchukuo in the Hinggan-Aldan area prior to the agreement of June 9, 1940.

The state frontier between the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchukuo as provided by the agreement of June 9, 1940.

Scale 1:1,000,000.

Состояние государственной границы Монгольской Народной Республики и Маньчжурии в районе Хинган-Алдан до соглашения от 9 июня 1940 г.  
 Состояние государственной границы Монгольской Народной Республики и Маньчжурии в соответствии с соглашением от 9 июня 1940 г.

The copy is correct.  
 Deputy Chief of the Legal Department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR  
 Penckersky



Великий Народный Хурал Монголии  
 Протокол заседания  
 МВНМ СССР  
 1940 г.

Excerpts from the Minutes of Interrogation  
of a Defendant.

Tokyo

April 24, 1946

I, Senior Councillor of Justice Morosov, Military Investigator for the USSR in the International Military Tribunal Far East with Junior Lieutenant Petrov acting as an interpreter, interrogated: HIRANUMA, Kiichiro;

Age : 80  
Official Position prior to arrest : Prime Minister of Japan, Chairman Privy Council;  
Party Membership :  
Address :

Attached herewith the certificates of the interpreter and the stenographer bearing responsibility for incorrect translation and recording.

Interrogation began : at 9.30 Hr.  
ended : at 13.00 hr

-----X-----

Question: What aim did the Japanese Government pursue giving its approval of the Attack of the Japanese troops against the M. P. R. territory in the Nomongan area?

Answer: The attack took place not during my premiership. Therefore I know nothing about it.

Question: You were prime-minister from January 1939 till August 1939, weren't you?

Answer Yes.

Q. : When did the Nomongan Area incident take place?

A. : I don't remember.

Q. : I remind you that the attack of the Japanese troops against M. P. R. in the Nomongan area took place in May 1939, i. e., when you were prime-minister of Japan and Ueda Kenkiti was commanding General of the Kwantung Army.

A. : It might be so, but, as I have already said, the military acted independently, without reporting their actions to the government and therefore I knew nothing.

- Q. : Then when was it that you learned about the said attack?  
 A. : After the opening of the hostilities.  
 Q. : Only then?  
 A. : Yes, only after the opening of hostilities.  
 Q. : Tell us, who reported the events to you, what were the contents of the report, and why for 3 months did you not take measures to check the actions of the Japanese troops attacking the M. P. R.?  
 A. : I received information about the outbreak of the incident from War Minister Itagaki, Seishiro. I spoke about the cessation of hostilities many times, but the military circles were of different opinion.  
 Q. : Did you as Prime-minister of Japan give anybody orders that hostilities be ceased? whom and when did you give such orders?  
 Answer : As the Supreme Command of the army was not controlled by the government I could not give such orders, but I expressed, my views on the necessity of ceasing hostilities to war Minister Itagaki orally.  
 Question: Did you suggest that, because you thought the Japanese attack on M. P. R. wrong?  
 A. : My opinion was that all disputes had to be settled by means of negotiations, and not by way of military operations.  
 Q. : In other words you considered those actions wrong?  
 A. : Yes, I considered those actions wrong.  
 Q. : During the Komangan incident, did you as prime-minister submit to the Emperor your suggestion that Hostilities be ceased?  
 A. : No, I did not submit my suggestion to the Emperor.  
 Q. : What was Itagaki's reply to your suggestion of the cessation of hostilities?  
 A. : Since Itagaki's view was at variance with mine, he considered that hostilities should continue.

-----X-----

I, Senior Councillor of Justice Morosov, Investigator of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East confirm that Kuranuma, Kiichiro was interrogated by me on April 24, 1946 with Petrov acting as an interpreter and Myamlina as secretary-stenographer and that he, Kuranuma Kiichiro gave the above testimony.

Senior Councillor of Justice ---Morosov.

Interpreter ---Petrov.

Secretary, Stenographer ---Myamlina.

Attached: the certificates of the interpreter and the stenographer.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT

I, Kaplan, V. A., hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated excerpts of the above document.

Signature: /s/ V. Kaplan



何前「五」  
社今言主美共  
司級二級二司  
「下」

一九九一年/四月/二十一日

謝二第

被之訊回調書技下

Ex 768 Doc 4122A



Doc 4122A

詢問開始午後九時三十分

詢問終了午後一時

.....

問

日本政府ハ「ハルビン」地区ニ於ケル蒙古人民共和國領ニ對スル日本軍ノ攻撃ヲ認可シ如何ナル目的ヲ追求セ下クカ。

答

攻撃が行ハタノハ私、總理大臣在職中ナラナイノヲ私ハシニ就テハ何モ知ラナイ。

問

貴下ハ一九三九年/昭和十四年/一月ヨリ一九三九年八月迄總理大臣ヲ下ツタテナシカ。

答

然リ

問

「何時「ハルビン」事件ハ起リタカ。

答

私ノ記憶ニテ居ナイ。

問

「ハルビン」地区ニ於ケル蒙古人民共和國ニ對スル日本軍ノ攻撃ハ一九三九年/昭和十四年/五月即チ貴下ハ月内總理大臣ヲ下リ植田謙吉ハ関東軍司令官ヲ下ツタ時ニ起リタトヲ想起セヨ。

答

アツテ下ツカモ之ヲ下リ、併シ既ニ述ベタ獲ニ軍部ハ

No 2

Doc 4122A

問答問答問

政府ニ報告セズニ擅自ニ行動スルヲアルコトハ、  
私ハ何モ知ラナカシク

貴下ノテ攻撃ヲニ関スル何時聞知シタカ

軍ニ行動が開始セシム後下ニ

ハ、時始メテ知ラシカ

然リテ事件が開始セシム後始メテ知ラシク

此ノ事ハ誰ノ誰ノ貴下ニ報告セシカ

ソレヲ何故貴下ハ三月間モ蒙テ人民共知ス

ヲ攻撃シテ多日本軍ノ行動ヲ中止セシムベキ事

段ヲ取ラシカシタカテ遊シ

No 3

Doc 4122A

答私軍事發生、報告ニ陸軍大臣板垣征四郎、  
受テ私軍事行動、中止ニ就キ、何用ニ就キ、  
併、軍部、意見ヲ異ニシタリ。

問 貴下、日英總領事陛下トシテ、軍事行動、中止スル旨、  
何等カニ指令ヲ出シタリ、誰ニ、又何時出シタリ、

答 軍最高統帥、政府ニ隷屬シ、井、カク、下、劣  
ラ私、何等、指令ヲ出スル、出、テ、カ、併、  
軍事行動、中止、必要、口頭、及、板垣、相ニ、話シタリ、

問 斯レ忠告ヲ與ヘタ、貴下、蒙古人民、共、非、對  
スル日本軍、攻撃、カ、ト、考ヘ、カ、ラ、テ、

答 私自解、凡、紛争、問題、交渉、ニ、リ、解決、ス  
ベシ、軍事行動、以、テ、ス、カ、ト、言、フ、

問 即、云、換、貴下、是、等、行動、正、シ、キ、ト、考  
ヘ、タ、カ

4 答 然、正、シ、キ、ト

問 此、事、貴下、總領事、陛下、ニ、  
行動、中止、ス、旨、陛下、ニ、上、奏、シ、タ、リ

答 此、問題、陛下、ニ、上、奏、シ、タ、リ、

Doc 4122A

河 靈言事行動中、其下、貴下、忠告、對之、極重、何  
答 合夕力  
答 極重、自解、私、具解、下、相違、三、年、夕、一、役、公、室  
事行動、繼續、廿、日、去、り、上、老、三、年、夕、

予在京、不、忌、際、軍、事、裁判、所、審査、官、之、上、級、司  
法、願、何、官、  
又、上、日、之、通、譯、及、  
予、親、同、受、  
速、也、  
上、級、司、法、願、何、官、

「  
署名

通譯

「  
署名

速記書記

「  
署名

添附書類—通譯及速記者、署名有書

105

4122A.

書類中四二二二號

證

余、中山登、ハ余カ日本語、及  
露西語ニ精通セシ者ナルコト、並ニ露西語原文  
及ニ日本語原文ヲ対照シ、本書類ニ於テ實  
且正確ニ翻譯セルナルヲ確證セルトシ、茲ニ證ス。

署名

中山登

附訂正 昭和二十一年八月廿日 署名

(署名)

九月十二日

No. 6

Ex 769

531  
Doc. No. 2370

Page 1

Extract

from the record of the conference of the Reich Foreign Minister with ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 23 February 1941.

\* \* \* \* \*

Military, the Reich Foreign Minister continued, the Fuehrer had created a number of new formations during the winter. In the spring 240 divisions, including 186 first-class attack divisions, are available.

\* \* \* \* \*

Should Germany lose the war, the Soviet star would rise over Europe. We observe the situation in the East attentively and with supreme calm. A German-Russian conflict, however, would result in a gigantic German victory and signify the end of the Soviet regime.

\* \* \* \* \*

However, Japan, in its own interest, should come in as soon as possible. This would destroy England's key position in the Far East, Japan on the other hand, would thus secure its position in the Far East, a position which it can acquire only through war.

\* \* \* \* \*

~~(3) Should it seem to be in the interest of Japan also to secure for itself still during the war, in consideration of the coming new world order, the position it wants to hold in the Far East at the time of a peace treaty.~~ Ambassador Oshima agreed with me entirely and said that he would do everything to carry through this policy.

\* \* \* \* \*

The German Minister for Foreign Affairs continued by saying that it was Japan's friendship which enabled Germany to arm after the antikomintern pact was concluded. On the other hand, Japan was able to penetrate deeply into the English sphere of interest in China. Germany's victory on the continent does now, after the conclusion of the three-power pact, bring great advantages for Japan.

\* \* \* \* \*

Fuschl, 23 February 1941.



OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

APO 124A U.S. Army

39 March 1946

This is to certify that the photostatic copies listed below are true copies of original enemy documents which were captured by the Allied Forces under the direction of the Supreme Allied Commander and are now in the custody of the U.S. Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality:

- 1877-PS Memorandum about the conference between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, at Berlin on 29 March 1941.
- 2929-PS Memorandum about the conference between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Ambassador Oshima on 18 April 1943 at Fuschl.
- 1834-PS Foreign Office, Reich Foreign Minister, #56/R. Extract of a memorandum about a conference with the new Ambassador from Japan, Oshima, at Fuschl on 23 February 1941.
- 2954-PS Memorandum about the conference of the Foreign Minister with Ambassador Oshima on 6 March 1943.
- 2897-PS Telegram, Tokyo, dated 14 July 1941. #1217.
- 2898-PS Telegram, Tokyo, dated 13 November 1941. #2097.
- 1881-PS Memorandum about a conference between the Fuehrer and the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, in the presence of the Foreign Minister of the Reich and Minister Weissner, at Berlin, on 4 April 1941.
- 2896-PS Telegram, special train Westphalen, #707, dated 10 July 1941.
- C-75 Directive No. 24 concerning collaboration with Japan. Fuehrer Headquarters. Dated 5 March 1941.

(S-d.) GERALD SCHAEFER  
1st Lt. Inf.  
Chief, Documentation Division

7-770

7

Doc. No. 751 D

Page 1

Secret telegram, 17 Jan. 1938--KWAN SEN telegram No. 1 addressed to the Vice-Minister by the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army. (F. 13)

Regarding air-line connections between JAPAN and GERMANY general prohibition cannot be fully expected, because the publication of newspaper accounts is prohibited only as regards the negotiation itself in spite of agreement that the absolute secret should be strictly kept from other countries. Therefore, I hope that this matter will be corrected as follows, and be immediately corrected in MANCHUKUO.

(Including everything except the announcement by the Japanese Foreign Ministry relating to the regular air-line connections between EUROPE and ASIA.)

62 771

Doc. No. 571

Page 1

Telegram (code) To be kept in locked file

Special train Westfalen No. 707

10 July '41, 1451 hr.

Arrival: 10 July '41 - 1600 hours

1. Code Office AA No. 634
2. German Embassy, TOKYO

Tel. Ciphers (Secret Cipher process) for the Ambassador personally.

Please wire immediately detailed analysis of conditions there. The following items are of greatest interest:

1. What are the present relations between Japan and the United States? I had already asked you to ask the Japanese Foreign Minister of your own accord and without orders, at the next occasion, whether the recent Japanese-American conversation on rapprochement has come to naught, and, above all, in which way they were terminated. Do you think it possible that the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, NOMURA, has made any oral assurances—without any written agreement—to the American government, which could have induced Roosevelt to occupy Iceland, knowing that in the rear he has nothing to fear from Japan? ✓

Please wire at once all available information on the subject of Japan-USA. Of course I request you not to show the slightest suspicion of the Japanese Government in official conversations.

2. What was the reaction to America's occupation of Iceland on the part of Japanese public opinion in the press, and above all of important government and army circles? How is this action evaluated? Have you the impression that there could be a tendency in Japan to nevertheless pursue a very short-sighted policy, let us say by coming to terms with America, thereby entangling it in a European war for a long time in order to have a free hand in East Asia without openly clashing with America, to adjust the Chinese question and further to expand in the South? I need not emphasize that this would be an extremely shortsighted policy which would mean that Japan could miss the great historical opportunity that will never come again.

With England and America, Japan will never be able to set up a Greater East Asia; this is only possible against those two countries. The Japanese Government would be under a terrible delusion believing to be able to diplomatically barter a gigantic, historical decision such as the establishment of their position of power in East Asia from the clever English and Americans.

Out of opportunism these would perhaps make certain temporary compromises but never yield on principles, in order to attack Japan at a good opportunity, seizing from her everything she has won during the last years with the blood of her army.

3. I request a detailed report on the reaction of the Japanese government to my message to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA. I fail to understand why you have not yet reported on this in detail. As Mr. MATSUOKA told you, he intended to lay the message before the Japanese Cabinet and the Emperor. What was their reaction? Has not Mr. MATSUOKA informed you about this during your conversation? If necessary please take up this question anew with the Japanese Foreign Minister, whereby an answer to this message must, of course, be expected by us.

4. Please thank the Japanese Foreign Minister at this opportunity for having transmitted the telegram/the Japanese ambassador at Moscow. It would be good if we could receive more news from Russia in this way at regular intervals.

Summarizing, I would like to say I still have full confidence in Japan's policy and in the Japanese Foreign Minister; above all because the present Japanese government would actually irresponsibly act against the future of their nation by not seizing this unique opportunity to solve the Russian problem as well as guarantee once and for all her expansion to the south and the settlement of the Chinese problem.

Since, as the Japanese ambassador is reporting from Moscow, Russia actually faces annihilation, which tallies, incidentally, with our observations insofar as we are able to appraise the situation during the present phase of the war, it is absolutely impossible that Japan does not solve the question of Vladivostok and of Siberian sphere.

It is, of course, to our advantage that Japan intends to secure for herself further positions in Indo-China, etc. just as any expansionist measure on the part of Japan is principally welcomed by us. As to the probable and certain consequences resulting from the occupation of Iceland by American fighting forces, as well as the attitude to be taken by us towards Japan in this connection, I will send you detailed instructions within the next days. I wish to say today for your order on what to say /Speechregelung/ that the fact of American fighting forces having been sent for the military support of England, into the area of operations officially announced by us not only clearly proves the aggressive intentions of Roosevelt but that the penetration of American fighting forces into this combat area in the support of England amounts, as such, to an aggression against Germany and Europe. For it is impossible to join one of

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armies in a battle area where two armies fight each other without wishing to join in the shooting and without actually doing so. I do not doubt for one moment that in the case of an outbreak of hostilities between America and Germany Japan will stand by her obligations resulting from the Tri-Partite Pact. Even today it can be regarded as absolutely certain that America is the sole aggressor.

Besides, I request that you go on working, for the soonest possible participation of Japan in the war against Russia, as per my message to IATSUMOKA, using all the means at your disposal, for earlier this participation in the war materializes, the better it is. The natural goal must be, as before, to bring about the meeting of Germany and Japan on the Trans-Siberian railroad before winter sets in. With the collapse of Russia the position of the Tri-Partite powers in the world will be so gigantic that the question of the collapse of England, that is, the absolute annihilation of the British Isles, will be only a question of time. The occupation of those of the remaining positions of the British Empire important to the Tri-Partite Powers will then be faced by an America completely cut off from all the rest of the world.

I have the rock-like conviction that the new order as desired by us will naturally be realized and will present no more unsurmountable difficulties if the Tri-Partite Powers will then firmly hold together, countering at once every action on the part of the Americans by employing the same weapons.

In future please report as often and as detailed as possible about all developments of the political situation there.

RIBBENTROP

Note: Sent on to Embassy, Tokyo, under No. 1018  
Tel. Ktr. 10 July 1941.

Certificate

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 571.

/S/ ULRICH STRAUS

Q 773

Page 1

OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENTS CONCERNING FOREIGN RELATIONS

EIGHTEENTH YEAR OF SHOWA (1943) (JULY-DECEMBER)

BOARD OF INFORMATION

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(pp 76-79)

3. MESSAGE OF FOREIGN MINISTER MAMORU SHIGEMITSU BROADCAST TO  
BERLIN ON THE OCCASION OF THE THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF THE CONCLUSION OF  
THE TRIPARTITE PACT

September 27, 1943.

I feel it a great honour to exchange greetings personally with  
Your Excellency on this memorable day of the third anniversary of the  
conclusion of the Tripartite Pact.

The Axis Alliance aims at the establishment of justice through-  
out the world, and we are marching forward toward the fulfillment of  
our great mission with an unflinching spirit regardless of what  
happens on the way. No matter to what machinations and manoeuvres  
Britain and America may resort in order to induce the Badoglio regime  
to fresh acts of betrayal and bad faith, the Axis Alliance remains  
unshaken. The Pact of Alliance, shines forth as brightly as ever to  
illumine our road to victory.

The ardent friendship of the Fuehrer has rendered possible the  
miraculous rescue of Premier Mussolini, who, upon this auspicious  
day has become the head of the newly established Fascist Republic of  
Italy. The Japanese Government, in conjunction with the German  
Government, has immediately taken the necessary steps to recognize  
the new Government. Thus will Italy, once again under the leadership  
of Premier Mussolini, be redeemed from destruction and dishonour  
entailing upon Badoglio's unconditional surrender. We are fully con-  
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The Axis countries, as States and peoples as well as members of  
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Indeed, this war is to us no other than a war of self-defense. This  
is precisely the reason why we have steeled our determination to  
fight it through until we gain the ultimate victory. Our enemy,  
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means, military, political and economic, in his attempt to lay a

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stranglehold upon us. Even today we may see clearly in his openly declared war aims an avowal of the intention to restore a world structure which permits him to rule and dominate other nations as he will, and to eliminate the Axis Powers which obstruct his purpose. During the past three years the Axis Alliance has succeeded, often under severe ordeals, in carrying out its constructive mission. At present, in the east as in the west, we are meeting and repulsing violent counter-offensives launched by the enemy. Our Allies in Europe headed by the German Reich are gallantly defending the great European fortress. They are manifesting a matchless fighting spirit of daring and bravery for which we, Japanese, desire to pay our profound respect. On the other hand, on the various fronts of the Greater East Asia, the enemy, whose counter-attacks have been expected, is being subjected to crushing blows entailing his huge losses in men and material.

While it is well for us to renew on this memorable day our firm determination to prosecute the common war vigorously, there is no room for doubt that the realization of justice throughout the world, which is the aim of the Axis Alliance, will be fully achieved by our glorious victory.

Japan desires to carry out great constructive work based on Justice in the vast region of East Asia, designed to bring about peace and prosperity to all nations and peoples therein by dint of mutual cooperation. This policy and purpose of Japan is not only obviously just, but also embodies the natural and legitimate aspirations of the peoples of East Asia. In fact, we are now staking our very national fortune in a colossal war in order to achieve this great mission. The Anglo-Saxon Powers, who for long years past invaded Asia, reduced a major portion of it to a colonial or semi-colonial status. They have not scrupled to resort to all kinds of intrigues subjecting the Asiatic peoples to merciless exploitations. Divide et impera is their time-honoured favourite tactics. The defence of our right of existence is identical with the liberation of East Asia from the domination and exploitation of Britain and America. We must, therefore, endeavour, first of all, to eliminate the disturbing influences of the Anglo-Saxon Powers. On the other hand, Britain and America, still intent upon regaining their oldtime mastery of Asia, have deliberately provoked the present war. Although they continue to fight stubbornly, the valor and enterprise of our military and naval forces are more than equal to check their inordinate ambition.

Now at this time when the nations of the Greater East Asia are cooperating on the basis of equality and reciprocity toward the inauguration of a new era of common prosperity and well-being, China should be freed from the Anglo-Saxon yoke and she should be rebuilt and restored to Asia. Thailand should develop a powerful sovereign independent state. Burma, the Philippines and India are all entitled to the honor of independence. Thus, these Asiatic peoples would be

enabled each to enjoy its proper place. The present war is on the one hand a war for universal justice, and on the other a war for the renaissance of Asia. I cannot lay too much stress on the absolute necessity for all the Asiatic nations and peoples to fight the war to our common victory, together with our European Allies, so as to ensure our right of existence, which was so seriously jeopardized.

The spirit of Japan, who is fighting in East Asia, is the spirit of Germany and her allies fighting in Europe. It is absolutely clear that through the final victory of the Axis Powers the great aim of our Alliance to establish international justice will be completely attained.

Let me wish the health of His Excellency the Fuhrer and your noble self, and the growing prosperity of the German people.

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(pp 114-120)

11. RADIO ADDRESS OF FOREIGN MINISTER MAORU SHIGEMITSU, DELIVERED ON THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE JAPANESE-GERMAN-ITALIAN AGREEMENT

December 11, 1943

Today is the second anniversary of the conclusion of the Agreement between Japan, Germany and Italy relating to the prosecution of the common war.

As soon as Japan, accepting the challenge of America and Britain, rose in arms, on December 8 two years ago, our allies, Germany and Italy lost no time in responding to our action by forming a common war front with us. It was two years ago today that an agreement was signed between the three countries to the effect that Japan, Germany and Italy would carry with their total strength on the war forced upon them by America and Britain until it was brought to a successful conclusion, and that they would not make a truce with either one of the countries except upon a complete agreement of views among the three Powers, and further that following the victorious conclusion of the war they would in accordance with the spirit of the Tripartite Pact, cooperate and collaborate in the disposition of post-war affairs. In order to celebrate this anniversary His Majesty the Emperor today has graciously exchanged congratulatory messages with the heads of German and Italian Governments, while in the various capitals of the Axis nations, commemorative functions have been duly performed in observance of the day.

America and Britain who precipitated the war against us two years ago have recently met in conference and made known their true intentions. They declare the war aims are to conquer Japan and relegate our country to the status prior to the Meiji Restoration and

also to deprive us of our military strength which is so much in the way of accomplishing the foregoing objective. They are boasting that they would carry on the war until they have succeeded in bringing about Japan's unconditional surrender. What do they mean by relegating Japan to the status prior to the Meiji Restoration?

Asia, who with its spiritual cultures of ages had sunk into indolence and inaction, could not withstand the onslaught of America, Britain and other Powers with their superior material civilization. These countries during the past centuries invaded Asia, sweeping from the west to the east and conquering one country after another. The Arab and Islamic regions, India, Burma, the Malay peninsula, Java and even the Philippines became their colonies. Continental East Asia from the North to the South was reduced to a colonial or semi-colonial status. Thus by exploiting Asia they had built up a boundless prosperity of their own countries. In order to subjugate China they did not hesitate to wage the Opium War. And finally to subjugate Japan similarly they dispatched their navies. The British Fleet which bombarded Kagoshima, or the American Fleet under Commodore Perry which reached the Bay of Shimonoseki, had no other aim than the conquest of Japan. It is to the conditions in those days that America and Britain are now dreaming to put back Japan. Would this be really possible?

Japan by dint of her incredible efforts in the nearly one hundred years since the opening of the country has come face to face in the international arena with the world's major Powers. By developing her intrinsic capacity in parallel with the progress of the world she has been placed in a position where she must share the responsibilities for the maintenance of the peace in the world. Despite the fact that in the light of human progress the world at the present stage is too small from the economic standpoint, its resources are being monopolized by Britain and America, while other nations and peoples are made victims of their exploitation.

On the other hand, the world, when viewed politically, has by no means reached the point where it may be put under the control of any single Power, because it is still by far too large. Nevertheless, America and Britain are attempting to overreach beyond their proper domains and conquer other countries by force of arms so as to perpetuate their monopoly of the world resources and their exploitation of other peoples.

They dislike nothing more than that Japan as a Great Power should become Asia's forerunner and the guardian of East Asia. Accordingly, in order to prevent Japan, in the first place from becoming powerful and great they have resorted to all manner of machinations. The formulation of their policy of pitting China against Japan is a most notorious case in point, as is evident from the so-called Christmas Memorandum of Austin Chamberlain, British Foreign Secretary of 1926. "Divide and rule" is their favorite game, which is played under "balance of power" politics in Europe and the principles of "the Open

Door and Equal Opportunity" in China. The Anglo-Saxons have a vicious tendency to impose upon others their own principles and ideas, and to despise as heretics all those who possess a character or creed different from theirs. The world they want is a world of one color-- an Anglo-American color. The peace they want is "Pan Britanica" of old, or "Pax Anglo-Saxonica"; as it may be called today.

America and Britain, in their resolve not to permit Japan to exist as a Great Power resorted politically to their traditional policy of divide and rule and economically straight to economic war by using as weapons their monopoly of resources and their organized strength. This war had been started by them long before the Pearl Harbor.

During the past two years of the War, the forces of aggression, thanks to the irresistible might of our army and navy, have been driven out for the most part from the region of East Asia, although the task still remains of sweeping them off clean from the entire Asia. It is with the elimination of the forces of aggression that the true aspect of East Asia have come to be fully revealed. It has been concretely shown in our new China policy, and its extension--our East Asia policy. It is clearly defined in the Joint Declaration adopted and issued at the Assembly of Greater East-Asiatic Nations by the heads of the governments of our allies. The Declaration is rooted in the following five fundamental concepts.

The first is that Asia should no longer remain a colony or semi-colony of the Anglo-Saxons, but it should be delivered from alien aggression and exploitation and restored to the Asiatics.

The second is that Asia should rise again and that there should be constructed a new East Asia. In the first place, the various nations of East Asia must recover their sovereignty and independence, which should be respected by one another while political equality and economic reciprocity should prevail among them. Such is the foundation, upon which may be built international relations of neighbourliness and amity.

The third is that of safeguarding the liberated areas from being once more subjected to external aggression and exploitation.

Japan, spurred by her spirit of action and progress and imbued with the lofty ideal upon which the empire is founded, has undertaken the great task of liberating Asia. In so doing she has no other end in view than to realize a world of common prosperity and well-being, in which all peoples are enabled to enjoy, each their proper place. It would be intolerable for the peoples of East Asia if their territories which have been

liberated at no small costs should be made again the object of aggression and exploitation. We do not object to Americans in America and Europeans in Europe finding respectively their proper places and promoting common prosperity and well-being. But Asia must naturally be restored to the peoples of East Asia.

The fourth concept is that in the economic and cultural fields there should prevail freedom and the open door principle so that nations may minister to one another's needs. Accordingly we stand for free access to natural resources, freedom of communication and trade, and unrestricted cultural interchange. Freedom of the seas should also be upheld. It is along such lines as these that the life of mankind should be moulded so as to eliminate as much as possible the causes of conflict. Economic exclusionism and monopoly generate the Anglo-Saxon concept of economic war, which in turn leads to an armed clash. If war of arms is to be renounced as an instrument of policy, an economic war as an instrument of policy should be equally renounced; and the party provoking it should most properly be made to bear the burden of war-guilt.

The fifth of the concepts is that the principles of equality and reciprocity should be extended to govern international relations throughout the world.

While the nations of East Asia are to realize common prosperity and well-being in accordance with the principles of equality and reciprocity, we intend and demand the extension of these principles to the rest of the world. All nations, large or small, strong or weak, should be accorded, we believe, an equal treatment and governed by the principle of reciprocity. Likewise, we uphold the principle of racial equality.

Racial prejudice among Americans and the British is notorious as has been exemplified in the White Australia doctrine, the immigration issues the exclusion of Asiatics from South Africa, and lynching of negroes in the United States. These are not merely so many blots on civilization but constitute at the same time serious political problems. Without the abolition of racial discrimination, there can be no true liberation of East Asia, nor can there be hope for world peace.

I have explained the basic concepts that underlie the policy of the Great East-Asiatic Nations as has been enunciated to the world through their Joint Declaration. It goes without saying that upon them also are based Japan's policy. Having seen East Asia in the process of reconstruction and Asia itself about to be made free, America and Britain have made public their intention of repudiating the existence of Japan - the shield for

liberated at no small costs should be made again the object of aggression and exploitation. We do not object to Americans in America and Europeans in Europe finding respectively their proper places and promoting common prosperity and well-being. But Asia must naturally be restored to the peoples of East Asia.

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the defense of East Asia - as a Great Power, exposing thereby their long-cherished plan to crush our country. They induced Chungking to join in the Cairo Conference, and they are trying every-thing to flatter and cajole that regime so as to prevent its defection and to prolong the Sino-Japanese conflict. They have promised the regime that China would be in the future allowed to replace Japan as a great Asiatic Power. By giving a promise impossible of fulfilment, they are simply seeking to make Chungking do them the yeoman's service in their war against Japan. This action, prompted through it was by their fear of Japan's might, is a perfect exposure of their sinister design to divide and rule East Asia by creating schism and friction. America and Britain are merely setting forth in blustering terms their intentions of conquering Japan, and conquering and exploiting Asia, but indicate nothing relating to world peace as if they desired one war lead to another war. It presents an interesting contrast with the Joint Declaration adopted by the Greater East-Asia Assembly in view of the destructive character of the one and the constructive character of the other. No comment is required as to which is right and which is wrong.

Today, together with her kindred nations of East Asia, Japan is staking her national fortunes in a war for the liberation, protection and reconstruction of East Asia. She is fighting bravely with all her energy. East Asia belongs to the peoples of East Asia. This is a war for the defense of our homelands. On its outcome depends whether East Asia shall finally be delivered from the yoke of Anglo-Saxon domination, or it shall become once more colonies of America and Britain to groan forever under their ruthless oppression and exploitation. This is truly East Asia's war for independence. Indeed, it is not only East Asia's war for independence; it is a great historic war for the upholding of world justice.

With the aim to destroy the Anglo-American hegemony of the world, and to usher in a new era of an equitable and truly enduring peace Japan and Germany are conducting their campaigns with skillful planning and valiant fighting. We are achieving brilliant results while our enemies are showing unmistakable signs of dismay and anxiety. As long as our two countries together with our other allies both in Europe and Asia fight on with an absolute confidence in victory, it is clear as daylight that we shall win in the end.



Doc. No. 1217

C E R T I F I C A T E

W. D. C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I. P. S. No. 1217

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Takahashi Michitoshi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Cabinet and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of \_\_\_\_\_ pages, dated July-Dec., 1943, and described as follows: Official announcement concerning foreign relations. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Board of Information.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
30th day of August, 1946.

/s/ M. Takahashi  
Signature of Official  
SEAL

Witness: \_\_\_\_\_

Secretary of Cabinet  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
30th day of Aug, 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis  
2d Lt. M. I.

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

Doc. No. 2419-A

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November 4, --.

To Mr. ANITA:

I hear that you have at last decided to go to China, and I sincerely congratulate you on this for our country. I hope that you will display utmost activity. I wish to tell you of the ideas I have always had concerning diplomatic problems, which are set down in the separate sheet and I should like to hear your criticism of it after reading. Though I know you have been an advocate for friendship between Japan and U.S.S.R., or at least, opposed to war between these two countries, but we have never had any discussion on this problem. As I do not know whether or not your view has changed since then, I have put down in the separate sheet my view concerning this problem rather in detail.

What I have put down here is a conclusion drawn from my long-cherished view, revised somewhat later, based on both what I had acquired by reading extensively during my two years' stay in SWEDEN and what I had heard from an authority on SOVIET UNION. However, as it was dashed off at a sitting, there may be inconsistent points in my aim. At any rate, my bad style does not fully express my intentions. One of these days, when I see you in SHANGHAI or somewhere, I should like to talk to you about it again.

Though the point of my argument is rather after the fashion of Sentaro UYEDA, it is not necessarily borrowed from him, and, as the saying goes, "a virtuous gentleman admits the truth of other's statement," please kindly read through it without prejudice. Although I have abundant literature on SOVIET RUSSIA, I think that Soviet Russia, Iron Age, and Russian Revolution, written by CHAS. L. LEE, an American, are very instructive books. I am sending you a copy of Iron Age and I hope you will read it through.

Yours respectfully,

SHIRATORI

12 November, Snowa 10/1935/

Mr. ARITA

(Dear Mr. ARITA,)

Your prompt reply and comments to my humble opinion concerning diplomatic affairs is deeply appreciated. The points you have pointed out in my letter are argumentations not fully clarified or expressions a little too radical. Your opinions are highly appreciated and I will make efforts to continue the study of such affairs.

As to the U.S.S.R. problem, I have had the idea that you and I embraced opposite views but finding now, by your letter, that it is not always so, I am exceedingly pleased. I am looking forward to the opportunity of meeting you and hearing your opinion thoroughly.

Diversion of the mind as you suggested in the last part of your letter is a matter of great consideration for a statesman. In my opinion, although nobody pays any attention today to any domestic policy whatever, which politicians present, if a drastic policy towards the U.S.S.R. is sincerely established, no doubt a certain amount of success can be attained, for the present, in its negotiation with the militarists. I am not without sympathy with those who advocate domestic renovation, but nothing could be expected from the present weak-kneed right wing parties whose ideas are surprisingly shallow and crude. But if a large-scale war breaks out it may be that we will be able to discover a lead in reorganizing a sound nation just as was seen in the almost perfect control established under the liberalist, Lloyd George, in World War I.

With a war in sight, no means should be adopted which will cause an extreme agitation in the economic phase of everyday life. At the same time, during the war, capitalists and ZEBTSJ (The Financial Clique) should submit to great sacrifices. If we could find, therefore, a suitable statesman who could lead the tension of all classes of people to good advantage, an unexpected good result might possibly be produced.

My last letter, having been written only for you without taking any copies, has not been prepared to be shown to others. But you might show my last letter in private to some influential members of the SEITUKAI Party if you think it advisable, considering the above stated consideration.

One point I would like to add is that if we discuss for or against war with Russia as an abstract argument, there will be various opinions, and perhaps as you say, it is not to be considered as a problem so urgent as I think. It all depends upon the disposition of the militarists in the near future. If the militarist's policy is decided, nothing could prevent it under the present circumstances and if neither diplomats nor political parties could suppress them, why not support their policy and exert our best to carry it out? This is my conclusion.

Doc. No. 2429-

Upon my application for permission to return to Tokyo, I have been notified to postpone it at present owing to the lack of travelling expenses. I have applied again stating that I will pay my own way if need be. Outwardly, I have given family affairs to be the reason but of course, it is not a matter that requires immediate solution. As you have conjectured, it is unbearable for me to merely view the cloudy skies from a remote corner in the present internal and external situation. I know I will be the object of much criticism but I would like to go about and express my views. I will be careful not to cause trouble for the higher officials of our Office; I cannot help if they think it would be better if a parasite like me should stay away -- which may be the reason for not wanting me home.

Sincerely yours,

SHIMAZU

(~~Conf.~~ Memorandum found with letter  
 dated November 12, 1935)

1. I cannot recall but doubt the real policy of the Imperial Government as possessing any definite object. The Foreign Office should be aware that the situation prior to the Manchurian Incident had more than proved that mere formality such as "Sino-Japanese Good-Will" has none in value; while on the other hand, the militarists are only focusing their eyes on North China trying to build up a somewhat modified and neutralized Manchukuo. Notwithstanding ulterior speculation, if seen from the standpoint of the Empire itself, the propriety of such policy is undoubtedly most problematic. Intrinsically, whether it be Manchuria or the China Proper, they would fall under our Empire's sphere of influence even if left neglected, and it would have been only natural for us to utilize them within the scope of our necessities. The reason why we cannot neglect them was due to the emulation brought about by foreign influences. After all, the Manchurian Incident was no other than an effort aimed to give complete emancipation to the Manchurian-Mongolian territories from foreign influence, and that we should demand that most valid and proper cause in regard to the said incident. Therefore, our future policy towards China should be aimed solely at the exclusion of outer influences, and, excluded of the small profits which we are now confronted with. Each and every of the various projects for China should be directed towards this object and as such things as "Sino-Japanese Good-Will" "Cease in Sino-Japanese Movements," and "Advance into North China" being but mere trifles, the fundamentals must lie in the point of having China cooperate with our Empire's policy aimed at the exclusion of foreign influences.

2. Although, we may mention "exclusion of foreign influences," we, of course, do not mean the exclusion of all foreign activities in order to acquire monopolistic positions. For instance, I believe that due respects should be given to the various British, American and other legal establishments in China, and moreover, we should be so prepared as to give them willing cooperation. By excluding foreign influences from China, we do not mean to be the so-called "dog in the manger," but only in the expulsion of all influences which are harmful to China, and accordingly to Japan. Although we may say that this shall be applicable to all, regardless of what that country may be, when we take a general view, we find that the movements of the various countries in China to-day is void of that former vestige when each country had her own sphere of influences. Few still cling to the relics of the former age and, in general, they could be said to be unarmful. If Japan takes the initiative, for instance, in discarding the rights of extraterritoriality and other special rights which are perfunctory; and of having the foreign settlement removed, and foreign advisors reduced; wouldn't others be, as a whole, possible?

3. It is needless to say that, among the foreign influences that should be most expelled, is that of Red Russia. This is a question which our Empire's diplomacy must concentrate its main force in the future, and that Sino-Japanese concert must be a solution to this problem also, together with our cooperation

with the Anglo-Americans. The reason why I take interest in the European political situation is because there is the problem related to the Soviets. There are some in Japan who are being deceived by the so-called "peace policy" of Soviet Russia; who ignore the red movement in China; who are satisfied with the obedient withdrawal of Soviet troops from North Manchukuo; and who advocate that Russo-Japanese good-will should be made a principle. Moreover, there are some who maintain the recent military power of Soviet Russia as something that should not be under-rated and, harbouring fear, point out the disadvantage of clashing against Russia. This is what displeases me most. It is true that Russia wants peace at present, but there will be no folly so great as this as to judge her being turned substantially into a peaceful country. For what purpose was that five-year plan made? What are the heavy industry and the chemical industry for? And for what are the huge armament preparations for? They say they fear foreign invasion. It's nothing but a hackneyed expression used by a militaristic country. The mighty always try to use this expression. Still more, when we consider the rising generation of present-day Russia burning with a kind of fervent religious order for an ideology; that is, they feel it an honor when they can enjoin in a crusade against the so-called "Capitalism" and "Imperialism"! People may say that Lenin's ideology of world revolution is no longer upheld. In fact, when we consider the ways in which they handle their matters, they seem to be satisfied with the "one nation socialism," but there is no proof to prove that STALIN himself recognized the abrogation of his dream of world proletarian revolution which he once firmly embraced. The point is that they know their deficiency in power to carry this out. It is because they have been disappointed to find that Germany and Italy, which they tied most of their hopes on, have only learned its ways whereby the contents took opposite courses.

We know that their inner desire is no other than to see Communistic revolutions break out everywhere when repetition of damages caused by another world war flare up again. The fact that Soviet Russia, a novice, should incessantly advocate the principle of "mediation by the League of Nations" in the Italo-Ethiopian controversy is because that she desires the downfall of MUSSOLINI and hope that once again Communism will over-run the Iberian Peninsula. It is a generally agreed opinion among the intelligentsia that the economic and social conditions of Western European countries are different from those of Russia, and that it is impossible to expect communistic achievements such as those seen in Russia. The leaders of Russia may have already realized this and may have given up the plan to bolshevize Europe. Nevertheless, the 400 million people of China and the 300 million people of India have become to-day their most aimed object, and the ignorance and remoteness of the economic conditions of these people resemble closely to those of Russia, which prior to the revolution was extremely inferior. It is often said that to-day, the only place on this earth that has possibilities of giving occurrence to communistic revolution are China and India. Although, I do not necessarily believe in this, the Soviet Government today does believe in this, and there is no doubt that they are now engaged in the various manipulations. Now, for instance, let us say Russia conceded to back up a hundred steps and gave up once and for all her dream of world bolshevization.

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In that case, Soviet Russia will gradually turn into a capitalistic country, and into an absolute imperialistic state as in the time of the czar, which her present tendency clearly indicates. If not the former, then the latter. And if there is absolutely no possibility for Russia, under the present regime, to become a democratic country with peace as its principle; then it would make no difference to the fact that Russia will remain to be a troublesome neighbour of Japan. Should we remain idly by and just let her with our hands locked, she would polish her claws and teeth all the more. The situation will become such that we have to choose one of the two; either submit ourselves to bolshevization or, if not, to expose ourselves to her armed invasion. I could never agree to the policy of binding ourselves with Russia and await her to replete her powers and expanding her materialistic wings.

4. Looking at the present day power of Soviet Russia as from the standpoint of figures, it does seem to be most imposing; but, as the days are still shallow since the revolution and the dissatisfied elements still infest the countryside and shortages are still acute in implements and machineries; resources and materials, and manpower, it is clear that she will immediately sustain internal collapse once she fights against some great power. This is the unanimous opinion of those who are familiar with the actual situation. What is most desirable for Soviet Russia at present, is to have peaceful and amicable relationships with the foreign powers. Therefore, countries which border Soviet Russia and who have any pending affairs that need be settled sooner or later with her, should never idle away this opportune time of today. At present there is no country on this earth except Russia that can become a real menace to Japan. Although it seems that forgetful Japanese people do not look back to the days in the latter stages of the Shogunate era when our northern borders were invaded and plundered, and look at the dangerous stages experienced during the Russo-Japanese War, as far away dreams of the past. But, beware, those who forget the teaching of history and lack far-sighted prudence will suffer troubles in the near future. Fate have that the Slavs and the Yamato race must eventually fight each other for supremacy on the Asiatic continent. The question is not of the temporary change to be made in the state of affairs or the form of government in Soviet Russia. Thus taking a far-sighted view, I believe that adoption of a policy for an instantaneous removal of future calamity at this stage when they are comparatively impotent is a fact which should never be neglected by those who bear concern for the welfare of the people and nation. I am not saying that we should unreasonably force a war against Soviet Russia now. I am only saying that we should start negotiations with her with resolutions, not refusing war if it is inevitable, to shut her out completely from advancing into East Asia.

Firstly, Russia should give up entirely her activities of Bolshevization in East Asia; abolish military armaments in VLADIVOSTOK, etc.; complete withdrawal of her troops from OUTER MONGOLIA and HSEICHILANG, not stationing a single soldier in the area of LAKE BAILL; -- these shall be our minimum demands, and others, not to speak of the problems relative to fishing and the rights and interests regarding forestry. Problems regarding transfer of the northern half of SAHILLER at moderate prices are also included. In the

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future, purchase of the MANCHURIAN PROVINCE OF SHENSI must also be considered. These demands should be made with firm determination. There would be no possibility of success if we negotiate with such a generous attitude as was done at the negotiation on the purchase of the North Manchuria Railway.

5. Now that we have already made up our determination of not refusing war if inevitable, diplomatic measures relative to this should be treated as early as possible. Since the relationship of Germany and Poland with Russia are in a same position as ours, there is no need for us to try and specifically weave understanding with them. Once the war breaks out they will surely rise on our side. The only trouble is England. As for America, she has not even reached an understanding with England and we can control her to a certain degree. Especially, in America the present regime will be re-elected in the next term, and it could be seen that its non-intervention policy shall be maintained, at least, for the next five years. Aside from this, there is no need to give much consideration. Then how can we reach an understanding with England? This will be the most urgent question. The first step is to open a way for an understanding on problems in regard to China. For this purpose, we, of course, must slacken the pace of our China policy but, as Britain shall fully recognize Japan's position in East Asia, we need not make much concessions. The fact is that this has been what Britain desired while we, on the contrary, have been rather reluctant on the question until now. Therefore, as far as it concerns China, I believe the problem is soluble. Only that although I desire to see such Anglo-Japanese alliance of the former years be formed against Russia now, the current situation will not allow it. As for us today, we do not find it necessary. It will be sufficient if we only had their spiritual aid. Now, there is question of ENGLAND and the CENTRAL ASIA; her primary dislike for communists; and especially while there are four to five years of domination by the conservative party, it seems most favourable for England in this regard. The only fact that is unfavourable for us is that the League of Nations still exists and Soviet Russia is one of her members. The decline of the League of Nations is most desirous. Although it would be a most advantageous development for us if England goes back to her old policy of isolation, and come closer in relation with Germany, it would not necessarily be an absolute requisite.

If JAPAN should be in a position to invade SOVIET RUSSIA in co-operation with GERMANY, GREAT BRITAIN will not remain a passive spectator. But from the outset we have abandoned territorial ambitions and furthermore, since GERMANY acknowledges the status quo of the western border and has been deprived of her colonies, GREAT BRITAIN may not be too unwilling to recognize GERMANY's eastward expansion at the expense of RUSSIA. Which ever way, I do not discern much opposition from GREAT BRITAIN in our policy to SOVIET RUSSIA. The diplomacy of the Empire must exert its efforts on this point.

6. The aim of our policy toward CHINA is self-evident from the explanation stated above. The nucleus exists in a Sino-Japanese Alliance and an anti-Soviet Russia policy. JAPAN should cooperate with CHINA in having the absolute sovereignty of INNER and OUTER MONGOLIA restored, cooperate in subjugating Communist rebels, cooperate in reorganizing and strengthening the Chinese armed forces. These are within the bounds of JAPAN-GREAT BRITAIN cooperation in CHINA. Other problems are minor details and trivialities of everyday occurrence. Furthermore, since the said policy does not infringe on any existing treaties, not only will it be free from criticism viewed from international morals but a Sino-Japanese Alliance formed to confront Communism, which is the enemy of a great number of peoples in the world today, would not only draw sympathy from world opinion but even the United States would understand the sincerity of JAPAN towards CHINA and there will be a great change of general opinion as regards the Manchurian Incident. In brief, success would depend on the method of execution and preparation.

In my opinion, the atmosphere is growing tense day by day within army circles that a war with Soviet Russia sooner or later is unavoidable. The frequent troubles on the Russo-Manchurian border and various movements against OUTER MONGOLIA proves this.

If our Foreign Office considers that it can patch up affairs by makeshift means of buying up the Eastern China Railway and establishing a border committee, it is evident that we shall again encounter the bitter experience such as the Manchurian Incident. This time our opponent is great RUSSIA although she may be withered and torn. If war with RUSSIA is unavoidable, the whole nation must unite to support it.

Especially in diplomatic circles, we must be fully prepared. Under the hand-to-mouth existence of the weak-kneed cabinet, the militarists and Foreign Office are acting arbitrarily. With complication and disorder in our internal renovation movement today, what would be the outcome if a large-scaled LIU CHOU-

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KO Incident suddenly exploded. It is hoped that the Imperial Army of today would not be uncontrollable as such and at least when RUSSIA is concerned, they would not execute their plans unless the whole army is in entire accord.

Judging from a far-sighted national policy and making reference to the present international situation, if the general opinion considers that to settle the issue with RUSSIA would be most profitable, the Army and Foreign Office should at least act in harmonious cooperation. If the Foreign Office considers a peace policy toward RUSSIA would be most profitable for the country, the Foreign Office should clarify its attitude and lead the people with dignity and make provisions for a peaceful solution. Without this faith and without this courage, being afraid of the imperious militarists and letting matters take the course of least resistance is being most unloyal to our country.

Generally speaking, the diplomacy of a country must have a fundamental policy. The so-called conciliatory diplomacy was welcomed as a temporary measure in our country after the tempest of the Manchurian Incident, but upon reconsideration it was merely a slogan having no particular contents. To conciliate without selecting the opponent or offerings is like a prostitute. An upright gentleman always selects his company. A nation with a firm belief and a mission will always have friends and also enemies. Vague pacifism and internationalism without a definite object will not pass anywhere today.

It was our Empire's diplomacy before the Incident to accept seriously the momentary empty prayers of the European nations which had fully experienced the disaster and hardship of World War I and have heretofore honestly practiced them.

The HIROTA diplomacy is surely not going to revive the insensible and faithless policy of former times. But judging from the past results, only the passive phase has been applied as in conciliation with all countries, Sino-Japanese amity, and as in purchasing of the North China Railway. The denouncement of the Washington Treaty too is within the category of passive diplomacy. At least, it cannot be deemed as being a positive diplomacy. One cannot help but entertain doubt as to the objective of Japanese diplomacy by the present Foreign Office.

Conciliation is merely a means of diplomacy and is merely technical. If it is a principle, it must be thorough. Have they enough courage to return MANCHURIA to CHINA, to get reinstated in the League of Nations and to apologize to the world for the crime? Although the popular newspapers in JAPAN

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write about conciliation with the nations of the world and applaud it, why is it that there is no response abroad? Is it merely an abstract idea? It is because empty talks without substantial contents only deceive the practical western people. Even the good-natured Japanese populace will not long be satisfied. They must first understand the objectives themselves.

Discarding all abstract terms and using clear terms so that everybody can understand what the Imperial diplomacy wants and what it is going to do should be clarified. Japanese people will not be lost as to which course to take and foreign powers will clarify their attitude. It cannot be denied that the uneasiness in JAPAN at present is due to economic and social causes but the chief reason is ambiguity and uncertainty of the foreign relations. I believe it is of the utmost necessity today to clarify the foreign policy in order to settle the trend of public opinion and to sweep away the uneasiness of the people. The internal and foreign situation does not permit a day of ease. The deep reconsideration of the men who guide the national foreign policy is required.

7. (In short, at this time I keenly feel the necessity of the cabinet decision regarding the great object of the Empire's diplomacy. I believe this object to be a drastic liquidation of relations with SOVIET RUSSIA. All diplomatic activities should be concentrated on this object. I believe that the CHINA problem and the disarmament problem are secondary considerations compared to this great object. The reformation of various internal affairs should also be limited within this phase and in line with Item 1. With this great problem in mind, internal and foreign relations should be adjusted for the time being and the trend of public opinion can be settled and the uneasiness can be swept away. Moreover, it is necessary that the liquidation of relations with SOVIET RUSSIA be thoroughgoing in order to sweep away the uneasiness not only for the present but to be rid of the fears and worries from the northwest forever. Therefore, it is natural that war may be unavoidable. It is needless to say that a diplomat should not talk rashly about such matters but I believe that if we miss this opportunity today, we will never have another opportunity to oust the Slav peril forever.) If we execute this today, I firmly believe that we can accomplish it thoroughly with minimum sacrifice and with least fear of interference by third parties.

First, if SOVIET RUSSIA advances at the present pace, it will not take ten years before she will become a very powerful country which we will not be able to touch.) Even before the revolution a remarkable development of industry in RUSSIA was gradually taking place. Today, by using forced labor and ignoran

profit, and possessing inexhaustible resources and continuing mass production, so far as quantity is concerned, no other power is able to keep pace with her.

(Second, her weakness is said to lie in the manpower requisites, but Russians before the revolution have gradually died out and have been replaced by those) blind (Russians who have been inspired with communism from the kindergartens and do not know the existence of any other civilization. As time goes by, she will become so powerful in manpower also that we will not be able to overtake her.

Third, in order to eliminate the menace of RUSSIA forever, it is necessary to make her a powerless capitalistic republic and to rigidly control her natural resources. However, when the foundation of the Communist Government becomes firm, the anti-revolution movement will not easily succeed even if she should be defeated in a war with a foreign country. At present, the chances are good.)

Fourth, in various countries, the enraged feelings against the cruel and atrocious communist revolution are still ardent. The capitalistic force of America and Europe is still strong and it is most advantageous to settle the issue now when the anti-communism force is strong.

Fifth, (the international position of SOVIET RUSSIA is not firm yet. GERMANY and POLAND are burning with aspirations for UKRAINE etc. I believe that the present time, when BRITAIN, FRANCE, etc., do not desire armed interference because of not having fully recovered from the effects of the World War, is the most opportune moment.) Especially we must not miss the present opportunity when FRANCE has no close relation with SOVIET RUSSIA as at the time of the Russo-Japanese war, and has neither intention nor ability to give financial assistance to her.

Sixth, we must anticipate that at least a half or one year will elapse before hostilities with Soviet Russia will break out. At the present world situation, during that period, she cannot make ample preparations for lack of financial credit and lack of exchangeable goods. On the other hand, we can make adequate preparations. This is the reason why I consider that this moment of world depression is the most opportune moment. There are many other reasons. However, we too cannot endure too great a sacrifice. However, if our highly trained army marches against the disorderly mob of revolutionist army, it is not difficult to predict the general outcome of the war. Internal disintegration cannot be avoided and I believe we may not have to exert much effort.

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Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard V. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the attached document, IPS No. 2419, was obtained by me from the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
17 day of Sept. 1946.

/s/ Richard V. Larsh  
NAME

Witness: /s/ Wm. C. Prout

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

Doc. No. 1632BB (1)

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Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary

August 22nd, 1939 (Tuesday) - Fair.

9 a.m. Had interview with the Vice-Minister, the Chief of the Metropolitan Police, and the Director of the Police Bureau. There was a report that a Non-Aggression Pact has been concluded between Germany and Soviet Russia. Was astonished at this extremely treacherous act considering the existence of the Anti-Comintern Pact and Secret Pact.

10 a.m. Cabinet Conference, following which attended Council meeting after lunch.

7:30 Proceeded to Prince Fushimi's residence and reported matters to His Highness.

9:00 Matsui came to visit me.

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Minutes of interrogation of Oshima

Excerpts

The City of Tokyo.

April 22, 1946

I, Col. S. I. Rosenblit, Assistant Prosecutor from the USSR in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East with the Participation of Major Pas'kovsky acting as interpreter interrogated the defendant who testified:

1. Surname, first name: Oshima Hiroshi
2. Post held before arrest: Japanese Ambassador in Berlin
3. Party membership: I was no member of political parties.
4. Domicile: Tokyo, Sugamo prison.

A certificate of the interpreter for being duly warned of the responsibility for false translation is attached to the minutes of interrogation.

The interrogation is conducted in Japanese.

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Question: What was the basic aim of Germany and Japan when they concluded the anti-Comintern Pact?

Answer: The Basic aim of Germany and Japan when they concluded the anti-Comintern Pact was to arrest the growth of communism.

Question: Specifically against what countries was this Pact directed?

Answer: When this pact was concluded Russia was meant in the first place. Moreover the Pact provided for the prevention of the spread of communist influence in other countries as well.

Question: Usually such Pacts are concluded not against ideas, but against a definite country. Are we correct if we say that the anti-Comintern Pact was directed against the Soviet Union?

Answer: The anti-Comintern Pact as a whole was not directed specifically against Russia. It was directed against communism in general. However it followed from the Pact that in case of Russo-German war Japan should not aid Russia, and also that Germany should not aid Russia in case of a Russo-Japanese war."

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Question: Describe the history of negotiations carried on in 1938-1939 concerning the conclusion of a military alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy.

Answer: Approximately in June 1938 I received from the Japanese General Staff the documents which set before me a task of probing in Germany the possibility of concluding a military alliance with Japan in virtue of which Germany would be under obligation to enter into the war with the Soviet Union in case the latter attacked Japan and vice versa that Japan would be under obligation to enter into the war with the Soviet Union if the latter attacked Germany. In that time I was a military attaché. At the beginning of July 1938 I visited Ribbentrop for the purpose of probing in a private manner whether Germany had any such intentions. I told Ribbentrop that I had an idea of concluding a consultative Pact between Japan and Germany, i.e. a Pact in virtue of which in case of conflict with Russia, the party which became subject to attack should consult the other party concerning the forms of aid the latter party should render to the party which became subject to attack. Just at that time Ribbentrop was leaving as he had his summer vacation. He told me that if a military alliance was to be concluded it should be a complete but not a halfway alliance. The obligation to hold consultations is a halfway obligation and Hitler was against such halfway Pacts and therefore we could talk only about a complete defensive alliance in virtue of which the contracting parties should without reservations enter into the war with the adversary which attacked one of the contracting parties.

Secondly Ribbentrop told me that Germany would like to have a military alliance directed not only against Russia but also against the other countries which might attack Germany and Japan, namely America, France, England, etc. I told him that the extension of that Pact to other countries, besides Russia, would depend on the degree of readiness of our army and

navy for the war against those states. I told him that such an extension of the Pact would be very difficult for Japan. To this Ribbentrop replied that Germany would not ask us to do the impossible, and that all the particulars of the behavior of the contracting parties in case of such a conflict could be discussed after the conclusion of the Pact. . . . I received a telegram confirming that major-general Kasahara forwarded my message to the leading military officers. All of them concurred in the idea of concluding such a Pact and reported to the council of five ministers which consisted then of Prime-Minister Kenryo, Foreign Minister Ugaki, War Minister Itagaki, Minister of the Navy Yonai and Minister of Finance Ikeda. The Council of five ministers also approved of the idea of concluding such a Pact, and I received a telegram from the General Staff offering me to continue the negotiations concerning the conclusion of the Pact, but bearing in mind that, that the military alliance should be mainly directed against Russia and all other countries which Germany had in view should be mentioned in the Pact as minor objectives.

Through Ito we received an instruction from our government. The basic idea of that instruction was as follows: "Russia should be the main objective mentioned in the treaty, all other countries should be minor objectives, and the entry of Japan into the war against other countries could take place only if those countries were infected with communism. . . ." The divergency of views between Japan and Germany led to further negotiations marking time, and practically the Pact was not concluded in 1939. This continued till the conclusion by Germany of a Pact of non-aggression with the Soviet Union on August 23, 1939 as a result of which further negotiations concerning the conclusion of a military alliance between Germany, Japan and Italy were discontinued. . . ."

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Question: How did you inform your Government as to the course of the German-Soviet war?

Answer: Approximately at the end of July or at the beginning of August 1941 I learned about the slowing up of the pace of the advance of the German army. The advance was not proceeding according to plan. Moscow and Leningrad were not taken according to the German plan. I asked information from Ribbentrop on that

subject. Ribbentrop invited Keitel to explain the matter. Keitel told me that the slowing up of the advance of the German army was caused by the excessive length of communications and rear units lagging behind, and that that was the reason why the pace of the advance of the German army was approximately three weeks behind plan.

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Question: Do you know Nahara, press-agent of the Japanese Embassy in Berlin?

Answer: Yes, I do. He worked as interpreter in our Embassy. His father was Japanese, his mother German, he received German education, was connected with the Embassy and was lately used for radio interception work. He worked with us unofficially.

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The testimony was recorded from the words of the defendant,  
OSHIMA, Hiroshi.

Interrogated: Col Rosenblitt,  
Assistant Prosecutor from the USSR  
International Military Tribunal  
For the Far East.

Interpreter: Major Pashkovsky.

Secretary-  
Stenographer: Krjizcvskaya.

Interrogation began : 08.30  
Interrogation was interrupted: 13.00  
Interrogation continued : 17.30  
Interrogation was over : 16.40

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, A. V. Kunin, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated excerpts of the above Document.

Signature: A. Kunin

## RADIO ADDRESS BY MR. YOSUKE MATSUKA, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

September 27, 1940, 10:00 P.M.

Today on the occasion of the conclusion of the Three Power Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, an Imperial Rescript—I am profoundly moved to say—has been issued to the nation. What we, His Majesty's subjects, should do has been plainly indicated by the Prime Minister in his message. I sincerely believe that it is incumbent upon all of us to lay to heart the august will of our Sovereign and put forth our best efforts in order to surmount the current emergency.

Our country is now faced with a most difficult situation, unparalleled in its history. What step we should take at this moment is a grave problem upon which hangs the fate of our nation. The Government, keenly conscious of the gravity of its responsibilities, is seeing to it that nothing shall come amiss.

The objective of Japan's foreign policy is no other than to dispose of the China Affair, to construct a sphere of common prosperity in Greater East Asia and to contribute thereby to the establishment of true peace for the entire world. But when we look at the actual international situation, we find that this intention of Japan is not yet fully understood. There are countries which have the mistaken idea that peace means the mere maintenance of the old order, or those which, while realizing the inevitability of change, are reluctant to part with the old order. Moreover, there are countries which attempt to obstruct directly or indirectly, our construction of a new order in Greater East Asia, and even those who resort to all sorts of stratagem in order to block the path of Japan's advance toward the fulfillment of her great historic mission—that of establishing world peace. The Japanese Government has assiduously striven to remedy this regrettable state of affairs. Nevertheless, I regret to say that the situation has not only failed to improve, but it has even shown signs of aggravation in certain quarters.

Circumstances have now brought Japan to the point where she can no longer permit the international situation to drift as it will. At this juncture, there is only one course for Japan to take. That is to say, internally we should stand resolutely together—one hundred million people as one—by establishing speedily the new state structure for national defense; and externally, we should first unite with Germany and Italy which have the same aspirations and policy as ours and later with those Powers who can cooperate with us. We should thus go fearlessly forward to carry out our conviction, calling at the same time upon those Powers that obstruct us to reconsider their attitude. In such manner, the Government expects to achieve the ultimate aim of our Yamato race—namely, the establishment of a new order in East Asia.



Accordingly, we have conducted negotiation with the representatives of Germany and Italy, which have resulted in the conclusion of the Three Power Pact, made public just a short while ago.

The establishment of this historic relationship of alliance between the three countries, is, of course, due to the wisdom of our gracious Sovereign. At the same time it owes much to the judgment and decision of the eminent leaders of Germany and Italy--Chancellor Hitler and Premier Mussolini. Again, the German Foreign Minister, Mr. von Ribbentrop, has earnestly made efforts for German-Japanese cooperation from the very day he assumed his present post, while the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, having been once stationed in East Asia, and understanding fully Japan's position in East Asia, has ceaselessly labored for the promotion of Italo-Japanese friendship. Needless to say, these two foreign ministers have played important roles in the conclusion of the present pact.

The pact provides that Japan, Germany and Italy shall cooperate freely with one another toward the construction of a new order, respectively in Greater East Asia and in the regions of Europe, in which these Powers are at present engaged. It also provides that if any one of the Contracting Parties should be attacked by an outside Power, at present not involved in the European War or in the China affair, the three Contracting Powers shall render mutual assistance with all possible means, political, economic and military. Accordingly, it does not mean that because of this pact Japan is to enter the European War at present, nor that she intends to challenge any Power without provocation. It may be added also that the present treaty will not affect in any way the existing political status between Japan, Germany and Italy on the one hand and Soviet Russia on the other.

The treaty also provides that Germany and Italy recognize Japan's position of leadership in regard to the construction of a new order in Greater East Asia. We in turn recognize the leadership of Germany and Italy in the European regions where they are now engaged in the establishment of a new order, staking even their national existence in the undertaking. And thus the Three Powers are to join forces and help one another to the utmost.

With the conclusion of this treaty, Japan's responsibilities as leader of the new order in Greater East Asia becomes even greater than before. Although it is the intention of the Japanese Government to fulfill these responsibilities always by peaceful means, there is no telling whether there might not arise occasions and circumstances calling for a momentous decision on the part of our nation. Our future is beset with countless obstacles and difficulties, which, it must be fully realized, no ordinary effort will be sufficient to surmount. Our Government and people, united as one and grasping fully the situation both at home and abroad, should be prepared to endure all hardship and all sacrifices, and redouble their efforts so as to conform to the august will of our Sovereign.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I.P.S. No. 823

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Koro hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 298 pages, dated \_\_\_\_\_, 1940, and described as follows: "Foreign Office Announcements" I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Office - - - - -

Signed at Tokyo on this 13th day of September, 1946. /s/ R. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, 2d Lt Eric W. Fleisher, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 13th day of Sep, 1946 /s/ Eric W. Fleisher 2d Lt US  
NALE

Witness: /s/ Richard H. Larsh  
Investigator IPS  
Official Capacity

Secret State LetterMemorandum of the Conference between the German Foreign Minister and Ambassador OSWALD on 24 June 1942 in Berlin.

At the beginning Ambassador OSWALD said it had been his desire to inform the German Foreign Minister before the beginning of the great German offensive something about the future military plans of Tokyo. However, to his great regret he had up to now received almost no concrete account from his Government about their military plans. There was, however, no doubt that the Japanese armed forces were making similar preparations for action of great scope in line with the German operations. Whether the direction of such action would be directed against Australia, India, or Russia was not clear; he guessed it would be directed to the South, against Australia.

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Ambassador OSWALD then handed the German Foreign Minister a short note (as attached) according to which no war material had entered Russia via Vladivostok since Japan entered the war.

\*\*\*\*\*

During the further course of the conversation the German Foreign Minister in general stressed the importance of the year 1942 for our conduct of the war; he believes, as heretofore, that this year should be fully utilized by all means by adopting as daring a strategy as can be conceived.

The Japanese Navy probably still has such important tasks to solve as the strengthening of the Japanese position in Australia, the push to the Indian Ocean, securing the position facing, or in, Hawaii, as well as in the Aleutians. If new heavy blows could be administered to the Americans and English there, this would be of great importance to the joint prosecution of the war. It would be of especial importance if we could join hands somewhere in the Indian Ocean in the not too distant future. The German Foreign Minister was not aware of Japan's plans in this regard. At any rate, it is, however, important not to lose sight of the Russian question. If in view of the reorganization of shipping routes and of the consolidation of the positions thus far captured in the various seas, further maritime operations would perhaps be contemplated only at a later time. Then he was of the opinion that at any case

Russia should be tackled and the Russian enemy finally jointly disposed of in this year. It was the strength of the Tripartite powers that they had proceeded on the offensive from the outset, never waging a defensive war as England has done thus far.

Ambassador OSWIMA stated that he agreed to what the German Foreign Minister had said in every respect and asked him to be convinced that neither he nor his Government believed in conducting the war defensively but that victory could only be secured through further attacks. He had no doubt but that his Japanese armed forces were at this time preparing further operations according to a definite plan and would attack anew at an appropriate time.

The German Foreign Minister replied that the victories of Colonel General Rommel as well as the first attacks in the East and the raids of our submarines prove that this year Germany would go on attacking and he was convinced that Japan would do likewise. He added that also in future a daring strategy would be the shortest road to a victorious end of the war.

/s/ Gottfriedsen

(Forwarded to the German Foreign Minister by Ambassador OSWIMA during the conference of 24 June.)

1. Since Japan entered the war, 20 Russian merchantmen, totalling 102,000 tons, with a maximum loading capacity of 113,124 tons have entered the harbor of Vladivostok. During their voyage, these ships were searched by units of the Japanese Navy. The search revealed that the freight consisted mainly of foodstuffs, flour, sugar, vegetable oil, etc. and contained no armaments or munitions.

2. Apparently, the transport of these goods to Vladivostok was carried out in most cases after reloading in the harbor of Petropavlovsk. The occupation of the western Aleutian Islands by Japanese fighting forces will make this method very difficult in the future.

Certificate:

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 1372i.

/s/ Ulrich. i. Straus

Ex 779

Resolutions concerning the Japanese-American Negotiations  
adopted through the conferences in the Imperial presence.

- 1. Through the Imperial conference on July 2, 1941.
- 2. Through the Imperial conference on September 6, 1941.
- 3. Through the Imperial conference on November 5, 1941.

Proposition (A)  
Proposition (B)

- 4. Through the Imperial conference on December 1, 1941.

(Tavenner's Excerpt)

- 1. RESOLUTION adopted through the Imperial conferences on July 2, 1941.

A summary of the Empire's POLICY according to the changes in the situation.

I PRINCIPLE.

- a. Regardless of any change in the international situation, Japan will adhere to the principle of establishing a "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere", and accordingly contribute to the establishment of world-peace.
- b. Japan will continue the disposition of the Chinese Incident, and will step up the Southward advance in order to establish for herself a basis for self-existence and self-defence. The Northern problems will be dealt with according to the changes in the situations.
- c. Japan will remove all obstacles for the achievement of the foregoing purpose.

II SUMMARY.

- a. In order to hasten the surrender of Chiang's Regime, further pressure will be strengthened to the changes in the situations, we shall execute our rights of war against the Chungking Regime at the proper time, and shall confiscate the enemy concessions in China.
- b. For the sake of her self-existence and self-defence Japan will continue necessary diplomatic negotiations with relevant nations in the Southern regions and will also promote other necessary measures. For this purpose we shall make preparations for a war with Britain and the United States. First, we shall accomplish the execution of our schemes against French Indo-China and Thailand following the "Principle Policy toward French Indo-China and Thailand," and "Matters concerning the Promotion

Document No. 1652

Page 1A

of our Southern Policy," thereby stabilizing our structure for the Southern advance. In order to achieve the above-mentioned purpose, Japan will be ready for a war with Britain and the United States.

c Though the spirit of the tripartite axis will form the keynote of our attitude toward the German-Soviet War, we shall not intervene for a while, but take voluntary measures to secretly preparing arms against the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, diplomatic negotiations will be continued with detailed precautions; and should the conditions of the German-Soviet war progress favorable to Japan we shall execute arms to solve the northern problems, thereby securing stability in the Northern regions.

d In the accomplishment of the above, all measures, especially in the case of execution of arms, must be decided so that there will be no great difficulty in maintaining our basic posture for a war with Britain and the United States.

e We shall do our utmost in preventing the United States participation in the War through diplomatic measures in the pre-arranged programmes, and every other possible way, but in case she should participate, Japan will act according to the Tripartite Pact. However, the time and method of military action will be decided independently.

f We shall shift promptly to the complete stabilization of internal war-time structures, particularly we shall strive for the stabilization of national defense.

g As to the definite measures we shall decide separately.  
(End Tavenor's excerpt)

2. RESOLUTION adopted through the Imperial conference on Sept.6,1941.

Summary: Execution of the Empire's Policy.

In view of the present acute situation, especially the aggressive movements the United States, Britain and the Netherlands have assumed; the situation of Soviet Russia; and the suppression of our national power; Japan will execute her Southern advance policy, related in the "Principle of Japan's Policy According to the Change of Situations," as follows:

a In order to secure self-existence and self-defence, Japan, with a determination for a war with the United States (Britain and the Netherlands), will have completed her preparations by the end of October.

b Meanwhile, in pace with the above, Japan will strive for the fulfillment of her demands through diplomatic measures with the United States and Britain.

The minimum matters of demand to be accomplished in Japan's negotiations with the United States (Britain), and the limit Japan is able to come to an agreement in this connection will be stated on another sheet.

c Though the spirit of the tripartite axis will form the keynote of our attitude toward the German-Soviet War, we shall not intervene for a while, but take voluntary measures b secretly preparing arms against the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, diplomatic negotiations will be continued with detailed precautions; and should the conditions of the German-Soviet war progress favourable to Japan we shall execute arms to solve the northern problems, thereby securing stability in the Northern regions.

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b Meanwhile, in pace with the above, Japan will strive for the fulfillment of her demands through diplomatic measures with the United States and Britain.

The minimum matters of demand to be accomplished in Japan's negotiations with the United States (Britain), and the limit Japan is able to come to an agreement in this connection will be stated on another sheet.



c If, through the above negotiations, our demands have no hope of fulfillment by the beginning of October, we shall immediately determine to wage war against the United States (Britain and the Netherlands.)

All measures, save for those concerned with the South, will be executed according to the pre-arranged national policy, and we shall particularly endeavour to check the formation of a Russo-American combined front against Japan.

ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Japan's minimum demand to be fulfilled in her negotiations with the United States (Britain), and the limit Japan is able to come to an agreement in this connection.

Sect. I. Japan's minimum-demand to be fulfilled in her negotiations with the United States (Britain).

(1) Matters concerning the CHINESE INCIDENT.

The United States and Britain will neither meddle in nor interrupt the disposition of the Chinese Incident.

a They will not interrupt Japan's attempt to settle the Incident in accordance with the Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty and the Japan-Manchoukuo-China Tripartite Joint Declaration.

b "Burma Route" will be closed; and the United States and Britain will give Chiang's Regime neither military nor economic support.

REMARKS -- The above does not obstruct Japan's existing contentions in the disposition of the Chinese Incident in Plan N. However, particularly regarding the stationing of the Imperial forces under the new arrangements made between Japan and China, we shall adhere to its necessity.

Following the settlement of the incident, we may assert that we have the intention of withdrawing, as a rule, all other forces except those mentioned above that have been sent to China for the disposal of the Chinese Incident.

It may also be affirmed that Japan has no intention to place any restrictions on American or British interests in China, provided that they will understand the new East Asia, and act accordingly.

(2) Matters concerning the security of Japan's national defence.

The United States and Britain will not take such action in the Far East as to threaten Japan's national defence.

a Recognition of the special relations existing between Japan and France based on the Japan-French Agreement.

b They will not establish any military interests in Thailand, Dutch East-India, China and far-eastern Soviet territory.

c They will not further strengthen their present armaments in the Far East.

(3) Matters concerning Japan's obtaining necessary materials.

The United States and Britain will cooperate with Japan in obtaining her necessary resources.

a They will restore their commercial relations with Japan and will supply Japan from their territories in the South-Western Pacific, with resources indispensable for her self-existence.

b They will gladly collaborate in Japan's economic cooperation with Thailand and French Indo-China.

Sect. II. The Limit Japan is able to come to an agreement.

If the United States and Britain will consent to our demands in Section I:

(1) Japan, with French Indo-China as a base, will make no military advances into any of the adjacent areas except China.

(2) Japan will be ready to withdraw her troops from French Indo-China after an impartial peace will have been established in the Far East.

(3) Japan will be ready to guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines.

(NOTE)

a In case of an interrogation as to Japan's attitude toward the Tripartite Alliance, it will be affirmed that there will be no changes in Japan's execution of her obligations to the Axis Agreement. We shall not discuss, of our own accord, either our attitude toward the Tripartite Pact or the attitude of the United States toward the European War.

b In case of an interrogation as to Japan's attitude toward Soviet Russia, it will be replied that Japan will not take the initiative for military action as long as Soviet Russia will respect the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact and will not threaten both Japan and Manchuria.

SUMMARY OF THE NEGOTIATION WITH BRITAIN CONCERNING THAILAND.  
(Memorandum)

Adopted in the Liaison Conference between the  
Imperial Headquarters and the Ministry, on August 16, 1941

Referring to the British Ambassador's private plans, chiefly on the problem of Thailand, at the conference with our Foreign Minister on August 11th, Japan's policy will be altered as follows:

(1) Japan's demands to Britain.

a. Britain will respect the neutrality of Thailand and will not execute military measures there.

b. Britain will supply Japan sufficiently with all resources necessary for her self-existence from Burma, Malay, British-Borneo, India, Australia, New Zealand, and other areas in the South-Western Pacific under British influence; and will devise the most favourable measures to normalize commercial tradings with those respective areas.

c. From the Dutch East Indies and Thailand, Britain will supply Japan sufficiently with resources necessary for her self-existence; and in normalizing Japan's commercial trades with these nations, Britain will not take any obstructive measures and abandon her present actions that are proving a menace.

d. Britain will bar her aid to Chiang Kai-shek (including the closure of the Burma Route).

(2) Matters that may be agreed upon according to the attitude of the British.

a. We shall respect the neutrality of Thailand.

b. We shall not make any military proposals to, nor military advances into Thailand.

c. We shall not make any military advance not only in Thailand but also in all areas adjacent to French Indo-China (excluding China).

(3) Our principles in the negotiations.

a. This negotiation will be the continuation of the daily contacts between our Foreign Minister and the British Ambassador; and each matter will be discussed in turn in the form of a reply to the Ambassador's private proposals. At the beginning, the problems of discussions will be localized to the utmost, and we shall strive to minimize the sphere of British proposals. We acknowledge it to be the best policy to start the discussions on the following matters:

- (a) Respect of Thailand's neutrality.
- (b) Military advance will not be made into Thailand.
- (c) Burma Route will be closed.
- (d) Resources will be supplied to Japan smoothly.

b Such problems as Abandoning of Britain's aid to Chiang Kai-shek, Japan's not making military advances into Thailand and all other areas adjacent to French Indo-China, and problems of Dutch East-Indies, will be discussed after looking over the situation of the negotiations.

c In the course of this negotiation, attention must be paid lest we shall have nothing to profit. Our future freedom of action will be restricted, and our present privileged standing will be obstructed.

(REMARK) The Imperial Government will promptly settle by mutual concessions the conference being held with Thailand in winding up the affairs of the frozen assets, and according to the situation, she will continue to negotiate on the general economic cooperation.

In this negotiation, special importance will be stressed on Japan's obtaining of her necessary resources.

3. PROPOSITIONS (A) and (B), adopted through the Imperial Conference on November 5, 1941.

PROPOSITION (A)

- (1) Problem of Commercial Indiscrimination.

In case our proposition of September 25 will have no hope of compromise, it will be revised, "If the principle of indiscrimination is to be universal the Japanese Government will accept it to be enforced in all the areas in the Pacific, including China."

(2) Problems of Interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Treaty. We shall further make it clear that we have no intentions, without good reason on our part, of expanding the meaning of our rights of self-defense; and that at the same time, we shall act, as we have often explained, according to our own decision concerning the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact. We shall reply that we feel this point has already had the acknowledgment of the United States.

- (3) Problems of Withdrawing Troops.

This problem will be eased as follows:

- a Stationing and withdrawing of troops in China.

Among the Japanese troops despatched to China for the disposal of the Chinese Incident, those in the designated areas in North China and Mongolia and on Hainan Island will be stationed there for a certain necessary term after the establishment of peace between Japan and China. Simultaneously with the establishment of peace we shall commence

to withdraw the rest according to a separate agreement between Japan and China, and with the stabilization of public order this will be completed within two years.

(Note) If the United States should make an inquiry as to the necessary term, it will be replied that our aim will be approximately 25 years.

b Stationing and withdrawing of troops in French Indo-China.

Japanese government will respect French Indo-China's sovereignty upon her land. The Japanese troops now despatched to French Indo-China will be withdrawn immediately after the settlement of the Chinese Incident, or after an impartial peace will have been established in the Far East.

Moreover, every effort will be made to avoid including the Four Principles in the final agreements between Japan and the United States, (both understandings and other statements.)

PROPOSITION (B)

(1) Both the Japanese and the United States Governments will firmly agree not to make military advances into areas in Southeast Asia and Southern Pacific, including French Indo-China.

(2) Both the Japanese and the United States Governments will mutually cooperate to guarantee the obtaining of necessary resources from the Dutch East-Indies.

(3) Both the Japanese and the United States Governments will restore their mutual commercial relations to the conditions before the freezing of the assets.

The United States Government will promise Japan her necessary supply of petroleum.

(4) The United States Government will not take such action as to obstruct Japan's efforts for a peace with China.

(REMARKS)

(1) If necessary, after the conclusion of this agreement, it may be promised that the Japanese troops will be withdrawn after the establishment of peace between Japan and China, or after an impartial peace will have been established in the Pacific area.

(2) If necessary, the regulations for commercial indiscriminate, and the prescriptions for interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact, both included in Proposition A, may be additionally inserted.

4. RESOLUTION adopted through the Imperial Conference on December 1, 1941. Our negotiations with the United States regarding the execution of our national policy adopted on November 5, have finally failed. Japan will declare war on the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands.

Q. # 760

Doc. No. 4C43 E

page 1

TOP SECRET!

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 23 March 1939 19 o'clock

Arrival, 23 March 1939 18.10 "

No. 121 of March 23

Secret!

For the State Secretary

I hear from well informed Japanese press source that the Japanese conference of the five ministers under the presidency of the Prime Minister had decided at two o'clock tonight after a discussion lasting several hours, to take up diplomatic negotiations with Germany for the purpose of concluding a military treaty directed against Russia. Parts of the Army advocated a further military treaty also against third powers. The same was demanded by the Italian Government. The Navy had recommended limitation on Russia. Ambassador OSHIMA is supposed to have delivered the inquiry of the German Government, whether Japan would be willing to conclude the military treaty. Ostensibly, Germany is supposed to be content with merely anti-Russian pact and has requested an answer by April 3. The government here does not wish to break off the bridge to America and England despite the treaty and is for this purpose supposed to be considering concessions in China. The newspaper ASahi also mentions in today's morning edition a secret minister's conference and announces that 'an important question of Japanese foreign policy would be decided upon in a few days.'

OTT

/135900/

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. CUMMING, being duly sworn, depose and say:

1. That I am a member of the United States Department of War, and am presently serving as a Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have, since the date, custody, and control of the Berlin documents to which reference is made, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said captured German Office files and archives were captured and obtained by Allied military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said Germany Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)



Doc. No. 1632 (54)

Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary

June 21st, 1941 (Extract)

At 6.30 p.m. I went to Prince KONOYE's house at Mejiro to dine with him and Baron HIRANUMA and to exchange opinions concerning current questions.

The gist of our talk was as follows: If a war between Germany and Soviet were to break out, it would prove a serious hindrance to the Japanese-German Alliance, as was the case with Germany's attitude at the time of the HIRANUMA Cabinet. Prince KONOYE, therefore, said that it would be necessary for the Cabinet to bear this responsibility. I objected to Prince KONOYE's opinion, saying that at the time of the HIRANUMA Cabinet, Germany signed a treaty with Soviet Russia, our hypothetical enemy, before the said Cabinet's policy was decided. In the case of the HIRANUMA Cabinet, the Premier, who had emphasized to the Emperor the necessity of a national policy to look upon the Soviet Russia as our hypothetical enemy, could not help keenly feeling the responsibility because this hypothetical enemy, Soviet Russia, had concluded a treaty with Germany. It is an important requirement in the Japanese-German Alliance that proper adjustment of Japanese-Soviet diplomatic relations should be effected. Germany knew this and had a complete understanding of it. Moreover Germany did not show any objection to the neutrality treaty between Soviet Russia and Japan. Regarding the war between Germany and Soviet Russia, we were not taken by surprise, for Ambassador OSHIIA had been confidentially informed. There is enough room for the government to act wisely considering the attendant circumstances. If the KONOYE Cabinet were to resign, it would create an undesirable precedent.

As regards Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's opinions, it is difficult from them to judge his true intentions. At a time when this country was facing a crisis, it was not advisable to cause a split in the Cabinet. We should do everything to avoid this, for it would disgrace the honour of our country to get caught in the backwash of other countrys' actions and so have the Cabinet broken up. The Premier was expected to assume leadership, if the following three cases should arise:

1. In case of a war between Germany and Soviet Russia.
1. In case of the participation of America in the war.
1. In case of our receiving an answer from the U.S.A.

Doc. No. 4050B

Page 1

COPY

Japanese Embassy  
Berlin

The Japanese Embassy has the honor to inform the Foreign Office, by order of the Japanese government, of the views of the latter in regard to the recently concluded pact of non-aggression and consultation between the German government and the government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, as follows:

"The Japanese Government regards the pact of non-aggression and consultation recently concluded between the German Government and the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics as running counter to the secret appended agreement to the Agreement against the Communist International."

Berlin, 26 August 1939

To the  
Foreign Office

Doc. No. 4050B

Page 2

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4050B.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

TOP SECRET (Rubber Stamp)

RECORD OF REICH FOREIGN MINISTER

A

Record of the Conversation between the Reich Foreign Minister (RM) and the Japanese Foreign Minister, MATSUOKA in the presence of Ambassadors OTT and OSMIMA in Berlin on 27 March 1941.

The Reich Foreign Minister welcomed MATSUOKA with cordial words as a man who has shown by word and deed that he has the same attitude toward the problems of his country as the Fuehrer and his co-workers must have for Germany, and who made possible the conclusion of the pact with Japan as the responsible Foreign Minister of his country. The Tri-Partite Pact is a very important instrument for the future of the three countries, and represents the foundation on which the future of the three nations can be assured in a manner that has always been imagined by German and Japanese patriots.

In this connection, the Reich Foreign Minister gave a survey of the situation as it appears from Germany's view.

In reference to the military situation, he pointed out that Germany today is in the final phase of her fight against England. During the past winter, the Fuehrer prepared everything further so that Germany stands today completely ready for deployment in order to meet England everywhere she can be reached. The Fuehrer has at this moment at his disposal perhaps the strongest military might which has ever existed in the world. Germany has ready to strike 240 divisions, 186 of which are first-class attack divisions of young soldiers. Twenty-four (24) of them are armored divisions to which must be added more motorized brigades.

\* \* \* \* \*

If one calculates the sum total of the military situation in Europe one arrives at the conclusion that the Axis is practically master of the situation in all of continental Europe in the military field. A gigantic army is at the disposal of Germany, which is practically unemployed and can be committed at any time at any place where the Fuehrer deemed it necessary.

The political situation is characterized by the adherence of almost all the Balkans to the Tri-Partite Pact. News about a putsch and a change of government arrived from Belgrade this morning, however all details are lacking so far. Also, the political situation in Europe and in the whole world has contributed to the strengthening of the Tri-Partite powers. Germany continues to strive to win over this or that state which still stands outside of the pact, to the cause of the three powers. He (Reich Foreign Minister) can inform MATSUOKA confidentially that Spain at least in spirit is in the Tri-Partite Pact. Of the two or three remaining, Sweden and Turkey are especially interesting. He can tell MATSUOKA confidentially that here too, attempts would be made to win these countries for the Tri-partite Pact.

Certain feelers have already been aimed at Turkey. Even if this country formally has an alliance with England, it is at least not entirely impossible that Turkey will in the future perhaps draw closer and closer to the Tri-Partite Pact.

Germany has concluded her well known treaties with Russia. Ambassador OSHIYA knows how these treaties were concluded. He had at that time the desire to conclude a pact with Russia. Due to the situation in Japan it had not been possible to carry out this desire. On the other hand, the storm clouds of the war appeared more and more threatening in Europe and since the pact, Italy-Japan was not possible at that time for the signing of which the Reich Foreign Minister had been, as Ambassador OSHIYA knows ready for six months on order of the Fuehrer, Germany had to decide upon the pact with Russia in view of the approaching war.

Confidentially, he (the Reich Foreign Minister) can inform MATSUCKA that present relations toward Russia are correct but not very friendly.

\* \* \* \* \*

The German armies in the East are available at any time. Should Russia one day take up an attitude which could be interpreted as a threat against Germany, the Fuehrer would dash Russia to pieces. One is positive in Germany that such a campaign against Russia would end in a complete victory for German arms and the absolute destruction of the Russian Army and the Russian State. The Fuehrer is convinced that in case of an advance against the Soviet Union a few months later a power (gropmacht) Russia would no longer exist.

The Tri-Partite Pact has followed mainly the aim of frightening America from continuing on the course taken, and to keep her out of war. This goal is absolutely clear and appropriate. Furthermore, the Tri-partite Pact is to serve to secure the cooperation of the signatories in the new order, in case of Germany and Italy in Europe, and in case of Japan in East Asia, for the future.

\* \* \* \* \*

Germany believes that for instance a rapid attack against Singapore would be a very decisive factor for a rapid overthrow of England.

Ex 784

Entry Count CIANO Diary

September 19, 1940

Arrival of Ribbentrop. He is in a good humour and very pleased with the welcome given him by the "applause squad" which was well coached by the Questura. In the car he immediately speaks of the surprise he has in his portfolio; this is the Japanese military alliance which is to be signed in a few days in Berlin. The Russian dream vanished forever in the halls of the Belvedere at Vienna after the guarantees to Rumania were made. He believes that this stroke will have a double edge. Against Russia and against America. The threat of the Japanese fleet will keep the latter from making any move. I express a different opinion: The anti-Russian guarantees are all right; the anti-American note which will induce Washington to increase her commitments to Britain is not so good.

As far as Great Britain is concerned, Ribbentrop says that the weather has been extremely bad and that cloud formations, rather than the RAF, have prevented the final success of the air attacks. However, he says that the attack will be successful as soon as the weather clears for a few days. The landing preparations are complete and a landing is possible. British territorial defenses are nothing to worry about. It will only take one German division to break up the entire defense system.

F. # 785

Doc. No. 4011

Page 1

Excerpt from the Record of the conversation of the German :  
Minister of Foreign Affairs with the DUCE in the presence of  
Count CIANO and Ambassador von MACKENSEN on 22 September 1940  
at the Palazzo Venezia.

. . . The German Foreign Minister made known his  
intention to invite SERRANO SUNER to be a guest at the  
ratification, and likewise to invite representatives of the  
countries on friendly terms with the Axis, such as Hungary,  
Bulgaria and Rumania. Count CIANO at first expressed  
doubts as to whether by the presence of a Spanish delegate,  
because of the known anti-Bolshevik attitude of the Spanish  
Government, the Three Power Pact with Japan would not show  
a too strongly anti-Russian tendency, but dropped these  
doubts again, as the DUCE declared the presence of SERRANO  
SUNER rather useful on account of the thereby emphasized  
solidarity of Spain with the three signatories. . .

Rome, 22 September 1940

SCHMIDT



I. (Orig. in Doc. Rm.)

AFFIDAVIT

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nurnberg, Germany, and as such have possession, custody and control of the original captured enemy document numbered 1865-PB by said Documentation Division.

2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from German Foreign Office files and archives.

3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure and capture was delivered to, filed with, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nurnberg, Germany in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 and captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents", and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of said original captured enemy document above described and referred to.

5. That said above referred to original captured enemy document is being held by me for possible use in connection with the trial of alleged war criminals before the International Military Tribunal, and that a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original document for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ Gerard Schaefer  
Gerard Schaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 3rd day of May 1946.

/s/ Smith W. Brookhart, Jr., Lt. Col  
SMITH W. BROOKHART, JR., IGD  
LT COLONEL, IGD  
O-508524

I. (Orig. in Doc. Rm.)

AFFIDAVIT

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nurnberg, Germany, and as such have possession, custody and control of the original captured enemy document numbered 1885-FB by said Documentation Division.

2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from German Foreign Office files and archives.

3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure and capture was delivered to, filed with, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nurnberg, Germany in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 and captioned, "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents", and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.

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/s/ Gerard Schaefer  
Gerard Schaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 3rd day of May 1946.

/s/ Smith W. Brookhart, Jr., Lt. Col  
SMITH W. BROOKHART, JR., IGD  
LT COLONEL, IGD  
O-508524

Document No. 1285

A G E N D A

1. Recognition of Protocol concerning entrance of Hungary into Three Power Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy.
2. Recognition of Protocol concerning entrance of Romania into Three Power Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy.
3. Recognition of Protocol concerning entrance of Slovakia into Three Power Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy.
4. Revision of the Ceremonial Law.
5. Special appointment of censors of the Home Ministry.

RECORD OF THE MEETING OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL

Meeting opens at 10:20 A.M., Wednesday, December 18, 1940

His Imperial Majesty Enters

## Present:-

President HARA  
Vice-President SUIKAI

Ministers:	Prime Minister KONOVE	(No. 5)
	Welfare Minister ZAKENITSU	(No. 6)
	Overseas Minister AKITA	(No. 7)
	War Minister TSUJO	(No. 8)
	Foreign Minister MATSUOKA	(No. 9)
	Education Minister HOSHIDA	(No. 10)
	Commerce & Industry Minister KOBAYASHI	(No. 11)
	Finance Minister HARAIDA	(No. 12)
	Home Minister YASUI	(No. 13)
	Justice Minister KAJIJI	(No. 14)
	Communications Minister MURATA	(No. 15)
	Agriculture & Forestry Minister ISHIGURO	(No. 16)
	Navy Minister OKAWA	(No. 17)
	Railways Minister OGAWA	(No. 18)
Councillors:-	Councillor KAWAI	(No. 21)
	Councillor ISEII	(No. 22)
	Councillor ARIMA	(No. 23)
	Councillor KUBOTA	(No. 24)
	Councillor ISHIZUKA	(No. 25)
	Councillor SHIMIZU	(No. 26)
	Councillor MINAMI	(No. 27)
	Councillor NARA	(No. 28)
	Councillor ARAKI	(No. 29)
	Councillor MATSUI	(No. 30)
	Councillor SUGAMARA	(No. 31)
	Councillor MATSUURA	(No. 32)
	Councillor USHIO	(No. 33)
	Councillor HAGASEI	(No. 34)
	Councillor FUKAI	(No. 35)
	Councillor FUTAGAMI	(No. 36)
	Councillor MANO	(No. 37)
	Councillor OSHIMA	(No. 38)
	Councillor OBATA	(No. 39)
Councillor TAKEKASHI	(No. 40)	
Councillor MITSUCHI	(No. 41)	

Absent:-

Imperial Princes:-	Prince YASUHIRO	(No. 1)
	Prince NOBUHIRO	(No. 2)
	Prince TAKAHIRO	(No. 3)
	Prince KOTOHIRO	(No. 4)

Councillors:-	Councillor KANEKO	(No. 20)
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Delegates (Government Delegates)

Director of the Legislation Bureau MURASE  
Councillor of the Legislation Bureau MORIYAMA  
(The above two concerning each item on the Agenda)

Director of the Europe & Asia Bureau (Foreign Ministry)  
SAHAMOTO

Director of the Treaty Bureau (Foreign Ministry) MATSUMOTO  
The above two concerning Items 1, 2 and 3

President of the Board of Decorations SEKO  
Secretary of the Board of Decorations MURATA  
(The above two concerning Item 4)

Director of the Police Bureau (Home Ministry) FUJIWARA  
(The above concerning Item 5)

Reporting member:-

Chief Secretary HORIE

Secretaries:-

Secretary MOROHASHI  
Secretary TAKATSUJI

President (HARA)

The meeting is called to order.

I submit the following three items together as the subject for discussion:-

1) Recognition of Protocol concerning entrance of Hungary into Three Power Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy.

2) Recognition of Protocol concerning entrance of Romania into Three Power Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy.

3) Recognition of Protocol concerning entrance of Slovakia into Three Power Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy.

According to precedent, we shall dispense with the Readings, restrict ourselves to the main points of the bill, omit the reading and immediately call for the report of the investigation.

Reporting Member (HCRIE)

Respectfully investigating these three items, I beg to state the following:-

Soon after the signing of the Three Power Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy, on September 27th of this year at Berlin, the German Government conveyed to the Imperial Japanese Government their desire that Hungary be allowed to enter the above-mentioned Three Power Pact, and asked for our opinion. Therefore, the Imperial Japanese Government replied that it had no objections. Following this, the German Government showed us the draft of the Protocol concerning Hungary's entrance into the above-mentioned treaty, and moreover told us on this occasion that it desired the early realization of this because of the European situation. Next the German Government told us it desired the entrance of Romania and Slovakia into the above-mentioned treaty, that it hoped for the realization of this as soon as possible, and as before asked for our consent. Therefore, the Imperial Japanese Government transmitted its consent to the draft of the Protocol, and at the same time, granted the desire of the German Government, and under the condition of receiving the recognition of the Government, caused our plenipotentiaries to sign the Protocol for Hungary on November 20th at Vienna, for Romania on November 23rd and for Slovakia on November 24th, both at Berlin.

The form and contents of the three Protocols are completely identical. They are composed of three articles. Japan, Germany and Italy are the contracting powers on one side while on the other side the contracting powers are Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia as the case may be. Between these two contracting powers, the following points are agreed upon:

1) Hungary, Romania and Slovakia are to join the Three Power Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy signed at Berlin on September 27, 1940.

Hungary, Romania and Slovakia may cause their representatives to participate in the mixed commissions provided for in Article 4 of the above-mentioned treaty whenever problems concerning the interests of these three countries are discussed by the Commissions.

The main body of the above-mentioned treaty is to be appended to the Protocol as a Supplement. The Protocol will be drawn up in Japanese, German and Italian and Hungarian, Romanian and Slovakian as the case may be. Each of these texts will be considered official.

By the conclusion of this treaty Hungary, Romania and Slovakia recognize the leading position of Germany and Italy in Europe and the leading position of Japan in Greater East Asia, and will also cooperate with Japan, Germany and Italy in making efforts for the construction of a new world order. The six countries of Japan, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia have pledged each other that if any one of them is attacked by a country not at present involved in either the European war or the Sino-Japanese hostilities, the six countries will aid each other with all possible means, and that these points will have no influence on the existing political situation between each of these countries and the Soviet Union.

We believe that the three items under consideration are in accordance with principles of the preamble of the Three Power Treaty previously concluded between Japan, Germany and Italy; that in order that Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia might join the treaty the interested countries have decided to conclude an agreement in the form of a protocol, and that this will be of service in strengthening the Japan-Germany-Italy Axis and in realizing the final purpose of the Three Power Treaty. For these reasons the conclusion of this agreement may be called an opportune step, and its articles may also be recognized as presenting no difficulties. Thus we consider that each of these three items should be passed as they stand.

The above is a respectful report on the results of the investigation.

No. 36 (FUTAKAMI)

The protocols under consideration will expand the Three Power Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy, and are a very serious matter because circumstances may arise in which our country will bear the duty of giving military aid to Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia and of going to war for them. Therefore, I wish to ask two or three questions. First, in what position are these three countries to enter the Three Power Treaty? That is, what is the meaning of the word entrance in these protocols? As there are no special stipulations concerning the Three Power Treaty other than the article regarding the Mixed Technical Commission in the protocols, we may consider the above-mentioned three countries have the same rights and duties as Japan, Germany and Italy as far as the other articles of the treaty are concerned. In that case, regarding the second article of the treaty, Germany, Italy, Hungary and the other two countries in Europe? Since the chief object of the Three Power Treaty is to establish the two great co-prosperity spheres of Europe and Greater East Asia, is it not right to understand it in the above-mentioned manner?

Delegate (MATSUMOTO)

The Honorable Councillor's theory concerning Article 2 of the Three Power Treaty is correct, but as to Article 1, our country does not recognize the position of Germany, Italy, Hungary and the other two countries in Europe; our country and Hungary and the other two countries recognize the

the leading position of Germany and Italy in Europe. In other words, we understand that Hungary and the other two countries recognize the leading position of Germany and Italy, and of Japan, in Europe and Greater East Asia, respectively.

No. 36 (FUTAKAMI)

Such an explanation would be convenient for Germany and Italy, but would not be convenient for Hungary and the other two countries. To cause a country to join a treaty in order to recognize the leading position of another country, and not to have one's own country's position recognized - that is a very awkward explanation. If the meaning (of the protocols) is indeed as the honorable delegate has answered, it would have been sufficient simply to have said that (Hungary and the other two countries) recognize the stipulations of Articles 1 and 2 of the treaty. Next, regarding the explanation concerning mutual aid among the six countries, there is no doubt that Japan, Germany and Italy, and the three countries who are parties to each of the protocols under consideration bear the obligation of mutual military assistance. What are not clear are the obligations the three countries of Hungary, Romania and Slovakia will bear between each other. From the form of these protocols it does not appear there is any provision for mutual assistance between these three countries. I ask for a reply.

Delegate (MATSUMOTO)

The honorable Councillor's theory is correct and there is some doubt about the wording of the protocols. But in actual practice, since three new countries have joined the Three Power Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy and since these six countries have entered into a relationship of alliance my interpretation is that when the situation stipulated in Article 3 arises, these three newly-joined countries also bear the obligation of assisting one another.

No. 36 (FUTAKAMI)

If there were an article providing for admissions in the Three Power Treaty, there would be no question, but since there is none, Hungary and the other two countries became one of the contracting parties in the respective protocols, but there is no reason for the arising of any relationship between these three countries. I believe that there is no reason for those who are not parties to a treaty assuming obligations. What is the Government's opinion?

No. 9 (MATSUOKA)

As to the first point of the honorable Councillor's question, it goes without saying that the three countries newly joining the treaty recognized the position of Japan, Germany and Italy when signing the protocol. Regarding this point, I believe that aside from the theory of treaties, as a political theory, there is no room for doubt, and as for the second point, there can also be no doubt. Since the fundamental spirit of the subject under consideration is that the countries party to this treaty act as one in



assisting each other, although there may be doubts on this point as a legal theory, no doubt can arise on it as an actual political problem.

No. 36 (FUJIKAMI)

Since the honorable minister declares himself of the same opinion as far as the interpretation of the treaty goes I hope he will satisfactorily deal with the matter politically. In conclusion I have a question to ask regarding the form of concluding international treaties. Recently, when the Three Power Treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy was submitted to this Council for deliberation only the Japanese text was placed before this Council as the official text of the treaty, and the German and Italian texts were not submitted. Today for the first time I have become aware of its contents when these protocols were placed before us for deliberation. Since I am fully aware of the circumstances of the times I have no intention of disputing about this, but in future I desire that all official texts be submitted to this Council for consideration before asking for the Imperial approval. Among the official texts of the protocols submitted to this Council for consideration are Hungarian, Romanian and Slovakian. These languages, unlike German and Italian, are comprehended by few persons in this country. What methods have the authorities employed to see that these texts agree with the official Japanese text? To give an example, a few years ago there was a plan to conclude a treaty between our country and Ethiopia. When the Imperial approval was almost about to be asked for, it was found on engaging a scholar of the Imperial University to interpret the official text in Ethiopian that there were two or three points on which it differed from the official text in our language. Finally, the draft was discarded and a new treaty drawn up in which French was the official language. While I believe that in all probability much care was taken in comparing the official texts of these protocols, I would like to know how this was done.

Delegato (MATSUMOTO)

As regards the matter pointed out by the honorable Councillor, in view of the precedent concerning the Ethiopian language we have taken due care. There are competent specialists in our country regarding Hungarian and Romanian while Slovakian is a dialect of Russian and there were specialists in the Russian language who comprehended that language. Therefore, we have carefully scrutinized the text, and have also inquired of the German and Italian Embassies concerning this. Thus we have taken every care so that there might be no discrepancy between these texts and the official Japanese text.

No. 26 (SHIMIZU)

When will Germany and Italy recognize the Nanking Government as the Government representing the Republic of China? Also, what attitude will the three countries newly adhering to the Three Power Treaty take regarding the recognition of this Government.

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No. 36 (FUTAKAMI)

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Delegate (MATSUMOTO)

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No. 26 (SEIMIZU)

When will Germany and Italy recognize the Nanking Government as the Government representing the Republic of China? Also, what attitude will the three countries newly adhering to the Three Power Treaty take regarding the recognition of this Government.

## No. 9 (MATSUOKA)

The Imperial Japanese Government had already discussed the recognition of the Nanking Government with Germany and Italy before our recognition of this Government. Italy is prepared to recognize this Government immediately and I expect that following this, Germany and the other three countries concerned in the protocols under consideration will extend recognition also. However, in regard to the Italian Government, as it is desirable that the Imperial Japanese Ambassador be the doyer of the diplomatic corps accredited to the new Government, we asked the Italian Government to extend recognition after our ambassador had presented his credentials, and obtained their understanding regarding this. Also, as for the time the German Government will extend recognition, there is a delicate problem. That is to say, the Imperial Japanese Government has not yet given up its hope of realizing an all-out peace in China. For this, it is all the more necessary to ask for German assistance on the side lines. But if the German Government should recognize the new Government it will naturally mean the severance of ties with the Chungking Government and will only bring about inconveniences. However, I am confident that the German Government will recognize the New Government any time our Government requires.

## No. 35 (FUKAI)

Recently a war has broken out between Italy and Greece. Concerning this have there been any negotiations between our Government and the Italian Government regarding the application of the Three Power Treaty?

## No. 9 (MATSUOKA)

To date there have been no negotiations between Japan and Italy regarding the application of Article 3 of the Three Power Treaty. I consider that even in future neither Germany nor Italy will demand action by Japan under the interpretation that they have been attacked by Greece.

## No. 22 (ISHII)

According to the explanation of the Foreign Office authorities, Hungary commenced negotiations with Germany herself because she desired to join the Japan-Germany-Italy Three Power Treaty, and our country agreed to this through the good offices of Germany. But as regards Romania and Slovakia, Germany urged their adherence and opened negotiations with the Imperial Japanese Government. Moreover, the German Government desired a speedy realization of this, so that the Imperial Japanese Government was unable to take the proper steps and finally concluded the protocols now under discussion by an ad referendum. To begin with, the Three Power Treaty was concluded by the three Great Powers of the world, as far as the Imperial Japanese Government is concerned, there should be no reason for such undue haste in causing these second rate powers to join the Treaty. Furthermore, each of the treaties now under consideration are treaties whose conclusion contains the danger of staking our national fate. Therefore, I consider that

these treaties are not such as should be welcomed by our government. As for Romania, she has a dispute of many years standing with Russia over Bessarabia. Should incidents arise from this, there is fear that, depending on developments, our country may bear the obligation of going to war for that country. Moreover our country has no hope of receiving any assistance from Romania. Germany also, because of her relationship to the Soviet Union will be in the position of flocking on with folded arms. In regard to this, there is something I would like to know. Why did Germany drag along these small weak countries and what is the reason for having been in such haste that the Imperial Japanese Government was even unable to take the proper steps in signing the protocols with these countries? Also, what led the Government to agree to the treaties under consideration, in which an occasion will arise wherein Germany will not bear any obligations but our country will.

## No. 9 (MATSUOKA)

No diplomatic relations in Europe at the present moment are so complicated and so delicate as those between several powers such as Germany, Italy, Soviet Russia, Great Britain and others in the Balkan Peninsula. GERMANY and ITALY are endeavoring to strengthen their position in the said peninsula to the greatest possible extent for convenience of carrying out their war with GREAT BRITAIN and from the necessity of maintaining friendly relations with, and at the same time, rendering a menace to SOVIET RUSSIA. In taking necessary steps for the purpose the German authorities concerned are most fearful of the divulgence of the secret. If these protocols should leak out before sealing, the object in view could never be attained, which circumstances explain their haste in concluding the agreements. Now in view of the circumstances that have led to the conclusion of the Three Power Alliance, and of the existing international situation, this Empire ought to agree to the enhancement to any extent of GERMANY's position in the Balkan Peninsula, for one of the objectives of the 3-Power Alliance lies in taking advantage of the alliance in order to adjust Russo-Japanese relations. While it is necessary to intensify the close relations between GERMANY and SOVIET RUSSIA based on the interests of the two powers. I deem it a good policy to aggrandize the German menace to SOVIET RUSSIA availing ourselves of the situation to regulate our relations with SOVIET RUSSIA, seeing that SOVIET RUSSIA does not find any menace in JAPAN and is inclined to reject the adjustment of Russo-Japanese relations. From this point of view the Government has agreed to the proposal in question from a conviction that it will be favorable to our diplomacy. It seems that GERMANY intends to include ITALY as well as the BALKAN states within her sphere of influence, and to besiege TURKEY diplomatically in order to take ultimate control of her, thereby obviating the danger of her entry into the war. It is not without reason that GERMANY should request JAPAN her/<sup>self</sup> be quick in taking action in connection with the matter. Considering it necessary for the improvement of our international position, especially in Russo-Japanese relations, we have taken the said exceptional action. I hope you will understand these circumstances.

President (HARA)

As there are no other opinions expressed, we shall immediately vote on the matter. All those in favor of the items under consideration, please rise.

(All arise)

President (HARA)

The items have been passed by a unanimous vote.

(Nine pages omitted)  
(Translator's Note: The discussion of Items 4 & 5, Revision of the Ceremonial Law and Special Appointment of Censors of the Home Ministry, are omitted as they are purely a matter of form and have no bearing on the present case.)

President (HARA)

The meeting stands adjourned.

His Imperial Majesty Leaves.

Meeting Closed at 11:50 A.M.

President:	Yoshinichi HARA	(Signature)
Chief of Secretary:	Sho FUJII	"
Secretaries:	Yuzuru NAKOHASEI	"
	Masami TAKATSUGI	"

Doc. No. 1285

C E R T I F I C A T E

W. D. C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I. P. S. No. 1285

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Shuzo Jimbo hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary to the President of the Privy Council and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of \_\_\_\_\_ pages, dated 18 Dec. 1940, and described as follows: Privy Council Proceedings "Recognition of Protocol in Entrance of Hungary Roumania, and Slavokia in Tri-Partite Pact". I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Privy Council in Palace ground.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
4th day of September, 1946

/s/ Shuzo Jimbo  
Signature of Official

Witness: Kiichi, Chosokabe

SEAL

\_\_\_\_\_  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
4th day of Sept, 1946

/s/ Edward P. Monaghan  
NAME

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis  
2d Lt. M. I.

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

TELEGRAM

(Secret Cipher Process) To be kept in locked file. MOST URGENT

Tokyo, 4 October 1941 2,578

Arrival: 4 October 1941 1325 hours.

No. 1974, of 4 October.

For the German Foreign Minister.

Re: Telegraphic report of 2 October, No. 1960 with Pol. VIII

NOTE: Sent on to Special Train under No. 3351. Tel. Ktr.  
4 October 1941.

As I have stated in my last report, the Japanese-American negotiations seem to be without result, unless the United States fundamentally changes her attitude towards the Chinese question which they will find difficult to do. However, even after the breakdown of the negotiations, there remains in JAPAN, a certain sense of uncertainty as to what policy should be adopted in JAPAN. For the first time in her history JAPAN feels herself physically isolated and surrounded by enemies. In a spirit of optimism and jingoism she has tested her forces on militarily inferior CHINA; now she is under the impression, despite brilliant individual successes, that she cannot successfully terminate this conflict by military means. Even more than this feeling prevailing within the country, the long drawn out service behind the front /Etappendienst/ has probably impaired the Japanese punch and readiness for sacrifices. One cannot help feeling that the mobilization, begun in July, has enhanced the sense of weakness by bringing to light the numerous economic and material deficiencies.

In spite of this, the realization has increased during the last weeks that by a policy of mere wait and see, the goals of JAPAN will not be furthered, nor will her continued existence be secured. As a result of a careful sounding out of the Army leaders (Minister for War, Chief of General Staff, Head of the Political Section and of the Section for Foreign Armies) the following picture of their ways of thinking is arrived at.

(The inherent aim of the Tripartite Pact is to bring about a new distribution of power in EUROPE and the Far East by overpowering the British Empire. Keeping

...ERIC.. at bay and eliminating the SOVIET UNION could only be mere means to this end.)

Now that Germany has begun the fight with the SOVIET UNION and has carried it through militarily successful to a great extent the important thing is to reestablish the connection of the powers of the Tripartite Pact through SIBERIA as soon as possible, and to concentrate the entire energy on fighting ENGLAND in the Middle and Far East as well as on the British Isles. Operations in European RUSSIA had demonstrated that the armies of the SOVIET UNION have suffered defeat but that the political collapse of the regime does not automatically follow. (Japan's waging of a war against the Far Eastern Army, still considered as being in fighting trim, is not feasible before next spring, unless a moral collapse of the regime comes about. The tenacity displayed by the SOVIET UNION against GERMANY indicates that not even by a Japanese attack in August or September could the route via SIBERIA be opened up this year). There are two ways of reaching this objective in the future: either by exploiting the considerable weakening of the SOVIET regime to be expected after the occupation of MOSCOW, to induce the remainder of RUSSIA to freely cooperate in this. JAPAN could contribute even in winter by bringing pressure to bear upon RUSSIAN supplies from the Far East at the appropriate time; the other way would be to attack SIBERIA from west and east during next spring for which JAPAN would then be in a position to do this/ despite having the CHINA conflict on her hands. In that case, however, huge areas would have to be traversed and common operations would not be easy, so that even in this case a political solution would be called for after some time.

Military actions by JAPAN against the Anglo-Saxon position in the South are independent of the time of year. It is to be endeavored to link /then/ up with a German drive against the Anglo-Saxon position in the Middle East, although there is no absolute necessity to wait /for it/. However, victory over the British Empire would be complete only when our actions from both sides would collapse the Indian position.

With the request for confidential, one group seems to be missing, I am stating the remarks as they were made to me by the War Minister in the presence of the Chief of the General Staff. In their frank peculiarity they clearly show the attitude taken by the leadership towards a campaign against RUSSIA. The remarks reveal also that the plans directed against the South, which chiefly have to be executed by the Navy, are not



too well considered and are lacking in preparation. I am at one with the Military Attaches in the impression that at least as far as the Army is concerned, the calculations which have been made are superficial, and that the state of preparations does not guarantee the success of a southward push beyond initial conquests. In French...one group garbled)...only a few military establishments have been set up thus far, according to concordant information. The relatively little outfitting of the troops with modern material, the length of the lines of communications, but most of all the feeling of having no unified energetic leadership deprives the Japanese fighting forces of the assurance which is essential to success. It is therefore to be supposed that the present government will further try to put off a southern drive.

The activation of JAPAN in the sense of the Tripartite Pact can most easily be brought about by demonstrating to her technically and politically, the possibility of operations having a tangible common goal (passage through SIBERIA or a combined attack in the Middle East or the Far East). A long-distance flight from the Russian front to MANCHURI as soon as this is technically possible, would probably make a deep impression here. Considering the formalistic character of the Japanese, I would like to suggest again that due consideration be given to whether after adequate preparations the attempt should not be made to entrust the commission, stipulated by the Tripartite Pact at the request of the Japanese, with the deliberation of common, military, economic and political tasks. The feeling that they are not consulted distresses circles which are otherwise ready to cooperate and hits them on their weakest spot, their self-esteem.

In the foregoing statements of the Army leaders, no mention was made of an American participation in the war. I was able to find out that in military considerations they were almost completely setting aside or ignoring the possible intervention of the UNITED STATES, while always referring to the British Empire as the enemy. Doubtlessly this is partly due to the desire to keep secret what is going on in the none too pleasant course of Japanese-American negotiations. But even stronger is the often reported atavistic fear of getting entangled in a conflict with the UNITED STATES, the end of which can perhaps not be foreseen. The Japanese Government /Staats-fvenng/ wants to embark on such a conflict only if worst comes to worst and wants to decide the time itself; at least help in deciding upon it. This not only chimes in with the character of the Japanese but also with the point of view of the Japanese Government of whether an attack in the sense of Article Three of the Pact is in question, must be decided through

common consultation by the Three Powers. I call to mind that Foreign Minister MITSUOKA had insisted on a concrete fixing of this already at the negotiations over the Tripartite Pact, conducted here with Ambassador STAMMER as negotiations chairman and myself.

The feeling that a conflict with the United States will not be avoided is gaining for us, however, it is of the greatest importance that JAPAN should take part in deciding as to when it is to be mutually waged.

I need not specially mention that I have argued along the lines indicated by my instructions and by an utterance regulation /Sprachregelung/ issued in BERLIN concerning the further prosecution of the fight against the SOVIET UNION, as well as the military and political weakness of the Anglo-Saxons. However, in view of the existing ratio of strength within JAPAN we have at present to reckon with the attitude described above the more so since the opinions of the Navy are identical by and large, with the utterances of the Army leaders.

I shall next report on the attitude of the political circles.

OTT

Certificate:

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4065A.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Cumming  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. H. Garde  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Report IAM 19/41

REPORT OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE  
REICH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (RAM)  
AND THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA  
IN BERLIN ON 29 MARCH 1941.

\* \* \* \* \*

The largest part of the German army was anyway on the Eastern frontiers of the Reich and fully prepared to open the attack at any time. He (the RAM) however believed, that Russia would try to avoid developments leading to war. Should Germany however enter into a conflict with Russia, the USSR would be finished off within a few months. In this case, Japan would have, of course, even less reason to be afraid than ever, if she wanted to advance on Singapore. Consequently, she need not refrain from such an undertaking because of possible fears of Russia.

\* \* \* \* \*

He (the RAM) wanted to point out to MATSUOKA, in any case, that a conflict with Russia was anyhow within the realm of possibility. In any case, MATSUOKA could not report to the Japanese Emperor, upon his return that a conflict between Russia and Germany was impossible. On the contrary, the situation was such that such a conflict, even if it were not probable, would have to be considered possible.

\* \* \* \* \*

The RAM declared that it was quite possible that the above-mentioned circumstances should very soon lead to a conflict between Germany and Russia. If Germany felt herself in danger, she would immediately strike and finish off bolshevism.

\* \* \* \* \*

Japan had, however, to bear in mind that, in this war, the heaviest burden was resting on Germany's shoulders. The Reich was fighting against the British Isles and was tying up the British Mediterranean Fleet. Japan, on the other hand, was fighting only on the surface. Apart from that, Russia's main weight lay on the European side. These facts the gallant Japanese Nation would certainly acknowledge.

Matsuoka finally agreed to this point of view and gave an assurance that Japan would always be a loyal ally who would devote herself entirely, and not just in a lukewarm way, to the joint effort.

(Berlin. 31 March 1941.)

OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL  
A. P. O. 1244 U. S. A. R. I. Y.  
28 March 1946

This is to certify that the photostatic copies listed below are true copies of original enemy documents which were captured by the Allied Forces under the direction of the Supreme Allied Commander and are now in the custody of the U.S. Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality:

- 1877-PS Memorandum about the conference between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, at Berlin on 29 March 1941.
- 2929-PS Memorandum about the conference between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Ambassador Oshima on 18 April 1943 at Fuschl.
- 1834-PS Foreign Office, Reich Foreign Minister, #56/R. Extract of a memorandum about a conference with the new Ambassador from Japan, Oshima, at Fuschl on 23 February 1941.
- 2954-PS Memorandum about the conference of the Foreign Minister with Ambassador Oshima on 6 March 1943.
- 2897-PS Telegram, Tokyo, dated 14 July 1941. #1217
- 2898-PS Telegram, Tokyo, dated 13 November 1941. #2097
- 1881-PS Memorandum about a conference between the Fuehrer and the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, in the presence of the Foreign Minister of the Reich and Minister Meissner, at Berlin, on 4 April 1941.
- 2896-PS Telegram, special train Westphalen, #707, dated 10 July 1941.
- C-75 Directive No. 24 concerning collaboration with Japan. Fuehrer Headquarters. Dated 5 March 1941.

GERARD SCHAEFER  
1st Lt. Inf.  
Chief, Documentation Division

Bepno:

Report RAM 19/41

REPORT ON THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH MINISTER  
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (RAM) AND THE JAPANESE FOREIGN  
MINISTER MATSUOKA IN BERLIN ON 29 MARCH 1941.

The RAM resumed the preceding conversation with MATSUOKA about the latter's impending talks with the Russians in Moscow, where they had left off. He expressed the opinion that it would probably be best, in view of the whole situation, not to carry the discussions with the Russians too far. He did not know how the situation would develop. One thing, however, was certain, namely that Germany would strike immediately, should Russia ever attack Japan. He was ready to give MATSUOKA this positive assurance, so that Japan could push forward to the South on SINGAPORE, without fear of possible complications with Russia. The largest part of the German army was anyway on the Eastern frontiers of the Reich and fully prepared to open the attack at any time. He (the RAM) however believed, that Russia would try to avoid developments leading to war. Should Germany however enter into a conflict with Russia, the USSR would be finished off within a few months. In this case, Japan would have, of course, even less reason to be afraid than ever, if she wanted to advance on Singapore. Consequently, she need not refrain from such an undertaking because of possible fears of Russia.

He could not know, of course, just how things with Russia would develop. It was uncertain whether or not STALIN would intensify his present unfriendly policy against Germany. He (the RAM) wanted to point out to MATSUOKA, in any case, that a conflict with Russia was anyhow within the realm of possibility. In any case, MATSUOKA could not report to the Japanese Emperor, upon his return that a conflict between Russia and Germany was impossible. On the contrary, the situation was such that such a conflict, even if it were not probable, would have to be considered possible.

X X X X  
Next, the RAM turned again to the Singapore question. In view of the fears expressed by the Japanese of possible attacks by submarines based on the PHILIPPINES and of the intervention of the British Mediterranean and Home fleets, he had again discussed the situation with GENERAL-ADMIRAL RAEDER. The latter had stated that the British Navy during this year would have its hands so full in the English home waters and in the Mediterranean that it would not be able to send even a single ship to the Far East. General-Admiral RAEDER had described the U.S. submarines as so bad, that Japan need not bother about them at all.

MATSUOKA replied immediately that the Japanese Navy had a very low estimate of the threat from the British Navy; it also held the view that in case of a clash with the American Navy it would be able to smash the

latter without trouble. It was afraid, however, that the Americans would not take up the battle with their fleet; thus the conflict with the United States might perhaps be dragged out to five years. This possibility caused considerable worry in Japan.

The RAM realized that America could not do anything against Japan the day of the capture of Singapore. Perhaps for this reason alone, SEVELT would think twice before deciding on active measures against Japan. For while, on one hand, he could not achieve anything against Japan, on the other hand, there was the probability of losing the Philippines to Japan; for the American President, of course, this would mean a considerable loss of prestige and, because of inadequate rearmament, he would have nothing to offset such a loss.

In this connection, MATSUOKA pointed out, he was doing everything to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted as if Japan had no intention at all regarding this key position of England in the East. Therefore it might be possible that his attitude toward the British would appear to be friendly in words and in acts. However Germany should not be deceived by that. He assumed this attitude, not only in order to reassure the British, but also in order to fool the pro-British and pro-American elements until one day he would suddenly open the attack on Singapore.

The RAM declared that, in his opinion, Japan's declaration of war on England should take the form of an attack on Singapore.

In this connection, MATSUOKA stated, his tactics were based on the certain assumption that the sudden attack against Singapore would unite the entire Japanese nation with one blow. ("Nothing succeeds like success," the RAM remarked.) He followed here the example of the words of a famous Japanese statesman, addressed to the Japanese Navy at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war: "You open fire, then the nation will be united". The Japanese need to be shaken up to awaken. After all, as an Oriental, he believed in fate which would come, whether you wanted it or not.

Later on, the discussion turned to the question of the transportation of rubber. The RAM asked Matsuoka to see what the possibility was of transportation by one or two Japanese auxiliary cruisers to Lisbon or to France.

Matsuoka replied that, immediately after the steps taken by Ambassador Ott in connection with the rubber question, he had interceded in favor of Japan delivering certain quantities to Germany from her own rubber stocks, and later on making up the resulting deficit in rubber from Indo-China.

The RAY pointed out in this connection that communication via Siberian railway was insufficient and that, moreover, 12,000 tons of French rubber from Indo-China would be delivered to Japan through German intervention. He here asked about the size of the auxiliary cruisers possibly to be used for the transportation of the rubber. Matsuoka, who stated that he was not precisely informed, estimated the size at 10,000 tons.

Then the RAY, referring to the discussion with Reich Minister Funk, turned the conversation to the future trade relationship between Japan and Germany. He amplified here the idea that trade between the big economic areas of the future, i.e., Europe and Africa on one hand and the Far East on the other, must develop on a cooperatively free basis, whereas the American Hemisphere, at any rate as far as the United States was concerned, would remain self-sufficient, as she had everything that she needed in her own territory, and, therefore, did not come into question in connection with exchanges with other economic areas. In South America, however, things were different. Here exchange possibilities with other economic areas actually presented themselves.

Matsuoka replied that she needed cooperation with Germany for her own reconstruction and for the development of China. He had already some time ago given written instructions to the Japanese missions in China to grant preferential treatment to German and Italian economic interests, similar to what was already carried out in Manchukuo and North China. Japan was not in a position to develop the extensive areas in China without the assistance of German technical science and German enterprise. Outwardly she will, of course, declare the open door policy, in actual fact, however, she will concede preferential treatment to Germany and Italy.

He must moreover admit only that Japanese business circles feared their German competitors, whom they considered as very competent, whereas they were only amused at British and American competitors. German business circles had much the same opinion about the Japanese, which resulted in complaints from both sides. He was, however, of the opinion that the interests of both sides could be brought into harmony and told Japanese industry not to be afraid of German competition but rather to attempt to solve the problem by equal efficiency. In any case, the Japanese Government would do everything in order to equalize the interests of both sides.

\* \* \* \* \*

Following this, Matsuoka once again turned the conversation to Japanese-Russian relations. He pointed out that he had proposed a Non-Aggression Pact to the Russians, to which Molotov had replied with a proposal of a neutrality agreement. Therefore, during his stay in Moscow, he must admit the attitude of having been the one to make



the original non-aggression proposal. He also wanted to take this opportunity to try to induce the Russians to forego the Northern half of the Sakhalian Peninsula. There were in extent oil resources there, against the exploitation of which the Russians were making every conceivable difficulty. Matsuoka estimated the total maximum quantity which could be obtained from these oil resources at 2 million tons. He would make an offer to the Russians to acquire North Sakhalien by purchase.

To a question by the RAM whether the Russians would be prepared to sell these territories, Matsuoka replied that this was highly doubtful. Molotov had asked the Japanese Ambassador, on a suggestion to this effect, whether "this was supposed to be a joke". Japan was in any case prepared to make other arrangements for the equivalent of the Forts-mouth and Feking treaties and also to give up her fishing rights. In any case he would have to take up these matters and, above all, the question of the Non-aggression Pact during his stay at Moscow. He asked the RAM whether he should deal with these questions very deeply or only just touch on them.

The RAM replied that he was of the opinion that these points would be dealt with only in a purely formal way and would not be gone into deeply. The question mentioned by MATSUOKA regarding Sakhalien could be settled even later. Should the Russians follow a stupid policy and compel Germany to strike, he would, in view of the temper of the Japanese Army in China, consider it right if this army were prevented from acting against Russia. Japan was helping the joint issue best if she did not allow herself to be diverted by anything from the action against Singapore. With a joint victory, the fulfilment of the aforementioned desires would in any case fall into the lap of Japan as a ripe fruit to a large extent.

MATSUOKA then introduced the subject of German assistance in the blow against Singapore, a subject which had been broached to him frequently, and mentioned the proposal of a German written promise of assistance.

The RAM replied that he had already discussed these questions with Ambassador OSHIMA. He had asked him to procure maps of Singapore in order that the FUHRER - who probably must be considered the greatest expert on military questions at the present time - could advise Japan on the best method of attack against Singapore. German experts on aerial warfare, too, would be at her disposal; they could draw up a report, based on their European experiences, for the Japanese on the use of dive-bombers from airfields in the vicinity against the British fleet in Singapore. Thus the British fleet would be forced to disappear from Singapore immediately.

MATSUOKA remarked that Japan was less concerned with the British fleet than with the capture of the fortifications.

The RAF replied that here, too, the FUHRER had developed new methods for the capture of strongly fortified positions, such as the Maginot Line and Fort Eben Emael, which he could make available to the Japanese.

MATSUOKA replied in this connection that some of the younger, rt Japanese Naval officers, who were close friends of his, were of the opinion that the Japanese naval forces would need three months until they could capture Singapore. As a cautious Foreign Minister, he had doubled this estimate. He believed he could stave off any danger which threatened from America for six months. If, however, the capture of Singapore required still more time and if the operations even dragged out for a year, the situation with America would become extremely critical and he did not know how to meet it.)

If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherlands East Indies, since he was afraid that in the event of a Japanese attack on this area the oilfields would be set on fire. They would be brought into operation again only after 1 or 2 years.

The RAF added that Japan would gain decisive control over the Netherlands East Indies simultaneously with the capture of Singapore.

Matsuoka then further mentioned that the desire for airbases in French Indo-China and Thailand had been divulged by Japanese officer circles. He had, however, denied this, as he in no way wished to undertake anything which could in any way disclose Japanese intentions regarding Singapore.

Finally the RAF once more reverted to the question of Germany's help to Japan. Perhaps something could be done also here. Japan had, however, to bear in mind that, in this war, the heaviest burden was resting on Germany's shoulders. The Reich was fighting against the British Isles and was tying up the British Mediterranean Fleet. Japan, on the other hand, was fighting only on the surface. Apart from that, Russia's main weight lay on the European side. These facts the gallant Japanese Nation would certainly acknowledge.

Matsuoka finally agreed to this point of view and gave an assurance that Japan would always be a loyal ally who would devote herself entirely, and not just in a lukewarm way, to the joint effort.

Berlin. 31 March 1941.

TRANSLATION OF NUREMBERG DOCUMENT  
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Page 1  
f Orig.)

Record

Fue/No. 13/14

of the conference between the "Fuehrer" and the Japanese Foreign Minister MATSUOKA in the presence of the German Foreign Minister as well as ambassadors OTT and OSHIMA on 27 March 1941.

After a few words of welcome the Fuehrer inquired first how MATSUOKA had stood the long and tiring trip from Japan to Germany. MATSUOKA replied that the trip agreed with him very well especially since on his trip through Siberia he was entirely cut-off from the outside world and only from time to time got to see a small Siberian country paper in which practically no actual news was recorded. He therefore had felt as if on a vacation trip.

Page 2  
f Orig.)

After that the Fuehrer gave a survey of the general situation. (He said) The war was forced upon Germany. However, she had not been surprised by the war; because she had had the opportunity to follow up the campaign of incitement of certain British, French and American circles for years and therefore prepared herself for everything. In spite of these thorough preparations the outbreak of the war was however not a political aim. Germany had political demands, but hoped to be able to satisfy same by reason. In 1939 the procedure of a peaceful revision of impossible situations which had worked until then with success was interrupted through Poland's pushing forward and the resultant consequences.

Page 3  
f Orig.)

Considering the present situation soberly and without imagination one would have to state that at the outbreak of the war in 1939 there were on the opposite side 60 Polish, 6 Norwegian, 18 Dutch, 22 Belgian and 138 French divisions. In addition there were 12-13 British divisions on the continent. Now it was possible, in barely 1½ years, to eliminate 60 Polish divisions with the occupation of Poland, 6 Norwegian divisions with the occupation of Norway, 18 Dutch divisions with the occupation of Holland, and 22 Belgian divisions with the occupation of Belgium, and out of 138 French divisions only 8 weak brigades are still in existence. All British troops were dispersed and chased away. These are losses which cannot be replaced, and Britain's position cannot be saved any more. By this the war was decided, the Axis powers have become the controlling combination. Resistance to their will is impossible.

Page 4

f Orig.) As MATSUOKA knows, at the beginning of the war Germany was just on the point of building a navy. In spite of this fact any military operations in the course of which seaways had to be used, especially in Norway, were completed, and the British were not in a position to prevent these operations. The German submarines as well as the surface vessels (auxiliary cruisers and battle ships) together with the Luftwaffe caused the British tonnage losses amounting to almost 3/4 of British and Allied losses of World War I. For, at first, very few submarines were put into active service by Germany. By far the greatest number had been used to train new crews for the numerous units manufactured by mass production. The real submarine warfare would only begin in the present and next month. Britain would be weakened to a considerably greater extent than her present losses and would not be in a position to threaten German shores and means of communications anymore. Besides, Germany is tying up an increasing percentage of the British fleet in the North Sea and the Atlantic. The same is being done by the Italian fleet and the German Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean.

Page 5

f Orig.) Germany has absolute control of the air in spite of all British explanations about alleged successes. MATSUOKA would be able to check this statement while looking around in Berlin and comparing present Berlin with present London. Blows of the Luftwaffe would still be increased considerably in the next few months. Britain would suffer from increasingly heavy losses of ship space, and the effectiveness of the German blockade is being shown by the fact that rationing in Britain has to be much stricter than in Germany. The war, meanwhile, would be continued as preparation for the final blow against Britain.

The "Fuehrer" then discussed the situation in the Mediterranean and explained the Italy had been unfortunate in North Africa because she lacked the necessary antitank defense against the British Tank army. Now, however, the danger has been eliminated with the arrival of the first armored division in Tripolitania which will soon be followed by a second division. A further British advance is now out of question, to the contrary, the Axis will in a short time begin a counter-attack.

Page 6

f Orig.) The Italian undertaking in the Balkans was hindered by severe weather conditions. However, in the next few days all difficulties in this theater will be eliminated by a combined advance of Germany and Italy. There is no military problem because Germany has 240 divisions "unemployed" at her disposal out of which 186 divisions are first class assault troops. The losses in personnel and material were very slight in the years of 1939 and 1940 so that in spite of the previous campaigns Germany is stronger in every respect than she was in 1939.

The Fuehrer than expressed his conviction that Britain already has lost the war. It is only a matter of insight whether she wants to admit this. Consequently this will then result in the collapse of the people and of the regime which is responsible for the insane policy of Britain.

Page 7  
(of Orig.)

In her present critical situation Britain is clinging to any blade of straw. She especially relies on two hopes:

First, for American help. Germany has figured on this help from the beginning. It will, however, assume more palpable proportion only in the year of 1942, but even then the extent of this help would be in no proportion to Germany's increased productivity:

Britain's second hope is Russia. The British Empire as well as the United States of America hoped that they would succeed, in spite of everything, in getting Russia on Britain's side. They expected to reach this goal if not this year then perhaps next year in order to bring about a new balance of power in Europe.

Page 8  
(of Orig.)

On this it should be noted that Germany has made the known treaties with Russia, but still more important than this is the fact that Germany has 160 to 180 divisions at her disposal in case of emergency, for her protection against Russia. In case of this eventuality she (Germany) has therefore not the slightest fear and would not hesitate for a second to draw the consequences at once in case of danger. He (the Fuehrer) however does not think that this danger will occur. |

About the objectives of the German warfare in Europe the Fuehrer said that the British hegemony, under all circumstances, would be broken, the British influence in Europe eliminated and every attempt at American interference in Europe would be excluded. Furthermore, the new order of the European continent would as the most essential element, establish the limitation of the rights and duties of those who lived on the continent, and would exclude all the countries which only wanted to interfere from the outside, that is especially Britain and America.

Page 9  
(of Orig.)

In the present struggle the Axis powers were spiritually, morally and partially materially, supported by Japan. The Tripartite Pact, for instance, through the cooperation with Japan made it possible to supply German auxiliary cruisers in East Asia. Above all it caused America to hesitate to enter the war officially. On the other hand it has contributed to the Japanese partner a great deal towards her own future by means of the work and battles of Germany.

There are few situations which offer greater facilitation and a greater probability of success in the realization of the Japanese aim than the present one. Britain is completely checked, on the sea, in the air and on land. In the Mediterranean ever stronger British power is being tied up. Likewise she has to use increasingly stronger units for convoys. Often, cruisers and destroyers are not longer sufficient since these convoys would be attacked on Germany's part by battleships. For in contrast to World War I, Germany owns today on the long front from Narvik to the Spanish-French border numerous bases from which she could advance with her naval forces against Britain and her supply lines. Britain, therefore, is nailed down in Europe, the aim is the destruction of the British Empire.

(Page 10

of Orig.) America has three alternatives: She can arm herself, help Britain or wage war some place else. If she would help Britain she could not arm herself. If she would neglect Britain, this country would be knocked out and America would find herself alone opposed to the powers of the Tripartite Pact. But in no case could America wage a war some place else.

Page 11  
of Orig.)

Therefore, a better opportunity for a joint action of the Tripartite power than the one established today will in all human possibility never again arise. On the other hand it is clear to him that with every historical act a risk has to be taken into consideration. Rarely in history, however, has the risk been less than at present while war is being waged in Europe, Britain is tied up there, America is still at the beginning of her armament, Japan is the strongest power in the East Asia sphere and Russia could not act since there are 150 German divisions standing at her Western border. Such a moment will never occur again, it is unique in history. No (the Fuehrer) admits that there is a certain risk involved, but it is an exceptionally small one at a time when Russia and Britain are eliminated and America is not yet prepared. If this favourable moment would pass by and the European conflict would possibly end in a compromise, France and Britain would recover in a few years. America would join them as Japan's third enemy and Japan would sooner or later be faced with the task after all of defending the security of her living space (Lebensraum) in a battle against these three nations.

Page 12

of Orig.) Militarily, too, there has not been since the memory of man a situation relatively as favourable as now, although the military difficulties resulting from action should not be underestimated.

Especially favorable is the fact that there exist no conflicts of interests between Japan and her Allies. Germany, which would satisfy her colonial demands in Africa, is just as little interested in East Asia as Japan is in Europe. This is the best basis for cooperation between a Japanese East Asia and a German-Italian Europe.

On the other hand the cooperation of the Anglo-Saxons never meant a real coalition but always only a playing off of one against the other. Just as much as Britain does not put up with the hegemony of one nation in Europe, she would in East Asia play off Japan, China and Russia against each other to promote the interests of her own empire. The United States would act just like Britain, she would inherit the empire and replace British imperialism with American imperialism.

A better situation for joint action would hardly ever again exist for a personal reason also. He (The Fuehrer) has full confidence in himself, the German nation stands unitedly back of him as with nobody also in her previous history. He has the necessary power of resolution in critical situations and, finally, Germany is experiencing a tremendous series of successes which is also unique in the world but need not be repeated.

In conclusion the Fuehrer pointed out that his attitude toward Japan did not originate in the year 1941. He has always been for cooperation with this country. Ambassador OSHIMA knows that he (the Fuehrer) has worked firmly toward this goal for many years. He is determined in the future never again to deviate from this line. As already mentioned, especially favorable for cooperation is the fact that there are no conflicts in interest between Japan and Germany. For interests in the long run are indeed stronger than personalities and the will of a Fuehrer; therefore they always endanger anew the cooperation between nations if they are turned in opposite directions. In the case of Japan and Germany, therefore, one can plan for the longest time on account of the non-existence of such conflicts. This has been his firm conviction since earliest youth. The Japanese, German, and Italian nations would be highly successful if they would draw the consequences from this present unique situation.

MATSUOKA thanked the Fuehrer for his frank statements which made the whole situation very clear to him. Although he already has occupied himself thoroughly with the arguments advanced by HITLER, he would once again consider most thoroughly the arguments mentioned.

On the whole he agrees with the views mentioned by the Fuehrer. Especially he is also of the opinion that any resolute action involves a certain risk. MATSUOKA declared with reference to the report of Ambassador OTT and the German Foreign Minister through which the Fuehrer will probably be accurately informed about the present situation in Japan, that he wants to present the situation personally and very frankly. There are in Japan, as in other countries, certain intellectual circles which can be kept in check only by a strong man. This is the type which although he would like to have the cubs of the tigress, is, however, not prepared to go into the cave to snatch them away from their mother. These trends of thought, were presented by him using

the same picture at a conference at headquarters in the presence of two princes of royal blood. It is regrettable that Japan has not yet rid herself of these circles, indeed that some of these people (Page 16 of Orig.) are even in influential positions. Confidentially, however, he can say that, after a violent discussion, he prevailed with his view at the conference at headquarters. Japan will act, and that decisively, when she has the feeling that she would otherwise lose a chance which might only return after a thousand years; and that Japan will advance regardless of the condition of her preparations, because there would always be some people who would consider the preparation insufficient. This point he, MATSUOKA, carried successfully also against both the princes. The timid politicians in Japan would always hesitate and would act partly because of a sympathetic pro-British or pro-American attitude.

MATSUOKA then pointed out that he had advocated the alliance already long before the outbreak of the European war. He greatly exerted himself at that time on behalf of its conclusion, but regrettably had had no success. After the outbreak of the European war he personally held the view that Japan first should attack Singapore and put an end to British influence in this district, and only then should conclude the Tripartite Pact, because the thought of Japan joining the alliance without simultaneously making a contribution toward knocking-out Britain was unpleasant to him. Because, while Germany has already waged a gigantic battle against Britain for a year, Japan, at the time of the conclusion of the pact, had not yet contributed anything. Therefore, he had very strongly insisted on a plan of attacking Singapore, but did not push it through and then, by force of circumstances reversed his program and put joining of the pact in first place.

He did not have the least doubt that the South Sea problem could not be solved without the capture of Singapore by Japan. One has only (Page 18 of Orig.) to intrude into the cave of the tigress and take out the cubs by force.

It is only a matter of time until Japan will attack. According to his opinion the attack should ensue as soon as possible. Unfortunately he does not govern Japan but has to convert the rulers to his opinion. He will surely also succeed in this some day. But at the present moment he cannot, under these circumstances, assume any obligation to act for his Japanese nation.

Upon his return, he would give these matters his most serious attention after his conference with the Fuehrer and the German Foreign Minister and after having personally examined the situation in Europe. He could not promise anything definite but promises that he will personally advocate to the utmost the goals indicated.

MATSUOKA then also urgently requested the statements just presented by him to be held strictly confidential because upon their becoming known in Japan the members of the cabinet differing in opinion would probably turn pale and try to get him out of his office. (Page 19 of Orig.)



While endeavoring to bring about the pact, he had also kept strictest silence until the very last moment and frequently and purposely created the impression of a pro-American or a pro-British attitude for the deception of his adversaries.

Shortly before conclusion of the pact it was reported to him that the British Ambassador made strong propaganda among the Japanese that Japan was playing a very risky game by joining the Tripartite pact. The American Ambassador also expressed himself similarly. A few days after conclusion of the pact he asked the American Ambassador whether the reports about the propaganda were based on fact. The ambassador  
 Page 20 admitted everything and, moreover, stated that every Japanese he had met  
 f Orig.) since publication of the conclusion of the pact, had expressed the opinion that Germany would win the war. This, according to the opinion of the American Ambassador, is untrue, Germany has no chance to win the war and therefore it would be in his (the American Ambassador's) opinion actually a very risky game for Japan if she had concluded the pact perhaps with the assumption of a German victory.

MATSUOKA declared further that he had thereupon replied to the American Ambassador that only God knows who would win the war in the long run. But he (MATSUOKA) did not conclude the pact on the basis of the victory of this or that power, but based on his vision of the new order. He had listened with interest to the statements of the Fuehrer about the  
 Page 21 new order and was fully and entirely convinced by them. If he would  
 f Orig.) for once, assume purely hypothetically, that the fortunes of war would turn at a given moment against Germany, he must state to the American Ambassador that Japan would then immediately come to the assistance of her ally.

His visions of the new order were laid down by him in the preamble of the Tripartite Pact. That is an ideal which has been transmitted from one generation to another since time immemorial. For him, personally, the realization of this ideal is his life objective to which he has devoted all his labor up to now, in order to make a small contribution on his part toward its realization. This Tripartite Pact, Berlin-Rom-Tokyo, is also a contribution toward this realization. The execution of these trends of thought, MATSUOKA emphasized further, stands moreover with the motto: "No conquest, no oppression, no exploitation."  
 Page 22 This was not yet understood everywhere in Japan. However, if Japan  
 f Orig.) should ever deviate from this line, he (MATSUOKA) would be the first to fight against it.

In this connection MATSUOKA also reminded of the other principle of the preamble to the Tripartite Pact according to which every nation was to take the place due it. Although Japan, too, will proceed by force, if necessary, in establishing the new order, and although she sometimes would have to lead with a strong hand the nations affected by this new order, she nevertheless keeps the previously quoted motto constantly before her eyes: "No conquest, no oppression, no exploitation."

During the further course of the conversation MATSUOKA came to speak about his discussions with Stalin in Moscow. As an ally he owes an explanation about it to the German Foreign Minister and would have given it at the morning conference if the German Foreign Minister had not been called away prematurely. Now he intends to give this information to the leader.

Page 23 (Orig.) First of all he intended to pay a complimentary visit to Molotov on his trip through Moscow. After some reflection however, he decided to ask the Japanese ambassador to find out in a mild way from the Soviet government whether there exists any interest in a conference between Stalin and him. However, before the Japanese ambassador could follow his instructions with the Soviet government, the proposal was made by the Russian government itself for a meeting between Stalin, Molotov, and Matsuoka. He spoke with Molotov for about 30 minutes, Stalin for one hour, so that due to the necessary translations he spoke perhaps 10 minutes with Molotov and 25 minutes with Stalin.

Page 24 (Orig.) He had explained to Stalin that the Japanese are morally communists. This ideal had been passed on from the fathers to the sons since time immemorial. But at the same time he stated that he does not believe in political and economic communism and rather assumed that his Japanese ancestors had already early given up every attempt in this direction and had devoted themselves to moral communism.

For that which he called moral communism, MATSUOKA then quoted some examples from his own family. This Japanese ideal of moral communism had been overthrown by the liberalism, individualism and egoism introduced from the West. At present the situation in Japan in this respect is extremely confused. However, there is a minority which is strong enough to fight successfully for the resurrection of the "old ego" of the Japanese. This ideological struggle in Japan is extremely bitter. But those who fight for the restoration of the old ideal are convinced of their final victory.

Page 25 (Orig.) The Anglo-Saxons are basically responsible for the penetration of the above-mentioned prevailing ideology; and for the restoration of the old traditional Japanese ideal Japan is compelled, therefore, to fight against the Anglo-Saxons just as well as in China she is fighting not against the Chinese but only against Great-Britain in China and capitalism in China.

MATSUOKA stated further that he had explained to Stalin his ideas about the new order and thereby emphasized that the Anglo-Saxons constitute the greatest obstacle to the establishment of this order and Japan, therefore, of necessity has to fight against them. He explained to Stalin that the Soviets also on their part are advocating something new and that he believes to be able to settle the difficulties between Japan and Russia after the collapse of the British empire. He pictured the Anglo-Saxons as Japan's, Germany's and Soviet Russia's common enemy.

Page 26 Stalin hold out the prospect of an answer when he would travel  
(Orig.) through Moscow on his return to Japan, but immediately added after  
some deliberation that Soviet Russia never was friendly with Britain,  
nor ever will be.

MATSUOKA, in the further course of the conversation, made some  
remarks about the nature of the TENNO. The TENNO is the state, and  
the life as well as property of each Japanese belongs to the TENNO,  
that is the state. This is so to speak the Japanese version of a  
totalitarian state structure.

In conclusion MATSUOKA spoke admiringly about the way in which  
the Fuehrer is leading the German nation, which stands behind him  
in complete unity, with determination and power through this great  
time of revolution unequalled in history. Each nation has such a  
Page 27 leader but once in a thousand years. The Japanese nation has not  
(Orig.) yet found its Fuehrer. But he would surely appear in the hour of  
need and take over the leadership of the nation with determination.

Berlin, 1 April 1941

signed: SCHMIDT  
Ambassador

-----  
3 May 1946

I, WANDA S. TIESZEN, Civ., X 046265, hereby certify that  
I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German  
languages; and that the above is a true and correct  
translation of Document 1878-PS.

WANDA S. TIESZEN  
Civ., X 046265

G. 791

Document No. 532-B

Page 1.

Record of the Conversation Between the Fuehrer and the Japanese Foreign Minister MATSUOKA in the Presence of the German Foreign Minister and State Minister REISSNER in Berlin on 4 April 1941.

\* \* \* \*

Then MATSUOKA reported on his conversations with Duce and the Pope. With Duce he had had a general conversation on the state of Europe and the war and on the relations between Italy and Germany, as well as on the future development of the world.

\* \* \* \*

Finally the Italian Chief of State talked about Soviet RUSSIA and America. It was necessary to clearly understand the strength of one's adversaries. America was Enemy No. 1, with Soviet RUSSIA ranking next.

\* \* \* \*

He (MATSUOKA) agreed with these thoughts.

\* \* \* \*

MATSUOKA then also expressed the request that the FUEHRER instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as generously as possible the wishes of the Japanese Military Commission. Japan was in need of German help, particularly concerning U-boat warfare, which could be given by making available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as the latest technical improvements and inventions.

\* \* \* \*

Berlin, 4 April 1941

Signed: SCHMIDT.

7-191

十九百二十一年(昭和十六年)四月四日伯林ニ於テ獨逸外務大臣及ニ國務大臣マイスナ一兩氏、立會、許ニ行ハルニ總統ト日本外務大臣松岡氏ト、會談、覺書

Doc 534b

最初ニ松岡氏ハ總統、名義ヲ贈ラシニ寄贈品ニ對シ伯林滞在中、永久、思出、土産物トシテ且ツ一生、寶物トシ又名譽トシテ心ニ止ムル旨ヲ求ベテ深甚ナル感謝、意ヲ表シ同時ニ彼ハ彼ガ獨逸ニ於テ總統初メ外務大臣及ニ全獨逸國民ヨリ受ケシ友情的歡迎ニ對シ深キ感謝、意ヲ表ス。彼ハ彼ガ生存セル限り當地ニ於テ總ニル方面ヨリ受ケシ友情ハ決して忘却セズ彼ガ日本ニ歸國セバカ、及テ限り日本國民ガ獨逸ニ居ルニ依リ信實ナル友情ト尊敬、念ヲ以テ迎ヘテ居ルニ實ヲ日本國民ニ確信セシムル様努力致サント誓ヘリ。

ソレニ關係シテ松岡ハ彼、ハツリニ統領及ビ法王ト、會談ヲ報告ス。

No1

統領トハ彼ハ一般的ニヨーロッパ及ビ戦争状態ニ依テ對獨關係及ビ將來ノ世界ノ發展ニ就テ語ツ。

最後ニイタリア政府統領ハ尚ソ聯及ビアメリカニ就テ語ツ。ソノ對抗者ノ意義ヲ明クセヌバナラヌ。オ一奮、敵ハアメリカルソノオニ奮ニ對シテ。

RETURN TO ROOM 361

No 2.

Doc 532B

彼(私因)彼(賛成)多。

x x x x x

尚不私因氏(日本)軍事使節、希珍(對)去來(限)  
"寬大(應)せられ様各獨逸當局者(指示)致(予)  
"總統(總)願、意(速)今(日本)行(潜水艦)戰術  
'分野(於)最近、戰爭經驗、技術上、改良及發明  
'自由使用、形態(於)性速、後助(伊)要(予)中心

x x x x x

伯林十九百四十二年(昭和十六年)四月四日

署名 ミミット

Item 11  
Telegram (Open) To be kept in locked file.

Special Train EURCPA	5 July 1941	0.17 hours
Arrival	5 July 1941	1.10 hours

No. 598

- 1.) Code Bureau
- 2.) German Embassy Tokyo  
(Telegram Cipher, secret cipher process)

Remark: Sent to Tokyo under No. 981, Tel. Ktr., 5.7.41.

At the occasion of the discussion concerning Japan's attitude towards Soviet Russia, I wish to rectify below for your own orientation what MATSUOKA has told you at the time concerning my conference, with him about the conclusion of a Japanese-Russian Pact of Non-Aggression or Neutrality.

As you reported in your telegram No. 685 of 6 May 1941, MATSUOKA told you at that time that after his departure from Berlin, he did not at first consider the possibility of concluding a Japanese-Russian Treaty of Neutrality. He said he had even brought this up in his conversation with me merely stating his willingness to accept in case Russia was willing to conclude such a pact. By talking to you in this way, MATSUOKA obviously wanted to say that I would have had to reckon with the conclusion of the Treaty after the conversations at Berlin.

After agreement had been reached on the conclusion of the treaty and immediately before it was formerly signed, MATSUOKA also informed Count SCHULENBURG in Moscow in a similar vein. At this occasion Mr. MATSUOKA described his conversations with me at Berlin as follows: He had told me that while at Moscow he would probably not be able to avoid touching upon the long pending question of a Japanese-Russian treaty of neutrality or non-aggression. He would, of course, show no empressement whatever, but should the Russians comply with Japan's wishes, he would be obliged to do something. I had consented to this trend of thought.

Neither the description made to you nor that made to Count SCHULENBURG corresponds to the facts. The subject of a Japanese-Soviet Treaty of Non-Aggression or Neutrality has been touched upon by MATSUOKA and myself in our conversation of 28 March 1941, in the following way, according to the memorandum made immediately after the conversation by Minister SCHMIDT:

Following<sup>R</sup>/remark on the conclusion of a Japanese-Russian long-term trade agreement, MATSUOKA asked me directly whether during his return trip he should stop over in Moscow somewhat longer, in order to negotiate a Non-Aggression or Neutrality Pact. He stressed that the Japanese people would not allow a direct admittance of Russia into the Tri-Partite Pact, which would cause one cry of indignation all over Japan. I replied to MATSUOKA that the adherence of Russia to the Pact was out of the question and recommended that he not broach the previously mentioned question, i.e., the question of a Non-Aggression or Neutrality Pact with the Russians in Moscow, since this would not fit into the frame of the present situation. On MATSUOKA's further remark that the conclusion of a trade and fishery agreement would improve the atmosphere between Russia and Japan, I replied that there were no objections against the conclusions of such purely commercial treaties.

Hence, what I said to MATSUOKA at the time unmistakably revealed that I did not consider the conclusion of a Japanese-Russian Treaty of Non-Aggression or Neutrality Pact to be suitable. The news of the conclusion of the Pact therefore came as a surprise to me. However, I refrained at the time from making this known to MATSUOKA.

Even now there would be no sense in pointing out to MATSUOKA the incorrectness of the statement which he made to you at the time as well as to point to the fact that with the concluding of the Pact, he has surprised the German Government with a fait accompli. I am nevertheless informing you of the actual course of events because during your future political conversations, there may arise the chance to rectify this point to MATSUOKA in a suitable way, should it be deemed useful.

In the same way, there may be an occasion in the further course of events to remind MATSUOKA that during the same conversation in which he discussed the conclusion of the Japanese-Soviet Treaty with you, he made the following noteworthy statement: "Should Germany come to blows with the Soviet Union, no Japanese Premier or Foreign Minister would ever be able to keep Japan neutral. In this case Japan would be driven by the force of necessity to attack Russia at the side of Germany. No Neutrality Pact could alter any of this."

Should you deem it advisable occasionally to draw attention to both of the points, please do it in a very gentle manner so that MATSUOKA will not receive the impression that I wish to take him to task on these matters.

RIBBENTROP



Document No. 4062 G

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4062 G.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Curmin, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control of the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Harburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Harburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Harburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

s/ W. P. Curmin  
W. P. CURMIN

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

s/ G. E. GARDE  
G. E. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGO  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

# FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361

1886 - 1

「日本駐劄ソ聯大使」カー・アー・スメターニンノ  
一九〇一年六月二十五日附日記抜萃」

昨日午後三時三十分、余ハ同志、「マリク」ト  
共ニ松岡ノ許へ行ツタ。此ノ度ハ、彼ハ、自己ノ  
官邸ニ非ザル外務省ニ於テ、吾々ヲ引見シタ。余  
ハ松岡ト會ツテ或ル特別ナ點ニ氣付イタ。彼ハ還  
メテ親密ナ重要ナ會談ハ私邸ニ於テ、茶ヲ飲ミナ  
ガラ之ヲ行フモノデアルガ、公式ノ盛大ナ歡迎宴  
或ヒハ年、若シクハ乙ナル大使及ビ其ノ大使ノ代  
表スル國ヲ滿悅セシメル目的ヲ特ニ催サレル宴ハ  
松岡ハ迎接ヲ自分ノ官邸ヲ行ヒ、爾餘ノ一切ノ會  
見ハ、外務省ヲ行ヒシカモソノ際シバシバ之ヲ次  
官或ハ局長ニ委任スルノデアアル。今日迄、余ハ松  
岡ト或ヒハ彼ノ私邸ニ於テ、或ヒハ、彼ノ官邸ニ  
於テ會見シタガ、今日、始メテ、彼ハ、外務省ノ  
官室ニ余ヲ迎へ入レタ。

正シク、彼ハ余ノ健康ヲ固ヒ、余ガ末ダ病氣ヲ  
アルト考へ、本日、余ト會見シヨウトハ思ヒモヨ  
ラナカツタト述ベタリシテ羨望ヨリ吾々對談ヲ始  
メタ。

余ハ彼ニ配慮ト援助ニ對シテ親シク感謝ノ意ヲ  
述べ、又、ソレヲ、余ノ病中ニ、余ニ協力ヲ示シ

1886-2

テ異レタ大橋次官及ビ外務省官更ニ傳ヘテ異レル  
ヤウ稟請シタ。

松岡ハ、吾ガ國ノ體面ヲ圖乘セシメ吾ガ國ノ飛  
行機ヲ日本へ來着セシメル許可ヲ彼由ラガ得ヤウ  
トシテキタコトヲ強調シ、シカシ乍ラ、「日本ノ  
軍當局ガコレヲ許可シテカツタ。ト云ツテ、請  
ヲ縮シタ。コレヲ手端メノ新設ノ後、余ハ、彼ニ  
或ル問題ヲ闡明セシガタメ、キツテ來タ旨ヲ、傳  
ヘタ。

コレヨリ前、余ハ松岡ニ彼ガ「ソノ聯邦ニ對ス  
ル「ドイツ」側ノ軍事行動ノ開始ニ關スル吾ガ外  
務人民委員同志「ゲエー、エム、モロトフ」ノ聲  
明ノ完全ナル内容ヲ告知シテルカ否カヲ訊ネタ。  
松岡ハ、完全ナル内容ハ、知ラズ旨傳ヘタ。ソコ  
テ、余ハ外務省通譯、名田春壽ニ、余ノ携帶セル  
ソノ聲明ヲ松岡ニ通譯スルヤウ長請シタ。ソノ時  
松岡ハ、「ドイツ」駐劄日本大使大橋及ビ齋川ヨ  
リ、此ノ聲明ニ關スル情報ヲ符テ居リ、人民委員  
「モロトフ」氏ノ聲明ノ根本的内容ハ承知シテキ  
ルト指摘シタ。シカシ彼ハモツトヨクソレヲ知ルタ  
メニ、ソノ聲明ノ本文ヲ讀シテラクヤウ請フタ。  
然ル後余ハ、松岡ニ、此ノ戰爭ニ關シテノ日本  
ノ態度及ビ本年四月十三日締結セラレタ「ソノ」日

中立條約ニ願シテ「ソ」ニ請フガ中立ヲ守ツテキル  
 如ク、日本ガ將來、中立ヲ守ルカドウカニ慮テノ  
 浪本國冠ヲ懸シタ。松岡ハ卒直ナル回答ヲ同避シ、彼ノ問題ニ  
 關スル態度ハ週日（本年四月二十二日）「ヨ」ロ  
 ツバ「ヨ」リ傳聞後ノ彼ノ聲明ヲ說明シタト陳ベタ。  
 ソシテ、茲キ松岡ハ、三國同盟ガ日本ノ對外政策  
 ノ基礎ヲアリ、若シ、今次ノ戰爭ト中立條約ガ此  
 ノ基礎及ビ三國同盟ト矛盾スルナラバ、中立條約  
 ハ、「効力ヲ失フテ」ラウ「ト」イフ「ヨ」ト「力説シ  
 タ。併シ、日本ノ態度如何ハ、明日（六月二十五  
 日）ノ國辭ノ後、徹底尙ニ問ルミニ出サレルノチ  
 アル。（松岡ノ聲明ニ應シテハ余ハ詳知シ、特電  
 中ニ述ベタ）。

此ノ直後、松岡ハ、彼ガ、カ、ル幕僚ハ勦撃シ  
 テキナカツタ旨、據々ト述ベ給ス、「ドイツ」ノ  
 態度ヲ辯護シ給ス、特ニ、英國大使「クリツ」ズ  
 ノ「モ」スクラ「ヨ」リノ突然ノ出立ニ自辯シテ、彼  
 自來ノ心中ニ「ソ」思「ト」ア「ソ」ダ「ロ」サ「ク」ソ「ン」、  
 ツク「ト」ノ「精」定ニ「爾」スル「一」種「念」ガ「深」カ「ソ」ズ「ト」イフ  
 コトヲ強調シタ。

余ハ、「ソ」ザ「イ」エ「ト」ニ政府ガ「後」ノ「一」分「楚」、  
 「ドイツ」トノ條約ノ關係ヲ遵守シテ「アリ」「ト」イ

1886-4

ツニハ此ノ條約不遵守トイフ點デ、「ソノ豫ラ  
 非難スベキ如何ナル根據モナカツタコトヲ力説シ  
 テ本國臣ニ於ケル旨ヲ懇度ヲ詳述ニ陳明シタ。  
 余ハ、「クリツアス」ガ「モスクワ」ヨリ、突  
 然出立シタ事實カラ、松岡自身ガ下シタ如キカ、  
 ル籍誌ヲ爲スコトハ出来ナイコトヲ松岡ニ指摘シ  
 タ。  
 松岡ハ答ヘテ、現在、誰ガ証シク誰ガ間違ツテ  
 キルカ「ソノ」ヲ、証シ、解明スルコトハ困難ナアリ  
 彼ハ、喜ビ、辭シク、一切ノ資料、帶ニ、同志「  
 モロトフ」ノ證明ヲ載セシ、ソノ後ニ別定ガツク  
 テアラウト陳ベタ。  
 余ハ松岡ニ、此等事實ヲ分析スルニ當リ、「ソ  
 ヴアイエト」國民ガ、彼ヲ迎ヘテ、「ソノ」部ト日  
 本ノ間ノ友好關係改善ノ支持者トシテ見做シ、現  
 在モ見做シテキル繼力家ニフサハシク、密儀的デ  
 アレト願フタ。  
 終ニ隨ミ、余ハ、政府ガ此ノ問題ヲ解決シタラ  
 時ヲ移サズ、松岡ガ余ヲ招クヤウニト云フ希望ヲ  
 述べタ。  
 答ヘテ、松岡ハ「サウ、然シマセリ。」ト云ツ  
 タ。  
 此處ニ於テ、吾々ノ會談ハ終ツタ。此ノ會談ノ

1886-5

スベテハ、初メノ算務同ヲ除キ、松岡ノ無變想ナ  
事務的無味乾燥シク調子ノ中ニ行ハレタノデアル。  
（以前ニハチカツクヤサナ。）  
「正確、確證ス  
「ソノ時都外務人民委員部第二科真際主任  
（署名トエス・イ・ジネラロフニ）」

1886-6

第 一 八 八 六 號

證

余中山登ハ余ガ日本語及ヒ露西語ニ  
 精通セラル者ナルコトヲ證ニ  
 露西語原文及ヒ日本語原文ヲ對照ノ上  
 若ハ本語類ヲ撰實ニ且正確ニ翻譯セルモ  
 ノナルヲ確證セルコトヲ茲ニ證ス

昭和二年九月六日

中

山

登



1886-6

第百五十四號

余中山登ハ余ガ日本籍及ビ露口互請ニ

希通セル者ナルコトヲ登ニ

露口互請原文及ビ日本無異大ヲ對照ノ上

右ハ本警署ヲ稟實ニ且正續ニ翻譯セラルモ

ノナルヲ確證セラルコトヲ茲ニ證ス

昭和二年九月六日

中

山

登

證 明 書

1886-7

余、タラネンコ・グーゼー (TARANENKO G.I.)  
 陸軍中佐ハ「ソヴェート」社會主義共和國聯邦軍  
 隊ノ一員トシテ、日本陸軍在「ソ」聯大使スメタニ  
 シ (SMETANIN) ノ一九四一年六月二十五日附  
 日記按奉即チ東京ニ於ケル一九四一年ノ昭和十六  
 年ノ六月二十五日松岡日本國外務大臣トノ會談ガ  
 一九四六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ四月二十日「ソ」聯  
 外務省ヨリ余ニ交附セラルタルモノナル事及ビ上  
 記按ノ原本ハモスコウ (MOSCOW) ニ於ケル、  
 「ソヴェート」社會主義共和國聯邦中央文藝保管  
 所内ニ保管シアル事ヲ證明ス

日本國東京ニ於テ

一九四六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ五月三十日

署名及階級                      陸軍中佐                      タラネンコ

EXTRACT FROM THE DIARY OF  
K. A. SMETANIN, THE USSR AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN  
of June 25, 1942

I asked Matsuoka the basic question concerning the attitude of Japan towards the war; I asked him whether Japan would remain neutral, the same way as the USSR was, in accordance with the neutrality pact between the USSR and Japan of April 13 of the current year.

Matsuoka evaded a direct answer to this question and said that his attitude to this problem had already been expressed (on April 22 of the current year) in his statement made by him upon his return from Europe. At the same time he emphasized that the Tripartite Pact was the basis of the foreign policy of Japan and if the present war and the neutrality pact happened to be at variance with that basis and with the Tripartite Pact, the neutrality pact "will not continue in force."

\* \* \* \* \*

The copy is correct:

N.I. Generalov, Chief of the Second Far Eastern Department  
of the People's Commissariat of  
Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF  
THE EXERPTS OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT

I, V. KAPLAN, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated excerpts of the above Document.

V. KAPLAN

EXTRACT FROM THE DIARY OF  
K. A. SMETANIN, THE USSR AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN  
of June 25, 1942

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF  
THE EXERPTS OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT

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V. KAPLAN

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G.I.,

a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify  
that the attached document -- "An extract from the diary of Smetanin  
the Soviet Ambassador to Japan about the talk with Matsuoaka, the  
Japanese Foreign Minister, of June 25, 1941, in Tokyo.  
was delivered to me by the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

on or about 20 April, 1946, and that the original of the  
said document may be found in the Central Archives of the U.S.S.R.  
in Moscow.

I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_.

Lt. Col. Taranenko 's/  
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan,

May 30, 1946.

6-111

Doc. No. 4072-E  
Item 5

Page 1

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

To be kept in locked file.

Tokyo 15 July 1941 1230 hours  
Arrival 16 July 1941 8.23 "

No. 1248 of 15 July

Most urgent!

Director European Section informed me that the Soviet Ambassador, on Saturday, announced himself to MATSUOKA for an urgent conversation in order to ask, in the name of his government, whether the neutrality pact would be applied, on the part of the Japanese, to the present German-Russian war. MATSUOKA replied that the neutrality pact could not be applied to the German-Russian war. It was concluded at a time when the German-Russian relations were essentially different.

Russian Ambassador, who had expected a statement that would set his mind at ease was much taken aback by this declaration.

OTT.

Marginal Note:

Sent on to Special Train without number  
Esp. Ktr. 16 July 1941.

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the german and english languages, and as a result of the comparison between the german and the english texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4072H.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cummins, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U. S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1946, and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cummins  
W. P. CUMMINS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U. S.)

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

No. 1

167.41  
Tel. Km.

(註) 番号ナシニ特別  
列車ニ轉送

オット

EX 794

ヨロツバ局長ハ「ビエート大使ガ土曜日、彼ノ政府、  
名ニ於テ日本側カラ、中立條約ガ現在、獨ソ戰ニ適  
用カレカ否カラ質問スツタメ緊急會談ノ度ニト松岡  
ニ通知シテ来タト私ニ通報シタ 松岡ハソレニ  
対シ彼ニ中立條約ハ独ソ戰ニハ適用サレ得ナイト  
答ヘタ。中立條約ハ独ソ關係ガ本質的ニ異  
ツテ居タ或時期ニ於テ締結サレタト。  
安心セシムル聲明ヲ期待シニキタ ヲシヤ大使、  
コノ言明ニ非常ニ狼狽シタ

Doc

4052H  
Items 5

修正セ復誦

電報(秘密暗號法)

施錠事項トシテニ取扱ニ

東京

一九四一年七月十五日

十二時三十分  
八時二十三分

着

十六日

緊急

七月十五日附第二四八号

丁



Doc 405214  
Item 5

書類 四〇五二H子

證

余 *Wenich. Stano* に余が獨逸語及び  
日本語ニ精通セル者ナルコト並ニ獨  
逸語原文及び日本語原文ヲ對照シ上  
右ハ本書類ヲ真實ニ且正確ニ翻譯セルモ、  
一ニヲ確證セシムルニ茲ニ證入

*Wenich. A Stano*

余、W. P. Carrington 正ニ宣旨シテ次ノ語項ヲ  
監音ス

一 余ハ合衆國自治省附、同自治關係事項政治原  
向部長タル事、及右ニ據リ余ハ（合衆國）自治  
軍政部代表ノ一員タルコト、且期上表明セラル  
後ニ於テ、余ハ自治省附、自治文書本部ニ  
於テ自治省附自治省集議文書並ニ文庫、原本ノ  
占有、保管、管理ニ任シタル事。

二 上述自治省附自治省集議文書並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合  
自治軍政部司令官ノ指揮下ニ在ル軍隊ニヨリ  
テ自治取得セラレ、其後、保ノ下ニ、初メ自治省  
マールブルグニ於テ該軍隊ニヨリテ軍文書本部  
ニ蒐集セラレ、後該聯合軍部任官ヨリ上述セル  
自治省附自治省集議文書並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合  
自治軍政部ニ移管セラレタルモノナル事

三 余ハ一九四五年八月十三日、自治省マールブルグ  
ニ於テ、上述文書本部に當ラセラルタル事。  
是ニ仍リテ該自治省附自治省集議文書並ニ文庫原  
本ハ、余ハ自治省マールブルグ駐在當時、初メテ  
余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任シ、爾來引續キ余ノ  
占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事

三 余ノ此供送品ノ添附セラル、所ノ文書ハ上述ノ  
御送外務省樂書文書並ニ文庫トシテ、自認セラ  
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ付シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ  
置カレタル、御送外務省文書原本ノ、真正精確  
ナル直接複製寫眞ノ居本タル事

四 茲ニ添附セラレタル直接複製寫眞原本ノ文書原  
本ハ、余ノ保管、自保ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ  
點檢圖覽ニ費スル如クナシアリ、爲ニ該原本ヲ  
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫眞原本ヲ提  
供シ且ツ之ヲ點檢ラサスモノナル事

ダアルゴー・ビー・カミング  
(W. P. Cumming)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ口前ニ於テ署名且  
宣誓ス

中佐 シー・エッチ・ガード  
G. H. Garde

高級副官兼書記官

Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

(合衆国) 副連軍政部

Doc. No. 4033D

Page 1

Telegram (To be kept in locked file)

(Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 23 June 1941                    1235 M  
Arrived 22 " "                    2215 hours

No. 1012 of 22 June                    Most urgent!

In answer to telegraphic instruction Multex No. 401  
of 21 June,

For the Reich Foreign Minister

Today at 1900 Japanese time, after receiving the telegram instruction mentioned above, I called on Foreign Minister MATSUOKA. I explained to him in detail the memorandum of the German Government and moreover handed to him the proclamation of the Reich.

The Foreign Minister accepted my explanation appreciatively and told me that Ambassador OSHIMA had been informed by the Reich Foreign Minister, after 0400 German time, corresponding to 1100 Japanese time, that war with the Soviet Union had begun. He thereupon requested me for information whether there had been a formal declaration of war. I answered in the negative and referred him to the text of the memorandum, where mention is made of the removal of a threat made against the German Reich. MATSUOKA described my explanation as valuable, but requested me to ask Berlin for information on this point. Precise wording of the question is without decisive significance for the attitude of the Japanese Government. However he requested precise information on the German point of view.

MATSUOKA remarked further:

1. A meeting of the Control Committee of the cabinet, consisting of the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, the Army Chief and the Finance Minister will take place tomorrow afternoon. He would report on the situation and hoped to be able to inform the German Government expeditiously of the opinion of the Japanese Government.

2. The Japanese Government would adopt no measures without detailed consultation with the Government of the Reich.

3. For himself he could once again assert that the United States would not be in a position to deliver military supplies to the Soviet Union by the Pacific route. The Japanese cabinet would certainly be of the same opinion.

4. He had requested all departments to refrain from giving their own views on the situation through spokesmen; the Japanese press was recommended to be reticent by the Bureau of Information.

MATSUOKA then asked me for information whether Germany reckoned on a quick collapse of the Stalin regime, as he had for some time been able to see danger in it only through an external war. When I answered that the German considerations were not known by me in detail he requested information from Berlin.

MATSUOKA continued that he had gained the impression from the report of Ambassador OSHIMA, that the Fuehrer and the Foreign Minister did not expect active Japanese participation against the Soviet Union on the basis of the Tri-Partite Pact. He personally was of the same opinion as before, that in the long run Japan could not remain neutral in this conflict. In the event of the entry of the United States of America into the war, as a result of the Russo-German war, he personally considered that the Tri-Partite Pact would apply to Japan.

Towards the end of the interview MATSUOKA received another telegram from OSHIMA wherein the Reich Foreign Minister called attention to an alleged Russian withdrawal of troops from the Far East. MATSUOKA explained spontaneously that he would immediately propose counter measures. MATSUOKA was thoroughly positive and cordial throughout the whole interview. He denied emphatically that the existence of the cabinet was in danger, and he repeatedly expressed his confidence that a quick success would be the lot of the German proceedings.

With regard to the current economic negotiations, he advocated that they should be carried on steadily.

Request telegraphic answer to the question brought up by MATSUOKA.

OTT

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cummins, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945, and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

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/s/ W. P. Cummins  
W. P. CUMMINS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Ex. 796

電報 (按電報字法)

鑒之聯合保管者之

Doc 4062E

東京 一九四二年(昭和十六年)七月三日 三時三十分

着 一九四二年(昭和十六年)七月三日 六時三十分

死四二年(昭和十六年)七月三日附不。元早

至急報

News

獨逸國外務大臣是

(日附電報才九四二号+) 参照

+) 外務大臣是

上記電報訓令、到着直後余、松岡ヲ訪ハ彼ニ獨逸  
 外務大臣、個人的報告ヲ傳達シ、松岡ニ余ニ彼ニ大島大  
 使、此ノ報告、通知ヲ既ニ天皇ニ議長トシ、本日、内閣  
 議、開催前ニ得テ平素ト説明シ、精確ニ本文ニ知テ  
 加彼、彼ノ立場支持、多シ、獨逸外務大臣、特別ニ傳達  
 正ニ到着セリトシ、平素ト會員、明確ニ決定ト傳達スル  
 利用シ、彼ノ報告ヲ感謝シ、且、之ヲ彼、明日直ニ陸海軍  
 天皇ニ知ラセシ、彼個人トシ、彼、獨逸外務大臣、考テ  
 全然同意見ナリ、彼、彼ノ意見、現在、貴僚、開キ、

701





103

Journal Doo 4062E

不足、出資及、除去年に於て、  
場合、備へ、  
今一度、確言、  
オット

特別列單、  
T.L.K. 七、  
四二年七月三日

註

767

Item # D004062E

書類第四〇六三號

證

余 *Wick Stearns* 係獨逸語及

日本語ニ精通セシ者ナルコト並ニ

獨逸語原文及日本語原文ヲ對照

シ右ノ本書類ニ真實ニ且正確ニ翻譯

セシモノナルヲ證セシコトヲ茲ニ證ス

*Wick A. Stearns*

Ex 796

DOCUMENT NO. 4062 E

Page 1

Item 8

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

To be kept in locked file

Tokyo 3 July 1941 3:55 p  
Arrival 3 July 1941 6:30 hours  
No. 1109 of 2 July 1941

Most Urgent!

For the German Foreign Minister  
Re Telegram of the 1st, No. 942 (Foreign Minister)

Immediately upon receipt of the above telegraphic order I have called on MATSUOKA, personally, transmitting the message of the German Foreign Minister. MATSUOKA stated that he had already received from Ambassador OSHIMA the announcement of the message already before today's Cabinet Session, presided over by the Emperor, had begun. Even without knowing the exact text he had made use of the fact that a special message from the German Foreign Minister was imminent for backing up his point of view and for bringing about a clear-cut decision. He was thankful for the message with which he would tomorrow immediately acquaint the Army and Navy, as well as the Emperor. He was personally in full agreement with the trend of thought set forth by the German Foreign Minister. He regretted that his opinions had not prevailed for the moment. During the Cabinet Session he had warningly pointed out to Premier KONOYE and other Cabinet members that the Japanese people would, after some time, demand government action against the SOVIET UNION. Antagonistic forces, who now are in the foreground, will in the long run be unable to carry their point.

He requests to assure the German Foreign Minister that he will adhere to the previous way /an alter Linie Festhalten/.

I brought to MATSUOKA's attention that the resolution of the Cabinet will certainly not be understood by the people, who will in the future heavily blame the government for the missing /their opportunity/.  
(Matsucka said the reason for the formulation of the Japanese statement to the SOVIET Ambassador was the necessity to deceive the Russians or at least to keep them in a state of uncertainty, owing to the armaments still being incomplete. At present SMETANIN was not aware of speedy preparations being made against the SOVIET UNION as is hinted at in the government resolution transmitted to us.)

He has furthermore informed SMETANIN that, as far as was known to Japan the USA had not promised armed assistance /Waffenhilfe/ nor had the SOVIET UNION asked for it. He wished to give the earnest advice not to attempt any cooperation of this kind since, at the request of her Allies, Japan would not tolerate shipments.

I told MATSUOKA that JAPAN's attitude could not satisfy us. MATSUOKA replied that he had expected this, personally regretted the Cabinet resolution, but he assured us again that deficiencies in preparedness

/  
would

Ex 796

Item 8

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

To be kept in locked file

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Arrival 3 July 1941 6.30 hours  
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I told MATSUOKA that JAPAN's attitude could not satisfy us. MATSUOKA replied that he had expected this, personally regretted the Cabinet resolution, but he assured us again that deficiencies in preparedness

would

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Guerin, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser in German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied Forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

e/ W. P. Guerin,  
W. P. GUERIN

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

e/ G. E. GARDE  
G. E. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGO  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

電報(秘密暗号法)

錠ヲ掛ケ保管スベシ

羅馬 一九四二年(昭和十七年)七月一日十五時二十分

幕 一九四二年

(七月一日十五時四十分)

七月一日附 第二四七三号

秘密

Doc 4062 F  
Item 1

EX 797

合ホノ...以前ニ既ニ「ビスマルク」ニ合旨ヲテ其ヒ  
度イトリテ「希望」ヲ述ベテ其ノ「期」又ニ「決」テ其意  
日本大使ハ本日「ビスマルク」ヲ訪ネテ其ノ「彼」ノ「訪」問  
ノ理由ハ先ヅ第一ニ「独」ノ「戦」場ノ「現」在ノ「状」態ニ付知ラ  
セルコトデアリタ。

注意スベキハ日本テハ内閣更迭ガ考慮サレテ其ト  
トフ「彼」ノ「言」葉デアリタ。彼ハ此ノ際日本ハ日本トシ  
テ積極的ニロシアニ對シテ前進スル意ハ固ク有リテ  
其ルガ然ル未ダ數週間ヲ要スルトイフコトヲ暗示シ  
タ。斯ルニ政策ハ然シテ下ラ松岡氏ノ「辞」職ヲ要ス  
ル。彼ハ最近ソビエト而路西亞トノ「不」侵略條約  
ヲ締結シテ「許」リテアルカラ、免ニテ「用」暫クハ政治ノ  
表面カラ「女」ヲ消サネバナラヌデアリタ。

尚日本大使ハ日本ノ政策ハ米國ノ「参」戰ヲ妨  
ゲル為ニ凡ユルコトヲセネバナラヌト述ベタ。

マウ...セン

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361

Handwritten notes on the left side of the page, possibly a list or index.

Doc 4062 F  
Otemi

Ulrich Strass (Ulrich Strass) ...  
Handwritten notes in the center of the page, including the name 'Ulrich Strass' and various symbols and characters.

Ulrich A. Strass

Handwritten mark or signature at the bottom right corner.

余、W. P. Cambridge へ正ニ真書シテ次ノ請願ヲ  
願言ス

一 余ハ合衆國自治省附、同國獨逸關係事項政治願  
問部長タル等、及右ニ依リ余ハ（合衆國）獨逸  
軍政部代表ノ一員タルニト、且如上表附セル資  
格ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸柏林府在、柏林文書本部ニ  
於ル同益獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫、原本ノ  
占有、保管、管理ニ任シアル等。

二 上述獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ總合  
國總領事館尙書部ノ指揮下ニ在ル專任ニヨリ  
テ負担取得セラレ、其信保ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國  
マールブルグニ於テ該專任ニヨリテ軍文書本部  
ニ蒐集セラレ、後該總合軍備任官ヨリ上送セル  
／＼柏林／文書本部ニ移管セラレタルモノナル等

三 余ハ一九四五年八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグ  
ニ於テ、上述文書本部總管ヲ命セラレタル等。  
是ニ仍リテ該國總領事館外務省集積文書並文庫原  
本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ駐在任時、初メテ  
余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ歸シ、爾來引續キ余ノ  
占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル等



四 余ノ此供進書ノ添附セラル、所ノ文書ハ上述ノ  
獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫トシテ、自獲セラ  
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ爲シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ  
置カレタル、獨逸外務省文書原本ノ、真正精確  
ナル直接復寫寫眞ノ謄本タル事

五 茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫寫眞謄本ノ文書原  
本ハ、余ノ保管、留保ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ  
詰問ニ資スル如クナシアリ、爲ニ該原本ヲ  
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫眞謄本ヲ提  
供シ且ツ之ガ謄寫ヲナスモノナル事

ダゲルユー・ビー・カミング  
(W. P. Cumming)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且  
宣誓ス

中佐 シー・エツチ・ガード  
G. H. Garde

海軍省情報部長  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

(合衆國) 海軍省情報部長

62797

Item 1.

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

To be kept in locked file.

Rome, 1 July 1941	1520 hours
Arrival, 1 July 1941	1540 hours
No. 1473 of 1 July	
Secret	

4) Clear text evidently missing

The Japanese ambassador, who previously my /) stated his desire to be received by BISMARCK, today called on the latter. The object of his call was, in the first place, to obtain information on the present state of the German-Russian theatre of war.

Worthy of note was his remark that a change of Cabinet must be reckoned with in JAPAN. (He intimated that JAPAN has the intention to actively advance /Vorgehen against Russia on its part, but needs a few more weeks. Such a policy, however, necessitates the resignation of Mr. MATSUOKA; since the latter has only recently concluded a pact of non-aggression with SOVIET RUSSIA, he would have to leave the political arena, at least for a certain period of time.) The Japanese ambassador further remarked that JAPAN's politics must do everything in order to prevent America from entering into the war.

WACKENSEN.

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4062-F.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cummins, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

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/s/ W. P. Cummins  
W. P. CUMMINS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Q-798

Doc. No. 4062-H  
Item 13

Page 1

Secret State Matter

Berlin, 6 July 1941

Pol I n. 2107 g.Rs.

Six copies were made  
This is No. 1

Ref.: LR. BRAHARZ

LEI GRANDU

(The Army High Command has informed us on 6 July:

"Colonel YAMOTO, assistant of the Japanese  
Military Attache, in Berlin called on Colonel  
von LAHOUSE, Chief of Counter Intelligence  
Section II, on 4 July 1941, accompanied by Major  
HIGUCHI, and said the following:

"The Japanese General Staff has commissioned  
him to communicate 'to us' that the Japanese  
General Staff is ready to carry out sabotage  
attacks against SOVIET RUSSIA in the Far East,  
especially from MONGOLIA and MANCHURIA and, primarily  
against the area adjoining Lake BAIKAL."

(BRAHARZ.)

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the german and english languages, and as a result of the comparison between the german and the english texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4062H.

's/ Ulrich A. Straus

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cummins, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

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/s/ W. P. Cummins  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

No 1.

EX 798

クラマツ

陸海軍最高司令部八月六日次、如ク通報ト素ツ。  
 『ペリン』日本大使館付陸軍武官補佐官、陸軍大佐山本、  
 (九四年(昭和十六年)七月四日陸軍少佐樋口ヲ帶同シテ  
 陸軍第三局長 (Abt 正) 『オニラ』ハセ之大佐、許ニ現ル。其ノ  
 次、如ク説明ス。  
 日本、参謀本部ハ彼ニ次、予ヲ傳ハシ、極東ニ於テ、ソビエツト、コシヤニ  
 即チ日本参謀本部ハ極東ニ於テ、ソビエツト、コシヤニ  
 対シテ、特ニ蒙古及シテ滿洲ニ於テ、而シテ先ヅ、ニ、バイカル湖  
 周辺、地域ニ對シ、サホタニニ攻撃ヲ美シクニ準備カ  
 フト』

宛書

「ペリン」、一九四一年(昭和十六年)七月  
 之部作成中一ノ一  
 独逸、秘密事項

4062H  
Item 13

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

No 1.

EX 798

クラック

次、如ク説明ス。  
 陸海軍最高司令部八月六日次、如ク通報ト来ツ。  
 「ベリン」日本大使館付陸軍士官補佐官、陸軍大佐山本、  
 (九四年(昭和十六年)七月四日陸軍少佐樋口ヲ帶同シテ  
 陸軍中局長 (Abt II) オナラハセシ大佐、許ニ現ルハ且ツ  
 日本、参謀本部ハ彼ニ次、予ヲ傳ヘシ様々委任シタリ  
 即チ日本参謀本部ハ極東ニ於テ、ソビエツト、コシヤニ  
 対シテ特ニ蒙古及シテ滿洲カラ而シテ先ガチニ、バイカル湖  
 周辺、地域対シ、サボターニ攻撃等ヲ美觀スル準備カ  
 ルト」

宛書

「ベリン」一九四一年(昭和十六年)七月  
 之部作成中一ノ一  
 独逸不秘密事項

4062H  
Item 13



No 2.

4062H  
Stem 13

書類第四六二H 號

證

余 *Ulrich Atama* ハ余カ独逸語及也  
 日本語ニ精通スル者ナルコト 並ニ  
 独逸語原文及也 日本語原文ヲ对照  
 上カ本書類ヲ眞定ニ且云確ニ翻譯  
 セシメ、ナレヲ確證セシムトヨ茲ニ證入

*Ulrich A. Atama*

No 2.

40624  
Stem 13

書類第四〇六二H 號

證

余 *Ulrich Stamm* 〆余が独逸語及  
 日本語ニ精通セル者ナルコト 並ニ  
 独逸語原文及 日本語原文ヲ对照  
 〆上点本書類ヲ眞定ニ且正確ニ翻譯  
 セルノ上此ヲ確證セラルコトヲ茲ニ證ス

*Ulrich A. Stamm*

余ハ、R. P. カミングハ正ニ宣稱シテ次ノ語項ヲ  
證言ス

一 余ハ合衆國内務省時、同國獨逸關係事項政治原  
向部長タル等、及右ニ據リ余ハ(合衆國)獨逸  
軍政部代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上義明セル資  
格ニ於テ、余ハ公海軍所在、怡林文書本部ニ  
於ル獨逸獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫、原本ノ  
占有、保管、管理ニ在リタル事。

二 上述獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合  
國總征軍最高司令部ノ指揮下ニ在ル軍除ニヨリ  
テ直接取得セラレ、其結果ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國  
マールブルグニ於テ該軍除ニヨリテ軍文書本部  
ニ蒐集セラレ、後該總司令部委任官ヨリ上述セル  
ノ怡林ノ文書本部ニ移管セラレタルモノナル事

三 余ハ一九四五平八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグ  
ニ於テ、上述文書本部信實ヲ告セラレタル事。  
是ニ仍リテ該國公海軍外務省集積文書並文庫原  
本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ駐在當時、初メテ  
余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ歸シ、買家引續キ余ノ  
占有、保管、管理ノ下ニ在リタル事

四 余ノ此後追往ノ添附セラル、所ノ文書ハ上述ノ  
御遺外務省架紙文書並ニ文庫トシテ、自撰セラ  
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ歸シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ  
置カレタル、御遺外務省文書原本ノ、真正精確  
ナル直接復寫寫真ノ屬本タル事

五 茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫寫真屬本ノ文書原  
本ハ、余ノ保管、留保ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ  
歸還閲覧ニ費スル如クナシアリ、茲ニ該原本ヲ  
流用ナシ得サルが故ニ、該原本ノ寫真屬本ヲ提  
供シ且ツ之ガ註明ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユー・ビー・カミング  
(D. B. Cumming)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且  
宣誓ス

中佐 シー・エッチ・ガード  
G. H. Garde

高級副官兼事務長  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

(合衆國) 海軍軍政部

E#799

Doc. No. 4062C

Page 1

Item 22

Telegram (Secret cipher process)

Tokyo, 12 July 1941	1025 hours
Arrived 13 July 1941	1.00 "

No. 1200 of 12 July

For High Command of Armed Forces.

A. I believe the following individual measures for Japanese preparations for war seem to have been taken:

- 1) Numerous officers called to new jobs.
- 2) Reserves of 24 years to 27 years allegedly called up.
- 3) Additional car drivers called up.
- 4) Requisition of tractors in Manchuria.
- 5) Students not allowed to travel far.
- 6) Russian speaking persons called up.

B. Allegedly only three divisions are kept in readiness for the occupation of Saigon which is expected on 17 July according to rumors.

C. Replenishment of the Kwantung Army for a war against Soviet Russia which is not yet imminent, evidently via Shanghai and Tientsin where reservists (cf. A2) and, to begin with, about two Japanese divisions including the 16th, are being sent.

D. In China major Japanese operations are unlikely at present.

Kretschmer

ETT

Note: Sent on to the code clerk of the Armed Forces High Command via the teletype office.

Tel. Ktr. 13.7.

Doc. No. 4062C

Page 2

Certificate

I, ULRICH STRAUS, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4062C.

/S/ ULRICH STRAUS

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cummins, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said Document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945, and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cummins  
W. P. CUMMINS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

AFFIDAVIT

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/s/ W. P. Cummins  
W. P. CUMMINS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)





4062C

C 末ダ直接ニハ差迫ツニナケイ対ソビエト

ロニ中戰ノ爲ノ國東軍ヲ表面上海並ニ天津ヲ格テ補充ニテナレ。莫勉ハ豫備軍

(A)ト比較セヨガ而シテ虎少亦ニソ、下二十六師

國ガソルニ約ニケ、日本師團ガ輸送サレ

D 支那ニ於テハ現存ヨリ大ナル日在ノ作戦

有リサニ惡心ナキ



ソソクナレ  
ナシ

注意電信所ヲ通シテ陸軍司令部ノ秘

書記ニ發送ナリ

Tei.  
KUI  
127

4062C

書類 芥四〇六二〇号

證

原 Ulrich Straus 八余ガ独逸語

及也 日本語ニ精通 七ル卷ナレコト並

ニ独逸語 原文及也 日本語原文

ヲ对照ノ上在ハ不書類ヲ眞実

ニ且正確ニ筆記 七ル元ノ下

ルニ 確證 七ルコトヲ並ニ證明ス

Ulrich A. Straus.

著 名

管 道 供

余、W・P・カミング（ W. P. CUMMINGS ）

ハ正ニ宣稱シテ次ノ諸項ヲ發言ス

Cent. Page 1

一 余ハ合衆國國務省ニ、同國獨逸關係幕僚政治顧問部員タル事、及右ニ據リ余ハ（合衆國）獨逸軍政部代表ノ一員タル事ト、且如上要明セル事ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸領事官在、柏林文藝本部ニ於ル國書獨逸外務省幕僚文藝並ニ文庫、原本ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任シアル事。

二 上述獨逸外務省幕僚文藝並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合國送征置最高司令部ノ指揮下ニ在ル毎隊ニヨリテ徴収取獲セラレ、其確保ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國マールブルグニ於テ該部隊ニヨリテ軍文藝本部ニ蒐集セラレ、後該聯合軍總司令部ヨリ上述セルノ柏林ノ文藝本部ニ送付セラレタルモノナル事

三 余ハ一九四五年八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグニ於テ、上述文藝本部擔當ヲ命セラレタル事。是ニ仍リテ該徴収獨逸外務省幕僚文藝並文庫原本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ駐在當時、初メテ余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ歸シ、爾來引續キ余ノ占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事

Sept. page - 2

四 余ノ此供還書ノ添附セラル、所ノ文管ハ上述ノ  
獨逸外務省集談文書並ニ文庫トシテ、爾後セラ  
レ、余ノ占有、保存ニ付シ、且余ノ整理ノ下ニ  
置カレタル、獨逸外務省支書原本ノ、真正精確  
ナル直探復寫寫真ノ謄本タル事

五 茲ニ添附セラレタル直探復寫寫真謄本ノ文書原  
本ハ、余ノ保存、整理ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ  
點檢調査ニ費スル如クナシアリ、爲ニ該原本ヲ  
流用ナシ待サルが故ニ、該原本ノ寫真謄本ヲ提  
供シ且ツ之ガ複製ヲナスモノナル事

クヱルユール、ピール、カミング  
(E. H. CUMING)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且  
宣誓ス

由佐 シー・エツク・ガード  
G. E. GARDE

高級副官事務取扱  
LT. COLONEL. AGD

ACTING ADJUTANT GENERAL.

(合衆國) 邦連軍政務

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361

電

(秘密附號法)

東京 一九四一年八月一日 十一時〇五

着 " " 二日 一時〇〇

至 急

八月一日附 第一四一五號

4025-2-1

Ex 800

外務次官カラ事務ヲ委任サレタ山本局長ハ余トノ最  
 初ノ合談ニ於テ現狀ニ關シ次ノ如キ通知ヲシタ。日  
 本ト佛蘭西政府トノ間ニ締結セラレタル印度支那ニ  
 關スル協定ノ通告ニ接シ、英國政府ハ印度支那ノ安  
 全ハ英國ニヨリ脅威セラレテキルト云フ、傳達サレ  
 タ理由ニ對シ、強硬ナル抗議ヲ申シ立テ、日本ノ太  
 平洋西南部ヘノ此レ以上ノ進出ハ重大ナル結果ヲ生  
 セシメルニ相違ナイト聲明シタ。アメリカ合衆國政  
 府ハ同様ナ聲明ヲナシタ。兩國政府ハ抗議ト警告ヲ  
 爲シテ、明ラカニ日本ノ態度ニ付満足シタモノデア  
 リ、差シ當リ經濟的報復ニ限ツテキル、ト云フ私ノ  
 解説ニ山本ハ反對シナカッタ。彼ハ日本ハ新シク獲  
 得シタ強力ナ地位ニ依リ、米英勢力ヲ著シク不安ナ  
 ラシメ、極端勢力ノ爲ニ武力威壓ヲ極メテ強化シタ、  
 ト強調シタ。

ロシアノ極東ニ於ケル戦力ヲ消滅セシメル志口ノ下

4025D-2...

ニ爲サレタル動員ハ是ト同様ノ意味ノ効果ヲ有シテ  
 ナル。ソビエツト政府ハ公式上ハ自重シテナルガ、  
 然シ信ズベキ情報ニ依レバ益々憂慮シツ、動員ニ注  
 目シ、最早殆ド此ノ上軍隊ヲ西部ヘ輸送スル決心ガ  
 出来ヌデアラウ。本日休暇ヲ滞在シテナル際、余ガ  
 或メテ訪同シタ白鳥モ眞面目ニ余ニ指摘シタル、日  
 本ハソビエツト政府ニ對スル何カノ要求ニヨリ積極  
 的ナ前進ヲ開始セント欲シテナルカ、ト云フ時ヲ根  
 據トシテ、其レト無ク打診シタ時、外務次官ハ此ノ  
 方法ハ中立協定ニ違ヒ、ロシアノ日本攻撃ニ對スル  
 防衛ノ口實ヲ見出ス上ニ最上ノ方法デアルト云ツタ。  
 彼ハソ聯ガ受諾不能トナルデアラウ程嚴重ナル要求  
 ヲ個人的ニ想像シテナルガ、此ノ際彼ハ明ラカニ領  
 土ノ割讓ニ着目シテキタ。ソビエツト政府ハ其ノ際  
 悉ク躊躇的商議ト米英ノ増大スル壓迫トノ協同ニ  
 依リ、日本ノ展開開始ヲ冬ノ始メ迄遅ラセ、之ニヨ  
 リ其レヲ恐ラク全然阻止セシメ得ルデアラウ、ト云  
 フ余ノ解説ニ對シ、山本ハ個人的ニハ早急ノ開戦ガ  
 正シイト思フト曰言シタ。

オ ツ ト

余、W. P. Cummings カミングハ正ニ宣誓シテ次ノ諸項ヲ  
宣誓ス

一 余ハ合衆國内務省付、同國獨逸關係事項政治原  
面部長タル事、及び是ニ就リ余ハ（合衆國）獨逸  
軍政事代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上表明セル資  
格ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸外務省、柏林文書本部ニ  
於ル獨逸獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫、原本ノ  
占有、保管、管理ニ任シタル事。

二 上述獨逸外務省集積文書並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合  
國遣任軍政顧問司令部ノ指揮下ニ在ル軍隊ニヨリ  
テ眞接取得セラレ、其結果ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國  
マールブルグニ於テ該軍隊ニヨリテ軍文書本部  
ニ蒐集セラレ、後該聯合軍總任官ヨリ上述セル  
／＼柏林／文書本部ニ移管セラレタルモノナル事

三 余ハ一九四五平八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグ  
ニ於テ、上述文書本部信當ヲ命セラレタル事。  
是ニ仍リテ該國公使獨逸外務省集積文書並文庫原  
本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ駐在當時、初メテ  
余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ就シ、爾來引續キ余ノ  
占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事



以余ノ此候迄亡ノ添附セラル、所ノ文書ハ上述ノ  
獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫トシテ、自撰セラ  
レ、余ノ占有、保存ニ屬シ、且余ノ管理、下ニ  
置カレタル、獨逸外務省文書原本ノ、真正精確  
ナル直接復寫寫眞ノ屬本タル事

此書ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫寫眞原本ノ文書原  
本ハ、余ノ保存、留保ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ  
歸還閲覧ニ費スル期シナシアリ、是ニ該原本ヲ  
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫眞原本ヲ提  
供シ且ツ之ヲ證明ラナスモノナル事

ダアルユー・ビー・カミング  
(W. P. Cumming)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且  
宣誓ス

中佐 シー・エッチ・ガード  
G. H. Garde

陸軍省軍務部長  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

(合衆国) 獨逸軍政府

Telegram  
(Secret Cipher Process)Tokyo, 1 August 1941 11:05 S  
Arrival, 2 August 1941 1:00 o'clock

No. 1415 of 1 August

Most Urgent

Minister Secretary YAMAMOTO commissioned with the affairs of the Vice Foreign Minister, gave me the following information about the situation at our initial talk today.

Upon the announcement of the agreement, concluded between the Japanese and the French Government concerning Indo-China, the English Government had defended itself in a sharp protest against the argument, which was delivered to the former, that Indo-China's security is threatened by Great Britain, and declared that a further advance of Japan in the Southwest Pacific would necessarily lead to serious consequences. The Government of the United States of America delivered the same declaration.

YAMAMOTO did not contradict my remark that both governments obviously put up with the Japanese measures under protest and warning and limited themselves, at present, to economic reprisals. He strongly underlined that Japan made the Anglo-Saxon powers very uneasy by her newly won position of power and that she has strengthened her pressure a great deal in favor of the Axis powers.

The mobilization works in the same way, which is being carried through with the intention of destroying the Russian military forces in the Far East. The Soviet Government is officially reserved, but according to reliable informations, is watching the mobilization with increasing anxiety and will hardly decide to move more troops to the West. When I, because of rumors, which SHIRATORI, whom I visited again during the past days in his place of convalescence, had pointed out to me as being serious, anticipatedly asked whether Japan intended to start her active advance with demands on the Soviet Government, the Vice Minister /Remark of the translator: Apparently a mistake, should be MINISTRY SECRETARY/ marked this way as the best method of finding a defensive excuse for a Russo-Japanese attack in face of the neutrality agreement. He is personally thinking of demands of such sharpness that the Soviet Government could not possibly be able to accept them, whereby he seemed to have territorial cessions in mind. In regard to my remark that the Soviet Government might then delay Japan's entry into war by delaying negotiations and in coopera

Doc. No. 4025D

Page 2

tion with the progressive pressure of the Anglo-Saxons, until the beginning of winter and thereby perhaps prevent it entirely, YAMAMOTO asserted that he personally believed that a quick entry into war would be the right thing.

OTT

/147741/

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cummins, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

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/s/ W. P. Cummins  
W. P. CUMMINS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Doc. No. 1000  
(Sec. 4)

Page 1

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

TOKYO 4 September 1941 1050 S  
Arrival 5 September 1941 505 hours

No. 1713 of 4 September 1941. Most urgent!

The attempt of Prince KONOYE to avoid, by a direct message to President ROOSEVELT, a clash with the ABCD Coalition, and possibly the SOVIET Union, resulted from the following situation.

[Even after MATSUOKA's dismissal, The Third KONOYE Cabinet was set to undertake a far-reaching mobilization as a result of the decision of 2 July which was adopted in the presence of The Emperor; by its very nature this mobilization was directed against the SOVIET Union. Accordingly, KONOYE considerably strengthened leading elements of the new Cabinet, and, to a great extent, placed the responsibility upon The Navy. Thus a cover of the rear to the North was greatly impeded. As reported, the Army Command in recent inquiries has become more reserved as to a clash with the SOVIET Union. It is being argued that the Japanese Army, tied up and weakened in the war against CHINA, was not in a position to start on a winter campaign against the SOVIET Union. In view of the resistance put up by the Russian Army against an army such as the German, the Japanese General Staff does not believe itself capable of achieving a decisive success against RUSSIA before Winter sets in. Moreover, it is probably guided by the thought of KOKOROJIMA, still vivid in the memory, notably of the KWANTUNG Army.] The exaggerated conception of Russian strength is partly based on the misleading argument that even in view of the collapse of the URBALINE front the Soviet Union still disposed of sufficient fighting forces for taking the offensive against PERSIA on the nearby CAUCASUS front.

[In view of this appraisal of the situation, the KWANTUNG Army allegedly pressed for a decision of the Imperial Headquarters. I learned from a usually reliable source that the Imperial Headquarters in the last days came to the decision to postpone action against the SOVIET Union. A new decision was contemplated, to be taken as soon as clear signs of the decomposition of the Far Eastern Army appear or when a great numerical superiority of the Japanese army is established.]

While consequently the Army, for the time being, adopts an attitude of readiness in the North, the activist elements of the Navy have again come to the fore to a greater extent, demanding a Southern advance. As to the plans existing in these circles (occupation of SIAM, ensuing blockade of SINGAPORE, attack on BORNEO, elimination of MANILA) I have already reported. The younger Navy officers corps are entertaining hopes that recent shifts in the Navy Command, notably the fact that activist VIVIANI KONOJO, until now Chief of the Navy General Staff, has taken over an important field command and was replaced by Rear-Admiral ITO, likewise an activist, will be beneficial to these plans. Weighty reasons are brought forth by

this group in the south. The Navy still has oil stores for two years. The imports from The Netherlands Indies have ceased and there is no hope that they will be resumed. These stores (4 groups missing) lies (in addition or instead of page) must be used up if JAPAN does not wish to submit helplessly to the dictates of Anglo-Saxons. The Navy activists are convinced that the United States will probably resist an attack on BURMEO immediately and will certainly not allow a peaceful Japanese exploitation. Any attempt to divide the United States and England is doomed to failure from the outset. After the outbreak of the German-Russian War the surrounding countries were welded into a psychological unit against isolated JAPAN. The press chief of the Imperial Headquarters, Colonel MABUCHI (cf. MIB No. 212 to 216, 1 September) and Admiral KONO have expressed themselves to the same effect. The result is that in case Japan must clash with the coalition, she must fight the United States directly. The impossibility of maintaining the present state of tension with the United States psychologically and materially; without reaching a clash, has induced the circles influencing KONOYE to make the primitive attempt of approaching ROOSEVELT directly. I am told by a reliable source that at first KONOYE wanted to carry on the negotiations secretly. When, however, the fact of NOMURA's visit to ROOSEVELT was published by the American press on the very same day, KONOYE hurriedly convoked the Cabinet for an extraordinary meeting and had to admit, whether he liked it or not, that JAPAN had initiated the talks despite American provocations. As I could gather from unanimous opinions during the last days, it has been suggested to the Navy and the other activist circles that the KONOYE message constitutes a last, not even seriously meant step to convince the Japanese people of the impossibility of a peaceful settlement. It is, however, obvious that this is not the intention of the circles surrounding KONOYE, but that, at least for the time being, a modus vivendi is sought with the United States. I am of the opinion that in view of the very real and far-reaching conflicting interests, this attempt to bring about a detente that is not merely temporary, also cannot be successful. The inner political situation has become even more tense during the last weeks, so that the outbreak of a crisis must be reckoned with at any time. As I reported, the Third KONOYE Cabinet did not know how to provide the Japanese people with unequivocal leadership in face of the grave inner political and foreign political questions which are awaiting a solution. The Cabinet rather tends to avoid any decision and to paralyze the activist groups by playing them off against each other. The attempt on the life of HIRANUMA, the demonstrations of nationalist organizations and the resignation of Admiral SUETSUGU, well-known nationalist leader, from the presidency of The Imperial Rule Assistance Association, sponsored by KONOYE, must be regarded as symptoms of crisis. The negotiations with the United States could possibly drag on for some time, but a compromise, which can be had only by maximum concessions on the part of JAPAN, would at once result in grave inner convulsions. This is confirmed to me by all circles which the Embassy is constantly influencing in accordance with telegraphic order of 25 August, No. 1383.

[OTT.]

this group in the Philippines in the South. The Navy still has oil stores for two years. The imports from The Netherlands Indies have ceased and there is no hope that they will be resumed. These stores ("4 groups missing") lies (handwritten correction of page) must be used up if JAPAN does not wish to submit helplessly to the dictates of Anglo-Barons. The Navy activists are convinced that the United States will probably resist an attack on MANITO immediately and will certainly not allow a peaceful Japanese exploitation. Any attempt to divide the United States and England is doomed to failure from the outset. After the outbreak of the German-Russian War the surrounding countries were welded into a psychological unit against isolated JAPAN. The press chief of the Imperial Headquarters, Colonel MABUCHI (cf. MIB No. 212 to 216, 1 September) and Admiral KONO have expressed themselves to the same effect. The result is that in case Japan must clash with the coalition, she must fight the United States directly. The impossibility of maintaining the present state of tension with the United States psychologically and materially; without reaching a clash, has induced the circles influencing KONOYE to make the primitive attempt of approaching ROOSEVELT directly. I am told by a reliable source that at first KONOYE wanted to carry on the negotiations secretly. When, however, the fact of NOMURA's visit to ROOSEVELT was published by the American press on the very same day, KONOYE hurriedly convoked the Cabinet for an extraordinary meeting and had to admit, whether he liked it or not, that JAPAN had initiated the talks despite American provocations. As I could gather from unanimous opinions during the last days, it has been suggested to the Navy and the other activist circles that the KONOYE message constitutes a last, not even seriously meant step to convince the Japanese people of the impossibility of a peaceful settlement. It is, however, obvious that this is not the intention of the circles surrounding KONOYE, but that, at least for the time being, a modus vivendi is sought with the United States. I am of the opinion that in view of the very real and far-reaching conflicting interests, this attempt to bring about a detente that is not merely temporary, also cannot be successful. The inner political situation has become even more tense during the last weeks, so that the outbreak of a crisis must be reckoned with at any time. As I reported, the Third KONOYE Cabinet did not know how to provide the Japanese people with unequivocal leadership in face of the grave inner political and foreign political questions which are awaiting a solution. The Cabinet rather tends to avoid any decision and to paralyze the activist groups by playing them off against each other. The attempt on the life of MURAMATSU, the demonstrations of nationalist organizations and the resignation of Admiral SUZUKI, well-known nationalist leader, from the presidency of The Imperial Rule Assistance Association, sponsored by KONOYE, must be regarded as symptoms of crisis. The negotiations with the United States could possibly drag on for some time, but a compromise, which can be had only by maximum concessions on the part of JAPAN, would at once result in grave inner convulsions. This is confirmed to me by all circles which the Embassy is constantly influencing in accordance with telegraphic order of 25 August, No. 1383.

[OTT.]

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cummins, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an attaché of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945, and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cummins  
W. P. CUMMINS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Gerde  
G. H. GERDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)







FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

電報 (秘密暗號法)

東京 一九四二年(昭和十六年)九月四日 十時三十分

着 " " 五日 五時五分

緊急

西一年九月四日 第一七一三號

松岡ノ解職後モ亦第三次近衛内閣ハ天皇ノ面前ニ於テナサレタル七月二日ノ決定ニヨリ、ソノ陛下上ソビエト聯邦ニ對シテ向ケラレテキタ屢況ナ動員ヲ決定シタ。近衛ハ其レ故ニ新内閣ヲ掌握スルヤ、保守派ヲ著シク預メ海軍ニ廣汎ナ責任ヲ負ハシメタ。新クテ北方ヘノ背後ノ溝壑ハ大障害物ニヨリ妨ゲラレタ。

報告シタ如ク最近ノ場合セニ於テ軍ノ指揮モソビエト聯邦トノ等ニ對シテヨリ望ヘ目ニホツタ。對交戦線ニヨリ拘束サレ、編隊化サレタ日本軍ハソビエト聯邦ニ對シテ冬期候ヲ行フ余裕ガナイト望モラレテキル。露西軍ガ前進軍ノ如キ軍隊ニ對シテ爲シテキル抵抗ニ對シ、日本海軍本部ハ冬期到来前ニ露西軍ニ對シテ恐ラク決定的武功ヲ收メ得ル自信ズナイ。恐ラクハ又特ニ露西軍ニ於テ

EX 801-A  
4080A-1 (item 4)

4080A-2 ☆

「モハ」生々々々思ふ思ふ、奔奔カシテ斗ルテアル  
露西更、國力ニ対スル誇大感ハ「ハ」ウクマテ「戦線」崩  
潰ニ拘ラズ尚且「ソ」ゾエト「聯邦」が近接セル「コ」カサ  
戦線ニ於テ「ベル」ヤ「ニ」対シテ攻勢ニ志ル者余ナル戦闘兵力ヲ  
振リ向ケタト言フ他ヲ謀ラズ推論ニ基テシテ耳  
事態、斯ナル觀測ニ鑑ミ則東軍ハ大本營、決定ヲ過シ  
「違」ヒ「テ」「通」例信然ト云々余ハ此ノ事ヲ聞ク  
即チ大本營最近「ソ」ノ「事」ヲ「聯邦」ニ討テ行動ヲ延期スル  
決定ニ到達シテ相「シ」ケル 檀東軍ニ於ケル明瞭ト崩壞  
ノ徴ガ現レルカ或ハ日本軍、大ナル數的優越勢ガ確立スル  
ヤ否ヤ計テ決定ガ下サレテ事ガ確定セリテ斗ルト。

オクト

会、W. P. カミング ( W. P. CUMMING )

ハ正ニ宣明シテ次ノ語ヲ説言ス

一 余ハ合衆國國務省、同國獨逸關係頂政治員

閣部員タル事、及若ニ執リ余ハ (合衆國) 獨逸

軍部部員ノ一員タル事、且如上要明セラル

密ニ於テ、余ハ親シク知悉所在、但林文督本部ニ

於ル體裁獨逸外務省兼領文督並ニ文庫、原本ノ

占有、保管、管理ニ任シタル事。

二 上述獨逸外務省兼領文督並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合

國憲兵最高司令官ノ指揮下ニ在ルニ在リ

テ高次取替セラレ、其積保ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國

マールブルクニ於テ該軍隊ニヨリテ紅文督本部

ニ兼領セラレ、後該聯合領任官ヨリ上述セル

ノ職務ノ文督本部ニ移管セラレタルモノナル事

三 余ハ一九〇五年八月十五日、勃達マールブルク

ニ於テ、上述文督本部擔當ヲ命セラレタル事。

是ニ仍リテ該國獨逸外務省兼領文督並ニ文庫原

本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルク駐在當時、初メテ

余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ歸シ、爾來引續キ余ノ

占有、保管、管理ノ下ニ了ル事

供 送 書

Cent. Page - 2

可 余ノ此供進書ノ添附セラル、所ノ文書ハ上記ノ  
製造外務省給付ノ文書ニ天庫トシテ、函達セラ  
レ、余ノ台右ノ保管ニ属シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ  
置カレタル、御外務省文書原本ノ、長正館精  
ナル直接復写寫長ノ謄本タル事

可 茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復写寫長謄本ノ文書原  
本ハ、余ノ保管、復写ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ  
請願函達ニ答スル如クナシアリ、幾ニ該原本ヲ  
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫長謄本ヲ提  
供シ且ツ之ガ複製ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユー、ビー、カミング  
(ダブルユー、ビー、カミング)

一 一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ所前ニ於テ署名且  
宣誓ス

中佐 シー・エツク・ガード

G. E. GARDE

高級副官事務取扱

LT. COLONEL. AGD

ACTING ADJUTANT GENERAL.

(合衆國) 馬達連政府

Doc. No. 2593-D-21

Page 1

*2593-D-21*  
(Item No. 23)

SECRET

From: Tokyo  
To: Berlin  
November 30, 1941.  
Purple. (CA)

#2985. (Part 1 of 3)<sup>a</sup>

Re my Circular #2387.<sup>b</sup>

1. The conversation begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government, now stand ruptured -- broken. (I am sending you an outline of developments in separate message #2986<sup>c</sup>.) In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

a - Part 2 not available. For Part 3 see S.I.S. #25553.

b - Not available.

c - See S.I.S. #25554 and 25555

SECRET

25552

JD 6943

Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Doc. No. 2553-D-21

Page 2

(Item No. 23)

SECRET

From: Tokyo  
To: Berlin  
November 30, 1941.  
Purple. (CF)

#985. (Part 3 of 3)

4. If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you about our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude toward the Russians in our statement of last July. Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north.

5. This message is important from a strategic point of view and must under all circumstances be held in the most absolute secrecy. This goes without saying. Therefore, will you please impress upon the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is.

6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated this to the Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation to Premier MUSSOLINI and Foreign Minister CIANO. As soon as a date is set for a conference with the Germans and Italians, please let me know.

Will you please send this message also to Rome, together with the separate message.

2553

Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

A TRUE COPY:

/s/ William J. Welsh, Jr.  
William J. Welsh, Jr.  
Captain, Inf.

SECRET



Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats  
of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric

or physical means, decrypted, and translated by  
trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments,  
and are accurate and authentic to the best of my  
knowledge and belief insofar as it is hurriedly possible  
for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese  
script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE  
Colonel, G.S.C.

# FILE COPY

## RETURN TO ROOM 361

ニモ拘ラズ、今ヤ決裂シ——斷絶セリ。(余ハ別電第九八六號〇ニテ經過ノ概要ヲ送附ス。)此レヲ目前ニシテ、我ガ帝國ハ重大ナ事慮ニ直ニ斷乎タル行動ヲ探ラザルベカラズ。其レ故、貴官ハ速カニヒツトラ——總統及リツベントロツブ外相ト會見シ、内密ニ經過概要ヲ傳達サレ度シ。最近ハ英米兩國共、批發的態度ヲ採ルニ至リタルコトヲ傳ヘラレ度シ。兩國ガ東亞ノ各地ニ軍隊ヲ動かス計畫ヲシ、我々モ又軍隊ヲ動カシ對抗セザルヲ得ナイ事ヲ傳ヘラレ度シ。或ル武力衝突ニ依ツテ、アングロ、サクソン國家ト日本トノ間ニ戰爭ガ突如勃發スル非常ナ危険ガ

2593-D-21 -1  
(Item no. 23)

極 秘

發 信 東 京  
受 信 伯 林

一 九 四 一 年 十 一 月 三 十 日

紫 (CA)

第 九 八 五 號 (三ノ第一部) A

往 信 第 二 三 八 七 號ニ關シ

一、去四月前内閣政府ノ時、東京及ワシントン間  
ニ開始サレタ會談ハ、帝國政府ノ眞摯ナル努力

# FILE COPY

## RETURN TO ROOM 361

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2593-D-21-1  
(Item no. 23)

秘  
秘

發 信 東 京  
受 信 伯 林

一九四一年十一月三十日

紫 (CA)

第九八五號 (三ノ第一部) A

往 信 第二三八七號ニ關シ

一、去四月前內閣政府ノ時、東京及ワシントン間  
ニ開始サレタ會談ハ、帝國政府ノ眞摯ナル努力

# FILE COPY

## RETURN TO ROOM 361

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81 2  
2593-D-21-1  
(Item no. 23)

極 秘

發 信 東 京  
受 信 伯 林

一 九 四 一 年 十 一 月 三 十 日

紫 (CA)

第 九 八 五 號 (三ノ第一部) A

往 信 第 二 三 八 七 號ニ關シ

一、去四月前内閣政府ノ時、東京及ワシントン間

ニ開始サレタ會談ハ、帝國政府ノ眞摯ナル努力



2593-D-21-2  
(Item No. 23)

了ル事ヲ極秘裡ニ彼等ニ傳へ且、本殿等ノ勃發時期ハ何人ノ夢想スルヨリモ速カニ到來スルヤモ知レズト附加サレ度シ。  
A 1 第二部入手不能。第三部ニ就テハ、S、I、S、第 2555 三號參照  
B 1 入手不能。  
C 1 S、I、S、第 2555 四號及 2555 五號參照。

二五五五二  
JD 六九四三

秘 密

機 密、 12-1-1-41 (NR)







秘

步兵大尉 宇野 三郎 氏  
J.R.

2593-D-21-4  
(Item No. 23)

二五五三

六、イタリニ關シ、我カ「ベルリン」駐在大使  
ガ本旨ヲドイッ測ニ寄達ノ後、ムツソリニ首  
相及チアノ外相ニ適當ナ辯辭ヲ撰送スベク、ド  
イツ綱及イタリニ御ト會談ノ日時決定次第同示  
サシ度シ。本電及ビ別電ト共ニ「ロイヤル」へ御  
送附アリ度シ。

眞 正 篇

標 語 'L' - 'L' (NR)

秘

歩兵大校 ウイリアム J. ウエルシュニ・JR.

2573-1-21-11  
(Items No. 23)

二五五三

六、イタリニハシ、我カ「ベルリン」班在大使  
ガ本行ヲドイツ側ニ寄進ノ後、ムツソリニ首  
相及チアノ外相ニ適當ナ辯辭ヲ寫送スベク、ド  
イツ側及イタリニ側ト會談ノ日時決定次第同示  
サシ度シ。本電及ビ別電ト共ニ「ロイヤル」へ御  
送附アリ度シ。

眞 正 寫

歩兵大尉 クイリナム J. ウエルツニ. JR.

秘

據 註 上 29-1-11-41 (H. H.)

2573-1-21-4  
(Item No. 23)

二五五三

六、イタリニハシ、我カ「ベルリン」班在大使  
ガ本旨ヲドイツ側ニ傳達ノ後、ムツツリニ首  
相及チアノ外相ニ適當ナ翻譯ヲ發送スベク、ド  
イツ側及イタリニ側ト會議ノ日時決定次第同示  
サシ度シ。本電及ビ別電ト共ニ「ロイヤル」へ御  
送附アリ度シ。

眞 正 稿

歩兵大隊 ウイリアム J・ウエルツニ・JR.

秘

據 詩 'Lullaby' (HR)



2573-10-21-4  
(Item No. 23)

六、イタリイニ關シ、我カ「ベルリン」駐在大使  
ガ本件ヲドイツ側ニ傳達ノ後、ムツソリイニ首  
相及チアノ外相ニ適當ナ豫計ヲ傳達スベク、ド  
イツ側及イタリイ側ト會談ノ日時決定次第同示  
サレ度シ。本電及ビ別電ト共ニ「ロイヤル」へ御  
送附アリ度シ。

二五五五三

秘 録 121141 (NR)

眞 正 寫

歩兵大尉 ウイリアム J・ウエルシュニ・JR.

秘

2573-D-21-4  
(Items No. 23)

二五五三

六、イタリニハシ、我カ「ベルリン」駐在大使  
ガ本旨ヲドイツ側ニ密達ノ後、ムツソリニ首  
相及チアノ外相ニ適當ナ翻譯ヲ擬送スベク、ド  
イツ側及イタリニ御ト會談ノ日時決定次第同示  
サシ度シ。本電及ビ別電ト共ニ「ロイヤル」へ御  
送附アリ度シ。

眞 正 稿

秘

歩兵大尉 ウイリアム J. ウェルシュニ・JR.

標 語 1914年11月(25)

Doc. 2593 cert-

機 密 陸 軍 省

陸 軍 省 参 謀 本 部

情 報 局

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り證明ス。即チ、  
添附致通ノ日本文電報ノ複寫寫眞ハ陸海軍兩省ノ熟  
練セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ツテ傍  
受サレ、解讀セラレ而シテ翻譯セラレシモノニシテ  
予ノ知り且信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ翻譯スル爲  
メ西洋人ニトリ人力ノ可能ナル限度ニ於テ正確且ツ  
典據ノアルモノナリ。

参 謀 本 部 付 大 佐

CARTER, W. CLARKE  
カーター・ダヴリウ・クラーク

Doc. No. 15F (3)

page 1

Excerpt from "Pearl Harbor, Intercepted Diplomatic Messages  
sent by the Japanese Government between  
July 1 and December 8, 1941" pp. 15 - 16

(Secret)

From: Tokyo  
To: Berlin.  
15 August 1941  
#739 (Separate message)

At the time of my conversation with Ambassador Smetanin the other day, I mentioned our desires in regard to the full realization of our rights and interests in Northern Saghalien and also the removal of danger zones in the waters of the Far East. Since then, we have been asked by the Soviet as to the attitude of Japan toward the German-Russian war; to which we have replied that there has been no change in our intentions of continuing friendly relations between Japan and Russia, that thus far we have maintained an attitude of observing the neutrality pact, and that it is still our desire to continue this in the future, but, that whether or not we can continue thus is a question that depends on the way in which the Soviet Union responds to this. For instance if (a) any of the Soviet Union's territory in East Asia should be ceded, sold, or leased to a third power, or offered as military bases, (b) the Soviet Union should take any steps that would cause the sphere of any third power's military movements to be extended into East Asia, or should conclude with a third power an alliance that might have the Empire as its object, we certainly could not overlook the threat that this would be to our nation.

To this the Soviet Ambassador replied, that the Soviet government is rigidly observing the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact, and that as far as the above mentioned two points are concerned he could give assurance that there has been nothing of the kind and that there will be none in the future.

I furthermore took this opportunity to call the attention of the Soviet to the fact that of late it is persistently rumored that the United States will be shipping munitions to the Soviet via Vladivostok, and that if this should be true, Japan would have to take a serious view of it, as it would involve the three power pact relations.

In regard to the Japanese Government's attitude to the German-Russian war, I reiterated that there has been no change in our foreign policy, which has as its keynote the spirit and the objectives of the three power pact, even as Foreign Minister Matsuoka had communicated to the Soviet Government 2 July, and that this point is well understood by the Soviet.

21175

JD-1: 4637

(F) Navy Trans. 8-19-41 (C-NR)

Mem

No 1

111

EX

803

# 15F(3)

1

編者 三田 隆夫

交際上の心得 舞臺の心得 舞臺の心得

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5001

ト及後船隻の事

ト云ふ所は、即ち此の如き事にて、且、本國に於て、

又、他國に於て、同様の事柄を、行はせしめ、

外に、船隻の、航行の、自由を、認め、

且、航行の、安全を、保障し、

ト云ふ、即ち、航行の、自由を、認め、

且、航行の、安全を、保障し、

ト云ふ、即ち、航行の、自由を、認め、

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ト云ふ、即ち、航行の、自由を、認め、

且、航行の、安全を、保障し、

#15F (8)

202

Document No. 1522

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I.P.S. No. 1522

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, TAKAHASHI, Michitoshi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Cabinet, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 66 pages, dated \_\_\_\_\_, 1941, and described as follows: Book, "Progress for Mapping Out a Program for Important Industry Extension. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Cabinet.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
17th day of August, 1946.

M. Takahashi (signed)  
Signature of Official

Witness: R. Kuriyama (signed) Secretary of Cabinet SEAL  
Official Capacity.

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
19th day of Aug., 1946

Richard H. Larsh (signed)  
NAME

Witness: Edward P. Monaghan  
(signed)

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity



Ex # 804

Doc. No. 15F (4)

page 1

Excerpt from "Pearl Harbor, Intercepted Diplomatic Messages  
sent by the Japanese Government between  
July 1 and December 8, 1941" p. 16

From: Tokyo  
To: Berlin  
15 August 1941  
#740

(Secret)

On the 15th I told the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo, confidentially, of my recent conversations with the Soviet Ambassador along the lines of my separate message #739\*. Ambassador Ott expressing a desire to understand the basic problem, said that according to the notice sent to the German Government on 2 July, he understood that the possibility of Japan's participating in the German-Russian war was not precluded, but asked if, now since the Soviets have given assurances regarding the two points which Japan considers vital, to the effect that there has been nothing of the kind and will not be in the future, the Soviets do not have the impression that Japan will not take part in the German-Soviet war. To this I replied that, in view of the military expansion the Empire is at present effecting, I think under present existing conditions the above-mentioned arrangement with the Soviet is the very best means of taking the first steps toward carrying out future plans concerning the Soviet, which will be undertaken together with the German Government, that this is entirely in harmony with the spirit and objectives of the Tripartite Treaty, and that I hoped that the German Government would fully understand this point. Ambassador Ott thereupon asked if it is proper to understand that this present arrangement is the first step toward future measures that are to be taken against Russia, that this is merely a temporary arrangement, in other words that it partakes of the nature of a restraint upon the Soviet until preparations can be completed. To this I replied in the affirmative.

Please relay to Rome together with the separate message.

\*JD-1: 4637 S. I. S. #21175. Report of conversation between Japanese Foreign Minister and the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo, in which both insist the Neutrality Pact is being strictly observed; Japan warns against third power's acquiring Russian territory, in East Asia; extension of third power's military movements to East Asia, and shipment of U.S. munitions to Vladivostok.

