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
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**PROGRAMME**

**1989**

**UNWCC**




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**REEL**

**no.**

**1 44**



**index  
of  
contents**

INDEXING DATA

PERIOD

United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC)  
 Member Governments, other National Authorities and  
 Military Tribunals  
 Box 388, 389 and 390

Transcripts of Proceedings and Documents  
 of the International Military Tribunal for  
 the Far East (Tokyo Trials).  
 Court Exhibits PAG-3/2.3.3

Court Exhibits consist of a wide variety of published  
 and unpublished documents mainly from United States  
 and Japanese sources. The Japanese items are generally  
 accompanied by English Translations (arranged  
 numerically, with gaps)

Nos.

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872 - 1244



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



**REDUCTION**

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


**IMAGE EVALUATION  
TEST TARGET (MT-3)**



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Already Approved by Parliamentary  
Not vet

Vice-Minister  
Councillor

Sections: General, Military Service, Accountant,  
Connected: Transportation, Machinery, Materials

Term to be kept: Permanently	Receipt No:	Received War Ministry	Army-China-Confidential- 11512 Receipt-No.	Issued by: Munitions Section of Ordnance Bureau
Decision directed by: Director of the Bureau	Concerning: Delivery of arms			
Action directed by: <u>YAMAMOTO</u>	Minister: appointed by person in charge	Parliamentary Vice-Minister	Parliamentary Councillor:	Secretary:
		Vice-Minister: appointed by person in charge	Senior Assistant: <u>YAMAHARA</u>	Assistant in charge: <u>KURATA</u>
		Director of Bureau in charge: <u>SUGA</u>	Chief of Section in charge: <u>ITO</u>	Commissioner of Secretariate Accountant: Section number in charge: <u>SHOJI</u>
At Bureau in charge	No: China-Confid.- A-363	Received on: Submitted on: Nov. 11, SHOJA 16/1941/	Connected: Director of Bureau:	Chief of Section: Milit. Serv. <u>HITAKAWA</u> Accountant <u>ADACHI</u> Machinery <u>CHOKIC</u> General <u>SUDO</u> Transport <u>HIRONAGA</u> Materials <u>YASUDA</u>
At Minister's Secretariate	Received on: Nov. 11	Finished on: Nov. 13	Circulation after execution (decision):	Director of Bureau: Chief of Section:

80-872

Army - China - Confidential

Instruction from the adjutant to the Vice-Director of the Army Ordnance Headquarters.

By order I inform you that you are directed to have the prepared arms, stated in the "Army-China-Confid.-No. 3998, dated Nov. 7," delivered to all troops at each place in accordance with the attached table.

P.S. Its expenditure is to be paid out of the extraordinary military budget account.

Army-China-Confid.-No. 4004 Nov. 11, SHOJA 16.  
/1941/

Army - China - Confid.

Instructions from the Adjutant to the Chiefs of the Staffs of the 16th, 55th, and 56th Divisions.

By order I inform you that arms stated in the attached lists No. 1 and 2 are to be delivered as shown in the attached table.

Army-China-Confid.-No. 4004 Nov. 11, SHOJA 16.  
/1941/  
(Sig.)

Army-China-Confid.-No. 10578 received by the War Ministry

Top Secret. Army Department in Imperial Headquarters.  
(Army)

No. 409. Part 3.

The notification to keep in secrecy the identification of the officers dispatched to French Indo-China.

15 October 1941.

The Chief Secretary of General Affairs of the Army Staff of Imperial Headquarters. Tadaichi Wakamatsu (Sig.)

To the Adjutant of the Army Ministry. Nawoichi Kawahara.

The notification.

To keep in secrecy the general plan for "Operation 'Ah'", I request your deep consideration to keep in secrecy at present, by wearing civilian clothes etc., the identification of the officers and the essential members of the staff of the Army Ministry who are to be dispatched to French Indo-China.

This notification to be sent to the following offices, i.e. Army Ministry; Aviation Section of Army Ministry; Sea transportation Headquarters of Army Ministry.

No. 1

Dec. 6 27

Supplement sheets of the distribution of munitions sent by the Secretariat.

The 16th Division

The 55th Division

The 56th Division

Army Ordnance Headquarters

Classification of the distribution of munitions		Date of the distribution	Name of depot to be distributed	Remarks
"Iiv."			The 55th Division	
"F30"		12th Nov.	The 56th Division	
"Iei"	"H0"			
	"H1"	13th Nov.	The 16th Division	
"Iee"		15th Nov.	The 55th Division	
"Iee"		15th Nov.	The 16th Division	

all the separate parts of the

the separate parts of the  
 180 55 50  
 180 55 50  
 180 55 50

the separate parts of articles and quantities of  
 materials and accessories to be established  
 in proper proportion.

Name of Article	No	35'	"112"			"120"			
			Color white	Color white "Rd"	Color white "Rd"	Color white "Rd"	Color white "Rd"	Color white "Rd"	Color white "Rd"
		180	180	21.00	21.00	21.00	21.00	21.00	21.00
33 style - light blue material									4
34 style - light blue material	180	180							
35 style - medium green	2	2							
36 style - heavy green	2	2							
37 style - green	2	2							
38 style - all accessories with ammunition flasks and other items	1,100,000	1,220,000	10,000	21.00	21.00	21.00	21.00	21.00	21.00
39 style - blue - light blue	2,000	200	330	3.70	21.350	50	150	150	250
40 style - heavy green	2,000,000	1,500	11,000	5,000	21.000	40	50	20	
41 style - all of 39	1,200,000	13,000	4,500	2,100	21.500	50	150	150	330

The table of articles and quantities of munitions and  
ammunitions to be distributed in Japan proper.

Name of articles	Class of articles Mark of cargo Place of distribution State of funding the operations for the distribution	"Jin"		"Bei"			"Tei"			
		Red in white	Red in white	Red in white "ah"		Red in white	Red in white "ah-ni"			
		"ah"	"ah"	"Ho"	"He"	"ah"	"Ji"	"Re"	"Ha"	"Ni"
		Hiroshima	Wafu	Nagoya	Osaka	Hiroshima				
10th Nov.										
92 style heavy machine gun	92 style ordinary ball-cartridge with ammunition clip and paper case	554,000	570,000	230,000	108,000	992,000	2,200	12,000	12,000	15,000
	92 style armour-piercing ball-cartridge with ammunition clip and paper case	72,000	80,000	91,000	12,000	119,000	100	1,800	1,800	2,400
97 style loading machine gun	92 style ordinary ball-cartridge with ammunition clip and paper case		22,500			110,000				
	93 style armour-piercing ball-cartridge with ammunition clip and paper case		7,500			30,000				
99 style caponating gun	92 style shell cartridge	3,000	4,700	3,020	1,660	5,300		70	70	130
94 style 81 mil. machine gun	Armour-piercing ball-cartridge	840	840							
	shell-cartridge	3,000	200	1,000		4,500				200
94 style 31 mil. machine gun	Armour-piercing ball-cartridge		1,110			500				
	shell-cartridge		1,110			1,660				
91 style machine gun	shell-cartridge	2,600	1,570	1,786	1,200	5,300				100



Dec. 827

- 14 -

8. style m. line a. tank gun	armor-piercing ball cartridge					2,320				
	Shell-cartridge					960				
94 style m. line gun	Shell-cartridge	16,000								200
	Abs cartridge	1,200								500
Reformed 35 style field gun	Shell-cartridge		18,000	7,400		15,000				
86 style Tentative field anti- aircraft gun	90 style, pointed anti-aircraft cartridge	44,000	12,000			5,000				
91 style 10 shell	Pointed cartridge with case					15,000				
Ends - tank m. line		50	50	30		1,000		20	20	20
Hand flame-bottle 10 style		90	90							
grenade	signal ball-cartridge	80	80							
Flung smoke-generator		400	330	200	100	400	100	100	100	300
Water smoke-generator		200	100	50	50	100	50	50	50	100
85 style middle line	abs grenade	1,000	1,000	400	100	1,200	100	100	100	200
44 style	destruction grenade	40	40	30	10	60	10	10	10	20
Hand gas-bottle		100	100	50	50	200	50	50	50	100



No. 6

Dec. 6 27

Quartz for No. 5 wireless telegraph	"Ko" 4 sets "Oto" 4 sets "Hei" 3 sets								
Dry-cell	Amount for 4 months for 36 inf. companies and 1 art. company	Same	Two-sixth of amount for 4 months for 1 division	One-eighth of amount for 4 months for 1 division	A half of amount for 4 months for 1 division		One-eighth of amount for 4 months for 3 inf. companies and 1 art. company	Same	
Vacuum-tube									
Cutting latchet	1,000	1,000	1,000	500	1,500	200	400	200	200
Long-handled trimmer	50	50	50	20	80	10	20	10	10
94 style No 3 special receiver		2							



Doc 627

The table of articles and quantities of "Ah" munitions to be distributed in Japan proper.

(addition)

Name of articles	Classification of way of distribution	"JIN"	"BO"	"HEI"	"TEI"	Remarks
		Red on white "Ah-JIN"	Red on white "Ah"	Red on white "Ah"	Red on white "Ah"	
Place of the distributions (or of shipping)	Mark of tag	Hiroshima	Moji	Osaka	Hiroshima	
Date of finishing the operations of the distribution		As soon as possible				
38 style rifle ball-cartridge with ammunition feeder and paper case			990,000			
97 style hand grenade			23,000			
89 style shell-cartridge for 89 style heavy grenade			18,000			
92 style heavy machine gun	92 style ordinary ball-cartridge with ammunition clip and paper case		65,000			
	92 style armour-piercing ball-cartridge with ammunition clip and paper case		29,000			
92 style rifle	92 style's shell cartridge		4,200			
94 style 37 millimetre gun	Armour-piercing ball cartridge		2,400			This is permitted to change for shell cartridge
	Shell cartridge		400			

Doc 627

-9-

41 style mountain shell-cartridge gun		3,000			
Reformed 30 style field Shrapnel-cartridge gun			500		
38 style No. 7 70 style anti-aircraft anti-aircraft pointed cartridge gun			2,000		
Ignition-tube of fire injector	1,000				
97 style square yellow powder	500 kg.				
Portable wooden tool	1 set.				
Portable tool for saddle	1 set.				
78 style electricity-proof instrument	5 set				
95 style collapsible boat				25	
Parts for repairing munitions	same quantity				Articles and quantity are shown in supplementary table
Kerosene	30 drums				
Heavy oil	30 drums				for fire injectors.

200. . . . .

Supplies . . . . .

Number of articles and quantities of parts for repairing  
machines.

-10-

Name of articles	quantity	Remarks
Ablead for 32 stpl. bayonet	100	
32 stpl. Projectile	200	
Spring of projectile	50	
Cartridge	20	
Follower board	20	
Follower spring	30	
Recoil	10	
Angle-regulator	5	
Impact tip	50	
89 stpl. Distance regulator	20	
Heavy grade Spring of d. regulator	20	
Small spring of d. regulator	10	
Guard ring of projectile	50	
Guard ring of a. regulator	50	
Trigger bar	10	
Guard ring of trigger bar	50	
Spring of guard ring	10	

14 style revolver	Projectile	5
10 style grenade	Projectile	6
96 style machine- gun	Bearing spring	20
	Piston	5
	Clamp	10
	Counter hook	10
	Projectile	30
	Follower	20
92 style heavy machine gun	Clamp	10
	Cylinder	5
	piston	10
	Projectile	100
	Cartridge	50
	Spring of cartridge	50
	Lever	5



Doc. No. 627

C E R T I F I C A T E

A.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. 627

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Kanoo Ishibashi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Corresponding Secretary 1st Mobilization Bureau, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 15 pages, dated Oct, Nov, 1941, and described as follows: Memorandum pertaining to concealment of identity of military officers going to French Indo China and memo and charts pertaining to distributions of munitions, etc.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): War Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
16 day of October, 1946.

/s/ Kanoo Ishibashi  
Signature of Official  
(S.E.L.)  
Corresponding Secretary  
Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ Torakichi Nakamura

Statement of Official Procurement

I, 2d Lt. Eric W. Fleisher, O-935000, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
16 day of October, 1946

/s/ Eric W. Fleisher, 2d Lt. -US  
N.I.E.  
Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ Douglas L. Waldorf  
1st Lt., Inf.  
Chief, Inv. Div., IPS

11  
Doc. No. 330

SECRET

(Various seals,  
etc.)

Despatched from NANKING, 14th Nov. 1947.

Despatched at 1142

Received at 1330

Addressed to the Vice-Minister of War  
Vice-Chief of the General Staff.

Despatched by the Chief of the Third Air Group.

Telegram-- The Third Air Group Tel # 2704.

1. The Chief of the Aerial Group will leave NANKING early tomorrow morning --the 15th-- with the staff officers required for the south part of Indo-China and will establish a command post in Saigon on and after the 16th.

2. The Chief of the Staff and the staff officers required shall remain in NANKING to carry out the concentration of aerial forces and measures with regard to shipping and transport.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
IPS No. 630-A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Kaneo Ishibashi, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Corresponding Secretary - 1st Demobilization and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 1 pages dated Nov. 14, 1941 and described as follows:

Telegram regarding troop movement

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

1st Demobilization Bureau (former War Ministry)

Signed at Tokyo on this  
22 day of Aug, 1946

s/ Kaneo Ishibashi  
Signature of Official

Witness: s/ Shinai, Kobayashi

SEAL  
Corresponding Secretary  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
22 day of Aug, 1946

s/ Richard H. Larsh  
Name  
Investigator  
Official Capacity

Witness: s/ J.A. Curtis, 2d Lt. MI

630A

EX 873

發信地 南京

秘電譯 一月十四日 十三時三〇分發

次 長 發信者 第三飛行集團長

三飛集團第二七〇四號

- 一、集團長八所長藤原從一月十五日早朝南京出發南  
部印慶文那ニ至リ十六日以降西<sup>貢</sup>ニ戰鬥司令部ヲ  
開設セラル
- 二、南京ニハ參謀長以下所長藤原ヲ編入航空部隊  
集中及船舶繪造ノ編入ニ任セシメラル

(終)

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

證明書

630A

國際檢察部 第六三〇一A号

典據及び公正ニ用スル證明

余石橋カネオハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ第一  
復員局書記トシテ、日本政府ト公的関係ニ在ルモ、  
ナルコト、茲ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレタル  
老頁ヨリ成ル、千九百四十二年ノ昭和十六年ノ十一月十四  
日附、下記題名、即チ軍隊輸送ニ用スル電報ノ文書  
ノ保管ニ任ジ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナル  
コト、並ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式書類及ビ綴  
ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シアラバ綴番号又ハ引用  
其ノ他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於ケル該文書ノ正規外在、  
公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ)

第一復員局 (元陸軍省)

千九百四十六年ノ昭和廿一年八月廿二日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名欄 石橋カネオノ署名捺印

右ノ者ノ公的資格 書記

證人 小林シゲジノ署名捺印

公式入手ニ用スル證明

余リチャドエッチラーシ / RICHARD. H. LARSH / 余ガ

聯合國最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモ、ナルコト、

並ニ上記題名ノ文書ハ余ガ公務上、日本政府ノ上記署名

No 1

No 2

630A

右官吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年ノ昭和廿一年ノ八月廿二日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名欄 "RICHARD. H. LARSH /  
"リチャード・エッチ・ラーシュ / 署名系 /

右ノ者ノ公的資格調査官

證

人

少尉 "J.A. CURTIS /  
"ジェイ・エー・カーチス / 署名

Top Military Secret

Proj. No. 105  
S. A. No. 15072  
Sack No.  
Item No. 372

Title: Monthly Wartime Report (KO) No. 4 of the HA Corps

Date: Nov. 1941  
Headquarters of the HA Corps

## Content:

- I. General Condition of the Corps.
- II. Preparation for the Attack on Hongkong.
- III. Operations and Garrison Duty.
- IV. The State of Public Peace.
- V. The Investigation of Topographical Data.
- VI. The State of Traffic and Communications.
- VII. Outline of the Rear Conditions.
- VIII. The Condition of the Army of the New Regime.

---

- I. General Condition of the Corps.
  1. The Corps is preparing whole heartedly for military operations against Hongkong, and also intensifying the blockade against the enemy.
  1. Preparations to attack Hongkong are progressing smoothly, and are expected to be completed early in December.
  2. Fortifications under construction for the defense of CANTON and its surrounding strategic points were completed during the latter part of November.
  3. The 18th Division, the 21st Heavy Field Artillery Battalion, the 4th and 15th Independent Engineer Regiments, the 8th and 11th Epidemic Prevention and Water-Supplying Sections, and the 10th River Crossing Materials Company left the command of the Corps at their respective positions at 00.00, 15th inst.
  4. The 45th Air Regiment, the main force of the 10th Independent Air Unit, a part of the 18th Independent Squadron, and the direct co-operation unit of the 44th Air Regiment were assigned to the corps at end of this month.

5. As the HAI Branch Unit in HAINAN had returned to their original units the MATSUO Branch Unit (consisting mainly of 1 Infantry Battalion) was organized and despatched to above place from Shantou.
6. The units of the SANO Corps in CHUNGKING districts were relieved of guard duty in the middle of this month by the newly organized BANJOE Branch Unit (consisting mainly of 2 Infantry Battalions)

## II. Preparation for the attack on Hongkong.

Upon receiving unofficial instructions to attack Hongkong, the corps wholeheartedly prepared and began concentrated movements of the units to attack at the end of this month.

### 1. Gathering of Information

Gathering of information was started from the middle of Showa 15 /1940/. In August of this year, the focus of the gathering of information was directed toward Hongkong and endeavored to grasp all aspects of Hongkong by air reconnaissance, reading air photographs, carrying out investigations in actual places, and utilizing all types of intelligence, moreover, the units to execute the attack were ordered to gather the information.

### 2. Training

The SANO Corps, as well as being appointed to guard /duty/ since the end of Showa 15 /1940/ commenced training for the attack /on Hongkong/, and especially executed training of the staff in attacks, building of fortifications, attacking fortifications of a special type, and the usage of materials in August of this year, and field training to about a 1000 officers and men who are to be the main body of units attacking five positions. Furthermore, in the beginning of October, when the KOI CDA Corps were relieved of guarding the guard area excluding the intermediate district, units were concentrated and executed regular training.

Since the NITAJIMA branch unit was stationed near the British-Chinese frontier, the branch unit devoted themselves to training for the attack on Hongkong.



3. The Repair of the Transportation Road in the Rear  
Since the end of September repairs of the motor-road between HUIEN and PAOAN, which is the main transportation road in the rear, were commenced and completed on the 3th Oct. as prearranged.
4. Commencement of Troop Movements.  
In the last part of this month SANO Corps units stationed in CHUNGHUI were concentrated in HUIEN. The main force of the SANO Corps concentrated in FUSHAN and units under direct army command in the CANTON area have commenced movements gradually to the HUIEN, TUNGKUN, and SHEKLUNG areas, secretly by the CANTON-SANSHUI and CANTON KOWICON lines.
5. Thus, the Corps has ordered, on the 30th inst., preparations for the attack on Hongkong and endeavoring to keep the plan secret are awaiting the opportunity to open hostilities.

### III. Operations and Garrison Duty

1. XI Corps  
A part of the forces were stationed at HSIKAN as public peace and order on the right bank of CHUKIANG had become worse, the remainder being engaged in guarding in their previous disposition.
2. KONGCDA Corps  
As a result of the enlargement of the guard area, importance was attached to the FATSEIN district, and cleared the district of the enemy.  
Furthermore, in the middle of November, the Northern SANSHUI and Southern TSUNCEA districts were cleared.
3. KITAJIHA Branch Unit  
Other than preparing for the campaign against Hongkong, a part of the unit annihilated the communist bandits in HANGSHOPAI, KUANGTOU AND TZUPATIEN districts in the beginning of November.
4. ARAKI Branch Unit  
The disposition of a part of the force was changed, and together with enforcing guarding more rigidly endeavored to reconnoiter the offensive plan of the enemy.

5. NATSUI Corps  
In the latter part of October a punitive expedition was conducted in the northern part of CHACYANG, the enemy bases being annihilated.
6. BANJOME, and NATSUC Branch Units  
No change.
7. HANYU Unit  
As well as executing air-defenses in the vicinity of CANTON, secretly reconnoitered the HONGYONG district.  
The summary table of main battles in November and the summary maps are shown in the attached chart No. 1 and inserted maps No. 2 respectively.  
Total war results are as per attached chart No. 2.

IV. Peace Conditions

The enemy disturbed our rear somewhat actively in attacking the ferry-steamers in the south of CANTON in the middle of November, and frequently, buses in the latter part of October. However, as a result of the activity of the Military Police (KEIFEI) these mixed units (partisans) were captured, and peace conditions in general are satisfactory.

The chart of the conditions of peace are as per attached sheet of inserted maps No. 3.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I.P.S. No. 628

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Okikatsu, Arai hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of General Affairs Division and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of \_\_\_\_\_ pages, dated November, 1941, and described as follows: "HA" Corps Monthly Report. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): First Demobilization Bureau

Signed at Tokyo on this 5 day of July, 1946 /s/ Okikatsu, Arai  
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Kaneo Ishibashi SEAL  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, William C. Prout, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 5th day of July, 1946 /s/ William C. Prout  
NAME

Witness: /s/ Edward P. Lonoshan Investigator  
Official Capacity

I.P.S.

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Ex 874A

陸軍省  
安領

陸支隊安次八。九號

陸軍省  
有和時  
17.4.3  
信官  
軍務課

陸軍省  
17.4.4  
17.4  
軍事課

軍事

甲  
陸支

昭和十六年十一月

陸軍省  
17.4.6  
2  
軍務課

陸軍省  
17.4.6  
2  
陸軍課

陸軍省

通

波集團戰時月報(甲)

第四號

陸軍省  
17.4.8  
100  
交通課

陸軍省

井上

波集團司令部

交通

平島

No. 1.

四月十七日

陸

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- 一 軍全般、狀況。
- 二 香港攻略準備。
- 三 作戰警備。
- 四 治安狀況。
- 五 兵要地理調査。
- 六 交通通信、狀況。
- 七 後方狀況、概要。
- 八 新政權軍隊、狀況。

第一 軍全般、狀況。

- 一 軍銳意、香港作戰ヲ準備スルト共ニ益々對敵封鎖ヲ強化ス。
- 二 香港作戰準備ハ順調ニ進展シ十月初頭之ヲ完了スル豫定ナリ。
- 三 廣東及ヒ其ノ周辺、要地防衛、為構築中ナリ陣地ハ十一月末之ヲ完成ナリ。
- 四 第十八師團野戰重砲兵、又三十一大隊獨立

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五 兵才四及三才十五聯隊、才八及三才十一防衛隊  
給水部浮河材料才十中隊へ十五日零時迄  
現在地ニ於テ軍、隸下ヲ離脱スリ。

六 新ニ飛行才四五戰隊、獨立飛行才十隊主力  
獨立飛行才十八中隊、一部、飛行才四四戰隊  
、直協一隊本月下旬軍、指揮ニ入リ。

七 在海南島令井支隊、原所居復歸ニ伴ヒ新ニ  
松尾支隊(歩二大基幹)ヲ編成シ本月中旬迄  
ヨリ同地ニ派遣スリ。

八 新ニ山城目支隊(歩二大基幹)ヲ編成シ本月中旬  
在中門地已、佐野兵團、部隊ト其、警備ヲ委  
代スルナリ。

### 第三香港攻略準備

軍ハ香港攻略内示ヲ受クルヤ、一意之ヲ準備ニ  
邁進シ本月末ニ至リ攻略部隊、集中移動ヲ開始ス  
ルニ至リ。

一 情報、蒐集。

NOS.

昭和十五年六月頃より、最近情報、蒐集ニ懸ケリ、  
本年八月二八日情報蒐集、要旨ニ香港ニ指目シ、  
飛行偵察空中ニ爲真判蹟現地於テ、実査各種  
諜報、利用等一應香港全貌把握ニ方、且攻撃豫定  
部隊ヲ之方ニ蒐集ニ任セタリ。

### 教育訓練

佐野矢團ハ昭和十五年末以降作戰豫言備ニ任テ、  
其ニ攻路、等、訓練ニ着手シ、特ニ本年八月攻撃、築城  
ニ裡障地攻撃。

資料自法等ニ関スル幹部教育ヲ九月特火兵攻撃  
際、甚幹員等ニ要員將校以下約一〇〇名、野營訓  
練ヲ実施シ、更ニ十月下旬中間地ニテ、隊ノ兵團警備  
地域、警備ヲ孤田矢團ニ交代スル、部隊ヲ集結シ、  
本格的訓練ヲ実施ス。

北島及隊亦英米國境附近ニ駐屯シ、以テ香港偵察、高  
教育訓練ニ專念ス。

二、後方輸送路、整備、

九月下旬、水衛主要後方輸送路、多島川一帯

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安南、自動車道路改修、着手、十月令予定、如ク之ヲ完了ス。

四、移動開始。

本月下旬ニ入ルヤ先ヅ任野兵團帯同地邑部隊ヲ虎門ニ集結シ佛山周辺地区ニ集結シテ任野兵團主力ヲ広東周辺ニテ軍直轄部隊ニ本月末ヨリ穩密裡ニ廣三、廣九、田隴、鉄道輸送ニ依リ逐次虎門、東莞、石竜地区ニ向テ移動ヲ開始ス。

五、斯ケル軍ハ本月三十日香港攻略ニ関スル準備命令ヲ下達シ企圖、概匿ニ好メテ南戰機至ルヲ待望ス。

100



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第三 作戰警備

一 基兵团

珠江右岸地区，治安悪化を爲す一部ヲ細研

ニ位置志ムル，外依然舊配備ニ在リテ警備ニ在ス

二 旅団

警備地区，擴大ニ伴ヒ重慶ヲ佛山周辺地区ニ指

向シ掃蕩ヲ実施ス。

尚十月中旬三水地方地区並ニ從化南方地区ヲ掃蕩ス

三 三島支隊

討香港作戰ヲ準備スル外一部ヲ以テ十一月下旬石樹

排光頭仔及田附近，共匪ヲ掃蕩ス。

四 高木支隊

一部配備ヲ變更シ一層至嚴ニ警備ニ在リテ外其

支那軍，攻勢企圖，搜索ニ努ム

五 松井兵团

十月下旬潮陽地方地区，討伐ヲ実施シ敵，根據

地ヲ覆滅ス。

六 万城目支隊 松尾支隊

変化ナシ。

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三三部隊

慶田不周也、防空=任スルト共=香港方面ニ總

密裡ニ偵察ス。

十月中主要戦闘概見表及概見圖附表

女一並ニ挿圖女二、如シ。

綜合戦果一覽表附表女三、如シ。

女四 治安狀況

十月中旬慶東南方地区ニ於ケル李路船

襲撃十月下旬屢々同区、襲撃等稍治況

ナル後ノ攪亂ヲテモ我憲兵隊ノ活動ニ依リ

之等混成隊(別動隊)ヲ逐次逮捕シ治安

狀況概テ良好ナリ。

治安狀況一覽圖挿圖女三、如シ。

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證明書

國際檢察部 第 十二号 A  
及公正之閣之證明

余其尾才之資格於前總務部長美田本將少將職  
係在任上此上並發給下之余が証明書トシテ 其言成此上當官年  
昭和十六年十月附下記題名即波集團戰時月報、文書、保管責任  
居下茲證明ス。

余復添附記録文書カ日本政府ノ公文書トシテ並存在此名稱省文  
部局ノ公文書類ニシテ一部トシテ證明ス。右ノニ檢査號又引用其  
他公文書類又檢査號ニシテ公文書トシテ規所存公文名稱ヲ特記ス。

一 第一復長省

千九百四十六年即昭和二十一年七月五日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官署署名欄

荒尾才キカ川 (印)

右署名ノ資格

證人

石橋カネヲ

公文書ノ閣之證明

余ウリアム・C・ブライアント、余カ聯合國最高指揮官總司令初閣係アルモ  
ル下並上記題名ノ公文書、余カ公務上日本政府ノ上記署名官署  
ニ手ニシテモ、此ニ證明ス

千九百四十六年即昭和二十一年七月五日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名欄

ウリアム・C・ブライアント

右署名ノ資格

國際檢察部調査官

證人

エドワード・ア・モナシ

C. 8751

Doc. No. 654

Page 1

Top secret telegram from O. TSUKADA, Chief  
of Staff of Southern Army to KIMURA, H.,  
Assistant Minister of War.

Nov. 22, 1941 . . . . . Top Secret

"Forward movement of Southern Army"

Addressed to Assist. Minister of War /H. Kimura/

From General Chief of Staff Osamu Tsukada.

"The HQ of the Southern Army will advance as follows. Special  
secrecy is requested.

- Nov. 25 to leave Tokyo
- Nov. 26 embark from Ujina by Suwa Maru
- Nov. 29 landing at Keelung.

After that the HQ will be located at Taihoku<sup>K</sup> until about  
Dec. 5. The staff officers will be about 5 and others will be  
stationed at Saigon.

C E R T I F I C A T E

"D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

IPS No. 654-A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ISHII, Masavoshi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: In charge of military History and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 1 pages, dated 22 Nov, 1941, and described as follows:

Top Secret Telegram O, Tsukada, Chief of Staff to Vice Minister of War.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files:

Military Affairs Section - War Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this  
27th day of June, 1946

s/ M. Ishii

Signature of Official

Witness: \_\_\_\_\_

SEAL

\_\_\_\_\_  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, William C. Prout, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
27th day of June, 1946

s/ William C. Prout

Name

Witness: s/ Edward P. Monaghan

Investigator

\_\_\_\_\_  
Official Capacity

IPS

EX

"MILITARY ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN  
THE EVENT OF JAPAN'S PARTICIPATION IN WAR"—12 Nov. 1941

SECRET

In dealing with this copy, special care must be taken in regards to outsiders.

12 November, 1941

Concerning measures to be taken in the event of Japan's participation in war. (Supplement No. 1)

(Precedents of military administration in occupied areas.)

The Second Department of the Treaty Bureau.

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(B) SAGHALIEN	41
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C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

IPS. NO. 1412-A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office. and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 60 pages, dated Nov. 12, 1941 and described as follows:

Military Administration Measures to be taken in the Event of Japan's Participation in War

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Japanese Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this  
22nd day of August, 1946

s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

Witness: s/ Nagaharu, Odo

SEAL.

Archives Chief  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
22 day of Aug, 1946.

s/ Richard H. Larsh  
Name

Witness: s/ J.A. Curtis, 2nd Lt. MI

Investigator  
Official Capacity

1412 A

本冊取扱ニ付特ニ外部ニ對シ注意相成リ度ニ

昭和十六年十月十日

帝國、參戰ニ當リ執ルテ措置ニ關スル件

(追加、一)

(占領地ニ於ケル軍政施行ニ關スル先例)

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條約局 第二課

No 1

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361



No. 2

1412 A

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1412 A

# 國際檢察部 第一四一三 A 号

## 與據及公正ニ関スル證明

余ハヤシカオルハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ即  
 日本外務省文書課長トシテ日本政府ト公的  
 關係ニ在ルモナルコト、並ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ  
 添附セラシタル六十頁ヨリ成ル十九百四十二年ノ昭和  
 十六年ノ十一月十二日附、下記題名、即チ帝國ノ參  
 戰ニ當リ執ルキ措置ニ関スル件、文書ノ保管ニ  
 任シ居ルニトシテ茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文  
 書ナルコト並ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公文書  
 類及ビ綴、一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シテラ、綴  
 番号又ハ引用、其他公文書類又ハ綴ニ於テハ該文書  
 ノ正規所在、公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ)

日本外務省

十九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ六月廿二日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名欄

右ノ者ノ公的資格

證人

ハヤシカオルニ署名

文書課長

オド・ナガハルニ署名

公式文書ニ関スル證明

余ノ RICHARD. H. LARCH、余ガ聯合國最高指揮官  
 司令部ニ關係アルモナルコト、並ニ上記題名ノ文書

No 1

No 2

14/2A

余が公務上、日本政府、上記署名官渡ヨリ入件ニ  
ルニ付、此トテ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年（昭和二十一年）八月廿二日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名欄

右者公的資格

證人

RICHARD H. LARSH

リチャード・ヒックマン 署名

調査官

J. A. CURTIS

ジョン・アール・カーティス 署名

Ex. 877

DETAILS OF THE EXECUTION OF ADMINISTRATION  
IN THE SOUTHERN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

No. 38 of forty volumes

National Top Secret

Decisions by the liaison conference between the Imperial Headquarters and the Government of Japan on November 20.

1. General Policy.

For occupied areas a military administration is to be temporarily enforced for the purpose of restoring public peace and order, for the immediate acquisition of resources vital for our national defense, and for maintaining the self-sufficiency of our operational forces.

The final reversion of the territories we have occupied and their future disposal are to be decided later.

2. Details

1. In the execution of military administration, such administrative organs as still exist will be made as much use of as possible and all obtaining social and racial customs will be respected.

2. As far as operations allow, our Occupation Forces will take measures to obtain all resources vital for our national defense and to expedite their development.

Resources vital for our national defense which are developed or obtained in the occupied areas will form an integral part of the Materials-Mobilization Plan of the Central Executive and everything needed by our operational forces for local self-sufficiency will, as a rule, be assigned to them locally in accordance with the Executive's distribution plans.

3. The transportation of resources to Japan will be assisted in every way possible by the Navy and Army alike, who will do their best to make full use of the ships they have requisitioned.

4. The Occupation Forces will keep control of railways, shipping, harbours, aviation, communications and the post.

5. The Occupation Forces will control trade and exchange and in particular will prevent any leakage to the enemy of resources of special importance, such as petroleum oil, rubber, tin, tungsten, quinine, etc.

6. Existing local currencies will, as a rule, be utilized and circulated as far as possible, but in unavoidable cases military notes of foreign denomination will be used.

7. Natives will have to reconcile themselves to such pressure as is unavoidably involved for them in our acquisition of resources vital for our national defense and the local self-sufficiency of our Occupation Forces. Demands for their pacification will not be tolerated if they militate against these objectives.

8. American, British and Dutch nationals will be directed to cooperate with our military administration. For the recalcitrant, deportation or other appropriate measures will be devised. The existing rights and interests of the Axis Powers will be respected but any future extension of them will be restricted as far as possible.

Chinese emigrants will be made to renounce allegiance to the Chiang Government and to sympathize and cooperate with our measures.

Native inhabitants will be directed so as to promote their feelings of dependence on the Imperial Army. We must avoid giving rise to any premature independence movement.

9. Japanese will be strictly examined as to their fitness <sup>the occupied</sup> before they can make their first trip into ~~enemy~~ <sup>territory</sup> land after the start of operations; preferential consideration will be given to the return journeys of those who were once resident in these areas, but who have returned to Japan.

10. The following measures are to be taken in connection with the execution of military administration:

- (a) All important matters concerning our local military administration shall be decided by means of liaison conferences between the Imperial Headquarters and the Government. Local troops will be notified of decisions of the Central Executive by the Navy and Army respectively.

- (b) Schemes and regulations for the acquisition and development of resources will for the present be made by the Central Executive organization, under the leadership of the Planning Board. The latter's decisions shall be carried out in accordance with (a).
- (c) In the case of F.I.C. and <sup>Thailand</sup>~~Siam~~, our pre-arranged policies will be adhered to and no military administration will be enforced. Measures will be decided later in the event of any sudden change in their status.

Notes:--

1. The military administration machinery will be gradually amalgamated, readjusted or taken over by the new organization which the Government will set up, depending on the progress of the Imperial policies toward the Occupied Territories.

(The End)

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Measures to be taken towards Foreign Countries relative to the Outline for the execution of National Policies, which was decided at the council in the presence of the Emperor held on November 5.

Liaison Conference Decision  
November 13th, 1941.

Policy Towards Germany and Italy.

When the present negotiations with the United States of America break down and a war with her becomes unavoidable (presumed to be after November 25th), the Japanese Government shall notify Germany (and Italy), without delay, of our intention to start war against the United States of America and Britain as soon as our war preparations are ready, and shall open necessary negotiations with them in connection with the following matters, telling them that these are a part of our war preparations:

1. Participation of Germany (and Italy) in the war against the United States of America.
2. No separate peace.

Remarks:

If we are requested by Germany to join in the war against the Soviet Union, we shall reply that we will not enter it for the time being. It cannot be helped if, as a result of it, Germany's participation in the war against the United States of America is delayed thereby.

Policy towards Britain.

Prompt measures shall be taken directly or through the medium of the United States of America to make Britain accept, and positively cooperate with us in, the matters included in the understandings reached in the negotiations between Japan and the United States of America.

In order to conceal our intentions, no other special diplomatic measures shall be taken.

### Policy towards the Dutch East Indies

In order to help conceal and disguise our intentions, we shall open as soon as possible a series of diplomatic negotiations /with the Dutch East Indies/, in the form of continuation of previous negotiations, with the chief object of obtaining commodities needed by our country.

### Policy towards the Soviet Union

Diplomatic negotiations /with the Soviet Union/ shall be continued in conformity with Item I of the Outline of Diplomatic Negotiations with the Soviet Union, which was decided at the Liaison Conference of Imperial Headquarters and the Government held on August 4th, 1941. ✓

### Policy towards Thailand.

1. Just before commencing the advance into /Thailand/, the following demands shall be made and their immediate compliance obtained:

Our troops shall advance /into Thailand/, as prearranged, even if our demands are rejected by Thailand. However, efforts shall be made to localize as much as possible military collision between Japan and Thailand.

(a) Right of passage of Japanese troops through her territory and the grant of various facilities incidental thereto.

(b) Immediate enforcement of measures to avoid possible collisions between the troops of Japan and Thailand, owing to the passage of Japanese troops.

(c) Conclusion of a joint defence agreement, if Thailand desires it.

Note: No special change in our attitude towards Thailand shall be made before the commencement of the negotiations. In particular, great care shall be taken to conceal our plan of opening war.

2. After the penetration of our troops, we shall immediately open negotiations with the Government of Thailand for concrete arrangements on the following matters:



(a) Matters concerning the passage and stationing of Japanese troops.

(b) Provision, construction and enlargement of military establishments.

(c) Provision of necessary traffic and communication facilities as well as factory facilities.

(d) Matters concerning billeting and sustenance for the Japanese troops passing through or stationed in Thailand.

(e) Loans to defray necessary military expenditure.

Remarks: In the negotiations on Items 1 and 2, we shall definitely promise to respect her sovereignty and territorial integrity in conformity with the Outline of Policies towards French Indo-China and Thailand, which was decided at the Liaison Conference of Imperial Headquarters and the Government held on February 1st, 1941.

Moreover, depending on the attitude of Thailand, we shall try to turn the negotiations to our advantage by suggesting that we will in future consider the cession of a part of Burma or Malay to Thailand.

#### Policy towards China.

The following measures shall be taken, bearing in mind the necessity of preserving our all-round fighting power to cope with a protracted world war by avoiding military attrition in China as far as possible, and also bearing in mind the probable decrease of our military strength in the future:

1. To drive out the military forces of the United States of America and Britain in China.

2. To place under our actual control enemy concessions in China (including the Legation Quarter in Peking) and important enemy interests (such as the maritime customs and mines), but care shall be taken to lighten as far as possible our burden in respect to man-power and materials.

Note: Though the International Settlements and the Legation Quarter in Peking shall be brought under our actual control after driving out the enemy's military forces, these areas shall not be completely taken over since they also include interests of countries friendly to us.

3. The abovementioned plans shall be carried out only after the declaration of war against the United States of America and Britain, lest our intentions be revealed.

4. Our right of belligerency against the Chungking Regime shall not be obtained by a declaration or other formalities, but the actual effect of belligerency will be obtained by a declaration of war against the United States of America and Britain.

5. Among the enemy interests in China, even those interests connected with the National Government shall, if necessary, be brought under our control for the time being, and adjustment made separately.

6. The activities of influential Chinese in the occupied area shall be encouraged and fostered as far as possible, so as to win the people's mind to Sino-Japanese cooperation and thereby gradually establish localized peace in the areas where this is possible.

7. In our economic relations with China, we shall lay special stress upon the acquisition of goods. For this purpose reasonable adjustments shall be made in the various existing restrictions.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I.F.S. No. 1441

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section of Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 7 pages, dated 13 Nov., 1941, and described as follows: Fundamental Foreign Tenets Concerning the Execution of the National Policies Decided by the Imperial Conference of November 5. Dated 13 November 1941. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Office -----

Signed at Tokyo on this 17 day of Sept. 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official  
SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Cdo

-----  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business

Signed at Tokyo on this 19th day of Sept. 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME

Witness: /s/ T/4 P. Toguchi

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

Doc. No. 1555I

Page 1

Excerpt from "TOKYO GAZETTE", Vol. V, No. 2, February, 1942

## THE 78TH SESSION OF THE IMPERIAL DIET

-Ministerial Addresses of December 16, 1941-

## ADDRESS BY THE PRIME MINISTER, GENERAL HIDEKI TOJO

I have been profoundly impressed with the Gracious Message from the Throne granted today at the opening ceremony of the Imperial Diet. In respectful response to the Imperial Wishes, it is my intention to overcome this difficult situation, unprecedented in history, by devoting myself heart and soul to service to State, and thereby to put His Majesty's mind at rest.

At the previous 77th session of the Diet I asked for your cooperation, by frankly laying before you the Government's convictions with regard to the execution of national policies. Since then, the Government had continued their negotiations with the United States of America. As already explained on that occasion, the negotiations were conducted for preventing third Powers from interfering with the successful conclusion of the China Affair which Japan has in view, for making various Powers surrounding Japan not only to refrain from giving direct military menace to Japan but also to remove such hostile measures as an economic blockade against Japan and to restore normal economic relations with us, and also for preventing the European war from spreading to East Asia. Bearing the unbearable and enduring the unendurable, the Government redoubled their efforts to attain the said purpose through diplomatic negotiations. The United States, however, took Japan's patience and prudence for a sign of weakness. She not only refused to listen to Japan's just contentions but furthermore withdrew her original proposals, and in collusion with Britain she submitted her new arrogant proposal to Japan. Details of the American proposal have already been made public by the Government. Three points of the American proposal which Japan could by no means accept were as follows:

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At the same time I feel keenly that the Government and people on the home front are shouldering increasingly heavy responsibilities. On the outcome of this war depends the destiny of the Japanese Empire. History clearly shows that the Japanese people, when confronted with a great national crisis, get united like one man and successfully overcome all difficulties, by giving full play to their self-sacrificing spirit for the cause of the State, thereby enhancing national fortune. The secret of winning a war lies in an abiding faith in sure victory. I am firmly convinced that the entire nation, in keeping with national polity and recalling the glorious history of the Empire, which has never been sullied with a single defeat in war during its twenty-six centuries' existence, will endure whatever hardships and privations they may have to undergo with unshaken faith in sure victory, and will bring the present war to a glorious termination by performing their duties in their respective functions.

However, our enemies are the United States and the British Empire who boast of extensive territories and abundant resources and by those means are intent on realizing their ambition of holding the world hegemony. It is the task of Japan to settle the disturbances in Greater East Asia and to defeat these powerful opponents. We are prepared that the war will be a long one. We must, therefore, definitely bear in mind that our country will hereafter meet many difficulties, and endeavour to exploit the brilliant successes won at the beginning of the war by increased efforts for the annihilation of enemy forces, and at the same time undertake a grand construction work in all fields embracing various regions of the South which will newly participate in the task, and thereby speedily perfect a structure capable of withstanding such a long-term war. The war remains rather to be fought hereafter. We people should not be intoxicated with individual victories; nor should we worry about any individual phenomena; we must all the more invigorate the inherent spirit of Japan, and help one another in guarding against negligence at home and preventing the infiltration of evil thought from the outside, and thus with a firm faith in our victory, exert ourselves resolutely to attain the objective of the war with the thought of giving ourselves to the cause of our Empire.

I wish here to express our profound gratitude to our Allies, Manchukuo and China, with which Japan's inseparable relations are evermore cordial, and which have, since the opening of the war, been rendering to us cooperation in

Excerpt from "TOKYO GAZETTE", Vol. V, No. 8, February, 1942

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-Ministerial Addresses of December 16, 1941-

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In other words, the United States demanded Japan to withdraw all her armed forces from China and French Indo-China, to repudiate the Nanking Government, and to renounce the Three-Power Pact. It became clear that the intention of the United States was to challenge Japan with a rupture of economic relations and military intimidation, and thereby to bring Japan to her knees. Had Japan accepted the American demands, not only the strenuous efforts of Japan for long years in the stabilization of Greater East Asia would have been brought to naught, but also, Japan's very existence would have been jeopardized and Japan's honour would have been lost by being compelled to break her pledge given to her allies for cooperation in restoring world peace. Such a thing could never be borne by Japan under any circumstances. When things came to such a pass, Japan, though ardent in her desire for peace, had no course left to her but to rise up with arms to safeguard her prestige and existence. This is the reason why the Imperial Rescript was issued on the eighth of this month, declaring war upon the United States of America and the British Empire. I am overwhelmed with emotion and inspired by the Imperial Will and Vision. Once hostilities were opened at the Imperial Command, the gallant officers and men of our fighting services have speedily broken through the enemy key positions within less than ten days. The bulk of the American fleet, which had its base in Hawaii, is destroyed. The main body of the British Far Eastern fleet is crushed. The encircling front against Japan, whose strength the enemy has exaggerated and given wide publicity in an attempt to intimidate Japan, is shattered at various places. The Anti-Japanese encircling front is already on the fair way to collapse. These great military achievements have become a wonder of the world, enhancing our Empire's prestige both at home and abroad. This is entirely due to the August Virtue of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor, which is the source of my profound inspiration.

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At the same time I feel keenly that the Government and people on the home front are shouldering increasingly heavy responsibilities. On the outcome of this war depends the destiny of the Japanese Empire. History clearly shows that the Japanese people, when confronted with a great national crisis, get united like one man and successfully overcome all difficulties, by giving full play to their self-sacrificing spirit for the cause of the State, thereby enhancing national fortune. The secret of winning a war lies in an abiding faith in sure victory. I am firmly convinced that the entire nation, in keeping with national polity and recalling the glorious history of the Empire, which has never been sullied with a single defeat in war during its twenty-six centuries' existence, will endure whatever hardships and privations they may have to undergo with unshaken faith in sure victory, and will bring the present war to a glorious termination by performing their duties in their respective functions.

However, our enemies are the United States and the British Empire who boast of extensive territories and abundant resources and by those means are intent on realizing their ambition of holding the world hegemony. It is the task of Japan to settle the disturbances in Greater East Asia and to defeat these powerful opponents. We are prepared that the war will be a long one. We must, therefore, definitely bear in mind that our country will hereafter meet many difficulties, and endeavour to exploit the brilliant successes won at the beginning of the war by increased efforts for the annihilation of enemy forces, and at the same time undertake a grand construction work in all fields embracing various regions of the South which will newly participate in the task, and thereby speedily perfect a structure capable of withstanding such a long-term war. The war remains rather to be fought hereafter. We people should not be intoxicated with individual victories; nor should we worry about any individual phenomena; we must all the more invigorate the inherent spirit of Japan, and help one another in guarding against negligence at home and preventing the infiltration of evil thought from the outside, and thus with a firm faith in our victory, exert ourselves resolutely to attain the objective of the war with the thought of giving ourselves to the cause of our Empire.

I wish here to express our profound gratitude to our Allies, Manchukuo and China, with which Japan's inseparable relations are evermore cordial, and which have, since the opening of the war, been rendering to us cooperation in

every possible way. It is also gratifying that Japan has previously concluded the joint defence agreement with French Indo-China and has also reached an agreement of views with Thailand concerning the conclusion of an offensive-defensive alliance with that country, and that these two countries are going forward together with us toward the construction of the New Order by further strengthening their collaboration.

That Japan has been obliged to take action at this time in the regions of the South is for no other purpose than to bring to an end the tyrannical policies of the United States and the British Empire and enable all regions of Greater East Asia to restore and develop their inherent character as well as to undertake construction work on a grand scale. It is earnestly hoped that several hundred millions of people of Greater East Asia will understand the real intentions of Japan and, without needless opposition, will participate rather as our partners in the consecrated task of constructing the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. It is very deplorable that the Chungking regime is at present still continuing its resistance. If it persists in offering resistance hereafter, Japan will not in the least relax her pressure upon it. As a matter of fact, however, the fountain-head of its power of resistance is now on the verge of complete collapse. A settlement of the disturbances in China is, I believe, forthcoming before very long.

It is a source of mutual gratification at this time that our allies, Germany and Italy, have joined the war immediately after Japan's declaration of war and have, together with us, pledged themselves with an inflexible determination to take all forceful means and never to lay down arms until a victory is won against the common enemies of world peace. They have also agreed with Japan not to conclude an armistice or peace with either the United States or the British Empire without a complete mutual understanding among the three countries and to cooperate more and more closely in future for the realization of a new order characterized by justice and equality. This agreement has resulted in a further consolidation of the bond of alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy. I desire here to express the firm determination of the Japanese Empire never to sheathe the sword until the United States and the British Empire are brought to submission. I also wish to take this opportunity to express our heartfelt appreciation of the enthusiastic display of patriotic spirit of our nation since the outset of hostilities. The budgetary and legislative measures submitted at this session are all confined to matters of urgent nature for the prosecution of the war. I earnestly hope that you will speedily deliberate and give your approval upon them.

THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF THE JAPANESE ARMY

<u>Period</u>	<u>Division</u>	<u>Brigade</u>	<u>Total Strength</u>
1 Jan. 1930	17	4	250.000
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Note

1. The number of division shows the total of infantry divisions, tank divisions, flying division groups, flying divisions and flying training divisions.
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July 16, 1946

C E R T I F I C A T E

Haruyoshi Saito certifies as follows:

(A) I, as an official of the Japanese Government who has the qualification of Demobilization secretary, have the power of making this certificate.

(B) I, as the Government official, has the right of keeping a part of the records and documents concerning the strength of the Army. And the larger parts of them was lost at the termination of the war by burning up and so on.

(C) The annexed papers concerning the strength of the Army were compiled by making the best use of the above remaining records and documents which could be available. (And some of them were collected from memories).

/s/ Haruyoshi Saito

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Secretary of 1st Demobilization Bureau

## EXCERPT FROM "JAPAN YEAR BOOK 1941-42"

## CHAPTER XLIII

## SOUTH SEA ISLANDS

## UNDER JAPAN'S MANDATE

## Geographical Features

The South Sea Islands mandated to Japan, numbering over 1,400, with an aggregate area of 2,148.80 square kilometers, are the Mariana, Marshall and Caroline groups, between 131° 10' and 172° 10' of east longitude and between 1° 15' and 20° 32' of north latitude. The Hawaiian Islands are to the east; the Philippines and Celebes to the west; the Bonin Islands to the north, and New Guinea to the south. Only one island among them, i.e. Guam, belongs to the United States.

The Mariana archipelago starts close to the southern end of the Bonin Islands, stretching toward the equator, and the Marshall and Caroline groups extend to the east and west along the equator, forming an inverted letter "T" with the Marianas. About 740 miles south of the Bonin Islands lies Saipan, the largest of the Marianas, and about 180 miles farther south is Truk, one of the largest of the Carolines, which marking the crossing point of the inverted "T", is the center of the mandated territory. The line of 148° east longitude divides the Carolines into the West Carolines, with Palau and Yap, and the East Carolines, with Truk and Ponape. Because of the distances between the islands and the extensive area covered by them, communications are difficult. The fact that each group of isles uses different words peculiar to itself sufficiently demonstrates the degree to which they are separated.

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Secretary of 1st Demobilization Bureau

Ex 881

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CHAPTER XLIII

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The Mariana archipelago starts close to the southern end of the Bonin Islands, stretching toward the equator, and the Marshall and Caroline groups extend to the east and west along the equator, forming an inverted letter "T" with the Marianas. About 740 miles south of the Bonin Islands lies Saipan, the largest of the Marianas, and about 180 miles farther south is Truk, one of the largest of the Carolines, which marking the crossing point of the inverted "T", is the center of the mandated territory. The line of 148° east longitude divides the Carolines into the West Carolines, with Palau and Yap, and the East Carolines, with Truk and Ponape. Because of the distances between the islands and the extensive area covered by them, communications are difficult. The fact that each group of isles uses different words peculiar to itself sufficiently demonstrates the degree to which they are separated.

2521

88

1001

### 陸軍兵力概見表

年度	師團數	旅團數	總兵力
1930. 1.1	17	4	250.000
1931. 1.1	17	4	250.000
1932. 1.1	17	4	300.000
1933. 1.1	17	5	330.000
1934. 1.1	17	5	350.000
1935. 1.1	17	5	380.000
1936. 1.1	17	5	400.000
1937. 1.1	17	5	450.000
1938. 1.1	26	5	950.000
1939. 1.1	25	15	1130.000
1940. 1.1	43	16	1240.000
1941. 1.1	53	24	1350.000
1942. 1.1	56	25	2100.000
1943. 1.1	68	25	2400.000
1944. 1.1	80	41	2900.000

#### 備考

1. 師團個數: 歩兵師團・戰車師團・飛行師團・教育飛行師團、合計
2. 旅團個數: 獨立混成旅團・獨立歩兵(旅)團・騎兵旅團・砲兵旅團・獨立戰車團・海上機動旅團・樺太混成旅團、合計
3. 陸軍總兵力(海軍別定員) = 師團數 ×
4. 上記陸軍兵力算出 = 資料諸記録: 陸軍時支部等、对其大部  
 7 表より従って上記諸数字は 1946年7月16日現在復員局  
 = 於所保存諸記録 (一部記憶ヨリ部分別) により調査レ  
 得る最大限に於て。

2591

# 證明書

按者 有藤春義 此 証 明 書

一 按者、復員事務官、資格ヲ有シ日本政府官吏トシ此、證明書ヲ作成スルノ權限ヲ有ス

一 右官吏トシ陸軍兵力ニ関スル記録及ヒ文書、

一部ヲ保管ス

陸軍兵力ニ関スル記録及ヒ文書、大部終戦時變却等ニヨリ之ヲ喪失ス

一 茲ニ陸軍部隊概員表ト記載セラルル諸書

類ハ上ニ~~陸軍部隊概員表~~記録及ヒ文書等ヲ用テ得ル限リ、

記録一部ハ~~陸軍部隊概員表~~部令等ヲ用テ作成セ

ル

以上

昭和二十五年七月十五日

二 於 此

官 署

復員事務官

署 長

有藤春義

首 印

證 人 署 名

No. 2

Doc. 1756 H-1, 881

日本ニ在任統治サレタル南洋群島ハ、其ノ數一千四百ヲ越ス、總面積二、一四八。八〇平方海里ニシテ、「マリアナ」、「マーシャル」及「カロリン」諸群島ヨリ成リ東經一三一度一〇分乃至一七二度一〇分ノ間、北緯一度一五分乃至二〇度三分ノ間ニ介在ス。南洋群島ハ其ノ東ニ、「フィリピン」及「セイロン」諸島ハ西方ニ、小笠原島ハ北方ニ又「ニューギニア」及「アムステルダム」諸島ニ位ス。其ノ中唯「アムステルダム」島ノミ合衆國ニ屬ス。

「マリアナ」群島ハ小笠原群島ノ南方ニ近接シ、南ハ「赤道」ニ過ス。又「マリアナ」島「カボクラ」群島ハ赤道ニ沿ヒテ東西ニ延ビ「マリアナ」群島ト共ニ「丁」字ヲ造ルニナル形ヲ成ス。小笠原群島ノ南方約七四〇哩ノ所ニ「サモア」群島、コレハ「マリアナ」群島中最大ノ島ナリ。又ソレヨリ東ニ約一八〇哩前方ニ「トクエラ」群島。コレハ「カ

(續)  
(終)  
地 形

南洋群島

第十四章 日本委任統治下ニ於ケル

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361

Doc. 1756 H-2

Caroline

カロリン諸島ノ最大ノ島一ニツテ厥例丁字形ノ交  
 點ニ當リ、委任統治領ノ中心ヲナス。東經一四八度  
 ノ線ハ「<sup>Caroline</sup>カロリン」諸島ヲ「<sup>Falao</sup>パラオ」及「<sup>Yap</sup>ヤップ」  
 ヲ含ム西「<sup>Caroline</sup>カロリン」諸島ト「<sup>Truk</sup>トラツク」及「<sup>Ponape</sup>ポナペ」  
 トヲ含ム東「<sup>Caroline</sup>カロリン」諸島トニ分ツ。島ト島ト  
 ノ距離悉ク又コレ等ノ島々ノ間存スル距離最大ナル  
 多ク、交通ハ困難ナリ。各島毎ニソレソレ特有ノ  
 長ル言語ヲ使用シ居ルル事實ハコレ等ノ島々ノ分數  
 シ居ル程度ヲ證明スルニ十分ナリ。



Q# 883

Doc. No. 6022

Page 1

Date 16 March 1946.

I, Manuel Blanco, I.D. No. 14492, Labor No. \_\_\_\_\_, do hereby make the following statement to the Legal Officer, ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ freely and voluntarily, without coercion, with the full realization that such statement made may be used as evidence against me.

I, Manuel Blanco, was born on Saipan on 13 November 1906. I worked for the N.K.K. as a blacksmith from 1934 to 1944. During this period the Japanese Navy's most important military construction projects were the buildings of ASLITO Naval Air Base commenced in 1932 and it was never completed. At the beginning of 1940 anti-aircraft, coastal batteries, and other type of ordnance were installed at the ASLITO Air field. I saw at that time the NK train bring plane parts and guns, bombs, etc., from the pier to the Aslito Naval Air Base. I helped to build a bomb shelter at Aslito Field in 1938. The hangars as well as other installations were camouflaged with grass, trees, and plants beginning in the later part of 1938.

The Japanese used forced labor in a very small degree before August 1939 but from that time on forced native labor was used extensively. The native forced laborers received 80 sen a day and this was not adequate. In my opinion the Japanese Govt. used forced labor without sufficient remuneration.

I have had all the foregoing material on this page interpreted to me by Vincente de Leon Guerrero in the Chamorro language, which I understand. I have made this statement voluntarily and have had the interpreter read the statement on this page; finding it to be a full and complete statement of the circumstances connected with my attachment to this case. I hereby certify that the above is a complete and true statement of facts, and that no compulsion or

Doc. No. 6022  
Page 1

pressure of any kind whatsoever was exerted on me by any person in making this written statement.

/s/ Manuel Blanco

I swear that I am familiar with both the English language and the Chamorro language and that before the above statement was signed I read same in the Chamorro language to the person who signed same.

/s/ Vincente de Leon Guerrero

WITNESS: s/ Charles D. Cook

Ens. D(L) USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before  
me this 16th day of March,  
1946.

Theodore M. Adelson, Lt. (JG) USNR

Legal Officer, U.S. Nav. Mil. Govt. Saipan, M.I.

日附、一九〇六年(昭和十一年)三月十日

私儀 MANUEL BLANCO

I.D. 第四九二号、労働者 号、

左、通り陳述致之

私儀

MANUEL BLANCO (一九〇六年(明治三十九年)十一月十三日サンパウロに於て生じ之り。

私一九三四年(昭和九年)より一九四四年(昭和十九年)迄鐵道屋卜三南洋興業株式会社に働きたり。此、期間に於て日本海軍、最も重要なる軍用建設計画、一九三二年(昭和七年)に始りたるアリト上海軍航空基地建設に於て、未だ完成せず。一九四〇年(昭和十五年)初め高射砲、沿岸砲、及他、型式、兵器等、アリト飛行場ニ提供せられたり。ソノ当時南洋興業株式会社、汽車、被上機、カラ飛行機、部分、大砲、爆弾等、アリト上海軍航空基地へ運ばし見たり。

8022

883

88

100

6022


私八九三八年(昭和十三年)アスリート館作場

！防空壕ヲ造ル手傳ヒヲシメタ。

船納庫ニ他ノ建物同部一九三八年(昭和十三年)

後半ノ始メカラ草ヤ木ヤ植木ヲ擬答サ

シエタ。



1402

Ev 884

Document No. 6024

I, Wakamatsu Makoto, I. D. No. 9804, Labor No. F-272, do hereby make the following statement to the Legal Officer, freely and voluntarily, without coercion, with the full realization that such statement made may be used as evidence against me.

I, Wakamatsu Makoto, was born at Oita Ken, Kyushu Japan, on 13 June 1907. I first came to Saipan in 1935 to work as a Chemical engineer for the N.K.K. I observed various military installations in the vicinity of the Aslito field on which construction was commenced in 1933. Two years before the outbreak of the war, the Japanese military built a series of concrete trenches and shelters around the Aslito Air Field, which were designated to serve as means of protection in case of air raids. In 1940, I happened to see some Japanese Navy Men storing a huge amount of ammunition in some warehouses in Aslito Air Field. These warehouses were situated in a forested section and were camouflaged to look like trees. They were coastal guns located on AGINGAN Point and NAFUTAN Point. I heard after from USK officials that there was an anti-submarine net in Tanapag Harbor placed there just before December 1941.

I have had all the foregoing material on this page interpreted to me by Ens. Charles D. Sheldon in the Japanese language, which I understand. I have made this statement voluntarily and have had the interpreter read the statement on this page; finding it to be a full and complete statement of the circumstances connected with my attachment to this case. I hereby certify that the above is a complete and true statement of facts, and that no compulsion or pressure of any kind whatsoever was exerted on me by any person in making this written statement.

/s/ Wakamatsu Makoto

I swear that I am familiar with both the English language and the Japanese language and that before the above statement was signed I read same in the Japanese language to the person who signed same.

/s/ Charles D. Sheldon,  
Ens., S (1), USNR

WITNESS: /s/ Charles D. Cock  
Ens. D (L) USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before me this  
16th day of March, 1946. (Seal)  
/s/ Theodore M. Adelson, Lt. (J.G.) USNR  
Legal Officer, U. S. Nav. Mil. Govt. Saipan, M. I.

FILE  
RETURN TO ROOM 361  
COPY

日附一九四六年三月十日

私若松真(主筆)が執筆した「島嶼奮闘記」

「二七三」の左に通り陳述致す

私若松真、一九〇七年六月十三日日本九州大分県

尾上ノ久、私、一九三五年初、南洋興業株式會社、社長

部下三働、爲「島嶼」の本名を「島嶼」に改

題、附近三開、始々々々、建設、一九三三年、種々の軍

施設を認め、又、戦争勃發、三年前日本軍、

入り、小飛行場、周圍三防護、場合、防衛手段

の設計を、標二設計せし、二、タリ、一、製、一、連

隊、隊、掩、甚、構、築、之、一、二、四、〇、年、私、偶、々

日本海軍、人達、が、ア、リ、小飛行場、幾、ツ、カ、倉

庫、二、莫、大、量、の、彈、藥、を、貯、り、て、見、え、タ、

其、時、倉、庫、の、森、林、地、帯、二、位、置、に、居、り、樹、木、

二、二、三、ヤ、ロ、二、偽、裝、を、ア、リ、タ、ア、リ、タ、一、方、之、甲、

二、ア、タ、之、甲、二、此、地、帯、に、附、け、て、二、年、マ、シ、タ、

私、後、二、南洋興業株式會社、高級社員、一、九、四

年、十二月、直前、三月、十六、日、卷、二、對、海、軍、艦、隊、を、

ヲ、聞、キ、マ、シ、タ、

884

Document No. 6019

Date March 16, 1946

I, Ignacio Benavente, Farmer and Village Chief Assistant, I.D. No. 20220, Labor No. B 728, do hereby make the following statement to the Legal Officer, freely and voluntarily, without coercion, with the full realization that such statement made may be used as evidence against me.

As far as I can remember the ASLITO Airfield was built in 1935. I saw a wireless station and gasoline tanks at the same airfield before I left for Yap in 1937 and another military wireless station north of Susupe, site of present Signal Supply. I heard at that time that an ammunition dump was being built and also a large tank in 1935 near the harbor.

When I came to Yap in 1937 I heard that Mr. Price and his wife had been there sometime in 1935, but they were not denied any equal rights. They were watched everywhere they went. During my stay in Yap I did not see any Americans there except after the surrendering of the Japanese.

I have written all the material on this page.

/Signed/ IGNACIO BENAVENTE

WITNESS: CHARLES D. COOK /s/.  
Ens. D(L) USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

16th day of March, 1946

/s/ THEODORE H. ADELSON, Lt. (J.G.) USNR  
Legal Officer, U.S. Nav. Mil. Gov't. Saipan, M. I.

(SEAL)

書類番号六二九

日付 一九四六年三月十六日

農天三子村、助教

此 Gracie Benvenuto 認識、番号二〇三〇、

労働番号、百七二八八番二次、陳述ヲナス。

私が記憶ニテキル限りテハ「スクリ」飛行場、一九三五年ニ建設サレタ。

然ガ一九三七年ヤ、島ニ三九前二月飛行場ニ無線

局トガソリニタリ及ビ又ス、北方現在信號發信所、

信置ニ、モ、軍用無線局ヲ見ス、ノ、堂謀私ノ聞キタ

感ニヨリハ港ノ近クニ、一九三五年彈藥集積所ガ建設

ス、又、大キオタニ建設中ニアリタ。

Doc. 1117  
885

RETURN TO ROOM 361  
COPY



Q 886

Document No. 6020

Page 1  
Date March 16, 1946

I, Elias P. Sablan, I. D. No. 1899, Labor No. C-850, do hereby make the following statement to the Legal Officer freely and voluntarily, without coercion, with the full realization that such statement made may be used as evidence against me.

I, Elias Sablan, was born on the 8 of November 1899, on Saipan, I. I. I worked as foreman loading and unloading cargoes. This work was carried on at Tanapag harbor in 1931. Aslito Field in 1935 was started. In 1939 Sanadero construction began. The Japanese brought in about 10-inch guns stored them in warehouses. This occurred around 1937. They were set up in 1939 and 1940. The forced labor started in 1939 and they took Saipan chamorros up to a reef to fortify it. Keeping forced labor there for 6 months. These people were paid two yens a day. Early 1931 the Japs started bringing in cement, lumber, many airplanes. In the summer of 1941, they started to bring in fighters, bombers, and many drums of gas. Forced labor used to help to fortify Saipan was used by the Japanese.

25  
About 18 November 1941 ten young Chamorros 21-25 who could speak English were picked forcibly and another group one which later were told they were to help the Emperor and Japan. On 6 December they were sent to Guam on unknown mission. Second group was sent to Guam on 8 December 1941. They were used to search the island for gun positions to help the Japanese but after being turned loose to watch they hid in the jungles.

I have had all the foregoing material on this page typewritten after I had written it in English.

/s/ Elias P. Sablan

WITNESS: Charles D. Cook

Ens. D (L) USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before me this  
16th day of March 1946.

Theodore K. Adelson, Lt. (JG) USNR  
Legal Officer, U. S. Nav. Mil. Govt.  
Saipan, I. I.

(SEAL)

Document No. 6020  
Page 1

60206

日附 一九三六年三月十一日

秘儀 ELIAS SABLAN I. 番号 # 1899 労働 # C-850  
の左記通り陳述を致した。

秘儀 ELIAS SABLAN: 一九三一年十一月六日委任  
統監サイパン島に赴き赴した。私の船荷揚卸  
の頭を勤めた居りました。此の仕事は一九三二年  
グアム港に於けること。一九三五年アスリート飛  
機場に着手せし。一九三九年四月に建設が開始  
なり。日本人の十噸石を持込する倉庫を貯蔵し、  
一九三七年頃、コトナス。

一九三九年及一九四〇年に提付せられた。

Ex 888

強制労働は一九三九年始マツソンテサパン、  
二島族を或暗礁に送られたり此を禁ず。其  
後六ヶ月間強制労働をせしめ人達の日  
一給支給せし。一九三三年始軍人セメント  
工場、飛行機多敷、持込を始す。一九四一年  
夏島嶼爆撃隊多敷、カソリ入、トラス島

1020

ヲ持込ニ始ナク。サイパン要塞化、為日本人、強制  
 勞働ヲ用ヒタシアル。一九四一年十一月八日頃若ク  
 ナヤモロ人十人が二十一オヨリ二十五オまで、若ク英語  
 解ルモノガ強制的ニ選抜サレ、別ニモウ一團選抜  
 シシハ後ニ天皇ト日本国ヲ助ケルコト言ハル。  
 十二月六日未詳、使命ヲ帯ヒテ「カム島」ヘ送ラ  
 ル。第三團ハ一九四一年十二月八日「カム島」ヘ送ラ  
 ル。彼等ハ島ニアル大砲、据付場所ヲ搜シテ日  
 本軍ヲ援助スル為ニ用セラレタガ捜査、為自由  
 ニサレタ時密林ニ彼等ハ隠レタリツネ。

102

Date 16 March 1946

I, Mariano Pangelinan, I.D. No. 1, Labor No. 849, do hereby make the following statement to the Legal Officer ~~Public Department~~ freely and voluntarily, without coercion, with the full realization that such statement made may be used as evidence against me.

I, Mariano Pangelinan, was born on November 1880 in Guam and came to Saipan in 1901. From 1903 to 1945 I served as district chief of District #2. Under the Japanese I was a labor foreman. In such capacity I had an opportunity to observe the conditions under which native labor worked. The Japanese government definitely used forced native labor. If a man did not work, he was beaten or thrown into jail. Even children of seven years were forced to work. Adults were poorly paid, native children were not paid at all. These youngsters carried baskets of sand, bricks and building materials and worked in road construction. The only thing that they obtained was food, and that was insufficient to sustain them. In my opinion the Japanese definitely forced laborers to work for them without remuneration.

The Japanese were very careful to hide from the native population all military installations and fortifications, but I saw many signs of Japanese rearmament in Saipan before 1941. This rearmament started gradually around 1935 with the building of the Aslito air field on the present site of Isley Field and made rapid headway by 1940. I noticed during this period the construction of ammunition dumps, military barracks, and other military installations.

I have had all the foregoing material on this page interpreted to me by Ignacio Benavente in the Chamorro language, which I understand. I have made this statement voluntarily and have had the interpreter read the statement on this page; finding it to be a full and complete statement of the circumstances connected with my attachment to this case. I hereby certify that the above is a

complete and true statement of facts, and that no compulsion or pressure of any kind whatsoever was exerted on me by any person in making this written statement.

/s/ Mariano Pangelinan

I swear that I am familiar with both the English language and the Chamorro language and that before the above statement was signed I read same in the Chamorro language to the person who signed same.

/s/ Ignacio Benavente

WITNESS: /s/ Charles D. Cook

Ens. D(L) USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before me this  
16th day of March, 1946.

/s/ Theodore H. Adelson, Lt. (JG) USNR

Legal Officer, U.S. Nav. Mil. Govt. Saipan, M.I.

(Seal)

302

7887

自附

一九四六年三月十六日

FILE COPY RETURN TO ROOM 361

姓 Masiano Pangelinon <sup>認識者為一</sup>  
 證人姓名第一，茲於三月廿一日，陳述如下。  
 姓 Masiano Pangelinon 一九一〇年十一月廿二  
 日生，一九四一年廿一月廿二日，一九三三年在  
 一九四五年迄一九四七年五月廿五日，勤大  
 一九四九年，日本入，下下私立海衛班長，平一九  
 一九四九年。  
 日本入，凡下，軍事施設及重要資料，其  
 際下為，非常，注意，認之，平一九四九年，併  
 一九四一年以前，廿一月廿二日，於日本，  
 無武裝，多，跡，見之。此戰，  
 一九三五年頃，漸，上，飛行場，現  
 遺，上，飛行場，建設，其，始  
 一九四一年。年迄，急，進，之  
 一九四九年。此期間，中，彈藥，集積所，兵營  
 及其他，軍事施設，建設，之，一九四九年。

6" 888

Doc. No. 6025

Page 1

Date 16 March 1946

I, Antonio Angallen, I.D. NO. 313, Labor No. C-851, do hereby make the following statement to the Legal Officer, freely and voluntarily, without coercion, with the full realization that such statement made may be used as evidence against me.

I was born on Saipan 24 November 1889. I was elected District Chief of Carolinians in 1912 while under the rule of the Carrans. At present I hold the same job. The Japanese ordered me to retain the same position. In 1935 a Naval Air Base at Tanapag was started. In 1937 Aslito (Isley) air field was built. In 1940 Japanese emplacements were put up. Children and adults were forced to level the air strips without only 7 ounces of rice a day to eat.

I have had all the foregoing material on this page interpreted to me by Elias Sablan in the Carolinian language, which I understand. I have made this statement voluntarily and have had the interpreter read the statement on this page, finding it to be a full and complete statement of the circumstances connected with my attachment to this case. I hereby certify that the above is a complete and true statement of facts, and that no compulsion or pressure of any kind whatsoever was exerted on me by any person in making this written statement.

/s/ ANTONIO ANGALLEN

I swear that I am familiar with both the English language and the Carolinian language and that before the above statement was signed I read same in the Carolinian language to the person who signed same.

/s/ ELIAS P. SABLAN

/s/  
WITNESS: / Charles D. Cook  
Ens. D(L) USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of March 1946.

(SEAL)

/s/ THEODORE M. ADLSON  
Lt.(jg) USNR, Legal Officer  
US Nav.Mil.Govt.  
Saipan, M.I.

Doc 6025

日附、一九四六年三月十六日

私、Antonio Angaiten 認識番号三三三、労働  
番号〇一五二、茲ニ於テ次、如上陳述ヲ致シマス。  
私、一九三九年十一月二十四日「サイヤ」ニ生レマシタ。  
ドイツ人ノ支配下ニアツタ一九三三年ニ私ハ「カロリ」諸

島ノ區長トシテ選ハレ現在同職ニ在リマス。日本人が同  
職ニ止マウ命ジマシタ。一九三五年「タナバク」ニ海軍  
航空基地が着エサレ、一九三七年ニアスリ止マシタ  
飛行場が作ラレマシタ。一九四〇年、日本軍砲床が振  
エラレマシタ。子供モ大人モ一日ニ七杯スル、米シカ  
喰バラズニ強制的ニ滑走路ヲサアサレマシタ。

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FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361



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Doc. No. 6025

Page 1

Date 16 March 1946

I, Juan M. Mia, I.D. No. 2685, Labor No. \_\_\_\_\_ do hereby make the following statement to the Legal Officer, freely and voluntarily, without coercion, with the full realization that such statement made may be used as evidence against me.

I was born in Saipan on December 2nd, 1896 and came to Saipan in 1899. In 1917 I was elected Head Chief of Garapan Village. In administering the village I was forced to take orders from the Japanese. In 1935 the Japanese bought up the farms in the area of Terapug Village and immediately started building a Naval Air Base. From 1939 to 1944 the Japanese forced all the Chamorros who were able-bodied to work at about 87 sen per day when the average wage was 250 per day for others. In 1943 in order to build the Saipan Air Field the Japanese forced all Chamorros from little school boys and school girls to old men and old women to work for no wages, giving them only 7 1/2 cups of rice for adults and half of that for a child per day.

I have had all the foregoing material on this page interpreted to me by Elias Sablan in the Chamorro language, which I understand. I have made this statement voluntarily and have had the interpreter read the statement on this page; finding it to be a full and complete statement of the circumstances connected with my attachment to this case. I hereby certify that the above is a complete and true statement of facts, and that no compulsion or pressure of any kind whatsoever was exerted on me by any person in making this written statement.

/s/ JUAN M. MIA

I swear that I am familiar with both the English language and the Chamorro language and that before the above statement was signed I read same in the Chamorro language to the person who signed same.

/s/ ELIAS F. SABLAN

WITNESS: /s/ CHARLES D. COOK  
Ens. D(L) USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of March 1946.

(SEAL)

/s/ THEODORE M. ADELSON  
Lt.(jg) USNR. Legal Officer,  
US Nav.Mil.Govt., Saipan, M.I.

DOC. 6026

94 387

日附、一九四六年 三月十六日

私 Guan M. Ada 認識番号二六八五一

茲ニ恭テ次、如キ陳述ヲ行フ。

私一九四六年十月十四日ニ父ノ死ニ至リ、一九四一年ニ  
母ノ死ニ至ル。

一九三七年ニ私ハカニ村ノ村長ニ選ビラセタ。村ノ行  
政ヲ負ヒ、ソノ時日本人ノ命令ニ應ジシメタ。

一九三五年ニ日本人ハカニ村地方ノ農場ヲ農工  
ノ直ニ上海軍航空基地ノ建設ニ取リカケタ。

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

SUMMARY OF JAPAN-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS DURING  
FOREIGN MINISTER ARITA'S TENURE OF OFFICE (FROM NOV.  
1938 UNTIL JULY 1939)

(September 2nd 1941)

- I. Prior to Minister ARITA assuming his duties as Foreign Minister in November 1938 Ambassador GREW remarked to Premier KONOYE (concurrently holding the post of Foreign Minister) on October 3rd that he wished to discuss orally regarding problems that the U. S. President felt as possessing direct interests, and after stating that, notwithstanding that the respecting of American rights and interests in China as well as the Open-Door Policy as well as Principle of Equal Opportunity had been definitely guaranteed by the former Minister (TANAKA, Foreign Minister), he regretted to have to declare that the infringing of American rights and interests had not ceased and that the Open Door Policy was still being ignored, and after citing some instances such as Exchange Control and Trade Restrictions etc. in North China, he demanded that prompt and effective measures be taken in order to carry out the guarantee that had been duly made. (Annexed Document No. 1). To this Minister KONOYE replied that Japan's China Policy as well as foreign policy remained unchanged, and that Japan's assertion with regard to the respecting of foreign rights and interests relative to China as well as the maintenance of the Open Door Policy and the Principle of Equal Opportunity remained unchanged, adding that, although in point of fact, there had been cases at times which were not settled satisfactorily due to military strategic necessity or other reasons, he was striving to settle matters as satisfactorily as possible upon the conditions returning to their normal state. He also stated that, with regard to commercial and trade problems he wished to, after studying same, comply with the Ambassador's request at the earliest possible opportunity.

Ambassador Grew subsequently sent a note embodying the same contents as the foregoing paragraph. (Annexed Document No. 2).

- II. The manner of reply to the aforesaid American Ambassador's note was studied ever since the appointment of ARITA as Foreign Minister and although it had been decided to put off the said reply until conditions had become settled for awhile as it happened to be just before the fall of Canton with the capitulation of Hankow being close at hand, so that the state of affairs was changing rapidly, in view of this matter representing problems which, after all, possess an important bearing to the Nine-Power Pact, after studying the draft of the reply based on the policy of:

- 1.3
- (a) Avoiding all phraseology whatsoever that would reaffirm the principles of the Open Door and Equal Opportunity based on the Nine-Power Pact,
  - (b) Making them understand that, although the existing rights and interests of Third Powers will be respected, this is not being done as a corollary of the Nine-Power Pact,
  - (c) Making them understand that the standard laws governing the future economic activities by Third Powers in New China shall be established in conformity with the new conditions, a reply was sent on November 18th to the following effect, in addition to giving explanations to each of the instances cited in the American note and clarifying the point that their claims regarding Infringement of Rights and Interests were unjustified, viz.:
    - (1) It is hoped that, inasmuch as military activities are being conducted on a unprecedented scale in East Asia, the United States will note the fact that there may be times when difficulties may occur in executing our intention regarding the respecting of American rights and interests,
    - (2) The Empire believes that it will not solve urgent problems of the moment or aid towards the establishing of permanent peace in East Asia by attempting to gauge the present and future state of affairs by ideas or principles in their original form that were applied to the pre-incident state of affairs, especially at this time when the Empire is dashing ahead with the Establishment of a New Order in East Asia and when new conditions are setting in in East Asia.
    - (3) Should any Third Power or Powers participate in the gigantic task of Reconstruction of East Asia in the fields of enterprises and trade by appreciating the afore-mentioned points, the Empire shall have no objection whatsoever towards same. (Annexed Document No.3).

III. p.4 When Minister ARITA invited Councillor Dooman of the U. S. Embassy at Tokyo on November 19th and asked about the impressions regarding the recent Japanese Reply, Dooman replied that Ambassador Grey's impression regarding the said Reply seemed to be that "It represented a wholesale denial of the American Demands," whereupon Minister ARITA explained that it would be excusable if the Open Door policy and the principle of Equal Opportunity were applied to the entire world from the start, but it is extremely illogical to apply same today to China only. ARITA then went on to say that his predecessor gave his guarantee regarding the

p.5 respecting of the said principles by being of the belief that the actual prevailing conditions could be made to harmonize with the Open Door Policy and the principle of Equal Opportunity, but that, in his own opinion, it was no longer possible to expect the said harmony, at the same time explaining the great pains taken by Japan in regard to the said reply, to which Dooman stated that it was extremely regrettable that there were over 300 cases recently remaining unsettled despite their having no connections with military actions and being extremely trivial matters, and that the recent official American note was the result of the American commercial concerns in various parts of China exerting severe pressure on their Home Government, at the same time pointing out that the United States did not make any reference to the Nine-Power Pact.

IV. On inviting Ambassador Crew to Tokyo subsequently on the 21st of the same month and conferring with him on the same principle as per the foregoing paragraph, Crew declared as follows after making the introductory remark that what he would be saying today would not be in the nature of any reply whatsoever to the Japanese Note of the 18th:-

(1) The United States Government has never attempted to exploit China nor extend American influences in China. The United States Government's interpretation of "Open Door" is totally different from the foregoing. In other words, the principle of Equal Opportunity in regard to Commerce has always been the actual basic principle of the United States.

(2) All of the treaties concerning the Far East embodying the said principle, and to which the United States is a signatory, were concluded for the purpose of preventing the occurrence or likely occurrence of international friction in the Far East, and the United States Government is intent upon checking the present day trend of international anarchy as well as contributing towards the adjustment of international relations as well as restoration of international order, and it is the advocacy of the United States that this object can be attained by peaceful negotiations and agreements as well as by faithful fulfillment of international agreements.

p.6

(3) The Commercial Policy of the United States lies in aiming at international concord by striving for the expansion of foreign trade by means of removing obstacles lying in the way of the international distribution of commodities. I believe that the frequent instances of other countries trying to gain most-favored footings do not contribute towards establishing prosperity in the United States and the world.

(4) On November 3rd Premier KONOYE stated that "Japan will cooperate with any Third Power that appreciates Japan's real intentions and adopts a policy that conforms to the new state of affairs," but what is the concrete meaning of this statement? Surely he does not mean the kind of co-operation whereby, as is being generally rumored, Americans can not engage in trade in China without going through the hands of Japanese merchants.

(5) Minister ARITA expressed his wish that the United States should allow Japan sufficient time to see what the results would be, but there is a limit to the patience of the American people. Considering it impossible to pacify public opinion, the Government has, to begin with, demanded the liberation of the Lower Yangtze region as well as the suspension of bombing of and other interference with churches and their properties situated at considerably far-off distances from the scene of military operations. (Annexed Document No. 4).

p.7 To the foregoing Minister ARITA explained that, in regard to Item (4) of the foregoing paragraph, it is difficult, as was made plain in the last part of our Reply dated the 18th, it was impossible for Japan to recognize the unconditional application of Equal Opportunity and Open Door at the present day when the state of affairs in China has become changed, but that Japan possesses the desire to cooperate with Third Powers in the event of the foregoing becoming understood, at the same time remarking in connection with the rumours as specified at the end of the said paragraph that such a thing was totally impossible and could also not be put into practice, whereupon Grew stated that he felt relieved on hearing the foregoing.

p.8 Minister ARITA further explained that the assertion that Japan's Open Door Policy and Principle of Equal Opportunity might clash with the respecting of rights and interests of Third Powers implied that measures necessary for fostering the closer relationship of Japan and China as well as for ensuring Japan and China's rights of existence might at times necessitate eliminating the application of the aforesaid Principles to some extent, so that there was still considerable room left for economic activities of other countries.

As Grew then asked as to what was meant by the New Order, Minister ARITA replied that same implies the establishing of co-operation between Japan, Manchoukuo, and China in regard to Politics, Economy, and Culture, meaning, as for example, that Political Co-operation is indispensable for exterminating the Anti-Japanese Policy as well as Pro-Communist Policy that have so far been the causes of unrest in the Orient, whereas, furthermore, in regard to Economic Cooperation, it may become necessary, as mentioned above, to

eliminate, to some extent, the application of the Open Door and Equal Opportunity principles.

Furthermore, on Grew remarking that he considered it necessary for Japan to make some sort of gesture in order to pacify the excited feelings of the general public in the United States, the Minister replied that, although he recognized the need of some on principle, he was not in a position to say any more as the question of Liberation of the Yangtze River had already been replied to.

- V. On December 8th Minister ARITA invited Grew, and after having explained as follows regarding the unanswered points of the foregoing Clause IV, handed to him a written note embodying the said points (Annexed Document No. 5.)

p. 9

(1) Referring to the views of the United States as per the former part of Item 2 of the foregoing Clause IV, the application, in their original form, of the various treaties which were concluded at the time for the purpose of preventing international disputes in the Orient would, with the general change of conditions in the world, as well as the new state of affairs that is developing in the Far East, rather hamper the bringing about of peace and Universal Prosperity.

(2) Equal Opportunity in regard to Commerce is what the Empire has been hitherto demanding of the world, and although we agree, on principle, to the opinion of the United States that Equal Opportunity in regard to Commerce will bring about World Peace, but, as things are at present, good quality and low-priced Japanese goods are meeting with discriminatory treatment all over the world. As regards the gaining of a most-favoured footing by one country in other countries as per Item (3) of the foregoing Clause IV, the Most-Favoured relations between the British Empire with her colonies as well as co-mutually among her colonies were pointed out, at the same time asserting that the contention that in the case of the British Empire it is unavoidable as it applies to a single political unit but that the establishing of economic relations between Japan, Manchoukuo, and China similar to those within the British Empire can not be recognized in view of the said three countries not constituting a single political unit, can not be tolerated.

(3) Moreover, it was reiterated that it was Japan's belief that it would by no means contribute towards stabilizing the world to let an economic unit like that of Japan exist on one hand against such large economic units of the British Empire,

the United States and the Soviet Union on the other, and that, as the relations of Japan, Manchoukuo and China in regard to mutual economic cooperation emanated from the afore-mentioned idea, same would not conflict with the prosperity of the world. This collaboration has for its object:-

(a) In regard to the field of enterprise, the guaranteeing of supply of products that are indispensable from the standpoint of national existence. To attain this object there may be enterprises that require the granting of special monopolistic rights in order to foster their development. In regard to such enterprises, Third Powers will be welcomed, within the sphere of the plans of Japan, Manchoukuo, and China, to participate in regard to capital, technical resources, but the establishment of competitive enterprises shall not be recognized.

(b) Furthermore, in regard to the field of foreign trade, it shall be the principle not to make any special discriminatory treatment by enforcing Customs tariffs or other export and import counter-measures.

To this, Grew remarked that he believed it to be the stand of the United States Government that it could not recognize any one-sided alterations to any treaties or other agreements until the necessary procedure regarding alteration of same be taken conjointly by the countries concerned, after which he stated that it would

p.11

be desirable to prove by actual facts that Japan will not show discriminatory treatment.

VI. On December 26th Grew was invited and told that it was regrettable that, whereas it had already been made clear on repeated occasions that Japan entertained no intention of closing the Chinese Market, the editorial tone of some of the American newspapers and magazines went to show that Japan's real intention was not being understood, whereupon Grew stated that, although the said newspapers and magazines were not necessarily expressing the views of the Government, it was nevertheless true that the American public in general were feeling greatly uneasy regarding Japan's actions in China, also adding that the use of restrictive phraseology, on the occasion of the previous interview such as having stated that it would be necessary to give protection to "certain" industries and "special" enterprises is liable to create uneasiness regarding Actual Treatment. To this the Minister replied that such restrictions should not be interpreted in a broad sense, whereupon Grew again expressed his desire to have the foregoing demonstrated by actual facts.

p.12

On that occasion Ambassador Grew remarked that it was regrettable



to have issued a statement like that of November 3rd regarding the Open Door and Equal Opportunity in China notwithstanding that same had been guaranteed by Foreign Minister CHU as well as Minister KONOYE, whereupon the Minister repeated the same explanation that he had made to Councillor Doeman on November 19th.

VII. On December 31st Ambassador Grew visited the Vice-Minister (adding that, although he had visited the Vice-Minister due to Minister ARITA being away on a trip, he wished it to be understood that same would have the same results as having visited the Minister) and handed him an official note expressing the views of the United States in regard to Japan's Reply to the United States under date of November 18th. The Vice-Minister asked for an explanation of the main points of the said note, to which Grew explained that same expresses the views of the United States Government as follows:-

(1) The so-called New State of Affairs in the Far East can not be created only by Japan's ex-parte Declaration, but should be recognized only by means of a Conference.

(2) It is true that the Powers including the United States possess special rights in China, and although the United States has always been advocating that such discriminatory special rights should be abolished and that China should be granted an equal (T.N. original says UNEQUAL) position, it is believed that such changes in the state of affairs should also be effected at a Conference of the Powers, and also added that, as the United States possesses special interest in the state of affairs in the Far East, the United States would announce same at the first opportunity. (Annexed Document No. 6).

VIII. Ever since then, the conversations between the Minister and Ambassador Grew became suspended, but on the occasion of Ambassador Grew's temporary return to the United States (T.N. the original specifies KICHO implying return to Japan, probably an error) in May 1939, Minister ARITA handed the said Ambassador a note as per Annexed Document, and Premier HIRANUMA also requested him to convey a message addressed to Secretary of State Hull. (Annexed Documents Nos. 7 and 8.)

C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. Doc. No. 1573

Statement of Source and Authentication

I, ODO Nagaharu, heroby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 13 pages, dated 2 Sept. 1941, and described as follows:

Summary of Japanese-American Negotiations During Foreign Minister ARITA's Term of Office (from Nov. 1938 until July 1939).

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at TOKYO on this  
31st day of October, 1946.

(s) Nagaharu Odo  
(SEI)

Ass. Chief, Archives Section  
Official Capacity

Witness: (s) M. Emura

Statement of Official Procurement

I, RICHARD H. LARSH, heroby cortify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at TOKYO on this  
31 da of October, 1946

(s) Richard H. Larsh  
N.M.E

Witness: Eric W. Floisher, 2nd Lt. US Investigation Division, I.S  
Official Capacity

Doc. No. 6021

Page 1

Date 16 March 1946.I, Concepcion Blanco, I.D. No. 17283, Labor No.B-311, do hereby make the following statement to theLegal Officer, ~~War Department~~ freely and voluntarily,

without coercion, with the full realization that such

statement made may be used as evidence against me.

I CONCEPCION BLANCO age 27 was born on Saipan on 13 December 1916. I worked as a clerk and telephone operator in the Japanese Naval Construction department at Tanapag Harbor Saipan from 1938 to 1944. In this capacity I had the opportunity to observe the construction of Japanese military fortifications and installations before December 1941. Six underground tanks were constructed in 1937. I saw fuel installations at the seaplane base. There were five barracks housing about 3000 military and naval personnel. The construction of these began in 1938. There were two radio stations constructed in 1938. There were five signal stations operated by Kasuga butai at Garapan, Shihata butai at Garapan, Nafuten, Agrenhan, Tanapag, Magacienne Bay. A Navy Rear Admiral was in charge of all these signal stations.

The natives were forced to work before 1941 by the NKK but not extensively. They were generally used at the pier. They were paid 80 sen a day. The average single laborer needed 120 sen a day. In my opinion the Japanese used forced labor and did not pay them the amount needed to live on.

I have had all the foregoing material on this page interpreted to me by Vincerte De Leon Guerrero in the Chamorro language, which I understand. I have made this statement voluntarily and have had the interpreter read

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Page 1

the statement on this page; finding it to be a full and complete statement of the circumstances connected with my attachment to this case. I hereby certify that the above is a complete and true statement of facts, and that no compulsion or pressure of any kind whatsoever was exerted on me by any person in making this written statement.

/s/ Concepcion Blanco

I swear that I am familiar with both the English language and the Chamorro language and that before the above statement was signed I read same in the Chamorro language to the person who signed same.

/s/ Vincente de Leon Guerrero

WITNESS: Charles D. Cook

Ens. D(L) USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before  
me this 16th day of March,  
1946.

Theodora J. Adelson, Lt.(JG) USNR  
Legal Officer, U.S. Nav. Mil. Govt. Saipan, M.I.

日 前一九四六年/昭和三年/三月十六日

6021

私儀 CONCEPCION BLANCO I.D 番号第一三三三  
労働番号 B-1-11 は是に在、通り陳述す。

私儀 CONCEPCION BLANCO は二十七年、一九六年  
大正八年十二月十三日サイパンに生れた。一九三八年  
昭和十三年、一九四四年迄サイパン、タバコ、港

事務員並に電話交換手として日本海軍施設部  
に働いた。此職務、故に私八幸三元一九四年、昭和六年  
十二月以前、日本一軍事要塞及施設、構造、見

事が出来た。一九三七年、昭和十二年、六六〇ノ地下  
水槽が造られた。此水上飛行機基地に燃料貯蔵  
設備が見た。約三千人余り、陸海軍軍人を收容得る

Ex A90

兵舎が五棟あった。此等、建築一九三八年(昭和十三年)  
に着手された。一九三八年(昭和十三年)、建設三ノ無線

局が二ヶ所あった。五ヶ所、信号所が作りがらに  
春日部隊ヨリ、カラスノ、アグノ、アグノ、

No1

一人、海軍少将が此等、信号所、監督する年。

E-291

(Date 15 March 1946)

(I, Vincente de Leon Guerrero, I. D. No. 2237, Labor No. C-884, do hereby make the following statement) to the \_\_\_\_\_ freely and voluntarily, without coercion, with the full realization that such statement made may be used as evidence against me.

(I was born on the 9th October 1928 in Garapan, Saipan. Since the age of 7 I entered the Public German School up to the age of 16, when I was graduated in April 1913. On December 1913, I was sent to Yap to the German Dutch Cable & Co. to work at the station as a Operator. During August 1914, the World War I broke out, and met then in Yap, the landings of the Japanese Navy in October 7, 1914. I miss my job as a Operator, and was turned back to Saipan in February 1915. Since then I work at my father's farm in helping my father supporting us, up to the time when I got married at the age of 25. My job is still a farmer, when in 1937 I was choosed as a foreman by order of the Chamorroan Administration, to go with a party of 30 natives to work at the underground tank installations at Tanagag Harbor for 3 month. There were 6 underground tanks (4 big ones and 2 small). Each tank of the big size are approximately 1200 Feet round. We are informed by the authority that we chamorros to have to carry some jobs; because a war might happen in the very near future, and these installations must be done before too late, those tanks when completed are to be filled with oil and gasoline, for the ships that have to come in Saipan. We are informed to keep the words very secret. Anybody who tells such things must be punished by the authority. The deepness of each of such tanks are 50 feet. The concrete around each tank are 3 feet thick and iron plates are riveted in concrete. Iron planks and concrete were used for roofing. In the inside of such tanks there were iron posts constructed to hold the roof. Many pipelines were constructed in connection of all the tanks. A big pipeline were crossing from the tanks to the pier. Plants and trees were used as camouflage. The location of such tanks are between what is now Hot Plant No. 3 and Pipe Plant. At the beginning of the year 1939, the Chamorroan Administration are informed from the authority to conscript labor to send to Kainan to "(Marcus Is.) for another installation for a plane base. The laborers have to be send over there for a three month period. Another bunch of laborers were send at the beginning of 1940. The wages are \$1.50 per day and is under the Japanese Naval Operations.

There were installed gun implacements in 1939 here in Saipan (AAA Battery behind the Japanese Naval Headquarters in Garapan, several coastal defenses guns in Larhan, Naftan Point, Agingen Point and Mirshot Point). On the Island in front of Garapag Harbor were also installed a gun implacement (Naniagasa). In every gun implacement were Navy personnel attached; (Units of the Shikata Butai.)  
*Shikata*

I have written all the foregoing material on this page.

/s/ Vincente de Leon Guerrero

I swear that I am familiar with both the English language and the \_\_\_\_\_ language and that before the above statement was signed I read same in the \_\_\_\_\_ language to the person who signed same.

WITNESS /s/ Charles D. Cook

Eng. D (L) USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

16th day of March, 1946.

Theodore M. Adelson, Lt. (JG) USNR  
Legal Officer, U. S. Naval Military Government,  
Saipan, M. I.

昭和三十年三月十日

私「七十七」イ・テリオ・ク・エ・シヨ 認識票第三六三二労働番号  
第六四號以下、如是申立又。

Doc 6017

私一九二九年十月九日「サイバ」クラビニ出、七キヨリ、十六才、  
逸仙学校ニ入学、一九三三年四月卒業シタ。一九三三年十二月、私  
「ア」、独逸和蘭海底電線会社ニ其処テ接トシ働ク為ニヤシ  
キ。一九三五年二月「サイバ」ニ戻リシタ。以来、私ハ父農場ヲ働キ  
私ハ二十五才テ結婚シ、此ニテ父ガ我ヲ養フ事ハ手助ケシタ。私、仕事  
ハ尚百姓テシ、一九三五年「シヤ」行政府、命令ニ依リ、職工長ニ  
選ビ「ク」港ニ於テ地下油槽設備ニ三月間働ク為ニ、三ノ原  
住民、一行ト夫ニ去發シタ。其処ニハ、六箇、地下油槽ガアリシタ。又  
四ノ小ニハ大油槽、各々、周圍約、六。メートルアリヌ。当局ヲス我々  
「シヤ」人ガ若干、仕事ヲ負担セオハラストシ、ハ、戦争ガ直クニ  
起ルヲ知ル此等、設備、間ニ合フ極ニヤリ終ラテケルナラシク  
タシ、コト、油槽ハ完成シタ。曉ニハ油ト「カリ」シテ、碎ニカビ宮  
テ、ハ「サイバ」ニ来ル艦船、為シヌ。其々、其、言葉ヲ極ク秘密ニシテ置  
クヲ志シタ。

Ex 891  
No 1

斯ル事ヲ語ル者ハ誰モ、当局ニヨリテ處罰サレバトシモ、  
此油槽、深サ、六、メートルトシ、各油槽、周圍、「三」メートルハ厚シ  
「ズ」テ鉄板ガ「三」メートル、中ニ鉄接サレテオリヌ。

鉄板ト「三」メートルトガ屋根覆ニ用ヒテ居リヌ。此油槽、内部  
ニハ屋根ヲ支ル為ニ建テシタ。鉄柱ガアリシタ。多ク、送油管ガ凡テ  
油槽、連絡ニ造ラテアリシタ。一本、大キテ送油管ガ油槽カ、埠  
頭ニ、横切リテアリシタ。草木ガ偽装用ニ用ヒテ居シタ。此等油



Doc 647

槽、位置現在「ホト」之下「第三號」ト云モト、輸送官「高」  
 「洞」ニ「リ」ヌ、一九三九年、当初、「中」モ「之」行政府、「海」働者「を」徴  
 用シテ「海」用島（「ミ」カ「ス」島）ニ他、飛行基地設備、當「之」送「送」林  
 「当」局「カ」ラ命令サシ「タ」。「海」働者「六」三「月」、期間「の」中「ニ」送「送」ル「本」  
 「五」テ「タ」。「一」九「四」年、始「メ」他、「一」隊、「海」働者「が」送「送」シ「タ」。「報」酬  
 「日」三「圓」五「角」ヲ「日」本「海」軍、「作」業「ニ」係「リ」テ「居」リ「シ」タ。「一」九「三」九「年」此  
 「カ」ラ「ハ」砲床「が」据「置」レ「タ」。  
 「カ」ラ「ハ」自「本」海軍司令部、背後「ニ」高射砲台「三」六「台」  
 「ヲ」又「一」呼「フ」カ「ラ」「呼」フ「ル」名「ト」「呼」フ「ニ」幾「ク、海軍防禦砲  
 「台」六「ヶ」所「前」面「ニ」砲床「が」据「置」レ「タ」（「三」ヶ「所」）  
 「ド」砲床「三」海軍「員」少「配」屋「サ」レ「テ」居「リ」シ「タ」。「采」田「部」隊「者」テ「又」

no 2 ☆

80-892

Doc. No. 6027

Page 1

Date 16 March 1946

I, Francisco de Borja, I.D. No. 20764, Labor No. ~~do hereby make the following statement~~ to the Legal Officer, freely and voluntarily, without coercion, with the full realization that such statement made may be used as evidence against me.

I was born on April 3rd 1887 on Guam, I came to Saipan in 1899 went to Angau in the Peleiu Island group and returned to Saipan in Feb. 1946. I worked as foreman for 800 workers in the Phosphorus Company there, first for the Germans then the Japanese. I knew of the building of an airfield on Peleiu in 1939. On Angau people from the surrounding islands were forced to dig phosphorous for the company for 50 sen plus 3 meals of rice per day. When I was in Yap in 1940 I knew of no Americans (civilians) there.

I have had all the foregoing material on this page interpreted to me by Elias Sablan in the Chamorro language, which I understand. I have made this statement voluntarily and have had the interpreter read the statement on this page; finding it to be a full and complete statement of the circumstances connected with my attachment to this case. I hereby certify that the above is a complete and true statement of facts, and that no compulsion or pressure of any kind whatsoever was exerted on me by any person in making this written statement.

/s/ FRANCISCO de BORJE

I swear that I am familiar with both the English language and the Chamorro language and that before the above statement was signed I read same in the Chamorro language to the person who signed same.

/s/ ELIAS P. SABLAN

WITNESS: /s/ CHARLES D. COOK  
Ens. D(1) USN

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of March 1946.

(SEAL)

/s/ THEODORE M. ADLSON  
Lt. (jg) USNR  
Legal Officer, US  
Nav. Mil. Govt.,  
Saipan, M.I.

Doc 6027

Ex 892

一八四六年(昭和三十一年)三月十六日  
 和儀 Francisco de Borja, S.J. 二〇七十四号  
 学務部資料 (左ノ通ニ證言ヲナス)  
 一八六六七年(明治三十年)四月三日 今ノ島ニ住ル  
 一八九九年(明治三十二年) サイパンニ來リ ペリリコ  
 群島ヲシテ行キ  
 一九四六年(昭和三十一年) 二月  
 サイパンニ於テ、同地博覧強術所ニ工場ノ  
 頭トシテ働ク。前期ハ独逸人多ク、後期  
 ハ日本人ノ多クナリ。尚私ハ一九三九年(昭和  
 十四年)ペリリコニ島ニ於テ飛行場ヲ建設セル  
 ニトシ知リ



E-893

Doc. No. 6018

Page 1

Date 15 March 1946

I, Jose S. Pangelinan, I.D. No. 2902, Labor No. C-900, do hereby make the following statement to the \_\_\_\_\_ freely and voluntarily, without coercion, with the full realization that such statement made may be used as evidence against me.

I was born on Saipan, 27 March 1904; I was 10 years old in 1914 on October when the Japanese took this Island (Saipan) from the Germans, I entered the Japanese School, and at the same time, they gave me a job as Messenger in the Japanese Milt. Govt. Head office: In 1916 they change my job and put me as an Interpreter in Japanese & Chamorro: In 1919 I quit work and went to Japan (to school) study music and business course, until 1923 when the big earthquake destroyed Tokyo, I returned and work with my Father at the farm (after I returned from Japan never had a chance to get a job): In 1926 I went to Guam trying to get permission from the Governor of Guam to reside on the Island, but I failed; I married a Guam girl and returned to Saipan the same year (I was in Guam for 3 months) and running my 50 acre sugar plantation using Okinawans tenants, about 11 farmers, until 1934 when the Japanese Government took my plantation away from me and gave it to the N.K.K. (South Sea Development Co.) the reason they said is "NO NATIVE AUTHORIZED TO USE A JAPANESE AS TENANTS" I know what they mean, and I gave up. In 1935, I went to Ponape, started my own business (using native laborers) as a copra trader, and sea transportation also. In 1940 they took my motor boat and sampan to use for transporting materials from mainland to the small islands around Ponape for installation; I returned again to Saipan early in 1940 and on May the same year I found my job at the seaplane base, using a bull cart, as a material transporter from the Navy Ware Houses to the contractors that working at the Seaplane Base. I worked till September the same year, and during this time, I noticed that there was 2 hangars, ware houses containing a big quantity of food, lumbers, nails, wires of all kinds and construction materials, small air planes, big air planes, etc: 1 Big overground heavy builded concrete shelter containing all kinds of explosives, bullets, bombs --- etc.: 2 or 3 repair shop for servicing airplanes; about 3 or 10 Big Barracks that can hold about 350 to 500 men each. During this time (my working time) I became very acquainted with many of the Navy Boys and they told me openly that all of this work is for the military purposes.

I did not working direct to the Navy, but for the contractors, and my working hours is from 0600 to 1700 with one 30 minutes during the morning and another 30 minutes in the evening, 1½ hour at noon recess time. They feed me 3 times a day and paid me ¥ 5.00 (five yens) p.d.

I noticed too that there was always 15 up to 25 Big 4 propellers Seaplane and some fighting and scouting plane. When they stopped me working at the Seaplane Base, I helped my father who was a chief of Section #2 in Garapan, issued Laborers for the Air Strip at Aslito and also for the load and unloading of Ships at Tanapag, Chalan Kanoa & Tenian.

All laborers that went out to work to the Air Strip was by force and every able man must go.

At 0400 they blew their buggle to wake up the workers, at 0500 they got their breakfast, and then March out in line to their working place. Around 1100 or 1130 they get their lunch and a rest for about 40 minutes then started to work untill evening; No one alouded to go to his home except on day off at every days for hours day off. We had many, many claims from the workers about foods and clothing, that they did not get enough and sometimes they slipped out from their quarters, and went to their family to get clothes and food.

This was the most worse situation we ever had; Our Chiefs and their helpers explained the matter to the peoples; We gave out all we could do to help them; Bananas, bread-fruits, Yams, potatoes and many other things that produced on our own farms, or sometimes we bought it from the Japanese Store and send it up to the Airfield once a week, so they can get more food. The pay rate for the workers at this time was 80 cents Japanese p.d.

I have written all the foregoing material on this page.

/s/ JOSE S. PANGELINAN

WITNESS: Charles D. Cook, Ens. D(L) USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15th day of March 1946.

(SEAL)

/s/ THEODORE M. ADELSON Lt.(jg) USNR  
Legal Officer, US Nav. Milt.Govt.  
Saipan, M.I.

# 6018

EX 993

No 1

日附一九四六年三月十五日

余在エス・パニジリテ、証據標ニルニ号、勞務番シ一丸。  
号ハヨ、三次、陳述ヲ為ス。×××

私ハ一九〇四年三月十五日「サイバ」ニ生シタ。一九〇四年十月私ガ  
十才ノ時ニ日本ガコノ島「サイバ」ヲ控逸クテ取リシタ。私ハ日本、  
学校ヘ入り同時ニ日本、軍政本部、使ト走リ、職ヲ与ヘシタ。  
タ。一九一六年、日本人ハ私ノ仕事ヲ変ヘ日本語ト「ヤモ」語  
ノ通訳ニシタ。一九一九年、私ハ仕事ヲ止メ日本ヘ行キ学校  
ヘ行キ為シ。一九三三年大地震ヲ東京ガ破滅シタ時、此音  
樂ト事務、コトヲ習ヒタ。ソレクテ歸ツテ父ト一緒ニ農場  
テ働キシタ。(日本リテ歸ツタ後ハ全然就職、機会ガアリシコ  
トシタ。一九三六年、私ハ「コノ島」ニ住ニタト思ツテ「ク」政  
廳ヘ許シテ仰ギニ行キシタガ駄目ナリタ。私ハ「コノ島」、或  
限ト結婚シタ。一九三九年「サイバ」ヘ歸リ命ケシハ三月居リシタ  
ナリタ。沖繩人ハ作人ヲ使ツテ、一九三四年迄五十  
平「カ」ノ砂糖農園ヲ經營シテ止メシタ。日本政府ハ  
私ノ農園ヲ取シテ、ソレヲ南洋興發株式會社ニ与ヘシ  
タ。ソレ理由ハ「各地人ハ如何ナル者ト謂トモ日本人ヲ小作

# 60/P

人トテ使フコトハ許サレテ居ト云フ、テアリヌ。私ハ其、意圖ガ  
命リシタテテ締メシタ。一九三五年、私ハ示テ「(行キ(不地人ヲ  
使ツテ)「コラ」兩人ト海上輸送ト云フ自命、高賈ヲ受  
メタ。一九四〇年、日本人ハ私、發動機船ト傳馬船ヲ取リ上  
ゲボナハ周辺、小島ハ施設ヲスルタメ本洲、カラシラ、小島ハ  
物資ヲ運ブト用ヒシタ。私ハ一九四〇年早々再ビ「サイ」トシテ  
歸リ同年五月、水上機根據地ト牛車ヲ以テ海軍倉庫トシ  
其、根據地、請負人、所ハ貨物ヲ運搬スルコトイフ仕事ヲ  
見ツケシタ。私同年九月迄仕事ヲシテ、間ニ於テ私ハコニ  
大量、食糧、材木、釘、コラニル種類、針金、コラ建築  
資材ハ小型飛行機、大型飛行機等ヲ入タニツ、格納  
庫ヤイックハ、倉庫、コラニル種類、爆薬、彈丸、爆彈  
等ヲ入タニツ、巨大ナ、ドックヲ造ラタコニクリト、地上  
防空壕ハ、航空機ヲ整備スルタメニ、修理工場ニ  
棟ニ三百五十人乃至五百人位ヲ收容スルハ乃至十棟  
バカリ、大キナ兵舎等ヲ見シタ。コノ内ニ於テ「私ガコニ」任  
事ヲシテ居ル間、私ハ数多、海軍、<sup>終休</sup>此ヲ知ルハ知ルヤウ  
ニナリ、日本人ハ其、仕事ハ皆軍事的目的、為タト公。

No. 3.

# 6018

然ト私ニ申上之云  
 私人直接海軍、為ニ働イタテタク其  
 マシタダス私、就業時間ハ午前  
 迄テ午前二、三十分、午後二、三十分、昼、休憩  
 アリタ。日本人ハ私ニ三食給テ五日給五円  
 マシタ。私ハ又ヨリ何時デモ十五機  
 ノ巨大ト四發水上機ト若干、戦闘機、偵察機  
 ノニ気がツキマシタ。私ハ其、水上機、根據地ヲ働カセ  
 日本人ニ止メサセラセテカラカスル、中ニ課長ヲアケテ  
 タテテ援助シマス。航空着陸場アリタ。又  
 バシクアリカ。アリタ。船、積込積卸、為ニ勞  
 働者ヲ甚多シタ。

XXXXX

No. 3.



1455  
(010)-gcl

HEADQUARTERS,  
OCCUPATION FORCES,  
TRUK AND CENTRAL CAROLINE ISLANDS.

\*\*\*\*\*

Information relative to the date of	*	Perpetuation of testimony
construction of fortifications and	*	of Alfred Milo, assistant
military installations in the Truk	*	chief, Moen Island.
Atoll prior to December 1941, use	*	
of forced native labor without	*	
adequate remuneration, and denial	*	
of equal rights to Americans on Yap.	*	

\*\*\*\*\*

Taken at:	Moen Island, Truk and Central Carolines.
Date:	February 25, 1946.
In the presence of:	Thomas Santamaria, first lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.
Reporter:	George C. Lishka, corporal, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.
Interpreter:	Artie Moses, chief of Uman Island.
Questions by:	Thomas Santamaria, first lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.

Q.	State your name, permanent home address, and occupation.
A.	Alfred Milo, assistant chief, Moen Island.
Q.	How long have you lived on the island of Moen?
A.	Forty-five years.
Q.	How long have you been living in the Truk Atoll?
A.	Forty-five years.
Q.	Have you any knowledge of fortifications or military installations constructed by the Japanese on Moen Island prior to December 1941?
A.	Yes.

- Q. State what you know of your own knowledge about the installations?
- A. During the latter part of 1938 the Japanese started constructing a lighthouse on the eastern tip of Moen. Prior to the construction of the lighthouse a dock was built along the eastern tip and then a road from the dock to where the lighthouse was to be erected. It required approximately one year to complete the dock, road, and lighthouse. Upon completion of the aforementioned project the Japanese commenced building caves, gun emplacements, and a searchlight platform. Six gun emplacements were built. The guns appeared to me to have an eight or nine inch bore. These installations were all in the immediate vicinity of the lighthouse. During November of 1939 on the mountain of Uitibiu the Japanese dug a concrete emplacement similar to a hut in which they installed radar and erected two gun emplacements for the installation of five or six inch guns and two smaller ones for anti-aircraft. In the same section two platforms were constructed and searchlights placed thereon. Two caves were dug into the mountain and ammunition stored therein. Upon the completion of this project in 1940 further development thereabouts was unknown to us because it was then made a prohibited area. On the eastern end of the island a radio station was installed during 1939. This building was constructed of concrete. In 1940 on the northwest tip of the island the Japanese commenced building an airstrip. This strip was completed after December 1941. On the southwestern tip of the island at the same time another airstrip was under construction and completed after December 1941. In 1940 on the northwestern tip of the island on the side of the mountain close to the airfield two gun emplacements were constructed and guns installed there. They appeared to me to have eight or nine inch bores, also a platform and searchlight was installed there.
- Q. Were any revetments built along the airstrip prior to December 1941?
- A. On the airfield on the southwestern tip one was built before December 1941.
- Q. When were all the pill boxes along the shore of Moen Island constructed?
- A. After December 1941.
- Q. I notice on the mountain of Uitibiu many big guns, machine guns, range finder, cave housed flat trajectory guns, and anti-aircraft guns, other than the ones already mentioned by you, when were these constructed?
- A. After December 1941, I believe for we were not allowed to go there after the initial construction in 1939 and 1940.

Q. I notice on the southern tip, slightly in rear of the airfield, anti-aircraft guns, cave housed guns, and machine guns, when were these placed there?

A. After December 1941.

Q. I notice throughout the island quite a few barracks to house the army and navy, when were they constructed?

A. After December 1941.

Q. How many Japanese troops were here before December 1941?

A. A great number of Japanese personnel were here on the island, and they had some barracks here at that time, also, most were built after December 1941.

Q. Do you know of any installations built on any islands in the immediate vicinity of Moen?

A. Yes.

Q. State what you know of your own knowledge about those installations.

A. On the island of Mor during 1940 a concrete reinforced dock was built. Two gun emplacements were constructed and guns installed thereon, appearing to be about three inches in diameter. Also buildings were built for the men and one searchlight was installed there. Telephone communication was installed between that island and Moen. The island has flat terrain and in one section a lookout tower was built.

Q. Were there any other installations built on this island?

A. No.

Q. On what other islands you know of installations being placed?

A. On the island of Pisemeu, during 1940. The exact construction was made there as took place on Mor.

Q. Do you know of any natives that were forced to work by the Japanese and not adequately remunerated?

A. Yes.

Q. State what you know of your own knowledge about these cases.

A. From January 1942 until the end of the war I was forced to furnish the Japanese commander on Moen Island one hundred fifty women and two hundred men per day. One day per month we were forced to furnish labor without pay. The day without pay occurred on the eight of each month.

Q. Are there any other cases where forced labor was used without adequate remuneration?

- A. At different times when the Japanese were in need of more help they would come to the village and call for any number they wished and refused to pay for the work performed. We did not keep a record of the number of times this occurred or the dates.
- Q. Do you know of any circumstances relative to the denial of equal rights to Americans on Yap?
- A. No, sir.
- Q. Is there any other information relative to the subjects on which you have been questioned that you wish to report?
- A. No, sir.

/s/ Alfred Mailo  
Alfred Mailo,  
assistant chief,  
Moen Island.

Moon Island

Truk and Central Carolines

I, Alfred Mailo, of lawful age, being duly sworn on oath, state that I have read the foregoing transcription of my interrogation and all answers contained therein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Alfred Mailo  
Alfred Mailo

Subscribed and sworn to me this 4th day of March 1946.

/s/ T. Santamaria  
T. SANTAMARIA,  
1st Lt., USMCR.,  
Legal Officer.

Moan Island

Truk and Central Carolines

I, Artie Moses, of lawful age, being duly sworn upon oath state that I truly translated the questions asked and answers given and that after being transcribed, I truly translated the foregoing deposition containing 3 pages, to the witness; that the witness thereupon in my presence affixed his signature thereto.

/s/ Artie Moses  
Artie Moses

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of March 1946.

/s/ T. Santamaria  
T. SANTAMARIA,  
1st Lt., USMCR.,  
Legal Officer.

I, T. Santamaria, first lieutenant, O32989, U.S.M.C.R., certify that on February 25, 1946, personally appeared before me Alfred Milo, and gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth; that after his testimony had been transcribed, the said Alfred Milo read the same and affixed his signature thereto in my presence.

Place: Headquarters Military Government,  
Truk and Central Caroline  
Islands.

/s/ T. Santamaria  
T. SANTAMARIA,  
1st Lt., USMCR.,  
Island Command, Truk.

Date: March 4, 1946

No. 1

Ex 894

DOC 6013

供出場所 トラック及中央カロリニ諸島中ノ七一五ノ島

年月日 一九四六年二月二十五日

氏名 本籍 職業ヲ述ベヨ

答 七一五ノ島、副島司アルビジドマイロ

問 七一五ノ島ニハ何年居住シテイルカ

答 四十五年

問 トラック、アトル島ニハ何年住ニテイルカ

答 四十五年

問 一九四二年十二月以前ニ於テ七一五ノ島上ニ日本軍  
ガ築城又ハ軍事施設ヲ施シタルコトニ就キテ知  
ツテイルカ

答 否

問 該施設ニ就キテ貴下自身ニヨリ知レル處ヲ述  
ベヨ

答 一九三八年後半期中、日本軍ハ七一五ノ島東端ニ  
一燈台ノ建造ヲ始メタリ。該燈台ノ建設ニ先  
立ツテ東端ニ一造船所ヲ設置シ、然ル後燈  
台ノ建設セラルベキ箇所ニ船渠カラ通ズル一本

Doc 6013

No. 2

道路が作られた。船渠道路及燈台を完成させた。約一年を要した。前記企劃、完成を見れば、日本軍、数個、洞穴砲床一基、探照燈、据付場所、築造を開始した。六基、砲床が築かれた。砲、口径は乃至九吋、ヤウニ思はれた。此等、施設、皆燈台、接近所とした。一九三九年十一月、日本軍、山に丸木小屋を造り、エクリート砲床を基礎とした。之、間ニ電波探信儀ヲ据エツテ、五六吋砲用砲床三基、又小口径ノ高射砲用トシ、三基ノ砲床ヲ設置シタ。此区劃ニテ、探照燈台が部、ト探照燈が基、ト据付ケラレタ。テ、所、洞穴ヲ山中ニ穿テ、弾薬が格納セラレタ。一九四〇年、此計劃、完成ト共ニ、山、其後、發展ハ、林々ニ敷カリマセリ。テ、山、行政上レバ、山、山、立入り禁止区域トセラレタ。カ、テ、山、一九三九年、山、東端ニ無線電信局が施設セラレタ。該建物、混凝土建テリタ。一九四〇年、山、西北端ニ日本軍、飛行場ヲ建設ニ始メタ。此飛行場、一九四二年十二月後ニ竣工シタ。同時

Doc 6015

二島、西南端ニ更ニ一ヶ所、飛行場が建設中ナリニタガ  
一九四一年十二月後ニ完成ナシタガ。一九四〇年三島、西北  
端、飛行場寄りノ山ノ側ニ基、砲床が造ラレ、砲が据付  
ケラシタガ。ソノ砲ノ口径ハ九寸位ニ思ハルガ。探照燈  
台ノ所が作ラレ探照燈ニ基が又同所ニ据付ケラシタ  
ガ。

問、一九四一年十二月以前ニ該飛行場周辺ニ被覆が作ラシタガ。

答、西南端ノ飛行場ニ一九四一年十二月以前ニ箇所ノ環造  
セラシタガ。

問、七ノ五島海岸ノトナリハ何時環造ナシタガ。

答、一九四一年十二月後ナリ。

問、少ナリノ山ノ頂ニ大口徑砲機銃巨艦測定器、  
調査ノ据付ケラレ、低伸彈道砲、高射砲、之等ハ

海岸ノ内ニモ、以外ナリガ何時ニ等ニ建設ナ  
シタガ。

答、一九四一年十二月後ナリナカト思ヒタガ。何故言フニ一九三九  
年ト一九四〇年ニ初メテ建設ノ見ナリタガ。後ニハ其ノ其  
ノ場所ニ禁止ナシテイタシタガ。

No. 3



Doc-6013

140.4

問 島南端飛行場、之之後方ニ高射砲掩蔽所、大砲機銃等アルニ付、何時迄未嘗、之ニ建設ナシカ。

答 一九四一年十二月後ナシ。

問 此島内ニ陸海軍ヲ收容スル爲メ、兵舎が五六ヶ所アルコト、何時建造ナシカ。

答 一九四一年十二月後ナシ。

問 一九四一年以前ニ、何名ノ日本兵が此島ニ居タカ。

答 此島ニ莫大ニ数ノ日本軍人が居タリ、其ノ當時ニモ、島内ニ兵舎八若干アリタリ、其ノ大多數、一九四一年十二月後、建造ナシカ。

問 此島ニ極近接シ、島嶼中ニ何カ施設ナシト知ツイルカ。

答 八。

問 其ノ施設ニ就テ、自分、知ツイルコトヲ述ベ。

答 一九四〇年、此島ニ鉄脚コシ、船渠亦出来タ。其ノ砲臺が造ラ、其處ニ二門ノ砲ヲ据付テ、口径三、三寸、口径二、二寸、又

委員は答へる建築物が築造され、工三探照燈一基  
が据付けられた。其の島トモト工三島間に電話通信  
が施設された。其の島の平潤す平地は有る三、四畝  
可なり物見權が築造せられた。

問、此島に何れ他、施設がなされたか。

答、下支ア字に於て

問、他に何れ島上に施設が行はれたか。

答、一九四〇年中に八ヶ岳平一ノ島に行はれた。

工三島内に三行に於て、殆ど同時に建設が

行はれた。  
1000000000

## EXHIBIT I.

A witness, JOSEB UERBELAU, called by the investigating officer entered, was informed of the subject matter of the investigation, duly sworn and declared through the interpreter, MASAO MOTOOKA, as follows:

Examined by the investigating officer:

1. Q. What is your name?

A. JOSEB UERBELAU.

2. Q. What is your date of birth?

A. 1908, I do not know the day.

3. Q. Where were you born?

A. NGERBECHED, KOROR ISLAND, PALAU.

4. Q. What is your present home address?

A. NGEREMID, KOROR ISLAND, PALAU.

5. Q. What is your occupation?

A. I am the native Chief of Police for military government on KOROR ISLAND. //

6. Q. Prior to the occupation of this area by the Americans what was your civil occupation?

A. I worked for the JAPANESE government and was in charge of three hundred (300) natives at DEELIK Village on BABELTHUAP. I was not paid.

7. Q. Did you bear military arms?

A. No, I did not.

8. Q. How long did you do this work?

A. From February, 1945 to August, 1945.

9. Q. Do you know of construction of fortifications or military installations prior to December, 1941?

A. Yes.

10. Q. Do you know the type of installation, the place of construction, and the date concerned?

A. I know of a gun emplacement constructed at NGERENLENGUI, BABELTHUAP, in 1939.

11. Q. Did you witness this construction?

A. Yes

26. Q. Did you pay for this food?

A. No, it was provided free of cost.

27. Q. Did the JAPANESE provide a place for you to live?

A. Yes.

28. Q. Did you have to pay for it?

A. No.

29. Q. During this period of work on the airfield did you have any days off?

A. No, we worked every day.

30. Q. Could you take a day off if you wanted to?

A. No, we were put in jail if we did.

31. Q. Were you ever put in jail for taking a day off?

A. No, I never took a day off and was never put in jail.

32. Q. Did you ever see anyone put in jail for taking a day off?

A. No, I did not.

33. Q. Did the JAPANESE provide you with clothing?

A. No, they did not.

34. Q. Did you buy your clothing from the JAPANESE?

A. Yes.

35. Q. What did they charge you for clothing?

A. The prices varied. I paid from 5 yen to 30 yen for a pair of pants.

36. Q. While you were doing this work were you treated well by the JAPANESE?

A. Yes, I was well treated.

37. Q. Were all the natives working on this project treated well by the JAPANESE?

A. No, some were mistreated.

38. Q. What mistreatment did you see the JAPANESE inflict upon the natives?

A. They were beaten with sticks.

39. Q. Who beat them?

A. A JAPANESE Navy Gonzoku known as KAWAHARA.

53. Q. Did you work there?

A. Yes.

54. Q. Who ordered you to work there?

A. The PALAUAN Government, a branch of an subordinate organization of the South Seas Government.

55. Q. What are the inclusive dates of this period of labor?

A. February, 1941 to July, 1941.

56. Q. What did they pay you?

A. 1 yen 50 sen per day.

57. Q. What was the length of your working day?

A. The length of the working day on this project depended entirely on the individual laborer and the effort he put forth. The average working day was from 5 a.m. until 2 p.m.

58. Q. Did the JAPANESE provide shelter?

A. Yes, tents.

59. Q. Did you pay for shelter?

A. No.

60. Q. Did the JAPANESE provide food?

A. No, they did not provide food.

61. Q. During this period of work were you allowed any days of rest?

A. One day a month was allowed.

62. Q. Did the JAPANESE treat you well while working on this project?

A. No, I was mistreated. I was not whipped but I was not permitted to leave the area and return to my village.

63. Q. Did you see any natives mistreated by the JAPANESE on this project?

A. No.

64. Q. Where did you work prior to this period of forced labor and what pay did you receive?

A. I worked for the PALAUAN Government as a small boat operator. The pay was 1 yen 40 sen per day.

65. Q. Did you see them place the gun in the emplacement you worked on?

A. Yes, I saw them and helped the Navy Gonzokus put the gun in place. The gun moved around and up and down while I on it.

66. Q. Do you have any knowledge of YAP ISLAND?

A. No.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Verification and authentication on the immediate following pages.

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## Verification by witness:

I, Joseb Uerbelau, having previously testified, was called in by the investigating officer, informed that my oath formerly taken was still binding, and having my testimony read to me in the Japanese language, declare it to be true and correct.

Joseb Uerbelau (signed)

## Verification by interpreter:

I, T-5 Masao Motooka, 6201 Special Interpreter Team, Western Pacific Base Command, USA, being duly sworn depose and say:

That after being duly sworn I translated the questions propounded by the investigating officer to Joseb Uerbelau in the Japanese language, and that I translated the information received in reply to each question in the Japanese language, into the English language.

That I have read the foregoing transcript of testimony to said Joseb Uerbelau and declare that it contains all the information I received from said Joseb Uerbelau.

Masao Motooke (signed)

## Verification by reporter:


I, Corp Richard L. Koll, USMCR, reporter of the testimony in the foregoing transcript, being duly sworn, hereby certify said testimony was taken by me in longhand and transcribed by me and I declare the same is true and correct.

Richard L. Koll (signed)

We, Joseb Uerbelau, T-5 Masao Motooka, 6201 Special Interpreter Team, Western Pacific Base Command, USA, and Corp Richard L. Koll, USMCR, hereby declare that we were duly sworn and subscribed our names to the foregoing transcript this 26th day of February, 1946.

Subscribed and sworn to before me.

Emery M. Perry (signed)  
Emery M. Perry,  
First Lieutenant, U.S. Marine  
Corps Reserve,  
Investigating Officer,  
at Island Command, Peleliu,  
Palau Islands.



The testimony of this witness was secured through use of the above named interpreter after the witness, interpreter and reporter had been sworn by me. The witness signed his testimony in my presence after such testimony had been translated and read to the witness by the interpreter, evidencing which such transcript bears my signature, as well as the signature of witness, reporter and interpreter.

Emery W. Perry (signed)

Emery W. Perry,  
First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine  
Corps Reserve,  
Investigating Officer,  
at Island Command, Peleliu,  
Palau Islands.



No. 7

Ex 895

Doc. 600 /

九、問 アタタハ一九四一年十二月以前ニ於ケル要塞  
又ハ軍事施設、構築ニ就イテ知ツテ井マ  
ス力  
答 ハ、知ツテ井マス。

五、問 アタタノ職業ハ何デスカ  
答 私ハコロール島 軍政部 原住民警察署  
長デス。

四、問 アタタ、現在ノ家庭ノ住所ハドコデスカ。  
答 パラオ コロール島「シゲルミッド」デス

三、問 アタタハドコデ生まレマシタカ  
答 パラオ、コロール島「シゲルミッド」デス

二、問 アタタノ生年、月日ハ  
答 一九〇六年、月日に存ジマセン

一、問 アタタノ名ハ何ト言ヒマスカ  
答 「ジョセフ ウエルベラウ」。

### 取調官ニ依ル訊問

関係取調官ニ依リ喚問セシタル証人「ジョセフ  
ウエルベラウ」ハ取調事項ニ付、通達ヲ受ケタル上  
正當ニ宣誓ヲ行ヒ、通譯「モトオカ」ニサシテ介シ  
次、如ク陳述セリ

Doc 6001

十問 アタタニ施設、種類構築、箇所、ソレニ  
関係シタ月日ヲ知ツテオラスカ

答 私ハ一九三九年「ビベルスアツア、ニゲルムレングイ」  
ニ構築セシタ砲床ヲ知ツテオラス

十一問 アタタニソノ工事ヲ見マシタカ

答 ハイ見マシタ

十二問 アタタニソノ工事ニ出テ働キマシタカ。

答 イイエ。

十三問 アタタニ出来上リタ砲床砲ヲ見マシタカ

答 イイエソノ地域ニ砲床完成後、日本人ニ  
依ツテ立入禁止トナリマシタ

十四問 「ビベルスアツア」ノ砲床構築ニ使用セラレタ  
原住民ノ勞力ニ強制セシタモノシタカ

答 ハイ サウデス

十五問 アタタニバドウニテソレガ砲床アリトイウ  
コトガ命リマシタカ。

答 私ハ砲が「ニゲルムレングイ」港ニ於テ下船  
カラ砲床、アル箇所へ運バレルヲ見マシタ

No. 2

Doc. 600 /

十六問 アタタハ前述ノ工事、他一九四二年以前何カ構  
築工事ノアツクコトヲ知ツテヤマスカ

答 イイエ

五十問 アタタハ原住民ニ対スル強制労働ノソノ他ノ  
事例ヲ知ツテヤマスカ。知ツテヤタス、ソノ事述ベテ下サ

答 「ルウサベル・イングリディウ」ノ瓦床ノ原住民ノ  
強制労働ニ依リテ構築サレタモノアリマス。

五十問 ソレハ何時行ハシマシタカ。

答 一九四一年二月デス

五十二問 アタタハ前ニ「ベルス」ノ瓦床が一九四一年十二月  
以前ニ構築サレタコトヲアタタ自身知ツテヤル  
唯一ノ要塞又ハ軍事施設ダト言ヒマシタネ。  
一九四一年二月トイフ日付ケニ間違ヒ「アリマシカ

答 ハイ、ソレニ間違ヒ「アリマセン」。私ハ前ニ答ヘタ時  
アタタノ言ハルコトガ各ニコメタカッタデス。

五十三問 アタタハソコヲ働キマシタカ。

答 ハイ働キマシタ

五十四問 誰ガアタタニソコヲ働クヤウニ命ジタ、デスカ。

答 南洋廳ノ下部組織、一令署タル「バ」ノ木廳デス

五十五問 ソノ労働期間ハ何時カラ何時ニ至リタカ

答 一九四一年二月カラ一九四一年七月ニ至リタ。

No. 3

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No. 4

Doc 6001

六十五問 アナタ、彼等が砲ヲ、アナタノ工事  
シタ砲床ニ据付ケルノヲ見マシタカ。

答 イ 私ハ見マシタ。ソレヲ私ハ海軍ノ  
軍属達ガ砲ヲ据付ケルノヲ手傳ヒマシタ。  
砲ハ私ガ乗ツテギルトグルグル廻ツタリ  
上、下ニ動ククリシマシタ

## EXHIBIT II

A witness, AUKST RIUMD, called by the investigating officer entered, was informed of the subject matter of the investigation, duly sworn and declared through the interpreter, MASAO MOTOOKA, as follows:

## Examined by the investigating officers:

1. Q. What is your name?  
A. AUKST RIUMD.
2. Q. What is your date of birth?  
A. March 24, 1913.
3. Q. Where were you born?  
A. At IMELIKLIK village on BABELTHUAP Island.
4. Q. What is your present home address?  
A. NGEREMID Village, KOROR Island, Palau.
5. Q. What is your present occupation?  
A. I am a native policeman for Military Government on KOROR Island.
6. Q. Prior to the occupation of this area by the Americans, what was your civil occupation?  
A. I was a policeman for the South Seas Government at IMELIKLIK Village on BABELTHUAP.
7. Q. Did you bear arms?  
A. No.
8. Q. How long did you do this work?  
A. From December 1, 1944, to December 2, 1945.
9. Q. Do you know of the construction of fortifications or military installations by the JAPANESE prior to December, 1941?  
A. Yes.
10. Q. Do you know the type of installation, the place of construction, and the date concerned?  
A. I know of a gun emplacement constructed at OIGUL Village, BABELTHUAP, in 1939.
11. Q. Did you work on it?  
A. No, I did not work on the emplacement. I was a supervisor of native labor called in to do the manual labor. The natives were ordered to do the work.

12. Q. Who ordered this work?  
A. A vice-admiral of the JAPANESE Navy, not Admiral ITO.
13. Q. Was this a written order?  
A. Yes, the written order was brought to the village chief by a navy man and the chief in turn ordered the natives to work.
14. Q. Did this order state there would be punishment for those who did not comply with it?  
A. Yes, the order said the gun emplacement was to be finished by a certain date and we want so many natives. Those failing to report will be punished.
15. Q. Did you see this order?  
A. Yes, the village chief showed the order to me.
16. Q. Do you have the order?  
A. No, the Navy man took it away with him after the chief and I had seen it.
17. Q. Can you describe the vice-admiral who issued this order?  
A. I cannot describe him. I know that he left these islands in 1939.
18. Q. Did you supervise the entire construction of this gun emplacement?  
A. No, I supervised the natives who carried boxes to the gun emplacement.
19. Q. Did forced native labor build the gun emplacement?  
A. No, the Navy Gonzokus built it.
20. Q. Did you see the contents of any of the boxes the natives carried to the gun emplacement?  
A. No, I did not see the contents. The natives carried the supplies to the site of the gun emplacement which had not been built at that time.
21. Q. Did you see the completed gun emplacement?  
A. Yes, but the gun was not in it yet.
22. Q. Do you remember what date this was?  
A. No, only that it was 1939.
23. Q. Did you see the gun placed in this fortification?  
A. No, I did not see a gun placed there but later in March, 1944, I saw a gun there.
24. Q. For the forced native labor which hauled the supplies prior to the completion of the gun emplacement, what was the daily individual wage?  
A. We received no pay.

25. Q. Did the JAPANESE provide the natives with food?  
A. Yes, breakfast and supper.
26. Q. Did the JAPANESE provide you with shelter?  
A. No, we lived at our village of OIGUL, on BABELTHUAP.
27. Q. Were JAPANESE guards present to force you to do this work?  
A. Yes, there were Navy guards who carried rifles.
28. Q. What was the length of the working day?  
A. From 5 a.m. to 6 p.m. We had 1 hour for lunch from 11:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. We took lunch with us or went to our homes to eat.
29. Q. Can you give the inclusive dates of this labor?  
A. No, but we worked for about three (3) weeks.
30. Q. Did you receive any days of rest during this period?  
A. Yes, we asked for and received one half day of rest during this period.
31. Q. Did the JAPANESE mistreat you?  
A. Yes, they mistreated me once.
32. Q. What mistreatment did you receive?  
A. I was slapped on the face three times by a Navy guard because I was late for work.
33. Q. Was this the only case of mistreatment you know of?  
A. No, two natives told me the guards had hit them with their fists.
34. Q. Do you know the names, rank, and organization of the JAPANESE who hit you and the natives?  
A. Their names were Leading Seaman TAKEMURA and another Navy man whose name was SHINOIARA. They were both members of a SASAKI Unit.
35. Q. For this forced native labor was the village chief given any remuneration?  
A. No, the guard just thanked the chief upon completion of the work.
36. Q. Besides the above mentioned gun emplacement, do you know of other fortifications constructed prior to December, 1941?  
A. Yes, I worked on the PELELIU Airfield from January, 1936 to March, 1936.
37. Q. Were you forced to do this work?  
A. Yes, I was ordered by the South Seas Government Officer, KAJISHIMA, to take the place of a man who became sick.

38. Q. Was this a written order?  
A. Yes.
39. Q. Do you still have this order?  
A. No, I returned it when I reported for work.
40. Q. What did the order say?  
A. It read, "On \_\_\_\_\_ (date) \_\_\_\_\_ you, RIUED, report and bring this order to the South Seas Government Officer, KAJISHIMA. If you fail to do so, you will be punished.
41. Q. Can you describe this man KAJISHIMA?  
A. He was a civilian who worked for the South Seas Government.
42. Q. What type of work did you do during this period?  
A. I carried stones and dug holes to place the dynamite in.
43. Q. What was the length of your working day?  
A. From 7 a.m. to 6 p.m. We were given a 15 minute rest period at 10 a.m. and 1 hour for lunch at 12 a.m. We were given another 15 minute rest period at 3 p.m.
44. Q. What was the daily wage received?  
A. 1 yen 50 sen per day, 75 sen of which was deducted by the JAPANESE for food and shelter which they provided.
45. Q. Were you mistreated during this period of labor by the JAPANESE?  
A. No.
46. Q. Did you see anyone mistreated?  
A. Yes, I saw a Navy Gonzoku beat a native on the back with a stick about three and one half (3½) feet long and about one half (½) inch in thickness.
47. Q. Were there JAPANESE guards present to force you to work?  
A. Yes, there were Navy Gonzoku supervisors who carried pistols.
48. Q. Were there any airplanes in the area at that time?  
A. No, the airfield wasn't finished.
49. Q. Were there any guns or fortifications around this area?  
A. No.
50. Q. What work were you doing prior to this period of labor and what pay did you receive?  
A. I was working as a department store clerk on KOROR Island and received 1 yen 30 sen per day.



51. Q. Besides the above mentioned information, do you know of any other fortifications or military installations constructed prior to December, 1941?

A. I have heard of others but these were the only ones I worked on.

52. Q. Do you have any knowledge of YAP Island?

A. No.

The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Verification and authentication on the immediate following pages.

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## Verification by witness:

I, Aukst Riund, having previously testified, was called in by the investigating officer, informed that my oath formerly taken was still binding, and having my testimony read to me in the Japanese language, declare it to be true and correct.

/s/ AUKST RIUND

## Verification by interpreters:

I, T-5 Masao Motooka, 6201 Special Interpreter Team, Western Pacific Base Command, USA, being duly sworn depose and say:

That after being duly sworn I translated the questions propounded by the investigating officer to Aukst Riund in the Japanese language, and that I translated the information received in reply to each question in the Japanese language, into the English language.

That I have read the foregoing transcript of testimony to said Aukst Riund and declare that it contains all the information I received from said Aukst Riund.

/s/ Masao Motooka

## Verification by reporter:

I, Corp Richard L. Koll, USMCR, reporter of the testimony in the foregoing transcript, being duly sworn, hereby certify said testimony was taken by me in longhand and transcribed by me and I declare the same is true and correct.

/s/ Richard L. Koll

We, Aukst Riund, T-5 Masao Motooka, 6201 Special Interpreter Team, Western Pacific Base Command, USA, and Corp Richard L. Koll, USMCR, hereby declare that we were duly sworn and subscribed our names to the foregoing transcript this 27th day of February, 1945.

Subscribed and sworn to before me.

/s/ Emery M. Perry

Emery M. Perry,  
First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine  
Corps Reserve, Investigating Officer,  
at Island Command, Peleliu, Palau  
Islands.

The testimony of this witness was secured through use of the above named interpreter after the witness, interpreter and reporter had been sworn by me. The witness signed his testimony in my presence after such testimony had been translated and read to the witness by the interpreter, evidencing which such transcript bears my signature, as well as the signature of witness, reporter and interpreter.

/s/ Emery M. Perry

Emery M. Perry,  
First Lieutenant, U.S. Marine  
Corps Reserve, Investigating Officer,  
at Island Command, Peleliu, Palau  
Islands.

Doc 6002  
委員才ノ人トシテノ公議主官ニ登擧セシ  
人等ノ取調ノ主題ヲ通告シ正式ニ實答シ  
通譯元岡正雄(夫ト力カマサシ)ヲ通シ次ノ如ク  
云フ。

取調主官ニ依リ取調スル。

一問 君現前ニ何ヲ申シマカ

答 夫ノ人トシテノ事

二問 君ノ生年月日ハ?

答 一九三三年(夫生年)三月廿四日

三問 何處ニ生レマシカ?

答 バブルサノ島ニ生レタリ村ニ生レタリ。

四問 現住所ハ?

答 夫ノ才コトノ島ニ住ルニシテ村

五問 君現任職業ニ何ナカ?

答 コトノ島ニ於ケル軍政府ノ原住民ヲ查

九問 一九四二年(昭和十七年)以前ニ於ケル日本

人ニ依ル要塞構造又軍事設備就  
テ如何ナカ?

答 夫ノ如ク居タリ。

一〇問 設備機材構築場所又之等ニ関シ  
年圖ヲ如何ナカ?

Ex 425

Nu. 1



Doc 602

十六問 君、其命令書ヲ所傳シ居ルカ。  
答、一、海軍一人が村長ト私ト見タト  
目分ヲ持テ行テシマヒタ。

十七問 此命令ヲ出シテ海軍中將トテ詔書  
答、一、一、五、マ、マ、彼一九三九年(昭和十四年)  
之等、群島カヲ去シタトテ其地ヲ居

十八問 君、此砲床、全構築ヲ監督シテカ  
答、一、一、私、此砲床ヲ相運搬スル原住  
民ヲ監督シタシテス

十九問 強制サシテ原住民労働者カ砲床ヲ構  
築シタシテスカ。

答、一、一、海軍、軍属カシテ構築シタシテス。

二十問 君、原住民カ砲床ニ運搬相ドシカ、  
内容ヲ見マシタカ

答、一、一、私、内容ヲ見マセテシタ。當時構  
築サシテ井カワシテ砲床構築ハ原住民ハ  
糧食ヲ運搬シタ。

二十一問 君、完成サシテ砲床ヲ見タカ

答、一、一、不見マシタ。然シ大砲ハマダ据エテアリ  
アセテシタ。

二十二問 君、ソレが何日頃デアリタカ記憶ニ居

答、一、一、一九三九年(昭和十四年)デアリタト云ハ

No. 2

Doc 6002

二十三問 君此要塞大砲が据置付て一月見  
カ

答 一、大砲が据置付て一月見  
た。タゞ然らば一九四四年(昭和十九年)  
三月二十日大砲が引取られたり見  
た。

三十六問 上記砲台、外君一九四二年(昭和十七年)  
十二月以前に構築せしむ此要塞を知  
り得るか

答 一、昭和十九年(昭和十四年)一月から  
一九四二年三月迄は、一飛行場を  
働きたり

三十七問 君此情事及此機は強要せしむるか

答 一、私南洋艦員梶島氏(富子)が  
酒氣を以て人々を辱し及継ぐ様は命  
令せられたり。

No. 4

三十八問 此命令書に依るか

答 一、是なり。

三十九問 君今其命令書持て居るか

Dec 6 1909

答、一、私に信事、多々出頭之時、此命令書ハ返却致シマシタ。

四下問、其命令書、何ト書キテアリマシタカ

答、一、一、何月何日貴殿ニシテ、南洋廳政府檳島、以此命令書ヲ持テ出頭セヨ、從ハザル罰セズベシトアリマシタ。

四上問、君、此檳島、コトヲ迷ハルコトガ出来カ

答、彼、一、民間人ニシテ南洋廳ニ働キテ居ル

四上問、此間、君、如何ニ種類、仕事ヲシタカ

答、私、石ヲ運ガル、タリ、タイトヲ入ル、穴ヲ掘リマシタ。

四上問、其當時、其附近ニ飛行機ガアリカ

答、一、一、飛行場、マシタ、是成ニ才アリヤシキ

四上問、大砲、又、要塞、其附近ニアリカ

答、一、一、アリマシタ。

四上問、上記報告、外、君、一九〇五年(昭和十一年)

十二月以前ニ構築セシ、何カ也、要塞

又、軍事施設、付テ居ルカ。

病

四上

No. 6

Doc 6002

登外毛私井ノ下河内ノ力ノ力ノ力  
ノ力私ノ働ノ力場行ノ力ノ力



G\*897

Document No. 6012

Page 1

1455  
(010)-gcl

HEADQUARTERS,  
OCCUPATION FORCES,  
TRUK AND CENTRAL CAROLINE ISLANDS.

\*\*\*\*\*

Information relative to the date of	*	Perpetuation of testimony
construction of fortifications and	*	of Ichiro Moses, assistant
military installations in the Truk	*	chief, Uman Island.
Atoll prior to December 1941, use	*	
of forced native labor without	*	
adequate remuneration, and denial	*	
of equal rights to Americans on Yap.	*	

\*\*\*\*\*

Taken at:	Moen Island, Truk and Central Carolines.
Date:	February 23, 1946.
In the presence of:	Thomas Santamaria, first lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.
Reporter:	George C. Lishka, corporal, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.
Interpreter:	Artio Moses, chief of Uman Island.
Questions by:	Thomas Santamaria, first lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.

- Q. State your name, permanent home address, and occupation.
- A. Ichiro Moses, assistant chief, Uman Island.
- Q. How long have you lived on the island of Uman?
- A. Forty-five years.
- Q. How long have you been living in the Truk Atoll?
- A. Forty-five years.
- Q. Have you any knowledge of fortifications or military installations constructed by the Japanese on Uman Island prior to December 1941?
- A. Yes.

- Q. State what you know of your own knowledge about the installations.
- A. In 1939 on the southern section of Uman Island the Japanese commenced building roads and fortifications. Houses were built to billet troops, a searchlight was installed, emplacements for big guns built, and two big guns and four small ones, installed. They dug a cave, reinforced it with concrete, and stored ammunition therein. This construction was under the direction of the navy. The officer in charge of the troops billeted there was Taicho. Second in command was Buntaisi. During 1940, prior to December of that year, on the island of Otta, eight miles south of Uman, the Japanese Navy erected a wharf, houses, installed a searchlight, two guns with bores of about two or three inches in diameter, and several machine guns were installed. During 1941, prior to December of that year, on the island of Salat, eight miles east of Uman, the Japanese Navy constructed a wharf, houses, installed a searchlight, two guns with bores appearing to be about three inches in diameter, and erected a radio station.
- Q. On the map which I have before me of Uman I notice a northeast battery, consisting of one Armstrong type forty caliber fifteen centimeter gun, two twenty-five millimeter dual mount machine cannons, and a northwest battery, consisting of one Armstrong type forty caliber fifteen centimeter gun, could you tell me when these were installed?
- A. In 1942.
- Q. In the center of the island I notice one quadruple thirteen millimeter machine gun, do you know when that was installed?
- A. In 1942.
- Q. When was the radar station in the center of the island constructed?
- A. In 1942.
- Q. Were all the guns in the southern part of Uman installed in 1939, 1940, and prior to December 1941?
- A. Yes.
- Q. In the construction of the buildings what material did they use?
- A. For the buildings they used concrete foundation and the rest was lumber. The cave was concrete reinforced and all emplacements were concrete based.
- Q. How many caves did they build before the war?
- A. Only one.
- Q. Did you see ammunition stored in the cave before the war?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did they have a great quantity of ammunition there?
- A. Yes.

- Q. What was the size of the cave?  
A. Twenty-four feet long, twelve feet wide, and nine feet high, and this cave was full of ammunition and provisions, mostly ammunition.
- Q. Before December 1941 did the Japanese ever practice shooting their big guns?  
A. Only to test them.
- Q. Was the searchlight built into a cave?  
A. It was built on a platform and covered over with canvas.
- Q. Did they have any other equipment close to the searchlight?  
A. They had a range finder.
- Q. On the island of Otta what did they have there beside guns and searchlights?  
A. They had a warehouse there in which they kept ammunition and provisions.
- Q. Did you see the provisions and ammunition?  
A. Yes.
- Q. What did they have on the island of Salat beside the searchlight and guns?  
A. A warehouse for ammunition and provisions.
- Q. Was all this construction on Otta and Salat prior to December 1941?  
A. Yes.
- Q. During 1939, 1940, and 1941, prior to the war, did the Japanese ever mention waging a war against the United States?  
A. Yes.
- Q. What did they say?  
A. We are going to install fortifications and military installations before we start the war against the United States.
- Q. Do you know of any natives who were forced to work by the Japanese and not adequately remunerated?  
A. Yes.
- Q. State what you know of your own knowledge about these cases.  
A. In 1939 when they were installing guns and the military installations on the southern part of Uman we were forced to furnish fifty men per day of eight hours, six days a week for about a year and a half. The wages at this time were eighty sen per day. During

1942 we were forced to furnish the Japanese one hundred natives a day for two months for construction of a road. None of these men were paid any salary. However, when we were through they gave us twenty bags of rice of one hundred pounds each, ten bags of barley of one hundred pounds each, one hundred loin cloths, one hundred towels, twelve bottles of saki each holding about three quarts. We were forced to furnish fifty men per day for the construction of barracks and a radar station for approximately five months. They paid us eighty sen per day and furnished our people with three meals per day. We furnished twenty-five men per day to work on the northern tip of Uman constructing a dock, wireless station, and houses. This continued for six months and the wages received was eighty sen per day. In 1944 the Japanese Army came to Uman. They took our houses for themselves and paid us half of what they were worth. After the war the houses were returned to us but they were all in very poor condition. Commencing in January 1944 we furnished the Japanese Army one hundred women and one hundred fifty men per day. From January to the end of the war we were forced to furnish this number every day. The workers we furnished ranged in age from thirteen to fifty. The men received one yen and twenty sen per day. The women were paid eighty sen per day. One day each month we were forced to work without pay.

- Q. Did you have to furnish help for the construction on the island of Otta?
- A. We were forced to furnish thirty men during 1939 for the construction on Otta for approximately five months. These men were paid eighty sen per day.
- Q. Did you have to furnish help for the construction on the island of Salat?
- A. We were forced to furnish thirty men per day for construction of installation on the island of Salat for approximately six months. The men received eighty sen per day.
- Q. Are there any further details you wish to report?
- A. No, sir.
- Q. Are you aware of any circumstances concerning the denial of equal rights to Americans on Yap?
- A. No, sir.

/s/ Ichiro Moses  
Ichiro Moses,  
assistant chief,  
Uman Island.

Moen Island

Truk and Central Carolines

I, Ichiro Moses, of lawful age, being duly sworn on oath, state that I have read the foregoing transcription of my interrogation and all answers contained therein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Ichiro Moses  
Ichiro Moses

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day of March 1946.

/s/ T. Santamaria  
T. SANTAMARIA,  
1st Lt., USMCR.,  
Legal Officer.

Moen Island

Truk and Central Carolines

I, Artie Moses, of lawful age, being duly sworn upon oath state that I truly translated the questions asked and answers given and that after being transcribed, I truly translated the foregoing deposition containing 4 pages, to the witness; that the witness thereupon in my presence affixed his signature thereto.

/s/ Artie Moses  
Artie Moses

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day of March 1946.

/s/ T. Santamaria  
T. SANTAMARIA,  
1st Lt., USMCR.,  
Legal Officer.

I, T. Santamaria, first lieutenant, C32989, U.S.M.C.R., certify that on February 23, 1946, personally appeared before me Ichiro Moses, and gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth; that after his testimony had been transcribed, the said Ichiro Moses read the same and affixed his signature thereto in my presence.

Place: Headquarters Military Government,  
Truk and Central Caroline  
Islands.

/s/ T. Santamaria  
T. SANTAMARIA,  
1st Lt., USMCR.,  
Island Command, Truk.

Date: March 11, 1946

1

ト云ク、中央カカリ之群島、モ之島ニ於テ行ハレタリ、  
日晴一九四六年二月二十三日。

其ノ一、貴下ノ名前、本籍地及ビ職業ヲ述ベサシ。  
モセズ、イナク、ウマノ島、長官補任役ヲス。  
ウマノ島ニハ何年位任ニテ居ルカ。  
四十五年間。

Doc. 6012

ト云ク、<sup>島</sup>ニハ何年位任ニテ居ルカ。  
四十五年間ヲス。

一九四一年(昭和十六年)十二月以前ウマノ島ニ  
日本ガ建設シタ。

要塞或ハ軍 施設ニシテ知ツニ居ルカ  
知ツニ居ラズ。

其ノ施設ニシテ、貴下自身ノ知ルト云フ述ビテサシ。

一九三九年ウマノ島、南部ニ日本人道路並ニ要要塞構築  
ヲ開始シタ。

軍隊ヲ島上ニ為シ、<sup>建設シタル施設、  
陸軍ノ巨砲ヲ備ヘシ。</sup>砲架ヲ構築シ、廿七(廿四)巨砲(四門)  
小砲ガ設置セラレタリ。

彼等ハ壕ヲ掘リ、ソノ中ニテ、<sup>ト云ク、</sup>ト云ク、<sup>中三軍</sup>  
要品ヲ貯藏シタ。

此構築ハ海軍指令下ニ行ハレタリ。

ソレニ露出シテ居ル部隊ノ首長ヲ將校ハ「タメナシ」  
デアリタリ。

別司令官ハ「アライ」デアリタリ。

Ex 997

Doc. 1

一九四〇年昭和十五年其一年十二月以前二島之島  
長六哩、才夕島二日本海軍八波止場ト家屋ヲ建  
築照燈ト徑ニ百至三イニナ、砲ヲ設置置ニ、又機關銃數  
銃ヲ壯麗置サレシタ。

一九四一年中其一年、五月以前二島之島長  
六哩、才夕島二日本海軍八波止場家屋ヲ築キ標照燈ト徑ニ  
三イニナ位ニ急ハルニ内ノ砲ヲ各、設置ニ發送局ヲ建  
シタ。

一九三九年(昭和十四年)一九四〇年以前迄二島之  
島守部、全砲が設置置サレタカ。

其ノ建築物ノ爲ニ彼等ハコニナリト、土室ヲ用ヒ殘  
リハ木材ヲ用ヒタ。

據云ニナリト、土室ヲ用ヒタ。

戰ニ則彼等ハ幾クノ壕ヲ掘ツタカ、  
唯一ツニアリマ。

戰前其ノ壕ノ中ニ軍需品が貯藏サレタヲ見タカ。  
非當中ニ多量ノ物ニアツタカ

其ノ壕ノ大キハトノクニアツタカ。  
長サ、二五メートル幅十二メートル深サ九メートルニアリ軍需  
品貯藏ニハ用ヒタリマニタカ、主ニ軍需資材アリマタカ。

壕ニナリト、土室ヲ用ヒタ  
砲床全數ニナリト  
土室ヲ用ヒタ

N.O.2

Doc. 6012

100.0012

NO. 8

同 二六四二平 總算 以前 三日 本 八 卷 十 巨 碑 射 擊 之 行 以 夕 矣。

同 唯 誠 驗 之 夕 矣 夕 矣。

同 家 中 三 探 照 燈 燈 工 夕 矣。

同 英 八 探 照 燈 燈 臺 上 二 探 照 燈 之 夕 矣。

同 探 照 燈 二 樓 之 夕 矣 何 力 他 二 探 照 燈 之 夕 矣。

同 彼 署 一 船 程 測 定 各 二 探 照 燈 之 夕 矣。

同 才 夕 矣 島 子 六 探 照 燈 上 地 上 探 照 燈 一 傍 二 何 夕 矣 夕 矣。

同 軍 需 資 材 糧 食 之 貯 藏 之 倉 庫 夕 矣 夕 矣。

同 軍 需 資 材 糧 食 之 貯 藏 之 倉 庫 夕 矣 夕 矣。

同 見 夕 矣。

同 夕 矣 島 子 探 照 燈 一 傍 二 何 夕 矣 探 照 燈 之 夕 矣。

同 軍 需 資 材 糧 食 之 貯 藏 之 倉 庫 夕 矣。

同 元 三 日 夕 矣 島 子 探 照 燈 一 傍 二 何 夕 矣 探 照 燈 之 夕 矣。

同 行 夕 矣 夕 矣 島 子 探 照 燈 一 傍 二 何 夕 矣 探 照 燈 之 夕 矣。

同 夕 矣 夕 矣。

同 何 夕 矣 夕 矣。





NO. 4

其一人曰：「此乃一書也。」

三十三人曰：「此乃一書也。」

## CONFIDENTIAL

## Exhibit 4

1455  
(010)-gel

HEADQUARTERS,  
OCCUPATION FORCES,  
TRUK AND CENTRAL CAROLINE ISLANDS.

\*\*\*\*\*  
Information relative to the date of \* Perpetuation of testimony  
construction of fortifications and \* of Sona Monukit, Assistant  
military installations in the Truk \* Chief, Tol Island.  
Atoll prior to December 1941, use \*  
of forced native labor without \*  
adequate remuneration, and denial \*  
of equal rights to Americans on Yap.\*  
\*\*\*\*\*

Taken at: Moen Island, Truk and Central Carolines.  
Date: February 25, 1946.  
In the presence of: Thomas Santamaria, first lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve.  
Reporter: George C. Lishka, corporal, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.  
Interpreter: Artie Moses, chief of Uman Island.  
Questions by: Thomas Santamaria, first lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.

Q. State your name, permanent home address, and occupation.  
A. Sona Monukit, assistant chief, Tol Island.  
Q. How long have you lived on the island of Tol?  
A. Forty-eight years.  
Q. How long have you been living in the Truk Atoll?  
A. Forty-eight years.  
Q. Have you any knowledge of fortifications or military installations constructed by the Japanese on the island of Tol prior to December 1941?  
A. Yes.  
Q. State what you know of your own knowledge about these installations.  
A. During 1939 on the southwest section of South Tol a road was built from the dock to the top of the hill. Around the edges of the top of the hill three gun emplacements were installed and three guns appearing to be about eight inches in diameter installed there. A platform was erected and a searchlight affixed thereon. A reinforced concrete cave in which ammunition was stored was dug in the side of the hill. Two barracks were built for the Japanese soldiers. During 1940 on the northern tip of North Tol a concrete wharf was constructed and a road from the wharf to the top of the mountain. At the top of the mountain one barrack and two warehouses were built. A concrete platform

was built and a searchlight placed thereon. Two gun emplacements were constructed and guns installed appearing to be about four or five inches in diameter and a radio station built.

Q. On the western section of North Tol I notice on this map before me a cave housed gun and some barracks, when were these constructed?

A. These were built after December 1941.

Q. On the eastern section of North Tol there are quite a few barracks, when were these constructed?

A. After December 1941.

Q. Did the Japanese place more guns and more installations on the northern section of North Tol after December 1941?

A. Yes.

Q. Were there any airfields built on either North or South Tol?

A. No.

Q. On the southeast section of South Tol we have a cave housed flat trajectory gun, generators, and searchlight, when were these put in?

A. After December 1941.

Q. On the eastern section of South Tol I notice a hospital, when was that built?

A. After December 1941.

Q. On the map of South Tol there are numerous buildings used as ammunition storage and barracks, when were these built?

A. After December 1941.

Q. Are there any other installations or fortifications on North or South Tol that you know of?

A. No.

Q. Do you know of any military installations or fortifications built on islands near Tol?

A. No.

Q. Do you know of any natives that were forced to work by the Japanese and not adequately remunerated?

A. Yes.

Q. State what you know of your own knowledge about these cases.

A. During 1942 and 1943 we were forced to furnish three hundred men per day to the Japanese forces for labor. These men received eighty sen per day. Four days each month we worked with no pay. During 1944 and 1945 we were forced to furnish five hundred persons per day to work for the Japanese. The men were paid one yen and twenty sen per day and the women received eighty sen per day. During this period we were forced to work four days per month without pay.

Q. Do you know the names of the Japanese in charge here at any time the construction was in progress prior to December 1941?

A. The second in command of Tol Island at that time was Hansai of the Japanese Navy and Michuno was in command of the army troops. I do not know the names of anyone else at that time.

Q. Do you know the names of any Japanese in command when they were securing from you personnel for forced labor?

A. Matsuta and Nakashima were the army commanders during 1942 when we were forced to furnish personnel for labor purposes.

Q. Do you know any other names?

A. No.

Q. Do you know of any circumstances relative to the denial of equal rights to any Americans on Yap?

A. No.

Q. Is there any information you wish to add to that already given relative to the subjects under question?

A. No.

(signed) Sona Monukit

Sona Monukit,  
assistant chief,  
Tol Island.

Moen Island

Truk and Central Carolines

I, Sona Monukit, of lawful age, being duly sworn on oath, state that I have read the foregoing transcription of my interrogation and all answers contained therein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(signed) Sona Monukit

Sona Monukit

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of February 1946.

(signed) T. Santamaria

T. SANTAMARIA,  
1st Lt., USMCR.,  
Legal Officer.

Moen Island

Truk and Central Carolines

I, Artie Moses, of lawful age, being duly sworn upon oath state that I truly translated the questions asked and answers given and that after being transcribed, I truly translated the foregoing deposition containing 3 pages, to the witness; that the witness thereupon in my presence affixed his signature thereto.

(signed) Artie Moses

Artie Moses

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of February 1946.

(signed) T. Santamaria

T. SANTAMARIA,  
1st Lt., USMCR.,  
Legal Officer.

I, T. Santamaria, first lieutenant, 032989, U.S.M.C.R., certify that on February 25, 1946, personally appeared before me Sona

Monukit, and gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth; that after his testimony had been transcribed, the said Sona Monukit read the same and affixed his signature thereto in my presence.

(signed) T. Santamaria

T. SANTAMARIA,  
1st Lt., USMCR.,  
Island Command, Truk.

Place: Headquarters Military Government,  
Moen Island, Truk and Central  
Carolines.

Date: February 28, 1946

CONFIDENTIAL.

6014

聴取場所... 中部カニノト群島トシテ

モトノ島

聴取日時... 九四六年昭和十五年三月五日

同姓名・住所・職業ヲ述ベヨ

答「ト」モ又キツトト申スト「ト」島ノ副酋長  
ナリ

同「ト」島ニ何年間居住ニテ居リカ

答「四」年間ナリ又

6015

同「ト」島ノ環礁ニ何年間居住ニテ居リカ

答「四」年間ナリ又

同「九四二年昭和十五年」三月以前「ト」島ニ

日本軍要要力軍事施設ヲ作リテ事ニ

付テ何カ知リテ居ルカ

答「人」知リテ居リ又

同「一」施設ニ付テ何カ知リテ居ル事ヲ述ベヨ

答「九三九年（昭和十四年）」南「ト」島ノ

161

西南部ニトシカカラ山ノ頂上ニテ道路ヲ

作リテ居リ又

60/4

本建設ニシテ山ノ頂上ノ分此ノ二三台ノ砲  
 臺ヲ掘工付ケラシメ口径八寸ト思ハレシニ基テ  
 六砲ヲ掘工付ケラシメシタ。台ヲ造リテ探照燈  
 ヲ備ヘ付ケラシメシタ。彈藥ヲ貯藏スル爲メ  
 鉄箱ノコトヲシテ一庫ガ中ノ側面ニ掘ラシ  
 メシタ。日本兵ノ爲メニシテ兵舎ヲ建テラシ  
 メシタ。一九四〇年(昭和十五年)内ニ此山ノ  
 北端ニコトヲシテ一制敵ノ埠頭ヲ建設セシ埠  
 頭カラ山頂ニ至ル道ニ基テ三ノ六ノ山ノ頂上  
 ニ一ツノ兵舎ト二庫ノ倉庫ヲ建テラシメ  
 シタ。コトヲシテ一砲ヲ作ラシテ探照燈ヲ  
 掘工付ケラシメシタ。二臺ノ砲座ヲ建造セシ  
 テ口径四寸カ五寸ト思ハレシ砲ヲ掘工付ケラ  
 シテ今ノ放送局ニ出界上ツテ一ノ字ヲ示シ

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1455  
(010)-gcl

HEADQUARTERS,  
OCCUPATION FORCES,  
TRUK AND CENTRAL CAROLINE ISLANDS.

\*\*\*\*\*

Information relative to the date of \* Perpetuation of testimony  
 construction of fortifications and \* of Ater Era, chief, Fefan  
 military installations in the Truk \* Island.  
 Atoll prior to December 1941, use \*  
 of forced native labor without \*  
 adequate remuneration, and denial \*  
 of equal rights to Americans on Yap. \*

\*\*\*\*\*

Taken at: Moen Island, Truk and Central Carolines.

Date : February 25, 1946.

In the presence of: Thomas Santamaria, first lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.

Reporter: George C. Lishka, corporal, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.

Interpreter: Artie Moses, chief of Uman Island.

Questions by: Thomas Santamaria, first lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.

Q. State your name, permanent home address, and occupation.  
A. Ater Era, chief, Fefan Island.

Q. How long have you lived on the island of Fefan?  
A. Forty-nine years.

Q. How long have you been living in the Truk Atoll?  
A. Forty-nine years.

Q. Have you any knowledge of fortifications or military installations constructed by the Japanese on Fefan Island prior to December 1941?  
A. Yes.

- Q. State what you know of your own knowledge about the installations.
- A. On the island of Fefan during the year of 1940 the Japanese constructed a road from the dock on the east side of the island to the top of the mountain. Emplacements for two guns were built and guns appearing to have bores of about five inches were installed. A searchlight was placed there on a platform and a generator placed inside a small building. Three large buildings were erected, one used as a barracks and two for warehouses.
- Q. On the north side of Fefan there is a cave housed flat trajectory gun, a machine gun, and two twenty-five millimeter twin mounts, when were these installed?
- A. After December 1941.
- Q. On the south tip they have a cave housed flat trajectory gun and a machine gun, when were these installed?
- A. After December 1941.
- Q. All over the island I notice numerous buildings, a hospital, barracks, warehouses, and guns, when were these installed?
- A. After December 1941.
- Q. Do you know of any military installations and fortifications placed on other islands thereabouts?
- A. Yes, on the island of Falea.
- Q. What was built on this island?
- A. After December 1941 they dug caves, built buildings, and installed guns there.
- Q. When was the seaplane base built on the island of Tsai?
- A. During 1943.
- Q. When was the airfield built on Param?
- A. Construction was started in 1943.
- Q. Do you know the names of any of the persons in command or in charge while the building was going on prior to December 1941?
- A. Iwai, Japanese Navy, was one of the officers in charge during that period.
- Q. Do you know of any natives who were forced to work by the Japanese and not adequately remunerated?
- A. Yes.
- Q. State what you know of your own knowledge about these cases.
- A. From January 1942 until cessation of hostilities we were forced to furnish four hundred men and three hundred women to the Japanese for

employment purposes. The Pay received was eighty sen for the men, sixty sen for women per day. During 1942 and 1943 we were forced to work one day each month without pay. For the year 1944 we were forced to work two months without pay and during 1945 three months without pay. During 1944 and 1945 the men received one yen and twenty sen and the women eighty sen per day.

- Q. What method did the Japanese use in forcing you to supply labor?  
 A. We were told to furnish certain amounts.
- Q. Supposing you hadn't furnished this labor what would have happened?  
 A. We had to furnish a list and if the person did not make an appearance or didn't report for work they were whipped. Because we would be punished if we didn't supply the request for personnel by the Japanese forces we never disobeyed orders.
- Q. Do you know the name of anyone in command forcing you to furnish labor?  
 A. The name of the military police master during 1942 and 1943 on Fefan was Sato, and during 1944 and 1945 the name of the police master was ANI. My people reporting for work had to report to these officials.
- Q. Do you know of any circumstances of denial of equal rights to Americans on Yap?  
 A. No.
- Q. Is there anything you would like to add to the testimony already given?  
 A. No.

/s/ Ater Era  
 Ater Era,  
 chief,  
 Fefan Island.

Moer Island

Truk and Central Carolines

I, Ater Era, of lawful age, being duly sworn on oath, state that I have read the foregoing transcription of my interrogation and all answers contained therein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Ater Era  
 Ater Era

before

Subscribed and sworn to me this 4th day of March 1946.

/s/ T. Santamaria  
 T. SANTAMARIA,  
 1st Lt., USMCR.,  
 Legal Officer.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Moan Island

Truk and Central Carolines

I, Artie Moses, of lawful age, being duly sworn upon oath state that I truly translated the questions asked and answers given and that after being transcribed, I truly translated the foregoing deposition containing 3 pages, to the witness; that the witness thereupon in my presence affixed his signature thereto.

/s/ Artie Moses  
Artie Moses

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of March 1946.

/s/ T. Santamaria  
T. SANTAMARIA,  
1st Lt., USMCR.,  
Legal Officer.

I, T. Santamaria, first lieutenant, 032989, U.S.M.C.R., certify that on February 25, 1946, personally appeared before me Ater Era, and gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth; that after his testimony had been transcribed, the said Ater Era read the same and affixed his signature thereto in my presence.

Place: Headquarters Military Government,  
Truk and Central Caroline  
Islands

/s/ T. Santamaria  
T. SANTAMARIA,  
1st Lt., USMCR.,  
Island Command, Truk.

Date: March 4, 1946

CONFIDENTIAL

Doc 6015

場所 土佐島及中央カカリ諸島中ノ土佐島

日時 一九四六年(昭和二十一年)二月廿五日

問 姓名 原籍地 職業

答 土佐島 首長 了外 工 了

問 土佐島 何年間に在り居り

答 四五年間

問 土佐島 據地 何年間に在り居り

答 四九年間

問 一九四二年(昭和十七年)十二月以前ニ土佐島

ニ日本軍が建設シタル要塞ニ軍事施設等

ニ如何に在り

問 答 然リ 軍事施設ニ至重ナル知事官等ノ流カ

答 一九四〇年(昭和十五年)中土佐島ニ日本軍

ノ島東側ニ在リタル山頂上迄道路

ヲ建設シ 二門大砲 砲床等ノ口徑

五寸許ト見立大砲ヲ据置ケル等 砲口ニ據

Ex 899

No. 1

NO. 2.

Doc 6016

照燈ヲ据工付テ、十廿建御内都ニ齊電ヲ据  
工付テ。

本建御三軒建テ、軒、兵衛、二軒、倉  
庫ニ付テ。

問. 一九四三年(昭和十八年)以前ニ其建御建  
築中、之ヲ指揮スル担任ニ居テ者、中  
誰方、名ヲ知ラズ。

答. 日本海軍、岩井ト云々、其建築期間  
中、担任將校中、人知ラズ。

6100

Q 900

1455  
(010)-gcl

Exhibit 6

HEADQUARTERS,  
OCCUPATION FORCES,  
TRUK AND CENTRAL CAROLINE ISLANDS.

\*\*\*\*\*

Information relative to the date of	*	Perpetuation of testimony
construction of fortifications and	*	of Michuo Nachuo, chief,
military installations in the Truk	*	Dublon Island.
Atoll prior to December 1941, use	*	
of forced native labor without	*	
adequate remuneration, and denial	*	
of equal rights to Americans on Yap.	*	

\*\*\*\*\*

Taken at:	Moan Island, Truk and Central Carolines.
Date:	February 25, 1946.
In the presence of:	Thomas Santamaria, first lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.
Reporter:	George C. Lishka, corporal, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.
Interpreter:	Artie Moses, chief of Uman Island.
Questions by:	Thomas Santamaria, first lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.

Q.	State your name, permanent home address, and occupation.
A.	Michuo Nachuo, chief, Dublon Island.
Q.	How long have you lived on the island of Dublon?
A.	Twenty-five years.
Q.	How long have you been living in the Truk Atoll?
A.	Twenty-five years.
Q.	Have you any knowledge of fortifications or military installations constructed by the Japanese on this island prior to December 1941?
A.	Yes.

Q. State what you know of your own knowledge about the installations.

A. About the middle of 1941 on the island of Dublon on the east side on top of a hill the Japanese commenced construction. They built two barracks, two warehouses, and one radar station. Concrete emplacements were set and three guns, appearing to be six inch guns, were installed there. A platform was erected and a searchlight placed there. On the south side of Dublon a fuel dump was established. Close to the fuel dump one large cave was dug and concrete reinforced. This was used to store ammunition and provisions. No other fortifications or military installations were erected prior to December 1941.

Q. On the island of Dublon I notice numerous buildings, barracks, warehouses, radio stations, and a hospital, when were these built?

A. After December 1941.

Q. Along the west shore line of Dublon I notice many guns, when were these installed?

A. After December 1941.

Q. In the central section of Dublon, up in the hills, I notice many guns, caved housed guns, and machine guns, when were these installed?

A. After December 1941.

Q. Do you recall any other installations established before December 1941?

A. A lookout tower was built before December 1941 and wireless communication established with Japan.

Q. On Dublon they have radio stations inside caves, when were they installed?

A. After December 1941.

Q. On the south side of Dublon I notice a seaplane base, when was that constructed?

A. After December 1941.

Q. On top of the hills in the west section of Dublon there are many large guns, when were these installed?

A. After December 1941.

Q. Do you know of any military installations and fortifications constructed before December 1941 on other islands thereabout?

A. Yes.

Q. What island?

A. Eten.



- Q. What was built there?
- A. During 1937 on the island of Eten the Japanese built an airfield. A platform was erected and a searchlight placed there. A concrete emplacement for one large gun was constructed and a gun about five inches in diameter was placed thereon. They also installed machine guns, a radar station, and dug three caves, reinforced them with concrete and stored ammunition and provisions in the caves.
- Q. Do you know of any natives that were forced to work by the Japanese and not adequately remunerated?
- A. Yes.
- Q. State what you know of your own knowledge about these cases.
- A. During 1943, 1944, and 1945 we were forced to furnish the Japanese two hundred fifty men, who were paid at the rate of one yen and twenty sen per day, and one hundred fifty women, who were paid eighty sen per day. From January 1944 until the end of the war one hundred sixty-seven persons worked thirty-two days without pay.
- Q. How many hours per day did these people have to work?
- A. Eight hours a day.
- Q. How many days did you have to furnish working personnel?
- A. Seven days a week.
- Q. Do you know the names of any of the persons who were in charge while the construction of military installations and fortifications was going on at Eten prior to December 1941?
- A. Topyama was the navy officer in charge.
- Q. Do you know the names of any of the persons who were in charge while the construction of military installations and fortifications was going on at Dublon prior to December 1941?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. Do you know who was in charge when you had to furnish forced labor?
- A. Misichawa, Japanese commander, in charge of Dublon, was the person our forced labor had to report to daily.
- Q. Do you know of any circumstances of denial of equal rights to Americans on Yap?
- A. No.
- Q. Is there any information that I haven't requested that you would like to add to the testimony already given?
- A. No. There were quite a few mines put around the Truk Atoll after December 1941.

/s/ Mitsuo Natsuo  
Mitsuo Natsuo  
chief,  
Dublon Island.

Moan Island

Truk and Central Carolines

I, Michuo Nachuo, of lawful age, being duly sworn on oath, state that I have read the foregoing transcription of my interrogation and all answers contained therein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Mitsuo Natsuo  
Mitsuo Natsuo

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of March 1946.

/s/ T. Santamaria  
T. SANTAMARIA,  
1st Lt., USMCR.,  
Legal Officer

Moan Island

Truk and Central Carolines

I, Artie Moses, of lawful age, being duly sworn upon oath state that I truly translated the questions asked and answers given and that after being transcribed, I truly translated the foregoing deposition containing 3 pages, to the witness; that the witness thereupon in my presence affixed his signature thereto.

/s/ Artie Moses  
Artie Moses

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of March 1946.

/s/ T. Santamaria  
T. SANTAMARIA,  
1st Lt., USMCR.,  
Legal Officer.

I, T. Santamaria, first lieutenant, 032989, U.S.M.C.R., certify that on February 25, 1946, personally appeared before me Michuo Nachuo, and gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth; that after his testimony had been transcribed, the said Michuo Nachuo read the same and affixed his signature thereto in my presence.

Place: Headquarters Military Government,  
Truk and Central Caroline  
Islands.

/s/ T. Santamaria  
T. SANTAMARIA,  
1st Lt., USMCR.,  
Island Command, Truk

Date: March 4, 1946

本島三島

同「一九四一年(昭和十六年)二月以前に三島

答「三」同年間于リ又

同答「ト」クノク環ニ何年同住ツ居ルカ

答「二」十五年同于リ又

同答「外」トクニ島ニ何年同住ツ居ルカ

同答「三」クニト申シ、トクニ島ニ住リ又

同「姓名・住所・職業ヲ述ベ」

同「取日時：一九四六年(昭和二十一年)三月十日

同「取場所：一、天工ノ島一中ノカロト部ノ三島

908

6016

200

ヲ作リ又シク。コシクラートト製鉄ノ砲座ヲ作リ六吋砲

ヲ作リ又シク。コシクラートト製鉄ノ砲座ヲ作リ六吋砲

ヲ作リ又シク。コシクラートト製鉄ノ砲座ヲ作リ六吋砲

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ヲ作リ又シク。コシクラートト製鉄ノ砲座ヲ作リ六吋砲

6016

ラシイ三基、大砲ヲ据エツケマシタ。  
臺モ作ツテ探照燈モ備ヘツケマシタ。『分館ノ島』、  
南側ニハ燃料集積所ガ設ケテマシタ。燃料集積  
所ノスグ近クニ大平テ塚ガ掘ラレテ、コンクリートニテ固メ  
テ居リマシタ。コノ弾薬中食糧島ノ貯蔵ニ使ハ  
テ居リマシタ。ソノ外ノ要塞軍事設備ハ一九四二年  
昭和十六年)十二月以前ニ作ラレマセシドシタ。

問「何カソノ他ノ施設ハ一九四二年(昭和十六年)十二月  
以前ニ出来テ事ヲ覚エテ居ラシカ」

答「監視塔ハ一九四二年(昭和十六年)十二月以前ニ出来  
タトノ間ノ無線連絡ガ設置サレマシタ」

問「不前ハ一九四二年(昭和十六年)十二月以前ニソノ辺  
ノ島ニ要塞ノ軍事施設ガ出来タノヲ知ラシカ」

答「ハ知ツテ居リマス」

問「何島ガ」

答「エテノ島デアリマス」

問「ソノ何ガ作ラレタノカ」

No 2

6016

答「一九三七年(昭和十二年)中ニ「エラ」島ニ日本軍ハ  
飛行場ヲ作ツタデアリマス。堂ヲ築イテソコニ探照燈  
ヲ備ヘ付ケマシタ。」

コンクリート大口径砲ノ砲座ガ築カレソレカラ口径  
約五吋ノ砲ヲ据エラシマシタ。ソレカラ日本軍ハ機関銃  
電波探知所ヲ備ヘツケマシタ、又ミツノ壕ヲ掘リソレヲ  
「コンクリート」テ固メソレ中ニ彈藥ヲ食糧ヲ貯ヘテ  
居リマシタ。」

No 3

57-901

D E P O S I T I O N

I, FERDINAND Z. FRIE of WOTJE ATOLL, MARSHALL ISLANDS, being duly sworn, depose and say that I am now employed as an interpreter at Naval Air Base No. 3234, MAJURO ATOLL. I was attending school in Japan until 1928 when I returned to the MARSHALL ISLANDS, JALUIT ATOLL.

AFFIANT further states that in August, 1938 he went to WOTJE ATOLL and was employed as an assistant to a surveyor who was taking measurements of the different islands. The Japanese commenced construction on the airstrip at WOTJE in June 1939. About fifty Japanese were employed on this job. The complement there consisted of three officers and five chiefs. Three hundred natives were hired to construct a Japanese prison camp. Natives were paid one yen a day. Construction of the prison camp was completed in October, 1939 and the same month prisoners came from Japan to finish their sentences in the WOTJE prison camp. After the arrival of the Japanese prisoners all Native labor with the exception of ten men and five women were returned to ORNEJ island, WOTJE ATOLL.

AFFIANT further says that in November, 1939 all trees on WOTJE island, WOTJE ATOLL were cut down so that the airfield could be constructed. About this time all prisoners (over two thousand) were returned to Japan and about one thousand Koreans and about two thousand Japanese laborers arrived at WOTJE to continue the work on the airstrip. Native laborers were again drafted thru the headman of each island.

AFFIANT further says that he saw large quantities of cement, asphalt and other construction material being delivered at WOTJE island, WOTJE ATOLL for use on the airstrip. Before construction was completed, in February 1942 an American plane bombed and strafed the island. In the night Native laborers were set to work to repair the damage.

AFFIANT further says that Native labor in 1941 was paid 85 sen a day. They were employed as masons, bricklayers and carpenters. Sickness was no excuse to

stop working. A Native was obliged to work for the Japanese. If he refused to work he usually suffered beatings and sometimes was sent to prison.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NOT.

/s/ FERDINAND Z. EMIZ  
AFFIANT.

I, FERDINAND Z. EMIZ, AFFIANT, say that I have read the above and foregoing by me subscribed and that the same is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ FERDINAND Z. EMIZ  
FERDINAND, Z. EMIZ.

Before me, an officer authorized to administer oaths appeared the affiant whose name is subscribed above, this 14th day of March, 1946.

/s/ FRANK E. C. REILLY  
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.



證 言

私儀アイシヤル群島ウオトエアル、住民アイロDINAND  
アイロDINANDハ宣誓、上證言致ミマス、私ハ現在アイロアル  
海軍航空基地第三三四號、通譯トシテ居、レテ居リ  
ス、私ハ一九三八年アテ日本ニ在學シテ居リマシタガ  
同年アイシヤル群島ヤツアルニ歸リマシタ

宣誓者ハ更ニ曰ク 一九三八年八月、彼ウオトエ  
アルニ行キ 各島カラ測量ミテマサ、 測量家ノ助  
手ニ雇ハレタ、 日本軍ハ一九三九年六月ニウオトエニ

飛行場ノ建設ヲ開始シタ、 日本人労働者五十人許リガ  
ノ仕事ニ働イタ、 ソコノ定員ハ三人ノ士官ト五人  
ノ頭ヲ必要トシタ、 工人三百人が雇ハレ、日本ノ監  
獄ヲ建築シタ、 工人ハ一日一回支給サレタ、

監獄ノ建築ハ一九三九年十月竣ニシタ、 ソニテ同月

ウオトエ監獄デソノ刑期ヲ勤メエゲルタメ日本ヨリ囚  
人ガ來タ、 日本囚人ノ到着後土人ノ労働者ハ男十

人、女五人ヲ除キ全部ウオトエアルノウオトエ島ノ戻サレタ、

宣誓者ハ更ニ語ヲ継イデ曰ク 一九三九年

十一月ウオトエアルノウオトエ島ノ樹木ハ全部伐倒サ  
レ、飛行場ノ建設ヲスルコトニタツタ、 コノ頃囚人ハ總テ

(二千人以上)日本ニ戻サレ、 約千人ハ朝鮮人ト約二千

人日本ノ労働者カウオトエニ到着シ、滑走路ノ作業ヲ續ケタ、

宣誓者ハ更ニ曰ク 滑走路ニ使用ノタメ大量ノセメント  
ヲ入ルルト其他建築材料カウオトエ島ニ運ビ込マレシマシタ、

Ex 901

200 6030

DEPOSITION

I, ABISA, of IMEJ island, JALUIT ATOLL, MARSHALL ISLANDS, being duly sworn, depose and say that I am now employed at the Native Labor Unit, Naval Air Base, Navy No. 3234. In 1938 the Japanese hired Natives to cut trees on IMEJ island, JALUIT ATOLL to make a place for the air field. There were two divisions of Native Working parties. One would work on gun emplacements and the other on the pier. These would be rotated. The Japanese Navy paid Yen 1.50 per day and the Japanese Company Yen 1.20 a day. The Company was in charge of all supplies for the Japanese Navy and supplied Natives to work for the Japanese Navy. Before the war the Natives that were paid Yen 1.50 a day had to buy their own food. ~~Others were given food by the Navy.~~ The Japanese gave the Natives only rice and canned fish. When the war started and until it ended both the Company and the Navy paid the Natives 85 sen per day. Before the war the food was good but during the war it was bad. The Natives were forced to work in the airfield. The Natives who worked at JALUIT airfield came from other atolls and when they wished to return to their homes the Japanese would not let them.

/s/ ABISAI  
AFFIANT.

We, MANUEL DEBRUM and FERDINAND Z. EMIZ, Interpreters state that we translated the deposition of ABISA from Marshallese to English, and that the above and foregoing is a true and correct translation, to the best of our knowledge and belief.

/s/ MANUEL DEBRUM  
MANUEL DEBRUM

/s/ FERDINAND Z. EMIZ  
FERDINAND Z. EMIZ

Before me, an officer authorized to administer oaths appeared the AFFIANT and the Interpreters whose names are subscribed above, this 16th day of March, 1946.

/s/ FRANK E. O'REILLY  
Lieutenant, U.S.N.

6032

口供書

マーヤ群島ヤルト環礁イノ島、私アビサ  
 式ニ立替言ハ次、如ク訴言シマス。私、現在海軍  
 ニニニ空母海軍航空基地、土人労働部隊ニ傭  
 下居リマス。一九三八年(昭和十三年)ニ早人、飛行  
 場用地建設、為ヤルト環礁イノ島、樹木ヲ切  
 為ニ土人ヲ雇ヒマス。土人労働部隊、ニ群下リマ  
 シ。一、群、砲、据付ニ他、群、埠頭ニ働キ時ニ交  
 代サシマス。日本海軍、一日一月五十銭、日本、会社、  
 一日一月二十銭支給シマス。コ、会社、日本海軍、  
 給与全部引受ケテ日本海軍、為ニ働、土人  
 ヲモ供給シマス。戦争前、一日給一月五十銭、土人  
 自命、食糧ヲ買ハサシテセシマス。他、者、海  
 軍、食糧ヲ支給シマス。

Ex 902

C 903

DEPOSITION

I, LANEN, of MALOELAP ATOLL, MARSHALL ISLANDS, being duly sworn, depose and say that I am now employed in the Native Labor Unit, Naval Air Base, Navy No. 3234. In 1939 I was living on MALOELAP ATOLL and in that year three hundred Japanese and four officers came to TARAVA ISLAND on MALOELAP. They put to work fifty natives to remove trees for an airfield. A little later five hundred more Japanese came from Japan. Eighty more natives were given work. The Japanese made the natives work from 6:00 AM to 5:00 PM for 85 sen a day. The natives worked at cutting down trees and making concrete. The trees were carried by four men to a specific place. Natives were also used to carry heavy loads of sand from the beach to the air strip. If the native did not work to suit the Japanese he would be beaten. The Japs sent people with broken limbs to the hospital but those who had internal injuries were not taken care of at the hospital. The airfield was finally completed in 1941 but barracks for the soldiers and other buildings were not completed.

/s/ LANEN  
AFFIANT

I, FERDINAND Z. EMIZ, Interpreter state that I translated the deposition of LANEN from Marshallese to English and that the above and foregoing is a true and correct translation, to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ FERDINAND Z. EMIZ  
FERDINAND Z. EMIZ.

Before me, an officer authorized to administer oaths appeared the AFFIANT and the Interpreter whose names are subscribed above, this 16th day of March, 1946.

/s/ FRANK E. O'REILLY  
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

2. 903

証書書類番號 MI 31  
口供書

DOC 6031

私ハ之ニ此群島ヲ召エテ、環礁ノ下ニ上申シ  
 了。正式ニ宣誓シテ通リ證言致シテ。私現在海軍第  
 三三四号海軍航空基地工務部部隊ニ使用サレテ居リ  
 下。一九三九年ニ私ハ召エテ、環礁ニ生活シテ居リマシタ。  
 シテ其ノ年名首名、日本人十四名、將校ガマロエテ、  
 シ島ニ来リマシタ。彼等八十五名ノ工ヲ使役シテ 飛行場  
 ノ建設ニ島ニ樹木ヲ除却セマシタ。シヨリテ後ニ更ニ五百  
 名日本人ガ日本カラ参リ更ニ六十名ノ工ガ仕事ヲ與ヘシマ  
 シタ。日本人一百六十五銭ノ午六時カラ午後五時テ工  
 人ヲ使役シマシタ。工ハ樹木ヲ伐リ倒シタリコケリト工事  
 ニ従事シテ働キマシタ。樹木八四名、人ニ依ツテ特定場所ニ  
 運搬サレマシタ。工ハ海岸カラ飛行場地帯ニ砂、重荷ヲ運  
 搬セリ、モ亦使用サレマシタ。若シモ工ガ日本人氣ハ、  
 働カカシタ場合ハ殴打サレマシタ。日本人ハ手ヲ足一折シタ  
 ハ病院ニ送リマシタ。内部傷害、人々ハ病院テ看護ヲ受  
 シ、トノ出来セマシタ。飛行場ハ一九四二年ニ遂ニ完成サレ  
 シマシタ。然シ兵營其他、建物完成シマシタ。

INDEXED  
 SERIALIZED  
 MAR 10 1951  
 361

DEPOSITION

I, AJIDRIK, of LAURA Island, MAJURO ATOLL, MARSHALL ISLANDS, being duly sworn, depose and say that I am employed as an Interpreter at Naval Air Base, Navy No. 3234. In the year 1940 I was living on LAURA Island, MAJURO ATOLL. In that year the Japanese started to cut down trees on RITA Island, MAJURO ATOLL to make an airfield. The Japanese did not pay for the trees they destroyed as they promised to do. This airfield was never completed. About the middle of 1941 the Japanese started to take all men from MAJURO ATOLL, to MILIE, MALLOELAP and JALUIT ATOLLS to work on the bases. Force was used in securing labor and those who did not wish to go were told that they would be put in prison or they would be threatened with a beating.

FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NOT.

/s/ AJIDRIK  
AFFIANT.

I, AJIDRIK, AFFIANT, say that I have read the above and foregoing by me subscribed and that the same is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ AJIDRIK  
AJIDRIK.

Before me, an officer authorized to administer oaths, appeared the AFFIANT whose name is subscribed above this 15th day of March 1946.

/s/ Frank E. O'Reilly  
Lt. USNR.

Doc 6029

証言  
私儀 ミーシャル 諸島

ローラ島

Doc 6029  
ローラ島、住民 AJIDRIK に此處ニ宣張  
ヲ爲シ誓フテ甲士トシ私ハ海軍ニ三四、海軍、然  
ル空基地ヲ通訳ニ從事シテ居リヌ。一九四〇年昭  
和十五年ニ私ハローラ島 ミーシャル、アトルニ住シテ居リ  
シタ。其ノ時日本人ハク、島ヲ木ヲ切り倒シ始メ其

ノ航空基地ヲ作り始メシタ。日本軍ハ木ノ  
代價トシテ約束シタガ及拂ヒレドシタ。此ノ航空基  
地ノ結局完成サレドシタ。一九四一年ノ昭和十六年

ノ頃日本人ハ基地ノ働カス爲ニ全部ノ男達ヲ  
ローラ島、ミーシャル、アトルニ連シテ行キ  
シタ。労働力ヲ得ル爲ニ強姦ガ用ヒラレ行キ度リ

No. 1  
無カッタ人達ハ投獄サレトカ又ハ打タレトカ其  
迫サレシタ。

Q-2 905

NATIVE DEPOSITIONS

U.S.N.O.B., NAVY NUMBER 3237  
Tuesday, March 12, 1946.

DEPOSITION NUMBER 1.

The witness, Johaniz, Chief of Eniwetok tribe, Eniwetok Atoll, was duly sworn and informed of the subject matter.

The interpreter, Chief Petty Officer Brown Smith, R.F.N.V.R., was duly sworn and informed of the subject matter.

The recorder, Ensign W.A. Helseth, (D) L, U.S. Naval Reserve was duly sworn and informed of the subject matter.

The following interrogations made by me, through the interpreter are herewith submitted:

- 1. Q. State your name and title.  
A. Johaniz, Chief of Eniwetok tribe, Eniwetok Atoll.
- 2. Q. Have you been Chief of your tribe from January 1941 to the present time.  
A. Yes.
- 3. Q. When did the Japanese marines arrive on this atoll.  
A. In January, 1942.
- 4. Q. When did the Japanese Navy arrive.  
A. April 27, 1941.
- 5. Q. When did the Japanese Army arrive.  
A. In January 1944.
- 6. Q. Did the Japanese military personnel force members of your tribe to work for them.  
A. Yes.
- 7. Q. Did they repay you in any form for this work.  
A. No.
- 8. Q. Did you request payment for this work.  
A. Yes.
- 9. Q. Do you know the name of any of the Japanese units or their officers or men under whom the members of your tribe worked.  
A. No.

/s/ Johaniz  
JOANIZ

/s/ Brown Smith  
Chief Brown Smith, interpreter.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this twelfth day of March A.D. 1946.

/s/ R.G. Dietiker  
R.G. Dietiker  
Lt. (jg) S(E) USNR  
Military Government Officer





Ex post

6010

米巨海軍作戦振興地海軍三二三七部

一九四六年（昭和二十一年）三月十二日 火曜日

證人「ジョハニツツ」エニカエトク環礁ノエニカ

エトク族ノ酋長ハ正當ノ宣誓ヲナシ冠目等項ニツ

イテ問カサレタ。

一問「姓名・資格ヲ述べヨ」

答「ジョハニツツ。エニカエトツク環礁、エニカ

エトツク族ノ酋長デアリマス。」

二問「オ前ハ一九四一年（昭和十六年）一月カラ

今マテ酋長ノ地位ニアツタカ」

答「ハイ。ササデアリマス。」

三問「イツ日本ノ艦隊隊員ガコノ環礁ニ到着シタカ」

答「一九四二年（昭和十七年）一月デアリマス。」

四問「イツ日本海軍艦隊ガコノ到着シタカ」

答「一九四一年（昭和十六年）四月二十七日デ

アリマス。」

906

DEPOSITION NUMBER 2.

The witness, Abream, Chief of Engebi tribe, Eniwetok Atoll, was duly sworn and informed of the subject matter.

The interpreter, Chief Petty Officer Brown Smith, R.F.N.V.R, was duly sworn and informed of the subject matter.

The recorder, Ensign W.A. Helseth, (D) L, U.S. Naval Reserve was duly sworn and informed of the subject matter.

The following interrogations made by me, through the interpreter are herewith submitted:

1. Q. State your name and title.  
A. Abream, Chief of Engebi tribe, Eniwetok Atoll.
2. Q. Have you been Chief of your tribe from January 1941 to the present time.  
A. Yes.
3. Q. When did the Japanese Marines arrive on this atoll.  
A. In January, 1942.
4. Q. When did the Japanese Navy arrive.  
A. April 27, 1941.
5. Q. When did the Japanese Army arrive.  
A. In January 1944.
6. Q. Did the Japanese military personnel force members of your tribe to work for them.  
A. Yes.
7. Q. Did they repay you in any form for this work.  
A. No.
8. Q. Did you request payment for this work.  
A. Yes.
9. Q. Do you know the name of any of the Japanese units or their officers or men under whom the members of your tribe worked.  
A. No.

/s/ Abream

/s/ Brown Smith  
Chief Brown Smith, interpreter.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this twelfth day of March A.D. 1946.

/s/ R.G. Dietiker  
R.G. Dietiker  
Lt. (jg) S(E) USNR  
Military Government Officer

証人エニウエトク環礁エニゲヒ族酋長アグリームハ宣誓  
ノ上題目事項ニツキ聞カセタ。

6011  
向 姓名有書ハ。

答 エニウエトク環礁、エニゲヒ族酋長アグリーム。

問 アタハ一九四一年(昭和十六年)一月カラ今日迄エニゲヒ  
族、酋長ダッタカ。

答 然リ。

問 日本陸戦隊ガ此、環礁ニ到着シタハ何時ダッタカ。

答 一九四三年(昭和十七年)一月デス。

向 日本海軍ハ何時着タカ。

答 一九四一年(昭和十六年)四月二十七日デス。

6x906

証人エニウエトク環礁エニゲト族酋長アフリームノ宣誓  
ノ上題目事項ニツキ聞カセタ。

60 向 姓名肩書ハ。

答 エニウエトク環礁ノエニゲト族酋長アフリーム。

問 アタハ一九四二年(昭和十六年)一月カラ今日迄エニゲト  
族ノ酋長タリタカ。

答 然リ。

問 日本陸戦隊ガ此ノ環礁ニ到着シタハ何時タリタカ。

答 一九四三年(昭和十七年)一月デス。

問 日本海軍ハ何時着イタカ。

答 一九四一年(昭和十六年)四月二十七日デス。

6x906

51 907

DEPOSITION

I, LAJINA, of MILEE Island, MILEE ATOLL, MARSHALL ISLANDS, being duly sworn, depose and say that I am now employed at the Native Labor Unit, Naval Air Base, Navy No. 2234. I was living on MILEE Island, MILEE ATOLL, in 1941 when in June of that year the Japanese brought 3000 Koreans and Japanese laborers there and started to build an airfield. First they cut down the trees. Native labor was used for which the Japanese paid 85 sen a day. Native labor was used to cut down trees, mix concrete and to unload the ships which brought all kinds of material from Japan. The natives were forced to work hard and they were fed rice and canned fish.

LAJINA  
Affiant.

I FERDINAND Z. EMIZ, Interpreter, state that I translated the deposition of LAJINA from Marshallese to English and that the above and foregoing is a true and correct translation, to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ FERDINAND Z. ZEMIZ  
FERDINAND Z. ZEMIZ

Before me, an officer authorized to administer oaths appeared the AFFIANT and the Interpreter whose names are subscribed above, this 16th day of March 1946.

/s/ Frank E. O'Reilly  
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

6x907

Doc 6028

林檎マニヤ諸島ニシテトニシ島ノ住民  
 LAJINA 人此処ニ宣誓ニ誓フテ申シ又私今海軍  
 才三三四号海軍航空基地ノ住民労働隊ヲ雇ヒテ  
 井マス一九四二年ニシ島ニ住ツテ居リ其年ノ六月五日  
 日本軍ガ三千人朝鮮人十日本人其所ニ連テ来テ能  
 行場ヲ作リ船大ニ及テ其外ニ住ニテ居リ又ニ夕。先ツ彼等  
 人樹ヲ伐リ倒シ之ヲ。及住民八日ノ十五美拂ヒテ之ニ  
 使ハシ之ヲ。及住民労働者人樹ヲ伐リ倒シ之ヲ。及  
 之ニシテ日本カラ色々ノ材料ヲ運テ来テ船  
 カラ積荷ヲ卸スコトニ使ハシ之ヲ。

Q. # 906

DOCUMENT No. 2378-A

Page 1.

Passenger, South Seas Branch #185  
/To all agencies/  
March 28, 1935

Yoshiharu Nagajima,  
Head, Passenger Dept.

Re: Deferring the booking of passengers desiring to go to places in Inner South Seas Area.

Lately, there has been a tendency toward the increase in the number of foreigners deciding to go to the islands in the Inner South Seas area, but since the facilities of this line are not only not suited in many respects to accommodate foreign passengers, but also the hotel facilities of the South Seas area, in general, are not suited to accommodate foreigners and since considerable inconveniences are apt to be experienced in case of stop-overs because of the poor shipping connections (besides, occidental meals aboard ships of this line may be wholly abolished), we would like to advise you not to book any foreign passenger, if possible, for the South Seas line until further notice.

If obliged to do so, secretly inform whoever is in charge to accept applications only after they have been first approved by the proper authorities.

Passenger, South Seas Branch, #115  
To Takaishi Hamano  
Ass't Manager, Chicago Branch  
Oct. 14, 1935

From Yoshiharu Nagajima  
Head of Passenger Dept.

Re: Ban against accepting foreign passengers for South Seas line.

We acknowledge receipt of your wire, dated October 7, as follows:

" ----- please reserve 1st class 2 outside two-berth cabins Kasuga Maru 12th December from Yokohama Jaluit thence to Palao also Yamashiro Maru 17th January Palao Menado."

We believe that the above was made in reference to the schedule of last year, but in reply, we sent the following wire, dated the 11th, as follows:

"Referring to your telegram of 7th N.Y.K. South Sea Island Line no accommodation available until March."

As you have already received it, we believe that you understand it.

As indicated in the Passenger Department's out Passenger, South Seas Branch #185, dated March 26, 1933 (copy sent to you), every effort is being made not to accept foreign passengers for this line. Taking this into consideration, we suggest that you politely refuse this application.

This is to affirm receipt of your telegram.

As an actual problem, in accepting a foreigner, even if he is a resident of the South Seas, it is necessary for us to give notice of his name, age, occupation, nationality and so forth, to the South Seas Government, which confers with the Navy and Foreign Ministries and directs us either to accept or not to accept the application.

Such being the case, we cannot accept any application unless approved by the proper authorities. As indicated in the aforementioned letter, we advised you "to secretly inform whoever is in charge to accept applications only after they have been first approved by the proper authorities." Hence, application merely by wire is of no use and even if an application is accompanied by a detailed letter, it is not certain that the approval of the proper authorities can always be obtained. Instead, it is believed that they have been rejected in the majority of cases.

Although there may be some business reasons, it would be wise to make it a general rule not to book any passenger for the South Seas line at agencies abroad.

As reference, we are sending you a copy of Passenger, South Seas Branch #185.



Passenger, South Seas Branch #121  
To Kazuo Takahashi  
Manager, New York Branch  
Oct. 26, 1935

From Yoshiharu Nagajima  
Head, Passenger Dept.

Re: Ships sailing in February and March, 1936, on South Seas line.

In regard to the above, we acknowledge receipt of the inquiry from the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions of Boston through your letter dated September 28.

However, as indicated in the circular, Passenger, South Seas Branch #185, dated March 28, 1933, we have adopted a policy of not accepting foreign passengers for this line and since the schedule is of practically no use as a schedule because of the frequent changes, we have stopped sending schedules of this line to our foreign agencies, lately. However, we are sending you a copy for reference.

Through circular, Passenger, South Seas Branch #115, dated the 14th of this month and addressed to employees of Chicago (copies sent to all branch officers in America), we advised that all overseas branches make it a general rule not to handle passengers for this line, but since the missionaries of the American Board, Boston, which has made the inquiry, engage in missionary work throughout the South Sea Islands and frequently make round trips between Japan and the islands, Rev. Harold W. Hackett, representative of the above-mentioned American Missionary society in Japan and residing in Kobe, handles their passages. He seems to have a considerable number of friends in the government offices concerned. Hence, even if you do not handle their booking, we are sure that they will not experience any inconvenience. We are mentioning this for your reference.

Furthermore, since the matter concerning South Seas line and foreign passengers is a very delicate problem and the actual reasons cannot be frankly revealed to the foreign agents, who thus might make useless and irrelevant inquiries, it is suggested that you make arrangements to have only Japanese employees handle problems pertaining to the South Seas line and foreign passengers and to have all correspondence written in Japanese.

Passenger, South Seas Branch #129  
To Tadashi Ashino  
Manager, Honolulu Branch  
November 4, 1935

Yoshiharu Nagajima,  
Head, Passenger Dept.

Re: Ban against booking occidental passengers for  
South Seas line.

As stated in the circular, Passenger, South Seas Branch #185, dated March 23, 1933, no foreign passenger is to be booked for this line, if possible. However, there has been a trend, lately, for two or three branches abroad to apply for cabin reservations by wire or to order English schedules of this line for distribution. Hence, we are again listing the reasons for the difficulty of booking foreign passengers for this line and seeking your cooperation in this non-acceptance policy.

1. General reason.

The meals aboard ships of this line are of Japanese standard and will not satisfy foreigners because only Japanese foods are served, breakfasts and suppers. Also, there are no hotel facilities in the South Seas, in general, to accommodate foreigners.

2. Special reasons (secret).

The year before last, we received a secret order from the South Seas Government office to the effect that if an application for passage aboard this line is received from a foreigner, regardless of the fact that he is a resident of the South Seas, said application should not be accepted until his name, age, residence, occupation and so forth have been reported to and approved by the said government office.

With the receiving of the above-mentioned report, the South Seas Government confers with the Navy and Foreign Ministries and directs us either to accept or not to accept the application, but to obtain approval appears not to be an easy task, for absolutely no foreigner, regardless of whether he is a resident of the South Seas or not, is accepted during naval maneuvers (which sometime last over several trips).

From the standpoint of national policy, the above measure is necessary, but since the authorities concerned cannot

directly handle the policy of approving (or disapproving) entry of foreigners to the islands because of the international situation, their entry is being controlled indirectly through our firm although it is a great deal of trouble to us. Besides, since the schedule for this line is often changed for governmental reasons, the schedule is apt to be of no use. Such being the case, it may cause you some difficulties in dealing with your clients, but it would be a wise policy for agencies, particularly those in far off places, not to handle passengers for the South Seas line.

The above being the case, we, desire all publicity in regard to this line cancelled, have stopped the publication of the English schedule (List No. 12) and the English guide (List No. 58) of this line. Since the mentioning of the latter in this department's English circular, P. Ad. No. 77, dated March 15 of this year, and pertaining to the necessary amount of advertisement and printed matter for next (this) year, was a mistake, please abstract it from your copies.

Since the above mentioned special reasons are matters that should not be revealed to your foreign passenger agents and since without this information they cannot be expected to carry out their work fully in dealing with passengers, it is suggested that you make arrangements to have only Japanese employees handle problems pertaining to foreign passengers for the South Seas line and to have all correspondence written out in Japanese.

P.H. #347  
To the president of NYK  
(Passenger Dept.)  
July 21, 1936

From Kaguo Takahashi  
Manager, San Francisco Branch

Re: Advertisement of South Seas Line in August issue  
of Travel Bulletin.

As we have been repeatedly directed to refuse all applications for passage on the South Seas line when applied for by foreign passengers, we find it difficult to understand the reasons for the publicity given to conditions in South Sea Islands and the ships with excellent passenger facilities in the Travel Bulletin, our magazine for foreigners. As long as there is no special reason, we would like to request that arrangement be made to withhold publication of items pertaining to this line in the future.

Today, for example, a passenger desiring to book passage on that line appeared at our office. We had a difficult time in dealing with him and even our foreign agent, regretting his inability to supply sufficient information in spite of the existence of such a new line, suggested that we send a wire to you inquiring about the schedule and the existence of vacancies.

However, explaining to him the uselessness of sending such a wire because of the frequent change of schedule of the said line according to conditions in Japan, the complete booking of cabins by Japanese passengers on every voyage, the existence of no hotel facilities in the South Seas and the preparation of meals aboard ship according to Japanese taste, I refused the application of the said passenger.

Passenger, South Seas Branch #183  
To all branch managers  
December 21, 1936

Yoshiharu Nagajima  
Head, Passenger Dept.

Re: Sending of revised South Seas line passenger rate schedule.

Since we have sent under separate cover 10 copies of the revised South Seas line passenger rate schedule, which becomes effective from Yokohama Maru's 2nd out voyage from Kobe to the various South Sea islands on December 15 for sailings from Japan and from Saipan Maru's 1st out voyage from Saipan on December 5 for return sailings, please examine and accept them.

Furthermore, for certain reasons, the rates for the out trips of the Osaka-Kobe-Moji-Yokohama run of all lines and the out trips of the Osaka-Kobe-Moji-Kulung-Naga run and the return trips of Naka-Kobe run of the Saipan line have been omitted from the schedule, but for caution's sake, we would like to add that the rates have not been changed and are the same as usual.

(References) Company report #1591, published May 2, 1936.  
Notice, Passenger, #18

Passenger, South Seas Branch #50  
Copies sent to all branch offices  
April 8, 1937

From Yoshiharu Nagajima  
Head, Passenger Dept.

Re: Mailing of revised South Seas line passenger rate schedule.

The revised passenger rate schedule for this route, which has been sent to and is awaiting the approval of the South Seas government at present, is being sent to you (one set enclosed; ten sets under separate cover). Hence, use it as stated below, as though it had been approved. However, for caution's sake, we would like to add that the out trip rates for Osaka-Kobe-Moji-Yokohama run of all lines and the out

trip rates for the Osaka-Kobe-Moji-Kulung-Naka<sup>h</sup> run and the return trip rates for the Naka-Kobe run of the Saipan line have not been changed and are the same as stated in the notification, Passenger, South Seas Branch #183, dated December 21, 1936.

Note: West Loop Line - Three times - By each ship after out trip of Yamashiro Maru from Kobe on April 15. However, for Yap-Rota, by each ship after 1st return trip of Yokohama Maru on West Loop line from Yap on April 15.

To overseas branches:

The above is being disseminated for reference, and the restriction against accepting foreign passengers has not been changed, as notified previously.

Passenger, South Seas Branch #211  
To Honolulu Agency  
Mar. 13, 1939

From Minoru Ikoma  
Head, Passenger Dept.

Re: Ban against accepting foreign passengers for South Sea line.

In regard to this matter, instructions were given in Passenger, South Seas Branch #185, dated March 28, 1933, and in Passenger, South Seas Branch, #129, dated November 4, 1935, but in view of the current trend of increase in the number of foreigners desiring passage to Inner South Sea Islands, it is desired that further attention be given to the following items:

1. As a general principle, do not accept foreigners for this route. If a foreigner is to be accepted, send in the application with the details of the Passenger Department of the main office for approval.

2. As reasons for refusal, state that the ships on this route are not equipped to accommodate foreigners in regard to facilities and meals and that there are no vacancies at present.

3. Point out the fact that there is no hotel equipped to accommodate foreigners in the Inner South Seas Area.

4. When information is obtained in regard to foreign passengers planning to tour Inner South Seas, refer to this directive and notify the branch offices concerned.

CERTIFICATE  
as to  
SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY OF DOCUMENT.

I, YALE CARLEE MAXON, Commander, United States Navy Reserve, do hereby certify as follows:

1. I was employed in the District Intelligence Office of the 14th Navy District at Honolulu from September 1941 to August 1945.

2. I have a competent knowledge of the Japanese language.

3. In the course of my official duties I became aware soon after the 7th day of December 1941 that all the property in Honolulu of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, a Japanese Shipping Company generally referred to as the "N.Y.K." had been taken possession of either by the United States Alien Property Custodian or by the Foreign Funds Administration, and that this property included a number of correspondence files.

4. I am aware by reason of my official duties that the said property including the said correspondence files remained in the custody of one or other of these authorities until some time in 1944 or 1945 when in accordance with instructions from my superior officer I inspected all such correspondence files.

5. I identify the portion of the file attached hereto (being I.P.S. Document No. 2378) which is in the Japanese language and comprises eight documents as one of the files which I inspected at that time. I took possession of the said eight documents at that time and lodged them with the District Intelligence Office.

6. I identify the portion of the said file which is in the English language as being the original translations of the eight documents referred to in para. 5 hereof. I caused the translations to be made immediately I had taken possession of the said documents and I supervised and corrected the translations, the alterations written thereon having been made by me in my own writing at that time.

7. The said translations are correct translations of the said Japanese documents excepting that the printed N.Y.K. letter-head and the printed list of N.Y.K. Agencies which appear in the original documents have not been translated and do not appear in the English translations.

SIGNED at Tokyo this 14th ) /s/ Yale Maxon  
day of October 1946 )

Witness: /s/ Eric V. Fleisher  
2nd Lt. AUSMI  
Investigation Div.  
I.P.S., Tokyo



2378A-1

寫「全種類へ日本郵船株式會社ニ程レタルモノ」

各通横、名、阪、神、門、長、香、森、新、大連、八丈島、

寫 二見、ダバホ、メナード、ハラホ、倫、紐、桑、沙、

心、カイヤ本市、海務課、南洋線各船

客南支第一八五號

寫

支店長

船客課長

永島義治

殿

昭和八年三月廿八日

一 莫南洋各地行外國人船客引受見合ノ件

最近外國人ニシテ莫南洋諸島へ渡航希望ノ船客漸増ノ傾向ナルガ本航路ノ施設ハ外人船客ノ引受ニ適セザル點多クアルノミナラズ南洋一帶ノ旅館設備ハ外人ノ宿泊ニ適セズ又接續船便モ完全ナラザル故途中滯留ノ場合ハ頗ル不便ナルヲ免レザルヲ以テ（又本船ニ於ケル賄向モ全然洋食ヲ廢止スルヤモ知レズ）今後追テ何分ノ通知ヲナス迄ハ南洋航路ニハ出來ル外人船客ヲ引受ザルコト、致慶ニ付左様御承知相

成慶

尙萬巴ムヲ得ザル場合ハ豫メ當方ノ承諾ヲ受ケル様係員ニ極秘トシテ内々嚴達相成慶

以上

Ex 902

2378A-2

寫「全書類八日不郵船株式會社ニ發シタルモノ」

寫 寶所、經青、沙市、桑港、羅府  
ボノルル、ワイヤホ

客南支第一一五號

新 展

市儀古在勤副長

船客課長

濱野隆一殿

永島 義 治

寫

昭和十年十月十四日

南洋航路船ニ洋人船客引受ケザルノ件

十月七日附貴電左ノ通り了承

"Please reserve 1st class & outside two-berth cabins  
Kasuga Maru 12th December from Yokohama Jaluit thence to  
Falao also Yamashiro Maru 17th January Falao Kenado"

右ハ昨年ノ定期表ニテ照會セルモノト思ハルノモ  
之ニ對シ十一月附電信ニテ

"Referring to your telegram of 7th N.Y.K. South Sea Island  
Line no accommodation available until March"

ト回答セルニツキ先着御了承ノ事ト存ス

昭和八年三月廿八日附船客課出客南支第一一五號

(寫費方)ニ依リ御承知ノ通り本航路船ニハ出來  
ルタケ洋人客ヲ引受ザル事ト程成后ニ付右御會シ  
ノ上今回ノ申込モ依良ク御詳リ程成度  
右電信相確メ迄

以 上

2378A-3

追而實際問題トシテ外國人ナルトキハ假令南洋在  
任者ニテモ引受ニ當リ一々管方ヨリ船客氏名、國  
籍、年齡、職業等南洋廳ニ通知ヲ與シ南洋廳ハ海  
軍省並ニ外務省ト協議シ引受ノ可否ヲ管方ニ指圖  
ス右様ノ次如ニテ其筋ノ承認ヲ得ザレバ引受出來  
ザル事ニ相成后ル故前記管西ニモ一線メ管方ノ承  
認ヲ受ケタル後引受クル様係員ニ極秘トシテ内々  
嚴達相成度ト申渡シ置キタル次如ニテ單ナル程  
報申込ハ其用ヲ爲サズ、又假令手紙ニテ票項ヲ具  
シ申込マル、トモ必ズシモ其筋ノ承認ヲ受ケ得ル  
トモ限ラズ等口斷ラル、方多カルベシト思ハル  
依ツテ接客都合モアランガ原則トシテ外國ニ於テ  
ハ南洋航路船客ヲ一切取扱ハザル様取計ヲ事得策  
ナルベシ  
参考ノタメ管南支第一八三號寫添附ス

2378A-4

寫「全權船入日本郵船株式會社ニ付シタルモノ」

寫 沙市、桑港、羅局、市、  
ホノルル、カイヤオ

新 展

客南支第一二一號

船客課長

紐育支店長

永 島 義 治

高 橋 一 雄 殿

昭和十年十月二十六日

寫

南洋航路昭和十一年二月及三月出帆船ニ付スル件

右ニ關シ九月廿八日附貴翰ヲ以テ在ボストン

American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions

ヨリ照會アリタル趣了承

然ル爲ニ昭和八年三月廿八日附客南支第一八五號回

幸ニテ御承知ノ通り本航路ニハ外國人船客不引受

ノ方針ヲ執レルト本航路定期ハ屢々變更セラレ定

期表ガ殆ンド定期表ノ用ヲ爲サル状態ニ付旁々

近來在外店所ニハ本線定期表ノ用ヲ中止シ居ル

次第ナルガ爲ニ参考茲許一葉送附ス

市俄古在勤員宛本月十四日附客南支第一一五號ハ

寫在米各店ヘテ以テ海外店所ハ原由トシテ本航路

船客ヲ取扱ハヌ儀申達メ置キタルガ御照會ノ American

Board, Boston

ノ宣教師ハ南洋諸島ニ於テ宣教ニ

2378A-5

從事シ時々内地トノ間ニ往復アリ日本ニ於ケル右  
「米國傳道會社」ノ代表者、神戸在住ノ Rev. Harold  
E. Hackett ガ渡航事務ヲ取扱ヒ居リ同氏ハ關係官廳  
方面ニ相當ノ知合ヒヲ有スルモノ、如ク、貴方ガ  
引受ヲ取扱ハザルモ不便ナキ筈ナリ右參考迄ニ申  
添フ


尙南洋航路ト外國人船客トノ關係ハ頗ルテリゲ  
イトノ問題ニテ忌憚ナク内情ヲ外國人係員ニ打  
明ケル譯ニモ參ラザルベク之ヲ知悉セザレバ照  
會等ニモ自然無駄ノモノヤ要領ヲ盡サバルモノ  
アレバ南洋航路ト外國人船客ニ關スル問題ニ就  
テハ總テ邦人係員ガ取扱ヒ和文ニテ照會ノ事ニ  
御取計有度

2378A-6

寫「全種類」日本郵船株式會社ニ登レタルモノ

各通 横、名、阪、神、門、安、大連、青、濱、上、香、廣、  
新、甲、孟、倫、メナード、タバオ、八丈島、二見、紐、  
市、桑、羅、紗、ホノルル、カイヤオ  
發、バラオ在勤、サイバツ在勤、シドニ一在勤、天津、  
シドニ一在勤、天津、南洋線各船

客席支第一二九號



ホノルル出張所長

船客課長 野正 段 永島 參 治

昭和十年十一月四日

南洋航路船ニ洋人船客引受ケザル件

昭和八年三月廿八日附客南支第一八五號同章ニヨ  
リ御承知ノ通り本航路船ニハ可及的外國人船客ヲ  
引受ケザル事ト相成居ル處最近在外ノ二三店所ヨ  
リ或ハ口信ヲ以テ船塞保留ノ申込ヲナシ或ハ配布  
用トシテ英文本航路定期表ヲ注文シ來レル向テリ  
タルニ付テハ更メテ本航路ニ外國人船客引受ケ困  
難ノ事情ヲ左ニ列記シ不引受方針ニ對シ貴方ノ協  
力ヲ希望ス

一、一般的事情

就航船ノ食料向邦人本位ニテ朝夕ハ和食ノ  
タメ外國人ニ適セズ又南洋一帶ニ外國人向  
旅館設備ナキ事

237SA-7

二、特殊事情（秘）

一 昨年南洋艦ヨリ、本航路船ニ外國人  
船客ヨリ乗船申込ヲ受ケタルトキハ假令南洋  
在住者ニテモ其氏名、年齢、住所、職業等ヲ  
同艦ニ届出テ其承認ヲ得ザレバ之ヲ引受ケザ  
ル様内命アリタル事

南洋艦ハ右届出ニ依リ海軍省並ニ外務省ト協  
議シ引受ノ可否ヲ當方ニ指圖スルモノナルガ  
承認容易ナラザルモノアリ海軍演習期間ニ於  
テハ（致航海ニ及ブ事アリ）假令南洋在留者  
ニテモ外國人ノ引受ハ絶対ニ許サレザル事  
右ハ國策上必要ノ事ナルガ其筋ニ於テハ國策  
關係上外國人ニ對シ直接入島認可ヲ裁議執レズ  
吾社トシテ甚迷惑ノ次第ナルモ間接ニ我社ヲ  
介シテ制限シ居ル次第ナリ

又本航路定期ハ官廳關係ニテ屢々變更セラ  
レ定期表モ兎角其用ヲ爲サザル様ノ次第ナ  
レバ旁々接客上苦シキ場合モアランガ、特  
ニ遠隔ノ地ニ於テハ南洋航路船客ヲ取扱ハ  
ザル事得策ナルベシ

右様ノ次第ニ付本航路船運停頓聲明中止欄  
續奉線ノ英文定期表（定期表）及ビ英文航路  
案内（定期表）ノ印刷ハ廢止セリ、次（本）

2378A-8

年度廣告印刷物所要數ニ關スル本年三月十五日  
附堂課英文同章 U. A. P. No. 27ニ後者丈ケ記載セラレ  
タルハ誤ニ付貴方控ヨリ之ヲ削除セラレ度  
尙前記特殊事情ハ外國人ノ船客係員ニハ打明ケ  
得ザル議ニ有之又此事情ヲ知ラザレバ接客上萬  
全ヲ期シ難キ次第ナレバ南洋航路ノ外國人船客  
ニ關スル問題ハ總テ邦人係員ニ於テ取扱ヒ照會  
狀モ邦文ニテ認ムル事ニ御取計アリ度

以 上



2278A-9

寫「全覽」日三郵船株式會社ニ送ルモノ」

寫 紐、町、市、船、ホノル、

PH 327

社長

桑港支店長

御中

高橋 一雄

(船客課) 昭和十二年七月二十八日

一 八月號 *TRAVEL BULLETIN* 南洋航路宣傳記事ノ件

外人船客ヨリ南洋航路船ニ乗船申込相受タル際ハ  
 婉曲ニ謝絶ス可申様屢々御指令相受ケ居ル度外人  
 ニ對スル宣傳機關タル *TRAVEL BULLETIN* ニ南洋諸島ノ事情並  
 ニ船客設備ノ優良ナル新船ヲ紹介宣傳サレル事ハ  
 如何ナル御事情ニヨルモノナリヤ當方 郷カ了解ス  
 苦シム次第ナルガ他ニ特別ノ事情ナキ限り今後ニ  
 於テハ同航路ノ記事ヲ掲載御見合せノ事ニ御取計  
 願ヒ度シ

現ニ本日ノ如キモ南洋航路乗船希望船客來客アリ  
 其ノ應對ニ苦心致シタルガ客内外人係員モ斯ル新  
 船ヲ有シナガラ充分ナル *サービス* ヲ與ヘ得ザルハ  
 迷惑ナク定期並ニ船室有無モ万ニ穩信ニテ照會ス  
 可キカト申出タルモ同航路船ハ内地事情ニヨリ定  
 期變更サル、付多ク又船室ハ每航日本人船客ニテ  
 滿員タル事、尙南洋ニハ旅館、ホテルノ設備ナク  
 本船食事も日本人位ナル故外人引受ニ不向ナレバ  
 打電スルモ無駄ナル理由ヲ諭シ中止セシメ右船  
 客アリシヨリ

以上

2278A-10

寫「全種類八百本郵船株式會社三輪レタルモノ」

各通横、名、阪、神、門、長、差、那、八丈、二見、サ、テ、  
寫 撥、ロ、キ、ハ、オ、ク、メ、ト、ホ、ク、ヤ、上、香、  
新、倫、經、市、桑、羅、抄、ホ、カ、バラオ在勘、  
サイパン在勘、南洋線各船

客南支第 一八三號

支店長

船客課長

豊

永

島

菱

治

*H. Tanaka*

昭和十一年十二月廿一日

一、南洋航路改正船客運賃表送附ノ件

内地發ハ十二月十六日神戸出帆第二次往航横濱丸  
ヨリ南洋各地間及ビ復航ハ十二月五日サイパン發  
第一次往航サイパン丸ヨリ實施ノ南洋航路改正船  
客運賃表一〇部別封附セルニ付御査収相成度

尙各線往復阪神、門司、横濱間及ビサイパン線  
往航阪神、門司、釜山、那羅南復航那羅南神戸間  
各等運賃ハ都合ニヨリ運賃表ヨリ削除シタルモ

賃率ハ從來通りニテ變更ナシ爲念申添フ

以上

(參照)

昭和十一年五月二日發行社報

第一五九一號

告知客第一八號

2378A-11

寫「全覽類ハ日本郵船株式會社ニ發シタルモノ」

各通 濱、名、阪、神、門、長、春、那、八丈、二見、サ、テ、  
口、ヤ、ハ、ホ、ア、ダ、メ、タ、ト、ホ、ク、ヤ、  
寫 登、上、香、新、倫、紐、市、桑、羅、沙、ホ、カ、  
ハ、ミ、ネ、在、島、南洋線各線

客聯文第五〇號



船客課長  
永 島 義

H. Tanaka

昭和十二年四月八日

一、南洋航路改正船客運賃表送附ノ件

目下南洋廳ニ認可申請中ノ本航路改正船客運賃表  
（同封 壹部）  
（別封 一〇部）送附セルニ付認可アリタルモノト  
シテ左記ノ通り實施相成反尙各線往航阪神、門司  
横濱間及ヒサイパン線往航阪神、釜蓋、那覇間、  
復航航線神戶間各等運賃ニ關シテハ昭和十一年十  
二月廿一日附客南支第一八三號通牒通りニテ變更  
ナシ爲念申添フ

左 記

西廻線第三回山城丸往航四月十五日神戶發以降  
各船  
但ヤツプロタ間ニ限り西廻線第一回横濱丸復航  
四月十五日ヤツプ發以降

2378A-12

海外各地へ

定ハ送券ノタメ送附スルモ外人船客引受制限ノ件

ハ發ニ通達シタル通り變更ナシ

以上

2378A-13

寫「全航路八日本郵船株式會社ニ屬シタルモノ」

各通商、名、神、門、長、天津、北京、大連、青、濟、上、香、  
廣東、新、甲、孟、倫、メナード、タバオ、タワオ、ハラオ、  
サイパン、八丈島、二見、海、市、桑、羅、沙、ホノルル、  
リマ、東京、シドニー在船、マニラ在船 寫 南洋線各線

客南支第211號

ホノルル出張所長

新 展

船客課長

御 中

生 簡

昭和十四年三月十三日

一、南洋線ニ外人船客引受ケザル件

本件ニ關シテハ昭和八年三月二十八日附客南支第  
一八五號並ニ昭和十年十一月五日附客南支第一二  
九號ヲ以テ指圖シ置タル處最近内南洋諸島へ渡航  
希望ノ外人増加ノ傾向アルニ付左記ノ諸點更ニ注  
意相成度

一 本航路ニハ原則トシテ外人ヲ引受ザル事、萬一  
外人ヲ引受ケント欲スル際ハ詳細ヲ具シ本店船  
客課ノ承認ヲ得タル後ニナス事

一 引受拒絕ノ理由トシテハ本航路ノ各港ハ設備及  
食料ノ點ニ於テ外人引受ノ用意無キコト、又ハ  
現ニ空床無キコトヲ以テスル事

2378A-14

一 尙兩幣洋ニハ外人ヲ宿泊セシム可キ旅館無キコ  
トヲ指摘スル事

一 内町洋へ渡航ヲ企テ居ル外人船客氏名ニ付シ營  
方ニ於テ情報ヲ得タル際ハ本署ヲ参照シテ關係  
支店ニ通知ス可シ

以 上

Doc 2378A (cont)

文書第二三七八A 號

文書ノ辨別並ニ公正ニ認ルル證

一、合衆國海軍隊偏役中佐イエル・キアンテ

・マクソン茲ニ下記ノ通り證明致シマス。

一 私ハ一九四一年ノ昭和十六年ノ九月ヨリ一九

四五年ノ昭和二十年ノ八月迄在ホノル、第十

四海軍區ノ區情報部ニ勤務シテキマシタ。

ニ私ハ日本語ノ知識ヲ或ル程度持ツテ居マス。

私ノ公職在任中一九四一年ノ昭和十六年ノ十

二月七日後間モナク私ガ氣附イタコトハ一設

ニ「MYRT」ト呼バレテ居ル日本ノ船會社、

日本郵船會社ノホノル、ニ於ケル全財産ガ合

衆國外國財産管理人又ハ外國資金管理部ノ何

レカニヨツテ占有セラレテ居タコト及コノ財

産ニハ多クノ輸給ガ含マレテキタコトデア

リマス。

四 私ハ職務上、右輸給ヲ含む上述ノ財産ガ一

九四四年ノ昭和十九年ノ又ハ一九四五年ノ昭

和二十年ノノ或時期迄右當局ノ何レカニヨツ

テ保管セラレテ居タコトヲ承知シテ居リマス。

當時私ハ上官ノ指示ニ從ツテ右輸給全部ヲ

檢回シマシタ。

私ハ茲ニ添附ノ綴（國際檢察部文書第二三七

Ex. # 909-A ✓

Doc. No. 794-A

Page 1.

Item No. 14 (a)

Notes of the Privy Council Regarding the Introduction of the Revised Bill of the Parliamentary Law to the Diet

Regarding the Special Appointment of Administrative Officials of the South Seas Government

The Privy Council was held at 10.05 a.m. on 20 January, Showa 12/1937/

The Emperor was not present.

Those present;

President HIRANUMA  
Vice President ARAI

Ministers;	Prime Minister HIROTA	No. 5
	Navy Minister NAGANO	" 6
	War Minister TERUUCHI	" 7
	Minister of Justice MIYASHI	" 8
	Minister of Finance MIBA	" 9
	Minister of Agriculture and Forestry SHIMADA	No. 12
	Minister of Communications TANOMOGI	" 13
	Minister of Overseas Affairs NAGATA	" 14
	Minister of Education HIRAO	" 15
	Minister of Commerce and Industry OGAMA	" 16
	Foreign Minister ARITA	" 17

Privy Councillors;

KAN'KO, Privy Councillor	No. 19
KURODA, " "	" 20
SAKURAI " "	" 21
KAWAI " "	" 22
SUZUKI (KAWABE) Privy Councillor	" 23
ISHII Privy Councillor	" 24
ARIMA " "	" 25
HARA " "	" 26
KUBOTA " "	" 27
NOTOYA " "	" 29
SUZUKI (Soroku) Privy Councillor	" 30
ISHIZUKA, Privy Councillor	" 31



ISHIWATA, Privy Councillor	No. 32
SHIMIZU, " "	" 33
FUJISAWA, " "	" 34
HAYASHI, " "	" 35
MURAKAMI, " "	" 37
YANAKA, " "	" 38

## ABSENTIES:

## Imperial Princes:

Imperial Prince YASUHIRO	No. 1
" " NOBUHIRO	" 2
" " TAKAHIRO	" 3
" " KACHIRO	" 4

## Ministers:

Railway Minister MATSUDA	" 17
Home Minister USHIO	" 11

## Privy Councillors:

KURENO, Privy Councillor	" 23
KANETADA, " "	" 36

## Committeemen:

TSUGIHA, Director of the Bureau of  
Legislation  
NIGAI, Councillor of the Legislation  
Bureau

The above committeemen attended at the investigation  
of the said two bills.

SHO, Chief Secretary of the House of Peers  
TACUCHI, Chief Secretary of the House of Commons

The above committeemen attended the investigation  
regarding the introduction of the revised bill of the Parliamentary Law  
to the Diet.

TOTOMI, Director of the Navy Affairs Bureau  
Commander TAKADA  
URAI, Director of Superintendent Bureau of the  
Ministry of Overseas Affairs  
MURAKAMI, Secretary of the Ministry of Overseas  
Affairs.

The above four committeemen attended at the investigation  
concerning the special appointment of Administrative Officials of  
the South Seas Government.

The President (HIR. NUMA): Next we shall introduce the bill regarding the special appointment of administrative officials of the South Seas Government. The first reading shall be held immediately and omitting the recitation of the bill we shall have the investigation report.

Reporter (MURAKAMI):

"Upon investigating this bill prudently, we find that the South Seas Government, in conformity with a fixed plan covering several years, is executing various measures concerning the expansion of colonization, promotion of industries and good organization of communications for the purpose of developing the South Sea Archipelagoes that are under its jurisdiction. In view of the fact that the South Sea Archipelagoes have come to hold an important position at this time in the national defense of the Empire in the light of the recent international situation, and because there are many installations concerned with the navigation routes, harbours, roads, aviation and communications of the said archipelagoes, which will require a special consideration of the archipelagoes, convenience and military circumstances of our Navy, it is necessary to provide a way to enable the special appointment of naval officers as the administrative officials who are to be in charge of the transportation and communication affairs in the said government."

"In order to establish a way for making such special appointments we wish to provide through the Imperial Ordinance concerning this bill that the administrative officials of the South Seas Government who will be engaged in the communication and correspondence affairs, may be appointed after being selected by the Higher Civil Service Examination Committee from among those who are well versed in the affairs of the South Seas and who possess the necessary knowledge and experience for the duty thereof and in appointing the naval officers in active service as administrative officers in the South Seas Government in accordance with this provision, a special rule will be established through the Imperial Ordinance concerning this bill in order to prevent them from being subjected to the restriction of rank of senior civil officials and be lowered in their official ranks. The rule will provide that in case of appointing a higher official on duty for the administrative office of the South Seas Government in accordance with the aforementioned rule of appointment, his rank will be made an exception in accordance with the Senior Civil Service Official Transfer Rule. That is, if a captain in the Navy, he may be immediately appointed as the administrative official of the South Seas Government with the 3rd rank of the higher civil service. However, in case the person who is appointed as above later becomes a high official in another capacity, it is natural that he becomes a subject to the restriction on official ranks fixed by Imperial Ordinance No. 285 of the 36th year of Meiji (1903), and, therefore, we wish to stipulate in the ordinance concerning this bill that he be regarded as the Special Civil Official mentioned in the said Imperial Ordinance, and thereby make the above ordinance applicable to him."

"The point is that this bill, because of special necessity, chiefly aims to set a rule of special appointment for those of the staff who are high officials who will have to be put in charge of special business in the South Seas Government, and at the same time it also proposes to lay down adequate rules regarding their official rank, which I deem is an unavoidable measure, and therefore I think it is proper to pass it as it is."

"I have humbly stated the result of the investigation as above."

President (MR. NUMA): "As no other view is expressed, we will omit the second reading and the rest and shall put the bill to vote. Will all those in favor of the bill, please rise?"

Then (all the members stand up), President (MR. NUMA) says: "It has been passed unanimously, and hereby we close the conference today."

Ex 909A

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憲法會議會錄

一 憲法會議中修正憲法草案之提出ノ事

一 憲法會議中修正憲法草案之提出ノ事

昭和十二年一月二十日（水曜日）午前七時五分開

議

議上臨時不議案

出席長

平沼 議長

荒井 副議長

大臣

廣田 內閣總理大臣 五番

永田 海軍大臣 六番

寺內 陸軍大臣 七番

林 司法大臣 八番

高橋 文部大臣 九番

磯田 農林大臣 十二番

磯田 水産大臣 十三番

永田 拓務大臣 十四番

平田 文部大臣 十五番

小川 商工大臣 十六番

有田 外務大臣 十七番

79, 1-2

縣屬管

空	子	以	同	官	十	九	香
無	田	以	同	官	二	十	香
樓	赤	以	同	官	廿	一	香
河	合	以	同	官	廿	二	香
館	米	(城)	同	官	廿	三	香
石	赤	以	同	官	廿	四	香
有	馬	以	同	官	廿	五	香
原		以	同	官	廿	六	香
國	田	以	同	官	廿	七	香
秀	田	以	同	官	廿	九	香
館	米	(莊)	同	官	三	十	香
石	梁	以	同	官	卅	一	香
石	梁	以	同	官	卅	二	香
滄	水	以	同	官	卅	三	香
康	律	以	同	官	卅	四	香
赤		以	同	官	卅	五	香
高		以	同	官	卅	七	香
田	中	以	同	官	卅	八	香

縣屬管

縣 族

樂 仁 縣 三 一 卷

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生 仁 親 王 二 卷  
兼 仁 親 王 三 卷  
心 仁 親 王 四 卷

大 三

前 田 仁 親 王 十 卷  
堀 内 仁 親 王 十一 卷

山 田 官

聚 山 田 官 廿八 卷  
上 山 田 官 廿六 卷

校 長

水田法蘭西長官

山長法蘭西長官

以上各書二卷

長 貴族院議員長官

山口宗憲院議員長官

以上各書均係在法蘭西國會  
< 議院 > 內二卷

藤田義孝院議員長官

藤田義孝院議員

藤田義孝院議員長官

藤田義孝院議員

以上各書均係在法蘭西國會  
< 議院 > 內二卷

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局長（平沼） 次ニ

南洋艦隊司令官ノ特別任用ニ關スル件ヲ議題ニ  
決スル一機会ヲ期シテ省議シテ直ニ卷込報  
告ヲ爲サシム

報告員（村土） 題テ此ノ条件ヲ卷込スルニ南洋  
艦ニ於テハ其ノ所管ノ南洋群島ノ開發ノ爲メ植  
民ノ増進、産業ノ振興、交通ノ整備等ニ關シ以  
年度ニ亘ル一定ノ計畫ノ下ニ目下各島ノ施設ヲ  
實施シツツアリ此ノ時ニ當リ南洋群島ガ近時ノ  
國際情勢ニ照シ吾國ノ自防上忘ラズ其ナル地位  
ヲ占ムルニ至レルニ考ヘ同群島ノ航路、港灣、  
道路、航空及通信ニ關スル施設ニ付テハ尙ニ我  
ガ法軍ノ利便ヲ考慮シ其ノ軍務上ノ都合ヲ斟酌  
スベキモノ尠カラザルガ故ニ同艦ニ於テ交通通  
信ニ關スル事務ニ従事セシムベキ事務官ニハ特  
ニ海軍武官ヲ任用スルコトヲ得ルノ途ヲ設クル  
必要アリ乃チ斯カル特別任用ノ途ヲ設クルノ趣  
旨ノ下ニ茲ニ本件ノ勅令ヲ以テ南洋艦隊司令官ニ  
シテ交通通信ニ關スル事務ニ従事スル者ハ南洋  
ノ事情ニ精通シ且其ノ職務ニ必要ナル學識経験  
ヲ有スル者ノ中ヨリ高等試験委員ノ候補ヲ以テ  
是ニ之ヲ任用スルコトヲ得ル旨ヲ定メントス而  
シテ此ノ規定ニ依リ在職ノ海軍武官ヲ南洋艦隊

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初官ニ任用スルニ當リ高等文官ニ屬スル官等、  
 開陳ヲ受ケテ官等ヲ選下スルコトナカラスムル  
 爲メ本件ノ期令ヲ以テ右ノ任用規程ニ依リ在職  
 ノ高等官ヲ前洋廳ニ初官ニ任用スル場合ニ於テ  
 ハ其ノ著ノ官等ハ高等文官停任ノ例ニ依ル旨ノ  
 停任ヲ設ケ、即チ振身大佐ニシテハ直ニ高等官三等  
 ノ前洋廳等初官ニ任用スルコトヲ符シム祖シ其  
 ノ着カセニ他ノ高等文官ト爲ル場合ニ於テハ明  
 治三十六年勅令第百八十五號所定ノ官等ニ屬  
 スル職階ニ依リシムルヲ當然トスルガ故ニ之ヲ  
 同令ニ屬テ所ノ特別文官トスル旨ヲ本件ノ期令  
 ニ定メ以テ之ヲシテ右期令ノ適用ヲ受クルモノ  
 タラシメントスルナリ  
 茲ズルニ本件ハ特別ノ須長ニシテ前洋廳ニ於ケ  
 ル特殊ノ職務ヲ擔當スベキ高等官タル職員ノ爲  
 メニ特別任用ノ規程ヲ定ムルニシテ三限トシ餘  
 セテ其ノ著ノ官等ニ屬シ相當ノ規程ヲ設ケント  
 スルモノニシテ已ムヲ得ザル指區ト認メラルル  
 ニ由リ本件ハ此ノ例之ヲ可決セラレ然ルベシト  
 思料ス  
 右諸事悉空ノ結果ヲ報告ス  
 附 表 (平沼) 別ニ御披露ナキ故第二國會以下シ  
 管轄シテ直ニ深次スベシニ案費處ノ各位ノ起立



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ヲ請フ

(委員起立)

議長 (平沼) 査管一紙可決セラレタリ

本日ハ之ニテ閉會ス

E. 910

Document No. 1124 -A

Page 1

Showa 5 /T.N. 1930/

MINUTES OF COMMITTEE MEETING

PRIVY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

(Excerpts)

The First Meeting of the Investigation  
Committee for the Ratification of the  
London Naval Treaty of 1930  
was held at the offices of the Privy Council  
on 18 August (Monday), Showa 5 /1930/

Those present:

President KURATOMI  
Vice President HIRANUMA

Chairman of the Investigation Committee, Councillor ITO

Members of the Investigation Committee

Councillor KANEKO	Councillor DEN
Councillor KUBOTA	Councillor ARAI
Councillor YAMAKAWA	Councillor KAWAI
Councillor KURODA	Councillor MIZUMACHI

Chief Secretary FUTAKAMI  
Secretary HORIE  
Secretary NIHO

(The meeting was opened at 1:05 P.M.)

Chairman ITO, after calling the meeting to order, stated that as this bill was an important bill which affected the national welfare, it was necessary to make a specially careful investigation of the bill, and that first, he wanted to determine the policy and order of the investigation in order that it might proceed in a satisfactory manner. He continued that the matters to be questioned would roughly be divided into seven items, for each of which a chief investigator would be appointed, who, after making a thorough investigation, would set a date, listen to the explanations of the authorities and ask questions. He further stated that he hoped that care would be taken not to allow the proceedings of the meeting to leak out.

Then the Chairman expressed thanks for the services of Chief Secretary FUTAKAMI who had exerted himself day after day to study this bill. Next, Chief Secretary FUTAKAMI made an explanation regarding the items to be questioned. Councillor KAWAI made an inquiry about the presentation of a memorial to the Throne by the Supreme War Council, and Chairman ITO gave his opinion on the matter. Councillor KANEKO spoke about questions relative to

the problem of the supreme command, and the Chairman expressed his views on the matter also.

President KURATANI stated that his negotiation some time ago with the Prime Minister about the manner of presenting the written reply to the Throne was with the intention of advising its presentation as material necessary for the investigation. Then he explained the details.

Councillor KANEKO inquired whether the Government had asked the Council to carry out the investigation quickly even at the sacrifice of the summer vacation. President KURATANI reported on the progress of the negotiations with the Cabinet since the receipt of the written Imperial Inquiry, and especially on the reply of the Cabinet as to whether it was necessary or not to carry out the investigation quickly.

Councillor KANEKO rejected the popular opinion that the present treaty should be ratified quickly in respect to international faith, and explained the internal circumstances under which the United States had ratified the treaty so promptly.

The Chairman next asked for the opinion of each councillor regarding the order of the investigation of this treaty. Councillors KANEKI and KURODA gave their opinions. The Chairman further referred his opinion to the council that as it was detrimental and useless for the State Ministers to be accompanied by so many unnecessary explainers to the committee meetings as has been the practice, he wanted, except when the presence of others was especially necessary, only the Premier and the Foreign and the Navy Ministers to attend the meetings for the investigation of this treaty. Councillors KANEKO and KURODA supported the proposal and it was decided as the Chairman proposed.

Chairman ITO, after giving the date and time of the next meeting, announced the meeting closed.

(The meeting was closed at 2:40 P.M.)

(Pages 4-5)

The Second Meeting of the Investigation Committee

regarding the Ratification of the

London Naval Treaty of 1930

Held at the offices of the Privy Council

on 23 August (Saturday), SHOWA 5 /1930/

Those present:

President NIELSON  
Vice President H. KUROKI

Chairman of the Investigation Committee, Councillor ITO

Members of the Investigation Committee:

Councillor KAMEKO	Councillor DEN
Councillor KUROTA	Councillor IRAI
Councillor YAMAKATA	Councillor KAWAI
Councillor KURODA	Councillor MIZUMACHI

Ministers of State:

Prime Minister HAMAGUCHI  
Navy Minister TAKAHARA  
Foreign Minister SHIDEWA

Chief Secretary FURUKAWA  
Secretary HOJIE  
Secretary MIYANO

(The meeting was opened at 1:05 P.M.)

Chairman ITO declared the meeting open, and asked for the explanation of the authorities regarding this draft. The Prime Minister explained, in regard to the London Naval Treaty of 1930, the history of the Naval Arms Limitation Conference, the purpose of the London Conference, the progress of the Conference, and the outline of the treaty. He also stated that he hoped the treaty would come into effect gradually from SHOWA 6 /1931/. Supplementing the explanation of the Premier, the Foreign Minister explained further in detail. The Navy Minister also explained from the expert's standpoint the gist of our counter-measures to meet the conference and the regulations regarding our armament set by the treaty; and stated that he had concluded

the treaty as it was deemed necessary to determine the general outline of their and our argument at this juncture, although the content of the treaty was of course not satisfactory. After that the Chairman requested the Ministers to retire.

(All Ministers retired.)

Then discussion was begun within the committee. The opinion was voiced that regarding the problem of the deficiency of our armed strength, the attendance of ITO, ex-chief of the Naval General Staff, should be requested through the Navy Minister. Regarding questions, it was decided that questions about facts would be given preference.

Committee Chairman ITO declared the meeting closed.

(The meeting was closed at 2:50 P.M.)

The Third Meeting of the Investigation Committee  
regarding the Ratification of the  
London Naval Treaty of 1930

Held at the offices of the Privy Council

on 26 August (Tuesday), Showa 5 /1930/

Those present:

President KURITOMI  
Vice President HIRANUMA

Chairman of the Investigation Committee, Councillor ITO

Members of the Investigation Committee:

Councillor KANEKO	Councillor DEN
Councillor KUBOTA	Councillor ARAI
Councillor YAMAKAWA	Councillor KATAI
Councillor KURODA	Councillor MIZUMACHI

Ministers of State:

Prime Minister HIGASHIMACHI  
Navy Minister TAKARABE  
Foreign Minister SUJIDHARA

Chief Secretary FURUKAWA  
Secretary HORIE  
Secretary MUTO

(The meeting was opened at 1:05 P.M.)

Councillor KANEKO said that according to the press a certain State Minister had made remarks that seemed to indicate hostility toward the Privy Council. This was a matter for great regret, since it ran counter to the Imperial Command of Emperor Meiji, but the Council had no intention of interfering with the accomplishment of the Cabinet's policies. Its sole intention was to obey the Imperial Command, and he requested that questions be answered without reserve. He then continued that he wanted to know why the Cabinet was in such a hurry for the ratification of this treaty as to wish the committee to investigate it even in the midst of the hot season during the time when vacations had been granted. To this question, the Foreign Minister made an answer.

Councillor KANEKO queried again whether in case Ireland would not ratify the treaty, it could not be carried into effect, and stated that it was only for the convenience of her domestic administration that the United States had finished its ratification without delay. He asked about the circumstances which had led the Japanese plenipotentiaries to go to England via America in answer to an invitation from the United States and received a reply from the Foreign Minister.

Then the same Councillor asked whether it was true that Plenipotentiary TAKARABE, prior to his departure, had invited in members of both Houses of the Diet and others, had explained the so-called Three Main Principles, and had stated that Japan's minimum military strength should be 70% of that of the United States. The Navy Minister replied in the affirmative.

The Councillor then asked whether it was true that Plenipotentiary WAKATSUKI had also declared at San Francisco that Japan's minimum military strength must be 70% of that of the United States. The Foreign Minister made a reply, but the Councillor not being satisfied demanded an explanation of Plenipotentiary WAKATSUKI about the matter. The same Councillor further asked about the facts of the negotiations concerning the "70%" problem between STIMSON, Ambassador DEBUCHI, and Plenipotentiaries WAKATSUKI and TAKARABE, and whether the so-called compromise had been agreed upon at the meeting of MATSUDAIRA and REED. The Foreign Minister answered in detail.

Then, the Councillor queried whether the rumor was true that no consultation had been held with Admiral ABO until the aforesaid compromise had been made. The Navy Minister replied in the negative. The Councillor inquired, furthermore, as to the authenticity of the fact that when the compromise among Japan, Britain and the United States was concluded, Admiral ABO, being astonished at the quantitative equality in submarines had stressed the necessity on the part of Japan of maintaining the present amount, but that Plenipotentiary WAKATSUKI had said it was already too late to amend the compromise. The Foreign Minister replied to this.

Then, the Councillor demanded to be shown the whole text of the telegram which, he heard, had been sent from Plenipotentiary TAKARABE to Vice Navy Minister YAMASHI with instructions to "introduce the opinion of the Navy General Staff about the compromise to the Cabinet," at the time of Plenipotentiary WAKATSUKI's requested instructions on whether or not to accept the compromise plan; he also demanded to be shown the secret documents, if any, as such seemed to be in existence from what had been discussed in the U. S. Upper House. To this, the Navy and Foreign Ministers answered respectively.

Furthermore, the Councillor inquired whether it was true that Premier HAYAGUCHI replied in the House of Peers: "I will not refer to what Articles XI and XII of the Constitution signify, because even the scholars have different opinions about them." The Prime Minister first explained the reason



why the Cabinet was in such a hurry to make this investigation during the hot season, and then, replied that he had thought it proper to withhold the answer on the constitutional interpretation, since it was not directly concerned with the London Treaty.

Then, the Councillor requested to be shown the formal texts of the transmitted documents of the direct appeals to the Throne, and of the memorials to the Throne as regards the disposition of matters concerning military strength.

Councillor KAWAI argued that it was utterly incomprehensible that the Japanese Plenipotentiaries, despite their declaration before their departure, asked for instructions, giving up the Three Main Principles, and that the Navy General Staff had approved. And he asked the Navy Minister for his opinion on the establishment of a Navy Minister's Administrative Office, and inquired whether it was true that at a meeting of the Supreme War Council it had been agreed not to set up the Navy Minister's Administrative Office in the future. To this inquiry, the Navy Minister stated that he had not considered that a slight diminution in Japan's holding of military strength from 70% of that of the United States would render impossible the concluding of the treaty, and he had presented the memorial to the Throne as regards the disposition of matters concerning military strength. The Prime Minister raised the question as to whether the investigation of the connection between the direct appeal to the Throne and the Cabinet which Councillor KANEKO had requested, must cover the whole period from the beginning of the Meiji Era to the present day. Councillor KANEKO replied it would be enough to have the titles of the documents which had been transmitted to the Cabinet from Meiji 43 /1910/ onward.

Then Councillor KAWAI requested that the confidential instructions to the Japanese Plenipotentiaries be produced. After this was done, Chairman ITO declared the meeting closed.

(The meeting was closed at 4:50 P.M.)

The Fourth Meeting of the Investigation Committee  
regarding the Ratification of the  
London Naval Treaty of 1930

Held at the offices of the Privy Council  
on 28 August (Thursday), Showa 5 /1930/

Those present:

President of the Privy Council KURATANI  
Vice President of the Privy Council HIRANUMA

Chairman of the Investigation Committee, Councillor ITO

Members of the Investigation Committee:

Councillor KANEKO  
Councillor YAMAKITA  
Councillor KURODA

Councillor DEN  
Councillor ARAI  
Councillor KAWAI  
Councillor MIZUMACHI

Absent: Councillor KUBOTA

Ministers of State:

Prime Minister HIRAYAGUCHI  
Navy Minister TAMURA  
Foreign Minister SUDEHARA

Chief Secretary FURUKAWA  
Secretary HORIE  
Secretary NITO

(The meeting was opened at 1:00 P.M.)

The Chairman of the Committee, ITO, called the meeting to order.

Councillor KANEKO charged that it is very unfortunate that the former as well as the present Cabinet regards the Privy Council as an enemy, and added that according to the newspapers the Administrative Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, NAGAI, in his speech at the oratorical meeting of the MINSEI TO held at Hibiya Public Hall on August 20th, stated as follows: "If the Privy Council interferes with the ratification of the London Treaty, which the Cabinet intends to conclude for the sake of promoting international peace and to lighten the national burden, we must fight them as the public enemy of our nation."

The Councillor further said that according to an article in the Japan Times, he /NAGAI/ stated: "Such superannuated men as the Privy Councillors are unnecessary to a modern nation," and then asked whether this was true or not. Regarding this, the Foreign Minister replied, "I think that the speech and statement of Mr. NAGAI were probably not truly reported." Thereupon Councillor KANEKO requested the facts be ascertained directly from Vice Minister NAGAI, to which the Foreign Minister agreed. Then the same Councillor asked why Japan doesn't join the Continental Group and do as Italy and France have done. To this, the Foreign Minister gave his answer.

The Councillor further denounced the Cabinet by stating that though the Foreign Minister says that the treaty was rather a success, a look at the minutes of the United States Senate will show that it was argued that this treaty would make Japan look on with hands tied until the U. S., which at present has only two heavy cruisers, constructed fifteen of them. Could the Cabinet still hold its view of diplomatic success, he questioned, and continued that while the strength of forces in the U. S. was decided by the President, and that in Japan by His Majesty with the assistance of the Supreme Command, in spite of this, the present Cabinet, assuming an attitude as if to assist and decide by itself, has signed such a treaty which is disadvantageous to our country and advantageous to the U. S.; and citing the minutes of the U. S. Senate, where it was said in ridicule: "Hats off to the Japanese," he emphasized the fact that our diplomacy had blundered in concluding this treaty. In reply, the Foreign Minister endeavored to explain.

Changing his point, the Councillor asked a further question regarding the regulations governing the replacement of U. S. cruisers and pointed out that the abolition of destroyers and submarines was exceedingly disadvantageous to our country as compared with the U. S. The Councillor inquired again why this country had agreed on such a treaty under these circumstances, and demanded a detailed explanation with regard to the relations between Britain and America at the London Conference. The Foreign Minister replied respectively to these queries.

The Chairman of the Committee, ITO, inquired about the S:ITO-CRAIGIE parley and the Foreign and Navy Ministers answered respectively in this connection.

Then Councillor KURODA stated his desire to know the relation between the Cabinet and the Privy Council, and called the attention of the Cabinet to the fact that there were many errors and omissions in diplomatic documents submitted for Imperial approval since the formation of the present Cabinet (this treaty being a conspicuous example) which would annoy the Throne and mislead the general public. Therefore, said the Councillor, pointing out actual examples, the Cabinet should investigate the causes to avoid such mistakes in the future. The Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister expressed their regret for the lapses and gave assurances that they would be careful in the future.

Councillor KATEKO criticized the Foreign Minister, saying that the remark he made laying the blame on the ill workmanship of the photogravure was without reason. There followed questions and answers between the Foreign Minister and the Councillor regarding this.

After this, Committee Chairman ITO stated that it was very regrettable that there are various propaganda-like rumors concerning this Committee, and so saying he declared the meeting closed for the day.

An inquiry was made by Councillor DEN concerning the dual complement of warship personnel, to which the Navy Minister answered.

(The meeting was adjourned at 3:30 P.M.)

The Fifth Meeting of the Investigation Committee  
regarding the Ratification of the  
London Naval Treaty of 1930.

Hold at the offices of the Privy Council  
on 1 September (Monday), SHOWA 5 /1930/

Those present:

President KURATOMI  
Vice President HIRANUMA

Chairman of the Investigation Committee, Councillor ITO

Members of the Investigation Committee:

Councillor KANEKO	Councillor DEN
Councillor KUBOTA	Councillor ARAI
Councillor YAMAKAWA	Councillor KATAI
Councillor KURODA	Councillor MIZUMACHI

Ministers of State:

Prime Minister HAYAGUCHI  
Navy Minister TAKAHARA  
Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA

Chief Secretary FUTAKAMI  
Secretary HORIE  
Secretary MUTO

(The meeting was opened at 1:00 P.M.)

Committee Chairman ITO announced the opening of the Conference, and stating that there had been an omission in the answer to Councillor KURODA's question in the previous meeting, asked how the erroneously written passages in the text of the treaty should be dealt with. A statement was also made by Councillor KURODA on the purport of this inquiry, to which the Foreign Minister replied. Councillor KATAI inquired about the procedure by which the instructions to the Imperial Plenipotentiaries were decided, and the Navy Minister answered this.