21219

JD-1: 4656

(F) Navy Trans. 8-20-41 (C-NR)

15 F (1)

東京發

ベルリン宛

一九四三年(昭和十八年)八月十二日

電報 第七四〇號

【其珠邊】三ノ枚 葦(十六頁)

一九四三年八月十日ヨリ十一月八日ヨリ日本政府ヨリ送ラシタル外交信電集後

八月十五日二私ハ別電ノ七三九號ノ趣意書ニ記載スル根拠ヨリ  
 聯大使ト会谈ヲセシメト。在東京ノ德使館大使ニ面シテ是等ノ  
 ナリト大使ハ其趣意問題ニ知悉ト置キ且チ和議ニ表出  
 ツツ七月二日独逸政府ニ傳達シタル外信ニ據ルニ日本ノ独  
 戦参加ノ可能性ハノ中ヨリ除外セテ年ナキト了解セル  
 ガ得シ。日本政府ガ緊要ト思考スルニ決シ「今日ニテニ據  
 ナリトハナク又今後トモ右様ナリトナシ」トイフ趣意ニ莫  
 シニ関シソ朕ガ今ヲ保証ヲ承セヨリ朕トシテ日本ガ独  
 戦ニ参加スルナキト云フ印象ヲ與ケ居ヌ又ガ「如何ト實出セリ。  
 之ニ對シ今日帝ノ政府ガ造ラシアル軍事的擴張ヨリ憂  
 レバ現存ノ状態ニ於テハ前項ノ如キ中合カク朕ニ對スル將來  
 ノ政策ヲ遂行スルニソノカ一歩トシ最良ノ措置ト私共ハ加  
 此ノ政策モ独逸政府ト協調ヲ採リシムコトウガ及ビ三心協  
 定ノ精神ト目的ニ完全ニ一致スルヨリ、コト就テハ独逸政府ノ  
 完全ニ理解ヲ希望スルト私ハ答フ。  
 ナリト大使ハ其趣意現下ノ協定ガ朕ニ對シテ將來採ラルベキ措置  
 ノ一歩ニシテ、一時的ノ手續模言セバ準備完テ、ソ聯牽制性質今  
 帯モト解釋ヲ宜キヤト質問スルモノ。コト對シテハ私ハ短キ答  
 テ置イタ。コトニ本頁ト別紙通信トモ中継傳送アリタ。

6x fox

No. 1.

15 F (4)

東京發  
ベルリニ宛

一九四三年(昭和十六年)八月十五日

電報 第七四〇號

「其珠邊」三ノ枚草(十六頁)  
一九四三年八月十五日(同日)日本政府  
ヨリ送ラレル外交信(信)傳受

ex fox

No. 1

八月十五日(私)別電第七三九號、趣意書に記載なき項、何れ  
 聯大使ト会谈ヲセシト、在東京、德伊兩大使、兩通譯者  
 ナリト大使、公使、德問題ヲ知悉シ、盟軍ニ對シテ希望ヲ表シ、  
 ツノ七月二日、德總政府ニ傳達シ、ソノ條約ニ據リ、日本、必  
 然ニ參加ノ可能性ハ、皆ヨリ除外セラルルナリト了解セル  
 ガ得シ、日本政府ガ緊要ト思考スルニ決シ、今日、ソノ立場  
 ナリトハ、カッタ又今後トモ、右條約ト分テ、ソノ趣意、三項  
 ——ニ關シ、ソ聯ガ今ヲ保證ヲ承ルモ、強トシテ、日本ガ獨  
 戦ニ參加シ、ソノ即、敵ヲ殺シ、居ラヌカ、如何ト贊出セリ。  
 之ニ對シ、今日、帝、本政府ガ進メ、ソノ置ル、擴張ヨリ、憂  
 ヲ、現存ノ状態ニ於テ、前記、如キ、申合、カ、誤ニ、對スル、將來  
 政策ヲ、遂行スルニ、ソ、才、一歩トシ、最良、措置ト、私、人、ガ  
 此、政策ヲ、獨逸政府ト、協調シ、採ラ、ル、心、カ、又、三、心、協  
 定、精神ト、目的ニ、完全ニ、一致シ、居リ、コト、就、テ、獨逸政府、  
 完全ニ、理解シ、希望スル、私、答、タ、  
 ナリト、大使、(其、趣)現下、協定ガ、誤ニ、對シ、將來、採ラ、ル、措  
 置、才、一歩トシ、一時的、手續、撰言、ニ、準備、完成、シ、ソ、聯、牽制、性、質、  
 帯、モ、ト、解釋、ヲ、宣、キ、ヤ、ト、質問、未、タ、己、ニ、對シ、私、人、答、  
 テ、宣、イ、タ、ソ、本、電、上、別、紙、通信、ト、申、繼、傳、送、ラ、ル、タ、

Doc. No. 2503-D-37

Page 1

(Item No. 40)

SECRET

From: Tokyo  
To: Berlin  
December 6, 1941  
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

11003

Re 2 of your #1418<sup>a</sup>.

1. From the standpoint given in 4 of my #985<sup>b</sup>, we would like to avoid bringing about any situation likely to result in an armed clash with Soviet Russia until strategic circumstances permit it: and so get the German Government to understand this position of ours and negotiate with them so that at least for the present they would not insist upon exchanging diplomatic notes on this question. ✓

In doing this, explain to them at considerable length that insofar as American materials being shipped to Soviet Russia through any point lying within the scope of our intelligence are concerned, they are neither of high quality nor of large quantity, and that in case we start our war with the United States we will capture all American ships destined for Soviet Russia. Please endeavor to come to an understanding on this line.

2. However, should Foreign Minister RIEBENTROP insist upon our giving a guarantee in this matter, since in that case we shall have no other recourse, make a ---- statement to the effect that we would, as a matter of principle, prevent war materials from being shipped from the United States to Soviet Russia via the Japanese waters and get them to agree to a procedure permitting the addition of a statement to the effect that so long as strategic reasons continue to make it necessary for us to keep Soviet Russia from fighting Japan (what I mean is that we cannot capture Soviet ships), we cannot carry this out thoroughly. ✓

3. In case the German Government refuses to agree with 1 and 2 and makes their approval of this question absolutely conditional upon our participation in the war and upon our concluding a treaty against making a separate peace, we have no way but to postpone the conclusion of such a treaty. This point is intended for you to bear in mind. ✓

25925

ARMY

SECRET

Doc. No. 2593-D-37

Page 2

(Item No. 40)

SECRET

4. Concerning our participation in the war and the question of our promising not to conclude a separate peace, I shall wire you later.

a - Not available.

b - Parts 1 and 3, S.I.S. Nos. 25552, 3. Part 2 not available. Tokyo informs Berlin that there is extreme danger of war suddenly breaking out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan and that if Russia joins hands with England and the United States against her, Japan will turn upon her with all her might.

25925

ARMY

Trans. 12/9/41 (NR)

SECRET

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE  
Colonel, G.S.C.

Doc. No. 2593 (Cont: text)

WAR DEPARTMENT  
NAVY DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE  
Colonel, G.S.C.

東電一〇三〇一〇三〇一八號ノ第二ニ書キ又九件  
一〇三〇一〇三〇一八號ノ第二ニ書キ又九件  
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一〇三〇一〇三〇一八號ノ第二ニ書キ又九件  
一〇三〇一〇三〇一八號ノ第二ニ書キ又九件

一九三〇年六月二十六日

東京  
電報

秘密

〇

一〇三〇一

八號ノ第二

ニ書キ又

九件

日

EX 805

-D-37 - 1

770-470





2593-D-37 -- 2-

(Item No. 40)

二、然シ乍ラ、若シリツベントロツプ外相ガ本  
件ニ對シ我方ヨリ保衛ヲ興ヘル可シト主張  
スルナラバ、其ノ場合ハ他ニ手段ガ當イ當  
我方ハ原則トシテハ日本領海内ヲ經由セル  
米品ニリソレノ空橋管材輸送ヲ阻止スル  
ト云フコトヲ表明シ、原路酌理申カラザル  
ガソコトヲシテ日本ニ對ヒラ仕増サセナイ  
ニスル必要ガ引續キ存スル限リハ（此ノ意  
味ハ我々ハソレ船隻ヲ捕獲出來ナイト云フ  
ニテアル）我々ハ此レヲ完全ニ遂行シ得ザ  
ル旨ノ候文附加ヲ許ス處置ニ同意セシメラ  
レ度シ。

三、ドイツ政府ガ第一若クハ第二ニ同意スル  
ヲ拒否シ、我方ノ戰爭參加及單獨締結ヲシ  
ナイ條約ヲ締結スル事ヲ絶対條件トシテ本  
問題ヲ是認スル場合ニハ我方トシテハ斯ノ  
如キ條約ノ締結ヲ延期スルガハナイ。  
此ノ點ハ貴官ノ心ニ留メ置カレタシ。

四、東西ノ戰爭參加及單獨締結ヲ締結シナイト  
云フ約定ノ問題ニシテハ追ツテ覽架スル。

2592-D-37-2

(Item No. 40)

a | 入手不能。

b | 第一部、第三部ハ S・I・S・第二五五五三、  
 及三。  
 第二部ハ入手不能。  
 東京ハ朝鮮ニ向ケアングロ・サクソン国家  
 ト日本トノ間ニ戦争勃発ノ非常ナ危険ガア  
 ル事及英シロシヤガ日本ニ對シ英米ト提携  
 スルナシバ、日本ハ全カラ以テ彼ニ對ス  
 ルト云フ事ヲ避報シテ居ル。

第二五九三五

翻譯 2/84/ (NR)

Doc 2593 cert.

陸 軍 省

陸 軍 省 参 謀 本 部

信 報 局

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り證既ス。即チ、  
添附敷通ノ日本文電報ノ複寫寫眞ハ陸海軍兩省ノ熟  
練セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ツテ傍  
受サレ、解讀セラレ而シテ翻譯セラレシモノニシテ  
予ノ知り且信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ翻譯スル爲  
メ西洋人ニトリ人力ノ可能ナル限度ニ於テ正確且ツ  
典據ノアルモノナリ。

参 謀 本 部 付 大 佐

CAREER. W. CLARKE  
カーター・ダザリウー・クラーク

新編 日本書紀 卷之六

カミタリ・ダウリワ・ケライク

Doc. 2593 cert.

機密 陸軍省

陸軍省参事本部

情報局

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り發見ス。即チ、  
添附數通ノ日本文書中ノ親身寫眞ハ陸海軍兩省ノ熟  
練セル職員ニ依リ精密的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ツテ傍  
受サン、解讀セラレ而シテ翻譯セラレシモノニシテ  
予ノ知り且信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ翻譯スル爲  
メ西洋人ニトリ入力ノ可能ナル限度ニ於テ正確ト  
トナルモノナリ。

G. 706

Document 11A(7)

Page 1

TELEGRAM

(Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, January 29, 1942 - 7:00 A.M.

Received, " 29, 1942 - 10:15 P.M.

No. 245 of January 27.

Secret!

Debates in the Diet last week brought out several basic declarations by leading Japanese statesmen, especially by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, about Japanese political and war aims, the texts of which are known thereto. The declarations are especially noteworthy because of their programmatic character and the time at which they were made, namely, shortly before the attack upon the fortress of Singapore, after the successful beginning of the attack on Burma in the direction of Rangoon, the start of the operations against the Netherland Indies, the progressive occupation of the Philippines and the first actions against the outer defenses of Australia, the Bismarck Archipelago, New Guinea and Torres Strait. According to confidential information, Prime Minister General Tojo himself desired the programmatic determination of Japanese politics and put it through against opposition. This emphasis, resulting from his own initiative, shows Tojo as a leading statesman, politically, who is advancing beyond the stature of an exponent of the army. His aim was obviously to lay down Japanese war policy along a line which is removed both from the limited wishes of the circles which formerly hoped for an understanding with the Anglo-Saxons and on the other hand from the very extensive tendency toward expansion on the part of certain radical groups.

From the explanations of Tojo and Togo can be seen, firstly, the outline of the future building of Greater Asia under Japanese leadership and, secondly, the program of the government for future policies and conduct of the war.

I.) The Building of East Asia.

1.) The inner core of the new organization is formed by Japan, Manchukuo and Nanking-China, to which are added Thailand and Indo-China, which are voluntarily cooperating with Japan. Around this core the other regions of the new empire program are to crystallize under various sovereignties. The active support of allied Thailand was especially cordially mentioned by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, its requests for revision not mentioned, however.

G# 706

TELEGRAM

(Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, January 29, 1942 - 7:00 A.M.

Received, " 29, 1942 - 10:15 P.M.

No. 245 of January 27.

Secret!

Debates in the Diet last week brought out several basic declarations by leading Japanese statesmen, especially by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, about Japanese political and war aims, the texts of which are known thereto. The declarations are especially noteworthy because of their programmatic character and the time at which they were made, namely, shortly before the attack upon the fortress of Singapore, after the successful beginning of the attack on Burma in the direction of Rangoon, the start of the operations against the Netherland Indies, the progressive occupation of the Philippines and the first actions against the outer defenses of Australia, the Bismarck Archipelago, New Guinea and Torres Strait. According to confidential information, Prime Minister General Tojo himself desired the programmatic determination of Japanese politics and put it through against opposition. This emphasis, resulting from his own initiative, shows Tojo as a leading statesman, politically, who is advancing beyond the stature of an exponent of the army. His aim was obviously to lay down Japanese war policy along a line which is removed both from the limited wishes of the circles which formerly hoped for an understanding with the Anglo-Saxons and on the other hand from the very extensive tendency toward expansion on the part of certain radical groups.

From the explanations of Tojo and Togo can be seen, firstly, the outline of the future building of Greater Asia under Japanese leadership and, secondly, the program of the government for future policies and conduct of the war.

I.) The Building of East Asia.

1.) The inner core of the new organization is formed by Japan, Manchukuo and Nanking-China, to which are added Thailand and Indo-China, which are voluntarily cooperating with Japan. Around this core the other regions of the new empire program are to crystallize under various sovereignties. The active support of allied Thailand was especially cordially mentioned by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, its requests for revision not mentioned, however.



2.) The remaining countries of Greater East Asia are divided into three categories.

a.) Previous bastions of British imperialism which served to oppress and dominate East Asia, namely, Hongkong and the Malayan Peninsula.

This region will have to be changed into a bastion for the defense of Greater East Asia and therefore placed under the direct control of Japan. This principle was given practical application in the appointment, reported elsewhere, of General Isogai as Governor General of Hongkong.

b.) Regions to which independence is to be granted, if they cooperate loyally with Japan: the Philippines and Burma. As the Military Attache hears confidentially from the army, their independence is to be patterned after that of Manchukuo.

c.) Regions which are to be militarily overcome if they continue opposition to Japan: the Dutch East Indies, Australia and Chungking-China.

Declarations of Tojo and Togo showed that the original hope for the yielding of the Dutch East Indies without resistance no longer exists, and military action is considered as indispensable. Both speeches contained an insistent appeal, addressed to Chungking, to turn away from the Anglo-Saxons and come to an understanding with Japan, which was also especially emphasized by the declaration, already reported, of the Prime Minister before the Budget Commission on January 23.

3.) General principles for the future Organization of Greater East Asia.

In this respect the speeches of Tojo and Togo as well as the declarations of Tojo and the President of the Planning Bureau, General Suzuki, before the Budget Commission on January 23, contain some interesting statements. The program is decidedly moderate. New regions were not to be exploited after the destruction of Anglo-Saxon rule. Instead of that, economic cooperation, no racial strife. Freedom of religion, no economic exclusivism, but direction and regulation of production, in certain cases also limitation of certain branches of production (sugar and rubber were mentioned in confidential conversation) according to the needs of the co-prosperity sphere directed by Japan. The aim of the present measures is the securing of the raw materials necessary for waging war and the foundation later of the autarchic co-prosperity sphere. The present program:

a.) Securing important sources of raw materials.

b.) Stopping the flow of raw materials from the South Sea regions to the enemy powers.

c.) Assuring the self-sufficiency of the army in the theaters of operations.

d.) Cooperation with Japan of the existing enterprises in the occupied regions.

## II. Further Policies and Conduct of the War.

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister strongly emphasized the inseparability of the Tripartite Pact Powers and the close inner cooperation of Japan with Germany, Italy, and its other European Friends.

Attack toward the south appeared as the military aim: Dutch East Indies and Australia. According to confidential military information, Port Darwin is to be taken first of all in Australia. For the present the Japanese war leaders can be contented with the possession of this base in Australia. This emphasis in the direction of the south explains the failure to mention India, toward which great restraint can be observed here. The government and the army hold the viewpoint that Japan cannot attack Australia and India at the same time but, rather, must halt after the fall of Singapore and Burma, since the push toward the south is more important and more useful. According to a confidential remark of the Director of the European Division of the Foreign Ministry, the Indian Congress is inimical to Japan. Indian Nationalism, even in the case of a successful revolution, would not be capable of building up an independent, orderly state. The control of such an immense region, containing 400 million inhabitants, would be scarcely possible for Japan along with its other numerous difficult tasks. Under these circumstances there would be danger that India would become a victim of Bolshevism.

Toward Soviet Russia the Foreign Minister emphasized that relations are unchanged and are still determined by the neutrality pact. In the Budget Commission, Togo reported that the yearly renewal of the Japanese-Russian fishing agreement is imminent.

According to very confidential information, however, military preparations against Russia are underway in Manchuria. Influential circles here are of the opinion that after the conquest of Port Darwin Japan must turn against Russia and seize Vladivostok, the coastal province and North Sakhalin in order definitively to make itself also secure in the north.

I have reported separately about the Japanese attitude toward South America and the Rio Conference.

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 11A(7).

/S/ Ulrich A. Straus

與スル行動ノ開始、比島ノ前進的攻塔、臺灣外廓  
防禦線即チ「ビスマーク」群島、「ニューギニヤ」  
及「トーレス」海峽ヘノ最初ノ攻塔等ノ後ニ當ツ  
テキタノデ特ニ注目ス可キデアル。秘密情報ニ依  
レバ、東條首相自身日本政策ノ計畫的決定ヲ望ミ、  
反シテ抑切ツテソレヲ所行シタ。東條首相自身ノ  
發意カラ香ハレタ此ノ卓越ガ軍部代表以上ニ進出  
セントスル指導的政治家ナルコトヲ表明シテキル。  
彼ノ目的ハ日本ノ戰爭政策ヲ會テ「アングロサク  
ソン」トノ了解ヲ望ンダ一派ノ換イ希望ヤ他ノ一

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Ex 806

11A (7) -1

電報 (秘密法)

東京、一九四二年(昭和十七年)一月廿九日 七時

着、一九四二年(昭和十七年)一月廿九日午後七時十五分

一月廿七日附第二百五四十五號

秘 密

先通ノ帝國議會ニ於ケル討論ニ於テ、日本ノ指導  
的政治家、特ニ首相及外相ニ依リ日本ノ政治及戰  
争ノ目標ニ關シ強固ノ建設的聲明ガ行ハレ、ソノ  
原文ガ當地テ周知サレテキル。コノ聲明ハソノ企  
劃的性格ト、ソノ聲調ガ出サレタ時期ガ恰モ「シ  
ンガポール」與英攻撃ノ直前デアリ、「ラングー  
ン」ヘ向フ「ビルマ」攻撃ノ請願ノ成功、南印ニ

11A(7)-2

ノ下地ノ同陸田泰口及府ノ下地ヲ包ムルニ至リテ  
 大田ノ他ノ地ヲ加ヘテ自領シテ其ノ地ノ中ニ  
 泰及申ノ地ヲ加ヘテ自領シテ其ノ地ノ中ニ  
 リテ作ラシメテ其ノ地ノ中ニ自領シテ其ノ地ノ中ニ  
 (一) 新編ノ中ノ地ノ中ニ自領シテ其ノ地ノ中ニ

ノ下地ノ同陸田泰口及府ノ下地ヲ包ムルニ至リテ  
 大田ノ他ノ地ヲ加ヘテ自領シテ其ノ地ノ中ニ  
 泰及申ノ地ヲ加ヘテ自領シテ其ノ地ノ中ニ  
 リテ作ラシメテ其ノ地ノ中ニ自領シテ其ノ地ノ中ニ  
 (一) 新編ノ中ノ地ノ中ニ自領シテ其ノ地ノ中ニ

許サレル地獄、比喩及「マデ」カマハ、御立  
 (B) 吾ク日本ニ思サレル地獄、比喩及「マデ」カマハ、御立

ニ於テ實サレタ

原則ハ別報ノ如ク、見サレタノ事ニ於テ、此  
 日本ノ直線ノ如ク、下ニ於テ、此ノ事ニ於テ、此

此ノ地獄ハ大東江ノ如ク、及「マデ」カマハ、御立  
 會子ノ地獄ハ大東江ノ如ク、及「マデ」カマハ、御立

(A) 東亞ノ地獄ハ大東江ノ如ク、及「マデ」カマハ、御立  
 六東亞ノ地獄ハ大東江ノ如ク、及「マデ」カマハ、御立

(二)

上ノ訂求ハ、心カサレタノ事ニ於テ、此ノ事ニ於テ、此  
 外相ニ於テ、心カサレタノ事ニ於テ、此ノ事ニ於テ、此

ベキコトヲ以返シ且ク訴へテキタ。此ノコトハ一月二十三日ノ豫算委員會ニ於ケル既報首相ノ聲明ニ依リ特ニ強調サレテキタ。

(三) 大東亞ノ將來ノ模範ニ對スル一般原則、此ノ點ニ於テ東條及比東郷ノ演說ハ一月二十三日ノ豫算委員會ニ於ケル東條及金聲院總裁鈴木將軍ノ聲明並ニ二、三ノ興味アル事ヲ含ンデキル。計畫ハ遠ヘ目ニ強調サレテキル。新地域ハ「アングロサクソン」ノ支配領域ノ後ニ擧取サレテハナラヌ。其ニ代ツテ經濟的協力ヲナシ、人種的争ヒガアツテハナラヌ。宗教自由ノ寛容、經濟的獨占ハナク生産ノ指導ト統制、アル場合ニハ又日本ノ指導下ニ於ケル共榮團ノ欲求ニ應ジ



11 A (7) - 3

(C)

山崎武官が尋部ヨリ内々尾ク尾ニ往レバ彼等ノ獨立ハ滿洲ノ獨立ニ類ルコトニナツテキル。

注シ日本ニ以該行為ヲ續ケルナラ軍事的不  
満足スベキ地域、南領東部度、後列及ビ重  
慶支那、印ガ沈没ヲ止メテ停戦スル本邦  
ノ希望ハ最早ヤ存在セズ、軍事行動ノ不可  
避ナルコトヲ東條、東郷ノ聲論ハ明ニシタ  
兩人ノ演説ハ露國ニ向ツテ、「アングロサ  
クソン」ヨリ採レテ日本トノ了解ニ到達ス

尊相公で外祖家、三山、其地、不可解、日本、及び日、本、の

外祖家、三山、其地、不可解

万

(B) 古蹟地、二、於、ク、ル、カ、ル、金、業、日、ノ、

(C) 作、原、地、以、持、地、實、新、ノ、

(A) 皇、長、子、以、持、地、實、新、ノ、

皇、長、子、以、持、地、實、新、ノ、

皇、長、子、以、持、地、實、新、ノ、

皇、長、子、以、持、地、實、新、ノ、

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皇、長、子、以、持、地、實、新、ノ、

皇、長、子、以、持、地、實、新、ノ、

11A (7) - 4

コトが出来ず、日米ハミナシ、子ヲ列ト印度ニテ、前方面ノ是等事カ  
一

慮カ認メテ居ル。

方々、由テル。ソノ印長ニテ、ハ大キテ、

出来、而方ハ先ツ、比ノ家ニテ、取ルコト、足

ノ、争、者ハ先ツ、比ノ家ニテ、取ルコト、足

「方、家、別ニテ、先ツ、比ノ家ニテ、取ルコト、足

ツ、方、家、別ニテ、先ツ、比ノ家ニテ、取ルコト、足

百、方、家、別ニテ、先ツ、比ノ家ニテ、取ルコト、足

ル、方、家、別ニテ、先ツ、比ノ家ニテ、取ルコト、足

是、方、家、別ニテ、先ツ、比ノ家ニテ、取ルコト、足

外務大臣ノ演説ハ如何シク、漁業委員會ニ於テ、  
東海ハ日露漁業協定ノ年次改訂ヲ行フテキルト報  
告シタ。

然シ乍ラ極ク内々ノ情報ニ依レバ滿洲ニ於ケル「  
ロシヤ」ニ與スル軍ノ準備ガ進メラレテキル。當  
地ノ有力筋ハ「ポートダーウキン」ノ攻略後日本  
ハ「ロシヤ」ニ向ヒ北方デモ絕對安全トナル爲ニ  
「ウラデヴオストツク」沿海洲及北緯太ヲ押ヘネ  
バナラストノ意見ヲ持ツテキル。

南米及ビ「リオ」會談ニ對スル日本ノ態度ニ關シ  
テハ私ハ別ニ報告シタ。

11A (7) - 5

層重し且合意の得ずアルカラ「シンガポール」及「  
ビルマ」ノ改稱後ハ停止セネバナラヌトノ見解ヲ  
持ツテキル。

外務省歐洲局長ノ秘密談ニ依レバ印度議會ハ日本  
ニ敬意ヲ抱イテ居ル。印度ノ國家主義ハ草創ガ成  
功シタ爲デモ、獨立シタ秩序アル國家ヲ作り上げ  
ルコトハ出来ナイダラウ。人口四億ヲ有スル此ノ  
國ナ廣大ナ地域ヲ統治スルコトハ他ノ多クノ難問  
題ト共ニ日本ニハ殆ト不可成ニ近イ。カウ云フ狀  
勢ノ下デハ、印度ガ國家主義ノ發展ニナル危險ガ  
アル。「ソヴィエツトロシア」ニ對スル關係ニハ、  
變り無ク依然中立條約ニ依ツテ規定サレテキルト

TELEGRAM IN CODE (G. Ch. V.)

From Berlin May 15th 2:20 P.M.  
To Tokyo May 15th.

Tokyo Embassy  
No. 1197/9 of May 14th.

To be kept under lock and seal  
For the Ambassador personally.

Re: Telegram of the 6th, No. 1412.

With respect to the question dealt with in your telegram on Japanese-Russian relations, the following should be taken under consideration: without doubt the opportunity to seize the Siberian Coastal Province and Vladivostok, so vitally necessary to Japanese security, will never be as favorable as at present when Russia's combined strength is strained to the utmost on the European front. In this situation the following exists:

1) If Japanese estimates of Russian forces in Siberia are accurate, and she is able to overcome Russian resistance in Vladivostok and penetrate into Siberia in the direction of Lake Baikal, then such an undertaking would be very significant to the subsequent development of the war. Japan can not evade the threat to her rear from Russian coastal provinces, it would therefore be best if she would arrive at a decision to attack Vladivostok at the very earliest. There is no question that this intervening time is used by the Russians in cooperation with the Americans for the sole purpose of fortifying the Siberian Coastal areas in order to provide air bases which will constitute a threat to Japan. Therefore, the earlier the push against Vladivostok takes place the less progress will have been made in these preparations. However, this is all based on the premise that Japan is sufficiently strong for an operation of this nature and will not have to free other forces which would weaken her position against England and America, as for example, in Burma.

2) If Japan lacks the necessary strength to successfully undertake such an operation then it would naturally be better that she maintain neutral relations with Soviet Russia.

This also eases our burden since in any event Russia must maintain troops in East Siberia in anticipation of a Japanese-Russian conflict. Above all any Japanese assurance to the Russians must be avoided. By maintenance of neutrality,

the risk of a long drawn out war with insufficient forces and particularly with danger of air attacks against the Japanese Home Islands will be avoided. In this respect, Japan must undertake the offensive in some other direction, as for example, India or Australia, in order to contribute effectively to the joint conduct of the war.

In summing up, the following is to be said from the German standpoint: a sudden and successful attack against Soviet-Russia might prove a great boon for the further conduct of the war to the Tripartite Powers, but this should only be undertaken if success can be assured.

I request that you stress the following considerations and perhaps put less emphasis on the advantages which may accrue from a Japanese attack on Soviet Russia to the United States as it appears in your telegram. The most important point which should be constantly brought to the attention of the Japanese are:

1.) that the situation was never as favorable as it is now.

2.) the longer one waits all the more airfields will be built in Siberia and

3.) the Americans will be able to render the Russians more effective support once these installations are completed than is possible today. With reference to III., 4, of your telegram in which you mention that a Russian-Japanese war would be welcomed by America since it would weaken Russia, I wish to note that this argument is somewhat devious since at the present moment the Americans are actually strengthening Russia by the delivery of war materials, etc. in order to strengthen her as much as possible, and by no means think of weakening Russia. On the other hand, I agree with your views expressed in II., 3 that the Americans in the light of coming presidential election will try everything to bring about a Soviet Russian Japanese War as a solution and so it must be reckoned that the Japanese will try to avoid such a conflict.

All in all our tactics must be such as to make Japan aware of these points of view without directly forcing the issue.

FIBBENTROP.

EX 807

1230-1

陸軍電報 (G. Ch. V)

「ベルリン」報、五月十五日午後二時二十分

東京着、五月十五日

東京大使館

五月十四日、第一一九七ノ九號

大使宛親長、銀使封印ノ上保存ヲ要ス

六日附日報、第一四一二號ニシテ

日「ソ」關係ニ出スル費下ノ電報中ニ取扱ハレ居ル關係ニシテ、下記事項ハ考慮ヲ要スル點チ「日本ノ利益ノ爲ニ言メテ必要ナル「シベリヤ」沿海州及ビ「ウラジオストツク」奪取ノ機會ハ「ソ」國ノ總合力ガ歐洲戰線ニ於テ進展ニ出シ盡サレタ在ヨリ好都合ナロトハ之カラ先アルマイト言フコトハ察ラセヌ。新カル情勢下ニ於テハ下記ノコトガ成立スル

一 若シ「シベリヤ」ニ於ケル「ソ」國兵力ニ對スル日本ノ見込ガ正確デ且日本ガ「ウラジオストツク」ニ於ケル「ソ」國ノ抵抗ニ打勝ツテ「バイカル」河ノ方向ニ「シベリヤ」ニ侵入出来ルナラバ新カル全盤ハ現戰爭ノ背後ノ強層ニ至大ノ意義ヲ有スルモノトナルデアロウ。日本ハ「ソ」國領沿海州ヨリスル背後ノ脅威ヲ懸ケルコトハ出来ナイ、ソレ故ニ若シ



日本が出来ルダケ早く「ウラジオストツク」ヲ攻撃  
 スル決定ニ立至レバ之ニ違シタコトハナイ。此ノ間  
 ノ時トシテ「ソ」聯ガ「アメリカ」ト協力シテ日本ニ  
 對スル脅威トナル様ヲ望望甚甚トシテ準備スル實ニ「シ  
 ベリヤ」沿邊州ノ要塞化トイフ唯一目的ノ爲ニ使用  
 スルコトハ長ナイ。ソレ故ニ「ウラジオストツク」  
 ニ對スル攻撃ガ早ク行ハレレバ行ハレル程擴カル事  
 備ハソレダケ違シテ居ナイコトニナル。然シ乍ラ  
 是ハ總シテ日本ガ此ノ地ノ作戦ニ對シテ得ルダケ十分  
 強大デアリ、他方其ノ兵力ヲ放ツテ其ノ結果實ニ  
 對スル日本ノ地位一尙ヘバ「ビルマ」ニ於ケル一ヲ  
 弱化スル事ナク目ニナツテハナラナイト言フ前接ノ  
 上ニ立ツテノ話デアル。

「ソ」聯ガ日本ガ新カル作戦企圖ニ成功スルニ足ル必  
 要兵力ヲ供イテ居ルナラバ當然日本ハ「ソ」ビエツト、  
 ロシアト中立關係ヲ維持スル方がヨイ

「ソ」聯ハドンナ場合ニモ日「ソ」衝突ヲ懸念シ  
 テ東部「シベリヤ」ニ兵力ヲ維持セネバナラナイカ  
 ラ是モ亦幾々ノ預備ヲ置クスルコトニナル。取分  
 ケドンナモノデモ日本ガ「ソ」聯ニ保護ヲ與ヘル様  
 ナコトヲサセテハナラナイ。

中立ノ維持ニ於ツテ不足ナ兵力ニヨル一因ニ日本内

日本が出来ルダケ早く「ウラジオストツク」ヲ攻撃  
 スル決定ニ立至レバ之ニ違シタコトハナイ。此ノ如  
 ノ時トシテ「ソ」聯ガ「アメリカ」ト協力シテ日本ニ  
 對スル脅威トナル様ヲ望望甚甚トシテ準備スル爲ニ「シ  
 ベリヤ」州邊州ノ要塞化トイフ唯一目的ノ爲ニ使用  
 スルコトハ長ナイ。ソレ故ニ「ウラジオストツク」  
 ニ對スル攻撃ガ早ク行ハレレバ行ハレル程長カル事  
 無クソレダケ違シテ居ナイコトニナル。然シ乍ラ  
 是ハ總シテ日本ガ此ノ如クノ作戦ニ決ヘ得ルダケ十分  
 足大デアリ、他方此ノ兵力ヲ放ツテ其ノ結果実ニ  
 對スル日本ノ地位一弱ヘバ「ビルマ」ニ於ケル一ラ  
 局化スル事ナカ目ニナツテハナラナイト言フ前接ノ  
 上ニ立ツテノ話デアル。

「ソ」聯ニ對シテ日本ガ新カル作戦全西ニ成功スルニ足ル必  
 兵兵力ヲ供イテ居ルナラバ當然日本ハ「ソビエツト」  
 「ロシア」ト中立協定ヲ維持スル方がヨイ

「ソ」聯ハドンナ場合ニモ日「ソ」衝突ヲ懸念シ  
 テ東部「シベリヤ」ニ兵力ヲ維持セネバナラナイカ  
 ラ是モ亦幾々ノ預想ヲ經クスルコトニナル。取リ分  
 ケドンナモノデモ日本ガ「ソ」聯ニ保護ヲ與ヘル様  
 ナコトヲサセテハナラナイ。

中立ノ維持ニ對シテ不足ナ兵力ニヨル一宗ニ日本内

1230-3

地ニ對スル經濟ノ危険ヲ伴ツタ一長期戦ノ冒險ガ遂  
ケラレルデアロウ。此ノ場合ニ於テハ日本ハ何等  
ノ共同進行ニ有効ニ參與スル爲ニハ別ノ方面例ヘバ  
印度カ「ホーストラリヤ」ニ於テ攻勢ニ出ナケレバ  
ナラナイ。

之ヲ以テスルニ對シテノ立場カラハ次ノ様ニ言フベキ  
デアル。即チ「ソビエツト・ロシア」ヲ突如攻撃シテ  
成功ヲ成メルナラバ、ソレハ三國同盟國ニ對シテ  
ノ戰爭進行上大ナル恩恵トナルデアロウ、然シ乍ラ  
是ハ成功確實ナ時ニ限ツテ行ハルベキモノデアル。  
余ハ貴下ガ下記ノ考慮スベキ事項ヲ強調シ且貴下  
ノ認識ニ在ル様ナ日本ガ「ソビエツト・ロシア」ヲ  
攻撃スルコトニヨリア「アメリカ」合衆國ニ對スベ  
キ利益ニ爲イテハ多分ハ望ム目ニセラレンコトヲ希  
冀スル。絶ヘズ日本人ノ注意ヲ向ケサセテ置クベキ  
點モ重要ナ點ハ

一 情勢ハ現在ノ様ニ好都合ノコトハ今迄ニ無カツタ  
コト

ニ 待テバ待ツ様ソレダケ「シベリヤ」ニハ多クノ飛  
行場ガ建設サレルデアロウト言フコト

三 「アメリカ」ハ一度是等ノ評價ガ完成スレバ今日  
ニ於テ可能ナヨリモ、ヨリ多クノ有効ナ援助ヲ  
「ソ」聯ニ對シテ與ヘルコトガ出來ルダロウト言

1230-4

アモト

日「ソ」は等ハ「ソ」は初化スルコトニナルカ  
 ラ「アメリカ」ハ之ヲ歡迎スルダロウト言フ、費下  
 ノ負担ノ重ノ4ニシテハ現在デハ「アメリカ」ハ  
 「ソ」ハ出来ルダケ強化セントシア軍艦品其ノ他  
 ラ交付シア現貨ニ「ソ」ハ強ヲ強化シア居リ何等「ソ」  
 是ヲ弱クスルコトナドハ考ヘテ居ナイノデアルカラ  
 余ハ是ノ議論ハ少シ陳造ツテ居ルト言フコトヲ注意  
 シタイト思フ。一万「アメリカ」ガ來ルベキ大統領  
 選舉ノコトヲ考ヘテ備忘録トシテ何トカシア日「ソ」  
 競争ヲデツテ上ゲヨウトスルデアロウトコト從ツテ日  
 本ハ其カル行突ヲ回避シヨウトスルデアロウト言フ  
 コトヲ考ヘネバナラナイト言フ五ノ三ニ進ベラレタ  
 費下ノ見解ニ余ハ賛成スルモノデアル。

要スルニ我々ノ競争ハ直接ニ結果ヲ強備スルコト  
 ナク日本ヲツテ是等ノ諸見解ヲ認識セシメルガ如キ  
 モノデアラネバナラナイ。

「リツベントロツブ」

1230-5 (cont)

WDSCA 118, 4

一九四六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 三月三十日

「ワシントン州、サンフランシスコ、ロサンゼルス、郵便局長会」

東京、聯合軍務高司令部、國際検察部、首席検察官

ジョセフ・ビー・キーンズ宛に

キーンズ 殿

茲ニ添附ノ、一九四六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 二月二

十七日附長巻並ニ日本陸羽行逸大使、羽逸國外務省

同ニ交ハサレタル羽逸電報ノ翻譯ヲ添セタル、タイ

プライタム印刷二十七卷ハ「コロムビヤ」區「ワシ

ントン」種族國犯罪検察部「アメリカ」合衆國主席

檢察官ヨリ當處へ遞付セラレタルモノニ候

本附録ニハ左記情報ヲ含ミ居リ候

(イ) 日本ニ於ケル政治及戦争ノ状態並ニ日本國外務省

ノ目標ニ關シ東京駐羽逸大使ヨリ羽逸國外務省

ニ寄セタル報告

(ロ) 日本國政府ニ與ヘラルベキ情報ニ關シ外務大臣

(一) フォトリソグラフィ「ヨリ日本陸羽行

逸大使ニ宛テタル副令

(ハ) 日獨共同戦争及ビ戦後計畫ノ輪議

敬 具

戦争犯罪局東京部首席

軍法會議總經理 露局

露軍中生「ライクダ」シム・スウエアリソグラフィ

Doc 1230-Z

文書第一二三〇番 (巻八〇七)

明語電報 (O. C. H. V.)

ベルリン / BERLIN / 發一千九百四十四年二月十三日十二時三十分

東京 着 一千九百四十四年二月十四日十六時

明語 著 一マイヤ / MEYER /

譯書 作成 一マイヤ / MEYER /

發表 一〇 稿

電信 號 一千九百四十四年二月十三日第三一八號

直接大使宛

カワハラ大使 / Ambassador KAWAHARA / ハ二月八日次

ノコトヲ、ヘンケ / HELENKE / 次官ニ告ゲタ。

(一) 一月二十四日ノ東京ニ於ケル貴下トノ會談ニ於テ  
日本外務大臣ハ、次ノ如ク述べタ、即チモシ、獨乙  
ガ、ソヴィエト聯邦 / SOVIET UNION / ト協定締  
結ノ交渉ヲ試ミルナラバ、極端ニ全般的地位ニ好  
結果ヲ齎ラスト思ウカラ日本政府ハソレハ結構ト思フト。

カワハラ / KAWAHARA / ハ此ノ點ニ關シ、聲額ヲ述ニシ  
且明カニ本國政府ノ意向ニ差クト思ハレルガ次ノコ  
トヲ問フタ。即チ、ドイツハ伊太利ニ於ケル崩壞ニ  
鑑ミ、伊太利ノ利益ヲ考慮スルコトナク、ドイツノ  
勢力圍ヲ地中海 / MEDITERRANEAN / 北阿弗利加 / NORTH  
AFRICA / 及ビ、バルカン / BALKAN / ニ伸バス機  
會ヲ得タノデアルカラ、ウクライナ / UKRAINE /

EXH. V.

Doc 1230

ノ保持ハ、ドイツニトツテ、最早必要ヲナイノテハ  
ナイカト  
(三)

貴下ト日本外務大臣トノ者會談ニ於テ、從者ハ又  
丁度日本方東亞ノ諸國ニ對シテナシタ様ニ、初乙ヨ  
リ占領下ノスベテノ國々ノ國家的自自由ヲ宣言サレタ  
シトイウ希望ヲ述べタ。

大彼ノ意見ニ依レバカ、ル宣言ハ戰爭遂行上、極  
國ヲ利スルデアラウシ又歐亞ノ諸國ノ解決ニ關シテ  
ハ、日本及獨乙ノ戰爭目的ニ於ケル一致點ヲ探明ス  
ルコトモナルノデアラウ。

貴下ハ日本外務大臣ニ獨乙政府ハ日本外務大臣ノ志  
見ニ大体ニ於テ同意アルガ、カ、ル宣言ヲナシ得  
ルタメニハソレ以前ニ豫期サレル聯合軍ノ頭部侵入  
ヲ擧退シテシマツテ置カケレバナラナイト答へタ  
ソレニ對シテ、森元氏ハ自分ノ意見ヲハ斯様ナ宣言  
ヲスルニハソノ時テハ悉クモウ通過ギルデアラウカ  
ト答へタ。

カクハラ / KAWHARA ノ語ハ以上ノ通り。  
外務大臣トノ此ノ宣讀ニツイテ貴下ヨリ未ダ報告ニ張  
セズ、森元ノ提議立ビニ貴下ノ返答ニ關シ詳細報告サ  
レタシ。

/ VON RIBBENTROP /  
フオシ・リツベントロツフ

E# 808

Doc. No. 2593D-2

Page 1

(Item No. 3)

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)  
To: Washington  
July 31, 1941  
Purple (CA)

#432 (Part 1 of 4) (Message to Berlin #708)

From time to time you have been sending us your various opinions about what we ought to do to help Germany who desires our assistance now that she is at war with Russia. After a conference with the military, at the risk of a certain amount of repetition which may cause you some ennui, I am wiring you the Imperial Government's policy and views. Hereafter, will you please act accordingly.

1. In a cabinet meeting during the forenoon of July 2, the broad outlines of our decision concerning our future policy were drawn. You were informed of it by Circular #1300. Ever since then the Government has been and is devoting every effort to bring about the materialization of that policy.

2. The China incident has already extended over a period of four years, and the Imperial Government's general trend, particularly its military trend, has hitherto been to expend the greater part of its energies in an endeavor to bring a conclusion to the incident, and now a new situation faces us from the north and from the south. In order to meet it, there is more reason than ever before for us to arm ourselves to the teeth for all-out war.

a - Not available.

NOTE: The system used in this message is considered to be of the highest type of secret classification used by the Japanese Foreign Office. It used the CA code transposed according to J-19 keys and the resulting transposed code was then enciphered in the purple machine. This is the first solution of such a system that has been effected.

ARMY

SECRET

Trans. 8/4/41 (NR)



(Item No. 3)

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)  
To: Washington  
July 31, 1941  
Purple (CA)

#433 (Part 2 of 4) (Message to Berlin #708)

It seems that Germany also understands this position of ours fairly well. The German Embassy people here in Tokyo are already quite aware of it. And yet I fear that their homeland is not yet as well informed as they are on our position.

3. Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by England and the United States are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas. Our Empire must immediately take steps to break asunder this ever-strengthening chain of encirclement which is being woven under the guidance and with the participation of England and the United States, acting like a cunning dragon seemingly asleep. That is why we decided to obtain military bases in French Indo-China and to have our troops occupy that territory.

That step in itself, I dare say, gave England and the United States, not to mention Russia, quite a set-back in the Pacific that ought to help Germany, and now Japanese-American relations are more rapidly than ever treading the evil road. This shows what a blow it has been to the United States.

Needless to say, the Russo-German war has given us an excellent opportunity to settle the northern question, and it is a fact that we are proceeding with our preparations to take advantage of this occasion. Not only will we have to prepare, however, but we must choose well our chance. In view of the real situation facing our Empire, this should be easily understood. If the Russo-German war proceeds too swiftly, our Empire would inevitably not have time to take any effective symmetrical action.

5. I know that the Germans are somewhat dissatisfied over our negotiations with the United States, but we wished at any cost to prevent the United States from getting into

(Item No. 3)

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To: Washington  
July 31, 1941  
Purple (CA)

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Doc. No. 2593D-2

Page 3

(Item No. 3)

From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)

To: Washington

July 31, 1941

Purple (C)

#433 (Part 3 of 4) (Message to Berlin #708)

the war, and we wished to settle the Chinese incident. We were working toward those objectives. Let him who will gainsay the fact that as a result we have indelibly impressed upon the United States the profoundness of the determination of the Empire of Japan and restrained her from plunging into the conflict against Germany.

It should be understood that we started these talks at a time which seemed opportune to us, and on the assumption that there was complete trust between Japan and Germany. For that matter, did not Germany start a war with Russia because of her own military expediency when it was least desirable on our part? Now we have not only to settle the Chinese incident but have to meet a new challenge in the north as well as in the south, and this is quite inconvenient.

We are expending our best efforts to cooperate with Germany. She knows it and ought to understand our actions.

6. Well, the formula for cooperation between Tokyo and Berlin, in order to realize the fundamental spirit of the Tripartite Pact, should be for each country to have a certain flexibility in its conduct. What I mean to say is that each should understand that real cooperation does not necessarily mean complete symmetry of action. In other words, we should trust each other and while striving toward one general objective, each use our own discretion within the bounds of good judgment.

Thus, all measures which our Empire shall take will be based upon a determination to bring about the success of the objectives of the Tripartite Pact. That this is a fact is proven by the promulgation of an Imperial rescript. We are ever working toward the realization of those objectives, and now during this dire emergency is certainly no time to engage in any light unpremeditated or over-speedy action.

Please send to Rome. Have sent to Washington.

ARMY

SECRET

Trans. 8/4/41 (NR)

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE  
Colonel, G.S.C.

Ex 808

2593-D-2-1  
(Item No. 3)

秘

長官室 (公前大三)

ワシントン地

一九四二年八月十六日、七月三十一日

案 (O A)

第三三三三 (五ノ一)

(ブルリシ宛書信第七ノ八)

目下「ロシヤ」ト英戦シ居ル英方ノ活動ヲ希求セ  
ル獨逸ニ對シ我方ノトル可キ態度ニ付時際リ安下ヨ  
リ種々ナル意見ヲ申述シ來レリ。

幾度ノ反覆ヲ置テ、爲メニ我ル程度ノ倦意ヲ安下ニ  
與ヘル感レアルモ、最近ト會議セル結果、英政府ノ政  
策及見解ヲ茲ニ披瀝スベシ、茲ツテ今茲共之レニヨ  
リ行動サレ度シ

一 七月二日午前ノ内閣會議ニ於テ我ニ今茲ノ政策ニ  
關スル決定ノ大綱ヲ採擇サレリ。

此ニ同狀第一三三〇號ニテ通譯済ミナルモノレ以  
來政府ハ該政策實現ニアラニル努力ヲ擲ヒ今尙擲  
ヒツ、アル。

一 我邦對英ハ統ニ四ケ年ノ長期ニ亘リ、帝國政府ノ  
一決然態度、特ニ軍部ノ傾向ハ是迄英ノ努力ノ大

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361



○  
ル  
上  
下  
初  
登

2593-D-2-3  
(Item No. 3)

東京府 (公債六三)

ダシントノ宛

一九二一年ノ一月二十六日ノ七月三十一日

第 (6 A)

第五三三三 (五ノ三)

(ムルリノ宛に價額七〇八)

此ノモテ東京府ノ民ノ立身ヲ充分ノ事ヲラルニ依テ  
東京府在野ニ大衆ノ各長ハ此ノ事ヲ熟知セルモ  
此ノ本山ハ彼等選我區ノ立身ヲ知悉シテラザルモノ  
ト思フ

日本ト第三山トノ間對面ニ於テ此種ノ米米雨霞ノ  
三等ニ截リ積込非僅ナル急進ヲ告テ裁方トシテモ  
モハヤ是以上我區シテ從ツテ常國ノ官田在野ノ  
爲前方ノ原野ヲ掘進スル爲區ヲ深ル必至アリ、  
我區ハ一見見レルカノ如ク見セカケテキル深澤  
ナル飛山ノ如ク行露セル米米ノ深澤ト懸念ニヨツ  
テ續リナサレル處ノ最區テク強花サレツ、アル包  
區ノ以テ切實スベキ手段ヲ實ニ深澤セザルベカ



2503-D-2-4  
(Item No. 3)

ラス。我方が必領印度支那ニ軍事進出ヲ遂行シ其  
ノ領土ニ侵入ヲ起シテシメタルハ此レガ故ナリ  
職ヲ申ス、此ノ處置言ハルガ。露國ハ云フニ及ズ  
米英ヲシテ平等ニ於ケル通行ヲ余獨ナクセシメ  
御ツテ此ニ役立ツベキナリ、今ヤ日米關係ハ加  
速發展ニ至ル所達ヲ達リツ、アル。此レハ米國ニ  
對シ如何ニ打撃ナルヤヲ示ス

2593-D-2-5  
(Item No. 3)

秘

東京（外務大臣）様

ワシントン宛

一九四一年 / 昭和十六年 / 七月三十一日

案（〇△）

第四三三號

（四ノ第三部）

（ペルリン宛書信第七〇八

號）

勿論獨逸軍等ハ吾等ニ北方向延原決ノ絶好ノ  
 機會ヲ具ヘタ。コノ機會ヲ利用スベク準備ヲ進メ  
 テ居ルコトハ事實デアル。併シ準備ノ必具アルノ  
 ミナラバ、吾人ハワタク機會ヲ選バホバナラス。  
 我ガ帝國ノ直ニ見ル現實ノ要意ニ違ミ、コレハ容  
 易ニ理解セラルベシ。若シ獨逸軍等ガ余リニ迅速  
 ニ進行スルカラバ、我帝國ハ必然的ニ、何等ノ有  
 效ナル一試ノ行動ヲ取ル余裕ヲ有シナイデアラウ。  
 吾等ハ獨逸人ハ誠實ニ變シニ望カ不滿ナルコ  
 トヲ知レルモ、我等ハ是非共米山ヲ設セシメス  
 様精望シ、且支那邊境ヲ解決セシコトヲ精望シタ。  
 コノ目標ニ向ヒ吾人ハ精勵シテ居タ。其ノ結果吾  
 等ハ日本帝國ノ決意ハ深刻ナリトノ精エ難キ印象  
 ヲ具ヘ、米國ヲシテ誠獨逸國ニ突入ヲ抑止セル事

2593-D-2-6  
(Item No. 3)

我ニ反撃セントスル人ハ反撃シテモ構ハナイ。  
吾等ニハ誠無セリト思ハレタル時ニ、且ツ日  
國ニ先立ナル備賦アリトノ推定ノ下ニコノ會談ヲ  
開始セルコトハ望ミセラルベキデアル。コノ事ニ  
關シテハ、吾等ニハ誠モ望マシカラズ時ニ到リ  
自身ノ學問的結合カラ露西亞ト關係シタノデハナ  
イカ、今キ吾等ハ又露西亞ヲ解決セバナラズノ  
ミナラズ、露西亞ニ北方ノ新ラシキ發展ニ道ハ  
不バナナイカ、コレハ益ク不便ナルコトデアル。

2593-D-2-7  
(Item No. 3)

秘

東京（外務大臣）發

ワシントン宛

一九四一年／昭和十六年／七月三十一日

紫（〇 A）

第四三三號（四ノ第四部）（ベルリン宛電信第七〇八號）

吾人ハ獨逸ト協力スベク最善ノ努力ヲ働ヒツツアリ。獨逸ハコレヲ知リ、吾人ノ行動ヲ理解スベキデアル。

6、 茲テ三國條約ノ根本精神實現ノタメ、東京ベルリン間ノ協力ノ形式ハ各國ソノ行動ニ於テ最程度ノ柔軟性ヲ有スベキデアル。本官ノ言ハントスルトコロハ、眞ノ協力ハ必ズツモ行動ノ完全ナル一致ヲ意味シナイコトヲ銘々諒解スベキダト云フコトデアル。換言スレバ、吾人ハ相互ニ信頼スベキデアリ、一個ノ益俾ノ目的ニ向ヒ努力シツ、モ、ヨキ利益ノ範圍内テハ自己ノ自由裁量ヲ用フベキデアル。

新クノ如ク我帝國ノ採ル一切ノ方策ハ三國條約ノ目的ノ成功ヲ招來スベキ決意ニ基クベキデアル。コレガ事實デアルト云フコトハ勅諭ノ發布ニヨリテモ證明セラレル。吾人ハ絶エズコノ目的實現ノタメニ

2593-D-2-8  
(Item No. 3)

活動シテ居ル。今ヤ現下ノ恐ルベキ緊急時ニ際シテ  
ハ確カニ如何ナル輕率、不用意致ハ早急ナル行爲ニ  
從事シテ居ルノ余裕ハナイノチアル。

ローマへ送信セラレタシ。

ワシントンへ送信セリ。

Doc. 2593 cert.

陸 軍 省

陸 軍 省 参 謀 本 部

清 報 局

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り證明ス。即チ、  
添附致通ノ日本文電報ノ複製寫眞ハ陸海軍兩省ノ熟  
練セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ツテ傍  
受ザレ、解讀セラレ而シテ翻譯セラレシモノニシテ  
予ノ知り且信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ翻譯スル爲  
メ西洋人ニトリ入力ノ可能ナル限度ニ於テ正確且ツ  
典據ノアルモノナリ。

参謀本部付大佐

CLARKE, W. CLARKE  
カーター・ダウリック・クラーク

Q# 810 |

Doc. No. 1621B

Excerpt from: "Establishment of East Asia," a symposium of the Institute of Total War

2. Conclusion of peace between Germany and the Soviet Union.

If there should arise good prospect that peace between Germany and the U.S.S.R. would cause Soviet alienation from America and Britain and reduce the threat against Japan, we shall mediate for peace between Germany and the Soviet Union by bringing, if necessary, pressure to bear at a period when the war situation is favorable to Germany.

I. When the war situation is favorable to Germany.

(1) To force peace on the Soviet Union by hinting at a declaration of war against her if she should refuse to suspend hostilities.

(2) In this case we will obtain from the Soviet Union a promise that she would not lend any military base to America, and a substantial guarantee for the fulfillment of this promise.

II. When the war situation is unfavorable to Germany

When the war situation is unfavorable to Germany, it shall be the general rule that no efforts will be made to bring about peace between Germany and the Soviet Union. However, we must be prepared to exert great pressure on the Soviet Union in case of unavoidable necessity, and to expect a peace which may not be necessarily satisfactory.

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Doc. No. 1621B

PAGE 2

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. ....

I.P.S. No. 1621B

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Takehashi, Michitoshi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Cabinet and that as such official I had custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 390 pages, dated 18 Feb 1942, and described G.T. as follows: Outline of the national policies in the first period of the general mobilization war for the establishment of East Asia. I further certify that the attached document was issued by the Total War Research Institute, for the study of its members and that it was in the custody of the Cabinet Secretariat by the request of the prescribed Institute.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
17th day of September, 1946

/s/ M. Takehashi  
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ R. Kuriyama

SEAL  
Secretary of Cabinet  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard E. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters, of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
17th day of September, 1946

/s/ Richard E. Larsh  
NAME

No 1 ☆

Ex 810

Doc 1621 B

東亞建設第二期總力戰方針「草案」  
總力戰研究所

獨「構和依」之「英米離」上戰「對」之「獨威減」  
少「自」之「場」獨「戰況有利」之「時期」担「之」必要「  
依」壓力「加」之「獨」之「構和」斡旋「ス」

(一) 獨戰況有利之場合

(1) 「對」之「停戰」之「方針」之「對」之「用戰」行「之」可「以」  
之「構和」強要「ス」

(2) 此「場合」之「三米」之「基地」之「實質」與「之」之「確約」  
及其「履行」之「實質」的「保證」を「求」む

(二) 獨戰況不利之場合

獨「戰況不利」之「時期」獨「之」構和「構和」強要「ス」  
之「本則」ニ「ス」但「之」已「之」得「之」場合「我」之「於」之「強要」之「  
壓力」を「加」之「覺悟」を「要」之「且」必「之」之「満足」之「之」之「構和」之「豫  
期」スル「之」を「要」ス

FILE COPY  
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Doc 1621B

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余 *Richard H. Lorsch*、余が聯合國最高指揮官總司令部  
ニ關係スルモノトシテ、美ニ上記題名、大書ニ余が公務上日本政府、  
上記署名官更ヨリ入手スルモノトシテ茲ニ證明ス

于九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 九月十七日

東京 泰子署名

氏名欄

*Richard H. Lorsch*

右者公的資格

國際檢察部調査官

證人

*William C. Coats*

No 2 ☆

Doc 1621

證明書

東京海上文書部 第 號

實際檢察部 第 一六二號

根據 及 公 心 三 國 之 通 明

余 高橋 (Michitoshi) 公 余 不 記 資 格 三 於 天 即 內 閣 書 記 官 長 一 日 本 政 府 卜 公 的 關 係 在 此 三 十 年 下 並 三 該 官 吏 卜 字 余 公 益 三 添 附 言 之 化 三 九 頁 三 成 心 年 九 百 四 十 二 年 船 和 十 七 年 二 月 十 八 日 附 下 記 題 知 即 年 東 亞 建 設 年 一 朝 然 亦 戰 略 之 文 書 保 管 三 任 心 居 此 卜 字 茲 三 證 明 又

余 更 三 此 添 附 文 書 公 然 亦 戰 研 究 所 亦 其 會 員 研 究 三 益 發 行 日 七 三 日 天 該 研 究 所 依 賴 三 依 心 內 閣 書 記 官 室 亦 其 保 管 三 任 心 居 卜 字 卜 三 證 明 又

年 九 百 四 十 三 年 昭 和 三 十 二 年 九 月 十 日

東京 三 於 下

署 長

當 後 官 吏 署 名 欄

高 橋

在 右 公 的 資 格

(Michitoshi)

證 人

人

栗 山

了 心

no 9

11811

2074-1

證人野原駒吉案内調書

一九四六年二月十五日、モスクワ

野原駒吉、一八九九年横濱市（日本）

ニ生ル、日本人、非黨員

家族ハ妻ト息子一人、歐洲ニテ中

等、高等教育ヲ受ケ、バーゼル及

ヒベルリンニ於テ大學ノ哲學科ヲ

卒業ス、

一九二三年ヨリ一九三九年迄、歐

洲、米合衆國、葡アメリカ、日本

ニ住ミ、新聞、雜誌記者トシテ働

ク、殺斃ヲ受ケタルコトナシ。

一九三九年九月一日ヨリ一九四五

年四月二十一日迄ベルリン陸軍日

本大使館ノ新聞報道係ヲ務ム。現

在ソ聯邦ニ拘留中。

虚偽ノ供遺ノ責任ニ關シテ警告サレ、ロシヤ社會主義聯邦ソビエト共和國ノ刑法第九五條が私ニ對シ宣セラレタ。

署名

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6x811

2074-1

被告人野原駒吉等内閣官

一九四六年二月十五日、モスクワ

野原駒吉、一八九九年横浜市（日本）

ニ生ル、日本人、非黨員

家族ハ妻ト息子一人、歐洲ニテ中

等、高等校ヲ受ケ、バーゼル及

ヒベルリンニ於テ大學ノ哲學科ヲ

卒業ス、

一九二二年ヨリ一九三九年迄、歐

洲、米合衆國、葡アメリカ、日本

ニ住ミ、新聞、雜誌記者トシテ働

ク、諷刺ヲ受ケタルコトナシ。

一九三九年九月一日ヨリ一九四五

年四月二十一日迄ベルリンニ在日

本大使館ノ新聞報道係ヲ務ム。現

在ソ聯邦ニ特在中。

眞偽ノ供述ノ責任ニ付シテ警告サレ、ロシヤ社會

主義聯邦ソビエト共和國ノ刑法第九五條ガ私ニ

對シ宣セラレタ。

署名

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2074-2

等國ハ通譯者ロイゼンバウム・イエ・ゲニヨツテ  
露語ニ通譯サレ、日本語ヲ行ハル。  
正確ナル通譯ノ責任ニ就イテハ、ロシヤ社會主義  
聯邦ソビエト共和國ノ刑法第九五條ニ從ヒ、通  
譯ロイゼンバウム・イエ・ゲニ警告セラレタ。

氏名

問。貴方ハ何時、何處テ、赤軍部隊ニヨリテ拘留  
サレタカ。

答。私ハ一九四五年四月二十一日、ベルリン郊外、  
東方四〇軒ノ地帯ニアルシュエトウクスベルグ市  
ニ於テ赤軍部隊ニヨリテ拘留サレタ。

問。何故ニ一九四五年四月二十一日ニ貴方ハ在ベ  
ルリン日本大使館ニ居ラスニ、軍作戦地域テ  
アルシュエトラウクスベルグ市ニ居タノデアルカ

答。其レハ私ハ常ニシュエトラウクスベルグ市ニ住ン  
テ居タカラテ、其處ニハ私がコノ様ナ願願ノ  
時ニ據レテ住ムノヲ好マナイ私ノ家族が居タ  
カラデアル。以後ニ私が「ベルリン」駐在日  
本大使館テ仕事シタノハ一九四五年四月十六  
日テ、ソレ以後私ハ「ベルリン」「シュエトラ  
ウクスベルグ」間ノ鐵道が破壊サレテキタタメ  
「ベルリン」へ出掛ケルコトハ出来ナカッタ。

問。貴方ニ呈示セラレアル拘留ノ際、赤軍將校ニ

2074-3

ヨツテ貴方ノ所ヲ発見サレタ、須藤 茂ヒ 英 語  
ノ 警 察 ノ 出 所 ト、 姓 質 ラ 知 ベ ラ レ タ イ。  
何 故 ニ 此 ノ 警 察 ガ 貴 方 ノ 所 ニ ア ツ タ ノ テ ア ル  
カ。

答。私ニ呈示サレタ四枚ヨリ廣ル警報ハ、實際私  
ノ所ヲ発見サレタモノデアリ、其レハ以前在  
ベルリン日本大使館所屬ノモノデアツタ。私  
ハ種々の反アツストデアリ、日、清ノ邊  
ソ朝鮮及ヒ兵ノ聯合國トノ賊等反對者デアツ  
タノテ、意識シテ之等ノ控領ヲ私等ツ、之ヲ  
聯合國ノ利益ノ爲ニ利用シヤウト考ヘテキタ  
ト云フノハ私ハ之等ノ警報ニヨツテ平和愛好  
國家ニ對スル賊ヲ奨励シ、自門ト門民ヲ破局  
ニ投ゲ込メダ日本賊等犯罪者ノ捕獲ニ何等カ  
ノ奨励が出来ル日ノ來ル時ヲ信ジテ居タカラ  
デアル。其レ故私ハコノ警報ヲ保管シ、シカ  
モ之ヲ隠匿或ハ放棄セントスルコトナク、私  
ガ一九四五年四月二十一日ニシユトラウスベ  
ルグ市テ拘束サレタ時ニ、警報ヲソグイエー  
ト將校ニ手渡シタノデアル。  
コノ警報ノ大部分ハ機密デアツタ。私ハ自分  
ノ直接ノ仕事テハ新聞報道係トシテ新ル警報  
ノ機密警報ニ關係スベキモノテハナカツタケ



2074-4

レドモ、私ハ河原信大佐館参事官ヲ通ジテ機  
密資料ニ係シテキタ。私ノ仕事ハ軍事的或  
ハ他ノ機密情報資料ノ整理ヲスルニトデアツ  
テ、此ノ情報ハ大使館ニ於テ秘密ナセノト考  
ヘラレ共ノ内容ヲ明サレタモノハ大島大使ノ  
外ハ、唯ダ河原参事官ト私ノミデアツタ。私  
ノ所ヲ見サレタ書類ノ大部分ハ先ニ述べタ  
書類ノ資料ニ属スルモノテ、赤江艦隊ノ兵員  
及ビ配置、其ノ装備及ビ補給、少尉補佐工樂及  
其ノ生計、船舶所乗行機、機章及ソノ船中ノ人的設備

等ノ機密資料ノ内容トスル事情ノ物ナキアル。  
斯クノ如キ性質ノソノ船中ニ属スル軍事情報ヲ  
在ベルリン日本大使館ハ一九四一年カウー九  
四五年迄在モスクワ日本大使館川及ビ佐藤ヨ  
リ暗號電報テ入手シタ。共ノ暗號電報ハ後テ  
河原参事官ト私ニヨツテ整理サレ、行頭譯ニ  
翻譯サレ然ル後在ベルリン日本大使館ハコノ  
情報ヲ獨逸外務省ニ手交シテキタノデアル。

同。貴方ニ一九四五年一月十九日附ノ「ソヴイエ  
トロシアノ軍事滞在力」ト題サレタ書類ガ  
呈示サレテキルガ、共レニハソノ船中ノ飛行機、  
機章、及ビ石油、共ノ他ノ生計高ノ数字ガ脱  
略サレテキル。何人ニヨツテ、又何時、コノ

2074-4

レドモ、私ハ河原信大使館参事官ヲ通シテ機  
密資料ニ係リテキタ。私ノ仕立ハ軍事的或  
ハ他ノ秘密情報資料ノ整理ヲスルニトデアツ  
テ、此ノ情報ハ大使館ニ於テ秘密ナセノト考  
ヘラレ兵ノ内容ヲ明サレタモノハ大島大使ノ  
外ハ、唯ダ河原参事官ト私ノミデアリタ。私  
ノ所ヲ発見サレタ資料ノ大部分ハ先ニ述べタ  
種類ノ資料ニ属スルモノテ、赤正部隊ノ兵員  
及ビ配置、其ノ装備及ビ補給、少尉補佐工樂及  
トシテ生産品、飛行機、機庫又ソノ機庫等ノ人的準備

等ニ係ル機密資料ノ内容トスルニ係リテモナキアル。  
斯クノ如キ性質ノソノ機庫ニ属スル軍事情報ヲ  
在ベルリン日本大使館ハ一九四一年カラ一九  
四五年迄在モスクワ日本大使館川及ビ佐藤ヨ  
リ陸軍電報テ入手シタ。兵ノ膨張程度ハ後テ  
河原参事官ト私ニヨツテ整理サレ、行状録ニ  
記録サレ然ル後在ベルリン日本大使館ハコノ  
情報ヲ行状録省ニ手交シテキタノデアリ。

問。貴方ニ一九四五年一月十九日附ノ「ソヴィエ  
トロシアノ軍事情勢」カト題サレタ整理ガ  
呈示サレテキルガ、其レニハソノ機庫ノ飛行機、  
機庫、及ビ石油、兵ノ他ノ生産高ノ数字ガ脱  
漏サレテキル。何人ニヨツテ、又何時、コノ

2074-5

管に作成されたカ、而して数字ノ隠匿ハ何  
ヲ意味スルセノデアルカ。

答。コノ管類ハ在セスクワ日本大使佐官ヨリ入手  
ノ資料ヲ基トシテ一九四二年一月ニ、私ト河  
原参事官トニヨツテ作成サレタモノデ、数字  
ノ隠匿ハ河原参事官ニヨツテナサレ、第一寫  
本ニ彼ハ数字ヲ手記シソノマ、須逸人ニ手渡  
シタノデアル。此ノ情報ヲ河原ハ特ニ機密ナ  
セト考ヘテキタ。

問。貴方ノ所テ見サレタ資料ノ中ニ「赤軍ノ兵  
員ニ就テ一ト探題サレタ警類ガアルガ、其レ  
ニハ」一九四二年一月二十一日在モスクワ日  
本大使館間武官ハ幾々ヲ過ジテ次ノ情報ヲ外  
務省ニ手交セリ。トノ貴方ノ手記ニヨル註釋  
ガアリ、警類ノ下部ニハ同様貴方ノ手記ニヨ  
ル「一九四二年一月二十二日、本情報ハ須逸  
總司令官ノ手中ニアリタリ。ト記載サレテア  
ル。コノ警類ニ表明セル貴方ノ註釋ハ何ヲ意  
味スルノカ釋明サレタイ。

答。コノ警類ハ在ベルリン日本大使館ガ一九四二  
年一月二十一日ニモスクワノ日本武官ヨリ入  
手シタ機密情報ノ記録テアリ、ソノ様ニ河原  
参事官ハコノ情報ノ出所ヲ口頭テ私ニ説明シ

2074-6

タ。ソレテ管轄ニソノ記録ガ私ニヨツテ草稿  
盤キカラ復寫サレタノデアル。翌日、一月二  
十二日、私ト河原忠壽官ガコノ交際ヲ作成<sup>整理</sup>シ  
タ後、河原忠壽官ハ自ラ管轄ヲ石井外務官ニ  
手交シタ。

在ベルリン日本大使館ニヨル聯合國ニ關スル  
機密情報ノ洩逸人ヘノ付達民間ニ就テ私が眞  
ニ覺ヘテ極キタイコトハ一九三九年ヨリ一九  
四五年ノ間ニ日本大使館ハモスクワ、ロンド  
ン及ヒ東京ヨリ資料ノ入手次第私ノ記憶ニヨ  
ルト約四〇通ノ通牒ヲ洩逸人ニ手交シタコト  
デアル。

手交サレタ資料ノ内容ハ主トシテソ聯邦及ヒ  
ソノ聯合國ノ經濟力ニ關シタモノテ、  
資料ノ一部ハ個々ノ問題ニ關スル特定調査ノ  
綜合報告テ、其ノ他ノ資料ハ戰時中ソ聯邦ヲ  
通過シタ日本人及ヒ他ノ外國人ノ個人的觀察  
ノ集積デアツタ。

問。貴方ハ一九四一年ニ締結サレタ日ソ中立條約  
ノ存在ヲ承知デアツタカ。

答。然リ、其ノ條約ノ存在スルコトハ他ノ在ベル  
リン日本大使館員同様私ハ承知シテキタ。

問。河津ノ指令ニヨリ在ベルリン日本大使館ハソ

2074-7

ダイエート聯邦ニ出スル秘密情報ヲ洩逸人ニ  
手交シテキタカ。

答。東京カラノ指令ニヨリ又大島大使ノ仁人的指  
令ニ依ツテアル。

問。然ル場合、日本貴府及兵ノ代理者アル在ベ  
ルリン大島大使ノ行動ヲ貴方ハ如何ニ考ヘル  
カ。

答。日本ノ聯邦間ノ中立條約ノ存在スル場合、獨  
逸ニ對スルソ聯邦ニ出スル軍艦、兵ノ他ノ機  
密情報ノ提供ハ、日本側カラノ對ソ戦争ニ於  
ケル獨逸ニ對スル決定的ナ援助トナリ、從ツ  
テ中立條約ノ實際的違反アル。

大島大使ハ日本政府ノ代理者トシテ全ク日ソ  
中立條約ヲ尊重、遵守シマウトツナカツタ。

彼ハ實際行動ニ於テ獨逸、日、伊間ニ在セル所  
謂「防共協定」ト謂ハレルイテオロギ」的同意

盟及ヒ三國軍艦同盟ヲ指導シテキタ。

コノ點ニ於テ大島大使ノ行動ハ日本政府ノ反  
ソ政策ニ全ク一致シ大島ハソノ積極的ナ達成

者アリ、先導者デモアツタ。

問。在ベルリン日本大使トシテノ大島浩ノ活動ニ  
就イテノ意向ヲ述べラレタイ。

答。獨逸陸軍大使トシテノ大島ノ活動同様ニ彼ノ

2074-7

ダイエート聯邦ニシテ秘密情報ヲ洩逸人ニ  
手交シテキタカ。

答。東京カラノ指令ニヨリ又大島大使ノ個人的指  
令ニ依リテアル。

同。然ル場合、日本政府及兵ノ代理者アル在ベ  
ルリン大島大使ノ行動ヲ貴方ハ如何ニ考ヘル  
カ。

答。日本ソ聯邦同ノ中立條約ノ存在スル場合、洩  
逸ニ對スルソ聯邦ニ關スル軍事、兵ノ他ノ機  
密情報ノ提供ハ、日本側カラノ對ソ戦争ニ於  
ケル洩逸ニ對スル決定的ナ援助トナリ、從ツ  
テ中立條約ノ實際的違反アル。

大島大使ハ日本政府ノ代理者トシテ全ク日ソ  
中立條約ヲ尊重、遵守シマウトシナカッタ。

彼ハ實際行動ニ於テ刻、日、伊國ニ容セル所  
謂「防共協定」ト謂ハレルイテオロギ「的」同  
盟及ヒ三國軍事同盟ヲ指導シテキタ。

コノ點ニ於テ大島大使ノ行動ハ日本政府ノ反  
ソ政策ニ全ク一致シ大島ハソノ積極的ナ達成  
者アリ、先導者テモアツタ。

同。在ベルリン日本大使トシテノ大島浩ノ活動ニ  
關イテノ意向ヲ述べラレタ。

答。洩逸者大島トシテノ大島ノ活動同様ニ彼ノ

政治的標頭を以上私ガ宛分往差ツケツガ、尙  
 次ノ部ヲ開ケ加ヘタイ。  
 大島海軍大臣ハ御達ツテツツスマムノ宛頭御覽成者ヲ  
 アリ、ソノ標頭、英日及米日ノ不平等條約ノ訂  
 テアル。一九四〇年ニベルリンノ陸海軍日方武官ト  
 ツテ協定ヲ訂セハ日、御ノ御覽同聖締結ニ  
 多大ノ功方ヲツタ。  
 奉天倉庫（一九〇四年—一九〇五年）ノ日露戰  
 役ニ於ケル日本軍ノ勝利（ノ紀念日）ノ祝賀ノ  
 時ニ、大島ハベルリンニ於ケル宴席ヲ「私ハ  
 ロシアノウホツカカク飲ミ、ロシアヲ敬ムコト  
 ヲ考ヘテキル」ト云ツタ。  
 大島大臣ノ親善能力ニ對スル御覽御覽信譽ハ  
 大儀館内ノミテナク、御達人同ニモ有名者ヲ  
 ツタ。  
 ゲーリング、カインテル、ヒムラー、其ノ他御達  
 著名ノ御達者達ガ屢々大島大使ニヨツテ大使  
 館ノ宴會ニ招待サレタ。一履ハヒツトナレモ  
 訪問ツタ。ゲーリングハ屢々ナガラ大使館ヲ  
 訪問ツテキタ。（彼ハ日本人ニ對スル懸念ヲ  
 懸クサナカツタ。）「ガタソノ代リヒムラー  
 ト他ノ御達者達ハ撰リト大島ヲ訪問シ、又代  
 リニ彼ヲ自分ノ所ニ招待シテキタ。

2074-8

2074-8

政治的機關モ以上私ガ充分注意ツケムガ、尙  
 次ノ事ヲ聞ケ加ヘタイ。  
 大島大佐ハ獨逸ニアツクスムノ絶對的權威者テ  
 アリ、ソノ獨逸、英國及米國ノ不保護天ノ道テ  
 アル。一九〇〇年ニベルリンニ駐在日米武官ト  
 シテ獨逸中從ハ日、獨、伊ノ軍事同盟締結ニ  
 多大ノ助方ヲシタ。  
 奉天會戰（一九〇四年—一九〇五年）ノ日露戰  
 役ニ於ケル日本軍ノ勝利（ノ紀念日）ノ祝賀ノ  
 時ニ、大島大佐ハベルリンニ於ケル宴席テ「私ハ  
 ロシヤノウオツカヲ欲ミ、ロシヤヲ欲ムコト  
 ヲ考ヘテキルト云ツタ。  
 大島大佐ノ獨逸能力ニ對スル絶對的ニ信奉ハ  
 大使館内ノミテテク、獨逸人固ニモ有名デア  
 ヲツタ。  
 ゲーリング、カイテル、ヒムラー共ノ絶對的  
 著名ノ指導者兼ガ屢々大島大使ニヨツテ大使  
 館ノ宴會ニ招待サレタ。一處ハヒットラーモ  
 訪問シタ。ゲーリングハ屢々ナガラ大使館ヲ  
 訪問シテキタ。（從ハ日本人ニ對スル熱惡ヲ  
 懸クサナカッタ。）ガッセル兵ノ代リヒムラー  
 ト他ノ指導者兼ハ頻リト大島ヲ訪問シ、又代  
 リニ從テ自分ノ所ニ招待シテキタ。



2074-9

大島ハ勸告語ヲ達者ナシテ、通漢人等同ニハ  
一處ニ通譯ヲ達レナカツタ。從ツテヒットラ  
ト云人等トノ言ハ達シ向ヒテ行ハレテキタ  
ノテ、私ニハ合談ノ内容ハ判明シナイ。  
ヒムラト及ビ彼ノ勳力者達ノ勳力ヲ大島ハ勸  
告各地ヲ遍歴シ、又勸告人ハ大島ヲ信用シテ  
アラユル場所ニ案内シタ。同様彼等ノ勳力ヲ  
大島ハ一九四二年迄ハ一九四三年ニ日米大使  
館附武官ヲ伴ツテ、引ノ職線ノ管轄ヲ行ヒ、  
ウクライナ、怒ラクカメンスクダカカメシカ  
ニモ居タ。  
彼ガソ連邦トノ中立信約ヲ有スル日本ノ大使  
デアルト云フコトハ、彼ヲ少シモ困惑サセナ  
カツタ。シカモ彼ハ獨逸軍占領ノソヴエート  
領土ニ居ルコトヲ許容サレルモノト考ヘテ居  
タ。  
大島ハ常ニソ連邦ニ對スル日、獨逸共同軍政  
體ノ支持者デアツタ。コレニ關係シテ次ノ通  
話ガソノ性格ヲ表ハシテキル。カツテ一九四  
一年六月二十三、二十三日ノソ連邦ニ對スル  
勸告ノ政變直後、東京ノ松岡外相大庭ヨリ大  
使館ニ陸海電報ガ到着シタ。電報ノ意味ハ大  
体现下ノ情勢ニ關係シ「防共協定ノ精神ニ於

2074-10

テ、日本ハ太平洋ノ防衛ニアタルデアラウ  
ト云フニアツタ。大島ハ河原邊警備ト私ヲ招  
キ、意見ヲ懇請シタ。河原ト私ハ電報ニヨッ  
テ判明スレバ、日本ハソノ部ニ對シテ行動ヲ  
起サナイデアラウト開陳シタ。大島ハ「太平  
洋ノ防衛」ハ日本ノ對シテ戰爭ヲ意味スルト、  
反對ノ見解ヲ述ベシタ。不閉際ハ電報ヲ致  
シタ大島ハ原文ノ字句ヲカヘズ又英語ヲ翻  
語ニシテ翻譯セズ、電報ヲ受取ツタマ、ノ情  
意ヲ判明人ニ手渡ス様ニ命ジタ。領事人ノ回  
答ハ私ニハ不明デアツタ。  
ヒットラーノ著書「吾ガ國」ニ記述サレテ  
キル所謂民族優越ノ「理論」ニ大島ハ全ク共  
鳴シテキタ。他ノ日本人ガヒットラーガ日本人  
ニ對シテモ低級ナル人トシテ記述シテキル  
ト大島ニ指摘スルト、大島ハソレハヒットラ  
ーノ誤謬デアリ、著作ノ適當ヲ修正ラ若老ニ  
懇請スルデアラウト云ツテキタ。  
自國ハヨウロッパ諸國及ビソノ部ノ被占領地  
域ニ於ケルヒットラーノ優越者ノ野蠻的行爲ニ  
對スル屬知ノ事實ヲ大島ハ全ク見逃シ、コレ  
ハ全部ノ虚偽デアリ、實ノ事實デアリ事實無

2074-11

誤テアルト見付シタ。  
 大島ノ初選入ニ對シテノ懇切ト屬從ハ卒實ニ  
 於テ限リガナカツタ。大使館ヲ辭ガセタ日本  
 ノ院村教授ノ事件ハ、ソノ一例デアル。院村  
 ハ日本冶金債兼金兼合同ノ派遣ヲ行發ニ志  
 中一九四三年或ハ一九四四年滿員ニ發行シ、  
 兵處テ彼ハ初選ハ然ノ不足テ同等ニ預ケルテ  
 アラウト英國新聞記者ニ合見被新ラシ又一級  
 的ニ初選ヲアシズムヲ非難シタ。初選例ノ抗  
 議ニ因聯シ、彼等ト大島トノ間ニ三回ニ亙ル  
 通牒ノ往復ガ生シタガ、以後ノ通牒ニ於テ大  
 島ハ初選入ニ院村ヲ初選官案ノ手ニ渡スコト  
 ニ對シテ抗議ハシナイト報告シタ。  
 コノ事實ハ私自身が抜荷的ニ通牒ヲ作成シタ  
 故難シテアル。  
 コノ大島ノ行爲ハフアシスト員氣ノ日本人間  
 ニ於テモ相當テ紛糾ヲ呼ビ起シタ。其ノ後ノ  
 院村ヲ選命ニ就テハ私ハ知マナイ、ナゼナラ  
 バ彼ハ大使館外ニ居住シテキタノテ私ハ彼ヲ  
 見掛ケナカツタ。  
 大島ニ就モ親シイ人々ハ陸軍武官「バンザイ」  
 「小松」ノ兩將軍及ビ海軍武官「櫻井」ト「

2074-12

小島一テアリ、大島ハ常ニ彼等ノ社会ニ出入  
 シテキタ。ソレハ彼等ハ嘗、ニアシスト員氣  
 テアツタカラテアル。  
 後ニ、勿邊ニ於ケル彼后ノ段階ニ於テモ大  
 島ハ勿邊ノ段力ニ對シテ限リ無イ狂信ヲ持ツ  
 テキタ。即チ一九四五年四月ベルリンニ於テ  
 彼等ハ危機ヲ孕ミツツアツタ時ニ、大島ハ南  
 勿邊へ移管セヨト勿邊側ノ申シ出ヲ容レタ。  
 ソレト云フノモ勿邊ガ南勿邊ニ於テ長期抗戦  
 ヲ進行出来ルトイフコトヲ信ジタカラテアル。  
 一九四五年四月十四日大島ハ大使館ト共ニザ  
 ルツブルグ市南方ノバトーガシユティン市ニ  
 向ツテ自動車ヲ出立シタ。  
 ソノ時カラ私ハ大島ニ就テノ情報ヲ待タナイ。  
 ベルリンニハ勿邊内閣ノ谷大正トノ連絡ノ爲  
 ニ河原参事官、外交隨員一名、日本領事ト二  
 一三ノ隨員ガ隨ツタ。  
 私ハ審問ノ冒頭ニ供進シタ原因ニヨリ留マツ  
 タ。敘述事項ハ私ノ言葉カラ正シク記載サレ、  
 私ニ日本語ニ通譯サレタ。

審問開始 十七時

野原

〃 終了 二十一時

審問者

陸軍中佐ベトロフ

通譯

ローゼンバウム

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一九四五年（昭和二十年）一月十九日

秘

「ソビエト」露西軍ノ戦力

「ソビエト」露西軍ノ戦力ノ有様ヲ展開トソノ  
尖地ノ両側ハ早ニ露西軍ノミナラズ露西軍ニモ「ソ  
ビエト」露西軍戦力ノ顕化ヲ察シタ。露西軍  
業ハ戦前ノ生産状態ニ未ダ到達シテキナイトハ云々  
石油、鉄、銅、鉛、石炭、石油、鉄、銅、鉛、銅、鉛、銅、鉛  
ノ生産額ノ生産ニ増加シタ。尋常セル地産ノ管理  
ハ固ニ開始セラレタガ、然シ未ダ「ソビエト」  
露西軍ハ生産工業ノ再興ニ足ラズ、大イニ外資カヲノ  
援助ニ頼リテキル。

食糧ノ分厚ニ於テハ露西軍ニ於ケル戦前ニ於ケル戦前  
比較的急進アリ、家畜ニ、昨年ノ豊作ニ値ミ食糧  
不足ニヨル露西軍戦力ノ回復ハ考ヘラレナイ。露西軍  
軍用及ヒ身備者ハ従来ノ能力ヲ維持シ得ル。露西軍  
ニ於ル露西軍、露西軍ノ宗教ニ對スル友好的態度  
ニ多クノ経済的方策ハ露西軍ノ戦力ニ役立ツタ。  
露西軍ニ云ツテ「ソビエト」露西軍ノ戦力カ可  
成リ露西軍ヲレタ等ハ種カテアル。

露西軍ノ生産

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総生産 一 一九四四年十二月ノ月産 一 一 一 一 一 一  
 一九四四年四月迄ニ外ニヨリ輸入セラレタル総産  
 総量 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一  
 毎月平均供給量 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一  
 對獨逸 一 煤ニ匹當セラレタル総産總量 一 一 一 一 一 一  
 東部「ソライニート」領ニ匹當セラレタル総産  
 總量 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一  
 炭産 一 一 一 一九四四年十二月ノ月産 一 一 一 一 一 一 一  
 一九四四年四月迄ニ外ニヨリ輸入セラレシ炭産  
 量 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一  
 (毎月平均量 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一)  
 各炭産ニ於ケル炭産ノ匹當  
 對獨逸 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一  
 東部「ソライニート」領 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一  
 船舶 一 一九四四年ニ建造サレシ船舶量、千隻、  
 總噸數 一 一 〇 〇 〇 〇 噸  
 石炭 「ドネツ」盆地ニ於ケル炭坑ノ再建ハ若  
 シキ進展ヲ爲サテカッタ。一九四四年末同盆地  
 ノ日産ハ七五乃至一〇〇〇〇〇噸ヲアツタ。然  
 シ「アラガンダ」及「ウズベキスタン」領區  
 テハ増産ノ見込ガアル。「ソライニート」領區内ノ  
 石炭生産ハ一九四四年ニハ一三〇〇〇〇〇〇〇噸ヲ  
 アツタ。

「アルミニウム」 一九四四年ノ生産 一〇〇

〇乃至一ニ〇〇〇〇噸 一九四四年四月迄ノ外産カラ

ノ輸入 一〇〇〇〇噸 (毎月平均量 一〇〇〇〇噸)

額 一九四四年ノ生産 一ニ〇〇〇〇〇噸

一九四四年四月迄ノ仁及銅製品ノ輸入 一ニ〇〇〇〇

〇噸

自働車 一九四四年ノ生産 一ニ〇〇〇〇〇台

一九四四年四月迄ノ外産ヨリノ輸入 一ニ〇〇〇〇〇

台

人 的 資 源

動員兵力数 一〇〇〇〇〇〇〇〇人

爾後以降ノ全損害、 一〇〇〇〇〇〇〇〇人

動員可能豫備兵数、 一乃至三〇〇〇〇〇〇〇人

河越戦線ニ配置セラレシ兵力数 一〇〇〇〇〇〇〇人

石油——一九四四年ノ石油ノ生産ハ「ルーマニア」  
及ビ「ポーランド」ノ油田ヲ奪メテ三六〇〇〇〇〇  
〇噸ニアツタ。

一九四四年に月進ニ外ヨリ輸入サレタル航空機原  
「ガソリン」ノ量「——」ト「——」ト（毎月平均量「——」）

及ビ「ウズベキスタン」ニ於テ増産ノ可能性ガアル。  
分ニ復興セラレテハキナイガ、然シ「ウラル」地方  
及ビ「ウズベキスタン」ニ於テ増産ノ可能性ガアル。

石油ノ生産——一九四四年「——」ト「——」ト噸



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同、東部「ソツイエイト」領「」人  
軍勢動員位置ニ於ケル身動力是「」  
内身、男子身動者「」、女子身動者  
「」  
臣臣可能ナル準備身動力三乃「」人

食糧状態

一九四四年ニ於ケル穀類ノ生産「」  
「」  
等々、

〔手記〕

一九四二年一月二十一日在「モスコウ」日本  
大使信符武官ハ以下ノ報告ヲ我々ノ手ヲ經テ  
獨逸外務省ニ送ツタ

秘 「ソツイエイト」露西軍ノ兵力ニ關シテ

「」參謀本部ニ送シタル情報ニ依レバ一九四  
一年十二月初旬ニ於ケル「ソツイエイト」露西軍ノ  
兵力状態ハ次ノ如シ

獨逸展開前ノ露西軍兵力

隊 数

歩兵「」一四六個師團

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騎兵	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	276	個
裝甲	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	35	個
合計										311	個

歩兵	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	25	個
騎兵	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	20	個
裝甲	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	5	個
合計										50	個

開戦後動員ニヨリ増強セラレタル陸軍軍団等ノ兵力

總兵力	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	340	個
										350	個

戦中ノ損害 (一九四一年十二月初旬迄)

歩兵	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	21	個
騎兵	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	5	個
裝甲	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	20	個

等

〔手記〕

此ノ報告ハ一九四二年一月二十二日獨逸軍最高司令官ノ手中ニ在ツタ。





Doc 23, 12

獨逸外務大臣之對之次、如く評言之ヲ  
 勿論相互ノ信賴が毀損せしむ事、全ク問題ニナリ  
 得たり。何れも、獨逸間、相互ノ信賴、不動ナルカヲテアル  
 此、提出モシク問題、專ラ共同ノ戰爭指導、共同ニ  
 守ルベキ戰線部ヲ共同ノ兵力、正ニキ使用ノ問題ニ  
 関リテナル。獨逸ノ日本が新ニ獲得シテ根據地ト陣  
 地ヲ先ツ完成セシムルハ、ソノカヲ強國ニセシムル  
 トイフ事ヲ完全ニ理解シテナル。日本、一年間、斯カル  
 事ヲ爲シテ來タリテアル。而シテ獨逸が戰爭ノ主要ト眞  
 擔ヲ負フテナル。現在日本、共同ノ敵對ニ新ニ決定的  
 事ヲ加ヘル事ガ案ナクシテナリ。相互ノ信賴問題  
 テ決シテナリ。然レ、彼ノ日本が後、年ノカヲ強國ニシ  
 シ、後始メテ新ニ攻事ヲ加ヘル意圖ヲ有シテナル事ヲ  
 屢々憂慮シテナルト。此ニ對シ、大使、自分、其  
 思ハヌト答ヘ。彼、祖國於ニ軍事指導者ガ何ヲ  
 意圖シテナルカ、自分ニ判ラヌ。然レ、自分、永ク間  
 日本ガ露西亞ニ反抗スル意圖ヲ有シ、來ル事ヲ知ツテ  
 ナル。然レ、乍ラ目下日本、此ヲスルニ爲シ、十分ニ強カ  
 テイト明ラカ感シテナル。全兵力ヲ北方ニ移動スル  
 爲ニ南方ニ戰線ヲ撤退セシメ、若干ノ島ヲ敵ニ爲  
 ニ放棄スルニバ、ソトニ依ルコトハ、可能ナリカモ  
 知シテ、之ノ然ラガラ、南方ニ於ケル重大ナル敗北ヲ  
 意味スルテアラウ。南方へ前進ト同時ニ北方へ前進  
 トイフ事ヲスル事、日本ニ出来テ、事ナラズ。

3

Doc 23/2

獨逸の海軍は、今(度)は、日本、攻勢問題、提出、彼  
 の、海軍、南方、防衛、海軍、問題、アリ、ソレ、物、本、本  
 一、海軍、線、一、支、隊、除、去、一、支、隊、陸、上、部隊、之、使用、カ、本  
 一、上、海、軍、又、彼、等、之、二、對、之、改、建、一、陸、軍、事、ア、ル、而、本  
 一、三、海、軍、之、為、必、要、之、部、隊、ヲ、得、ル、カ、ハ、同、題、ニ、大、屬  
 一、日本、軍、本、部、會、中國、得、ル、カ、ハ、又、一、海、軍、線、於、兵、力、之、減、少、  
 一、海、軍、線、平、下、上、各、(又、本、日、本、之、露、西、亞、改、建、下、海、軍、之、後、海、軍、  
 一、海、軍、線、由、其、海、軍、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、  
 一、確、信、下、海、軍、線、之、改、建、得、ル、カ、ハ、一、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、  
 一、ト、又、一、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、  
 一、對、之、改、建、一、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、  
 一、今、日、三、月、本、部、會、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、  
 一、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、  
 一、諸、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、  
 一、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、  
 一、ト、其、意、思、ハ、一、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、  
 一、日、露、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、  
 一、斗、力、之、遠、近、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、  
 一、能、力、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、  
 一、詳細、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、  
 一、彼、等、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、  
 一、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、  
 一、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、  
 一、從來、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、  
 一、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、  
 一、人、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、之、海、軍、線、

4

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獨逸軍務大臣三金(度)之十二日、日本、攻其問題ヲ提出シ、彼  
心ニシテ、鐵道、面、於、之、戰、ニ、海、軍、同、題、ヲ、下、リ、シ、之、物、ヲ、本、体  
一、於、之、二、三、鐵、道、一、支、部、ヲ、除、キ、一、二、三、少、ク、陸、上、部、隊、ニ、カ、使、用、セ、ル、事  
ト、ト、言、フ、事、ト、又、從、之、ト、一、二、三、對、之、攻、事、ニ、對、シ、陸、軍、ノ、事、ト、ト、而、シ、  
シ、之、物、ヲ、以、テ、爲、シ、必、要、ト、認、知、カ、ル、事、ヲ、得、ル、コ、ト、ヲ、カ、ル、問、題、ニ、テ、大、島  
日本、軍、大、部、分、中、國、總、領、事、ト、ナ、リ、又、一、二、三、鐵、道、線、於、之、兵、力、ヲ、派、遣、シ、  
テ、其、數、ヲ、以、テ、上、答、ヘ、又、若、シ、日本、が、露、西、亞、ノ、攻、擊、ニ、ト、於、テ、一、二、三、陸、軍、總、隊、  
軍、隊、中、亦、一、三、獨、逸、ニ、格、別、ト、シ、テ、一、二、三、兵、力、自、身、運、送、シ、勝、利、  
確、信、ト、シ、鐵、道、線、ヲ、攻、擊、シ、得、ル、コ、ト、ト、一、二、三、陸、軍、總、隊、ヲ、所、有、シ、居、ル、コ、ト、ヲ、  
ト、一、二、三、兵、力、以、來、者、ト、シ、場、合、ニ、備、ヘ、ト、明、シ、ニ、武、裝、力、ヲ、一、二、三、兵、力、  
對、之、攻、擊、ニ、對、シ、一、二、三、兵、力、ヲ、派、遣、シ、居、ル、事、ト、ト、

今、日、三、日、不、四、月、始、メ、傳、言、便、士、又、大、使、館、書、記、官、ト、シ、假、裝  
シ、去、リ、工、部、省、東、京、市、内、地、ニ、日、本、情、勢、並、ニ、海、軍、的、諸、部、カ、ト  
諸、部、長、官、三、國、之、以、上、細、事、傳、達、シ、爲、シ、來、ル、彼、等、が、到、着、シ、一、二、三、鐵、道  
ヲ、以、テ、傳、言、シ、事、が、去、來、ス、ル、大、使、館、再、度、日、本、防、禦、的、能、力、ヲ  
ト、其、意、思、カ、一、二、三、事、ヲ、強、調、シ、

日、露、鐵、道、線、於、之、兵、力、分、配、同、一、大、使、館、日、本、戰、斗、力、口、一、戰  
斗、力、ニ、遠、近、各、方、一、二、三、事、ト、述、ス、日、本、防、禦、本、部、亦、極、東、軍、ノ、狀  
態、同、一、口、一、戰、斗、力、對、シ、注、意、深、ク、打、建、シ、一、二、三、間、諜、網、係、非、常、ニ  
詳、細、ニ、展、望、シ、得、ル、事、ト、其、長、處、ト、非、常、ニ、多、ク、朝、鮮、人、同、語、ト、シ、

彼、等、ノ、爲、シ、一、二、三、事、ト、障、害、物、(Bunker) 障、害、物、層、(Bunkerdeckel)  
等、同、一、口、一、戰、斗、力、對、シ、露、西、亞、軍、總、兵、力、一、二、三、事、ト、露、西、亞、  
從、來、ノ、戰、役、ニ、對、シ、日、本、側、ノ、奇、襲、者、攻、擊、ト、シ、非、常、ニ、苦、シ、經、驗、ヲ、終  
了、シ、露、西、亞、其、其、程、多、數、軍、隊、ヲ、國、境、ニ、派、遣、シ、居、ル、事、ト、亦、極  
大、ノ、苦、難、ト、シ、一、二、三、事、ト、一、二、三、事、ト、終、由、ト、日、本、合、衆、國、力、口、一、戰、斗、力、

4

Doc 23/2

全國の我々、報告ニ就テ大島、日本、ノ唯一ノ海路、(使用)
ヲ許シ居ル、ミテアルト言フ。之海路ニ於テ、船舶、武器、彈藥、
ヲ檢索セリ。日本、政府、ノ此ノ方法、ヨリ戰爭、資材、アメリカ、(送給)
ニ因テ、何等、諒報、ヲ得、ナシ。然レ、彼等、アメリカ、(トラスカラ)ニ
リ、向テ、航空、路ヲ保持、シ、本、事、ガ、知、ラ、レ、ル、ニ、シ、テ、ア、エ、ル、ハ、ニ、ラ、ス、ア、
ゲ、ル、ヤ、リ、ウ、ウ、カ、ラ、ウ、ニ、エ、ノ、ダ、ル、ニ、シ、テ、ニ、喜、キ、而、シ、テ、コ、ノ、事、直、ニ、確、カ、
ル、ニ、ヤ、人、ニ、トリ、價、値、多、ク、名、子、物、自、ラ、共、給、セ、ル、事、也。

獨逸、外務、大臣、日本、(ヤ)ガ、テ、ソ、ノ、運、ヲ、前、進、シ、テ、權、據、地、ヲ、敵、補
給、線、ニ、對、シ、効果、的、ニ、高、船、政、事、(Handelskrieg)ヲ、行、フ、得、ル、事、ト、云、フ、自、己、
ヲ、示、シ、テ、示、ス、ル、事、ト、云、フ、大、島、大、使、今、一、度、自、國、政、府、
名、於、テ、獨、逸、ノ、好、意、ヲ、感、謝、シ、後、獨、逸、外、務、大、臣、大、使、ニ、別、シ、テ、
告、グ、タ、シ、

伯林

一九四三年三月九日

署名 コットアールドヤニ



Dac 23/2

全周に戒む、報告ニ被マテ大島、日本、唯一ノ海路、使用  
ヲ許シ居ル、ミテト言ハス。海路ニ於テ、船舶、武備ト運集  
ヲ檢索カスル、日本、政府、カレテ法ニヨリ、戰爭、資材、アメリカ、供給  
ニ向テ、航空路ヲ保持、シテ、事ヲ知ラシムル、コト、ア、エ、ル、ハ、ス、ア、  
カ、ル、ヤ、ク、ワ、カ、ラ、ス、ノ、ヤ、ル、ス、ニ、吾、等、而、テ、コ、シ、通、シ、確、カ、  
ル、ヤ、人、ニ、トリ、價、値、多、ク、名、子、物、資、材、共、給、サ、レ、キ、ル、

獨逸外務大臣、日本、ヤ、カ、テ、ソ、ノ、遠、ク、前、進、シ、タ、獲、得、地、ヲ、敵、補  
給、線、ニ、對、シ、効果、的、ニ、商、船、攻、撃、(Handelskrieg) ヲ、得、ル、コ、ト、  
ト、云、フ、自、己、ノ、存、在、ヲ、恐、レ、ル、コ、ト、大、島、大、使、ヲ、今、度、自、國、政、府、  
名、ニ、於、テ、獨、逸、ノ、好、意、ヲ、感、謝、シ、後、獨、逸、外、務、大、臣、大、使、ニ、別、シ、テ、  
告、ゲ、タ、

伯林

一九四三年三月九日

署名 ゴットフリートセン

5

Affidavit of Examination of the Witness Nohara Komakichi

Moscow, February 15, 1946.

Nohara Komakichi, born in 1899, a native of Yokohama (Japan). A Japanese subject. Non-party member. Family: Wife and son. School and university education received in Europe, graduated from the faculty of philosophy at the University in Basle and Berlin. From 1922 till 1939 he lived in Europe, the United States of America, South America and Japan. He was a journalist. Has never been tried. From the 1st of September 1939 till the 21st of April 1945 he was an assistant of a press-agent of the Japanese Embassy in Berlin. At present he is in the U.S.S.R. as an internee.

I have been warned of the responsibility for false testimony. I am informed of the contents of Chapter 25 of R.T.F.S.R. Criminal Code.

The examination is being conducted in the Japanese Language, with translation into Russian by the interpreter Rosenbaum E. G. The interpreter Rosenbaum E. G. is warned of the responsibility for the correctness of the translation, according to Chapter 98 of the R.T.F.S.R. Criminal Code.

Question: When and where were you detained by the units of the Red Army?

Answer: I was detained by the units of the Red Army on the 21st of April 1945 in the suburb of Berlin, in Shtrausberg, 40 kilometres to the East of Berlin.

Question: Why were you in the area of military operations and not at the Japanese Embassy in Berlin on the 21st of April, 1945?

Answer: It happened, because I always lived in Shtrausberg, where my family was. I didn't want to part with them in such troublesome time. Last time I worked at the Japanese Embassy on the 16th of April, 1945, later on I was not able to go to Berlin, because the railway between Berlin and Shtrausberg was destroyed.

Question: Explain the origin and nature of the present German and English documents, which were found about you by the Red Army officer at the time of your arrest and explain why those documents were on you.

Answer: The present documents on four sheets of paper which were actually found on me, belonged in the past to the Japanese Embassy in Berlin. As I was a convinced antifascist I was against the war of Japan and Germany against the Soviet Union and her allies. I deliberately kept these documents and intended to use them in the interest of the allies, as I was sure that the day would come when these documents would to a certain extent expose the Japanese war criminals, who had provoked the war against the peace-loving countries and brought their country and their people to a catastrophe. Therefore, I kept those documents and made no attempt to hide or destroy them. When on the 21st of April 1945 I was taken in Shtrausberg I handed them over to the Soviet officer. The greater part of these documents were secret. Though it was not my immediate duty, as a press-agent, to deal with documents of that kind, yet I was made to be concerned with secret work by the counselor of the Embassy Kawahara Sin. My duty was to work at the documents of military and other secret information. The work was considered to be top secret and nobody but Ambassador Oshima, the counselor of the Embassy Kawahara and me were initiated in it. The greater part of the present documents which were found about me are copies of memorandums, containing secret information about the number and disposition of the units of the Red Army, its equipment and supplies, the state of the war industry of the Soviet Union and its production: planes, tanks and also man-power of the U.S.S.R. The Japanese Embassy in Berlin received military information of similar nature about the Soviet Union from Japanese Ambassadors in Moscow Tatekava and Sato in the form of ciphered telegrams, at which the Counselor Kawahara and me worked afterwards and translated into German. Afterwards the Japanese Embassy in Berlin passed that information to the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Question: You are being shown the document of the 19th of January 1945, headed "War potential of the Soviet Russia", in which figures of planes, tanks, oil, etc., produced in the Soviet Union, are omitted. By whom and when was the document drawn up and what does the omission of the figures mean?

Answer: This document was drawn up by the Counselor Kavaahara and me in January, 1945, on the ground of the information, received from Sato, the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow. The omission of the figures is made by the Counselor Kavaahara; he wrote them in hand in the 1st copy and handed the copy as it was, to the Germans. This information Kavaahara considered top secret.

Question: Among the documents found about you, there is a document under the title of "On the strength of the Red Army". There is a mark, made in your hand on this document, stating that on the 21st of January, 1942, the military attache in the Japanese Embassy in Moscow, through us, handed the following information to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Under the document it is written in your hand that "on the 22nd of January, 1942, that information was in the hands of the German Commander-in-Chief". Explain what those marks on that document mean.

Answer: This document is a record of secret information received by the Japanese Embassy in Berlin from the Japanese attache in Moscow on the 21st of January, 1942. That's how the origin of this information was explained to me orally by the Counselor of the Embassy Kavaahara. The record is reproduced by me in this document on the ground of draft copies. The next day, on the 22nd of January, after Kavaahara and me had worked up this document, the Counselor Kavaahara personally handed it to the German Foreign Office. As to the delivery of secret information about the Allies to the Germans by the Japanese Embassy in Berlin, I want to say in addition that from 1939 till 1945 the Japanese Embassy handed, as far as I remember, about 40 communiques to the Germans whenever they were coming from Moscow, London and Tokyo. The contents of those materials, mainly, refer to war-economic power of the U.S.S.R. and her Allies. Part of the materials were summaries of certain investigations concerning different problems, other materials were results of personal observations of the Japanese who passed through the Soviet Union in war-time.

Question: Was anything known to you about the agreement of neutrality between Japan and the Soviet Union, signed in 1941?

Doc. No. 2074

Page 3

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Question: Was anything known to you about the agreement of neutrality between Japan and the Soviet Union, signed in 1941?

Doc. No. 2074

Page 3

Answer: Yes, I, as well as the rest of the Japanese Embassy staff in Berlin, knew of the existence of such an agreement.

Question: By whose orders did the Japanese Embassy in Berlin pass the secret information about the U.S.S.R. to the Germans?

Answer: By the order from Tokyo and the personal order of Ambassador Oshima.

Question: In this case, how will you characterize the actions of the Japanese authorities and their representative Oshima, the Ambassador in Berlin?

Answer: Since there was an agreement of neutrality between Japan and the Soviet Union, the delivery to Germany of secret military and other information about the U.S.S.R. helped to a certain extent Germany in her war against the Soviet Union and, consequently, was a breach of the agreement of neutrality. Ambassador Oshima, as a representative of the Japanese Government did not want to consider and fulfill the agreement of neutrality between Japan and the Soviet Union. In his practical activity he was guided by the ideological alliance, the so-called "anti-komintern pact", a military union between Germany, Japan and Italy. Oshima being an active partisan and conductor of the Japanese Government's anti-Soviet policy, in this respect his activity directly contributed to the latter.

Question: Characterize the activity of Oshima Hiroshi, as Ambassador of Japan in Berlin.

Answer: The activity of Oshima, as well as his political face, have been sufficiently described by me above. I only want to add the following: Oshima Hiroshi is a convinced partisan of fascism of the German type and an irreconcilable enemy of the U.S.S.R., England and the U.S.A. He contributed to a large extent to conclusion of a military agreement between Germany, Japan and Italy, being the Japanese military attache in Berlin. During the celebration of the anniversary of the Mukden battle (the victory of the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905), Oshima said at a banquet in Berlin: "I am drinking Russian vodka and think that I am drinking Russia". The complete Oshima's confidence in power of Germany was well-known not only at the Embassy but

to the Germans as well. Goering, Keitel, Himmler and other notorious leaders of Germany were often invited by Ambassador Oshima to banquets at the Embassy. Hitler was once present there. Goering was reluctant of visiting the Embassy (he did not conceal his unfriendliness towards the Japanese, but Himmler and other leaders of "S.S." frequently called on Oshima and in their turn invited him to them. Oshima knows the German Language quite well and therefore he never took an interpreter along while visiting the Germans. In this way his talks with the Hitlerites were held in privacy and their topics are unknown to me. With the help of Himmler and his assistants Oshima travelled in Germany a lot and the Germans trusting Oshima showed him very much. It was also with their assistance that Oshima, accompanied by the Japanese military attache in 1942 or 1943 made a trip to the Soviet-German front. He was in the Ukraina, I think in Kamensk or Kanenka. The fact that he was an Ambassador of Japan, which had an agreement of neutrality with the U.S.S.R., did not embarrass him in the least. He thought it quite appropriate to stay on the Soviet territory, occupied by the Germans. Oshima has always been an advocate of a joint military attack of Japan and Germany on the U.S.S.R. In this respect the following episode is characteristic. Immediately after the attack of Germany against the Soviet Union on the 22 - 23rd of June 1941, a ciphered telegram was received in Tokyo, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the meaning of which was approximately the following: "In connection with the present situation Japan would guard the Pacific Ocean in the spirits of anti-komintern pact." Oshima summoned the counselor Kawahara and me and asked for our opinion. Kawahara and I declared that, according to the meaning of the telegram Japan will not attack the U.S.S.R. Oshima tried to prove the opposite, pointing out that "the guard of the Pacific Ocean" meant war of Japan against the U.S.S.R. Oshima, infuriated by vagueness of the telegram, ordered the telegram to be sent to the Germans in the form it was received, without paraphrasing the text and translating it from English into German. The reply of the Germans is unknown to me. Oshima completely shared the so-called "theory" of racial domination, exposed in Hitler's book "Mein Kampf". When other Japanese made hints to Oshima that Hitler spoke about the Japanese as well as of inferior creatures, Oshima answered that it was Hitler's mistake and that he would ask the author to introduce correspondent corrections in the book. Oshima ignored facts that were

common knowledge about the Hitlerites' atrocities within their own country and on the occupied territory of the Soviet Union. He considered these to be false, saying that they were only lies and enemy propaganda. As a matter of fact, obligingness and servility of Oshina towards the Germans were boundless. The case of a Japanese professor Sakimura may serve as an example of it. Being sent on commission by a Japanese Metallurgical concern to Germany Sakimura in 1943 or 1944 left for Sweden, where in an interview given to an English correspondent declared that Germany would lose the war through shortage of iron and on the whole he denounced German fascism. In connection with the protests of the Germans there was an exchange of notes between Oshina and the Germans three times. In his last note Oshina informed the Germans that he did not object to the delivery of Saki-Ihr to the Gestapo. This is an indisputable fact, as I myself put the technical touches to the note. This action of Oshina caused great indignation even among pro-fascist Japanese. I don't know what has become of Sakimura, as he did not live in the Embassy and I lost sight of him. Military attaches generals Banzai and Komatsu and navy attaches Iokoi and Kodzima were the most intimate people, with whom Oshina had close connections. He constantly kept company with them as all of them cultivated profascist sentiments. Finally, the last stage of Oshina's career in Germany was also connected with Oshina's complete confidence in strength and possibility of the Germans. When in April 1945 the situation became alarming in Berlin, Oshina accepted the Germans' offer to move to the South of Germany as he believed the Germans that they would be able to continue a lasting resistance in the South. On the 14th of April 1945 Oshina with the Embassy went to Bad Gashtein, to the south of Salzburg in motor cars. Since then I haven't heard anything new about Oshina. In Berlin, the Counselor Kawahara, a diplomatic attache, the Japanese consul and two or three officials were left in Berlin to contact with separate members of the German Cabinet. I stayed because of the pointed out at the beginning. The testimony is written from my words correctly and is translated into Japanese to me.

Nohara



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Page 7

The examination began at 5 o'clock  
The examination ended at 9 o'clock.

Examined: Lieutenant-Colonel Petrov.

The interpreter Rosenbaum

Hepetus Rejobs

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT

I, M. GILDENBLAT, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and (the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Doc. No. 2074  
Page 7 (final)

19 January 1945

Confidential

WAR POTENTIAL OF SOVIET RUSSIA

**Favorable development of the military status of Soviet Russia and the reconquering of her lost regions has resulted not only in the moral but also in the material strengthening of the war potential of Soviet Russia.**

The production of aircraft, tanks, vessels, coal, oil iron, steel, and other war materials has increased though the basic industries have not yet reached the pre-war production level. Rebuilding in reconquered regions has already begun, but still Soviet Russia, in restoring her war industry, relies on the aid from abroad to a large extent.

As far as food-stuffs are concerned, restoration in the reconquered territories is comparatively rapid and therefore in view of last year's good harvest, the breakdown of the Russian war potential due to the lack of food-stuffs is unthinkable. Russian armed forces and workers can maintain their former efficiency.

The patriotic movement in Russia, the friendly attitude of the government towards religion, as well as a number of economic measures have led to the revival of the national spirit. On the whole, it can be confirmed that the war potential of Soviet Russia has notably increased.

PRODUCTION OF WAR MATERIALS

AIRCRAFT

Production per month in December 1944 \_\_\_\_\_

Number of aircraft received from abroad until April 1944 \_\_\_\_\_

(Average monthly delivery: \_\_\_\_\_)

Number of aircraft in disposition on the first front against Germany \_\_\_\_\_

Number of aircraft in use in the eastern regions of the USSR \_\_\_\_\_

TANKS

Production per month in December 1944 \_\_\_\_\_

Number of tanks imported from abroad  
until April 1944 \_\_\_\_\_

(Average monthly delivery: \_\_\_\_\_)

Number of tanks on the fronts: \_\_\_\_\_

Against Germany \_\_\_\_\_

In eastern regions of the USSR \_\_\_\_\_

#### VESSELS

Number of vessels built in 1944:  
10 with the total tonnage of 120,000 tons.

#### COAL

The restoration of coal mines in the Donetz Basin has not made any noticeable progress. At the end of 1944 the daily output of the Basin amounted to from 75,000 to 100,000 tons. However, there are possibilities of increasing the output in the Alaganda and Uzbekistan regions. The output of coal in Soviet Russia in 1944 amounted to 130,000,000 tons.

#### OIL

The production of oil in 1944, including the Rumanian and the Polish oil fields amounted to 38,000,000 tons. The amount of aviation petrol imported from abroad before April 1944 \_\_\_\_\_  
(Average delivery per month: \_\_\_\_\_)

#### IRON and STEEL

Iron industry of the Donetz Basin has not been restored in full measure, though there are possibilities of increasing production in the Urals and in Uzbekistan. The production of steel in 1944 amounted to 11,500,000 tons.

#### ALUMINUM

Production in 1944 - from 100,000 to 120,000 tons.  
Importation from abroad before April 1944 \_\_\_\_\_  
(Average amount per month \_\_\_\_\_)

#### COPPER

Production in 1944 - 200,000 tons. Importation of copper and copper wares from abroad before April 1944 - 240,000 tons.

AUTOMOBILES

Production in 1944 - 200,000. Importation from abroad before April 1944 - 220,000.

MANPOWER

Number of mobilized forces \_\_\_\_\_ men

Total losses since the beginning of the war - 11,000,000

Reserves able to be mobilized: from 1,000,000 to 3,000,000 men.

Manpower in use on the Soviet-German front \_\_\_\_\_ men.

In eastern regions of the USSR \_\_\_\_\_ men.

Number of workers engaged in war work --

71,000,000

Among them: 28,200,000 men  
43,400,000 women

Reserves of labor power from 3,000,000 to 3,500,000

FOOD SITUATION

Cereal Production in 1944 - 46,800,000 tons

etc. etc.

(Written in handwriting) On 21 January 1942, the Military Attache at the Japanese Embassy in Moscow let the following report go through us to the German Foreign Office:

Confidential

The Strength of the Soviet Russian  
Armed Forces

According to information received by the Rumanian General Staff the aspect of the strength of the Red Army at the beginning of December 1941 is as follows:

Strength of Russian troops before the beginning  
of the Russian-German war:

European Russia:

Infantry . . . . .	146	divisions
Cavalry . . . . .	27	"
Armored forces . . . . .	35	"
Total . . . . .	208	"

Far East:

Infantry . . . . .	25	divisions
Cavalry . . . . .	20	"
Armored Forces . . . . .	5	"
Total . . . . .	50	"

The strength of Russian troops increased by mobilization since the beginning of the war:

Total strength - 340-350 divisions

Losses during the war:

(until the beginning of December 1941)

Infantry . . . . .	215-220	divisions
Cavalry . . . . .	15-20	"
Armored Forces . . . . .	20-22	"

(Translator's note  
corrected by hand;  
originally types:  
"10-20")

etc.

(Written by hand under the printed text on lower margin of the document)

"On January 22, 1942 this information was in the hands of the German commander-in-chief."

MEMORANDUM

On the Discussion of the German Foreign Minister  
with Ambassador SATO on 6 March 1943

Ambassador SATO stated that he had received a telegram from Tokyo, and he is to report to the German Foreign Minister, by order of his government, the following:

The suggestion of the German Government to attack Russia was the subject of a mutual conference between the Japanese Government and Imperial Headquarters, in which the question was exhaustively discussed and minutely probed. The result was the following:

The Japanese Government thoroughly recognizes the danger which threatens from Russia and has full understanding for the desire of its German ally, that Japan, too, enters into the war against Russia. It is not possible for the Japanese Government, however, in view of her present war situation to enter into the war. It is rather of the conviction that it is in the common interest, not to start the war against Russia now. On the other hand, the Japanese Government will never disregard the Russian question.

The Japanese Government has the intention to once again, in the future, take the offensive on the other fronts.

In the declaration of the Ambassador, the German Foreign Minister asked how one conceived, in Tokyo, the future waging of the war. At present, Germany is to a great extent waging war against the common enemies, England and America, alone, while Japan is taking a rather defensive stand. However, it would be more in order if all the powers bound by the Tripartite Pact joined all their forces to jointly defeat not only England and America, but Russia as well. It is not good when one part must fight alone. One should not overstrain the German people's strength. In secret he is concerned that forces could be at work in Tokyo, who are of the opinion -- and who also propagate it -- that Germany would conclude the fight victoriously anyway, and Japan should therefore further consolidate herself before it would make further and supreme efforts.

The U.S.A. and England were pursuing the strategy that the Allies should at first turn all their strength against Germany and Italy alone, and had also expressed this in CASABLANCA completely openly as their program. Actuality has confirmed this until now. Unfortunately, Ambassador SATO in KUIBYSHEV has apparently delivered to the Russians in this matter the assurance of the absolute neutrality

of Japan. However, we had to undergo the experience that on the Eastern Front -- especially in FINLAND also -- fresh Siberian divisions had fought. We would nevertheless attack the Russians again and again. The situation on the eastern Front had stabilized itself and a stable German Front had been established except for a small, still existing, gap. However, at the same time we have to fight against England and America more or less by ourselves in Africa, in the air and on all the oceans as well.

Compared with this, Japan's share was small. Even the battle area in BURMA was small in comparison. Tokyo must therefore understand it when Germany raises the question of whether in the spirit of waging the joint war, it is the correct strategy for Japan not to make full use of her people's strength, while Germany's is strained to the limit. He would like to emphasize again that if Germany would ever become weak, Japan would find herself facing a world coalition which would consist not only of England, America and Russia, but the people's strength /VOLSKRAFT/ of all the countries on earth, as well as that of a bolshevized Europe. The question was therefore raised whether at this time so exceedingly decisive for the outcome of the war, the strength of the allies was properly distributed and was really being used in the spirit of a joint, total conduct of the war.

Ambassador OSHIMA answered that what decided the issue for Japan was whether she had sufficient forces and whether her armament capacity was sufficient in order to attack and defeat the Russians, in addition to the enemies Japan already has, without endangering her operations on the other fronts. Tokyo is afraid of splitting its forces. On the other hand Japan's attitude was in no way purely defensive and just waiting, but a new attack against the U.S.A. and the British will surely take place. Even though he has no detailed reports concerning this, he personally believes that this attack will come in the direction of the Indian Ocean. In any case, however, the belief in an inseparable mutual victory of the allies was a foregone conclusion for Tokyo.

\* \* \* \* \*

The German Foreign Minister commented at this point that an infraction of mutual trust was naturally completely out of the question, since this was unshakable between Germany and Japan. In the matter of the inquiry which was brought up, it was solely a question of the joint conduct of the war, the strategy which is to be jointly carried out, that is, the proper use of the common strength. Germany entirely understands that Japan must first finish constructing her newly won bases and positions and must consolidate her forces. Japan had done this for a year and now

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when Germany is bearing the brunt of the struggle, Japan should be in a position to be able to apply a new decisive blow against the common enemy. It was in no way a question of mutual trust, but he sometimes is concerned that Japan has the intention of consolidating her forces for yet another year and only later starting a new attack.

Upon this the ambassador replied that he did not think so. The intentions of the military leaders in his fatherland were unknown to him; nevertheless, he knew that for a long time Japan had the intention of turning against Russia. But for the time being she evidently did not feel strong enough to do so. If one withdrew the front in the South and abandoned several islands to the enemy in order to shift all forces to the North, this could be possible. This would, however, mean a heavy defeat in the South. Both an advance to the South, and at the same time to the North was impossible for Japan.

\* \* \* \* \*

The German Foreign Minister then once more brought up the question of a Japanese attack on Russia, by stating that the struggle on the Burma Front as well as in the South was more of a maritime problem and that actually only a few land troops were being employed on all fronts, excepting China. The attack on Russia was therefore in the first place a matter for the Army and the consideration was whether the necessary forces were nevertheless ready for this. OCHIMA replied that the bulk of the Japanese Army was bound in China and on the Burma Front the forces were by no means insignificant either. If Japan should want to attack Russia, she would have to bring almost all the troops from the South into Manchuria. In any case, one did not have enough troops in order to be able to attack Russia with the firm prospect in an early victory. In case the Russians are the attackers, one is naturally armed. But for an attack on them, insufficient forces were ready.

At the end of March or early April of this year, a few officers, cloaked as couriers and Embassy Secretaries, will come here from Tokyo in order to deliver particulars concerning the situation and Japan's military forces and plans. He will be able to draw a better picture/of matters/ there when these have arrived. The ambassador emphasized again that Japan was unwilling to take up a defensive attitude.

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Concerning the division of strength on the Russo-Japanese front, the ambassador remarked that the Japanese fighting forces were greatly inferior to those of the Russians. The Japanese General Staff has a very exact view over the state of the Red

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For Eastern Army, on the basis of a carefully expanded /ausgobaut/ spy net on the Russian side, many Germans were working for them as spies. One has an exact idea of the position of the bunkers, the thickness of the bunkers, etc. The general strength of the Russian Army amounts to 300,000 men. It was quite unusual that the Russians left so many troops at the frontier, as in the course of their history they had always until now made extremely unpleasant experiences with surprise attacks on the part of Japan.

Concerning our reports on Russia's imports from the U.S.A. via VLADIVOSTOK, OSIMMA learned that Japan allowed the Russians only one seaway, and that on this seaway all ships are searched for arms and ammunition. The Japanese Government has no particulars concerning American deliveries of war materials over this way. However, it was known to him that the Americans were maintaining an air line from Alaska to Siberia. This goes from FAISENMAN, ANADYR, JAZZPSK to KRASNOJARSK and some material, of value to the Russians, would certainly be delivered over it.

\* \* \* \* \*

In that the German Foreign Minister expressed the hope that Japan will soon be able to conduct an effective shipping war from her far advanced bases against the enemy lines of supply, and after Ambassador OSIMMA once again expressed his thanks for the German willingness in the name of his Government, the German Foreign Minister bid goodbye to the Ambassador

GOTTFRIEDSEN

Berlin, 9 March 1943

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GOTTFRIEDSEN

Berlin, 9 March 1943

Doc. 1887

Page 1

Ev # 813

U.S.S.R.  
People's Commissariat  
of the Navy

CHIEF of  
Naval General Navy Staff  
of the U.S.S.R. Navy

February, 20th 1946

append. to N. 34563 c

Moscow

TO GOVERNOR S.A.

ASSOCIATE PROSECUTOR FOR THE

SOVIET UNION IN THE INTERNA-

TIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL IN

TOKYO.

I inform you that the Naval General Staff of the U.S.S.R. Navy has at its disposal the following data on the measures taken by Japan to tie up the Soviet navigation in the course of World War.

These measures may be divided into the following three groups:

1. Closing for navigation the straits connecting the open seas which was a violation of the freedom of the seas and violation of article 9 of the Portsmouth treaty concerning the navigation in the straits of Laperouse.

2. Examining and holding up on Soviet ships by the Japanese command accompanied by the violation of generally recognised principles of international law:

3. Attacking and sinking of Soviet ships.

1. At the beginning of World War II Japan proclaimed the Straits of Laperouse, Sangar and Korea her "Naval defensive zones" (Statement N 38 of the Naval Ministry, in the official government Bulletin "Korpo", December 8, 1941).

This measure enabled the Japanese authorities to control the Japanese Sea and its outlets and was directed against the U.S.S.R.

An attempt to establish a control of this kind on the part of Japan had already taken place before Japan entered the war.

This is testified by the statement of the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow addressed on August 25, 1941 to the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. to the effect that the shipment from the U.S.A. to Vladivostok of the materials purchased by the U.S.S.R. creates an "embarrassing and a very delicate situation" for Japan, so far as these purchases are shipped close to the Japanese territory. In connection with this the Japanese government requested that the Soviet government should pay serious

attention to that fact, especially to the question of the routes and means of these shipments.

In reply to this the Soviet government found it necessary to make a statement that it could not but consider the attempt to hinder the trade between the U.S.S.R. and the USA through the Far-Eastern ports and unfriendly act towards the U.S.S.R. ("In The People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs" - statement published in the Moscow Press, August 26, 1941).

Since June, 1941 the Japanese Authorities proclaimed the stretch of water to the west of the Pescador, Islands to the Chinese mainland in the straits of Formosa a dangerous zone for navigation. This said zone practically blocks the straits of Formosa (it stretches about 60 miles longitudinally and about 100 miles latitudinally).

Since August 15, 1944 a zone around Formosa Island stretching 25 miles from the shore was additionally proclaimed dangerous for navigation. Furthermore, according to the earlier data the approaches to the straits of Hoko-ko from the South and the North (On the Formosa Island to the east of the Pescador Islands) were mined. The approaches to the ports of the Chinese coast located in the Straits were mined as well.

Whereas there is an agreement (exchange of notes, 19/VII -- 18/X 1895) between the Russian and the Japanese governments on the status of the straits in accordance with which the Japanese government accepted that the straits of Formosa were an important international sea-route, and that "therefore this straits are outside the sphere of its exclusive control and use". (E.D. Grimm. Symposium of treaties and other documents on the history of international relations in the Far East, 1927).

Legal status of Soviet trade shipping (before the declaration of war by the U.S.S.R. on Japan) was determined by their belonging to a neutral country. Since the straits were proclaimed by Japan "naval defensive zones" the neutral Soviet trade ships might have had the right to go not only through the Straits of Laperuse (art. 9 of the Portsmouth treaty), but also through the Sangar, Korean and Formosa Straits, straits of international importance.

The Soviet Union was particularly interested to use the Sangar Straits, which directly connect the Japanese Sea with the Pacific.

The use of Laperuse Straits for navigation is less advantageous. In the first place, the straits connect the Japanese Sea with the Sea of Okhotsk, and the latter with the Pacific through the Kuril Straits, which naturally, makes the route longer and hampers shipping, and secondly, soviet ships can pass through the Laperuse straits from January to April only with the help of powerful icebreakers.

The Soviet government frequently requested that the Japanese governments open the Sangar straits free from ice in the winter months for Soviet trade ships, but those requests were declined under the pretext that this zone was a defensive one.

By way of compromise the Japanese suggested that Soviet ships navigate through the Korean straits and further North, to the East of the Kyushu and Honshu Islands.

At first it was not necessary to keep to a definite fairway to pass through the straits, but on February 14, 1942, the Japanese Command fixed the limits of fairways, and on January 21, 1943, the conditions of navigation for Soviet ships passing through the Korean Straits were again changed. In the straits and around the Island of Kyushu new fairways were fixed. For the navigation in the Pacific were indicated border limits which the Soviet ships were not allowed to cross and approach the coastline of the Island of Honshu besides the fact, that the route through the Korean straits indicated by the Japanese was disadvantageous, it was dangerous for navigation and threatened the safe sailing of Soviet vessels, which is corroborated by the shipwreck of the "Angarabro", the "Kolia", and the "Ilmen" (Appendix N 4).

After these shipwrecks Soviet boats stopped navigating in the Korean Straits. The Straits of Laperouse were practically closed since the Japanese had left only two narrow fairways for the passage of Soviet ships.

The passage through the fairways of the Laperouse Straits during the winter months took extra fifteen days for the ships could only pass with the help of icebreakers there often was a danger for the ships to get jammed and drift icebound.

2. The right of the belligerent party to stop and examine the tradeships of neutral countries, was resorted to by the Japanese Naval Command, not only in full measure but also so captiously (including holding up ships for a long time) that it rendered navigation in the Laperouse, Korean and Kuril Straits practically impossible. Below is given a table of the number of stoppages and delays by the Japanese of the Soviet ships bound overseas in the Pacific from August 1941 to the end of the year 1944.

T A B L E

Destination Regions	Laperouse Straits	Korean Straits	Kuril Straits	Other regions	Total	Notes
En route to USA	45	28	3	2	78	Out of 178 ships 3 were held up by the use of arms; 3 ships were taken to the Japanese ports.
En route from USA	63	24	9	4	100	
Total	108	52	12	6	178	

The "Ingul" bound in April 1943 for Vladivostok from Seattle (USA), and having on board as a general cargo heavy loads and fustuffs is an example of prolonged holding up of Soviet ships.

At 9.02, April 29, the ship was held up by a Japanese patrol boat and was released only on June 28, 1943. (Appendix N 2)

On examining the ships the Japanese officers offered the captains to sign certificates prepared beforehand by the Japanese Naval Command according to a certain form (Appendix N 2). Demanding signing such certificates is contrary to the principles of international law.

3. Deliberately creating difficulties for the navigation of Soviet trade vessels on the routes Vladivostok-Petrozavodsk-USA ports, the Japanese did not hesitate to destroy soviet ships, whenever they considered it expedient.

The following documents are given in the appendixes:

a. Extracts from the detailed report of the captain of the "Vanzette" which was attacked by a Japanese plane and later was towed to the harbour of Kusimoto (Appendix N 3).

b. Description (based on the captains' reports) of the sinkings of the ships: the "Krechet", "Penkop", "Kailkop", "Angarstroy", "Ilmen", "Kola", "Belorussia" (Appendix N 4).

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET (Signed Isakov)

**CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF  
THE ABOVE DOCUMENT**

I, A. KUNIN, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

A. KUNIN



CX 814

Doc No. 18F (6)

page 1

Excerpt from "Pearl Harbor, Intercepted Diplomatic Messages  
sent by the Japanese Government between  
July 1 and December 8, 1941" P. 19

From Tokyo (Secret)  
To Washington  
August 20, 1941  
#487 (Part 2 of 2)

If the United States Government asks you questions concerning the increase of Japanese troops in the North, will you explain to them suitably as your own view of the matter what I have pointed out above. Impress upon their minds that the movement of the troops has for its objective purely preventive precautions against unforeseen emergency and that by it we will be able to forestall any possibility of peace in the Far East being disturbed.

Recently when the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo inquired about this matter, I replied that so long as the Russian Government lives up to the treaty Japan also will be faithful to it. The Ambassador was very much pleased to hear this, saying that my statement had clarified the matter. This is solely for your information.

If it becomes definitely known that the United States is shipping iron, airplanes and other materials by way of Japanese coastal waters to assist Soviet Russia, this fact would unnecessarily provoke the feelings of the Japanese people, and it cannot be said that it will not have an unfavorable effect on the question of readjusting Japanese-American relations, a question which is at the present stage a very delicate one. We would like, therefore, to see the United States refrain from such action. Will you take a good opportunity and tactfully call the attention of the United States authorities to this fact. Today I personally called the attention of the American Ambassador to it.

Army 21235

Trans. 8/20/41 (S)

15 F (6)

6x814

東京茶  
7-11-2  
1941年/昭和十六年/月 日  
市田宅号 (二六部)

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

甚三——合衆國政府が北方に於て凡日本軍一隊増強に因り他國に  
爲之先導を<sup>(備)</sup>せしむるに實官自其ノ意見上之ヲ適当ニ認守ニ説  
きし且之軍隊ノ移動ハ目的上之ヲ豫見シ得ルに際急乎<sup>(備)</sup>  
凡純粹ナル予防策ニテ吾人ノ利益ニ於ケルヲ極力<sup>(備)</sup>カシ如何ニ  
可能性ヲ制シ得ルニ云フコトヲ彼ノ心印象ガ全ク<sup>(備)</sup>度シ。

最近東京駐劄ノ聯大使が本件ニつき復問<sup>(備)</sup>凡本官ハ臣ノ予  
府が條約ヲ遵守スル限リ日本モ亦ソシニ思案<sup>(備)</sup>ニ答<sup>(備)</sup>。大使  
コシ<sup>(備)</sup>聞キ非常ニ喜ビ本官陳述ハト<sup>(備)</sup>明セリト云リ。以上ノ事ヲ貴  
官<sup>(備)</sup>參考<sup>(備)</sup>タ<sup>(備)</sup>モ<sup>(備)</sup>。

合衆國が日本沿海ヲ經由<sup>(備)</sup>テノ聯援助<sup>(備)</sup>タ<sup>(備)</sup>ニ<sup>(備)</sup>鉄<sup>(備)</sup>飛<sup>(備)</sup>機<sup>(備)</sup>其他物  
資ヲ輸送<sup>(備)</sup>之<sup>(備)</sup>尾<sup>(備)</sup>ハ<sup>(備)</sup>ト<sup>(備)</sup>カ<sup>(備)</sup>確<sup>(備)</sup>定<sup>(備)</sup>的<sup>(備)</sup>一<sup>(備)</sup>知<sup>(備)</sup>ラ<sup>(備)</sup>シ<sup>(備)</sup>ラ<sup>(備)</sup>バ<sup>(備)</sup>コ<sup>(備)</sup>ノ<sup>(備)</sup>事<sup>(備)</sup>實<sup>(備)</sup>ハ<sup>(備)</sup>不<sup>(備)</sup>要<sup>(備)</sup>ニ<sup>(備)</sup>日<sup>(備)</sup>本<sup>(備)</sup>人<sup>(備)</sup>民<sup>(備)</sup>  
感情ヲ激<sup>(備)</sup>セ<sup>(備)</sup>テ<sup>(備)</sup>而<sup>(備)</sup>シ<sup>(備)</sup>テ<sup>(備)</sup>日<sup>(備)</sup>本<sup>(備)</sup>關係<sup>(備)</sup>調<sup>(備)</sup>整<sup>(備)</sup>問題<sup>(備)</sup>ニ<sup>(備)</sup>シ<sup>(備)</sup>テ<sup>(備)</sup>頃<sup>(備)</sup>段<sup>(備)</sup>階<sup>(備)</sup>階<sup>(備)</sup>ニ<sup>(備)</sup>  
微<sup>(備)</sup>妙<sup>(備)</sup>ノ<sup>(備)</sup>問題<sup>(備)</sup>ヲ<sup>(備)</sup>カ<sup>(備)</sup>シ<sup>(備)</sup>不<sup>(備)</sup>利<sup>(備)</sup>ナル<sup>(備)</sup>野<sup>(備)</sup>蠻<sup>(備)</sup>ヲ<sup>(備)</sup>及<sup>(備)</sup>ズ<sup>(備)</sup>テ<sup>(備)</sup>予<sup>(備)</sup>ヲ<sup>(備)</sup>保<sup>(備)</sup>シ<sup>(備)</sup>難<sup>(備)</sup>シ<sup>(備)</sup>合<sup>(備)</sup>衆<sup>(備)</sup>  
國ガ<sup>(備)</sup>カ<sup>(備)</sup>ル<sup>(備)</sup>行<sup>(備)</sup>動<sup>(備)</sup>ヲ<sup>(備)</sup>抑<sup>(備)</sup>止<sup>(備)</sup>ス<sup>(備)</sup>ル<sup>(備)</sup>コ<sup>(備)</sup>ト<sup>(備)</sup>ヲ<sup>(備)</sup>希<sup>(備)</sup>望<sup>(備)</sup>ス<sup>(備)</sup>。實<sup>(備)</sup>官<sup>(備)</sup>ハ<sup>(備)</sup>予<sup>(備)</sup>機<sup>(備)</sup>會<sup>(備)</sup>ヲ<sup>(備)</sup>提<sup>(備)</sup>テ<sup>(備)</sup>巧<sup>(備)</sup>  
ニ<sup>(備)</sup>合<sup>(備)</sup>衆<sup>(備)</sup>國<sup>(備)</sup>當<sup>(備)</sup>局<sup>(備)</sup>者<sup>(備)</sup>ノ<sup>(備)</sup>注<sup>(備)</sup>意<sup>(備)</sup>ヲ<sup>(備)</sup>コ<sup>(備)</sup>ノ<sup>(備)</sup>事<sup>(備)</sup>實<sup>(備)</sup>ニ<sup>(備)</sup>對<sup>(備)</sup>シ<sup>(備)</sup>テ<sup>(備)</sup>喚<sup>(備)</sup>起<sup>(備)</sup>言<sup>(備)</sup>シ<sup>(備)</sup>度<sup>(備)</sup>シ<sup>(備)</sup>。在<sup>(備)</sup>日<sup>(備)</sup>本<sup>(備)</sup>官<sup>(備)</sup>會<sup>(備)</sup>  
ヲ<sup>(備)</sup>米<sup>(備)</sup>大<sup>(備)</sup>使<sup>(備)</sup>ノ<sup>(備)</sup>注<sup>(備)</sup>意<sup>(備)</sup>ヲ<sup>(備)</sup>シ<sup>(備)</sup>テ<sup>(備)</sup>對<sup>(備)</sup>シ<sup>(備)</sup>テ<sup>(備)</sup>喚<sup>(備)</sup>起<sup>(備)</sup>ニ<sup>(備)</sup>テ<sup>(備)</sup>オ<sup>(備)</sup>イ<sup>(備)</sup>タ<sup>(備)</sup>。

R E P O R T

On detaining the ship "Sergci Kirov" of the Far Eastern State Maritime Agency in the Bay of Ito by the Japanese Military Authorities from 17th to 22nd of April 1942.

On April 5, 1942, the ship "Sergci Kirov" left the port of Petropavlosk on Kamchatka bound for Vladivostok through the Strait of Korca with a cargo of provisions.

In spite of compliance with all the established rules of navigation in the vicinity of Japanese Islands, at 10:00 hours on April 17, 1942 near the Island of "Mikura Jima" latitude 33 degrees 30 minutes North and longitude 140 degrees 02' East, the said ship was stopped by a Japanese destroyer which without finding out the nationality of the ship, the nature of her cargo and her route, and regardless of the protests of Captain Ushakov, proposed that the ship follow them into the Tokyo Bay.

In spite of non-resistance on the part of the crew of the ship, in executing the orders given from the destroyer, the latter was repeatedly threatening to commit violence against the ship, and wantonly, fired two volleys from her guns, and, likewise, twice at night machine-gunned the ship.

Besides, at the time the ship "Sergci Kirov" was being escorted, two Japanese Military Aircraft came on April 17, at 15:45 hours and started for an unknown reason maneuvering and diving above the mast.

On April 18 at 14:00 hours the Soviet merchantman seized by the Japanese was escorted into the Bay of Ito, where the Japanese Military Authorities conducted a superficial inspection of the ship and its cargo and although nothing prejudicial was detected, yet the ship was not freed. The Japanese kept the ship in the Bay under the surveillance of a trawler until April 22 inclusive and only in the morning of April 23, was it allowed to follow its own course.

In this way the Japanese Military Authorities committed the aforesaid unlawful action keeping the ship "Sergci Kirov" without any reason for 6 days and nights in the Ito Bay.

The Military Prosecutor of the Pacific Area  
Lt. Colonel of Justice /SFLICFKOV/

March 20, 1946, Vladivostok.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, G. Minenko, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English Languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature: George Minenko.

一九四二年（昭和十七年）四月十七日ヨリ二十二日迄、東京国立海運會社ノ「セルゲイ・キイロブ號」ガ伊東灣ニ於テ日本軍管馬ニヨツテ拘留サレシ件ニ就キ

一九四二年（昭和十七年）四月五日ニ「セルゲイ・キイロブ號」ハ食料ノ積荷ヲ乗セ「カムチヤツカ」ノ「ペトロハブロスク」ヨリ朝鮮海峽ヲ通過シ、「ウラヂオストツク」ニ向ケ出帆シタ。

日本近海テノ規定サレタ凡テノ航海規定ニ從ツタニモ拘ハラズ、一九四二年四月十七日午前十時「ミクラ島」ノ近海、北緯三十三度三十分、東經百四十二度二分ノ海上テ、上記ノ船ハ日本驅逐艦ニ依ツテ航行ヲ停止セシメラレタ。ソシテ船ノ所有權ヲ糾サレルコトモ、積荷ノ種類ト船舶ヲ檢査サレルコトモナク、船長「ウシヤコツ」ノ抗議ヲモ無視サレ、日本驅逐艦ニツイテ東京灣ニ進入ツテ行ク旨ヲ申渡サレタ。

船員們ガ無抵抗ニ日本驅逐艦ノ命令ニ從ツタニモ拘ハラズ、日本驅逐艦ハ當船ニ對シテ暴行ヲセント度々脅カシテキタ。斯クテ何等ノ理由ナクシテ二發發砲シ、又同様ニ夜間二回ニ亙リ、船ヲ機關銃テ射

6x8/5

2232-1

2232-2

尋シタ。コノ他ニ「セルグイ・キイロブ號」發送時、四月十七日十五時四五分、二機ノ日本軍用機ガ飛來シ、如何ナル目的カ判ラヌガ船ノマスト上空ニ於テ急旋回、急直降下ヲ行ヒ給メタ。

四月十八日十四時日本軍ニヨリ拿捕サレタソグイ  
エト蘭船ハ日本ノ伊東灣ニ護送サレ、其處デ日本軍  
當局ニヨリ船、積荷、ノ表面的ナ檢査ガナサレタ、  
コノ際何等非難サルベキコトハ發見セラレナカツタ、  
然シ船ハ送還サレナカツタ。日本側ハ同船ヲトロ  
ル船監視ノ下ニ四月二十二日迄（二十二日ヲ含ム）  
同港ニ拘留シ續ケ四月二十三日朝ニ至リヤット同船  
ハ自己ノ航路ニ就クコトヲ許サレタ。

新クシタ方法デ日本軍當局ハ「セルグイ・キイロ  
ブ號」ヲ理由ナク大連波ノ同伊東灣ニ拘留スルト云  
フ上述ノ不法行爲ヲ爲シタノデアツタ。

太平洋方面軍務總監檢察

司法中佐 シェリチヤコフ

一九四六年三月二十日

ウラヂオストツク

2-232-3

書類第二二三二號

證

余服部榮次ハ余ガ日本語及ビ樺西亞語ニ  
精通セル者ナルコト並ニ樺西亞語原文及  
ビ日本語原文ヲ對照ノ上右ハ本書類ヲ眞  
實ニ且正確ニ翻譯セルモノナルヲ確證セ  
ルコトヲ茲ニ證ス

昭和二十一年八月二十日

署名 服部 榮次 印

Q# 816

Doc. No. 23251

Page 1

REPORT

On the detention of the ship "Dwina" of the Far Eastern Shipping Agency by the Japanese authorities on July 20, 1943.

On July 20, 1943 at 11 hours in the Strait of Laperuzo near the "Hook of Danger", a Japanese patrol-boat had stopped the ship "Dwina", heading for Petropavlosk, and took her under escort to Port "Otomari", where Captain Watanabe and Junior Lieutenant Tezuka, Masatoshi of the Japanese Navy conducted inspection of the cargo and then handed to the local police authorities.

The ship was in the hands of the Japanese authorities since July 20 till August 25, 1943 i.e. during the period of 35 days.

The crew of the ship, and her 30 passengers were all the time subjected to interrogation during which the Japanese officials and in particular the prosecutor of the town of Otomari and the officer Toni-Mari, attached to him, were rude and threatening. The Captain of the ship "Dwina" Peer was taken by force from the steamer by Japanese officials and police who beat and insulted him. After this Peer was arrested and kept in custody, then was sentenced in absence to 100-day imprisonment or 2000 yen fine.

From the date of investigation the ship "Dwina" was detained under the following circumstances:

On July 16, 1943 at 10 hours the ship "Dwina", under command of Captain Peer and having a load of 900 tons of chrome ore and with 30 passengers aboard, left Vladivostok on a voyage bound for Portland of the USA.

On July 18 at 5:30 hours the ship, being in the latitude of 45 degrees 49' north and in the longitude of 139 degrees 05' 2" east, and having the radio-location of Velkin radio-beacon took the course of 97 degrees (-9 degrees) leading 2 miles to the south of Cape Notora Misaki, with the intention of correcting her course to go through the Laperuzo Strait. Due to thick fog at 14:45 hours the ship went at a medium speed, whilst at 16:10 hours she went at a slow speed. Soon after the ship lost its orientation and went aground in the latitude of 46 degrees 00, 7 north and in the longitude of 141 degrees 57.

On July 19 at 5:05 A.M. the ship got afloat by her own power.

On July 20, 1943 having partly checked the leak in the oil-tank, and having cleaned the oil in the canteen, and adding some fresh oil, the ship took off at 7:50 A.M. to continue the voyage.

On July 20 having passed the "Rock of Danger", the ship was stopped at 11 A.M. by a Japanese patrol-boat, and regardless of the protest of the captain, she was directed to Port Otomari.

On July 21, 1943 at 0 hour 25 minutes the ship reached Otomari and cast an anchor in the outside roadstead at a distance of 1/4 mile from the ship "Mogin". At 8:05 A.M. the ship was inspected by two Japanese officers who then sealed the radio station.

After the documents were examined, a lieutenant of the Japanese Navy made a note in Japanese in the ship log to the following effect: (translation made by an interpreter) "On July 21, 1943 ordered by our chief Captain Watanabe, I have made an inspection and acknowledge that the ship's papers and the cargo are all in order---21 July 1943, Inspector Junior Lieutenant of the Imperial Japanese Navy Tezuka Masatoshi. Captain Peer was informed that another inspection will yet be made by the local authorities.

At 16.20 hours a Japanese patrol-boat approached the ship and 16 armed soldiers and officers together with the prosecutor of the town of Otomari an interpreter and 4 officials of the local police got aboard the ship.

Captain Peer was asked a series of questions and then told by the interpreter that the ship will be put under arrest.

The prosecutor confiscated a series of ship's documents and photographed the ship.

Peer handed a written protest concerning the illegal detention of the ship to the prosecutor who did not give him any receipt for it. A copy of the protest addressed to the Consul of the U.S.S.A. was not accepted by the prosecutor.

On July 24 at 14:30 hours the Japanese authorities came aboard the ship with the demand to change the anchor-hold which was fulfilled. At 17 hours the ship anchored 3 miles off the shore near Rutake village.

On July 25 at 15 hours the Japanese authorities with 31 soldiers armed with rifles came and told Captain Peer and his mates to follow them to the shore for an inquest by the prosecutor



The Captain refused to comply with this demand and proposed that he and the mates above-mentioned be interrogated on the ship in the presence of the Soviet Consul. After this the Captain was not even given an opportunity to pass orders to the chief mate, and was by force rudely pushed down from the ship, whilst the Prosecutor forbade the members of the crew to come ashore.

At 19 hours the Captain was put under arrest in a police office in Kurak. village.

On July 26 the Prosecutor called Peer for interrogation during which he shouted and was rude to him, accusing the latter of violating the Japanese territorial waters. His interrogation was conducted in this manner till August 1. Simultaneously the other members of the crew were interrogated and treated as rudely as their captain.

During the interrogation the Prosecutor and the officials tried to get corroboration of the fact that the ship "Dwina" was bought by the Soviet Union in the U.S.A., after the outbreak of the American-Japanese war, so as to confiscate the ship as trophy.

On August 10 a court official came to Peer, who was in custody and announced him the sentence of the Japanese court, according to which Peer was found guilty of unlawful violation of the Japanese territorial waters, and sentenced to 100 days imprisonment or fine of 2000 Japanese yen. Peer refused to pay the fine, stating that the sentence of the court was unlawful, and continued to sit in custody.

In connection with this the Prosecutor called Peer for an interrogation nearly every day and subjecting him to ill-treatment and to indignities categorically insisted that the fine be paid and recommending as a means to raise the funds to sell a part of cargo fuel and the ship's equipment, also agreeing to be paid in Soviet currency yet Peer refused categorically to fulfill these demands.

On August 25 the Prosecutor set Captain Peer free, returning him all the documents of the ship, and permitting the ship "Dwina" to go on her voyage.

When Peer was freed, he was searched once more, all of his things were inspected, whilst the Japanese money taken away from him at the time of search was not returned.

On August 25 at 18 hours the ship started for her port of destination.

Doc. No. 23251.

Page 4

Thus the Japanese military, court and police authorities detained the Soviet ship "Dvina" without any ground for 35 days and subjected the Soviet sailors to indignities.

Military Prosecutor of the Pacific Area  
Lt. Colonel of Justice Shlych'kov

March 22, 1946

Vladivostok

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, Minenko, G., hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature: George Minenko

Doc. No. 23251.

Page 4

Thus the Japanese military, court and police authorities detained the Soviet ship "Dwina" without any ground for 35 days and subjected the Soviet sailors to indignities.

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Signature: George Minenko

Doc 2325A

報 告

一九四三年七月十日極東海運汽船會社所屬船「トウ」十一號、日本官憲  
依<sup>レ</sup>抑留關スル件

一九四三年七月十日白谷海峡「危險」附近ニ於テ一時日本側看  
視船依<sup>レ</sup>「トウ」トシテ方面<sup>ニ</sup>向<sup>テ</sup>航行中、汽船「トウ」トシテ、<sup>（船長）</sup>柳田  
ヲ監視シ、大泊港<sup>（船長）</sup>導<sup>ル</sup>テ其處<sup>ニ</sup>讓<sup>レ</sup>渡<sup>シ</sup>海軍大佐ト日本海軍  
少尉手塚正敏<sup>（手塚）</sup>依<sup>レ</sup>積荷<sup>（手塚）</sup>検査<sup>（手塚）</sup>ガ行<sup>ハ</sup>ル、然<sup>ル</sup>後同地警察當局  
引渡<sup>（手塚）</sup>セタ。該汽船一九四三年七月十日八月五日迄

即<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>チ十五日間在<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>タ。該汽船乗組員及<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>チ三名乗客絶<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>テ訊問  
ヲ受<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>ケタ其際日本官憲側特<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>ニ大泊市、海軍少佐、<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>事<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>前<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>將<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>校<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>トシ  
テ暴行<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>ト脅迫<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>ヲ受<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>ケタ。汽船「トウ」船長トシテ汽船カ  
日本官吏及<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>チ警察<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>被<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>テ殴打<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>シテ連<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>テ去<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>リタ。其<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>後  
「トウ」捕<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>縛<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>シ監視<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>シ、監視<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>中<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>ニ後<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>欠<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>布<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>裁<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>判<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>三<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>日<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>間<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>、  
禁錮<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>或<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>ニ<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>用<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>テ<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>言<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>渡<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>セリ。

No 1

汽船「トウ」トシテ調査<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>スルトヨ<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>シ依<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>ルニ、如<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>キ事情<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>トシテ抑留<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>セリ。又<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>チ  
正<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>即<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>チ一九四三年七月十六日十時汽船「トウ」トシテ船長トシテ指揮<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>トシ  
ク<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>噸<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>九<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>百<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>噸<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>ヲ積載<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>シ乗客<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>三名<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>ヲ乗<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>テ「トウ」カ合衆國<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>ホ<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>ト  
ニ止<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>港<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>ヲ目指<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>テ浦塩斯德<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>ヨリ航行<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>途<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>ニ航<sup>（日本官憲）</sup>セリ。

Doc 2325A.

廿五日午後五時五分該汽船由北緯三十三度三十分東經一百一十八度五分  
 二秒在西北風中燈台線為、其時有北風吹來、其時該汽船  
 通測、其已於針路、修正北緯三十三度三十分東經一百一十八度五分  
 九十七度分五十九度、針路、採以、讓務、後、此、時、該、汽、船、  
 速度、中、之、十、二、分、十、六、時、十、分、該、汽、船、依、速、度、中、之、十、分、間  
 至、該、汽、船、之、左、位、失、北、緯、四、十、六、度、東、經、七、十、七、度、二、分、西、一、分、十、  
 七、分、地、點、坐、標、之、廿、九、日、廿、五、時、五、分、廿、五、時、廿、五、分、該、汽、船、之、經、緯、  
 一、九、四、三、年、七、月、廿、九、日、油、槽、漏、洩、之、事、之、密、勒、亞、在、其、掃、除、新、  
 油、補、給、之、七、時、五、分、該、汽、船、航、行、繼、續、之、掃、除、之、  
 廿、九、日、該、汽、船、危、險、出、通、行、中、十、時、日、本、側、有、禮、船、一、艘、留  
 之、船、長、抗、議、之、拘、於、大、治、港、(差、向、之、)   
 一、九、四、三、年、七、月、廿、九、日、五、時、五、分、該、汽、船、大、治、到、屋、港、外、被、提、  
 提、錨、之、其、處、三、四、分、哩、距、離、之、十、五、時、該、汽、船、之、十、五、時、五、分、  
 之、十、五、分、日、本、將、校、依、該、汽、船、臨、檢、之、行、之、然、之、後、  
 彼、等、無、意、室、封、印、之、施、之、  
 事、類、悉、檢、終、後、日、本、海、軍、一、少、尉、航、海、日、誌、日、本、語、本、(如、內、容、  
 之、記、之、為、之、雜、談、通、談、依、行、之、之、之、之、之、之、之、之、之、之、之、之、  
 本、官、之、我、之、官、渡、邊、大、佐、指、示、依、之、臨、檢、之、行、之、之、之、之、之、之、

No 2

事類悉檢終、後日本海軍一少尉航海日誌日本語本、如左  
 記、之、為、之、雜、談、通、談、依、行、之、之、之、之、之、之、之、之、之、之、  
 本、官、之、我、之、官、渡、邊、大、佐、指、示、依、之、臨、檢、之、行、之、之、之、之、之、之、

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No 3

官公船關係書類積荷が全う正當なる事ヲ認め一九三一年七月二十  
 日臨檢者日本帝國海軍少尉塚正敏船長ト此ニ付同地官  
 憲依テ更ニ臨檢が行ハルコトヲ明白得テシタ  
 十六時十分日本小汽船が接近シ来テ該汽船武装セル十六名兵  
 卒ト將校ガ乗船シ又彼等ト共ニ通訳ヲ伴フ大泊市檢事ト四名  
 同地警務役人ク着タ  
 船長ト此ニ多數質問ガ發ヤリ然ル後通訳ニ依テ該汽船  
 抑留ガ宜シト檢事ニ依リ多數船舶關係書類ガ没収セリシ  
 該汽船爲眞ニ擧野セルト該汽船不法抑留ニ関シ抗議  
 書ヲ檢事ニ手交シテ彼トシテ受取又際彼ニ受領書ヲ與ヘテ  
 カタシト聯邦領事院抗議書寫ガ受取ル事ヲ拒絕シ  
 七月十四日二十分該汽船日本側官憲カ来テ他處泊地移ル事  
 要求シ而シテ果セタ十七時留多加村海岸ヲ去ル事ニ埋投錨  
 シ七月二十五日十五時日本側官憲ト小銃武装シ十三名兵卒カ  
 来テ彼等船長ト此ト運轉士達ニ訊問多ク上陸シ檢事許  
 迄ヲ強ク申シ出タ船長此ト受取ニ應ズル事ヲ拒メ彼ト指名  
 カタ各運轉士船上ニ於テシテト領事立會ト下ニ訊問スル旨ヲ  
 提案シテ此後船長腕力暴力ガ加ラレテ彼船カラ兵出テ上級運

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No 4

轉子、指因傳、ル、餘、裕、之、頭、之、子、之、而、之、於、餘、裕、之、機、關、  
 船業組員、二陸、ヲ、禁止、支、一、九、時、船、長、命、令、船、行、於、警、察、署、  
 之、監、禁、之、一、七、月、之、六、日、檢、事、之、一、ル、之、罰、金、之、其、間、次、為、  
 之、暴、力、之、如、此、除、日、本、領、海、不、法、侵、入、ル、船、長、之、罪、問、  
 斯、ル、風、波、被、訊、問、八、月、日、迄、續、之、同、時、該、船、他、業、組、員、  
 之、訊、問、呼、出、之、彼、等、之、同、様、之、罪、取、扱、之、訊、問、之、檢、事、之、  
 之、諸、人、之、國、後、以、上、之、此、之、船、之、沒、收、之、汽、船、之、一、号、  
 日、米、戰、争、勃、發、後、之、禁、斷、之、所、以、入、手、之、事、實、之、確、証、之、行、之、  
 八、月、十、日、監、禁、中、心、之、ル、之、許、裁、判、所、官、夫、カ、本、日、彼、日、本、創、裁、判、所、  
 判、決、之、言、渡、之、カ、己、依、之、船、長、日、本、領、海、之、不、法、侵、入、之、罪、  
 認、之、之、監、禁、之、禁、錮、或、日、本、向、之、干、預、之、罰、金、之、言、渡、之、  
 之、ル、之、彼、裁、判、所、判、決、之、合、法、的、之、非、之、上、層、之、中、立、之、罰、金、支、  
 拂、之、拒、之、向、之、引、續、之、監、禁、之、一、七、月、之、六、日、之、此、之、件、之、關、之、檢、事、之、始、之、母、  
 之、訊、問、呼、出、之、暴、力、之、罰、金、之、如、此、之、事、之、依、之、能、之、之、罰、金、支、拂、之、  
 之、又、此、際、資、金、之、積、荷、之、燃、料、或、之、船、船、用、器、具、之、一、部、  
 實、之、之、彼、獲、之、之、上、之、資、金、之、取、之、之、言、之、分、得、之、之、此、  
 等、之、要、求、之、意、之、事、之、斷、之、拒、絶、之、八、月、十、五、日、檢、事、之、船、長、  
 之、取、扱、之、彼、凡、之、船、船、開、係、書、類、之、之、汽、船、之、一、号、之、航、行、

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轉于該國之領事官之調查之結果。而該船之船長及船員等  
 船長組員、二陸、禁止之。一九四九年船長組員等、於該國  
 監禁之。七月五日檢事、由該國之領事官、向該國政府  
 交涉、要求釋放該船長及船員等。該國政府、以該船長及船員  
 斯、其風、被、詢問、八月五日、檢事、又、同時、致、該國、他、界、組員、等、  
 王、詢問、呼、出、之、檢事、同、類、之、取、扱、又、又、同、日、檢事、之、  
 諸、彼、人、之、檢事、以、此、汽、船、之、取、扱、之、事、情、形、事、  
 日、米、戰、争、勃、發、後、之、米、國、之、研、究、人、等、之、事、業、之、證、據、等、  
 八月十日、監禁、中、心、之、事、業、之、研、究、官、之、來、信、據、自、本、國、裁、判、所、  
 判決、之、言、渡、之、分、己、依、之、船、長、が、日、本、領、海、之、不、法、侵、入、之、事、業、有、罪、  
 認、之、之、旨、開、禁、錮、或、日、本、内、之、干、預、罰、金、刑、之、言、渡、之、事、  
 之、旨、以、彼、が、裁、判、所、判決、之、言、渡、の、非、不、看、做、之、旨、申、立、之、罰、金、支、  
 拂、之、拒、之、向、之、引、續、之、監、禁、中、之、事、業、此、件、之、關、之、檢、事、之、始、之、旨、  
 之、旨、以、其、出、之、果、力、之、事、業、之、依、之、旨、申、立、之、罰、金、支、拂、之、旨、  
 又、此、際、資、金、獲、得、之、事、業、積、荷、燃、料、或、船、船、用、器、具、等、  
 實、之、旨、以、彼、が、發、給、之、事、業、之、取、扱、之、旨、申、立、之、旨、分、得、之、旨、以、此、  
 等、之、旨、亦、未、忘、之、旨、事、業、之、斷、之、旨、拒、絶、之、旨、八月十五日、檢、事、之、船、長、  
 之、旨、以、其、取、扱、之、旨、凡、之、船、船、關、係、之、旨、類、之、旨、汽、船、之、旨、早、之、旨、航、行、

No 4



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途三就事子許

官一、秋放、除三、微、全一、意、身、体、檢、查、日、二、三、件、物、品、及

檢、查、此、身、体、檢、查、除、取、七、日、之、日、不、復、帶、送、三、十、九、日、

自、二、五、日、時、該、汽、船、按、鐘、之、自、的、港、同、去、日、斯、如、之、

日、本、制、軍、部、裁、判、所、及、警、察、署、為、何、等、一、概、據、無、事、之、事、

之、事、被、問、以、三、汽、船、一、等、子、留、留、之、以、三、小、海、良、一、等、

加、身、子、

大、東、洋、汽、船、三、事、檢、察、官、志、務、中、佐、三、三、三、三、(、三、三、三、)

一、九、四、六、年、二、月、三、日

浦、邊、斯、德、市、

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途三就事言計三

日三、秋三秋三秋三秋三、今三夜三身三夜三夜三三三三三、物三以三

檢三查三此三身三夜三夜三夜三夜三、除三取三三三三三三三、送三三三三三。

自三三三、三時三該三該三該三、按三鐘三之三自三自三自三、同三同三同三、如三如三、

日三本三制三制三制三、裁三判三判三判三、及三警三警三警三、會三會三會三、何三何三、核三核三核三、三三三三。

立三查三查三、問三問三三三、三三三三、三三三三、三三三三、三三三三、三三三三。

如三如三三三

大正洋行經理事務官 浦田新徳市

一九二六年三月三日

浦田新徳市

No 5

Ex-817

DOCUMENT 2311

Page 1

151-9

Prosecution Office of the U.S.S.R.  
Military Prosecutor of  
Pacific Area  
April 4 1946

#21

Vladivostok

REPORT

On detaining the ship "Ingul" of the Far Eastern State Maritime Agency in 1943.

The results of investigation conducted by the Military Prosecution of the Pacific Area, showed that:

The ship "Ingul" following its course in the northern fair-water of the Laperuzo Strait, northern latitude 45 degrees 49' and eastern longitude 141 degrees 53', was on April 29, 1943 at 9:42 hours stopped by a Japanese war-ship.

A Japanese lieutenant, an interpreter, a signal-man and 10 others of the crew came to the ship "Ingul" by the Japanese ship's boat.

The documents on the cargo and the ownership of the steamer were examined, and under suspicion that the steamer was bought in America during the war, the said ship was placed under arrest, and with threat of arms, the ship "Ingul" was escorted to Port "Otomari," where it arrived on April 30, 1943 at 2:55 hours.

After the arrival of the ship "Ingul" in the Port "Otomari," a Japanese armed detachment consisting of twelve men headed by a junior-Lieutenant Tezuki, set themselves up in various parts of the steamer. The radio operator's cabin was closed by the Japanese. In the following days the Japanese military men were reviewing documents and interrogating the Captain on various questions, in the hope of obtaining an explanation that the steamer was received in America during the war.

When Captain Bashkatov refused to present the documents of the steamer on May 18, 1943, motivating that they were repeatedly examined, the Japanese started to threaten. A battle-alarm was given on the Japanese war-ship and her guns were directed on the ship "Ingul". An armed Japanese guard was running and loading rifles on the deck of the ship "Ingul".

EW-817

DOCUMENT 2311

Page 1

151-9

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DOCUMENT 2311

Page 2

Without giving a special accusation the ship "Ingul" was kept under arrest in the Port "Otomari" till 13:15 hours of June 23, 1943, i.e. 60 days.

Military Prosecutor of the Pacific Area  
Lt. Colonel of Justice

Shlichkov.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT.

I, Minenko, G., hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

SIGNATURE: /s/George Minenko

四月二十九日 各條「歐北」方水路三四月三日 航行中 九時八分  
「クック」ル「號」入 九時八分 記

大津水境 互 軍 號 家 口 = 依ル 航 測 查 界 下 記 / 如

「...」... 船... 航測... 界下... 記 / 如

告 報

Handwritten signature or mark, possibly 'V. B. 23' or similar.

2311-1



2311-2

人等ハ同船ガ戦争中米國ニ於テ受領セラレタルセ  
ノナリトノ證據ヲ得ントシテ整頓ヲ怠ラシ、且電  
々ノ函件ニ就テ船長ヲ訊問セリ。

一九四三年（昭和十八年）三月十八日船長「バ  
シユカイトフ」ガ同船員ハ一戻ナラス證據サレタ  
リトノ理由ニ依リ船員整頓ノ奨励ヲ推行セルニ日  
本人ハ荷造手段ヲ用ヒ治メタリ。日本軍艦上ニハ  
隊員整頓ガ勵ヲサレ、船ハ「インダール」様ニ照  
準セラレタリ。「インダール」様上ノ武裝セル日  
本海軍兵士ハ走りカガラ小銃ニ據置シ甲板上ヲ四ケ  
廻リタリ。

一號ノ停航ノ経緯ヲナク「インダール」様ハ一  
九四三年六月二八日十三時十三分浦大崎灣ニ擱置  
セラレタリ。

太平洋水陸軍事務檢察官

濱田中佐 シニルイテコフ



R E P O R T

ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE WRECK OF THE STEAMER  
"KRECHET", BELONGING TO THE STATE SEA-SHIPPIING  
AGENCY, IN THE HARBOR OF HONG KONG

The Military Prosecution Office of the Pacific Ocean Area has established by investigation following:

That at the end of August, 1941, the ship "Krechet" arrived at the harbor of Hong Kong to be put under recondition. On December 8, 1941, the recondition of the ship was interrupted because of the opening of hostilities between Japan and USA and Great Britain.

To avoid the damaging of the ship during artillery bombardments of the docks by the Japanese forces, the ship "Krechet" was led off to the roadstead state flag of the Soviet Union being on the stern, and other flags painted on her deck and boards. There were no other ships belonging to any other country on the roadstead.

Late in the afternoon of December 14, 1941, artillery bombardment of the ship "Krechet" was began from the Koulun Island, occupied by the Japanese.

The first shells fell on the stern and the bow. Then an incendiary shell hit one of the deck-cabins, and fire broke out on the ship. After this the ship was several times directly hit by explosive and incendiary shells, which damaged the hull and the engine-room. The ship was ablaze and in about two hours sank.

The witnesses: the captain of the ship "Krechet" Bazhanov, the senior radio-operator of the ship Pokrytiuk, the mechanic of the ship "Svirstroy" Iordansky and others estimated that there were 34 shells discharged by the Japanese armed forces at the ship "Krechet" from the distance of less than half a mile.

On leaving the ship on fire, the crew consisting of 10 men got into a boat and made for Hong Kong. But a gun shot was made at the boat from the Japanese side, and the boat was forced to sail in the direction of the Koulun Island.

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After Hong Kong was occupied, the captain of the ship "Krechet", the representative of the Commercial Mission Prokhorov and the employee of the "Exportshlep" Ageev were summoned by the military authorities to negotiate on the matter of the wreck of the ship "Krechet".

During the talk which lasted about 3 hours, the representative of the Japanese command repeatedly threatening with responsibility for giving false testimony endeavoured to prove that the ship "Krechet" could not have been fired at by the Japanese, and tried with all means to make them testify that it was the English who had fired at the ship.

During the months that the crew stayed in Hong Kong they were constantly subjected to indignities by the Japanese, who beat them, robbed them of their personal things, money in foreign currency and food, and as a result of it the crew of the ship "Krechet" were half starving and suffered from inanition and various diseases.

The losses sustained by the state amounted to 17,700,000 rubles, which was the cost of the ship.

Military Prosecutor of the Pacific Ocean Area,

Lieutenant-Colonel of the Judicial Corps

Shlychkov

20.III.46 CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT

I, F. Gildenblat, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature: /s/ M. Gildenblat

5 ex. be  
12.YI.46.

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I, N. Gildenblat, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature:/s/ M. Gildenblat

5 ex.be  
12.Y1.46.

FILE COPY

No. 218

RETURN TO ROOM 361

2315-1

香港港内ニ於ケル極東國營海運會社所有船

「クレチエト」號沈没ニ關スル件。

太平洋地區軍事檢察團ノ調査ニヨリ決定ヲ見タル  
事項左ノ如シ。

一九四一年（昭和十六年）八月末商船「クレチエ  
ト」號ハ修理ヲ受ケルタメ香港港ニ入港シタ。

日本ノ米國及ビ英國ニ對スル敵國行動開始ノ結果  
船ノ修理ハ一九四一年（昭和十六年）十二月八日  
ニ中絶サレタ。

日本軍側ヨリノ「ドック」砲撃ニ際シ發生スベキ  
船ノ被損ヲ回避スル爲「クレチエト」號ハ碇泊地  
ニ移動シ、其ノ際船尾ニ「ソヴァイエト」聯邦ノ國  
旗ヲ掲ゲ、兩舷及ビ甲板ニモ同旗ニ國旗ヲ書イタ。  
碇泊地ニハ他ノ款レノ國ノ船舶モ無カツタ。

一九四一年（昭和十六年）十二月十四日ノ夕刻ニ  
至リ日本軍占領下ノ九龍側カラ「クレチエト」號  
ニ對シ砲撃ガ開始サレタ。  
始メ數彈ガ船首及ビ船尾ニ落下シタ。次イテ燒夷  
彈ガ上部構造ニ落下シタ、メ、船上ニ火災ガ發生  
シタ。續イテ船ハ船体及ビ機艙部ニ損傷ヲ受ヘル  
コト、ナツタ地震彈、燒夷彈ノ數發ノ直撃ヲ受  
ケタ。船ハ火焰ニ包マレ、約二時間後ニ沈没シタ。

2315-2

「クレチエト」班船長「バジヤノフ」、同班上級無線士「ボクルインチユイクル」、シザイリストロイ「號機師士」イヨルタンスキ「等目撃者ノ計算スルトコロニ於レバ、日本軍ハ「クレチエト」號ヲ目標ニシテ、五「マイル」以内ノ距離ニ三十四發發射シタト。

乗組員十名ハ、燈上スル本船ヲ見棄テ、搭載「ボート」ニ乘リ、香港ニ向ツクガ、其時又シテモ「ボート」ハ日本側カラ砲撃ヲ受ケタガタメ、止ムナク九龍側ニ向フコト、ナツタ。

日本軍ノ香港占領直後「クレチエト」號船長「バジヤノフ」、通商代表「ヨホロフ」、食糧輸出組合職員「ブゲイエフ」ハ「クレチエト」號沈没ニ付スル會談ノタメ軍當局ニ召喚サレタ。

約三時間ニ亘ル會談中、日本軍統帥部代表ハ繰返シ威嚇シテ、證據ノ證言ニ對スル責任ガアルトナシ、「クレチエト」號ハ日本側ノ砲撃ヲ受ケル筈ガナイト證明シヨウトシ、又同船ハ英國軍ダケニ砲撃サレタノダト云フ證言ヲ得ヨウトアラユル方浩ヲ用ヒテ努力シタ。

數ヶ月ニ亘ル香港滯在中、乗組員ハ日本軍ニ種々ト嘲弄サレ、毆打サレ、私物、外國貨幣及ビ食料ヲ掠奪サレテ、「クレチエト」號ノ乗組員ハ食フ

2315-3

ヤ食ハズテ生活シ、タメニ衰弱シテ、定々ノ疾病  
ヲ發生シタ。

國家ニ與ヘタ損害ハ一千七百七十萬「ルーブル」  
デアルガ、コノ額ハ無ノ價値デアル

太平洋地區軍事情報官

法務中佐 「シユルイテコフ」

2315-3

ヤ食ハズテ生活シ、タメニ衰弱シテ、定々ノ疾病  
ヲ發生シタ。  
國家ニ與ハタ損害ハ一千七百七十萬「ルーブル」  
デアルガ、コノ額ハ主ノ償額デアル

太平洋地區軍事學家會

法務中佐 「シユルイテコフ」



2315-4

登録第三一五號

證

余中山登ハ余ガ日本語及ビ露西亞語ニ精通セル  
者ナルコト並ニ露西亞語原文及ビ日本語原文ヲ對  
照ノ上右ハ本書類ヲ眞實ニ且正確ニ翻譯セルモノ  
ナルヲ確證セルコトヲ茲ニ証ス

昭和二十一年九月六日

中 山 登

R E P O R TON THE FIRING ON AND PLUNDERING IN THE HARBOR OF HONG KONG  
BY THE JAPANESE TROOPS OF THE SHIP "SVIRSTROY" BELONGING TO  
THE FAR EASTERN STATE SHIPPING AGENCY, IN DECEMBER, 1941

The Military Prosecution Office of the Pacific Ocean Area established by investigation the following:

That since July, 1941, the ship "Svirstroy" had been overhauled in the docks of the English company "Pampy-Dock" at Hong Kong, and by the beginning of December 1941, she was 90-90 per cent ready.

On December 8, 1941, the Japanese troops made a surprise attack on Hong Kong from the North and drove the English troops defending the town back to the Victoria Island.

In order to avoid the Japanese troops mistaking the Soviet ship for an English or American one, the crew led out the ship "Svirstroy" to the roadstead and put her far from the other ships, keeping at a distance of 200 m. from the shore; large state flags with the inscription "The USSR" on them were painted on the roof of the round-house and on the boards.

Although it was obvious that what the nationality of the ship "Svirstroy" was and that she belonged to the Merchantile Marine of the Soviet Union the Japanese planes twice bombed her, but without any results. After this on December 13, the Japanese forces began artillery ranging from the shore batteries and opened gun fire on the ship "Svirstroy." Five shells directly hit the hull of the ship, considerably damaging her and the deck-structures.

The 3rd mate Kovernikov and baker Elagin were killed during the bombardment.

During the Japanese bombardment of the ship the crew sailed in boats and landed on the Japanese-held-shore, where the Japanese troops put them under guard and took to the zone under the fire of English batteries on Victoria Island.

Stoker Krivoruchko was killed and sailor Bochko badly wounded during one of the bombardments. The Japanese did not render Bochko any medical aid in due time.

Notwithstanding their lawful requests to the Japanese command to transfer them to some safe place, the Soviet sailors were forced to stay in the zone under the artillery fire during the whole time of fighting.

During and after the fighting the Soviet sailors were kept like prisoners in the area surrounded by barbed-wire and under guard of the Japanese soldiers.

As the crew of the ship "Svirstroy" had left the ship during the bombardment, they could not have taken food and personal belongings with them, for a month the Japanese authorities did not allow the Soviet sailors to return to the ship assuring them that the ship was guarded by them. But when the Soviet sailors succeeded to

get there, they found out that the Japanese flag had been hoisted on the ship and the Japanese had given her a trophy number. It also turned out, that besides the damage done by the artillery fire, the principal parts of the engine and of the stokers room were covered with rust, there were about 200 tons of rainwater in the holds; the ship equipment, machinery, food and personal belongings of the crew were stolen by the Japanese soldiers.

The ship was put out of commission but the Japanese authorities responsible for the bombardment and the plundering of the ship, refused to compensate the damage caused by them to the Soviet Union and to her citizens.

Those of the crew of the ship "Svirstroy" who had left the ship before the bombardment and stayed on the Victoria Island, were constantly subjected to various indignities and were robbed by the Japanese soldiers when the latter occupied the island.

Because of the hostilities on the part of Japan the ship "Svirstroy" had to stay in Hong Kong and having been damaged by the bombardment and plundered she sank afterward. She could not have been led away into a Soviet port because of the hostilities.

The amount and the articles of the plundered property are specified in the act

MILITARY PROSECUTOR OF THE PACIFIC  
OCEAN AREA LIEUTENANT-COLONEL OF  
JUDICIAL COPPS /SELYCHKOV/

5 ex. be.  
12. YI.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. GILDENBLAT, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

Signature: /s/ M. Gildenblat

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 301

2310

香港港に於ける汽船「セルゲイ・ラッ」号ニ対する日本機、投彈及日本軍ノ「ソビエト」國有財産掠奪ニ関スル件。

Ex 820

太平洋戦争軍艦検査局ヨリ作シタル調査(抄)如シ。  
汽船「セルゲイ・ラッ」号、一九四一年(昭和十六年)八月末以降香港港内ニテ修理ヲシツツアツタガ、本船ハ日本ノ対米英軍事行動開始ノ結果斯ル状態ニ引留メラレタ。

一九四一年(昭和十六年)十二月九日汽船「セルゲイ・ラッ」号ハ場碇泊地才田号浮標ニ繫留セラレタ。

一九四一年(昭和十六年)十二月十一日二回ニ亘リ日本機ヨリ爆撃ヲ受ケタガ、命中ニシタツタ。船体ハ

「ソビエト」社会主義共和国聯邦所屬ノ標識ガアリ又「ソビエト」聯邦ノ國旗ガ掲ゲラレテ中タ。

日本軍統帥部ノ命令ニヨリ船長「クウケ」ヲ含ム汽船「セルゲイ・ラッ」号ノ乗組ノ人々ハ本船ヲ離シ日本

2310

軍艦隊、三島、島根、松江、大津市  
アリ、三島、島根、松江、大津市、  
一九四一年（昭和十六年）十二月三十一日乗組員、  
居住ル家屋ニ落下丸砲彈ニヨリ、大津市、  
死亡ニ又、大津市、八重傷ヲ蒙リ、乗組員ニヨリ  
病院ニ運ビシ。

汽船「ソビエト」スビリストロイ、及「ソビエト」号  
ソビエト海員、大人数、香港ニ居リ。九龍ニ居  
住シテ、海員團ニ対シテ、日本軍統帥部、香港  
ニ居住セル「ソビエト」海員ト交際スルコトヲ禁ズ。  
日本軍統帥部、九龍ニ於テ、汽船セルゲイ・ゾ  
号乗組員警備隊、隊長デアツタ海軍大尉、三卷  
ヲ通シ、再ニ汽船船長「ソビエト」ニ対シ、正式ニ汽船「ソ  
ビエト」号ハ英人ニヨリ撃沈サレ、又汽船「スビリストロイ」  
ハ同様英人ニヨリ砲撃サレ、日記述スル様ニ、外  
ニ何語ニテモ構ハズ、感謝状ニ通リ、一通ハ日本軍統  
帥部宛、日本軍ハ「ソビエト」海員ニ対シ、好意的態度  
ヲトツタ旨ヲ、又次、一通ハ海軍大尉三卷個人宛、汽

2

2310

此の如く、乗組員計五名は、同二書の様要  
 求を提出す。然る場合に、乗組員は香港市に移され  
 且大多數は、ソビエト海員と合併し、又乗船を許  
 されしが、船長「グウ」がソビエトの條件を遂行せし  
 め汽船「ゼルゲイ・ラジ」号、全乗組員、無期限に九龍  
 市に居住せしむる等、内何人モ乗船を許さしなすア  
 ウト云フノデアツタ。

日本当局ニヨリ汽船「ゼルゲイ・ラジ」号乗組ノ者ニ乗  
 船ヲ許サシナカッタガ、ソビエト船上テ連日日本軍ニ  
 対シ人員ノ交代ガ行ハシ又日本國旗ガ掲揚サレルガ認  
 ラシタ。

3

一九四二年(昭和十七年)六月二十三日、日本軍統帥部  
 許可ニヨリ船長「グウ」、一等運転士「ケモフエフ」、高級運  
 転士「キリシ」、高級機関士「タルウリス」及其他乗組ノ者  
 ガ九龍ドックニ繋索スルアツタ本船ノ保存、為ニ乗船  
 ヲ許サシタガ、彼等ハ日本軍ガ甲板部船用品、舵手用  
 具、掌帆具、食器、厨房及火災用物品救護用具、  
 特殊衣類、文化用品、船舶無線電信器材、乗組

ヨリ人員ノ交代ガ行ハシ又日本國旗ガ掲揚サレルノガ認メ  
ラシク。

一九四二年(昭和十七年)六月二十三日、日本軍統帥部ノ

許可ヨリ船長「グウ」、一等運転士「ケモフエフ」、高級運

転士「キリ」、高級機関士「タルウリス」及其他乗組ノ者

3  
カ九龍「ドック」ニ繋系索シテアツタ本船ノ保存ノ爲ニ乗船

ヲ許サレタガ、彼等ハ日本軍ガ甲板部船用員、舵手用

具、掌帆具、食器、廚房及火災用物品、救護用具、

特殊衣類、文化用品、船舶無線電信器材、乗組

2310

船 七ノクハシラシテ、

求コ提 出 免 然ル 場 合ニ 乘 組 員ハ 悉 市ニ 移 出レ

且 大 多 數ノ 船ト 海 員ト 合 併シ 又 乘 船ヲ 許

サレガ 若シ 船長「グ」ガ コレノ 條 件ヲ 遂 行シ 得レ

バ 汽 船「セルゲイ・ラゾ」号ノ 全 乗 組 員ハ 無 期 限ニ 九 龍

市ニ 居 住シ 彼 等ノ 内 何 人モ 乘 船ハ 許 サレナイデアラ

ント云フノデアツタ。

日本当局ニヨリ 汽 船「セルゲイ・ラゾ」号 乗 組ノ 者ニ 六 乘

船ヲ 許 サレナカッタガ、ソビエツト 船 上デ 連日 日本 軍ニ



1着、私物、食糧物品、機内部部分品、各種器具及  
材料ヲ掠奪ニテコトガ明カトナリタ。

太平洋水域軍事檢察官

法務中佐

署名 エルイターフ

2310

4

2310

書類 才 = 三十一。号

證 -

余中山登 余が 日本語 及び 露西亞  
語 = 精通セル者ナルコト並ニ 露西亞語原  
文 及び 日本語 原文ヲ 対照シ / 上右ニ 本書  
類ヲ 眞実ニ 且 正確ニ 録セルモノナルヲ 確  
證セルコトヲ 茲ニ 證ス

昭和二十一年九月三日

中山登

署名

6

REPORTON THE BOMBING BY THE JAPANESE AIRCRAFT OF THE  
SHIP "SERGEY LASO" IN THE HARBOR OF HONG KONG AND  
ON THE PLUNDERING OF THE SOVIET STATE PROPERTY  
BY THE JAPANESE

The Military Prosecution Office of the Pacific Ocean Area has established by investigation following:

That the ship "Sergey Laso" was under recondition in the Harbor of Hong Kong since the end of August, 1941, and the recondition was stopped because of the opening of hostilities between Japan and USA and Great Britain.

On December 9, 1941 the ship "Sergey Laso" was put on anchor at the buoy 4, on the dock roadstead.

On December 11, 1941, the ship "Sergey Laso" was twice bombed by Japanese planes, but the bombs missed her. The ship had identification signs and the state flag of the Soviet Union.

By the order of the Japanese command the crew of the ship "Sergey Laso", including captain Guk left the ship and settled down in 272, Prince Edward Street, the town of Koulun, near the Japanese Staff, and lived there under Japanese watch.

On December 23, 1941, stoker Krivoruchko was killed and sailor Bochko badly wounded by the shell that hit the house where the crew lived. The crew carried Bochko to the hospital.

The main part of the sailors of the ships "Krechet," "Svirstroy" and "Simpheropol" was at Hong Kong. The Japanese command forbade those who lived in Koulun to have intercourse with the Soviet sailors staying at Hong Kong.

The Japanese command through Lieutenant Mitana who was at the head of the soldiers guarding the crew of the ship "Sergey Laso" at Koulun, repeatedly demanded that Captain Guk should officially write that the ship "Krechet" had been sunk by the English, and that the ship "Svirstroy" had also been fired at by them. Besides, they demanded that he should write two letters of gratitude, no matter in what language, one addressed to the Japanese Command telling that the Japanese treated the Soviet sailors well; and the other to Lieutenant Mitana, personally,

thanking him for good treatment of the crew of the ship "Sergey Laso." Mitana said that if he did that, they would transfer the crew to Hong Kong where they might join the main group of the Soviet sailors and would be allowed to go aboard their ship. If Captain Guk refused to do that, then the whole crew of the ship "Sergey Laso" would stay in the town of Koulun for an indefinite time and would not be allowed to go to the ship.

The Japanese authorities did not allow the crew of the ship "Sergey Laso" to go aboard their ship, but it was noticed, that the Japanese replaced people on the Soviet ships every day and that the Japanese flag was hoisted on them.

On June 23, 1942, the Japanese Command gave Captain Guk, second mate Timofeev, first mate Kiriy, chief mechanic Tarulius and others permission to go aboard the ship with the aim of conservation of the ship, which was standing at the pier of the docks of Koulun. They found out that the Japanese had plundered the deck equipment the skipper, pilot, buffet, caboose and fire equipment, the life-rescuing equipment, overalls, things pertaining to cultural entertainment, the ship radio-station, personal belongings of the crew, food, details of machines, various tools and materials.

Military Prosecutor of the Pacific Ocean Area

Lieutenant Colonel of the Judicial Corps Shlychkov.

5 ex6be.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

II.Y.

I, M.Gildenblat, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages, and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature: /s/ M. Gildenblat

R E P O R T

ON THE ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT OF THE SHIP "SIMPHEROPOL"  
BY JAPANESE AT KOULUN AND ON THE LOOTING BY THE  
SOLDIERS AND OFFICERS OF THE JAPANESE ARMY.

The Military Prosecution Office of the Pacific Ocean area established by investigation following:

The ship "Simpheropol" was under recondition at the town of Koulun, which was stopped because of the opening of hostilities between Japan and USA and Great-Britain. The ship was moored at the pier of the Koulun Docks.

From December 18, 1941, to June 23, 1942 the Japanese authorities did not allow any member of the crew to go aboard the ship, and refused to give them permission to go to the docks territory to inspect the ship "Simpheropol" and to take measures for preserving the equipment and other valuables which were on the ship.

On the twentieth of December, 1941, a Japanese descent coming from the Koulun direction landed on the Victoria Island and occupied the territory where the house where more than one hundred Soviet sailors - the crews of the ships "Krechet", "Simpheropol", "Svirstroy", "Sergey Laso" and some groups of Philippine sailors lived, was.

Having occupied the Victoria Island, the Japanese officers and soldiers burst into the house of the Soviet sailors and threatening with arms, opened valises belonging to the Soviet sailors with bayonets and took things of some value. They also searched the sailors and took away money, watches and other valuables. So, for instance, they took commander Sokolov's gold watch, and robbed stoker Starostin of his gold watch, etc. Then the Japanese officers and soldiers took all the sailors out in the street and, though the area was under unceasing machine-gun and artillery fire, they lined them up in the square in front of the house, and during the lining up the Soviet sailors were beaten with bamboo sticks receiving blows on their heads. A Japanese officer twice stroke stoker Diachuk on the brow with a stick. The Soviet sailors again were searched, and valuables were taken from them. That lasted for 2 hours. Then the sailors were allowed to return to the house. During a month and

a half the Japanese authorities did not give the Soviet sailors any food and the latter suffered from starvation. Later they gave each of them 100 gr. of rice per day.

The indignities to which the Japanese officers and soldiers subjected the Soviet sailors were committed systematically. The following intolerable fact of humiliation of dignity and honour of Soviet sailor will show what these indignities were like: in the middle of May, 1942, the chief radio-operator of the ship "Krechet", Pokratiuk, Viadimir Semenovich and the chief-mechanic of the ship "Simpheropol" were returning from Hong Kong to Koulun, when being not far from the harbour they were searched by the Japanese policeman on guard. When Pokratiuk was approaching the booking-office he was called back by a Japanese sentinel who checked his passport and afterwards ordered him to stand on his knees and to ask pardon for the alleged offence he had given the sentinel. Pokratiuk got a stoke of bayonet for refusing to stand on his knees, and two other Japanese soldiers who had meanwhile approached him, beat him with sticks. Then Pokratiuk was taken to the Police Station where the Japanese officer having learned from the passport that Pokratiuk was a Soviet sailor, interrogated him for half an hour in the Japanese language inapprehensible to Pokratiuk, the interrogation being accompanied with beating his face. Then his left ear was injured with a strong blow inflicted with fist, and as a result of it Pokratiuk had a dull hearing for a long time.

On June 23, 1942 the Japanese command allowed the captain of the ship "Simpheropol", second mate Korsakov, first mate Sidorenko and others to go aboard their ship with the aim of conservation of the ship which was moored at the pier of the Koulun Decks. They found out that there was a hole in the hull of the ship "Simpheropol" made by the artillery shell which had hit the left upper deck of the bow, that the cabin doors were torn away, the writing tables broken, the velvet from the sofas cut off. Besides, the deck equipment, the pilot, skipper, buffet caboose and fire equipment, the life-rescuing equipment, overalls, personal belongings of the crew, things pertaining to cultural entertainment, cabin equipment, the ship radio station and the whole stock of food for the crew were plundered, and some damage was deliberately done to the engine room.

Doc. No. 2308

3

The losses sustained by the state amount to 10,615,000 rubles.

Military Prosecutor of the Pacific Ocean Area

Lieutenant Colonel of the Judicial Corps

Snlychkov.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, M. Gildenblat, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature: /s/ M. Gildenblat

5 ex.be  
12.YI.

Doc. No. 2308

E# 822

Doc. 2305,

Page 1

AFFIDAVIT OF BUDARIN B.S. FORMER  
FIRST MATE OF THE SHIP NAME OF THE  
SHIP "PEREKOP" OF MARCH 14, 1946,  
ON SEVENTEEN SHEETS.

A F F I D A V I T

of Boris Alexandrovich BUDARIN.

On March 14, 1946 Military Prosecutor of the Pacific Ocean area lieutenant-colonel of Judicial Corps SHLCHKOV having warned of responsibility for giving false testimony interrogated as a witness.

(Signature)

1. Surname, first name, father's name: BUDARIN Boris Alexandrovich.
2. Age: Born in 1908.
3. Place of birth: the town of Saratov.
4. Occupation before the October Revolution: I was on my parents allowance.
5. Occupation at present: Second mate.
6. Education (graduate of what school): high technical school.
7. relations with the defendant: no relations.
8. Origin: of a worker's family.
9. Previously under trial? No.
10. Party membership -
11. Present address: 35 Bestuzhev Street Fl. 7 Vladivostok

I can give the following testimony concerning the case of the sinking of the steamer "Perekop" by a Japanese aircraft. The testimony is written by my own hand.

At the end of November 1941 I was appointed first mate of the steamer- "Perekop". Urgent preparations for the voyage were made, and early in the morning of December 3 we left Vladivostok without cargo, bound for the Surabaya Harbor on Java. The ship was not armed; we had neither a gun, nor a single machine-gun, there were only a few rifles for guarding the ship. It was a most harmless commercial timber-carrying ship.



... of 3 men and 3 women who worked ... night during the period of preparations for the voyage. On the fourth day after leaving Vladivostok we were located by a Japanese aircraft.

We were not far from Shanghai, and the day being bright, we could clearly see the bright red circles on the wings of the plane; they were the military identification signs of the Japanese planes. At the same time it was evidently very easy to discern the USSR flag, the name of the ship written in Russian and English and the flags of the USSR printed on the canvases of the holds from the plane. It happened on December 5, 1941, and we felt that now we were under the watch of the Japanese. In the night of December 9, being in the East-Chinese Sea, we listened to the radio news "Tikhookeansky Moriak" ("The Seaman of the Pacific Ocean") and learned about Japan having opened hostilities against the English and Americans.

In connection with this news we took a number of measures: an inquiry was sent to the Chief of the Commercial Fleet, the crew was informed of the events, etc.

Two days later, on December 11 or 12, 1941 we, being this time near the coast of the Fernosa Island, were again located by a Japanese aircraft. The plane made several circles over the ship at a low altitude, and we clearly saw the Japanese signs on its wings and fuselage.

Our national ensign was clearly seen, and the pilot evidently identified the ship quickly. After a while the plane disappeared.

On December 15, 1941, in the day-time, we saw an aircraft again. The bright weather allowed us to identify its nationality. It was a Japanese bomber. This plane, also, located the vessel. It was impossible not to discern and not to see our state flag on the flagstaff and the flags painted on the holds, and when the aircraft went away, it occurred to me that the Japanese had been watching us all the time and that they exactly knew that ours was a Soviet ship, otherwise they would have attacked her long ago.

Besides, it was quite clear that the Japanese must have been well aware of the presence of the Soviet ship in the waters which were under their thorough control.

The Japanese reconnaissance planes, as it was already stated met us systematically, identified our nationality and did not touch us. But on December 17, early in the morning, we again saw a Japanese aircraft under following circumstances: the third mate, comrade Andrianov who was on watch saw the aircraft and reported to captain Denisov about it, the latter sounded the alert signal (as is usually done when an aircraft is located) and summoned me to his bridge.

I went there. It was about 9 a.m. The aircraft made two or three circles and then made for the ship. The captain and I watched it through the binoculars and when it came nearer, we saw on its wings the Japanese "sun" the red circles which showed, that was a Japanese aircraft. The plane was making for the ship, and when it was almost directly above it, two bombs were dropped and fell off the starboard (near the engine-department), but did not inflict any damage.

The plane was identified; it was a Japanese two-engined bomber, and it again began lowering for the attack. The captain ordered the battle unit on duty (7 men armed fifth rifled) to enter into action, and the plane was met with rifle fire. Flying too low when it was fired at, the plane changed its course, made a circle, gained altitude and being already at a considerable altitude it glided into battle course and dropped two more bombs. This time the bombs fell near the starboard again, and damaged the ship in the sector of the hull N 3. The damage was located and fixed. We continued our voyage thinking that Japan had declared war on the USSR.

It could not have been otherwise, because the Japanese knew that it was a Soviet ship which had several times been located by the Japanese planes. The last plane, too, had evidently identified the nationality of the ship, because had he not done this, he would not have bombed us because he might have hit a ship of his own country a number of which were sailing in these waters.

Therefore I am sure that the Japanese sank the ship "Parskop" being aware that it was a Soviet vessel. I must add that the last plane belonged to Japan. I myself saw the identification signs on its wings. And not only myself but everybody on deck did.

After the plane had dropped the first two bombs which missed the ship, I myself, with the aid of two members of the crew set fire to the barrels filled with bakum which had been prepared beforehand on the stern, to initiate a fire.

Those who were in the plane saw the dense smoke coming from the deck, and evidently decided to look at "their work" at a shorter distance. The plane lowered, made a circle (and it was then that we discovered its nationality) and flew away.

It must be stressed that the national flag on our ship was clearly seen during the bombing and that besides that we hoisted our identification flags. Flags with the inscription "The USSR" made in English were painted on the canvases of the hold.

As soon as we identified the plane, and the bombs were dropped the captain ordered to send a wireless message to Singapore, and the wireless operator, comrade N.F. Plisko, transmitted something like this: "I, the Soviet ship 'Farokop' is in latitude..., in longitude.... I am attacked by a Japanese plane which is bombing us. I ask for help."

The message was received by an English radio station not far from Singapore and our operator received following answer: "Singapore does not hear you, but I shall forward your message to them". We received no help from Singapore, though we hoped that English planes would come, for we were only 250-300 miles from Singapore.

Believing that Japan had declared war on us (for we thought that the Japanese would not have bombed a peaceful ship if there had been no declaration of war, if they had not been at war with the USSR), we carefully blacked-out and continued our voyage intending to pass the Netherlands Islands "Natuna" on their left.

In the morning of December 18, 1941, between 8 and 9 o'clock we heard the roar of engines, but no one saw the planes.

At noon the gong for dinner sounded. At that time I was on the stern deck taking a shower together with other members of the crew.

At 12.20 the watchman in the crow's-nest, sailor Nechaev cried: "I see a number of planes left of the bow".

I saw 11 twin-engined planes. They fell in two groups and made for the ship, one (there were 9 of them) were making for the bow, the other 8 for the stern.

The identification signs (flags on the holds) of our ship were clearly seen, we had hung out our identification flags, the ensign was now and fluttered in the breeze, its colour and emblem brightly displayed. The planes attacked the ship and started bombing and machine-gunning at low flight our unarmed commercial vessel belonging to the Soviet country neutral to Japan (by this time we knew that there were no hostilities between the USSR and Japan). The Japanese were sure to know that the ship belonged to the USSR. They were flying very low over the masts and having dropped the bombs followed the ship for a while.

Then turning back flew along the board at the masts height machine gunning the ship. They flew so low that we saw their faces, to say nothing of the Japanese signs on the wings and fuselages of the planes.

The Japanese clearly saw that they were bombing a Soviet ship. The bombing continued for about 2 hours. During this time bombs were constantly dropped, and the fire of the machine-guns did not cease. Bombs hit the bow, the mate's storeroom where 4 men were instantly

killed, the hold N 1 and 2. Two fires broke out on the bow and on the stern, the bridge was destroyed, plaster and all other life-saving equipment was torn away.

When captain Demidov saw that the ship was in a hopeless position he ordered to leave it. Part of the crew were already in the water, thrown out by an air-wave; others began to descend on the water trying to swim up to the boats which were not controlled by people being machine-gunned all the time.

Captain Lemidov, the chief mechanic Pogrebnoy the charwoman Sordiuk and I remained on the ship. The ship was sinking fast; now the planes began dropping bombs not on the ship, but on the men in the water who were constantly machine-gunned at the same time.

It was in the water that Stokers Onipko, Ogarkov, and engineer Dudoyan were killed. It was a horrible picture. The drowning people were cruelly and atrociously shot.

In the end, one of the Japanese planes made two circles over the burning and sinking ship, then flew very low over the people in the water and, having evidently taken pictures, flew South following the other planes.

The charwoman Sordiuk, the chief mechanic Pogrebnoy, the captain and I were the last to leave the ship. With great difficulties were the crew fished out into the boats. 12 men of the crew were wounded, 2 - badly wounded, the 3d mate Andrianov had his arm broken, and the stewardess Bokharanova had a wound in the leg. 3 men perished.

By night we reached an island. As we learnt later it was Natuna island. We spent the night lying at anchor, and on landing in the morning sailor Barden and I went to reconnoitre the territory.

When we reached a thicket we were met by armed soldiers with a Dutch officer at the head. He asked us who we were and said: "We are your friends, and I shall help you".

We returned to our comrades awaiting us on the beach, told them, that we were asked to carry the wounded and to send the captain to the Dutch officer.

After some time we came to the village of Ranai and learnt that we were on one of the islands of the Dutch East Indies, called Great Natuna. Lieutenant Peter Engers was representing Dutch authorities on the island, and besides him, there were his sergeant, the Dutchman Yanson, 25 Malay soldiers and the civilian governor of the island Emir.

The village where we came was the centre of the island, and there were no more than 10 cabins there, and among them the "school", the "Emir's office" and

the lieutenant's cabin. We were given room in the school. They gave us some rice and cigarettes.

On the same day of December 19, 1941 we sent a cable through the lieutenant's radio station (he had one) to the Dutch authorities asking them to inform Moscow and Vladivostok of what had happened to us and to give us help.

On December 20, 1941, the lieutenant told the captain, that the Dutch radio had broadcasted that the Japanese had sunk the Soviet ship "Perekop".

The island, where we were staying, was a rather hilly country. A lot of coco-palms grew there, and therefore before the war ships would come there twice a month to fetch copra.

A kind of a pier was built where the ship used to come, and colonial merchants had there a kind of storehouses for copra and kept there some supplies of rice, and of simple clothing and other trifles indispensable for the natives; in other words, the supply of food of the island was kept there.

And so, on December 21, 1941, a Japanese plane bombed that pier and destroyed all the supplies of food. Therefore the lieutenant could help us no more, the villagers frightened by the bombing went away into the mountains, and we were left alone.

With the lieutenant's help we learnt how to extract oil out of coco-nuts, to obtain salt by boiling of the sea-water, to bake sugar pancakes, to catch turtles and fish, etc. But working very hard each of us could get only 50-60 grams of copra with a drop of oil in it, and the rest of what we had was water.

Without clothes, food and medicines, wounded and sick running all sorts of danger in the jungles Soviet sailors suffered great hardships due to the pirate action of the Japanese.

After the Japanese planes had bombed the village of Ranai once more, the scanty population of the island and the lieutenant with his soldiers ran backwoods and the crew was left alone in the thickets of the jungles.

So we lived there for half a year. In the beginning of June, 1942, seeing the helplessness of our position, we discussed the situation. All the islands, and among them Borneo, Java, Sumatra, as well as Singapore, Malay, Indo-China and Philippines were occupied by the Japanese. There was no war between the USA and Japan, therefore we put the question of sending a group of men to Singapore or to Kuching on Borneo who would state before the Japanese authorities the hardships of the Soviet sailors and demand permission to get connected with Moscow, or Vladivostok or with the USSR consul in Japan.

After a long and thorough deliberation of this problem, capt in Demidov decided to send a group of 9 men to fulfill the above said task. The captain thought that the whole crew could not go, for we had no reliable boats.

The group was formed, and I together with other 8 men set to work on preparing our halfbroken boat (a very small one) for the voyage. It took us 11 days to make it, but a little fit for a voyage of 250-300 miles. But at last the work was finished, I myself tested the boat, and though it was clear to everybody that our enterprise was very dangerous because the boat was very old and had not even 10 per cent. of the equipment which should have been on it, we still decided to set off on our voyage.

Early in the morning of June 14, 1942, I with a crew of 8 men left the island. The comrades who saw us off had no hope to see us again. The boat was very small and so crowded that no one could lie down. The board was only 15 cm. above the water. We had following supplies: fresh water, coconuts, dried roots of the ubyu plant.

We sailed in the open sea 7 days; and at the beginning of June arrived at the borneo Island. We were worn out, hungry naked and with a growth of hair. The Japanese already were on borneo. At first we arrived at the town of Srikey on the Rajay River, where on the following day we were met by Japanese soldiers who asked us who we were and having learnt it, treated us rudely and searched us all. On the same day we were taken to the town of Shiba, where by order of a Japanese officer who had learnt that we were Russian sailors, we were sent to lunatic asylum. Half the house was occupied by mad Chinese and Malays, the other - by us. I never saw a baser treatment, to put quite sane men into a lunatic asylum was a refined mockery.

Soon all the 9 men fell ill with malaria, and we were laid up in a hospital. It must be said, that our clothes were nothing but miserable rags. But although the Japanese saw our suffering, no help was given us. After several days stay in the hospital we were taken to the town of Kuching, where we were asked: "What do you want?"

We asked permission to cable to Moscow, Vladivostok and to the Soviet consul in Tokyo. We were refused all this, and received no help there either. We were not given even a small piece of soap.

Next day we were sent to Singapore. We went in a dirty hold accompanied by two soldiers.

In Singapore we looked still more horrible. We were so dirty and ragged that crowds of people followed us when we walked in the port.

We were put into prison, where we stayed for 30 days. We got no reply to all our requests to get into contact with the consul, and in general, and they spoke with us only once for 5 minutes. We lay on the dirty cement cold floor.

Once a day a dirty bucket was brought in. There was some stale kitchen drags with flies and worms in it. We were given no water, and drank from the lavatory sink. Japanese soldiers often treated us brutally, beat us, made us stand on our knees.

After 40 days, at the end of August we were taken aboard a samp and were escorted to the Kuching harbor on the Borneo Island.

While our group had been travelling from Borneo to Singapore and back the condition of the group remaining on the Natuna Island had become desperate and they had managed to leave the island with the help of some Malays and to come to the same harbor on the Borneo Island where we were brought to from Singapore.

We were gathered together at that harbor and sent back to the Natuna Island. We were put ashore, ordered not to leave the island; and the cutters with the Japanese went away.

So, we had seen Japanese authorities, asked them to help us and to communicate with our consul, but got nothing. We had been brought back to a remote island and left to our fate.

Emir confirmed the Japanese' order that we should not leave the island and added that we had to start cultivating land (to clear away a part of the thicket to plant there roots of ubi, something like potatoes), because he, Emir would not be able to provide us food in future. We realized that it was decided to keep us on the island for a very long time.

Having remained on the island with no hope of receiving help from the Japanese we had to provide food ourselves, and therefore we began to clear a piece of land for a "kitchen-garden". It was a very hard work. Half naked, without shoes, suffering from tropical heat we cut trees and lianas with small Malay knives (parangs).

And all this time we thought of leaving the island and of requesting the Japanese once more to send us back to our country.

We talked much about the way of leaving the island. Many considered it impossible. But I did not give up the idea and kept thinking about it all the time. After a while a Japanese ship arrived at the island, and 40 soldiers landed there. We could not make out what they had come for. We asked them to give us food and to take us from the island to Singapore or somewhere else where we could receive help and get in touch with the USSR consul. The Japanese refused to take us and leaving us a scant supply of food sailed off.

This visit of the Japanese to the island had proved to us that they had no intention to help us to reach our country, and the idea of finding a way for escaping

from the island became permanent.

Once we learnt from the Malays that somewhere very far away, in the Northern part of the island a schooner had been cast ashore by the tide I decided to see it and to find out whether it was true. Having obtained captain's consent I together with the 3rd mechanic comrade Karanov set off on search of the place where the schooner had been cast ashore.

We walked all the day making our way through the thickets. We had made not less than 25 km. when we found the iron carcass of a barge lying on the shore. We had evidently been on voyage when planes bombed HER. We found out that some iron details were a little damaged, and that all the wooden parts had been burnt. There was only the carcass of a ship in front of us. It was 15 m. long and 4 m. wide. The carcass had one large and two small holds on the bow and on the stern.

We returned to our camp, told about our finding and after long discussions decided to put it in the water, to bring it nearer to the camp and to begin equipping it. I took up this job, and in a day the barge was near from the camp. We cut a tree for the mast and started putting the barge into a decent state.

Emir learnt about our work and became suspicious. He had once seen a group of Russian sailors leave the island in a small boat. Emir evidently remembered my group who had been rebuilding the boat, and one morning when I together with several other members of the crew was walking to the barge to work there he met us and asked, "Are you going to leave the island again?" "Yes, - I answered, - but this time not for Singapore but for Australia".

I saw that Emir believed us, and saying nothing he bid us good bye.

We were working on the barge. A Malay approached me and said that Emir would send a boat to Borneo this day to inform the Japanese that we were going to leave.

In the evening a small boat sailed off from the island, and 6-7 days later a Japanese transport ship came to the island and the Japanese announced that they were going to take us away. They asked us why we wanted to leave the island when they told us to stay there.

We began to make preparations for our departure, and Emir led the Japanese to show them our barge. The Japanese examined her and came back to the village.

On the day of our departure the Japanese gave us shoes (shirts and trousers had been given to us some time before), several combs, some soap, and when we got all this the Japanese ordered us to come together and



to sit down on the ground. Then a photographer appeared and made us hold the shoes in such a way that we could be seen on the picture with the shoes in our hands. We understood that the Japanese wanted to film us with their cameras, and we tried either to disperse or to take such postures that to avoid the deification.

Then we were made to form a line on the shore, and, the Japanese banner being brought, we were ordered to bow to it. It was evidently done also with the view of taking pictures of this scene as well. Some of the men tried to go away, but the Japanese made them step back into the line with their bayonets.

The Soviet sailors refused to bow before the Japanese flag, and the Japanese started beating them. A Japanese soldier struck me, the stoker Zinchuk standing by my side, and several others, but it was no food.

30-40 minutes later we came up sailing in boats to the Japanese mine-layer, went on board and were put into the hold.

In a day we arrived at Singapore. On board all of us had been searched under the pretext of looking for a china cup (its price was not more than 2 cents). We saw that it was only a pretext.

We spent a night in Singapore, and on December 1, 1942, after a one year stay on the island, we were put in a small house near the town of Dzohor-Baru which was not far from Singapore, at the very end of the Malacca peninsula.

The Japanese commandant told us how we should behave and added, that Japanese soldiers would inspect us every morning and evening and by this time all of us should be on the spot.

We were given little food of bad quality and some cigarettes.

Several times the captain asked the commandant to let him communicate with the USSR Consul in Tokyo or to dispatch cables to Moscow and Vladivostok, but each time he was not allowed to do this. We stayed in Dzohor-Baru exactly 6 months. On June 1, 1943 it was announced that we were leaving for home. The Japanese official Katsubara who had come to accompany us began "taking care" of us. We were given a little money and taken in groups to the dirty native bazaar in Singapore where we were offered to buy some clothes in the rag-shops. We were given so little money that we could not buy more or less decent clothes even in the rag-shops. Japanese soldiers followed each of us close at our heels, and mister Katsubara was afraid that some of us might escape (he understood that no one would run away if he were treated well). But his fears were groundless. The Soviet sailors were disciplined and did not break any regulations.

Having bought some articles of clothing we went on board the Japanese ship. Akachi-Baru which took us to Szechuan (Indo-China), where we were put ashore because, they said, the point of the destination of the ship was changed.

We were sent to town and placed in a vast empty barrack. We were forbidden to go out.

There we met English prisoners of war. They worked in the yard every day building some sheds there. We regarded them as allies having been taken prisoner and however poor, we decided to share with them what we had. We handed them secretly 12 shorts, 8 shirts, about 250 packs of cigarettes, some soap, tooth-powder and other small things.

Many of our sailors gave them the last they had. Although the Japanese forbade us categorically to approach the English soldiers, our desire to help them was great and we did it. The English soldiers lived under very bad conditions, and they were heartily grateful for our attention.

In Saygon we were under watch all the time.

We left Saygon on the ship "Alice" previously belonging to Norwegians and captured by the Japanese.

On July 5, 1943 after stopping at Hon Kong we arrived at Shanghai where we were met by comrade Volgin, the chief of the Consul Department of the USSR Embassy in Tokyo who had come for the special purpose of meeting us.

We settled down in the Consulate in Shanghai and began to put ourselves in order. We were heartily welcomed and given enough money, clothing etc.

It was here that we could see ourselves. It turned out that we had grown so thin, that the men's weight was from 45 kgm. to 5 kgm. But we already felt our government's care and began to recover.

We stayed in Shanghai over 4 months. When we left Shanghai our sailors who were placed in the hold were searched. On arriving at Dairen we stopped for a while there, and it is very interesting to point out that we were shadowed all the time. We left Dairen by train being under constant observation of the Japanese gendarmes. But the Soviet vice-consul in Dairen accompanied us, and nobody bothered us.

On November 19, 1943 we arrived at the Station Otpor and found ourselves on our native soil.

The crew of the Soviet sailors suffered privations for nearly two years, and it was the fault of the Japanese pirates who had sunk the ship "Perekop" by instructions of the Japanese Government.

All the time when the crew of the ship "Perekop" was abroad the Japanese authorities notwithstanding the captain's frequent requests for help and sending us back to our country had deliberately kept the crew for nearly two years under very hard conditions.

Doc. No. 2305

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Signature

THE MILITARY PROSECUTOR OF THE  
PACIFIC OCEAN AREA, Lt. Colonel  
of the Judicial Corps

Shlychkov

C o r r e c t :

Golubev

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF  
THE ABOVE DOCUMENT

I, M. GILDENBLAT, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English Languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

/s/ M. GILDENBLAT

六 敬 育 (卒業學校) 中等工業學校

七 後 告 ト ノ 關係 關係無シ

八 生 家 労働者ノ家庭出身

九 裁判關係 ナシ

十 黨 關係 ナシ

十一 本籍及現住所 ヴラデオストーク、ベストウ

デエーワ三五號館七住宅

本件ニ關シ私ノ證書シ得ルコトハ以下ノ如ク、

FILE  
RETURN TO

EX 828

2305-1

説人ノ書簡前巻

一九四六年三月十四日太平洋洋地区軍官会共官法務  
中佐「シュルイテコフレ」ハ盧僑ノ陳述ニ對スル責  
任ヲ警告シタル上証人トシテ審問ヲ行ツタ 署名

一送・名・父姓・ フグリン・ボリス・アレキサンドロヴィッチ

二年 留 一五〇八号在

三出生地 ナラトフ市

四十月革命マデノ職業 兩親ノ恒業ニテ生活ス

五現職業 汽船二等運轉士

COPY  
ROOM 361

2305-2

汽船「ベレコブ」ノ日本飛行機ニヨル墜沈ノ真相ニ就テテアル。

鉄道警ハ自警ニ任ルモノナリ

・：本船ハ武蔵ノテオラズ、我々ニハ大砲ガナカ  
ツタノミナラズ機銃一ツテカツタ。船員防禦ノ  
爲備ヘテアツタモノハ若干、自警機銃ガケテアツテ、  
本船ハ我々無害ナホヤ近キル自警機銃アツタ。

・：午前九時頃テアツタ、ソノ航望機ハ二、三旋  
回シ而ル後本船ニ向ツテ來タ船長ト私ハ雙眼鏡デ  
ソノ航望機ヲ見給メタ而シテ航望機ガヨリ近ズク  
ヤ我々ハ兩翼ニ赤イ圓形ノ「日ノ丸」ヲ見タ。ソ  
レハソノ航望機ガ日本ノモノナル事ヲ證明スルモ  
ノデアアル。航望機ハ船ニ向ソタ、而シテソレガ殆  
ド船ノ真上ニ至タ時二翼ノ懸架ガ落サレ、右舷側  
(機口部近ク)ニ落テタ。

・：一九四一年十二月十八日朝八時乃至九時ニ我  
々ハ發動機ノ騒音ヲ聞イタ、然シ誰モ飛行機ハ見  
テカツタ。

・：茲ハ十七機ノ取扱航望機ヲ見タ、ソレハ二編  
隊ニ分レ一方ハ船首カラ他方ハ船尾カラ向ツテキ  
給メタ、一ツノ編隊ハ九機他方ハ八機デアツタ  
我々ノ船ニハ明白ニ標識符號(船員上ノ旗)ガ

見エテキタ。我々ハ標旗符號ヲ出シタ。船尾ノ旗  
 ハ新シク、旗員ノ中テハツネリトソノ色並ニ標章  
 ヲ示シツ、標ツテキタ流望機ハ船尾ヲ攻撃シ、艦  
 艇ヲ日本ニトツテハ中立ヲアル「ソヴェート」所  
 屬ノ赤武裝商船ヲ攻撃シ、艦艇ヲ閉鎖シタ。・  
 ・：艦艇ハ船首ニ下着シ、水夫長並ニ着テ、此處  
 テハ四名ガ一度ニ獲サレ第一番及ビ第二番船倉ニ  
 モ着テタ。船上ニハ火矢ガ船首ト船尾トニケ所ニ  
 發生シタ、船體ハ破壊ツレ先衣其他救命器具ガ起  
 毀サレタ。

・：本船ハ忽チ沈没シタ、流望機ハ爆界ヲ汽船テ  
 ハナク水中ニ居ル人々ニ投下シ着タ。其上水中  
 ニ居ル船員ニ對シテ銃艇ヲ浴ビセタ。水中ニ  
 於テ火夫「オニツブロー」、「オガルコフ」機士  
 「ブドヤン」ガ獲奪サレタ。

・：夜ニナツテ我々ハ「ナツナ」島（我々ガ後ニ  
 ナツテ判ツタ所テハ）ニ退シタ。

・：暫クシテ我々ハ「ラナイ」村營ニヤツテ來タ、  
 ソシテ我々ハ蘭領東印長島ノ一島「グレイトナ  
 ツナ」ト呼バレテキル島ニ居ル事ヲ知ツタ。此ノ  
 島ニハ和蘭政府ヲ代表スル「ペーナル、エンゲル  
 ス」陸軍中尉ト軍曹ノ同シク和蘭人「ヤンソン」

2305-3

見エテキタ。我々ハ標艦待機ヲ出シタ。船尾ノ旗  
 ハ新シク、従員ノ中テハツキリトソノ色並ニ標章  
 ヲ示シツ、標ツテキタ流望機ハ船尾ヲ攻撃シ、低  
 空ヲ日本ニトツテハ中立ヲ示スル「ソグエート」艦  
 尾ノ赤武漢面船ヲ見守ル艦隊ヲ開始シタ。・・  
 ・：船尾ハ船首ニ下着シ、水夫長並ニ落チ、此處  
 テハ四名ガ一度ニ墜サレ第一番及ビ第二番船倉ニ  
 モ落テタ。船上ニハ火災ガ船首ト船尾トニケ所ニ  
 發生シタ、船倉ハ復原ツレ共ニ其他救命道具ガ配  
 置サレタ。  
 ・：本艦ハ忽チ沈没シタ、流望機ハ爆界ヲ汽船デ  
 ハナク水中ニ居ル人々ニ投下シ始メタ。其上水中  
 ニ居ル船員ニ救テテ流望機ヲ浴ビセタ。水中ニ  
 於テ火夫「オニツブロー」、「オガルコフ」機士  
 「ブドヤン」ガ救命サレタ。  
 ・：夜ニナツテ我々ハ「ナツナ」島（我々が後ニ  
 ナツテ究ツタ所デハ）ニ避シタ。  
 ・：暫クシテ我々ハ「ラナイ」前管ニヤツテ奈タ、  
 ソシテ我々ハ蘭領東印度諸島ノ一島「グレイトナ  
 ツナ」ト呼バレテキル島ニ居ル事ヲ知ツタ。此ノ  
 島ニハ和蘭政府ヲ代表スル「ベール、エンデル  
 ス」陸軍中尉ト軍曹ノ同ジク和蘭人「ヤンソン」



二三名ノ馬家人兵士ガ居タ。

日本ノ航空艦ニヨツテ「ライカイ」村密ガ喜ビ  
攻撃ヲ受ケテカラ後、少數ノ兵ノ土着民並ニ陸軍  
中尉ハ兵隊ヲ遣レテ島ノ奥深クニ遠ガ去リ乗組員  
ハ只獨リ絲幕赤ノ環赤ノ中ニ居留ツタ。カクシテ  
半年程此處ニ坐留ツタ。...

一九四二年六月十四日早朝、私ハ八名ノ船員ト  
共ニ島ヲ出發シタ。我々ヲ送ツテクレタ同志艦ハ  
我々が喜ビ會フトハ豫期シナカッタ。「ポイント」  
ハ非常ニ小サカツタ、而シテ「ポイント」ノ中ニ居  
ル者ハ辛シクテ坐レル程度デアツタ。水面上ノ舷ノ如  
高サハ十五週ニ週キナカッタ。貯藏食糧ハ次ノ如  
キモノデアツタ。即チ

淡水、椰子ノ實、干藻シタ根等デアル。  
我々ハ外海ニ居ル等七晝夜七月始メニ「ポルネ  
オ」島ニ着イタ。我々ハ疲勞シ、腹ニ糞ハレ、襟

体ヲ、望願デアツタ。「ポルネオ」島ニハ既ニ日  
本軍ガ居タ則チ最初我々ハ「ライヂエイ」河岸ノ「  
スリケイ」町ニ着イタガ、此處ニ於テ翌日我々ハ  
日本ノ兵士遇ト會フタ。彼等ハ我々が何人ナルカ  
ヲ尋ネタガソレヲ知ツテ我々ヲ短野ニ取扱ヒ留マ  
シタ。同日我々ハ「シブ」市ニ送致サレタ。  
此處ニ於テハ日本士官ノ命ニヨリ我々が「ロシヤ」

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2305-5

ノ船員ナルコトヲ知ツテ、我々ヲ精神病院ニ送ツ  
タレコノ病院ノ半分ハ氣ノ狂ツタ支那人、馬來人  
ヲ占メラレ他ノ半分ハ我々ニヨツテ占メラレタ。  
之以上ノ忌ムベキ嘲弄ヲ私ハ未ダ見タコトガナカ  
ツク即チ健全ナル地位ヲ有スル者ヲ精神病院ニ入  
レル事ハ余リニモ語イ嘲弄デアル。

署名

太平洋地區軍事檢察官

2305-6

管類第二三〇五號

證

余中山君ハ余ガ日本語及ビ露西語ニ  
 精通セル者ナルコト並ニ露西語原文及  
 ビ日本語原文ヲ對照ノ上右ハ本管類ヲ眞  
 實ニ且正確ニ翻譯セルモノナルヲ確證セ  
 ルコトヲ茲ニ證ス

昭和二年九月六日

中

山

登

To the Consulate General of U.S.S.R. in Shanghai:

MARINE PROTEST

I, Captain Levchenko, Anatoly Vasilievich, Commander of U.S.S.R. motor vessel "Maikop" (1826 Gross Registered Tons) being first duly sworn, hereby depose and say:

On 14th December 1941, m/v "Maikop" which is the property of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, sailed under my command, with 12 officers (including myself) and 23 members of the crew (total 35 persons), from the port of Soerabaja (Java) for Vladivostok, carrying a cargo of 1994 metric tons of Liquid Coconut oil, in accordance with instructions received from the Far Eastern Department of U.S.S.R. Merchant Marine.

On 20th December 1941, at 7.00 a.m., the m/v "Maikop" was passing 33 miles South of Sarangani Islands, heading East-North-East. At about 7.10 a.m., two single engine airplanes (one hydroplane and one land plane) were sighted, approaching us from East. In accordance with International Rules the U.S.S.R. flag was hoisted on our stern, to show the nationality of our ship. At about 7.18 a.m., (Dec. 20th) these two airplanes flew over our ship and started circling around her at an altitude of about 150-200 meters. I could clearly see red circles on the wings and fuselages of said airplanes, which shows that they were of Japanese nationality.

The weather was bright and clear, with good visibility and the U.S.S.R. flag was flying over the stern of our ship. There is absolutely no doubt, that our U.S.S.R. flag could be clearly seen and distinguished, as well as the name of our ship, which was painted on both sides of the "Maikop's" bridge.

First Attack. Nevertheless, at 7.40 a.m., one of the airplanes (the land plane) dropped two bombs aimed at our ship; the bombs fell not far from our vessel, one about 8 metres and the other about 15 metres from the "Maikop". A radio messages was immediately sent by me to the U.S.S.R. Merchant Marine at Vladivostok and also to Tarakan and Davao (for transmission to Vladivostok), informing them of the bombing of our ship, the m/v "Maikop" by Japanese airplanes.

In view of said bombing I decided to turn back, returning on my course toward Soerabaja.

Second Attack. At 10.00 a.m., the same morning (December 20th) an airplane, bearing similar red circles again appeared and dropped a

torpedo aiming at our ship; I maneuvered, turning my ship hard aport, and the torpedo missed our stern. A few minutes later three more twin-motored Japanese bombers (land planes) with red circle markings, started to bomb us, the bombs falling very close to our ship, and as a result she suffered severe damage, injury and deformations. Between 10 a.m. and noon the Japanese bombers continually attacked us, they dropped about 12 bombs aimed at our ship. During these nerve-wrecking two hours, I was continually maneuvering my ship, attempting to dodge the airplanes, as they flew across our course, at an altitude of about 1000 metres to release their bombs aimed at our ship. As I saw the planes "lining up" and taking a course which indicated to me, that they were intending to drop another bomb, I would immediately change the direction of the ship, so that on many occasions the airplanes would not be in good position to drop their bombs and then they would circle and make another attack. We were bombed for about an hour and one half. At about 11.30 after dropping approximately 12 bombs all three airplanes coming lower, machine-gunned our ship, from an altitude of about 200 metres, flying over us and alongside in the direction we were going, viz., from our stern toward our bow. We were machine-gunned by these planes for about 25 minutes. The second attack lasted nearly two hours; viz., we were bombed for about an hour and a half (10.00 a.m. to 11.30) and machine-gunned from about 11.30 to 11.55 a.m.

When the second bombing by Japanese airplanes started, I was compelled to turn North toward the Island of Mindanao, to save the lives of the crew, should the vessel sink as a result of said bombing.

Third Attack: The same day, (December 20th) at about 2.30 p.m. four Japanese bombers of a similar type and with similar red circle markings, appeared and dropped about 20 bombs on our ship. During this bombing attack the ship sustained very serious damage; direct hits were made on our Radio room, Chart room and Foremast; both Radio and Chart rooms were demolished and Radio Operator Dianov, E.I. was killed; bombs exploded in the water very near our ship and caused her plates to buckle, bend and open below the ship's waterline. The third attack lasted from 2.30 p.m. to about 5.00 p.m., December 20th, when the airplanes flew away.

At about 6.00 p.m., December 20th, 1941, we anchored off the South coast of Mindanao Island, three miles west of Butulaki village. To save the lives of the crew and avoid unnecessary casualties, part of our personnel, wounded persons, men and women member of the crew, who were not on duty, were sent ashore.

Fourth Attack. At about 9.00 a.m., December 21st, our ship was again bombed at a low altitude by Japanese planes for about half an hour; approximately 9 more bombs were dropped, aimed at our ship.

On the afternoon of December 21st., an inspection of the ship was made by myself, my officers and crew. We found a "stabilizer" from a Japanese bomb in our demolished chart room. Said "stabilizer" bore the following marks; a Japanese character of square shape and number "96" in arabic (English) figures; The "stabilizer" was painted with red lead on the inside and had four metal "fins" on it, which were not as long as the body of the "stabilizer". On the outside it was painted gray, with superimposed colored lines. A similar "stabilizer" was stuck in our foremast.