The same Councillor further inquired what induced the Navy Minister to submit to the Throne the matter regarding the disposition of armed forces and to ask for Imperial sanction when there was already an established usage, to

which question the Navy Minister replied that it was because that matter had become a problem in the Special Session of the Diet after the London Disarmament Conference, breeding various arguments among the military authorities also. Subsequently the same Councillor said that he considered the Prime Minister, who had been the Navy Minister's Administrative Officer at that time, as not having conformed to the said usage; and asked the Navy Minister what he thought of it. The Navy Minister replied that after his return to Japan he had carefully inquired of the persons responsible on that matter, and it was concluded that there had been nothing wrong in the procedure taken by the said Administrative Officer at that time.

Further, Councillor KAWAI inquired as to the reason for the many changes of post in the Naval General Staff, including the Vice Chief of Staff, to which the Navy Minister replied. Subsequently, the same Councillor requested a detailed explanation regarding the situation which led to the replacement of the Navy Chief of Staff, to which the Navy Minister stated that he regretted very much receiving questions based on newspaper articles, and further explained that Admiral KATO himself regretted what he had done at the time he was asked for instructions, and had tendered his resignation with the reason that he could not bear the thoughts of self-reproach for not having stated his opinion positively. He, the Navy Minister, had thereupon reported the change of post to the Throne. The same Councillor also stated that it could be interpreted that when Admiral KATO submitted his resolution to resign to the Throne on the grounds that he could not do justice to the independence of the Supreme Command, he was commanded to resign, and asked whether it was so. The Navy Minister replied that it was true that he had submitted his papers at the time he reported his resignation to the Throne but changes in the posts had not been made by it.

The Councillor further stated that he had heard that Vice Admiral SAKONJI, with the consent of Plenipotentiary TAKARABE, had sent a wire to Vice Navy Minister YAMAMOTO telling him to be prepared for a break-down when sending instructions; and after the instructions were dispatched the Navy Chief of Staff had also sent a secret telegram to Plenipotentiary TAKARABE. The Councillor demanded the telegraphic message be presented. The Navy Minister explained the circumstances at the time the telegram from London was received and, saying that he had by no means sent the telegram in betrayal of his colleagues, gave a summary of the telegram from the Navy Chief of Staff.

Regarding the Councillor's question as to whether Plenipotentiary TAKARABE did or did not know that Chief of Staff KATO had opposed the military strength of the requested plan, the Navy Minister replied that he did not think he /KATO/ would oppose it to the extent of risking a breakdown. To this, the same Councillor reprovingly asked why the Plenipotentiary did not confirm the intentions of the Navy Chief of Staff, and the same Minister replied that as the Navy Minister's Administrative Officer was in Tokyo he had not thought it necessary for TAKARABE, who was only a plenipotentiary, to confirm the said Chief's intentions. Then he read the telegram from the Navy Chief of Staff, dispatched on 2 April.

At this time, Committee Chairman ITO demanded the presentation of the telegram read by the Navy Minister, but the Minister replied that he would answer after consideration.

Councillor ARAI questioned on some doubtful points in regard to the tonnage of heavy cruisers of Japan and America as brought out by the Navy Minister in the last committee meeting, and moreover asked whether or not the Navy Minister's Administrative Officer and the Chief of the Naval General Staff agreed in their opinion on the military strength at the time the instructions were dispatched, and also, whether or not they considered it necessary to agree on their opinion.

To these questions, the Navy Minister and the Prime Minister gave detailed replies. The Prime Minister, as a rule, would withhold his comment, but regarding the plans for instructions, he replied that the agreement of the opinion of both parties was necessary, and added that both had arrived at an agreement.

Next, Councillor KAKI asked why OKADA, a member of the Supreme War Council, accompanied the Navy Chief of Staff, and why he didn't clarify the statement of the Chief of Staff when there were vague points in his replies; and to this, the Prime Minister answered that at the time he had met both parties, Mr. OKADA, speaking as a representative, stated: "The situation has become unavoidable. The naval experts' views will be given later by Vice Minister YAMASHI, but if the conference is going to conclude this treaty as it is, we must study the best method possible."

Mr. KATO replied: "As for the Naval General Staff, this would cause difficulty in the military operations and tactics, but, if this present treaty is decided upon, we will endeavor with our best efforts to carry it out."

Councillor KANEKO pointed out that the fact that the Emperor decided upon the strength of forces is clearly stated in the Japanese Constitution, and asked why a Staff meeting was not held in order to decide on the military strength in accordance with the treaty. To this, the Prime Minister replied that they had followed what had become the customary procedure since the Washington Conference, and stated that since all the supreme powers belonged to the Emperor, an advisory organ by no means infringed upon the sovereign power. Here, the said Councillor explained the reason for providing Article 11 in the Constitution, and stating that the determination of the military strength is the most important of the Imperial prerogatives, said that the Cabinet cannot arbitrate on the matter. To this, the Prime Minister replied that although in form, the military strength can be determined only by the Cabinet, the military strength provided in the treaty had been decided after having obtained the approval of the Navy Chief of Staff. Then Committee Chairman ITO stated that the disregard of the Navy Chief of Staff's opinion was already being much talked about, and so that point must be well investigated, and if what the Prime Minister said was true, it is vastly different from the rumor that are going around. He then adjourned the meeting.

(The meeting was closed at 4:10 P.M.)

The Sixth Meeting of the Investigation Committee  
regarding the Ratification of the  
London Naval Treaty of 1930.

Held at the Offices of the Privy Council  
on 3 September (Wednesday), SHOWA 5 /1930/

Those present:

President KURATANI  
Vice President HIRANUMA

Chairman of the Investigation Committee; Councillor ITO

Members of the Investigation Committee:

Councillor KANEKO	Councillor ARAI
Councillor KUBOTA	Councillor KATAI
Councillor YAMAKATA	Councillor MIZUMACHI
Councillor KURODA	

Absent: Councillor DEN

Ministers of State:

Prime Minister HAMAGUCHI  
Navy Minister TAKARABE  
Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA

Chief Secretary FUTAKAMI  
Secretary HORIE  
Secretary MUTO

(The meeting was opened at 1:00 P.M.)

Chairman ITO announced the opening of the meeting.

Councillor KANEKO stated that he had heard that Parliamentary Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs NAGAI who had abused the Privy Council in his public speech was going to make a two months trip to China, and demanded that the said Councillor be ordered to postpone his departure until the questions raised by said Councillor the other day were settled.



The Foreign Minister answered that he had asked NAGAI about the matter, but that NAGAI had replied that he had never abused the Privy Council, that he had only said that as it was absolutely necessary to conclude the Naval Treaty, we had to fight against any statesmen who tried to prevent the conclusion of the said treaty. The Foreign Minister continued that NAGAI had also said that he had been quite surprised at the articles in the foreign-language newspapers. Then Councillor KANEKO made a request for the withdrawal of the said account from the various newspapers. The Foreign Minister replied that the Government did not have a newspaper account retracted each time they found mistakes in it, and that he did not think it necessary to take such measures in this case. The said Councillor, however, insisted upon its withdrawal, explaining that with the publication of such an account in the newspapers, not only the people would naturally come to bear bad feelings against the Privy Council, but that the account was also very prejudicial to the maintenance of amicable relations between the Privy Council and the Foreign Ministry.

Councillor KUSOTA asked for the control of such persons as would take advantage of matters relative to the Throne for party movements. He also recommended that the article on NAGAI's speech be caused to be withdrawn. Chairman ITO also expressed his desire that the Government should take a moderate view in the matter, and announced his wish to begin the discussion of the main subjects.

Councillor KATAI asked what the Premier meant when he answered in the Lower House that the Government would be solely responsible for national defense. The Premier answered that he had just replied that it was unnecessary to discuss in the Diet the details of the negotiations between the military administration organization and the military command organization; and that as the Navy General Staff was not responsible to the outside, the Government would be responsible. The said Councillor again asked on what grounds the Premier had, regardless of the objection of the military, decided that the military strength decided upon by the Treaty was sufficient for our national defense; and what he meant when he said that the strength decided upon by the present agreement was only a part of our country's military strength. The said Councillor continued to ask about the authority possessed by the Chief of the Navy General Staff; and how the Premier could say, with a military strength of which the Chief of the Navy General Staff did not approve, that our national defense was secure. The Premier replied to each of these questions.

Then the same Privy Councillor asked whether the above-mentioned plan of instructions in response to a request had been drafted by the Naval General Staff or not, and why the plan had been made the last one in spite of the fact that our plenipotentiary had often reported that it was not to be the last plan. The Premier answered each question and stated that it was due to the fact that he had been informed by the plenipotentiary that it was hopeless to expect the other parties to concede any further. Then the same Councillor said that he was told that the Navy Minister's administrative officer was heard to say, when he saw the Chief of the Navy General Staff on 27 March, that there was no other way for him but to decide the matter by himself, if

the Chief of the Navy General Staff persisted to the end in his disagreement. The Councillor asked how it was possible that such a thing could have been said. The Councillor asked again whether or not on the same occasion the Premier had petitioned the Emperor to convene a meeting of the Supreme War Council. The Premier answered that he had only expressed his own feeling about the matter and that he had not petitioned the Emperor to call the Supreme War Council meeting. The same Councillor continuing further said that he wanted to ask the Premier the reason why the latter could say that there was no other way but to decide the matter by himself. The Premier repeated his former answer and said that he had only expressed his own feelings. Whereupon, the same Councillor demanded to know how it happened that the Premier came to feel like that and stated definitely that the Premier was wrong in concluding that the Navy Chief of Staff had agreed with him. To this, the Premier explained in detail the situation at the time and stated the circumstances in which he had concluded that the Navy Chief of Staff had agreed with him. However, the same Councillor asked whether he had not been too hasty in interpreting the behavior of the Navy Chief of Staff as agreement. The Premier insisted that it was not unreasonable.

After this the same Councillor pointed out that the Premier's explanation in the Privy Council was quite different from that which he had made in the Diet where he had stated that the Government held the right to decide military strength. The Premier answered that he had not stated that the Government held the right of decision, but he had only said that the matter of concluding treaties should be decided by the Cabinet. He answered also that he could not state the scope and extent to which he took the military's opinion into consideration, as this was a confidential matter. Whereupon, the same Councillor asked how the Premier could explain that agreement had been reached when the matter required agreement by the military. The Premier explained that it was because he had thought that the military had had no objection after all.

Councillor KAMEKO asked the Premier the reason why he had stated in the Imperial Diet that he had respected the military's opinion and taken it into consideration, instead of saying that the military had agreed with him. As the Premier answered that it was not necessary to have gone so far as to say that he had obtained their consent, the same Councillor voiced the opinion that the question had come up because the Premier had not said that he had obtained their consent, and that the Councillor considered it most incomprehensible why the Government had had to say particularly that it had taken the opinion of the military into consideration in deciding the matter.

The Premier explained that it was because he had thought that the question of what the ideas of the Army and Navy General Staffs were should not be made an object of discussion in the Diet. The same Councillor said that he would conclude his questioning on this point, although he was not satisfied with this reply.

Then Councillor KATAI asked the Premier why, in spite of the fact that the opinion of the Navy General Staff ought not to be violated by others, it seemed, according to the Premier's reply, as though it were a consultative organ

of the Government. The Premier replied that it was not.

Privy Councillor ARAI, after making introductory remarks that he would ask about the same thing once more as it was a serious matter, asked for corroboration as to whether or not the Premier thought that the agreement of the Chief of the Navy General Staff was necessary in deciding military strength. The Premier replied that he thought that he would consider anything proposed by the Navy Minister as having been approved by the Chief of the Navy General Staff, because the Premier thought that the Minister's opinion would be in conformity with that of his Chief of Staff. The same Councillor asked what if the Minister did not agree with the Navy Chief of Staff? The Premier replied that they should be made to confer until they came to an agreement. The same Councillor asked whether it was not necessary for the Premier in such a case to consider it his duty to deal with the matter /T.N. only/ after having persuaded them to agree. The Premier replied that a discordant opinion would not be brought to the Premier. The same Councillor wanted to know if the Premier considered that the Navy Minister and the Navy Chief of Staff should agree concerning the measures to be taken on matters having to do with military strength. The Premier replied in the affirmative.

The Chairman of the Committee, ITO, explained in detail about the progress and the facts of the negotiations between the Navy Minister's Administrative Officer and the Chief of the Navy General Staff as he found that the Premier's reply was very different from what he had heard concerning the question of the agreement of the Navy Chief of Staff, and he could not make out the situation.

The Chairman said that he hoped that the Premier and the Navy Minister would make efforts in regard to the attendance of the former Navy Chief of Staff in order to solve the problem, and to assist the progress of the conference. Councillor KURODA expressed his agreement with the proposal. Then the Chairman of the Committee stated that the Premier might give his answer the next day after consultation. The Premier replied that he would answer after due consideration. He explained also that although he had been informed of the direct appeal to the Throne, his opinion might differ from that of the Chief of Staff in the matter of the interpretation of their lack of agreement to which he had referred.

Committee Chairman ITO stated that he had heard that the Chief of the Naval General Staff had never expressed his concurrence. To this, the Premier explained that he had never said that the former Chief of Staff had agreed, but that he had only concluded that after all there had been no objection.

The Chairman of the Committee ITO declared the meeting closed.

(The meeting was closed at 4:20 P.M.)

The Seventh Meeting of the Investigation Committee  
regarding the Ratification of the  
London Naval Treaty of 1930.

Held at the Offices of the Privy Council  
on 5 September (Friday), SHOWA 5 /1930/

Those present:

President KUMOTOMI  
Vice President HIRANUMI

Chairman of the Investigation Committee, Councillor ITO

Members of the Investigation Committee:

Councillor KANEKO	Councillor ARAI
Councillor KUBOTA	Councillor KATAI
Councillor YAMAKATA	Councillor MIZUMACHI
Councillor KURODA	

Absent: Councillor DEN

Ministers of State:

Prime Minister HAMAGUCHI  
Navy Minister TAKARABE

Chief Secretary FUTAKAMI  
Secretary HORIE  
Secretary HUTO

(The meeting was opened at 1:05 P.M.)

Committee Chairman ITO called the meeting to order, and read the Prime Minister's answer (refusal) to the recommendation for the attendance of the former Navy Chief of Staff.

Councillor KANEKO brought up the point that at the Diet the Premier had answered that he had taken the military's opinion into consideration, while here at the Privy Council the Premier had answered that he had obtained their approval. Moreover, the Premier had explained that the reason why he had not answered to the same effect in the Diet as here was because the matter touched on the internal relations between the military and the civil government. However, Councillor KANEKO said, he proposed to ask why "taking into consideration" was all right and "obtaining approval" was all wrong. He then shifted his questioning to inquire why the provisory clause of Article 23 of this

treaty was put in. The Navy Minister answered that as it was indicated through this clause that we have not renounced our claim which was not approved by America and Britain, it would at least give spiritual strength to Japan in making her claim at the next conference. The Premier also answered that as it was feared that this treaty would pave the way to restricting Japan's heavy cruiser strength to 60% of that of America, we have specially provided this clause, and thereby have shown clearly that at the next naval conference the attitude of the different countries is not to be restricted in any way by the provisions of this treaty.

The said Councillor KAMEKO argued that it was a fundamental principle of international law that no independent country could be restricted by a treaty after its expiration, and so it was not necessary to make such a provision. Therefore, it was an extreme sophistry on the part of our plenipotentiaries to say that the insertion of this clause was an achievement. To this the Prime Minister made some explanation, but the said Councillor again asserted that this provision was only an excuse and that any kind of assertion that might lead to the expansion of armaments could not by any means be permitted in the future.

The Premier then argued that although it was not yet decided whether or not Japan would make claims based on the so-called three great principles at the next naval conference, even if that claim should be made, it would not always mean an expansion of armaments, for the reason that if light cruisers and destroyers were to some extent to be decreased and heavy cruisers and submarines to be increased in the same amount, there would be no increase in the total.

Thereupon, the said Councillor further gave his firm opinion that by this treaty the United States of America had attained its object of limiting Japanese heavy cruisers and submarines and under such circumstances, such a provision would, of course, be of no use at the next conference.

Then the Navy Minister explained that the American plenipotentiary was inclined to be over-enthusiastic over 8-inch cruisers, although from the technical view-point 6-inch cruisers are not always inferior to 8-inch cruisers; and as to the merits of submarines there was no definite theory.

Then Councillor KATAI asked to be allowed to speak, stating that he desired to bring the questions he had been asking for some time now to a conclusion, but as the Chairman said that there would be a further chance of reviewing the questions some other day, the said Councillor stated that it was simply beyond his comprehension that the Navy Minister should say in his reply in the House of Peers that the age when the strength of force determines all had already passed, and advocate that the most important point as regards armaments lay in keeping them in a perfect state at all times. He argued that Japan's armaments should be based upon the possibility of a crisis in the peace of the Orient with America or other Third Powers intervening in Sino-Japanese relations over rights and interests in Manchuria and Mongolia, and demanded to know the Government's opinion on the matter.

To this, the Premier replied that it was a fact that the ratio of strengths, vis a vis America, provided in this treaty would become more unfavorable for Japan the nearer we got to 1936, and therefore it would be quite natural that he /Councillor KAWAI/ should worry about Japan's national defense, provided that it was interpreted in a narrow sense, but the Premier continued, he believed that friendly relations with other Powers, financial adjustments and other such matters were likewise the essentials of national defense. Therefore, although he too was dissatisfied with some phases of the national defense he was determined to put up with the present state of things for the time being; and although we would have to bear with the unfavorable ratio till the end of 1936, we would be able to build ships from the beginning of 1937, and so we had better make preparations within the scope admitted by the treaty. If we commenced our ship-building simultaneously with the expiration of the treaty terms, we would soon be able to hold 70% as against America; and finally the Premier asserted that it was a groundless fear that America would raise trouble in China, taking advantage of the period when the ratio would be low for our country.

Councillor KAWAI then stated that it would be a very good thing if our claims were accepted at the next conference, but that this was a matter of great doubt and in case our claims were not accepted it would be most probable that the treaty would remain as a virtually permanent restraint, that though he would not say that America would necessarily raise trouble in China, he believed that efforts should always be made to perfect armaments upon the grounds that such things might happen. To this remark, the Premier answered that the reason why the Government had signed the treaty despite some dissatisfaction with it was because the treaty was short-termed, and hence the Government did not think the ratio would be a permanent one.

Next, Councillor YAMAKAWA asked how much burden would, in reality, be lightened by the conclusion of the present treaty, which estimate the Government should have already made as a matter of course. The Premier stated in reply that study of the question of the replenishment of military strength was under way in military quarters. He regretted that he could not give even a general idea of it, except that the estimated amount for the ship-building plan already decided upon was 500 million yen in the budget for 1930, out of which 400 million yen would become financial resources both for the replenishment of military strength and for the diminution of burdens. The percentage for the two, however, was still uncertain, but he asserted, he would allot a part of it to the diminution of burdens without fail.

Thereupon, the said Councillor stated that he had heard that it was the view of the highest naval staff officers that the navy would be insufficient for national defense even if the ship-building rights as recognized by the present treaty should be fully exercised. If that should be true, as the tonnage of ships which Japan was authorized to build by the end of Showa 11 /1936/ was 106,000 tons and the estimated expenditure therefor was about 330 million yen, the remainder would be only 70 million yen, and consequently if the replacement expenditure should be added there would be no surplus. On the contrary, a considerable deficit would arise. However, the press had said nothing about the

fact that the present treaty would necessitate such a large sum of money, and the Premier's explanation was completely beyond his comprehension. Thereupon, the Premier gave assurances that, despite the fact that if the building right were fully exercised the amount would surpass 300 million yen, the right would be exercised appropriately in view of financial conditions. The said Councillor further contended that financial matters which would result from the conclusion of the treaty should of course be estimated before the signing of the treaty, and the same thing could be said of the replacement plan. However, if the Navy Ministry and the Naval General Staff had not yet made the replacement plan, it could be nothing but the neglect of duty on the part of the authorities concerned. Then the Navy Minister responded that the replacement plan was being studied by the Navy Ministry and the Naval General Staff, but unless an agreement could be reached between the two and prior to consultation with the Finance Ministry, the matter could not be presented. On this point Councillor YAMAKATA bitterly criticized the authorities concerned for not already having a complete plan and said that it was incomprehensible that it should not be presented at this time.

Then Councillor KUSOTA stated that he thought the question just raised by Councillor YAMAKATA was extremely important, that the fundamental object of the present treaty was to lighten the burden of the nation, and consequently unless the effect of the conclusion of the treaty in regard to this point was studied it ought not to have been possible for it to have been signed at such a conference. He requested the authorities concerned to make a reply centering around this point.

Then Chairman ITO, stating that the other remaining questions would be left to the next meeting, declared the meeting adjourned.

(The meeting was adjourned at 3:30 P.M.)

The Eighth Meeting of the Investigation Committee  
regarding the Ratification of the  
London Naval Treaty of 1930.

Hold at the Offices of the Privy Council  
on 8 September (Monday), SHOWA 5 /1930/

Those present:

President KURATOMI  
Vice President HIRANUMA

Chairman of the Investigation Committee, Councillor ITO

Members of the Investigation Committee:

Councillor KANEKO  
Councillor KUBOTA  
Councillor YAMAKITA

Councillor KURODA  
Councillor IRAI  
Councillor KAWAI  
Councillor MIZUMACHI

Absent: Councillor DEN

Ministers of State:

Prime Minister HAMAGUCHI  
Navy Minister TAKARABE  
Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA

Chief Secretary FUTAKAMI  
Secretary HORIE  
Secretary HUTO

(The meeting was opened at 1:00 P.M.)

Chairman of the Committee ITO called the meeting to order.

Councillor KURODA asked what was the basis upon which the naval strength stipulated for each country in the present treaty was agreed upon. The Navy Minister replied that the existing naval strength was taken as the basis in the Washington Conference and that our country made the existing strength our basis in the Geneva Conference also; that it could be said that in the latest conference although both Britain and the United States advocated parity, Britain generally made the existing naval strength as the basis, while the United States, too, made the existing strength in a broad sense as the basis, and Japan also used the existing strength as the basis in a general way. Thereupon the Councillor calculated the tonnage which the United States should possess on the basis of Japan's existing strength and also pointed out the tonnage which Japan



should possess in case the existing strength of the United States is taken as the standard. Then he asked the reason why our country had agreed to a ratio of strength which was very unfavorable to our country and was content with a result which was tantamount to the annihilation already of numerous warcraft without engaging in a single battle. The Navy Minister replied that, although we need not be shy at all from the standpoint of right, the Japanese Government, since the Washington Conference, had been satisfied with the ratio of 70% as against the United States, and since its instructions for the London Conference were based on the rate of 70% against the United States in total tonnage, the agreement was made accordingly.

Next, the same Councillor, after explaining the spirit of disarmament in the KELLOGG Treaty, which Delegate WAKATSUKI had referred to in his speech at Seattle, U.S.A., asked whether it was not inconsistent with this spirit that the installation of taking off and landing equipment for aircraft on 25% of the cruisers was newly approved in the present treaty, and he asked to know what attitude and means our delegates had taken against it. The Navy Minister confessed that it would have been simple if we had followed the KELLOGG Pact, but that we had agreed upon the strong insistence of the United States.

The same Councillor then inquired of the Prime Minister why the authorities concerned had signed such a treaty as this one which would cause a defect in our national defense, and what counter-measures the authorities had to remedy this defect. The Prime Minister answered that absolutely no defect would be allowed to occur in our national defense, as he believed that, although there might be a deficiency from the standpoint of operational tactics with only the naval strength permitted by the treaty, this could be supplemented by other naval strength outside of the restrictions. He explained that there would be various ways for supplementing the naval strength: One way would be the repletion of the substance, and the other would be the improvement of strategy, but that its practical plan was now under consideration by the departments and bureaus of the Navy Ministry and was not yet in a stage for announcement.

Councillor KAWAI said that, although it was said that submarines were not so effective as they were believed to be by the public, he thought they were most necessary and effective to a country possessing topography, national traits and economic conditions like our country. Stating that he could not understand the reason why submarines were being replaced by airplanes which had an entirely different capacity, he asked for the views of the Navy Minister. The Navy Minister explained that he had only said that opinions did not necessarily agree as to the fighting value of submarines. After comparing the capacity of submarines and airplanes, he explained the merits and demerits of the two and declared that the future of airplanes was becoming more and more promising. To this, the same Councillor argued that the Navy Minister's words might have the result of repudiating the operational plans of the Imperial Navy. He said that the United States was extremely afraid of the submarines of the Japanese Navy which had made great progress since the Great

War, and expressed the view that so long as our country maintained the existing naval strength, the United States would surely not dare to fight our country. He then asked the Navy Minister if the latter was confident of success in regaining in the next conference the submarine strength which had been lost in the latest conference. The Navy Minister replied that our Naval General Staff had decided to make up for the shortage of submarines by airplanes, and that utmost efforts would be made in the next conference to raise the ratio against the United States, although there were no great prospects of success.

Next, the same Councillor said that the ratio against the United States would fall below 70% in 1936, that it was very clear that a time would come when it would become very disadvantageous to our country even if we gained the ratio of 70% in the conference of 1935; and that, generally speaking, he believed the essence of national defense lies in being prepared for emergencies with standing armaments and not to be exposed to danger even for half a day. He asked to hear the views of the Navy Minister on this matter. Then he said that there would be a great difference in competition for warship construction between the present time and the year 1936, asserting that it was needless to say that Japan would be left far behind the United States if competition was started after the naval strength had been once depleted. He asked to hear the Navy Minister's views on this point.

The Navy Minister replied that if the treaty failed to be concluded, then the United States would be hostile to Japan and there would be no guarantee that she would not undertake direct competition with our country in warship construction; that although the ratio against the United States in the 8-inch gun cruiser class would fall to 60% and the cruisers would be of old age, as pointed out by the Councillor, and no one could say that no trouble would occur then, it was not true that 6-inch gun cruisers could not necessarily stand up against 8-inch gun cruisers. He added that some admirals even asserted that they could successfully sink one 8-inch gun cruiser with four destroyers.

Next, the same Councillor asked about the circumstances for the failure of our delegates to obtain the reduction of the tonnage of capital ships and also their guns, as had been instructed. The Navy Minister answered that Japan insisted on lowering the tonnage of capital ships, but that Britain and the United States, making parity between them their main object, had not agreed to our proposal. The same Councillor further stated that he was of the opinion that there was no way of making up the defects in national defense unless we carried our point, and he asked for the Navy Minister's view on this matter. In reply, the Navy Minister explained that by defects in national defense it was meant that a shortage in naval strength would arise if the tactical plan based on the already established national defense plan should be carried out as it stood; that the shortage was not impossible of being supplemented by something else; that even if we possessed 70%, this did not necessarily mean complete victory, but that it meant that a fifty-fifty battle could be fought; and that he was of the opinion that there was no error in the deficiency supplementation plan, because it had been unanimously approved by

the Supreme War Council. Thereupon, the Councillor asked if there was no defect in national defense, to which the Navy Minister replied in the negative.

Councillor YAMAKATA raised a question to the following effect: Whereas the other day Prime Minister HATAGUCHI answered that, in regard to the fixing of naval strength, there had been an agreement of opinion between the Acting Navy Minister and the Chief of the Naval General Staff KATO, it is a fact that in the Diet he stated that he took into consideration /"SHINSHAKU"/ the opinion of the Naval General Staff. Now, as to the meaning of the word "SHINSHAKU," the "GENKAI," which is considered the most reliable dictionary in our country, defines "SHINSHAKU" as "to compare and then select." The "DAIIPPON KOKUGO DAIJITEN," also defines it as "to select after taking into consideration this and that." This word does not have by any means the same meaning as "DOI" /TN "agreement; consent approval"/. Now which is true?

Thereupon the Prime Minister asked the Committee Chairman for permission to explain, but the latter refused it, suggesting that the matter be taken up later as the question of Supreme Command was to be deferred for the time being. Accordingly, the same Councillor turned to the Navy Minister and asked whether or not the agreed opinion of our present highest naval authorities considered the naval strength stipulated by the treaty to be defective. The Navy Minister explained in detail that since the naval strength stipulated by the treaty involved excesses and shortages depending upon the categories, it had been decided to supplement as much as possible those portions having shortages by making accommodations among the various categories. The same Councillor requested him to answer simply "yes" or "no".

Thereupon the Navy Minister answered that although there was a shortage of naval strength numerically, no defect in national defense would be allowed to arise. The Councillor further asked whether although the Navy Minister said that no defect would be allowed to arise, it was not true that it was the second best, whereas the naval strength demanded by us was the best. The Navy Minister replied that although it was correct to consider it as the second best, it was possible to achieve the object of national defense with this naval strength.

Next, Councillor KANEKO said that national defense as conceived by the Prime Minister was quite different in meaning from the accepted definition of the term; that so-called "KOKUBO" means "national defense," which is defense against the invasion of a foreign army; and that economics, diplomacy, etc., as expounded by the Prime Minister was not national defense. He then asked the concept of national defense as spoken by the Navy Minister. The Prime Minister explained that what he had stated before was national defense in a broad sense, and that the accepted definition of national defense was the same as defined by the Councillor.

Councillor YAMAKATA pointed out that, whereas the Navy Minister replied that our national defense under the treaty was the second best, it had been explained at the time of the departure of our delegate that this demand was the

minimum limit of national defense; and that if the second best would do, it was a lie to have called it the minimum limit. Then he asked if the highest naval authorities considered it possible to almost complete national defense by supplementation of naval strength. Replying in the affirmative, the Navy Minister said that it was possible to remove almost all defects although perfection might not be attainable. Continuing, the Councillor said that there were many factors which decide the issue of battle, but considering other factors to be the same for the time being, we should make the naval strength necessary to make possible a fifty-fifty battle as our standard and make it the minimum limit of the national defense plan; that the Government's instruction to the delegates was based on this standard. Accordingly, he argued whether a concession from this instruction would not make a fifty-fifty battle impossible. The Minister answered that there was a chance of carrying on a fight at almost fifty-fifty basis.

Thereupon, the Councillor asked in return whether it was not true that a fifty-fifty fight was impossible because of this "almost" /"HOBO"/. The Navy Minister said that the Councillor was perfectly right in this opinion, but that, of course, he considered himself capable of assuming the responsibility for it. Nevertheless, the Councillor declared that from a comparison between the plan to be drawn up within the scope permitted by this treaty and the original plan, he could not but consider the former as the best and the latter as the second best.

Lastly the Prime Minister explained that the statement that the naval strength stipulated by the treaty was insufficient meant that the naval strength was insufficient for maintaining and carrying out the operational plans based on the established national defense policy, but that this was naturally different from the defects in internal defense.

Chairman ITO announced that the meeting would be closed today, although there were further questions to be asked.

(The meeting was closed at 3:50 P.M.)

The Ninth Meeting of the Investigation Committee  
regarding the Ratification of the  
London Naval Treaty of 1930.

Held at the Offices of the Privy Council

on 10 September (Wednesday), SHOWA 5, /1930/

Those present:

President KURATOMI  
Vice President HIRAHARA

Chairman of the Investigation Committee, Councillor ITO

Members of the Investigation Committee:

Councillor KANEKO	Councillor ARAI
Councillor KUBOTA	Councillor KATAI
Councillor YAMAKATA	Councillor MIZUMACHI
Councillor KURODA	

Absent: Councillor DEN

Ministers of State:

Prime Minister HAMAOKA  
Navy Minister TANAKA  
Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA

Chief Secretary FUKUKAMI  
Secretary HORIE  
Secretary MUTO

(The meeting was opened at 1:00 P.M.)

Chairman ITO called the meeting to order.

Councillor KANEKO, after saying that it was his belief that the delegates, at the time of signing this treaty, had already investigated how much the burden on our people would be reduced by the treaty, asked the amount of this reduced burden. The Navy Minister, saying that he would give his mental calculation at that time, mentioned the rough amount of expenditures in case the treaty was successfully concluded and also in case it failed to materialize. The Councillor further requested the investigation of the maintenance expenditures required for auxiliary aircraft under the treaty. Councillor ARAI, too, inquired about the amounts of expenditures in case the treaty is concluded, and in case it failed to materialize.

Supplementing the reply of the Navy Minister, the Prime Minister explained the difficulty of calculating the figures and said that the reduction in amount would be almost nil.

Next Councillor MIZUMACHI said that he appreciated the circumstances which made the calculation of maintenance costs difficult, but he asked to know the source of revenue for the supplementary expenditures. The Prime Minister answered that the sum of ¥580,000,000 appropriated as a continuing expenditure from Showa 6 /1931/ to Showa 11 /1936/ would be its source. Thereupon the Councillors questioned how this amount would be distributed. The Prime Minister replied that both the supplementary expenditures and the amount of tax reduction would not be decided until after the matter had been discussed by the General Staffs and Ministries and also after consultation with the Finance Minister and the Foreign Minister.

Councillor YAMAMOTO, citing figures, discussed the expenditures for national defense and declared that if we exercised our rights under the treaty only ¥60,000,000 would be left, which, if divided into five years, would give ¥10,000,000 per year. He asked whether airplanes and other facilities could be provided and the security of national defense ensured with such a small amount. He further asked whether it was not true that if this amount were expended, the reduction of the burden on the people would become impossible. The Prime Minister replied that if we built substitute warcraft to the full extent of our right, the amount remaining would be ¥170,000,000, but that it was still an undecided issue whether we would avail ourselves to the full extent of the right to build substitute warcraft.

Next, Councillor ARAI asked whether the main points of the budget had not yet been decided even after the lapse of five months since the signing of the treaty. The Navy Minister replied that they had not yet been decided. The Councillor said that there was no way but to defer the examination of the bill under consideration until the time of the compilation of the budget, inasmuch as it was impossible to approve or disapprove it before seeing the supplementation plan. He requested that, if postponement was impossible, steps be taken to show at least the outline of the plan. Councillor MIZUMACHI also made the same request. The Navy Minister explained that he had been of the opinion that no plan for the construction of auxiliary warships need be submitted, because no such request had been made by the Privy Council on the occasion of the submission by the Navy Minister of the Washington Naval Treaty for imperial ratification on the ground that, although the ratio of 60% for capital ships would cause a defect in our national defense, there would be no hitch inasmuch as no restrictions had been placed on auxiliary warcraft.

Councillor KANEKO said that, according to the report of the United States Senate, that the United States fears most is submarines, and therefore the more the number of Japanese submarines was reduced, the more powerful the United States would become. Stating that as long as Japan possessed submarines, there was nothing to be afraid of from the United States, that world peace and international faith were merely outward courtesies, and that peace was untenable without repletion of military strength, he discussed the indispensability of submarines.

The Prime Minister stated that the arguments on the treaty were on two points, namely, the fear that we would be bound in the future by the ratio of 60% against the United States and the reduction of our submarine force, but that it was the agreed opinion of both the Navy Minister and the Chief of Naval General Staff that through the perfection of armaments other than those restricted there would be no insecurity in national defense. He then expressed the hope that the Councillors trust the Government and proceed with the deliberations.

Councillor ARAI again requested that the supplementation plan and the rough amount of tax reduction be shown, but the Navy Minister explained the reasons why this could not be done. Councillor KANEKO pointed out that, since a national defense plan was a matter under the direct supervision of the Chief of Naval General Staff and transmitted to the Navy Minister after it had received Imperial sanction, he could not understand the reason given to the effect that we might rest assured because the Cabinet assumed responsibility for it.

With the conclusion of the foregoing, Chairman ITO announced the closing of the meeting.

(The meeting was closed at 4:00 P.M.)

The Tenth Meeting of the Investigation Committee  
regarding the Ratification of the  
London Naval Treaty of 1930.

Hold at the Offices of the Privy Council  
on 12 September (Friday), SHOWA 5, /1930/

Those present:

President KUFUTOMI  
Vice President HIRANUMA

Chairman of the Investigation Committee, Councillor ITO

Members of the Investigation Committee:

Councillor KANEKO	Councillor DEN
Councillor KUBOTA	Councillor ARAI
Councillor YAMAKAWA	Councillor KITAI
Councillor KURODA	Councillor MIZUMACHI

Ministers of State:

Prime Minister HATAGUCHI  
Navy Minister TAKESABE  
Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA

Chief Secretary FUKUSHI  
Secretary HORIE  
Secretary MUTO

(The meeting was opened at 1:00 P.M.)

Chairman ITO called the meeting to order. Interrogations were continued.

Councillor KITAI argued that the fact that the former Chief of Naval General Staff had drawn up the plan for the supplementation of naval strength did not necessarily prove that he did not disapprove the naval strength of the bill under consideration. He then asked whether it was really possible to avoid insecurity of national defense by supplementation of armaments. The Navy Minister, asserting that there was no difference at all between the direct report to the Throne made by Chief of Naval General Staff KATO on 2 April and the purport of the Supreme War Council's reply to the Throne, and further that there was also no contradiction between his /TM. KATO's/ statement and this reply, he read the statement in question. Then he further stated that, according to his own understanding regarding the contents of the Supreme War



Council's reply to the Throne, defects would arise if the established national defense plan were to be maintained and operations based thereon were to be carried out with the naval strength agreed in this treaty; that, therefore, besides always maintaining, of course, the naval strength agreed upon, it was necessary to strive to replenish the air force, improve the warcraft belonging to categories not subject to the restrictions, replenish the substance of other naval armaments in general, and improve tactics, once the treaty was considered. If these counter-measures were carried out, he said that he considered there would be almost no hitch in national defense under present conditions.

The same Councillor further declared that the term "zensho" /TN "to take proper steps"/ of Chief of the Naval General Staff KATO could be interpreted in many ways and could not always be taken to mean only that the military strength was not disapproved, and asked why, if the new Chief of the Naval General Staff had already drawn up a replacement plan, it could not be presented. The Prime Minister explained that although the military strength provided for in this agreement would cause some defects in the execution of the established operations plan, as this was a short-term treaty, he believed that proper replacement would enable us to clear away almost all sense of insecurity regarding national defense. He continued that as there was a way of replenishing our strength and because the treaty was of short duration, the treaty had been signed. The Navy Minister answered that it was difficult to produce the replacement plan of the Military immediately that day.

Subsequently, Councillor YAMAKIWA said that the other day the Navy Minister had stated that he could not reply to Councillor KAWAI's inquiry as it involved the honor of General KATO, yet now he (the Navy Minister) said that General KATO had never changed his principles. If that was the case, in what way was the honor of General KATO involved? The Navy Minister replied that he had simply said that he could not talk about his /TN General KATO's/ report to the Throne on 10 June for the sake of the General's honor. The same Councillor asked if he might take this to mean that the Navy Minister would not mention the ungentlemanly actions /TN. taken by the General/ aside from matters concerning military strength. The Navy Minister replied that it concerned His Imperial Majesty and the General's own movements; it was not concerned directly with military strength. The same Councillor argued that a gentleman should make his movements most clear and subsequently asked whether or not it was true that at the time of the interview of Plenipotentiaries WAKATSUKI and Stinson in London, Mr. Stinson became extremely angry at Mr. WAKATSUKI's assertion and tore up the document given to him by Mr. WAKATSUKI before the latter's face and threw it away. The Navy Minister acknowledged the fact and gave a detailed account of it.

Citing the Parkes case in which Parkes committed an outrage in the Japanese Foreign Ministry on about the first year of Meiji /about 1868/, the said Councillor discussed the proprieties of true gentlemen, and said it was a superstition to think that the United States was a country of justice.

He asked if there were not persons in the Foreign Ministry holding such a superstition. Furthermore, the Councillor said, there were people in this world who misunderstood the Japanese nation as being extremely warlike, but Japan had maintained her peace for two hundred and thirty years from the time of the AMAKUSA Rebellion of three hundred and thirty-three years ago until the HALLIGURI BOMON Battle, after which only six wars had been waged, namely, the Conquest of CHOSHU, the HAKODATE Fighting, the Southwestern Rebellion, and the wars with foreign nations, namely, the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War and the German-Japanese War. On the other hand, the United States during the one hundred and fifty-five years since her independence had fought as many as six times, namely, the Independence War, the British-American War, the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War and the German-American War. Therefore she had fought more than twice as many times as Japan. They speak of humanity and justice, but they never practice them. In 1926 the United States claimed the Sino-Japanese Treaty consisting of 21 articles to be null and void and attempted to purchase the South Manchurian Railway. The capital was to be borrowed from the United States with the railway as security. As a consequence, the South Manchuria Railway and the Chinese Eastern Railway would have come under the control of the United States, and Japan would finally have been compelled to withdraw from Manchuria and Mongolia. People were apt to believe that the United States was a country of humanity, but she was far from being so.

According to the minutes of the U. S. Senate concerning the ratification of the London Treaty, Admiral Pratt stated that within the century the United States would fight for the sake of China. A century is a figure of speech in English, meaning "in the not too distant future." These were the words of a prominent high official in the United States Government. Then who can guarantee that there will be no war between Japan and the United States? The only way to prevent such a war would be to complete Japan's armaments. Although Japan could still bear the deficiency in her armaments, it was greatly to be feared that this deficiency would cause a gap, from which a Japanese-American war might arise, and the Councillor asked if it were not possible to build up Japan's naval armaments a little more.

The Foreign Minister stated that there were in the Foreign Office no superstitious persons such as previously mentioned, and after reading the notes of the speech made by Plenipotentiary HAKATSUKI in Seattle, expressed his approval of the principle of the speech. Then explaining the matter of the 21 articles of the Sino-Japanese Treaty, he said that after all the United States had acknowledged her own participation in the said treaty only because she had recognized the validity of the treaty. The Minister also declared that he believed the United States would never fight for the sake of China though Admiral Pratt might have said so, and said that in order to prevent a war with the United States, it was more important to increase the national power rather than armaments.

To this the same Councillor argued that neither did he think that the state of the national power did not matter. However, he did not think that the

peoples' power would be positively fostered by the conclusion of the treaty and that it would be impossible to lessen their burden should the treaty remain unmaterialized. On the contrary, could not more money be saved if the treaty were abrogated?

According to the stenographic records of the Foreign Relations Committee of the U. S. Senate, it was their unanimous opinion that the United States should be active in the Western Pacific Ocean and that only Japan could prevent her from her activity. The Western Pacific, the Councillor continued, meant the Republic of China and it virtually meant that the Japanese Navy should be demolished. Then, saying that although he could not obtain any satisfactory answers, he would conclude his questions, he closed his speech.

Subsequently the Prime Minister stood up and contended that though Councillor YAMAKATA had said that the military strength provided in the treaty and its replenishment did not make national defense secure, there probably is no country that has a complete armament. Japan's military experts have affirmed that a fair fight was possible with this strength. Should the conference end in a rupture because of Japan's attitude, Japan would have to be prepared for a ship-building race which would have no other alternative than an increase of taxes, and it seems impossible for Japan's national power to last thus. Moreover, the rupture of the conference might cause a war.

Then Councillor YAMAKATA said that, according to that reply, Japan would have to yield to the United States in fear of a ship-building race. However, in 1936 her ratio as against that of the United States would be 60%, and later it would fall to 50% and thus Japan would have to submit without fighting; and saying that he thought there was no other way but to come to a decision at this time he asked what the others thought of the matter.

Councillor KUBOTA expressed opinion that for national defense, wealth and diplomacy were necessary in addition to military power, and although knowledge and spirit were most essential, yet there was no other way to settle international disputes but to resort to arms in the end. Japan's importance today in the world lay in her military power alone. The London Conference was where Britain and the United States gave expression to their avarice under the fine names of universal peace and the lightening of burdens, but they were only afraid of Japan's military power. Such being the situation, he said, he was most concerned over the recent question of the Supreme Command and thought it was essential that the Navy Minister and the Navy Chief of Staff come to an agreement in deciding the military strength. Therefore, upon hearing that the Minister concerned had replied in his recent instructions that the two had come to an agreement he was greatly relieved.

Next, Councillor KANEKO declared that he had become more anxious after hearing the Foreign Minister's reply. As far as he knew the United States was generally opposed to Japan. At the time of the Russo-Japanese War, the United States had said that it was proper that Korea be annexed to Japan and Manchuria be developed by Japan with the South Manchuria Railway as the foundation.

However, as soon as Taft became President, her policy suddenly changed and she attempted to establish the AIGUN Railway, but in vain as she met Japan's opposition. Since then she has been trying to make Manchuria a market for American products. Thus some Americans were shouting that a war between Japan and the United States was inevitable in the near future, that docks should be built in Seattle and other places on the Pacific Coast, and preparations should be made. Also, a prosecutor, in connection with the oil graft case, had read a telegram in court that war would break out soon between Japan and the United States; and when the Japanese people were suffering from the earthquake disaster in the Kanto District in TAISHO 12 /1923/ the American Senate and House of Representatives passed the Immigration Law rejecting the Orientals. Such is the history of the United States. Yet the Foreign Minister said a while ago that there would be a time when the people of the United States would awaken. That, the Councillor said, he could not understand.

Japanese-American relations would be at their most dangerous point about 1937. The United States would most certainly purchase the South Manchuria Railway in cooperation with China and would attempt to drive Japanese influence out of Manchuria and Mongolia. Such being the case, it was extremely important to supplement the lack of military strength caused by the London Treaty. Justice, he said, was only superficial courtesy between nations, and the last resort was military power alone. That Japan could abolish extra-territoriality was due entirely to the Sino-Japanese War. On the other hand, the Netherlands which had once been known as the world's wealthiest country had fallen today to the position of a third-rate country because of the limitation of her armaments. That a small country like Japan could advance into the world as one of the Five Great Powers was due entirely to the military men. The Treaty of Portsmouth was also a reward of Japan's military's victory.

In Meiji 22 /1889/ when he /TN Councillor KANEKO/ had gone to Europe with the newly established constitution and asked constitutional scholars of the different countries for their criticisms, Articles 11 and 12 of the Constitution drew their attention most. They highly praised these provisions saying that such a constitution was unequalled in the world, that it was only in Japan that the Emperor himself exercised supreme military authority, that this was entirely the fruit of the special characteristics of Japanese history which the various European countries wished to obtain but could not, and that with such articles, military command could be firmly secured. National defense was the guarantee for national life, the Councillor asserted, and its deficiency should be most feared.

As the Japanese military system was characteristic of Japan, being based on the Japanese fighting spirit, soul, and national structure, it should be perfected to the last. On the basis of the speeches made in the United States Senate there could be no doubt that the London Treaty was a preparation for pressure against Japan after 1936.

Committee Chairman ITO announced the closing of the meeting.

(The meeting was closed at 4:00 P.M.)

The Eleventh Meeting of the Investigation Committee  
regarding the Ratification of the  
London Naval Treaty of 1930.

Held at the Offices of the Privy Council  
on 15 September (Monday), SHOWA 5 /1930/

Those present:

President KUPATOMI  
Vice President HIRANUMA

Chairman of the Investigation Committee, Councillor ITO

Members of the Investigation Committee:

Councillor KANEKO  
Councillor KUBOTA  
Councillor YAMAKAWA

Councillor KURODA  
Councillor ARAI  
Councillor KAWAI  
Councillor MIZUMACHI

Absent: Councillor DEN

Ministers of State:

Prime Minister HAYAGUCHI  
Navy Minister TAKARABE  
Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA

Chief Secretary FUTAKAMI  
Secretary HOEIE  
Secretary NUTO

(The meeting was opened at 1:00 P.M.)

Committee Chairman ITO called the meeting to order.

Councillor KURODA asked whether the rumor was true that the Government had sent a document to the Naval General Staff. The Prime Minister at the time the instructions were sent replied that he was requested by the Navy by letter, in case the treaty were passed in the original form, to fully consider each and every item for the sake of technical improvements and completeness of content of the national defense plan, and he had answered that he would consider them thoroughly after it had passed the Cabinet. Again, the same Councillor stated that though the authorities had often explained that the determination of military strength was the responsibility of the Government, he wondered what this meant, because it could not be decided without

the agreement of the Navy Chief of Staff. The Navy Minister replied that he thought it necessary to get the agreement of the Navy Chief of Staff. The same Councillor said that according to the reply made by the Government, the opinions of both the parties are said to have agreed, but, he asked, did they agree in practice? The Navy Minister replied that the practical matters were now under negotiation.

Next, Councillor APAI and the Navy Minister discussed the financial aspects of the conclusion or non-conclusion of the treaty, particularly the amount of supplementary expenditures and the reduction of taxes in case the treaty were concluded. With the figures in hand, the discussion grew. The Councillor requested roughly estimated figures on these two points, saying it was necessary to know the approximate figures in order to comment on the treaty. To this, the Navy Minister answered that the figures for supplementary expenditures were not calculated as yet, and it was impossible to announce them until the budget-making period. Councillor KURODA also requested the estimates be presented and the Navy Minister made almost the same reply. Next, Councillor KANEKO explained that, regarding the military strength for national defense, correspondence had been exchanged in March, the 29th year of Meiji /1896/, between the Prime Minister ITO and the Ministers of the Army and the Navy. Up to that time a direct appeal to the Throne had never been discussed with the Cabinet, and sudden orders concerning military strength for national defense were customarily given to the Cabinet; but after the above correspondence had been exchanged, it became customary to first consult the Cabinet on matters dealing with expenses.

Navy Chief of Staff TOGO and Army Chief of Staff OKU once made a direct appeal to the Throne concerning Army and Navy expansion and when the Imperial assent was granted to the SAIONJI Cabinet, a meeting of Marshals and Admirals was held concerning financial aspects and it was decided that the plan would be carried out gradually, but with regard to national defense requirements the decisions would always be made by the Navy General Staff and the Army General Staff.

Then the Councillor asked if this draft was the gist of the supplementary plan agreed upon by the Military Authorities. The Prime Minister replied that as he had explained many times before, the plan for supplementary military strength could not be established without regard to finances. To the inquiry of the same Councillor about the budget surplus which would result from the London Conference and the estimated amount of military power desired by the specialists, the Navy Minister replied that he was sorry he could not answer at the moment, as he had stated many times before.

Next, there were several questions and answers between the Councillor and the Navy Minister in regard to supplementing by airplanes, the lack of submarines, and the Councillor pointed out that according to the treaty, Japan was to wait with folded arms until the United States had built fifteen heavy cruisers, and to the United States this was not the reduction of armaments, but on the contrary, an expansion; and he asked if this matter was not discussed in the London Conference. The Navy Minister answered that the number

of United States heavy cruisers already built was two, but that she had more than ten if we included those under construction, and the total number would reach twenty-three if we included those provided for in the budget; and although our delegate had endeavored at first to limit the number to fifteen, it was in vain, and it was finally decided at eighteen; hence, we could call it an expansion of armaments for the United States if considered from the point of view of her present strength. Thereupon, the same Councillor, pointing out the fact that the United States had expanded her armaments by the London Conference, explained that she would be able to build up a well-balanced fleet for the first time through the treaty.

Councillor APAT asked if he could hear about the replacement plan agreed upon by both the Navy Minister and the Navy Chief of Staff, and if any special obstacles might occur, if the investigation were to be postponed until the budget had been made. The Prime Minister replied that it could not be delayed until the completion of the budget because if the plan did not receive Imperial assent the political situation would probably become unsettled, causing depression in economic circles. And he expressed his anxiety because so much gold had been flowing out during the latter half of that year.

Next, Committee Chairman ITO took the floor and stated that since September 18, eleven committee meetings have been held in the course of which many problems have been discussed and investigated. But as to the decision on military strength, the question has been raised whether it has been agreed to by the Military Authorities or not, to which the Prime Minister has declared repeatedly that he regards it as having been agreed to by the Military Authorities. As there were some, however, who still doubted the fact, they requested the Government to summon Mr. KATO, but the Government did not respond, and, therefore, it has become impossible for this body by its own powers to directly investigate the facts. But, as the Navy Minister has explained that an Imperial decision was given to the effect that the agreement of the Military Authorities is necessary in dealing with matters of Military strength, and the Cabinet has received the information already, the problem of the Supreme Command must be said to have ceased to exist.

No answer as to the telegram of the Navy Chief of Staff has been received, and such being the case, you will kindly understand that there is no further necessity to request the Government to tender it. With regard to the replacement and financial plans, which are essential for investigating this treaty, the Government requests us, as it were, to sign blindly without their being submitted to us at all; but we cannot place too much faith in the Government, considering the duty of our Council. At the previous meeting, however, the Navy Minister stated the contents of the Supreme War Council's reply to the Throne in connection with the present treaty. According to that statement, it is certain that there were some items in the said reply concerning the replacement of naval strength, and since this is the only key for deciding the approval or disapproval of the treaty, that is why we intended to request the Government to submit it at the opening of these committee hearings, but as we feared that it might cause delay in the proceedings, we had hoped

that the Government would present it voluntarily; but now, however, as the Navy Minister himself has described its contents, there can be no harm in presenting the reply to the Privy Council, so today we again request its presentation. I believe it to be the responsibility of the Cabinet to show us the reply, for the Prime Minister must have been informed about it privately as its contents are a state affair, and I think it is the Government's duty to show us the reply. I hope the Government will show its sincerity by proceeding to do so no matter how important it considers the matter to be. We will expect a reply by letter after due consideration.

To this, the Prime Minister replied that although it was stated that he altered his answer in this meeting from that which he had made in the Diet concerning the Supreme Command, he has not changed the principle but only was discreet in his choice of words. The extent of replacements /of naval strength/ and the reduction of taxes, cannot be published at this moment as they are now under investigation as well as negotiation. The Cabinet believes that they are not obliged to present such documents as materials for the purposes of investigation though they have no objection to producing them if they are completed; but they are not finished as yet.

He also stated that when this draft was presented for discussion, the President requested that the reply to the Throne be produced as it was a necessary material for investigation before the bill was submitted to the Committee. But he had answered that, as the Government did not keep it at hand, the document could not be produced, and therefore, the Committee should be convened again as soon as possible to hear the explanations of the Ministers concerned. Though the same request has been again received from the Chairman of the Committee, it is hoped that he will be satisfied with what the Navy Minister stated in detail the other day in regard to his opinion in approving the reply, and if he still insists on the request, there is only one way left, that of refusing it at once, the Prime Minister declared.

Committee Chairman ITO announced the meeting closed.

(The meeting was closed at 3:00 P.M.)



The Twelfth Meeting of the Investigation Committee  
regarding the Ratification of the  
London Naval Treaty of 1930.

Held at the Offices of the Privy Council  
on 17 September (Wednesday), SHOWA 5, /1930/

Those present:

President KUPATCHI  
Vice President HIRANUMA

Chairman of the Investigation Committee, Councillor ITO

Members of the Investigation Committee:

Councillor KAMEKO	Councillor DEN
Councillor KUBOTA	Councillor ARAI
Councillor YAMAKAWA	Councillor KATAI
Councillor KURODA	Councillor HIZUTACHI

Chief Secretary FUTAKAMI  
Secretary HORIE  
Secretary MUTO

(The meeting was opened at 1:00 P.M.)

Chairman ITO called the meeting to order and the Committee went into discussion.

By the request of Councillor KUBOTA, the Chairman of the Committee expressed his opinion as follows: As the Government unfortunately has not consented to present the investigation materials which were requested by the Committee, we have no choice, taking in consideration the limits of the authority of the Privy Council, but to close the investigation at this stage and make out a report. However, although we can say that the investigation of the treaty was made impossible because necessary materials were not produced, there is the consideration that such an attitude may cause the Privy Council to lose its dignity. Moreover, we are somewhat lacking in grounds for argument that the treaty should be abrogated. Therefore, I think it best that we state in a part of our report that if full cooperation be maintained with the Military, if the replacement plan for national defense be carried out, if the people's burdens be lightened and if thus a complete fulfillment of the objectives of the treaty can be expected; then, it will be proper for the Emperor to ratify the treaty on the grounds that the Government and the military authorities are responsible for the treaty.

To this, Councillors KURODA and IRAI expressed their opinions, and Councillor KAMEI asked if the investigation of this bill might not be postponed until after the completion of the national defense plan. Councillor DEN stated that it was regrettable that they could not be informed about the reply to the Throne and about the replacement and finance plans. He continued that, as he thought it proper, however, for the Privy Council to continue to the end to give appropriate replies to the Emperor, in this case there would be no other way but to act in accordance with the opinion of the Committee Chairman. He said that he believed that by doing so the duty of the Privy Council was fulfilled. Councillor YAMAMOTO stated that he wished to postpone the day's decision for further consideration, for according to the treaty our military strength would eventually be 60% of that of the United States, and in case of a war our country would be defeated. To this, the Chairman of the Committee expressed his opinion. The same Councillor further contended that the matter of whether or not the opinion of the Committee was adopted by the Council had nothing to do with the honor of the Committee and argued on two or three points with the Chairman. Subsequently, Councillor HIZUMACHI stated that although he regretted the lack of investigation material, as the financial world had not been in a normal condition recently, he agreed entirely with the Chairman's point of view.

Councillor KANEKO explained the purport of Articles XI and XII of the Constitution, and gave the details of the time the Constitution was made and stressed that military strength should be decided by a direct appeal to the Throne by the military and should not be decided in the Cabinet. Councillor KUBOTA then stated that although Councillor YAMAMOTO was right in his opinion, the situation would not allow it, and so unity of action should be practiced as much as possible, and he hoped that such measures as fighting for the decision by a majority would be avoided. Councillor YAMAMOTO agreed with Councillor KUBOTA.

After a number of discussions among the Committee members it was decided to pass the bill in accordance with the opinion of the Committee Chairman.

Chairman ITO announced that the Committee would convene once more in order to examine the draft of the report, and declared the meeting closed.

(The meeting was closed at 3:00 P.M.)

The Thirteenth Meeting of the Investigation Committee  
regarding the Ratification of the  
London Naval Treaty of 1930.

Hold at the Offices of the Privy Council  
on 26 September (Friday), SHOWA 5 /1930/

Those present:

President KURATANI  
Vice President HIRANUMA

Chairman of the Investigation Committee, Councillor ITO

Members of the Investigation Committee:

Councillor KANEKO	Councillor DEN
Councillor KUBOTA	Councillor ARAI
Councillor YAMAKAWA	Councillor KAWAI
Councillor KURODA	Councillor MIZUTACHI

Chief Secretary FUTAKASHI  
Secretary HORIE  
Secretary ITO

(The meeting was opened at 1:00 P.M.)

Chairman ITO called the meeting to order and expressed his desire to omit clause by clause consideration of the treaty as a preliminary investigation had already been made. The Committee then began to deliberate on the draft of the investigation report.

Reading of the draft of the investigation report. (Secretary HORIE read it several times.)

During this time questions and suggestions were made by the various members of the Committee. Finally the draft of the report was decided upon.

Chairman ITO announced the closing of the meeting.

(The meeting was closed at 2:00 P.M.)

C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 1124

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, T. SUZUKI hereby certify  
that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the  
following capacity: Secretary of Privy Council

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached  
consisting of 240 pages, dated \_\_\_\_\_, 1930, and described as follows:

Book entitled "Minutes of the Committee Meetings for the Years 1930,  
Secretariat of the Privy Council."

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official  
document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official  
archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying  
also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation  
of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Privy Council

Signed at Tokyo on this

1 day of Oct., 1946.

T. SUZUKI  
Signature of Official

Witness: J. A. CURTIS, 2d Lt.

SEAL  
Secretary of Privy Council  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, JOHN A. CURTIS, hereby certify that I

C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 1124

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, T. SUZUKI hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Privy Council

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 240 pages, dated \_\_\_\_\_, 1930, and described as follows:

Book entitled "Minutes of the Committee Meetings for the Years 1930, Secretariat of the Privy Council."

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Privy Council

Signed at Tokyo on this 1 day of Oct., 1946.

T. SUZUKI  
Signature of Official

Witness: J. A. CURTIS, 2d Lt.

SEAL  
Secretary of Privy Council  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, JOHN A. CURTIS, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 1 day of Oct., 1946

J. A. CURTIS, 2d Lt.  
NAME  
Investigator  
Official Capacity

Doc. 1124-A

FILE COPY  
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昭和五年

委員會錄

No. 1 Ex 910-A

極密院秘書課

按萃

千九百三十年「ロ下」海軍條約即批准、件第一回審査委員會

昭和五年八月十八日(月曜日)本院事務所ニ於テ開會

出席者

倉富議長

平沼副議長

審査委員長

伊東顧問官

審査委員

金子顧問官

久保田顧問官

山川顧問官

黒田顧問官

田顧問官

荒井顧問官

河合顧問官

水町顧問官

二上書記官長

堀江書記官

武藤書記官

Doc. 1124-A

NO. 2

(午後一時五分開會)

伊東委員長開會ヲ宣シ本案ハ急運、消長ニ関スル重要案件ニ付特ニ慎重審議ヲ盡ササルヘカラサルニ由リ先ニ審査ノ方針及順序ヲ決定シ萬遺憾ナキヲ期シ之ヲ旨トシ告ケ偵問事項ヲ大體六項ニ大別シ各項ニ付主査員ヲ定メ各自ニ於テ十分研究ヲ爲

Dec. 1124

シタル上時日ヲ定メテ当局、説明ヲ聽取シ且質問ヲ爲スコト及本  
會ニ於テハ議事、外部ニ漏洩セサルヤウ注意セラルコトヲ望ミ連日本案  
ノ審査ニ努力シタルニ上書記官長、勞ヲ謝ス

次ニ上書記官長ヨリ質問事項ニ付説明アリ河合顧問官ヨリ軍  
事參議院、上奏文、提示ニ付訊ストコロアリ伊東委員長之ニ  
答

金子顧問官ヨリ統帥權問題ニ関スル質問ニ付述フルトコロアリ委員  
長亦之ニ関シ所見ヲ述

倉富議長ヨリ曩ニ内閣總理大臣ニ付テ奉答文、提示方ヲ交渉  
シタルニ審査上、必要資料トシテ提示セラルコトヲ勸告スル意味ヲ以テ  
シタルモ、ナリト前段ノ其ノ顛末ヲ詳述ス

次ニ金子顧問官ヨリ夏休ヲ廢シテ早ク審議ニ與ルト政府ヨリ交  
渉アリシヤ否ニ付質問アリ倉富議長ヨリ御諮詢書受理以來内閣  
トノ交渉、次第ニ審議ヲ急クヤ否ニ関スル内閣、答辯ニ付陳述  
アリ

金子顧問官ヨリ國際信義ヲ重シ本條約、批准ヲ急クヘシト爲ス  
俗説ニ作ケ米國カ急ニ批准シタル國內ノ事情ヲ説明ス

次ニ委員長ヨリ本案審査ノ順序ニ付各員ノ意見ヲ向ヒ河合  
里田兩顧問官ヨリ發言アリ同委員長ハ更ニ從來國務大臣カ委  
員會ニ不用ナル説明員ヲ多勢隨行スル、有害無益ニ付特ニ必要  
ナラサル限リ本件、審議ニ付テハ總理大臣及外務海軍、兩大臣、  
ノ出席ヲホムル下、爲シ度旨ヲ詔リ金子久保田顧問官、賛成  
アリ之ニ決ス

NO.3

伊東委員長次回開會、時日ヲ告ケテ閉會ヲ宣ス

(午後二時四十分閉會)



No. 4

Doc 1124

千九百三十年ロニドノ海軍條約御批准、件第二回審  
査委員會

昭和五年八月二十三日(土曜日)本院事務所ニ於テ開會

出席者

倉富 議長

平沼 副議長

審査委員長

伊東 顧問官

審査委員

金子 顧問官

久保田 顧問官

山川 顧問官

黒田 顧問官

田 顧問官

荒井 顧問官

河合 顧問官

水野 顧問官

國務大臣

濱口内閣總理大臣

財部海軍大臣

幣原外務大臣

二上書記官長

堀江書記官

武藤書記官

Dac 1124

(午後二時五分開會)

伊東委員長開會ヲ宣シ本案ニ對スル當局說明求  
内閣總理大臣ヨリ千九百三十年ロトノ海軍條約ニ關シ  
海軍軍備制限會議ノ沿革、ロトノ會議ノ目的、會議  
ノ經過及條約ノ梗概ヲ說明シ且條約ノ效果ハ之ヲ昭和  
六年ヨリ漸次實現シタリト考ルル旨、演述ス外務  
大臣更ニ首相ノ說明ヲ補充シテ屢々演述スルトコト、  
又海軍大臣、其ノ專門的立場ヨリ會議ニ對スル我對策  
ノ要項及條約ノ我兵力量ニ關スル規定ヲ說明シ其ノ  
内容ニ付テハ元ヨリ不満足ナルモ此ノ際ハ他我軍備ノ大  
體、輪廓ヲ定ムコトヲ必要ト考ヘ調印シタル旨ヲ述  
テ右終ニ委員長、大臣、退席ヲ求ム

(各大臣退席)

其ヨリ委員間ノ協議ニ入り兵力量ノ問題ニ付  
テハ海軍大臣ヲ通シテ所屬海軍令部長ノ出席ヲ  
求メタリトノ意見、陳述アリ質問ノ事實、質問ヲ  
先トスルコトニ決ス

伊東委員長開會ヲ宣テ

(午後二時五十分開會)

No. 5

千九百三十年ロトノ海軍條約御批准ノ件第三回審  
查委員會

昭和五年八月二十六日(土曜日)本院事務所

ニ於テ開會

Doc 1124

No. 6

出席者

倉富 議長

平沼 副議長

審査委員長

伊東 顧問官

審査委員

金子 顧問官

久保田 顧問官

山川 顧問官

黒田 顧問官

田 顧問官

荒井 顧問官

水河 顧問官

水町 顧問官

國務大臣

濱口内閣総理大臣

財部海軍大臣

幣原 外務大臣

二上書記官長

堀江 書記官

武藤 書記官

Dac 1124

(午後一時五分開始)

伊東委員長開會ヲ宣ス

金子顧問官ヨリ新聞ニ依リ國務大臣ニシテ本閣  
 敵視スルカ如キ言辞ヲ用スルモノアリ之ヲ全ク明治  
 大帝ノ聖旨ニ背反スルモノニシテ甚タ遺憾ナリトス  
 我々ノ意ニ内閣ノ政策遂行ヲ妨クル意ナク只至誠  
 奉答ノ忱ヲ竭サントスルモノナレバ我々ノ質問ニ對シテハ  
 忌憚ナク御答辯アラムニトテ布ムヨリ述ヘ且内閣  
 ハ本案ノ御批准ヲ非常ニ急キ休暇ヲ賜リタル者中  
 ニモ拘ニス審議セムコトヲ望ムル事由ヲ聞キタリト述ヘ  
 之ニ對シテ外務大臣ノ答辯アリ同顧問官更ニ「アハル  
 ン」カ批准セザレバ本條約ノ實施出來サルニアラスヤリ詛不  
 半國カ早速批准ヲ了スルハ内政上ノ便宜ニ出ルニ遇キ  
 スト述ヘ更ニ日本全權カ米國ヨリノ招電ニ依リ米國ノ經  
 由ニテ渡英ニタル事情ヲ偵シ外務大臣之ニ答フルトニ  
 曰アリ女ヲ同顧問官ヨリ財部全權ハ出發前貴衆  
 兩院議員其他ヲ招キ所謂三大原則ノ説明ヲ爲シ對  
 米七割ヲ以テ最少限度ノ兵力量ト爲スト述ヘタル事實  
 アリヤ否ヤヲ偵シ海軍大臣然リト答フ繼イテ同顧問官  
 ハ若槻全權ニ亦「サンス」ニ答フニ於テ對米七割ヲ最  
 少限度ト爲スヨリ述ヘタリト聞クカ事實ナリヤト問  
 ヒ然否カ大臣答フル所アリタルモ之ニ満足セス若槻全  
 權ニ之ヲ認サレトテ要ム

No. 7

更ニ同顧問官ハ七割問題ニ付「ス」ニシテ「出洲大  
 使及若槻、財部兩全權トノ間ノ交渉事實及所謂  
 妥協案ハ松平「」ニシテ會見ニ依テ成立シタルヤ

Pac/124

空ヤヲ賞シ外務大臣ニリ續々答辯ス其ヨリ同顧問官  
 公使安福未 成立スル迄安福大将ニ對シテハ何ニモ相諒  
 セザリシト云フ等ヲ賞シ海軍大臣然ニサレヨリ答へ  
 タル同顧問官ハ更ニ日英米ノ妥協案カ出来タル時安  
 福大将ヲ替水艦ノ保有量ノ同一ナルニ整齊キ現有量保  
 有ノ必要ヲ力説シタルモ若槻全權ハ今日ニ及ニテハ歐目ナリト  
 謂ヘリト云フ事案ノ有無ヲ問ヒ外務大臣之ニ答フ  
 續テ同顧問官ハ若槻全權ヨリ妥協案ニ付可合ノ訓令ヲ  
 請ムル際財部全權ハ山梨海軍次官ニ宛テ妥協案ニ付  
 傳令部ノ意見ヲ問フ事案ニ付打電セリト聞ク其ノ全  
 文ヲ示セタリ又米國上院ニ於ケル議事ノ狀態ヲ見シ本  
 條約ニ秋屆ノ文書ニカカレ果シテ然ラバ之ヲモ根示セテ度  
 百ヲ述フ之ニ對シ海軍大臣及外務大臣ヨリ答辯スル  
 事ナリ

又同顧問官ヨリ貴族院ニ於テ濱口首相ノ憲法第廿一  
 條及第廿三條ノ意義ニ付ハ學者ノ意見ニ依リテ之ヲ故  
 ニ云フ事案ニ付答へタル事案ノ有無ヲ賞シ内閣總理大臣ヨ  
 リ又海軍守備議ヲ云フ理由ヲ説明シテ憲法上ノ解  
 釋ハ以下ニ條約ノ問題ニ直接關係セザル答辯ハ之ヲ差  
 控ヘヨリ置置ス者ハ之ヲ力為シ之ヲ答フ

No. 8

其ヨリ同顧問官ハ惟懼上奏ノ移牒書及兵力ニ関スル  
 事項直ニ復理ニ問ヒテ上奏書ノ正文根示ヲ求メ  
 河合顧問官ハ全權カ本發前ノ聲明ニ拘ラレ三大臣  
 則テ之ヲ請訓シタルト及傳令部ノ之ヲ贊成スル事ト  
 洵ニ不可解ナリト論シ海軍大臣ニ對シテ海軍大臣事務  
 管理ノ設置ニ付テ感想及軍事參議官會議ニ於テ

Doc 1124

得兼海軍大臣事務管理ヲ置キカレトテ會合セタリトテ  
 事實ノ眞金ノ間ノ之ニ對シ海軍大臣ヨリ本會ニ對米七割  
 ノ金ニ付缺キテ條約ニ成ニセシメシトモ考ヘカリシ旨ヲ  
 述ヘ且チ其ノ事項ノ處理ニ關スル上奏文ヲ提出セリ  
 内閣總理大臣ハ金子顧問官ノ要請ニ依リ惟懼上奏ト  
 内閣ノ關係ヲ調査シ明治初年ヨリ全部ニ亘ルヲ要スルヤ  
 ト問フニ金子顧問官ヨリ明治四十二年ニ降内閣(移謀セ  
 リ)ト云フ件名論ヲ答ヘ可ト答フ  
 次ニ河會顧問官ヨリ帝國全權ニ對スル内訓ヲ提示シ零  
 來ニ  
 加終ニ任兼海軍大臣本日ノ之ヲ開會スル旨ト宣フ  
 (午後四時五十分開會)

十九百三十年四月二十日之選舉係御批准件案同審會委員  
 會報五年八月二十日(本曜日)本院事務行ニ於テ開會

出席者

- |       |          |
|-------|----------|
| 會 長   | 富 謙      |
| 副 長   | 沼 副      |
| 審査委員長 | 伊 東 顧問 官 |
| 審査委員  | 金 子 顧問 官 |
|       | 田 川 顧問 官 |
|       | 田 川 顧問 官 |
|       | 荒 井 顧問 官 |
|       | 荒 井 顧問 官 |

No. 9



Doc 1124

永井忠也ニ付陸軍取調事二十二年十月三十一日東京新聞  
之ヲ是諾ス

次ニ同顧問官ヨリ日本ハ何故ニ大陸艦隊ニ入り  
伊佛ノ事通リニヤト問フリ之ニ對シテ  
外務大臣ヨリ答辯ス所アリ更ニ同顧問官外  
務大臣ニ答辯ス所アリ云ク米國上院  
議事筆記ヲ見ヨ本條約目下大巡洋艦ニ隻ヲ  
有スニ過キザル米國カ十五隻ヲ有スニ至ルニテ日  
本ヲシテ其手傍觀セシムルニト論セリ云ク  
之ニテ米國カ外交ニ成功ナリヤト論議ニ米國ニ於  
テ兵力量ニ大統領ニ之ヲ定メ日本ニ於テハ帷幄輔  
弼ニヨリテ天皇自ラ之ヲ定メ給フニト云ク云ク現  
在ノ時ニ於テ我カ國ニ不利ニシテ米國ニ有利ナル條  
約ニ對シテ米國人ハ日本ニ對シテ脱帽又  
嘲ミヤト云ク米國上院議事録ヲ引用シ  
本條約ニ對シテ我カ國カ外交ニ大失敗ナリト論シ  
之ニ對シテ外務大臣ヨリ答辯ス所アリ

No. 11

同顧問官長ニ答フニ米國大巡洋艦ニ隻ヲ  
規定ニシテ其質簡ニ又我カ國カ驅逐艦及潜水艦  
廢棄カ米國ニ比シテ其量ニ不利ナリト云ク其  
ト云ク其先我カ國カ本條約ニ同意セザルカニヤ  
ニ對シテ其會議ニ於テ英米兩國關係  
ニ對シテ其說明ニ求ムルニ對シテ外務大臣ヨリ答  
答辯アリ

伊藤委員長ヨリ答藤ノ事ニ付



Dac 1124

質問下「外務大臣及海軍大臣言之三答」  
六三皇田顧問官等、内閣府、關係三付各望、關係  
續、本條約、始、現、内閣成立以來、中、諮詢、守、件、内閣  
外交、文書、誤、謬、服、褊、甚、多、勘、方、カ、カ、如、上、至、尊  
ヲ、煩、之、答、下、内、外、衆、庶、之、過、誤、陷、之、處、也、以、テ  
目、以、處、因、之、次、將、來、再、カ、カ、如、時、失、態、之、二、ト、テ、望、言  
具體、之、事、例、等、ヲ、示、意、及、示、下、外、務、大、臣、及、總、理、大  
臣、之、粗、瀆、之、說、將、來、充、分、注、意、カ、カ、(日、日、之、答、)  
金子顧問官、外務大臣、答、辯、中、責、ヲ、富、貴、放、恣、以、故、  
聘、嫁、之、如、言、等、下、之、甚、多、不、條、理、ナ、ト、難、之、外、務、大、臣、ト、  
問、問、答、下、

右、終、之、海、軍、長、官、本、委、員、會、開、會、之、旨、傳、下、  
カ、如、時、再、之、其、之、難、點、ト、接、接、之、本、日、之、三、問、答、之、旨、  
之、旨、也、  
尚、田、顧問、官、之、海、軍、長、官、組、員、二、重、次、員、付、質、問、下、海、軍  
大、臣、之、答、

(午後三時三十分會)

No. 12

九月三十日、三三、海軍條約、御批准、件、案、之、閣、會、查  
委員、會

昭和九年九月一日(月曜日) 本夜事務所、於、開、會

出席者

倉高議長

平沼副議長

查會委員長

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伊東 顧問官

金子 顧問官

久保田 顧問官

山川 顧問官

黒田 顧問官

荒井 顧問官

水町 顧問官

河合 顧問官

國務大臣

濱口 內閣總理大臣

財部 海軍大臣

幣原 外務大臣

三上 書記官長

佐江 書記官

武藤 書記官

No. 13

(午後一時開會)  
 伊東委員長 開會 直前に 國里 田 顧問官 質問 對  
 スル 答辯 滿 上リ 上リ 條約 正本 中、誤記 如何 取扱 此  
 ル 下、質問 ヲ 國里 田 顧問官 亦 該 領 同 全 旨 付  
 述 之 所 下リ 外務 大臣 之 答 答  
 河合 顧問官、帝國 全權 對 之 訓令、決定 之 事 續  
 順序 訂 海軍 大臣 之 答 答 尚 同 顧問官、海相、

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既定、履行するに拘り、何、必要あり、兵力に關し、  
 盛衰一俾、上奏裁可ヲ請ひ、ハヤ、實、海軍大臣、  
 下之會議後、臨時議會ニ於テ問題トナリ、軍部内  
 ニ於テ无程之、議論生じ、タカ、力、爲ナリト、答、  
 同顧問官、當時海軍大臣事務管理、  
 相該、情、行、遵、守、セ、シ、サ、シ、ヤ、考、ル、カ、何、  
 人ニ付、聞、キ、直、セ、ル、カ、當、時、事、務、管、理、執、  
 續、ニ、何、等、不、都合、ナ、シ、ト、決、論、ニ、達、シ、  
 河合顧問官、更ニ軍令部長以下多數部員、  
 多、シ、タ、リ、理、由、問、ヒ、海、軍、大、臣、之、  
 同顧問官ヨリ、軍令部長更迭、事情ニ付、詳細  
 ン、説明ヲ求、ム、ニ、對、シ、海、軍、大、臣、  
 時、分、ハ、其、多、ク、遺、憾、ナ、リ、ト、求、  
 表、セ、テ、自、責、ノ、念、甚、ク、ス、ト、シ、  
 更、迷、上、奏、ヲ、ナ、シ、  
 同顧問官、又加藤大將、統帥權、  
 譯、ト、シ、  
 ト、仰、セ、  
 臣、之、  
 事、實、  
 廿、日、  
 財、部、  
 令、部、長、

No. 14

又加藤大將、統帥權、  
 譯、ト、シ、  
 ト、仰、セ、  
 臣、之、  
 事、實、  
 廿、日、  
 財、部、  
 令、部、長、

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ト同トシ、電文、豫示ヲ求メ海軍大臣、口下ニヨリ打  
電シタル事、時事情ヲ述ベ、決シテ同僚ヲ憂切ニ視テ、發  
シタルニ、非カレ、皆ヨリ辯疎ニ、部長ヨリ、電報、大意ヲ述フ  
同顧問官ヨリ、財部全權、加藤慶令部長力請訓示、  
兵力量反對、又トテ、知ルニ、各々ノ實ニ、對シ海軍  
大臣、決裂ヲ踏ミ、近ニ反對セ、口下、又ヨリ答ニ、  
ヨリ顧問官、全權、何故軍令部長、意思ヲ確メ、口下  
ト語リ、口下、同大臣、海軍大臣事務管理、東京、故一全權  
又、財部、力ニ、確ニ、必要ト、下、信、口下、答、四月二日發、  
軍令部長、電報、訓讀、

此時、伊東、本部長、海軍大臣、訓讀、口下、電報、豫示ヲ  
求メ、口下、同大臣、懸慮、上、返答、口下、答、  
某井顧問官ヨリ、顧問委員會、於テ、海軍大臣、舉テ、昨日、  
米大巡艦、噸數、計、不審、貨、口下、同訓書、時、海軍大臣  
事務管理、軍令部長、兵力量、同、實見、一致、見  
又、各々、又、實見、一致、要、口下、答、口下、答、口下、答、口下、答、  
對シ、海軍大臣、原、則、口下、答、口下、答、口下、答、口下、答、  
總理大臣、原則、口下、答、口下、答、口下、答、口下、答、  
對、口下、答、口下、答、口下、答、口下、答、口下、答、口下、答、  
答、口下、答、

原 15

次、河、顧問官ヨリ、同、軍事、會議、官、何故、口下、軍令  
部長、口下、同行、口下、部長、口下、答、口下、答、口下、答、  
別、然、之、確、メ、口下、答、口下、答、口下、答、口下、答、  
氏、口下、實見、實際、田、代表、的、意見、口下、答、口下、答、口下、答、  
海軍、專門、的、意見、後、程、山、科、次、官、口下、答、口下、答、口下、答、  
若、口下、會議、於、本案、通、口下、決定、口下、最、善、口下、答、口下、答、

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之(之)上述(據)據氏(庫)令部(之)之(之)行(軍)用兵(上)國  
以(然)之本(亦)決(是)之(之)其(最)重(要)之(力)行(之)之(之)上(下)告(之)之  
リト答(之)之

金子(願)同(官)有(り)天(皇)力(兵)額(手)接(受)之(以)自(本)憲(法)明  
示(之)以(所)以(之)該(之)條(約)依(之)兵(力)量(決)長(之)付(惟)惟(會)  
議(之)所(以)有(之)理(由)同(之)之(對)總(理)大(臣)之(之)上(下)之(會)議  
後(處)理(例)從(之)リト答(之)總(手)大(權)大(皇)三(歸)之(之)故(之)  
弱(弱)機(有)力(大)權(之)侵(害)之(之)絶(對)之(之)得(之)之(之)不(之)可(之)  
上(述)之(之)此(之)於(之)同(願)同(官)官(憲)法(之)第(十)條(制)長(事)情(之)說  
明(之)我(國)之(於)之(兵)力(量)決(長)大(權)最(之)肝(要)之(之)所(以)之(之)所(以)之(之)  
內(閣)得(之)裁(定)得(之)之(之)之(之)次(第)論(述)之(之)對(之)  
總(理)大(臣)之(之)兵(力)量(決)長(之)所(以)之(之)國(議)之(之)外(之)之(之)  
本(條)約(之)依(之)兵(額)庫(令)部(長)同(意)得(之)決(之)之(之)之(之)  
之(之)以(之)之(之)所(以)之(之)力(之)伊(東)原(員)長(庫)令(部)長(之)其(其)見(之)  
無(視)之(之)之(之)世(上)之(之)說(論)之(之)直(之)之(之)取(之)之(之)之(之)之(之)之(之)  
之(之)總(理)大(臣)之(之)言(之)如(之)之(之)世(間)之(之)傳(之)之(之)甚(之)之(之)相(登)之(之)之(之)  
述(之)同(會)之(之)音(之)之(之)

(午後四時十分閉會)

No. 16

十九百三十五年(之)之(之)海(軍)將(帥)御(決)准(之)件(第)七(之)  
同(審)查(委)員(會)  
開(會)之(之)事(九)月(三)日(水)曜(日)本(院)事(務)所(之)於(之)

出席者

金子富議長  
平沼副議長

Dac 1124

審査委員長

伊東 顧問 官

金子 顧問 官

山久 顧問 官

水河 顧問 官

荒思 顧問 官

町合井田川保田 顧問 官

田 顧問 官

閣席者

國務大臣

幣原 外務大臣

武堀 二上書記官長

藤江書記官

藤江書記官

武堀 二上書記官長

藤江書記官

藤江書記官

No. 17

午後一時開會  
伊東委員長開會宣言  
金子顧問官より公開演説、席上三於本院  
討論、荒思馬加へる永井外務政務次官ハ  
一月、予定下近支那ハ旅行也ト又  
ト、トハ力先期本官、復閣、解決ニ迄



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No. 19

其在責任上答(九)三答、同顧問官、更三庫部、不同意、  
此物之首相、條約所定、兵力量ヲ以テ國防安全ナリト爲  
了理由如何、今次協定、兵力ヲ以テ我國兵備一部ナリトシ  
意味如何、向已又軍令部長職權如何及同部長、同意也  
ナリト答、此ナリト向且國防安全ナリト云得(十理由ヲ續、總理  
大臣未之ニ答)

次、同顧問官、更同訓令軍令部、於此起身セリト答  
及我全權ヲ、傳之本請訓令、且最後答ニ下、ト其中之  
此物之之ニ最後ト爲、此理由如何、實ニ總理大臣、未  
之ニ答、全權ヲ之、以テ彼ヲ、讓步セ、此見、ト、通  
知ナリト答、此ト述、依テ同顧問官、更、海軍全權事務  
管理、三月三十一日、軍令部長、會員、條約部長、於テ飽迄  
不同意、之、自今、於テ裁決、外、ト、之、(ト、同、力、如何、  
ト、此、如何、ト、之、得、此、又、其、際、海軍、參議、官、會議、  
開會、奉請、ト、之、ト、ト、同、總理、大臣、其、其、自、身、  
心、持、テ、之、ト、之、ト、又、海軍、參議、官、會議、之、集、之、  
奉請、ト、之、ト、ト、之、答、同顧問官、更、進、及、之、首相  
如何、ト、之、自、身、裁決、外、ト、謂、得、此、理由、聽、キ、ト、述  
ス、又、總理、大臣、進、自、身、心、持、テ、之、ト、之、ト、前、答、辯、了、結  
返、リ、此、於、同顧問官、斯、如何、心、持、テ、如何、ト、起、キ、  
ト、詔、且、軍令部長、同意、ト、ト、首相、認、長、ト、不、可、ト、  
ト、論、點、ニ、總理、大臣、之、對、之、續、ト、當時、情況、ヲ、敘、述、之、  
部長、同意、ト、ト、認、長、ト、之、事情、ヲ、述、ス、此、力、同顧問官、  
同部長、擇、措、ヲ、敘、述、之、ト、以、テ、同意、ト、ト、ト、解、了、餘  
ニ、輕、重、ト、之、ト、論、總理、大臣、之、不、可、ト、ト、ト、主張、セ、リ  
其、同顧問官、首相、議會、於、之、兵力量、決定、權



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政府三、一、述、元、本院三、於、辯、明、會、  
其、ト、異、ト、ヲ、摘、摘、又、之、三、對、總、理、大、臣、ハ、決、定、  
於、於、之、ヲ、決、定、又、ト、謂、ル、ト、之、軍、務、意、見、ヲ、對、  
於、之、ト、就、國、程、度、ト、ハ、外、輪、ト、ト、ハ、合、辯、會、  
リ、ト、ト、ト、合、フ、安、ニ、於、テ、同、顧、問、官、ハ、何、故、  
ト、自、相、ハ、軍、部、ノ、意、見、ト、一、致、ヲ、受、之、ル、ト、ト、對、  
テ、意、見、ハ、一、致、ヲ、リ、ト、說、明、セ、シ、サ、レ、ト、實、總、  
理、大、臣、ハ、軍、部、ノ、終、局、ニ、於、テ、異、議、ヲ、ト、ト、  
ト、若、ク、ハ、力、故、ト、ト、辯、明、セ、リ、

No. 20

全、ク、顧、問、官、ヨリ、帝、國、議、會、ニ、於、テ、自、相、  
軍、部、ノ、意、見、ヲ、尊、重、對、應、シ、タ、リ、ト、謂、フ、ト、軍、  
部、ト、同、意、シ、タ、リ、ト、謂、フ、ト、其、理、由、ニ、付、總、理、  
總、理、大、臣、ヨリ、同、意、ヲ、得、タ、リ、ト、述、ブ、ル、ト、受、テ、  
カ、リ、ト、ト、合、フ、ト、高、同、顧、問、官、ヨリ、同、意、ヲ、得、  
タ、リ、ト、言、フ、ト、力、故、ト、問、題、起、シ、ト、特、ニ、對、應、シ、  
政、府、力、之、ヲ、定、ム、ト、謂、フ、カ、ル、カ、サ、ル、理、由、甚、  
ク、自、解、ト、ト、論、評、ス、總、理、大、臣、ハ、之、ト、對、  
シ、テ、本、部、ト、軍、令、部、ト、意、思、也、何、故、ト、  
ヲ、議、會、ニ、於、テ、討、論、ト、ト、ト、ト、ト、ト、ト、ト、  
ト、考、ス、ル、力、為、ト、ト、辯、明、セ、リ、同、顧、問、官、  
今、ハ、合、辯、ニ、滿、足、ス、ル、ト、ト、ト、ト、ト、ト、  
顧、問、官、ハ、之、ニ、打、切、ル、日、ヲ、告、ク、次、テ、何、故、  
顧、問、官、ヨリ、軍、令、部、長、ノ、意、見、ハ、他、ヲ、リ、  
カ、ル、ト、ト、ト、ト、ト、ト、ト、ト、ト、ト、ト、  
恰、モ、政、府、諮、詢、機、關、ト、ト、觀、ア、ル、力、也、何、ト、問、  
リ、總、理、大、臣、ハ、答、フ、ト、答、フ、

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甚元井顧問官の重大なる一鷹問として前提  
兵力量の決定は軍令部長の同意を要す。首相は  
これを對し總理大臣の大臣と部長との意見を以て確  
屋へキナリト考へた故に海軍大臣ヨリ申出ツルコトの軍  
令部長と一致して井にモトニテ取扱フ考へタリト答へ同  
顧問官の然る大臣と部長との間ニ一致ナカリトキ、如何  
ト質ニタルニ總理大臣の一致セシムル所マテ協議セシキ  
ルヘカラスト述テ依テ同顧問官の斯ル場合ニ於テ總理  
大臣の職責トシテ之ヲ一致セシメテ取扱フ必要ナ  
キヤト述ヘタル對シテ一致セサルモハ首相の外ニ持テ來  
ラサルハト答へ首相の兵力ニ関スル事項ノ處理ニ關  
シ海軍大臣ト軍令部長トの意見一致アルハキモノト認  
ムルヤト確メタルニ對シテハ然リト答辯ス

伊東委員長ヨリ軍令部長の同意問題ニ付テハ首  
相の答辯ハ本官の傳聞セル所ト大差アリテ了解ニ苦  
ムモノトシテ海軍大臣事務管理ノ部長トの交渉經過  
事實ヲ詳述シ且疑問ヲ氷解シ審議ノ進捗ヲ圖  
ル爲前軍令部長ノ出席ニ付首相及海軍大臣ニ於  
テ書力セニシタキ上日ヲ述テ黑田顧問官ヨリ之ニ對スル  
賛意の表示アリ委員長ハ次ニ御相談、上明日返答  
セニルモノ可ナキ旨ヲ述ヘタルトニロアリ總理大臣ヨ  
リ篤小懇答ノ上返答スヘシト答へ且本官の帷幄上  
奏ノ通知ヲ受ツタルカ結局ニ於テ私言ヲ適量謝テ  
リシモノト解スル點ニ付テ部長考へ果ナキヤ未知ル  
カニスト詳疏ス

No. 21

伊東委員長ヨリ軍令部長の同意ヲ表シタルことト

Dac/124

言ハリト申サリト申述アリ之ニ対シ總理事大庭ニ本館前議長  
同意ニシテ謂フニ下上ニ唯結局具議ナカリニモト認メ  
タレ旨ヲ述アリト辯解アリ  
伊東委員長閉會ヲ言フ  
(午後四時三十分閉會)

大正十三年二月之條約御批准件ニ関スル調査委員會

昭和三年九月五日(金曜日)本院事務所ニ於テ開會  
出席者

倉富 議長

平沼 副議長

調査委員長

伊東 顧問官

調査委員

金子 顧問官

桑田 顧問官

山川 顧問官

黒田 顧問官

荒井 顧問官

水河 顧問官

合野 顧問官

出席者

田 顧問官

No. 22

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國務大臣

濱口内閣總理大臣  
財部海軍大臣

武堀上書記官長  
藤江書記官長

No. 23

伊東委員長閣下宣旨本委員會、以刑軍令  
 部長、出席、御視、方、希均三對、之、内閣總理  
 大臣、因、答、書、(拒絕)ヲ、朗讀ス  
 金子顧問官ヨリ首相、議會ニ於テ、軍部、  
 同意見ヲ、得、行、ト、答、之、仰、シ、議會ニ於テ、斯、ク、  
 云、テ、敢、テ、問、ハ、ル、西、ト、云、ハ、可、シ、ト、同意、  
 ト云、ハ、何、故、不、可、ナリヤ、論、ヲ、轉、シ、本、將、領、  
 第三十三條、但、書、由、テ、作成、セ、ル、タ、ル、事、由、ヲ、  
 問、フ、之、三、對、シ、海、軍、大、臣、ヨリ、之、ヨリ、一、其、米、  
 認、ル、ト、テ、表、示、ス、ル、ト、テ、得、ハ、カ、故、ニ、少、ク、ト、テ、精神、  
 船、二、日、本、ノ、次、ノ、會議、ニ、於、テ、主張、ニ、對、シ、海、陸、  
 軍、ヲ、以、テ、天、ト、考、テ、答、之、又、總、理、大臣、ヨリ、本、條、  
 約、依、リ、大、洋、艦、力、對、米、古、割、對、ニ、拘、束、サ、ル、ニ、  
 到、ル、キ、端、ヲ、解、ク、虞、ヲ、為、ス、ト、テ、一、リ、シ、カ、為、

Dac 11 24

16.24

特ニ本項ヲ設ケテ次、海軍會議ニ於ケル各國ノ態度  
 ニ付本條約ノ規定ニヨリ何等ノ拘束ヲ受ケルコトナキ  
 ヲ明ニシタルモノナリト答辯ス  
 同顧問官ハ獨立ノ國家カ條約ノ滿了後之ニ拘束  
 ニルコトナキハ國際法上ノ原則ニシテ斯ル條規ヲ俟ツ  
 マテモ無キコトナリト述ヘ我全權カ之ヲシテ成功ナリト  
 為ス強辯モ亦甚シト論セリ之ニ對シテ總理大臣  
 ヨリ釋明スル所アリシカ同顧問官ハ更ニ本規定ノ單  
 ニ氣安メノミ軍擴トナルヘキ主張ハ到底將來ニ於  
 テ許サルヘキニアラスト断スルヤ總理大臣ヨリ日本カ次回  
 ノ會議ニ於テモ尚所謂三大原則ニ基ク主張ヲ為  
 スヤ否ヤハ不明ナルカ假ニ之ヲ主張ストスルモ必スモ  
 軍擴トハナラス蓋シ輕巡及驅逐艦ヲ若干減縮  
 增加スルコトナケシハナリト論セリ此ニ於テ同顧問官ハ  
 更ニ本條約ノ範圍カ其ノ目的タル日本ノ大巡艦及  
 潜水艦ニ制限ヲ加フルコトニ成功シタルモノナリト答辯  
 論ナリト氣々所見ヲ演述シ海軍大臣ヨリ米國全權  
 ハ八吋巡洋艦ニ餘リ熱申シ過キタル傾キリ技術上ヨ  
 見シ六吋艦必スモ八吋艦ヨリ少カ勢ナニス潜水  
 艦ノ有利亦必スモ定説アルニアラスト詳論セリ  
 次河合顧問官ヨリ先般來、質問ノ結末ニ付ケ  
 タシトテ發言、許可ヲ要メタルモ委員長ヨリ他日更  
 ニ查明ノ機會アル年七月ヲ述ヘタルニ依リ同顧問  
 官ハ海軍大臣カ貴院ニ於ケル答辯中ニ其カ

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2025  
201124

Dac 1124

96.26

唯海軍！既定製艦計劃額、四億五千萬圓、  
 予算に於て、意圖ナリキ以テ、四億五千萬圓、  
 補充ト負擔輕減ト、財源トナシ、其割合、  
 今、所不明ナリ。然レトモ、其一部、少ク負擔、  
 輕減ニ差向クヘシト、答辯ナリ、同顧問官、  
 本條約ニ依リテ、認マラルル我國、製艦權ヲ  
 全權行使スルニ、國防上、缺陷アルト、海軍ヲ  
 服取、向幹部、考ヘテ、聞ク、果シテ、然ラバ、  
 服取、十二年、未ダ、行使ス、製艦權、噸數、  
 十方、十噸ニシテ、費用、約三億三千万圓、  
 九方、十噸ニシテ、僅カニ、七千万圓、過キス、從テ  
 之ニ、補充費ヲ、加フルトキ、ハ、剩餘金、ハ、思ハ、多額  
 ナル、是、金ヲ、生スルニ、到ル、レ、然レ、モ、本條約、依リ  
 テ、斯、如キ、大、金ヲ、要スルニ、到ル、キ、ト、ハ、各、新、  
 聞、ハ、皆、淵、黙、シ、テ、語、ラ、ズ、自、相、説、明、本、官  
 全ク、了解、スルニ、能ハ、サル、ト、コ、ト、ナリ、ト、論、  
 三、億、円、ヲ、超、ス、キ、財、政、ニ、願、テ、適、当、所  
 行、決、行、ス、ヘシ、ト、辯、解、ス、同、顧、問、官、更、  
 條、約、調、印、前、財、政、上、計、算、ハ、言、フ、迄、無、  
 信、ス、知、ル、ニ、海、軍、有、望、補、充、計、劃、亦、  
 懷、疑、計、劃、之、下、ト、公、之、レ、部、  
 計、劃、有、部、於、テ、夫、論、之、レ、海、軍、大、臣、補、充  
 於、テ、夫、論、之、レ、海、軍、大、臣、補、充

研究、中、ニ、属、シ、大、体、ノ、ト、ス、申、上、得、サル、ヲ、遺憾  
 研究、中、ニ、属、シ、大、体、ノ、ト、ス、申、上、得、サル、ヲ、遺憾

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兩者ノ協議調ヒ大藏省トモ相談、上ニアリサレハ申上テ  
難シト答フ之ニ對シ同顧問官、當局ニハ既ニ定成セル  
計劃アルベキ筈ナリ而シテ今之ヲ提示セサルハ不可解  
ナリト考フト痛言ス

久保田顧問官ヨリ唯今、山川顧問官、御質問ハ  
極メテ重要ナリト考フト本條約、根本的目的ハ國民  
負擔ノ輕減ナルカ故ニ其ノ點ニ關スル本條約、成之ヲ  
結果ヲ考ル先セサレハ斯ル會議ニ於テ調印ヲ爲スコト  
能ハサル筈ナリ當局、此ノ點ヲ中心トシテ答辯セリ  
レトコトヲ請フ旨陳述セリ

伊東委員長爾餘、質問ハ次回ニ譲ル旨ヲ述ベテ  
閉會ヲ宣ス

(午後三時三十分閉會)

1629



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no 28

十九日三時三十分之海軍條約御批准、件本、(四)審查委員會  
昭和五年九月(廿四日)本院事務所三六三開會

出席者

倉宮田議長

平沼副議長

審查委員會長

伊東顧問官

來賓委員

金子顧問官

久保田顧問官

山川顧問官

星田顧問官

荒井顧問官

河合顧問官

水野顧問官

開會席者

田 顧問官

國務大臣

濱口內閣總理大臣

財部海軍大臣

幣原外務大臣

三上書記官長

堀江書記官

武藤書記官

(午後一時開會)

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伊東委員長開會中宣ス  
 里田顧問官ヨリ今次ノ條約ニ規定スル各國ノ保有兵力量ハ何  
 ヲ基準トシテ協定スルヤトノ質問アリ海軍大臣ハワシトシテ會議  
 議ニ於テハ現有勢力ヲ又ハ「ワシト」會議ニ於テモ他國ノ現有  
 勢力ヲ標準トシテ今國ノ英米兩國ノ英米「ワシト」高調セル  
 毛英國ノ大體現有勢力ヲ標準トシテ他國モ亦ハ此ノ意味ニ於テ  
 現有勢力ヲ基準トシテ他國モ亦大體ニ於テ現有兵力ヲ標準ト  
 爲スリト答ヘ得(シト答フルヤ同顧問官ハ曰ク、現有勢力  
 ヲ標準トスル米國ノ保有量タルキ噸數ヲ算出シ又更ニ  
 米國ノ現有勢力ヲ基準トシタル場合、他國ノ保有量タルキ  
 噸數ヲ指稱ス本條約中其ノ何レモ依ルコトナク而モ他國ニ取り  
 極メテ不利ナル比率ノ保有兵力ニ同意シ他國ノ未タ一戰ヲ交スル  
 前既ニ多數ノ艦船ヲ撤滅セリタルカ如キ結果ニ目ヤトスル理由  
 ヲ價ノ海軍大臣ハ權利上ヨリ言(シ何モ憚ル所ナキ米海軍政務  
 官ニ「ワシト」會議以來對米七割比率ヲ以テ足リト爲シ現ニ今次  
 白下ノ會議ニ對シ訓令於テモ米總指七割ヲ基準トシルカ  
 故ニ他國ノ之ニ從ヒテ協定スルニテナリト答ヘテ

no 29

次ヲ同顧問官ハ右觀全權ヲ米國ニヤトシテ於此ニ演說ニ引用スル  
 「ワシト」條約ノ軍縮精神ヲ說キ本條約ニ於テ新ニ巡洋艦  
 ニ割女令ニ對シ飛行機發着臺置新設ヲ承認スルカ悉キハ全ク  
 此ノ精神ニ矛盾スルモノニテ「ワシト」或全權ノ之ニ對シテ如何ナル態度  
 手段ヲ執ルタルヤヲ訊ク海軍大臣ハ今次ノ會議ハ「ワシト」上ニ從  
 ハ「ワシト」上ニモ米國ノ強硬ナル主張ニ同意ヲ表スルモノナリト告  
 白セリ其ヨリ同顧問官ハ總理大臣ニ對シテ何カ故ニ當局者ハ國勢  
 ニ缺陷ヲ生スル本條約ニ調印スルヤ又其ノ缺陷ニ對シテ如何

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此種策ヲ有セラルヤト、價同ニ發シ總理大臣條約兵力量ニ  
ヨリテハ作戦用兵上或ハ不足アラハニ制限外、兵力ヲ以テ之ヲ  
補充シ得(ニト)信スルカ故ニ国防上ニ(漸シテ)欲(ハ)生セシメス兵  
力補充ノ方法ハ種々アリ(ハ)内容ノ充實ニテ他ノ術カノ向上ナリ  
然レドモ其ノ具體的計劃ハ目下(漸)部ニ於テ存(在)中ニ屬シ香  
發表スルノ時機ニ達セヌト答辯ス

河合顧問官ヨリ潜水艦ハ世間ニ謂フ程有效ノモノニアラスト言ハ  
ルモ我(國)ノ如キ地勢、国民性及經濟狀態ヲ有スル國ニ於テハ最も  
必要有教ノモノナリト考フ然モ全ク性能ヲ異ニスル飛行機ヲ以テ之  
ニ代(ト)スルハ方(ハ)此(ノ)所(以)ヲ知(ラ)ズ油相ノ所見如何ト價同アリ油  
軍大臣ハ潜水艦ノ戰術的價値ニ付テハ所論必ス之モ定セヌト言フ  
ニト辯シ潜水艦ト航空機トノ性能ヲ對比シ其ノ得失ヲ説キ飛  
行機ハ前(ノ)利益有餘ナリト述(ク)之ニ對シテ同顧問官ハ油相ノ今  
言(ハ)帝國海軍策(略)計(画)ヲ非認スル結果トナラヌト論シ米國  
ハ(大)戰(後)非常ノ進歩ヲ遂(ゲ)ル帝國潜水艦ヲ恐(ル)ルコト大(ト)モ  
了(ラ)ズ從(テ)帝國ニテ現存潜水艦ヲ保(存)スル限(リ)米國ハ必(ズ)我(國)  
ニ戰(争)ヲ挑(ク)ト無(カ)ルニ油相ハ次(ノ)國(際)會議ニ於テ今次喪(ヒ)ル潜  
艦ヲ取(ル)成(算)アリヤト同(ノ)海軍大臣ハ我(國)令(部)ニ於テ潜水艦不  
足ハ航空機ヲ以テ補充スルコトニ決(シ)リ次(ノ)會議ニ於テ對米比率  
ヲ定(ム)ルコト多(ク)見(ル)ナキモ極力力カスベシト答(フ)次(ノ)同顧問官ヨリ

1030

一九三六年ニ入(リ)對米比率ハ七割ヲ割(リ)ルニ假(シ)令(ス)三(年)ノ  
會議ニ於テ七割比率ヲ獲得(ス)タリトスルモ我(國)ニトシテ甚(ク)不利  
益(ト)スル時期アルコト明白ナリ大凡(ソ)國防要義ハ常備ヲ以テ變(化)供(給)  
百(分)之(一)ト雖(モ)危險ニ曝(ス)コトナキアリト信(ス)之ニ對シテ油相ノ所見  
如何又今日一九三六年後トニ於テ海軍體裁競争上ニハ非常(ニ)相  
違(フ)ルヲ知(ラ)ルカラス一旦兵力整備(ス)タル後(ニ)到(リ)テ競争(ス)ル

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日本米國及ハサルキハ謂フ迄モ無カレハ此ノ點ニ関スル海相ノ所見ヲ  
 南カト論述ヲ海軍大臣ハ若シ本條約ニシテ不成立ニ終ラハ乃チ米國ハ  
 日本ヲ敵視シ其何ヨリ艦艦競争ノ權ニ出ツルコトナキヲ保ヤス  
 御説ノ如ク三六七年ノ頃ニ到ラハハ既ニ巡洋艦ノ対米比率ハ六割ニ  
 低下シ且老齡ナルヘク其ノ際事ヲ起ラストハ斷言出来ルモ六割  
 巡洋艦ハ必モ六割巡洋艦ト太刀打出来サルモニアラス駆逐艦四隻  
 アハ必ス六割巡洋艦一隻ハ止メテ見セト斷言スル將官サアリト  
 信フ次ニ同僚同官ヨリ今次ノ會議ニ於テ我全權ハ主力艦ノ噸數  
 備砲トノ低下ヲナスキ訓令ヲ改メテカラシメ現狀スルコトヲ得  
 サシニ経緯如何トノ質問アリ海軍大臣ヨリ今次ノ會議ニ於テハ  
 日本ハ主力艦噸數低下ヲ主張スルモ英米ハ英米ハ「4」シヨ眼目  
 トシ之ニ應マサリキト一答辯アリ同僚同官ハ更ニ元來国防上ノ  
 缺陷トモハ其主張ヲ通サシハ補充ノ途ナキモト考フ海相之ニ  
 対スル所見如何ヲ同僚海軍大臣ハ之ニ對テ国防上ノ欠陥ト稱スル  
 ハ既定ノ国防方針ニ基テ用兵計畧ヲ其儘實施スルハ兵力量  
 ニ不足ヲ生ストノ意ナリ而シテ其不足ハ何モテ以テ補得サルニ  
 アラス假ニ七割ヲ保有ストスレバハ全勝トイフ譯ニハラス司令  
 ヲ令ノ戰ハ出来ルト云フ程度ナリ欠陥補充ノ計畧ニ付テハ軍事  
 委員會會議ニ於テ全會一致ヲ以テ可決ルコトナリ(同僚ト考フ  
 答フ依テ同僚同官ハ補充ニ依テ国防上ノ欠陥ナキコトナリヤト

如シ!

確メ海軍大臣然ト答フ  
 山川同僚ヨリ先日濱口總理ヨリ兵力量ノ決定ニ依テ海軍大臣事  
 務管理ト加藤軍令部長ト同ニ意見一致アリト答辯セシケル  
 ナ議會ニ於テハ軍令部ノ意見ヲ斟酌シタリト謂フ事(事實アリ)  
 而シテ此ノ斟酌ハ日本諸ノ其義ヲ考フニ我國ニ於テ最モ信用ル  
 録事官海軍ハ酌量トハ即ニ合ヤテ取捨スルコトナリトアリ)



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五分五分戦、お赤サル天、トナラサル（カラスト論スルヤ同大臣、畧  
 々五分五分戦争カお赤ル見込ナリト述フ依テ同顧問、  
 畧ナルカ故ニ五分五分ノ戦、お赤サル天ニアラスト反  
 問ニ同大臣、御意見充テナレトモ畧ト云フハ決シテ不正確  
 ニアラス本官等ハ無論責任ヲ執リ得ル天ノナリト考ヘ居  
 リト述ヘタシトモ同顧問、本條約、評ス戦田ニ  
 於テ為ス計画、最初、計画トヲ對比スルハ前者力  
 最善ニシテ後者、公善ナリト考ヘサルヲ得スト断セリ  
 且、後ニ總理大臣ヨリ條約ニ依テ兵力、不足  
 ナリト、既定ノ国防方針ニ基テ采ル戦計劃ヲ維持  
 行スルニ兵力不足ナリト意味ナリ国防上、  
 欠陥ト、事目ヲ別ナリト辨明ス  
 伊東本委員長、顧問アルキモ本日、之ニ閉  
 會ス（ト宣ス）  
 （午後三時五十分閉會）

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no. 34

千九百三十年「ロンドン」海軍條約御批准、件第九回審査委員會  
昭和五年九月十日(水曜日)本院事務所於開會

出席者

倉富議長

平沼副議長

審査委員長

伊東顧問官

審査委員

金子顧問官

久保田顧問官

山川顧問官

黒田顧問官

荒井顧問官

河合顧問官

水町顧問官

列席者

田顧問官

國務大臣

濱口内閣總理大臣

財部海軍大臣

幣原外務大臣

三上書記官長

堀江書記官

武藤書記官





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日本潜水艦ヲ滅殺スル程米國ノ優勢ナル云々、日本ニテ潜水艦ノ有ル  
 米國恐ルハ是ニテ世界ノ平和ヲ國際信義ヲ表面ノ禮儀ニシテ其力ヲ充實スル  
 能ク平和ノ保トカスト述テ潜水艦ノ必要ヲ論スルニ總理大臣ヨリ條約ニ付  
 議論スルニ將來對米大制ヲ拘束スル度及潜水艦減勢ノ二點トシテ制限外  
 天備整備ニ依リ國防上不安カラシムコトヲ得ニテ、海軍大臣ト軍令部長ト、  
 致スル意見ナリト述テ政府ヲ信シテ審議ヲ進メコトヲ希望ス、  
 荒井顧問官ヨリ夏補元計劃及減勢ノ概算ヲ示シコトヲ示シ、海軍大臣之  
 應ニ難キ所以ヲ述テ  
 金子顧問官、國防計劃、軍令部長、直轄事務ニテ和裁ヲ經テ、後之ヲ  
 海軍大臣ニ移スニテ、從テ内閣ヲ責任ヲ持テ政安心ヲトスルニ理由ヲ解スル  
 不能ト論テ、  
 右終了伊東委員長、閉會ヲ宣フ  
 (午後四時閉會)

No. 36

No. 37

Doc 1124

千九百二十年、ロンドン海軍條約御批准件第十回審査委員會  
昭和五年九月十二日(金曜日)本院事務所於了開會

出席者

倉富議長

平沼副議長

審査委員長

伊藤顧問官

審査委員

金子顧問官

又保田顧問官

山川顧問官

黒田顧問官

田顧問官

荒井顧問官

河合顧問官

水町顧問官

國務大臣

濱口内閣總理大臣

賤部海軍大臣

幣原外務大臣

二上書記官長

堀江書記官

武藤書記官

1124.

(午後再開會)

伊東委員長開會ヲ宜シ質問ヲ繼續ス

河合顧問官ヨリ前軍令部長カ兵カ補充計劃ヲ立テタリトテ必

シ其カ本軍亦ノ兵力ニ不同意ナリタル證據トナシタル次第ヲ  
論且補充ヨリテ果シテ國防不安ナキヲ得ヘキヤト、質問

アリ海軍大臣ヨリ四月二日、加藤軍令部長、帷幄上奏、軍  
事參議院、奉答文、主旨ト毫末モ異ナラス又其、聲明

書モ亦之ニ矛盾スルモノニテラストテ同聲明書ヲ朗讀シ更  
ニ軍事參議官會議、奉答文、内容ニ付自己了解シ

タル所トシ本條約ノ協定兵量ヲ以テシテ、既定、國防計  
劃ヲ維持シ之ニ基キ策戰ヲ遂行スル上ニ缺陷ヲ生ズ縱

テ本條約成立、上、當ニ協定兵量ヲ維持スヘキ、勿論航空  
兵力、充實、制限外艦船整備其他一般兵力、内容、

充實ト術カ、向上トニ努力スル、必要アリ而シテ右、對策  
ニテ遂行セラルトキ、當面、情勢ニ於テ國防上畧々差支

ナキモノト認ルル旨ヲ述テ更ニ同顧問官ヨリ加藤軍令部  
長、聲明書ニイフ善處、意味、之ヲ種々ニ解スルト

得ヘク必シモ之ヲ以テ兵力量ニ不同意ナシト、ニ、解  
得サルヘシト述ヘ既ニ新軍令部長ニ於テ補充計劃ヲ

立テタリトセ、何カ故ニ之ヲ提示シ得サルヤト質シ總理大  
臣ヨリ本協定、兵力量ヲ以テシテ、既定、策戰計劃、

遂行上不足ヲ生ズルモ短期條約ナリ、相當、補充、實  
行ヲ爲セ、國防上、不安、畧々、之ヲ掃スルトヲ得

シト信ズ短期ナル補充、道アルカ故ニ之ニ調印シタル

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1124 モノナリト述ヘ海軍大臣ヨリ今日直ニ軍部ノ補充案ヲ提  
示スルト困難ナリト答フ

次ニ山川顧問官、海相、過日河合顧問官、問ニ對シ  
其事、加藤大將ノ名譽ニ関スル故答ニスト述ヘテ  
ルニ拘ラス本日、同大將、終始一貫何等ノ變節ナシ  
ト御答ナルカ果シテ然ニ、何事カ大將ノ名譽ニ関ス  
ルヤト問ヘ海軍大臣ヨリ六月十日参内上奏シタル時、  
ニトラ名譽ノタノ話サスト申述セタルノミト答ヘ依テ  
同顧問官、兵力量関係以外ニ於テ非君子ノ行動  
ヲ執リシトヲ云ハスト解シテ宜シキヤト尋ネ海軍  
大臣、至尊トノ関係ニシテ一身ノ出所進退ニ関スル  
モノナリ直接兵力量ニ関スルモノニアラズト答ヘ  
此ニ於テ同顧問官、出所進退ノトハ士君子ノ最  
モ期カニスモノナリト論シテロビドニ於テ若  
槻スチン、西全權會見、際スルチン、氏、若槻氏  
ノ主張スル所ヲ大ニ憤リテ若槻氏ヨリ同氏ニ交附シ  
ル文書ヲ其ノ面前ニ於テ引裂テ之ヲ投棄シタリト  
ノ事實、有無ヲ質シ海軍大臣、之ヲ肯定シ具体  
的事實ヲ陳述ス

更ニ同顧問官、明治元年前後日本、外務省ニ於  
テ暴行シタルノ久シ、事例ヲ引テ士君子タル者、  
儀禮ヲ論シ且米國ヲ正義國、如ク思惟セルハ、  
迷信ナリ、外務省邊ニ斯ル迷信者ナキヤト問  
ニ又日本人、極メテ好戰國民、如ク誤解スル

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者アルモ日本、今ヨリ三百三十三年前天草、乱以後、御  
 門、戦迄二百三十三年間、太平ヲ保チ其後僅カニ長  
 州征伐、函館戦争、西南戦争、日清、日露、日獨  
 外役ヲ加テ六回、戦争ヲ為シタルニ遇キス之ニ反  
 北米合衆國、獨立以來僅カ百五十五年、間ニ獨立戰  
 争ヲ始メトシ、英米戦争、墨西可戦争、南北戰  
 争、西班牙戦争、及米獨戦争、合計六回、戦争  
 ヲ行ハルヲ以テ米國、日本ニ比シテ倍強、戦争ヲ  
 為セル天ノ道ニ非ズ、人道正義ヲ高唱スルモ決  
 シテ正義人道ヲ行フ天ノ道ニ非ズ、然ルニ十九百二  
 十七年ニハ、二十一條、日支條約ヲ無効トシ、滿鐵  
 實收ヲ企テ資金、同鐵道ヲ擔保トシテ米國ヨ  
 リ借款スルニ到ル、從テ滿洲鐵道及東清鐵  
 道、米國ノ支配ニ屬スルニ到リ、日本ハ終ニ滿蒙  
 ヨリ退却スル、己ムナキニ至ル、世人動モスル米  
 國ノ人道國、如クニ思惟セル天決シテ然ラス、口  
 下ニ條約ヲ批准ニ閣スル米國上院、議事記  
 録ニ依リ、上ト大將、自年ヲ經サルニ我  
 國ノ支那、爲ニ戰フコトアルヘシト求メテ、我  
 百年トシ、英語上、修辭ニシテ遠カラサル  
 下トイフ意ナリ、米國要路、大官ヨリ此言漏内  
 而シテ斯ル間ニ戦争ヲ止メ、斷言ニ得ル天ノ漏  
 備ヲ鞏止セル、戦争ヲ未然ニ防止セル、道唯軍  
 事ニアリ、我軍備、不忽カ、

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尚忍ハントスルモ之ヲ為日米戰爭惹起ノ間隙  
 ヲ作ラトナキヤヲ深慮ス今ナニノ海軍軍備ヲ  
 十分ニスルコト能ハサルヤト莫ク外務大臣ハ外務省ニ  
 御話ノ如キ米信者ナリト述ベ若槻全權カニ又  
 トルニ於テ為シタル演説ノ筆記ヲ朗讀シテ甚趣  
 自ニ其同之ル旨ヲ語リ又ニ各國保問題ヲ説明  
 シテ米國カ目ノ同條約ニ均霑スルコトヲ認メタルハ  
 畢竟同條約ノ效力ヲ認メタル結果ニ過キスト為  
 コトナラシ大將カ百年内ニ支那ノ為ニ戰フカ天知ラズ  
 イテ米國ノ支那ノ為ニ戰フニ困カルハント信スト  
 告ケ日米戰爭ヲ避ケケニ軍備ヨリモ寧年且國力  
 ヲ増大スルコトカハ要ナリト若槻ルモ日ヲ強シ之ニ  
 對シテ同顧問官ハ本官モ國力ニ如何ナルモノナ  
 シト考ヘス然レトモ本條約成立スルハ少ス民力涵  
 養セリ成之セサル真摺ヲ輕減スルコト能ハスト  
 考ヘス寧此條約ヲ破棄スルハ金力得ラニテ  
 ラサルヤ米國上院ノ外交委員會ノ速記録ヲ見  
 ルニ何レモ異且同者ニ米國ハ西太平洋ニ活動ス  
 洋トハ支那ノコトニシテ田井意日本海軍ヲ亡サ  
 ルハカラスト謂フコトニ外ナラス本官ハ未タ満足  
 ナル合辭ヲ得サレトモ之ニテ莫ク問ヲ打切ルハト

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總理大臣起テ山川顧問官ハ本條約ノ兵力

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國量及之補充三六國  
 雖完全十軍備國防  
 我國軍事專門家之有ニル國家ハアツカレ  
 来ル天トナリ日本ノ能ニ五分五分ノ戰ハ去  
 不ニ造トナリ日本ノ能ニ五分五分ノ戰ハ去  
 勢備場外ナリ斯ノテ到底國力ノ續カレ  
 下考ヘラレ又或ハ之カ爲ニ戰爭ヲ惹起スル  
 競争トナリ論述スル山川顧問官ニ更ニ制艦  
 事トナリ慮ルカ故ニ日本ノ米國ニ屈服セ  
 サハカラストノ御答タルカ千九百三十五年ニ對  
 米割トナリヤチハ五割トナリ戰ハスルニ  
 可カラサルニ到レテ本官ハ此ノ旨ニ決心  
 ス外ナリト考ルカ如何ト述フ又保田顧問官ハ  
 國防ニ兵備外富及外交ヲ要スルヲ知識ト  
 精神ヲ最モ必要ナリ然レ國際關係ノ紛議ヲ  
 解決スルニ究極兵力ニ訴フル外ナリ日本ク今  
 日昔リニ重キヲ爲ルニ日本ノ兵力ノ日  
 トニ會議ハ英米兩國カ其界ノ平和ヲ担輕  
 減美名ノ天トニ射影ハ行フ天ノナリ唯恐  
 六ニ日本ノ兵力タルカ故ニ今次ノ統帥權問題  
 行テ最モ慮ヲ爲セル天ノ兵力量決定ニ付  
 六ニ海軍大臣ト軍令部長ハ意見一致ヲ要ス  
 大臣ハ實際ニ天ノ意見一致ヲ行フニ當局  
 向會辯論キカラスニ心セリト述フ

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次子金子瀧閣宮の本官、外務大臣、御答ヲ聞  
 ニ查之、其本官ノ知所ニ係ルニ米國ノ大佐日兵ニ  
 及テ、日露戦争ノ当時ニ於テ、朝鮮ノ日兵ノ併合ニ滿洲  
 ノ滿鉄ヲ基本トシテ日兵ニ於テ之ヲ開発スルカ至高ノ事ト謂ヘル  
 事トシ、大統領トシテヤ方針ニ變シ、米國ノ自ラ環璣鐵道ヲ  
 建設セムトシタルモ日本ノ交好ニ置キ、米國ノ南米滿洲ヲ以テ  
 米國國產産品ノ捌場トシ、米國ノ所ニテ米國ノ  
 外人ノ止キ捲来ニ於テ日米ノ戦ハルニカラス、東ニシテ其ノ  
 他太平洋沿岸ニ船渠ヲ立テ、準備ヲ整ルルノ必要アリト叫ビ  
 又彼ノ石油不正事件ニ関シ、米國ノ一様事ハ公廷ニ於テ亦日米  
 戦争アリト、電報ヲ誦讀シタルコトアリ、而シテ大正十一年秋ノ  
 廣東ニ大地震アリ、國民慘害ニ困ル、時米國ノ上下院、東洋  
 人排斥移民法ヲ通過セシメタル事、實ニ米國ノ歴史ニ正  
 ニ斯ノ如ク然モ、先刻外務大臣、米國人カ自覺スルニキアル令  
 ト論セラルタルニ、甚々其ノ解チ、而シテ日米ノ干渉ハ三七  
 年吹カ最モ危期ナリ、以テ米國ノ交好ト相提携シテ滿鉄ヲ實取  
 リ、日兵勢力ヲ滿洲ヨリ奪取ハトス、(之ヲ以テ「ド」條  
 約ニヨリ矢カ、缺陷ヲ補フ、極メテ重要ナルコトナリ、惟ニ三國  
 ト國ト、同ニ於テハ正我ニ表裏、禮儀ニシテ、最モ後ハ兵力  
 日本カ、外法權ヲ擡廢シ得タル、全ク日清戦争ノ賜  
 物ナリ、及之、和蘭カ、昔ニ世界ノ富國ヲ以テ知ラレタルニ拘ラ  
 ス、今日遂ニ三等國トナル、其ノ兵備ヲ制限セシメタルカ爲  
 ナリ、助ケル日本カ、大強國トシテ世界ニ進歩スルコトヲ得タル  
 ハ、全ク軍人ノ賜物ナリ、ホツクス、條約モ全ク我軍勝利ノ



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賜物ナリ。明治三十二年本宮が我新憲法ヲ措（于歐洲ニ渡リ）  
各國憲法ヲ悉ク、批評シテ之ヲ第一條ト第三條ト八  
最モ彼等ノ注意ヲ引キ斯ノ如キ憲法ハ世界無比ニシテ  
皇帝自ラ兵隊大權ヲ掌握スルハ日本ノ之ノ全ク特殊  
ナル日本歴史ノ成果ニシテ歐洲諸國均ニ之ヲ得ルコト能ハ  
シト本條第六ノ兵權ノ確保ノ確立セラルルニシテ深ク此ノ  
規定ヲ嘆美スリ国防ノ國家生命ノ保障其ノ欲陷（皇躬）  
恐ルキモ、ニシテ日本ノ兵制ハ正ニ日本ノ士氣精神及國  
體ニ基キ日本ノ特色ナル點ニ其ノ完備ヲ期セラルル方  
ラスロンドン條約ハ三十二年以後ニ於テ日本臣民準備ナル  
ト米國上院ノ演說ニヨリテ既ニ疑フ、餘地ナシト論述ス  
伊東委員上開會ヲ道ス

(午後臨時閉會)

千九百三十一年以下之海軍條約御批准、件才十回審查委員會  
昭和三年九月十五日（有曜日）本院事務所於行開會

出席者

倉田議長

牙沼副議長

審查委員長

伊東顧問官

審查委員

金子顧問官

久保田顧問官

山川顧問官

黒田顧問官

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荒井顧問官  
河合顧問官  
水町顧問官

關 席者  
田 顧問官

國務大臣  
濱口內閣總理大臣  
財部海軍大臣  
幣原外務大臣

三書記官長  
堀江書記官  
武藤書記官

(午談(時用會))

伊東委員長(時用會)より  
黒田顧問官より政府より軍令部三好、一丸、タリト、タリ  
ノ事實果シテ如何ト、顧問、總理大臣、閣議、陸海、  
原案通り決定、国防計画内容、先及術力向上、海、  
是々、事項、二倍、命令考慮、度、海軍より書面、以テ申  
出アリタル、由リ、閣議、經ハ右、案、去、考慮、年、自、答、タル  
旨、ヲ答、テ、更ニ、同、顧問官、三、當局、公、應、改、修、主、任、於、テ、  
其、力量、ヲ決定、ナリ、ト、述、テ、又、右、如何、ナル、意味、ナリ、ト、軍令  
部長、同意、ナリ、ト、決定、ナル、ト、能、ハ、ケル、ニ、ア、ラ、ヌ、ヤ、ト、顧問  
官、海軍大臣、より、軍令部長、同意、ヲ要、ス、ト、考、テ、此、日、ヲ答、テ、

1.045

由海大艦一隊ニ乗リ飛ハスルニ其ノ時ニ海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて  
 一ノ海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて  
 二ノ海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて  
 三ノ海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて  
 四ノ海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて  
 五ノ海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて  
 六ノ海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて  
 七ノ海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて  
 八ノ海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて  
 九ノ海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて  
 十ノ海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて海軍大臣ノ命ニ依リて

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予軍不次于同敵向官便三在條約案三條ハ日本ハ拱手ニテ  
 米國カ大巡十五隻又予發工ルヲ待ツニシテ而モ米國ニ付ハ軍艦  
 ニアラスニテ及于軍擴テ此點同トシ會議ニ於テハ何事ハ  
 議論ナカリヤト實ニ海軍大臣ハ米國ハ既成大巡艦八隻ト  
 トモ建造中ノモノヲ加シハ十隻又至ニ豫算計上ヤラシムルモ  
 加ハハ三三隻ナリ我代艦ハ目前ノ十五隻ニ止メタルモ及ハ  
 十隻ニ定メリ故ニ現在ヨリニハ軍擴ト謂ヒ得ヘト答フ  
 爰ニ於テ同敵向官ハ米國ハ同トシ會議ニ依リ軍備擴  
 張ヲ行ヒタル事美ヲ數明ニ米國ハ條約ニ依リテ始メタル  
 シ取ル艦隊ヲ生レトテ得ルニ到ル才ヲ説述ス甚ハ其艦向  
 官ヨリ海軍大臣ト軍令部長ト一致タル補充計畫ヲ固キク  
 尙在米案相議ハ之ヲ豫算計成完了スル迄延期スルトキハ何カ  
 特ニ支障ナク廉下リヤト領向ニ總理大臣ヲ豫算計成ニ付  
 能ハス本意、御諮詢濟ニカ、政局不安トナリ引ク計財界、不  
 安ノ虞ス到ヘク現ニ本年下半年期ニ入リテ正金、流出多ク深ク  
 配慮ニツアル次第ナリト答フ  
 次ニ伊集本員長、九月十日以來本員會ヲ開クニ計三十一回  
 ニ及ビ諸種問題ニ付領向應答ヲ重クテ審査ヲ進メタリ  
 兵力量ノ決定ニ付軍部、同意得タリヤ否ノ問題トナリ總  
 理大臣線通ニ同意シタルト認ラレヨリ言明セシムルモ其  
 事實ニ付談ヲ抑シモトシ官リ加藤氏本官手續ヲ總請シ  
 ルモ當局、之ニ應ヒシルカ故ニ本夜、職權ヲ以テハ直接  
 事實ノ究明ニ付能ハサルコト然レトモ海軍大臣、兵力  
 量ニ付之ニ處理ニ付、軍部、一致ヲ答テ、官報裁仰

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内閣其通牒ヲ受理セリト云ハルヲ以テ統帥權  
 問題消滅スルヲト謂ハサルハカラス軍令部長電文ニ  
 付テ未ダ回答キテ事態斯ノ如クナル以上貴院  
 其提示ヲ要求スル必要トキテ了承ヤリシコト  
 之ヲ備本條約案審議上要件タル補充並ニ  
 財政計畫ニ付テ政府能マラ之ヲ提セシコト  
 ヲ避テ謂ハル旨判ヲ押セトコトナル徒ニ政府ヲ  
 過信スルコト本院職責上爲ニ能ハルコトナ  
 リ然ルニ前同定審査際海軍大臣ヨリ本條約  
 閣下ニ軍事者議院奉答文ノ内容ニ付陳述  
 求アリ該陳述ニ依リ同文ニ兵力補充ニ  
 閣下事項ナルコト確實ニシテ而テ其事項  
 本條約對テ其否ヲ決スルニ殆ト唯一ナル  
 カ故ニ委員會於テ研頭之ヲ要求セト爲タル  
 ル天爲ニ其議事停頓ヲ未サコトヲ虞シ出  
 未得テ自然政府自發ニ依リ提出セシコト  
 ヲ希ミ今日及ル天同文ニ既ニ海相自ラ其  
 内容ヲ敘述セリタル以上之ヲ樞府提出スルニ何  
 支障アルキニアラス依テ本日設クテ右奉答  
 文提出ヲ要望ス同文ノ内容國務ニ屬  
 スル故ニ内閣總理大臣ニ示スラセリタル  
 ト信スルカ故ニ之ヲ提示セシル正ニ内閣責  
 務ナリト考テ政府何故ニヤ其提示ヲ重々  
 せシル天宜シク誠意ヲ示シ奉答文提示ヲ視  
 手續ヲ執ラシ度若シ執ラシ上書面ヲ以テ回  
 答アリコトヲ望ム日ヲ論述ス之ニ對シテ内閣

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總理大臣、兵令、帥權問題ニ関スル議會、答辯  
 ヲ本院ニ於テ<sup>總論</sup>行ハシタルモ、右ノ用  
 語ヲ<sup>總論</sup>補遺ニシテ、主義ヲ變更シタルニ  
 了ス。補遺ニ於テ、<sup>總論</sup>減稅ノ程度ニ付、目下當局ニ於  
 テ、調査文書中ナルヲ以テ之ヲ究表スルニ能ハ  
 ス。政府信スル所ニ依リ、斯ル書類、審査資料  
 トシテ提出スルハ、義務ナキモノトス。尤モ完成セシ書  
 類ニ之ヲ提出スルニ妙ケサルヲ未ダ完成セシカ  
 故ニ、今之ヲ提出スルニ能ハス。本案、御下付、  
 當時議長ヨリ奉答文、<sup>審査資料</sup>審査上ニ必要ナル資料  
 ニ付、委員ニ之ヲ附託スル前提ヲセムコトヲ旨  
 申出アリタルニ、右ノ政府、<sup>審査資料</sup>前提ニ固キニシテ、  
 提出スルニ能ハス。寧ろ連ニ委員會ヲ開カシ、  
 臣、説明ヲ聽取セ、度日、<sup>審査資料</sup>然ルニ、今又委員  
 長ヨリ御要求ヲ受テ、<sup>審査資料</sup>力過日、<sup>審査資料</sup>然ルニ、今又委員  
 意見ヲ以テ奉答文ニ、<sup>審査資料</sup>禁其成ニタル、<sup>審査資料</sup>自續進セシ  
 タル故ニ、此ノ程度ニ<sup>審査資料</sup>満足セシムコトヲ希シ、  
 御要求ハ、<sup>審査資料</sup>郎持<sup>審査資料</sup>絶<sup>審査資料</sup>外<sup>審査資料</sup>トシテ、<sup>審査資料</sup>断言ス  
 伊東委員長閉會ヲ宣ス

(午後三時閉會)

No 49

千九百三十年九月十七日(水曜日)本院事務  
 十二回審査委員會 御批准ノ次第  
 於テ開會

doc 1124

去 席 者

倉 富 議 長  
平 沼 副 議 長

審 査 委 員 長

伊 東 顧 問 官

審 査 委 員

金 子 顧 問 官

久 保 田 顧 問 官

山 田 顧 問 官

荒 井 顧 問 官

水 河 顧 問 官

町 合 顧 問 官

武 堀 二 上 書 記 官 長  
藤 書 記 官

(午 後 一 時 開 會)

伊 東 委 員 長 開 會 予 宣 示 協 議 二 入

久 保 田 顧 問 官 發 言 二 由 リ 委 員 長 ヲ 先 シ  
政 府 公 事 二 求 フ

No 50

顧 査 資 料 提 出 予 月 七 日 故 二 本 院 權 限 二  
本 件 審 査 之 三 打 切 リ 報 告 書 予

Doc 1124

No. 51

作成スル外ナカルベシ蓋シ必要ナル審査資料  
 ノ提出ナキ、故ヲ以テ本案ノ審査不能ナリト爲  
 スカラサルニテニサレハキモ斯ノ如キ態度ハ果シ  
 テ本院ノ面目ヲ失スルニ到ルコト無キヤ疑問ニ屬シ  
 又本條約ノ破棄ニモ論據ニ乏シキ嫌アリカ故ニ  
 報告書ノ一部ニ軍部ト充分ナル協調ヲ整ヘ國防  
 ノ補充計劃ヲ遂行シ且人民ノ負擔輕減ヲ實行  
 シテ本條約ノ目的ヲ達スルニ遺憾ナキヲ期スルニ於  
 テハ御批准アリテ然ルヘキ旨ヲ記載シ本案ニ對  
 スル軍部及政府ノ責任ノモトニ批准ノ奏請ヲ爲サシ  
 ムラ可トスト思料ス

之ニ對シテ黒田、若井兩顧問官ヨリ意見、陳述アリ  
 リ河合顧問官ヨリ國防計劃ノ完成スルマテ  
 本案ノ査定ヲ延期シテハ如何トノ發言アリ田顧問  
 官ヨリ奉答文ト補充並財政計劃トヲ知ル  
 コト能サルハ甚々遺憾ナリ然レトモ本院トシテハ能  
 クマテ相當ノ奉答ヲ爲スカ本當ナリト考フルカ故ニ  
 此ノ場合委員長、御意見、如ク爲スノ外ナカルベシ  
 蓋シ本院ノ職責ハ之ヲ以テ盡サレタリモト信ス  
 トノ陳述アリ山川顧問官ハ本條約ニ依リ我兵  
 力量ハ遂ニ對米六割トナリ萬一戰爭トナシ我國  
 力敗北スヘキカ故ニ更ニ熟考スル爲今日ノ決定ヲ  
 延期シクシト述フ之ニ對シテ伊東委員長ヨリ  
 外見ノ陳述アリ同顧問官ハ更ニ委員會ノ意見  
 カ本會議ヲ通過スルト否トハ決シテ委員會、  
 面目ニ關スルモ、ニテラサルヘシト論ニ委員長トノ



Doc 1124

間ニ二三、問答アリ次テ水師顧問官ヨリ審査ノ資料不足、遺憾トスルモ助界ノ近況尋常トナルモ、アル折柄委員長ノ所見ニ全然賛成スル旨ヲ述ヘ金子顧問官ハ憲法第十一條及第十二條ノ法意ヲ説キ憲法制定當時ノ経緯ヲ述ヘ兵力量ハ帷幄上奏ニ依リテ決スヘク内閣ニ於テ定ムヘキモノニアラサルコトヲ強調ス又保田顧問官ハ山川顧問官ノ御意見尤トシテ筆態己クヲ得サルカ故ニ成可ク一致ノ行動ヲ執リ數ヲ以テ決テ争フカ如キコト無キ様爲シ度旨ヲ述ヘ山川顧問官之ニ同意ス其ヨリ

更ニ委員間ニ於テ協議ヲ重ネタシ結果ニ委員長ノ所見ノ通り本安未ヲ可決スルコトニ決ス伊東委員長ハ報告未査閱ノ爲今一回委員會ヲ開クヘキ旨ヲ述ヘ閉會ヲ宣ス

(午後三時閉會)

十九百三十年「ロ」ドノ海軍條約御批准ノ件第十三回審査委員會

昭和五年九月二十六日(金曜日)本院事務所ニ於テ開會

出席者

倉富 議長  
平沼 副議長

No. 52

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審査委員長

伊東 顧問官

審査委員

金子 顧問官

山久 保田 顧問官

黒田 顧問官

田 顧問官

荒井 顧問官

水合 顧問官

町 顧問官

町 顧問官

二上 書記官長

堀江 書記官

武藤 書記官

(午後一時開會)

伊東委員長開會ヲ宣ニ下審査ニ依リ本案、  
逐條審議ハ之ヲ省略シ夕キ三日ヲ述ニ審査  
報告安未、審議ニ入ル

報告安未朗讀 (堀江書記官數回ニ  
朗讀)

此ノ間各委員ヨリ質問若ハ希望、陳述アリ  
終ニ報告安未ヲ決定ス

伊東委員長開會ヲ宣又

(午後二時開會)

No. 53

1124 cert-1

證 明 書

「ワシントン」文書 第一一三四號  
國際檢査部 第一一三四號

真摯及び公正ニ關スル証明

余、鈴木知身ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ樞密院  
秘書官トシテ、日本政府ト公的關係ニ在ルモノナル  
コト、茲ニ該官更トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレタル、  
二四〇頁ヨリ成ル、千九百三十年ノ昭和五年ノ

附、下記題名、即チ昭和五年委員會録樞密院秘  
書課ノ文書ノ保管ニ任シ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及び文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナ  
ルコト、茲ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式書類  
及び簿ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シアラバ該書  
號又ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ簿ニ於ケル該文書  
ノ成規所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ) 樞密院

11214 cert-2

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／十月一日

東京ニ於テ署名

省警官長署名は 鈴木 知 男 印

右ノ者ノ公的資格 樞密院事務官

証 人 J, A. Curtis 2dLt

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、ジョン・ア・カーティス  
JOHN A. CURTIS ハ、余が聯合國最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、茲ニ上記署名ノ文書ハ余が公證上、日本政府ノ上記署名官長ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／十月一日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏 名 欄 J. A. Curtis 2dLt

右ノ者ノ公的資格 Investigator

証 人 T/4 Takeo Toguchi

Document No. 891-A

Page 1

RECORD OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL  
REGARDING THE IMPERIAL RATIFICATION OF  
THE LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF 1930

(ORIGINAL)

1st October 1930

RECORD OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL  
RECORDING THE IMPERIAL RATIFICATION OF  
THE LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF 1930

The Conference met at 10:25 a.m. on Wednesday, October 1st, 1930.

H. M. The Emperor was present.

ATTENDANCE:

President KURATOMI  
Vice President HUMANUMA

State Ministers:

Prime Minister HAYAGUCHI	No. 4
Navy Minister TAKIYAMA	No. 5
Foreign Minister SHIDEMURA	No. 6
Railway Minister EGI	No. 7
Justice Minister WATANABE	No. 8
Finance Minister INOUE	No. 9
Commerce and Industry Minister TANAKA	No. 10
Home Minister ADACHI	No. 11
Agriculture and Forestry Minister MICHIDA	No. 12
Overseas Minister MATSUDA	No. 13
Education Minister TANAKA	No. 15
Temporary Acting War Minister ABE	No. 16

Councillors:

Councillor ITO	No. 18
Councillor KAMEKO	No. 20
Councillor IONEDA	No. 21
Councillor TOHJI	No. 22
Councillor ISHIGURO	No. 23
Councillor YAMAMOTO	No. 24
Councillor YUNODA	No. 25
Councillor FUJIKI	No. 26
Councillor MATSUNAGA	No. 27
Councillor HAY	No. 28
Councillor SANUKI	No. 29
Councillor DEN	No. 30
Councillor ARAI	No. 31
Councillor KAWAI	No. 32
Councillor KANEKI	No. 34

Councillor SUZUKI	No. 35
Councillor ISHII	No. 36
Councillor MIZUMACHI	No. 37
Councillor OKADA	No. 38
Councillor FUKUTA	No. 39

Absentees:

Imperial Princes:	
Prince YASUHITO	No. 1
Prince NOBUHITO	No. 2
Prince KOTOHITO	No. 3

State Minister:	
Communications Minister KOIZUMI	No. 14

Councillor KUKI	No. 19
Councillor ISHIMURA	No. 32

GOVERNMENT DELEGATES:

Director of the Bureau of Legislation KAWASAKI  
Councillor of the Bureau of Legislation KAMIMORI  
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs YOSHIDA  
Chief of the Treaty Bureau of the Foreign Office MATSUNAGA  
Chief of the Bureau of European and American Affairs of  
the Foreign Office HOTTA  
Chief of the Intelligence Bureau of the Foreign Office SAITO  
Secretary of the Foreign Office YAMAGATA  
Secretary of the Foreign Office SHIOZAKI  
Administrative Official of the Foreign Office FUKUDA  
Administrative Official of the Foreign Office YAMADA  
Vice Minister of Navy KOBAYASHI  
Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau HORI  
Secretary of the Navy Department ENOMOTO  
Captain SHUICHIKAWA  
Captain IMAHARA  
Commander FUJITA

Reporters:

Chief of the Judging Committee ITO

Chief Secretary:

Chief Secretary FUTAGAMI

Secretaries:

Secretary HORIE  
Secretary MIJIO

President (KURATOMI): The meeting will now come to order. As has been previously notified, "The Ratification of the London Naval Treaty of 1930" is brought up for discussion. According to precedent, we shall omit the readings and the subject shall be debated on general principles. The recitation will be omitted and we shall ask the Chief of the Investigation Committee to make a report.

Reporter (ITO): Upon being appointed members of the Investigation Committee concerning the ratification of the London Naval Treaty of 1930, which is now being referred to the Privy Council for deliberation, we have been fully aware of the great importance attached to the situation, and have been destined to give our fullest deliberation upon the matter. Ever since August 18, we have held frequent meetings, listening to explanations in detail from the Ministers of State, and repeatedly deliberating on the matter with each member expressing his respective opinion; thereby we have aimed at achieving complete thoroughness in our investigation.

First, allow me to relate to you the origin of the treaty. The naval armament limitation treaty concluded among Japan, Britain, U. S., France and Italy at the Washington Conference in February 1922, (Taisho 11) had prescribed limitations for total tonnage of capital warships and aircraft carriers to be maintained by each nation, as well as the limitations of tonnage of single warships and the size of mounted guns. As regards auxiliary vessels, however, the treaty had only prescribed limitations for the tonnage of single ships and of the calibre of mounted guns, and did not prescribe any limitation for the total tonnages to be maintained by the respective powers. Accordingly, not more than a few years after the Conference, there is already a tendency among leading Naval Powers for marked competition in building auxiliary vessels. The League of Nations, according to its mission, has made repeated efforts to realize general disarmament of army, navy and air forces alike. But in view of the extent of the sphere of discussion there was a wide difference of opinion among the Powers, and accordingly it was extremely difficult to come to any concrete decision. Therefore, the Government of the United States, sponsoring nation of the said Washington Conference, recognizing the urgent necessity of concluding some agreement on the limitation of auxiliary ships among the leading Naval Powers without waiting for the conclusion of a disarmament treaty by the League of Nations, made a proposition in February 1927 (Showa 2) to hold a conference among the above five Powers. The Governments of France and Italy, however, did not accept the proposition.



Negotiations were held among the Governments of Japan, Britain, and the U. S. at Geneva in June, the same year, but as there was a wide difference of opinion between Britain and the U. S. concerning cruisers armed with 8-inch guns, the negotiations ended in failure. Then following the changes in the general political situation in these two countries in 1929, (Showa 4), there was a rapid development of the desire to realize disarmament. As a consequence, the British Government, in October of the same year, proposed to the Governments of Japan, U. S., France and Italy to hold a conference in London, with the object of studying the limitations on types of ships not prescribed in the above Washington Treaty, as well as of deliberating the necessary changes to be effected in the stipulations of the said treaty, after carefully studying Article 21, clause 2 thereof in order to adapt the treaty to recent scientific and technical progress. • With the consent of the Governments of the four powers, Japan, Britain, France and Italy, the representatives of the five powers concerned held a conference in London in January 1930 (Showa 5). After about three months' diplomatic negotiations and much meandering, an agreement was finally reached and a treaty called the London Naval Treaty of 1930 was concluded. This was signed and sealed by the plenipotentiaries of the Powers on April 22, the same year. This is the treaty now being referred to the present Council for deliberation.

This treaty consists of 5 parts and 26 articles, together with 3 annexes added to Part II, besides the preamble and the concluding clause. Parts I, II, IV and V are agreements concerning the five Powers, while Part III is an agreement among Japan, Britain and the U. S. Allow me to omit the explanation of its substance here because it is stated in detail in the written report.

On looking back at the progress towards the conclusion of the present treaty, the Imperial Government, at the opening of the London Conference, had decided, according to the established policy of national defense, its three fundamental principles -- (1) To maintain seventy percent of the U.S.'s total tonnage of auxiliary ships; (2) To maintain seventy percent of the U.S.'s total tonnage of heavy cruisers; (3) To maintain the present strength of about 77,800 tons in submarines.

The Government had instructed the plenipotentiaries to carry out this demand and had also announced it to the general public. Nevertheless, the Japanese plenipotentiaries could not attain this object in the negotiations and were

forced to make concessions. They had drafted the so-called temporary compromise plan according to the U. S. proposition, and had asked the Government for instructions. The Government gave instructions that the plan had been generally recognized; and thus was concluded the present treaty outlined on the plan. According to the present treaty, Japan has agreed to maintain only 69.75% of the U.S.'s total tonnage of auxiliary ships, 60.22% of the U.S.'s total tonnage of heavy cruisers, and 52,700 tons of submarines, which will mean a reduction of about 25,100 tons, or about one-third of the present tonnage. Accordingly, the problem of insufficient national defense brought about by the present treaty, as well as the inappropriate measures taken by the government at the time of the instructions, have given rise to much criticism in the country. It was criticised for instance in the recent 58th session of the Imperial Diet and became the subject of much discussion. In view of these circumstances we have made this investigation with special care and have endeavored to study it from various standpoints, and frequently exchanged questions and answers with the Ministers concerned. The following is the outline of the questions and answers.

1. In the past, there were many mistakes in the diplomatic documents referred to the Privy Council. In the present treaty too there were many misprints in the original text, so the Cabinet, after an inquiry, had taken measures to correct them. As it is a matter of great regret that such mistakes should be caused by the carelessness in handling business, we have asked the opinion of the Minister concerned. He has expressed deep regret and has pledged that he would take care not to repeat such mistakes in the future; and he further added that because the omission of the name of the Italian Plenipotentiary was due to the mistake in the original text, it was impossible to correct it and that there was no way but to dispose of this matter by leaving it as it stood.

2. The question of whether or not the instructions of the Government given to our plenipotentiaries in reply to their reference prior to the conclusion of the treaty, were issued with the consent of the Chief of the Naval General Staff-- is a very important constitutional problem, although it may merely seem to be a purely formal point. It was widely played up that the Cabinet had delivered the instructions without going through the formalities and the question gave rise to disputes in the Navy and also gave rise to the "Supreme Command Question" in the recent Imperial Diet. The Navy Minister has obtained the Imperial decision that

the affairs concerning the Naval forces should be dealt with according to the old custom; and that in this case there should have been an accord of opinions between the Navy Minister and the Chief of the Navy General Staff. After the Imperial sanction, he reported it to the Prime Minister and notified him that things would be run in this way hereafter. That the Prime Minister had replied that he had received the notification is a point fully clarified by the documents submitted by the Navy Minister. As we thought it very important to clarify the truth of this question, we first asked the Prime Minister, who had at that time been in charge of the business affairs of the Navy Minister, if he had considered it necessary from the beginning to obtain the consent of the Chief of the Navy General Staff in giving the instructions regarding the agreement on naval strength. The Prime Minister answered that he had considered it necessary that there should have been an accord of opinions between them according to the old custom. Next, to the question whether there had actually existed an accord of opinions between them he replied that the Chief of the Naval General Staff asserted at first that our three great principles were the minimum possible demands from the standpoint of our plan of operations; and therefore he, as the one responsible for the manipulation of troops for operations, could not agree to the naval strength outlined upon the U.S. plan which did not fulfil the necessary conditions. However, in the light of the various circumstances thereafter, he had considered that the Chief of the Naval General Staff after all, had no objections to the measures taken by the Government in giving the instructions. As we harboured much suspicion about this answer, we wanted to hear personally from the former Chief of the Naval General Staff, so we had requested the Cabinet to take measures to have him attend the meeting and explain the fact. The Cabinet, however, refused to do it. When we further questioned the reason why, the Ministers of State, in reply to questions in the Diet on this problem, had answered that the Government had decided the matter, after taking the opinions of the military circle into consideration, and intentionally avoided the use of the expression "consent" or "accord of opinion"; the Prime Minister explained that the Cabinet had answered simply "taking into consideration so and so," because it had considered it undesirable to give a detailed account of its relation with the military circle in the Diet.

Moreover, to the question whether Plenipotentiary TAFARABE, who had been the Navy Minister, in signing this treaty did not think the Chief of the Naval General Staff

would oppose the contents of the draft, the Navy Minister answered that, although he had been informed of some dissatisfaction on the part of some of the naval officers at that time, he considered that they would refrain if their opposition involved the risk of a break down in the negotiations. When further questioned why he did not confirm the intention of the Chief of the Naval General Staff, the Minister replied that there was a man in charge of business matters of the Navy Minister at that time in the Cabinet and that he had signed the treaty as a plenipotentiary, according to instructions from the Government. He further explained that judging from the telegram received from the Chief of the Naval General Staff at the time of the instructions, he had thought the Chief had rather agreed to the instructions.

3. Regarding the circumstances under which the Government accepted the proposed compromise which was inconsistent with the so-called three great principles held to be the minimum demand for part of our naval strength necessary for national defense, the Government explained that though they would admit the proposal was unsatisfactory, there had been no possibility of reaching any other adequate agreement, judging from the development of the negotiations. If the conference broke down, it would have had a grave influence upon the international situation of Japan; and considering the financial and economic hardships which would be visited upon our country through competition in shipbuilding, etc., in other words looking at the matter from the general situation of our nation, he considered the Government could not help but accept the proposal.

We then put a question to the Minister concerned, whether the security of the national defense of our country could be secured by the naval strength prescribed in the present treaty; and he answered that it might be difficult to carry out operational plans according to the existing principles of national defense with the above naval strength. On one hand, however, Japan has succeeded in maintaining more tonnage of light cruisers and submarines than expected. While on the other hand if she carries out the right to build replacement ships; does her best to perfect quality by completing equipment and improving armaments of existing ships, equipping ships not subject to limitations; increases the number of airplanes; and makes an effort to develop her troops "technical" power by improving training and discipline and increasing the number of crews, he believed that the security of our national defense could practically be expected.

He further said that the term of validity of this treaty is as short as five or six years, and that through Japan's demand, a prescription has been added to Article 23 of this treaty promising Japan a position to discuss in the next conference from an entirely free standpoint without any restrictions from the present treaty. Therefore, he explained, though there are some points with which we are dissatisfied in this treaty, we are left a way to adjust them in the future difficult though it may be.

4. If the U.S. is to maintain 18 heavy cruisers according to the provisions of this treaty, Japan will have her heavy cruisers considerably reduced in ratio to the U.S. two or three years after 1936 and this will bring about insecurity in our national defense. There are some who are of the opinion that the Chinese problem will then give rise to complications between Japan and the U.S. As we felt anxiety on this point, we asked the opinion of the authorities; the Minister concerned replied that, in order to prepare for the period immediately after the expiration of the treaty term, we must make previous preparations within the extent of the provisions of the treaty, and accelerate the building of new ships after the termination of the treaty; thereby we shall be able to increase our ratio. It is hard to believe that the U. S. will take a provocative attitude toward Japan during that time; and he explained that as the diplomatic relations between the two countries will become more amicable by the conclusion of this treaty, there will be no fear of any war.

5. The Government authorities have explained that the deficiency in naval strength caused by this treaty will be replenished as a result of the next conference. However, Japan has already failed once, at the Washington Conference, to realize her demand to maintain 70% in capital ships of the amount of the U.S.; and she has failed the second time at the recent London Conference to realize her demand to maintain 70% in heavy cruisers and her present strength in submarines. Thus, it will not be difficult to imagine that she will face more difficulties in carrying through her demands at the next conference. Especially, the conditional clause of Article 23 of this treaty not only seems to be meaningless in legal logic but according to the original text of Article 23, the object of holding the conference of 1935 lies in the conclusion of a new treaty with the object of a gradual realization of disarmament. Accordingly, such a demand like the above is likely to be regarded as expansion of armament; especially the demand to increase the numerical strength of

submarines will be contrary to the spirit of the article, and it was feared that it would be impossible to carry through such a demand. When we questioned the Minister in charge on this point, he replied that it does not necessarily mean that Japan should contend her three great principles at the next conference. He further asserted that only by taking into consideration the various changes in the situation during the next few years shall we establish the best policy and strive to carry through its demands; and that even if we should repeat the demands of the three great principles, the total tonnage of auxiliary ships and the cost of construction shall not exceed the limitations prescribed in this treaty, so it cannot necessarily be regarded as an expansion of armaments.

6. It has been acknowledged by the Government itself that the naval strength prescribed in this treaty is insufficient and that, unless some appropriate replacement programme be established, we can never hope for security in our national defense. If so, what will be the result of such a replacement program? What will be the expenditure necessary for it? What will be the surplus fund to be produced by this treaty and will it or will it not lighten the burden of taxes on our people; and if so, to what extent?

As all these questions are very essential for judging whether this treaty will attain its object or not, and are the important items for investigation, we demanded that the Government give us a general outline on these points. To this, the Minister in charge explained that a national defense replacement programme is now under investigation by the Naval General Staff, but as it will not be published till the investigation is complete and approved by the Navy Ministry and further discussed with the other Government departments concerned, the time for decision will be, at the earliest, this autumn, about the time when the national budget will be drawn up. However, as there will be considerable surplus funds following the fulfilment of this treaty, the Government will declare on its own responsibility that part of it will be appropriated for the replacement of deficiencies in our national defense, while the rest will be appropriated to lighten the burden of taxes on the people.

Supposing we consider it on the basis of the total sum of five <sup>hundred million</sup> ~~billion~~ yen reserved in the financial programme for 1930 (Showa 5) to 1936 (Showa 11) as an established plan for the Navy, there will still be some surplus fund even if Japan makes use of every right to build the replacement ships prescribed in this treaty. He explained

therefore, that this will be appropriated to the cost of replacements in our national defense and also to the reduction of taxes.

Such, then, was the gist of the questions and answers. In short, the object of this treaty lies in revising and supplementing the Washington Treaty, and concluding an agreement on various limitations in every type of ships for the realization of disarmament. Now, security or insecurity of national defense decides the fate of a country. Accordingly, to conclude an agreement limiting the armament of a country is a matter which requires the most serious consideration.

There is good reason in regard to the military affairs of our country where the military administration has been separated from the military command for years, and each, with its own separate organs, has been cooperating in assisting the exercise of the Imperial authority. However, it is of great regret that there had been in the Navy some controversies, which afterwards gave rise to criticism in the general public, about the measures taken by the Cabinet in deciding their instructions at the time of the signing of this treaty. The Cabinet not only answered that they had thought there were no objections from the Chief of the Naval General Staff at the time the instructions were decided; but also that the Navy Minister had obtained the Imperial decision that matters pertaining to naval strength should require an accord of opinions between the Navy Minister and the Chief of the Naval General Staff, and that the decision had been reported to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister has been instructed to stick to the rule in the future, and as there has been a reply of acceptance from him, there is no necessity of discussing the "Supreme Command problem."

This affords us much gratification. Moreover, in looking at the object of this treaty, of course everyone should be willing to give his approval to its spirit of promoting world peace and preventing the danger of competitive armament, and reducing the public's burden. But the question is, as far as Japan is concerned, whether or not she will be able to attain the object with the naval strength prescribed in this treaty without bringing about any deficiency in her national defense. As this is the most important point of argument in judging the results of this treaty, we have made a careful and thorough investigation on this point. The Ministers concerned, however, have admitted that there are deficiencies in the

naval strength prescribed in this treaty, but asserted that the security of national defense could in fact be expected by taking replacement measures. As for the replacement plan, they did not even show us its general outline, nor its principal items, on the ground that they have not yet completed the investigation, and they also have not explained much about the necessary expenditures and the estimates in the reduction of taxes. All that the Government has done was to declare on its own responsibility, that the deficiencies in our national defense will be replenished and that a considerable reduction of taxes will be carried out. But as the national defense replenishment programme essentially, should be drawn up by the mutual agreement of the Minister of State and the organs of the military command, and is not to be declared on the responsibility of the State Minister alone, we thought that the opinion of the organs having direct access to the throne would be greatly instrumental in our judgment of the problem, and we were anxious to hear their opinions by some means or other. Finally, we requested the State Minister to take steps to submit the written document of the Military Council in reply to the Imperial question, but the request was rejected by the State Minister. Originally, according to explanations by the Foreign Minister, this treaty had already been ratified by the U. S. Britain will not complete her ratification as far as Ireland is concerned until November, this year. So, even if Japan should ratify it today it would not come into effect immediately. Accordingly, in view of the grave influence that will be exercised on the interests of Japan by the results of the conclusion of this treaty, we thought it better to spend some time in waiting for the completion of the Government's investigation on the aforesaid national defense replenishment programme, and then to make mature deliberations on the question. We proposed our opinion to the State Minister but he did not approve the idea.

It was a matter of great regret for us, for it has been our duty to consider problems carefully and deliberately. But, according to the explanations of the State Ministers, the internal situation lately has become very deplorable, and they stressed that if the ratification of this treaty is left long undecided, it will give rise to political and economical unrest and exert a bad influence upon the general public. Therefore, we came to the conclusion that, under such circumstances, there was no other way than to adopt a vote on the problem, by limiting our investigations to the extent mentioned above,



and relying upon the responsibility of the authorities concerned. As there seems to be no fear of any other obstacle in the provisions of this treaty, we think it is inevitable, under these circumstances, to give our final decision and recognize this treaty. Relying upon the responsibility of the State Ministers who have pledged that they would take every measure to attain the object of the treaty by carrying out the national defense replenishment programme in concert with military circles and by reducing the burden of taxes, the Investigation Committee has unanimously passed a resolution.

I respectfully report the result of the investigation to the Throne that the Privy Council should pass the draft treaty.

No. 4 (HAMAGUCHI): I should now like to state briefly the opinion of the Government on today's problem of ratification of the London Naval Treaty. The object of the London Naval Treaty, as has just been reported by the Chief of the Investigation Committee, is to prevent the danger of competitive armament for the sake of world peace, and to reduce the burden of taxes; and this treaty has been signed and sealed by the representatives of the Five Powers-- Japan, Britain, the U.S., France and Italy. As far as Japan, Britain and the U. S. are concerned, we have been successful in an agreement on the limitation of auxiliary ships which had not been realized at the Washington and Geneva Conferences, and have been able to put a limitation on every type of ship.

Generally speaking, the agreement on the limitation in maintaining strength of auxiliary ships contains more complicated questions than the agreement on capital ships; and at the recent London Conference there has been much meandering in its discussions for which reason France and Italy, finally, refused to join the treaty. Japan, Britain and the U. S., however, judging from the general situation, have concluded the treaty with a spirit of mutual concession and compromise. Therefore, the result of the agreement in the said treaty on maintaining strength in auxiliary ships does not fully satisfy our demands, which will mean that deficiencies will arise in our Naval strength for maintaining and executing the present plan of operations, drawn up according to our established policy of national defense. But the military specialists are agreed in their opinion that such deficiencies can be remedied by taking some other proper replenishment measures, and that any difficulties in our

national defense can be prevented. This replenishment programme is presently under careful investigation by the Government and we are not yet able to give you the actual figures. In short its object is to replenish the quality and to promote technical power. The outline of its principal items is, as has been explained by the Navy Minister at the Investigation Committee. As the fund for the established Naval programme reserved in the financial programme for 1931 (Showa 6) to 1936 (Showa 11) amounts to a total of about half a billion yen, this will be properly appropriated for the expenditure in building replacement ships and for replenishing deficiencies in our naval strength mentioned before and also for reducing taxes. As you all know, the U. S. has already ratified this treaty. As for the British Empire, almost all of the British Commonwealth of Nations have either ratified it or have finished preparations to ratify it, except for Ireland, whose procedure for ratification will be taken either after the opening of her ordinary Diet session in November this year, unless some other means for ratification may be devised before that.

We have not yet received any definite report on it, but, after all, we cannot imagine that difficulties will arise in its ratification. There are some points in the State Minister's reply, given in the reports of the Investigation Committee, which seem to prove that the meaning of our explanation has not been thoroughly understood. But as it is feared that this matter will involve too many complications, I shall not indicate them here. In short, the Government, at this occasion, hopes, in view of the internal and external situations, that the draft treaty will be passed promptly.

No. 36 (ISHII): I received on August 15, the documents relating to the London Treaty, which is presently being referred to the Privy Council. I think the President had appointed the members of the Investigation Committee prior to this, and the said documents were distributed to me at the same time with the members of the Committee. This, originally, is a matter of course, but the previous method was not necessarily like this. So I had once expressed my opinion that, as it is all the Councillors who have been ordered to discuss, it is a duty that every member should have access to the documents as soon as they are called upon for discussion,--that is to say, that I wish the documents to be distributed as soon as possible. I hereby wish to express my gratification, for I believe the recent method of distributing documents, from this standpoint, is an improvement in the proceedings of the Privy Council. I have

one thing I wish to ask the President, though it may seem presumptuous. Three weeks time had elapsed since the Privy Council had been called upon to discuss this matter on July 24 before I had received the documents on August 15. What was the Privy Council doing when such an important problem had been brought up? There had been frequent voices of distrust in the public and I, too, was one that felt suspicion about it. During that time, according to newspapers and other sources, the President had requested the Prime Minister to submit the answers of the Supreme War Council in reply to the Imperial question on about August 5, ten days after the draft treaty had been referred to the Privy Council, and the Prime Minister declined it.

One week after that, the Investigation Committee was organized. Thus, the Councillors could know nothing about the substance of the bill for three weeks though we had been consulted by the Emperor. I believe that when such an important bill is submitted to the Privy Council, the authorities should distribute the bill immediately and hold the Investigation Committee as soon as possible, and if there is something to ask the authorities it should be done after the Councillors are consulted over the matter. I don't intend to denounce the President for his behaviour in the past. I only wish to call his attention to this point, in order to promote the authority of the Privy Council which is the supreme advisory organ for the Emperor. If the President has any explanation to make on this point, I would like to hear it.

President (KURATOMI): No. 36 has just expressed his desire about the distribution of documents. But, it is needless for me to say that Article 7 of the Business Affairs Regulations of the Privy Council prescribes that the report of the Investigation Committee should be distributed, together with annexed documents, to all Councillors at least three days before the opening of the conference. In the past, according to this regulation, we had distributed the documents three days before the conference after the report of the Investigation Committee had been submitted. I do not think, however, that this provision is absolute. Accordingly, I do not think it against the regulations to distribute, if necessary for convenience' sake, before the Investigation has been completed. There had been examples when documents had been distributed beforehand in cases when the bill required a large quantity of documents. It is so with the present case. But this cannot be arranged according to the convenience of the Privy Council alone.

The relation with the Government must also be taken into consideration. So, in the present case, I have adopted an irregular measure after having consulted the Government. It does not necessarily mean that such a measure will always be taken hereafter. Moreover, No. 36 has talked as if I had delayed the investigation in order to have the written reply of the Supreme War Council submitted to the Privy Council, but it is not true. I did not demand the presentation of the document, I only advised its presentation, and I did not delay the investigation. As has been reported by the Chief of the Investigation Committee, there are liable to be some mistakes in the documents of the bill. In the present case too, the Government had to take due formalities for corrections, and more than ten days had elapsed during that time. These are necessary procedures for investigation. As I have stated above, it is a usual practice to distribute documents after the investigation is over, so the opinion of No. 36 is unreasonable.

No. 36 (ISHII): I, too, have knowledge of the provision of the Business Affairs Regulations of the Privy Council concerning distribution of documents. But according to the provision, it is stated "together with the reports" and not "at the same time as the reports." Moreover, looking at it from the point of common sense, there is no reason why documents should not be distributed beforehand. And as the President has expedited the time of distribution in this case, I only wish that this precedent could be followed in the future. I did not say anything about the past. I only said about the future. According to explanations just made by the President, even in the future, whenever some important problem is referred to the Privy Council, several weeks will be needed for the careful investigation of documents. I cannot help feeling anxiety about the future. I hope that, if any problem is referred to the Privy Council, a committee will be organized immediately and will be ordered to investigate the matter. Then the Councillors can investigate the matter together with the Government authorities and can revise the points which require revision. It is an excessively cautious and therefore unsuitable system, not to distribute documents until the Chief Secretary and his assistants spend some days in investigating the bill and correcting the misprints. But I shall not discuss the matter further. I only wish to express my regret here that my opinion was not thoroughly understood, although I had meant it for the future of the Privy Council.

I shall now wish to put my questions to the Government. First, as regards the three great principles; judging from the expression in the report, "the Imperial Government has decided the three great principles... based on the established policy of national defense," it seems to me that the three great principles had been decided just before the London Conference. So I think the principles had, of course, also been included in the instructions given to our plenipotentiaries. Now, the Navy Minister and other naval authorities seem to have greatly emphasized the three great principles prior to the conference, stressing that this was the minimum demand for our national defense, and had informed people that in case these principles should not be realized, it would endanger our national defense. Naturally, the general public, lacking exact knowledge, would readily believe it, would be very anxious about it if even the slightest part of these principles is not realized, and believe that it would surely bring about defeat in war. I, myself, was one of those who felt such anxiety, although I have been relieved of it, because it has been pointed out in the reports that these principles should not necessarily be followed in the next conference.

I think that these circumstances should be made clear to the public, as it is because of these three principles that the people are afraid of the U. S. Now, it seems these three principles did not exist at the time of the previous Geneva Conference. Allow me to refer briefly to what the Japanese plenipotentiaries proposed to the plenipotentiaries of Britain and the U. S. at that conference. There were no such principles in the instructions given to the Japanese representatives at that time. But at the Conference, the U. S. wanted an equal balance of power with Britain, while Britain asserted that she would need 620,000 tons of auxiliary ships for she required many cruisers on account of her special position, and tried to reduce the maintenance of Japan's force. As the negotiations became complicated, Japan was compelled to propose that if Britain and the U. S. would reduce the tonnage of auxiliary ships to 470,000 tons, Japan was ready to reduce hers to 310,000 tons. To this, the U. S. agreed on principle, while Britain did not. So Vice-Admiral KOPPELASHI studied the matter with FREED, a U. S. delegate, and made a compromise plan, but it was not agreed on at the conference. As regards submarines, it was decided that Japan, Britain and the U. S. should maintain 60,000 tons respectively. Thus, does not the result of the recent London Conference resemble Japan's proposition at the above Geneva Conference? It is regrettable that there are many among the people who are discontented with this treaty, by which, according to their belief, an unreasonable naval ratio had been forced upon Japan by Britain and the U. S. The naval authorities should have made it known to the public that there had been no oppression by Britain and the U. S. concerning the conclusion of the recent agreement.

Secondly, when did the so-called three great principles come into existence? It seems they did not exist in about 1927 /Showa 2/. Actually, did not our naval authorities consent at the Geneva Conference to our maintaining 60,000 tons of submarines? I do not think that the international situation has become worse during the three years after that. On the

contrary, the Anti-War Pact had been concluded, and it may be said to have advanced the countries a step forward in their peaceful relations. Nevertheless, at the last conference our authorities had demanded that Japan should maintain 70,000 tons of submarines, an increase of 10,000 tons to the former 60,000 tons. I just cannot understand the reason, and I entertain suspicions about the three great principles.

Moreover, as for the national defense replacement program, there was talk as if there was some proper method of replacement, both in the reports of the Investigation Committee as well as in the explanation of the Premier. But what is the meaning of the word "proper"? As Japan had insisted on maintaining 60,000 tons of submarines in 1927 /Showa 2/, and has been compelled to consent to 52,000 tons at the recent conference, the difference of 7,000 or 8,000 tons can (not?) logically be called a deficiency in our national defense. Though the U. S. formally insisted on the five-five-three ratio in submarines, she has recently consented to an equal basis. From this standpoint, we must admit that she, too, has made concessions. As for other auxiliary ships, the recent proposition made by Britain and the U. S. closely resembles the one made by Japan in former years.

Accordingly, I am of the opinion that 73,000,000 yen is sufficient for the expenditure in our national defense replacement program, and that it would not only be proper to appropriate the remainder of the half billion yen minus the said sum of 73,000,000 yen to the reduction of taxes, but it would also conform to the previous demand of our Navy. In short, I wish to have the Navy Minister explain when the three great principles came into existence, and had become an irrevocable, established policy for our national defense. I also wish to hear the Navy's explanations on the national defense replacement program. I don't want to hear about the concrete plan; the principle alone will be enough.

Except for the above questions and requests, the present treaty is not one which Japan was forced to accept. I agree to this treaty because the recent propositions by Britain and the U. S. are in line with the propositions made by our country three years ago, and it is our duty to accept it. Moreover, I wish to express my whole-hearted approval of the conclusion that this bill shall be passed with faith in the responsible utterances of the State Ministers, as has been stated at the end of the report by the Chief of the Investigation Committee.

No. 5 (TAMARAKE): The first point of your question seems to be, when did the so-called three great principles come into existence, which did not exist in 1927 /Showa 2/, at the time of the Geneva Conference. Of course, there was no such thing as the three great principles at the time of the Geneva Conference. To be precise, even at the last conference, they have neither been clearly implied in the instructions given to the plenipotentiaries nor have they been formally declared. Why, then, have there been rumors about them?

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In the first place, we had considered it necessary for our Navy to have 70 per cent in strength of the most probable potential enemy, and we had made efforts to maintain this ratio in capital ships at the Washington Conference. But, finally, we had failed to attain this object and the ratio was fixed at 60 per cent. Thus, the five-five-three ratio was decided on the condition that the status quo shall be maintained in defense in the Western Pacific. At the Geneva Conference, too, we had contemplated, in general, the maintenance of 70 per cent in auxiliary ships, but the 70 per cent decided was a general estimate and did not go into details regarding the tonnages per types of ships. Speaking of submarines, Japan's demand was 70,000 tons, which is equivalent to the present 73,000 tons. This is because submarines under 500 tons were not subject to any limitations at the time of the Geneva Conference, and so they were not put into calculation. In short, it was a demand to maintain Japan's present strength.

Then there was a question whether there had been no objections in Central Naval Headquarters to the 60,000 tons equal basis decided in their provisional compromise draft by the experts commission of Japan and Great Britain. Yes, there had been many objections. Although, at that time we had acquired the right to maintain more than 70 per cent in cruisers armed with 6-inch guns, it did not reach the 70 per cent mark in total tonnage, so there had been much criticism and argument. Therefore, at the opening of the present London Conference, it was again our Navy's stand to maintain the present strength. Of course, at the time of the Geneva Conference all the powers did not attach so much importance to cruisers carrying 6-inch guns, as today. For this reason, the strength maintained by Japan was even considered comparatively favorable. But today, as a far superior fighting power has been recognized in newly-built cruisers, Japan, too, has demanded 70 per cent. This, however, is not a new and hastily decided policy.

The so-called three great principles are concerned with the military strength necessary for the execution of the plan of operations based on the national defense policy decided in 1923 /Taisho 12/. Thus, the three points - 70 per cent in total, 70 per cent in cruisers with 6-inch guns, and the present strength in submarines - were instructed. No mention was made as to which of the three would be the more important, and the expression "the three great principles" was not used in any of the official documents. Just because these three were the main points in our demands, people called them the three great principles. The Navy has always attached importance to them.

As has been explained by Councillor ISHII, we had failed to accomplish our demand of 70 per cent in capital ships at the Washington Conference, and it was decided at 60 per cent; and also at the Geneva Conference our strength in auxiliary ships was set at 60 per cent in the provisional compromise draft between Japan and Britain. Accordingly, our Naval authorities, after years and years of investigations, were well aware of the difficulties in carrying through our demand of 70 per cent. In view of these former experiences, they had instructed our plenipotentiaries with the three



great principles, for the first time, just before the opening of the last Conference. Prepared to fight with their backs against the wall, they put every effort into obtaining the understanding of the whole nation. For this purpose, young officers made trips to various places and gave lectures, greatly emphasizing the importance of the three great principles. Some of them seem to have pushed their arguments to extremes by stressing that it would mean the ruin of our nation if we should fail to accomplish these principles. These were all manifestations of their patriotic spirit, and as a result, the public opinion was thoroughly unified. I believe this has had much to do with our success at the Conference in obtaining the ratio of 70 per cent in total tonnage.

Though Councillor ISHII seems to be greatly discontented that the military circle has previously much emphasized the three great principles and is showing no effort whatever today in further obtaining the understandings of the people concerning the consequence of this conference, there is a natural limit to the necessity of things. There is a difference between the situations prior to the opening of the conference and that of today. Here so, when we think of the next conference. We should make a more thorough investigation on points that will become necessary at the next conference, and strive for the best measures. Generally, the fact that one has a position at one moment, does not necessarily mean that it is one's position forever. For instance, the U. S. at one time, advocated the necessity of submarines, and at another time, she advocated the complete discontinuance of the use of submarines. There can be a great change between the armaments of ten years ago and those of today. So it is only natural that a nation's demands should change according to the circumstances. As to the expenditures for replacement and the tax problem, I believe the Prime Minister will give you the reply.

No. 4 (HIRAGUCHI): As to the problems of the national defense replacement plan and the reduction of taxes, the opinion of the Government expressed at the Committee Meeting has been stated minutely in the reports of the Investigation Committee, the conclusion being especially well written, so it will be unnecessary for me to make further explanations at this moment. Moreover, I believe Councillor ISHII will not insist upon my explanation. In short, both the problem of replacement plan and the problem of reduction of taxes are still under intensive investigation by the authorities concerned, and at present we are unable to give you any concrete figures. The gist of the replacement plan is as has been stated by the Navy Minister at the Committee Meeting and which has been quoted in the report. Anything beyond that is uncertain at present and cannot be decided until the budget will have been framed this autumn. As I do not wish to say anything of which I am not sure, I shall refrain from making any further explanation beyond this point at present.

No. 35 (ISHII): I neither wish to ask the Government for any concrete plan nor for any explanation about figures. According to the report, it is stated that the Government would not publish even the general principles of the

replacement plan and the reduction of taxes, but the Premier has just talked as if the Government had given a detailed explanation. Insofar as the Privy Council has been called upon to deliberate on this bill, I feel, as a member of the Committee, that it is proper for me to put some questions to the Government about the replacement plan and the reduction of taxes which are the immediate purposes of this treaty. When it comes to not informing the councillors of even the general outline of the treaty, it is making it too difficult for them to pass any judgment. Merely as a principle, can't we have the general estimation as to what amount, in general, will be appropriated to the expenditure in replacements and what amount to the reduction of taxes; or, on the basis of 7,500 tons deficiency in submarines, what amount will be necessary for replacement? I would like to have as much explanation as you can give on this point.

No. 4 (HAMAGUCHI): As I have just stated the opinion of the Government, the total sum that will be reserved from 1931 /Showa 6/ to 1936 /Showa 11/ for the Navy's established program will be about half a billion yen, and this will be appropriated to the expenditures for building replacement ships and replenishing our naval strength according to this treaty, and to the reduction of taxes. But as these are mutually related they must be decided at the same time, and, so, they cannot be clarified until the time when the budget will be framed. Now, not speaking of the amount of money, what is the general outline?

On this point, it has been stated in the explanation of the Navy Minister at the Investigation Committee, written in page 23 of the Investigation report, as follows: "Then, can we or can we not expect the security of our national defense with the naval strength prescribed in this treaty? We have queried this point with the Minister concerned. To this, the Minister replied that this naval strength would perhaps be insufficient to maintain and fulfill the plan of operations based on the existing plan of national defense. But, on one hand, we have been successful in securing the right to maintain more light cruisers and destroyers than we had expected; and if, on the other hand, we take steps for replenishment by properly executing the right to build replacement ships, and moreover, strive to perfect the quality of the Navy by completely equipping the existing ships, renovating their armaments, equipping the ships not under limitation, expanding the air-force, etc., and do our best to improve technical strength by renovating the training and education of navy personnel, and increasing the number of crews, I believe we can pretty well rely on the security of our national defense."

This is the explanation of the general outline given at the Investigation Committee. I regret to say that this is all the material I have today, to make any more explanations, and I hope you will forgive me.

No. 23 (ISHIGURO): Do you intend to continue this conference in the afternoon?

President (KURATOMI): If the discussion is unfinished we may continue in the afternoon, after we ask the convenience of the Emperor.

No. 23 (IYEMURO): Regarding this treaty, it has been reported after full and impartial consideration by each committee member, so it has been pretty well understood, but there are many matters I wish to question more particularly. However, judging from the replies made by the Government, it seems to me that the Government does not wish to make any answer further than its explanations at the Committee Meeting. So I shall rely on the Committee report and refrain from putting any further questions. But, in the report it says: "According to explanations by the State Minister, the internal situation has become deplorably bad these days...etc." What is the meaning of this? I would like to have a full explanation.

No. 4 (HAYAGUCHI): As regards the London Treaty, there had been, prior to its being referred to the Privy Council for deliberation, various rumors in public about the influence it will have upon the political world, and some mischievous elements, in line with these rumors, had been spreading a number of wild tales. For this reason, there were indications that unrest had been arising in the political and financial worlds. The treaty was referred to the Privy Council for deliberation on July 24, and after preliminary investigations by the Secretariat of the Council, it was brought before the Investigation Committee which convened for the first time on August 16. Since then more than fifty days had passed till September 17, and the meeting of the Committee had been held twelve times during that period. Meanwhile, the newspapers in Tokyo, not being informed of the proceedings of the Investigation Committee which had been kept secret, indulged in conjectures and published a number of articles. Readers, ignorant of the circumstances, would either harbor suspicions about the destiny of the treaty, or would be sceptical about a probable discord between the Privy Council and the Government. Various organizations, taking advantage of this situation, began one after the other to attempt mischief-making; and among the various articles, there were some that could be classified as reprehensible. They were openly or secretly distributed to various quarters, and every means of alienation and slander were attempted. This being the situation, it was impossible for people to discriminate truth from falsehood and good from bad. As a result, it is a fact that cannot be concealed, that the general public was driven to an indescribable sort of unrest and unhappiness. Even if it were not so, public feeling today is apt to lack stability and self-possession, and it is deplorable that such a condition should long continue.

As long as the destiny of this treaty remains undecided, it will not only be impossible to eradicate this type of unrest, but it is evident that there will be a tendency for the unrest in public feeling to gradually increase, incited by daily articles in newspapers and all the other scandalous propaganda. The problem of the financial world in particular, is what the Government cannot help but be most concerned about.

The present financial situation is being affected by the great world depression as well as by the remedial measures taken after the lifting of the embargo on gold; and this is a most important period, when we shall have to act with caution. Without the utmost effort on the part of the Government and people, united in one fixed policy, I fear the future of our national economy will be greatly endangered.

At this moment of long political unrest resulting from the untoward relations between the Government and the Privy Council, our economic circles have become very nervous from fear that there might be a drastic change any time in our financial and economic policies due to a possible political upheaval; business and financial circles have been unable to manage their business and keep themselves peacefully employed in their work. They could not look on at the course of events with folded arms; but, alarming rumors were meanwhile current, throwing financial circles into confusion and disturbing the public bonds and all the other valuable securities markets, and they were far from being stable.

In the first place, such things as political unrest and speculations on political changes, are not supposed to have so much influence upon the financial circles in ordinary times; but, in this case, it is not very long since the embargo on gold was lifted and its influence has not yet subsided. Moreover, as I have previously related, when the influence of world depression had become considerably grave, and public sentiment had become very nervous, the theory of lifting the gold embargo at par, which had hitherto been advocated rather as an academic curiosity, had become very popular among some of the scholars and editors of newspapers and magazines. For this reason, not only those connected with the stock-markets began utilizing this theory speculatively, but some people holding pretty high positions in the political and financial worlds, especially those with very pessimistic opinions on the present and future situation of our financial circles, whether with intention to deceive or in good faith, had been making observations in some quarters of financial circles that the next Cabinet may make it their policy to prohibit the export of gold again; and when, as a consequence, the exchange rate falls to a certain degree and is stabilized, devaluation will be executed according to it, and then the embargo on the export of gold will be lifted once again. Many began to believe in it; and many, though they did not really believe in it, tried to take advantage of such fears in the financial circles for their selfish designs. Such a phenomenon is beyond the imagination of an intelligent man; but as financial circles are presently in a specially nervous condition, this propaganda and supposition, which is partly true and partly false, has in fact exerted considerable influence. Its most outstanding fact lies in the outflow of specie to foreign countries. The considerable outflow of specie during the import period in the first half of the year under the lifting of the gold embargo is not a matter to be suspicious about. But, that there has been a very great amount of outflow in specie at a period of favorable balance of trade in the second half of the year, especially recently, at the end of the year when it is still far from the period for imports, is, I believe, attributable to the instability in the exchange-rate in anticipation of the lifting of embargo on the new par, which will result from the prohibition of gold export, granting the political unrest resulting from the various speculations caused by the delay in the progress of deliberations of this treaty at the Privy Council by political and financial circles; though there may be other reasons for it.

Therefore, if the deliberations of the Privy Council are to be further prolonged in getting to a decision, and if the political unrest is not

eliminated, the tendency mentioned above will become doubly pronounced, and as a result, there is no telling what lamentable phenomenon we shall see in general financial circles.

This, really, is the point the Government had been mostly concerned about in the course of deliberating this treaty. Fortunately, since every member of the Investigation Committee, with the State their first consideration, has promptly concluded their deliberations and approved this bill unanimously, we have finally been able to see stability in political circles since the middle of September. The Government is deeply gratified that we have been able to eliminate the financial unrest which has resulted from these political anxieties.

No. 23 (ISHIGURO): I understand. Although there are many questions I wish to ask, a strict investigation has been made by all the members of the Investigation Committee, so I shall respect it and believe in it. I, hereby, wish to express my approval.

President (KURATONI): As there is no other proposal, we shall take a vote on the bill. All in favor of the investigation report, please stand up.

(Approved unanimously)

The Emperor retires.

(Meeting adjourned at 12:20 P.M.)

Signed by:

President:	Baron Yuzaburo KURATONI
Chief Secretary:	Hyoji FUTAKAMI
Secretaries:	Sueo HORIE Moriio MUTO

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Secretaries:	Sueo HORIE Morio MUTO

C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 891-A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, /s/ T. Suzuki hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Privy Council

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 166 pages, dated 1 October, 1930, and described as follows: Book entitled "A Record of the Privy Council Concerning the Ratification of the London Naval Treaty of 1930," dated 1st October, 1930.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Privy Council Secretariat

Signed at Tokyo on this  
1 day of Oct., 1946.

Witness: J. A. Curtis 2d Lt.

/s/ T. Suzuki  
Signature of Official

Secretary of Privy Council  
Official Capacity

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Doc 891

千九百三十年「ロンド」海軍條約御批准  
一件會議筆記

昭和五年十月一日

正



樞密院會議筆記

一千九百三十年 十月一日 海軍  
條約御批者六件

Doc 891

昭和三年十月一日(水曜日)午前十時二十五分  
開議

聖上臨御

出席員

倉富 議長  
平沼 副議長

大臣

- 濱口 內閣總理大臣 四番
- 幣原 海軍大臣 五番
- 幣原 外務大臣 六番
- 江本 鐵道大臣 七番
- 上野 司法大臣 八番
- 井澤 藏大臣 九番
- 依田 商工大臣 十番
- 安達 內務大臣 十一番
- 松田 農林大臣 十二番
- 田中 拓務大臣 十三番
- 田中 文部大臣 十四番
- 阿部 陸軍大臣臨時代理 十五番

顧問官

- 伊東 顧問官 十六番

No. 2

loc 091

no. 5

金子	顧問官	二十番
久保田	顧問官	廿一番
富井	顧問官	廿二番
石黒	顧問官	廿三番
山川	顧問官	廿四番
黒山	顧問官	廿五番
吉市	顧問官	廿六番
江松	顧問官	廿七番
井木	顧問官	廿八番
櫻田	顧問官	廿九番
荒井	顧問官	三十番
河合	顧問官	卅一番
鎌田	顧問官	卅二番
石井	顧問官	卅三番
木田	顧問官	卅四番
町	顧問官	卅五番
石	顧問官	卅六番
水	顧問官	卅七番
福	顧問官	卅八番
田	顧問官	卅九番

關帝員

皇族

大臣	戴宣雍	仁親王	王	一番
	仁親王	親王	王	二番
	親王	親王	王	三番
	親王	親王	王	四番

泉流信大臣

十四番

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No. 4

顧問官

石原 顧問官 十九番  
九鬼 顧問官 廿三番

委員

川崎 法制局長官  
金森 法制局長官  
吉田 外務次官  
松永 外務省條約局長  
齋藤 外務省情報部長  
山形 外務書記官  
山内 外務書記官  
山内 外務事務官  
海軍省 海軍次官  
榎本 海軍省軍務局長  
田村 海軍書記官  
藤原 海軍大佐  
佐佐木 海軍中佐

幹事員

伊東 審查委員長  
書記官長  
三上 書記官長

書記官

武藏 藤書記官

Doc 891

議長會憲之り會議ヲ開ク豫ニ御通知スル通リ  
 千九百三十年口下ノ海軍條約御批准ノ件  
 議題ニ供テ本先例ニ依リ讀會ヲ省略シ大體議止ノ朗  
 讀省略ニ審査委員長報告ヲ求ム  
 報告員伊東今同御諮詢、千九百三十年口下ノ海軍條約御批准  
 件關本官等審査委員ノ命令及之ニ事態關乎甚々重  
 大ニテ深ク考慮ヲ盡スモトルヲ念去ル八月十八日以來在公會同  
 議務大臣辯明ヲ聽キ各員交リ所見述テ及復審議ニ重テ荷  
 之ニ査覈ヲ遺闕ナカニ期スリ  
 先ニ條約由來ニ付テ述ビ大正十二年二月米國華盛頓會議於  
 日英米佛伊、其國間成立スル海軍軍備制限關ル條約、  
 主力艦及航空母艦ニ付其各國保有量軍艦噸數及備砲  
 關ル制限ヲ協定スル補助艦ニ付、其軍艦噸數及搭  
 載砲口徑制限約來タル止リ其各國保有量關テ何等協  
 定ス所ナリ、因リ同會議後數年トステ早クモ主要海軍國間補  
 助艦ノ建造競走漸著カトスル傾向ヲ見ル至リ此時方リ國際  
 聯盟其使命從テ陸海空全般立リ軍備縮少ヲ實現スル爲類  
 々努力ス所ナリ、其討議範圍頗ル廣汎ニテ各國意見懸隔甚  
 々具體的結果到達ニ至リ極々困難ナリ、由リ前陳華盛頓會  
 議主催者米國政府國際聯盟於ケル軍備縮少條約成

No. 5

Doc 891

No. 6

之待之主要海軍國間補助艦關之制限協定之義務上  
 認之昭和二年二月前述之國間會議之開催を以て提唱之る佛伊  
 兩國政府之承諾之爲同年六月瑞西國に於て日英米  
 三國政府間商議開始之る八ヶ月迄搭載之る巡洋艦關之英  
 米兩國主張甚之に達し爲此會議遂に不調終り然レ昭和  
 四年至右兩國於一般政情變化に伴軍備縮少實現之  
 氣運急速進展其結果同年十月英國政府日米佛伊各國  
 政府對前陳華盛頓條約規定之艦種關之制限考  
 究之件同條約第三十條第五項規定之技術上及科學上  
 最近發達適應之爲同條約條項加之變更審議之  
 目的以英國倫敦會議開催を以て提議之る日英佛伊  
 四國政府乃之誓同昭和五年一月關係國代表者同地會合  
 約三月五日博羅打街重不迂餘曲折之盡之稍協議調之九百  
 二年以下海軍條約稱之條約協定同年四月十二日各國  
 全權委員於之署名調印之是即本條約  
 本條約前文及末文外五編二十六條及第二編添附之三附屬書  
 成第二編第三編第四編及第五編之國間協定之第三編日  
 英米三國協定其內容報告書詳述之る以之及說明  
 省略之本條約成立經過之顧レ倫敦會議開催臨レ帝國政  
 府既定國防方針基に補助艦總括噸數對米比率七割  
 以巡洋艦噸數對米比率七割三潛水艦我現存量七萬七  
 千八百餘噸保有之以下三原則定之カ主張之貫徹之キ  
 以全權委員訓令普國內聲明之所トシ之拘レ帝國全  
 權委員右會議於打衝意志也之終謀之餘儀之  
 其結果稍米國提案之基所謂假令協定之作成之以政  
 府請訓政府大體於之承認之同訓爲之因茲設

100 of 91

案ノ前子ノ本條約成立見ルニ至リ、此等即本條約ニ添ハ  
帝國補助艦總括保有量ニ於テ對米六割九分七厘五毛大巡洋艦  
保有量ニ於テ同六割三厘三毛ヲ協定シ潜水艦ニ於テ現在約三分  
一ニ萬五千餘噸ヲ減シ五萬二千七百噸ヲ保有スルニ遊ス  
是於テ本條約伴、國防缺陷問題同訓當時於テ政府位指道  
等關ニ朝野間ニ幾多ノ論議ヲ醸成シ最近、第五八回帝國議  
會ニ於テ七問題トシテ頗ル喧囂ヲ極ス此等ノ経緯ヲ顧ミ本官等  
特ニ慎重ニ態度ヲ以テ本末、審查使事ノ種々點ヲ攷究スル  
ト爲シ同ノ累年官局大臣ト問答問應答ノ書ヲリ余其ノ概要  
ヲ述ベテ次如シ

一從來御諮詢案件ニ關シテ外交文書ニ類スル誤謬、本末條約  
就テ本原文中ニ數多ノ誤爲シト爲シ内閣於テ經同上之ヲ訂正  
手續了スル此如キ畢竟事務取扱上ニ殊滿シ出ルニ至リ頗遺  
憾トス所ナリ此意付閣下大臣ニ於テ遺憾、是ヲ本特來注  
意加勞トシ巡檢ナキニ期スナリ百陳、尚伊太利全權委員名  
腕字、原本、誤謬ニ由リテ訂正スルニ能ハル以テ其儘之  
ヲ奏進スル外ナルニ附言セリ

一 本條約、調印ニ先ニ俄カ全權委員ヨリ、請訓ニ付、内閣ニ於テ  
四訓ニ卷スル際海軍部長、向高心經タリヤ否ヤ、俟奉軍ニ手續ニ  
屬スルヤ如キ觀テ、上ニ同法ニ極大ニ重要ナル問題ナリ然ルニ内閣、此  
手續ヲ經ズニテ同訓ニ死シタリト宣傳セリ、海軍部内、紛議ヲ  
來シ、舊來日ノ帝國議會ニ於テ所謂統帥權問題トシテ、生ズルニ  
至リ、其後海軍大臣、海軍兵力ニ關スル事項、從來、慣行ニ  
依リテ處理スル、此、場合ニ於テ、海軍大臣、海軍軍令部  
長、固ニ意見一致スル、今、毛、ト、允裁、仰、御、裁、可、  
後、內閣總理大臣、結、之、ヲ、報告、シ、且、今後、其、之、ニ、據、

100

(中略) 照會ヲ專シ内閣總理大臣ニ於テ之ヲ必以領事同僚  
 之ヲ事實の海軍大臣提議ニ付テ之ヲ文書ニ依リテ明瞭トシテ  
 仍テ本館署ニ此ノ向書ニ具相ヲ究明スルノ權メテ行ヒテ之ヲ念  
 先ノ當時ノ海軍大臣事務管理タリテ内閣總理大臣任  
 力重シト協定シ其ノ内容トスル期陳阿訓案ニ依リテ發令部  
 長ノ同意心ノ以テ必要ニ出スルニ付テ之ヲ慣例ニテ之ヲ大體從業  
 價行司重シト恣ニ同意見一紙ナルト必要ト思ヒテ之ヲ日手  
 之辯り續キ事案案ニ於テ此ノ兩案ノ同意見一紙アリタリ  
 上ノ海軍大臣ノ軍令部長官初我力三原則ノ作數計與  
 上其ノ限度ノ要求トシテ以テ之ヲ要件ヲ充テ之ニ本館署  
 子トスル兵力量ニ於テ之ヲ以テ採用スル事任在トシテ同意心ノ難  
 事ヲ主張スル事其後ニ於テ之ヲ請假ノ事情ニ照シテ之ヲ  
 際ニ政府ノ處置ニ於テ之ヲ結局同官ニ異議ナカニテ之ヲ認  
 事ト答辯アリタリ然ルニ本館署ニ此ノ答辯ニ幾クノ變  
 事ヲ親シテ則軍令部長官陳阿訓力ト欲シ内閣ニ於テ其  
 事ヲ說明テ手續ヲ執ルコトヲ要求スルニ内閣ノ之ヲ拒絕  
 事案生起シ此ノ問題ニ關シ議會ノ慣例ニ於テ國發案  
 會議ノ意見ヲ斟酌シ政府ニ於テ決定スルアリ答辯之故  
 事同意心ノ意見一紙トシテ之ヲ理由如何ト信同之見  
 事内閣總理大臣ノ軍令部長官ノ内容ノ議會ニ  
 於テ討論スルコト好シカラズト田代將シタル事田代三則所  
 事答(ラ)トシテ辯明スル向本條約ノ調印ニ臨ミ海軍大臣  
 事發令權委員ニ條約案ノ内容ニ付海軍軍令部長官ニ異議  
 事ト思惟セリヤト信同ニ付テ海軍大臣ハ當時海軍大臣  
 事若干ノ不測アリタル事之ヲ知ルニ彼等ト雖モ會議ニ決  
 事トシテ之ヲ交舞スルニ非カレバ之ト同意心ニ付テ之ヲ答辯セリ

140  
 141  
 142

146.0

10.9

從前以來何故三軍令部長、意圖心、確、此、與、等、指、三、出、三、十、  
リ、三、カ、ト、及、同、之、ハ、高、大、連、の、政、策、三、の、通、場、本、任、事、務、管、理、者、  
ス、ル、リ、自、令、の、唯、全、權、委、任、身、一、人、之、ヲ、政、府、訓、令、三、從、三、訓、令、  
ウ、ル、ニ、加、之、同、訓、令、時、受、領、セ、ル、軍、令、部、長、等、ノ、電、報、三、由、リ、  
軍、令、部、長、同、訓、令、亦、三、同、意、セ、ル、ト、上、解、ス、ル、ハ、自、今、以、上、各、辯

10.9

セ、リ、  
三、政、府、の、我、國、防、衛、要、求、之、以、設、兵、力、量、最、小、限、度、ト、充、張、セ、ル、所、  
謂、三、大、原、則、三、直、合、セ、ル、ハ、安、排、未、ク、成、談、ス、ル、ハ、事、情、三、開、三、政、  
策、(因、リ)該、案、本、其、意、三、滿、タ、サ、ル、廉、ア、リ、認、ル、ハ、先、前、委、任、  
済、經、過、三、徵、三、他、三、適、当、ト、シ、抑、定、得、ル、見、込、リ、第、一、會、議、  
決、議、の、場、合、其、他、帝、國、の、國、際、的、立、場、三、及、亦、不、影、響、ス、各、島、  
ヲ、テ、上、及、生、體、效、三、因、リ、帝、國、財、政、經、済、上、ノ、苦、難、甚、シ、  
ル、(其、上、三、事、三、想、到、シ、即、チ、國、家、ノ、大、局、ヨ、リ、見、テ、之、ヲ、認、  
ス、)外、主、毛、ノ、由、(性、)ヨ、リ、自、辯、明、セ、リ、然、レ、本、條、約、三、條、  
其、力、量、ヲ、以、テ、三、帝、國、國、防、安、全、ヲ、期、ス、ル、ト、三、得、ル、カ、否、也、之、  
ヲ、考、へ、任、三、條、約、三、ハ、高、層、局、大、在、(右、兵、力、量、ヲ、以、テ、三、  
條、約、ノ、國、防、方、針、三、長、ク、作、戰、計、画、三、維、持、遂、行、上、或、ハ、困、難、  
ス、ル、カ、元、三、區、三、海、軍、洋、艦、及、驅、逐、艦、三、於、三、豫、期、以、上、保、存、量、三、獲、  
得、セ、ル、ト、更、三、他、區、三、ハ、秋、建、造、(確、利、十、週、高、層、三、申、行、ス、)外、別、  
ハ、設、備、艦、艇、教、養、備、兵、三、海、軍、三、改、善、日、制、限、外、艦、艇、三、整、備、海、空、  
機、三、擴、張、三、新、備、肉、容、三、充、實、三、圖、リ、且、兵、員、三、訓、練、三、整、備、  
改、善、三、集、組、三、定、實、三、増、加、三、等、所、滑、術、力、ノ、何、上、三、力、ハ、三、於、三、  
國、防、衛、安、全、ヲ、期、ス、ル、ト、三、得、(之、ト、信、ス、)三、本、條、約、三、有、效、  
期、間、僅、三、五、六、年、三、短、日、月、三、過、半、又、而、七、帝、國、ノ、主、張、三、爲、リ、次、同、  
會、議、三、於、三、本、條、約、三、規、定、三、條、未、セ、ル、ル、ト、三、上、リ、全、ク、自、  
由、立、場、三、於、三、該、議、三、得、ル、趣、目、規、定、三、本、條、約、第、三、三、條、

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機、三、擴、張、三、新、備、肉、容、三、充、實、三、圖、リ、且、兵、員、三、訓、練、三、整、備、  
改、善、三、集、組、三、定、實、三、増、加、三、等、所、滑、術、力、ノ、何、上、三、力、ハ、三、於、三、  
國、防、衛、安、全、ヲ、期、ス、ル、ト、三、得、(之、ト、信、ス、)三、本、條、約、三、有、效、  
期、間、僅、三、五、六、年、三、短、日、月、三、過、半、又、而、七、帝、國、ノ、主、張、三、爲、リ、次、同、  
會、議、三、於、三、本、條、約、三、規、定、三、條、未、セ、ル、ル、ト、三、上、リ、全、ク、自、  
由、立、場、三、於、三、該、議、三、得、ル、趣、目、規、定、三、本、條、約、第、三、三、條、





河、會議 二於于帝國、父、主、從、前、三、大、原、則、ヲ、主、張、セ、ル  
ル、力、ニ、非、ス、及、今、後、數、年、間、於、此、諸、般、事、情、ノ、變、化、ヲ  
斟酌、シ、最、善、ノ、方、案、ヲ、立、テ、之、力、主、張、貫、徹、シ、努、力、ス、ル、又  
假、シ、所、謂、三、大、原、則、主、張、ヲ、繰、返、ス、ト、ス、ル、モ、補、助、體、ノ、總、數、及  
建、造、費、額、ニ、於、テ、本、條、約、ニ、依、ル、ヲ、超、過、セ、ル、キ、ニ、由、リ、之、ヲ、以、テ  
直、ニ、軍、備、擴、張、ト、目、ス、ル、ニ、非、ス、ト、答、辯、セ、リ、  
本、條、約、ニ、依、ル、兵、力、量、ニ、缺、陥、ル、ヲ、以、テ、直、ニ、軍、備、擴、張、ト、言、フ、五  
ツ、ル、ニ、非、サ、シ、我、國、防、衛、安、全、之、期、ヲ、俾、テ、ル、今、事、ハ、政、務、ノ、自、認  
ハ、シ、テ、然、ル、ヲ、右、補、充、計、画、成、否、何、如、何、之、三、要、ス、ル、費、額、如  
何、本、條、約、ニ、因、リ、生、ズ、ル、剩、餘、金、何、如、何、立、國、民、兵、備、縮、減、  
有、無、及、其、程、度、何、如、何、ノ、問、題、ハ、本、條、約、ノ、自、的、ヲ、達、成、シ、得、ル、  
否、ヤ、ヲ、判、斷、ス、ル、ニ、於、テ、極、大、ノ、重、要、事、項、ニ、屬、シ、正、ニ、審、査、  
要、自、タ、ル、ニ、由、リ、其、大、綱、提、示、ヲ、要、求、ス、ル、然、ル、ニ、之、ニ、對、シ、  
シ、テ、軍、備、在、リ、辯、明、ハ、國、防、補、充、計、画、ハ、尚、海、軍、部、ヲ、令、致、ス、於、テ、  
調、査、中、ニ、係、ル、ヲ、以、テ、該、調、査、完、了、シ、海、軍、省、ト、同、一、意、見、一、致  
シ、ル、以、後、更、ニ、閱、修、條、約、ニ、協、議、ヲ、果、ス、ル、ニ、非、サ、シ、之、ヲ、明、確、  
ス、ル、ト、能、ハ、ル、力、ヲ、據、シ、其、一、確、定、時、期、(年、々、ト、シ、今、秋、豫、算、編、成  
ヲ、了、ス、ル、頃、ト、シ、但、意、圖、局、上、ニ、於、テ、右、條、約、實、施、結、果、對、政、士、相  
臨、シ、餘、裕、ヲ、生、ズ、ル、ニ、至、ル、一、致、之、ヲ、國、防、缺、點、補、充、ニ、充、テ、  
他、一、部、ト、シ、之、ヲ、國、民、倉、庫、縮、減、ニ、充、テ、ル、一、方、針、ト、シ、テ、之、  
實、行、ヲ、以、テ、言、明、ス、ル、ニ、於、テ、海、軍、部、既、定、計、画、ト、シ、テ、比、較、  
度、言、シ、同、十、年、度、度、一、財、政、計、画、ニ、保、保、シ、テ、金、額、總、計、  
其、他、由、リ、假、シ、其、在、候、一、行、為、ト、シ、テ、本、條、約、ニ、依、リ、代、探、建、立、  
一、權利、ヲ、全、數、行、フ、至、同、基、本、ノ、剩、餘、金、ヲ、生、ズ、ル、ヲ、以、テ、之、ヲ、  
國、防、補、充、案、ト、稱、ス、ト、按、排、ス、ル、胸、算、ナ、リ、ト、謂、フ、ニ、在、リ、  
偵、問、應、答、令、一、大、要、右、如、之、ノ、三、要、ス、ル、ニ、在、案、本、條、約、ハ、軍、政、

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條約ヲ訂補シテ海軍軍備制限ノ目的ヲ達成スル為各種  
艦船ニ関シ諸般ノ制限ヲ協定セラルモナリ抑国防ノ安全  
八國公約ニ發見スル所ナリ故ニ條約ヲ以テ軍備ノ制限ヲ約諾スル  
カ如キ最モ重要ナル者ニ思フ要スル事項多ク出テ我國海軍  
ノ軍政ト軍令トヲ區別シ各別異ノ程度ヲ設ケ之ニ  
關スル大權行郵、輔弼共ニ協力セシムルモ、海ニ以テ是非セリナリ  
然ルニ今回本條約調印、際内閣、報々ニ同訓決定ノ手續ニ  
關シ海軍部内ニ物議ヲ生シ、意ニ世間ニ物議ヲ醸スニ至ルモ  
ハ海ニ對シテハ今所ナリモ内閣ニ於テ右同訓決定、際軍令部  
長ニ異議ヲカキシモ、上議ヲタリナリ答辭アリタルニ、ナリナリ  
海軍大臣ヨリ海軍ノ兵力ニ關スル事項ノ決定ハ海軍大臣海軍  
軍令部長ニ關シ意見ヲ要件トスルコトノ勅諭ヲ仰律條  
裁キ、後内閣總理大臣ニ報告シ今後共ニ之ニ據ルニ旨  
（照會書ニ對シ同大臣ヨリ受領、向答ヲ得タルヲ以テ今ヤ所屬  
級部權問題ナリモ、更ニ討究スルハ必要ナキニ至リ是レ在官  
手ノ煩ル概ナキトスル所ナリ）更ニ本條約ノ目的ヲ見ルニ其世界  
本邦ヲ念ヒテ、彼等ノ軍備ニ伴フ危險ヲ防止シ且負擔  
輕減ヲ圖ラントスル趣旨ニ於テ、勿論何人ト雖モ力積同ク若  
ク非ニ非ニ唯海軍ノ關スル限リ本條約所定ノ兵力量ニ由リ兼  
テ成リ国防ニ缺陷ヲ生ズルコトナリ右ノ目的ヲ達成スルコト  
ヲ得ルヤ否ヤ是レ本條約ノ否ヲ判定スル最モ重要ナル論  
點ナリ故ニ在官書ハ之ニ關シ特ニ縝密ニ調査ヲ試ミ  
リ然ルニ吾國大臣ハ本條約所定ノ兵力量ニ於テハ缺陷ニ  
テ予認スルコトノ力積ハ、方法ヲ講ズルニ由リテ略国防ノ安全  
ヲ期シ得（ト）為真ニ補充計思ニ至リテ（ハ）亦調査受  
ルコトナリ、故ニ以テ其ハ大體要旨ヲ示サズ從テ之ニ要スル

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現其發及檢額 見之 三行 七亦多 說明 其 不唯 政府  
 實出 必 國防 缺 際 補 充 且 相 當 概 概 行 之 全 日 言  
 明 然 上 本 官 署 國防 補 充 計 劃 本 來 國 務 不 在 下  
 集 合 材 料 上 合 意 由 于 空 來 毛 子 年 天 二 之 獨 行  
 國 務 大 任 責 任 之 言 明 之 得 毛 子 二 非 其 力 故 二 該 問 題  
 二 分 之 一 確 口 惟 惟 材 料 意 見 本 官 署 判 斷 不 及 三 指 力 十 二  
 資 料 上 爲 此 年 日 思 之 何 事 力 方 法 二 多 子 之 意 見 二  
 聽 力 二 子 日 思 之 異 取 檢 三 重 事 務 議 院 奉 答 文 二 示 示  
 下 之 手續 可 執 之 二 子 日 國 務 大 任 三 請 求 之 二 大 任 二 令  
 拒 絕 之 元 素 外 務 大 任 說 明 二 念 二 本 條 約 二 本 國 二 於 二 該  
 二 之 力 批 准 二 手續 了 之 之 二 安 道 二 以 進 二 安 團 二 團 二 本  
 事 十 月 必 須 二 到 二 可 二 之 完 了 之 二 力 故 二 假 二 語 國 力 今 日 之  
 可 批 准 之 元 素 二 甚 二 社 力 二 發 生 之 二 子 以 二 本 官 署 二 本 條 約 締  
 結 二 結 果 二 國 國 二 利 害 二 及 二 之 影 響 二 甚 大 二 且 二 恐 二 假 二  
 時 日 二 以 二 前 述 二 國 務 補 充 計 劃 二 事 務 二 付 二 官 署 二 調 查 二 結 果 二  
 二 之 後 二 徐 二 審 議 二 意 見 二 之 意 見 二 之 二 官 署 二 大 任 二  
 提 議 二 之 元 素 二 亦 其 二 同 意 二 之 計 劃 二 爲 二 斯 二 如 二 潛 思 二 意 見  
 二 之 二 本 官 署 二 亦 二 意 見 二 上 二 之 計 劃 二 之 國 務 大 任 二 說 明 二  
 二 之 依 二 二 近 時 國 內 情 勢 二 大 二 甚 爲 二 慮 二 之 二 元 素 二 本 條 約 批  
 准 二 意 見 二 未 定 二 上 二 之 政 治 上 二 經 濟 上 二 不 安 二 意 見 二 之 二  
 社 會 二 及 二 之 影 響 二 大 二 之 二 高 唱 二 之 二 元 素 二 故 二 本 官 署  
 今 日 二 場 合 二 此 二 問 題 二 付 二 官 署 二 審 查 二 程 度 二 於 二 結 局  
 官 署 二 言 查 二 事 務 二 決 議 二 爲 二 外 二 之 二 計 劃  
 長 二 之 二 其 二 他 二 本 條 約 二 條 項 二 國 務 二 大 任 二 於 二 支  
 障 二 除 二 之 二 認 二 之 二 以 二 此 二 際 二 本 條 約 二 承 認 二 之 二 意 見  
 決 定 二 之 二 之 二 上 二 之 二 得 二 之 二 計 劃 二 之 二 思 料 二 之 二

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審查委員會於本月(國務大臣)軍部、協同整  
國、補充計畫、遂行、且國民負擔、輕減、遂行、  
本條約、目的、達成、之、事實、ヲ、期、ス、ト、言、責、信、賴、  
之、本、件、ヲ、決、ス、ヘ、シ、ト、全、會、一、致、ヲ、以、テ、議、決、シ、リ、

右、謹、テ、審、査、結、果、ヲ、報、告、ス

會、議、意、見、有、テ、議、題、タ、リ、ト、下、之、海、軍、條、約、御、批、准、  
件、對、シ、此、場、會、同、學、生、政、府、ヲ、以、テ、申、述、シ、テ、今、同、日、  
下、之、海、軍、條、約、唯、今、各、負、長、ヲ、御、報、告、シ、リ、之、由、

世界、平和、ヲ、念、ト、シ、競、争、的、軍、備、ヲ、行、フ、危、險、ヲ、止、シ、且、  
國民、負擔、輕、減、ヲ、圖、ル、趣、旨、ニ、由、テ、タ、ル、ニ、シ、テ、日、英、米、得、  
伊、立、之、國、代、表、者、等、名、詞、印、シ、テ、モ、十、七、日、其、中、日、英、米、

三、國、之、間、之、限、り、違、表、シ、テ、之、ト、シ、之、會、議、及、シ、テ、不、一、之、會、  
議、於、テ、度、現、見、之、至、ラ、サ、リ、之、補、助、艦、制、限、ノ、協、定、ニ、  
成、功、シ、各、艦、種、ニ、對、シ、テ、制、限、ヲ、遂、行、ス、ル、ト、得、ル、ニ、至、リ、ト、

ナ、リ、又、未、補、助、艦、種、有、量、制、限、ノ、間、之、協、定、ニ、主、ト、シ、  
協、定、比、之、層、複、雜、ト、シ、テ、今、同、日、下、之、會、議、ニ、  
於、テ、之、ヲ、論、議、シ、タ、リ、シ、テ、迂、餘、曲、折、ヲ、終、得、テ、之、ヲ、

見、ル、ト、得、サ、リ、シ、モ、日、英、米、三、國、大、局、ヲ、考、察、シ、テ、互、讓、妥、  
協、以、テ、其、成、立、ヲ、見、ス、次、第、ヲ、仍、テ、今、同、條、約、中、補、助、艦、  
保、有、量、間、之、協、定、結、果、ニ、對、シ、テ、我、等、之、要、求、全、部、滿、足、ヲ、與、

ス、ル、ニ、至、ラ、ズ、即、チ、我、等、之、所、方、針、ニ、基、テ、安、樂、道、ニ、シ、テ、現、  
作、戰、計、畫、ヲ、維、持、遂、行、シ、兵、力、量、ノ、不、足、ヲ、生、ル、ニ、シ、テ、  
此、等、之、間、之、制、限、ヲ、補、充、シ、テ、海、軍、上、之、支、障、ヲ、

生、ズ、シ、タ、ル、ト、得、ル、ニ、シ、テ、軍、部、專、門、的、意、見、亦、  
一、致、シ、テ、其、之、補、充、計、畫、目、下、之、局、ニ、於、テ、慎重、政、  
策、中、之、條、件、之、方、具體、的、數、字、ヲ、示、ス、ル、ト、得、ル、由、

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會三三三ノ上雜報ニ其ノ内容、充實及術力、何止ノ上  
 眼トスルモ、三三三其、大綱要目、審査委員會ニ於テ海軍  
 大臣ヨリ説明シテ、如ク而テ海軍、既定計畫トシテ  
 昭和六年度ヨリ同十一年度迄、財政計畫且ニ確保シテ  
 多ク金額、總計約一億圓トシテ、故ニ以テ本條約條  
 件代換金製造及前送兵器量、補充等ニ終局ノ國  
 民負擔、輕減トシ通宜按配スルモ、本條約ニ對シ御承  
 知ノ通米國家ニ批准ヲシ、英帝國ニ於テ金貨同盟  
 各邦、大部會ニ批准ヲシ、若ク其、準備完了、惟テ  
 三三三同ニ、其、批准手續、本年十月同國通商議  
 會、商會、得、ハヤ又、ハ之ヲ早ク批准ヲシ、得、ハ  
 便宜ヲ早ク未タ何トモ雜報ニ接スル雜給局其、批准  
 手續生ルモ、相違得、又此、審査報告中國  
 務大臣答辯トシ、揚、ハ之ヲ部、裁、説明、趣旨  
 會ニ徹底シ、居、ハ此、閣下、ハ之ヲ考、ハ之ニ事煩瑣ニ  
 下、ハ之ヲ該、ハ之ヲ指、捕、ハ之ヲ要、ハ之、此、際政府トシ、  
 内外、情勢ニ警、ハ之、本條、可決スルコトヲ望、ハ之、  
 第十、

No. 15

二十六番(石井) 會同御諮詢、ハ三三三海軍條約ニ付、余  
 去、ハ八月十五日其、關係書類ヲ受領セリ、且、長ヨリ失議  
 長ヨリ、審査委員會ニ相成、ハ之ヲ加書類、ハ之ヲ令、本員トシ、  
 時ニ配付セ、ハ之ヲ行、ハ之ヲ料、ハ之ヲ長、國ヨリ有、然、事、ハ之、  
 從來、取扱、ハ之、必、無、然、ハ之、故、余、ハ之、會、同、御、諮詢、ハ之、  
 顧問官金殿文、ハ之ヲ御諮詢、ハ之、直、其、金、員、力、  
 書類拜見、ハ之ヲ義務、ハ之ヲ官、ハ之ヲ成、ハ之ヲ連、書類、配付、ハ之、  
 夕、三三三委員、ハ之ヲ、ハ之ヲ、ハ之ヲ、今、會、書類、配付、ハ之、此、見

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地より見、樞密院議事、一政事ナルヲ思ヒ満足、意ヲ表  
 ス更ニ龍ヲ得テ蜀ヲ望ム感アルトモ、茲ニ議長ニ希望ス  
 一ノ事ナリ、今本件書類ヲ受取リタルハ前述、如ク八月十五  
 日ナリ、其御諮詢アリタルハ七月二十四日ナリ、其間ニ既ニ三週  
 間ヲ終過スルモ、ナリ此重大案件、御諮詢アリタルハ樞  
 密院何ヲ為シ居タルカ天下皆知トシテ不審、解ヲ放  
 余モ亦不審思ヒタル一人ナリ、此間於新聞紙及各方  
 面ヨリ、報道依リ議長、本件御下付後、自ラ終タルハ  
 月之六日、内閣總理大臣ニ對シ、軍事ヲ議院ニ奉答文、  
 提出ス求メタル總理大臣ハ之ヲ拒絶セリトシ、トナリ、其後、  
 一週間終テ本員會組織セリ、此、如ク、前後三週間ハ  
 顧問官ニ對シ、御諮詢ヲ蒙リ、其、案、内容ヲ知能、  
 サルナリ、余、此、如ク、重大案件ニ付、御諮詢ヲ蒙リ、以上ハ  
 直ニ議長ニ配付シ、成ル、速ニ審査、本員會ヲ開ク、ナリ  
 一ニ、此、間、對シ、請求ス、ナリ、顧問官相談、上之、  
 請求スルヲ可ト信ス、余、既ニ、謝リ、議長、行動ヲ非難  
 セトスル者、非ス、只、天皇、至高顧問府ニ本院、權威  
 高ニ為、將來ニ向テ議長、御注意ヲ望ム、次第ナリ、此、案  
 一ニ、付、議長ヲ御辯明、ナリ、承ル、

No. 16

議長(倉庫) 只今三十六番ヲ書類配付ニ付、希望御  
 申出、ナリ、本官ヨリ、更ニ、言フ、迄、モ、樞密院事務  
 規程、第一條ニ、審査報告書、付、稿、文書、ト、共ニ、其、  
 會議ヲ開ク、日ヨリ、少ク、モ、三日、以前ニ、之、各員ニ、配付ス、ル、  
 ト、一、從、亦、此、規程、依リ、報告書、提出、後、三日、以前ニ、配  
 布セリ、ト、得、此、規程、絶対的、モ、ト、考ヘ、場合、依  
 一、實際、便宜、上、審査、終、一、前、配、布、ス、ル、モ、違法、ト、

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用ス又鐵案若漸ルル其場合等前以テ配却ルル事例  
 アリ本付付テモ亦然リ而シテ此、事多ク猶本院、都  
 合依ルハ非ス政府ト關係ヲモテ有願スルハ必要ナリ  
 以テ今回政府當局ト打合タル上ニテ格、変則、取扱ヲ為  
 シタルハ以テ今後ハ之モ母、今回、如キ取扱ヲ為スモト、  
 限ラ又又二十六番、本官、軍事多議院、奉答文ヲ求  
 ムニ為シ、審査ヲ遲延シタルカ如ク述ベラシムルハ、事實ニ相  
 違ヒ、本官、該文書ヲ提示ヲ要求スルニ非スニテ、勸告  
 タルニ、又、大カ、為シ、審査ヲ遲延セタルニ非ス、委員長  
 報告ニ在リ、通リ、免責議案、文書、承認アリ、今回モ之  
 カ訂正ニシテ政府、於テ、經濟手續ヲ復シタル為テ、十日ヲ  
 經過アリ、此等、審査、為シ、必要ナル手續ニシテ、又、審査終  
 了ヲ待テ、配付スルハ、先例トスルニ、前陳、如ク、七、三十  
 六番、御説、ハ、當リ、

No. 17

二十六番(石井)書類、配付、閣下、樞密院事務現程、  
 現長、余モ亦之ヲ知リ、之、同現定、報告書ト共ニ  
 トアリ、報告書ト同時ニ、之、且、常識ヨリ、見ルモ、豫  
 メ配付、不可ナル事ナリ、而シテ、今回、議長、配付、時期  
 ヲ早メ、タルニ、由リ、今後、此、例、依リ、之、ト、テ、各、種、之、ル  
 一、余、此、以、往、事、ヲ、言、又、將來、付、言、ハ、ル、ナリ、然、ル、ニ、只  
 今、御、辨、明、依、リ、將、來、雖、重、大、事、件、付、付、ハ、文、書、ヲ  
 細、密、ニ、調、査、ス、ル、為、數、週、間、ヲ、延、ス、テ、モ、知、シ、ス、ト、之、ト、ル、カ  
 余、將、來、付、付、憂、慮、十、千、能、ス、直、ニ、之、事、件、御、下、付、後  
 直、ニ、本、員、會、ヲ、設、ク、之、ヲ、調、査、ス、ル、ハ、然、ラ、ハ、願  
 問、官、ト、以、府、當、局、者、ト、共、ニ、調、査、ヲ、訂、正、ス、(キ、モ、ハ、訂、正



No. 18

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又(オナリ)出(シ)公(ノ)書記(ト)官(長)及(シ)其(ノ)補助(者)ヲ(シ)テ(シ)幾(日)カ(シ)テ  
 議(案)無(ク)調(査)員(ト)シ(テ)誤(植)訂(正)ヲ(シ)テ(シ)タ(ル)後(ニ)非(シ)ハ  
 配(付)ス(ト)謂(フ)如(キ)事(實)鄭(重)ニ(シ)テ(シ)取(扱)上(ニ)適(當)ナ(リ)ト(シ)謂(フ)  
 可(カ)ス(ル)然(レ)ト(シ)テ(シ)此(ノ)問(題)付(テ)最(早)此(ノ)上(ニ)言(議)ヲ(シ)員(員)  
 カ(サ)レ(シ)唯(余(ノ)極(密)院(ヲ)得(未)得(ル)思(ヒ)茲(ニ)微(表)ヲ(シ)述(ス)  
 タ(ル)意(見)徹(底)ナ(リ)ト(シ)テ(シ)遺(憾)ト(ス)  
 (次(頁)ニ(續)ク)

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No. 19

之ヨリ政府ニ對シテ問ハク先ニ所謂三大原則ニ関シ  
 報告書ニ帝國政府ニ既定ノ國防方針ニ基キ  
 ……三大原則ヲ定メトアルニ依リテ見ハク三大  
 原則ハ今回ノロンドン會議ニ臨ミ定メラル  
 天ノ如シ故ニ該原則ハ我カ全權委員ニ對  
 ル訓令中ニ天勿論擧ケラル天ノ如シ然ルニ海  
 軍大臣以下海軍官憲ハ此會議前ニ於テ大ニ  
 此三大原則ヲ高調シ之ヲ以テ我カ國防上最  
 モ限度ト爲シ之ヲ缺クトキハ國防危シト公衆  
 教育セラルカ也故ニ専門知識ナキ社會  
 一般ハ之ヲ信シ甚シ耶タリトモ該原則ニ缺クル  
 下アルカ戦争必敗ナルニシテ大ニ憂慮シ  
 余天亦之ヲ憂慮シタル人ナリ然ルニ報告書  
 ニ依リテ同會議ニ於テ必シモ該原則ヲ以  
 テ臨ムニシトハ限ラストノコトナル故ニ是心ナルモ  
 世間カ米國ヲ恐ルル原因ハ畢竟此原則ニ  
 在リ以テ茲ニ之ヲ明瞭ナラシムルハ必要ナリ  
 會談際ニハ之ヲカキカ也故ニ同會議ニ於  
 テ日本全權委員カ英米全權委員ニ提議シ  
 タル所ヲ簡單ニ一言セテ同會議ニ際シ日本  
 全權委員カ又ケタル訓令中ニハ向テ如キ三  
 大原則ハ下サレサリキ然ル會議ニ於テ米國  
 ハ英國ノ均勢ヲ欲シ英國ハ其特殊地位  
 ニ鑑ミ多數ノ洋艦ヲ受スルニ由リ補助艦位  
 總噸數ハ十二萬噸ヲ必要トスト主張シ日

No. 20

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現ニ我カ軍事当局ハ我カ保有量トシテ六千噸  
 年間ニ於テ國際關係惡化タリトモ覺ス  
 却テ不戰條約成立シ平和關係ニ歩ヲ進メ  
 於テ我カ當局ハ右ノ潜水艦保有量六千噸  
 上ニ更ニ一萬八千噸ヲ増加シタルハ六千噸

本、保有量ヲ引下ケテ之ヲ談判  
 日本側ハ之ヲ得ス英米、水上補助艦ヲ四  
 十六萬噸引下ケテ引下ケヨ之ニ對シ日本ハ三十萬  
 噸引下ケルノ用意アリト提議セリ之ニ對シ  
 英國側ハ主義トシテ同意シタルモ英國側ハ  
 同意セズ仍テ日本、カ林中將米國ノ不  
 協トト研究ノ結果ニ之ヲ協案ヲ作リタルモ  
 會議ノ協定ヲ見ルニ至ラズ而シテ潜水艦ニ  
 付テハ日英米各六萬噸トストコトナリキ而  
 シテ今向ノ口ニテ會議ノ成果ハ右ノ如ク  
 會議ニ於ケル日本ノ提議ニ近似セル非ス然レ  
 ルニ世間ニ本條約ニ依リ日本ハ英米ヨリ無  
 理ナル比率ヲ強ヒラレタリトテ不滿ヲ唱ル者  
 多キヲ遺憾トス海軍當局ハ宜シク今向ノ協定  
 成立ニ付何等英米ノ壓迫ナカリシトテ國  
 民ニ周知セムカカリナリ  
 次ニ所謂三大原則ハ何時ヨリ始マリタル  
 ナルヤ昭和三年頃ニ本々之ナカリシカレ  
 現ニ我カ軍事當局ハ我カ保有量トシテ六千噸  
 年間ニ於テ國際關係惡化タリトモ覺ス  
 却テ不戰條約成立シ平和關係ニ歩ヲ進メ  
 於テ我カ當局ハ右ノ潜水艦保有量六千噸  
 上ニ更ニ一萬八千噸ヲ増加シタルハ六千噸

No. 21

此の理由不可解ナリ又国防補充計画ニ付テ  
 付テ惑ヲ抱ケナリ又国防補充計画ニ付テ  
 其差大ナルハ論上我カ国防ノ缺陷ト謂  
 比率ヲ主張スルニ今向ノ均等ヲ承認ス  
 其也水上補助艦ヲ付テ英米今同提議  
 先年我カ国防補充計画ニ西スル經費七千  
 三百萬圓ニ以テ足ル保固財源五億圓中  
 之ヲ差引キ甚ク残額凡テ國民員中  
 海軍從來ノ主張ト致スルニト思惟ス我カ  
 三大原則何時未決定ノ国防方針  
 補充計画ニ動的ノ天ト為リ又国防針  
 程度ニ以テ海軍側ノ御説ヲ均シテ主義  
 以上ノ價值ヲ外ニ今向ノ條的  
 何等ノ壓迫ヲ受ケタルニ非ス今向ノ  
 英米提議我國力三年前ニ提議スル

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此の理由不可解ナリ又国防補充計画ニ付テ  
 付テ惑ヲ抱ケナリ又国防補充計画ニ付テ  
 其差大ナルハ論上我カ国防ノ缺陷ト謂  
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 程度ニ以テ海軍側ノ御説ヲ均シテ主義  
 以上ノ價值ヲ外ニ今向ノ條的  
 何等ノ壓迫ヲ受ケタルニ非ス今向ノ  
 英米提議我國力三年前ニ提議スル

9 / 新三學リ我於之為起設諾之キ无ナリ  
放三余ハ之ニ賛成ス而シテ本委員長報告ノ  
未段ニ於テ本院ハ國務大臣ノ三ト其真信  
ノ意ヲ表スルニナリ

五番(財部)御質問ノ第一三大原則ニ於テハ  
ハ昭和ニ至リシニ本ノ會議ノ際ハ之ナリ  
シカ其意ハ何時ニ去来スルカト謂フニ在リカ如  
シ無論ニシテ本ノ會議ノ時ニハ三大原則如  
ナルニハ今同ト雖正確ニ言ハルニ之ヲ明則如  
自ニ擣テ全權ニ訓令ニ或形式ヲ以テ聲明  
シタルニ然ラバ何故世上ニ宣傳セラルニ至リ  
タルカ抑フニトシ會議ニ於テ帝國海軍ノ  
兵力最モ願念スルニ假想敵國ノ大割ヲ要  
スルニト見テ主力艦ノ保有量ニ付テ率ヲ要  
保持セムトシタルニ結局之ニ達セシテ大割  
ニ著シク所謂太平洋防備ノ現状維持ヲ  
條件トシテ五五ニ大率トナシテ以テ不ナリ

10.22  
會議ニ於テ大體補助艦ノ保有量ニ付テ  
ヲ目録ニシテ其總括的ニ大割ニ止リ其割  
内定額數ノ詳細ニ互ニナリシモ潛水艦ニ付テ  
言ハル日本ノ主張ハ大率ニ即今同トナリ  
萬八千噸ト同ニ歸ス其ノ故ハ今同トナリ  
限會議當時ニ於テ八百噸以下ノ潛水艦無制限  
ナリシニ以テ我カ八百噸以下ノ潛水艦ヲ算入  
ヤサリシニ以テナリ要スル日本ノ現有勢力

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専門委員間暫定安協案ニ於テは万噸均  
 勢ト定ムル付我カ海軍中央部ニ於テ反  
 對ナリシカト言フニ大ニ反對論アリタリ然レハ日英  
 八時巡洋艦ニ付テハ割以上ヲ獲タルモ總括七  
 割ニ達セザルハ故テ以テ非難論議セラルリ故  
 ニ今回ニドモ會議ニ臨座ハ五リテモ我カ海  
 軍ノ主張ハ同ク現有勢力ヲ保持シ使要ト  
 スルニ在リタリ尤モ八時巡洋艦ニ付テハ不  
 少會議力ニ於テハ各國共今日如ク之ニ  
 重ヲ置カス從テ日本ノ保有量ハ比較的有利  
 ニ認メラル程ナルカ今日新造ノモノハ戰鬥  
 力優越ナルト認メラルニ至リタル結果日本  
 七割ニ要求スル次第ナルト所謂今日日本  
 作リタル方針ニ非ス而シテ所謂既定ノ  
 方針トシテ正十二年ニ定マリタル國防方針  
 基礎ヲ作戦計畫ノ遂行上必要ナル兵力量  
 ニ付テ謂フナリ故ニ先以總括七割八時巡洋艦  
 七割及潜水艦現有勢力ノ三者カ割令セラル  
 ルナリ其ハ何シカ重要ナルカヲ言ハス又ハ  
 文書中ニモ三大厚則ト言ハス唯此ノ三者カ要  
 求主眼ナル事ナルカ故ニ人評テ三大厚則ト  
 謂フナリ固ヨリ海軍トシテハ之ニ重ヲ置  
 キタリ而シテ古井顧問官御説如クハ  
 下ノ會議ニ於テ主力艦七割ノ要求成ラズ  
 シテ七割ト爲リ又以テネーダ會議ノ時日

No. 23

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英艦定安女揚安二於三補助艦六割ト高リ  
 タル三ト十二令向天多年研究三重示九海軍  
 困難ニ於テ我力七割、要求ヲ貫徹スルコトノ  
 三鑑ミ始テ三大原則ヲ以テ全權ヲ負真ニ  
 訓令其水陣ヲ布ト共ニ全力ヲ擧年々  
 下朝野ノ諒解ヲ得ルニ努ムル所ニシテ  
 之ヲ為壯年ノ士官等諸方ニ主張講演シテ大ニ三原則ノ高  
 調ニ中ニ以テ得セシ國七ノヘシト云フ如キ極端ニ言論ヲ  
 為シタル者アリクモ如シ而モ其唱國ヲ廢スル至誠ニ志スル  
 事ニテ其結果國論能一致ノ會議ニ於テ總括的七割ノ  
 成果、如キ亦之ニ負テ行アルモノ思料スル石井廣岡官軍  
 部、於テ是亦三原則ノ高調ニ力加シ、今日此ノ會議、結  
 果ニ付更ニ國民諒解ヲ得ルニ如キ女兵トシテ不稱トセラル  
 カ如キ物、自ラ女軍ノ程度アリ前ノ會議、臨ミタル時ト今日  
 ト、場合ヲ異ニス況ヤ次回ノ會議、事ヲ考慮スルニ於テヤ  
 次回ノ會議ニ於テ、其時ニ於テ女軍トシテ所ヲ以テ今回以上  
 ニ精査ニ其改善ノ方法ニ向テ努ムル為メ、凡ソ或時、主  
 張力女兵モ永久ノモノト限ラズ現ニ米國、如キ或時、著  
 水艦、必要ヲ唱ヘ或時ニ之ヲ全廢設ヲ唱フカ如キ狀  
 況ニシテ十年前ト今日ト軍備ニ變化ヲ来セルトモアルヲ以  
 テ時宜ニ應ニ主張ニ變化ヲ来スベシト云フ亦當然ノ事  
 ナリ尚補給費用及國民負擔問題、向テ總理大臣ヨリ答

No. 24

詳セラルル所アリ  
 四番意見國防補充計畫及國民負擔輕減問題ニ付、  
 本員會報告書ヲ以テ本員會ニ於テ亦一見政府、所信  
 ヲ詳シクモ  
 又

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No. 25

結論を良く書カレタルニ因リ茲ニ更メテ述フルノ要ナリ  
 へシ又石井顧問官モ強テ説明ヲ求メラルニ非サ  
 ルヘシ要スルニ補充計畫モ負擔輕減モ今日尙當  
 局ニ於テ熱心攷究中ニ屬シ未タ具體的數字ヲ述  
 へ得ル程度ニ至ラス而シテ補充計畫ノ要目ハ海軍  
 大臣カ委員會ニ於テ述へタル所ヲ報告書中ニ引用  
 セラレタル通ニシテ夫以上ノコトハ不明ニシテ今秋豫  
 算編成後ハ非サレハ確定セズ不確實ノ事ヲ述フル  
 ヲ欲セサルヲ以テ今ハ此ノ程度ノ説明ニ止ムル外ナシ  
 三十六番(石井) 本官ハ敢テ政府ニ對シ具體的  
 計畫又ハ數字ノ説明ヲ求ムルニ非ス唯此ノ報  
 告書中ニハ補充計畫及負擔輕減ノ大體方針  
 ヲモ示リストアルモ只今總理大臣ハ委細説明セル  
 カ如ク述ヘラレタリ余ハ樞密院カ本寮本御諮詢  
 ヲ蒙リタル以上委員會トシテ條約當面ノ目的  
 タル補充計畫及負擔輕減ニ付當局ニ質ス所ア  
 ルヘキハ當然ノコトナリト思料ス然ルニ其ノ大綱要目  
 ヲモ示リスト謂フニ至テハ餘リニ顧問官ヲシテ是  
 非ノ判定ニ困難ヲ感セシムルモノト謂フヘシ只主義  
 トシテ大體如何ナル部分ハ補充費ニ充テ如何ナル  
 部分ハ負擔輕減ニ充ツルト云フカ如キ例ヘハ潜水  
 艦七千五百噸ノ不足ヲ基礎トスレハ何程補充ヲ  
 要スト云フカ如キ大體ノ目安ハ立テ得ルニ非スヤ  
 何令ノ御説明ヲ求ム

四番(濱田) 先刻政府ノ所見トシテ述へタルカ如ク海  
 軍ノ既定計畫トシテ昭和六年度ヨリ同十一年度



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迄留保ナル金額總計約五億圓ニシテ之ヲ以テ本條  
 約ニ依ルニ換建造茲兵力量補充經費及國民負  
 擔輕減ニ充ツヘシテ此等ノ相互ニ關係ヲ有スルヲ  
 以テ同時ニ決定スルヲ要シ從テ豫算并編成期ニ至ラ  
 サレハ判明ニ難キモノナリ然レハ金額ヲ雜リテ大綱  
 要目如何之ニ付テハ審査報告書二十三枚目ニ海軍  
 大臣ノ委員會ニ於ケル説明ヲ記載セル中ニ然レハ  
 本條約ニ依ル兵力量ヲ以テシテ帝國國防ノ安全ヲ期  
 スルコトヲ得ルヤ否ヤ之ヲ當局大臣ニ質シタル當  
 局大臣ハ兵力量ヲ以テシテ從來ノ國防方針ニ  
 基ク作戰計畫ノ維持遂行上或ハ困難アリハモ  
 面ニ輕巡洋艦及驅逐艦ニ於テ豫期以上ノ保有  
 量ヲ獲得シセリ更ニ他面ニ代換建造ノ權利ヲ  
 適當ニ實ニ行スルノ外例ハ既成艦船ノ整備裝備  
 ノ改善制限外艦船ノ整備、航空機、擴張等所  
 謂内容ノ凡實ヲ圖リ且兵員ノ訓練教養、改善、  
 乘組定員、增加等所謂術力、向上ニ努ムル等、補  
 充方法ヲ執ルニ於テハ略國防ノ安全ヲ期スルコトヲ  
 得ヘシト信ストアリ尤ハ委員會ニ於ケル大綱要目  
 ノ説明ニシテ今日ニ於テモ此ノ以上説明ノ材料ヲ有  
 セサルヲ遺憾トス故ニ此ノ程度ヲ以テ御了承ヲ乞フ  
 二十三番(黑) 此ノ會議ヲ午後ニ續行セラルルヤ  
 議長倉道 此ノ上永引ク様ナレハ御都合ヲ伺  
 タル上ニテ午後ニ續行ニテ可ナリ。  
 二十三番(黑) 本案第三付テハ委員各位ノ嚴正ナル  
 態度ヲ以テ十餘御精査ノ結果報告セラレタル所

No. 26

Doc 89 /

ニ依リ略シ解ニタルカ細目ニ至リテ各種々質問シタ  
事項アリ併政府ノ答辯ヲ察スルニ委員會ニ於テ  
ル説明以上ニ及ハサルカ如ニ故ニ余ハ委員會ノ報告  
ヲ信シ質問ヲ差控テ之ヲ兵報告書中ニ國務大臣  
ノ説明ニ依リ近時國內ノ情勢大ニ憂慮ス  
ヘキモノ現シ云々トアリ其ノ意如何詳細ノ御説明  
ヲ承リタリ

四番 覆書 曰ニド、ニ條約ニ關シテ、樞府御諮詢  
前ヨリ政界ニ及ホスヘキ影響等ニ付世上ニ兎角、  
風評アリ事ヲ好ム徒之ニ和シテ種々臆説ヲ流布  
シ爲ニ世界及財界ノ不安ヲ招クノ徵候アリタルカ  
七月二十七日愈々本條約ノ御諮詢ト爲リ樞府事務  
局ノ下采査ヲ經テ八月十八日始メテ第一回ノ審査  
委員會開會セラシ爾來九月十七日ニ至ル迄日ヲ經  
ルニト五丁餘日委員會ヲ開クコト十二回其ノ間  
都下ノ新聞紙ハ委員會ノ議事ノ秘密ニシテ其  
ノ真相ヲ知ルコトヲ得サル爲ニ且ニ揣摩臆測ヲ  
逞ムニ種々ノ記事ヲ掲載シ事情ヲ知ラサル讀  
者ハ或ハ條約ノ運命ニ付一點ノ疑ヲ挾ニ或ハ樞  
府ト政府トノ衝突ヲ危クニ云テ各種團體ニテ  
此ノ問題ニ乘リテ策動ヲ試ムルモノ續出シ又種々ノ  
文書中ニハ怪文書ト目セラルルモノアリ公然又ハ秘密  
裡ニ各方面ニ頒布セラシ離間中傷至ニサルナキ  
ノ狀況アリキ爲ニ人ヲシテ其ノ真偽是非ヲ辨別セ  
シムルニ能ハサルカ如キ状態ニシテ其ノ結果一般ノ  
人心ヲニテ一種言フヘカラサル不安不愉快ニ陥ラシ

No. 27

Doc 891

No. 28

メタルコトハ蔽フヘカニサレ事蹟ナリ左キタニ社會、  
 人心免名ハ平靜沈著ヲ缺ケル今日ノ場合ニ於テ此、  
 如キ状態能ハ永續ハ決ニテ喜フヘキコトニ非ス而モ係  
 約ノ運命カ未定ノ状態ニ在ル間ハ此ノ種不安状態  
 ノ終熄ハ之ヲ望ムコトヲ得サルノミナラス人心ノ不  
 安ハ日々ノ新聞ノ記事其ノ他種々ノ惡宣傳ニ刺戟  
 セラレテ益々甚シキヲ加フルノ傾向歴然タルモアリ多  
 特ニ政府ノ最モ憂慮ニ堪ヘサリシコトハ財界ノ問題ナ  
 リ我國財界ノ現状ハ金解禁ノ善後策ニ加フルニ世  
 界的大不景氣ノ影響ヲ受ケ之ニ善處セサルヘカニ  
 サル最モ要ナル時ニシテ一定ノ方針ニ則リ官民一致  
 最善ノ努力ヲ爲スニアラサレバ或ハ國民經濟ノ前途  
 ヲ誤ラサルヤヲ恐ル此ノ時ニ方リ樞府對政府ノ關係  
 係ニ因リ政界ノ不安定久シキニ涉ルニ於テ近時頗  
 ル神經過敏ニ陥ル財界ノ人々ハ何時政變ノ爲政  
 府ノ財政經濟政策ニ大ナル變更ヲ來スヤモ知  
 レス、直後慮ヨリシテ事業界金融界ノ人々ハ安  
 心ニテ其ノ事業ヲ經營シ其ノ業務ニ從事スルヲ  
 得ス唯手ヲ束ネテ空ニク成行ヲ傍觀スルノ  
 外ナキノミナラス種々ノ流言蜚語其ノ間ニ行ハ  
 場ハ動搖シテ益々不安定ニ難カルヘシ抑ニ政界、  
 不安又ハ政變ノ凶惑ノ如キハ平常無事ノ際ニ  
 在テハ財界ニ左述重大ナル影響ヲキサシムルモ今  
 日ノ財界ハ金解禁ノ實行セラレシヨリ未ダ遠カ  
 ラス從テ其ノ影響未ダ鎮靜スルニ至ラサルニ加ヘテ

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前述、如、世界的不景氣、影響相當深刻ニシテ  
 財界、人心頗ル神經過敏ト爲レ、際學者及新  
 聞雜誌記者、一部、間ニ從來定平ニ學究的好  
 奇的ニ唱ヘラシタル平價切下解禁論ナルモノ、現ニ氣  
 勢ヲ即×株式市場ニ關係アル者等カ投機思  
 或心のニ此ノ説ヲ利用スルニ至リタルニ至ラス終ニ  
 政界財界ニ於テ相當ノ地位ヲ有スル一部ノ人々特  
 ニ財界ノ現狀及其前途ニ付本ニ悲觀的意見  
 ヲ有スル、人等カ故意カ眞面目ナルカラ知ラサルモ  
 次ノ内閣、或ハ金ノ輸出再禁止ヲ斷行シ其ノ結果  
 爲替相場、或ル程度ニ下落ニ其ノ安定セル頃ヲ  
 見計ヒ其ノ下落ノ程度ニ應ジテ平價ヲ切下ケテ  
 再ヒ金解禁ヲ實行スル、政策ヲ取ルニ非サルカ  
 ト、觀測財界ノ該方面ニ行ハルニ至リ中心之ヲ  
 信用スル者又之ヲ信用セサル迄モ財界ニ於ケル斯カ  
 ル危懼心ノ利用シテ私利私益ヲ圖ルノ具ニ供セ  
 ムトスル者ヲ生シタリ此ノ如キ現象ハ識者ノ常識  
 ヲ以テ之ハ想像スルニト能ハサル所ナルモ何分神經  
 ノ特ニ過敏ト爲レ、近時、財界ノコトナルハ此等  
 ノ虛實ハ此等ノ宣傳又ハ思或心カ安外今日、財界  
 ニ實質的ノ影響ヲ及ボスニ至リタルモノナリ而シテ  
 其ノ最モ顯著ナル事實ハ正貨ノ海外流出ナリ  
 金解禁ノ下ニ於テ上半期ノ輸入期ニ相當ノ正貨  
 流出アルハ怪ムニ足ラサル所ナルモ下半期出超ノ時期  
 ニ入リ而シテ年末ノ輸入期ヲ距ルニ尚遠キ最近  
 ノ時機ニ於テ相當巨額ノ正貨流出ヲ見タルハ其

No. 29

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No. 30

原因他ニ存スルト雖モ、政界財界、人カ政府於  
 此條約審議進行、進ムルニ因リ種々、臆設ヲ送ルニ  
 政界不安之傳、夫リ联想シテ、金、輸出入禁止、新平  
 價解禁ヲ氣構ヘテ為習相場、動搖ナリタルニ因リモト  
 思惟之故ニ、政府、審議ニシテ此ノ上長ク決ムルヲ延ブ  
 政界、不安云々ニ於テ上述ノ如キ傾向、益々顯著ト為リ  
 其ノ結果、世界全般ニ於テ此ノ憂々（キ現象）見ルニ至ルモ  
 測、難ニ本條約審議、成行付政府、最モ憂慮シタル、  
 實ニ此ノ憂々ニ存スルニ、審査委員各位、於テ、國家、重キヲ  
 念シ、速ニ之ヲ審議シ、全員一致ヲ以テ本案ヲ可決セ  
 之ニ因リ、其月中旬以來、漸ク政界、不安ヲ見ルニ至リ、延  
 此ノ方面ヨリ、未レ財界、不安ヲ除クヲ得ルニ至リ、政府、  
 深ク憂シナリ

二三會名ニ、了解ヨリ、質問シタキニ、數々、トトモ審  
 査委員各位、殷念ニシテ、調査ヲ行ハルコトナシ、之ヲ敬且  
 信シ、茲ニ、賛成、意ヲ表ス  
 議長、倉庫也、別ニ、御發言ナキニ、由リ、直ニ、採決ニ付スル  
 委員會、報告、並ニ、賛成、各位、起立ヲ請フ  
 全會一致可決

聖上ノ御

(午後零時三十分閉會)

議長 田中

倉庫 田中三郎

書記 官長

二上 兵治

書記 官

堀江 李雄  
武藤 盛雄

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證 明 書

一ワシントン工文書局 第 第  
國 際 秘 察 部 第 八 九 一 號

長 塚 及 ビ 公 正 ニ シ ス ル 證 明

余、御木知男ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ工務院  
事務官トシテ、日本政府ト公同關係ニ在ルモノナル  
コト、茲ニ該官更トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレタル、  
一八六頁ヨリ成ル、千九百三十年ノ昭和五年ノ十月  
一日附、下記姓名、即チ千九百三十年一ロンドン工  
務院事務官御披露ノ件ノ文書ノ保管ニ任シ居ルコトヲ  
茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文在ナ  
ルコト、茲ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式文書  
及ビ其ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シテラハ御披露  
及ハ引用、其ノ他公式文書又ハ其ニ於ケル該文書  
ノ成規所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ) 工務院事務官

千九百四十六年ノ西曆二十一年ノ十月一日

東京ニ於テ署名

管該官更身名欄

御 木 知 男

右ノ者ノ公同資格

工務院事務官

證 人

J. A. CURTIS 2d IT

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公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、<sup>ジエ。エ。カ。ナ。ク</sup> J. A. CURTIS、余が聯合國兵高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、<sup>ニ</sup> 茲ニ上記姓名ノ文書ハ余が公府上、日本政府ノ上記姓名官吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／十月一日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名 欄

J. A. CURTIS 2d LT

右ノ者ノ公的資格

INVESTIGATOR

証人

RICHARD H. LARSH

Ex. 912 1

"THE METHOD AND MAIN POINTS OF ENLIGHTENING PUBLIC OPINION ON  
THE PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATION RE 1935 NAVAL LIMITATIONS CONFERENCE"

Decided on 12 October 1934

The enlightenment and guidance of public opinion on the preliminary negotiation re 1935 Naval Limitations Conference shall be done based upon the following according to general principles:

ACCOUNT

I. MATTERS OF ENLIGHTENMENT

- (1) It is the national right of every country to hold sufficient military forces in order to stabilize her own national defense; at the same time for our Empire, it is a necessary duty in order to secure the peace of East Asia.
- (2) Our Empire's claim is not the expansion of armaments but the reduction of armaments; namely, it means to plan the armament reduction of all nations to the utmost based upon the spirit of disarmament and to contrive to lighten the national burden as much as possible in the future. Moreover, it means the promotion of friendship among nations.
- (3) In order to establish the principle of no-threats and no-aggression, it is necessary to carry out limitation of armament by abolishing or by reducing offensive force, and by replenishing defensive force.
- (4) Our Empire denounces the Washington Treaty, but she hopes to conclude a just and appropriate treaty as a substitute.
- (5) In case an agreement is not effected, the Empire has a counter-plan which will make the best of the situation from the standpoint of national defense. However, the Empire will persistently maintain an attitude of just peace and, of course, try willingly not to aggravate peaceful relations with the interested countries.

II. THE WAY OF ENLIGHTENMENT

- (1) Internal enlightenment and propaganda shall be performed through journalists and correspondents. In addition, the interested authorities will dispatch lecturers in case of necessity; or it shall be done by contributions to newspapers, by broadcasts, by films, by distribution of pamphlets and so on.
- (2) All interested officials shall guide internal newspaper and magazine writers and correspondents. Even though they will avoid as much as possible



taking measures such as banning publication of anything except currently banned matters, each ministry shall exert itself and shall attempt to prevent publication of speeches which might destroy a policy already decided by the Empire, which make special mention of opposition of ministry to ministry, of disunity of internal public opinion, or the publishing of articles which would tend unnecessarily to stimulate internal and external public opinion. Each ministry should try to prevent it.

(3) As the newspaper articles containing announcements for internal enlightenment are promptly translated by foreign journalists in Japan and are telegraphed outside Japan, when the aforesaid announcements are made, we must give ample consideration to the foreign reaction.

(4) We should carry on propaganda for foreign enlightenment according to item (5) in addition to carrying it on through foreign correspondents in Japan and Japanese correspondents. We shall direct organizations abroad such as our foreign companies and non-official groups, and Japanese residents abroad to cooperate with the policy of enlightenment of the Government. Special consideration shall be given to the indirect effectiveness of internal enlightenment.

(5) The enlightenment in foreign countries shall be conducted with foreign diplomatic establishments as centers. Concerning this, the central government shall consider and take measures for close liaison with military and naval attaches in diplomatic establishments abroad.

(6) The guidance and the enlightenment of foreign correspondents should be done with the Foreign Office as a center.

(7) As censorship of the communications of foreign correspondents is not established as a system, we make it a rule not to limit them especially, except in the case of an extreme communication; instead the guidance of correspondence is emphasized.

(8) We should make a separate study concerning refutation and counter-propaganda in response to the propaganda from foreign countries.

(9) We should make a separate study concerning the prevention of the bribing of internal newspapers and magazines by others, and the buying of foreign newspapers and magazines.

(10) We should make a separate study concerning the oppositions and the artificialities, etc., in the public opinion of countries which participated in the Conference, especially those of Britain and America.

(11) The controlled and firm attitude of the authorities is a basic condition of enlightenment and guidance, and at the same time, it is the best protective wall for stopping propaganda from foreign countries. Accordingly officials in charge of each interested ministry should maintain the necessary liaison.

The End

REFERENCE (Confidential) 25 Navy

METHOD OF EXTERNAL PROPAGANDA

I. The policy of Japan is always to maintain peace in the East.

(1) The maintenance of peace in the East is not only one of the greatest pillars for the Peace System of the world, but also it is the important element of existence for Japan without which self-supply and self-support are impossible and the importing and exporting of goods are necessary.

(2) Therefore, the maintenance of peace in the East and the Japanese national defense are closely connected and indivisible.

(3) History testifies that Japan protected, at the risk of her national fortune, the peace of the East every time it was in danger. In fact, Japan has never taken up arms except in the above instance.

(4) For other powers also, the maintenance of peace in the East is the guarantee of their trade in the East.

(5) When the powers look dispassionately at the actual situation in the East, they will discover Japan as the only defender of the peace of the East and will be unable to help thanking her and respecting her.

II. The attitude of Japan is always on a basis of justice and duty, and at the Naval Conference of 1935, Japan is to take the same attitude.

(1) The intention of Japan based on the spirit of the reduction of armament, is to abolish increases in armament and to reduce armament. In this case, the powers with the greatest armament should take the lead in making reductions.

(2) It is absolutely necessary to maintain national existence. Therefore, every country has an equal right to feel at ease about her defense; so each nation has an equal right to provide the armament necessary for national defense.

(3) As naval strength is very easily moved, all powers concerned can be at ease as regards national defense when the treaty based on the principle "NOT TO THREATEN OTHERS" is concluded.

(4) This discriminating ratio of naval strength is a violation of the principle of no-threats and no-aggression and should be rejected.

(5) In order not to menace one another, we should abolish or drastically reduce our offensive force, and assert our defensive armament.

III. The abrogation of the existing treaty is a natural stage in concluding a new impartial treaty.

(1) Ten years have passed since the conclusion of the Washington Treaty and this treaty has lost its validity due to the development of sciences and due to the changes in the international situation. The discriminating ratio gives Japan especially a constant menace and makes her anxious about the safety of her national defense. This stimulates still more the idea of opposing powers, and is not the measure for maintaining the international peace; we must abrogate this as soon as possible.

(2) The Washington Treaty itself anticipates the loss of its validity owing to the passing of time, and provides for the abrogation of the treaty. Therefore, according to the stipulation of the treaty, it will be natural for Japan to announce the abrogation of the treaty; this is based on her constructive hope for concluding a new treaty, impartial and suitable for the present situation.

(3) The London Treaty is originally temporary and it is natural that we abrogate it according to its provision and substitute a new agreement.

(4) It is the traditional spirit of the Japanese that they get along with good neighbors and help their neighbors, making nothing of their own lives in the maintenance of justice. No one can terrorize her by putting on a demon's mask.

NAVAL COMMITTEE VERBAL NOTE

(to be distributed at the 4th Joint Disarmament  
Information Commission, 5 October 1934)

All the Ministries cannot carry out the concrete details of propaganda and its diffusion in the same way for they all are in different situations, and it may be advantageous for each Ministry to take a different attitude in attaining the object.

The principle should be that all have a close connection beneath the surface. Under separate cover is contained the elementary methods of propaganda diffusion now being used by the Navy. We shall be pleased if you make a suitable selection and use it.

CONFIDENTIAL - REFERENCE 25 Navy

ELEMENTS OF INTERNAL PROPAGANDA

I. We should be sure to make the people believe that maintaining the national defense power permanently is absolutely essential to the armament reduction treaty.

(1) Generally speaking, it is absolutely necessary that an independent country has the right to armaments necessary to safeguard herself.

(2) Without the safety of national defense, we positively cannot expect to build the international peace system, the stability of the national life, nor the future prosperity of the country.

(3) Therefore, a just and impartial treaty of armament reduction should contain the permanent maintenance of the national defense as its essence.

II. The following items should be emphasized for the conclusion of a just and valid new treaty for armament reduction.

(1) We cannot accept any treaty which threatens the independence of the national defense of Japan and by which the permanence of the national defense of Japan cannot be anticipated.

(2) To insure the principle of no-threats and no-aggression, we abolish the gradation and ratio. Moreover, we should limit our armament on the basis of drastically reducing military strength and replenishing military strength.

(3) All nations should plan to drastically lower their amounts in accord with the spirit of reducing armament.

III. We explain the following concerning the abrogation of the existing treaty.

(1) As ten-year years have passed since the conclusion of the Washington Treaty, it is not suited to the present situation due to scientific progress and changes in the international situation in the meantime. The treaty itself anticipates its own abrogation, and it is the proper and just preparatory measure for concluding a new and just armament reduction treaty. Therefore, it is not simply as a use of a right proper from the standpoint of the treaty, but as a step in the direction of a fair agreement that we announce the abrogation of the treaty.

(2) The London Treaty is a temporary agreement in force until the end of 1936, and after the term is over it will naturally become invalidated.

IV. Japan who resigned from the League of Nations with regard to the Manchuria Incident experienced the fact that a just claim is not necessarily always recognized in an international conference. Even if our claim should unfortunately not be accepted, and the agreement should not be concluded, we need not necessarily expect the opening of a ship construction race considering the national situation in the various countries. If such competition should appear, the authorities are confident of maintaining the national defense by independent measures. Therefore, we should strongly advocate that the people should not be afraid of it.

V. Due to the situation of the empire, the defense of the empire is connected with East Asiatic peace and indivisibility, and as the maintenance of naval force by Japan is the basis of the peace of East Asia, they should be made to recognize emphatically that the future of Japan depends on the vicissitudes of her Navy.

VI. As the negotiation for the armament reduction reaches its climax, foreign propaganda may become violent. We must spread the warning ahead of time not to be taken in by foreign tricks.