Said inspection disclosed that my ship, the m/v "Maikop" had suffered the following damage from the aforesaid Japanese bombing attacks:-

- a) Large holes in hull, fore and aft.
- b) Holes in tanks Nos. 1, 9, 10, 11, and 12.
- c) Holes in main bunkers on both port and starboard side.
- d) Damage to and leakage of hull into engine room.
- e) Demolition of radio room and chart room.
- f) Destruction of officers quarters under bridge; part of engineer's quarters, ship's saloon, and crew's accommodation.
- g) The deck and deck cargo pipelines, et c, were pierced by bomb fragments and on the starboard side the pipeline was demolished (this pipeline was used to pump bulk liquid cargo into and out of the ship).
- h) All moving parts and shafting of the main engine was shifted and dislodged; pipelines were torn, compressed air tanks were shifted and moved from their proper position.
- i) Forepeak pump room was flooded and the forepeak pump was out of commission.
- j) Both our port Electric cargo pump and cleaning pump were damaged by bombs to such an extent that they could not be used.
- k) The starboard cargo pump had also been damaged and would not work properly. It was damaged to such an extent, that we were not able to pump out the water, in the hull, with this pump.

as fast as it was leaking into our ship.

With the approach of darkness on 21st December, 1941, I ordered the crew, who had been sent ashore the previous night to return to the ship. After the crew were on board, at about 8.00 p.m., December 21st with great difficulties, the m/v "Maikop" was moved under her own power to Sarangani Bay, a place better protected from winds and the sea, and we anchored off Makar village.

Owing to holes in the ship's hull resulting from the aforesaid bombing attacks, she was steadily filling with water and it was very difficult to keep her afloat, as all our water pumps and equipment had been damaged.

As above stated, during said bombing attacks, our radio operator Dianov E.I. was killed, and 6 member of the crew were wounded (Chief Mate Bryzgin, crew members Fomin, Haibrahmanov, Gorelenko, Sedov, Berdnikov). The body of Radio Operator Dianov was carried ashore and buried on the evening of December 20th, 1941, near the village of Butulaki on the Mindanao Island. The wounded received first medical treatment from our ship's Doctor Krasnokutsky. On December 22nd, the wounded were again sent ashore for further medical attention; two of the wounded were placed in Lagao Hospital by courtesy of the local authorities. At the same time also part of the crew who were not then on duty, were transferred ashore.

As a result of the above damage, sustained by my ship, m/v "Maikop", through bombing attacks by Japanese planes, the ship sank completely at about 2.00 a.m., 26th December, 1941, near the village of Makar. It was impossible to beach the ship in shallow water, as the main engine had been so badly damaged, that it would not run at that time.

The crew was transferred into our lifeboats at about 1.00 a.m., December 26th, 1941, when it appeared that we were sinking. After the m/v "Maikop" sank we went ashore and joined our comrades, who had been previously sent ashore.

The motor vessel "Maikop" completely sank and perished with the following:

1. A cargo of liquid cocconut oil - 1994.1 metric tons.
2. Bunkers, diesel oil - 120 tons.
3. Lubricating oils - 4 tons.
4. Ship's inventory and equipment.
5. Most of the personal property and effects of the crew.



As aforesaid, a direct hit, and an explosion of great force, demolished:

(a) the chart room and the ship's log book; chief mate Bryzgin was wounded at that time during the execution of his duties;

(b) The same bomb demolished our radio room, which was adjoining the chart room and the radio log book was also destroyed. Radio Operator Dianov was instantly killed by this bomb, while executing his duties.

The following were saved:-

1. Ship's Engine log book.
2. Ship's documents.
3. Cargo documents (Bills of Lading, Manifests, Licenses for cargo and Mate's Receipts.)
4. Ship's cash and cash vouchers.
5. Three ship's clocks and one stop watch.

From 3 a.m., December 26th, until 31st May 1942, the officers and crew of the "Maikop" have resided on the shore of Mindanao Island, landing first, near Makar, a Moro-village. This Moro-village is so small, that there are no houses, only bamboo huts set on piles two or three metres above the ground. We stayed two days in Makar village; 5 days in the small town of Cotobato; 3 days in the small town of Illigan; then to the small town of Malaybalay, where we stayed from January 6th, 1942, until we were taken to Manila by the Japanese authorities.

It was impossible to lodge a Marine Protest regarding the loss of the m/v "Maikop" with anyone or any official on the Island of Mindanao, in view of the Japanese-American hostilities in this area at that time. I was only permitted by the American Military authorities in the provincial town of Malaybalay, on the Island of Mindanao, to send a cable to the U.S.S.R. Ambassador in Washington, D.C., United States of America, notifying him of the loss of the USSR motor vessel "Maikop" (said cable was sent on 24 January, 1942.)

On 31st May 1942, the officers and crew of m/v "Maikop" were sent by the Japanese authorities, under guard, by a transport, to Manila, arriving there on June 4th, 1942. We were detained in Manila, under guard, by the Japanese authorities, from June 4th to June 17th, 1942. I and my officers and crew were not allowed to move out of the place where we lived and therefore I could not lodge a Marine Protest at Manila.

On June 17th, 1942, the Japanese authorities shipped us to Shanghai by a Japanese military transport "Takaoka Maru". The transport arrived in Shanghai on 25th June, 1942. I, my officers and my crew were detained by the Japanese authorities, under guard, in Shanghai from June 25th to June 30th, inclusive, at the Japanese Naval barracks, situated on Szechuen Road, Shanghai. During our stay in said barracks, I and all the officers and members of the crew were forced to give evidence to Japanese Consular Officials regarding the loss of the m/v "Maikop". After said evidence was given, at 5.30 p.m., June 30th, 1942, the Officers and crew were handed over to Mr. J.P. Sharikoff, U.S.S.R. Consular Representative at Shanghai.

This is, therefore, the first opportunity, that I have had to lodge a Marine Protest and file a full report concerning the loss of my ship, the U.S.S.R. m/v "Maikop" and its cargo.

NOW THEREFORE, I, Captain LEVCHENKO, A.V., Commanding the m/v "Maikop" hereby lodge this Marine Protest against, and repudiate any and all claims, that may be presented to me or to my owners, arising from or concerning the loss of the said m/v "Maikop" or its cargo.

A.V. Levchenko,  
Captain in command of m/v  
"Maikop".

Shanghai, 1st July, 1942.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 2nd day of July, 1942.

J. P. Sharikoff,  
Consular Representative of the  
U.S.S.R. at Shanghai, China.

シテ、極東艦隊司令部ノ指圖ニ從ヒ私ノ指揮  
トニ、スラバヤ港（ジャバ島）ヨリウラヂガ  
トツクニ向ツテ出航シタ。

一九四一年一月二〇日午前七時發動機沿  
コイブーハサランガ諸島南方三三哩ノ地點ヲ  
北一京ニ進路ヲ向ケテ航行シテキタ。凡ソ午前  
七時一〇分頃水平線上ニ單發ノ飛行機二機（一機  
ハ水上機他ハ陸上機）ガ現ハレ東方ヨリ我々ニ向  
ツテ接近シ來ツタ。國際法規ニ從ヒ、船舶ノ國籍  
ヲ明示スルタメ、船尾ニハソ聯邦國旗ガ掲揚サレ  
テキタ。七時一八分頃コノ二機ハ我方船上空ヲ飛  
過ギ、一五〇乃至二〇〇米ノ高度ニテ上空ニ圖ヲ  
描キ始メタ。

機翼ト機体ニハ、日本國籍ノ所屬デアルコトヲ物  
語ル赤イ國ガ明瞭ニ見ラレタ。天候ハヨク見透シ

COPY  
TO ROOM 361

上海ソ邦領事信宛

海軍抗告ニ就イテノ陳述

22. 8. 23

1889-1

私、發動機船「マイコープ」(登録總噸數一八二  
六八二噸)ノ船長アナトリー、ワシリーエヴィチ、  
レフチエンコ、ハ宜誓ノモトニ陳述スル、

一九四一年一二月一四日ソ聯邦所有ノ發動機船「  
マイコープ」ハ乗員卅五名(高級船員十二名、普

通船員廿三名)ト椰子油一九四一噸ノ積荷ヲ積載

シテ、極東艦隊司令部ノ指圖ニ從ヒ私ノ指揮ノ  
トニ、スラバヤ港（ジャバ島）ヨリウラヂグ  
トツクニ向ツテ出航シタ。

一九四一年一月二〇日午前七時發動機船「  
コーブ」ハサランガ諸島南方三三哩ノ地點ヲ、  
北東ニ進路ヲ向ケテ航行シテキタ。凡ソ午前  
七時一〇分頃水平線上ニ單發ノ飛行機二機（一機  
ハ水上機他ハ陸上機）ガ現ハレ東方ヨリ我々ニ向  
ツテ接近シ來ツタ。國際法規ニ從ヒ、船舶ノ国籍  
ヲ明示スルタメ、船尾ニハオランダ國旗ガ掲揚サレ  
テキタ。七時一八分頃コノ二機ハ我方船上空ヲ飛  
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描キ始メタ。

機翼ト機体ニハ、日本國籍ノ所屬デアルコトヲ物  
語ル赤イ圓ガ明瞭ニ見ラレタ。天候ハヨク見透シ

COPY  
TO ROOM 361

RECEIVED  
JAN 21 1941

上海ソ聯邦總領事信宛

海軍抗告ニ就イテノ陳述

22. 8. 23

1889-1

私、發動機船「マイコープ」(登録總噸數一八二  
六八二噸)ノ船長アナトリ、ワシリーエヴィチ、  
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マイコープ」ハ乗員卅五名(高級船員十二名、普

通船員廿三名)ト椰子油一九四一噸ノ積荷ヲ積載

1889-2:

ノキク時天テアリ、ソノ時ハ我ガ船尾ニ照ヘツテ  
キタルソシテコノソノ時ガハツキリト見ルコトガ  
出来、發動機船「マイコープ」ノ船荷雨何ニ登カ  
レタ我ガ船名ガ明瞭ニ認知サレ待タコトハ、船体  
ニ疑ヒノナイ所テアル。

### 最初ノ攻撃

ソレニモ拘ラス、午前五時四〇分、ソノ一機（陸  
上機）ハ我ガ船ニ對シテ二個ノ爆弾ヲ投下シタ、  
爆弾ハ「マイコープ」船ノ近クニ、一個ハ一五米  
離レテ、他ハ八米離レテ落下シタ。日本機ニヨル  
「マイコープ」船爆撃ノ無様通報ガ直クニ私ニヨ  
ツテ、ウラヂヂオホストツクニ送ラレ、同様ニ、タ  
ラカン、タバホニモ（ウラヂヂオホストツクニ中  
ノ爲メ）送ラレタ。モノ時ノ船尾ノ船名私ハストラバヤ  
ヘノ方向ニ向ツテ引返ノ進路シトルコトニ決メタ、

### 第二回ノ攻撃

同朝凡ソ一〇時頃、全ジ赤イロツケタ一機ガ再  
ビ現ハレ魚雷ヲ投下シタガ、ソレハ私ノ處ニシタ  
運動（船ハ急進ニ左ニ廻轉サレタ）ノ結果船ニハ  
命中セズ、船尾ヲ通過シタ。  
尙、數分経テ、赤イロツケタ又從日本爆撃機（  
陸上機）三機ガ現ハレ、我ガ船ヲ爆撃シ始メタ。

1889-3

爆撃ハ益ク船ニ接シテ蓄下シ、其ノ結果船ハ多大ノ被害、損傷ヲ蒙ツタ。午前一〇時カラ正午迄ノ間、日本爆撃機ハ同行ナク我々ヲ攻撃シ、約一二個ノ爆弾ヲ我が船ニ投下シタ。コノ恐怖ノ一二時同ノ間、私ハ蓄下スル爆弾ヲ送ケル所クハエズ行策シタ、ソシテ私ノ側近ニヨルト其ノ爆撃ハ我が進路ヲ遮断セントスル爆撃機ガ約一〇〇〇米ノ高度カラ投下シタモノデアル。飛行機ガ爆撃ヲ投下スルノニ、道管ナ位置ヲ占メタト見タ時、私ハ直チニ、船ノ位置ヲ換エタノテ多クノ場合、飛行機ハ爆撃ヲ投下スルコトガ出来ズ、甚屬シ得ビ攻撃シナケレバナラナカッタ。

爆撃ハ凡ソ二時同半程續イタ。一一時半頃爆撃約一二個ヲ投下スルト、コレ等ノ飛行機ハ降下シテ、二五分間約二〇〇米ノ高度ヨリ我が船ヲ機銃射撃シタ（射撃中飛行機ハ我々ノ上ヲ船舷ニ沿ツテ飛過シツツ、我が進路ヲ飛翔シタ。即チ二回ノ攻撃ハ午前一一時五五分迄約二時同續イタ。二回目ノ本船爆撃ノ開始ト共ニ、私ハ日本飛行機ニヨツテ開始サレタ爆撃カラ本船避難ノ場合ニ、乗組員救助ノ目的ヲシメタナホ島ニ向ツテ北方へ回航セネバナラナカッタ。



1889-4

第三回ノ攻撃

同日午後二時半頃、同型ノ同標機ヲツケタ日本爆  
撃機四機ガ三度目船上ニ現ラヘレ、二〇個ニ及ブ  
爆弾ヲ投下シタ。コノ爆撃中ニ本船ハ重大ナ損害  
ヲ受ケタ、即チ無線機ト舵手室ニ直撃ガ命中シ、  
同様ニ前櫓ニモ命中シタ。兩室トモ完全ニ破壊サ  
レ、無線機亦沈、在。デアノフ。ハ落命シタ。爆  
撃ハ船ニ非常ニ近クノ水中ヲモ破裂シ、爲メニ外  
側ノ板裂損板ヲ損傷シ、船ノ吃水線下ニ漏ロヲ生  
シタ。

今回ノ爆撃ハ二時三〇分カラ、飛行機ガ去ツタ、  
五時迄(十二月廿日)續イタ。

一九四一年一月二〇日午六時頃、多カサホホ  
島貝嶺岸ヲ去リテ、海軍面蒙至、墜ノ地機機投銷時  
困リ、  
然ッ近乗組員下室命ヲ救助シ、余計ナ犠牲ヲ避ケ  
悉爲斃シ我乗組員ト一部即チ負傷者ヤ當直ニ差支  
ヘノ無イ他ノ乗組員(婦人ヲ含ム)ハ海岸ニ移サ  
レタ。

第四回ノ攻撃

一九四一年一月二一日午前九時頃、我が船ハ再  
ビ日本飛行機ニヨル爆撃ヲ蒙ツタ、飛行機ハ半時  
間ノ間アマリ高クナイ高度カラ、凡ソ九個ノ爆弾

- ノ結果、次ノ如キ損傷ヲ蒙ツタコトガ判明シタ。
- (イ) 船体ニハ、後部カラト前部カラ六キナ裂口ガデキタコト。
- (ロ) タンク、一號、9、10、11、12ノ各々ニ漏口ガデキタコト。
- (ハ) 左右炭庫ト右石炭庫ノ裂口
- (ニ) 船体ノ損傷ト機械部ノ水漏レ。
- (ホ) 無線室ト舵手室ノ破壊
- (ヘ) 船橋下ニアル幹部室、技術員室ノ一部、一サロ  
ン」及ビ普通船員室ノ破壊、
- (ト) 甲板貨物用導管ガ破片ニヨツテ貫通サレ、ソノ

1889-5

ヲ沿ノ近クニ投下シタ。

私ト幹部ト乗組員トニヨツテ行ハレタ船ノ検査ノ結果、一九〇一年一月二日ノ昼過ぎニ、被毀サレタ舵手室ニ於イテ日本ノ爆弾ノ安定装置ガ發見サレタ。上記ノ安定装置ニハ、四角バツタ日本文字ト九六トアラビヤ數字ヲ巻號ガ記入サレテアリ、外面ハ色ノツイタ小筒ノアル鼠色デ、内側ハ赤イ鉛丹ヲ塗裝サレテアツタ。安定装置ノ外側ニハ、其ノ安定装置ヨリ短イ四ツノ「穂先」ガ附イテキタ。

同様ナ安定装置ハ右ニモハマリ込ンデキタ。此ノ検査デ「マイコープ」號ハ日本飛行機ニヨル爆撃

1889-6

右側が破損シタ。(此ノ船中ノ被害者等ノ死シ  
 上テ、要ミ出シニ期ヒラレテキタ。)

(テ) 主長船長ノ遺體ト心臓ノ線カ出テラレ、船中ノ  
 一部ハ破カレ、船中ノ船員等ハ死シタ。

(リ) 船首ノボンプ室ニ浸水シ、ボンプモ役ニ立タナ  
 クナツタ。

(ヌ) 左舷側用ボンプト船中用ボンプハ此ク役立タナ  
 クナツタ。

(ル) 右舷側用ボンプハ船中シテ船中ニ入ルベク難  
 ルコトガ出来ナクツタ。而シテ此ノボンプ  
 テハ、水ガ船中ニ入ルヤウナ道程ヲ船中  
 ラ水ヲ抜ミ出スコトハ不可能ナクツタ。而シテ  
 以上列挙シタ結果本船ノ機ツタ口ガ原  
 因シテ船中ニ浸水ニ被テテノ機ガボ  
 用器具及ビボンプガ爆発ニヨツテ破損シタノ  
 テ船ノ浮力ヲ保持スルコトハ益々困難ニナツタ。

一九四一年一月二一日夕間ト米ニ海軍ニキ  
 タ乗組員ニ船中ヨリ命令シタ。而ル後、同日  
 午後八時頃、「マイエー」號ハ幸フシテ自力テ、  
 瓜波カラヨリ良ク戻ラレテキルサランガニ機ニ移  
 動シタ。ソコテ機中ハ、マカル村神ニ機留シタ。

上記述べタ如ク、船ノ機中我ガ乗組員イエ・イ  
 テアノフハ死亡シタ、乗組員ノ死体ハ海岸ニ移サ

1889-7

レ一月二〇日夕刻シンタナホ島ノブトラキ村近  
クニ墜落セシタ。其ノ他六名ノ乗組員ガ死傷シタ。  
(一等船長、ブルイスキ、乗員、フーミン、  
ハイアラフマー、ツ、ゴレンコ、セドフ、ベル  
デニコフ)

全乗組員者ハ我ガ船中クラスナクートカスキノ應  
急治療ヲ受ケタ。一九四一年一月二二日乗組員者  
船ハ再び墜後ノ治療ノ爲ニ海岸ニ移サレタ。彼等  
ノ中二人ハ地獄官憲ニヨツテ、ラガオ病院ニ送ラ  
レタ。同時ニ當時當直ニ差支ヘノナイ乗員ノ一部  
モ上陸シタ。

日本飛行機ニヨル爆撃ニヨツテ發動機箱「マイコ  
ーブ」ニ加ヘラレタ上記列擧シタ損傷ノ結果、一  
九四一年一月二六日夜二時頃、マカド村附近ニ  
テ船ハ完全ニ沈没シタ。本船ハ主翼機殻ガ役ニ立  
タヌ程損傷ヲ受ケタノデ、復旧ニ乗リ上ヅルコト  
ハ不可能デアツタ。船ニ留ツテキタ乗組員ノ一部  
ハ一九四一年一月二六日夜一時頃我々が沈ムト  
云フコトヲ認メタ時ボートニ移サレタ。「マイコ  
ーブ」號沈没後、我々ハソレヨリ先ニ上陸シテ幸  
々仲間ノ所ヘ沙集シタ。

船ト共ニ次ノモノガ完全ニ喪失シタ。

(1) 液体椰子油ノ缶物、總量一八九四一 匁

(2) 「バンカー」、モーター石油 總量一三〇 匁

1889-8

(5)(4)(3) 潤滑油 (他長徳 口也)

(5)(4) 船ノ自録備品及ヒ設備品、

(5) 乗組員ノ各自ノ所有品ノ大部分。

直探取ニヨリ荷取ニヨツテ取扱サレタモノ、

(イ) 純手室ト航海日誌、其ノ時一等通稱手アルイ  
スキノハ自己ノ任務遂行ノ際ニ預借ス。

(ロ) 純手室ニ隣リ合ツテキタ無線室ト無線日誌モ  
完全ニ取扱サレ、其ノ探取ニヨツテ無線士チ  
アノアハ自己ノ任務遂行中奮命ス。

次ノモノハ救出サレタ。

(1) 航海機関日誌

(2) 航海用公文書

(3) 貨物用書類(船荷証券、載貨目録、積荷許可  
證ト通稱證明書)

(4) 金銭出納結及ヒ合計報告書

(5) 船時計三ヶ及ヒ秒時計一ヶ

一 マイコイゾラ號乗組員ハボートカラモロ族ノ  
マカル村附近ニ上陸シテ、一九四一年一月二六  
日午前三時カラ一九四二年五月三一日迄ミンダナ  
オ島ニ居タ。其ノ部落ハ極メテ小サク、家ハ無ク  
只桐材ノ上ニ地上二、三米ノ高ニ揚ゲラレタ竹ノ  
小舎ガアツタ。マカル村ニハ二日ハ居リ、小サナ  
コトバト町ニハ五日間、小町イリガンニ三日間、

1889-8

(5)(4)(3) 船内設備 船内設備

(4) 船内設備品及び設備品、

(5) 乗組員ノ各自ノ所有品ノ大部分。

直隷界ニヨリ航路ニラツテ發見サレタモノ、

(1) 舵手室ト航海日誌、其ノ時一等通稱手アルイ

スキシハ自己ノ任務遂行ノ際ニ預備ス。

(2) 舵手室ニ隣リ合ツテキク無線機ト無線日誌モ

完全ニ發見サレ、其ノ機界ニヨツテ無線士チ

アノフハ自己ノ任務遂行中齟齬ス。

次ノモノハ救出サレタ。

(1) 航海機関日誌

(2) 航海用公文書

(3) 貨物用書類(船荷證券、載貨目録、積荷許可  
證ト通稱證明書)

(4) 金銭出納結及ヒ合計報告書

(5) 船時計三ヶ及ヒ秒時計一ヶ

「マイコイプ」號乗組員ハボートカラモロ族ノ  
マカル村附近ニ上陸シテ、一九四二年一月二六  
日午前三時カラ一九四二年五月三一日迄ミンダナ  
オ島ニ居タ。其ノ部落ハ極メテ小サク、家ハ無ク  
只柵村ノ上ニ地上二二三米ノ高ニ錫ダラレタ竹ノ  
小舎ガアツタ。マカル村ニハ二日ハ居リ、小サナ  
コトバト町ニハ五日間、小町イリガンニ三日間、

1889-9

ソレカラ小町マライバライニ移轉シ、其處ヲ日本  
 政府ニヨツテマニラニ渡ラレル迄滞在シテキタ。  
 發動機船「マイコー」號ノ沈没ニ因シテミンダ  
 ナオ島ニ於テ何等カノ公人ト海軍抗告ニ就イテノ  
 行動ヲ爲スコトハ、其ノ頃コノ地區ニ於テ進ツタ  
 日米間ノ真尋行動ガ原因シテ、可能性ハ無カツタ。  
 ミンダオ島ノ地方ノ小町マライバライニ於ケル  
 米國軍管局ハ私ニソビエト發動機船「マイコー」  
 ブー沈没ノ電報ヲアメリカ合衆國ワシントン陸海  
 軍省ニ送リテ其ノ事ノミ許可シタ。而シテコレ  
 ハ一九四二年一月二四日實行サレタ。  
 一九四二年五月三十一日「マイコー」船乗組員ハ  
 日本官憲ニ依リ輸送船ニテマニラヘ送進サレタ。  
 當地ニ我々ハ一九四二年六月四日ニ到着シタ。  
 マニラニ於テ我々ハ引續キ一九四二年六月四日  
 ヨリ一七日迄日本官憲ノ護衛ノモトニアツタ。私  
 同様乗組員モ住宅ノ場所ヨリ外ヘ出カケルコト  
 ガ許サレナカツタノチ、私ハマニラニ於テモ海軍  
 抗告ニ因シテノ行動ヲ起スコトガ出来ナカツタ。  
 一九四二年六月一七日日本官憲ハ我々ヲ軍用輸送  
 船「タカオカ丸」ヲ上海ニ送ツタ。「タカオカ丸」  
 ハ一九四二年六月二五日ニ上海ニ到着シタ。  
 私ト「マイコー」全乗組員ハ上海ニ於テ四川路



1889-10

ニテル日本海軍兵舎三一九四二年六月二五日カラ  
三〇日迄ノ間保護サレテキタ。兵舎ニ滞在申一マ  
イコロ「ゾ」號沈没ニ因リ日本領事館ノ役人ニ陳  
述スルヤウイ我々全部が頭長サレタ。ニノ供通後一  
九四二年六月三〇日午五時三〇分全乗組員ハ上  
海陸軍部ノ領事館代表イ・ベ・シヤリコフ・ノモ  
トニ引渡サレタ。

今コソ、私ニ取ツテ海軍抗告ノ抗訴ヲ行ヒ、且ツ  
我がリ部機動機船「一マイコロ」及ビ其ノ役  
物ノ沈没ニ關シテ餘々「ヨ」夫キ報告ヲ疲弊ス  
ル機會ヲ捕メテ與ベラセタ。ハ、  
從ツテ、私ニ「ゾ」號、船長「フ」テエソコ  
「フ」ベ、ハ本艦ヲ以テ海軍抗告ヲ宜シ、機動機船  
「マイコロ」及ビ其ノ役物ノ沈没ニ因リシテ、  
私、或ハ本艦ノ所有者達ニ對シテ提起サレテテ  
ラウヒベテノ請求權ヲ拒否スルモノデアル。

「フ」テエソコ「ゾ」  
機動機船「マイコロ」船長

上海、一九四二年七月一日

私ノ列席ニ於テ宣言ノモトニ署名サレル  
上海市、一九四二年七月二日

シヤリコフ・イ・ベ  
上海陸軍部ノ領事館代表

Doc. 1889

書類第六九號

證

余中山登、余が日本語及び露西亞語ニ  
精通也者、此ノト並ニ露西亞語原文及日本  
語原文ヲ対照、上右ノ本書類ヲ眞實ニ且正確ニ  
翻譯セルモノヲ確證セルコトヲ茲ニ證ス

昭和二年九月四日

中山登

*J. Takayama*

(署名)

No. 2

Doc. 1889

書類第六九號

證

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原文ヲ対照、上右ノ本書類ヲ眞實ニ且正確ニ  
翻譯セシモノヲ確證セシトシ、茲ニ證ス

昭和三年九月四日

中山登

J. Nakayama (署名)

No. 2

REPORT ON THE RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION  
OF THE SHIPWRECK OF THE TANKER "MARIUPOL"

February 19, 1946

The Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics  
Prosecution Department.

The USSR Sea and River Fleet  
Chief Military Prosecutor  
Moscow

To Comrade Golumsky, Prosecutor for Soviet Union at the Inter-  
national Military Tribunal in Tokyo.

## Report

on the results of the investigation into the shipwreck of the tanker  
"Mariupol".

By the inquiry into the shipwreck of the tanker "Mariupol" con-  
ducted by the prosecution department of the Pacific basin, the following  
facts were established:

The tanker "Mariupol" was sailing in November 1943 from the United  
States of America to the Soviet Union with a cargo of 8001 tons of  
iso-octane. While passing through the First Kurilsky strait on November  
14, 1943 at 18.04 hours in the territorial waters of Japan near the  
cape Kotanari-Saki at the point-Latitude 50° 48 m. north, long-  
titude 156° 31 m. east the tanker ran onto rocks.

The tanker "Mariupol" remained at the place of the shipwreck till  
January 23, 1944, and help being not rendered, the ship and 9700 tons  
of cargo were lost.

The commanding authorities of the Far Eastern Sea-Fleet having  
received the report from the shipwrecked tanker immediately sent the  
tankers "Tuapse", "ERIVAN" and other vessels, which were not far from  
the First Kurilsky strait, to the area of the shipwreck. The tanker  
"Tuapse" of great cargo capacity arrived at the area of the shipwreck  
2 hours after the incident had taken place and had actual possibility  
to render help to the tanker "Mariupol" by completely unloading it and  
towing it from the rocks.

To approach the tanker "Mariupol" the Soviet ships had to get  
permission from the Japanese government. This permission was given  
when 35 days had passed since the shipwreck, and the wrecked ship was  
already in a hopeless condition, as its hull was damaged by the winter  
storms. The greater part of the cargo was lost due to the same reason.

By the end of December it had become evident, that the tanker  
"Tuapse" could not render effective help to the tanker "Mariupol".  
It was decided to send the shallow-drafting tanker "Menets" and  
trawler "Paltus", but these ships approached the place of the ship-  
wreck only on January 10, 1944 because of the hindrances on the part  
of the Japanese authorities.

The Japanese authorities acted in such manner, as to prevent  
the possibility of rendering help to the damaged ship as long as  
possible, so that the Soviet government would abandon the thought  
of rescuing the ship, and would leave the tanker and the cargo in  
the Japanese territorial waters. After the shipwreck of the tanker

"Mariupol" on November 14, 1943, the Japanese military authorities headed by the head of the rescuing party Kazuki Hideo visited the tanker on the following day, i. e. on November 15 at 8-9 hours. They carefully looked through the ship, searched the crew and put seals on binoculars and the radio cable. The Japanese officers leaving the ship left on the tanker a guard detachment under a junior officer. Besides, Captain Alekseev was forbidden to start the machine and that prevented him from the possibility to get off the shoal by his own efforts. This clearly shows that the Japanese rescue detachment not only had no wish to render help to the shipwrecked tanker but even robbed it of the possibility to use its own machine to save the ship.

During their first visit to the tanker "Mariupol" on November 15, 1943 the Japanese proposed to Captain Alekseev to draw up an act to the effect that it was absolutely impossible to take the tanker off the shoal and to save it. They proposed to take off the crew and leave the tanker. They persistently and several times made similar proposals to the Captain of the tanker "Thyusa" Scherbachev, while negotiating with him. They told him that the tanker was in a hopeless condition and offered to render help to Captain Alekseev on condition the tanker "Mariupol" would be towed to a Japanese port.

In their advising letters to Captain Alekseev dated November 21 and December 2, 1943 officers Watanabe, Yamamoto and Kazuki, Hideo said that in case the crew would not be taken off the tanker "Mariupol" in the manner proposed by them, they would not be responsible for its safety.

It is clear that the Japanese authorities showed hostile attitude towards the tanker's crew. On November 21-22, 1943, all store of drinking water on the tanker was finished.

Captain Alekseev made a request to the Japanese asking them to bring water for the crew. On November 23 a Japanese Kawasaki-boat brought 6 barrels of fresh water to the tanker. This water had a flavour of kerosine and could not be used for drinking.

On December 28, 1943 the administrative office of the sea fleet in Vladivostok received a report that the Japanese government permitted a group of our specialists to visit the tanker "Mariupol" for the first time to examine its condition. Nevertheless Samimi, Hideo, Commander of the so-called rescue detachment, seeing that even after the storms the condition of the tanker "Mariupol" still gave hope, began to interrupt the examination of the wrecked ship. Captain Scherbachev on November 29, 1943 at 11 hours was permitted to visit Captain Alekseev under the guard and escort of the Japanese officers. The examination of the ship was forbidden, and the meeting with Captain Alekseev was under such conditions that it was impossible to get the full information of the tanker and condition necessary to render help.

The above mentioned facts are absolutely true, and therefore it is possible to say that the Japanese authorities were against rendering help to the tanker "Mariupol" to save the cargo and the ship. Pursuing their own interests the Japanese openly wanted the tanker to perish, and by their actions prevented the saving of the ship until it was in absolutely hopeless condition. It was quite possible to take the tanker "Mariupol" off the shoal and to save its cargo, under the condition of the Japanese favorable attitude and if the Japanese would not have prevented our ships to approach the wrecked tanker for so long a time.

Chief Military Prosecutor  
for the Sea and River Fleet of the USSR  
Major-General of the judicial corps

The copy correct

(Schitovich)

(Taranenko)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, V. T. Tarkhov, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature: (Signed) V. Tarkhov

Chief Military Prosecutor  
for the Sea and River Fleet of the USSR  
Major-General of the judicial corps

The copy correct

(Schitovich)

(Taranenko)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, V. T. Tarkhov, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature: (Signed) V. Tarkhov

"Official Announcements Concerning Foreign Relations"

VI. ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE BOARD OF INFORMATION CONCERNING THE CONCLUSION  
OF THE JAPANESE-GERMAN AND JAPANESE-ITALIAN AGREEMENTS ON  
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

January 21, 1940.

Yesterday, January 20th, at the General Headquarters of the German Fuehrer, the Japanese Ambassador to Germany, Lieutenant General Hirochi Oshima, and the German Foreign Minister, Mr. Joachim von Ribbentrop, signed an agreement between Japan and Germany concerning economic co-operation and on the same day at Rome the Japanese Charge d'Affaires, Mr. Shunichi Kase, and the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Galeano Ciano, signed an agreement on economic co-operation between Japan and Italy.

These agreements possess the same period of validity as the Tripartite Pact, the purpose of which they are to substantiate in the field of economy. In this respect they may be considered as the extension and re-inforcement of the Tripartite Pact. Japan, Germany and Italy have constantly been strengthening their political co-operation established by the Tripartite Pact and now, by concluding these agreements, they intend to prosecute war against their common enemy through the formulation of a grand economic plan and by employing the total combined strength of the two great economic spheres of Greater East Asia and Europe and, at the same time, to lay the foundation for permanent economic co-operation between these spheres after the war. The agreements provide for the acceleration of extensive exchange of various kinds of economic goods and services and also for co-operation regarding all matters pertaining to economy and finance.



VII. STATEMENT OF THE SPOKESMAN OF THE BOARD OF INFORMATION  
CONCERNING THE CONCLUSION OF THE JAPANESE-GERMAN  
AND JAPANESE-ITALIAN AGREEMENTS ON ECONOMIC  
CO-OPERATION

January 21, 1943.

By concluding the Tripartite Pact on September 27, 1940, Japan, Germany, and Italy, recognizing and respecting the leadership of Japan in Greater East Asia and that of Germany and Italy in Europe in the establishment of a new order, pledged among themselves to stand by and co-operate with one another. The treaty is the propelling force of an epochal nature for the construction of a new world order which is primarily aimed at establishing permanent peace. Wherever this force has exercised its dynamic influence the work of constructing a new order in Greater East Asia and Europe has steadily produced concrete results.

The economic agreements which have just been concluded are agreements which give concrete expression to the spirit of the Tripartite Pact in the field of economy. The fact that these agreements have been concluded is in itself a demonstration that the construction of the new order is being further substantiated and that economic collaboration among the three Powers will henceforth be rendered increasingly closer.

In addition, these agreements bring to an end an exploitative economic system with which the United States and Britain have endeavored to dominate the world under their monopolistic control and have opened the way for the direct settlement of accounts between Japan and Germany and Japan and Italy, another fact which is of very great significance.

It is my firm conviction that the co-operation among these three Powers in both the spiritual and material spheres will thereby be further enhanced in strength and that it will not only contribute powerfully toward the prosecution of the war but also to the completion after the war of the grand undertaking of establishing the new world truly based on fairness and righteousness.

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Doc/210B

昭和十六年度(一月一六月)

政府公表集

— 對外關係 —

情報局

EXA25

No 1

六經濟協力ニ関スル日独協定及日伊協定  
 締結ニ関スル情報為天表(二月二十一日)  
 本年一月二十日独逸國總統大木登三於大島  
 駐法大使及リクニトクフ、独外相、經濟協力  
 ニ関スル日本國、ドイツ國間協定ニ署名調印  
 アリ又同日ローマニ於テ加瀬駐伊代理大使及  
 リテ、伊外相、經濟協力ニ関スル日本國、イタリ  
 了國間協定ニ署名調印アリ  
 右協定三國條約ト同一ノ有効期間ヲ有シ之ヲ  
 趣旨ヲ經濟部西ニ於テ且現スル天ノニ三國  
 條約ヲ擴張交達スル天ト謂フ、日独伊三國  
 三國條約ニ依リ確立スル政治的聯繫ヲ終始  
 強化シテ、アリケル處今々茲ニ兩協定ヲ締結  
 以テ、雄大ナル經濟計畫ヲ樹立シ大東亞及歐  
 洲、二大經濟圈ノ總力ヲ擧ゲテ共同敵對  
 スル戰争ヲ遂行セトスル、其戰後ニ於テ天  
 經濟圈間、恒久的經濟協力ニ関スル基礎ヲ  
 樹立セトスル天、ナリ而シテ兩協定、各種經  
 濟給付ノ廣汎ナル交換ヲ促進スルコトヲ規定シ

No. 2

Doc 1210B

規定は経済上及金融上、相互に其の利益を協力す  
（八頁）

No. 2

Doc 1210B

互經濟上及金融上、相互に其ニ関スル協力ヲ  
規定スルニ付、

(八頁)

C-26

Doc. No. 2462

Page 1

(Excerpt from Asahi Shimbun, Tokyo, December 12, 1941)

Victory is Undoubted (A talk of Premier TOJO)

With the news of the declaration of war by GERMANY and ITALY against the United States of America, Premier TOJO gave the following statement at 11:00 p. m., on the 11th.

"Today, both GERMANY and ITALY declared war against the United States of America. Furthermore, it made clear that JAPAN, GERMANY and ITALY renew their alliance and would firmly carry out the war until final victory has been gained against our common foe, the United States of America and BRITAIN, and that we would not conclude treaties of armistice and peace without mutual understanding.

"The world is now divided into two groups; one that vainly struggles to maintain the status quo, and the other, who earnestly strives to establish the rightful new order; and they are fighting the greatest battle that has ever occurred in history.

With just cause and substantial power, I believe without doubt victory is ours.

I now offer my hearty congratulations on the alliance of the three countries in becoming stronger than ever, and herewith express my firm belief in our glorious future.

Dec. No. 2462

Page 1.

C E R T I F I C A T E

Yoshiji NISHIJIMA (Seal)

I certify the following:

That the reduced-size edition of the December, 1941, issues (including the December 13 issue) of the ASAHI SHIMBUN, kept within the Investigation Department of the Main Office of the ASAHI SHIMBUN in Tokyo, was presented to International Prosecution Section on May 10, 1946, upon their request.

Yoshiji NISHIJIMA (Seal)  
Head, Investigation Dept.  
Tokyo Office, Asahi Shimbun

Doc. No. 2462

KX. 826A

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FILE ROOM  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Doc. No. 2462

Page 1.

**Q E R T I E I Q A T E**

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Head, Investigation Dept.  
Tokyo Office, Asahi Shimbun.**

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**Yoshiji NISHIJIMA (Seal)**  
**Head, Investigation Dept.**  
**Tokyo Office, Asahi Shimbun.**

2462A

826月

no

朝日新聞、昭和十六年十二月十二日附の板正

断じて勝つ 東條首相談話

東條首相は獨伊兩國の對米宣戰布告の報に  
十二日午後十二時左の如き談を發表した

首相談 本日獨伊兩國は米國に對して宣戰を  
布告し、更に日獨伊三國はその盟約を新に  
し共同の敵に對し最後の勝利を得るに至る迄  
断乎と戰爭を遂行し、且に相互の諒解なく  
休戦および講和を行はざること明かにし、  
よや世界は徒らに現状を維持せんとする  
國家と、只管正しき新秩序を建設せ  
んとする國家との兩陣營に合れて有史以來  
空前の大戰爭が行はれ、ある、しかして  
正しき理由と立証せる要員力とに鑑み、勝  
利は断じて我が陣營の上にあることを私  
は信じて疑はぬとある。私には此に三國

702

2462A

の締盟はよく固きことに満腔の同慶の  
意を表るとともにわれくの先采ある時  
来に對し不動の信念を被瀝する次第である

Excerpt from "Tokyo ASAHI" of April 16, 1944

"War for Indian Emancipation towards Achieving Common Objective.  
Premier's Address Lauds Brave Fight Put Up by Germany and Italy

PREMIER TOJO'S ADDRESS

On this event in the opening meeting of the Mixed Specialists' Committee today which is being based on the Tri Partite Pact, I deem it an extreme pleasure to have the opportunity to address you.

Taking a general view of the war situation, we find that the Anglo-Americans who were defeated in each and every consecutive battle in the early part of this war have, since last year, begun proclaiming counter-offense.

They have mobilized their full force and are now pressing the borders of the Axis territories - in the East and the West. Despite their efforts our strong and solid camp has not even shown the slightest stir. The firm conviction of ultimate victory and the undefeatable positions of Japan, Germany and Italy have been all the more strengthened.

I am always paying my respects to the brave and courageous fight put up by the Germans and Italians in Europe; especially, I am unable to withhold my joy upon receiving the report that German troops have completely smashed the enemy advance on the Italian front; the carrying on of attack on a large scale against London; and besides, that Italy has arrayed new battle formations and is about to join the front lines of this Co-operative War.

Impatience being increased through such state affairs, our enemy, the Anglo-Americans, have recently declared the construction of the Second Front in Europe. It is rather for such rash acts that Germany awaits, and I firmly believe that Germany will not merely drive them back, but will deal them deadly blows and thereby hurry the time of winning the ultimate victory for Japan, Germany and Italy.

In Greater East Asia, our Empire is ensuring the key point of the Southern areas, and smashing the enemies' aggressive attempts in the continents and the Pacific areas. Through the complete cooperation given in war efforts by the countries and nations within the Greater East Asia Sphere, and the utilization of the abundant important resources for armaments, our position of ultimate victory is being strengthened day by day. Our Empire will maintain this position to the last, and resolutely deal blows to the enemies and thereby fight through this war to the end.

As you are all aware, the Japanese forces, with the great help received from Burma, have recently marched abreast with the Free Indian Nationalist Army and have already crossed the Indian-Burmese border into Indian territory, gaining victories after victories. Especially the Free Indian Nationalist Army, <sup>led by</sup> their Chief, Chandra Bose, is fighting for the emancipation of their country with the hearty cooperation accorded by Burma and the other Asiatic nations; and, it is most joyful to note

the fact that the surging tendency for Indian emancipation is now prevailing all over India, which proves the steady achievements of our common objective - that is, the emancipation for the oppressed nations.

It is needless to repeat that this current war was fought by the Axis powers which stood up to fight for self-existence and self-defense and for the construction of a world peace, based upon righteousness against the greedy ambition of world domination of the Anglo-Americans who unashamedly sacrificed others for their own prosperity. Especially the ambition of the two countries has lately become all the more clear and to this we shall further determine our resolution never to put down our arms but fight until we smash exhaustively the insolent ambition of the Anglo-Americans. Even though battle fields may be apart, to the east and the west, the necessity arises for us, the Axis nations, to cooperate and concert much more closely and to increase our fight against our common enemies, America and Britain.

To meet this situation, Japan must carry on connections with the countries of Germany, Italy and the other Axis nations in Europe on a closer basis, and smash all Anglo-American plots to segregate Japan from the other Axis nations. We will then be able to advance together towards the achievement of common objective and thus, with the collaboration of Europe and Asia, gain the ultimate victory. I have the firm conviction that both Germany and Italy possess the same determination as we possess. At this time of emergency, as today, it is most opportune that this meeting has been held, and I heartily pray for its success."

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G. I. a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that a file of the Japanese Newspapers "Tokyo Asahi" for April 1944 with TOJO's speech of April 15, 1944 was taken from the Imperial Library in Tokyo on or about July 10, 194, and that the original of the said document may be found in \_\_\_\_\_.

I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_.

/s/ Lt Col Taranenko  
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan,

July 11, 1946.



No. 2461

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Sokichi Ishiguro, Chief of Section II of the Imperial Library, do hereby certify the following, viz.:- The book, Title: "Tokyo Asahi Shimbun's Miniature Edition of April, 1944" (including issue of the 16th of April);

Publisher: Tokyo Asahi Shimbun Co.

Year of publication: 1944

No. of Volumes: One

Bookshelf No: Miscellany 54/200

owned by the Imperial Library, was, at the request of the International Prosecution Section, Supreme Command of the Allied Powers, loaned out to the said Section on June 13, 1946.

Dated the 28th day of September, 1946.

Sokichi Ishiguro (Sign. & Seal)

" Excerpts from Article Appearing in Dec. 12, 1944 Issue of the Nippon Times."

UNITY WILL WIN VICTORY,  
AVERS FOREIGN MINISTER

---

High Tribute Paid Axis Efforts  
By Shigemitsu in Exchange Broadcast

---

"There cannot be the slightest doubt about final Axis victory so long as Japan, Germany, Italy and their Allies remain firmly united together," declared Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu, in his exchange broadcast with German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and Italian Premier and concurrently Foreign Minister Benito Mussolini delivered Monday evening in commemoration of the third anniversary of the Axis Military Pact.

Paying high tribute to the German people's heroic struggle under the leadership of their Fuhrer, Mr. Shigemitsu said, "we are firmly convinced that Europe will, after all, be saved by Hitler and Mussolini."

Mr. Shigemitsu's radio message follows:

"Today, on the occasion of the third anniversary of the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy, it is a great pleasure for me to be able to exchange greetings over the radio with His Excellencies the Foreign Ministers of Germany and Italy.

"I recall that in 1939 when the war broke out with Britain's declaration of war on Germany, Japan, in accordance with her traditional policy, exerted every possible effort in order to check the expansion of the war disaster. In her sincere desire to maintain peace in East Asia, Japan exerted her best possible efforts in her negotiations with the United States until the last minute, but as it increasingly transpired that the United States was attempting to deny the existence of the Japanese Empire as a great Power in order to attain her sinister designs of dominating the world, Japan was forced to rise resolutely in arms for her self-existence and selfprotection. That Germany and Italy, abiding faithfully by the Tripartite Alliance, immediately declared war on the United States, following in the footsteps Japan, was greatly appreciated by Japan. I also recall that on December 11, 1941, the three nations, concluding a new treaty, firmly pledged themselves to fight out the common war until final victory and simultaneously clarified again to the world their common ideal of establishing a new world order and also realizing true international justice.

Brilliant Results Achieved

"For three years since then, the Armed Forces of the three nations have achieved numerous brilliant war results in the various battlefields of the east and west. On the other hand, we the Japanese people have made steady efforts and are forging ahead toward the realization of our war objective---international justice---by overcoming all sorts of difficulties.

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Despite the fact that two or three minor nations in Europe have recently, becoming unable to bear the heavy pressure of the war, fallen out of the Axis camp, Germany, together with Italy, is still carrying on her gallant fight in order to defend the fatherland. In fact, the German National Army, for the self-protection of the German race, is showing a strong determination of not letting the enemy stain even an inch of her soil by repeating its death-defying struggle. The figures of the German people under the leadership of their Fuehrer are undoubtedly the figures of heroes. We firmly believe that after all Europe will be save by Hitler and Mussolini.

"The war situation in Greater East Asia as everyone knows, has today entered the decisive stage. Confident of final victory both on the first line and on the home front, we are fighting this decisive war to a finish. The fighting on Leyte has become truly violent. America, depending on material superiority, has mobilized her material strength and brought this to bear in her Leyte operations. However, it is my belief that our Special Attack Units and the Kamikaze Corps will unflinchingly shatter the American forces. Furthermore, the attacking spirit of the Kamikaze Corps is also the spirit of the entire nationals of Japan, both at the front and at home, and is the propelling force that will lead to the attainment of the ultimate victory.

"The attainment of our aim of international justice must be realized no matter what difficulties confront us or how great the Sacrifices. Nay, our lofty ideas of the liberation of Asia and the resurrection of East Asia are today rapidly seeing realization. It is indeed with great joy and pride that hand in hand with the nations and peoples already liberated in East Asia we throw our full strength in this war of righteousness.

"As the war become a prolonged one the enemy has come to disclose in increasingly stark nakedness his inordinate ambitions of world domination. Spurred on by blind hatred against Japan, Germany and Italy, the enemy leaders seek to efface the three nations of Japan, Germany and Italy from the face of the earth and to rule and police the world by themselves, depriving the various peoples of their right of free development. It is clear to all that such is an inhuman policy that attempts to reverse the flow of history. Their policy is a freak phenomena which in the present time prepares for the next war. With the war sacrifices mounting increasingly it is but natural that the grave question of why the war is being waged should arise in the minds of the nationals of the enemy countries.

#### Enemy Seen Frantic

"Thus, the enemy who has fatal weakness within his country, in spite of material superiority, is eager to end the war as soon as possible by means of desperately moving into the offensive. In order to terminate the war at the earliest possible date, the enemy has been mustering all available military forces and resorting to underhand maneuvers when closing in on the Japanese, German and Italian positions. Thanks to the united efforts of Japan, German, Italy and other Axis nations, the enemy has not achieved any of his strategic Schemes in spite of his enormous attrition and sacrifices and his irritation over the progress of the war has become greatly aggravated. Undoubtedly the decisive war is progressing in our favor.

"We harbor unwavering faith in the fact that the struggle for justice will emerge victorious in the end. As long as, Japan, Germany, Italy and other Axis nations are solidly united, we need entertain no doubt as to the successful outcome of the war. It is of deep significance that we pledge afresh to further tighten our cooperation and forge ahead for final victory ever faithful to our ideal, on the occasion of the third anniversary of the signing of the Three Power Military Alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy.

"In closing I should like to pay highest tribute to the struggle now being waged by Germany and Italy and at the same time, pray for the best of health of the Leaders and Foreign Ministers of those countries."

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel G.I. Taranenko,  
a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify  
that This photostat is a true copy of the article appearing in  
Dec. 12, 1944 issue of the Nippon Times.  
was delivered to me by Library of the Document Division of the  
International Prosecution Section, Far East  
on or about July 26, 1946, and that the original of the said  
document may be found in Document Division of International Pro-  
secution Section.

I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

/s/ Lt. Col. Taranenko  
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan,

\_\_\_\_\_, 1946.

Doc. No. 2528

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Sokichi Ishiguro, Chief of Section II of the Imperial Library, do hereby certify the following, viz.:

The book,

Title: "Nippon Times" of Nov. and Dec. 1944

Year of Publication: 1944

No. of Volumes: One

owned by the Imperial Library, was, at the request of the International Prosecution Section, Supreme Command of the Allied Powers, loaned out to the said Section on May 24, 1946.

Dated the 28th day of September, 1946.

Sokichi Ishiguro (Sign. and Seal)

Official Gazette (extra)

Proceedings in the 86th Imperial Diet  
Published Jan. 22, 1945.

Speech by Prime Minister KOISO Kuniaki  
(Addressed on Jan. 21, 1945)

P. 12 The present situation of the war is far from reassuring but I firmly believe that now it is the best opportunity for us to gain a victory, for the enemy's long way of supply is exposed as our attacking target.

P. 14 The enemies are discussing at random about the post-war international structure, calling for our non-conditional surrender and thus planning to strike out Japan. Of course it is a mere dream of fools.

Their Anglo-American's greedy ambition to control the world has been disclosed to the sun. In the district of their occupation they already are quarreling on the share of their big game. On the contrary the countries in the East Asia are, under the joint ideal of reconstructing East Asia, exerting their utmost to protect it and to fight it out with their total powers. The ideal of co-existence and co-prosperity in the joint declaration of the Greater East Asia could not be compared with their cunning object of the aggressive war.

I believe that only the country which would endure any hardship to come, would stand in the way of critical situation and would fight it out with firm resolution of victory, should win in the end.

Speech by Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU Mamoru  
(Addressed on Jan. 21, 1945)

P. 14 The world war has reached a white-heat point. And the enemy which has weak points in its country is making a headlong rush being impatient to finish the war in a hurry.

P. 15 They call themselves as peace loving countries but their war aim lies not in the protection and respect of freedom of the lesser powers but lies in reconstruction of the world system under the dictatorship of the big powers with U.S.A. and Britain as leaders.

The truth is that the Greater East Asia War was broken out because U.S.A. and Britain tried to remove the Japanese power which will be an obstacle to such enterprises.



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Depriving East Asians of their countries they want to make them their eternal colonies and make use of them as a base to control the world.

If we lose the war once, all the nations in the East Asia will be exploited and oppressed forever. Britain's policy of fishing in troubled waters, urging the internal strife among Asians, was succeeded by U.S.A. as it is. And it is clearly seen in China. She has driven China into anti-Japanese front with honeyed words and threat.

Our army's aim in the South China is at U. S. Army and its base in order to drive out the U. S.'s disturbing forces in China, to return China to Chinese and to make them contribute to reconstruction of the East Asia in cooperation with Japan.

P. 16 In brief, Japan's intention lies in constructing the world of non-threat and non-aggression.

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The Official Gazette. The extra number on the 22nd of January, in the 20th year of Showa. (1945)

The third number of the shorthand records of the proceedings in the House of Peers. (The 86th session of the Imperial Diet.)

(Mamoru SHIGEMITSU, the Minister of States, goes up on the platform.)

The Minister of State (Mamoru SHIGEMITSU)

The combination between our empire and the other allied countries is becoming firmer and firmer, and we are convinced of carrying out the current war successfully to the last together with our allied countries at any cost.

I am convinced that it is our most sacred mission to exert ourselves to carry out, together with our allied countries both in the East and West, the severe battles destined to exploit the future of mankind in order to accomplish the common war aim of making clear international justice in the war of self-existence and self-defence.

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C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I.S.S. No. 590

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, TAKAHASHI Michitoshi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Cabinet and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of \_\_\_\_\_ pages, dated 22 Jan., 1945, and described as follows: Official Gazette. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Cabinet Secretariat

Signed at Tokyo on this 17th day of September, 1946. /s/ H. Takashi  
Signature of Official  
SEAL  
Secretary of Cabinet  
Official Capacity

witness: H. Kuriyama /s/

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 17th day of Sept., 1946 /s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME  
Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

witness: Wm C. Prout

Excerpt from SHIGEMITSU's Speech 21 Jan. 1945  
at the 86th Session of the Imperial Diet

.....The truth is that the Greater East Asia War broke out because the UNITED STATES and BRITAIN tried to remove the Japanese power which will be an obstacle to such enterprises. Depriving East Asians of their countries, they want to make them their eternal colonies and make use of them as a base to control the world.

If we lose the war once, all the nations in East Asia will be exploited and invaded forever.

Our army in South China aims against the U. S. Army and its bases in order to drive out the U. S.'s disturbing forces in China, to return China to the Chinese, and to make them contribute to reconstruction of East Asia in co-operation with Japan.

In brief, Japan's intention lies in constructing the world of non-threat and non-aggression.

The combination between our empire and the other allied countries is becoming firmer and firmer, and we are convinced of carrying out the current war successfully to the last together with our allied countries at any cost. Germany is now continuing an admirably brave struggle, overcoming many difficulties. A general attack, which England and America had decided upon at the Teheran Conference, was made upon Germany from the east, west, and south, together with all sorts of strategic activities. Moreover, our enemies are declaring without any hesitation that they intend to wipe out the existence as great nations of both Japan and Germany by dividing their territory, moving their peoples, and changing their form of government in order to make Germany and the German race powerless forever. Germany was confronted by a most grave crisis at the time of the attempted assassination of Fuehrer Hitler on July 20th of last year. However, the plan ended in failure, and Germany's internal and external position was completely restored. It is indeed a stirring sight to see the German people fighting united under Fuehrer Hitler with an iron will that prevents the enemy from making even the slightest invasion of her territory. As was to be expected, Germany assumed the offensive on the western front and has already smashed important positions of the American Army. We cannot help being filled with admiration seeing that Germany, even when placed in a woeful predicament, has

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great self-confidence and calmly advances with a firm conviction of ultimate victory. On the other hand, Italy, led by Mussolini, is also steadily repleting her national armaments and fighting bravely with honor and glory in concert with Germany. I am convinced that it is our most sacred mission to exert ourselves to carry out, together with our allied countries both in the East and West, the severe battles destined to exploit the future of mankind in order to accomplish the common war aim of making clear international justice in the war of self-existence and self defense.



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第八十号  
帝國議會貴族院議事速記録第三號

Doc 590

國務大臣(小磯國昭君) ○國務大臣(小磯國昭君)  
戰勢必之と雖、觀ヲ許サシ、現状デ、アリマスガ、敵、長  
延ル補給路、全線ニ亘リテ、我が攻惠、前ニ暴露路  
セリテ居リ、茲ニ、我ガ、勝利ヲ把握ス、キ、好機存  
スルトヲ確信スル次第デ、アリマス。

829A

敵、對シテ、戰後、國際機構、未ダ、論  
テ、帝國、抹殺ヲ企圖シ、居ル、ト、アリマス、呼號シ、  
如キ白日夢、國ヨリ、憫シ、外、ト、アリマス、

EX-111

彼等米英民族、負、禁、記、ト、キ、世界、制、覇、野、心、  
戰爭、進展、ト、共、漸、次、自、日、下、ニ、露、呈、セ、シ、野、心、  
等、占、領、セ、ル、地、域、ニ、於、テ、獲、物、ノ、分、配、ヲ、繞、リ、シ、既、彼、  
ニ、相、刻、對、立、ガ、暴、露、セ、リ、漸、次、激、化、ス、深、刻、  
對、シ、我、ガ、東、亞、諸、國、家、ニ、對、シ、漸、次、激、化、ス、深、刻、  
下、ニ、敵、ノ、侵、攻、ニ、對、シ、愈、々、激、化、ス、深、刻、  
亞、ヲ、保、衛、ス、ル、決、意、ヲ、振、興、ス、深、刻、  
ニ、敢、進、ス、ル、決、意、ヲ、振、興、ス、深、刻、  
テ、東、亞、諸、國、家、ニ、對、シ、愈、々、激、化、ス、深、刻、  
道、義、理、念、ニ、對、シ、愈、々、激、化、ス、深、刻、  
的、等、ト、比、ス、ル、モ、ト、リ、マ、セ、ヌ、極、ル、侵、略、的、戰、争、目、

No 1

EX-111 COPY ROOM

590

今後愈々加重スベキ如何ナルサヲ難ニモ敢テ耐テ拔  
キ如何ナル危局ニ遭遇スルモ決してタジロクコトナキ  
ハ勝鬪魂ヲ持續シテ最後迄戰ヒ抜ク者ガ克  
ク最後ノ勝利ヲ制シ得ルキヲト信ス

Doc

國務大臣重光葵君登壇

帝國ト同盟諸國トノ連繫ハ愈々固クカ人ハ能ク  
此戰爭ヲ我カ同盟諸國ト共ニ戰ヒ抜クモノナリ  
ス

自存自衛ノ戰ニ於テ國際主義顯現、共同戰  
争目的也。遂ニ爲メ人類將來ノ道ニ  
刻ナル戦斗ヲ東西ノ同盟諸國ト共ニ戰ヒ抜カ  
スルハ我人ノ最モ神聖ナル使命ナリト信スル  
ベシラス

No 2

大東亞戰爭、實ニ米英ガ斯カル企圖ニ對シテ陸害  
トナル日本ノ勢力ヲ除カントシテ爲メ誘發セリ  
テニアリテ、彼等ハ東亞人ノ御土ヲ奪取シ、永久ニ  
彼等植民地ト爲シ、世界ヲ支配、其地トシテ之ヲ使  
用スルモノナリト信ス

No

若シ此戰ニ破ルルガ如キコトアルハ東亞人ノ永  
遠ニ搾取侵略セラルルコトニナルベシ

Doc 590

帝國が今日軍ヲ南支那ニ進メテ居ルハ其目指  
ス所ニ米國ノ軍隊アリ其基地ニアラズ支那ヨ  
リ米國ノ攪乱勢力ヲ驅逐シテ支那ヲ支那人ノ  
手ニ還シ之ヲ共ニ相立ニテ東亞復興ノ大事業ニ  
真ニ屬スルモノトシテ念願スルガ爲ニアリマス

一言ニテ之ヲ述ブニ帝國ノ主張スル所ニ不脅威  
不侵略ノ世界ヲ建設セシムルニアルニアリマス

No 3

帝國ノ同盟諸國ト連繫シ念國ノ支ニ能クテ  
以テ戦争ヲ我ガ同盟國ト共ニ戦ヒ抜クテ  
リマシ今日ドイツノ幾多難關ヲ突破シ驚嘆ス  
ベキ取テヲ續ケテ居ルニアリマス米英ノ  
凡ニ謀略ヲ決定スル東西南ヨリニ對テ獨  
ツ及ビドイツノ民衆ヲ永久ニ立シ能ハザラシムル爲  
變更シ日獨兩國ノ大國トシテ人ノ存在ヲ抹殺セ  
ト云フテ憚ラヌ次第ニアリマス又ドイツノ非  
大ニ危機ニトシテ總統暗殺未遂ノ際ヲ以テ最  
ニ歸シテドイツノ内外ニ對スル計畫ハ失敗  
ニ致シテドイツノ國民ガ形勢ハ完全ニ立テ直  
ノ意志ノ下ニ關ツテ居ル安ハ其情觀ニアリマス

NO 4.

Doc 590

果然ドイツの西部戦線は、我々の野望は  
 米軍の重要たる部分を粉砕致して居るにあり  
 又吾人のドイツが如何なる苦境に立つて天  
 泰然自若として自ら信じて、上層の操が  
 るは勝、信念を以て勇力往邁進するに  
 見たり、感激、念に確たるを得るにあり  
 又此の「タリ」又昔々國を以て整備の名譽  
 ト光輝ト以てドイツ共ニ面々戦ふに  
 此の「タリ」自存自衛、戦ふに、國除正義  
 顯現、共同、戦争目的、意義、爲  
 人類將、來、途ヲ拓ク、キ、深刻ナル戦、ナ  
 東、西、同盟、與國ト共ニ戦ヒ、技カ  
 ントス、吾人、最、天神聖  
 使命ヲ以テト信ズル、トアリ、ト云

Doc 590

果然ドイツの西部戦線は、攻勢は野に既  
 米軍の重要たる部分を粉砕して居るに於て  
 吾人のドイツが如何なる苦境に於て居  
 泰然自若として自ら信じて、上層の連絡が  
 必勝の信念を以て勇力往邁進するに於て見  
 感激、念に催はるを得るに於てアリマス。世  
 のハリニ、タリニ又其者各階層に於て整備の  
 光輝を以てドイツ共、一面に於ては次第  
 自衛、戦はるに於て、國際正義  
 顯現、共同の戦争目的の完成、爲人類將  
 来の途ヲ拓ク、深刻たる戦はる、東西同盟  
 與國共ニ戦はるに於て、吾人、最天神聖  
 使命ヲ以て信じて、アリマス。

Doc 590

證明書  
ワシントン之文書局 第五九〇號  
國際檢察部 第五九〇號  
典據及之公正之關之證明

余吳公之於此、余於下記資格於內閣書記官上、日本政府上公的關保在三十以上、該官吏上、余於茲添附之、頁三、成於一千九百四十五年、昭和二十年、月二十日附下記題名、即、官報、文書、總官、上、居、上、之、茲、證明、又、余更添附、記錄及之文章、日本政府公文書上、三十以上、之、下記名稱、省、又、部、局、之、式、書、類、及、之、綴、一、部、上、之、之、證明、(若、之、之、綴、番、號、之、引、用、其、他、公、式、書、類、之、綴、於、之、該、文、書、上、正、規、所、在、之、式、名、稱、之、存、記、之、之、內、閣、官、房、  
于九百四十六年、昭和二十年、九月十七日、

東京於署名

當該官吏署名欄 M. 名、之、(署名)  
右、者、之、公、的、資格、內閣書記官、(捺印)  
證 人 K. フリヤマ、(署名)

公之入于之關之證明

余、Richard H. Larsh、之、余於聯合國最高指揮官總司令部、關係、上、之、之、上、記、題、名、文、書、余於公務上、日本政府、上、記、署、名、欄、官、吏、之、入、于、之、之、之、之、之、證明、又、

于九百四十六年、昭和二十年、九月十七日

東京於署名

代名欄 RICHARD H. LARSH  
理查德·H·拉什 (署名)  
右、者、之、公、的、資格、國際檢察部調查官。  
證 人 E. N. C. PROUT  
伊文·C·普勞特 (署名)

TELEGRAM (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 25 July 1941 6.20  
Arrived, 25 July 1941 21.30 hours

No. 1355 of 25 July

Most Urgent

Simultaneously for the Supreme Headquarters of the Wehrmacht and Supreme Army Headquarters.

- 1) The draft of reserves slowly beginning in Japan and Manchukuo on 10 July and the following days, suddenly reached a large and no longer concealable extent, especially in the 1st, 4th, 7th, 12th and 16th division, and continued until today in decreased strength. Until the middle of August supposedly about 900,000 (nine hundred thousand) reservists are to be drafted, that is the 24 to 45 year olds; among the eldest, however, only specialists like drivers, technicians, people able to speak Russian, etc. After that, another 500,000 (five hundred thousand) reservists, are supposedly available.
- 2) Together with the drafting of the reservists on 10 July /orders came for/ a draft of horses, motor vehicles, etc., and a little later, instructions to firms to provide military goods of consumption, like foodstuffs, candles, and others till the end of September at the latest.
- 3) On 11 (12) July limitation of the use of foreign languages in the teletype and telephone communications. In addition, starting 20 July mail censorship on foreigners' letters, also within Japan.
- 4) Since 12 July prohibiting of travel by railway, ship, and airplane for foreigners on gradually all along distance lines within Japan and to Korea, China, Formosa. Japanese are also prohibited from entering Sachalin. Japanese students have to remain in the vicinity of their residence.
- 5) Since about 10 July transporting of troops, beginning with Quartermaster troops, technician troops and artillery of the 16th and 1st division and transport of reservists from Japan. Goal: Seishin and Rashin for troops and reservists, Tientsin and Shanghai only for reservists.



- 6) Since the middle of July preparation in Manchuria for billeting and the arrival of troop transports. In addition increased transport of military goods, which may be interpreted as the establishing of supply bases.
- 7) My impression:
  - a) Besides the increase of Japanese troops in Manchuria and probably also in North China, a new army group is being formed in Korea.
  - b) According to conversations with officers of the General Staff, besides the Japanese forces in Manchuria and Korea apparently also parts of the North China Army are to be used for action against the Soviet Union. No clarity regarding the Japanese operations plan. But it is probable that it will not be limited only to an attack on the Vladivostok area and in a northerly direction, but will also simultaneously start in the direction of Lake Baikal, along the Manchurian Railroad, through Chita, and from the area of Kalgan through Outer Mongolia.
  - c) Time of start /of operations/ unknown. One fact which might bear this out is that, in my opinion, the deployment of troops will take until about the middle of August, and that General OKAMOTO several times mentioned in his conversations that Japan would only start when the German units had reached the Volga.

KRETSCHMAR

OTT

Note: Forwarded through the teletype office to the code-clerk of the Headquarters of the WEHRMACHT  
Tel. Ktr. 26 July 1941.

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KRETSCHMAR

OTT

Note: Forwarded through the teletype office to the code-clerk of the Headquarters of the WEHRMACHT  
Tel. Ktr. 26 July 1941.

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cummins, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an attache of the United States Department of State on the Staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945, and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cummins  
W. P. CUMMINS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, ASD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cummins, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

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5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cummins  
W. P. CUMMINS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Ex. # 831

Doc. No. 2595 A

Page 1

CERTIFICATE

Aug. 7, 1946.

The undersigned does hereby certify that it is impossible to submit you the following documents, as they are not in our possession now.

- 1.) All the files of 1st and 2nd Departments of Japanese General Staff bearing upon the planning of war against the USSR. (Otsu and Kan-Toku-En Plans).
- 2.) The correspondence of the General Staff and the War Ministry of Japan with the Headquarters of Kwantung and Korean Armies on the question of military preparation of Japan for a war against the Soviet Union.

/s/ Yo to Miyama  
Yo to Miyama

Chief of  
Correspondence Section,  
1st Demobilization Bureau.

證明書

2595 A

左記書類は現在所有せざる爲提出不可能であること左證明する

一 対ソ「戦計畫」に関する日本参謀本部亦一課及亦二課の全書類（乙案及関特演計畫）

二 対ソ「戦のため日本側にとれる軍事的準備」に関し、日本参謀本部及陸軍省と関東軍及朝鮮軍司令部とに交せられたる文書

昭和十二年八月七日

亦一復員局文書課長

美山 要藏 (美山)

EX 831

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G# 832

Doc. No. 1973

The Matter pertaining to Supplementary Education  
of the Interpreters of the Kwangtung Army

Staff H. Q. Directive No. 2,  
Notice No. 1408

To the Entire Army under the H. Q.

The students of foreign language schools in Japan and Harbin  
College (Harbin Gakuin) who have been employed as Army interpreters  
on Russian language since the opening of the "Ken toku en" should be  
given supplementary education, in accordance with the "Outline of  
Supplementary Education for Kwangtung Army Interpreters", as explained  
in the separate booklet.

Sept. 16, 1941 · Commander, Kwangtung Army,

<sup>v</sup>  
IMEZU, Yoshiro <sup>zi</sup> -  
IMEZU, Yoshiziro

Doc. No. 1973

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO, G. I., a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify that the photostatic copy of the Kwantung Army Headquarters directive under the title: "The Matter Pertaining to Supplementary Education of the Interpreters of the Kwantung Army", was delivered to me by the Red Army Chief Military Prosecution Department, Moscow on or about March 22, 1946, and that the original of the said document may be found in the Records office of the said department.

I do further certify -----

Lt. Col. TARANENKO  
(Signature and rank)

Tokyo, Japan,  
September 26, 1946.



Ex 422

5.

陸軍省

陸軍省

別附一 陸軍省  
地計區 陸軍省  
開始以來 陸軍省  
通譯委員 陸軍省

EX 432

昭和拾六年九月拾六日 陸軍省

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO OFFICE

1973 cert

證明書

余、中佐 G. I. タラネニコ / THRENENKO G. I. / 社会主義  
ソビエト共和国聯邦陸軍、部員ニシテ、茲ニ左記、如ク證明ス

記

関東軍司令部指令「関東軍通譯補助教育ニ関スル件」題  
下、直轄機密寫真ニシテ、一九四六年三月二十二日又、其前  
ニ於テ、在マスコウ赤坂下軍部、檢閲室有長官ニヨリ余ニ引渡サレ  
ル事、茲ニ該文書ニ原本ノ前記有記録所、所在スト者ニ事。

(西肩名及端級) 中佐 タラネニコ / 署名

日本東京ニ於テ

一九四六年九月二十六日

1973 cert

證明書

余 中佐 G. I. タラネンコ / THANEKID G. I. / 社会主義者  
ソビエト共産國聯邦陸軍ノ部員ニシテ 茲ニ左記ノ如ク證明ス

記

関東軍司令部指令「関東軍通譯補助教育ニ関スル件」題  
下ノ直接複寫寫真ハ、一九四六年三月二十一日又ハ其前後  
ニ於テ在莫斯科赤田ヲ軍部検査官長官ニヨリ余ニ引渡サレタ  
ル事、並ニ該文書ノ原本ハ前記有記録所ニ所在スト看ス事

(四百名及階級) 中佐 タラネンコ / 署名

日本 東京ニ於テ

一九四六年九月二十六日

Witness Interrogation Affidavit

May 19th, 1946

At Khabarovsk

Captain of Justice Skolov interrogated the following person as witness, warning that the said witness is responsible under Article 95 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R. for any false statement made.

1. Name: Japanese Major MATSUJIRA, Kusuo
2. Year of birth: 1927
3. Official position: Chief of Cipher Section, General Headquarters of the Kwantung Army.
4. Membership in political parties: None.
5. Present address: The town of Khabarovsk.

A certificate is appended in which the witness and the interpreter acknowledge that they are responsible for any false testimony or interpretation made.

Q. What languages have you learned?

A. Japanese and some Chinese.

Q. In what language do you wish to state?

A. I wish to state in Japanese.

Q. State about your official positions in Japanese Army.

A. In 1935, I entered the Military Academy in Tokyo, and graduated at it in the beginning of 1939. I was appointed Sub-lieutenant immediately on graduation. I was assigned to the First Company, Reservist Corps, the 23rd Infantry Regiment, Miyakonojo City. In August, 1939, I was appointed instructor of the Cadets' Company (Training Company) of the same Corps. In March, 1940, I was promoted to Lieutenant, assigned to the 23rd Infantry Regiment, the Sixth Division, the Eleventh Army of the Middle China Expeditionary Forces, and appointed section commander of the First Machine Gun Company of the same Regiment. From August 15, 1940, to October 15 of the same year, I was given a lesson in cryptography at the General Headquarters of the China Expeditionary Forces at Nanking, and after completing it, I returned to the previous position in the previous Regiment. On November 15, 1940, I was despatched to the Army Communications School as a student in cryptography. After having graduated at that school on

Witness Interrogation Affidavit

May 18th, 1946

At Khabarovsk

Captain of Justice Skolov interrogated the following person as witness, warning that the said witness is responsible under Article 95 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R. for any false statement made.

1. Name: Japanese Major MATSUJIRA, Kusuo
2. Year of birth: 1907
3. Official position: Chief of Cipher Section, General Headquarters of the Kwantung Army.
4. Membership in political parties: None.
5. Present address: The town of Khabarovsk.

A certificate is appended in which the witness and the interpreter acknowledge that they are responsible for any false testimony or interpretation made.

Q. What languages have you learned?

A. Japanese and some Chinese.

Q. In what language do you wish to state?

A. I wish to state in Japanese.

Q. State about your official positions in Japanese Army.

A. In 1935, I entered the Military Academy in Tokyo, and graduated at it in the beginning of 1939. I was appointed Sub-lieutenant immediately on graduation. I was assigned to the First Company, Reservist Corps, the 23rd Infantry Regiment, Miyakonojo City. In August, 1939, I was appointed instructor of the Cadets' Company (Training Company) of the same Corps. In March, 1940, I was promoted to Lieutenant, assigned to the 23rd Infantry Regiment, the Sixth Division, the Eleventh Army of the Middle China Expeditionary Forces, and appointed section commander of the First Machine Gun Company of the same Regiment. From August 15, 1940, to October 15 of the same year, I was given a lesson in cryptography at the General Headquarters of the China Expeditionary Forces at Nanking, and after completing it, I returned to the previous position in the previous Regiment. On November 15, 1940, I was despatched to the Army Communications School as a student in cryptography. After having graduated at that school on

January 15, 1941, I returned to the previous Regiment and was appointed cipher officer in the Headquarters of the 23rd Infantry Regiment.

In March, 1941, I was appointed Chief of the Cipher Section in the Headquarters of the Mongolia Stationary Army. The Mongolia Stationary Army Headquarters were stationed in the town of Kalgan, Inner Mongolia.

I served in the above mentioned place until August, 1943.

In March, 1942, I was promoted to the rank of Captain.

In August, 1943, I was assigned to the Cipher Section of the Kwantung Army Headquarters.

In August, 1944, I was promoted to the rank of Major and ordered Chief of the Cipher Section. I served in this capacity until the surrender of the Japanese Army on August 19, 1945.

Q. In what sort of work did you engage as Chief of the Cipher Section?

A. I engaged in teaching cryptography to the units of the Kwantung Army as well as in the practical ciphering in the Kwantung Army Headquarters. I took in charge all the cipher communications concerning military operations and various informations which were exchanged between the Kwantung Army and the Army General Staff Office, the War Ministry, the Headquarters of the Tokyo Defence Army and other Defence Armies in homeland, the China Expeditionary Forces and the South Sea Army. In the service, I was placed under the command of Lieut.-Col. Morio TOMURA, senior signal staff-officer, who himself was placed under the command of Colonel MATSUMURA Tomokatsu, Chief of the First Section. Colonel MATSUMURA was afterwards appointed Vice-Chief of Staff and concurrently Chief of the First Section.

When I was the Chief of the Cipher Section in the Mongolia Stationary Army prior to August 1943, I took charge of almost the same work as I did as the Chief of the Cipher Section of the Kwantung Army General Headquarters.

Q. What do you know about the Japanese Army's plan regarding the preparations for offensive against the Soviet Union?

A. Towards the end of June, 1941, when I was perusing the orders concerning the cipher work at the Staff Department of the Mongolia Stationary Army, I found among many orders, an order of the Commander-in-Chief of the North China Area Army, who was the direct superior commander of the Mongolia Stationary Army. It was an order issued in June, 1941, but I do not remember its order number. I remember in it was written the order to the Commander of the Mongolia Army that the preparations for military actions should be completed as soon as possible according to the Appendix, "the Principles of the preparations for military actions". I think it was a document ordering the commencement of putting into practice the war preparation plan against the Soviet Union.

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Q. For what reason do you witness think that the said order had some connection with the Japanese Army's preparations in Inner Mongolia for offensive against the Soviet Union?

A. I was led to the conclusion by the following facts: After the beginning of the German-Soviet War, about June 23-24, 1941, Gen. OKAMURA, Commander of the North China Area Army, called by cipher telegram Lieut.-Gen. AMAKASU, Commander of the Mongolia Stationary Army, and Col. KABURAGI Masataka, senior staff officer in charge of military operations, to the North China Area Army Headquarters in Peking. The above two left for Peking about June 24, 1941.

On returning from Peking, about July 5, 1941, Lieut.-Gen. AMAKASU Tatabo called all commanders of the forces under his command for an assembly. It appeared that directives concerning preparations of war against the Soviet Union were given at this meeting. Regarding the military operations against the Soviet Union, Japanese troops in Inner Mongolia had to act in concert with the Kwantung Army. I was told about this matter by Lieut.-Col. ITSHIKI Masao, senior signal staff officer, who had attended the assembly.

Lieut.-Col. Masao ITSHIKI asked me whether the code book to be used after the outbreak of the war against Soviet and to be distributed by the Imperial Headquarters had been fully prepared.

I reported that the said code-book had been fully prepared and well learned.

It was prearranged that, after the opening of hostilities, the additive tables and the emergency indicator tables to be used in combination with the army code-book No. 3 should be changed according to the instructions of the Army General Staff Office.

These additive tables and indicator tables had been already received from the Army General Staff Office.

At the same time, the Commander of the 23th Division who had been in charge of suppressing Chinese guerilla army received orders to prepare for military operations against Outer Mongolia in the Teisuan-taihu desert district.

Early in Sept., 1941, Lieut.-Col. KOTANI, General Staff Officer arrived by airplane from the Kwantung Army Headquarters.

As regards his arrival, a cipher telegram had been previously received informing that Staff-Officer KOTANI would be dispatched from the Kwantung Army General Headquarters for liaison purpose. He had an interview with the commander of the Mongolia Stationary Army. I do not know what had passed between them at the interview.

Since June, 1941, the discharge from military service upon expiration of the term was suspended, and the increase of troops was enforced by newly conscripted strength. For example, over 5,000 appear to have arrived between June and Dec., 1941.

By 1942, the Army forces had been increased to about 70,000 from about 40,000.

About Aug., 1942, the 3rd Tank Division was organized, with the cavalry group as a cadre unit.



I cannot help but say that the problem of an offensive against the Soviet Far East was openly discussed by Japanese officers. During a conversation with Captain NAMI Ichiro, an officer attached to the Army Intelligence Section, he stated that the offensive of the Japanese army against Outer Mongolia was to be directed against Ulanbator-Zabaikalye, the object which lay in making military transportation to the Far East difficult by cutting off the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

In May, 1943, five expeditionary parties were organized, each party being composed of about one company. Among them, three parties were dispatched from the 26th Division, and other two from the 2nd Independent Mixed Brigade. Major AOSHIMA Ryoichiro, senior army intelligence staff-officer commanded the parties. The object of the expeditionary parties lay in the actual exploration of the Feisuantaiiku desert district.

After about one month's exploration, it was found out that the Feisuantaiiku desert district was passable by tanks, and that water could be obtained by a small digging. I heard this from Captain Tsuboi, company commander of the 2nd Independent Mixed Brigade, who had joined the expeditionary parties. In the beginning of August, 1943, I was transferred to the General Headquarters of the Kwantung Army.

Q. What do you know about the plan of operations of the Kwantung Army General Headquarters against the Soviet Union?

A. On August 5, 1943, I arrived at the Kwantung Army General Headquarters. I immediately reported my arrival to Major KOBAYASHI, Chief of the Cipher Section, and after having received directions for an officer attached to the Cipher Section, I asked him the explanation of organization and general conditions of the Kwantung Army. Because these were essential problems for fulfilment of my duties.

Major KOBAYASHI explained by means of a map which was hanged on the wall of the officers' room, and stated that there had been in the Kwantung Army an offensive plan of operations against the Soviet Union called "the Kan-Toku-En/ Kwantung Army Special Manoeuvre 1941. According to the said "Kan-Toku-En" plan, two area armies had been newly organized under the command of the Kwantung Army.

The 1st Area Army consisted of the 2nd, 3rd, 5th and the 20th Armies, and its headquarters were stationed at Mutanchiang. The object of the Army lay in the hostile operations against the Red Army in the occupation of the Soviet Maritime Province.

The 2nd Area Army consisted of the 4th and the 6th Armies, and its headquarters were stationed at Chichihaerh. The object of the Army lay in the defensive operations towards the west, with the object of covering the offensive of the 1st Area Army.

According to this plan of operations, large-scale manoeuvres were put into practice in Manchuria by the Kwantung Army since August, 1941. It was so also with the Korea Army in Korea. It can be said that these manoeuvres meant the completion of preparations for the offensive of the Kwantung Army against Soviet.

The "Kan-Toku-En" plan was effective during 1942 and 1943.

During this period, the military strength of the Kwantung Army was ever increased by the supplementary forces conscripted in Japan proper and Manchuria.

Ex-soldier government officials and officials of the special companies of importance in national defence were subject to special education and training while they were off duty.

In December 1943 I attended the assembly of officers attached to cipher sections held at the Army General Staff Office in Tokyo, in order to receive directives concerning the compilation of the code-book for the year 1944. During a conversation with Captain HATTORI, who had been in the service of the Cipher Section of the Kwantung Army General Headquarters in 1941, and was then an officer attached to the Cipher Section of the Army General Staff, he told me that the offensive plan of operations, for the year 1941, of the Kwantung Army against Soviet had been made with the secret designation "Kan-Toku-En".

According to the above-mentioned plan, two stages were pre-arranged in the military action against Soviet. In the first stage, the 1st Area Army was to occupy the Soviet Maritime Province; and in the second stage, it was previously arranged that the military strength of the 1st Area Army, which would have finished the object of its operations in the first stage, should be transferred for the purpose of increasing the military strength of the 2nd Area Army, with the object of developing the offensive operations against the Soviet Zabaikalsky district. At the same time, it was pre-arranged, too, that the Mongolia Stationary Army should begin the advance into the Zabaikal district through the Republic of Outer Mongolia.

Q. What do you know, besides what you have already stated, about the documents concerning cipher business which were intended for use after the commencement of advance of the Japanese Army into the Soviet territory?

A. According to the instructions of the Japanese Imperial Headquarters, the Cipher Section of the Kwantung Army General Headquarters completed the compilation of an appendix dictionary to be used in combination with the Army code-book No. 3, which was then used.

In this appendix dictionary, the names of the inhabited places in the Soviet Maritime Province and the Zabaikal Province were contained in form of cipher. That cipher form was four figure type. For instance, Vladivostok, Voroshilov, Grodekovo, Sovgavani, Khabarovsk, in the Soviet Maritime Province; Chita, Borzya, Blagoveshchenski in the Zabaikal Province, together with other towns and villages were recorded in the document.

The appendix dictionaries were about 100 pages each, published as separate volumes and distributed to the headquarters of divisions, armies and area armies to be used in the occupation of Soviet territories. The like appendix dictionaries were also made by the Mongolia Stationary Headquarters, which contained the place names of the Republic of Outer Mongolia and the Zabaikal Province. Each one copy was sent to the Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo for reference and has been kept there from 1941 to the time of the surrender of the Japanese Army.

Q. What do you know about the time of the opening of hostilities by the Japanese Army against Soviet?

A. I do not know precisely about the time of the opening of hostilities against Soviet, but judging from the progress of preparations made by the Kwantung Army and the Mongolia Stationary Army according to the "Kan-Toku-En" plan, it can be concluded that the preparations for the surprise attack had been completed by the end of 1941.

In Aug. 1943, Lieut.-Col. TOMURA, Morio, Senior staff liaison officer of the Kwantung Army Headquarters warned Maj. KUBAYASHI and myself that preparations must be made so that we might change the ciphers speedily when military operations against the Soviet Union were opened.

Lieut.-Col. TOMURA told me that, according to the directives of the Imperial Headquarters, the Kwantung Army would open surprise operations against the Red Army so as to overwhelm it by taking the initiative against its superior force.

When I asked Lieut.-Col. TOMURA about the time of advance into Soviet, he replied he did not know.

It was rumoured at that time among the young officers of the General Headquarters of the Kwantung Army that the opening of war against the Soviet Union would be about the beginning of winter of 1943. For example, Captain Tadao HAKAJIMA, attached to the Intelligence Section of the Second Department, drew this inference from the fact that, in winter, rivers would be frozen over and military movement would be facilitated.

Q. What sort of spiritual education were the Japanese troops and people given regarding the offensive against Soviet?

A. The Japanese public propaganda organs acted so that they might impress deeply on the mind of the people, as early as from the age of school pupils, that the Soviet Union was the perpetual enemy against Japan and that there was a constant danger for Japan of being attacked by Soviet. They further propagated the inevitability of the war against Soviet under the conception that it was a matter affecting the destinies of the nation, as the problem of national defence or national existence for Japan, whether she could occupy Sakhalin and the Maritime Province, which were at present possessed by the Soviet Union and which were so near to Japan and accordingly would become the base of military offensive against Japan.

The like propaganda was made through newspapers, magazines and radio broadcastings.

It was at the time of the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact and the Triple Alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy when the anti-Soviet propaganda was specially strengthened.

At the time of the German advance into the Soviet Union, all Japanese newspapers reported the situation of war favorable to Germany and foretold the victory won by Germany in the near future. As for the official propaganda for the Manchurian occupation, they expounded that Manchukuo was the child of Japan, that the country was necessary for the Japanese people who were the parents of Manchukuo, and that the Soviet Union was a perpetual menace to the security of Manchuria.

According to the order of Major-General TAKAHASHI, Chief of Staff of the Mongolia Stationary Army, Major AOSHIMA, senior staff-officer in charge of intelligence, gave lectures on current problems to officers, at the dining room, almost every day at the beginning of the German-Soviet War. In these lectures, the Major sometimes referred, concerning the inevitability of the War against Soviet, to matters of Anti-Soviet nature. For example, he stated his opinion that the proper time for opening the offensive against Soviet was the period from July to December, 1941, in view of the reduction of military forces of the Soviet Army in the Far East on account of the outburst of the German-Soviet War.

Q. What units were belonging to the Mongolia Stationary Army? And give the names of the commanders of these units.

A. The Mongolia Stationary Army was composed of the 26th Division, (The Division Commander was Lieut.-Gen. Kenoshiro SHIBAYAMA), a Cavalry Group consisted of three regiments, (The Group Commander was Lieut.-Gen. Masao BABA. This Group was reorganized in August, 1942, to the 3rd Tank Division, Lieut.-Gen. Issaku NISHIHARA being appointed by the Emperor as the Division Commander), the 2nd Independent Mixed Brigade (the Brigade Commander was Major-Gen. Goro MAEO), the 56th Anti-aircraft Gunnery Regiment, the 23rd Automobile Regiment, and the 11th Telegraph Regiment. (I do not remember the regiment commanders' names).

The Commander-in-Chief of the Army was Lieut.-Gen. Juturo AMAKASU in 1941, Lieut.-Gen. Ichiro SHICHIDA in 1942, Lieut.-Gen. Yoshio KOZUKI in 1943. The Chief of Staff of the Army was Major-Gen. Mosuke TAKAHASHI in 1941, Major-Gen. Toyojiro INAMURA in 1942, Major-Gen. Masao YANO in 1943. The Senior Staff-officer in charge of military operations was Col. Masataka KAEURAGI in 1941, Col. Tomomichi YAZATO in 1942 and 1943. The Senior Staff-officer in charge of intelligence was Major Ryoichiro AOSHIMA from 1941 to August 1942, Major Masujiro NAKANISHI from August 1942.

I hereby testify that the above statement was made by myself and that it was true.

Witness	Japanese Major	Kusuo MATSUURA
Interrogator	Officer of Justice	Captain Sokolov
Interpreter		Tsvilov
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Doc. No. 2133

C E R T I F I C A T E

МАТЮШКИН

March 26, 1946

I, undersigned Major МАТЮШКИН, Krasno pledge that being a witness in the case of the main war criminals I shall testify truly and correctly.

I am aware of the responsibility I bear for giving false testimony provided for in article 95 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR.

This certificate is submitted to the Military interrogator Captain SOKOLOV, Sergei Pavlovich.

/s/ МАТЮШКИН, Krasno

The certificate is submitted to: the Military Interrogator, Captain SOKOLOV.

/s/ SOKOLOV.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT:

I, V. A. Kozma, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages; and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated document.

/s/ V. A. Kozma

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

The United States of America, etc. )  
 )  
 vs. ) SS.  
 )  
 WANI, Sadao and others )

AFFIDAVIT.

I, SEJIMA, Kuzo, ex-Lieutenant-Colonel of the Japanese Army, born in 1917 (Meiji 44) state as follows:

I graduated from the Military Academy in 1932 (showa 7) and from the Military College in 1938 (Showa 13). In January 1940 (Showa 15) I was attached to the Army General Staff Office; then in December 1941 (Showa 16), I was appointed member of the 1st Department (Military Operations Department) of the Army General Staff Office, where I actually worked till August 1944 (Showa 19).

I take oath and testify as follows to the facts I had been able to learn in the execution of my duties while working with the Army General Staff Office from January 1940 (Showa 15) to August 1944 (Showa 19).

I. During this period I worked continuously in Section II /'DAIWA'/' 1st Department of the Army General Staff Office. This section, called the Military Operations Section, took charge of duties regarding plans for military operations. From January 1940 (Showa 15) to December 1941 (Showa 16), I attended to matters of general business which included safe-keeping of secret documents and incineration of documents for which the custody period had expired. During the period that I was a member of Section II, I had charge of matters regarding employment of military forces, and during the latter part, I also participated in the drawing up of operational plans, some of which I drew up myself.

In about spring of 1941 (Showa 16), I incinerated the documents concerning the plans for the 1939 (Showa 14) military operations which had been kept in the document safe. In the Army General Staff Office, the period of custody for operational plans was generally two years. Before incinerating these documents



I took a glance through them and found among them the plans for the 1939 (Showa 14) operations against the U.S.S.R. It was thus that I learned about these plans and can still recollect their outline.

According to this plan, the chief strategical scheme of Japan's Supreme Command, in case of a Russo-Japanese war, was to concentrate our main forces in Eastern Manchuria and take the offensive against Far East Russia. In this case, the Kwantung Army was to occupy VOI OSHLOV, VLADIVOSTOK, I'AN and then KHABAROVSK, BRAGOVESHCHENSK and KUIVSHEVSKA.

After I became a member of Section II, 1st Department of the Army General Staff Office, I was able to learn in far more detail the contents of the operational plans as my duties were related to the employment of military forces. It was because I had to consider operational plans for the various areas concerned, in the employment of military forces. Accordingly, I have been able to learn the plans for operations against Russia for the years 1941 (Showa 16) and 1942 (Showa 17).

According to the operational plan for the year 1941 (Showa 16) the Kwantung Army was to concentrate its main forces in the direction of the Maritime Provinces, a part of its forces in the direction of BRAGOVESHCHENSK and KUIVSHEVSKA, and another part in the neighbourhood of HAILAR while the reserve was to be concentrated in HARBIN in the event of a Russo-Japanese war. The offensive was to be taken from the SUI-REN HO district towards and from the HEI-HO district towards the BRAGOVESHCHENSK and KUIVSHEVSKA districts. Plans were made for the forces in the neighbourhood of HAILAR to take a defensive position in order to protect offensive operations in other areas. The aim of the offensive operations in the Maritime Provinces was to occupy that area, while the offensive in the BRAGOVESHCHENSK and KUIVSHEVSKA districts was meant to cut the railway, to make reinforcement and supply from the west impossible.

In the first phase of the war, they expected to occupy VOI OSHLOV, VLADIVOSTOK, BRAGOVESHCHENSK, I'AN, KUIVSHEVSKA and RULOVO, while in the second phase, they expected as far as the situation permitted, to occupy North SAKHALIN, Port PETROPAVIOVSK of KA'CHATKA, NIKOLAYEVSK of the Amur River, KOMOS'OBISK and SORGATANI.

Beside the Army's plan of operation worked out at the Army General Staff Office, there were as a part of the operational plans, the plans for joint operations to be carried out in close cooperation by the Army and Navy together. Out of

these plans, those concerning Naval operations were worked out at the Naval General Staff Office and forwarded to the Army General Staff Office where they were inserted as part of the operational plans.

Accordingly, I looked through some of the plans for Naval operations also. For instance, the Naval operations for 1941 (Showa 16) had the three following objects:

- (1) to protect the landings on Port PETROPAVLOVSK of KAMCHATKA and NORTH SAKHALIN;
- (2) to attack the Russian Pacific Fleet and blockade VLADIVOSTOK from the sea front;
- (3) to protect the communication line connecting Japan Proper, Korea and Manchuria by guarding the TSUSHIMA channel.

In 1942 (Showa 17), the 1st Department of the Army General Staff Office had worked out a new plan for operations against the U.S.S.R., which was adhered to until the spring of 1944 (Showa 19). Having seen this plan many times, I can still recollect its outline.

Like all the previous operational plans, this plan for the year 1942 (Showa 17) was an offensive plan and the operation was scheduled to commence with a surprise attack.

According to the above plan, about thirty divisions were scheduled to be concentrated in MANCHURIA with the main force in Eastern MANCHURIA and concentrations of some of the forces in the SUN-WU and HAILAR districts respectively. The First Front which was to take the offensive against VOROSHILOV consisted of the 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 20th armies. The forces of the four armies were to advance in parallel so that they could fight a decisive battle in the vicinity of VOROSHILOV. The 2nd Front consisted of the 4th and 8th armies and its object was to take the offensive in the SVOVODONUK and KUIBYSHEVKA districts to annihilate the Russian forces in those areas, and cut the railway. Diversional operations were scheduled to be undertaken by the 6th Army in the Western areas. In the first phase of the war, the Japanese Army was scheduled to occupy the Russian cities in the Maritime Province and BIACOVESHCHENSK, SVOVODONUK and KUIBYSHEVSKA. The forces in HOKKAIDO were to occupy North SAKHALIN, and a division in Japan Proper was to occupy Port PETROPAVLOVSK of KAMCHATKA.

these plans, those concerning Naval operations were worked out at the Naval General Staff Office and forwarded to the Army General Staff Office where they were inserted as part of the operational plans.

Accordingly, I looked through some of the plans for Naval operations also. For instance, the Naval operations for 1941 (Shows 16) had the three following objects:

- (1) to protect the landings on Port PETROPAVLOVSK of KAMCHATKA and NORTH SAKHALIN;
- (2) to attack the Russian Pacific Fleet and blockade VLADIVOSTOK from the sea front;
- (3) to protect the communication line connecting Japan Proper, Korea and Manchuria by guarding the TSUSHIMA channel.

In 1942 (Shows 17), the 1st Department of the Army General Staff Office had worked out a new plan for operations against the U.S.S.R., which was adhered to until the spring of 1944 (Shows 19). Having seen this plan many times, I can still recollect its outline.

Like all the previous operational plans, this plan for the year 1942 (Shows 17) was an offensive plan and the operation was scheduled to commence with a surprise attack.

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The plans for Naval operations for the year 1942 (Showa 17) was in general the same as that of 1941 (Showa 16). The operational plans against the U.S.S.A. for 1943 (Showa 18) also followed the above plans for 1942 (Showa 17).

It had never been explained to me whether there was to be a war against Russia or not. All I knew were the military matters concerning operational plans as an officer of the 1st Department of the Army General Staff Office, and I have no knowledge concerning political relations.

II. In about the summer of 1941 (Showa 16), after the German attack on Russia, I came to learn the following facts in connection with the reinforcement of the Kwantung Army.

A. In about the summer of 1941 (Showa 16), I saw, at the 1st Department of the Army General Staff Office, the text of the Imperial Command (handwritten) for despatching two new divisions to the Kwantung Army.

B. In about the summer of 1941 (Showa 16), I saw, at the 1st Department of the Army General Staff Office, a military order (printed) reorganization in connection with the fifteen divisions of the Kwantung Army on a semi-war-time basis, which was distributed to each section of the department.

C. Through the documents I saw at the Army General Staff Office, in other words, through the telegrams reporting the progress of mobilization in all districts, I knew that a mobilization was underway in Japan in the summer of 1941 (Showa 16) to reinforce the Kwantung Army. The number of mobilized men was about 300,000, and I came to learn about it through calculation of the strength of the Kwantung Army in 1942 (Showa 17).

The mobilization was secretly carried out, and the usual elaborate send-offs for the conscripts were prohibited. In Tokyo, I often saw mobilized troops passing through or leaving from the stations in profound silence.

The above was written by my own hand and the contents are true.

(signed) Sejima, Ruizo

Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned officer by the above-named SEIJIMA, Ruizo, at the Soviet Embassy Building, Tokyo, Japan, this day 27th of September, 1946.

/signed/ Roland J. Schwartz  
Roland J. Schwartz, Capt. T.C.  
Summary Courts Martial

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, 2nd Lt. John D. Hattori, hereby certify that I am fully conversant with the Japanese and English languages, and that this day, the said SEIJIMA, Ruizo, was duly sworn in my presence and signed said affidavit under oath in my presence; and that all proceedings incidental to the administration of said oath and the signing of said affidavit were truly and correctly translated from Japanese into English and English into Japanese and fully understood and comprehended by said Affiant.

Dated this 27th day of September, 1946, at Tokyo, Japan.

/signed/ John D. Hattori  
JOHN D. HATTORI  
2nd Lt.  
Central Interrogation Section.

Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned officer by the above-named SEIJIMA, Ruizo, at the Soviet Embassy Building, Tokyo, Japan, this day 27th of September, 1946.

/signed/ Roland J. Schwartz  
Roland J. Schwartz, Capt. T.C.  
Summary Courts Martial

C E R T I F I C A T E

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Dated this 27th day of September, 1946, at Tokyo,  
Japan.

/signed/ John D. Hattori  
JOHN D. HATTORI  
2nd Lt.  
Central Interrogation Section.

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Ex P 34

祖東國際運筆裁判所

受審者 谷本 隆三  
某不詳其他

供述書

私、明治四十四年十一月、久日本陸軍少佐瀨島龍三より  
一、谷本通、申述（三）

私、昭和七年志願士官學校、又昭和十二年陸軍大學校、  
夫卒業致し、昭和十五年一月志願本部附次、昭和十六  
年十二月令謀本部第一作戦部、部員、命じ同部、  
事實、昭和十九年八月迄勤務致し、終り、

志願本部勤務、昭和十五年一月、昭和十九年八月迄  
同、職務上、此事實、通、宣誓、下、証言致し、

第一、私、七期間中、運筆顧問、志願本部第一、第二、第三、勤務、  
序、志願本部第一、第二、第三、作戦課、稱、作戦計  
畫、同、此、業務、三、行、り、此、謀、於、私、昭和十五年、  
昭和十六年十二月迄、一般、庶務、事項、行、其、中、公、務、家  
書類、保管、保管、期、日、過、り、又、書類、燒却、令、  
序、第一、第二、第三、部、間、上、り、二、三、より、志願本部、勤務、終、  
時、迄、兵力、運用、關係、事項、及其、外、後、期、於、作戦計  
畫、立案、加、り、又、部、作戦計畫、自、之、立案、致、  
昭和十六年、公、項、書類、令、傳、在、り、昭和十四年度、作戦  
計畫、燒却、致、し、志願本部、於、作戦計畫、保





Pac 2673

各三方方面ニ討テ取返シ、退者ヲ悉數トシ西下正田ヨリ増  
 兵ヲ繰ルヲ存心トシ之ニ任ス  
 戰軍第一隊ヲ於テ守リテ、酒田附近、アノコノ、アノコノ  
 外ニ、アノコノ及アノコノ附近、占領ヲ手段トシテ、アノコノ於  
 狀況ニ討テ取リテ、アノコノ、アノコノ、アノコノ、アノコノ、アノコノ  
アノコノ、アノコノ及アノコノ、占領スル手段アリニシテ、  
 參謀本部ニ於テ是レニ陸軍作戰、外作戰計畫、一部合  
 トシテ陸海軍関係中心切リテ、アノコノ、アノコノ、アノコノ、アノコノ  
 外、中海軍作戰、軍令部ニ於テ是レニ其計畫、參謀本  
 部、傳達スル作戰計畫、一部合シテ、アノコノ、アノコノ、アノコノ  
 (本頁ニ續ク)

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斯之海軍計劃... 於海軍下  
戰六次、三目的ヲ有シテ居リ之、其ハ力カ  
ヲトカ、遠及、故、極、大、上陸、受、護、甚、(2)ハ  
聯太平洋艦隊ヲ攻惠シ、浦、德、海、正、雪  
リ封鎖、其ハ對馬海峡ヲ可備シテ、内、鮮、滿  
交通ヲ掩護スルニ在リ之。

服部十七年社、於テ、本、部、第、一、部、對、  
作、戰、計、劃、ヲ、立、本、之、夫、船、部、十、九、年、春、迄  
踏、踏、集、於、居、之、私、ハ、社、ニ、ス、以、計、劃、ヲ  
見、概、要、ヲ、記、憶、シ、居、リ、之、

從、本、作、戰、計、劃、始、ク、即、和、十、七、年、社、計、劃、  
攻、勢、計、劃、ニ、作、戰、急、務、ニ、開、始、シ、予、定  
テ、ア、リ、之、同、計、劃、於、滿、洲、部、三、十、師、團  
ヲ、集、中、シ、其、主、力、東、部、滿、洲、一、部、滿、洲、附  
近、三、部、ハ、自、身、附、近、ニ、夫、々、集、中、配、置、ス、計  
劃、テ、ア、リ、之、

ハ、本、部、之、方、向、ニ、主、攻、勢、ヲ、實、施、ス、第、一、方、面、軍  
ハ、第、二、第、三、第、五、及、第、十、軍、ヨリ、成、リ、居、リ、之、  
ヲ、其、四、個、軍、ノ、兵、力、ハ、本、部、之、附、近、ニ、於、テ、決、戰  
ヲ、行、フ、如、併、進、ス、キ、テ、ア、リ、之、第、二、方、面、軍  
ハ、第、四、及、第、八、軍、ヨリ、成、リ、其、目、的、ハ、本、部、之、  
及、不、ア、リ、之、方、向、ニ、對、シ、攻、勢、ヲ、取、リ、該、方、面、ノ、軍  
ヲ、專、滅、シ、鐵、道、ヲ、遮、斷、ス、ニ、在、リ、之、西、方、面  
ニ、於、テ、第、六、軍、ヲ、以、テ、牽、制、作、戰、力、ヲ、予、定、シ、  
居、リ、之、戰、事、第、一、段、階、日、本、軍、ハ、濱、州

No 4

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其二十年海軍計劃一併實施之  
千九百十六年春對日作戰計劃三於海軍下  
戰六次三月為期之居り之其(1)カ  
チヤトカノ、港及兵庫太ノ上陸攻撃甚(2)カ  
聯大軍洋艦隊ヲ攻惠シ浦鹽斯德ヲ海軍  
リ封鎖其(3)カ對馬海峡ヲ守備シ内鮮滿  
交通ヲ掩護スルニ在リ之ヲ  
昭和十七年春ニ於テ本謀本部第一對日  
作戰計劃ヲ立案シ夫ノ昭和十九年春迄  
見テ概要ヲ記憶シ居リ之ヲ

從本、作戰計劃、如ク昭和十七年春計劃  
攻勢計劃ヲアリ之ヲ作戰急態ニ開始スルヲ定  
テアリ之ヲ同計劃ニ於テ滿洲ニ開始スルヲ定  
テ集中シ其主力ヲ東部滿洲ニ一部、孫吳附  
近ニ部、ハ付附近ニ夫々集中配置スル計  
畫ヲアリ之ヲ

ハカノ方ニ主攻勢ヲ實施スル第一方面軍  
ハ第一第三第五及第二十軍自リ攻ヲ居リ之  
ヲ其四週軍ノ兵力ハカノ方附近ニ於テ決戰  
ヲ行フ如ク準備スルヲアリ之ヲ第二方面軍  
ハ第四及第八軍ヲ成リ其目的ハ不列支  
及列強ノ方ニ對シ攻勢ヲ取リ該方面ノ軍  
ヲ專威シ鐵道ヲ遮斷スルニ在リ之ヲ西方面  
ニ於テハ第六軍ヲ以テ牽制作戰ヲ定テ之ヲ  
居リ之ヲ戰事第一段階ニ日本軍ハ濱州

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doc 2673

八月廿五日... 道部... 漢軍... 子定...

昭和十七年... 海軍... 昭和十七年... 昭和十七年...

昭和十七年... 昭和十七年... 昭和十七年... 昭和十七年...

昭和十六年... 昭和十六年... 昭和十六年... 昭和十六年...

昭和十六年... 昭和十六年... 昭和十六年... 昭和十六年...

昭和十七年... 昭和十七年... 昭和十七年... 昭和十七年...

昭和十七年... 昭和十七年... 昭和十七年... 昭和十七年...

no 5

No. 6

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實真施也之ハトテ承知之ヲ任セシメ  
 郵員也之ハ人員具ハ約三十名行テ了ルニシテ力夫  
 ハ服和十七年ニ於テ關東軍ノ兵力計算ニ亦  
 ヲ之ヲ承知取ルニシテ  
 郵員ハ秘密ニ行ハシテ郵員也之ハ人ニ對シ  
 從來如ク盛大ナル歡送ヲ行ハシテ東京ニ於テ  
 郵員軍隊ニ通行ノ權ニ於テハ先ハ極メテ靜  
 肅ニ行ハシテ履ル觀望ハ行ハス

此ノ宣稱ノ下ニ發言ノ自筆一紙ニシテ其ノ總  
 合ノ內容ハ眞實ナリトス

Doc 2673

日本國駐小野(西曆十一月)本國駐小野(西曆十一月)...

署名(一)...

大尉

T. C.

伊波洋行會議

證 明

本即子少尉(一)...

日本東京...

九月六日(西曆十一月)九月廿七日

伊波洋行

少尉

署名(一)...

No. 7

AUTOGRAPH TESTIMONY

P.W. Former Commander of the First Area Army  
of the Kwantung Army. General KITA, Seichi.  
From April 20 to April 23, 1946.

I, former Commander of the First Area Army of Kwantung Army, General KITA, Seichi shall state about the preparation for seizure of Manchuria and the attack against U.S.S.R. by Japan.

At the beginning of Showa era, i.e., in 1926, the civil war in China expanded. This civil war was caused by the anti-northern expedition carried out by Sun-Sun and CHIANG Kai-shek with the object of unifying and restoring the national rights of China. If this movement should extend to Manchuria, the Japanese rights in that area would be contradicted. The Japanese government, therefore, decided the following measures:

1. That the civil war of China shall not be allowed to extend over Manchuria.
2. That the influence of Sun-Sun shall not be allowed to penetrate into Manchuria.
3. That the government of CHIANG Tsuo-lin in Manchuria shall be supported to the utmost so that he might be able to make every effort to prevent the Chinese national liberation movement from penetrating into Manchuria and also to suppress the anti-Japanese sentiment in Manchuria itself.

These political measures of Japan were decided by the Ministers of War, Navy and Foreign Affairs and were sanctioned by Premier TAMAKA. I myself saw the documents concerning the above decisions at the War Ministry office in July, 1927. The then War Minister was General UGAKI.

In May 1928, the nationalist forces in North China smashed the resistance of CHIANG Tsuo-lin and drove him into Manchuria. The nationalist movement did not penetrate into Manchuria, but the anti-Japanese sentiment there gradually aggravated. Under such conditions in China and Manchuria in August 1929, I was appointed assistant Military Attache to the Japanese Embassy in Nanking by the order of the Chief of the General Staff, General KANAYA, and was attached to Military Attache, Major-General SATO, who was stationed in Shanghai. I was appointed to this post, because I had studied the general situation in China, the characters and customs of the Chinese people, and the Chinese language, and also because I had some acquaintances among the important persons of the Army in the Nanking government. For instance, I met War Minister General HO Ying-Chin at CHENKIANG in 1927 through one of his friends who was working at the Japanese consulate in Nanking. At that time the Japanese War Ministry dispatched me for the investigation of the Nanking Incident in China. (Japanese residents took refuge in the Nanking Consulate, which was attacked by the nationalist force). I went to CHEN KIANG with the



object of spying upon the conditions of the nationalist anti-northern expedition. It was there that I made the acquaintance of HU Ting-Chin, then the highest commander of the nationalist army in that section. HU Ying-chin had formerly studied in the Military Academy of Japan and was kind to the Japanese. Besides this person, I was on good terms with the vice-chief of the Military Administration Section of the Nanking Government, CHEN-Yi, Inspector-General of Military Discipline, Lt. General CHU Ya-wei, Chief of the Survey Bureau of Army, Lt. General FUANG, MI-sung, and Commander of Engineer Corps, Lt. General YANG-Chieh. With them I was friends from the time when we were students of the Military Staff College in Tokyo. When I was appointed assistant Military Attache to the Embassy, my personal opinion regarding the Japanese policy in China was taken into consideration in addition to the above-said conditions. I, of course, was in accord with this policy. Before my departure for Nanking, I received the following instructions from the Chief of the General Staff, General KATAYA:

1. To spy upon the military strength of the Central Army of the Nanking Government.
2. To collect data regarding the national liberation movement originated by the Nationalist party, to pay special attention to the trend of expansion of this movement into Manchuria, and to make efforts to prevent it from penetrating into Manchuria.
3. To form friends among the military circles of the Nanking Government to facilitate execution of my duties.

I received the same instructions from the military attache to the Embassy, Major-General SATO in Shanghai, who directed me further on the day that I was dispatched to Nanking, to pay attention to the situation of military administration of the Nanking Government. After my arrival in Nanking, I established contact with the above-mentioned military authorities of the Nanking Government and I carried out my duties as instructed. Aside from the above, I took charge of the intelligence work pertaining to Military Administration. I executed this work through connections with important persons in the Nanking Government and by the utilization of secret agents. The situation in China at that time can be said to have facilitated intelligence work -- the segregation of society due to the civil war, the confrontation of the Chinese military cliques, the existence of anti-government elements and so on. We could easily fulfill whatever requirements concerning intelligence under such circumstances. I succeeded in forming somewhat better relationship with the military authorities of the Nanking Government, but the situation in Manchuria at that time was aggravated day by day by anti-Japanese movement which caused many incidents. Not long before the Manchurian Incident in 1931, a Japanese captain whose name was NAKAMURA was killed on a road in HSING AN LING near Solon. Captain NAKAMURA was one of the staff officers of the General Staff. The General Staff had dispatched him to attend to the intelligence work in the neighborhood of HSING AN LING. After my arrival as Chief of the second section of the Headquarters of Kwantung Army, in 1932, I heard from many people working at the headquarters of the Kwantung Army that the said NAKAMURA was dispatched with the object of investigating the roads in HSING AN LING and I am convinced of the statements being true.

I think I can safely say concerning the Japanese preparation for the occupation of Manchuria that the fact that Japan has long been covetous of Manchuria could be testified by the condition before the Manchurian Incident and by various other situations there. Japan wanted to have military bases in Manchuria for the execution of aggressive plans against Soviet Russia. The construction of strategic railway lines in Korea such as the Seoul-Fumen line, the Hanan line, and the Tuzon-Mukden line was carried out with the same objective. To realize this cherished plan some proper historical time had to be chosen. The year of 1931 afforded a good opportunity, because countries which had interests in Manchuria, for instance, China and Soviet Russia were absorbed in their own affairs and could not afford to direct their attentions to Manchuria, the former being absorbed in civil war, and the latter, in the five-year national construction program. Japan, taking all these facts into consideration, increased the expeditionary forces in Manchuria on Sept. 18 1931. The action resulted in the occupation of the whole of Manchuria. Following the occupation, Japan set to work on the establishment of Manchukuo. There were two opinions—one was to place Manchuria under Chinese administration with certain number of Japanese advisers in the Manchurian government, the other was to form an independent monarchical state, Manchukuo, and to keep the real power of the country in the hands of Japan. The latter plan was advocated by Lt. Col. ISHIMARA and Col. ITAGAKI who were at the headquarters of Kwantung Army, and was supported by Gen. ARAKI. In accordance with the latter program, all the ministers of the cabinet were selected from among the Manchurians, and the positions of vice-ministers were filled by Japanese subjects. Moreover, it was decided that some Japanese officials should serve in various Manchurian government offices. Such a policy aggravated the anti-Japanese sentiment among the Manchurian people, and caused the increase of anti-Japanese troops which had actively resisted the Japanese forces in Manchuria. In this connection Kwantung Army made it their primary task to annihilate all the anti-Japanese elements either by subjugating them or by advising their allegiance by means of propaganda. Major punitive expeditions were carried out around the cities of Harbin, Chinchow, and in the vicinity of TUNG PING TAO. The pursuit of the armies of MA Chen-shan and LI-Tu and the subjugation of Jehol were also punitive campaigns. These military operations were directed by the Chief of the Staff Lt. Gen. MIYAKE and Lt. Gen. KOISO when Generals Honjo and Muto were commanders of the Kwantung Army. These punitive operations caused the innocent Manchurian civilians enormous damage and brought many of them to bankruptcy. We cannot but definitely admit that such operations caused the diversion of the people, destruction of houses, loss of properties and such like. Owing to the number of years that have elapsed I do not remember well the amount and scope of losses and damage caused by these operations, but I cannot but recognize the fact for seven long years warfare was conducted at a considerable sacrifice on the part of the Chinese people. During the period when I served at the headquarters of the headquarters of the Kwantung Army as Chief of the second section, the subjugation plans and measures were formed in the headquarters of the Kwantung Army by Col. SAITO and Lt. Col. NEDO. Those officers who directly commanded the expeditions are as follows:

1. Harbin and the vicinity of KIRIN the 10th Division  
(Commander, Lt. Gen. HIROSE)
2. The vicinity of Chinchow and Jehol the 8th Division  
(Commander, Lt. Gen. NISHI).

3. The Province of HAILUJING and the vicinity of CHINHLIANG the 14th Division (Commander, Lt. Gen. MISONI, later succeeded by Lt. General HATA, Shinroku.
4. Vicinity of Jehol, the 6th Division (Commander, Lt. Gen. SAKAMOTO)  
Mixed brigade (Commander, Maj. Gen. HATTORI)

A part of the above-mentioned divisions simultaneously launched a punitive campaign in another area. The operations in Jehol was directly commanded by the commander of Kwantung Army General MUTO and I also participated in the Jehol operations. I, as chief of the second section, presented to the chief of staff of Kwantung Army the data of intelligence concerning both the doings and movements of the anti-Japanese troops; and the districts whose population was imbued with anti-Japanese sentiments. Then the first section made the subjugation plan based on my reports. In the spring of 1934 a large scale military operation was carried out in the vicinity of TU LUNG SHAN, south of CHIA MU SSU. The operation was carried out to subjugate the Manchurian units which, being dissatisfied with the purchase of Manchurian possessed land by the Manchurian Development Company of Japan, revolted and attacked the Japanese forces with the result of annihilating the whole strength of a company and killing the regimental commander, Colonel IIZUKI. In order to suppress the rioters in the vicinity of TU LUNG SHAN, the Japanese army sent a large number of forces there. Bestirred by the retaliative sentiment provoked by the death of their own regimental Commander Col. IIZUKI, they caused enormous damages to the Manchurian residents. This fighting was directed by the chief of staff Col. KANO of the 10th Division (Commanded by Lt. Gen. HIROSE). The responsibility for these subjugation campaigns in general carried out by Kwantung Army in Manchuria during the period from 1931 to 1936 should be borne by the then commanders of Kwantung Army--Generals HONJO, MUTO, HISHIKARI, MINAMI and UEDA. At the same time in 1933 Japan began to take measures to expel from Manchuria the influence of Soviet Russia which at that time confined itself to the management of the Chinese Eastern Railway. With this object in view, the Japanese put various kinds of pressure upon the railway and its employees. These machinations were chiefly made by the head of military Special Service in Harbin, Maj. Gen. KOME TSUBARA, the Representative of the South Manchuria Rly. Company in Harbin, Director USAMI and other agents, they were all under the direction of Col. HARADA, chief of the third section of headquarters. I cannot flatly deny the fact that Japan made use of agitators in the Chinese Eastern Rlys. in order to expel the influence of Soviet Russia from Manchuria or that Japan utilized some bandits to disturb the railway administration as well as to bring pressure to bear upon its employees. But at that time, not only the business of the Chinese Eastern Rlys, but also those of all other railways throughout Manchuria were disturbed by bandits.

In 1935 Japan, by resorting to every possible means, induced Soviet Russia to sell the right and interest of the Chinese Eastern Rlys. After that Japan gradually enlarged her preparation for military bases in Manchuria for war against Soviet Russia. Along with it, the building of fortresses in ten areas, the establishment of 200 airfields of all sizes,

the construction of railways extending 9,000 kilometers, the construction of Hsien Tung Harbor, the construction of communications and roads, the establishment of munition factories etc., were carried out. Most of these construction works were executed in accordance with the plans prepared by the General Staff of the Japanese Government the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry. The Kwantung Army took the following measures in order to carry out these plans, the instructions of the General Staff, and requests made by itself.

1. The Fortification department to build fortresses.
2. The air force units to build air-fields.
3. The Manchurian Civil Engineering Bureau to build military roads.
4. The Manchurian Telegraph and Telephone Company to establish communications.
5. The construction of harbors and railways shall be entrusted to the South Manchuria Ry. Company.
6. The Manchurian Heavy Industry Company shall be founded for the establishment and management of munition factories.

The Japanese authorities, either purchased at low prices by compulsion the land owned by Manchurians or forced them to remove to other places for the sake of these construction works and for the settlement of Japanese immigrants, and thereby provoked intense dissatisfaction among the Manchurian people. In addition, the Japanese authorities established the system of compulsory labor to conscript Manchurians for military construction works. The conscripted laborers received lower wages than the free laborers to the detriment of their welfare. Moreover, the bad condition of housing, sanitation and supply, the defective management by the Japanese and so on resulted in the death of many laborers from sickness. In 1944, for instance, about 20,000 Manchurian laborers were employed for the construction of fortresses in the neighborhood of HSING AN LING and the number of those who died from illness mounted to 500. The former chiefs of staff of the Kwantung Army, Lt. Gen. HATA and General USHIROKU explained to me that there were cases of death reported from other districts but they did not tell me the number of the dead laborers. The total number of Manchurian laborers conscripted by Kwantung Army amounted to 120,000 or 130,000.

Those who were responsible for the strengthening of Manchuria as military bases against Soviet Russia since the Manchurian Incident in 1931 are Japanese Premier, INUKAI, KONOE, and General TOJO; Japanese War Ministers Generals ARAKI, SUGIYAMA and TOJO; Chiefs of the General staff, Generals KAFAYA, Prince KAN-IN, SUGIYAMA and TOJO; Commanders of the Kwantung Army, Generals HONJO, HISHIKARI, MINAMI, UEDA and UMEZU, and those members of the headquarters of the Kwantung Army to whom I referred to in this testimony. In August of 1934 I was transferred to the position of Chief of the China section in the General Staff. The then chief of the General Staff was Prince KAN-IN, Deputy Chief, Lt. Gen. SUGIYAMA (later General); Chief of the 1st department, Maj. Gen. SUZUKI (later Lt. Gen.); chief of the 2nd Department, Maj. Gen. ISOYA (later Lt. Gen.), and chief of the 3rd department, Maj. Gen. USHIRO-KU (later General). The work of the China section was the adjustment and judgment of the intelligence pertaining to China and the investigation of topography for military purposes. The section constituted of two groups, that is, the China group (chief, Lt. Col. KUSUMOTO) and the geography group (chief Lt. Col. WACHI), with four or five officers being attached to each of them. The work was executed

by studying and putting together all the intelligence and documents from the Korean Army, Kwantung Army, Tientsin Army and Formosa Army; from the military attaches and officers stationed in the various countries, especially from the attaché at the Embassy in China and officers stationed in Peking, Shimon and Carter, together with those from the Navy and Foreign Ministers. While I was in that post, the anti-Japanese sentiment in China gradually increased and spread owing to the Manchurian Incident, but nothing serious happened. At that time a plan for strengthening the forces in Manchuria was furthered and in 1936 the program to increase Kwantung Army to four divisions, five railway guard units (each five battalions) and four frontier garrisons, was realized.

In 1934 the General Staff gave Kwantung Army instructions pertaining to the building of fortresses. In this connection investigation had already been made since about 1933.

#### The Anti-Comintern Pact among Japan, Germany, and Italy:

In 1936 the anti-Comintern Pact was concluded among Japan, Germany and Italy. Negotiations relative to this pact had already been in progress since autumn 1935 between the military attaché to the Embassy in Germany, Lt. Gen. OSHIMA, and the German government authorities. Since then through the efforts of Military Attaché OSHIMA its conclusion was reached. It is not clear who, among the important governmental officials in Tokyo supported this measure, but I, as well as other persons clearly recognized the fact that the appearance of this pact, whose nature was provocative to Soviet Russia, brought an ill effect on the diplomatic relations between the two countries. In Japan this anti-Comintern Pact was used to unify the National thought against Soviet Russia. Every possible effort was made to instigate the people that we had to fight to the utmost against the Communist politics of Soviet Russia, and that it was necessary to dissolve the PA LU Army of China, etc. This pact resulted in strengthening Japanese national spiritual preparation for war against Soviet Russia and also in the interference in the internal administration of China.

#### The days when I was the Military Attaché to the Embassy in China:

In April 1936, having been appointed the Military Attaché to the Embassy in China, I reported to Shanghai. Before this, the Foreign Minister of the Tokyo Government, considering the fact that the Sino-Japanese relation was becoming more serious, had newly appointed Ambassador KAWAGOE to China. The problems to be solved by the Ambassador were as follows:

1. China shall connive the Japanese rights in Manchuria, that is to say, China shall pretend not to notice the occupation of Manchuria by Japan.
2. China shall suppress movements which are anti-Japanese and which are insulting to Japanese. Both countries shall cooperate economically.

3. China shall cooperate with Japan in anti-Comintern activities.

I remember that as the compensation for the above three conditions Japan promised China economic and technical aid. Although in June 1936, Ambassador KAWAGOE began negotiations with the Nanking Government on these problems, the Nanking Government did not agree and the negotiations were suspended. The Nanking Government made the following answers as to the proposals offered by Japan:

1. China will not officially recognize Manchukuo, but will connive the situation in Manchuria.
2. China herself will resist Communism. Materially speaking, China is fighting against the Red Army. But she cannot promise Japan that she will cooperate against Communism lest it should aggravate diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia.
3. The Chinese Government cannot suppress the anti-Japanese movements in China by its own power as it represents the sentiment of the whole Chinese people, and not sentiment of an individual.

The Nanking Government continued to maintain this opinion till the last moment, and brought about the Sino-Japanese war in 1937. Before my departure for Shanghai as Military Attache to the Embassy in China, I received from the Deputy Chief of the Staff, Lt. Gen. NISHIO instructions, the important points of which were as follows: "I shall collect intelligence regarding the political trend of the Nanking Government, especially the military situation and at the same time co-operate with Ambassador KAWAGOE to adjust the diplomatic relations between both countries." I went from time to time to Nanking and saw the Ambassador. However, relations with China became serious day by day and at last an incident broke out when, in July 1937, Japanese troops stationed in the suburbs of Peking on maneuvers were fired upon by the Chinese. Japan strived to solve the problem on the spot but did not succeed. Japan later announced in the press and to the diplomatic representatives that she would not recognize CHANG Kai-shek's Government and would attack to punish the Chinese troops. In August 1937 the Japanese landing party (Navy) collided with the Chinese forces near Shanghai. This incident formed the second stage of the gradually expanding Sino-Japanese War.

The period when I was the Chief of the Special Service Section and the Chief of the Liaison Section of the China Affairs Board (KO-A-M).

In August 1937 at the time of the expansion of the Sino-Japanese War the North China Area Army was established in Peking. At the same time, I was appointed Chief of the Special Service Section of the Army and reported to my new post in Peking. I was appointed to that post by War Minister Gen. SUGIYAMA. The duties of the Special Service Section

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were to execute the work of Military administration, and the actual work was to Japanize the occupied areas in China, i.e. to establish a government as a guiding organ of politics, economics and culture. I made the following bureaux in the Special Service Section.

1. General Affairs Bureau--in charge of political matters.
2. First Economic Bureau--in charge of finance and economy.
3. Second Economic Bureau--in charge of traffic and industries.
4. Culture Bureau--in charge of education and culture.

Experts were sent to the Special Service Section from various departments of the Japanese government and in order to establish a plan for managing administration and economy in the occupied areas in China at that time. An important measure, which I took in North China while I was chief of the Special Service Section, was the establishment of a regime in North China with Wang Ko-min, a pro-Japanese at its head. He was formerly a finance minister, but I do not remember in what regime. Japanese representatives were employed as advisers in the Wang Ko-min regime. As one of the advisers I took direct charge of political affairs. The others were economic adviser HIRAO Hachisaburo, administrative adviser YUSAWA Michio, and legal adviser ODATE Shigeo. These three were not military men. The principle of the advisers was to carry out the policies of the Japanese government in the activities and operations of the Wang Ko-min regime and to cooperate to the fullest extent with Japanese Military forces in the war against China. In 1939 the Special Service Section was DISSOLVED and its duties were transferred to the newly organized Asia Development Board (Koain). I was appointed Chief of the North China Liaison Section of the Asia Development Board. I received this appointment from the cabinet, HIRANUMA was Premier at that time. Since the board was not a military organ, I became a civilian official, but still remaining in active service. I was also a committeeman on the board. The headquarters of the Asiatic Development Board was in Tokyo and Premier HIRANUMA was the head and the president. Vice-presidents were War Minister Lt. General ITAGAKI, THE Navy Minister, the Foreign Affairs Minister and the Finance Minister; and there were about sixty board members. The actual work was not carried out by the president but by Chief of the General Affairs Bureau YANAGAWA Heisuke. Since this board was not a social organization but a purely national organization, civilian officials as well as military officers could become board members. As stated above during the time when I was Chief of the Liaison Section up until 1940 the planning duty of the Asia Development Board was to Japanize China. I know well that such a plan was not to be applied to the other countries which came into the system of greater East Asia. Later, however, upon the break of the Jap.-U. S. war when Japan occupied other countries in East Asia such as Burma, Thailand, French Indo-China, the Phillipine Islands and other islands in the Southern Pacific, the scope of such activities as those of the Asia Development Board was greatly expanded. Therefore, so as to perform the planning duties of the board not only in China but also in the occupied territories in Greater East Asia, a larger and stronger organization based on the Asian Development Board was required. Consequently, in the beginning of 1942, the Board was absorbed by the newly established Greater East Asia Ministry and the duty of the Chief of the

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Liaison Section of the Board was transferred to the embassies set up in the various occupied territories. For example there was General YAMADA, the commander of the Kwantung Army as Envoy Extra-ordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary in Manchuria, TANI as Ambassador in a similar position in the Wang Ching-Wei regime and similar embassies in Burma, Thailand, French Indo-China, other countries occupied by Japan. These embassies performed the planning duty of the former Asia Development Board, that is, they Japanized the territories under Japanese occupation. While I was the Chief of the Special Service Section and the Liaison Section in North China, I did much to assure the suitable condition of the strategic operation of our North China Army and to help to strengthen the military foundation in Manchuria.

In the summer of 1937, the Inner Mongolian Garrison Army was set up in Kalgan concurrently with the operations of the North China Army. In August 1937, the Kwantung Army under the command of the Chief of Staff Lt. General TOJO (later full general) captured Inner Mongolia and established the Special Service Agency TOKUMU-KIKAN, appointing Major General MATSUI its chief. Later, when the Mongolian Army was established its Commander was Lt. General HASUTUMA, the Special Service Agency was changed into the Special Service Section (TOKUMU-BU and Major General MATSUI remaining as chief. In November 1937, Major General MATSUI established a Japanized Mongolia-Hsinkiang government headed by Prince Te. Japanese advisors from Manchuria were placed in this government. The object of our occupation of Inner Mongolia and the establishment of a Japanized government was the same as our object at the time when we got possession of Manchuria, that is to say, to hold Inner Mongolia at Japan's command and set up a military base there against Outer Mongolia. This measure was carried out at the insistence of Lt. General TOJO, the then Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, and the same policy was continued by him even after he became Prime Minister of Japan. The assistance which I offered to the measure for the taking of Inner Mongolia was in creating in North China a provision for driving out of China and out of Inner Mongolia the Chinese forces which opposed our North China Army thereby facilitating Lt. General TOJO's occupation of Mongolia. The Japanese assets in Inner Mongolia being lacking, Japan did not build fortresses there as she did in Manchuria but maintained a force of 50,000 soldiers in Inner Mongolia until 1941. As to the border line troubles at Chang-Ku-Feng in 1938 and at Nomonhan in 1939, the hostilities between Japan and the Soviet Russia initiated by lawless actions of the Japanese Army; and since the details and the persons responsible for those incidents are well known, I need not make any further answer here.

In March 1940, I was recalled from the position of Chief of the Liaison Section of the Asiatic Development Board and appointed commander of the 14th Division in Utsunomiya (Japan). In September 1940, I was told confidentially by the Chief of the General Staff His Highness Prince Kan-in that the 14th Division would be diverted to Manchuria in accordance with a plan to increase the Kwantung Army to 15 divisions. In October 1940, I arrived at Chichihaorh with my division. Since such an increase in strength was not necessary for defense of order in Manchuria it was in preparation for Japanese operations against the Soviet Russia.

When I was in Chichihaerh with the division in 1940, I received secret instructions from the commander of the 6th Army to the effect that the officers of the 14th Division were requested to be thoroughly familiar with the topography in the vicinity of Hairaorh, as the division would be employed on the Hairaorh plain in case of the outbreak of war; and also that training should be carried out so as to be chiefly capable of sustained defense against the well-equipped Russian forces. Moreover, the 6th Army in Hairaorh executed map strategic maneuvers in the vicinity of Hairaorh twice in 1940, by way of studying the operation against Soviet Russia. I and my staff participated in these and I stressing combat with Soviet Russia trained my subordinates.

After the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia in 1941, the General Staff Headquarters heavily increased the Kwantung Army by sending troops, horses and guns from Japan in order to strengthen the preparation for the operations against Russia. This increase was executed in accordance with a plan known as "Ken-Toku-En" (Kwantung Army Special Maneuvers). The amount of troops and ordnance of the Kwantung Army reached the maximum limit under the plan of the summer of 1941. First of all, two fresh divisions were sent from Japan and added to the thirteen divisions already there. Besides this, each division was increased by 5,000 personnel and 3,500 horses. Consequently, the Kwantung Army which, before the "Ken-Toku-En" consisted of:

13 divisions.....	195,000 men
2 tank divisions.....	30,000 men & 400 tanks
Air forces.....	24,000 men & 1,000 planes
Border guards (28 battalions).....	19,000 men
Railway guards (5 units).....	17,500 men
Rear forces.....	100,000 men
Total...(men).....	386,00
(horses).....	40,000

It now possessed 600,000 men and 80,000 horses due to the increase made by the "Ken-Toku-En" plan. As for guns, the 14th Division under my command had the increased number of 48 while the number previously was 36. It may be considered that similar increases were made in other divisions.

When the increase was put into effect, the Imperial Headquarters issued an order to hasten preparations for the operations against Soviet Russia. This order was issued in the latter part of June 1941, but I did not read it, and I do not know its number, as I simply heard of it from a man in the service of the Kwantung Army. At that time I received no other order except an instruction from the Commander of the 6th Army to which my 14th Division belonged. However, the Commander of the 6th Army ordered the 23rd Division at Hairaerh to build field fortifications on the heights east of Hairaorh in order to quickly prepare for the operation. All the conditions in Kwantung Army during the summer of 1941 were of such a nature as to hasten preparations for a war against Russia. But, at that time, the Japanese forces had invaded and occupied French Indo-China. This caused a sudden tension in the Jap-American relations, making the situation acute and, as a consequence, Japan was placed at a crossroad. That is to

say, the Japanese Government did not know whether she should open a war first against the Soviet Russia or against America. The following three items were decided at an Imperial Council in Tokyo in June 1941:

- (1) To go on independently with no opinions and policies of our own as regards the Russo-German War.
- (2) To prepare for the operations in the South.
- (3) To keep peace with Russia on the borders.

But at this time, too, Japan suddenly irritated Russia by continuing the reinforcements of Kwantung Army based on the "Kan-Toku-En" plan. I was appointed to the Commander of the 6th Army in October 1941, and soon after that I was called to the Kwantung Army Headquarters together with other commanders. At that time, the commander of the Kwantung Army General Limezu gave individually to each army commander instructions as regards the duties of the war-time armies. I received the following instructions for the 6th Army: At the outbreak of war the 6th Army should firmly hold the positions in Hailaerh and its adjacent key-points, and plan for sustained defence. One division shall be added to the 6th Army after one month. General LIMEZU however, did not indicate to me the duration of time for the sustained defense and the time for opening the war. I was only instructed to maintain the positions in Hailaerh for a long period of time.

In accordance with the duty given me, I reinforced the fortifications already built by the 23rd Division on the heights east of Hailaerh and strengthened the operational preparations; and at the same time stored enough ammunition and food supplies for six months near Hailaerh. In June 1942 at Chichihaerh, when the Second Area Army, to which the 6th Army belonged was set up, its Commander Lt. General ANAMI Korechika explained to me the object of establishing the Second Area Army and its present duty as well as the present and future duties of the 6th Army under my command. In this explanation I was informed of the preparations for attacking Soviet Russia, which had been underway in the Kwantung Army in accordance with the strategic plan known by the secret name "B" (Otsu), which was decided at General Staff Headquarters. Troops, horses, guns and ammunition were sent to the Kwantung Army from Japan and China according to the "Kan-Toku-En" plan, which was preparation for a part of the general strategic plan known as "No. B". Lt. General ANAMI further indicated to me that, since the 6th Army was going to assume the offense at the third stage of the operations, I should make necessary investigation and preparation for it. He further explained the strategic plan which should be followed by main force of the Second Area Army at the second stage. The details will be given later. The offensive movement at the first stage in the area of Maritime Province was to be carried out by the First Area Army according to the Strategic Plan "B". I was told about the plan of the First Area Army for the offensive operation by the former Commander of the First Area Army General YAMASHITA at Tokyo in October 1944 when his duties were transferred to me. This same operation was explained to me in more detail by the Chief of Staff Lt. General SHIDEI when I took over my duties as Commander of the First Area Army in Mutanchiang.

Thus I was fully informed of the progress of the preparations and offensive operation of the First and Second Area Armies of the Kwantung Army based on Plan "B". Under this plan the following measures were to be taken.

#### Preparatory Measures

**Heike District:-** In the peace time there were in this district two divisions of the Fourth Army and one detachment of borderguards. The Army Headquarters was at Sunwu. Before the war was opened against Soviet Russia the Second Area Army and N Army were to be set up at Tsitsihar and Heike respectively. N Army seemed to be changed to 8th Army later. This formation was to be made by diverting four divisions from China and Japan. Consequently the Second Area Army was to have attained a strength of six divisions before the outbreak of war, that is. There were three divisions of the 4th Army at Sunwu, two divisions of 8th Army at Heike and one division under the direct control of the Area Army. Besides, the 6th Army under the Second Area Army consisting of the 23d Division and the Arshan detachment (about one division strong) should be increased by the addition of another division after the outbreak of war. Two more divisions were to be added in the future.

**Maritime Province District:-** Those stationed in peace time in this district were three divisions of the 5th Army, three divisions of the 3rd Army, the 71st Division at Hunchung and one division under the direct control of the Kwantung Army at Chiamusu--eight divisions in all together with two tank divisions. In 1941, 20th Army Headquarters was established at Tsining and to that army was given one division each from the 3rd, and 5th Armies. Prior to the outbreak of war, the 1st Area Army Headquarters, and the 2nd Army Headquarters were to be set up at Mutanchiang and Chientao respectively according to Plan B. Eight more divisions were to be transferred to this district from Japan and China, making the First Area Army possess fifteen divisions and two tank divisions, that is, three divisions and one tank division of the 5th Army, five divisions and one tank division of the 20th Army, three divisions of the 3rd Army, two divisions of the 2nd Army and two divisions under the direct control of the First Area Army. In addition there was one air force army under the direct control of the Kwantung Army Commander with 1,000 planes. The Kwantung Army was expected to be in the above condition on the Eastern, Northern and Western fronts just before the opening of war against the USSR according to the Plan "B".

**Offensive Plan:-** In accordance with the offensive Plan "B" we expected to seize the entire Far East as far as Baikal in four successive steps. In the first step the 4th and the N Armies of the Second Area Army were to carry out demonstrations on the Russian border near Sunwu and Heike, pretending offensive preparations by occasionally shooting into Russian territory. No actual offensive, however, was to be made. Thus the Red Army was expected to be fettered within that area. Should the Red Army start an offensive it must be checked. The 6th Army should maintain its positions at Hailor and Arshan.

In case an attack was made by the Red Army from Chita via Manchuria it must be checked by keeping these positions firm. In this case, the 1st Area Army in the Maritime Province District would act decisively on the offensive according to the following plan:-

(a) The 5th Army shall advance from Kuling with 3 divisions and 1 tank division and occupy Iman, and, while securing Iman to the North with a portion of its force, the main force shall march southward to join the battle to be fought by the main force of the First Area Army near Voroshilov.

(b) Two divisions of the 2nd Army shall advance from Hunchung break through the border; proceed North through the Nann District toward Voroshilov. Its action shall be in concert with the main force of the Area Army.

(c) Five divisions and one tank division of the 20th Army shall go south toward Voroshilov, passing the south-west side of Lake Hsingkoi.

(d) Three divisions of the 3rd Army shall advance from Tunking to ~~redoxovo~~ and join the area army's main force there. All these forces were to press the Red Army at Voroshilov, and part of them, after seizing Voroshilov, were to cooperate with the Japanese Navy at Yuanshan to capture Vladivostok by envelopment. This was to end the first stage. Its chief object was to secure Japan proper and the industrial areas of Manchuria from the Red Army's air raids from the Maritime Province district, by entirely occupying the district.

Second Stage:- In case the first stage of the offensive was successful, the main force of the First Area Army was to advance Northward toward Habarovska along the railroad, leaving part of the Army in the Maritime Province to maintain the occupied area. The division stationed at Chiamusu would occupy the positions facing Leninsk to protect the wings of the First and Second Armies in the vicinity. At this time the 4th and the N Armies of the Second Area Army would cooperate with the First Area Army and commence an offensive operation from Heike and its vicinity; cross the Amur; seize Blagoveshchensk Kuibishevka and Svobodny and cut off the Siberian Railway. One part of the forces were to defend the West and the main force was to move eastward along the railway line to Khabarovsk. Then the First and the Second Area Armies were to cooperate in attacking in a decisive battle the Red Army from both sides and occupy Khabarovsk. This was to complete the second stage.

Third Stage:- After the occupation of Khabarovsk the Second Area Army would immediately turn westward to make preparations for the reinforcements necessary for the future offensive operations upon the Zabaikalyo. At this time the 6th Army at Hailar was to be reinforced raising its strength to four divisions which were to prepare to advance the attack. In the Maritime Province the First Area Army was to secure the important districts and the rear of the Second Area Army. The main force of the Second Area Army would turn West after completing preparations and commence the advance to Chita along the railway.

As soon as the Second Area Army's main force reached Mogaona, the 6th Army was immediately to start the attack by breaking through the border near Sanho and Manchuria. And the 6th Army was to act in cooperation with the Second Area Army's main force and advance to Chita and its southern area. On seizing Chita and its vicinity, the Second Area Army was to secure important districts in the West; and thus the operation of the third stage was to come to a close.

In the fourth stage it was planned to continue the offensive until the Zabarkalye as far as Lake Baikal was seized. But I do not know about the offensive plan of the fourth stage.

Operations Regarding Outer Mongolia: - In the third stage, at the same time as the commencement of the advance of the 6th Army, the Arshhan Detachment (approximately one division) was to have been brought under the direct control of the Second Area Army to combine with and take command of the Mongolian force in Manchuria (approximately one division) and advance to Chita from Arshhan via Tampsakbulak, Baintumen and Ulan-Orasomon. This unit would cover the right wing of the Second Area Army by marching through the eastern part of Outer Mongolia.

Maintaining coordination of all Military Operations the Imperial Headquarters was to transfer one mechanized army group from North China and to have it begin strategic operations from Kalgan toward Ulan-Bator. But I am not able to explain the plan for the future development of the offensive action since I don't know it. The general outline of the offensive plan against Soviet Russia is as above. This plan for the offensive operation against the Soviet Union in 1942 was set up by the General Staff and the Kwantung Army; it was revised every year thereafter. This plan for Japanese military measures existed till around the middle of 1944. Since Japan faced difficult conditions in the battle field of Greater East Asia War, she could not carry out this plan. This hand-written testimony is confirmed by my signature.

General Kita Seiichi  
Ex-Commander of the First Area Army  
Kwantung Army

Interrogator: Lt. Colonel Derevyankin

Interpreter: Shehobenkov

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G. I.  
a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify  
that 22 pages of a photostat of the testimony of the Japanese  
prisoner of war general Kita Seiichi, written by him in Japanese on  
April 20-23  
was delivered to me by the Prosecutor of the Khabarovsk Region of the  
U.S.S.R.  
on or about June 27, 1946, and that the original of the said  
document may be found in the files of the Prosecutor's Office of the  
Khabarovsk Region.

I do further certify \_\_\_\_\_.

Lt. Col. TARANENKO  
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan

September 26, 1946.

Ex. 835 Doc. 2467

自筆證言

停虜前關東軍第一方面軍司令官大將

喜多誠一

自四月二十日

至四月二十三日 一九四六年

私前關東軍第一方面軍司令官喜多誠一大將、日本、滿洲獲得準備及對蘇攻勢ニシテ陳述ス。昭和初頭一九二六年支那ニ於テ内乱擴大又此内乱、孫文及蔣介石軍、北伐ヨリ起リタル七ノ二ニ支那全、民ノ統一及支那全權回收ノ目的ヲ以テ行ハタル七ノ一、此運動滿洲ニ波及スル時ハ是ハ日本ノ權利ニ撞着スルヲ以テ日本政府ハ次ノ政治方針ヲ決定セリ、

- 一 滿洲支那ノ内乱ヲ進入セシメ
- 二 孫文勢力ノ滿洲滲透ヲ防止ス
- 三 滿洲ニ於テ此種張作霖ノ政權ヲ極力支持シ彼ノ之ニ基キ支那ノ全民自由運動ヲ滿洲ニ進入セシムル努力ヲ以テ滿洲自体ニ於テ此種排日風潮ヲ制圧スルヲ要セリ

此日本ノ政治方針ハ陸海空陸外務大臣ト共ニ策定シ田中總理大臣之ヲ決裁セリ自今、一九二七年陸軍省ニ於テ此決定ニ關スル書類ヲ見タリ當時陸軍大臣ハ宇垣大將ナリ

No. 1

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361



Doc 2467

一九三九年五月北支ニ於ケル国民党軍、張作霖  
抵抗ヲ抑圧シ滿洲ニ驅逐セリ国民党、運動  
ハ滿洲ニ進入セザリ毛滿洲ニ於ケル抗日派ハ  
逐次教化セリ斯ガ北支那及滿洲、情況、下ニ  
私一九三九年八月參謀總長金谷大將ノ命ヨ  
リ南京大使館附武官輔佐官ニ任セラレ上海ニ駐  
在セシ大使館附武官佐藤少將ニ附屬スルコトト  
シ、私北支那情況、北支、國民性風俗及北支那語  
ヲ研究シ又南京政府ニ於ケル軍政要人中ニ和  
合有セリ以テ此職ニ任セシメラレタリ例ハ軍  
政要長何應欽大將一九三七年南京日本領事  
館ニ勤務セル彼ノ友人ヨリ鎮江ニ於テ會見セリ  
當時日本陸軍省北支那ニ於ケル南京事件（日本居  
留民ハ南京領事館ニ避難シ國民黨軍ハ之ヲ襲  
撃セリ）狀態ヲ調査シ爲私ヲ派遣セリ其時  
私ハ國民黨軍ノ北伐情況ヲ諜知スル目的ヲ以  
テ鎮江ニ赴ケリ茲ニ此方面ニ於ケル國民黨軍ノ最  
高指揮官何應欽ト知人トナリ、何應欽ハ

No. 2.

Doc 2467

前二日本王宮學校二留學二日本人二討三親切ナリキ  
是レ以外三私八南京政府軍政部次長陳儀訓練總監  
周亞衡中將軍測量局長黃慕松中將工兵司令楊  
本中將三能ノ故ト關係ニ在リ私八上記ニ支那將軍ト  
東京陸大ニ英ニ在學セリ且初ヨリ彼等ト友人ナリ、然レ大  
使館附武官輔佐官ニ任命セル時八上記ノ條件ノ外支那  
ニ於テ日本政策ニ對シ自今ノ意見ヲ為慮セリ然レ勿論  
此政策ニ對シ賛成者ナリ、南京ニ在リ私八參謀總長  
金谷大將ニ次ノ訓令ヲ受ク

- 1. 南京 政府軍政部(武力)ノ諜知又ニ
- 2. 國民黨ニリ、起ル必良自由運動ニテキ資料ヲ蒐集  
ニ特ニ滿洲ニ於テ此運動ノ極大ノ傾向ニ注意ニシテ  
滿洲ニ波及セシメ如ク努力スニ
- 3. 業務遂行ノ容易ナラシムル爲メ南京政府ノ軍人界ト  
連絡及時間係ヲ結ビ是等ノ訓令(上海大使  
附武官佐藤少將ヨリ同様ニ受ケル)以外私ヲ南京ニ派  
遣、時南京政府ノ軍事政治ノ狀態ニ注意スニト  
指示セリ、私八南京到着後上記ノ南京政府ノ軍人  
局著ト連絡ヲ遂ケ又受ケル訓令ニ基キ自己ノ業  
務ヲ實行セリ、是レ以外又軍事政治ノ諜報ヲ担任  
セリ此任務ハ南京政府ノ要人ト連絡又諜報ノ利  
用ニリ遂行セリ當時ノ支那ノ情況ハ諜報勤務  
ノ容易ナリト云フを得(三即チ支那ニ在リシ社  
會内ハ三派リテ金谷ニ支那軍閥、討立交政府

No. 3

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NO. 4

反對、分子等下り子吾父、如何七謀報上、而亦之三達成  
 不之得也、而之上上託、條件下、三南之政、而亦之三達成  
 關係、若于良好、上上之三達成、上上之時、滿洲三於之  
 情況、八極目、運動、遂次擴大、總上之事件、其心起り、  
 一九三三年滿洲事變、稍前、解軍、領、於之三達成  
 案、備附近三於之日本、中村大尉、力殺害也、上上、中村  
 大尉、八參謀本部、參謀上り、參謀本部、八續、之興、安  
 領、附近謀報、任務、之、以、派遣也、上上、中村大尉、興、安  
 領、首途、調查、目的、之、以、派遣也、上上、中村大尉、一九三三年  
 關東軍司令部、才、課長、上上、着、任、後、關東軍司令部  
 部、勤務者、多數、ヨリ、聞知也、又、是、八、實際、上上、上上、上上、  
 命、確信、上り、日本、滿洲、之、獲得、不、八、獲、二、國、三、  
 八、私、次、如何、云、之、得、之、日本、八、從來、三、滿洲、三、行、三、  
 希望、之、有、也、八、滿洲、事變、前、狀態、其他、種、及、事、態  
 三、ヨリ、證明、也、上上、日本、八、自己、對、蘇、攻、勢、計、畫、遂、行、爲、  
 滿洲、三、於、之、軍事、地、盤、之、保有、之、上上、破、也、上上、朝鮮、三、於、  
 之、鐵路、鐵道、建設、例、八、京城、圈、們、線、圈、們、們、們、們、們、  
 一、羅、南、線、又、釜、山、奉、天、線、八、建設、八、之、途、途、之、意、之、上上、目  
 的、之、途、途、之、上上、此、問題、之、解決、不、爲、二、適、其、上上、歷史、的  
 時間、之、選、之、上上、八、力、之、大、斯、之、上上、一九三三年、八、恰、度、適、時、之、  
 上上、之、即、之、滿洲、三、對、三、關係、上上、他、之、例、八、支、那、八、内、亂、三、意  
 之、上上、蘇、聯、七、五、年、計、畫、三、三、上上、之、内、建設、三、意、之、上上、三、時  
 上上、是、時、之、考慮、三、日本、八、一九三三年、九月、十八、日、滿洲、出征  
 之、極、大、之、全、滿、之、獲得、不、八、結果、上上、上上、

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滿洲獲得三權之日本、滿洲之經濟三權、其目的、是  
 見下、本、滿洲之全部、政權、下、置、置、滿洲、三權、若  
 于日本顧問之、此、然、關東軍司令部、一、如、勢、不  
 石原中佐板垣大佐、主張、三、三、將、之、支、持、三、等  
 政、滿洲、獨立、五、樹、立、之、其、決、權、ヲ、日、本、ニ、於、于、把、握、ス、ル、様  
 組織セリ、之、ト、カ、長、谷、大、臣、ヲ、滿、大、三、次、長、八、日、人、ヲ、任、命、シ、又  
 官、衛、内、三、日、人、官、吏、又、ル、ル、コ、ト、ヲ、決、定、セ、リ、斯、カ、ル、以、策、八、又  
 一、層、三、滿、人、中、三、抗、日、運、動、ノ、氣、分、ヲ、銳、セ、リ、是、ハ、三、洲、三、不  
 々、日、本、軍、三、討、三、抗、日、三、志、士、三、下、ル、反、抗、軍、ノ、振、大、原、因、三  
 爲、セ、リ、關、東、軍、八、是、三、關、聯、三、滿、洲、三、三、抗、日、志、士、ヲ、討  
 伐、三、ヨ、リ、掃、蕩、三、他、方、三、於、于、宣、傳、三、ヨ、リ、振、等、三、歸、三、順、ヲ、勤、ム  
 ル、コ、ト、ヲ、才、一、任、務、ト、セ、リ、是、等、ノ、主、手、ハ、討、伐、八、哈、爾、濱、錦、州、  
 東、遼、道、附、近、三、行、八、及、占、山、及、李、杜、軍、ノ、追、擊、八、討、伐、  
 等、ト、是、等、ノ、討、伐、八、關、東、軍、司、令、官、五、佐、大、將、武、藤、大、將  
 時、參、謀、長、三、宅、中、將、小、磯、中、將、三、ヨ、リ、行、八、ト、是、等、  
 討、伐、作、戦、八、無、辜、ノ、滿、人、住、民、三、大、ト、ル、損、害、破、産、ヲ、與、ヘ、タ、  
 即、チ、討、伐、八、住、民、ノ、離、散、住、家、ノ、燒、却、財、産、ノ、喪、失、ヲ、伴、フ、  
 コ、ト、明、ラ、カ、ニ、認、メ、サ、ル、カ、ラ、又、私、ハ、長、年、月、ヲ、経、過、セ、ル、身、  
 討、伐、三、ヨ、リ、住、民、三、災、三、元、犠、牲、ノ、數、量、ト、範圍、ヲ、記、憶、セ、ル、七  
 然、レ、七、年、向、關、聯、三、三、大、ト、ル、犠、牲、ヲ、與、ヘ、タ、ト、認、メ、  
 ル、カ、ラ、又、私、ハ、才、三、課、長、ト、三、關、東、軍、司、令、部、三、任、職、  
 間、是、等、討、伐、ノ、意、思、及、計、劃、八、關、東、軍、司、令、部、三、於、于、  
 有、藤、大、佐、及、遠、藤、中、佐、三、於、于、策、定、セ、リ、然、レ、討、伐、隊、三、直  
 接、指、揮、セ、ル、一、次、ノ、如、シ、

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獨以獲得三條之日本、滿洲、延慶、三管年已、三、其  
 見下、本、滿洲、主、部、政、權、不、三、直、于、滿、洲、主、權、二、若  
 于日本顧問ヲ入ルル也、然、之、關、東、軍、司、令、部、一、部、務、不、  
 石原中佐板垣大佐、主張、三、リ、其、本、部、將、之、支、持、三、中  
 政、滿、洲、獨、立、三、樹、立、之、其、實、權、ヲ、日、本、三、於、三、把、握、不、  
 組織セリ、之、力、為、各、大、臣、ヲ、滿、洲、三、次、長、日、人、ヲ、任、命、三、又  
 官、衙、内、日、人、官、吏、ヲ、入、ル、ト、ヲ、決、定、セ、リ、斯、カ、ル、以、來、日、人、又  
 一、層、三、滿、洲、中、三、抗、日、運、動、ノ、氣、分、ヲ、銳、セ、リ、是、ハ、三、洲、三、三、  
 々、日、本、軍、三、對、三、抗、日、三、運、動、三、下、ル、反、抗、軍、ノ、根、本、原、因、三、  
 爲、セ、リ、關、東、軍、ハ、是、三、關、聯、三、滿、洲、三、於、ル、抗、日、分、子、ヲ、討  
 伐、三、ヨ、リ、掃、蕩、三、他、方、三、於、三、宣、傳、三、ヨ、リ、報、害、三、歸、三、悞、ヲ、勤、  
 止、ト、ヲ、力、一、任、務、ト、セ、リ、是、等、ノ、主、ル、討、伐、ハ、哈、爾、濱、錦、州、  
 東、遼、道、附、近、三、行、ハ、又、馬、占、山、及、李、杜、軍、ノ、追、擊、熱、河、討、伐、  
 等、ト、リ、是、等、ノ、討、伐、ハ、關、東、軍、司、令、官、本、庄、大、將、武、藤、大、將、  
 時、參、謀、長、三、宅、中、將、小、磯、中、將、三、ヨ、リ、行、ハ、ル、ハ、是、等、  
 討、伐、作、戰、ハ、無、事、ノ、滿、洲、人、住、民、三、大、ト、損、害、破、産、ヲ、蒙、ル、タ、  
 即、チ、討、伐、住、民、ノ、離、散、住、家、ノ、燒、却、財、産、ノ、喪、失、等、ヲ、伴、フ、  
 コ、ト、ヲ、明、ラ、カ、シ、認、メ、サ、ル、カ、ラ、ズ、私、ハ、長、年、月、ヲ、経、過、セ、ル、身、  
 討、伐、ヨ、リ、住、民、三、安、(三、ル、犠、牲、ノ、數、量、ト、對、比、ヲ、認、憶、セ、ル、也、  
 然、レ、七、年、間、ノ、戰爭、三、ヨ、リ、大、ト、リ、犠、牲、ヲ、蒙、ル、タ、コ、ト、ヲ、認、メ、  
 三、カ、ラ、ズ、私、ハ、才、三、課、長、ト、三、關、東、軍、司、令、部、三、在、職、  
 間、是、等、討、伐、ノ、實、景、及、計、劃、ハ、關、東、軍、司、令、部、三、於、  
 有、藤、大、佐、及、遠、藤、中、佐、三、於、三、策、定、セ、リ、之、三、討、伐、隊、ヲ、直  
 接、指、揮、セ、ル、ト、次、ノ、如、シ、

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- (一) 呼倫貝爾省公署附近 (二十一年國軍司令部)
- (二) 綏州附近 (二十一年國軍司令部)
- (三) 黑龍江省公署附近 (二十一年國軍司令部)
- (四) 本州附近 (二十一年國軍司令部)
- (五) 熱河附近 (二十一年國軍司令部)
- (六) 張家口附近 (二十一年國軍司令部)

上記師團の各一部は他方並に於て同時討伐を行ひ、熱河討伐(國軍司令部官武藤大將)直接指揮下、私に熱河討伐に參加し、抗官軍、行動動靜及び機目氣布、發生三〇七住民、區域等二圖三ヲ撰報資料ヲ私に謀長トシテ、國軍司令部謀長ニ提出シ、是ニ基キ、國軍司令部第一課(討伐)爲作戰計劃ヲ決定シ、一九三〇年春佳木斯附近地方に於て討伐隊を遣はし、行ハルは、日本、滿洲拓殖會社力、土地ヲ奪取シ、タリ、此附近、滿洲部隊力反乱、暴動、日本、軍隊ヲ殲滅シ、隊長飯塚大佐ヲ殺シ、タリ、以テ是、討伐三〇七、土龍山附近、暴動ヲ鎮壓ス、日本軍六十部隊ヲ派遣シ、自己、隊長飯塚大佐、新死シ、復仇ノ意味ヲ加ヘ、滿人住民、六十、擯置シ、與ヘ、タリ、此作戰ハ、十師團(長官瀨中)參謀長加納、佐ヨリ實施セラル、一九三〇年ヨリ一九三一年迄、滿洲於テ、國軍司令部行ハル、全數、討伐、責任ハ、此期間ニ於テ、國軍司令部官武藤大將、武藤大將、長官、大將、田中、大將、三、在リ、

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- 4. 通信施設、為滿洲國、僑社
- 5. 築港及鉄道、建設、滿鉄、本、
- 6. 雇傭工場、設置及経営、為滿洲國、工業株式會社、設置

日本當局、是等構築及日本移民為強制的、強價、以、  
 滿洲之地、買收、又彼等、別地、移民、之、滿、今、大、不、不、不、  
 招き、此、外、軍、事、構、築、作、業、為、活、働、力、之、強、制、制、度、作  
 之、滿、人、強、價、也、此、活、働、者、徵、用、自、由、活、働、比、之、低、率、上、  
 須、金、之、高、也、之、滿、人、福、祉、甚、稀、與、之、他、亦、面、於、各  
 種、施、設、及、衛、生、總、體、狀、況、及、日、本、官、理、不、良、等、事、以、活  
 働、中、有、多、數、病、死、者、出、之、多、例、一、九、四、四、年、興、安、鎮  
 附近、軍、營、構、築、之、時、滿、人、活、働、者、約、二、萬、人、作、業、之、力  
 死、亡、率、五、百、名、達、也、他、亦、面、於、死、亡、者、有、一、九、四、四、年、興、安、鎮  
 總、參、謀、長、秦、中、將、及、後、方、大、將、自、合、說、明、也、量、之、計  
 一、九、四、五、年、於、興、安、鎮、強、制、徵、用、滿、人、活、働、者、一、三、萬  
 一、三、萬、名、達、也、

一、九、三、一、年、滿、洲、事、變、後、全、期、間、日、滿、對、蘇、軍、事  
 其、他、強、化、為、行、之、多、處、置、責、任、者、日、本、內、閣、大、臣、農、  
 近、衛、東、條、大、將、日、本、陸、軍、大、臣、荒、木、大、將、杉、山、大、將、東、條、大、  
 將、參、謀、總、長、金、谷、大、將、關、根、大、將、杉、山、大、將、東、條、大、將、關、  
 東、軍、司、令、官、本、庄、大、將、菱、刈、大、將、南、大、將、植、田、大、將、梅、津、大、  
 將、其、他、本、証、言、記、述、也、關、東、軍、司、令、部、重、務、者、  
 私、一、九、四、三、年、八、月、參、謀、本、部、支、那、課、長、上、野、壽、任、之、時、  
 總、長、關、根、大、將、杉、山、中、將、後、大、將、參、謀、本、部、長、金、谷、大、  
 將、後、中、將、參、謀、本、部、長、磯、谷、大、將、後、中、將、參、謀、本、部、長、後、

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- 4. 通信施設、為滿洲處、會社
- 5. 築港及鉄道、建設、滿鉄、本、
- 6. 雇傭工場、設置及経営、為滿洲工業株式會社、設置、

日本當局、其等、梅津及日本移民、為強制的、僱傭、以、  
 滿洲之地、實收、又、彼等、別地、移民、之、拘、今、本、此、不、拘、  
 招、此、外、軍、梅津、作業、為、所、働、カ、ト、強、制、制、度、作、  
 酒、人、徵、傭、也、此、所、働、者、徵、用、自、由、所、働、比、之、低、率、上、  
 須、金、之、所、此、酒、人、福、祉、甚、痛、與、也、亦、面、於、右、  
 任、社、設、及、衛、生、給、養、状、況、及、日、本、管、理、不、良、等、事、以、所、  
 働、者、中、多、數、病、死、者、出、之、例、一、九、四、四、年、一、般、安、願、  
 附近、守、度、梅津、之、酒、人、所、働、者、約、三、萬、八、千、人、之、力、  
 死、之、率、五、百、名、達、也、亦、面、於、死、者、有、三、萬、八、千、人、  
 總、參、謀、長、泰、中、將、及、後、方、大、將、自、合、說、明、也、其、中、之、  
 一、九、四、五、年、於、一、般、安、願、強、制、徵、用、酒、人、所、働、者、三、萬、  
 一、三、千、名、達、也、

一、九、三、一、年、滿、洲、事、變、以、來、全、期、間、五、年、滿、洲、社、隊、僅、事、  
 其、地、強、化、之、為、行、之、以、處、置、責、任、者、日、本、內、閣、大、臣、  
 近、衛、兼、條、大、將、日、本、陸、軍、大、臣、荒、木、大、將、杉、山、大、將、兼、條、大、  
 將、參、謀、總、長、金、谷、大、將、閑、院、宮、杉、山、大、將、兼、條、大、將、  
 兼、陸、軍、大、臣、官、本、庄、大、將、兼、外、務、大、將、南、大、將、植、田、大、將、梅、津、大、  
 將、其、也、本、証、言、記、述、也、同、陸、軍、大、臣、部、勤、務、者、  
 一、九、三、四、年、八、月、參、謀、本、部、及、參、謀、長、上、之、轉、任、之、時、  
 總、長、閑、院、宮、兼、條、大、將、後、方、大、將、兼、參、謀、本、部、長、金、谷、  
 將、後、中、將、兼、參、謀、本、部、長、磯、谷、大、將、後、中、將、兼、參、謀、本、部、長、後、

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- 4. 通信施設、為滿洲國之會社
- 5. 築港及鐵道、建設、滿鉄之本
- 6. 煙草工場、設置及經營、為滿洲國工業株式會社、設置云

日本當局、是年、滿洲及日本移民、為強制之信價、以予  
 滿洲之土地、買收、又彼等、別地、移民、之、滿洲、土地、不、拘、  
 招、引、此外、年、滿洲、移民、之、業、為、活、働、力、之、強、制、制、度、及、作  
 業、之、強、制、也、此、活、働、者、徵、用、自、由、活、働、之、比、之、成、率、上、比  
 須、金、之、高、也、滿、洲、人、福、祉、之、苦、痛、與、之、他、亦、面、於、右  
 任、地、設、及、衛、生、條、件、之、狀、況、及、日、本、官、理、不、善、等、事、以、而  
 動、物、中、有、多、數、病、死、者、出、之、多、例、一、九、四、四、年、興、安、鎮、  
 附近、畜、產、場、中、有、滿、洲、人、活、働、者、約、三、萬、人、其、業、之、力  
 死、亡、率、五、百、名、達、也、他、亦、面、於、死、者、有、一、九、四、四、年、  
 總、參、謀、長、系、中、將、及、後、方、大、將、自、合、說、明、也、其、中、之、一、  
 一、九、四、四、年、於、興、安、鎮、強、制、徵、用、滿、洲、人、活、働、者、一、三、萬  
 一、三、萬、名、達、也、

一九三二年滿洲國成立後、其、間、日、本、乃、因、國、之、發、展、  
 其、地、法、化、為、行、之、以、其、處、置、責、任、者、日、本、乃、因、國、之、發、展、  
 近、衛、東、條、大、將、日、本、陸、軍、大、將、其、本、大、將、杉、山、大、將、東、條、大、  
 將、參、謀、總、長、金、谷、大、將、閑、院、宮、大、將、東、條、大、將、南、  
 大、將、植、田、大、將、梅、津、大、將、其、他、本、証、言、記、述、也、國、軍、軍、令、部、動、務、部、  
 一、九、四、四、年、八、月、參、謀、部、支、那、課、長、上、轉、任、以、為、時、  
 總、長、閑、院、宮、大、將、杉、山、中、將、後、大、將、其、部、長、金、谷、大、將、  
 後、中、將、其、部、長、機、本、大、將、後、中、將、其、部、長、後、







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經濟文化及政治、指導機關タル政權ヲ樹立ス

私の特務部、組織ニ次、局ヲ設ケタリ

1. 總務局 政治問題ニ關係ス
2. 第一經濟局 金融經濟ニ關係ス
3. 第二經濟局 交通産業ニ關係ス
4. 文化局 教育文化ニ關係ス

當時支那、主領地ニ於テ政治經濟、適當計畫策定、毎日

在政府各省ヨリ特務部ニ専門家を差遣セリ、私の特務部長、

時北支ニ於テ最重要ナル處置ニ接シ、親日家王克敏ヲ首班ト

スル政權ヲ樹立シタルコトナリ、彼ハ從來財政大臣、經歷ヲ

有セルモノ、政權時代ナリシヤ私ハ記憶セズ、王克敏政權

ニ於テハ顧問トシテ日本代表ヲ入ケタリ、此顧問ハ政治問題ニキ

自今直接担当セリ、經濟顧問平生銀三郎、行政顧問

湯澤三才、司法顧問大憲政、推シテ後者三名、軍人トシ

テ顧問原則ハ王克敏政權、活動及行動ニ於テハ日本政府

政策ニ実行スルニ全力ヲ盡シ、對支戰ニ於テハ日本軍ニ協力ス

ルニ、私等特務部ハ解散シ、特務部ハ職務ニ新クニ組織スル

興亞院ニ移リ、又興亞院ハ此支那總務部長官ニ私ヲ任命セリ、

私ハ此任命ヲ内閣ヨリ受ケタリ、當時總理ハ平沼ナリ、興亞

院ニ顧問ニ非ズルニヨリ私ハ文官ニ移リタルモ現彼ニ列スルコト

ナリ、又興亞院委員ナリ、興亞院中央設、東京、平沼ニ在リ

平沼總理ハ院、頭首ニシテ興亞院總裁ナリ、副總裁ハ陸軍

大臣板垣中將、海軍大臣外務大臣大藏大臣ニ興亞院委員

員、約六十名ナリ、實際、仕事ハ總裁之ヲ行ハズ、興亞院、

總務長官柳川平助之ヲ實施ス、此興亞院ハ社會機關ニ

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非之久遠國家機關之ニシテ、文官及軍人ニ於テモ長官トシテ  
 不得立定、如キ興亞院、計画的任務ノ自任ガ一四〇年迄迄  
 絡長官タリ之間、支那ヲ日本化スルニ在リ、私大軍(支)  
 組織ニ入リ他國ニ此計画ノ自任ガ一四〇年迄迄  
 然、後ニ日米戰爭開始、時日本、東亞ニ於テ他國ヲ占領スル  
 時例ハビル、泰佛印、及他國太平洋、島ヲ占領スル  
 時興亞院、如キ活動、範圍ハ大ニ拡大セラル、以テ支那トシテ又  
 大東亞ニ於テ占領地ニ興亞院、計画的任務ヲ遂行スル事ニ  
 興亞院ニ基キ最大又強化セル組織ヲ要求スルニ至リ、斯  
 ク一九四三年当初興亞院ハ新設大東亞省ニ編入セリ、又興亞  
 院、連絡部長官、勤務ハ各占領地ニ於テ設置セラル、大  
 使館ニ移官セリ例ハ滿洲ニ於テ特命全權大使、陸軍  
 司令官山田大將支那ニ於テ汪精衛政權ニ對シ同様ナル  
 大使官又ビル、泰佛印及日本占領地他國ニ於テ新  
 設大使館アリキ、是等大使館ハ元、興亞院、計画的任  
 務ヲ遂行セラル、即チ日本ニ於テ占領スル領土ヲ日本  
 化セリ、私大軍ニ於テ特務部長及連絡部長官時代ニ  
 在リ、私大軍、作戰行動、適當ナル狀態ヲ確保セシムル爲  
 並ニ滿洲軍事地盤強化援助ノ爲メ、北支事ヲ行ハ、  
 一九三七年夏北支方面軍ノ行動ニ伴ヒ張家口ニ於テ内蒙  
 駐屯軍ヲ設置セラル、一九三七年八月間東軍ハ參謀長東  
 條中將(後大將)指揮シ内蒙ヲ占領ス、茲ニ於テ特務  
 機關ヲ設置シ松井少將ヲ任命ス、後駐蒙軍設置  
 (司令官蓮沼中將)ノ際ハ特務機關ハ特務部ニ更生シ  
 松井少將ハ其儘長トナシ、一九三七年十一月頃松井少

心



Doc 2467

將ハ德王ヲ普班トスル日本の蒙疆政府ヲ樹立セリ此政府  
ニ滿洲ヨリ來ル日人顧問ニシテ内蒙ノ占領及日本  
的政府ノ樹立ノ目的ハ滿洲ヲ獲得セル時ト同様、目的ヲ追  
ヒ即チ内蒙ヲ日本ニ掌握シ此領土ニ於テ對外蒙軍事基地  
ヲ作ストスルニ在リ是レ蒙疆參謀長東條中將ノ主張ヨリ行ハレタリ東條中將ハ日本總理大臣  
トシテ此方針ヲ継続セリ内蒙ヲ獲得スルニ行ハレタ  
ル蒙疆ニ於テ自今ノ援助ハ北支ニ於テ北支方面軍及那軍ニ支那  
及内蒙ヨリ驅逐スル事ヲ條件ヲ作リ以テ東條中將ハ蒙古占領  
ヲ容易トシテ此ノ現ハレタリ日本ハ内蒙ニ於テル資産ハ不足爲  
滿洲ニ於テルカ如ク要基構築ヲ蒙疆ニシテ一九四二年迄内  
蒙五万ノ兵力ヲ有セリ 一九三八年張報發拳一九三九年ノ七

ハニ五境紛爭問題ニ関シ日本軍ノ不法行動ニヨリ日蘇兩  
軍間戰トシレド、ニ事其事件ノ經過及責任者ニシテ詳細  
承認セラレルヲ以テ私ハ蒙ニ行キ新ヲ三管轄ヲ有セス  
一九四〇年三月私ハ興亞院ノ連絡部長官ヨリ召還セラレ  
宇都宮(日本)ニアル才十四師團長ニ任セラレタリ私ハ  
一九四〇年九月參謀總長閑院宮ヨリ計畫ニ基キ關東軍  
ハ十五師團迄増加スヘキヲ以テ才十四師團ハ滿洲ニ轉用  
セラルヘキ旨内示ヲ受ケタリ

私ハ一九四〇年十月師團ト共ニ齊々哈爾濱ニ到着ス  
關東軍、此増加ハ滿内秩序ヲ防衛スル爲メ斯ルカニ數量  
ノ兵力ヲ要セサルヲ以テ日本、對蘇作戰準備ナリ

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將ハ徳王ヲ普班トスル日本の滿蒙疆政ヲ樹立セリ此政府  
 一滿洲ヨリ來ル日人顧問タルヲ、内蒙ノ古領及日本  
 的政府、樹立、目的ハ滿洲ヲ獲得セリ時ト同様、目的ヲ追  
 ヒ即チ内蒙ヲ日本ニ掌握シ此領土ニ於テ對外蒙軍事基地  
 ヲ作ラントスルニ在リ是ハ原直ハ當時陸軍參謀長東  
 條中將、主張ヨリ行ハタリ東條中將ハ日本總理大臣  
 トシテ此方針ヲ継続セシ内蒙ヲ獲得スル為ニ行ハタ  
 ル處置ニ於テ自今、援助ハ北支ニ於テ北支方面軍及那軍之支那  
 及内蒙ヨリ驅逐スル為メ、條件ヲ作リ以テ東條中將ハ蒙古古領  
 ヲ容易ナラシムルニ現レタリ、日本内蒙ニ於テル資産不足為  
 滿洲ニ於テル力如ク要基構築ヲ原直セザリニテ一九四一年迄内  
 蒙五万、兵力ヲ有セリ 一九三八年張敬奎一九三九年ノモ  
 ハハ五境紛爭問題ニ関シ日本軍ノ不法行動ヨリ日蘇兩  
 軍圍戰トナルモ、三三其事件、經過及責任者ニキ詳細  
 承認セラレリ以テ私ハ茲ニ行方新クニ答辯ヲ有セヌ  
 一九四〇年三月私ハ興亞院、連絡部長官ヨリ召還セラレ  
 宇都宮(日本)ニアル才十四師團長ニ任セラレタリ、私ハ  
 一九四〇年九月參謀總長閑院宮ヨリ計畫ニ基キ關東軍  
 ハ十五師團迄増加スルヲ以テ才十四師團ハ滿洲ニ轉用  
 セラルベキ旨内示ヲ受ケタリ

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私ハ一九四〇年十月師團ト共ニ齊ハ哈爾濱ニ到着ス  
 關東軍、此増加ハ滿内秩序ヲ防衛スル為メ斯カル數量  
 兵力ヲ要セサルヲ以テ日本、對蘇作戰準備ナリ

又467

私一九四〇年師團十共三各略爾ニ君先時自分、判断  
 以外ニ才六軍司令官ヨリ才十四師團ニ南戦、場合  
 才一ノ平地ニ使用スヘキヲ以テ師團ノ将校ハ海拉爾附近  
 ノ地形ニ精通スルヲ要ス又教育ハ裝備優良ナル蘇軍ニ  
 對スル持久防禦ニ重点ヲ置キ訓練スヘキ旨、秘密訓令ヲ  
 受テタリ。尚、才一ノ才六軍司令部ニ於テ、一九四〇年ニ團  
 ニ置リ、才一ノ附近、圖上戰術演習ヲ實施シ對蘇作戰ヲ研究  
 セリ。私及師團、參謀ハ是ニ參加セリ。私ハ對蘇戰團ニ  
 重点ヲ置キ部下ヲ訓練セリ。

一九四一年、獨蘇開戦後參謀本部ハ對蘇作戰準備強化  
 ノ為日本ヨリ人馬及砲ヲ送り、關東軍ニ大ナル增強ヲ行ヒタリ  
 此增加ハ國特演、稱呼アル計畫ニ基キ實施セリ。

一九四二年、復此計畫ニ基キ、關東軍ノ兵數及兵器ハ最高迄  
 達セリ。才一從來十三師團アリシヲ日本ヨリ新クニ二師團ヲ送り  
 此外各師團ハ人員五〇〇〇馬三五〇〇ヲ增加セルヲ以テ、關東軍ハ  
 國特演前ニ

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十三師團	人	一九五〇〇	
戰車三師團	人	三〇、〇〇〇	戰車、四〇〇

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飛行軍 人 二四、〇〇〇 飛行機 一〇〇〇  
 國境守備隊 (三八大隊) 人 一九、六〇〇  
 鐵道守備隊 (五 隊) 人 一七、五〇〇  
 後方部隊 人 一〇〇、〇〇〇  
 計 人 三六、〇〇〇  
 馬 四〇、〇〇〇

ナリシカ因特演、計畫ヨリ行ハタル増加後國東軍ハ  
 人 六〇、〇〇〇 馬 八〇、〇〇〇ヲ有スルニ至リシ。

砲團之ヲ私ノ指揮シアリシ才十四師團ニ於テ因特演計畫  
 ニ基キ行ハタル増加前三十六門、増加後四十八門ナリ。

他ノ師團モ同様ニ増加シタルコトヲ考慮シ得ヘシ。

國東軍増加ノ際大本營ヨリ對蘇作戰準備ヲ促進スヘキ  
 命令ヲ發セリ此命令ハ一九四一年六月下旬ニ發セラレタルモ

私ハ之ヲ讀ミアラス國東軍ノ勤務者ヨリ聞キタルニシテ  
 以テ番号ヲ知ラス此時私ハ才十四師團ノ屬スル才大軍司令官

ヨリ教育訓練ヲ促進スヘキ訓令以外ニ別ニ命令ヲ受ラズス。

然シ才大軍司令官ハ海拉爾ニ在ル才十三師團ヲ指揮シ

速カニ作戰準備ヲ行フ為メ海拉爾東方高地<sup>野</sup>ニ戰築城

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飛行軍 人 二四、〇〇〇 飛行機 一〇〇〇  
 国境守備隊 (三八大隊) 人 一九、六〇〇  
 鉄道守備隊 (五 隊) 人 二七、五〇〇  
 後方部隊 人 一〇〇、〇〇〇  
 計 人 三六六、〇〇〇  
 馬 四〇、〇〇〇

ナリシカ爾特演、計畫ヨリ行ハタル増加後周東軍ハ  
 人 六〇〇、〇〇〇 馬 八〇、〇〇〇ヲ有スルニ至リ。

砲 團 之 一 八 秘 指 揮 シ ア リ シ 才 十 四 師 團 二 於 于 爾 特 演 計 画  
 二 基 于 行 ハ タ ル 増 加 前 三 十 六 門 増 加 後 四 十 八 門 十 リ。

他、師團无同様ニ増加シタルコトヲ考慮シ得ヘシ。

周東軍増加、際大本當ヨリ對蘇作戰準備ヲ促進スヘキ  
 命令ヲ發セリ此命令ハ一九四一年六月下旬ニ發セラレタルモ

私ハ之ヲ讀ミアラス周東軍ノ勤務者ヨリ聞キタルノミナラ  
 以テ番号ヲ知ラス此時私ハ才十四師團ノ一員スル才大軍司令官

ヨリ教育訓練ヲ促進スヘキ訓令以外ニ別ニ命令ヲ受ラズ

然シ才大軍司令官ハ海拉爾ニ在ル才十三師團ヲ指揮シ

速カニ作戰準備ヲ行フ為メ海拉爾東方高地<sup>野</sup>ニ戰築城

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飛行軍	人	二四〇〇〇	飛行機	一〇〇
国境守備隊 (三八大隊)	人	一九六〇		
鉄道守備隊 (五隊)	人	一七五〇		
後方部隊	人	一〇〇〇〇		
計	人	三八六〇〇		
	馬	四〇〇〇		

ナリシカ周特演、計畫ヨリ行ハタル増加後周東軍ハ  
人六〇、〇〇〇 馬八〇、〇〇〇ヲ有スルニ至リシ。

砲<sub>二</sub>團<sub>一</sub>之<sub>一</sub>私ノ指揮シアリシ才十四師團ニ於テ周特演計畫  
ニ基キ行ハタル増加前三十六門、増加後四十八門ナリ。

他ノ師團モ同様ニ増加シタルコトヲ考慮シ得ヘシ。

周東軍増加ノ際大本営ヨリ對蘇作戰準備ヲ促進スルキ  
命令ヲ發セリ此命令ハ一九四一年六月下旬ニ發セラレタルモ

私ハ之ヲ讀ミアラス周東軍ノ勤務者ヨリ聞キタルノミナリ

16 以テ番号ヲ知ラス此時私ハ才十四師團ノ一員スル才大軍司令部  
ヨリ教育訓練ヲ促進スルキ訓令以外ニ別ニ命令ヲ受ラズス

然シ才大軍司令部ハ海拉爾ニ在ル才十三師團ヲ指揮シ

速カニ作戰準備ヲ行フ為メ海拉爾東方高地<sup>野</sup>ニ戰築城

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ヲ構築セリ。一九四一年、夏ノ凡テノ状態ニ因テ、陸東軍ニ於テハ對蘇  
南戰準備促進ノ性質ヲ有セリ。

然シ此時日本軍ハ佛印ヲ侵領セシメヨリ日本關係ハ急激ニ  
尖銳ニ情況ハ緊迫シ日本ヲシテ二途、岐路ニ立タシメタリ  
日本政府ハ所謂對蘇及對米開戦ヲ何シテ先キニ行フ  
ヘキカヲ知ラザリキ

一九四一年六月東京御前會議ニ於テ、次ノ三條ヲ決定セラル

1. 独蘇戦ニハ独自ノ意見及政策ヲ以テ進ム。
2. 對南方作戰準備ヲ進ム
3. 蘇聯ニ對シ國境靜態ヲ守ル。

然シ此時ニ於テ元閣特演計畫ニ基キ日本ヨリ南東軍ニ兵力  
増加ヲ繼續セラシタルカ以テ日本ハ蘇聯ヲ急激ニ刺戟セリ

一九四一年十月私ハ才六軍司令官ニ任命セラシタリ固モ無ク

他、兵團長ト共ニ南東軍司令部ニ呼ハルタリ其際南東

軍司令官梅津大將ハ各軍司令官ニ戰時軍ノ任務團ニ

別々ニ訓示ヲ與ヘタリ。私ハ才六軍ノ急次ノ如ク訓令ヲ受

ケタリ「才六軍ハ開戦ノ場合海拉爾陣地及附近ノ要地ヲ

確保シテ待テ久ク策ム。一箇月後才六軍ニ師團ヲ増加ス

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然之持久防禦、時同及開戰、時期二因之、梅津大將、  
 私ニ指示セリキ、只海拉爾陣地ヲ長期間保持スルニ在リ  
 私ニ與ヘラレタル任務ニ基キ、ハイル、亦方高地ニ伏兵第三  
 師團力稱築シタル陣地ヲ補強シ作戰準備ヲ強化セリト、且時  
 ニ彈藥糧秣等半年ヲ自途トシテ海拉爾附近ニ貯藏セリ  
 而シテ一九四三年六月齊ハ哈爾ニ於テ中六軍、隸屬スル才ニ方面  
 軍設置、際軍司令官阿南惟綏中將ヨリ才ニ方面軍設置  
 目的及最近、任務又自命、指揮スル中六軍、最近及將來  
 任務ニツキ説明ヲ受ケタリ此説明ヨリ私ニ關東軍力參謀  
 本部ニ於テ決定シタル作戰計畫乙号秘密名稱ニ基キ行ヒル  
 對蘇攻勢ノ準備ニ關シ承知セリ、關特演、計畫ヨリ日本及  
 支那ヨリ關東軍、為人員及砲彈藥ヲ增加セラル此關特  
 演ハ乙号、名稱アル一般作戰計畫、一部、準備ナリ、茲ニ又  
 阿南中將ハ私ニ作戰才ニ段階ニ於テ中六軍ハ攻勢作戰ヲ取  
 ルヲ以テ是ヲ研究及準備ヲナスル旨指示セリ、又才ニ段階  
 ニ於テ才ニ方面軍主力ノ作戰計畫ニツキ説明セリ其詳細ハ後  
 ニ説明ス。

才ニ段階ニ於テ乙号作戰計畫ニ基キ沿海州地区ノ攻勢ハ



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才二方面軍 = 於行乃才一方面軍、攻勢作戰計畫、私  
一九四四年十月東京 = 於前才二方面軍司令官山下大將  
業務引継、際承知セリ、及其他此作戰ニ于才二方面軍司令官  
トシ、牡丹江ニ着任、際軍參謀長四手井中將ハ細密ニ説明  
セリ、之ヲ以テ私乙号ノ計畫ニヨル南東軍、才一才二方面  
軍、準備及攻勢作戰、經過ニ通曉セリ、此、計畫ヲ以テ  
次、処置ヲ取ラタリ

準備處置

黑河方面 此方面ニ於テ平時才四軍三師團及國境守備  
隊アリ、軍司令部ハ孫吳ニ位置ス、對蘇南戰前齊哈爾ニ  
才二方面軍 黑河ニ一軍（後ニ才八軍ト丁ルカ如シ）ヲ設置ス  
是等ノ編合ハ支那及日本ヨリ四師團ヲ轉用シテ行フ、從テ  
用戰前ニ才二方面軍、兵力ハ六師團ニ達ス、其中孫吳、  
才四軍三師團黑河、才八軍三師團方面軍直轄一師團ナリ

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其他才二方面軍ニ屬スル才六軍ハ才二三師團及阿爾山部隊  
（約一師團）南戰後一師團ヲ增加ス、ク將來又ニ師團ヲ增加  
沿海州方面 平時ニ此方面ニ駐在タルハ才五軍三師團  
才三軍三師團琿春才七一師團、佳木斯南東軍直轄

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一師團計八師團十戰車二師團ナリ

一九四一年鶴岡ニ才二軍司令部ヲ設置シ才二才三才四才五軍ヨリ各一師團ヲ抽出シノ與ヘラタリ南戰前  
 乙号計畫ヨリ牡丹江ニ才一西軍司令部、周島ニ才二軍  
 司令部ヲ設置ス又奉天及及那ヨリ此方面ニ新タニ八師團ヲ  
 轉用ス是ヨリ才一西軍八十五師團及戰車二師團ナル  
 内才五軍三師團戰車一師團、才三軍五師團十戰車一師團  
 才三軍三師團、才二軍二師團、才一西軍直轄三師團ナリ  
 此外南東軍司令官直轄飛行一軍飛行機二千機アリ  
 南東軍乙号計畫ヨリ南戰直前ニ東正面北正面西正面  
 共ニ斯ル状態ナリ

攻勢計畫、乙号攻勢ノ計畫ヨリ全極東ニ於テ是迄  
 獲得ヲ豫期ス、此攻勢計畫ハ四段階ニ別ツ  
 才一段階ニ於テ才三方面軍、才四軍、及N軍ハ孫吳及黑河  
 附近蘇聯國境ニ於テ示威的行動ヲ行ヒ時々蘇領ヲ射  
 撃シ以テ攻勢準備ヲ行フ、然レトモ攻勢ヲ取ラズ斯クシテ  
 專ラ此方面ニ赤軍ヲ拘束シ若シ赤軍攻シ来ラハ抑制ス才六  
 軍ハ海拉爾及阿爾山ノ陣地ヲ確保ス若シ赤軍ニシテ知多方面

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ヨリ滿州ヨリ經テ攻陸軍ニ來ル場合ニハ此等障地ヲ固守シテ之ヲ阻止ス此際沿海州方面第一方面軍ハ次ノ計畫ヨリ斷平トテ攻勢ヲ取ル

a. 才五軍ハ三師團戰車一師團ヲ以テ虎林ヨリ前進シハ之ヲ占領シ一部ヲ以テ北方ニ對シ同地ヲ確保シ主力ハ南進ヲ行ヒ附近第一方面軍主力ノ會戰ニ參加ス

b. 才三軍ハ二師團ヲ以テ瑯春ヨリ前進國境ヲ突破シ南島地ニ北進ヲ行ヒ之ニ向テ其行動ハ第一方面軍主力ト策應ス

c. 才三軍ハ五師團戰車一師團ヲ以テ東安ヨリ南方ニ向テ興寧湖南側ヲ經テノコソクニ向テ前進ス

d. 才三軍ハ三師團ヲ以テ東寧ヨリノコソクニ向テ前進ス茲ニ於テ第一方面軍主力ニ參加ス

是等ノ總テノ兵力ハ「ノコソク」ニ於テ赤軍ヲ制壓シ「ノコソク」

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ヲ占領後一部ヲ以テ元山ニ在ル日本海軍ト策應シ于浦塩ヲ攻圍占領ス是ヲ以テ才一段階ヲ終了ス主ニ此ノ「蘇聯

沿海州全域ヲ占領シ日本自体及滿洲産業地ニ于沿海州

方面ヨリス赤軍ノ航空襲撃等ニ對シ安全ヲラシムルニ在リ

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ヨリ滿州里ヲ經テ攻撃シ未ル場合ニ此等陣地ヲ固守シ之ヲ阻止ス此際沿海州方面第一方面軍ハ次ノ計畫ヨリ斷乎トテ攻勢ヲ取ル

a. 赤五軍ハ三師團戰車一師團ヲ以テ虎林ヨリ前進シ之ヲ占領シ一部ヲ以テ北方ニ對シ同地ヲ確保シ主力ハ南進ス附近第一方面軍主力ノ會戰ニ參加ス

b. 赤三軍ハ二師團ヲ以テ瑯春ヨリ前進國境ヲ突破シ南島地区ヲ北進「オロシロ」ニ向テ其行動ハ方面軍主力ト策應ス

c. 赤二軍ハ五師團戰車一師團ヲ以テ東安ヨリ南方ニ向テ興凱湖西南側ヲ經テ「オロシロ」ニ向テ前進ス

d. 赤三軍ハ三師團ヲ以テ東寧ヨリ「オロシロ」ニ向テ前進ス茲ニ於テ方面軍主力ニ參加ス

是等ノ總テノ兵力ハ「オロシロ」ニ於テ赤軍ヲ制壓シ「オロシロ」ヲ占領後一部ヲ以テ元山ニ在ル日本海軍ト策應シテ浦塩ヲ

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攻圍占領ス。是ヲ以テ赤一縱隊ヲ終了ス主トシテハ蘇聯沿海州全域ヲ占領シ日本自体及滿洲產業地已テ沿海州方面ヨリスル赤軍ノ航空襲撃等ニ對シ安全トラシムニ在リ。

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才二段階、才一段階ノ攻勢成功ナル場合ハ占領地已ヲ確保ス  
 為一部ヲ以テ沿海州ニ殘置シ才二方面軍ノ主力ハ北方ニ向ヒ  
 鉄道ニ沿ヒ「ハロスク」ニ前進ス。佐木斯ニアリシ師團ハ「三多」  
 ニ對スル陣地ヲ占領シ此附近ニ於テ才一才二方面軍ノ襲撃ヲ  
 掩護ス。此時才二方面軍、才四軍及八軍ハ才一方面軍ノ  
 行動ニ策應シテ黑河及其附近ヨリ攻勢ヲ取り「アムル」ヲ渡  
 河シ「アラゴエ」「クシフカ」「スボルネ」ヲ確保シ西伯利鉄道ヲ  
 遮斷シ一部ヲ以テ掩護、為西方ニ對セシメ主力ハ東方ニ向ヒ  
 鉄道ニ沿ヒ「ハロスク」ニ前進ス。茲ニ於テ才一才二方面軍ハ  
 策應シテ赤軍ヲ兩方ヨリ夾撃決戦シ以テ哈府ヲ占領ス  
 是ヲ以テ才二段階ヲ終ル

才三段階、哈府占領後才二方面軍ハ急速ニ西方ニ轉進シ  
 將來後貝加爾攻勢作戰、為兵力増加準備ヲ行フ  
 此時海拉爾ニ在ル才六軍ハ三師團ヲ増加セラシ兵力四師

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團ニ達シ攻撃ヲ前進、為準備ヲ行フ

才一方面軍ハ沿海州ニ於テ重要ナル地区及才二方面軍ノ後方  
 ヲ確保ス。

才二方面軍ノ主力ハ完全ニ準備シタル後「ソボネヤ」ヨリ西方ニ向ヒ

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西伯利鐵道沿之知多ニ前進ヲ開始ス。才ニ方面軍主力  
「元が中」ニ連スルハ才六軍ハ直ニ三河附近及滿洲里附近  
國境ヲ突破シ攻勢ヲ開始ス自己ノ行動ハ才ニ方面軍、主力  
ニ策應シ知多及其南方地ニ前進ス。

知多及其附近ヲ占領後才ニ方面軍ハ西方ノ重要地ニ確  
保シ才ニ段階ノ作戰ヲ終ル  
才四段階ノ攻勢ニ於テハ後貝加爾及貝加爾ニ至ル迄獲得ス  
然シ攻勢計畫ハ才四段階ニ就テハ私ハ承知セズ。

對蒙作戰 才三段階ニ於テ才六軍ノ前進開始ト共ニ阿爾  
山部隊(約一師團)ハ才ニ方面軍ノ直轄トシ滿洲蒙古  
部隊(約一師團)ヲ併セ指揮シ阿爾山ヨリ「タフサ」ニ  
次テ「バシトメ」ツヤシオラサモシヲ經テ知多ニ向テ前進ス。  
此部隊ハ東部外蒙ヲ前進シツヤ才ニ方面軍ノ右翼ヲ  
掩護ス。

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大本營ハ總テ、武力行動ニ策應シ北及ヨリ機械化兵團  
ヲ轉用シ張家口ヨリ庫倫ニ向テ作戰行動ヲ開始セシム  
然シ將來ノ攻勢行動展開ノ計畫ハ私ハ承知セサルヲ以テ  
説明スルコト能ハス

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對蘇攻勢計畫、概要以上、如三 此一九四二年度、對蘇  
攻勢作戰計畫、參謀本部関東軍共ニ立案制作製ニ  
爾後年々更新セリ 此日本ノ軍中処置ノ計畫、一九四四年  
中頃迄存在セリ

日本ノ大東亞戰爭ノ戰場ノ困難ナル状態ニ陥リタルニ依リ  
此計畫ヲ実行スルコトハ出来得サリキ  
此自筆ノ證言ハ署名ヲ以テ確認ス

前関東軍第一方面軍司令官大將 喜多 誠一

記同者 示エシエラニキ中佐 署名

通訳者 シキエベシコフ 署名

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證明書

余中佐 G. I. タラネニコ / TARANENKO G. I. / 社會主義ソビエト共和國聯邦陸軍、部員ニシテ、茲ニ左記、如ク證明ス

記

日本人俘虜陸軍大將喜多誠ニ依リテ四月三十日ヨリ全二十三日迄、間ニ日本語ニテ記サシタル二十三頁ヨリ成ル書證、直接複寫寫真、寫ハ

一九四六年六月二十五日又、其後ニ於テ

社會主義ソビエト共和國聯邦ハバロフスク地方、檢察官ヨリ余ニ引渡サシタル事、並ニ該文書ノ原本ハ、ハバロフスク地方檢察官、保管書類ノ中ニ所在スルト着ラル事。

余ハ更ニ左ノ事ヲ證明ス。

(署名及階級) 中佐 タラネニコ / 署名 /

日本東京ニ於テ

一九四六年九月二十六日



International Military Tribunal  
Far East

The United States of America and Others,  
versus  
ANAHI Sadao and Others.

Affidavit

I am MATSUMURA Tomokatsu, formerly Major-General of the Japanese Army, and was born in the 32nd year of Meiji /1899/. I state here as follows:-

I served in the Japanese Army General Staff Office in various capacities in and after the 4th year of SHOWA /1929/. In October of the 16th year of SHOWA /1941/, I became chief of the 5th section (Soviet Russian Intelligence) of the 2nd dept. (Intelligence) in the Army General Staff Office. In August of 18th year of SHOWA /1943/, I was transferred from that post to that of the chief of the 1st section (operations) of the Kwantung Army Headquarters. In March of 20th year of SHOWA /1945/ I was appointed Vice-Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, remaining in that post until the surrender.

I testify as follows the facts I knew in relation to my duties during the period mentioned above:-

1) Having arrived at the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army in the 18th year of SHOWA /1943/, I, as the Chief of the Strategy Section, was first of all informed of the operations plan kept by the Headquarters. At this time I was informed of the directives of the Army General Staff concerning the operations plan against Soviet Russia for the 17th year of SHOWA /1942/ and the operations plan itself of the Kwantung Army Headquarters based upon the said directives.

The directives of the Army General Staff instructed the Kwantung Army Headquarters to form an operations plan against Soviet Russia with the occupation of the Maritime Provinces of Soviet Russia and the destruction of the air-bases in the Maritime Province as the general objectives, and also to focus the principal attack upon Voroshilov. It was also written in the directives that the Kwantung Army should make preparations for further operations after occupation of the Maritime Provinces.

The operations plan made by the Kwantung Army Headquarters according to the above directives in 17th year of SHOWA /1942/ contained the following items: -

- 1) The general tasks of the Kwantung Army.
- 2) Distribution of military strength.
- 3) The tasks of the different fronts and armies.

The tasks as set forth in the afore-mentioned directive of the Army General Staff were indicated as the general tasks of the Kwantung Army.

In the item of the distribution of military strength, it was planned that the First Front, the Second Front and the Sixth Army should participate in the operation against Soviet Russia. The First Front comprised 4 armies (the 2nd, 3rd, 20th, 5th Army), consisting of 15 infantry divisions, and 2 tank divisions. Furthermore, besides the First Front Armies, one independent infantry division was stationed at CHIAPUSU in order to protect the left wing of the First Area Army.

The Second Front was planned to comprise two Armies (the Fourth Army and a certain other Army) consisting of seven divisions; and the Sixth Army consisting of four divisions. Besides these there were three infantry divisions as the general reserve of the Kwantung Army and the Second Air Force Army consisting of four air divisions were under direct control of the Kwantung Army.

In the item concerning the tasks of the different fronts and armies, the task of the First Front was indicated as follows: that the Second Army should attack from CHIENAC Area toward the Southern USSURI Area; that the Third Army should attack from TUNGNIIG Area toward VOROSHILOV; that the Twentieth Army should attack from the area to the west of Lake Khanka toward VOROSHILOV; and that the Fifth Army should attack from HUTOW Area toward LIAN Area and thereby cut off the enemy's communications extending from south to north and later have one part of the force cover the north and have another part advance southward to facilitate the attack of the main force on VOROSHILOV. Although it is not expressly indicated in the plan, it can be presumed that the occupation of VLADIVOSTOK was to follow that of VOROSHILOV.

The tasks of the Second Front were indicated as follows: that the Fourth Army and a certain other Army should be stationed in the SHU-WU and HEI-HO Areas respectively, where they were to check the Soviet Army in the AIUR River Area.

- 1) The general tasks of the Kwantung Army.
- 2) Distribution of military strength.
- 3) The tasks of the different fronts and armies.

The tasks as set forth in the afore-mentioned directive of the Army General Staff were indicated as the general tasks of the Kwantung Army.

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The tasks of the Second Front were indicated as follows: that the Fourth Army and a certain other Army should be stationed in the SIEN-NU and HEI-HO Areas respectively, where they were to check the Soviet Army in the AMUR River Area.

The task of the Sixth Army was to stand on the defensive in the HSIINGAN mountain-range against the Soviet Army from ZABAISKALYE and cover the offensive operation of the First Front.

The operations plan against Soviet Russia for SECWA 17 /1942/ was signed by General UMEZU, Commander of the Kwantung Army, Lieutenant-General KASAHARA, Chief of Staff, and Colonel TAMURA, Chief of the Operations Section.

It was not clear to me whether a war against the Soviet Union would be carried on. I know only of matters related to operations. Matters concerning the political aims of war against Soviet Russia were under the authority of the government, and I know nothing about them. As for the operations plan against Soviet Russia for SECWA 18 /1943/ the Army General Staff gave us no new directives whatever. Therefore, according to the general practice in the Army, the plan for SECWA 17 /1942/ was followed in SECWA 18 /1943/ as well.

Immediately after my assumption of office in October 1941 as Chief of the 5th Section (Soviet-relations) of the 2nd Department, Lieutenant General CHAICTO, Seifuku, the Chief of the 2nd department, gave me an order in his office to deliver the intelligence relating to the Soviet Union collected by the 5th Section to the 16th Section (GERMAN RELATIONS) of the 2nd Department. On this occasion, Lt.-General CHAICTO explained to me that the intelligence was wanted by KRETSCHNER, German military attache. Thenceforth, in accordance with the orders given by Lt.-General CHAICTO, Seifuku, Chief of the 2nd Department, and his successor Lt.-General ARISUE, Seizo, I systematically forwarded to the 16th Section (GERMAN RELATIONS) for Colonel KRETSCHNER the intelligence regarding Soviet military forces, their disposition in the Far East, war potential of the Soviet Union, movement of Soviet divisions to the west from the Far East, internal movements of Soviet strength, and reconstruction of the withdrawn Soviet industries. These intelligences were based upon materials reported to the General Staff Office from Japanese military attaches in MOSCOW and various other intelligence sources. They were arranged by officers of my section and after my examination were delivered directly to the 16th Section. Sometimes important ones were delivered to the 16th Section after I had examined them and after Chief of the 2nd Department had gone over them.

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We used to deliver intelligence to the 16th Section  
(in charge of German affairs about once a month.

The above was written by my own hand and the contents  
are true.

(Signed)

NATSUMURA, Tomokatsu

Sworn and subscribed to before the  
undersigned officer by the above-named  
NATSUMURA, Tomokatsu, at the Soviet Embassy  
Building, Tokyo, Japan, this day 27th of  
September, 1946.

/signed/ Roland J. Schwartz  
Roland J. Schwartz Captain T.C.  
Summary Courts Martial

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, 2d Lt. John D. Hattori, hereby certify that I  
am fully conversant with the Japanese and English languages,  
and that this day, the said Natsumura, Tomokatsu, was duly  
sworn in my presence and signed said Affidavit under oath  
in my presence: and that all proceedings incidental to  
the administration of said oath and the signing of said  
affidavit were truly and correctly translated from Japanese  
into English and English into Japanese and fully under-  
stood and comprehended by said Affiant.

Dated this 27th day of September, 1946, at  
Tokyo, Japan.

/signed/ John D. Hattori  
JOHN D. HATTORI  
2d Lt. Central  
Interrogation Section.

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陸軍省参謀本部

陸軍省参謀本部

其他参謀本部

明治三十四年九月日本陸軍少将松村和勝三、  
通申速云云

私昭和四年以来日本参謀本部之各種職務之  
昭和十年十月私参謀本部第三部(情報)  
第五課(諜報)長(昭和十年八月同職)関  
東軍司令部第一課(作戰)長(轉之昭和十年三月関  
東軍参謀副長三位命也)同職務(在之降伏)至之  
之、以之期間私職務(関聯)之私自、知得  
事實云、如證言云云

昭和十年関東軍司令部(列着)之作戰課長ト云  
先司令部(在之)作戰計画ヲ承知云云私此時昭和  
十年、對其作戰計画ヲ承知云云(日示)之  
基(関)云云

THE  
RETURN TO ROOM 361  
COPY



UOC 2672

參謀本部指示關東軍司令部對滿洲解海州  
一廢除海州陸軍航空基地，廢滅一般目的  
對滿洲作戰計畫作成之旨，指示其攻擊等之方針  
二向子兒知、不卡、之、尙參謀本部指示、以海州、  
及須賀川、關東軍、爾後作戰準備之旨、記、

以上指示、基於關東軍司令部作成之昭和七年作戰  
計畫、之、諸項、合、

- (1) 關東軍一般任務
- (2) 兵力命令
- (3) 各方面軍及軍、任務

關東軍一般任務、之、參謀本部指示、不卡、之、任務  
記載、之、

兵力命令、對滿洲作戰、第一方面軍、第二方面軍、第三方面軍、  
參加之、如、之、第一方面軍、四、

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(第三第三第三、第五軍) 步兵十五個師團、戰車三  
個師團、及、之、尙第一方面軍、外、第二方面軍、  
在、之、及、之、獨立步兵一個師團、於、

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置道云々云々

第三方面軍、三國軍(第四軍及地(某二軍)之四師團  
 目、成、第六軍、四國師團、三、成、如、孫、定、云、云、居、之、云、云  
 右、外、歩、兵、三、國、師、團、加、測、察、軍、總、務、備、上、又、測、察、軍  
 直、轄、上、三、國、飛、行、師、團、三、成、此、第、二、航、空、軍、が、下、之、云、云  
 各、方、面、軍、及、軍、の、任、務、項、目、は、第、二、方、面、軍、の、任、務、次、如、下、不  
 々、三、居、之、云、云、即、ち、第、三、軍、の、用、島、地、区、の、南、方、一、地、区、向、て  
 攻、撃、す、第、三、軍、の、康、寧、地、区、カ、ラ、右、に、一、地、区、向、て、攻、撃、す、  
 第、三、軍、の、興、凱、湖、西、方、地、区、カ、ラ、右、に、一、地、区、向、て、攻、撃、す、第、  
 二、軍、の、虎、頭、地、区、カ、ラ、右、に、一、地、区、向、て、攻、撃、す、之、南、北、之、交、通、ヲ  
 遮、断、す、爾、後、一、部、ヲ、以、て、北、方、ニ、對、し、掩、護、す、一、部、ヲ、以、て、南、方  
 ニ、前、進、す、之、カ、ラ、右、に、一、地、区、向、て、攻、撃、す、(各、目、的、十、二、之、云、云、又  
 尚、計、画、ハ、ハ、ハ、キ、リ、不、サ、キ、ハ、ハ、ハ、セ、ニ、ガ、カ、ラ、右、に、一、地、区、向、て、攻、撃、す、  
 遮、り、占、領、す、之、カ、ラ、右、に、一、地、区、向、て、攻、撃、す、之、カ、ラ、右、に、一、地、区、向、て、攻、撃、す、

了  
 第三方面軍、任務、次、如、下、不、々、三、居、之、云、云、即、ち、第、  
 四、軍、の、孫、吳、地、区、ニ、配、置、せ、ら、る、云、云

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也、某二軍、奥河地に配置し、蘇軍に對し、監視ヲ行ハシメ、

中三軍、任務、嚴守候テサレバ、蘇軍に對シ防禦、之ニ  
向テ軍、攻勢作戰ヲ捲張スルニ在リシ。

昭和十年、對敵作戰計、思ハ、國東軍司令官、梅津大將  
ノ署名、參謀長、笠原中將、作戰課長、田村大佐、捺印カ  
ラシマシ。

蘇聯邦ニ對シ、戰爭ニ參シテ、私ハ、不明ナリ、之ハ、私  
ハ、唯、作戰關係多ク、分リ、之ニ、對蘇作戰、政策、關係ハ、  
政府、權能ニ屬シ、之ニ、國ハ、私ハ、全然、分リ、之ニ、昭和十  
年、對蘇作戰計、思ハ、國ハ、參謀本部多ク、何奇、私指  
不モ、アリ、之ニ、從テ、軍、一般、慣例、言ハ、昭和十年、計  
思ハ、昭和十年、モ、依然、踏襲、カラシマシ。

一、私、昭和十六年十月、中三部、中五課、(蘇聯關係長  
就任直後、中三部長、岡本清福中將、部長室、テ、私  
中五課、テ、收集、シ、蘇聯、情報、ヲ、中三部、中十六課、(獨逸  
關係)ニ、渡ス、如ク、命ジ、之、此、際、岡本中將、其、情報、  
獨逸、武官、ク、之、タル、ガ、希望、シ、之、モ、之、ル、旨、説明、シ、之、此、  
後、私、中三部長、岡本清福中將、及其、後任、有未精  
三中將、命、依リ、恒例、的、ク、之、タル、大佐、為テ、中十六  
課(獨逸關係)ニ、蘇軍、兵力、極東、ニ、於テ、其、配置、  
蘇聯邦、戰爭、能力、ニ、關シ、情報、ヲ、傳ヘ、蘇聯、師團、極東、  
多ク、西方、ニ、移動、國內、ニ、於テ、蘇軍、兵力、移動、撤退、多ク、  
蘇聯、工業、再建、事情、ヲ、與ヘ、之、等、情報、モ、之、ク、旨、  
本武官、其、他、各種、情報、源、多ク、參謀本部、ニ、報告、

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之資料之其不<sup>レ</sup><sub>レ</sub>之等情報、私、課、谷將  
 校が準備<sup>レ</sup>、私、実檢、後、直接、中、十、課、送<sup>レ</sup>、時、下、  
 重要、言、私、実檢、後、中、二、部長、一、覽、ヲ、經、中、十、支  
 課、送<sup>レ</sup>、也、中、十、課、(他、速、因、係)、概、不、可、回、位、情  
 報、ヲ、傳、入、也。  
 以上、私、自、筆、多、王、手、其、内、容、真、実、ナ、リ、ス。

松村 知勝

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上記 松村知勝、一九四六年(昭和二十一年)九月  
二十七日、聯大使館内ニテ本官、面前ニテ宣  
誓、上本供述書ニ署名セリ。

簡易軍事法廷

輸送隊陸軍大尉

ロートランドエー エーワルツ (署名)

證 明 書

予陸軍少尉服部テイ、此ノハ茲ニ左、如ク證明ス予  
自英兩言語ニ通曉シ且本日前記松村知勝、予、面前  
ニテ正式ニ宣誓シ且供述書ニ予、面前ニテ宣誓、上署  
名セリ。

No. 6 該宣誓ヲ為シ且該供述書ニ署名スルニ就イテ、凡テ、手續  
日本語ヨリ英語ニ、又英語ヨリ日本語ニ忠實且正確ニ翻  
訳セシ右供述書ニヨリ充分理解且了解セシム。

一九四六年(昭和二十一年)九月二十七日

日本國東京ニ於テ

中央訊問部 陸軍少尉

服部テイ、此ノハ (署名)

Witness Interrogation Affidavit

At Khabarovsk

March 28, 1946

I, Col. of Justice Ivanof, Assistant Prosecutor for the USSR at the International Military Tribunal, Tokyo, interrogated through the interpreter officer, Lt. Petrof, the following person as a witness, having previously warned him of the responsibility he should take upon himself in case of false statements, according to Article 95 of the Criminal Law of the U.S.S.R.

1. Name: Kazuma OTSUBO
2. Age: 51
3. Official Position: Chief of Staff of the Third front of the Kwantung Army
4. Political Affiliations: None
5. Present Location: Khabarovsk

A certificate concerning the responsibility of the witness for false statement and also the interpreter-officer's for false interpretation are attached to this affidavit.

Kazuma OTSUBO

- Q. From when have you been in the service of the Japanese Army? What kind of military education have you received? In what position have you served?
- A. I entered the active service in 1918. I graduated from the Military Academy in the same year, and from the Army Staff College in 1930. Then I became a Company Commander of the Third Mountain Artillery Regiment. From 1931 to 1936, I served in the Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry and from 1936 to 1937, in the Field Artillery School as an instructor in tactics. In 1937, I was transferred to the Artillery Section of the Department of Military Education. From 1937 to 1939, I served as a staff-officer of the Middle China Expeditionary Army, and from 1939 to 1940, I served again in the Artillery Section of the Department of Military Education. From 1941 to 1942, I became commander of an artillery regiment in North China. From 1941 to 1943, I served in the Artillery Section of the Department of Military Education. From 1943 to 1945, I was Chief of the Heavy Artillery School. In 1945, I became Chief of Staff of the Third front, the post of which I hold as my last duty in the Army.

- Q. From when and to what time have you been in service in Manchuria?
- A. From March to August, 1945, until I was interned by the Soviet Army.
- Q. Have you never been in service in Manchuria before that?
- A. I was the Chief of Staff of the 23rd Division under the command of the Sixth Army, Hailar, for eleven months in 1942-43. The then Commanders of the Sixth Army were Lt.-Gens. KITA and ISHIGURO.
- Q. When and where was the Second front Headquarters established?
- A. In 1942, at Chichihaerh.
- Q. Of what armies did the Second front consist?
- A. It consisted of the 4th and the Sixth armies.
- Q. In what directions were these Armies?
- A. The 4th Army stationed in the direction of Blagoveshchensk and 6th Army stationed in the direction of Bozzia-Danria.
- Q. When were the First front Headquarters established in Manchuria?
- A. The First front Headquarters were established at the same time with those of the Second front, in May or June, 1942.
- Q. For what reason were these two fronts composed in Manchuria in 1942? The Japanese were preparing war against Soviet, weren't they?
- A. I heard that, as the military strength of the Kwantung Army had been increased owing to the realization of the "Kan-Toku-En" plan, fronts were newly organized in order to make the commandship easy, and the Kwantung Army Headquarters took the command of these fronts.
- Q. How much was the military strength of the Kwantung Army in 1942?
- A. The Kwantung Army had the military forces of about fifteen divisions.
- Q. Were there any other army formations, for example, brigades or general reservists corps, etc.?
- A. There were, besides eight Frontier-Guards detachments the front in which I served had three Frontier-Guards detachments, but there were eight in all in the Kwantung Army. There were no brigades at the time of "Kan-Toku-En", but just before the war was opened, the Frontier-Guards were reorganized into brigades and thus ten brigades were formed.

- Q. When and from whom did you hear about the "Kan-Toku-En" plan?
- A. In July, 1941, when I was in service of the Artillery section of the Department of Military Education. I saw the name of the plan on the documents which were sent to there from the War Ministry.
- Q. What measures was the Department of Military Education compelled to take by the plan of the "Kan-Toku-En"?
- A. The special purpose of the "Kan-Toku-En" plan was the speedy training of troops for the emergency of war. It was difficult to practice the training in the Japanese homeland.
- Q. Were these the troops prepared for the war against Soviet according to the plan of the "Kan-Toku-En" in 1941-42?
- A. These were the troops to be used, for example, in the wars against Soviet, the United States, or Britain, according to the changes in international situation.
- Q. Against what country was Manchuria a basis for war?
- A. Manchuria was the basis for war against Soviet and China. It was important for war against U.S. too.
- Q. Was it prearranged, in the "Kan-Toku-En" plan, to complete the construction of railways as well as of warehouses necessary for the supply of munitions and foods to the Kwantung Army?
- A. Though I don't know much about the "Kan-Toku-En" plan, I think such matters were prearranged. As the measures prearranged in the plan were kept in secrecy, I don't know them exactly.
- Q. Was the designation, "Kan-Toku-En", a cipher for the measure for the increase and strengthening of the Kwantung Army?
- A. The meaning of this designation is the special manoeuvre of the Kwantung Army. The men who were sent to Manchuria from home in 1941, according to this plan, were told that they were going to have a special manoeuvre.
- Q. Then, were the concentration and the strategic deployment of military forces in Manchuria kept in secrecy even to the Japanese enlisted men transported to Manchuria?
- A. The increase of the Kwantung Army was secret to the enlisted men.
- Q. How much was the Kwantung Army increased by the "Kan-Toku-En" plan?



- A. In 1941, the military formations of the Kwantung Army were put into the wartime organization, the deployment of the troops was a strategic one. The increased strength was some 300,000 men and the total numbered about 600,000.
- Q. Was each division of the Kwantung Army mainly arranged to the quarters in strategic directions most important in the war against Soviet?
- A. Yes, all divisions were stationed at the places mainly strategic important in the war against Soviet.
- Q. Can you come to the conclusion that the commander-in-chief of the Japanese Army made the strategic deployment of the Kwantung Army in 1941, for the war against Soviet?
- A. Yes; according to my private opinion, this strategic deployment was made for the war against Soviet.
- Q. Were the Headquarters of the First and the Second fronts established in conjunction with these circumstances?
- A. Yes; I think the Headquarters of the First and the Second fronts of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria were organized in connection with the strategic deployment of the troops.
- Q. Where was the "Kan-Toku-En" plan made?
- A. In the Japanese Army General Staff.
- Q. Who was the Chief of the Japanese Army General Staff at the time of the making of the "Kan-Toku-En" plan?
- A. The Chief of the Army General Staff was Gen. SUGIYAMA. The Chief of the Army General Staffs Military Operations Department was Major-Gen. TANAKA Shinichi. The War Minister of the Kono Cabinet, the then Cabinet, was General TOJO.
- Q. Was there, at that time, any agreement that Japan should enter the War on the side of Germany and Italy?
- A. I have heard of the military alliance among Japan, Germany and Italy, but I don't know the substance.
- Q. Was the Anti-Comintern Pact which was concluded among Japan, Germany and Italy in 1936 an anti-Soviet pact?
- A. I think it was anti-Soviet.
- Q. When were the Third front Headquarters established?

- A. The Third front Headquarters were organized in September, 1943, at ChiChihar, in place of the Second front which had gone to the South.
- Q. Did the Armies and Divisions of the Second front remain in Manchuria?
- A. All the Armies and Divisions of the former Second front remained in Manchuria in 1943, and came under the command of the Third front staff.
- Q. From where did the orders about the organization of the First, Second and Third fronts come? From the Army General Staff Office or the War Ministry?
- A. According to my opinion, it came from the Army General Staff.
- Q. Who made the replenishment? Was it the Army General Staff or the War Ministry?
- A. The replenishment plan was made by the Army General Staff. The War Ministry guided its practice.
- Q. Was it the War Ministry that put the "Kan-Toku-En" plan made by the Army General Staff into operation?
- A. I think so.
- Q. What do you know about the surprise attack plans made by the Japanese Army against Soviet in 1942 and 1943?
- A. At the first stage of the war against Soviet, the First front was to attack and occupy the Soviet Maritime Province. The Fourth Army of the Second front, by engaging in the diversional movement in the Blagoveshchensk District, was to cut off the Trans-Siberia Main Line, give a blow to this supply line, and facilitate the action of the First front which was in charge of the most important duty. The duty of the Sixth Army was to hold the Red Army from invading into Manchuria from Zabaikalye and engage in the defensive action.
- Q. Were these plans of the Kwantung Army offensive plans?
- A. Yes, in the eastern district, the plans of operations against Soviet were offensive.
- Q. Were these plans effective till the spring of 1944?
- A. Yes, these plans were effective till the spring of 1944.
- Q. What was the plan of hostile operations against Soviet made by the Sixth Army and the Second front in 1942 and 1943?

- A. In August, 1943, a conference concerning the military operations against the U.S.S.R. was held at the Headquarters of the 6th Army, Hailar. At that time, I attended the conference as the Chief of Staff of the 23rd Division. The chairman of the conference was Maj.-General IGETA, the then Chief of Staff of the 6th Army.
- Q. Were you the only person attended the conference as the divisional Chief of Staff?
- A. Yes, I was the only person.
- Q. For what reason?
- A. At that time, there was only one division in the 6th Army. Besides that, there were frontier-guards detachments.
- Q. Speak more minutely about the conference.
- A. As the Kwantung Army was to take the offensive in the areas of the Maritime Province during the first step of the war against the U.S.S.R. the 6th Army was to go on the defensive in its area. Therefore, through the first two days of the conference, the plan of defence in the area of the 6th Army was discussed. It was the scheme of the commander that we were to fight to death against the enemy in the Zabaikalye Area until new divisions would arrive to the Second front. On the third day of the conference, the offensive operation was studied. The operation was to be executed by the Front and the Army, reinforced by new formations. In this occasion, the 2nd front was to attack in the direction of Chita. The commander's plan was, after concentrating the main body in the area of Hailar, to make an attack from the southern district of Lake Dalainoor by an encirclement movement, behind the right wing of the Zabaikalye front and advance to Borzisa Area, destroying the enemy forces and cutting off their retreat.
- Q. Were there sufficient military forces in the Area Army for attaining the purpose of operations in 1942-43?
- A. At least twenty divisions were required in order to achieve the objective of attack in the area of Chita. However, our strength in this area was sufficient just to make a strong resistance. Therefore in order to attack, reinforcement of between fifteen and twenty divisions from other areas was necessary. The regrouping of the Kwantung Army could be done only after the occupation of the Soviet Maritime Province and the accomplishment of the initial stage of war.

I wish that the map drawn by me showing the defensive operations of the 6th Army, belonging to the second front, at the first stage of the war against Soviet in 1943 and also the map showing the offensive operations of the Second front at the second stage of the war against Soviet, after the occupation of the Maritime Province was attained successfully, and the military forces of between ten and twenty divisions were transferred to the direction of Chita, were attached to this brief interrogation affidavit.

- Q. When did Lieut.-Gen. KITA command the 6th Army?
- A. I do not remember exactly, but I think he commanded the Army from 1941 to 1942. It was Lieut.-Gen. ISHIGURO who succeeded Lieut.-Gen. KITA.
- Q. What was the plan of operations of the 3rd front when you were the Chief of Staff of that front in 1945?
- A. In 1945, the duty of the 3rd front was to interrupt the advance of the Soviet Army in the vicinity of Chaonan, Wuchakow, and Tungliao in Manchuria. According to the plan of operations in 1945, the main forces of the third front should take up positions in the districts of Mukden, Saupingchieh, and Hsinking, and if the enemies would come to attack, should destroy them in these districts.

The fundamental principles of the plan of operations for the war against Soviet in 1945 were as follows:

1. In case the main forces of the Soviet Army would attack the 44th Army in the vicinity of Mukden, the Japanese Army was to give a blow to the enemy's left wing with the largest possible military strength. For this purpose, the 30th Army from the Hsinking district and the 39th Division and the 9th Tank Brigade from the Saupingchieh district were to attack the Red Armies with the purpose of annihilating them in short time.
2. In case the enemy would attack the 30th Army in Hsinking with its main forces, the blow to the enemy's wing was to be dealt by the 44th Army, the 39th Division and the 9th Tank Brigade.
3. In case the main forces of the Soviet Army would attack Saupingchieh, the Japanese Army was to give an enveloping attack to both wings of the enemy. In this case, by the attack of the 30th Army from Hsinking and that of the 44th Army from Mukden, we should promptly annihilate the Soviet troops in the battlefield in short time.
4. If we could drive back the Red Army units in the district of the Dairen-Hsinking Railway Line, the Japanese Army was to attempt with one part of its military forces, to pursue the enemy promptly along the Harbin-Hailar Railway, to attack along the Chaonan-Khalonarshan Railway with its main forces, then to advance through Choi Colsan to the vicinity of Olovyomaya and Karymskaya in the Soviet territory, and to destroy the enemy by interrupting the enemy's retreat.
5. If we should be driven back by the confronting enemy, the Third front was to retreat, with its main forces to the vicinity of the line of Liuho, Hsinking and Huan-chien, to prevent the enemy's advance and form a plan for holding out with the utmost effort.

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Q. Who was the Inspector-General of Military Education of the Japanese Army in 1941?

A. General YAMADA.

Q. Under whose command was Gen. YAMADA as the Inspector-general of Military Education?

A. He was under direct control of H.I.M. the Emperor.

Q. Did he have the same power as the War Minister and the Chief of the General Staff?

A. Yes, he had the same power and occupied the same leading position in the army as they did.

Q. What was the duty of the Inspector-general of Military Education?

A. The principle duty of the Inspector-general of Military Education was the guidance and supervision of the Japanese military education. The Inspector-general issued orders concerning the military education, and the Army Infantry School, the Army Artillery School and the Military Academy, etc., were under his control. The Army Paymaster's School and the Military Medical College were under the command of the War Minister, while the Army Staff College was under th at of the Chief of the General Staff.

Q. What measures did Gen. YAMADA take as the Inspector-general of Military Education according to the "Kan-Toku-En" plan?

A. Gen. YAMADA assumed leadership only in the military education of ordinary times. The education and guidance of the Kwantung Army according to the "Kan-Toku-En" plan, which was the plan of the front line, was made directly by the Chief of the General Staff. Accordingly, Gen. YAMADA supplied the Army General Staff only with the materials regarding education.

Q. What propositions did Gen. YAMADA make concerning the education of the Kwantung Army units?

A. Gen. YAMADA furnished only the materials necessary for the short course education to the Chief of the General Staff. The Inspector-general of Military Education assumed leadership in the military education of the units of peace organization footing. The units in Manchuria were educated as the units on a war footing, and accordingly, the guidance of education of the Kwantung Army in 1941 was made by the Army General Staff.

Q. Concretely speaking, what materials did Gen. YAMADA offer?

- A. They were the general materials for education.
- Q. How were the recruited men which, as you said before, were increased by about 300,000 in the Kwantung Army in 1941 organized?
- A. In 1941, the levy concerning the "Kan-Toku-En" plan was made in the homeland of Japan, and the recruited men were transported from Japan to Manchuria.
- Q. This levy was made during June and July, 1941. Was it a secret mobilization?
- A. At that time, it was a secret mobilization under the name of an educational levy.
- Q. Were the men mobilized and ordered to serve in the Kwantung Army those who had undergone military education or had they been in military service?
- A. Most of them were those who had undergone military education and had been in military service.
- Q. What order did General YAMADA issue concerning the training of the special attack corps (the death band)?
- A. Gen. YAMADA did not issue any order concerning the special attack corps (the death band). I think nobody gave any special order concerning them. Sometimes wartime death bands were organized, but these units did not receive any special training.
- Q. In what way were the Japanese soldiers trained for the purpose of war of aggression? What order did Gen. YAMADA give when he was the Inspector-general of Military Education?
- A. The fundamental object of education lies in training soldiers so that they can engage in any war without thinking of the characteristic of that war. The materials for spiritual education were prepared by a special section in the Department of Military Education. This section distributed to the troops the pamphlets in which behaviours of model soldiers were written.
- Q. Was it Gen. YAMADA who instructed the fundamental principles of education of officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted men?
- A. Yes, Gen. YAMADA instructed the fundamental principles of military education as the Inspector General of Military Education. He often instructed about the spiritual education, too. But as regards the education of the units on a war footing, Gen. YAMADA, as the Chief of Military Education, sent to the Army General Staff only the materials.

- Q. What were the fundamental principles of spiritual education of soldiers concerning the war against China, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.?
- A. Political education was not conducted, but spiritual education was given, in which soldiers were taught that they should obey orders of superior officers and that they should become model soldiers.
- Q. What propaganda was made regarding the right of Japan to take over China?
- A. Towards China, it was propagated that this war had been waged for the purpose of constructing a new order in the Greater East Asia.
- Q. Who had suggested such an education?
- A. The fundamental principles of such education were instructed by the War Minister.
- Q. Who, among the War Ministers, had issued orders of such spiritual education that Japan should be the ruler of the Greater East Asia?
- A. War Minister TOJO spoke about these affairs at the assembly of Chiefs of Staffs in about 1941 and 1942.
- Q. Who, among Japanese statesmen and soldiers, had propagated the war against Soviet?
- A. I think General TANAKA, who had become the Vice-chief of the General Staff. The War Minister and the Premier, etc., had such thought. Lieut.-General MURAOKA, who was the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantun Army just before the Manchurian Incident had such thought that Japan must solve her population problem by seizing the natural resources in Manchuria.

By my signature, I hereby certify that the above answers are of my own writing.

Kazuma OTSUBO

Interrogator: Col. of Justice, Assistant Prosecutor for the USSR at the International Military Tribunal, Tokyo.

Ivanof.

Interpreter-Officer:

Lt. Petrof.

The Witness:

Maj.Gen. Kazuma OTSUBO

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1. page 3. The word "army" is inserted in two places.
2. page 6. Four letters of a Japanese word for English "mainly" are inserted.
3. page 7. Two letters of a Japanese word for English "yes" are inserted.
4. page 18. Two letters of a Japanese word for English "spirit" are inserted.
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
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Map showing the offensive operations of the Second front at the second stage of the war against Soviet, after the occupation of the Maritime Province was attained successfully, and the military forces of between ten and twenty divisions were transferred to the direction of Chita.




Maj. Gen. Kazuma Otsubo, Chief of Staff of the Third Area Army  
(March 28, 1946)

DOC. 1981

1 13

Map showing the defensive operations of the 6th Army, belonging to the Second front, at the first stage of the war against Soviet in 1943.



Doc. No. 1981

P. 14

Acknowledgment

Date & Place

I, the undersigned, Maj. Gen. Kazuma OTSUBO, Chief of Staff of the Third front, delivered this acknowledgement to Col. of Justice Ivanof, Assistant Prosecutor for the USSR at the International Military Tribunal, Tokyo, after having sworn that I, as a witness, would make only true statement concerning major war criminals.

I was previously warned of the responsibility I should take upon myself in case of false statements, according to Article 95 of the criminal law of the USSR.

Maj. Gen. Kazuma OTSUBO

Recipient of this acknowledgement

Assistant Prosecutor for the USSR  
at the International Military Tribunal  
Tokyo

Ivanof.

81 821

Affidavit of a Witness

March 25, 1946 at Khabarovsk

I, Colonel IVANOV, Assistant Prosecutor for U.S.S.R. at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, interrogated the undermentioned person; through an interpreter 2nd Lt. PETROV, as a witness after warning him that he would be responsible under Art. No. 95 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R. if he made any false statements.

1. Name: KISABA, Tatsumi
2. Age: born in 1888. 58 years
3. Official position: Ex-Commander of the Continental Railway
- n.2 4. Political Party: nil
5. Present address: Khabarovsk

Attached certificate of the responsibility of a witness regarding false statement and also a certificate of the official interpreter regarding false interpretation with this interrogatory of a witness.

This interrogation has been made in the Japanese language through the interpretation of 2nd Lt. PETROV.

- p.3 Q. When, and by whom were you appointed to the Commander of the Continental Railway?
- A. At the date of December 16th, 1944, I was appointed the commander of the Continental Railway by His Majesty.
- Q. Have you ever participated in the Manchuria Railway?
- A. Yes, after the Manchurian Incident. I have participated in it as the head of the Sixth Section of the Third Division of the General Staff Office (the head of the Section of Railway), from the 6th year of Showa /1931/ to the 8th year of Showa /1933/. In the 6th year of Showa /1931/ the head of the Third Division was, Major-General OKI and in the 7th year of Showa /1932/ Major General CBATA.
- Q. When did you have relation to the leadership of the Manchurian Railways?
- A. From 10th year of Showa /1935/ to 12th year of Showa /1937/ I had connection with the leading of the South Manchurian Railway as an adviser attached to the South Manchurian Railway and belonging

to the staff of the KWANTUNG Army. And I took the charge of the connection between the KWANTUNG Army, the government of Manchuria and the head office of the South Manchurian Railway Company. At that time I took the position in the general Bureau of the South Manchurian Railway Company in Mukden. At that time the Commander of the KWANTUNG Army was General HINAI Jiro, and the Chief of the staff of this army was Lieutenant-General NISHIO Juzo.

p. 4 Q From and to what time were you on active service?

A I was on active service from 1908 to 1944 and on December, 1st, 1944, I was ordered to go into reserve.

Q What kind of military education did you get?

A In 1915 I had graduated from the staff college.

Q From what year did you specialize in the railway relations?

A From 1916.

Q Before the Manchurian occupation, that is to say before 1931, has the government of Japan ever carried out the construction of strategic railways in Manchuria?

A Yes, it has.

Q Before the Manchurian occupation in 1931, had any strategic railways been constructed in Manchuria on Japanese funds?

p.5 A Yes, there was. The railway between Ssipinghai - Tachan - Angongchi was built in 1929, and its length was 500 kilometres long.

Q Where is the strategic point of this railway? Tell me.

A This railway can transport promptly the Japanese forces staying on Manchurian Railway Main Line to the direction of Tsitsihar and cut off the East China Railway, and besides it is convenient to transport the troops in the direction of outer Mongolia via Selun from Tachan. In 1931, at the time of the Manchurian incident this railway was utilized for the transportation of the Japanese forces.



Q. Before 1931, was there any other railways built in Manchuria?

p. 6 A. In 1928, Changchun-Kirin-Tunkua Railway was built by the South Manchurian Railway Company. It was constructed as the first step of Kirin-Hweining Railway which is one of the Five Railways of Manchuria and Mongolia, and it is convenient for making the Japanese troops in Korea advance promptly in the direction of Khabin. At the time of the Manchurian incident this railway was utilized for transportation of Japanese forces.

Q. What are the Five Railways of Manchuria and Mongolia and their strategic meanings?

A. They are as follows:--  
1. Ssupingkaï-Taonan Railway  
2. Taonan-Tsitsihar Railway  
3. Kirin-Hweining Railway  
4. Tsitsihar-Talai Railway  
5. Chanchun-Talai

p. 7 Japan got the concession to lay these railways in the 21 Items Treaty of Japan against China in 1915. I already explained the strategic meanings of 1,2,3. Tsitsihar-Heiho Railway is convenient for carrying troops which could cut off Heilung Railway. Changchun-Talai Railway is convenient for making advance the Japanese troops in Korea promptly to the direction of Tsitsihar via the established Changchun-Kirin Railway and Kirin-Hweining Line.

Q. Before 1931 what railways were built besides them?

A. In 1929, Mukden-Hailung-Kirin Railway was completed by Chinese North-East government.

Q. Did it do good for Japan?

A. It brought the benefit to Japan from the strategic point of view. Japan utilized it for carrying her troops at the time of the Manchurian incident.

Q. Don't you think that the suggestion of constructing this railway was made by Japanese General Staff?

p. 8 A. I don't know whether Japanese General Staff participated in it or not, though it was a benefit to Japan. In 1926 Kinchou-Fitzuro Railway was built on Japanese private companies funds, but it has no strategic meaning. In 1930, Hulutao-Koupangtze-Tahusken-Tungliao Railway was constructed

by Chinese North-East government, and the length of this railway is about 400 Kilometres and it had strategic importance for Japan after the Manchurian incident.

Q. What do you think of the reason why the activities of some Manchurian prominent men on the construction of this railway were in to the Japanese advantage?

A. At the time of the construction of the railway they were of anti-Japanese attitude.

Q. What did you hear of the TANAKA plan?

A. I have heard that TANAKA wanted to accomplish the Japanese continental advance policy, basing on Manchuria and Mongolia.

p. 9 Q. From whom have you heard of it?

A. I knew it through newspapers and from my friends.

Q. Did this plan intend to occupy Manchuria?

A. Yes, it did.

Q. During the term from 1927 to 1931 who of the Japanese politicians participated most actively in the strategic policy which was carried on in Manchuria?

A. The TANAKA cabinet. At the time of the TANAKA cabinet the special service agency were organized and set in Mukden.

Q. Is the intelligence service agency regarded to have been set for the preparation of the Manchurian occupation?

A. The special service agency was necessary for the collection of Manchurian information and for the observation of the schemes of Chinese North-East Government.

p.10 Q. What part did those railways which were constructed in Manchuria from 1927 to 1929 by Japan, perform at the time of Manchurian incident?

A. They performed an important part in transporting Japanese troops against Manchuria in the time of 1931.

Q. Who of the Japanese prominent persons do you think is responsible for these policies of Manchurian occupation

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- A. General HONJO, Shigeru, the commander of the KWANTUNG Army at that time is responsible for the happening of Manchurian incident. At that time, his headquarters was in Luchun. Manchurian incident was operated following the plan made by HONJO, Shigeru.
- Q. What kind of part did the commander of the Japanese Korean Army take and by whose direction was he put in motion?
- A. The commander of the Korean Army, General HAYASHI, Senjuro made the 20th Division cross the border on his own responsibility. The leading of the battle in the actual place was operated by Lieutenant General TAMON, Jiro, the commander of the Second Division under the KWANTUNG Army.
- p. 11
- Q. Who was the Prime Minister at that time?
- A. WATANABE, Reijiro was Prime Minister of Foreign Affairs was SUYEDHARA Kijuro, and the Minister of War was MINAMI Jiro and the Chief of the General Staff was KANAYA Hanzo.
- Q. What attitude did they take towards the Manchurian incident?
- A. They wanted the activities of Japanese troops to be limited only to the self-defence of railway lines. But both General MINAMI Jiro and the Chief of the General Staff KANAYA Hanzo wanted the Manchurian occupation.
- Q. How can you know that MINAMI Jiro took the leading part regarding the Manchurian occupation?
- p.12
- A. He did not emphasize the stoppage of the Japanese forces' activities of hostilities. On the contrary he required the increase of forces in Manchuria and supported the advance of Japanese forces into various places in Manchuria.
- Q. To whom did he emphasize?
- A. He reported with the Chief of the general staff to His Majesty on the increase of Japanese troops against Manchuria and the spreading of the war zone.
- Q. Could MINAMI, Jiro carry on that policy and complete the Manchurian occupation?

A Since Manchuria was occupied practically, the plan of the War Minister was completely carried on. The Minister of War, HIGASHI Jiro carried on this plan with the co-operation with KAWAYU Hanzo.

Q What sort of recognition could these people get from His Majesty as to the activities of Manchurian occupation and among them who received the gratitude and were decorated?

p. 13 A The Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff received the gratitude from His Majesty and received the special favours of being decorated.

Q Tell me the activities and the parts ISHIMAZA, Kanji, DOIHARA Kenji, and ITAGAKI Seishiro played in planning and carrying on the Manchurian occupation?

A ITAGAKI took the part of leading on the planning and carrying on the Manchurian occupation as a high staff officer. ISHIMAZA took the part in drawing up operation orders as the head of the operation section and of leading the battle at the time of the outbreak of the Manchurian incident. DOIHARA co-operated with them in the construction of independent Manchuria as the head of the special service agency in Mukden.

Q Did the latter instigate this incident directly?

A I don't know well, but I suppose he might have been connected with this event directly as he was the head of the special service agency.

p.14 Q For what purpose was the Manchurian occupation carried out by Japan?

A Politically, its purpose was to obtain right for Japan of a leading monopolization in Manchuria.

Q Only in Manchuria?

A At that time it was only in Manchuria.

Q And after that time?

A After that, the idea occurred to them that it would be convenient to make an invasion into the territories of China and the U.S.S.R. through Manchuria as a strategic point.

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- Q Who agreed with this opinion?
- A TAMURA Gaiichi, ARAKI Sadao, TOJO Hidoki, ITAGAKI Seishiro, IATSUOKA Yosuke, SUGAYAMA Gou, FUYASAWA Senjuro, KONOL Fuminoro, OSHIDA, Niyoshi, MINAMI Jiro, and many others, and their activities were concentrated in attacking the territories of the U.S.S.R., China, and the Republic of Outer Mongolia, and they also urged the occupation of the South Sea islands by Japanese forces. According to newspaper accounts and my friends' gossip ARAKI Sadao and UGAKI Issai made a plan to turn the Japan Sea as an inland sea of Japan, that is to say, they were planning to occupy the Maritime Province, which is the territory of the U.S.S.R. They also urged Japanese political predominance all over East Asia as positive policy. These people pointed out that the Ural Mountains would be the limit of Japanese predominance.
- p. 15
- Q Have you met Mr. IATSUOKA?
- A Yes, while I was an adviser of the South Manchurian Railway Company, he was the President of the company. This was from 1936 to 1937.
- p. 16 Q What ideas does IATSUOKA hold in regard to the occupation of territory in the U.S.S.R.?
- A Mr. IATSUOKA often used to sing: 'Let the flag of Rising Sun wave over the Ural Mountains' at the banquets he attended. I also have been present at banquets given by the South Manchurian Railway Company.
- Q What railway was constructed in Manchuria after the Manchurian occupation?
- A In 1933 Kirin-Hweining line, in 1934 the Line from Hoshin to Tunon to Mutankiang were built. Kirin-Hweining Line is convenient to carry the Japanese forces who are to be sent from the interior of Japan to continent, to the direction of Harbin promptly. And RASFIN-Tunon-Mutanhiang Line is convenient to transport the forces promptly to the border of the U.S.S.R. and Manchuria. Since the military utilization of the established railways were paid the great attention and from about 1936 the whole attention was paid to the construction of the strategic railway.



p. 17 Q. Has not the railway towards the shore of Muir River established in 1936 any direct strategic meaning?

A. At the time of the Manchurian incident, the construction of railways were chiefly carried out in the middle Manchurian zone, and after there, in the North and east Manchurian zone. For example, Mutankiang-Linkou Futou Line--this railway has the important strategic meaning. The plan of this railway was made before 1934. In 1932-1933 the Liao-Harbin-Peian-Heihe Line, and the Peian-Tsitsihar Line--these railways are convenient to carry promptly the forces to the north, so that they have the important strategic meaning. The Paichiengtzu-Solun-Halonarshan Line was planned in 1933 and was built in four year. The strategic meaning of this railway is clear from the fact that lead to the border of Manchuria and Mongolia. The construction of the Changchun-Paichiengtzu line was begun in 1933 and the construction of the Linkou-Chiamussu-Suihua line in 1935 and in the same year, the Suiyang-Tungning-Anghing line was also begun to be constructed. The latter railway pointed out to the direction of Vovoshilov, and has the important strategic meaning. The direction of Vovoshilov is the direction of the important point of attacking. In 1939 and 1940, the Hsichiengtzu-Lishuchen-Chining-Nishan Line was constructed. It has a great strategic meaning as the connecting line of the railway for Vovoshilov and the railway for Iman. In 1941 the Fangpichen branch line from Tungan to Turi-kog was constructed. In 1940, the Lunchun-Tumentzu line was constructed. This railway has a great strategic meaning as it points out the direction of Barabash and Vladivostok. These above mentioned railways were all constructed till 1941.

p. 18

p. 19 In 1943, railways for Blagoveshchensk were constructed.

From 1935 to 1940 three main lines from Korea to Manchuria were constructed. One is the Kanko Sei-sin Tumen-Mutankiang-Linkou-Tungan line and other is the Heijo-Kanko-Manpuchen-Tunghua-Usupingkae line and the rest is the established Fushan-Antung-Mukden line.

These three main lines were convenient to carry promptly the forces for any way in Manchuria from south Korea. If one of them became useless, it does not effect to the others and can change the forces into other lines, and the most valuable line which could carry on this changing is the Heijo-Genzan Line.

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Q Were the Manchurian railways, which provide Japan with her military ease in that country, based on the plans made by the General Staff Headquarters of the Japanese Army?

p. 20 A Yes, they are based on the plans drawn up by Japanese General Staff.

Q Were the plans of Japanese General Staff made by the Strategic Transportation Section?

A The plans were conceived in the Operations Department, and their technical details were the responsibility of No. 3 Department. The Operations Department has neither the personnel nor materials necessary to draw up such plans, but only presented drafts to No. 3 Department, which then made practical plans and introduced them to the War Ministry as the opinion of the General Staff. The War Ministry negotiated with the Cabinet, and with their approval, passed the plan on to the Kwantung Army. The Kwantung Army made out a practical scheme on the spot and passed it on to the South Manchurian Railway Co., who put it into execution.

Q Do you think the network of railways in Manchuria was sufficient for the attack on the U.S.S.R. in 1941?

p. 21 A Yes, it was, especially the dense strategic network at the eastern front. The railway could secure the force in the central part of Manchuria and it was possible to transfer it quickly and whenever it was necessary, to places in trouble in the front area of Manchuria and the U.S.S.R. And we were able to transfer the forces from one place to another promptly by this network in time of war.

Q Was it at the request of the Operations Department of the General Staff?

A Yes, it was at the request of the Operations Department in the General Staff.

Q What kinds of Operations Plan against the U.S.S.R. were made by the General Staff and the Staff of the Kwantung Army before 1941?

A The General Staff and the Staff of the Kwantung Army carried out all the preparations of war against the U.S.S.R. and had the plans of war.

Q Were they offensive plans?

A Yes, they were.

p. 22 Q Tell me what you know about the "Ken-Toku-En" plan.

A It provided for the increase of our military strength in Manchuria in connection with the outbreak of the Russo-German War in 1941, and by this plan some three hundred thousand troops were transferred to Manchuria. The "Ken-Toku-En" plan was only the name to camouflage our plan of operations against the U.S.S.R.

Q What was the order which had relation to the construction of railway based on the "Ken-Toku-En" plan?

A I don't know, but I think there was no order concerning the construction of railway.

Q So was it the approval of the completion of the preparation against the U.S.S.R. concerning the construction of the railway that caused the plan?

A Yes, it was.

Q How many kilometres long were the Manchurian Railways in 1931?

p. 23 A They were 4,450 kilometers at that time.

Q And in 1941?

A They were about 11,000 kilometers long.

Q What field of operation had the sufficient network for the war against the U.S.S.R.?

A The strategic network in the field of operations in the Maritime Province was sufficient for the operation against the U.S.S.R.

Q How many lines led to the Maritime Provinces border of the U.S.S.R.?

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Q How many lines led to the Maritime Provinces border of the U.S.S.R.?

- A There are eight lines, which start from Yuki (Korc), Tsumcutzu, Suifuho, Tungan, Panchei ho, Futow and Tan Pichen. As the Asia Chientzu-Hichon-Futow line runs along the borders, the forces can detrain at any place where operations are required.
- Q How about the lines for Blagoveshchensk and Zabaikalye?
- p. 24 A There are two lines to Blagoveshchensk, they are the Harbin-Peien-Feiho line, and the Chichihærk-Nouni-Feihe line. As for Zabaikalye district we have also two lines, they are the old 'East China Line', and the Feichengtze-Holoruarsban-Handagai Line. These lines are suitable for carrying troops promptly for operation in the neighbourhood of Chita and the outer Mongolian Republics.
- Q The witness knows that the railway must secure the transportation capacity of troops which were going to carry out operation in the Chita district, toward Chichihærk district, foreseeing that the plan of the offensive operation against the U.S.S.R. must be changed as for the disposition of the troops after the attack of the Maritime district. Then did the network secure the transportation capacity of the troops which were necessary for the carrying out of the second stage operation against the U.S.S.R.?
- p. 25 A Yes, the transportation of the troops might be done promptly. The condition of railway made the troops possible to concentrate promptly to Tsitsihar district from those districts in Manchuria and China, but advance towards the further westwards, that is to say, Hailaerh and Handagai, was late because of the condition of the railway. The imperfection of the railway in the western district was caused chiefly by the lying of the zone of Tainingon Mountains. If there is no such a cause the railway in this same district might have been developed more greatly.
- Q How many days were necessary to transfer the No. 2 and 5 Army from Maritime Province direction to Tsitsihar district?
- A The number of divisions of the 2 and 5 Army is 10 divisions (about 400 trains are necessary to transport) and for the attached artillery divisions

and tank brigades and troops in rear (about 400 trains)--for these, 800 trains are necessary in all. And so the concentration near Tsitsihar would be accomplished for twenty days using the following lines mixed 40 trains a day.

LINE	Numbers of Trains in a day
Old East China line	20
The Futow-Tugen-Rinkou- Chiamussu-Suikuo-Paian- Tsitsihar line	8
Tungning-Tumen-Kirin-Chungchun- Paichengtzu line	12

- Q Was the network completed to transport the forces which were decided by the plan of war against the U.S.S.R. to Manchuria promptly from North China just before or in the time of the war against the U.S.S.R.?
- A For this transportation via the Tientsin-Chinhsien line, twenty trains a day and via the Peipin-Changte-Yehpaishou-Tsien-Hsinlitun-Tungliao line, 5 trains a day might be used and according to circumstances if necessary 6 trains a day from Peipin to Kalgan or its west can be used to the transportation of troops.
- Q How many days it takes to transport 5 divisions to near Tsitsihar and the same divisions to near Chungchun from China?
- p. 27 A To carry five divisions to Chungchun from North China via Tientsin-Chinhsien-Mukden line, about 200 trains are necessary, and to carry five divisions to near Tsitsihar via Tientsin-Chinhsien-Mukden-Ssupiangkai-Paichengtzu from North China, about 200 trains are necessary. So 400 trains are necessary in all. The above two lines transport capacity is twenty trains a day. Using the Peipin-Changte-Yehpaishou-Tsien-Hsinlitun-Tungliao-Chongchiatun-Paichengtzu-Tsitsihar line and the Chongchiatun-Ssupiangkai-Chungchun line at the same time and using 5 trains a day, we can conclude to transport 400 transport trains for 16 days.
- Q How many days does it take to transfer the main forces of the 2nd Army Group from Blagoveshchensk to near Tsitsihar?

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Q How many days does it take to transfer the main forces of the 2nd Army Group from Blagoveshchensk to near Tsitsihar?



- p. 28
- A It would take 15 days to transfer completely the main forces of the 2nd Army Group, that is five divisions (200 trains), and the attached artilleries, tank corps, correspondence corps and rear-guards and so on (100 trains), using totally 300 trains, that is 15 trains a day via Heiho-Peian-Tsitsihar line and Heiho-Peian-Harbin-Tsitsihar line, and 5 trains a day via Liishen-Shanshenfu-Huolungmen-Munkiang-Tsitsihar line at the same time, namely using 20 trains a day.
- Q Was there any railway construction going on during the period of 1941 to 45?
- A Yes, the work for doubling the tracks was in progress.
- Q What railways?
- A The work for doubling the tracks of those lines were carried out; the Harbin-Mutankiang-Suiyang line, Mutankiang-Linkou-Tunagn line, the Changchun-Harbin line, the Mukden-Antung line and the Mukden-Chinhsien-Shanhaikwan line.
- p. 29
- Q Was the Huolungmen-Heiho line constructed?
- A Yes, it was opened to traffic from Huo-lungmen to Liishen, in 1943.
- Q Was the said railway in concert with the plan of war against the U.S.S.R. in 1942 and 43?
- A Yes, I think the construction of the railway was carried out basing on the plan of war against the U.S.S.R. in 1942 and 43.
- Q From and to what time were you the commander of the Kwantung defending army?
- A From November 1941 to 26th December 1942. It was for one year and one month.
- Q How did you want to deploy the Kwantung defending army by the plan of operations in 1941 and 42?
- A The Kwantung defending Army took the part of the rear defence while the First Army Group and next the Second or Third Army Groups were delivering an attack against the U.S.S.R.

p. 30 Q From what time to what time were you the commander of the Fourth Army?

A It was from December 1942 to February 1944. It was for one year and two months.

Q To what Army Group was the Fourth Army attached?

A Till November 1943, it was attached to the Second Army Group and after that it was attached to the third Army Group. The headquarters of the Second Army Group (it was changed to the Third Army Group afterwards) was in Tsitsihar.

Q Who is the commander of the Second Army Group?

A The commander of the Second Army Group is General ANAMI Korechika, and the Chief of Staff is Major General MATSUDA.

Q How was the Second Army Group organized?

A It was organized by the Fourth and Sixth armies.

Q Was there any time when the headquarters of three Army Groups, that is, the headquarters of the First, Second and Third Army Group, were in Manchuria at the same time? If there was, when?

p. 31 A No, there was no time when they were in Manchuria at the same time. When the headquarters of the Second Army Group was diverted to the south battle front, the Third Army Group was organized.

Q Who was the commander of the Third Army Group?

A The commander of the Third Army Group was General OKABE Masaburo till August 1944, and after that it was General USHIOCKU Jun.

Q How was the organization and the position of the Fourth Army in the first half part of 1943?

A The headquarters of the Fourth Army was in Sunwu. On the First Division, its Commander was Lieutenant-General NAKAZA'A and its headquarters was in Sunwu. On the Fifty-seventh Division, its commander was Lieutenant-General UEMURA and its headquarters was in Shenshenfu. The headquarters of the First Artillery and the Artillery Intelligence Regiment were in Sunwu, the First Regiment of the Heavy Field Artillery was in Shenyutun, and the Independent Heavy Artillery Regiment was in Peian. The tank

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corps was in Sumner. The headquarters of the second engineer was in Turakki. Frontier guard units were directly subordinate to the commander of the Fourth Army.

Q With how many divisions was the Fourth Army organized in war time?

A The scheduled plan was that in war time the Fourth Army should be doubled then in peace time. That is it was to be extended to four divisions and one tank brigade.

Q Did you know the plan of operations of the Second Army Group and the Fourth Army?

A Yes, I did, and it was the offensive plan.

Q Tell me about the contents of the plan of operations of the Second Army Group and the Fourth Army from 1941 to 1944?

A According to the plan of 1941, reported and explained by the Chief of the Staff of the Fourth Army Major General KH IPIRA, the early concentrated attack of the war against the U.S.S.R. was to be carried out by the First Army Group in the Maritime Province, and during this time the Second Army Group was to cover the flank of the First Army Group and to prepare for the plan of operations in the districts of Zavitaya and Kuibyshevka. In preliminary stage of a war, the N Army and airforces which had operated before in the Maritime Province were to be transferred to the 2nd Army Group. According to the plan of operations of the authorities, the Second Army Group was to let the Fourth Army (four divisions) cross the Heilungkiang River from the place between Shengyuton and Tigun and to let the N Army (two divisions) cross it from the place near Chikt, and let these two armies carry out the attack against the Zavitaya and Kuibyshevka, cut off the Heilungkiang Railway, destroy the Army of the U.S.S.R., occupy the important points of Blagoveshchensk, Kuibyshevka, Zavitaya and Simanovskaya, and then advance to the direction of Khabarovsk and Fuk'lovo. In September, 1942, the commander of the Second Army Group, General ANMI Konechika intended this plan. Major-General KH IPIRA participated in this sub-plan of operations. According to this sub-plan, the Second Army Group was to let the Fourth Army (four divisions) cross the Heilungkiang River from

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the front of T-yinshan and S-ntooka, cut off the Feilungkian Railway; occupy Svobodny and Kuibyshevka and advance to Khabarovsk. During this time the Eighth Army (one and a half division) was to cross the river from Funa, and advance to Rubilovo along the railroad and occupy it. Those plans of operations of the Second Army Group was in force from 1941 to the spring of 1944, that is the time when I was the commander of the Fourth Army, this plan was in force. I don't know other plans of operations of the Second Army Group. The headquarters of the Third Army Group which took the place of the headquarters of the Second Army Group did not change the above mentioned plan of operations in 1943.

Q Do you know about the offensive movement in the district of Chita at the next stage of war?

A No, I don't know.

Q By whom was the offensive plan of operations against the U.S.S.R. in 1941-42 and -43 decided?

A It was decided by the Chief of the General Staff SUGIYAMA Gen; the Minister of War TOJO Hideki and the Commander of the Kwantung Army UMEZU Yoshijiro.

Q What kind of the preparation was carried out in Blagoveshchensk and Kuibyshevka to make the plan of operations in 1941-42 and -43 succeed?

p. 36

In 1943, Sunwu-Shenshanfu-Funa military road was completed. The military road between Sunwu and Chike was completed in 1941 and Japan began to construct the roads which lead to the main points of the passage of a river. Only the road bed construction was operated and in 1943, the road bed between Sunwu and Sunho (about 50 kilometers long) and the one between Suanghsia and Tuanlich (about 50 kilometers long) were constructed. Those military roads were camouflaged against the territory of the U.S.S.R. in the other shore, and among the main points of a passage of a river; the road construction of those parts which can be seen from the other shore was not operated.

Q Was there any preparation of the line of communication for liaison?

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Q Was there any preparation of the line of communication for liaison?

A Yes, the Fourth Army had the military telegraphs and telephones. Telephone wire was constructed in 1942 and '43 and secured the liaison to Harbin and Tsitsihar, and at the same time telegraph wire was constructed.

Q Were there any preparations for the storage of food and ammunition?

p. 37 A The storage of the ammunition and food for the operation of the first stage of war were finished on the whole.


Q What was TOJO's and UMEZU's position in the preparation of war against the U.S.S.R.?

A TOJO, as the minister of war, suggested and made the "Ken-Toku-En" plan with the Chief of the General Staff SUGIYAMA Gen and the Commander of the Kwantung Army UMEZU Koshijiro. They developed their preparation to the condition of being able for the Kwantung Army to advance to the territory of the U.S.S.R. in 1941, and as the main supporter of the Japanese-Germany Military Alliance against the U.S.S.R., devoted all their power to the preparation of war. I don't know whether they planned the occupation of the Maritime Province in the first stage of war or not, and at the same time about their plan of next stage.


p. 38

It is testified that the answers in this interrogation were written in Japanese by the witness himself, Lieutenant-General KUSABA Tetsuri. I.J.A. interrogator: Colonel IVANOV, Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R. at International Military Tribunal in Tokyo. Interpreter: Second Lieutenant PEEHOV.

The Military Sketch of the Accessory Programme  
for the Offensive Plan of Operations of the Second  
Army Group in 1942 and 43.



A military sketch of the Chief of programme  
for the Offensive Plan of Operations of the Second  
Army Group in 1941, 42, and 43.





C E R T I F I C A T E

The Undermentioned Lieutenant-General KUSABA Tetsu  
swore to make true statements about the main war criminals  
as the witness to Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.  
at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, Colonel  
of Justice IVANOV, and gave this certificate to them.  
He was warned that he would be responsible under Art. No. 95  
of the Criminal Code of the R.S.S.R. if he made any false  
statements.

KUSABA tetsu

The receiver of this acknowledgement, Assistant  
Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R. at the International War Tribunal,  
Tokyo.

Doc. No. 520

Page 1 \*

Excerpt from: Notes on the conversation between the Reich Foreign Minister and Ambassador Oshima at Fuschl on 18 April 1943.

The Reich Foreign Minister then once more emphasized that if Japan felt strong enough and had sufficient anti-tank weapons, the current year was without doubt the best opportunity for attacking Russia, which would certainly never again be as weak as she is now.

We had reliable information according to which the Russians are now constructing a large number of airfields in the East from which they themselves as well as the Americans would one day certainly attack the Japanese Island Empire with their bomber squadrons. The Japanese estimate of the strength of the Russians as 800,000 men in Siberia is, in our opinion, however, over-estimated. Our estimate is only 250,000 men, who, in addition, are second-class soldiers, since all the Siberian Divisions had already been battered by the German armies last winter. If, however, Japan was not in the position to beat the Russians quickly and decisively, it would be better for her not to attack. However, she would then under all circumstances have to launch a new attack in some place against the British or the Americans. Ambassador Oshima explained that he did not know the views of his Government but understood that for the last 20 years all plans of the General Staff had been worked out for an attack on Russia and were still directed towards such an attack. If success in that direction could in any way be expected, they would certainly attack. If, however, Japan did not do so now, she would certainly shortly launch an attack against the Anglo-Americans. The risk on this side was becoming ever greater through the constant increase of their Air Force, which, therefore, had to be beaten ever anew. The Japanese Air Force had for a long time been inferior at the fronts, now, however, it had again caught up with this advantage and was on its part superior to the enemy. Fundamentally, he could, however, say that Japan throughout the whole of its history had never yet remained on the defensive in war.

Doc. No. 520

Page 2

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 520.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

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THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED  
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND  
NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNION  
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

-against-

FERMAN WILHELM GOLRING et al

Defendants.

---

CERTIFICATE.

The undersigned, BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM L. MITCHELL  
hereby certifies

That he is the duly appointed qualified and acting  
General Secretary of the International Military Tribunal,  
and that as such he has possession, custody and control of  
all of the records of said Tribunal and all documents  
admitted in evidence during the trial of the above entitled  
cause.

That the document to which this certificate is  
attached is a true and correct copy of the photostatic  
document which was heretofore admitted in evidence in the  
course of the trial of the above entitled cause and identified  
as Exhibit USA 159.

That said photostatic document so admitted in evidence  
as aforesaid has been impounded by said International Military  
Tribunal through the undersigned as its General Secretary,  
and as a result is being held and retained by the undersigned.

That the undersigned has issued the herein  
certificate and caused the same to be attached to said copy  
of said photostatic document in order to verify the  
existence and contents of said Exhibit, and to further  
establish the fact that the original of said Exhibit is  
unavailable because of its having been impounded as aforesaid.

D O N E at Nurnberg, Germany this 16th day of April  
1946.

/s/ William L. Mitchell  
WILLIAM L. MITCHELL  
General Secretary  
International Military Tribunal

125

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Doc 590

書類第五〇號

證

余 Ulrich Strass 人余カ根逸語及也日本語ニ精  
通也者ナレトナニ根逸語系文及也日本語原文ヲ訂  
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Ulrich A Strass

140.2

Doc 520

アメリカ合衆国、フランス共和、木アリ子之及び北ア、  
ルラニ聯合王の並ニノ皇ト 社会主義、共和國聯邦

對

Herman Wilhelm Goering  
(此ノニシテハルム、グロウ、グ、他被告)

證明書

William L. Mitchell

下記署名、*William L. Mitchell* 在此代將、茲ニ左記、如ク

證明ス。

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Doc 590

東京、海三番附七三六九下

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 四月十六日

/Nurnberg/

東京、海三番附七三六九下

/William L. Mitchell/

東京、海三番附七三六九 署名

国際軍事裁判所 秘書長

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Doc 590

140.

東京、東京三番附七三六九号下

一九四十六年、昭和二十一年、四月十六日

/Nurnberg/

東京、東京三番附七三六九号下

/William L. Mitchell/

東京、東京三番附七三六九号 署名

国際軍事裁判所 秘書長

Doc 590

no. 2

東京、東京三番附九三六九ノ下

一九四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 四月十六日

/Nurnberg/

東京三番附九三六九ノ下

/William L. Mitchell/

東京三番附九三六九 署名

国際軍事裁判所 秘書長

Page - 1

米國主席檢察官事務所

米國陸軍一二西 A 陸軍郵便局

昭和廿一年三月廿八日

下記ニ列擧セル複寫寫眞ハ聯合軍最高指揮官ノ指  
示ノ下ニ聯合軍ニ依リ捕獲セラレタル敵國書類原本  
ノ真正ナル「寫シ」ニシテ且ツ現在複寫複製ニ對ス  
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一八七七 P S、一九四一年ノ昭和十六年ノ三月二十九  
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大島トノ會談覺書抜萃

Page - 2

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〇一七五 日本トノ共同ニ關スル指令第二四號、  
總統大本營、一九四一年 / 昭和十六年 /  
三月五日附

文書課長 歩兵中尉

シエラード、シエルフアレン (署名)

CV# 840

DOC. 9030

PREPARED STATEMENT  
of  
MR. J. G. LIEBERT

SUBJECT: GENERAL PRODUCTION & FINANCIAL  
PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

International Prosecution Section

3 October 1946

EJ# 840

DOC. 9030

PREPARED STATEMENT  
of  
MR. J. G. LIERERT

SUBJECT: GENERAL PRODUCTION & FINANCIAL  
PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

International Prosecution Section

3 October 1946

1. Preparation for war is disclosed in great measure by direct examination of the trends of raw material supply and industrial production. Enormous amounts of equipments of various sorts are necessary to the conduct of modern warfare. These equipments, in many cases, differ radically from those normally used in peace time economy. In other cases, the equipments are the same but the amounts and proportions are different. Hence to disclose preparation for war one must examine the end products of industrial activity subjectively and proportionately, as well as the flow of raw materials which are used, either immediately or potentially, in the manufacture of war products and equipments. Responsibility for directing the flow and expansion of production of raw materials and for establishing specialized industrial production for war preparation is best shown in the methods by which such objectives are achieved.

2. The Outline of the Five-Year Plan for Production of War Materials prepared by the War Office, dated June 23, 1937 (IPS Document 9002 A) is a plan for achieving a war-time supply of principal war materials. Its purpose is to provide stimulation and control of industries to secure the specific end products which are vital to military effort. I will read the Preface, page 1, of that Document. To make possible the achievement of this basic Plan for production of the end products many supporting plans were made by the government. Three of these basic plans are

contained in the document entitled "Particulars in Framing a Program for Extension of Important Industries" (IPS Document 1522). The relationship of these three plans to war production is clear from the plans themselves. I will read the following excerpts from IPS Document 1522 to fix this relationship:

- a) Pages 1, 2 and 3 of Part I
- b) Page 1 of Part II
- c) Page 1 of Part III

3. The trends of material and industrial production and methods of government control during the years immediately preceding December 1941 will be discussed specifically in several short surveys of selected industries. One must bear in mind, however, the interrelationship of industries and the consequent necessity for visualizing the industrial field as a whole to show the pattern of the general trend of production in preparation for war as reflected in the separate surveys.



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## ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY

4. The importance of the utilization of electric power in the development of certain industries cannot be over-emphasized. The electric power industry was one of the first Japanese industries to be nationalized and, as such, was one of the original pillars in the "new structure" in support of total war. Prior to 1937, the electric power industry was operated by a large number of companies each of which served a particular area and usually combined in itself the functions of generation, transmission and distribution. However, in addition to these, many factories maintained their own private power plants within their compounds.

5. The Outline of the Plan for the Expansion of Productive Power of the Board of Planning (Part III of IPS Document 1522) aimed at an increase in the production of electric power by hydroplants of 2,693,700 k.w. for the four year period. This is approximately a 50% expansion. The Plan also aimed to increase production of electric power from coal by 1,000,000 k.w. This represents an approximate expansion of 35% for the same four year period. When one considers the enormous amount of capitalization and equipments necessary to produce this kind of an increase in power generation within such a short period one is aware of the enormous importance of electric power in the planned expansion of industries.

6. In furtherance of the plans for the expansion of the industry the first step towards organizing the power industry on a completely totalitarian basis was taken in March, 1938 with the promulgation of the Electric Power Control Law. By

means of this Law and subsequent enacting Ordinance, a national policy company called the "Japan Electric Generation and Transmission Company" was organized. All utility companies designated by the Communications Minister, who was in charge of power production, were required to turn over all of their hydro-electric plants to this new company in return for stock. This excepted many of the small factory plants. All plants, however, for the development of hydro-electric power and of transmission facilities were taken over by the Company in 1941.

7. The Japan Electric Generation and Transmission Company was established in order to harness Japan's electric power resources to the war machine by means of a planned rationalization of equipment and operating practice. In its preamble the Five-Year Electric Power Plan outlined the principal objectives of the Company as follows:

- (1) To increase the electric power resources of Japan and develop them along lines aimed at meeting military requirements.
- (2) To coordinate the operation of the power networks so as to use the existing facilities most efficiently.
- (3) To promote the construction and operation of larger and more efficient power plants and to repair the less efficient plants
- (4) To economize on materials used in the construction of power installations.

The Japan Electric Generation and Transmission Company was directed and controlled by the government. Created by special law, it was ordered to take over existing facilities and was directed in its entire operation by the national policy in furtherance of war plans. The government guaranteed the principal and interest of all debentures issued up to three times the capitalization of the Company. Its stock was made eligible for hypothecation by the Bank of Japan. The Company was exempted from local taxation and was accorded many other indirect and direct subsidies. In addition to all of this, a dividend of four percent on stock was guaranteed by the government for a period of ten years. In September, 1941 the total capital operated by this Company amounted to 1,376,645,000 yen.

8. To make sure that electric power was not used for non-essential purposes the Electric Distribution Control Law was promulgated August 29, 1941. As a result of this legislation, nationalization was extended to the electric distribution field. There were established in each of the nine Electric Distribution Regions, a special company having general organization lines similar to the Japan Electric Generation and Transmission Company. These distribution companies actually allocated the use of electric power in accordance with government direction.

9. There were other national policy companies under the control of the Japanese Government directly having as part of their functions the production and control of electric power and electric power facilities in those areas wherein they operated. Special reference is made to the South

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Manchuria Railway, Manchurian Heavy Industry Development Corporation, The Taiwan Electric Co. Ltd., the North China Development Company and the Central China Development Company. The emphasis on the universal expansion of electric power and the governmental control at an early date indicates the methodical way by which Japan achieved control over production industries.

10. The degree of expansion of electric power production and the direction of flow of electric power within Japan Proper as a result of the Government policy is shown on the following table marked "Electric Power Consumption by Industries in Japan Proper".

ELECTRIC POWER CONSUMPTION BY INDUSTRIES IN  
JAPAN PROPER 1931-1941

Year	(Million KWE)						Electric Total light & household appliances
	Basic War and War Supporting Industries			Chiefly Non-War Industries			
	Mining	Heavy Mfg Industries	Total	Light Mfg Industries	Other Industries		
1931	1,112	4,042	5,154	2,707	2,055	2,815	7,577
1932	1,281	4,850	6,131	2,782	2,125	2,800	7,707
1933	1,504	5,693	7,197	3,212	2,197	2,610	8,019
1934	1,935	6,504	8,439	3,672	2,294	2,680	3,646
1935	2,100	8,061	10,161	3,998	2,434	2,800	9,232
1936	2,346	9,030	11,376	4,296	2,524	2,830	9,710
1937	2,450	10,641	13,091	4,781	2,678	2,950	10,309
1938	2,656	13,531	16,187	4,616	2,810	3,000	10,426
1939	3,301	14,327	17,628	4,860	2,870	3,000	10,730
1940	3,571	14,800	18,371	4,188	3,108	2,900	10,196
1941	3,765	16,863	20,628	3,562	4,385	2,850	9,795

Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Bureau of Electric Power.


It can readily be seen that the purpose of expansion in the production of electric power was to advance the heavy industries in support of war preparation. For graphic illustration there is attached a chart marked "Electric Power Consumption in Japan Proper" drawn from the data contained in the above table.

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# ELECTRIC POWER CONSUMPTION IN JAPAN PROPER, 1931-1941

KILOWATT HOURS  
(BILLIONS)



SOURCE : MINISTRY OF COMMERCE & INDUSTRY

## PETROLEUM INDUSTRY

11. Petroleum is a commodity vital to the conduct of modern warfare as well as to certain industries. Japan is by no means self-sufficient in indigenous petroleum. As a matter of fact, the Japanese production of petroleum is almost negligible in proportion to her normal needs, that is to say about 10 per cent. As a consequence of this deficiency in petroleum production the supplying of petroleum for war purposes depended upon four factors (1) The storing of sufficient petroleum to last a reasonable length of time, (2) Stimulating the indigenous production of petroleum, (3) Production and use of synthetic petroleum, (4) Restriction of civilian and non-essential use of petroleum.

12. In 1934 the Diet passed the Petroleum Control Law making it obligatory on oil companies, both foreign and national, to maintain a perpetual reserve of six months supply of oil in addition to the reserve normally needed for carrying on business, or the equivalent of nine months stock based on the petroleum requirements for any one year. The obvious purpose of such a measure was to increase the national stockpile of petroleum for use in the event of national emergency or failure of the normal imports. One of the provisions of the Petroleum Control Law enabled the initiation of a definite program for self-sufficiency in refining. Under this program Japanese Refineries with charging capacities of over 100,000 tons per year were to provide for or expand the cracking capacity to 25 per cent of crude capacity within 10 years.

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13. Effective July 1, 1935, the Petroleum Industry Law was the beginning of an intensive campaign to create a monopoly in the oil industry by inaugurating a licensing system for oil refining enterprises and oil importers.

Subsequently, quantity and quality of imports were regulated by the government. The size of refineries and other equipments were controlled. Price regulations were made effective by which all companies were forced to agree to sell to the government upon demand at market prices. Additional regulations relating to obligatory storage were enacted and provisions were made for the payment of storage subsidies.

14. To carry out regulations for the distribution of petroleum the Petroleum Distributing Company was established as a central control organization for the distribution of petroleum products, placing distribution in the hands of one authorized company for each of the 47 prefectures.

15. From 1934 to 1941, the total daily capacity of oil refineries was almost quadrupled. Inasmuch as Japan's own production is confined almost completely to the west coast refineries were built on the Pacific Coast to be more accessible to the imports of crude, with particular emphasis on crude imports from the East Indies. By 1941 the highly strategic refining plants of the Navy and Army had been built up to a capacity bordering on 10,000,000 barrels a year. It is significant that the plants were dispersed to out of way points.

16. Large Japanese Companies from 1937 on made every effort to acquire as much equipment and knowledge concerning the manufacture of aviation gasoline and high grade lubricants as possible. Many reorganizations and amalgamations took place after 1937 to improve the financial and operating structure of the old line oil companies. These new amalgated companies attempted the manufacture of high grade octane aviation gasoline by establishing new plants

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

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and importing tremendous quantities of tetra-ethyl lead needed for stepping up the octane content of aviation gasoline. Certain of their production plans, however, were blocked when the United States, in September of 1940, prohibited the export of plans, designs and information that could be used in the production of high grade aviation gasoline.

17. Japan was one of the first countries to build fast tankers with a speed of 15 knots or more compared with the usual 10 or 12 knots. Between 1937 and 1939, Japan's tanker fleet, excluding naval tankers, increased from 220,000 tons to about 440,000 tons and in 1941 it was well in excess of 500,000 tons. These additions to the fleet are significant in that they constitute necessary preparations to secure the speedy importation of petroleum to be manufactured in the newly established refineries - eminently serviceable in case of national emergency.

18. The following table and chart marked "Crude Oil Consumption and Stocks in Japan Proper" shows the ever increasing imports of petroleum and the growing stockpile prior to the war. It is noted that the oil embargo of the United States in 1940 cut deeply into Japan's reserve stocks.

# CRUDE OIL CONSUMPTION AND STOCKS IN JAPAN PROPER, 1931-1941



SOURCE : MINISTRY OF COMMERCE & INDUSTRY

CRUDE OIL CONSUMPTION AND STOCKS IN JAPAN PROPER

(Thousands of litres)

YEAR	PRODUCTION	NET SUPPLY IMPORTS	TOTAL	CONSUMPTION	STOCKS END OF YEAR
1931	306	1014	1322	1239	83
1932	253	1452	1706	1700	88
1933	226	1618	1844	1800	133
1934	284	1900	2184	2174	143
1935	352	2040	2392	2422	112
1936	391	2443	2834	2750	296
1937	393	3214	3609	2890	1015
1938	392	2925	3318	3200	1133
1939	371	2996	3366	2470	2029
1940	335	3752	3086	2524	2591
1941	317	1254	1570	2440	1721



19. Through economic sanction in 1940 Japan tried to force The Netherlands to provide 22,990,000 barrels of oil and oil products. This included one million tons for making aviation gasoline, 400,000 tons of aviation gasoline itself, or roughly three times the normal consumption even under an intensive airplane training schedule. This method, however, did not meet with much success.

20. To attempt a degree of self-sufficiency in petroleum and petroleum products production the Outline of the Plan for the Expansion of Productive Power by the Board of Planning (Part III of IPS Document 1522) provides that production of gasoline for aircrafts should be increased approximately 630 per cent in the four years between 1938 and 1941; that production of artificial gasoline for motorcars should be increased approximately 2900 per cent; that natural heavy oil production should be increased approximately 30 per cent; that artificial heavy oil production should be increased approximately 900 per cent; and that lubricating oil for aircrafts should be initiated to achieve a production of 20,000 kilo litres. It is noted that great emphasis is placed on the artificial petroleum industry.

21. For the development of indigenous production the Oil Resources Exploitation Law was passed March 28, 1938 (Law No. 31). It was provided that those who had mining rights for the drilling of oil must make a plan to be submitted to the government for the development of such rights and that the government could provide subsidies to oil producers for trial diggings. In addition, the government was empowered

to give orders to increase production and develop oil fields. By the Regulations for Enforcing the Oil Resources Exploitation Law (Commerce and Industry Ordinance No. 772, dated July 30, 1938), it was necessary for the owners of oil rights to make reports to the government concerning the progress of oil exploitation. Standard rates of subsidies for drilling were set up and subsidies were provided for the purchase of machinery, fittings, motors, pumps and accessories for drilling. The following table indicates the amount of increased subsidies paid by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry alone as a bounty for oil prospecting:

1935	132,045 Yen
1936	342,691 Yen
1937	425,105 Yen
1938	903,113 Yen
1939	3,560,616 Yen
1940	6,891,704 Yen
1941	6,124,676 Yen

22. Every effort was made by the Japanese government to develop oil interests in Northern Saghalien. An indication of the emphasis placed upon the securing of oil rights in Saghalien is shown in the following subsidies paid by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry for the securing of oil rights:

1939	6,148,000 Yen
1940	7,680,000 Yen
1941	3,206,000 Yen

23. The Imperial Oil Company Law of March 15, 1941 (Law No. 73) established the Imperial Petroleum Company, a national policy company, to survey and develop oil fields and to control the purchase and sale of all petroleum and oil products. The capitalization of this national policy company was 100,000,000 yen, one-half of which was invested by the government. To facilitate its financial operation, the Company was allowed to issue debentures, the interest and principal of which were guaranteed by the government. A dividend of 6 per cent was guaranteed to private stockholders investing in the Imperial Oil Company. The usual provisions of exemptions from business tax, income tax and local taxes were granted so that the Company, a monopoly in fact, was the active government instrument for the purpose of stimulating and controlling the indigenous production of petroleum both at home and abroad.

24. Petroleum shortages presented such a serious problem to the military that it was decided to advance the production of synthetic petroleum using coal as the raw material. In August 1937, the Diet passed the Imperial Fuel Development Company Law, which established the Imperial Fuel Enterprise Company for the purpose of developing and financing the artificial petroleum industry. This Company was a national policy company and had an original capitalization of 100,000,000 yen. Hand in hand with the Imperial Fuel Development Company Law was the Synthetic Oil Industry Law which provided for a system of licensing, tax exemption and subsidies, together with government control and guidance of the new industry. Bounties paid by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry for the production of synthetic oil were as follows:

1939	290,720 Yen
1940	386,059 Yen
1941	804,361 Yen

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1939	290,720 Yen
1940	386,059 Yen
1941	804,361 Yen

Grants for the dividend of the Imperial Fuel Enterprise Company paid by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry were:

1938	148,094 Yen
1939	378,387 Yen
1940	1,938,000 Yen
1941	2,624,057 Yen

As a result of these forcing laws, and the special emphasis placed upon the new industry by the government, synthetic petroleum production increased from 3,571,200 barrels in 1939 to 5,066,600 barrels in 1941. The proportionate rate of increase was from 2.73 per cent of total indigenous production in 1938 to 24.31 per cent in 1941.

25. The South Manchurian Railway Company attempted to and did develop the production of petroleum in Manchuria from shale oil. Their plans in 1939 called for the production of 7,000,000 barrels of synthetic petroleum by 1943. Inasmuch as the production of petroleum in Manchuria was instituted for the purpose of supplying that area, the effect of such production was not felt in Japan proper since only negligible quantities were imported into Japan proper.

26. Because the great portion of synthetic petroleum was developed directly at government expense, and since the production was bought up for government use, there is no exact data available concerning the relative cost of synthetic petroleum in Japan to the cost of the imported natural product. Authoritative sources, however, indicate that the production of synthetic petroleum from coal and shale is so costly as to be prohibitive under normal conditions.

27. The conservation of oil and oil products was considered such a strategic problem that the Planning Board gave early

consideration to limiting the amount of petroleum available for civilian use. On March 7, 1938, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry Ordinance No. 8, provided a rationing system for the use of petroleum. It was provided at this time that gasoline for private motorcars should be curtailed by 40 per cent, for taxis, buses and government cars by 30 per cent. Additional regulations provided that certain percentages of alcohol should be mixed with gasoline for motor fuel. The government gave an impetus to the use of substitute fuels for automobiles by the establishment of the Nippon Substitute Fuel Producer Company. This Company was granted a monopoly for the production of apparatus which converted charcoal or woodchips into fuel for automobiles. A subsidy of 300 yen was granted for each automobile equipped with substitute fuel apparatus. The Subsidy Budget of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry for substitute fuel for automobiles is as follows:

1938	1,560,000 Yen
1939	1,720,000 Yen
1940	2,900,000 Yen
1941	3,000,000 Yen

Additional subsidies were paid for propagandizing conservation of petroleum and oil products and the use of substitute materials wherever possible. Other regulations, however, which limited the use of charcoal and coal and normal substitutes made such regulations tantamount to non-use of certain facilities normally requiring oil, because such substitutes even were not readily available. The extent of emphasis on substitute fuel is shown in the attempted development of gasoline from pine tree roots and other such highly uneconomic enterprises.

## COAL INDUSTRY

28. Normally, Japan is a substantial exporter of coal, excepting coking coal which is imported. However, in spite of a plentiful supply of coal, Japan regulated the use of coal for productive purposes in conformity with the national policy and stimulated its production. Following the organization of the Fuel Bureau in June 1937, the Coal Division of that Bureau was charged with the conduct of all matters concerning the distribution and use of coal, together with the regulation of transportation, etc., the development of coal resources and the technique of coal mining. This was done in cooperation with the producers.

29. Industrial planning for war industries necessarily implied an increase in the production of coal for manufacturing. The reflection of this necessity is disclosed in the Outline of the Plan for the Expansion of Productive Power by the Board of Planning (Part III of IFS Document 1522), which provides that the production of coal should be increased from 58,363,000 kilo tons in 1938 to 78,182,000 kilo tons in 1941. When one considers the nature of coal mining and its already well developed state in 1938, the proposed expansion is proportionately very large. To provide a mechanism for this planned increased production, coal was named as one of the important minerals, the production of which was to be promoted under the provisions of the Act to Promote the Production of Important Minerals of March 29, 1938. The expense of such an increase in production was enormous. To a small degree the cost of increasing production is disclosed in the fact that the Ministry of Commerce and Industry alone paid a bounty of 20,500,000 yen in 1940 and 19,900,000 yen in 1941 for the stimulation of coal production.

30. On August 17, 1939, by decree of the Commerce and Industry Ministry, in accordance with Articles 2 and 3 of the Exports and Imports Temporary Management Law, there was promulgated the Coal Sales Control Regulations. These Regulations provided that coal producers and coal agents could not sell coal without permission of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, except sales of less than 250 tons per month, or to privileged named distributors of coal who were charged with carrying out the government policy. This method of controlling the flow of coal into industrial production was most effective, because it forced producers of certain industries to manufacture types of products desired, thus achieving specialized production. This was also true of electric power. By virtue of stimulation of coal production and by limiting the use of coal into what was considered non-essential industries, the actual available supply of coal was increased for war industries.

31. Continued expansion of industry, however, necessitated further controls over distribution. To tighten distribution control there was passed the Coal Distribution Control Law, (Law No. 104), April 6, 1940, which provided for the establishment of the Japan Coal Company. This national policy company was created for the purpose of handling and distributing all coal within Japan. The law provided that all producers and importers of coal must sell to the newly created national control company. The Japan Coal Company, an absolute monopoly, was charged with the purchase and sale of all coal, the importation and exportation of all coal, the licensing and investment in coal mining, together with related enterprises and with matters concerning demand, supply and prices. For facilities the Japan Coal Company was empowered to take over



the management of existing facilities belonging to private concerns for the distributing and handling of coal. One can hardly envision a more absolute control over an industry than that exercised by the government upon the establishment of this company in conjunction with related laws.

32. The control of the coal industry and the expansion of it cannot be justified on the basis of sound industrial expansion when one considers that in addition to mining subsidies the government paid in 1941 through the Ministry of Commerce and Industry alone 94,651,216 yen as a grant for adjusting coal prices to other commodities. This money was paid to subsidize submarginal producers and to equalize the price of coal to users by a pooling arrangement.

## CHEMICAL INDUSTRY

33. Since chemicals play such an important part in the manufacture of explosives, the processing of materials and the manufacture of equipments vital to the war effort, certain of the chemical industries underwent tremendous expansion during the years immediately preceding 1941.

Many chemicals are by-products of other industrial activity so that the securing of raw materials in many cases presented no problem; hence, concerted action for production required only the expansion of facilities. A few of the more important chemicals together with their uses and production expansion are outlined.

### ALCOHOL

34. Ethyl alcohol is used for many purposes among the most important of which are beverages, medicines, synthetic rubber, high explosives and propellants, dyestuffs, lacquer, varnishes and antifreeze. The most important use quantitatively, however, is as a fuel. Prior to 1936 Japan produced only about 11.3 per cent of domestic requirements of ethyl alcohol, the remaining 88.7 per cent being imported principally from Formosa and the South Sea Mandated Islands. The normal peacetime consumption of ethyl alcohol has been estimated at about 5,250,000 gallons, which is the 1931 apparent consumption figure. In 1936 the Japanese Government announced a seven year program whereby production in Japan proper would be increased to 39 million gallons a year by 1941. The government subsidized the construction of new plants which enabled a vast expansion to take place.

Although the target was not reached the following production table shows an increase from 1935 to 1941 of over 6000 per cent.

ETHYL ALCOHOL PRODUCTION:  
(Unit - 1000 litres)

1935	1.1
1936	1.6
1937	7.1
1938	34.0
1939	44.0
1940	63.0
1941	67.4

35. In 1938 the government decreed that ethyl alcohol should be mixed with gasoline for motor fuel in order to reduce reliance on the importation of gasoline and to conserve available stocks. The expansion of the alcohol industry was thus planned and conserved to obtain maximum self-sufficiency, regardless of cost, in order to reduce Japan's vulnerability in event of being shut off from the imports of alcohol, gasoline or oil by wartime blockade.

36. Japan started production of synthetic methyl alcohol in 1933. It was previously made in small quantities in Japan by wood distillation, but its production was almost negligible since it could not compete in price with the imported synthetic methanol from the United States and Germany. In order to become independent of foreign sources and to achieve self-sufficiency, the Japanese Government promoted the production of the synthetic methanol which is one of the most important of the war chemicals. Its chief use is in the manufacture of formaldehyde (which is used in explosives), plastics, motor fuels, antifreeze and in de-

Although the target was not reached the following production table shows an increase from 1935 to 1941 of over 6000 per cent.

ETHYL ALCOHOL PRODUCTION  
(Unit - 1000 Hectolitres)

1935	1.1
1936	1.6
1937	7.1
1938	34.0
1939	44.0
1940	63.0
1941	67.4

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naturing ethyl alcohol. Methanol is also used directly in the production of explosives and plastics. The following table shows the enormous expansion in this vital chemical during the years immediately preceding the war:

SYNTHETIC METHYL ALCOHOL PRODUCTION  
(Unit - Metric Tons)

1932	0
1933	162
1934	2, 785
1935	3, 457
1936	4, 369
1937	6, 626
1938	9, 776
1939	11, 224
1940	12, 788
1941	19, 906

BUTANOL

37. In wartime butanol is invaluable as a raw material in the production of aviation fuels with high octane values. It is also used as a plasticizer and solvent in explosives and plastics. Its major peacetime use is that of a solvent in the cellulose lacquer industry. Prior to the China Incident Japan was almost entirely dependent on imports from the United States for its requirements of butyl alcohol, or butanol. After 1937 Japan pushed plans for self-sufficiency in this industry. As the following production table reveals there was an increase in production of 1,950 per cent between 1936 and 1941:

BUTANOL PRODUCTION  
(Unit Metric Tons)

1932	22
1933	49
1934	77
1935	117
1936	27
1937	132
1938	160
1939	289
1940	629
1941	1,784

GLYCERINE

38. Glycerol or glycerine, is another important chemical which is used in the manufacture of explosives, synthetic resins, antifreeze, pharmaceuticals, cellophane, leather and rubber products, and as a solvent and moistening agent. Japan was ordinarily dependent on the imports of glycerine or glycerol to meet requirements. The Japanese government, to become self-sufficient in glycerine production, promoted the expansion of this industry through subsidies. It also promoted the domestic production of raw materials by restricting fat imports. The following table shows the expansion of indigenous glycerol production in the years immediately preceding the war.

GLYCERINE PRODUCTION  
(Unit - Metric Tons)

1930	4,963
1931	3,875
1932	6,312
1933	6,281
1934	6,921
1935	8,535
1936	8,342
1937	8,405
1938	10,475
1939	10,387
1940	8,292
1941	7,158

ACETONE

39. Acetone is chiefly used as a solvent in making smokeless powders. It is also used in the making of lacquers, methyl methacrylate resins, and substitute glass. In 1941 over 40 per cent of the acetone production was used in making organic glass for airplanes. The following production table shows an increase of production between 1932, a relatively normal year, and 1941 of over 27,000 per cent.

ACETONE PRODUCTION  
(Metric Tons)

1932	11
1933	26
1934	52
1935	60
1936	258
1937	472
1938	1,734
1939	2,053
1940	2,182
1941	2,972

NITRIC ACID

40. Nitric Acid is an ingredient common to the great majority of important modern warfare explosives. It is used to nitrate a variety of organic materials as follows:

- a. Coal Tar Derivatives including benzene, toluene, picric acid among the high explosives; other coal tar fractions such as naphthalene, cresols and xylene which can also be nitrated into serviceable explosives.
- b. Cellulose and other plant materials to make nitro-cellulose, the basis for all modern military propellants.
- c. Glycerol and related materials to make nitroglycerine used as a component of double base powders and as a compound of dynamite:



d. Formaldehyde and similar materials with ammonia to yield hexogen, and with acetaldehyde to produce PETN, both important military high explosives not based on coal tar derivatives.

The increase in Nitric Acid production is shown in the table below together with the production and available supply of fixed nitrogen during the years immediately preceding the war.

NITRIC ACID PRODUCTION  
Metric Tons 98% Conc.

FIXED NITROGEN PRODUCTION  
& IMPORT  
Unit Metric Tons of N<sub>2</sub>

Production :		Production	Imports	Available Supply	
1930	4,178	1930	69,900	73,050	142,950
1931	6,401	1931	72,400	63,680	136,080
1932	9,703	1932	114,500	54,800	169,300
1933	14,845	1933	128,000	46,650	174,650
1934	20,781	1934	143,800	56,860	200,660
1935	23,370	1935	198,360	75,000	273,360
1936	30,494	1936	250,930	90,500	341,430
1937	45,593	1937	287,045	57,400	344,445
1938	79,302	1938	316,195	71,600	387,795
1939	85,165	1939	282,015	35,200	317,215
1940	86,242	1940	323,095	74,700	397,795
1941	92,119	1941	355,230	33,300	388,530

DYES

41. The following table concerning the production of dyes is included because the raw materials used in dye production are the same as those used in the manufacture of explosives from coal tar derivatives.

RYES - PRODUCTION  
(Unit - Metric Tons)

1930	7,800
1931	9,700
1932	14,000
1933	16,000
1934	17,100
1935	19,400
1936	19,100
1937	21,400
1938	22,900
1939	27,600
1940	23,200
1941	21,800

PLASTICS

42. The Japanese have manufactured all the leading types of plastics for many years but particularly great increases in production were made after 1937 to carry forward the self-sufficiency program. Since the raw materials required to make the type of plastics based on coal tar distillation products were also required to make explosives, efforts were made to develop plastics based on other than coal tar distillation products. The production of acrylic resin began in 1938. It is very superior transparent resin that is used in making shatter-proof glass for airplanes. The cost of producing this plastic is too high for ordinary consumers and the whole production was taken by the military.

43. Vinyl acetate resins and the products thereof are used in the manufacture of synthetic fabrics, for water-proofing fabrics, as adhesives, as a latex substitute, in electric cable coatings, in tank linings and as finish on metals to make them chemically resistant.

44. The tar acid resins, having a large number of useful characteristics and the advantage of low production cost, remained the most important of the plastics that were used although they are derived from coal tar. They are used for making telephone and radio instruments, electrical accessories, protective helmets, valves, building materials, airplane parts, instrument panels and housing, etc. The following tables show the expansion of production of these three chemicals during the years immediately preceding the war:

ACRYLIC RESIN PRODUCTION		VINYL ACETATE RESINS PRODUCTION		TAR ACID RESINS PRODUCTION	
Unit-Kilograms		Unit-Kilograms		Unit - Metric Tons	
1932	-	1933	-	1930	300
1933	-	1934	-	1931	50
1934	-	1935	-	1932	700
1935	-	1936	2,000	1933	1,000
1936	-	1937	3,000	1934	1,400
1937	-	1938	21,000	1935	1,500
1938	63,000	1939	38,000	1936	2,000
1939	276,100	1940	31,000	1937	3,500
1940	208,516	1941	28,000	1938	3,600
1941	348,989			1939	4,500
				1940	5,100
				1941	6,100

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1934	-	1935	-	1932	700
1935	-	1936	2,000	1933	1,000
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## COKE AND COKE OVEN BY-PRODUCTS

45. Since coke and coke oven by-products are indispensable in manufacturing war equipments and explosives Japan's preparation for war is strikingly apparent upon investigation of the expansion of the coke by-products industry. The most important coke by-products and their industrial uses are shown as follows:

### INDUSTRIAL USES OF COKE BY-PRODUCTS

#### BENZENE

Explosives	Numerous organic chemicals	Rubber Cement
Pharmaceuticals	Polishes	Textile Soaps
Perfumes	Varnishes	Extracting Waxes
Dyestuffs Intermediates	Lacquers	Solvents
Photographic Developers	Artificial Leather	Celluloid & Rubber
Enriching Gas		Synthetic Rubber
		Motor Fuel

#### TOLUENE

Explosives	Numerous organic chemicals	Saccharin
Dyestuffs Intermediates	Pharmaceuticals	Varnishes
Rubber Cement	Solvent	
Finishes for Leather	Perfumes	
	Solvent for Rubber	

#### NAPHTHALENE

Explosives	Organic chemicals	Phthalic Acid
Dyestuffs Intermediates	Plastics	Lubricating Composition
Dyestuffs	Artificial leather	Insecticides
Synthetic resins	Varnishes	Binder
Synthetic tannins	Solvents	Enriching Gas
Lacquers	Disinfectant	
Rubber reclaiming		
Wood preservatives		

#### PHENOL

Explosives	Organic Chemicals	Germicidal Com- position
Pharmaceuticals	Disinfectants	Antiseptic
Dyestuffs	Photographic Developers	Artificial Tannin
Perfumes	Elastic Compositions	Synthetic resins
Photograph Records	Development agent in dyeing & printing	Paint & Varnish Remover
Insulating Materials	textiles	Detergents
Synthetic Rubber		

#### CRESOLES

Explosives	Paint & Varnish Removers	Pharmaceuticals
Disinfectants	Leather Preservative	
Disinfectants	Solvents	
Photographic Developers	Pastes and grinding compounds	
Printing Inks	Softening & reclaiming rubber	
	Synthetic resins	

The following tables show the expansion of the coke  
 over by-products industries and clearly demonstrate increased  
 war potential.

BENZENE PRODUCTION  
 (Unit - 1000 Metric Tons)

TOLUENE PRODUCTION & IMPORTS  
 (Unit - 1000 Metric Tons)

BENZENE PRODUCTION		TOLUENE PRODUCTION & IMPORTS			
(Unit - 1000 Metric Tons)		(Unit - 1000 Metric Tons)			
		<u>Production</u>	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Supply</u>	
1930	5.0	1930	.5	n.d.	-
1931	6.0	1931	.5	n.d.	-
1932	7.7	1932	.8	.5	1.3
1933	9.9	1933	1.2	1.0	2.2
1934	34.9	1934	1.6	.5	2.1
1935	26.3	1935	2.0	.5	2.5
1936	31.3	1936	2.3	1.0	3.3
1937	33.1	1937	2.8	1.0	3.8
1938	54.9	1938	4.6	3.1	7.7
1939	60.5	1939	5.2	5.2	10.4
1940	76.1	1940	6.1	1.3	7.4
1941	88.1	1941	7.4	.7	8.1

	NAPHTHALENE Metric Tons	PHENOL Metric Tons	CRESOLS Metric tons
1930	8277	1104	1930
1931	8760	1168	2070
1932	9765	1302	2275
1933	11745	1466	2740
1934	12060	1608	2810
1935	13509	1800	3150
1936	15894	2119	3710
1937	22770	3036	4300
1938	25302	3373	5850
1939	28347	3780	6620
1940	29558	3874	6780
1941	30462	4062	7100

46. The foregoing illustrations show the rapid advances in the chemical industry and the great number of uses of important chemicals. In time of war, because of these many uses of chemicals it is a simple process to convert the end output of the industry from civilian products to war materials production. It is noted in Appendix I of the "Outline of the Five-Year Plan for the Production of War Materials" (IFS Document 9C02) that Chemical Works were expected to be converted to the supplying war materials of many sorts.

47. In addition to subsidies, both direct and indirect, to stimulate chemical production the Synthetic Chemical Industry Law of 1940 was designed to promote the chemical industry as a whole by restricting undue competition. It provided for licensing establishments producing rubber, toluol, benzol, methanol, butanol, acetic acid, rosin and synthetic fibre. This sort of licensing control allowed the government, as in the cases of other specific industries, to dominate expansion of special chemical production enterprises and by regulation of products of the primary industries concerned, to regulate the amount and kind of the chemical and product.

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## SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY

48. The conduct of war in foreign territory necessarily demands adequate ocean transportation facilities. Support of an army in Manchuria and the need for shipping to bring necessary imports brought about an early expansion of shipbuilding by Japan. In 1932 the Japanese Government made an important decision when, with a view to improving the unfavorable age of Japanese ships and to reduce the frequency of marine casualties, it introduced the first of the "scrap and build" programs. The first program which took effect October 1, 1932, provided for the construction of 200,000 gross tons of new shipping on condition that two tons of vessels of 25 years or over were scrapped for each ton of new vessel built under subsidy. Each new vessel had to be 4,000 gross tons or over, capable of at least 13½ knots of speed and built in a Japanese shipyard. Under this scheme approximately 200,000 gross tons, amounting to 31 new vessels, were built with a total Government subsidy of nearly 11,000,000 yen. The second and third "scrap and build" programs which took effect in 1935 and 1936, respectively, produced a combined result of the construction of 100,000 new gross tons with a subsidy of little more than half that under the first program. The vessels built under these second and third programs had gross tonnages of 4,000 or over and were capable of at least 15 knots of speed. Thus, between the years 1932 and 1937 there were built approximately 48 fast, new and large cargo ships of approximately 300,000 gross tons giving Japan more tonnage less than five years old in proportion to her total tonnage than any other nation in the world. A fourth production program came into operation in April, 1937 providing for the subsidized construction of superior passenger and passenger-cargo liners of not less than 6,000 gross tons of

19 knots of speed. The subsidy rate for this building program was in some cases equal to the building cost.

49. Other indirect assistance to shipbuilding was given by the Iron Manufacturing Industry Law Enforcement Ordinance No. 507, of September 20, 1937, which provided subsidies for iron manufacturers who gave special consideration to the manufacture of steel plates, tubes and pipes, wire and rod including turbine blades, etc., all of which were essential to the expanding shipbuilding program.

50. The Outline of the Plan for the Expansion of Productive Power by the Board of Planning (Part III of IES Document 1522) demands an expansion of ships from 402,000 gross tons in 1938 to 650,000 gross tons by end of 1941 or roughly an expansion of one-third. Because the program did not move forward quickly enough, the Shipbuilding Industry Law (Law No. 71) was promulgated April 5, 1939. The purpose of the Shipbuilding Industry Law was to sanction and provide subsidy and loss indemnification to encourage shipbuilding. Basically, the law operated to allow the Imperial Government to make contracts with banking organizations that provided funds for shipbuilding or for buying ships, and to indemnify the loss they might incur by accommodation of the funds. By the same law the Government was authorized to issue public loans to the necessary limit and to pay the indemnity in bonds. The shipbuilding industry was brought under strict government supervision by a system of licensing production. Further, the establishment of new enterprises, amalgamation and cessation of work of the shipbuilding companies was made subject to government permission. When it was deemed necessary in the public interest, the Government was em-

powered to order the installation, enlargement and improvement of equipment, together with the repair of vessels, engines and equipment. For this supervision the shipbuilders were given the right of eminent domain, allowed to issue debentures up to twice the amount of the paid-up capital, were granted direct subsidies and indemnified for any losses incurred in the execution of the Government orders.

51. By a series of regulations the Government standardized types of cargo vessels and in general systematized the control of the industry. Direct participation in the equipping of the shipbuilding industry by the Government for war purposes was further provided for by the Industrial Equipment Corporation established by legislation in November 1941. One of the prime purposes of this corporation, details of which will be cited later, was to equip shipyards and build ships. Thus by December, 1941 the shipbuilding industry of Japan had for several years been rigidly controlled.

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## IRON MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY

52. Japan has always been deficient in the indigenous production of iron for the development of heavy industries and industrial purposes generally. Ever since the turn of the century the iron industry has been subsidized because of the high cost of production. However, it was not until the passage of the Japan Iron Manufacturing Company Law, April 6, 1933 (Law No. 47), that the government directly took a leading part in the iron industry as an operator. The aforementioned Law established the Japan Iron Manufacturing Company, a national policy company, for the development of the iron manufacturing industry and the sale of iron and steel. This Company, controlled, directed and financed by the government subsequently became the largest producer of iron in Japan and the hub of the iron industry.

53. With the commencement of activities of the Planning Board further special attention was given to stimulating and controlling iron and steel production. On August 12, 1937 (Law No. 68), the Iron Manufacturing Industrial Law was passed to develop iron manufacturing industries of Japan and to strengthen national defense. This Law provided that persons wishing to inaugurate iron manufacturing enterprises or suspend or alter facilities must first obtain permission of the government. Those who developed iron manufacturing enterprises under this law were entitled to expropriate land under the Land Expropriation Law if their annual capacity was over 100,000 tons. Likewise, other privileges were extended to those willing to engage in iron manufacturing, such as exemptions from income and business property taxes and exemption from import duty on machinery, equipments

and materials necessary to the industry. Special tax exemptions were given to those manufacturers who commenced the production of pig iron from iron sand and iron ore. This practice is exceedingly uneconomical because iron sand is very low grade ore and can be smelted into pig iron only at high production cost. Under certain conditions the government was empowered to grant other subsidies for the development of the iron industry. The subsidies paid by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry alone as a bounty for iron production were as follows:

1935	1,799,966 Yen
1936	1,400,361 Yen
1937	1,941,539 Yen
1938	3,865,407 Yen
1939	2,005,791 Yen
1940	4,050,017 Yen
1941	1,894,050 Yen

This bounty was in addition to other subsidies. In the subsequent Iron Manufacturing Industries Law Enforcement Ordinance, Imperial Ordinance No. 507, dated September 20, 1937, there were set out special rates of subsidies for:

- (1) Steel ingot and steel billet for forging.
- (2) Wire and rod, including turbine plates.
- (3) Steel plates.
- (4) Tube and pipe.

These materials are all used in the building and repair of steel ships.

54. For all these privileges and subsidies the government, under the Iron Manufacturer Industrial Law was empowered to direct iron manufacturers on matters of sale prices, terms of sale, expansion and improvement of facilities, changes in operating methods and such other actions as were necessary to control the kind and direction of iron manufacturing enterprises. As was the case in many other industries, the mechanism for control of iron manufacturing was the cartel, or control association system by which substantial producers of iron were allowed to effect understandings among themselves under the control, guidance and approval of the government. Peculiar to the iron industry, however, is the fact that the controlling influence in the association was always the government controlled Japan Iron Manufacturing Company which acted as a private corporation.

The Act to Promote the Production of Important Minerals, Act No. 35, March 29, 1933, specified iron as one of the important minerals. Under this Law the government could order all owners of mining rights to commence mining operations or sell their mining rights to those who would do so. Such artificial stimulation of production, with no relation to production costs, brought many submarginal producers into the field. But even with all the forces of special legislation to promote indigenous production, Japan continued to import enormous quantities of not only pig iron but also iron ore.

55. Scrap iron is an important material in the production of finished steel. Enormous quantities of scrap iron were imported and efforts were made to collect and conserve local scrap. On November 21, 1938, a decree of the Commerce and Industry Ministry set up the Scrap Iron Distribution Control Regulations relating to collection and use of scrap iron and steel. To facilitate the handling of scrap iron and raw materials there was inaugurated a special control company which had the monopoly over such distribution and sale. The actions of this control company were directed by the government.

56. The Outline of the Plan for the Expansion of Productive Power by the Board of Planning (Part III of IPS Document 1522) indicates the emphasis placed on increasing indigenous production of iron and steel in conformity with the national policy. The schedules of planned increase are as follows:

	1938	1939	1940	1941
Steel Material				
Ordinary Steel	4,615,000	5,630,000	6,220,000	7,260,000
Special Steel,				
pig, cast steel	520,000	670,000	820,000	1,000,000
Steel Ingots	6,310,000	7,753,000	8,799,000	9,950,000
Pig Iron	3,300,000	4,000,000	5,293,000	6,362,000
Iron Ore	2,250,000	3,200,000	4,400,000	5,700,000

57. Many additional regulations controlling the use of iron and iron products were promulgated. It is interesting to note that there were certain favored industries into which iron was channelled as a basic material. For instance,



under the Cast Iron Manufacturing Establishing Restrictive Regulation of September 23, 1939, Commerce and Industry Department Regulation No. 55, it is provided that:

"Persons planning to establish or extend or alter (only in case of capacity increase), cast iron manufacturing facilities must obtain permission from the Minister of Commerce and Industry. But exceptions are provided in the following cases:

- '(1) Establishment, expansion or alteration of cast iron manufacturing facilities by a company which is established by a special ordinance or by approval, permission, or license of an administrative office of the government \*\*\*.
- '(2) Establishment, expansion or alteration of cast iron manufacturing facilities used for industries permitted by the Automobile Manufacturing Industrial Law, the Machine Tool Manufacturing Industry Law, the Aircraft Manufacturing Industry Law and the Shipbuilding Industry Law \*\*\*".

The integration of the various production stimuli for the purpose of advancing special wartime production as desired is obvious.

54. In addition to the emphasis placed upon indigenous production of iron, so essential to wartime economy, the government did not stop the importation of iron ore, scrap and manufactured iron. The various plans of the Planning Board always place great stress on the securing of the natural deficiencies of these products. That the iron and steel industry, by virtue of the various governmental actions, underwent an enormous expansion is indicated in the following tables marked -

TABLE A. Production and Imports of Iron Ore, Japan Proper

TABLE B. Production and Imports of Pig Iron, Japan Proper

TABLE C. Production and Imports of Steel Scrap, Japan Proper

TABLE D. Production and Imports of Finished Steel, Japan  
Proper

and in the attached chart marked "Steel Production and Imports  
in Japan Proper", which is a graphic reproduction of the Tables

TABLE (A)

PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS OF IRON ORE, JAPAN PROPER  
1926 - 1941

Year	(Thousand Metric Tons)			Total Supply
	Production in Japan	Imports from Korea and Manchuria	Imports from other countries	
1926	130	99	794	1,023
1927	160	169	938	1,267
1928	158	225	1,618	2,001
1929	170	314	1,945	2,438
1930	246	288	1,974	2,508
1931	208	177	1,550	1,935
1932	227	158	1,476	1,861
1933	320	253	1,524	2,099
1934	432	184	2,128	2,744
1935	515	243	3,404	4,163
1936	619	243	3,780	4,642
1937	584	304	3,009	3,897
1938	766	340	2,842	3,978
1939	850	413	4,536	5,799
1940	993	486	4,643	6,122
1941	1,334	812	4,246	6,392

TABLE (B)

## PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS OF PIG IRON, JAPAN PROPER

1926 - 1941

(Thousand Metric Tons)

YEAR	Production in Japan	Imports from Korea & Manchuria	Other Imports	Total Supply
1926	810	105	400	1,315
1927	896	103	473	1,472
1928	1,093	140	570	1,803
1929	1,087	138	654	1,879
1930	1,162	109	405	1,676
1931	919	95	399	1,413
1932	1,010	528	122	1,660
1933	1,437	615	185	2,237
1934	1,728	573	204	2,505
1935	1,906	514	579	2,999
1936	2,007	394	701	3,102
1937	2,309	348	783	3,440
1938	2,562	425	647	3,634
1939	3,231	573	354	4,158
1940	3,426	595	259	4,340
1941	4,233	691	93	5,017

TABLE (C)

## PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS OF STEEL SCRAP, JAPAN FOCFER

1926 - 1941

(Thousand Metric Tons)

YEAR	Domestic Supply	Imports from Manchuria	Other Imports	Total Supply	Consumption for Steel Making
1926	707	-	80	787	619
1927	755	0	224	979	818
1928	866	0	363	1,229	1,019
1929	993	0	487	1,480	1,182
1930	992	0	488	1,480	1,188
1931	847	0	295	1,142	1,056
1932	1,096	2	557	1,655	1,242
1933	1,460	6	1,006	2,472	1,836
1934	1,754	5	1,407	3,166	2,426
1935	2,058	4	1,688	3,750	2,981
1936	2,367	19	1,478	3,864	3,215
1937	2,911	20	2,399	5,330	4,085
1938	3,037	25	1,332	4,394	4,142
1939	3,279	1	2,554	5,834	4,542
1940	3,282	0	1,390	4,672	4,189
1941	3,430	4	199	3,633	3,418

PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS OF FINISHED STEEL, JAPAN PROPER





1926 - 1941

(Thousand Metric Tons)

YEAR	Production in Japan	Imports	Total Supply
1926	1,507	34	1,541
1927	1,686	88	1,774
1928	1,906	90	1,996
1929	2,294	166	2,460
1930	2,290	70	2,360
1931	1,883	26	1,909
1932	2,398	26	2,424
1933	3,198	105	3,303
1934	3,843	89	3,932
1935	4,704	274	4,978
1936	5,222	242	5,464
1937	5,801	434	6,235
1938	6,472	300	6,772
1939	6,696	214	6,910
1940	6,855	291	7,146
1941	6,844	152	6,996

# STEEL PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS IN JAPAN PROPER, 1926-1941

■ PRODUCTION    ▨ IMPORTS



SOURCE: MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY

59. The type of development demonstrated in the above chart was the creation of an artificial finished steel industry. It is noted that by far the greater percentage of iron ore was imported into Japan. Only the processing of finished materials was done. Thus Japan had to rely almost wholly on imports of basic ore to have any iron manufacturing industry at all. This development is quite contrary to the normal manner which is a natural development from existing raw materials. It goes without saying that Japan's iron industry was uneconomic and was developed only in support of a national program which demanded iron products. Since iron is a basic raw material the purpose of this enormous expansion is shown in increased production of those products principally using iron in their manufacture. Specific reference is made to the shipbuilding industry, automobile and tank industry, heavy machine industry, machine tool industry, heavy armaments and others of a like nature. All of these products are the end products of iron industry directly and indirectly important to conduct of war.

## LIGHT AND NON-FERROUS METAL PRODUCTION INDUSTRY

60. While special attention was paid by the Japanese Government to the stimulation of the production of certain minerals by specific law, as in the case of iron, gold and petroleum consideration was also given to the stimulation of the production of other minerals and metals as an important part of the program for supplying basic raw materials for war industries. For the production of light metals and non-ferrous metals, the Outline of the Plan for the Expansion of Productive Power by the Board of Planning (Part III of IFS Document 1-22) specifically set goals to be reached by the end of 1941.


61. Aluminum is perhaps the most important of the light metals, particularly so when one considers that approximately 71 per cent of the Japanese aircraft and parts alone were made of aluminum. Other uses were for personal equipment, rolling stock and all these products where lightness in weight as well as strength is a factor of mobility. The importance of aluminum to war production is disclosed in the emphasis which the Board of Planning placed upon increasing its production. That Plan calls for the expansion in local production of from 19,000 kilo tons in 1938 to 126,400 kilo tons in 1941, or an expansion of approximately 667 per cent in four years. The actual extent to which the indigenous aluminum industry was expanded is shown in the following table marked "Aluminum Production, Imports and Consumption in Metric Tons" and more graphically illustrated in the attached chart marked "Aluminum Production in Japanese Empire".



ALUMINUM PRODUCTION, INGOTS AND CASSENETTES  
IN METRIC TONS, 1925-1941


YEAR	PRODUCTION			Imports Ingots & Scrap	Apparent Consumption
	Japan Proper	Formosa Korea	Manchuria		
1925	-	-	-	n.a.	-
1926	-	-	-	7,418	7,418
1927	-	-	-	5,731	5,731
1928	-	-	-	9,088	9,088
1929	-	-	-	12,062	12,062
1930	-	-	-	11,419	11,419
1931	-	-	-	5,115	5,115
1932	-	-	-	6,503	6,503
1933	19	-	-	8,147	8,166
1934	1,002	-	-	10,743	11,745
1935	3,159	-	-	15,816	18,975
1936	5,497	210	-	10,573	16,280
1937	11,203	2,776	-	5,623	19,602
1938	16,728	4,608	-	**	21,336
1939	21,658	7,901	3,258	**	32,817
1940	30,620	10,243	5,026	**	45,889
1941	56,080	15,667	8,031	**	79,778

# ALUMINUM PRODUCTION IN JAPANESE EMPIRE, 1926-1941



SOURCE: (1) PRODUCTION DATA: LIGHT METAL CONTROL ASSOCIATION;  
 (2) IMPORT DATA: FINANCE MINISTRY

# ALUMINUM PRODUCTION IN JAPANESE EMPIRE, 1926-1941



SOURCE: (1) PRODUCTION DATA: LIGHT METAL CONTROL ASSOCIATION;  
 (2) IMPORT DATA: FINANCE MINISTRY

62. It is significant that prior to 1934 Japan imported all of the aluminum needed for her economy. The industry was advanced at great cost, uneconomically, to achieve self-sufficiency to insure material for aircraft and other production.

63. Magnesium is second strategic light metal which has manifold uses for war products. The Board of Planning provided that magnesium production should be increased from 1,123 kilo tons in 1938 to 11,000 kilo tons in 1941, or roughly an expansion of 979 per cent in four years. The actual expansion of the indigenous production of magnesium fell far short of the hopes of the Planning Board as disclosed in the following production table:

MAGNESIUM PRODUCTION  
(Unit Kilo Ton)

1935	332
1936	655
1937	891
1938	1,331
1939	1,929
1940	3,097
1941	2,687

The above table indicates, nevertheless, the enormous expansion of the magnesium industry during the period 1935 to 1941.

## NON-FERROUS METALS

64. Copper is one of the most important of the non-ferrous metals, having many war uses among which is the manufacture of projectiles, shell cases, sheeting, electric equipment, communications equipment, alloys, etc. The Board of Planning provided for an increase in indigenous production of copper from 97,406 kilo tons in 1938 to 179,000 kilo tons in 1941, or an expansion of roughly 80 per cent. The extent of the development and increase in indigenous copper production is shown by the following table which shows the increase of local production of refined copper, together with ever increasing imports showing available supplies for military use.

### REFINED COPPER

(Unit - Metric Tons)

	PRODUCTION	IMPORTS	TOTAL
1931	77,900	2,100	80,000
1932	74,200	1,900	76,100
1933	71,200	17,600	88,800
1934	70,700	51,500	122,200
1935	75,500	69,600	145,100
1936	83,900	53,300	137,200
1937	94,200	105,700	199,900
1938	151,400	101,700	253,100
1939	108,400	87,100	195,500
1940	150,900	32,000	182,900
1941	133,800	700	134,400

65. Lead is another extremely important war material, used in the manufacture of bullets, waterproof cables, communications equipments, pipes, solder, batteries, paint, alloys, etc. The Board of Planning, provided for the expansion in indigenous lead production from 18,744 kilo tons in 1932 to 35,550 in 1941, or an increase of approximately 90 per cent. The expansion in the indigenous production of lead is shown by the following production and import table. Inasmuch as sufficient lead is not to be found in Japan proper, it is significant that the total amounts of imports shown in the table continue to increase along with indigenous production. This fact indicates enormous uses of this commodity during the years prior to war and increased stocks available for war purposes.

LEAD PRODUCTION  
(Unit Metric Tons)

PRODUCTION		IMPORTS	
1932	6,415	1932	55,954
1933	6,824	1933	67,254
1934	7,039	1934	95,114
1935	7,807	1935	91,408
1936	10,601	1936	97,822
1937	15,813	1937	n.d.
1938	16,283	1938	n.d.
1939	14,223	1939	101,001
1940	22,655	1940	92,090
1941	25,716	1941	78,538
1942	25,832	1942	720

66. Zinc ranks with lead in industrial importance. The indigenous production of zinc was planned to be increased from 55,800 kilo tons in 1932 to 95,000 kilo tons in 1941, or an increase of approximately 70 per cent. Zinc is used for corrosive resistant coatings on iron and steel, in the making of brass, bronze, die-castings, etc. Normally, zinc and lead are found together in their natural state so that the stimulation in the production of one would normally result in increased production of the other. Inasmuch as both have important war uses it was desired to increase the indigenous production of both. The following table indicates the extent of the increased indigenous production of zinc, together with imports. As in the case of lead, imports of zinc continued during the same years that increased indigenous production is shown. This fact again indicates enormous uses of this material in production during the years immediately preceding the war and heavy stocks available for war production purposes.

<u>PRODUCTION</u>		<u>ZINC</u>	<u>IMPORTS</u>
1932	27,043	1932	26,572
1933	30,658	1933	32,526
1934	32,145	1934	33,208
1935	30,207	1935	45,843
1936	36,968	1936	61,774
1937	49,786	1937	n.d.
1938	54,203	1938	n.d.
1939	51,256	1939	60,747
1940	59,703	1940	24,285
1941	61,092	1941	6,324

67. Nickel is considered a strategic war material occupying the prominent place in the manufacture of alloys of many sorts. The normal requirements of nickel for Japan are very low. Shortly prior to the China Incident, Japan began to stockpile this critical metal and increased her imports during the following years. When Japan found it difficult to continue the importation of nickel she proceeded to produce nickel from domestic ores which were of a very low grade. So uneconomic was this process that the government subsidized production to the extent of from 1200 yen to 1500 yen per ton. The subsidies for increasing the production of nickel paid by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry alone were as follows:

1939	94,690 Yen
1940	149,710 Yen
1941	206,000 Yen

68. The Board of Planning demanded a production increase of from 150 kilo tons in 1938 to 5,000 kilo tons in 1941, in spite of the fact that such production was almost a physical impossibility. The emphasis placed upon self-sufficiency in the production of nickel in spite of the manifold attendant difficulties is an excellent example of the type of uneconomic national planning indulged in for war production purposes. The following table shows imports of nickel, together with the smelter production from domestic ores:



ZINC SMELTER PRODUCTION  
From Domestic Ores

(Unit Kilo Tons)

1937	-
1938	33
1939	143
1940	617
1941	1,823

IMPORTS OF ZINC & PRODUCTION  
From Imported Ore

(Unit kilo Tons)

1933	1,595
1934	2,958
1935	1,922
1936	6,280
1937	4,417
1938	8,829
1939	7,865
1940	845
1941	384

69. Tin is another metal vital for war equipment purposes and the Board of Planning provided that its production should be increased from 1204 kilo tons in 1938 to 3,500 kilo tons in 1941, or an expansion of approximately 100 per cent. Tin is not found in Japan proper but small quantities of tin are found within the Empire. The following table shows the expansion of the indigenous production of tin, together with the enormous expansion in imports of that commodity and the amount of tin available during the years immediately preceding the war.

TIN

(Unit - Kilo Ton)

	<u>Production</u>	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Total Available Suppl</u>
1931	1015	3330	4345
1932	1002	3532	4534
1933	965	3551	4516
1934	1218	4102	5320
1935	2069	4277	6346
1936	1870	4624	6494
1937	1702	7219	8921
1938	4400	9934	14334
1939	2944	8794	11751
1940	3896	9955	13858
1941	6419	1804	7223

70. While there were many laws and regulations passed for the benefit of special mining companies and enterprises operating under favors of the government, a further definite stimulus to indigenous mineral production generally was the Act to Promote the Production of Important Minerals of March 29, 1938. This Law provided that all operators of mines were to be licensed and that all owners of mines and mining rights had to submit for approval, by the government, a plan for the development of their mines and rights. In the event that the government ordered the commencement or re-commencement of mining operations, which were not satisfactorily carried out by the owners, the government could order the sale of mines and rights.

This, of course, forced the development of nearly every type of mineral production. The important minerals named in the law to be given consideration were gold, silver, copper, lead, tin, antimony, mercury, zinc, iron, iron sulphide, chromite, magnesium, molybdenum, nickel, cobalt, coal, lignite, sulphur, alluvial gold, iron sand and others to be decided by Imperial Ordinance. The law further provided that the government could order the owner of a mine to construct, enlarge, or improve mining equipments and could give orders concerning working progress as well as qualification of tools, equipments and materials. In the event that losses were incurred by mine owners in carrying out the order of the government, compensation was to be made. The operation of the Act to Promote the Production of Important Minerals placed virtually all mining activities, together with other special laws effecting mining, under direct government control, supervision and order in accordance with plans to stimulate war production potential.

71. Some indication of the cost borne by the government to stimulate the processing of minerals as well as mining is shown in the following table which discloses only the amount of subsidy paid by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry alone for the establishment of smelters and refineries:

1938	2,049,200 Yen
1939	1,981,420 Yen
1940	7,362,800 Yen
1941	12,485,000 Yen

## LIGHT METAL MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY

72. The development of light metal mining has an important place in the development program of the Board of Planning. The extent of planned and actual expansion of light metal mining is treated in paragraphs 60 to 63 of this statement. The importance given to the development of facilities for the light metal manufacturing industry is noted in the Outline of the Five-Year Plan for Production of War Materials by the War Office, dated June 23, 1937 (IPS Document 9002 A), which indicates, in Appendix I, that the purpose of the peace plan production of light metal alloys shall be for converting to wartime production of aircraft and parts. The planned enormous expansion in the processing of aluminum and magnesium set forth in Section III of the Outline, at Sub-Section (3), provides that the special raw material industry and parts industry connected with munitions should be speedily expanded by means of the synthetic national policy. That the national policy stimulated the expansion of light metal manufacturing and processing is clearly shown by the Light Metal Manufacturing Law of April 29, 1938, (Law No. 88).

73. This Law had as its aim the "establishment of the manufacturing business of light metals with the object of contributing towards the adjustment of national defense". Light metals within the meaning of the law were aluminum and magnesium. It was provided that persons desiring to engage in light metal manufacturing must be licensed by the government after which the licensed companies were given many subsidies and privileges including exemption from income

and business profit taxes, local government tax, exemption from import duty on machinery and equipment necessary to build or expand light metal manufacturing plants as well as the right to expropriate land under the Land Expropriation Law. In addition, the licensed manufacturing companies were allowed to issue debentures up to twice the amount of their paid-up capital without security. For these licenses, privileges and subsidies the government was empowered to take over the supervision and direction of the manufacturing companies: being empowered to fix prices of all products, to order changes in manufacturing techniques, to order expansion of plants and direct the type of goods to be manufactured, to name the purchasers of light metal products and to compel the stockpiling of basic materials needed for light metal manufactures. Thus the light metal manufacturing industries were completely controlled by government policy and securely bound to the war production program.

## MACHINE TOOL INDUSTRY

74. Machine tools can roughly be described as the machines which make other machines - the only mechanisms that are self-perpetuating from an industrial point of view. The basic machine tools are lathes, drills, presses, drilling machines, planers, shapers, grinders and boring machines. For time saving purposes various complicated adaptations and combinations of machine tools such as automatic turret lathes, multiple boring machines and such type tools have been evolved to perform several intricate operations simultaneously. Mass production of finished metal machined products and working parts is impossible today without machine tools in large quantities. Hence, for an expanded industrial program, machine tool production is a primary necessity.

75. Until 1937, there were over 1000 small plants manufacturing machine tools in Japan in addition to the government arsenals. However, the major portion of machine tools were manufactured by five large companies. Before the China Incident, the United States, Germany and Great Britain were the principal sources of imports of machinery and parts. Between 1935 and 1940, samples of the best American Swiss, German and other make machine tools were purchased as prototypes by the Japanese. With almost unlimited Capital, and the use of prototypes and technical assistance from Sweden, Swiss and German Engineers, the Japanese went to work to establish self-sufficiency in the production of machine tools. By 1941 intensive integration of the industry had taken place so that approximately 90 per cent of the machine tools were manufactured in approximately 100 plants with the five leading companies operating 28 plants responsible for over half the total production.

76. The enormous impetus given to production of specific war materials by the planned program of the War Office required expansion of the machine tool industry with a view to self-sufficiency in production. That it was intended to encourage and cultivate the machine tool industries so that they could be converted to the manufacture of war materials is disclosed in the Outline of the Five-Year Plan for Production of War Materials of the War Office, (IPS Document 9002 A) at page 9, paragraph 4 as follows:

"The objectives of expansion of major industries convertible into industries for the manufacture of munitions in time of war throughout Japan and Manchoukuo are as follows:

- a. "Machine tool industry (excluding construction machinery industry)

"Although they will be steadily expanded according to the peacetime production conversion of already existing industries through arrangement of materials accompanying the promotion of industries, in general, based on the comprehensive national policy, and the repletion of armaments, but their installation capacity will be increased two to three-fold by about the end of 1941 through the comprehensive national policy."

Appendix No. I of IPS Document 9002 A at page 16 discloses the types of plants using machine tools in peacetime which were to be converted to the manufacture of specifically named war materials. For instance, spinning and weaving machinery was to be converted to the manufacture of shells using lathes, fuses, weapons and parts; the machinery for manufacturing clocks and watches was to be converted to the manufacture of fuses and firearms, etc. It is a very simple conversion in most cases to use multiple purpose machine tools employed in one industry for another industry.

77. The synthetic national policy mentioned in the Outline of the Five-Year Plan for Production of War Materials (IPS Document 9002 A) placed additional emphasis upon the importance of stimulating production of machine tools. In the planned expansion table attached to the Outline of the Plan for the Expansion of Productive Power by the Board of Planning (Part III of IPS Document 1522), it is disclosed that the machine tool production was to be expanded from a value of 76,000,000 yen in 1938 to 200,000,000 yen in 1941. This expansion, of course, was to provide machine tools which could be converted in time of war as well as machine tools primarily intended for use in the manufacture of war materials. While this program of expansion aimed at self-sufficiency, Japan, nevertheless continued to import machine tools to supply deficiencies in her program.

78. While various laws directed capital investment into the development of an indigenous machine tool manufacturing industry and controlled the flow of materials to aid that development, a further special stimulus was given to the machine tool industry by the Machine Tool Industry Law passed in the Spring of 1938. This law made it necessary to obtain permission from the government to organize, transfer or suspend machine tool production or to modify or expand equipment. At the same time manufacturers were made subject to regulations regarding prices, purchases of equipments, use of materials, standardization of products and other government controls. The government further was empowered to order mergers of plants and equipments, to order specific production and make compensation occurring in case of loss from such orders. As an encouragement to machine tool production under the Machine Tool Industry Law, those licensed machine tool producers were exempted from income,



profits and local taxes for five years. Imports for the purpose of increasing the materials in support of the industry were made free of duty. In addition, the government provided development subsidies and in certain cases compensation for depreciation of capital investments. In subsidies for the manufacture of machine tools, the Commerce and Industry Ministry alone paid 296,000 yen in 1938, 500,000 in 1939 and 450,000 in 1940. These subsidies, of course, were in addition to other subsidies and were used for the encouragement of the industry solely.

79. Among the biggest users of machine tools were the Japanese Army and Navy Arsenals which purchased special purpose machine tools directly through purchasing missions which went around the world seeking prototypes for the infant Japanese industry. Between the years 1937 and 1940, the Japanese Army Ordnance and Aviation Arsenals purchased more machine tools in the United States than any Japanese industrial company. For this period there were shipped from the United States to the Army Ordnance and Aviation Arsenals approximately 22½ Million Dollars worth of machine tools.

80. The force of law and regulation focused on the procurement of machine tools resulted in enormous expansion of indigenous production as well as increased imports. The following table marked "Production, Import and Export of Machine Tools, Japan Proper" shows this expansion clearly for the ten-year period before 1941. The attached chart marked "Machine Tool Production and Net Imports in Japan Proper" is a graphic illustration of the table:


PRODUCTION, IMPORT AND EXPORT OF MACHINE TOOLS  
JAPAN PROPER, 1930 - 1941

Year	Production	Import	Export	Supply
1930	2,250	500 $\frac{1}{2}$ '	120 $\frac{1}{2}$ '	2,630
1931	2,100	300 $\frac{1}{2}$ '	100 $\frac{1}{2}$ '	2,300
1932	3,000	450 $\frac{1}{2}$ '	120 $\frac{1}{2}$ '	3,300
1933	6,500	1,140	150 $\frac{1}{2}$ '	7,490
1934	8,200	1,602	200 $\frac{1}{2}$ '	9,602
1935	10,500	1,205	210 $\frac{1}{2}$ '	11,995
1936	16,227	3,248	660 $\frac{1}{2}$ '	18,815
1937	21,888	6,324	710 $\frac{1}{2}$ '	27,502
1938	67,260	7,128	1,200 $\frac{1}{2}$ '	73,188
1939	66,830	7,635	2,700 $\frac{1}{2}$ '	71,765
1940	58,088	3,134	2,500 $\frac{1}{2}$ '	58,722
1941	46,058	1,500 $\frac{1}{2}$ '	1,500 $\frac{1}{2}$ '	46,058

Note: Exports estimated  $\frac{1}{2}$ '

Imports estimated  $\frac{1}{2}$ '

## MACHINE TOOL PRODUCTION AND NET IMPORTS IN JAPAN PROPER, 1930-1941



SOURCE : MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND  
MACHINE TOOL CONTROL ASSOCIATION


81. Closely allied to the machine tool industry from the standpoint of importance in industrial machines and end products is the precision bearing industry. Every important machine having moving parts uses precision bearings. War machines are no exception. For war machine purposes precision bearings are a critical item. Hence, certain types of industrial expansion can be quickly gauged by the expansion of the bearing producing industry and the output. The following table marked "Production and Capitalization in Precision Bearing Industry, Japan Proper" shows the remarkable expansion of this industry. The table is graphically illustrated by the attached chart marked "Expansion of Precision Bearing Industry in Japan Proper".

PRODUCTION AND CAPITALIZATION IN PRECISION BEARING INDUSTRY,  
JAPAN PROPER 1930 - 1941

(Thousand Yen)

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>Authorized Capitalization</u>	<u>Value of Production</u>
1930	1,000	1,000
1931	1,000	1,000
1932	1,000	700
1933	1,500	1,000
1934	6,500	2,000
1935	11,050	3,000
1936	11,050	5,000
1937	37,900	13,000
1938	40,400	28,000
1939	85,230	45,000
1940	115,230	65,000
1941	162,610	105,000

## EXPANSION OF PRECISION BEARING INDUSTRY IN JAPAN PROPER, 1931-1941



SOURCE : PRECISION MACHINE CONTROL ASSOCIATION

## MOTOR VEHICLES, TANKS AND ROLLING STOCK INDUSTRY

82. The Japanese Motor Vehicle Industry was virtually non-existent prior to 1936. Domestic manufacture has not only been quantitatively small but poor in quality. Prior to 1936, almost all of the automobiles, engines and parts used in Japan were imported. Japan has always been much less dependent upon motor vehicles for transportation than most of the western countries. At the beginning of 1938, for example, Japan had only one truck or bus per 700 people as against one for 38 people in the United States, 81 in the United Kingdom, and 126 in Germany. Even Italy, ranking next lowest to Japan, had approximately twice as many per capita. With the advent of war planning indigenous motor transport production was considered an indispensable necessity for military forces. The establishment of an indigenous automobile industry in Japan, however, is not based upon sound economics or good business, but upon the opinion of the Japanese Government that reasons of national defense required the development of such an industry regardless of the cost involved.

83. The Automobile Industry Control Law (Law No. 33), was enacted May 29, 1936 to "firmly establish the necessary motor-car industry enterprise in order to adjust national defense and develop the nation's industry". It was provided that all companies undertaking to manufacture motorcars must be licensed by the government, whereupon, companies manufacturing motor vehicles were exempted from corporation, business and income taxes for a period of years. Likewise, motorcar manufacturing companies were exempted from import taxes on machinery and equipments necessary for the establishment of plants or the maintenance of their enterprises.

Further, as an incentive to development, such companies were allowed to offer debentures, beyond the limitation provided in the Commercial Code, to the equivalent of double the amount of the paid-up shares. Protection of the infant industry was provided in that the government was authorized by the law to take whatever steps were necessary to restrict imports. These steps were taken very quickly.

84. In spite of all the government's efforts to increase production of automobiles it was a very expensive industry, depending almost entirely upon government subsidy for its existence. For example, in the immediate pre-war period it cost about 8,000 yen for a Japanese producer to make a standard small size truck which was sold to the general public for 4,500 yen. This constituted a loss of approximately 3,500 yen which was made up by the government subsidy. Competition with imported vehicles under such circumstances was so impossible that by 1938 import duties were approximately 50 per cent ad valorem on both cars and parts. By 1940 there were virtually no imports of automobiles to Japan.

85. For the granting of these special protections and subsidies, the Automobile Industry Control Law provided, in effect, that the government should control manufacturing, planning and designing, operational facilities, sales, prices and other related matters. An interesting provision of this law was that the government might issue orders to a motorcar manufacturer directly for the manufacture of military cars or their parts and the establishment of special facilities deemed necessary to fill the orders. That the military demanded expansion of automobile production is shown in the provisions of the Outline of the Plan for the Expansion of Productive Power by the Board of Planning

(Part III of IPS Document 1522) which provides that motorcar production should be expanded from 15,700 units in 1938 to 80,000 units by the end of 1941. That the military intended to use the Automobile Manufacturing Control Law as the authority for forcing production of automobiles is disclosed in the Outline of the Five-Year Plan for Production of War Materials by the War Office (IPS Document 9002 A). As a policy to assist in the expansion of the automobile industry it was provided in the above mentioned IPS Document 9002 A at page 7, sub-paragraph 2, as follows:

"In regard to armament industries (including tanks and special military vehicles) and industries manufacturing related parts and raw materials, they will be privately shown the estimated orders for over several years from time to time within the scope of not hampering the preparations suitable to the immediate situation in the future and will be guided toward rapid expansion with the supply of capital being made smooth.

"In regard to airplane industries and industries manufacturing related parts and raw materials, they will be guided toward expansion for the time being according to the preceding paragraph in order to meet the urgent demands from the standpoint of peace time arrangement of military materials accompanying the replication of armaments. However, large scaled expansion carried out according to the national policy will be considered. In regard to the expansion of automobile industry, the application of the Automobile Manufacturing Enterprise Law will be relied upon and the Military Automobile Subsidy Law will be utilized."

86. Indigenous automobile production was desirable from the military point of view, not alone for the production of automobiles, but also to create equipments and plants, a part of which could be converted to the manufacture of tanks and aircraft and aircraft parts. The Outline of the Five-Year Plan for Production of War Materials (IPS Document 9002 A) provides in Section II, page 4, as follows:



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"It is planned to expand and cultivate the munitions industries (including parts and raw materials industries) as well as the various industries to be converted in time of war simultaneously with the expansion of the major national defense industries and to strengthen the necessary control.

"The emphasis of expansion is to be placed on the production of airplanes, arms and ammunition, tanks and military vehicles, which are the main factors for constituting fighting power, and on others directly connected to this."

\* \* \* \* \*

"In regard to the automobile industry, those in the category of genuine war supplies such as tanks and special military vehicles will be governed by the foregoing Clause 2, but in regard to ordinary automobiles, it will be guided by the comprehensive national policy in such a way as not to impede the commandeering and supplying of the required number in time of war. However, necessary military administration measures will be devised to have a considerable portion of the wartime capacity of the said industry cooperate in the war-time production of airplanes."

Appendix No. 3 of IPS Document 9002 A at page 27 sets out a schedule indicating the degree to which the automobile engine industry should be converted to the manufacture of airplane engines.

87. With regard to the manufacture of tanks and armoured vehicles it was proposed to use the expansion of the automobile industry for the purpose of converting to the manufacture of tanks. The Outline of the Five-Year Plan for Production of War Materials (IPS Document 9002 A) indicates on page 4, paragraphs 2 and 3; on page 9, paragraph 2c, Appendix I, pages 17 and 18; and Appendix 6, pages 34 and 35 that the two industries are inter-related for purposes of producing war equipments. I will read those portions of the document.

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It was further proposed to use the infant industry of Manchuria for the purpose of manufacturing tanks and military vehicles. The following is a quotation from pages 4 and 5, and 35 of IPS Document 9002 A:

"The areas of expansion will be both Japan and Manchoukuo and their field of operation will be determined roughly as follows:

"(a) In regard to the continent, particularly Manchuria, local production of airplanes, arms and ammunition, tanks and military vehicles will be started in connection with the development of raw materials and resources and gradually developed to make possible mass production in time of war."  
(pp 4 and 5)

\* \* \* \* \*

"War-time Production Conversion of Private Enterprises  
\*890 (\* of which approximately 500 Tanks  
are converted)

Engines--Utilization of Automobile Industry --  
Manchuria." (p 35)

In the detailed schedule for expanded war material production in Manchuria, Appendix No. 7, IPS Document 9002 A, it was anticipated that 50 tanks per month, including armoured cars, would be manufactured.

88. An increased production of rail transportation facilities was likewise a necessity brought about by war-time planned economy. The Outline of the Plan for the Expansion of Productive Power by the Planning Board (Part III, IPS Document 1522) aims at the expansion in the production of locomotives from 877 units in 1938 to 1100 units by the end of 1941; of rail cars from 1161 units in 1938 to 2000 units by the end of 1941; of freight cars from 14,111 units in 1938 to 21,000 units by the end of 1941. This expansion would appear to be extremely significant when one considers the already well developed railway system in Japan which was operated by the government. That the expansion of railway production equipment as well as the expansion of equipment

itself was considered important for the war effort is disclosed in the Outline of the Five-Year Plan for the Production of War Materials (IFS Document 9009 A). At Appendix No. 1, page 17, a plan to convert the vehicle industry to the manufacture of locomotives for army use, parts of weapons, assembling of tanks, etc., is shown. It was further planned, in Appendix No. 7, of IFS Document 9009 A, page 32, that Manchuria was to provide a capacity of 130 light railway freight cars per month for military use.

## AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

89. Aircraft production commanded top priority in the Japanese program for war preparations. In support of this statement I will read the following excerpts from the Outline of the Five-Year Plan for Production of War Materials by the War Office, (IFS Document 9002 A):

- a). Page 4, paragraphs 2, 3 and 4(a).
- b). Page 8, sub-paragraph 3.
- c). Pages 21, 22 and 23 through (6), page 26 and page 27 of Appendix 3.

90. To give effect to planned aircraft expansion concerted action was taken by the government in the promulgation of the Aircraft Manufacturing Law in March 1938. This Law provided for the licensing of manufacturers of aircraft, aircraft parts and accessories by the Japanese Government. Subsidies in the form of exemptions from income and business profit taxes, local government tax, import tax on tools, machinery and materials necessary for the development of plants were to be granted as well as encouragement money for the manufacture of new types of aircrafts. Likewise, licensed companies were allowed to effect an increase in capital even before original capital on the company was fully paid up and were allowed to issue debentures up to twice the paid-up capital without security. For these and other special privileges the government completely took over the direction of the licensed plants. Such direction included supervision and authority to order expansion of plants, special manufacture,

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researches, training of technicians, joint use of facilities, fixing of prices and all other matters "necessary in the public interest". Thus the aircraft manufacturing industry became completely dominated by the government's program for its expansion.

91. The following table illustrates the expanded production of military aircraft for the years 1935 to 1941 inclusive:

LIST OF MILITARY AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION

<u>TYPE</u>	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941
<u>Army Aircraft Bodies</u>							
Pursuit F.	11	188	342	400	549	596	724
Bomber	167	42	85	752	1,203	693	769
Reconn. P.	139	94	140	106	179	524	746
Others	32	239	280	409	737	1,195	1,548
Total	349	563	847	1,667	2,668	3,008	3,787
<u>Navy Aircraft Bodies</u>							
Fighter	91	258	407	466	463	668	620
Bomber	27	49	142	496	522	452	492
Patrol P.	59	146	144	340	430	247	210
Others	231	120	88	385	707	744	758
Total	408	573	781	1,687	2,122	2,111	2,080
<u>Army &amp; Navy Aircraft Motors</u>							
Air-cool	481	792	1,404	2,260	5,973	7,334	11,652
Water-cool	103	78	22	468	596	257	2
Total	584	870	1,426	2,728	6,569	7,601	11,654



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The above table does not show the production of aircraft for civilian uses nor does it show the true picture of expansion in the production potential of aircraft as developed during these years. Such potential can best be judged by the development of the machine tool industry, the light metal industry, the automobile industry and others which were expanded with a view to conversion of their facilities to the manufacture of aircraft and aircraft parts. One can properly say that the aircraft industry was being prepared for war production on a far greater scale than appears from the actual production of war planes, although that production proceeded along the schedule outlined by the War Office.

## INDUSTRIAL CONTROL

92. In addition to the direct and indirect controls for stimulation of specific industries, as outlined briefly in the foregoing surveys, in furtherance of a planned economy as demonstrated by laws and regulations affecting the specific industries, other direct measures of industrial control of universal nature were planned and executed. In support of this statement I will read the following excerpts from the Outline of the Five-Year Plan for Production of War Materials by the War Office, dated 23 June 1937, (IPS Document 9002 A):

- a) Page 3, paragraphs 1, 2 and sub-paragraph 3.
- b) Page 5, paragraph 6.
- c) Pages 13 and 14, Section V.

I shall also read the following excerpt from pages 3 and 4, paragraph 3 of the Outline of the Plan for the Expansion of Productive Power by the Board of Planning, dated January, 1939 (Part III of IPS Document 1522):

93. To accomplish the purpose of general concentration of industrial control for war purposes it was planned to build upon the basic structure of cartels and control mechanisms already in existence in industry. A brief review of these mechanisms will serve to explain the simplicity and completeness of their operation. In December 1929, rationalization of industries in a narrow sense first came into being with the formation of the Special Committee on Industrial Rationalization of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. In June of 1930, the Emergency Industrial Rationalization Bureau was formed. This Bureau, created for normal government purposes, formulated plans for standardization and simplification of parts and products, dissemination

of scientific industrial management data, and generally provided for substantial measures to assist in national recovery and promote industrialization for export trade.

94. A first direct attempt to control heavy industries for the sake of a rational planned economy was undertaken in August 1931 with the passage of the Major Industries Control Law. This law provided for large scale heavily capitalized industries by facilitating industrial self-control and making legally enforceable agreements made between producers and important industries with regard for the public welfare. However, an amendment to this law in 1936 enforced cartelization of major industries and placed such industrial self-control organs under direct government supervision. In cases where persons operating in the major industries made a cartel agreement which effected one-half or more of the total production within the specific industry such an agreement had to be registered with the Government Control Committee and could be modified by that Committee in the public interest. Of course, such cartel agreements within the Major Industries forced many mergers of plants and equipments and threw the control of the Major Industries generally into the hands of the large groups. The industries specifically cartelized by the government permission and direction were cotton spinning and weaving, silk spinning and weaving, rayon, paper, carbide, flour, sulphuric acid, cement, copper, sugar and oil pressing. Other Major Industries such as iron and steel, mining, import and export and shipbuilding were being effectively consolidated by other special laws and programs.

95. The effect of such enforced cartelization was to destroy the ability of the small and medium scale industries to compete with large industrial organizations controlled by the so-called Zaibatsu interests. Since anti-monopoly laws were repugnant to this Japanese method of industrial control for the national welfare, smaller concerns united into guilds and unions for protection. The Industrial Guilds Law, as amended in 1931, contained provisions for the unionization and associational control of smaller manufacturing industries with provisions similar to the Major Industries Control Law. Again in September 1932, by the Commercial Guilds Law, control and organization of commercial undertakings was fostered. Increased facilities for guilds, and associations from a standpoint of banking, were provided in 1936 by the Central Bank for Commercial and Industrial Associations which loaned money at cheap rates and provided many special facilities.

96. The extent of the forced mergers of companies and their recapitalization for streamlined operation is disclosed in the statistics of the Bank of Japan which tell plainly what was accomplished by such measures. During the year 1940, 212 major corporation mergers took place affecting capital investment of 2,300,000,000 yen, approximately. During the first half of 1941, 172 major companies mergers took place, affecting capital investment of over 3,000,000,000 yen.

(By 1941 there were over 1000 Kogyo Kumiai or Guilds formed of smaller enterprises). The significance of these enormous mergers indicates the strength of the government's program and the desire to build a complete control structure upon a foundation of unification of similar enterprises under government supervision.

97. Following the Plan for Control provided for in Section V of the Outline of the Five-Year Plan for Production of War Materials, (IFS Document 9002 A), there resulted the National General Mobilization Law effective May 1938 which is Court Order No. 100. This law is the basic legislation for the complete mobilization of all facilities for war economy not otherwise provided. I will read the following excerpt from The National General Mobilization Law.

98. One of the first important ordinances affecting industry promulgated pursuant to the National General Mobilization Law was the Ordinance Concerning the Plan by the Promoter of a Business for General Mobilization, dated 26 July 1939. This Ordinance provided that the Ministers of War and Navy could call in the owners or promoters of selected businesses, named pursuant to ordinance under the National General Mobilization Law, and order such persons to make plans for production following a set national production schedule. This authority of the Ministers included the power to order the type of training programs of personnel within the specific industrial plants in conformity with anticipated needs for skilled personnel as disclosed in IFS Document 1522. Such methods forced businessmen to cooperate in the execution of the plans of the Army and Navy to fullest extent of their facilities and skills.

99. One of the most forthright industrial ordinances promulgated pursuant to the National General Mobilization Law, was Imperial Ordinance No. 901 of December 28, 1939 entitled Use and Expropriation Ordinance of Factories and Workshops.

Pursuant to this Ordinance the War and Navy Ministers were given the authority to authorize expropriation of materials, lands, buildings, constructions, machinery and equipment, deemed necessary for the national general mobilization. Upon notification by the competent ministers, the owners and operators of selected plants similarly turned them over to the government direction and management. Likewise, by order, the owners or operators of such plants who turned them over for government use were to make available their workers as demanded by the government. This expropriation law applied likewise to patents. Article No. 27 of the National General Mobilization Law provided for a method of compensation. This ordinance, aimed at materials and equipments manufacturers, was a constant threat to private ownership to obey the instructions of the Army and Navy and provide the equipments desired.

100. The most sweeping of all the control ordinances, however, was the Key Industries Control Ordinance promulgated August 30, 1941. This Ordinance was based upon the provisions of Article 18 of the National General Mobilization Law and was to serve as a foundation for the complete control of all major industries by the government, using the cartel structure already in existence as its guiding principle. It was provided that the major industries named by the government were to form themselves into control associations according to type of industry. Thus there was to be in each major industry such as, iron and steel, cement, machinery, chemical, rubber, rolling stock, etc., one single national industrial organization for each kind of industry. The power of each such national association was to:

- (a) Participate in the government's plans concerning production and distribution in the industry concerned and the demand and supply of raw materials, funds, labor required in the said industry, and also the government's other plans concerning the said industry.
- (b) Control and guide concerning the production and distribution in the industry concerned and also the control and guidance concerning the enterprises in such industries which are owned by its members or by persons who form the organizations which become members of the said control organizations.
- (c) Increase the perfection of the organization of the industry concerned.
- (d) Establish the importance of technique, the promotion of efficiency, the standardization of specifications, the importance of the accounting system, and other facilities for the development of the enterprises in such industry.
- (e) Oversee the investments and resources in the industry concerned.
- (f) Conduct inspection of the enterprises in the said industry.
- (g) Control other enterprises which are necessary for the attainment of the importance of the control of the association.



The system established provided that each Industrial Control Association should nominate a president who would be appointed by the government. All of the important directors of associations were appointed subject to government sanction. The right of dismissal of officials was in the hands of the government. The Control Association, by direction of the president, could impose special levies on the members, order the merger of enterprises within the industry for the sake of efficiency, order changes in plant equipments and management and, in general, exercise complete and autocratic control over the entire industry. The fixing of production plans, the allocation of materials to individual plants to effect planned production, the nomination of sale of all products, the establishment of wage policies and the fixing of prices within each industry was made pursuant to the joint planning of the heads of the Control Associations and the Planning Board who united policy and production. In this connection it can be said that one of the functions of the Planning Board was to compare the indigenous supplies of materials with production demands and make plans for the means of securing and paying for deficiencies, making such adjustments as were consistent with the national policy. All producers were forced to become members of their respective industrial association or go out of business. In certain cases diversified companies had to belong to several associations. In those cases where individual producers were too small to participate they were either merged into larger enterprises, or were formed into a union of similar enterprises and the

union taken in as a member of the Control Association. In each prefecture sub-control associations were formed for the sake of efficiency in dissemination of orders and effective control.

101. This elaboration of the control association system was the perfection of the already well-functioning system with the added element of universal application. It was established immediately preceding the outbreak of war to perpetuate peak wartime production which was planned to be reached by the end of 1941. The timing of such activities would appear to be extremely significant when one considers the element of preparation in the light of events subsequent to December 7, 1941.

102. In addition to the many methods for stimulating war materials production, otherwise cited, the government directly took over the job of equipping war industry plants pursuant to legislation enacted November 25, 1941 (Law No. 91). This Law was entitled, "Law Concerning The Sangyo Setsubi Eider" ("Industrial Equipment Corporation"). By virtue of the aforementioned law, the government created a special equipment corporation, a juridical person, with the following object:

"Article 1.

"The objectives of the Industrial Equipment Corporation are, in time of war \*\*\*\* inclusive of a serious accident that shall be regarded as the same, to have the following industries equipped with necessary plants, such as munitions industries, the production of which shall be increased on

certain definite lines of the government programmes and other indispensable industries for national economy when any other enterprisers could hardly do the same or maintain such equipments, and are to build ships that shall conform to gauge designated by the government, and to make full use of industrial plants, inclusive of machines and implements to be used in furnishing the mentioned plants, which are not yet brought to completion or employed \*\*\*\* these shall be called the unfinished and unemployed plants in the following Articles".

To achieve the purposes outlined in the objectives for the establishment of this corporation it was empowered to transact the following business:

- "(1) To construct or purchase plants of the indispensable industries for the national economy when other enterprises cannot construct or maintain such plants.
- "(2) To lend, invest in and sell the plants obtained or constructed.
- "(3) To give orders to build or manufacture ships, ship's engines and equipment that shall conform to government specifications.
- "(4) To sell such ships and ship's equipments.
- "(5) To buy, sell and hold the unfinished and unemployed plants.
- "(6) To act as mediator in making full use of unemployed plants.
- "(7) Do the necessary business to carry out the above named purposes".

103. As a further facility to carrying out the business of the Industrial Equipment Corporation it was exempted from income, corporation, business and local taxes. Its entire capitalization of 400,000,000 yen was supplied by the government, and for additional funds it was authorized to issue debentures up to 15 times the amount of the paid up capital, with the government standing security for the payment of both principal and interest. The governors, directors and auditors of the corporation were to be appointed by the government. In addition to all this, the corporation was authorized to expropriate or use land, and the rights connected with land other than the ownership, when it was deemed necessary in constructing plants of the indispensable industries.

104. The planned and accomplished expansion in production by the various industries before December 7, 1941 as disclosed in the foregoing surveys, far exceeded the amount of materials and potential needed for the conduct of the war in China. The elaborately detailed planning and careful gathering of controls in the hands of the government effectively chained all industry to the national policy of industrial preparation for a far greater conflict. In a speech made by Kenryo SATO, Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry, in March 1942, a copy of which is IPS Document 9027 A, this fact is made unmistakably clear. I will read an excerpt from that Document taken from pages 5 and 6 which reviews government policy for industrial production in connection with the China Incident which needs no further amplification from me.

## FINANCIAL PREPARATIONS

105. Under the Japanese form of totalitarian imperialism financial controls for the years immediately preceding 1941 were designed for two purposes:

- (1) To integrate dependent territories into the economic system of Japan in order to draw from them materials and wealth necessary for strengthening the Japanese economic position, and to control the flow of money and goods to achieve the maximum benefits of foreign trade in support of industrial production for war purposes.
- (2) To use most effectively the total financial capacities of Japan proper to build up war production and war production potential by direct and indirect government spending and by rigid control over the flow of money capital, and goods.

## INTEGRATION OF TERRITORIES

106. During the Manchurian Campaign, 1931 to 1932, the Japanese Army relied upon the Bank of Chosen (The Bank of Issue of Korea under the control of the Japanese Government) to supply currency and to provide banking facilities. As a result of these operations, chiefly on behalf of the Japanese, bank note circulation of The Bank of Chosen, rose from 75,000,000 yen on June 30, 1931 to 222,000,000 yen at the close of 1935 when gradual withdrawal of these notes was initiated; at which time notes of the Central Bank of Manchuria (The Bank of Issue of Manchoukuo) were issued

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instead. Additional financing for industry during this period was handled through the South Manchurian Railway, a national policy company of the Japanese Government, which, together with its subsidiary companies spread like an octopus into nearly every phase of Manchurian developments.

107. After the establishment of the Manchoukuo Government an agreement was entered into between the Imperial Japanese Government and the Imperial Government of Manchoukuo which politically as well as practically bound the economies of the two nations. I have a copy of a record of the meeting of Privy Council held on 3 July, 1935, (IPS Document 275A), which discloses the true purpose of the agreement from the Japanese Government's point of view. I shall read the first eight pages of that record.

The Agreement Regarding the Establishment of the Joint Economical Committee of Japan and Manchoukuo (IPS Document 2196A) was signed on the 15th of July, 1935. I will read that document, the import of which can be more clearly understood in the light of IPS Document 275A.

108. The creation of the Industrial Bank of Manchuria in December, 1936 furnished a means of financing the planned development of Manchurian industry. The Bank was originally capitalized at 60,000,000 yen and later increased to 100,000,000 yen. Officials of the Bank were appointed by the Government and its activities supervised by the Finance Ministry. The Industrial Bank was authorized to issue debentures up to 15 times the amount of paid up capital and authorized to issue saving debentures to secure necessary funds for industrial development purposes. The facilities afforded by this

Bank provided easy financing for preferred industries named by government policy which after all was Japanese dominated.

109. In November, 1935 the yen bloc was established when Manchou'kuo's currency was legally cut off its silver basis and stabilized at par with the yen. This action integrated the monies of the two countries, Japan and Manchoukuo. The yen bloc was enlarged in March, 1938 when Japan, her colonies, Manchoukuo and the dominated parts of China accepted the money notes issued by the Federal Reserve Bank of China. Under the regulations then put into effect Manchoukuo and China utilized the yen balances supplied by Japanese Banks practically as their exclusive currency reserves.

110. The "Essentials of the Five-Year Program of Important Industries by the War Ministry", dated 29 May 1937, (Part I of IPS Document 1522) discloses that the Japanese War Ministry in its planning intended to make use of the reserves and materials of Manchuria and North China. The following quotation is taken from page 1, paragraph 2 of that Document:

"Although our Empire is made the subject in the promotion of important industries for national defense, the requisite industries (for national defense) should be pushed ahead to the continent as far as possible according to the principle of right work in the right place with Japan and Manchuria as a single sphere and in consideration of their necessity in our national defense, and, furthermore, observing the farsighted future policy of our Empire, we should pick out the most important resources, should ingeniously take the initiative in economic exploitation of North China, and should make efforts to secure its natural resources."



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This Document contains also a schedule citing a general goal for promotion of important industries in Manchuria, as well as in Japan, and expressing specifically the intention to supply certain deficiencies from Manchuria. However, The Outline of the Five-Year Plan for Production of War Materials, (IPS Document 9002 A), shows this planned integration to be vital to war expansion. I will read the following excerpts from that Document:

a) Page 3 (all)

b) Section III, pages 5 to 7 inclusive

111. It was also the intent of the War Ministry to fully utilize the resources of Chosen (Korea). Integration had already been effected during the four decades in which Chosen had been completely dominated by Japan. Financially, Chosen was controlled by Japan through control of investments as well as through the operation of the Bank of Chosen which was an official bank of issue of Japanese currency and the single effective instrument by which fiscal policies of the Japanese Government were carried out in that territory. So strong was the hold of Japan over the economic structure of Chosen that approximately 97% of all corporations (Kaisha) doing business in Chosen were controlled by Japanese. When one adds to the picture the fact that the Government of Chosen was completely Japanese one can understand the completeness of the integration of the two economies under the control of Japan.

112. Since the turn of the Century the economic structure of Taiwan (Formosa) has also been dominated by Japan.

Taiwan is predominantly an agricultural territory normally exporting sugar, rice, and sweet potatoes. What few industries it had were developed predominantly by the Japanese. Like Chosen, dominance was exercised through control of investments and control of the Government. The Bank of Taiwan, likewise an official bank of issue of Japan, carried out the fiscal policies of the Japanese Government in that territory. Similarly, the Commercial and Industrial Bank of Taiwan (operating as it did in purely commercial circles), was at the disposition of Japanese policy makers. Formosa, like the mandated islands in the South Pacific, was, in all factual respects, a colony of Japan.

113. The direct integration of the economy of China into that of Japan did not commence until a later date. The integration, however, was planned by the War Ministry to carry out the military objectives as previously cited in paragraph 110. of this statement. Further evidence of planning to use the facilities of China for war purposes is disclosed in the Resume of Policy Relating to Execution of Summary of Five-Year Program of Important Industries, dated 10 June 1937, (Part II of IPS Document 1522), which states on page 1, sub-paragraph B, the following:

"This plan is for the establishment of a plan for the expansion of the productive power of the major industries of our country based on the policy for the establishment of a comprehensive plan for Japan, Manchoukuo and China through close contact and coordination among Japan, Manchoukuo and China."

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114. During the first year of hostilities in China, 1937-1938, the Japanese Army used the bank notes of the Bank of Chosen in North China and the bank notes of the Bank of Japan in Central China, together with scrip denominated in yen, so-called "military" yen. However, the practice of using currency in occupied territories which was valid for circulation in Japan had disturbing effects upon Japan's monetary structure. As a consequence, the practice of using official Bank of Japan notes backed by specie was definitely abandoned in the autumn of 1938, at which time the Federal Reserve Bank of China was formed and the yen bloc extended through the use of the facilities of this bank. The Japanese in North China made use of the new local currencies issued by the Japanese dominated Federal Reserve Bank of China, whereas in Central and South China the "military" yen became the sole legal tender of the Japanese Army.

115. A word might be said of the Federal Reserve Bank of China. The Federal Reserve Bank of China was incorporated on February 11, 1938, and commenced actual business on the 10th of March of the same year. The main purpose of the bank was to stabilize currency and control the money market, and foreign exchange; and for such purposes it was authorized by the government to manufacture and issue currency. The Governor and Vice Governor of the bank were appointed by the government, and its directing personnel were mainly Japanese. The currency issued by the Federal Reserve Bank of China was linked to the Japanese yen,

and so paved the way towards Japanese investments in North China and greatly facilitated the exploitation of this territory. The original credit of the bank was established by a credit of 100,000,000 yen from the Japanese Banking Syndicate. This Japanese government dominated bank, becoming as it did the "Bank of Banks" in North China, through careful extensions of preferred credits and the manipulations of its funds and foreign exchange, carried out the Japanese Government's policies in financial fields within the area dominated by the Bank.

116. The "military" yen used by the Japanese Army in China did not represent an obligation of the Government, nor that of any Japanese bank. These notes lacked the coverage of specie or foreign exchange reserve, and were not convertible into the free yen accounts with Japanese banks, nor were they redeemable in specie or foreign exchange. Japanese military notes of this character were simply worthless fiat money, and the use of these notes was one means by which the Government forced China to support the Japanese armies and the commercial undertakings of the armies at no cost whatever to Japan. The "military" yen were put into circulation in payment for goods and services by the army of occupation and withdrawal was made through fiscal levy and the sale of goods and services by the army of occupation.

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117. The wholesale use of military currency in denominations other than yen was anticipated by Japan in planning for the conquest of the southern regions. As early as January 1941 responsible officials with the Government directed the preparation and printing of military currencies in foreign denominations. A series of secret communications by the Government departments during the year 1941 is contained in IPS Document 9022. This document discloses that the Government caused stocks of military currency to be printed in denominations of guilders, pesos and dollars and that it was intended to use this currency to defray war expenditures of the Japanese forces in Dutch East India, British Malay, British Borneo and Thailand and the Philippines. I will read IPS Document No. 9022.

118. The procedure for handling this special military currency is disclosed in IPS Document 9016, dated 1 November 1941. This document was addressed from Minister of Finance Okinobu KAYA to the Bank of Japan. I will read Document 9016, That currency in foreign denominations of guilders, pesos, and dollars was actually printed in execution of the plans and orders disclosed in IPS Document 9022 and IPS Document 9016 is disclosed in IPS Document 9016 B. This latter document is a ledger of the Bank of Japan showing entries of amounts of currencies by kind, together with the dates on which such currencies were received by the Bank of Japan for handling, pursuant to the instructions contained in IPS Document 9016. I will read IPS Document 9016 B for the purpose of showing



that as early as May 1941 currency in foreign denominations for anticipated use in southern regions was in existence.

119. As further proof of the existence of military notes in denominations of guilders, pesos, and dollars which the Japanese intended to use to defray war expenses in southern regions I have secured from the Ministry of Finance the actual engraver's plates manufactured before December 7, 1941, pursuant to the orders contained in IFS Document 2022, together with some of the actual notes printed from these plates before December 7, 1941.

120. In the integration of territories outside the limits of Japan proper, the device of the "National Policy" companies was used extensively by the Japanese Government. National policy companies were created by special legislation of the Japanese Government to create business enterprises abroad when it was difficult or inconvenient to induce private enterprises and private capital to undertake a particular kind of business, or where it was desired to develop a foreign territory. A list of the more important national policy companies which the Japanese Government initially established abroad together with a short description of their activities follows:

- (1) The South Manchurian Railway Company was a Japanese corporation formed for the purpose of developing railway and communication, water transport service, motorcar transport service, mining, electrical industry, warehousing, management of land and such other business as would be appointed by the Government. The South Manchurian Railway, together with its subsidiary companies, was the largest single economic unit in Manchuria. The company was formed in 1906 and continued a gradual development of railways and other services as a business enterprise until after 1931 when it became the active Government exploitation.

agency in Manchuria. Its capital was increased many times. Until prior to the outbreak of the war in December 1941 its capital was 600,000,000 yen.

- (2) The Manchuria Industry Development Corporation was established pursuant to an economic agreement between the Manchoukuo Government and the Japanese Government. While, ostensibly this was a Manchoukuo Government National Policy Company, in reality, because of the economic understanding between Manchoukuo and Japan, it was truly a national policy company of Japan. It was organized pursuant to a Manchoukuo Imperial Ordinance No.460, promulgated December 20, 1937. The purpose of this company was to expedite the development and establishment of heavy industries and to control those industries at the direction of the Manchurian Government. These industries included iron and steel, light metals, automobile manufacture, airplane manufacture, the coal industry, together with mining of all kinds and such other industries as the Government from time to time authorized it to promote.
- (3) The Oriental Development Company was formed in accordance with the provisions of Law No. 63, of 1908, for the purpose of supplying funds necessary for the development of undertakings in the promotion of the Japanese interests in countries outside Japan proper. The original capital of the company was 10,000,000 yen but by 1941 it had increased to 50,000,000 yen.
- (4) The Taiwan Electric Power Company was formed August 1, 1919, for the purpose of developing the electric power industry in Formosa. In 1940 its capitalization was 77,400,000 yen. The company concerned itself, under the direction of the Japanese Government, with the distribution of electric power.
- (5) The South Seas Development Company was formed November 27, 1936, for the purpose of developing the South Sea Islands with particular relation to fishing and other natural resources. Its original capitalization was 20,000,000 yen.
- (6) The Taiwan Development Company was formed pursuant to Law of February 3, 1936, for the purpose of the development of industrial enterprises in Formosa. Its original capitalization was 30,000,000 yen.
- (7) The Korea Forestry Development Company was formed September 1, 1937, for the purpose of developing the Lumber Industries in Korea. Its original capitalization was 20,000,000 yen.

- (8) The Japan Gold Production Enterprise Company was formed pursuant to law, September 16, 1938, for the purpose of developing the production of gold in the dominated areas as well as Japan proper. Its original capitalization was 50,000,000 yen.
- (9) The North China Development Company was formed pursuant to Law 81, April 30, 1938, for the purpose of promoting the economic development of North China and for controlling and coordinating the economics of North China. The original capitalization of the company was 350,000,000 yen.
- (10) The Central China Development Company was formed pursuant to the law, November 10, 1938, to accomplish the same purposes as the North China Development Company by operating within the Central China area. The capitalization of the Central China Development Company was 100,000,000 yen.
- (11) The Korea Magnesite Development Company was formed pursuant to law, June 19, 1939, with a capitalization of 15,000,000 yen, for the purpose of developing magnesite mining and the control and sale thereof.
- (12) The Korea Rice Exchange Company was formed November 25, 1939, with a capital of 5,000,000 yen for the purpose of controlling the rice exchange in Korea. Deficiency in Japan's rice production is in great part made up from Korea's excess.
- (13) The Korea Mining Development Company was formed pursuant to law August 25, 1940, with an authorized capitalization of 10,000,000 yen. The purpose of this company was to control the mining and sale of all minerals except magnesite which was already controlled by the Korea Magnesite Development Company. This Company was the effective instrument by which the Government more rigidly controlled the output of mines in Korea.
- (14) The Karafuto Development Company was formed pursuant to law, July 10, 1941, with an authorized capital of 50,000,000 yen. The purpose of this company was to develop and control mining, forestry, and the agricultural development of that territory.
- (15) The Imperial Petroleum Company was formed September 1, 1941, with an authorized capital of 100,000,000 yen. The purpose of this company was to survey and develop oil fields, both in Japan proper and in the dominated territories and to control the purchase and the sale of all petroleum and oil products. This company was the effective Government instrument for the complete control of petroleum.

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- (11) The Korea Magnesite Development Company was formed pursuant to law, June 19, 1939, with a capitalization of 15,000,000 yen, for the purpose of developing magnesite mining and the control and sale thereof.
- (12) The Korea Rice Exchange Company was formed November 25, 1939, with a capital of 5,000,000 yen for the purpose of controlling the rice exchange in Korea. Deficiency in Japan's rice production is in great part made up from Korea's excess.
- (13) The Korea Mining Development Company was formed pursuant to law August 25, 1940, with an authorized capitalization of 10,000,000 yen. The purpose of this company was to control the mining and sale of all minerals except magnesite which was already controlled by the Korea Magnesite Development Company. This Company was the effective instrument by which the Government more rigidly controlled the output of mines in Korea.
- (14) The Karafuto Development Company was formed pursuant to law, July 10, 1941, with an authorized capital of 50,000,000 yen. The purpose of this company was to develop and control mining, forestry, and the agricultural development of that territory.
- (15) The Imperial Petroleum Company was formed September 1, 1941, with an authorized capital of 100,000,000 yen. The purpose of this company was to survey and develop oil fields, both in Japan proper and in the dominated territories and to control the purchase and the sale of all petroleum and oil products. This company was the effective Government instrument for the complete control of petroleum.

While this list shows the capital investment in these foreign operating national policy companies up to 1941, it is to be understood that after that time enormous further capital outlays were made in many instances to enlarge the scope of the activities of these companies and tighten the control of the economies of the areas wherein they operated. This further expansion was made particularly in Manchuria and China. As the war progressed new national policy companies were formed to further integrate the economies of the dominated and occupied areas.

#### FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND FOREIGN TRADE

121. Japan is dependent on foreign commerce for her economic livelihood and position as a modern industrial nation. Her natural resources are extremely limited and she must import from abroad about one-third of the total raw and other materials required for manufacturing. All of the raw cotton, wool and crude rubber used in Japanese industries must be imported, while the major portion of the requirements of iron and non-ferrous metals (notably, copper, lead, zinc, nickel, antimony and tin) coking coal, petroleum, phosphorous ores and industrial salt must also be imported. One of Japan's great problems has always been to sell sufficient materials and manufactured goods to acquire the necessary exchange to pay for these imports. Thus, foreign trade and foreign exchange transactions played a vital role in the complete industrial development and economic life of the country.

122. The exports of Japan's industries have seldom been sufficient to pay for her imports except in 1909, 1917 to 1918 and 1935. Before 1931 the excess of imports was paid for by foreign borrowings and by depleting the

gold and foreign balances acquired by Japan during World War I. Since the Manchurian Incident, however, Japan has not been able to borrow abroad. Even the usual short term credits were curtailed, and it is common knowledge that Japanese merchants had to make substantial cash payments at the time of placing orders abroad. As a consequence of expansion in the heavy industries fields, together with capital investments in Manchoukuo and China, at a time when Japan's balance of trade was unfavorable, enormous outlays of foreign exchange were required. To make the necessary payments for increased purchases of machinery and equipment, petroleum, metals, metal products and various other commodities not indigenous of Japan, but necessary to industrial expansion for war materials production, the problem of acquisition of sufficient foreign exchange was magnified many times. Japan attempted to solve the import financing problem in the following ways:

- (a) By consolidating, conserving and controlling all of the available foreign exchange and restricting imports to supply materials according to plan.
- (b) By stimulating exports to foreign currency countries.
- (c) By increasing Empire gold production.

123. The first decisive measure to conserve foreign exchange was taken in the summer of 1932 by enactment of the Capital Flight Prevention Law, a few months after Japan went off the gold standard for the third time. Pursuant to this Law bank reports on foreign exchange

transactions were made compulsory to enforce the embargo on gold exports. The gold embargo of 1931, unfortunately for Japan, did not prevent gold exports, nor did the Capital Flight Prevention Law. As a result of the allowed gold exports in 1932 which amounted to 112,000,000 yen, the Foreign Exchange Control Law of March 1933, (Law No. 28), was enacted. It became the basis for many subsequent regulations in regard to the handling and disposition of foreign exchange.

124. The Foreign Exchange Control Law, with subsequent amendments, authorized the Government to concentrate all foreign exchange transactions in the Bank of Japan and other specified banks and required the compulsory sale to the Government of exchange securities and currencies. It further permitted the Government to prohibit, or limit, the acquisition and disposal of securities and debentures in foreign countries, the issue and acquisitions of letters of credit, the granting of credits to persons abroad, the imports and exports of securities and the export of articles not covered by permitted purchases of foreign exchange. The powers granted by this law were not completely invoked until January 8, 1937, when, although prior to the Lukouchiao Incident, the import excess was so great that Japan began actually to ship gold in payment for imports. More effective action had to be taken to prevent the non-essential spending of foreign exchange assets. On January 8, 1937, exchange settlements in payment of imports amounting to more than 30,000 yen per month were made subject to license. This

limit of exception from license was progressively lowered by new enforcement ordinances to transactions of 1,000 yen per month on July 7, 1937 (Ordinance No 23) and to 100 yen per month on December 11, 1937 (Ordinance No. 55). Further restrictions on credits for Japanese travelers abroad and remittances to other countries were imposed.

125. The Army, realizing that the success or failure of production plans depended in great measure upon the careful balancing of imports and exports with consideration to ability to pay, drafted its policy regarding foreign trade control. This policy is set out in the "Resume of Policy Relating to Execution of Summary of Five-Year Program of Important Interests", dated 10 June 1937, (Part II of IPS Document 1522). I will read the following excerpts from Section II of that Document as shown on pages 5 to 9 inclusive.

126. The outbreak of the China Incident precipitated the Foreign Trade Adjustment Law of August 1937 which empowered the Government to prohibit or restrict imports of certain commodities after consultation with the Foreign Trade Council for the purpose of adjusting the balance of payments with any particular country and ensuring the supply of important commodities. Very shortly thereafter, in September 1937, a new and more effective law was passed which governed the import and export of commodities completely. This new law was called the Law for the Temporary Control of Imports and Exports. Its purpose was to set up an import licensing system to ensure that



import transactions were directed towards the securing of necessary war-use commodities. The law also gave wide powers over the distribution and consumption of commodities and any articles made from such commodities. Under regulations, as revised and extended, four classes of commodities were defined in proportion to the urgency of the demand for them. Class A contained the leading raw materials of peace time industry, such as cotton, wool, jute, wood pulp, wood, rubber, hides and leather. Imports of these commodities were subject to severe curtailment from normal levels according to the policy expressed by the Planning Board. Class B listed nearly 300 articles of which imports were generally entirely prohibited. These consisted, for the most part, of goods which were felt to be not necessary to the Japanese people or goods which could be produced in Japan. Chiefly, they were toilet articles, light chemicals, textiles and luxuries, such as beer, watches, electric fans, woolen fabrics, boots and shoes, etc. Class C embraced those articles considered essential for military purposes, the exports of which were absolutely prohibited. This category included cotton waste, gold, certain non-ferrous ores, iron pipes, special steel, antimony, automobiles and parts, internal combustion engines and other materials of a like nature. Class D, which was added in 1938, placed supervision over a specified number of imports to be given preferential positions for licensing. Commodities in this category included platinum, copper, lead, tin, zinc, antimony, brass and mercury.

127. The machinery used by the Japanese Government to control foreign trade under the laws above cited was the cartel system also adopted for the control of manufacturing enterprises. On August 13, 1937, (Law No. 74) there was passed The Law of the Foreign Trade Associations. This law provided that there should be established import and export associations for the handling of foreign trade. The members of the associations were those engaged in handling the same kinds of goods or dealing in particular markets. The principal goods to be handled by each association for the particular market was named by the competent Minister. Only one association was allowed in each field. Therefore, this law actually formed all foreign traders into organizations which carried out the policies of the Government through the operation of Government imposed restrictions, inasmuch as the associations were charged with implementing the Government's policy. Under the same law the various import associations and export associations were formed into two federations, one for import and one for export. A third federation was a federation of the two previously named. This was known as the Control Federation of Foreign Trade Associations.

128. The results of these programs, that is to say, the operation of the Foreign Exchange Control Law controlling the monies involved in transactions and the Law for the Temporary Control of Imports-Exports controlling commodities, were to a degree effective. Nevertheless, it was soon apparent that by limiting imports to war potential goods Japan was unable to acquire sufficient

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foreign exchange to continue operations over a long period of time. It should be borne in mind that while imports of non-essential materials, i.e., non-war materials, were curtailed, Japan, nevertheless, depended upon the processing of many of these materials for her export trade by which to acquire new and necessary foreign exchange. This presented a real dilemma. Japan had to stimulate foreign exports and make drastic curtailments.

129. So serious did the problem of acquisition of foreign exchange become to the acquisition of essential materials that, when the export trade fell off, the Cabinet called for a severe curtailment of plans as well as severe restrictions on civilian economy. A notification from the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet to the War Minister, Seishiro ITAGAKI, dated 23 June 1938, (IPS Document 9018 A) discloses this fact together with decisions of the Cabinet concerning this matter. I will read that Document. A second communication between the same officials on 23 June 1938, (IPS Document 9017 A) outlines the type of revision deemed necessary by the Cabinet to achieve the national plan. I will read that Document.

130. The Japanese Government attempted to solve this import-export dilemma by resorting to the mechanism of linking purchases of foreign exchange for the imports of certain raw materials to sales realized by exporting the finished product made from the same materials. The so-called "link" system worked in this fashion. In order

to import cotton, for example, it was necessary to give assurance that an equivalent amount of cotton textiles would be exported within a specified period. There were, of course, many kinds of combinations, or links, of commodities. The import of tallow was linked to the export of soap; bristles and ebony to brushes; wood pulp to staple fibres; Manila hemp to Japanese style paper; carpet wool and hair to rugs, etc. The basic principle involved was to keep exports moving to produce exchange without cutting into foreign exchange available and allocated for import of war materials. These sorts of operations demanded limits and curtailment of industries not involved in such transactions as well as a complete control of the whole. The "link" system first received general recognition in 1938 when it was applied to approximately 30% of Japan's total exports. In addition to the "link" system, other efforts of a more orthodox character were made to stimulate foreign trade such as, advertising, market surveys, commissions, etc.

131. The annual foreign trade reports between 1935 and 1941 show ever increasing export and ever decreasing import trade between Japan and the areas comprised in Korea, Formosa, Kwantung, Manchuria and China. The following table shows the amounts and percentage of this trade shift:

EXPORTS OF JAPAN  
(1000 Yen - Unit)

Year	Total Exports to all Countries (including Korea & Formosa)	Exports to Korea, Formosa, Kwantung, Manchuria & China	
		Value	% of Total
1935	3,220,530.3	1,302,099.3	40.4
1936	3,514,814.7	1,487,656.5	42.3
1937	4,122,035.7	1,747,808.3	42.4
1938	3,900,993.7	2,381,295.0	61.1
1939	5,113,202.3	3,288,485.5	64.3
1940	4,961,194.8 <sup>(A)</sup>	3,175,221.7 <sup>(A)</sup>	63.9 <sup>(A)</sup>
1941	2,633,997.7 <sup>(B)</sup>	1,644,557.2 <sup>(B)</sup>	62.4 <sup>(B)</sup>

IMPORTS OF JAPAN  
(1000 Yen - Unit)

Year	Total Imports from all Countries (in- cluding Korea & Formosa)	Imports from Korea, Formosa, Kwantung, Manchuria & China	
		Value	% of Total
1935	3,248,753.7	1,130,272.4	34.8
1936	3,611,612.1	1,248,109.0	34.6
1937	4,737,062.0	1,394,751.0	27.3
1938	3,757,253.1	1,664,563.1	44.3
1939	4,118,185.6	1,891,231.4	45.9
1940	4,155,723.9 <sup>(A)</sup>	1,465,730.0 <sup>(A)</sup>	35.3 <sup>(A)</sup>
1941	2,885,475.3 <sup>(B)</sup>	850,274.1 <sup>(B)</sup>	29.4 <sup>(B)</sup>

(A) Does not include Formosa. Average Formosa Trade was:

Exports ¥ 300,000,000 annually. Imports ¥ 400,000,000 annually.

(B) Does not include Formosa and Korea. Average Korean Trade

Exports ¥ 1,100,000,000. Imports ¥ 700,000,000.



Because of this shift in foreign trade balances, exports to yen bloc areas were eliminated from the "link" system. This was done because such trade produced no excess foreign exchange to support purchases from requiring payment in foreign exchange. To effect restriction of exports to the yen bloc areas which might otherwise be used to acquire foreign exchange from other countries, Ordinance No. 53 of September 20, 1939, was passed. This ordinance provided that certain designated commodities were not to be exported to yen bloc areas without approval of the export associations. The commodities included drugs, paper, glass, paint, toys, and similar items. It is to be noted that these items were not produced from that class of raw materials constituting major Japanese imports. These were items, which when sold on the open market, produced the maximum of exchange.

## GOLD PRODUCTION

132. The excess of imports over exports during the early months of 1937 was 126% greater than the excess for the first six months of 1936. In order to pay for these imports the Bank of Japan, in March, 1937, began shipping gold in payment of goods. Some indications of the important role played by gold in the financing of Japan's imports may be gauged by the fact that her gold sales to the United States Treasury alone from 1937 to June, 1941, totalled \$580,000,000, or 2,160,000,000 yen, at prevailing market rates. The necessity for stimulating the production of gold became at once apparent. In the Resume of Policy Relating to Execution of Summary of Five-Year Program of Important Industries (Part II of IPS Document 1522), dated 10 June 1937, the Government further anticipated unfavorable balances of trade. At Section II, page 6, of the aforementioned Resume the table entitled "Estimates of International Receipts and Payments, Japan and Manchuria considered as one Unit \*\*\*" shows that for the years 1937 to 1941 it was estimated there would be an excess of imports amounting to 1,530,000,000 yen. This estimate called for action on the part of the Government to do something about the gold supply in relation to managements of foreign trade. On August 10, 1937, a number of measures pertaining to gold were passed by the Diet. The most important of these measures were The Gold Reserve Re-valuation Law, The Gold Fund Special Account Law and The Gold Production Law.

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133. The Gold Reserve Revaluation Law confirmed the suspension of the obligation of the Bank of Japan to convert bank notes into gold coins. It also concentrated the gold reserves of the Bank of Chosen and the Bank of Taiwan with the Bank of Japan, and re-valued the total gold stock. Reduction in the gold content of the yen increased the face value of the total gold stock from 472,000,000 yen to 1,219,000,000 yen. The Gold Fund Special Account Law established a special gold account using the gross profit of 747,000,000 yen accruing to the Government by the above mentioned revaluation processes as its basis. The purpose of this gold fund special account was to provide funds with which to purchase gold and silver at home and abroad, and from which to make disbursements of gold for special purposes.

134. The Gold Production Law of August 10, 1937, had as its purpose the stimulation of gold mining and the production of gold. By its provisions the government was empowered to order improvements and expansions of mines and the mechanisms for handling gold, to control prices, to restrict consumption and to grant subsidies. Under the Law those persons engaging in the mining of gold were exempted from the payment of import duties on machinery and other necessary equipments to increase production. It also provided for the establishment of a national policy company called the Japan Gold Production Enterprise Company. This Company was formed on September 16, 1938, for the purpose of developing the production of gold within Japan and the Empire. One half of the original capitalization of 50 million yen was provided

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135. So important was gold, for foreign exchange, that the Outline of the Plan for the Expansion of Productive Power by the Board of Planning (Part II of IPS Document 1522) scheduled expansion in the production of gold from 51,669 kilograms in 1938 to 106,534 kilograms in 1941. Gold production was given all possible encouragement by the government. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry alone paid the following bounties:

1937	302,840 Yen
1938	2,401,105 Yen
1939	2,488,110 Yen
1940	4,541,510 Yen
1941	4,342,500 Yen

This was in addition to other bounties provided for mineral prospecting generally. The gold purchase premium system was adopted in November, 1939, whereby mine operators would receive a premium of one yen per gram for any increase over the mine's previous output and a premium of two yen per gram for any increase over a quota established by the Ministry of Finance.

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
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136. Every effort was made by Japan to acquire all the gold bullion, ornaments, jewelry, etc., held by individuals and private institutions. An amendment to the Gold Production Law, passed in March, 1939, authorized the compulsory purchase of all gold by the government. This, of course, had the effect of throwing all gold and gold articles in Japan into the hands of the government where it could be used for the very essential foreign exchange. The following table marked "Gold Production in Japanese Empire" shows the gold production in the Empire Japan from the years 1925 to 1941. The chart marked "Gold Production in Japanese Empire" graphically illustrates the production table:



# GOLD PRODUCTION IN JAPANESE EMPIRE, 1925 - 1941



SOURCE : (1) MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY  
(2) MINISTRY OF FINANCE

GOLD PRODUCTION IN JAPANESE EMPIRE, 1925 - 1941

(Kilo grams)

Year	Production Home Islands	Empire Including Home Islands
1925	8,463	13,397
1926	9,099	16,740
1927	9,606	15,705
1928	10,390	15,845
1929	10,422	16,436
1930	12,067	18,740
1931	12,275	21,859
1932	12,497	23,014
1933	13,728	25,888
1934	15,146	28,575
1935	18,321	34,188
1936	22,234	41,017
1937	23,010	47,164
1938	24,067	53,493
1939	25,926	56,384
1940	25,583	51,625
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GOVERNMENT INTERNAL FINANCIAL POLICY - DIRECT  
AND INDIRECT FINANCING

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- (a) Page 3, commencing Paragraph A to Paragraph D, inclusive page 5.
- (b) Pages 24-26 inclusive Section IX.

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138. An attempt was made to estimate the amount of funds necessary to construct the facilities to carry out the expansion program of important industries. This estimate is set forth in detail in Table No. 3, appended to the aforementioned Resume. In brief, the Table classifies the industries to be expanded in Japan and Manchuria, and shows the amount of funds estimated to be required in each area for the classified industries. The industries included are, of course, the same as those which appear in the preceding sections of the Document. It is anticipated in the Program that it would be necessary to expend 6,092,000,000 yen in Japan and 2,444,000,000 yen in Manchuria. It being apparent that it was necessary

for the Government to participate directly in furnishing funds for the financing of industrial expansion, the War Office estimated a schedule of over-all direct and indirect subsidies for industries. This schedule is shown as Table No. 4 (I) appended to Part II of IPS Document 1522. I will read that table together with Table No. 4 (II), likewise appended to the Document which is an estimate of subsidies for collateral enterprises to show the extent of planned government subsidies for war production purposes.

139. The Government gave effect to this subsidy program by providing for payment of subsidies in certain cases as a matter of law hereinbefore cited. While nearly every Ministry of the Japanese Government granted subsidies for one purpose or another, the records of subsidies paid are incomplete. Fairly accurate records, however, were obtained from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry covering the five years immediately preceding the war which are as follows:

1937	10,607,706 Yen
1938	29,726,825 Yen
1939	51,536,684 Yen
1940	92,049,585 Yen
1941	207,353,194 Yen

140. One of the favored means by which the Japanese Government directly stimulated business in accordance with national policy, when it was difficult or inexpedient to induce investment by private enterprise, was through the medium of national policy companies. National policy companies can be divided into two types: (1) Those for the purpose of effecting the exploitation or

development of foreign territories; (2) Those established for the purpose of entering into business directly to develop a specific industry or industries generally. The first type policy company was described and listed hereinbefore at Paragraph 120, pages 90, 91, 92 and 93 of this statement. The latter type of national policy company, established for the purpose of developing specific industries, is listed and described as follows:

- (1) The Japan Iron Manufacturing Company was formed under the provisions of Law No. 47, April 6, 1933, for the purpose of developing the Japanese iron manufacturing industries. The production of iron had been very small and uneconomic, and it was thought that one strong company for the development of iron and steel manufacturing enterprises at the direction of the Government would greatly enhance the productive capacity of Japan. Since its formation the capitalization has been increased four times from 350,000,000 to 800,000,000 Yen.
- (2) The Japan Transportation Company was formed pursuant to Law, October 1, 1937, for the purpose of developing the transportation facilities in Japan. It has an original capitalization of 35,000,000 Yen.
- (3) The Imperial Fuel Enterprises Company was formed pursuant to law, January 19, 1938, for the purpose of developing artificial petroleum. Original capitalization was 100,000,000 Yen.
- (4) The Japan Electric Power Company was formed April 1, 1939 for the purpose of effecting a unity in the production and distribution of electric power within Japan proper. This company was given monopolistic powers by law under the control of the Government. The capitalization of the Japan Electric Power Company, however, was provided by private sources.
- (5) The Japan Rice Company was formed July 25, 1939, for the purpose of effecting a monopoly in the purchase and sale of rice. The Company had a capitalization of 30,000,000 Yen and was one of the means used to control the price of foodstuffs, since rice constitutes the major item of the Japanese diet.



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- (6) The Imperial Mines Development Company was formed pursuant to law, August 10, 1939, for the purpose of developing the mining industry of Japan and the sale of the products therefrom. Its original capitalization was 30,000,000 Yen, but this was increased later to 90,000,000 Yen. One of the prime functions of this Company was to assist private enterprise in developing the natural resources of the country in accordance with the national policy.
- (7) The Japan Aeronautics Company was formed pursuant to law, August 31, 1939. It had control of all airplane travel both national and international.
- (8) The Imperial Petroleum Company was formed September 1, 1941, with an authorized capital of 100,000,000 Yen. The purpose of this Company was to survey and develop oil fields, both in Japan proper and in the dominated territories, and to control the purchase and the sale of all petroleum and oil products. This Company was the effective Government instrument for the complete control of petroleum.
- (9) The Industrial Equipment Corporation was organized pursuant to Law No. 92 of November 25, 1941, for the purpose of equipping wartime industry as determined by the Government. All of the capitalization of 400,000,000 Yen was furnished by the Government. This was the effective means by which the Government, in its last stages of preparation for war, utilized all machinery and plant capacities in Japan in accordance with national policy.

The distinctive feature of all national policy companies is that (a) they were organized pursuant to a special law for a stated government purpose; (b) in all cases they are managed and directed by the government; (c) in all cases the companies have very broad powers of action within their respective fields of endeavor; (d) the Government usually furnished 50% of the capital; (e) the Government waives its right to dividends when profits are short; (f) the Government guarantees payment of debentures and interest on loans; (g) in addition to special

operating privileges the companies receive subsidies, grants in aid, freedom from tax restrictions, and other operating benefits. It is to be noted that of the 29 national policy companies cited and described in this statement 22 of them were formed since 1933 for the purpose of industrial production or control. Of these 22 companies 13 of them were formed after the China Incident and were specifically set up for war production.

141. In addition to the money originally advanced to the national policy companies in the form of capital the Government guaranteed bonds as a further financial assistance. The following table indicates the ever increasing amounts of this kind of obligation undertaken by the Japanese Government:

1936	3,000,000 Yen
1937	5,500,000 Yen
1938	211,000,000 Yen
1939	575,240,000 Yen
1940	1,762,090,000 Yen
1941	3,317,530,000 Yen
1942	5,695,060,000 Yen

The guarantees represented by the above table do not include other types of guarantees such as the principal and interest on special debentures and the guarantee of dividends on stock, facts which considerably enlarge the scope of the Government's financial obligations. The emphasis which the Government placed upon financing the national policy companies by debenture issues is shown in the following

table, compiled by the Industrial Bank of Japan, which indicates the ratio to total debenture issues by year of national policy companies and ordinary companies:

	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941
Special Company Debentures	27.1	50.2	66.9	77.5	72.8
Ordinary Company Debentures	71.9	49.8	33.1	22.5	27.2

142. It is notable that as the war preparations became more intense the amount of unsecured company debentures increased. The following table, compiled by the Industrial Bank of Japan, shows the amount by year of total company debentures issued with security and total company debentures issued without security:

	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941
Company Debentures issued with Security (including Ordinary and National Policy Companies)	49.2	45.1	38.7	27.0	30.2
Company Debentures issued without Security (including Ordinary and National Policy Companies)	50.8	54.9	61.3	73.0	69.8

However, by far the greater portion of unsecured company debentures were issues of the national policy companies as shown in the following breakdown:

	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941
Percent of Non-Secured Company Debentures to total Debenture Issues.	50.8	54.9	61.3	73.0	69.8
National Policy Company Non-Secured Debentures	28.1	48.8	60.5	72.5	69.6
Ordinary Company Non-Secured Debentures	22.7	6.1	0.8	0.5	0.2

143. The three tables cited above which show the debenture issues between 1937 and 1941 demonstrate:

- (a) That from 1937 onward by far the greater portion of total debenture issues were by national policy companies.
- (b) That almost all the national policy company debenture issues were without security.
- (c) That by guaranteeing the principal and interest of debentures of national policy companies, as provided by law, the Government became the direct and principal financier for the expanding operations of the national policy companies organized for increasing war production and war production potential.

## THE BUDGET FOR WAR AND NAVY

144. A direct showing of financial preparations for war is made in the yearly budget of the Japanese Government for the War and Navy Ministries (IFS Document 9023 A). Ordinarily the budgets of both Ministries are composed of two accounts, the General Account and the Special Account. In 1937, however, a third account was set up called War Expenditure Account. This War Expenditure Account was set up to carry the direct war making expenditures after the China Incident. It is significant that these accounts were never closed but steadily increased in amount between 1937 and 1941 as did the General Accounts. I will read the following excerpts from IFS Document 9023 A:

- a) Page 1 which is the totals of the budgets of the Ministry of War for the years 1931 to 1941.
- b) Page 16 which is the totals of the budgets of the Ministry of Navy for the years 1931 to 1941.

145. Authorization to expend money from the Extraordinary War Expenditures Accounts of both the Army and Navy was made through the power of Imperial sanction but actually was done by the Ministers of War, Navy and Finance. For instance, the document

discloses that Ministers of War ITAGAKI, HATA, and TOJO, together with Minister of Navy, SHIMADA as well as Minister of Finance, KAYA, all authorized expenditures from these accounts. Pages 2, 3, 4, 17, 18 and 19 of IPS Document 9023 A is a complete breakdown, by dates, amounts and authority for expenditures from the Extraordinary War Expenditures Accounts.

146. The following table discloses a clear picture of the total money budgeted for the Ministries of War and Navy in proportion to the total of the annual budgets.

Fiscal Year	Total Budget	Total of War and Navy Budgets
1936	2,317,724,000 Yen	1,075,220,972 Yen
1937	5,520,633,000 Yen	4,057,446,139 Yen
1938	8,083,662,000 Yen	6,097,755,799 Yen
1939	8,952,463,000 Yen	6,417,646,999 Yen
1940	11,033,769,000 Yen	6,766,745,902 Yen
1941	19,253,257,000 Yen	15,446,711,931 Yen

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## MONETARY POLICIES

147. During 1932 the yen was allowed to depreciate even more rapidly than the pound sterling in relation to gold and the United States dollar. While it is true that during 1933 and 1934 the dollar itself depreciated vis-a-vis gold, in 1934 the dollar was stabilized in terms of gold and the yen was stabilized in terms of the pound sterling at 1s. 2d. From then until August 1939, the yen remained pegged to the pound sterling.

148. Shortly after the demise of K. TAKAHASHI, Minister of Finance, on February 20, 1936, Japan embarked upon a series of financial programs emphasizing state control of economy for political purposes. This fact has been demonstrated repeatedly in this statement. The Monetary Policies reflect the all-out war expansion program with little consideration for sound government financing. To provide for the enormous budget outlays for war purposes the government steadily increased its issue of National Loan Bonds. The following table shows the amounts of bond issues, together with the amounts purchased and the percentage of purchase of the issue. In many instances the Bank of Japan purchased these government bonds directly and, through its control of banks, forced the banks and other financial institutions to repurchase them:

Fiscal Year	Issues	Boughts	Percentage
1937	2,230,000,000 Yen	1,536,000,000 Yen	68.9%
1938	4,530,000,000 Yen	4,066,000,000 Yen	89.8%
1939	5,516,000,000 Yen	4,746,000,000 Yen	86.0%
1940	6,884,000,000 Yen	5,693,000,000 Yen	82.7%
1941	10,191,000,000 Yen	8,873,000,000 Yen	87.1%

The increased use of the Bank of Japan as an underwriter-distributor of government bonds is disclosed in the following table showing the amount of holdings of government bonds by the Bank of Japan.

1936	487,000,000 Yen
1937	1,094,000,000 Yen
1938	1,635,000,000 Yen
1939	2,207,000,000 Yen
1940	3,633,000,000 Yen
1941	5,409,000,000 Yen

149. The Government twice increased the tax free note issue limit of the Bank of Japan, the Bank of Chosen and the Bank of Taiwan between 1936 and 1941 in order to continue the easy money regime. The following table indicates the increased amount of notes issued by the Banks of Issue between 1936 and 1941:

End of the Year	Bank of Chosen	Bank of Taiwan	Bank of Japan
1936	211,000,000 Yen	79,000,000 Yen	1,865,000,000 Yen
1937	280,000,000 Yen	112,000,000 Yen	2,305,000,000 Yen
1938	322,000,000 Yen	140,000,000 Yen	2,755,000,000 Yen
1939	444,000,000 Yen	171,000,000 Yen	3,679,000,000 Yen
1940	581,000,000 Yen	200,000,000 Yen	4,777,000,000 Yen
1941	742,000,000 Yen	253,000,000 Yen	5,979,000,000 Yen

Despite these increases note circulation kept above the tax free limit, consequently, effective April 1, 1941, there was passed the Law Concerning Extraordinary Exceptions from Application of Convertible Bank Note Law. This Law

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suspended the provisions which governed the monetary reserve of the Bank of Japan, Bank of Chosen and Bank of Taiwan and dissolved the distinction between specie reserve (gold and silver) and fiduciary reserve (commercial paper and government bonds). The Ministry of Finance was authorized to fix the maximum amount of tax free note issues. These provisions, together with other laws, had the effect of giving a completely artificial value to the yen.

150. The "Resume of Policy Relating to Execution of Summary of Five-Year Program of Important Industries" (Part II of IPS Document 1522), provides in its plan for accelerating the increase of fresh savings of money, at page 4, the following program:

- " (a) To open a national movement for practicing economy of consumption and thrift and saving.
- " (b) To lower the minimum limit of postal savings (from 10 sen to 5 sen).
- " (c) To start house-to-house collection system of postal savings (similar to post office insurance)."

To put this plan into action the government set up many National Savings Encouragement campaigns, even providing in 1937 a National Savings Encouragement Bureau, the function of which was in general to promote savings habits by advertising and through posters, movies, and radio propaganda, particularly to attract small savings to Postal Savings Offices. The effectiveness of the savings programs is demonstrated to a degree in the following table which shows the amounts of bank deposits made during the years 1937 to 1941:

End of the Year (April 1930)	BANK DEPOSITS		
	Banks Special Banks	Deposits Ordinary Banks	Savings Banks
1937	1,277,000,000 Yen	12,352,000,000 Yen	2,117,000,000 Yen
1938	1,473,000,000 Yen	15,073,000,000 Yen	5,571,000,000 Yen
1939	1,935,000,000 Yen	19,794,000,000 Yen	3,363,000,000 Yen
1940	2,348,000,000 Yen	24,389,000,000 Yen	4,453,000,000 Yen
1941	2,853,000,000 Yen	29,406,000,000 Yen	5,542,000,000 Yen

In this connection, the Postal Savings Bank offices sold to the public special government bonds in small denominations. These were 3.5 per cent, 7-year Reconstruction Savings Certificates and Capital Savings Certificates with a face value of 100 yen. In May 1940, further steps were taken to absorb surplus savings by the sale of "baby" bonds or "patriotic" bonds. This sort of bond was in denominations of 5 and 10 yen and had a maturity value of 10 years but carried no interest. The appeal to purchase this sort of bond was the offering of prizes after the fashion of a public lottery. The amount of increase of Postal Savings by the impetus of this sort of encouragement is disclosed in the following table of Postal Savings Accounts:

Year Ending March 31	POSTAL SAVINGS	
	Number of Accounts	Amount of Deposit
1934	37,703,287	2,809,191,817 Yen
1935	<del>39,256,550</del>	<del>2,978,025,809 Yen</del>
1936	41,360,343	3,094,985,279 Yen
1937	43,919,099	3,331,015,732 Yen
1938	48,394,680	3,720,816,082 Yen
1939	66,970,295	4,535,010,491 Yen
1940	77,265,192	5,900,012,681 Yen
1941	86,556,723	7,599,080,432 Yen
1942	99,760,577	9,571,935,849 Yen

Accounts for Okinawa are included in figures above.

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As a further inducement to public savings, the National Savings Association Law was passed on the 12th of March 1941. It was promulgated by Imperial Ordinance under the provisions of the National General Mobilization Law. The purpose of this Law was to provide for the establishment of organizations known as "Savings Associations". These Associations were established in local communities, in cities, and within other associations and group organizations for the purpose of encouraging the people to deposit thrift accounts. These Associations in turn, bought up national bonds with their assets. Psychologically and practically these organizations were very effective implements for the national policy.

152. Within the Government was a special Bureau known as the Deposit Funds Management Bureau. The purpose of this Bureau, an old-line government agency, was to administer the surplus funds of special government accounts, Postal Savings, the proceeds of the sale of Reconstruction Savings, Savings Certificates, Patriotic Bonds, Special Deposits of Local Government Agencies, Public Bodies, and Private Institutions. This Bureau had complete control over allocation and use of the assets deposited with it. One might describe it as a "trust bank" under the control and direction of the government. The investment of funds, however, was limited to the following:

- (a) Government bonds, corporate debentures guaranteed by the government and loans to government accounts;
- (b) Foreign government bonds and yen debentures issued by foreign corporations under foreign government guarantees;
- (c) Debentures issued by and loans to public bodies and the financing of emergency needs necessitated by national disaster;



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- (d) Debentures issued by corporations organized under special laws;
- (e) Loans to banks organized under special laws;
- (f) Deposits with the Bank of Japan to be held abroad for purposes designated by the government.

By the middle of 1941, 64 per cent of the assets of the Deposit Funds Management Bureau were in government bonds, 14 per cent in bank and corporate debentures, while 11.5 per cent was invested in prefectural and municipal bonds and 8 per cent in special banks and companies. The percentage of government bonds held would seem to be inordinately large when one considers the origin of the funds and the purpose of the Bureau. Again, the fact is clearly demonstrated that the Government vigorously pushed the sale of national bonds as a method of acquiring liquid funds.

153. In connection with the adjustment of capital investment to national policy, a program is set out in the "Resume of Policy Relating to Execution of Summary of Five-Year Program of Important Industries", (Part II of IPS Document 1522), at page 4 as follows:

- "(3) Measures for adjusting investment of capital.
  - " (a) To suppress fresh investment in non-urgent and non-essential enterprises;
  - "(b) To have the Bank of Japan supervise and guide the employment of capital by the various banking organs;
  - "(c) To restrain double investment."

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  - "(c) To restrain double investment."

The execution of this policy is reflected in the Temporary Fund Adjustment Law passed on September 10, 1937. This Law had as its purpose the adjustment of use of funds within the country with a view to equi-balancing the demand and supply of commodities and funds.

154. The Temporary Fund Adjustment Law centralized complete authority over the nation's financial structure in the Bank of Japan. Under this law the following operations of all banks were strictly regulated:

- (1) Control of bank credit for long term industrial financing;
- (2) Capital increases and bond issues by companies engaged in important industries, and
- (3) All financial operations and programs by banking institutions and industrial enterprises.


The application of the law was entrusted to the Minister of Finance who acted upon consultation with a Temporary Fund Adjustment Commission consisting of officers of the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Japan, and the Industrial Bank of Japan. When financing expansion of industrial facilities, financial institutions were required to obtain permission from the Ministry of Finance. The principle according to which such permission was given was based on the division of industries into three groups, according to the degree of their participation in such activities as armament production, export trade, and strategic industrial expansion. Class A included industries directly engaged in these lines and was further divided into two groups, A (a) and A (b), according to the importance of the industries.

Loans to A (a) industries up to 3,000,000 yen and loans to A (b) industries up to 1,000,000 yen could be made upon consultation with the Bank of Japan, and permission for loans in excess of these amounts were freely granted by the Minister of Finance. The industries in Class B, to which loans could be made only under special circumstances, were divided into three groups, B (a), B (b) and B (c), again according to the importance of the industries. Loans under B (a), up to 300,000 yen could be granted upon consultation with the Bank of Japan, and loans in excess of this amount were freely permitted; authorization for loans to B (b) in excess of 30,000 yen was granted only under special circumstances; and loans to B (c) in excess of 30,000 yen were generally prohibited. Class C was made up of industries with excess capacity or of those industries producing unessential goods. Loans to these industries in excess of 30,000 yen were forbidden. This law had the effect of rigidly controlling expansion of industries by the Government in accordance with the national policy and directing the flow of such capital into preferred industries. The following table marked "Gross Value Added by Manufacturing in Heavy and Light Industries 1931-1941" very plainly shows the direction of the controlled flow of capital. This table is graphically illustrated in the appended chart marked "Expansion of Industry in Japan Proper, 1931-1941"

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# EXPANSION OF INDUSTRY IN JAPAN PROPER, 1931-1941


GROSS VALUE ADDED BY MANUFACTURE  
1931 PRICES



SOURCE : MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY

# EXPANSION OF INDUSTRY IN JAPAN PROPER, 1931-1941

GROSS VALUE ADDED BY MANUFACTURE  
1931 PRICES



SOURCE : MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY



TABLE \_\_\_\_\_  
 GROSS VALUE ADDED BY MANUFACTURING  
 IN HEAVY AND LIGHT INDUSTRIES, 1931 - 1941 1/

2/

	Current Prices			1931 Prices		
	Light In- dustries	Heavy In- dustries	Total	Light In- dustries	Heavy In- dustries	Total
1931	1,315	832	2,147	1,315	832	2,147
1932	1,505	1,082	2,587	1,433	906	2,339
1933	1,706	1,476	3,182	1,420	952	2,372
1934	1,746	1,922	3,668	1,415	1,280	2,695
1935	1,801	2,334	4,135	1,447	1,611	3,058
1936	1,878	3,235	5,113	1,457	2,220	3,677
1937	2,236	4,488	6,724	1,536	1,956	3,492
1938	2,832	6,173	9,005	1,680	2,415	4,095
1939	3,502	9,658	13,160	1,877	4,083	5,960
1940	3,842	10,880	14,722	1,858	4,312	6,170
1941	4,031	13,954	17,985	1,774	5,372	7,146

Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry: Factory Statistics 1931 to 1941 and Supplementary Reports to Factory Statistics 1936 to 1941.

1/ Gross value added equals value of output minus cost of materials and fuel in private factories employing five or more workers. Heavy industry includes the metal refining and manufactures of metal products, the machinery and tools (including motor vehicles and steel shipbuilding) or the basic war industries and the chemical industry. Light industry includes the textile manufacturing, ceramics, food products, wood and lumber products, printing and publishing and other miscellaneous manufacturing industries. Production of aircraft and all production in government factories such as arsenals are not included. In addition some production data in the categories included in Factory Statistics or in the confidential Supplementary Reports were also not reported in the official statistics.

2/ Value in 1931 prices estimated by dividing value in current prices by the wholesale prices indexes of the relevant commodity groups published by the Oriental Economist.

155. Further domination of banking and financial facilities was conferred upon the Minister of Finance by Imperial Ordinance No. 681 of October 19, 1940, entitled "Ordinance Concerning Operation of Funds of Banks and Other Financial Institutions". This Ordinance provided that all financial institutions were required to adjust their investment policies in accordance with the directives of the Minister of Finance. This measure completely destroyed the last vestige of autonomous action of banking institutions. When it was deemed necessary for the smooth supply of funds for expansion of productivity the Minister of Finance had the power to, and did, order banks to advance funds, subscribe to, underwrite, or buy negotiable securities and guarantee obligations. This Ordinance further provided that any losses incurred by financial institutions as a result of directives of the Finance Minister should be compensated by the Government.

156. Promulgated at the same time was Imperial Ordinance No. 680, entitled "Ordinance for Control of Corporate Accounts". This Ordinance was made pursuant to the National General Mobilization Law and charged commercial concerns with the responsibility for "attainment of the national object". To accomplish the national object commercial concerns were compelled to utilize and conserve funds as directed by the Government, to pay expenses and depreciate assets reasonably, to withhold excessive payment of salaries and to accumulate funds. Furthermore, the distribution of profits above a fixed percentage required permission of the Minister of Finance, as well as the payment of bonuses, etc. The amount of money which

commercial agencies could spend for social expenses, entertainment, advertising, and contributions, other than to national defense groups or war relief funds, were likewise subject to permission of the Minister of Finance. Companies were controlled as to the limit of acquiring negotiable paper, patent, mining or fishing rights and the lending or borrowing of funds. To enforce this ordinance the Government was empowered to inspect the books of any corporation at any time.

157. The effect of these banking and corporate fund controls was to completely integrate the financial resources and activities of banks, financial institutions and corporations into the national policy. That national policy was the expansion of specific industries necessary to develop war materials and war material potential.

158. While the immediate objective of industrial expansion and the control of finances by the Japanese Government was the building up of war production and war production potential by the end of the year 1941, there was an even more far-reaching program which concerned the use and purpose of this production. It was the domination of East Asia. This purpose was clearly outlined in IPS Document 1611 A which is entitled the Outline for the Economic Construction of Japan, Manchukuo and China, as decided at Cabinet meeting on 3 October, 1940. I will read that document which is self-explanatory.

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OUTLINE OF THE FIVE YEAR PLAN FOR PRODUCTION  
OF WAR MATERIALS

MILITARY SECRET

WAR OFFICE  
(June 23 1937)

Preface

1.) This outline, whose two primary objects lie in the perfection of war preparations simultaneously with the realization of the 5 Year Plan for Major Industries, has been drafted with the purpose of unifying the Army's policies principally within the sphere of handling of matters by military administration, in regard to the expansion, cultivation and control, etc., of munition industries so as to ensure perfection in the wartime supply of principal war materials.

2.) Such factors as funds, raw materials, materials, fuel, machinery, labor, technic, motive power and transportation, etc., that are likely to crop up in connection with the realization of this outline, shall be merged into the afore-mentioned Outline of the 5 Year Plan for Major Industries.

In addition to this, as for the aircraft industry and automobile industry, they have been classified under the scope of the synthetic national policy due to there being so many requiring disposition by national measures. However, those deemed especially necessary under the respective related items have been inserted, also, in this Outline in order to regulate the Army's policies. This applies, also, to the machine industry.

3.) The term "munition industries" in this Outline refers not only to industries engaged in the manufacture or repair of finished goods or parts for war purposes, but applies also to vital raw material industries.

Furthermore, where necessary, the policies towards industries to be converted into the aforementioned industries in time of war have also been made expressly clear in this Outline.

4.) From the standpoint of controlling the pace of its execution, this Outline shall depend firstly on the basis of the fixed war budget.

On measures planned outside of the aforementioned basis, special attention should be paid so as to avoid any confusion in regard to their description.

CONTENTS

- I. Policy
- II. General Plan
- III. Outline of Expansion
  - 1.) Building-up on the Continent
  - 2.) Expansion in Japan Proper
  - 3.) Objectives of Expansion and Japan and Manchuria's quotas.
- IV. Outline of Cultivation.
- V. Outline of Control.
- VI. Outline of Guidance of Government-managed Institutions.
- VII. Outline of Technical Research and Type and Model Control.

Annexed Documents:--

- No. 1. Standard Table re Conversion of Peace-time to War-time production.
- No. 2. General Outline for Computation of Objective of Expansion.
- No. 3. Basic Table for Computation of Objective of Expansion of Aircraft Industry.
- No. 4. Basic Table for Computation of Objective of Expansion for Armament Industry.
- No. 5. Basic Table for Computation of Objective of Expansion of the Shell and Fuse Manufacturing Industry utilizing lathes.
- No. 6. Basic Table for Computation of Objective of Expansion for Tank Manufacturing Industry.
- No. 7. Standard statistical list showing goal of Monthly War-time Production of Principal Munitions in Manchuria.
- No. 8. Standard List showing Quotas of Japan and Manchuria in regard to Expansion of Munitions Industries.

OUTLINE OF THE FIVE YEAR PLAN FOR THE PRODUCTION OF  
WAR MATERIALS

I. POLICY

In order to cope with the present situation and to establish the foundation of our national defense power accompanying the perfection of armaments, it has been planned to carry out a speedy epoch-making expansion of war industries and to exercise the necessary control over them from the standpoint of national defense.

For this purpose, special stress will be laid on accomplishing the following purposes generally by the end of the 1942 fiscal year, and the operation of Japan's economy will be made to develop rationally by unifying the handling of affairs by military administration as well as maintaining a close contact with the synthetic national policy.

- (1) Wholesale strengthening of the productive power of all war material industries as well as of all major industries which can be converted in wartime, in Japan and Manchuria.

Especially the moving of all these industries to Manchuria, Korea and other parts of the Continent.

- (2) Accelerating the establishment of a plan of self-sufficiency in raw materials, materials and fuel in Japan, Manchuria and North China.
- (3) Hurrying up the control of war material industries, having in mind the conversion from a peacetime basis to a wartime basis.

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## II General Plan

1. It is planned to expand and cultivate the munitions industries (including parts and raw materials industries) as well as the various industries to be converted in time of war simultaneously with the expansion of the major national defense industries and to strengthen the necessary control.

2. The emphasis of expansion is to be placed on the production of airplanes, arms and ammunition, tanks and military vehicles, which are the main factors for constituting fighting power, and on others directly connected to this.

In regard to the expansion of the airplane industry in particular, the utmost effort will be directed toward it to guide it speedily and rapidly.

3. The objective of expansion will be based on the sufficiency of the war time supply requirements.

For this purpose, the expansion of industries manufacturing genuine munitions other than airplanes and automobiles will be guided by military administration measures with perfection of materials accompanying the repletion of armaments as the yardstick for the time being and in regard to the shortages from the standpoint of meeting the wartime demands, the necessary military administration measures will be devised to accelerate the development of various industries to be converted in time of war through the comprehensive national policy as well as for the purpose of preparing for wartime conversion.

In regard to airplane industry, it will be guided toward active expansion so as to be able to comply with the realization of the gigantic perfection plan aiming for the creation of an invincible airforce and the national aviation policy based on the comprehensive national policy without a moment's delay, although the primary aim will at first be to adapt it to the fixed repletion of armaments /plan/.

In regard to the automobile industry, those in the category of genuine war supplies such as tanks and special military vehicles will be governed by the foregoing Clause 2, but in regard to ordinary automobiles, it will be guided by the comprehensive national policy in such a way as not to impede the commandeering and supplying of the required number in time of war. However, necessary military administration measures will be devised to have a considerable portion of the wartime capacity of the said industry cooperate in the wartime production of airplanes.

4. The areas of expansion will be both Japan and Manchoukuo and their field of operation will be determined roughly as follows:

(a) In regard to the continent, particularly Manchuria, local production of airplanes, arms and ammunition, tanks and military vehicles will be started in connection with the development of raw materials and

resources and gradually developed to make possible mass production in time of war.

(b) In regard to the expansion in Japan proper, it will be made to correlate and correspond with the previous clause, but it will be especially guided so as to meet the urgent needs. However, the degree of expansion will be appropriately regulated and the establishment of new or expanded plants on the continent will be facilitated.

(c) Although profound consideration will be given in regard to allocation of the right industry in the right place and to mutual relief of economic disadvantages throughout Japan and Manchoukuo, emphasis will be laid to unify them according to the viewpoint constituting Japan and Manchoukuo as one and to the wartime needs as much as possible.

5. Cultivation will depend primarily on the proper use of successive war budgets.

Consequently, in determining the usage of the budget, careful consideration will be given to the point of taking wartime into consideration insofar as it does not interfere with the original purpose of the budget. However, in regard to those especially necessary, every effort will be made to devise subsidy measures. Especially, drafts of planned outlays extending over several years will be drawn whenever necessary and government-managed ordnance institutions and civilian munition industries will be directed according to this.

6. The underlying principle of control will be to meet the requirements of national defense.

For this purpose, the emphasis of control will be placed on the positive expansion of such industries and their advancement into the continent and necessary measures will be devised to ensure proper and smooth execution of the mobilization, with special care being given not to cause any failure of enterprises through unnecessary feeling of uneasiness and fear on the part of businessmen.

7. In regard to matters requiring collaboration with the Navy for adjustment, special conciliatory policy will be devised.

### III Outline of Expansion

#### 1. building-up on the continent.

1. In the 5 year Industrial Plan of Manchoukuo, proper guidance will be given to the group of war industries such as airplanes, arms and automobiles and in addition to increasing and strengthening the national defense value of this plan, the establishment of industries for the manufacture of

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necessary parts and raw materials will be encouraged and various machine tool industries convertible into these in time of war will be cultivated.

Accompanying the carrying out of the economic development of Korea, efforts will be exerted towards the promotion of major industries according to the preceding paragraph.

2. Government-managed arsenals will be newly established or enlarged as a nucleus for the guidance of war industries in Manchoukuo and Korea.

3. As for the war industries in Manchoukuo and Korea and others convertible into these in time of war, emphasis will be laid on Southern Manchuria and Northern Korea, in particular, from a military point of view and for the present, guidance will be so given as to have these established in the following areas:

- a. The zone comprising Mukden, Liaoyang, Anshan, Fushun and Penhsihu.
- b. The zone centering around the neighboring area of Dairen.
- c. The zone extending to Heijo (Pingyang) and Shingishu.

In addition to the above, however, the creation of such industrial zone within the Tungpin-Tao District will be considered depending on its future development. Furthermore, the cultivation of war industries may be undertaken, if necessary, even in the industrial zone of Eastern and Northern Korea. Facilities within the industrial zones and areas will be suitably dispersed as a precaution against air raids.

4. Relative to the setting-up of industrial zones in Manchoukuo and Korea, consideration will be sought for the gradual realization of the following transportation facilities:

- a. For Mukden-Anshan Zone--Improvement of water transportation facilities on the Taitzu-ho, Hun-ho and Liao-ho and reconstruction of Yingkw Harbor.
- b. For Tungpin-Tao District --(Construction of harbor at Toshihtao (and a railway leading to it.
- c. For Northern Korea Zone -- (Construction of a railway interlinking (with the eastern shores of Northern (Korea industrial zone.

5. Maximum effort will be exerted toward overcoming the various factors impeding the speedy construction of the war industries in Manchoukuo and others convertible in time of war.

For this purpose, attention will be given to the following items:

- a. Absorption and acquisition of capital.
- b. Acquisition of technique and labor.
- c. Adjustment of both munition and civilian demand industries and preparation for conversion into wartime production.
- d. Elimination of lags within the various related industries.
- e. Counter-measures against depression and development of export measures.
- f. System and organization of enterprises.
- g. Cultivation and protection.

## 2. Expansion in Japan Proper

1. In regard to armament industries (including tanks and special military vehicles) and industries manufacturing related parts and raw materials, they will be privately shown the estimated orders for over several years from time to time within the scope of not hampering the preparations suitable to the immediate situation in the future and will be guided toward rapid expansion with the supply of capital being made smooth.

In regard to airplane industries and industries manufacturing related parts and raw materials, they will be guided toward expansion for the time being according to the preceding paragraph in order to meet the urgent demands from the standpoint of peacetime arrangement of military materials accompanying the depletion of armaments. However, large scaled expansion carried out according to the national policy will be considered. In regard to the expansion of automobile industry, the application of the Automobile Manufacturing Enterprise Law will be relied upon and the Military Automobile Subsidy Law will be utilized.

2. Even in regard to machine tool, metallic and chemical industries, which, accompanying the depletion of armaments, are to be partially used for the manufacture of munitions, paragraph 1 of the preceding article will be applied.

3. In regard to the various industries to be converted into manufacturing munitions in time of war, promotion of industries, in general, will be relied upon, but the army will do its utmost to transplant and cultivate the necessary technique as impartially as possible and prepare them for wartime use.

3. Objectives of Expansion and Japan and Manchoukuo's Quota.

1. The standard for the conversion of peace and wartime production to be considered for the determination of the objectives of expansion of munition industries and the standard for distribution of production for the production of munition in peacetime are as shown in Appendix #1.

2. The general outline for estimating the objectives of expansion of munition industries is as shown in Appendix #2.

3. The objectives of expansion for industries manufacturing munitions throughout Japan and Manchoukuo are generally as follows; in cases where the annual schedule is not listed, the objectives are to be obtained by the end of 1941.

a. Airplane industry (including industries manufacturing parts and special raw materials)

Installation capacity is to be roughly doubled during 1938.

Subsequent expansion will conform to the national aviation policy to be handled as the comprehensive national policy and the new aviation repletion expected to be realized in addition to the already determined repletion of armaments, particularly looking forward to the epochal expansion of installation capacity. (The above mentioned national policy provides for an installation capacity ensuring a peace-time production of 10,000 planes through a protective policy and for a standing strength of 2,000 civilian airplanes). Even if the above listed national aviation policy is not realized quickly, the installation capacity will at least be tripled by about 1939.

The basis for estimating the objectives of expansion is as shown in Appendix #3.

b. Arms and ammunition industry (including industries manufacturing parts and special raw materials)

1. Arms industry.

In addition to strengthening the government institutions, civilian installation capacity will be quadrupled by about 1939.

Moreover, in regard to the preparations for wartime conversion through training request, the scope of technical cultivation for 1936 will be gradually widened to about three times by 1941.

The basis for estimating the objectives of expansion is as shown in Appendix No. 4.

2. Ammunition industry (including bombs)

In regard to government institutions, emphasis will be laid on strengthening those in Manchoukuo and Korea and in regard to civilian institutions, their lathe installation capacity will be increased about sevenfold by 1941 with special type companies, in particular, being made to install the necessary drilling equipment and to make appropriate expansion even in regard to gun-powder and explosives.

Moreover, in regard to the preparations for wartime conversion through education and request, the scope of technical cultivation for 1936 will be gradually widened to about three times by 1941.

The basis for estimating the objectives of expansion (for only lathe) is as shown in Appendix #5.

c. Tank industry (including armored cars).

The installation capacity will be increased two and a half times by 1939.

The basis for estimating the objectives of expansion is as shown in Appendix #6.

d. Arms industry, in general.

Practically the same as the previous clause.

4. The objectives of expansion of major industries convertible into industries for the manufacture of munitions in time of war throughout Japan and Manchoukuo are as follows:

a. Machine tool industry (excluding construction machinery industry)

Although they will be steadily expanded according to the peacetime production conversion of already existing industries through arrangement of materials accompanying the promotion of industries, in general, based on the comprehensive national policy, and the repletion of armaments, but their installation capacity will be increased two to three-fold by about the end of 1941 through the comprehensive national policy.

b. Metal industry (including a portion of the parts industry)

In regard to special raw material industry and parts industry connected with munition it is the same as the previous clause.

In regard to other metal industries, in general, they will be dealt according to a separate plan for the comprehensive national policy.

c. Automobile industry, in general (including parts industry).

Excluding the miniature-sized cars, the number of cars for peacetime will be 300,000 (including 150,000 trucks) and the comprehensive national policy aiming for a yearly production of 100,000 in peacetime will be relied upon.

d. Construction machinery industry.

Through the comprehensive national policy, the annual production will be made to reach about 50,000 units in peacetime.

5. The objectives of expansion for industries manufacturing munitions in Manchoukuo will be as follows:

In all cases where the dates are not specifically expressed, the objective is to be reached by the end of 1941.

a. Airplane industry (including parts and special raw materials industry)

With the undertaking starting from 1937, an airplane industry with a wartime capacity for producing 600 planes annually will be constructed. In addition to the above, they will be further guided toward positive expansion so as to comply with the realization of the new aviation revolution plan apart from the national aviation policy based on the comprehensive national policy and the already determined revolution of armaments and in the event Japan and Manchoukuo retain an installation capacity capable of meeting an annual production of 10,000 planes in peacetime, Manchoukuo's goal will be about 3,000 planes.

b. Arms industry (same as above) and converted wartime industries.

The objective will be to meet on the spot the requirements of the supply depots supplying ten divisions organized on war footing.

However, the Mukden Arsenal will be cultivated by the continuous war budget by the end of 1941 and aside from those of special nature, it will be possible to meet 70 per cent of the objectives as indicated in the preceding paragraph. In regard to deficiency toward achieving the objectives mentioned previously, guidance will be given to the machine tool industries expected to spring up through the Manchurian 5 year industrial plan and they will be prepared for wartime conversion.



c. Ammunition industry (same as above) and converted wartime industries.

Starting the undertaking from 1938, the objective will be to establish government arsenals and to ensure the supply of various types of shells sufficiently to the ten divisions on war footing and the supply of bombs to a considerably powerful air force by the last fiscal year of the continuous war budget.

However, provided that there be no change in the military budget, about one-third of the government installations mentioned above will be completed by the end of 1941 and combining the capacity of Mukden Arsenal and the civilian industries cultivated by the military budget, a war time capacity of roughly over one-half (a greater part in some items) of the objective mentioned previously will be obtained. In regard to the deficiency toward achieving the objectives mentioned in the preceding paragraph for the said year, guidance will be given to the machine tool industries expected to spring up through the Manchurian 5 year industrial plan and they will be prepared for wartime conversion.

Moreover, in the event of the outbreak of hostilities during that said year, special measures for the rapid replenishment of equipment will be devised.

d. Gunpowder and explosive industry.

Aside from government installations, the required capacity will be set up as a means to meet the demand for ammunition and bombs, mentioned in the two previous clauses, through the appropriate use of the substitute chemicals of Manchoukuo and Korea.

4. Tanks (including armored cars) industry (including parts industry).

A monthly production of about 30 cars will be attained as quickly as possible through installations added to government arsenals and the guidance of civilian industrialists to advance into Manchoukuo and this will be increased to a monthly production of 50 cars with the progress of the Manchurian 5 year industrial plan.

f. Automobile industry (including parts industry).

As has been in the automobile policy within the comprehensive national policy, Manchoukuo's annual production will be expected to be 10,000 cars.

g. General armaments, food and clothing requirements.

They will be appropriately expanded.

h. The standard of production items and quantity of war supplies to be expected of Manchoukuo during 1942 will roughly be as shown in Appendix #7.

A general view of the field of production of Japan and Manchoukuo for the production of war supplies is as shown in Appendix #8.

#### IV. Outline of Cultivation.

1. For the improvement of the munition mobilization capacity, arrangements will be made as quickly as possible, a five year plan will be established and the basic principle for the cultivation of the munition industries will be regulated according to the following points:

a. Aside from those deemed necessary or advantageous to rely on government-controlled institutions, the emphasis for the supplying of war materials will be directed toward civilian factories.

b. Efforts will be made to establish new factories.

c. Although the expansion of large industries is necessary, efforts will be made to cultivate medium and small-sized industries as far as circumstances permit.

d. In addition to the proper application of the training request system, the existing accounting law will be revised in view of the specific nature of the supplying of war materials so as to expedite the prosecution of the army's plan in regard to the cultivation of industries manufacturing war materials.

e. The development of enterprises will be facilitated by contracting for the supplying of war materials over a long period and, if necessary, opening the way to make payments in advance.

f. In regard to production quota, plans will be made to have it agree as much as possible in substance with that of the wartime plan.

g. The unification of supplying duties will be further strengthened.

Especially, efforts will be made to modify the regulations pertaining to unified acquisition and transportation in the wartime plan for peacetime use.

h. Outside of those which must be specially imported to meet urgent requirements, home industries will be strongly encouraged.

V. Outline of Control.

1) As regards the controlling of war material industries, perfection will be sought in regard to removing the various factors likely to impede wartime expansion, in view of the special characteristics of these industries, especially the characteristic of the demands in wartime and those in peacetime having a wide difference.

In this instance, every effort will be made to maintain the standard working hours and prevent the strengthening of operations by means of extension of hours, and to accelerate the expansion of installations.

2) With the object of planning the material strengthening of the munition mobilization capacity, enterprises will be guided mainly according to the following points through the Superintendent system:

- (a) Old-fashioned equipment will be improved; up-to-date equipment will be reinforced.
- (b) Obstacles in the course of production accompanying conversion into wartime production will be rectified, and lags in the various associated industries will be removed.
- (c) Control over industrial copartnership will be effected to facilitate the disposition of the previously mentioned clauses.

The aforementioned supervision for the present, will be executed from the standpoint of the parties placing the orders, but plans will be made for the strengthening of guidance and supervision by enacting the necessary laws and regulations as soon as possible.

Furthermore, the Superintendent system will be carefully re-studied as regards organization, system, structure and stationing, and consideration will be given to the unification and adjustment of Factory Administration Government Office and Factory Superintendent systems at the time of enforcement of munition mobilization.

3) To facilitate the peacetime to wartime conversion of industries: manufacturing war materials, structural control will be accelerated according to the following points:

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3) To facilitate the peacetime to wartime conversion of industries: manufacturing war materials, structural control will be accelerated according to the following points:

- (a) Proper guidance will be given to the merger and incorporation of enterprises.

According to the needs of the times, an organ to facilitate the general control of industries manufacturing important war materials will be gradually established.

- (b) The formation of an organic production bloc will be fostered. For this purpose, the nuclear factories and the sub-contracting factories will be logically arranged, and their relationship with parts factories, material factories and raw material factories will be adjusted.

Special attention will be given towards putting an end to the present disorganized condition of the sub-contracting factories.

- (c) The organizing of unions will be guided from the military point of view to enable the mass power of the small-sized factories to collaborate effectively in the production of war materials in time of war.

4) Social policies will be tempered from the viewpoint of national defense in a wide sense and the necessary control over industries manufacturing war materials will be exercised.

For this purpose, consideration will be given to profit control, labor control and localization of industries.

#### VI. OUTLINE OF GUIDANCE OF GOVERNMENT-MANAGED INSTITUTIONS.

1) Although definite plans will be worked out separately in regard to government managed institutions, their expansion will be planned, in general, according to the following essentials for the purpose of strengthening the munition mobilization capacity:-

- (a) Expansion of installation through the continuous budget, especially
  - (1) the moving of ordnance equipment to the Continent, and
  - (2) adjustment of the bottle-necks of wartime production.
- (b) Improvement of equipment operated personally.

- (c) Organization of man-power and training of technicians.
- (d) Intensification of labor guidance plans.
- (e) Supplying of necessary raw materials and materials as well as arrangement and renovation of materials for armaments.

2) As regards expansion of Government-managed institutions, special attention will be paid to the allocation of munitions to the Government and private industries, especially in regard to the allocation of operations in the course of production.

Special consideration will be given to the efficient use of the national industrial power in time of war.

#### VII. OUTLINE OF TECHNICAL RESEARCH AND TYPE AND MODEL CONTROL.

1) As regards airplane manufacturing technique, all government and civilian technical researches will be mobilized so as to surpass the world's maximum level by the end of the 1941 fiscal year. In connection thereto active efforts will be exerted towards absorbing superior foreign technique.

2) As regards arms manufacturing technique, means will be devised for wartime mass production.

Especially in regard to shells, the following simplified manufacturing methods will be speedily established by taking their wartime use into consideration.

- (a) Manufacturing Method utilizing steel tubes.
- (b) The abolition or lessening of Lathe operations in the inside of the shell bodies for extraction shells and steel tube shells and the mass production method of special substitute shells to lessen the burden of the machine tool industry.

3) As regards the types and models of war materials, simplification of control over types and models as well as the establishment of substitute types and substitute models will be made after ascertaining and making a thorough study of the actual facts in regard to wartime supply.

- (c) Organization of man-power and training of technicians.
- (d) Intensification of labor guidance plans.
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TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

In view of the impracticability of reproducing in English the charts referred to in the following Appendices, a copy of the page in the original Japanese document containing the chart referred to in an Appendix is included at the end of such Appendix.



## APPENDIX NO. 1

Standard Chart of Conversion of peace-time production of Munition Industries

<u>Peace-time production according to industry</u>	<u>Converted Wartime Production Item</u>
<u>METAL WORKS</u>	
Metal refining (including materials)	: Raw materials and materials for arms, etc.
Light alloys	: Airplane materials
Cast iron products	: Hand grenades, tank tracks, arm materials, materials and parts for airplanes, automobiles, etc.
Steel pipes	: Shell bodies, bomb bodies
Rolled plates	: Steel helmets, shields, and other parts for weapons
Various other metal products	: Parts for weapons, tank parts, shell parts
<u>MACHINE TOOL WORKS</u>	
Arms (including aircraft)	: )
Engines	: ) Same product
Steamboilers	: )
Insulated electric wires and cables	: )
Electrical communication sets	: )
Batteries	: ) Same product
Mining, sorting and refining machinery	: )
Spinning and weaving machinery	: Manufacture of shells by lathes, fuses, parts of weapons.
Construction machinery	: Same products, parts of weapons

Contd on p.

<u>Peacetime Production</u>	<u>Martime Production after Conversion</u>
Machinery for ceramics	: Manufacture of shells using lathes
Agricultural machinery	: Same product, wooden tools
Paper-making machinery	: )Machinery for manufacturing
Machinery for Chemical Industry	: )Gunpowder
Elevators	: Steel plates, weapons
Cranes	: Same product; parts of weapons
Pumps	: Ditto, power engines
Scales and measures	: Ditto, testing implements
Meters	: Ditto, parts for firearms, fuses
Watches	: Fuses, parts of firearms
Testing and scientific instruments:	: Same product, testing implements
Medical instruments	: Ditto
Surveying and drafting instruments:	: Ditto, glasses, etc.
Optical instruments	: Optical weapons
Glasses	: Same product
Machine tools for lighting purposes	: Ditto, search lights
Vehicles	: Locomotives for army use, parts of weapons, : assembling of tanks, manufacturing of : shells using lathes.
Shipbuilding - Shipbuilding Section	: Equipping of ships, boiler mfg., materials : For army's Marine transportation.
Enginemfg. Section	: Parts of weapons, mfg. of shells using : lathe
Fittings for ships	: Same product

Contd. on P.

<u>Peacetime Production</u>	<u>Wartime Production after Conversion</u>
Automobile parts	: Ditto, tank parts
Automobile assembling	: Ditto
POTTERIES	: :
Ceramic ware	: ) Ditto
Glass and glass products	: )
Bricks and fire-proof articles	: )
Cement	: ) Ditto
Lime	: )
Enamelled iron ware	: Steel helmets, etc.
CHEMICAL WORKS	: :
Medicine manufacturing	: Same product
Ammonium sulphate	: Raw material for gunpowder and explosives
Soda and bleaching powder	: Anti-gas drugs, chemical warfare weapon
Dyes and mediums	: Raw material for gunpowder, chemical warfare weapons
Paints and pigments	: Same product; raw material for gunpowder
Soap and cosmetics	: Raw material for explosives
Pure cotton	: Raw material for gunpowder
Mineral oils	: ) Same product
Vegetable oils and fats	: )
Rubber products	: Anti-gas clothing, parts for automobiles, airplanes and weapons
Pulp	: ) Same product
Paper manufacturing	: )

Contd. on P.

<u>Peacetime Production</u>	<u>Wartime Production after Conversion</u>
Celluloid	: ) Raw materials for gunpowder
Rayon	: ) and explosives
Leather tanning	: ) Same product
Fur dressing	: )
	: )
GAS AND ELECTRICITY	: Fuel and motive power
LUMBER AND WOODEN PRODUCTS	: Materials and parts for weapons and tools
PRINTING AND BOOKBINDING	: Same product
	: )
FOOD FACTORIES	: )
Japanese alcoholic beverages	: ) same product, alcohol
Western alcoholic beverages	: )
Beer	: )
Soy sauce	: )
Soy bean paste	: )
Flour milling	: ) Ditto
Sugar refining	: )
Canned goods	: )
Bread Baking	: )
Confectionery and millet-jelly	: )

- Remarks - (1) Even for the munition production in peacetime, the plan will partially follow this chart.
- (2) In regard to items marked "ditto" in the chart, many do not need to have their production converted, but for the sake of reference they have been included.

APPENDIX NO. 2

GENERAL OUTLINE FOR THE COMPUTATION OF THE OBJECTIVES  
OF EXPANSION OF WAR MATERIAL INDUSTRIES

1) Excluding that which concerns the airplane industry, computations are made in general in the following manner:

- (1) The ratio obtained after comparing the installation capacity of the industry concerned required for digesting the material equipment budget accompanying the repletion of armaments with the productive power for the 1936 fiscal year the required ratio for expansion of installations.

In this case, every effort should be made to compute the objectives positively on the assumption that the production of civilian products shall not be oppressed in the branch of industry concerned and that the operation rate for the 1936 fiscal year shall not be increased.

- (2) The wartime total productive power of the expanded installations shall be determined by computing the wartime operation rate.
- (3) The shortage obtained after comparing the wartime total productive power and the required wartime supplying power shall be supplemented by the wartime total capacity of the industries whose production is to be converted in time of war.

To supplement the above shortage, efforts shall be exerted towards the cultivation of technicians from peace time by means of education orders and in regard to its scope, the capacity of the machine tool industries making rapid progress through the comprehensive national policy is to be determined and relied upon. In the event of there still being a shortage, the speedy expansion of wartime facilities based on the counter measures for productive machinery, shall be planned and the demands regarding these matters shall be transferred to the Five Year Major Industry Plan.

2) As for the airplane industry, it shall be guided by the foregoing clause insofar as it depends on the military budget, but compute the objective positively without relying on the figures of the already determined armament repletion plan, but by taking a far-sighted view of the future demand and supply by taking into consideration the revision of the aviation repletion plan.

## APPENDIX 3 (Part 1)

Basic Table For Computing The Objective Of Expansion for the Airplane Industry Cultivated under the Already Fixed Military Budget.

(Goal to be five years hence and to include Japan and Manchoukuo)

(Judgment) 1. Accompanying the repletion of armament, it is necessary to increase the 1937 installation capacity of factories connected with military aviation three-fold.

2. Expansion of about two-fold, especially, must be completed by 1938.

Plan:

Present State	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>
1936 Perfected Units	522	320
Total war time operation capacity	700	700
Based on present plan (Army -- 140 companies )		
• (Navy--Those of war time )		
(connections are estimated)		
Repletion of Armaments	From 522 raises	From 320 raises to
1937-1943 Units perfected	to maximum of	maximum of 900 and
annually	1450 and drops	drops to 700
	to 1050	
Expansion accompanying repletion of armaments		
1939 (40) Expansion ratio	About 3 fold	About 1.8 fold
1939 (40) and thereafter		
Total peace time operation capacity	About 4000	About 3400
		(will be accompa-
		nied by additiona
		increase)
1942 and thereafter	About 5000, but to	About 3000
Required war time capacity	meet the require-	(about 1500
(first year)	ments of emergency	during period
	organization (140	of preparation
	companies) about	for war)
	10,000	
Supplementary measures	War time expansion and Army- Navy	
	munition industry mobilization	
	agreement for A.	
	Creation of active aviation industry	
	through the establishment of the	
	national aviation policy for B	
	(Refer to Part 2)	

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NOTE:

Upon their realization through national measures as listed in Part 2, the policy of cultivation of industries concerned must undergo the necessary changes.





APPENDIX NO. 3 - Part 3

Computation of Objectives of Expansion for Airplane  
Industry Based on National Policy Measures

Estimation of Inertive Productive Power

Judgment

- (1) If an equipment capacity be maintained so as to make it possible to cope with a peace-time operation of 10,000 planes, the following mobilization plan will, even in the case of a peace-time actual demand of 3,000 planes, make the capacity reach close to an annual production of 20,000 planes from and after the 8th month, and over 20,000 planes from the 10th month.

However, the total of the first year's production will be a little less than 13,000 planes, and that of the second year approximately 30,000 planes.

- (2) In the event of it being possible to make the peace-time actual demand around 4,000 planes, this would, in addition to increasing the certainty of mobilization, bring the total of the first year's production up to around 14,500 planes.

Mobilization Plan

- (1) The personnel at the beginning of the outbreak of war will be increased about seven-fold.
- (2) Production for the first two months will be conducted in the following manner: -
  - (1) With 2/3 of the peace-time personnel
  - (2) On 20% of the total equipment
  - (3) Net working time, 13 hours

- (3) The training of newly employed workers will be conducted as follows during the first two months:-
- (1) 1/3 of the peace-time workers shall be placed in charge of training (37 men to one trainer)
  - (2) Training by two daily shifts' (day and night) system
  - (3) In day-time on 80% of the suspended equipment
  - (4) At night time on 100% of the equipment.
- (4) From and after the third month production will be conducted as follows.
- (1) Equal dividing-up of peace-time workers and newly employed workers in both day and night-time.
  - (2) Enforcing of a two-shift system of 22½ actual working hours to be divided equally day and night.
  - (5) From and after the sixth month the peace-time equipment will be increased monthly by 5% (implying Production Increase from that month)
  - (6) Along with the foregoing, the personnel will be increased monthly (1/3 of peace-time) from and after the fourth month to meet 10% of the peace-time equipment.

#### Production Progress

1. as per chart below.
2. as per remarks below the chart, it will be necessary to use the automobile industry.

Mobilization Curve (Personnel, Equipment, Factory Efficiency and Production Curves)

#### Legend:

=====	Efficiency curve of body factories
-----	Productive " " " "
====	Efficiency curve of engine factories
----	Production " " " "

Attendant ( --- Efficiency curve of body production increasing  
to ( factories  
increase ( Increased production curve of bodies  
equipment ( ( O O O O Efficiency curve of engine production factories  
( |||| Increased production curve of engines

Personnel increase curve accompanying expansion of equipment.

Personnel Mobilization Curve (about seven-fold)

Bodies Production Curve

Engines " "

Equipment Expansion Curve

The Peace-time equipment capacity:  
(to meet an annual production  
of 10,000 planes by operating  
10 hours daily in peace-time). Approximately  
20,000 sets of machine tools for engines, and from  
8,000 to 9,000 sets for bodies.

Peace-time break-even point (annual production of  
7,000 planes)

Peace-time demand (annual production 3,000 planes)

According to established plan, the Army requires 1,377  
planes, the Navy 900 planes, besides which 400 planes  
are required for replenishing a standing civilian air  
strength of 2,000 planes, making the total requirement  
2,677 planes.

Attendant ( -- Efficiency curve of body production increasing  
to ( factories  
increase ( Increased production curve of bodies  
equipment ( (0 0 0 0 Efficiency curve of engine production factories  
( |||| Increased production curve of engines

Personnel increase curve accompanying expansion of equipment.

Personnel Mobilization Curve (about seven-fold)

Bodies Production Curve

Engines " "

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are required for replenishing a standing civilian air  
strength of 2,000 planes, making the total requirement  
2,677 planes.

Months from Outbreak of War	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	14	15	16	17	18		
No. of Planes Monthly Produced by Permanent Equipment	217	217	217	217	900	1158	1300	1450	1450	1600	1600	1750	1750	1750	1750	1750	1750		
Annual Production	TOTAL (FIRST YEAR) 12,076 PLANES																		
Increased Equipment Increased Production									33	50	158	225	291	375	458	541	625	708	791
	(SECOND YEAR) 30,996 PLANES (Up to 24th Month)																		
TOTAL	Annual Production (SECOND YEAR) 30,996 PLANES																		

DESCRIPTIVE EXPLANATION

No. of Monthly Production Planes - 10,000 x Body Production Index (%)  
12

However, should the production of Engines fail to keep up, it will become necessary to utilize the automobile industry.

REMARKS: -

- (1) The required degree of conversion of the Automobile Engine Industry shall be roughly as follows:-

quantity of Shortage of Airplane Engines =  
 $10,000 \times \frac{28.3}{12} \times 3 \times 1.5 = 2,831$

12  
 (28.3 represents the 8 months' average of difference in production indices.)

(1.5 represents 1.5 Engines per Body).

By calculating the foregoing, the quantity of shortage of Automobile Engines shall be  $2,831 \times 20 = 56,620$  units.

- (2) The War-time First Year Capacity of the Automobile Industry will be at least 150,000 units (peace-time 100,000). In addition, it will be possible to obtain a capacity for the production of 57,000 units from the capacity now used for the production of miniature cars and 3-wheel as well as 2-wheel motorcycles.

JUDGMENT re POSSIBILITY OF MEETING DEMAND FOR WAR-TIME MILITARY PLANES

By concluding an Army-Navy Munition Industry Mobilization agreement based on the figures for 1937 according to different operations along with the above chart and by placing the peace-time regular civilian air force of 2,000 planes at the disposal of the Army, there will be no difficulty in effecting the following supply of Military Planes, viz:-

First Year . . . . . Approx. 10,000 planes  
 Second Year . . . . . Approx. 20,000 planes

Distribution of production between the Army  
and Navy

As per chart below (which, however, is for the  
first year only).

Number of monthly airplane production

Airplane production curve

Replenish curve of army planes

Number of standing civilian air-strength

Peace-time equipment capacity (825 planes per month)

Peace-time actual demand (250 " " " )

Explanatory Remarks:-

The War-time First Year's Total Airplane Replenishment will be



$$12,866 \div 2,000 = 14,866 \text{ planes.}$$

By dividing some up between the main strategic forces and reserve forces in accordance with the Army-Navy Munition Industry Mobilization Agreement at the ratio of 5:3 (62 : 38) by considering the 2,000 civilian planes as Army planes the number of Army planes will be approximately 10,041.

Considering the productive power for the first four months and also the necessity of making a monthly replenishment of approximately 20 per cent against the 1,780 planes required under the established plan for first-line military strength, the standing strength of civilian air force is an absolute requisite.

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
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
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 (第一年) 12,866 機  
 (第二年) 30,996 機 (平均)


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
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 (第二年) 30,996 機 (平均)

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


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 實性ニ増ス、共二第一年、生産、計八萬四千五百機、程度トナリ、


第一 生産曲線



月次	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
生産機数	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
計 (第一年)	12,000 機												35,831,581,251,200	37,514,521,541,625,100,81,770	38,299,621,996,機 (4,924)			

生産機数  
 10000 X 機、生産、30 機、(物)  
 計 (第一年) 12,000 機  
 計 (2年) 30,996 機 (4,924)

生産機数  
 10000 X 機、生産、30 機、(物)  
 計 (第一年) 12,000 機  
 計 (2年) 30,996 機 (4,924)



生産機数  
 10000 X 機、生産、30 機、(物)  
 計 (第一年) 12,000 機  
 計 (2年) 30,996 機 (4,924)

## APPENDIX NO. 4

Basic Table for Computation of Objective of Expansion for Arms Industries for the First Year from Outbreak of War (with the goal set for Five Years Hence, and including both Japan and Manchuria.)

Judgment

- (1) For the sake of repletion of armaments, it shall be necessary to increase approximately four-fold, the equipment under private management that are being utilized at present for peace-time purposes.
- (2) For the sake of war-time replenishment it shall be necessary, in addition to bringing into full play the total capacity of the forementioned expansion and increase in government-owned equipment as well as the industries that are to be prepared for conversion into war-time production through educational requests during peace-time and to seek for a war-time expansion of equipment corresponding to approximately three times of the equipment under private management that are being utilized at present for peace-time purposes.

Peace-time Equipment accompanying the Repletion of Armaments

(the indices have been computed by figuring the Equipment Value for 1936 as 100; 100 = approximately ¥ 34,000,000).

<u>Year</u>	<u>Index No.</u>	
1936	100	)
1937	148	)
1938	184	)
1939	185	)
1940	194	)
1941	188	)
1942	178	)
1943	107	)

Repletion of Armaments  
Classified by  
Year

APPENDIX NO. 4

Estimation of Expansion Objective

Work allotment for governmental and private factories in peace-time operation in 1936

Governmental . . . . .	70
Private . . . . .	30

War-time plans for 1936

(a) Governmental (full capacity) . . . . .	114
(b) Private . . . . .	56

NOTE: Increase of operation ratio in (b) . . . 180%  
 (War-time private production upon conversion . . . 20  
 Planned Capacity Limit . . . . . 190

Capacity required to replenish armament mobilization for 1936 (total) . . . . . 250

Capacity required for temporary formation (total) . . . . . 390

Allotment for governmental and private peace-time production of 1938

Governmental . . . . .	60%
Private . . . . .	40%

War-time capacity of private production (Basic) capacity (b)  
 - - - - - 125

\* Multiply (b) with wartime operation ratio of 180% (c) . . . 225

Condition of replenishment after repletion armament.  
 (Governmental) similar to (a) . . . . . 114  
 ( " ) replenishment  
 increase of 1/2 (a) . . . . . 57  
 (Private) similar to (c) . . . . . 225  
 Reconversion of war-time private production 65

Planned capacity limit for 1942 . . . . .	460
Capacity to increase production (d) . . . . .	180
Capacity required to replenish armaments mobilization for 1941 (total) . . . . .	500
Capacity required for temporary formation (total) . . . . .	540
Expansion increase ratio Private 4 time . . . . .	125
Multiplied ratio of war-time replenishment governmental . . . . .	(70)
Private factories war-time capacity . . . . .	(30)
(multiply war-time operation ratio 180% to (basic) . . . . .	(54)
Capacity for increased production (increase) wartime equipment) same as (d) 5 time )	130
Anticipated reconversion of war-time private production . . . . .	65

REMARKS:

- (Note 1) During the first period of consolidating equipment, government enterprises will most probably operate 13 to 14 hours per day. This will be unavoidable in regard to arms industry (2/3 of the total war-time capacity).
- (Note 2) To cultivate capacity "A" among civilian industries, attention particularly must be given to guidance of technique.
- (Note 3) By anticipated capacity, we mean the capacity expected in time of war by preparing for the conversion into war-time production through educational requests from peacetime.

Planned capacity limit for 1942 . . . . .	460
Capacity to increase production (d) . . . . .	180
Capacity required to replenish armaments mobilization for 1941 (total) . . . . .	500
Capacity required for temporary formation (total) . . . . .	340
Expansion increase ratio	
Private 4 time . . . . .	125
Multiplied ratio of war-time replenishment governmental . . . . .	(70)
Private factories war-time capacity . . . . .	(30)
(multiply war-time operation ratio 190% to (basic) . . . . .	(54)
Capacity for increased production (increase) wartime equipment) same as (d) 5 time )	130
Anticipated reconversion of war-time private production . . . . .	65

REMARKS:

- (Note 1) During the first period of consolidating equipment, government enterprises will most probably operate 13 to 14 hours per day. This will be unavoidable in regard to arms industry (2/3 of the total war-time capacity).
- (Note 2) To cultivate capacity "A" among civilian industries, attention particularly must be given to guidance of technique.
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APPENDIX NO. 5

Basic Table for Computing the Objective of Expansion for Shell-Body (including Bombs) and Fuse Manufacturing Industry Utilizing Lathes.

(with the Goal set for Five Years Hence, and including both Japan and Manchuria)

Judgment

- (1) With the steady progress in the repletion of armaments, the present private-owned equipment capacity for manufacturing shells by the exclusive use of lathes shall have to be increased to about seven-fold.
- (2) In addition to the foregoing it shall become especially necessary to actively guide the wholesale expansion of the various machine and tool industries convertible into war-time production simultaneous to the promotion of general industries.

Peace-time Organization (Equipment) as effected by the Repletion of Armaments.  
(the Index figure 100 shall represent the Peace-time Organization Value for 1936)

Armament Repletion	( 1936 .....	100
	( 1937 .....	130
classified	( 1938 .....	170
	( 1939 .....	191
by year	( 1940 .....	244
	( 1941 .....	296
	( 1942 .....	276
	( 1943 .....	216

Expansion of Shell-Manufacturing Factories as affected by the aforementioned Maximum Production.

- (a) Capacity required to process maximum production ..... 300.
- (b) Allotment of Governmental and Private Work for production in 1936.

Governmental .....	70
Private .....	<u>30</u>
	100



APPENDIX NO. 5

Basic Table for Computing the Objective of Expansion for Shell-Body (including Bombs) and Fuse Manufacturing Industry Utilizing Lathes.

(with the Goal set for Five Years Hence, and including both Japan and Manchuria)

Judgment

- (1) With the steady progress in the repletion of armaments, the present private-owned equipment capacity for manufacturing shells by the exclusive use of lathes shall have to be increased to about seven-fold.
- (2) In addition to the foregoing it shall become especially necessary to actively guide the wholesale expansion of the various machine and tool industries convertible into war-time production simultaneous to the promotion of general industries.

Peace-time Organization (Equipment) as effected by the Repletion of Armaments.  
(the Index figure 100 shall represent the Peace-time Organization Value for 1936)


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	( 1937 .....	130
classified	( 1938 .....	170
	( 1939 .....	191
by year	( 1940 .....	244
	( 1941 .....	296
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Expansion of Shell-Manufacturing Factories as affected by the aforementioned Maximum Production.



- (a) Capacity required to process maximum production ..... 300.
- (b) Allotment of Governmental and Private Work for production in 1936.

Governmental .....	70
Private .....	<u>30</u>
	100

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 7. 第七号  
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 10. 第十号



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 10. 第十号

(c) Allotment of Governmental and Private work for maximum production.

Governmental . . . . . 80  
Private . . . . . 220  
300

(Almost no expansion seen in governmental work form (b)).

Maximum wartime capacity of private works allotment of (c)  
. . . . . 480  
(Wartime operating ratio . . . 220%).

Required Wartime Capacity and its Conditions of Sufficiency.

(d) Allotment for Governmental and Private work in Wartime Capacity Plans for 1936; relation between the required replenishment capacity and its Conditions of Sufficiency.