Doc 16/01A

秘

昭和九年十月十一日決案

昭和十年海軍軍縮會議豫備交渉ニ  
対シテ輿論啓發事項及方法

昭和十年海軍軍縮會議豫備交渉ニ対シテ輿論啓發  
指導ニ般綱領ニ遵由之左記依リ之ヲ行フ

### 一 啓發事項

(一) 各國ノ自國ノ國防ヲ守固スルニ充テル兵力ヲ保持スルニト  
シテ當然ノ權利ナリト共ニ帝國トシテ東亞ノ平和確保ノ大  
責ニ負テ居ルニ下

(二) 帝國ノ主張スル軍備縮小ニ非スル軍備縮小ニテ即  
チ軍縮ノ精神ニ基テ極力各國ノ有量ニ減下スルヲ以テ  
將來成可ノ國民負擔ノ緩和ヲ圖リ且各國間ノ平和親  
交ヲ増進スルニ下

(三) 不始戦不侵路ノ原則ヲ確立スル為メ必要ノ兵力ヲ全廢  
及ニ縮減スル防禦ノ兵力ヲ充實スル趣旨ニ基テ軍備縮小  
限リ行フニ要スルニ下

(四) 帝國ノ互府條約ノ廢棄ヲ行フニ代シテ可キ正妥當  
ナル條約ヲ締結スルニ下

(五) 下一協長不成立ニ終リル場合ニ於テ帝國トシテ國府上  
之ニ善處スル對策ヲ行フ但シ帝國トシテ飽ク迄ニ正平  
和状態ヲ守ルニ下之ヲ進テ國府間ノ平和關係  
ヲ惡化セザルニ力スルニ下

10.1 ☆

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No. 2 女

### 二 啓發方法

- (一) 對國內啓發宣傳而言：新聞雜誌記者通信員及  
 三行、外行等應同係當局、講演官、派遣之  
 或寄稿放送映画冊子願在等、依之、行、之、ト、ス
- (二) 國內新聞雜誌記者通信員、對、各、國、係、官、於、  
 之、指、導、現、行、禁、止、事、項、以、外、對、之、成、可、揭、載、禁  
 止、等、指、置、之、ト、以、避、之、ト、雖、之、座、國、既、定、亦、針、  
 破、壞、之、其、之、言、論、各、有、同、對、立、國、係、國、內、輿、論、不  
 統、一、等、符、記、或、不、必、字、內、外、輿、論、刺、戟、之、如、記  
 事、揭、載、各、省、協、力、之、之、所、過、之、如、之、ト、ス
- (三) 國內啓發、為、新聞發表記事、直、在、本、邦、外、國、新  
 聞、通、信、員、等、依、翻、譯、之、國、外、發、電、之、ト、以、  
 該、發、表、際、之、豫、對、外、反、響、充、分、考、慮、之、ト、ス
- (四) 對、國、外、啓、發、宣、傳、而、言、在、本、邦、外、國、通、信、員、及、本  
 邦、通、信、社、員、等、介、之、行、外、由、依、之、可、之、ト、ス  
 或、在、外、會、社、民、團、體、等、在、外、機、關、及、在、留、邦、人、之、  
 政、府、啓、發、之、協、力、之、ト、如、之、指、導、之、
- (五) 別、國、內、啓、發、向、接、的、效、果、考、慮、置、之、ト、ス
- (六) 國、外、現、地、之、啓、發、在、外、公、館、之、中、心、之、行、之、ト、ス  
 有、關、之、在、外、公、館、附、設、海、軍、武、官、之、緊、密、之、連、繫  
 之、中、央、之、考、慮、指、置、之、ト、ス
- (七) 對、外、通、信、員、之、啓、發、外、務、省、之、中、心、之、行、之、ト、ス
- (八) 對、外、通、信、員、之、通、信、對、之、檢、閱、制、度、之、確、立、之、ト、  
 之、非、之、以、之、極、端、之、通、信、之、非、之、限、之、之、制、限、也  
 之、建、前、之、字、之、通、信、員、指、導、之、置、之、ト、ス
- (九) 海、外、之、宣、傳、對、應、之、反、駁、之、宣、傳、等、同、之、ト、ス

Dac/6/8

No. 2

二 啓發方法

(一) 對國內啓發宣傳：新聞雜誌記者、通信員、記者、行、外、打、字、應、用、法、官、講、壇、官、派、遣、之

或寄稿放這、或冊子、願、不、喜、依、之、行、之、以、

(二) 國內新聞雜誌記者、通信員、對、各、國、法、官、於、之、指導、現、行、禁、止、事、項、以、外、對、成、可、揭、發、禁、止、等、指、置、之、以、避、之、難、度、既、定、亦、針、

破壞、其、已、言、論、各、自、同、對、立、國、係、國、內、輿、論、不、統、一、等、特、記、或、不、字、內、外、輿、論、刺、戟、如、記、事、揭、發、各、省、協、力、之、所、過、如、此、也、

(三) 國內啓發：為、新聞、發、表、事、直、在、本、邦、外、國、新、聞、通、信、員、等、係、翻、譯、之、國、外、發、展、之、以、以、

該、發、表、之、權、對、外、反、響、充、分、考、慮、之、要、

(四) 對國外啓發宣傳：在本邦外國通信員及本邦通信社員等、介、行、外、由、係、可、以、

或、在、外、會、社、民、間、團、體、等、在、外、機、關、及、在、留、邦、人、之、政府、啓、發、之、如、指、導、

別、國、內、啓、發、間、接、的、效、果、考、慮、置、之、以、

(五) 國外現地：於、此、啓、發、在、外、公、館、中、心、之、行、之、以、在、外、公、館、附、設、海、軍、武、官、之、緊、急、之、連、繫、中、央、之、考、慮、指、置、之、以、

(六) 對外通信員：亦、直、啓、發、外、務、省、中、心、之、行、之、以、對外通信員、通信、對、檢、閱、制、度、之、確、立、也、非、以、以、極、端、之、進、信、非、以、限、得、之、制、限、也、建、前、之、寧、日、通、信、員、指、導、置、之、以、

(七) 海外：宣傳、對、應、之、反、駁、並、直、傳、等、同、之、以、



No. 3 \*

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- 別 = 政治主義的ニシトス
- (A) 國內新聞雜誌，被買收防止。外國新聞雜誌，買收等  
 = 國ニシテ別ニ政治ス
- (T) 會議參加國就中英未輿論，对立作為等國ニ別  
 = 政治スルモノトス
- (I) 當局，統制已堅確ニ態度及，裕容指專，根本要件  
 = 同時ニ外部ニ，宣傳ヲ抑止スル取上，防壁ニシテ以テ  
 關係各省係官，必要ニ連絡ヲ保持スルモノトス

(終)

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御参考  
「秘」

對國外宣傳要項

海軍

- (一) 日本、國策、高、東洋平和、確保、ナリ
- (二) 東洋平和保全、全世界平和機構、支柱、ト、同時、自給自足、不能、ニ、物産、輸出、絶對、必要、ナル、日本、ト、ナリ、(實、其、存、立、關、ス、大、事、ナリ)
- (三) 従、東洋平和、維持、日本、国防、上、密、接、合、命、關、係、ナリ
- (四) 東洋平和、危殆、激、甚、場合、日本、其、國、運、ヲ、賭、ク、之、擁護、仕、ル、事、(青史、明證、ナル、ナリ)、日本、ナ、チ、報、ヲ、下、ル、公、報、ナ、リ、場合、ヲ、除、キ、テ、絶、無、ナリ
- (五) 列國、ト、シ、テ、東洋平和、保全、其、東洋貿易、之、進、展、之、以、保障、ナリ
- (六) 而、シ、テ、列國、之、紛、争、現、實、東洋、ヲ、直、視、ス、ル、時、必、ヤ、其、處、東洋平和、唯一、擁護、者、ナル、日本、之、ヲ、發、見、之、敬、愛、感謝、念、ハ、行、ク、ナリ
- (七) 帝國、態度、高、大、義、名、命、則、ス、ル、ニ、シ、テ、昭、和、十、年、海軍、締、結、會議、之、以、正、女、國、態度、ヲ、持、ス、ル、ナリ
- (八) 日本、主、張、締、結、大、精、神、則、リ、軍、備、擴、張、ヲ、排、シ、軍、備、縮、減、ヲ、期、ス、ル、ナリ、此、場合、高、度、重、備、國、ニ、在、ル、之、縮、減、ヲ、取、行、ス、ル、公、認、事、ナリ

女

(三) 国家生存権、保有絶対ナル国防安全感ヲ満足スル  
ハ、各国平等ニ享有スルモノニシテ国防上必要トスル限度  
ノ準備ヲ有整スルノ権利、各国等之ノ之ヲ有スルモノナリ。

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(四) 海軍力ノ移動ハ極メテ容易ナルニ鑑ミ、関係各国互ニ他  
カ脅威セザル事ヲ基調トセリ軍縮條約ヲ締結シテ妥協セテ一  
称ニ国防ノ安全感ヲ得ルモノナリ。

(四) 海軍力ノ力量ニ差等比率ヲ設クルガ如キ、將來ハ勿論現行ニ  
於テモ不脅威不侵略ノ原則ヲ害スモノニシテ斷然排斥ス  
ルモノナリ。

(五) 互ニ他カ脅威セザルニシテ又攻撃力ノ全廃若ハ極度  
ノ縮減ヲ行ヒ防禦力ノ整備ヲ主張スルモノナリ。

三、既存條約ノ廢棄ハ公正ナルニ新條約ノ協定ニ進ムガ爲メ  
ノ過程ナリ。

(一) 華英條約(其ノ協定ハ未既ニ十數年ヲ経過シ其ノ内容  
言ハ、進歩ノ國際情勢ノ変遷ニ因リ今ヤ其ノ妥協性ヲ失  
ヒタリ殊ニ其ノ差等比率ハ日本ニシテハ不斷ノ脅威ヲ感  
ゼシ国防上ノ安全感ヲ傷クルモノナリ益々國家好立ノ觀念  
ヲ刺戟シテ國際平和ヲ維持スルノ所以ニシテ之ヲ以テ速ニ廢  
棄スルノ要ナリ。

女  
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(二) 華英條約自体既ニ斯ク、如キ時代ノ経過ニ伴フ妥協性ノ消滅  
ヲ豫期シテ之ガ廢棄ノ規定ヲ設ケタリ、從ツテ日本ガ條約ノ  
規定ニ從ヒ廢棄ヲ通告ヲ行フ條約上ノ当然ノ權利行使ニシテ  
而シテ新時代ニ適合スル公正ノ條約ヲ協定セトスル建設的  
希望ニ基クモノナリ。

(三) 倫敦條約ニシテハ元來數量的協定ニシテ其ノ規定ニ專シ  
解消ノ新ナル協定ニ更迭スルノ当然ナルナリ。

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四、美隣ト相親之、相援テ正其氣、爲ニ公処ヲ鴻毛ヨリモ輕ニシテ  
僅ニ日本民族傳統精神ナリ、愈ニ人ヲ骨カスガ如キハ斷テ  
日本人ニ對シテ用スルモ、ニテ

(終)

古代

(宋四國聯合軍總情報委員會於  
配布 九一〇五)

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宣傳普及具體的組織三三三、各有立場、依、必、同、  
兼、以、進、下、能、以、之、時、又、思、之、表、現、以、之、大、向、  
目的達成上却、有利、之、上、無、三、三、三、  
要、只、內、面、的、三、高、三、密、接、大、連、絡、保、持、三、三、三、別、冊、現、  
海、軍、行、之、三、三、三、宣、傳、普、及、密、項、三、三、三、取、捨、海、軍、  
三、三、三、三、三、

別冊

御參考

對國內普及要項

海軍

25  
秋

一、國防、恒久的安全確保、軍、協、的、三、絕、對、專、件、三、三、  
國民、信心、三、三、徹、底、三、三、

- (一) 凡、自、主、獨、立、之、國、家、自、國、獨、立、之、防、護、三、三、必、要、三、三、軍、  
備、權、權、三、三、絕、對、三、三、
- (二) 國防、安全、三、三、國、際、平、和、機、構、建、設、國、民、生、活、  
安、寧、國、家、三、三、政、務、新、斷、三、三、得、力、三、三、明、白、三、三、
- (三) 從、三、三、三、三、軍、備、修、的、國防、恒久的安全確保  
三、三、絕、對、專、件、三、三、三、三、三、三、

二、公、三、三、三、新、軍、備、協、定、實、現、三、三、三、三、三、三、  
強、調、三、三、

- (一) 三、三、國防、恒久的安全、三、三、國、防、自、主、權、三、三、  
三、三、三、三、三、三、三、三、三、
- (二) 不、增、兵、不、修、略、三、三、三、三、三、三、三、三、  
三、三、三、三、三、三、三、三、三、三、三、

對

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自之基本準備，制限於以下

一、軍縮精神則，極力各國保有量，以下之圖心也

二、既存條約，齊章三國美，在，其多說以下

(一) 華府條約，其，協定以來十數年，經過之其，間糾

紛，進步，國際情勢，其，變遷，依，既，現，狀，通，之，之，

齊章，八國條約，自，發，見，之，所，且，又，心，心，安，寧，大，新，

軍縮條約，協定，之，必要，且，進，步，過，程，之，從，之，之，齊，章，

通，告，之，行，之，四，軍，條，約，之，上，之，然，之，權，力，行，使，之，止，之，三，公，心，之，協，

定，之，而，之，之，步，之，進，之，之，所，以，之，也，

三、倫敦條約，昭和十年，束，定，之，警，告，之，協，定，之，之，有，效，期，

間，之，之，之，然，之，消，滅，之，之，公，心，之，也，

四、公心，之，主張，之，國際，會議，之，之，之，必，之，之，之，之，之，也，

之，之，之，也，之，滿，洲，問題，之，之，之，之，之，之，之，也，

國，之，之，之，也，之，之，之，之，之，之，之，也，

不幸，之，之，之，也，之，之，之，之，之，之，之，也，

各國，國情，之，之，之，也，之，之，之，之，之，之，之，也，

★

五、帝國，國防，之，也，之，之，之，之，之，之，也，

而，之，之，之，也，之，之，之，之，之，之，之，也，

之，之，之，也，之，之，之，之，之，之，之，也，

1618 cert. /

證 明 啓

「ワシントン」文警局 第 一六二八 號  
國 際 檢 察 部 第 一六二八 號  
議

典 據 及 び 公 正 ニ 關 ス ル 證 明

余、筑土龍男ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ第二復員局文警課課員トシテ、日本政府ト公的關係ニ在ルモノナルコト、故ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレタル、一巻ヨリ成ル、千九百三十四年ノ昭和九年ノ九月及十月附、下記題名、即チ千九百三十五年ロンドン軍縮會議ニ關スル輿論指導、文警ノ保管ニ任シ居リシコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文警ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナルコト、故ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式書類及ビ綴ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シテラバ綴番號又ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於ケル該文警ノ成規所在、公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ) 海 軍 省

1618. cert. 2

第 二 卷 第 五 冊  
 丁 丑 年 第 五 冊  
 不 外 第 五 冊  
 ( 印 刷 )

第 二 卷 第 五 冊  
 丁 丑 年 第 五 冊  
 不 外 第 五 冊  
 ( 印 刷 )

第 二 卷 第 五 冊  
 丁 丑 年 第 五 冊  
 不 外 第 五 冊  
 ( 印 刷 )

千九百廿九年十月三日



公 司 總 經 理 處

余、2D LT. ERIC W. FLEISHER 〇 余、2D LT. ERIC W. FLEISHER 〇  
可入手〇余、2D LT. ERIC W. FLEISHER 〇  
分、文書、余、2D LT. ERIC W. FLEISHER 〇  
總、司、余、2D LT. ERIC W. FLEISHER 〇

平 光 可 區 十 六 號 〇 區 區 十 一 號 〇 十 一 號 〇 十 一 號 〇

區 區 十 一 號 〇

ERIC W. FLEISHER 〇 DLT AUSMI  
INVESTIGATOR 〇 I. P. S.  
HENRY SHIMAJIMA

I.P.S. No. 1618 A

C E R T I F I C A T E

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Tatsuo TSUKUDO hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Member of Archives and Documents Section, Second Demobilization Bureau

and that as such official I had custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 1 Volume, dated Sept. and Oct., 1934, and described as follows: "Guidance of Public Opinion Re: 1935 London Naval Limitations Conference."

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Navy Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this 3rd day of Oct., 1946.

TATSUO TSUKUDO  
Signature of Official (SEAL)

Witness: R. IMAMURA (SEAL)

Member of Archives and Documents Section, 2nd Demobil. Bureau  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, 2d Lt. ERIC T. FLEISHER O-935000, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 3rd day of October, 1946

ERIC T. FLEISHER  
NAME

Witness: HENRY SHIMOJIMA

Investigation Division, IPS  
Official Capacity

BATTLE SHIPS (B.B.)

Year 年	Names 艦名	Dates 日				Displacement 排水量	On hand 保有量	Main guns 主砲		
		Keel Laid 起工	Launched 進水	Trialed 試航	Commissioned 就役			Cal (inch) 口径	No. 枚	
1931	KONGO 金剛	1911 1-17	1912 5-8	1913 8-16	1913 8-16	29,330		14	8	
	HIEI 比叡	1911 11-4	1912 11-21	1914 8-4	1914 8-4	29,330		14	8	
	HARUNA 榛名	1912 3-16	1913 12-14	1915 4-19	1915 4-19	29,330		14	8	
	KIRISHIMA 霧島	1912 3-17	1913 12-1	1915 4-19	1915 4-19	29,330		14	8	
	FUSO 扶桑	1912 3-11	1914 7-28	1915 11-8	1915 11-8	29,330		14	8	
	YAMASHIRO 山城	1913 11-20	1915 11-3	1917 3-31	1917 3-31	29,330		14	12	
	ISE 伊勢	1915 5-10	1916 11-12	1917 12-15	1917 12-15	29,990		14	8	
	HYUGA 日向	1915 5-6	1917 7-27	1918 4-30	1918 4-30	29,990		14	8	
	NAAGATO 長門	1916 8-28	1919 11-9	1920 11-25	1920 11-25	32,720		16	8	
	MUTSU 陸奥	1918 6-1	1920 5-31	1921 10-24	1921 10-24	32,720		16	8	
	Total 計					301,400				
1932	Same as above					301,400				
1933	"					301,400				
1934	"					301,400				
1935	"					301,400				
1936	"					301,400				
1937	"					301,400				
1938	"					301,400				
1939	"					301,400				
1940	"					301,400				
1941	(Same as above +) YAMATO 大和	1937 11-4	1940 8-8	1941 12-16	1941 12-16	64,000	365,400	18	9	
1942	(Same as above +) MUSASHI 武蔵	1938 3-29	1940 11-1	1942 8-5	1942 8-5	64,000		18	9	
	(Same as above -) KIRISHIMA 霧島 HIEI 比叡						-58,660			
	Total 計 (Balance) (総計)					5,340	370,740			
1943	(Same as above -) MUTSU 陸奥					-32,720	338,020			
1944	Same as above						338,020			
1945	(Same as above -) FUSO 扶桑 YAMASHIRO 山城 KONGO 金剛 YAMATO 大和 MUSASHI 武蔵						-215,990	122,030		

Document NO 6262.

Note on HIEI

The HIEI was a training battleship since 1932 to 1940.

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CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government as Member of Research Division, Second Demobilization Bureau, and that in such official capacity, I have prepared the foregoing table from official records of the Japanese Government. I further certify that the table is true and accurate.

Hidemi Yoshida

Member of Research Division  
2nd Demobilization Bureau

Signed at Tokyo, Japan,  
on this 27 day of

September, 1946:

S. Takano

比較の國語記号

NO. 2

1932年より1940年までの間に於て比較の練習戦艦であった。

證 明 書

私は茲に第一復員局資料整理部部員として公的に日本政府の關係、其の資格に於て日本政府の公的記録より前記表を作成したことを証明する。

更に前記表の眞實且つ正確であることを証明する。

第一復員局資料整理部部員

吉 田 英 三

1946年9月27日

日本東京に於て

高 野 左 平

Ex. 914

DOCUMENT No. 903-A

Page 1

TOP SECRET

At the Secret Meeting  
of the Third Special Committee of the  
Japan Diplomatic Association

Delivered by Vice-Admiral TOYODA, Soeru,  
Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau of Navy Ministry

(SUMMARY)

Outline of Naval Budget for the Fiscal Year 1937  
and the  
General Aspect of National Defense  
Related to the Navy

(January, 1937)

Japan Diplomatic Association

This is the gist of the speech delivered by Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau of Navy Ministry TOYODA at a secret meeting of the Third Special Committee of our association (concerning diplomacy and the Navy). It has been recorded by the secretary of this association. Consequently, we have not obtained the speaker's consent nor his approval of this speech. Naturally, this association bears entire responsibility for this copy.

Investigation Bureau  
Japan Diplomatic Association

December, 1937

Further, it is requested that special attention be directed so as not to permit these pamphlets to be read by people other than the members of the Special Committee of this association.

Outline of Naval Budget for the  
Next Fiscal Year  
and  
General Aspect of National Defense as  
Related to the Navy

Delivered by

Mr. TOYODA, Soeru, Vice Admiral,  
Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau of  
Navy Ministry

It is an honor for me to have the opportunity to focus my talk on the naval budget for the next fiscal year and to speak on what the Navy is thinking about. As I have made hasty preparations for this speech, I am afraid you will find it hard to listen to. You are cordially requested to ask me questions and to give comments later on.

The order of my speech will be as follows: The present international situation and the viewpoint of the Imperial Navy; recent conditions of the British and U. S. navies and those of other Powers; what the future armament policy of the Imperial Navy should be on the basis of the recent international situation and the recent naval conditions of the various Powers; then the outline and the key points of the naval budget for the next fiscal year drawn up on the basis of the aforesaid policy of armament; and the future of the ship construction competition about which so much is being said. I should like to give my personal opinions on these questions first, and then, taking into consideration the aforesaid future situation, to speak on what the Imperial Navy's budget ought to be in years to come.

1. Determination to cope with the non-treaty era.

Though our delegates attended the disarmament conference held in London from the end of last year to the beginning of this year, with the claim that externally we would promote a feeling of national safety and internally reduce the burden on the people by reducing our naval armament as much as possible by cutting down on aggressive armament and by intensifying the defensive power according to the fundamental policy of non-threat and non-invasion, the Powers



did not recognize our just and rational claim; and the Empire was obliged to withdraw from the conference. Within ten days we entered a naval non-treaty era as far as Japan was concerned, but we do not intend to encourage a ship-building competition nor a threat to other Powers, as we, as the Japanese Government or as the Imperial Navy, have taken every opportunity to declare both before and after the Disarmament Conference and up to the present. We have a firm intention to push our naval armaments in the future with this conviction. But although we would not encourage ship-building competition, we cannot remain a spectator, leaving the armaments to take care of themselves if we look at the present international situation and consider the fact that naval armament has an important relation to the execution of the national policy. There is no denying that there is an urgent need to observe the situation closely and to set up a plan to cope with it. Since the present international situation as it concerns Japan is one of the subjects which it is the duty of this association to study, your Excellencies are well aware of the said situation and as it is I who will have to ask for your instructions, I shall not go into details.

When I think of the diplomatic developments up to now from the time of the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident and from the time of our withdrawal from the League of Nations two years ago, I feel that importance and difficulty are being added day by day to Japan's national defense. During the interim, there have been ups and downs, and I cannot say that when we look at the future the present state of affairs is reassuring.

## 2. Britain, U. S., Soviet Russia and China as the central consideration.

I believe that Britain, U. S., Soviet Russia and China will become the core of Japan's external relations to which we shall have to give our closest attention. Though our navy has no direct relation with Soviet Russia, we have, of course, several indirect relationships. However, our navy is not so much concerned with Russia as with Britain and the U. S. Although I shall refrain from speaking in full detail here, we are well aware of the fact that the army will have to replenish its armament as preparation against Soviet Russia.

The greatest obstacle to the execution of Japan's foreign policy can never be limited to Soviet Russia alone. I feel that we must concern ourselves especially with Britain and the U.S.A. Even now we can draw such conclusion, judging from the naval armament of these two countries. England has important rights and interests in China, not to mention India, and, of course, she must have enough power to secure such rights and interests; on the other hand, the U. S. does not have such big interests in China nor in other Oriental countries. She has few overseas investments and little trade as compared with Japan. Nevertheless, the U. S. in the past few years, especially since the

outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, has been making a great effort to complete the equipment of her Navy. If we consider this fact and the attitude which her Navy is taking at present, we shall clearly understand what the U. S. has in mind. Some Americans, and even some Japanese, often say that the U. S. does not have such big interests in the Orient and that for this reason common sense tells us that the U. S. will absolutely not attack Japan. On the contrary, I feel that reality indicates that the U. S. has a special concern to suppress Japan. There are wars in the absolute sense, and wars in the relative sense. If Japan and the U. S. should fight one another in the future the war will be absolute and a question of life and death to Japan; but not to the U. S. That is, to the U. S. it will be a war for her prosperity, while it will be a question of life or death to Japan. Therefore, viewed from a common sense standpoint, it is absurd to say that the U. S. will spend so much money and make various large scale gestures to put pressure on Japan. But actually she is doing so. The U. S. naval installations of recent years and the question of stationing the Pacific fleet permanently in the East, of which I will speak more fully later, have no other object than to check and oppress Japan.

In short, both the U. S. and Britain do not like Japan's development in the East. It is their basic idea to wish to check it in some way and to nip it in the bud; consequently, various questions which accidentally occur in the international relation, are always based on the aforesaid idea, though the situations may differ. We must, therefore, keep this in mind all the time, and to say that the U. S. has relaxed her pressure or has tightened it by looking at her superficial behavior must be avoided so that we may not mistake the main issue. After all, the Imperial Navy has not the least intention of attacking the U. S., at least at the present time, but we must be prepared at any cost with an invincible attitude. I believe that it is only by this attitude that Japan's foreign policy will be guaranteed.

### 3. Comparison of Japanese, British and U. S. Naval Expenditures.

I shall speak on the latest situation of British and U. S. navies.

In comparing the British, U. S. and Japanese naval expenditures, as shown in Table I, we find that the Manchurian Incident which broke out in 1931, and the Shanghai Incident in 1932, have made it necessary for Japan to make a supplementary budget, etc., raising the amount to ¥300,000,000. Since then the amount has increased yearly. The measures which Japan was obliged to take to cope with the tenseness in the international situation appear in the budget. Likewise, the budgets of the British and U. S. navies have also rapidly increased during the past three years.

TABLE I

	NAVAL EXPENDITURE (Unit - one million)						
	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936
UNITED STATES (dollars)	383	360	329	406	455	482	527
BRITAIN (pounds)-Navy	52.6	51.6	50.5	53.6	58.8	67.8	84.1
" " -Air Force	17.9	15.1	17.4	17.4	20.4	30.8	55.2
JAPAN (yen)	253	295	307	404	489	530	550

#### 4. U. S. Ship-building Program and its Present Condition.

The latest ship-building program of the U. S. and its present state of progress are shown in Table II. Almost in the same way as the Japanese Navy, the U. S. Navy draws up a comprehensive ship-building program to be effected within a limited number of years, but the budget is not in the form of continuous expenditures like that of Japan, but the necessary budget is appropriated yearly. Consequently, it often happens that even if a program has been decided on the ship building does not go according to the program, depending on the financial situation at the time.

The biggest plan now existing is the Vinson plan which was set up in 1934, involving 102 ships, about 200,000 tons, at a cost of \$500,000,000, which is expected to be completed by 1939, so it will be finished in 1940. In addition to the above, in the preceding year, she was building 32 ships, about 120,000 tons, with a budget of \$238,000,000, derived from the money from the Sangyo Fukkoku (Reconstruction Finance) as an emergency project.

Another is the Navy Completion Plan which was supplemented successively from 1916 to 1929. This, however, was not completed by 1929, as expected, and in 1933, the building of 11 ships of about 35,000 tons, costing approximately \$120,000,000, was left undone. This program is also underway at present.

Of the above programs, about 57 ships are not yet laid down for construction; about 53 ships, 223,000 tons, are under construction; while the rest have already been completed. The expenditures for building these ships do not cover the whole of the naval budget. Construction expenditures were \$38,000,000 in 1931, which increased yearly, and finally amounted to more than \$200,000,000 in 1935. The estimate for 1936 is \$168,000,000. These plans aim at the completion of Treaty navy of which the U. S. so often speaks, i. e., a plan to prepare the amount of ships stipulated both in the Washington and the

London Treaties. Accordingly, if these plans go smoothly, in 1940 the U. S. navy will come to possess the naval force provided for in the two treaties. This includes not only replenishment for the lack of new ships, but also the construction of ships to replace the out-of-date ones. Besides this, though the official report has not yet reached us, it seems that a new plan is under way which mainly provides for the building of 2 battleships and 12 Class-B cruisers. There are, in addition, ships and boats which do not come under the limitations, or special service ships. In the budget for the current fiscal year, a ~~2,120,000~~ <sup>220,000</sup> ton building plan was presented, but was not adopted by Congress because it could not get through the discussion stage.

At any rate, it may be perceived that the U. S. will come to possess the number of ships stipulated both in the Washington and the London Treaties. It is not certain whether the U. S. has any intention of expanding her navy beyond this plan, but, according to what was declared by the responsible people of the U. S. Government in Congress, or on various other occasions, she will respect the past two Treaties to the utmost and has no intention of increasing her naval plan. This, however, cannot be fully relied upon (as it may change) according to the development of the situation in the future. Generally speaking, it would not be a great mistake to believe that the U. S. will effect the completion of naval armaments based on the tonnage of ships stipulated both in the Washington and the London Treaties in the coming four or five years.

TABLE II

U. S. SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM AND ITS PRESENT STATE OF PROGRESS		
Vinson Plan		1934 Program
102 ships, about 200,000 tons	\$500,000,000	(to be finished by 1939)
From the Sangre Fudohi (PFC Funds)		1933 Program
32 ships, about 120,000 tons	\$231,000,000	
The remainder of the plan for 1916 and 1929 (construction to be commenced after 1933).		
11 ships, about 35,000 tons	- about \$120,000,000	
Of the above-mentioned plans:		
Not yet begun	about 68 ships	115,000 tons (a part of the Vinson Plan)
Under construction	about 63 ships	233,000 tons
The rest are already completed.		

Year	BUILDING EXPENDITURES						
	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936
Unit - One million dollars	42.4	38.3	62.9	90.0	182.2	216.5	168.5

5. U. S. Establishments for naval operations in the Pacific.

Next, I shall speak on the U. S. establishments for naval operations in the Pacific. It is an obvious fact that the U. S. has been laying great stress on land and water establishments in the Pacific area of recent years. After the Washington Treaty the U. S. set to work on a 20 year plan with a budget of \$150,000,000 for the improvement of land and water establishments in the Pacific area, but that program has not made much progress since then owing to the policy of financial retrenchment and so on. She took much interest in the equipment of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, but, besides this, there was no other notable phenomenon.

As soon as the Manchurian Incident broke out, however, the U. S. suddenly changed her attitude. She increased her naval budget and besides she began to lay much stress on the Pacific area by means of Sangro Ful'ohi (RFC funds). The establishment on which the greatest importance was laid was Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The detailed figures of the sum of money spent here are not at hand now, but to cite the latest example, 1936, \$15,000,000 out of \$28,000,000 appropriated as expenditures for land and water equipment was allocated to this port, and we hear that almost 80 or 90 per cent of the work is finished and the whole is nearing completion. Actually when the grand naval maneuver was held last year in the Pacific area, the whole fleet entered Pearl Harbor at the same time for supplies and rest. Hereafter, also, she will take more interest in that harbor; for instance, she has a plan to build two floating docks which will be made with pointed bows so that they can be towed and can sail under their own power. I cannot say for certain, but, at any rate, it seems that she has a plan for building such things and defraying therefor the amount of \$10,000,000 to this harbor. This material is evidence to show how earnest the U. S. is about operations in the Pacific area.

In addition to the above, along the western coast of the continent, starting from the north, at Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Pedro and Panama, she is taking steps to increase equipment so as to perfect these ports for repair, supply and recuperation purposes. Since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, the U. S. fleet has continued to be stationed in the Pacific area, and the American people as well as ourselves were at the outset anxious that if it were to be stationed there for a long time it would be impossible for the U. S. to maintain the fleet on the Pacific Coast, but the fact is that she has managed to maintain them on the western coast by means of prompt increase of land and water installations.

Only those ships requiring great scale reconstruction sail to the eastern coast, and daily repairs, docking, repainting of the ships' bottoms and such other works are all arranged for somehow or other on the western coast. Last year when the major part of the U. S. fleet sailed to the eastern coast, we heard that no workmen went to the fleet from the New York Navy Yard, which fact is almost unbelievable to us of the Japanese Navy. But this is

strong evidence to show on one hand that U. S. ships have perfect mechanical equipment and that they are quite self-sufficient. On the other hand, it shows land and water equipment on the Pacific Coast is so complete that there is nothing lacking for the maintenance and repair of a big fleet. Besides these, the U. S. has been making great efforts recently to complete air bases and to investigate the weather conditions around Alaska and the Aleutians in the north. It is also said that some army air forces are stationed in Alaska and that they are being trained. At any rate, the U. S. is making strenuous efforts for the defense of the north, the completion and investigation of the important strategic points and such others. Thus the amount of money defrayed recently for land and water equipment, as shown in Table III, while it was only about 4,000,000 in 1925, has exceeded \$10,000,000 each year in recent years. In 1936 it amounted to \$28,000,000. We can perceive the general situation from these facts.

#### 6. The Strength of the U. S. Naval Air Force

Next, I shall speak on the U. S. naval air force. Like Japan, the U. S. does not have an independent air force; the Army and the Navy each equip and maintain their own air forces. The effort which the U. S. Navy puts into the air forces is great, and from what we hear, the U. S. Navy says that she will complete her air forces attached to the fleet and fight decisive battles with control of the air.

This preparation policy has changed with the years and has, of course, become larger scale. The latest scale of the plan is said to be to complete about 2200 naval planes with the object of replenishing the naval air forces, but fearing these 2200 could not be finished by 1939, the terminal year of the Vinson Plan, it was first reduced to 1650, and later a plan was set up to build 1900 planes in five years. At present she has about 1500 planes and I think the 2200 planes of the first plan will also be completed by the time the Vinson Plan has been completed.

In addition to the above, the U. S. Army is showing an extraordinary zeal for the air forces, which, it seems, intend to cooperate with the navy by participating not only in army operations but also in naval operations.

TABLE III

OUTLINE OF APPROPRIATION OF EXPENDITURES FOR LAND AND WATER EQUIPMENTS												
A.D. 19--	'25	'26	'27	'28	'29	'30	'31	'32	'33	'34	'35	'36
Unit - million dollars	4.0	2.7	2.7	4.7	5.4	5.2	11.1	12.2	12.5	23.5	16.8	38.1
Note: Out of 31 million dollars, 15 million was devoted to Pearl Harbor in 1936.												

7. Importance attached to the East by the British Navy.

The British Navy, a little different from that of the U. S. or Japan, does not customarily make public comprehensive building programs covering a certain number of years. As she adds or supplements necessary plans each year to the original it is difficult for us to see through to the future, but generally speaking, around the time when the London Treaty was concluded, she was not active in building ships. She was at that time building only about three cruisers, nine destroyers and three submarines yearly. The past two or three years, however, it was suddenly increased and according to the government announcement of last spring, the construction of two capital ships will be started next year and one airplane carrier, five cruisers, over 12 destroyers, some submarines and several non-limitation ships are to be built.

As for the budget, only the estimates for 1936 and 1937 are presented, and how many years are needed after that for the fulfillment of the plan is not made known. At any rate, it can be clearly perceived that her ship-building in the last two or three years has become very active as compared with that of several years preceding. The increase of expenditures is shown in Table IV.

TABLE IV

BUILDING EXPENDITURES OF THE BRITISH NAVY							
Year	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937
In million pounds	6.2	6.0	7.7	9.7	11.5	11.9	16.2

To touch a little on Britain's intention in regard to her war operations in the Oriental area, that is, her naval forces in the Orient and her installations at the important strategic points in the area, in recent years Britain seems to be laying special emphasis on naval strength in the Orient. After the Russo-Japanese War, following the downfall of the Russian Navy, the revision of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the rise of the German Navy in Europe and so on, Britain gradually reduced her naval forces in the Orient. A long time ago, she had a powerful navy in the Orient, but it was extremely reduced at one time, and needless to say, during the World War her naval power in the Orient was but a small one, for she relied for the most part on the Japanese Navy. After the World War, however, she gradually augmented the strength and in recent years in the Orient she holds one airplane carrier, 7 cruisers (10,000 ton cruisers of the latest type) - she only has 15 in all, but out of her total of 15 cruisers, 7 are allotted to the Orient - as well as 15 Class-B cruisers. Destroyers and submarines have been attached to this nucleus, not including the gunboats for the use on the Yangtze.

Taking all these into consideration, it is obvious that the strength is far more full and strong than in the past. And, moreover, the ships are new, and it seems that in many cases cruisers, destroyers, submarines, or whatever ships they may be, when newly built, are first sent to the Orient. Besides the naval forces, she lays much stress on the solidification and strengthening of strategic points, making a chain from Gibraltar-Malta-Suez Canal in the West, and Aden-Colombo-Singapore-Hongkong and so on in the East, furnishing fuel oil tanks and other installations in the ports.

Among these ports, the one on which the biggest importance is laid is Singapore. The plan was at the outset a considerably big one, but at the time of the Labor Cabinet it seemed as though it was temporarily stopped, but later, especially after the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, the plan was resumed with some additions. It is said that Britain has been making strenuous efforts for its realization in recent years. I hear that the money already poured into Singapore is about £15,000,000, but she is still carrying out, step by step, her plan and the construction of her installations; moreover, it is said the work is nearing completion, the drydock being already finished, and 1,000,000 ton fuel-supply facilities, repair shops, armouries, fort barracks, and so on, which have been planned hitherto, to be completed around the end of this year. And it is supposed that additions will be made to the plan in the future. It is reported that despite the fact that Hongkong is situated within the defense restriction zone, it is being considerably strengthened.

#### 8. British Air Force Rapidly Growing.

The British air force grew rapidly during the Great War. At one time later, however, it showed signs of decline, compared with those of France, Italy, and others. But recently Britain has begun to put great efforts into the air force. According to the announcement made by the government at the end of last year, Britain aims to have a strength of 1750 planes, and actually her whole air force around the end of last year was reportedly about 1300 planes already. We can see the recent rapid increase in her budget by looking at her air force expenditures shown in Table I.

#### 9. Far Eastern Navy of Soviet Russia

Besides the above, there are problems concerning the state of the navies of France, Italy, Germany and of Soviet Russia, with which we have an important relationship in the Far East. If I enter into these problems, my talk will become too detailed, and, considering the fact that if our navy manages to cope with the British and U. S. navies, those of the other Powers can be taken care of, I should like to refrain from speaking on those navies today. Yet we cannot entirely ignore the fact that Soviet Russia has begun to increase her naval installations rapidly in recent years and, therefore, we have a great concern for the Russian Navy.



At present, Russia has about 50 submarines in the Orient. Russia apparently has about 120 submarines in all, of which about 50 are assigned to the Far East. Moreover, she has 6 destroyers, which are not worth mentioning, and some so-called high speed torpedo boats, which are of a very small type of several tons of tons, probably used as submarine chasers on some occasions and as torpedo boats on others. She has about 100 of these high speed torpedo boats in all at Vladivostok and there is no denying that these will have a considerable power of restraint upon the Japanese navy in case Russia takes the defensive. However, the power of a navy or the command of the sea is not constituted by submarines or torpedo boats alone. It can't be maintained without a well balanced navy with big ships as its center. The torpedo boats and submarines may have value as defensive forces, but, as far as the command of the sea in the Orient is concerned, these ships have, I believe, no chance of victory over the Japanese navy.

#### 10. Japanese Naval Armament Policy

Taking into consideration the aforesaid international situation and the actual status of the navies of other Powers, what policy should our navy take for its armament? I will speak a little on this matter.

As I have stated above, Japan, for her part, has no intention whatever to incite a shipbuilding competition even if a no-treaty era should set in; she aims at possessing the minimum invincible force. At the recent naval reduction conference, Japan claimed the maximum equal ratio, which other Powers opposed, saying that Japan does not have the strength enough to possess an equal ratio with Britain and the U. S. and that each Power has its particular geographical condition. In other words, it has specific weakness in the so-called national defense, but Japan has little weakness in this point, while Britain and the U. S. have many weaknesses. To have equal military force, ignoring such difference in weakness, cannot be said to be non-threatening nor non-aggressive. It will only lead to inequality in the feeling of safety. For these reasons, the Powers opposed the Japanese claims, but we of the navy firmly believe even now that we were not wrong in making such claims.

#### 11. Invulnerable Defense Lines in the Western Pacific.

It is too officious to say that it would be a luxury for Japan to have the degree of armaments as Britain and the U. S. without having enough national power. They may say so privately, but to discuss in such a way at an international gathering is not permissible. Furthermore, although we cannot say that there is absolutely no weakness in our national defense, weakness mainly arises in case of aggression. In other words, we can say that weakness will be considerably decreased if only we maintain the defensive attitude. If each Power admits the principle of safeguarding herself and of non-aggression, I believe that each Power can openly and squarely claim the right to possess an

equal number of armaments wherever it may be. I believe it absurd for the first class Powers to say that 50 or 70 per cent of their quota will be enough for us because they will not attack us, notwithstanding the fact that they and we are on equal footing. It would be quite another matter if they forced it on us, but they must consider the difference of Japan's national strength, her national situation and also of her international situation from the time of the former Washington and London Treaty Conferences and the time of the present naval reduction conference held from last year to this year. We were not under any circumstance to be forced to accept their unreasonable demands, and if we are to adhere to our assertion of non-threat and non-aggression from the standpoint that the navy holds an important role, especially as the stabilizing power of the Orient and as the power for assisting the carrying out of Japan's national policy, we cannot but claim that the right of armament of the Powers should be equal.

Although Japan demanded equality of military power at the Disarmament Conference, it does not necessarily mean that Japan will immediately build up a military power equal to those of Britain and the U. S. as her future armament plan. Japan has no intention at all to invade other countries. Japan has no intention of attacking the western coast of the U. S. or of invading Singapore and occupying India in the near future. It suffices that Japan complete her national defense. Concretely Japan will be satisfied to have an actual fighting power that is invulnerable in the West Pacific as compared with that of any naval Power.

To have equal fighting power does not necessarily mean to have ships of the same type, of the same tonnage and in the same numbers. If a country makes aggressive operations it will, of course, be at a disadvantage. Whereas, if Japan strategically fights a defensive war she will be able to make full use of her geographical advantage, and if Japan will fight with her particular geographical conditions, with particular installations added thereto, and the strategy of "awaiting the enemy's fatigue after coming a long distance," she will be able to preserve the security of national defense even without a naval strength (means concrete naval strength) equal to that of the opposing country.

#### 12. New Armament Program of the Japanese Navy.

Such being the case, the necessary military power for national defense has been unofficially decided in our naval armament plan for the future after the various relations have been considered and in accordance with the new situation. I have no liberty to refer to it here, but the program is aimed at replenishing the naval forces by the new replenishing scheme based on the above unofficial decision. The amount of forces which will form the basis of our naval armament as shown in the budget for the next fiscal year is not necessarily to realize immediately the whole of the strength estimated to be necessary for national defense itself.

Since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, Japan has been quite busy externally. She has to complete national defense on one hand, and on the other hand to provide security for the people. All these together with other matters in various fields require enormous national expense. The Army especially requires a prompt replenishment of armaments. On the other hand, as the revenue of the treasury will not allow unlimited expenditures, the minimum tolerable amount has been appropriated as naval expenditures for the budget of the next fiscal year. Consequently because of financial reasons, matters of considerable importance, not only from the strength necessary for the national defense power as a standard, but also in the light of this immediate urgent necessity cannot be realized promptly, would have to be put off to some future fiscal years. I feel that we can but wait for some measures to be taken in the future to tide us over these difficulties in accordance with the national finance or the international situation, etc.

Next comes the question of what degree of equipment should be made according to the new armament plan. I regret to say, we cannot give you the concrete figures today, as we must consider the new London Treaty concluded between Britain, the U. S. and France, the special armament reduction agreement concluded at the Anglo-Russian Meeting, as well as the Anglo-German naval agreement which Germany concluded with Britain last year, all of which will naturally have relation to the new armament reduction of this year, I believe.

In addition to the above, Britain is making vigorous efforts to induce all Baltic border states to come under her control and is trying to restrict their naval armament. Therefore, in the near future the new armament reduction treaty concluded this year will have the effect of restricting the European countries and the U. S. at least.

### 13. Significance of Agreement on Notification of Shipbuilding.

In short, the new London armament reduction treaty concluded this year consists of two parts, i.e., substantial reduction and notification of shipbuilding. Speaking in detail, although there may be some difference in substantial reduction as compared with the former Washington and London Treaties, we will not be greatly mistaken if we say it has been concluded for the most part after the spirit of these treaties. But the shipbuilding notification is considerably different in method from that stipulated in the former treaties, that is, the main part consists in mutual secret notification of shipbuilding among the nations concerned.

Consequently, it is so constituted that non-treaty Powers cannot know the shipbuilding policies or programs of the treaty Powers. As for the method of notification, the Powers are to notify secretly the countries concerned between January and April of the shipbuilding program planned to be put into

practice during the current calendar year, the items of notification to include the types, number, and the maximum calibre of cannon to be installed on the ship. Just before construction work is begun further details are to be made known, these items being the type, important measurements, horse power, and speed of the ship and the armaments to be installed on the ship. The most precise notification is required in regard to the last item, i.e., the number of cannon, torpedoes, machine guns, planes, catapults, and search lights. And the building work cannot be begun until four months after the notification to the countries concerned. If any changes should be made in the principal items during the construction, the work on the changes cannot be begun until four months after the arrival of notifications thereof to the countries concerned as in the above. The provisions are strict to this extent.

#### 14. Reasons why it cannot be made Public.

This is, in short, the device of Britain and the U. S. to check the weak naval Powers, and by means of this device the two countries intend to watch an opponent country so that it will not get ahead of them. The provisions have been made as a means for the strong naval Powers to suppress the weaker naval Powers. At any rate, as Japan has not participated in the Treaty, she has no idea of what shipbuilding plans the U.S. and Britain have, nor of course the contents thereof. Under such circumstances if Japan follows her customary way of making public too early what types of ships will be constructed and in what numbers, the total number, the total tonnage and total expenditures, and so on, according to the new replenishment plan, it would be nothing but showing our hand to others without seeing the other's hand. Such foolishness can absolutely not be tolerated.

In demanding a considerably larger amount of expenditure of the Diet and its approval thereof, the Imperial Navy almost gobbles up the budget without making any full explanation, and without acquiring the understanding of either the Diet or the people at large. This is indeed regrettable and, of course, against our principles, but, the situation of the Powers being such at present, please understand that we unfortunately cannot make public the contents of our plan at this time. However, once a ship is completed, one can know the approximate size of the ship, or of the cannon on the ship, though the details may not be known. The main reason for not making them public is that it is unprofitable for us to let the other Powers know too early the future shipbuilding policy of our navy, whose armaments and materials are making rapid progress from day to day.

#### 15. Analysis of Naval Budget for 1937.

The total amount appropriated for the next fiscal year in the naval budget is a little over ¥681,000,000, a total increase of about ¥129,000,000 compared with that of the working budget of last year, which was ¥551,000,000. To select the important items from among the increased expenditures, among the ordinary expenditures there is a maintenance expense for new ships totalling

¥9,450,000. This is a customary one and covers the expense of maintaining the ships to be completed during the fiscal year of 1936, i.e., till the end of March, 1937, and all these ships are included in the secondary replenishment program.

Then comes the air force units maintenance expense totalling ¥9,530,000, which is for the increase of air units in accordance with the secondary supplement program and will be completed in the next fiscal year. With these, the secondary supplement program will be completed for the most part, and a small part will be left over for the following fiscal year, which will appear in the 1938 budget as a normal increase.

Next come the expenditures to maintain aircraft weapons, a little more than ¥2,270,000. In the navy the so-called air units are those on the land, and the maintenance expenses for aircraft carried on board aircraft carriers and other ships are appropriated separately. Last comes the expenditure for the testing of shipbuilding and armaments, which amount to ¥1,500,000. It is the case, I believe, with not only the navy but in all fields throughout Japan that techniques are always following and running after those of other Powers and it is to be regretted that there has been such imitation and that fundamental research has been lacking. As fundamental experiment and research has been lacking hitherto in the Navy also, the various methods tried usually ended in failure or did not get good results. Therefore, a considerable amount of expenditures has been demanded in the budget for the next fiscal year for experiment and research on all kinds of facilities. In the extraordinary expenditures there is shipbuilding expenditure totalling ¥60,000,000, in which is included the first year allotment of the new supplementary program amounting to about ¥45,000,000, the balance of ¥15,000,000 being the additional expenses arising from the change in the first and second supplement programs.

In addition to this, the allotment for the last year of the supplement program is a little over ¥150,000,000 in the 1937 budget. Together with the newly requested ¥60,000,000, it totals ¥210,000,000 which constitutes the shipbuilding expenses for 1937.

Next comes the expenditure needed for the installations of the Mechanical Engineering Board. As the docks and the various arsenals are of the old type and are inefficient, ¥33,950,000 has been appropriated as miscellaneous improvement expenditures, while ¥9,000,000 has been set aside as necessary for the equipment of Munitions Department, the biggest expense of which is for the additional building of heavy oil storages. The navy has up to now stored liquid fuel as an emergency measure, and has a considerable amount stored today, but it is in no way sufficient to meet the demand of war operations. From the beginning of this year the fuel question has become very grave. Officials and citizens of all fields connected with this problem are deliberating the question and will work according to the national fuel policy. Therefore a considerable amount has been appropriated in the budget of the Commerce and Industry Ministry for the coming year as expenditure for the national fuel policy, but the substitute fuel industry cannot realize in two or three years even the annual

production of only 2,000,000 tons, and I think that vigorous efforts will be needed to increase production to 2,000,000 tons in six years as planned. And even if two million tons are produced according to plans, when viewed from the demand and supply of the past years, that amount only corresponds to the normal amount of increases in that number of years, and therefore the amount to be imported from abroad will not show any remarkable decrease as compared with the present, it is expected. Consequently, the navy cannot stop immediately storing oil even if the national liquid fuel policy is set up, and will have to continue its policy of storage for the time being.

Next, the expenditures for the air units' equipment, ¥26,670,000, is for the equipment of 5 air units to be started in the next fiscal year in connection with the supplementary program for the next fiscal year. The expenditures for the overhauling of ships are ¥36,670,000. Though the overhauling of the capital ships has been for the most part completed by 1936, that of aircraft carriers and other auxiliary ships still remains to be done, and the above expenditure is for these.

Lastly, the expenditure of ¥13,950,000 is for the completion of munitions, including arms, ammunitions, fuels, and so on, but the majority of it is for the purchase and storage of liquid fuel. Besides the above, expenditures for the Manchurian Incident and for the grand maneuver and others are to be found in the budget, but I shall omit them for they are not worth explaining.

#### 16. Equilibrium in the Drafting of the Naval Armament Program.




In connection with the supplement program, I have a while ago stated a general idea that Japan has no intention of inciting shipbuilding competition; and now I should like to speak on it in figures.

In the new armament program we have at present already rid ourselves of the notion of ratio on which many discussions were held in connection with the Washington and London Treaties. Although there is no other way of comparing a completed strength than by percentage, such as the percentage of a certain type of ship out of the total tonnage of ships, we do not fix a percentage first and then fill up the content thereof in order to decide on our own military power. It is, of course, necessary to take into consideration the approximate strength of the Powers in question, since the problem is relative.

Now, considering the relations with the U. S., with our eyes fixed on 1940, the year in which the Vinson Plan and other supplementary plans relating thereto will be completed, we find that the navy of the U. S. is a so-called treaty navy, and will possess the strength stipulated in the Washington and the London Treaties. If Japan had retained the treaty, she would have only built ships to replace her former ones, and the strength would have naturally been fixed. But now, as Japan is not restricted by the treaty, she can decide

on the strength needed, which can be decided naturally by comparing the relative strength of America and Japan, and consider the organization and the unit of all of the forces from a strategic point of view, instead of thinking that our main ships must be 70 per cent of America's, that we must have such and such a percentage of cruisers, etc. In our new armament plan we neither say nor think today that we must have such and such percentage of the armament of the United States. The navy aims at successively adding such units as would build up a navy corresponding to our national strength, from the standpoint of actual war operations. There should be some difference in the results between building up a treaty navy and execution of the new armament policy, which I have just stated. As a matter of fact, they happen to coincide with each other, without the amounts having been equalized intentionally.


17. Investigation of the tonnage of Japanese, British and U. S. Shipbuilding.

Table V does not include the new program, and it is divided in three groups: Japanese, British and U. S. The line  on the left shows the average annual tonnage of ships for the next ten years that would have to be replaced by each Power in the following year in order to maintain the military power, assuming that the past Washington and London Treaties were in existence. According to this table, Japan would have to build about 53,000 tons yearly, Britain, about 83,000, and the U. S., about 70,000. The line  to the right of the above shows the tonnage of ships to be built in the course of 1936: Japan, about 30,000 tons, Britain, about 40,000, and the U. S., about 86,000. Furthermore, the black line  to the extreme right shows the average annual tonnage in the five year period of 1931-1935; Japan, about 22,000, Britain, about 33,000, and the U. S., about 48,000. The latter two lines are added only for reference, and as the lines on the left show, even if the past two treaties had continued to exist, Japan would have to build about 53,000 tons, Britain, about 83,000, and the U. S. about 70,000. Keeping in mind the amount of 53,000 tons as shown in this graph, let us see the average annual tonnage in the programs of five consecutive years as given in Japan's new supplementary program and we will find that it comes far below 53,000 tons. This, I am sure, is statistical proof that Japan has no intention of encouraging a shipbuilding competition even in a naval non-treaty era.

Thus, it is clear that the tonnage of ships to be built according to the new program is actually not more than that it would be if the two treaties were still in effect. Then there probably will arise the question of why the total sum of expenditures in the budget has been increased. This will explain itself if the middle and left lines are compared, that is, the building of capital ships has become a very heavy burden. It is true that the former Washington and London Treaties restricted the whole scale of the navy and, for instance, the building of replacements for capital ships was postponed by prolonging the lives of the ships, and that they would have been effective in temporarily checking the increase of national expenditures at that time. But it is not an

absolute problem; so, owing to the suspension of building capital ships, the naval building expenditures would have to be increased the following year. This increase is not in the least the result of withdrawal from the naval reduction treaty nor of having entered into a non-treaty era.

TABLE V





18. Spiritual gains obtained by withdrawal from Armament Reduction.

With reference to the armament treaty, although we are about to enter into a non-treaty era beginning next year, we have no intention whatever to applaud it merely as a matter of sentiment. I believe that armament reduction is surely effective if it is really done impartially with mutual understanding. But, sad to say, the two treaties of the past were not in the least impartial; they were extremely unfavorable, especially to Japan. Among such unfavorable points, there were, of course, material disadvantages, but there were also extreme spiritual disadvantages. This is not a question of national dignity, but is a question pertaining to the navy itself; it is my personal opinion that undesirable ideas have been implanted in the naval officers for more than ten years, that is, whenever the Disarmament Conference was broadcast, or discussed in magazines and newspapers. We have been told for more than ten years that in order to attack many with little, Japan which has been allowed only a low ratio, should do this, etc. Then the senior officers taught the juniors they always encouraged the latter to do their utmost because Japan had limited strength. This has, I fear, unconsciously planted in the heads of officers, especially of the younger ones, the idea that fighting is impossible with an inferior ratio.

Besides, various demands are made by the young men of the fleet with reason that the strength is inferior. This produces a very undesirable effect on the psychology of war. I am of the belief that, to foster a soldier's spirit it is absolutely necessary to give them discipline so as to have an idea of infallible victory even with an inferior strength and to go ahead with a firm determination in that direction. But as we hear always about the reports, discussions of the Disarmament Conference, etc., we compare the strength of both sides and are apt to think that we have no chance of winning because our strength is inferior. I fear this is the most undesirable idea implanted in us soldiers by the Disarmament Conference.

From now on, after our withdrawal from the reduction treaty, we shall not speak of our strength as being only 60 or 70 per cent of that of the U. S., and so on. Of course, if we make comparison, we may say that she has the advantage and that we are inferior, but there is no need to say such a thing now, and the source of discussions comparing each other's strength has for the most part disappeared. Is this not a valuable spiritual gain obtained by our withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference, which in turn has released us from the fetters of the reduction treaty? I also feel that we will have to guide properly the young officers, after taking the above fact into consideration.

19. Lack of Encouragement for Shipbuilding Competition.

Next, I shall speak on the problem of shipbuilding competition. It is difficult to foretell the future on this matter, but in the Pacific the U. S. asserts that she will limit herself to the tonnage stipulated in the two treaties.

of the past and will also stick to the spirit of the treaties. Therefore, we may be justified to think that the U. S. will not begin ship-building competition unless she is stimulated by others. Japan, as the rival of the U. S., has no intention whatever of making armament plans which might threaten the U. S. and incite a shipbuilding competition. As we are of the idea that we will be satisfied with the minimum, with that minimum necessary for the security of Japan's national defense on the sea in the West Pacific, we may be able to say there will be no chance for the rise of a shipbuilding competition between the two states; but, putting aside Japan's idea, how will the U. S. public regard Japan's new armament program? If they conclude from the new program that Japan has begun shipbuilding competition against the spirit of the Disarmament Treaty, and begin the same under the above pretext that is another matter. If their real purport is the preparation of a treaty navy, they may not enter into a competition. But, as I first said, if the fundamental idea of the U. S. is that she does not like Japan's development in the Orient and wants to nip her in the bud as soon as possible, the less said, the better.

#### 20. Probable Start of Competition in Europe.

I cannot make a definite conclusion, but I think, if any shipbuilding competition should arise, that it might be in Europe instead of in the Orient. In Europe a conference was successfully held between Britain and Germany last year. This conference was motivated by the fact that Germany, after declaring a rearmament policy, began to proceed steadily in that direction, and Britain, foreseeing the seriousness of the situation in case Germany should be left to take her own course, wished to oppress Germany. On the other hand, as Germany would not be able to oppose Britain openly for the next ten years, or at least for some time, she wanted, though reluctantly, to go hand in hand with Britain, and thus they came to hold the conference, I believe. Taking advantage of this conference, Britain wanted to hold the Disarmament Conference of last year, and also direct the reduction treaty of this year in the line of the Anglo-German conference, but she was balked in her designs.

Since the Disarmament Conference, Britain has negotiated with Soviet Russia, Poland, Sweden, and other countries. Now Soviet Russia has stood up again. However, Germany, above all, was so exhausted during the Great War and immediately after the war also, that she could not spend money for navy equipment. In recent years, together with France and Italy she has come to make efforts to replenish her navy, thereby driving Britain into a very tough situation. Such being the case, Britain is striving hard to preserve the stand on which she can always remain invincible against any combination of at least two navies, by controlling the various naval countries in Europe.

You are well aware of the recent situation in Europe. I fear it would become serious should complications arise, brought forth by the Spanish problem. Then any country like Soviet Russia or Germany or France may go into a shipbuilding competition, and a stone thrown by one country will directly or indirectly stir the other Powers. Then Britain will not be able to remain a

spectator in the impending emergency, especially as Britain has received no restriction of armaments by the new reduction treaty, she can build ships whenever she wants to. Britain and the U. S. are tacitly carrying out things in a sort of parity between themselves, and so if Britain increases her strength it is only natural that the U. S. will do so also. I may be a little mistaken, but I am of the opinion that if shipbuilding competition should arise in the future the origin will be in Europe instead of in the Orient. And I also feel that it will be caused by none other than the international situation in Europe.

#### 21. Standard for Naval Budget in the Future.

As for our naval budget for the future, if all the Powers enter into shipbuilding competition from the outbreak of some abnormal situation, I can say nothing for certain now; but, otherwise, the navy, though she is not fully satisfied with the strength estimated and required in the new supplement program, will not need an enormous increase in the future budget, which, if we set up a plan by looking into the near future, will be based on the standard of 1937 budget. We also hope to follow it as much as possible. This is confidential between ourselves. The budget which the navy has demanded of the Finance Ministry is not the same as that which has been recognized, and much has been deleted. As some items of considerable importance were eliminated or postponed for future years, it cannot be said that the budget for future years will be the same as that of 1937. It is a matter of course that items of importance will have to be accomplished early, and consequently the budget of later years will have to be somewhat increased, but, generally speaking, I think that you may understand that the estimated expenditures for the navy for the next few years will be based on the standard of the budget for 1937 with some inevitable addition, and this will suffice us for the next several years. We, on our part, also wish to make it suffice as far as circumstances permit.

I shall end my speech here and shall answer your questions if you have any. I thank you very much for your courteous attention.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 903-A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO, Nagaharu hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity:

Assistant Chief, Archives Section, --- Foreign Office

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 57 pages, dated Jan., 1937, and described

as follows: "Outline of Naval Budget for Fiscal Year 1937 and the

General Aspect of National Defense Related to the Navy", a lecture

by Adm. Soeru TOYODA, Chief, Naval Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry,

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department

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Signed at Tokyo on this

1st day of Oct., 1946.

NAGAHARU ODO

Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: T. SATO

Ass't. Chief, Archives Section,  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, 2d Lt. ERIC W. FLEISHER, O-935000, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

1 day of Oct., 1946

ERIC W. FLEISHER, 2d Lt.  
NAME

Witness: HENRY SHIMIZU

Investigator, I.P.S.  
Official Capacity

Ex 714A

903A-1

Ex 914

運送 記録

日本外交協會第三特別委員會秘密會席上

海軍省軍務局長 豊田副武中將通 (軍官)

十二年度海軍親善要綱並ニ  
海軍關係國防ノ全貌ニ就イテ

(昭和十二年二月)

日本外交協會

本編ハ豊田海軍省軍務局長ガ、當協會第三特別  
委員會(外交ト海軍關係)秘密會ニ於テ演述セラ  
レタル要旨ニシテ本協會幹事ノ筆録シタルモノナ  
リ。因ツテ豊田局長ノ同意並ニ關ラザルモノナル  
ヲ以テ謄寫ノ責任ハ全然本協會ニ在リ。

昭和十一年十二月

日本外交協會調査局

尚本編ハ協會特別委員會委員以外ノ閲覧ヲ禁ズ

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明年度海軍豫算案長綱並ニ  
海軍關係國防ノ全貌ニ就テ

海軍省軍務局長  
海軍中將 豊田副武氏 通

來年度ノ海軍豫算ヲ中心ニシテ海軍ヲ考ヘテ居  
ルコトヲ述ベル機會ヲ與ヘラレタコトヲ光榮トス  
ル。匆忙ノ故ニ十分整マツタ準備モ出來ズ、オモ  
キ書シイコトト恩フガ、後刻御覽同並ニ御批判ヲ  
承リタイ。

話ノ順序ハ、現在ノ國際情勢ト帝國海軍ノ立場、  
英米海軍其他列國海軍ノ近況、次ニ此ノ國際情勢  
ト列國海軍ノ近況ヲ基礎ニシテ、將來ノ帝國海軍  
軍備ノ方針ガドウ云フモノデアルカ、ソノ軍備ノ  
方針ニ整ツテ出來タ來年度ノ海軍豫算ノ梗概並ニ  
要點、ヤカマツク簡ハレテ居ル將來海軍競争ガド  
ウ云フヤウニナルカ、之等ノ點ニ關スル私見ヲ述  
ベ、ドウ云フ將來ヲ見越シテ帝國ノ海軍豫算ハ今  
後ドウナツテ行クカト云フ點ヲ述ベテミタイ。

一 條條約ニ對處スル信念

昨年暮カラ本年ノ初メニ掛ケテロンドンテ行ハ

レタ軍備合議ヲ、帝國ハ不費成不償債ノ根本方針  
 ニ則ツテ、海軍ノ算備ヲ出来ルダケ僅少シ、政費  
 的ノモノヲ減ラシテ防務方ヲ強化シ、以テ、外ハ  
 國家的ノ安全感ヲ増進シ、内ハ負擔ノ輕減ヲ圖リ  
 タイト云フ主張ヲ以テ此ノ合議ニ齒シテアル  
 ガ、帝國ノ公正妥當ナ主張モ遂ニ列國ノ容ルル所  
 トナラズ、帝國ハ已ムヲ待ズ此ノ會議ヲ降退スル  
 コトニナツタ。而シテ茲旬日ヲ越テズシテ帝國ノ  
 國スル限リハ海軍擴張時代ニ入ルコトニナツタ  
 ノデアルガ、軍備會議ノ前後ヨリ今日ニ至ルマデ  
 日本政府トシテマタ海軍トシテ、機會アル毎ニ中  
 外ニ聲聞シテ居ツタヤウニ、假令今條約條約狀態  
 ニナツテモ日本カラ遠シテ遠慮覺テ警戒スルト  
 カ他國安全ヲ脅威スルヤウナ勢ハ持ツテナクイ  
 マタ將來モ雖ク此ノ信念ヲ以テ海軍ノ算備ヲ進メ  
 ル心持チ居ル。許シ彼等遠慮等ノ進シテハ防務  
 シタイト云フモノ、現下ノ國際情勢ヲ考ヘテ見  
 レバ、海軍ノ算備ガ其ノ國ノ國策遂行ニ重大ナ區  
 係ヲ有スル點カラシテ、タダ無爲ニ形勢ヲ觀望シ  
 テ算備ヲ放棄スルコトハ出来ナイカラ、懸念ヲ能  
 ク懸望シテ之ニ應ズル計畫ヲ行テナケレバナラヌ  
 コトハ言フ迄モナイ。

903-4

日本ヲ中心ニシタ現下ノ國際情勢ハ、嘗日本外交協倉ノ使命トシテ居ラレル研究項目デアリ、閣下各位ノ能ク御承知ノコトデ、寧ロ私ノ方ヨリオ教ヲ乞ハナケレバナラヌ點デアルカラ、細カイコトハ述ベナイガ、滿洲事變ガ勃發シ、マタ一昨々年ハ國際聯盟ヲ脱退シテ、今日迄ノ外交上ノ經過ヲ色々考ヘテ見ルト、日本ノ對外的ノ國防ハ日ヲ逐フテ其ノ切要ト困難トヲ加ヘテ居ルノテハナイカト思フ。ソノ間一張一弛ハアツタガ、決シテ現在ノ事態ヲ以テ將來安心シテ可ナリトハ言ヘナイ。

ニ英・米・蘇・支ヲ中心ニ

日本トシテ對外的ニ段モ意ヲ注ガナケレバナラヌノハ、英・米・蘇・支ノ四ヶ國ガ大体中心ニナルノテハナイカト思フ。ソヴイエツトニ付テハ我が海軍ハ直接關係ヲ持ツテキナイガ、間接ニハ無倫關係ガ色々アル。併シ英米ニ比較スレバ海軍トシテハ關係ガ薄イ。此處テ立入ツテ述ベルコトハ差控ヘルガ、ソヴイエツトニ對シテ陸軍ガ軍備ヲモツト充實シナケレバナラヌト云フコトハ我々ノ十分了解シテ居ルトコロデアル。併シ日本ノ對外政策ヲ遂行シテ行ク上ニ部隊ヲナルモノハ何カト云ヘバ、ソレハ決シテ



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軍ニソゾイエツトダケトハ既ラナイ。英米ニ對シテ  
 ハ尙ニ大キナ關心ヲ持ツテキナケレバナラスト思フ。  
 英米ノ海軍軍備ニ對シテ今日デモサウ云フ結論ガ下  
 サレルト思フ。イギリスハ、印度ハ勿論ノコト支那  
 ニ重大ナル權益ヲ持ツテ居ツテ、コノ權益ヲ保護ス  
 ル爲ニハ十分ナ勢力ヲ持ツテ之ヲ確保スルコトハ當  
 然デアルガ、アメリカハ支那大陸其他東洋方面ニ於  
 テハ左程大キナ權益ヲ持ツテ居ラズ、マタ海外投資  
 トカ貿易ノ方面ニ於テモ日本ニ比レバ左程ノモノ  
 テハナイニモ拘ラズ、アメリカガ此ノ數年特ニ滿洲  
 事件勃發以來、海軍ノ整備ニ力ヲ盡シテ居ルコト、  
 マタ海軍ガドウ云フ姿勢ニ居ルカヲ考ヘテミルト、  
 アメリカガ如何ナル考ヲ持ツテ居ルカト云フコトハ  
 自ラ明瞭デアラウト思フ。ヨクアメリカ人、マタ日  
 本人ノ中ニモ、アメリカハ東洋ニ左程大キナ權益ヲ  
 持ツテキナイノダカラ、決シテ自分カラ薄シテ日本  
 ヲ震スキウナコトハ常ニ上考ヘラレヌテハナイカト  
 謂ハレルガ、併シ現實ハ逆ニアメリカガ日本ヲ抑ヘ  
 ルノニ特別ナ關心ヲ持ツテ居ルト云フコトヲ証明シ  
 テ居ルト思フ。競爭ニハ絶對的ノ競爭ト比較的ノ競  
 争ガアル。若シ將來日米相戦フコトガアルトスレバ、  
 日本ノ立ツ競争ハ絶對的ノ競争デアツテ、空キルカ  
 ラスカノ問題デアルガ、アメリカハ決シテ絶對的テ

ナイ。ツマリアメリカハ自國ノ繁榮ヲ土台ニシテノ  
 戰テアルガ、日本ハ國家存亡ノ問題デアル。サスレ  
 バアメリカガ多額ノ金ヲ使ヒ、色々大キナモステユ  
 アラ使ツテ日本ヲ強壓スルコトハ、常態カラ考ヘレ  
 バアリ得ナイコトデアル。然ルニ實際ハソレヲヤツ  
 テ居ル。アメリカノ海軍ハ後ニ勉メルガ、ソノ近年  
 ノ増設ニセヨ艦隊ノ太平洋常駐ノ問題ニセヨ、イツ  
 レモ日本ヲ牽制シ強壓スル以外ニ目的ハナイ。  
 要スルニアメリカニセヨイギリスニセヨ、日本ノ  
 東洋ニ於ケル發展ガ彼等ノ氣ニ入ラナイノデアツテ、  
 何トカ之ヲ阻止シヤウ、双葉ノ間ニ若ヲ刺リタイト  
 云フ考ガ根柢ニナツテ居ル。従ツテ國交上ニ色々派  
 生的ニ種ル個々ノ問題ノ如キハ、ソノ都度、情勢ハ  
 色々アラウガ、根本ノ觀念ハ其處ニアル。故ニ色々  
 トシテハ始終ソレヲ願ニ入レテ置カナケレバナラナ  
 イ。チヨツトシタ顔色ヲ變ツテ、アメリカガ日本ニ  
 對スル壓力ヲ緩メタトカ、或ハ長カガ加ハツテ奈タ  
 トカ、ソノ一張一弛ニ動カサレテ大局ヲ誤ラナイヤ  
 ウニシナケレバナラヌ。従ツテ帝國海軍トシテハ決  
 シテ彼ヲ侵スヤウナ意思ハ、少クトモ現在ニ於テハ  
 待ツテキナイガ、何トシテモ不敵ノ姿勢ダケハドウ  
 シテモ望ヘテ置カナケレバナラヌ。ソレニ依ツテ初  
 メテ日本ノ對外政策モ保障サレルノデアルト思フ。

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### 日・英・米ノ海軍費比較

次に米海軍ノ近況ニ付テ述ブ。

日・英・米ノ海軍費ヲ比較スレバ、第一表ニ示ス如ク、昭和六年ニハ滿洲事變ガ勃發シ、同七年ハ上海事變ガアツテ、日本ハ之ガ爲ニ昭和七年ニハ追加歳入等々テ三億ニ上リ、爾後年々増加シテ居ル。之ハ國情勢ノ暴變ニ應ズル爲ニ己ムヲ得ズ歟ツタ事變ガ豫算ニ現ハレテ居ルノデアリ。之ニ對應シテ英米モ過去三年間グライ海軍算ガ急増ニ膨脹シテ居ル。

### 米國建造計劃ト英ノ現狀

アメリカノ近年ノ建造計畫及ビ英ノ進歩狀況ハ第一表ニ示ス通りデアリ。アメリカハ大抵日本ノ海軍ノヤリ方ト同様ニ、幾ル年以テ限ツテ統合的ノ建造プログラムヲ衝テテ居ル。但シ豫算ハ、日本ト違ツテ漸進的テテク、年々所長豫算ヲ計上シテ居ル。從ツテソノ時々ノ財政狀況ニ依ツテプログラムハ減ツテ居ツテモ、必ズシモ其ノプログラム通りニハ進シテ行カナイコトガ懸々アル。現在衝テテ居ル艘モ大キクモノハ、一九三四年ニ衝テタヴァインソン級、百二隻約二十萬噸、八億ドルデアツテ、之ガ一九三九

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第一表

	海軍費 (單位百萬)						
	昭和5年	昭和6年	昭和7年	昭和8年	昭和9年	昭和10年	昭和11年
米	383	360	329	406	455	482	527
海軍	52.6	51.6	50.5	53.6	58.8	67.8	84.1
海軍	17.9	18.1	17.4	17.4	20.4	30.8	55.2
日	263	211	307	404	489	530	550

第二表

建造計畫及其ノ進捗状況

(1) ダイソンソノ線 一九三四年計畫

百隻 約二〇萬圓 八隻亦(一九三九年迄ニ終了決定)

(2) 産業復興費ニ依ル 一九三三年計畫

三十二隻 約十二萬圓 一億三千八百萬圓

(3) 一九一六 一九二九年計畫ノ延期(ニツテ一九三三年)

十二隻 約三萬五千圓 約一億二千萬圓 以後竣工

以上ノ計畫ノ内

未竣工 約六十八隻 十一萬五千圓(ダイソンソノ線中ノ一部)

建造中 約六十三隻 二十三萬三千圓

其ノ他ノ竣工

百隻 進捗

昭和	年	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
單位	百隻	四・四	三・三	三・九	四・〇	四・三	四・四	四・五

903-9

在マテニ終了ノ決定ナルカラ一九四〇年ニハ完成  
スル。ソノホカニ、英ノ前年ニ應急計画トシテ産業  
復興策ヲ、三十二隻、約十二萬噸、二億三千八百萬  
ドルノ算定ヲ定メテ之モ実行シテ居ル。モウ一ツハ、  
一九一六年カラ一九二九年マテニ辛見シタタテテ  
海軍ノ充實計畫ヲ定メテ居ツタガ、ソレガ一九二九  
年マテニ總テ完成セズ、一九三三年以後ニ、十一隻、  
約三萬五千噸、約一億二千萬ドルノモノガ残ツテ居  
ル。コノプログラムモ目下進行中デアル。以上ノ計  
画ノ中、未竣工ノモノガ、約六十八隻、十一萬五千  
噸、建造中ノモノガ約六十三隻、二十三萬三千噸テ  
アツテ、其他ハ全部既ニ竣工シテ居ル。ソノ艦船建  
造費ハ海軍預算ノ全部テハナイ。建造費ハ昭和六年  
ニハ三千八百萬ドルデアツタモノガ段々増エテ、昭  
和十年ニハ二億ドルヲ超ユルニ至ツタ。昭和十一年  
度ハ一億六千八百萬圓ニナツテキル。之ハアメリカ  
ガ艦ク言フ條約艦算ノ完成、即チワシントン・ロン  
ドン兩條約ヲ規定サレタ條約艦ノ建造ヲ之テ準備ス  
ル計畫ニナツテ居ル。從ツテ之ガ無事ニ進行スレバ  
一九四〇年ニハアメリカノ海軍ハワシントン・ロン  
ドン兩條約ヲ規定サレタ兵力量ヲ大體保有スルコト  
ニナル。コノ中ニハ勿論新造ノ足ラヌ部分ノ補充モ  
アルガ、舊艦ノ代換建造ノ部分モ入ツテ居ル。ナホ

コノホカニ、マダ公報ハ我々ノ手ニ入ツテキナイガ  
 新規計費トツテハ、戦艦ガ二隻、乙級巡洋艦十二隻  
 ヲ主ニシタ計費ガ進ンテ居ルヤウデアル。ソノホカ  
 側面外洋艦隊ハ待機艦等ガアル。今年ノ預算ニ二十  
 二萬圓ノ計費ヲ出ツタガ、之ハ豫算未了ヲ議會ニ提  
 擧サレオカッタ。イツレニシテモ現在アメリカノ海  
 軍ハ一九一〇年マデニワシントン・ロンドン兩條  
 約ヲ決メラレタモノヲ保有スト觀テ差支ヘナイ。コ  
 ノ計費以上ニ海軍ヲ擴張スル意思ガアルカナイカト  
 云フコトハ測ラナイガ、議會其他色々ナ都合ニ政府  
 ノ責任ヲ負ベテ居ルトコロニヨレバ、アメリカハ  
 何處マデモ過去ノ二條約ヲ尊重スルノ好。ソレ以上  
 ニ海軍計費ヲ增加スル意思ハナイト申シテ居ルガ、  
 今後ノ海軍ノ變化ニ就ツテハ、何トモ測ラナイ。大  
 體茲四五年前ハワシントン・ロンドン條約ニ規程サ  
 レタ兵力量ヲ標準ニシテ海軍ノ兵力増強ヲ斷行スル  
 モノト觀テ大ナル動搖ヒハナイト思フ。

・ 米國ノ太平洋作戦施設

次ニアメリカノ太平洋作戦關係ノ施設ニ付テ述ベ  
 ル。アメリカガ太平洋方面ノ水陸設備ニ近年非常ニ  
 力ヲ入レテ居ルコトハ極メテ顯著ナ事實デアル。ワ  
 シントン條約ノ後ニ二十年計費テ太平洋方面ノ水陸

903-11

設備ヲ改善スル目的ヲ以テ、一億三千六ドルノ費  
テ着手シテ居ツタガ、美英露法蘇露等ノ關係ヲ余リ  
巨額シ不モノハナカッタ。露陸ノ長孫灣ノ進營ノ如  
キハ力ヲ注イタガ、其他ニ以テテ現象ハ見エナカッ  
タ。トコロガ滿洲軍ニガ勃發スルヤ俄然アメリカノ  
對露ガ變ツテ來タ。自チ海軍擴張モ増加スルシ、ソ  
レ以外ニ産業復興費ニ使ツテ太平洋ニ非常ニ力ヲ入  
レテ來タ。其中堅モ力ヲ入レテ居ルノハ露陸ノ長孫  
灣デアル。之ニ今日マテ入レタ金ニ付テノ準備ナル  
數字ハ只今手計ニナイガ、最近ノ一九三六年ノ例テ  
モ、水陸施設費三千八百萬ドル中一千五百萬ドルヲ  
長孫灣ニ入レテ居ル狀態デアル。而シテ大体八九割  
程度ハ終ツテ完成ノ域ニ近イト高イテ居ル。現ニ昨  
年等學大演習ガ太平洋方面デアツタガ、露陸陸ガ同  
時ニ長孫灣ニ入ツテ補給・保養ヲヤツテ居ル。今後  
モマダ長孫灣ニ力ヲ入レ、例ヘバフロイディング・  
ドックヲ二ツ造ル計畫ガアル。コノフロイディング・  
ドックハ額ヲ尖ラシテ良港ニ造ヘ、且ツ自力流行ガ  
出來ル。ハツキリトハ別ラナイガ、兎ニ角サウ云フ  
處ヲ造ツテ經費一千萬ドルヲ之ニ注スル計畫ガア  
ルヤウデアル。之ノ如キハアメリカガ太平洋ノ作戦  
ニ如何ニ熱心デアルカラ顯現スル材料デアル。コノ  
ホカ本主ノ西海岸ニ於テモ、北カラ言ヘバシヤトル。

903-12

サンフランシスコ・ロスアンゼルス・サンビドロ・  
パナマニ施設ヲ増加シテ完全ナル修理・補給・休養  
ノ方面ニ遺憾ノナイヤウニ段々進メテ居ルヤウデア  
ル。滿洲露興勃發以來アメリカノ艦隊ハ引續キ太平  
洋方面ニ常駐シテ居ツタガ、アメリカニ於テモ亦我  
々モ、アレヲ何時マデモ儘クニシテモ太平洋岸テハ  
邊モ艦隊ヲ出テ来ナイノテハナイカト云フコトヲ心記  
シテ居ツタガ、專管ハ急進ナル水陸施設ニ依ツテ大  
谷西海岸テ待機シテ居ル。東海岸ニ行クノハ大磯道  
ノ船ヲ行クニ日當ノ修理、入渠、煙底塗替等ハ極  
テ重要岸テ陸ニ合セテ居ル。昨年アメリカ艦隊ノ大  
隊分ガ東海岸ニ行ツタ時、ニューヨークノ工廠カラ  
ハ職工ガ一人モ艦隊ニ行カナカツタト云フコトヲ聞  
イテ居ルガ、此ノ事ハ我々日本海軍ニ居ル者カラ云  
ヘバ信用出来ナイ程ノコトデアツテ、之ハアメリカ  
ノ艦船ガ艦内ニ於ケル工作施設等ガ完備シテ居ツテ  
自給自足ノ力ガ強イコトノ証明ニモナルガ、一ツハ  
太平洋岸方面ノ水陸施設ガ完備シテ大艦隊ノ待機  
態ニ要ラ候イテキナイ証明ニモナルト思フ。コノホ  
カアメリカガ最近カラ入レテ居ルノハ北方ノアラス  
カ・アリユーション方面ニ於ケル航空基地ノ整備、  
氣象ノ調査、或ハアラスカ方面ニ於テハ既ニ陸軍ノ  
航空部隊ガ出テ訓練ヲシテ居ルガ、北方ノ防備、用



903-13

兵器地點ノ整備度ハ獨逸等ニ非常ニ力ヲ入レテ居ル  
ト云フコトデアル。新クノ如クニシテアメリカガ水  
陸軍備ノ爲ニ近頃入レテ居ル金ハ、第三表ニ示ス如  
ク一九二五年頃ニハ四百萬ドル位デアツタモノガ近  
年ハ何レモ一千萬ドルヲ超エ、一九三六年ノ如キハ  
三千八百萬ドルヲ達ツテ居ル。之ニ従ツテ大體ガ察  
セラレル。

### 米海軍ノ航空勢力

次ハアメリカ海軍ノ航空ニ付テ述ベル。日本モサ  
ウデアルガアメリカハ獨立海軍ヲ養ツテ居ラス、陸  
軍ト海軍ト別ニ航空兵力ノ整備維持ヲツテ居ル。  
アメリカ海軍ガ航空ニ力ヲ入レテ居ルコトハ非常ニ  
モノデアツテ、我々ノ流レ頂ク所ニ當レバ、アメリ  
カノ海軍ハ濠洲ニ附隨シテ航空兵力ヲ充實シテ、獨  
立艦下ニ於テ決戦ヲヤルノダト爲シテ居ル。コノ整  
備ノ方針モ、年ト共ニ色々變リ、マタ増加シテ居ル  
ガ、最近ノ規模ハ、海軍ノ航空兵力整備ヲ目的トシ  
テ、海軍機總二千二百ヲ整備スルト言ツテ居ツタガ、  
併シ此ノ二千二百機ハヴァインソン案ノ一九三九年迄  
ニハ出來サウモナイノテ一應一千六百五十機ニ改メ  
更ニ後ニ一千九百機ヲ五年間ニ造ルト云フ計畫ヲ行  
テタガ現在ハ約一千五百機ヲ持ツテ居リ、最初ノ目

903-117

第三表

水陸施設充當ノ概要

西曆 19 一年	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36
單位 百萬磅	4.0	2.7	2.7	4.7	5.4	5.2	11.1	12.2	12.5	23.5	16.8	38.1
註 = 1. 936年 3800萬磅中 倫敦港 1500萬磅												

903-15

約テアル二千二百機モ大体ダインソン線完成ノ時ニ  
出来ルノテハナイカト思フ。コノホカニアメリカ  
ノ陸軍モ希望ニ非常ニ力ヲ注イテ居ツテ、ソノ意氣  
悉ニ於テハ、將來ハ陸軍方面テナシニ陸軍ノ作戦ニ  
モ陸軍ガ機率的ニ参加シテ其ノ作戦ニ応應シヨウト  
云フ意思ヲ持ツテ居ルヤウデアル。

### 英國海軍ノ東洋重視

イギリスノ海軍ハアメリカヤ日本ト少シ違ツテ統  
合シタ或ル年數ノ儀イタ建造プログラムヲ發表シテ  
イノヲ例トシテ居リ、年々ノ計畫ヲ繼々足シ々々々  
々テ居ルノテ、ハツキリシタ將來ノ見透シガ付キ兼  
ナルガ、大体ロンドン條約締結前後アタリハ活潑ナ  
建造ヲシテ居ラナカツタ。豈トシテハ、巡洋艦三隻、  
驅逐艦九隻、潛水艦三隻ダイヤヲ毎年造ツテ居ル狀  
況デアツタガ、コノ二三年來忽ニ増加シテ、今悉政  
府ノ發表ニ依レバ、明年中ニ、主力艦二隻ヲ起工ス  
ル外、航空母艦一隻、巡洋艦五隻、驅逐艦十二隻以  
上、潛水艦其他制限外艦艇若干隻ヲ建造スル。豫算  
トシテハ一九三六年及ヒ一九三七年ダケガ上ガツテ  
居ツテ、後ノ何年間ニ之ダケヲヤルト云フコトガ判  
ツテキナイガ、イツレニシテモ過去數年ニ比ベルト  
一兩年來活潑ナ建造ヲ始メタコトハ明ラカニ看取サ

第四表

903-16

		英國ノ建造費						
昭和	年	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
單位	百萬磅	6.2	6.0	7.7	9.7	11.5	11.9	16.2

レル。サウツテ艦船建造ノ進歩ハ第四表ニ示ス如ク  
増加ツテ居ル。

イギリスノ東洋方面ニ對スル作戰上ノ意圖ト云フ  
カ、在東洋ノ海軍兵力、其他東洋方面ニ對スル作戰  
線上ニ在ル基地ノ施設ニ付テ述ベレバ、近年在東洋  
ノ海上兵力ニハ餘程特別ノ力ヲ入レテ居ルヤウニ見  
エル。日露戰争後ハ、ロシヤ海軍ノ没落、日英同盟  
ノ改訂、マタヨロツバ方面ニ於テハドイツ海軍ノ  
勃興等ニ起レテ、東洋方面ノ海上兵力ヲ變々改改シ  
テ來タ。ズツト以前ハ甲々大キナモノヲ持ツテ居ツ  
タガ、一時ハ非常ニ減シテ、世界大戦中ハ勿論ノコ  
ト、日本ノ力ニ多クヲ依頼シテ、其ノ勢力ハ大ツタ  
モノヲナカツタガ、世界大戦後ニ變々内容ヲ増加シ  
テ來テ、近年ハ東洋方面ニハ、航空母艦一隻、巡洋  
艦一シカモ一萬噸巡洋艦ノ彙モ計シイモノ一七隻、  
イギリス全体テハ十五隻シカ持ツテ居ナイノデア  
ルガ其ノ十五隻ノ中ノ七隻ヲ東洋ニ廻シ、乙級巡洋艦  
十五隻、之等ヲ速力ニシテ巨艦、潛水艦ヲ附ケ、  
其他長江筋ニ居ル河川艦艇ハ勿論デア  
ルガ、過去ニ  
比ベレバ内容が充實強化サレテ居ル。シカモ其ノ艦  
艇ハ新シイモノデアツテ、巡洋艦ニセヨ四隻、潛  
水艦ニセヨ、完成スルト先ツ東洋ニ最初ニ持ツテ來  
ルコトが異常ニ多イヤウデア  
ル。ナホ海上兵力ノミ

ナラズ東洋方面ニ對スル兵要地帯ノ施設尙實強化ニ  
モ非常ニ力ヲ入レテ居ツテ、西ハジブラルタルカラ  
マルタ、スエズ運河ヲ通ツテ、アデン・コロンボ、  
シンガポール・香港等ハ一ツノチエインニナツテ、  
重油タンクヲ造リ、其他ノ施設モ出來テ居ル。之等  
ノ宿所ノ施設ノ甲テ最モ力ヲ注イテ居ルノハシンガ  
ポールデアル。之ハ初メハ相當大キナ計畫ヲ始メタ  
ノデアルガ、其後労働黨内閣ノ採ニ之ヲ一時中止ス  
ルヤウナ形モアツタガ、マタ其後變ツテ、殊ニ滿洲  
要領ヲ治マツテカラハ計畫ヲ進キ足ツツテ、最近ハ  
聯進的ノ進歩ヲ圖ツテ居ルヤウニ見エル。今日マテ  
シンガポールニ注込シタル金ハ約一千五百萬ポンド  
ト云フコトデアルガ、ナホ之以上着々ト計畫施設ヲ  
進メテ居ルヤウデアル。ソカモ其ノ進歩状態ハ大体  
完備ニ近イ。乾船渠モ完成シテ居ルシ、百萬噸ノ燃  
料ノ供給施設、修理工場、兵船庫、兵營兵舎等、大  
体從來計畫ノモノハ本年末グライニ完成シテ、將來  
ハ莫ニ進キ足シラヤルノテハナイカト云フ氣勢ヲ見  
エル。香港ハ前橋鐵道帯ニ在ルガ、其ノ内容ヲ相  
當強化シテ居ルトイフ情報モアル。

ハ急進ニ發展スル英空軍

イギリスノ空軍ハ世界大戦中ハ急進ニ發展シタ。

併シ其後フランス・イタリ一等ニ比ベト一時獨善  
 ノ嫌ヒガアツタガ、最近ハ總軍ニカヲ入レ始メテ居  
 ル。昨年末政府ノ公表ニ依レバ、總軍ノ勢力ヲ一千  
 七百五十員ニスルノダト云フコトテ、現ニ昨年末テ  
 タリニ持ツテ居ル以ハ總軍益々約一千三百機ト開  
 イテ居ル。ソノ豫算ハ第一表ノイキリスノ總軍費ニ  
 依ツテモ、幾許年來急進ナ増加ヲシテ居ルコトガ判  
 ル。

英ソグイエットノ艦東海軍

英艦、荷、荷、英、及ヒ東洋方面ニ於テ日本ト重  
 大ニ關係ニ在ルソグイエットノ海軍狀況等モアルノ  
 テアルガ、アマリ振カクナルシ、帝國ノ海軍トシテ  
 ハ、大條英米ヲ睨シテ居レバ、他ハソレテ賄ツテ行  
 ケルカラ、サウ云フ方面ノ海軍ノ内容ニ付テ述ベル  
 コトハ本日ハ控ヘタト思フ。唯ロシヤノ海軍ハ近  
 年急進ニ整備ヲ始メ、帝國海軍トシテモ全然之ヲ無  
 視スル譯ニハ行カズ、莫大ナル關心ヲ持ツテ居ル。  
 現在艦隊ニ層ルロシヤノ海軍ノ主要ナモノハ、潜水  
 艦約五十隻、ロシヤハ潜水艦ヲ總數ニ約二百二十隻  
 グラキ等ツテ居ルヤウテアルガ、英甲五十五隻位ガ艦  
 隊ニ在テ居ル。其他艦艇總數ガ六五、之ハ大シクモ、

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テハナイ。ナホ商運水運ニトシテ居ルガ、之ハ以  
 中限ノ極小サイモノデ、恐ラク、此ル場合ニハ、  
 運送トシテ使ヒ、或ル場合ニハ水運ニトシテ使フノ  
 事ト思ハレル。コノ商運水運ニ結言ラウラジオニ  
 於テ日本ノ海軍ニ對シテ相當設備ノ力ヲ持ツコトハ  
 守ハレナイ事アル。昔シ海軍ノ勢力、海上社ノ  
 確保ハ、幾ツテも水運ヲ水運ニシテハ出來ナイノ  
 デアツテ、何トシテモ大運ヲ運送ニシテ均衡ノトシ  
 タ海軍ガ弱ク言フノデ、守勢的兵力トシテハ僅僅ハ  
 アルガ、東洋ニ於ケル海上社ヲ以テスル上カラハ日本  
 ノ海軍ニ此ツテ勝目ハナイト考ヘテ居ル。

### 二 帝國海軍ノ準備方針

新クノ如キ國際情勢ト列國海軍ノ實狀ヲ既ミ合セ  
 テ、帝國海軍トシテハ、然ラバト云フ巨額ノ方針  
 ノ事ナルカト云フコトニ此ツテ見レバ、前ニモ述  
 ベタ如ク、假令海軍總長ニシテモ日本カラ進シ  
 テ海軍費ヲ削減スルヤウナコトハ帝國トシテハ考  
 ヘテキナイ。最少限度ニ於テ不敵ノ力ヲ持ツコトダ  
 ケラ目標ニシテ居ル。最近ノ軍縮會議ニ於テ日本ハ  
 共通最大限ト云フコトヲ主張シタ。ソレニ對シテ列



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強ハ、——共通大敵ト云フテモソレハ無茶ダ。  
 日本ハ英米ニ對抗シテサウ云フ海軍ヲ造ルダケノ  
 カヲ持ツテキナイテハナイカ。取ハ冬國ハ各國特有  
 ノ地理的條件ヲ備ヘテ居ル。所謂國防ニ將兵ナ施弱  
 性ヲ持ツテ居ル。然ルニ日本ハ其ノ脆弱性が少ナク、  
 英米ノ如キハ脆弱性が非常ニ大キイ。ソノ脆弱性ノ  
 差等ヲ無視シテ均等ノ兵力ヲ持ツコトハ決シテ不智  
 成、不慮ヲテハナイノダ。却ツテ安全感ノ不均等ニ  
 ナルノダ。——新ウ云フ理由テ反響シテ居ツタノ  
 テアルガ、日本ノ主張スル所ハ今日ニ於テモ決シテ  
 間違ヒハナイト我々海軍ノ者ハ確信シテ居ル。

一 西太平洋ニ不敗ノ傳

第一日本ハ國力が足ラナイカラ英米ト同シ兵力ヲ  
 持ツノハ後継ダト言フコトハ餘計ナオセツカイテ、  
 英米サウ云フコトヲ言フトシテモ、國際會議ノ席上  
 テサウ云フコトヲ理由トシテ争フベキテハナイ。  
 マタ國際上ノ脆弱性ハ相對ニハイトハ言ヘナイガ、  
 管シテ弱性ノ出來ルノハ後継シヤウトスル爲ニ起ル  
 ノデアツテ、自分ヲ守衛ヲ持シテキルナラバ脆弱性  
 ハ若シク少クナルト云フコトガ言ヘル點デアル。  
 各國已ラ等ツテ他ヲ後継シナイト云フ見地ヲ容認ス  
 ルナラバ、各國ガ均等ノ兵備ノ信ヲ持ツコトハ何處

ニ行ツテモ正々堂々と主張シ得ルコトデアルト慰フ。  
 オ互ニ對等ノ立場ニ立ツテ、他ノ方ハオ前ノ方ニ攻  
 メテ行カナイカラ六偏ヲ宣イトカ七輕テ宣イトカ言  
 フコトハ、國際的ノ一流理ヲ言ヘルベキモノテハナ  
 イ。嘗ツ嘗ケレバ格別、日本ハワシントン・ロンド  
 ン兩條約ヲ締結シタ時ト、昨年カラ本年ニ對ケテ軍  
 備合點ニ臨ンタ當時ノ、西方ニセヨ、東方ニセヨ、  
 國際的ノ地位ニセヨ、決シテ向フノ無理押付ケラ其  
 ノ受諾シナケレバナラヌヤリテ取懸テハナカツタ。  
 殊ニマタ東洋ノ安定勢力、マタ日本ノ國策ヲ遂行ス  
 ル上ニ海軍ノ兵備ガ支障ノ力トシテ重大ナル役働ヲ  
 演ズル立場カラシテ、不脅威、不侵略ノ主張ニ立ツ  
 ナラバ、ドウシテモ列國ノ軍備ハ同等テケレバ  
 ナラヌト主張セザラザナイ。嘗ツ軍備會議テ均等  
 ノ兵力ヲ要求シタカラ、然ラバ直チニ日本ハ將來ノ  
 軍備計畫トシテ未來ト同等ノ兵力ヲ造ルノカト云へ  
 バ、必ズシモサウテナイ。日本ハ決シテ他國ニ對シ  
 テ進取ノ意思ヲ持ツテナイ。アメリカノ西海岸ヲ  
 侵ストカ京ハシンガポールヲ侵シテ印度ヲ取ルトカ  
 云フヤウナコトヲ日本ハ少クとも近キ將來ニ於テハ  
 考ヘテホナイ。日本ノ國土ノ防衛ヲ全ウスレバ宜シ  
 イ。具體的ニ言ヘバ、日本ハ西太平洋ニ於テ如何ナ  
 ル海軍力トモ比較シテ賤ケナイタケ、陸軍實力ヲ持  
 テバ宜シイ。 同條ノ我國實力ヲ持

ツト云フコトハ必ズシモ同進進、同費費ト云ツタヤ  
 ナ意味テハナイ。進軍作戦ノスレバソレタケ進軍  
 スルモノニ分ノ悉イコトハ申ス迄モナイシ、マタ日  
 本ガ地理的ニ守勢ノ態ヲ取ルナラバ、日本ノ  
 地理的ノ地位ヲ全體的ニ活用シ得ル點テ、地理的ノ  
 特長ノ情勢ト、ソレニ加ヘル特殊ノ地勢ト、透ニ居  
 ツテ對テ待ツト云フ意味的ノ考ニ思ルナラバ、日本  
 ハ必ズシモ艦手重ト海軍ノ海上兵力（有形物ノ海上  
 兵力ノ意）ヲ待ツテ居ルタテモ國防ノ策國ヲ期スル  
 コトガ出來ルト考ヘル。

一 海軍ノ新算備計畫

ソレテ我が將來ノ海軍ノ算備計畫ハ、新算備ニ應  
 ツテ計策ノ巨細ヲ考慮シ、國防所要兵力ガ内定シテ  
 居ル。之ハ此處ヲ指セル限リテナイガ、ソレヲ基準  
 ニシテ、新補充計畫ニ依リ海軍ノ兵力ヲ充實セント  
 スル次第デアル。

來年度ノ豫算ニ現ハレタ海軍算備ノ差額ニナル兵  
 力差ハ、必ズシモ兼定サレタ國防所要兵力ソノモノ  
 ヲ直ニニ實現シヨリト云フモノテハナイ。滿洲事變  
 以來、國外多難デアツテ、國防充實モツナケレバナ  
 ラズ、國民生活ノ安定モツナケレバナラズ、ソノホ

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此の方面ニ色々大ニ調査ヲ必要トスル次第デアル。  
 特ニ陸軍ニ於テハ、急遽ニ準備ノ完妥ヲシナケレバ  
 ナラス。一方、歳入ニ於テハ、歳入ノ失墜ヲ許サナイ  
 ト云フ状況デアルノデ、海軍ニ於テモ忍ビ得ル程小  
 限度ヲ計上シテ來年度ノ預算ヲ作成シタ次第デアル。  
 従ツテ國庫所収兵力ヲ維持ニスレバ勿論ノコト、當  
 面ノ需要ヲ引當ニシテ考ヘテ見テモ、相當量其ナモ  
 ノガ、國家財政ノ爲ニ、直チニ實現出来ズ、將來年  
 度ニ繰延ベラレタモノモアル次第デアルカラ、之ハ  
 國家財政ニハ其他國際信譽ニ關シテ、將來ノ善處ニ  
 榮ツヨリ位方ガナイト考ヘテ居ル。

然ラバ新軍備計畫テドノ程度ノモノヲ整備スルノ  
 事ト云フコトニナルデアルガ、之ハ具體的ノ數字  
 事今日衆多ヲ表シ得ナイ時期ニアルコトヲ善ク注意  
 ニ思フ。

ソノ理由ハ米英佛三國ノ間ニ締結サレタ新ロンド  
 ン軍備條約、及ヒ、最近英露國ノ會談ニ依ツテ締結  
 サレタ特別ノ軍備協定並ニ之ニ關聯シテドイツガ許  
 洋イキリストノ間ニ決メタ英獨海軍協定等モ自然ニ  
 今年ノ新軍備ニ關聯ヲ持ツヤウニナルト思フ。マタ  
 イギリスハ歐州ニバルチツク海沿岸國ヲ誘引シテ  
 自分ノ傘下ニ包イテ、海軍準備ヲ促ラウトスル工作

本年開始サレタ新ロンドン軍艦艦隊ハ、之ヲ長崎  
 スレバ、貨物ノ積込ト遊覧通報ノ二ツノ行分カラ成  
 ツテ居ル。貨物積込ハ、編カク云ヘバ今迄ノワッソ  
 トン・ロンドン兩艦船ト遊ツタ所モアルガ、大體ア  
 ノ流レヲ汲ソテ出来上ツテ居ルト見テ大キク間違ヒ  
 ハナイ。タズ遊覧通報ダケハ從來ノ條約ニ依メテア  
 ツクノト大分ヤリ方ヲ變ツタ。ソレハ、建造スルニ  
 付テハ該艦隊ノ間チオ互ニ内審ノ通報ヲスルト云フ  
 コトガ主體ニナツテ居ル。従ツテ條約ニ加入ソテキ  
 ナイ國ニハ、條約加入國ノ遊覧ノ方針規定が別ラナ  
 イコトニナツテ居ル。ソノ通報ノ仕方ハ、毎年一月  
 カラ四月迄ノ間ニ、ソノ艦隊ノ間ニ遊覧スル遊艦  
 計數ヲ互ニ開列書ニ内審ニ通報スル。ソレハ艦隊  
 ト集約ト、ソノ艦ニ搭載スル大砲ノ數大口徑ヲ知ラ  
 セル。ソレカラ忽々遊艦ニ攻撃ル前ニハ烟目ヲ通報  
 スル。ソレハ各遊艦ニ付テ、艦ノ重量寸法、艦力、  
 艦力、及ビ搭載スル兵數……コノ諸般スル兵裝ノ

一 長崎遊覧艦隊ノ概況

ラツテ居ル。従ツテ近半艦隊ニ於テハ、少ナクモ  
 歐列國トアメリカノ間テハ、大體本年開始サレタ  
 新軍艦艦隊ノライソテ到來スル去リテ去リテ去リテ去  
 ラクト居フ。

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如キハ、大砲、魚雷、機銃、飛行機、カタパルト、  
機雷艇ノ數マテ、非常ニ細カイ内容ヲ備ヘタモノデ  
アルガ、ソノ内容ノ詳細ナル兵目ヲ監看國ニ内報ス  
ル。ソノ内報ガ三週間ニ到着シテカラ四ヶ月経タナ  
ケレバ建造ニ着手スルコトが出来ナイ。若シ建造中  
途ニシテ其ノ兵目ヲ變更シタル場合ハ、ソノ變更ノ  
工事ニ着手スルノモ、同ジク内報ガ到着シテカラ四  
ヶ月経タナケレバ着手出来ナイ。新ウ云フ艦ツイ流  
定ニナツテ居ル。

一 何故ニ公談シ得ヌカ

之ハ其スルニ英米ガ海軍小海軍國ヲ領ル手デアツテ、  
之ニ敵ツテ相手ノ出方ヲ始終見テ、先ヲ制サレナイ  
ヤウニト云フ、優勢海軍國ガ劣勢海軍國ヲ押ヘル手  
トシテ新ウ云フ規定が出来タノデアルガ、ソノ目的  
ハ兎モアレ、日本ハ條約ニ参加シテキナイノテ、英  
米ガドウ云フ建造計畫ヲ待テ、マタ其ノ計畫ノ内容  
ガドウ云フモノデアルカト云フコトハ全然判ラナイ。  
從ツテ斯カル事案ニ於テ、日本ガ從來ノヤリ来リヲ  
踏襲シテ、新補充計畫ハ、ドウ云フ艦隊ガ何隻、總  
計ガ何隻、噸位ニシテ何十萬噸、總金額幾キト云フ  
ヤウナコトヲ、通早ニ發表スルコトハ、特屬コツテ  
ノ手ノ出ダケヲ見セテ向フノ手ノ甲ヲ知ラナイト云

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フコトニナリ、之ハ到底忍ブコトが出来ナイ。

海軍が經營費ノ總額ヲ議會ニ要求シテ其ノ勘賞  
 ヲ認ルノニ、ソノ内容ヲ詳細ニ説明スルコトナク、  
 議會ハ勿論、國民ニモ其ノ餘額ヲ求メズニ、總額ノ  
 ナリナ格好ヲ要求スルコトハ、海軍トシテ職ニ心  
 苦シク感ズル次第デアツテ、余シテ本壇トスルトコ  
 ロテハナイノデアルガ、列國ノ情勢ガサウ云フ風テ  
 アルノテ、強國ナガラ今茲ニ其ノ内容ヲ世間ニ公  
 表シ得ナイ處ヲ御察取ルヒタイ。但シ之モ、誰ガ出  
 來テシマヘバ、細カイ長目ハ有ラナイニシテモ、何  
 頃ドラキノ體テ大體ハ何時ト云フコトドラキハ判ル  
 ガ、公示セザル主タル理由ハ、算定費ガ若々ト過  
 費懸シツツアル海軍ノ建造計畫ガドウ云フ方向ニ  
 進ンテ居ルカト云フコトヲ相手國ニ通告ニ示スコト  
 ガ不利ダト云フ斷ニアル。

一 一九一二年海軍費ノ概況

本年度ノ海軍費ハ總額六億八千百餘萬圓デアツ  
 テ、昭和十一年度ノ実行費總額五億五千餘萬圓ニ  
 較べルト、總額ニ於テ一億二千九百餘萬圓ヲ增加シ  
 テ居ル。ソノ増加ノ中テ重要ナル項ヲ摘ミ舉ゲレバ、  
 經常費ニ於テハ、新艦船ノ維持費ガ九百四十八萬圓、

之ハ恒例ノモノデアツテ、昭和十一年度中即チ昭  
 和十二年即チ昭和十二年三月一杯マテニ完成スル艦  
 船ノ維持費デアリ、コノ造船ハ皆第二次補充計費ニ  
 屬シテ居ルモノデアル。ソレカラ航空艦隊維持ニ要ス  
 ル經費ガ九百六十三萬餘圓、之モ第二次補充計費ニ  
 差ク航空隊ノ増設デアツテ、來年度ニ完成スルガ、  
 ソノ維持費デアル。之テ第二次補充計費ハ來年度ヲ  
 以テ大體完成シ、アト極カナモノガ十三年度ニ要ル  
 ガ、併シ之ハ營業場ニナツテ十三年度ニ要ハレル譯  
 デアル。ソレカラ航空兵艦維持ニ要ル經費二百二十  
 七萬餘圓、海軍ヲ航空隊ト稱フノハ總テ陸上ノ航空  
 隊ノコトデアツテ、艦載飛行機、即チ航空母艦ソノ  
 ホカ各種艦船ニ搭載シテ居ル飛行機ノ維持費ハ別ニ  
 取ツテ居ル。ソレカラ造船及造兵費百五十萬圓  
 之ハ、從來海軍ノミナラス日本全体ガサウテナイカ  
 ト思フガ、技術ガ、常ニ列國ノ進歩ニ追いつテ、追  
 ヒ遅クマ々々々ヲヤツテ居ツテ、類似ガ多ク、根本  
 的ノ研究ガ足ラヌト云フ憾ミガ少ナクナカッタノテ  
 アルガ、海軍ニ於テモ此ノ基礎的、根本的ナ研究研  
 究ガ從來十分テナカッタ爲ニ、色々ヤツテモ失敗シ  
 タリ良イモノガ出來ナイト云フ状態ガアルノテ、各  
 種兵器ノ實地研究ノ要ヲ來年度ハ相當要求シテ居





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持方ヲ要スルト居フ。假ニ其ノ計數ヲ守現シテ二百  
 萬圓ニ達セシタニシテモ、從來ノ平均狀態カラ考  
 ヘルト、二百萬圓ト云フノハ大體ソノ年數ニ在エル  
 鐵道ニ相當スル位ノモノテ、海外ノ輸入ニ依リテナケ  
 レバナラス類ハ現在ト比較シテ著シイ減少ハナイノ  
 テハナイカト考ヘテ居ル。従ツテ海軍トシテハ政府  
 總理政算ガ假令暫立ツテモ今にテニ此ノ時數ヲ停止  
 スルコトハ考ヘラレナイデアツテ、マダ舊分ハ此  
 ノ時數ノ方針ヲ續ケテ行カナケレバナラス。ソレカ  
 ラ鐵道設備ニ要スル經費二千六百八十七萬圓、之  
 ハ來年度ノ補充計數ニ比シテ、來年度差手スル流  
 入額ガ五割アルガ其ノ設備費デアル。ソレカラ造船  
 設備ニ要スル經費ガ三千六百八十七萬圓、主方造  
 ノ設備ハ大體昭和十一年度ヲ以テ完成シタノデア  
 ルガ、マダ航空母艦ノ設備、其他補助艦船ノ設備モ  
 ツテ居ルノテ、之ニ對スル經費デアル。ソレカラ軍  
 需品整備ニ要スル經費千八百九十五萬圓、之ハ兵  
 隊・兵器・燃料等デアルガ、大半ハ政府燃料ノ消費  
 時數ノ費用デアル。其他海軍設備トカ大演習費等  
 モアルガ、尙ニ内容ヲ説明スルガケノ煩僅モナイカ  
 ラ當座スル。

一六 軍備計畫立ノ重心


ナホ補充計畫ニ關係シテ、極ク概念的ニハ既ニ先  
 程、日本が通シテ進進競争ヲ誘發スル意思ハナイト  
 云フコトヲ辨ベテ置イタノデアルガ、ソレヲ数字的  
 ニ述ベテミタイ。新軍備計畫ニ於テハ、從來ワシン  
 トン・ロンドン兩條約ヲ總ツテ色々酌量サレタ比率  
 ノ概念ハ今日我々ハ脱脚シテ居ルノデアツテ、出來  
 上ツタ勢力ヲ比較スルニハ、應順數テ何が何程ト云  
 フヤウニ比率テ比ベルヨリ目安ノ付ケ方ガナイガ、  
 自己ノ兵力量ヲ決定スルニハ、決ッテ先ツ比率ヲ決  
 メテ其ノ内容ヲ盛り込ムト云フヤウナ行キ方デハナ  
 イ。相對的デアルカラ、大體相手ノ兵力ヲ考ニ入レ  
 ナケレバナラメコトハ勿論デアル。



茲ニ對米關係ヲ、アメリカノヴァインソン系其他之  
 ニ關係シタ補充計畫ガ完成スル一九四〇年ヲ目標ニ  
 ツテ考ヘテ見ルト、アメリカノハ大體所謂トカリイ  
 テイ・ノイヴァイテ、ワシントン・ロンドン兩條約  
 ニ規定シタ兵力量ニ準スル。ダカラ若シ日本ガ其ノ  
 條約ニ入ツテ居ツタナラバ、代償ヲ建造シテ其ノ  
 量ハ自ラ染マツテ來ルノデアルガ、日本ハ其ノ條約  
 ニ制限サレナイノデアルカラ、必ズシモ主力艦ハ七  
 割ナケレバナラメトカ巡洋艦ハ何割テ行クト云フヤ  
 ウニ考ヘズトモ、アメリカノ相對的ナ兵力ヲ見テ、



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之ニ對ツテ海軍兵ノ上カラ我ガ方ノ各部隊ノ編制ヤ  
 個々ノ單位ヲ考ヘレバ、右ノツカラ兵力ガ出テ來ル  
 ノデアツテ、新軍備計畫ハアメリカノ何割ナセムバ  
 ナラヌト云フヤウナコトハ、我々ハ今日テハ言ヒモ  
 セズ考ヘテモキナイ。實質的作戰ノ立脚ニ立ツテ國  
 カニ應ジタ海軍ヲ造リ上ゲルヤウナ單位ヲ集計ツテ  
 行クノガ海軍ノ視ヒ方デアル。従ツテ、條約海軍ヲ  
 造ルノト、今般ベク計算偏方針ヲ遂行ツテ行クノト  
 テハ、結果ニ違ガアツテ然ルベキデアルガ、故意ニ  
 其ノ量ヲ合シテ誤テハナイガ偶然一致シテ居ル。

一 日・英・米ノ造艦量比較

第五表ハ、新計畫ハ入ツテキナイガ、日・英・米  
 ノ三グループニ分ケテ、左側ノ  ハ、若シ過去  
 ノワシントン・ロンドン條約が容認シタト假定シ  
 テ各軍ガ來年以後ソノ兵力ヲ維持ツテ行ク爲ニハ毎  
 年下ノ位ツツ建造ツナケレバナラヌカト云フ其ノ代  
 表建造量ノ將來十年間ノ一年平均デアル。之ニ依レ  
 バ、日本ハ約五萬三千噸、イギリスガ約八萬三千噸、  
 アメリカガ約七萬噸ヲ建造ツナケレバナラヌ譯デア  
 ル。ソノ右ニアル  ハ昭和十年度ノ造艦量デア  
 ツテ、日本ガ約三萬噸餘、イギリスガ約四萬噸、ア

メリカが約八萬六千噸、更に英ノ右ノ  ハ昭和六年乃至昭和十年ニ至ル五年間ノ毎年平均建造量ヲアツテ、日本が約二萬二千噸、イギリスが約三萬三千噸、アメリカが約四萬八千噸テアル。  ト


 線ハ参考ノ爲ニ附ケタノデアルガ、左ノ  ガ示ス如ク、過去ノ二條約が存続シテモ、日本ハ約五萬三千噸ヲ造ラナケレバナラメシ、イギリスハ約八萬三千噸、アメリカハ約七萬噸ヲ造ラナケレバナラヌ。コノグラフニ示ス日本ノ五萬三千噸ヲ頭ニ入レテ、新補充計畫ニ於テ日本ハトノ位ヲ造ルカト云フコトヲ許容シテミルト、五ヶ年總管艦隊ヲ各年平均ニ割ツテ見ルト、五萬三千噸ヨリハ餘程下ガルノデアル。之ハ海軍が無條約状態ニアツサモ、自ラ造ンテ發達競争ヲ誘發スル意思ガナイト云フ数字的ノ註明ニナル。

然ラバ過去ノ條約が存続シタノニ比ベテ、製造量ハ實際ハ多クナイノニ懸念ハ何故置エタノカト云フ點が起ルデアラウガ之ハ  ト  ヲ比較スレバ解ル。主力艦ノ製造ガ非常ニ大キキ負擔ニナツテ居ル。成程從來ハワシントン・ロンドン兩條約ハ、海軍ノ全体ノ規模ヲ制限シ、或ハ戦艦ノ如キハ代艦ノ建造ヲ延期シテ艦齡ヲ延長スルト云フヤウナコト

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第五表

日米米造産量比較表



□ ハ米産、倫敦商標約ヲ含ムル場合ノ代表産量  
(昭和十年間ノ一年平均)

▨ ハ昭和十年産造産量

▩ ハ昭和六年乃至昭和十年間ノ平均造産量

子、ソノ當時ニ於テハ一時國費ノ膨脹ヲ抑止スル爲メ、景ガ種カニテツタト思フガ、密ツソレハ獨斷的ノ間  
 門チハホイノテツテ、主力造ノ建造ヲ中止シタオ  
 蓋チ、來年カラハ製造費ヲ計算スルハトシテ積エザルヲ  
 審ナイ。コノ増加ハ決ツテ軍備條約ヲ既退シタカラ  
 トカ無條約款ヲニナツタカラト云フ結果ヲハナイ。

一八 軍備條約ノ締結

ナレニ、我々ハ決シテ軍ナル心持ノ門トカ何ト  
 カチ無條約ヲ願秋スルト云フ意思ハ毛禰ナイ。若シ  
 オ互ノ立場ヲ瞭解シテ本當ニ公正ニナルナラバ、軍  
 備ノ放棄ハ必ズアルト思フ。密ツ懸シイ幾過去ノ二  
 條約ハ決シテ公正ナモノチハナカツタ。特ニ日本ニ  
 對シテ蓋々不利ナモノチアツタ。ソノ不利ナモノ  
 中チ、物質的ナ不利ハ言フ迄モナイガソレ以外ニ精  
 神的ノ非難ナ不承ガアツタ。之ハ國民ノチイグニテ  
 イノ間題チナク、陸軍部内ノ問題チアリ又私一信ノ  
 私見チアルガ、過去十數年間ニ密ツカカラザル概念  
 ヲ陸軍軍人ニ抱エ付ケタト思フ。ソレハ、軍備會議  
 ノ際ガ、屢々發送サレ、報道サレ、新聞雜誌ニ載  
 サレルト、日本ハ他比尋テアルカラ、察ヲ以テ衆ヲ  
 討ツニハ云々ト、十數年間ソレバカリヲ耳ニシ、上

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兵が都下ニ被ヘル時ニハ、日本ハ兵力ガ少ナイカラ  
 オ前邊ハツツカリヤラナケレバイカヌゾト云フコト  
 フ常ニ申ツテ居ツタノデアルガ、之ガ知ラズ觀ラズ  
 ノ間ニ、余ニ若イ士官ナドノ類ノ中ニ、劣勢比尋テハ  
 暇ガ出来ナイノダト云フ考ガ温エ付ケラレタノテハ  
 ナイカト思フ。其他、艦船部隊ノ若イ人カラ、劣勢  
 ダカラ新ウシテ呉レ、アアシテ呉レト注文ガ出ル。  
 之ガ誤ノ心理ニハ誠ニ寄マシカラメ懸影ヲ及ボシ  
 テ居ル。軍人ノ精神トシテハ、假令劣勢テモ必ズ勝  
 ツノダト云フ訓練ヲシ、マタ自分ノ決心ヲ固メテ之  
 ニ邁進シテケレバナラヌガ、軍縮會議ノ報道論議等  
 ガ始終アルト、兩方ノ勢力ヲ比較シテ、動モスレバ  
 劣勢デアルガ故ニ勝算ナシト云フ執念ヲ持チ易イ。  
 之ハ軍縮ガ我々軍人ニ温エ付ケタ最モイケナイ執念  
 テハナイカト考ヘテ居ル。今後ハ軍縮條約ヲ締結シ  
 テ、日本ハアメリカノ六割トカ七割ノ劣勢ヲ云フ  
 ヤウナコトヲ口ニシナイ。比較スレバ彼ガ有利デア  
 リ我ガ劣デアルト言ヘルカモ知レナイガ、ソシテコ  
 トヲ言フ必要ガナイシ、オ互ノ勢力ヲ比較スル論議  
 ノ類ガ大分ナクナツタ。之ハ日本ノ軍縮會議カラ脱  
 退シテ軍縮條約ヲ締結シタ精神的ノ改變テハナ  
 イカ。マタ其ノ感ニ目ヲ着ケテ警覺シナケレバナラ  
 スノテハナイカト考ヘル。



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次ニ海軍艦隊ノ開進デアルガ、之ノ見送ッハ固難  
 デアルガ、併ソアメリカハ太平洋方面ニ於テハ通商  
 ノ二條約ノ條約書ヲ行クノ多。ソノ條約ヲ何處ニテ  
 モ履行ツテ行クノ多ト云フコトヲ主張シテ居ル。故  
 ニアメリカガ價值カラ刺戟サレテ以上ハ海軍艦隊ニ  
 對シテコトハハナイト云フコトガ一途ハ考ヘラレル。  
 ソノ對峙スル日本ハ疾クテアメリカヲ脅カスルヤウ  
 ナ軍備増強ヲ爲テ、海軍艦隊等ヲ擴張スル意思ハ毛  
 ナイ。故小威威ノモノヲ我ニスルノ多、固太平洋  
 ニ於ケル日本ノ海上勢力ガ安固デアル其ノ長ハ威  
 力ヲ存ルノ多ト云フ考テ居ルノデアルカラ、日本  
 固ニ海軍艦隊等ヲ進ルコトハナイト一途ハ言ヒ得ル  
 デアルガ、併ソ日本ノ自信ハ弱モアレ、アメリカニ  
 於テハアメリカノ公人ガ進言シテ居ルガ如ク、果ッ  
 テ日本ノ海軍増強ヲ如何ニ見ルカ。之ヲ、固考ヘ  
 軍備維持ノ精神ニ戻シテ海軍艦隊等ニ對シテハ固  
 云フ口實ニ取リテ進出シテ來レバ如何、若シ軍ニ  
 對シテ海軍ノ設備ガ其ノ異志ナラバ果出シテ來ナイカモ  
 分ラナイ。故シテ我々ニハ如何カ、アメリカノ考ヘ  
 テ居ルコトガ、日本ノ海軍ニ於ケル影響ヲ如何ニ  
 受クテ一日モ早ク海軍ノ固ニ成ミ取ラナケレバナラ

一、海軍艦隊ノ擴張ニ對シテ

ナイト云フノガ根本信念デアルナラバ、之亦何ヲカ  
言ハシヤデアル。

ニル 競争ハ寧ロ以洲ヨリ

イツレトモ懸断ハ出来ナイガ、私ハ、製造競争ガ  
若シ起ルトスレバ、東洋方面ヲ起ルノチハナシニ、  
ヨロッパバテ起ルノチハナイカト考ヘル。ヨロッパ  
バニ於テハ、昨年英獨ノ同テ合談ガ出来タガ、ドイ  
ツガ再算備ヲ宣言シテ端々實行ニ入り出シタノニ對  
シ、之ヲ激任シテ置ク。大變ナコトニナルノチ、イ  
ギリスハ之ヲ抑ヘンガ能ハズ云フ會談ヲシ、ドイ  
ツハ又、近イ將來ノ十年間カ、！ニカク相當期間ハ  
イギリスニ正面カラ衝突イテモ仕方ナイカラ殊々  
ナガライギリスト手ヲ繋ルヤウニ措好テ行キタイト  
云フノチ、兩方ノ氣合ガ合ツテ軍備會談ガ出来タノ  
ダト思フガ、イギリスハ其ノ英獨會談ヲキツカケニ  
シテ昨年ノ軍備會談ヲ興信シ、！ノ英獨會談ノライ  
ンテ今年ノ軍備條約モリドシテ行カウト云フヤウ  
デアツタガ、專志ト違ツテイギリスノ思フヤウニナ  
ラナカツタ。會議ガ濟ンテソヴイエット・ボラン  
ド・スウエーデン等ト話ラシテ居ルガ、ソヴイエツ  
トガ起ツテ來、殊ニド分ツハ、世界大戦中ハ勿論ノ  
コト大戦直後モマダ國力が衰微シテ居ツテ、海軍ノ

整備ニ金ヲ漸ケルコトガ出来ナカツタノデアルガ、  
 近年ハ尙<sup>伊</sup>ト共ニドイツモ海軍ノ充實ニ意ヲ注グ聲  
 態ニナツテ、イギリストシテハ非常ニ苛シイ立場ニ  
 ナツタノチ、歐洲ノ諸海軍國ヲ抑ヘ、少クトモ其ノ  
 ニツ位ガ京ニナツテ來テモ自分ノ所ハ決シテ敗レナ  
 イト云フヤウナ姿勢ヲ保持スルコトニ汲々トシテ居  
 ルヤウデアル。

最近ノヨウロッパノ情勢ハ諸君ノ御承知ノ通りテ  
 アツテ、今般スペインノ同盟等ガ賭博ニナツテ紛糾  
 シテ來ルト大變ナコトニナルノチハナイカ。サウス  
 レバ歐洲ノ、ソヴイエツトカ、孰ハドイツカ、孰ハ  
 フランスカ、何レノ國ニナルカ分ラヌガ無難競争ニ  
 乘出シテ、一國ノ發券多石銀專ニ列國ニ直接間接ニ汲  
 汲ヲ強イテ來ル。サウスレバ無盾ノ急ニナツテ、イ  
 キリスモドウツテモ乘出サザルヲ得ナイ。殊ニ新軍  
 備條約テハイギリストシテハ量的ノ制限ヲ全然受ケ  
 テキナイノデアルカラ、ヤラリト思ヘバ何時テモ出  
 來ル。英米ハ陸軍ノ間ニバリテイト云フヤウナコト  
 テ行ツテ居ルノデアルカラ、イギリスガ勢力ヲ増セ  
 バアメリカモ之ニ隨從シテ來ルコトハ當然思ヘラレ  
 ル。孰ハ少シ要斷カモ知レナイガ、將來無難競争ガ  
 起ルトスレバ、ソノ火元ハ、東洋テナシニ、ヨロ

ツバテハナイカト考ヘテ居ル。之ハ一ニヨロツバ  
各軍ノ實際情勢が根本ニナルダラウト照アリ

二一 將來ノ海軍擴張ノ基準

從ツテ將來ノ我が海軍ノ擴張チアルガ、若シ英海  
ナル點が物置シテ列國が法廷海軍ニ類出スト云フ  
ヤウナコトニナレバ、見越シハ至然竹カナイガ、併  
ツソレテナイ限リ是等トツテハ、新艦充實ノ所要  
兵力ヲ算ラ十分充足スルモノテハナイガ、先ツ近イ  
將來ヲ見越シテ數年ヲ待テテ見ルト、今後海軍ノ基  
盤ハ大体十二年度ノ擴張が基礎ニナリ、大ナル飛躍  
的ナホ加ナシニ於ムノテハナイカ、マタ尙ルベクソ  
レテ英マシタイト云フ考ヲ持ツテ居ル。尤モ内閣  
ニナルガ、海軍が大減量ニ長スツク項等ハ、認メラ  
レタモノト決シテ同ジモノテハナイノデアツテ、相  
當ナモノガ削ラレテ居ル。相當ニ量ト見ラレルモ  
ノモ削ラレタハ後年度ニ繰延ベラレタモノガアルカ  
ラ十二年度ノ量實現リテ後年度モ行ケルノ事トハ言  
ヘナイ。重要ナモノハ勿論早ク手ヲ着ケルヤウナコ  
トニナラナケレバナラヌカラ、若干ノ増加ハ強レ候  
イ體當ト考ヘルガ、大體近キ將來ノ海軍擴張ハ十  
二年擴張が基準ニナリ、ソレニ多少ノ加シタモノテ

903-41

勝々等在ハ行ケルト御承ニ下サツテ堂カラウト起フ。  
我々モ出来ルヌケサウ云フ瓜ニツテ行ニタイ。  
大管コノ程度ニ止メテ、アトハ得愛蘭テモアレバ  
悉ルコトト致ッタイ。御意ニリ感言ス。

(了)

903-42

証 明 書

「ワシントン」文書局 第 〇 三 號

國 際 検 察 部 第 九 〇 三 號

典 據 及 び 公 正 ニ 關 ス ル 證 明

余、尾戸長春ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ外務省  
 文書課長代理トシテ、日本政府ト公的關係ニ在ルモ  
 ノナルコト、竝ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレ  
 タル、五十七頁ヨリ成ル、千九百三十七年ノ昭和十  
 二年ノ一月附、下記原名、即チ十二年度海軍豫算要  
 領竝ニ海軍關係國防ノ全貌ニ就イテ（海軍省軍務局  
 長）ノ文書ノ保管ニ任シ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。  
 余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナ  
 ルコト、竝ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式書類  
 及ビ綴ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。（若シアラバ綴番  
 號又ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於ケル該文書  
 ノ威規所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ傍記スベシ）

903A-43

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 十月一日

東京ニ於テ署名

管轄官吏署名欄 尾戸長春

石ノ若ノ公的資格 外務省文書課長代理

証 人 佐藤武五郎

公式入手ニ關スル証明

エリツク・ダブリウ・フライシヤ少尉 0-935000

余ノ 2d Lt Eric W Fleisher ハ、余ガ聯合國軍高擧

總官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、並ニ上記題

名ノ文書ハ余ガ公務上、日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ニ

リ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 十月一日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏 名 欄 Eric W Fleisher 2d Lt

石ノ若ノ公的資格 國際警察部配任員

証 人 Henry Shimajima

P2 Document No. 6260

MAJOR COMBATANT VESSELS OF JAPAN  
1931 - 1945

ON HAND AND UNDER CONSTRUCTION

1931年乃至1945年における日本の軍艦の保有量及建造中量

ON HAND  
保有量

No. 1

Year (Date)	Battle Ships 戦艦		Aircraft Carriers 航空母艦		Heavy Cruisers 重巡洋艦		Light Cruisers 軽巡洋艦		Destroyers 駆逐艦		Submarines 潜水艦		Total 計	
	NO 隻数	Tons 噸数	NO 隻数	Tons 噸数	NO 隻数	Tons 噸数	NO 隻数	Tons 噸数	NO 隻数	Tons 噸数	NO 隻数	Tons 噸数	NO 隻数	Tons 噸数
1931	10	301,400	3	61,270	8	68,400	19	91,355	110	123,940	67	71,174	217	717,539
1932	10	301,400	3	61,270	12	107,800	19	91,355	101	122,040	62	71,518	207	755,383
1933	10	301,400	4	68,370	12	107,800	19	91,355	101	123,956	59	69,298	205	762,179
1934	10	301,400	4	68,370	12	107,800	19	91,355	100	122,842	57	68,478	202	760,243
1935	10	301,400	4	68,370	12	107,800	21	108,355	96	118,520	60	73,998	203	778,443
1936	10	301,400	4	68,370	12	107,800	21	108,355	97	120,349	55	70,173	199	776,447
1937	10	301,400	5	78,420	15	133,300	20	99,855	108	136,458	59	75,623	217	825,056
1938	10	301,400	5	78,420	17	150,300	19	91,355	112	142,458	62	80,373	225	844,206
1939	10	301,400	6	88,470	18	158,800	19	91,355	116	149,458	62	80,373	231	869,256
1940	10	301,400	7	97,970	18	158,800	19	93,055	104	149,828	54	75,260	212	876,313
1941 (7 Dec)	10	301,400	10	152,970	18	158,800	20	98,855	112	165,868	65	97,900	235	975,893
1941	11	365,400	11	162,470	18	158,800	20	98,855	112	165,868	65	97,900	237	1,049,343
1942	10	310,740	10	153,370	17	156,400	20	100,185	101	156,439	67	102,831	225	1,037,965
1943	9	338,020	13	192,370	17	156,400	21	112,760	85	133,337	83	114,497	228	1,047,384
1944	9	338,020	12	254,730	12	109,850	9	50,570	63	99,159	67	92,922	172	945,151
1945 (31 Aug)	4	122,030	6	87,870	7	62,850	4	25,400	43	62,513	64	73,390	128	434,003



IPS Document No. 6260

UNDER CONSTRUCTION

建造中量

No. 2

1931	0	0	1	7.100	4	39.400	2	17.000	8	12.604	6	9.669	21	85.773
1932	0	0	1	7.100	0	0	2	17.000	4	5.804	3	4.700	10	34.604
1933	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	25.500	6	8.208	7	9.600	16	43.308
1934	0	0	1	10.050	0	0	5	42.500	7	9.576	12	17.000	25	79.126
1935	0	0	1	10.050	0	0	4	34.000	13	18.180	7	10.200	25	72.430
1936	0	0	2	20.100	0	0	4	34.000	16	22.944	7	10.200	29	87.244
1937	1	64.000	3	50.050	2	17.000	0	0	11	19.000	8	15.420	25	165.470
1938	2	128.000	4	59.550	1	8.500	2	11.600	11	21.000	12	25.050	32	253.700
1939	2	128.000	3	49.500	0	0	3	17.400	15	30.000	19	38.700	42	263.600
1940	2	128.000	4	64.500	0	0	2	12.300	11	22.820	23	45.840	42	273.460
1941 (7 Dec)	2	128.000	4	77.860	0	0	4	27.500	12	27.120	29	42.554	51	303.034
1941	1	64.000	3	68.360	0	0	4	27.500	13	29.820	32	44.912	53	234.592
1942	0	0	7	166.860	1	12.500	4	27.500	11	24.420	49	64.560	72	295.840
1943	0	0	10	218.580	0	0	1	6.500	16	28.260	40	73.698	67	327.038
1944	0	0	2	29.960	0	0	0	0	21	29.340	25	35.910	48	95.210
1945 (15 Aug)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	26	13.930	26	13.930

IPS Document No. 6260

Note on HIEI:

The number and tonnage of Battleships from 1932 to 1940 includes the HIEI which was a training battleship during that period.