(Governmental wartime capacity) . . . . . 400

Private-operated and private owned machineries and machine tools convertible for production (abt 500)  
(520)

Capacity limit of 1936 plans . . . . . 1370  
Capacity required for temporary formation . 160

Coefficient of Expansion and Required Supplementary Capacity.

Coefficient in Peacetime Expansion . . . . . 1: 7.4  
(Comparison of respective private enterprise (a) and (c)).

NOTE: Reparation for Conversion from peacetime through trial orders. ----

Ratio ( Governmental . . . . 70 [similar to (b)]  
in (   
Wartime ( Private . . . . . 30 [similar to (c)]  
Capacity (


NOTE: Anticipated Capacity (converted Production of private enterprise in wartime) is similar to (c).

Capacity of Increase Production (increase and strengthening of factory installations in wartime) . . . . . 18 times or 1260. Comparative to (a) of 1936 which will be the coefficient of required supplementary capacity in wartime.

26

Doc 9002A

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Remarks: -

- (1) The increased installations of extracting equipment is an absolutely indispensable factor so as not to hinder the expansion of the industry specified in this Appendix.

These shall be installed in the Government factories and special companies connected with the steel business.

- (2) Especially, the plans to expand production capacity by lathes is due to the enormous wartime demands as well as the easy conversion of factories for military and civilian needs.

For the present it is considered unnecessary to give any guidance towards private concerns regarding the special expansion of the cartridge-case, explosive powder and fuse manufacturing industries.

- (3) The attainment of expansion may be impossible unless suitably coupled by enacting of standard working hours, advance payment of funds for increasing equipment as well as counter-measures regarding productive machinery.
- (4) In computing the indices, the lathe operating cost for shell bodies and fuses has been roughly figured at 1/2 of the balance after having deducted the rifle cartridge costs from the entire ammunition cost.

Furthermore, the index figure 100 represents roughly Yen 12,000,000.

APPENDIX NO. 6

Basic Table (indices) for Computation of Objective of Expansion for Tank Industry (including Armored Cars)

Judgment

For the purpose of repletion of armaments, it shall be necessary to increase the equipment capacity (1936) by approximately 2.6 times.

Explanatory Diagram

(Government-operated equipments have not been expressly classified in view of their capacity).

Equipment Capacity for 1936	100
" " " 1937	160
" " " 1938	175
" " " 1939	210
" " " 1940	196
" " " 1941	210
" " " 1942	162
" " " 1943	147

Equipment Capacity for 1936 . . . . . 100

Peace-time Standard Capacity for 1936  
(showing surplus margin of about 30% . 130

War-time Capacity for 1936 . . . . . 220

Expanded Peace-time Equipment . . . . . 210

Expanded Peace-time Capacity (allowing  
for 30% surplus margin . . . . . 260

Expanded War-time Capacity . . . . . 470)

" " " of Government-owned  
Institutions 220)

1580

War-time Production Conversion of Private  
Enterprises . . . . . \*890)  
(\* of which approximately 900 Tanks  
are converted)


Engines--Utilization of Automobile Industry -- Manchuria.  
Steel Plates . . . . . -- Manchuria.

REMARKS:

- (1) The War-time Operating Rates shall be 180% similar to the Arms Industries.
- (2) Although this brand of war-time industry possess a fair deal of surplus margin at present, its equipment capacity shall be doubled by seizing the opportunity for doubling the quantity of Peace-time Equipment.

Doc 9002 A

Doc 9002 A



圖例：第一層... 第二層... 第三層... 第四層... 第五層...  
 圖例：第一層... 第二層... 第三層... 第四層... 第五層...  
 圖例：第一層... 第二層... 第三層... 第四層... 第五層...

圖例：第一層... 第二層... 第三層... 第四層... 第五層...  
 圖例：第一層... 第二層... 第三層... 第四層... 第五層...

APPENDIX NO. 7

Standard Chart Showing Goal of Monthly War-time Production  
of Principal War Materials in Manchuria (Scheduled for  
Five Years Hence)

ARMS

Rifles . . . . .	5,000
Light Machine Guns . . . . .	350
Heavy Machine Guns . . . . . (both fixed and revolving types)	500
Automatic Cannons . . . . .	20
Heavy Grenade Throwers . . . . .	200
Various types of Infantry Cannons . . . . .	15
Small-bore Cannons . . . . .	25
Anti-aircraft guns . . . . .	5
Medium-bore Cannons . . . . .	10
Tanks (including Armored Cars) . . . . .	50
Others . . . . .	To be expanded as much as possible so as to cope with the aforementioned arms.



SECRET IX NO. 7

Standard Chart - cont'd

AMMUNITION

Cartridges (6.5 and 7.7 m/m) . . . . .	The war-time capacity of the present Mukden arsenal is to be expanded as much as possible.
20 m/m Cartridges . . . . .	35,000
Hand Grenades . . . . .	170,000
Heavy Grenade Shells . . . . .	110,000
37 m/m Shells . . . . .	36,000
57 m/m Shells . . . . .	10,000
75 m/m Shells . . . . .	350,000
10 c/m Shells . . . . .	35,000
15 c/m Shells . . . . .	20,000
15 kg. Bombs . . . . .	10,000
50 kg. Bombs . . . . .	5,000
100 kg. Bombs . . . . .	1,000
250 kg. Bombs . . . . .	800
500 kg. Bombs . . . . .	500
Gunpowder . . . . .	To be expanded as much as possible in accordance with the Gunpowder Resources in Manchuria.
Fuses . . . . .	To be expanded as much as possible to cope with the aforementioned shells.

Cartridge Cases . . . . . To be expanded and repaired as much as possible to cope with one-half of the aforementioned shells.

AIRCRAFT

Airplanes . . . . . 50 at start  
(It is being considered to furthermore expand same up to 250 in order to cope with the New Aircraft Repletion Plan).

EQUIPMENT

Freight Cars (for military use)  
(light Railways) . . . . . 130

Automobiles . . . . . Maximum production will be promptly assigned on assumption that the fundamental equipment for the 9 year plan is about completed.

Other . . . . . Accordingly

CLOTHING . . . . . Accordingly

FOODSTUFFS . . . . . Accordingly

HORSESHOES . . . . . Accordingly

Cartridge Cases . . . . . To be expanded and repaired as much as possible to cope with one-half of the aforementioned shells.

AIRCRAFT

Airplanes . . . . . 50 at start  
(It is being considered to furthermore expand some up to 250 in order to cope with the New Aircraft Repletion Plan).

EQUIPMENT

Freight Cars (for military use)  
(light Railways) . . . . . 130

Automobiles . . . . . Maximum production will be promptly assigned on assumption that the fundamental equipment for the 9 year plan is about completed.

Other . . . . . Accordingly

CLOTHING . . . . . Accordingly

FOODSTUFFS . . . . . Accordingly

HORSESHOES . . . . . Accordingly



APPENDIX NO. 8

Standard Chart Showing the Respective Spheres of Influence of Japanese and Manchurian War Material Industries in regard to Expansion. (with the Goal set for Five Years Hence).

(Note: Chart denotes war-time condition).

Airplane Industry  
Respective Spheres of Influence of Japanese and Manchurian Industries in regard to the War-time Capacity Fixed Plan based on the Army's 140 Company Plan and the Navy's Second Plan

Airplane Industry (Japan Proper)	for the Army . . . .	3,400 planes
" " (Manchuria)	" " " . . . .	500 planes
" " (Japan Proper)	" " Navy . . . .	2,400 planes

Refer A: Allotment of war-time capacity when Army is given priority over Navy.

Army . . . . .	5,000 planes
Navy . . . . .	1,400 planes

Newly Anticipated Plan and its Application to Japan Proper and Manchuria.

Japan Proper . . . . .	7,000 planes
Manchuria (Korea may also be included) . . . . .	3,000 planes
Total	<u>10,000 planes</u>

Arms Industry

The ratios applicable to the major war materials for which there will be large war-time demands shall be

Japan Proper and Chosen . . . .	80%
Manchuria . . . . .	20%

As regards the Parts, etc., for major war materials requiring special precision work, the ratio for Manchuria may be reduced accordingly.

Doc 9002 A.

距離

10,000

500

陸軍工廠

陸軍工廠

海軍充當  
飛行機工業  
(三四。機)  
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
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C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I.P.S. No. 9002

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Kaneo Ishibashi, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Corresponding Secretary, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of \_\_\_\_\_ pages, dated \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_, and described as follows: Draft outline of 5 year plan of production of war materials.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is a part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): First Demobilization Bureau.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
6 day of July, 1946.

/s/ K. ISHIBASHI  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ SHINAJI KOEYASHI

\_\_\_\_\_  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, William C. Prout, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
6th day of July, 1946.

/s/ WILLIAM C. PROUT  
NAME

Witness: /s/ EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

Investigator IPS  
Official Capacity

SECRET

"PARTICULARS IN FRAMING A PROGRAM FOR EXTENSION  
OF IMPORTANT INDUSTRIES".

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I. Summary of 5-year Program of Important Industries

Prepared by War Ministry, dated 29 May 1937.

II. Resume of Policy Relating to Execution of Essentials  
of 5-Year Program of Important Industries.

Trial Draft Prepared by Army, dated 10 June 1937.

III. Summary of Program for Extension of Productive  
Capacity.

Prepared by Planning Board, dated January 1939.

## ESSENTIALS OF 5-YEAR PROGRAM OF IMPORTANT INDUSTRIES

WAR MINISTRY, 29 May 1937

### I PRINCIPLE

I. We plan systematically to promote the activity of important industries generally by 1941, so that, if anything happens, our country may be capable of self-supplying the important materials in Japan, Manchuria and North China and also to realize long-stride advancement of the nation's strength in peace time, ensuring the actual power of leadership in East Asia.

### II OUTLINE

1. This program, having in view five years from 1937 to 1941 as its first period, is to strictly select the classes and goals of important industries for the national defense and to control and encourage the realization production. Although five years has been set as a general period, the extent and time of achievement of the advancement and expansion shall be adjusted in conformity with the degree of demand for the various materials

According to the degree of progress of the first period, necessary plans shall be prearranged for the second period.

2. Although our Empire is made the subject in the promotion of important industries for national defense, the requisite industries (for national defense) should be pushed ahead to the continent as far as possible according to the principle of right work in the right place with Japan and Manchuria as a single sphere and in consideration of their necessity in our national defense, and, furthermore, observing the farsighted future policy of our Empire, we should pick out the most important resources,

## ESSENTIALS OF 5-YEAR PROGRAM OF IMPORTANT INDUSTRIES

WAR MINISTRY, 29 May 1937

### I PRINCIPLE

I. We plan systematically to promote the activity of important industries generally by 1941, so that, if anything happens, our country may be capable of self-supplying the important materials in Japan, Manchuria and North China and also to realize long-stride advancement of the nation's strength in peace time, ensuring the actual power of leadership in East Asia.

### II OUTLINE

1. This program, having in view five years from 1937 to 1941 as its first period, is to strictly select the classes and goals of important industries for the national defense and to control and encourage the realization production. Although five years has been set as a general period, the extent and time of achievement of the advancement and expansion shall be adjusted in conformity with the degree of demand for the various materials

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2. Although our Empire is made the subject in the promotion of important industries for national defense, the requisite industries (for national defense) should be pushed ahead to the continent as far as possible according to the principle of right work in the right place with Japan and Manchuria as a single sphere and in consideration of their necessity in our national defense, and, furthermore, observing the farsighted future policy of our Empire, we should pick out the most important resources,

should ingeniously take the initiative in economic exploitation of North China, and should make efforts to secure its natural resources.

3. In carrying out this program, it is considered advisable to avoid causing an abrupt change in our present system of capitalism. However, proper and timely measures should be taken in connection with the control of circulation of money, finance, prices of goods, trade, settlement of accounts with foreign countries, transportation, distribution (of commodities), labour and non-important production and consumption so as to ensure the wholesale and satisfactory progress of the program.

4. In the promotion of important industries, those elements such as technique, capital, raw materials, etc., should be coordinated, and perceiving the mutual relationship of the various industries, we should eliminate any discord among them. However, we must distinguish the degree of importance and urgency and pick out in the first place the most important and urgent ones and encourage their achievement. With the above in view, the important items to be taken up with priority in our first period program are listed as follows:

1. Munitions industry
2. Aircraft industry
3. Automobile industry
4. Engineering machinery industry
5. Iron and steel industry
6. Liquid fuel industry
7. Coal industry
8. General machinery industry
9. Aluminium industry
10. Magnesium industry
11. Shipbuilding industry
12. Electric-power industry
13. Railway car industry

The promotion of the Munitions and Aircraft Industries should be in accordance with the plan separately framed by the Army, but, elements such as funds, machinery materials, labour, fuel, motive power, etc., which should be dealt with and arranged in parallel with the promotion of general important industries, are included in this program.

5. Based on the foregoing principles, the general goal for the promotion of important industries and their arrangement in Japan and Manchuria are roughly shown in the attached table.

GENERAL GOAL FOR PROMOTION OF IMPORTANT INDUSTRIES

ITEMS	UNITS	GOAL FOR PROMOTION OF PRODUCTION			GOAL FOR TOTAL	EXPAN JA
		TOTAL	JAPAN	MANCHURIA		
Aircraft	No.	( )	( )	( )	Civil Use 2,000	
Automobiles	10,000 Cars	10	9	1	30	
Engineering Machinery	10,000 Machines	50	45	5		
	Steel Materials	1,000 (1,300)	700 ( 900)	300 (400)		
Iron & Steel	<u>Pig Iron</u> 10,000 Metric tons	1,150 (1,550)	750 (1,000)	400 (550)		
	<u>Iron Ore</u>	2,250	1,050	1,200	Ore in Stock 800	
Liquid	<u>Gasoline</u>	330	190	140	Compulsory Oil Storage as per present rule	Compulsory Storage present
Fuel	<u>Alcohol</u> 10,000 Kilo litres	50	45	5		
	<u>Benzol</u>	20	14	6		
	<u>Heavy Oil</u>	235	135	100		
Coal	10,000 Metric tons	11,000	7,200	3,800		
Aluminum	10,000 Metric tons	10	7	3		
Magnesium	1,000 Metric tons	9	6	3		
Vessels	10,000 tons	(93)	(86)	( 7 )	700	68
Electric Power	10,000 k.w.					
Railway Cars	No.				L 2,200 W 52,700	L 1,0 W 30,

NOTES: 1. Yearly production of General Machinery of approximately 2,700,000,000 is the goal. 2. although pre-arranged as shown in this table, is to be subject to re-adjustment in accordance with figures in parentheses in "Goal for Promotion of Production" column represent Capacity of investigation is urged in connection with the construction of Cross-Korean Channel Railway

IMPORTANT INDUSTRIES

EXPANSION OF HOLDING CAPACITY  
JAPAN                      MANCHURIA

REMARKS

se

Goal for promotion of production is not shown in order to keep secrecy.

26

4

1. Small size automobiles & tractors are not included.
2. Proportion of passenger automobiles & trucks to be generally equal.

Deficiency in Japan to be supplemented from Manchuria.

ck

800

Deficiency of about 4,500,000 k. t. in Japan to be supplemented from Central & South China, South Seas & Australia. Besides, efforts shall be made to utilize Resources of North China to curtail the above imports.

Oil  
per  
e

Compulsory Oil  
Storages as per  
present rule

Compulsory Oil  
Storage as per  
present rule.

To be mixed with Gasoline

Benzol, to be exclusively for peace time

1,000,000 Kilo-litre from Manchuria is Shale Oil

10,000,000 k.g. to be imported to Japan from Manchuria.

680

20

Vessels under 1,000 tons & above 25 years of age are not included.

L 1,000  
W 30,000

L 1,200  
W 22,700

1. Figures of this column represent required amount of increase.
2. Manchoukuo column includes Korea.
3. L. Represents locomotive & W. Represents Freight wagons.

0,000 is the goal. 2. With the progress of researches distribution between Japan & Manchuria, re-adjustment in accordance with the principle of "right work in right place". 3. Those column represent Capacity of Equipment. 4. Munitions are not included in this Table. 5. Substantial loss-Korean Chareel Railway.

GENERAL GOAL FOR PROMOTION OF IMPORTANT INDUSTRIES

ITEMS	UNITS	GOAL FOR PROMOTION OF PRODUCTION			GOAL FOR TOTAL	EXPANSION JAPAN
		TOTAL	JAPAN	MANCHURIA		
Aircraft	No.	( )	( )	( )	Civil Use 2,000	
Automobiles	10,000 Cars	10	9	1	30	
Engineering Machinery	10,000 Machines	50	45	5		
Iron & Steel	Steel Materials	1,000 (1,300)	700 (900)	300 (400)		
	Pig Iron 10,000 Metric tons	1,150 (1,550)	750 (1,000)	400 (550)		
	Iron Ore	2,250	1,050	1,200	Ore in Stock 800	
Liquid Fuel	Gasoline	330	190	140	Compulsory Oil Storage as per present rule	Compulsory Storage present
	Alcohol 10,000 Kilo litres	50	45	5		
	Benzol	20	14	6		
	Heavy Oil	235	135	100		
Coal	10,000 Metric tons	11,000	7,200	3,800		
Aluminum	10,000 Metric tons	10	7	3		
Magnesium	1,000 Metric tons	9	6	3		
Vessels	10,000 tons	(93)	(86)	(7)	700	68
Electric Power	10,000 k.w.					
Railway Cars	No.				1 2,200 ₩ 52,700	1 1,000 ₩ 30,000

NOTES: 1. Yearly production of General Machinery of approximately 2,700,000,000 is the goal. 2. although pre-arranged as shown in this table, is to be subject to re-adjustment in accordance with figures in parentheses in "Goal for Promotion of Production" column represent Capacity of investigation is urged in connection with the construction of Cross-Korean Channel Railway



OF IMPORTANT INDUSTRIES

FOR L	EXPANSION OF HOLDING CAPACITY		REMARKS
	JAPAN	MANCHURIA	
Use			Goal for promotion of production is not shown in order to keep secrecy.
	26	4	1. Small size automobiles & tractors are not included. 2. Proportion of passenger automobiles & trucks to be generally equal.
			Deficiency in Japan to be supplemented from Manchuria.
Stock	800		Deficiency of about 4,500,000 k. t. in Japan to be supplemented from Central & South China, South Seas & Australia. Besides, efforts shall be made to utilize Resources of North China to curtail the above imports.
Oil per se	Compulsory Oil Storages as per present rule	Compulsory Oil Storage as per present rule.	To be mixed with Gasoline  Benzol, to be exclusively for peace time  1,000,000 Kilo-litre from Manchuria is Shale Oil  10,000,000 k.g. to be imported to Japan from Manchuria.
	680	20	Vessels under 1,000 tons & above 25 years of age are not included.
	L 1,000 W 30,000	L 1,200 W 22,700	1. Figures of this column represent required amount of increase. 2. Manchoukuo column includes Korea. 3. L. Represents locomotive & W. Represents Freight wagons.
<p>000 is the goal. 2. With the progress of researches distribution between Japan &amp; Manchuria, re-adjustment in accordance with the principle of "right work in right place". 3. Those in represent Capacity of Equipment. 4. Munitions are not included in this Table. 5. Substantial S-Korean Charnel Railway.</p>			

II. RESUME OF POLICY RELATING TO  
EXECUTION OF SUMMARY OF  
5-YEAR PROGRAM OF  
IMPORTANT INDUSTRIES

(Draft)

Tentative Draft by Army.

10 June 1937

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No. 1. Principle

No. 2. Plans

1. Financial Policy (for raising funds)
2. Foreign trade and exchange policy
3. Policy on Commodity Prices
4. Policy for Controlling Industry
5. Policy for Technicians & Labourers
6. Policy for Machine Industry
7. Transportation Policy
8. Policy for Assuring Stability of People's  
Subsistence
9. (National) Financial Policy
10. Reformation of Administrative Organizations

Tables Attached:

- No. 1. Table showing proportion of expansion of  
projected industries
- No. 2. Table showing assumed amount of people's savings
- No. 3. Table showing approximate amount of necessary funds  
under Japanese-Manchurian Industrial Extension  
Program
- No. 4. Estimates of subsidy by Japanese Government to  
the projected industries

### Outline of Plan for Expansion of Productive Power.

In view of the present situation at home and abroad, this plan aims at the repletion and strengthening of the power of our nation, which is the stabilizing force of East Asia, and at the establishment of a comprehensive productive power expansion plan for Japan, Manchoukuo and China, which will bring about the realization of the necessary goal in regard to important national defense and basic industries by 1941, in order to be prepared for the epochal development of our country's destiny in the future; to be attained in spite of all difficulties.

#### I. Basic Policy.

A. The scope of this plan chiefly aims at the perfection of the foundation of national defense, and is particularly restricted to essential industries requiring rapid expansion under a unified plan.

B. This plan is for the establishment of a plan for the expansion of the productive power of the major industries of our country based on the policy for the establishment of a comprehensive plan for Japan, Manchoukuo and China through close contact and coordination among Japan, Manchoukuo, and China.

C. This plan aims at the establishment of self-sufficiency in regard to important resources within the sphere of our influence and thereby avoid depending on the resources of a third power as far as possible even in time of an emergency.

The prospective distribution of the shares of capital expenditures necessary for the enforcement of this plan is generally as follows:

(Unit = Yen 1,000,000)

Years	Japanese Government	Manchukuo Government	Civilians	Total	NOTES
1937	30	4	700	734	1. Estimates of necessary funds for the respective industries are shown in attached Table No. 3
1938	146	90	1,866	2,102	
1939	261	130	1,866	2,257	
1940	278	130	1,866	2,274	
1941	289	125	755	1,169	
TOTAL	1,004	479	7,053	8,536	2. Estimates of investments by the
Remarks:	To be included in increased amount of Government Expenditure		Principally consists of private investment of Japanese nationals		Japanese Government are shown in attached Table No. 4.

And it is assumed that the people's savings, which must provide the required fund amounting approximately to 17,000,000,000 Yen as shown above, will reach about 17,000,000,000 Yen within the period of this plan (Refer attached Table No. 2).

However, in addition to the foregoing, there will be demand for funds of about a billion and several hundred million yen including local and foreign investment during these five years. Consequently, although it is thought needless to be extremely pessimistic over the

raising of funds, it is not difficult to presume that a control will be necessary to quite an extent.

For the above purpose, our nation should exert itself for a smooth progress of this plan with a complete collaboration among all officials and people.

Herewith, several financial policies essential for carrying out this plan, are set forth.

A. In order to facilitate supply of funds essential to the construction to accompany the fulfilment of this plan, the basic principle for guiding finance shall be carried out smoothly by the positive and voluntary cooperation of the existing banking organs.

B. However, with a view to avoiding various obstructions liable to be met with in the money market, necessary and appropriate control is to be exercised.

The prime object of this control may be summarized as follows:

To facilitate raising of necessary funds for this plan.

To contrive to increase positively new savings, which are the sources for the supply of funds.

To adjust the investment of capitals and to prevent double investment.

To firmly maintain the proper and relevant policy in respect to rate of interest.

C. Several concrete measures essential for the above purposes, may be stated as follows:

(1) Measures for facilitating raising of funds.

(a) To amend the Bank of Japan Act and have the bank administrate the finance of the basic industries.

- (b) To grant this bank the controlling and supervisory powers over various banking organs.
  - (c) To amend the Industrial Bank of Japan Act and extend the legal limit of issuance of debentures by 15 times the present system. For this end, necessary increase of capital shall be made by means of Government investment.
  - (d) To grant this bank monopoly power over issue and trust of public bonds and debentures and to have it exercise control over the loan market.
  - (e) To revise the system of real rights granted by way of security.
  - (f) To extend the financing of industries by the funds of Deposit Section / of Finance Ministry/ and Post Office Insurance.
- (2) Measures for increasing savings.
- (a) To open a national movement for practicing economy of consumption and thrift and saving.
  - (b) To lower the minimum limit of postal savings (from 10 sen to 5 sen).
  - (c) To start house-to-house collection system of postal savings (similar to post office insurance).
- (3) Measures for adjusting investment of capital.
- (a) To suppress fresh investment in non-urgent and non-essential enterprises.
  - (b) To have the Bank of Japan supervise and guide the employment of capital by the various banking organs.
  - (c) To restrain double investment.
- (4) Measure for interest rate.
- (a) To firmly maintain the general low money rate policy.

- (b) To exercise control over the rate of interest of public bonds and debentures by unified acceptance of public bonds and debentures by the Industrial Bank of Japan.
- (c) To make an adjustment of long-term interest and of interest on public loan bonds.
- (d) To regulate employment of funds of the Deposit Section, for the purpose of suppressing sudden rise of money rates.
- (e) To accelerate the amalgamation and rationalization of the various banking organs with a view to lowering the cost of raising funds to the utmost.

D. To carry out a sound currency policy and to manage the money market properly and opportunely under the control of the Central Bank.

## II. Foreign Trade and Exchange Policy.

Upon estimating the international receipts and payments accompanying the execution of this plan, Japan and Manchuria considered as one unit, the deficiency in international payments as shown in the following table exceeded<sup>ed</sup> 1,000,000,000 yen for the years 1937 and 1938, and this cannot be paid up with that year's gold export alone. However,<sup>with</sup> the repletion of productive power, it is anticipated that this decline will be checked and that the international balance will improve from 1940 on.



**ESTIMATES OF INTERNATIONAL RECEIPTS & PAYMENTS, JAPAN & MANCHURIA**  
**CONSIDERED UNIT, ACCOMPANYING EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN**

*as before*

(Unit = Yen 1,000,000)

	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	Total	Average
Total Exports	4,085	4,478	4,987	5,420	5,917	24,887	4,977
Total Imports	4,699	5,367	5,423	5,458	5,470	26,417	5,283
Excess of Exports or Imports (-)	614	(-)889	(-)436	(-) 38	447	(+)1,530	(-) 306
Receipts & Payments outside of Foreign Trade	230	230	230	230	230	1,150	230
International Receipts & Payments (-)	(-) 384	(-) 659	(-)206	192	677	(-) 380	(-) 76
Export of Gold	154	370	180				
Excess or Deficiency of Payment (-)	(-) 230	(-) 289	(-) 26				

And as whether or not the balance would improve depends on proper foreign trade and exchange measures of the government, it is deemed necessary to consider the following policies.

A. Measure for Foreign Trade.

(1) Comprehensive Trade Control Plan.

- (a) To enact "a trade control law", regulating uniformly the domestic and foreign territories and institute "Trade Guild Law" with a view to promoting autonomous control and common interest of the traders.
- (b) To establish "A Foreign Trade Ministry" with a view to proper adjustment and management of foreign trade.

- (e) To establish a National Policy Foreign Trade Company, Ltd., to undertake the export and import of those manufactures important for national defense.
- (2) Positive measures for accelerating export. The emphasis in exportation shall be laid on the munitions industry and <sup>materials</sup> for production. Provided that, in order to maintain balance of the international receipts and payments, the export of textile goods and consumable materials shall be encouraged as heretofore (vide attached Table No. 3).
- (a) To strengthen the Export Association and enforce compulsory participation of all exporters. The association shall also be made to exercise independent control in respect to qualities, quantities and prices.
- (b) To undertake complete organization of export banking organs for the smooth functioning of export finance.
- (c) To intensify the existing Export Compensation Law and to promote overseas exportation by means of export compensation and credit compensation.
- (d) For the purpose of propagandizing Japanese and Manchurian goods and speedy collection of trade-intelligence from various sources, to institute Trade Offices in the principal cities of the world and, in addition, to station trade intelligence officials in the necessary points.
- (3) Negative measures for suppressing import.
- (a) To keep in force the present import-bill permit system, if found necessary, and to apply proper and timely control over the importation of non-expedient and non-essential articles.

- (b) To vest the Trade Minister with the controlling power over customs duties. To amend the Customs Law, laying emphasis on international receipts and payments, and adopt the Japan-Manchurian Preferential Tariff System, which aims at the abolishment of double duty and customs duties.
  - (c) To demand, under the indemnification principle, the promotion of exportation or the suppression of importation to those over-import countries such as U.S.A., Australia, Germany, Canada, India, etc., and, on the contrary, to adopt the scattered purchase system according to the import compensation system, in response to the demand for indemnification of those over-export countries such as Central America and the Near East.
- (4) Improvement of receipts and payments outside of overseas trade
- (a) To encourage the expansion of our shipping business and increase the income from overseas freight.
  - (b) To endeavour to attract the foreign tourists and simultaneously to curtail expenditures abroad of Japanese and Manchurian nationals.

B. Exchange Plan.

- (a) To maintain, as far as possible, the exchange rate of 1:2 against Britain for the purpose of stabilizing the exchange value.
- (b) To intensify the Foreign Exchange Control Law and completely stop the flight abroad and speculative investment abroad of our capital.
- (c) To fix appropriate and opportune purchasing value of gold in order to encourage an epochmaking production

of gold (Vide attached Table No. 3). To remove the holdings of the Manchurian Central Bank to the Bank of Japan and to export necessary gold.

- (d) To create a long term credit abroad amounting approximately to 500,000,000 yen for five years, the proposed countries being U.S.A., Britain, and Germany.

### III. Policy for Prices of Goods.

As the result of increase of demand for goods, following the execution of this program, it is presumed that the price level within the period of this program may rise by 10% more or less per year.

Consequently, it becomes an urgent problem to make pertinent the measures for price and wages to ensure uninterrupted execution of this program and to prevent probable decline of export-trade which would follow<sup>a</sup> rise of production costs and also to avoid the confusion of people's livelihood. For this purpose, the following measures are deemed necessary.

- A. To speedily increase the production of iron and other important materials. To amplify the supply of articles by all means and to facilitate their distribution.
- B. To intensify the price control, if conditions so require, not only on the standard of price of general merchandise but also on the individual price.
- C. To make all possible efforts to avoid stimulating the domestic market resulting from an excessive restriction of imports, namely, holding back of commodities, big increase of speculative imports and the resultant boosting of market price abroad.

Especially as regards the projected industries, export industries, and industries producing the principal necessities of life, to operate the priority import system and to examine the import prices according to the standard price to be determined from time to time.

- D. To intensify the Anti-Profiteering Ordinance and to control all attempts for limiting supplies and unreasonable profiteering, imposing heavy penalties on the offenders.
- E. To institute Price Inspectors (Kakaku-Kan) with function of inspecting prices in pursuance of the provisions of Anti-Profiteering Ordinance, Important Industries Control Law and Important Fertilizer Industry Control Law.  
  
To make it necessary to obtain government permission in order to raise the price of any important merchandise (to be enforced immediately).
- F. To designate the cartels or associations of coal and other important home product materials and machineries (i.e. Engineering Industry Association, Commercial Association, Marine Products Association, Industrial Association, etc.) as the controlling bodies and make them exercise control on production, sales allocation of distribution, and on prices.
- G. To have the merchants submit monthly reports of amount in stock, amount under contract, and amount of production to the competent minister through the competent prefectural offices.
- H. To prevent increase of freight costs and to undertake importation of about 650,000 tons old ships, if found necessary, for the purpose of stocking scrap iron.
- I. To control use of iron and other important merchandises and also papers. This may be effected by way of building permission for iron materials and for papers by restricting the number of pages in newspapers and magazines.

- J. To take measures for preventing rise in general cost of living.
- (1). To require permission of the competent authorities for raising house-rent, and to make it a fundamental principle not to grant such permission throughout the period of this program. This rule shall also apply to the case of beanpaste (miso), sauce (shoyu), meats, electric lights, gas, and water-supply.
  - (2). To effect reduction or exemption of sugar consumption tax within Japan.
  - (3). To adopt regulation uniforms for civil service employees causing the private companies and banks to follow this example, and thus undertake to simplify general clothings.

IV. Policy for Control of Industries.

Although this policy may only be quickly achieved by people's close union brought about through collaboration of the Government and people and labour and capital under stern and confidence-inspiring guidance by the Government, the essence virtually lies in the most efficient utilization of the existing economic organizations. From this point of view, the existing economic organizations and useful persons engaged in their management shall be mobilized in a most logical and efficient way so as to make them leaders in the execution of this policy.

Accordingly, in respect to the problem of forms of enterprises, it is planned to strengthen state administration where necessary with a view to attaining the nation's objectives by independent control of private enterprises without placing them under state ownership or state management.

The urgent measures called for in the meantime in pursuance of the foregoing principle shall be as undernoted.

- A. To extend the Industry Control Bureau as follows:
- (a) To strengthen the existing organization of the Industry Control Bureau.
  - (b) To institute a committee composed of representatives of production, distribution and consumption to ensure pertinence and smoothness in applying the relative laws.
- B. The important industries shall be subject to control in accordance with the following principles:
- (a) To intensify the policy of aiding industries and, if necessary, to grant subsidy, compensation for loss, and guarantee of profit to those national policy enterprises.
  - (b) To enact a special law for each proposed industry.
  - (c) As to munitions industries, to make it compulsory to obtain the Government permission concerning the following items.
    - (1) The reduction and disuse of producing facilities.
    - (2) The important matters relating to production, sale, labour, and general trade.
    - (3) Disposal of profit or loss.
  - (d) Ceilings on unit prices shall be exercised in case especially necessary. The disposal of profit shall be directed from the point of view of state policy when necessary.
- C. The fundamental industries shall be expanded in accordance with the following principle.

- (1) Iron and Steel Industries.
  - (a) To aid import and custody of material ores and to suppress importation of scrap iron, if required.
  - (b) To urge disposition of the poor mines.
  - (c) To stimulate use of iron sand.
  - (d) To foster the spread of special tempering method.
  - (e) To accelerate improvement of quality and increased production of special steel.
  - (f) To unify control of importation and distribution of iron and steel from the standpoint of state policy.
  - (g) To unify and rationalize the distributing and purchasing system of steel material throughout Japan and Manchuria.
- 2) Petroleum.
  - (a) To enforce a decisive subsidizing policy for synthetic petroleum and exploitation of oil-fields in order to ensure self-sustaining of fuel oil supplies.
  - (b) To establish special juridical person Imperial Fuel Industry Promoting Company in order to ensure an ample supply of funds for the petroleum industry, and also to let them put into effect synthetic petroleum industry, which is necessary.
  - (c) To control and utilize the domestic manufacturing capacity of machinery (including those under governmental management) and to contrive for quick equipment of synthetic petroleum plants. Provided that in its early state, the equipping shall be aimed at approximately one million metric tons per year as the goal and to import German equipments as the national policy.
  - (d) Having the above in view, to establish special juridical person National Policy Machinery Manufacturing Company



making synthetic petroleum manufacturing plants for the making of machineries of high precision and importance. For this purpose, 10,000 metric ton forcing press and other engineering machineries essential for their equipping shall be expeditiously imported preferably from Germany as the national policy.

(e) The manufacturing method of synthetic petroleum and the form of enterprise shall not be subject to any particular restriction. However, emphasis shall be laid on production of gasoline of superior quality for aircraft use and of Diesel Oil.

(f) In development of artificial fuel oil industry for war use stress shall be laid on the continent, especially in the rational utilization of Manchurian coal.

(g) In addition to acceleration of the prospecting of the existing oil-fields, to exert exploitation of hidden oil-fields by extensive and drastic investigation of oil veins running through the Empire and the neighboring countries under national management.

(h) To stimulate research and utilization of substitute fuels.

(3) Coal Industry.

(a) In the exploitation of coal-fields emphasis shall be laid on the continent.

(b) To make unified control over the price and distribution throughout Japan and Manchuria and specially to promote the importation of Manchurian coal.

(c) To unify and liquidate those inferior enterprises in order to rationalize this industry.

(4) Electric Power.

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- (a) In the exploitation of coal-fields emphasis shall be laid on the continent.
- (b) To make unified control over the price and distribution throughout Japan and Manchuria and specially to promote the importation of Manchurian coal.
- (c) To unify and liquidate those inferior enterprises in order to rationalize this industry.

(4) Electric Power.

- (a) To put the generation and transmission of electric power under private ownership and governmental management, contriving the abolishment of double equipping, rationalization of equipments and thorough exploitation and utilization of hidden resources. For the above purpose, to create a special juridical person, The Japan Electric Power Equipment Company and let it administrate and manage these matters.
  - (b) To exercise necessary control over the price, equipment etc., in connection with the distribution of electric power.
  - (c) The jurisdiction shall be with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and importance attached to the promotion of industries. Particularly, to practice the general low rate system and, moreover, to apply the specific low rate system to the specially designated industries for quickening the promotion of the important national defense industries.
  - (d) To place emphasis on water power exploitation and maintain the principle of "water power prior to fire power".
- (5) Aluminium and Magnesium.
- (a) To provide abundant and cheap electric power supplies so as to reduce the production cost to the lowest possible degree.
  - (b) To cultivate positively their uses by deed of the national policy and extend the scope of their general demand.
  - (c) To strive to utilize the continental resources as far as possible.
- (D) To amend the Important Industries Control Law as follows:

1. To discontinue the designating system of industries and employ a general cartel law.
  2. To make the efficient use of the provisions controlling the establishment and extension of enterprises with a view to inducing new investments.
  3. To strengthen public benefit regulations, ensuring specially their prompt and appropriate application.
  4. To intensify the penalty provisions, adopting the corporal punishment system and imposing deprivation of the trade right according to the circumstances.
- (E) In order to unofficially guide and control the execution of this policy throughout Japan and Manchuria, to create in the capital an organ for unified guidance and control.
- (F) Particularly in Manchuria, to designate iron, coal and petroleum industries as war industries and urge their expeditious development by means of military aid in addition to ordinary aid.
- (G) Beside the above to take measures for uniformity of research, assistance, and encouragement of inventions as regard essential industries and spur research in and exploitation of requisite resources.

7. Plans for Technicians and Labourers.

Consequent to the rise of productive capacity and in general industries and the increase of traffic following the execution of this program, the demand for technicians, skilled workmen and ordinary labourers in the manufacturing, mining and transport industries around 1941 is expected to be so increased as shown hereunder.

1. To discontinue the designating system of industries and employ a general cartel law.
  2. To make the efficient use of the provisions controlling the establishment and extension of enterprises with a view to inducing new investments.
  3. To strengthen public benefit regulations, ensuring specially their prompt and appropriate application.
  4. To intensify the penalty provisions, adopting the corporal punishment system and imposing deprivation of the trade right according to the circumstances.
- (E) In order to unofficially guide and control the execution of this policy throughout Japan and Manchuria, to create in the capital an organ for unified guidance and control.
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(Unit = One Thousand Men)

Class	1936	1941	Number of Increase	Proportion of Increase
Technicians	137	232	95	1.7%
Skilled Workmen	674	1,339	665	1.9%
Ordinary Labourers	6,090	8,027	1,937	1.3%

Of the foregoing, the portion to be supplied by natural increase is anticipated to be 78,000 technicians, 559,000 skilled workmen and 6,975,000 ordinary labourers. In addition to this, it is calculated that 9,780 technicians are to be raised in their status from the lower grade as well as supplied from the graduates, therefore, the ultimate number of men needed for special replenishment training will be 6,700 technicians, 96,000 skilled workmen and 1,052,000 ordinary labourers. For this purpose the following steps should be taken by the Government.

(1) Plans for Technicians.

To plan the increase of graduates from the industrial sections of government, public and private universities, and from the industrial technical colleges creation of industrial sections in private universities, raising of status of the industrial technical colleges and A-class industrial schools and also attaching of the technical colleges to government, public and private universities.

(2) Plans for skilled workmen.

To establish or extend the training institutes for skilled workmen in the metropolitan and local prefectures and also in large factories.

(3) Plans for ordinary labourers.

To contrive absorption chiefly from the agricultural and commercial population and strengthen the organization of employment agency office in order to ensure smooth progress of the absorption. Also, to make efforts in dispersing industries into the provinces.

(4) Necessary expenses.

The expense required for training technicians and skilled workmen is estimated at 87,600,000 yen (to include equipment, expenses and working budget for five years) of which 58,300,000 yen will be disbursed by the Government.

VI. Plans for Mechanical Industries.

From the present status of our productive capacity, it is quite impossible to self-supply immediately all the necessary machineries for this program, so that, it becomes imperative for satisfying the most urgent demand of the least amount to have recourse to importation. The import is roughly estimated as hereunder.

(Unit : One Million Yen)

CLASS		Total Amount Required	Amount to be Imported	Remarks
Needed for this Program	General Machinery	2,900	950	All based on Assumption.
	Engineering Machinery	500	250	
Machinery needed for Other General Industries		10,500	1,050	
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>13,900</b>	<b>2,250</b>	

Even though we estimate the export amount of our home made machinery for five years at 1,700,000,000 Yen, the balance will result in a considerable excess of imports. However, such a phenomenon is quite unavoidable for a country in the course of building up her heavy industries and we have to make up with all despatch for our lacks by adopting the equipment and techniques of others so as to quickly secure the means of independence and self-support, aiming at advancing into the international market before long. For this purpose, the following steps are necessarily to be taken.

- (1) To create a special juridical person, National Policy Machinery-manufacturing Company and charge it with the manufacture of machineries of limited demand, engineering machinery of high precision, coal liquefying machinery and the like which are considered to be too difficult for the existing enterprises from the technical and economical point of view.
- (2) To expedite imports to undertake <sup>techniques</sup> and installation under the national policy. These ~~importations~~ shall be principally conducted by the National Policy Trading Companies which will execute control of orders abroad, investigation of order accepting capacity abroad, suppression of importing price and financing export funds, etc.
- (3) To plan quick promotion of productive capacity by standardization of various gauges of manufactures, rationalization of giving orders at home and control in the descriptions of manufactures.
- (4) To make efforts in controlling subcontractors to promote their qualities and capability.

#### VII . Traffic Policy..

The Government is to contrive complete equipping of railways, harbors and roads, over-all rationalization of the freight rates and cancellation of non-urgent transportations with a view to meeting the increased amount of freight following this plan. Apart from the above, the Government is to frame a resolute protective and fostering policy towards the civil air transportation in order to guarantee its epoch-making development. The principal items pertaining to the above problem will be:

##### (1) Railways.

- (a) To adopt the principle of "freight first", passengers second so as to assure the smooth working of freight traffic in spite of all difficulties.



- (b) To expedite realization of the straight-line plan of principal main lines of Manchurian-Korean Railways to promote their transporting capacity.
- (c) To adopt specific low freight rates system for the constructive materials of important industries and their essential commodities and particularly in Manchuria and Korea, to practice long-distance diminishing freight rates.
- (d) To undertake construction and improvement of railways in the important industrial zones in Manchuria and Korea in accordance with their requirements.

(2) Marine Transportation.

- (a) To firmly establish "Home cargo on home ship" principle. For this end, to execute import of old vessels, if it is found inevitably (as stated before).
- (b) To stimulate increase in building of superior vessels.
- (c) To accommodate special carriers for coal, steel material, iron ore and petroleum.
- (d) To improve harbour accommodations in the important industrial zones.

(3) Land Transportation.

- (a) To take up home made motor-vehicle principle with one accord of the Government and people, provided that during the period of this program, use of cheap "Ford" and "Chevrolet" within the limits of necessity is to be exempted.
- (b) To urge propagation of large size motor-trucks of superior home manufacture to supplement the deficiency of railway transportation.
- (c) Other measures to be taken are:
  1. Equipment of roads to afford facilities to motorcar transportation.
  2. Standardization of motor-vehicles for business

purposes and restrictions on the use of the cars of inferior quality.

3. Propagation and fostering of Diesel cars.
4. Reduction and exemption of various taxation on motorcars.

(4) Aviation.

- (a) To create speedily the Central Air Technical Research Institute to encourage epoch-making advancement of air techniques.
- (b) To rationalize regular air-transport service rates and extend as much as possible its use for civil purposes.
- (c) To spur working en bloc of railway and air transport and to stimulate progress of air-transport through the medium of the railways.
- (d) To extend further the protection and fostering with a view to founding regular international air routes over the continent and ocean areas.
- (e) Furthermore, to carry into effect the following progressive and protective policies.
  1. Creation of duty of keeping aircrafts at the large companies and factories.
  2. Encouragement of research and trial manufacture of special bodies or motor engines.
  3. Aid to private purchase of home made aircrafts.
  4. Stimulation and aid to export of home made aircrafts.
  5. Encouragement of searching fish-shoals by aircraft.
  6. Encouragement of various air work (photography, survey, etc.).
  7. Establishment of air navigation insurance system.
  8. Guarantee of upkeep of aircraft manufacturing equipment, etc.

VIII POLICY FOR ASSURING STABILITY OF PEOPLE'S SUBSISTENCE.

The development recorded by our industries in the recent years is worthy of special mention. However, owing to its recent origin, we can not deny the fact that in comparison with other powers, with national wealth and people's income, we have a remarkably lower standard. The prime object of this program of course lies in the unified organization of the nation's strength, so that, by the execution of this program, various industries now being expanded can make big advancement and it is assumed that through the increase in production the people's earnings will rise from the present 20,000,000,000 yen to over 30,000,000,000 yen by about 1941. However, special caution is called for at this moment on the question of how this expanded national wealth and people's income can be disposed among the various classes of people with appropriateness and fairness since expanded wealth is the basis of stability of the people's subsistence. From the above point of view, the following practical measures should be adopted pertaining to promotion of agricultural districts, improvement of the living conditions of urban workers and the relief of medium and minor industries.

(1) Promotion of agricultural districts. With a view to avoiding the evil of preponderance of cities which is liable to result in course of execution of this program, to exert the promotion of economy of farm-villages by means of dispersal of industries into provinces and simultaneously to lessen the burden of farmers and improve their condition of living.

(1) Reduction of burden of taxation.

Total yen 216,000,000, of which

Total abolishment of Household Rate            140 Million Yen

50% reduction of Special Land-Tax

and its Additional Tax                                7       "       "

50% Reduction of Miscellaneous Tax  
and its Additional Tax 50 Million Yen  
Transfer of that portion of expenses  
of Town and Village Offices belong-  
ing to the Government business. 19 Million Yen

(2) Re-adjustment of the farmer's debts.

To clear off about 1,500,000,000 yen out of those high-interest and unsecured debts caused by operating and living expenses borne by the middle and small class farmers and constituting an impediment to agricultural production. The Government is to indemnify loss of the Loan Administrative Association with the limitation of 10,000,000 yen per year.

(3) Creation of the Health Association System. To create the Health Association in towns and villages and make it obligatory for the inhabitants to join it. Medical expenses amounting approximately to 175,000,000 yen a year (for 7,000,000 houses at 25 yen per house) will be divided equally and borne by the health instalment of the inhabitants, Government subsidy, payment by the patients, etc.

(4) New establishment of compensation system for the natural disaster to agriculture.

To establish insurance association with several villages as a unit to undertake crop insurance business on the staple farm products. This shall be re-insured by the national insurance at an assumed amount of approximately 60 million yen which is to be paid by the Government.

(2) Promotion of subsistence of urban workers.

(1) To contrive to the best of our ability, means for alleviating intensity of labor resulting from expansion of industries and decline of living level resulting from rise of prices and to work for the cultivation of people's laboring strength and for maintenance of industrial peace.

- (2) To revise Factory Ordinance and especially to undertake alleviation of excessive labor and relief for the sick and wounded.
- (3) To plan enlargement of various labor insurances.
- (4) To promote welfare institutions for working class in general.

(3) Protection of middle and minor class manufacturers. In view of the importance of the position occupied by the medium and minor industries in our industrial organization, to adopt the following measures for their revival and succor.

- (1) Readjustment of debts of the middle and minor class manufacturers.
- (2) Readjustment of banking organs for medium and minor industries.
- (3) Removal of pressure by big enterprises.
- (4) Rationalization of management and systematization of organization.

#### IX. Financial Policy.

The success or failure of this program is doubtless solely dependent upon the Government's consistent and firm guidance under the national policy. The Government should support various industries with all possible means from the standpoint of strengthening the nation's power and it is especially of vital necessity that measures for financial aid should be taken by our Government.

The assumed amount requisite for the financial aid to be executed by the Government for achievement of this program is as follows

(As to outline of the items of account, vide attached table

No. 4).

(Unit = One Million Yen)

ITEMS	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	TOTAL
Amount of Subsidy for Construction of Projected Industries	30	146	261	278	289	1,004
Amount of Subsidy Incidental to Execution of this Program	27	82	59	55	49	272
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>228</b>	<b>320</b>	<b>333</b>	<b>338</b>	<b>1,276</b>

The estimate of the future annual expenditure of our Empire for the purpose of realization of repletion of the nation's strength and completion of the national defense (i.e. amount of the future annual expenditure having as an object the execution of this program) is approximately as in the chart below and the foregoing subsidies are to be included in the amount of annual expenditure.

(Unit = One Million Yen)

Classification	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	TOTAL
Total Amount of Estimated Annual Expenditure (Assumed)	2,945	3,571	3,900	4,200	4,300	18,843
Increase as against 1937	(a). 72	626	955	1,255	1,355	4,263

NOTE: (a) Represents the requisite amount as the secondary additional estimate for 1937 following execution of this program and is included in 2,945 million yen.

The counter-plan for the above purposes will be:

1. Estimates for the annual revenue corresponding to the above quoted expenditure shall be dealt with in the following manner:

(Unit = One Million Yen)

ITEMS	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	TOTAL
Amount of Subsidy for Construction of Projected Industries	30	146	261	278	289	1,004
Amount of Subsidy Incidental to Execution of this Program	27	82	59	55	49	272
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>228</b>	<b>320</b>	<b>333</b>	<b>338</b>	<b>1,276</b>

The estimate of the future annual expenditure of our Empire for the purpose of realization of repletion of the nation's strength and completion of the national defense (i.e. amount of the future annual expenditure having as an object the execution of this program) is approximately as in the chart below and the foregoing subsidies are to be included in the amount of annual expenditure.

(Unit = One Million Yen)

Classification	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	TOTAL
Total Amount or Estimated Annual Expenditure (Assumed)	2,945	3,571	3,900	4,200	4,300	18,843
Increase as against 1937	(a) 72	626	955	1,255	1,355	4,263

NOTE: (a) Represents the requisite amount as the secondary additional estimate for 1937 following execution of this program and is included in 2,945 million yen.

The counter-plan for the above purposes will be:

1. Estimates for the annual revenue corresponding to the above quoted expenditure shall be dealt with in the following manner:

(Unit = One Million Yen)

CLASSIFICATION	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	TOTAL
Fundamental Revenue	1,600	1,600	1,600	1,600	1,600	8,000
Natural Increase & Increased or New Taxes	400	784	903	1,075	1,211	4,373
Increase Transferred from Specific Account	50	60	73	86	93	362
National Loan Bond	895	1,127	1,324	1,441	1,350	6,137
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2,945</b>	<b>3,571</b>	<b>3,900</b>	<b>4,200</b>	<b>4,300</b>	<b>18,916</b>
Amount of Increase as Against 1937	(a) (72)	626	955	1,255	1,355	4,263

2. It is necessary for the Government, not only to carry out all possible synthetic measures to improve the financial situation regarding circulation of money, consumption and all the matters concerned with the people's subsistence, but also to take the following important steps for the purpose of successful accomplishment of the above financial policy.

- (1) To intensify the control of budget. To concentrate the annual expenditure on fostering and achievement of the execution of this program and to thoroughly cut down non-urgent and non-important expenditures.
- (2) In conjunction with the advancement of producing capacity and increase of the people's income, to contrive fundamental rationalization of the taxation system, etc., in order to increase the running revenue of the nation.
- (3) To strive all the more for drawing the military expenditure into industrial branches.
- (4) To stimulate the profits of heavy industries to be participated in by the agricultural and fishing districts.
- (5) To firmly establish the national loan bond policy in conjunction with the financial policy.
- (6) To enforce administrative and financial re-adjustment with a view to promoting efficiency of the Government and public officials.



## REFORMATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION

X. In the course of execution of this program, it is imperative to firmly establish a powerful administrative organization and to maintain it as a systematic and immovable national policy, and for this purpose fundamental reformation of the present cabinet system, such as formation of the Board of National Affairs and severance of the heads of all ministerial departments from the ministers of national affairs, etc., and also re-investigation on the whole administrative organization, becomes inevitably necessary. However, due to the difficulty of rapid realization of the above objects, the following emergency measures at least ought to be adopted for the present to avoid any impediment in carrying out the national policy for execution of this program.

- (1) Formation of the Board of General Affairs as the central directive and controlling organ for the execution of this program.
- (2) New establishment of the Foreign Trade Ministry for adjusting and handling foreign trade.
- (3) New establishment of the Air-transport Ministry for realization of unprecedented advancement of our civil air-transportation.
- (4) New establishment of the Ministry of Health for the promotion of people's physique and cultivation of their labor strength.
- (5) Revision of the Civil Service Appointment Ordinance with a view to selecting and appointing capable civilian personnels to let them undertake fresh and active industrial administration.
- (6) As to personal affairs of the special juridical person, to make it a basic principle not to appoint any Government official in view of the evils in the past.

Attached Table  
No. 1.

TABLE SHOWING PROPORTION OF EXPANSION OF PROJECTED INDUSTRIES

Comparison of Production Strength in 1941 of principal projected industries with that of 1936 shows approximately the following result:

ITEMS	(A)	PRODUCTION GOAL			(B)	PRESENT CAPACITY			MULTIPLE RATIO OF (A) to (B)		
		Total	Japan	Manchuria		Total	Japan	Manchuria	Total	Japan	Manchuria
Ordinary Automobile	( 1,000 No.) 100	90	10	37	37	-	2.7	2.4	-		
Engineering Machinery	( 1,000 No.) 50	45	5	13	13	-	3.8	3.5	-		
Steel Material	( 10,000 Metric ton) 1,300	900	400	485	440	45	2.7	2.0	8.9		
Petroleum	( 10,000 Metric ton) 565	325	240	36.4	21	15.4	15.6	15.5	15.6		
Coal	( 10,000 Metric ton) 11,000	7,200	2,800	5,556	4,200	1,356	2.0	1.7	2.8		
Aluminum	( 1,000 Metric ton) 100	70	30	21	21	-	4.8	3.3	-		
Magnesium	( 1,000 Metric ton) 9		3	0.5	0.5	-	18.0	12.0	-		
Electric Power	( 10,000 K.W.) 1,257	1,117	140	721	675	46	1.7	1.7	3.0		
Shipbuilding	( 10,000 ton) 93	86	7	50	50	-	1.9	1.7			

- NOTES: 1. The expansion ratio of general machineries is approximately 18.  
2. The expansion ratio of Petroleum shows exclusively that of home produced gasoline and heavy oil. In case the producing capacity (1936) based on imported crude oil is taken as standard, the multiple ratio becomes little less than 10.

Attached Table  
No. 2

ASSURED AMOUNT OF PEOPLE'S SAVINGS

Yearly Increase or Decrease	Reserve Companies	Fund Indus- trial Assn.	Investment by Industrial Assn.	Paid-up Capital of Companies	Internal			
					Company Bonds	National Bonds	Local Bonds	Industrial Bonds
1926	98	14	21	578	205	158	26	2
1927	61	5	18	539	427	242	101	13
1928	129	14	18	462	466	420	169	2
1929	92	11	17	659	238	239	137	6
1930	(-)42	10	12	299	295	66	48	17
1931	(-)78	7	6	273	136	204	145	-
1932	84	5	5	264	147	746	145	18
1933	316	6	4	632	(-) 164	1,109	262	5
1934	438	8	7	1,330	96	1,041	359	0
1935	x 438	x 8	x 7	999	151	878	114	2

DIVISION OF PEOPLE'S SAVINGS

Internal		Insurance Reserve Fund		Government Insurance	Mutual Financing Association Fund	Bank Deposits	Postal Savings & Postal Transfer Savings	Trust Deposits	Savings & Deposits in Organs belonging to Industrial Section Ass. System	Special Deposits
Local Bonds	Industrial Bonds	Insurance Companies	Government Insurance							
26	2	137	92	(-)	1	365	26	220	145	(-)
101	13	114	147	-	-	104	369	274	146	
169	2	136	137		5	257	224	294	177	
137	6	151	131		10	293	318	151	115	
48	17	113	138		8	(-) 343	296	4	(-) 7	(-)
145	-	123	127		8	(-) 542	265	46	(-) 35	
145	18	142	172		1	369	85	5	54	(-)
262	5	157	240		13	598	109	169	217	
359	0	217	232		18	707	157	189	99	(-)
114	2	241	x 232		14	934	160	164	x 93	(-)

(Unit = One Million Yen)

Savings & Deposits in Organs belonging to Industrial Section of System	Specific Deposits in Deposit Section	Cash Held by Individuals & Industrial Companies	TOTAL A	Owned by Banks, Ins. Trust, Mutual Finance Ass., Government, Local Public Bodies		Securities, Deposits & Cash Owned by Industrial Companies	TOTAL B	People's Savings (A - B)	
				Deposits	Securities				
145	(-)	2	(-) 57	2,029	(-) 64	382	115	499	1,596
146		1	91	2,652	16	990	125	1,131	1,521
177		6	12	2,928	(-) 264	1,359	172	1,267	1,661
115		90	(-) 70	2,528	94	504	129	727	1,801
7	(-)	7	(-) 151	756	(-) 122	291	11	180	576
95		16	(-) 56	645	(-) 307	403	14	110	535
54	(-)	17	72	2,297	110	1,091	5	1,206	1,091
217		120	95	3,890	913	1,715	119	2,141	1,749
99	(-)	22	82	4,966	48	1,542	278	1,868	3,098
99	(-)	99	• 104	• 4,500	• 112	• 1,238	309	* 1,659	• 2,841

X Represents unknown and figures for previous year provisionally adopted.

• Represents that which includes figures adopted as above.

(Unit = One Million Yen)

Specific Deposits in Deposit Section	Cash Held by Individuals & Industrial Companies		TOTAL A	Owned by Banks, Ins. Trust, Mutual Finance Ass., Government, Local Public Bodies		Securities, Deposits & Cash Owned by Industrial Companies	TOTAL B	People's Savings (A - B)	
				Deposits	Securities				
2	(-)	57	2,029	(-)	64	382	115	433	1,596
1		91	2,652		16	990	125	1,131	1,521
6		12	2,928	(-)	264	1,359	172	1,267	1,661
30	(-)	70	2,528		94	504	129	727	1,801
7	(-)	151	756	(-)	122	291	11	180	576
16	(-)	56	645	(-)	307	403	14	110	535
17		72	2,297		110	1,091	5	1,206	1,091
120		95	3,890		313	1,715	113	2,141	1,749
22		82	4,966		48	1,542	278	1,868	3,098
39	•	104	• 4,500	•	112	• 1,238	309	* 1,659	• 2,841

X Represents unknown and figures for previous year provisionally adopted.

• Represents that which includes figures adopted as above.

ATTACHED TABLE NO. 3

CLASSIFICATION	UNIT	ESTIMATED AMOUNT OF REQUISITE FUNDS FOR EXTENSION PLANE OF			Total
		Amount to be Newly Extended		Construction Funds	
		Total	Japan	Manchuria	Total
Aircraft		-	-	-	375
Ordinary Motorcar	10-Thousand	11	10	1	153
General Machinery	10-Thousand Yen	125,000	17,000	8,000	625
Engineering Machinery	"	13,700	10,700	3,000	137
<u>Iron Manufacture</u>					
Steel	10-Thousand kilo tons	715	360	355	1,001
Pig Iron	"	839	474	365	98
Ore	"	1,207	477	730	97
<u>Petroleum</u>					
Oil-Field	"	151	151	-	100
Artificial Fuel Oil	"	400	165	Liquid 149 Shale 86	1,325
Total	"			235	
Alcohol	"	29	25	4	86
Total	"	580	341	239	1,512
Coal	"	5,844	3,400	2,444	769
Aluminium	"	6	4	2	141
Magnesium	1-Thousand Kilo tons	5	3	2	14
Electric Power	10-Thousand K.W.	536	442	94	2,477
Shipbuilding	10-Thousand tons	43	36	7	129
Vehicle Locomotive	No.			88(691) 3,000(7620)	28
Freight Car					
Soda	10-Thousand kilo ton	22	19	4	24
Dyestuffs	"	2	2	-	33
Pulp	"	28	23	5	98
Gold Mining	10-Thousand Yen kilo tons	21,141 57	14,175 40	6,966 17	186
OTHERS		-	-	-	641
GRAND TOTAL OF REQUISITE FUNDS					8,536

REMARKS: This Table has been specially studied and composed for the purpose of estimating total for execution of this program and consequentially does not completely coincide in basic and Attached Table No. 1. However, this Table has been inserted for reference as shown

**REQUISITE FUNDS FOR EXTENSION PLANS OF IMPORTANT INDUSTRIES OF JAPAN & MANCHURIA.**

Extended Construction Funds Required (Unit: One Million Yen)

Japan	Manchuria	Total	Japan	Manchuria
	-	375	302	73
10	1	153	146	7
7,000	8,000	625	585	40
4,700	5,000	137	107	30
360	355	1,001	504	497
474	365	98	-	98
477	730	97	38	58
151	-	100	100	-
165	Liquid 149 Shale 86	1,325	598	Liquid 621 Shale 107
	235			728
25	4	86	75	11
341	239	1,512	773	739
3,400	2,444	769	476	293
4	2	141	79	62
3	2	14	7	7
442	94	2,477	2,210	267
36	7	129	108	21
	88(691)	28	-	28
	3,000(7620)			
19	4	24	19	5
2	-	33	33	-
23	5	98	81	18
4,175	6,966	186	144	42
40	17			
-	-	641	481	160
<b>TOTAL OF REQUISITE FUNDS</b>		<b>8,536</b>	<b>6,092</b>	<b>2,444</b>

Proposed for the purpose of estimating total amount of construction funds required. This table does not completely coincide in basic figures with Table of Requisite Items. It has been inserted for reference as showing basis of calculation of such funds.



ESTIMATES OF DIRECT & INDIRECT SUBSIDIES OF JAPANESE  
FOR INDUSTRIES PROJECTED BY THIS PROGRAM

Attached Table No. 4 - 1

<u>ITEM</u>	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941
Maintenance & Guarantee of Factory Equipments of Aircraft Manufacturing Company					2,574
Amount to be appropriated out of Army Air Expenditure for Aircraft Industry (Based on Assumption)	22,199	21,393	22,793	22,253	46,713
Aid for equipment in accordance with Iron and Steel Self-sufficient Policy	260	2,100	2,100	2,600	-
Subsidy to Petroleum Prospecting (Decided)	692	715	715	715	715
Subsidy to Exploitation of North Sakhalin Petroleum Resources (Ditto)	2,172	2,440	1,338	864	864
Prospecting Expenses of Navy Reserve Oil Fields (Ditto)	710	710	-	-	-
Subsidy for Prospecting Oil Fields	-	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000
Government Investment in Imperial Fuel Joint Stock Company	1,000	9,000	5,000	5,000	5,000
Subsidy for Artificial Fuel Oil Manufacture	1,792	7,327	24,772	34,327	46,265
Security Money for National Policy Shipbuilding Companies	-	640	1,220	876	180
Government Investment to National Policy Machinery Company	-	5,000	5,000	5,000	-
<u>OTHERS</u>	-	51,000	150,000	150,000	150,000
<u>TOTAL</u>	29,825	116,320	230,553	247,545	259,268
Government Subscription to Mining and Industrial Section of Manchurian Railway Company	-	10,000	10,000	10,000	9,687
Government Investment in Other Enterprises in Manchuria	-	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000
<u>TOTAL</u>	-	30,000	30,000	30,000	29,687
<u>AGGREGATE</u>	29,825	146,320	260,553	277,545	288,955

NOTE: This Table is a provisional calculation for the purpose of obtaining basis of Requisite Funds

OF DIRECT & INDIRECT SUBSIDIES OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT  
INDUSTRIES PROJECTED BY THIS PROGRAM

(Unit = One Thousand Yen)

	1939	1940	1941	TOTAL
			3,574	3,574
393	32,798	42,153	46,713	176,256
000	3,100	2,600	-	3,000
15	715	715	715	3,552
40	1,988	864	564	7,580
710	-	-	-	1,420
000	6,000	6,000	6,000	24,000
000	5,000	5,000	5,000	25,000
27	34,772	34,337	46,365	115,093
40	1,280	876	180	2,976
000	5,000	5,000	-	15,000
0	150,000	150,000	150,000	501,000
0	230,553	247,515	259,268	883,511
0	10,000	10,000	9,687	39,687
0	20,000	20,000	20,000	80,000
0	30,000	30,000	29,687	119,687
0	260,553	277,545	289,955	1,003,198

urpose of obtaining basis of Requisite Funds.

ESTIMATES OF DIRECT & INDIRECT SUBSIDIES OF JAPANESE  
FOR INDUSTRIES PROJECTED BY THIS PROGRAM

Attached Table No. 4 - 1

<u>ITEMS</u>	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941
Maintenance & Guarantee of Factory Equip- ments of Aircraft Manufacturing Company					3,574
Amount to be appropriated out of Army Air Expenditure for Aircraft Industry (Based on Assumption)	22,199	21,393	32,793	42,153	46,713
Aid for equipment in accordance with Iron and Steel Self-sufficient Policy	260	2,100	2,100	2,600	-
Subsidy to Petroleum Prospecting (Decided)	692	715	715	715	715
Subsidy to Exploitation of North Sakhalin Petroleum Resources (Ditto)	2,172	2,440	1,988	864	864
Prospecting Expenses of Navy Reserve Oil Fields (Ditto)	710	710	-	-	-
Subsidy for Prospecting Oil Fields	-	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000
Government Investment in Imperial Fuel Joint Stock Company	1,000	9,000	5,000	5,000	5,000
Subsidy for Artificial Fuel Oil Manufacture	1,792	7,327	24,772	34,337	46,265
Security Money for National Policy Shipbuild- ing Companies	-	640	1,200	876	180
Government Investment to National Policy Machinery Company	-	5,000	5,000	5,000	-
<u>OTHERS</u>	-	51,000	150,000	150,000	150,000
<u>TOTAL</u>	29,825	116,320	230,553	247,545	259,269
Government Subscription to Mining and Industrial Section of Manchurian Railway Company	-	10,000	10,000	10,000	9,687
Government Investment in Other Enterprises in Manchuria	-	20,000	20,000	20,000	20,000
<u>TOTAL</u>	-	30,000	30,000	30,000	29,687
<u>AGGREGATE</u>	29,825	146,320	260,553	277,545	288,955

NOTE: This Table is a provisional calculation for the purpose of obtaining basis of Requisite Funds.

DIRECT & INDIRECT SUBSIDIES OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT  
STIPES PROJECTED BY THIS PROGRAM:

(Unit - One Thousand Yen)

1939	1940	1941	TOTAL
		3,574	3,574
2,798	42,153	46,713	176,256
2,100	2,600	-	3,090
715	715	715	3,552
1,888	864	864	7,580
-	-	-	1,420
6,000	6,000	6,000	24,000
5,000	5,000	5,000	25,000
4,772	34,327	46,265	115,099
1,290	876	180	2,976
5,000	5,000	-	15,000
1,000	150,000	150,000	501,000
553	247,545	259,268	883,511
1,000	10,000	9,687	39,687
1,000	20,000	20,000	80,000
1,000	30,000	29,687	119,687
553	277,545	289,955	1,003,198

of obtaining basis of Requisite Funds.

ESTIMATES OF SUBSIDIES OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT FOR COLLATERAL  
ENTERPRISES FOR EXECUTION OF THIS PROGRAM

Attached Table No. 4 - 2

(Unit = One Thousand Yen)

ITEMS	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941	Total
Promotion & Subsidy to Civil Air-Transportation	-	12,998	14,168	14,158	14,403	55,727
Government Investment in The Industrial Bank of Japan	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	15,000
Government Investment in The National Policy Trade Company	5,000	5,000	-	5,000	-	15,000
Expenditure Cultivating Overseas Farm Products Markets	300	300	300	300	300	15,000
Training Expenses for Technicians & Skilled Workmen	17,418	13,850	15,155	5,950	5,950	58,323
Aid to Exploitation of Special Iron Resources	1,004	2,148	1,165	1,200	700	6,217
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>26,722</b>	<b>37,296</b>	<b>33,788</b>	<b>29,608</b>	<b>24,353</b>	<b>151,767</b>
Government Investment for <u>Other</u> Industrial Enterprises than the Manchurian Railway	-	30,000	25,000	25,000	24,105	104,105
Expenses of National Policy of Immigration to Manchuria	-	15,000	-	500	500	16,000
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>45,000</b>	<b>25,000</b>	<b>25,500</b>	<b>24,605</b>	<b>120,105</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>26,722</b>	<b>82,296</b>	<b>58,788</b>	<b>55,108</b>	<b>48,958</b>	<b>271,872</b>

REMARKS:

1. The Amounts Shown in this Table are not included in the Amounts of Government Investment described in the text of Financial Policy.
2. This Table has been provisionally prepared for the purpose of calculating basis of requisite funds.

III OUTLINE OF THE PLAN FOR THE EXPANSION OF

PROGRESSIVE POWER

By

PLANNING BOARD

(Decided by Cabinet Conference) Jan 1939

## OUTLINE OF THE PLAN FOR THE EXPANSION OF PRODUCTIVE

### POWER

In view of the present situation at home and abroad, this plan aims at the repletion and strengthening of the national power of our country which is the stabilizing force of East Asia, and for the establishment of a comprehensive productive power expansion plan for Japan, Manchoukuo and China, which will bring about the realization of the necessary goal in regard to important national defense and basic industries by 1941, in order to be prepared for the epochal development of our country's destiny in the future, and the realization of this is expected at all cost.

#### 1. Basic Policy.

- (1) The scope of this plan chiefly aims at the perfection of the foundation of national defense and is restricted to major industries requiring rapid expansion under a unified plan.
- (2) This plan is for the establishment of a plan for the expansion of the productive power of the major industries of our country based on the policy for establishment of a comprehensive plan for Japan, Manchoukuo and China through close contact and coordination among Japan, Manchoukuo and China.
- (3) → This plan aims at the establishment of self-sufficiency in regard to important resources within the sphere of our influence and thereby avoid dependency on the resources of a third power as far as possible in time of an emergency.

#### 2. Aim.

The types of planned industries, the production goal to be achieved in 1941 by this plan and the yearly production estimates are as follows:

KIND OF MATERIAL	UNIT	GOAL	Yearly Estimates			
			1938	1939	1940	1941
<u>IRON &amp; STEEL</u>	1,000 Kilo tons					
Steel Material						
Ordinary Steel		7,260	4,615	5,630	6,280	7,260
Special Steel & Cast Steel		1,000	520	670	820	1,000
Steel Ingots		9,950	6,310	7,753	8,799	9,950
Pig Iron		6,362	3,300	4,000-	5,293	6,362
Iron Ore.		5,700	2,250	3,200	4,400	5,700
<u>COAL</u>	1,000 Kilo tons	78,182	58,363	65,803	71,725	78,182
<u>Light Metals</u>	Kilo tons					
Aluminum		126,400	19,000	29,200	39,100	126,400
Magnesium		11,000	1,123	2,780	6,650	11,000
<u>Non-Ferrous Metal</u>	Kilo tons					
Copper		179,000	97,406	128,183	149,477	179,000
Lead		35,550	18,744	26,785	33,625	35,550
Zinc		95,000	55,800	70,100	88,000	95,000
Tin		3,500	1,804	2,650	2,850	3,500
Nickel		5,000	150	2,150	3,980	5,000
<u>Petroleum &amp; its Substitutes</u>	1,000 Kilo-litres					
Gas. for Aircrafts		240	45	74	145	240
Gas. for Motorcars (nat.)		1,250	965	1,228	1,417	1,250
Gas. for Motorcars (art.)		290	10	26	76	290
Heavy Oil (nat.)		850	610	756	886	850
Heavy Oil (art.)		246	28	48	83	246
Lubricating Oil for Aircrafts		20		5	10	20



KIND OF MATERIAL	Unit	Goal	Yearly estimates			
			1938	1939	1940	1941
Absolute alcohol		270	20	90	170	270
<u>SODA &amp; INDUSTRIAL SALT</u>	1,000 Kilo tons					
Soda Ash		908	736	667	757	908
Caustic Soda		574	408	396	471	574
Industrial Salt		325	50	71	157	325
Ammonia Sulphate	1,000 Kilo tons	2,039	1,510	1,760	1,936	2,039
<u>PULP</u>	1,000 Long tons					
For Paper		1,037	875	901	989	1,037
For Rayon		307	95	194	253	307
<u>GOLD</u>	Kilogram	106,534	51,669	76,025	91,909	106,534
<u>MACHINE TOOLS</u>	1,000 Yen	200,000	76,000	118,500	172,500	200,000
<u>ROLLING STOCK</u>	Cars					
Locomotives		1,100	877	980	1,050	1,100
Passenger cars		2,000	1,161	1,600	2,000	2,000
Freight cars		21,000	14,111	20,000	21,000	21,000
<u>SHIPS</u>	Ton	650,000	402,000	550,000	600,000	650,000
<u>MOTORCARS</u>	1,000 Cars	80	157	45	65	80
<u>WOOL</u>	Bale	9,166	2,722	3,902	4,103	9,166
Electric Power	K.W.					
Hydro.		2,699,700	415,000	528,000	658,700	1,092,000
Coal		1,000,000	295,000	245,000	230,000	230,000

N.B. The yearly figures for electric powers denote the estimated increase during the year and the figures given in the Goal Column represent the aggregates.

### 3. Method of execution.

This plan is to be realized in accordance with the real object of its planning, with the government and the people united as one, and with the entire strength of the nation backed by

perfect cooperation and firm determination directed toward it. Accordingly, in executing this plan, the government should take every possible measures for its accomplishment, so that there could occur no setback in its execution.

For this purpose, the government should endeavor to make a proper and effective use of the various systems and facilities for the promotion of industries executed heretofore, and in view of the fact that this plan aims at a rapid and intensive expansion of the productive power, the government shall devise special measures in regard to the control and encouragement of enterprises, the supplying of technicians and laborers, the accommodation of funds and the supplying of necessary materials according to the condition of the various industries for accelerating and securing the execution of the plan.

Pursuant to the above policy, the government is to take such measures, if necessary, as to enact laws and to enforce the National Mobilization Law.

(Reference Material)

PLANS FOR EXPANSION OF PRODUCTIVE POWER OF  
MANCHOUKUO & NORTH CHINA

In Manchoukuo, a 5-Year Plan for industrial exploitation has been framed aiming at 1941 (8th Year of Kotoku) as a goal and is in course of its execution, while in North China, a plan for expansion of productive power during a period of 1939-1942 was also undertaken and is at present under vigorous preparation.

In the above two plans, those factors corresponding to our expansion program of productive power may be outlined in the following tables.

Furthermore, these plans may <sup>be</sup> subject to further re-adjustments from the point of view of an expansion plan for synthetic productive power of Japan, Manchoukuo ~~and~~ when our plan is finally decided.

(1) 5-YEAR PLAN FOR INDUSTRIAL EXPLOITATION OF MANCHOUKOO

<u>ITEMS</u>	<u>UNITS</u>	1938	1939	1940	1941
<u>IRON &amp; STEEL</u>	One-Thousand Kilo tons				
Steel Materials		335	395	557	1,038
Steel Ingot		620	655	1,099	2,027
Pig Iron		910	1,760	2,350	3,325
Iron Ore		3,286	5,315	7,295	11,200
<u>COAL</u>	One-Thousand Kilo tons	17,185	21,450	26,410	31,910
Light Metals	Kilo ton				
Aluminum	" "	1,500	4,500	8,500	15,000
Magnesium	" "		10	400	1,000
<u>NON-FERROUS METALS</u>	Kilo ton				
Copper	" "	390	1,765	3,160	3,971
Lead	" "	2,993	12,395	27,487	46,152
Zinc	" "	2,575	14,319	31,850	50,525
<u>LIQUID FUEL</u>					
Gasoline	One-Thousand Kilo-litres	135	143	191	335
Heavy Oil	One-Thousand Kilo-tons	95	91	186	186
<u>SODA &amp; SALT</u>	Kilo-ton				
Soda Ash	" "	54,000	72,000	72,000	72,000
Caustic Soda	" "	200	3,100	9,655	12,255
Salt	" "	391,180	509,190	679,400	910,160
<u>SULPHATE OF ALUMINA</u>	" "	270,670	308,162	382,420	593,990
<u>PULP</u>	One-Thousand Kilo tons	54	65	193	270
<u>GOLD</u>	Kilograms	5,142	10,065	20,568	33,277
<u>ENGINEERING MACHINERY</u>	No.	120	250	500	500
Automobile	No.				30,000
<u>SHEEP'S WOOL</u>	Kilo ton				
Select Breed		116	212	318	529
Ordinary Breed		3,171	3,346	3,548	3,757
<u>ELECTRIC POWER</u>	K. W.	603,730	898,010	1,394,210	2,066,010

N.B. 1. This Table shows the estimated amount of production in and after the 2d year, of the same articles enumerated in the expansion plan of productive power of Japan.

2. Respecting Sheep's Wool, plan on Japanese side has been provisionally adopted.

(2) EXPANSION PLAN OF PRODUCTIVE POWER OF NORTH CHINA

ITEMS	UNITS	1939	1940	1941	1942
<b>IRON &amp; STEEL</b>	One-Thousand Kilo-tons				
<b>STEEL MATERIALS</b>	"				130
Pig Iron	"	45	141	210	571
Iron Ore	"	290	822	1,260	1,689
<b>COAL</b>	One-Thousand Kilo-tons	14,200	17,900	22,700	22,300
<b>LIQUID FUEL</b>	One-Thousand Kilo-tons				
Gasoline				25	215
Heavy Oil					85
<b>SODA &amp; SALT</b>	One-Thousand Kilo-tons				
Soda Ash	"	42	55	125	125
Caustic Soda	"			18	215
Salt	"	1,076	1,266	1,532	1,820
<b>SHEEP'S WOOL</b>	"				
Select Breed	"		30	74	334
Ordinary Breed	"	8,633	9,108	9,609	10,036
<b>ELECTRIC POWER</b>	K.W.	84,000	84,000	229,000	269,000

N. F.

1. This Table shows the estimated amount of production of the same articles taken up in the expansion plan of productive power of Japan.
2. Regarding Sheep's Wool, amount anticipated by Japan has been adopted.
3. Regarding Electric Power, figures planned in Mongolian-Sing Kiang Districts are not included.

Document No. 1522

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I.P.S. No. 1522

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, TAKAHASHI, Michitoshi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Cabinet, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 66 pages, dated \_\_\_\_\_, 1941, and described as follows: Book, "Progress for Mapping Out a Program for Important Industry Extension. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Cabinet.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
17th day of August, 1946.

M. Takahashi (signed)  
Signature of Official

Witness: R. Kuriyama (signed)

Secretary of Cabinet SEAL  
Official Capacity.

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
19th day of Aug., 1946


Richard H. Larsh (signed)  
NAME

Witness: Edward P. Monaghan  
(signed)

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity



# ELECTRIC POWER CONSUMPTION IN JAPAN PROPER, 1931-1941

KILOWATT HOURS  
(BILLIONS)



SOURCE : MINISTRY OF COMMERCE & INDUSTRY



# CRUDE OIL CONSUMPTION AND STOCKS IN JAPAN PROPER, 1931-1941



SOURCE : MINISTRY OF COMMERCE & INDUSTRY




1926-1941  
**STEEL PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS IN JAPAN**  
 PROPER, 1926-1941




SOURCE: MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY

# ALUMINUM PRODUCTION IN JAPANESE EMPIRE, 1926-1941




SOURCE: ① PRODUCTION DATA: LIGHT METAL CONTROL ASSOCIATION;  
 ② IMPORT DATA: FINANCE MINISTRY

# ALUMINUM PRODUCTION IN JAPANESE EMPIRE, 1926-1941




SOURCE: ① PRODUCTION DATA: LIGHT METAL CONTROL ASSOCIATION;  
 ② IMPORT DATA: FINANCE MINISTRY

## MACHINE TOOL PRODUCTION AND NET IMPORTS IN JAPAN PROPER, 1930-1941



SOURCE : MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND  
MACHINE TOOL CONTROL ASSOCIATION

## EXPANSION OF PRECISION BEARING INDUSTRY IN JAPAN PROPER, 1931-1941



SOURCE : PRECISION MACHINE CONTROL ASSOCIATION

"The Tokyo Michi-Nichi"  
11 March 1942  
No. 23,588

A SPEECH BY KENRYO SATO  
CHIEF OF THE MILITARY AFFAIRS SECTION  
OF THE WAR MINISTRY.

Hot Pursuit of America and Britain. Not to be Relaxed.  
Internal Structure Must be Reinforced.

Major General Kenryo Sato, Chief of the Military Affairs Section, War Ministry, delivered the following speech at the Army Day commemoration lecture meeting, held from 6:30 p.m. on March 10, the Thirty-Seventh Army Day, at Hibiya Public Hall, Tokyo:

"Recalling the Russo-Japanese War on this anniversary of the Mukden Battle, which, together with the Battle of the Japan Sea, brought about an end to the Russo-Japanese War, I wish to express my views on the direction of the Greater East Asia War and our firm belief in gaining ultimate victory.

The Time of Starting the Russo-Japanese War and the Initial Battle.

"Generally speaking, there are two points that are most important in a war. One is to select the right time for starting war and to obtain substantial results in the initial battle. The other is to gain a complete victory in the ultimate battle which truly determines victory or defeat. What required our country's deepest consideration in selecting the time for starting the Russo-Japanese War was to start the war before the construction of the Siberian Railway was completed and before its great transportation capacity was developed. We seized our opportunity to start the war, though we had many troublesome internal difficulties. This selection of the right time for battle and the resulting surprise attack against Port Arthur, the crossing of the Yalu River, the surprise landing on the Liao-tung Peninsula and other brilliant war results, brought to nothing the Russians' operational plan to mass their army between Haicheng and Kiao-yang and to defeat one by one with a determined offensive our forces which were marching northward from the direction of the Korean Peninsula on the one hand and from the Liao-tung Peninsula on the other.

Opening of the Greater East Asia War, The Time and the Initial Battle.

"The points which required consideration in the selection of the time for opening the Greater East Asia War were the amount of reserve war materials and the various tactical factors for the landing operations against Malaya. If there was no way of breaking the deadlock in the Japanese-American negotiations, the time for opening the war would surely decide the fate of our country. That is, with the opening of the war, reserve war materials would be fast consumed and, unless the graph of consumption of war materials could be completely adjusted with the graph of the new production which could be newly and steadily acquired by operations, the continuance of the war would become impossible.

"If our country were dragged along by America's policy of procrastination, we would have grown poorer and poorer and the adjustment of the consumption graph and the new production graph rendered impossible, thereby crippling the country, because we consumed annually hundreds of thousands of tons of oil, even if the Greater East Asia War had not been started. The other matter which was the subject of the greatest anxiety to the Army and Navy in the initial battle was the landing operations against Malaya. Landing operations are seriously affected by the moon, the tide, and the monsoon. Because of these factors, December 8 was the last opportune moment. The decision of our Empire to start the Greater East Asia War by seizing the opportunity in the direction of our national policy was a feat that finds its place in the most illustrious moments of history.

The Cardinal Principle of Directing the Greater East Asia War.

"Secondly, what will be the greatest decisive battle in the Greater East Asia War which will be comparable with the Mukden Battle and the Battle of the Japan Sea?

Our Empire has already captured Singapore, the greatest of the British strategic bases in East Asia, taken possession of all the strategic bases in the South Seas, and is now completing the occupation of Burma, whereby our military power will control the Indian Ocean. The loss of Singapore, which, together with the Suez Canal and Gibraltar, both of which will perhaps be occupied later by the German and the Italian Armies, forms Britain's three great key points in the world from the standpoint of strategy and trade, is not only a serious loss to the existence of the British Empire, but places under our complete control areas with important

resources in China and the South Seas. Furthermore, it will not be long before India and Australia fall out of the British Empire. Thus, even if the British Empire fails to collapse altogether, it will be nothing but a tributary of America.

"Thus, while bringing about the collapse of the British Empire, we shall be securing and consolidating strategic bases in the Pacific against America. Meanwhile, Germany and Italy while pressing hard on the British rear guard line, will secure and consolidate strategic points in the Atlantic. Finally, Japan, Germany and Italy, in perfect cooperation, will employ both political and military tactics to defeat Britain and America by carrying out active operations in both the Pacific and the Atlantic.

#### 'What Are the Enemies' Measures?

"What measures will the enemies take against us? America and Britain are placing great expectations on the Soviet-German War. They also appear to be planning to consolidate their contacts with Soviet Russia via Africa, the Near East and the Caucasus, and also their contacts with India and China via the Near East, with a view to smashing German and Italian spearheads, while checking cooperation between Japan, Germany and Italy. Then they hope to take the offensive against Japan. From what direction will this offensive come? First, they may force the Soviet Union to attack the Japanese mainland from the north, using the Maritime Provinces as their base. But it should be more than clear what the fate of Soviet territory in East Asia will be if the Soviet Union should attack Japan in cooperation with America. When Ex-Foreign Minister Matsuoka visited Stalin in Moscow, their conversation happened to touch on the problem of the Maritime Provinces. It is said that Stalin, holding a stick under his chin as if he were hanging himself, stressed that to lose the Maritime Provinces was to Soviet Russia like hanging herself. However, since it is always the cardinal principle of war to rely on one's own preparations, we have already fully prepared ourselves for any emergency.

"The second course is for the enemies to attack us from the Southwestern Pacific and the Indian Ocean, gradually taking back those strategic bases that have already fallen into our hands or will be occupied by us in the near future. Under present conditions, however, Anglo-American offensive operations against Japan are a very, very hard task, unless a great commander makes some very wonderful plan. We do not know from where the ~~next~~ attack will come, from the north or from the south, but we must anticipate that America and



Britain will seek a decisive battle with Japan in one, two, or three years after America has completed the expansion of her armaments.

#### The Lesson of the Russo-Japanese War.

"In the Russo-Japanese War, our army gained consecutive victories from the beginning. The Russian General Kropatkin, upon being defeated at the Battle of Liaoyang, decided to give up Mukden and to retreat as far back as Tieling. Herein lies a great lesson. If our army had possessed a rallying force and had hotly pursued the Russian troops after the Battle of Liaoyang, further battles would not have been fought and the war would have ended then and there. Alas, however, the Japanese Army at that time possessed no such rallying force and hence could not make any chase worthy of the name. That is to say, up to the Battle of Mukden, Japan could not compete with Russia in concentrating or expanding fighting power. In the light of this lesson, the best way to win the present war is to forestall and frustrate the intentions of the enemies, and cause their submission without fighting another Battle of Mukden or another Battle of the Japan Sea.

#### Anglo-American Contradictions and Miscalculations

##### A. Contradictions in American War Aims

"Here I wish to point out the enemies' contradictions and miscalculations. First, the contradictions in American war aims. Ever since the time when the Chinese Incident broke out, the European War occurred and the Greater East Asia War was started, the United States, always with the object of protecting democracy, has been trying to fight Japan's expansionist policy, Hitlerism and Fascism. And yet America is now associated with the Soviet Union. Isn't communism the most formidable enemy of democracy? Aside from this inconsistency, America has adopted the defense policy of making London, Moscow and Chungking the first line of her national defense and assigning to herself the role of an arsenal for supporting Britain, Chiang Kai-Shek and the Soviet Union, whereby to achieve her national policy, by offering goods instead of blood. Moreover, utilizing to advantage her neutral position, she is obtaining as much as she pleases of rubber, tin, tungsten and other important products from the various parts of the world, especially from East Asia, and she is making strenuous efforts to expand her armaments, in the hope of gaining the greatest voice, nay, the highest power of command in the world when the belligerents have been finally exhausted. However, the outbreak of the Greater East Asia War

has radically upset America's defense policy. The Chungking Government is being reduced to a local regime in the interior, while Japan has inflicted great damage to the Allied Powers, cut off America from the treasure islands of the South Seas, deprived her of almost all strategic points in the Pacific, and inflicted heavy losses to the American Navy.

"Thus, America, which might have gained victory by sacrificing only materials, has no prospect of victory, nay, she will be a loser, even if she made sacrifices both in materials and human blood. The chief cause of this sad plight of America's can be traced back to the question of stationing Japanese troops in special districts of China for a certain specified period of time, which was the last point in the Japanese-American negotiations. America opposed the stationing of Japanese troops, because she was deceived by Chiang Kai-Shek's propaganda. Roosevelt had a great mind to please the Chinese and win their applause. Chiang Kai-Shek himself neither thought it possible to secure the complete evacuation of Japanese troops, nor considered it would be impossible to make peace with Japan unless complete evacuation was effected. As a matter of fact, the Chungking side once intimated to Japan through a certain channel that it had the intention of recognizing the stationing of Japanese troops in certain specified districts of China. It follows that we must not overlook the fact that behind the greatest cause of the rupture of the Japanese-American negotiations was this stupid ambition of Roosevelt's, who had been influenced by Chiang Kai-Shek's propaganda.

#### B. Miscalculation of Japan's Fighting Power.

"The fundamental cause of the commission of such a serious blunder by American leaders may be traced back to the fact that Japan's excessive humility toward America in her past foreign policy and other matters invited for herself American contempt. Especially since the outbreak of the China Affair, America thought Japan had completely exhausted her national strength.

"In 1936 our army formulated a national defense plan, for the army felt keenly the necessity of expanding armaments and productive power in order to secure and develop the results of the Manchurian Incident. As the expansion of armaments and rearmament by the European Powers were to be completed by 1941 or 1942, we anticipated an international crisis at about that time. Therefore, considering it necessary to complete by every means possible the expansion of our armaments and productive power by 1942, we decided to effect a great expansion by means of a six-year armament plan for the period 1937 to 1942, and a five-year production expansion plan for the period 1937 to 1941. In 1937, the first year of

this plan, the Lukouchiao Incident broke out. What worried us most was the fear that this incident might cause the break-down of our Armament Expansion Plan and the Five-Year Production Expansion Plan. So we decided to see that the Chinese Incident would not end in a war of attrition to our side. Accordingly, generally speaking, we spent 40% of our budget on the Chinese Incident and 60% on armament expansion. In respect to iron and other important materials allotted to the army, we spent 20% on the Chinese Incident and 80% on the expansion of armaments. As a result, the air force and mechanized units have been greatly expanded and the fighting power of the whole Japanese Army has been increased to more than three times what it was before the China Incident. I believe that our Navy, which suffered very little attrition in the China Affair must have perfected and expanded its fighting power. Of course, productive power of the munition industry has been expanded 70 to 80% at a rough estimate.

"Besides the above-said armaments and productive power, we have separately defeated each anti-Japanese force in China and occupied the greater part of the important portions of China, and the iron ore, coal, cotton and other important defense resources obtained from these areas are now contributing greatly to our fighting power. We have completed our establishment of strategic points on the continent, in particular our troops have marched into French-Indo-China, which gave us powerful footing for the present Greater East Asia War. Furthermore, through four and a half years of the China Affair we have gained real training in actual fighting. Their intangible results are now being developed before our eyes.

#### Sword and Abacus

"According to what I heard recently from certain people who had been on friendly terms with American leaders, the latter seem to think that Japan's expansionist policy cannot be checked at all, that if Japanese troops once march southward, it cannot be helped if the Philippines, Malaya and the Netherlands Indies fall into Japanese hands for a time; but that after breaking the brunt of the German attack, the Allied Powers will be able to subdue Japan very soon if they face Japan cooperatively and apply the great economic power of Britain and America, because Japan will exhaust her national strength more and more owing to her military advance into the Southern areas. British leaders seem to think the same.

"It is very comic that they think too much of economic power. They are committing again the same mistake that they did in mistakenly judging that Japan would be ruined economically by the China Affair. If a cartoonist is allowed to depict this, he will perhaps draw a picture in which Miyamoto-Musashi, a famous fencer of the Tokugawa Era, is brandishing his sword while underneath a clerk of a big shop tries to check the blow with an abacus. The enemies probably realized the difference of power between a sword and an abacus from the initial battles of the present war, but they must be shown by facts that their abacus is getting out of order.

"The American Navy will probably regain in two or three years what it lost in the initial battle of the war and build, in addition, more powerful warships. Aircraft, tanks and army units also will be enormously increased. However, the military training necessary for operating these arms cannot be carried out in a short time. Moreover, we have a tremendous advantage over America in respect to strategic positions.

#### Analysis of Causes of the Greater East Asia War

"The most important problem for directing the war is the expansion of productive power. This cannot be unrelated to the stabilization and maintenance of the people's life. We can neither fight nor produce with an empty stomach. Hence we do not ask people to work without food. Therefore, the Army pays the greatest attention to the rice-problem and does not grudge closest cooperation in bringing back rice from the South, even though it causes much inconvenience to military operations. Nay, the Army thinks it a part of military operations to acquire and transport rice, and is firmly determined that there shall be no dearth and unrest over the total amount of our nation's chief diet.

"As I have already said, the enemy makes it his war aim to protect democracy, and has declared war against Japan's ideology of the coprosperity sphere, and against the Hitlerism of Germany. The war has taken the pattern of a purely ideological war. It goes without saying how dangerous it is in the prosecution of war to have within the country still many admirers of liberalism, which is the monopoly of the enemy. At the time of the Russo-Japanese War, the outcome of war was decided simply by armed force. There was no such thing as ideological war then. For the prosecution of war poisonous remnants of western civilization must be speedily rooted out. If we analyze the causes of the Greater East Asia War, we have the following domestic problems apart from armed clashes:

Attrition of Aircraft and Ships -- Expansion of Productive Power and Ensurance of People's Life -- Exclusion of Liberalism and other Poisonous Remnants of Western Civilization. Invincible Conviction.

"Since the secret of winning the Greater East Asia War lies in the solution of internal problems, we ought to pay great interest to the renovation and strengthening of our internal structure. I don't wish to touch much on internal problems here, but at the time of the crucial point in Japanese-American negotiations last year, I felt there was no clear manifestation of a truly united national opinion, and a truly organized people's strength. Of course, I heard the voice of our people and there was no doubt about the existence of the strength of our great nation, but I felt that I could not believe in any realistic sense that this voice and strength was so united and organized as to truly propel and assist the Government and to put it into practice. In order to gain final victory and successfully build up the Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere, we must conquer many difficulties. Since most of them are internal problems in the final analysis, it is most important for us to establish a national organization fully imbued with the spirit of assisting Imperial Rule by performance of our duties as subjects in order to tide over these difficulties.

Doc. No. 9027.

C E R T I F I C A T E ( )

I hereby certify that the following copy in Japanese is identical with the article appearing in our press; No. 23538 of THE TOKYO NICHU-NICHU SHIMBUN (Dated 11 Apr. 1942 /S.D. No. 17/

Mr. MATO, Chief of the Section of Military Affairs of the War Ministry, emphasizes the secrets of sure victory:

"We must not relax our efforts to hotly pursue BRITAIN and AMERICA and we should strengthen our internal structure."

D.T. 15 Oct. 1946 /S.D. No. 21/

/S/ Director of the Data Department  
of THE NICHU-NICHU SHIMBUN  
MITSUHI TAMURA

## SECRET

Record of the Meeting of Privy Council Held on 3 July, 1935.

- Re: A) The conclusion of an agreement between Japan and Manchoukuo on the establishment of a Joint Economic Committee
- B) The changes to be made in the organization of the Ministry of Communications.

The meeting of the Privy Council was opened on 3 July 1935 in the presence of His Majesty the Emperor.

Others present were as follows:

Chairman	ICHIKI
Vice-Chairman	HIRAUMA

## Members of the Cabinet:

Premier	OKADA
Home Minister	GOFO
Navy Minister	OSUMI
Foreign "	HIROTA
War "	HAYASHI
Communication Min.	TOZUMAMI
Commerce & Industry	MACHIDA
Agriculture & Forestry	YAMASAKI
Overseas Min.	KODAMA

## Councillors:

KUBOTA	ISHII	ISHIZUKA
TOMII	ARIMA	SAKAMOTO
KURODA	HARA	ISHIWATA
SAKURAI	KIFUTA	SHIMIZU
ARAI	MOTODA	FUJISAWA
KAWAI	SUZUKI (Soroku)	HAYASHI
SUZUKI (Kantaro)		

## The absentees:

Imperial Princes:  
 Prince YASUHITO  
 Prince NISHIHITO  
 Prince KOTOHITO

Ministers:  
Minister of Finance           TAKAHASHI  
"       "   Justice           OHARA  
"       "   Education        MATSUDA  
"       "   Railways         UCHIDA

Councillors:

KANEKO, ISHIGURO, ISHIHARA, KURINO.

/Names of other minor members will be omitted here/

Chairman ICHIKI: The meeting will now be opened.

Our subject will be the conclusion of an agreement on the establishment of a Joint Economic Committee between Japan and Manchuria. We shall have the first reading, and omitting the recitations we shall immediately hear the report of the chairman of the Investigation Committee.

Reporter ARAI: Having been appointed members of the Investigation Committee to study on the subject which was referred to the Privy Council by His Majesty the Emperor for deliberation, we held a committee meeting on the 27th of this month, and after inquiring the Minister of State and other authorities connected with the subject, we have completed its investigation.

The Empire's basic policy toward Manchukuo is, as it has been declared in the Rescript of March 1933, on the withdrawal from the League of Nations and in the Japanese-Manchurian Agreement concluded in Sept. 1932, to recognize and respect Manchukuo's independence and help its progress and development by maintaining an inseparable relationship between the two countries.

It has been the constant wish of the Japanese Government to adhere to this principle in taking any form of measures and to secure a strong connection with Manchukuo. Thereby, based on the article on the united front in the Japanese-Manchurian agreement, Japan has established the right to garrison Japanese troops permanently in Manchukuo and has also formed military agreements with her.

In the diplomatic field, it was concluded in the official documents exchanged at the time of the establishment of the Manchurian Empire last March, that Manchuria should submit, beforehand, all diplomatic and military matters to the Japanese government for thorough and unreserved deliberation. However, in comparison to the military diplomacy, no system has been established, as yet, for cooperative measures in the economic field which plays a close and vital role in uniting the two countries. Therefore, the Japanese Government has no formal voice



in the management of the economic problems of Manchuria which have important relations with that of Japan, especially in the supervision of the Japanese-Manchurian joint concern having its object in the important industries of that country; and Japan, at present, is obliged to leave it up to the discretion of the Manchurian Government.

This is no way to hold an inseparable tie between the two countries, nor is it without doubt, the way to strengthen the economic interdependent relations of our countries. As long as it is related to the unity of both countries, it is necessary that Japan should gain formal voice in the economic field as well as in the military and diplomatic fields through the establishment of cooperative measures based upon an organization. To meet this necessity Japan has found it well to conclude a pact with a view to establishing a joint instrument between the two countries, and has been able to draft concrete plans for this purpose by having a Japanese diplomat in Manchuria negotiate with that government.

The agreement of the programme is a document entitled:

"An agreement between Japan and Manchukuo on the the establishment of a Joint Economic Committee", with an "annex" giving the precise details of the agreement and is a "matter of understanding concerning the conclusion of a pact for the establishment of a joint committee, agreed upon by representatives plenipotentiary of both countries." The fundamental principles of each department are as follows:

I. The Agreement.

- (1) A Joint Economic Committee of Japan and Manchukuo will be established permanently in Hsinking, Manchoukuo.
- (2) The committee will deliberate on and answer all questions submitted by the Japanese and Manchurian governments on all important matters concerning the economic tie of the two countries and the supervision of business of the Japanese-Manchurian Joint special corporation. The two governments cannot settle any of the above matters until they have been submitted to the committee for deliberation.
- (3) If necessary, the committee may make proposals to the governments of Japan and Manchukuo on any matter concerning the national economic unification of the two countries.
- (4) The organization and operation of the committee will be prescribed in the annex.

- (5) The agreement will go into effect on the date of signature. Both Japanese and Chinese will be the official language, and in case of a difference in the interpretation of the two texts, it will be settled according to the Japanese text.

## II. Annex.

The fundamental principle of the organization and operation of the committee will be prescribed in the annex.

- (1) The committee shall consist of eight members, four from each country, which shall report to each other. In case of absence of any member, a proxy will be appointed through the conference of the Japanese plenipotentiary in Manchukuo and the Prime Minister of Manchukuo. If necessary, the two governments may appoint the same number of temporary member after a consultation.
- (2) The chairman of the committee will be elected by mutual vote among the members. (He will be elected at every meeting.)
- (3) The same number of secretaries will be appointed by the two governments from among the staff members to take care of the general affairs of the committee.
- (4) All matters of the committee will be decided by a majority. The chairman has the right to vote as a member, and in case of a tie he has the right to make the decision.
- (5) The rules for the proceedings in the committee will be set by the committee after obtaining approval of the two governments.

## III. Understood matters.

More definite rules on the organization and power of the Joint Economic Committee will be given here in detail:

- (1) Japan's permanent members of the committee shall consist of the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, the Chief Counsellor in full service at the Japanese Embassy in Manchukuo, Chief of the Kwangtung Bureau, and one member specially appointed by the government.

The Manchukuo members shall consist of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Commerce and Industry, and Finance, and Head of General State Affairs.

- (2) The important matters to be deliberated by the committee, and are connected with the economies of the two governments are: the export, import and tariff problems; the development and control of the important industries; the enactment and amendment of laws concerning the establishment of a special Japanese-Manchurian Joint Corporation; investment; and other important problems concerning the economic connection of the two governments and are within the power of the Manchurian Government. Those matters important to the economic ties of both governments but are within Japan's power will not be taken up by this committee. Because they will not be deliberated by the committee they will be made into unilateral contracts binding only the Manchurian Government.
- (3) The important matters to be deliberated by the committee concerning the supervision of business of the special Japanese-Manchurian Joint concern include; the important amendments in the regulations of corporations, the purpose of which is to materialize important industries concerned with economic unity of both governments, and which have been established according to the laws of one of two countries and more than half of whose capital has been raised by the government, citizens, or juridical persons of the opposite government; the disposition of the profit of said corporation and the recognition of the decision to amalgamate or dissolve.

As there is as yet no corporation established according to the Japanese law with more than half of Manchurian investment, the agreement in reality binds only the Manchurian Government in this point also. Due to the existence in the document of such one sided articles binding only Manchukuo, the authorities have declared, after an agreement brought forth by the two governments, to have this point kept secret.

The point is that the agreement aims at the realization of a rational unification of the economies of the two countries by a full and close cooperation to strengthen permanently the economic relations according to the principles of the Japan-Manchukuo Agreement. For the purpose the Japanese-Manchurian Joint Economic Committee has been formed. Whenever important economic question relating to the two countries arise, the committee will deliberate on it and settle it.

In view of the special relationship of the two countries and the

assistance the committee will accord Japan in accomplishing her Manchurian policy, the said agreement is approvable in its general principle with little or no disapproving points in the articles. It is needless to say, such special provisions without proper application will never attain expected results, so the authorities must give their fullest attention in enforcing the agreements. The agreement has been approved unanimously by the Investigating Committee with hopes that the authorities will not err in their enforcement and would render the best results.

The result of the investigation has been reported as above.

MOTODA: According to this agreement, matters concerning Japanese-Manchurian joint concerns with more than half of capital invested by opposite party must be deliberated by the committee. Is it proper to set the investments of both countries on an equal basis?

Furthermore, the committee shall consist of <sup>four</sup> members from each country, from among whom the president is appointed by mutual election. The chairman not only has a right to vote but has the power of decision, acquiring for herself a tremendous power. His term, moreover, has not been set.

According to the investigation report the chairman is elected at every meeting, but such matters require more definite rules or it will give rise to doubts. I think it proper to set this rule in the agreement and also in the proceedings regulations. At any rate, with only the rules of agreement the question brought to the committee for deliberation are apt to be decided by the chairman alone. The agreement, I feel is not completed on this point. May I hear the opinions of the authorities regarding this matter?

HIROTA: By his question, I take counsellor MOTODA to mean that should the committee consist of four members from each country Japan might be at a disadvantage in case a matter is decided by the chairman. I ask him to consider the fact that three out of the four from Manchukuo are Ministers and the remaining one is the Chief of General State Affairs who is, and will be, a Japanese forever, I am confident. Although he is an official of Manchurian, he is the central organ assuming the leadership of that country. Therefore, in case of a difference of opinions between the two countries, it cannot be imagined that he will make any decision that will be disadvantageous to Japan.

The chairman may make the final decision at times, but we felt it improper for him to have a permanent position, so we have adopted the system of electing the chairman at every meeting according to the nature of the matter to be deliberated. This point, however, may need full reconsideration when regulations for the proceedings are enacted in the future.

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In short, the set up of the committee may apparently seem equal on the part of both countries, but in reality it is not. Such being the case, we should like to have the agreement stand as it is despite some points that may be difficult to interpret.

MOTODA: I do not think that there is any need of enforcing treaty rights between the two countries today, but not to form any agreement for this reason should be a lack of prudence. If agreements are to be formed, it should be made so as to be applicable to the nation's plans for a hundred years.

It has been stated in the Investigation Report that the fullest attention should be paid in enforcing the agreement, that no error should be made, etc. I hope that the authorities will give their full consideration to this point, which I think comprises many meanings.

SAKAMOTO: I agree with the opinion of Councillor MOTODA. According to the Foreign Minister's reply, a Japanese is appointed as Chief of General State Affairs, and as he will do his duty as a Japanese, he will not act against Japan's interest. Should he act in favor of Japan in case of an opposition of the two countries' interest, he will incur the ill-feeling of the Manchukuo people. As long as he is an official of Manchukuo, we must not be too sure that he will not act against Japan's interest. I should like to ask the authorities' opinions on this point. Furthermore, there is no case in our country where a chairman is elected at every meeting. Can the authorities tell me of such a case, if it should exist?

HIROTA: I take the question to mean that even if he is a Japanese, the Chief of General State Affairs must do his duty as a loyal official of Manchukuo; and that therefore, it will be impossible for him to decide in favor of Japan's interest. The Chief of General State Affairs, who is the general manager of the Japanese officials there, is employed by the Manchoukuo Government to guide it. He is an official of Manchoukuo and simultaneously a leading instrument dispatched by Japan. He, therefore, must perform both duties, and it is his primary duty to see that there will not be any opposition between Japan and Manchoukuo.

In case the Manchoukuo members of the Committee should purposely scheme to act against Japan's interest after the committee is formed, the chief of General State Affairs will take proper measures after giving due consideration to the interests of both countries. It will be his duty to lead Manchukuo in such a way that such fear would be unnecessary.

KURIYAMA (member of Investigation Committee): There was a question as to the existence of such a system of legislation in which the

chairman is elected by mutual vote from among the members. The chairman of the Board of Directors of the League of Nations is generally elected by mutual vote at each meeting from among the members, and he acts as the temporary chairman until the new chairman is elected. The election of the chairman of the Joint Economic Committee will function almost in the same manner. We are thinking of establishing detailed prescriptions on this point in the procedure regulations that will be set up in the near future. As the members of this committee are formally Japan and Manchoukuo on an equal basis, we have taken this form of election.

SAKAMOTO: I feel that this committee is different from that of the League of Nations, but I shall not relate on that at present. The idea seems to be that there will be no mistakes because the Chief of General State Affairs occupying the important position of 'leading Manchuria' is an official of Japanese descent. However, we cannot be too positive that the present relations between Japan and Manchuria will never change forever, so I hope the authorities will put their fullest efforts in fulfilling the points stressed in the Foreign Minister's reply.

Chairman ICHIKI<sup>K</sup>: As there are no more discussions, we shall omit the second reading and pass on to the vote. Those in favor of this plan will please stand up.

(Every member stands up.)

Chairman ICHIKI: The whole council has decided in favor of it.

Chairman ICHIKI: We shall now proceed to the changes to be made in the organization of the Ministry of Communication. We shall have the first reading, and omitting the recitation, we shall immediately hear the investigation report.

Reporter MURAKAMI: Upon investigating the matter of making changes in the organization of the Ministry of Communication, which has been referred to the Privy Council by His Majesty the Emperor for deliberation, we deem it necessary to make the following changes.

To complete the establishment for supervising wireless electric facilities such as telegraph, wireless telephone, and others, which have shown a remarkable progress, a secretary, an engineer, two clerks and two assistant-engineers will be newly appointed. To have a more strict control over the electric wire, electric equipments, and the laborers in the engineering works, one administrative official, three clerks, and three assistant engineers will be added.

To take charge of the business affairs connected with the maintenance of the newly established air route between FUKUOKA and TAIHOKU, one aviation official and two assistant engineers will be appointed. Two clerks and one assistant engineer will be added as the business affairs for the purchasing and rationing of necessary supplies have increased with the progress of the communication business. A clerk will be added to supervise and take charge of the business affairs concerned with the plan of increasing the non-collecting and non-delivering third class post offices in every district.

As the ordinary mails have greatly increased in number, an engineer, six clerks and two assistant-engineers will be appointed to supervise and make plans for setting up machineries and other establishments. Four clerks will be appointed to intensify the censorship of foreign mails, which is necessary in controlling dangerous ideologies. Nine clerks and five assistant engineers will also be added to take charge of the business concerned with the maintenance of the expanding telephone business.

We hereby wish to make the above changes in the present organization of the Ministry of Communication. The number of employees will be increased by one secretary, one administrative official, and one officer in charge of aviation, two engineers, twenty-seven clerks, and fifteen assistant engineers.

Considering the fact that this draft for the Imperial Ordinance has been drawn to make necessary increase in the employees to cope with the increasing business affairs in the Ministry of Communication, and as we see no points to be contradicted, we believe it quite permissible to pass the plan as it is. My report on our investigation is as above.

Chairman ICHIKI: As there is no proposal, we shall omit the second reading and the rest and immediately proceed with the vote. Will those in favor of the plan please stand up?

(All stand up.)

Chairman ICHIKI: The whole council has decided in favor of it. The meeting will be adjourned for today.

(Time of adjournment: 11:05 a.m.)

Signed:

Chairman: ICHIKI, Kikokuro  
Chief Secretary: MURAKAMI, Kyochi.  
Secretaries: HORIE, Sueo.  
MUTO, Morio.



Agreement on the Establishment of a Joint Economic  
Committee between Japan and Manchuria.

" Hoping to realize a rational unification of the economies of Japan and Manchoukuo in order to strengthen permanently the economic relations now existing between the two countries, and deeming it necessary to have a full and close cooperation on all economic problems essential to the relationship of both countries, according to the principles of the Japan-Manchoukuo Agreement signed on 15 September 1932, (15 September of the 1st year of Tatung) the two governments have decided to establish a Joint Economic Committee. The agreement on the establishment of the said committee is as follows:

Article I. A Joint Economic Committee between Japan and Manchoukuo will be established in Hsinking, Manchoukuo.

Article II. The committee will deliberate on and give opinion on all questions, submitted by the Japanese and Manchurian governments, concerning the economic tie of the two countries and the supervision of business of the Japanese-Manchurian joint special corporation.

Article III. The two governments shall execute any of the above matters only after having submitted them to the committee for deliberation.

Article IV. If necessary, the committee may make proposals to the governments of Japan and Manchoukuo on any matter concerning the rational economic unification of the two countries.

Article V. The organization and operation of the committee will be prescribed in the annex.

Article VI. The agreement will go into effect on the date of signature. Both Japanese and Chinese will be the official language, and in case of a difference in the interpretation of the two texts, it will be settled according to the Japanese text.

The following have signed to the agreement as proof to the above with proper authorization from their respective governments.

ANNEX

1. The committee shall consist of eight members. The governments of Japan and Manchoukuo each will appoint four members and report to each other. In case of absence of any member, a proxy may be appointed, through the conference between the Japanese plenipotentiary in Manchoukuo and the Prime Minister of Manchoukuo. The proxy will perform his duties

as a member. Beside the above, the two governments may appoint, if necessary, the same number of temporary members after consultation.

2. The chairman of the committee will be elected by mutual vote from among the members.

3. Secretaries will be placed in the committee to take care of the general affairs. The same number will be appointed by the two governments from among the staff members.

4. All matters of the committee will be decided by a majority. In case of a tie the chairman will make the decision. The chairman may join in the vote as a member.

5. The committee will decide on its rules for procedure after obtaining approval of the two governments.

Imperial Ordinance No. \_\_\_\_\_

The following changes shall be made in the organization of the Ministry of Communication.

"Seventeen secretaries" in Article II shall be changed to "eighteen secretaries".

"Sixteen full-time administrative officials of the Ministry of Communication" in Article VII shall be changed to "seventeen full time administration officials of the Ministry of Communication".

"Eleven full-time officials in charge of aviation" in (2) of Article VII shall be changed to "twelve full-time officials in charge of aviation".

"Sixty-seven engineers" in Article VIII shall be changed to "sixty-nine engineers".

"Three hundred eighteen full-time clerks" in Article IX shall be changed to "Three hundred forty-five full-time clerks."

"One hundred twenty-nine assistant-engineers" in Article X shall be changed to "One hundred forty-four assistant engineers".

Supplement:

This ordinance shall go into effect on and after the day of promulgation.

## C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 I.P.S. No. 875

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Shuzo Jimbo, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Private Secretary to the President of the Privy Council, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of \_\_\_\_\_ pages, dated July 3rd, 1935, and described as follows: Consideration of Agreement Establishing Joint Japanese-Manchurian Committee on Financial Affairs.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Privy Council, at the Imperial Palace Ground.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
10th day of July, 1946.

/s/ Shuzo Jimbo  
 Signature of Official

Private secretary to the SEAL  
President of the Privy Council  
 Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ Kichi, Chosokabe

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
10th day of July, 1946.

/s/ EDWARD P. MONAGHAN  
 NAME

Witness: /s/ William C. Prout

Investigator I.P.S.  
 Official Capacity

Ex. 851

AGREEMENT REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JOINT ECONOMICAL  
COMMITTEE OF JAPAN AND MANCHOUKUO. (Full translation)

(Treaty 7. 17 July 1935)

WHEREAS the Imperial Government of Japan and the Imperial Govern-  
ment of Manchoukuo wish to materialize the rational union of economy  
of Japan and Manchoukuo for the purpose of eternally strengthening  
the relations of economically mutual reliance now existing between  
the two countries and,

WHEREAS the Governments of the two countries recognize the neces-  
sity of close cooperation concerning important economical problems  
between the two countries, in accordance with the principle of the  
Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol signed on the Fifteenth of September in  
the Seventh Year of Showa, corresponding to the Fifteenth of September  
in the First Year of Daido, the Governments of the two countries have  
decided to establish the Joint Economical Committee and made the  
following Agreement;

ARTICLE I

The Joint Economical Committee of Japan and Manchoukuo shall  
be established in Heinking of Manchoukuo.

ARTICLE II

The Committee shall present its opinion to the Governments of  
Japan and Manchoukuo in compliance with the consultation of the two  
Governments regarding the important matters of economical connection  
of the two countries and the control and inspection of the business  
of Japan-Manchoukuo special joint companies.

ARTICLE III

The Governments of Japan and Manchoukuo, concerning the matters  
mentioned in the preceding ARTICLE, shall ask the opinion of the  
Committee beforehand and manage them in accordance with the opinion.

ARTICLE IIII

The Committee shall be capable of making a proposal to the  
Governments of Japan and Manchoukuo concerning all the problems on  
the rational union of economy of Japan and Manchoukuo, as the case  
may be.

ARTICLE V

The organization of the Committee and its management shall be provided in the Annexed Papers to this Agreement.

ARTICLE VI

This Agreement shall be enforced on and from the day of its signature.

The text of this Agreement is written both in Japanese and Chinese and in case there rise any difference in construing the Japanese and the Chinese texts, the Japanese text shall be authorized.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, rightly authorized by their respective Governments, affix their signature and seal to this Agreement.

THE FIFTEENTH DAY OF THE SEVENTH MONTH OF THE TENTH YEAR OF SHOWA CORRESPONDING TO THE FIFTEENTH DAY OF THE SEVENTH MONTH OF THE SECOND YEAR OF KOTOKU.

Done in duplicate in HSINKING.

Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary of the Empire of Japan.

Jiro MINAMI . Signature .

Minister of the Foreign Department of the Empire of Manchoukuo.

Chang YEN-ching . Signature .

THE ANNEXED

1. The number of the Committee-members shall be eight and the Governments of Japan and Manchoukuo shall appoint four members respectively and notify each other about it. In case a member be prevented, owing to unavoidable circumstances, from attending the committee meeting, the Japanese Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary to Manchoukuo and the Prime Minister of Manchoukuo shall

have a negotiation concerning a deputy in his stead and still the deputy attend the Committee meeting. The deputy shall exercise his duty in the name of the absentee-member. Besides the members mentioned in the preceding paragraph the governments of Japan and Manchoukuo, when necessary, may, upon consultation, each appoint an equal number of temporary members.

2. The President of the Committee shall be elected from the members, by mutual vote.
3. A certain number of secretaries shall be appointed in the Committee and they shall manage general affairs.

The Governments of Japan and Manchoukuo shall appoint the same number of secretaries respectively from the persons attached to their members.

4. The decision of the Committee shall be made by majority and in case the "ayes" and "no's" be equally divided, the President shall decide the matter.

The President shall not be prevented from participating in the decision as member.

5. The Committee shall formulate the regulations of the proceedings with the approval of the Governments of Japan and Manchoukuo.

This is to certify that the contents of this document are true and accurate.

(Signed) SUZUKI, Masakatsu (Sealed)  
Chief of Continental Section,  
Economic Department,  
Administrative Bureau of Foreign Ministry

The Japanese members of the Japan-Manchoukuo Joint Economical Committee. (Aug. 1945)

Lieutenant General Hikosabro HATA.

Chief of the Kwantung Bureau Naohiko MIURA.

(Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary Haruhiko Nishi)

have a negotiation concerning a deputy in his stead and will the deputy attend the Committee meeting. The deputy shall exercise his duty in the name of the absentee-member. So that the members mentioned in the preceding paragraph the governments of Japan and Manchoukuo, when necessary, may, upon consultation, each appoint an equal number of temporary members.

2. The President of the Committee shall be elected from the members, by mutual vote.
3. A certain number of secretaries shall be appointed in the Committee and they shall manage general affairs.  
The Governments of Japan and Manchoukuo shall appoint the same number of secretaries respectively from the persons attached to their members.
4. The decision of the Committee shall be made by majority and in case the "ayes" and "no's" be equally divided, the President shall decide the matter.

The President shall not be prevented from participating in the decision as member.

5. The Committee shall formulate the regulations of the proceedings with the approval of the Governments of Japan and Manchoukuo.

This is to certify that the contents of this document are true and accurate.

(Signed) SUZUKI, Masakatsu (Sealed)  
Chief of Continental Section,  
Economical Department,  
Administrative Bureau of Foreign Ministry

The Japanese members of the Japan-Manchoukuo Joint Economical Committee. (Aug. 1945)

Lieutenant General Hikosabro HATA.

Chief of the Kwantung Bureau Nao-hiko MIURA.

(Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary Haruhiko Nishi

DOCUMENT 2196A

Page 4

(Commissioner of the Greater East Asia  
Ministry Minoru TANAKA

This is to certify that above was investigated in the personnel  
section of the Cabinet Secretariat.

SUZUKI, Masakatsu, (Sealed)  
Chief of Continental Section,  
Economical Department,  
Administrative Bureau of Foreign Ministry



DOCUMENT 2196A

Page 4

(Commissioner of the Greater East Asia  
(Ministry Minoru TANAKA

This is to certify that above was investigated in the personnel  
section of the Cabinet Secretariat.

SUZUKI, Masakatsu, (Sealed)  
Chief of Continental Section,  
Economic Department,  
Administrative Bureau of Foreign Ministry

DOCUMENT NO. 2196

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SUPREME COMMAND ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Document No. 2196

28 May 1946

CERTIFICATE

I, James M. McEwen hereby certify that I am associated with the International Prosecution Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Command Allied Powers, and that the attached document, consisting of 6 pages and described as follows: Document establishing Joint Economic Control Committee (and names) for Japan and Manchukuo and dated \_\_\_\_\_, was obtained by me on the date above set forth in my above capacity and in the conduct of my official business and in the following manner, to wit: (place and from whom obtained, including specific Japanese archives, records and files involved, if any) Foreign Office Japanese Government

/s/ James M. McEwen  
NAME

Int. Sec. JACO  
RANK OR CAPACITY

0-2052720  
ASN

2196 A

日滿經濟共同委員會設置ニ関スル協定

日本國政府及滿洲國政府、日本國及滿洲國間ニ現ニ存  
昭和七年九月十五日  
 在ル日滿兩國、經濟上、依存關係ヲ永遠ニ鞏固トシ、  
 且、爲、日滿兩國經濟、合理的融合ニ實現トシ、  
 且、之ニ因リ、兩國政府、昭和七年九月十五日、即チ大同元年  
 九月十五日、調印、日本國滿洲國間識定書、趣旨ニ據リ、日  
 滿兩國相互間、重要ナル經濟問題ニ關シテ、日滿兩國、  
 分且緊密ニ共同、實ヲ舉ゲ、且、必要ナル認メタル、兩國  
 政府、日滿經濟共同委員會ヲ設置スルニ決シ、茲ニ左  
 如ク協定ス

第一條

滿洲國新京ニ日滿經濟共同委員會ヲ設置ス

第二條

委員會ハ日滿兩國經濟ノ運轉ニ關スル重要事項及日滿  
 合弁特殊會社ノ業務ノ監督ニ關スル重要事項ニ付日滿  
 兩國政府、諮問ニ應ジ、其ノ意見ヲ兩國政府ニ具申スル  
 事トス

No. 1.

日滿兩

政務前事務行員會

RETURN TO ROOM 361

85

2196A

諮詢之其、意見ヲ俟テ之ヲ處理スヘキモノトス

第四條

委員會ハ必要ニ應ジ日滿兩國經濟、合理的融合ニ因テ一切ノ事項ニ付テ日滿兩國政府ニ建議スルコトヲ得。

第五條

委員會、組織及運用ニ付テ本協定附屬書、定ムル所ニ依ル。

第六條

本協定ハ署名、日ヨリ實施セラルヘシ  
本協定、正文ハ日本文及漢文トシ日本文本文ト漢文本文ト、間ニ解釋ヲ異ニスルトキハ日本文本文ニ依リ之ヲ決シ  
右證據トシテ下名ハ各本國政府ヨリ正當ノ委任ヲ受ケ本協定ニ署名調印セリ

昭和十年七月十五日 即チ康德二年七月十五日 新定  
於此本書ニ通テ作成ス

日本帝國將命全權大使 南次郎 印  
滿洲帝國外交部 大臣 張蔭卿 印

2196A

附屬書

- 一 委員會、委員、八名トシ日滿兩國政府、各四名ヲ任命シ相輩ニ之ヲ通報スルニ委員事務アルトキ、其、代理者ニ付キ、滿洲國駐劄特命全權大使滿洲國事務總理大臣相互協議、上之ヲ出席セシムルコトヲ得代理者、委員、名ニ於テ其、職ヲ行ス。
- 二 右、外日滿兩國政府、必要ニ應ジ協議、上各同數、臨時委員ヲ任命スルコトヲ得。
- 三 議長、委員中ヨリ之ヲ互選ス
- 三 委員會ニ幹事若干名ヲ置ク幹事、庶務ヲ整理ス幹事、隨員中ヨリ日滿兩國政府各同數ヲ任命スルモノトス。
- 四 委員會、議事、過半數ヲ以テ之ヲ決ス可各同數トキ、議長、決スル所ニ依ル
- 議長、委員トシ議決ニ加ルコトヲ妨ケズ
- 五 委員會、日滿兩國政府、承認シテ其、議事規則ヲ定ム。

右漢文在、如之(省略)

NO.3

本書、内容正確ナルコトヲ證明ス

外務省管理局經濟部大陸課長

鈴木政勝 (印)

2196 A

附屬書

- 一、委員會、委員、八名トシ、日滿兩國政府、各四名ヲ任命シ、相執ニシテ之ヲ通報スヘシ、委員事故アルトキ、其、代理者ニ付キ、滿洲國駐劄特命全權大使滿洲國、外務總理大臣相互協議、上之ヲ出席セシムルコトヲ得、代理者、委員、名ニ於テ其、職ヲ行ス。
- 右、外日滿兩國政府、必要ニ應ジ、協議、上各同敷、臨時委員ヲ任命スルコトヲ得。
- 二、議長、委員中ヨリ之ヲ互選ス。
- 三、委員會ニ幹事若干名ヲ置ク、幹事、庶務ヲ整理ス。幹事、隨員中ヨリ日滿兩國政府各同敷ヲ任命スルコトス。
- 四、委員會、議事、過半数ヲ以テ之ヲ決ス、可否同敷トキ、議長、決スル所ニ依ル。
- 議長、委員トシテ議決ニ加ルコトヲ妨ケズ。
- 五、委員會、日滿兩國政府、承認シテ其、議事規則ヲ定ム。

右漢文在、如之(省略)

NO.3

本書、内容正確ナルコトヲ證明ス

外務省管理局 經濟部 大陸課 長

鈴木政勝 (印)

2196 A

日滿經濟共同各員會委員(日方側)名簿  
(一九四五年(月)現在)

陸軍中將	秦彦三郎
関東局總長	三浦直彦
特命全權公使	西春彦
大東亞事務官	田中龍

右八内閣官房人事課ニ於テ調査セシメ  
左下ヲ證明ス。

外務省管理局經濟部大陸課長

鈴木政勝 (印)

no. 4.

CV# 852

第 三 一 九 六 號

一 九 四 六 年 ( 西 曆 二 一 年 ) 五 月 二 十 八 日

2196

證 明 書

余、「シエムズ・エム・マクユーウエン」ハ聯合  
國最高指揮官總司令部國際檢察部ニ關係アルコト  
及ビ茲ニ添附セラレタル六頁ヨリ成ル「日滿共同  
經濟統制委員會設置ノ登類」ト記載セラレタル日  
附ノ登類ハ前記日時ニ余ガ前記ノ發給ニ於テ又公  
務上ノ行爲ニ於テ且次ノ方法ニ依リ即チ（出所及  
ビ若シアラバ關係アル特定ノ日本文書記録並ニ滯  
込ヲ記載セヨ）日本政府外務省ヨリ入手セルモノ  
ナルコトヲ茲ニ證ス

姓 名 シエムズ・マクユーウエン

位 又 ハ 發 給 法 務 省 尉

〇 一 二 〇 三 二 七 二 〇



皇朝年號二一九六號

一九四六年(昭和二十一年)五月二十八日

2196

證 明 書

余、シエムズ・エム・マクニール・マクニールハ聯合  
國最高指揮官總司令部國際檢察部ニ關係アルコト  
及ビ茲ニ添附セラレタル六頁ヨリ成ル「日滿共同  
經濟統制委員會設置ノ要領」ト記載セラレタル日  
附ノ要領ハ前記日時ニ余ガ前記ノ資格ニ於テ又公  
務上ノ行爲ニ於テ且次ノ方法ニ依リ即テ(出所及  
ビ若シアラバ關係アル特定ノ日本文書記録並ニ添  
込ヲ記載セヨ)日本政府外務省ヨリ入手セルモノ  
ナルコトヲ茲ニ證ス

姓 名 シエムズ・マクニール

位 又ハ 資格 法務官 尉

〇 一 二 〇 五 二 七 三 〇

E# 852

Doc. No. 9022 A

Page 1.

Re: Military Currency, 1941.

(Communication 1, p. 1)

19-7-43

(1) TOP SECRET

Kei-Shu-Hetsu No. 14

16 January 1941

To Shinhei TAKIUCHI,  
Chief of the Financial Bureau,  
Ministry of Finance.

Communication referring to preparation of Plates for Military Currencies

We want you to urgently prepare the original plates of military currencies to be used in "certain unspecified areas". We hereby make this inquiry.

P.S. — Regarding particulars of the preparations, I would like to add for caution's sake that direct communications will be made with your bureau by the officials in charge.

Hansaburo IRIKAWA,  
Chief of Intendance Bureau,  
War Ministry.

(Communication 2, p. 1)

(2) (Top Secret)

Drafted 17 January 1941

Sanctioned 24 January 1941

From Chief of the Financial Bureau, (TAKUCHI)\*

Head of the Treasury Division, (YOSHIDA)\*

Head of the Foreign Affairs Division (SEAL)\*\*

To Minister, (KAWAII)\*

Vice-Minister, (HIROSE)\*

Head of the Archives & Document Division, (UJIE)\*

Head of the Accountant Division, (UWAKITA)\* (UKI)\*

Investigation (FUJITA)\*

Chief of the Intendance Bureau. (TANIGUCHI)\* (KUROGANE)\*

Subject Concerning Preparations for Printing of Military Currency Notes.

With reference to preparations for printing of Military Currency Notes which may be used in "certain unspecified areas" in the future, we received an inquiry from the Chief of the Intendance Bureau, War Ministry, as per attached. Since we are of the opinion that the same is unavoidable under the circumstances, would it be alright to reply to the War Ministry with Draft No. 1 and to the Cabinet Printing Bureau with Draft No. 2 requesting preparation of the original plates, following a decision to prepare for their issuance?

We request your approval.

Draft No. 1

Date

To Chief of the Intendance Bureau,  
War Ministry (Confidential)

I acknowledge receipt of your inquiry Kei-Shu-Hatsu No. 14 dated 16 January with reference to preparations of the original plates for military currency notes, contents of which have been fully noted.

Chief of the Financial Bureau,  
Ministry of Finance.

\* Indicated on original by "Han" (seal).

\*\* "Han" not legible.

Document No. 9022

Page 3

(Communication 2, p. 2)

Draft No. 2

Date

To Chief of the Cabinet Printing Bureau, (Confidential)

In view of the necessity for the preparation of printing military currency notes, you are requested to immediately make preparations for the original plates of military currency notes in accordance with the design herewith attached.

P.S. -- You are also requested to advise us as soon as the original plates are ready and we would like to add that top secrecy be maintained in regard to this subject, particularly.

Chief of the Financial Bureau.

Document No. 9022

Page 3

(Communication 2, p. 2)

Draft No. 2

Date

To Chief of the Cabinet Printing Bureau, (Confidential)

In view of the necessity for the preparation of printing military currency notes, you are requested to immediately make preparations for the original plates of military currency notes in accordance with the design herewith attached.

P.S. -- You are also requested to advise us as soon as the original plates are ready and we would like to add that top secrecy be maintained in regard to this subject, particularly.

Chief of the Financial Bureau.

(Communication 3 - p. 1)

TOP SECRET

Drafted 15 March 1941

Sanctioned 29 March 1941

From Chief of the Financial Bureau, (TAKUCHI)\*  
Head of the Treasury Division, (YOSHIDA)\*  
Head of the Foreign Affairs Division. (SEAL)\*\*  
Investigation (FUJITA)\*

To Minister  
Vice-Minister (SEAL)\*

Head of the Archives & Document Division, (YUJI)\* (SEAL)\*  
Head of the Accountant Division, (UNIKITA)\* (SEAL)\*  
Chief of the Intendance Bureau. (TANIGUCHI)\* (SEAL)\*

Subject concerning printing of "Ha" and "Ni" Series Military Currency Notes.

Pursuant to the decision of the ministerial conference held on 24 January last, we made application to the Cabinet Printing Bureau for the preparation of the original plates of military currency notes which may be used in "certain unspecified areas" in the future. We now have received an inquiry from the Chief of the Intendance Bureau, War Ministry, concerning the printing of the said military notes as enclosed herein, and since we are of the opinion that this is unavoidable under the circumstances, would it be alright, following the decision to print them, to reply to the War Ministry with Draft No. 1 and to request the Cabinet Printing Bureau with Draft No. 2?

We request your approval.

Draft No. 1

1 April 1941

To Chief of the Intendance Bureau, War Ministry.

I acknowledge receipt of your inquiry Kai-Shu-Hatsu No. 107 dated 11 March pertaining to the manufacture of "Ha" and "Ni" series of military currency notes and duly noted the contents.

Chief of the Financial Bureau  
Ministry of Finance.

(Marginal Note: P.S.--Upon approval, we would like to send them dated as of April 1 for budgetary reasons.)

\* Indicated on original by "Han" (seal).  
\*\* "Han" not legible.

(Communication 2 - p. 2)

Draft No. 2

1 April 1941

To Chief of the Cabinet Printing Bureau,

You are requested to manufacture immediately "Ha" and "Ni" series of military currency, as follows:

Denomination	SERIES	
	"Ha" Series Thousand Yen	"Ni" Series Thousand Yen
50 Sen Note	1,000	1,000
1 Yen Note	1,500	1,500
5 Yen Note	7,000	7,000
10 Yen Note	10,000	10,000
TOTAL	19,500	19,500

(Communication 4 p 1.)

Kei-Shu-Hatsu No. 107

Communication on Subject Concerning Manufacture of "Ha" Series  
Military Currency Notes.

11 March 1941

To Shinhei TAKUCHI,  
Chief of the Financial Bureau,  
Ministry of Finance.

I have to request that you will manufacture, for the time being, "Ha" series military currency notes as follows:

Denomination	Notes		Total	Period Required
	In Dutch Language	In English Language		
	10 Thousand Yen	10 Thousand Yen	10,000 ¥	
50 Sen Note	100	100	200	
1 Yen Note	150	150	300	
5 Yen Note	700	700	1,400	Early in April 1941
10 Yen Note	1,000	1,000	2,000	
TOTAL	1,950	1,950	3,900	

Furthermore, regarding the particulars, I would like to add that I will have the official in charge of my bureau get into direct contact with yours to make the arrangements.

Yasumasa KURIHASHI,  
Chief of the Intendance Bureau,  
War Ministry.



(Communication 5, p. 1)

TOP SECRET

Drafted 19 April 1941.  
Sanctioned 23 April 1941.

Chief of the Intendance Bureau, (TAKEUCHI)\*  
 Head of the Treasury Division, (YOSHIDA)\*  
 Investigation (FUJITA)\* (SATAKE)\* (MORI)\*

Subject Concerning Notification to Cabinet Printing Bureau for the  
 Manufacture of Samples of "Ha" and "Ni" Series Military Currency Notes.

Draft

Date

To Chief of the Cabinet Printing Bureau,

You are requested to arrange for the manufacture of samples of  
 "Ha" and "Ni" series military currency notes, as follows:-

The samples above referred to are to be ordered for  
 manufacture simultaneously with military currency  
 notes previously ordered.

Notes

Denomination	"Ha" Series Sheets	"Ni" Series Sheets
50 Sen Note	150	150
1 Yen Note	150	150
5 Yen Note	150	150
10 Yen Note	150	150
TOTAL	600	600

CHIEF OF THE FINANCIAL BUREAU.

\* Indicated on original by "Han" (scal).

(Communication 5, p. 1)

TOP SECRET

Drafted 19 April 1941  
Sanctioned 23 April 1941.

Chief of the Intendance Bureau, (TAKEUCHI)\*  
Head of the Treasury Division, (FUCHIDA)\*  
Investigation (FUJITA)\* (SATAKE)\* (MORI)\*

Subject Concerning Notification to Cabinet Printing Bureau for the  
Manufacture of Samples of "Ha" and "Ni" Series Military Currency Notes.

Draft

Date  
To Chief of the Cabinet Printing Bureau,

You are requested to arrange for the manufacture of samples of  
"Ha" and "Ni" series military currency notes, as follows:-

The samples above referred to are to be ordered for  
manufacture simultaneously with military currency  
notes previously ordered.

Notes

Denomination	"Ha" Series Sheets	"Ni" Series Sheets
50 Yen Note	150	150
1 Yen Note	150	150
5 Yen Note	150	150
10 Yen Note	150	150
TOTAL	600	600

CHIEF OF THE FINANCIAL BUREAU.

\* Indicated on original by "Han" (scal).

(Communication 6, p. 1)

MILITARY SECURITY

Kei-Shu-Hatsu No. 485

Communication on Subject Concerning Manufacture of "Ho" Series and Increase of Manufacture of "Ro", "Ha" and "Ni" Series Military Currency Notes.

13 September 1941

To Shinhei TAKUCHI,  
Chief of the Financial Bureau,  
Ministry of Finance.

You are requested to make arrangements immediately for the manufacture of "Ho" series military currency notes, preparations for which were requested previously and the additional manufacture of "Ro", "Ha", and "Ni" series military currency notes, as follows:

P. S.--In this connection, kindly note that you are at liberty to postpone in the meantime, the manufacture of "I" series military currency notes now in progress and we would like to add that we will have our official in charge get in touch with yours in regard to the particulars.

## 1. Re "Ho" series military currency

## 1. Denomination, quantity and value

Denomination	Sheets	Pesos
10 Pesos Note	2,000,000	20,000,000
5 Pesos Note	1,900,000	9,500,000
1 Pesos Note	4,000,000	4,000,000
50 Centavos Note	5,000,000	2,500,000
10 Centavos Note	10,000,000	1,000,000
5 Centavos Note	3,000,000	150,000
1 Centavos Note	5,000,000	50,000
TOTAL	30,900,000	37,200,000

2. Date of completion 20 October
3. Samples  
300 Sheets of each denomination.

(Communication 6, p. 1)

MILITARY SECURITY

Kei-Shu-Hatsu No. 485

Communication on Subject Concerning Manufacture of "Ho" Series and Increase of Manufacture of "Ro", "Ha" and "Ni" Series Military Currency Notes.

13 September 1941

To Shinhei TAKUCHI,  
Chief of the Financial Bureau,  
Ministry of Finance.

You are requested to make arrangements immediately for the manufacture of "Ho" series military currency notes, preparations for which were requested previously and the additional manufacture of "Ro", "Ha", and "Ni" series military currency notes, as follows:

P. S.--In this connection, kindly note that you are at liberty to postpone in the meantime, the manufacture of "I" series military currency notes now in progress and we would like to add that we will have our official in charge get in touch with yours in regard to the particulars.

## 1. Re "Ho" series military currency

## 1. Denomination, quantity and value

Denomination	Sheets	Pesos
10 Pesos Note	2,000,000	20,000,000
5 Pesos Note	1,900,000	9,500,000
1 Pesos Note	4,000,000	4,000,000
50 Centavos Note	5,000,000	2,500,000
10 Centavos Note	10,000,000	1,000,000
5 Centavos Note	3,000,000	150,000
1 Centavos Note	5,000,000	50,000
TOTAL	30,900,000	37,200,000

2. Date of completion 20 October
3. Samples  
300 Sheets of each denomination.

(Communication 6, p. 2)

2. Re "N1" series military currency

1. Additional manufacture of currency according to denomination, quantity and value.

Denomination	Units of 10 Thousand Sheets	Units of 10 Thousand Dollars
10 Dollar Note	240	2,400
5 Dollar Note	220	1,100
1 Dollar Note	500	500
50 Cents Note	600	300
10 Cents Note	2,400	240
5 Cents Note	600	30
1 Cent Note	1,600	16
TOTAL	6,160	4,586

2. Date of Completion

About one-half	30 October
Remainder	10 December

3. Samples

500 sheets of each denomination.

3. Re "Ha" series military currency.

1. Additional manufacture of currency according to denomination, quantity and value.

(Communication (, v. 2a)

	Units of 10 Thousand Sheets	Units of 10 Thousand Guilders
10 Guilders Note	240	2,400
5 Guilders Note	220	1,100
1 Guilder Note	500	500
1/2 Guilder Note	600	300
10 Cents Note	2,400	240
5 Cents Note	600	30
1 Cent Note	1,600	16
TOTAL	6,160	4,566

## 2. Date of Completion

About one-half	20 November
Remainder	30 December

## 3. Samples

500 Sheets of each denomination.

## 4. Re "Ro" series military currency.

## 1. Additional manufacture of currency according to denomination, quantity and value.

	Units of 10 Thousand Sheets	Units of 10 Thousand Yen
10 Yen Note	55	550
5 Yen Note	50	250
1 Yen Note	110	110
50 Sen Note	180	90
TOTAL	395	1,000

2. Date of Completion 20 November

3. Samples 500 sheets of each denomination.

Yasumasa KURIHASHI, Chief of the  
Intendance Bureau, War Ministry.

Document No. 9022

Page 11

(Communication 7, p. 1)

TOP SECRET

Drafted 16 September 1941

Sanctioned 16 September 1941

From Chief of the Financial Bureau, (TAKUICHI)\*  
Head of the Treasury Division, (YOSHIDA)\*  
Head of the Foreign Affairs Division, (SAKOMIZU)\*  
Investigation (HISHIHARA)\* (SATAKE)\*

To Minister  
Vice Minister, (TANIGUCHI)\* (KUROGANE)\*  
Head of Archives & Documents Division, (YAMAGITA)\*

Subject concerning Manufacture of "Ho" and "Ro" Series and also  
"Fa" and "Ni" Series Military Currency Notes.

In regard to the manufacture of "Ho" (new manufacture) and "Ro", "Ha" and "Ni" series (additional manufacture) of military currency notes which may be used in certain unspecified areas in the future, we received an inquiry from the Chief of the Intendance Bureau, War Ministry, as enclosed herein. Since we are of the opinion that this is unavoidable under the circumstances, wouldn't it be alright to reply to the War Ministry with Draft No. 1 and make a request for the manufacture of these to the Cabinet Printing Bureau with Draft No. 2.

We request your approval.

DRAFT NO. 1

Date:  
To Chief of the Intendance Bureau,  
War Ministry

We acknowledge receipt of your inquiry Kei-Shu-Hatsu No. 485, dated 13 September concerning the manufacture of "Ho", "Ro", "Ha" and "Ni" series military currency notes and have fully noted its contents.

Chief of the Financial Bureau,  
Ministry of Finance

\* Indicated on original by "Han" (seal).

Document No. 9022

Page 12

(Communication 7, p. 2)

DRAFT NO. 2

Date.

To Chief of the Cabinet Printing Bureau

Your are requested to manufacture immediately military currency notes as per particulars in the attached sheets. In this connection, we would like to add that you handle it with top secrecy.

Chief of the Financial Bureau



(Communication 7, p. 3)

(Unit = One Thousand Sheets)  
(One Thousand Yen )ITEMSLISTREQUIREMENT OF MILITARY CURRENCY NOTES TO BE MANUFACTURED

Amount of Manufacture : Required Quantity & Date  
 Denomination : Quantity Value 20 Oct End Oct 20 Nov 10 Dec End Dec  
 (It has been decided to call the "Ho" series Notes to be newly manufactured by the Cabinet Printing Bureau as "No. 3 Notes")

## No. 2

10 Yen Note	2,000	20,000	2,000	-	-	-	-
5 Yen Note	1,900	9,500	1,900	-	-	-	-
1 Yen Note	4,000	4,000	4,000	-	-	-	-
50 Sen Note	5,000	2,500	5,000	-	-	-	-
10 Sen Note	10,000	1,000	10,000	-	-	-	-
5 Sen Note	3,000	150	3,000	-	-	-	-
1 Sen Note	5,000	10	5,000	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	30,900	37,200	30,900	-	-	-	-

## "Ni" Series

10 Yen Note	2,400	24,000	-	1,200	-	1,200	-
5 Yen Note	2,200	11,000	-	1,100	-	1,100	-
1 Yen Note	5,000	5,000	-	2,500	-	2,500	-
50 Sen Note	6,000	3,000	-	3,000	-	3,000	-
10 Sen Note	24,000	2,400	-	12,000	-	12,000	-
5 Sen Note	6,000	300	-	3,000	-	3,000	-
1 Sen Note	16,000	160	-	8,000	-	8,000	-
TOTAL	61,600	45,860	-	30,800	-	30,800	-

(Communication 7, p. 3)

(Unit = One Thousand Sheets)  
(One Thousand Yen )ITEMSLISTLIST OF MILITARY CURRENCY NOTES TO BE MANUFACTURED

Amount of Manufacture : Required Quantity & Date  
 Denomination : Quantity Value 20 Oct End Oct 20 Nov 10 Dec End Dec  
 (It has been decided to call the "Ho" series Notes to be newly manufactured by the Cabinet Printing Bureau as "No. 3 Notes")

## No. 2

10 Yen Note	2,000	20,000	2,000	-	-	-	-
5 Yen Note	1,900	9,500	1,900	-	-	-	-
1 Yen Note	4,000	4,000	4,000	-	-	-	-
50 Sen Note	5,000	2,500	5,000	-	-	-	-
10 Sen Note	10,000	1,000	10,000	-	-	-	-
5 Sen Note	3,000	150	3,000	-	-	-	-
1 Sen Note	5,000	10	5,000	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	30,900	37,200	30,900	-	-	-	-

## "Ni" Series

10 Yen Note	2,400	24,000	-	1,200	-	1,200	-
5 Yen Note	2,200	11,000	-	1,100	-	1,100	-
1 Yen Note	5,000	5,000	-	2,500	-	2,500	-
50 Sen Note	6,000	3,000	-	3,000	-	3,000	-
10 Sen Note	24,000	2,400	-	12,000	-	12,000	-
5 Sen Note	6,000	300	-	3,000	-	3,000	-
1 Sen Note	16,000	160	-	8,000	-	8,000	-
TOTAL	61,600	45,860	-	30,800	-	30,800	-

(Communication 7, p. 4)

## "Ha" Series

10 Yen Note	2,400	24,000	-	-	1,200	-	1,200
5 Yen Note	2,200	11,000	-	-	1,100	-	1,100
1 Yen Note	5,000	5,000	-	-	2,500	-	2,500
50 Sen Note	6,000	3,000	-	-	3,000	-	3,000
10 Sen Note	24,000	2,400	-	-	12,000	-	12,000
5 Sen Note	6,000	200	-	-	3,000	-	3,000
1 Sen Note	16,000	160	-	-	8,000	-	8,000
TOTAL	61,600	45,860	-	-	30,800	-	30,800

## "Ro" Series

10 Yen Note	550	5,500	-	-	500	-	-
5 Yen Note	500	2,500	-	-	500	-	-
1 Yen Note	1,100	1,100	-	-	1,100	-	-
50 Sen Note	1,800	900	-	-	1,800	-	-
TOTAL	3,950	10,000	-	-	3,950	-	-
GRAND TOTAL	158,050	138,920	30,900	30,800	34,750	30,800	30,800

(Communication 8, p. 1)

MILITARY SECRET

(OZAMA)\*

(ARMY)\*

Koi-Shu-Hatsu No. 547

INQUIRY PERTAINING TO FORMING OF MILITARY CURRENCY

15 October 1941

To Chief of the Financial Bureau,  
Ministry of Finance

Please be advised that you are requested to forward, for the time being, the following of the military currencies which have previously been ordered for manufacture.

As to particulars of transportation, we would like to add that we will have our officials in charge contact you.

## I. Series and denominations of Military Currencies.

## 1. "Ni" Series Military Currency

10 Dollars Note	2,100,000 Dollars
5 Dollars Note	1,050,000 Dollars
1 Dollar Note	450,000 Dollars
50 Cents Note	500,000 Dollars
Total	4,100,000 Dollars

## 2. Auxiliary Currency (Japanese coins)

10 Sen	12,000 Yen
5 Sen	1,500 Yen
1 Sen	800 Yen
Total	14,300 Yen

## II. Destination

The Bank of Japan, Shanghai Agency.

## III. Time to arrive

By 22 October

Chief of the Intendance Bureau  
War Ministry

\* Indicated on original by "Han" (seal).

(Communication 9, p. 1)

TOP SECRET

Drafted 22 October 1941  
Sanctioned 31 October 1941

From Chief of the Financial Bureau, (TAKEUCHI)\*  
Head of the Treasury Division, (YOSHIDA)\*  
Acting Head of the Foreign Affairs Division (AI)\*  
Investigation (NISHIHARA)\*

To Minister, (TANIGUCHI)\*  
Vice-Minister, Head of the Archives & Documents Division, (YAMAGIWA)\*  
Head of the Accountant Division, (OTSUKA)\*

Chief of the Financial Bureau (KIUCHI)\* (KUROGANE)\*  
Chief of the Banking Bureau (AIDA)\* (AOKI)\* (HAYASHI)\*  
Chief of the Exchange Bureau (HARAGUCHI)\* (SEAL)\*\* (NAKAMURA)\*  
Superintendent of the Bank of Japan (KISHI)\* (NODA)\* (HARA)\*

Prime Minister, (TOJO)\*  
War Minister, (TOJO)\*  
Vice-Minister, (KIYURU)\* Acting Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau (SANADA):  
Head of the Military Affairs Section, (SANADA)\*  
Acting Chief of the Intendance Bureau, (NDC)\*  
Head of the Intendance Section, (ENDO)\* (KURIBASHI)\*

Navy Minister, (SHIMADA)\*  
Vice Minister, (SAYEMOTO)\*  
Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, (OKAKI)\*  
Head of the 1st Section (TAKADA, TOSHIKANE)\*  
Chief of the Intendance Bureau (SEAL)\*\*  
Head of the 1st Section (FUKUOKA)\*

\* Indicated on original by "Han" (seal).  
\*\* "Han" not legible.

(Communication 9, p. 2)

Chief of the Intendance Bureau  
Head of the No. 1 Division

SUBJECT MATTER RELATING TO ISSUANCE OF MILITARY CURRENCY NOTES IN  
FOREIGN DENOMINATIONS

Considering the eventuality of carrying out a military operation in the southern regions, it is deemed necessary to issue military currency notes in foreign denominations for the purpose of affording the convenience to defray the war expenditures of the forces.

It is, therefore, desired to carry into effect the outline for the issuance of military currency notes as enclosed herein upon approval by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance, the War Minister and the Navy Minister.

We request your approval.

OUTLINE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF MILITARY CURRENCY NOTES

1. Military currency notes in foreign denominations are to be issued for the purpose of affording the conveniences to defray war expenditures, in consideration of the eventuality of carrying out a military operation in the southern regions.
2. The military currency notes are to be exchangeable with Japanese currency, where necessary.
3. The mode of procedures of the preceding Articles shall be determined at a conference of the Minister of Finance, the War Minister and the Navy Minister.

(Communication 10, p. 1)

TOP SECRETDRAFTED 22 October 1941  
SANCTIONED 31 October 1941From Chief of the Financial Bureau, (TAKEMUCHI)\*  
Head of the Treasury Division, (TOSHIDA)\*  
Acting Head of the Foreign Affairs Division, (AI)\*  
Investigation, (FISHIHARA)\*

To Minister

Vice-Minister, (TAMIGUCHI)\*  
Head of the Archives & Document Division, (YAMAGIWA)\*  
Head of the Accountant Division, (CHYUKA)\*  
(KUROGANE)\*  
Chief of the Financial Bureau, (KIUCHI)\* (UETKI)\* (NAKAMURA)\*  
Chief of the Banking Bureau, (MIDA)\*  
Chief of the Exchange Bureau, (FARAGUCHI)\* (HAYASHI)\*  
Superintendent of the Bank of Japan, (KISHI)\* (HARA)\*War Minister, (TOJO)\* Vice-Minister, (KIMURA)\*  
Acting Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, (SANADA)\*  
Head of the Military Affairs Section, (SANADA)\*  
Chief of the Intendance Bureau, (ENDO)\* (KURIBASHI)\*  
Head of the Intendance Section, (FUDO)\*  
Navy Minister, (SHIMADA)\* Vice-Minister (SAWAJITO)\*  
Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, (OKAKI)\*  
Head of the 1st Section, (TAKADA TOSHIKANE)\*  
Chief of the Intendance Bureau, (SPAL)\*\*  
Head of the 1st Section, (INAOKA)\*SUBJECT PERTAINING TO INSTITUTION OF PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING  
MILITARY CURRENCY NOTES IN FOREIGN DENOMINATIONS FOR THE  
SOUTHERN REGIONS.

In consideration of the eventuality of carrying out operations in the South Seas area, the policy in regard to the matter of issuing military currency notes of foreign denominations for the purpose of affording the convenience of defraying the military expenditures of the said forces is to have the outline for the issuance of military currency notes decided by the Prime Minister, the Finance Minister, the War Minister and the Navy Minister and have it carried out, but would it be alright to establish a procedure for the handling of military currency notes of foreign denominations for the southern areas, as enclosed herein, after the above has been decided? Furthermore, it is desired that this matter be substituted at the conference with the War Minister and the Navy Minister as stipulated in Article 3 of the outline for the issuance of military currency notes. After the above has been decided, would it be alright to notify the respective quarters concerned with the following plan? We again seek for your approval.

\* Indicated on original by "Han" (seal). \*\* "Han" not legible.

(Communication 10, p. 2)

PLAN OF PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING MILITARY CURRENCY NOTES IN  
FOREIGN DENOMINATIONS FOR SOUTHERN REGIONS.

- ARTICLE 1. For the purpose of affording the convenience of defraying the war expenditures in the areas of military operations in the South, the government shall issue military currency notes in foreign denominations within the scope of the budget.
- ARTICLE 2. The military currency notes mentioned in the preceding article shall be called Military Currency Notes of 1941 (hereinafter briefly called Foreign Currency Military Notes) and their denominations shall be as follows:
- Gulden Military Notes, 7 denominations - 10 Gulden,  
5 Gulden, 1 Gulden, 1/2 Gulden,  
10 Cents, 5 Cents & 1 cent.
- Dollar Military Notes, 7 denominations - 10 Dollars,  
5 Dollars, 1 Dollar, 50 Cents,  
10 Cents, 5 Cents & 1 Cent.
- Peso Military Notes, 7 denominations - 10 Pesos,  
5 Pesos, 1 Peso, 50 Centavos,  
10 Centavos, 5 Centavos &  
1 Centavo.
- ARTICLE 3. The Chief of the Financial Bureau, Ministry of Finance, with the approval of the approval of the Minister of Finance, shall at any time when necessary determine the denomination, amount and period of manufacture of foreign currency military notes and shall advise the Cabinet Printing Bureau of the same.
- ARTICLE 4. The Cabinet Printing Bureau, following completion of the manufacture of foreign currency military notes, shall inform to Chief of the Financial Bureau, Ministry of Finance, their denominations and amount.
- ARTICLE 5. The Chief of the Financial Bureau, Ministry of Finance, upon receipt of the advice mentioned in the preceding article from the Cabinet Printing Bureau, shall direct the said bureau to deliver the foreign currency military notes to the Bank of Japan and shall also take steps to instruct the said Bank to receive the same.



(Communication 10, p. 3)

ARTICLE 6. The Bank of Japan, upon receipt of the foreign currency military notes in accordance with the provisions of the preceding Article, shall accept the same as specific deposits and shall dispose of them under the category amount of military notes issued in the general ledger of Government funds. However, the amount accepted for the said specific deposits shall be as indicated in the attached table.

ARTICLE 7. When the War Ministry or Navy Ministry desires to have payments of foreign currency military notes, ~~she~~<sup>they</sup> shall give previous notice to the Ministry of Finance in regard to their amount, denomination, quantity and date.

The Ministry of Finance upon receipt of the notice of the preceding provision from the War Ministry or the Navy Ministry, shall immediately advise the Bank of Japan to that effect.

ARTICLE 8. When delivery of foreign currency military notes are necessary to advance funds to the funds advancing official, the disbursing official of the War or Navy Ministry shall attach to the cheque he issue, a statement of items showing the denominations and quantity of the foreign currency military notes. However, the amount to be issued shall depend on the retained value of the specific deposits.

The foregoing provision shall also apply to cases where the fund advancing official of the War or Navy Ministry, desiring to draw out its deposited funds, requires the delivery of foreign currency military notes.

ARTICLE 9. The Bank of Japan shall prepare a 1941 account book for Military Currency Notes and shall report the amount of receipts and disbursements to the Ministry of Finance each time such transaction is made.

The Bank of Japan shall report to the Ministry of Finance the balances of foreign currency military notes according to their denominations at the end of each month.

ARTICLE 10. The procedures of payment and exchange of foreign currency military notes shall be provided for separately.

(Communication 10, p. 4)

attached chart.

AMOUNT OF MILITARY CURRENCY TO BE DEPOSITED IN THE SPECIFIC DEPOSITS  
FOR 1941

Area to be used in	Distinction as per Series	Denomination in Foreign Currency	Accepting Value
Dutch East Indies	"Ha" Series	10 Guildens	10 Yen
	"	5 Guildens	5 Yen
	"	1 Gulden	1 Yen
	"	1/2 Gulden	50 Sen
	"	10 Cents	10 Sen
	"	5 Cents	5 Sen
British Malay, British Borneo & Thailand	"Pi" Series	1 Cent	1 Sen
	"	10 Dollars	10 Yen
	"	5 Dollars	5 Yen
	"	1 Dollar	1 Yen
	"	50 Cents	50 Sen
	"	10 Cents	10 Sen
Philippines	"	5 Cents	5 Sen
	"	1 Cent	1 Sen
	"Ho" Series	10 Pesos	10 Yen
	"	5 Pesos	5 Yen
	"	1 Peso	1 Yen
	"	50 Centavos	50 Sen
	"	10 Centavos	10 Sen
	"	5 Centavos	5 Sen
	"	1 Centavo	1 Sen

Document No. 9022

Page 22

(Communication 10, p. 5)

DRAFT NO. 1

Date

To War Minister, )  
Navy Minister, ) Respectively

I hereby would like to inform you that procedures for Handling Military Currency Notes in Foreign Denominations for Southern Regions have been instituted as enclosed herein.

Minister of Finance

DRAFT NO. 2

Date

To The Bank of Japan,

Since procedures for Handling Military Currency Notes in Foreign Denominations have now been prescribed, your attention is invited thereto.

Minister of Finance

Document No. 9022

Page 22

(Communication 10, p. 5)

DRAFT NO. 1

Date

To War Minister, )  
Navy Minister, ) Respectively

I hereby would like to inform you that procedures for Handling Military Currency Notes in Foreign Denominations for Southern Regions have been instituted as enclosed herein.

Minister of Finance

DRAFT NO. 2

Date

To The Bank of Japan,

Since procedures for Handling Military Currency Notes in Foreign Denominations have now been prescribed, your attention is invited thereto.

Minister of Finance

Document No. 9022

Page 23

(Communication 10, p. 6)

DRAFT NO. 3

Date

To Chief of the Cabinet Printing Bureau,

I, acting on orders, am hereby informing you that the Procedures for handling Military Currency Notes in Foreign Denominations for Southern Regions have been instituted as enclosed herein.

Chief of Financial Bureau

DRAFT NO. 4

1 November 1941

To Financial Commissioner at Shanghai )  
" SAKATA, Secretary at Kwangtung ) respectively

I am hereby informing you that the "Outline for the Issuance of Military Currency Notes" and the "Procedures for Handling Military Currency Notes in Foreign Denominations for Southern Regions" have now been decided as enclosed herein.

Chief of Financial Bureau

C E R T I F I C A T E

U.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. \_\_\_\_\_

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Sueo YAMAGUCHI, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Member of Liaison Office, Imperial Finance Ministry

and that as such official I have custody of the file of correspondence hereto attached (being I.P.S. Document No. 9022A) consisting of ten communications, written between the dates of 1 January 1941 and 31 October 1941 concerning the making of plates for the printing of military currency for use in occupied territories and instructions relating to the use of such currency. I further certify that the papers comprising this file have been extracted from the official files of the Finance Ministry of the Japanese Government and are part of the official archives and files of that Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this

10th day of Oct., 1945. /s/ Sueo YAMAGUCHI  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Richard H. Larsh  
Investigator, IFS

Member, Liaison Office  
Finance Ministry  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Investigator

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 10th day of October, 1946 /s/ Richard H. Larsh  
Investigator, IFS  
Official Capacity

/s/ J. I. Curran

90221-31  
852

證明書

「ワシントン」文書局 第... 號  
口 際 検 察 部 第 九 〇 三 三 (I) 號

典 據 及 ビ 公 正 ニ 示 ス ル 證 明

余、楠田光雄（音譯）ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、  
即チ大藏省理財局長トシテ、日本政府ト公的ニ係  
ニ在ルモノナルコト、竝ニ該實吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ  
添附セラレタル、一頁ヨリ成ル、千九百四十二年  
ノ昭和十六年ノ一月十六日附、下記題名ノ文書即  
チ大藏省理財局長石川半三郎ヨリ大藏省理財局長  
竹内新平ニ宛テタル、某方面ニ於テ使用スル算  
用票印刷局原型製造ノ急京準備方妥請ニ示ル  
極秘文書保管ニ任ジ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。  
余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書  
ナルコト、竝ニ右ガ下記各條ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式  
印及ビ綴ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。（若シアラ  
ハ綴番號又ハ引用、其ノ他公式印及ハ綴ニ於ケ  
ル該文書ノ成規所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ）

大藏省（千九百四十二年ノ昭和十六年ノ算用票ニ  
關スル件）

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ七月二十五日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該實吏署名楠田

右ノ若ノ公的資格印

證人 テイ一渡邊

90324-32

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、ウイリアム・シー・ブラウトハ、余ガ聯合國  
最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係ザルモノナルコト、並  
ニ上記題名ノ文書ハ余ガ公認上、日本政府ノ上記  
署名官吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明  
ス。

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ本七月二十六日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名 欄

ウイリアム・シー・ブラウト

右ノ者ノ公的職務

國際検査部調査官

證人

エドワード・ビー・モナガン



410224-533

證

廣

警

「ラッシュ」文書局

第

號

國 際 検 察 部

第 九 〇 三 三 ( 2 ) 號

先 據 及 び 公 正 三 局 ス ル 證 明

余、荷田新雄（番號）ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、

即チ大藏省理財局長トシテ、日本政府ト公的關係

ニ在ルモノナルコト、並ニ該首更ハシテ余ガ茲ニ

添附セラレタル、三頁ヨリ成ル、千九百四十一年

昭和十六年一月二十日に日葡、下記題名ノ文書即

チ文書添附ノ圖案ニ從ヒ軍用手票印刷万急準備

スル様大藏省ヨリ内閣印刷局ニ呈請セル「極秘」

印アル文書内、印刷局ハ大藏省ヨリ本件ノ極秘取

扱方長請セラレ保管ニ任ジ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書

ナルコト、並ニ右ガ下記各稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式

種類及ビ綴ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。（若シアラ

ハ綴番號又ハ引用、其ノ他公式警備又ハ綴ニ於ケ

ル該文書ノ成製所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ傍記スベシ）

大藏省（千九百四十一年）昭和十六年（用手票三冊スル件）

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年云七月二十五日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該首更署名欄

印

證 人 テイ、渡 邊

9022A-3J

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、ウイリアム・シム・ブラウトハ、余ガ聯合國  
最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、竝  
ニ上記題名ノ文書ハ余ガ公務上、日本政府ノ上記  
署名官真ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明  
ス。

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ五月二十六日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名 楠 ウイリアム・シム・ブラウト

右ノ君ノ公的資格 國際檢察部調査官

譯人 王下、~~...~~、~~...~~、~~...~~

9022A-35

証 明 書

「ロンドン」文藝局 知 事  
口 様 検 察 部 宛 九〇三三(3) 類

泉 滙 及 ビ 公 文 二 關 ス ル 証 明 書

余、橋田光澤（書畫）ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、  
門チ大蔵省理財局ニトシテ、日本政府ト公的ニ係  
ニ在ルモノナルコト、茲ニ該官更トシテ余ガ茲ニ  
添附セラレタル、三頁ヨリ成ル、千九百一十一年  
ノ昭和十六年ノ三月二十一日附、下記題名ノ文藝  
即チ大蔵省ヨリ青島關税局ニ宛タル、外國流用  
票三千九百圓目ノ紙額ノ半、ハ「は」號（クルテ  
ン券）ニシテ他ノ半額ハ「ニ」號（海峽植民地  
ル）ノ印刷ニ、スル「極秘」印アル文藝保管ニ  
任ジ居ルコトヲ茲ニ証明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ書封及ビ文藝ガ日本政府ノ公文藝  
ナルコト、茲ニ右カ下記各書ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式  
書封及ビ綴ノ一部ニルコトヲ證明ス。（若シアラ  
ハ添付書封及ビ引向ノ書ノ他公式書封又ハ綴ニ於ケ  
ル該文藝ノ所屬所存ノ公式書封ヲモ證明スベシ）

大藏省（千九百一十一年ノ昭和十六年ノ）用手票ニ（スル件）

7022 A-36

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／云七月二十五日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官官署名欄 ヲム、 堀 田

右ノ若ノ公的資格



證 人 テイ・。 渡 邊

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、ウイリアム・シー・アラウトハ、余ガ聯合國  
最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、茲  
ニ上記姓名ノ文書ハ余ガ公秘上、日本政府ノ上記  
署名官吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明  
ス。

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／云七月二十六日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏 名 欄 ウイリアム・シー・アラウト

右ノ若ノ公的資格 國際檢察部調査官

證 人 エドワード・ビー・モガシ

9c22A-37

證 明 書

「ワシントン」文書局 第 17 號  
皇 族 院 宗 部 第 九〇三(4) 號

典據及ビ公正ニシテスル證明

余、菊田光澤（字謙）ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、  
皇族院宗部局長トシテ、日本政府ト公的ニ關係  
ニ在ルモノナルコト、茲ニ該官員トシテ余ガ茲ニ  
添附セラレタル、一頁ヨリ成ル、千九百四十一年  
ノ昭和十六年ノ三月十一日付、下記類名ノ文書即  
チ皇族院ヨリ大藏省ニ宛テタル、「は」號算用事  
票三千九百萬圓ノ半額ハ精蘭語ニテ、此ノ半額ハ  
英訳ニテ記述セラルベシモノトシテ、千九百四十一年  
ノ三月十一日付ノ手紙ニ記述スルコトヲ證明セ  
タル事、茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ茲ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書  
ナルコト、茲ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式  
書類及ビ號ノ一部ナルコトヲ證ス。（若シアラ  
ハ憲章又ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ號ニ於テ  
ル該文書ノ處規所存ノ公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ）

大藏省（千九百四十一年ノ昭和十六年ノ算用事票ニシテスル件）

902-A-38

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／本七月二十五日

東京ニ於テ署名

警務官 梶名 楠ニム。 袴田

右ノ者ノ公的資格

印

証人 アイ・渡邊

公式入手ニ出スル證明

余、ウィリアム・シー・ブラウトハ、余ガ聯合國  
最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、並  
ニ上記姓名ノ支那ハ余ガ公使上、日本政府ノ上記  
署名官更ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明  
ス。

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／本七月二十六日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名 楠 ウィリアム・シー・ブラウト

右ノ者ノ公的資格 國際檢察部調査官

証人 エドワード・ビー・マガン

402-A-39

證 明 書

「ワシントン」文藝局 第 第  
目 際 検 察 部 第 九〇三 (5) 號

典 據 及 ビ 公 正 ニ 關 ス ル 證 明

余、瀧田光雄（音譯）ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、  
即チ大藏省理財局長トシテ日本政府ト公的関係ニ  
在ルモノナルコト、竝ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添  
附セラレタル、二頁ヨリ成ル、千九百四十一年ノ  
昭和十六年ノ四月二十三日附、下記題名ノ文藝即  
チ「はし號（ダルトン管）及「ニ」號（海峽植民  
地ドル）軍用手票見本ノ印刷ニ關スル内閣印刷局  
ニ對スル指令ヲ含ム文藝保管ニ任ジ居ルコトヲ茲  
ニ證明ス。

余ハ頁ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文藝ガ日正政府ノ公文藝  
ナルコト、竝ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式  
種類及ビ綴ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。（若シアラ  
ハ綴番號又ハ引用、其ノ他公式管及ハ綴ニ於ケ  
ル該文藝ノ版親所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ持記スベシ）

大藏省（千九百四十一年ノ昭和十六年ノ軍用手票ニ關スル件）

9022A-40

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／奉七月二十五日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官更署名ニム、 梅田

右ノ者ノ公的資格



證人 テイ・渡邊

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、ウイリアム・シー・ブラウトハ、余ガ聯合國  
最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、茲  
ニ上記題名ノ文書ハ余ガ公認上、日本政府ノ上記  
署名官更ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明  
ス。

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／奉七月二十六日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名ニム ウィリアム・シー・ブラウト

右ノ者ノ公的資格 國際警察部調査官

證人 エドワード・ビー・モナガン



9022A-40

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／卒七月二十五日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官署署名係 **三ム**、 楠 田

右ノ者ノ公的資格



證 人 **テイ・渡 邊**

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、ウイリアム・シー・ブラウトハ、余ガ聯合國  
最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、茲  
ニ上記題名ノ文書ハ余ガ公認上、日本政府ノ上記  
署名官署ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明  
ス。

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／卒七月二十六日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏 名 楠 **ウイリアム・シー・ブラウト**

右ノ者ノ公的資格 **國際警察部調査官**

證 人 **エドワード・D・モナガ**

9022A-41

證 明 書

「ワシントン」文書局 第 第  
國 際 檢 察 部 第 九 〇 三 三 (6) 號

典 據 及 び 公 正 ニ 關 ス ル 證 明

余、前田光雄（音譯）ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、  
朗チ大藏管理財局長トシテ、日本政府ト公的關係  
ニ在ルモノナルコト、並ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ  
添附セラレタル、六頁ヨリ成ル、千九百四十一年  
ノ昭和十六年ノ九月十三日附、下記題名ノ文書朗  
チ蔵算省ヨリ大藏省ニ宛テタル、「一」(一) (ベソ  
賞)、(二) (一) (タルテン賞)、(三) (渡峽植民  
地ドル) 及ビ「ろ」(一) (日本賞) 印票印刷増加  
ニ關スル件ト題スル文書保管ニ任ジ居ルコトヲ  
茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書  
ナルコト、並ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式  
書類及ビ綴ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シアラ  
バ發番號又ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於ケ  
ル該文書ノ成規所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ持記スベシ)

大藏省 (千九百四十一年ノ昭和十六年ノ算用手票ニ關スル件)

90-2A-42

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ奉七月二十五日

東京ニ於テ署名

管線官吏身名 榎 三郎 榎 田

右ノ者ノ公的資格

證人 テイ・イ・渡 邊

公式入手ニシテ証明

余、ウイリアム・シー・アラウトハ、余ガ聯合國  
最高指官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、並ニ  
上記通名ノ支警ハ余ガ公務上、日本政府ノ上記署  
名官更ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ奉七月二十六日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏 名 榎 ウイリアム・シー・アラウト

右ノ者ノ公的資格 國際警察部調査官

證人 エドワード・ビーマガシ

9022A-43

證 明 書

ワシントン支管局 第 九 〇 二 二 (V) 號  
際 検 察 部 第 九 〇 二 二 (V) 號

典 據 及 ビ 公 文 ニ 關 ス ル 證 明

余、橋田光雄ハ警部ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、  
即チ大藏省理財局長トシテ、日本政府ト公的係  
ニ在ルモノナルコト、竝ニ該百頁トシテ余ガ茲ニ  
添附セラレタル、六頁ヨリ成ル、千九百四十二年  
ノ昭和十六年九月十六日附、下記題名ノ文書即チ  
理財局長ヨリ大臣ニ宛テタル印用手票「係  
號」並ニ「る號」、「は號」及「に號」製造ニ關  
スル件ト文書ノ保管ニ任ジ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。  
余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書  
ナルコト、竝ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省及ハ部局ノ公式  
種類及ビ綴ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シアラ  
バ綴番號又ハ引用、其ノ他公式書及ハ綴ニ於ケ  
ル該文書ノ版規所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ持記スベシ)

大藏省(字九百四十二年ノ昭和十六年ノ印用手票ニ關スル件)

6022A-411-

千九百三十六年／西曆二十一年／本七月二十五日

東京ニ於テ  
署名官更替名簿  
右ノ者ノ公印資格  
人 テイ・、

公式入手ニ

余、ウィリアム・シー・ブラウットハ、余ガ聯合國  
最高指揮官司令部ニ在アルモノナルコト、並  
ニ上記姓名ノ又經ハ余ガ公認上、日本政府ノ上記  
署名官更ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ證明ス。

千九百三十六年／西曆二十一年／本七月二十六日

東京ニ於テ  
氏名  
右ノ者ノ公印資格  
人  
ウィリアム・シー・ブラウット  
國際警察部監督  
エドワード・ビー・モガ

9022, A-145

證 明 書

「ワシントン」文書局 第 九〇三三 (8) 號  
附 際 漁 丞 部

真 據 及 ビ 公 正 ニ ス ル 證 明

余、植田光雄（音譯）ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、  
自テ天藏管理尉局長トシテ、日本政府ト公約締結  
ニ在ルモノナルコト、眞ニ諒負與トシテ余ガ茲ニ  
添附セラレタル、二頁ヨリ成ル、千九百四十一年  
ノ昭和十六年ノ十月十五日附、下記標名ノ文書館  
チ該文書ヨリ天藏省ニ宛テタル、「一〇一」號（海峽  
植民地地下ル）手票ニ千百万圓ノ日本銀行上海代理  
店ヘノ前送員兼文書ノ天藏省ハ千九百四十一年ノ  
昭和十六年ノ十月十六日、日本銀行ニ對シ斯カル  
命令ヲ發セリ保管ニ任ジ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。  
余ハ眞ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書  
ナルコト、茲ニ右カ下記各標ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式  
記録及ビ該ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。（若シテラ  
ハ該記録又ハ引用、其ノ他公式記録又ハ是ニ於ケ  
ル該文書ノ原規所在ノ公式記録ヲモ實記スベシ）

天藏省（千九百四十一年ノ昭和十六年ノ皇用手票ニ付スル件）

9022 A-116

千九百四十六年/昭和二十一年/本七月二十五日

東京 二於テ署名

當該官更者名欄 エム。

和田

田

右ノ者ノ公的資格

(印)

人

テイ・

邊

公式入手ニスル證明

余、ウイリアム・ソ。ブラウトハ、余ガ聯合國

最高指揮官總司令部ニ係アルモノナルコト、故

ニ上記種名ノ文書ハ余ガ公認上、日云政府ノ上記

署名官更ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明

ス。

千九百四十六年/昭和二十一年/本七月二十六日

東京 二於テ署名

氏 名 欄

ウイリアム・ソ。ブラウト

右ノ者ノ公的資格

國際檢察部調査官

人

エドワード・ピア・ミカシ

9022A-17

證 明 書

「ワシントン」文書局 第  
四 除 捺 察 部 第九〇二二 (9) 號

典 據 及 ビ 公 正 ニ シ ス ル 證 據

余、梅田光雄（音譯）ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、  
 即チ大藏省理財局長トシテ日本政府ト公的ニ  
 在ルモノナルコト、並ニ該官更トシテ余ガ茲ニ添  
 附セラレタル、四頁ヨリ成ル、千九百四十一年ノ  
 昭和十六年ノ十月三十一日附、下記題名ノ文書即  
 チ「外貨發示用用手票發行ノ件」ニ關スル大藏省  
 ノ「口頭機密」印アル文書。戰爭ノ場合ヲ考慮シ  
 外貨發示用用手票發行ノ決定セラレタル旨記載ア  
 ル該文書ニハ東條内閣總理大臣、東條陸軍大臣、  
 賀屋大臣、嶋田海軍大臣ノ印章アリ。保管ニ任ジ  
 居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ茲ニ添附ノ記路及ビ文書カ日本政府ノ公文書  
 ナルコト、並ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式  
 印及ビ綴ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。（若シアラバ  
 復他文ハ引片、其ノ他公式文書又ハ於ケル該文書ノ成規所  
 在ノ公式名稱ヲモ持記スベシ）

文書 (千九百四十一年ノ昭和十六年ノ用用手票ニ關スル件)



9022 1-47

千九百二十六年ノ昭和二十二年ノ三月

東京ニ於テ署名

官製富達地盤社

エム。

田

右ノ者ノ公的資格

（印）

證人 テイ・イ・渡邊

公式入手ニ由スル證明

余、ウイリアム・ジー・ブラウナーハ、余ガ聯合國

最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、並

ニ上記三名ノ文藝ハ余ガ公認上、日ハ政府ノ上記

署名ノ文藝ハ余ガ公認上、日ハ政府ノ上記署名官

實ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百二十六年ノ昭和二十二年ノ三月二十五日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏 德 刺

ウイリアム・ジー・ブラウ

右ノ者ノ公的資格

國際警察部調査官

證人

エドワード・ピー・ミカフ

4022A-49

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又、田、光、典、(、香、及、公、正、) 余、日、カ、下、用、ノ、余、的、於、ニ、勝  
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「ク」 探、シ、ク、 論、シ、ク、 宗、シ、ク、 又、シ、ク、 局、シ、ク、 (T0) 號、シ、ク、

聖 歌 局 等

大正憲法(第九百四十一号)第六百六十二号附手続ニ関スル法律

言ハシム

ノ類ニ於ケル該文章ノ原籍所在ノ公式台格ヲ持  
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千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ六月二十五日

東京ニ於テ署名  
自前右實地検査官  
右ノ君ノ公的資格  
證人  
テイ・・・・・ 田邊

公式入手ニシスル證明

余、ウィリアム・シー・ブラウツ、余ガ聯合國  
最高紙幣管理司部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、並ニ  
上記題名ノ文書ハ余ガ公認上、日本政府ノ上記署  
名官吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ誠告ス

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ七月二十六日

東京ニ於テ署名  
氏名 桐 ウィリアム・シー・ブラウツ  
右ノ君ノ公的資格 國際警察部調査官  
證人 エドワード・ビー・モナガン

SECRETARIATE SECRET B No. 841-3

1 November 1941

To ~~The~~ Bank of Japan,

The procedures in dealing with the military currency expressed in southern region foreign currency have been prescribed as under and shall accordingly be pursued.

Okinobu KAYA  
 Minister of Finance . Minister's .  
 . Seal .

Procedures in dealing with the military currency expressed in southern region foreign currency.

ARTICLE 1--The Government, for the convenience of defraying the war expenditure in the southern region under war operations, shall issue the war-notes expressed in foreign currency within the scope of the budget.

ARTICLE 2--The war-notes mentioned in the preceding Article shall be named military currency for 1941 (hereinafter briefly called Foreign Military Currency) and be sorted as follows:

Gulden War-notes	10 Guildens, 5 Guildens, 1 Gulden, 1/2 Gulden, 10 Cents, 5 Cents and 1 Cent--7 sorts.
Dollar War-Notes	10 Dollars, 5 Dollars, 1 Dollar, 50 Cents, 10 Cents, 5 Cents, and 1 Cent--7 sorts.
Peso War-notes	10 Pesos, 5 Pesos, 1 Peso, 50 Centavos, 10 Centavos, 5 Centavos and 1 Centavo --7 sorts.

ARTICLE 3--The President of Financial Management Bureau of the Ministry of Finance through sanction of the Minister of Finance, shall at any time determine the sorts, number, and period of manufacture of the foreign military currency and shall advise the Cabinet Printing Bureau of the same.

ARTICLE 4--The Cabinet Printing Bureau, following completion of manufacture of the foreign military currency, shall inform the President of Financial Management Bureau of the Ministry of Finance of their sorts and number.

ARTICLE 5--The President of Financial Management Bureau of the Ministry of Finance, upon receipt of the advice mentioned in the preceding Article from the Cabinet Printing Bureau, shall direct the said bureau to deliver the foreign military currency to the Bank of Japan and shall also take procedures for instructing the said bank for receiving the same.

ARTICLE 6--The Bank of Japan, upon receipt of the foreign military currency in pursuance of the provisions of the preceding Article, shall accept the same as a separate deposit and shall settle it under the item "amount of issuance of the war-notes" in the items of the combined ledger of the Treasury, provided that the acceptance value of the said separate deposits shall be in accordance with the appended table.

ARTICLE 7--When the Ministry of War or the Ministry of Navy intends to receive payment of the foreign military currency, it shall give previous notice to the Ministry of Finance of their amount, sorts, number, and time.

The Ministry of Finance, upon receipt from the Ministry of War or of Navy of the notice of preceding provision, shall immediately advise the Bank of Japan to the same effect.

ARTICLE 8--When the disbursing official of the Ministry of War or of the Navy must deliver military currency in case he wishes to advance funds to the fund-advancing official, he shall attach to the cheque he issues, a statement of items showing sorts and number of the foreign military currency, and the value so defrayed shall be in accordance with the value of the balance in the special account.

The foregoing provision shall also apply to the case where the funds-advancing official of the Ministry of War or the Ministry of Navy intending to withdraw its deposit funds, requires delivery of the foreign military currency.

ARTICLE 9--The Bank of Japan shall prepare an account book of receipts and disbursements of military currency for 1941 and shall each time report to the Ministry of Finance the amount of receipts and disbursements. The Bank of Japan shall also report to the Ministry of Finance the balances of the foreign currency war-notes in distinction of their sorts at the end of each month.

ARTICLE 10--The methods of making payment and exchange of the foreign currency war-notes shall be separately prescribed.

## APPENDIX TABLE

Accepting Value of Specific Deposits of War-notes for 1941			
Circulating Regions	Distinction as per Forms	Value Expressed in Foreign Currency	Acceptance Value
	No. HA (1 E)	10 Guildens	10 Yen
	"	5 "	5 "
Netherlands	"	1 "	1 "
East India	"	1/2 "	50 Sen
	"	10 Cents	10 "
	"	5 Cents	5 "
	"	1 "	1 "
	No. NI (1=)	10 Dollars,	10 Yen
	"	5 "	5 "
British Malay,	"	1 "	1 "
British Borneo & Thailand	"	50 Cents	50 Sen
	"	10 "	10 "
	"	5 "	5 "
	"	1 "	1 "
	No. HO (1 E)	10 Pesos	10 Yen
	"	5 "	5 "
	"	1 "	1 "
Philippines	"	50 Centavos	50 Sen
	"	10 "	10 "
	"	5 "	5 "
	"	1 "	1 "

DOCUMENT NO. 9016

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I.P.S. No. 9016

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Otoo Fujii hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Bank of Japan in the following capacity: Chief of Treasury Dep't. and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 6 pages, dated Nov. 1st, 1941, and described as follows: "Procedures in connection with Military currency in Southern areas", "Topsecret," signed by Mr. Okunobu Kaya, Minister of Finance.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the Bank of Japan.

Signed at Tokyo on this 24 day of June, 1946.

/s/ O. Fujii

Signature of Official  
SEAL ( )  
Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ T. Nakajima

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward F. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Bank of Japan in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 24 day of June, 1946.

/s/ Edward F. Monaghan

NAME  
Investigator  
Official Capacity  
I.P.S.

Witness: /s/ A. R. Goyce



"General Records Book from  
the Bank of Japan."  
Ledger of the Locality of Goods Controlled  
and Entrusted to the Government

Unissued war notes				In the main bank	
Date	Note	Number	Sum	Number	Sum

(The above is the heading on each and every page of this book)

Pages of Original Book	Date 1941	Amount Received ¥	Labelled 1941 Issue Military Currency
1	(20 June 1941	5,000,000	"Ha-go" ¥ 10
	(30 June 1941	5,000,000	"Ha-go" ¥ 10
	(12 Nov. 1941	12,000,000	"Ha-go" ¥ 10
	(22 Nov. 1941	12,000,000	"Ha-go" ¥ 10
3	(10 June	2,000,000	"Ha-go" ¥ 5
	(20 June	2,500,000	"Ha-go" ¥ 5
	(30 June	2,500,000	"Ha-go" ¥ 5
	(12 Nov.	5,500,000	"Ha-go" ¥ 5
	(22 Nov.	5,500,000	"Ha-go" ¥ 5
5	(31 May	500,000	"Ha-go" ¥ 1
	(10 June	500,000	"Ha-go" ¥ 1
	(20 June	500,000	"Ha-go" ¥ 1
	(12 Nov.	1,000,000	"Ha-go" ¥ 1
	(22 Nov.	1,500,000	"Ha-go" ¥ 1
7	( 6 Dec.	1,000,000	"Ha-go" ¥ 1
	(23 May	500,000	"Ha-go" 50 sen
	(30 May	500,000	"Ha-go" 50 sen
	( 8 Nov.	750,000	"Ha-go" 50 sen
	(15 Nov.	750,000	"Ha-go" 50 sen
9	(24 Nov.	750,000	"Ha-go" 50 sen
	( 8 Nov.	300,000	"Ha-go" 10 sen
	(13 Nov.	300,000	"Ha-go" 10 sen
	(17 Nov.	300,000	"Ha-go" 10 sen
	(20 Nov.	300,000	"Ha-go" 10 sen
10	( 1 Dec.	300,000	"Ha-go" 10 sen
	( 5 Dec.	300,000	"Ha-go" 10 sen
	( 4 Nov.	150,000	"Ha-go" 5 sen
	( 8 Nov.	150,000	"Ha-go" 5 sen

<u>Pages of Original Book</u>	<u>Date 1941</u>	<u>Amount Received ¥</u>	<u>Labelled 1941 Issue, Military Currency</u>
11	(13 Nov.	30,000	"Ha-go" 1 sen
	(17 Nov.	30,000	"Ha-go" 1 sen
	(19 Nov.	20,000	"Ha-go" 1 sen
	( 2 Dec.	30,000	"Ha-go" 1 sen
	( 5 Dec.	30,000	"Ha-go" 1 sen
13	(31 July	5,000,000	"Ni-go" ¥ 10
	( 5 Aug.	4,500,000	"Ni-go" ¥ 10
	(28 Aug.	500,000	"Ni-go" ¥ 10
	(24 Oct.	6,000,000	"Ni-go" ¥ 10
	(30 Oct.	6,000,000	"Ni-go" ¥ 10
	( 6 Nov.	2,100,000	"Ni-go" ¥ 10
	(26 Nov.	5,010,000	"Ni-go" ¥ 10
	(27 Nov.	990,000	"Ni-go" ¥ 10
	( 5 Dec.	6,000,000	"Ni-go" ¥ 10
15	(10 July	2,000,000	"Ni-go" ¥ 5
	(21 July	2,500,000	"Ni-go" ¥ 5
	(31 July	2,000,000	"Ni-go" ¥ 5
	(23 Aug.	500,000	"Ni-go" ¥ 5
	(25 Oct.	2,500,000	"Ni-go" ¥ 5
	(30 Oct.	3,000,000	"Ni-go" ¥ 5
	( 6 Nov.	1,050,000	"Ni-go" ¥ 5
	(27 Nov.	3,000,000	"Ni-go" ¥ 5
	( 5 Dec.	2,500,000	"Ni-go" ¥ 5
17	( 1 July	500,000	"Ni-go" ¥ 1
	(10 July	500,000	"Ni-go" ¥ 1
	(21 July	500,000	"Ni-go" ¥ 1
	(25 Oct.	1,000,000	"Ni-go" ¥ 1
	(31 Oct.	1,500,000	"Ni-go" ¥ 1
	( 6 Nov.	450,000	"Ni-go" ¥ 1
	(20 Nov.	544,000	"Ni-go" ¥ 1
	(27 Nov.	656,000	"Ni-go" ¥ 1
	( 5 Dec.	1,300,000	"Ni-go" ¥ 1
19	(10 July	500,000	"Ni-go" 50 sen
	(21 July	500,000	"Ni-go" 50 sen
	(24 Oct.	500,000	"Ni-go" 50 sen
	(28 Oct.	500,000	"Ni-go" 50 sen
	(31 Oct.	500,000	"Ni-go" 50 sen
	( 6 Nov.	500,000	"Ni-go" 50 sen
	(24 Nov.	750,000	"Ni-go" 50 sen
	(29 Nov.	750,000	"Ni-go" 50 sen
21	(21 Oct.	200,000	"Ni-go" 10 sen
	(23 Oct.	300,000	"Ni-go" 10 sen
	(27 Oct.	300,000	"Ni-go" 10 sen
	(29 Oct.	300,000	"Ni-go" 10 sen
	(30 Oct.	100,000	"Ni-go" 10 sen

<u>Pages of Original Book</u>	<u>Date 1941</u>	<u>Amount Received ¥</u>	<u>Labelled 1941 Issue Military Currency</u>
	( 4 Nov.	300,000	"Ni-go" 10 sen
	( 5 Nov.	200,000	"Ni-go" 10 sen
	(22 Nov.	200,000	"Ni-go" 10 sen
	(25 Nov.	200,000	"Ni-go" 10 sen
	(27 Nov.	300,000	"Ni-go" 10 sen
23	(25 Oct.	50,000	"Ni-go" 5 sen
	(30 Oct.	100,000	"Ni-go" 5 sen
	( 4 Dec.	150,000	"Ni-go" 5 sen
24	(22 Oct.	20,000	"Ni-go" 1 sen
	(25 Oct.	30,000	"Ni-go" 1 sen
	(30 Oct.	30,000	"Ni-go" 1 sen
	(22 Nov.	30,000	"Ni-go" 1 sen
	(27 Nov.	30,000	"Ni-go" 1 sen
	(29 Nov.	20,000	"Ni-go" 1 sen
55	( 6 Oct.	20,000,000	"Ho-go" ¥ 10
57	( 8 Oct.	9,500,000	"Ho-go" ¥ 5
59	(14 Oct.	1,000,000	"Ho-go" ¥ 1
	(16 Oct.	2,000,000	"Ho-go" ¥ 1
	(20 Oct.	1,000,000	"Ho-go" ¥ 1
61	(14 Oct.	1,000,000	"Ho-go" 50 sen
	(20 Oct.	500,000	"Ho-go" 50 sen
	(21 Oct.	1,000,000	"Ho-go" 50 sen
63	( 8 Oct.	200,000	"Ho-go" 10 sen
	(11 Oct.	300,000	"Ho-go" 10 sen
	(14 Oct.	100,000	"Ho-go" 10 sen
	(15 Oct.	300,000	"Ho-go" 10 sen
	(16 Oct.	100,000	"Ho-go" 10 sen
65	(20 Oct.	60,000	"Ho-go" 5 sen
	(21 Oct.	90,000	"Ho-go" 5 sen
67	(16 Oct.	20,000	"Ho-go" 1 sen
	(20 Oct.	30,000	"Ho-go" 1 sen

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I.P.S. No. 90162

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Otoe Fujii hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Bank of Japan in the following capacity; Chief of Treasury Dept. and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 1-89 pages, dated June 20, 1941 - Apr. 1, 1942 and described as follows: "Record of Locale of Articles Entrusted for Custody by the Government".

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the Bank of Japan.

Signed at Tokyo on this 24 day of June, 1946.

/s/ O. Fujii  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: T. Nakajima

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Bank of Japan in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 24 day of June, 1946.

/s/ Edward P. Monaghan

NAME

Witness:  
A. R. Joyce  
B

Investigator  
Official Capacity  
I.P.S.

Doc 90/60

11

政府寄託保管品所在品別張  
本店

本行軍用手票 15 號 拾四

11年	摘要	入		出		残	
		数量	金額	数量	金額	数量	金額
5	20	500,000	5,000,000			500,000	5,000,000
	30	500,000	5,000,000			1,000,000	10,000,000
11	12	1,000,000	10,000,000			1,200,000	12,000,000
	22	1,000,000	10,000,000			2,200,000	22,000,000

政府寄託保管品所在品別張

本店

本行軍用手票 15 號

五十四

11年	摘要	入		出		残	
		数量	金額	数量	金額	数量	金額
6	10	400,000	4,000,000			400,000	4,000,000
	20	500,000	5,000,000			900,000	9,000,000
	30	500,000	5,000,000			1,400,000	14,000,000
11	12	1,100,000	11,000,000			1,300,000	13,000,000
	22	1,100,000	11,000,000			2,400,000	24,000,000

政府寄託保管品所在品別張

本店

本行軍用手票 15 號

壹十四

11年	摘要	入		出		残	
		数量	金額	数量	金額	数量	金額
5	31	500,000	5,000,000			500,000	5,000,000
6	10	500,000	5,000,000			1,000,000	10,000,000
	20	500,000	5,000,000			1,500,000	15,000,000
11	12	1,000,000	10,000,000			1,000,000	10,000,000
	22	1,500,000	15,000,000			2,200,000	22,000,000
12	6	1,000,000	10,000,000			2,850,000	28,500,000

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政府寄託 保管品所在別張

本行軍用手票 12 號 本店 五拾張券

年	摘要	入		出		残	
		数量	金額	数量	金額	数量	金額
5	22	1,000,000	500,000			1,000,000	500,000
	20	1,000,000	500,000			2,000,000	1,000,000
11	1	1,500,000	750,000			1,500,000	750,000
	15	1,500,000	750,000			2,100,000	1,350,000
	24	1,500,000	750,000	240,000	120,000	2,120,000	1,270,000

政府寄託 保管品所在別張

本行軍用手票 12 號 本店 拾張券

年	摘要	入		出		残	
		数量	金額	数量	金額	数量	金額
11	8	3,000,000	300,000			3,000,000	300,000
	13	3,000,000	300,000	600,000	60,000	5,300,000	5,240,000
	17	3,000,000	300,000			9,300,000	8,940,000
	20	3,000,000	300,000			11,300,000	11,240,000
12	1	3,000,000	300,000	20,000	2,000	14,278,000	13,228,000
	5	3,000,000	300,000			16,278,000	15,228,000

政府寄託 保管品所在別張

本行軍用手票 12 號 本店 五張券

年	摘要	入		出		残	
		数量	金額	数量	金額	数量	金額
11	X	3,000,000	150,000			3,000,000	150,000
	8	3,000,000	150,000			6,000,000	300,000

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政府寄託保管品所在別張

本行軍用手票

15 號

本店  
一 劃

年	摘要	入		出		残	
		数量	金額	数量	金額	数量	金額
11	13	3,000,000	30,000	300,000	3,000	2,700,000	27,000
	17	3,000,000	30,000			5,700,000	57,000
	19	2,000,000	20,000	10,000	100	1,680,000	16,800
12	2	3,000,000	30,000			1,500,000	15,000
	5	3,000,000	30,000			12,500,000	125,000

政府寄託保管品所在別張

本行軍用手票

12 號

本店  
拾 九

年	摘要	入		出		残	
		数量	金額	数量	金額	数量	金額
7	31	500,000	5,000,000			500,000	5,000,000
8	5	450,000	4,500,000			950,000	9,500,000
	38	50,000	500,000			1,000,000	10,000,000
10	24	600,000	6,000,000			1,390,000	13,900,000
	30	100,000	1,000,000			1,990,000	19,900,000
11	8	210,000	2,100,000	370,000	3,700,000	1,070,000	10,700,000
	26	501,000	5,010,000	501,000	5,010,000	0	0
	27	99,000	990,000			99,000	990,000
12	5	100,000	1,000,000			199,000	1,990,000

政府寄託保管品所在別張

本行軍用手票

12 號

本店  
五 四

年	摘要	入		出		残	
		数量	金額	数量	金額	数量	金額
7	10	400,000	4,000,000			400,000	4,000,000
	21	500,000	5,000,000			900,000	9,000,000
	31	400,000	4,000,000			1,300,000	13,000,000

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8 28	100,000	1,000,000			1,400,000	7,000,000
10 35	100,000	2,000,000			1,600,000	8,400,000
30	100,000	2,000,000			2,200,000	11,000,000
11 6	210,000	1,050,000	250,000	1,250,000	1,350,000	6,750,000
27	100,000	3,000,000			660,000	3,300,000
12 5	500,000	2,500,000			1,160,000	5,200,000

政府寄託保管品所在別帳

本銀行專用手帳

12 號

本店

卷四

11年	摘要	入		出		残	
		数量	金額	数量	金額	数量	金額
7 1		500,000	500,000			500,000	500,000
10		500,000	500,000			1,000,000	1,000,000
21		500,000	500,000			1,500,000	1,500,000
1 25		1,000,000	1,000,000			2,500,000	2,500,000
31		1,500,000	1,500,000			3,500,000	3,500,000
11 6		950,000	950,000	780,000	780,000	2,110,000	2,110,000
26		584,000	584,000	584,000	584,000	0	0
27		656,000	656,000			656,000	656,000
12 5		1,300,000	1,300,000			1,956,000	1,956,000

政府寄託保管品所在別帳

本銀行專用手帳

12 號

本店五拾號

11年	摘要	入		出		残	
		数量	金額	数量	金額	数量	金額
7 10		1,000,000	500,000			1,000,000	500,000
31		1,000,000	500,000			2,000,000	1,000,000
10 24		1,000,000	500,000			3,000,000	1,000,000
28		1,000,000	600,000			4,000,000	1,600,000
31		1,000,000	500,000			5,000,000	2,000,000
11 6		1,000,000	500,000	1,000,000	200,000	4,500,000	2,200,000
24		1,500,000	950,000			6,000,000	3,150,000
29		1,500,000	950,000			7,500,000	4,100,000



Doc: 90/68

政府寄託保管品所在別帳

本銀行專用簿

12 號

本店拾支

10年	摘要	入		出		残	
		数量	金額	数量	金額	数量	金額
10	21	2,000,000	200,000			2,000,000	200,000
	23	2,000,000	200,000			5,000,000	500,000
	27	2,000,000	200,000			8,000,000	800,000
	29	2,000,000	200,000			11,000,000	1,100,000
	30	1,000,000	100,000			12,000,000	1,200,000
	11	2,000,000	200,000	4,500,000	400,000	10,500,000	1,020,000
	5	2,000,000	200,000			12,500,000	1,220,000
	13	2,000,000	200,000			10,720,000	1,020,000
	35	2,000,000	200,000	4,500,000	400,000	8,220,000	820,000
	37	2,000,000	200,000			11,220,000	1,020,000

政府寄託保管品所在別帳

本銀行專用簿

12 號

本店五支

10年	摘要	入		出		残	
		数量	金額	数量	金額	数量	金額
10	25	1,000,000	50,000			1,000,000	50,000
	33	2,000,000	100,000			3,000,000	150,000
10	34	2,000,000	100,000			5,000,000	250,000

政府寄託保管品所在別帳

本銀行專用簿

12 號

本店拾支

10年	摘要	入		出		残	
		数量	金額	数量	金額	数量	金額
10	26	2,000,000	20,000			2,000,000	20,000
	25	2,000,000	20,000			5,000,000	50,000
	30	2,000,000	20,000			2,000,000	20,000
11	32	2,000,000	20,000			6,020,000	60,000
	27	2,000,000	20,000			6,520,000	60,000
	29	2,000,000	20,000			8,520,000	80,000

2009/9/16B

政府郵政保險總局自利帳

不能行保用項		第三號保			付居信(同)	
日期	摘要	數量	金額	數量	金額	備註
10/6		2,000,000	2,000,000			金銀
/						
10/8		1,900,000	9,500,000			金銀
/						
10/14		1,000,000	1,000,000			金銀
/						
10/11		2,100,000	2,000,000			金銀
/						
20		1,000,000	1,000,000			金銀
/						
10/14		2,100,000	1,000,000			金銀
/						
20		1,100,000	500,000			金銀
/						
21		2,000,000	1,000,000			金銀
/						
10/8		2,000,000	200,000			金銀
/						
11		2,000,000	200,000			金銀
/						
14		1,000,000	100,000			金銀
/						
15		2,000,000	100,000			金銀
/						
16		1,000,000	100,000			金銀
/						
10/20		1,200,000	10,000			金銀
/						
21		1,800,000	90,000			金銀
/						
10/16		2,000,000	20,000			金銀
/						
20		2,000,000	30,000			金銀
/						

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W. D. O.

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臣等謹案第第九〇一六(一)號

出所及び真正ニシテル體現

余、藤井カトエハ、余ノ妻ニ於テ御テ會計部長

トシテ日本銀行ニ公表ニ出テシテ居ルコト及ビソ

ノ契約ニ於テ業ニ懸附セラレタル八十九頁ヨリ成

ル前一九四一年(昭和十六年)六月二十日至一九

四二年(昭和十七年)四月一日附ノ、破席ヨリ、

保書ニベク書説サレタル品物ノ場所ノ記載ト記載

セラレタル文書ヲ保管シ居ルコトヲ披三體ス。

披ニ添附記録及ビ文書ハ公表文書ナルコト及長等

ハ日本銀行ノ公文記録及ビ簿リノ一部ナルコトヲ

証ス

一九四六年(昭和二十一年)六月二十四日、東京ニ

於テ署名

證人

W. D. O.

公文記録

印

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ニナリテ二種ノ。

此種ノ上ニ於テハ、  
 各種ノ材料ニ對シテ、  
 其ノ性質ノ異ナルヲ  
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圖 人 A · R · 矢 入

野 心 回 歸 演 義 會 報 誌 刊 行 時

「H. K. 矢 野 · 田 · 中 · 矢 野」

一 九 一 六

一 九 一 六 年 大 正 五 年 西 曆 一 九 一 六 年 六 月 十 一 日 田 中 矢 野 刊 行

X 53

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, SUEO YAMANOCHI, certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Member of the Liaison Office, Imperial Finance Ministry. I further certify that the monetary engraving plates of the currencies of the following denominations, which were delivered to the International Prosecution Section, SCAP, on 27 September 1946, were manufactured on the dates as indicated and by the order of Shimpei TAKEUCHI, Director of the Financial Division, Ministry of Finance.

<u>Denomination</u>	<u>Date</u>
10 Gulden	29 March 1941
5 Gulden	29 March 1941
1 Gulden	29 March 1941
1/2 Gulden	29 March 1941

It is further certified that the attached specimens are samples of the notes printed from the above mentioned plates.

/s/ SUEO YAMANOCHI (SFAL)  
Sueo YAMANOCHI

Signed and sworn to before Richard H. Larsh and John A. Curtis, 2nd Lt, MI, Investigators, International Prosecution Section, at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan, on this 10th day of October 1946.

/s/ RICHARD H. LARSH  
RICHARD H. LARSH

/s/ J. A. CURTIS 2d Lt.  
JOHN A. CURTIS  
2nd Lt, MI

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that the monetary engraving plates mentioned above were delivered to me by the Japanese Finance Ministry on 27 September 1946.

/s/ RICHARD H. LARSH  
RICHARD H. LARSH

755

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Suetō YAMANOUCHI, certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Member of the Liaison Office, Imperial Finance Ministry. I further certify that the monetary engraving plates of the currencies of the following denominations, which were delivered to the International Prosecution Section, SCAP, on 27 September 1946, were manufactured on the dates as indicated and by the order of Shimpei TAKEUCHI, Director of the Financial Division, Ministry of Finance.

<u>Denomination</u>	<u>Date</u>
10 Pesos	16 September 1941
5 Pesos	16 September 1941
50 Centavos	16 September 1941
10 Centavos	16 September 1941
5 Centavos	16 September 1941
1 Centavo	16 September 1941

It is further certified that the attached specimens are samples of the notes printed from the above mentioned plates.

/s/ SUETO YAMANOUCHI (REAL)  
Suetō YAMANOUCHI

Signed and sworn to before Richard H. Larsh and John A. Curtis, 2nd Lt, MI, Investigators, International Prosecution Section, at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan, on this 10th day of October 1946.

/s/ RICHARD H. LARSH  
RICHARD H. LARSH

/s/ J. A. CURTIS  
JOHN A. CURTIS  
2nd Lt, MI

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that the monetary engraving plates mentioned above were delivered to me by the Japanese Finance Ministry on 27 September 1946.

/s/ RICHARD H. LARSH  
RICHARD H. LARSH

DOC. NO. 9028C

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Suco YAMANOUCI, certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Member of the Liaison Office, Imperial Finance Ministry. I further certify that the monetary engraving plates of the currencies of the following denominations, which were delivered to the International Prosecution Section, SCAP, on 27 September 1946, were manufactured on the dates as indicated and by the order of Shimpei TAKEUCHI, Director of the Financial Division, Ministry of Finance.

<u>Denomination</u>	<u>Date</u>
10 Dollars	29 March 1941
5 Dollars	29 March 1941
1 Dollar	29 March 1941
50 Cents	29 March 1941
10 Cents	29 March 1941
5 Cents	29 March 1941
1 Cent	29 March 1941

It is further certified that the attached specimens are samples of the notes printed from the above mentioned plates.

/s/ SUEO YAMANOUCI (SEAL)  
Suco YAMANOUCI

Signed and sworn to before Richard H. Larsh and John A. Curtis, 2nd Lt, MI, Investigators, International Prosecution Section, at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan, on this 10th day of October 1946.

/s/ RICHARD H. LARSH  
RICHARD H. LARSH

/s/ J. A. CURTIS  
JOHN A. CURTIS  
2nd Lt, MI

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that the monetary engraving plates mentioned above were delivered to me by the Japanese Finance Ministry on 27 September 1946.

/s/ RICHARD H. LARSH  
Richard H. Larsh.



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<u>Denomination</u>	<u>Date</u>
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5 Dollars	29 March 1941
1 Dollar	29 March 1941
50 Cents	29 March 1941
10 Cents	29 March 1941
5 Cents	29 March 1941
1 Cent	29 March 1941

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/s/ J. A. CURTIS  
JOHN A. CURTIS  
2nd Lt, MI

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/s/ RICHARD H. LARSH  
Richard H. Larsh.

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會... 記... 部... 理... 初...  
會... 記... 部... 理... 初...  
會... 記... 部... 理... 初...

序	姓名	日期
一	...	一九四一年九月十二日
二	...	一九四一年九月十二日
三	...	一九四一年九月十二日
四	...	一九四一年九月十二日
五	...	一九四一年九月十二日
六	...	一九四一年九月十二日

向... 證... 明...

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一九四一年九月十二日... 軍情...

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RETURN TO ROOM 361

一九四一年九月十二日... 軍情...

一九四一年九月十二日



RETURN TO ROOM 361

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證 照 音

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登錄名目

日

附

- 一〇 「ドル」 一九四二年三月二十九日
- 一五 「ドル」 一九四二年三月二十九日
- 一一 「ドル」 一九四二年三月二十九日
- 五〇 「セント」 一九四二年三月二十九日
- 一〇 「セント」 一九四二年三月二十九日
- 一五 「セント」 一九四二年三月二十九日
- 一 「セント」 一九四二年三月二十九日

尚 添 附 標 本 六 上 記 原 版 三 引 印 刷 之 紙 幣 一 集 本  
 云 之 證 明 云。

山之内 本男 實謹 (印)

一九四六年本月十日、日本、東京、陸軍省ニテ國際檢察部  
 調査官「リチャード・エフ・ライエ」及び軍情報部  
 少尉「ジョージ・エム・カークラス」ノ面前ニ於テ署名  
 名 實 璽 也 リ

リチャード・エフ・ライエ

ジョージ・エム・カークラス  
 軍情報部 少尉

Doc 9028c

余、リキヤ、ト、エ、キ、ニ、シ、シ、ハ、上、記、紙、幣、板、書、原  
版、一、九、四、六、年、九、月、二、七、日、日、本、大、藏、省、二、條、リ、赤  
引、然、ル、ト、シ、ル、モ、ハ、キ、ル、ニ、シ、リ、茲、ニ、證、明、ス  
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Ex 856

Document No. 9018a

Page 1

RE POSITIVE ENFORCEMENT OF THE URGENT  
MEASURES VITAL TO THE GENERAL MOBILIZATION

CABINET KAKU KO NO. 141

June 23rd, 1938

FROM: KAZAMI, Akira, Chief Secretary of Cabinet

Your Excellency, ITAGAKI, Seishiro, War Minister

Information by Order

About the prosecution of urgent policies vital to the general mobilization, the cabinet conference has passed a decision as per enclosure.

War Ministry Received

S E C R E T

Ichii No. 3090

(Enclosure)

RE POSITIVE ENFORCEMENT OF THE URGENT  
MEASURES VITAL TO THE GENERAL MOBILIZATION

The Chinese Incident has now made a great advance in the tide of war with the fall of Hsuehchow. However, the future of the war is still far and our people should face it with resolve, and with our persevering mind harden.

The cabinet has just opened a meeting on general mobilization, which deliberated on enforcement of the general mobilization by acquiring the reports from all ministries. Judging from the result of that meeting, the plan of the mobilization of commodities for 1938 (13th year of Showa) decided before, has become difficult to realize because of the extremely unfavorable foreign trade balance owing to the decrease in export and other reasons.

If we should patch up affairs and put off from day to day under such a circumstance, we should have a great obstacle to meet the military demand and to attain an expansion of productive power vital to the circumstance. So we fear a grave consequence to occur. Therefore, at this time the government intends, with a great decision, to concentrate various institutions upon execution of war aims, deepen the understanding of officials and civilians as to the tension of the situation to issue a statement in order to urge a great resolve of the people to meet it. At the same time, to exclude firmly all obstacles and enforce the following policies urgent and vital to the existence of our nation.

(1) In order to maintain the stability of exchange rates, to keep supply of munitions, promote exports and support liveli-

6. 856

Document No. 9018a

Page 1

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(1) In order to maintain the stability of exchange rates, to keep supply of munitions, promote exports and support liveli-

hood of the nation (consumers), we will take necessary measures, in particular, to restrain the rise of prices above the present level and at the same time work on a scale of basic prices or official prices and furthermore will take steps to lower the current prices by strengthening both saving in the consumption and also by control of rations.

(2) With respect to general commodities, we will make every effort to economize in consumption. Especially, in regard to imported commodities, by the way of restriction of consumption, as occasion demands, by setting up a rule of restriction or prohibition, we will enforce a compulsory use of substitutes among the nation and strengthen thoroughly to minimize consumption of commodities for not urgent purposes.

(3) To promote exports, under synthetic plan, we will strengthen the general promotion policy of export. Further,

(a) We will arrange to bring about a unified foreign trade administrative function.

(b) By such a way as linking exports of finished manufactures and imports of materials thereof, we will try to ~~enure~~<sup>enure</sup> importation of materials destined to ultimate export.

(c) As to imported materials we will divide them into materials for domestic consumption and materials for export and any materials for export shall be thoroughly prevented from being switched over to the domestic consumption.

(d) In order to check the tendency of boycott of Japanese goods in foreign countries, special measures will be taken.

(e) In regard to the granting of subsidies for the specially designated goods and to the reshuffle of civilian trade organizations, a thorough and drastic measure will be taken.

(4) About goods of prime importance, an appropriate organization of import and ration will promptly be set up.

(5) A mobilization of our funds in foreign countries in order to replenish the foreign exchange funds.

(6) We will make efforts to control and rationalize war profits.



(7) Planning a spread and thoroughness of savings.

(8) To make a simple style of national living at the emergency we will run a national movement and at the same time the government also will take necessary measures so that the government officials will set a standard to be followed by the people.

(9) A thorough measure will be executed for increased production of major types of goods, especially for increase of mineral production.

(10) In order to promote an industrial capacity for production of munitions, we will take necessary measures about adoption of shift system and an urgent employment of technicians and other laborers.

(11) Instructing and making use of a national movement and forming a necessary organization about collection of waste materials.

(12) Measures necessary for conversion and its results, measures for relief of unemployment should be executed.

(13) The policies set forth in the foregoing articles shall promptly be executed by every ministry concerned. For this purpose, if necessary, a part of the articles in the law of general mobilization should be put into action.

Doc. 9018

C E R T I F I C A T E

U.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.I.S. No. Doc. 9018 (443-95)

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, TAKAHASHI Michitoshii hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of the Cabinet

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 5 pages, dated July 29, 1946, and described as follows: Review of policies advised by the General Mobilization

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Cabinet

Signed at Tokyo on this 6th day of July, 1946.

(s) M. Takahashi  
Signature of Official

Witness: (s) R. Kuriyama

Secretary of the Cabinet SEAL  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 6th day of July, 1946.

(s) Edward P. Monaghan  
NAME

Witness: (s) William C. Frout

Investigator  
Official Capacity  
I. P. S.

23 June 1938

From: Akira HAZAMI, Chief Secretary of the Cabinet

To : Seishiro ITOYAKI, War Minister

Notification in compliance with orders. Subject: regarding revision of the plan for regulating the supply and demand of essential materials for Showa 13 (1938) has been decided at the cabinet meeting as follows:

Revision of the plan for regulating the supply and demand of essential materials during Showa 13 (1938). In the plan for regulating the supply and demand of essential materials during Showa 13 (1938) which was decided at the cabinet meeting of 18 January, it was decided that imports shall be ~~3,000,000,000~~ <sup>3,000,000,000</sup> yen and the total sum of imported materials shall be ~~3,000,000,000~~ <sup>3,000,000,000</sup> yen by decreasing both military and domestic demands (excluding Manchuria and Kwangtung province).

On the contrary, since the beginning of this year, the export results have been continuously very inactive. And in comparison with the plan, the results of the first quarter of the year decreased by about 27%, and moreover as the trade of North and Central China is included, the rate of decrease will be more outstanding and will drop to about 53% when that is excluded. (In comparison with the results of last year, a decrease of 32.8%). If this tendency is left alone, exports most probably will not exceed ~~1,000,000,000~~ <sup>1,000,000,000</sup> yen no matter what efforts are made to increase exports. (Excluding Manchuria, Kwangtung province, North and Central China). Supposing that the new products of gold, excess in invisible exports, etc., are realized as prearranged, the import capacity will be about ~~2,100,000,000~~ <sup>2,100,000,000</sup> yen, but according to the results up till now, contrary to that anticipated, invisible imports exceeded that of exports. Therefore, it is rather exaggerated to estimate the maximum of import capacity at ~~2,100,000,000~~ <sup>2,100,000,000</sup> yen. Consequently, although there is no way but to cut down the amount of demand with all efforts by fundamentally revising the first plan of regulating supply and demand, the demand for war munitions as a result of operations to arm and replenish the mobilized force cannot be fulfilled by the primary demand amount. For, rather, war munitions demand is increasing. Therefore, in order to regulate these two cross-demands, there is no other way <sup>than</sup> to strictly control the supply and demand in the home lands, and at the same time endeavor to check the increasing war munitions demand.

As to home demand, other than the following imports, as a principle, shall not be recognized.

1. Those to be allotted for military demands and raw materials, materials, machine tools, fuel, etc. which are necessary for production and supply of war munitions.
2. Raw materials and materials for exports.
3. The minimum amount of medicine, fertilizer, etc., which are absolutely necessary for the maintenance of the nation's livelihood.
4. The minimum amount of articles which are necessary for barter trade.

Although a plan for decrease of trade has been established, and at the same time, in regards to munitions, methods to actively utilize substitute materials spontaneously, to appropriate stored goods to mitigate the standard of supplied goods, to call in unnecessary office articles, have been considered, still a total of over 2,730,000,000 yen, including over 130,000,000 yen import from North and Central China, of imports of which Home demand over 1,981,000,000, Army and Navy over 749,000,000, is found necessary. However, in order to supply this sum of imports, it will be necessary to send the greater part of the reserved fund. In this way, in the case of an emergency and the situation becomes worse, it is very difficult to procure arms and other necessary articles because of a lack of capital to procure them. So we have to study the decreasement policy for the amount of demand in the home land, and plan on following points, to postpone the use of the special conserved oil and the compulsory conserved oil, to partially postpone the term of executing bartering contracts, to postpone the production of a part of the machines which are necessary for the development of the strength of production, and to call in materials in the home land.

After considering these measures the total sum of domestic demands which is necessary to be imported was decided at about 1,810,000,000 yen. Consequently the total sum of imports is estimated at about 2,550,000,000 yen in which it is expected that the sum of imports from Central and North China will amount to about 130,000,000 yen and most of them will be imported regardless of exchange relations. If so, we shall be able to overcome this year's crisis.

*the total sum of imports will be estimated at over 2,420,000,000 yen, and.*

In order to keep the sum of imports of the domestic demands within the above said amount, it is necessary to carry out a strict control policy regarding the use of articles in the latter half of the year. Moreover, care must be taken regarding many social problems and those of compensation resulting from the breach of contracts must be anticipated. Therefore, in order to relieve these problems, disbursement of new expenditures and other necessary measures shall be taken. In consideration of the above mentioned situation, the most important task at present is to realize the following items which have been decided as quickly as possible.

1. The total sum of imports shall be about 2,550,000,000 yen (about 2,420,000,000 yen excluding Control and North China). Revise the table of contrast of supply and demand and replenishment measures of essential materials (materials' mobilization No. AOC4) which is contained in the attached document regarding the plan of maintenance of supply of essential materials, that was decided at the cabinet meeting on 13 January, according to the attached document (materials' mobilization No. AOC6). Furthermore, the detailed amendments of the supply and demand plan as a problem of execution shall be managed within the limits of the total amount of imports, but in case of requiring more imports of raw materials than the prearranged plan on account of an increase of exports, the amount of imports will be adjusted and adapted separately through the consultation of the ministries concerned regardless of the above said total amount of imports.

2. In order to carry out the revised supply and demand plan, each government office shall put into practice, as soon as possible, urgent policies regarding national mobilization as well as adopt measures concerning the control of the use of imports in the home land in accordance with the attached sheet No. 1.

3. Take measures concerning disbursement of expenditure and other necessary measures for the various kinds of compensation problems and unemployment relief which occur as a result of the control of the use of the materials.

4. As to the materials imported according to the revised supply and demand plan, the same shall be managed as quickly as possible by the Materials Adjustment Bureau of the Commerce and Industry Ministry (those not under the jurisdiction of this Bureau by the competent government office) upon communicating with the Exchange board.

In order to keep the sum of imports of the domestic demands within the above said amount, it is necessary to carry out a strict control policy regarding the use of articles in the latter half of the year. Moreover, concurrently many social problems and those of compensation resulting from the breach of contracts must be anticipated. Therefore, in order to relieve these problems, disbursement of new expenditures and other necessary measures shall be taken. In consideration of the above mentioned situation, the most important task at present is to realize the following items which have been decided as quickly as possible.

1. The total sum of imports shall be about 2,550,000,000 yen (about 2,20,000,000 yen excluding Control and North China). Revise the table of contrast of supply and demand and replenishment measures of essential materials (materials' mobilization No. AOC4) which is contained in the attached document regarding the plan of maintenance of supply of essential materials, that was decided at the cabinet meeting on 13 January, according to the attached document (materials' mobilization No. AOC2). Furthermore, the detailed amendments of the supply and demand plan as a problem of execution shall be managed within the limits of the total amount of imports, but in case of requiring more imports of raw materials than the prearranged plan on account of an increase of exports, the amount of imports will be adjusted and adopted separately through the consultation of the ministries concerned regardless of the above said total amount of imports.

2. In order to carry out the revised supply and demand plan, each government office shall put into practice, as soon as possible, urgent policies regarding national mobilization as well as adopt measures concerning the control of the use of imports in the home land in accordance with the attached sheet No. 1.

3. Take measures concerning disbursement of expenditure and other necessary measures for the various kinds of compensation problems and unemployment relief which occur as a result of the control of the use of the materials.

4. As to the materials imported according to the revised supply and demand plan, the same shall be managed as quickly as possible by the Materials Adjustment Bureau of the Commerce and Industry Ministry (those not under the jurisdiction of this Bureau by the competent government office) upon communicating with the Exchange Board.

The attached document (Document No. Mobilization No. A008) will be sent later from the Cabinet Planning Board,

(Attached Sheet No. 1)

Main controlled and prohibited items required to be carried out in connection with the use of materials in the latter half of this year in order to execute the general supply and demand plan except materials for the military.

1. Suspension of construction works which are not immediately necessary for the war, and even those which are at present under construction.

a. Suspension of new construction and reconstruction of government public and business offices and schools

b. (Suspension of works of the International Exhibition and the Olympics) *Excluded.*

c. Suspension of large-scale construction of department stores, hotels and other big buildings for the purpose of commerce and business, and to control new construction of houses.

d. Suspension and postponement of urgent construction works.

2. Suspension and postponement of rail track work, Suspension and postponement of railway construction and reconstruction except works which need increase of transport capacity for military use and national mobilization.

3. Partial suspension and postponement of construction of ships.

4. Suspension of construction of electric light, electric heat, telephone, gas and water service except those which are necessary for military use and general mobilization.

5. Postponement of the use of the special-conserved oil and the compulsory conserved oil.

6. Enforcement of prohibitive control on articles of domestic demands made from materials which have to be imported.

a. Prohibition of spinning and weaving of cotton except for such special articles as uniforms, exports, sails, sewing thread, and articles which are used for industrial and hygiene purposes. Enforcement of export control on cotton thread and cloth to outer Japan, Manchukuo and North and Central China.

The attached document (War Relocation No. A008) will be sent later from the Cabinet Planning Board,

(Attached Sheet No. 1)

Main controlled and prohibited items required to be carried out in connection with the use of materials in the latter half of this year in order to execute the present supply and demand plan except materials for the military.

1. Suspension of construction works which are not immediately necessary for the war, and even those which are at present under construction.

a. Suspension of new construction and reconstruction of government public and business offices and schools.

b. (Suspension of works of the International Exhibition and the Olympics) *Excluded.*

c. Suspension of large-scale construction of department stores, hotels and other big buildings for the purpose of commerce and business, and to control new construction of houses.

d. Suspension and postponement of urgent construction works.

2. Suspension and postponement of rail track work. Suspension and postponement of railway construction and reconstruction except works which need increase of transport capacity for military use and national mobilization.

3. Partial suspension and postponement of construction of ships.

4. Suspension of construction of electric light, electric heat, telephone, gas and water service except those which are necessary for military use and general mobilization.

5. Postponement of the use of the special-conserved oil and the compulsory conserved oil.

6. Enforcement of prohibitive control on articles of domestic demands made from materials which have to be imported.

a. Prohibition of spinning and weaving of cotton except for such special articles as uniforms, exports, sails, sewing thread, and articles which are used for industrial and hygiene purposes. Enforcement of export control on cotton thread and cloth to outer Japan, Manchukuo and North and Central China.



b. Strict control on the manufacture of woolen articles for domestic demands and for export of the same to Manchukuo and Kwantung province. Prohibition of manufacturing cloth of yellow hemp used for packing in the home land. Prohibition of manufacturing ordinary paper made of Manila hemp. Prohibition of manufacturing cloth and other domestic articles which are made of linen, ramie or hemp.

c. Prohibition of manufacturing bags, shoes and other articles of domestic demand which are made of cowhide, household appliances, daily necessaries which need copper, brass, lead, antimony, etc., and rubber shoes and other ordinary articles of domestic demands which need raw gum. Control of manufacturing ordinary paper.

d. Prohibitive restriction on articles of domestic demand other than those mentioned above and which require imported materials for their manufacture.

7. Execution of thorough readjustment of communication system by the suspension of the service of more than half of all automobiles, abolishment of lines parallel with railways, competing lines and the sightseeing buses.

8. Prohibitive restriction of use of petroleum by fishing boats fishing along the coast. Restriction of service of ships using heavy oil and plowing the rivers and coastal sea. Prohibitive restriction of use of heavy oil and volatile oil to works which are not necessary for either the military or the general mobilization point of view.

9. Strict restriction on use of imported fertilizer.

10. Restriction of the use of electric power.

Offices concerned shall mutually consult as to the execution of the above matters.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. Exd. Doc. 9017 (ATIS 32)

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, TAKAHASHI Michitoshi, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of the Cabinet, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 10 pages, dated June 23, 1946, and described as follows: Revision of the Plan for Regulating the Supply and Demand of Staple Materials.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files) Cabinet.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
6th day of July, 1946.

/s/ M. TAKAHASHI  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: R. NURIYAMA /s/

Secretary of the Cabinet  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
6th day of July, 1946

/s/ EDWARD P. MONAGHAN  
NAME

Witness: /s/ William C. Front

Investigator IPS  
Official Capacity

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. Evid. Doc. 9017 (LIS 52)

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, TAKAHASHI Michitoshi, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of the Cabinet, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 10 pages, dated June 23, 1946, and described as follows: Revision of the Plan for Regulating the Supply and Demand of Staple Materials.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files) Cabinet.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
6th day of July, 1946.

/s/ M. TAKAHASHI  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: R. MURUYAMA /s/

Secretary of the Cabinet  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.


Signed at Tokyo on this  
6th day of July, 1946

/s/ EDWARD P. MONAGHAN  
NAME

Witness: /s/ William C. Froot

Investigator IPS  
Official Capacity

# GOLD PRODUCTION IN JAPANESE EMPIRE, 1925 - 1941



SOURCE : (1) MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY  
(2) MINISTRY OF FINANCE

Ex # 859

## MINISTRY OF WAR

Fiscal year	General Account	War Expenditure Account	Total	Special Accounts
1931	246,619,575	0	246,619,575	53,396,408
1932	413,230,611	0	413,230,611	55,014,865
1933	463,138,475	0	463,138,475	126,947,025
1934	463,379,989	0	463,379,989	136,669,165
1935	498,681,102	0	498,681,102	126,882,063
1936	514,778,209	0	514,778,209	126,896,535
1937	728,699,498	2,021,019,270	2,749,718,768	347,437,484
1938	567,102,886	3,683,485,000	4,250,587,886	1,485,082,450
1939	1,001,004,763	3,646,320,000	4,647,324,763	1,522,561,400
1940	1,275,833,730	3,618,534,290	4,894,368,020	1,347,514,540
1941	1,702,393,207	7,392,090,000	9,094,483,207	1,676,908,498
Total	7,874,862,045	20,361,448,560	28,236,310,605	7,005,310,433

Note: The Special Accounts mostly displicate the general account and / or the War Expenditure Account and therefore have been eliminated from the total.

Imperial Sanctioned Amount of Extraordinary War Expenditure Account (Jurisdiction of War Ministry)

1937 fiscal year to  
1941

Classification	Total	Army Extraordinary War Expenditure	Reserve	Extraordinary War Expenditure	Excess over Budget	Name of Minister
1937	2,021,019,270	1,736,019,270	285,000,000			
Transfer from						
General Account	398,306,493	313,306,493	85,000,000			
Amount expended without Imperial sanction	313,306,493	313,306,493	0			Kaya (M.F.) Sugiyama (M.W.)
3rd Imperial Sanction (Jan 22, 1938)	85,000,000	0	85,000,000			"
72nd Diet	1,622,712,777	1,422,712,777	200,000,000			"
1st I.S. (Sept. 15, 1937)	1,119,723,336	1,119,723,336				"
2nd I.S. (Oct. 30, 1937)	362,248,993	302,989,441	60,259,552			"
3rd I.S. (Jan. 22, 1938)	139,740,448	0	139,740,448			"
1938						
73rd Diet	3,683,485,000	3,257,000,000	426,485,000			"
4th I.S. (Apr. 12, 1938)	1,540,000,000	1,540,000,000				"
5th I.S. (July 22, 1938)	810,600,602	810,600,602				Ikeda (M.F.) Itagaki (M.W.)
6th I.S. (Sept. 22, 1938)	848,800,550	848,800,550				"
7th I.S. (Dec. 3, 1938)	57,598,848	57,598,848	326,485,000			"

Classification	Total	Army Extraordi- nary war Expenditure	Reserve	Extraordinary War Expenditure	Excess over Budget	Name of Minister
1939 8th I. S. (Jan. 21, 1939)	100,000,000	0	100,000,000			Ishiwata (M.F.) Itagaki (M.W.)
74th Diet	3,646,320,000	3,143,000,000	503,320,000			
9th I.S. (Mar. 20, 1939)	600,000,000	600,000,000				"
10th I.S. (May 1, 1939)	900,000,000	900,000,000				"
11th I.S. (July 17, 1939)	850,000,000	850,000,000				"
12th I.S. (Nov. 18, 1939)	735,000,000	735,000,000				Aoki (M.F.)
13th I.S. (Jan. 23, 1940)	561,320,000	58,000,000	503,320,000			Hata (M.W.) Sakurauchi (M.F.) Hata (M.W.)
1940 75th Diet	3,618,534,290	2,973,000,000	645,534,290			"
14th I.S. (Mar. 26, 1940)	900,000,000	900,000,000				"
15th I.S. (June 8, 1940)	900,000,000	900,000,000				"
16th I.S. (Sept. 14, 1940)	900,000,000	900,000,000				"
17th I.S. (Nov. 16, 1940)	750,000,000	273,000,000	477,000,000			Kawada (M.F.) Tojo (P.M.)
18th I.S. (Jan. 16, 1941)	168,534,290	0	168,534,290			"
1941	7,392,090,000	0	477,400,000	6,750,000,000	164,690,000	"

Classification	Total	Army Extraordi- nary War Expenditure	Reserve	Extraordinary War Expenditure	Excess over Budget	Name of Minister
76 Diet	3,727,400,000	0	477,400,000	3,250,000,000	0	
19th I.S. (Feb. 25, 1941)	500,000,000	0	0	500,000,000		Kawada (M.F.)
20th I.S. (Mar. 22, 1941)	800,000,000	0	0	800,000,000		Tojo (P.M.)
21st I.S. (May 11, 1941)	600,000,000	0	0	600,000,000		"
22nd I.S. (Jul. 5, 1941)	600,000,000	0	0	600,000,000		"
23rd I.S. (Aug. 2, 1941)	497,000,000	0	0	497,000,000		Ogura (M.F.)
24th I.S. (Sept. 17, 1941)	400,000,000	0	147,000,000	253,000,000		Tojo (P.M.)
25th I.S. (Oct. 29, 1941)	330,400,000	0	330,400,000	0	0	Kaya (M.F.)
Excess of Budget	164,690,000	0	0	0	164,690,000	Tojo (P.M.)
1st I.S. (Nov. 1, 1941)	74,690,000				74,690,000	"
2nd I.S. (Nov. 5, 1941)	90,000,000				90,000,000	"
77 Diet	1,900,000,000	0	0	1,900,000,000	0	
26th I.S. (Nov. 29, 1941)	300,000,000	0	0	300,000,000		"
27th I.S. (Dec. 6, 1941)	800,000,000			800,000,000		"
28th I.S. (Jan. 10, 1942)	400,000,000			400,000,000		"
29th I.S. (Mar. 7, 1942)	400,000,000			400,000,000		"
78 Diet	1,600,000,000			1,600,000,000		"
Among 28th I.S. (Jan. 10, 1942)	1,000,000,000			1,000,000,000		"
Among 29th I.S. (Mar. 7, 1942)	600,000,000			600,000,000		"



Jurisdiction of War Ministry Classification	General Account		Total	1931 fiscal year Special Account		Total
	Ordinary	Extraordi- nary		Army arsenal	Senju Woolen Factory	
Main budget (No. 59 Diet)	172,775,490	16,108,015	188,883,505	48,075,607	5,320,801	
Supplemen- tal budget						
No. 59 Diet		235,990	235,990			
No. 61 Diet		6,567,203	6,567,203			
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
Expenditure from Re- serve	181,741	51,251,136	51,432,877	0	0	
1st Reserve	181,741	39,281	221,022	0	0	
2nd Reserve	0	5,702,687	5,702,687	0	0	
Temporary Expenditure Outside Reserve	0	45,509,168	45,509,168	0	0	
Total	172,457,231	74,162,344	246,619,575	48,075,607	5,320,801	

Classification	Division of War Ministry General Account			1932 fiscal year Special Account		Total
	Ordinary	Extraordi- nary	Total	Army arsenal	Senju Woolen Factory	
Main budget (No. 60 Diet)						
Supplemen- tal budget	172,593,077	227,856,856	400,449,943	49,662,211	5,352,651	
No. 61 Diet						
No. 62 Diet						
No. 63 Diet						
No. 64 Diet						
No. Diet						
Expenditure from Re- serve	327,244	12,053,124	12,780,668		0	
1st Reserve	327,244	206,515	533,759	0	0	
2nd Reserve	0	12,246,609	12,246,909		0	
Temporary Expenditure Outside Reserve						
Total	172,920,321	240,310,290	413,230,661	49,662,211	5,352,651	

Note: As the budget of 1931 fiscal year was carried over to be 1932 budget under Art. 71 of the Constitution, the division of general budget and supplementary budget is not accurate.

The Total Amount thereof is therefore set forth.

Jurisdiction of War Ministry Classifi- cation	General Account		Total	1933 fiscal year Special Account		Total
	Ordinary	Extraordi- nary		Army arsenal	Senju Woolen Factory	
Main budget (No. 64 Diet)	172,119,330	275,763,922	447,883,252	120,383,446	6,563,579	
Supplemen- tal budget						
No. 64 Diet	0	240,217	240,217			
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
Expenditure from Re- serve	331,157	14,683,849	15,015,006			
1st Reserve	331,157	228,849	560,006			
2nd Reserve	0	14,455,000	14,455,000			
Temporary Expenditure Outside Reserve						
Total	172,450,487	290,687,988	463,138,475	120,383,446	6,563,579	

Transaction of War Ministry			1934 Fiscal year		
Classification	General Account		Total	Special Account	
	Ordinary	Extraordinary		Army arsenal	Senju Woolen Factory
Main budget (No. 65 Diet)	168,656,052	280,514,094	449,170,146	130,109,956	6,559,199
Supplemental budget	382,325	4,142,809	4,525,134	0	0
No. 65 Diet	0	555,000	555,000	0	0
No. 66 Diet	0	3,500,000	3,500,000		
No. 67 Diet	382,325	87,809	470,134		
No. Diet					
No. Diet					
Expenditure from Reserve	89,756	9,594,953	9,684,709	0	0
30 Reserve	89,756	158,350	248,106	0	0
201 Reserve	0	9,436,603	9,436,603	0	0
Temporary expenditure Outside Reserve					
Total	169,128,133	294,251,856	463,379,989	130,109,966	6,559,199

Expenditure of War Ministry

1934 Fiscal year

Classification	General Account			Special Account		Total
	Ordinary	Extraordinary	Total	Army arsenal	Senju Woolen Factory	
Main budget No. 65 Diet	168,656,052	280,514,094	449,170,146	130,109,936	6,559,199	
Supplemental budget No. 65 Diet	382,325	4,142,809	4,525,134	0	0	
No. 66 Diet	0	555,000	555,000	0	0	
No. 66 Diet	0	3,500,000	3,500,000			
No. 67 Diet	382,325	87,809	470,134			
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
Expenditure from Reserve	89,756	9,594,953	9,684,709	0	0	
3rd Reserve	89,756	158,350	248,106	0	0	
2nd Reserve	0	9,436,603	9,436,603	0	0	
Temporary expenditure Outside Reserve						
Total	169,128,133	294,251,856	463,379,989	130,109,966	6,559,199	

## Transaction of War Ministry

1934 Fiscal year

Classification	General Account			Special Account		Total
	Ordinary	Extraordi- nary	Total	Army arsenal	Senju Woolen Factory	
Main budget (No. 65 Diet)	168,656,052	280,514,094	449,170,146	130,109,966	6,559,199	
Supplemen- ta. budget	382,325	4,142,809	4,525,134	0	0	
No. 65 Diet	0	555,000	555,000	0	0	
No. 66 Diet	0	3,500,000	3,500,000			
No. 67 Diet	382,325	87,809	470,134			
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
Expenditure from Re- serve	89,756	9,594,953	9,684,709	0	0	
So Reserve	89,756	158,350	248,106	0	0	
201 Reserve	0	9,436,603	9,436,603	0	0	
Temporary expenditure Outside Reserve						
Total	169,128,133	294,251,856	463,379,989	130,109,966	6,559,199	

## Ministry of War Ministry

1934 Fiscal year

Classification	General Account			Special Account		
	Ordinary	Extraordinary	Total	Army arsenal	Senju Woolen Factory	Total
Main budget (No. 65 Diet)	168,656,052	280,514,094	449,170,146	130,109,966	6,559,199	
Supplemental budget	382,325	4,142,809	4,525,134	0	0	
No. 65 Diet	0	555,000	555,000	0	0	
No. 66 Diet	0	3,500,000	3,500,000			
No. 67 Diet	382,325	87,809	470,134			
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
Expenditure from Reserve	89,756	9,594,953	9,684,709	0	0	
3rd Reserve	89,756	158,350	248,106	0	0	
2nd Reserve	0	9,436,603	9,436,603	0	0	
Temporary expenditure outside Reserve						
Total	169,128,133	294,251,856	463,379,989	130,109,966	6,559,199	

Jurisdiction of War Ministry				1935 fiscal year		
Classification	General Account			Special Account		Total
	Ordinary	Extraordinary	Total	Army arsenal	Senju Woolen Factory	
Main budget (No. 67 Diet)	179,803,775	313,155,204	492,958,979	120,789,258	6,092,805	
Supplemental budget				0	0	
No. 67 Diet	0	0				
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
Expenditure in Reserve	495,661	5,226,462	5,722,123	0		
Reserve	95,661	122,058	217,719	0		
Reserve	0	4,436,072	4,436,072	0		
Temporary expenditure outside Reserve	400,000	668,332	1,068,332	0		
Total	180,299,436	318,381,666	498,681,102	120,789,258	6,092,805	



Jurisdiction of War Ministry			1935 fiscal year			
Classification	General Account			Special Account		
	Ordinary	Extraordi- nary	Total	General	Senju Woolen Factory	Total
Main budget (No. 69 Diet)	191,030,470	320,352,866	511,383,336	5,800,494	6,095,041	
Supplemen- tal budget						
No. 69 Diet						
No. 70 Diet						
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
Expenditure from Re- serve	932,946	2,461,927	3,394,873			
1st Reserve	932,946	96,700	1,029,646			
2nd Reserve	0	2,365,227	2,365,227			
Temporary Expenditure Outside Reserve						
Total	191,963,416	322,814,793	514,778,209	5,800,494	6,095,041	

Note: As the budget of 1935 fiscal year was carried over from the 1936 budget in the same way as 1932 fiscal year, the total amount thereof is set forth

Jurisdiction of War Ministry			1935 fiscal year			
Classification	General Account			Special Account		
	Ordinary	Extraordi- nary	Total	Senju Woolen Factory	Total	
Main budget (No. 69 Diet)	191,030,470	320,352,866	511,383,336	6,095,041	6,095,041	
Supplemen- tal budget						
No. 69 Diet						
No. 70 Diet						
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
Expenditure from Re- serve	932,946	2,461,927	3,394,873			
1st Reserve	932,946	96,700	1,029,646			
2nd Reserve	0	2,365,227	2,365,227			
Temporary Expenditure Outside Reserve						
Total	191,963,416	322,814,793	514,778,209	6,095,041	6,095,041	

Note: As the budget of 1935 fiscal year was carried over from the 1936 budget in the same way as 1932 fiscal year, the total amount thereof is set forth

Jurisdiction of War Ministry			1937 fiscal year		
Classifi- cation	General Account			Special Account	
	Ordinary	Extraordi- nary	Total	Army arsenal	Senju Woolen Total Factory
Main budget (No.70 Diet)	217,804,071	510,161,209	727,965,280	170,365,768	7,071,716
Supplemen- tal budret	0	300,000	300,000	170,000,000	0
No.70 Diet	0	0	0	0	0
No.71 Diet	0	300,000	300,000	0	0
No.72 Diet	0	0	0	170,000,000	0
No. Diet				0	
No. Diet					
Expenditure from Re- serve	0	434,158	434,158		
1st Reserve	0	34,158	34,158		
2nd Reserve	0	400,000	400,000		
Temporary Expenditure Outside Reserve					
Total	217,804,071	510,895,367	728,699,438	340,365,768	7,071,716

Note: Amount of 313,306,493 yen transferred to special account of the Temporary War Expenses are not included.

Jurisdiction of War Ministry			1937 fiscal year			
Classification	General Account			Special Account		Total
	Ordinary	Extraordinary	Total	Army arsenal	Senju Woolen Factory	
Main budget (No.70 Diet)	217,804,071	510,161,209	727,965,280	170,365,768	7,071,716	
Supplemental budget	0	300,000	300,000	170,000,000	0	
No.70 Diet	0	0	0	0	0	
No.71 Diet	0	300,000	300,000	0	0	
No.72 Diet	0	0	0	170,000,000	0	
No. Diet				0		
No. Diet						
Expenditure from Reserve	0	434,158	434,158			
1st Reserve	0	34,158	34,158			
2nd Reserve	0	400,000	400,000			
Temporary Expenditure Outside Reserve						
Total	217,804,071	510,895,367	728,699,438	340,365,768	7,071,716	

Note: Amount of 313,306,493 yen transferred to special account of the Temporary War Expenses are not included.

Jurisdiction of War Ministry				1938 fiscal year		
Classification	General Account		Total	Special Account		Total
	Ordinary	Extraordinary		Army arsenal	Senju Woolen Factory	
Main budget (No.73 Diet)	165,783,439	398,810,750	564,594,189	203,574,185	4,858,896	
Supplemental budget No.73 Diet	65,402	2,096,095	2,161,497	1,269,942,013	6,807,356	
No. Diet				0	0	
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
Expenditure from Reserve	0	347,200	347,200			
1st Reserve	0	50,000	50,000			
2nd Reserve	0	297,200	297,200			
Temporary Expenditure Outside Reserve						
Total	165,848,841	401,254,045	567,102,886	1,473,416,198	11,666,252	

Jurisdiction of War Ministry				1938 fiscal year		
Classifi- cation	General Account			Special Account		Total
	Ordinary	Extraordi- nary	Total	Army arsenal	Senju Woolen Factory	
Main budget (No.73 Diet)	165,783,439	398,810,750	564,594,189	203,574,185	4,858,896	
Supplemen- tal budget				1,269,942,013	6,807,356	
No.73 Diet	65,402	2,096,095	2,161,497	1,269,942,013	6,807,356	
No. Diet				0	0	
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
Expenditure from Re- serve	0	347,200	347,200			
1st Reserve	0	50,000	50,000			
2nd Reserve	0	297,200	297,200			
Temporary Expenditure Outside Reserve						
Total	165,848,841	401,254,045	567,102,886	1,473,416,198	11,666,252	

Jurisdiction of War Ministry			1939 fiscal year			
Classification	General Account			Special Account		Total
	Ordinary	Extraordi- nary	Total	Army arsenal	Senju Woolen Factory	
Main budget (No. 74 Diet)	193,643,603	212,068,537	455,712,140	232,874,220	4,852,061	
Supplemen- tal budget				1,278,029,922	6,805,197	
No. 74 Diet	31,694,117	472,996,656	504,690,773	1,278,029,922	6,805,197	
No. Diet				0	0	
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
Expenditure from Re- serve	0	601,850	601,850			
1st Reserve	0	199,850	199,850			
2nd Reserve	0	402,000	402,000			
Temporary Expenditure Outside Reserve						
Total	215,337,720	785,667,043	1,001,004,763	1,510,904,142	11,657,258	

Jurisdiction of War Ministry			1939 fiscal year			
Classification	General Account			Special Account		Total
	Ordinary	Extraordi- nary	Total	Army arsenal	Senju Woolen Factory	
Main budget (No. 74 Diet)	183,643,003	212,068,537	455,712,140	232,874,220	4,852,061	
Supplemen- tal budget				1,278,029,922	6,805,197	
No. 74 Diet	31,694,117	472,996,656	504,690,773	1,278,029,922	6,805,197	
No. Diet				0	0	
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
Expenditure from Re- serve	0	601,850	601,850			
1st Reserve	0	199,850	199,850			
2nd Reserve	0	402,000	402,000			
Temporary Expenditure Outside Reserve						
Total	215,337,720	785,167,043	1,001,004,763	1,510,904,142	11,657,258	



Jurisdiction of War Ministry				1940 fiscal year		
Classification	General Account			Special Account		
	Ordinary	Extraordi- nary	Total	Army arsenal	Senju Woolen Factory	Total
Main budget (No. 75 Diet)	182,019,661	1,092,761,400	1,274,781,061	1,319,352,335	13,162,205	15,000,000
Supplemental budget				0	0	0
No. 75 Diet	117,982	147,437	265,419			
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
Expenditure from Reserve	0	787,250	787,250			
1st Reserve	0	125,250	125,250			
2nd Reserve	0	662,000	662,000			
Temporary Expenditure Outside Reserve						
<b>Total</b>	<b>182,137,643</b>	<b>1,093,696,087</b>	<b>1,275,833,730</b>	<b>1,319,352,335</b>	<b>13,162,205</b>	<b>15,000,000</b>

Jurisdiction of War Ministry				1941 fiscal year		
Classification	General Account			Special Account		
	Ordinary	Extraordinary	Total	Army arsenal	Senju Woolen Factory	Aircraft Plant
Main budget (No.76 Diet)	330,516,659	1,057,174,995	1,387,691,604	270,029,598	10,093,824	10,000,000
Supplemental budget				1,378,936,810	7,848,266	0
No.76 Diet	47,018,957	265,684,346	312,703,303	879,916,370	7,848,266	0
No.77 Diet				499,020,440	0	
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
Expenditure from Reserve	0	1,998,250	1,998,250			0
1st Reserve	0	355,250	355,250			0
2nd Reserve	0	1,643,000	1,643,000			0
Temporary Expenditure Outside Reserve						
Total	377,535,616	1,324,857,591	1,702,393,207	1,648,966,408	17,942,090	10,000,000

Fiscal year	General Account	War Expenditure Account	Total	Special Accounts
1931	232,624,323	0	232,624,323	57,230,380
32	320,556,595	0	320,556,595	61,167,794
33	410,005,418	0	410,005,418	119,017,093
34	491,780,160	0	491,780,160	113,347,832
35	534,594,232	0	534,594,232	122,248,146
36	560,442,763	0	560,442,763	123,145,862
37	708,668,990	519,058,381	1,307,727,371	171,562,768
38	681,867,913	1,165,300,000	1,847,167,913	261,135,836
39	830,772,236	939,550,000	1,770,322,236	302,856,504
40	1,032,377,882	840,000,000	1,872,377,882	406,733,620
41	1,249,018,014	5,103,210,710	6,352,228,724	591,146,638
Total				

Note: The Special Accounts mostly duplicate the General Account and / or the War Expenditure Account and therefore have been eliminated from the total

Fiscal year	General Account	War Expenditure Account	Total	Special Accounts
1931	232,624,323	0	232,624,323	57,230,380
32	320,556,595	0	320,556,595	61,167,794
33	410,005,418	0	410,005,418	119,017,093
34	491,780,160	0	491,780,160	113,347,832
35	534,594,232	0	534,594,232	122,248,146
36	560,442,763	0	560,442,763	123,145,862
37	708,668,990	519,058,381	1,307,727,371	171,562,768
38	681,867,913	1,165,300,000	1,847,167,913	261,135,836
39	830,772,236	939,550,000	1,770,322,236	302,856,504
40	1,032,377,882	840,000,000	1,872,377,882	406,733,620
41	1,249,018,014	5,103,210,710	6,352,228,724	591,146,638
Total				

Note: The Special Accounts mostly duplicate the General Account and / or the War Expenditure Account and therefore have been eliminated from the total

IMPERIAL SANCTIONED ACCOUNT OF EXTRAORDINARY  
WAR EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT

(Jurisdiction of Navy Ministry)

(From 1937 fiscal year to 1941 fiscal year)

	Total	Navy Extra-ordinary war Expenditure	Reserve	Extraordi-nary war Expenditure Budget	Excess over Navy Budget	Name of Minister
1937	519,058,381	454,058,381	65,000,000			
Transfer from General Account	119,100,000	104,100,000	15,000,000			
Amount expended without Imperial Sanction	104,100,000	104,100,000				Kaya(F.M.) Yonai(N.M.)
3rd Imperial Sanction (Jan. 22, 1938)	15,000,000		15,000,000			"
72nd Diet	399,958,381	349,958,381	50,000,000			"
1st I.S. (Sept. 15, 1937)	299,263,211	299,263,211				"
2nd I.S. (Nov. 17, 1937)	58,195,170	50,695,170	7,500,000			"
3rd I.S. (Jan. 22, 1937)	42,500,000		42,500,000			"
1938						
73rd Diet	1,165,300,000	1,043,000,000	122,300,000			
4th I.S. (Apr. 12, 1938)	434,020,393	434,020,393				Kaya(F.M.) Yonai(N.M.)
6th I.S. (Aug. 8, 1938)	296,937,281	296,937,281				Ikada(F.M.) Yonai(N.M.)
8th I.S. (NOV. 1938)	229,035,859	229,035,859				"

- cont'd. -

	Total	Navy Extra-ordinary war Expenditure	Reserve	Extraordi-nary war Expenditure	Excess over Budget	Name of Minister
10th I.S. (JAN. 21, 1938)	205,306,467	83,006,467	122,300,000			Ishiwata(F.M.) Yonai(N.M.)
1939 74th Diet	939,550,000	812,000,000	127,550,000			
12th I.S. (Apr. 12, 1939)	230,226,685	230,226,685				"
14th I.S. (June 28, 1939)	249,303,641	249,303,641				"
16th I.S. (Oct. 28, 1939)	249,750,564	249,750,564				Aoki(F.M.) Yoshida(N.M.)
19th I.S. (Jan. 30, 1939)	210,269,110	82,719,110	127,550,000			Sakurauchi (F.M.) Yonai(N.M.)
1940 75th Diet	840,000,000	737,000,000	103,000,000			
21st I.S. (Apr. 17, 1940)	208,341,013	208,341,013				Sakurauchi(F. Yonai(N.M.)
23rd I.S. (July 27, 1940)	229,862,218	229,862,218				Kawada(F.M.) Yoshida(N.M.)
25th I.S. (Nov. 13, 1940)	200,000,000	200,000,000				"
27th I.S. (Dec. 21, 1940)	201,796,769	98,796,769	103,000,000			"
1941	5,103,210,710		5,074,410,710		28,800,000	
76th Diet	2,174,410,710		2,174,410,710			Kawada(F.M.) Oikawa(N.M.)
29th I.S. (Feb. 15, 1941)	500,000,000		500,000,000			"
31st I.S. (Apr. 12, 1941)	550,000,000		550,000,000			"
33rd I.S. (June 21, 1941)	550,000,000		550,000,000			"

- cont'd. -

	Total	Navy Extraordinary war Expenditure	Reserve	Extraordinary war Expenditure	Excess over Budget	Name of Minister
36th I.S. (Aug. 9, 1941)	250,000,000		250,000,000			Ogura(F.M.) Oikawa(N.M)
38th I.S. (Oct. 4, 1941)	324,410,710		324,410,710			"
Excess over Budget						
41st I.S. (Nov. 5, 1941)	28,800,000				28,800,000	Kaya(F.M.) Shimada (N.M.)
77th Diet	1,100,000,000		1,100,000,000			"
42nd I.S. (Nov. 29, 1941)	750,000,000		750,000,000			"
44th I.S. (Dec. 27, 1941)	350,000,000		350,000,000			"
78th Diet	1,800,000,000		1,800,000,000			"
46th I.S. (Jan. 28, 1942)	800,000,000		800,000,000			"
48th I.S. (Mar. 28, 1942)	1,000,000,000		1,000,000,000			"

Jurisdiction of Navy Ministry			1931 fiscal year			
Classifi- cation	General Account			Special Account		Fuel Depot
	Ordinary	Extraordi- nary	Total	Navy arsenal	Powder Depot	
Main budget (No. 60 Diet)	141,209,983	69,131,307	210,341,290	33,033,502	2,353,726	21,516,505
Supplemental budget	0	1,545,806	1,545,806			
No. 61 Diet	0	1,545,806	1,545,806			
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
Expenditure from Reserve	72,146	20,665,081	20,737,227			
1st Reserve	72,146	95,500	167,646			
2nd Reserve		802,647	802,647			
Expenditure by Public Bonds		19,766,934	19,766,934		Outside Reserve 326,647	
Total	141,282,129	91,342,194	232,624,323	33,033,502	2,680,373	21,516,505
						<u>57,230,380</u>



Jurisdiction of Navy Ministry				1931 fiscal year		
Classifi- cation	General Account		Total	Special Account		
	Ordinary	Extraordi- nary		Navy arsenal	Powder Depot	Fuel Depot
Main budget (No. 60 Diet)	141,209,983	69,131,307	210,341,290	33,033,502	2,353,726	21,516,505
Supplemental budget	0	1,545,806	1,545,806			
No. 61 Diet	0	1,545,806	1,545,806			
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
Expenditure from Reserve	72,146	20,665,081	20,737,227			
1st Reserve	72,146	95,500	167,646			
2nd Reserve		802,647	802,647			
Expenditure by Public Bonds		19,766,934	19,766,934		Outside Reserve 326,647	
Total	141,282,129	91,342,194	232,624,323	33,033,502	2,680,373	21,516,505
						<u>57,230,380</u>

## Jurisdiction of Navy Ministry

1932 fiscal year

Classifi- cation	General Account		Total	Special Account		Fuel Depot
	Ordinary	Extraordi- nary		Navy arsenal	Powder Depot	
Main budget (No. Diet)	138,275,301	96,445,113	234,720,414	36,093,502	3,553,129	21,521,163
Supplemental budget						
No. 61 Diet						
No. 62 Diet	2,338,169	41,829,801				
No. 63 Diet		20,741,773				
No. Diet						
No. Diet	143,548,152	171,002,221	314,550,373			
Expenditure from Reserve	45,102	5,961,120	6,006,222			
1st Reserve	45,102	30,695	75,797			
2nd Reserve		875,179	875,179			
First Reserve for Manchuria						
Incident Expenses	0	5,055,246	5,055,246			
Total	143,593,254	176,963,341	320,556,595	36,093,502	3,553,129	21,521,163
						<u>61,167,794</u>

- Note 1. Main budget was not approved by the Diet but the previous year's budget was carried over under Art. 71 of the Imperial Constitution.
2. The figures for the General Account are accurate in total but the divisions according to main budget and supplemental budget may not be accurate.

Jurisdiction of Navy Ministry		1933 fiscal year				
Classifi- cation	General Account		Total	Special Account		Fuel Depot
	Ordinary	Extraordi- nary		Navy arsenal	Powder Depot	
Main budget (No. 64 Diet)	178,822,411	193,783,927	372,606,338	58,730,846	7,725,570	22,560,677
Supplemental budget	0	31,165,000	31,165,000			
No. 65 Diet	0	31,165,000	31,165,000	30,000,000		
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
Expenditure from Reserve	697,886	5,536,194	6,234,080			
1st Reserve	697,886	831,600	1,529,486			
2nd Reserve		484,594	484,594			
First Reserve for Manchuria						
Incident Expenses		4,220,000	4,220,000			
Total	179,520,297	230,485,121	410,005,418	88,730,846	7,725,570	22,560,677
						<u>119,017,093</u>

Jurisdiction of Navy Ministry		1934		fiscal year		
Classifi- cation	General Account		Total	Special Account		Fuel Depot
	Ordinary	Extraordi- nary		Navy arsenal	Powder Depot	
Main budget (No. 65 Diet)	199,337,475	288,534,188	487,871,663	81,567,617	8,036,293	23,743,922
Supplemental budget	572,339	703,507	1,275,846			
No. 67 Diet	572,339	65,512	637,851			
No. 65 Diet		82,995	82,995			
No. 66 Diet		555,000	555,000			
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
Expenditure from Reserve	444,626	2,188,025	2,632,651			
1st Reserve	444,626	928,025	1,372,651			
2nd Reserve		1,260,000	1,260,000			
Total	200,354,440	291,425,720	491,780,160	81,567,617	8,036,293	23,743,922
						<u>113,347,832</u>

Jurisdiction of Navy Ministry 1935 fiscal year						
Classifi- cation	General Account			Special Account		
	Ordinary	Extraordi- nary	Total	Navy arsenal	Powder Depot	Fuel Depot
Main budget (No. 67 Diet)	215,917,830	313,765,604	529,683,434	89,560,003	8,246,733	24,441,413
Supplemental budget	C	100,000	100,000			
No. 67 Diet	C	100,000	100,000			
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
Expenditure from Reserve	935,487	3,875,311	4,810,798			
1st Reserve	652,487	355,643	1,008,130			
2nd Reserve		3,093,500	3,093,500			
First Reserve for Manchuria						
Incident Expenses		350,000	350,000			
Treasury Surplus	283,000	76,168	359,168			
Total	216,853,317	317,740,915	534,594,232	89,560,003	8,246,733	24,441,413
						<u>122,248,149</u>

Jurisdiction of Navy Ministry		1936 fiscal year				
Classifi- cation	General Account			Special Account		
	Ordinary	Extraordi- nary	Total	Navy arsenal	Powder Dept	Fuel Depot
Main budget (No. 69 Diet)	215,797,109	200,001,423	415,798,532	89,560,003	8,258,921	25,326,938
Supplemental budget						
No. 69 Diet	20,955,101	115,077,782	136,032,883			
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
Expenditure from Reserve	927,960	7,683,388	8,611,348			
1st Reserve	927,960	220,074	1,148,034			
2nd Reserve	0	7,463,314	7,463,314			
Total	237,680,170	322,762,593	560,442,763	89,560,003	8,258,921	25,326,938
						<u>123,145,862</u>

Jurisdiction of Navy Ministry		1937		fiscal year		
Classifi- cation	General Account		Total	Special Account		
	Ordinary	Extraordi- nary		Navy arsenal	Powder Depot	Fuel Depot
Main budget (No. 70 Diet)	273,953,380	407,700,236	681,653,616	101,560,125	8,023,779	33,791,261
Supplemental budget		106,404,676	106,404,676			
No. 70 Diet		1,455,948	1,455,948			
No. 71 Diet		104,948,728	104,948,728			
No. 72 Diet					6,014,259	
No. 73 Diet				20,120,000	2,053,344	
No. Diet						
Expenditure from Reserve	287,565	323,133	610,698			
1st Reserve	287,565	162,020	449,585			
2nd Reserve		161,113	161,113			
Total	274,240,945	514,428,045	788,668,990	121,680,125	16,091,382	33,791,261
						<u>171,562,768</u>

Jurisdiction of Navy Ministry		1937		fiscal year		
Classifi- cation	General account			Special account		
	Ordinary	Extraordi- nary	Total	Navy arsenal	Powder Depot	Fuel Depot
Main budget (No. 70 Diet)	273,953,380	407,700,236	681,653,616	101,560,125	8,023,779	33,791,261
Supplemental budget		106,404,676	106,404,676			
No. 70 Diet		1,455,948	1,455,948			
No. 71 Diet		104,948,728	104,948,728			
No. 72 Diet					6,014,259	
No. 73 Diet				20,120,000	2,053,344	
No. Diet						
Expenditure from Reserve	287,565	323,133	610,698			
1st Reserve	287,565	162,020	449,585			
2nd Reserve		161,113	161,113			
Total	274,240,945	514,428,045	788,668,990	121,680,125	16,091,382	33,791,261
						<u>171,562,768</u>



Jurisdiction of Navy Ministry		1938 fiscal year				
Classifi- cation	General Account		Total	Special Account		Fuel Depot
	Ordinary	Extraordi- nary		Navy arsenal	Powder Depot	
<b>Main budget</b>						
(No. 73 Diet)	293,382,149	383,976,291	677,358,440	108,436,225	10,267,964	36,469,657
<b>Supplemental budget</b>						
No. 73 Diet	711,141	2,313,770	3,024,911	56,903,675	29,796,524	5,356,567
No. 74 Diet				15,082,500		
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
<b>Expenditure from Reserve</b>						
1st Reserve	303,912	1,180,650	1,484,562			
2nd Reserve		869,500	869,500			
<b>Total</b>	<b>249,397,202</b>	<b>387,470,711</b>	<b>681,867,913</b>	<b>179,245,124</b>	<b>40,064,488</b>	<b>41,826,224</b>
						<u>261,135,836</u>

Jurisdiction of Navy Ministry		1939			fiscal year		
Classifi- cation	General Account			Special Account			
	Ordinary	Extraordi- nary	Total	Navy arsenal	Powder Depot	Fuel Depot	
Main budget (No. 74 Diet)	287,215,995	366,726,767	653,942,762	205,353,818	42,209,500	55,293,186	
Supplemental budget							
No. 74 Diet	5,510,670	167,299,000	172,809,670				
No. Diet							
No. Diet							
No. Diet							
No. Diet							
Expenditure from Reserve	1,952,397	2,067,409	4,019,806				
1st Reserve	1,952,397	81,409	2,033,806				
2nd Reserve		1,986,000	1,986,000				
Total	294,679,062	536,093,176	830,772,236	205,353,818	42,209,500	55,293,186	
						<u>302,856,504</u>	

Jurisdiction of Navy Ministry		1939			fiscal year		
Classifi- cation	General Account			Special Account			
	Ordinary	Extraordi- nary	Total	Navy arsenal	Powder Depot	Fuel Depot	
Main budget (No. 74 Diet)	287,215,995	366,726,767	653,942,762	205,353,818	42,209,500	55,293,186	
Supplemental budget							
No. 74 Diet	5,510,670	167,299,000	172,809,670				
No. Diet							
No. Diet							
No. Diet							
No. Diet							
Expenditure from Reserve	1,952,397	2,067,409	4,019,806				
1st Reserve	1,952,397	81,409	2,033,806				
2nd Reserve		1,986,000	1,986,000				
Total	294,679,062	536,093,176	830,772,236	205,353,818	42,209,500	55,293,186	
						<u>302,856,504</u>	

Jurisdiction of Navy Ministry		1940			fiscal year		
Classifi- cation	General Account			Special Account			
	Ordinary	Extraordi- nary	Total	Navy arsenal	Powder Depot	Fuel Depot	
Main budget (No. 75 Diet)	351,298,461	677,646,669	1,028,945,130	274,681,991	58,193,080	73,858,541	
Supplemental budget							
No. 75 Diet	94,440	35,947	130,387				
No. Diet							
No. Diet							
No. Diet							
No. Diet							
Expenditure from Reserve	1,887,249	1,415,116	3,302,365				
1st Reserve	1,887,249	1,164,462	3,051,711				
2nd Reserve		250,654	250,654				
Total	353,280,150	679,097,732	1,032,377,882	274,681,991	58,193,080	73,858,541	
						<u>406,733,621</u>	


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Jurisdiction of Navy Ministry		1941		fiscal year		
Classifi- cation	General Account			Special Account		
	Ordinary	Extraordi- nary	Total	Navy arsenal	Powder Depot	Fuel Depot
Main budget (No. 76 Diet)	464,345,187	776,688,927	1,241,034,114	225,997,917	19,152,730	104,031,513
Supplemental budget						
No. 76 Diet	213,682	308,738,000	308,951,682	163,372,519	58,202,031	20,389,928
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
No. Diet						
Expenditure from Reserve	2,787,379	5,196,521	7,983,900			
1st Reserve	2,787,379	1,675,521	4,462,900			
2nd Reserve		3,521,000	3,521,000			
Total	467,132,566	781,885,448	1,249,018,014	389,370,436	77,354,761	124,421,441
						<u>591,146,638</u>

Jurisdiction of Navy Ministry		1941			fiscal year		
Classifi- cation	General Account			Special Account			
	Ordinary	Extraordi- nary	Total	Navy arsenal	Powder Depot	Fuel Depot	
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# EXPANSION OF INDUSTRY IN JAPAN PROPER, 1931-1941

GROSS VALUE ADDED BY MANUFACTURE  
1931 PRICES



SOURCE : MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY



OUTLINE FOR THE ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION  
OF JAPAN, MANCHOUKUO AND CHINA.

Decided at Cabinet Meeting  
of 3 October, 1940.

In order to concretely realize the mission of our country, which is to create a new order in East Asia and to ensure a lasting world peace, it is necessary to push forward the process of renovation of our domestic system and that of the expansion and reorganization of our sphere of existence collectively and unitedly. Consequently, the basic economic policy of our country should be based on the nature of the general plan of the following three process:

1. perfection of the reorganization of the national economy.
2. Organization and strengthening of the sphere of self-existence.
3. Expansion and organization of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

After all, it is necessary to organize and strengthen the general political, cultural and economic union of Japan-Manchoukuo, North China and Mongolia-Sinkiang Areas as an organically solid sphere of self-existence based on the national defense and geo-political position of our country, together with the specific islands off the South China Coast as its advance base in order to organize and expand our sphere of existence and at the same time to establish the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere embracing Central and South China, Southeastern Asia and the southern Areas in order to accelerate and expedite the perfection of a national defense economy. And in regard to the method of applying the economic policy, it is necessary that special consideration and thought be given to it to make it conform to the stages of livelihood of the respective races while adjusting it to the basic policy pertaining to our merger with the nations or areas and races within the sphere of existence.

1. Basic Policy

1. The aim of the economic construction of Japan, Manchoukuo and China is to establish a state of self-sufficient economy with Japan, Manchoukuo and China as a unit by about 1950 and at the same time to accelerate the establishment of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and thereby strengthen and secure their position in world economy.
2. The guiding spirit of the Japan-Manchoukuo-China economy is to establish a national defense economy through the united cooperation of Japan, Manchoukuo and China with Japan as the leader according to the great spirit of universal concordia and to promote the welfare of the people in general through the principle of live and let live.
3. Japan, being the motive power for the economic construction of Japan, Manchoukuo and China, will guide and nurture the economic construction of Manchoukuo and China by making every effort to enhance the spirit of the people, renovate their domestic situation and expand their national power. Especially, Japan will plan for the epochal development of their science and technique and undertake the development of their pioneer industries.
4. While further strengthening her inseparable relationship with our empire, Manchoukuo will plan for the speedy perfection and development of the important basic industries with the establishment of the sphere of self-existence as the chief objective.
5. China will cooperate with Japan and Manchoukuo and will plan for the development of her resources and the restoration of her economy. And North China and the Mongolia-Sinkiang Areas will develop her transportation and important industries with the establishment of the sphere of self-existence as the chief objective, while Central and South

China will contribute to the establishment of the East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere by focusing their attention on the smooth flow of materials and the development of important resources. However, the specific islands off South China coast, such as Hainan Island, will make every effort toward their own development, in particular, as the advance bases of the sphere of self-existence.

6. Every effort will be made to preserve the national defense power by planning for a systematic joint storage of the national defense resources within the sphere of self-existence.

7. In order to regulate and accelerate the execution of the general economic construction plan of Japan, Manchoukwo and China, the mechanics of the general plan of the Japan-Manchoukwo-China economy will be perfected.

## 2. Sectional Policy.

The basic policy in regard to the industrial distribution, labor, finance, trade and transportation policy of Japan, Manchoukwo and China is determined, in general, as follows:

### 1. Distribution of industries:

a. Placing her emphasis primarily on precision instrument industries, machine industries and armament industries henceforth, our empire will plan for their epochal development, while the other industries, such as heavy industries, chemical industries and mining, will be developed according to the principle of the right industry in the right place within the sphere of self-existence.

Light industries, particularly fiber and miscellaneous industries, will be systematically arranged and gradually transferred to the continent. At the same time, their transfer into the hands of continental capital will also be considered.

In regard to agriculture, reform of the land system and scientific renovation of management will be undertaken, while the control of the rural population, together with the betterment and stabilization of the farmers and the maintenance of the staple food of our country, will be planned.

In regard to the marine industry, plans for its further development will be made so as to continue to maintain our position as the first in the world.

The unification and renovation of the forestry administration will be made for the rational utilization and preservation of the forestry resources.

b. Manchoukwo henceforth will plan for the epochal development of her mining and electrical industries, in particular, and make every effort to develop her heavy and chemical industries according to the principle of the right industry in the right place between herself and China. At the same time, she will supply our empire with a portion of the raw materials for the heavy industries. Furthermore, machine industries and armament industries will be developed to the extent of satisfying the national defense requirements.

Light industries will be developed according to the domestic demands.

In regard to agriculture, in view of her position as the supply base of food and fodder for Japan, Manchoukwo and China and as the source of special agricultural raw materials for the world, the development of her agricultural land and the improvement and rationalization of her agricultural method will be undertaken to increase production of agricultural products extensively.

Furthermore, for the development of the agricultural industries, the migration of our pioneer farmers will be accelerated and they will be made the nucleus.

Even in regard to salt manufacturing, stock raising and forestry, plans for their epochal development in keeping with the above will be made.

c. China henceforth will contribute toward the establishment of the foundation for the economic construction of Japan, Manchoukuo and China by planning for the epochal development of her mining and salt manufacturing industries and carrying out large scaled production of industrial raw materials and, at the same time, will construct some heavy and chemical industries according to the principle of the right industry in the right place to augment the Japanese-Manchoukuoan industries.

In regard to light industries, she will plan for their mutual adjustment according to the degree of development of the industries of our empire and for their development primarily with native capital.

In regard to agriculture, she will make every effort to perfect the basic facilities, in particular, plan for the improvement and rationalization of farm management and make every effort to maintain the staple food of our country as well as increase the production of cotton and special products.

## 2. Labor

In view of the importance of the position of labor and technical productivity of the people within the national defense economy, an epochal reform will be made to the labor and technical systems. At the same time, a Japan-Manchoukuo-China labor plan based on the foundation of racial cooperation will be established and "gesamtpolitisch" control and redistribution will be undertaken.

(Note: Gesamtpolitisch includes not only geopolitical factors, but also cultural, social and economical factors.)

a. Our empire will make every effort to establish a new system of labor and technique, train laborers spiritually and physically, promote scientific education, intensify labor productivity, train technicians and skilled workers and will guide and assist in the economic construction of China and Manchoukuo.

b. Manchoukuo will obtain from our empire the technicians and skilled workers necessary for the development of her industries and at the same time establish a training system for these types of workers within her country also.

Systematic migration of Japanese and Korean pioneers will be planned and in regard to labor, in general, the systematic migration of North China laborers into Manchoukuo will be planned and every effort will be made to establish a policy of replenishment from domestic source and particularly to reorganize and establish labor control in the mining and manufacturing industries.

c. China will obtain from our country the technicians and skilled workers necessary for the development of her industries and the restoration of her economy, and also make every effort to train such types of laborers within her own country.

In regard to laborers, in general, she will devise measures for their stabilization and at the same time make the necessary provisions for the development of Manchurian industries.

## 3. Finance.

For the establishment of the national defense economy, the financial ideology will be so changed as to enable the acquisition of the necessary quantity and quality of materials as a state primarily without placing the financial foundation solely on the certainty of collection.

Even in regard to salt manufacturing, stock raising and forestry, plans for their epochal development in keeping with the above will be made.

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In regard to light industries, she will plan for their mutual adjustment according to the degree of development of the industries of our empire and for their development primarily with native capital.

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## 3. Finance.

For the establishment of the national defense economy, the financial ideology will be so changed as to enable the acquisition of the necessary quantity and quality of materials as a state primarily without placing the financial foundation solely on the certainty of collection.

a. A financial plan conforming to and enabling the execution of the industrial plan for Japan, Manchoukuo and China will be established and a financial system to carry this out will be perfected.

b. In view of the possibility of the necessity of making numerous changes in the industrial facilities, accompanying the progress of technique and the establishment of industrial fields and accompanying the execution of a systematic joint storage of national defense materials, a financial system for this purpose will be perfected.

c. As a rule, the procurement of funds will be made from the savings of the three countries and for this purpose plans for the increase and utilization of the savings in each country will be made. However, in regard to the funds for the strengthening of the national defense production strength, assistance will be rendered by Japan for the time being. Furthermore, plans for the utilization of foreign capital, so long as it does not run counter to the aims of the establishment of a new order in East Asia, will be made.

d. In regard to foreign exchange, the aim of control will not be directed solely on the economy of overseas payments, but also on acquisition of national defense materials from foreign countries and in regard to the foreign exchange funds, both Japan and Manchoukuo will utilize it jointly. Even in regard to China, it will be so set up to enable her to utilize it together with Japan and Manchoukuo as much as possible. Furthermore, it will be further planned as to make Japan the center of finance and settlement for the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

e. The necessary agreements for international settlement will be made among Japan, Manchoukuo and China to strengthen the interdependent and correlated characteristics of the three nation economy.

f. In regard to the monetary system of China, it will be remedied according to the shifting of the situation with the preservation of Japan's leadership as the general principle.

#### 4. Commerce.

The past conception of commercial trade will be changed to establish a trade policy based on principle of production economy with the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as a unit centering around Japan and to secure its position in world economy.

a. Priority materials needed mutually among China, Manchoukuo and Japan will be made to flow smoothly, accurately and fastly.

b. In regard to the relations with a third power or group, the trading of materials with Japan, Manchoukuo and China as a unit will be set up according to nations or groups to secure the materials necessary for production in Japan, Manchoukuo and China and plans will be made to regulate their distribution internally.

c. In regard to the relations with the various areas of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere outside of Japan, Manchoukuo and China, a trade agreement aimed at the preferential acquisition of materials needed mutually will be made and they will be further guided to take on a united relationship with Japan, Manchoukuo and China.

#### 5. Traffic.

To accelerate the unification of the economy of Japan, Manchoukuo and China and to comply with the national defense demands, shipping harbors and railways will be perfected and expanded for the epochal development of traffic and communications among the three countries. At the same time, the organic connection of sea and land transportation facilities will be promoted and every effort will be made to affect a unitary control and

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b. In regard to the relations with a third power or group, the trading of materials with Japan, Manchoukuo and China as a unit will be set up according to nations or groups to secure the materials necessary for production in Japan, Manchoukuo and China and plans will be made to regulate their distribution internally.

c. In regard to the relations with the various areas of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere outside of Japan, Manchoukuo and China, a trade agreement aimed at the preferential acquisition of materials needed mutually will be made and they will be further guided to take on a united relationship with Japan, Manchoukuo and China.

#### 5. Traffic.

To accelerate the unification of the economy of Japan, Manchoukuo and China and to comply with the national defense demands, shipping harbors and railways will be perfected and expanded for the epochal development of traffic and communications among the three countries. At the same time, the organic connection of sea and land transportation facilities will be promoted and every effort will be made to affect a unitary control and

a. A financial plan conforming to and enabling the execution of the industrial plan for Japan, Manchoukuo and China will be established and a financial system to carry this out will be perfected.

b. In view of the possibility of the necessity of making numerous changes in the industrial facilities, accompanying the progress of technique and the establishment of industrial fields and accompanying the execution of a systematic joint storage of national defense materials, a financial system for this purpose will be perfected.

c. As a rule, the procurement of funds will be made from the savings of the three countries and for this purpose plans for the increase and utilization of the savings in each country will be made. However, in regard to the funds for the strengthening of the national defense production strength, assistance will be rendered by Japan for the time being. Furthermore, plans for the utilization of foreign capital, so long as it does not run counter to the aims of the establishment of a new order in East Asia, will be made.

d. In regard to foreign exchange, the aim of control will not be directed solely on the economy of overseas payment, but also on acquisition of national defense materials from foreign countries and in regard to the foreign exchange funds, both Japan and Manchoukuo will utilize it jointly. Even in regard to China, it will be so set up to enable her to utilize it together with Japan and Manchoukuo as much as possible. Furthermore, it will be further planned as to make Japan the center of finance and settlement for the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

e. The necessary agreements for international settlement will be made among Japan, Manchoukuo and China to strengthen the interdependent and correlated characteristics of the three nation economy.

f. In regard to the monetary system of China, it will be remedied according to the shifting of the situation with the preservation of Japan's leadership as the general principle.

#### 4. Commerce,

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and connection of airways and to expand and perfect electrical communication and broadcasting facilities. Furthermore, the epochal expansion of transportation facilities on the continent will be planned for.

a. In order to meet its mission of leadership in regards to traffic among Japan, Manchoukuo and China and to occupy the position of absolute dominance in the maritime circle of East Asia as well as to further develop it universally, Japan will markedly increase her shipping.

b. From the standpoint of her national defense and the promotion of her industrial development plan, Manchoukuo will plan for the speedy expansion of her traffic and communication facilities.

c. For the reconstruction of her economy and the promotion of her industrial development, China will plan for the expansion of her traffic and communication facilities and will make every effort to develop her interior water transportation facilities.

In regard to traffic and communication in North China and the Mongolia-Sinkiang areas, she, from the standpoint of national defense, will tighten her relations with Japan and Manchoukuo and plan for their speedy expansion.

d. In order to maintain the autonomous position of the traffic and communication in East Asia, every effort will be made to bring the interests and rights of the third powers under our influence one after the other.

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C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. NO. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. NO. 1611 AStatement of Source and Authenticity

I, TAKAHASHI Michitoshi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of the Cabinet and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 11 pages, dated 3rd October, 1940, and described as follows: Nichi-man-Shi Keizai Kensetsu Yoko. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Cabinet

Signed at Tokyo on this9th day of July, 1946./s/ M. Takahashi

Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ M. Kobayashi

SPAL  
Secretary of the Cabinet  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, William C. Prout, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this9th day of July, 1946./s/ William C. Prout

NAME

Witness: /s/ Edward P. Monaghan

Investigator  
Official Capacity

I.P.S.

E. 862

The Japan Advertiser, Tokyo, May 19, 1938

ARMY EXPLAINS WAR BILL  
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Scope of General National Mobilization Law Takes In Every  
Private Industry; Toys and Raw Silk May be Included

Following is the translation of the text of a pamphlet issued by the War Department, explaining provisions of the National Mobilization bill. The concluding part will appear on this page tomorrow.

Under the existing international circumstances, it is necessary for the Japanese people to have a clear and unified understanding and appreciation of the National General Mobilization Law. We will, therefore, explain first the form and scope of the law and then its contents.

Although some of the items in the law are secret matters and we can not reveal them to the public at large for the time being, we will, at any rate, try our best to show the spirit and substance of the law as a whole so that readers may grasp its reality purely from the viewpoint of national defense.

Japan faces on her north the Soviet Union, which, with an ambition to sovietize the world, has organized an immense army and has completed her national defense all along her boundary lines. On her west she has the Chiang Kai-shek political power with a violent policy of resistance against her. Moreover, she is surrounded by the powerful navies of the United States and Great Britain. As an island Empire she is narrowly limited in her land area and woefully lacking in natural resources. Under such conditions, it is simply inevitable that Japan has to face great difficulties in organizing a plan which makes for the efficiency of her national defense.

Defense Line Shifted

The Manchurian incident has brought about a great change in the condition of national defense. The situation has been enhanced by the present incident. Under the new situation, the line of national defense has been shifted several hundred miles further from the national boundary and extended to Central China by way of North Manchuria and North China, a distance of more than a thousand miles. In the face of this, it has become a matter of supreme importance for Japan to expand and strengthen all aspects of her national power to hold this line of defense effectively for the establishment of permanent peace in the Orient in cooperation

E-862

The Japan Advertiser, Tokyo, May 19, 1938

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with Manchukuo and North and Central China. A success or failure in her attempt to realize this national ideal depends upon the determination of the Japanese people. For many years to come, Japan must make very serious efforts in perfecting and strengthening her national defense for the realization of this ideal and the National General Mobilization Law is intended to accomplish this end.

By the National General Mobilization, Japan aims to control and operate her entire personal and material resources to the fullest possible extent in order to enable her to demonstrate her national power most effectively for her national defense in time of emergency. In other words, she seeks to mobilize her national vitality to the greatest possible extent, in order to enable her to supply her army and navy with the vast amount of war materials they require in time of war to secure the smooth economic operation for the stability of national life, and at the same time to demoralize the enemy on the battlefield as well as on the economic and propaganda fronts. Military success in the future depends chiefly upon superiority to the enemy in the ability to fight by mobilizing systematically and effectively the synthetic national strength as long as war continues.

#### All-Embracing

By synthetic national strength, we mean the national strength consisting of all elements, tangible and intangible, of personal and material resources. The national general mobilization calls for the concentration of these elements most systematically to one constant synthetic national power for an effective demonstration in order to gain the final victory in a war.

All elements of national strength may be displayed effectively by the efficient operation of the national system. Since the national system is operated by man, the source of fighting strength is the people and their spiritual power. From this consideration, it is obvious that the mobilization of spiritual power is more important than any other element of national strength. All possible efforts, therefore, must be made by mobilizing educational institutions and propaganda organs for a unified campaign to intensify the fighting spirit of the people, which will enable them to endure any amount of hardship and difficulties.

Another important matter in the scheme of general mobilization is the acquisition of vast quantities of necessary materials to supply the army and the navy. In time of war, all kinds of materials will be consumed in great quantities due to the vast expansion of fighting equipment in keeping with the progress of science. In order to satisfy this demand, the government must collect and prepare them for use speedily in the shortest time possible. A shortage of war materials must be made up by acquiring them from abroad in good time. On the other hand, the government must make efforts to increase the production of such materials at home and have them in store to provide

for any possible contingency. It may be necessary for the government to limit or prohibit the consumption of certain war materials for ordinary purpose or to encourage the people to use substitutes for them.

In order to facilitate such activities, it is necessary to unify all producing enterprises and organs of exports and imports for a systematic production and distribution. For this purpose, the government will have to issue various regulations by Imperial ordinances. It will also take necessary steps to prevent a rise in prices of commodities and go the length, if necessary, of fixing official prices on such commodities. Japan is blessed with plenty of food-stuffs, but some arrangement will have to be made to prevent a possible decline in production.

With the outbreak of a war, a large number of young men who are working in mines and factories will be called to the colors, and those establishments must be replenished with a greater number of operatives than before to meet the emergency. In time of war, however, all organizations engaged in peace industries may have to curtail their activities or even suspend them altogether because their products may not be wanted in such a time or due to difficulty in securing raw materials to work upon, with the result that a large number of operatives will be out of work. The object of personnel mobilization is to adjust the demand and supply of labor to cope with the situation. For this purpose, it is necessary for the government to perfect educational and employment institutions for the proper training of young men in certain trades and for the proper distribution of workers. It calls for close cooperation between labor and capital as well as the cooperation of women. The effective relief of wounded soldiers and their families is another important item which comes under the personnel mobilization.

#### Government Finance Control

In order to raise enough funds for the execution of war, it is necessary for the government to establish a war time tax system and a policy of floating public bonds to prevent an undesirable financial inflation. For this purpose the government may control all money circulation organizations to facilitate a proper circulation of money. It will also make efforts, in order to buy necessary raw materials, to increase export trade, to arrange financial credit to manage foreign bonds held by Japanese, to increase the output of gold, etc.

In time of war, a speedy transportation of men, munitions and provisions to the war fronts is essential for gaining a victory. This calls for the unified operation of all transportation facilities on land and sea to the greatest possible extent. At the same time, equipment of all harbors and ports must be perfected and strengthened. It must not be forgotten that in time of war the army and navy will appropriate a greater proportion of vessels for their own purpose. The

government will take similar steps for increasing the efficiency of communication services.

#### Scientific Mobilization

Mobilization of the scientific elements of national strength is another important item in the scheme of general mobilization. In time of war, it is urgent for the government to /Note. several words unreadable/ shortage of various war materials by mobilizing the science resources of the country. For this purpose the government will make special arrangements for enabling scientists and scientific institutions to raise their efficiency to the highest possible point.

In order to facilitate the national general mobilization, the government will accurately collect all kinds of information at home and abroad as a part of the mobilization of information propaganda and guard services. It also will launch a propaganda campaign for mobilization of the national spirit and the unification of national opinion for the execution of war. As a part of the propaganda, efforts will be made to create in foreign countries favorable public opinion for Japan. In addition to this, the government will make efforts for the protection of materials and for the maintenance of peace and order to facilitate the national general mobilization. This is particularly important in time of enemy air raids and to thwart spy activities.

#### Flexible Plans Essential

It is imperative for the government to make necessary preparations in time of peace to provide against any possible contingency necessitating the general mobilization. The government, therefore, must be equipped with far-reaching plans to raise efficiency promptly in production of necessary materials, their transportation and other activities to facilitate the general mobilization. The plans and preparations will differ in their scope according to the magnitude of war. The government, therefore, must be equipped with plans and preparations, applicable to varying conditions to carry out a general mobilization.

The Cabinet first will draw a rough draft on the basis of which all departments of the government will make their respective plans and preparations for the general mobilization. Parties engaged in foreign trade and those engaged in enterprises for producing and distributing commodities must conform to the plans prepared by the departments of the government. The conduct of the parties concerned will be controlled by regulations to be promulgated by Imperial ordinances or to be brought into existence by revising existing law. The government will take such steps in good time so that the army and the navy will always be adequately supplied with all essentials to carry on war.

Such regulations, which may require revisions in the future, should be fixed by Imperial ordinances for the sake of convenience instead of being made provisions of the National General Mobilization Law. If they were made provisions of the law, any alteration in them would require a sanction of the Imperial Diet. Such a process for securing a revision is not practical in time of war when everything must be arranged swiftly. Nor is the method of resorting to an urgent Imperial ordinance for the revision practical because the matter would have to be referred to a deliberation of the Privy Council. Moreover, an urgent Imperial ordinance could not be issued if a Diet session were in progress.

But the basic principles on which such regulations may be established should be embodied in the law because they would require alterations according to any change in the circumstances of general mobilization. In the application of the law, the government is to consult with the National General Mobilization Research Commission, thus preventing it from abusing its power of causing the issuance of Imperial ordinances. It is also expected that the government will create various semi-official organs to deliberate ways and means of control under the regulations to insure justice, as has been the case in the control of iron, steel and copper. The government in the actual execution of the regulations in keeping with prevailing industrial conditions of the country will depend largely upon a voluntary control on the part of private enterprises. It will also take into consideration views of such self-governing bodies when it will formulate its plans in order to avoid making a blunder.

#### Summary of articles

Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the National General Mobilization Law define the meanings of the national general mobilization goods and the general mobilization business. The law is to become operative when the nation is threatened by a possible war (including incidents of the nature of war). The beginning and the end of the period of application of the law will be duly announced after the Imperial sanctions are obtained. The term "personal resource" includes spiritual power, technical power and labor power. As for the general mobilization goods, most of them are mobile (vessels being included in the category of real estate). A reservation is made in the ninth section, Article 2 for a possibility of designating additional goods as subject to mobilization. At present the government has no definite plan in this connection, but it may add toys and raw silk, if necessary, in order to improve the balance of international accounts.

By saying the general mobilization of business, the word "business" is employed in a broad sense, not necessarily restricted to commercial enterprise. Such an item as the activity of the Women's National Defense League may possibly be named in this category under the ninth section of article 3.

In drafting persons in wartime according to the provisions of Article 4, the government will make efforts to recruit them without

resorting to compulsory measure. In recruiting them, the government will announce by an Imperial ordinance the age limit, sex, categories of work, and amount of remuneration as specified in qualifications for the service.

Term Clarified

The word "bodies" as referred to in Article 5, are organizations in general, excepting National Defense Leagues, the Women's National Defense Leagues, the Young Men's Associations and the Boy Scouts. The activities in which such bodies may be called upon to become engaged, include, for instance, health promotion, relief, propaganda, information and guard services.

By article 6, the government may limit or prohibit the employment of persons for non-urgent enterprises. It also may draft persons according to the provision of Article 4 and order the owners of particular enterprises, with which the drafted persons would be familiar, to employ them. The government may take necessary steps for the elimination of causes which make for competition in securing operatives, and order employers to adopt various necessary measures for the promotion of workers' health and other matters of social policy. In order to increase the labor power in time of war, article 6 will also empower the government to order owners of enterprises to mitigate or suspend various working conditions prescribed in the Factory and Mining Laws and Labor Regulations.

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THE NIPPON TIMES, LTD.

Tokyo

July 31, 1946

To whom it may concern:

This is to certify that the present Nippon Times (previously known as the Japan Times) absorbed the former Japan Advertiser on October 10, 1940 and all records of the Japan Advertiser prior to that date have been lost or destroyed.

Therefore the original manuscript, from which the article was translated, entitled "Army explains War Bill" appearing in the Japan Advertiser of May 19th and 20th 1938 cannot be located.

The Nippon Times, Ltd.

(signed) K. Togasaki

K. Togasaki  
Executive Editor



Document No. 2604-A

Page 8

CERTIFICATE

31 July 1946

I certify that the original pamphlet or a copy of the same, referred to in an article entitled "Army Explains War Bill" which appeared on page 4 of the May 19th and May 20th, 1938 issues of the Japan Advertiser cannot be found in the files or archives of the First Demobilization Bureau which has custody of the documents of the former Japanese War Ministry.

(signed) O. Arao

O. Arao

Chief of  
General Affairs Division  
First Demobilization Bureau

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Chief of  
General Affairs Division  
First Demobilization Bureau

862 #

一九三八年五月十九日 星期一 東京

「アトバトヤ」所載

軍、戰時法案、説明スル

2604 A

國家總動員法、範圍、凡、私的產業、包括スル、

玩具及生絲、包含スル、ト、得ル、

以下、獨裁、記事、陸軍省發行、ニ、カ、ル、私的總動員法、闡明、ハ、

ニ、ト、雜誌、下、リ、後、本、日、発行、本、紙、收、録、ス、

現在、陸軍省、本、ニ、カ、ル、私的總動員法、付、明確、ニ、述、ク、理解、認識、得、ル、

ニ、日本、國民、ニ、ト、必要、ト、ス、ル、故、我、レ、ハ、生、三、國、誌、形式、及、範圍、之、説明、ニ、其、

内容、及、ハ、ト、ス、ル、事、ナ、リ、

國、誌、細、目、ハ、私的總動員法、ノ、我、レ、當、今、廣、泛、全、般、ニ、是、を、表、ス、ル、ト、シ、テ、

ナ、リ、其、我、レ、ノ、誤、者、ハ、純粹、ニ、シ、テ、見、地、方、ニ、其、現、實、ヲ、把握、出来、得、ル、ニ、國、誌、全、

体、ノ、精神、ト、本、質、ト、ヲ、究、ニ、角、全、ク、盡、シ、テ、説明、ス、ル、事、ナ、リ、

日本、北、方、ニ、於、テ、世界、ヲ、シ、テ、北、方、ニ、シ、テ、巨、大、ノ、軍、政、ヲ、編、成、シ、其、

ニ、據、據、シ、テ、防、守、ヲ、完、成、シ、テ、蘇、聯、邦、面、ニ、居、ル、日本、北、方、ニ、於、テ、日本、ニ、對、シ、

テ、猛烈、ノ、反抗、政策、ヲ、執、ル、將、介、石、政、權、ヲ、有、シ、ル、之、加、ヘ、テ、日本、ハ、米、及、

英、米、ノ、權力、ヲ、海、軍、ニ、依、リ、包、圍、シ、ル、事、ナ、リ、日本、ハ、島、國、ニ、シ、テ、故、其、北、方、

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其、ノ、防、守、ノ、効果、的、ト、ス、ル、計、畫、ヲ、編、成、ス、ル、ニ、當、リ、大、ニ、困難、ニ、直面、シ、

ハ、シ、テ、其、ノ、誠、ニ、不、可、避、ク、ス、ル、

防、線、ノ、移動

滿、洲、事、變、ハ、防、守、ノ、態、勢、ヲ、大、変、化、シ、テ、招、来、シ、テ、事、態、ハ、

201

2604A

現在、事變に依り促進させ、新ラシニ状況、下三於テ、國  
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 言、滿洲國及支、中支ト協カ、東洋永遠、平和確立  
 二、向テ此、國防線ヲ有効ニ保持スル為、日本、凡、此、方面  
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 二、極、ト、真劍ト努力ヲ為カ、不、バ、又、ソ、テ、國家、總動員法  
 此、目的ヲ達成スル、ト、目的ト、ナ、ル。

國家總動員法ニ依リ、日本、緊急、場合、其、國カ、  
 國防、目的、ニ、最モ、有効、ニ、發揮、セ、ル、極、最大、限、ニ、其、  
 全、人、的、及、物、的、資源、ヲ、統制、運用、ス、ル、ト、目的ト、ス、ル。  
 換、言、ス、ル、ニ、日本、其、國家、的、治、力、ヲ、最大、限、ニ、動員、シ、  
 戰、時、ニ、際、シ、要、ス、ル、巨大、ナル、軍、用、物、資、ヲ、其、陸、海、軍、  
 二、供給、セ、ル、ト、及、國民、生活、ノ、安定、為、丹、滑、ナル、經  
 濟、作用、ヲ、確保、ス、ル、ト、同時、ニ、戰場、並、ニ、經濟、及、宣傳、戰、  
 線、ニ、於、テ、敵、士、氣、ヲ、沮、喪、セ、ル、ト、目的ト、ナ、ル、將、來、  
 二、於、テ、軍事、的、成功、ノ、主、ト、シ、テ、戰爭、ヲ、繼續、ス、ル、限、リ、其、  
 一、綜合、國、力、ヲ、組織、的、且、有効、的、動員、能力、ヲ、敵、對、  
 一、能力、優、越、性、ニ、依存、ス、ル。

總括的。

綜合國力ト云フ、有形無形、人的物物資源、凡、此、要素、

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現在，事變三依り促進サ友新ラシ一狀況，下三於了國  
 防線，國境力ヲ數百哩モ遠ク移動サレ，並滿及其支ヲ陸  
 一千里以上，距離ニ心中支ヲ擴張サシ。此，事實ニ直而  
 支滿洲國及支支，中支ト協力シ，東洋永遠，平和確立  
 二向テ此，國防線ヲ有効ニ保持スル為日本，凡ソ此方面  
 一國ヲ擴張シ且強化スルト之ヲ事カ日本ニトリ最モ重  
 要ト事柄トツラキタデアル。此，國家的理想實現，成テ  
 不成功ハ日本國民，決心ニ依ルモデアル。今後長期ニ亘リ，  
 是本此，理想實現，為其，國防ヲ完全ニ且強化スル  
 二極メテ真劍ト努力ヲ為サバシマ。ソテ國家總動員法  
 此目的ヲ達成スル下目的トシテ也。

國家總動員法ニ依リ日本，緊急場合，其，國力ヲ  
 國防目的ニ最モ有効ニ發揮セシムル極大限ニ其，  
 全人的及物的資源ヲ統制運用スル下目的トスル。  
 換言スルニ日本，其，國家の治力ヲ最大限ニ動員シ  
 戰時ニ際シテ要スル巨大ナル軍用物資ヲ其，陸海軍  
 二供給セシムル下及國民生活，安定，為丹滑ナル經  
 濟作用ヲ確保スル下同時ニ戰場並ニ經濟及宣傳戰  
 線ニ於テ敵，士氣ヲ沮喪セシムル下目的トシテ，將來  
 二於テ軍事的成功ハ主トシテ戰爭，繼續スル限リ其  
 一綜合國力，組織的且有効の動員能力，敵對ス  
 一能力，優越性ニ依存スル。

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總括的。

綜合國力ト云フ，有形無形，人的物的資源，凡ソ此要素

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之成也國力ヲ意味スル事也 國家總動員ニ戰爭ノ冠極、  
勝利ヲ得ル為ニ必要ナルヲ表現スル事、此等ノ要素ヲ最モ經濟  
的ニ、一莫ク國家總力ヲ集中スル事が必要ナル。

國力、全要素、國力機構、能率的ト運用ニ依リ、効果的  
ニ發揮シ得ル、國家機構ハ合依リテ運用ナル故、戦力、源  
泉、國民ト、精神カヲ示ル。此ニ鑑ミ、精神力、動員、國力、  
他、如何ナル要素ヲ、モ重クテ事ハ明カナル。故、成得ル限リ  
、努力カヲ國民、勵志心ヲ強化スル為、統一戰線ニ教育  
施設、宣傳機關ヲ動員シテケレバ、是ニ依リテ國民、  
如何ナル艱難辛苦ニモ耐ヘル事カ出来ル。

總動員企案中、更ニ重要ナル事項ハ陸海軍ニ補給スル  
莫大量、必要ノ資材ヲ獲得スル下ナリ。戰時ニ於テハ科學  
、進歩ト併行シテ戰闘裝備カ夥ク優入カレル為ニ凡テ  
糧食、資材カ大量ニ消耗サレ、此ノ要求ヲ滿ス為ニ政府成  
シ得ル最短期間ニ其等ヲ採メ且速カニ使用スル程準備ヲ  
ケレバ、戰爭資材、欠乏ハ適時海外ヨリ獲得シ補給  
シケレバ、他方ニ於テ政府、國內、此ノ種資材、生産ヲ  
増加スル努力ヲ擧グ且其等ヲ如何ナル予想サル不慮ノ事件ニ  
モ供給スル程ニ貯ヘテ置カケレバ、國家、或ル種ノ戰爭資  
材ノ普通目的ニ消費スルトヲ制限若ク禁止シ又ハ國民、其  
等代用品、使用ヲ奨励スル事が必要ナルヲモ知ナリ。

N03

ナル活動ヲ促進スル為ニ凡テ生産企業及輸出入機關  
ヲ組織的ニ生産ト配給ニ統一スル事が必要ナル。  
此ノ目的ヲ政府ハ勅令ニ依リ種々規則ヲ出サシメ、

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一九三八年五月十九日 本曜日 東京

「アサヒ」所載

軍、戰時恣意、説明スル

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國家總動員法範圍、凡公私の產業、包括スル、

玩具及生絲、包含スルコトヲ得ル。

以下掲載、記事、陸軍省発行ニカケル國家總動員法闡明、ハ、  
「アサヒ」雜誌下ル、後半分明日発行、本誌ニ収録ス。

現在、陸軍省ハ「アサヒ」雜誌總動員法ヲ明確ニ「アサヒ」理解、認識ヲ持  
テ、日本國民ニ「必要」トナシテ、故、我々ハ「中」ニ同志、形式及範圍ヲ説明、其  
ハ答及「アサヒ」スルコトナリ。

同志、細目ナルモ、概然事項、屬シ、我々ハ「中」ニ同志、全般ニ「アサヒ」ニ、  
「アサヒ」我々、諸君、統制「アサヒ」見地、其、現象、把握、出来、得、  
「アサヒ」同志、  
体、精神、本、頭、上、角、全、力、盡、シ、説明、ス、  
日本、北方、於、  
云、境、線、沿、  
「アサヒ」  
英、  
決、少、  
其、  
「アサヒ」

防線、移動

滿洲事變、防、  
満洲事變、防、  
満洲事變、防、

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2862#

一九三八年五月十九日 木曜日 東京

「シバニアバヤガ」所載

軍「戰時法案」説明スル

國家總動員法範圍凡私的產業ニ包括スル

玩具及生絲ニ包含スルコトヲ得ル

以下攝政、記者、陸軍省發行ニ力ルル國家總動員法闡明、ハ、

「上」雜誌刊ル。後半分、明日発行、本誌ニ收録ス

環境急降豫勢ト「上」雜誌總動員法行明確ニ「總」ニ理解、認識ヲ持

「上」日本國民「上」必要トスルニ故、我々ハ中ニ國法形及範圍ヲ説明スルニ其

内容及バ「上」ニモテナル

同法細目ハ「上」ニモテハ概然事項頂屬、我々之當命國法全般ニ是ヲ發表スルコトハ國家

ナリ其我々之誤者ガ純粹ニ「上」ニ見地、其現實ヲ把握出来得ルコトヲ國法全

體ノ精神ト本質ト「上」ニ角全ク盡シテ説明スルコトヲ

日本北方ニ於テ「上」ニ世界ヲ「上」ニ化セシメ「上」ニ野ニ「上」ニ巨大ニ軍政ヲ編成スル

ニ「上」ニ境線沿テ「上」ニ防ヲ完成スルニ朝鮮半島ニ「上」ニ居ル日本、西方ニ於テ「上」ニ日本ニ對シ

ニ「上」ニ猛烈ニ反抗政策ヲ執ルニ將今右政權者「上」ニ本心ニ「上」ニ加ルニ「上」ニ日本、米、及

英、ノ「上」ニ權力ハ「上」ニ海軍ニ務ルニ包圍サレタルニ「上」ニ日本、獨、米、帝、主、ニ「上」ニ敬ニ其公主、

埃少ニ「上」ニ悲シムルコトハ天然資源不足ニ「上」ニ非シ、斯ル「上」ニ狀況、上ニ日本ガ

其「上」ニ「上」ニ防ノ効果的「上」ニ「上」ニ計畫ヲ編成スルニ「上」ニ當リ、大ニ困難ニ「上」ニ直面セ

バ「上」ニ「上」ニ誠ニ不可避ナリ

名、防、線、移、動

滿洲事變、自防、防禦、大ニ變化ヲ招来スル、事態、

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Ver 2

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現在、事變依り促進サケ、新ラシテ状況、下ニ於テ、國防總環境、多數自望ニ遠ク移動サレ、北滿及北支ヲ經テ一千里以上、距離ニシテ中支ヲ擴張サケ、此、事實ニ直ニ面シテ、滿洲國及北支、中支ト協力シ、東洋永遠、平和確立ニ向テ、此、國防總ヲ有効ニ保持スルニ為日本、凡ソ心ヲ固クシ、擴張シ且強シタルト云フ事、日本ニシテ、最モ重要ナ事柄トナシ、其、國家的理想實現成功ニ要ス、此、理想實現、為其、國防ヲ完全シ且強シタルニ極メ、其、眞劍ニ努力ヲ為サズ、ソレ、國家總動員法此、目的ヲ達成スルニテ、目的トシ、

國家總動員法ニ依リ、日本、緊急場合、其、國力ヲ國防目的ニ、最モ有効ニ發揮セシムル様、最大限ニ其、全人の及物の資源ヲ統制運用スルニテ、目的トシ、換言スレバ、日本、其、國家の治力ヲ最大限ニ動員シ、戰時ニ際シ、要スル巨大ナル軍用物資ヲ其、陸海軍ニ供給セシムル及國民生活、安定、為丹滑ナル經濟作用ヲ確保スル同時ニ、戰場並ニ經濟及宣傳戰線ニ於テ、敵、士氣ヲ沮喪セシムル目的トシ、此、特殊ニ於テ、軍事的成功ハ主トシテ、戰爭、繼續スル限リ、其、綜合國力、組織的且有効な動員能力、敵ニ對シテ、此能力、優越性ニ依存スル。

### 總括的

綜合國力ト云フ、凡有形無形、人的物的資源、凡ソ此要素

之成此國力可意味スル也。國家總動員ニ戰爭ノ究極ノ勝利ヲ得ルニ爲シテ結果的ニ表現トシ、此等ノ要素ヲ最モ組織的ニ、貫クニ國家總力ニ集中スルニ事ガ必要ナル。

國力、金要素ハ國家機構ノ能率的ニ運用ニ依リテ結果的ニ發揮シ得ル。國家機構ハ人依リテ運用スルニ故戰力、源泉國民トシテ精神力ヲ示シ。此ニ鑑ミ精神力、動員國力、他、如何ナル要素ヨリモ重要ナ事ハ明カナル也。故ニ成ルニ得ル限リ、努力ヲシテ國民ノ團結心ヲ強化スルニ爲シ、統一戰線ニ教育施設ヲ宣傳機關ヲ動員シテ示ス。是ニ依リテ國民ハ如何ナル艱難辛苦モ耐ヘル事ガ出来ル。

總動員企業中、更ニ重要ナル事項ハ陸海軍ニ補給スル莫大量、必要ヲ資材ヲ獲得スル下テ、戰時ニ於テハ科學的進歩ヲ併行シテ戰術的設備ガ夥ク擴張スルニ爲シ、此種額、資材ガ大量ニ消耗サレ、此ノ要求ヲ滿スルニ爲シ政府或レ得ル最短期間ニ其算ヨリ米々且速カニ使用スル準備ヲケルナリ。戰爭資材、不足ハ通商海外ヨリ獲得スル補給ヲシテ示ス。地方ニ於テハ政府ハ國內、此種資材、生産ヲ增加スル努力ヲ、擧グニ其算ヲ如何ナル下テ想サル不慮ノ事件ニモ供給スル權ニ斯ヘテ置カケルナリ。國家ハ或ル種ノ戰爭資材ノ普通目的ニ消費スルコトヲ制限若クハ禁止スルハ國民其等代用品、使用ヲ獎勵スル事ガ必要ナルヲ知ナリ。此種活動ヲ促進スルニ爲シ凡ソ生産企業及運輸ノ種類ヲ組織的ニ生産上配給ニ統一スル事ガ必要ナル也。此ノ點ヲ政府ハ勅令ニ依リ、種々規則ヲ出サシムルニナリ。

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政府又物資、價格騰貴ヲ防止スル必要ナキ段ヲ採リ又、  
 要トシテカニル物資ニ公定價格ヲ設ケル迄ニ到ルナク、日  
 本ニ豊富ナ食糧ニ懸クシ居ルナキ相想ナル生産、低下ヲ防  
 止スル為ニ何等カ、取極ムヲ以テスナリ。  
 戰爭、勃發シ伴ニ炭坑・工場ニ就業中ノ青少年、多  
 數ノ入營應召ナリ而シテ、工務場ニ緊急事態ニ即  
 應スル為ニ以前ニ増シ多數、工員ヲ補充サレバナリ。併  
 シ戰時ニ於テ、平和産業ニ從事スルニ事畢体ハカル際  
 ニ、生産物ノ需要ガナリトスルニ或ル作業ニ原料ノ確保ガ困難  
 テルカ、理由ヨリ縮減更ニ中止、止ムナキ列ビテ、結果  
 多數、工員ガ職ヲ離ルルニ至ル。人の動員、目的ハ事態ニ  
 對應シテ労働、需給ヲ調整スルニ在リ。此目的、為ニ六、或種  
 職業ニ於テ青少年、適正ヲ訓練、為ニ又労働者、適  
 正配置、為ニ職業輔導及ニ雇傭施設、完備ガ政府  
 トテ必要ナリ。ソレニハ勞資間、緊密ナ協力同様ニ婦  
 人、協力が要請サル。偏兵及ニ同家族、効果的ナ救済  
 ガ人の動員、下ニオカレバ、重要ナ事項ナリ。

### 政府、金融統制

戰等遂行ニ要スル資金ヲ充テシテ調達スルニ爲シ、好マシキルニ  
 通貨膨脹ヲ防遏スルニ爲シ戰時租稅制度及公債發行、  
 政策、樹立シテ政府ニシテ必要ナリ。此ノ目的、爲シ政府通  
 貨、適正ナリ流通ヲ円滑ナシメルニ爲シ、金融機關ヲ統制  
 之得ルニ更ニ政府ノ必要ナリ原料ヲ購入ルニ爲シ輸出貿易  
 増進、財政の信用、設定、日本人所有外債、操作、  
 金、増産等々ニ切カスル。

戰時ニ於テハ赤線、人員、武器、彈藥、糧秣、資材等、迅速  
 ナリ輸送シテ勝利獲得止不可欠ナリ。之ハ可能ナリ最大限、  
 陸海輸送機關、統一の運用ヲ要請スル同時ニ全港灣、  
 施設、完備強化サレヌバナシ。忘レテナラントハ戰時ニ  
 於テハ陸海軍カ船舶、大部ヲ軍目的ニ充當スルコトナリ。

政府、通信業務、効率増進、爲シ同様ニ措置ヲ採ル

### 科學勤貢

國內、中、科學の要素、勤貢、總動員計畫中、  
 モラツ、重要ナリ事項ナリ。戰時ニ於テ政府ノ國家、  
 科學資源ヲ動員シ各種戰時物資、不足ヲ補フニ途ナ  
 段ヲ見出スルコトハ緊要ナリ。此ノ目的、爲シ政府  
 ハ科學者並ビニ科學施設ヲ最ニ最高度ニシテ、効率ヲ増進  
 セシメルニ特別ノ考慮ヲ押シ、

國家總動員ヲ円滑ナシメルニ爲シ政府ハ情報、宣傳及  
 警備業務、勤貢ノ一部ニテ凡ソ内外、各種情報ヲ

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### 政府、金融統制

戰爭遂行ニ要スル資金ヲ充分ニ調達スルニ爲シハ好マシカニ  
 通貨膨脹ヲ防遏スルニ爲シ戰時租稅制度及公債發行、  
 政策、樹立シテ政府ニトリ必要ナル。此ノ目的、爲シ政府通  
 貨、適正ニ流通ヲ円滑ナラシムル爲シ、金融機關ヲ統制  
 シ得ルニ更ニ政府ハ必要ニ原料ヲ購入スルニ爲シ輸出貿易  
 増進、財政の信用、設定、日本人所有外債、操作、  
 金、増産等々ニ努メル。

戰時ニ於テハ赤線ノ人員、武器、彈藥、糧秣、資材等、迅速  
 ナ輸送ハ勝利獲得止不可欠ナル。之ハ可能ニ最大限、  
 陸海輸送機關、統一の運用ニ要請スル。同時ニ全港灣、  
 施設、完備強化サレバハ、忘レテラナイコトハ戰時ニ  
 於テハ陸海軍カ船舶、大部ヲ軍目的ニ充當スルコトナル。

### 科學勤貢

國力、中、科學の要素、勤貢ハ總勤貢計畫中、  
 モラツ、重要ニ率頂ナル。戰時ニ於テ政府ハ國家、  
 科學資源ヲ勤貢ニ各種戰時物資、不足ヲ補フニ途ヲ  
 緘ミ見エタガストハ緊要ナル。此ノ目的、爲シ政府  
 ハ科學者並ビニ科學施設、之ヲ最高度ニシ、効率ヲ増進  
 スルニヤラ特別、考慮ヲ押、  
 國家總勤貢ヲ円滑ナラシムル爲シ政府ハ情報、宣傳及  
 警備業務、勤貢ノ一部トシテ凡ソ内外、各種情報ヲ

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適確ニ蒐集スル。政府ハ併セテ國民精神動員、爲。並ニ國內輿論ヲ戰爭遂行ニ結集スルニ爲ニ宣傳運動ヲ起ス。此、宣傳一部トシテ外國ニ於テ此對自輿論ヲ有テ是等ノ努力スル。之ニ加ヘテ政府ハ國家總動員ヲ円滑ナラシメル爲ニ物資ノ保護並ニ治安、確保ニ努力スル。之、敵空襲、際ニ於テ亦スル。活動ヲ阻止スルニ特ニ重要ナラシ。

彈力性ナル計畫、必要

政府平時ニ於テ總動員ヲ不可避ナラシムル如キ如何ニ、起リ得ベキ不慮ノ事態ニ對テ又ル準備ヲ絕對ニ必要ナラシ。故ニ政府ハ必要ノ物資、生産、ノ、輸送及ビ其他總動員ヲ円滑ナラシメル諸活動ニ於テ、效率ヲ即時ニ高メヤラシテ遠大ニ計畫ヲ用意シテバナラシ。ソ、計畫及ビ準備、範圍ハ戰爭、規模ニ應ジテ異ル。故ニ政府ハ總動員ヲ實行スルニ爲ニ各種ノ事態ニ適用スル得ベキ種々ノ計畫及ビ準備ヲ用意シテバナラシ。

內閣ハ先ヅ總動員ニ對スル概略ノ草案ヲ作成シテ基礎キ各省ハソレノ計畫及ビ準備ヲスル。外國貿易各商品生産乃至配給、企業ニ從事スル団体ハ政府各省、準備メテ計畫ニ從ハスナラシ。當該団体、行爲ハ勅令ニ依ツテ公布サレ或ハ現行法改正ニ依リ成立サレ規定ニ依リ取締ラレ。陸海軍ハ戰爭遂行、爲メ、常ニアツテ必要品ヲ充份ニ供給サレヤラ政府ハ適當ノ時期ニ斯様ノ手段ヲ講ズル。

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斯様 + 規定ハ將來改正ヲ要スル場合國民總動員法、  
條項ヲ作ルルニ便宜上勅令ニ依リテ確定カレベキナリ。  
若シ規定カ右法、條項トシテ其、條項中、變更ハ帝國  
議會、認可ヲ要スル。改正ヲ宜カラシムル斯様 + 過程  
ハナリモ、カ迅速ニ整ヘラレテハナラナイ。戰時ニ於テハ果地  
ニ即シテモ、ナクハ。樞密院、審議ニ付サズバナラナイ。故ニ  
緊急勅令ニ賴ル改訂法モ實際上不適ナリ。其二、緊  
急勅令ハ若シ國會ヲ進行中ニハ發布ハ出来ナイ。  
惟テ斯様 + 規定ガ設定カレ基本原則ハ總動員ノ情況  
變化ニ從テ改正ヲ必要トスルカ故ニ右法ニ編ミ込ムベキナ  
リ。此、法、適用ニ於テ政府ハ國民總動員研究委員會  
承認コトナリ。斯クニテ勅令發布ヲテ職權濫用ヲ

抑制スル  
政府ハ又從來、鉄、鋼、銅、銻、錫、鋅、鎳、場合、如ク公平ヲ  
期スル。諸規定、下ニ統制、不法乃至手段ヲ十分  
ニ考究スベキ各種半官半民、機關ヲ創設スル。政府ハ現在  
ノ産業情況ニ即シテ諸規定、實際、遂行ニ於テ、民間  
企業家側、自覺的統制ニ須ク依存スル。間違ニ避ケル  
爲メ計畫ヲ作ル場合、斯様 + 自治諸團體ノ見解モ無熟ク  
考スル。

各條項、概略  
國民總動員法、一、三條、國民總動員、物資及總動員  
業務、意義ヲ明カニテ居ル。此法ハ國家ヲ起シ得ベキ戰

7  
107

208

Doc 2604A

争(戦争、性質ノ下ル事変ヲ含ム)脅威ヲ受ケル場合

発動セルモノナリ此、法、適用期間、開始ト終結ト御裁可ヲ得ル後適當ニ公表セラル個人資力ナル言辭ハ精神能力、技術能力、労働能力ヲ含ムモノナリ。總動賈物資ニ関シテハ其、大概、モ、ハ可動性、モノナリ(船舶ハ不動産、部類ニ含マレ)

指命、可能性ニ対シテハ第九部第二條ニ保留條件ヲ設テ下ル現在政府ハ此、點ニ関シテハ決定スル計畫持ツ居テハ國際上、勘定決済ヲ改善セシムニ必要ト

了レバ玩具 生糸ヲ加ヘルナラフ事業、總動員ハ意義、事業業ヲ意味ス。必ズモ高業的事業ニ限定サレモナラハ。國防婦人會、活動、如キモ第三條第九項、範圍ニ含ミルナラフ。

第四條、條文ニ依リ、戰時中人員ヲ徵用スル場合、政府ハ強制的手段ニ訴ヘズシテ徵集ス可ク努力スル、徵集スル場合政府ハ勅令ニ因リ、年令、制限、男女ノ區別、作業、權利及ビ勤務、性質ニ從ヒ設定スル報酬ヲ発表スル

語意、明解

第五條ニ云ク「國防團體、婦人國防團體、青年團、少年團ヲ除ク一般團體ヲ意味スル。是等團體ガ從事スベキトシテ要求サレシ活動ニ例ヲ下シテ、保健、救済、宣傳、情報、警備ヲ含ム」



No 9

Doc 2604A

第六條ニ依ルハ政府ハ緊急ノ際ニ於テ人員ノ雇  
傭ノ制限又ハ禁止スルコトガルベシ。又第四條ノ條文ニ依ル  
人員ノ雇用ニ特定ノ事業主ニ對シテ其ノ事業ニ熟練セル  
是等ノ僱用者ヲ雇傭スルニヤラ命令之得ル。政府ハ勞務  
者獲得ノ競争ヲ生起セシムル原因ヲ除ク手段ヲ施シ勞  
務者ノ保健及ビ社會政策ニ関スル其ノ他事情ヲ確保  
スル手段ヲ施ス可ク、雇主ヲ命令スルコトアルベシ。  
戰時ノ勞働力ノ増進ヲ計ルル旨第六條ハ工場及鉱業  
法並ニ勞務調整法ニ依リ政府ヲ以テ事業主ニ諸勞働  
條件ノ緩和或ハ停止ヲ命令之得ル

有限責任会社日本タムム社 東京  
一九四六年/昭和二十一年七月三十日

関係者各位

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謹啟

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 本館出版以來之經過情形，編成「東亞圖書集成出版紀念大會紀略」一冊，分送各館及圖書館。

一九四六年一月三十日

第一級負責編輯部長  
荒尾斐助 印

8463

Doc. No. 2605.

Page 1

The Japan Advertiser, Tokyo, Friday, May 27, 1938

NEW JAPANESE WAR BILL

Japanese Subjects Residing Abroad May Be Called for Service in  
National Mobilization Enterprises, Pamphlet Reveals

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Following is the second and concluding part of a trans-  
lation of a pamphlet issued by the War Department ex-  
plaining the provisions of the National Mobilization Bill.  
-----

There will be no outbreak of labor trouble in wartime, but  
the National General Mobilization Law is provided with Article  
7 against any such possible contingency.

According to this article, the government may require em-  
ployers and employees to maintain organs for harmonizing labor  
and capital as a preventive against labor disputes or may impose  
mediation to settle such a dispute. The article also empowers  
the government to close any work stop which is operated with a  
design to foment dissension after a labor dispute has occurred  
and to limit or prohibit the activity of a third party to insti-  
gate a labor dispute. All difficulties between land owners and  
tenant farmers, however, are to be settled according to the pro-  
visions of the Agricultural Land Adjustment Law.

Article 8 includes important provisions for the control of  
mobilization materials. The concrete regulations for production  
distribution and consumption of the materials are to be announced  
by Imperial ordinances or departmental ordinances. A large pro-  
portion of matters pertaining to transportation comes under this  
article, for the important part of the Extraordinary Ship Con-  
trol Law falls within the scope of this article.

May Regulate Trade.

By Article 9, the government may import important materials  
for the war industry and encourage export in order to improve  
the international trade balance. When the government deems it  
necessary to place a restriction on imports and exports or to  
increase or reduce tariffs, it may do so under the provisions  
of this article. In that case, however, the government is likely  
to refer the matter to the Customs Tariff Investigation Commis-  
sion for deliberation.

In the event the government should be unable to obtain

General mobilization goods by purchase, it may accomplish its object by the application of Article 10. The difference between the requisition order and Article 10 is that the former enables the army and navy promptly to acquire materials directly necessary for their military operations, while the latter empowers the government to acquire the mobilization goods for military and other purposes.

It is conceivable that by the application of Article 11 the government may order companies engaged in various enterprises to readjust the distribution of profits and to appropriate their reserve funds for extension and improvement of their equipment or employ them for their subscription of government bonds. The government by this article may also order the special money circulation organs to limit the accommodations of loans, or the subscription, underwriting, purchasing, or flotation of debentures. It is quite possible that the government, when control of the money market is necessary in the event a thoroughgoing national general mobilization is adopted, may order them to curtail the amount of dividends or to extend the scope of loan accommodation.

#### Certain Exemption.

Under provisions of the Commercial Code, the flotation of debentures must not exceed the amount of capitalization, but companies engaged in war industries may, by virtue of Article 12, go beyond this limit. An increase of capitalization according to the Commercial Code, is not permitted until fully paid up, but those companies are exempted from the restriction according to the provisions of this article.

In anticipation that the government may use or expropriate the establishments engaged in general mobilization enterprises, employers, according to Article 13, are required to make some arrangements with their operatives so that the government will have no difficulty in reemploying the same operatives when it takes over such establishments for its own purposes. When the National General Mobilization Law is put into effect, the plants now being operated by the army and the navy shall come under the ruling of this law.

In the instance of "water" as referred to in Article 14, it must be interpreted as private water. As for the mining right, the government may, according to this article, use or expropriate a part of it despite the provision of the Mining Law to the contrary. The priority right of former owner or his successor to buy back the mining right and facilities is recognized by Article 15.

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In order to expand and perfect the wartime industries, necessary materials, capital and labor must be devoted for this purpose instead of being absorbed by non-essential and non-urgent enterprises.

#### Similar Provisions

Article 16 is included in the mobilization law for this purpose. The Important Industries Control Law, the Iron Industry Law and the Petroleum Business Law contain provisions similar to those of Article 16, and they are likely to continue to function as long as they are competent to satisfy the demand of national general mobilization.

It is better for the government to control wartime enterprises on the basis of independent and voluntary control of such enterprises on the part of the parties interested. From such a consideration, the government may, according to the provisions of Article 17, order the owners of such enterprises to form organizations and controlling agreements of their own categories to deal with the government. The Government may also order those who are outside the organizations to abide by the controlling agreements of the organized owners.

Article 18 is intended to accomplish cooperative purchase, cooperative import and cooperative sale through guilds of persons interested in those enterprises, which can not be accomplished by the controlling agreements as mentioned in the previous article.

Article 19 is designed to prevent an undue rise in prices of commodities in time of war. The article is included in the mobilization law because of the fact that the law controlling profiteering has no power to fix official prices of commodities.

According to the provisions of the existing Newspaper Law, the government may prohibit or limit the publication of military and diplomatic matters, but under Article 20 of the new law, it may take similar steps toward the publication of matter relating to economy and finance as well.

#### To Operate Soen.

Article 21 is intended to keep the government well-informed in time of peace of technical ability of workers in order to enable it to adjust the demand and supply of labor speedily in time of war. This registration of technical ability of workers is very important; together with works of employment offices the government is expected to undertake it in due course of time,



starting first with workers whose technical ability is most important in wartime.

The General Mobilization Law is provided with Article 22 to meet a great demand of labor in time of war by training workers in time of peace. By training institutes, it means such institutes as farmers' training quarters, schools giving short courses and mechanics training quarters. Employers, according to the provision of this article, are required to select from among their employees workers to be trained and send them to training institutes.

By virtue of Article 23, the government may make persons engaged in the manufacture and importation of certain mobilization goods create a reserve supply of the materials which may run short in time of war.

To make the national general mobilization smoothly operative Article 24 requires leaders of general mobilization enterprises to formulate detailed programs on the basis of the general plan of mobilization made by the government and to rehearse them repeatedly to facilitate the execution of the programs in time of war. Speaking of general mobilization enterprises here, they need not necessarily belong to industrial or business undertakings of profit-making character. They may be mobilization enterprises such as guard and propaganda services in cities, towns and villages as are designated in other articles. "Those who shall be caused to execute general mobilization enterprises," as stated in the same article, means leaders or engineers of such services. They are required to prepare programs pertaining to general mobilization and conduct necessary drills according to those programs.

#### Scientific Mobilization

Article 25 deals with the mobilization of scientists because they are an important element for perfecting national defense. The items on which special experiment and research are to be conducted in this connection are about 40 in number as designated by the Cabinet some time ago, including special kinds of steel, airplane motors, fuel substitutes for petroleum, utilization of sand, iron, nickel, etc.

Article 26 guarantees a fixed profit or grant of subsidy to those engaged in the business of producing or repairing general mobilization materials. There are laws specifying in detail the method of such guarantees, but not a few items of scientific works can be developed advantageously by guaranteeing profit or

granting subsidies without going through the trouble of making laws for the purpose. A speedy method is essential in time of war. In the event a subsidy is granted or a profit is guaranteed according to Article 28, the government may supervise the enterprises concerned and issue orders to them according to the provision of Article 30.

Articles 27 and 28 state regulations pertaining to compensation of losses incidental to the execution of the general mobilization law. But the aim of national general mobilization is of such character that no one should demand individual compensation for a loss which might be sustained by everybody. Take, for instance, losses due to a mobilization drill or losses caused by the control of prices of commodities. The government may grant subsidy instead of compensating the losses. In this connection, other articles which may be brought to operate together with Article 27 are Articles 8, 10, 13, 14, 9, 11 and 16. Those related to Article 28 are Articles 22, 23 and 25.

Article 31 is important because in the operation of the Mobilization Law all kinds of investigations must be conducted. There is a law pertaining to the investigation of natural resources but its scope is so limited that it cannot cover many matters which may be found within the wide range of general mobilization.

#### Severe Punishment.

The punishments for crimes which directly affect the proper execution of national general mobilization particularly for those due to profiteering during wartime, is heaviest. The punishments for crimes indirectly affecting the well-being of general mobilization is next in severity. Other punishments in violation of the Mobilization Law will be fixed according to the character of offenses.

The Mobilization Law is provided with Article 44 to prevent a possible leakage of secrets through persons occupying various positions of leadership who know secrets of government offices.

The National General Mobilization Inquiry Commission as designated in Article 50 will deliberate such matters as contents of Imperial Ordinances to be issued and the policy by which the Mobilization Law shall operate. The Commission shall be headed by the Premier with the President of the Cabinet Planning Board as the Vice-Chairman. The members of the Commission will be about 50 in number, who will represent the Upper and the Lower Houses, high officials of various departments of the government

and specialists with great experience. The Commission is purely a deliberative body to insure the administrative justice.

The National General Mobilization Law is intended to meet promptly and effectively all conditions and requirements of modern warfare. The law will not operate until detailed working regulations are issued by Imperial ordinances. Imperial ordinances dealing with matters which require preparation in time of peace will be promulgated in good time. The provisions of some of the articles which will not become operative until the nation is threatened by a war are being carried out for the time being under provisions of the War Industry Mobilization Law.

The National General Mobilization Law may be put into force by the Imperial sanction whenever the government deems it necessary. The government, for instance, may take such steps when it has to order the guild of importers secretly to import materials from abroad in anticipation of a possible shortage of such materials during the course of war.

#### Japanese Subjects Abroad.

Some of the articles in the law such as, for instance, Articles 4 and 5 are applicable to Japanese subjects abroad, providing that the steps to be taken by the Japanese Government would not violate the sovereign right of the country in which Japanese subjects are resident. Some of the articles of the General Mobilization Law overlap with those of various existing laws. Both will continue to operate in time of war but the government will see to it that it will adopt a definite policy in the application of them in order to secure unity in the conduct of the national general mobilization.

The National General Mobilization is an administrative affair and will not be placed under the direction of the Imperial Headquarters. But the two must maintain a close cooperation inasmuch as the aim of the mobilization is to satisfy the military demand. It is for this reason that many members of the Cabinet Planning Board are recruited from the Army and Navy.

#### Revolves Around Cabinet.

The business of general mobilization is related to every aspect of administrative organs with the Cabinet as the pivotal point. Under the Cabinet, the Cabinet Planning Board will formulate all the plans which make for the proper adjustment and unity

of general mobilization. All the departments of the government under the board will function as the central organs in their respective spheres to carry out the working plans of mobilization. This system is not subject to a change even in time of war, but the present administrative organs will have to be expanded and new organs may have to be established whenever necessary. Take, for instance, the Extraordinary Material Adjustment Bureau. It is scheduled to be established soon in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry to function as the central planning organ to strengthen the system of general mobilization in the ministry. A number of semi-official commissions will be organized to insure the perfect operation of general mobilization.

The National General Mobilization can not be carried out by the strength of the law alone. What is important for the accomplishment of the aim of the law is the establishment of a system, by which the personal and material resources of the nation may be controlled, and perfecting preparations for raising the efficiency of national power.

CERTIFICATE

31 July 1946

I certify that the original pamphlet or a copy of the same, referred to in an article entitled "Army Explains War Bill" which appeared on page 4 of the May 19th and May 20th, 1938 issues of the Japan Advertiser cannot be found in the files or archives of the First Demobilization Bureau which has custody of the documents of the former Japanese War Ministry.

(signed) O. Arao

O. Arao

Chief of  
General Affairs Division  
First Demobilization Bureau

THE NIPPON TIMES, LTD.

Tokyo

July 31, 1946

To whom it may concern:

This is to certify that the present Nippon Times (previously known as the Japan Times) absorbed the former Japan Advertiser on October 10, 1940 and all records of the Japan Advertiser prior to that date have been lost or destroyed.

Therefore the original manuscript, from which the article was translated, entitled "Army explains War Bill" appearing in the Japan Advertiser of May 19th and 20th 1938 cannot be located.

The Nippon Times, Ltd.

(signed) K. Togasaki

K. Togasaki  
Executive Editor

α605A

一九三八年五月二十日 金曜日

東京

「決心」下「決心」の所載

陸軍の戦時法案を説明す。

「決心」に依り海外在住日本臣民に國家總動員諸事業、  
為徵用を得以下掲載、記事、陸軍省發行「決心」國家總動  
員法説明、「決心」に、翻譯、文三部（即ち後半）に記す。

戦時中労働問題の發生を防止するに國家總動員法第六十  
條三條より不、場合を備へたる。

此條文は依り政府の労働問題、防止策として雇傭主及び勞  
務者との労資協調機関を設置せしめ、或は労働問題を解  
決するに爲る調停を行ふを得。同條文は政府は労働問題の發生を後  
紛争を助成する目的を以て運轉する場を閉鎖する權限を有し  
又三者が労働問題を制止する活動を制限し、禁止する權  
限を有す。但し地主と小作人の問題に當り農産調整法に従つて解決  
するに依り、不。

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2605A

一九三八年五月十日 金耀石

東京

「アムステルダムイザ」所載

陸軍、戦時法案ヲ説明ス。

パブリック・リレーションズ・セクション、海外在任日本臣民ヲ國家總動員諸事業

ヲ徵用シ得ル以下掲載、記事、陸軍、省發行ニカク國家總動

員法團明、パブリック・リレーションズ、文二部(即ち後半)以下。

戰時中労働問題ハ發主トシテ、國家總動員法ハ六七

條ニ依リテ、下場合ニ備ヘテ。

此條ニ依テ政府ハ労働問題、防止策トシテ雇傭主及労働

者等ヲ労働協同機關ヲ設置セズ、或ハ労働問題ヲ解

決スルニシテ労働協同機關ヲ設置セズ、或ハ労働問題ヲ發生シ後

決テ労働協同機關ヲ行ハズ、同條ニ依リテ政府ハ労働問題ヲ發生シ後

紛争ヲ助成スル目的ヲ以テ、労働協同機關ヲ設置セズ、或ハ労働問題ヲ解

決スルニシテ労働協同機關ヲ設置セズ、或ハ労働問題ヲ發生シ後

限リ、但シ地主、小作人問題、皆農調整法ニ從テ解決

スルニシテ、ト云。

TO ROOM 361  
COPY



備 撤張中改善ノ物ニ當リテリ小債ノ應募ニ使用シ  
 二命ニ于利益ノ既當ニ再整出理ニリ小債ノ積立金ヲ設  
 半一條ノ適用ニリ政府種各下ノ事業ニ從リ三十七年比金社  
 已ニ撤限ニ政府ニ與レシ。

復舊ノ勸奨員物資ヲ軍事ノ上ニ使ヒ、目的ノ滿テニ獲得  
 策戰ニ直接必要ノ物資ヲ迅速ニ獲得セシムルニ反シ  
 了ルルニ止ル。徵稅令上ノ十條ノ相違ノ前者ノ陸海軍ニ  
 能キル場合ニ六中十條ノ適用ニリ、目的ノ達成ス  
 若シ政府ガ獎勵員物資ヲ買上ニリ獲得スルニ了ルカ不  
 議戰計比三十七年止。

乘併三三場合政府ノ團體ノ審査委員會ノ審  
 計ニ必要アリト認メ、此ノ本條ノ規定ニリ之ヲ爲スニ了ル  
 屬カテ了ラズ。又政府ガ輸出入ノ制限ノ關係ノ增加減少  
 未ニ實際ノ貿易ノ輸出入ノ平衡ヲ改善スルニ爲シ輸出入ノ變  
 更ニ條ニ依リ政府ノ軍事上ノ必要ニ必要ナリ重要貨品ノ輸出入ノ出  
 入員日額ノ統制ニ得シ。

附三ノ力ニ了ル

一、予比何上ノ六臨時船舶管理法ノ重要部所力本條ノ範  
 以テ表カレ六予比運輸ニ關スル事項ノ大部ハ本條ニ見  
 資材ノ生産ノ配給消費兩方ニ具體ノ規定ヲ令ス、省令ヲ  
 本條ノ勸奨員物資ノ統制ノ關シ重要ノ規定ヲ包含スニ了ル。

機關ニ命ニ了履行ヲ制限ニリ、又、社債、應募ヲ引受  
 得ルニ了ルニ了認スル。政府ハ、一、條文ニ、特殊金融

購入及び発行等ヲ制限スルコトガ出来ル。又政府ノ承認動員  
員ヲ實施スルニ際シ金融市場ノ統制が必要ナ場合ニ金融市場  
ノ命令ニテ適當額ヲ削減セシメテリ貸付ノ範圍ヲ拡大スルコトガ  
出来ル。

特殊免除

商法ノ規定ヨリハ社債ノ發行ハ該会社ノ資本金額ヲ越スル  
コトガ出来ズガ軍手票而シテ從テ三ノ中心ニ該社ハ廿二條ニ  
依リ該制限額ヲ超過スルコトガ出来ル。増資ノ際ハ商法ニ依リテ  
金額ノ拂着ノ後ヲテハ許サレナガ此等ノ会社ハ本條ノ規  
定ヨリ該制限ヲ受ケルコトガナク。

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政府獎勵實業義務從予之施設ヲ使用又收用スベキ事ヲ

豫想シテ中十三條ニ依リ政府ガ之等施設ヲ本末目的ノ爲

ニ引越テ同ニ從業員ヲ再ビ雇フコトニ困難ヲ感シテ、

構ニ雇主ハ彼等ノ從業員トシテ取極メテ又ハ構ノ要求カシ

テ雇ハ。本家獎勵員ニ是等規定カシテ揚ニ陸海軍ニ依リテ、

操業券ヲテ雇立場ハ此、法律三三ヲ支配カシ。

中十四條ニ指テ採上ハ私採ト解概カシ可シ。採業權ニ因リテ

本條ニ從ヒ政府ハ採業權、條項等ヲ指テ毛ノ部ヲ用ヒ又

ハ收用元ニテ付來ル也。前ノ所有主ハ、從越者ガ採業權

及、設備員等ハ優先權ヲ十五條ニ認メテ可シ。

戰時工業界ヲ完成ニ爲メハ必要ニ決算村決算本志努力ハ

不要ト無シ企業者吸納シテ代リニ本目的ノ爲メニ採用元ニ

可キ事也。

### 同條ノ條令

中十六條ニ此、目的ノ爲メ獎勵員法ニ規定カシテ居ルハ、重要ニ從業

者ヲ指シ、獎勵員法ニ從業員及石油業法ニ中十六條ノ同様ノ條項

ヲ含テ居リ、之等法律ハ重要獎勵員法ノ西京采口充テ、能力ガ

ハ此限ノ存続ニ在リテ。

之等企業關係者側ノ自主的ノ長官獎勵特別ノ基礎ニテ、戰

時企業ノ獎勵、ハ此事ノ政府ハ有利ノ事ト見テ、獎勵員

政府ノ中十七條ニ規定シ、以テ、之等企業ノ所有主ニ對シテ政府

ハ之等企業者トシテ彼等ノ自身ノ利益ニテ、國庫及之獎勵ヲ規定

等ヲ勸告シ可シ。命令ニ此、ガ從來ハ政府ノ關係者トシ

テ、對シテ之等獎勵員法ニ從業員ニ對シテ、命令ニ此、

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出来也。

第十八條 何等企業關係人々、組合ヨリ共同購入女同業前

入反其自販賣員ヲ遂行セシム目的トス。

何等前條違ハル統制規則原シテ遂行セシム出来ナク

第十九條 戰時於テ何物價、不當ナル騰貴ヲ抑制スルノ目的

トシテ居ル法律ハ是等權利ヲ取締ルツテ是等關係ト動員該ノ條

項ニ當リ、公價ヲ決定スル權限ヲ有ス。

現在、新聞等業法規定依テ政府ハ軍中及外交關ニ

出版ヲ禁止スル制限アリカ出来也。然レ新法律ノ千條

下ニ終局及財政關テハ、柄ニ取テ付テモ同様、処置カ

トシ得也。

第二十條 戰時ニ於テ労働力ニ而テ急遽ニ調整

ニ得ル爲メ早始テ政府ヨリ労働者ノ技術的能力ニ

調整セラルル目的トシ居ル。労働者技術的能力ニ

付テ、ノ人互ニ其大差無要ナリ。職業紹介所ノ任事ト

其調整付テ、其ノ中ニ戰時ニ於テ必要ナル技術的

能力ノ人労働者ニ付テ、其法カニ着手スル調整ナリ。

労働員該ノ平等ニ労働者ヨリ訓練ニ以テ要路ニ於テ労働

務ノ大要ニ應ジテ之ヲ二十一條規定ナリ。

訓練施設、ハ發展其訓練所短期訓練學校、及ニ技術

者訓練所、如キ施設、細言テ其ノ條、規定ヨリハ雇傭主

ハ、被雇員者中ヨリ訓練ニ心キ労働者ヲ豫メ之ヲ

之ヲ訓練施設送リテ之ヲナリ。

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出表也。  
中十八條之等，在營業關係中，組合等共同購入並向輸

入及賣自販賣等，遂行在子目的上之。

之等前條違反之統制規則，應以遂行在子出來之

中十九條，戰時於此物價，不當於購買者抑制之，目的

上之，雇員法律於其裁判，取締，以雇員關係上勤員法，條

項，高品，公價，決定，在權限，有子之。

現在，新聞，營業法，規定，依政府，八單，及外支，關元

出瓶，禁止，及限制，元之，出來，然，之新法律，十條

中，八條，經濟，及戰時，應，不，拘，違反，三付，在同等，處置，及

上之，得也。

中二十一條，戰時，於勞動，力，而，給，急，速，三，週，並

三得也，為，三單，始，於，政府，子，勞動者，技術，的能力，二

通曉，也，文化，子，目的，上，之，雇員，勞動者，技術，的能力，二

付，子，二，至，該，次，變，更，重要，子，也。職業，紹介，所，任，子，上

其，政府，中，子，及，少，者，二，戰，時，於，取，無，必要，技術，的

能，力，子，之，勞動者，三，付，子，之，法，力，三，者，手，及，也，子，也。

總，勤，員，法，三，平，始，二，勞，務，者，三，訓，練，三，以，子，戰，時，子，之，勞

務，大，而，要，三，應，之，子，二，十，一，條，規，定，子，也。

訓，練，施設，八，農，民，訓，練，所，短期，訓，練，學校，及，也，技術

者，訓，練，所，如，中，施設，三，言，子，也，五，條，規，定，三，六，雇，員，主

ハ、被，給，者，中，子，訓，練，三，三，年，勞，務，者，三，費，三，五，六，三，六

之，訓，練，施設，送，之，不，ハ，三，六，三，六。

中千三條目政府、一定、勤員物産、生産及心輸入子業  
 上此者、三、較、略、中、缺、乏、心、上、思、心、比、資、材、貯、藏、ヲ、廿、三  
 大化、上、升、生、果、也  
 至、案、總、勤、員、ヲ、円、滑、ニ、実、施、セ、ル、ル、ヲ、中、千、四、條、六、條、勤  
 員、子、業、指、導、者、ヲ、三、政、府、ノ、作、成、ニ、シ、テ、勤、員、計、劃、書  
 三、其、中、細、察、心、計、劃、ヲ、設、定、セ、テ、且、其、計、劃、ヲ、反、復  
 演、練、シ、戰、地、ニ、於、テ、計、劃、遂、行、ヲ、容、易、ト、ス、之、心、中、  
 要、求、ニ、中、心、ト、シ、テ、該、二、條、勤、員、子、業、ニ、就、テ、二、述、心、三、其、條  
 子、業、ニ、決、定、三、毛、當、利、ヲ、上、ト、シ、テ、高、工、業、業、ニ、屬、ス、ル、  
 要、素、ヲ、シ、テ、他、條、項、規、定、シ、テ、比、外、中、一、部、  
 村、ニ、於、テ、此、敬、備、宣、傳、業、務、中、心、勤、員、業、務、  
 子、業、ヲ、行、ハ、同、條、三、述、ベ、ク、シ、テ、  
 勤、員、業、務、ニ、実、施、セ、ル、者、ト、ハ、勤、力、比、諸、業、  
 務、指、導、者、若、ク、ハ、制、作、者、ノ、認、可、ヲ、得、ル、者、ト、  
 勤、員、業、務、及、心、計、劃、書、  
 三、從、テ、決、定、心、計、劃、ヲ、行、ハ、不、可、ナ、ラ、ズ、  
 三、從、テ、決、定、心、計、劃、書、  
 三、從、テ、決、定、心、計、劃、書、

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科學的勸業

科學者國防完遂之重要之素也故三十五條三十三條六科勸業者  
勸業者規定之中心此關係三於之特別之定驗研究行此  
二十三午內閣之規程其久、故於約  
四十午之內鋼、航空機用燃料、石油代用燃料、砂  
鐵、三午其內利用之中心、

三十五條八總勸業者、至產或終之理、業者此者三訂之定、  
利益又補助金、交付之保證、中心此保證之方法、明細規定  
之保證法、其、終之法律、設之、願、自、利、益、之、保、證、之、  
補助金之興起、少カ、此科勸業者、諸部門、便  
進、得、以、迅速、方法、說明、於、大、切、之、中心、

三十八條依之、補助金、下附之場合、又利益が保證九、場合六、  
政府、六、三、條、規定、依、該關係、業者、整理之命令、得、以、  
三十七條及三十八條、總勸業者、施行、三、午、之、總、勸、業、補、償、金、之、  
規定、定、併、之、國家、總、勸、業、之、中心、惟、三、午、之、總、勸、業、人、家、之、  
如、其、損害、對、之、個人、之、總、勸、業、之、要求、也、六、例、六、勸  
業、銀、鍊、之、依、之、損害、及、物、質、統、制、之、依、之、損害、等、其、例、之、中心、政府  
之、總、勸、業、之、三、午、之、補助、金、之、及、給、付、之、中心、三、午、之、條  
上、條、目、之、條、目、之、條、目、之、條、目、之、條、目、之、條、目、之、條、目、之、條、目、之、  
三、十六、條、之、三、條、之、條、目、之、條、目、之、條、目、之、條、目、之、條、目、之、  
三、十五、條、之、中心、

三十二條、重要、之、三、午、之、勸、業、之、進行、之、中心、爲  
三、十、午、之、天然、資源、調查、之、中心、之、三、午、之、進行、範圍、之、制限、が

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嚴罰

了此亦故三廣況下此總動員範圍內人心如未不為柄、同法律中其  
含之以下、

國家總動員、適正施行、直接影響及於本國犯罪、延罰、特  
戰時中、暴利、暴害、犯罪、延罰、最重者、下、總動員  
、安寧、同落影響及於本國犯罪、延罰、奇酷者、於下、三、次、  
、延動員法之違反及延罰、犯罪、性質、從之、之、定、之、之、  
動員法、八條、四、條、規定、之、以、之、政府、官廳、機關、知、此、指、導、  
的、各、地、位、之、者、之、通、之、一、機、密、漏、洩、之、之、防、之、

第五十條、規定、之、國家總動員調查委員會、發布、之、勸令  
、內容、一、如、半、問題、及、延動員法、運用、之、之、方針、等、之、之、審  
議、之、。委員會、之、總理、大臣、之、委員長、內閣、全、體、院、總、裁、之、副、委  
員、長、上、之、。委員、數、約、五、十、名、之、。委員長、院、及、各、議、員、議、員、院、所  
各、為、高、官、。經驗、之、之、專門、家、力、之、。該、委員會、之、純、然、之、之、審、查、權、  
國、之、之、行政、之、公正、之、保證、之、之、之、之、之、之、之、。

國家總動員法、近、代、戰、之、總、之、條件、及、需要、之、對、延、速、之、有效  
、即、應、之、之、之、自、途、上、之、之、。本法、之、之、細、則、之、之、之、勸、令、  
依、之、之、之、之、之、之、之、之、。平時、之、之、之、之、之、之、之、之、  
項、之、之、之、之、之、之、之、之、。國家、之、之、之、  
、之、之、之、之、之、之、之、之、。或、之、之、之、之、之、  
分、之、之、之、之、之、之、之、之、。規定、之、之、之、之、之、之、  
國家總動員法、政府、之、之、之、之、之、之、之、之、。何、時、之、之、之、  
依、之、之、之、之、之、之、之、之、。政府、之、之、之、之、之、之、之、  
之、之、之、之、之、之、之、之、。或、之、之、之、之、之、之、之、





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國家總動員法之執行ニ付テハ、本法ノ目的、或ハ重要ナルモノトシテ、國家、人ノ及物ノ資源ヲ統制スル組織ヲ確立シテ、国力ノ増進ニ付テハ、準備ヲ充實スル也。

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関係者各位

本書状公存、多少を證明せしむるに、即ち現在、日本タムム

(以前)「タムム」(トシテ知ラレバ)ハ「タムム」トシテ「タムム」

ヲ一九四〇年、昭和十一年十月十日併合シタルモノトシテ

該合併以前「タムム」トシテ「タムム」トシテ、記録ハ失ハレ

ハ被仰セラレタリ

右ノ次ナニ付、一九三八年、昭和十三年、五月十九日、

「タムム」トシテ「タムム」トシテ、陸軍、戦時法、案ヲ證明ス

トシテ、不忠實、欺罔、タル記載、事項、原稿、ハ其所在、ヲ指示

スルモノヲ得ズ、

有限責任会社 日本タムム

編輯局長 東ナ崎 潔

有限責任会社 日本タムム 東京

一九四六年、昭和二十一年、七月、三十日

2605 月

證明書

本館ハ茲ニ一九三八年五月十九日二十日兩日ニ互リ「沙中ハソドガ」  
夕刊「紙」米四二掲載サシ夕「陸軍戰術法案ヲ說明ス」ト題ス  
此論說ハリノ本文及寫字共ニ元日本陸軍省ノ記錄、文書類ヲ保  
管シ中心米復員局ノ保護書類中ニ存在シテ今「ト」ヲ證明ス心

一九四六年七月三十日

米復員局總務部長

荒尾 樂功 圖

Excerpts from "The Japan Year Book, 1941-1942"

Page 233: "Revision of the Military Service Law"

Revision in 1939

The Law Amending the Military Service Law was promulgated on March 8, 1939. The items of revision include: amendments to the regulations on the term of military service; conscription of ex-service men; postponement of conscription for students and the manner of their conscription; abrogation of the short-term service system; and recognition of the privilege of postponement of conscription for Japanese students in Manchukuo Government schools.

Revision of the Term of Service.

Under the new Law the term of the supplementary reserve service for the Army was lengthened from 12 years and four months, while that of the first reserve service for the Navy was prolonged from four years to five years and that of the second reserve service from five years to seven years.

Page 234: Revision of the Military Service Law in 1941.

Another revised Military Service Law which was passed by the Imperial Diet at its 76th Session was enforced on April 1, 1941.

The main points of revision are (1) the enrolment of new conscripts in overseas districts into the garrisons nearest to their residences, (2) the abrogation of the second reserve service system, and (3) the prolongation of the days of call for the education of the supplementary reservists.

(1) According to the provisions of the existing Military Service Law, new conscripts are enrolled, as a rule, into the armies stationed in areas in Japan proper where they are registered as Japanese subjects, or, into the garrisons in such overseas districts as Chosen, Taiwan, Kwantung or China for convenience. There arise cases where the ambitious young men who have gone out to overseas territories to open a future for themselves have to return to Japan proper for their examination and enrollment and are cut short of their ambition. The revision is therefore made in this respect to cause young men to be enrolled in the armies or garrisons stationed in the regions other than Japan proper without regard to their census registration. The new rule shall be applied first to those young men who are to receive the conscription examination in 1942.

(2) The old system divides those eligible for military service into three categories, namely, the active, the 1st reserve and the second reserve. In view of the increased demands made on armed services in wartime, the increase of different kinds of works and the intricacy of organization in the recent defense services, the demarcation between the first and second reserves has become meaningless, the State requiring all reserve soldiers to appear for active service at any time and in the same spirit of loyalty. And the new law provides that all those who have completed their active service shall be enlisted in the reserve list for the whole length of term formerly divided into the two reserve services. This rule governing the reserve servicemen came into force as from April 1, 1941.

(3) With the progress of military drill and education in many fields of military art, the duration of term for educating the supplementary reservists has been lengthened from the present 120 to 180 days, the rule coming into force from April 1, 1941.

Page 241. National Defense Security Law

The National Defense Security Law is one of the most important legislation, which was approved by the 76th session (December 1940-March 1941) of the Imperial Diet and enforced on May 10, 1941.

There is already in operation the Military Secret Protection Law designed to guard against the leakage of military secrets and the Defense Resources Secrets Protection Law to safeguard the secrecy of the defense resources of the country. But, no law specifically intended to protect the highest secrets of the State relating to diplomatic, financial and economic matters had yet been enacted.

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Doc. No. 1570

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STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

April, 1941 / Showa 16/

DIRECTIVE OF  
FUNDAMENTAL NATIONAL POLICIES

Planning Board

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8. Joint Economic Council for Japan, Manchukuo and China  
(Decided by the Cabinet on February 25, 1941 /Showa 16/  
Joint Economic Council for Japan, Manchukuo and China  
(Published in the Papers, on February 25, 1941 /Showa 16/



Fundamental State Policy Decided by the Cabinet  
( . . . July 26, 1940 /Showa 15/

The world now faces a great historic turning point. It is about to see new politics, new economics, and a new culture created and perfected on the basis of the creation and development of several groups of nations. Our Empire also faces a great trial unprecedented in her history. At this time, if we intend to push through the national policy of our Empire based on the lofty spirit that founded the nation, it is urgently necessary that we grasp the essential tendencies of world development; fundamentally reform all our policies; surmount all obstacles and make every effort to achieve the perfection of our national defense system. Accordingly the essence of fundamental state policy has been decided as follows:

The Fundamental State Policy

1). Fundamental Measures.

The fundamental policy of our Empire lies in bringing about the establishment of exalted world peace based upon the spirit that founded our Empire, that is to say, the spirit of "Hakko-ichiu." First of all it lies in the construction of a new order in Greater East Asia founded upon a strong union between Japan, Manchuria and China with Japan as the nucleus.

To achieve this purpose, our Empire must speedily build up a strong national structure suitable for meeting any new situations and the nation will make every effort to realize this state policy with its total strength.

2. National Defense and Diplomacy.

In view of the new situations at home and abroad, our military preparations will be completed by the best efforts of the nation, on the basis of a nation-wide demonstration of the national defense structure.

The present foreign policy of our Empire is aimed at the construction of a new order in Greater East Asia, with the primary stress laid in ending the China Affair. It is hoped that our national fortunes will be advanced by the changing international situation and by execution of constructive and elastic policies.

3. Reforming our Internal Structure

The urgent task of our internal administration lies in reshaping our various policies to conform with the essential character of our

national structure and in building up the foundations of a national defense system. To achieve this purpose we hope for the realization of the following:

- A. Our system of education will be changed so that teaching will be infused with the essential character of our national structure, and, at the same time, we reckon on doing away with egoistic and utilitarian ideas and establishing national morals which place prime emphasis on service to the state. Furthermore, we reckon on promoting the scientific spirit.
- B. We calculate on establishing a new and strong political structure, and bringing about a general unification of national politics.
- a. Establishment of a new national organization by which officials and civilians will cooperate and be united in service to the state through their respective office.
  - b. Reformation of the Diet system in accordance with the new political structure.
  - c. Fundamental reformation of administrative execution. Setting up a new government system aimed at speed and coordination.
- C. Construction of the foundations of national defense economy based upon a Japan-Manchuria-China independent economy with Japan as the nucleus.
- a. Establishment of a self-sufficiency and self-supporting policy with Japan-Manchuria and China forming a bloc and embracing the Greater East Asia.
  - b. Cooperation between officials and civilians in carrying out planned economy, especially for setting up a unitary control system for controlling consumption, distribution and production of staple materials.
  - c. Setting up of a financial plan and strengthening control of money circulation aimed at general economic development.
  - d. Reforming our foreign trade policy to meet new world situation.
  - e. Setting up measures for self-support as regards daily necessities especially foodstuffs.
  - f. Epoch-making development of important industries, especially chemical and machine industries.

- g. Epoch-making development of science and rationalization of industries.
- h. Perfection and expansion of communication and transportation facilities to meet new situation.
- i. Setting up territorial development plans for the general development of the national strength of Japan, Manchuria and China.

D. A long-range policy shall be established for the improvement of public health and for increasing the population which is what generated the power for the execution of national policies. A fundamental policy shall be set up to secure development of agriculture and higher living standards for the farmers.

E. Resolute steps shall be taken to rectify the inequality of sacrifice (sacrifices made by the people) made in the execution of our state policies. Welfare installations shall be thorough-going, the life of the people shall be improved, and a living standard for the people capable of withstanding ten years of hardships shall be secured.

## OUTLINE OF FUNDAMENTAL NATIONAL POLICIES

(Published in the Papers on Aug. 1, 1940)

The world now faces a great historical turning point. It is about to see new politics, a new economic and a new culture created and perfected, based on the creation and development of several groups of nations. Our Empire also faces a great trial unprecedented in her history. At this time if we truly intend to push through the national policy of our Empire founded on the lofty spirit that founded the nation, it is urgently necessary that we grasp the essential tendencies of world development, fundamentally reform all our policies, surmount all obstacles and make every effort to achieve the perfection of our national defense system. Accordingly, the essence of fundamental state policy has been decided as follows:

## 1. Fundamental Measures.

The fundamental policy of our Empire lies in bringing about the establishment of world peace based upon the spirit of the founding of our Empire, that is to say, the spirit of "Hakko-ichiu." First of all it lies in the construction of a new order in Greater East Asia founded upon a strong union between Japan, Manchuria and China with Japan as the nucleus. To achieve this purpose, our Empire must speedily build up a strong national structure suitable for meeting any new situations, and the nation will make every effort to realize this state policy with its total strength.

## 2. National Defense and Diplomacy.

In view of the new situation at home and abroad, our military preparations will be completed by the best efforts of the nation, on the basis of the nation-wide demonstration of the national defense structure.

The present foreign policy of our Empire is aimed at the construction of a new order in Greater East Asia, with the primary stress laid in ending the China affair. It is hoped that our national fortunes will be advanced by far-sighted views of the changing international situation and by the execution of constructive and elastic policies.

## 3. Reforming our internal structure.

The urgent task of our internal administration lies in reshaping our numerous policies to conform with the essential character of our national structure, and in building up the foundations of a national defense system. To achieve this purpose we expect the realization of the following:

A. Our system of education will be changed so that teaching will be infused with the essential character of our national structure, and at the same time, we reckon on doing away with . egoistic and utilitarian ideas, and establishing national morals which place prime emphasis on service to the state. We furthermore reckon on promoting the scientific spirit.

B. We calculate on establishing a new and strong political structure and bringing about a general unification of national politics.

a. Establishment of a new national organization by which officials and civilians will cooperate and be united in service to the state through their respective offices.

b. Setting up the Imperial Rule Assistance system to conform with the new political structure.

c. Fundamental reformation of administrative execution. Setting up a New Government system aimed at speed and coordination.

C. Construction of the foundations of national defense economy based upon a Japan-Manchuria-China independent economy with Japan as the nucleus.

a. Establishment of a self-sufficiency and self-supporting policy, with Japan-Manchuria and China forming a bloc, and embracing Greater East Asia.

b. Cooperation between officials and civilians in carrying out planned economy, especially for setting up a military control system for controlling consumption, distribution and production of staple materials.

c. Setting up of a financial plan and strengthening control of money circulation aimed at general economic development.

d. Reforming our foreign trade policy to meet the new world situation.

e. Setting up measures for self-support in regard to daily necessities, especially foodstuffs.

f. Epoch-making development of important industries, especially chemical and machine industries.

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h. Perfection and expansion of communication and transportation facilities to meet any new situation.

i. Setting up territorial development plans for the general development of the national strength of Japan, Manchuria and China.

4. A long-range policy shall be established for the improvement of public health and for increasing the population which is what generates the power for the execution of national policies. A fundamental policy shall be set up to secure development of agriculture and higher living standards for the farmers.

5. Resolute steps shall be taken to rectify the inequality of sacrifices (made by the people) made in the execution of our state policies. Welfare installations shall be thorough-going, the life of the people shall be improved; and a living standard for the people capable of withstanding ten years of hardships shall be secured.

THE OUTLINE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TERRITORIAL PLANNING

(Decided by the Cabinet on Sept. 24, 1940 /Showa 15/)

1. The motive underlying the plan.

To accomplish the holy task of constructing a new East Asia and to keep up with the progress of the times according to the ideals of the founding of our Empire, it is urgently necessary that we plan for a bold increase of our national strength upon the basis of a general administrative plan involving the various countries of East Asia. That is, with the object of strengthening the national defense structure throughout Japan, Manchukuo and China, it is sought to establish a plan for the all-round preservation, utilization and development of the national territory and to push forward on a control basis various policies in the current situation under a consistent guiding principle by establishing a system of territorial planning, geographically including Manchukuo and China also, taking into consideration the long future of the country, and organizing plans for the distribution of industrial communications, cultural facilities and population on an all-round basis and in accordance with the objects in their relation to the soil.

2. The classification and the application of the plan.

a. The plan for Japan, Manchukuo and China.

This is a plan for the all-round utilization and development of the three countries of Japan, Manchukuo and China, each country being a unit and men and facilities rationally distributed among them. This

This plan is to be the standard for the determination of the enterprises planned on a territorial basis by each of the countries concerned. For Japan, this shall be the standard for setting up a central plan.

b. Central Planning.

It is planning for the entire areas, including both the homeland and overseas. It is to be set up on the basis of the plan for Japan, Manchukuo and China. It is intended to project a plan for the all-round utilization and development of the country from a national standpoint which will enable each locality at home and abroad to display its special features.

This central plan is to be applied as a basis of the administration of the various government offices. It is to be directly carried out as the enterprise of the various government offices, besides serving as the



basis for setting up local plans for each local unit in Japan and the plans for the development of overseas areas.

3. Essentials for setting up the plan.

a. In view of the purpose of setting up this plan, the investigation, researches and drafting of plans on a territorial basis is to be always conducted progressively and on a unified basis from the standpoint of promoting the strengthening of the nation's all-round defense power.

b. The drafting of plans is to be made by setting a definite period to be aimed at with the object of promoting the establishment of the East Asia Co-Prospersity Sphere, including Japan, Manchukuo, China and the Southern Regions.

c. In planning, the object should be to protect and preserve the national territory; emphasis should be laid on seeking the controlled distribution of industry and population in their organic relation to the all-round communication and motive power plans and importance should be always attached to considerations of air defense.

d. As to the plan pertaining to economies, the object is to promote the acquisition and the proper interchange and distribution of necessary materials through the development, preservation and cultivation of the resources in the East Asia Co-Prospersity Sphere, and to endeavor at the same time to secure a superior position in international economy.

e. As to the plan for population, the object is to promote the reinforcement of population both in number and quality, and the proper distribution of the population according to geographical location and functions.

f. The basic investigations are intended to consolidate the investigations conducted by the different government offices and, with the cooperation of civilian quarters, properly arrange the relative data concerning both the homeland and overseas.

4. Principal matters to be planned.

a. The plan for the distribution of the economy of Japan, Manchukuo and China;

b. The plan for the distribution of manufacturing and mining;

1) The plan for the distribution of heavy chemical industries according to their classification.

II,

II) The plan for the distribution of light industries according to their classification.

III) The plan for the distribution of manufacturing districts.

IV) The plan for the development of mineral resources.

c. The plan for the distribution of agricultural, forestry, live-stock, and marine products industries.

I) The plan for agriculture

II) The plan for forestry

III) The plan for the marine products industry

d. All-round communication plan.

I) The plan for perfecting transportation and communication facilities in the homeland and overseas.

II) The plan for perfecting transportation and communication facilities in East Asia.

e. All-round plan for motive power (including fuel);

f. All-round plan for control of Natural Features and of irrigation.

g. All-round plan for population distribution.

I) Plan for the distribution of cities;

II) Plan for the distribution of population according to vocations.

III) Plan for the distribution of the population according to zones.

IV) All-round plan for emigration.

h. Plan for the distribution of cultural and welfare facilities.

i. Fundamental policy for planning for each local unit.

5. Business machinery and its operation.

a. The territorial planning shall be placed under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister, and its business shall be handled by the

Planning Board.

b. A territorial planning committee shall be established in the Cabinet by official organization to serve as a consultative body for the projection and operation of territorial plans.

c. Each government office shall take part in the projection of the territorial plans and according to its competences shall take charge of the investigations, projection and enforcement of matters which constitute the substance of the plans.

The Prime Minister may exercise supervision over the enterprises of the various government offices in so far as such supervision is necessary for the operation of the plans. Local planning shall also be supervised by the Cabinet.

d. The various councils, investigation committees and other committees established within the various government offices shall maintain, if necessary, close liaison with the territorial planning committee. The means of maintaining liaison among them shall be considered later.

e. The liaison with Manchukuo and China concerning the plan for Japan, Manchukuo and China shall be established through the government offices concerned.

f. The enforcement of the central plan overseas shall be placed under the jurisdiction of the various overseas government offices and supervised by the Ministry of Oversea Affairs (the Manchurian Affairs Bureau in the case of the Kwantung Province).

ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TERRITORIAL PLANNING

(Oral Statement by Naoki HOSHIKAWA, President of the  
Planning Board)

Published in the Papers on Sept. 24, 1940 /Showa 15/

In regard to the adoption of a plan for territorial development intended to develop the all-round national strength combining Japan, Manchukuo and China, the present Cabinet had previously taken the matter up as a fundamental national policy. Since then, the Planning Board as the nucleus, has made studies as to the method of projecting such a plan. The matter has now been adopted by the Cabinet as the Outline for the Establishment of Territorial Planning.

Now at this historic turning point in the world, it has become an urgent need of the hour to strive to form the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, with the alignment of Japan, Manchukuo and China as the axis, and Japan as its center.

For this purpose, we must establish an all-round scientific plan for Japan, Manchukuo and China in the field of industrial economy as well as communications and push forward all measures based on this plan. This is the first reason for requiring territorial planning.

On the other hand, the unlimited expansion of big cities, and the springing up of newly-risen industrial cities caused by the sudden increase in the number of factories and other factors accompanying the progress of the recent expansion of productive power are creating many problems in the fields of national health, sanitation, air-defense, transportation, etc. In the rural districts, there has arisen the problem of farms being devastated and forests laid waste, which cannot be left unattended to. Of course, studies have been made of and plans enforced individually in respect to the problems of properly deploying cities, localization of manufacturing industries, and the management of farm production on a planned basis. But, to tell the truth, the absence of appropriate all-round planning for obtaining an organic coordination between the individual plans is weakening the operating force of all these plans. The need of giving a unified objective for the various measures of the hour is the second reason why territorial planning is necessary.

Territorial planning seeks to adopt measures for meeting these needs, but the form of the plan places the highest object of the planning on the strengthening of a high degree defense structure for Japan, Manchukuo and China. This being the main object, it is intended to establish a plan for the all-round preservation, utilization and development of the territory by an over-all consideration of the plans

for the distribution of industrial, communication and cultural facilities and for the ideal distribution of population. However, by utilization and development of the territory we do not mean their utilization for merely selfish motives. Needless to say, we must start out with the spirit of love for our territory and project all plans with the ideal of perfecting our territory.

The plans will be divided into two main classes, one pertaining to the three countries of Japan, Manchukuo and China, combined, and the other concerning Japanese possessions. In order to carry out these two plans, studies must be extended even to the most fundamental problem of deciding the maximum population capacity and the limit of self-sufficiency in foodstuffs of Japan Proper. Also, the plan must be extended to such concrete problems as the distribution and formation of industrial districts, and their relation to the source of motive power, water supply, labour and various kinds of communication facilities.

The business of territorial planning is expected to become wider and wider, and more and more varied as the planning progresses. In regard to this, we hope to project a definitive plan with the cooperation of Manchukuo and China and also with the cooperation of the knowledge, experience, and insight of the public at large.

OUTLINE FOR THE ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION OF JAPAN, MANCHUKUO  
AND CHINA

Decided by the Cabinet on Oct. 3, 1940 /Showa 15/

In order to achieve in concrete form the Empire's mission of establishing a new order in East Asia and securing the eternal peace of the world, it is necessary to push ahead in comprehensive unity the process of internal reformation and the process of expanding and organizing our living sphere, thereby speedily perfecting a defense state. Therefore it is necessary to establish the basic economic policies of the Empire on a comprehensive planning for the following three big processes:

1. The perfection of the Reorganization of the national economy.
2. Strengthening the organization of our sphere of self-sufficiency.
3. The expanding organization of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Probably in order to expand and organize our living sphere, it is necessary to strengthen and expand the comprehensive fusion of the politics, culture and economies of Japan, Manchukuo, North China, Meng-chiang and their advance points, namely the specified islands along the South China Coast, which form a unified organic sphere of independent existence. At the same time it is necessary to establish an East Asiatic Co-Prosperity Sphere embracing Central and South China, Southwestern Asia and the various areas of the Southern Region in order to promote and assist the perfection of our defense economy.

As to the means of applying our economic policies, it is necessary to devise special measures adapted to the scale of living conditions of the respective peoples, while adjusting the fundamental policy on the fusion of our country with the other states or areas and peoples within our living sphere.

1. The fundamental policy

1. The object of the economic construction of Japan, Manchukuo and China is generally to establish a self-sufficient economic structure for Japan, Manchukuo and China as a single unit by about 1950, and at the same time promote the construction of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, thereby strengthening and securing a position in world economy.
2. The guiding spirit of the economic construction of Japan, Manchukuo and China is to establish a defense economy and promote co-existence and co-prosperity and the welfare of the people at large through the unified collaboration of Japan, Manchukuo and China, with Japan as the center, in accordance with the spirit of "hakko ichiu" /"universal brotherhood"/.

3. Japan, in view of its position as driving force for the economic construction of Japan, Manchukuo and China shall enhance her national spirit, reform her internal structure, and try to increase her national strength, thereby guiding and rearing the economic construction of Manchukuo and China, especially promoting an epoch-making development of science and technology and also the development of pioneering industries.

4. Manchukuo, while further strengthening its inseparable relation with our country, shall make the establishment of a self-existent sphere its main objective and promote the speedy adjustment and development of important basic industries.

5. China shall cooperate with Japan and Manchukuo to develop her resources and rehabilitate her economy. North China and Mongchiang shall develop communications and important industries with the main object of establishing a self-existent sphere. Central and South China shall lay stress on the smooth exchange of goods and the development of important resources, and thereby contribute to the establishment of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. However, special efforts shall be made to develop such special islands as Hainan Island, along the South China Coast as the advanced posts of our self-existent sphere.

6. Efforts shall be made to secure a systematic joint storage of defense materials within our self-existent sphere and thereby preserve our national defense power.

7. In order to adjust and promote the prosecution of the plan for the comprehensive economic construction of Japan, Manchukuo, and China, the machinery for the all-round economic planning for Japan, Manchukuo and China shall be perfected.

## II Policies for different branches

The fundamental policies concerning the measures for industrial distribution, labor, finance, trade, communications, etc., have been roughly decided as follows:

### 1. Industrial Distribution:

Hereafter our country shall lay stress on and promote an epoch-making development of

a) the precision tool, machine tool, and munition industries.

The other heavy industries, chemical and mining industries shall be developed within our self-existent sphere according to the principle of "the right industry in the right place."

The light industries, particularly the textile industry and miscellaneous industries, shall be adjusted on a planned basis and transferred one after another to the continent, at the same time consideration shall be given to the transfer of their ownership to continental capital.

In regard to agriculture, the land system shall be reformed, management shall be reformed on a scientific basis, the security and advancement of farmers shall be promoted, the staple diet of the people shall be secured, and the farm population shall be maintained at a fixed number.

The marine products industry shall be developed more and more to maintain first place in the world as heretofore.

Forestry administration shall be unified and reformed and the rational utilization and preservation of forest resources shall be promoted.

b. Manchukuo shall strive to effect the epoch-making development of mining and electrical enterprises in particular and, in accordance with the principle of the "right industry in the right place" between Japan and Manchukuo, try to promote heavy and chemical industries, besides supplying to Japan a part of the raw materials for heavy industries. Machine and munition industries shall be developed as far as they are necessary to fill the demands of national defense.

Light industries shall be promoted to fill domestic requirements.

In regard to agriculture, Manchukuo, in view of position as the supply base of food and fodder for Japan, Manchukuo, and China and the source of special agricultural resources for the world shall develop farmlands, improve and rationalize farming technique, and drastically increase its agricultural productions.

In the development of agriculture, colonization of Japanese immigrants shall be promoted to make them the kernel of agricultural development.

Salt manufacturing, live-stock breeding, and forestry shall be promoted actively along with the foregoing.

c. China shall hereafter try its best to effect an epoch-making development of the mining and salt manufacturing industries, produce industrial raw materials on a large scale and contribute to the establishment of the basis for the economic construction of Japan and Manchukuo. At the same time China shall construct a number of the heavy and chemical



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industries, in accordance with the principle of the "right industry at the right place", thereby reinforcing Japan and Manchukuo's industries.

In respect to light industries, mutual adjustment shall be made in accordance with the stages of the development of the industries in Japan and their development fostered principally through native capital.

As to agriculture, special efforts shall be made to perfect the basic facilities to improve and rationalize agricultural management in order to secure the staple diet of the people and also increase the production of cotton and other basic products.

## 2). Labor.

In view of the importance of the people's labor and the position of the productive nature of technology in the national defense economy, a drastic reform shall be made in the structure of labor technique. At the same time a labor plan for Japan, Manchukuo and China shall be established and a geographical control and redistribution made on the basis of inter-racial cooperation.

a) Japan shall establish a new system of labor technique, and try to train the workers' mind and body, promote scientific education, increase the productivity of labor and train technicians and skilled workers. At the same time guidance and assistance shall be given for the economic construction of Manchukuo and China.

b) Japan will provide Manchukuo with technical experts and skilled workers necessary to develop her industries, besides establishing a system for their training in Manchukuo itself. The colonization of Japanese and Koreans on a planned basis shall be promoted. As to common laborers, the immigration into Manchukuo of laborers from North China on a planned basis shall be promoted, besides the adoption of measures for supplementing laborers from within the country. Efforts shall be made to effect reforms in labor management in the mining and manufacturing industries especially.

c) China shall obtain from Japan technical experts and skilled workers necessary for her industrial development and economic rehabilitation, besides making efforts to train them in her own country.

As to general laborers, measures for their stabilization and advancement shall be adopted. At the same time laborers necessary for the industrial development of Manchukuo shall be supplied.

## 3. Finance.

For the attainment of a national defense economy a change in financial ideology shall be effected so as to aim principally at making

it possible to secure both the quality and quantity of materials necessary to the state, instead of placing the basis of finance merely on the certainty of withdrawal of money from circulation.

a) According to the industrial plan for Japan, Manchukuo and China, a financial plan to enable its enforcement shall be established, and a financial machinery for carrying it out shall be perfected.

b) In view of the necessity for the conversion of the facilities of many enterprises consequent upon the progress of technology and the division of industries and also in order to cope with the systematic joint storage of defense materials, the financial system shall be perfected.

c) Funds shall, as a rule, be obtained from the savings of the three nations. For this purpose, measures shall be adopted to promote increased savings and their employment in each country. However, for the time being, the funds for the repletion of defense productive power shall be supplied by Japan. Moreover, in so far as it is not contrary to the purpose of establishing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, measures shall be adopted to promote the use of foreign capital.

d) As to foreign exchange, the aim of control shall be to ensure the acquisition of defense materials from abroad, instead of placing emphasis merely on the economization of foreign payments. Measures shall be taken to utilize foreign exchange funds jointly between Japan and Manchukuo and also as comprehensively as possible in regard to China too. Furthermore, measures shall be adopted to make Japan the center of finance and settlements for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

e) Japan, Manchukuo, and China shall cooperate with each other for making the <sup>necessary</sup> international settlements and strengthen the mutual relationship of the economy of the three countries.

f) In regard to the monetary system of China, Japan shall maintain, as a rule, its leadership and take proper steps to cope with the changing situations.

#### 4. Trade.

The past ideology of commercial trade shall be changed, a trade policy based on the principle of productive economy embracing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, with Japan as its center, shall be established, and its position in world economy secured.

a) A smooth, certain, active, preferential interchange of mutually necessary goods between Japan, Manchukuo and China shall be fostered.

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a) A smooth, certain, active, preferential interchange of mutually necessary goods between Japan, Manchukuo and China shall be fostered.

b). In the relations with third countries, or other groups, Japan, Manchukuo and China, as one body, shall establish trade of goods, country by country, or group by group, ensure the acquisition of goods necessary for the production of the three countries and distribute and adjust the goods among themselves.

c) In relations with the areas of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere other than Japan, Manchukuo and China, trade agreements with the object of mutually supplying each other with the necessary goods on a preferential basis shall be concluded and guidance given to put them in a position of inseparable relationship with Japan, Manchukuo, and China.

#### 5. Communications.

In order to foster the consolidation of the economy of Japan, Manchukuo and China, and to make it conform with the requirements of national defense, the shipping, ports and harbours and railways shall be perfected and expanded to effect an epoch-making development of the transportation and communications among the three countries. At the same time the organic coordination of overland and marine transportation facilities shall be promoted and measures adopted to effect unified control and coordination of airways, and the perfection and expansion of electric communication and radio broadcasting facilities. Moreover, an epoch-making expansion of communication facilities on the continent shall be effected.

a) Japan shall fulfil the mission of leadership in communications among Japan, Manchukuo and China, <sup>and also</sup> occupy an unquestioned superiority in the shipping of East Asia. Furthermore, she shall strive to effect an epoch-making increase of Japanese shipping in order to create world-wide developments.

b) In Manchukuo a rapid expansion of transportation and communication facilities shall be fostered from the viewpoints of national defense and fostering industrial development plans.

c) For the purpose of fostering economic rehabilitation and industrial development, China shall do her best to expand transportation and communication facilities, as well as to develop inland water transportation. As to transportation and communications in North China and Mengchiang, specially close connection shall be maintained with Japan and Manchukuo from the viewpoint of national defense, and their rapid expansion promoted.

d) In order to secure an independent position for the transportation and communication of East Asia, efforts shall be made to gradually bring foreign rights and interests under our influence.

PREAMBLE

(Draft Published in the Papers)

Japan's great policy of establishing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, with the view to constructing a new world order has entered a new stage as the result of the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy. In order to cope with this situation, the Government decided at the Cabinet meeting the other day on "the Outline of the Economic Construction of Japan, Manchukuo and China" as one of the basic economic policies, and also decided to consolidate the measures under this policy.

The object of the policy is to plan the epoch-making advance of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere which has as its basis the development of Japan, Manchukuo and China in accordance with the new concept of economic order.

The world economy of free trade based on the free exchange of goods by each country, like the old order, is now collapsing before our eyes.

Japan's economy, too, must cast off the old system based on this old order, and effect a new organization. By this reorganization, we must make Japanese economy higher and wider and stronger than what it has been, and thereby bring about the advancement of the life of the various races of East Asia and guide them to a proper place in the world. By "higher" we mean to give a further higher productivity to the people's living power. By "wider" we mean to expand the economic sphere of mutual interdependence from Japan, Manchukuo and China to the Greater East Asia and to establish a solid co-prosperity sphere. By "stronger" we mean to reduce to the minimum the dependence of Japan's economy on foreign countries and to maintain a staying power unshakable under all adversities.

In order to make our economy thus higher, wider, and stronger, we must, with a firm will, overcome internally the agonies attendant on reforms and also eliminate whatever oppression and threats may come from external sources, by concentrating the total strength of the people, and in about ten years hence complete a new order of East Asian economy, of which Japan is the leader.

It is within this order that the economy of the various countries of East Asia, not to speak of Manchukuo and China, can expect to achieve a glorious advancement and development.

THE MAIN POINTS OF THE OUTLINE FOR THE ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION  
OF JAPAN, MANCHUKUO AND CHINA

In order to establish a new order in East Asia, and fulfil concretely Japan's mission to secure eternal peace in the world, it is necessary to push forward in comprehensive unity the process of reorganizing the internal structure and the process of expanding and organizing our living sphere. It follows that the basic economic policies of Japan must be built on the <sup>comprehensive</sup> planning of the following big three processes:

- 1) The completion of the reorganization of national economy
- 2) The organization and strengthening of the economy of Japan, Manchukuo and China.
- 3) The expansion and organization of the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Basic policies

1. The aim of the economic construction of Japan, Manchukuo and China is generally to establish a self-sufficient economy of the three countries combined during the next ten years and also to promote the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, thereby strengthening and establishing the position of East Asia in the world economy.
2. Japan's guiding spirit concerning the economic construction of Japan, Manchukuo and China is to promote the co-existence and co-prosperity and the general welfare of the three countries by their unified cooperation based on the great spirit of "hakko ichiu."
3. In order to promote the economic construction of Japan, Manchukuo and China, Japan shall exalt the people's morale, reform the internal structure, increase the national strength, and lend assistance for the economic construction of Manchukuo and China. For these purposes, Japan shall especially promote an epoch-making development of science and technology and the development of pioneering industries.
4. Manchukuo, which has an inseparable relation with Japan, is expected to rapidly perfect and develop important basic industries.
5. China is expected to cooperate with Japan and Manchukuo, to develop her resources, rehabilitate her economy, especially promoting the development of communications, smooth exchange of goods, and the development of important industries and resources, and to contribute

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to the establishment of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

6. In order to adjust and promote the planning of a comprehensive economic construction of Japan, Manchukuo and China, the machinery for the comprehensive economic planning for Japan, Manchukuo and China shall be perfected.

As Japan, Manchukuo and China constitute the basic trunk of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, they have the duty of regulating their economic relations on the basis of a very close combination. It was from this point of view that the Government decided the basic policies on industrial distribution, labor, finance, trade and communications of Japan, Manchukuo and China.

#### Industrial distribution:

In deciding industrial distribution, it is important to make comprehensive decisions by taking Japan, Manchukuo and China as a truly organic unified body, with due consideration for the economic and geographical conditions and the stage of economic development of each of the three countries involved.

It is important for Japan to promote hereafter an epoch-making development of the high precision and machine industry and also to develop extensively the basic industries such as heavy, chemical and mineral industries.

In Manchukuo the mining and electric industries are expected to make epoch-making developments, while Japan will lend necessary assistance for the development of the heavy and chemical industries. In China a large production of industrial raw materials through the development of mining and salt manufacturing industries is expected hereafter. The development of heavy and chemical industries is also expected hereafter since there is room for such a development from the viewpoint of geographical and economic conditions.

The need for greatly fostering the development of light industries on the continent is recognized. There is also need to consider the gradual readjustment and the transfer to the continent of the light industries of Japan, especially the textile and miscellaneous industries.

As to Japanese agriculture, it is intended to improve the various land systems, reform management, promote the stabilization and advancement of farmers, and to secure the people's main diet, as well as to maintain the farm population at a certain fixed figure. As to the marine products industry, its further development shall be fostered. The rational utilization and preservation of forest resources shall be also fostered.

In view of the fact that Manchukuo is the food and fodder supply base for Japan, Manchukuo, and China and also the world's source of supply for special agricultural products, a drastic increase of agricultural production in Manchukuo is expected. Moreover, in developing agriculture, the colonization of Japanese agricultural pioneers shall be promoted. In Chinese agriculture it is necessary to make efforts to secure the staple diet of the people and to increase the production of cotton and other staple products.

#### Labor.

In order to secure a superior position in world economy, the position of the people's labor and technique becomes more and more important. For this purpose it is necessary to effect a great reform in the Japanese labor and technical systems. In order to maintain also the superior position of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in world economy, each country and each area must consider how to contribute its labour power to the advancement of the whole sphere.

For this purpose, Japan intends to arrange new labour and technical systems, try hard to build up the mental and physical welfare of the laborers, make scientific education universal, increase the productive efficiency of labour, and to train technicians and skilled workers, and attain the object of lending necessary assistance for the economic construction of Manchukuo and China.

That is, Japan will offer to Manchukuo and China good technical experts and skilled workers necessary for industrial development and economic rehabilitation. In view of the importance of technology it is of course necessary for the two countries to train technicians and skilled workers themselves. It is thought necessary for Manchukuo to promote the immigration and settlement of laborers from North China on a planned basis, as well as to adopt measures for supplementing labor from within the country and try to reform labor management in the mining and manufacturing industries.

#### Finance.

In order to promote the construction of a national defense economy, the function of finance, too, naturally must have a national object, which is to make possible the acquisition of both the quality and quantity of goods required by the country. In order to make possible the enforcement of an industrial plan for Japan, Manchukuo and China, it is necessary to possess a financial organ capable of deciding the distribution of funds on a planned basis and of carrying it out. It is also felt necessary to perfect a financial organization capable of coping with the conversion of industrial facilities attendant on technical progress and the establishment of industrial distributions, or capable of storing important materials.

It is a matter of course that the funds needed by Japan, Manchukuo and China must depend upon accumulated savings of the three countries.

For this purpose the three countries must adopt measures to increase savings and make active use of them.

The funds necessary for the development of important industries in Manchukuo and China shall be provided by Japan.

Along with the furtherance of the economic relations between Japan, Manchukuo and China, a relation of mutual assistance between the three countries in respect to international settlement of accounts should be established.

#### Trade.

As to trade in the new order of world economy, it is necessary to make considerable modifications to the purely commercial trade principle of the past. In place of this principle, it is necessary to have productive trade, that is, in order to acquire materials necessary for one's own planned production from other countries, other areas and other spheres, it is necessary to supply materials that others need. Japan, Manchukuo and China, of course, as well as the other areas of the Co-Prosperity Sphere should regulate trade under an inseparable relationship of mutual assistance. In doing so, a special payment agreement between Japan, Manchukuo, China and other areas of the Co-Prosperity Sphere becomes necessary in order to promote the exchange of goods among them.

#### Communications.

With the closer exchange of materials between Japan, Manchukuo, China and other areas of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, and in order to assure the security of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, it is necessary to regulate and operate the communications between the three nations on a comprehensive planned basis. For this purpose, we must foster the connection between overland and water transportation, promote a drastic increase of shipping, the control and interdependence of airways, and the perfection and expansion of electric communication facilities of the three countries.

OUTLINE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW LABOR STRUCTURE

(Decided at the Cabinet Meeting of Nov. 8, 1940 / Showa 15/

In view of the fact that the completion and heightening of national labour is the basis for the completion of a high degree national defense structure and the enhancement of national productive power, it is intended to establish a new labour system for the purpose of achieving labour mobilization by enabling all workers to display their originality and ability to the fullest extent and also by promoting the training of workers and their proper distribution.

For this purpose a spirit of labour shall be established, a labour organization and combined labour organizations in the enterprise management body, which is an organic composite of capital, management and labour, shall be established and the administrative organization shall be perfected.

1). Establishment of Labor Spirit:

Labor shall embody comprehensively and completely its national character, personality and productivity as the war service activity of the people of the Empire.

Therefore, a labour spirit shall be established on the basis that labour is the people's responsibility to the country and at the same time an honour, that each and everyone should display the fullest capacity in his own position, that labour should conform to order, be obedient and display by cooperation the overall efficiency of industry, and that labour should be creative and voluntary as the manifestation of the whole personality.

2). Establishment of a labour system in each operative unit.

The labour system in each operative unit shall be organized in accordance with the following main points:

a. All the workers belonging to the operative body shall be organized as a special corporate organization with the enterprise operator as the leader.

b. The component members shall display the highest degree of productivity by cooperating as a single body according to the functions of each. Moreover, with the object of establishing labour spirit, promoting the workers welfare and cultivating

the foundation of labour, they shall undertake enterprises necessary for achieving these objectives.

c. An organ will be established for making the will of the higher authorities known to the lower ranks and vice versa in respect to improving production, promoting welfare and other matters on labour, and also the necessary organs for making special studies of these matters and fostering their application.

d. If it is not proper to set up this type of organization in medium or minor operative bodies, a single labor organization shall be formed comprising all the workers within a specified district or those employed by operators engaged in the same line of business in a specified district.

e. This labor organization shall be set up not only in manufacturing mining and transportation industries but also in commercial and other industries so as to cover all industries as far as possible.

3). Establishment of Combined Labor Organizations.

Combined labor organizations shall be set up according to the following main points:

a. A combined national labour organization shall be organized by the various unit labour organizations throughout the country. A combined local labor organization shall be organized by the various unit labor organizations within a certain area.

The combined local labor organization may set up branches in various parts of the district, if necessary.

In the case of those engaged in ocean transportation, a labour organization shall be organized in accordance with the actual circumstances and admitted into membership of the national labour organization.

b. The combined labour organization shall be a special public corporate organization charged with the guidance and supervision of the unit labour organizations and the subordinate combined labour organizations.

c. National and local combined labor organizations and their local branches shall, if necessary, establish national committees, according to different types of industry as organs of activity.

d. The national labour organization shall have a central headquarters to carry on, as an auxiliary organ of the Government, occupational conversion, the adjustment of the demand for and supply of labour and other labour controls, besides training leaders studying

and guiding basic studies on methods of increasing efficiency, and the all-round enforcement of welfare enterprises.

e. Combined local labor organization shall, besides correspondingly carry on enterprises in accordance with the preceding paragraph mediate disputes and conduct special youth training.

f. Sectional meetings according to different types of industry may, besides making researches, investigations, and plans for special problems concerning the industries concerned, carry on, if necessary, enterprises by establishing special accounts.

4). Relation between the combined labor organization and other organizations,

a. The various existing organizations whose objects are to make researches and investigations and give guidance concerning labour, shall be amalgamated into the combined labour organization so far as possible.

b. In the government enterprises also, labour organization shall be organized and act in concert with the combined labour organizations.

c. As to agriculture, agricultural associations shall be regarded as the agricultural labour organization, which shall have generally the following relations with the combined labour organization:

1. Labour Control shall be enforced in close cooperation according to an all-round plan.

2. In respect to matters relating to welfare and other enterprises where it is felt proper to embrace farm workers, they shall be carried out as one body.

3. Proper measures shall be taken in regard to the alternate assignment of officers and the establishment of permanent liaison organs, etc.

5. Administrative Machinery.

Labour administrative machinery shall be reformed to conform with the new labour system.

6. Overseas system.

Insofar as the conditions permit, the present outline shall be correspondingly applied in the overseas areas.

THE CONTENTS OF THE OUTLINE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF  
THE NEW LABOUR SYSTEM

1. Fundamental Policy.

In order to complete a national defense state and display the productive power to the highest extent a new labour system for enabling workers to display their originality and ability as one cooperative body in their respective occupations within the operative body and also for promoting the establishment of the position of labour and training and distribution on a planned basis.

For this purpose, it is necessary to establish (1) a labour spirit in a national defense state, (2) labour organization in a unit operative organization and (3) a labour control system conforming with the new national economic system, and (4) to perfect the administrative machinery.

2. Establishment of Labour Spirit in a National Defense State.

Labour in a national defense state should not be regarded as a materialistic means of the people's life. Its national character, personality, and productivity should be thoroughly realized as the service activity of the people. Therefore, labour in a national defense state should be practiced on the basis of the following spirit:

1. Labour should be the people's responsibility to the Empire and an honour for them.

2. Labour should be displayed at the highest efficiency in each individual's performance of his duties.

3. Labour should display overall efficiency by attention to order and by cooperation.

4. Labour should be creative and voluntary as the manifestation of one's whole personality.

3. Establishment of a new labour organization.

1. Labour organization in a Unit Operative Body:

A. Nature.

a. It shall be a corporate body embracing the entire personnel of the operative body under the premise of giving the actual operative body the predominant position in enterprises where capital occupied a superior position.

b. The objects of this organization shall be to foster the display of the highest degree of productivity by its members through cooperation as one body in performing their respective

duties within the operative body, and to increase their welfare and to raise and cultivate the basis of labour.

c. This organization shall be an organization of leadership supervised by leaders.

d. This organization shall be a special juridical body bearing a public character.

13. Structures:

a. Members -

The entire personnel of the operative body, including operators, technicians, office personnel, and the general laborers, shall comprise the membership of this organization.

b. Supreme leader -

The operator shall be the supreme leader of this organization.

c. Pivotal organs -

1. Cooperative council.

a. A cooperative council shall be organized according to the size of the enterprise.

b. The supreme leader shall be the chairman of the supreme cooperative council.

The members of the supreme cooperative council shall be nominated by the supreme leader. Among them about one-half shall be nominated from those recommended by the workshops.

c. The composition of lower rank cooperative council shall be organized correspondingly as above.

d. The lowest rank cooperative council shall be composed of the entire personnel.

e. The constituent membership of each cooperative council shall be from 10 to 30.

2. Pivotal body -

a. The supreme leader or a person nominated by him shall be the head of the pivotal body.



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e. The constituent membership of each cooperative council shall be from 10 to 30.

2. Pivotal body -

a. The supreme leader or a person nominated by him shall be the head of the pivotal body.

b. The supreme leader shall nominate as its constituent members capable elements from the various branches of the enterprises.

c. The following divisions shall be generally set up within the pivotal body:

Research Division, Training Division, and Welfare Division.

3. Young men's unit -

A. Young men's unit shall be organized by persons from 15 to 25 years of age.

B. The chief of the training division of the pivotal body shall serve as the director of the young men's unit.

C. Functions -

a. Labour Organization Body.

1. To carry out the enhancement of a patriotic labour spirit and other matters concerning education and training.

2. To study, plan, and put into practice matters concerning the improvement of productivity.

3. To study, plan, and foster matters concerning the perfection of all labor conditions.

4. To carry out matters concerning the welfare and culture of laborers.

5. To have matters concerning cooperation with national policies put into practice.

6. To put into practice other matters legally ordered.

b. The supreme leader.

The supreme leader shall give the highest guidance and decisions with full responsibility in regard to all matters for the improvement of productivity and the promotion of welfare.

c. Cooperative council.

1. To assist the leaders by making known to the

upper ranks the will of the lower rank, and vice versa, in regard to the improvement of productivity and the promotion of welfare based on the concentration and exaltation of the cooperative body consciousness.

2. Meetings shall be conducted in the form of round table discussions and presided over by the chairman of the council.

3. The matters for discussion shall cover all matters concerning labour such as the thorough inculcation of the patriotic labour service spirit, education and training, improvement of skill, improvement of operational process control, perfection of various labour conditions, welfare and mutual relief, and renovation of living conditions.

d. Pivotal body.

1. To assist the leaders by fostering professional researches, planning, and putting into practice of measures for improving productivity and promoting welfare, and to take charge of the business of the labour organization.

2. The matters to be performed by each division of the pivotal body are generally as follows:

a. Research Division

Improvement of skill, control of operational processes, environmental conditions surrounding work operations, prevention of poor quality goods, salaries and wages, and working hours.

b. Training Division.

The thorough inculcation of the patriotic labour spirit, training in observing rules, physical education, training, young men's unit, labour service, etc.

c. Welfare Division.

Health and sanitation, welfare and mutual relief, renovation of living conditions, home front activities, and personal affairs consultations.

c. Young men's unit.

1. To give special training for the cultivation and training of mind and body, the acquisition of skill, group discipline, etc.

2. To serve as the venue for bringing about the new production system.

D. 1). Exceptions to the Unit Labor Organization.

a. In the case of small and small operative bodies, a single labor organization may be organized, comprising the entire operators and employees within a specified district or in the same kind of enterprises within a specified district.

b. The composition, functions, etc., of this labor organization shall be generally the same as described above.

2). Organization of Labor Control.

A. Character.

a. A labor control organization shall be the guidance of control organization for unit labor organizations or subordinate labor control organizations.

b. A labor control organization shall be a public judicial body composed of unit labor organizations as its constituent units.

c. A labor control organization shall be an organization of leaders superintended by leaders.

B. Form of organization.

a. A national labor control organization shall be organized by all of the unit labor organizations.

b. Local labor control organizations shall be organized by the unit labor organizations of a certain fixed district (prefectures as a rule).

Local labor control organizations may establish, if necessary, district labor control organs as their branches.

c. National and local labor control organizations and their district branches may, if necessary, establish sectional committees, according to the types of industry to serve as an organ of activity.

d. In regard to the marine transportation business, as exceptions, labor control organizations organized by unit labor organizations of the operative bodies or by local labor organizations (or individuals) in the case where unit labour organizations cannot be organized, shall constitute the constituent unit of the national labour control organization.

C. Organ.

a. National Labour Control Organization.

This organization shall have a central headquarters, a chief of organization, a director-general, directors, councillors and trustees. There shall be a board of directors, a board of trustees, a secretariat, and sectional committee for each industry.

In addition, a president, advisors and other officers may be installed.

1. The chief of the organization shall superintend the business of the organization. He shall be nominated by the Minister of State.
2. The director-general shall superintend the business of the central headquarters.

He shall be nominated by the chief of the organization from among the members of the political pivotal body.

3. The directors shall take charge of the business of the central headquarters.

They shall be nominated by the chief of the organization from among the executive staff of the labour organizations, government officials concerned, or men of high scholarship and experiences.

4. The councillors shall take part in the organization's business.

They shall be commissioned by the chief of the organization from among government officials concerned.

or men of high scholarship and experience.

5. The trustees shall be members of the board of trustees.

They shall be nominated by the chief of the organization from among the executive officers of the labor control organizations or the unit labor organizations.

6. The board of directors shall be composed of the chief of the organization (chairman), the director-general, and the directors, and deliberate on important matters.

7. The board of trustees shall be composed of the chief of the organization (chairman) and the trustees, and deliberate on the budget, account settlement, planning of enterprises, and other important matters.

8. The secretariat shall be divided into the following divisions and superintended by the director-general. The chiefs of the divisions shall be nominated by the chief of the organization from among the directors.

General Affairs Division  
Organization Division  
Labor Control Division  
Research Division  
Training Division  
Welfare Division  
Youth Division

Besides the above, a research and investigation organ shall be established and superintended by the director-general.

9. Sectional committees for shipping, commerce, mining, metal manufacturing and machine industries and for others shall be established as the occasion demands.

The sectional committees for the various types of industry shall be superintended by the director-general and each of them shall deliberate on important matters for each industry.

The members of each sectional committee shall be nominated by the chief of the organization from among the leaders of the labor organizations for each industry or government officials concerned, and persons of high scholarship and experience.

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5. The trustees shall be members of the board of trustees.

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F. Local Labor Control Organizations.

The local labor control organization shall have a president, councillors, a director-general, directors and trustees. There shall be a board of directors, a board of trustees, a secretariat, and sectional committees for the various types of industry. Besides the above, other necessary office posts may be created.

1. The president shall superintend the business of the local labor control organization.

He shall be nominated by the prefectural governor (or a person holding a similar post) or by the chief of the organization on the recommendation of the prefectural governor.

2. The councillors shall take part in the business of the organization.

They shall be commissioned by the president from among the government officials concerned, or persons of high scholarship and experience.

3. The director-general and the directors shall take charge of the execution of business.

They shall be nominated by the president from among the executive officers of the unit labor organizations, government officials concerned, or persons of high scholarship and experience.

4. The trustees shall be members of the board of trustees.

They shall be nominated by the president from among the executive officers of the unit labor organizations.

5. The board of directors shall be composed of the president (chairman), the director-general, and the directors, and shall deliberate on important business affairs.

6. The board of trustees shall be composed of the president (chairman) and the trustees, and shall deliberate on the budget, account settlement, business planning, and other important matters.

7. The secretariat shall be divided into the following divisions and superintended by the director general. The chiefs of the divisions shall be nominated by the president from among the directors.

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Welfare Division  
Youth Division

8. Sectional committees for the various types of industry shall be established as the occasion demands.

The sectional committees shall be superintended by the president and each shall deliberate on important matters for each industry.

The members of the sectional committees shall be nominated by the president from among the executive officers of the unit labor organizations, or government officials concerned and persons of high scholarship and experience.

c) The organs of the district branches shall be generally similar to those of the local labor control organization.

D. Functions and enterprises.

a) Central headquarters:

Essential points as follows:

1. Superintendency and guidance of the subordinate control organizations and unit labor organizations.
2. Guidance for the thorough inculcation of patriotic labour spirit and the training of leaders.
3. Basic study of and guidance for the improvement of skill, control of manufacturing processes, labour management, and the training of skilled workers.
4. Planning, guiding and comprehensive execution of welfare enterprises.
5. Planning, guiding and execution of systematic activity, reorganization of occupations and counter-measures for the unemployed and those who have changed their business.

6. Labor control (control of demand and supply, and regulation of salaries and wages, etc.) as a proxy agent of the government.

7. Making reports and representations, and filing data with the government.

8. Liaison with the government, the pivotal political body, and the central economic and cultural headquarters.

b) Local labor control organizations

Apart from the following matters, essential points are in general the same as those of the central headquarters, but stress shall be laid especially on the establishment of facilities and the execution of enterprises.

1. Mediation of disputes.

2. Special training of youth.

c) District branches

Essential points are in general the same as those of the local labor control organizations, but in particular they shall carry out such joint enterprises as research committee work for technical skill, distribution of essential foodstuffs, dormitories, welfare halls, personal affairs consultation bureaus, etc. in accordance with actual conditions in the district concerned.

d) Sectional committees according to types of industry.

Essential points as follows:

1. A systematic liaison with the sectional committee for the same industry.

2. Making reports and representations and filing data concerning the branch of industry concerned.

3. Research, investigation and planning in regard to special problems of the branch of industry concerned. The sectional committees may, if necessary, establish special accounts and carry out enterprises.

e) Unification of the various organizations concerning labour.

The various existing organizations concerning labour shall be generally amalgamated with the national or local labor control organization.

f) Relation to agricultural workers

No agricultural labor organization shall be specially established. Agricultural organizations shall be regarded as agricultural labor organizations and a labour section shall be established within them.

The relation between the two organizations shall be generally as follows:

1. Labor control shall be enforced in close cooperation according to an all-round plan.
2. In respect of matters relating to welfare and other enterprises where it is felt proper to embrace farm workers, they shall be carried out as one body.
3. Proper measures shall be taken in regard to the alternate assignment of officers and the establishment of permanent liaison organs, etc.

g.) Relation to the labor organization of Government enterprises.

Labour organizations shall be also organized for the government enterprises, similar to what has been described for unit operative bodies. These organizations shall maintain close connection with the various labour control organizations and act as one body.

For this purpose, the government officials concerned shall be made officers of the labor control organization. In regard to other matters, the provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) under the "Relation to Agricultural Organizations" shall correspondingly apply.

h.) Relation to the New Economic System.

In order to promote close connection between the new economic organizations and the labor control organizations, a permanent liaison organ shall be set up. If necessary, officers shall be assigned alternately to them both.

IV. Administrative Machinery

- A) The labor administrative machinery shall be reformed so as to conform with the new labour structure.
- B) A labour officer system shall be established
  - a) The labour officers shall exclusively exercise a part of the supervisory rights of the administrative offices in regard to permissions, authorizations and dispositions.

b) They shall be given the right of decision in settling disputes.

In this case, a consultative organ shall be established.

c) They shall be vested with the right to take part in the nomination of the officers of the unit labor organizations.

d) Assistants shall be nominated from among the officers of the labor control organizations to take charge of guidance and superintendence as assistants to the labour officers.

Outline for the establishment of  
a new labour structure

(Published in the papers 8 November 1940)

Translator's note:

/The translation of this outline is omitted herefrom because it is identical with the outline on pages 35-38, decided by the cabinet on 8 November 1940.--TN/

Outline for the establishment of  
a new economic structure

(Decided by the Cabinet on Dec. 7, 1940) / Showa 15/

I. Basic Policy

It is intended to establish a self-sufficient co-prosperity sphere embracing Greater East Asia, linking Japan, Manchukuo, and China, to secure an independent national defense economy based on the resources found within the sphere, and to carry out an all-round planned economy centering around important industries, with the cooperation of the government and the people, thereby coping with the current situation and contributing to the completion of a national defense state structure. It is aimed thereby to promote the completion of armaments, the stabilization of the people's life and the everlasting prosperity of the national economy.

For this purpose it is necessary to achieve the object of a high degree defense by (1) establishing an industrial structure and making enterprises, which constitute an organic unity of capital, management, and labour, effect independent management on the initiative and responsibility of the operators, as a component part of the national economy under comprehensive planning by the state, and increasing production through the display of the highest efficiency, and by guiding the national economy in accordance with the principle of "public interest first" and "service through one's own work," and making the national economy display the overall strength of the nation as an organic unity by organizing economic organizations.

In carrying out this outline, in view of the current situation, stress shall be laid on the urgent points, which shall be carried out one after another as the occasion demands, without causing decrease of production, unsatisfactory distribution of goods, or uneasiness in the minds of the people. Moreover, in conformity with the perfection of this structure, the administrative structure concerned and its business shall be reorganized.

II. Industrial structure

Production shall be maintained and increased by establishing an industrial structure and making each enterprise manage itself according to national objective and on its own initiative and responsibility.

(1) Enterprises shall be operated privately in principle. State management and management by national policy companies shall be limited to special cases.

(2) Restrictions shall be made, as the occasion demands, on the establishment, etc. of enterprises according to a certain fixed standard depending upon their nature.

(3) Enterprises may be separated or combined from the viewpoint of production planning and technique according to a certain fixed standard depending upon the nature of the enterprises.

(4) Medium and small enterprises shall be maintained and protected. If their maintenance is difficult, they shall be adjusted and unified voluntarily and assisted in making smooth transfers.

(5) Proper guidance and control shall be effected for enterprises in order to make them contribute to the increasing of national production and also to make continual development.

(a) In deciding the official prices of important materials, just profits shall be computed on the basis of moderate production costs.

(b) The growth of speculative profits and monopolistic profits which obstruct the maintenance of the national economic order shall be prevented and at the same time proper entrepreneur profits shall be recognized. Especially for those who have contributed to increasing national production, an increase of profits shall be recognized.

(c) In distributing entrepreneur profits, appropriate restrictions shall be made, but the excess profits shall be reserved in the form of government bonds, etc. and a way shall be provided for their disposal in accordance with fixed conditions after the lapse of a fixed period.

(d) Measures shall be taken to socially reward persons who have contributed to the increasing of national production by discoveries and inventions.

(e) A way shall be provided for letting the public show technical skill and the development of excellent ones shall be fostered by granting appropriate rewards as encouragement.

(f) Larger provisions for depreciations shall be made in order to facilitate the renewal of industrial equipment and to strengthen the foundations of enterprises.

(g) The expansion and development of enterprises shall be promoted on a priority basis according to their contribution to the increase of national productions.

(6) Separate considerations shall be given to the industrial structure for the management of agriculture and the marine-products industry.

### III. Economic Organizations

(1) The structure of economic organizations

a) In regard to the important branches of industry, economic organizations for each kind of industry or for each kind of material, embracing those engaged in the same kind of industry or handling the same kind of materials, shall be set up, with each enterprise or association as a unit.

The basic conditions are as follows:

1. Economic organizations shall be social juridical bodies.
  2. Economic organizations shall be operated under the guidance of directors approved by the government on the basis of the recommendation of those engaged in business.
- b) The other industries shall be organized into organizations according to the kind of industry or into regional organizations, as the occasion demands, in a manner similar to the provisions of the preceding paragraph.
- c) Overseas enterprises shall be organized into economic organizations in their respective areas in a manner similar to the provisions of the preceding paragraphs. However, in respect to those which require unified control with those of Japan proper, appropriate measures shall be provided for effecting national control.
- d) For the organization of economic organizations, special attention should be given to the following matters:
1. The organization of economic organizations should be carried out step by step in the order of their importance and necessity.
  2. Separate consideration should be given to enterprises which are specially necessary from a military standpoint.
  3. A supreme economic organization for superintending all industries shall be established, if necessary.

## II. The functions of economic organizations

- a) The functions of important economic organizations are as follows:
1. As cooperative organs of the government they shall cooperate with the government in projecting important policies, assume the responsibility of drafting and carrying out plans for the enforcement of such policies, and also, if necessary, express their views to the government.
  2. In carrying out the plans of the preceding paragraph they shall give guidance to the subordinate economic organizations and the enterprises belonging to them.



3. If the occasion demands, they shall investigate the practical aspects of management, such as production, distribution, etc., as well as inspect the quality of the products and also superintend the subordinate economic organizations.

4. By joint accounts and other means they shall mutually assist fellow enterprises and contribute to the development of industries.

b) The functions of other organizations are generally similar to the above.

II. Relation to the Government's superintendence and to the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.

a) The government shall guide and superintend the economic organizations.

With the perfection of the economic organizations, their management shall be made as independent as possible, the guidance and superintendence being limited to main points only.

b) The government shall cooperate with the Imperial Rule Assistance Association in order to promote the organization and development of economic organizations.

IV. Separate consideration shall be given to the organization of economic organizations concerning farming, forestry, and the marine products industries.

OUTLINE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A POPULATION POLICY

Decided by the Cabinet 22 January 1941 /Showa 16/

I. Purport.

It is the mission of the Empire to establish the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and promote its everlasting healthy development. In order to accomplish this mission, it is especially and urgently necessary to promote, by establishing a population policy, the rapid and permanent development of our country's population and the drastic improvement of its quality, and also effect the proper distribution of our population in order to secure Japan's leadership in East Asia.

II. Aims.

In accordance with the foregoing purport, our population policy shall aim for the time being, at obtaining a total domestic population of 100,000,000 by 1960 /Showa 35/ with the object of achieving the following objectives. Separate provisions shall be made for overseas population.

- 1) To maintain a continual development of population;
- 2) To surpass other countries in respect to its reproductive power and quality;
- 3) To ensure the supply of military and labour forces required by a high-degree national defense state;
- 4) To effect the proper distribution /of population/ in order to secure Japan's leadership over the various races of East Asia.

III. Policies necessary for attaining the above-mentioned aims shall be planned on the basis of aiming to establish the following convictions:

- a) To be conscious of the fact that we are a race destined for everlasting development;
- b) To reject the world outlook based on the individual and to promote the establishment and thorough inculcation of a world outlook based on the household and the race;
- c) To be conscious of pride and responsibility as the leader in the establishment and development of the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere;
- d) To thoroughly understand that the drastic development of our domestic population constitutes the basic condition in both number and quality for the accomplishment of our country's mission.

IV. Policy for increasing population.

In order to ensure continual development, increase of population shall rest on increase in births and also on decrease in deaths.

1) Measures for increasing births.

Increase in births shall be so planned with the object of hastening the marriage age by three years during the next ten years as compared with that at present, and also increasing the average birth-rate of each couple to five children.

For this purpose, the following measures shall be taken generally:

- a) As the fundamental premise for increasing population, unsound ideas shall be eradicated, and the maintenance and strengthening of a healthy family system shall be promoted.
- b) Organizations or publicly-operated agencies, etc. shall actively recommend, mediate, and guide marriages.
- c) Marriage expenses shall be drastically reduced, and a system of lending funds for marriage expenses shall be created.
- d) In reforming the present school system, special consideration shall be given to its relation to the population policy.
- e) In girls' high schools and young women's schools, efforts shall be made to rear healthy motherhood by inculcating in the students the national mission of motherhood and thoroughly stressing education in bringing up children, health and sanitation, and technical skill.
- f) In respect to the engagement of women as employees, a policy shall be adopted to considerably restrict the employment of those who are over 20 years of age, and measures shall be taken to alleviate or improve those conditions of employment and work which obstruct marriage.
- g) Considerations shall be given to the relation between tax policy and population policy by lessening the burden of persons with large families to support, and by increasing the burden of single persons.
- h) A family allowance system with the aim of lightening the burden for medical, educational, and other family expenses, shall be established.

For this purpose, consideration shall be given for the establishment of a Family Burden Adjustment Bank (provisional name).

- i) Preferential rationing of goods to families having many children, their commendation and various other appropriate measures for their considerate treatment shall be adopted.
- j) A system for the protection of pregnant women and infants shall be established, and measures for the expansion of maternity and babies' hospitals, the distribution of sanitary materials for child delivery, and other necessary measures shall be adopted.

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- j) A system for the protection of pregnant women and infants shall be established, and measures for the expansion of maternity and babies' hospitals, the distribution of sanitary materials for child delivery and other necessary measures shall be adopted.

- k) Artificial birth-controls, such as contraception, abortion, etc., shall be prohibited and prevented, and venereal diseases shall be stamped out.
- 2) Measures for reducing deaths.

The measures for reducing deaths shall have as their immediate object the improvement of the infantile death-rate and the prevention of tuberculosis, and shall be so planned as to reduce the general death-rate by approximately about 35 per cent within twenty years from now. The measures to be taken for achieving this objective are generally as follows:

- a) A network of health guidance agencies, centering around the health bureaux, shall be established.
- b) The main emphasis for the reduction of the infant death-rate shall be placed on the reduction of deaths from diarrhoea and enteritis, pneumonia and congenital debility. For this purpose, health nurses with the object of protecting and guiding mothers and infants shall be appointed throughout cities and villages. At the same time, measures shall be taken to establish nurseries, expand rural settlement works, secure necessaries for infants, and to spread knowledge regarding the rearing of babies. Furthermore, a movement shall be conducted for the lowering of the infant death-rate.
- c) Measures shall be taken for the early discovery of tuberculosis, improvement of industrial and school sanitation, intensification of guidance for and protection for the prevention and early treatment of cases and the expansion of sanatorium facilities. At the same time, the machinery for adjusting the liaison among the various government offices shall be perfected and counter-measures for tuberculosis thoroughly established.
- d) By expansion and strengthening, the health insurance system shall be extended to the whole people, and the different treatments necessary for the prevention /of illness/ shall be given as well as medical treatment.
- e) The improvement of environmental sanitary facilities, especially the improvement of the housing of the common people, shall be fostered.
- f) In order to prevent overwork, the life of the people shall be reformed so as to provide sufficient rest.
- g) In order to improve the national nutrition, a knowledge of nutrition shall be disseminated and inculcated, the taking of nutritious foods shall be encouraged, and a collective meal supply expanded.
- h) Medical educational organs and medical treatment and preventive facilities shall be expanded. At the same time medical education shall be reformed and researches on and dissemination of preventive medicine shall be promoted.

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V. Measures for improving quality.

The improvement of quality shall be planned with the object of improving the spiritual and physical qualities necessary for national defense and labour.

- a) Through the execution of the territorial plan, the composition and distribution of the population shall be rationalized. In particular, the population of the big cities shall be dispersed by evacuation.

For this purpose, measures shall be taken to disperse factories and schools to the provincial areas.

- b) In view of the present condition in which the rural villages constitute the best source of military and labour forces, the rural population of Japan proper shall be maintained at a fixed number, and measures shall be taken to secure for agriculture 40 per cent of the Japanese population in Japan, Manchukuo and China combined.
- c) With the object of giving spiritual and physical training to youths in schools, the courses of study shall be reformed, training intensified, method of education and training reformed, and the physical training facilities expanded.
- d) In view of present condition of rapid increase in the population of the cities, the physical and spiritual training of youths in the cities especially shall be intensified, so as to make them a good source of military and labour forces.
- e) In order to train the mind and body of young men, a system of making them undergo special group training on a compulsory basis for a fixed period of time shall be created.
- f) The different welfare, physical education facilities shall be increased in large numbers and a healthy, simple form of national life shall be established.
- g) Eugenics shall be disseminated, and the national eugenics law shall be strengthened and thoroughly understood.

VI. Measures for securing leadership:

The measures for securing leadership shall be planned with the aim of distributing the population of the Japanese nationals necessary for guiding the political, economic and cultural societies of the various areas throughout the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

The measures to be taken for this purpose are in general as follows:

- a) According to the purpose of strengthening the inseparable relationship between Japan and Manchukuo, a certain fixed portion of the domestic population shall emigrate to Manchukuo. For this purpose, an all-round immigration plan on a larger scale than heretofore shall be established, and measures necessary for its execution by Japan and Manchukuo shall be adopted.
- b) In order to ensure also the distribution of the population of Japanese nations necessary for guiding the other areas of the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, an emigration plan necessary for this purpose shall be established.

VII. Perfection of data.

- 1) Statistics of the dynamic and static condition of population shall be perfected and improved.
- 2) The scope of application of the national physical strength law shall be expanded and its contents perfected. At the same time data on other matters concerning physical strength and health shall be perfected.

VIII. Perfection of the machinery

- 1) The machinery for statistics, investigations and researches on the population problem shall be perfected.
- 2) The machinery for planning, promoting, and enforcing population policies shall be perfected.



OUTLINE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A POPULATION POLICY

(Published in the papers on Jan. 22, 1941 /Shwa 16/)

(Translator's Note:--)

This outline is the same as the previous outline (decided by the Cabinet on Jan. 22, 1941), except that it omits Section VI (Measures for Securing Leadership). Hence, it is omitted.

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OUTLINE OF COMMUNICATIONS POLICY

(OUTLINE FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE OUTLINE OF  
BASIC NATIONAL POLICIES)

(Decided by the Cabinet on 14 February 1941 /Showa 16/)

This outline establishes the outline for transportation and communications, and also for atmospheric phenomena connected with them.

I. Fundamental Policy.

In view of the mission of communications as the basic factor for the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prospcrity Sphere, of which the firm solidarity of Japan, Manchukuo and China forms the trunk, it is resolved to establish an all-round organic communications structure for Greater East Asia with the object of completing a highly-developed national defense state structure.

1) The improvement and expansion on a planned basis of communication facilities shall be promoted, and the control of their operations shall be strengthened.

For this purpose, the improvement and consolidation of administrative machinery concerning communications shall be promoted.

2) In effecting the improvement and expansion of communications facilities, efforts shall be made to meet military requirements and to harmonize them with economic requirements.

3) Efforts shall be made to bring little by little under our influence the rights and interests of third countries concerning communications in Greater East Asia.

4) In conformity with the change in Japan's international status, efforts shall be made to secure communications between Asia and Europe.

II. Improvement and expansion of communication facilities.

The improvement and expansion of communication facilities shall be achieved according to the following policy:

1) The unbalanced condition of communications in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere shall be adjusted and its organic inter-connection promoted. In respect to the communication facilities of Japan, Manchukuo and China, they shall be generally based on the Outline for the Economic Construction of Japan, Manchukuo and China.

Furthermore, the facilities of communication with the various areas of the Southern Region shall be improved and nothing to be desired shall be left undone in providing counter-measures for meeting the national defense requirements on the northern borders of our country.

2) The following are matters to be specially considered as improvement and expansion policy for each branch of communications:

a) Overland transportation

- 1) As to the improvement of the railways, the main thing shall be to expand the carrying capacity of the trunk lines and to remove the bottle-necks in the channels of transportation. The construction of new lines shall be limited to only urgent ones for the time being.
- 2) Rolling stock and other special railway materials shall be improved and the capacity for their production reinforced.
- 3) Efforts shall be made to improve warehouses, small-scale transport apparatus and loading installations, especially their mechanization. Measures shall be also taken to secure workers for small-scale transport.
- 4) In order to increase the capacity of overland transportation, efforts shall be made to construct, improve and pave the principal highways.
- 5) In order to increase automobile production capacity, efforts shall be made to increase the number of automobile holdings and to promote their advance overseas. Fuel arrangements and other appropriate measures necessary for increasing and maintaining the number of automobile holdings shall also be taken.

b) Marine transportation and harbors

- 1) In order to increase bottoms, ship-building capacity shall be reinforced, planned ship-building carried out, especially in promoting the improvement of cargo ships, oil tankers, and other special service ships and small-sized ships.
- 2) Marine transportation between Japan, Manchukuo and China shall be expanded and reinforced. Efforts shall also be made to expand the sea-routes and tramp steamship services to the various areas of the Southern Region and also to extend the right of navigation in other seas.
- 3) The various harbor facilities shall be improved and expanded on a priority basis according to the function of each harbor. The harbors of Japan, Manchukuo and China in particular shall be improved for mutual convenience.

- 4) In order to promote the improvement of the capacity of our harbors, efforts shall be made to improve boat-train lines and other linking water and overland services, warehouses and other storage facilities.
- 5) In the reinforcement of loading capacity at the harbors, efforts shall be made to increase the number of barges and to mechanize loading, besides securing laborers for loading work.

c) Air Transport

- 1) In view of the present state of aviation and its important military mission, a long-stride development of aviation shall be ensured and the airways connecting Japan, Manchukuo, and China shall be perfected and reinforced. Efforts shall also be made to develop airways in the various areas of the Southern Region and, furthermore, the expansion of international airways outside the Sphere shall be ensured.
- 2) The expansion of airplane production capacity shall be promoted, and efforts shall be made to increase the number of superior planes and to promote their expansion overseas.
- 3) An all-round improvement of plane preservation facilities in the various areas of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere shall be promoted.

d) Communications /"TSUJIE"/

- 1) In improving electric communication facilities, the reinforcement of the basic facilities, such as the installation of cables for the main trunk lines, and the high development of communication methods, as well as the consolidation and adjustment of the different electric communication facilities, shall be promoted.
- 2) In order to establish Japan's independent communication network in Greater East Asia, efforts shall be made to complete the trunk communication cable lines between Japan, Manchukuo, and China. The improvement of communication facilities with the various areas of the Southern Region also shall be promoted. The improvement and expansion of international electric communication facilities shall be promoted in order to ensure communication connection with foreign countries.
- 3) As to broadcasting facilities, their perfection shall be promoted under organic co-operation between Japan, Manchukuo, and China. Efforts shall be made especially to expand and reinforce wire broadcasting and the facilities for broadcasting to foreign countries.

- 4) Efforts shall be made to improve technically the manufacture of communication apparatus and to expand the capacity for their production and to promote their expansion overseas.

c) Atmospheric Phenomena

In view of the present state of meteorological observation and the importance of its military mission, its long-stride development shall be promoted in order to ensure the safety of communications in East Asia and to meet military requirements.

3) In improving and expanding communication /"kotsu"/ facilities, nothing to be desired shall be left undone from the standpoint of air-defense.

4) Appropriate measures shall be adopted to promote the training and the numerical adequacy of technical experts and skilled workers for communication enterprises.

III. Control and operation of communications /"kotsu"/

In order to promote the smooth operation of the various departments of communications, and to ensure the display of its all-round efficiency, the following matters should be specially considered:

1) On the basis of the requirements for the consolidation as one body of the communications between Japan, Manchukuo and China, efforts shall be made to improve the liaison machinery for the communications of Japan, Manchukuo, and China, Japan being the nucleus. The liaison and unification of their management and the standardization of the communication materials and apparatus shall also be promoted.

2) In order to conform to the requirements of planned economy and to improve transportation efficiency, the following measures shall be generally adopted.

- a) Establishment of an appropriate freight policy.
- b) Proper distribution of function between overland transportation and marine transportation.
- c) Maintenance of close connection between transportation organs and production and distribution control organs.
- d) Adjustment and unification of the various overland transportation enterprises.

- 4) Efforts shall be made to improve technically the manufacture of communication apparatus and to expand the capacity for their production and to promote their expansion overseas.

e) Atmospheric Phenomena

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- c) Maintenance of close connection between transportation organs and production and distribution control organs.
- d) Adjustment and unification of the various overland transportation enterprises.

- e) Establishment of a system of intensive operation of ships and the thorough enforcement of planned distribution of ships.
  - f) Comprehensive control of the different harbour enterprises.
  - g) Utilization of existing installations, especially the diversion to other uses of idle installations.
  - h) Improvement and rationalization of packing and wrapping.
- 3) In order to establish for Japan's shipping a position of leadership in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, the necessary unification of shipping enterprises shall be promoted, and efforts made for the improvement of marine insurance.
- 4) In order to maintain the leadership of communications in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, the following measures shall be generally adopted:
- a) Formation of a communications union comprising the various areas in one unit.
  - b) Insuring the stability of wireless communications by electric wave control.
  - c) Establishment of appropriate policy of communication charges.



OUTLINE OF COMMUNICATIONS POLICY

(OUTLINE FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE OUTLINE OF BASIC  
NATIONAL POLICIES)

(Published in the Papers on 14 February 1941 /SHOW. 16/)

(Translator's Note:--Identical to the preceding  
Outline decided by the Cabinet on the same day,  
except for the omission of the following paragraphs:)

a) Item 2 under Section I (Fundamental Policy) reading:

"In effecting the improvement and expansion of communications facilities efforts shall be made to meet military requirements and to harmonize them with economic requirements."

b) Item 3 under Section I (Fundamental Policy), reading:

"Efforts shall be made to bring under our influence the rights and interests of third countries concerning communications in Greater East Asia."

c) Item 4 under Section I (Fundamental Policy), reading:

"In conformity with the change in Japan's international status, efforts shall be made to secure communications between Asia and Europe."

d) Second half of the second paragraph of Item 1 under Section II (Improvement and expansion of communications facilities), reading:

".....and nothing to be desired shall be left undone in providing counter-measures for meeting national defense requirements on the northern borders of our country."

ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT ECONOMIC COUNCIL  
FOR JAPAN, MANCHUKUO AND CHINA

(Decided by the Cabinet on 25 February 1941 /SICWA 16/)

Previously the Government, in the Outline of Fundamental National Policies, laid down as a national policy the establishment of a self-sufficient economy for Japan, linking Japan, Manchukuo and China together and embracing Greater East Asia, and with this as the basis, decided the Outline for the Economic Construction of Japan, Manchukuo and China. In order to foster the practical application of this outline and to carry out a comprehensive plan for Japan, Manchukuo and China based on it, a Joint Economic Council for Japan, Manchukuo and China shall be established as a provisional measure according to the following main points:

Main Points:

1) This Council shall deliberate on an all-round plan for Japan, Manchukuo and China based on the Outline for the Economic Construction of Japan, Manchukuo and China.

2) This Council shall be established in the Cabinet and shall in practice constitute the deliberative organ with Japan as its center.

3) The President of the Planning Board shall be the President of the Council. The members of the Council shall consist of the Vice-President of the Planning Board, Vice-Director of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau, the Chief of the Political Affairs Division of the Asia Development Board /Ko-A-In/ the Vice-Ministers of the various ministries concerned, and Manchukuoan officials concerned.

4) The secretaries shall consist of the higher civil service officials of the various offices concerned and the Manchukuoan officials concerned.

Sectional committees shall be created in the Board of Secretaries.

Temporary secretaries for the sectional committees may be appointed as the occasion demands.

5) A secretariat shall be established in this Council and located in the Planning Board.

The secretariat shall consist of the staff officials despatched from each government office concerned (Planning Board, Manchurian Affairs Bureau, Asia Development Board, Army and Navy and Manchukuo).

6) Matters decided by this Council shall be transferred to the respective competent authorities concerned according to their sequence to be put into practice by them.

Remarks:

1) The appointment of Manchukuoan officials shall be made by Manchukuo after consultation with Japan.

2) The officials connected with the local army and other local quarters may attend and express their views at the Council, Board of Secretaries, and sectional committees.

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Important matters under the jurisdiction of the secretariat shall be as follows:

1) matters concerning the establishment of economic development plans for Japan, Manchukuo and China combined.

2) matters concerning the establishment of communications plans for Japan, Manchukuo and China combined.

3) matters concerning the formulation of the policies for establishing plans year by year for materials, labor, capital, funds, trade, communications, etc. for Japan, Manchukuo and China combined.

4) matters concerning liaison and adjustment of urgent matters necessary for the economic cooperation between Japan, Manchukuo and China.

5) matters concerning reporting and giving information on the progress of economic construction of Japan, Manchukuo and China.

ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT ECONOMIC COUNCIL  
FOR JAPAN, MANCHUKUO AND CHINA.

(Published in the Papers)

Previously the Government, in the outline of fundamental national policies, laid down as a national policy, the establishment of a self-sufficient economy for Japan linking Japan, Manchukuo and China and embracing Greater East Asia, and on this basis decided the Outline for the Economic Construction of Japan, Manchukuo and China. In order to foster the practical application of this outline and to carry out a comprehensive plan for Japan, Manchukuo and China based on it, a Joint Economic Council for Japan, Manchukuo and China shall be established as a provisional measure according to the following main points:

Main Points:

- 1) This Council shall promote adjustment and liaison for the economic construction of Japan, Manchukuo and China based on the Outline for the Economic Construction of Japan, Manchukuo and China.
- 2) This Council shall be for practical purposes the deliberative organ established in the Cabinet.
- 3) The President of the Planning Board shall be the President of the Council. The council members shall consist of the Vice-chief and Vice-Minist of the various offices concerned.
- 4) The secretaries shall consist of the high civil service officials of the various offices concerned.

Sectional committees shall be created in the Board of Secretaries.

Temporary secretaries for the sectional committees may be appointed as the occasion demands.

- 5) A secretariat shall be established in this Council and located in the Planning Board.

The secretariat shall consist of the staff officials despatched from each government office concerned (Planning Board, Manchurian Affairs Bureau, Asia Development Board, Army and Navy and Manchukuo).

## C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 I.P.S. No. 1570

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Takehiko Okada hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: former Chief Secretary (present Chief of Industrial Policy Section) and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 94 pages, dated April, 1941, and described as follows: "Fundamental State Policy" pamphlet published by the Planning Board. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Commerce and Industry Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
18 day of October, 1946

/s/ Takehiko Okada  
Signature of Official

SE/L

Witness: /s/ Yoshikatsu Natani Chief of Industrial Policy  
Official Capacity Section

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Henry Shimojima, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
18th day of Oct., 1946

/s/ Henry Shimojima  
N.I.E.

Witness: S/Sgt. T. Toruchi

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

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一日滿洲共同委員會設置三國ノ協定締結ノ件

一遞信省官制中改正ノ件

極秘 昭和十年七月三日 會議筆記 正

衆議院會議筆記

一日滿洲共同委員會設置三

國ノ協定締結ノ件

一遞信省官制中改正ノ件

昭和十年七月三日（水曜日）午前十時十五分開議

聖上臨御

主席

平沼副議長

COPY ROOM 361

大臣

岡田内閣總理大臣 四番

後藤内務大臣 六番

大角海軍大臣 七番

廣田外務大臣 八番

林陸軍大臣 九番

床次遞信大臣 十番

町田商工大臣 十二番

山崎農林大臣 十三番

兒玉拓務大臣 十六番

850

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顧問官

久保田顧問官	十九番
富井顧問官	二十番
黒田顧問官	廿二番
櫻井顧問官	廿三番
荒井顧問官	廿四番
河合顧問官	廿五番
鈴木 <small>(賢太)</small> 顧問官	廿七番
石井顧問官	廿八番
有馬顧問官	廿九番
原顧問官	三十番
窪田顧問官	卅一番
元田顧問官	卅三番
鈴木 <small>(莊六)</small> 顧問官	卅四番
石塚顧問官	卅五番
坂本顧問官	卅六番
石渡顧問官	卅七番
清水顧問官	卅八番
藤澤顧問官	卅九番
林顧問官	四十番

出席員

皇族

雍仁親王	一番
宣仁親王	二番
敏仁親王	三番

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大臣

- 高橋大藏大臣 五番
- 小原司法大臣 十一番
- 松田文部大臣 十四番
- 内田鐵道大臣 十五番

顧問官

- 金子顧問官 十八番
- 石黒顧問官 廿一番
- 石原顧問官 廿六番
- 栗野顧問官 卅二番

委員

- 金森法制局長官
- 樋貝法制局參事官
- 以上各件ニ付
- 川越對滿事務局長
- 重光外務次官
- 栗山外務省作務局長
- 桑島外務省東亞局長
- 小林外務省書記官
- 柳井外務省書記官
- 大久保外務省事務官
- 永田陸軍省軍務局長
- 平井陸軍一等主計
- 以上日滿經濟共同委員會設置ニ
- 關スル協定締結ノ件ニ付



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進藤逓信省電務局長

清水逓信省電氣局長

片岡逓信省航空局長

藤川逓信省記官

以上逓信省官制中改正ノ件ニ付

報告員

荒井審査委員長

日清經濟共同委員會設置ニ關

スル協定締結ノ件ニ付

村上記官長

逓信省官制中改正ノ件ニ付

記官

堀江記官

武藤記官

議長（一木）之ヨリ合議ヲ開ク先ツ

日清經濟共同委員會今設置ニ關スル協定締結  
ノ件

ヲ議題ニ供ス第一讀合ヲ開キ朗讀ハ之ヲ省略シ  
テ直ニ審査委員長ノ報告ヲ求ム

報告員（荒井）今回御諮詢ノ日清經濟共同委員會

設置ニ關スル協定締結ノ件ニ付本官等審査員ヲ

命セラレ本月二十七日委員會ヲ開キ國務大臣及

關係官ノ説明ヲ聽取シ以テ之ガ審査ヲ遂ゲタリ

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進藤逓信省電務局長

清水逓信省電氣局長

片岡逓信省航空局長

藤川逓信省書記官

以上逓信省官制中改正ノ件ニ付

報告員

荒井審査委員長

日清經濟共同委員會設置ニ關スル協定締結ノ件ニ付

村上書記官長

逓信省官制中改正ノ件ニ付

書記官

堀江書記官

武藤書記官

議長（一木）之ヨリ會議ヲ開ク先ヅ

日清經濟共同委員會ノ設置ニ關スル協定締結ノ件

ヲ議題ニ供ス第一讀行ヲ開キ朗讀ハ之ヲ省略シ

テ直ニ審查委員長ノ報告ヲ求ム

報告員（荒井）今回御諮詢ノ日清經濟共同委員會

設置ニ關スル協定締結ノ件ニ付本官廳審査員ヲ

命ゼラレ本月二十七日委員會ヲ開キ國務大臣及

關係官ノ辯明ヲ聴取シ以テ之ガ審査ヲ遂ゲタリ

抑々帝國ノ滿洲國ニ對スル國策ノ基調トスル所  
ハ變ニ昭和八年三月漢口ノ國際聯盟脫退ニ由ス  
ル昭府及昭領七年六月滿印ノ日滿議定書ヲ以テ  
宣明セラレタルガ如ク滿洲國ノ獨立ヲ確認尊重  
シ且之ヲシテ帝國ト不可分依存ノ關係ヲ持シテ  
進歩發達セシムルニ在リ帝國政府又常ニ此ノ方  
針ニ則リ適切ナル處置ヲ爲スルコトヲ念トシ日  
滿兩國ノ邊境ヲ確保スル爲メ日滿議定書ニ於ケ  
ル兩國共同シテ國家ノ防衛ニ當ルベキ旨ノ條規  
ニ基キ互等ニシテハ同議定書ニ依リ共同防衛  
ニ必與ナル日本國軍ノ滿洲國內ニ永久陸屯ノ權  
ヲ確立シタル外別ニ兩國間ニ互等上ノ協定ヲ締  
結シ又外交ニ關シテハ客年三月滿洲國帝制實施  
ノ際兩國間ニ交換セル公文ニ依リ滿洲國ハ其ノ  
外交其ノ他共同防衛上必與ナル事項ニ付必ズ豫  
メ日本國ニ充分且隔離ナキ協議ヲ遂グベキコト  
ヲ協定シタリ然ルニ互等ノ交ト均シク兩國ノ適  
當ニ緊密重要ノ關係アル經濟ニ關シテハ其ノ共  
同措置ノ方法ニ付未ダ何等制度トシテ確立セル  
モノナク爲メニ滿洲國ノ經濟問題ニシテ帝國ノ  
經濟ニ重大ノ關係アル事項ノ處理殊ニ滿洲ニ於  
ケル重要産業ヲ目的トスル日滿合辦會社ノ監督  
ニ關シテモ正式ニハ帝國政府ハ發言權ヲ有セズ  
之ヲ滿洲國政府ノ措置ニ一任スルノ外ナキ現狀

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875A-6

ニ在リ新クノ如キハ日滿兩國ノ不可分關係ヲ確  
保スル所以ニ非ズ又兩國經濟上ノ依存關係ヲ鞏  
固ナラシムル所以ニ非ザルコト明ニシテ兩國ノ  
連繫ニ關係アル限り「軍事及外交ニ關スルト同  
シク經濟ニ關シテモ亦共同指辨ノ方法ヲ制度ノ  
上ニ確定シ以テ正式ニ帝國ノ發言權ヲ存立セシ  
ムルノ必要アリ帝國政府ハ此ノ必要ニ應ズル爲  
メ日滿兩國間ニ一ノ共同機關ヲ設置スル旨ノ協  
定ヲ締結スルヲ可ナリトシ在滿帝國使臣ヲシテ  
滿洲國政府ト交渉セシメタルニ協議調ヒテ本件  
取極ノ成案ヲ得ルニ至レリ」  
本案ノ取極ハ「日滿經濟共同委員會設置ニ關ス  
ル協定」ヲ主タルモノトシ之ニ添フルニ其ノ細  
目ヲ定メタル「附屬書」及「日滿經濟共同委員  
會設置ニ關スル協定ノ締結ニ付日本國及滿洲國  
全權委員ガ一致シタル了解事項」ナル文書ヲ以  
テス今逐次此等各部ノ要旨ヲ述ブレバ次ノ如シ

### 第一 協定

- (一) 滿洲國新京ニ日滿經濟共同委員會ヲ常設ス
- (二) 本委員會ハ日滿兩國經濟ノ連繫ニ關スル重  
要事項及日滿合辦特殊合社ノ業務ノ監督ニ  
關スル重要事項ニ付日滿兩國政府ノ諮問ニ  
應ジ意見ヲ答申スベキモノトシ兩國政府ハ

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此等ノ事項ニ付テハ本委員會ノ諮問ヲ受クル後  
ニ非ザレバ之ヲ處理スルコトヲ得ザルモノトス

(三) 本委員會ハ必要ニ應ジ日滿兩國經濟ノ合理的融  
合ニ關スル一切ノ事項ニ付兩國政府ニ建議スル  
コトヲ得ルモノトス

(四) 本委員會ノ組織及運用ニ付テハ附<sup>添</sup>増<sup>ノ</sup>定ムル  
所ニ依ル

(五) 本協定ハ署名ノ日ヨリ之ヲ實施シ日滿兩文ヲ以  
テ共ニ正文トシ其ノ間ニ解釋ヲ異ニスルトキハ  
日本文ニ依リ之ヲ決スルモノトス

## 第二 附屬章

附屬章ハ前述ノ委員會ノ組織及運用ノ大綱ヲ定メ  
タルモノニシテ(一) 本委員會ノ委員ハ八名トシ兩國  
政府ニ於テ各其ノ半數ヲ任命シ相互ニ之ヲ通報ス  
ベク委員等故アルトキハ滿洲國駐劄日本帝國特命  
全權大使ト滿洲國國務總理大臣トノ協議ニ依リ共  
ノ代理者ヲ定メ又兩國政府ハ必要ニ應ジ協議ノ上  
各同數ノ臨時委員ヲ任命スルコトヲ得ルモノトシ  
(二) 議長ハ委員中ヨリ之ヲ互選シ(一) 毎回互選(三) 本  
委會ノ庶務ヲ整理セシムル爲メ幹事若干名ヲ置キ  
兩國政府各其ノ同數ヲ隨員中ヨリ任命スルモノト  
シ(四) 本委員會ノ議事ハ過半數ヲ以テ之ヲ決シ議長

875A-7

此等ノ事項ニ付テハ本委員會ノ諸箇ヲ經タル後  
ニ非ザレバ之ヲ處理スルコトヲ得ザルモノトス

(三) 本委員會ハ必其ニ應ジ日滿兩國經濟ノ合理的融  
合ニ由スル一切ノ事項ニ付兩國政府ニ建議スル  
コトヲ得ルモノトス

(四) 本委員會ノ組織及運用ニ付テハ附屬章ノ定ムル  
所ニ依ル

(五) 本協定ハ署名ノ日ヨリ之ヲ實施シ日滿兩文ヲ以  
テ共ニ正文トシ其ノ間ニ解釋ヲ異ニスルトキハ  
日本文ニ依リ之ヲ決スルモノトス

## 第二 附屬章

附屬章ハ前述ノ委員會ノ組織及運用ノ大綱ヲ定メ  
タルモノニシテ (一) 本委員會ノ委員ハ八名トシ兩國  
政府ニ於テ各其ノ半數ヲ任命シ相互ニ之ヲ通報ス  
ベク委員等故アルトキハ滿洲國駐劄日本帝國特命  
全權大使ト滿洲國國務總理大臣トノ協議ニ依リ其  
ノ代理者ヲ定メ又兩國政府ハ必其ニ應ジ協議ノ上  
各同數ノ臨時委員ヲ任命スルコトヲ得ルモノトシ  
(二) 議長ハ委員中ヨリ之ヲ互選シ (一) 毎回互選 (三) 本  
委會ノ庶務ヲ整理セシムル爲メ幹事若干名ヲ置キ  
兩國政府各其ノ同數ヲ隨員中ヨリ任命スルモノト  
シ (四) 本委員會ノ議事ハ過半數ヲ以テ之ヲ決シ議長

875A-8

ハ委員トシテ議決ニ加ハルノ外ニ可希同致ナル  
トキ之ヲ決スルノ權ヲスルモノトシ(二)委員會ノ  
議事規則ハ兩國政府ノ承認ヲ得テ委員會之ヲ定  
ムルモノトスルノ諸項ヲ掲ゲタリ

第三 了解事項

此ノ文書ハ前述ノ委員會ノ組織及權限ニシテ  
ニ具體的ノ取極ヲ爲シタルモノニシテ(一)本委員  
會ノ常任委員ハ帝國側ハ東京專參謀長、在滿大  
使館專任首席參事官、山東局總長及政府ニ於テ  
特ニ任命スル者一名トシ滿洲國側ハ外交部、實  
業部及財政部ノ各大臣並ニ國務院總務局長トシ  
(二)本委員會ノ諮問事項中日滿兩國經濟ノ連繫ニ  
關スル重要事項トハ滿洲國政府ノ權限ニ屬スル  
經濟問題ニシテ兩國經濟ノ連繫ニ關係アル輸入  
及關稅ニ關スル事項並ニ重要産業ノ開發及統  
制、日滿合辦特殊會社ノ設立ニ關スル法令ノ制  
定及改正、投資其ノ他兩國經濟ノ連繫ニ關スル  
重要事項ヲ謂フモノトス而シテ兩國經濟ノ連繫  
ニ關スル重要事項ト稱スルモノ日本政府ノ權限ニ  
屬スルモノハ此ノ委員會ニハ諮問セザルヲ以テ  
此ノ點ニ於テ滿洲國ノミヲ拘束スル片務的約定  
ト爲ルモノトス(三)同諮問事項中日滿合辦特殊會  
社ノ業務ノ監督ニ關スル重要事項トハ日滿兩國  
經濟ノ連繫ニ關係アル重要産業ヲ目的トシ兩國

875A-8

ハ委員トシテ議決ニ加ハルノ外ニ可希同致ナル  
トキ之ヲ決スルノ權ヲスルモノトシ(二)委員會ノ  
議事規則ハ兩國政府ノ承認ヲ得テ委員會之ヲ定  
ムルモノトスルノ諸項ヲ掲ゲタリ

### 第三 了解事項

此ノ文書ハ前述ノ委員會ノ組織及權限ニシテ  
ニ具體的ノ取極ヲ爲シタルモノニシテ(一)本委員  
會ノ常任委員ハ帝國側ハ東京駐參謀長、在滿大  
使館專任首席參事官、山梨局總長及政府ニ於テ  
特ニ任命スル者一名トシ滿洲國側ハ外交部、實  
業部及財政部ノ各大臣並ニ國務院總務局長トシ  
(二)本委員會ノ諮問事項中日滿兩國經濟ノ連繫ニ  
關スル重要事項トハ滿洲國政府ノ權限ニ屬スル  
經濟問題ニシテ兩國經濟ノ連繫ニ關係アル輸入  
及關稅ニ關スル事項並ニ重要産業ノ開發及統  
制、日滿合辦特殊會社ノ設立ニ關スル法令ノ制  
定及改正、投資其ノ他兩國經濟ノ連繫ニ關スル  
重要事項ヲ謂フモノトス而シテ兩國經濟ノ連繫  
ニ關スル重要事項ト稱スルモノ日本政府ノ權限ニ  
屬スルモノハ此ノ委員會ニハ諮問セザルヲ以テ  
此ノ點ニ於テ滿洲國ノミヲ拘束スル片務的約定  
ト爲ルモノトス(三)同諮問事項中日滿合辦特殊會  
社ノ業務ノ監督ニ關スル重要事項トハ日滿兩國  
經濟ノ連繫ニ關係アル重要産業ヲ目的トシ兩國



875A-9

ノ一方ノ法律ニ依リ成立シテノ資本金ノ半額以上  
上方地方ノ國ノ政府、臣民又ハ法人ノ提出ニ係  
ル會社ノ定款ノ蠶長ナル變更、利益金處分又ハ  
合併及解散ノ決議ノ認可ニ關スル事項ヲ關フモ  
ノトスル旨ヲ揭ゲタリ而シテ現在ニ於テハ日本  
ノ立法ニ依ル合辦會社ニシテ精洲國側ノ出資半  
額以上ヲ占ムルモノナシト謂フヲ以テ實際上本  
取極ハ此ノ點ニ於テモ精洲國側ノミヲ拘束スルモ  
ノナリ此ノ如クニ文書ニハ精洲國ノミヲ拘束ス  
ル片務的條項アルガ故ニ兩國ノ協議ニ依リ之ヲ  
秘密ニ付スルコトトセラル旨當局ハ聲明シタリ  
按ズルニ本件ノ取極ハ邊ニ締結セラレタル日精  
議定書ノ趣旨ニ基キ日精兩國ノ經濟上ノ依存關  
係ヲ永遠ニ鞏固ナラシムル目的ヲ以テ兩國間ノ  
重要ナル經濟問題ニ關シ充分且緊密ニ共同ノ實  
ヲ舉ゲテ兩國經濟ノ合理的融合ヲ實現スル爲メ  
日精經濟共同委員會ナル兩國政府ノ顧問機關ヲ  
常設シ以テ兩國ノ經濟ニ關聯アル一定ノ重要事  
項ヲ處理スルニ當リ豫メ該委員會ニ諮問シ其ノ  
意見ヲ俟チテ之ヲ措辨セムトスルモノニシテ斯  
クノ如キ機關ヲ設置スルハ日精兩國ノ特殊關係  
ニ考ヘ帝國ノ對精洲國策ヲ遂行スルニ補スル所  
アルベキガ故ニ本件取極ハ其ノ大體ノ趣旨ニ於  
テ之ヲ可トスベク其ノ各部ノ條項モ亦特ニ非議

875 A-10

スベキ廉ヲ取メズ唯斯カル榮殊ノ施設ハ其ノ選  
用宜キヲ得ルニ非ザレバ所爲ノ效果ヲ齎スコト  
能ハサルハ言ヲ俟タザル所ナルガ故ニ不件ニ極  
ノ實施ニ難リ信局ニ於テ最善ノ注意ヲ拂ヒ苟モ  
其ノ措置ヲ謬ルコトナク以テ能ク充分ノ成績ヲ  
收ムルニ至ラムコトヲ切望セザルヲ得ズ仍テ審  
査委員會ニ於テハ不件ハ此ノ儘之ヲ可決セラレ  
然ルベキ旨右ノ希望ト俱ニ全行一致ヲ以テ議決  
シタリ

右審査ノ結果ヲ報告ス

三十三年(元田)不協定ニ依レバ委員會諮問事項

中日合辦特種會社ニシテ資本金ノ半額以上ガ  
他方ノ拠出ニ係ルモノノ一定事項ニ付テハ必ズ  
諮問セザルベカラザルコトトセルモ斯ノ如ク日  
滿兩國ノ出資額ヲ同様ト爲スコトハ果シテ妥當  
ナリヤ

又委員會ノ組織ヲ見ルニ兩國ヨリ各四名宛ノ委  
員ヲ出シ議長ハ右委員中ヨリ之ヲ互選スルモノ  
トス而シテ議長ハ表決權ノ外採決權ヲ有スルモノ  
ノト爲スガ故ニ其ノ權限ハ非常ニ強大ナルモノ  
ナリ而シテ其ノ任期ニ付テハ何等ノ規定ナシ審査報  
告ニ依レバ議長ハ會議ニ之ヲ選定ストノコト  
ナルモ左様ノコトハ既觀ヲ其スベク明觀無ケレ  
バ疑義ヲ生ズルノ虞アリト考フ斯ル事項ハ本節

875A-11

定中ニ之ヲ明記スルヲ相當ト考フルモ議事規則  
中ニ之ヲ定ムルモ亦不可ナカルベシ兎ニ角ニ於  
定ノ規定ノミニテハ委員會ノ諮問事項ハ結局議  
長ノ専決スル所ト爲ルノ虞アリ此ノ點ノ條規充  
分ナラズト考ヘラルルガ之ニ對スル當局ノ所見  
如何

八番（廣田）元田顧問官ノ御質問ハ兩國ヨリ各四  
名宛ノ委員ヲ出シテ委員會ヲ開クヲ以テ萬一議  
事ガ議長ノ採決權ニ依テ決定セラル場合ニ於テ  
ハ日本側ニ不利益ヲ生ズルコトナキヤトノ疑ナ  
リト解ス併シ滿洲國側ヨリ出ス四人ノ委員ノ内  
三名ハ大臣ニシテ他ノ一名ハ總務廳長ナリ此ノ總  
務廳長ハ日本人ニシテ將來ニ於テモ亦然リト信  
ズ而シテ同廳長ハ一面ニ於テハ滿洲國ノ官吏ナ  
レドモ他面ニ於テハ滿洲國指導ノ任ニ當レル中  
心機關ナリ故ニ委員會ニ於テ若シ日滿兩國ノ意  
見ノ對立アル場合ニ於テモ日本側ノ不利益ト爲  
ルガ如キコトハ殆ド之ヲ相像スルコトヲ得ズ  
議長ハ場合ニ依リ自ラ最善ノ決ヲ採ルコトアル  
ベキモ其ノ地位ハ之ヲ常定ノモノト爲サザルガ  
反テ適當ナラズヤト思惟シ諮問事項ノ如何ニ依  
リ會議ノ都度之ヲ選定スルノ制度ト爲セリ然レ  
ドモ將來議事規則ヲ定ムル場合ニ於テハ尙此ノ  
點ニ關シ充分ニ考慮セザルベカラズト考ヘ居レ

875A-12

要員タルヲ此ノ要員ニテ表面形式ニ日葡議定スルモ實質ニ於テ  
ハ相異ルニ由リ文管ノ解釋上多少ノ困難ノ點ア  
ラムモ實際上右ノ如キ解釋ノ下ニ之ヲ運用シタ  
シト考フ

三十三番（元田） 本員ハ今日日葡間ニ條約上ノ權  
利ヲ強行セザルベカラザルガ如キコトアルベシ  
トハ思惟セズ然レドモ今日其ノ心配ナキヲ理由  
トシテ協定ヲ結バザルハ細心ナラズ協定ヲ結ブ  
トセバ國家百年ノ大計上萬遺算ナキ規定ヲ設ク  
ルノ必要アリト考フ 審查報告書ニ本件ノ取極ノ  
實施ニ應リテハ最善ノ注意ヲ拂ヒ苟モ其ノ推遷  
ヲ謬ルコトナク云スト謂ヘルハ種々ノ意味ヲ包  
含スルモノト考フルヲ以テ當局ニ於テハ此ノ點  
ニ付深ク考慮セラレムコトヲ希望ス

三十四番（坂本） 只今元田顧問官ヨリ御質問アリ  
タル事柄ハ本員モ考ヘタル事ナリ外務大臣ノ御  
答辯ニ依レバ總務廳長ニハ口本人が任ゼラレ后  
ルヲ以テ何レ日本人ノ心ヲ以テ仕事ヲ爲スベク  
從テ日本ニ不利益ナルコトナカルベシトノコト  
ナルモ同官ガ日葡兩國ノ利益相反スル場合ニ於  
テ日本側ノ利益ヲ擁護スルトキハ歐洲國民ノ反  
感ヲ買フニ到ルベク其ノ已ニ歐洲國ノ官吏タル  
以上日本ノ爲メ不利ナルコトヲ爲サザルベシト  
考フルコトハ大ニ考慮ヲ要スベキニ非ズヤ此ノ

875A-12

要員ルヲ此少要員ノ表画形式ハ日葡議定モモ實ニ於テ  
ハ相異ルニ由リ文書ノ解釋上多少ノ困難ノ點ア  
ラムモ實際上右ノ如キ解釋ノ下ニ之ヲ運用シタ  
シト考フ

三十三番（元田） 本員ハ今日日葡間ニ條約上ノ權  
利ヲ強行セザルベカラザルガ如キコトアルベシ  
トハ思惟セズ然レドモ今日其ノ心配ナキヲ理由  
トシテ協定ヲ結バザルハ細心ナラズ協定ヲ結ブ  
トセバ國家百年ノ大計上萬遺算ナキ規定ヲ設ク  
ルノ必長アリト考フ森査報告書ニ本件ノ取極ノ  
實施ニ應リテハ最善ノ注意ヲ拂ヒ苟モ其ノ措置  
ヲ謬ルコトナク云スト謂ヘルハ種々ノ意味ヲ包  
含スルモノト考フルヲ以テ當局ニ於テハ此ノ點  
ニ付深ク考慮セラレムコトヲ希望ス

三十六番（坂本） 只今元田顧問官ヨリ御質問アリ  
タル事柄ハ本員モ考ヘタル事ナリ外務大臣ノ御  
答辯ニ依レバ總務廳長ニハ日本人ガ任セラレ后  
ルヲ以テ何レ日本人ノ心ヲ以テ仕事ヲ爲スベク  
從テ日本ニ不利益ナルコトナカルベシトノコト  
ナルモ同官ガ日葡兩國ノ利益相反スル場合ニ於  
テ日本側ノ利益ヲ擁護スルトキハ濠洲國民ノ反  
感ヲ買フニ到ルベク其ノ已ニ濠洲國ノ官吏タル  
以上日本ノ爲メ不利ナルコトヲ爲サザルベシト  
考フルコトハ大ニ考慮ヲ長スベキニ非ズヤ此ノ

875A-13

點ニ關スル當局ノ御意見如何又新ル委員會ノ議  
 長ヲ官費毎ニ選出スル制度ハ我國ニハ尋例ナカ  
 ルベシト考フル處何所ニカ新ル先例アリヤ承リ  
 タシ  
 八 行(廣田) 只今ノ御質問ハ日本人ナリトスルモ  
 滿洲國ノ官吏タル以上ハ滿洲國ノ爲メ忠良ナル  
 役人トシテ盡サザルベカラザルニ由リ委員會ニ  
 於テ日本ノ利益ノ爲メニ裁決スルコト能ハザル  
 管ナラズヤトノ御主旨ナリト解セリ紅毛廳長ハ  
 日系官吏ノ總元帥ニシテ滿洲國指導ノ爲メニ招  
 聘セラレ居ルモノナリ即チ滿洲國ノ官吏タルト  
 同時ニ日本ヨリ派遣セラレタル指導機關ナルヲ  
 以テ同廳長ハ職務トシテ此ノ二重ノ使命ヲ達成  
 セザルベカラズ日滿兩國ノ行動ニ矛盾ナキ様指  
 導スルコトが其ノ本来ノ任務ナリ委員會組織ニ  
 於テ滿洲國側ノ委員ガ若シ特ニ惡意ヲ以テ日本  
 ノ不利ヲ圖ルコトアルトキハ同廳長ハ兩國ノ  
 利益ニ付十分ナル考慮ヲ拂ヒテ之ニ善處スルコ  
 トト爲ルベシト考フ同廳長ハ斯ル懸念ナキ様滿  
 洲國ヲ指導スルコトヲ任務トスルモノナリ  
 委員(栗山) 議長ヲ委員中ヨリ互選スル立法例ア  
 リヤトノコトナルガ國際聯盟理事會ノ如キハ大  
 體ニ於テ議長ハ官議ノ都度委員中ヨリ互選スル  
 例ナリ而シテ新議長ノ選定迄ハ前議長ガ假議長

875A-14

トシテ議案ノ職ヲ行フ例ナリ本協定ニ依ル經濟  
共同委員會ノ議長ニ付テモ大體同様ナルガ近ク  
制定セララルベキ議案規則ニ於テハ此ノ點ニ關シ  
詳細ナル規定ヲ設ケタキ考ナリ此ノ委員會ノ委  
員ハ形式上日籍平等ナルガ故ニ斯ノ如ク互選ノ  
形式ヲ採リタルモノナリ

三十六番（坂本）ニ委員會ノ場合ハ國際聯盟ノ場

合トハ異レリト考フルモ今ハ之ヲ述ベザルベシ  
總務局長ハ日系官吏中滿洲國ヲ指導スベキ議長  
ノ地位ニ在ルモノナレバ同選ナシト考フトノ事  
ナルモ永キ將來ニ於テハ日滿關係ノ現狀ガ全ク  
變化ナシトハ斷ズベカラザルニ由リ當局者ハ今  
後最善ノ努力ヲ以テ大臣ノ答辯ヲ裏切ルガ如キ  
コトナカラムコトヲ希望スルモノナリ

議長（一六）別ニ御發言ナキ故ニ二讀會以下ヲ省  
略シテ直ニ採決スベシ本案贊成ノ各位ノ起立ヲ  
請フ  
議長（一六）全會一致可決セラレタリ  
○

議長（一六）次ニ

遞信省官制中改正ノ件

ヲ議題ニ供ス第一讀會ヲ開キ朗讀ヲ省略シテ直  
ニ容悉報告ヲ爲サシム

875A-18

第四條

委員會ハ必具ニ應シ日滿兩國經濟ノ合理的融合ニ  
シスル一切ノ事項ニ付日滿兩國政府ニ建議スルコ  
トヲ得

第五條

委員會ノ組織及運用ニ付テハ本協定附屬章ノ定ム  
ル所ニ依ル

第六條

本協定ハ署名ノ日ヨリ實施セラレベシ  
本協定ノ正文ハ日本文及漢文トシ日本文本文ト漢  
文本文トノ間ニ解釋ヲ異ニスルトキハ日本文本文  
ニ依リ之ヲ決ス

右議錄トシテ下右ハ各本國政府ヨリ正當ノ委任ヲ受ケ本協定ニ署名  
捺印セリ

昭和十年 月 日即チ康德二年 月 日新京ニ於テ本協定ニ署名  
成ス



875A-19

附 屬 書

- 一 委員會ノ委員ハ八名トシ日清兩國政府ハ各四名ヲ任命シ相互ニ之ヲ通報スベシ委員等故アルトキハ其ノ代理者ニ付滿洲國陸軍大臣帝國特命全權大使滿洲國國務總理大臣相互協議ノ上之ヲ出席セシムルコトヲ得代理者ハ委員ノ名ニ於テ其ノ職ヲ行フ  
右ノ外日清兩國政府ハ必要ニ應ジ協議ノ上各同數ノ臨時委員ヲ任命スルコトヲ得
- 二 議長ハ委員中ヨリ之ヲ互選ス
- 三 委員會ニ幹事若干名ヲ選ク幹事ハ庶務ヲ整理ス
- 四 委員會ノ議事ハ過半数ヲ以テ之ヲ決ス可否同數ナルトキハ議長ノ決スル所ニ依ル議長ハ委員トシテ議決ニ加ハルコトヲ妨ゲズ
- 五 委員會ハ日清兩國政府ノ承認ヲ受テ其ノ議事規則ヲ定ム

875A-20

關於設置滿日經濟共同委員會協定

附 屬 章

關於設置滿日經濟共同委員會協定

茲因滿洲國政府及日本國政府希望為使滿洲國及日本國間現存之滿日兩國經濟上之依存關係永遠鞏固實現滿日兩國經濟之合理的融合

又因兩國政府認為依據大同元年九月十五日即昭和七年九月十五日蓋印之滿洲國日本國間釐定誓之主旨關於滿日兩國互相間重要經濟問題亦滿日兩國有收充分且緊密共同之實效之必要

兩國政府決定設置滿日經濟共同委員會茲協定如左

第一條

滿日經濟共同委員會設置於滿洲國新京

第二條

委員會關於滿日兩國經濟之聯繫上重要事項及滿日合辦特務公司業務之監督上重要事項須應滿日兩國政府諮詢向兩國政府具陳其意見

第三條

滿日兩國政府關於前條事項預諮詢委員會俟有其意見之具陳後辦理之

第四條

委員會有必要時關於滿日兩國經濟之合理的融合上一切事項向滿日兩國政府建議

875A-20

關於設置滿日經濟共同委員會協定

附 屬 條 約

關於設置滿日經濟共同委員會協定

茲因滿洲國政府及日本國政府希望為使滿洲國及日本國間現存之滿日兩國經濟上之依存關係永遠鞏固實現滿日兩國經濟之合理的融合

又因兩國政府認為依據大同元年九月十五日即昭和七年九月十五日蓋印之滿洲國日本國間議定書之主旨關於滿日兩國互相間重要經濟問題亦滿日兩國有收充分且緊密共同之實效之必要

兩國政府決定設置滿日經濟共同委員會茲協定如左

第一條

滿日經濟共同委員會設置於滿洲國新京

第二條

委員會關於滿日兩國經濟之聯繫上重要事項及滿日合辦特務公司業務之監督上重要事項須應滿日兩國政府諮詢向兩國政府具陳其意見

第三條

滿日兩國政府關於前條事項預諮詢委員會俟有其意見之具陳後辦理之

第四條

委員會有必要時關於滿日兩國經濟之合理的融合上一切事項向滿日兩國政府建議

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第五條

關於委員會之組織及其運用依照本協定附屬章所定辦理

第六條

本協定自簽字之日起實施之

本協定以漢文及日本文為正文原文與日本文原文之間遇有解釋不同之處應以日本文原文為準

為此記名奉兩國政府之正當委任將本協定簽字蓋印以昭信守

康德二年 月 日  
昭和十年 月 日

於東京議成云協定二份

875A-22

附 屬 條

- 一 委員會委員以八名爲定數滿日兩國政府應各任命四名並互相知照委員有事故時即於其代理人得選滿洲國國務總理大臣及駐劄滿洲國日本帝國特命全權大使互相協議後派代理人參加該代理人以委員之名義行其職務  
此外滿日兩國政府有必要時得選協議後各任命同數之臨時委員
- 二 議長由委員互選之
- 三 委員會設幹事若干名幹事整理庶務  
幹事由滿日兩國政府於隨員中各任命同數
- 四 委員會議事以過半數決之可否同數時由議長決之議長不妨以委員資格加入議決
- 五 委員會應由滿日兩國政府承認定其議事規則

8/5A-23

勅令第 號

逓信省官制中左ノ通改正ス

第三條中「警記官ハ十七人」ヲ「警記官ハ十八人」ニ改ム

第七條中「逓信省事務官專任十六人」ヲ「逓信省事務官專任十七人」ニ改ム

第七條ノ二中「航空官專任十一人」ヲ「航空官專任十二人」ニ改ム

第八條中「技師六十七人」ヲ「技師六十九人」ニ改ム

第九條中「局ハ專任三百十八人」ヲ「局ハ專任三百四十五人」ニ改ム

第十條中「技手百二十九人」ヲ「技手百四十二人」ニ改ム

附 則

本令ハ公布ノ日ヨリ之ヲ施行ス

875-A-24

證 明 書

「ワシントン」文書局 第 八七五 號  
對 陸 軍 部 第 八七五 號

表 採 及 び 公 証 ニ 關 ス ル 證 明

余、辭保シヨシソノハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、  
即チ樞密院議長秘書トシテ、日本政府ト公的関係  
ニ在ルモノナルコト、並ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ  
添附セラレタル、頁ヨリ成ル、千九百三十  
五年ノ昭和十年ノ七月三日附、下記員名、即チ  
日滿經濟共同委員會設立ニ關スル協定締結ノ件ノ  
文書ノ保管ニ任ジ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文  
書ナルコト、並ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公  
式書類及ビ綴ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シテ  
ラハ綴番號又ハ引用、其他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於ケ  
ル該文書ノ成規所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ)

875A-28-

實業内務院

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 本七月十日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏名

左ノ者ノ公的資格

證人

神保シユウソウ(シヱノ)

樞密院議長秘書

長會我部キチ (キウ)

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、エドワード・ビー・モナガンハ、余ガ聯合  
國最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、  
竝ニ上記姓名ノ文書ハ余ガ公務上、日本政府ノ上  
記署名官吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證  
明ス。

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 本七月十日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名ニ

右ノ者ノ公的資格

證人

エドワード・ビー・モナガン

國際檢察部調査官

ウキリヤム・シー・フラウト



CS 866

Doc. No. 488C

Page 1

The Inevitability of the Renovation by  
FASHI'OTO (p. 139, paragraph 4)

A Leap Towards Armament

There must be established an absolute armament to subjugate under any occasion, any nation with doctrines dis-similar to ours that may hinder the execution of the expansion of the Imperial undertaking. The main stress in the armament must be in the establishment of an air force, taking away from the people the idea that the aircraft belongs to the army and imbuing them with the idea that the aircraft belongs to the nation and the people, similar to the faith that our people had in the Japanese sword in olden times.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I.P.S. No. \_\_\_\_\_

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Shihata, Kosaburo hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Second Class Administrative Officer of Investigation Bureau of Home Ministry in charge of Home Ministry Library. and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of \_\_\_\_\_ pages, dated \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_, and described as follows: Book, entitled "The Inevitability of Renovation", by FASHIMOTO, Kingoro. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Home Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this 7th day of August, 1946 /s/ \_\_\_\_\_  
Signature of Official  
SEAL  
Witness: /s/ H. C. Nortory \_\_\_\_\_  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 7th day of August, 1946 /s/ Edward P. Monaghan  
NAME  
Witness: /s/ Richard P. Larsh \_\_\_\_\_  
Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

Doc 488C

「革新の必然性」ヨリ、抜萃

橋本欣五郎著

昭和十五年十二月二十五日

Ex 866

四軍備的飛躍 皇業亦恢弘、軍具行ニ對シ主義ヲ  
 異ニスル諸國家材害ヲナス場合、隨時之ヲ莫服  
 之得ル、絶対的軍備ヲ完成スルニ、軍備ノ主  
 体ニ無敵空軍トシ、軍ノ航空機タル、觀念ヨリ  
 脱却シ、國家國民、航空機トシ、觀念ニ至リ  
 之ニコト、恰モ古來我國民、日本刀ニ對スル  
 信賴ト同様ナラシムシ。 (二三九頁)

**FILE COPY**  
 RETURN TO ROOM 361

Ex. 867

Doc. No. 522

Page 1  
TRANSMISSION OF DOCUMENT 7897 IS  
SPECIALLY HANDLED

To be kept in locked file.