比較に同寸の記号。

1932年より1940年までの戦艦隻数は、艦隊中に在り、  
鹿嶋練習艦隊の艦隻は比較の合算に在り。

No. 3

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese government as Member of Research Division Second Demobilization Bureau, and that in such official capacity, I have prepared the foregoing table from official records of the Japanese government. I further certify that the table is true and accurate.

Shideimi Yoshida

Member of Research  
Division 2nd  
Demobilization Bureau.

Signed at Tokyo, Japan  
on this 23 day of September,  
1946:

S. Takano

證明書

私は茲に第二復員局資料整理部部長に在りて日本政府に同係し其の資格を於て日本政府の公式記録より前記表を作成し其の正確を証明す。更に前記表の真実を正確に在りて証明す。

第二復員局資料整理部  
部長

吉田英三

1946年9月23日  
日本東京に於て

高野庄平



1936	Same as above																				
1937	Plus MUKUMA 三 限 MINUS MUGANI 五 上	1937	10-10	1938	10-10	1939	10-10	1940	10-10	1941	10-10	1942	10-10	1943	10-10	1944	10-10	1945	10-10	1946	10-10
1938	Same as above																				
1939	Plus KATORI 香 取 MINUS KASHIWA 香 島 MIRATO 石 野 山 田 史 郎	1938	8-24	1939	9-25	1940	5-31	1941	6-1	1942	5-800	1943	91.355	1944	5.5	1945	5.5	1946	5.5	1947	5.5
1940	Total (Balance) 計 (差引)																				
1941	Plus KASHII 香 桂 MINUS AGANO 阿 賀 野 YURA 由 良	1939	10-4	1940	10-15	1941	7-15	1942	7-15	1943	5.800	1944	98.855	1945	5.5	1946	5.5	1947	5.5	1948	5.5
1942	Total (Balance) 計 (差引)																				
1943	Plus OYODO 大 遼 MINUS NOSHIRO 能 代 YASAGI 矢 野	1941	2-14	1942	4-2	1943	2-28	1944	2-28	1945	8.000	1946	100.185	1947	6.1	1948	6.1	1949	6.1	1950	6.1
1944	Total (Balance) 計 (差引)																				
1945	Plus SAKIYAMA 酒 匂 MINUS YASOSHIMA 八 十 島	1942	11-21	1944	4-9	1944	11-30	1944	11-30	1945	6.500	1946	112.180	1947	6.1	1948	6.1	1949	6.1	1950	6.1
1946	Total (Balance) 計 (差引)																				
1947	Plus KISO 木 島 MINUS KASHII 香 桂	1944	9-25	1944	9-25	1944	9-25	1944	9-25	1945	2.600	1946	50.570	1947	4.7	1948	4.7	1949	4.7	1950	4.7
1948	Total (Balance) 計 (差引)																				
1949	Plus KISO 木 島 MINUS KASHII 香 桂	1944	9-25	1944	9-25	1944	9-25	1944	9-25	1945	2.600	1946	50.570	1947	4.7	1948	4.7	1949	4.7	1950	4.7
1950	Total (Balance) 計 (差引)																				

NOTE The YASOSHIMA was placed in the group of light cruisers on September 25, 1944 after having been converted from the Chinese cruiser.

HEAVY CRUISERS (重巡洋艦)

No. 2

Year	Names	Dates				Displacement (Tons)	On hand	Main guns	
		Set out	Launched	Delivered	Commissioned				
1931	FURUKABA 古賀	1922 12-5	1925 2-25	1926 3-31	?	7,100	8	6	
	KAKO 加古	1922 11-17	1925 11-10	1926 7-20	?	7,100	8	6	
	A OBA 青葉	1924 2-4	1926 9-25	1927 4-20	?	7,100	8	6	
	KINUGASAWA 衣笠	1924 1-23	1926 10-24	1927 9-30	?	7,100	8	6	
	NACHI 那智	1924 11-21	1927 6-15	1928 11-26	?	10,000	8	1	
	MYOKO 妙高	1924 10-25	1927 4-16	1929 7-31	?	10,000	8	1	
	HAGURO 羽黒	1925 3-16	1928 3-24	1929 4-25	1929 11-30	10,000	8	1	
	ASHIKARA 足柄	1925 4-11	1928 4-22	1929 8-20	1929 11-30	10,000	8	1	
	Total					68,400			
	1932	Plus ATAGO 愛宕	1927 4-28	1930 6-16	1932 3-30	1932 12-1	9,850	8	1
Plus TAKAO 高雄		1927 4-28	1930 5-12	1932 5-31	1932 12-1	9,850	8	1	
Plus CHOKAI 朝海		1928 3-26	1931 4-5	1932 6-30	1932 12-1	9,850	8	1	
Plus MAYA 摩耶		1928 12-4	1930 11-8	1932 6-30	1932 12-1	9,850	8	1	
Total						39,400	107,800		
1933		Same as above							
	Plus SUZUYA 鈴谷	1933 12-11	1934 11-20	1937 10-31	1937 12-1	8,500	8	1	
1937	Plus KUNAMO 熊野	1934 4-5	1936 10-15	1937 10-31	1937 12-1	8,500	8	1	
	Plus MIKUMA 三隈	The 61 guns were removed and 8 guns installed. The 61 guns were replaced so that it had 69 guns.				8,500	8	1	
	Total					25,500	133,300		
1938	Plus TONE 利根	1934 12-1	1937 11-21	1938 11-20	1939 5-20	8,500	8	1	
	Plus MUGAMI 最上	The 61 guns were removed and 8 guns installed. The 61 guns were replaced so that it had 69 guns.				8,500	8	1	
	Total					17,000	150,300		
1939	Plus CHIKUMA 筑摩	1935 10-1	1938 3-19	1937 5-20	1939 5-20	8,500	158,800	8	
1940	Same as above						158,800		

Plas	1898	1899	1900	1942					
YAGUMO 八重	5-1	9-8			9-1	2040		8	4
Plas IWATE 岩手	1898	11-11	1900	3-24	1901	2-18	1942	2-1	2
Plas IZUMO 出雲	1898	5-14	1899	9-19	1500	9-25	1942	2-1	4
MINUS									
AKO 赤松									
FURUTAKA 古田									
KIYODAKA 清田									
MIYUWA 三浦									
Total (Balanced)									
1943	Same as above								
MINUS									
1944	ATAGO 出雲丸 MAYA 摩耶丸 SUZUYA 鈴屋丸								
1945	MINUS MACHI BE'S ASHIGARIBI HAGURO MARU KUMANO MARU MURUMATSU MARU								

NOTE

a) The SUZUYA, KUMANO, TONE and CHILUMWA were planned and under construction until 1936 as light cruisers with 6.1" guns but the plan was altered to mount 8" guns aboard these cruisers and they now estimate completion underway cruisers by the YAGUMO, IWATE and IZUMO were transferred on July 1, 1942 from the list of East Division to that of the Cruiser

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government's Naval Research Division, Second Demobilization Bureau and that in such official capacity, I have prepared the foregoing table from official records of the Japanese Government. I further certify that table is true and accurate.

Midzumi Yoshitaka

Member of Research Division  
and Demobilization Bureau

Signed at Tokyo, Japan,  
on this 7th day of  
October, 1942.  
S. T. Adair

証書

a) 船名 熊野利根及出雲丸は1936年本邦で建造され、軽巡洋艦の計画に於ては6.1インチの主砲を装備するが、後に8インチの主砲を装備する軽巡洋艦として改修され、1942年7月1日海軍省に編入された。

b) 八重丸、摩耶丸、鈴屋丸は1942年7月1日海軍省に編入された。

証明書

私は、海軍省第二復員局資料整理部職員として、本政府の記録に基づき、資料を入手し、日本海軍の公認した資料を基に、この表を作成し、その真実性を証明する。

1942年10月7日  
日本東京 八重丸  
高野庄平

吉田 英三

第二復員局資料整理部



Year	Month	Day	Location	Amount	Remarks
1945	Total	1-1		13000	
		1-2		13000	
		1-3		13000	
		1-4		13000	
		1-5		13000	
		1-6		13000	
		1-7		13000	
		1-8		13000	
		1-9		13000	
		1-10		13000	
1944	Total	1-1		12500	
		1-2		12500	
		1-3		12500	
		1-4		12500	
		1-5		12500	
		1-6		12500	
		1-7		12500	
		1-8		12500	
		1-9		12500	
		1-10		12500	
1943	Total	1-1		12000	
		1-2		12000	
		1-3		12000	
		1-4		12000	
		1-5		12000	
		1-6		12000	
		1-7		12000	
		1-8		12000	
		1-9		12000	
		1-10		12000	

...activity certify that same officially connected with the ...  
 ...Demobilization Bureau, and that six such official ...  
 ...official records of the Japanese Empire ...  
 ...correctly that the table is true and accurate.

Mitsumasa Yoshida

Member of Research Division

September 1944

...整理部員...  
 ...整理部員...  
 ...整理部員...

1944年9月27日

高野 丹彦

高野 丹彦

吉田 英二



Q. 719

(title) Basic Principles for Rapid Conclusion of War Against the UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, NETHERLANDS, and the CHUNGKING Regime

The Fifth of Five Copies

State Top Secret

LIAISON CONFERENCE DECISION PLAN  
11 November 1941

Policy

- I. We shall endeavor to overthrow quickly the American, British, and Dutch bases in the FAR EAST, establish our self-sufficiency, and at the same time hasten the surrender of the CHUNGKING Regime. Further, we shall endeavor to cooperate with GERMANY and ITALY in planning for the submission of ENGLAND first, and then to deprive AMERICA of her will to continue war.
- II. We shall do our utmost to avoid making more enemies. /TN: can be translated: We shall do our utmost to prevent the expansion of enemy powers./

Principal Points

- I. JAPAN will execute a swift war by force of arms and will overthrow the American, British, and Dutch bases in EAST ASIA and in the Southwestern Pacific, thereby ensuring herself a strategically dominant position. At the same time she will secure areas of vital natural resources and principal communication lines, thereby facilitating self-sufficiency of long duration. We shall exhaust every effort to lure out at an opportune time the main naval force of the UNITED STATES and destroy it.
- II. The three countries, JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY, will cooperate in planning for the submission of ENGLAND first.
  - (1) JAPAN will adopt the following plans:
    - (a) In regard to AUSTRALIA and INDIA, she will use such methods as political warfare and disruption of commerce to cut their ties with the UNITED KINGDOM and so scheme to alienate them.
    - (b) She will promote the independence of BURMA.
  - (2) JAPAN will endeavor to have GERMANY and ITALY adopt the following plans:

- (a) Carry out military operations in the NEAR EAST, NORTH AFRICA, and in SUEZ, and at the same time take measures with regard to INDIA.
  - (b) Strengthen the blockade against ENGLAND.
  - (c) Carry out landing operations against ENGLAND, when the situation permits.
- (3) The three countries will cooperate in the adoption of the following plans:
- (a) Strive for liaison and simultaneous action among the three countries via the INDIAN OCEAN.
  - (b) Intensify warfare for the disruption of commerce.
  - (c) Put an end to ENGLAND's receiving natural resources from occupied territory.

III. JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY will endeavor to deprive AMERICA of her will to fight and at the same time carry out measures against BRITAIN.

(1) JAPAN will adopt the following plans:

- (a) A. Alienate the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS from the U.S.A. and give them independence.
- B. Take into consideration that the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS must be so handled that they contribute to the rapid conclusion of war.
- C. Leave ~~the internal policies of~~ *matters concerning* the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS alone.
- (b) Intensify warfare for the destruction of AMERICA's commerce.
- (c) Put an end to AMERICA's receiving natural resources from CHINA and the SOUTH PACIFIC.
- (d) Intensify propaganda and conspiracies against AMERICA. Lay emphasis on luring the main naval force of the UNITED STATES into the FAR EAST, on causing her to reconsider her Far Eastern policy, and on pointing out the senselessness of a Japanese-American war. Induce AMERICA to develop public opinion against war.
- (e) Plan for the alienation of relations between AMERICA and AUSTRALIA.

(2) Endeavor to have GERMANY and ITALY adopt the following plans:

- (a) Intensify on-the-sea aggression against AMERICA in the ATLANTIC.
- (b) Intensify military, economic, and political aggression against CENTRAL and SOUTH AMERICA.

IV. JAPAN, in her relations with CHINA, will use to her own advantage the war against the UNITED STATES and the NETHERLANDS, especially the successful outcome of the military operations. She will plan to stop aid to CHIANG-KAI-SHEK, thereby reducing his power to fight, and, by positive political and military measures, ensure the downfall of the CHUNGKING Regime.

V. While JAPAN is engaged in military operations against southern areas, she will do all in her power to avoid provoking a war with the U.S.S.R. She will take into consideration that if GERMANY and the U.S.S.R. are so inclined, they may be brought to make peace and the U.S.S.R. enticed into the Axis camp.

VI. While constantly keeping watch on and examining the international situation, trends of enemy public opinion, and developments in the war situation, JAPAN shall endeavor to make use of the following opportunities to end the war:

- A. An important pause in military operations against the southern areas.
- B. An important pause in military operations against CHINA, particularly the downfall of the CHUNGKING regime.
- C. A favorable change in the European War situation, especially, the downfall of ENGLAND, termination of the Russo-German War, or success of the programme against INDIA.

To achieve these ends, JAPAN will immediately intensify her program of diplomacy and propaganda toward the countries of SOUTH AMERICA, SWEDEN, PORTUGAL, and the VATICAN. At the time of ENGLAND's surrender, the three countries, JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY will not immediately conclude peace with her, but will strive to have ENGLAND induce AMERICA /to make peace/.

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.F. No. 1444

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO Nagaharu hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity:

Assistant, Chief Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached

consisting of 7 pages, dated 11 Nov., 1941, and described as

follows: Liaison Conference Decision Plan, 11 November 1941, entitled

"Basic Principle for Rapid Conclusion of War against the United States,

England, Netherlands and Chungking Regime."

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this

22nd day of Oct., 1946.

Nagaharu ODO

Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: S. KOYAMA

Assistant Chief Archives Section

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, JOHN A. CURTIS, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

22 day of Oct., 1946

J. A. CURTIS, 2d Lt.

NAME

Witness: RICHARD H. LARSH

Investigator, IPS

Official Capacity

六

Doc 14444.

立部内立班  
國家機密

對米英蘭葡戰事終末  
促進要領

6x 9/19

昭和十六、十七、十八  
連絡會議決案集

☆

Doc 1444

外書

一、三國協約之成立，其目的在維持東亞之和平，保障各國之利益，促進各國之合作，防止任何侵略之發生，維護各國之領土與領海之完整，尊重各國之主權與獨立，保障各國之安全與福利，促進各國之經濟與文化之發展，維護各國之和平與穩定，防止任何戰爭之發生，維護各國之利益與安全，促進各國之合作與發展。

要領

一、帝國之利益與安全，保障各國之利益與安全，促進各國之合作與發展，防止任何侵略之發生，維護各國之領土與領海之完整，尊重各國之主權與獨立，保障各國之安全與福利，促進各國之經濟與文化之發展，維護各國之和平與穩定，防止任何戰爭之發生，維護各國之利益與安全，促進各國之合作與發展。

二、獨得三國協力之先，以英法爲依存之圖。

乙

(一) 帝國之義務與責任

- (1) 歐洲之和平與穩定，防止任何戰爭之發生，維護各國之利益與安全，促進各國之合作與發展。
- (2) 保障各國之領土與領海之完整，尊重各國之主權與獨立，保障各國之安全與福利，促進各國之經濟與文化之發展，維護各國之和平與穩定，防止任何戰爭之發生，維護各國之利益與安全，促進各國之合作與發展。
- (3) 保障各國之安全與福利，促進各國之經濟與文化之發展，維護各國之和平與穩定，防止任何戰爭之發生，維護各國之利益與安全，促進各國之合作與發展。

702 \*

2.00111111

- 2 (1) 續得... (2) 續得... (3) 續得...

- 3 (1) 續得... (2) 續得... (3) 續得...

- 3 (1) 續得... (2) 續得... (3) 續得...

2.00111111

Doc. 1444

(一) 米價傳謀略三類  
其一、糧餉。米運軍士方。極運。人。請。五。三。極。米。政。策。  
及。省。日。米。價。無。益。米。稅。皆。高。五。五。米。自。食。論。食。家。  
請。察。三。事。方。

(二) 米運海關保儲三類

- (一) 糧價爭奪
- (二) 米運海關保儲三類
- (三) 中國米運不食軍事經濟政治的政權三類

五、五、部、三、部、三、米、運、海、關、保、儲、三、類、食、家、請、察、三、事、方、  
請、察、三、事、方、  
積、極、三、事、方、  
積、極、三、事、方、  
積、極、三、事、方、

五、五、部、三、部、三、米、運、海、關、保、儲、三、類、食、家、請、察、三、事、方、  
請、察、三、事、方、  
積、極、三、事、方、  
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積、極、三、事、方、

五、五、部、三、部、三、米、運、海、關、保、儲、三、類、食、家、請、察、三、事、方、  
請、察、三、事、方、  
積、極、三、事、方、  
積、極、三、事、方、  
積、極、三、事、方、

五、五、部、三、部、三、米、運、海、關、保、儲、三、類、食、家、請、察、三、事、方、  
請、察、三、事、方、  
積、極、三、事、方、  
積、極、三、事、方、  
積、極、三、事、方、

1704



Doc 14114

6 5

一、歐洲戰局在俄國變遷後，好拜特三及木士波基塔爾之戰  
 終未打印度英軍成功  
 二、文身及達三南米希國瑞西之國國法王應事  
 三、此外外交並三言得表家言德人  
 四、日俄伊三國之英、法、三際之之十世三續報及子十  
 五、與三三米子新華也之九如也德米又三三

205

1444 Cert.

證明書

ワシントン文書局 第 号

國際檢察部 第四四号

典據及公正之證明

余オド丁ガハル、余が下記資格に於て、即ち外務省文書課長代理として、日本政府との關係に在りて、此の該官吏として、余が茲に添附せらるる七頁の成心十九百四十二年昭和六年十月十日附、下記題名、即ち「村松英園將戰終末促進要領」に關する一九四一年十月二十日連絡會議決定案、文書保管に在り居りて之を證明す。

余更に添附、記録及公文書が日本政府の公文書として、此の下記名稱の省又一部局の公文書類及綴、一部として證明す。(若し之の綴番號又引用其他公文書類又綴に於て、該文書成規所に公文名稱を特記又は之)

千九百四十六年昭和三十一年十月二十二日

東京に於て署名

當該官吏署名欄

右、者、公的資格

證人

公正之證明

余、ジョン・A・カーティス、余が聯合國最高指揮官總司令部關係に在りて、此の該官吏として、此の該題名、文書が余が公於て日本政府に記署名官吏として、此の證明す。

千九百四十六年昭和三十一年十月二十二日

東京に於て署名

氏名欄

右、者、公的資格

證人

ジョン・A・カーティス少將

John A. Curtis, Lt.

國際檢察部調査官

リチャード・H・ラーシュ

Richard H. Lersch

No. 6

Ex. # 420

Doc. No. 210P (1)

Page 1

BR. IX. 17

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
22 September 1931

(Washington,) September 22,  
1931

I opened the conversation with the Japanese Ambassador by referring to our last talk on September 17th when we had both expressed our feeling that the relations of our two countries were in such a satisfactory condition. I said I had been profoundly surprised and concerned by what was taking place in Manchuria and that I had sent Dr. Hornbeck to see the Ambassador on Saturday and now as the matter had developed I wished to see him myself. He said yes, that he had seen Dr. Hornbeck and he had told him of how surprised he (the Ambassador) had been and how concerned he was and how impossible it was for him to understand the causes of what had taken place.

I explained that as he well knew, I had the utmost confidence in Baron Shidehara and his desire for peace and correct international relations. I told him that I had learned from Dr. Hornbeck's report of what Debuchi had said Sunday--that there was a sharp cleavage between Shidehara and some of the militaristic elements of his government. He said that that was so. I said that what I was now doing was seeking to strengthen Baron Shidehara's hand and not to weaken it. The Ambassador said he understood that perfectly. I then took the memorandum which had been prepared (a copy of which is annexed) and read it very slowly to the Ambassador, paraphrasing the language into more simple words wherever it seemed at all necessary in order that he should fully understand it. He repeated many of the sentences, showing that he did understand. When I had finished I said that this was not to be taken as a formal note or an official action on the part of my government, but as the memorandum of a verbal statement given to the Ambassador for the purpose of enabling him to understand and report to his government how I, with my background of friendship towards Japan, felt towards this situation. I said that the Ambassador was at liberty to send it to Shidehara or not, as he saw fit. He said he understood perfectly and that the memorandum did not represent an official note but that if the situation was not remedied he understood that it might be followed by official action on our part later. He said he would communicate its contents to his government that evening.

I then told him that there was one thing however that I would like to ask of him and that was that he postpone his

departure for Japan until the situation was in better shape. I told him I felt confidence in him from our long relations together and that it would be easier to handle the situation if he was here. He expressed himself as very much touched by this and said that he was glad to be able to say that this morning he had, after having purchased his tickets and made all his plans, decided to postpone his departure and had told Madame Debruchi and his daughter to that effect, and had telegraphed out to the Japanese Consul in San Francisco to cancel the appointments he had made.

I spent quite a little time after reading the memorandum in pointing out what a serious impression it would make in this country if the situation of Manchuria is not restored to the status quo. He said he fully understood that and he had been surprised at the moderation of our American press thus far and attributed that to the care which I had taken in the press conferences. He begged me that if the time should ever come when I did wish to act officially in this matter I would first inform him. I said I would try to do so.

Henry L. Stimson

Br. Ex. 17

出務長官備忘録 一九三二年九月二十二日

(華盛頓) 一九三一年九月二十二日

余ハ日本大使ト九月十七日ノ最後ノ會談ニ關聯シ會談ヲ開始セリ。九月十七日ノ會談ニ於テ我等兩人ハ我等兩國ノ關係ハ新クノ如ク満足スヘキ狀態ニアリトノ我々ノ願シテ互ヒニ語り合ヒタル次第ナリ。

余ハ滿洲ニ於テ起リタル事件ニ付非常ニ驚キ且憂慮シ居ル事、土曜日ニ大使ニ會見スル爲メニホウソウベック博士ヲ送シタル事、今ヤ尋常消息シタルヲ以テ余自身大使ト會見ヲ希望シタルコト等ヲ語レリ大使ハ然リト答ヘ彼ハホウソウベック博士ト會見シタル事及ビ彼ガ如何ニ驚キ且憂慮シ居ルカ又悲起サレタル事件ノ原因ヲ了解スルコトガ如何ニ至難ナルカラ同博士ニ語りタル旨ヲ述べたり。

余ハ彼モ熟知シ居リシ通り菅原男及ビ平沼及公正ナル關係ニ對スル彼ノ要求ニ最大ノ憤慨ヲ感シ居リシモノナルコトヲ述べたり。

余ハホウソウベック博士ノ報告ニヨリ岡田氏が日軍ニ語リシコト即チ菅原ト彼レノ政府部内ニ於ケル軍國主義的分子トノ間ニ甚キ溝ガ存スルコトヲ知りタル旨彼ニ語りたり。彼ハソノ通りテリト言ヘリ。

余ハ余ガ今爲シツ、アルコトハ菅原男ノ腕ヲ補強シ

219P(1)-1

Ex 920

219P(1)-2

且ツコレヲ弱メサルコトヲ求ムルコトナルヲ彼ニ語  
リタリ。大使ハヨク此ヲ了解シタル旨ヲ語レリ。

余ハ準備シテアリシ備忘録（英書ヲ添附ス）ヲトリ大  
使ガ完全ニ理解スル爲メニ必要ナリト考慮サル、信  
所ヲ尙單ナル言葉ニテ意譯シツ、大使ニ徐々ニ説明  
目カセタリ。大使ハ其章句ノ多量ヲ復唱シテ之ヲ了  
解シタル旨ヲ示セリ。

余ノ腹ミ終リタルトキコノ備忘録ハ我政府側ノ公式  
文書若シクハ正式行動ト解釋スヘラスシテ、余ノ  
日本ニ對スル宏誼ヲ背景トシテ現在ノ状態ヲ余ガ如  
何ニ看テ居ルヤヲ大使ガ理解シ本國政府ニ報告スル  
ヲ得セシムル目的ヲ以テ大使ニ兵ヘラレタル口頭ノ  
申入レ宛聲ナリト解釋スヘキモノナリト余ハ語レリ  
余ハ大使ガ其選擇ニヨリ備忘録ニ報告スルヤ否ヤハ自  
由ナリト語リタリ。大使ハ完全ニ理解シタル旨ヲ告  
テ且ツ備忘録ハ公式文書ニハ非サルモ状態ノ改善サ  
レザル場合ニハ適テ我政府側ニ於テ正式行動ガ深ラ  
ルヘキコトヲ了解シタル旨ヲ語レリ。彼ハ今夜本國政  
府ニ其内容ヲ通報スヘキ旨ヲ語レリ。

余ハ其原由ニ一ノ原因スヘキコトアルヲ告ゲタリ。  
其ハ状態ノ改善サルル迄ノ日本ヘノ出帆ヲ延期スル  
コトナリ。余ハ我々相互ノ延期日ノ實際ニヨリ余ガ  
彼ニ信賴ラザルヲ彼ガ我側ニ居ルナラバ此局面處理ヲ

219P(1)-3

一層容易テラシムベシト告ゲタリ。彼ハ此言ニ甚タ  
感激セル旨語リ且ツ今切符ヲ買奈メ總テノ計畫ヲ  
ナシタルモ出立ヲ延期スルコトニ決定シ出淵夫人及  
彼ノ娘ニ之ヲ歸リ、サンフランシスコ、ノ日本領事  
ニ彼ガ既ニ打合セ済ナリシ積々ナル取極メノ取消方  
ニ付電報シタルコトヲ余ニ告グルヲ得ルヲ喜ブ旨語  
レリ。

余ハ憶忘録ノ了了後、小時間、蒲洲ノ狀勢ガ從來ノ  
狀態ニ復歸セサル場合之ガ米田内ニ於テ如何ニ意大  
ナル印象ヲ與フヘキカラ措擧シタリ。彼ハ悉ク此ヲ  
了解シタル旨ヲ語リタリ。而シテ彼ハ米田新聞ガ只  
今迄ノ所採リ居レル懸念ナル態度ニ驚キ、此ノ事實  
ハ余ガ新聞會見ニ於テ深リ來タレル注意ニヨルモノ  
ナリト語レリ。

此事件ニ關シ余ガ公式ニ行動スルコトヲ欲スル時期  
ノ萬一到來シタル場合ハ余ガ最初ニ之ヲ彼ニ告グル  
コトヲ彼ハ余ニ懇請セリ。余ハ斯ク計ラフベキ旨ヲ  
告ゲタリ。

ヘンリ・エル・ステムソン

Doc. No. 2100 (2)

Page 1

BR. EX. 10

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR -- 22 SEPTEMBER 1931

Excerpt.

. . . . .

MEMORANDUM

Without going into the background, either as to the immediate provocation or remote causes or motivation, it appears that there has developed within the past four days a situation in Manchuria which I find surprising and view with concern. Japanese military forces, with some opposition at some points by Chinese military forces, have occupied the principal strategic points in South Manchuria, including the principal administrative center, together with some at least of the public utilities. It appears that the highest Chinese authority ordered the Chinese military not to resist, and that, when news of the situation reached Tokyo, but after most of the acts of occupation had been consummated, the Japanese Government ordered cessation of military activities on the part of the Japanese forces. Nevertheless, it appears some military movements have been continuously and are even now in process. The actual situation is that an arm of the Japanese Government is in complete control of South Manchuria.

The League of Nations has given evidence of its concern. The Chinese Government has in various ways invoked action on the part of foreign governments, citing its reliance upon treaty obligations and inviting special reference to the Kellogg Pact.

This situation is of concern, morally, legally and politically to a considerable number of nations. It is not exclusively a matter of concern to Japan and China. It brings into question at once the meaning of certain provisions of agreements, such as the Nine Powers Treaty of February 6, 1922, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

The American Government is confident that it has not been the intention of the Japanese Government to create or to be a party to the creation of a situation which brings the applicability of treaty provisions into consideration. The American Government does not wish to be hasty in formulating its conclusions or in taking a position. However, the American Government feels that a very unfortunate situation exists, which no doubt is embarrassing to the Japanese Government. It would seem



that the responsibility for determining the course of events with regard to the liquidating of this situation rests largely upon Japan, for the simple reason that Japanese armed forces have seized and are exercising de facto control in South Manchuria.

It is alleged by the Chinese, and the allegation has the support of circumstantial evidence, that lines of communication outward from Manchuria, have been cut or interfered with. If this is true, it is unfortunate.

It is the hope of the American Government that the orders which it understands have been given both by the Japanese and the Chinese Governments to their military forces to refrain from hostilities and further movements will be respected and that there will be no further application of force. It is also the hope of the American Government that the Japanese and the Chinese Governments will find it possible speedily to demonstrate to the world that neither has any intention to take advantage, in furtherance of its own peculiar interests, of the situation which has been brought about in connection with and in consequence of this use of force.

What has occurred has already shaken the confidence of the public with regard to the stability of conditions in Manchuria, and it is believed that the crystallizing of a situation suggesting the necessity for an indefinite continuance of military occupation would further undermine that confidence.

Ex 921

219P(2)-1

Ex. 18

國務長官ノ日本大使ニ對スル覺書

一九三二年九月二十二日

敬 奉

。 。 。 。 。 。 。 。 。 。

宛 啓

根據ニ違サカノボラナクトモ、直接ノ挑發テア  
 レ、又ハ違イ原因又ハ動機ニ關シテテアレ、過去  
 四日間ノ中ニ余カ驚キ且ツ懸念ヲ以テ目スル事感  
 カ南洲ニ發生シタ如ク見ラレル。日本軍隊ハ、或  
 ル地點ニ於イテハ支那軍ノ反響ヲ受ケタガ、少ク  
 トモ公共事業ノ幾ツカノ中心地ト共ニ、主ナル行  
 政ノ中心地ヲ含ム南洲ニ於ケル主ナル戰略的地  
 點ヲ占領シタノデアル。最高支那當局ハ、支那軍  
 ニ抵抗スルナトノ命令ヲ發シタ様ニ思ハレソシテ情勢ノ  
 報ガ東京ニ達シタ時ニ、大部分ノ占領行為ガ完成  
 シタ後テハアツタガ、日本政府ハ日本軍隊側ニ於  
 ケル暴行ノ中止ヲ命ジタト見受ケラレル。  
 併シテカラ茲ル軍事行動ハ續續的ニ、ソシテ今テ  
 モ行ハレツ、アル如クニ見エル。眞實ノ情勢ハ、日  
 本政府ノ勢力ガ南洲ヲ完全ニ統御シテキルノデ  
 アル。

國際聯盟ハソノ懸念ノ證據ヲ示シタ。支那政府

219F(2)--2

ハ、ソノ條約義務、信賴ヲ述べ、又、ケロツグ協約ニ對スル特別ノ參照ヲ望ムガリ、茲々ノ方法ヲ外國政府側ニ於ケル行動ヲ乞フタノデアアル。

此ノ情勢ハ、大多數ノ國家ニ取ツテ、道徳的ニ、法律的ニ、政治的ニ不安ヲ與ヘル。夫レハ、日本及ビ完那ニ取ツテノミノ不<sup>符</sup>合<sup>心</sup>デアルノデハナイ。夫レハ大正十一年（一九二二年）二月六日ノ九箇國條約及ビケロツグアリゾド協定ノ如キ條約ノ或條款ノ意味ニ就イテ直チニ疑問ヲモタラスモノデアアル。

アメリカ政府ハ、條約ノ條款ノ適用ヲ考慮セシムル情勢ヲ生ミ出ス、又ハ生ミ出ス一國トナラントスルハ日本政府ノ意圖ニアラザリシコトヲ信賴スル。

アメリカ政府ハソノ結論ヲ述べ又ハ或ル態度ヲ輕卒ニ取ルコトヲ欲セス。併レドモ、日本政府ニ取リテ疑モナク當惑ヲ感ゼシムル、非常ニ不幸ナル事態ガ存ストアメリカ政府ハ感シテキル。此ノ情勢ヲ清算スルニ關スル幕柄ノ進行ヲ決定スル責任ハ、大部分日本ニ存シテキルト思ハレル、ト云フノハ、日本軍隊ガ占領シ且南滿洲ニ於ケル事實上ノ支配ヲ實行シツ、アルト云フ簡單ナ理由カラ

219P(2)-3

デアル。

荷洲カラ外ヘノ通信ガ絶タレ、又ハ訪害サレテ  
キルト支那人ニ依ツテ主張サレテ居リ、又ソノ主  
張ハ、情況ニ依ル證據ノ支ヘラ有シテキル。若シ  
モ之レガ本營ナラバ、ソレハ不幸デアアル。

アメリカ政府ノ諒解スル敵對行爲及ビコレ以上  
ノ行動ヲ避ケヨトノ日本政府及ビ支那政府兩方ニ  
ヨリテソノ軍隊ニ與ヘラレタル、命令ガ尊重サレ、  
且コレ以上ノ武力行使ナキコトヲアメリカ政府ハ  
望ンデキル。日本及ビ支那政府ガ、各々自ラ特別  
ノ利益ヲ促進セントシ、此ノ武力行使ニ關係シテ、  
或ハ結果トシテ生ジタル情勢ヲ利用セントスル何  
等ノ意圖モ兩者共ニ有セザルヲ世界ニ向ツテ速カ  
ニ示スヲ、可能ナリト認ムルヤウニトハ、亦アメ  
リカ政府ノ望ム所デアアル。

今迄ニ起ツタ事ハ、荷洲ノ狀勢ノ安定ニ關スル  
一般ノ確信ヲ既ニ弱メテキル、ソシテ、軍事占領  
ヲ無限ニ續續セシムル必要ヲ指唆スル情勢ノ固定  
化ハ、更ニソノ確信ノ基ヲ危カラシムルデアラウ  
ト信ゼラレテキル。

BR. EX. 19

TELEGRAM  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES  
(NEVILLE)

Washington, September 24, 1931--  
4 p.m.

167. Please deliver to the Minister for Foreign Affairs immediately as a note, the identical text of which will be communicated by the American Minister to China to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, the following:

"The Government and people of the United States have observed with regret and with great concern events of the past few days in Manchuria. In view of the sincere desire of the people of this country that principles and methods of peace shall prevail in international relations, and of the existence of treaties, to several of which the United States is a party, the provisions of which are intended to regulate the adjustment of controversies between nations without resort to use of force, the American Government feels warranted in expressing to the Chinese and the Japanese Governments its hope that they will cause their military forces to refrain from any further hostilities will so dispose respectively of their armed forces as to satisfy the requirements of international law and international agreements, and will refrain from activities which may prejudice the attainment by amicable methods of an adjustment of their differences."

STIMSON

Foreign Relations I, p. 9

電 報

Pr. Ex. 19

國務長官ヨリ駐日代理公使（ホヰイール）宛  
ワシントン、昭和六年（一九三二年）九月二十四日午後四時

219P(3)

一六七、陸又米公使ヨリ支那外交部長ニ通報サレル  
ベキ下記原文ト同様ノモノヲ「地書」トシテ外務大  
臣ニ直サニ手交セラレタシ、  
「アメリカ合衆國政府及ビ國民ハ滿洲ニ於ケル過去  
數日ノ事件ヲ遺憾ノ念ト多クノ關心トヲ以テ注視シ  
ツ、アリ。平和ノ原則ト手段トヲ國際關係ニ普及セ  
シメントスル吾國民ノ眞摯ナル希望及ビ合衆國ガソ  
ノ加盟國ノ一員デアリ且ソノ條款ガ武力行使ニ訴ヘルコ  
トナク國家間ノ紛争ノ調製ヲハカルコトヲ目的トス  
ル諸條約ノ存在ニ鑑ミアメリカ政府ハ支那及ビ日本  
政府ニ對シ兩政府ハ兩重障ヲシテ之以上敵對行動ヲ  
止メシメ、國際法ト國際協定ノ要求ヲ充足セシムル  
如ク相互ニ武装軍隊ヲ處理シ且友交手段ニヨル兩者  
ノ紛争調整ノ進取ヲモソレアル諸行動ニ拘束ス  
ルデアラウトイフ希望ヲ述べルコトヲ至當ト感ズル  
モノデアアル。

Ex 922

／Stimson／  
ス テ ム ソ ン

外務關係一、九頁

7

Ex. # 923

Doc. No. 219P (5)

BR. EX. 21

THE JAPANESE EMBASSY TO THE DEPARTMENT  
OF STATE

STATEMENT ISSUED AFTER EXTRAORDINARY CABINET MEETING  
SEPTEMBER 24, 1931

Excerpt.

(5) It may be superfluous to repeat that the Japanese  
Government harbors no territorial designs in Manchuria.

Foreign Relations I, p. 11 et  
12

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Ex 923

外務省 十三ノ頁十一

因スル迄モナキ所アリ。

(五) 日本政府ハ總領ニ於テ候士朝野心無キ事ハ反響言

219P(5)

遊セラレタル様明ノ按察。

一九三二年ノ昭和六年ノ九月二十日臨時國體ノ被

日本大憲法ヨリ國體省へ



Ex. # 924

Dec. No. 2109 (6)

BR. EX. 22

NOTE FROM JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS TO THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN  
JAPAN -- 29 SEPTEMBER 1931

Excerpts.

The Japanese Government is deeply sensible of the friendly concern and the fairness of views with which the American Government has observed the recent course of events in Manchuria. . . . Every care has been, and will continue to be, exercised by the Japanese forces to observe all the requirements of international law in international agreements, and to avoid any action that is calculated to prejudice an amicable settlement of the differences between Japan and China.

Foreign Relations I, p. 13

Ex 924

219P(6)

Ex. 22.

日本外務大臣ヨリ日本駐米大使館へノ一九三一年ノ昭和六年ノ九月二十八日附書簡抜萃

日本政府ハ最近ノ濫請ニ於ケル事態ノ経過ニ關シ米國政府ガ示セル友好的關心ト公平ナル見解ヲ深ク感服シ居ル所ナリ。『』『』『』日本軍艦ハ國際法ト國際協定ニ依ル總ベテノ要求ヲ遵守スルタメ專ニ日本、中島間ノ紛争ノ友好的解決ヲ圖營スルモノト看ララル凡テノ行動ヲ避クルタメ從來有ラユル措置ヲ講シ來タレルモノニシテ今後モ之ヲ續行セントスルモノナリ。

「ネビル」人名ナランモ不明

外務關係一ノ十三頁

GA 925

Doc. No. 219P (7)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 23

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE  
LEAGUE OF NATIONS ON SEPTEMBER 30, 1931

Excerpts.

The Council,

1. Notes the replies of the Chinese and Japanese Governments to the urgent appeal addressed to them by its President and the steps that have already been taken in response to that appeal;

2. Recognizes the importance of the Japanese Government's statement that it has no territorial designs in Manchuria;

3. Notes the Japanese representative's statement that his Government will continue, as rapidly as possible, the withdrawal of its troops, which has already been begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured and that it hopes to carry out this intention in full as speedily as may be.

. . . . .

5. Being convinced that both Governments are anxious to avoid taking any action which might disturb the peace and good understanding between the two nations, notes that the Chinese and Japanese representatives have given assurances that their respective Governments will take all necessary steps to prevent any extension of the scope of the incident or any aggravation of the situation;

6. Requests both parties to do all in their power to hasten the restoration of normal relations between them and for that purpose to continue and speedily complete the execution of the above-mentioned undertakings;

. . . . .

Ex 925

219P(7)-1

Br. Ex. 23

二一九P (七)

一九三二年 (昭和六年) 九月三十日 國際聯盟  
理事會ニヨリ採擧セラレタル決議

按 奉

理事會ハ

一 議長ニヨリ文辭及ビ日本政府ニ對シ發セラレタル  
緊急要請ニ對スル兩國政府ノ回答及ビ該要請ニ應  
ジ該ニ採ラレタル措置ヲ了承ス。

二 日本ガ滿洲ニ於テ領土的野心無キ旨ノ日本政府駐  
陶ノ真要性ヲ確認ス。

三 日本國代表ガ、日本政府ハ可及的速カニ艦ニ開始  
セラレタル( ) 遠附屬地ヘノ軍隊ノ撤退ヲ日本國人  
ノ生命並ニ財產ガ效果的ニ確保セラルル度合ニ準  
ジ進行スベク且ツ此ノ意圖ヲ全面的ニ可及的速カ  
ニ遂行センコトヲ望ム旨陳述シタルコトヲ了承ス

。。。。。。

四 兩國政府ガ兩國家間ノ平和及ビ友好的了解ヲ妨グ  
ル如何ナル行動ヲモ避クル無意アルコトヲ確信シ  
中華民國並ニ日本國代表ガ、自國政府ガ欲レモ該  
領ノ範圍ノ擴大或ハ其領ノ重大化ヲ避クル凡ユル  
必要ナル措置ヲ採ラントスル事ニ付保障ヲ與ヘタ  
ルコトヲ了承ス。

219P(7)-2

六 次方當業者ニ進シ總進ニ兩着團ノ正常關係ヲ回復  
セシ爲盡力ヲ盡スベキコト、茲ニ此ノ目的ノ爲上  
進セル企圖ノ履行ヲ爲ケ、遂ニ之ヲ完成セシコト  
ヲ長望ス。

。。。。。。

對外關係第一册 一三頁一四頁

Ex. # 926

Doc. No. 219P (8)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 24

TELEGRAM  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE CONSUL  
AT GENEVA (GILBERT)

(Paraphrase)

Washington, October 9, 1931-6 p.m.

. . . . .

"On its part the American Government acting independently through its diplomatic representatives will endeavor to reinforce what the League does and will make clear that it has a keen interest in the matter and is not oblivious to the obligations which the disputants have assumed to their fellow signatories in the Pact of Paris as well as in the Nine Power Pact should a time arise when it would seem advisable to bring forward those obligations. By this course we avoid any danger of embarrassing the League in the course to which it is now committed."

STILSON

Foreign Relations I, pp. 17-18

Br. Ex 24

「要報」

GILBERT

白紙要言ヨリ ジュネーブ駐在領事 (ギルバート) へ

(要言)

一九三一、十月九日午後六時

(ワシントン)

.....

219P(8)

カカル事、ラ待出スノガ、素素ト思ハレル勢ナ場合  
 ガ遅ラバ、公使代表トシテ、自ノ立場ニ於テ括約シ  
 ツアル米國政府ハ海軍ノ爲ス所ヲ却得スルニ努力  
 シ且、歐事項ニ多大ノ苦心アル事ヲ認カニシ、且富  
 強保等益ガバリト保得、及ビ九ヶ箇條ニ於テ他諸  
 國ニ對シテ貢フテイル義務ヲ看過セザルツモリテ  
 ナル。此ノ万會ニ就リ吾々ハ海軍ガ現在強カサレテ  
 居ル万国ニ於テ懸然ラ國懸サセルガ如キ危險ハ有ル  
 テサケルノテアル。

スチムソン

STIMSON

外交要言第一号 第十七、十八頁



Ex. # 927

Doc. No. 219P (9)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 25

RESOLUTION VOTED UPON BY THE COUNCIL OF THE  
LEAGUE OF NATIONS ON OCTOBER 24, 1931

The Council,

In pursuance of the resolution passed on September  
30th:

Noting that in addition to the invocation by the  
Government of China, of Article 11 of the Covenant of the League of Nations,  
Article 2 of the Pact of Paris has also been invoked  
by a number of the Governments:

(1) Recalls the undertakings given to the Council  
by the Governments of China and Japan in that resolution,  
and in particular the statement of the Japanese repre-  
sentative that the Japanese Government would continue  
as rapidly as possible the withdrawal of its troops into  
the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives  
and property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured,  
and the statement of the Chinese representative that his  
Government will assure the responsibility for the safety  
of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside  
that zone--a pledge which implies the effective protection  
of Japanese subjects residing in Manchuria;

(2) Recalls further that both Governments have  
given the assurance that they would refrain from any  
measures which might aggravate the existing situation,  
and are therefore bound not to resort to any aggressive  
policy or action and to take measures to suppress hostile  
agitation;

(3) Recalls the Japanese statement that Japan has  
no territorial designs in Manchuria, and notes that this  
statement is in accordance with the terms of the Covenant  
of the League of Nations, and of the Nine-Power Treaty,  
the signatories of which are pledged to respect the  
sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and  
administrative integrity of China;

(4) Being convinced that the fulfillment of these  
assurances and undertakings is essential for the restora-  
tion of normal relations between the two parties:

(a) Calls upon the Japanese Government to  
begin immediately and to proceed progressively  
with the withdrawal of its troops into the railway  
zone, so that the total withdrawal may be effected  
before the date fixed for the next meeting of the  
Council:

(b) Calls upon the Chinese Government, in execution of its general pledge to assume the responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of all Japanese subjects resident in Manchuria, to make such arrangements for taking over the territory thus evacuated as will ensure the safety of the lives and property of Japanese subjects there, and requests the Chinese Government to associate with the Chinese authorities designated for the above purpose, representatives of other Powers in order that such representatives may follow the execution of the arrangements;

(5) Recommends that the Chinese and Japanese Governments should immediately appoint representatives to arrange the details of the execution of all points relating to the evacuation and the taking over of the evacuated territory so that they may proceed smoothly and without delay;

(6) Recommends the Chinese and Japanese Governments, as soon as the evacuation is completed, to begin direct negotiations on questions outstanding between them, and in particular those arising out of recent incidents as well as those relating to existing difficulties due to the railway situation in Manchuria. For this purpose, the Council suggests that the two parties should set up a conciliation committee, or some such permanent machinery;

(7) Decides to adjourn till November 16th, at which date it will again examine the situation, but authorizes its President to convoke a meeting at any earlier date should it in his opinion be desirable.

Br Ex. 25

219P(9)-1

一九三一年／昭和六年／十月二十四日、國際聯盟理事會ノ投票ニ依ル決議

理事會ハ、

九月三十日可決ノ決議ヲ参照、支那政府ガ國際聯盟規約第一一條ノ適用ヲ懇請セシ外ニ、多數ノ政府ガ巴黎條約第二條ノ適用ヲ懇請セシコトヲ了承シ

(一) コノ決議ノ中ニ日支兩國政府ガ理事會ニ與ヘタ約定、特ニ日本政府ハ日本國民ノ生命及財産ノ安全ガ有効ニ確保セララルニ從ヒ、日本軍隊ヲ鐵道附屬地内ニ撤退セシムル爲既ニ開始セラレタ軍隊ノ撤退ヲ出來ル限リ速ニ續行スベシトイフ日本代表ノ聲明及支那政府ハ鐵道附屬地外ニ於ケル日本國民ノ生命及財産ノ安全ニ對スル責任ヲ負フベキ旨

(二) 尙兩國政府ハ現狀ヲ惡化セシムル虞アル、如何ナラ有効ニ保護スルトイフ言質ヲ想起スル。ノ支那代表ノ聲明一即チ滿洲ニ居住セル日本臣民ノ聲明及支那政府ハ鐵道附屬地外ニ於ケル日本國民ノ生命及財産ノ安全ニ對スル責任ヲ負フベキ旨

(三) 日本ガ滿洲ニ於テ何等領土的目的ヲ有セザル旨ノヲ想起スル。ル措置ヲ取ル責任ヲ有ストイフ保證ヲ與ヘタコトニモ訴ヘルコトナク又敵意ヲ有スル擾亂ヲ抑制スル措置ヲモ避ケ從ツテ如何ナル侵略政策或ハ行爲

會合ニト指サレテ、日期始シ、且鐵道ヲ附地ニト、撤退ヲ完了スルコ  
 ルコト政庁ハ、復テ、及了解ルコト、實ト承了、ハ、兩國間ノ  
 (1) 日本政庁ハ、復テ、及了解ルコト、實ト承了、ハ、兩國間ノ  
 (四) 日本政庁ハ、復テ、及了解ルコト、實ト承了、ハ、兩國間ノ  
 日本ノ國際ノ明ヲ、項志シ、及此ノ、明ハ、國際聯盟規約及  
 九國條約ノ、主權ヲ、約立、領土保全、及行政的保全ヲ、印  
 支那ノ、主權ヲ、約立、領土保全、及行政的保全ヲ、印

(五) 代表者ヲ任命シ國權ニ且運籌ナクムヲ進行セシムルヤ  
 スル凡テノ點ノ實施細目ヲ取ル地ノ接収ニ  
 日支兩國政府ハ明瞭及明瞭サレタ地ノ接収ニ  
 。

(ロ) 手配ノ實施ヲ監視スルヤウニスルコトヲ要求ス  
 ノ列強ノ代表者ト協同シ命ヲ爲スコトヲ代表者カコ  
 又上記ノ目的ヲ如キ住ニ任命サレタコトヲ要請シ  
 ノ安全ヲ保シ其變ニ如キ住ニ任命サレタコトヲ要請シ  
 スルタメニ際ニ其變ニ如キ住ニ任命サレタコトヲ要請シ  
 實行スル際ニ其變ニ如キ住ニ任命サレタコトヲ要請シ  
 意ノ安全ヲ保シ其變ニ如キ住ニ任命サレタコトヲ要請シ  
 支那政府ニ對シテ  
 支那政府ニ對シテ

219P(9) - 3

ウ兩國政府ニ勸告スル。

(六) 日支兩國政府ハ明渡完了次第速ニ兩國間ニ懸案ニ  
ナツテキル問題特ニ最近ノ事變ノタメニ起ツタ問  
題竝ニ滿洲ニ於ケル鐵道事態ニ依ル現實ノ支障ニ  
關スル問題ニ就テ直接交渉ヲ開始スルコトヲ勸告  
スル。コノ目的ノタメニ理事會ハ兩當事國ガ和解  
委員會又ハ何等カ斯様ナ恒久的機關ヲ設置スルコ  
トヲ提起スル。

(七) 會合ヲ十一月十六日マデニ延期スルコトニ決定ス  
ル、ソノ日ニハ事態ヲ再ビ検討スルコトニスル、  
然シ議長ノ意見ニシテ希望スルトアレバソレヨリ  
モ早イ時期ニ會談ヲ召集スル權能ヲ議長ニ賦與ス  
ル。

Br. Ex. 26

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE  
LEAGUE OF NATIONS ON DECEMBER 10, 1931

Excerpts.

The Council.

(1) Reaffirms the resolution passed unanimously by it on September 30th, 1931, by which the two parties declare that they are solemnly bound; it therefore calls upon the Chinese and Japanese Governments to take all steps necessary to assure its execution, so that the withdrawal of the Japanese troops within the railway zone may be effected as speedily as possible under the conditions set forth in the said resolution;

. . . . .

Decides to appoint a Commission of five members to study on the spot and to report to the Council on any circumstance which, affecting international relations, threatens to disturb peace between China and Japan, or the good understanding between them, upon which peace depends;

. . . . .

219 P (10)

Br Sn. 26

二一九 P (一〇)

一九三一年(昭和六年)十二月十日西國新聞

國務會議ヨリ發給サレタル決議

國務會議

(一)一九三一年(昭和六年)九月三十日全會一環ヲ以テ

テ組織セル決議ヲ承認ス。此ノ決議ニヨリ兩省

各自ハ該局ニ宿決議ヲ遵守スル義務ヲ負フ旨ヲ宣

告ス。故ニ中國及ビ日本兩政府ハ、右決議履行ヲ

獲得スルニ必長ナル凡ユル手段ヲ執ルコトヲ長論

サレ、其ノ第一日本軍ノ前進附屬地ヘノ撤退ハ該

決議ニ於テ放棄セラレムル點標價ニ非キ可及的無

カニ實施スルヲ要ス。

× × ×

國務會議ハ國際關係及ビ中日間ノ平和親善ノ看破

ハ平和ノ條ツテ悉ク兩國間ノ良キ理解ニ影響ヲ與

ボス凡ユル事情ヲ現地ニ於テ觀察シ、之ヲ以テ聯合

ニ轉告セシムル爲メ該局會長五名ヨリ成ル委員ノ

任務ヲ決定ス。

外國新聞第一號 五九頁一六〇號



Doc. No. 219P (11)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 27

THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE MINISTER IN CHINA  
(JOHNSON)Washington, December 11, 1931 -  
11 a.m.

455. On December 10 the Secretary of State issued a statement to the press as follows:

"The Government of the United States is gratified at the unanimous adoption by the Council of the League of Nations of the Resolution of December 10. This represents a definite step of progress in a long and difficult negotiation which Mr. Briand and his associates have conducted with great patience.

The Council of the League of Nations was in session on September 18 when the present situation in Manchuria first developed. China at once appealed to the Council under Article 11 of the League Covenant. The Council took immediate cognizance of this appeal, and China and Japan participated in the discussions before it in accordance with their obligations as parties to the covenant. This Government has from the beginning endeavored to cooperate with and support these efforts of the Council by representations through the diplomatic channels to both Japan and China. Not only are the American people interested in the same objective sought by the League of preventing a disastrous war and securing a peaceful solution of the Manchurian controversy, but as a fellow signatory with Japan and China in the Kellogg-Briand Pact and in the so-called Nine-Power Treaty of February 6, 1922, this government has a direct interest in and obligation under the undertakings of those treaties.

The present Resolution provides for the immediate cessation of hostilities. It reaffirms the solemn pledge of Japan to withdraw her troops within the railway zone as speedily as possible. It provides for the appointment of a commission of five members to study on the spot and report to the Council on any circumstances which disturb the peace or affects the good understandings between China and Japan. Such a provision for a neutral commission is in itself an important and

Br. Ex. 27

constructive step towards an ultimate and fair solution of the intricate problem presented in Manchuria. It means the application with the consent of both China and Japan of modern and enlightened methods of conciliation to the solution of this problem. The principle which underlies it exists in many treaties of conciliation to which the United States is a party and which have played in recent years a prominent part in the constructive peace machinery of the world. The operation of such a commission gives time for the heat of controversy to subside and makes possible a careful study of the underlying problem

. . .

These are the essential principles for which the United States and the nations represented on the Council have been striving and it is in itself a signal accomplishment that there has been arrayed behind these principles in a harmonious cooperation such a solid alignment of the nations of the world.

2150-1

Ex 929

報 告

一九三一年乃至一九四五年ノ朝鮮ニ於ケル兵營施設ノ増加ニ就イテ

滿洲占領時ノ朝鮮ノ日本軍採用ノ全兵營施設ハ補強隊ヲ持ツ歩兵二箇師團ニ等シカツタ。兵舎並ニ軍營部落ハ概シテ此ノ國ノ大都市ニ存シタ、即チ京城、平壤、羅南、鎮海デアル。

日本ノ滿洲占領後ハ朝鮮ニ於テ兵營施設ノ急速ナク發展ガ始ツタ。而シテ兵舎並ニ軍營部落ハ概シテ北朝鮮ニ建テラレ、主トシテソソイェト社會主義共和國聯邦ト境ヲ接スル地方ニ建テラレタ。

一九三一年乃至一九四一年朝鮮ニ於ケル兵營施設ハ三倍以上ニモ増加サレ、七箇歩兵師團ヲ收容スル事ガ可能デアツタ。ソノ中、北朝鮮ニ收容シ得ルモノハ五箇師團デアツタ。

一九四一年乃至一九四五年日本人ハ朝鮮全域ニ亙ツテ兵舎並ニ軍營部落ノ建設ヲ繼續シタ。此期間ニ於テ朝鮮ノ兵營施設ノ收容能力ハ補強隊ヲ持ツ十二箇歩兵師團ニ迄達シタ。

カクシテ朝鮮ニ於ケル、就中ソノ北部地方ニ於

2150-2

ケル軍兵營ノ多數ノ建設ハ日本視師本部ガ、朝鮮ラソゾイェト沿海洲ニ侵入スル爲ノ根據地トナサント計登シテキタ事ヲ證明スルモノデアル。

附録 1 地圖「一九三一年乃至一九三二年ノ朝鮮ニ於ケル兵營施設」

2 地圖「一九四一年乃至一九四二年ノ朝鮮ニ於ケル兵營施設」

3 地圖「一九四五年ノ朝鮮ニ於ケル兵營施設」

赤軍參謀本部總務部代理

陸軍大佐

(ツウイキテコ)

一九四六年一月三〇日

書類第二、一五〇號

證

余平野英雄ハ余ガ獨西語及ビ日本語ニ精通セ  
ル者ナルコト並ニ露語原文及ビ日本語原文ヲ對照  
ノ上右ハ本書類ヲ眞實ニ且正確ニ翻譯セルモノナ  
ルヲ確證セルコトヲ茲ニ證ス

平野英雄

(印)

2150--3

Doc. No. 219P (4)

Br. Ex. 20

TELEGRAM  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN  
(FORBES)

Washington, January 7, 1932--noon.

7. Please deliver to the Foreign Office on behalf of your Government as soon as possible the following note:

"With the recent military operations about Ch'inchow, the last remaining administrative authority of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18th, 1931, has been destroyed. The American Government continues confident that the work of the neutral commission recently authorized by the Council of the League of Nations will facilitate an ultimate solution of the difficulties now existing between China and Japan. But in view of the present situation and of its own rights and obligations therein, the American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the Chinese Republic that it cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those Governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open door policy; and that it does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1920, to which Treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties."

State that an identical note is being sent to the Chinese government.

STIMSON

Foreign Relations I, p. 76

61930  
219P(4)-1

國務長官發駐日大使<sup>(Forbes)</sup>フオーブス宛電報 1934. 2. 20

華盛頓一九三三年／昭和七年／一月七日正午發

七、次ノ要旨ヲ至急本政府ノ公メ外務省ヘ傳達  
被下度  
「最近ノ錦州附近ニ於ケル軍兵行動ニヨリ一九  
三一年（昭和六年）九月十八日以前ニ存在シタ  
様ナ南滿洲ニ於ル中國政府ノ最後ノ存在行政權  
ハ消滅シタ。國際聯盟委員會ガ最近承認シタ中  
立委員會ノ業務ハ現在日華間ニ存在スル困難ナ  
ル問題ノ最良的解決ヲ容易ニスルモノナルコト  
ヲ亞米利加政府ハ依然確信スル。併シ乍ラ現時  
局並ニ夫ニ就スル我國ノ權利及義務ニ鑒ガミ、  
亞米利加政府ハ現在ノ事變ノ合法性ヲ容認出來  
難ク又兩國政府又ハ其代理機關ノ間ニ締結サレ  
タル條約若クハ協定ニシテ中國ノ主權、獨立、  
若クハ領土的及行政的保全又ハ通常門戶開放政  
策トシテ知ラル、中國ニ關スル國際政策ニ關係  
アルモノヲ結メ、合衆國又ハ在中國合衆國民ノ  
條約上ノ權利ヲ損フ恐アル條約若シクハ協定ヲ  
承認スル意志ナキコト、並ニ中國、日本及ビ合  
衆國カ加既スル一九二八年（昭和三年）八月二  
十七日附巴里條約ノ約定並ニ義務ニ違背スル手

三

2-19 P (4) - 2

段ニ依リ贊ラサル、局西、條約若シクハ指定ヲ  
承認スル意志ヲキコトヲ併セテ日本帝國政府及  
中國政府ニ通告スルコトヲ義務ナリト見テス。  
同一時期ヲ中國政府ニ發送中ナル事ヲ述ブレ度。

/ Stimson /  
スタムソン



E-931

Doc. No. 219F (13)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 31

TELEGRAM  
THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (FORBES) TO THE  
SECRETARY OF STATE

TOKYO, January 16, 1932--2 p.m.  
(Received January 16--6:03 a.m.)

11. Department's telegram No. 7, January 7, noon.  
I have just received the reply of the Japanese Government  
which reads as follows:

. . . . .

"The Government of Japan were well aware that the Government of the United States could always be relied on to do everything in their power to support Japan's efforts to secure the full and complete fulfillment in every detail of the treaties of Washington and the Kellogg Treaty for the Cancellation of War. They are glad to receive this additional assurance of the fact.

As regards the question which Your Excellency specifically mentions of the policy of the so-called 'open door,' the Japanese Government, as has so often been stated, regard that policy as a cardinal feature of the politics of the Far East, and only regrets that its effectiveness is so seriously diminished by the unsettled conditions which prevail throughout China. Insofar as they can secure it, the policy of the open door will always be maintained in Manchuria, as in China proper.

. . . . .

While it need not be repeated that Japan entertains in Manchuria no territorial aims or ambitions, yet, as Your Excellency knows, the welfare and safety of Manchuria and its accessibility for general trade are matters of the deepest interest and of quite extraordinary importance to the Japanese people.

FORBES

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電 報

フオードン (Ford) 駐日大使ヨリ國務長官宛

昭和七年 (一九三二年) 一月十六日午後二時東京發  
(一月十六日午前六時三分 受信)

十一、國務省電報第七號一月七日正午。余ハ只今次ノ如キ日本政府カラノ回答ニ接セリ。

.....

「日本政府ハ合衆國政府ガ必ズヤ常ニ、ワシントン條約及戰爭拋棄ヲ主張スルケロツダ條約ノ各細目ニ互ツテ全的且完全ナル逆行ヲ確保セントスル日本ノ努力ヲ支持スルタメニ全方ヲ盡シクレルモノナル事ヲ能ク承知シ居レリ。日本政府ハ真ニコノ事實ニ關シ保護ヲ得タコトヲ喜ブモノデアアル。」

閣下ガ特ニ言及セラレ居ル所謂「門戶解放」政策ニ關シテハ、日本政府ハ、屢次述べラレ居ル如ク、該政策ヲ極真政策ノ主要特性ト見做シ居リ、且ツ全文ニミナギル狀勢不安ニヨリソノ效果ノ著シク減殺サレ居ルコトヲ只遺憾トシテイル。日本政府ガ其ヲ確保シ得ル限リニ於テ門戶解放政策ハ支那本部ニ

219P(131)-2

於ケルト同様常ニ滿洲ニ於テモ維持サレルデアラウ。

— — — — —

日本ハ滿洲ニ於テ何等ノ領土的意圖モ野心ヲモ有  
セザルコトハ言テ置ナル要ナキモ、閣下御承知ノ如  
ク滿洲ノ福祉ト安全及一般通商ノ円滑ハ日本國民ニ  
トリ最大ノ關心事デアリ且極メテ重大ナ問題デアル。

フォーブス (FORBES)

外務關係一七六頁—七七頁

Doc. No. 2195 (14)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 32

TELEGRAM  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE CONSUL GENERAL  
AT SHANGHAI (CUNNINGHAM)

Washington, February 24, 1932 - 2 p.m.

50. For the Minister. Reference your February 9, a.m., from Nanking, paragraph 2, and Nanking's 14, January 24, 4 p.m., paragraph 5, and Shanghai's 72, February 18, 6 p.m., paragraph 5.

1. There is now being released to the press here the text of a letter from the Secretary of State to Senator Borah, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

You should communicate to the Foreign Office and make available to the press, at once, the text, as follows:

"You have asked my opinion whether, as has been sometimes recently suggested, present conditions in China have in any way indicated that the so-called Nine Power Treaty has become inapplicable or ineffective or rightly in need of modification, and if so, what I considered should be the policy of this Government.

This Treaty, as you of course know, forms the legal basis upon which now rests the 'Open Door' policy towards China. That policy, announced by John Hay in 1899, brought to an end the struggle among various powers for so-called spheres of interest in China which was threatening the dismemberment of that empire. To accomplish this Mr. Hay invoked two principles (1) equality of commercial opportunity among all nations in dealing with China, and (2) as necessary to that equality the preservation of China's territorial and administrative integrity. These principles were not new in the foreign policy of America. They had been the principles upon which it rested in its dealings with other nations for many years. In the case of China they were invoked to save a situation which not only threatened the future development and sovereignty of that great Asiatic people, but also threatened to create dangerous and constantly increasing rivalries between the other nations of the world. War had

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already taken ~~take~~ place between Japan and China. At the close of that war three other nations intervened to prevent Japan from obtaining some of the results of that war claimed by her. Other nations sought and had obtained spheres of interest. Partly as a result of these actions a serious uprising had broken out in China which endangered the legations of all of the powers at Peking. While the attack on those legations was in progress, Mr. Hay made an announcement in respect to this policy as the principle upon which the powers should act in the settlement of the rebellion. He said

'The policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.'

He was successful in obtaining the assent of the other powers to the policy thus announced.

In taking these steps Mr. Hay acted with the cordial support of the British Government. In responding to Mr. Hay's announcement, above set forth, Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister expressed himself 'most emphatically as concurring in the policy of the United States.'

For twenty years thereafter the Open Door policy rested upon the informal commitments thus made by the various powers. But in the winter of 1921 to 1922, at a conference participated in by all of the principal powers which had interests in the Pacific, the policy was crystalized into the so-called Nine Power Treaty, which gave definition and precision to the principles upon which the policy rested. In the first article of that Treaty, the contracting powers, other than China, agreed

1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.

2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government.

3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.

4. To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states.

This Treaty thus represents a carefully developed and matured international policy intended, on the one hand, to assure to all of the contracting parties their rights and interests in and with regard to China, and on the other hand, to assure to the people of China the fullest opportunity to develop without molestation their sovereignty and independence according to the modern and enlightened standards believed to maintain among the peoples of this earth. At the time this Treaty was signed, it was known that China was engaged in an attempt to develop the free institutions of a self-governing republic after her recent revolution from an autocratic form of government; that she would require many years of both economic and political effort to that end; and that her progress would necessarily be slow. The Treaty was thus a covenant of self-denial among the signatory powers in deliberate renunciation of any policy of aggression which might tend to interfere with that development. It was believed--and the whole history of the development of the 'Open Door' policy reveals that faith--that only by such a process, under the protection of such an agreement, could the fullest interests not only of China but of all nations which have intercourse with her best be served.

In its report to the President announcing this Treaty, the American Delegation, headed by the then Secretary of State, Mr. Charles E. Hughes, said

'It is believed that through this treaty the 'Open Door' in China has at last been made a fact.'

During the course of the discussions which resulted in the Treaty, the Chairman of the British delegation, Lord Balfour, had stated that

'The British Empire delegation understood that there was no representative of any power around the table who thought that the old practice of "spheres of interest" was either advocated by any government or would be tolerable to this conference. So far as the British Government was concerned, they had, in the most formal manner, publicly announced that they regarded this practice as utterly inappropriate to the existing situation.'

At the same time the representative of Japan, Baron Shidohara, announced the position of his Government as follows:

'No one denies to China her sacred right to govern herself. No one stands in the way of China to work out her own great national destiny.'

The Treaty was originally executed by the United States, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Portugal. Subsequently it was also executed by Norway, Bolivia, Sweden, Denmark and Mexico. Germany has signed it but her Parliament has not yet ratified it.

It must be remembered also that this Treaty was one of several treaties and agreements entered into at the Washington Conference by the various powers concerned, all of which were interrelated and interdependent. No one of these treaties can be disregarded without disturbing the general understanding and equilibrium which were intended to be accomplished and effected by the group of agreements arrived at in their entirety. The Washington Conference was essentially a disarmament conference, aimed to promote the possibility of peace in the world not only through the cessation of competition in naval armament but also by the solution of various other disturbing problems which threatened the peace of the world, particularly in the Far East. These

problems were all interrelated. The willingness of the American government to surrender its then commanding lead in battleship construction and to leave its positions at Guam and in the Philippines without further fortification, was predicated upon, among other things, the self-denying covenants contained in the Nine Power Treaty, which assured the nations of the world not only of equal opportunity for their Eastern trade but also against the military aggrandizement of any other power at the expense of China. One cannot discuss the possibility of modifying or abrogating those provisions of the Nine Power Treaty without considering at the same time the other promises upon which they were really dependent.

Six years later the policy of self-denial against aggression by a stronger against a weaker power, upon which the Nine-Power Treaty had been based, received a powerful reinforcement by the execution by substantially all the nations of the world of the Pact of Paris, the so-called Kellogg-Briand Pact. These two treaties represent independent but harmonious steps taken for the purpose of aligning the conscience and public opinion of the world in favor of a system of orderly development by the law of nations including the settlement of all controversies by methods of justice and peace instead of by arbitrary force. The program for the protection of China from outside aggression is an essential part of any such development. The signatories and adherents of the Nine Power Treaty rightly felt that the orderly and peaceful development of the 400,000,000 of people inhabiting China was necessary to the peaceful welfare of the entire world and that no program for the welfare of the world as a whole could afford to neglect the welfare and protection of China.

The recent events which have taken place in China, especially the hostilities which have been begun in Manchuria have latterly been extended to Shanghai, far from indicating the advisability of any modification of the treaties we have been discussing, have tended to bring home the vital importance of the faithful observance of the



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covenants therein to all of the nations interested in the Far East. It is not necessary in that connection to inquire into the causes of the controversy or attempt to apportion the blame between the two nations which are unhappily involved: for regardless of cause or responsibility, it is clear beyond peradventure that a situation has developed which cannot, under any circumstances, be reconciled with the obligations of the covenants of these two treaties, and that if the treaties had been faithfully observed such a situation could not have arisen. The signatories of the Nine Power Treaty and of the Kellogg-Briand Pact who are not parties to that conflict are not likely to see any reason for modifying the terms of those treaties. To them the real value of the faithful performance of the treaties has been brought sharply home by the perils and losses to which their nationals have been subjected in Shanghai.

That is the view of this Government. We see no reason for abandoning the enlightened principles which are embodied in these treaties. We believe that this situation would have been avoided had these covenants been faithfully observed, and no evidence has come to us to indicate that a due compliance with them would have interfered with the adequate protection of the legitimate rights in China of the signatories of those treaties and their nationals.

On January 7th last, upon the instruction of the President, this Government formally notified Japan and China that it would not recognize any situation, treaty or agreement entered into by these governments in violation of the covenants of these treaties, which affected the rights of our Government or its citizens in China. If a similar decision should be reached and a similar position taken by the other governments of the world, a caveat will be placed upon such action which, we believe, will effectively bar the legality hereafter of any title or right sought to be obtained by pressure or treaty violation, and which, as has been shown by history in the past, will eventually lead to the restoration to China of rights and titles of which she may have been deprived.

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In the past our Government, as one of the leading powers on the Pacific Ocean, has rested its policy upon an abiding faith in the future of the people of China and upon the ultimate success in dealing with them of the principles of fair play, patience, and mutual goodwill. We appreciate the immensity of the task which lies before her statesmen in the development of her country and its government. The delays in her progress, the instability of her attempts to secure a responsible government, were foreseen by Messrs. Hay and Hughes and their contemporaries and were the very obstacles which the policy of the Open Door was designed to meet. We concur with those statesmen, representing all the nations in the Washington Conference who decided that China was entitled to the time necessary to accomplish her development. We are prepared to make that our policy for the future.

Very sincerely yours, (Signed) Henry L. Stimson"

2. Repeat the whole of the above in clear at once to Tokyo.

STIMSON

Foreign Relations I, pp. 83-87

45932

二一九P (一西)

國務長官ヨリ駐上海總領事(カンニンガム)ヘノ電文

一九三二年(昭和七年)二月二十四日午後二時

ワシントンニ於テ

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FILE  
RETURN TO ROOM

五〇。公使宛。二月九日午前九時南京ヨリ貴官發電  
報第二節、南京一四號一月二十四日午後四時發電報  
第五節、及ビ上海七二號二月十八日午後六時發電報  
第五節参照ノコト、

一唯今當地新聞ニ對シ、國務長官ヨリ上院外交委員  
長上院議員ボラ一宛書翰ノ正文ガ公表セラレント  
ツ、アリ。

一貴官ハ外務省ニ連絡シ 直ニ以下述ブル正文ヲ新  
聞用ニ供セラルベシ。

一貴官ハ、最近復同指示ヲ受ケタル所ナルガ、中  
華民國ニ於ケル現状ハ、所謂九ヶ國條約ノ適用不  
能状態ニアリヤ、或ハ無効状態ニアリヤ、或ハ直  
ニ修正ヲ必要トスル状態ニアリヤ、又其ノ何レカ  
ノ状態ナル時、余ノ思考スル所ガ、本政府ノ政策  
タリヤ否ヤニ付余ノ意見ヲ徴シタリ。

一勿論貴官ノ知レル如ク、本條約ハ現在中華民国  
ニ對スル一門戶開放ノ政策ノ法律的根據ヲ爲スモ  
ノナリ。一八九九年(明治三十二年)一シヨシ。

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二一九P(一四)

國務長官ヨリ駐上海總領事(カンニンガム)ヘノ電文

一九三二年(昭和七年)二月二十四日午後二時

ワシントンニ於テ

五〇。公使宛。二月九日午前九時南京ヨリ貴官發電報第二節、南京一四號一月二十四日午後四時發電報第五節、及ビ上海七二號二月十八日午後六時發電報第五節參照ノコト、

一唯今當地新聞ニ對シ、國務長官ヨリ上院外交委員長上院議員ボラ一宛書翰ノ正文ガ公表セラレントシツ、アリ。

貴官ハ外務省ニ連絡シ直ニ以下述アル正文ヲ新聞用ニ供セラルベシ。

一貴官ハ、最近數回指示ヲ受ケタル所ナルガ、中華民國ニ於ケル現状ハ、所謂九ヶ國條約ノ適用不能状態ニアリヤ、或ハ無効状態ニアリヤ、或ハ直ニ修正ヲ必要トスル状態ニアリヤ、又其ノ何レカノ状態ナル時、余ノ思考スル所ガ、本政府ノ政策タリヤ否ヤニ付余ノ意見ヲ徵シタリ。

勿論貴官ノ知レル如ク、本條約ハ現在中華民國ニ對スル一門戶開放ノ政策ノ法律的根據ヲ爲スモノナリ。一八九九年(明治三十二年)一シヨン。

へいしヨリ宣言セラレタル該政策ハ、中華民国  
 ヲ分割セントスルガ如キ、列強ノ中間ニ於ケル所  
 謂勢力圏ノ紛争ヲ終息セシメタリ。之ヲ完全ニセ  
 シ爲、一へいし氏ハ次ノ二原則ヲ提唱セリ。(一)中  
 華民国トノ取引ニ當リ、益テノ國民間ニ於ケル商  
 業上ノ機會均等及ビ(二)該機會均等ニ必要ナル中華  
 民国ノ領土及ビ行政ノ保全ノ維持。該原則ハアメリ  
 カノ對外政策ニ於テハ斬新ノモノニ非ズ。該原則  
 則ハ多年詭國民トノ取引ニ際シテ、ソノ根本原則  
 トナシ來リタルモノナリ。中華民国ノ場合ニ於テ  
 ハ、該原則ハ、彼ノ偉大ナルアジア國民ノ將來ノ  
 發展ト主權トヲ利威スルノミナラズ、世界ノ他國  
 民トノ間ニ危險且不斷ニ紛争ヲ増大セシメントス  
 ルガ如キ、狀勢ヲモ救済センガ爲ニ提唱セラレタ  
 ルナリ。戦争ハ既ニ日本及ビ中華民国間ニ發生セ  
 リ。該戦争ノ終期ニ當リ他ノ三國民ハ日本ヲ要求  
 セル戦争ノ結果ノ一部ヲ進行スルコトヲ妨害セン  
 爲干渉セリ。他ノ國民ハ要求シタル結果勢力圏ヲ  
 獲得シタリ。一部ハ是等行動ノ結果トシテ熾烈ナ  
 ル暴動、中華民国内ニ勃發シ北京ニ於ケル列強ノ  
 全公使館ヲ危殆ニ類セシメタリ。此ノ公使館攻撃  
 ノ行ハレツ、アール間ニ、一へいし氏ハ列強ガ反亂  
 鎮壓ニ當リ行動スベキ原則トシテ該政策ニ關スル  
 説明ヲ發シタリ。彼曰ク、

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「合衆國政府ノ政策ハ、中華民國ニ恒久的安全ト  
平和トヲ齎シ、中華民國ノ領土的行政的實体ヲ保  
持シ、條約ト國際法トニ依リ友好列強ニ保障セラ  
レタル全テノ權利ヲ保護シ、良ニ世界ノ爲、中華  
民國ノ全領域ニ於テノ平等公平ナル通商ノ原則ヲ  
擁護セントスルニ在リ。」ト。  
彼ハ斯ク表明セル政策ニ對シテ他ノ列強ノ同意ヲ得  
ルコトニ成功シタリ。  
斯カル措置ヲ採レル際、一ヘイル氏ハ英國政府ノ懇  
篤ナル支持ヲ受ケ行動セリ。上述セル一ヘイル氏ノ  
表明ニ呼應シテ英國首相「サリスベリ」卿ハ自ラ敢  
モ熱心ニ合衆國ノ政策ニ同意ヲ表スル旨ヲ述べタリ。  
其ノ後二十年間門戶開放政策ハ斯ク多數列強ニヨ  
リ爲サレタル非公式言質ニ基キテ行ハレ來リタリ。  
然レドモ一九二一年（大正十年）ノ冬ヨリ、一九二二  
年（大正十一年）ニ亘リテ、太平洋ニ利害關係アル  
主要列強全部ノ參加セル會議ニ於テ該政策ハ所謂九  
ヶ國條約ト云フ具體的ノモノトナリ、且同條約ハ該  
政策ノ基礎タルベキ原則ヲ明瞭且正確ナラシメタリ。  
該條約ノ第一條ニ於テ中華民國ヲ除ク締約列強ハ次  
ノ如ク意見ノ一致ヲ見タリ。  
「中華民國ノ主權、獨立及ビ領土的行政的安全ヲ尊  
重スルコト。」

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二 中華民國が實力アリ且安定セル政府ヲ發達セシム  
且維持セン爲、同國ニ對シ完全且妨グルコト無キ  
機會ヲ與フルコト。

三 中華民國全領土ニ亙リ各國々民ノ商業上産業上ノ  
機會均等ノ原則ヲ有效ニ設定シ且維持センガ爲ニ  
各國ハ盡力スルコト。

四 友好諸國ノ臣民又ハ國民ノ權利ヲ奪フガ如キ特殊  
利益ヲ得ンガ爲中華民國ニ於ケル諸國ノ狀況ヲ利  
用スルコトヲ禁ジ、且該諸國ノ安全性ニ有害ナル  
行爲ノ獎勵ヲ禁ズルコト。

ヲ協定セリ。

解 多 伊 注、甚 深 次 發 展 且 成 育 セ ラ レ タ ル 國

際政策ヲ表明スル本條約ハ、一方ニ於テハ全締約者  
ニ對シ中華民國内及ビ同國ニ對スル權益ヲ保障セン  
コトヲ意圖スルト同時ニ他方ニ於テハ、中華民國ノ  
國民ニ對シ、同國民ガ地球上ノ諸國民同ニ維持セラ  
ルルト信ゼラルル近代文明ノ標準ニ從ヒ、干涉ヲ受  
クルコトナク、彼等ノ主權ト獨立トヲ發展セシムベ  
キ完全ナル機會ヲ保障センコトヲ意圖シタリ。該條  
約ノ署名セラレタル當時、中華民國ハ、其ノ政府ノ  
專制形態ヨリ最近ノ革命從成立シタル共和的形態ノ政  
府ヲ排シ、自治共和國トシテノ自由制度ヲ發達セシ  
ムル意圖ヲ有シタルコト、及ビ同國ハ右目的達成ノ

為經濟上並ニ政治上多年ノ努力ヲ必要トスベキコト、  
 並ニ同國ノ發展ハ必然的ニ週々タルベキコト等ハ了  
 解タリシナリ。  
 斯クノ如クナレバ本條約ハ署名各國ニ於テ、懷  
 ニ考慮シ中國ノ發展ヲ妨グルガ如キ侵略政策ヲ拋棄  
 スルニ於テハ右名列強國ノ自己否定ノ條約タルモノ  
 ナリ。而シテ斯カル協定ノ締結ノ下ニ斯カル過程ヲ  
 經テノミ、中華民國ノ完全ナル利益ノミナラス、之  
 ト交渉ヲ有スル諸國家國民ノ全利益ガ最大ニ與ヘラ  
 レルモノト信ゼラレタリ。此ノ信念ハ一門戶開放シ  
 政策ニ關スル全テノ歴史ノ明ラカニ證明スル所ナリ。  
 本條約ヲ大統領ニ報告セル報告書ニ於テ、時ノ國  
 務長官「チキールズ。イ。ヒュニス」氏ノ首席タ  
 リシアメリカ代表團ハ、  
 本條約ニ依リ中華民國ニ於ケル一門戶開放シハ  
 逃ニ實現セラレタルモノト信ス。  
 ト述ベタリ。  
 本條約ノ締結ニ導キタル討論ノ過程ニ於テ英國代  
 表團議長「バルフォア」卿ハ、  
 三英帝國代表團ハ、本會議ニ出席シタル列國代表  
 者中ニハ、一勢力團ニ關スル過去ノ羣例ヲ支持  
 スベキ政府アリト考フル者モ無ク、又本會議ニ對  
 シ何等カノ異議アリト考フル者モ無キモノト了解  
 ス。



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英國政府ノ口スル限リ我代表ハ最も正式ナル方法  
ヲ以テ公式ニ該領内ハ現状ニ對シ全然不適當ナリ  
ト思考スル旨宣言セリト  
述ベタリ。

同時ニ日本國代表常原男爵ハ日本政府ノ地位ニ關  
シ次ノ如ク述ベタリ。曰ク、

一何人モ中華民國ニ對シ其ノ神聖ナル自治ノ權利  
ヲ否定スル者ナシ。何人モ中華民國ガ自己ノ偉大  
ナル國民的運命ヲ完成セントスルニ當リ之ヲ妨害  
スル者無シ。ト。

本條約ハ元來合衆國、ベルギー、英帝國、中華民  
國、フランス、イタリ、日本、ネザラランド及ビ  
ポルトガルニヨリ作成セラレタリ。其ノ結果又ノ  
ルウエー、ボリビア、スウエーデン、デンマーク及  
ビメキシコモ之ニ參加シタリ。ドイツハ之ニ署名セ  
ルモ、同國議會ハ未ダ之ニ批准セズ。

更ニ本條約ハ、ワシントン會議ニ於テ相互ニ關係  
シ且相互ニ依存セル關係諸列強ニヨリ協定セラレタ  
ル諸條約並ニ協定ノ一ナルコトハ言ヲ要セズ。又是  
等ノ條約ノ一タリト雖モ之ヲ無視シタル時ハ、完全  
無缺ナル一連ノ諸協定ニ依リ完成招來セントシタル  
一時的了畢放ニ均衡ヲ障害スルニ至ルベシ。ワシン





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ヲモ認メザルガ如シ。彼等ニトリテハ該條約ノ恩賞  
ナル履行ガ實ニ必置アルコトナルハ、彼等ノ山人ガ  
上訴ニ於テ受ケタル危トニ失トニヨリ亦切ニ慮ジ  
タルトコロナリ。

是レ本政府ノ見解ナリ。吾人ハ本條約ニ異議セラ  
レタル文明的基點ヲ放棄スル理由ヲ認メズ。吾人ハ  
若シ是レ條約ニシテ其實ニ履行セラレタランニハ、  
吾人ハ該條約ヲ履行シテ其利益ニ該條約ニ其從スルコ  
トガ、該條約ノ訂名國ニソノ國民ノ中華國民ニ於  
ケル合法的權利ノ一切ナル保護ノ妨害タルベキ何事  
ノ證據モ無キモノト信ズ。

昨年一月七日附大英領ノ公書ニ於テ、本政府ハ日  
本及ビ中華國民ニ對シ、本政府ハ、是レ條約ニ悖  
リタル日清條約ノ廢止、條約或ハ其條約ニシテ、  
中華國民ニ於ケル本政府並ニ我國民ノ中華國民内ニ  
有スル權利ニ影響ヲ與フルモノハ如何ナルモノト信  
モ之ヲ是認スルコトヲ欲サル旨日本及ビ中華國民ニ  
通告セリ。若シ世界ノ中ノ政府ニシテ同條約ノ決定ニ  
強固シ同條約ノ立場ヲ保リタランニハ、上述ノ如キ行  
クニ通告ヲ與フルコトニナルベク、且其條約ハ條約  
條約ニヨリ今欲獲得セラルル如何ナル各分我ハ權利  
ニ對スル正當性ヲモ強暴的ニ對シ且、過去ニ於ケ  
ル歴史ノ示セル如ク、自々中華國民ニ對シ其ノ奪ハ

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レントセシ名分ト權利トヲ回復スルニ至ルモノト信  
ズ。

過去ニ於テ我が政府ハ太平洋ニ於ケル指導國ノ一  
トシテ、政策ヲ中華民國ノ民衆ノ將來ニ對スル不變  
ノ信心ニ基キ、又彼等ニ對シ公平、忍耐、及ビ相互  
的好意ノ原則ノ究行尙成功ニ俟キタリ。吾人ハ國ヨ  
リ民衆及ビ民衆政府ノ發展ニ對シ、同國ノ政治家ノ  
前ニ横タハル任務ノ長大ナルコトヲ知ル。其ノ進歩  
ノ遲延、責任政府維持ノ企圖ノ動搖ハ一ヘイレ一ヒ  
ユーズレ及ビ其ノ同時代ノ諸氏ニヨリ豫見セラレ、  
且ハ一門戸開放ニ政策ノ違ケ得ラレザリシ際在タリ  
シナリ。吾人ハ、中華民國ガ其ノ發展ヲ完成センニ  
ハ必要ナル時ヲ待ツ權利アルコトヲ決意セルワシン  
トン會議ニ列席シタル全國民代表タル政治家選ト意  
見ヲ同ジクス。吾人ハ之ヲ以テ將來ニ對スル我國ノ  
政策トナサントスルモノナリ。

署名

(署名) ヘンリー・エル・ステムソン

ニ上述ノ全文ヲ院際ニシテ譯チニ東京へ償還シ打替セヨ。

ステムソン

對外關係第一冊 八三一八七頁

Q. 933

Doc. No. 2192 (12)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 30

TELEGRAM  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE MINISTER IN  
SWITZERLAND (WILSON)

Excerpt.

Washington, February 25, 1933--6 p.m.

78. Your 125, February 24, 7 p.m. Communicate to Drummond (Secretary General of the League) as a letter from me under today's date the following:

\*There has been communicated to me the text of your letter of February 24, 1933, transmitting to me a copy of the report of the Committee of Nineteen as adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations on this day.

I note your request that I communicate to you as soon as possible the reply of the Government of the United States.

In response to that request I have the honor to state the views of the American Government as follows:

In the situation which has developed out of the controversy between China and Japan, the purpose of the United States has coincided in general with that of the League of Nations, the common objective being maintenance of peace and settlement of international disputes by pacific means. In pursuance of that objective, while the League of Nations has been exercising jurisdiction over a controversy between two of its members, the Government of the United States has endeavored to give support, reserving to itself independence of judgment with regard to method and scope, to the efforts of the League on behalf of peace.

The findings of fact arrived at by the League and the understanding of the facts derived by the American Government from reports made to it by its own representatives are in substantial accord. In the light of its findings of fact, the Assembly of the League has formulated a measured statement of conclusions. With those conclusions the American Government is in general accord. In their affirmations respectively of the principle of non-recognition and their attitude in regard thereto the League and the United States are on common ground. The League has recommended principles of settlement. In so far as appropriate under the treaties to which it is a party, the American Government expresses its general endorsement of the principles thus recommended.

.....

STIMSON

Foreign Relations I, pp. 115-116.

電文  
Br. 30

WILSON

國務長官ヨリ駐米公使 ウィルソン氏へ

4933  
219P(12)-1

敬 奉

ワシントンニテ

一九三三年（昭和八年）二月二十五日午後六時

七八二月二十四日午後七時發賣第一二五號。

本日附ニテ小官發ノ警輸トシテ下記ノ如クドラモ  
ンド氏 DRUMMOND （華盛事務總長）宛對信  
セラレ候

「國際聯盟總會ニヨリ採擇セラレタル十九ヶ國委  
員會報告書一部ト共ニ一九三三年二月二十四日附  
ノ貨輸本日拜受仕候

合衆國政府ノ同意ラ可及的迅速ニ採擇アリタキ旨  
ノ御要請ハ小官ニ於テ了承仕候

右御要請ニ應ジ米國政府ノ見解ラ左記ノ如ク御兼  
願早上候

日支間ノ紛争ニヨリ展開セル尙重ニ同シ合衆國  
ノ企圖スル處ハ皆ホ國際聯盟ノ企圖ト合致ス、  
即チ兩者共ニ其ノ目標ハ平和ノ維持及ビ平和の手

Handwritten mark or signature at the bottom right.

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駐米公使館長ノ紛争解決ニアリ、  
此目録連版ノ爲メ駐米公使館長ガ両國間  
ノ紛争ニ對シ調停權ヲ行使スル一アニ於テ、合  
衆國政府ハ万端ト範圍ニ限リテ如何ノ御三ヲ認  
係スル連同ノ下ニ平和ノシメノ聯盟ノ努力ニ對  
シテ支援ヲ與フルニ甚カナラザリシ所ナリ。

駐米公使館長下セル諸事實ノ御定ト米國政府ガソ  
ノ代表者ノ報告ヲ聽シテ得タル諸事實ニ對スル  
認識トハ根本ニ於テ台致ス。

諸事實ニ對スル目カラノ御定ニ基キ聯盟總會ハ  
若干ノ精進ニツキ適正妥當ナル聲明書ヲ作製セ  
リ。是等精進ト米國政府ハ固本見解ヲ一ツニス  
。不承認原則ノ肯定ト同盟原則ニ對スル態度ニ於  
テハ聯盟ト合衆國トハ共通ノ立場ニアリ。  
聯盟ハ所決案ニ符若干ノ原則ヲ掲げヤリ。米國  
政府ハ種別別ノ一長タル諸條約ノ制約下妥當ナ  
ル限りニ於テ採案セラレタル石原即ニ對シ全面  
的同意ヲ表明ス。

.....

スチムソン STEPHENSON

(附録第一)



Doc. No. 219P (15)

Br. Ex. 34 THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE  
SECRETARY OF STATE

No. 1052

TOKYO, November 14, 1934  
(Received December 1.)

Excerpt.

.....

While it may be argued that the Japanese Government never specifically guaranteed the maintenance of the principles of the open door and equal opportunity in Manchuria after the government of "Manchukuo" was organized, the Japanese recognition and endorsement of the new regime was largely predicated upon the maintenance of those policies, as is evidenced by the speech of Count UCHIDA, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, before the Diet on August 25, 1932, and the Japanese Government's public statement of September 15, 1932, issued on the occasion of the recognition of "Manchukuo", which reads in part as follows:

"As regards the economic activities of foreigners, the Manchukuo Government made clear in their communication of March 10 above alluded to that they would observe the principle of the Open Door. What Japan desires in Manchuria is to do away with all anti-foreign policies there so that the region may become a safe place of abode for natives and foreigners alike, while, at the same time, guaranteeing her legitimate rights and interests there; and therefore, it is hardly necessary to repeat the assurance that Japan sincerely hopes that all the peoples of the world will pursue their economic activities in Manchuria on a footing of equal opportunity and will thereby contribute to the development and prosperity of that region."

The Protocol between Japan and "Manchukuo" of September 15, 1932, itself is predicated upon the observance by "Manchukuo" of international obligations applying to that territory, as is shown by the second paragraph of the preamble of the Protocol:

"Whereas Manchukuo has declared its intention of abiding by all international engagements entered into by China in so far as they are applicable to Manchukuo."

It is difficult to see how the Japanese Government can ignore these definite declarations, but that it has done so is not only shown by the excerpt quoted above, etc.

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B-Ex-34

駐日大使(ダラー) / 中野 / 發國務長官宛

第一〇五二號 東京、一九三四年 / 昭和九年 / 十一月十四日  
(十二月一日受領)

披 考

.....

「滿洲國」政府成立後、日本政府ハ滿洲ニ於ケル門戶開放及ヒ機會均等ノ原則維持ヲ特ニ保證セザリシ事實ハ一應主張シ得ル所ナルベキモ日本ガ此ノ新政權ヲ承認セルハ概ネ之等原則ノ維持ニ基ケル所ニシテ、此ノ點ハ一九三二年 / 昭和七年 / 八月二十五日議會ニ於ケル菅野ノ外相内田伯ノ演説及ヒ、一九三二年 / 昭和七年 / 九月十五日、「滿洲國」承認ノ際發セラレタル日本政府一般聲明ニ徴スルモ瞭カナル處ナリ右聲明ノ一節ハ次ノ如シ。

「外國人ノ經濟的活動ニ關シテハ滿洲國政府ハ、既述三月十日附通牒ニ於テ、門戶開放ノ原則ヲ遵奉スベキ旨ヲ據カニセリ。日本ノ滿洲國ニ於テ欲スル所ハ、同國ノ正當ナル權益ヲ保證スルト同時ニ、總ニ排外政策ヲ

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放棄セシメ以テ同地域ヲシテ、内外人ノ價シク  
安居樂業ノ地トシメントスルニアリ。  
右ノ故ニ世界ニ於ケル歐ユル國民ガ滿洲ニ於テ  
機會均等ノ基礎ニ立脚シソノ經濟的活動ニ從事  
シ、以テ同地域ノ發展、繁榮ニ寄與セン事ヲ、  
日本ガ衷心ヨリ希望スル旨改メテ確言スルノ契  
無カルベシ。一 一九三二年ノ昭和七年ノ九月十  
五日附日本「滿洲國」間認定書ソレ自体、滿洲  
國ノ同地域ニ適用サレタル國際間ノ義務ノ遵守  
ニ基クモノタルコトハ右認定書前文第二段ニ示  
サル、通りナリ。即チ

「滿洲國ハ、中華民國ニ依リ締結セラレタル  
國際間ノ約定ハ總テ其ガ滿洲國ニ適用サル、限  
リ之ヲ遵守スル意志アル事ヲ宣言セルガ故ニ」  
トアリ。

日本政府ガ果シテ如何ニシテ之等確乎タル宣  
言ヲ無視シ得ルヤ理解スルハ困難ナリ、然カモ  
同政府ガ今日迄斯ク爲シ來レル事ハ尙ニ上ニ引  
用セル敬奉ニ依リ明カナルノミナラズ、云々。

外交關係Ⅰ、一三五頁及一三七頁

EX. # 935

Doc. No. 219<sup>a</sup> (22)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 41

UNOFFICIAL STATEMENT BY THE JAPANESE FOREIGN OFFICE,  
April 17, 1934

The following is an English translation unofficially issued by the Japanese Foreign Office of the unofficial statement issued by the Foreign Office on April 17, 1934, known as the "Aman Statement":

Owing to the special position of Japan in her relations with China, her views and attitude respecting matters that concern China, may not agree in every point with those of foreign nations; but it must be realized that Japan is called upon to exert the utmost effort in carrying out her mission and in fulfilling her special responsibilities in East Asia.

Japan has been compelled to withdraw from the League of Nations because of their failure to agree in their opinions on the fundamental principles of preserving peace in East Asia. Although Japan's attitude toward China may at times differ from that of foreign countries, such difference cannot be evaded, owing to Japan's position and mission.

It goes without saying that Japan at all times is endeavoring to maintain and promote her friendly relations with foreign nations, but at the same time we consider it only natural that, to keep peace and order in East Asia, we must even act alone on our own responsibility and it is our duty to perform it. At the same time, there is no country but China which is in a position to share with Japan the responsibility for the maintenance of peace in East Asia. Accordingly, unification of China, preservation of her territorial integrity, as well as restoration of order in that country, are most ardently desired by Japan. History shows that these can be attained through no other means than the awakening and the voluntary efforts of China herself. We oppose therefore any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan. We also oppose any action taken by China, calculated to play one power against another. Any joint operations undertaken by foreign powers even in the name of technical or financial assistance at this particular moment after the Manchurian and Shanghai Incidents are bound to acquire political significance. Undertakings of such nature, if carried through to the end, must give rise to complications that might eventually necessitate discussion of problems like fixing spheres of influence or even international control or division of China, which would be the greatest possible misfortune for China and at the same time would have the most serious repercussion upon Japan and East Asia. Japan therefore must object to such undertakings as a matter of principle, although she will not find it necessary to interfere with any foreign country negotiating individually with China on questions of finance or trade, as long as such negotiations

Br. Ex. 41

benefit China and are not detrimental to the maintenance of peace in East Asia.

However, supplying China with war planes, building aerodromes in China and detailing military instructors or military advisers to China or contracting a loan to provide funds for political uses, would obviously tend to alienate the friendly relations between Japan and China and other countries and to disturb peace and order in East Asia. Japan will oppose such projects.

The foregoing attitude of Japan should be clear from the policies she has pursued in the past. But, on account of the fact that positive movements for joint action in China by foreign powers under one pretext or another are reported to be on foot, it is deemed not inappropriate to reiterate her policy at this time.

Foreign Relations I, pp. 224-225

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doc 2/19P(22)

日本外務省、非公式聲明 一九四四年四月十七日。  
年次、文、天羽聲明トシテ知ララルモ、ニシテ一九三  
聲明、四月七日日本外務省ヨリ發セラル、非公式  
英譯文ナリ、外務省ニ依リ非公式ニ發セラル

支那ニ関スル日本、特殊ナル地位ニ依リ支那  
ト必ズモ一致セザルモ、アルヤモ知ラズ、然レ  
果ス、極力努力ヲ求メラレ、アルコトハ認  
ル、ヲ要ス

日本、東亞ニ於ケル平和維持、根本義ニ付  
國際聯盟ト意見一致セザルアルヲ以テ國際聯  
盟ヲ脱退スル、余儀ナキニ至リタリ  
日本、對支態度ハ列國、ソルト屢々異ナル所  
有リ、天以、如キ差異、日本、地位及ビ使命ニ依リ  
免レ得ザルモノナリ

日本、常ニ列國ト友好關係ヲ保持増進スル  
努力ニ居ル、多言ヲ要セズ、然レドモ同時ニ我々ハ  
東亞、平和及秩序維持、為我々自身、責  
任ニ於テ單獨ニ行動スルハ當然ノコト、考ヘラレ

同時ニ東亞ニ於ケル平和、維持ニ付日本ト共  
ニ責命ヲ以テ地位ニ了レ、國ハ支那ヲオイト、他ニ  
非ズ、從テ支那、統一領土、保全及支那ニ於  
ル秩序、恢復ハ日本、最モ切望スル所ナリ。

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之等、達成、支那自身、自覺的並、自強の勢  
 力、待、以、他、之、歴、史、徴、ス、以、明、ラ、カ、リ、故、ニ、支  
 那、ニ、シ、テ、他、國、之、勢、力、ヲ、利、用、シ、日、本、ヲ、排、斥、ス、ル  
 也、キ、擧、ニ、出、ツ、ル、吾、人、ノ、反、對、ス、ル、所、ナ、リ、  
 又、支、那、ニ、シ、テ、來、リ、以、テ、表、示、ス、ル、劃、ス、ル、如、キ、措  
 置、ヲ、反、對、ス、ル、所、ナ、リ、滿、洲、事、變、上、海、事、變、後、措  
 置、ヲ、持、殊、特、期、ニ、於、テ、引、國、側、ニ、於、テ、十、廿、三、年  
 共、同、動、作、ノ、假、令、名、目、ノ、技、術、的、或、ハ、財、政、的、措  
 取、ニ、ア、ル、ニ、モ、政、治、的、意、味、ヲ、帶、フ、ル、ニ、至、ル、ハ、必、然、ナ、リ、  
 此、如、キ、性、質、ノ、動、作、ノ、遂、行、セ、ル、ハ、必、ズ、國、際、情、勢、ヲ  
 振、盪、ス、ル、支、那、ニ、於、テ、執、力、ノ、範、圍、ノ、設、定、或  
 ハ、國、際、法、理、ノ、公、割、等、ノ、問、題、ノ、論、議、ヲ、受、ク、  
 ン、支、那、ニ、ト、リ、テ、ハ、非、常、ノ、不、幸、ヲ、派、屬、ス、ル、ニ、至、  
 亦、日、本、及、東、亞、ニ、對、シ、テ、本、問、題、ト、シ、テ、重、大、ト、ル  
 反、響、ヲ、派、屬、ス、ル、ニ、至、リ、セ、ル、日、本、ノ、原、則、ト、シ、  
 カ、ル、見、解、ヲ、ト、ス、キ、デ、ア、ル、ガ、然、リ、ト、雖、モ、各、國、ニ、  
 支、那、ニ、對、シ、テ、個、別、的、ノ、經、濟、貿、易、問、題、ノ、交、渉、ヲ  
 十、也、キ、以、テ、如、キ、交、渉、ノ、支、那、ヲ、利、益、東、亞、平  
 和、ノ、維、持、ニ、支、障、ヲ、及、ボ、サ、ル、限、リ、之、ニ、干、渉、ス、ル  
 必、要、ヲ、認、ム、。

然、之

然、レ、ド、モ、支、那、ニ、軍、用、飛、行、機、ヲ、供、シ、飛、行、場、ヲ  
 建、設、シ、軍、事、教、官、或、ハ、軍、事、顧問、ヲ、派、遣、シ、  
 政、治、借、款、ヲ、起、ス、ル、也、キ、日、本、支、那、其、他、ノ、關係、  
 ヲ、離、隔、シ、東、亞、平、和、及、秩、序、維、持、ヲ、乱、ス、如、キ  
 結、果、ヲ、生、ズ、ル、コ、ト、明、ラ、ク、ナ、ル、ヲ、以、テ、日、本、ニ、於、テ、  
 之、ニ、反、對、ス、ル、所、ナ、リ、

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前送、日本、態度、定、ル、キ、天、一、十、リ。然、シ、ド、モ、諸、外、國、ノ、文、明、ニ、對、シ、共、勤、作、等、ノ、名、義、ニ、テ、積、極、進、出、シ、形、跡、ヲ、報、ゼ、ル、ヲ、以、テ、以、テ、此、ノ、際、日、本、ノ、方、針、ヲ、再、言、ス、ル、ニ、不、適、当、ト、ス、ト、信、ズ、ル、天、一、十、リ。

外交関係工  
二三四頁—二三五頁

No 3



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Page 1

Mr. W. G.

TELEGRAM  
THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE SECRETARY  
OF STATE

(Paraphrase)

Excerpt.

TOKYO, April 25, 1934 -- 1 p.m.  
(Received April 25--9:55 a.m.)

75. This morning I had an interview with the Foreign Minister. Mr. Hirota referred, on his own initiative, to the subject of the Anau statement regarding the attitude of Japan toward foreign assistance to China, and said that he wished to clarify that statement to me in confidence. He told me that under questioning by newspaper men, Anau had given out the statement without his knowledge or approval, and that the world had received a wholly false impression of Japanese policy, that Japan had no intention whatever of seeking special privileges in China, of encroaching upon the territorial and administrative integrity of China, or of creating difficulties for the bona fide trade of other countries with China. Various foreign activities have tended to disturb peaceful conditions in China, and Japan is naturally very much interested in those peaceful conditions owing to her nearness to China. But that does not mean that there is any intention or desire on the part of Japan to claim a privileged position in derogation of the rights and responsibilities to which the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty are entitled. The policy of Japan is complete observance and support of the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty in every respect.

.....

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日本駐劄グー(Grant)大使宛國務長官宛電報

抄録

東京 一九三四年/昭和九年/四月二十五日午後時號電廿五日午前九時五十分發

七五 今朝本使、外務大臣ト會見セリ、廣田氏ハ自らノ發意ヲ外國、中國援助ニ對スル日本ノ態度ニ関スル天羽聲明、問題ニ言及シ、ソノ聲明ヲ本使ニ内密ニ明カニシタキ旨申シタ。

彼ハ天羽が新聞記者、質問ニ答ヘテ彼ニ通告モセズ又承認モ受ケナイテ聲明ヲ發表シ日本が中國ニ特殊ノ權益ヲ求メ、中國ノ領土的並ニ行政的保全ヲ侵害シ、若クハ中國ト他國トノ善意ノ貿易ニ對シ困難ヲ醸スガ如キ意志、全然無イ日本、政策ニ就テ世界ノ全面的ニ誤リト印象ヲ受ケタト本使ニ語リ、各國ノ活動ハ中國ニ於テハ平和狀態ヲ亂ス傾向ガ有リ、而シテ日本ハ中國ニ直接ニテ此關係上ノ平和狀態ニハ当然多大ノ関心ヲ持ツテ在リ、乍然夫ハ九ヶ國條約調印國ガ附與セシテ此權利義務、毀損ヲスル特權的地位ヲ主張スルコトヲ日本ガ意圖ニ又ハ希望ニ在ルトイフ意味ハナリ。 日本政策ハ凡ソ此點ニ於テ九ヶ國條約、條約ノ條項、完全ニ遵守及支持ス。

eu 936  
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MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
(WASHINGTON) May 19, 1934.

The Japanese Ambassador called and promptly drew out an elaborate telegram which he said was from Foreign Minister Hirota in Tokyo to him. He first remarked that Hirota desired to extend his appreciation of the friendly spirit in which I sent the statement to him on April 28, 1934, and which was delivered by United States Ambassador Grew. He added that Ambassador Grew had stated to Minister Hirota at the time that the United States Government did not expect any reply. The Japanese Ambassador then proceeded practically to read the telegram, although appearing more or less to be speaking orally. He retained the telegram which was in his language. At its conclusion, I inquired if it was virtually a restatement of the statement during the latter part of April of his Government to Sir John Simon in the London Foreign Office. He replied that it was. I then stated that I had kept perfectly quiet while Japanese officials all the way from Tokyo to Geneva on April 17th, and for many days following, were reported as giving out to the press the views and policies of the Japanese Government touching certain international phases relating to the Orient; that at the conclusion of these different statements I felt, in order not to be misunderstood here or anywhere, that I should in a respectful and friendly spirit, offer a succinct but comprehensive restatement of rights, interests, and obligations as they related to my country primarily and as they related to all countries signatory to the Nine-Power Treaty, the Kellogg Pact, and international law as the same applied to the Orient.

I then inquired whether the Japanese Government differed with any of the fundamental phases of the statement I sent to the Japanese Foreign Minister on the 28th day of April, 1934? The Ambassador replied that it did not differ, that his Government did agree to the fundamentals of my note or statement, but that his Government did feel that it had a special interest in preserving peace and order in China. He then repeated the same formula that his government had been putting out for some weeks about the superior duty or function of his government to preserve peace and of its special interest in the peace situation in--to quote his words--"Eastern Asia". I remarked that, as Hirota

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wrote me, I saw no reason whatever why our two countries should not, in the most friendly and satisfactory way to each, solve every question or condition that existed now or that might arise in the future. I then said that, in my opinion, his country could conduct its affairs in such a way that it would live by itself during the coming generations, or that it might conduct its affairs even more profitably and at the same time retain the perfect understanding and the friendship of all civilized nations in particular that my hope and prayer was that all the civilized nations of the world, including Japan, should work together and in a perfectly friendly and understanding way so as to promote to the fullest extent the welfare of their respective peoples and at the same time meet their duties to civilization and to the more backward populations of the world and that my Government would always be ready and desirous of meeting his Government fully half-way in pursuing these latter objectives.

I then remarked that I would be entirely frank by saying that just now there was considerable inquiry everywhere as to just why his government singled out the clause or formula about Japan's claiming superior and special interests in the peace situation in "Eastern Asia" and her superior rights or duties in connection with the preservation of peace there; and that many were wondering whether this phrase or formula had ulterior or ultimate implications partaking of the nature of an overlordship of the Orient or a definite purpose to secure preferential trade rights as rapidly as possible in the Orient or "Easterr Asia"--to use the Japanese expression. The Ambassador commenced protesting that this was not the meaning contemplated or intended. I said it would be much simpler and casier if when the national of any other government engaged in some act in the Orient which Japan might reasonably feel would affect her unsatisfactorily, to bring up the individual circumstance to the proper government, instead of issuing a blanket formula which would cause nations everywhere to inquire or surmise whether it did not contemplate an overlordship of the Orient and an attempt at trade preferences as soon as possible. The Ambassador again said that this so-called formula about the superior interests of Japan in preserving peace, etc., did not contemplate the interference or domination or overlordship such as I had referred to.

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I stated that today there was universal talk and plans about armaments on a steadily increasing scale and that Japan and Germany were the two countries considered chiefly responsible for that talk; that, of course, if the world understood the absence of any overlordship intentions or other unwarranted interference by his government, as the Ambassador stated them to me, his country would not be the occasion for armament discussion in so many parts of the world; and that this illustrated what I had said at the beginning of our conversation that nations should make it a special point to understand each other, and the statesmen of each country should be ready at all times to correct or explain any trouble-making rumors or irresponsible or inaccurate statements calculated to breed distrust and misunderstanding and lukewarmness between nations. I went on to say that it was never so important for the few existing civilized countries of the world to work whole-heartedly together; and that this action of course would, more fully than any other, promote the welfare of the people of each and also would best preserve civilization. I emphasized again that it would be the height of folly for any of the civilized nations to pursue any line of utterances of professed policies that would engender a feeling of unfairness or treaty violation or other unsatisfactory reaction in the important nations who right have both rights and obligations in a given part of the world such as the Orient. I said that in this awful crisis through which the world was passing, debtors everywhere were not keeping faith with creditors in many instances; that sanctity of treaties, in Western Europe especially, was being ignored and violated; that this was peculiarly a time when our civilized countries should be especially vigilant to observe and preserve both legal and moral obligations; and that my country especially felt that way, not only on its own account but for the sake of preserving the better and the higher standards of both individual and national conduct everywhere.

I remarked that my Government, apart from its general treaty obligations, was only interested in the equality of trade rights in the Orient as in every part of the world and also its obligations and rights under the law of nations; that what little trade we had in the Orient we naturally desired to conduct on this basis of

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equality, even though it might be less in the future than now. Then I remarked that if these treaties which imposed special obligations on my government in the Orient were not in existence that, while interested in peace in all parts of the world, my government would also be interested in equality of trade rights.

I inquired whether his government had any disposition to denounce and get rid of these treaties in whole or in part, and said that to ignore or violate them would be embarrassing to my government, and that this would relieve it of any possibilities of such embarrassment. I said that I was not remotely suggesting in the matter. He replied that his government was not disposed to denounce and abrogate these treaties. He said that they felt obliged to get out of the League of Nations on account of certain considerations which their membership created. I then inquired of him whether his government abandoned membership on account of difficulties arising from the fact that Japan was a member of the League or whether it was due to Japan being a signatory to the Versailles Treaty. I did not get a complete answer to this.

The Ambassador then stated that in any preliminary naval conversations that might soon take place, his government would be opposed to discussing any Far Eastern political or similar questions or conditions and that only the purely naval side should be taken up. He said that political and all other phases of the subject were discussed at the Washington Conference and his government was opposed to a repetition of this. I offered no comment.

C(ORDELL) H(ULL)

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No 1

國務長官、手記

昭和九年(一九三四年)五月十九日(以下)

日本大使公訪問スルヤ否ハ丹念ニ綴ラシタル電報ヲ取ホセリ  
 大使、言ヨシバ在東京廣田外務大臣ヨリ大使宛ニ送ラシ  
 モナリ。大使ハ最初ニ廣田氏ハ昭和九年(一九三四年)二月  
 十日ニ余ヲ送リ且ケル／＼大田ニ大使ニヨツテ年交  
 シタル聲明中、友交精神ニ對シテ彼、謝意ヲ傳達スル様  
 希望スル旨申述ベタリ。彼ハ又其時ケル／＼大田ニ  
 大使ハ廣田外相ニ對シテ合衆國ニ何等ノ回答ヲモ  
 豫期セズト申述ベタル旨附加シタリ。次イデ日本大使  
 ハ事實ヲ、電報ヲ讀ムゲタリ。幾ノ口頭ニシテ語カ  
 ルカ如キ態度、所モアリタリ。彼ガ手ニ居リタル電  
 報ハ日本文ニテ認メラレタリ。ソレ、終リシトキ余  
 ハソノ事實上四月、後半ニシテ外務省ハ、三ノ  
 サイモニ、日本政府ノ聲明、再聲明ニズト尋  
 ネトニ、彼ハ然リト答ヘタリ  
 其時余ハ四月十七日及其後相当長時日ニ亘リ日本  
 官吏ハ東京ヨリシテ、途次ニ於テ東洋ニ關係  
 ル或國際問題ニ關シ日本政府ノ見解及政策ニ關シ新聞  
 発表ヲ行ヒ、アリト、報道セラシトキ余ハ完全ニ沈黙  
 守リ居リシト、又此等種々ノ聲明、結果、余ハ当地ニ  
 何レノ場所ニ於テモ誤解ヲ招カサシガタシ、尊敬及友  
 交ノ精神ヲ以テ先ツ吾國ニ關係ヲ有シ且九ノ國條約  
 ヲロク／＼ニ條約、調印國、總テニ關聯スル而  
 テ東洋ニ適用サル、場合國際法ニ關聯ヲ有スル諸權利

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No 2

權益、及義務ニ関シ、簡潔ニシテ、ニカモ包括的ナル再聲明  
 ヲ発スベキナリト思フ旨語リ。  
 次ニ余ハ日本政府ハ、昭和九年、一九三四年四月二十日？  
 余ガ日本外務大臣ニ送りテ聲明中、若干基本的範圍  
 ノ或ルモノニ関シ、意見ヲ異ニスルヤヲ尋ネタリ。大使ハ之ニ  
 就テ日本政府ハ見解ヲ異ニスルモノニアラズ。又日本政府  
 ハ余ノ囑書或ヒハ聲明中、基本事項ニ関シテハ見解ヲ  
 同シクスルモノニシテ、之カモ政府ハ支那ニ於ケル平和ト秩  
 序ノ維持ニ特別ノ関心ヲ有スルコトヲ感ズ居ル旨答ヘタ  
 リ。次ニ彼ハ平和維持上、日本政府ノ優越的任務或ハ  
 使命ニ付更ニ一彼ノ言ヲ援用スルニ「東亞」ニ於ケル  
 平和状態ニ対スル日本政府、特別ノ関心ニツキ數週間ニ  
 亙リ日本政府ガ聲明ニ来ル所ト同様ノ公式ヲ反復  
 セリ。余ハ廣田氏ガ余ニ書送りテ如ク、吾々兩國ガ現存  
 在セル或ハ將來ニ起ルヤモ知シヌアラユル問題或ハ事態ヲ互ニ  
 最も交友的且満足ナル方法ヲ解決シ能ハサル理由ハ何等  
 存在セズト思フ旨語リ。更ニ余ハ余ノ見解トシテハ貴  
 國ハ未ルベキ袋時代カラ通シ自力ニヨリ生活シ得ルガ如キ方  
 法ヲ自己ノ諸問題ヲ処理シ得ベキ事否寧ロ日本ハ  
 自己ノ問題ヲバ一層有利ニ処理シ得ルノミナラズ同時  
 ニ就中スベテ、文明國家ノ完全ナル了解ト友誼ヲ  
 享受シ得ベシト語リタリ。余ノ希望且祈念スルハ  
 日本ヲ含ム世界ノアラユル文明國家ガ各々自國民ノ  
 福祉ヲ最高度ニ向ヒセシメ且同時ニ文明ニ對シ將又世  
 界ノ後進諸國民ニ対スル彼等ノ義務ヲ果スタタ完全  
 ナル交友及ヒ了解ノ下ニ共働スベキ事ニシテ而モ吾政府ハ



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No 3.

將ニ半カバ此等後者ノ諸目標ヲ進ホスル上ニ於テ常ニ  
日本政府ノ意思ヲ充スベク用意アリ且斯クスル事ニ右  
ナラザルモノナリト告ゲタリ。

次ニ余ハ「東亞」ニ於ケル平和状態ニ於テ優越ニテ特殊  
ナル權利ヲ而シテ同地域ニ於ケル平和維持ニ関聯シ日本ノ優  
越的權利乃至義務ヲ日本が要求スル事ニ就テ何故日本政  
府ハ斯カル條項或ハ公式ヲ引キ出セシヤ此矣ニ付即今至ル  
処深酷ナル質問が投ケラレ居ル事 而モ斯様ナル辭句  
或ハ公式が東洋ノ至上支配權ノ性質ヲ包藏スル暗示  
的或ハ究竟的意義ヲ有スルモノカ或ハ東洋ニ於テ  
——日本側ノ表現ヲ用ヒシバ——「東亞」ニ於テ能ク限  
急速ニ優先的ノ通商權ヲ確保スルタメノ確タル目的ヲ有  
スルモノナルニ付疑問ヲ挿シテ、甚カニ其趣ヲ全ク平直  
ニ申述ベタキ所存ナリト語リ。

大使ハ此ハ企圖セラレタル或ハ希求セラレタル意味ニア  
ラズト反駁ニ始メタリ。余ハコトニ或ル他國政府屬  
スル國民が東洋ニ於テ日本が當然日本ニ不利ナル影響  
ヲ與フベシト考フル行為ヲ採ル場合、至ル処諸國家ヲテ  
日本政府が東洋ニ於ケル至上霸權ヲ担ヒ且能ク限リ速  
ニ通商上ノ優先權ヲ掌握セテ企圖セシニアラズヤト、  
疑問乃至推測ヲ抱クニ至ラシムルが如キ單一ノ包格的  
ナル公式ヲ發スル代リニ個々ノ問題ヲ當該政府ニ對テ  
提起スルコトが一層簡單ニシテ而モ容易ナルベシト語リ  
同大使ハ重シク平和維持ニ日本ノ優越的權利其他  
ニ就テ、此所謂公式ナルモノハ余が言及セシ如キ干涉、支配  
或ハ至上支配權ヲ企圖スルモノニ非ズト言明セリ。

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余ハ今日益々大規模トナラントスル軍備ニ関シテ廣ク論議  
行ハル且斯カル計畫ノ存スルヲ看ル所ナルガ日本及独  
逸斯カル論議ニ主トシテ英聯ニ居ルモノト看ラレ二國ナ  
ルト又勿論若シ世界ガ——大使ガ余ニ語ル如ク——  
日本政府ニ於テ至ニ支配權ニ対スル何等ノ意図ナク又  
日本政府ヨリ不當ナル干渉ヲ存在セザルコトヲ了解スルニ  
至ラバ貴國ノ世界ノ大部分ニ於テ行ハル居ル軍備ニ関ス  
ル論議ニ於テ対象トナル事ナリトシテ而モ此ハ吾々ノ會  
談ノ當初ニ余ガ語リタル諸國家ノ相互ニ理解ニ合フ  
コトニ特ニ意ヲ用フベキコト又各國ノ政治家ハイツレモ常  
ニ國家間ノ不信誤解不明確ナル態ニ於テ醸シ去ス  
様考案サレタル問題ヲ起ス如キ流言或ハ無責任或ハ  
不正確ナル聲明ヲ修正シ又ハ説明ニ得ル様心掛クベキナリト  
趣旨ヲ示スモノナリト語リタリ。余ハ更ニ語リテ世界  
ニ於ケル現在少數ノ文明諸國ニトリ且ニ誠意ヲ盡シテ  
共働スル必要今日程重要ナルコト未ダ當テナリトシテ  
モ斯カル行動ハ勿論他ノ如何ナル行動ヨリモ各國民ノ  
福祉ヲ能ク増進シ且文明ノ最善維持ヲ期シ得ベト  
語リタリ。更ニ余ハ如何ナル文明諸國ニトリテモ世界ノイッレ  
カノ地域例ハ東洋ニ於テ權利並ニ義務ヲ有スルト考ヘラレ  
ル重要ナル國民ノ間ニ不公正或ハ條約ノ侵犯其他好ミカ  
ラザル反應ヲ惹起セシムルガ如キ言葉或ハ表面上ノ政策ヲ  
バ詮索スルコトノ愚ノ骨頂ナルヲ強調セリ。余ハ世界ガ直  
面シタル斯カル重大ナル危機ニ於テ債務者ガ債權  
者ニ對シテ約束ヲ履行セザル場合多クアル事。條約ノ神

No 4

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聖が特ニ西部ヨリロツバニ於テ無視サレ且侵犯サレツ、ア此事  
今ハ吾々文明諸國家ガ法的並ニ道德的義務ヲ遵守  
且之ヲ維持スルニ特ニ細心ナルベク且又就中吾國ハ自己  
自身ノ為ニミテ至ル處ニ於テ個人及ビ國家兩者ノ行動  
ヨリ良キヨリ高キナル規範ヲ維持セムガタメ斯クハ感ズルモ  
ナリト告テク。

余ハ吾政府ハ其一般的ナル條約上ノ義務ヲ措キテ唯世界  
各地ニ於ケルニ同様東洋ニ於ケル通商ノ權利ノ平等即  
チ又各國ノ法律ノ下ニ於ケル吾國ノ義務及權利ニノ関  
心ヲ有スルモノトシテ吾國ガ東洋ニ於テ保持セシ通商ガ如  
何ニ僅少ナルモノナリトハシ又假令將來現在ヨリ尚僅  
少ナラヤモハカラシトハイ吾人ハ當然此平等ノ根柢  
基キテ行動セムトヲ欲スルモノナリト語リ。次ニ余ハ東洋  
ニ於テ吾政府ニ特別ノ義務ノ課セラル諸條約ノ存在セ  
ズトモ世界各地ノ平和ニ関心ヲ有スル吾政府ハ又通商權  
ノ平等ニモ関心ヲ示サカルフ得ズト言明セリ。

余ハ貴國政府ハ全体ニ言リ又ハ部分的ニ此等諸條  
約ヲ否認シ且之ヲ廢棄スル意向アリヤト訊テク。  
又此等ノ諸條約ヲ無視シ又ハ侵犯スルコトガ吾政府ニ  
テハ迷惑至極ナルコト及ビ之ハ吾政府ヲミテ斯カル困惑  
可能性ヲ脱セズラト云ハル。余ハ此問題ニ就テ逡迴ニ  
暗示ヲ試ミ居ルモノハアラズト云ハル。大使ハ日本政  
府ハ此等ノ諸條約ヲ否認シ又ハ廢棄ヲ通告スル意  
圖ハナキ旨返答セリ。大使ハ日本政府ハ加盟權ヨリ  
生シタル或考慮ノタメ國際聯盟ヲ脱退スルノ止ムキ  
ニ至ルニ感カ居ル旨ヲ云リ。依リテ余ハ貴國政府

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か會員、資格ヲ拋棄スルハ聯盟、一頁タリトヨリ  
生ズル支障、タメナリヤ、終又日本カソエルナリ條約、署名  
名國、一頁タルコトヨリ、タメナリヤト問ヒタダセシモ此ニ  
對シ完全ナル回答ヲ得ザリキ  
大使ハソレヲヤガ下奉ルベキ海軍豫備會談ニ於テ、  
日本政府ハ極東政策或ハソレニ類似ノ問題、條約ヲハ討  
議スルニトモ、反對テアリ唯純粹ニ海軍關係、部面ニ  
採リ上テ奉ルベキナリトモ、是レ旨申述シタリ、彼ハコノ問  
題ニ關スル政治的或ハ其他ノ面、既ニソレトシ會議ニ  
於テ討議セシタルヲ知シテ、日本政府ハ之ヲ及復スルコトニ  
及テナリト云示、余ハ論評ヲ差控メタリ

/ Cordell / Hull /  
コールドウェル / ハル /

外交關係第一冊 二三五頁 一三六頁

No 6

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Br. Ex. 44

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STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE 10

In reply to inquiries by press correspondents in regard to the "autonomy movement" in North China, Chinese and Japanese activities in relation thereto, and the American Government's attitude, the Secretary of State said:

There is going on in and with regard to North China a political struggle which is unusual in character and which may have far-reaching effects. The persons mentioned in reports of it are many; the action is rapid and covers a large area; opinions with regard to it vary; what may come of it no one could safely undertake to say; but, whatever the origin, whoever the agents, be what they may the methods, the fact stands out that an effort is being made--and is being resisted--to bring about a substantial change in the political status and condition of several of China's northern provinces.

Unusual developments in any part of China are rightfully and necessarily of concern not alone to the Government and people of China but to all of the many powers which have interests in China. For, in relations with China and in China, the treaty rights and the treaty obligations of the "treaty powers" are in general identical. The United States is one of those powers.

In the area under reference the interests of the United States are similar to those of other powers. In that area there are located, and our rights and obligations appertain to, a considerable number of American nationals, some American property, and substantial American commercial and cultural activities. The American Government is therefore closely observing what is happening there.