TELEGRAM

(Secret cypher process)

Tokyo	14th July 1941	0230 hrs.
Arrived	13th July 1941	1120 hrs.

As fast as possible!

No. 1217 of 13th July

For Reichs Minister for Foreign Affairs

.) R.M. In reply to telegram of 10th No. 108 †), received Tokyo 12th July, 1941

1) In view of the present relations of Japan towards the United States, may I refer to my cable reports of 10th & 12th July, which have crossed with the above mentioned telegram. Japanese-American relations are characterized by growing tension. Economic strangulation measures by the U. S. against Japan, which eventually became apparent in the breaking off of the Japanese-Netherlands Indies economic negotiations at the instigation of the Anglo-Saxons, have considerably worsened the situation. Attempts by anglophile Japanese circles to still reach a settlement are doomed to failure owing to American attitude and increasing will to resist on the part of Japanese activists. In view of the state of affairs, I therefore consider the question of a secret verbal assurance by the Japanese government, giving Roosevelt a guarantee and free hand to occupy Iceland as unlikely. Of course, the majority of the Japanese cabinet and the Japanese Foreign Minister consider the possibility of an American entry into the war with unconcealed concern, as has doubtlessly been expressed meanwhile by a "personal message", dated 11th July, Code 5, from Matsuoka and handed by ambassador Oshima to the Reich Foreign Minister. As Matsuoka already explained in Berlin.

The next six sheets (about 1½ typewriter pages) are completely garbled. Repetition is requested.

Cypher Bureau 14th July 1941.

in army and navy, as well as other activist circles, there is a conviction that a Japanese position of power in East Asia can only be realized against Anglo-Saxon Powers. It is true that in these circles one also encounters the

consideration of the ensuing course of the war and the German successes will entail a constantly increasing weakening of not only the Soviet Union but also of the Anglo-Saxons in the Pacific. The chief difficulty is to constantly convince these circles that Japan will gain nothing by waiting.

3) On handing the personal message from Reich Foreign Minister to Matsuoka on evening of 2nd July, the conversation was of a serious nature on account of the unsatisfactory contents of the statement made to Germany. I took it for granted that Matsuoka would carefully discuss the personal message from the Reich Foreign Minister, with the Emperor and Government, in view of its due importance, and reply to it in detail. I therefore do not understand how Matsuoka, as expressed in the preface of his "personal message" to Reich Foreign Minister, could conceive that a personal reply was not expected. I did, however, knowingly fail, at my next conversation with Matsuoka, which was on 8th July, to press for a reply, so that the Japanese government should not be under the misapprehension that their participation in the Russo-German war, or even their assistance, was indispensable. In view of the Japanese mentality, that did not appear to me to have much purpose. Moreover, at his interview of 8th July, Matsuoka made a decidedly uncertain and irritable impression which, as I hear, is connected with fears for his personal position. In accordance with instructions, at my next interview with the Japanese Foreign Minister, I will talk to him as to the reaction of the Japanese cabinet and the composition of the cabinet concerning the Reich Minister's personal message. As I was able to ascertain to-day, when called for by the Minister of War, the message from the Reich Foreign Minister aroused, to a large extent, consent from the army commanders, although they stressed the necessity for a certain time for preparing an attack against the Soviet Union.

(Group garbled.)

4) As regards the report of the Japanese ambassador in Moscow, I refer to telegraphic report No. 1207 of 12th July. In the meanwhile + there are symptoms perceptible here that Japan is seriously undertaking military mobilization measures. The military attaché reported regarding this in telegram No. 1200 of 12th July. As regards Japanese attitude towards an American attack against one of the Axis Powers, I beg to refer to my telegraphic report No. 893 of 6th June, cypher 2.

I am using all possible means to bring about Japan's entry into the war against Russia as soon as possible, and in particular by using the arguments of the personal message from the German Foreign Minister and the telegram cited above, to influence Katsuko personally, as well as the Foreign Office, military elements, Nationalists and friendly businessmen. I believe that, as military preparations reveal, Japanese participation will soon take place. The greatest obstacle against which one has to fight is the disunity of the Activist groups which, without unified command, follows various aims and only slowly adjusts itself to the changed situation.

Ott.

Doc. No. 522

Page 4

Certificate

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages; and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 522.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus \_

Doc. No. 522

Page 4

Certificate

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages; and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 522.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus \_



IPS DOC 522

II. (Orig. in Court) AFFIDAVIT

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am Chief of the Documentation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, Nurnberg, Germany; and that, prior to its introduction and receipt in evidence before the International Military Tribunal I or my predecessors in such office had possession, custody and control of the original captured enemy document number 2897-PS by said Documentation Division.

2. That said above referred to original document was captured and obtained by military forces under command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, from German Foreign Office Files and Archives.

3. That said original captured enemy document after its seizure and capture was delivered to, filed with, numbered and processed by the Documentation Division of said Office of the United States Chief of Counsel at Nurnberg, Germany in the manner set forth and described in detail by me in a certain affidavit made by me and dated the 15th of April 1946 and captioned "Affidavit Concerning the Capture, Processing and Preservation of German Documents and which said affidavit I hereby verify, ratify and affirm and make a part of the herein affidavit by reference.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of said original captured enemy document above described and referred to.

5. That said above referred to original captured enemy document has been introduced and received in evidence before the International Military Tribunal in the course of the trial of the case of the United States of America et al against Herman Wilhelm Goering, et al, and was delivered by said Documentation Division to the General Secretary of the said International Military Tribunal concurrently with its said introduction in evidence, and that said original captured enemy document is now in the possession of, and has been impounded by said International Military Tribunal and its said General Secretary, and that a photostatic copy of said original document is hereby furnished because of the unavailability of said original document for the reasons set forth above.

s/ Gerard Schaefer  
Gerard Schaefer

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 16th day of April 1946.

s/ John W. Auchincloss  
John W. Auchincloss, o-2052152  
Capt., JAGD

IPS DOC. 522

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, THE UNITED  
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND  
NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE UNION OF  
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

-against-

HERMAN WILHELM GOERING et al  
Defendants.

CERTIFICATE

The undersigned, BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM L. MITCHELL,  
herby certifies:

That he is the duly appointed qualified and acting General  
Secretary of the International Military Tribunal, and that as  
such he has possession, custody and control of all of the records  
of said Tribunal and all documents admitted in evidence during  
the trial of the above entitled cause.

That the document to which this certificate is attached is  
a true and correct photostatic copy of the original document  
which was heretofore admitted in evidence in the course of the  
trial of the above entitled cause and identified as Exhibit  
US.. 156.

That said original document so admitted in evidence as  
aforesaid has been impounded by said International Military Tri-  
bunal through the undersigned as its General Secretary, and as  
a result is being held and retained by the undersigned.

That the undersigned has issued the herein certificate  
and caused the same to be attached to said photostatic copy of  
said document in order to verify the existence and contents of  
said Exhibit, and to further establish the fact that the original  
of said Exhibit is unavailable because of its having been im-  
pounded as aforesaid.

DONE at Nurnberg, Germany, this 16th day of April 1946.

s/ William L. Mitchell  
WILLIAM L. MITCHELL  
General Secretary  
International Military Tribunal

Doc 522

67867

N. 1

一六四二年七月十四日附ノオトノリヲ獨外務大臣家ノ三乃至四頁ノ電報ヨリノ抜萃

四ノモノトシ駐劄日本大使ノ報告ニ関シテハ余ハ七月十二日附電報々告第一二〇七號ヲ参照願ヒ度ニ此ノ間……(一部不明)日本ガ真創ニ軍事的動員ノ處置ヲ爲シテナル徴候ガ此所ヲ認メニシル。

大使館附武官ハ是ニ関シ七月十二日附電信第一二〇〇号ニテ報甚シク。

樞軸國ノ一國ニ對スル米國ノ攻撃ニ関スル日本ノ態度反ニ関シテハ六月六日附電報々告第一九三号暗号ニテ御参照乞フ

余ハ此ニ手段ノ就中獨逸國外務大臣ノ個人的メッセージニ該ニ上記ノ電信訓令ノ論旨ヲ利用シ松岡個人外務省軍部國粹主義者等ニ友好的財界諸團體ヲ説得シロシヤニ對スル日本ノ出來ルガク速カナル參戰ヲ志シテナル而シテ戰爭準備ニ現シテナル如ク近キ將來ニ日本ガ參戰スルヲアラウ事ヲ信スル此ニ因リテ關ルベキ最大ノ障害ハ統一的指導無シニ種々ナ目的ヲ求メ情勢ノ變化ニ適應スルニ錢キ積極論者團體ノ命烈否ニ在ル

オット

No. 2

Doc 522

書目類集 五二二號

證

余 Ulrich Straus (余が獨逸語及び日本語  
ニ精通セル者ナルニト並ニ獨逸語原文  
及び日本語原文ヲ対照シ、上右の本書  
類ヲ眞實ニ且正確ニ翻譯セルモノト  
ルヲ確證セルニトヲ以テ證ス

Ulrich A. Straus

Doc 522

國際理事會  
一九四六年九月二十一日  
一九四六年九月二十一日

WILMAN-THOMAS GOLDRIK  
(H.A. Goldrik) - 1946

Ex 867

William S. Mitchell!  
The following is a copy of the letterhead memorandum dated September 21, 1946, from the International Council on Atomic Energy to the United States Atomic Energy Commission. The letterhead memorandum is a copy of the original document and is not a translation. The original document is in English and is located in the file of the International Council on Atomic Energy, New York, New York, under the name of William S. Mitchell. The letterhead memorandum is a copy of the original document and is not a translation. The original document is in English and is located in the file of the International Council on Atomic Energy, New York, New York, under the name of William S. Mitchell.

Doc 522

國際軍事裁判

東京裁判所  
東京裁判所  
東京裁判所

1. 1948年11月11日  
東京裁判所

證明書

東京裁判所  
東京裁判所  
東京裁判所 / William G. Mitchell

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1920年 11月 11日 星期一  
Dear Mr. ...

Dear Mr. ...  
I have received your letter of the 10th and am glad to hear from you.

(Received)

Dear Mr. ...  
I have received your letter of the 10th and am glad to hear from you.

I have received your letter of the 10th and am glad to hear from you. I am sorry that I cannot give you a more definite answer at this time, but I will do my best to get it done as soon as possible.

I have received your letter of the 10th and am glad to hear from you. I am sorry that I cannot give you a more definite answer at this time, but I will do my best to get it done as soon as possible.

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I have received your letter of the 10th and am glad to hear from you. I am sorry that I cannot give you a more definite answer at this time, but I will do my best to get it done as soon as possible.

2

Doc 622

國際軍事裁判

東京裁判所  
被告 威廉·米契爾

WILMAN WILHELM GOLRIK  
(被告)

證明書

本證明書係由 William L. Mitchell

所簽發

記一本人在此以前係在國際軍事裁判所

之法律顧問職務又係在二二二日本職任

時曾於一九四五年及一九四六年判決證據二項

之事實及證據之事實係在二二二日本

在該明書中亦曾於一九四五年及一九四六年

曾於一九四五年及一九四六年曾於一九四五年

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曾於一九四五年及一九四六年曾於一九四五年

Ex 867



1780年 德意志 柏林 普鲁士 国王 腓特烈二世 的 命令  
Nürnberg

德意志 皇帝 腓特烈二世 的 命令  
Nürnberg

(德意志 皇帝)

德意志 皇帝 腓特烈二世 的 命令  
Nürnberg

德意志 皇帝 腓特烈二世 的 命令  
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Nürnberg

德意志 皇帝 腓特烈二世 的 命令  
Nürnberg

2

ケラポド・シニーパー

Grand SCHAEFER (1902)

一九四六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ四月十六日余ノ面前ニ於テ著  
者トシテ宣誓セリ

レヨングブヒニー・オーチンクマウス

John W. AUCHINCLOSS (1902)

D-2052/52

佐藤大尉

Doc 522

此の文書は、締結された文書による記述に基いて参照せしむべき  
戦国文書原簿を真正に寫真したるものなり

右の土地は、戦国文書原簿の「マヨリ」合衆國其他計

「ヘン」の「マヨリ」/ Heer van Michielin GOERING

其の記述は、新設の公判經過中、國際軍事裁判所にて証拠物

として提出せられたるものなり、而して上記文書原簿より上記

証拠物として其の提出に際して上記國際軍事裁判所事務

總長に引渡せられたるものなり、又上記戦国文書原簿の現在

上記國際軍事裁判所及其の二記事務總長の依り所

藏せられたるものなり、上記理由に依り、右文書原簿の流用不可

能くせん以上、上記文書原簿の寫真本を茲に提供せし

モノ十七枚

Doc 522

此項文書係在東京會議上，記述其內容時，已指為  
偽造文書，係不真正之國際法條約。  
此項文書係在東京會議上，由各國代表，由  
「Hermann Wilhelm GOERING」  
將軍所訂定，公認經過中國陸軍部裁判所之證據  
——其案內且受理之——即上述文書，係由  
證據物上，其案內之證人，上述國際軍事裁判所事務  
總長，引證之。又上述證據國文書，原本，現在  
上述國際軍事裁判所及其，上述事務總長，係由  
該文書之證人，上述理由，係由文書原本，亦用不  
能見之。上述文書原本，當其原本，並非提供之  
也。十七年。

Gerard SCHAEFER (署名)

一九四五年一月廿七日，西曆一月廿七日，於  
東京會議上宣誓

John W. AUCHINCLOSS (署名)  
O-2052/52  
法律大尉

OFFICIAL GAZETTE

Showa 15-10-1 (1st Oct 1940)

No. 4122

Tuesday

Imperial Ordinance

We promulgate the Imperial assent to the organization of the Total War Research Institute.

Imperial Signature  
Imperial Seal

Showa 15-9-20 (30 Sept. 1940)

Prime Minister Prince Konoye Fumimaro

Imperial Ordinance No. 648

Organization of the Total War Research Institute Control.

Article I:- The Total War Research Institute shall be under the administration of the Prime Minister and shall control basic study and research in connection with national total war and shall control the education and training of officials and others in connection with national total war.

Article II:- The staff of the total war research institute shall be constituted as follows:

Head of Institute:- of Chokunin Rank

Staff:- Full time; 11 persons; Sonin rank (of which 3 can be Chokunin rank)

Assistants:- Full time; 5 persons; Hannin rank

Clerical Staff:- Full time; 3 persons; Hannin rank.

Article III:- The head of the institute shall govern the affairs of the Institute under the supervision of the Prime Minister.

Article IV:- The staff will control the affairs of the Institute under the orders of the head of the Institute.

Article V:- The assistants will carry on the affairs of the Institute under the directions of their superiors.

OFFICIAL GAZETTE

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Clerical Staff:- Full time; 3 persons; Hannin rank.

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Article IV:- The staff will control the affairs of the Institute under the orders of the head of the Institute.

Article V:- The assistants will carry on the affairs of the Institute under the directions of their superiors.

Article VI: The clerical staff will carry on general duties under the directions of their superiors.

Article VII: Councillors shall be installed in the Total War Research Institute and shall participate in its duties. Councillors shall be appointed by the Cabinet from among higher civil servants of the various government offices concerned and from among eminent and experienced scholars on recommendation to the Throne by the Prime Minister.

Additional Rule:

This ordinance comes into force from the day of promulgation.



C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
IPS. No. 1705-E

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, TAKAHASHI, Michitoshi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Cabinet and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 1072 pages, dated \_\_\_\_\_, 1940, and described as follows:

Bound Volume of Official Gazette for October, 1940, issued daily except Sundays and holidays for the purpose of publishing all ordinances and laws among other things by authority of the Japanese Government.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):  
Japanese Cabinet Secretariat

Signed at Tokyo on this  
26th day of August, 1946.

s/ M. Takahashi

Secretary of Cabinet

Witness: s/ R. Kuriyama

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
26th day of August, 1946.

Witness s/ R. F. Mahon

s/ Edward P. Monaghan

Name

Investigator, IPS

Official Capacity

868 A Dec # 1795B-1

陸軍省陸軍研究所官制ヲ改訂シ茲ニ之ヲ公布セシム

御 名 御 璽

昭和十五年九月三十日

内閣總理大臣 公 告 第 一 四 六 六 号

勅令第六百四十八號

總力戰研究所官制

第一條 總力戰研究所ハ内閣總理大臣ノ管理ニ屬シ  
國家總力戰ニ關スル基本方針ヲ制定シ及官吏其  
ノ他ノ者ノ國家總力戰ニ關スル教育訓練ヲ掌ル


第二條 總力戰研究所ニ左ノ職員ニ任ズ

- 所 長 勅任
- 所 員 專任十一人 陸軍省內ニテハ勅任ト爲スコト  
之ヲ得
- 助 手 專任五六 現任
- 登 記 專任三人 現任

第三條 所長ハ内閣總理大臣ノ指揮監督ヲ承ケ所務  
ヲ統理ス

第四條 所員トシテ國家ノ命ヲ承ケ所務ヲ掌ル

第五條 助手ハ國家ノ命ヲ承ケ所務ニ關ス



RETURN TO ROOM 36

1795 B-2

第六條 登記へ上司ノ指揮ヲ受ケ属務ニ従事ス

第七條 總力坂研究所ニ參與シ得キ所業ニ參與セシ

ム

參與ハ内閣總理大臣ノ奏請ニ依リ門係各府高等官及學識經驗アル者ノ中ヨリ内閣ニ於テ之ヲ命ズ

附 則

本令ハ公布ノ日ヨリ之ヲ施行ス

1795B

國際檢察部 第一七九五B號  
證明書  
典據及公正ニ関スル證明

余高橋ニトシハ余カ下記資格ニ於テ、即チ  
内閣書記官トシテ日本政府ト公的関係ニ在ルモ、  
タルト、茲ニ該官吏トシテ余カ茲ニ添付セラレタル、  
千七百二頁ヨリ成ル千九百四十年ノ昭和十五年ノ  
下記題名、即チ日本政府ノ許可ニヨリ勅令、法律、  
其他一切ヲ公示スルタメノ日曜及祭日ヲ除ク日刊  
一九四〇年ノ昭和十五年ノ十月分官報製本ノ文書、  
保管ニ任シ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。  
余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書カ日本政府ノ公文書  
タルコト、茲ニ右カ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局、公式書類  
及ビ綴ノ一部タルコトヲ證明ス。(若シテ綴番號又ハ  
引用、其他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於テ該文書、正規  
所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ)

日本内閣書記官室

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十二年ノ八月廿六日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名欄

右ノ者ノ公的資格

證人

高橋ニトシ署名捺印

内閣書記官

アール・クリヤマ一署名

No 1

1795-B.

余 EDWARD P. MONAGHAN 余が聯合國最高指揮官  
 總司令部ニ關係スルニ、且ト右ノ上記題名ノ文書、  
 余が公務上日本政府、上記署名官吏ヨリ入手スル  
 モノニシテ、茲ニ證明ス。

十九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 六月廿六日

東京ニ於テ署名

代名欄	EDWARD P. MONAGHAN
右者ノ公的資格	イトワルド P. モナガン 署名
證人	檢察部調査官
	アール P. MOLION 署名

No 2

Ex 8

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and OTHERS )  
 )  
 - AGAINST - )  
 )  
ARAKI, SADA0 and OTHERS )

A. E. I. D. A .

I, HORIBA, KAZUWO do swear on my conscience that the following is true :

1. I am officially connected with the Japanese Government as the Secretary of the First Demobilization Bureau.
2. THE document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit A" which has been signed by me is a list of Members of the Institute for the research into total war. The document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit AA" which has also been signed by me is a translation of Exhibit A which I handed to the International Prosecution Section.
3. THE document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit B" which has been signed by me is a list of research student members of the Institute for the research into total war for the first, second and third periods from April 1, 1941 to March 1944. The document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit BB" which has also been signed by me is a translation of Exhibit B which I handed to the International Prosecution Section.
4. THE document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit C" which has been signed by me is a list of the contents of lectures at the Research Institute. The document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit CC" which has also been signed by me is a translation of Exhibit C which I handed to the International Prosecution Section.
5. THE said documents marked "Exhibit A", "Exhibit B" and "Exhibit C" have been compiled by me from memory and from enquiries made by me, the official records having been burnt or destroyed, and I cannot claim that they are complete.
6. THE document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit D" which has been signed by me is a list of the subjects and practices of education and training for first term students of the Institute in 1941 showing the names of lecturers and the number of lectures on each subject and other particulars. The document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit DD" which has also been signed by me is a translation of Exhibit D which I have procured and handed to the International Prosecution Section.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and OTHERS )  
 )  
 - AGAINST - )  
 )  
MIYAKI, SADAO and OTHERS )

A. E. E. L. E. A. . .

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2. THE document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit A" which has been signed by me is a list of Members of the Institute for the research into total war. The document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit AA" which has also been signed by me is a translation of Exhibit A which I handed to the International Prosecution Section.
3. THE document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit B" which has been signed by me is a list of research student members of the Institute for the research into total war for the first, second and third periods from April 1, 1941 to March 1944. The document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit BB" which has also been signed by me is a translation of Exhibit B which I handed to the International Prosecution Section.
4. THE document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit C" which has been signed by me is a list of the contents of lectures at the Research Institute. The document hereto annexed and marked "Exhibit CC" which has also been signed by me is a translation of Exhibit C which I handed to the International Prosecution Section.
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7.\_\_\_\_IN my official capacity, I have examined the twentysix documents, particulars of which are contained in the Schedule annexed hereto and marked "Exhibit E", the said documents being now in the custody of the International Prosecution Section. The said documents have been compiled by the Total War Research Institute as material for research and training in the Institute, or are collections of the results of the work of the research students and were obtained by General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers from Japanese Government Offices.

8.\_\_\_\_IIMURA, Jo who formerly held the rank of Lieutenant -General in the Japanese Army held the post of Director of the Total War Research Institute from January 1941 to October 1941. Prior to his holding that post he was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, and on ceasing to hold that post he was appointed to command the Fifth Army in Manchuria and subsequently he was appointed Director of the Military War College.

/s/ Horiba Kazuwo

Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned Officer by the abovenamed HORIBA, KAZUWO at War Ministry Bldg., Tokyo, Japan this 5th day of August 1946.

/s/ Roland Schwartz, Capt. TC  
Summary Courts Martial

C E R T I F I C A T E.

I. A. R. Joyce hereby certify that I am fully conversant with the Japanese and English languages and that I did, this day, read the foregoing Affidavit to the abovenamed HORIBA, KAZUWO in Japanese and in so doing did truly and correctly translate the contents thereof from English into Japanese. And I further certify that I did at the same time show to him the Japanese translation of the said affidavit which is annexed hereto and that he did read the same and thereafter did sign the said affidavit and the said translation in my presence, having previously duly sworn on oath that the contents of both the said documents were understood by him and were true. And I also certify that all proceedings incidental to the administration of the said oath and the signing of the said documents were truly and correctly translated from Japanese into English and from English into Japanese and were to the best of my knowledge and belief fully understood by him.

Dated this 5th day of August, 1946 at War Ministry, Tokyo, Japan.

/s/ A. R. Joyce



7.\_\_\_\_IN my official capacity, I have examined the twentysix documents, particulars of which are contained in the Schedule annexed hereto and marked "Exhibit E", the said documents being now in the custody of the International Prosecution Section. The said documents have been compiled by the Total War Research Institute as material for research and training in the Institute, or are collections of the results of the work of the research students and were obtained by General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers from Japanese Government Offices.

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Dated this 5th day of August, 1946 at War Ministry, Tokyo, Japan.

/s/ A. R. Joyce

LIST OF MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE RESEARCH INTO TOTAL WAR

Official post	Name	Former post (Rank)	Return to Original post	Period in charge	Item in charge
President	Jo Iimura	Lieut. General	Commander of 5th Army	From Jan.1941 to Oct.1941	Control
In charge of { President General Secretary President	Shin Oka	Vice-Admiral	Naval attache in Shanghai	From Dec.1940 to Nov.1941	Assistant to President
	Shichi Endo	Major-Admiral	Commander in Chief of the 1st Despatched Fleet to China	From Nov.1941 to Mar.1943	Control
President	Kobayashi Marakami	Lieut. General	Commander of Army	From Mar.1943 to Dec.1943	Control
President	Yoshigawa	Vice-Admiral	Naval attache to Japa- nese Embassy in China	From Dec.1942 to Jan.1945	Control
General Secretary	Yoshikawa Kawamoto	Secretary of Great East Asia Ministry	Secretary of Home Ministry	From Dec.1943 to Apr.1945	Economy
In charge of President General Secretary In charge of President	Yoshida Wada	Secretary of Commerce and Industry Ministry	Ammunition official of the ammunition Ministry	From Mar.1944 to Apr.1945	Economy
General Secretary	Yoshida Fujimuro	Major-General	Chief of the Marine Production Bureau, Agriculture & Forestry Ministry	From Oct.1941 to Aug.1942	Military affairs
Member	Chiaki Matsuda	Captain	Front	From Oct.1940 to Sep.1941	Military affairs
Member	Nataru Watanabe	Colonel	Front	From Oct.1940 to Oct.1941	Military affairs
Member	Shoichi Terada	Secretary of Agricul- ture & Forestry Ministry	Chief of the Marine Production Bureau, Agriculture & Forestry Ministry	From Oct.1940 to Feb.1942	Economy
Member	Seitiro Okamatsu	Secretary of Commerce & Industry Ministry	Chief of Mining Supervision Bureau	From Oct.1940 to Mar.1943	Economy

Official post	Name	Former post	Return to Original post	Period in charge	Item in charge
Member	Hiroo Oshima	Secretary of Home Ministry	Chief of the Business Bureau, Military Aid Board	From Oct.1940 to Jul.1943	Thought
Member	Katsumi Maeda	Secretary of Ministry of Finance	Secretary of Ministry of Finance	From Oct.1940 to Jun.1942	Economy
Member	Katsuzo Okumura	Secretary of Foreign Office	Second Rank Secretary of Embassy	From Oct.1940 to Nov.1940	Diplomacy
Member	Tooru Hagihara	Secretary of Foreign Office	Secretary of Foreign Office	From Dec.1940 to Feb.1942	Diplomacy
Member	Masaru Nishiuchi	Professor of Army	Professor of Army	From Mar.1941 to Jan.1944	Thought
Member	Kazuo Horiba	Colonel	Front	From Jul.1941 to Aug.1942	Military affairs
Member	Tetsutoki Tsuda	Secretary of Communication Ministry	Secretary of Communication Ministry	From Jul.1941 to Dec.1941	Economy
Member	Hideo Hosoi	Secretary of Taiwan-government	Secretary of Taiwan-government	From Aug.1941 to Sep.1942	Thought
Member	Shigeo Honda	Senior staff of South M.R.Co.Ltd.	To South M.R.Co.Ltd.	From Oct.1941 to Mar.1943	Economy
Member	Kaoru Takeuchi	Captain	Ministry of Navy	From Nov.1941 to Jul.1942	Military affairs
Member	Totaro Sasaki	Member of Mitsui Bussan Co.Ltd.	To Mitsui Bussan Co.Ltd.	From Dec.1941 to Dec.1942	Economy
Member	Yuichi Hori	Secretary of Communication Control Office	Secretary of Communication Control Office	From Dec.1941 to Sep.1943	Economy
Member	Tsuru Kuwahara	Secretary of Legation	Secretary of Foreign Office	From Feb.1942 to Jan.1943	Diplomacy

Official post	Name	Former post	Return to Original post	Period in charge	Item in charge
Member	Kikuro Higuchi	Railway Investigation Division	Secretary of Railway Ministry	From Feb.1942 to Dec.1943	Economy
Member	Tadao Annaka	Secretary of Insurance Board	Secretary of Ministry of Welfare	From Oct.1941 to Jul.1943	Economy
Member	Toshio Mano	Lieut. Colonel	Lieut. Colonel	From Mar.1942 to Dec.1943	Military affairs
Member	Kunao Nishimura	Secretary of Foreign Office	Senior official of Embassy	From Mar.1942 to Dec.1943	Diplomacy
Member	Risaku Yamazoe	Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry	Chief of the Forestry Administration Bureau	From Mar.1942 to Feb.1944	Economy
Member	Jiro Oba	Senior official of Monopoly Bureau, Ministry of Finance	Secretary of Ministry of Finance	From Jul.1942 to Dec.1943	Economy
Member	Jaro Iwase	Member of Yokohama Specie Bank	Headquarters of Investigation and Research Mobilization	From Mar.1943 to Mar.1944	Economy
Member	Mikio Suzuki	Secretary of Home Ministry	Chief of Section Metropolitan Police Station	From Jul.1943 to Aug.1944	Thought
Member	Genpu Nakayama	Colonel	Front	From Aug.1942 to Aug.1944	Military affairs
Member	Den Harada	Secretary of Agriculture Forestry of Ministry	Secretary of Combined Board	From Dec.1943 to Apr.1945	Economy
Member	Seiichi Arafune	Secretary of Communication Control Bureau	Secretary of Communication Board	From Sep.1943 to Mar.1945	Economy
Member	Keakichi Yoshida	Secretary of Foreign Office	Secretary of Foreign Office	From Dec.1943 to Apr.1945	Diplomacy
Member	Minoru Machida	Secretary of Home Ministry	Secretary of Home Ministry	From Aug.1944 to Apr.1945	Thought

EXHIBIT "B"LIST OF MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE  
RESEARCH INTO TOTAL WAR

(Note: Those whom no explanations are  
given returned to former posts.)

First period students (From April 1, 1941 to March 2, 1942)

Former place of service	Return to original post	Name	Remarks
Ministry of Railway		Osamu Akutagawa	
Domei-tsushin-sha		Takeo Akiba	
Ministry of Overseas Development		Takashi Ishii	
Ministry of Finance		Kenkan Imaizumi	
Intendance Bureau of War Ministry		Shun Okamura	
Secretariat of House of Representatives		Shiro Okabe	
Home Ministry		Shojiro Kawaguchi	
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry		Tadashi Kiyoi	
Member of central Bank of Industrial association		Kakuichi Kubota	
Tokyo girls' Higher Normal School		Go Kurazawa	
Ministry of Finance		Toshihiko Sakai	
Member of Nippon Bank		Tadashi Sasaki	
Ministry of Navy		Tadashi Shimura	
War Ministry		Masatoki Shirai	
Ministry of Commerce and Industry		Keizo Tamagi	

Navy Ministry		Yoshio Takechi
Foreign Office		Hiroshi Chiba
Nippon Steel Manufacturing Co. Ltd.	Recruited in course of study	Yukio Chiba
Ministry of Education		Takashi Choji
Tokyo Prefectural Office		Hisao Nakanishi
North China Area Army		Kanichi Narita
Ministry of Commerce and Industry		Tsutomu Nomiyama
Foreign Office	Intelligence Bureau of Cabinet	Kaoru Hayashi
Tokyo Higher School	Ministry of Education	Taneyuki Hara
Chosen Government		Hiroo Hirasa
Home Ministry		Kiyoshi Fukuda
Mitsubishi Mining Co. Ltd.		Reiichi Hoshina
N.Y.K.		Katsuji Maeda
Judge	Judicial Research Institute	Kantaro Mibuchi
Ministry of Welfare		Katsumi Mibuchi
Daido-Gakuin		Jiro Mizazawa
Ministry of Communication	Yokohama Marine Affairs Bureau	Iwao Mori
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry		Gaisei Yano
Military Staff College	to proceed to front before graduation	Toshihisa Yamaguchi
Home Ministry		Keiichi Yoshioka

## Second period students (From 1st April 1942. to March 1943)

Former place of service	Return to original post	Name	Remarks
Domei-tsushinsha		Nori Akutagawa	
Judge	Tokyo District Civil Court	Masanori Asano	( dead in June, 1944 )
Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry		Yoshihiko Ito	
Rural Rehabilitation Association		Katsuhide Inoue	
Sumitomo chemical Industry Co. Ltd.		Yasuhiko Inochi	
Yokohama Specie Bank		Taro Iwase	
Yamashita Shipping Co. Ltd.		Juichi Urushino	
Home Ministry		Toshio Eguchi	
Ministry of Communication		Shigeru Otsuka	
North China Area Army		Teiken Oda	
Ministry of Railway		Gaku Kanematsu	
War Ministry		Kiyoyasu Kawakami	
Ministry of Education		Fujimaro Kubota	
Intendence Bureau of War Ministry		Takuji Kumagai	
Imperial agricultural Association		Kenichi Koike	
Tokyo Higher Normal School		Nobuaki Kobayashi	
Local Office	Ministry of welfare	Shinjiro Koyama	

War Ministry		Kasetsugu Sakakibara	
Ministry of Commerce & Industry		Kyo Salama	(dead in June 1944)
Ministry of Over Seas Development Nippon Oil Co. Ltd.	Ministry of Great East Asia	Hideo Sue	
		Eiji Suzuki	
Foreign Office		Akira Sono	
M. H. I. Co. Ltd.		Fumio Takaoka	
Home Ministry		Katsuji Tamakoshi	
Ministry of Navy	Front	Taizo Doi	
Ministry of Finance		Yasuo Nakanishi	
General Affairs Bureau. Manchukuo Government Chosen Government General		Tadao Natsume	
Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry		Masayuki Hashimoto	
General Affairs Bureau Manchukuo Government		Yoshinori Fujimaki	
Ministry of Welfare	Home Ministry	Yoshifumi Futagawa	
Nippon Steel Manufactur- ing Co. Ltd.		Kishiro Hoshino	
Taiwan Government		Isao Mizuno	
Ministry of Finance	Ministry of Finance	Seiji Minoyama	(dead in March 1943)
The 4th Higher School		Hajime Murakami	
Ministry of Commerce & Industry	Ministry of Commerce & Industry	Hiroshi Morikawa	
Foreign Office		Hachiro Yamaji	
Ministry of Navy		Zene Yamatsu	
Nippon Electric Distribution Co.		Katsuro Yamamoto	
		Ichiro Watanabe	



War Ministry		Masatsugu Sakakibara	
Ministry of Commerce & Industry		Kyo Sakuma	(dead in June 1944)
Ministry of Over Seas Development Nippon Oil Co. Ltd.	Ministry of Great East Asia	Hideo Sue	
		Eiji Suzuki	
Foreign Office		Akira Sono	
M. H. I. Co. Ltd.		Fumio Takaoka	
Home Ministry		Katsuji Tamakoshi	
Ministry of Navy	Front	Taizo Doi	
Ministry of Finance		Yasuo Nakanishi	
General Affairs Bureau. Manchukuo Government Chosen Government General		Tadao Natsume	
Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry		Masayuki Hashimoto	
General Affairs Bureau Manchukuo Government		Yoshinori Fujimaki	
Ministry of Welfare	Home Ministry	Yoshifumi Futagawa	
Nippon Steel Manufactur- ing Co. Ltd.		Kishiro Hoshino	
Taiwan Government		Isao Mizuno	
Ministry of Finance	Ministry of Finance	Seiji Minoyama	(dead in March 1943)
The 4th Higher School		Hajime Murakami	
Ministry of Commerce & Industry	Ministry of Commerce & Industry	Hiroshi Morikawa	
Foreign Office		Hachiro Yamaji	
Ministry of Navy		Zene Yamatsu	
Nippon Electric Distribution Co.		Katsuro Yamamoto	
		Ichiro Watanabe	

War Ministry		Masatsugu Sakakibara
Ministry of Commerce & Industry		Kyo Sakuma (dead in June 1944)
Ministry of Overseas Development	Ministry of Great East Asia	Hideo Sue
Nippon Oil Co. Ltd.		Eiji Suzuki
Foreign Office		Akira Sono
M. H. I. Co. Ltd.		Fumio Takaoka
Home Ministry		Katsuji Tamakoshi
Ministry of Navy	Front	Taizo Doi
Ministry of Finance		Yasuo Nakanishi
General Affairs Bureau. Manchukuo Government Chosen Government General		Tadao Natsume
Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry		Masayuki Hashimoto
General Affairs Bureau Manchukuo Government		Yoshinori Fujimaki
Ministry of Welfare	Home Ministry	Yoshifumi Futagawa
Nippon Steel Manufactur- ing Co. Ltd.		Kishiro Hoshino
Taiwan Government		Isao Mizuno
Ministry of Finance	Ministry of Finance	Seiji Minoyama (dead in March 1943)
The 4th Higher School		Hajime Murakami
Ministry of Commerce & Industry	Ministry of Commerce & Industry	Hiroshi Morikawa
Foreign Office		Hachiro Yamaji
Ministry of Navy		Zene Yamatsu
Nippon Electric Distribution Co.		Katsuro Yamamoto
		Ichiro Watanabe

## Third period Students (From April 1, 1943 to Dec. 1, 1943)

Former place of service	Return to original post	Name	Remarks
Judge	Tokyo District Criminal Court	Gizin Aoki	
Home Ministry	Tokyo Prefecture Office	Masaaki Adachi	
Ministry of Navy		Teizaburo Ara	(dead)
Nippon Manure Co.		Yoshiro Arai	
Army Surgeon School		Katsuhiko Inagaki	
Ministry of Finance		Ryoichi Iida	
Mainichi-Shinbun-sha		Masahiro Imaizumi	
Government Deposit Bureau		Hiroshi Imai	
Ministry of Commerce and Industry	Ministry of Ammunition	Akira Irie	
Tokyo Shibaura Electricity Co. Ltd.		Tsugio Iwata	
Home Ministry		Toshio Ueda	
Chosen Government		Kiyokazu Okubo	
Nippon Nitrogen Manure Co. Ltd.		Tadashi Kakegawa	
Nippon Coal Co. Ltd.		Yoshiro Kanazaka	
Dai Nippon Air Navigation Co.		Tatsuhiko Kawabuchi	
Daido-Gakuin	General Affairs Bureau Manchukuo Government	Haruo Kitazawa	
Mitsui Shipping Co.		Shuichi Kumano	
Ministry of Railway	Ministry of Communication	Hirotsugu Kobun	
War Ministry		Yoshio Kouda	
Foreign Office		Tasaku Kojima	
Yokohama Higher Commercial School		Shinzaburo Koshimura	

## Third period Students (From April 1, 1943 to Dec. 1, 1943)

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Home Ministry	Tokyo Prefecture Office	Masaaki Adachi	
Ministry of Navy		Teizaburo Ara	(dead)
Nippon Manure Co.		Yoshiro Arai	
Army Surgeon School		Katsuhiko Inagaki	
Ministry of Finance		Ryoichi Iida	
Mainichi-Shinbun-sha		Masahiro Imaizumi	
Government Deposit Bureau		Hiroshi Imai	
Ministry of Commerce and Industry	Ministry of Ammunition	Akira Irie	
Tokyo Shibaura Electricity Co. Ltd.		Tsugio Iwata	
Home Ministry		Toshio Ueda	
Chosen Government		Kiyokazu Okubo	
Nippon Nitrogen Manure Co. Ltd.		Tadashi Kakegawa	
Nippon Coal Co. Ltd.		Yoshiro Kanazaka	
Dai Nippon Air Navigation Co.		Tatsuhiko Kawabuchi	
Daido-Gakuin	General Affairs Bureau Manchukuo Government	Haruo Kitazawa	
Mitsui Shipping Co.		Shuichi Kumano	
Ministry of Railway	Ministry of Communication	Hirotsugu Kobun	
War Ministry		Yoshio Kouda	
Foreign Office		Tasaku Kojima	
Yokohama Higher Commercial School		Shinzaburo Koshimura	

Government Monopoly Bureau	Ministry of Finance	Masakatsu Mitsueda
Manchukuo Government		Asami Sato
Local Office	Ministry of Ammunition	Tadao Sato
North China Area Army		Seihei Sawabe
Ministry of Education		Sakuo Teranaka
Tokyo Prefecture	Tokyo Prefectural Office	Kosaku Nakamura
Army Ministry		Masaro Nalamura
Military Aid Board		Isao Nerio
Ministry of Great East Asia		Takehiko Hisatake
Foreign Office		Seizo Hiuga
Ministry of Navy		Ichiro Fujihara
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry		Mori Masuda
Koshi Higher School		Toshihiko Miyata
Ministry of Commerce and Industry		Shigeru Murata
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry		Toyozo Murata
Mining Control Association		Saburo Morimoto
Taiwan Government		Asataro Yamamoto
Nippon Bank		Ko Yoshizawa
Mainichi-Shinbunsha		Nobu Yoshitake

EXHIBIT "CC"LIST OF THE CONTENTS OF LECTURES AT THE RESEARCH INSTITUTE  
FOR TOTAL WARFARE

Name of lecturer	Social position of lecturer	Subject of lecture
Jyo Iimura Kiichi Endo Keisuke Murakami Kanji Ogawa	the Head of the Institute, " ) " ) " )	Foundamental principles of National Total Warfare
Arata Oka	the Director of the Insti- tute	Merits and demerits of Japanese
Wataru Watanabe Kazuo Horiba Chiaki Matsuda Genpu Nakayama	Member of the Institute " ) " ) " )	On China Incident  General Principles of Total warfare
Seitaro Okamatsu Shuzo Yamada Taro Oda Yoji Minobe	" ) the Planning Board ) Director ) the Planning Board )	Concerning the material mobilization
Shoji Suganami	Chief of Steel Section ) in the Ministry of ) Commerce & Industry )	Steel
Shoichi Terada	Member of the Institute	General conception of food question; food question; the condition of the marine products.
Einosuke Ishii	Chief of Agricultural Administ- ) ration Bureau in the Ministry ) of Agriculture and Forestry )	General conception of food question; Food condition; the condition of marine products.
Risaku Yamazoe Den Harada Mototake Yugawa Ko Kurakami	Member of the Institute ) " ) Director of Provision Bureau ) Ministry of Agriculture and ) Forestry )	General conception of food question; Food condition; the condition of marine products.
Kanji Kato Tadaatsu Ishiguro	) )	) )
Tetsutoki Tsuda	Member of the Institute	General conception of communication
Yuichi Hori Shizuo Yoneta	Member of the Institute ) Director of Marine trans- ) portation Bureau )	Marine transportation

Kikuo Higuchi	Member of the Institute	Land traffic
Sonosuke Nagasaki	Director of transportation Bureau in the Railway Bureau	Railroad transportation
Katsumi Maeda	Member of the Institute	General conception of finance
Uichi Noda	Secretary of Finance	Control of foreign exchange
Hisatsune Sakamizu	"	Finance control
Juichi Tsushima	Vice President of Bank of Japan	Theory on financial matter
Tsuneji Taniguchi	Director of Accountant's Bureau in the Ministry of Finance	Present state of Japanese Finance
Hideo Matsukuma	Director of Revenue Bureau in the Ministry of Finance	System of Japanese taxes
Tadao Annaka	Member of the Institute	General conception of service
Takeo Mori	Intendant Maj. Gen.	Economic history
Tooru Hagihara	Member of the Institute )	
Katsuzo Okumura	" )	
Tsuru Kuwatara	" )	State of things in foreign policy
Kumao Nishimura	" )	
Kenkichi Yoshida	" )	
Hikomatsu Kamikawa	Doctor of Law	History of diplomacy
Hidemi Ozaki	the Asahi (newspaper)	State of affairs in China
Kumataro Honda	Ambassador	State of affairs in China
Shigeharu Matsumoto	Domei News Agency	Gossip on China
Saburo Ota	Secretary of Foreign Affairs	State of affairs in the United States of America
Yoshio Nakano	Colonel	State of affairs in Great Britain
Buryo Isomura	Colonel	State of affairs in the Near East
Minister Sakamoto	Minister of Foreign Affairs	State of things in Europe
Ambassador Hongo	Ambassador	State of affairs in Soviet Russia
Hisao Tani	Lt. General	History of Russo-Japanese War
Koji Sakai	Lt. General )	History of World War I
Tsunamasa Shidei	Maj. General )	
Ryosuke Fujimuro	Maj. General	History of China Incident
Tetsuzo Nakajima	Lt. General	Change of Military Power Warfare
Takeji Teramoto	Rear Admiral	Essence of leadership
Masami Ishii	Colonel	Real condition of battle
Wataru Watanabe	Member of the Institute )	
Kazuo Horiba	" )	Outline of Military tactics
Genpu Nakayama	" )	

Chiaki Matsuda Kaoru Takeuchi	Member of the Institute "	)	Outline of Naval tactics
Yozo Miyama Susumu Nishiura	Colonel "	)	Organization of the Army
Kikusaburo Okada	Colonel		Military munition mobilization
Chiaki Matsuda Sumi Hiraizumi Takeo Yamada	Member of the Institute Doctor of Literature		Organization of the Navy Japanese History "Kojiki" (ancient chronicle)
Masaru Nishiuchi	Member of the Institute		Original meaning of Japanese Nationality
Hiroo Oshima Hideo Hosoi Misao Suzuki Minoru Machida	" " " "	) ) ) )	trend of thought in the country
Goro Murata	Director of Peace Section in the Ministry of Home Affairs		Trend of the thought in the country
Sotaro Ishiwata	Secretary-General of the assistance of the Imperial Rule association		Regarding to the Imperial Rule Assistance Association
Seizo Kobayashi	Admiral		State of affairs in Formosa
Hideoto Mori	Secretary of the Planning Board		Poly-geography of the East Asia

Note: As above-mentioned has been made retracing my memory, it is not yet perfect.

/s/

The 22 May 1946.J. Imura



\*DD\*

Subjects and practices of lectures and trainings for 1st term students in 1941.

Basic principle of National Constitution	22
NISHIUCHI, Staff Member.	18
YAMADA, President of Tengu Kogakukan College.	2
HIRAIZUMI, Professor.	2
Totalized War	412 (118)
Principle and rules of totalized war.	50
Director of Institute.	10
Superintendent of Institute.	15
TERADA, Staff Member.	2
MATSUDA, Staff Member.	11
NATANABE, Staff Member.	6
HORII, Staff Member.	3
SATO, Chief of Military Affairs Section.	2
FUJIMURO, Staff Member with an additional post.	6
Leadership.	
Captain TERAMOTO.	6
State of things in foreign Countries.	34
1941	
Apr. 5. Extra lecture Latest international situations.	
HAGIWARA, Staff Member.	1
Apr. 14. Germany and Italy.	Major General OKAMOTO. 1
Apr. 28. Politics in China.	OTA, Chief of 1st of Far East Bureau. 1
Apr. 30. Navy.	MATSUDA, Staff Member. 1
May 2. Politics in Europe.	SAKAMOTO, Chief of Europe and America Bureau. 1
May 15. Military affairs in U.S.S.R.	Colonel ISOMURA. 1
May 20. Problems in the South Seas.	Captain HORIUCHI. 2
June . . . . .	lecture. Ambassadors HONDA. 1

ANNEX D

Subjects and practices of educations and trainings for 1st term students in 1941.

Basic principle of National Constitution	22
NISHIUCHI, 3rd Member.	18
YAMADA President of Jingu Kogakukan College.	2
HIRAIZUMI, Professor.	2
Totalized War	412 (118)
Principle and rules of totalized war.	50
Director of Institute.	10
Superintendent of Institute.	15
TERADA, Staff Member.	2
MATSUDA, Staff Member.	11
MATANABE, Staff Member.	6
HORIBA, Staff Member.	3
SATO, Chief of Military Affairs Section.	2
FUJIMURO, Staff Member with an additional post.	6
Leadership.	
Captain TERAMOTO.	6
State of things in foreign Countries.	34
1941	
Apr. 5. Extra lecture Latest international situations.	
HAGIWARA, Staff Member.	1
Apr. 14. Germany and Italy.	Major General OKAMOTO.
	1
Apr. 28. Politics in China.	OTA, Chief of 1st of Far East Bureau.
	1
Apr. 30. Navy.	MATSUDA, Staff Member.
	1
May 2. Politics in Europe.	SAKAMOTO, Chief of Europe and America Bureau.
	1
May 15. Military affairs in U.S.S.R.	Colonel ISOMURA.
	1
May 20. Problems in the South Seas.	Captain HORIUCHI.
	2
June 1. Lecture.	Ambassadors HONDA.
	1

	June 18. Navies in Europe. Captain KOJIMA	2
	June 19. Economics in China. MORI, Secretary of Board of Planning.	1
	June 30. Powers politics toward China. SAITO, Yoshie.	1
	July 1. 1.) Policy in China. OZAKI, Hidemi.	2
	2.	
	July 2. Economics in the South Seas. YAMADA, Fumio	1
	July 4. Navy of U.S.A. Captain OGAWA	2
	July 4. Europe and the South Seas HAGIWARA, staff member	1
	July 8. Political policy of U.S.A. UKI, Chief of 1st Section of American Bureau.	2
	July 8. Foreign Policy of U.S.A. ONO, Chief of 2nd Section of American Bureau.	1
	July 9. Foreign Policies in the South Seas. TOKO, Chief of 2nd Section of the South Seas Bureau.	1
	July 14. Natives in the South Seas. ITAGAKI, Professor of College of Commerce.	1
	July 25. Foreign policy of Germany. Secretary FURUUCHI.	1
	Aug. 5. Military affairs of China. HORIBA, Staff member.	1
	Sept. 10. Extra lecture. IMAI, 1st Secretary of Japanese Ambassadors in U.S.S.R.	1
	Oct. 21. 1.) Affairs in U.S.S.R. Lieutenant Colonel HAYASHI.	2
	23.	
	Oct. 28. Problems in the South Regions. HAGIWARA, Staff member.	1
	Nov. 18. British Colonial Policy. OTA, Chief of 3rd Section of European Bureau.	
	Nov. 29. Economics in Germany. TACHI, Investigation Official of Bank of Japan.	1
1942	Jan. 24. Observation of the Great War from British point of view. Lieutenant Colonel NAKANO.	2
	History of Totalized War.	28
	Lieutenant General TANI	13
	" SAKAI	5
	Vice-Admiral NAKAJIMA	10
	Practical exercises in room, investigations and trainings.	294

	June 18. Navies in Europe. Captain KOJIMA	2
	June 19. Economics in China. MORI, Secretary of Board of Planning.	1
	June 30. Powers politics toward China. SAITO, Yoshie.	1
	July 1. )Policy in China. OZAKI, Hidemi.	2
	2.	
	July 2. Economics in the South Seas. YAMADA, Fumio	1
	July 4. Navy of U.S.A. Captain OGAWA	2
	July 4. Europe and the South Seas HAGIWARA, staff member	1
	July 8. Political policy of U.S.A. UKI, Chief of 1st Section of American Bureau.	2
	July 8. Foreign Policy of U.S.A. ONO, Chief of 2nd Section of American Bureau.	1
	July 9. Foreign Policies in the South Seas, TOKO, Chief of 2nd Section of the South Seas Bureau.	1
	July 14. Natives in the South Seas. ITAGAKI, Professor of College of Commerce.	1
	July 25. Foreign policy of Germany. Secretary FURUUCHI.	1
	Aug. 5. Military affairs of China. HORIBA, Staff member.	1
	Sept. 10. Extra lecture. IMAI, 1st Secretary of Japanese Ambassadors in U.S.S.R.	1
	Oct. 21. )Affairs in U.S.S.R. Lieutenant Colonel HAYASHI.	2
	23.	
	Oct. 28. Problems in the South Regions. HAGIWARA, Staff member.	1
	Nov. 18. British Colonial Policy. OTA, Chief of 3rd Section of European Bureau.	
	Nov. 29. Economics in Germany. TACHI, Investigation Official of Bank of Japan.	1
1942	Jan. 24. Observation of the Great War from British point of view. Lieutenant Colonel NAKANO.	2
	History of Totalized War.	28
	Lieutenant General TANI	13
	" SAKAI	5
	Vice-Admiral NAKAJIMA	10
	Practical exercises in room, investigations and trainings.	294

## Military Warfare.

Essence, strategy and tactics of Military Warfare.	40
WATANABE, Staff Member.	1
HORIBA, Staff Member.	7
Lieutenant General NAKAJIMA.	13
Major General SHITEI	4
ISHII, Staff Member with an additional post.	8
MATSUDA, Staff Member.	1
NAOI, Staff Member with an additional post.	6

Military Organization.	22
WATANABE, Staff Member.	3
Colonel NAKAYAMA.	2
"    SANADA.	1
"    OKADA.	2
Lieutenant Colonel OSMKA.	2
MATSUDA, Staff Member.	4
Captain TAKADA.	1
ISHIKAWA, Staff Member with an additional post.	1
Captain YAMAGUCHI.	3
"    NAGATANI.	2
HASHIMOTO, Staff Member with an additional post.	2

Ships, arms and military materials.	20
WATANABE, Staff Member.	1
MATSUDA, Staff Member.	19

Political Warfare.  
(Diplomatic)

Essence, basic principle, rules and applications of political warfare.	10
HAGIWARA, Staff Member.	10
History of political warfare.	8
Professor KAMIKAWA.	8

## Economical Warfare.

Principle and rules of economical warfare.	9
TERADA, Staff Member.	4
OKAMATSU, Staff Member.	3
MAEDA, "	2
History of economical warfare.	6
Major General, Intendance MORI.	6

Economics in War  
Nil.

	<b>Important Materials.</b>		16
1941	Apr. 22. Food situation.	ISHII, Chief of Bureau.	2
	May. 1. General plan for material mobilization.	SUZUKI, Staff member with an additional post.	1
	May 7. General plan for development of production.	YAMADA, staff member with an additional post.	1
	May 10. Iron.	SUGANAMI, Secretary of Ministry of Commerce and Industry.	1
	May 13. Coal.	TSUDA, Chief of Coal Bureau.	1
	May 14. Fuel oil.	AZUMA, President of Fuel Bureau.	1
	June 30. Fertilizer.	SHIGEMASA, Chief of Bureau.	2
	July 24. Withdrawal of substitute materials.	HIRAI, Chief of Section.	1
	Oct. 23. Non-iron Metals.	WATANABE, Chief of Section.	1
	Oct. 28. Control of silk thread.	YOSHIDA, Seiji.	1
	Oct. 31. Forestry products.	IDEYAMA, Chief of Forestry Bureau.	1
	Nov. 7. On reorganization of economy.	KANDA, Staff Member with an additional post.	1
	Dec. 2. Substitute fuel.	BAN, Chief of Fuel Investigation Institute.	1
	Dec. 9. Agriculture in General.	TERADA, Staff Member.	1
	<b>Money market and others.</b>		
1941	Apr. 14. Finance.	TANIGUCHI, Chief of Intendance Bureau.	1
	Apr. 21. Taxes.	MATSUZUMI, Chief of Revenue Bureau.	1
	Apr. 22. Control of Money Market.	SEKOMIZU, Chief of Planning Section.	1
	Apr. 24.) Inflation	ARAI, Vice Governor of Kogyo Bank.	2
	30.)		
	Apr. 28. Affairs of Money Market.	TEUSHIMA, Vice Governor of Bank of Japan.	1
	May 1.) Money order.	NODA, Staff Member with an additional post.	2
	2.)		
	May 27. Railroad transportation.	NAGASAKI, Chief of Transportation Bureau.	2
	June 12. Ships.	YONEDA, Chief of Section.	2
	July 5. Electricity.	TAGURA, Chief of 1st Bureau of Electricity Board.	2
	July 10. Services.	Saiki, Chief of Section.	2

July 16.	Commerce.	MIZUNO, Chief of Bureau of Commercial Affairs.	2
July 21.	Latest state of affairs in China.	TSUDA, Staff Member.	1
Sept. 11.	Aviation.	OKUDO, Chief of International Aviation Section.	1
Sept. 12.	Communication.	TSUDA, Staff Member.	1
Oct. 31.	Prices.	HONGO, Chief of 2nd Bureau of Price Board.	1
Nov. 18.	Emigrants.	IMAYOSHI, Chief of Takuhoku Board.	1
	Inspection.		
	Inspection of establishments in Tokyo Metropolis.		3
	Thought Warfare.		19
	Principle and rules of thought warfare.		12
	OSHIMA, Staff Member.		8
	HOSOI, "		2
	OKA, Masao.		2
	History of thought warfare.		
	Nil.		
	Educational questions.		4
	Colonel NAKAGAWA.		2
	HORIIKE, Chief of Planning Bureau of Education Board.		2
	Domestic thought questions.		
	MURATA, Chief of Peace Section.		3
	Lectures on Science and others.		10
Apr. 7.	On observation of secrecy.	OSHIMA, Staff Member.	1
Apr. 24.		KOBAYASHI, ex-Governor General of Formosa.	1
May 12.		HOSHINO, President of Planning Board.	1
May 19.		ISHIWATARI, President of General Affairs Bureau of Imperial Rule Assistance Association.	1
May 22.	Inspection of examination of conscription.	WATANABE, Staff Member.	1
June 17.		SORIMACHI, Eiichi.	1
Sept. 4.		SAKURAZAWA, Joichi.	1
Sept. 11.		MATSUMOTO, Chief of Editorial Office of Domei News Agency.	1

Nov. 17.	Inspection of the expeditionary session of the Diet.	1.
Inspection tour.		61 days
May 8-9.	Inspection of Military Cadets School.	2 "
May 30-June 3.	Inspection of the establishments in Niigata and Toyama Prefectures.	5 "
June 21-28.	Visit to the Great Shrine of Ise. Inspections of Naval Manouvre, and economical establishments of Kyushu and Chugoku, Districts.	8 "
July 19-20.	Visit to the Kashima Shrine.	2 "
Sept. 1-2.	Practice of purification ceremony.	2 "
Sept.14-Oct.19.	Foreign tour.	36 "
Nov.12-14.	Inspection of Military Manouvre.	3 "
Nov.20-22.	Inspection of Agricultural Communities in Ibaraki Prefecture.	3 "



Nov. 17.	Inspection of the expeditionary session of the Diet.	1.
Inspection tour.		61 days
May 8-9.	Inspection of Military Cadets School.	2 "
May 30-June 3.	Inspection of the establishments in Niigata and Toyama Prefectures.	5 "
June 21-28.	Visit to the Great Shrine of Ise. Inspections of Naval Manouvre, and economical establishments of Kyushu and Chugoku, Districts.	8 "
July 19-20.	Visit to the Kashima Shrine.	2 "
Sept. 1-2.	Practice of purification ceremony.	2 "
Sept.14-Oct.19.	Foreign tour.	36 "
Nov.12-14.	Inspection of Military Manouvre.	3 "
Nov.20-22.	Inspection of Agricultural Communities in Ibaraki Prefecture.	3 "

EXHIBIT "E"SCHEDULE OF COMPILATIONS OF THE TOTAL WAR RESEARCH INSTITUTE.

<u>I.P.S.</u> <u>Doc.No.</u>	<u>TITLE.</u>	<u>Date of compilation</u> <u>by Total War Research</u> <u>Institute.</u>
1543 (1)	"Special Plan of Export and Import under War Conditions." (Top Secret).  This document was compiled by the Japanese-Manchurian Economic and Financial Research Institute in April 1938.	27 October 1941
1544 (2)	"Plan for Replenishing Technicians, Skilled Laborers and General Laborers for Expanding Productive Power". (Top Secret).  This document was compiled by the Japanese-Manchurian Economic and Financial Research Institute on 17th June 1937.	18th October 1941
1548 (3)	"Data pertaining to natural Petroleum".	June 1943
1355 (4)	"Reports on 1942 Total Research". (Marked Secret).	30th March 1943
1367 (5)	"Daily Log of Training Affairs". (Marked Confidential).	July 1942
1368 (6)	"The Estimates of the Domestic and Foreign situation in the early part of 1941 from the Total War viewpoint". (Marked Top Secret).	1941
1471 (7)	"Data in Estimating the Future of East Asia from an Economic Standpoint". (Marked Top Secret).  This publication was compiled by the Japanese-Manchurian Economic and Financial Research Institute.	5th October 1941
1472 (8)	"Anticipation of Economic Warfare". (Marked Secret).	19th December 1941
1473 (9)	"Study on Total War pertaining to the National strength of Imperial Japan and Foreign Powers". (Top Secret).	March 1944

SCHEDULE OF DOCUMENTS IN THE TOTAL WAR RESEARCH INSTITUTE - Contd.

I.P.S. Doc.No.	TITLE	Date of Compilation by Total War Research Institute.
1507	(10) "Plans for Direction of Wartime Finance". (Marked Top Secret).	25th October 1941
	This document was compiled by the Japanese-Manchurian Economic and Financial Institute in January 1939.	
1521	(11) "Table Discussion pertaining to completion Remaining Business". (Marked Secret).	1941
	"Suggestions for Implementing the Directions for the table discussion". (Marked Top Secret).	1941
1524	(12) "Summary on Total War" - Volume I. (Marked Secret).	1 July 1941
1669	(13) "Documents pertaining to Second Stage Exercises table discussion in the Planning of Total War". (Marked Secret).	1943
1594	(14) "Discussion from the Standpoint of Total War regarding present situation of Japan". (Marked Top Secret).	10th January 1943
1605	(15) "Documents pertaining to 1942 Exercises in the planning of Total War". (Marked Secret).	1943
1621	(16) "Draft of Establishment of Greater East Asia-First Phase in the Total War Plan". (Marked Military Top Secret).	18th February 1942
1660	(17) "Opinions on Research Items". (Marked Top Secret).	1941
1341	(18) "Asiatic Affairs".	14th December 1941
2228	(19) "Records of Progress of the First Stage Exercise in table discussion of Total War". (Marked Top Secret).	August 1941
1401	(20) "Report of Basic Research of War Time Industry".	March 1943

SCHEDULE OF COMPILATIONS OF THE TOTAL WAR RESEARCH INSTITUTE - Contd.

<u>I.P.S. Doc. No.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>Date of Compilation by Total War Research Institute.</u>
1343	(21) Basic Research Materials for 1942.	1941-42
1342	(22) Table Top Manoeuvres for 1942. (Military "Top Secret")	1942
1331	(23) Anticipation of Diplomatic War in the Total War. ("Top Secret").	24 January 1942
1566	(24) "The Study of the System of National Organ- ization for the Total War of the Empire".	3rd February 1941
1549	(25) Revision of educational system of Total War Institute.	September 1943
1795	(26) Imperial Ordinance No.648 establishing "Control of Total War Research Institute".	30 September 1940.

Q# 811

Doc. No. 2228

RECORDS OF THE PROGRESS OF  
THEORETICAL MANOEUVERS FOR TOTAL WAR No. 1

(Secret)

∟ To be perused by

Director of the Institute  
The Secretary  
The Staff

pp 1-3

THE THIRD PERIOD (August, Showa 16 /1941/)

I. The measures taken by the Government of "Blue Country" during the period were as follows:-

1. Decided by the Cabinet.

- (1) To take measures for delaying A's conciliatory proposal to N.
- (2) To reply to D's request to the new Cabinet of Blue Country for manifestation of its attitude towards D by saying that as long as D observes the N-D Treaty, N will make no positive attack on D.
- (3) To plan the strengthening of political and military collaboration with T.
- (4) To leave things as they are regarding X.
- (5) To strengthen the purpose of joint defense regarding F.
- (6) To prevent further deterioration in present conditions regarding E and to continue economic negotiations.
- (7) To accelerate imports from A, B, E and L in view of the prospect of their cessation.
- (8) To provide extraordinary postal regulations by emergency Imperial decree for the opening, censoring and confiscation of mails.

- (9) To expand and alter commodity mobilization plan by 50%.
- (10) To take appropriate measures for the regulation of food consumption; maintenance of import trade; increased production and the ration system (rice 2.1 "go" per day and a composite ration-ticket system, etc.).
- (11) To set up a revised capital mobilization plan with an ¥800,000,000 reduction in administrative expenses.

II. The following measures were reported in the Cabinet council:-

- (1) Telegraphic instructions were sent to the Ambassador to A to sound A's true intentions and the possibility of a concession - Foreign Minister.
- (2) Measures to increase shipping and crews and plans for marine transportation - Communications Minister.
- (3) Measures to cope with the shortage of 300,000 labourers. - Welfare Minister.
- (4) Various measures regarding the freezing of funds and measures for industrial funds - Finance Minister.
- (5) Measures for overland transportation:  
(Passenger and freight - through Korea and Manchukuo) - Railway Minister.

The Fourth Period (September, Showa 16 /1941/)

pp. Measures taken during this period were as follows:  
4-6

I. Decided by the Cabinet:-

- (1) To reply that we shall not deviate from our policy of abiding by the Treaty of Alliance in answer to X's request that N should immediately participate in the war against A.
- (2) To establish our position gradually regarding T.

- (3) To continue our usual policy regarding A and D.
- (4) To obtain as much materials from A, B, E and L as the situation permits.
- (5) To maintain strict control against the internal spread of false rumors, and to give the people a more thorough knowledge of the present situation.
- (6) To place small-type transportation and freight trucks under government control as a measure for small scale transportation in special areas.
- (7) To set up a Shipping Board and to place all private shipping under government control.
- (8) To adjust and reorganize the medium and small-scale tradesmen and manufacturers, and thereby prevent the confusion arising from the reduction of the volume of civilian goods, as well as to redistribute labour to lines urgently needed in the emergency.
- (9) To enact an Imperial ordinance for fixing official prices of shares.

II. Matters reported at the Cabinet Meeting:-

- (1) Measures for securing a propagandizing communication network for coping with wartime emergencies.
- (2) Measures concerning the leakage of secrets.
- (3) Measures in the educational field for establishing a thought guidance system, exalting the morale of educators, and perfecting the labour mobilization system of students.
- (4) Food policy.
  - (i) Importation of 10,000,000 koku /TN.  
49,629,000 bushels/ of foreign rice.
  - (ii) Enforcement of a composite ration-ticket system.
  - (iii) Establishment of a self-sufficient food supply bloc.

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- (5) Measures for dealing with the unsatisfactory importation of Korean rice.
- (6) Plan for promoting the subscription of Government bonds and for maintaining their market prices.
- (7) Counter-measures for the unemployment of medium and small-scale tradesmen and manufacturers in the overseas.
- (8) Civilian aviation policy.
- (9) Plan for the distribution of ocean vessels.

TOP SECRET

The Fifth Period (October, Shows 16 /1941/)

pp.  
7-8

1. It was decided that E shall be occupied by force, and immediate all-out preparations for war shall be launched in anticipation of a war against A, B and E; and that the Supreme Command shall be consulted at once, and be informed that we hope to apply force three months hence. Various measures were discussed and decided upon, regarding the Cabinet Council's decisions on the 15th October for the invasion of E.
2. Emergency air defense measures to meet the international situation were decided upon and an estimation was made as to how far X would cooperate with N in the event of Blue Land participating in the war against A, etc.
3. The Government's answer to the request lately submitted to the Government by the Supreme Command asking for the Government's concrete views regarding our precise capacity for waging war against A, B and C, was discussed and decided.
4. A second committee consisting of the vice ministers of the various ministries concerned was established, for the preparation and preliminary study of measures necessary for starting hostilities against A and B.
5. Reports were received from the various Ministers about matters under their jurisdiction, the most important questions brought up being as follows:-
  - (1) Food measures to cope with the decrease of rice and other cereals.

- (2) Stock market measures to cope with the depreciation of shares.
- (3) Measures for the disposal of savings in local banks.
- (4) Measures for the cessation of trade with A, L, E, and F.
- (5) Measures for psychological warfare to conceal our intentions of invading E.

pp. The Sixth Period (November, Shows 16 /1941/)  
C-11

1. It was decided to reply that the Government is in complete agreement with the Supreme Command in their request for maximum speed in the execution of the actions pre-arranged against E and to that end will hold a joint conference where it hopes for Cabinet decisions.
2. Decision was reached on the questions to be discussed in the said liaison conference, of which the most important were: (1) Date and time of the armed invasion, (2) Purpose and form of the expedition, (3) and diplomatic policies at the time.
3. In view of the situation during the middle and latter parts of November, it was decided that, while making up our mind to open forestalling hostilities against A and B at a good opportunity as soon as preparations are completed, diplomatic negotiations shall be continued peacefully with them.
4. The Government decided on a petition to the Emperor to convoke an extraordinary session of the Imperial Diet immediately after the invasion of E, and on the bills to be introduced into the Diet, the more important of which are as follows: -

China Affair Emergency War Expenditure Special Account Budget Bill.

Tax Increase Bill.

Wartime Finance Corporation Bill.

State Management of Shipping Bill.

- (2) Stock market measures to cope with the depreciation of shares.
- (3) Measures for the disposal of savings in local banks.
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pp. The Sixth Period (November, Shows 16 /1941/)  
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Wartime Finance Corporation Bill.

State Management of Shipping Bill.

Cooperative Farming Bill.

Revision of the Railway Business Law.

Special Criminal Procedure in Wartime Emergency Bill.

Wartime People's Life Maintenance Bill

5. The important items decided by or reported to the Cabinet Council are as follows:-

Decisions on:-

- (1) Draft reply to D's proposal to N of November 10.
- (2) Request for the closing of A and B's consulates in N.
- (3) Measures for coping with any deficiencies in our internal police strength.
- (4) Concerning the enforcement of a clothes rationing system.

Reports on:-

- (1) Plans for dealing with the complexities of the labour situation.
- (2) Plans for an increase in shipping.
- (3) Food plans
- (4) Plans for internal and external psychological warfare.

The Seventh Period (December, Showa 16 /1941/)

pp.

12-13 1. Cabinet decisions were mainly as follows:-

- (1) To make increased efforts in preparations for war against A and B, and endeavour to achieve speedy results from our invasion of E.

(The above decision was introduced for consideration in the joint council with the Supreme Command, and it was decided to wage war on A due to considerations of strategy. This decision received Imperial sanction.)

- (2) To file a strong protest against the unlawful sinking of our warships by A.
  - (3) To file a protest against A's declaration of a neutral sea zone in the Far East.
  - (4) To file a protest against A's oppression of the Japanese nationals in A.
  - (5) To inform third powers that we have started hostilities against B.
  - (6) To sign a secret anti-war pact with D.
  - (7) To make it our policy to keep the L countries neutral.
  - (8) To take, upon declaration of war on A and B, the direct measures reported by the Second Committee.
  - (9) The following food measures were decided:-
    - (1) Basic consumption of rice and cereals:-  
1.9 "go" per day.
    - (2) To expedite the import of foreign rice and rice from outside Japan.
  - (10) To place the whole country under martial law.
  - (11) To make sure of our plans for railway transportation at the time war is declared.
  - (12) Diet Measures.
    - (1) To carry out a general election.
    - (2) Measures to shorten the period of adjournment.
2. Plans for psychological warfare at the beginning of the war, and other important measures were reported in the Cabinet Council.

The Eighth Period (January-March, Showa 17 /1942/)

pp.

14-16 1. It was arranged, following consultation with the Supreme

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The Eighth Period (January-March, Showa 17 /1942/)

pp.

14-16 1. It was arranged, following consultation with the Supreme

Command, to sound T as to the possibilities of utilizing her for military purposes, short of turning her into an actual battlefield.

2. Transportation of war supplies from L to D by D's ships will not be interfered with, but trade between L and D through neutral ships will be discouraged as much as possible by the establishment of danger zones and by application of the principle of non-stop voyages for wartime contraband.
3. Bills to be submitted to the regular session of the Diet were considered and it was decided that the term of session should be one month.

The most important of the bills introduced into the Diet were as follows:

General budget for the fiscal year 1942.

Supplementary bills to the Special Budget for Extraordinary Military Appropriations for the China Incident.

Bill for the revision of the regulations of the Bank of Japan.

A bill for the reduction or exemption of taxes in afflicted areas.

A bill for banking organizations.

Bills for taxes and bonds.

A bill for government airraid insurance.

A bill for corporations to utilize wartime installations.

A bill for corporations for wartime control of resources.

A bill for revision of the telegraph and postal regulations.

A bill concerning special wartime crimes and punishments.

A bill for special civil case procedures for wartime emergency conditions.

3. bill for the enforcement of conscription in Korea.
4. bill for the incorporation of schools.
4. The proposals of the First Committee were listened to and studied concerning a valuation of the economic importance as a whole of E, and the general course of action for administration of the occupied territories.
5. Reports were received on the damage sustained in the air raids on Tokyo, estimated at 32,000 houses burnt down and a total of 172,000 victims, and on the countermeasures to be taken by the various ministers for matters under their respective jurisdiction.

The Ninth Period (April-October, 1942)

pp. 17-18 The matters decided upon by the Cabinet council during the period were mainly as follows:-

1. To enter a strong protest with D for having supplied A with bases and at the same time to suspend forthwith the facilities given D and make preparations for war against D.
2. To reply to A's request for hostilities by us against D by saying that X must be satisfied for the present with the blockade we now intend to carry out, and to request X in return to engage energetically in the destruction of A's shipping. (These were the measures to be taken during April and May.)
3. To vanquish all the difficulties of the present situation and carry out the Manchurian emigration policy, as already planned.
4. Things being what they were in July, the Cabinet did not reach agreement on whether or not we should open hostilities against D, due to the strong convictions voiced that the military supplies required by the Supreme Command (revision of the commodity mobilization plan by 100% expansion) beyond the nation's capacity.
5. Conference was held regarding the proposed plan for strengthening the Cabinet, but no conclusion was reached.



6. Offensive measures for economic warfare against A and B were reported by the Finance Minister.

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Records of the Progress of Diplomatic Warfare  
In the Theoretical Maneuvers for Total War No. 1

August 23, 1941

Akira CFIBA, Foreign Minister

The General Outline of the Progress

Akira CFIBA, Foreign Minister

pp. 20-21 The Third Period (August 1941)

In conformity with the decisions of the conference held in the Imperial presence on 10 August, our diplomatic policies during this period were aimed chiefly at preparations for our advance into the Southern Regions while at the same time maintaining the status quo between N and X and avoiding conflict with A and D by the following line of action:-

- (1) We avoided making any definite reply to A's suggestion of 10 August to neutralize the alliance between N and X in view of the fact that ultimately the national policies of N and A were irreconcilable and we did our best to delay a clash with A by following a neutral policy.

- (2) We endeavoured to promote friendly relations with D by settling trade and fishing problems with her. We invoked the treaty of neutrality existing between N and D and thus endeavoured to check A-D collaboration aimed against N.

- (3) We sounded T on her inclination to cooperate politically and militarily with N and also endeavoured to strengthen economic cooperation with T. Finding T faced with numerous internal political difficulties, we concentrated the greater part of our efforts on the latter objective and obtained considerable success during this period as well as the next.

- (4) We endeavoured to obtain as much materials as possible from E, A, B and L, but without much success due to various obstacles during the next and subsequent periods.

pp. The Fourth Period (September)  
21-22

During this period, we followed the same policy as we had in the previous one.

- (1) X decided to open hostilities against A due to A's offensive, and requested us to do so simultaneously. We answered that though relations between N and X remained the same, N found it inconvenient to open hostilities just at present. X began to try to make peace again with B, but we pointed out that as there was little possibility of success in it we hoped she would rather intensify her war against B and also proposed joint N-X operations in case of war against A.
- (2) A asked N for the expression of N's attitude. We told A that we were concerned with the maintenance of peace in the Pacific and tried to make A believe that our determination to observe the treaty between N and X was unchanged.
- (3) In view of the impending war between A and X, the Foreign Minister demanded of the Government that they implement their resolution to observe the treaty between N and X and effect immediate completion of armaments and all military preparations for war against A and B.

The Fifth Period (October)

pp.  
22-  
23

X at last opened hostilities against A. A interned N's ships; B, F and L followed suit. Economic negotiations with E came to a stop. On the 15th at a cabinet council, it was decided that we would march into L at a favourable opportunity on or after 1 December. Accordingly, our diplomacy during this period was as follows:-

- (1) X again requested us to open war on A at once, to which we answered that our resolution to abide by the treaty was unchanged and that we would soon be invading L. We notified X of the assistance we expected from her in case N pushed southward or declared war against A.
- (2) We avoided provoking A and confined ourselves to a protest against A's internment of our ships, without resorting to retaliatory measures. We also lodged similar protests against the

internment of our ships by B and L.

- (3) We warned E against the internment of our ships and the seizure of our goods. The Government still entertained some hopes of peaceful settlement in spite of the decision of the Cabinet Council on the 15th, and decided to reopen economic negotiations but could not reach an agreement with the Supreme Command Headquarters as to the methods by which the negotiations should be carried on. The Government, therefore, had no alternative but to notify its envoy in F. (The Foreign Minister proposed sending an ultimatum just before we resorted to armed force, but the Supreme Command Headquarters objected to this by arguing the necessity of concealing our intentions.)

#### The Sixth Period (November)

pp.  
23-  
25

In response to A's declaration of war on X and strengthening of its position against N in the early part of this period, it was decided to carry out our plans at an earlier date and start operations against E on the 15th of this month.

- (1) We immediately lodged with E our minimum economic requirements and opened negotiations, but E refused our requests. On the 15th we started operations against E.
- (2) Just before the invasion of the 15th, we asked X for assistance from the rear by intensifying her operations against D.
- (3) Immediately following our invasion on the 15th, we notified A and B of the objective of our advance and of the necessity of our taking counter-measures if we were interfered with. A and B declared a severance of economic relations with N and demanded the withdrawal of our consulate personnel. They also detailed their forces in preparation against us. So the War, Navy and Foreign Ministers urged the Government to take the initiative in starting hostilities against A and B, but the Government could not yet bring itself to this decision.

- (4) We only demanded the closing of the consulates of A and B.
- (5) During the middle part of this month D demanded that we guarantee the territorial integrity and importation of goods from third countries. We began negotiations for the guarantee on the condition that F was not put to military use by A.

#### The Seventh Period (December)

pp.  
25-  
26

It was while our operations against E were progressing favourably that F on the 1st unlawfully declared a neutral zone in the seas off P, thus impeding our operations, and on the 5th unlawfully sank our transports. We again urged the Government to make a decision and with the understanding of the Government we took the following actions:

- (1) We lodged a strong protest with J against her unlawful actions. Then on the 10th the Cabinet Council decided to start hostilities against A. On the 20th, we began attacking the strategic point of P. A and B declared war on us.
- (2) We took the necessary steps both internally and for third countries regarding A and B's declaration of war.
- (3) We proposed to X the issuing of a joint declaration on the objectives of the war, to which X agreed; and we issued it. And at the same time N and X concluded a non-single-peace treaty.
- (4) In response to E's declaration of war at the beginning of this month, we started hostilities against her.
- (5) At the beginning of this month, we requested D to sign a secret anti-war pact. This was signed at the end of the month.

#### The Eighth Period (Jan. - March, 1942)

pp.  
26-27

(1) A request was made by the Supreme Command Headquarters regarding cooperation with T. Accordingly, as the result of a joint conference with the Supreme Command Headquarters, the Government decided to sound T on her intentions.

In February we were in the middle of this when B invaded T, which gave us the opportunity for concluding a joint-defence agreement between N and T. N and P were to jointly oppose A and B and A was offered facilities for her troops to pass through T.

(2) There was some suspicion that D was connected with A, so we warned D in order to check her. On the other hand, in respect to D's request for a guarantee in obtaining goods from A, we decided to accord D facilities for her vessels to pass through the below-mentioned danger zones and endeavoured to observe the secret treaty. In March D asked our assistance in obtaining goods from C, F, T, P and Q, but we refused for operational reasons.

(3) There were signs of an increase in trade between A and D by means of L's ships; our navy declared a danger zone in our neighboring seas and took measures to make it physically impossible for neutral ships to get through. All of the L countries, except A, B and C, demanded the withdrawal of our diplomats and we retaliated by severing relations with them.

#### The Ninth Period (Apr.-July, 1942)

pp.  
27-  
28

(1) A's attack upon us by aircraft and submarines increasingly deepened our suspicions of an understanding between A and D, so we suspended strictly in May the facilities for D's ships to pass through the danger zone and lodged a strong protest with D for violating the secret anti-war treaty.

(2) To X's request that we start hostilities against D, we asked her to be satisfied with our intensified operations against A and B and the pressure we were exerting upon D.

(3) As it became certain in July that A was making use of h, the Foreign Minister urged the Government to take a strong attitude towards D. The Government, however, reached no decision on counter measures. Our diplomatic measures were to be considered as soon as the Government's decision was made.

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pp.  
27-  
28

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THE RECORD OF THEORETICAL MANEUVERS FOR TOTAL WAR No. 1

(Confidential Documents)

By: Pseudo War Ministry

Date: August 1941

p.30-32

Record of Maneuvers

By Minister SHIRAI Masatake (the War Ministry)

Vice Minister OKAMURA Shun (the War Ministry)

The Third period of maneuvers (August)

1. Measures against A:

Against A's proposal of August 10th, the Minister firmly insisted at the Five Ministers' Conference, that "we should not agree to it, but should push ahead independently with the preparations for advance into B." But in view of the demand from the Supreme Command Headquarters that "they desire to secure materials from A, L, etc., as much as possible," the Conference adopted a temporizing policy for the negotiations with A.

2. Internal measures.

In view of the fact that the country's internal affairs had at last become very complicated, what with the military and industrial mobilizations, the Minister requested the other Ministers to make efforts to exterminate these obstacles by adopting the principle of military priority at this time of emergency.

3. Revised commodity mobilization plan and the estimation of fighting capacity.

After being informed by the Supreme Command Headquarters of the scale of war against A, B, and C, we were asked our opinion of our war prosecution capacity. After conferring forthwith with the Planning Board and others we worked out a revised plan for commodity mobilization. This we referred to the Supreme Command Headquarters and obtained its agreement along the line of the government plan. The estimate of our war prosecution capacity, we did our best to complete in cooperation with the Planning Board. (This estimate was presented to the Supreme Command in the fourth period after approval by the Cabinet Council.)

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4. The expansion of the productive power of munitions factories.

In accordance with what we had planned, we notified the factories concerned of our expansion goal.

5. Conscription of civilians.

Necessary personnel for munitions factories according to our plan was conscripted.

6. The First Committee Meeting.

The First Committee meeting was held and decided the fundamental policy for the handling of occupied territories.

p.33-

34

The fourth period of maneuvers (September)

1. External measures.

In view of the international situation, we presented to the Cabinet Council our considered opinion that, "Blue Country should continue to expedite her preparations for southward advance, while securing her position on the side of X." As this opinion was generally in accord with the proposal made by the Foreign Minister, we further expressed our desire to know the real intentions of X's peace offensive against B.

2. Pushing ahead with the revised commodity mobilization.

In view of the unsatisfactory progress in the shift to the revised commodity mobilization, we not only promoted its enforcement inside our own department, but also called the attention of other Ministries to this point by expressing our opinion in the Cabinet Council.

3. The strengthening of the Cabinet's powers of control.

Believing that, in view of the acute situation, it was urgently necessary to strengthen the Cabinet's powers of control, we presented our opinion to the Cabinet Council and obtained the approval of other Ministers with regard to the putting into operation of article 2 of Imperial Ordinance No. 673 (of 1939) and other matters.

4. The readjustment of civil aviation.

After conferring with the ministers of the Navy and of Communications, we adopted a readjustment plan for civil aviation. In view of the shortage of fuels, the plan called for the abolition of all air routes, except those connecting N with the continent and the Southern Region, though the training of crews was to be continued on the present scale. The plan was approved by the Cabinet Council.

4. The expansion of the productive power of munitions factories.

In accordance with what we had planned, we notified the factories concerned of our expansion goal.

5. Conscription of civilians.

Necessary personnel for munitions factories according to our plan was conscripted.

6. The First Committee Meeting.

The First Committee meeting was held and decided the fundamental policy for the handling of occupied territories.

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The fourth period of maneuvers (September)

1. External measures.

In view of the international situation, we presented to the Cabinet Council our considered opinion that, "Blue Country should continue to expedite her preparations for southward advance, while securing her position on the side of X." As this opinion was generally in accord with the proposal made by the Foreign Minister, we further expressed our desire to know the real intentions of X's peace offensive against B.

2. Pushing ahead with the revised commodity mobilization.

In view of the unsatisfactory progress in the shift to the revised commodity mobilization, we not only promoted its enforcement inside our own department, but also called the attention of other Ministries to this point by expressing our opinion in the Cabinet Council.

3. The strengthening of the Cabinet's powers of control.

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## 5. Psychological warfare against C.

Taking advantage of the anti-war sentiments in C, we issued orders to all concerned to intensify psychological warfare against C.

## 6. External measures based on newly reported conditions.

We proposed to the Cabinet Council that "Blue Country" should make up her mind that war against A and B was inevitable, and to promptly complete all preparations for it," but the Cabinet Council decided that its policy would remain unchanged.

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## The fifth period of maneuvers (October)

## 1. External measures.

In view of the international situation, the Minister firmly insisted in the Cabinet Council, that "Blue Country" must promptly complete all her preparations against A and B, and carry through her economic demands against E by intensified pressure." He also urged emphatically that it was time for "Blue Country" to adopt concrete measures for advancing into E (anticipated to take place about one month later). However, since some thought a date some three months later would be more appropriate, no decision was reached even by midnight. The Cabinet went to the Liaison Conference armed with both proposals, where they decided on a measure for planning for armed advance into E by grasping a good opportunity any time after 1 December."

## 2. C's request for the purchase of munitions.

It was proposed and approved by the Cabinet Council that with reference to C's request for the purchase of munitions "though not complying with the request in substance, we will manifest our earnest desire to help her, and not give a definite refusal to her request until after our advance into the South."

## 3. Air defense.

(1) The Home Minister proposed among others, "an urgent Imperial Ordinance for the Enforcement of Air Defense," to which we agreed.

(2) We proposed to the Cabinet Council that preparations be made for enforcing martial law in order to strengthen air defense. Since the Home Minister disagreed, it was decided to negotiate with him on this matter.

## 4. External measures to cope with additional conditions.

We expressed our opinion at the Cabinet Council that with reference to the advance into E "we should first enter into diplomatic

negotiations with E and if she did not comply with our demands by the time December arrives, we should surprise her with an armed advance." The Cabinet Council, however, failed to come to an agreement of opinion on the question of whether or not in our plans for diplomatic negotiations we should take an attitude tantamount to an ultimatum.

5. The convocation of the Diet.

As regards the convocation of the Diet, there were proposals for convening it in December, but as the Supreme Command Headquarters asked for its postponement in order to keep its plans secret, we agreed to it and proposed the postponement to the Cabinet Council. However, no conclusion was reached.

6. The cooperation of X with N.

The Supreme Command Headquarters asked us our estimate of the degree of cooperation which X would extend to N in case the latter declared war against A. The Minister, as the minister in charge, made the estimate required, and notified the Supreme Command Headquarters of it via the Cabinet Council.

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The sixth period of maneuvers (November)

1. External measures.

In this period, it became clear that the Supreme Command Headquarters "scarcely expected the acceptance of our demands by E prior to our armed advance into E and hoped the date of the advance would be speeded up."

Thus, the question of whether or not to adopt a step tantamount to an ultimatum, and the question of the convocation of the Diet which had been pending since the last period, were settled.

2. Martial law.

We proposed again to the Cabinet Council the proclamation of martial law, and it was unanimously decided that "the necessary preparations shall be begun immediately, and the time for its announcement shall be fixed after the beginning of war against A and B."

3. Internal labour conditions.

In view of the shortage of internal labour, we made a thorough application of the principle of military priority, and at the same time released essential technicians from military service.

4. Internal control.

In view of the lack of capacity for control, we took necessary measures for cooperation, and reported the matter to the Cabinet Council.

5. External measures to cope with additional conditions.

Though we strongly insisted in the Cabinet Council that "Blue Country" should make up her mind to start war against A and B in the middle part of December, the Cabinet Council decided that "our preparations should be continued, but that a last effort should be made to avoid or postpone the opening of hostilities."

6. Anti-air defense order.

We proposed to the Supreme Command Headquarters that the air defense order should be issued early in December.

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The seventh period of maneuvers (December)

1. External measures.

After explaining that the war against B was progressing, that the war against A was inevitable, and that both internal and external conditions of "Blue Country" were supremely favorable for the immediate opening of hostilities against A, we strongly urged that "Blue Country" should suddenly open hostilities against A in the middle part of December" and first of all swiftly capture P. But as some again proposed a more cautious attitude towards A, the Council was completely divided in opinion. As time was pressing, the Cabinet adopted the Premier's arguments for circumspection, but at the Liaison Conference which it attended, thanks to the strong demands of the Supreme Command Headquarters, it decided to start war against A (B).

2. Gubernatorial conference.

The prefectural governors' conference was held in early December, at which we expressed our opinions on cooperation between the military and civil.

3. Martial law.

After the start of war against A and B, FORMOSA and KYUSEU districts were raided several times by enemy air forces, and it

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3. Martial law.

After the start of war against A and B, FORMOSA and KYUSEU districts were raided several times by enemy air forces, and it

was anticipated that the whole country would be subject to air raids. We therefore proposed in the Cabinet Council the enforcement of martial law throughout the country as the chief means of ensuring air defense. After obtaining the consent of the Cabinet Ministers, we notified the Supreme Command Headquarters.

4. Measures for the Diet.

The bill for the enforcement of conscription law in KOREA was passed by the Cabinet Council, and submitted to the regular session of the Diet.

5. Relations with X.

In view of the extreme intimacy into which the relations between N and X have been brought by N's participation in the war against A and B, we proposed that we should again open negotiations with X in regard to future cooperation. The proposal was approved by the Cabinet Council.

6. The import of F and T rice.

At the request of the Agricultural and Forestry Ministry, and the Communications Ministry, we requested the Supreme Command Headquarters for their assistance in the purchase and transportation of F and T rice.

7. Strengthening of the Cabinet.

National administration needs to be carried out with the maximum of speed and vigour now that the war had been started against A and B, but in fact the Cabinet was always divided in opinion, thereby rendering the present cabinet incompetent to meet the emergency. We therefore expressed our belief in the need of a wholesale resignation by the present cabinet to allow the emergence of another and more powerful Cabinet. However, it was decided that the Cabinet would carry on with its endeavors for a united front in national administration without resorting to wholesale resignation. At the Cabinet Meeting, the War Minister was also dissuaded from resigning.

9.43-  
42

The eighth period of maneuvers (January-March)

1. External measures.

At the demand of the Supreme Command Headquarters regarding T, we proposed in the Cabinet Council an immediate occupation of T. But most of the Ministers opposed the proposal, emphasizing the disadvantages to us if the war extended to T, and as it was felt that the demands of the Supreme Command Headquarters were not backed up by conditions

of sufficient urgency, the Cabinet Council decided first of all to sound T's real intentions.

2. Anti-air-raid measures.

We reported to the Cabinet Council on the facts of the air-raid of 25 January. At the same time, regarding the treatment of shot-down crew, we maintained that we should treat them differently from ordinary prisoners of war, and make this treatment contribute to the prevention of airraids by using it in psychological warfare. But some opposed it from the viewpoint of psychological warfare. So it was decided that, in any subsequent repetition of the incident, we should take propaganda measures on the lines of the suggestion.

3. Internal psychological warfare.

We requested those concerned to pay attention to the fact that, although all our military preparations were progressing favourably, the war situation did not yet, of course, warrant optimism for the future and that, in view of the national character of the Japanese people, which was lacking in high tension endurance, we needed take some adequate steps to bolster national morale.

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The ninth period of maneuvers (April - October)

1. External measures.

In view of the fact that the damage caused by A's air forces and submarines, whose base was certainly R, was steadily increasing, the Minister maintained in the Cabinet Council that "Blue Country while continuing its hostilities against A and B, should step up its preparations for war against D and adopt a strong minded attitude in ensuring the fulfilment of the secret agreement, in particular, we should promptly put an end to imports by D's ships, and at the same time notify D that, if we secure positive proof that D is permitting A to use its bases, we will attack these bases." The Council agreed in general to the proposal, but it was decided about the notification that, at a time when a decisive battle against A was imminent, we should avoid provoking D by what we could not put into practice.

2. The further stepping up of general mobilization.

We gave orders to those concerned to step up still more general mobilization in preparation for a war against D.

3. The disposition of the materials seized in E.

On this subject, we reported the things required to the Supreme Command Headquarters, after conferring with the ministries concerned



with economic affairs.

4. Estimation of our capacity for maintaining war against D.

After being notified by the Supreme Command Headquarters of the scale of the military operations against D, we gave the information principally to the Planning Board and, with its cooperation, succeeded in making the estimation.

5. Diplomatic measures to cope with additional conditions.

In spite of the great victory in the naval battle between the main forces of N and A, A's attacks from R became increasingly fierce. On the other hand, X was overwhelmingly successful in its war against D. In view of the above facts, the Minister proposed in the Cabinet Council the following plan: "According to the estimation of our national strength, we are not fully confident of success against D even if we speed up the preparations for war against D which will involve the very destiny of our country. So we should make efforts to drive away A from R by separating D from and B through reconciliation between D and X." But no conclusion was reached owing to difference of opinion among the Cabinet Ministers over our war prosecution capacity. Thereupon, the Minister, after conferring again with the Supreme Command Headquarters, came to the conclusion that this was a literally unprecedented opportunity for JAPAN and that we could obtain further material for military purposes if we took proportionately unprecedented measures. So he brought up the matter once more in the Cabinet Council and strongly urged the Planning Board to reconsider things, but all doubts were not dispelled. Finally, as the result of a Liaison Conference, a decision was reached to start war against D by adopting Plan B for general mobilization and a reconsideration of our operational plans.

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THEORETICAL MANEUVERS FOR TOTAL WAR No. 1

Report on the Development of Psychological Warfare  
(Confidential document)

Submitted on August 23rd, 1941.

Minister of State and Vice President of the  
Imperial Rule Assistance Association.

HARA, Tanoyuki

The Third period

We submitted to the Government of Blue Country "Measures for raising national morale to meet the emergency" in the middle part of August, 1941.

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The Fourth period.

We submitted to the Government of Blue Country in the latter part of September "The Counter-Measures of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association for Conditions in the Early, Middle and the Latter Parts of September."

The Fifth period.

1. Toward the end of September, 1941, we proposed to the Government of Blue Country the establishment of a Board of Technology in view of the urgent situation.

Toward the end of October, 1941, we presented to the Government "The I.R.A.A.'s Situation Report on the Tendencies of Public Sentiment," and at the same time reported to the Government the gist of the basic counter-measures.

The Sixth period /T.H. - This period is not given in the original/

The Seventh period

1. Toward the end of December, 1941, we planned and settled "The Outline of the I.R.A.A.'s Counter-Measures for Psychological Warfare to meet the needs of a long War," and reported it to the Government of Blue Country.

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The Eighth period.

1. Towards the end of February, 1942, we presented to the Governor of Blue Country our decision on "The I.R.A.A.'s Outline of Psychological Warfare in the period of air attacks."

The Ninth period.

1. In the middle part of July, 1942, we decided on Psychological Warfare Counter-Measures of the I.R.A.A. in the period of anticipating war against D and reported them to the Government.

1. At the end of October, 1942, we presented "The Measures for all-out war to be Taken by the Government of Blue Country."

(Confidential document)

NOMIYAMA, Tautomu

Minister of Commerce and  
Industry

Date submitted: August 23rd.

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Summarized Record of the First Maneuver.

No. 1. Policy for the enforcement of the commodity mobilization plan and the productive power expansion plan.

Although these plans were carried out in accordance with the general policy adopted for the second period, the policy mentioned in the heading was decided in the Cabinet Council in the fifth period, in view of the subsequent developments in the situation.

The substance of this policy was to push through the principle of priority in conformity with the circumstances for both the mobilization of raw materials and the expansion of productive capacity. At the same time, it was intended to effect the readjustment and consolidation of various enterprises, the perfection of the distribution system, the establishment of organs for recovering and collecting materials, and the application of the general mobilization law.

No. 2. Emergency counter-measure for the demand and supply of important materials.

1. Transportation problem.

We maintained close connections with the Communications Ministry and conferred with them in regard to the minimum requirements for wartime transportation and the order of precedence to be given to each class of materials. As the circumstances demanded, we took such measures as the advancing of the dates of import during the third period by assignment of special shipping in anticipation of the stoppage of imports from A, B, E and L, the increased assignment of ships to SAGHALIEN, HOKKAIDO, NORTH CHINA and CENTRAL CHINA (coal and iron ore) in the fourth period, and the transportation of coal from KYUSHU by mobilized diesel sailing boats at the time of scarcity of coal in HONSHU and SHIKOKU in the seventh period.

2. Labour problem.

In collaboration with the welfare Ministry, we requested the increase

in the number of technicians and labourers, especially the assignment of the right man in the right places. We also requested the Agriculture and Forestry Ministry to pay special consideration to the distribution of food. The Commerce and Industry Ministry strengthened methods to increase working efficiency.

2. Measures to supplement deficient materials.

We intensified the various measures such as the recovery and collection of materials, the utilization of goods on hand, standardization, the restriction of consumption, the rationalization of the use of materials, and the development of the substitutes industry.

No. 3. Measures to prevent confusion in the industrial world.

1. Counter-measure for stock prices.

In accordance with the situation in the Fourth Period, we promulgated and enforced an Imperial Ordinance concerning the fixing of stock prices.

2. The problem of unemployment in the middle and small scale commerce and industry.

In view of the increasing seriousness of the unemployment situation in the Fourth Period, we adopted a measure for the adjustment and reorganization of middle and small scale commercial business. That is, we decided the kinds of business which needed readjustment and reorganization, and the extent of such readjustment and reorganization, judging it from the form and scale which the middle and small scale commerce and industry should have within the framework of wartime industries and from the amount of materials which could be allotted to these industries from the standpoint of commodity mobilization. Powerful and appropriate readjustment and reorganization were to be carried out in accordance with this decision.

As to the measures to be taken, the activities of control associations and other civilian organizations were to be intensified, the functions of the National Employment Offices expanded and strengthened, the functions of the Regeneration Bank stimulated, and the total mobilization law enforced, not to mention the intensification of guidance by the Government. Furthermore, mutual assistance amongst those engaged in the same trade, purchases and loans by the Regeneration Bank, and governmental compensation were to be given as indemnity.

3. The problem of the suspension of trade.

As commercial relations with A, L, B and E were suspended in the Fifth period, the following measures were taken (principally for exporters and industries connected with exports. As temporary measures, steps were taken to promote the smooth flow of funds by

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by means of financial accommodation orders, and at the same time accumulated goods were brought up by designated purchasing agencies. As a general policy for the future, the export industries would be maintained at a capacity capable of supplying domestic and inter-sphere requirements, as well as of playing an active part in post-war commerce with third countries. However, a certain amount of adjustment would be necessary in view of the present situation. Industries relying on imported materials would be adjusted, except those which were capable of being converted to the use of self-supplying materials.

4. Measures against the conversion of funds into stocks, black-marketing, etc. (Sixth Period)

i. Distribution of goods was suspended to those who violated control regulations.

ii. The control organs intensified the supervision of their members' business.

iii. A composite clothing rationing system was enforced.

5. Measures to cope with the growing difficulty in the management of important industries (Seventh period).

We adopted the following measures after considering the various causes of the growing difficulty in management.

1. Rationalization of the distribution of raw materials and labour.

2. Adjustment and unification of enterprises. Those enterprises which found it difficult to continue management because of the restricted distribution resulting from the measures mentioned in the preceding article, were adjusted and made to change business or be merged in order to overcome the difficulties.

3. Disposal of unmobilized funds and idle equipments.

a. These were either transferred or their management entrusted to superior enterprises.

b. A special organ was established for purchasing them or making investments in them. However, for the time being, provision was made for extending loans to them, the interest thereon being guaranteed by the Government.



4. Rationalization of management.
  - a. Balanced distribution of raw materials, etc.
  - b. Rational use of raw materials, etc.
  - c. Promotion of labour efficiency.
  - d. Improvement of technique (throw them open to the public)
  - e. Promotion of standardization.
5. Maintenance of a low price policy for wages, freight, etc.
6. Indemnity for price deficiency below the actual production cost.

In the case of those enterprises which encountered production impediments owing to price deficiency below actual production cost, in spite of the measures mentioned in the preceding items, and yet whose production increase was urgently needed the following measures were adopted:

- a. The price of certain goods were adjusted within an appropriate limit, if the raising of price of such goods would have no bad influence upon prices in general.  
(Example: Copper)

- b. In other cases, payment of subsidies and other steps were taken in order to make both ends meet.  
(Example: Coal)

#### No. 4. Problems of economic negotiation with other countries.

##### 1. Expectation by C, F, T. and I of Commodities from N.

(The fifth period). Goods for private requirements (Fibre goods, pottery, canned goods, etc.) would be supplied to a certain extent. Consideration would be given to goods for military requirements for our advance into E.

##### II. Negotiations between D and N.

With regard to the proposal to D made in the sixth period (in the middle part of November), we informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs that N demanded from D oil, manganese, platinum, santonin, etc., and that N would be able to supply D with tea, raw silk, cement, fishing nets, rubber, tin, quinine, etc., subject to the condition in regard to products of the Southern Regions, that we could obtain them.

As to the proposal to D made in the eighth period (at the end of March) we notified the Minister of Foreign Affairs that we could not spare the goods requested by the other party, as we could not obtain enough from the Southern Regions.

### III. Negotiations with E.

In the sixth period (in the early part of November) we informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the types and quantities of oil, rubber, tin, etc., which composed our minimum requirements from E.

#### No. 5. Measures for the acquisition of E resources.

##### 1. Fifth period (middle part of October).

a. Important points in securing E from the standpoint of economic warfare.

b. Investigations and preparations were made in regard to the materials and personnel needed for the restoration of oil fields and refining equipments.

2. Seventh period (the latter part of December). We hastily despatched a development party of technicians.

##### 3. Eighth period (the latter part of March).

In view of the favorable turn in marine transportation and war operations, we shipped development materials to E. Furthermore, we also made urgent preparations of materials necessary for the reconstruction of the iron mining equipments in the P and Q areas. The confiscated resources in E, P and Q have been gradually shipped and refined.

#### No. 6. Bills submitted to the Diet.

##### p.57 Eighth period (the latter part of December).

We submitted the following bills to the regular session of the Diet:

National Operation of Air-Rail Insurance Bill  
Wartime Resources Administration Corporation Bill  
Wartime Equipments Utilization Corporation Bill

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THE RECORD OF MANEUVERS OF THE PLANNING BOARD

Submitted by:

The President of the Planning Board

Date Submitted: August 23.

(SECRET)

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The Record of Maneuvers of the Planning Board.

The Third period (from the beginning to the end of August, 1941)

I. After a complete re-examination of the plan for economic warfare which had been decided in the above-mentioned maneuvers, we re-drafted the mobilization plans for raw materials, capital, labour, and traffic. These were submitted to and adopted by the Cabinet.

II. To meet the request of the Supreme Command Headquarters, the above-mentioned commodity mobilization plan, which had already been decided in the Cabinet Council, was amended in order to prepare for the war against A, B and E. Following its adoption in the Cabinet Council, this plan was submitted as the Government's plan to the Liaison Conference of the Government and the Supreme Headquarters. With the exception of a part concerning steel products, which was amended, the draft was approved as it stood when submitted.

III. To prepare for war against A, B and E, the Cabinet Council requested the following matters to be carried out or prepared for by the Government offices concerned.

- a. Counter-measures for the urgent and immediate supplementation of materials which were lacking, in accordance with the request of the Supreme Command Headquarters.
- b. The establishment of a central organ in the Cabinet for the prosecution of economic warfare.
- c. The financing of the activities especially of our diplomatic offices abroad, in order to promote the special importation of war materials.

Of the above, item (b) was reserved by the Cabinet Council for a later date.

IV. We discussed with the Government Offices concerned the enforcement of the following matters which had connection with the Planning Board:

- a. Counter-measures for wartime food, and expansion of food production.
- b. Plan for marine transportation and measures for reinforcing and replenishing our stock of ships and crews.
- c. Plan for labor mobilization to go with the mobilization of early July and later.
- d. Measures for industrial capital and measures for the prevention of disturbances in currencies linked to the yen.
- e. Measures for the settlement of N's international trade accounts and for coping with the stoppage of international finance consequent upon the application to N of the Capital Freezing Act by A and B.
- f. Examination of the economic value of A's proposal to N.
- g. Measures for promoting imports from A, B, E and L.

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The fourth period. (From the beginning to the end of September)

As we had been requested by the Supreme Command Headquarters to state our opinion concerning the ability of Blue Country to prosecute war in the event of hostilities with A, B and E under the present situation, we submitted to the Cabinet meeting our judgment on our national strength in respect to national morale, shipping, materials, capital, labour, etc. The Cabinet Meeting adopted this judgment.

2. The matters which were discussed with the Government offices concerned were as follows:

- a. Measures for the changing of business by middle or small scale tradesmen and manufacturers.
- b. The absorption of government bonds, the maintenance of their market prices, and counter-measures for stocks.
- c. National management of ships and distribution schedule of ocean-going ships.

pp. 61-

62 The Fifth period (from the beginning to the end of October)

1. Since it was necessary to reinforce war preparations in view of the increasing drift toward war with A, B and E, the commodity mobilization plan was re-examined. Especially in regard to supplying power, examination was made from the following standpoints:

- (a) The cessation of imports from A, B, E and L.
- (b) The drop in coastal transportation capacity as the result of the requisitioning of ships.
- (c) The drop in efficiency of labour and internal transportation capacity.
- (d) Increased production, collection /of resources/, savings, and also the supplying power of M, C, F and T to Japan.

At the same time we examined military and civilian requirements by periods in order to ensure propriety of planning, and reported our findings to the Cabinet Meeting.

2. It was decided at the Cabinet Meeting that thereafter the commodity mobilization plan should be drafted every three months.

3. For the purpose of submission to the Supreme Command Headquarters, the Planning Board decided at its conference a plan concerning the securing of certain points in E from the viewpoint of resources and economy in case of war against E. This plan was submitted to and adopted at the Cabinet Meeting. In particular, we estimated the obtainable amount of petroleum and requested the Government offices concerned to speed up the different preparations in regard to materials, personnel, etc., necessary in this connection.

4. The principal matters discussed with the Government Offices concerned were as follows:

- (a) Counter-measures for the stock market.
- (b) Counter-measures for the withdrawal of deposits and runs on banks.
- (c) Financial measures /for the situation/ resulting from the cessation of trade with third countries and counter-measures for the inflationary trend in M.
- (d) Measures for ocean-going ships and detained ships.

(e) Plan for marine transportation after November.

(f) Plan for enforcing labour mobilization, etc.

p.63 The sixth period (from the beginning to the end of November)

1. The principal matters discussed with the Government offices concerned were as follows:

(a) Counter-measures for the shortage of technicians.

(b) Measures for ships requisitioned for military service, and plans for promoting shipbuilding, etc.

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The seventh period (from the beginning to the end of December)

1. The principal matters discussed with the government offices concerned in regard to their enforcement were as follows:

(a) Measures for breaking the deadlock of industrial capital, and counter-measures for the monetary situation at the year's end.

(b) Measures for coping with the shortage of coal in Honshu and Shikoku.

(c) Measures for coping with the growing difficulties in the management of the principal industries.

(d) Re-examination of marine transportation capacity of 00 tons of ships requisitioned for military service.

(e) The treatment of ships sailing in dangerous waters and also of the crew of such ships.

The eighth period (from January to March, 1942)

1. The principal matters discussed with the government offices concerned were as follows:

(a) The matter of despatching exploitation units to the E, P and Q areas.

(b) The matter of transporting the goods confiscated in E, P and Q.

(c) Examination of the marine transportation capacity resulting from the de-requisitioning of 00 tons of ships from military service.



(e) Plan for marine transportation after November.

(f) Plan for enforcing labour mobilization, etc.

p.63 The sixth period (from the beginning to the end of November)

1. The principal matters discussed with the Government offices concerned were as follows:

(a) Counter-measures for the shortage of technicians.

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(a) The matter of despatching exploitation units to the E, P and Q areas.

(b) The matter of transporting the goods confiscated in E, P and Q.

(c) Examination of the marine transportation capacity resulting from the de-requisitioning of 00 tons of ships from military service.

p.65 The ninth period (from April to May)

I. At the request of the Supreme Command Headquarters, we conducted investigations for tightening up the economic mobilization plan, in order to cope with the war against D, and reported our findings to the Cabinet Council.

II. The following matters were discussed with the government offices concerned:

(a) Counter-measures for the decrease in the number of applicants for crew duties and for the increase in the number of seamen leaving their ships.

(b) Plans for the transportation of goods produced in E, P and Q.

OUTLINE OF THE PROGRESS OF THE THEORETICAL MANEUVERS FOR  
TOTAL WAR No. 1

(Overseas Affairs Ministry)

ISHII, Takashi  
Overseas Affairs Minister

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The third period (August 1941)

No measures were taken.

p.66 The fourth period (September 1941)

After explaining the rice situation in KOREA in view of the unsatisfactory importation of Korean rice in Japan proper, we emphasized the importance of smooth interchange of food among Japan proper, overseas territories, Manchukuo and China, and proposed the establishment of a powerful central organ for achieving this object.

In connection with the unemployment problem of middle and small scale tradesmen and manufacturers resulting from the modification of the commodity mobilization plan, we explained the measures to be taken for those overs as who had to change their occupation, classified into Koreans, Formosans and Japanese.

pp.66-

67 The fifth period (October 1941)

In connection with the problem of runs on banks, we explained the overseas financial situations individually.

In response to the demands of the Supreme Command Headquarters of Blue Country to consolidate the whole nation's strength, we proposed the enforcement of a military conscription system in KOREA and the adoption of a special volunteer system in FORMOSA. This was approved. The enforcement of the military conscription system in KOREA was passed and fixed in the regular session of the Diet, which convened in December of the same year.

We also reported the measures adopted in KOREA and FORMOSA as regards the thorough enforcement of wartime educational measures in the overs as areas.

The sixth period (November 1941)

We conferred with the Communications Minister in regard to the shortage of rice in the Inner South Seas Islands, and obtained his approval for the assignment of ships to that area. However, we made no special report on it.

p.67 The seventh period (December 1941)

We reported that we made efforts to collect rice for the consumption of the people of Japan Proper by tightening up the rice consumption regulations in KOREA and FORMOSA in order to cope with the increasing demand for rice collection from these areas owing to the shortage of food in Japan Proper.

We reported on the measures taken against possible air-raids on NORTHERN FORMOSA following the opening of hostilities with A and E.

p.68 The eighth period (January to March, 1942)

We reported on the measures we had taken to cope with the disquieting situation among Korean farmers due to the tightening up of food regulations in KOREA and the increased shipments of rice to Japan Proper.

The ninth period (After April, 1942)

In order to cope with the difficulty confronting Japanese immigrants in Manchukuo in putting out their productions to the market owing to the shortage of labour as the war progressed, we decided to stress the significance of such productions from the standpoint of national policy and continue to strongly enforce this measure. Having been appointed on 30 July 1941 /Showa 16/ as members of the First Committee, we studied the administration of the occupied territories, especially the Netherland East Indies, which had been assigned to us to investigate. During the course of our investigations we submitted a report on the economic value of the Netherland East Indies.

Moreover, there were a considerable number of problems arising in Japan Proper which had an influence on the overseas territories to a certain extent. (For instance, commodity mobilization, labour problems, etc). However, since it was impossible to propose measures for each one of them in view of personnel and knowledge needed, we submitted measures for only those matters which had a direct bearing on the overseas territories.

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THE RECORD OF THE PROGRESS OF THE THEORETICAL MANEUVERS  
FOR TOTAL WAR No. 1

The Minister of Finance

August 23rd.

The second period (July 1941)

As a part of the Plans for Total War of the Government of Blue Country, we decided on a policy for financial planning, the gist of which was as follows.

- I. The principle object was to establish firmly the position of finance in the national economy and to concentrate state finance on the replenishment of military preparations and the reinforcement and expansion of productive power for national defense, while avoiding vicious inflation through the right handling of demand and supply between capital and commodities.
- II. To put state finance on a more planned basis.
- III. To fix taxes not only on the basis of the requirements of state finance, but also, by attaching great importance to the absorption of purchasing power in war time, and also to their connections with industry, on the national livelihood, etc.
- IV. To reduce as much as possible the issue of Government bonds by avoiding the compilation of a pointless expenditure budget which relies on merely the issuance of Government bonds for covering the deficit, and at the same time to prosecute a financial policy laying main stress on the absorption of Government bonds.
- V. To compile, in accordance with the foregoing policy and in conformity with the revised commodity mobilization plan of the Planning Board, a working budget by roughly estimating the military expenditures (total of general accounts and of special military expenditures) capable of being defrayed during 1941 /Showa 16/ at ¥ 12,500,000,000 (¥11,700,000,000 according to the capital mobilization plan of the Planning Board) and economizing ¥800,000,000 in administrative expenditures.

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The third period (August 1941)

In order to cope with the tense international situations surrounding us in August, 1941, especially the enforcement by us of the Assets

Freezing Act against H. and the tightened situation of the internal financial market, we took the following measures (submitted on August 7th).

1. Measures concerning industrial capital.

(a) Provisionally suspended the grant of authorizations and permissions under the Temporary Capital Funds Adjustment Law and other industrial laws.

(b) Continued, as counter-measures for the stock market, the active purchase of principal stocks by the Cooperative Securities Co., and moderation in the sale of stocks on the part of financial organs, etc.

(c) In order to break up stagnation in the capital market, the kinds of debentures to be floated were selected, the plan for the subscription of debenture by the syndicates was carried out, the amounts of bonds underwritten with Government funds were increased, smooth finance for debentures was provided, the repayment of advances made by the syndicates was suspended for the time being, and the method of raising capital by the companies issuing debentures was re-examined.

(d) Financial organs were required to make strict inspection of loans for equipment installations, and to streamline the finance for normal enterprises. Closer financial relations between the various financial organs and the Bank of Japan were fostered. Furthermore, the issuance of financing orders in regard to stored funds and funds for converting equipments necessitated by the war situation, were considered.

2. Measures for the cessation of international finance following the enforcement of Capital Freezing Act by both A and E.

(a) Concluded individual clearance agreements based on a barter system for the settlement of international accounts and especially strive to develop a many-sided all-round method of settling accounts among the countries of the East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere, with H country as the center, by taking into account the balance of payments among them.

(b) There was no way but to leave our relations with A and B to take their own course.

(c) Regarding our relations with L, we expedited the import of goods for stocking from the countries concerned by

Freezing Act against H. and the tightened situation of the internal financial market, we took the following measures (submitted on August 7th).

1. Measures concerning industrial capital.

(a) Provisionally suspended the grant of authorizations and permissions under the Temporary Capital Funds Adjustment Law and other industrial laws.

(b) Continued, as counter-measures for the stock market, the active purchase of principal stocks by the Cooperative Securities Co. and restriction in the sale of stocks on the part of financial organs, etc.

(c) In order to break up stagnation in the capital market, the kinds of debentures to be floated were selected, the plan for the absorption of debenture by the syndicates was carried out, the amounts of bonds underwritten with Government funds were increased, smooth finance for debentures was provided, the repayment of advances made by the syndicates was suspended for the time being, and the method of raising capital by the companies issuing debentures was re-examined.

(d) Financial organs were required to make strict inspection of loans for equipment installations, and to streamline the finance for normal enterprises. Closer financial relations between the various financial organs and the Bank of Japan were fostered. Furthermore, the issuance of financing orders in regard to stored funds and funds for converting equipments necessitated by the war situation, were considered.

2. Measures for the cessation of international finance following the enforcement of Capital Freezing Act by both A and F.

(a) Concluded individual clearance agreements based on a barter system for the settlement of international accounts and especially strive to develop a many-sided all-round method of settling accounts among the countries of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, with H country as the center, by taking into account the balance of payments among them.

(b) There was no way but to leave our relations with A and B to take their own course.

(c) Regarding our relations with L, we expedited the import of goods for stocking from the countries concerned by

utilizing the fun's which had fled to the L countries, and strive to conclude as quickly as possible clearance agreements with them.

(d) Efforts were made to bring about a balanced position in international payments between our country and E country and a many-sided method was devised for settling accounts, giving consideration to the balance of trade between E and the various countries of the co-prosperity sphere. Any difference of payments was paid by ser-marked gold.

(e) Efforts were made to conclude clearance agreements with I and G also.

(f) The settlement of accounts with F and T could be made by means of clearance agreements, but if T really insisted on it, settlement might be made by means of ser-marked gold.

3. Counter-measures for preventing the fluctuation of the currencies linked to the yen.

(a) Concerning M's currency, we consulted with M for the adoption of such measures as the tightening up of control of prices and profits, the tightening up of the Capital Funds Control Law, the drastic revision of the Five-Year Industrial Plan, and the intensive promotion of self-sufficiency in the necessaries of life, and the encouragement of savings.

(b) In regard to the notes of the Federal Reserve Bank of North C, measures were taken to reduce the amount of disbursements for military expenditures, to promote the exchange of goods with N by expanding the system of foreign exchange adjustment fees, to withdraw the Federal Reserve Bank notes from circulation through the production of cotton goods by the transfer of cotton industry from Japan Proper to North C, and to increase the bottoms between N and C.

(c) In regard to the military notes in Central and South C, the existing measures were reinforced and continued. At the same time, measures were taken to trans-export N's goods which had accumulated owing to the suspension of export to third countries, to check the disbursements for military expenditures, and to promote the inter-flow of goods among the countries of the Co-Prosperty Sphere.

We consulted with and received the approval of the Governor of the Bank of Japan and the department heads of the Planning Board on the foregoing matters.



utilizing the fun's which had fled to the L countries, and strive to conclude as quickly as possible clearance agreements with them.

(d) Efforts were made to bring about a balanced position in international payments between our country and E country and a many-sided method was devised for settling accounts, giving consideration to the balance of trade between E and the various countries of the co-prosperity sphere. Any difference of payments was paid by ear-marked gold.

(e) Efforts were made to conclude clearance agreements with I and G also.

(f) The settlement of accounts with F and T could be made by means of clearance agreements, but if T really insisted on it, settlement might be made by means of ear-marked gold.

3. Counter-measures for preventing the fluctuation of the currencies linked to the yen.

(a) Concerning M's currency, we consulted with M for the adoption of such measures as the tightening up of control of prices and profits, the tightening up of the Capital Funds Control Law, the drastic revision of the Five-Year Industrial Plan, and the intensive promotion of self-sufficiency in the necessaries of life, and the encouragement of savings.

(b) In regard to the notes of the Federal Reserve Bank of North C, measures were taken to reduce the amount of disbursements for military expenditures, to promote the exchange of goods with N by expanding the system of foreign exchange adjustment fees, to withdraw the Federal Reserve Bank notes from circulation through the production of cotton goods by the transfer of cotton industry from Japan Proper to North C, and to increase the bottoms between N and C.

(c) In regard to the military notes in Central and South C, the existing measures were reinforced and continued. At the same time, measures were taken to trans-export N's goods which had accumulated owing to the suspension of export to third countries, to check the disbursements for military expenditures, and to promote the inter-flow of goods among the countries of the Co-Prosperity Sphere.

We consulted with and received the approval of the Governor of the Bank of Japan and the department heads of the Planning Board on the foregoing matters.

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The fourth period (September 1941)

The advent of September saw the absorption of Government bonds gradually declined and the market price of  $3\frac{1}{2}\%$  Government bonds drop below the issue price. Security prices also took a downward trend. Accordingly we adopted the following steps as counter-measures for the absorption of Government bonds and the maintenance of their market value and for the stock market (submitted on August 11):

1. Counter-measures for speeding up the absorption of Government bonds and maintaining their market value.

As the consequence of the conference with the Governor of the Bank of Japan, we made the Bank of Japan take the following steps for the time being:

The other banks were induced individually to purchase Government bonds; and the life insurance companies were requested to invest their idle funds in Government bonds or lend them on call to the Industrial Bank of Japan and the Yokohama Specie Bank. Furthermore, as a measure for the maintenance of market prices, the Nikko Securities Co. was asked to buy up  $3\frac{1}{2}\%$  Government bonds, while the various security companies gathered up small batch sales of Government bonds. In addition, arrangement was made for the financial organs to adopt a resolution of following a policy of restraint in respect to Government bond transactions, and large sellers were warned individually.

2. Counter-measure for the stock market.

Besides having the Japan Cooperative Securities Co. continue the purchases, we drafted an Imperial ordinance for the fixing of stock prices (Article 19 of the General Mobilization Act) and had it promulgated on September 25, to be effective immediately. The substance of it was that the price of shares transacted by the trading members of the stock market must be operated within the minimum or maximum limit (the maximum limit to be not applicable for the present) set by the competent minister, and at the same time, the shares owned by companies could be estimated below the appraised value of the preceding term.

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The fifth period (October 1941).

Developments in the international situation following the outbreak of war between X and A led people to think that it was impossible for N to avoid war. Consequently, the stock market slumped and was in a semi-panic state, while the banks, other than the big ones, were subjected to runs owing to the rumour that the withdrawal of deposits would be restricted. Therefore, the restoration of stability in the financial world through the recovery of the stock market and the checking of the withdrawal of

bank deposits was most urgently necessary. Accordingly, we hastily adopted the following measures (submitted on August 13):

1. Counter-measures for the stock market.

Both the Finance Minister and the Commerce and Industry Minister hastily issued statements that they had no intention of further reducing the minimum value of shares, and at the same time we ordered the Cooperative Securities Co. to buy up shares in defense against sellers. And, as a posture of the government's support, we ordered a new loan of ¥ 50,000,000 to the Cooperative Securities Co.

2. Counter-measures for the run on banks.

(a) The Finance Minister denied in an oral statement the rumour of the restriction against the withdrawal of bank deposits and at the same time expressed the wish that the people would actively cooperate in the savings moving, since there was no anxiety regarding the foundation of banks.

(b) We had the Bank of Japan speedily begin unlimited lending and immediately provide each of its branches and agencies with a sufficient amount of convertible notes.

(c) The financial organs were notified that the Bank of Japan would give them support by unlimited lending in order to enable them to promptly respond to the demand for the withdrawal of deposits, and that they should not cause difficulties in industrial financing by recalling their loans especially at this time.

(d) We arranged with the Information Board to prohibit articles on transactions and withdrawals of bank deposits as there were fears that such articles would intensify the unrest.

(e) We received a report from the Bank of Japan that it had already commenced taking these measures.

Besides these, we adopted the undermentioned measures in view of the heavy blow inflicted on various quarters by the cessation of exports to third countries (submitted on August 12).

Moreover, at the request of the Vice Director of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau, we requested that a counter-measure be taken to cope with the movement for the conversion of funds into goods in M country, which had been prompted by the inflationary trend in that country.

1. Financial measures taken following the cessation of trade with third countries:

Bank deposits was most urgently necessary. Accordingly, we hastily adopted the following measures (submitted on August 13):

1. Counter-measures for the stock market.

Both the Finance Minister and the Commerce and Industry Minister hastily issued statements that they had no intention of further reducing the minimum value of shares, and at the same time we ordered the Cooperative Securities Co. to buy up shares in defense against sellers, and, as a gesture of the government's support, we ordered a new loan of ¥ 50,000,000 to the Cooperative Securities Co.

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(c) The financial organs were notified that the Bank of Japan would give them support by unlimited lending in order to enable them to promptly respond to the demand for the withdrawal of deposits, and that they should not cause difficulties in industrial financing by recalling their loans especially at this time.

(d) We arranged with the Information Board to prohibit articles on transactions and withdrawals of bank deposits as there were fears that such articles would intensify the unrest.

(e) We received a report from the Bank of Japan that it had already commenced taking these measures.

Besides these, we adopted the undermentioned measures in view of the heavy blow inflicted on various quarters by the cessation of exports to third countries (submitted on August 14).

Moreover, at the request of the Vice Director of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau, we requested that a counter-measure be taken to cope with the movement for the conversion of funds into goods in M country, which had been prompted by the inflationary trend in that country.

1. Financial measures taken following the cessation of trade with third countries:

(a) In consultation with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, we indemnified losses by application of the Export Indemnification Law.

(b) Financial organs cooperated in financing the purchase of accumulated goods, the hurried collection of loans by the exchange banks was checked and financial assistance was given to the export industry.

(c) Assisted M and C in raising yen funds in connection with the transferred export of accumulated goods to M and C.

## 2. Counter-Measures for the inflation in M.

(a) We requested the M government to carry out a movement for encouraging savings, absorb idle funds by perfecting and expanding financial organs, to convert the commercial capital owned by the native inhabitants into industrial capital, to carry on a large-scale lottery system, to enforce the Revised Five Year Plan and to intensify the application of the Capital Funds Control Act.

(b) In M consideration was given to the transferred exportation to M of the accumulated goods which had been originally intended for export to third countries and to the supplying of yen funds (short term credit) necessary in this connection. At the same time, exchange control was strengthened and measures taken to prevent fluctuations in the prices of import and export goods as preventives against the spread of inflation into Japan Proper. Furthermore, we expended a total of ¥ 79,500,000 from the Second Reserve Fund on counter-measures for food storage, for export goods consequent upon the suspension of trade with third countries, for labour, for the collection of essential materials, and for propaganda.

Although the police and judicial authorities were powerless to control the movement for the conversion of money into goods and the continual violation of economic control owing to the spread of the inflationary tendency, no special measure was taken and a policy of "Watch and wait" was pursued (the financial world was tranquil). We prepared beforehand measures to prevent the confusion of the financial world at the start of war, and also requested both the police and the judicial authorities to supervise the more important violations of economic control. Especially for the increase of the number of policemen, we decided to appropriate ¥ 3,200,000 from the Second Reserve Fund (submitted on August 15).

2. Although the absorption of Government bonds continued without improvement in the latter part of November, we did not take any special positive measure to expedite the absorption of Government bonds for fear that it might cause the tightening up of the money market at a time when the year was drawing to a close, besides the shock suffered by the financial world from the military advance into E. We decided to compile the budget for the next year under a policy of conforming with the commodity mobilization plan by effecting a drastic readjustment of the affairs of the Government offices and keeping down the total of general accounts and special military expenditures to a sum within the amount of this year's working budget.

Furthermore, we effected a considerable raise in tax rates from the viewpoint of absorbing the general purchasing power. We announced the increase of tobacco prices (average of 20% in general) at midnight of November 30. (These were submitted on August 16).

3. We submitted to the extraordinary session of the Diet the following budget bill and other bills (Submitted on August 16).

- (a) Supplementary budget to the total budget for general accounts  
¥ 1,003,000,000
- (b) Supplementary budget to the special military accounts budget:  
¥ 4,000,000,000
- (c) Supplementary budget to the special accounts budget for both Korea and Foreign, respectively  
¥ 1,500,000
- (d) Supplementary budget to the special account budget for government investments.  
¥ 300,000,000
- (e) Supplementary budget to the special account budget for state management of ships.  
¥ 200,000,000
- (f) Bill on Out-of-Budget contract for special finance.  
¥ 1,500,000,000
- (g) Bill concerning the issuance of government bonds:  
Total of the special military expenditures and  
general accounts: ¥ 4,010,000,000
- (h) Bill on the Special account for the state management of ships.
- (i) Bill for the revision of the various tax laws in order to increase tax levies.

	<u>Average Rate of Increase</u>	<u>Estimated increase of tax receipts in normal years</u>	<u>Estimated increase for 1941</u>
Direct taxes	32.7%	¥ 883,000,000	¥ 294,000,000
Indirect taxes	83.4%	¥ 580,000,000	¥ 193,000,000

## (j) Wartime Finance Corporation Bill.

In order to facilitate wartime industrial financing, the Wartime Financial Corporation, with a capital of ¥ 500,000,000 (of which ¥ 300,000,000 to be invested by the government) was established for the purpose of making investments in and financing national enterprises, buying up idle or non-employed equipments, extending loans for changing business lending against Government bonds debentures, and stocks, putting the floor on the security market, and regulating the money market.

## (k) Bill for special financing by the Bank of Japan and the indemnification for losses thereon.

In order to cope with the financial difficulties arising at the outbreak of war, indemnification for losses on special financing was made within the limit of ¥ 1,500,000,000 during one year and a half from now.

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84 The seventh period (December 1941)

The following measures were taken for the time being as counter measures for industrial financing and also the end-of-year financing in order to cope with the increasing difficulties of industrial management caused by all the different conditions attending the progress of wartime economy.

## 1. Measures to break the tight money situation for industrial financing.

A way was provided to have the Bank of Japan extend special loans to those companies which had fallen into management difficulties owing to the non-employment of their assets, and measures were taken to have the national treasury pay subsidy to cover interest charges by establishing a system of registration with the association of unemployed assets and idle equipment effect the rationalization of management, institute proper accounting procedure, and amalgamate affiliated companies.

At the same time the financial organs were asked to exercise moderation in collecting their loans. Furthermore, as a counter-measure for the tendency toward cash transactions due to the shunning of the discounting of bills, efforts were made to restore the circulation of credit bills by the adoption of a stamped-bills system.

2. Measures for the end-of-year finance.

In regard to the end-of-year finance, the disbursements of government funds were regulated in the Government Funds Demand and Supply Planning Conference and an ample supply of funds was provided by the release of the funds held by the Deposit Bureau, the curbing of the absorption of call loans by the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Industrial Bank, and the purchase of Government bonds by the Bank of Japan from the city banks under the condition of selling them back. At the same time, the demand for long-term funds was adjusted on a planned basis under the Capital Funds Adjustment Law also.

The northern part of Kyushu was raided towards the end of December. There was also a request for assistance from agricultural districts. In these connections we adopted the following measures (submitted on August 18):

1. Anti-air-raid measures.

Loans of the funds of the Deposit Bureau were made for the rehabilitation and relief enterprises of local public organizations, and assistance was given to the loans by the People's Bank and the Central Bank of Commercial Associations. Moreover, special treatment was accorded to applications for permits concerning the lending of rehabilitation funds by financial organs.

2. ¥ 380,000 was expended from the Second Reserve Fund for the relief of agricultural districts.

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87 The eighth period (from January to March, 1942)

1. On January 25, A's air force raided Tokyo. The damage done was considerable and the following steps were speedily taken (submitted on August 20):

(a) For the damage done to a part of the Finance Ministry by the bombing, remedial measures were immediately taken. At the same time efforts were made to raise the morale of the ministry's staff.



(b) Speedy, suitable steps were taken in cooperation with the Bank of Japan concerning the disposal of the business of the banks destroyed by fire, the delays in the clearing of checks connected with the destroyed banks and the prevention of disturbances in financial circles.

(c) We adopted a policy of submitting a supplementary budget for the expenses for the movers to government offices and the financial relief for the restoration of local public bodies, and of reducing or abolishing taxes, according upon the extent of the damage. In addition, low interest loans were granted by the Deposit Bank as special loans.

2. The following bills were submitted to the regular session of the Diet\* (submitted on August 20):

- (1) The 1942 total budget for general accounts.
  - (2) Supplementary budget to the special account for special military expenditures.
  - (3) Bill concerning the issuance of various Government bonds.
  - (4) The 1942 Budget for the various special accounts.
  - (5) Supplementary budget for 1941 (general and special accounts).
  - (6) Matters concerning out-of-the-budget contracts to be borne by the National Treasury.
  - (7) Special account for air-raid insurance bill.
- (Note) The outline of the 1942 budget for the general accounts and the special account for military expenditures is as follows:

Military expenses	¥ 11,000,000,000
Administrative expenses	¥ 2,500,000,000
Government bonds expenses	¥ 1,600,000,000
Income from national taxes and customs duties	¥ 5,460,000,000
Profits from monopoly	¥ 430,000,000
Amount of new Government bond issues	¥ 8,300,000,000

(8) Bill for the revision of the Bank of Japan law.

(a) Written clarification of the business now handled by the Bank of Japan.

- (b) Authorization to own government guaranteed debentures.
  - (c) Partial revision and repeal of the business restriction provisions.
  - (d) Reduction of the powers of the general meeting of shareholders.
  - (e) Extension of the term of existence.
- (9) Stricken Areas Tax Reductions or Exemptions Bill. The authority for granting/exemptions in the stricken areas was vested in the government.
- tax reductions or
- (10) Financial Organizations Bill.

In order to have the financial organs cooperate in the enforcement of a powerful financial control three kinds of organizations, namely, a national financial control association, financial control associations according to types of business, and local financial councils were to be organized, with the Bank of Japan as the central organ, whereby the financial organs were to be linked together and manifest their unified functions. Through these organizations it was hoped to achieve control of the employment of funds, the perfection of the structure of financial business, and closer relations between finance and industry.

(11) In order to contribute to the increase of national savings, tax-bonds were issued and allotted for compulsory purchase by classified income taxpayers according to the amounts of their incomes. After the lapse of five years, these tax bonds were to be used for the payment of taxes or for deposit as postal savings.

3. As a relief measure for the rural districts, the term of repayment of agricultural debts was extended with the aid of the activities of the Industrial Guilds' Central Bank. In addition, an Imperial Ordinance for the exemption of taxes for one year in flooded districts of northern Kanto and the districts north of it was promulgated (submitted on August 20).

4. With the beginning of the new year, stress was laid on the absorption of Government bonds and a vigorous movement for the encouragement of savings was carried out (Submitted on August 20).

pp. 87-89.

The ninth period (From April to August, 1942).

both

1. Since the Wartime Finance Corporation and the Financial Control Association completed the procedure for their establishment and began their activities from about June, we prepared all possible measures

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for coping with the tense situation, while enforcing a powerful financial control through the employment of this financial control system (submitted on August 22).

2. As the financial world then seemed to be gradually regaining its tranquility, no new steps were undertaken in regard to the financial situation. However, since the payment for imported foreign rice had been delayed we conferred with the Governor of the Bank of Japan and adopted the following measures (submitted on August 22).

(1) Relations with F.

Payment of the price of imports for 1941. The extension of whose due date had expired, was made by the export of necessary materials. Efforts were made beforehand to moderate the terms of payment for the imports for 1942.

(2) Relations with T.

Although we had been considering the earmarking of gold for the settling of accounts between N and T, we did not insist on earmarking for the settlement of accounts, but exported gold as the occasion demanded.

Matters disposed of in the above-mentioned periods were all reported to the Cabinet Meeting, and those requiring decision by the Cabinet meeting were decided by that body, and then submitted to the Supreme Command Headquarters. (The date in brackets at the end of each item is the date on which the disposition report was submitted).

(Confidential Document)

THE RECORD OF THE PROGRESS OF MANEUVERS

The First Committee.

pp. 9C-  
92

1. At 9 a.m. August 8 (by Real Calendar).

The first consultation meeting of the First Committee was opened.

Bills.

- (1) The basic policy for the management of the various areas of the Southern Region.

- (2) Allotment of the business of the committee.

2 The following decisions resulted from this meeting:

- (1) The policy for the management of the various areas of the Southern Region (Future management).

- (a) Netherlands Indies:

Java and Sumatra shall be combined into one independent state and the other remaining areas shall be annexed to it.

- (b) Malaya:

For the time being, the whole of it shall be united into one, though the subject requires further study.

- (c) The Philippines:

The entire region shall be made independent.

- (d) French Indo-China.

While strengthening the existing situation, we must promote the infiltration of our country's power.

- (e) Thailand:

While respecting her independence, we must promote the infiltration of our country's power.

2. Allotment of the business of the Committee.

(a) Business summary and the drafting of a basic plan of rule was assigned to post-graduate student MIYAZAWA.

(b) The outline of rule for the Netherlands East Indies and the estimation of the economic value of the Netherlands East Indies was assigned to post-graduate student ISEII.

(c) The outline of rule for Malaya and the estimation of the economic value of Malaya was assigned to post-graduate student FARITA.

(d) The outline of rule for the Philippines and the estimation of the economic value of the Philippines was assigned to post-graduate student HIGASA.

3. After fixing these assignments, the appointed four members tried their best to collect materials and although sufficient materials could not be collected, the studies were pursued to the utmost.

As the other committeemen, who were members of the Cabinet, were very busy, these four students pursued their studies, consulting each other every day; there was no chance to hold a specially general consultation conference.

4. On August 20 (real calendar), when we had drafted a general definite plan, we held a second committee conference, and obtained a general understanding of the results of our studies of the past ten days. After receiving further guidance from the Supreme Command Headquarters, we presented the plan in question to Assistant officer Matsuda.

(Confidential document)

THE RECORD OF THE PROGRESS OF MANEUVERS

Manchurian Affairs Bureau

pp. 93-

- 94
1. In the fourth period of maneuvers there was a scarcity of yen funds in M and a standstill in its Five-Year Industrial Plan. We expressed to the Prime Minister by letter our views as a suggestion regarding the measures which N should take to cope with this situation, and, after consulting with the authorities concerned of the Finance Ministry, the Bank of Japan and the Planning Board, we took emergency measures.
  2. In the fifth period there was an unsatisfactory trend of inflation, which produced a disquieting situation among the peasants of M. We adopted emergency measures against the situation, and at the same time expressed by letter to the Finance Minister our views by way of suggestion, because fundamental political operations were necessary to avert popular feeling, and at the same time we made a report to the Prime Minister.
  3. In the ninth period of the Maneuvres, it became difficult to send pioneers to Manchukuo in view of the conditions of agricultural labour in our country. We consulted with the Ministers of Overseas Affairs and of Agriculture and Forestry, and unanimously decided on the unswerving prosecution of our national policy. After obtaining the understanding of the Cabinet meeting, we made this policy thoroughly understood throughout the whole country.
  4. In the ninth period of the manoeuvres our relations with D were strained. As data to serve as the basis for the resolutions of the N government, we communicated the recent internal conditions of M to the Prime Minister and the War Minister.
  5. Throughout the whole maneuvers we felt the uncertainty of the position and duties of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau under the present system. The progress of the maneuvers/ also showed that its activities were very passive.

(Confidential Document)

The Record of the Progress of the Theoretical Maneuvers  
of Total War No. 1.

MARITA, Kenichi

The Chief of Administrative  
Affairs of the Asia  
Development Board

Submitted August 23, 1941

p.95 The third period of maneuvers.

1. Considering the necessity of taking immediate measures for maintaining N's exchange rate in C in view of the sudden stringency in N's trade with A produced by the application of the Capital Freezing Act by A, we expressed to the Finance Ministry authorities our opinion on the counter-measures to be taken.

2. The fourth period of maneuvers.

In view of the increasing war weariness among the officials and people of C2 in direct proportion to the progress of our operations for the maintenance of public peace in C; we submitted to the President of the Information Board in a special document our opinions on the following two points:

(a) Methods of strengthening our enemy propaganda against C2's central organ and the front line.

(b) Opinions on the unified establishment of propaganda organs as the nucleus of our forces in China.

3. The fifth period of maneuvers.

In view of the fact that the psychological warfare conducted in the preceding period had proved genuinely effective and caused agitation in the minds of the people of C2, a grand chance presented itself for immediately expediting the settlement of the China Affair.

Accordingly, we submitted the "Plan for the Perfection and Reinforcement of the Field Organs of the Asia Development Board" and requested the convocation of an Asia Development Board Conference in order to take an emergency measure for establishing machinery for directing and controlling the various organs in China.



The gist of this plan was as follows:

- (a) To open a General Affairs Bureau in Nanking and appoint the Japanese Ambassador to China as the Director of this Bureau.
- (b) To transfer /to it/ the political affairs machinery of the military.
- (c) To limit the guidance of local administration to North China only.

pp. 97-98 4. The same period of maneuvers.

The Cabinet's decision on October 15 called for a ready-for-war structure in order to advance into E. and in conformity with the request of the Supreme Command Headquarters to give the appearance of directing our war preparations with the object of an offensive against C, in order to conceal our plan for the southward advance, we took the under-mentioned measures to heighten the patriotic spirit of our nationals in China and to strengthen the national solidarity, while promoting their spiritual unity and taking a stand of smashing the enemy in a single stroke, thereby paving the way for war.

- (a) A conference of the chiefs of the liaison departments was held.
- (b) A consultation meeting of the field authorities of the Army, Navy and Foreign Ministries and of the Asia Development Board was held.
- (c) The training of all organizations was intensified.
- (d) A spiritual mobilization of our nationals in China through the Imperial assistance movement was conducted.

5. The sixth and subsequent periods of maneuvers.

On the one hand, we worked to spiritually unify our nationals and had them maintain a low standard of living during wartime, and on the other hand, we continued our unchanging, consistent guidance in respect to our operations toward C, in conformity with the policy for disposing of the China affair contained in the "Total War Policy."

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(Confidential Document)

THE RECORD OF PROGRESS OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE (IN SO FAR AS IT CONCERNS THE INFORMATION BOARD) DURING THE THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT PERIODS OF THE THEORETICAL MANEUVERS OF TOTAL WAR  
No. 1.

pp.99

100 The third period

Domestic policy

1. Guidance of public opinion, such as the press and other educational organs.

(a) Control.

Problems of negotiations between J and A.

Comments on diplomacy.

(b) Guidance.

No change in the relations among the Axis powers.

Ready for war against A (B).

The significance of the advance into French Indo-China.

Completion of war preparations.

2. Practical measures.

(a) The leaders of the press ) round-table

(b) The leaders of the principle schools of thought ) conference

(c) Consistency of speech and action of all military and civilian officials.

External policy (mostly against A).

1. The expansion of an overseas intelligence network.

2. The creation of the post of spokesman of the President of the Information Board.

3. Thorough intensification of propaganda.

pp.100-

101 The fourth period.

External policy.

(Confidential Document)

THE RECORD OF PROGRESS OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE (INSOFAR AS IT CONCERNS THE INFORMATION BOARD) DURING THE THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT PERIODS OF THE THEORETICAL MANEUVERS OF TOTAL WAR  
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pp.100-

101 The fourth period.

External policy.

1. Propagandizing of peace and order in C.
2. Propaganda towards C2 (in consultation with military, diplomatic and economic quarters).
3. Measures to alienate enemy countries.

Foreign propaganda.

Utilization of foreign telegrams of our allies.

4. Interview with foreign correspondents.

Internal policy.

1. Guidance of X's peace offensive against B.
  - (a) The use of the president's spokesman.
  - (b) Attention to be paid in the handling of information.
  - (c) Offensive against A and B.
2. Measures against leakage of secrets.
3. Nation-wide personal appearances and radio broadcasting by the Prime Minister and all the other Cabinet Ministers.
4. Demands to the Communications Minister.

Matters concerning the securing of radio and newspaper communication facilities.

pp. 102

103 The fifth period.

Internal policy.

1. Control of speech.
  - (a) Scarcity of rice.
  - (b) The problem of Koreans in the Hanshin district.
  - (c) Economic unrest.
    - Finance, shares, etc.
  - (d) Movement in Buddhist circles and religious guidance.

2. Propaganda.

- (a) A and B's oppression of N and war responsibility.
- (b) Criticism of the uncooperative attitude of E.
- (c) Attack against the Military Pact among A, B and C2.
- (d) Exposure of and attack on the Military Pact between A and D.

3. Measures.

Mobilization of speech and press organs, Cabinet Ministers, politicians (Diet members), etc.

External policy.

1. Press Campaign.

- (a) Attack against the detention of N's ships by A, B, E and L (partial).
- (b) Desire N for peace in the Pacific.
- (c) Individual judgment of the relations between A and X.

2. Alienation of A from L.  
Conflict of interests between them.

- 3. Intensification of operations toward C2.
- 4. Intrigues against E.
- 5. Liaison with X, after the advance into E.
- 6. Propaganda towards I and Arabian districts.

pp.104-  
105 Supplements for the fifth period.

Internal policy.

1. Unification of the ideological front.

- (a) Gubernatorial conference.
- (b) Liaison with the speech organs.
- (c) Liaison with schools and other educational institutions.
- (d) Liaison with motion pictures, the drama and other cultural quarters.

2. Wartime structure reinforcement week.

2. Propaganda.

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pp. 104-

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2. Wartime structure reinforcement week.

3. Counter-measures for food.

- (a) Counter-measures for consumers.
- (b) Clarification of the position of the agricultural districts.  
Sale of rice to the government.
- (c) Circulating motion pictures and drama.

4. Counter-measures for economic unrest.

Collaboration of the various ministers concerned.  
Propagandizing (a) the importance of order in wartime finance and (b) instances from World War I.

5. The setting up of public loudspeakers and secret informers.

- (a) Public loud-speakers  
Principal cities.  
Streets, schools and factories.

- (b) Secret informers.

1,500 members. Budget ¥ 7,500,000

Liaison with the Home Ministry and gendarmes

pp. 106-

107 The sixth period.

External policy.

- (A) 1. The question of A's declaration of war against X.

- (a) The statement of the President of the Information Board.

It is not a new situation.

- (b) Non-interference with the public demand for immediate entry into war.

2. Propagandization of X's attack against Suez and Gibraltar.

3. No alteration to be made in the tone of arguments in regard to the encirclement of B by A, C and E. Intentions behind it to be kept secret.

4. Propagandization of the attacks on C2.



(B) The intrigues against E were reported to be unsatisfactory.

(A) Hand-bills, pamphlets and the fifth column in line with the landing operations against E.

1. Problem of rice substitutes and fertilizers.  
Kept pace with the plans of the Agriculture and Forestry Ministry.
2. Labour problems.
3. The enforcement of a Wartime Economic Morality Week.
  - (a) Thorough inculcation of the policy.
  - (b) Moral conduct, inflation, barter and extermination of black market operations.
4. Tightening up of the anti-espionage spirit.

Supplements for the sixth period.

External policy

1. Conformity with the military advance into E.
  - (a) Efforts to make E abandon its resistance spirit.  
By means of handbills, radio and propaganda agents.
  - (b) Reporting of the E campaign and its object.  
Defense of the nation's existence.
  - (c) Propaganda towards M, C, F, T and C2 concerning the above campaign.
  - (d) Consultation with X.

Internal policy.

1. Liaison with the Supreme Command Headquarters.
2. Exaltation and intensification of the people's morale through the advance into E.
3. Elucidation of the object of the E expeditionary campaign.  
However, unnecessary stimulus to A and B was avoided (according to the given situation).
4. Speech and reports concerning the Diet.

pp.109 The seventh period.  
110

External policy.

1. A's establishment of a neutral water zone in P.  
The President's /Information Board/ statement.

2. Propaganda broadcasts to E.  
Tokyo-Tsuhoku-Palau-Saigon
3. Attack against A's oppression of N's nationals in A.
4. Propaganda about the control of oppression against A's  
nationals in N.
5. Emphasis on the strengthening of the internal structure.

Internal policy.

1. The problem of the sinking of transports.

Exaltation and intensification of the people's morale, and  
caution against rash actions.

2. Correct understanding of the situation.
3. Control of the self-righteous discussions of diplomatic problems.
4. Control of public opinion and positive announcements.
5. Propaganda in connection with the start of war with A and B.

(1) Imperial Rescript observance ceremony and the Premier's  
broadcast elucidating the spirit of the rescript and the  
object of war.

(2) Propaganda regarding the responsibility and injustice of  
A and B in starting the war.

(3) Report of the eradication of A and B's interests in the  
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

(4) The air raid against Northern Kyushu and its announcement.

(5) Suppressive measures against amusement lines.

(6) Alteration of Asia Development Service Day.

pp.110 The eighth period.

112

External.

1. The L countries request the evacuation of N diplomats.
2. The tactics for luring A's main fleet.
3. Tokyo air-raid; announcement of A's damages.
4. Intrigues towards T.

Internal policy.

1. The announcement of the reports of the results of N's armed forces in E, Q and S.
2. Air-raid against Tokyo city.
  - (a) Actual fact of damage
  - (b) Extent of damage
  - (c) Guidance of speech
  - (d) Exaltation and intensification of the people's morale.
3. Damage to A's aircraft carriers and cruisers.
4. Exaltation of the tense feeling of the agricultural districts.

The eighth period.

1. Questions and answers in the Diet and the utilization of foreign propaganda.
2. Foreign and domestic propaganda.
  - (a) Co-prosperity of the East Asiatic races.
  - (b) Self government of East Asia.
  - (c) Non-interference and non-aggression.
  - (d) Principle of equality and freedom.
  - (e) Future management policy for P, Q and E.
3. Propaganda regarding the luring of A's fleet.

pp. 112

113 The Ninth period.

Internal policy.

1. Measures against the slackening of the people's spirit as the result of our successful military operations. (Elucidation of the purport of the Imperial Rescript).
2. Propaganda.
  - (a) The success of our military operations and our war results.
  - (b) Construction of the occupied areas.
  - (c) A's fleet remains in tact.
  - (d) Damage from enemy air-raids and submarine activities.
3. Firm views against R.  
(Non-interference with such views, except in extreme cases)

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4. Measures to cope with the increasing number of people desiring to travel to E.

- (a) Restriction of qualifications.
- (b) Driving home the significance of the sacred war.

5. Measures to cope with the shortage of seamen and to keep seamen from leaving their ships.

- (a) Propaganda for their recruiting.
- (b) Gratitude toward seamen.

.114 Ninth period -- Supplement.

(Naval battle of "J" and the period following).

Internal policy.

1. A 3-day mass celebration in the great victory of the naval battle of "J".

2. Measures for tightening up public morale (propaganda).

(a) D's disregard for the neutrality pact, and supplying A with military bases.

(b) Necessity for widespread effort for East Asia prosperity.

3. Parachutists land on Korea.

(in accordance with our previous policy)

External policy.

1. Continuous propaganda on the great naval battle of "J".

2. Unrest in R.

3. Disclosure of B's peace movements.

(Confidential Document)

RECORDS OF THE THEORETICAL MANEUVERS FOR TOTAL WAR NO. 1  
(1941)

Home Minister

YOSHIDA Keiichi

p.115 Third period (August)

1. With the increasing tension in international relations, the supervision of foreigners was tightened up.
2. Control of the Leftist elements was tightened up as a measure against D's intrigues..
3. Control of Koreans and C's nationals was tightened up.
4. Control of speech and press was tightened up and anti-espionage was driven home to the people.

pp.115

116 The fourth period (September)

1. We collected information concerning the trend of public sentiment on the international situation, and at the same time controlled extremist speeches and writings advocating an immediate commencement of war against A or D, or slandering X's peaceful offensive against B.
2. A black-list of Japanese nationals who should be closely watched as a defense against foreign intrigues and espionage was drawn up, and control exercised over them.
3. With the growing seriousness of the unemployment of those engaged in middle or small scale industries, we collected information and also controlled petitions, etc., as well as made them cooperate in changing to other business.
4. We made /the people/ cooperate in food rationing.
5. We exercised a control over rumours circulated among financial circles and in general.
6. We adopted prudential measures against rumours of the arrests of legitimate Leftist elements, and also closely watched foreign propaganda and intrigues.
7. We adopted necessary measures in connection with the enforcement of the mail control ordinance.

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p.116

117

Fifth period (October)

1. We supposed the disquieting situation in the Hankin district was arising from the rice ration system. At the same time patrol plans were prepared in case of rice riots in other districts.
2. As to runs on banks, we banned the publication of news articles about them and at the same time controlled rumours. Furthermore, we requested the attention of the War Minister in regard to mobilization in the districts where runs had occurred.
3. We paid attention to the domestic situation accompanying the cessation of foreign trade.
4. We tightened up control of the Rightists.
5. We perfected and strengthened the central machinery for air-defense.
6. Besides proposing the issuance of an Imperial emergency ordinance concerning the restrictions, prohibitions and orders necessary for the enforcement of air-defense, we made a number of air-defense preparations.
7. We controlled speeches and writings which would enable people to form an idea of our policy towards A, B and E.

pp.117

118

Sixth period (November.)

1. We reinforced the police and also employed assistants. At the same time we worked to concentrate police administration on important matters in order to cope with the lack of policemen.
2. We adopted necessary measures for the enforcement of the Imperial Emergency Ordinance concerning the restrictions, prohibitions, and orders necessary for the enforcement of air-defense (simultaneously with the invasion of E).

pp.118

119

Seventh period (December)

1. We carried out farm relief enterprises which lay principal stress on munition works.
2. The Foreign Minister and others explained the current situation at the meeting of prefectural governors.
3. We tightened up the control of the amusement districts according to the developments of the war situation.

4. We tightened up the control of speech and press and rigidly enforced strong anti-espionage measures, as diplomatic relations with A and B became so tense.
5. Simultaneously with the issue of air defense regulations, we took such measures as the designation of non-evacuation areas and the distribution of air-raid precaution pamphlets.
6. The responsible prefectural governors were required to provide ameliorative measures against air-raids in the Kyushu districts. We also controlled the spread of rumours.
7. With the opening of hostilities against A, we tightened up the control of speech and press and provided defensive measures against the intrigues and propaganda of enemy countries.
8. We submitted to the regular session of the Diet a bill for the amendment of the police regulations for preservation of law and order.
9. The decision was made for general elections to be carried out in 1942.

pp.119  
120

Eighth period (January, February and March, 1942)

1. With the enforcement of martial law, local authorities were required to work in close collaboration with the commander of the forces enforcing martial law. This office also cooperated with the authorities concerned.
2. Regarding air-raids on the Metropolis, the Chief of the Metropolitan Police Board was required to provide proper measures under the direction of the commander of the forces enforcing martial law.
3. We effected the maximum of local delegation of our work to simplify our office work.
4. Secretaries and commissioners were sent to raided areas for superintendance and liaison work.

Ninth period (April to September, 1942)

As we were now under martial law, our line of policy was as follows, both for individual action and in cooperation with the authorities concerned:

1. Suppression of extreme cases of speech or press of advocacy of open hostilities against D, arising from increasingly tense diplomatic relations with D.
2. Measures for defense against intrigues and espionage of A and B as well as D.



3. In view of wartime circumstances, suppression of extreme criticisms in speech or press of Government policies, especially the government's diplomatic policies, and determined attempt at impartiality in the elections.

4. Temporary slackening of control to celebrate the decisive see victory over A.

RECORDS OF THE PROGRESS OF THEORETICAL MANEUVERS  
FOR TOTAL WAR NO. 1 - 1941

Submitted by: T. SASAKI, President of the  
Bank of Japan

pp. 121-

122 Third period (August 1941)

1. Measures for industrial capital.
  - (a) Execution of a measure to break the deadlock in the bond market.
  - (b) Guidance of loan policies of finance institutions.
2. Stock market measures.
  - (a) Purchase of stocks by the Amalgamated Securities Company of Japan to prevent a fall in stock prices.
  - (b) Checking of new capital increase and of further calling up of capital payments.
  - (c) Preparation for establishment of official prices of stocks.
3. Measures to cope with the foreign exchange question arising from the freezing of N's assets by both A and B.
  - (a) Conclusion of an agreement for the settlement of accounts on a barter basis and centered in the East Asia co-prosperity sphere.
  - (b) Consideration for utilizing gold for the settlement of balance accounts.
  - (c) Acceptance of the Yen as the foreign trade currency of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
4. Measures for the maintenance of the value of currencies linked to yen.
  - (a) Economy in military expenditures.
  - (b) Transfer to M and C of goods whose export to third countries had become difficult.
  - (c) Re-examination of development plans.

p.122 Fourth period (September 1941)

Measures for fostering the absorption of Government bonds and maintaining their market prices.

- (a) Enforcement of measures for converting into long-term investments the abundant short-term investments of financial institutions.
- (b) Support of the market prices of Government bonds through the Nikko Securities Co.
- (c) Curbing of Government bond sales by the financial institutions.
- (d) Absorption by security dealers of Government bonds sold out by individuals.

p.123 Fifth period (October 1941)

1. Measures against runs on banks.
  - (a) Previous provision of bank notes at each place.
  - (b) Supplying each bank with sufficient funds for the payment of deposits.
  - (c) Announcement to the effect that the government had no intention of restricting the repayment of deposits.
2. Measures against the tight money situation of those engaged in foreign trade. Curbing of the recalling of loans to them, and assistance to them by releasing relief funds.

p.123 Sixth Period (November 1941)

1. Measures for preventing disturbances in financial circles.
  - (a) The expansion and reinforcement of the Financial Council.
  - (b) Support for the maintenance of market prices of securities.
  - (c) New preparations after the runs on banks have subsided.
2. For the 77th special session of the Diet.

Requested the presentation of the Bank of Japan Special Finance and Indemnification of Losses Bill.

p.124 Seventh Period (December 1941)

1. Measures to cope with the tight situation of industrial finance.
  - (a) Enforcement of special finance for the relief of non-utilized capital and idle equipment.
  - (b) Guidance for the rationalization of management on the part of the capitalists.

- (c) Adoption of the stamp-bill system.
- 2. Measures to cope with the demand for funds to effect end-of-year payments.
  - (a) Adjustment of the disbursement of government funds.
  - (b) The release of the funds of the Bank of Japan.
- 3. Measures to cope with the air-raids in northern Kyushu.
  - (a) Extension of emergency loans by the Moji and Fukuoka branches of the Bank of Japan and the establishment of temporary sub-offices.
  - (b) Suppression of the recalling of loans by city banks.

pp.124-

125 Eighth Period (From January to March, 1942).

- 1. Measures for the perfection of the financial structure.
  - (a) Organization of a financial control system.
  - (b) Carrying out the reformation of the Bank of Japan.
- 2. We requested the presentation of the following bills to the 78th ordinary session of the Diet.
  - (a) Financial Organization Bills.
  - (b) Bill for Revision of the Bank of Japan Law.
- 3. Measures against air-raids on Tokyo.
  - (a) The appointment of proxies for carrying on the business of the banks destroyed by fire.
  - (b) Partial postponement of check clearing.
  - (c) Supplying funds from the Bank of Japan in order to prevent disturbances in financial circles.
  - (d) The enforcement of measures necessary for continuing business during air-raids.

pp.125 Ninth period (April to August 1942)

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- 1. Measures for carrying out the Financial Organizations Law.

The Bank of Japan, in view of its duties in becoming the nucleus of the organization, carried out various measures necessary for the powerful and speedy enforcement of the law.

2. Measures for the commencement of the business of the Wartime Finance Corporation.

The corporation was made a powerful channel for raising industrial capital by making active use of the increased capacity of the Bank of Japan for supplying funds as the result of the reformation of the Bank of Japan Law.

3. Measures to prevent the increased issue of currency.

(a) Prevented the possession of a large sum of cash through the use of current account checks, postal deposits, etc.

(b) Put to use relief funds disbursed by various sources.

(c) Fostered the absorption of Government bonds by providing appropriate allotment of rice certificates, Finance Ministry certificates and short-term Government bonds.

4. Measures to cope with the delay in the settlement of accounts for imports of foreign rice.

(a) As it was the first settlement of accounts for the deferred payment towards F, the accounts were settled by the export of necessary goods from N. From this year on efforts will be made to moderate the terms of payment.

(b) In the case of T, we settled the accounts in gold as much as possible, avoiding settlement by goods, as T had demanded to be paid in gold.

Furthermore, we participated in the /discussion of the/ Planning Board and the First Committee and gave our suggestions and opinions, as the occasion demanded.

(Confidential Documents)

Records of the Progress of the Theoretical Maneuvers of  
Total War No. 1 for 1941

by AKITAGAWA, Osamu Railway Minister of the Government of Blue  
Country.

p. 12F Maneuvers during the third period.

1. Measures for Railway Transportation (Aug, 1941)

The enormous expansion of the situation necessitated an increase in military transportation which increased the requisitioning of ships, freight trucks and horses. It was thus inevitable that this situation should influence in every possible way transportation as a whole. Accordingly, in establishing the following line of policy, we looked forward to harmonious working of military transportation, transportation concerned with increase of production and transportation of the necessities of life:

(a) Restrictions on passenger transportation on both a quality and a quantity basis.

(b) Restrictions on freight transportation owing to the shift from marine transportation, and also the decline in small scale transport capacity.

2. Measures for motor-truck transportation.

As a measure to counteract the decline of transportation capacity produced by requisitioning, freight trucks in the larger cities were placed under control

p. 129-130 Maneuvers during the fourth period. (September 1941)

1. Measures for the transportation of coal, from  
SAGHALIEN, HOKKAIDO and KYUSHU.

(1) As measures for the transportation of coal from SAGHALIEN, HOKKAIDO, harbor facilities and overland transportation capacity were increased, taking into consideration the shift from marine transportation/to overland transportation./

(2) As measures for the transportation of coal from KYUSHU, the completion of the KAMON Tunnel was hastened to prepare for the shift/to overland transportation/from transportation by steam - and - sail - driven boats.

2. Measures for maintaining the present railway capacity. (1) Efforts were made to increase transportation capacity by expanding equipment, replenishing personnel, and increasing efficiency.

(2) Control was effected of passenger and freight traffic to regulate the demands for transportation.

(3) Transportation of munitions and the necessities of life must be maintained to the last. The suppression of ordinary transportation was effected first of all, and if unavoidable, the restrictions were extended to comparatively non-urgent materials among those for production increase.

3. Measures for small scale transportation.

As the stringency in the capacity of small scale transportation not only reduced the railway transportation capacity, but also greatly affected the movement of emergency materials, freight trucks in the larger cities were placed under national control.

4. Cooperation in the control of passenger and freight traffic was requested of the various organs concerned.

pp. 130-131 Maneuvers during the 5th period (Oct 1941)

1. In respect to railway passenger-traffic, the people at large had deepened their understanding of the current situation and the volume of passenger traffic had decreased, through the cooperation of the various organs concerned. However, we kept the regulation in force since the situation permitted no optimistic outlook for the future.

2. In respect to railway freight traffic, we continued the policy of the preceding period.

3. The procedure for placing the freight trucks in the larger cities under national control was completed, and actual operation was commenced.

4. Matters to be prepared beforehand to cope with extraordinary damage during air raids against railways. In anticipation of air raids by A, B and E, we adopted air defense measures, with stress on the Keihin, Hanshin and Northern Kyushu districts, and at the same time drew up a plan for the transportation of the people seriously affected.

## n. 131 Maneuvers during the sixth period (Nov. 1941)

## 1. Measures for maintaining the railway business in Japan Proper in connection with the advance into E.

In order to replenish the shortage of employees and materials resulting from the furnishing of personnel and materials in connection with this advance, the sphere of employment of women was widened, retired personnel were re-employed and some of the operating lines, as well as those already constructed but so far not operated, were removed.

## 2. Revision of the Railway Business Law. Passed by the Extraordinary session of the Diet in the latter part of November.

Since, by this revision, we were able to refuse transportation, accord preferential transportation and inspect the contents of freight during wartime conditions, control of transportation could display its effective results by the operation of this law.

## n. 132-133 Maneuvers during the 7th period (Dec. 1941)

1. Measures to aid the railways of M and C<sub>1</sub>

Due to the pressure of work since August, the wear and tear and damage sustained by the railways of M and C<sub>1</sub> were so severe that the Government of Blue Country was requested to furnish men and materials.

As "Blue Country", at the request of the Supreme Command Headquarters had already extended men and materials to E (F), her transportation capacity had fallen into fairly straightened circumstances. However, since the shortage of men and materials in M and C would not only affect the transportation of necessary materials between M, M and C<sub>1</sub>, but would also greatly affect the transportation of military supplies and necessities of life within M and C<sub>1</sub>, it was decided to extend aid as much as possible, while taking into account the future demands of the Supreme Command Headquarters.

## 2. Measures for railways transportation in time of War.

In order to be prepared to transport refugees during air raids and guard against any decline in our transportation capacity under wartime conditions, the speed and spacing of trains were equalized to form a balanced schedule, while their composition was standardized.



3. Measures for the air raid damage in north mKvushu. Restoration of damaged places connecting transportation, and the transportation of air raid victims were carried out to the utmost.

n. 133 Manoeuvres during the 6th period. (Jan 1942)

Measures for the damage done by air raids in the metropolis and the surrounding districts.

1. Efforts were made to restore the damaged places, and at the same time the necessary transportation facilities in the cities for "commuting" were mobilized to display their utmost capacity.

2. By the use of trucks and ships, every possible preferential measure was taken for the transportation of afflicted people, food and charcoal.

p. 133-134 Manoeuvres for the 9th period (Apr & May 1942)

1. Since the operation of the railways became unsatisfactory on account of the scarcity of men and materials, we tightened up the regulation of the demand for ordinary transportation according to established policy. At the same time efforts were made to promote the efficient operation of cars by encouragement of the employees.

2. In respect to the control of local railways and tramways we exercised a intensive supervision and strove to alleviate the situation by common use of the cars.

3. According to supplementary information, the operations of railways and trucks were restricted as a result of insufficient distribution of fuel and scarcity of labour. Since a drastic revision of the time schedule and the reduction in the train services were carried out as a result of it, a great shock was given to the people.

As counter measures, the following were adopted:

(1) The Minister's statement to the press and broadcast by radio.

(2) Preferential transportation of the necessities of life.

DOC. NO. 2228

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(3) By spiritual training the railway employees were inculcated with a truly spirit of service abandoning the concept that they were letting people ride or transporting them as a favor, and devote themselves to service to the country through transportation.

Records of the Progress of the Theoretical Measures for  
Total War No. 1 for 1941.

Submitted by KIVOI, Masashi, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry  
p.135-138 Measures for the 3rd Period (Aug 1941)

No. 1. Emergency Wartime Food Measures.

1. Rice

(1) Further restrictions on consumption.

(a) 50% reduction of rice for sake brewing, etc.

(b) Ration cards or tickets reduced in every city.

(c) Reduction of rations from 2.3 "go" to 1.1 "go" per person, but with increased elasticity.

(2) The extra delivery of 1,000,000 "koku" /Koku is 4,9629 bushels/ from the rice kept for the farmer's own consumption.

(3) The perfection of the rationing system and of warehouses.

2. Wheat

State control was strengthened all along the line, and at the same time the uses of wheat, other than as food, were restricted.

3. Preparations were under way for an all-round ration ticket system for all kinds of food.

4. Government purchase was begun of dried noodles and starch.

5. Increased production was begun of sweet potatoes, Irish potatoes, etc. and also of emergency food articles.

6. Storage

In the six major cities and Simonosaki-Moji district, one week's provision in each family and a month's provision in the distributing organs \_\_\_\_\_ 1,190,000 "koku".

The government provided a three months' supply for these districts. The manufacturing companies or organizations concerned were ordered to always keep in storage more than a month's

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supply of "wiso", soy oil, condensed or powdered milk, salted or dried fish, dairy products, frozen foods, etc. for the consumption of these districts.

7. Prudential measures were taken to secure the import of foreign rice.

8. Special stress was laid on spiritual mobilization.

No. II - Measures for the expansion of food production plan.

1. Stress was laid on the production of staple foods or their substitutes, compulsory planting or restricted planting, encouragement of growing cash-crops and two crops a year, and emphasis on self-supplied fertilizers.

2. Emergency measures adopted for damage by floods.

3. Stress laid on fishing in inland and coastal waters and use of sardines and herrings as food.

No. III - Labour measures.

1. Labour.

"With the collaboration of the Welfare Ministry, we enforced a registration system, prohibited the transfer of laborers to unimportant industries, and adopted other measures to promote planning. At the same time we strengthened the measures which had been adopted previously.

2. Fostered the efficient use of farming machines and animal power by encouraging their collective use.

p.139 Maneuvers during the 5th period (Sept. 1941)

No. I. In view of the decrease in the import of Korean rice, it became necessary to unify the food policy for N proper, oversea areas, M and C<sub>1</sub> collectively. We proposed that an appropriate measure be taken for the establishment of a concrete policy. This proposal was accepted. We also warned M and C<sub>1</sub> that it would be difficult to export rice from N proper next year.

No. II - As a measure for coping with the labor system, we made preparations for the adoption of a permit system for the transfer of farmers to other occupations.

No. III The hoarding of food in large cities was recognized to a certain extent, and the selling of canned foods in the course of manufacture was suspended. The food bloc system in prefectures was rejected.

n. 140 - Maneuvers during the 5th period (Oct 1941)

No. I - The actual rice harvest for this year being 55,000,000 "koku", it was necessary to import 15,000,000 "koku" of rice from F and T.

This was decided at the cabinet meeting and immediately put into effect.

No. II - In regard to labor, we are especially considering a joint farming system for the future.

We requested the War Minister to consider the system of permitting soldiers to return to their homes during the farming season.

In regard to arable land, the development of highlands was encouraged.

No. III - We requested supervision of disquieting conditions due to scarcity of food, but we made some provision of cereals in order to cope with possible emergency.

No. IV Whaling expeditions were suspended, but no compensatory measure was taken.

p. 141-142 Maneuvers for the 6th period (Nov. 1941)

No. I As obstacles to the import of foreign rice were arising, the following steps were taken:

1. We adopted a composite ration ticket system. Separate composite ration ticket systems for rice substitutes and for other foods were adopted. If necessary, these two were to be combined with rice into a single composite ration ticket system.

2. We imported overseas rice.

3. The uses of rice, other than as food will be greatly restricted next year. Requested the Foreign Minister to negotiate in regard to the increasing of rice production in F and T, its distribution control, and improvement of facilities.

No. II - Although F and North C requested wheat, we replied that this could not be done at present. We also proposed a joint conference to discuss future collaboration between the three countries.

No. III - As countermeasures for fertilizers, we decided to discourage reliance on commercial fertilizers and foster the use of self-supplied fertilizers.

No. IV - The special session of the Diet was opened.

In order to make possible the collective forming of waste lands and returned tenant lands, we submitted the collective farming Bill, which was passed as submitted.

n.143 Measures for the 7th period (Dec. 1941)

No. I - War with A and F began, imports from F and T were not going smoothly. Collection in F and T was unsatisfactory. Faced with a long drawn out war, etc., and after an estimation of the food situation a year after next, it was found necessary to effect a further reduction of 0.2 "go" in the rice ration per person bringing the ration down to 1.9 "go" per person per day. In view of the seriousness of the situation the matter was submitted to the Cabinet meeting and a decision reached.

No. II - As relief measures, subsidiary industries were encouraged as much as possible in the farming villages, importance was attached to providing employment to enable them to obtain ready cash), and the extension of loans was encouraged. (Early part of Dec.)

n. 144-145 Measures for the 8th period.

January, 1942

No. I. We requested and received the approval of the War Minister to make use of requisitioned vessels and return voyage bottoms for the importation of foreign rice.

No. II - As to the rural districts the activities of debt adjustment association, and loan associations were encouraged.

No. III - Measures for the Diet.

Having decided to rely on the General Mobilization Law for the control of agricultural organization, we submitted no bill for it.

No. IV - Air defense measures

We did our best to secure food and charcoal at the time of the air raids on the Metropolis.

(March, 1942)

DOC, NO, 222F

We requested and received the approval of the offices concerned to increase the transportation of rice by 300,000 "koku" per month after April in view of the alleviation of the situation in regard to the import of foreign rice.

p.146-147 Measures for the 9th Period.

(April and May, 1942)

No. I - Food ration of 1.0 "go" per person was maintained and efforts were made to increase the distribution of cereals and other substitutes.

No. II - It is our policy to continue the Manchurian immigration plan, but in reality the number will decrease.

No. III - As to labor, the collective Farming Law was enforced and at the same time the established plan was continued.

(July 1942)

No. I - As a normal year's rice harvest was anticipated we calculated on this basis the demand and supply for 1943, and finally reached the conclusion that it was necessary to import about 4,500,00 "koku".

No. II - We also made every arrangement to supply charcoal for generating gas.

p. 148 Records of the Progress of the Theoretical Maneuvers of Total War No. I for 1941

Presented by: Iwao MORI, Minister of Communications

(First and Second Periods Omitted)

P.148-150 Third Period

Though N's relations with A, B, D and E were not acute, international relations could hardly be called tranquil. As men and ships had been mobilized and D's espionage activities had been most energetic, the following measures were adopted:

1. Measures of replenishment and increase for the decline in numbers of ships and crews.

(a) Material, labor and funds, are required in order to augment our shipping, and so, while we shall do our best to build new ships, we shall do our best also to charter or buy ships from X, F and T.

(b) As a measure to increase the number of seamen, retired seamen will be recalled, advertising for seamen will be intensified and vigorously carried out; and the number of men per ship will be reduced.



(c) To prepare ourselves against the economic pressure of A and B, ships were temporarily placed on the lines to those countries to hasten the import of urgent war materials.

2. Measures for obtaining ship's fuel.

(a) There was prospect of securing coal for ships.

(b) Motor ships and crude oil burning steamships were transferred as soon as possible to the American line so as to take in crude oil from the United States of America.

(c) We requested that motor ships and crude oil burning steamships be used for military requisitioned ships.

3. Counter measures for the sudden increase of communications and for the shortage of employees.

(a) Although no authoritative measures were adopted for mails and telephones, a restriction of telegrams was enforced by ministerial ordinance.

(b) As to the shortage of employees, it was decided to secure technicians chiefly by intensifying the training of newly employed workers, and at the same time by teaching telegraphy to all employees.

4. Communication control, with special consideration to the close liaison with oversea areas, M and C<sub>1</sub>.

(a) As to mails Emergency Imperial Ordinance for the control of mails was enacted (promulgated on Sept. 20) whereunder letters may be opened and inspected and, when occasion demands confiscated.

(b) As to telegraph and telephone services, a thorough control was effected by reinforcing the personnel.

p. 150-151 Fourth Period

Relations between X and A became more and more strained, and there were also indications of a movement in the international situation surrounding N. The requisitioning of ships was continued as the result of the revision of the commodity mobilization plan, civil aviation fell into extreme difficulties. The measures taken during this period were as follows:-

1. Measures for civil aviation.

(a) All regular air lines, excepting those engaged in communication with the continent, and the Southern Air lines were suspended.

(b) Training of aviators was to be continued according to schedule at all costs, even in the face of a great decrease in the supply of gasoline.

2. Counter-measures for the new demand for telephones.

Although there were numerous applications from munitions and general mobilization quarters only those deemed most urgent were installed for the time being leaving the fundamental solution of the problem to a later date.

3. Measures concerning the enforcement of mail control.

In close collaboration with the police and the gendarmes, censors were placed in the principal offices to take charge of censorship. Some mails which could be easily used for espionage purposes were either prohibited or restricted.

4. Intensification of marine transportation control and emphasis on transportation of important materials.

In order to tighten up the control of marine transportation a Shipping Board was established to requisition all ships, which were then allowed as a rule, to be operated by their owners or proxy in accordance with the policy of emphasizing the transportation of important materials. (Decided by the Cabinet meeting).

5. Relationship between the securing of important foreign materials and the prevention of internment and capture of ships.

In collaboration with the Navy and the Foreign Ministry, we made preparations to cope with any sudden development in the situations, and continued the assignment of ships in the full expectation of undergoing some sacrifices.

p.151-152 Fifth Period.

With the entrance of X and A into a state of hostilities against each other, the detainment of N's ships by A, etc. and E's refusal to continue the negotiations with N, the situation becomes somewhat acute. The Supreme Command Headquarters of N requested that the supply of materials from E be secured. The Cabinet meeting of October 15 decided upon advancing into E by force. Although the use of communications declined somewhat, the transmission of secret information via A was very active.

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It was now impossible to assign ships to the A, B, E and L areas and numerous ships had been requisitioned. The measures taken in this period were as follows:

1. Measures to be taken before hand against air raids on communication facilities.

(a) Transfer of the important lines to safer places, and the camouflaging of important stations.

(b) Preparations for men and materials for reconstruction and selection of stations to replace the ones damaged.

(c) Construction of temporary lines and preparations for wireless communications.

(d) Suspension of telephone and radio broadcasting services during air raids.

2. Measures for the control of communications with A.

(a) Detection of illicit facilities in the country.

(b) Replenishment of telegraphic officials.

(c) Tightening up of control over telegrams and telephone calls to A, especially the use of secret languages.

(d) In collaboration with the police, tightening up of control over individuals (those listed). If war should start, foreigners and foreign correspondence were to be further restricted.

(e) Tightening up of correspondence to A from M and C<sub>1</sub>, especially those from SHANGHAI.

3. Re-examination of the schedule for ocean going ships and the utilization of repatriation ships.

(a) Ships now in A, B, E and L were ordered to enter neutral waters as soon as possible and proceed homeward. The placing of ships thereafter was suspended.

(b) Repatriated cargo ships were used for voyages to F, T, North and Central C, KYUSHU and HOKKAIDO.

4. No reprisals against the ships of A and B in N and C ports were to be made (until after our advance into E).

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(c) Tightening up of control over telegrams and telephone calls to A, especially the use of secret languages.

(d) In collaboration with the police, tightening up of control over individuals (those listed). If war should start, foreigners and foreign correspondence were to be further restricted.

(e) Tightening up of correspondence to A from M and C<sub>1</sub>, especially those from SHANGHAI.

3. Re-examination of the schedule for ocean going ships and the utilization of repatriation ships.

(a) Ships now in A, B, E and L were ordered to enter neutral waters as soon as possible and proceed homeward. The placing of ships thereafter was suspended.

(b) Repatriated cargo ships were used for voyages to F, T, North and Central C, KANTSU and HOKKAIDO.

4. No reprisals against the ships of A and B in N and C ports were to be made (until after our advance into E).

It was now impossible to assign ships to the A, E, E and L areas and numerous ships had been requisitioned. The measures taken in this period were as follows:

1. Measures to be taken beforehand against air raids on communication facilities.

(a) Transfer of the important lines to safer places, and the camouflaging of important stations.

(b) Preparations for men and materials for reconstruction and selection of stations to replace the ones damaged.

(c) Construction of temporary lines and preparations for wireless communications.

(d) Suspension of telephone and radio broadcasting services during air raids.

2. Measures for the control of communications with A.

(a) Detection of illicit facilities in the country.

(b) Replenishment of telegraphic officials.

(c) Tightening up of control over telegrams and telephone calls to A, especially the use of secret languages.

(d) In collaboration with the police, tightening up of control over individuals (those listed). If war should start, foreigners and foreign correspondence were to be further restricted.

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p.153-154 Sixth Period

The situation grew further acute, and advancing the date of carrying out the Cabinet's previous decision concerning our operations against E, we finally resorted to the use of force on November 15. A and B also severed their economic relations with N. Marine transportation was greatly impeded owing to the further requisitioning of ships. Communications also was confronted with shortage of men and materials due to the advance into F. The following measures were adopted under the circumstances.

1. Measures to maintain internal communication service following the advance into F, etc.

(a) Restriction of telegraph service, and the reduction in the number of times of collecting and delivering mails.

(b) Training of employees and the concentration of technicians on telegraphy.

(c) Closure of unimportant telegraph offices.

2. Measures to avoid too rigid use of military requisitioned ships.

Owing to the drop of efficiency and the increase in requisitioned ships due to the military operations in the Southern Region, transportation capacity decreased to 4,800,000 tons per month, thus causing a considerable accumulation of stocks. Accordingly, after consultation with the War and the Navy Ministries we decided to transport 5,000,000 tons during the year by utilizing the return voyages of military requisitioned ships. Furthermore, the distribution of crude oil was to be increased to promote the use of motor and sail driven boats, whereby 7,000,000 tons was to be transported during the year.

3. Measures for fostering ship-building.

All efforts were to be made to secure materials, labor and funds, and at the same time by fixing a simple standard type of shipping with the object of shortening the number of construction days, with secondary importance attached to their quality.

4. Since the special session of the Diet was opened on Nov. 20, we drafted into concrete form the outline of state management of shipping which we had adopted previously. We submitted to the Diet a Management Bill and a special account

bill necessary for carrying it out, and both of these bills were passed. (Danger allowances for seamen, and the necessary expenditure for shipping insurance were included in the budget for this special account)

pp. 154-156 Seventh Period

Although the advance into N was progressing satisfactorily, A's pressure on N increased, and N finally decided to start war against A. On Dec. 20, N made a sudden attack and landed on A's territory. The shortage of marine transportation capacity affected all quarters. Not only was the southern line almost suspended by the operations in the Southern Region, but the ships sunk reached a considerable number. A re-examination of foreign communications was necessitated in view of our relations with A and B. There were many other matters which called for counter-measures, such as the scarcity of electricity, and air raids against FORMOSA and FUYUSHU.

(1) Measures for balancing the demand and supply of electricity.

Besides stream-lining the transportation of coal and providing relief from other sources, we effected under the Electricity Adjustment Ordinance, a 15% restriction in general, except for military use or for use by the most urgent enterprises in the current situation.

2. Method of utilizing equipment which has become idle owing to the suspension of communications and the countries with which our communications should be strengthened.

The communications with X, F, T, Switzerland and Brazil were strengthened for collecting informations or for propaganda by using the equipment previously used for communication with A and B, which have become idle owing to the international situation.

3. Materialization of the broadcasts to E.

As to short-wave broadcasts, those to the Southern Region chiefly from TOKYO and PALAU were strengthened. As to medium-wave broadcasts, small broadcasting instruments and necessary personnel were despatched to cooperate in propaganda.

4. Measures for the protection of ships and crew sailing in dangerous waters.



- (a) A convoy system was adopted in the South China Sea.
- (b) A wartime shipping insurance system was established.
- (c) Complete sets of life saving equipment and danger allowances were provided for the crew.

5. With respect to the damage caused by the air-raid against northern Kyushu in the latter part of December, we strove to restore important facilities first according to established plan.

6. Transportation capacity during this period was 3,300,000 tons per month, which was very inadequate. Ships withdrawn from the Southern Region owing to the cessation of transportation there were assigned to transportation to North China and coastal regions.

pp. 156-158 Eighth Period

In the middle part of January, the capture of Q and S was begun and Tokyo was raided. There was considerable damage done to telegraph and telephone service stations and power transmission lines. Transportation with the Southern Region continued to be disrupted, and the number of ships lost was considerable. However, with the progress of military operations, some ships were released from requisition in February, and transportation routes in the Southern Region were gradually revived.

1. Counter-measures for the air-raid on the Metropolis (Communications).

(a) The Central Telegraph Office and the Central Telephone Office were not transferred to other places, but reconstructed with aid from other sources.

(b) With respect to the destruction of the out-of-city lines via Tokaido, the principal lines were maintained by connections with the norther line.

(c) Telegrams were places under necessary restrictions.

2. Measures to cope with the damage done to power transmission lines.

(a) Electricity supply was restored according to the damaged condition of each factory and the degree of importance of the industry.

(b) Electric lighting in general was restored as soon as possible.

3. Bills submitted to and adopted by the regular session of the Diet.

(a) Postal Law Revision Bill.

The handling of certain kinds of postal matters may be refused, if occasion demands during wartime.

(b) Telegraph Law Revision Bill.

Telephone subscribers may be forced to give up the service, if occasion demands during wartime.

4. Marine transportation capacity.

Although we were confronted with difficulties owing to the scarcity of ships and the disruption of transportation with the Southern Region, we were able to recover transportation capacity of 4,000,000 tons to 4,500,000 tons per month through the release of ships from requisition. However, transportation from F and T was but only half the amount.

pp. 158-159 Ninth Period

Operations in E, P, and Q area were almost completed and there followed the clash of the main fleets of N and A. Although the southern sea-route was reviving, our loss of ships gradually increased owing to the activities of A's submarines and aeroplanes operating from their bases in R. On the other hand some ships requisitioned by the navy were released. With the activities of the submarines, there was a shortage in the number of applicants for seaman. The difficulties in communication and transportation also increased. As there were many people listening to foreign short-wave broadcast through "all-wave receivers", we adopted the following measures.

1. Measures to smooth out communication difficulties.

(a) Restriction of third and fourth class rails, parcel-posts and telegrams.

(b) Forced withdrawal of telephones and the restriction of the frequency of telephone calls.

(c) Intensification of the training of telegraphic technicians and the expansion of the field for inexperienced operators by simplifying operations.

2. Measures against the listening in to foreign short-wave broadcasts by our nationals and aliens.

(a) Strict supervision of the unlawful possession of "all-wave receivers."

(b) Control by the Home Ministry and Foreign Ministry of propaganda by listeners to foreign short-wave broadcasts.

3. Transportation plan for materials from E, P. and Q.

In consultation with the Army and Navy, we decided to transport materials to Japan Proper by means of requisitioned ships, and at the same time have non-requisitioned ships cooperate in military transportation in their outward voyages.

4. Measures to cope with the decrease of applicants for jobs as seamen and the increase in the number of seamen leaving their ships.

(a) Inculcation of maritime spirit.

(b) Requisitioning.

(c) Make those wishing to leave their ships change their mind.

(d) No increase in danger allowances was to be made.

(Confidential Document)

General Outline of the Progress of the Manoeuvres  
of the Blue Country

(The Jurisdiction of the Justice Ministry)

Kentaro HIBUCHI, Minister of Justice.

p. 160 4th Period of Manoeuvres (September, 1941).

1. Report was received regarding the leakage of N-A negotiations that on Sept. 25, 1941, the chief public procurator of the Tokyo district criminal court lodged a suit against a certain person who had attended the conference. (cf. the Justice Minister's instruction "Confidential, No. 899, 1941").

pp. 160-162 2. 6th Period of Manoeuvres (Nov., 1941).

In view of the frequent violations of economic control, the following measures could be considered by the justice authorities as long as it remained difficult to supplement personnel: (1) revision of the substantive law, (2) revision of the adjective law, (3) a more rational management of existing systems.

1. As to the revision of the substantive law, we submitted to the extraordinary session of the Diet, a "bill for the maintenance of national life", which was approved. This law pertains to the establishment of constituent elements for crimes of conventional offenses to promote speed and simplification in their investigations and thorough control of such crimes by suppressing the main organs, in order to work to secure important materials, particularly necessities of life, and for their equal distribution.

2. As to the revision of the adjective law, we submitted "a bill for the special criminal procedures under wartime emergency," to the same session of the Diet which was also approved. This law provides for a two trial system, generally in conformity with the procedure regulations of the national defense peace preservice law, and acknowledges the procurator's power for compulsory detentions prior to indictment.

3. The management of the system was entrusted to the authority of the chief public procurator of each court of appeal. He was to undertake such matters as commanding the management of business of districts where the procurator was overworked, inducing judges to become procurators, and appointing more than half of those taking examinations for the bar as procurators.

### III. 7th Period of Manoeuvres (Dec., 1941.)

Bills presented to and adopted by the ordinary session of the Diet were as follows:

1. "Law for the punishment of special wartime crimes". This law prescribes strict punishment for crimes committed during wartime such as (1) theft in residences vacated in flight, (2) various kinds of crimes, violence and regular theft prescribed in the criminal law, and committed during defense activities by Army or Navy or during black-outs, (3) damaging of necessary facilities and others established for air-defense.

2. "Code for special civil case procedures under wartime emergency conditions."

Procedures for civil trials under wartime emergency conditions will comply with this code, as a rule, and will simplify trials in conformity with the code of procedure for non-litigious cases and at the same time grant the Court the rights of discretionary trial by compulsory arbitration as in article 7 of the code of arbitration for monetary debts. Furthermore, as measures against decreasing of personnel, the jurisdictional rights of the district courts shall be extended, and appeals to higher courts restricted; and as measures for air-raids and transportation restrictions, offices may be opened at any time and in any place by order of the Minister of Justice, and documents may be dispatched in a special simplified method.

3. Revisions in the code of special criminal procedure under wartime emergency conditions.

As measures against decreasing of personnel, and air-raid and transportation restrictions, the same revisions were made as in civil procedures.

pp. 163-164 IV. 8th Period of Manoeuvres (Jan. to Mar., 1942)

As the Shitaya temporary branch office of the Tokyo district criminal court was destroyed in a fire caused by an air-raid in January of 1942; and some of the register books were also destroyed:

(1) It was decided by order of the Ministry of Justice that the business of the above branch office should be managed at the main office. (cf. Article 17, II; Code of Court Constitution.)

(2) Registration business at the above branch office temporarily suspended by notification of the Ministry of Justice. (cf. Article 10, Code for registration of immovable properties.)

(3) Application for restoration registration on designated terms was permitted by the above notification. (cf. Article 23, Code for registration of immovable properties.)

n. 165

To:----The Government of Blue Country

From:----The Minister of Education

Measures adopted by the Education Ministry in the 1st Theoretical Total War Manoeuvres.

n. 165 3rd Period (middle and latter part of Aug., 1941).

National spiritual mobilization was carried out in collaboration with the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. In particular nation-wide organizations like schools, cultural organizations, etc., were utilized to emphasize the need of rousing the national spirit on a basis of preparation for war, to promote the spirit of public service, to encourage savings; to drive home the significance of travel restrictions; to start a movement for a new wartime mode of living; and to get students to give their services for labour. (Details were as contained in the reports of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.)

pp. 165-166 4th Period (middle and latter part of Sep., 1941)

(1) Intensification of the activities of the Students' Patriotic Organization.

As a measure against labour shortage, the activities of the recently organized Students' Patriotic Organization were intensified to contribute to the increased production of food and the expansion of production.

(2) Establishment of ideological guidance system as a measure for strengthening spiritual mobilization. An organization for positive guidance of national ideology was set up to establish and strengthen the ideological national defense system.

3. Measures for raising the morale of Educators.

(a) Educational organizations throughout the country were united, and with permission, we were granted a member of the Imperial Family as president, thereby doing our best to raise the morale of educators.

(b) A voluntary educational assistance movement was developed by educators under consciousness of being fighters on the fronts of the nation's ideological defense.

pp. 166-168 5th Period (middle and latter part of Oct., 1941).

1. Measures adopted to arouse the national morale.

Besides intensifying the various plans which we had been following, the people were kept informed, as long as there was no inconvenience, of the present situation of Blue Country at home and abroad, and of its future course, to stimulate self-inspiration and encouragement.

2. Measures for raising the national spirit.

As the state of things had come to manifest still further the acuteness of the situation, the pressing need of the moment was to raise the spirit of the general public, so a basic plan for it was established and carried out immediately.

(a) The definite object of spiritual mobilization was to be the manifestation of the total power of a united nation.

(b) The Ministers and the leaders were to take the lead and set an example, and importance was to be laid on the moral side of administration.

(c) The establishment of Japanese education and reconstruction of the national life in line with Japanese ways.

(d) The establishment of a strong and sturdy wartime national life both in its spiritual and material aspects.

3. Counter-measures for internal strife between the different Buddhist sects and for the guidance of the people's spiritual life.

(a) The roots of internal troubles were to be exterminated by re-examination of doctrines, tightening of supervision, and short courses of education in Japanese Buddhism, etc.

(b) By studying Japanese religion through the establishment of the Religious Investigation Committee and reorganization of the National Spirit and Culture Research Institute, the people were to be guided so as to prevent disturbance of their spiritual life.



pp. 168 6th Period (Middle and latter part of Nov., 1941).

1. Measures to cope with the shortage of technicians.

(a) As an emergency measure the graduation period for students who are scheduled to be graduated in March, 1942, from technical and agricultural schools lower than colleges, was to be advanced to December.

(b) Plans for the future, apart from existing plans, included the expansion and continuation of the 2nd regular course and the special course in technical schools, establishment of more regular and 2nd regular courses, in agricultural schools, establishment of more higher technical and agricultural schools, and increase of enrollment in science courses in the higher schools.

pp. 168-169 7th Period (Middle and latter part of Dec., 1941)

1. Measures to cope with the shortage of elementary school teachers.

(a) As an emergency measure, students scheduled to be graduated from normal schools next March were to be graduated in advance in December; retired teachers were to be re-employed; and three months or six months short course training for assistant teachers was to be offered.

(b) As permanent measures;--Increase of classes in normal schools; expansion of the provisions for teachers' welfare, prevention of the change of occupations by raising the spirit of national service through education, study and preparation for requisitioning girls graduating from girls' high schools as elementary school teachers.

2. Air defense measures in schools, etc.

Directions on air-defense measures were given to the Ministry of Education and all sections under its direct jurisdiction, public and private schools, social educational institutions, temples, national treasures, attached hospitals, etc., respectively to take appropriate air defense measures. The Wartime Measures Guidance Section was established in the Education Ministry to take charge of this guidance.

pp. 169-170 8th Period (Jan.-Mar., 1942).

1. Presentation of a bill for the incorporation of schools.

In order to completely organize the educational system for total war, a fundamental renovation of private schools was felt to be necessary. As a means to this end we hoped to effect thorough supervision and guidance from the financial side.

## 2. Measures against air-raids on Tokyo.

According to established plans, the Governor of Tokyo Prefecture was empowered to act on the order of the Martial Law Headquarters, while this Ministry assumed the leadership in command.

(a) Elementary school buildings in the vicinity of the damaged districts were utilized to shelter the victims.

(b) Refugee students and school children were put into schools in the country or in other schools in Tokyo.

(c) Students' Patriotic Organizations were made to clear the districts destroyed by fire.

(d) Schools in the entire city were closed for about ten days.

pp. 170-171 9th Period (Apr.--Aug., 1942).

## 1. Results of the investigations concerning the abolition of the postponement of conscripting students.

In anticipation of the day when this problem will have to be considered with the development of the situation, an investigation was made from the standpoint of education, the result of which were as follows:

(a) In view of the fact that the enforcement of this matter would bring about much confusion and waste in education, it should be carried out only when absolutely essential for the reinforcement of military forces.

(b) Actual measures to be taken upon its enforcement.

1. Method for execution of examinations.

2. Scope of its application.

3. Special technicians.

4. Treatment of the returned soldier.

5. Measures for dealing with faculty members.

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1. Method for execution of examinations.

2. Scope of its application.

3. Special technicians.

4. Treatment of the returned soldier.

5. Measures for dealing with faculty members.

2. Supplements to the measures to cope with the shortage of elementary school teachers.

When the next 700,000 men are mobilized for the armed forces, the number of school teachers to be conscripted is estimated to reach 5,250. Therefore, suitable persons from among the graduates of high schools, (mostly females) shall be registered according to the revised National Working Capacity Report Ordinance, and conscripted to serve as assistant teachers.

(Confidential Document)

August 1941

n. 172

Theoretical War Maneuver for Total War No. 1, for 1941

Records of Progress of Blue Country's Naval Maneuvers.

Navy Minister: Lieutenant-Commander Tadashi SHIMURA.

p.173 Third Period of Maneuvers (6 to 31 Aug., Period of strained international relations)

1. Naval armaments and war preparations were completed according to pre-arranged schedule.

2. By 31 August 3,000 men with the rank of warrant officer or above and 50,000 petty officers and men were called cut and 100,000 tons of shipping were requisitioned.

3. A request was made in the Cabinet Conference on August 6, for the acquisition from A, B, E., etc., of materials of which we are short, as far as conditions allow.

pp. 173-174 4th Period of Maneuvers 1 to 30 Sept. (period of strained international relations).

1. Completion of armaments and war preparations were continued.

2. The following notification was given to the Ministry of Communications regarding measures for ships sent overseas.

(a) Ships proceeding to the west coasts of south and north A should continually maintain communications from anywhere east of 180° east longitude. If there is any sudden change in the situation, ships should try their best to escape and take the South Pacific route, making clear the ship's /position/ all the time; but if captured by warships of A, B and E, measures should be taken to scuttle the ship.

(b) Ships bound for E, F and T of the Southern Region should take refuge in South Sea Islands, or the ports of F on South C which are occupied by us. Otherwise, same as above.

pp. 174-175 Fifth Period. Manoeuvres. (1 to 31 Oct. Period when war became inevitable.)

1. Completion of armaments and war preparations were continued.

2. Since A interned N's ships anchored in A's harbours with, B, E and L's successive cooperation, we stopped sending ships abroad any more, and at the same time notified the Communications Ministry of the execution of the proposal made in the Fourth Period.

3. In accordance with the Cabinet's decision to advance into E, we called out on 15 October 3,000 men with the rank of warrant officer or above and 50,000 non-commissioned officers and men, and requisitioned 500,000 tons of shipping.

p. 175 Sixth Period Manoeuvres. (Nov. 1 to 30. Period of advance into E)

1. Completion of armaments and war preparations were continued.

2. In the Cabinet Conference held in the middle part of November the following requests were made as the views of the Supreme Command:

(a) Under the present conditions, war with A and B was not considered entirely unavoidable.

(b) Every effort should be made to realize the matters which were decided by the Cabinet Council on 15 October, and also those which received Imperial Sanction on 5 November

3. On 15 November 100,000 tons of ships and 200,000 tons of oil tankers were requisitioned in preparation for the war against A.

p. 185 Seventh Period Manoeuvres: (12 to 31 December, period when war against A and B was started).

1. Completion of armaments and war preparations were continued.

2. On 15 December 100,000 tons of ships and 100,000 tons of oil tankers were requisitioned for use in the operations against A.

3. On 20 December two platoons of troops were sent out from the Yokosuka naval barracks for air defence duties. (They lived at the Navy Ministry, in schools, etc.)

pp. 176-177 Eighth Period Manoeuvres (1 Jan. to 31 March, 1942. Period of war against A, B and E.)

1. Repletion of armaments and war preparations were continued and damaged warcraft and vessels were repaired.

2. During the air-raid on the metropolis on January 25, by A's carrier-borne planes, bombs were dropped on the Navy Ministry, causing destruction of a part of the buildings. The situation was properly handled by the detailed troops.

3. On 1 February various neutral countries were notified of the establishment of danger zones by Blue Country. However, D's ships would be given escort through these zones if notification was received beforehand.

4. After discussions, we notified the Supreme Command of our decision as to the waters in which the enemy's commercial traffic should be destroyed.

pp. 177 Ninth Period. Manoeuvres. (1 April to 31 August -- Period of war against A, B, and E.)

1. Completion of armaments and war preparations were continued and damaged ships repaired.

2. On 1 May we prohibited the passage of D's ships through the waters of Blue Country's danger zones.

3. On 15 July, 250,000 tons of ships and 50,000 tons of oil tankers were released from requisition.

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(Confidential Document)

Measures taken by the Superintendent-General of the Metropolitan Police Board during the Theoretical Manoeuvres for Total War No. 1.

Superintendent-General of the  
Metropolitan Police Board

FUKUDA Hageshi.

178 Fourth Period (10 September 1941)

On inquiring of the Foreign Minister on the leakage of the negotiations between N and A a reply was received to the effect that the contents of the negotiations were to be kept a national secret. Therefore, the offender was immediately arrested under Article 6 of the National Defence and Peace Preservation Law.

Furthermore, in view of this incident, we submitted to the President of the Information Board and to the Cabinet our opinion that further care should be exercised in future in keeping national secrets.

pp. 178-180 Eighth Period (26 Jan. 1942).

The following measures were taken when A planes raided the Metropolis early on the morning of 25 Jan. 1942.

No. I. Previous measures.

1. Established the air-defense headquarters of Tokyo prefecture in the Metropolitan Police Board.
2. Concentrated guards at important points and maintained mobility of patrol.
3. Placed in the central areas rotor pumps sent as reinforcement from outside districts.
4. Set up patrolling areas.
5. Detailed guards to take post upon the issuance of an air-raid alert signal.

No. II Subsequent measures.

1. Fire-fighting.

By mobilizing every organ for fire-fighting under our jurisdiction, we were able to limit the area destroyed by fire to 3,450,000 square metres, involving 32,000 houses destroyed, and 137,000 victims.

2. Emergency refuge.

Victims were taken to and sheltered at Hibiya, Shiba, Korakuen and Ueno Parks.

3. Treatment of the victims.

(a) Of the 137,000 victims, 70,000 were cared for at relatives or friends' homes in Tokyo city, while the remainder were accommodated in elementary school buildings within the city.

(b) Those who had no relatives in Tokyo city were sooner or later sent to the country districts.

(c) Appropriate measures were taken to publicize the safety of the victims.

4. Patrol.

(a) Set up interception lines and established inspection posts.

(b) Enforced various traffic restrictions.

(c) Controlled rumors and intelligence.

5. Restoration operations.

(a) Cleared up areas destroyed by fire, disposed of unexploded shells and repaired damaged places.

(b) No rebuilding was done in the areas destroyed by fire.

6. Relief work.

(a) Accommodated the sick and the wounded at medical relief stations and hospitals.

(b) Prevented the spread of bad influenza.

7. Distribution of food and charcoal.

Special distribution of food and charcoal was made to the victims with the assistance of the Agriculture and Forestry Ministry.

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n. 181 Outline of the Progress of the Theoretical  
Manoeuvres for Total War No. I.

Welfare Minister

pp. 182-184 2nd Period.

In accordance with the labour mobilization policy  
the following plans were adopted and put into effect.

No. I. Adjustment of the demand and supply of  
ordinary workers and technicians.

1. Distribution /of workers/ with emphasis on the  
importance of munitions /production/.

2. Setting up of "everybody working" system  
(organization of Labour Service Units based on the opera-  
tion of the General Mobilization Law).

3. Control of the employment of the new graduates  
of elementary schools and middle schools.

4. Expansion of national registration system.

5. Restriction on the employment of new workers in  
not-urgent fields.

6. Measures for the change of occupations by persons  
engaged in small and middle scale industries. (establish-  
ment of a plan for the redistribution of labour)

7. Measures for farm labour.

8. Plan for the large-scale immigration of Koreans.

9. Strengthening of the structure for requisitioning  
people.

10. Housing measures in connection with the redistri-  
bution of labour.

11. Plan for the distribution of the graduates of  
technical schools.

12. Improvement and expansion of institutions for the  
training of technicians.

13. Expansion of the system for training skilled  
workers.

14. Plan for the redistribution of technicians and skilled workers.

Ec. II. Measures for securing, replenishing and promoting the efficiency of labour.

1. Intensification of the industrial service movement.

2. Rectification of the employment of workers, wages, working hours, and other terms of employment.

3. Renovation of the organization of the workshop and other measures for promoting efficiency.

4. Restriction of the retirement of employees.

5. Setting up of a commendation system for workers.

6. Measures for the physical improvement, instruction, and training of workers.

7. Ensuring the distribution of necessities of life and working implements for the workers.

p. 184 3rd Period. (Early and middle parts of August)

In order to cope with the shortage of 300,000 labourers consequent upon the mobilizations since the early part of July, we adopted the following measures:

Of the 300,000 men needed, 100,000 were obtained by ordinary advertisement, 100,000 by conscripting youth from among those registered under the National Occupational capacity Report Ordinance, and the remaining 100,000 (of which 30,000 were experienced workers having one or more years' experience in the same occupation) from among the skilled workers registered under the National Occupational Report Ordinance.

pp. 184-187 4th Period. (First and middle parts of Sept.)

No. I. In order to cope with the growing seriousness of the problem of unemployment of persons engaged in the middle and small-scale business as the result of the revision of the commodity mobilization plan, the following measures were decided upon in the Cabinet Council.

Measures for the change of occupation or unemployment of persons engaged in middle or small-scale trade and industries.

1. Persons engaged in middle or small-scale trade and industries who have to change their occupations or go out of work should be assigned to urgent work as much as possible from the view point of the reorganization of labour. Accordingly, the following measures should be taken:

(1) To guide those who have to change their occupations in such a way as not to make them feel that they are stragglers of society, but to instil in them the resolution to work willingly in any line of work, considering it an honour to be assigned and mobilized in works urgently demanded under the present situation in accordance with the requirements of the national policy.

(2) To expand the National Labour Training Institute.

(3) To foster the activities of the National Occupational Guidance Institute and to place into employment on a preferential basis those forced to change their occupations.

(4) To instruct employers to moderate their terms for hiring workers and for preference select those who have changed their occupations or are out of work.

(5) To grant family allowances for a certain period of time until work is found for those unemployed who immediately fall into difficulties in making a living.

(6) To provide measures for supplying funds to those forced to change their occupations, who are in need of money for preparation.

(7) To urge the persons involved to take mutual aid measures on their own initiative.

(8) To assist and urge those middle and small-class tradesmen and manufacturers who are carrying on a half closed business to take on another occupation.

2. To have prefectural, city, town and village offices and social work organizations establish or expand industrial training or institutes and side-work associations and provide them with some way of making a living.

No. II. With respect to the great shortage of workers especially transportation, commercial, and domestic workers nothing was done to supply new workers for commercial and household work, since labour supply was scarce, but with respect to the shortage of transportation workers, the Government encouraged the National Occupational

No. III. The following measures were taken to regulate the labour shortage in the farming districts, especially during the autumn harvest season, as a result of the natural drift of farm workers into factories and other fields:

(1) To persuade factories, shops and working places to let the workers go back to the farms during the harvest season.

(2) To promote the activities of the labour service units based on the National Mobilization Law, and make people living in the cities near farming districts who are not working in urgent business participate in food production.

(3) To tighten up the restriction on fresh employment in non-urgent branches of industry.

pp. 188-189 5th Period. (First and middle parts of October).

No. I As production in the industry related to foreign trade was severely affected and many large factories and shops were closed down, the Welfare Ministry decided to encourage the National Occupational Guidance Institutes and to take necessary measures in order to divert from the standpoint of labour reorganization those workers who had to be discharged from the industries related to foreign trade into those branches of industry which are important from the standpoint of national policy.

No. II. In order to cope with the growing difficulty in bring in Korean labourers owing to the scarcity of food, etc., the following measures were decided by the Cabinet Council.

(1) In order to strengthen the structure for labour mobilization for supplying the labour requirements of Japan proper with the labour resources, the hiring of general labourers shall be controlled, the active use of labour service units fostered, the national labour guidance institutes expanded and other measures adopted.

(2) In order to foster the immigration of Korean labourers the extra distribution of cereals to Korean labourers shall be considered and the capacity of transporting Korean labourers shall be increased.

No. III. Regarding the scarcity of agricultural labourers, the measures adopted in the previous period shall be further strengthened.

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No. III. Regarding the scarcity of agricultural labourers, the measures adopted in the previous period shall be further strengthened.



No. IV. In response to the demand of Blue Country's Supreme Command Headquarters to the government that the concentration of the nation's total strength be further intensified, the regulations for the assignment of labour in the urgently necessary branches of industry and other matters pertaining to labour were decided in the Cabinet Council, thereby intensifying the labour mobilization structure.

pp. 189-190 6th Period. (Early and middle parts of November.)

It was decided to adopt the following measures in order to cope with the complications of internal labour, especially the scarcity of technicians in every industry.

1. Re-examination of the plan for labour distribution in urgently necessary industries.
2. Thorough enforcement of the measures for the prevention of the movement of workers.
3. Thorough enforcement of wage regulations.
4. Tightening up of the regulations for hiring workers.
5. Redistribution of technicians by compulsory technical training institutions.

p.190 7th Period. (Early part of December)

In order to cope with the shortage of labour, it was decided to reinforce the previous measures and at the same time to strengthen especially the measures for the mobilization of students through labour service units, and the complete mobilization of women workers.

pp. 190-191 8th Period (January, 1942)

In cooperation with the Home Ministry the Welfare Ministry took necessary measures for the relief of the sick and wounded on the occasion of the air-raid against the Metropolis of N by A's planes.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I.P.S. No. 2228

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Tomo Satow hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of the Cabinet and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 191 pages, dated \_\_\_\_\_, 1946, and described as follows: Records of the Progress of Table Top Interviews for Total War No. 1. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Cabinet Secretariat.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
17 day of Oct., 1946.

/s/ T. Satow  
Signature of Official  
SIA/L

Witness: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
Secretary of Cabinet  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, John Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
17 day of Oct., 1946

/s/ J. A. Curtis, 2d Lt.  
MIE

Witness: /s/ Douglas L. Waldorf  
1st Lt., Inf.  
Chief, Inv. Div., IPS

\_\_\_\_\_  
Investigator  
Official Capacity

Ex. # 870

IPS DOC NO.  
1356-A

EXCERPTS FROM IPS DOCUMENT NO. 1356 ENTITLED  
"FIRST TABLE TOP TOTAL WAR MANEUVERS - No. 1"

(Outside Cover)

Secret

Number 1

First Table Top Total War Maneuvers

Situation of the Maneuvers from the Third to the Ninth Terms.

The Problem and the Disposition of the Maneuvers

Superintendent's Department of the Table Top Maneuvers



(2) In order to prepare for war against D and A, (B, E) the Blue State is mobilizing calling up since the first decade of July, 300,000 new military personnel and 300,000 tons of new ships. (Quantity given orally).

### 3. Home Situation.

(1) The new mobilization and requisition of ships, carriages and cattle, have had some influence on all the fields of labor power, communication power, agriculture, mining, industry, etc. in the country. Decrease of production as well as considerable obstacles are expected as the situation grows more and more serious.

(2) As regards railroads and electrical communications, they are not smoothly functioning on account of the increase of military transport and communication, and decrease in the number of employees.

(3) The raising of funds for industry is not satisfactory especially the issue of debentures Pt I, p. 4 for the various enterprises for increase of production is becoming more and more difficult, with the result that 35 percent of raised debentures remain unsold and the situation cannot be neglected.

Short term funds are sufficient.

The stock market is not active.

(4) Owing to bad weather the rice crop all over the country will obviously be poor, and agricultural crops in general are also very poor. A shortage of fuel and the requisition of fishing boats have considerable influence on the haul of fish.

(5) As a result of leakage of a part of the negotiation between N and A, various rumors are arising among the people, but the situation is not yet noteworthy. As the situation grows more and more serious, the people in general are desiring the powerful leadership of the Government.  
Pt. I, p. 5

\* \* \* \* \*

### Questions II

1. Submit a report concerning the steps which the various organs of maneuvers of the Blue State will adopt by the 20th of August. (Deadline: 13.00 on 7th of August) and a report concerning the steps to be adopted by the end

(2) In order to prepare for war against D and A, (B, E) the Blue State is mobilizing calling up since the first decade of July, 300,000 new military personnel and 300,000 tons of new ships. (Quantity given orally).

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Page 3

of August. (Deadline: 0830 on 8th of August). However, the general policy to be taken by the Blue State Government must be shown privately to the Leading Section by 0900 on 7th of August.

2. The Blue State Government shall effect communications with the Supreme Command, and investigate concretely the competency of the Blue State in the execution of war on the occasion of entering war against A, B and E from the present situation, and submit the report at an appointed time which will be indicated afterwards. Pt. I, p. 8

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SOKIEN Part II of No. 7	Appointed Distributor	MATSUDA, Member of Staff
CONFIDENTIAL		
No. 5 of 120 copies in all	Keeping Secret Management	Secret to all except to those who are concerned with the maneuvers, Should be returned after the maneuvers are over.

August 7, SFCWA 16 (afternoon)

Superintendent of Total War Table Top Maneuvers - IIMURA, Jo

Supplementary Situation of the Third Period Maneuvers of the First Total War Table Top Maneuvers

1. On and after the 1st of August, meetings of the Liaison Conference between the Blue State Government and the Supreme Command were held several times, and the following items were decided on:

(1) The original plan of the private draft for the Total War policy.

(2) To submit to the Throne to open a meeting in the Emperor's presence concerning the Total War policy and the preparation for war which requires immediate attention.

(3) The draft provided for the above mentioned meeting in the Emperor's presence. (The draft should consist of the fundamental items of the Total War policy and the items concerning the action for the preparation for war

2. On 10th of August a meeting was held in the Emperor's presence and after questions on the fundamental problem by the Emperor, the prepared policy was concluded as the decision of the meeting in the Emperor's presence.

3. As regards the Government's plan for mobilizing resources and goods in the preparation for war against A, B and E, the Government and the Supreme Command negotiated with each other, with the result that they reached an agreement on the 20th of August after modifying a part of the final plan of the Government. During the proceedings of the meeting:

(1) Protracted negotiations between the authorities of administrative affairs resulted in no settlement while the situations didn't permit delay. So by the political settlement between the leaders of both parties, they compromised in that they should provide 100,000 tons of steel in addition to 1,900,000 tons for munitions reserve, and that they should perform supplementary operations for each of the other deficient materials.

(2) The Supreme Command demanded in the meeting the following items:

(a) That they should accelerate, most urgently, the technical investigation for the increase of "octane" value of aircraft gasoline.

(b) That they should supplement as quickly as possible the deficient materials. Pt. II, p. 2

(Supplementary Order)

In the course of the maneuvers, try to make investigations on the minimum limit for securing civilian demand, especially the limit of ordinary gasoline, to such extent as is possible. Pt. II, p. 3

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SOKIEN Part III of No. 7

CONFIDENTIAL

Management Plans of the 3rd Period Maneuvers - No. 1

Time to be presented: (Supposition) Middle of Aug. 1941  
(Real date) 7 Aug. 9:00 a.m.

authorities to be presented to	Superintendent's Head- quarters, the heads of the sections for: Military Force; Diplo- matic War, Ideological War; Economic War; Judgment.	Presenter (Occupation and name of maneuvering officer)	Prime Minister of the Blue State Government
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General Policy of the Blue State Government concerning  
the Third Period Problems

(Project for Private Showing)

1. Against A

To the proposal of A, we shall neither give our word  
clearly concerning the position of the Blue State, nor expect  
an ultimate peaceful settlement with A, but adopt a delaying  
policy by diplomatic negotiations, completing war preparations  
in the meantime.

2. Against D

We shall give to D the reply that the Blue State will  
not attack D positively, as long as D would faithfully observe  
the fulfilment of the Neutral Treaty between N and D.  
Pt. III, p. 2

3. Against X

We shall proceed along the policy of the maintenance of  
the status quo, and make them satisfied with the effect of  
the Tripartite Pact between N, X<sub>1</sub> and X<sub>2</sub>, restraining A's  
participation in war against X.

SOKIEN Part III of No. 7

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2. Against D

We shall give to D the reply that the Blue State will not attack D positively, as long as D would faithfully observe the fulfillment of the Neutral Treaty between N and D.  
Pt. III, p. 2

3. Against X

We shall proceed along the policy of the maintenance of the status quo, and make them satisfied with the effect of the Tripartite Pact between N, X<sub>1</sub> and X<sub>2</sub>, restraining A's participation in war against X.

4. Against F and T

Against F, we shall proceed with the Total War policy previously decided upon. Against T, we shall endeavor to enforce the political and military coalition, and take positive steps in order to conclude a military alliance (Secret, if necessary).

5. Against E

We shall continue economic negotiations so that the relation between N and E will not grow worse than at present.  
Pt. III, p. 3

CONFIDENTIAL

The Management Papers of the Third Period Maneuvers No. 3

Authorities to be presented to	Superintendent's Headquarters "War of Arms; War of Diplomacy; War of Thoughts; War of Economy; Judgment Section	Time to be presented Supposition - Middle of August, 1941 Real Date 1 p.m. 7th of August
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Authorities to be reported to	State Minister	Presenter (Occupation and name of maneuvering officer)	Prime Minister of the Blue State Government
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I intend to finish consultation at the Liaison Conference with the Supreme Command concerning the necessary matters in the draft of General Policy of the Blue State Government on the problem of the Third Period Maneuvers, decided in the cabinet meeting on the morning of the 7th of August, and then I will submit it to the Throne to obtain Imperial sanction.  
Pt. III, p. 4

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SOKIEN Part IV

Management Papers of the Third Period Maneuvers No. 2

To be presented  
Real date - 7th August, a.m.

Authorities to be presented to	The Superintendent's Headquarters	Presenter (Occupation and name of maneuvering officer)	Foreign Minister, CHIBA, Hiroshi
Authorities to be reported to or informed	Government		

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Against F, we shall proceed with the Total War policy previously decided upon. Against T, we shall endeavor to enforce the political and military coalition, and take positive steps in order to conclude a military alliance (Secret, if necessary).

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Pt. III, p. 3

CONFIDENTIAL

The Management Papers of the Third Period  
Maneuvers No. 3

Authorities to be presented to	Superintendent's Headquarters War of Arms; War of Diplomacy; War of Thoughts; War of Economy; Judgment Section	Time to be presented Supposition - Middle of August, 1941 Real Date 1 p.m. 7th of August
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SOKIEN Part IV

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To be presented  
Real date - 7th August, a.m.

Authorities to be presented to	The Superintendent's Headquarters	Presenter (Occupation and name of maneuvering officer)	Foreign Minister, CHIBA, Hiroshi
Authorities to be reported to or informed	Government		

Measures of Foreign Minister to meet the situation at the beginning and middle of August. In conformity with the General Policy decided upon in the Five Minister's Meeting on of August, I aim, as an imminent question at preventing the relation between N, A and B from getting worse than they are at present and at the completion of the Blue State's intention of advancing southward into T and F, and I will adopt the following steps:

Against A

I will get the Ambassador in A to open negotiations with the A Government concerning the proposal of August 10 from A and get him to sound out A's real intention and possibilities of her granting concessions without speaking our mind concerning our situation and without expecting a final peaceful settlement. And I will prevent the relations between N and A from getting worse than they are. In the meantime, replete our war preparations and go on Pt. IV, p. 10

impressing A with our firm resolution to fulfill our duties of the N, X<sub>1</sub>, and X<sub>2</sub> Alliance, and to endeavor to restrain A's participation in war against X<sub>1</sub>. (Further details will be stated in the accompanying document in the telegraphic instructions to the Ambassador in A).

Against F

We shall superintend F's attitude so that she will not disturb our actions in the stationing of troops, establishment of military equipments, etc., in accordance with the Joint Defense Agreement. When necessary, we shall adopt coercive measures against F.

Against T

Though aiming at the enforcement of an economic, military and political coalition with T, and ultimately the conclusion of a military alliance, we shall endeavor for the time being to obtain staple commodities, and to conclude an agreement needed for the financial and monetary coalition between N and T. Should this be difficult, we shall endeavor to push the negotiations concerning the agreement, by resorting to oppressive measures such as military pressure, repatriation of residents, etc. In case we cannot find any other measures except the use of armed force which will cause military conflict with A and B Pt. IV, p. 11

we shall wait until the completion of war preparations, avoiding unnecessary instigation.

Concerning the political and military coalition with T, we shall sound the intention of T's authorities, and endeavor to promote the coalition. But if we find it difficult to attain this object without resorting to pressure, we shall wait until the completion of war preparations.

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Against A

I will get the Ambassador in A to open negotiations with the A Government concerning the proposal of August 10 from A and get him to sound out A's real intention and possibilities of her granting concessions without speaking our mind concerning our situation and without expecting a final peaceful settlement. And I will prevent the relations between N and A from getting worse than they are. In the meantime, replete our war preparations and go on Pt. IV, p. 10

impressing A with our firm resolution to fulfill our duties of the N, X<sub>1</sub>, and X<sub>2</sub> Alliance, and to endeavor to restrain A's participation in war against X<sub>1</sub>. (Further details will be stated in the accompanying document in the telegraphic instructions to the Ambassador in A).

Against F

We shall superintend F's attitude so that she will not disturb our actions in the stationing of troops, establishment of military equipments, etc., in accordance with the Joint Defense Agreement. When necessary, we shall adopt coercive measures against F.

Against T

Though aiming at the enforcement of an economic, military and political coalition with T, and ultimately the conclusion of a military alliance, we shall endeavor for the time being to obtain staple commodities, and to conclude an agreement needed for the financial and monetary coalition between N and T. Should this be difficult, we shall endeavor to push the negotiations concerning the agreement, by resorting to oppressive measures such as military pressure, repatriation of residents, etc. In case we cannot find any other measures except the use of armed force which will cause military conflict with A and B Pt. IV, p. 11  
we shall wait until the completion of war preparations, avoiding unnecessary instigation.

Concerning the political and military coalition with T, we shall sound the intention of T's authorities, and endeavor to promote the coalition. But if we find it difficult to attain this object without resorting to pressure, we shall wait until the completion of war preparations.

Against E

By continuing economic negotiations with E, authorities through the resident organs, we shall endeavor to prevent the relation between E and B from getting worse and to reduce the influence of the freezing of funds. If E's attitude is uncompromising and it becomes difficult to accomplish this, we shall wait until the completion of war preparations, avoiding unnecessary stimulation. Moreover, we will supplementarily propose to A and B the necessity of supplying F with E's goods and get them to advise E to mitigate her attitude.

Against D

Concerning the rumor of the military alliance with A, B and C<sub>2</sub> against N, we shall request D to make her attitude clear and inform her that our country has grave concern Pt IV, p. 12 for the performance of the Neutrality Treaty, and indicate that we are prepared to take revenge for a violation of the Treaty. And at the same time, we shall inform D that though our policy is centered on the N, X<sub>1</sub> and X<sub>2</sub> Alliance as did that of the previous government, we have no intention of attacking as long as D maintains a friendly attitude towards us.

Running parallel with the said proceedings, we shall propose to D the conclusion of a new agreement concerning trade and fishery and the offer of the rights of the Karafuto petroleum. If D will not agree to our proposal, we shall threaten her with military demonstration, denunciation of the Neutrality Treaty, etc., but avoiding the conflict of arms. Concerning this economic request against D, we shall obtain beforehand the understanding of X<sub>1</sub>, and be prepared for D's alienating propaganda.

Against X<sub>1</sub>

We shall make X<sub>1</sub> be satisfied with the restraint of A and D and concerning their inquiry on negotiations with A, we shall explain our real intention of securing the final victory of the Axis Powers by the above negotiations.

Pt IV, p. 13

Against C

If there is fear of doubt arising about negotiations with A, we shall explain our real intention, and ask for her understanding.

Against B

Though we shall not positively request to negotiate with her; if we find an opportunity, we shall sound her intentions on the adjustment of diplomatic relations between N and B according to the same purport as in the negotiations with A.  
Pt. IV, p. 14

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SOKIEN NO. 7  
Part 23

Management Papers of the Sixth Period Maneuvers No. 2

Authorities to be presented to	Superintendent's Headquarters; War of Arms; War of Diplomacy; War of Ideological; War of Economic; Judgment Section	Time to be presented	Supposition	First part of November, SHOVA 16 August 14 5 p.m.
Authorities to be reported to or informed	Prime Minister	Presenter (Occupation and name of maneuvering officer)	SHIRAI, Masatatsu, War Minister	

Foreign Policy (to be presented to the Cabinet Meeting).

I. Policy

1. Keeping its intention secret, the Blue State will carry out a surprise advance against E in the middle of November.

II. Measures.

2. We will continue diplomatic negotiations with E as long as possible until the disembarkation is executed, without issuing an ultimatum.



Against C

If there is fear of doubt arising about negotiations with A, we shall explain our real intention, and ask for her understanding.

Against B

Though we shall not positively request to negotiate with her; if we find an opportunity, we shall sound her intentions on the adjustment of diplomatic relations between N and B according to the same purport as in the negotiations with A.  
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1. Keeping its intention secret, the Blue State will carry out a surprise advance against E in the middle of November.

II. Measures.

2. We will continue diplomatic negotiations with E as long as possible until the disembarkation is executed, without issuing an ultimatum.

3. We will first land our advance troops then the main forces by surprise on E on X day attempting, if possible on this occasion to conquer E at one stroke.

4. In case A and B take up the gauntlet after our military advance into E Pt. 23, p. 3

we will lose no time in advancing, overcoming these obstacles; but in case they open hostilities against us before the event takes place, we will begin an attack on P and Q first of all, and later seize the opportunity and advance against E.

5. We will take no measures against A and B for the time being, and with the landing on E, propose the following items:

(1) That N's advance into E is indispensable for the self-existence of the Blue State and peace in the Pacific.

(2) That we are prepared for a challenge from A and B at any time but we are ready to supply them with the necessary materials if they understand our real intention.

6. Against X we will request without delay that as we shall advance into E first of all to assist X against A and B; X shall not change her military operations against D into a defense attitude throughout and shall carry out positively her war of economy and thoughts against D Pt. 23 p. 4

and moreover shall wage war positively against A and B. Pt. 23, p. 5

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Management Papers of the Sixth Period Maneuvers No. 8

Authorities to be presented to	Superintendent's Headquarters; War of Arms; War of Diplomacy; Judgment Section	Time to be presented Supposition - Latter part of November SHO'A, 16 August 15, 3 p.m.
		Real date

Authorities to be reported to or informed	Prime Minister	Presenter (Occupation and name of maneuvering officer)	SHINAI, Masatatsu, War Minister
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3. We will first land our advance troops then the main forces by surprise on E on X day attempting, if possible on this occasion to conquer E at one stroke.

4. In case A and B take up the gauntlet after our military advance into E Pt. 23, p. 3

we will lose no time in advancing, overcoming these obstacles; but in case they open hostilities against us before the event takes place, we will begin an attack on P and Q first of all, and later seize the opportunity and advance against E.

5. We will take no measures against A and B for the time being, and with the landing on E, propose the following items:

(1) That N's advance into E is indispensable for the self-existence of the Blue State and peace in the Pacific.

(2) That we are prepared for a challenge from A and B at any time but we are ready to supply them with the necessary materials if they understand our real intention.

6. Against X we will request without delay that as we shall advance into E first of all to assist X against A and B; X shall not change her military operations against D into a defense attitude throughout and shall carry out positively her war of economy and thoughts against D Pt. 23 p. 4

and moreover shall wage war positively against A and B. Pt. 23, p. 5

\* \* \* \* \*

Management Papers of the Sixth Period Maneuvers No. 8

Authorities to be presented to	Superintendent's Headquarters; War of Arms; War of Diplomacy; Judgment Section	Time to be presented Supposition - Latter part of November SHO <sup>WA</sup> , 16 August 15, 3 p.m.
		Real date

Authorities to be reported to or informed	Prime Minister	Presenter (Occupation and name of maneuvering officer)	SHIRAI, Masatatsu, War Minister
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Opinions to be presented to the Cabinet Meeting  
Foreign Policy Based on Supplementary Circumstances

I. Decision

1. The Blue State shall decide to initiate war against A and B and every possible measure should be taken to see that the internal and external situations at the time of the outbreak of war be extremely favorable.

2. The date of the opening of war shall probably be after the middle of December.

II. Measures

1. Against E

Besides waging a war of arms, we shall develop a strong war of thought Pt. 23, p. 10

and expect E's complete surrender in a short time. Further, we shall endeavor to send back ships and materials taking into consideration the temporary isolation of our troops which have advanced into E after the outbreak of the war against A and B, and to send beforehand the required munitions.

4. Against A and B

We shall endeavor to keep our intention of opening a war secret by means of a compromising and concessive diplomatic policy and endeavor to seize an advantageous situation at the outbreak of the war.

5. Against X

We will inform X that the time of our opening a war against A and B is at hand, and present our demand indicated in the items of SOKIEN, Total War Table Top Maneuvers No. 9, Part 4.

6. Against D

We will open negotiations on request. Though we will adopt a delaying policy, we shall maintain the premeditated plan of granting Items 1, 2 and 4. Pt. 23, p. 11

1356A

機密 第一号

第一回總力戰机上演習

第三期乃至第九期演習情況

課題及演習処置

綴

机上演習院監部

1.

181

1356A

總机密字七号，一  
全120部中序号  
機密

指定配付者	松田珍貞
機密保持	演習関係員以外ニ秘
処 理	演習終了後返却

昭和十六年八月六日(八三。交付)

總力戦机上演習統監 飯村 穰

第一回總机密第三期演習概況及課題

(一) 昭和十六年八月上中旬、概況

一 國際情勢

- (一) D、英、露、波、匈、意、日、獨、各、國、之、對、日、改、善、ハ、近、ク、積、極、化、セ、ト、ス、ル、兆、アリ
- (二) D、ハ、N、出、方、ヲ、極、度、ニ、警、戒、シ、其、月、國、勢、内、閣、ニ、討、ニ、重、ク、示、テ、之、能、ク、交、表、明、ス、ル、ホ、ク、アリ

2

二 統帥部及軍、概況

- (一) 吾國統帥部ハ、予、態、急、ニ、變、ニ、對、心、ス、ル、爲、極、力、軍、備、戰、備、ヲ、促、進、シ、要、望、ニ、又、T、(F)

1356A

方面ニ於テハ軍事ヲ擴張スル獲得(充實)ヲ要求スルナリ  
但シテ三國トシテ重火器ヲ以テ能ク發生殊ニ對DA(B)  
兩面作戰ハ絶対ニ回避シテ交渉同意ナリ

(一) 對DA(B, E)戰備、爲七月上旬以降形ニ兵員  
30万、船舶30万噸(數量ハ口述)ヲ動員(徵用)中ナリ

三國內情勢

(一) 新動員及船舶車輛役畜等徵用、爲國內  
労働力及運輸力及農業鉱工業等全般ニ亘リ  
若干ノ影響アリ、予見ニ據テ極大ニ伴ヒ相室、支障  
及生産、減退ヲ予想セラル

(二) 鐵道、電氣通信ニ於テモ電氣ノ輸送及通信、  
増加ト人員減少、爲疎通困難ナラズ

(三) 産業資金、調達困難ナリシカラス殊ニ各生産補充  
事業、社債発行ハ漸次困難ヲ加ヘ公募令、  
三割五分ノ賣却ヲ見ル狀況ニテ放置シ難キ状態ナリ

3

短期資金ハ潤滑ナリ

證券市場 活氣乏シ

1356A

方面ニ於テハ文字ヲ據テ莫ク獲得(充實)ヲ要求スルナリ  
但シテ本國上ノ雷ニ重大ナルハ才能ノ發生ニ殊ニ對 DA(B)  
兩面作戰ニ絶對ニ回避シ之ヲ意圖スルナリ

(一) 對 DA(B, E) 戰備、爲七月上旬以降形ニ兵員  
30万、船舶30万噸(數量ハ口述)ヲ動員(徵用)中ナリ

三國内情勢

(一) 新動員及船舶車輛役畜等徵用、爲國內  
労働力及運輸力及農業林工業等全般ニ亙リ  
若干ノ影響アリ、予態ニ據テ極大ニ伴ヒ相當ノ支障  
及生産ノ減退ヲ予想セラル

(二) 鐵道、電氣通信ニ於テモ電氣ノ輸送及通信、  
増加ト人員減少、爲疎通困難ナラズ

(三) 産業復興金、調達ニ據ルカニ殊ニ各生産補充  
事業、社債発行ハ漸次困難ヲ加ヘ公募令、  
三割五分ノ賣却ヲ見ル狀況ニテ放置シ難キ情勢ナリ

3

短期資金ノ調達ナリ

證券市場ノ活況ナリ



Doc 1356A

(四) 天候不良、爲全國的ニ米作不良、徵收著上ル。  
尚農作一般ニ不良ナリ

燃料不足及漁船徴用ニ因リ漁獲高率ニ相  
違、窮乏著ナリ

(五) NA交渉、一部民省ニ漏洩シ毛氏、省ニ移ル  
憶識ヲ生シツ、アモ未ダ特ニ注意スベキナ  
然ニ非ス時局、重大化ニ伴ヒ一般毛民ニ政府、  
強カナル指導ヲ給望シツ、アリ

〔三〕 課題

一 青國演習 詔機關が八月十日迄ニ執ラントスル處置  
ヲ(八月七日三〇迄)及八月末日迄ニ執ラントスル處置  
ヲ(八月八日八三〇迄)提出スベシ

但シ青國政府ノ執ラントスル一般方針ハ八月七日〇九〇。  
迄ニ指導部ニ内示スベシ

二 青國政府ハ統帥部ト連絡シ 現状勢ヨリ討  
B E 戦ニ入ル場合青國、戦争遂行能力ニ自  
具体的検討ヲ行ヒ別ニ指示スル時機ニ提出スベシ

(終)

Doc 1356A

- (四) 天候不良、爲全國的ニ米作不良、徵收著上ル。  
尚農作一般ニ不良ナリ  
燃料不足及漁船徵用ニ因リ漁獲高等ニ相  
違ノ影響著アリ
- (五) NA交渉、一部民省ニ漏洩シタル、省ニ終ル  
憶説ヲ生シツ、アルニ未ダ特ニ注意スベキ事  
態ニ非ス時局ノ重大化ニ伴ヒ一般民政府、  
強カタル指導ヲ待望シツ、アリ

(二) 課題

- 一 吾國海軍 詔機關が八月五日迄ニ執ラントスル處置  
ヲ八月七日一三〇〇迄ニ及八月末日迄ニ執ラントスル處置  
ヲ八月八日一三〇〇迄ニ提出スベシ  
但シ吾國政府ノ執ラントスル一般方針ハ八月七日〇九〇  
迄ニ指導部ニ内示スベシ
- 二 吾國政府ノ統帥部ト連絡シ 現状勢ヨリ対A  
BE戦ニ入ル場合吾國ノ戰軍遂行能力ニ自  
具體的檢討ヲ行ヒ別ニ指示スル時機ニ提出スベシ

(終)

1356A

總機演習七号、二  
機密

金部中第5号

指定	松田所負
配付者	
機密保持	演習関係員以外秘
處理	演習終了後返却

昭和十六年八月七日(午收)

總力戰機上演習統監 飯村 穰

第一回總機演習第三期演習追加情況

(八月一日以後教團三軍り青國政府及統帥部  
連絡會議了り、尤、諸件ヲ決定ス

(一) 總力戰方略内案原案

(二) 總力戰方略及當面、戰軍準備二關三市前會  
議表請

(三) 右市前會議、為準備七九案文、案本文、總力戰  
方略、根本了り及當面、戰軍準備從動二  
關了り了り成り總力戰方略並當面、戰  
軍規模二關又ハ判斷ヲ以テ表請了り了り了り

1356A

二、八月十日 東京會議開催ニ付、豫定問題ニ関シ、  
法下向アリタルニ準備セル方針、ハ東京會議  
決定トスル

三、對 A、B、E 戰事準備ニ関スル政府協定案ニ就キ  
政府統帥部協議、結果八月二十日ニ至リ政府  
協定案ニ對スル一部修正ヲ以テ政府及統帥部  
ノ意見一致ヲ見タリ

右協議、経過ニ於テ

(一) 事務當局界隈、於衝ニ要領ニ至ラズ、予覺  
猶予ヲ許サザルモ、下リ双方最高首腦部、  
政治的解決ニ依リ鋼材百九千トン、外材三十千トン  
ヲ軍需準備トシ、他不足物資ニ就テハ、

夫レ夫レ補備作業ヲ少クストトシテ妥協ス

(二) 右會議ニ於テ統帥部ハ尤、條件要領ニセリ

(A) 航空揮発油、為テクク之價向上、技術的  
研究、緊急促進

(B) 不足物資、可及的緊急補填

6

1356A

(附合)

演習進行中民衆確保最低限交就中普通

揮発連関スル限交就キ不及的範圍ニ於テ研究

ヲ試ムベシ

7.

1356A

極秘	提出者	青國政府
第三期演習処置書(一)	職官名	内閣總理大臣
提議先 陸軍部 武官 外交官 海軍部 武官 審判部	提出者	青國政府
通知先 各事務主任	職官名	内閣總理大臣
	提出者	青國政府
	職官名	内閣總理大臣
	提出者	青國政府
	職官名	内閣總理大臣
	提出者	青國政府
	職官名	内閣總理大臣
	提出者	青國政府
	職官名	内閣總理大臣

第三期課題ニ對スル青國政府一般方針  
(内示案)

一 對 A

A、申入ニ對シテ、青國、立場ニ付以瞭ナル言指ヲ與ヘズ、結局、妥結ヲ期待セズ、外交交渉ニヨリ遷延策ヲ採リ、以、軍備、充實ヲ期ス。

二 對 D

N、D 中立條約、履行ヲD が忠實ニ遵守スル限リ青國ヨリ積極的ニ攻撃ヲ為サレバ、回答ヲ與フ。

8 三 對 X

現状維持、方針ヲ以テ進ニ、N、X、X 三國條約ガ A、對 X 參戰ヲ牽制シ居ル效果ニ満足セシム。

1356A

極秘	第三期演習処置書(一)	提出者	青國政府
機先	陸軍部 武官 外交官 海軍部 武官 裁判部	提出者	青國政府
通知先	各事務主任	職官名	內閣總理大臣
		提出時	昭和十六年八月中旬
		提出時	八月廿九日午後九時。分

第三期課題ニ對スル青國政府一般方針

(內示案)

一 討 A

A、申入ニ對シテ青國、立場ニ付以瞭トシ言質ヲ與ヘズ。結局、妥結ヲ期待セズ。外交交渉ニヨリ遷延策ヲ採リ、兵、官戰備、充實ヲ期ス。

二 討 D

N D 中ニ條約、履行ヲDガ忠實ニ遵守ス限リ青國ヨリ積極的ニ攻撃ヲ為サレトシ、回答ヲ與フ。

三 討 X

現状維持、方針ヲ以テ進ミ、N X X 三國條約ガA、討 X 參戰ヲ牽制シ居ル效果ニ由ル也トシ。

1356A

四. 对 F 及 T

F = 对三八是畏 = 决定三八总力战否略通 / 更  
施又。

T = 对三八：故子字了 三携，强忙努力。

军事同盟(要三八秘密)缔结，为积极的工作  
为又。

五. 对 E

NE 告 / 關係现状三恶化也三女儿探经济在逃  
可續行不。



1356A

機密		提出時	憲法	昭和十六年八月中旬
第三期演習処置書一五三		提出者	青國政府	
提出先	統帥部 武力戰 外交戰 思慮戰 經濟戰 審判部	職名	內閣總理大臣	
報告先	國務大臣			

八月七日午分、閣議に於て決定シタル第三期演習  
 課題ニ對スル青國政府一般方針案中。  
 必要ナルモノニ付テハ統帥部ト、直接會議ヲ了シ  
 更ニ上奏決裁可ヲ得ントス。

Doc 13556A

機密	提出先	報告先	通知先	提出者	職名	決定	昭和十年 月 日
第三期演習処置書二、三	陸軍部 陸軍省 陸軍省 陸軍省	政府	政府	提出者	外務大臣	陸軍省	八月七日午前十時分

八月上旬中旬、状況ニ対シテ外務大臣、処置  
 八月五日相會議決定、一般方針ニ基キNAB關係  
 視望以上、惡化防止及T.F.ニ於テ青國先進能  
 勢、完成ヲ當面、目標トシテ記、如ク措置ス

対A  
 八月十日、A側申出ニ関シテA大使ヲテ先方ト話  
 合ヲ開始セシメ終局、妥協ヲ期待セズ我方、立場ニ  
 對言積ヲ與ヘザル方法ニ依リA、真意及讓歩、  
 可能性ヲ打診セシメ現在以上、NA關係惡化  
 防止ニテ、官線が戰備、充實ヲ期スルト共ニ引續キ  
 Aニ對シNも同様に、義務ニ對スル決意、不動  
 ナルヲ印象セシメA、對テ、牽制ニ努ム  
 (更ニ詳シクハ別紙在A大使宛訓電ニ記載ス)

対F  
 共同防衛協定ニ基キ我が兵力配置軍子施設、  
 設定等、更ニ支障ヲ予振下側、態度ヲ監視ス  
 必要、場合ハ強力解決ヲ圖ル

No 11

Doc/356A

討丁

丁上、経済的及更ニ軍事的政治的提携、強化及富  
同ニ於ケル軍事同盟、締結ヲ目標トスルモ、是レハ  
必需物資、取得及NT、財政的金融的提携ニ必要  
ナル協定締結ニ努メ、右困難ナル場合ハ武力威嚇在滿民

ヲ引上ゲテ、壓迫手段ヲ用ヒ右協定交渉、推進ヲ  
圖ルAB上、武力衝突ヲ志スルニキリ、武力行使ニ依  
外無キ場合ハ不必要ナル刺戟ヲ避ケ、戦備完成、  
了期ヲ待ツ

政治的軍事の提携ニ付テハ当局、意向ヲ打診シ  
右提携促進ニ努ムルモ、結果ニ依リ外目的達成  
困難ナル時ハ戦備完成、時機ヲ待ツ

討E

現地機關ヲシテE當局ト経済交渉ヲ續行セシメ  
NE関係、變化防止及資金凍結ニ依リ影響、減  
殺ニ努ムE側、態度強硬ニシテ右努力困難ナル  
時ハ不必要、刺戟ヲ避ケ、戦備、完成ヲ待ツ  
尚ABニ対シ補足的ニE物資、計N供給、必要  
ヲ申入レE態度交談力ヲ奮告セシム

討D

AB及C上、討N同盟ニ付先方意志、  
鮮明ヲ求メ中立條約、履行ニ對シ此我カ重大関  
心ヲ申入レ違反ニ對シハ報復、準備アルヲ指摘スル  
ト共ニ吾政府ト同盟條約政策ハNX右同盟ヲ

20/2

Doc/356A

中心トスルモノナルコトニハ愛リ多キモ D が友好的態交  
ヲ維持スル限リ我方ヨリ攻撃ノ意圖多キヲ申入ル  
右ト併行シテ通商及漁業ニ関スル新協定締結  
及樺太石油利權提供方ニ付申入ヲ行フ D 之ニ応ゼ  
ザル時ハ武力示威中立條約破棄等ヲ以テ推スモ  
武力衝突ヲ回避ス 右討 D 経済要求ニ付テハ予メ  
X, / 了解ヲ求メ D / 反問電傳ニ予メ備フ  
討 X,

A D 牽制ヲ以テ満足セシメ討 A 交渉ニ付テハ先方  
同意セシ討 C 有交渉ニ依リ枢軸ノ窮局ノ係利ヲ  
確實ナラシメントスル我ガ真意ヲ説明ス

討 C,

討 A 交渉ニ付疑惑生ズル怖アル場合ハ真意ヲ説明  
シ了解ヲ求ム

討 B

積極的ニ話合ヲ求メザル場合アラハ討 A 交渉ト  
同趣旨アリ N B 國交調整ニ付スル意向ヲ打診

No. 13

DOC/3564

總機發七号、三三

第六期預習位置書 三二	提出 時機	昭和六年十一月下旬 十一月十四日午後五時〇分
提出先 總理大臣	提出者 陸軍大臣	白井西長
報告先 總理大臣	職官名 (機密)	

對外方針(閣議提案)

第一方針

(一) 青國企圖ヲ秘匿シ、十月中旬奇襲的ニ討  
E進出ヲ決行ス

第二 処置

- 一 討E外交交渉ハ急激進捗的措置ヲ採ルコトヲ  
爲シ得ん限リ上陸迄ハ交渉ヲ續行ス
- 二 上陸セシム此際爲之得ルハ總ニE降伏  
ヲ圖ル
- 三 上陸セシム此際爲之得ルハ總ニE降伏  
ヲ圖ル
- 四 討E武力進出時、A B立上リニ討Eハ之が妨害  
ヲ排除シ一舉進出ヲ決行スルニ急テ立上リニ  
對シテ先ツP Q、攻畧ヲ開始シ後好機ヲ捕  
殺シ討E進出ヲ決行ス
- 五 A Bニ對シテハ取敢ハ措置ヲ採ルコトナリE上陸ト  
共ニ左記要旨、申入ヲ行フ。

左記

(一) 青國自衛及太平洋平和爲N、討E進出ハ  
沙眼ノ毛ナシト

No. 14

No. 15

Doe 1356A

(一) A Bニシテ更ニ挑戰セバ何時ト雖モ之レニ応スル準備アルモ、我眞意ヲ了得スル迄テハ必要物資ヲ供給スルニ準備アリ

六、又ニ対シテハ直々ニ「A Bニ対シテXニ協力スル爲先ツ対E進出ヲ決トスベキヲ以テXヲ対D作戰ヲ全面的防止態勢ニ転移セシムルコトナク且對D經濟戰思想戰積極的遂行」並對A B作戰積極化ヲ要望ス

Doc/356A

第六期演習處置直書(5)	提出	想定	昭和六年十月下旬
通告先	海軍部 陸軍部 外交院 裁判部	時機	十一月十五日午後三時。分
報告先	總理大臣	提案者	陸軍大臣
通知先		(演習官) 氏名	白井心辰

日誌 議 提出意見

追加狀況ニ基キ對外方策

第一判決

- 一 吾國ハ對 A B 兩戰ヲ決意シ 凡ル手段ヲ盡シ之レカ兩戰時ニ於テル内外能ハ勢ヲ極力有利トラシムルヲ要ス
- 二 兩戰時期ヲ概テ十月中旬以後トス

第二處処置

- 一 對 E
  - 武力戰ヲ強クスル共ニ強烈ナル思想戰ヲ展開シ速ニ全面的降伏ノ遂成ヲ期ス
  - 尙船舶物資ノ輸送ニ妨グル共ニ對 A B 兩戰後一時E進出兵力ノ孤立化ヲ顧慮シ必要軍需品ノ輸送ニ妨グ
- 四 A B 二 對シテハ特ニ妥協讓歩的外交方策ヲ以テ成立ナリ、秘匿ニ努メ以テ有利ナル兩戰態勢ヲ補強スルニ力ム



No. 17

Doc 1356 A

五. 対 X

我對 A B 兩戰近キニ下ルヲ申入レ以テ 總机演  
第九号ノ四記載ノ項ノ要亦ヲ提出ス

六. 対 D

要求ニ依リテ交渉ヲ開始ス 空方策ニ遷延の方針  
ヲ採ルモ (一) (二) (四) 項ノ之ヲ容ルノ腹案ヲ保持ス

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第一圖機力機乳牛製糖總記

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FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

(2)

第三期（昭和十六年八月）

内閣

本期ニ於テ帝國政府ノ採リタル措置左ノ如シ  
一 閣議決定

- (一) Aノ對N 融和的申入ニ對シ遷延策ヲトルコト
- (二) Dヨリ吾國新四國ノ對D 態度表明ノ申込ニ對シ  
N D 條約F D ガ遵守スル限リ、Dニ對シNヨリ  
積極的攻撃ヲ爲ササル旨回答スルコト
- (三) Tニ對シテハ政治、軍事提議ノ強化ヲ圖ルコト
- (四) Xニ對シテハ現狀通り
- (五) Fニ對シテハ共同防衛ノ趣旨ヲ強化スルコト
- (六) Eニ對シテハ現狀ヨリ惡化セシメズ、經濟交渉  
ヲ續行スルコト
- (七) A、B、E、Dヨリノ輸入ハ杜絶ノ際アルヲ以  
テ之ガ促進ヲ圖ルコト
- (八) 郵便ノ開發、検査、差押等ニ關スル臨時郵便取  
締令ヲ緊急勅令ヲ以テ定ムルコト
- (九) 物動ヲ一、五倍ニ増大、修正スルコト
- (十) 食糧ノ消費規正、輸入確保、増産、配給機構等  
ニツキ適當ノ措置ヲ採ルコト（米一日二合一勺、  
食糧綜合切符制等）
- (二) 行政費八億圓減ノ改訂資金動員計畫ヲ着ツルコ  
ト

ニ閣議ニ於テ左ノ措置ノ報告ヲ受ケタリ

(八) 郵便ノ開拔、撤去、差押等ニ關スル臨時郵便取

締令ヲ緊急勅令ヲ以テ定ムルコト

(九) 物動ヲ一、五倍ニ増大、修正スルコト

(一〇) 食糧ノ消費規正、輸入確保、増産、配給改善等

ニツキ適當ノ措置ヲ採ルコト (米一日二合一匁、

食糧綜合切符制等)

(二) 行政費八億圓減ノ改訂資金動員計畫ヲ行ツルコ

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ニ目録ニ於テ左ノ措置ノ報告ヲ受ケタリ

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第三期（昭和十六年八月）

内閣

本期ニ於テ青島政府ノ換リタル措置左ノ如シ  
一 閣議決定

(一) Aノ對N 金融的申入ニ對シ遷延策ヲトルコト  
(二) Dヨリ青島新四國ノ對D 態度表明ノ申込ニ對シ

N D 條件F Dガ遵守スル限り、Dニ對シNヨリ  
積極的攻撃ヲ爲ササル旨回答スルコト

(三) Tニ對シテハ政治、軍事提携ノ強化ヲ圖ルコト

(四) Xニ對シテハ現状通り

(五) Fニ對シテハ共同防衛ノ趣旨ヲ強化スルコト

(六) Eニ對シテハ現状ヨリ悪化セシメズ、經濟交渉

ヲ續行スルコト

(七) A、B、E、Lヨリノ輸入ハ社總ノ旨アルヲ以

テ之ガ促進ヲ圖ルコト

(八) 郵便ノ開發、收支、差押等ニ關スル臨時郵便取

締令ヲ緊急勅令ヲ以テ定ムルコト

(九) 物動ヲ一、五倍ニ増大、修正スルコト

(〇) 食糧ノ消費規正、輸入確保、増産、配給改善等

ニツキ適當ノ措置ヲ行ハルコト(米一日二合一勺、

食糧綜合切符制等)

(二) 行政費八億圓減ノ改訂資金動員計畫ヲ行ツルコ

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ニ關シニ於テ左ノ措置ノ報告ヲ受ケタリ

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第三期（昭和十六年八月）

内閣

本期ニ於テ帝國政府ノ興リタル措置左ノ如シ  
一 閣議決定

(一) Aノ對N 露和防申入ニ對シ懸延策ヲトルコト  
(二) Dヨリ背屈野因内ノ對D 態度表明ノ由込ニ對シ

N D 條在フDガ遵守スル限リ、Dニ對シNヨリ  
積極的攻撃ヲ爲ササル旨回答スルコト

(三) Tニ對シテハ政治、軍事提携ノ強化ヲ圖ルコト

(四) Xニ對シテハ現狀通り

(五) Fニ對シテハ共同防衛ノ趣旨ヲ強化スルコト

(六) Eニ對シテハ現狀ヨリ悪化セシメズ、經濟交渉

ヲ履行スルコト

(七) A、B、E、Lヨリノ輸入ハ社絶ノ際アルヲ以

テ之ガ促進ヲ圖ルコト

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- 第四期（昭和十六年九月）
- 本邦ノ處置未定ノ如シ
- 一 閣議決定
- (一) XノNニ對スル對A即時參以方真辭ニ對シ、向  
臣條約ノ履行ニツキ從來ノ方針ニ變更ナキ旨ヲ  
回答スルコト
  - (二) Pニ對シ我地歩ノ前進的確立ヲ口ルコト
  - (三) 對A、對B方針專一ニ從テ進トスルコト
  - (四) 情勢ノ許ス限リA,B,C,Dヨリ均齊ノ觀察ヲ圖ル  
コト
  - (五) 同例ニ於ケル流弊言語ノ取締ヲ豫ニシ、臣民ヲ  
シテ一層時局ノ認識ニ徹セシムルコト

- (一) Aノ眞意及該歩可能程ヲ打診スル様テA大使ニ  
訓電シタリ 外務大臣
  - (二) 船舶増加及燈台増設、船舶檢査計畫 遞信大臣
  - (三) 勞務者三〇萬人不足對應策 厚生大臣
  - (四) 資金凍結ニ關スル谷坂ノ論議及虚譽率全ニ關ス  
ル措置 大蔵大臣
  - (五) 陸上冠送制策 鐵道大臣
- （旅券、貨物——鐵道ヲ通シテ）



(九) 綫式價公定ニ關スル切合ヲ定メテ

方面ニ停止スルコト

視小間ヲ防止スルニ努ムルコト

(八) 中 小間工業者ヲ保護スルニ努ムルコト

コト

(七) 船ヲ既ニ有スル船ヲ一切ノ切手

車ヲ既ニ有スル車ヲ一切ノ切手

(六) 特殊地帯ノ小間及貨物自動

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- (六) 特殊地帯ノ小運送對策トシテ小運送及貨物自動車ヲ國家管理ニ置クコト
- (七) 瑞箱院ヲ設置シ兵器一切ノ始端ヲ國家管理スルコト
- (八) 中小商工業者ヲ整理與テ民需物資減少ニ甚ク混亂ヲ防止スルト共ニ勞働力ヲ時局ニ要與ナル方面ニ再配置スルコト
- (九) 株式價格公定ニ關スル勅令ヲ制定スルコト
- (一) 戰時緊急事態ニ處スル宣密通信網ヲ確保スルノ措置
- (二) 疎密事項漏洩ニ關スル處置
- (三) 教育部門ニ於テ愚想指導前ヲ確立シ、教育者ノ士氣昂揚ヲ圖リ、學生生徒ノ勞務動員依例ヲ整備スル措置
- (四) 食糧對策
  - (1) 外米一、〇〇萬石輸入
  - (2) 綜合切符制實施
  - (3) 食糧自給自足プログラムノ設定
- (五) 朝鮮米ノ移入實績不良ニ伴フ措置
- (六) 公債消化促進及市價維持方策
- (七) 外地ニ於ケル中小商工業者ノ失業對策
- (八) 民間航空對策

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- (六) 特殊地带ノ小廻送对策トシテ小廻送及货物自動  
車ヲ国家管理ニ置クコト
- (七) 瑞穂院ヲ散置シ兵器一切ノ始端ヲ国家管理スル  
コト
- (八) 中小高工業者ヲ整理與編シ民需物資減少ニ甚ク  
混乱ヲ防止スルト共ニ勞働力ヲ時局ニ要スル  
方面ニ再配置スルコト
- (九) 株式價格公定ニ關スル法令ヲ制定スルコト
- (一) 戰時緊急事豫ニ處スル宣傳通信網ヲ確保スルノ  
措置
- (二) 疎密事項漏洩ニ關スル處置
- (三) 教育部門ニ於テ恩惠指導前ヲ確立シ、教育者ノ  
士氣昂揚ヲ圖リ、學生生徒ノ勞務動員依例ヲ遂  
行スル措置
- (四) 食糧対策
- (1) 外米一〇〇萬石輸入
- (2) 綜合切符制實施
- (3) 食糧自給自足プロツクノ設定
- (五) 閉鎖米ノ流入實績不良ニ伴フ措置
- (六) 公債消化促進及市價維持方策
- (七) 外地ニ於ケル中小高工業者ノ失業対策
- (八) 民間航空対策

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(九) 海軍艦艇新造

機密

第五期（昭和十六年十月）

一 對B武力進駐ヲ決意シ、對A、B日艦ヲ豫想シ、全面開城ニ着手スベク、實力行使ノ時期ハ約三ヶ月後タルコトヲ希望スル旨ヲ附加シテ進ニ就キ、海軍部トノ間ニ協議ヲ遂グルコトニ決ス。

對B進出決定ニ關スル十月十五日廟議決案ニ對シテ、國際情勢ニ對應スル防禦緊急措置及青島ノ對A、B陸ノ場合ニ於ケルX<sub>1</sub>ノ對B協力ノ程度ニ門スル列強ノ他ヲ決定ス。

海軍部ヨリ政府ニ對シテ要求セラレタ對A、B陸軍進行能力ニ關スル具體的所見ニ付テ、政府同答ヲ特議決定ス。

對A、B開城ニ必要ナル措置ヲ豫メ研究準備スル爲メ關係各省次官ヲ以テ第二委員會ヲ設置ス。

各大臣ヨリ所管事項ニ關スル報告ヲ受ケ、其中重要ナル點密注ノ如ク。

(一) 米穀減少ニ伴フ食糧對策

(二) 株式市價低落ニ伴フ市場對策

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- (三) 地方銀行預金取付ニ對スル對策
- (四) A I B Tノ貿易往來ニ對スル對策
- (五) 對日進出企圖秘匿ニ關スル愚慮對策

以上

附

一 既定ノ對日行動ヲ極力繰上テ決行シタツトノ統一

部ノ畏堂ニ對シテ政府トシテモ向慮ナルヲ以テ總ニ

道給會議ヲ開催シ開議決案ヲ希望スル旨回答ヲ爲

スコトニ決定ス。

二 右道給會議ニ於テ協議スベキ事項就中(一)武力進出

ノ時期、(二)出陣ノ目的、形式、(三)當面ノ外交方針

ニ關シ決定ス。

三 十一月甲下旬ノ情況ニ從ヒA Bニ對シ準備完成既次

察好機ヲ捕捉シテ先制開戦スルコトヲ決無シツ、

之ト平和的ニ外交々渉ヲ微行スルコトニ決定ス。

四 對日進出直後ニ於テ臨時議會ノ召集ヲ奏請スルコ

トトシ該會議後出陣ヲ決定ス。就中實現ナルモノ

左ノ如ク、

支那警備臨時軍事費特別會計豫算案

租稅ノ増徴ニ關スル法律案

臨時金融會議社法案

船舶國家管理法案

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機

密

(一) 閣

第七期 (昭和十六年十二月)

(一) 閣 決定事項 左ノ如ク

(一) 對 A B 機信ノ充實ニ一層ノ努力ヲ加ヒツツ 對 B 進駐ノ成果ノ追カテル 獲得ニ邁進スルコト

(然ルニ右ノ決定ヲ以テ 海軍部ト 通符會議ヲ開キ

以上

報告

(一) 十一月十日ノ對 N 提議ニ對スル 閣答

(二) 在 N、A B 領事館閉鎖要求

(三) 國內警察力不足ニ對スル 措置

(四) 衣料品配給切符制實施ノ件

(一) 勞務關係ノ 錯雜ニ關スル 對策

(二) 船舶增加ニ關スル 對策

(三) 食糧對策

(四) 對内、對外 恩惠 對策

異

共同操作法案

鐵道營業法中改正ノ件

臨時緊急戒嚴下ニ於ケル 特別刑事手續ニ關スル 法律案

臨時國民生活ノ保持ニ關スル 法律案

臨時決定事項及 閣議報告事項ノ 申主ナルモノ左ノ

如ク、

決定)

タル所、臨時の對策ニ基キ對 A 開闢ニ決シテ上奏  
御裁可ヲ儘タリ

(二) Aノ我軍用船ノ不法擧沈ニ對シテ嚴重抗議スルコト  
ト  
(三) Aノ極東ニ於テル中立水域宣言ニ對シテ抗議スルコト  
ト

(四) Aノ在留邦人壓迫ニ對シテ抗議スルコト

(五) 第三國ニ對シテ對 B 開闢ノ旨申入ルコト

(六) 對 C 不睦條約ヲ調印スルコト

(七) I 諸國ノ中立維持ヲ方針トスルコト

(八) A B 關係ニ伴フ衝突ノ地區ハ第二委員會報告ノ  
通りトスルコト

(九) 食糧對策トシテ左ノ如ク決定ス

(1) 米穀ノ消費基準ヲ一日一合九勺トス

(2) 外地米及外米ノ移輸入ニ努ムルコト

(10) 全國ニ救急令ヲ施行スルコト

(11) 開闢時ニ於ケル鐵道輸送對策ニ極力ヲ勉ムルコト

議會對策

(1) 總選舉ノ施行

(2) 各會期同短縮ノ措置

開闢時ニ於ケル急應對策ヲ他重要方針ニツキ  
國務ニ報告アリタリ

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タル所、以階的列時ニ惹キ對 A 開隊ニ決シ上奏  
御裁可ヲ極タリ

(二) Aノ我軍用船ノ不法暴沈ニ對シ嚴重抗議スルコ

ト

(三) Aノ極東ニ於ケル中立水線宣言ニ對シ抗議スルコ

ト

(四) Aノ在留邦人壓迫ニ對シ抗議スルコト

(五) 第三團ニ對シ對 B 開隊ノ旨申入ルルコト

(六) 封リ不賦密約ヲ調印スルコト

(七) B 諸國ノ中立維持ヲ方針トスルコト

(八) A B 開隊ニ伴フ直接ノ地區ハ第二委員會報告ノ  
通りトスルコト

(九) 食糧封鎖トシテ左ノ如ク決定ス

(1) 米穀ノ消費基準ヲ一日一合九勺トス

(2) 外地米及外米ノ移輸入ニ努ムルコト

(10) 全國ニ戒嚴令ヲ施行スルコト

(11) 開隊時ニ於ケル鐵道輸送對象ニ完全ヲ期スルコ  
ト

(12) 警備對象

(1) 總動員ノ施行

(2) 伴合期間短縮ノ措置

ニ開隊時ニ於ケル思想對策其ノ他重要方針ニツキ

國務ニ報告アリタリ

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第八期（昭和十七年一月乃至三月）

- 一、  
 1、ノ軍事の利用ニ關シ統帥部トモ連絡ノ上  
 2、ヲ機巧トセサルノ限度ニ於ケル可能性ニ就キ  
 3、ノ打診ヲ措置ス。  
 4、D船ニ依ルAヨリDへノ軍需品輸送ニ付テハ  
 5、平涉ヲ爲サズ、ED間ノ中立船ニヨル貿易ハ  
 6、危険水域ノ設定、戰時禁制品ニ對スル運箱統  
 7、海主權ノ適用ニヨリ權力之ヲ所止ス。  
 8、三、運管議會、爲議案ヲ檢討シ實則一ヶ月トスル  
 9、コトニ關シ對策ヲ定ム。

議會提出法案中重要ナルモノ左ノ如シ、

- 昭和十七年度一般會計豫算案
- 支那事變臨時預算特別會計豫算追加案
- 日本銀行條例中改正法草案
- 災害地租稅減免法案
- 金融團庫法案
- 租稅證券法案
- 空軍保險團營法案
- 戰時設備利用營團法案
- 戰時資源管理營團法案
- 電信法及郵便法中改正法律案
- 戰時特別犯罪廢止ニ關スル法律案
- 戰時緊急狀態下ニ於ケル特別民事手續ニ關  
 スル法律案
- 兵役法ヲ軌範ニ施行スルノ件

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學校法人法案

- 四、 四ノ一校の總務部、會計部、庶務部、地籍部ニ關スル一校方針ニ付第一委員會議ヲ豫取付シ、燒失戶數三萬二千、被災者十七萬二千人ト推定セラルル、東京聖島線電氣部ノ報告ヲ受ケ、各大臣ヨリ別管事項ニ付其ノ對策ノ報告ヲ受ケ。

以上

第九期（昭和十七年四月一十月）

- 一、 本期ニ於テ閣議決定ヲ急タル事項ハ概ネ左ノ如シ
  - 一、 DガAニ對シ共謀ヲ供與シタルコトニ對シ該重抗命スルト共ニ、直ニ、Dニ對シ供與シテ了ル便宜ヲ停止シ、且對D候捕ヲ進メルモノトス
  - 一、 Xヨリノ對D開戦ノ要求ニ對シテハ現在行ハントスル對策ノ程度ニテ一應精尾スル態回答シ、且Xニ於テモ對A避難確保ヲ採テ進行ツ

標中人ヲナス

- 一、 以上四、五月ノ措置ハ
- 一、 滿洲移民政策ハ時局下ノ難請ヲ考慮シテ、既

定計畫ヲ遂行スルコト

- 一、 七月ノ狀況ニ於テDニ對シ閉城スベキヤ否ニ



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針ニ依リ

(一) Aノ八月十日ニ於ケルN X 高院中和ノ申出ニ

對シテハ結局ニ於ケルN A 兩國懸案ノ調和不

可能ナリトノ見地ヨリ明答ヲ避ケ不即不辯ノ

關係ニ於テ專ラAトノ破局趨延ニ努メタリ

Dニ對シテハ通商及漁業問題等ノ解決ニ依ル

友好關係ノ強化ヲ試ミタル外ND中立條約ヲ

援用シADノNヲ目標トスル協力ノ牽制ニ努

メタリ

(三)

Nトノ政治的基礎的提揚ニ對スルEノ奮闘打

診及Eトノ經濟提揚ノ強化ニ努メタル方前者

ハ同國內政上困難多キヲ以テ主力ヲ後者ニ注

キ本期及次期以降ニ互リ相當ノ成果ヲ上ゲタ

リ

(四)

努メタルモ次期以降諸屋迫ヲ振り下ナル効果

無カリキ

第四期（九月）

本期へ前期ノ方針ヲ踏襲セリ

(一)

X,ハAヲ攻勢ノ特異對A開戦ヲ決意シ同時參戰

ヲ求メ來リタル方之三對シNX關係ニ對スル

態度不變ナルモNノ都合ハ即時開戦ヲ不可ト

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第五期（十月）

遂ニX、ノ對A開戦ヲ見、他方AノN兵船抑留及  
右ニ追隨セルB、E、Iノ處置等ニ就ニ於ケル懸案  
交渉ノ停頓ヲ見タルガ十五日塘諭ニ於テ十二月  
一日以降好転ニ於テ對B進出方御決了了リタリ  
依テ本期外交トシテハ

(一) X、★リ再展ノ對A即時開戦要請ニ對シ條約廢  
行ノ決意不變ニシテ近ク對B進出スベキ旨申  
入レ他方Nノ商進及對A戰ノ場合ニ於テX、ヨ  
リ期待スル扶助ニ付申入レタリ

(二)

スル旨回答セリ、X、カBニ對シ和平攻勢ニ出  
テタルニ對シテハ成立可能極少トシX、ニ對  
シ寧ロ對B戰強化ヲ希望スル旨申入ル、外對  
A戰ノ場合ニ於ケルN、X、共同作戦ニ付申入レ  
タリ

AガNノ態度表明ヲ求メタルニ對シテハ太平  
洋ノ平和維持ニ對スル關心ヲ甲入レN、X、同盟  
履行ノ決意不變ナルヲ印象セシムルニ努メタ  
リ、

(三) 尙今期ニ於テハ外務大臣ヨリA、X、間切迫ニ鑑  
ミ政府ノN、X、條約履行ノ決意及對A、B軍備廢  
備ノ至急充實ニ付要望セリ

スル旨回答セリ、X、カBニ對シ和平攻勢ニ出  
テタルニ對シテハ成立可能任僅少トシX、ニ對  
シ寧ろ對B戰強化作希望スル旨申入ル、外對  
A戰ノ場合ニ於ケルNX共同作戰ニ付申入レ  
タリ

(二)

AガNノ態度表明ヲ求メタルニ對シテハ太平  
洋ノ平和維持ニ對スル關心ヲ申入レNX同盟  
履行ノ決意不變ナルヲ印象セシムルニ努メタ  
リ

(三)

尙今期ニ於テハ外務大臣ヨリAX際切迫ニ鑑  
ミ政府ノNX條約履行ノ決意及對AB實備戰  
備ノ至急充實ニ付要望セリ

第五期（十月）

遂ニX、ノ對A開戦ヲ見、他方AノN行抑留及  
右ニ追隨セルBELノ處置特ニEニ於ケル經濟  
交渉ノ停頓ヲ見タルガ十五日期滿ニ於テ十二月  
一日以降好機ニ於テ對E進出方御決定アリタリ  
依テ本期外交トシテハ

(一)

X、★リ再度ノ對A即時開戦要請ニ對シ條約履  
行ノ決意不變ニシテ近ク對E進出スベキ旨申  
入レ他方Nノ南進及對A戰ノ場合ニ於テX、ヨ  
リ期待スル補助ニ付申入レタリ

(一) Aニ對シテ挑撥ヲ避ケ船舶抑留ニ對シテ抗辯スルニ止メ報復的處置ハ取ラサリキ尙B及C方  
 面諸國船舶抑留ニ對シテ同様抗議セリ  
 Bニ對シテハ船舶抑留及物資ノ供出抑制ニ付  
 警告シタルガ十五日ノ廟議決定アリタルモ尙  
 平和的解決ニ希望ヲ馳シ經濟交渉ヲ再圖スル  
 コトヲ政府ニ於テ決定シタルモ統轄部ト右交  
 渉ノ方法ニ付意見ノ一致ヲ見サリシ爲在B使  
 臣ニ豫告ヲ發スルノ外何等處置ヲ取ラザリキ  
 (外務大臣ハ最近通牒ノ提出ヲ武力行使ノ直  
 前ニ行ハシコトヲ提議シタルモ統轄部ハ企圖  
 秘度ノ立場ヨリ同意セザリキ)

第六期(十一月)  
 本月初ニ於ケルAノ對X宣戰布告及對N休戰  
 化ニ對Bシ豫定ヲ繰上ゲ本月十五日ヨリ對B作  
 戰ヲ開始スルコトニ御決定アリタリ依テ  
 Bニ對シ早達ヲ求メ少限展延ヲ請求ヲ提出シ  
 之ガ交渉ヲ開始シタルモBハ右要求ニ應セズ  
 其ノ内十五日ニ至リ對B行動開始セラレタリ  
 他方右述出ニ先チ  
 Xニ對シ對D作戦ノ進行等ニ依ル背後援助ヲ  
 申入レタリ、十五日ノ進出直後ニ於テハ

秘



(三) A B 二對シ我方出師目的ヲ示シ妨礙セバ對處  
 ノ發テル旨申入レタルガ  
 A B 共ニ對 N 總領事官ヲ實シ領事官ノ引上  
 ラ要求シ來リ又我ニ對スル兵力ノ印ヲ行フ等  
 ノコトアリタルヲ以テ陸海外三天西ヨリ政府ニ  
 對シ對 A B 先制開戰ノ決意ヲ促ス所アリタルガ  
 政府トシテハ未ダ右決意ヲ固ムルニ至ラズ外交  
 的處置トシテハ

(四) A B ノ領事館閉鎖ヲ要求セルノミ  
 他方本月中旬 D ヨリ領土ノ不可侵及第三國ヨリ  
 ノ物資輸入ニ付保衛ヲ求メ來リタルヲ以テ

(五) R ヲ A ノ境用ニ供セザルノ條件ヲ加ヘ右保障  
 ニ關シ商議ヲ開始セリ

第七期(十二月)  
 我方對 B 作戰計劃ニ進捗シ居タルニ一日 A へ P  
 近海ニ中立水域ノ不法宣言ヲ爲シ我作戦ニ妨礙  
 ラ加ヘ五日ニ至リ我方軍用船不法沈没事件等  
 リタルヲ以テ政府ノ決意ヲ再ビ促スト共ニ政府  
 ノ諒解ノ下ニ

(一) A 二對シ其ノ不法態度ニ付以重抗議セリ  
 次ヲ十日ニ至リ對 A 開戰ノ願御決定アリ二十  
 日 P 處地ノ攻略開始セラレタルニ對シ A B 八直

(三) A Bニ對シ我方出師目的ヲ示シ妨礙セバ對處  
 ノ發テル旨申入レタルガ  
 A Bハ共ニ對N總領事官ヲ實シ領事官ノ引上  
 ラ要求シ來リ又我ニ對スル兵刃ノ揮ヲ行フ等  
 ノコトアリタルヲ以テ陸海外三大臣ヨリ政府ニ  
 對シ對A B先制開戦ノ決意ヲ促ス所アリタルガ  
 政府トシテハ未ダ右決意ヲ固ムルニ至ラズ外交  
 的處置トシテハ  
 (四) A Bノ領事館閉鎖ヲ要求セルノミ  
 他方本月中旬Dヨリ領土ノ不可侵及第三關ヨリ  
 ノ物資輸入ニ付保障ヲ求メ來リタルヲ以テ  
 (五) BヲAノ軍用ニ供セザルノ條件ヲ加ヘ右保障  
 ニ關シ商議ヲ開始セリ  
 第七期(十二月)  
 我が對B作戰計劃ニ進捗シ居タルニ一日AハP  
 近海ニ中立水域ノ不法電言ヲ爲シ我作戦ニ妨礙  
 ラ加ヘ五日ニ至リ我方魚用船不法電沈没事件等  
 リタルヲ以テ政府ノ決意ヲ再ビ促スト共ニ政府  
 ノ諒解ノ下ニ  
 (一) Aニ對シ其ノ不法電言ニ付以重抗議セリ  
 次ヲ十日ニ至リ對A開戦ノ府議御決定アリ二十  
 日P島地ノ攻撃開始セラレタルニ對シA Bハ直

## (二)

N T 共同防衛協定成立シ N T ハ A B ニ對シ共  
 同對抗スルト共ニ N 軍ハ T 通過等ノ便宜ヲ得  
 ルコト、ナレリ

D ハ A ト運送ノ難アリ之ヲ牽制スル爲 D ノ反  
 省ヲ促セリ他方 D ノ A ヨリ物資取得ニ對スル  
 保障申入ニ對シテハ後述危険水域ノ D 船通過  
 ニ付便宜ヲ供與スルコト、シ密約ノ履行ニ努  
 メタルモ三月ニ至リ D ハ C F T P Q 方面物資

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ニ宣戰布告ヲ以テ應ジ來レリ依テ

(二) A B ノ宣戰ニ對シ所要ノ國乃至第三國ニ對スル處置ヲ取ルト共ニ

(三) X<sub>1</sub>ニ對シ共同ノ戰爭目的を明方提議シX<sub>1</sub>ノ同意ニヨリ之ヲ行フト共ニN X<sub>1</sub>相互ニ單獨不媾和ノ約諾ヲ交セリ

(四) Bヨリ月初宣戰布告アリタルヲ以テ之ニ對應シ開戰セリ

(五) Dニ對シ月初不戰密約詢印方申入下旬訓印ヲ了セリ

第八期（十七年一一三月）

(一) Tトノ協力ニ關シ統帥部ノ要望アリ政府統帥部連絡會議ノ結果Tノ意向ヲ打診スルコトト成リ右實行中ノ處二月BノT侵入ヲ模範トシ

取得ニ付斡旋方希望ヲ申越セルガ作戦ヲ理由  
 トシ之ヲ拒絶セリ  
 (三) 工船積ニヨルAD間交易増大ノ兆アリ之ニ對  
 抗スル爲海軍ニ於テ我カ近海ニ危險水域ヲ宣  
 言シ中立國艦船ノ通航ヲ禁止上不可能ナラシ  
 ムル虞ヲ取レリ尙ABO以外ノ諸國ハ外  
 交官ノ引上ゲヲ要求シ來レルヲ以テ我モ之ニ  
 應ジ外交官艦ノ處置ヲ取レリ

第九期(一) 我ニ對スル航空機並ニ潜水機ニ依ル攻  
 ヲリ察シAD艦隊ノ擬定厚トナリタル爲五月  
 頃D艦隊ノ危險水域航行ノ便宜供與ヲ停止セ  
 ル外Dノ不戰艦隊發長トシ以真抗議セリ  
 (二) X,ヨリ對D艦隊ヲ求メ來リタルニ對シ對AD  
 艦隊行及D艦隊ノ發長ヲ持テ協定セシムルコ  
 ト、セリ

(三) 七月ニ至リAノR利用艦隊實トナリタルヲ以テ  
 外務大臣ヨリ對D艦隊艦隊ヲ具申セルモ政府  
 ハ對策決定ニ至ラズ外交的處置ハ右決定ヲ待  
 ツテ考慮セララル、等ナリ

以上

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機密

昭和十六年八月

第一回總力戦況上演習記録

演習監 岡 省

演習記録(上巻)大臣 白井 正 辰

次官 岡村 俊

演習第三期(八月)

一 對 A 方針

八月十日 A ノ侵入ニ對シ大連ハ一之ニ應ズルコ

トナク我ハ自主的態度ヲ以テ對テ進出ノ準備ヲ

張力ニ進進スルヲ冀ヌ一旨五相會議ニ於テ強張

ニ主張セルモ一出來得ル限リ A 兵ヨリノ攻撃

ヲ取得シ度キ一統部隊ノ配置モテリ同令等ハ對

A 攻撃進出ヲ豫メセリ

二 國內對策

軍務員、陸軍勳員ノ其地ニ當ヒ國內對策ノ狀況

新夕等線ヲ察セルニハミ大連ハ各線ニ對シ此際

軍務員先主として之ノ防ノ掃除ニ努力セラ

レ度キ旨ヲ稟呈セリ

三 忠正防動及豫守力別

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一 對外方針  
 國際債務ニ對シテ「青島ハ三國ノ立場ヲ確保スル  
 ツ依然舊方針ヲ維持スルヲ要ス」ノ解決  
 ヲ口實ニ提出シ外相ノ提案ニ對シテ「一歐ソタルヲ  
 以テ「X」ノ對B和平政策ノ採行ヲ前提セラレ度」

演習第四期（九月）

第一委員會開會セラレ占領地處理ニ付スル根本  
 方針ノ決定ヲ見タリ

第二委員會  
 計置セル所ニ對シテ軍需品生産工場實員ヲ徵集ス  
 兵國民徵用

計置セル所ニ對シテ軍需工場ニ對シテ擴充目標ヲ示  
 差セリ

四 軍需品工場生産擴充  
 計置セル所ニ對シテ軍需工場ニ對シテ擴充目標ヲ示  
 差セリ  
 至リ之ヲ具體通過ノ上院部ニ通過セリ  
 院ニ協力ノ其完成ニ努力ス（本院部ハ第四期ニ  
 合意ヲ見タリ一方院部總行部方ニ付テハ念  
 之ヲ以テ院部トシテ結果院部政府第三期ニ對シ  
 取置ヘズ念院部其他トシテ修正物動計劃ヲ得  
 之ニ對シテ院部總行部方ニ付テハ念  
 院部ヨリ對A B 兩院ノ規模ヲ承知スルト共ニ

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希望意見ヲ附セリ

三 修正勅勅ノ推進

修正勅勅へノ轉移同前ナラザルノ情勢ニ鑑キ部  
内ノ實施ヲ推進スルト共ニ國會議席上其所信ヲ披  
瀆シ證省ノ注意ヲ促セリ

四 内國航路ノ擴張

切迫セル情勢ニ對處ソ内國航路力ノ強化ハ國家  
ノ長件ト信シ取極ヘテ昭和十四年豫令第六百七  
十三號第二條ノ適用其他ニ關シ國會議ニ意見ヲ披  
出シ國策ノ同意ヲ得タリ

五 民國航空ノ整理

海軍及通信大臣ト協議シ燃料不足ノ情勢ニ鑑ク  
民國航空ヲ整理整備スルニテハ現程廣ク維持シ  
ツツ航空船ハト大陸及南洋ヨリノ南方航路以外  
ハ廣ナル整理策ヲ決シ國策ノ承認ヲ得タリ

六 對國恩惠職

○内部陸戰氣運ニ感セルノ狀況ニ於テ對國恩惠  
策ヲ帶ニ強化スベキ旨國策方面ニ通告セリ

七 追加情況ニ對テ對外方針

國策ニ於テ「青島ハ對立ニ不可避ノ決意ヲ確定  
シ之ニ對テ對準備ヲ進ニ完遂スルヲ要ス」旨ヲ  
呈請シタルモ國策ハ方針依然然變化ナキ旨ヲ決意  
セリ



對外方策

國際情勢ニ對シテ大臣ハ閣議席上「青洲ハ對A B  
 全面設備ヲ懸ニ完遂シツツ是迄ノ強化ニ依リ對  
 經濟的要求ヲ實行スルヲ冀ヌ」旨ヲ強調ニ主  
 張シ青洲ハ遠ニ對島進出（或ハ一ヶ月後ニ豫期  
 ス）ニ懸スル具體的方針ノ決定ヲ要スル機ニ懸  
 シテ力積セツモ或ハ三ヶ月以後トスルヲ懸  
 營テリトスル案モ閣下探賈ニ及ブモ非セズ内閣  
 ハ兩案ヲ提ヘテ連絡會議ニ臨ミ「十二月一日以  
 後停機ヲ策定シ對島武力進出ヲ四ツ」方針ヲ決  
 定スルニ至レリ

軍需品ノ入申出

軍需品ノ入ノ申出ニ對シ「實質的ニハ其要求  
 ニ應ゼサルモノ撥カノ懸意表明ヲ行フト共ニ對  
 南方進出實現後其要求ヲ何程ニ拒絶セゾトスル」  
 ノ方針ヲ閣議ニ表示シ商意ヲ極タリ

防 望

(一) 内務大臣ヨリ「所望實施ニ待テ緊急勅令」案  
 其他ニ際スル提議アリ之ニ同意ス  
 (二) 防望強化ノ爲テ緊急勅令勅導例ニ對シ閣議ニ提  
 案セルモノ内務大臣トノ意見一致セザルニ結テリ

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三 追加情報ニ基ク對外方針  
シテ以テ之トノ新術ヲ施ムルニ決ス

對馬進出方針ニ關シテ一週ニ對シ先ヅ外交交渉ヲ  
開始シ十二月ニ入ルモ其要求ニ應ズサルヤ急變  
的武力進出ヲ決行スル旨ノ意見ヲ閣議ニ開陳セ  
ルモ閣議ハ外交實態ノ方策ニ關シ對後預備的懸  
度ノ探答ニ付意見ノ一致ヲ見ズ

四 議會召集

議會召集ニ當リテハ一月三十一日之ヲ召集  
セラルハ、ヲ可トスル意見ヲ有テテリシガ統帥部  
ヨリ新ニ一全國秘密ノ爲召集ヲ延期セラレ度ニ  
要望アリシヲ以テ之ニ同意シ閣議ニ提示セルモ  
遂ニ延期ニ至ラズ

六 Mニ對スルXノ協力

M方對A參戰ノ場合Xノ對M協力ノ程度ニ對ス  
ル判斷ニ關シ統帥部ヨリノ同合セテリ大臣ハ主  
任者トシテ此判斷ヲ實施シ閣議ヲ統帥部ニ  
通告セリ

演習第六班 (十一月)

一 對外方針

本週ニ至リ統帥部ノ一週別武力進出前ニ於ケル

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五、我要求要請ニハ殆ト期待ヲ與ケズマカテ出期  
 ヲ早メ度ニ希望ヲ明ニスルヲ待前期俱當要項々  
 ル「最後通牒的危置ノ探査」及「聯合召集」ニ  
 行ヌル旨解決セリ  
 六、演説令  
 演説令ノ報告ニ「ソフ等」トシテニ演説セル結果  
 之ガ急送ニ所要準備ニ着手シテ而テハ「A B 關係  
 時要ニ其時期ヲ決定ス」ノ意見ニ一致ヲ見タリ  
 七、國內勞務  
 國內勞務總局ノ狀況ニ應ジテ單身者先立額ノ復原  
 ヲ口ルト共ニ所要被送者ノ召集ヲ豫定セリ  
 八、國內取部  
 國內取部總局乃通過ニ付ヒ其取部協力ニ「ソ」所長  
 ノ危置ヲ行ヒ總局ニ報告セリ  
 九、追加情報ニ基クテ對外方針  
 自議ニ於テ「前副ハ「A B 關係」ヲ十二月中旬ニ  
 次悉スルヲ要ス」旨總局ニ呈報セルモ「演説令」  
 準備ハ進ムルモ「關係」ノ通過同時ニ「ソ」今一期ノ  
 方針ヲ行フ「ハ」キヲ決定セリ  
 六、演説令  
 十二月ニ入ルルヤ「演説令」ヲ行ハルベキヲ總帥部  
 ニ提請ス

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月ノ我要求受話ニハ殆ト期待ヲ集ケズマツ編出期  
 ヲ早メ度シ希望ヲ明ニスルヲ待前期保實事項々  
 ル「最後通牒的處置ノ探査」及「聯合召券」ニ  
 行ヌル旨示映セリ  
 三 我聯合  
 流聯合ノ報告ニ付シ得ヒ協議ニ對シテ結果  
 之ヲ決定ニ所要準備ニ着手シテ言ハ對A B開談  
 時辰ニ其時擲ヲ決定ス「ノ意見ニ一致ヲ見タリ  
 三 我内務部  
 國內勞務部ノ狀況ニ處シ單點爲先主觀ノ發展  
 ヲ圖ルト共ニ所要技能者ノ召集ヲ密察セリ  
 四 内政部  
 國內聚總力ヲ通達ニ付ヒ其取給能力ニ付テ所長  
 ノ處置ヲ行ヒ續談ニ報告セリ  
 五 追加情況ニ對シ對外方針  
 協議ニ於テ「前副ハ對A B開談ヲ十二月中旬ニ  
 決意スルヲ要ス」旨對談ニ主眼セルモ對談ハ「  
 準備ハ進ムルモ開談ノ迅速開達ニ付テ今一期ノ  
 努力ヲ行フ」ニキテ示映セリ  
 六 所望下命  
 十二月ニ入ルヤ所望下命ヲ行ハルベキヲ統帥部  
 ニ提請ス

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滇督第七期 (十二月)

一、對外方針

滇省邊境紛擾之然。至滇A城。既三連。之難。且音。四  
 內外ノ情勢ハ。至A則。時。則。機。ニ。最。モ。有。利。ナル。ヲ  
 具。シ。一。音。四。ハ。十二。月。中。旬。急。變。因。ニ。A。ニ。對。シ。關  
 機。シ。先。ツ。避。ニ。P。ヲ。攻。局。ス。ル。ヲ。長。ス。一。ノ。判。決。ヲ  
 閣。議。ニ。於。テ。極。限。ニ。主。張。セ。ル。モ。至。A。更。ニ。自。意。ス  
 ベ。シ。ト。ノ。案。亦。尚。テ。兩。端。盡。ク。試。立。シ。時。期。切。迫。セ  
 ル。ヲ。以。テ。一。感。育。補。ノ。自。重。斷。ヲ。採。擇。シ。邊。境。會。談  
 ニ。臨。ミ。タ。ル。モ。副。部。ノ。主。張。ニ。依。リ。至。A。(B)

二、地方長官會議

十二月。上。旬。地方。長。官。會。談。開。催。セ。ラ。レ。軍。民。一。休  
 ノ。活。動。等。ニ。關。シ。所。情。ヲ。明。瞭。ス。ル。所。アリ

三、戒嚴令

A。C。兩。城。後。台。均。及。九。州。万。面。ニ。第。次。進。襲。アリ。更  
 ニ。益。固。ニ。其。被。襲。ヲ。深。慮。セ。ラ。ル。、ニ。至。リ。タ。ル。ヲ  
 以。テ。防。壁。ノ。完。壁。ヲ。ハ。ラ。ン。爲。益。固。ニ。防。壁。ヲ。主。ト  
 ス。ル。戒。嚴。令。ヲ。布。告。セ。シ。コ。ト。ヲ。提。議。シ。同。僚。ノ。同  
 意。ヲ。繼。統。帥。部。ニ。通。達。セ。リ

四、議會對策

副。部。ニ。徵。兵。會。進。行。ノ。案。案。同。議。ニ。於。テ。可。決。セ。ラ  
 レ。通。信。議。會。ニ。提。出。ス

五、對英關係

日ノ對ABC勢ニ依リABC間ノ關係最も緊密化セル情勢ニ於テ爾後ノ協同ニ因シ改メテXトノ交渉ヲ行フベク擬議シ同議之ヲ可決セリ

六、

農赤及遞信省ヨリノ要請ニ應キ日米輸入及輸送方援助ニ因シ統帥部ニ要求セリ

七、

内閣強化ノ件  
既ニ對ABC域開始セラレ口政ノ進管ハ長モ機敏強クナルヲ冀スルニ閣内ノ意見ハ専々ニ對立シ現内閣ハ之ニ任ジ得ザル狀況ニアルヲ以テ此際總辭職ヲ以テ他ニ組カ内閣ノ出現ヲ庶幾スルヲ冀スル旨ヲ閣内各員モ更ニ一致シ口頭ニ盡瘁セントスルノ決意ヲ口メ總辭職ヲ行ハザルニ決ス

演習第八期（一月一三月）

一、對外方策

日ニ對シABC島部ノ要求ニ對シ進ニ進駐ヲ口ルベキヲ同議ニ擬シタルモ統帥部ニ及ブノ不利ヲ慮スル反對論大部ニシテ且統帥部ノ要求モ與衆ノ希望ニ違ラレテラザルヲ知り一應日ノ兵艦ヲ打診セントスル旨ノ閣議決意ヲ見

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二、對空襲

一方二十五日空襲ノ状況ヲ圖説ニ報告スルト  
共ニ投降者處分ニ關シ一級俘虜ノ取扱ト別個  
ノモノトシ之ヲ思想戰ニ利用シテ空襲防遏ニ  
資スベキヲ主張セルモ思想戰關係ヨリノ反討  
論出キ將來カ、ル專懸反覆スベキニ於テハ其  
件ヲ示唆スル宣傳方策ヲ探ルコト、セリ

三、對内思想戰

諸般ノ作戰風潮ニ進展シアリト雖戰局ノ前途  
勿論ホダ樂ムヲ許サズ緊張持續ニ關シ候論ヲ  
有スル我國民性ニ鑑ミ此際精神更張ノ施策ヲ  
行フヲ要スル旨ヲ關係方面ニ稟望セリ

演習第九期（四月一七月）

一、對外方策

Bヲ基地トセルコト確實ナルA空軍及潜水艦  
ニ依ル被害漸ク増加セントシ大巨ハ國議ニ行  
育國ハ或AB處理ヲ履行スルト共ニ對D設備  
ヲ促進シ強硬態度ヲ以テ誓約履行ヲ監視スル  
ヲ要シ得ニD船ニ依ル輸入ヲ即時社絶セシム  
ルト共ニCカAニ基地ヲ使用セシメアル確  
證ヲ得バ其地誣ヲ攻撃スル一旨申入ルニベキ  
ヲ主張シ尙ホ其策ヲ承認スルコトトナリタル

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モ申入三圖シテハ對A次機目前ニ遵リテハ現  
狀ニ於テ實際ニ行ヒ得サル事項ニ依ル刺戟ハ  
避クベキニ決セリ

三、總動員ノ強化推進

對D機ニ備フベク總動員ノ強化推進ニ關シ圖  
係方面ニ應直セリ

三、

Bニ於ケル抑收勿件處理員領

本件ニ關シ總動員以テ省ト連絡シ所要事項ヲ統  
制部ニ稟求セリ

四、

對D機等遂行能力判明

統制部ヨリ對D作機規模ニ關シ察知スルト共  
ニ主トシテ企畫院ニ之ヲ通知シ圖シテ判明  
作業ヲ實施セリ

五、

追加情況ニ志ク對外交策

N A主刀海機ノ快勝ニ拘ラヌAノRヨリスル  
攻撃愈々激化シ一萬Xノ對D機壓倒的有利ニ  
進展セル狀況ニ應シ大巨ハ「比勝機ニ口選ヲ  
贈スル」對D機ノ爲演習ヲ急遽ニ促進スルモ  
口力判明ニ依レバ十分ナル自信ハ持テ得ザル  
狀況ニアレバ今一機DX和平ニ依ルDトAB  
トノ區別ニ志クAノRヨリノ口選ヲ口ルベキ  
案ヲ提出シタルモ同該ハ機等遂行能力ノ判明  
ニ關シコレヨリ生ズル疾意ニ付キ所見ヲ具ニ



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セルヲ以テ遂ニ一決スルニ至ラズ。大直ハ純  
脚部ト更ニ意見ノ交換ヲ行ヒタル結果皇口三  
千年來ノ一大好劇ナルト非信ノ餘ハ非信ノ餘  
直ヲ探レバ企程疑案ヨリモ更ニ疑案充屑妙寶  
ノ増加ヲ行ヒ得ルノ見通シヲ得得ト固執ニ歸  
ミテ極限ニ企程腕方口ノ尋考ヲ促セリ然レト  
モ未ダ釋然タラザル極限ニ延綿會談ノ結果  
動員乙案採用ト作以方式ノ再被討ニ依ル討  
開演ノ決意ニ到起セリ



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第一回 愚刀機机上演習

愚想院 経過報告

昭和十六年八月二十三日提出

検 密

山崎大臣

大政翼賛會副總裁

原 福 行

第三期

- 一、昭和十六年八月中旬、「時局ニ對慮スル國民精神ノ昂扬方策」ヲ青田政府ニ提出ス

第四期

- 一、昭和十六年九月下旬、「九月上中旬及ビ下旬ノ情況ニ對スル大政翼賛會ノ對策」ヲ青田政府ニ提出ス

第五期

- 一、昭和十六年九月下旬、華露ノ経過ニ對シ、我衛院ノ設想ヲ青田政府ニ呈呈ス
- 一、昭和十六年十月下旬、「民心ノ動向ニ對スル大政翼賛會ノ情況報告」ヲ政府ニ提出、併セテ基本政策ノ長官ヲ政府ニ報告ス

第七期

- 一、昭和十六年十二月下旬、「長期戦ニ對慮スル大

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政務委員會ノ懇懇願封策長編「ヲ訂立決定シ、  
之ヲ青田政府ニ報告ス

第八期

一、昭和十七年二月下旬「翌以下ニ於ケル大政發  
議會ノ議内懇懇願封策長編「ヲ決定シ、之ヲ青田  
政府ニ報告ス

第九期

一、昭和十七年七月中旬、議中議決期ニ於ケル  
「大政發議會ノ懇懇願封策長編」ヲ決定、之ヲ政府  
ニ報告ス  
一、昭和十七年十月末、「青田政府ノ探ル可キ總  
力以方縮」ヲ提出ス

以上

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Doc 2220

機密	第 期演習處置書 其ノ	提出先	統監部 武力部 外交部	提出者	商工大臣	通知先	報告又ハ
		提出先	恩戒部 經濟部 審判部	(職名) 野見山 勉			
	提出	想定	和年十年 月 日	時機	實歴	八月廿三日 午後	時分

第一回演習記録摘要

第一 物資動員計費及生産力擴充計費實施方針ノ件

第二期ノ處置ニ於テ決定セル方針ノ下ニ實施シツ  
 ツアリタルモ其ノ家情勢ノ進展モアリ第五門ニ於  
 テ標記ノ件關議決定ヲミタリ、其ノ内容ハ物動、  
 生産共ニ情況ニ即應スル焦點主等ヲ擧行サントス  
 ルモノニシテ、之ニ伴ヒ企業ノ整理統合、配給  
 部ノ整備、資源回收機關ノ設置、總動員法ノ發  
 等ヲ爲サントスルモノナリ、

第二 真安物資ノ供給緊急対策

一 繰送問題

特ニ遞信當局ト緊密ニ連絡シ戰時ニ低價必要  
 及物資別種送付位ニ付協議ヲ遂ゲタリ。情況ニ

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シテハ第三期 A B E U ヲリノ輸入杜絶ヲ見越セル  
 特別配船ニ依ル漂上輸入、第四期樺太、北海道、  
 北支中支方面（石炭、鐵礦石）へノ配船増加、第  
 七期本州四國ニ於ケル石炭種ニ際シ機帆船動員ニ  
 依ル九州炭輸送等ノ措置ヲ講ジタリ、

二 勞務問題  
 厚生省ト遠隔シ技術者、勞務者ノ増強、特ニ適材  
 適所ノ配置ヲ奨励セリ及赤省ニ對シテハ食料配給  
 ニ特別ノ考慮ヲ望ムシ商工省トシテハ獎勵能率増  
 進方法ヲ強化セリ、

三 不足物資補填策  
 資源回収、在庫品ノ利用、規格統一、消費制限、  
 使用法合理化、代用品工業ノ振興等ノ諸措置ヲ強  
 心セリ。

第三 産業界ノ混成防遏ノ措置  
 一 凍價封鎖  
 第四期情況ニ基キ凍價公定ニ依スル勅令ヲ公布賞  
 勵セリ

二 中小商工業失業問題  
 第四期ニ於テ失業問題重大化ノ傾向ニ伴ヒ、中小  
 商工業政策改編ノ措置ヲ深レリ。即チ戰時産業機

種ノ中ニ於テ中小商工業ノ在ルベキ型態及規模、  
 近ニ物物上中小商工業ニ振向ケ得ベキ物資量等ヨ  
 リ判断シテ整理改竊スベキ業種及其ノ程度ヲ決定  
 シ之ニ基キ強力且適切ナル整理改竊ヲ行フモノト  
 ス。措置トシテハ政府指導ノ強化ハ勿論、統制會  
 其ノ他民間團體ノ活動ノ積極化、國民職業指導所  
 ノ擴大強化、更生金庫ノ機能ノ促進、總動員法ノ  
 發効ヲ行ヒ尙補償トシテ業者間ノ互助更生令厚ノ  
 買上、貸付、政府ノ補償ヲ行フモノトス

三貿易社絶ニ固スル問題

第五期ニ於テA. J. B. トノ貿易社額シタルヲ以テ  
 一主トシテ輸出業者及輸出品業者ニ對シ一左ノ  
 指導ヲ請ゼリ、應急的ニハ融資金令ニ依リ金融ノ  
 融通ヲ圖ルト共ニ、滞後ハ買收機關ヲ指定シテ買  
 収ラシム將來ノ問題トシテハ、輸出産業ハ國內向  
 及其榮耀向更ニ戦後勃三圖向トシテ括濶スル爲ノ  
 能力ヲ維持セシムルヲ大體ノ方針トス但シ現下ノ  
 状態ニ就キ或程度ノ整理ヲ必要トスベシ尙輸入原  
 料ニ依ル産業モ自給原料ニ取換シ得ルモノ以外ハ  
 産現スルモノトス。

- 四 換物運動、開取引等ニ對スル措置。(第六期)
  - 1 統制違反業者ニ對シテハ物資配給ヲ停止ス
  - 2 統制團體ラシテ團體員ノ義務取締ヲ強化セシム
  - 3 衣料品綜合切符制ノ實施
- 五 重要産業ノ經營因難化ニ對スル處置。(第七期)
  - 經營因難化ノ各種原因ヲ考察シ左ノ如ク處置セリ
  - 1 原材料及勞力ノ配當ノ合理化
  - 2 企業ノ整理統合前項ニ依リ配當ヲ抑制セラレタムル等ノ結果經營因難トナルモノハ整理シテ轉業セシメ又ハ統合シテ困難ヲ脱セシム
  - 3 未効資本、退休設備ノ處理。(1 優秀企業ニ譲渡又ハ經營委託ヲ爲サシム) (又ハ投資)ノ爲ノ特別機關ヲ設置ス但シ差當リテハ融資ノ送ヲ請シ政府ニ於テ利子補給ヲ爲ス
  - 4 經營ノ合理化。(1 原材料等ノ均衡的配當) (原材料等ノ合理的利用) (2 勞働能率ノ増進) (3 技術ノ向上) (公開) (4 規格ノ統一)等ヲ促進ス
  - 5 勞賃、選賃等ニ付低物價政策ヲ堅持スルモノト
  - 6 コスト別補項貸。以上各項ニ依リテ毛織コスト割ヲ來シテ生産ニ支障ヲ來シ而モ其ノ生産増



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強ガ緊急ナルモノニ付テハ  
 イ當該物資ノ値上ガ一般物價ニ無影響ナシト  
 認メラルルモノハ適當ナル範圍ニ於テ價格  
 ノ是正ヲ認ム(例、銅)  
 ロ其他ノモノハ補助金ノ交付其他ノ方法ニ依  
 リ採算ヲ可能ナラシム(例石炭)

第四對外經濟交渉問題

一 O P T I 對 N 物資期待。(第五期)民需物資(織  
 織品、陶磁器、磁器等)ハ或程度供給ス。  
 軍需物資ハ對馬進出ニ役立つモノニ付テハ考慮ス  
 ルコトトセリ。

二 ~~N~~ N 交渉。第六期(十一月中旬)ノ D 申入ニ關シ  
 N ハ D ニ石油、マンガン、白金サントニン等ヲ安  
 求シ、N ヨリハ茶、生糸、セメント、魚網、ゴム  
 錫、キナ(但シ兩万品ニ付テハ確保ヲ條件トシテ  
 )等ヲ供給シ得ベシト外務大臣へ通知ヤリ  
 第八期(三月末)ノ D 申入ニ關シテハ兩万確保十  
 分ナラザルヲ以テ先万甲出物資ノ供給餘力ナキ旨  
 外務大臣へ申出タリ

三 對馬交渉第六期(十一月上旬)ニ於テ對馬最低要

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第五

家トシテ石油、ゴム、錫其ノ他ニ付品目、数量ヲ外務大臣へ申出タリ。

且資源獲得ニ關スル措置。

一 第五期（十月中旬）ノ經濟戰ヨリ見タル且確保要

點（ロ）油田及精製設備回復ノ爲ノ資材及人員ニ付研究及準備ヲ爲セリ。

二 第七期（十二月末）開發隊技術者ヲ不敵取先遣セ

三 第八期（三月末）海上交通、作戰狀況等ノ好轉ニ

繼シ且ニ向ケ開發資材ヲ輸送セリ。尙P.Q方面鐵礦關係施設復舊所要資材ニ付テモ至急準備ス。

且P.Qニ於ケル押收資源ハ逐次移送ヲ開始シ精製

第六

議會提出法案

第八期（十二月末）通常議會ニ左記法案ヲ提出セ

空軍保險國營法案

戰時資源管理營團法案

戰時設備利用營團法案

成ヲ行ヒ閣議ニ提出シ之ヲ決定ヲ見タリ

二統帥部ノ要請ニ基キ對A B E 戰爭準備ノ爲閣議ニ於テ決定セル、前記物動計畫ノ修正ヲ行ヒ閣議ニ於テ、決定シ之ヲ政府原案トシテ政府統帥部退給會議ニ、提出附議シタル處、對前ニ同シ一部修正ヲ行ヒ其他ハ原案ノ通り決定セリ

三對A B E 戰準備ノ爲閣議ニ於テ、關係官廳ニ對シ實施又ハ準備方ニ對シ要望セル事項左ノ通り

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機密

通知先 報告又ハ	提出先	第一期演習處置	
	統監官	提出者	提出者
	演習官 坂氏名	企聲院總裁	昭和十年 月 日
		八月廿三日午 時 分	

企聲院演習記録

企聲院演習經過記録

第三期（昭和十六年八月上旬―同月下旬）

一前記演習ニ於テ決定セル追加設計書ノ全般ニ亘リ再發  
討ヲナシ物資、資金、勞務及交通ノ諸項目計費ノ再編

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See XXXXX

イ 労働部ノ要求ニ應ジ不足物産ノ可及的緊急補填對策  
 ロ 經濟激突地ノ爲メ甲種機具ヲ内閣ニ設置スルノ件  
 ハ 臨時物産特別輸入促進ノ案等ニ在外公館ノ活動所共  
 資金ノ融通ニ關シル件  
 (右ノ内ロハ組織ニ於テ關係スルコトナレリ)

四 企業整理ニ關係スル左記事項ノ實現ニ關シ組織官廳

ト 組織ヲ行ヘリ  
 イ 綿織食糧對策及貨物生産増進對策  
 ロ 船舶輸送前整及増進、増長増強補充策  
 ハ 七月上旬以降ノ物産三件ノ勞務人員計費

ニ産業資金ニ關スル處置ノ關係通策ノ動搖防止策  
 ホ A B 兩國資金凍結令適用ニ伴フニ對外國貿易決  
 算其他國際金融社施ニ對スル處置  
 ヘ A ノ對B 甲入ノ經濟的價值ノ檢討

ト A B 兩國ヨリノ輸入促進ニ關スル措置  
 結四 第四(九月上旬一箇月下旬)

一 統制部ノ要求ニヨリ現狀ヨリ對A B 兩國ニ入ル物産  
 青島ノ戰時遂行能力ニ關シ所見ヲ求メラレタルニ依リ  
 國民精神力、技術、物資、資金、勞務等ニツキ能力判  
 定ヲ行ヒコレガ結果ヲ組織ニ提出決定セラル。

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二 國領官廳卜陽謀シタル幕張左ノ通り

イ 中小商工業者ノ救済對策

ロ 國債消化及市債維持對策並捺式對策

ハ 船舶國家管理及遠洋配船許費

第五期（十月上旬一箇月下旬）

一 對A B 兩報ノ氣運變化シ後々般情ノ強化ヲ圖ルノ要アリ

ルヲ以テ物價動員ノ再賦課ヲ行ヒ特ニ供給力ニ關シテ

イ A B 兩報ノ輸入超過

ロ 船舶救済ニ付テ近海急送力ノ低下

ハ 労働力及國內急送力ノ能率低下

ニ増産ノ圖以テ府會及M、O、P 辰里ヨリノ對日供給

力ノ増強ヨリ豫算スルト共ニ軍需民需ヲ區別ニ依テ

シ計畫ノ進止ヲ決シ之ヲ結果ヲ圖シテ報告セリ。

二 預後物價動員ノ再賦課ニ作製スルコトヲ明議ニ於

テ決定

三 船舶救済ニ關シテ見出しノ地

ヨリヨリニ於テ船舶救済スベキ地點ニ關スル點ヲ企業院會談

ニ於テ決定シ之ヲ船舶救済ニ關シテ見出しノ地ニ石炭取得可

能點ヲ選定シ之ニ關スル救済人員等ニ付テ報告ヲ進

ムル機ニ當リ官廳ニ報告セリ

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- 四 關係官廳ト協議ヲ行ヒタル主ナル事項左ノ通り
- イ 株式市場對策
- ロ 銀行預金ノ引出及銀行取付ニ關スル處置
- ハ 第三國貿易社施ニ伴フ金融的措置及M國內インフレーション傾向ニ關スル對策
- ニ 遠洋航路船及復還留船ニ對スル處置
- ホ 十一月以降海上急送計畫
- ヘ 勞務勸業實施計畫等

第六期 (十一月上旬 - 同月下旬)

- 一 關係官廳ト協議シタル主ナル事項左ノ通り
- イ 技術者不足ニ對スル對策
- ロ 軍徵用船ニ對スル處置及造船促進策等

第七期 (十二月上旬 - 同月下旬)

- 一 關係官廳ト實施ニ關シ協議ヲ遂ゲタル主ナル事項左ノ通り
- イ 産業金融機體打開策及年末金融對策
- ロ 本州四島ニ於ケル石炭不足ニ對スル處置
- ハ 重要産業ノ經營四島化ニ對スル處置
- ニ 軍徵用船〇〇隻ニ對スル船荷急送力ノ増強計
- ホ 危候海域航行船及高乘組員ニ對スル措置

第八期 (昭和十七年一月 - 三月)

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第一回總力戦机上演經過概要 (拓務省所管)

拓務大臣 石井 喬

第三期 (昭和十六年八月)

處置ナシ

第四期 (昭和十六年九月)

朝鮮米ノ内地移出不良ナル状態ニ對シ、朝鮮ノ米

穀事情ヲ説明シ、之ニ關聯シテ、内地、外地、滿

洲、支那等ノ食糧交流ノ圓滑化ノ重要性ヲ強調シ

之ガ爲強力ナル中央機構設置ノ問題ヲ提議ス

物動修正ニ伴フ中小商工業者ノ失業問題ニ關聯シ

外地ニ於ケル要職業者ノ處置ヲ朝鮮人及臺灣人ト

内地人トニ分ケテ説明ス

第五期 (昭和十六年十月)

銀行ノ取付問題ニ關シ、外地ニ於ケル金融事情ヲ

個別のニ説明ス

育國統帥部ノ國家總力策中ニ關スル要望ニ應ヘテ

朝鮮ニ於ケル徵兵制度ノ實施並ニ臺灣ニ於ケル特

別志願兵制度ノ採用ノ提案ヲ承認セラレ、朝鮮ニ

徵兵制度ヲ施行スルノ件ハ同年十二月ニ召集セラ

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第一回總力戦机上演經過概要 (拓務省所管)

拓務大臣 石井 喬

第三期 (昭和十六年八月)

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朝鮮米ノ内地移出不良ナル状態ニ對シ、朝鮮ノ米

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洲、支那等ノ食糧交流ノ圓滑化ノ重要任ヲ強調シ

之方爲強力ナル中央機構設置ノ問題ヲ提案ス

物動修正ニ伴フ中小商工業者ノ失業問題ニ關聯シ

外地ニ於ケル要職業者ノ處置ヲ朝鮮人及臺灣人ト

内地人トニ分ケテ説明ス

第五期 (昭和十六年十月)

銀行ノ取付問題ニ關シ、外地ニ於ケル金融事情ヲ

個別的ニ説明ス

帝國統帥部ノ國家總力策中ニ關スル要點ニ應ヘテ

朝鮮ニ於ケル徵兵制度ノ實施並ニ臺灣ニ於ケル特

別志願兵制度ノ採用ノ提案ヲ承認セラレ、朝鮮ニ

徵兵制度ヲ施行スルノ件ハ同年十二月ニ召集セラ

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レタル重信議會ニ於テ可決確定セラレタリ。

又外地ニ於ケル戰時教育對策ノ徹底方ニツキ朝鮮

及臺灣ニ於テ採レル措置ヲ報告ス

第六期

(昭和十六年十一月)

內南洋ニ於ケル米穀不足問題ニ關シ、遞信大臣ト

協議シ、配船方承認ヲ受ケタルモ特ニ報告セズ

第七期

(昭和十六年十二月)

内地ニ於ケル食糧事情逼迫<sup>朝鮮</sup>臺灣ニ對ス

ル米穀供出ノ要求増大セラルニ對應シ之等地方ニ於

ケル米穀ノ消費規畫ヲ環化シテ米穀ノ内地供出ニ

努力セル旨報告ス

對A、B兩段ニ伴ヒ臺灣北部爆撃セラレタルヲ以

テ之ニ對スル處置ヲ報告ス

第八期

(昭和十七年一月一三月)

朝鮮ニ於ケル食糧規畫ノ擴大ト内地移出米穀ノ増

大ニ伴ヒ朝鮮農民ノ困ニ不穩ナル情勢アリタルニ

對シ其ノ處置ヲ報告ス

第九期

(昭和十七年四月以降)

鐵線ノ運行ニ伴ヒ、燃料ニ於ケル勢力不足ノ益々

甚シキニ伴ヒ滿洲移民ノ供出困難ニ陥リタルニ對

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シ、其ノ國策的意義ヲ強調シ之ヲ強行繼續スル事ニ決定セリ。

昭和十六年七月三十日附ヲ以テ第一委員會委員ヲ命ゼラレ占領地ノ統治ノ研究ニ當リ爾領印度方面ヲ担當研究セリ、其ノ中間ニ於テ爾領印度ノ經濟的價值ニ關シ報告ヲ提出セリ。

尙内地ニ在テセル問題ニシテ天小ノ差コソアレ外地ニ影響ヲ及ボスモノ相當ニ多ク（例ヘバ勸勤勞力ノ問題等）之等ニ對シ一々處置ヲ提出スルハ人費、智識等ノ關係ヨリ到底不可能ナルヲ以テ該狀況中特ニ外地ニ關係アルモノノミニ就キ處置ヲ提出セリ。

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Doc 222.8

第一回總力戦机上演習経過記録

第二期 (昭和十六年七月)

青國政府總力戦計畫ノ一部トシテ財政計畫ノ方針

ヲ決定セリ、其ノ要旨左ノ如シ

一 財政ノ國民經濟ニ於ケル地位ヲ確立シ國家財政

ヲシテ資金ト物資トノ需給ノ適合ニ依リ惡性ノ

インフレーションノ招來ヲ回避シツツ置備戰術ノ

充實ト國防生産力ノ増充強化ニ策中セシムルヲ

本旨トス

ニ 國家財政ヲ計畫化スルコト

ヲ根據ハ財政上ノ所要ニ應ズルノミナラス戰時ニ


於ケル購買力ノ吸收、故ニ産業、國民生活等ト

ノ關係ヲ真視シテ之ヲ決定ス

第 期演習處置善 其ノ	提出先 統監部、武力段、外交戰 思想戰、經濟戰、審判部	報告又ハ 通知先	提出者 大藏大臣	提出 (想定) 昭和十年月日	時機 (實際) 八月二十三日午後三時
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四 單ナル 廣入 清 公債ニ 依ル 漫然 多ル 撥出 予 等ノ  
 編成ヲ 進ケ 公債 發行 行ヲ 極力 展 延スルト 共ニ 公  
 債ノ 精化ニ 中心ヲ 置ク 金融 政策ノ 精勵ヲ 期ス  
 右ノ 方針ニ 依リ 企 畫院ノ 正 協 委員 計 理ト 照  
 應シテ 昭和 十六 年度 中ニ 支 出 可能 ナル 輕 課 費  
 (一) 豫 會 計 及 豫 算 合 計) ヲ 百 二 十 五 億 圓 ( 全 體  
 院 費 至 幼 幼 算 計 額ニ 於テハ 百 七 十 七 億 圓) ト 精 定 シ  
 行 政 費ヲ 八 億 圓 備 充スル コトト シテ 實 行 豫 算ヲ  
 編成ス

第三 期 ( 昭和 十六 年 八 月 )  
 昭和 十六 年 八 月 八 日 國 務 院 口 頭 報 告 ノ 採 道 案ニ A  
 ノ 對シ 案 外 採 算 令ノ 發 動、 國 內 金 融 市 場ノ 振 蕩 等  
 ノ 狀 況ニ 注ノ 審 査ヲ 命 ず ( 八 月 七 日 提 出 )  
 一 進 業 資 金ニ 關スル 處 置

(イ) 進 業 資 金 新 設 法 其ノ 他ノ 事 業 法ノ 記 許 可 ヲ 一  
 時 停 止ス

(ロ) 採 算 市 場 對 策ト シテハ 國 庫 債 券ニ 依リ 主 兵 隊  
 式ノ 補 給 的 與 濟、 金 融 撙 節ノ 實 務 自 備 等ヲ 期  
 目ス

(ハ) 進 業 市 場ノ 沈 滞 打 斷ノ 爲ニハ 起 債 債 權ノ 轉 讓  
 シヨク 社 會 補 充 新 設ノ 實 行、 政 府 資 金ニ 依リ

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引受額ノ償還、社債金額ノ目消化、シロノ前  
貸金ノ取上、社債發行會社ノ資金調達方法ノ  
再検討等ヲ行フ

(三) 金融機関ニ對シテハ、政府保証、貸出ノ限之下

正當ナル事業資金ノ金融不圓消化ノ回避ヲ要  
求シテ、各金融機関ニ日償トシテ、資金圓積ノ際密  
化ヲ促進スルニ限リ、臨時貸付化ニ依リテ、時限貸  
付ノ設備ノ提供資金ニ付、政府命令ヲ考慮ス

三 A B 両國資金凍結令發効ニ依リテ、國際金融社紀ニ

對スル措置

(1) 各國トノ交渉ヲバ、一タ一割ヲ維持トスル種別

別種別別是種別ニ其ノ方向ヲ定メ得ニ、緊要共  
同ニ、各日ニ對シテハ、其ノ在、五口ノ投資狀  
態ヲ考慮シ、中心トスル、多角制の綜合的

決済方法ノ導入、清成ニ努ム

(四) A B 兩國ノ輸入額ノ増進ニ努ムノ外ナシ

(六) 輸出ハ、輸出ノ促進、資金ノ利用ニ依リ、管

該國の對輸入手當ヲ急率可及的ニ削減、輸出

に努ム

(七) 輸出額ノ増加、輸入ノ均等ヲ圖ルト共ニ、

ノ、共ニ、各口トノ貿易政策ヲ考慮シテ、多角

的決濟方派ヲ靜シ給局支拂差額ヲ差ゼル場合  
 ハイキマクセル金ニ依リ決濟ス  
 (ホ)(イ) I G 關係ニ付テモ清算協定ノ締結ニ努カス  
 F I 關係ハ天常清算協定ニ依ル決濟可能ナル  
 ガレニシテ固キ要求アラバ金ノイキマクノ  
 方法ニ依ルモノトス  
 三 四 系通關防阻止對策  
 (イ) M 國通貨ニ付テハ物價暴落等ニ對スル統制預  
 化、資金統制法ノ強化、進業五ヶ年計畫ノ振  
 本均改訂、生活必需品ノ自給自足、貯蓄奨励  
 ノ徹底等ノ方策ヲ講ゼシムル様ニ口ト連絡ス  
 (ロ) 北〇國債券ニ付テハ量貸出額ノ限額、外國  
 貨幣對置料削減ノ擴充ニ依ルMトノ物資交流  
 ノ促進、内地棉業ノ北〇移轉ニ依ル綿製品生  
 産ニ依ル棉銀參與、Mトノ同ノ棉産額化等  
 ヲ講ズ  
 (ハ) 中印〇紅票ニ付テハ現在ノ清償ヲ順化繼續ス  
 ルト共ニMノ第三國向輸出社絶ニ依ル漏費ノ  
 減省輸出、實業貸出額ノ抑揚、共榮國內各口  
 トノ物資交流ノ促進等ノ方策ヲ講ズ  
 以上日本銀行總裁、金野茂部長ト連絡、謙稱子セリ



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第四期 (昭和十六年九月)

九月ニ入ルヤ、公債消化率ハ漸次悪化シ三分半公債市價ハ銀行償還額レヲ空シ、證券相場亦漸落ノ傾向ヲ進リツ、アルヲ以テ公債消化及市價維持對策

並ニ株式市場對策トシテ左ノ措置ヲ講ズ八月十一日突開

一 公債消化促進及市價維持對策

日本銀行總裁ト協議ノ結果不致取日銀ヲシテ各銀行ニ對シ個別約ニ公債ノ買入ヲ懇懇シテ空保筋越

費ノ公債、投資、又ハ興債、正金ヘノコトヲ放出

ヲ求メ、更ニ市價維持對策トシテ日興証券ノ三分

半國債買出動、小口買物ノ各種券業者ノ取進ヲ手

配スルノ外金回撥額ニ公債取引自負決議ヲ行ハシ

メ大口買方ニ對シテハ個別約ニ警告セシムル様措

二 株式市場對策

三 株式市場對策

日本共同證券ノ買出動ヲ繼續セシムルト共ニ株價

ノ公定三厘スル勸告ヲ(總務員法第十九條)立案

九月二十五日公布即日實施ス其ノ要旨ハ株式取引

員ノ株式取引價格ハ主務大臣ノ定ムル最低又ハ最

高(支店ハ皆分適用セズ)價格ヲ違エテ行ヒ得ザ

ルコトトスルト同時ニ金融ノ所有株式ニ付テモ前

期ノ評價額以下ニ評價シ得ザルモノトセルモノナ

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第五期（昭和十六年十月）

×△間ノ開戦ニ伴フ國際情勢ノ推移ハNノ戰爭不可避ヲ思ハシテ株式市場ハ慘澹シテ半恐慌狀態ヲ呈シ又預金拂長制限ノ風評ニ六銀行以外ハ一新ニ取付ニ會フニ至レルヲ以テ株式市場立直及銀行預金引出阻止ニ依ル金融暴ノ安定恢復ハ焦眉ノ急務トセララルニ至レリ。依テ十月上旬取急辛左ノ措置ヲ講ゼリ（八月十三日提出）

一 株式市場對策

不取敢大藏省工部大臣ヨリ株式ノ最低價格ハ更ニ之ヲ引下ル意思ヲキテ聲明スルト共ニ協同證券ニ防礙買ヲ命ジ、政府ノ貸入援助ノゼスチュアトシテ協定ハ新ニ五千万圓ノ融資命令ヲ發効ス

二 銀行取付對策

(1) 銀行預金引出制限ノ風評ニ對シテハ大藏大臣談ヲ以テ之ヲ否定スルト共ニ、銀行ノ基礎ニハ不安ヲキラ以テ積極的ニ貯蓄運動ニ協力スベキ旨ヲ要請ス

(四)

日銀ヲシテ迅速ニ無制限貸付ヲ開始セシメ又各支店、代理店ニ至急充分ナル兌換準備ヲ行ハシム

(三)

金融機關ニ對シテハ預金引出要求ニ對シテハ即時之ニ應ズベク日銀ハ無制限貸出ニ依リ支持ス

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へキ留置ニ付ニ此ノ際貸出ノ回收ヲ行ヒ産業金  
融ノ興隆ヲ加フルニトナシ様通牒ス

(三) 取引、預金引出運動ニ際スル記事ハ益々不景ク  
敏化セシムル銀アルヲ以テ差止ルコトニ情報局

ト打合セケリ

(ホ) 日銀ヨリ各預入措置ヲ開始セル留報告ニ據ス  
者ノ外第三回商標出産局シ爾後方面ニ甚大ナル打撃

ヲ與ヘツツアル状況ニ備ミ左ノ措置ヲ講ジタリ  
八月十四日(據照)又M国イレフレ領向ニ依ル換物

運動ニ付テモ對流暴落局次長ヨリ申入アリタルヲ以  
テ之ニ對スル對策ヲ取置セリ

一 第三回貿易社總ニ伴フ金融的措置

(イ) 商工省ト連絡シ輸出補償法ノ運用ニ依リ損失ヲ  
補償ス

(ロ) 游資異收金ニ對スル金融機關ノ協力、爲替銀行  
ノ同、爲慮ノ阻止、輸出關係産業へノ金融的援助

助ヲ行フ

(ハ) 游資ノMOへノ爲替輸出ニ伴フMOノ日圓資金  
ノ調達ニ付援助ヲ爲ス

M国イソソレ對策

(イ) M国政府ニ對シ賠償獎勵運動ノ展開、金融機關  
ノ整備擴充ニ依ル遊資ノ回收、土着商業資本ノ

産業資金化、大規模ノ影響、修正五ヶ年計畫ノ

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へキ留置ニ付ニ此ノ際貸付ノ回收ヲ行ヒ運業金  
融ノ興隆ヲ加フルニトナシ様通牒ス

(三) 取引、現金引出運動ニ際スル証券ハ益々不景ク  
減化セシムル惧テルヲ以テ差止ルコトニ情報局  
ト打合セケリ

(ホ) 日銀ヨリ左各項ノ措置ヲ開始セル留報告ニ據ス  
者ノ外第三回商標出差局シ區標方面ニ甚大ナル打撃  
ヲ與ヘツツアル状況ニ付ニ左ノ措置ヲ講ジタリ

(八月十四日委員) 又M国イレフレ領向ニ依ル換物  
運動ニ付テモ對シテ事務局長ヨリ申入アリタルヲ以  
テ之ニ對スル對策ヲ擬定セリ

一 第三回貿易社結ニ伴フ金融的措置

(イ) 商工省ト連絡シ輸出補償法ノ運用ニ依リ損失ヲ  
補償ス  
(ロ) 滯留買収金ニ對スル金融機關ノ協力、爲替銀行  
ノ同、爲慮ノ阻止、輸出關係産業ヘノ金融的援  
助ヲ行フ

(ハ) 滯留ノMOヘノ爲替輸出ニ伴フMOノ日圓資金  
ノ調達ニ付援助ヲ爲ス

M国イソフレ對策  
(イ) M国政府ニ對シテ賠償獎勵運動ノ展開、金融機關  
ノ整備擴充ニ依ル遊資ノ回收、土着商業資本ノ  
産業資金化、大規模ノ影響、修正五ヶ年計畫ノ

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同行ト資金流調法ノ適用理化ニ要望ス  
(四) N 曰ニ於テモ第三回向輸出化ノEヘノ爲巻ト

之ヲ爲必要ナル原資金(短期クレディット)ノ  
供給ヲ考慮スルト共ニEノインフレーションノ内地ヘノ  
波及ヲ防止スル爲爲管理ノ預化、輸出入品價  
格變動防止ノ措置ヲ講ス

猶ホ食糧貯蓄策、對第三日貿易社絶ニ伴フ新出品  
對策勞務對策、重要物資同收對策、宣傳費等ノ爲第  
二預備金ヨリ合計七千九百五十萬圓ヲ支出セリ

第六期(昭和十六年十一月)

一世上一般ニインフレーションハ氣潮漲シ換物運動起リ經濟

統制違反進行ニ對シ警察及司法當局ノ取締不能ノ  
狀況ナルモ幣ニ新ナル措置ヲ爲サズ專断ヲ斷絶ス  
ルト共ニ(金融界ハ準備ナリ)、剛硬時ニ金融界  
ノ動搖防止對策ヲ豫メ準備シ、猶ホ經濟統制違反

ノ重酷的取締ヲ警察兩院兩當局ニ要望シ幣ニ警察  
官増員ノ爲第二預備金三百二十萬圓ヲ支出シ決

定セリ(八月十五日提出)

三十一月下旬公債消化狀況依然抄々シカラザルモ對  
且武力進出ニ伴フ金融界ノ衝激ニ加ヘテ年末ヲ迎  
ヘテ金融癩癩ヲ生スル惧モアリ幣ニ積體的ナル公  
債消化促進策ヲ講ゼズ明年度預算ニ付テハ官廳專  
断ノ文書類ニ行ハ物對計數ニ照原ナル擬定ナラシ

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× 一般會計及預算ノ合計ヲ本年度實行豫算程度ニ  
照應スル方算ノ下ニ決定スルコトトセリ  
猶ホ一般財源力ノ増進ノ見込ヨリ相當大額ノ増税  
ヲ行ヒ又十一月三十日夜半短草値上(益税的ニ平  
均二割)ヲ發表ス(以上八月十六日提出)

臨時議會ニ主ノ豫算案及議決案ヲ提出セリ(八月  
十六日提出)

- (イ) 一般會計豫算案追加案 一〇〇三百万圓
- (ロ) 臨時會計豫算案追加案 五〇〇〇
- (ハ) 朝鮮、臺灣各特別會計豫算追加案 一三
- (ニ) 政府出資特別會計豫算追加案 三〇〇
- (ホ) 船舶國家管理 〃 二〇〇
- (ヘ) 特種ノ爲ノ豫算外契約案 一三〇〇百万圓
- (ト) 公債發行ニ關スル法律案

臨時、一般會計 合計 一〇一〇百万圓

- (チ) 船舶國家管理特別會計法案
- (リ) 租税増徴ノ爲ノ各稅法中改正法律案

平均増徴率 平均増徴見込 昭和十六年度

直接増徴額 三三三 八八三百万圓 二六四百万圓

間接増徴額 八八〇 五八〇 一三三

- (ヌ) 臨時金融會社法案

臨時ノ産業金融ノ圓滑化ヲ圖ル爲資本金五億圓

(内三億圓ハ政府出資)ノ臨時金融會社ヲ設立

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シ國家の學業ニ對スル積蓄的投資、進修、未  
 償設備ノ異度、轉換ノ爲メ金庫、公債債券式金  
 庫及相變ノ進メ、金庫市場ノ調節等ヲ行ハシム  
 (元) 日本銀行特別積蓄損失、積蓄後  
 戰時救護時ニ於ケル金庫會ノ困難ニ對處スル爲  
 向ク一半半、十五億圓ヲ限リ特別積蓄ヲ行  
 ヲ

第七期（昭和十六年十二月）

戰時經濟ノ進行ニ伴フ諸條件ニ差ク産業短管ノ困  
 難増嵩ニ對シ積蓄ノ産業金融對策盛ニ年末金融對  
 策ノ爲メ不取敢テノ措置ヲ講メ

一産業金融短管打倒策

未償投資ニ依リ短管困難ヲ來シタル會社ニ對シ日  
 該ヲシテ待藏ノ道ヲ開カシメ、未償投資、遊休設  
 備ノ組合ニ於ケル並列例ニ依ル金庫ノ四庫補給、  
 經營ノ合理化、整理内容ノ適正化同系會社ノ合併  
 等ヲ講ズルト共ニ、金融機關ノ貸出回收ヲ自重セ  
 シム。猶ホ手形割引同進ニ依ル現金取引化ノ傾向  
 ニ對シテハタムテ手形制度ノ採用ニ依リ手形備  
 用ノ流注恢復ニ努ム

ニ年末金融對策

年末金融ニ付テハ廣府發金補給計畫協同會ニ於テ

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政府資金ノ撤去ヲ節シ、預金部資金ノ放出、正  
 金、貸付、ニシテ以テ高ノ抑削、日銀ノ市中銀行  
 ヲリノ買戻係管員買入ニ依リ資金ノ潤滑ナル  
 供給ヲ圖ルニ共ニ資金調査ニ於テモ計画的ニ長  
 期資金持込ノ調整ヲ圖ルコトス

十二月下旬北方軍地方ニ望望アリ又器材方面ニ於ケ  
 ル運搬策ノ要請アリ、之ニ圖シテ左ノ如キ處置ヲ講ズ

一 組織対策

地方公共団体ノ復舊救護事業ニ對スル預金部資金  
 ノ貸付、庶民金庫、高組中金ノ貸出ニ對スル援助  
 ラナシ又金融機關ノ復舊資金貸出ニ關スル許可申  
 請ニ對シ特見ノ取扱ヲ爲セリ

一 農林救護事業ノ爲メノ第二預金支出

一 千八百圓

第八期（昭和十七年一月乃至三月）

一月二十三日△翌早ノ東京總領事アリ 後審相管轄  
 大ナルモノアリ

依テ至急左ノ如ク處置ス（八月二十三日電出）

(一) 大蔵省一部機要ニ付テハ速カニ善後處理ヲナス  
 ト共ニ職員一同ノ精神昂揚ニ努ム

(二) 損失銀行ノ業務處理、損失銀行關係ノ手形交換  
 ノ延期、金融界ノ動搖防止ニ付テハ日銀ト協力



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政府資金ノ振立ヲ調節シ、領金部資金ノ放出、正金、負債、ニシテ以テ高ノ拘制、且、市中銀行ヨリノ買戻係管管日償買入ニ依リ資金ノ潤滑ナル供給ヲ圖ルト共ニ資金調整ニ於テモ計画的ニ長期資金増長ノ調整ヲ圖ルコトス

十二月下旬迄尤も地方ニ影響アリ又農村方面ニ於テル運搬策ノ取立アリ、之ニ圖シテ左ノ如キ處置ヲ講ズ

一 運搬對策

地方公共団体ノ行爲救護事業ニ對スル預金部資金ノ貸付、庶民倉庫、高租申金ノ貸出ニ對スル援助ヲナシ又金融機關ノ復舊資金貸出ニ關スル許可申請ニ對シ特別ノ取扱ヲ爲セリ

一 農村運搬事業費ノ爲メ第二預金部資金支出

一 一八〇千圓

第八期（昭和十七年一月乃至三月）

一月二十五日A總算ノ東京總算アリ 被管相管普大ナルモノアリ

依テ至急左ノ如ク處置ス（八月二十二日提出）

(一) 大蔵省一部繰出ニ付テハ進カニ繰出處理ヲナス

ト共ニ職員一同ノ精神昂揚ニ努ム

(二) 損失銀行ノ業務處理、損失銀行關係ノ手形交換ノ延期、金融界ノ窮乏防止ニ付テハ口供ト地方



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(1) 日本銀行條例中改正法律案

(4) 現在日本銀行ニ於テ行ヒツツアル業務ノ明文

化

(5) 政府保證債券ノ所有ヲ認ムルコト

(6) 業法ニ對スル制限規定ノ部分的改廢

(三) 株主總會ノ權限減少

(四) 營業年限ノ延長

(2) 災害地租稅減免法案

災害地ニ對スル租稅ノ減免ニ關スル制限ヲ政府

ニ委任ス

(1) 金融團體法案

預力ナル金融統制ノ實施ニ協力セシムル爲メ金融

機關ヲ日銀ヲ中心トシテ全國金融統制會、業

態別金融統制會、地方金融協議會ノ三個ノ組織

ニ組成シ同業連帶、一體的機能ノ發揮ヲ實現シ

此ノ組織ヲ通シテ資金運用ノ統制、金融業務ノ

意思整備、金融ト産業トノ關係ノ緊密化等ノ實

現ヲ期スルモノトス

(2) 租稅證券法案

國民府著ノ増強ニ資スル爲メ租稅證券ヲ發行シ分

額所得稅納付者ニ對シ所得ニ應ジ一定金額ノ租

稅證券ヲ制當額調購入セシメ五年間期日後租稅

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(1) 日本銀行條例中改正法律案

(2) 現在日本銀行ニ於テ行ヒツツアル業務ノ明文

化

(3) 政府保證債券ノ所有ヲ認ムルコト

(4) 業法ニ對スル制限規定ノ部分的改廢

(5) 株主總會ノ權限減少

(6) 營業年限ノ延長

(7) 災害地租稅減免法案

災害地ニ對スル租稅ノ減免ニ關スル制限ヲ政府ニ委任ス

(8) 金融團體法案

預力ナル金融統制ノ實施ニ協力セシムル爲メ金融機關ヲ日銀ヲ中心トシテ全國金融統制會、業

態別金融統制會、地方金融協議會ノ三個ノ組織

ニ組織シ同業連帶、一體的機能ノ發揮ヲ實現シ

此ノ組織ヲ通シテ資金運用ノ統制、金融業務ノ

意思遂行、金融ト産業トノ關係ノ緊密化等ノ實

現ヲ期スルニトス

(9) 租稅證券法案

國民貯蓄ノ増強ニ資スル爲メ租稅證券ヲ發行シ分

額所得稅納付者ニ對シ所符ニ應ジ一定金額ノ租

稅證券ヲ相當額調換入セシメ五年間期間後租稅

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三 簡付、郵便貯金、ノ拂込ニ使用セシム

農村匡救對策トシテ産組中金ノ活動ニ依ル農村債

券ノ期限延長ヲ行ハシムル外北口東北方水害地ニ

對シ向フ一々年租税ノ免除ヲ爲ス旨ノ勅令ヲ公布

ス、八月二十日提出)

二 新年ト共ニ公債消化策ニ力點ヲ置キ積極的貯蓄策

勵運動ヲ展開ス、八月二十日提出)

第九期(昭和十七年四月乃至八月)

一 戦時金融會社、金融統制會ハ何レモ設立手續完了

ラ見、六月頃ヨリ活動ヲ開始セルヲ以テ、此ノ金

融統制組織ノ運用ニ依リ強力ナル金融統制ヲ實施

シツツ緊迫セル情勢ニ對應スル爲メノ策ヲ準備ス

ハ八月二十二日提出)

三 金融界ハ一應着キテ見セツツアルヲ以テ之ニ對

シテハ新ナル措置ヲ講ゼズ、唯外債輸入代金決済

ノ途端ヲ察セルヲ以テ日本銀行總裁ト協議シ左ノ

處置ヲ講ス、八月二十二日提出)

(一) 對 國 債

昭和十六年度分輸入代金中延期拂期間経過セル分

ニ付必需防費ヲ輸出決済シ昭和十七年度分ニ付テ

ハ豫メ支拂條件ノ緩和ニ努ム

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精付、郵便貯金、ノ繰込ニ使用セシム

農村匡救對策トシテ産組中金ノ活動ニ依ル農村債

券ノ期限延長ヲ行ハシムル外北口東北方水害地ニ

對シ向フ一々年租税ノ免除ヲ爲ス旨ノ勅令ヲ公布

ス、八月二十日提出)

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勵運動ヲ展開ス、八月二十日提出)

第九期(昭和十七年四月乃至八月)

一、臨時金庫會社、全農統儲會ハ何レモ設立手續完了

ヲ見、六月頃ヨリ活動ヲ開始セルヲ以テ、此ノ金

庫統儲組織ノ運用ニ依リ強力ナル全農統儲ヲ實施

シツツ緊迫セル情勢ニ對慮スル爲メノ策ヲ準備ス

ハ八月二十二日提出)

ニ全農界ハ一應落着キヲ見セツツアルヲ以テ之ニ對

シテハ新ナル措置ヲ圖ゼズ、唯増徴輸入代金決済

ノ進捗ヲ察セルヲ以テ日本銀行總裁ト協議シ左ノ

處置ヲ圖ス、八月二十二日提出)

(一)對英關係

昭和十六年度分輸入代金中延擱期間超過セル分

ニ付必額放棄ヲ輸出決済シ昭和十七年度分ニ付テ

ハ豫メ支拂條件ノ緩和ニ努ム

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(一) 對 E 關係

N E 間ノ決済方法ニ付金ノイヤマークヲ考慮シ  
來レルモ、イヤマークハ固執セズ、必要ニ應ジ  
金ヲ繰出シテ決済ス

右各期ニ於テ處置シタル事項ハ何レモ閉議ニ報告シ  
閉議決定ヲ長スルモノニ付テハ決定ヲ記クル後統監  
部ニ提出セリ、ハ各項括弧内ノ日付ハ處置暨提出時  
日ナリ)

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Doc 2228

機密

演習經過記錄

第一委員會

一 八月八日（實曆）午前九時

第一委員會第一回打合せヲ開ク

議案

一 南方諸地域處理根本方針

二 委員會業務分擔

三 右打合せニ於テ決定セル結果左ノ如シ

エ、南方諸地域處理方針（將來處理）

イ、蘭印

シヤバ・スマトララ合シ獨立門トシ

爾餘ノ地域ヲ併合ス

ロ、馬來

一 應全部併合スルコト、シテ尙研究

ハ、フィリピン

全般ヲ包括シ獨立セシム

ニ、荷印

現狀ヲ強化シ、ツ、我カ国力ノ増進

ヲ圖ル



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ホ、タイ  
獨立ヲ尊重シツツ我が國威ノ滲透ヲ  
圖ル

2、委員會業務擔任  
1、業務總括及統治基本計劃作成ハ官釋  
研究 生

ロ、暹印統治要綱及暹印經濟價值判斷  
石井 研究生

ハ、馬來統治要綱及馬來經濟價值判斷  
成田 研究生

ニ、フイリピン統治要綱及經濟價值判斷  
八日笠 研究生

其右分擔ヲ決定シテヨリ四名ノ擔當員ハ出來

得ル限リノ資料ヲ蒐集ニ努メタルモ充分ニ  
得ラレサルマデニ極力研究ヲ續ケタリ、

爾後隨員タル他ノ役員繁忙ナルニ依リ之等  
四名邊ニ諮議ソツツ研究ヲ進メ特ニ委員會  
全體ノ行政會議ニ於テ機曾ナカリキ

四 大帝ノ勅ヲ得タル八月二十日（寶曆）第  
二回參事會ヲ開キ過去十日間ノ研究成果ニ  
就キ大體ノ了解ヲ得、更ニ統監部ノ指導ヲ  
受ケタル後、該案ヲ松田補助官ニ提出セリ

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機密

演習經過記錄

對稱警務局

一 演習第四期ニ於テMニ於ケル圓資金缺乏及

産業五ヶ年計劃ノ行惱ミノ狀況アリ、之ニ

對シM國トシテ執ルヘキ處置ニ關シ參考意

見ヲ總理大臣ニ書面具申シ、大野省、日本

銀行、企圖院關係官ト打合せヲ遂ケ應急對

處セリ、

二 演習第五期ニ於テMニ於ケルインソフレ狀況

ト之ニ伴フ農民ノ動向思ハシカラサル狀況アリ

アリ、之ニ對シテハ一方應急處置ヲ講スル

ト共ニ人心ノ動向ヲ轉換セシムヘキ根本的

政治工作ヲ必要トスルニヨリ大藏大臣宛參

考意見ヲ書面具申スルト共ニ總理大臣ニ報

告セリ

三 演習第九期ニ於テ我カ農村勞力ノ關係上精

洲諸拓民送出困難ノ狀況アリ、之ニ付テハ

拓務、農林兩大臣ト打合せ不勳ノ國策遂行

ニ決閣議ノ了解ヲ經テ其ノ方針ヲ全國ニ

徹底セシメタリ

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機密  
機密

昭和十六年八月二十三日提出

第一回總力戰机上演習經過概要

與亞院政務長官 成田 敬一

四 演習第九期對D空氣緊迫セル狀況アリ、N

政府決心ノ資料トシテ總理及陸相ニ對シ最  
近ノM日內情勢ヲ連絡セリ

五 演習全般ヲ通シ對島嶼警務局ハ其ノ料席上ノ

地位ト任務不徹底ナルモノアルヲ自ラ感シ  
經過ニ就テ見ルモ逐メテ消極的ナリキ、

一 演習第三期

NハAヨリ在A資金凍結令ノ適用ヲ受ケ爲

ニ對A貿易一時ニ逼迫シタル結果ニ對シC

ニ於ケルNノ爲替價值維持ニ速カニ措置ヲ

講セサル可クサルヲ考慮シ大藏當局ニ之カ

對策ニシテ見ラハ願セリ

二 演習第四期

Oノ吾治安肅正工作次第ニ進歩スルニ正比

例シC2例內幕ニ在リテ官民共ニ緊張氣運

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三 演習第四期  
○ノ吾治安肅正工作次第ニ進歩スルニ正比例シ○2例内部ニ在リテ官民共ニ緊張氣運

一 演習第三期  
NハAヨリ在A資金疎結令ノ適用ヲ受ケ爲ニ對A貿易一時ニ逼迫シタル結果ニ對シ○ニ於ケルNノ爲替價值維持ニ速力ニ指圖ヲ請セサル可クサルヲ考慮シ大藏當局ニ之カ對策ニ對シテ見テ願セリ

昭和十六年八月二十三日提出  
第一回總力戰机上演習經過概要  
與亞院政務長官 成田茂一

機密  
機密

四 演習第九期對D空氣緊迫セル狀況アリ、N政府決心ノ資料トシテ總理及陸相ニ對シ最近ノM日内情勢ヲ連絡セリ  
演習全般ヲ通シ對加緊務局ハ其ノ幹席上ノ地位ト任務不徹底ナルモノアルヲ自ラ感シ經過ニ就テ見ルモ逐メテ消極的ナリキ、

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達成スル傾向アリタルニ鑑ミ本長官ハ情報  
局總裁ニ對シ特ニ文書ヲ以テ  
(イ) 對シ中央並ヒニ前線ニ對スル純宣傳ノ  
強化方法

(ロ) 在支總算ヲ中心トスル宣傳機關ノ統一、  
確立ニ關スル所見  
概要右ノ二點ニシテ意見ヲ申陳シオケリ

三 演習第五期

前期ニ於ケル思想戦ハ如實ニ奏効シタル  
内部ノ人心ニ切拵ヲ與ヘタル等ニ鑑ミ支  
部學藝ノ處理ヲ早速ニ進展セシメ得ル好  
機到來セリ、

依テ~~東亞~~亞院現地機關ノ整備強化案~~一~~ヲ提  
出シ、在支諸機關ノ指導統制機構ノ確立  
ヲナス緊急措置ヲ執ラシカ爲メ亞院會議  
開催ヲ要請セリ

該案ヲ要約セル次ノ如シ

(イ) 南京ニ事務總局ヲオキ總局長官ハ陸支大  
使ヲシテ兼任セシムル事

(ロ) 單方面ノ政務機構ヲ移管スル事

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四 演習同期

(ハ) 地方行政ノ指導ハ北支ノミトスル事

十月十五日演習ハ對北支進出ヲナストノ隨戰

態勢ニ入ル、而モ統帥部ハ南方進出ノ企圖

秘匿スルノ必要上武力戰準備ノ目標ヲ對

攻勢ニ指向スル如クセヨトノ要求ニ應ジ、

左ノ如キ措置ヲ執ル、即チ一面在〇同胞ノ

精神的結束ヲ圖リ一掃殘敵ノ態勢ヲ示シツ

、眞意ハ愛國的精神昂揚ヲナシ國民的團結

ヲ鞏固ニシ以テ戰爭ニ移行セントスルモノ

ナリ、

(イ) 各道給部長官會議開催

(ロ) 現地ニ於ケル軍外與三機關ノ打合せ開催

(ハ) 說國俾ノ訓練強化

(三) 在〇同胞ニ對シ興發運動ヲ通シタル精神

功員

其演習第六期以後

一面吾同胞ノ精神的結合暨生活ノ低化ヲ

堅持セシメツ、他面對シ工作ハ一線力費方

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第三期  
第一回總力戰演習第三期以降  
思想戰經過記錄（但シ情報局關係ノミ）

第三期

對內分

一、言論報導機關與論指導

1、取締

N A 交渉問題

外交ニ關スル批判

口、指導

樞軸關係不變

對 A (B) 戰備セズ

佛印進駐ノ意義

軍備ノ充實

三、具體清醒

1、言論機關幹部

口、主要思想團體幹部

ハ、文武官ノ言論一致

懇談會

指導ヲ續行ス

第三支那事態處理方針ニ從ヒ一貫不變ナル

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陸一支部變處理方針ニ從ヒ一貫不變ナル  
指導ヲ續行ス

第一回線力戰演習第三期以降

思想戰經過記錄（但シ情報局關係ノミ）

第三期

對內分

一、言論報導機關與論指導

1、取籍

NA 交渉問題

外交ニ關スル批判

ロ、指導

軍備關係不變

對 A (B) 戰備セズ

佛印進駐ノ意義

軍備ノ充實

三、具體問題

1、言論機關幹部

ロ、主要思想團體幹部

ハ、文武官ノ言論一致

懇談會



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對外 (主トシテ對A)

一 海外情報網ノ私充

二 情報局總裁代辯者設置

三 宣傳ノ徹底強化

第四期

對外

一 治安ノ宣傳

二 對O 2 宣傳

(武力、外交經濟關係ト連絡

三 敵性國難間策

對外宣傳

與口外電利用

四 外人記者團イソタビユ一

對内

一 Xノ對B 和平攻撃ニ關スル指導

イ、總裁代辯者利用

ロ、報道取扱ヒニツキ留意

ハ、A・Bニ對スル攻撃

二 機密漏洩ニ付スル措置

三 總理大臣以下全閣僚ノ全國遊説並ニラヂ

ヲ放送實施

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四 逓信大臣へノ要求

ラデオ、新聞通信設備確保ノ件

第五期

對内

一 言論取締

イ、米穀不足

ロ、阪神地方ニ於ケル鐵人問題

ハ、經濟不安

金融、株式其他

ニ、佛教界ノ功勳ト宗教指導

二 宣傳

イ、A、B軍對日壓迫ト戰爭ノ責任

ロ、Bノ非協力批難

ハ、A、B、C軍協定攻撃

ニ、A、D軍協定ノ攻撃暴彈

三 施設

言論、報道、通信機關並ニ關係、政治  
家(代議士)其ノ他助員

對外

一 アレスカンスペイン

イ、A、B、E、L(一部)ノN船抑

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第五期 對內

四 逕信大臣へノ要求  
ヲテオ、新聞通信設備確保ノ件

一 言論取締

- イ、米穀不足
- ロ、阪神地方ニ於ケル鑑人問題
- ハ、經濟不安
- ニ、佛教界ノ功勳ト宗教指導

二 宣傳

- イ、A、B 軍對日壓迫ト戰爭ノ責任
- ロ、E ノ非協力批難
- ハ、A、B、C 軍協定攻撃
- ニ、A、D 軍協定ノ攻撃暴露

三 指置

言論、報道、通信機關並ニ關係、政治家（代議士）其ノ他助員

對外

一 アレスカンスペイン

イ、A、B、E、L（一部）ノN 暴抑

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留攻

口、太平洋平和ノ希求 (M)

ハ、X關係ノ自判斷

三 A: U 權圍

相互利益ノ背反

三 O 2 工作強化

四 對 B 謀略

五 對 B 進出後ノ對 X, T ノ連絡

六 對 I . T ラビヤ方面宣傳工作

第五期追加

對內

一 思想戰線統一

1、地方長官會議

口、言論機關卜連絡

ハ、學校教育機關卜連絡

二、映畫、劇其ノ他文化方面連絡

三 隨我機勢強調週聞

三 食糧關係對策

1、消息者對策

口、農村ノ立場解明

米ノ供出

ハ、巡回映畫、演劇

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民 總 濟 不 安 對 策

關 係 各 省 提 携

イ、戰 時 金 融 治 安 ノ 重 大 性

ロ、前 大 戰 時 ノ 引 例

宣 傳

其 公 共 ラ ウ フ 、 ス ビ ー カ ー 及 秘 密 情 報 員 設 置

イ、公 共 ラ ウ フ 、 ス ビ ー カ ー

首 裏 都 市

衙 頭 、 皇 校 、 工 場 等

ロ、秘 密 情 報 員

一、五 〇 〇 名、豫 算、七、五 〇 萬 圓

內 務 省 憲 兵 等 通 絡

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第六期

對 外

(A) 一、Aノ對X宣戰問題

1、情報局總裁談

新ナル事象ニ非ズ

ロ、國內輿論ノ即時參戰論放任

二、Xユノスエス、ジアラタルタル攻擧宣傳

三、A、B、E、ノ對H包圍ニツキ檢討ニ變化ナ

キラ期ス、企圖心秘匿

四、Oニ攻擧宣傳

(B) 對E諜略思ハシカラスノ報アリ

(C) 對E上陸作戰ニ即應スビラフメント、第五列

對 內

一、代用食、肥料問題

農林省ノ施策ト併行

二、勞力問題

三、戰時經濟道德週聞實施

1、政策ノ徹底

ロ、道德律、イソフレ、投物、口取引絶滅

四、防諜精神ヲ一段ト強化ス

第六期追加

對 外

一、對E武力進出ニ即應

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(4) E、抗戰意識播葉ニ努ム

ビヲ、ラデオ、工作員

ロ、E作戦ノ報導ト其ノ目的

國家ノ存立防衛

ハ、右作戦ノ、M、O1、E、F、C2ニ對スル宣

傳

ニ、Xトノ協議

對内

一、統帥部トノ連絡

二、E進出ニヨル民心昂揚ト緊張

三、對E出脚目的ノ解明

但シA、B等ヲ殊更刺戟セズ

(與ヘラレタル情況ニ依ル)

四、議會ニ關スル言論報導

第七期

對外

一、AノPニ於ケル中立水域ノ設定

總裁談

二、對B宣傳放送

東京、臺北、パナマ、西貢

三、Aノ在AN人ノ壓迫ノ攻撃

四、在ニ、A入壓迫取締宣傳

五、國內感勢強化ヲ高調ス

對內

一、輸送船隻沈問題  
民心、昂揚、緊張、卜輕鬆、戒×

二、時局認識

三、外交問題、親善的論議、取締  
四、與論取締卜積極的發表

五、對A、B、兩戰卜宣傳

一、御詔勅、奉戴式卜御趣旨戰爭目的解明、總  
理放送

二、A、B側ノ關係責任、反正義、宣傳

三、東亞共榮圈內A、B權益、掃蕩、報導

四、北九州ノ空襲卜發表

五、享樂方面ニ對スル壓迫的措施

六、興亞奉公日ノ改正

第八期

對外

一、L諸國ノH外交官退去要求

二、A主力排除ノ誘致策

三、東京空襲、A側ノ損害報導

四、Tニ對スル謀略

對內

一、E、Q、S等H軍ノ戰果發表報導

二、東京市空襲



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第九期

- 對 內
  - 一、 作戰、順調、民心、秘、對策
  - 御詔勅、御趣旨、具明
  - 二、 宣傳
  - 一、 作戰、原詞、戰果
  - 口、 占領地、建設
  - 八、 遺隊、健在

第八期

- 一、 議會、質疑、應答、對外、宣傳、利用
- 二、 對內外宣傳
- 一、 大東亞民族共榮
- 口、 東亞自治
- 八、 不干涉不侵略
- 二、 平等、自由、原則
- ホ、 P Q B / 將來ニ於ケル取扱方針
- 三、 A 遺隊誘致宣傳策

- 一、 被害事實
- 口、 被害、程度
- 八、 言論指導
- 二、 國民心、緊張昂揚
- 三、 A 軍母體巡洋、損害
- 四、 農村、緊張昂揚

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- ニ、敵空襲、敵潜水艦ノ被害
- 三、對R硬語
- 四、B渡流希望者ノ激増對策
- イ、資格制限
- ロ、聖戰ノ意義徹底
- 五、船員不足、下船者ノ對策
- イ、募集宣傳
- ロ、船員ニ對スル感謝
- 第九期追加（丁海戰ト其以後）
- 對内
  - 一、丁海大海戰ノ大捷ニツキ大祝賀會三日間
  - 二、民心緊張策（宣傳）
  - イ、Dノ中立條約無視、Aヘノ軍事基地供與
  - ロ、東亞繁榮力ニ一段ノ努力必要
  - 三、朝鮮ニ落下傘降下
- 對外
  - 一、丁大海戰ノ連絡宣傳
  - 二、Rノ動搖
  - 三、Bノ和平暴響

以上

- 二、敵望裏、敵潜水艦ノ被害
- 三、對 R 硬語
- 四、B 渡流希望者ノ激増對策
- イ、資格制限
- ロ、聖戰ノ意義徹底
- 五、船員不足、下船者ノ對策
- イ、募集宣傳
- ロ、船員ニ對スル感謝
- 第九期追加 (丁海戰ト其以後)
- 對 内
  - 一、丁海大海戰ノ大捷ニツキ大祝賀會三日間
  - 二、民心緊張策 (宣傳)
  - イ、Dノ中立條約無視、Aノ軍事基地供與
  - ロ、東亞繁榮力ニ一段ノ努力必要
  - 三、朝鮮ニ落下傘降下
- 對 外
  - 一、丁大海戰ノ連絡宣傳
  - 二、Rノ勳搖
  - 三、Bノ和平暴得

以上

極秘機密

第 期演習處監督 其、	提出先 海軍部武力隊本部長 長官海軍部海軍部長田中	報告文 六	通知先
提出(宛定)	昭和十年 月 日	時刻(實曆)	昭和十年 月 日 午前 時 分
内務大臣	吉岡 憲一	(演習官) 職氏名	

昭和十六年度第一回總力戰机上演習記録

第三期 (八月)

(一) 國際關係ノ緊迫化ニ伴ヒ外國人目標ノ取締  
ヲ強化ス

(二) Dノ謀略ニ對シ左翼分子ノ取締ヲ強化ス

(三) 朝鮮人及ヒ國ハノ取締ヲ強化ス

(四) 言論文藝ノ取締ヲ強化シ防諜ノ徹底ヲ期ス

第四期 (九月)

(一) 國際情勢ニ關スル民心ノ動向ノ情報ヲ蒐集

スルト共ニ對A即時閉戦若ハ對D即時開戦

ヲ主張シ又ハXノ對B和平政策ヲ誹謗スル

極端ナル言論文藝ヲ取締ル

(二) 本邦人ニ付テモ外國ノ諜略ノ情報ニ對スル

防衛上注意スベキ人物ノ名簿ヲ作製シ取締

ヲ爲ス

第五期 (十月)

- (三) 中小商工業者ノ失業問題ノ徴化ニ伴ヒ情報蒐集ヲ爲スト共ニ傾情等ノ取締ヲ爲シ且窮業ニ臨大セシム
- (四)(五) 食糧ノ配給ニ協方セシム
- (五) 金融界ヲ始メ一液ニ流言蜚語ノ取締ヲ嚴ニス
- (六) 合法部面ノ左翼分子檢舉ノ風説ニ對スル萬全ノ措置ヲ講シ且外國ノ宣傳、謀略ニモ留意ス
- (七) 郵便物取締令施行ニ伴ヒ必要ナル措置ヲ講ス
- (一) 米ノ配給ニ關聯スル阪神地方ノ不穩情勢ニ對シテハ彈壓ヲ加フルト共ニ他ノ地方ニ對シテモ米糧動揚發ノ場合ノ警備計畫等ヲ備テシム
- (二) 銀行ノ取付ニ關シテハ記事ノ掲載禁止ヲ爲スト共ニ流言蜚語ノ取締ヲ爲シ且取付了リタル地方ノ勸員ニ關シテ注意方陸軍大臣ニ要望ス
- (三)(四)(五) 貿易杜絶ニ伴フ國內關係ニ留意ス
- (五) 右翼ノ取締ヲ強化ス
- (五) 防禦中央機構ヲ整備強化ス

- (六) 防空實施ニ必要ナル制限、禁止又ハ命令ニ關スル緊急勅令ノ制定ヲ豫定スル外防空諸準備ヲ爲ス
- (七) A B 對スル我國ノ方針ヲ窺知シ得ベキ言論文藝ヲ取締ル
- 第六期 (十一月)
  - (一) 警察官ノ増員ヲ行ヒ且補助員ノ利用ヲ行フト共ニ警察行政ノ重點主義化ヲ圖リ警察官不足ノ對策ヲ講ス
  - (二) 防空實施ニ必要ナル制限、禁止又ハ命令ニ關スル緊急勅令施行ニ必要ナル措置ヲ講ス
  - (三) 進攻ト同時ニ
- 第七期 (十二月)
  - (一) 軍需産業ヲ主點トシタル農村區救済業ヲ實施ス
  - (二) 地方長官會議ニ於テ外務大臣其ノ他時局ニ關スル説明ヲ爲ス
  - (三) 時局ノ進展ニ應ジ享樂街ノ取締ヲ強化ス對 A B 關係ノ國家緊張ニ伴ヒ言論文藝ノ取締ヲ強化スルト共ニ防諜ヲ嚴ニス
  - (四) 防空下令ト同時ニ退去禁止區域ノ指定ヲ爲ス
  - (五) 外空襲ニ關スル注意書ヲ配布スル等ノ措置ヲ講ス

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遊シ遊地ニ記官又ハ專官ノ一部シ  
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(一三)

遊シ遊地ニ記官又ハ專官ノ一部シ  
遊シ遊地ニ記官又ハ專官ノ一部シ  
遊シ遊地ニ記官又ハ專官ノ一部シ





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本省ニ於テモ關係官局ニ協力スルヲ共  
廉可分官下置ルニ伴テ地方官局ヲ  
戒服令施カレタニ三月

第一期) 昭憲十七年ニ於テ

昭憲十七年ニ於テ治安警察令  
昭憲十七年ニ於テ治安警察令

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昭憲十七年ニ於テ治安警察令

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(八)

(九)

(一)



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(四) 變和ス 對A 海ノ 上公 段平ヲ 快期ス 變ニ 則シ 祝勝ノ 爲一時 取締ヲ

取締スルニ 下ニ 變時 取締スルニ 公コト 甚シク 政ノ 府ノ 言施 策然ニ 取外 交政 且選 皇

(三)

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機密

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第 別表管理監督 其ノ		發出 (志定)	
發出先	院監督、或方院 外交院 農林院 經濟院 海軍院	時刻 (六層)	昭和十年 月 日
報告又は 通知先	(演習官) 唐氏名	發出者	日本銀行總裁 佐々木 直

昭和十六年第一回地方財政上調査會通記録

第三期 (昭和十六年八月)

一 産業資金關係對策トシテハ

不起債市場ノ行詰打開策ノ實施

金融機關ノ貸出方針ノ指導

二 株式市場對策トシテハ

日本市場高騰ニ依ル買支ハ

但新規増資、繰込徴収ノ準備

三 公債償公定ノ準備

四 A、B 兩區資金凍結令 四 四区ニ伴フ外國為替對

策トシテハ

各東區共榮に中心トシテパートナー制ヲ整備トス

ル為替清算對策ヲ講究

五 收支差額ノ決済ニ付テハ金ノ利用ヲ考慮

六 東京五共榮同貿易進出トシテ「四」ヲ採用

七 四区通貨償付維持對策トシテハ

外埠費ノ削減

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- (何) 第三回高橋田區難トカリタル助費ノ出、口振替
- (イ) 開設計畫ノ再檢査
- 第四期 (昭和十六年九月)
- 公債消化促進及市債維持對策トシテハ
- (イ) 金融機關ノ置留ナル短費ノ長期化工作實施
- (何) 日興証券ヲ退スル國債市債購入
- (イ) 金融機關ノ國債買却抑制
- 牛個人ノ國債買却ノ証券業者ニ依ル消化
- 第五期 (昭和十六年十月)
- 一 銀行取行對策トシテハ
- (イ) 銀行券ヲ名宛ニ準備
- (何) 各銀行ニ對シテ預金支拂資金ヲ充分供給ス
- (イ) 預金支拂制限ノ意思ナキ旨ノ發表
- 二 証券業者金融振整對策トシテハ
- 業者ニ對スル貸出回款ノ抑留並ニ救済費全額出撥
- 助
- 第六期 (昭和十六年十一月)
- 一 金融界救済防止對策トシテハ
- (イ) 金融機關會ノ擴充預充
- (何) 有價証券市價維持ノ爲ニ購入
- (イ) 取付沈没後ノ再準備
- 二 第七十七臨時議會ニ對シ
- 日本銀行停業回避及損失補償案ノ提出ヲ要望

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第七期 (昭和十六年十二月)

一 産業金融展進對策トシテハ

(A) 未働資本及遊休設備救済ノ爲特別融通ヲ實施

(B) 資本ノ側ヨリ經營ノ合理化指導

(C) スタムフ手形制度ノ採用

ニ 年末決済資金需要對策トシテハ

(A) 政府資金撤布ノ調整

(B) 日本銀行ノ資金放出

三 北九州空襲對策トシテハ

(A) 日本銀行門司福岡支店ノ緊急貸出及出張所設

置

(B) 市中銀行ノ貸出同改押働

第八期 (昭和十七年一月乃至三月)

一 金融總勢整備對策トシテハ

(A) 金融統制組織ノ精勵

(B) 日本銀行ノ機構改革ヲ實施

ニ 第七十八通幣議會ニ對シテ左ノ法案ノ提出ヲ要請

(A) 金融圓券法案

(B) 日本銀行條例中改正法律案

三 東京空襲對策トシテハ

(A) 損失銀行事務代行者ノ決定

(B) 手形交換ノ部分の延期

(C) 金融界防備防止ノ爲日本銀行ヨリ資金供給

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三 整理臨時業者組織ニ必要ナル措置ノ實施

第九款 (昭和十七年十一月乃至八月)

一 金融匯兌法實施趣旨ヲシテハ

日本銀行ヲ匯兌ノ中核タルニシテ、各銀行ニ對シテハ

有方且、匯兌ノ手續ヲ簡便スルヲ實行ス

二 臨時金融會社組織ヲ設ケテハ

日本銀行條例改正ニ依ル發給能力ノ増大ヲ活

用シ、商業資金融通ノ有力ナル組織ヲ設ケ

三 通貨増發防止政策トシテハ

(1) 管理小切手、郵便貯金ノ利用等ニ依リ現金ヲ多

額ニ所有スルヲ防止ス

(2) 各方面ヨリ支出セラル、故濟的資金ノ利用ヲ行

フ

(3) 米穀證券、大藏省證券、短期公債等ノ發給ニ依

リ、國債消化ヲ促進ス

四 外米輸入代金決済遲滯対策トシテハ

(1) 對米關係トシテハ、何分運搬ノ第一國決済ナルヲ

以テ、其必要費額ヲモリ、輸出決済次年度ヨリハ、

支拂擔當義務ヲ免除ス

(2) 對米關係トシテハ、何國亦、其要求シ居ル款額ニ

對シ、出來得ル限リ、金ニ對シ、擔當義務ニ依リ、決済ヲ圖リ

尙金に對シ、第一發行者ニ隨時參加、必要費見ヲ通

ベタリ



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第九號 (昭和十七年十一月至八月)

三 整理臨時業者組織ニ必要ナル措置ノ實施

一 金融團體法實施細則トシテハ

日本銀行方面等ノ中核タルニ非職分ニ儘ミ兩法ノ

有力且且且活ナル實地ニ必要ナル諸施策ヲ實行ス

二 臨時金融會社別業組織トシテハ

日本銀行條例改正ニ依ル發給能力ノ増大ヲ指

用シ產業資金前送ノ有力ナル運轉々ラシム

三 通貨増發防止調整トシテハ

(イ) 管理小切手、郵便貯金ノ利用等ニ依リ現金ヲ多

額ニ所有スルヲ防止ス

(ロ) 各方面ヨリ支出セラル、救済的資金ノ利用ヲ行

フ

(イ) 米穀證券、大藏省證券、短期國債等ノ發售ニ依

リ國債消化ヲ促進ス

四 外米輸入代金決済進捗調整トシテハ

付對 關係トシテハ何分進捗ノ第一國決済ナルヲ

以テ其進捗調整ヲロヨリ輸出決済次年度ヨリハ

支拂保證手續ヲ固ル

回對 關係トシテハ何日亦全ク要求シ居ル状態ニ

儘ミ出來得ル限リ全ク支払保證ニ依ル決済ヲ促進ス

筒金に就テ、第一委員官ニ隨時參加、並考意見ヲ施

スベキ

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秘寄

昭和十六年第一回總力戦況上野電報通記集

帝國政府鐵道大臣 芥川 治

第三期演習處置

一鐵道輸送對策（十六年八月）

車庫ノ擴大ニ伴ヒ軍事輸送ハ増加シ、船舶、貨物  
自動車役馬ノ使用モ増加ス。従テ一般輸送ニ多大  
ノ影響アルハ免レザルトコロナリ。依テ左ノ方策  
ヲ樹立シ、軍事輸送生産擴充關係輸送及坐括必需  
品輸送ノ圓滑ヲ期ス

（イ）旅客輸送ノ質的及量的統制ヲ圖ル。

（ロ）貨物輸送ニ付テハ海運ヨリノ標準並ニ小運送能

力ノ減退ヲ考慮シテ輸送ノ統制ヲ圖ル

ニ貨物自動車ノ輸送對策

使用ニヨル輸送力減退ニ對スル方策トシテ大都市

ニ於ル貨物自動車ノ統制ヲ圖ル

第五期演習處置（十六年九月）

一 海太北海運及九州ノ石炭輸送對策

（イ）海太北海運農礦輸送對策ニ付テハ艦船ヨリノ標準

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檢符

昭和十六年第一回總力戦況上預覽通記録

青田政府鐵道大臣 宗川

治

第三期預看處置

一鐵道輸送對策（十六年八月）

事懸ノ擴大ニ伴ヒ軍事輸送ハ増加シ、糧餉、貨物  
自動車役馬ノ徵用モ増加ス。従テ一般輸送ニ多大  
ノ影響アルハ免レザルトコロナリ。茲テ左ノ方策  
ヲ樹立シ、軍事輸送生産擴充關係輸送及生活必需  
品輸送ノ圓滑ヲ期ス

(1)旅客輸送ノ質的及量的統制ヲ圖ル。

(2)貨物輸送ニ付テハ海運ヨリノ稼採並ニ小運送能

力ノ派遣ヲ考慮シテ輸送ノ統制ヲ圖ル

ニ貨物自動車ノ輸送對策

徵用ニヨル輸送力派遣ニ對スル方策トシテ大都市

ニ於ル貨物自動車ノ統制ヲ圖ル

第五期預看處置（十六年九月）

一海太北海運及丸ノ石炭輸送對策

二海太北海運農糧送對策ニ付テハ糧船ヨリノ稼採

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ラ考慮シ港灣施設及陸上輸送力ヲ増強ス  
 仁九州農ノ輸送對策ニ付テハ關門隧道ノ完成時ヲ  
 線リ上テ機帆船ヨリノ轉據ニ備フ  
 三鐵道現有能カ維持方策  
 付施設ノ増強、人員ノ補充及能率ノ向上ヲ圖リ以  
 テ輸送力ノ増強ニ努ム  
 口旅客及貨物ノ統制ヲ行ヒ輸送需要ノ規正ヲ爲ス  
 自軍需及生活必需品ノ輸送ハ後後マテ確保ス、一  
 般輸送ノ抑揚ヲ先ツ實行シ己ムヲ得ザレバ生産  
 擴充收費ノ比較的不急ナルモノニ及ボスモノト  
 ス  
 三小運送對策  
 小運送能力ノ逼迫ハ鐵道輸送力ヲ減殺スルノミナ  
 ラズ緊急物資ノ移動ニ影響大ナルヲ以テ大都市ノ  
 貨物自動車ヲ國家管理ニ移ス  
 三旅客輸送ノ統制ニ關シ協力方ヲ關係各機關ニ依頼  
 ス  
 第三類積習處置（十六年十月）  
 一鐵道旅客輸送ニ付テハ關係各機關ノ協力ニヨリ巴  
 民一揆ノ時局認識モ深マリ旅客ハ減少ヲ來セリ  
 然レドモ今后ノ情勢尙樂觀ヲ許サバハラ意願リ利ハ  
 規正ヲ繼續ス  
 三鐵道貨物輸送ニ付テモ前期方針ヲ繼續ス

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三 大都市貨物自動車ノ國家管理ハ手續ヲ終了シ適用

ヲ開始ス

四 鐵道墮落時、非常災害ニ對シ豫メ措置スベキ事項

A、B、Cノ墮落ヲ豫想シ京濱、阪神、北九州ニ

最勵ラ豫メ防禦措置ヲ講ズルト共ニ罹災民ノ救済

計登ヲ樹立ス

第六期演習處置（十六年十一月）

一 B等進出ニ伴フ鐵道ニ於ケル内地業務維持方策

右貸出ニヨリ相當量ノ人員及資材ノ不足ヲ察セル

ヲ以テ之ガ補充ノ爲メ女子ノ復用範圍ノ擴大、遇

職者ノ再採用營業線ノ一部撤去、建設未開業線ノ

撤去ヲ行フ

二 鐵道營業法中改正ノ停

十一月下旬臨時議會ニ於テ可決サル

右ニヨリ臨時事變ニ際シ、輸送ノ短縮、優先輸送、

荷役ノ内容點檢ヲ行フコトヲ得ルニ至リタルヲ以

テ今般無差ノ設備ハ之ヲ適局ニヨリ効果ヲ發揮ス

ベシ

第七期演習處置（十六年十二月）

一 B及C、鐵道ニ對スル援助計畫

八月以來繁忙ナリシ爲ニ及ビ、鐵道ハ損傷、消耗

甚シキニ陥リ人員及資材ヲ背國政府ニ要求シ來レ

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背國鐵道ハ統制部ノ要求ニヨリB(Ⅱ)等ニ既ニ  
 人員、資材ノ供出ナリ此ガ爲輸送方ハ相當程度適  
 追ス。然レドモB及Cノ人員、資材ノ不足ハM、  
 M、Cノ相互間ノ必要物資ノ輸送ニ影響スルノミ  
 ナラズM、Cノ自來ノ軍需及生活必需品ノ輸送ニ  
 影響スル慶大ナルヲ以テ統制部ノ今后ノ要求ト院  
 ミ合セ可及的援助ヲナスコトス。

二 關東時鐵道輸送對策  
 望戰時避難輸送ニ戰時下輸送力減退ニ備フル爲、  
 列車運度及列車密度ノ平均化ヲ行ヒテ餘行タイヤ  
 トシ列車編成ノ單一化ヲ實施ス  
 三 北九州空襲被害ニ對スル措置  
 被害箇所ノ復舊、避難輸送及罹災民搬送ニ万全ヲ  
 期セリ

第八期演習處已(十七年一月)  
 帝都及其附近總襲撃警ニ對スル措置  
 一 被害箇所ノ復舊ニ努ムルト共ニ避難ニ必要ナル部  
 市交通機關ノ總方ヲ調整セシム、  
 二 罹災民搬送、食糧輸送及水災輸送ニ付テハトラツ  
 シ、船舶ノ利用ヲ圖リ万全ヲ期ス

リ、

第九類 豫省 慶應 (十七年、四、五月)

- 一 人員資材ノ不足セル結果鐵道ノ運行不円滑トナリタルヲ以テ既定方針ニ従ヒ一規檢送ノ重要視正ヲ強化スルト共ニ從事員ヲ定應シ車輛運用効率ノ向上ニ努ム
- 二 地方鐵道軌道ノ統制ニ付テモ積廢ノ監督權ヲ發揚シ車輛ノ共通運用ヲ爲スコトニヨリ緩和シタル。
- 三 追加荷扱ニヨルベ燃料ノ配給不充分、勢力不足ノ爲鐵道及自功車ハ運行ノ制限ヲ受ケ此ガ爲ニ時刻大改正、運轉回環ノ減少等ヲ實施セルヲ以テ國民生活ニ影響ナル衝撃ヲ與ヘツ、テリ
- 四 此ガ政策トシテ
- 五 大巨ノ新國策表制、ラヂオ放送
- 六 生産品ノ優先輸送
- 七 從事員ニ對スル福利的訓練ヲナシ其ノ特征的訓練ニ燃エシメ「榮セテヤル」「送ツテヤル」ノ觀念ヲ灌輸シ交通報國ニ邁進セシム

以上

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機密

第 期演習處監督 其	統監部 武力隊 外交隊 恩禮隊 經濟隊 警備隊	提出先	報告又	通知先	提出 (預定) 昭和十年 月 日	時間 (實際)	提出者	農林大臣 精井 正
							(演習官) 職氏名	月 日 午前 時 分

昭和十六年第一回總力隊机上

演習經過記録

第三期三對スル處置 (昭和十六年八月)

第一 臨時食糧對策

一、米穀

(一) 消費矯正ノ強化

(イ) 酒造米等ノ五割減

(ロ) 短帳又ハ切符ノ全都市施行

(ハ) 一人當配給量二合三勺ヲ一合一勺ニ引下ゲ、

彈力性ヲ增加ス

(ニ) 農家保有米ヨリ百万石ヲ供出増セシム

(三) 配給換符及倉庫ノ整備

三、麥類

國家管理制度ヲ全面的ニ強化スルト共ニ食用以

外ノ用途ヲ制限ス

三三、食糧品ノ綜合切符制ノ準備ヲ開始ス



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- 四 政府ニ於テ新ニ乾麵及澱粉ノ買上ヲ開始ス
- 五 甘藷、馬鈴薯其ノ他ノ増産及非常時所用食糧品ノ増産ヲ開始ス
- 六 貯藏 各大都市及關門 各家庭一週山分 已給出月一分 百十九万石 政府ハ右地方ニ對シ三月分ヲ準備シ置ク
- 味塩、醤油、油、海産、煉乳、菓子食品、寶製品、冷藥品等ヲ各官廳又ハ機關ヲシテ右地方ノ一月分以上ヲ常時貯藏セシム
- 七 外米輸入確保ニ万全ヲ期ス
- 八 精神勸励ニ特ニ直結ラセク
- 第一 食糧生産計程擬定對策
- 一 主要食糧及代用食糧ノ生産ニ直結ラ置キ、作付ノ強弱又ハ期限、以テ其作ノ獎勵ヲナシ肥料ハ自給原料ニ直結ラセク
- 二 水害到來ノ虞急在セラ探ル
- 三 内水漁業、沿岸漁業及仁徳ノ食料化ニ直結ラセク
- 第三 勞務對策
- 一 勞力 厚生省卜賃給ノ上對策與テ實施シテ不怠進歩ス

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ノ輸出ヲ禁止シ其ノ他強度ノ計畫化ヲ已ルト共  
ニ從前トリ察リタル政策ヲ強化ス  
長松農及畜力モ共同利用ヲ強化スル等其ノ能率  
ノ發揮ヲ圖ル

第四期ニ對スル處置（昭和十六年九月）

第一 朝鮮米ノ移入減ニ經シM國ノ内地、外地M及

O、ヲ進シテ食糧政策ヲ一元化スルノ要アリ、之

ガ長條策樹立ノ爲適當ナル措置ヲトルベキコト

ヲ維持シ製販ヲ稱

又M及O、ニ對シ明年度ハ内地ヨリ米穀輸出ハ固

然トナル旨ヲ報告ス

第二 勞務對策トシテ長長ノ輸出ニ付許可額ヲ準備

ス

第三 大都市ノ食糧買糧ハ殊ニ穩健認メ、銀券中ノ

信託ハ販賣ヲ止ム

府縣内ノ食料品プロツクヲ拵ス

第五期ニ對スル處置（昭和十六年十月）

第一 米穀實收高五、五〇〇万石トナリ丙年度ニ於

テハF型ヨリ千五百万石ノ米穀輸入ヲハスコト

ヲ要ス

代片食糧ト其ノ他ノ食糧トヲ別々ニ綜合切符  
 付ラシキ、必要ニ應ジ米穀トノ三者ヲ綜合セ  
 ントス

二 外地米ヲ輸入ス

三 陸年度ハ食糧以外ノ用途ヲ強力制限ス

尙 F T ノ増産、供給確保及施設改善ニ付シ外務大

臣ニ交渉方依頼ス

第二 M 及北 C ヨリ小麥ノ確保アルモ然レリ不可成

ナル旨回答ヲ爲スト共ニ將來ノ対策ヲ三考置テ

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右圖說決定ヲ直ニ實施ス

第二 勞力ニ付テハ特ニ將來共同耕作信ヲ考慮ス

又農繁期ニ於ケル兵士ノ備長施設ニ關シ巨軍大臣ニ依頼ス

新地ニ付テハ高原地開發獎勵ヲ爲ス

第三 食糧不足ノ不穩情勢ハ取締ヲ依頼スルモ、万

一ニ備へ若干ノ雜穀ヲ準備ス

第四 捕鯨船隊ノ出發ハ之ヲ中止セシムルモ捕鯨等

ノ發艦ヲ禁ラズ

第六期ニ對スル處置（昭和十六年十一月）

第一 外米輸入ニ支障ヲ生ジツツアリ左ノ措置ヲ採  
ル

一 綜合切符信ノ實施

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- 第七期三號スル迄止（昭和十六年十二月）
- 第一 對A B 地配給シ、P 地ヨリ輸入不自給、P 地  
 國內ノ榮付成績不長、長知も誠懇等ヲ待ミシ既  
 往年以前ノ榮付額前ヲ維持シ此ノ際一日一人當  
 民給食ヲ買ニ二匁強シテ一匁九匁ニハス要アル  
 ラ以テ、第五大ナルニ自給止ニハカリ之ガ決  
 定ヲ見タリ
- 第二 本荷區敷取トシテ自給等ヲ協力策具シテ自給  
 事業（現食ヲ以テシム）ヲ實施シ資金積ラ集  
 出ス（十二月上旬）
- 第八期三號スル迄止（昭和十七年一月）
- 第一 榮米ノ輸入三匁強ヲ維持シ自給額實行見ニシ  
 已第大區ニ對シテ榮ノ供給ヲ給
- 第二 本荷三匁強シテハ現食供給組合及管理組合ノ給  
 費ヲ指シナラシム
- 第三 肥料對策トシテハ長良尾肥料倉ヲ配却シ自給  
 肥料倉ニ移商セシメトス
- 第四 臨時議會開會ヲ見  
 本馬地及返遊小作地ヲ共同耕作セシムル等一共  
 向小作法「ヲ推廣策ノ見解ヲ見タリ
- 第五 自給自足スベキ旨申出テタリ

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- 第三 銀行業務  
 出業自體ノ統一ハ總務員法ニ依ルコトヲシ滋養  
 ハ提出セズ  
 第四 銀行業務  
 儲蓄生利ニ際シテハ銀行及水災ノ損失ニ万金ヲ  
 以シタリ
- (昭和十七年三月)
- 外米輸入ニシテ若干狀況ノ緩和ヲ冀ムルヲ以テ  
 四月以降月三十万石増ノ應給力得ル方價ニ付振  
 シ英ノ意圖ヲ無タリ
- 第九知ニ關スル旨  
 (昭和十七年四月、五月)
- 第一 食糧ニ付テハ一人當り給糧一食九与ハ之ヲ以  
 濟シ給養及代用食糧ノ分配ニ努ム
- 第二 食糧供給許難ハ次第ヲ施行スル方策ナリ得シ  
 第三 食糧上ニ少ヌベシ
- 第三 食糧ハ共同新法ノ實施ニ依ルト共ニ自給計  
 畫ヲ行ス
- (昭和十七年七月)
- 第一 米價ハ平年程ヲ維持セラレタルヲ以テ之ニ基  
 キ昭和十八年度ノ新法ヲ施行シ給糧日百三十万

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第三 裁官裁員

裁員は、裁員法ニ依ルコトシ裁員

ハ提出セズ

第四 監査委員

幣部監製ニ係ルテハ、監査委員ノ對策ニ万全ヲ

ルシタリ

(昭和十七年三月)

外米輸入ニシテ若干狀況ノ緩和ヲ思ハルヲ以テ

四月以降月三十万石増ノ他、送方自給方面ニ留意

シ、其ノ裁制ヲ編タリ

第九局ニ關スル長官

(昭和十七年四月、五月)

第一 食糧ニ付テハ一人毎に給糧一石九斗ハ之ヲ以

テ、食料及代用品食糧ノ供給ニ對シ

第二 食糧委員許諾ハ、食糧ノ輸送ナル方特ナリ、且シ

第三 食糧上ニ少スベシ

第三 食糧ハ、共同新糧ノ供給ニ依ルト共ニ、食糧

費ヲ減ス

(昭和十七年七月)

第一 米價ハ、平年行キ、米價セラレタルヲ以テ之ニ對

シ、昭和十八年行キ、米價ヲ抑制シ、幣部ニ百五十万

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第 三 卷ノ 序 入ヲ 爲 スコトヲ 爲 ストノ 次ニ 三 列 題 ス  
第 二 卷 長ニ 付テハ 瓦 刻 鳥 本 族ノ 撰 論ニ 付テモ 万 登  
ノ 符 號ヲ 記 ス



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要 籍

第	明海軍艦隊 其ノ	時間(予定)	昭和十一年 月 日
發	先統監部、武力及外交長 恩恩長、海軍省艦隊部	時間(實際)	八月二十三日午後 時分
報告文ノ 通知先	(對艦長) 森 野 夫	出席者	海軍大臣

昭和十六年第一回海軍艦隊上員會議記

第一期及第二期會議

第三期 Mトム B D Eトノ關係ハ愈々シク是ラサル元  
 自國艦隊ヲ平論ナラサルモノアリ兵隊及艦隊ノ  
 動員ニ行ハレ又Dノ提議諸國モ宿願ナルモノアル  
 シ以テ左ノ方針ヲ取レリ

- (一) 艦隊及兵隊ノ減少ニ對スル補償策ヲ案
- (1) 艦隊増加ニ付テハ兵隊、空軍、海軍ノ方面ヨ  
 リ新造船ノ増強ニ努ムルト共ニ在野隊 X F T  
 等ノ艦隊要入ニ努ムルモノトス
- (2) 艦隊増強ニ付テハ引込有償格差ノ利益、艦隊  
 運用ノ變化及増強、艦隊是員ノ減少等ヲ山ル  
 モノトス

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第 四 期 第 一 次 公 司 年 終 報 告 書

ノ 貸 付 金 額 及 債 權 額 等 一 切 詳 細 記 載 中 之 如 下

(2) 貸 付 金 額 及 債 權 額 一 切 詳 細 記 載 中 之 如 下

日 本 公 司 有 限 公 司 之 貸 付 金 額 及 債 權 額 一 切 詳 細 記 載 中 之 如 下

(1) 貸 付 金 額 及 債 權 額 一 切 詳 細 記 載 中 之 如 下

特 殊 貸 付 金 額 及 債 權 額 一 切 詳 細 記 載 中 之 如 下

(附) 貸 付 金 額 及 債 權 額 一 切 詳 細 記 載 中 之 如 下

リ 特 殊 貸 付 金 額 及 債 權 額 一 切 詳 細 記 載 中 之 如 下

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- (3) A B等ノ委託懸望ニ由リテ豫メ緊急降降物資  
 類上出入ノ爲此等ノ地方へ前降降物資ヲ行フ  
 帶懸望者對資
- (二)
- (1) 燃料費ハ前降降物資  
 (2) 内陸運輸ノ燃料費ハ可成りニ赤國統籌ニ用  
 比テ加テ來朝ニテ積送バシム  
 (3) 軍用燃料ニ成ルベク内陸運輸ノ燃料費ヲ當  
 ツルコトヲ希望セリ
- (三)
- (1) 運輸ノ技術者ト徒懸望不足對資  
 (2) 地方及運輸ニ對シテハ強固前降降物資ヲ對資サレ  
 ドモ現報ハ省令ニ依リテ開闢ス
- (2) 徒懸望ノ不足ニ對シテハ主トシテ有經驗ノ運  
 係ヲ出ル爲メ新設運輸局ニ屬シテ共ニ運輸  
 員登錄ニ對シテ運輸セシムルコト、セリ
- (四)
- 運輸局方資
- 特ニ各地及M Oトノ懸望ナル運輸ニ對資シ  
 (1) 前降降物資ハ赤國統籌令(九月二十  
 日各省)ヲ制定シテ派駐似江ヲ行ヒ聯合ニ依  
 リテハ之ガ機材ヲ行フコト、シ  
 (2) 運輸局ニ付テハ派駐ノ運輸ヲ増進シテ懸望  
 ノ解決ヲ期スルコト、セリ
- 第四期 X A 運輸局、M O 運輸局、運輸局

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カントスル包アリ諸は役用モ引算キ行ハレ、効  
 効は進ノ結果民兵流シモ艦隊ノ對艦ニ對艦セリ、  
 本邦ニ據リタル諸艦充ノ如ク

(一) 民間汽船等

(1) 寇船汽船等ハ大膽トノ進出ニ當ルモノ及南方航  
 線諸ノ外之ヲ停止ス

(2) 客員汽船ハ輕便汽船等ニシテドモ尙万難ヲ辨

シテ汽船等ヲ通行アリ行フモノトス

(二) 汽船  
 新艦ニ對スル諸艦

軍艦及汽船長艦等方ヨリノ申込豫到シタレドモ

モ復本國海軍ハ後日ニ謀リ進出リ艦隊等モ高

キ申進ノ豫設ヲ行フ

(三) 鄂軍軍令ノ相行ニ關スル諸艦

鄂軍、寇兵ト密接ナル連絡ヲ保持シ、主要島ニ

關シ其兵ヲ艦隊シテ編制ニ當ラシムルコト、シ、

艦隊ニ利用セシムル等干ノ要領等ノ禁止の虞

ヲ行ヘリ

(四) 海軍艦隊自來化學兵器ニ要領等ノ要領等艦隊ノ如

化學兵器

海軍艦隊自來化學兵器ニ要領等ノ要領等艦隊ノ如

海軍艦隊自來化學兵器ニ要領等ノ要領等艦隊ノ如

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海軍艦隊自來化學兵器ニ要領等ノ要領等艦隊ノ如

(一) (由該庚定)

(五) 海外重要物資ノ確保ト船舶留倉停止トノ臨

海軍及外務省局ト連絡シテ該項ノ急務ニ依ラ

ト共ニ若干ノ秘密ヲ施シテ船舶ヲ航行ス

第五期 X A 交際船三入リ、A 等ハ M 船ヲ柳

シ、B 等 M トノ交渉ヲ進メザル船隊等ハ

告グ、M 艦隊モ B 等交際船ヲ要求セルガ十月

十五日ノ商議ハ對 B 等實力進出ヲ決セリ、通信ノ利

用ハ稍減少ヲ示セルモ A 艦隊口秘密情報ノ密閉

烈ナリ、船舶ハ A B 等上方道ニ配備不整トナルト

共ニ多數ノ費用ヲ受ケタリ、本邦ノ準備充ノ如ク

(一) 通信ノ設備ニ對シテ自ラ進出スルキ事項

(1) 重要國境ノ安全ナルニ望ム、秘密等ハ及重要局

ノ遺影等

(2) 復舊ノ爲メ人員費等ノ比及代位局ノ選定

(3) 重要國境ノ安全及無線通信設備ニ對スル準備

(4) 重要國境ニ於ケル電話及電送ノ中止

(二) 對 A 通信設備方針ノ見

(1) 重要國境ノ安全

(2) 重要國境ノ安全

- (4) 警察トノ巡檢ニ依リ二人別取捕ノ預化（リス  
ト）、戰爭物持セバ外人及外國郵便ヲ預ニ制  
限スルコト
- (5) M、Q、帶ニ上海ヨリノ對A通信ノ取密強化
- (三) (1) 港洋船組配船ノ再檢討ト引切船積ノ利用方法  
在A、B、D、E船組ハ可及的ニ中立水域ニ出テ可  
沈セシメ今後ノ配船ハ中止ス
- (2) 引揚貨物船ハF、G、甲北C、九州、北海道  
方面ニ使用ス
- (四) N及O在港A、B船組ニ對スル報復ハ之ヲ行ハズ  
(E連出換送)
- 第六期 情勢ハ更ニ急進ヲ旨テ對B行動モ對ノ願  
ヲ繰上ゲテ十一月十五日迄ニ妥カヲ行彼スルニ至  
リ、A、B亦對M經濟協定ヲ行フニ至レリ、然加ハ  
實ニ從前ノ增加ニ依リテ選出上六ナル支隊ヲ添ッ  
通信モ對B選出ノ爲人兵兵亦ニ不足ラ空ジタリ、  
此ノ狀況ニ於テ取りタル措置充ノ如シ
- (一) B等選出ニ伴フ内地通信兼切維持方策
- (1) 電報ノ取扱制度、郵便兼配送回數ノ減少
- (2) 從前兵兵派訓練ト有欲者ノ通信ヘノ其中
- (3) 緊要度少キ通信局ノ閉鎖
- (二) 軍費用格ノ固定化因運策

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第七期 對 司 進 出 入 項 目 二 進 步 ス ル モ A ノ 對 M 追  
 欲 化 シ 遂 ニ M 劇 劇 義 ハ 對 A 以 テ 決 定 シ 十 二 月 二 十  
 日 A 管 三 總 長 上 院 ス 、 海 上 輸 送 力 不 足 ハ 各 方 面 二  
 影 響 ス 、 殊 ニ 南 方 作 戰 ノ 爲 南 方 航 路 ハ 大 體 分 中 總  
 シ タ ル ノ ミ ナ ラ ス 現 況 セ ラ ル ル モ ノ 相 當 欲 ニ 上 ル

(E) 十一月二十日臨時議會開會セラル、ニ付議ニ於  
 定シタル船舶國家管理要綱ヲ具體化シ、管理法  
 及之ヲ選用ニ必要ナル特別會計法案ヲ提出可決  
 ラ得タリ、(尙同特別會計法案中ニ船員危險手  
 管及船舶保具ニ必要ナル施設ヲ計上セリ)

(二) 資材努力資金ノ確保ニ努ムルト共ニ船隻ヲ第二  
 義トシ建造日數ノ短縮ヲ主眼トスル簡易ナル綜  
 算型ノ船型ヲ決定シテ可成的大量ノ建造ニ努ム  
 ルモノトス

(三) 南方作戦ニ依ル總率低下、軍機用船増加ノ爲  
 資材送可能費八月四八〇万屯ニ於テ相當ノ油氣  
 ヲ生ズルニ至レリ、勿テ國海軍ト協同ノ結果軍  
 機用船ノ復流ヲ利用シ年同約五〇〇万屯ノ輸送  
 ヲ行フコト、セリ  
 尙真油ノ配給ヲ増加シテ以船ノ利用ヲ四〇年  
 間約七〇〇万屯ノ量送ヲ行フモノトス



又 A B T ノ關係上對外通信尋常計ノヲ生ズ、其  
 他電力不足、台灣九州方面ノ空襲等對策ヲ要ス  
 ツモノ多シ

(一) 電力需給對策

石炭輸送ノ円滑化、他ヨリノ應急設備ヲ圖ル外、  
 電力調整令ニヨリテ軍用又ハ時局上緊要特殊  
 用ヲ除クノ外原則トシテ一五%ノ制限ヲ行フ  
 (二) 通信設備ニ依リ停止トナル設備ノ利用方法及通  
 信強化ノ相手方國際關係上停止トナルベキ A B  
 向等ノ通信機ヲ利用シテ情報宣傳ノ爲メ、  
 T、M、S、P、Z、J、L 等トノ通信ヲ強化ス

(三) 對 M 攻撃ノ具體化

強波ニ付テハ東京、パライオヲ中心トシテ對南方  
 攻撃ヲ強化シ、中波ニ付テハ小笠原嶽及所屬人  
 員ヲ派遣シテ宣傳ニ協力ス

(四) 危險區域航行船及空母員ニ對スル保護方策

(1) 南支那海ニ於テハコジボイ空母  
 (2) 船舶戰時保險制度ノ確立  
 (3) 船員ニ對シテハ救命具等ノ設備ヲ完全ニスル  
 ト共ニ危險手管ヲ支給ス

(五) 十二月下旬ニ於ケル北九州及空襲被害ニ對シテ  
 ハ既定方針ニ依リ重要施設ヨリ急速復舊ニ努メ  
 タリ

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- 又 A B T ノ關係上對外通信尋偵計ノ事ヲ生ズ、其  
 他電力不足、台灣九州方面ノ望遠等對策ヲ要ス  
 ルモノ多シ
- (一) 電力需給對策  
 石炭輸送ノ圓滑化、他ヨリノ應急設備ヲ圖ル外、  
 電力調整令ニヨリテ軍用又ハ時局上投資要緊案  
 用ヲ除クノ外原則トシテ一五%ノ制限ヲ行フ
- (二) 通信設備ニ依リ停止トナル設備ノ利用方法及通  
 信強化ノ相手方國際關係上停止トナルベキ A B  
 向等ノ通信機ヲ利用シテ情報宣傳ノ爲メ、  
 T、M、S、P、Z、J、L 等トノ通信ヲ強化ス
- (三) 對 B 放送ノ具體化  
 強波ニ付テハ東京、パラオヲ中心トシテ對南方  
 放送ヲ強化シ、中波ニ付テハ小笠原嶽及所屬人  
 員ヲ派遣シテ宣傳ニ協力ス
- (四) 危險區域航行船及采掘員ニ對スル保護方策  
 (1) 南支那海ニ於テハコンボイ設備  
 (2) 船舶戰時保險制度ノ確立  
 (3) 船員ニ對シテハ救命具等ノ設備ヲ完全ニスル  
 ト共ニ危險手管ヲ支給ス
- (五) 十二月下旬ニ於ケル北九州ノ望遠線管ニ對シテ  
 ハ既定方針ニ依リ重要施設ヨリ急速復舊ニ努メ  
 タリ





行ヲ限ル郵政ノ郵政正當ニ於テハ  
 (1) 郵政ノ郵政正當ニ於テハ  
 (2) 郵政ノ郵政正當ニ於テハ  
 (3) 郵政ノ郵政正當ニ於テハ

行ヲ限ル郵政ノ郵政正當ニ於テハ  
 (1) 郵政ノ郵政正當ニ於テハ  
 (2) 郵政ノ郵政正當ニ於テハ  
 (3) 郵政ノ郵政正當ニ於テハ

行ヲ限ル郵政ノ郵政正當ニ於テハ  
 (1) 郵政ノ郵政正當ニ於テハ  
 (2) 郵政ノ郵政正當ニ於テハ  
 (3) 郵政ノ郵政正當ニ於テハ

行ヲ限ル郵政ノ郵政正當ニ於テハ  
 (1) 郵政ノ郵政正當ニ於テハ  
 (2) 郵政ノ郵政正當ニ於テハ  
 (3) 郵政ノ郵政正當ニ於テハ

行ヲ限ル郵政ノ郵政正當ニ於テハ  
 (1) 郵政ノ郵政正當ニ於テハ  
 (2) 郵政ノ郵政正當ニ於テハ  
 (3) 郵政ノ郵政正當ニ於テハ



未開國者用面ノ技術大

- (3) 電報有技術者養成ノ強化学習ノ實用度ニ等シク
- (2) 電報ノ強國強民及小包郵便物送ニ等シク
- (1) 通國ノ打撃及小包郵便物送ニ等シク

以テ左ノ諸國ヲ取ルニ

ウエ一「受信機ニヨリ各國ノ電報大ニ取テ多キ  
 足ヲ來シ、又通信ノ機ニヨリ各國ノ電報大ニ取テ多キ  
 セラレタリ、加ス、水陸交通ノ便ニヨリ各國ノ電報大ニ取テ多キ  
 船隻ノ増加セリ、又水陸交通ノ便ニヨリ各國ノ電報大ニ取テ多キ  
 R 諸島ノ地ヲ開キ、南洋方面ノ作戦ヲ完了スルモ、  
 力ヲ盡シ、南洋方面ノ作戦ヲ完了スルモ、  
 第九期 R 南洋方面ノ作戦ヲ完了スルモ、

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コトトセリ

(2) 電信法中改正法律案 現時必真アルトキハ電  
話加入者ヲシテ極端退セシムルコトヲ得ル

コトトセリ

(四) 船舶輸送方

十二月中旬以來ノ船舶不足、南方交通社絶ニヨ  
リ甚シキ困難ニ遭遇セルガ、今期ノ設備増強ニ  
ヨリテ月四〇〇乃至四五〇万石ニ輸送力恢復シ  
タリ、但シPTヨリノ輸送ハ未ダ半分ニ過ギズ

第九期 R P Q 方面ノ作戦未完了シ、次テNA主  
力艦隊ノ衝突アリ、南方流氷モ開通シツツアルモ、  
Rヲ基地トセルA海軍艦隊ノ活動ニ依リ喪失  
船舶漸次増加ス、一方海軍徴用船舶ノ一部ハ解除  
セラレタリ、海軍艦隊ノ活動ト共ニ船員希望者ノ不  
足ヲ來シ、又通信運送ニ不円滑増大シ、一オール  
ウェーブル受信機ニヨル各艦艇波長差聴取者多キ  
ヲ以テ左ノ措置ヲ取レリ

(一) 通信不円滑打開策

- (1) 第三種、第四種及小包郵便物並ニ電信ノ制限
- (2) 電話ノ強制撤去ト電話使用度数ノ制限
- (3) 電信有技者養成ノ強化ト取扱簡易化等ニヨル  
未従業者使用面ノ擴大



セラレタリ、海水艦ノ活動ト共ニ船員希望者ノ不足ヲ來シ、又通信道況ニ不圓滑増大シ、「オールウエーブ」受信機ニヨル各國江波放送聴取者多キヲ以テ左ノ措置ヲ取レリ

(一) 通信不圓滑打開策

- (1) 第三種、第四種及小包郵便物並ニ電信ノ制限
  - (2) 電話ノ強制撤去ト電話使用度數ノ制限
  - (3) 電信有技者養成ノ強化ト専務簡易化等ニヨル
- 未開闢者使用面ノ擴大

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コトトセリ

(2) 電信法中改正法律案 現時必具アルトキハ電

話加入者ヲシテ強制退セシムルコトヲ得ル

コトトセリ

## (四) 船舶輸送力

十二月中旬以來ノ船舶不足、南方交通社絶ニヨ  
リ甚シキ困難ニ遭遇セルガ、今期ノ徵備解除ニ  
ヨリテ月四〇〇乃至四五〇万吨ニ輸送力恢復シ  
タリ、但シF Tヨリノ輸送ハ未ダ半分ニ過ギズ

第九期 E P Q 方面ノ作戦概テ完了シ、次テN A 主

力港隊ノ衝突アリ、南方航路モ閉通シツツアルモ、

Rヲ善地トセルA 海水艦艇ノ活動ニ依リ喪失

船舶漸次増加ス、一方海軍復用船舶ノ一部ハ解除

第九期 E P Q 方面ノ作戦甚不完了シ、次デ N A 主力艦隊ノ衝突アリ、南方航路モ開通シツツアルモ、R ヲ基地トセル A 艦水陸航空機ノ活動ニ依リ喪失船舶漸次増加ス、一方海軍復用船舶ノ一部ハ解除セラレタリ、潜水艦ノ活動ト共ニ船員希望者ノ不足ヲ來シ、又通信道況ニ不円滑増大シ、「オールウエーブ」受信機ニヨル各國江波放送聴取者多キヲ以テ左ノ措置ヲ取レリ

(一) 通信不円滑打開策

- (1) 第三種、第四種及小包郵便物並ニ電信ノ制限
- (2) 電話ノ強制撤去ト電話使用度数ノ制限
- (3) 電信有技者養成ノ強化ト専務簡易化等ニヨル未従業者使用面ノ擴大

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コトトセリ

(2) 電信法中改正法律案 擬時必取アルトキハ電

話加入者ヲシテ強制脱退セシムルコトヲ得ル  
コトトセリ

(四) 船舶輸送力

十二月中旬以來ノ船舶不足、南方交通社絶ニヨ  
リ甚シキ困難ニ遭遇セルガ、今期ノ徵備解除ニ  
ヨリテ月四〇〇乃至四五〇万屯ニ輸送力恢復シ  
タリ、但シFTヨリノ輸送ハ未ダ半分ニ過ギズ

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- (二) 内外人ノ外國運送手取ニ對スル管理
  - (1) 「オートルウエーゾ」受信機不法所持ノ懸賞並  
督
  - (2) 外國運送手取者ノ「テマ」船内ハ内務省外務  
省ノ取締ニ依ル
- (三) 軍部及出動費總計並
  - 軍部ト運送シテ役用船ヲ以テ物資ヲ内地ヘ送ル  
ト共ニ往航ニ於テハ役用船以外モ努メテ軍需品  
送ニ加方スルコトトス
- (四) 船員志願者減少、下船増加對案
  - (1) 海國船員ノ慰励
  - (2) 役用
  - (3) 下船希望者ニ對シテハ官廳者ヲシテ極力誠意  
セシム
  - (4) 危険手當ノ増額ハ行ハズ

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横 密

青島鎮守使局長 (司法省所管)

司法大臣 三浦 純太郎

一、

演習第四期 (昭和十六年九月)

N A 交涉演習三回シ増和十六年九月二

十五日東京別荘地方裁判所檢察正ヨリ懇談

會出席若葉ニ對シ公訴ヲ提起シタル旨ノ報

告ヲ受ク

(昭和十六年昭和八年九月九號司法大臣訓令

参照)

二、

演習第六期 (同年十一月)

經濟總務違反ノ積出ニ對シ司法當局ノ處置

トシテ考ヘ得ルモノハ人員ノ補充困難ナル

現状ニ於テハ(一)實地法ノ改正(二)手續法ノ改

正(三)現行法ノ運用ノ合理化ヲ圖ルヨリ外ナ

キモノトシ左ノ長直ヲ採レリ

(一)實地法ノ改正トシテ八屆時議會ニ「司法長

生活保持ニ關スル法律案ヲ提出シ得

タリ。此ノ法律ハ實地法ニ生活必需品

ノ確保ト其ノ配給ノ公平ヲ期スル爲メ、自然

犯罪犯罪者長官ヲ裁ク大綱ヲ擲ヘテ取

ノ徹底ト取ルノ迅速同義ニシテハルモノナリ

三、演習第七期（同年十二月）

- (二) 手續法ノ改正トシテハ「候時緊急狀態下ニ於ケル特別刑罰手續ニ關スル法律案」ヲ同議會ニ提出シ島賀ヲ得タリ。此ノ法律ハ大體口防保安法ノ手續規定ニ準據シ、二審簡便トシ被告ニ起訴前ノ知照權ヲ認ムルモノナリ
- (三) 補選用ニ符テハ各控訴院檢察長ノ權限ニヨル檢察ノ事務繁忙ナル地方ノ事務取扱ノ命令、被尋ヘノ知照ノ旨旨懇懇、司法官試補中選半試ヲ被尋ニ任百セシムルコト等ノ處置ヲ執ル
- 三、演習第七期（同年十二月）
  - 追補議會ニ提出シ島賀ヲ得タルモノ左ノ如シ、
  - (一) 「候時特別犯罪庭前ニ關スル法律案」
  - 此ノ法律ハ候時又ハ候選ニ關シ(E) 避難ノ爲立退キタル在居ニ於ケル竊盜、(B) 陸海軍ノ防衛ノ實施又ハ烟火管制等ノ場合ニ行ハル、刑法所定ノ各篇犯罪、暴刀行爲、常習竊盜(5) 防壁ノ必長上認偏セラレタル地盤其ノ他ノ物件ノ損壞等ニ符特ニ意加ラ以テシトスルモノナリ
  - (二) 「候時緊急狀態下ニ於ケル特別刑罰手續ニ

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關スル法律

「裁判緊急状態」ニ於テ行フ民事裁判手續ハ  
原則トシテ此ノ法律ニ依ラシムルモノニシ  
テ、非訟事件手續法ニ準ジテ裁判ノ簡易化  
ヲ圖ルト共ニ、裁判所ニ金錢債權留保法第  
七條ノ如キ強制執行ニヨル裁量裁判ノ權限  
ヲ與フルモノナリ、而シテ人員減少ノ対策  
トシテ區域裁判所ノ管轄權ヲ擴張シ、上訴ヲ  
制限シ望見交通制限等ニ對スル政策トシテ  
司法大臣ノ命令ニヨリ裁判所ニ執務場所  
ヲ設置シ得ベク、尙書類ノ送達等ニ付特別  
簡易ナル方法ニヨルヲ得ルモノトセリ

(三) 「裁判緊急状態」ニ於ケル特別刑事手續ニ

關スル法律中改正ノ點

人員減少対策、望見、交通制限等ノ対策ト  
シテ民事手續ト同様ノ點ニ付改正ヲ爲シタ  
ルモノナリ

四、演習第八期（昭和十七年一月乃至三月）

昭和十七年一月ノ東京望見ノ結果東京區裁判  
所下谷出張所焼失シ登記簿ノ一部亦滅失シタ  
ルヲ以テ

- (一) 司法省令ニヨリ出張所ノ事務ハ本廳ニ於テ  
之ヲ取扱フコトトシ（裁判所帶庭法第十七條

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目スル法律

於テ行フ民事裁判手續ハ

原則トシテ此ノ法律ニ依ラシムルモノニシ

テ、訴訟事件手續法ニ準ジテ裁判ノ簡易化

ヲ圖ルト共ニ、裁判所ニ金錢債權留保法

七條ノ如キ強制執行ニヨル裁量裁判ノ權限

ヲ具フルモノナリ、而シテ人員減少ノ裁量

トシテ區裁判所ノ管轄權ヲ擴張シ、上訴ヲ

制限シ望ミ交遊關係ニ對スル裁量トシテ

司法大臣ノ命令ニヨリ隨時隨所ニ執行場

ヲ設置シ得ベク、尙舊類ノ送達等ニ符特別

簡易ナル方法ニヨルヲ符ルモノトセリ

(三)

一時緊要狀態下ニ於ケル特別裁判手續ニ

目スル法律中改正ノ旨

人員減少裁量、望ミ、交遊關係等ノ對策ト

シテ民事手續ト關係ノ點ニ符改正ヲ爲シタ

ルモノナリ

四、

濱省第八別(昭和十七年一月乃至三月)

昭和十七年一月ノ東京望ミノ結果東京區裁判

所下谷出張所區區長シ送達等ノ一部亦減少タ

ルヲ以テ

(一)

司法省令ニヨリ出張所ノ區長ハ本廳ニ於テ

之ヲ裁量フコトトシ(裁判官職務法第十七條

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- ノニ抄照)
- (三) 同法省告示ニヨリ 同出願所ノ取扱フベキ登記
- (三) 等ヲ一時停止シ (不功達登記法第十條抄照)
- (三) 同ジク告示ニヨリ 一定期間ヲ設ケテ國領登記
- ノ申請ヲ許シタリ (不功達登記法第二十三條
- 抄照)

以上

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(一) 官報 報口 報ノ 括弧 以 化  
 其乃 不足 謂 策 ト シテ 今 同 級 級 也 ラ レ タ ル 學 校  
 報 口 報 ノ 括 弧 以 化 シ 食 糧 知 道 及 生 產 額 充 三  
 實 セ シ ム  
 (二) 補 給 別 員 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 ト シテ ノ 患 患 指 導 制 ノ 確 立  
 患 患 出 別 報 口 報 ノ 括 弧 以 化 確 立 ノ 爲 目 民 患 患 ノ 積 聚  
 因 患 患 ノ 患 患 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化  
 (三) 救 育 者 ノ 士 氣 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化  
 (4) 空 山 ノ 救 育 報 口 報 ノ 大 同 山 報 括 弧 以 化 行 ヒ 患 患 ト

第四期 (昭和十六年九月下旬)

大 臣 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 ト シテ 官 口 報 括 弧 以 化 行 フ 特  
 二 學 校 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 自 報 等 ノ 空 山 報 括 弧 以 化 利 用 シ テ 口 報  
 報 口 報 ノ 患 患 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化  
 弊 害 ヲ 獎 勵 シ 旅 行 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 ノ 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化  
 新 生 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 ヲ 起 シ、 學 生 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 ノ 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 行 フ  
 大 臣 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 ノ 報 告 三 條 ル

第三期 (昭和十六年八月下旬)

第一回 總 執 行 三 於 テ 文 部 省 ノ 採 リ タ ル 措 置

第 三 期 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 其、	總 務 部 文 部 省 外 務 省 農 林 省 海 軍 省 陸 軍 省	報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化	報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化	報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化	報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化
報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 其、	報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化	報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化	報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化	報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化	報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化 報 口 報 括 弧 以 化

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第四期（昭和十六年九月中下旬）

(一) 宇賀報口球ノ振動は化  
 勢乃不足ヲ策トシテ今同級展セラレタル學校  
 報口球ノ振動ヲ強化シ食糧増進及生産増進ニ  
 資セシム

(二) 補給員は化振進トシテノ思想指導ノ確立  
 是等山陽密閉ノ強化確立ノ爲ニ民愚惑ノ精進  
 因習者ノ土氣和動ヲ策ス

(三) 彼等者ノ土氣和動ヲ策ス

(四) 空山ノ振動は山陽ノ大同山給ヲ行ヒ總裁ト

第一回編撰ニ於テ文部行ノ採リタル措置

第三期（昭和十六年八月中下旬）

大政翼賛會トシテ山陽山陽山陽山陽ヲ行フ特  
 ニ宇賀報口球ノ振動ヲ利局シテ山陽山陽  
 補給ノ振動ヲ強固シ振動ヲ振動ヲ振動ヲ振動  
 野蠻ヲ振動ヲ振動ヲ振動ヲ振動ヲ振動ヲ振動  
 新生活運動ヲ起シ、學生生徒ノ勤勞奉仕ヲ行フ  
 大政翼賛會ノ報告ニ依ル）

第 期	某、	時出 (總定) 昭和十年 月 日
通知先	警告又ハ 青 山 府	時出 (局定) 八月 日 午後 時 分
提出先	文 部 省	時出 (局定) 八月 日 午後 時 分
提出先	文 部 省	時出 (局定) 八月 日 午後 時 分

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第五

(一)

國民精神界ノ為執ルベキ方針

從來深リ察レル國福ノ方針ヲ變化スル外特ニ  
支障ナキ限リ晉山内外ノ現狀及進路ヲ國民ニ  
周知セシメ國民ノ自行自勵ヲ促ス

(二)

國民士氣掃蕩方針

實ニ情況ニ依リ時局ノ緊迫ヲ皆グルニ至レル  
第一はト國民ノ士氣ヲ振興スルノ急務ナルヲ  
以テ真ノ根本方針ヲ策定シテ直ニ宣揚ス

(4)

精神刷新ノ具體的目標ヲ一億一心總力發揮

ニ在リコト

(四)

大陸以下諸島ヲ卒先盡境ト先取ノ道義性

(4)

ヲ先取トスルコト

(4)

日本領土ノ確立ト國民生活ノ日本の存続

(4)

物心兩面ニ重ク須實則極ナル程度國民生活

(三)

ノ確立

如彼各派ノ内証並ニ國民ノ内面生活ノ振興

シム

(ロ)

國家ノ患難國防ノ第一線は士タルノ自知ヲ  
以テ教育者ノ國家的義務ヲ盡竭ラ展開セ

掃蕩ニ在リ

シテ御許ヲ得テ黨派ヲ超越シ教育者ノ士氣

第五

(一)

國民精神作興ノ為執ルベキ方針

從來深リ察レル所ニ方策ヲ變化スル外符ニ

支原ナキ長リ臂口内外ノ現狀及進路ヲ國民ニ

周知セシメ口民ノ自行自勵ヲ促ス

(二)

口民士氣昂揚方策

實ニ情加ニ依リ時局ノ緊迫ヲ皆グルニ至レル

第一口民ノ士氣ヲ和暢スルノ急務ナルヲ

以テ莫ノ濼本方策ヲ策定シテ直ニ實施ス

(三)

精神勸興ノ具體的目標ヲ一徳一心總刀發揚

ニ在クコト

(四)

大正以下諸君ノ卒先善規ト充實ノ道義徳

ヲ先決トスルコト

(五)

日本教育ノ確立ト口民生活ノ日本の形體

物心両口ニ重ル實効ナル以テ口民生活

(三)

教育各派ノ内証並ニ口民ノ内口生活ノ指導

(ロ)

歸幼ニ努ム

國家ノ恩惠口所ノ第一線以テ士タルノ自知ヲ

以テ教育者ノ自家國教育者ヲ養成シテ

シム

昭和十六年十月中下旬

第五

(一)

國民精神作興ノ為執ルベキ方針

從來深リ察レル所福ノ方針ヲ變化スル外特ニ  
支障ヲキ展リ晉ニ内外ノ現狀及進路ヲ國民ニ  
周知セシメ國民ノ自行自勵ヲ促ス

(二)

國民士氣昂揚方針

實ニ節加ニ依リ時局ノ緊迫ヲ皆グルニ至レル  
第一以下國民ノ士氣ヲ振興スルノ急務ナルヲ  
以テ莫ノ濼本方針ヲ策定シテ直ニ實施ス

(三)

精神振興ノ具體的日課ヲ一德一心總力發揚

ニ以テ  
六部以下諸官署ノ卒先發見ト先取ノ進取性  
ヲ先發トスルコト

(四)

日本教育ノ獨立ト國民生活ノ日本の振興

(五)

物心両面ニ在ル實業制ナル以テ國民生活

(三)

物心両面ニ在ル實業制ナル以テ國民生活

集

物心両面ニ在ル實業制ナル以テ國民生活

(四)

國民ノ思想口防ノ第一線以テ士氣ノ自勵ヲ

以テ教育者ノ自發的進取ヲ展開セ

シム

第一線

シテ御許ヲ得テ農林ヲ導導シ教育者ノ士氣

第七期

(一)

國民學校經費不足対策

(4) 國民學校經費不足対策  
 (4) 國民學校經費不足対策  
 設新卒ヲ十二月ニ繰上卒業セシムルコト、  
 越級シテ特級卒業ルコト、助教ノ三月月、  
 六月月ノ時給ヲナスルコト  
 (4) 恒久施設トシテ同地年夜ノ學費増加、教員  
 離職施設ノ増加、教育救國協會ノ補助ニ依  
 ル採算防止、女子寮卒業生ヲ國民學校教員

第七期

(一)

國民學校經費不足対策

(4) 國民學校經費不足対策  
 (4) 國民學校經費不足対策  
 理工場方面ノ學校卒業生中專門學校以下ノ  
 卒業生ヲ十二月ニ繰上シ  
 (4) 將來計畫トシテ配属計畫ノ外、工業學校ノ  
 第二工管及球技科ノ施設擴張、農業學校本  
 科及第二本科ノ増設、商工及商農ノ増設、  
 高等學校ノ増設

第六期

(一)

國民學校經費不足対策

(4) 國民學校經費不足対策  
 (4) 國民學校經費不足対策  
 學務委員會ニ依リテ内証等ノ根據ヲ總ツ  
 (4) 素養委員會ノ設置、國民精神文化研究所ノ  
 設置ニ依ル日本素養ノ研究等ニ依リ國民、  
 内証等ノ勵進ヲ以テ如ク指導ス

第六期

(一)

國民學校經費不足対策

國民學校經費不足対策



第七期

(一)

國民學校教員不足調査

(イ)

本年三月卒業決定ノ師範學

設新卒

十二月ニ繰上卒業セシメルコト、

退職者

ヲ募集スルコト、助教ノ三行月、

六月ノ

講習ヲナスコト

(ロ)

恒久地區トシテ同地年夜ノ學費増加、教員

禮應施設ノ實現、教育報國精神ノ昂揚ニ依

ル修業以止、女子修業者ヲ國民學校教員

第六期

(一)

教員不足調査

(イ)

本年三月卒業スベキ

理工學方面ノ學校卒業者中尋常學校以下ノ

卒業生

ヲ十二月ニ繰上シ

(ロ)

特派許員トシテ監督ノ外、工業學校ノ

第二本科及球技科ノ組織擴張、農業學校本

科及第二本科ノ増設、商工及商賈ノ増設、

高等學科ノ増設

第六期

(イ)

學費ノ輕微、監督ノ強化、日本佛教ノ教

(ロ)

宗親宗議會ノ設置、國民精神文化研究所ノ

設置ニ依リ日本佛教ノ研究等ニ依リ國民ノ

内道生活ノ刷新ヲ以テ如ク指導ス

(一)

昭和十六年十一月中下旬

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(二) 在彼用ノ件ノ研究準備

(三) 學校等防空対策指圖

本省、直轄各部、公私立諸學校、社會教育施設、寺院、園寶、附屬病院等ニ對シ防空対策要項ヲ指示シ夫々趨切ナル防空対策ヲ講テシメ本省ニ戰時對策指導部ヲ設ケテ之ガ指導ニ當ラシム

第八期

(昭和十七年一月一三月)

(一) 學校法人法案ノ提出

總務機關的教育體制ヲ整備スル爲私立學校ノ振興刷新ヲ行フ長アリ而シテ之ガ一方法トシテ財政方面ヨリノ監督指導ヲ徹底セシメントス

(二) 東京空襲ニ對スル指圖

既定前報ニ對シテ京政司令部ノ指導ヲ受ケ東京府知事ヲシテ指圖セシメ本省ハ陣頭指揮スルニ被害地附近國民學校ヲ罹災者ノ收容ニ充テラシム

(ロ) 避難兒童生徒ヲ地方又ハ東京ノ學校ニ轉學セシム

(ハ) 學校報國隊ヲシテ機隊整理等ニ當ラシム

(ニ) 空市學校ヲ凡ソ十日間休業セシム

第九期 (昭和十七年四月一八月)

(一) 學生生徒ノ徵集選別試驗ニ關スル研究結果  
 時局ノ延長ニ伴ヒ本問題ノ考慮セララルベキ場  
 合ヲ豫想シ教育ノ見地ヨリ研究セル結果次ノ  
 如シ  
 (イ) 本管ノ實施ハ教育上ノ混亂ト派歐トヲ惹起  
 スルコト極メテ大ナルニ似ミ若ハ兵員補充  
 上與ニ止ムナキ憂慮ニ至リテ痛メテ變動セ  
 ラルベキモノト價ス  
 (ロ) 變動ニ伴フ實際上ノ措置  
 I 徵集施行方法  
 2 進馬範圍  
 3 特殊技能者  
 4 補給者ノ徵集  
 5 徵集員ノ處置  
 (二) 國民學校教員不足現象方針追加ノ管  
 兵員ヲ以テ三七〇万補充セラル、初合ニハ國民  
 學校教員ノ應召者五二五〇人ニ達スル見込ナ  
 ルヲ以テ先ニ行ヒタル國民學校總務部報告ノ  
 改正ニ依リ登錄セラレタル中等學校卒業者(一  
 主トシテ女子)ノ中ヨリ適任者ニ付徵用シテ  
 助成ニ充テントス

(一) 學生生徒ノ彼集選別演説ニ關スル研究結果  
 時局ノ進展ニ伴ヒ本問題ノ考慮セラレベキ場  
 合ヲ豫想シ教育ノ見地ヨリ研究セラル結果、  
 (イ) 本管ノ實施ハ教育上ノ混亂ト無厭トラ悉起  
 スルコト極メテ大ナルニ歸シ右ハ兵員補充  
 上眞ニ止ムナキ憂懸ニ至リテ痛メテ振動セ  
 ラルベキモノト信ス  
 (ロ) 振動ニ伴フ實際上ノ清直  
 I 演説施行方法  
 2 起馬純固  
 3 特殊演説者  
 4 演説者ノ取扱  
 5 教職員ノ處置  
 (二) 國民學校教員不足調査方針追加ノ旨  
 兵員ヲ更ニ七〇万切員セラル、初合ニハ國民  
 學校教員ノ應召者並ニ至〇人ニ達スル見込ナ  
 ルヲ以テ先ニ行ヒタル國民職業道刀車指令ノ  
 改正ニ依リ選録セラレタル中待望卒業生(一  
 三)トシテ女子)ノ中ヨリ選定者ニ付復用シテ  
 助教ニ充テントス

機密

昭和十六年八月

昭和十六年度第一回線力機机上演習  
青島海軍演習経過記録

海軍大臣

海軍少佐

志村

正

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一 既定方針ニ基キ海軍々備並ニ戦備ヲ充實ス

八月三十一日迄ニ確士官以上三、〇〇〇名下士  
官兵五〇、〇〇〇名召集シ船塲一〇箇所ヲ徵備  
ス

八月六日ノ演習ニ於テ情況許ス限リA B R等ヨ  
リ不足物資ノ獲得ニ際シ要望ス

第四期演習（日英緊要期自九月一日  
至九月三十日）

一 軍備整備ノ充實續行

一 海外派遣船塲ニ對スル配置ニ關シ通信卷ニ左記  
ヲ通告ス

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(一) 南北 A 西岸向船舶ハ東經一八〇度以東ヨリ通信常時連絡ヲ行ヒ情勢急變ノ際ハ極力逃避ニ努メ南太平洋航路ヲ採ルモノトシ常時船舶ヲ的確ナラシムルコト但シ A B E 艦艇ニ拿捕セラレタル場合ハ自沈ノ處迄ヲ採ルヲ要ス

(二) 南方 E F 方面向船舶ハ避泊地ヲ南洋諸島若ハ F 南 C 北占據地域トスル岩石ニ避ズ

第五期演習 ( 期限不可避期自十月一日至十月三十一日 )

一 軍備戰備ノ充實續行

ニ A ハ在 A 港灣 N 船抑留ヲ行ヒ、且 B E 及 L 諸國モ逐次之ニ協力セルヲ以テ船舶ノ濫小濫禁ヲ停止スルト共ニ第四期通信管ニ對スル申入レノ實行ヲ通告ス

三 對 E 進出ノ廟議決定ニ基キ十月十五日准士官以上三、〇〇〇名下士官兵五〇、〇〇〇名召集スルト同時ニ船舶五〇艘噸ヲ徵備ス

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一軍備整備ノ充實續行

十一月中旬ノ閣議ニ於テ統帥部委員トシテ左記

ヲ要望ス

(一) 現情勢ハ采ダ對AB戰絶對不可避トハ判明シ

處ラズ

(二) 十月十五日閣議決定及十一月五日ノ御裁可籌款

項ハ艦力之方實現ニ努ムルコト

十一月十五日對A作戦準備トシテ艦艙十萬噸油

積船二十萬トシテ艦備又

第七期演習 (對AB戰) 自十二月一日  
至十二月三十一日

一軍備整備ノ充實續行

十二月十五日對A作戦ノ爲新艦十萬噸油積船十

萬噸ヲ徵行ス

十二月二十日防壁處置ノ爲機須賀港兵隊ヨリ兵

力二ヶ小隊派遣ス (機隊を其ノ他諸島被ニ居住)

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第八期演習（對A B E戰爭期 自昭和十七年一月一日 至同 三月三十一日）

- 一 軍備戰備ノ充實續行損傷艦船ノ修理
- ニ 一月二十五日 A 空軍ノ帝都空襲ニ依リ海軍省ニ 爆弾ニ落下シ建物ノ一部破壊セルヲ以テ派兵 力ヲ以テ通管ニ加益ス
- 三 二月一日中立各該國ニ對シ青島危險水域設定ヲ 通告ス
- 四 租界シD 巨港船通航ニ際シテハ通告アラバ之ヲ橋 導ス
- 四 敵國通商破壊ヲ要望スル海域ニ關シ協議決定ノノ 上統帥部ニ通告ス

第九期演習（對A B E戰爭期 自四月一日 至八月三十一日）

- 一 軍備戰備ノ充實續行損傷艦船ノ修理
- ニ 五月一日 D 船隻ノ青島危險水域各水陸ノ通航ヲ 禁止ス
- 三 七月十五日 船隻三五隻噸噸油船五隻陸ノ徵管 ヲ解除ス

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機 密

第一回總机演ニ於テ福福總監ノ探リタル措置

警 視 總 監 福 田 列

第五期 (昭和十六年九月十日)

NA交渉滞滞ニ照シ外務大臣ニ照會シタル處、  
 NA交渉ノ内容ニ關シテハ國家機密トシテ指示  
 シアル旨ノ回答アリタルヲ以テ、國防保安法第  
 六條ニ該當スルモノトシテ區ニ犯人ヲ檢尋セリ  
 尙本案件ニ關シ、將來國家機密ノ保持ニ關シテハ  
 ハ一段ノ苦勞ヲ發スル、情報局偵察及内務ニ對  
 シテ見具申ヲナセリ。

第八期 (昭和十七年一月二十六日)

昭和十七年一月二十五日早朝A軍飛行機ノ墜落  
 空襲ニ對シ、左ノ如キ措置ヲ為セリ。

第一、警備措置

一 監視區ニ東京府防空本部ヲ設置ス

二 警備力ノ要點集中及機體動力ノ保持

三 地方ヨリ消息ヲ受ケタル自動電報機ノ  
中心部設置

四 警戒警備命令ニ伴フ警戒措置

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予警戒警報發令ニ伴フ警戒措置

第二、事後措置

一 消防

管下消防力ノ全機能ヲ動員シタル結果、焼失面積三四五万平方メートル焼失戸數三二、〇〇〇人ノ程度ニ止メ得タリ。

二 緊急避難

罹災者ハ日比谷公園、芝公園、後樂園、上野公園ニ誘導避難セシメタリ

三 罹災者ノ處置

イ、罹災者十三万七千人中七万人ハ東京市内ノ親戚知人宅ニ、殘餘ハ市内國民學校ニ收容ス

ロ、東京市内ニ身寄りナキ者ハ地方ニ逐次避難セシム。

ハ、罹災者ノ安否告知ニ關シ適當ノ措置ヲ講ズ

四 警備

イ、遮斷線ノ設定、檢問所ノ設置

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ロ、各種交通制限

ハ、流言蜚語、謠報ノ取締

五 復舊工作

イ、焼失區域ノ清掃、不發弾ノ魔界、破壊箇所ノ修復

ロ、焼失地區ヘノ建築ハ行ワズ

六 救護

イ、傷病者ノ救護所、病院ヘノ收容

ロ、悪性流感蔓延予防

七 食糧及木炭ノ配給

農林當局ノ斡旋ヲ受ケ避難者ニ對スル特別配給ヲ行ヘリ。

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第一回總親補選投票

厚生大臣

第一回選為益地投票

厚生大臣

第二回

獎勵投票ノ方針ニ即應シ左列ノ積立及之ガ要記ニ着手セリ

第一 勞務行及技術者給與金方集

一 準備ノ直屬主調制記

二 國民皆勤身進給ノ積立（國家補助員滋ノ獎勵ニ基

ク獎勵給付及新烈中等卒業者ノ獎勵給付

三 新設國民学校及新烈中等卒業者ノ獎勵給付

四 國民皆勤身進ノ給付

五 不登部門ニ對スル新設勞務者ノ雇入獎勵

六 中、小工業者ノ獎勵給與（勞務者區區計畫ノ指

七 農村勞務對象

八 個人大賣場ノ設置

九 國民皆勤用資給付ノ進歩

一〇 勞務者區區ニ對シテ之ニ對シテ

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第一回總裁員會通告

厚生大臣

第一回演習總裁員會

厚生大臣

第二期

獎勵功員ノ方針ニ即應シ左列ノヲ立及之ガ實地ニ着手セリ

第一 功業者及技術者諸給賞方策

一 準備ノ官制主義的論議

二 國家總動員法ノ制定（國家總動員法ノ發効ニ基

ク功業者及技術者ノ獎勵制度

三 新設職員等及新設中等及高等業者ノ獎勵制度

四 發展業自修費ノ給付

五 不設部門ニ對スル新設功業者ノ雇入制度

六 中、小工業者ノ獎勵制度（自務專任員計畫ノ行

七 農村獎勵制度

八 勸業人夫獎勵入部並

九 國民勸業用資財ノ活用

一〇 勞務專任員ニ對シテ之修業獎勵

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- 一 候補者、候補職工ノ分配計畫
- 一 候補者養成候補ノ整備充實
- 一 候補職工養成制度ノ充實
- 一 候補者、候補職工ノ再配置計畫

第二 候補力ノ健全増進及標準増進方策

- 一 職業生活運動ノ強化發展
- 一 從業者ノ健康、安全、就業時間其ノ從業條件ノ適正化

第三 候補力ノ刷新其ノ他ノ標準増進方策

- 一 從業者ノ進取發展
- 一 勤勞者獎勵制度ノ確立
- 一 引揚者ノ特殊獎勵及獎勵制度方策
- 一 候補者ニ對スル生活必需品及作業用具ノ供給確保

第三期（八月上、中旬）

七月上旬以降ノ応募ニ各ノ從業者三十万不足ニ到シ左記ノ如ク計畫ス

況

與充足人員三〇万人ノ内一〇万人ハ一從業者ニ依リ、一〇万人ハ、職業能力申告青年引揚者中ヨリ採用ニ依リ、一〇万人ハ同一組織ニ一年以上ノ経験ヲ有スル熟練員（老）ハ、職業能力申告全按保受給者中ヨリ採用ニ依リ充足ス

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第四編（九月上、中旬）

（第一）物産修正ノ結果中、小商工業者ノ失業問題  
大化セントスルノ情況ニ對シ團體ニ於テ左記對  
策ヲ決定ス

中、小、商工業者ノ職失業對策

一、中、小商工業者ノ職失業者ハ勞務需要處ノ見地ヨリ  
能力之が如何力ヲ時局下需要ナル方面ニ再配置スル  
コト、之が爲左記諸方策ヲ講ズルコト

1、要職業者ニ對シ社會ノ待遇差タルノ失望感ヲ與フ  
ルコトナク職業ノ必要ニ志キ時局下需要ナル方面  
ニ配置勤勞サルルノ策下如何ナル勞働ヲモ厭ハ  
サル如何ヲ抱カシムル極指導スルコト

2、國民勤勞訓練所ヲ充元スルコト

3、國民職業指導所ノ活動ヲ促進シ要職業者ヲ優先シ  
テ轉換セシムルコト

4、従業者ヲ使用スル者ニ對シ其ノ採用ノ條件ヲ緩和  
シ職失業者ヲ優先的ニ配備セシムル極指導スルコ  
ト

5、失業者ニシテ直チニ生活ノ困難ヲ奈ス者ニ對シテ  
ハ補助スル迄ノ一急助國家救済金ヲ支給スルコ  
ト

6、要職業者ニシテ志願ニ依リ支度金ノ貸付ヲ受スル  
者ニ付テハ之が支度ノ方針ヲ講ズルコト

7、各業者ノ自主的補助ノ方針ヲ強調スルコト

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第四節（九月上、中旬）

（第一）物産修正ノ結果中、小高工業者ノ失業同程度  
大化セントスルノ情況ニ對シ團體ニ於テ左記對  
策ヲ決定ス

中、小、高工業者ノ職失業對策

一、中、小高工業者ノ職失業者ハ勞務管理處ノ見解ヨリ  
精力之ガ衰ハ力ヲ時局下稟要ナル方面ニ寄附セスル  
コト、之ガ爲左記諸方策ヲ講ズルコト

1、要職業者ニ對シ社會ノ待遇者タルノ失望感ヲ免フ  
ルコトナク職界ノ必要ニ應キ時局下稟要ナル方面  
ニ配量勤勞サルルノ榮譽ト如何ナル勞賃ヲモ厭ハ  
サル如信ヲ抱カシムル極措取スルコト

2、國民勤勞訓練所ヲ充元スルコト

3、國民職業指導所ノ活動ヲ促進シ要職業者ヲ優先シ  
テ轉讓セシムルコト

4、従業者ヲ使用スル者ニ對シ其ノ採用ノ條件ヲ緩和  
シ職失業者ヲ優先的ニ整備セシムル極措取スルコ  
ト

5、失業者ニシテ直チニ生活ノ困難ヲ來ス者ニ對シテ  
ハ勸業スル迄ノ一急助國家補助金ヲ支給スルコ  
ト

6、要職業者ニシテ職界ニ際シ支度金ノ給與ヲ要スル  
者ニ付テハ之ガ支給ノ方針ヲ講ズルコト

7、各業者ノ自主的援助ノ方針ヲ強調スルコト



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- 一、無知ニ至工務局初者、一時自慢セシムル所トシテ、
- 「高産」ニ至ルニ至リテ、私情のニ動カスルコト
- 二、無知ニ至ル所、私情ノ所、私情ヲ促進シテ
- 三、附近市而居者ニシテ、私情ニ至リテ、私情ヲサ
- ルモノヲ、私情ニ至リテ、私情ヲサ
- 四、無知ニ至ル所、私情ノ所、私情ヲサ
- 五、無知ニ至ル所、私情ノ所、私情ヲサ

（第三） 夫家ノ努力ハ工務局ノ他ノ自然流出止マズ秋  
 季、夫家ノ努力不足ノ現象、夫家ノ他ノ自然流出止マズ秋  
 季、夫家ノ努力不足ノ現象、夫家ノ他ノ自然流出止マズ秋  
 季、夫家ノ努力不足ノ現象、夫家ノ他ノ自然流出止マズ秋

（第二） 夫家ノ努力不足、夫家ノ他ノ自然流出止マズ秋  
 季、夫家ノ努力不足ノ現象、夫家ノ他ノ自然流出止マズ秋  
 季、夫家ノ努力不足ノ現象、夫家ノ他ノ自然流出止マズ秋  
 季、夫家ノ努力不足ノ現象、夫家ノ他ノ自然流出止マズ秋

8、半稼業状態ニアル中、小商工業者ニ對シテ、  
 半稼業ヲ、私情ニ至リテ、私情ヲサ  
 三、夫家ノ努力不足、夫家ノ他ノ自然流出止マズ秋  
 季、夫家ノ努力不足ノ現象、夫家ノ他ノ自然流出止マズ秋  
 季、夫家ノ努力不足ノ現象、夫家ノ他ノ自然流出止マズ秋  
 季、夫家ノ努力不足ノ現象、夫家ノ他ノ自然流出止マズ秋

第五期（十月上、中旬）

(第一) 貿易關係ノ打撃甚大ニシテ大工場大商店ノ兩儀休業スルモノ甚クキ情況ニ對シ厚生省ニ於テハ貿易關係業者中僱用ヲ餘裕ナクセラル、若シ勞務尋常ノ見地ヨリ則ち上量製ナル方面へ配置スル爲長職業指導所ヲ管轄シ所費ノ處置ヲ勵ムルコト、セリ

(第二) 食糧不足其ノ他ノ原因ニヨリ朝鮮人勞働者ノ移入困難トナリツ、テ其情況ニ對シ左記ノ處置ヲ同議ニ於テ決定シタリ

記

一 内地ニ於ケル勞務需要ハ内地ニ於ケル勞務資源ヲ以テ充足スルコトヲ目途トシ勞務所員總勢ヲ強化スル爲一或勞務者ノ就職増加、勞務報團隊ノ活用促進國民職業指導所ノ擴充其ノ他ノ處置ヲ勵ムルコト

二 朝鮮人勞働者ノ移入ヲ促進スル爲朝鮮人勞働者ニ對スル雜費ノ負擔ヲ軽減スルト共ニ朝鮮人勞働者ニ對シテノ負擔力ヲ増強スルコト

(第三) 農業勞力不足ニ對シテハ前期ニ執リタル處置ヲ更ニ強化スルコト、セリ

(第四) 青島滿洲部ノ政府ニ對シテ農務總力集中強化学ノ要求ニ對シ勞務資源ニ於テハ緊急産業部門

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ニ於ケル勞務配置規程其ノ他ノ條ヲ因襲ニ於テ  
決定シ勞務勸誘勞ヲ一披ト強化スルコト、セリ

第六期（十一月上、中旬）

國內勞務關係ノ維持ニ各産業ニ於ケル技術者不足  
ノ情況ニ對シ左記ノ處置ヲ講スルコト、セリ

- 一緊急各産業ニ對スル勞務配置計畫ノ再激發
- 二勞務者移動防止方策ノ徹底
- 三賃金規制ノ徹底
- 四勞務者雇入規制ノ強化
- 五強制の手帳ニヨル技術者ノ再配置
- 六各種技術者養成機關ノ擴充強化ノ促進

第七期（十二月上旬）

勞力不足ノ情況ニ對シ從來ノ對策ヲ推展スルト共に  
勸勞報團隊ニヨル學生、生徒ノ勸誘及女子勞務者ノ  
徹底の勸誘等ノ處置ヲ併ニ強化スルコト、セリ

第八期（十七年一月）

A 飛行機ノ配備ニ對シ厚生省ニ於テハ内務省  
ト協力シ技術者ノ教育ニ關シ所屬處置ヲ講ジタリ。

Ex. 871

ERRATA SHEETS

Dec. 7, 2018

Language:	Page No.	Line No.	Doc. now reads:	Suggested correction
English	91	18	faint	"to"
"	15	17	"	"A" and B
"	"	18	"	"was" described
"	25	25	intimidated	intimidated,
"	"	35	experte	experte).
"	"	40	fund. (B)	funds.
"	28	25	C1,	C,
"	39	40	¥ 117,000,000	¥ 17,000,000,00
"	59	7	many-sided	many-sided.
"	44	2	--- her and	of increase
"	"	7	3.4%	3.4%
"	"	10	---ance position	Finance Corporation
"	"	15	idle ---	idle of
"	45	15	of	of
"	46	18	--- ted	granted
"	50	28	---y busy	very busy
"	51	17	sug stion	suggestion
"	"	18	vert	divert.
"	52	22	--- inion	opinion
"	53	21	--- ile	while
"	"	22	--- enemy	the enemy
"	47	"	--- rifest	manifest
"	"	23	--- ped	proped

## ERRATO SHEETS

Doc # 2228 2

Language	Page No.	Line No.	Doc. now reads:	Suggested correction
English	59	12	self-righteous	amicable
"	60	9	to A's	of A's
"	"	20	3 Propaganda...	3 measures for - propaganda---
"	72	30	su oles	supplies
"	75	9	introduced	introduced
"	76	32	ad tion	adoption
"	"	34	h arding	tiarding
"	102	last line	"engated"	"engaged"
"	103	st "	"	- do -
"	"	last line	-----	Add "Guidance Institute to endeavour its utmost to fill the required number."
"	105	Middle of the Page	-----	Add " 6 Promotion of strengthening and expanding various technicians training organs."
"	105	Middle of the page	-----	

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CERTIFICATION


*I certify that the micrographs appearing in this reel of film are true copies of the original records described above.*

Date: 19 May, 1989



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Camera Operator: M E John-Lewis

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



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





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TEST TARGET (MT-3)**



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**UNWCC**



**PAG - 3**

**REEL**

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

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**security  
microfilm**

**PROGRAMME**

**1989**

1

A bold, black, stylized letter 'M' with a thick, uniform stroke. It features a horizontal top bar, a vertical central stem, and two vertical side stems that meet the top bar at right angles.A bold, black, stylized letter 'Z' with a thick, uniform stroke. It consists of a horizontal top bar, a diagonal stem sloping downwards from left to right, and a horizontal bottom bar.A bold, black, stylized letter 'D' with a thick, uniform stroke. It has a horizontal top bar and a curved bottom that forms a semi-circle.