Political disturbances and pressures give rise to uncertainty and misgiving and tend to produce economic and social dislocations. They make difficult the enjoyment of treaty rights and the fulfillment of treaty obligations.

The views of the American Government with regard to such matters not alone in relation to China but in relation to the whole world are well known. As I have stated on many occasions, it seems to this Government most important in this period of world-wide political unrest and economic instability that governments and peoples keep faith in

principles and pledges. In international relations there must be agreements and respect for agreements in order that there may be the confidence and stability and sense of security which are essential to orderly life and progress. This country has abiding faith in the fundamental principles of its traditional policy. This Government adheres to the provisions of the treaties to which it is a party and continues to bespeak respect by all nations for the provisions of treaties solemnly entered into for the purpose of facilitating and regulating, to reciprocal and common advantage, the contacts between and among the countries signatory.

Foreign Relations I, pp. 240-241.

Footnote:

(<sup>10</sup> Issued as a press release December 5, 1935, for publication in the morning newspapers of December 6, 1935.)

Doc. No. 219P (1<sup>o</sup>)

BR. EX. 37 THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN JAPAN TO THE JAPANESE  
MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AIDE-MEMOIRE

Excerpt

. . . . .

With particular reference to the Foreign Office memorandum of November 5 the American Government finds unconvincing the statement as contained therein that the proposed control of the oil industry in Manchuria is not within the knowledge or concern of the Japanese Government. The American Government must of necessity assume that a project of such major importance to all concerned and one with regard to which Japanese interests including a quasi-official organization apparently are taking so active and so prominent a part can not escape either the knowledge or the concern of the Japanese Government. Likewise for obvious reasons the American Government can not accept the implied disclaimer of responsibility on the part of Japan in relation to the industrial policy in Manchuria of which this prohibition (project?) is a manifestation.

The American Government does not wish nor does it believe that the Japanese Government would wish to enter into controversy over the details of the project under discussion. The American Government feels however that it must call to the attention of the Japanese Government for that Government's most careful consideration certain facts and conclusions to which the American Government attaches great importance namely that there is proposed the setting up in Manchuria of a control of the petroleum industry which by whatsoever means attained and whatever called would in fact constitute a monopoly of the sale and distribution of oil in that area; that the creation of such a monopoly would impinge upon treaty rights which rights the authorities in Manchuria have affirmed to the world they would respect and maintain, an affirmation which the Japanese Government accepted and adopted in the protocol into which it entered with those authorities; that an oil monopoly and in fact any monopoly would in addition constitute a violation of Article III of the Nine Power Treaty to which both Japan and the United States are co-signatories. The creation of such a monopoly would adversely affect legitimate American interests long established in that region. Perseverance in this project by its promoters and indifference by the Japanese Government to that development and its consequences would tend to place at naught the emphatic and unconditional assurances repeatedly made by the Japanese Government of its devotion to the maintenance in Manchuria of the principle of the open door.

. . . . .

TOKYO, November 30, 1934

Foreign Relations I, pp. 143-144

國務長官答覆(註)

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北美自治運動、大ニ因テ中国人及日本人ノ活動ト亞米  
利加政府ノ態度ニ因テ新南通信員ノ博問ニ答(國務長官  
ハ答ヘテ語リタリ。

北支那ニ對シテ即チ去年此ニ因テ、三國聯立ニ與テ、常ニ在リ、力ニ影響力  
大ニ持テ、最近ハ行ハレ、本年此ニ、是ニ因テ種々ノ報道中ニ現レ、了  
レ、人知ル、然レ、以テ行動ハ急激ナラズ、地域ニ直シ、

以テ三國ノ意見ハ種々示レ、以テ如何ナル結果ニシテ、力ハ何人  
ニ確メ、言ハレ、得、レ、以テ、何ノ原因ハ何ナラ、口上、平先ハ、誰  
ニ、以テ、方法ハ何ナラ、口上、中國北部諸省ノ政治的狀勢

並ニ狀態ニ留意シ、變化ヲ觀察ス、夫レ、力ガナシ、即チ之ガ及、抗  
シ、今、本年此、一、ト、自、今、ト、八、月、末、示、レ、

中國名義ニ於テ九軍、常ニ十、情勢ハ變リ、本政府並ニ中國名義、  
ト、示、レ、中國ニ利害關係ヲ有ス、レ、各國ハ當然、且、以、必然、的、ニ、國、心、ヲ  
持、シ、ト、示、レ、其、理由ハ、中國國ノ又、中國ニ、於、テ、條、約、國  
ノ、條、約、ニ、確、並、ニ、義務、ハ、一、般、ニ、同、示、レ、了、レ、。合、衆、國、ハ、夫、等、條、約、國  
ノ、一、示、レ、。

問題ノ地域ニ於テ、合衆國、利害關係ハ、他國、天、ト、同、祥、示、レ、  
以、レ、地域ニ、多數、亞米利加人、居、テ、亞米利加ノ財產、多、量、  
亞米利加ノ商業的並ニ文化の活動ハ、所、在、シ、吾、等、權益、並ニ、責任  
ハ、夫、等、ト、同、示、レ、了、レ、。故、ニ、亞米利加政府ハ、右、地域ニ、於、テ、子、  
能、ク、自、覺、重、要、現、示、レ、了、レ、。

政治的紛争ト抑、歷、ト、不、容、シ、疑、惑、ヲ、生、シ、經濟的、社會的  
後、進、ヲ、阻、礙、シ、利、ハ、夫、三、以、テ、條、約、ノ、權、利、ヲ、享、受、シ、條、約、上  
ノ、義務、ヲ、履行、ス、レ、國、難、ト、示、レ、。



219 P (25)

中国ニ関スルミナラズ全世界ニ關係アル事件ニ関スル重要利益加  
 政府ノ見解ハ明カニ知ラシキナルト云ハレタリ。余カ屢々述ベタ  
 様ニ此ノ政治的不安、経済的不安定ノ時代ニ於テ、各国政府  
 並ニ国民ガ原則及誓約ヲ固守スルコトハ最モ重要ナルコトト  
 本政府ハ考ヘル。國際關係ニ於テハ秩序アル生活及進歩ニ肝  
 要ナル信頼、安定、安全感ヲ与ラシタル為ニハ協定ガアリ且ツ協定  
 ノ尊重ガナクテハナラナイ。吾國ハソノ傳統政策ノ基本原則  
 ヲ固執シタリ。本政府ハソノ同盟スル條約ノ條項ヲ遵奉シ、  
 相互ニ並ニ共通ノ利益ノ為、調印國間ノ接觸ヲ助長規整  
 スル目的ヲ以テ嚴密ニ締結シタ條約ノ條項ヲ、各国ガ尊重セ  
 ラルコトヲ依然願フモノナリ。

外交關係米(卷) 二四〇—二四〇頁

註 — 一九三五年十二月六日附朝刊(掲載) 十二月五日  
 新聞記事ト云々発表ナシタルモノ

Doc 219P(18)

抄録 駐日米國大使館、日本外務省宛補助覺書

Ex 939

時三十一日付外務省覺書ヲ参照。米國政府、滿洲ニ於ケル石油事業ニ對シ提議セラルル統制「日本政府、関知ス干與セザルモノナルナリト」右覺書中ニアル説明ヲ首肯シ得ザルモノナリ。米國政府、全開係者ニトリ斯クモ重要ナル計畫ニシテ且半官的組織一ヲ含ム日本事業團ガ明カニ頗ル積極的且顯著ナル役割ヲ演

ズルベシ。計畫日本政府、関知ス干與其孰シ得ザルモノナルトシ主張セザルヲ得ズ。其ノ理由ニヨリテ米國政府、此ノ禁止亦明瞭ニ其ノ一表現ヲナス滿洲ニ於ケル産業政策ニ關スル日本ノ役割ノ責任ニ對スル暗示的言葉ニ認

認スルコト能ハズ。米國政府、日本政府ガ問題ノ計畫ニ關スル細目ニ付敢テ論争ノ渦中ニ入ルヲ欲スルモノナル事ヲ希フモノニアラズ或ハ又斯ク信スルモノナル事ヲ米國政府、然レ乍ラ日本政府ニ對シ「米アズ」ガ最重要視スル或事實及結論ニ付日本政府最モ周到ナル熟慮ニ對スル注意ヲ付日本政府

No 1

ルヲ得ズ。即チ其ノ石油事業ノ統制ヲ滿洲ニ

Doc 2/19P(18)

設定スルコトヲ提案スルモノニシテ其、如何ナル手段  
 依リ達成セラルニセヨ又如何ナル名義ヲ以テスル  
 无事実上其、地域ニ於ケル石油、販賣及配給  
 独占ヲ構成スル斯ル独占、設定ハ條約上、  
 權利即チ滿洲當局カ之ヲ尊重シ且維持ス  
 ビト世界ニ對シ確言セル權利ヲ侵害スル天、  
 ニシテ然天此確言タルヤ日本政府カ該當局ト  
 締結セル議定書中ニ是ヲ採擇用ヤル確言アリ  
 又石油独占ノ、ニシテズ事實如何ナル独占モ日  
 本及合衆國、兩者ガ加盟シ居ル九國國條  
 約第三條、違反ヲ構成スル、斯ル独占、  
 創設ハ長期間其、地域ニ於テ建設サレタル正  
 當ナル米國、權益ヲ不當侵害スル。該計畫  
 ニ於ケル其、起業者側、固執並ニ其、展開及  
 結果ニ對スル日本政府側、無煩着振ハ門戸開  
 放主義、滿洲ニ於ケル保持ニ對シ專心就テ  
 日本政府ニ依リ固ニ強調サレタル無條件的確  
 認ヲ反古ニスル虞シアルベシ。

東京一九三四年十一月三十日

外交關係第一冊 一四三—一四四頁

No 2

Doc. No. 219P (16)  
 BR. EX. 35 THE CONSUL AT MUKDEN (LANGDON) TO THE  
 AMBASSADOR IN CHINA (JOHNSON)

Excerpts. Mukden, October 30, 1937.

No. 158

. . . . .

For Mr. Ohashi's ready reference Mr. Langdon cited some of the many declarations made by Hsinking promising to maintain the Open Door in Manchuria, namely:

The passage dealing with foreign policies in the Proclamation on the establishment of the State, March 1, 1932;

The telegram of Foreign Minister Hsieh to the Secretary of State of the United States, March 12, 1932, in particular paragraph 7, reading as follows: "With regard to economic activities of peoples of foreign nations within the state of Manchuria, the principle of the Open Door shall be observed";

The statement of Foreign Minister Hsieh on the occasion of the signing of the Manchukuo-Japan Protocol of September 15, 1932;

The telegram of congratulation of November 12, 1932, by Foreign Minister Hsieh on the occasion of the election of President Roosevelt;

Statement given to United Press representatives in Tokyo by the Manchukuo Foreign Office (see Bureau of Information and Publicity, Department of Foreign Affairs, Bulletin No. 60, May 4, 1933);

Statement for foreign countries issued March 1, 1934, by Foreign Minister Hsieh on the occasion of the enthronement of the Emperor, reaffirming the undertaking to maintain the Open Door announced March 1, 1932, on the occasion of the establishment of the State.

. . . . .

Mr. Langdon expressed to Mr. Ohashi his deep regret that the statutes of Manchukuo now placed discriminatory restrictions on the commercial relations of his country with Manchuria and requested that Mr. Ohashi communicate to the proper authorities the unfavorable impression which such restrictions were making in the United States, which treats the trade of all countries, including Manchuria, alike.

C. 940

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Br. 2x 35

奉天領事ラングドン (Langdon) ヨリ

陸支大使ジョンソン (Johnson) へ

奉天 一九三七年十月三十日

(抜 萃) 一五八號

大橋氏ノ参考ノ爲「ラングドン」氏ハ滿洲ニ於ケル  
門戶開放維持ヲ約束セル新京ニ依ル多クノ聲明ノ幾  
ツカラ引用セリ。

一九三二年三月一日ノ國家設立ニ關スル布告中  
對外政策ニ關スル部分。

一九三二年三月一日附、謝外交部長ヨリ合衆國  
國務長官へノ電文中、特ニ其ノ第七節ニハ次ノ字句  
アリ。「滿洲國內ニ於ケル諸外國人ノ經濟活動ニ關  
シテハ、門戶開放主義ガ守ラルベシ。」

一九三二年九月十五日、日滿議定書調印時ニ於  
ケル謝外交部長ノ聲明。

「ルーズベルト」大統領選舉時ニ於ケル謝外交部  
長ヨリノ一九三二年十一月十二日ノ祝電。

滿洲國外交部ニ依リ在東京合衆國新聞派遣記者團  
ニ與ヘラレタル聲明 (一九三三年五月四日附外務省  
情報局會報六〇號参照)

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一九三四年三月一日皇帝即位ノ時謝外交部長ニ依  
リ爲サレタ滿洲國建國ノ際一九三二年三月一日附ヲ  
以テ聲明セル門戶開放維持ノ企圖ニ關スル再確認ヲ  
ナセル聲明。  
「ラングドン」氏ハ大橋氏ニ、滿洲國法令ガ自國  
ト滿洲ノ商業關係ニ差別的制限ヲ與ヘタ事ニ深甚ノ  
遺憾ヲ表シ且カカル制限ガ、滿洲ヲモ含ム凡テノ國  
トノ貿易ヲ一樣ニ取扱フ合衆國ニ於テ好マシカラザ  
ル印象ヲ作りツツアル事ヲ、シカルベキ當局ニ傳ヘ  
ル様大橋氏ニ要求セリ。

外交關係第一冊第一五二頁及び第一五三頁

Doc. No. 219P (19)

BR. EX. 38

ORAL STATEMENTS BY THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN  
(GREW) TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
(HIROTA)

(TOKYO, April 16, 1935.)

1. The creation of the oil monopoly in Manchuria, and the part played therein by Japanese nationals and interest, will have a deplorable effect upon public opinion in the United States, which regards the monopoly and Japanese participation therein as clear breaches of treaty obligations.

2. The American companies selling oil in Manchuria have been engaged in good faith in the oil business for many years and have built up their business with the expenditure of much thought, energy and money. During all of this time they have maintained supplies sufficient to carry on the business uninterruptedly, and there is no record, so far as the Embassy is aware, of their having engaged in practices that were unfair to their clients or detrimental in any way to the best interests of Manchuria. The destruction, through the operation of the Monopoly, of this business and the good will so carefully built up over a long period of years, and the throwing of this business in large part into Japanese hands, will appear to the American public to be a most inequitable proceeding.

3. The Japanese Government disclaims responsibility for measures taken by the authorities in Manchuria in establishing the monopoly on the ground that they are acts of a state recognized by Japan as sovereign and independent. Nevertheless the peculiar relations and undoubted influence of Japan with those authorities have been fully demonstrated in other recent issues. This inconsistency is certain to affect adversely American opinion of the good faith and sincerity of the Japanese contentions in the present issue.

4. The American oil interests are being deprived of a business which they have been lawfully conducting for many years, on the ground, among others, of national defense, for which the Japanese Government insists it has responsibility. If the principle of national defense is involved, therefore, it would seem that Japan can not dissociate itself from the monopoly project. On the other hand, if the monopoly project is purely a commercial question, or is concerned solely with economic policy, it would appear to be eminently fitting for Japan to associate itself with other nations to assist in maintaining the principle of equality of commercial opportunity in Manchuria.

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在日アメリ大使(カール) GREY / 日本外務大臣(横田) / 日頭申入 (東京昭和十一年五月十四日)

滿洲ニ於テ石油事業ノ開始及ビ之ニ關聯シテ日本人及ビ日人事業  
國ニ於テ演進セラルル及ビ對シテ事實及ビ夫レニ於テ日本人参加  
ヲ條約義務上ノ明カニ書及ビ見做ス合衆國ノ輿論上ニ悲  
シキ影響ヲ與ヘルコトナリ

滿洲ニ於テ石油事業ノ進展及ビ之ニ對シテ會社ノ何許モ直ニシテ識  
察ニ油業ニ從事シテ來ルモノナリ然レモ思慮上精力上気  
力及ビ之ニ對シテ事業ノ進展及ビ之ニ對シテ此間ニテ事業  
ノ妨ガレタルニ對シテ二十餘年供給ノ彼等ノ維持ノ彼等ノ業  
務ニ顧客ニ對シテ正當ニ之ガ標準ヲ定メテ滿洲ノ最善ニ  
利益ニ何モノカ及ビルヤト事ヲ之ヲ爭ハ大使館ノ知見  
リニ於テハ記録ヲナシテ其事實ノ進展ヲ通シテ之ヲ以  
テ事業ノ破壞及ビ長キ年月ヲ要スルモノナリ其權ノ破壞  
シテ此事業ノ大影響ヲ日本ノ手ニ及ビテ事ノアリト上  
國民ニ取テハ非常ニ不意ニ行爲上田心ハナリ

日本政府ハ滿洲ニ於テ石油局ヲ專斷ニ開始セシメ之ヲ取テ  
手段ニ對シテ責任ヲ其後者ハ日米ニシテ主權ヲ有シ且ツ獨ニ  
本國家トシテ認メタル國ノ行爲ナリト言フ根據ヲ以テ否認  
シテ此ノモノモ抑テ其後者ハ石油局ニ對シテ日本ノ特殊ノ關係  
及ビ其勢力ハ他ノ最近ノ出来事ヨリ十分ニ示シテ

此ノ矛盾ハ彼等ノ互ニ同意ニ於テハ日本側ノ主張ノ信實  
ト實證自ラニ就テアリ力ノ輿論ニ並ニ效果ヲ與ヘルコトナリ  
日本政府ハ親中光ニ對シテ責任ヲ負ヒテ主張スル國防ノ權  
據ハ長キ年月ノ合法的ニ行ハルニ來テ事業ノ下カレト石油  
事業國ハ其年ノ發展ハ其ノ國防原則ガ包含セラル



doc219p(19)

ナラバソレ故日本八自ラヲ專賣計画セウ引離及事ハ出来ナ  
ク三田心ル他運專賣計画加納粹ニ商業上ノ問題ニアリ  
バ或ハ全ク經濟政策ニミ関ルヲ有スルナラバ滿洲ニ於ケル商  
業様會均等ノ原則ヲ維持スルニ於テ他ノ国家ト聯合シテ  
之ヲ支持日本ニ取ツテ極メテ安穩田ヲ措置セラルト思ハル  
スルハ

外國関係 — PP 150-151.

6. 11. 17  
E. #942

Document No. 219P (26)  
Br. Ex. 45

Page 1

THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (SAITO) TO THE  
SECRETARY OF STATE

No. 250

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1934.

SIR: I have the honor, under instructions from my Government, to communicate to you the following:-

In accordance with Article XXIII of the Treaty concerning the Limitation of Naval Armament, signed at Washington on the 6th February, 1922, the Government of Japan hereby give notice to the Government of the United States of America of their intention to terminate the said Treaty, which will accordingly cease to be in force after the 31st December, 1936.

Accept (etc.)

SAITO

Foreign Relations I, p. 274.

華海軍軍備制限條約廢止通告文

Er 942  
219P (26)

以書翰答工致候。保者本使、本國政府ノ訓令ニ依リ左ノ  
通閣下ニ通報スルノ光榮ヲ有シ候。

日本國政府、一千九百三十二年二月六日ノ之上ニ於テ署出  
セラレタル海軍軍備制限ニ関スル條約第三十三條ニ從ヒ茲ニ  
アメリカ合衆國政府ニ對シ右條約ヲ廢止スルノ意思ヲ通告  
ス能ク右條約、一千九百三十六年十二月三十一日後ニ效力ヲ有セザル  
モノトス

本使、該ニ閣下ニ伺フ重キテ敬意ヲ表シ候。 敬具。

千九百三十四年十二月二十九日

齊藤 博

在(之上)

國務長官ヨリ示ル、公ノ閣下

Ex. 943

Document No. 219P (27)  
Br. Ex. 46

Page 1.

T E L E G R A M  
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE AMERICAN DELEGATION (DAVIS)  
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Excerpt.

LCNDON, January 15, 1936--2 p.m.  
(Received January 15--11:27 a.m.)

. . . . .

The United States has been most desirous of reaching a new agreement for a reduction and limitation of naval armaments to supersede the existing treaties that are to expire at the end of this year. We have, therefore, been willing to discuss any proposals and to explore every possibility of agreement. We have been willing to consider any evidence that might have been presented to the effect that the present relative strengths are not fair and equitable and do not provide for equal security.

We have accordingly listened with the most careful attention to all the explanations given by the Japanese delegation of their proposal for a common upper level with a view to determining whether any new facts or considerations might be developed which would justify the United States in modifying its belief that the principles of the common upper limit would not be a practicable basis for the limitation and reduction of naval armament. While we greatly appreciate the clear exposition of the Japanese point of view presented by Admiral Nagano, the discussion has if anything served to strengthen our conviction that the principle of a common upper limit would not serve as a basis for negotiation and agreement.

. . . . .

Foreign Relations I, pp. 294-295

51943

Doc 219P(27)

米國首席代表(デービス) / DAVIS / より國務長官に宛てた電報

抜萃

一九三六年 / 昭和十二年 / 一月十五日午後三時 倫敦  
受信、一月十五日 午前十一時三十分

合衆國は今年末失効する現存條約  
 軍備縮小及制限に関する新しき協定に代る  
 達するやうに切に希望して來た。故に我々は  
 喜んで如何なる提案でも検討し、又協定の  
 見込ある案を探し求めて來た。現在の  
 相對的兵力量は妥當公平でなく、各國間  
 の安全保證を與へないといふことを説明する均等  
 提出される凡ての證據を考慮するに各かたが  
 故に日本代表が最高規準を各國に共通にせよと  
 いふ提案を説明したとき、我々は最も注意し  
 て耳を傾けた。而してその説明より、共通最高  
 規準の原則は海軍軍備制限の縮小に對する實  
 行可能の基礎でないといふ合衆國の所信を改變  
 する事を合理化する何か新しい声柄又は考  
 へ方が發展するや否やを定めよといふ考へた。

No. 1

Doc 219P(27)

永野大將の提出した日本側の見解の明確なる説明を我々は十分に尊重したが、討議の結果共通最高規準の原則は交渉及協定に對する基礎として役に立たないといふ我々の信念を強むるに役に立た

外國關係一、二九四—二九五頁

No. 2

E. 4944

Doc. No. 219P (20)

Br. Ex. 39

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE  
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (HIROTA)

No. 82P

TOKYO, December 1, 1937.

EXCELLENCY: Acting under the instructions of my Government I have the honor to refer to reports that on November 1 (5?) a treaty was signed with Japan ending Japanese extraterritorial rights in Manchuria and that on this account there was issued a manifesto in regard to the extraterritorial rights of foreigners other than Japanese in Manchuria. It has also been brought to the attention of my Government that the branch at Harbin of the National City Bank of New York, an American concern, has received a letter from the Department of Economics at Hsinking stating that a recently promulgated "law concerning foreign juridical persons" "naturally" applies to all foreign firms and requesting that preparation be made to register and to appoint a representative in accordance with the law. The extraterritorial rights of nationals of the United States in Manchuria are granted by treaties between the United States and China and my Government considers that the law under reference which apparently contemplates the assertion by the authorities in Manchuria of jurisdiction over American juridical persons is inapplicable to American nationals and firms. My Government therefore is impelled to register emphatic objection to any attempt by the authorities of Manchuria to exercise jurisdiction over American nationals and to make full reservation in regard to the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens.

I am directed by my Government to address the Japanese Government on this matter in view of the relationship between the Japanese Government and the authorities in Manchuria.

I avail myself, (etc.)

JOSEPH C. GREW

Foreign Relations I, p. 154.

駐日アメリカ大使(元) / GREW / 兼 日本外務大臣(舊田)

第八号

庚午九月廿一日(西曆十一月一日)

219p(20)

閣下、我政府、指令三基年余、十一月一日(五日?) 滿洲に於て  
 日本、治外法權廢止三國之條約、日本に署名するに及ぶ  
 之に伴ひ、滿洲に於て日本人以外、外人治外法權三國之宣言が  
 登るに及ぶ、報告二言及ス、支那多有ス、アメリカ會社、三  
 ヲク、十月九日、National City 銀行に於て、支店、新  
 京に於て、經濟部、最近公布せし、外國法人、因法律  
 ハ、總て、外國商社、適用其、旨、且、右法律、  
 準、登録、及、代表者任命、準備、為ス、母、請、見、書、翰  
 之、受、領、也、我、政府、頃、目、之所、より、居、り、ア、メ、リ、カ、國、籍、人  
 之、支、那、に、於、て、治、外、法、權、三、國、之、本、件、法律、ハ、明、カ、滿、洲、に、於、  
 へ、官、憲、心、が、之、に、對、し、ア、メ、リ、カ、法、人、對、し、行政、權、ヲ、主張、せ、上、企  
 圖、之、多、ク、如、キ、我、政府、ハ、ア、メ、リ、カ、國、人、及、商、社、ニ、對、し、人、在、  
 適用、得、各、部、定、ト、因、來、之、從、テ、我、政府、ハ、ア、メ、リ、カ、國、人、對、し、  
 行政、權、ヲ、行使、せ、上、滿、洲、官、憲、心、如何、ハ、企、圖、ニ、對、し、  
 強、硬、ト、及、對、應、態度、ヲ、務、め、且、今、衆、國、及、同、東、民、條、約  
 上、權利、三、國、之、人、之、が、完全、ニ、認、得、(ア、メ、リ、カ、及、得、此、完全、  
 本、職、ハ、日本、政府、及、滿、洲、に、於、て、官、憲、心、同、ノ、關係、ニ、鑑、シ、本  
 件、三、國、之、日本、政府、ニ、申、入、ル、事、我、政府、ニ、命、じ、之、  
 次第、ナリ

此、概念、ニ、(三、三)

GREW, J. C.

/ JOSEPH. C. GREW /

外交關係 I

一五四頁



Ex 4945

Document No. 219P (28)  
Br. Ex. 47

Page 1

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JAPANESE DELEGATION (NAGANO)  
TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CONFERENCE (MONSELL)

(LONDON,) January 15, 1936.

MY LORD, I have the honour hereby to notify Your Lordship that as it has become sufficiently clear at today's session of the First Committee that the basic principles embodied in our proposal for a comprehensive limitation and reduction of naval armaments cannot secure general support, our Delegation have now come to the conclusion that we can no longer usefully continue our participation in the deliberations of the present Conference.

We remain, nevertheless, firmly convinced that our proposal is one best calculated to attain an effective disarmament, and we regret to state that we cannot subscribe, for the reasons we have repeatedly set forth, to the plans of quantitative limitation submitted by the other Delegations.

I desire to assure you, on this occasion, that we most sincerely appreciate the cordial manner in which you have been good enough to conduct the Conference; at the same time, I should like to tender our deepest thanks on behalf of our Delegation, for the hearty co-operation of all the Delegations to this Conference.

I have (etc.)

OSAMI NAGANO

Foreign Relations I, p. 297.

30 745

219 P (20)

日本使節團之長(永野)宛 會議之長(王三三) / Monzelli  
宛書簡

(口上) / LONDON / 一九三六年一月十五日

閣下！

海軍之備、包括的制限及縮少ニ對スル我々ノ提案ニ包攝セ  
 ラレ居ル根本原則が一般的支持ヲ受ケ得テ事  
 第一委員會ノ本日ノ會議ニ於テ充分明ラカニカレタル以テ我  
 代表部ノ之以上本會議ノ評議ニ參加ヲ續ケル事ハ無益ナ  
 トノ結論ニ到達シタル事ヲ閣下ニ御通告申上ケタラ存ジマス  
 併シ之ガ我々ノ提案が効果的軍縮達成上最善ノモノナリトス  
 ル見解ヲ依然堅持スルモノナリトシテ、屢次述べマシタ理由ニ  
 依リ他代表部ヨリ提出サレタ量的制限案ヲ承認シ得テ事  
 ヲ申上ケルノ遺憾ト致シマス。此機會ニ於テ我々ノ貴下ガ  
 本會議ヲ極力支持シ懇切ナル態度ヲ以テ示サレタル事ニ對シ  
 衷心敬意ヲ表スルモノナリトス。

同時ニ本宮ハ本會議出席ノ各國代表部ノ懇切ナル御力  
 ニ對シ我々代表部ニ代リテ之ヲ深甚ナル感謝ノ意ヲ表シテ存  
 存ジマス

永野修身

外交關係下 二九七頁

Q. 946

Document No. 219P (29)  
Br. Ex. 48

T E L E G R A M  
THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GFEW) TO THE  
SECRETARY OF STATE

TOKYO, June 18, 1937--4 p.m.  
(Received June 18--9:05 p.m.)

While the limitation of the gun calibre for capital ships constitutes one important aspect of qualitative limitation, the Japanese Government, in elucidating at the last London Naval Conference their basic attitude concerning the means calculated to bring about just and fair state of naval disarmament, made it clear that they could not subscribe to qualitative limitations alone, if not accompanied by a simultaneous restriction in quantity. The Japanese Government still hold the same conviction as regards the matter of qualitative limitations. Stated briefly, it is their belief that a mere limitation in quality alone will only induce a tendency to make up for the deficiency caused through such limitation, by resorting to quantitative augmentation, thus ultimately leading to a competition in naval armament in quantity. The Japanese Government, therefore, are not, at this juncture, in a position to adopt, apart from quantitative restrictions, a mere limitation of the gun calibre for capital ships, a matter which properly belongs to the most important phase of qualitative limitation and hope that the United States Government will understand the above-mentioned position of the Japanese Government.

It may be added for the information of the United States Government that this position of the Japanese Government as regards qualitative limitation was communicated towards the end of March to the British Government, when the Japanese Government responded to the British proposal of January this year regarding the limitation to fourteen inches of the maximum calibre of guns for capital ships.

June 18, 1937.

GFEW

Foreign Relations I, 301-302

電報

駐日大使(元一) Grew 陸軍務長官宛

東京 一九三七年六月十六日午後四時

(六月十六日午前九時五分受信)

219P(29)

主力艦、砲口徑、制限が質的制限、重要な部面を成す一方  
 日本政府、海軍の備縮少、公正安善な状態を有する事  
 有る方法、考慮の周知、ロンドン海軍會議に於て其の  
 根本態を説明するに當り、量に於て併行的制限を伴ふ  
 非が、質的制限、に應諾する事、不可能なるを明言する事。  
 日本政府、依然質的制限、問題に關して同様、信念を保持す  
 居る。要約するに、軍事的制限の量的増加に依り、七、八  
 海軍の備、量、競争上は依り、此、如き制限に依り欠陥を  
 補ふ傾向を引起す、ミデアルト云フ、が其、信念である。故  
 日本政府、此、際、量的制限を離し、主力艦、砲口徑、軍事的  
 制限、即ち將質的制限、最も重要な部面を成す此、問題に  
 対して、アゲル様十の、サイン、而して合衆國政府が日本政府、上述、  
 立場を了解する事を望む事。  
 質的制限に關して日本政府、此、立場、主力艦、最大砲口徑を  
 十四吋に制限する事、關して本年一月、英國、提案に對して回答する  
 是、政府が三月末頃英國政府に通告せしむる事、合衆國政府に参考、為  
 附記する事。

一九三七年 六月十八日

外交關係 I

元一 / GREW /

三〇一頁 - 三〇三頁

Ex 947

Doc. 2192 (31)  
Br. Ex. 50

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE<sup>11</sup>

I have been receiving from many sources inquiries and suggestions arising out of disturbed situations in various parts of the world.

Unquestionably there are in a number of regions tensions and strains which on their face involve only countries that are near neighbors but which in ultimate analysis are of inevitable concern to the whole world. Any situation in which armed hostilities are in progress or are threatened is a situation wherein rights and interests of all nations either are or may be seriously affected. There can be no serious hostilities anywhere in the world which will not one way or another affect interests or rights or obligations of this country. I therefore feel warranted in making--in fact, I feel it a duty to make--a statement of this Government's position in regard to international problems and situations with respect to which this country feels deep concern.

This country constantly and consistently advocates maintenance of peace. We advocate national and international self-restraint. We advocate abstinence by all nations from use of force in pursuit of policy and from interference in the internal affairs of other nations. We advocate adjustment of problems in international relations by processes of peaceful negotiation and agreement. We advocate faithful observance of international agreements. Upholding the principle of the sanctity of treaties, we believe in modification of provisions of treaties, when need therefor arises, by orderly processes carried out in a spirit of mutual helpfulness and accommodation. We believe in respect by all nations for the rights of others and performance by all nations of established obligations. We stand for revitalizing and strengthening of international law. We advocate steps toward promotion of economic security and stability the world over. We advocate lowering or removing of excessive barriers in international trade. We seek effective equality of commercial opportunity and we urge upon all nations application of the principle of equality of treatment. We believe in limitation and reduction of armament. Realizing the necessity for maintaining armed forces adequate for national security, we are prepared to reduce or to increase our own armed forces in proportion to reductions or increases made by other countries. We avoid entering into alliances or entangling commitments but we believe in cooperative effort by peaceful and practicable means in support of the principles, hereinbefore stated.

Foreign Relations I, pp. 325-326.

Footnote:  
(<sup>11</sup> Issued as a press release on July 16, 1937; reprinted from Department of State, Press Releases, July 17, 1937 (vol. XVII, No. 407), p. 41.)

國務卿聲明書

947  
Doc 219 P(31)

予、世界、各所、於、此、紛、亂、事、態、ヨリ、益、ル、所、ノ、實、情、ヲ、示、唆、ス、  
多、ク、此、所、ヲ、受、領、ス、ル、事、

疑、義、無、キ、ニ、地、域、ニ、於、テ、緊、張、ヲ、生、ジ、シ、テ、孰、モ、表、面、上、  
相、隣、諸、國、家、ノ、関、係、ヲ、平、化、ス、ル、之、ヲ、密、切、高、ク、予、以、解、析、  
ス、ル、ニ、全、世、界、對、シ、テ、是、ノ、難、キ、利、害、関、係、ヲ、相、以、テ、上、述、  
武、器、以、テ、之、敵、對、行、為、ヲ、進、行、ス、ル、行、為、或、モ、其、智、威、力、所、  
即、チ、凡、ソ、ノ、國、家、ノ、利、益、ヲ、損、害、ス、ル、事、態、ヲ、現、實、ニ、受、ク、若、  
ク、受、ク、處、ル、情、勢、ニ、於、テ、世、界、ノ、利、害、於、テ、又、何、ク、干、テ、ハ、勿、  
ク、自、何、等、ノ、形、態、ニ、於、テ、我、國、ノ、利、益、權、利、乃、至、義、務、関、與、ス、ル、所、  
ト、シ、テ、又、此、取、テ、我、國、ノ、深、重、関、心、有、ル、所、ノ、國、際、問、題、  
及、情、勢、関、係、ニ、對、シ、テ、此、信、託、ス、ル、聲、明、書、ヲ、發、シ、極、  
力、ニ、以、テ、予、以、義、務、ト、シ、テ、示、ス、

我、國、ノ、對、外、ノ、一、貫、シ、テ、平、和、ノ、維、持、ヲ、主、張、ス、我、等、國、家、  
ノ、及、國、際、的、目、的、ヲ、主、張、ス、我、等、凡、ソ、ノ、國、家、ノ、其、ノ、政、策、亦、亦、  
武、器、ヲ、使、用、ス、ル、他、國、内、治、干、渉、ス、ル、事、ヲ、自、裁、ス、ル、  
ヲ、主、張、ス、我、等、ノ、國、際、関、係、ニ、於、テ、問、題、ノ、解、決、  
平、和、的、ノ、商、議、協、定、ノ、方、法、ニ、據、リ、テ、之、ヲ、主、張、ス、  
我、等、ノ、國、際、協、定、ノ、忠、實、ニ、遵、守、ス、ル、ヲ、主、張、ス、我、  
等、ノ、條、約、神、聖、ノ、主、義、ヲ、遵、守、ス、ル、其、條、項、分、變、  
更、修、正、ヲ、受、ク、ル、協、合、ニ、相、互、ニ、援、助、相、解、釋、精、神、  
ヲ、以、テ、之、ノ、秩、序、ヲ、平、穩、ニ、以、テ、成、就、シ、得、ル、精、神、  
ニ、以、テ、之、ヲ、作、ス、我、等、ノ、ス、ル、ノ、國、家、ニ、ヨ、リ、テ、他、國、  
ノ、權、利、ヲ、重、キ、ト、シ、及、凡、ソ、ノ、國、家、ニ、ヨ、リ、テ、自、己、  
ノ、義、務、ヲ、遂、行、ス、ル、ニ、以、テ、信、ス、我、等、ノ、國、際、法、

No /

Doc 219P(31)

復強化了擁護。我等全世界，經濟的保存上  
安定及增進之方法主張。我等國際貿易之  
障礙，障礙，低減或撤去之主張。我等  
貿易上，有效之機會均等主義及凡各國之  
待遇均等，原則，實施之要求。我等軍備，  
限制及縮減之信託。我等國際保安，為適度，  
軍備維持之必要之認識。我等自軍備，  
他國軍備，增減之比例之增減，準備之有之。  
我等同盟及紛糾之未如契約之避。然  
以上列舉之原則，支持和平和實際之  
段之協同的努力之信託。

(對外國係 I 三三五一三三六頁)

腳註六：

- 一九三七年七月十六日新華公報記者上三行發行
- 一九三七年七月十七日國務省新華公報記者集
- (第十七卷四十四頁) 再版

No. 2 ★

Ex. 49

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(WASHINGTON,) June 12, 1936.

Excerpt.

. . . . .

In reply, I told Mr. Yoshida that I would speak frankly but in the friendliest possible spirit and say that the impression among many persons in this country was that Japan sought absolute economic domination, first of eastern Asia, and then, of other portions as she might see fit; that this would mean political as well as military domination in the end; that the upshot of the entire movement would be to exclude countries like the United States from trading with all of those portions of China thus brought under the domination or controlling influence so-called of Japan; that this presented a serious question to first-class countries with commercial interests in every part of the world, for the reason that, for instance, my country stood unqualifiedly for the principle of equality of commercial opportunity and industrial right alike in every part of the world; and that it would be strange and impracticable for my country to stand for this doctrine with the announcement always that it qualified same by applying it to only one-half of the world and one-half of the world's population. I remarked that I could say in all candor that this Government had never by the slightest word or intimation suggested to the people or officials of the 20 Latin American countries as to what amount of trade they should conduct with Germany, or Great Britain, or Japan, or any other country.

I continued with the statement that there was no reason, in my judgment, why countries like Japan, the United States and England, could not in the most amicable spirit, and with perfect justice and fairness to each, agree to assert and abide by the worldwide principle of equality in all commercial and industrial affairs, and each country solemnly agree that it would not resort to force in connection with the operation of this rule of equality and why Governments like the three mentioned could not sit down together and in a spirit of fair dealing and fair play confer and collaborate and not cease until they had found a way for amicable and reasonable adjustments or settlements. I said that this would wipe out and eliminate 90% of all the occasions for friction between the nations.

. . . . .

C(ORDELL) H(ULL)

Foreign Relations I, pp. 241 at  
242-243



60948  
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國務長官覺書

(三十三) 昭和十年(一九三六年)五月十二日

按筆

其向答トシ余卒直然ニ去来ニ限リ友誼的精神ヲ以テ語ラント古  
民ニ云ヒ次事ヲ申述セリ則チ此國ニ於ケル言ハシク今問ニ於テ印泰  
日本ガ第三東亞次ニ日本ガ適當ト認ル他地域絶對的ニ經濟的制  
覇ヲ求メ居タルト云フ之終局ニ於テ軍事的支配及政治的支配ヲ意  
味スルモノトシ之ニ全運動歸結シ合衆國如チ國々ト斯ク所謂日本  
支配或ハ統制力下ニ置カラル又那天等一切地域上貿易ヲ排除ス  
ルトナル之ニ世界凡ニ其部分於テ商業上權益ヲ有スル諸國ニ  
次理由ヨリ重大ナル問題ヲ投シ即例ニ我國世界凡ニ其地域ニ於  
テ商業上機會及工業上權利ニ對シ平等原則ヲ無制限的ニ  
標榜スルモノトシ之ニ世界三分ニ世界人口二分ニ該原則ヲ  
適用スル事ヲ我國ガ之ヲ制限スルノ事ニ漸ク充テ併行シ斯ル  
主義ヲ支持スル事我國ニテ不可思議且実行不可能事ニ屬スル所  
我政府ハ二十ニテアメリカ國及國民又官吏ニ對シ数量貿易ヲ  
以テ國々獨逸或ハ英國或ハ日本或ハ他國ト行ハレキニ關シ  
一言半句ヲ以テ提言或ハ暗示ヲ極メ當ニ示唆スルコトトシ余卒直  
言得ルモノトシ余ハ述ベリ

NO. 1.

余ハ語ヲ續ケ余ハ判斷スル所ニ日本合衆國及英國如チ國々ガ行  
政最モ友誼的精神ニ在リ得ガク又互ニ完全正義公平ヲ以  
テ總テ商業及工業上事項ニ於テ世界普遍ノ平等原則ヲ主  
張ス且其字得ルカ又各國ガ此ノ平等原則運用ニ關聯シ武力ニ  
訴ヘテ之ニ嚴厲同意得ルカ又前述スル如ク政府ガ公正折  
衝及行動精神下ニ相會ニ談合又協働ニ彼等ガ友誼的且

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NO. 2

合理的ナル調整又解決ノ道ヲ見出ス迄之ヲ續行シ得ガレ理由トシ  
思ヒト余ハ述ベテリ。國家間ニ於テ摩擦ヲ生ズルニハ機會・尤モ是レ  
之ヲ拭キテ除去サルベシト余ハ述ベテリ

コーデル・ハル (Cordell Hull)

外國關係 I, p. 241 at 242-243.

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Page 1

Pr. Ex. 51

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Excerpts.

(WASHINGTON) July 21, 1937.

The Ambassador of Japan called this morning at my request. After brief preliminaries, I very seriously addressed the Ambassador and said that, of course, he must be fully aware that when two nations comprising 500 million people are engaged in a controversy in which danger of general hostilities appear imminent this country cannot help but be greatly interested and concerned; that it is in the light of this situation and of the intense desire of this country for peace everywhere, that I have been undertaking to confer with the ambassadors from both Japan and China from time to time regarding developments, present and prospective, in the danger zone; that I have approached each government, in a spirit of genuine friendliness and impartiality in an earnest effort to contribute something to the cause of peace and to the avoidance of hostilities in the Far East; that, if the Ambassador did not mind, I would be glad to reemphasize the chief points I had referred to in our previous conversations on this general subject and situation; that these included a most earnest appeal to each government, from every possible standpoint, for peace, as well as an earnest expression of the opinion that a war would result in irreparable harm to all governments involved and would prove utterly disastrous, in the present chaotic state of world affairs, to all phases of human welfare and human progress . . .

I then said to the Ambassador that I might repeat what I had also said to him at the beginning--that this government is ready and will be most glad at any time to say or do anything, short of mediation which of course requires the agreement of both parties in advance, which might in any way whatever contribute towards composing the present matters of controversy between Japan and China; that this was, of course, said to the Ambassador for his Government; and I added that I desired to repeat with emphasis the present, continued attitude of this government of thus being ready and desirous of saying or doing anything that the government or governments concerned might suggest which would be fair and impartial towards all concerned and at the same time calculated to be helpful in restoring thoroughly peaceful relations in the Far East.

I said to the Ambassador that there was another phase of the matter I would like to put before him. I explained that I was anxious that my point of view be completely understood and for this reason I would like to inform the American Ambassadors

in Japan and in China of the conversations held here and would like to have those Ambassadors report what I said, just as the Ambassadors of those countries to whom I spoke here would report, to the Japanese and Chinese Governments.

At one stage I asked the Ambassador what the latest developments were. He replied that he knew very little in addition to what had been reported to me by the Japanese Counselor during the past three or four days, except a report about a clash near the Marco Polo Bridge in which the Japanese used artillery only and declined to use their infantry. He said their purpose was to localize the controversy and avoid general hostilities; that he still has hopes that this result may be accomplished; that they are not bringing down troops from Japan proper.

The Ambassador said little throughout the conversation, but sought to make himself agreeable. I emphasized to him that if we did not feel genuinely friendly and impartial towards his country and all concerned I would not be saying some of the things I was saying.

During the course of the conversation, I remarked that I desired to refer specially to an incident of the past two days in which two American women, near their embassy in Peking, were assaulted by Japanese guards. I said that I had remarked to the press, off the record, on yesterday that I had only received newspaper information about this attack upon the American women and I could not comment upon it with accuracy until official information came to me; that in the meantime I assumed and hoped that our Embassy in Peking would take the matter up with the Japanese Government and a settlement, or adjustment, or action satisfactory to all concerned would be brought about. The Ambassador expressed his favorable interest in such action and also his belief that such would be the case. Dr. Hornbeck, who was present, remarked to the Ambassador that similar incidents relating to our nationals or the nationals of other governments have occurred during the past five years and that it would be very helpful to the reputation of the Japanese Government to see to it that their guards would deport and demean themselves in a way to avoid such occurrences. The Ambassador expressed his approval.

C(ORDELL) H(ULL)



219 P (32)

寄與スル所アルベク、一種ノ居中調停トシテ、本政府ハ善ニ予  
 如何ニル時ニテモ、如何ナル事ニテモ、速ニ或ハ為スル同意アリキ  
 之、且余ハ改テ繰返シタリ。

此ノ方ハ勿論貴國ノ為ニ貴大使ニ述ベタル次ホナリト、更ニ余ハ  
 附加テ、同國政府或ハ關係アル政府ノ承認スル処ニテ總テ、  
 關係國ニ對シ公正不偏ナルト共ニ極東ニ於テ完全ニ平和ナル關係  
 ノ回復スルニ有効ナリト考ヘラル、又、如何ナル事ナリトモ速ニ或  
 為サントスル用意アリ且ツ希マシトスル我ガ政府能ハ現在斯ク  
 ナルト共ニ將來モ不致ナル事ヲ反覆強調シ度ト語りタリ。

余ハ同大使ニ對シ本件ニ就キテ、貴大使ニ提言シタキ他ノ問題  
 ナリト述ベ次、如ク説明セリ。余ハ余ノ見解ヲ完全ニ承ル  
 事ヲ切望シキモ、然レ余ハ駐日駐華ナリカ大使ニ當地ニ於  
 ケル話合ノ模様ヲ通知シ且ツ之等ヲシテ余ノ述ベタル事ヲ報告セ  
 シムルト共ニ、當地ニ余ガ會談セル兩國大使モ右ニ聞シルル、政府  
 ニ報告セシ事ヲ知悉ス。

會談ニ節ニ於テ余ハ最近ノ狀況如何ヲ尋ネタリ。大使ハ此ニ  
 四日未日本參事官ヨリ余ニ報告セル以外ニ附テ加フルベキ何物ヲ  
 モ殆ト知ラズ、唯蘆溝橋 / Marco Polo Bridge / 附近ニ於テ衝突ス  
 リシ際日本軍ハ砲兵ノミヲ用ヒ步兵ヲ使用スル事ヲ禁ジタリト  
 ノ報告アリタリト述ベタリ。更ニ大使ハ日本側ノ意圖又ハ所ノ紛争  
 ノ局部的ノモノナラズニ全面的戦争ヲ避クルニアリ、余ハ種々ノ  
 目的ノ達成ナルベキ希望ヲ抱キ居リ、又日本側ガ日本本土ヨリ  
 軍隊ヲ派遣シツル如キ事案無シト述ベタリ。

同大使ハ會談中殆ト覺言セガリシモ、余ニ調子ヲ念セテ好々  
 ナリ、余ハ余等ガ彼ノ國及ニ總テノ關係者ニ對シ純然タル友好

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無私、情ヲ飛情フニ非レバ余ハ此方ナリトモ余ガ飛情タルガ如キハ出ガリシタルベキコトヲ強調セリ。

會談中ニ於テ余ハ在北京アメリカ大使館附近ニ於テ二名ノアメリカ婦人が日本軍警備兵ヨリ籠巻ハルタル此ニ日間ニ於ケル一橋ヲ時言及シタト述ベタリ。余ハ昨日新聞記者ニ對シ其ノ場限リ、語ルニ余ハ此ノアメリカ婦人籠巻問題ニ就キテ、新聞ニテ報道ヲ得タルノミニテ公報ヲ接受スル迄ハ正確ナル論評ニテ得ズト語リタリ。其ノ際余ハ在北京アメリカ大使館ニ本行ヲ日本政府ト向メ問題トシテ上ノ關係者總テ對シ満足ナル落着、調整或ハ行動、齎サルベキモノト爲メ、且ツ希望シタル次第ナリ。右ノ如ク述ベタルニ大使ハ斯ル事段ニ對シハ好意アル關心ヲ示ス上共ニ右橋ノ解決ヲ見ルニシテト信スル旨表明セリ。其ノ場ニ同席セルホーベック博士 (Dr. Hombach) ハ同大使ニ過テル五十年間ニアメリカ國ニ其ノ他ノ國人ニ對シ同様ノ事件發生シタル事、日本ノ警備兵ガ斯ルニ事件ノ生起、避ケル様其ノ振舞ニ氣ヲツケル如ク日本政府ニ於テ注意ヲ拂ハルニテハ同政府ノ聲譽ヲ擧ゲタルニ大ニ力アルベシト述ベタリ。同大使ハ之ヲ肯定スル旨述ヘタリ。

三〇九 (北) / (CORDELL) HULL /

外交關係工 三三〇—三三三頁

Q. 950

Doc. No. 219P (33)

Br. Ex. 52

MEMORANDUM BY THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW)

(TOKYO) August 10, 1937

Excerpt

.....

American Offer of Good Offices.

2. I then referred to the statement which I had made to the Minister in our last conversations as on my own initiative and responsibility, that I hoped he would let me know if he ever saw ways in which I could be helpful in the present situation. I said that my Government had now authorized me to present this as a definite offer of good offices and that I was doing so in an informal, confidential and exploratory way, first because it seemed to me important to avoid publicity, and second because we wished to avoid any semblance of interference and were only anxious to be as helpful as possible. I repeated and emphasized this aspect of my remarks so that there could be no doubt in the Minister's mind as to our precise attitude and intentions. I then said that it had occurred to us that either now or later it might be helpful for us to arrange some neutral ground for a meeting of Japanese and Chinese plenipotentiaries to conduct negotiations and perhaps to be helpful if difficulties in those negotiations should arise.

.....

J(OSEPH) C. G(GREW)

Foreign Relations I, p. 339 at 340.



Eu 950  
Doc 2/9P (33)

駐日ノ米國ノ大使(グー) (GREW) 備忘録

抜萃

一九三七一年ノ昭和十二年ノ八月十日(東京)

「アメリカノ日本外務省ニ斡旋ヲ申出デタル件」

ニ、ソノカラコノ前大臣ト會談シタトキニ私自身、發音ト責任於テ現在ノ状態ニ於テ不従ニ立コトガアツテ私ニ知ラセテ頂キ度イト言フ名トニ話ガ移テ行ク。本國政府ガ斡旋ノ具体的提案トイフ意味トニテ贈呈スル權能ヲ私ニ與ヘテアルト又第一ニ世間ニ知ラズルニテ避ケル必要ガアルト思ヒシタ。第二ニ私達ガ聊カキトモ干渉ガマシキトテ避ケタイト思ヒ又出来ルタテ御援助出来ルヤウニ掛ケルガテアルトイフ理由テ私ハコトヲ非公式ニ秘密裡ニ且探索的ニ行フタトイフコトヲ話セリ。私達ノ几帳面ト態度及考ヘニ對シ大臣ハ中ニ疑ヲ起サセナイタメニ私ハ私話中ニ其ヲ線返シテ述ベ且強調セリ。ソノカラ私ハ只今テモ今後テモ交渉ヲ行フタメ日支兩國全權ガ會見スル何等カ中立地帯ヲ用意スルコトガ我々ニトリ役立テアルコトイフコト殊ニ斯カラ交渉ノ經過中何等カ困難ト問題ガ起ラトキ思フク役立ツモト我々ガ考ヘテアルコトヲ話セリ

ジョセフ・C・グー (Joseph C. GREW)

外國關係一

三三九頁  
三四〇頁

Ex. # 951

Doc. No. 219P (34)

Br. Ex. 53

THE JAPANESE EMBASSY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Japanese Government wishes to express its concurrence with the principles contained in the statement made by Secretary of State Hull on the 16th instant (ultimo) concerning the maintenance of world peace. It is the belief of the Japanese Government that the objectives of those principles will only be attained, in their application to the Far Eastern situation, by a full recognition and practical consideration of the actual particular circumstances of that region.

(WASHINGTON) August 13, 1937.

Foreign Relations I, p. 342.

Er 957

Doc. 219P(34)

日本大使館ヨリ國務省へ

本月(先月)十六日、ハル國務長官ニ依リ「為サレタル世界  
平和維持ニ関スル声明中ニ掲ゲラレタル若干ノ原則ニ對シ、  
日本政府ハ賛意ヲ表スルモノナリ。  
是等ノ原則ハ其適用ニ當リ極東ノ現實ノ特殊事情ヲ  
十分ニ認識シ且實際的ナル考慮ヲ拵ル事ニ依リ  
始テ其ノ目的ヲ達成シ得ルモノナルコトヲ、日本政府ハ信ズ。

一九三七年八月十三日 (ワシントン)

外國關係 I

三四三頁

Doc. No. 219P (35)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 54

PRESS RELEASE ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF  
STATE ON AUGUST 23, 1937

Excerpt.

The issues and problems which are of concern to this Government in the present situation in the Pacific area go far beyond merely the immediate question of protection of the nationals and interests of the United States. The conditions which prevail in that area are intimately connected with and have a direct and fundamental relationship to the general principles of policy to which attention was called in the statement of July 16, which statement has evoked expressions of approval from more than 50 governments. This Government is firmly of the opinion that the principles summarized in that statement should effectively govern international relationships.

When there unfortunately arises in any part of the world the threat or the existence of serious hostilities, the matter is of concern to all nations. Without attempting to pass judgment regarding the merits of the controversy, we appeal to the parties to refrain from resort to war. We urge that they settle their differences in accordance with principles which, in the opinion not alone of our people but of most peoples of the world should govern in international relationships. We consider applicable throughout the world, in the Pacific area as elsewhere, the principles set forth in the statement of July 16. That statement of principles is comprehensive and basic. It embraces the principles embodied in many treaties, including the Washington Conference treaties and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris.

From the beginning of the present controversy in the Far East, we have been urging upon both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments the importance of refraining from hostilities and of maintaining peace. We have been participating constantly in consultation with interested governments directed toward peaceful adjustment. This Government does not believe in political alliances or entanglements, nor does it believe in extreme isolation. It does believe in international cooperation for the purpose of seeking through pacific methods the achievement of those objectives set forth in the statement of July 16. In the light of our well-defined attitude and policies, and within the range thereof, this Government is giving most solicitous attention to every phase of the Far Eastern situation, toward safeguarding the lives and welfare of our people and making effective the policies--especially the policy of peace--in which this country believes and to which it is committed.

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Page 2

Our Government is determined to see that life, strengthened, and revitalized, in reference to the Pacific area and to all the world, these fundamental principles.

Foreign Relations I, p. 355 at  
356-357

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一九三七年八月廿三日

國務省ニ依ル新聞發表

披尋

太平洋方面、現局面ニ於テ本政府、固ク對象トシテ向  
題ニ合衆國ノ民及其權益ヲ保護スルニ等シク、他面  
問題ヲ多量ニ超越スル重大ナル問題ナリ。

同地域ニ於テハ狀態ハ五十個國以上、政府ニ依リ同意  
表セルトシテ七月十六日、聲明ニ依リ、注意ヲ喚起セラレタ  
ル政策、一般原則ニ密接ニ關係シ、且直接ニシテ根本的  
關係ヲ有スルモノナルニ、本政府、該聲明中ニ掲ゲラレタ  
ル原則、國際關係ヲ有効ニ律スルモノナリ、確信ス  
ルナリ。

不幸ニシテ世界、何レカ、部分ニ重大ナル威嚇行為、恐レ  
或ハ存在、見ルニ至ラレバ、斯ルニ事項ハ凡レノ國家ニ  
トシテ同心、對象トシテ紛争、真相ニ就テ、判斷ヲ企圖  
スル邊ニテハ、各其國ニ對シテ戰爭ヲ許スルコトヲ  
差控ヘ、豫定セラレタリ。

我々、一般等、其、摩擦ヲ我國一國、ニテハ、全世界ヲ  
通ジ、大部分、國民、見解トシテ、國際關係ヲ律スルモノ  
ト見ラレ、原則ニ導據ニテ解決スル事ヲ要請ス。我々  
ハ七月十六日聲明ニ述ベラレタ原則、全世界ヲ通ジテ太  
平洋地域ニ於テモ、將又他、地域ニ於テモ、有ク、適用ナ  
ルベキト思惟ス。是等原則、固ク、右聲明ハ、包括的  
ニシテ、基本的トモ、ナラズ。

此ノワシントン會議條約、Kellogg-Briand Pact  
含ム多數條約中ニ體現セラレ、凡レ諸原則ヲ包含シ、且

No. 1

Doc 2/19P(35)

極寒於今次紛爭，自初，我之中國日本兩政府，計  
 敵對行為，避之平和維持之事，重要性強調之矣。  
 我之平和的調停之方向，向之中華國政府，商議  
 常參加之矣。本政府政治的連繫或為謀或  
 又極端之孤立是等之，一再傾之，本政府  
 七月十六日，聲明中，示之其目的，意欲平和的  
 手段，求之國際的協力，信之置之，トスルモ，ア  
 我之明確之態度及方針，且是等方針，範  
 國內，於本政府，我國民，生命福祉，保護之，且政  
 策，特我國，信奉之，且約束之，平和政策，ト，有初  
 之，極寒事情，ア，之，向，之，全視之，之，之，  
 本政府，太平洋，及，全世界，之，之，之，之，  
 之，支持之，之，之，其，之，之，之，之，  
 之，之，之，之，之，之，之，之，之，之，之，之，

外交文書 第(冊)三五頁  
 三六三三五頁

帳 2

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Page 1

Br. Ex. 56

THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE MINISTER IN  
SWITZERLAND (HARRISON)

(Substance)

Excerpts.

WASHINGTON, September 28, 1937  
10 p.m.

It is desirable, however, inasmuch as the United States Government associates itself with the League's deliberations through authorizing the Minister to sit with the Assembly Advisory Committee and the subcommittee, that the Minister know of and understand the American Government's thought in connection with his possible contributions toward enabling his associates at Geneva to reach decisions which may have some beneficial practical effect regarding objectives which are common to the United States and to the League's members.

When Japan embarked last July upon military activities in China, the United States Government, which took full account of evidence presented at that time and during the past indicative of Japanese political objectives, on July 16 made public a statement of basic principles which it felt should underlie normal and peaceful international relationships.

Government

The United States reiterated more specifically on August 23 in a statement, with especial reference to the armed conflict between Japan and China, certain of the principles comprised in the statement of July 16, and the view was emphasized that these principles applied as well to the Pacific area as elsewhere. Attention was called, inter alia, expressly to the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty. Exception was thus definitely taken to the course followed by Japan.

Moreover, several definite steps have been taken in support of the American position: (1) Direct appeals to Japan and China to desist or refrain from hostilities; (2) repeated statements to both sides regarding the availability to them of good offices should they make any suggestions for resort to conciliation processes; (3) repeated protests to the Japanese Government against aerial bombing of noncombatants and publication in one instance of an American note to the Japanese Government in objection to and condemnation of such bombing and in another instance issuance of a statement today on that subject.



Doc. No. 219P(36)

Japan's military operations have increased in intensity and in extent with the unfolding situation. Charges of Japan's violation of treaty provisions and international law have been amplified by the Chinese Government, and a willingness to resort to conciliation processes has been affirmed by the Chinese. The Japanese have announced, however, their intention to destroy the Chinese will and capacity to resist and actually to overthrow the existing Chinese Government. By declining the League Assembly Advisory Committee's invitation, the Japanese have refused even to consult with other governments with a view to adjusting their difficulties with China.

The Secretary expresses the feeling that the Sino-Japanese situation definitely concerns the world as a whole. No longer do the questions involved relate merely to specific provisions of particular treaties being violated; they are questions of international law, of principles of humanity, of war and peace. Naturally it is true that the questions involve violating agreements, particularly the League of Nations Covenant, the Nine-Power Treaty, and the Kellong-Briand Pact. But problems of world economy, world humanity, and world security also are involved.

HULL

Foreign Relations I, pp. 375-377

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4953

NO. 1

國務長官ヨリ瑞西駐刺公使(ハリシ)ニケミソン

要旨

拔萃 ワシントン一九三七年(昭和十二年)九月二十八日  
午後十時

併ニ米國政府、其使節、總會顧問委員會及七小委員會ニ出席スル事ニ依リ夫自身聯盟討議ニ参加スルモノトシ、其使節が壽府ニ於テ彼、同僚ニテ米國ト聯盟加盟諸國ニ共通ナル若干目的、關之何等カ有用ナル實際的結果ヲ齎シ得テ若干、決定到達スルヲ得タルヲ、彼、可能ナル貢獻ニ關聯シ米國政府、意圖ヲ知リ之ヲ諒解シ置ク事ヲ希ナリ。去ル七月日本、中國ニ於テ軍事行動ヲ開始スルヤ米國政府、當時過去ニ於テ日本、攻略的展開、期間ヲ通シ與ニシタル證據ヲ徹底的吟味シ、七月十六日正當且平和的國際關係、根柢ヲ成メ、ト看ル基礎的原則ニ關スル聲明、公表ス。米國政府、八月二十日、聲明中ニ日本ト中國間、武力衝突ニ時ニ言及シ七月十六日、聲明中ニ含シ居ル原則、一部ヲ更ニ逐條的又復シ而シ此等、原則ガ他、地域ニ對スルト同様太平洋地域ニ適用ニ得ト、其見解ヲ強調セリ。

就中明確ニ「ケロッグ・ブリアンド條約」及七九國條約ニ就テ注意ヲ促スル次第ナリ。斯クシテ日本、執リニ行動ニ對シ確然異議ヲ表明セリ更ニ米國、立場ヲ擁護スルモノ數種、具体的手段ヲ執リ即ケ

- (1) 戰爭ヲ中止若クハ抑制スル様直接日本ト中國ニ對シ要請。
- (2) 若シ日本ト中國ガ和解ノ方法ヲ殊ル事ニ就テ何等カノ提案ヲナシ米國場合、米國、斡旋ヲ彼等カ利用ニ得ル事ニ就テ、双方ニ對シ又復聲明。
- (3) 非戰調良爆略ニ關シ日本政府ニ對シ又復抗議及斯、如キ爆略等

Doc-219P(36)

對之支村非難セリ兼、覺書公表、更ニ同問題ニ關スル本日、聲明書發表。

當面、時局ニ關聯シ日本、作戰ニ益々強烈、其ヲ加ヘ其範圍ヲ擴大スルニ條約、諸條項ト國際法ニ對スル日本、侵犯ヲ非難スル中國政府、主張、高調セシ和解、方法ニ對シテニ意圖ニ支那側ニ肯定セシマリ。然レ日本側ニ中國側抗戰意欲ト能力、破壞直現在、中國政府、現實ニ打倒シテスル彼等、意圖ヲ聲明シ。

聯盟總會顧問委員會、招請ヲ作シ日本側ニ支那ト紛争ヲ解決スル爲他諸外國政府、協議ニ事ヲ拒絕セリ。本官、今次、日支時局、明ニ全世界ニ憂慮スル問題トト思考シテモナリ。此、問題最モ特殊條約、或モ特定條項、單ニ侵犯問題ニテス其、國際法問題ナリ。人道原則ニ關スル問題、戰爭及モ平和、問題ナリ。

自然此問題、條約、侵犯、特ニ國際聯盟規約、九國條約及モケロッグブレンド條約、KELLOGG-BRAND Pact、侵犯ヲ包含ス事、事變ナリ。然レ世界經濟、世界、人道、世界、安全等、問題ヲ包含スル所ナリ。

ハル、HULL、  
外交關係(三七五—三七七頁)

NO 2

Q. # 954c

Doc. No. 853-A

Page 1\*

Exhibit No. \_\_\_\_\_

IPS Document 953, taken from Japanese Foreign Ministry

ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT RELATING TO THE CHINA INCIDENT

(VOL. 2)

December 1937

Announcement by Foreign Ministry on invitation to  
Attend the Nine Power Treaty Meeting

BRITISH EMBASSY

His Excellency, the Belgian Ambassador, Baron de Bassompierre,  
paid an official call on Mr. Hoki Hirota, Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
on October 21st, at 10:30 A.M. and handed him the following Note Verbale.

NOTE VERBALE

In compliance with the request of the Government of Great  
Britain, made with the approbation of the Government of the United  
States of America, the Royal Government propose to the Signatory  
States of the Treaty of February 6, 1922, to convene at Brussels on  
the 30th of this month, with the view of examining in accordance with  
Article 7 of that Treaty, the situation in the Far East and of studying  
the amicable means of hastening the end of the unfortunate conflict  
existing there.

Tokyo, October 20th, 1937

---

C E R T I F I C A T E

W. D. C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I. P. S. No. 853

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 143 pages, dated Oct-Nov-Dec., 1937, and described as follows: Announcements of the Japanese Government Relating to the China Incident. (Vol. 2).

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
23rd day of Sept., 1946

/s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Chief, Archives Sect  
Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Statement of Official Procurement

I, John A. Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
23 day of Sept., 1946

/s/ J. A. Curtis 2d Lt.  
NAME

Investigator  
Official Capacity.

Witness: /s/ Richard H. Lersh

60954 A  
853 A

昭和十二年十二月

支那華北交關係公報集(第三号)

外務省情報部

853 A

校

九國條約會議參加招請ニ関スル外務省発表(百三)

昭和十三年十月三十日午前十時半在京自耳義國ハツシゴ工工  
大使八廣田外務大臣ヲ来訪、上本國政府、訓令ニ基キ左記  
口上書ヲ手交セリ。

口上書

亞米利加合衆國政府、同意ヲ以テ為セタル英國政府、要  
請ニ從ヒ王國政府、八千九百二十三年二月六日、九國條約著  
名國ニ對シ同條約第七條基キ東亞ニ於ケル事態ヲ檢討シ  
且該地域ニ行ハル莫懣タル紛争、終結ヲ促進スル友好  
的手段ヲ攻究スル為本月三十日、アラセシニ會合セシコトヲ  
提議ス

千九百三十七年十月三十日東京於テ

853A cert-1

「ワシントン」文書局 第五號  
國際檢察部 第八五三號

眞録及公正ニ因スル証閉

余、恭慕ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ外務省文書  
課長トシテ、日本政府ト公的關係ニ在ルモノナルコ  
ト、竝ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレタル、一  
四三頁ヨリ成ル、千九百三十七年ノ昭和十二年ノ十  
二月附、下記題名、即チ支那事變關係公表案（第二  
號）ノ文書ノ保管ニ任シ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。  
余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナ  
ルコト、竝ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式書類  
及ビ様ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。（著シテラハ鐵道廳文  
書司長、其ノ他公式書類又ハ鐵道廳ノ該文書ノ保管所在ノ公式名  
簿ニ記載スベシ）

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ六月二十三日

東京ニ於テ署名  
當該官吏署名欄 赤 標  
右ノ者ノ公的資格 外務省文書課長  
証 人 尾 戸 長 壽



Doc 853 A 2

公文入手ニ関スル證明

余 John A. Curtis: 余が聯合國最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係ニルモノタルコト、並ニ記題名ノ文書ノ余が公務上、日本政府上ニ記署名直度ヨリ入手ニタルモノタルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 九月二十五日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名 榎

John A. Curtis

右者公的資格  
證人

國際檢察部調査官

Richard H. Laish

Ex. 9546

Br. Ex. 55 (Page #4)--IPS Doc. 853B  
Ct. Ex. \_\_\_\_\_

Page 1\*

Reply of Japanese Government Notifying ~~British~~  
~~Government~~ its Non-Attendance at Nine-Power  
Treaty(s) Meeting 27 October 1937.

The Japanese Government have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the Note Verbale under the date of the 20th instant, by which the Royal Government, in accordance with the request of the Government of Great Britain, and with the approbation of the Government of the United States of America, propose to the Powers signatory to the Treaty of February 6, 1922, to meet at Brussels on the 30th of this month in order to examine, in conformity with the Article VII of the said treaty, the situation in the Far East and to study amicable means of hastening the end of the regrettable conflict which is taking place there.

The League of Nations, in the report adopted on the 6th of the month, has declared on the basis of the declaration of only one of the two parties that the military operations carried on by Japan in China are in violation of the Nine Power Treaty. The action of Japan in China is a measure of self-defence which she has been compelled to take in the face of China's violent anti-Japanese policy and practice, especially by her provocative acts appealing to force of arms; and consequently, it lies, as has been declared already by the Imperial Government, outside the purview of the Nine Power Treaty.

The Assembly of the League of Nations has even gone the length of assuring China of its moral support and of recommending to its members to abstain from any action that might weaken that country's power of resistance and add to its difficulties in the present conflict, and also to study how they might individually give aid to China. This to take no account of the just intention of the Imperial Government, who propose to bring about a sincere co-operation between Japan and China, to assure enduring peace in East Asia, and to contribute thereby to the peace of the world. This is to take sides with one of the parties and to encourage its hostile disposition, but in no way to contribute to an early settlement.

The Royal Government make in their invitation no mention of the connection between the proposed Conference and the League of Nations. However, in view of the fact that in its Resolution, the League of Nations has suggested a meeting of those of its members who are party to the Nine

Power Treaty, and that the Government of the United States, who have acquiesced in the request of the Government of Great Britain for the convocation of the conference, have declared on October 6 their approval of the Resolution, the Imperial Government cannot but conclude that the convocation of the conference is linked to the Resolution of the League of Nations. Now the League of Nations, as mentioned above, has expressed its views casting reflection upon the honour of Japan, and it has adopted a resolution which is incontrovertably unfriendly towards her.

In these circumstances, the Imperial Government are constrained to believe that frank and full discussion to bring about a just, equitable and realistic solution of the conflict between Japan and China, cannot be expected between the Powers concerned at the proposed conference.

Moreover, the present Sino-Japanese conflict arising from the special situation of East Asia has a vital bearing upon the very existence of the two countries. The Imperial Government are firmly convinced that an attempt to seek a solution at a gathering of so many Powers whose interests in East Asia are of varying degrees, or who have practically no interests there at all, will only serve to complicate the situation still further and to put serious obstacles in the path of a just and proper solution.

For these reasons explained above, the Imperial Government regret their inability to accept the invitation of the Royal Government.

The present conflict has been caused by none other than the Chinese Government who for these many years have been engaged as a matter of national policy in disseminating anti-Japanese sentiment and encouraging anti-Japanese movements in China, and who, in collusion with the Communist elements, have menaced the peace of East Asia by their virulent agitations against Japan. Consequently, what is most urgently needed for a solution of the conflict is a realization on the part of the Chinese Government of the common responsibility of Japan and China respecting the stability of East Asia, a revision of their attitude, and a change of their policy to that of co-operation between the two countries. What Japan asks of the Powers is that they comprehend fully this need. Their cooperation based upon such comprehension can alone, she believes, contribute effectively toward the stabilization of East Asia.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W. D. C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I. P. S. No. 853

Statement of Source and Authenticity

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Signed at Tokyo on this  
23rd day of Sept., 1946

/s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

STAL

Chief, Archives Sect  
Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ Kageharu Odo

Statement of Official Procurement

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Signed at Tokyo on this  
23 day of Sept., 1946

/s/ J. A. Curtis 2d Lt.  
NAME

Witness: /s/ Richard H. Larsh

Investigator  
Official Capacity.

~~853 B~~

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2

~~七~~

七. 九國條約委員會不參加回答文 (十月十七日)

帝國政府、米國政府、同意、以、為、廿七、廿八、廿九、國政府、要、請、  
二、於、一九三二年、二月、六日、九國條約署名國、三、對、之、同條、  
約、才、七、條、三、基、本、東、亞、三、於、此、石、能、之、檢、討、之、且、該、地、域、三、行、此、  
三、遺、憾、十、分、等、一、終、結、之、促、進、又、(一)和、柳、手、段、之、收、效、不、  
三、為、本、月、三十日、之、三、會、合、也、之、下、之、提、議、也、之、廿、七、日、本、  
三、日、附、向、國、政府、之、提、請、之、正、三、島、領、也、。

國際聯盟總會、本月六日、日、友、友、友、友、三、國、之、採、擇、也、之、廿、九、  
三、報、國、書、三、於、一、等、國、一、方、之、陳、述、三、依、據、三、現、三、帝、國、力、支、  
三、那、三、於、三、執、行、以、三、九、國、條、約、三、違、反、三、之、  
三、斷、定、三、之、。今、次、帝、國、一、友、那、三、於、三、行、動、三、友、那、則、  
三、極、端、三、九、排、日、政、策、三、強、行、三、之、實、力、三、以、三、之、挑、發、行、動、  
三、修、三、餘、儀、十、之、也、之、廿、九、日、自、衛、三、之、置、三、三、九、國、條、約、之、  
三、外、三、之、三、三、帝、國、政府、之、聲、明、三、之、所、三、。

聯盟總會、更、三、三、其、決、議、三、三、友、那、三、對、三、精、神、之、  
三、持、三、表、明、三、且、三、友、那、三、之、友、那、一、抵、抗、力、三、三、現、在、  
三、給、三、三、於、三、友、那、一、困、難、三、增、大、三、之、三、效、果、三、有、三、之、力、  
三、如、三、行、動、三、差、控、三、且、各、個、三、友、那、三、之、援、助、三、得、三、程、交、三、者、  
三、慮、三、(一)三、三、之、三、右、三、明、三、日、友、兩、國、一、真、實、三、之、協、  
三、網、三、依、三、東、亞、三、平、和、三、其、現、三、之、三、三、年、和、三、等、與、三、之、三、  
三、三、三、帝、國、一、公、明、三、之、三、無、視、三、之、紛、爭、三、當、友、國、一、方、三、加、  
三、確、三、之、三、對、意、識、三、鼓、吹、三、之、三、三、本、件、紛、爭、。



853 B

列国此ノ要諦ヲ充分ニ認識スルコトニテ此ノ認識ニ基ク  
協力ニテ世界安定ニ寄與スルコトヲ得ルニ  
昭和十三年十月二十七日

853 B cert-1

「ワシントン」文書局 第 八 五 三 號  
國 際 條 約 部 第 八 五 三 號

真偽及び公正ニ關スル證明

余、米籍ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ外務省文書  
局長トシテ、日本政府ト公使資格ニ在ルモノナルコ  
ト、並ニ該官更トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレタル、一  
四三頁ヨリ成ル、千九百三十七年ノ昭和十二年ノ十  
二月附、下記題名、即チ支那事變日誌公表案（第二  
號）ノ文書ノ保管ニ任ジ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。  
余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナ  
ルコト、並ニ右ガ下記条約ノ管下ハ部局ノ公式記録  
及ビ雜ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。（添シアラズ條約及  
公列長、其ノ他公式文書ノ類ニ於ケル誤謬ノ虞現所在ノ公式文  
書ニ係リ得記スベシ）

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ九月二十三日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官更署名欄

米 籍

右ノ者ノ公使資格

外務省文書局長

證 人

尾 戶 長 春



Doc. P.5.3 B  
Curt-2

公証人十二箇又此證明

余 John A. Curtis: 余が聯合國最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト並ニ上記題名ノ文書ノ余が公務上、日本政府上ニ記署名官更ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 九月三十一日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名 榎

John A. Curtis

右者公署  
證人

國際檢察所調査官

Richard N. Laish

Q. 9510

THE BRITISH NOTE DELIVERED BY SIR ROBERT CRAIGIE  
TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON DECEMBER 16, 1937

*concerning attacks made on British warships and*

*Your Excellency, merchant shipping at Wuhu and Nanking*

I have the honour on instructions from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to address your Excellency on the subject of attacks made by Japanese aircraft and land forces on British warships and merchant shipping at Wuhu and near Nanking on 12th December. These incidents clearly raise grave issues.

2. At Wuhu a British tug which had conveyed from Nanking His Majesty's Consul, the British Military Attache and the Flag-Captain to the British Rear-Admiral, Yangtze, was attacked by Japanese machine-gun fire after transferring these officers to H. M. S. Ladybird. The latter proceeded to join the tug in order to protect her, when she observed a Japanese field gun battery firing on merchant ships concentrated above the Asiatic Petroleum Company's installation. Firing continued and was directed at H. M. S. Ladybird herself.

3. There were four direct hits on this vessel, one naval rating was killed, another was seriously wounded and there were several minor casualties including Flag-Captain. A direct hit was also seen to be sustained by the British merchant ship Suiwo. H. M. S. Bee then arrived on the scene and was also fired on by the shore battery. The Commander of H. M. S. Bee landed to protest and was informed by Colonel Hashimoto, the senior Japanese military officer then at Wuhu, that firing on warships was due to a mistake but that he had orders to fire on every ship on the river. At a later interview the same officer stated categorically that if any ships moved on the river they would be fired on and, despite protests, H.M.S. Bee and Ladybird after berthing remained covered by guns at point blank range.

4. Near Hsia San-shan above Nanking where British merchant ships were concentrated in a part of the river previously designated by the Japanese Commander-in-Chief as a safety-zone, three separate bombing attacks were made by Japanese aircraft on them and on H. M. Ships Cricket and Scarab which were with them.

5. His Majesty's Government have now been glad to receive your Excellency's note of the 14th December offering the profound apology of the Imperial Japanese Government for the attacks on His Majesty's Ships, stating that measures were immediately taken to prevent the recurrence of such

incidents and adding that they will deal suitably with those responsible and pay the necessary compensation.

6. His Majesty's Government observe that Your Excellency's note makes no mention of the attacks on British merchant vessels and I am instructed to request that an assurance may be given that all that is said in that note applies equally to these attacks.

7. His Majesty's Government take particular note of the statement that those responsible will be suitably dealt with. Adequate punishment of those responsible for the particular attacks under discussion seems indeed to His Majesty's Government to be the only method by which further outrages can be prevented.

8. His Majesty's Government cannot but recall the previous incidents in which the Japanese Government have expressed regret for attacks made on British nationals and property and have given assurance that adequate steps had been taken to prevent any repetition. They call to mind the attack made on His Majesty's Ambassador to China while travelling by road from Nanking to Shanghai, the subsequent attack on motorcars conveying British officials on a similar journey, the attacks on British civilians and military posts on the defense perimeter at Shanghai, as well as other incidents, and the repeated assurances of the Japanese Government of their intention fully to respect the interests of third Powers in the present conflict with China. It is clear that the steps hitherto taken by the Japanese Government to prevent such attacks have so far failed in this purpose and His Majesty's Government must now ask to be informed that measures have actually been taken of a character which will put a definite stop to the incidents of which they complain.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

Signed: R. L. Craigie

C E R T I F I C A T E

W. D. C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I. P. S. No. 853

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi Maoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 143 pages, dated Oct-Nov-Dec., 1937, and described as follows: Announcements of the Japanese Government Relating to the China Incident. (Vol. 2).

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Office.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
23rd day of Sept., 1946

/s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Chief, Archives Sect  
Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Statement of Official Procurement

I, John A. Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
23 day of Sept., 1946

/s/ J. A. Curtis 2d Lt.  
Investigator

Witness: /s/ Richard H. Larsh

Investigator  
Official Capacity.

60954C  
853 C

~~校~~

三九 蕪湖及南京ニ於テノ英國艦船攻撃ニ関スル十二月  
下省門廣田外務大臣宛英國大使公文(十二月三十日)

一 本使ハ本國政府ノ訓令ニ基キ閣下ニ於テ十二月十二日蕪湖及南  
京附近ニ於テ日本軍航空機及陸上部隊ノ英國軍艦及商船  
ヲ攻撃スル事件ニ関シ茲ニ申述スルノ先聲ヲ有ス此等ノ事件  
ノ重大ナル問題ヲ提起スルモノハ明白ナリ。

二 蕪湖ニ於テ南京ヨリ英國領事、英國陸軍武官及英國揚子  
江派遺少將門參謀長ヲ搭載シ来ル英國兵船ハ右搭載者ノ  
英國軍艦トシテイバトトニ乘リ移リテ後日本側機関銃ノ  
射撃ヲ受ケタリトシテイバトトノ護衛ノ為右兵船ニ接近スル  
ノ實際亞細亞石油会社施設物ノ上流ニ集結中ノ商船ニ對シ  
日本軍野砲陣ヨリ射撃シ居ルヲ見受ケタル処右射撃  
ハ引續キトシテイバトトニ向ケラレタリ。

三 同艦ニハ彈丸四発命中シ水兵一名死亡他ノ一名重傷ヲ負  
ヒ參謀長ヲ始メ數名ノ輕傷者ヲ出タシタリ尚英國商  
船總和号ニハ彈丸一発命中セルヲ看取セリ次ニ英國  
軍艦トシ現場ニ到着セル處之亦沿岸砲陣ヨリ砲撃  
セラレタリトシ艦々長ハ抗議ヲ為ス為上陸セル處蕪湖  
ニ於ケル日本陸軍先任將校橋本大佐ハ軍艦ニ對スル砲  
撃ハ過ニ甚キタルモノナルヲ江上ニ於ケル一切ノ船舶ニ對シ射  
撃スル命令ヲ受ケ居ル旨述ベタリ其後念見ノ際  
同將校ハ何レノ船舶モ江上ヲ移動スル場合ハ砲撃セザル

乙

853 C

（キ）白断言（ビ）及（シ）デ（イ）バ（ド）ハ抗議（ス）ルニ（モ）拘（ラ）ズ投（シ）  
後直射距離ニ于野砲ヲ向（ケ）ラシ居（リ）タル（モ）ナ（シ）。

四、南京上流下三山附近ニ於（テ）是（レ）日本軍司令長官（ノ）安全地  
帯トシテ指定（セ）ル水域ニ英（王）商船集中（シ）居（リ）シ（ル）ニ於（テ）日本軍  
航空機ハ右商船及（シ）ト共（ニ）在（リ）タル英國軍艦（ヲ）ク（リ）ケ（ト）及  
（シ）カ（ラ）ズ（ニ）對（シ）テ（モ）互（ニ）爆撃（ヲ）加（ヘ）タリ。

五、英國軍艦（ニ）對（シ）テ（モ）攻撃（ヲ）シ（テ）付（テ）日本政府（ノ）深甚（ト）シ（ル）陳謝（ヲ）提  
示（シ）此種（ノ）件（ヲ）再（テ）防止（ス）為（メ）直（ニ）措置（ヲ）テ（ル）旨（ヲ）述（ベ）更（ニ）  
責任者（ニ）對（シ）テ（モ）適當（ト）シ（ル）処置（ヲ）執（ル）ハ（ク）又（モ）必要（ト）シ（ル）賠償  
ヲ（モ）テ（キ）旨（ヲ）附記（セ）ル十二月十四日附貴翰（ヲ）受領（シ）タル英國  
政府（ノ）欣幸（ト）ス（ル）所（ナ）リ。

六、英國政府（ノ）貴翰（中）英國商船（ニ）對（シ）テ（モ）攻撃（ヲ）シ（テ）付（テ）言（及）無（キ）  
ヲ認（メ）本使（ニ）對（シ）テ（モ）貴翰（御）申越（ス）次第（ハ）總（テ）此等商船（ニ）對（シ）  
テ（モ）攻撃（ヲ）シ（テ）付（テ）無（キ）旨（ヲ）保障（ヲ）本（レ）標  
訓（令）越（シ）タリ。

七、英國政府（ノ）責任者（ハ）適當（ト）シ（ル）處置（ヲ）セ（ラ）ル（ニ）シ（テ）御申越（ス）  
特（ニ）重視（ス）ル（モ）ナ（シ）英國政府（ハ）本件（個）々（ノ）攻撃（ノ）事件（ノ）  
責任者（ヲ）充分（ト）処罰（ス）ル（コ）ト（シ）今後（ハ）此種（暴）行（ヲ）防止  
ス（ル）唯一（ノ）方法（ナ）リ（ト）思料（ス）。

3

八、英國政府（ハ）是（レ）日本政府（ノ）英國臣民及（シ）財產（ニ）對（シ）テ（モ）攻撃（ヲ）  
シ（テ）付（テ）遺憾（ノ）意（ヲ）表（シ）之（カ）再（テ）防止（ス）為（メ）充分（ト）處置（ヲ）執（ル）  
リ（タ）旨（ヲ）保障（セ）ラ（シ）タル諸（ノ）事件（ヲ）想起（セ）サル（ヲ）得（ザ）ル（モ）ナ（シ）  
英國政府（ハ）其（駐）支（大使）陸路（南京）ヨリ（上海）向（テ）途（上）ニ於（テ）  
受（ケ）タル攻撃（ノ）其（後）同様（ノ）旅行（ノ）途（上）ニ於（テ）英國官吏（ヲ）  
搭載（セ）ル自動車（ニ）對（シ）テ（モ）加（ヘ）ラ（シ）タル攻撃（ノ）上海（周）邊（防）備（區）域（ニ）  
於（テ）英國非戰鬥員及（シ）守備軍陣地（ニ）加（ヘ）ラ（シ）タル攻撃（ノ）及

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其他事件並ニ現下ノ日支紛争中ヲ三國ノ利益ヲ充分尊重  
スル意圖ナル旨ノ日本政府累次保障ヲ想起スルモノナリ此種  
攻撃防止ノ為日本政府力從來執ラシタル措置ハ今迄ノ所  
其目的ヲ達セサリシコト明白ニシテ英國政府ハ其不滿トスル  
諸事件ヲ確定ニ防止スルカ如キ性慣ノ措置ヲ現行ニ執ラシテ  
ル旨ノ通報ヲ要請セサルヲ得サル次第ナリ。

以上三ノ旨

8530 857-1

「ワシントン」文藝局 第 〇 號  
目 録 部 第八三三號

身操及び公正ニ圖スル旨

余、森島ハ余ガ下記ノ資者ニ於テ即テ外務省文藝課  
長トシテ日本政府ト公的關係ニ在ルモノナルコト、  
並ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレタル、一四三  
頁ヲリ居ル、千九百三十七年ノ昭和十二年ノ十二月  
附、下記姓名、即テ支那海關公署第一(第二號)  
ノ文藝ノ保存ニ任ジ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ茲ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文藝ヲ日本政府ノ公文書ト  
ルコト、並ニ若ガ下記姓名ノ全又ハ一部ノ公文書  
及ビ其ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(茲ニ添付ノ文書及  
ハ別紙、其ノ他公文書及ビ其ニ於テ該文書ノ關係在ル公文書  
ニモ等記ス)

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ九月二十三日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏姓名 森 島  
右ノ者ノ公的資格 外務省文藝課長  
証 人 戸 長 森



Doc 453 C  
1018-2

公人十二國之證明

John A. Curtis: 余於聯合國最高指揮  
部宣稱司令部關係之元、此二、如三  
記類名、文書、余於公務上、日本政府之  
記類名、宣稱、於一九四五年、此二、宣稱、證  
明。

一九四五年 昭和二十五年 九月二十日

東家 = 於于署名

Richard N. Lorsch  
證人  
署名  
人

John A. Curtis  
國際檢察部調查員  
Richard N. Lorsch

Ex. # 955

Doc. No. 219A (46)  
Br. Ex. 74

Page 1

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE JAPANESE  
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (HIRATA)

No. 796

TOKYO, September 17, 1937.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor, by direction of my Government, to address to Your Excellency the following note:

"Since the beginning of the present fighting in China the American Government has received reports of attacks by Japanese armed forces in China upon American nationals and their property, including attacks upon American humanitarian and philanthropic establishments and upon the persons and property of non-combatants generally.

The American Government desires in particular to bring to the attention of the Japanese Government a recent attack on September 12 by Japanese planes on an American missionary hospital in South China, located at Waichow, Kwangtung Province. Information in the possession of the American Government indicates that three Japanese planes flew low three times over the mission compound where two large American flags were flying; that each time the planes dropped bombs all of which exploded seriously injuring personnel of the hospital as well as damaging the hospital and the residence, that there were no anti-aircraft guns at Waichow, and that the mission itself is two miles distant from any Chinese military encampment.

Attack upon non-combatants is prohibited both by long accepted principles and by established rules of international law. Also, attack upon humanitarian establishments, especially those which are lawfully under the flags of countries in no way party to military operations, have no warrant in any system of law or of humane conduct. The American Government, therefore, is impelled, in fulfillment of its obligations toward its nationals and on behalf of those fundamental principles of law and of morality which relate to the immunity of non-combatants and humanitarian establishments, emphatically to voice objection to such attacks and to urge upon the Japanese Government, which the American Government cannot believe approves of such disregard of principles, that effective steps be taken toward averting any further such attacks."

I avail myself (etc.)

JOSEPH C. GREW

Foreign Relations I, pp. 498-499



219 p (46)

李使公啟云：此種攻擊，對其抗議，表示之且又  
此種，常則無視，認各在心上，米國政府，信其能此所  
自本政府，於此，更三斯以擊，自辯，其為，有知九權，置  
其言之事，位，其，餘，儀，十，七，十，日

李使公啟云云（後文略）

Joseph C. GREW

(Joseph C. GREW)

Foreign Relation I, pp. 498-499

Doc. No. 219P (47)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 75

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE  
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (HIKOTA)

No. 780

TOKYO, September 22, 1937.

Excerpts.

. . . . .

The American Government objects both to such jeopardizing of lives of its nationals and of non-combatants generally and to the suggestion that its officials and nationals now residing in and around Nanking should withdraw from the areas in which they are lawfully carrying on their legitimate activities.

. . . . .

In view of the fact that Nanking is the seat of Government in China and that there the American Ambassador and other agencies of the American Government carry on their essential functions, the American Government strongly objects to the creation of a situation in consequence of which the American Ambassador and other agencies of this Government are confronted with the alternative of abandoning their establishments or being exposed to grave hazards.

In the light of the assurances repeatedly given by the Japanese Government that the objectives of Japanese military are limited strictly to Chinese military agencies and establishments and that the Japanese Government has no intention of making non-military property and non-combatants the direct objects of attack, and of the Japanese Government's expression of its desire to respect the embassies, warships and merchant vessels of the Powers at Nanking, the American Government cannot believe that the intimation that the whole Nanking area may be subjected to bombing operations represents the considered intent of the Japanese Government.

. . . . .

JOSEPH C. GREW

Foreign Relations I, pp. 504-505

△

駐日アメリカ大使(ルー氏)、GREW、より日本外務大臣(廣田氏)へ

第六。號 板 草

東京ニテ

一九三七年(昭和十二年)九月二十二日

60956  
219P(17)

x x x x x

米國政府、米國人並ニ一般非戦闘員、生命ヲ危殆ニ陥ラシムルカ  
如キ行為及ニ現在南京市内外ニ居住スル米國政府官吏並ニ米國市  
民ノ、正当ニ活動ヲ合法的ニ遂行ラシムル地域ヨリヲ揚グベシト、警告  
、雙方ニ反對ス。

x x x x x

南京、中國政府所在地ニテ且米國大使並ニ米國政府、他諸機關  
其ノ主要ナル業務ヲ遂行ラシムル事實ニ鑑ミ、其ノ廢倉ヲ放棄スルカ  
シテ、大ニ危険ニ暴露サルカニ者其、一ヲ選ク、再ニ直面  
シク如キ事態、發生對シ米國政府、強硬反對スベシト。

日本軍、目標、中國、軍事機關及ニ其施設ニ局限セシ日本  
政府、非軍事的財産及ニ非戦闘員、攻撃ヲ直接、目標トス  
ク如キ企圖ヲ有セト、日本政府、屢次興ヘタル保証及ニ南京ニ  
於テ引強ク、大使館軍艦商船ヲ尊重セトス日本政府、希望  
表明ニ鑑ミ米國政府、南京全地域ガ爆撃ヲ受ルベシト、通告ヲ日  
本政府、恩慮ニ意圖ヲ示セト、信ジ得ス。

ジョセフ・C・グレイ  
/JOSEPH C. GREW/

外事関係一 五〇四—五〇五

Doc. No. 219 P (48)  
Br. Ex. 76

Page 1

Ex 957

MEMORANDUM BY THE CHIEF OF THE DIVISION  
OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS (HAMILTON) OF A  
CONVERSATION WITH THE COUNSELLOR OF THE  
JAPANESE EMBASSY (SUWA)

Excerpts

(WASHINGTON,) September 25, 1937

. . . . .

I referred to the recent Japanese bombing operations at Canton where, according to the reports, some 2,000 non-combatants had been killed. I said that I had noticed a statement in some newspaper to the effect that the Japanese military were very much surprised that reports were being sent from China to the effect that Japanese military operations were resulting in the death of non-combatants. I said that this killing of non-combatants at Canton, at Hankow, at Nanking and at various other places in China could not but create the most deplorable impression in this country and in other countries. . . . I said again that this whole matter of bombing non-combatants was deplorable and was creating a most unfortunate impression.

(MAXWELL) M. HAMILTON

Foreign Relations I, pp. 505-506

Doc. No. 219P (49)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 77

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS  
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SEPTEMBER 27, 1937

The Advisory Committee,

Taking into urgent consideration the question of  
the aerial bombardment of open towns in China, by Japanese  
aircraft,

Expresses its profound distress at the loss of life  
caused to innocent civilians, including great numbers of  
women and children, as a result of such bombardments.

Declares that no excuse can be made for such acts  
which have aroused horror and indignation throughout the  
world,

And solemnly condemns them.

Foreign Relations I, p. 506



64958  
219P(49)

△

一九三七年、昭和十二年、九月二十七日 國際聯盟諮問委員  
會決議  
諮問委員會

日本空軍ニ依ル支那非武装都市空爆問題 頃々緊急  
考慮ヲ加ヘル結果  
斯カル爆撃ヨリ多数、婦人幼少者ヲ含ム無辜、市民、蒙リ  
ル生命、喪失、深甚ナル悲嘆、意ヲ表明スル共ニ、全世界ノ  
通ジ恐怖ト憤怒、念ヲ喚起スル斯カル行為ニ対シテハ如何  
ル陳弁モ為心得九不ヲ宣、言  
且ツ嚴肅ニ之ヲ罪アリト宣ス

外交関係 工、五、六頁

601 959

Doc. No. 219P (50)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 78

PRESS RELEASE ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ON SEPTEMBER 28, 1937

The Department of State has been informed by the American Minister to Switzerland of the text of the resolution unanimously adopted on September 27 by the Advisory Committee of the League of Nations on the subject of aerial bombardment by Japanese air forces of open towns in China.

The American Government, as has been set forth to the Japanese Government repeatedly, and especially in this Government's note of September 22, holds the view that any general bombing of an extensive area wherein there resides a large populace engaged in peaceful pursuits is unwarranted and contrary to principles of law and of humanity.

Foreign Relations I, p. 506

959

△

二一九P(五〇)

959  
D. 219 P (50)

一九三七年九月三日、名務省ヨリ出サレタル新聞発表  
名務省、瑞運駐米公使ヨリ、支那ニ於ケル若干ノ無防備  
都市、日本空軍ニ依リ爆撃ノ問題ニ関シ、名務聯盟勸  
告委員会ニヨリ九月十七日全會ニ於テ採用サレタ決議、  
本文ヲ通報セラル。

又、名務政府、日本政府ニヨリテ繰返シ指摘シタル如クシテ、  
殊ニ九月二十二日、米政府、復書ニ就テラシシ如ク平和的  
職業ニ従事スル市民、多数人口カ居住スル心竹範圍ノ地域  
ノ一般爆撃、如何ナルモ之モ不法ニシテ且法ト人道ノ原  
則ニ反スルモノナルハ、見解ヲ有スルモノナリ。

外國關係第壹冊 頁。六頁

E. 960

Doc. No. 219P (51)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 79

PRISS RELEASE ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ON JANUARY 31, 1938

Excerpt.

The Department of State on the evening of January 28, 1938, instructed the American Embassy at Tokyo to make oral representations to the Japanese Foreign Office with reference to the incident involving the slapping by a Japanese soldier of Mr. John M. Allison, third secretary of the American Embassy at Nanking, on January 26.

The Department instructed the Embassy at Tokyo orally to communicate the substance of Mr. Allison's telegrams of January 27 and 28 to a high officer of the Japanese Foreign Office and that in so doing there be emphasized that in weighing the gravity of the incident this Government takes into account the fact that the whole incident, including the slapping by a Japanese soldier of a diplomatic representative of the Government, is not an isolated case, but represents but one of and cannot be dissociated from a series of cases of irregular entry of American property and disregard of American rights by Japanese soldiers.

. . . . .

foreign Relations I, p. 574

Doc 219P (51)

960

一九三八年（昭和十三年）一月三十一日（國務省提供新聞）  
発表抜萃

國務省は一九三八年（昭和十三年）一月三十一日及在東京  
米大使館に訓令を發し一月二十六日在東京米大使館  
三等書記官ヨシノ、M. P. スニウ Mr. John M. Allison  
が日本兵に平手を打たれた事件に關し日本外務省に口  
頭を以て抗議申入れたと云ふが如し

國務省は一月二十五日及二十六日附のヨシノ、M. Allison  
の電報の内容を日本外務省の高級職員に口頭を以て  
傳達し同時にこの事件の重大性の検討に當り本政府は  
日本兵が本政府の外交代表を平手を以て打たれた事件  
は孤立した事件ではなからず日本兵が米兵の威嚇に不志  
侵入をなした日本兵が米兵の權利を無視する譯少の事  
件に關し過意なくあり今雖も考慮を以て之を以て之を  
之を以て考慮するが如し之を以て之を強硬に申入れたらう  
訓令を發した

外務關係一。子七四頁

Doc. No. 219P (37)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 57

ADDRESS DELIVERED BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AT  
CHICAGO ON OCTOBER 5, 1937

Excerpt.

. . . . .

The political situation in the world, which of late has been growing progressively worse, is such as to cause grave concern and anxiety to all the peoples and nations who wish to live in peace and amity with their neighbors.

Some 15 years ago the hopes of mankind for a continuing era of international peace were raised to great heights when more than 60 nations solemnly pledged themselves not to resort to arms in furtherance of their national aims and policies. The high aspirations expressed in the Briand-Kellogg Peace Pact and the hopes for peace thus raised have of late given way to a haunting fear of calamity. The present reign of terror and international lawlessness began a few years ago.

It began through unjustified interference in the internal affairs of other nations or the invasion of alien territory in violation of treaties and has now reached a stage where the very foundations of civilization are seriously threatened. The landmarks and traditions which have marked the progress of civilization toward a condition of law, order, and justice are being wiped away.

Without a declaration of war and without warning or justification of any kind, civilians, including women and children, are being ruthlessly murdered with bombs from the air. In times of so-called peace ships are being attacked and sunk by submarines without cause or notice. Nations are forming and taking sides in civil warfare in nations that have never done them any harm. Nations claiming freedom for themselves deny it to others.

Innocent peoples and nations are being cruelly sacrificed to a greed for power and supremacy which is devoid of all sense of justice and humane consideration.

To paraphrase a recent author, "perhaps we foresee a time when men, exultant in the technique of homicide, will rage so hotly over the world that every precious thing will be in danger, even book and picture and harmony, every treasure garnered through two millennia, the small, the delicate, the defenseless—all will be lost or wrecked or utterly destroyed."

If these things come to pass in other parts of the world let no one imagine that America will escape, that it may expect mercy, that this Western Hemisphere will not be attacked, and that it will continue tranquilly and peacefully to carry on the ethics and traditions of civilization.

If these days come "there will be no safety by arms, no help from authority, no answer in science. The storm will rage till every flower of culture is trampled and all human beings are leveled in a vast chaos."

If these days are not to come to pass--if we are to have a world in which we can breathe freely and live in amity without fear--the peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort to uphold laws and principles on which alone peace can rest secure.

The peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort in opposition to those violations of treaties and those ignorings of humane instincts which today are creating a state of international anarchy and instability from which there is no escape through mere isolation or neutrality.

Those who cherish their freedom and recognize and respect the equal right of their neighbors to be free and live in peace, must work together for the triumph of law and moral principles in order that peace, justice, and confidence may prevail in the world. There must be a return to a belief in the pledged word, in the value of a signed treaty. There must be recognition of the fact that national morality is as vital as private morality.

A bishop wrote me the other day: "It seems to me that something greatly needs to be said in behalf of ordinary humanity against the present practice of carrying the horrors of war to helpless civilians, especially women and children. It may be that such a protest might be regarded by many, who claim to be realists, as futile, but may it not be that the heart of mankind is so filled with horror at the present needless suffering that that force could be mobilized in sufficient volume to lessen such cruelty in the days ahead? Even though it may take twenty years, which God forbid, for civilization to make effective its corporate protest against this barbarism, surely strong voices may hasten the day."

There is a solidarity and interdependence about the modern world, both technically and morally, which makes it impossible for any nation completely to isolate itself from economic and political upheavals in the rest of the world, especially when such upheavals appear to be spreading and not declining. There can be no stability or peace either within nations or between nations except under laws and moral standards adhered to by all. International anarchy destroys every foundation for peace. It

jeopardizes either the immediate or the future security of every nation, large or small. It is, therefore, a matter of vital interest and concern to the people of the United States that the sanctity of international treaties and the maintenance of international morality be restored.

The overwhelming majority of the peoples and nations of the world today want to live in peace. They seek the removal of barriers against trade. They want to exert themselves in industry in agriculture, and in business, that they may increase their wealth through the production of wealth-producing goods rather than striving to produce military planes and bombs and machine guns and cannon for the destruction of human lives and useful property.

In those nations of the world which seem to be piling armaments en masse for purposes of aggression, and those other nations which fear acts of aggression against them and their security, a very high proportion of their national income is being spent directly for armaments. It runs from 30 to as high as 50 percent.

The proportion that we in the United States spend is far less--11 or 12 percent.

How happy we are that the circumstances of the moment permit us to put our money into bridges and boulevards, cars and re-forestation, the conservation of our soil, and many other kinds of useful works rather than into huge standing armies and vast supplies of implements of war.

I am compelled and you are compelled, nevertheless, to look ahead. The peace, the freedom, and the security of 90 percent of the population of the world is being jeopardized by the remaining 10 percent, who are threatening a breakdown of all international order and law. Surely the 90 percent who want to live in peace under law and in accordance with moral standards that have received almost universal acceptance through the centuries, can and must find some way to make their will prevail.

The situation is definitely of universal concern. The questions involved relate not merely to violations of specific provisions of particular treaties; they are questions of war and of peace, of international law, and especially of principles of humanity. It is true that they involve definite violations of agreements, and especially of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Briand-Kellogg Pact, and the Nine Power Treaty. But they also involve problems of world economy, world security, and world humanity.



It is true that the moral consciousness of the world must recognize the importance of removing injustices and well-founded grievances; but at the same time it must be aroused to the cardinal necessity of honoring sanctity of treaties, of respecting the rights and liberties of others, and of putting an end to acts of international aggression.

It seems to be unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading.

When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and orders a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease.

It is my determination to pursue a policy of peace and to adopt every practicable measure to avoid involvement in war. It ought to be inadmissible that in this modern era, and in the face of experience, any nation could be so foolish and ruthless as to run the risk of plunging the whole world into war by invading and violating in contempt of solemn treaties the territory of other nations that have done them no real harm and which are too weak to protect themselves adequately. Yet the peace of the world and the welfare and security of every nation is today being threatened by that very thing.

No nation which refuses to exercise forbearance and to respect the freedom and rights of others can long remain strong and retain the confidence and respect of other nations. No nation ever loses its dignity or good standing by conciliating its differences and by exercising great patience with and consideration for the rights of other nations.

War is a contagion, whether it be declared or undeclared. It can engulf states and peoples remote from the original scene of hostilities. We are determined to keep out of war, yet we cannot insure ourselves against the disastrous effects of war and the dangers of involvement. We are adopting such measures as will minimize our risk of involvement, but we cannot have complete protection in a world of disorder in which confidence and security have broken down.

If civilization is to survive the principles of the Prince of Peace must be restored. Shattered trust between nations must be revived.

Most important of all, the will for peace on the part of peace-loving nations must express itself to the end that nations that may be tempted to violate their agreements and the rights of others will desist from such a course. There must be positive endeavors to preserve peace.

America hates war. America hopes for peace. Therefore, America actively engages in the search for peace.

Foreign Relations, I, pp.380-3  
(Beginning 379 )

一九三七年十月五日 かがニ於テ ルーズヴェルト大統領、行ル

演説抜萃

最近漸次惡化シテ、世界、政治的、状態、今ヤ隣國民ト平和ト親睦ニ生キト欲スル凡テ、國民ト國家ニ對テ、重大ナル心處ト不安トヲ惹起スルニ至ツテ居ル。

約十五年前永續スル國際的平和時代ヲ求メトスル人類、希望ハ六十餘國ガ國家、目的及政策ヲ助長セガ為嚴肅ニ交渉ニ許ヘザラント誓約セシ時ニ偉大ナル高度ニ達スル。

ブリタニヤ國ク平和條約ニ表現セシ高度、抱負ト斯クニ高メシ平和ヲ求メトスル希望ハ、輒直今ク地ニ墜クテ不幸ナル不安ガ吾人、腦裏ヲ去来スル。

現在、恐怖ト國際的無秩序、時代ハ數ク年ヲ開始ス。

其レ他國家、内事ニ不正ニ容喙シ、又ハ條約ヲ犯シテ外國、領土ニ侵入セルトニ起因ス。而シテ今ヤ文明、眞、根柢スルモ脅ク及處、段階ニ到達ス。

法律、秩序及正義、状態ヲ指向スル文明、進歩ヲ指示シタル歴史上、顯著ナル事實及伝統ニモ現在拂拭セラレツアル。

無宣戰又ハ何テ、警告告戒ハ辯明無シテ女子ヲ念ハ非戰鬥員ガ空中、ク、爆彈ヨリ無情ニ殺戮セラルル所謂平和時ニ船舶ガ無原因又ハ無警告ニ潜水艦ニ攻撃セリ且撃沈セラルル。

國家ガ何テ、損害ヲ及ビ他國家、内亂ヲ挑發シ援助シラル。

自國ニ自由ヲ求メシ國公ニ他國ニ否認ス。

罪ヲ國民ト國家ハ残酷ニモ正義及人情、凡テ、觀念ヲ缺ク權力ト霸權、貪慾ニ犠牲トナラシムル。

最近、或著者、言ヲ解釋スルニ一即テ

人間ガ殺入ト謂フ技術ヲ得意トシ凡テ、貴重品ガ危險ニ

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No 1

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曝ケル位 在界中ヲ劇シ暴シ廻ル時代が到来スルデゾ  
書籍・繪畫・対觀書。二千年間ヲ蓄藏シタ凡テ、寶物・些細  
タル事物。優美タル事物。無テ備テ事物等一凡テ、モガ失ハ或  
破滅スル或ハ徹底的ニ破壊セルデアラト

若シ其等、事物が在界、他、部分ニ發生ストモ、東米利加ハ神、  
慈悲ヲ期待シテ逃避スル此、西半球ハ攻撃サレヌデゾ而シテ  
米利加ハ文明、倫理ト技術ヲ靜養ニ且ツ平和ニ當ルデアラト等ト  
夢思考スル也。

若シ其、時代が到来ストモ武力ニ依ル安全性・權カヨリ、非途  
科学、應酬等モ皆無トナリ。此、風化、凡テ、精華ヲ蹂躪シ  
全人類ヲ巨大ナル渾沌、中ニ平等トスル此暴シ廻ルデアラト。

若シ其、時代が到来ストモ一即ケ吾人が自由ニ棲息シ恐怖  
無ク親睦ニ生活シ得ル在界ヲ所有ストモ平和ヲ愛好セシ國家、  
平和ガソレニヨリ安全ナル法律ト道義ヲ擁護スク協力セホ  
トス。平和ヲ愛好セシ國家ハ今日障ニ孤立乃至中絶、理由  
ニ困リ逃シ得ル國際的無政府状態ト不安ヲ創造シツル  
條約、違反及人類本能、無視ニ抗シ協力セホトス。自由ヲ  
愛好シ且ツ自由ニ平和ニ生活スベク隣國、平等權ヲ承認シ尊重  
セホク在界ニ平和・正義並ニ信用ガ普及スル條、法律及道義  
的原理、勝利、為ニ協力セホトス。

署名スル條約、眞価ニ於テ誓約トスル文字、信條ニ對シ  
ハ返報ガ無クバトス。

國家的道義ハ個人的道義ト全ク同様ナル重要性アルト謂フ  
事實、認定ガ無クバトス。

一びしよふ 監督が過目ヲ二次、如キ書面ヲ寄セ、一即  
私ハ頼リ無イ非戰鬥員特ニ婦女子ニ戰、恐怖ヲ及ボス如ク現

no2

在ノ習慣ニ抗シテ通常的人道ノ為ニ申スベキ必要アル重大ナル何物  
 カゾル程ニ思考サル。斯ノ如キ抗議ハ實在論者ナリト自稱スルモノ  
 ノ者カラハ無益ナリト思考サルカモ知ラヌ。然レ人類ノ心ハ現在ノ不  
 要ヲ苦痛ニ依ッテ非常ニ恐怖ヲ示シテ居ルカラ將來斯ル残忍  
 ノ軽減スルニ足ル充分な兵カヲ動員シ得ルカモ知レヌ。萬一ヨレ文明ガ  
 斯ル變行ニ抗シテ其ノ協同的抗議ヲ効カラシムヘク二十年ノ長年  
 月ヲシテ神ガ許カヌガ必要トスルモ必ず強クアル意見ガ其ノ日ノ来  
 ルヲ促進スルデアラウト。

現今在界ニ技術上又ハ道德上共ニ共同責任ト相互依存トカ  
 存在ス。而シテ此ノ兩者ガ如何ナル國家ト雖モ在界ノ他國ニ於テ  
 經濟的並ニ政治的動乱カラ完全ニ隔離スルトトテ不可能ナラズ。  
 特ニ斯ル動乱ガ蔓延シ且ツ終熄ノ徴ガ無キ時ハ然リテアル。  
 法律並ニ道德的準據ガ凡テノ國家ニ固守セシメル状態以外ニ  
 ハ如何ナル安定モ平和モ國內乃至國家間ニ存在シ得ズ國際的  
 無政府状態ハ平和ニ対スル凡テノ基礎ヲ破壊ス。

其六、大小何レノ國家ノ真接乃至將來ノ安全ヲ危殆ナラ  
 シム。サレバ國際條約ノ神聖並ニ國際的道義我維持ノ回復  
 ハ五采利加合衆國々民ノ重大ナル利害ト内心事デアル。

今日在界ノ絶對多數ニ國民並ニ國家ハ平和ニ生キント希  
 求ス。彼等ハ貿易ノ障壁ヲ除去セト希望ス。

彼等ハ人命ト有益ナル財産ヲ破壊セガ為軍用航空機  
 爆彈・機關銃及大砲等ヲ懸命ニ製造セトスルヨリ寧ろ富  
 生産物ヲ製造シテ富賤ヲ増大セトシテ工業ニ農業ニ又ハ商  
 業ニ挺身セト希望ス。

侵略ノ為ニ在界ノ其等ノ國々ニ於テハ武器ノ上ニ武器ガ積ミ重ネラ  
 レ、又其ノ侵略行為ヲ防止シ及自己ノ保全ヲ恐レル他ノ國家ハ

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國家收入、大部分ヲ直接ニ武器、為ニ消費シタル。其ノ國家收入、  
三割ヨリ五割、高度並ニ達シテキル。

我々東米利加合衆國ノ消費スル割合ハ一割乃至一・二割ヨリ  
遙クニ下廻ツテキル

現下、境遇ガ吾人ニ巨大ナル常備軍並ニ莫大ナル武器、補給ニ  
金錢ヲ注入スルヲ寧ロ橋梁、幹線、街路、堰、堤、植林、國土  
保全及其他、有益ナル工事ニ金錢ヲ注入スル事ヲ許ストハ  
吾人ハ何タル果報者ツ!

今ヤ予而シテ諸君ヲ亦前視セシムルヲス。

世界人口、九割並ニ平和、自由及安全ハ殘部九割、為  
ニ危殆ニ瀕シツツアル。此ノ人々ハ凡テ、國際的秩序及法律ヲ  
崩壞セトシテ脅威シムル。

確カニ法律、下ニ平和ニ生活シ且ツ數百年ヲ殆トシ一般  
ノ受納ヲ享受スル道德的基準ニ順應セトシ欲スル九割、今  
自己ノ意志ヲ廣ク行フ何カノ方法ヲ發見シ得又發見セザル  
ニ又。

現勢ハ明確ニ弘ク世ノ関心事ナリ。

關係セル問題ハ特定條約、特殊條項、單ニ其處及關スルモ  
テ無ク。

其ハ戰爭、平和、國際法、而シテ特ニ人道ノ原則ニ係ル問題ナ  
リ。

其ノ問題ハ條約、特ニ國際聯盟規約、ブリッセルノケロク條約  
及九箇國條約、明確ナル條及等ヲ包含スルヲ謂フコトハ事實  
ナリ。

no 4

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然其等亦世界、經濟、保全及人道、諸問題ヲ包含其心。世人、道德的良心ノ不正ヲ根據、アル言柄ヲ除去スル、重要性ヲ認識セシムル又ト謂フニトハ事實ナリ。

然今同時ニ道德的良心ノ條約、神聖ヲ保持シ他國、權利及自由ヲ尊重シ而シテ國際的侵略行為ニ終止符ヲ打ツ基本的必要性ニ對シテ喚起セシメバトラス。

今、世界の無秩序、悪疫が蔓延シタル事、不幸ニモ事實ナリ保シ心ハル。

身体的病症、悪疫が蔓延シタル時、公衆ハ該病、蔓延ニ對シテ公衆、健康ヲ保護セシムル為、患者、隔離ヲ承認シ且ツ参加ス。

予、決意トシテハ戰爭ノ参加ヲ防止セシメ平和的政策ヲ追求シ且ツ凡ソ實際的手段ヲ採用スルコトナリ。此、現代ニ至リテ經驗ニ拘ル如何ナル國家ト雖モ嚴肅ナル條約ヲ他國ニ何ヲ実害無キ而シテ弱カシメ人々適當護身、不能ナル他國、領土ヲ侵略シ且ツ侵害シテ全世界ヲ戰爭ニ陥レル危險ヲ自ラ怪愚ニ察スルモノハアリ得ナシト謂フニトハ當然信得可カシム事ナリ。

然レトモ今、世界、平和ト各國、安寧及安全ハ斯、如キ實在ニ依テ脅威サレツツナリ。

如何ナル國家ト雖モ他國、權利行使ヲ拒否シ且ツ自由ト權利ヲ尊敬スルモノハ永續シテ強大ナリ又他國、信用ト尊敬トヲ保持スルコトハ出来ヌ。

如何ナル國家ト雖モ他國家、權利ヲ考慮シテ不知ヲ調停シ且ツ強大ナル忍術ヲ行使シ、威嚴ト立派ト地位ヲ失墜スルモノ無キ。戰爭ハソレガ宣言セテツガサレミーガ一種、傳染物ナリ。

其レハ戰鬥、根源地ヨリ遠隔、國家及國民生活ニ及ボテ

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吾人の戦争より離レト決意ス。然レドモ尚 吾人の戦争、残忍ナル結果ト纏絡、危険ニ抗シテ保証スルコトハ出来ヌ。吾人、今吾人、危シキ危険ヲ極クテ之ニ備ヘテ手段ヲ採用シテ居ル。

然レ吾人の信用ト安全ガ破壊サレテ秩序ヲ世界ニ於テ完全ニ保護ヲ求ムルコトハ出来ヌ。若シ文明ガ残存スベクナルヲバキリスト、主義ガ復興サレネバナラス。

國家間、傷ツク信頼ハ回復サレネバナラス。

凡テノ中最モ重要ナル事——即チ

平和ヲ愛好スル國家側ニ於テ平和ヲ希求セ下ス決意ハ結局ニ於テ彼等ノ條約ヤ他國ノ有ル權利ヲ犯サントスル國々ニ在ル事、項ヲ思止マシムルヲ現ハス可キ事。

平和維持、為積極的ニ努力スベキ事。

亞米利加ハ戦争ヲ嫌惡ス。

亞米利加ハ平和ヲ愛好ス。

セバ亞米利加ハ積極的ニ平和探求ニ努力スル。

外國關係 I . 三八。 — 三六三頁

(冒頭 三七九頁)

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E. # 962

Doc. No. 219P(3P)

Br. Ex. 5P

FIRST REPORT ADOPTED BY THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS  
ASSEMBLY ON OCTOBER 6, 1937

Excerpt.

It cannot, however, be challenged that powerful Japanese armies have invaded Chinese territory and are in military control of large areas, including Peking itself; that the Japanese Government has taken naval measures to close the coast of China to Chinese shipping; and that Japanese aircraft are carrying out bombardments over widely separated regions of the country.

After examination of the facts laid before it, the Committee is bound to take the view that the military operations carried on by Japan against China by land, sea and air are out of all proportion to the incident that occasioned the conflict; that such action cannot possibly facilitate or promote the friendly cooperation between the two nations that Japanese statesmen have affirmed to be the aim of their policy; that it can be justified neither on the basis of existing legal instruments nor on that of the right of self-defense, and that it is in contravention of Japan's obligations under the Nine-Power Treaty of February 6th, 1922, and under the Pact of Paris of August 27th, 1928.

Foreign Relations I, p. 384 at  
pp. 393-304.



一九三七年十月六日 國際聯盟總會 依リ採擇セラシク  
ル第一報告

坂 萃

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然レ乍ラ次ノ事實ハ否定サレ得ナイ。即チ有力ナル日本軍ガ支  
那領土ニ侵入シ北平自身ヲ含む花木ノ地域ヲ軍事的制禦下  
ニ置キタルト云フ事。又日本政府ハ支那ノ海運ニ對シ支那  
海岸ヲ封鎖スル為ニ海軍力ヲ使用シタルト云フ事。而シテ又日本軍  
航空機ガ支那ノ遠ク隔絶セリ居ル諸地域ニ遠距離ヲ實施シ  
タルト云フ事ナリ。總會ニ提起セラル諸事、實ニ檢討後、委員  
會ニ次、如キ見解ヲ示ルノ余儀ナキニ至リ。即チ陸、海、空ヨリス  
ル支那ニ對シテ日本ニヨリ實行セラシク軍事的行動ハ紛爭ヲ捲  
起シテ謂フ所ノ事、實ニ對シテ、今ノ釣金ハナクガカリナキ、  
ナリ事、又斯ナル行動ハ日本ノ政治家ガ彼等ノ政策ノ目的ヲ  
了ト確言シテ、兩國間ノ友誼的協力ヲ容易ニスルコト  
モ或ハ増進スルコトモ出来ナイト云フ事、ナル行動ハ現存  
法的文書或ハ自衛權ニ基礎セテ合理シク得ナイト云フ  
事。而シテ、一九二二年二月六日ノ九國國條約並ニ一九一  
六年八月二十七日ノパリ協約ニヨリ日本ノ義務ニ違背シタルト  
云フ事ナリ。

外國關係第一冊 三八四頁

三九三—四頁

Doc. No. 219P (39)

Br. Ex. 59

PRESS RELEASE ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT  
OF STATE ON OCTOBER 6, 1937

(The following excerpt)

9 13  
.....  
In the light of the unfolding developments in the Far East, the Government of the United States has been forced to the conclusion that the action of Japan in China is inconsistent with the principles which should govern the relationships between nations and is contrary to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty of February 6, 1922, regarding principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China, and to those of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of August 27, 1928. Thus the conclusions of this Government with respect to the foregoing are in general accord with those of the Assembly of the League of Nations.

Foreign Relations J, n. 396 a 397

一九三七年十月六日、外務省ニヨツテ発表セラシタ新聞発表

(以下抜萃)

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極東ニ於テ引續キ南サシツ、アル事態ニ鑑ニテ、合衆國政府  
府決如キ結論ニ達セザルヲ得ナキヲ。即チ支那ニ於ケル日本ノ行  
動諸國深固ノ外交ヲ律スル原則ニ矛盾スルモノデアリ、又支那ニ  
関スル事項ニ就テ準據モラレバキ諸原則及方針ニ関スル  
一九三三年二月六日、九ヶ條約ノ條項及一九三八年八月二十七日、  
ケルソグリアニ Kellogg - Briand 條約ノ規定ニ違反  
スルモノナル。

カクノ如クニ前記ノ事ニ関シ、我政府ノ結論ニ於テ、實際  
聯盟總會ノ結論ニ致スルモノナル。

外交關係書一冊

三九六—三九七頁

Doc. No. 219P (40)

Br. Ex. 63

TELEGRAM  
THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE UNITED STATES  
ASIANIC FLEET (YARNELL) TO THE SECRETARY OF  
THE NAVY (SWANSON)

December 23, 1937  
(Received 10:50 a.m.)

0023. The following is the opinion of the Court of Inquiry ordered to investigate the bombing and sinking of the U. S. S. Panay. The opinion is approved.

Opinion was that the U.S.S. Panay was engaged in carrying out the well-established policy of the United States of protecting American lives and property.

1. That the Japanese aviators should have been familiar with the characteristics and distinguishing markings of the Panay as this ship was present at Nanking during the Japanese aerial attacks on this city.

2. That, while the first bombers might not have been able on account of their attitude to identify the U.S.S. Panay, there was no excuse for attacking without properly identifying the target, especially as it was well known that neutral vessels were present in the Yangtze River.

3. That it was utterly inconceivable that the six light bombing planes coming within about six hundred feet of the ships and attacking for over a period of twenty-minutes could not be aware of the identity of the ships they were attacking.

4. That the Japanese are solely and wholly responsible for all losses which have occurred as the result of this attack.

5. That the death of C. L. Ensringer, skipper and E.W.G. Kulsebus, coxswain occurred in line of duty and were not the result of their own misconduct.

6. That the injured and wounded members of the crew of the U. S. S. Panay received their wounds and injuries in the line of duty and were not the result of their own misconduct.

7. In considering the case as a whole and attending incidents that the court is of the opinion that no offenses have been committed nor blame incurred by any member of the naval service involved. 1735

Foreign Relations I, pp. 546-547

Eu 964

Doc 211 P (40)

會衆國軍總艦隊司令長官(艾-本尼) / KARNELI / 三海  
軍大臣(艾-本尼) / BRACKSON / 寇 寇 報

一九三九年三月二十一日下午十時二十分發信

〇〇二號(本) 米合衆國軍艦六十八 / USS PANAY / 雅、  
爆彈及射擊火雷等生命也。以上查問會議、再行復查。  
此、其意、不設、

該意見、如左

一 米 合衆國軍艦六十八 / USS PANAY / 號：本國之生命  
財產之保護及此處之確立也。米合衆國、政府、  
遂行、復查、

二 八十八號 日本艦隊、南京空襲、當時南京康  
給、長、故、思、艦隊、六十八號、特徵、顯著  
十日、艦、隊、在、之、艦、上、

三 最初、艦、隊、在、之、艦、上、為、二 米合衆國軍艦六  
十八號、艦、隊、在、之、艦、上、計、二、廿、日、日、艦、隊、在、之、  
艦、上、故、思、艦、隊、在、之、艦、上、計、二、廿、日、日、艦、隊、在、之、  
艦、上、故、思、艦、隊、在、之、艦、上、計、二、廿、日、日、艦、隊、在、之、

四 本艦、在、之、艦、隊、在、之、艦、隊、在、之、艦、隊、在、之、艦、隊、在、之、  
以、之、艦、隊、在、之、艦、隊、在、之、艦、隊、在、之、艦、隊、在、之、  
氣、付、之、艦、隊、在、之、艦、隊、在、之、艦、隊、在、之、艦、隊、在、之、

五 本艦、在、之、艦、隊、在、之、艦、隊、在、之、艦、隊、在、之、艦、隊、在、之、  
金、國、之、艦、隊、在、之、艦、隊、在、之、艦、隊、在、之、艦、隊、在、之、

六 本艦、在、之、艦、隊、在、之、艦、隊、在、之、艦、隊、在、之、艦、隊、在、之、  
理、主、艦、在、之、艦、隊、在、之、艦、隊、在、之、艦、隊、在、之、艦、隊、在、之、

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No 2.

艦長、死亡、軍務、範圍内ニテ起生之彼等自身、過失ニ由來セルモノニアラス

七、米合衆國軍艦「パン」/USS. PANAY/ 號兼組員、負傷者、其軍務ニ從事、負傷ニタルモノニテ彼等自身、過失ニ基キ負傷ニタルモノニアラス。

八、事件ヲ全體トシテ又附隨、去來事ヲ考察シテ査問會議、海軍ノ各員ハ如何ナル犯罪モ犯サズ如何ナル非難ヲモ被ルニザルベシトノ意見ナリ。 一七三五。

外交關係 I

五四六—五四七頁

Ex. # 965

Doc. No. 219P (17)

BR. EX. 36

THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN JAPAN TO THE JAPANESE  
MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

INFORMAL MEMORANDUM

Excerpt.

. . . . .

The plans under discussion are, it appears, plans to monopolize the distribution of oil and in part at least the importation, processing and exploitation of oil in Manchuria. The American Government cannot escape the conclusion that the effectuation of such plans would result in the setting up of a monopoly control of the oil industry in Manchuria. The development of a monopoly control in any field would be a matter prejudicial to the treaty rights of American nationals and would run counter to the principle of the open door.

These plans however are apparently being formulated with the concurrence and cooperation of Japanese nationals, the participation of such quasi-official organizations as the South Manchuria Railway and the assent or approval of the Japanese Government.

In approaching the Japanese Government on this subject the American Government has had in mind developments of the past three years in relations between Japan and Manchuria and has given thought to treaties to which Japan and the United States are parties and to various declarations in which the Japanese Government has given assurances that there will be maintained in Manchuria the principle of the open door. This Government has of course assumed and continues to assume that the Japanese Government wishes to implement its undertakings.

. . . . .

Tokyo, August 31, 1934.

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Ref. 36

在日米國大使館發日本外務省宛書簡  
 非公式地書  
 級 尋

陸 薩サレテ居ル諸計畫トハ滿洲ニ於ケル石油ノ配  
 給、少クトモ石油ノ輸入、製造過程及輸出ヲ充分御  
 占スル計畫デアラハ見ウケラレル。

アメリカ政府ハ此ノ如キ計畫ノ遂行ハ滿洲ニ於ケ  
 ル石油産業ノ獨占的支配ノ設定ヲモタラスモノデア  
 ルトノ結論ニ到着セザラザ得ナイ。

如何ナル分野ニ於テモ獨占的支配ノ進展ハメリ  
 カ人ノ條約上ノ權利ヲ阻害シ又門戶開放ノ原則ニ悖  
 ル事トナル。

併ツ作ラ是等ノ案ハ明ラカニ日本人ノ参加及協力  
 臣滿洲鐵道ノ如キ半官制機關ノ参加及日本政府ノ同  
 意或ハ承認ノ下ニ作製サレテ居ルモノデアル。

此ノ問題ニ關シ日本政府ニ交渉スルニ當リメリ  
 カ政府ハ過去三年間ノ日滿關係ノ進展ヲ考慮シ日本  
 及合衆國ガ加盟セル條約及日本政府ガ滿洲ニハ門戶  
 開放ノ原則ガ保持サレト保証シタ種々ノ宣言ヲ總  
 起セリ

我が政府ハ勿論日本政府ハ其ノ保證ヲ履行スルコ



219P(17)-2

トヲ望ムモノト思ヒ、及今後其ノ多恩ニ至ノテアル。

東京

一九三四年八月三十一日

外國關係整理第一冊

一三三頁—一三四頁

Doc. No. 219P (21)

Br. Ex. 40

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(WASHINGTON), January 5, 1933.

Excerpt.

.....

He said that in any event Japan had no territorial ambition south of the Great Wall. I reminded the Ambassador that a year ago he had told me Japan had no territorial ambitions in Manchuria.

.....

H(ENRY) L. S(TIMSON)

64966  
2190 (21)

國務長官證書

(21.11.11) / Washington / 一九三三年十一月十一日

按

彼、日本、如何、不、適合、長城、以南、領土、之、野、心、  
可有、其、下、言、之、私、不、便、討、究、彼、在、其、前、私、  
日本、滿、州、領土、之、野、心、可有、其、下、言、之、事、可、指、摘、  
也。

(21.11.11) (4.5.11)  
/ HENRY L. STIMSON /

外交關係 1. 10. 10

Br. Ex. 68

ADDRESS DELIVERED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
ON "OUR FOREIGN POLICY" AT WASHINGTON ON  
MARCH 17, 1938

Excerpts. . . . .

During the early months of the conflict in the Far East I appealed on several occasions, in the name of our Government, to both Japan and China to desist from using armed force and to resort to the well-recognized processes of peaceful settlement for the adjustment of whatever differences existed between them. I said that we would be glad to be of assistance toward facilitating, in any manner that might be practicable and mutually agreeable, resort by them to such processes.

On August 17, and with frequent reiteration thereafter, I stated that we did not intend to abandon our nationals and our interests in China.

From time immemorial it has been the practice of civilized nations to afford protection, by appropriate means and under the rule of reason, to their nationals and their rights and interests abroad. This policy has been pursued by the Government of the United States throughout the existence of our country.

. . . . .

Likewise dangerous, from the viewpoint of the preservation of peace, is the proposal that we retire from the Far East, comprising the chief portion of the Pacific area. Unfortunately, many people in this country have wholly misunderstood the position and policy of our Government in relation to that situation. Some have visualized only our trade and investment relationships with China, or our moral and cultural interests there, symbolized by missionary, educational, medical, and similar activities. Some have concentrated their attention solely upon the incidental and exceptional facts of the existence of extraterritoriality and the maintenance of some armed forces to assist in safeguarding our nationals against possible mob violence and similar disorders--special rights which it is our policy to give up and forces which it is our policy to withdraw the moment the unusual conditions disappear.

All these are important. But the interest and concern of the United States--whether in the Far East, in any other part of the Pacific area, in Europe, or anywhere else in the world--are not measured alone by the number of American citizens residing in a particular country, or by the volume of investment and trade, or by exceptional conditions peculiar to the particular area. There is a much broader

Br. Ex. 68

and more fundamental interest--which is, that orderly processes in international relationships based on the principles to which I have referred be maintained.

As I have already indicated, what is most of all at stake today, throughout the world, is the future of the fundamental principles which must be the foundation of international order as opposed to international anarchy. If we and others were to abandon and surrender these principles in regard to the Pacific area, which is almost one-half of the world, we would have to reconcile ourselves to their certain abandonment and surrender in regard to the other half of the world.

It would be absurd and futile for us to proclaim that we stand for international law, for the sanctity of treaty obligations, for nonintervention in internal affairs of other countries, for equality of industrial and commercial rights and opportunities, for limitation and reduction of armaments--but only in one-half of the world, and among one-half of the world's population. The catastrophic developments of recent years, the startling events of the past weeks, offer a tragic demonstration of how quickly the contagious scourge of treaty breaking and armed violence spreads from one region to another.

. . . . .

The momentous question--let me repeat--in whether the doctrine of force shall become enthroned once more and bring in its wake, inexorably, international anarchy and a relapse into barbarism; or whether this and other peaceful nations, fervently attached to the principles which underlie international order, shall work unceasingly--singly or in cooperation with each other, as circumstances, their traditional policies and practices, and their enlightened self-interest may dictate--to promote and preserve law, order, morality, and justice as the unshakeable bases of civilized international relations.

. . . . .

We want to live in a world which is at peace; in which the forces of militarism, of territorial aggression, and of international anarchy in general will become utterly odious, revolting, and intolerable to the conscience of mankind; in which the doctrine of order under law will be firmly established; in which there will no longer be one code of morality, honor, justice, and fair play for the individual in his relations with other individuals, and an entirely different code for governments and nations in their relations with each other. We want to live in a world in which fruitful and constructive international relationships can serve as a medium for disseminating throughout the world the benefits of the material, spiritual, and moral progress of mankind.

Br. Ex. 68

To that end we will continue to give full and sincere adherence to the fundamental principles which underlie international order; we will continue to urge universal acceptance and observance of these principles; we will continue, wherever necessary and in every practicable and peaceful way, to cooperate with other nations which are actuated by the same desires and are pursuing the same objectives; we will persevere in appropriate efforts to safeguard our legitimate rights and interests in every part of the world; and we will, while scrupulously respecting the rights of others, insist on their respecting our rights.

To that end we will continue to strive, through our reciprocal trade program and through other economic policies, to restore the normal processes and to expand the volume of mutually beneficial trade among the nations, which is indispensable to an increase of production, employment, purchasing power, and general economic well-being here and everywhere; we will continue to promote peace through economic security and prosperity; we will continue to participate in the numerous international scientific, technical, and other conferences and collaborative efforts, which have been such powerful influences in assisting the stream of new ideas, of new discoveries, of learning and culture, to flow throughout the world; and we will continue to urge other nations to give their support to such policies and efforts.

We believe that a world at peace, with law and justice prevailing, is possible, and that it can be achieved by methods to some of which I have referred. That is the cornerstone of our foreign policy--a policy graphically described by President Roosevelt when he said:

"There must be positive endeavors to preserve peace. America hates war. America hopes for peace. Therefore, America actively engages in the search for peace."

The objectives of our foreign policy are as easy to grasp as they are fundamental. The means we are using to attain these objectives are the only means approved by reason and by experience. For the sake of the best interests of our people, we must maintain our strength, our courage, our moral standards, our influence in world affairs, and our participation in efforts toward world progress and peace. Only by making our reasonable contribution to a firm establishment of a world order based on law can we keep the problem of our own security in true perspective and thus discharge our responsibility to ourselves--to America of today and to America of tomorrow. No other course would be worthy of our past or of the potentialities of this great democracy of which we are all citizens and in whose affairs we all participate.

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二一九P(四)

一九三八年(昭和十三年)三月十七日ワシントンニ於テ「吾ガ對外政策」  
閣下行ハル公務長官ノ演説

抄録

極東ニ於テ紛争ノ當初數月余ニ於テ我政府、名ニ於テ日支双方ニ對シ武力  
行使ヲ中止ス且又双方間ニ存在スル一切ノ摩擦ヲ調整セシムル為ニ平和的解決ノ常  
道ノ過程ヲ取リテ上ヲ要スル也。

余ニ實行可能ニシテ且相互ニ合意可能ナル何事カ、才法ヨリ彼等ガ斯ル  
過程ヲ取テ事ヲ容易トスルニ爲テ援助スルニ吾々、欣然トスルニ日ヲ語リ  
タリ。

八月十七日及シ其後屢々繰返シテ余ニ吾々、中華民國ニ於テ吾々同  
胞並ニ吾ガ權益ヲ拋棄スル意圖無キ日ヲ述ベタリ。

吾々未ダ過正ナル手段ニ依リ且理性ノ法則ヲ在外同胞並ニ權益ヲ擁護ス  
ル文明國民ノ慣行ニ屬ス。該政策ニ吾々國建設以來常ニ合衆國政  
府ヨリ遂行セシメリタルモノナリ。

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平和維持ノ觀點ヨリ吾々ガ太平洋區域ノ主要部分ヲ占メ極東ニ  
後退スベシト、提案ノ同様ニ危險ナリ。不幸ニシテ多數吾々國民該  
事態ニ對スル我政府ノ立場ト政策トヲ全ク誤解シ居リ。

或者、中華民國ト、我々貿易及シ投資關係或ニ宗教傳道ト教  
育ト關係上及シ類似諸活動ヨリ象徴セラルル該地域ノ道義的

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及文化的諸事業之中心ニ據リ居タリ。或者一軍ニ海外法權存在  
伴的例外的諸事案並ニ起リ得ベキ暴動及心類似、無秩序ヨリ吾ガ  
同胞ヲ保護スルコトニ便スル為メ、若干武裝軍隊ヲ維持シ即チ其ヲ  
拋棄スルヲ以テ吾ガ政策上ニ特殊權利並ニ非常力能消滅、既撤收  
ルヲ以テ吾ガ政策上ニ軍隊ニ對シテ、何等ノ注意ヲ向テ居ル所ナ  
ク是等、總テ重要ヲ有ス。然レドモ合衆國ノ關心ハ、其ノ極東ニ於テ  
ルト太平洋地域、他、如何ナル部分ニ於テモ、ヨリヨリニ於テ上或ハ世  
界、他、如何ナル部分ニ於テモ、タルヲ 同ク一軍ヲ特定、或ハ國ニ居  
住スルカリカ市民ノ數ヨリ、或ハ接濟ト貿易トノ量ヨリ、或ハ此特定  
地域ニ特有ナル例外的狀態ヨリ、之ニ計量セルモノナラズ、更ニ廣汎  
且ニ層根本的ニ關心ヲ有ス。一即チ余ガ今言及セル、則チ其ノ國際間  
係上、秩序ノ處理過程ヲ維持スベシトイフ所ナリ。

余ガ既ニ指示シ如ク、今日世界ヲ通過シ最大、危險ニ暴露セ居ル元、  
ハ國際的無政府狀態ニ對立スル實際秩序、基礎タルニキ根本原則ノ將來  
ナリ。假リニ我國並ニ他、諸國ガ殆ド世界ノ半分ヲ占ム太平洋地域、國此等  
原則ヲ拋棄スルトスレバ、吾人ハ世界、他、半分、南ニシテ亦無秩序原則、空の拋棄  
ヲ甘受スルコト、ナルベシ

國際法條約上、義務、神聖、他國ノ內治ニ對スル不干涉、產業上及心商業上  
ノ權利並ニ機會、平等、軍備、制限ノ縮少、一但シ世界ノ一分、一部分世界  
人口、二分、一ノニ對スル一ヲ我國ガ支持スルヲ聲明スルハ無稽ニシ、且無益  
ナルコトナルベシ。近年發生セル悲慘ナル幾多、去來有、此數週向、警メ  
キ種々ノ事件、果實ハ高直ナリ、以下條約違反及心武力ヨリ暴行、蔓  
延の慘禍ハ一地域ヨリ他地域ニ擴大セリ、アルカ、悲慘的表現ヲ示  
スナリ。

No. 2



Doc 2/19P(41)

實問題、——余言練兵之曰——武力主義が専ら支配  
之所ナリ、建之之が谷致ナリ、實際の無政府状態及野蠻行為、陸  
落ヲ招来スル事トシテ、或ハ熱意ヲ以テ、實際秩序基礎トスル原則ヲ奉  
ル各が必ダ他、平和愛好諸國が——諸種情勢彼等傳統的政  
策及慣行、高尚ナル自利が命ナリ、從ニ單独或ハ互ニ協力シ——  
文明的國際關係、操キテ基礎トシ、法、秩序、道義及正義ヲ高  
揚シ、且之ヲ維持セリトシ、不斷、努力ヲ傾ケル力否カニ存ス。

吾人、平和、世界ニ生活セリトシ、故ニ、即チ軍國主義、領土侵略、一般の國際  
無政府状態、勢力が人類、良心ニシテ、直ニ憎ム、忌ム、許さず得  
ベカラズ、トシテ、世界ニ法ニ從テ、秩序、原則が強國ニ打建テ、以テ、世界ニ  
早ヤ一個人が他、個人ニ對スル復シ、關係ニ於ケル此個人ニ對スル道義、  
名譽、正義及公平、アリ、トシ、律スル法典、ハ存在セズ、各政府及各國家  
相互間、諸關係ニ於テ、復シ、律スル全然、異ナル、法典、ハ存在スル、平和、世界  
ニ生活セ、事ヲ欲スルナリ。吾人、復シ、多年建設的ナル實際關係が人  
類、物質的、精神的、道德的、進歩、恩惠ヲ世界ニ傳播スル手段トシ、復  
シ、世界ニ生活セリトシ、故ニ、

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此目的、為ニ、吾人、國際秩序、根底ヲ、其基本原則ニ對シ、全的且真  
實ナル遵守ヲ續行セリトシ、故ニ、吾人、此原則、普遍的承認及遵守ヲ更ニ  
ニ主張セリトシ、故ニ、吾人、必要、場合何時ニモ、凡ソ、其實行可能ナル平和の手段  
ヲ以テ、同一希望ニ依テ、行動シ、同一目的ヲ追求シ、以テ、他、諸國家ト協力  
セリトシ、故ニ、吾人、世界、凡ソ、其部分ニ於テ、我等、正當ナル權益ヲ  
保護セ、為ニ、適當ナル努力ヲ續行セリトシ、故ニ、吾人、周到ニ注  
意シ、以テ、他家、權利ヲ尊重スル、及テ、他家、吾人、權利ヲ尊重ス



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斯多吾人自來——即今日、亦非明日、亦非三對之吾人  
性、果之可待也。之、以外、吾人、歷史或之、吾人、總之、其、市民、  
之、力、吾人、總之、其、當面、之、諸、問題、參加、之、是、偉大、之、民  
主、主義、之、能力、對、應、之、當、之、途、ハ、ニ、信、也。

外交關係第一冊 四五三頁、四五  
五頁 四六頁——四六三頁

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Br. Ex. 114

Page 3

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW)  
TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS (HIROTA)

No. 874

TOKYO, January 31, 1938

(Excerpt)

. . . . .

The American Government has recently received information from its representatives in China to the effect that a provisional regime in Peiping has caused a revision to be made of Chinese customs rates on certain articles entering into the foreign export and import trade of North China. My Government, regarding the Government of China as the only authority which can legally cause a revision to be made in the Chinese customs tariff, is constrained to invite the attention of the Japanese Government to this arbitrary and illegal assumption of authority by the provisional regime in Peiping and to point out that the action of the provisional regime may have a seriously adverse effect upon the integrity of the Chinese customs, with regard both to administration and to revenues, and that the revision of rates does violence to the principle of a uniform Chinese tariff at all ports.

The Japanese Government shares with the American Government and with other Governments a long established and well recognized interest in the integrity of the Chinese customs administration, and the American Government has expressed its confident belief that the Japanese Government reciprocates the earnest desire of the American Government that the integrity of the Chinese customs be respected. The action of the provisional regime at Peiping in revising rates of duty seriously threatens the integrity of the customs. For the creation and the acts of the provisional regime the Japanese Government has an inescapable responsibility; and when those acts are of a character, as in the case of the revision of the rates of duty, which affect the interests of foreign Governments, it is to the Japanese Government that those Governments must address their representations.

. . . . .



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Page 1

Br. Ex. 80

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW)  
TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS (FIROTA)

No. 872.

TOKYO, February 4, 1938.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to my note no. 866, of January 17, 1938, and, under instructions from my Government, to inform Your Excellency that numerous complaints are being received by the American Government of the utter disregard shown by Japanese armed forces in China for American property. Among such cases are:

SOOCHOW: According to American missionaries who visited Soochow a number of times between November 21 and December 21, on November 24 they found that property of the Baptist Mission had been broken into and thoroughly looted, and they observed Japanese soldiers looting the ladies' home and school buildings. On the same day these missionaries inspected the American Presbyterian Mission Hospital, saw one building burning, and found that the administration building had been looted. They inspected the Methodist Episcopal Mission Hospital, and found that the lower floor of the doctor's residence had been looted, and saw Japanese soldiers engaged in looting the upper floor. On November 26 they inspected property of the American Church Mission in company with Japanese officers detailed by military headquarters, and they saw three Japanese soldiers on the premises engaged in looting. They inspected Soochow Academy property and found the principal's and treasurer's offices thoroughly looted, and all safes and filing cabinets broken open. They found also that one foreign residence had been thoroughly looted, and that the Church had been broken into and vestments looted or strewn about in great disorder. On December 1 they found Japanese soldiers in the treasurer's office in the Yates Academy, trying to break open the safe. On visiting the office the following day they found that the safe had been broken open. They also saw soldiers loading loot from Baptist residences and school buildings.

According to Bishop Arthur J. Moore, in charge of the missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, in China, who had visited Soochow, where the Mission has large holdings, including Soochow University and Laura Haygood School for Girls, all the buildings had been looted, four buildings had been bombed, and Japanese

were occupying other buildings, using the new chapel of Laura Haygood School for Girls as a stable.

HANGCHOW: Reports from missionaries at Hangchow indicate that on December 26 Japanese soldiers entered three American residences, on which American flags were flying and on which American consular proclamations and notices issued by the Japanese military police had been posted, and stole money, jewelry, and other articles. On December 27 Japanese soldiers again entered the same residences and stole property.

. . . . .

JOSEPH C. GREW

Foreign Relations I, p. 578





Doc 219P (52)

同... 住宅及び... 校舎... 教会...  
 認... 在... 教會...  
 Bishop ARTHUR J. MOORE  
 LAURA HAYGOOD  
 LAURA HAYGOOD

使用...  
 杭州... 杭州... 報告...  
 省... 米... 銀...  
 告... 米... 金... 銀...  
 取...

Joseph C. GREN  
 文... 員

Ex. 970

Doc. No. 2195 (81)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 115

THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN JAPAN TO THE  
JAPANESE MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AIDE-LE-CAMP

Excerpt.

More than three months have elapsed since the occupation of Nanking by Japanese military forces. The areas of hostilities have in that interval moved to substantial distances from that city, and there is at this time no conceivable danger which would of itself make it unwise for Americans to reside there. Notwithstanding these facts the Japanese military authorities continue to impose restrictions which in effect prevent American missionaries and business men, with important interests in Nanking, from returning to that city.

.....

TCHYO, April 4, 1938.

Foreign Relations I, pp. 761-762

Doc 219P(81)  
w 970

駐日米大使館發 日本外務省宛  
補助覺書

抜萃

日本軍ニ依リ南京占領以來、時日、経過スル事  
既ニ三月余ナリ。此ノ間交戦地區ノ同市ヨリ  
相當ノ距離ニ移動シ 現在ニ於テハ米人ノ同市ニ  
居住スルヲ賢明ナラズトスル如何ナル危険モ有  
ル能ハズ、然ルニモ拘テス。日本軍當局ハ南  
京ニ甚大ナル利害關係ヲ有スルアメリカ傳導團  
及び事業經營者ニ對シ事實同市復歸ヲ  
阻止スル種々ノ制限ヲ續行シツツアリ

東京 一九三六年/昭和十三年/四月廿日

外交關係 I 七六一—七六二頁

Ex. # 971

Doc. No. 219P (53)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 81

THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN JAPAN TO THE JAPANESE  
MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AIDE-MEMOIRE

The American Embassy had the honor, in its note No. 892 of March 12, 1938, to invite the serious attention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the continued occupation by Japanese forces of certain American mission property in Shanghai. The occupation of American property by Japanese military forces is not confined to the cases cited in that note but is a condition which obtains extensively in areas in Central China under occupation by Japanese military forces. American missionaries have been denied access to mission property and during their enforced absence nearly all buildings have been looted and damaged and some have been destroyed by fire.

American mission property at the following named places is occupied at the present time by Japanese troops: Changshu, Changchow, Chinkiang, Liuho, Nanking, Nansiang, Quinsan, Shanghai, Soochow, Singkiang, Yangchow, and Wusih in the Province of Kiangsu, and Huchow and Kashing in Chekiang Province.

. . . . .

Tokyo, March 26, 1938.

Foreign Relations I, p. 588.

971

在日米大使館より日本外務省宛  
副覽書

219P (53)

米大使館、昭和十三年（一九三八年）三月十二日、覽書第八九  
号に於て在上海、某アメリカ布教團の資産、日本軍隊により  
引續き行はるる占據に因り、外務省に深甚なる注意を喚  
起スル、先達を有シタ。日本軍隊に由りアメリカ資産の占據に  
唯ニコ、引用セル覽書、場合ニテラズ日本軍占領下、中文  
一帯に於ける廣汎ナル諸地域ニ及ぶ状態下、幾多アメリカ  
宣教師、布教團資産ニ接近スルコトヲ禁ゼラシ、強制  
立退、向テ殆ドスベテ、建物、稼穡ヲ損害ヲ蒙リタ。ソレ  
ノ若干、火災ニ燒失セシメタ。

下記地域ニ於けるアメリカ布教團の資産、現在日本軍隊ニ  
ヨリ占據セラレタリ。江蘇省、常熟、常州、鎮江、劉河  
南京、南翔、崑山、上海、蘇州、松江、楊州及ヒ無錫、浙江  
省、湖州、嘉興。

昭和十三年（一九三八年）三月二十六日 東京ニ於テ

外事関係一、五八頁



Document 854-A

ANNOUNCEMENTS OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT  
RELATING TO THE CHINA INCIDENT (Vol. 3).

(Excerpts)

. . . . .

STATEMENT OF IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT

January 16, 1938.

Even after the capture of Nanking, the Japanese Government have till now continued to be patient with a view to affording a final opportunity to the Chinese National Government for a reconsideration of their attitude. However, the Chinese Government, without appreciating the true intentions of Japan, blindly persist in their opposition against Japan, with no consideration either internally for the people in their miserable plight or externally for the peace and tranquility of all East Asia. Accordingly, the Japanese Government will cease from henceforward to deal with that Government, and they look forward to the establishment and growth of a new Chinese regime, harmonious co-ordination with which can really be counted upon. With such a regime they will fully co-operate for the adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations and for the building up of a rejuvenated China. Needless to state, this involves no change in the policy adopted by the Japanese Government of respecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of China as well as the rights and interests of other Powers in China.

Japan's responsibilities for the peace of East Asia are now even heavier than ever before.

It is the fervent hope of the Government that the people will put forth still greater efforts toward the accomplishment of this important task incumbent on the nation.

Ex # 972 b.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I.P.S. No. 854-A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, KAORU hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 177 pages, dated Jan.-Dec., 1938, and described as follows: Announcements of the Japanese Government Relating to the China Incident (Vol. 3). I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
23 day of Sept., 1946.

K. Hayashi (signed)  
Signature of Official SE  
Chief of the Archives Section  
Official Capacity

Witness: Nagaharu Odo (signed)

Statement of Official Procurement

I, John A. Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
23 day of Sept., 1946

J. A. Curtis, 2d Lt. (signed)  
NAME

Witness: Richard H. Larsh /s/

Investigator  
Official Capacity

7.

Doc 854-A

No 1

昭和十三年十月

支那事變關係公表集(第三号)

外務省情報部

RETURN TO ROOM 361

TOP SECRET

帝國政府聲明(月六日)

帝皇政府、南京政略後、向支那人民政府、反省、最後、

機會、與之、會、及、然、此、至、民政府、帝皇、真、意、

解、也、漫、抗、戰、策、之、內、民、途、途、苦、之、察、也、外、東、亞、全、

局、和平、願、此、所、之、仍、帝皇政府、爾、後、民政府、對、

上、帝皇、上、真、提、權、之、是、以、新、興、支、那、政、權、成、立、發、展、期、

待、是、上、兩、部、之、調、整、之、事、支、那、新、支、那、建、設、之、協、力、也、

上、又、天、之、帝皇、之、支、那、領、土、及、主、權、並、在、支、列、之、權、益、

ヲ、專、重、之、以、方、針、ニ、六、毫、カ、ハ、所、ナ、

今、支、東、亞、和、平、對、於、帝皇、之、責、任、愈、々、重、

政、府、民、力、以、重、大、之、任、務、遂、行、一、層、完、全、之、權、望、

手止

查 調
14. 3. 10
課 一

249728



Doc. 854 A

證明書  
ワシントン文書局 第 号  
國際檢察部 第八五四号  
與據及公正之證明

余林馨、余が下記資格ニ於テ、即チ外務省文書課長トシテ日本政府  
ト公的関係ニ在ルニ付、此ニ該官吏トシテ余が茲ニ添附セリ  
百七十七頁ヨリ成ル一九百三十八年即和十三年一月ヨリ十二月附下記題名  
即チ支那事變關係公表集(第三号)、文書係(增刊)ニ在リ居テ、茲ニ  
余ハ更ニ添附、記録及文書カ日本政府公文書トシテ、此ニ下記名  
稱省又ハ部局、公式書類及綴、一部トシテ、證明人及署名綴番  
号又ハ引用其他公式書類又綴ニ於テ、該文書正現所在、公式  
名稱ヲ特記スベシ

一 外務省

一九百四十六年 / 昭和十五年 / 九月二十三日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名欄

林

馨(林)

在者、公的資格

外務省文書課長

證明人

尾 戸 長 春

公式年ニ因ル證明

余 John A. Curtis、余が聯合國最上指揮官總司令部關係正現  
下、此ニ上記題名、文書、余が公務上日本政府、上記署名官署名  
入キ、此ニ下記證明人

一九百四十六年 / 昭和十五年 / 月 日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏 名 欄 John A. Curtis

在者、公的資格 國際檢察部調査官

證明人 Richard H. Larsh.

No. 3

STATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE SPOKESMAN  
CONCERNING THE ALLISON CASE

January 31, 1938.

Concerning the case of Mr. John Allison, American Consul at Nanking, the American Ambassador in Tokyo, Mr. Joseph C. Grew, called on Mr. Komsuke Horinouchi, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, at 6:30 o'clock last Saturday evening, January 29th.

The American Ambassador made to the Vice-Minister, an oral representation based mainly on the reports from Mr. Allison; and the Ambassador further informed the Vice-Minister that the American Government expect to receive a suitable expression of regret by the Japanese Government and an assurance that the Japanese Government will take adequate measures for the punishment of those responsible.

As a reply to the American Ambassador's oral representation of the evening of the 29th, the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, explained the following three points to the American Ambassador, Mr. Grew, at 10 o'clock yesterday evening.

1. Under whatever circumstances the incident might have taken place, the slapping by a Japanese soldier of the American Consul at Nanking, Mr. John Allison, was an extremely unfortunate occurrence. Major Hongo, staff officer of the Japanese forces in Nanking, went to the American Embassy and tendered, in the name of the Commander, expressions of regret and apologies which, it has been reported, were accepted on the part of Mr. Allison. The Japanese Government, on their part also, wish to express their profound regret for this happening.

2. In view of the serious character of the incident, the Japanese Government wish to give assurances that, on the completion of the strict investigations, steps will be taken for the adequate punishment of those responsible for the act.

3. In consideration of the possibility of there existing considerable discrepancies as to the circumstances leading to the occurrence in a case of this kind between assertions of those involved in the case; just so, in this case also, there exist considerable differences between the version given in the American complaint regarding the circumstances leading up to the slapping of the American Consul by a Japanese soldier; and as the real facts will be brought to light only after careful and thoroughgoing investigations to be conducted, the carrying out of the investigations will, of necessity, have to be reserved to later date.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 I.P.S. No. 854-B

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, KAORU, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 177 pages, dated Jan.-Dec., 1938, and described as follows: Announcements of the Japanese Government Relating to the China Incident (Vol. 3). I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
 23 day of Sept., 1946.

(signed) K. Hayashi  
 Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: Magaharu Odo (signed) Chief of the Archives Section  
 Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, John A. Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
 23 day of Sept., 1946.

(signed) J. A. Curtis, 2d Lt.  
 NAME

Witness: Richard H. Larsh (signed) Investigator  
 Official Capacity

昭和十三年十二月

支那事變關係公報集(第三年)

外務省情報部

查詢
14.3.10
課一

RETURN TO ROOM 361

COPY FILE

972-B

南京駐在「」之「米國領事」與「外務省情報部長」談

(一月三十一日)

一月二十九日午後二時半、駐日「米國大使」堀内、外務省會客室に於て「」之「米國領事」與「米國側近」之「」會談、詳細に「」後「米國政府」及「日本政府」之「」之「」表「」對「」之「」之「」保證「」期「」日「」

三月十日午後一時、堀内大使會談、駐日「米國大使」堀内、外務省會客室に於て「」之「米國領事」與「米國側近」之「」會談、詳細に「」後「米國政府」及「日本政府」之「」之「」表「」對「」之「」之「」保證「」期「」日「」

1000228

司之官名於本件發生對遺憾下既謝上事明也  
 此亦二言アハハハ氏之受又ハハ趣ルハ事政府  
 之意本件對之衷心遺憾、意事明不  
 事政府トハ本件之重大性鑑之關係者、是則對  
 嚴重調査上之充分措置ヲ執ルハ事保證不  
 此種事件發生、場合關係者、命令ハ銘々相違スルハ勝三三  
 本件ハ何モ米國側報告ト日本側報告ト、同ハ相當、不致、  
 ルニ鑑ミ真相ハ究明、今後、調査ニ候以テ調査、要實施、  
 之後、留保スルコトトシタシ

140228

證明書

文部省 文書局 牙 号

國際檢察部 牙八五四号

典據及公正之證明

054-15

余林壽、余が下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ外務省文書課長トシテ、日本政府ト公ノ關係ニ在ルモノトシテ、並ニ該官吏トシテ余が茲ニ添付スルモノ、頁ヨリ成ル一九三六年（昭和十三年）十月間、下記題名、即チ支那ノ重要關係公志集（第三号）、文書ノ保管ニ任シ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ添付ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナルコト、並ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ外務省ノ公文書類及ビ總務部ノ公文書類トシテ、並ニ該文書ノ正規ナル公定名稱ノモノトシテ、

一九三六年（昭和十一年）九月三日

東京ニ於テ署名

当該官吏ノ名稱

林 壽 園

右ノ者ノ公的資格

外務省文書課長

證人

尾 戶 長 春

公正之證明

054-16

余 Richard Lanah 余が聯合國最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係ルモノトシテ、並ニ上記題名ノ文書ハ余が公務上、日本政府トシテ、添付スルモノトシテ、一九三六年（昭和十一年）九月三日、茲ニ證明ス。

一九三六年（昭和十一年）九月三日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏 名 蘭

Richard H. Lanah

右ノ者ノ公的資格 國際檢察部調査官

證人

T. Y. Taguchi

C. # 9720

Doc. No. 854-C

Page 1 \*\*

Collection of Official Announcements Concerning  
China Incident ( Jo. 3 )

Information Department, Foreign Ministry

December 1938

September 22, 1938

Mr. Avenol  
Secretary General of the League of Nations  
Geneva.

I acknowledge the receipt of your telegram of the 19<sup>th</sup> September 1938, transmitting the invitation based on the first paragraph of Article 17 of the Covenant, and addressed to the Imperial Government by the Council of the League of Nations.

The Imperial Government hold to the firm belief that the method as envisaged by the Covenant of the League of Nations can not bring about a just and adequate solution of the present conflict between Japan and China and their attitude in this regard has repeatedly been made clear in the past.

I have the honour of bringing to your knowledge that, for this reason, the Imperial Government regret that they are not able to accept the invitation of the Council.

K. Ugaki  
Minister for Foreign Affairs  
of Japan

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No.  
I.P.S. No. 854-C

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, KAORU, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 177 pages, dated Jan.-Dec., 1938, and described as follows: Announcements of the Japanese Government Relating to the China Incident (Vol. 3). I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
23 day of Sept., 1946.

(signed) K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: Nagaharu Odo (signed)

Chief of the Archives Section  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, John A. Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
23 day of Sept., 1946.

(signed) J. A. Curtis, 2d Lt.  
NAME

Witness: Richard H. Larsh (s)

Investigator  
Official Capacity



Doo854-C

昭和十三年十二月

支那事變關係心裏集(第三号)  
外務省情報部

查	調
14.3.10	
課一	

規約第十條「基之國際聯盟理事會」招請狀「對之  
帝國政府回答(情報部発表)(九月二十二日)  
十九日十九日附貴電以下相達」之「國際聯盟理  
事會」帝國政府「對之規約第十條第一項「基」招請  
接受也。

☆ 帝國政府「國際聯盟規約」豫具之「力如力志」依「今次支  
紛爭」公平妥當「解決」具出之「得」其「行國」信「又」之「三」  
右帝國政府「方針」已「屢」之「明」之「力」今「同理事會」招請「无  
亦」理由「依」憤慨「之」受「理」之「得」其「日」同「答」之「光榮」有「不」。

昭和十三年九月二十二日

日本帝國外務大臣宇垣一成

國際聯盟事務總長「下」之「心」殿

Doc. 854 C

證明書

文書局 第 號  
國際檢察部 第五四〇號  
典據及公正國之證明

余 林馨 余下記 資格 於 即 外務省 文書課 長  
于 日本政府 公的 關係 在 此 上 且 該 官吏 上 余 加 茲 添  
附 多 心 百 七 頁 言 成 十 九 百 三 十 八 年 昭 和 十 三 年 一 月 三 十 日  
附 下 記 題 如 即 又 那 事 受 美 保 公 表 集 ( 亦 之 稱 ) 文 書 保  
官 任 心 上 下 可 茲 證 明 又

余 更 添 附 記 錄 及 文 書 日 本 政 府 公 文 書 上 且 並 註 明 下  
記 如 稱 省 文 部 局 公 式 書 類 及 綴 一 部 在 下 可 證 明 ( 若 言  
公 綴 卷 號 又 引 用 其 他 公 式 書 類 又 綴 於 此 該 文 書 正 規 所  
在 公 式 如 稱 可 持 記 及 外 務 省

十 九 百 三 十 八 年 昭 和 十 三 年 九 月 十 三 日

東京 於 文 部 局

當 該 官 吏 署 如 楠

有 公 的 資 格

證 人

公 式 入 手 二 國 之 證 明

林 馨 ( 林 )

外 務 省 文 書 課 長

尾 戶 長 春

No. 3 女

余 John A. Curtis 余 於 聯 合 國 最 高 指 揮 官 總 司 令 部 國 際  
已 有 公 的 關 係 在 此 上 且 註 明 如 文 書 公 於 公 務 上 日 本 政 府 上 記 署 如  
官 吏 入 手 多 心 百 九 十 三 日 茲 證 明 又

十 九 百 三 十 八 年 昭 和 十 三 年 月 日

東京 於 文 部 局

當 該 官 吏 署 如 楠

有 公 的 資 格

證 人

John A. Curtis

國際 檢 察 部 調 查 官

Richard H. Larak

Ex 4972d

Document No. 854-D

Page 1\*

STATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE SPOKESMAN

October 12, 1938.

The operations just undertaken in South China by the Imperial Japanese forces are purely military operations for the purpose of intercepting the principal route for arms and munitions supply to the Chinese forces and destroying the important points of hostile machinations against Japan.

The policy hitherto pursued by the Japanese Government of respecting the rights and interests of third Powers remains unchanged. Although the best efforts will therefore be exerted for the prevention of any damage to them in the present operations, it is earnestly hoped that the third Powers will understand the real intentions of Japan and extend cooperation to the efforts of the Japanese forces and thereby preclude the occurrence of any untoward incidents.

C E R T I F I C A T E

V.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 I.P.S. No. 854-D

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, KAORU, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the documents hereto attached consisting of 177 pages, dated Jan.-Dec., 1938, and described as follows: Announcements of the Japanese Government Relating to the China Incident (Vol. 3). I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
 23 day of Sept., 1946

(signed) K. Hayashi  
 Signature of Official

Witness: Nagaharu Odo (signed)

Chief of the Archives Section  
 Official Capacity

SEAL

Statement of Official Procurement

I, John A. Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
 23 day of Sept., 1946.

(signed) J. A. Curtis, 2d Lt.  
 NAME

Witness: Richard H. Larsh /s/


Investigator  
 Official Capacity

619720 Doc 854-D

~~昭和二十二年十月~~

~~外務省對策委員會(軍事部)~~

~~外務省情報部~~



南支作戰之関心情報部長談(十月十二日)

今次帝國軍南支作戰之於軍中對其軍需品、主其補給路之遮斷、抗日策謀、重要據點之復滅、其息、純軍事行動、外下云。

在支第三國權益甚重、帝國政府從來亦對其何事、渝、浙、云。從今次行動、於其之損害、防其之周、最甚、努力、云。致其、勿論、其第三國側、於其之、軍國、竟、在、其、諒解、之、在、帝國軍、努力、協力、以、不、慮、其、事故、發生、之、其、樣、特、別、留、其、要、望、其、云、云。

10/1 ☆

854D

證明書

ワ三十二、文書局 中 号  
國際檢察部 才五四D号  
與據及公正圖スル證明

余林馨、余が下記ノ資格ニ於テ即チ外務省、文書課長トシテ日本政府ト公的関係ニアルモノナルコト並ニ該官吏トシテ余が茲添附セシ凡百千七夏ヨリ成ル九百廿六年、昭和十一年一月ヨリ十二月附、下記題品即チ支那事變関係公表集(第三号)、文書、保管主任ニ任シテ之ヲ證明ス。余、更ニ添附ノ記録及文書ガ日本政府、公文書ナルコト、並ニ存テ下記名稱ノ省又ノ部局、公式書類及公綴、部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(右ノ三ノ公綴番号又引用英、他公式書類又公綴ニ於ケル該文書、正親所在、公式名稱ヲモ特記ス。之)

一、外務省

千九百廿六年、昭和十一年、九月二十三日  
東京ニ於テ署名

当該官吏署名欄  
右者ノ公的資格  
證人

林 馨 (林)  
外務省文書課長  
尾戸 長春

公式令ニ関スル證明

余 John A. Curtis、余亦聯合國最高指揮官總司令部ニ関係アルモノナルコト並ニ下記題名ノ文書、余が公務上、日本政府、上記署名官吏ヨリ入手シタシタルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス

No 3 ☆

千九百廿六年、昭和十一年、月 日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名 欄 John A. Curtis  
右者ノ公的資格 國際檢察部調査官  
證人 Richard H. Larsh.

Pr. Ex. 65 (Pagel)--IFS Doc. 854-E  
Ct. Ex. \_\_\_\_\_

The Foreign Office made public at 10 o'clock p.m., November 18, the following text of the Japanese Government's reply to the Note of October 6th of the Government of the United States, concerning American rights and interests in China, which was delivered to the American Ambassador Mr. Joseph Grew in the evening of the same day.

EXCELLENCY,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note, No. 1076, dated October 6th, addressed to the then Minister for Foreign Affairs Prince Konoye, concerning the rights and interests of the United States in China.

In the Note are cited various instances based on information in the possession of the Government of the United States that the Japanese authorities are subjecting American citizens in China to discriminatory treatment and violating the rights and interests of the United States.

I have now the honour to state hereunder the opinions of the Japanese Government with regard to these instances.

1. The circumstances which led to the adoption of the present measures concerning export exchange in Tsingtao and the present situation being, so far as the Japanese Government are aware, as set forth below, they consider that those measures can not be construed as constituting any discrimination against American citizens.

A short time ago the Federal Reserve Bank of China was established in North China whose notes with an exchange value fixed at one shilling and two pence against one yuan, have been issued thus far to the amount of more than one hundred million yuan, and are widely circulated. These bank notes being the compulsory currency of the Provisional Government, the maintenance of their value and their smooth circulation is regarded as an indispensable basis for the conduct and the development of economic activities in North China. Consequently the Japanese Government have taken a co-operative attitude; and all Japanese subjects are using the said notes, and in their export trade are exchanging them at the rate of one shilling and two pence. On the other hand, the old fa-pi still circulating in these areas has depreciated in exchange value to about eight pence per yuan. Consequently those who are engaged in export trade and are using this currency are enjoying illegitimate profits, as compared with those who use the Federal Reserve notes and carry on legitimate transactions at the legitimate rate of exchange; that is to say, Japanese subjects who use the Federal Reserve notes have been suffering unreasonable disadvantages as compared with persons who while residing and carrying on their business in the areas under the jurisdiction of the Provisional Government of North China, use nevertheless, the old fa-pi exclusively.

Furthermore, the existence of the beforementioned disparity in exchange value between the new notes and the old fa-pi, which the Federal Reserve Bank has been exchanging at a rate not very much below par, is bound to exert an unfavourable effect upon the exchange value of the new notes, and eventually upon the exchange value of the Japanese yen.

The Japanese Government feel that it is incumbent upon the not to remain indifferent to such a situation.

The export exchange measures adopted in Tsingtao are calculated to place the users of old Chinese currency who have been obtaining unfair profits, on equal footing with those who are using the Federal Reserve notes. These measures are also intended to protect the exchange value of the Federal Reserve Bank notes. Inasmuch as the application of the measures makes no differentiation according to nationality they cannot be considered as discriminatory measures. As a matter of fact, it is through these measures that those users of the Federal Reserve notes who had in a sense been discriminated against, have been placed on an equal footing with the others, and thus enabled to compete on a fair basis.

2. In North and Central China the new Chinese regimes some time ago effected revisions of the Customs tariff in an attempt to secure a rational modification of the former tariff enforced by the Kuomintang Government, which was unduly high and ill-calculated to promote the economic recovery and general welfare of the Chinese people. However, the schedule actually adopted for the time being is the one that was approved by the Powers in 1931, so that no complaint has been heard from foreign residents of any nationality on the spot. The Japanese Government are of course in favour of the purpose of the said revision, believing that it will serve to promote effectively the trade of all countries with China.

3. As for the organization of certain promotion companies in China, the restoration and development of China's economic, financial and industrial life after the present Affair is a matter of urgent necessity for the welfare of the Chinese. Moreover, the Japanese Government are deeply solicitous for the early inauguration and progress of work having for its object this restoration and development, for the sake of the realization of a new order in East Asia, and are doing all in their power in that direction. The North China Development Company and the Central China Development Company were established with a view to giving China the necessary assistance toward the said restoration and also with the aim of contributing toward the development of China's natural resources. It is far from the thoughts of the Japanese Government to impair the rights and interests of American citizens in China or to discriminate against their enterprises. The Japanese Government therefore do not oppose, but welcome heartily, the participation of third Powers on the basis of the new situation that has arisen.



The telecommunication companies in North and Central China and of the inland navigation steamship company at Shanghai and the wharfage company at Tsingtao have also been established to meet the imperative need of an early restoration of communications, transportation, and harbor facilities. With the exception of the telecommunications enterprise, which, because of its obvious relation to the maintenance of peace and order and to the national defense, as well as because of its public character, has been placed in the hands of special companies, all these enterprises are turned over to concerns that are ordinary Chinese or Japanese juridical persons, without any intention of allowing them to reap monopolistic profits by discriminating against America or any other Power. As regards the wool trade, while the control of purchasing agencies was enforced for a time in the Mongolian region, it has since been discontinued. There is no plan at present of any sort for establishing a monopoly in tobacco.

4. Concerning the return of American citizens to the occupied areas Your Excellency is aware that in North China there is no restriction, excepting in very special cases where the personal safety of those who return would be endangered, while in the Yangtse Valley large numbers of Americans have already returned. The reason why permission to return has not yet been made general is, as has been repeatedly communicated to Your Excellency, due to the danger that persists because of the imperfect restoration of order and also to the impossibility of admitting nationals of third Powers on account of strategic necessities such as the preservation of military secrets. Again, the various restrictions enforced in the occupied areas concerning the residence, travel, enterprise and trade of American citizens, constitute the minimum regulations possible consistent with military necessities and the local conditions of peace and order. It is the intention of the Japanese Government to restore the situation to normal as soon as circumstances permit.

5. The Japanese Government are surprised at the allegation that there exists a fundamental difference between the treatment accorded to Japanese in America and the treatment accorded to Americans in Japan. While it is true that in these days of emergency Americans residing in this country are subject to various economic restrictions, yet these are, needless to say, restrictions imposed not upon Americans alone but also on all foreigners of all nationalities as well as upon the subjects of Japan. I beg to reserve for another occasion a statement of the views of the Japanese Government concerning the treatment of Japanese subjects in American territory, referred to in Your Excellency's note.

As has been explained above, the Japanese Government, with every intention of fully respecting American rights and interests in China, have been doing all that could possibly be done in that behalf. However, since there are in progress at present in China military operations on a scale unprecedented in our history, it may well be recognized by the Government of the United States that it is unavoidable that these mili-

Br. Ex. 65 (Page 4)--IFS Doc. 854-E \*

Such operations should occasionally present obstacles to giving full effect to the principle of respecting the rights and interests of American citizens.

Japan at present is devoting her energy to the establishment of a new order based on genuine international justice throughout East Asia, the attainment of which end is not only an indispensable condition of the very existence of Japan, but also constitutes the very foundation of the enduring peace and stability of East Asia.

It is the firm conviction of the Japanese Government that in the face of the new situation, fast developing in East Asia, any attempt to apply to the conditions of today and tomorrow inapplicable ideas and principles of the past neither would contribute toward the establishment of a real peace in East Asia nor solve the immediate issues.

However, as long as these points are understood, Japan has not the slightest inclination to oppose the participation of the United States and other Powers in the great work of reconstructing East Asia along all lines of industry and trade; and I believe that the new regimes now being formed in China are prepared to welcome such foreign participation.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 I.P.S. No. 854-E

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, KAOFU, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 177 pages, dated Jan.-Dec., 1938, and described as follows: Announcements of the Japanese Government Relating to the China Incident (Vol. 3). I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
 23 day of Sept., 1946.

(signed) K. Hayashi  
 Signature of Official

Witness: Nagaharu Odo /s/

Chief of the Archives Section  
 Official Capacity

SEAL

Statement of Official Procurement

I, John A. Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
 23 day of Sept., 1946

(signed) J. A. Curtis, 2d Lt.  
 NAME

Witness: Richard H. Larsh /s/

Investigator  
 Official Capacity

Doc 854-E

昭和十三年十月

支那事変関係公表集(第三号)

外務省情報部

調査	調
14.3.10	
課	一

在支米國權益ニ對スル米學國同答ニ関スル情報發表

(十月十日)

米國政府、去十月三日附 近衛外務大臣宛公文ヲ送リ(主眼點

ニ於テハ爲替管理(一)北支及中支ニ於テハ關稅率、改正

(二)通信運輸、埠頭、開港、諸公社、設立(三)帝國(四)軍事

事上、必要ニ對シテ諸制限等、縮點ニ付申入ル所ニ付

對シテ有外相ヨリ本月十日「駐日本國公使宛公文」ヲ

送リ、通同答等

不圖翰越上致候際有支那ニ於テハ省米權益ニ關シテ自所

貴翰第一〇七之六號ヲ以テ近衛前外務大臣宛仰申越、

此等有之閱悉致候

必貴翰ニ於テ閣下ニ貴米政府、有スル情報ニ甚キ羨多事例

ヲ舉テ支那ニ於テ亦亦官憲力貴米人民ニ對シテ差別待遇ヲ興

省米權益ヲ侵害スル旨申述スル候處皇等事例行當米

政府自解、同陳スル在通ニ有之候

No. 1



Doc 854-E

地位ト同等トナルト共ニ 聯銀券ノ外債通維持ヲ擁護セ  
トスルニ、企圖アリニテ、而シテ本措置ハ、本籍ニ依リ適用シ度  
ニスルモ、非シテ、何事ノ差別待遇ニ非ス等ク從來一種ノ  
差別の待遇ヲ受ケ居リテ、聯銀券使用者、地位本措置  
置ニ依リ初メト同等トリ完全ニ平等ト基礎トシテ、競争力  
ヲ得ルニ至ルニ次第ナリ

二、北支及中支ニ於テ、支那新政府力、逕般周税率改正ヲ  
定稅之ヲ、實ニ本民政所、施行スル税率力不齊ニ故率  
ニ、經濟復興民生ノ福祉ヲ圖ルニ適セザリニ、鑑ニ合理的改正ヲ  
爲サントシテ、此モ、免ニ用敢取入ス各亦力既ニ承認シテ  
一九三二年ノ税率ヲ採用スルニ、或特定ノ利益ヲ企圖  
シタルモ、非ス從テ石改正ニ對シ、如何ニシ、任支居留民ヨリモ  
不滿ノ言聞カレリニ、次第ナリ、早小政府モ固ヨリ其ノ改正ノ譽  
ニ贊成ニ、本改正ニ依リ各亦、訂及貿易ノ念ニ促進セシムル  
ト思考ス居リ

三、次ニ支那ニ於テ、或種ノ企業會社ノ設立ニ行テ、今次事變後  
ニ於テ、支那ノ經濟財政及産業等、復興開弁力支那民生  
ノ存息固、急務トシ、ミテラス、而シテ、政府トシテ、東亞ニ於テ、新  
秩序建設、在望等復興開發事業、急速ニ着手ス、及、其ノ  
進行ニ、重大ノ周心ヲ有シ、凡有積極的努力ヲ傾注ス居ルニ、  
シテ、北支那開發及中支那振興、一冊投資會社ノ設立ヲ、自  
ルニ、支那側ニ對シ、石復興ニ必要ナル援助ト供與スルト共ニ、支那  
ノ資源開發ニ寄與セシムルニ、外ニ、ス、何事モ、人民ノ支  
那ニ於テ、權利ヲ言フ、其事業ニ差別待遇ヲ與スルモ、非ス

NO 3

☆

Doc 854-E

從于帝小政府トシテ新事態ニ立脚シテ政府ニ協力セシムル事  
ニ亦參加シテ反對スル意無キハ勿論率々之ヲ歡迎ス  
ルモノナリ

北支及中支ニ於ケル電氣通信会社、上海ニ於ケル内河汽船会社  
ニ青島埠頭会社設立モ亦事業ヲ司破壞セラルル通信通  
輸及港灣經營機關トシテ急務ナルノ弊急ニ必要ニシテタルモノ  
ナル處電氣通信事業力公共的性質ヲ有スルモノナラズ治安  
防軍關係ヨリ特殊会社、事業タルトシテ當然ナル其外普通  
トシテ日本法人ニシテ何レモ實心又ハ等シク之ヲ差別對待  
ヲ古ハ利益ヲ独占スルコトヲ目的トシ居ルモノニ非ズ尙軍毛取引  
ニ付テ蒙難地ニ於テ買付機關ヲ統制シタルトシテ現在右  
ハ撤去スルニ居リ又煙草行テ、現任何軍費實計畫事業  
行ハズ

四、我軍占領地域ノ實心人民、復歸ニ付テ北支ニ於  
テ復歸ノ部ヲ復歸者、安全ニ言ハルカ如キ特殊場合外之  
ノ制限ニ居ラス揚子江流域地方ニ於テ既ニ多數實心人、復  
歸見タル所承知、通ル處悉ク商販的復歸ヲ許容シ  
得タル層次申達通リ或ハ治安、年々恢復又ニシタルモノ  
危險ヲ慮リ或ハ機密保持等軍隊作戰、必要上軍ニ示人  
ノ出入ヲ許シ得タル事由ニ基クモノナリ其他一般ニ右占

★ 領域内ニ於ケル實心人民、居住往來營業及ニ通商ニ  
課スル諸制限モ亦占領地域内ノ治安、現狀及軍事上  
ノ必要ニ基ク限少クシテ、帝小政府ニ於テ事情許ス  
限リ速ニ事態復セシムコトヲ期シ居ル次第ナリ

NO 4

Doc 854-E

一、貴州領域内ニ於テ帝ノ臣民ノ受ケ居ル待遇ト高シ  
 内ニ於テ貴州人民ノ受ケ居ル待遇ト、固ニ何等ノ根本的  
 ナル差違アリト為スル如キハ帝ノ政府ノ意外トモナリ  
 帝ノ内ニ於テ貴州人民ノ刻下ノ非常事態ニ際シテ  
 之ニ經濟上ノ拘束ヲ課セラルル事案ナリトモ、如キ拘  
 束ハ帝ノ臣民及貴州人民以外ノ外人モ均ニ之ヲ受ケ  
 居ル所ニテ特ニ貴州人民ニ課セラルルモノニ非ラズト  
 申ス迄モ之ニ尙貴州領域内ニ於テ帝ノ臣民ノ待遇ニ  
 関シテ貴州中ニ陳テ之ヲ貴州見ニ行ハレトモ帝ノ政府  
 見解ヲ申述スヘキコトヲ留保スルモノナリ

一、上述ノ通り帝ノ政府ノ支那ニ於ケル貴州權益之ヲ  
 分ニ尊重スルノ意圖ヲ示シ去來得ル限リ、努力ヲ為シ来ル  
 一ル處目下東亞ニ於テハ有史以來曾テ見サル大規模ノ  
 軍事行動行ハルツアルヲ以テ貴州權益尊重ノ意圖ヲ  
 実行スル上ニ所トシテ支障ヲ生スルコトハ貴州政府ニ於テ  
 御諒相成ルヘキトモ信候

目下帝ノ東亞ニ於テ之ヲ與シ、實際正義ニ基テ新秩序建  
 設ニ全力ヲ與テテ邁進スツアル次第ナル力之ヲ達成シ、高  
 一子立ニ致スルカラサルモノナルニテ又東亞永遠安定ノ  
 礎石タルキモノニ有之候今又東亞ノ天地ニ於テ新ナル情勢  
 一展開スツアルノ秋ニ至リ事要前ノ事態ニ適用アリタル舊  
 念乃至原則ヲ以テ其ノ實現ニ及今後事態ヲ律セトス  
 一トハ何等モ面ノ問題ノ解決ヲ看入ル所ニ非ラズトス

No 5



No 6 ☆

Doc 854-5

又東亞恒久平和ノ確立ニ資スルモノニ非サルコトヲ信スル次第  
ニ有之候

取置貴事並他ノ列邦ニ於テ余上ノ趣旨ヲ諒解セラレヌテ  
企業貿易ノ諸分野ニ日リテ東亞再建ノ大業ニ参加セラルル  
コトニ對シテハ帝事トシテ何等之ニ及於スルノ意嚮ナキノミテ又  
目下支那ニ於テ成長中ナル政權トシテモ之ヲ歡迎スル用意  
アルモノト存セラレ候

右回答申進旁々本人臣ハ茲ニ在テ閣下ニ向テ敬意ヲ表

ス候 敬具

(一八六頁—九頁)

證明書

E ワシントン文書局 号

4 国際検察部 号五四E号

855 Doc. 累據及び公正に關する證明

余林馨(余が下記)資格に於て即ち外務省文書課長に日本政府の  
公的関係に在るに於て此に於て該文書に於て余が茲に添附せらるる白紙  
頁に於て千九百三十八年(昭和十三年)一月ヨリ十二月間下記題名(支那  
の義勇隊公衆(第三号)の文書)保管に任じ居るに於て茲に證明す。

余又三添附(記録及び)文書が日本政府の公文書に於て此に右が下記名  
稱(省及)各部局の公文書類及び綴(一部)に於て證明す(若し下(綴番  
号)及び引用其他公文書類及び綴に於て該文書(正規)所在(公文名稱  
を)時記(す)。

一 外務省

千九百四十六年(昭和二十一年)九月三日

東京に於て署名

茲該官長署名欄

林 馨 (印)

右(者)の公的資格

外務省文書課長

證 人

尾戸長春

公正に關する證明

余 John A. Curtis (余が聯合國最高指揮官總司令部關係に於て  
此に於て此に記題名の文書(余が公務上日本政府に記署名官吏に  
り)に於て此に於て證明す。

千九百四十六年(昭和二十一年) 日

東京に於て署名

氏名欄

John A. Curtis

右(者)の公的資格

国際検察部調査官

證 人

Richard H. Lush

★

★

No. 3

C. # 9724

No. Ex. 65 (Page 1)--IPS Doc. 854-G

ADDRESS OF THE PRIME MINISTER, PRINCE FUMIMARO KONOE,  
BEFORE THE 73RD SESSION OF THE IMPERIAL DIET

January 22, 1938.

The New Year is with us amid the storm and stress of the China Affair. Today at this session of the Imperial Diet which faces a momentous crisis of our nation, I have the honour to wish with you a long life to our Sovereign and prosperity and happiness to the Imperial House, before stating to you the views of the Government. I have been moved beyond words by the Imperial Message that was graciously granted at the opening session and by the deep concern shown by His Majesty over the present situation.

It is scarcely necessary for me to say that Japan's immutable national policy aims at building the edifice of permanent peace for East Asia on the unshakable foundation of close co-operation between Japan, Manchoukuo and China, and to contribute thereby to the cause of world peace. The adoption some time ago of our determined policy not to deal with the obdurate Kuomintang Government of China, and the exertion of ceaseless efforts towards the cultivation of friendly relations with the Powers, have been both dictated by this policy of the Government. We all rejoice for the sake of world peace that the tripartite Anti-Comintern Agreement between Japan, Germany, and Italy was completed through the participation of Italy last fall.

It is now more than half a year since the commencement of the present conflict. The fields of hostilities have been extended from North China to Central and South China. The valorous and daring operations of the Imperial forces have brought us victory after victory. Nanking, the Chinese Capital, quickly fell into our hands. The situation is developing most favourably for Japan. While this is, of course, due to the August Virtue of our Sovereign, I am profoundly grateful for the loyalty and courage of the officers and men of the Imperial forces at front and for the ardour and enthusiasm of all our people at home.

Now the Government look forward to the emergence of a new Chinese regime which may really be counted upon to co-operate with Japan, and with such a regime they intend to adjust the Sino-Japanese relations and lend their hands in the rehabilitation of China, and in laying firmly thereby the foundation for a permanent peace of East Asia. Needless to say, there will be no change in Japan's policy to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China and the legitimate rights and interests of Third Powers in China.

The mission of Japan as the stabilizing force of East Asia is greater and her obligations have grown heavier than ever. In order to fulfil this mission, and to discharge those obligations of ours, we must certainly be prepared to make hereafter still greater sacrifices than we have made

heretofore. But unless we resolve to do this, we only lay in store misfortunes for the future. I believe that to bear such sacrifices is a noble duty that we of the present generation owe to posterity.

It is under a conviction such as this that our Government are striving with all their might to deal with the China Affair and to achieve the end they have in view. And for that they are working for the completion of the plans for the national mobilization both material and spiritual, and the execution of the various necessary measures. Under this policy, the Government realize the first necessity of replenishing armaments and filling the national treasury, and accordingly, emphasis has been placed on this point in regulating country's economy and finances. As regards the budget for the coming fiscal year, it has been so compiled as to devote as much money and material as possible to the fulfilment of military requirements, and to curtail as far as possible the general consumption of the goods and funds having to do with military supplies.

In the field of industry, the basic principle of the Government will be laid in the increase of our nation's productive power under the one comprehensive scheme covering Japan, Manchoukuo and China, and efforts are to be exerted toward supplying the articles needed for national defence, promoting all the important industries, and expanding our export trade.

As for our work at the home front, not only everything will be of course done in order to keep our officers and men at front free from all anxieties for those at home, but suitable and effective measures will be taken to provide for the relief of the families of those killed, wounded, or taken ill.

Far distant still is the end of the conflict. We should expect that it will be a long time before a settlement is reached. Ours is indeed a momentous task unparalleled in history. We shall never succeed in accomplishing the task unless all of us show the dauntless spirit of gladly and courageously offering ourselves to our country. Let me assure you that the Government, with patience and perseverance and a resolute will, expect to reach a settlement of the Affair.

In accordance with these views, the necessary bills together with the budget are being presented to you, on which I earnestly hope that you, appreciating the intentions of the Government, will give your approval.

## C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No.  
I.P.S. No. 854-GStatement of Source and  
Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, KIOMU, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 177 pages, dated Jan.-Dec., 1938, and described as follows: Announcements of the Japanese Government Relating to the China Incident (Vol. 3). I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
23 day of Sept., 1946.(signed) K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: Nagaharu Odo (signed)Chief of the Archives Section  
Official CapacityStatement of Official Procurement

I, John W. Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
23 day of Sept., 1946(signed) J. W. Curtis, 2d Lt.  
NAMEWitness: Richard K. Larsh /s/Investigator  
Official Capacity

Doc 9722  
854-G

昭和十三年十一月

支那事情調査会公表集(第三号)

外務省情報部

直調  
14.3.10  
課

第七十三回帝國議會ニ於テ内閣總理大臣演説

(十一月二十日)

事變下ニ於テ外手ヲ迎ヘ皇大内閣ニ直面スル第七十三回帝國  
 議會ニ臨ミ諸君ト共ニ聖壽ノ高歲ト皇室ノ隆興ニ  
 トテ壽キ奉リ茲ニ政府ノ所信ヲ周陳致ス、概念ヲ得ニキト  
 八ノ先業トスル所ナリトス。今期議會内閣院ニ於テ「  
 特ニ優渥ニ初語ヲ賜ハリ、内閣ニ對シテ深キ御信心ヲ  
 示シテ、皇ニ恐懼感激ニ堪エ又次第ナリトス。  
 伊ニテモテウ日滿又、鞏固ナル提携ヲ把軸トシテ永永遠  
 一平和ヲ確立スルニテ、吾ノ平和ニ貢獻スルニ、吾等亦  
 力ヲ盡ス。先般英反者九支那志民政府ニ對シ  
 斷平ニテ村手トヤルノ方針ヲ取ルニ至リマシタリ、又列  
 志トシ、反好關係ノ増進ニ不斷、努力ヲ志スルニ、此  
 志ヲ、今亦所テリトス。昨ニ昨秋所出ノ理想ヲ同シ、  
 英明邦伊大利ヲ加テ日独伊志同ニ所出協定  
 力成立ニシテ、在恩平和ノ名目ニ同慶ノ至キナリトス。

no/a

Doc p 54-55

願ニ事後効発ヲ求テ半歲餘、武原、北支ヨリ守南支  
ニ及ビ、皇軍ノ實武果敵ニ行動ニ依リ、軍捷相繼、勿テ  
首級南京ヲ攻取ニ戦局ハ極テ有利ニ展成ニツキ下  
リ。是レ固ヨリ所獲成、然レ之ニ所テアリニモ、皇軍將士諸  
士ノ忠實ト鏡後必民諸君ノ熱誠トハ是ニ感謝措ク能ハ  
サルモノナリニス。

今ヤ政府ハ亦亦ト眞ニ提揚スルニ足ル新興及那政確  
一成立發展ヲ期待ニ之ト所亦亦支ヲ調整ニ使主支  
那建設ニ協力ニ依テテ東亞長久平和ノ基礎ヲ確立セ  
トスルモノナリニス。勿論帝皇ノ支那ノ領土地主權ニ  
ニ於ケル列必ノ正當ナル權益ヲ尊重スルハ方針ニハ毫モカレ所  
ナリニセ。

惟ニ東亞ノ安定勢力タル帝皇ノ使命ハ愈々大ニシテ、  
責任ハ益々重キヲ加ルニ至ルモノトイハ、ホナリニセ。

此ノ使命ヲ果シ此ノ任務ヲ盡スニ今後ト雖モ吾人  
ノ犧牲ヲ擲リ決意ヲ固メ八國ヨリテリス。然モ今日ニ於  
此ノ決意ヲ為スニハハ結局不平等ヲ將來ニノスモノナ  
リニス。

從テ現狀ノ急カク犧牲ヲ忍コト正ニ吾々ノ後代  
同胞ニ對スル崇奉也ナル義務ヲタルコトヲ信スルノテ  
アリニス。

★ No 18



Doc 854-E

願ニ事後高勲ヲ示シテ半威余、戦線北支ヨリ南支ニ及ビ、皇軍ノ實果敵ニ行動係リ、戦捷相繼キ勿ク首都南京ヲ攻取ニ戦局ハ極テ有利ニ展開ニツキ下リス。是レ固ヨリ所獲威、然レ之ニ所テ下リニテ、皇軍將士諸士ノ忠勇ヲ鏡像シ民諸君ノ熱勢トハ是ニ感謝指ク能ハサルモノナリニス。

今ヤ政府ハ帝ニト眞ニ提揚スルニ足ル新興又那政權ノ成立発展ヲ期待シ之ト阿ヒテ支テ調整シ使主又那ノ建設ニ協力シ休テテ東亞長久平和ノ基礎ヲ確立セトスルモノナリニス。勿論帝亦リ支那ノ領土主權ニ於ケル列強ノ利益トシテ之ノ權益ヲ盡ク重スルノ方針ニハ意モカレ所ナリニセ。

惟ニ東亞ノ安定勢力タル帝亦ノ使命ハ愈々大ニシテ責任ハ遂ニ重キヲ加ルニ至ルモノトシ、示ハリニセ。

此ノ使命ヲ果シ此ノ任務ヲ盡スニハ今後ト雖モ吾人ノ犧牲ヲ擲リ決意ヲ固メ八國ヨリテ下リス。然モ今日ニ於テ此ノ決意ヲ為スニハハ結局不平等ヲ將來ニノスモノナリニス。

従テ爾、吾人ハ犧牲ヲ忍ビテ正ニ吾人ノ後代同胞ニ對スル崇奉ナル義務ヲ下ルコトヲ信スルノテアリニス。

★ No 18

Doc 854-8

政府、此、如、見解、基、以、全、カ、ヲ、譽、テ、支、那、事、業、ニ、打、出、  
 ン、自、的、ヲ、達、成、ニ、邁、進、セ、ン、ト、ス、ル、ニ、テ、リ、ス。之、カ、タ、タ、ニ、物、心、兩、部、  
 ニ、亘、リ、事、業、發、展、動、員、態、勢、ノ、充、實、ヲ、圖、ル、ニ、必、要、ト、シ、諸、般、ノ、  
 経、済、ノ、充、實、ヲ、期、ス、ル、ニ、テ、リ、ス。政府、此、ヲ、針、ニ、シ、テ、  
 先、テ、軍、備、ノ、充、實、ト、必、費、ノ、調、達、ト、ニ、邁、進、ス、ル、カ、ラ、シ、ム、ニ、  
 カ、極、テ、緊、要、ト、シ、信、託、政、経、済、何、レ、ノ、才、面、ヲ、キ、キ、ニ、シ、テ、此、ノ、  
 充、實、ヲ、置、ク、ニ、ト、政、之、ニ、昭、和、十、二、年、度、豫、算、案、ノ、編、成、ニ、行、  
 キ、三、六、事、業、ノ、長、期、ニ、亘、ル、ニ、備、入、物、資、及、資、金、ヲ、出、来、得、ル、  
 限、リ、軍、事、ノ、需、要、充、足、ニ、集、中、シ、軍、需、ニ、関、係、ス、ル、資、材、及、資、  
 金、ノ、一、般、消、費、ニ、於、テ、之、ヲ、減、少、セ、シ、メ、建、修、ノ、下、ニ、之、ヲ、編、成、  
 シ、テ、テ、リ、ス。

産、業、方、面、ニ、於、テ、日、滿、文、ヲ、通、シ、テ、全、体、計、畫、ノ、下、我、國、産、  
 力、ノ、擴、充、ヲ、圖、ル、ヲ、以、テ、基、調、ト、シ、殊、ニ、水、陸、上、陸、切、テ、物、資、ノ、  
 供、給、電、氣、産、業、ノ、振、興、輸、出、貿、易、ノ、伸、張、ニ、力、ヲ、致、シ、  
 今、リ、タ、イ、ト、存、シ、ス。又、戦、後、ノ、處、理、ニ、取、善、ヲ、甚、之、出、征、將、兵、  
 ノ、後、顧、自、身、方、カ、ニ、シ、テ、回、リ、戦、死、傷、病、者、ト、世、ノ、遺、  
 族、家、族、ニ、對、シ、テ、扶、助、後、護、ニ、行、適、切、誠、實、措、置、ヲ、講、シ、  
 必、厚、ニ、シ、ス。

事、業、之、期、途、ニ、遠、達、ス、ル、ニ、テ、リ、ス。之、カ、解、決、ノ、長、期、ニ、亘、ル、ニ、テ、リ、  
 又、テ、テ、リ、ス。而、シ、テ、是、ノ、事、業、ノ、艱、苦、ノ、大、業、ヲ、テ、リ、ス。此、ノ、大、業、  
 ノ、為、メ、ニ、我、國、民、衆、ノ、勇、躍、難、ニ、赴、ク、ノ、精、神、ヲ、發、揮、ス、ル、ニ、  
 テ、リ、ス。到、底、成、果、ヲ、收、メ、難、シ、ク、テ、リ、ス。政府、堅、忍、持、久、不、退、轉、  
 米、意、ヲ、以、テ、事、業、ノ、解、決、ニ、努、メ、テ、ス、ル、ニ、テ、リ、ス。

☆ No 2

況、ノ、如、キ、考、ニ、依、リ、テ、政府、ノ、茲、ニ、必、要、ト、シ、テ、法律、案、及

NO.3 ☆

Doc 854-G

経目并末ヲ提出スルモノナリマス。且テテ敬謝ノ意ニテ所  
計トモテ、榎實ヲ奨ムニテ切望スル次第ナリマス。

(六頁—三〇頁)

證明書

文書局

國際檢察部

第八五四号

與據及公正之證明

Doc 548

余林馨、余が下記ノ資格ニ於テ即チ外務省文書課長トシ日本政府ト公的関係ニ在ルモノトシト並ニ該官更トシ余が茲ニ添附セシル百七十七頁ヨリ成ル千九百三十八年/昭和三年ノ月ヨリ十二月附下記題名即チ支那等東關係公案集(第三)、文書、保管ニ在ルモノトシテ證明ス  
余、更ニ添附、記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府、公文書ナルコト、並ニ右ノ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局、公式書類及ビ綴、一部ナルモノヲ證明ス(若クハ綴番号又ハ引用其、他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於ケル該文書、正規解在、公式名稱ヲモ持記スベシ)

千九百四十六年/昭和二十一年九月二十三日

東京ニ於テ署名  
當該官吏署名欄  
證人者、公的後記  
林馨  
外務省文書課長  
尾戸春

公式入午ニ関スル證明

余 John A. Curtis 余が聯合國最高指揮官總司令部關係アルモノトシト並ニ上記署名、文書ハ余が公務上、日本政府、上記署名官更ヨリ入午ニナルモノナルコトヲ證明ス。

千九百四十六年/昭和二十一年 月 日  
東京ニ於テ署名

氏名欄 John A. Curtis  
證人者、公的資格 國際檢察部調査官  
Richard H. Larsh

No. 3 ☆

ADDRESS OF MR. KOKI HIROTA, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS, AT THE SEVENTY-THIRD SESSION OF THE  
IMPERIAL DIET, DELIVERED ON JANUARY 22, 1938.

At the last session of the Diet I had the honor to speak on the policy of the Japanese Government regarding the China Affair. Today I desire to address you on the subsequent developments which have occurred in the Chinese situation as well as on our foreign relations in general.

The attitude of the Japanese Government towards the present Affair has been clearly set forth in their statements made public from time to time in the past. Japan has no territorial ambitions in China, nor has she any intention of separating North China from the rest of the country. All she wants is that China, taking a broad view of the situation, will collaborate with Japan toward the fulfilment of the ideal of Sino-Japanese co-operation for the common prosperity and well-being of the two countries. Accordingly, even after the outbreak of the present Affair, we eagerly looked forward to joining forces with China for the purpose of securing peace in East Asia as soon as the Nationalist Government should have discarded their policy of opposition to Japan and Manchoukuo and evinced a sincere desire to work together for this idea of Japan. However, the Nationalist Government failed to understand our true intentions, and they were caught, so to speak, in the trap set by themselves, being bound by their commitments to the anti-Japanism that they had fostered for such long years. Unable to act wisely and well with a calm judgment, but relying upon third Powers, or allying themselves with Communists, they are even now calling for a prolonged resistance, regardless of the plight of the 400 million people of China whom they have plunged into the depth of suffering and misery. Now the heroic operations of our loyal and valiant forces in the north and in the south, have forced the Nationalist Government to abandon Nanking, their capital, and to flee far up the Yangtze River. Still unrepentant, they persist in their desperate opposition. It is a most lamentable thing for the sake of East Asia as a whole as well as for the people of China.

Some time ago when the Japanese Government received a proffer of good offices by the German Government to act as an intermediary for bringing about direct negotiations between Japan and China, they proposed, with a view to affording the Nationalist Government a last opportunity for reconsideration, the following four points as the basic conditions for the solution of the Affair:

1. China to abandon her pro-Communist and anti-Japanese and anti-Manchoukuo policies to collaborate with Japan and Manchoukuo in their anti-Comintern policy.
2. Establishment of demilitarized zones in the necessary localities, and of a special regime for the said localities.
3. Conclusion of an economic agreement between Japan, China and

Manchoukuo.

4. China to pay Japan the necessary indemnities.

These items summarized the minimum requirements which were considered absolutely indispensable by the Japanese Government. It was my earnest hope that the Nationalist Government would sue for peace on the basis of these fundamental conditions. However, that Government, blind to the larger interests of East Asia, and ignoring both our magnanimity and Germany's friendly intention, exhibited no readiness to ask frankly for peace, but only sought to delay the matter and ultimately failed to send a reply that could be regarded in any way as sincere. The Nationalist Government having thus wilfully thrown away the last chance placed at their disposal by the Japanese Government, it became clear that there would be no hope of ever arriving at a solution by waiting indefinitely for any reconsideration on the part of the Nationalist Government. It is because of these circumstances that the Japanese Government issued on the 16th of this month the statement that they would from thence forward cease to deal with the Nationalist Government, as is made plain in that statement our Government now look forward to the establishment and the growth of a new Chinese regime capable of genuine cooperation with Japan, which it is their intention to assist in the building up of a new and rehabilitated China. I am fully convinced that this is the only way of realizing our ideal of securing the stability of East Asia through Sino-Japanese co-operation.

I desire to avail myself of this occasion to say that in Europe and America there are some who are apt to entertain misgivings regarding Japan's intentions as though she were trying to close the Chinese door, and expel the interests of the Powers from China. Let me state explicitly that not only will Japan respect to the fullest extent the rights and interests of the Powers in the occupied areas, but she is prepared, for the purpose of promoting the welfare of the Chinese people, to leave the door wide open to all Powers and to welcome their cultural and economic cooperation thereto. It is earnestly to be hoped that the Powers, by recognizing the new conditions prevailing in China, and by appreciating the propriety of such Japanese demands for necessary and national adjustments as have been submitted, or may be submitted hereafter, in order to meet those conditions, will co-operate for the establishment of a new order in the Far East.

As regards our relations with Manchoukuo, it is the fundamental principle of our national policy to help that country to achieve a healthy progress as an independent state, maintaining all the while its intimate and inseparable relationship with our own. In accordance with this basic principle our Government decided upon the abolition of the extraterritoriality long enjoyed by Japan and transfer of her administrative rights in the South Manchuria Railway zone. And in the execution of that pro-

grante the first treaty was concluded in June, 1936, and the second treaty in November last year, the operation of both of which has proved exceedingly satisfactory. As for the international status of Manchoukuo, because of the various governmental reforms and improvements accomplished through her strenuous efforts exerted with the help of Japan for their materialization, the Powers have come to revise their appraisal of the new state. Italy, first of all, extended formal recognition towards the end of November last, and the mutual extension of formal recognition with the Franco Government of Spain took place in the early days of the following December.

Japan's policy towards the Soviet Union has always been guided by our conviction of the urgent need of placing the relations of the two countries upon a normal footing for the sake of the peace of East Asia. It is in accordance with this policy that we endeavored within the past year to solve the long pending issue of the revision of the Fishery Treaty, but unfortunately, owing to the attitude of the Soviet authorities, we were obliged to conclude a *modus vivendi* at the year end as in the year before last. I should add, however, that since the Soviet Government are proceeding with the necessary internal preparations for the conclusion of an agreement providing for a revision of the treaty now in force, we are taking steps for the continuance of the negotiation and the signing of the new agreement at the earliest possible date.

This Government attach great importance to a smooth operation of the Japanese concession enterprises in North Saghalien. Let me say that the Japanese Government will never allow these rights and interests derived from the Soviet-Japanese Basic Treaty to be nullified through unreasonable pressure. Again, the relations between the Soviet Union and China are attracting the special attention of our nation. China concluded in August last a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, while members of the Communist International have penetrated all classes of the Chinese, destroying the social order of the country and endangering the stability of East Asia. Japan, ever solicitous for the civilization of East Asia and the welfare of its people, cannot but view the situation with the gravest concern.

In conducting military operations in China, Japan has been exercising special care lest the nationals and the rights and interest of third Powers should suffer. But there have occurred, I regret to say, toward the end of last year the Panay Incident and the Ladybird Incident, involving Great Britain and the United States. While it is needless to say that their occurrence was entirely unintentional, it was feared for a time that these incidents might lead to an alienation of feeling between Japan and those two countries. I rejoice that thanks to the calm and fair-minded attitude taken by the Governments of both countries and the sincerity of our Government and people, the incidents have been brought in each case to an amicable settlement.

Since the outbreak of the present Affair, the United States has always maintained a fair and just attitude, acting on all occasions with such careful regard for the cause of Japanese-American friendship that, despite such mishaps as the Panay Incident, the relations of the two countries, I am happy to say, have suffered no impairment. The importance to the conduct of our foreign affairs of American understanding needs scarcely to be mentioned. We shall continue to do our best towards the furtherance of Japanese-American amity and good will.

As regards Great Britain, there has been no change in the policy of the Japanese Government, which aims at the maintenance of the traditional friendship between the two countries. I hope that the British Government and people, grasping fully the importance of Anglo-Japanese relations, will endeavour to comprehend correctly Japan's position in East Asia and to co-operate with Japan for the furtherance of peace and good understanding between the two nations. At the same time, I desire to urge upon our own people to stand solidly behind this policy of the Government, in view of the seriousness of the general situation.

I am glad to say that Japan and Germany have been brought closer together than ever through such auspicious events as the visit of E.I.H. Prince Chichibu who was pleased to make a tour of that country on his way home from England last year, and also the cruise of the H.I.N.S. Ashigara, which included a call at Kiel. Especially do this Government appreciate the friendly and most sympathetic attitude Germany has taken in consonance with the spirit of the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Agreement. We will strive to strengthen further the cooperation between the two countries.

From the beginning of the present Affair, Italy, understanding our true motives, has collaborated with us along all lines. It is well known to you how consistently and how energetically the Italian Government supported our country in November last year at the Brussels Conference of the Signatory Powers to the Nine Power Treaty. In connection with the question already mentioned of the settlement of the present Affair, the Italian Government again manifested their sympathetic concern. This Government are most grateful for these proofs of good will on the part of Italy, which had taken actually the same position as Japan in the matter of combatting the Comintern, joined in the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Agreement in November last. It is a subject for congratulation from the standpoint of securing world peace that Japan, Germany and Italy have come to join forces under the Anti-Comintern banner. This Government will seek to extend further the effective operation of this agreement in concert with Germany and Italy.

In Spain, the civil war which broke out in July 1936 has developed steadily in favour of the regime under General Franco, which has now succeeded in bringing the greater part of the country under its control, and in consolidating its foundations. Moreover, the Franco Government is



identified with the Government of this country in the policy adopted against the Comintern. In the light of these facts we have decided to recognize that Government, and the necessary steps to that end were taken early in December last year.

A survey of our foreign trade shows that there has been in the past year a notable increase, as compared with the preceding year, of more than 35 per cent. in value as regards imports and 18 per cent. in value as regards exports--the total value of imports and exports together exceeding 7,270,000,000 yon, which is an unprecedented sum in the history of our foreign commerce.

Nevertheless, there still remain the economic barriers as heretofore. While endeavouring on the one hand to eliminate these obstacles through diplomatic means by dealing individually with the various countries according to their respective circumstances and the measures employed by them, this Government are exerting on the other hand unremitting efforts to promote our foreign trade by every means available. During the past year trade agreements have been concluded with British India, Burma, and Turkey. There were also signed in December a Treaty of Commerce with Siam and a supplementary agreement to the Italo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce relating to the Italian colonies. Negotiations are now in progress with other countries for the conclusion of the necessary trade agreements, covering both old and new markets.

A boycott of Japanese goods has been initiated in certain countries owing to misleading Chinese propoganda concerning the present Affair and to the machinations of the Chinese who reside there in large numbers. However, nowhere has it developed into any serious proportions, thanks to the united efforts of the Government and people and the fair attitude of the general public in the countries concerned.

The Japanese Government believe it to be one of the necessary conditions of the peace and harmony and the prosperity of Japan, Manchoukuo and China, and consequently of the entire world, to increase rationally the productive power of these three countries, and to strengthen their economic ties, and at the same time to promote their trade with the rest of the world. For the realization of this purpose the Government are now carefully preparing appropriate plans at home and abroad.

Finally I desire to say a few words on cultural work. In order to promote international friendship and to bring about a real peace among mankind it is necessary that nations should form intimate cultural bonds and cultivate a full understanding of one another's ideals and aspirations. The present Affair is traceable in no small degree to Chinese lack of understanding in this regard. If Japan and China are to build up a lasting friendship, they should understand each other's national conditions and characteristics, and cooperate culturally according to the fundamental spirit of the Orient. Taking this standpoint, the Government

intend to carry on in China more intensively than heretofore the cultural work which will serve as a foundation for the permanent peace and prosperity of the two nations. At the same time the Government will not relax their cultural work elsewhere since there is a special need, in the face of the present international situation, of making other peoples better acquainted with our unique culture and the national traits of our people who love justice and peace.

I hope that from what I have now said you have been able to understand the views of the Government regarding the present China Affair and foreign questions in general. In brief, the underlying aim of the foreign policy of the Government is to eradicate the root of evil in East Asia, to make known throughout the world the justice of our cause, and to contribute toward laying the foundations of world peace. To that end the Government are doing their very utmost. And I trust that you will appreciate the intentions of the Government and will extend your cooperation for the attainment of the objectives of our foreign policy in dealing with the grave emergency that confronts the nation today.

C E R T I F I C A T E

U.P.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I.P.S. No. 854-H

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, KAWASHI, KAOFU, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 177 pages, dated Jan.-Dec., 1938, and described as follows: Announcements of the Japanese Government relating to the China Incident (Vol. 2). I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
23 day of Sept., 1946.

(signed) K. Kawashi  
Signature of Official

Witness: Inobu Odo (signed) Chief of the Archives Section  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, John A. Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
23 day of Sept., 1946

(signed) J. A. Curtis, 2d Lt.

Witness: Richard A. Larsen /s/ Investigator  
Official Capacity

619023 Doc 854 H.

(三) 九十三回帝國議會ニ於テハ廣田外務大臣演説(八月十三日)及般事變ニ對スル帝國政府ノ方針ニ付マシテ、曩ニ亦十三回帝國議會ニ於テ陳述スル所アリシタカ本旨茲ニ其ノ後ノ情勢及狀カ對外關係ノ全般ニ付テ所見ヲ陳致シタト存シマス。今次事變ニ對スル帝國政府ノ態度ハ屢次ニ互ニ政府齊言、披瀝ニシテ明カニテアリシテ帝國政府ハ支那ニ對シテ何等ノ領土ノ野心ヲ有セス又支ヲ支那ヨリ分離セシメトスルカ如キ意圖ヲ有シテ居ナイテアリマス即チ帝國ノ本旨ハ所ハ唯支那大局ニ自覺メ且ニ提携共存共榮ノ理想ニ協力スルニ至ラン事ニ在リテアリマス、従ツテ事變勃發後ニ於キマニテモ國民政府ニシテ排日抗滿政策ヲ捨テ右帝國ノ理想ニ協力スルノ誠意ヲ披瀝シ來ルニ於テハ帝國ノ之ト手ヲ携(東亞和平ノ確立ニ邁進セリトヲ期シテ居タリテアリマス、然レニ國民政府ハ帝國ノ真意ヲ解セス多事自ラ鼓吹シ來ルニ排日抗日ノ主張ヨリ自繩自縛ニ墮リ冷靜大局ヲ觀念シテ善處スルコトヲ得ス或ハ亦三國ノ頼リ或ハ共產黨ト結ビ今尙長期抵抗ヲ唱ヘ國民衆ヲ塗炭ニ苦ニ投シテ取テ敵ニテアリマス、今ヤ帝國ハ忠勇ナル軍隊ハ北ニ南ニ勇戰奮闘シ以テ國民政府ノ自衛南條ヲ捨テテ寧ク長江上流ニ迷竄用ヤルヲ得テ上トナリシマシタカ而モ尙自ラ覺ルコトヲ自暴自棄的抵抗ヲ續ケテ居リマス斯クノ如キ支那民衆ニモ得又更生ノ大局ノ爲ニモ痛恨相措ク能ハサル所ナリマス帝國政府ノ曩ニ獨逸政府ヨリ日支兩國ノ間ニ立テ直接交渉ノ橋渡シヲナス等自ラ好意的申出ニ付マシタリテ國民政府ニ最後ニ及者ヲ其ノカガ爲事變解決ノ基礎條件トシテ次由點ヲ提示シタリテアリマス。

16

854A

Doc

「支那の容兵、抗日滿政策を放棄之日滿兩國、防共政策に協力せず。  
 二、重要地域、非武装地帯を設け且該地方、特殊の機構を設定せず。  
 三、日滿支三國間、密接たる經濟協定を締結せしむ。  
 四、支那の帝國に對し、所費、賠償ヲナスト」

右の如し帝國政府、絶對に要す認め、最少数限度要求を概括致し  
 又モ、アメリカ、私八國民政府カ東ニ此基礎條件ヨリ和ヲ求メ来リ  
 ニトテ、抑留シテ居タリテ、アメリカカ東ニ大目ニ目覺メサル同政府ハ  
 我カ、眞意殆ど無ク、政府ノ好意トテ無視シ、廣心坦懷ニ和ヲ乞フ  
 態度ニ出テ、徒ラニ要スル事トシタル、未ダ、何等謝意ヲ認め、今  
 同答ヲシテ、カ、アメリカ、私八國民政府ノ態度ハ、帝國政府ノ要ス  
 ル最少数、好機ヲ自ラ、抛擲シタルモノトシテ、今、アメリカ、私八國民政府  
 至リ、此、上、在、同政府、及、省、ヲ、待、ツ、モ、到、底、事、變、解決、見、出、キ、コ  
 ト、明、カ、ト、相、談、ツ、ク、テ、ア、リ、マ、ス、之、ト、去、リ、テ、六、日、前、帝國政府カ、今後、國民政府  
 ヲ、好、ム、ト、セ、サル、旨、ヲ、聲明、ヲ、ナ、ス、ニ、至、リ、テ、所以、アメリカ、私八國民政府、高、談、聲明、中、ニ、モ  
 明、示、シ、テ、アメリカ、私八國民政府、今後、帝國政府ハ、帝國、上、真、ニ、提、携、ス、ル、ニ、定  
 ル、新、興、支、那、政、權、以、テ、充、展、シ、期、待、致、シ、マ、ス、ニ、是、ト、兩國、一、國、ヲ、  
 調整、シ、更、生、利、支、那、建設、ニ、協力、ス、ル、決、意、ヲ、ア、リ、マ、ス、テ、私、八、國民政府、此、力  
 帝國、理想、ト、シ、テ、日、支、提、携、ヲ、以、テ、東、亞、安定、ヲ、得、ル、唯一、途、ナル、コ、ト、ヲ  
 信、シ、テ、疑、心、ナ、ク、アメリカ、私八國民政府、高、此、ノ、機會、自、言、致、シ、度、ハ、八、日、前、諸、國、  
 於、キ、マ、ス、テ、郵、モ、ス、ル、帝國、力、支、那、力、ヲ、内、鎖、シ、列、國、權、益、ヲ、駭、惑、  
 セ、コ、ト、ヲ、企、圖、シ、テ、居、ル、カ、知、キ、誤、解、ヲ、有、ス、ル、何、カ、アル、コ、ト、ア、リ、マ、ス。  
 帝國政府ハ、帝國軍隊、之、據、区域内、ニ、在、ル、列、國、權、益、ハ、飽、ク、シ、テ、  
 之、ヲ、尊重、ス、ル、コ、ト、勿、論、應、ル、支、那、民、衆、利、益、増、進、ノ、多、ク、諸  
 外國、主、義、ヲ、解放、シ、其、次第、ハ、進、出、ヲ、モ、歡迎、ス、ル、モノ、ト、シ、テ、

乙

Doc 854H

茲三明ニシテ後ト存トス私ハ閣僚列國カ友邦ニ於ケル新十軍艦  
ヲ直視シ之ニ即應テ帝國ノ現ニ爲シツアリ又ハ今後爲スコト  
ルニ合理的調離ニ要求ヲ諒解シ以テ東亞ノ新ニ秩序ノ建設ニ協力  
セシコトヲ希望スル決トアリマス次ニ日滿兩國關係ヲ見スルニ  
滿洲國ヲシテ帝國ト緊密ナル關係ヲ持ツツ獨立國トシテ其健  
全ニ發展ヲ遂ヘシムルコトハ帝國對滿國策ノ基調トアリマス帝國  
カ多量滿洲ニ於テ占有セル治外法權及自衛戰爭ノ代償タル南滿  
洲鐵道附屬地行政權ニ付キニテモ政府ハ右國策ノ基調ニ遵據  
シテ成遂シ之カ撤廢乃至移讓ヲナス方針ヲ決定シ右實現  
爲昭和十有月條約並昨月十日ノ條約ヲ締結シクテアリマス  
而シテ右兩條約ノ實施狀況ハ極メテ順調トアリマス万國際政局  
ニ於テ滿洲國地位ヲ見スルニ建國以來帝國ノ協力ノ下ニ庶政ノ  
改革ニ斷進シ改メシタ結果今ヤ列國モソノ滿洲認識ヲ新  
スルニ至リ昨月十日未先ツ伊國ノ正式承認ヲ得テ十二月初西班  
牙カソノ將軍政府トノ間ニ相互ニ正式承認ヲ行ヒシタコトハ御  
同慶ノ至リトアリマス

「ソレト聯邦トノ關係ニ付キニテハ帝國政府トシテ由來兩國關係ヲ  
出來得ル限り正常ナル狀態ニ置クコトヲ東亞平和ノ又々喫緊ト信ジ  
此方針ヲ以テ措置シ來ルテアリマス即チ兩國間往來ノ懸案  
又ハ漢蒙條約ノ修正問題ヲ昨月中ニ解決セシト努力致シタ  
コトモニ此方針ニ基クモニアリマスカソレト政府當局ノ態度ニ  
ヨリ昨月末遂ニ昨月ト同様ノ暫定取極ヲ結フコトヲ得セルニ至  
リタコト事ハ私ノ首肯トスル所トアリマス尤モソレト政府ニ於テモ  
現行條約ヲ修正スル決定ヲ締結スルニ爲シ必要ナル國內的準備ヲ

Doc 8544

進マテ居リマスガ故ニ、引續キ交渉ヲ行ヒ、以テ可成速ニ、新協定、

實現ヲ見ル程、折角ヲ配中デアリマス。

尙政府ハ北極太ニ於ケル利權事業ノ正常ナル進行ヲ極メテ  
重要視スルモ、テマリマシテ、日ソ「基本條約ニ由來スル此種  
ノ利權カ、不當ノ圧迫ニヨリ有名無實トナルカ如キコトハ、帝國  
政府トシテ黙過シ得ナイ所デアリマス。

又ソビエト「聯邦ト支那トノ關係ニ付テハ、我國一般ノ特ニ注  
意ヲ惹イテ居ル所デマリマシテ、支那ハ昨年八月ソ「聯邦トノ  
向ニ不侵略條約ヲ結ビ殊ニ國際共產黨員ヲ支那ノ各層ニ喰  
入ツテ同國ノ社会秩序ヲ破壊シ、延イテ東亞ノ安定ニ禍シテ  
居リマス。ソトハ、東亞ノ文明ト諸民族ノ福祉ヲ念トスル、帝國  
トシテ、多大ノ關心ヲ持ツサルヲ得ナイ次第デアリマス。  
帝國ハ對支軍事行動ヲ進ムルニ當リ、在支第三國權益ニ  
不測ノ被害ヲ及ハサル程、特ニ留意シ来ツタノテマリマスガ、  
不幸ニシテ英米トノ向ニ、昨年末米艦「パン」号、及英艦  
「ジイバー」号事件ヲ起リシコトハ、甚タ遺憾トスル  
所デアリマス。

4a

此等ノ事件カ我ラノ故意ニ出テタルモノニ非サルハ申ス迄モ  
ナイ所デアリマスガ、右兩事件ハ、一時、我國ト右兩國ノ感情  
疎隔ノ因ヲ成スコトナキヤリ氣遣ハシメタノテマリマス。

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HKSJ  
2008

幸ニシテ西國政府、冷靜且公正ナル態度上、我國民一致、誠意トシヨリテ、事件、圓滿ナル解決ヲ見ニシタコトハ、邦家、多ク欣快ニ堪ヘテ、所ナリトス。

今次事變勃發以來、米國政府、寧ニ公正ノ態度ヲ持シ、ヨリ日米關係、大局ヲ顧念シテ、海峽ニ、所謂「ハット」等事件、如キ不祥事件、突發ニモ不拘、西國友好關係ニ何等障礙ヲ及ボスコトナカリシコトハ、私、欣幸トスル所ナリトス。帝國、外交上米國ノ理解認識、必要ニ付テハ、今更甚ニ言フ所ニ付テ、所ナリトス。此、上共日米親善、又ハ出来得ル限り、努力ヲ續ケテ行キ度イ所存トアリトス。

英國ノ關係ニ付キテハ、帝國政府カ、日英西國、傳統的支那關係ヲ維持セシトスル從來、方針ニハ、何等渝ル所ナシトアリトス。

私、英國政府及國民ニ於テ、日英關係、重大性ニ付テ、今、理解ヲ持テ、真意ニ於テハ、帝國、立場ヲ正解シ、我々一協力ニテ、西國ノ親善増進ニ努力セシトスル態度ニ出テ、来ルべきコトヲ期待スルト共ニ、我國民モ亦、支那時局、重大ナルニ鑑ミ、  
(次頁續ク)





Doc of 5414.

諸般事情ニ鑑ミ同政府ヲ承認スルヲ適当ト認メ昨昨十日  
初承認手續ヲ執ルニアリマス  
次ニ昨昨ニ於ケル通商関係ヲ概觀致シマスニ一昨昨ニ比シ  
輸入金額ニ於テ三割五分餘又輸出金額ニ於テ割五分餘  
激增スルノ實情總額美ニ七十二億七千餘萬円トシテ未曾有  
ト巨額ニ達シタリマス

然レテ今一諸外國ニ於ケル經濟的障害ハ其後依然トシテ存  
續シテ居リマスニテ政府ト致シテ一諸國ノ事情甚ニ其ノ措置  
ニ應ジ各他外交手段等ニ依リ打開ヲ圖リツツアル方眞易促進  
トス不斷ノ努力ヲ致シツツアル次第ニアリマシテ昨昨中東領印度  
印及土耳其ト一國ニ通商協定締結ヲ完了シ又暹羅ト一國  
ノ通商條約及伊銀植民地ニ関スル日伊通商追加協定モ舊臘調  
印ヲ了スルニ次チアリマシテ更ニ尙新市場ニ亘リ諸國上通  
商ニ関シ必要ナル取極ノ締結ヲ交渉中ニアリマス

諸國中ニハ事變ニ関スル支那側ノ虚構ノ宣傳ニ惑ハル者ハ多數  
在在スル其偏策動ノ結果女邦名排斥擧行ニ出テタルモノアリ  
マシタリト誠ニ遺憾ニ堪ヘテ所ニアリマスカ然レ官民一致ノ努力  
ト諸國民一般ノ公正ニ態度トニ依リマシテ其ノ擴大ヲ見ルニ至ラ  
カクテ誠ニ幸トスル所ニアリマス

日滿支三國ノ生産力ヲ合理的ニ擴充シ其ノ經濟的連繫ヲ鞏固  
スルト共ニ之ト諸外國ト一眞易關係發展ヲ圖ルコト日滿支三  
國共ニ法律安全條約簽結ト世界協和トヲ齎ラス(キ必須條  
件)ト信スルモノアリマシテ之ヲ實現スルニ政府ハ自内内外ニ亘リ  
萬全ノ措置ヲ講ジツツアルニアリマス

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54H.

Luc

最後ニ附言致之ヲト思ヒマスコト文化事業ニ付テアリ又国際  
 間ノ親善ヲ増進シ人衆ノ真在和ヲ招来セシメ各国民カ相互ニ  
 文化的連繫ヲ緊密ニ相与シ是意ヲ充分ニ理解スルコトカ必要  
 ナリマス今次事変ノ如キモ面ニ於テ支那側カ此ノ點ニ於テ缺  
 所アリト起因スル所カ勘クテアリマス故ニ日支間恒久  
 ノ親善關係ヲ樹立スルタメハ日支兩国民カ相互ニ其ノ國情ト國民性  
 トヲ理解シ東洋本然ノ精神ニ立脚シ文化的提携ヲ實行スルハ  
 要カリテアリマス政府ハ此ノ見地ヨリ日支文化事業ニ層々力ヲ  
 注之ヲ以テ兩國間百計ノ基礎ヲ固メントスルコトヲ期シ居ル  
 決テアリマス同右ト同時ニ我國文化ヲ海外ニ紹介ヲ行フ  
 爲メ善義ト在和トヲ愛好スル我ノ國民性ト我ノ固有ノ文化ヲ海外ニ  
 宣揚スルハ現下ノ國際情勢ニ鑑ミ特ニ必要ナルモノカルト考ヘマス  
 一ト政府公益ノ國際文化事業ニ力カセトスルモアリマス  
 以上建議致シ之ヲ所ヨリ今次事変共ニ對外國問題ニ全般ニ関ス  
 ル政府ノ所見ヲ大體御諒察願ヘル事ト存スルテアリマス之ヲ要ス  
 ルニ政府ノ外交政策ノ根柢ヲナスモノハ一ニ東洋ノ根柢ヲ除キツク大義  
 ノ守内ニ顯揚シ以テ世界在和ノ基ヲ樹テントスルアリマシテ此  
 ノ目的ヲ政府自取善ヲ盡シテ居ルニテアリマス何卒諸君ニ  
 於テセテテモ政府ノ意ハ此ヲ御了解シ現下非常重大ノ時局  
 ニ處ルニ際シ外交ノ自的達成ヲメテ御協力アリコトヲ希望スル  
 決テアリマス

Doc. 854 H

證明書  
ワシントン文書局 第 号  
國際檢察部 第八五四号

余林馨余が下記資格於即々外務省文書課長トシ日本政府ト公的  
關係在ルモノナルト。並ニ該官吏トシ余ガ茲ニ添附セラルル百七十七頁ヲ成ル  
千九百三十八年/昭和十三年/一月ヨリ十一月附。下記題名。即々支那事務關係公衆  
集第三号ノ文書ノ保管ニ任居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。  
余ニ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナルト。並ニ右ガ下記名  
稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式書類及ビ綴。一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シテハ六綴番  
号及引用其他公式書類又ハ綴。於ケル該文書ノ正規所在ノ公式名稱  
ヲ特記スベシ)

一 外務省  
千九百四十六年/昭和二十一年/九月二十三日  
東京ニ於テ署名  
当該官吏署名欄  
右ノ者ノ公的資格  
證明人  
林 馨 (林)  
外務省文書課長  
尾 戸 長 春

公式ノ手ニ関スル證明

No. 3 ☆ ☆

余 John A. Curtis 余ガ聯合國最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係ルモノナル  
コト。並ニ上記題名ノ文書ノ余ガ公務上ノ日本政府ノ上記署名官吏  
ノ手ニシタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス

千九百四十六年/昭和二十一年/ 月 日  
東京ニ於テ署名

氏名欄 John A. Curtis.  
右ノ者ノ公的資格 國際檢察部調査官  
證明人 Richard H. Larsh.

Q.#9724

Ex. Br. 65 (Page 1)--IPS Doc. 854-J

STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER, PRINCE FUMIMARO KONOE.

December 22, 1938.

The Japanese Government are resolved, as has been clearly set forth in their two previous statements issued this year, to carry on the military operations for the complete extermination of the anti-Japanese Kuomintang Government, and at the same time to proceed with the work of establishing a new order in East Asia together with those far-sighted Chinese who share in our ideals and aspirations.

The spirit of renaissance is now sweeping over all parts of China and enthusiasm for reconstruction is mounting ever higher. The Japanese Government desire to make public their basic policy for adjusting the relations between Japan and China, in order that their intentions may be thoroughly understood both at home and abroad.

Japan, China, and Manchoukuo will be united by the common aim of establishing the new order in East Asia and of realizing a relationship of neighbourly amity, common defence against Communism, and economic cooperation. For that purpose it is necessary first of all that China should cast aside all narrow and prejudiced views belonging to the past and do away with the folly of anti-Japanism, and resentment regarding Manchoukuo. In other words, Japan frankly desires China to enter of her own will into complete diplomatic relations with Manchoukuo.

The existence of the Comintern influence in East Asia can not be tolerated. Japan therefore considers it an essential condition of the adjustment of the Sino-Japanese relations that there should be concluded an anti-Comintern agreement between the two countries in consonance with the spirit of the anti-Comintern Agreement between Japan, Germany and Italy. And in order to ensure the full accomplishment of her purpose, Japan demands, in view of the actual circumstances prevailing in China, that Japanese troops be stationed, as an anti-Communist measure, at specified points during the time the said agreement is in force, and also that the Inner Mongolian region be designated as a special anti-Communist area.

As regards economic relations between the two countries, Japan does not intend to exercise economic monopoly in China, nor does she intend to demand of China to limit the interests of those third Powers, who grasp the meaning of the new East Asia and are willing to act accordingly. Japan only seeks to render effective the cooperation and collaboration between the two countries. That is to say, Japan demands that China, in accordance with the principle of equality between the two countries, should recognize the freedom of residence and trade on the part of Japanese subjects in the interior of China, with a view to promoting the economic interests of both peoples; and that, in the light of the historical and economic relations between the two nations, China should extend to Japan facilities for the development of China's natural resources, especially in the regions of North China and Inner Mongolia.

Er. Ex. 65 (Page 2)--IP3 Doc. 854-J \*

The above gives the general lines of what Japan demands of China. If the true object of Japan in conducting the present vast military campaign be fully understood, it will be plain that what she seeks is neither territory nor indemnity for the costs of military operations. Japan demands only the minimum guarantee needed for the execution by China of her function as a participant in the establishment of the new order.

Japan not only respects the sovereignty of China, but she is prepared to give positive consideration to the questions of the abolition of extra-territoriality and of the rendition of concessions and settlements-- matters which are necessary for the full independence of China.

DECLASSIFIED

C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
S. No. \_\_\_\_\_

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Y. KAWAYE, 3011, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 177 pages, dated Jan.-Dec., 1941, and described as follows: Announcements of the Japanese Government Relating to the China Incident (Vol. 2). I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this  
23 day of Sept., 1946.

(signed) Y. Kawayé  
Signature of Official  
3011

Witness: Haraharu Sôo (signed) Chief of the Archives Section  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, John A. Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
23 day of Sept., 1946.

(signed) J. A. Curtis, 2d Lt.

Witness: Richard L. Jorsh /s/ Investigator  
Official Capacity

Doc 854J

近衛内閣總理大臣談 (十二月二十二日)

シフン

政府、本年再度、聲明ニ於テ明カニシタル如ク、終始一貫、抗日國民政府、徹底的武力掃蕩ヲ期スルト共ニ、支那ニ於テ同慶具眼ノ士ト相携ヘテ東亞新秩序、建設ニ同ツテ邁進セシムルモノトアル。

今ヤ支那各地ニ於テハ更生ノ勢澎湃トテ起リ、建設ノ氣煙愈高マルルヲ感得セシムルモノカアル。於茲政府ハ、更生新支那ト、關係ヲ調整スヘキ根本方針ヲ中外ニ闡明シ、以テ帝國ノ眞意、徹底ヲ期スルモノトアル。

日滿支三國ハ東亞新秩序、建設ヲ共同ノ目的トシテ結合シ相互ニ善隣友好、共同防共、經濟提携、實ヲ擧ゲシムルモノトアル。之ガタメニハ支那ノ先ツ何ヨリモ舊來ノ偏狹ナル觀念ヲ清算シテ抗日ノ懸ト滿洲國ニ對スル拘泥ノ情トヲ一擲スルコトが必要トアル。即チ日本ハ支那ヲ進ニテ滿洲國ト完全ナル國交ヲ修メ、コトヲ率直ニ要望スルモノトアル。

次ニハ東亞ノ天地ニハ「コミンテルン」ノ勢力、存在ヲ許スヘカニナル故ニ、日本ハ日獨伊防共協定、精神ニ則リ、日支防共協定ノ締結ヲ以テ日支國交調整上喫緊ノ要件トスルモノトアル。而シテ支那ニ存在スル實情ニ鑑ミ、コノ防共ノ目的ニ對スル十分ナル保障ヲ擧グルタメニ、同協定繼續期間中、特定地域ニ日本軍、防共駐屯ヲ認めルコト及ヒ内蒙地方ヲ特殊防共區域トスヘキコトヲ要求スルモノトアル。

日支經濟關係ニ就テハ日本ハ何等支那ニ於テ經濟的独占ヲ行ハシムルモノニ非ス。又新ニキ東亞ヲ理解シ、コレニ即應シテ行數セシムル主義、第三國ノ利益ヲ制限スルカ如キコトヲ支那ニ求ムルモノニ非ス。唯飽ミ込日支、提携ト合作トヲシテ實効アリシメ、コトヲ期スルモノトアル。即チ日支平等ノ原則ニ立ツテ、支那ノ帝國臣民ニ支那内地ニ於

1/8



Doc 854J

今此居住聯繫、自由ヲ發達スルニ由テ國民、經濟的利ヲ得ル  
 此ノ日支國、歷史的經濟關係ニ鑑ミテ、其ノ内閣政策  
 於テハ、一、資源、開發利用上、日本ニ對シテ積極的ニ便宜手樂  
 此トテ要求スルモノニナル。

日本、支那ニ求ムル所、モ、大綱ハ以上、如キモノニナル。日本が敢  
 テ大膽ヲ勵カセバ、其ノ實ニ徹スルニ至ル、日本、支那ニ求ムルモノ、カ國  
 ミタル領土ニ非ズ、又鐵道、鑛權ニ非サルコトハ、明カナリ。

日本、實ニ支那カ新秩序建設、分擔者トシテ、職能ヲ實行スル  
 ニ必要ナル學識、程度、保障ヲ要求セムルモノニナル。日本、  
 支那、二權ヲ平衡スルニ因リ、道ニテ支那、相互完成、スルニ必  
 要トスル外、他權ヲ撤シ、一、日、細察、逐邊ニ對シテ積極的  
 ナル考慮ヲ掛クニ名ナリナルモノ、ニナル。

Doc. 854.J.

證明書  
「シ」ト之文書局 第 号  
國際檢察部 第八五四丁号

典據及公正ニ関スル證明

余林馨查余が下記資格ニ於テ即外務省文書課長トシテ日本政府トシテ  
關係ニ在ルモノトシテ並該課長トシテ余が茲ニ添附セララルル頁ニ於テ  
千九百三十六年即和三十年九月十三日附下記題名即支那事變關係公表  
集(第百号)文書ノ保管及任シ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス  
余更ニ添附ノ記録及文書が日本政府ノ公文書ナルトシテ並右が下記  
稱省文書局ノ公式書類及綴ノ部ナルコトヲ證明ス(若シニ綴番号  
又引用其他公式書類又綴ニ於テ該文書ノ正規所在ノ公式名稱ヲ  
指記スル)

一 外務省

千九百四十六年 / 昭和三十年 / 九月十三日

東京ニ於テ署名

此該官吏署名欄

右ノ者ノ公的資格

證明人

公式ノ手ニ関スル證明

林 馨查 (林)  
外務省文書課長  
尾 戸 長 春

☆

余 John A. Curtis 余が聯合國取高指揮官司令部關係アリ  
トシテ並下記題名ノ文書ノ余が公務上日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ  
手ニ取ルモノナルトシテ茲ニ證明ス

千九百四十六年 / 昭和三十年 / 月 日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名欄

右ノ者ノ公的資格

證明人

John A. Curtis  
國際檢察部 調査官  
Richard H. Cursh

ORAL STATEMENT BY THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN  
JAPAN (GEEW) TO THE JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER  
AND MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (PRINCE KONOYE)  
OCTOBER 3, 1938

Excerpts

. . . . .

I have had many conferences on this general subject with former Ministers, especially Mr. Hirota and General Ugaki, who have repeatedly given me precise and definite assurances that American interests in China would be respected and that the principle of the Open Door and equal opportunity would be steadily maintained.

The American Government to its regret is constrained to observe that violation of American rights and interests, including violation of the principle of the Open Door, has nevertheless persisted.

In the light of the situation which I am now reviewing, the President of the United States asks that the Japanese Government implement its assurances already given with regard to the maintenance of the Open Door and to non-interference with American rights by taking prompt and effective measures to rectify the situation which I am about to explain.

. . . . .

The American Government has already pointed out to the Japanese Government that alterations of the Chinese customs tariff by the regimes functioning in those portions of China occupied by the Japanese and for which the Japanese Government has formally assured its support are arbitrary and illegal assumptions of authority, the responsibility for which the Japanese Government cannot escape.

It is hardly necessary to state that there can be no Open Door in China so long as the ultimate authority to regulate, tax, or prohibit trade is exercised, directly or indirectly, by the authorities of one "foreign" power in furtherance of the interests of that power.

It would appear to be self-evident that a fundamental prerequisite of a condition of equality of opportunity or Open Door in China is the absence in the economic life of that country of preferences or monopolistic rights operating directly or indirectly in favor of any foreign country or its nationals.

. . . . .

Lu 973  
21972 (1933)

日本總理大臣兼外務大臣(近衛公)二对二

駐日英國公使(牟北)二对三(一九三三年十月)

抄録

余此二一般の問題二就二前大臣、特二原田氏及宇垣總督大

將二幾二交二高議二之二如二彼等二線二之二余二对二中国二於二

米國、權益二始二重二之二且二戶甫故二該二機二會二均二等二原則

二嚴二維持二之二之二、明確且具體的、保証二與二之、

二之二拘二、不二米國政府二遺憾二作二戶甫故二主義、違背及

英國人、權利二利益二關係、侵害二當然二續行二之二可二

目睹二此、余二感二于二三二之二、

余二現二在二推二辭二之二居二此二狀況二之二徵二、合衆國大統領、余二加二將二謀

明二之二上二此二局面二之二度二正二之二為二之二敏二速二且二有二效二之二措二置二于二採二取二下

二條二、日本政府二在二其二之二三二與二之二戶甫故、維持二及二米國權益、

对二此二不二中二涉二、尚二此二保証二之二履行、又二此二權二要求二之二之二此、

日本二依二り二占領二、三二之二在二中国、之二等、部二分二於二于二機二能二于二從二揮

シ、二此二諸二政二策二之二之二、二对二日本政府、公二成二其二機二助二于二保証二之

政二權二二條二此二半二回、國二機二能二、受二重二、八二身二勝二于二之二且二非二合二法二的、二此二條

力、二潛二用二之二、之二對二此二責任、日本政府、回二避二之二得二其二之二此、

二与二米國政府、八二已二自二奉二政府二对二之二指二權二也、

二外二國、官二憲二一、條二于二這二國、利益二于二助二長二不、二課二稅二、調二整

之、二又二、二貿易二、二不二能二又二之二嚴二密二權二能二が二直二接二又二間二接二二行二使二之二此

限二、中国二此二之二戶甫故、不二得二十、二八二言二、後二之二此二也、

中国二於二此二機二、之二機二能二、戶甫故、狀態、根本的、之二此二必二然二條件、

219P(82)

一 外國又公認該國民利益上之地位之直接又間接作用之  
優先權又公認占據中國之經濟生活之權利之地位之  
自明之事實

外國關係一七六—一七八

Doc. No. 219P (55)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 83

THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN JAPAN TO THE JAPANESE  
MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Excerpts.

No. 942

The American Embassy presents its compliments to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to refer to the damage to American mission property at Nantungchow on August 17, 1937, as a result of Japanese military operations.

. . . . .

According to information received from the American Consul General at Shanghai, Mr. C. A. Burch of the United Christian Missionary Society, who proceeded to Nantungchow to make an investigation, stated in a sworn statement that, during an air raid which occurred at ten-thirty on the morning of August 17, 1937, four two-winged hydroaeroplanes described by witnesses as bearing the "Red Sun" insignia on the wings flew low over the mission property and dropped a number of bombs, one of which was believed to be incendiary, on the hospital and other mission buildings causing extensive damage.

. . . . .

TOKYO, May 30, 1938.

Foreign Relations I, pp. 590-591

△

219 p (55)

在日本アメリカ大使館ニリ日本國外務省へ  
九四三号

アメリカ大使館、日本國外務省ニ付之敬意を表ス共ニ日  
本ノ軍事行動ノ結果一九三七年(昭和十二年)八月七日南  
通州ニ於テアメリカ傳道會財産ノ毀損セシメタル事及  
ス先此ヲ有ス

\*\*\*

在上海アメリカ總領事館ニ接受セシ報告ニ依リ南通州  
ニ調査ニ赴キ先聯合キリスト教傳道會、ニ工  
心ノ氏(Mr. C. A. BURCH)ノ宣揚者上、一九三七年(昭  
和十二年)八月七日朝十時ニ行テ先空襲後、目撃者ハ  
彈三回、標識ニ有リト稱ス復葉水上機四回ハ  
傳道會財産上ニ空襲飛、爆彈散レ、其後  
ハ被爆彈ト信ス一施設及他、傳道會建物ニ投  
下、甚大ニ損害ヲ與ヘ又自陳述

一九三八年(昭和十二年)五月三日東京ニ於テ  
対外関係第冊五頁一五九頁

Q. # 975

Doc. No. 219 P (56)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 84

THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN JAPAN TO THE JAPANESE  
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Excerpts.

No. 946

The American Embassy presents its compliments to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to state that the following message from Haichow has been received through the American Consul General at Shanghai:

"American Presbyterian Chapel only a few feet from American Presbyterian Hospital and American Presbyterian Women's Bible School, in same yard with our residence, were bombed on May 24th by Japanese planes causing great damage; residences only very slightly damaged. Chapel and school greatly damaged, in addition our chapel(s) inside the city and at Shaiho were bombed and greatly damaged. American flags were prominently displayed at each building.

. . .

The American Consul General at Shanghai reports that a second message has been received stating that the Mission was again bombed on May 28, one bomb landing less than thirty-five yards from Mr. McLaughlin's residence, but that they were, however, fortunately unharmed.

. . . . .

TOKYO, May 31, 1938.

Foreign Relations I, p. 593.



△

駐日米國大使より日本國外務大臣宛披露  
(九四六号)

219 P (56)

米國大使、日本國外務大臣ニ謹テ上海駐在米國  
領事由、海州 (HAI CHOW) 在記通達ヲ申奉  
ル先書有之

五月二十四日日本軍飛行機ニリ米國長老教會病院  
僅ニ救災、禮拜堂及我々、邸宅敷地内、米國長老教會婦  
人聖書學校ハ爆撃受テ甚大ニ損害ヲ蒙リ、住宅  
ハ損害甚大ニ輕微ナリ。禮拜堂及學校ハ損害甚大  
加ニ市内及沙河ニ在リ於禮拜堂、爆撃受テ大損  
害ヲ蒙リ、米國之旗、自ニ之標ニ各建物ニ掲揚セ  
アリ

×××

米國上海領事、該傳道所於五月二十八日再ニ爆撃ヲ  
受テ一彈 (ニクドリ) / MR. McLAUGHLIN / 氏邸三五ヤ  
ト以内ニ墜下セシモ、傳道所ニ無怪我ヲ蒙リ、由  
第回通知ヲ受テ、此由報シ

一九三八年五月三十日 東京三

E. #976

Doc. No. 219P (57)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 85

THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN JAPAN TO THE JAPANESE  
MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Excerpt.

No. 955

The American Embassy presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to state that according to information received through the American Consul General at Shanghai, the nurses' home and two residences on the compound of the Soochow Hospital, property belonging to the American Methodist Episcopal Mission South, were occupied by Japanese troops on May 30 last. The American Consul General at Shanghai has made representations to his Japanese colleague concerning this report of the recent occupation of additional American property.

. . . . .

TOKYO, June 10, 1938.

Foreign Relations I, p. 597.

219 P (57)

駐日アメリカ大使館三リ

日本外務省

第九五五号

技萃

米國大使館ハ外務省ニ対シ敬意ヲ表シ且ツ在上海米國總領事ヨリ受理セル先記情報ニ関シ申入リテ先當有候  
即チ去ル五月三十日日本軍隊ハ米國南メソヂト監督教會所屬ノ蘇州病院棟内ノ看護婦宿舎並ニ住宅ニ棟ヲ占據致候  
右上海米國總領事ハ日本側同僚ニ対シ最近追加占據セル米國人財産ニ関シ抗議申入置候

東京ニテ

(一九三八年(昭和十三年)六月十日)

(外務省第一P.五九七)

Q. #977.

The Basis of National Policy

June 30, 1936 (SHOWA 11)

The War and Navy Ministries

I. The fundamentals of administrating state affairs lie in strengthening our national foundation at home and bringing about the prosperity of our nation abroad so that, on the basis of the relations between sovereign and subject, our Empire may secure the peace of the Orient and contribute to the welfare of mankind as the real stabilizing power in East ASIA, thereby realizing the ideal underlying the foundation of our nation. In view of the internal and external situation of the Empire, her fundamental policies must consist in advancing and developing in the Southern Seas as well as obtaining a firm position in the East Oriental continent for the stabilization of our national defense.

These fundamental policies are as follows:

(1) We must strive to correct the great Powers' aggressive policies and share happiness and favor with others according to a real principle of give and take; that is to say, our guiding principle must be to realize the spirit of the 'Imperial Way' (KODO) by a consistent policy of overseas expansion.

(2) We must complete our national defense armament in order to maintain peace and tranquillity, to safeguard our prosperity and to secure the position of the Empire as the stabilizing power in East ASIA in fact as well as in name.

(3) We expect the sound development of MANCHUKUO and hope by accomplishing this to stabilize Japan-Manchukuo national defense; thus in order to promote our economic development, we intend to get rid of the menace of the U.S.S.R., while preparing against BRITAIN and the U. S. and bringing about close collaboration between JAPAN, MANCHUKUO and CHINA. This is the basis of our continental policy in the execution of which we must also pay due attention to friendly relations with other powers.

(4) We plan to promote our social and economic development in the Southern Seas, especially in the Outer Southern Seas, and without rousing other powers to action, we must attempt to extend our strength by moderate and peaceful measures. Thus with the establishment of MANCHUKUO in addition to the above, we may expect the full development of our national resources and the completion of our national defense.

II. On the basis of the above fundamental national policies we expect to reform our government system so as to make it suitable for the present external and internal situation, and to unify political, financial and economic policies both within and without the country. The essential points are as follows:

(1) Defensive armament preparations.

a) The aim of our military preparations is to enable us to cope with any force which the U.S.S.R. can mobilize in the Far East. Especially, our force in MANCHUKUO and KOREA must be strengthened so that we may smash her Far Eastern force at one blow from the beginning.

b) As for the navy, we must complete its armament sufficiently to maintain the command of the Western Pacific against the U. S. Navy.

(2) The first principle of our diplomatic policy lies in the smooth execution of our fundamental state policies as well as synthesizing and renewing them. The military will give undercover assistance without appearing on the surface so that the activities of our diplomatic organs may progress advantageously and smoothly.

(3) We must reform and improve our administrative system and establish an economic and financial policy by means of every facility available so as to strengthen our defensive strength and to promote our economic development vigorously. For this purpose, we will take suitable steps concerning the following matters.

a) We should direct and unify internal public opinion and make the resolution of the people steady to tide over the present emergency.

b) We should appropriately improve our political and economic systems in order to develop the important trade and industries which are necessary for the execution of national policy and national defense.

c) We should take appropriate measures to stabilize the life of the people, promote their physical strength and lead their thoughts into sound channels.

d) We should make appropriate arrangements for the rapid development of the aviation and shipping business.

e) We should promote the establishment of a self-supporting and self-sufficient policy for resources and materials important for national defense and industry.

f) We should reform our diplomatic organs and also draw up a system of information and propaganda in order to make our diplomatic function and the spread of our culture in the world more active.

Matters Pertaining to Outline of the  
State Policy

June 30, 1936

The War and Navy Ministries

I. The vision of Japan is to make clear the justice and cause of the country, to plan the rise of the country and to realize the peace of the East and contribute to the welfare of the human being.

"In view of the internal and external situations of the Empire, the fundamental policies of the Empire must lie in advancing and developing into the Southern Seas as well as obtaining firm position in the East Oriental continent stabilizing the national defense."

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. 1634-I

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Ministry, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 5 pages, dated 30 June, 1936, and described as follows:

Outline of the basis of National Policy by War and Navy Ministers

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
20th day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

SEAL  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
23 day of Sept., 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis, 2d Lt.

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

極社

國策大綱 (一一一三〇)

陸軍省  
海軍省

Eu 977

Doc. # 1634 I ... /

一 國家經濟ノ基本ハ大體右分ニ即シテ内國際ヲ鞏固  
ニシ外國界ノ發展ヲ遂ゲ帝國ガ名實共ニ東亞ノ安  
定勢力トナリテ東洋ノ平和ヲ確保シ世界人類ノ安  
寧福祉ニ貢獻シテ茲ニ聲國ノ理想ヲ實現スルニア  
リ

帝國内外ノ情勢ニ鑑ミ當ニ帝國トシテ確立スベキ  
根本國策ハ國防ヲ安固ニシテ東亞大陸ニ於ケル帝  
國ノ地歩ヲ確保スルト共ニ南方海洋ニ進出發展ス  
ルニ在リテ其ノ基準大綱ハ左記ニ據ル

(一) 列強ノ霸道政策ヲ是正シ眞個共存共榮主義ニヨ  
リ互ニ慶福ヲ頌タントスルハ即チ皇運神ノ具  
現ニシテ我對外發展政策上常ニ一貫セシムベキ  
指導精神ナリ

(二) 國家ノ安泰ヲ期シ其ノ發展ヲ擁護シ以テ名實共  
ニ東亞ノ安定勢力タルベキ帝國ノ地位ヲ確保ス  
ルニ要スル國防軍備ヲ充實ス

(三) 滿洲國ノ健全ナル發展及其ノ完成ト日滿國防ノ  
安固ヲ期シ北方蘇俄ノ脅威ヲ除去スルト共ニ英  
米ニ備ヘ日滿支三國ノ緊密ナル提携ヲ具現シテ  
我カ經濟的發展ヲ策スルヲ以テ大陸政策ノ基調  
トス而シテ之ガ遂行ニ方リテハ列強トノ友好關  
係ニ留意ス



1634 I-2

(四) 南方海洋珠ニ外南洋方面ニ對シ我民族的經濟的  
發展ヲ策シ努メテ他國ニ對スル刺戟ヲ避ケツツ  
前進的平和的手段ニヨリ我勢力ノ進出ヲ計リ以  
テ滿洲國ノ完成ト相俟テ國力充實、國防強化ノ  
兩全ヲ期ス

ニ右根本國策ヲ樞軸トシテ外交其ノ他財政經濟策等内  
外各般ノ政策ヲ統一調整シ現下内外ノ情勢ニ照應  
スル施政一新ヲ期ス要綱左ノ如シ

(一) 國防軍備ノ整備ハ  
(イ) 陸軍軍備ハ陸軍ノ極東ニ使用シ得ル兵力ニ對  
抗スルヲ目途トシ特ニ其在極東兵力ニ對シ開  
戦初頭一撃ヲ加ヘ得ル如ク在滿鮮兵力ヲ充實  
ス

(ロ) 海軍軍備ハ米國海軍ニ對シ西太平洋ノ制海權  
ヲ確保スルニ足ル兵力ヲ整備充實ス

(二) 我外交方策ハ一ニ根本國策ノ圓滑ナル遂行ヲ本  
義トシテ之ヲ綜合刷新シ且部ハ外交機關ノ活動  
ヲ有利且圓滑ニ遂行セシムル爲内面的援助ニ勉  
メ表面的工作ヲ避ク

(三) 政治行政機構ノ刷新改善及財政經濟政策ノ確立  
其ノ他各般ノ施設經營ヲシテ國防力ノ強化並ニ  
陸海軍的經濟發展ニ綜合セシムルヲ主限トスルヲ  
要ス尙之ガ爲左記事項ニ關シテハ適當ノ措置ヲ

1634 I-3

ス

(イ) 国内真面目ヲ指導統一シ非常時局打開ニ關スル

國民ノ覺悟ヲ鞏固ナラシム

(ロ) 國策ノ遂行、國防上必要ナル産業並ニ重要ナ

ル貿易ノ振興ヲ期スル爲政治機構並ニ經濟組

織ニ適切ナル改善ヲ加フ

(ハ) 國民生活ノ安定、國民能力ノ増強、國民思想

ノ健全化ニ就キ適切ナル措置ヲ講ズ

(ニ) 航空並ニ海運事業躍進ノ爲適當ナル方策ヲ講

ズ

(ホ) 國防及産業ニ要スル重要ナル資源並ニ原料ニ

對スル自給自足方策ノ確立ヲ促進ス

(ヘ) 外交機關ノ刷新ト共ニ情報宣傳組織ヲ充備シ

外交機能並ニ對外文化發揚ヲ活潑ニス

1634 I-4

証 明 書

「ワシントン」文書局 第 一 六 三 四 一 号  
國 際 禮 儀 部

典 據 及 び 公 正 に 関 ス ル 證 明

余、林權ハ余カ下記ノ資料ニ於テ、即チ外務省文書  
館長トシテ、日本政府ト公同關係ニ在ルモノナルコ  
ト、竝ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレタル、五  
頁ヨリ成ル、千九百三十六年ノ昭和一一年ノ六月三  
十日附、下記署名、即チ國策大綱（一一一六一三〇  
陸軍省）ノ文書ノ保管ニ任シ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス、  
余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナ  
ルコト、竝ニ右ガ下記署名ノ管外ハ部局ノ公式書類  
及ビ悉ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。（若シアラバ懸着  
號又ハ引取、其ノ種公式書類又ハ綴ニ於ケル該文書  
ノ成規所在ノ公式を尋テモ傳記スベシ）

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 九月二十日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名欄 林 繁

右ノ者ノ公的資格 外務省文書課長

証 人 島戸長春

1634 I-5

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、リチャード・エイチ・ライシユハ、余ガ聯合國最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、竝ニ上記題名ノ文書ハ余ガ公務上、日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 九月廿三日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏 名 欄 Richard H. Larsh

右ノ者ノ公的資格 Investigator I.P.S

証 人 J.A. Curtis 2D. Lt.

Doc. No. 1634J

Page |

Matters Pertaining to Basic Principle  
Of State Policy; 30 June 1936

Conference of Premier, Army, Navy,  
Foreign, Finance Ministers

On 30 June 1936, after the cabinet conference ended, the premier, the foreign and finance ministers remained on request by both the army and navy ministers. At the meeting of the above five ministers, the navy minister presented the annexed report (Basic Principle of State Policy) and explained it.

1. First, the finance minister remarked that "to correct the militaristic despotism of foreign powers", etc., as stated in (1) of Item 1 has been his intentions and have followed this policy to date. He therefore stated that he had no objections to this policy in general. But he added that it is essential that Japan too, must not carry out militaristic despotism.

2. The foreign minister declared that he too had no objections to this proposal and that its principles coincide with the foreign policy which he had under consideration. However, detailed plans have been conferred on by the three ministers and that they are being prepared now under his care. He agreed entirely with what the finance minister had said. For example, he thought it would be better to avoid using methods such as the special trade with East HOPEH. To this, the navy minister remarked that he too agreed with them and further explained that the preamble of (1) states, "According to the great cause and righteousness".

3. The foreign minister said that in view of the present international situation, it was necessary for JAPAN to make efforts to avoid isolation. Since in (3) of Item 1, it is stated "strive for friendly relationship with foreign countries", the foreign minister considered the spirit to be in line with his idea. However the phrase "to provide against England and America" seemed to be cause for some apprehension and he requested a definition of this phrase. The navy minister explained that this was only a provision for military preparedness in case of emergency and that it was absolutely not intended to look upon England and America as enemies. The foreign minister then stated that under the

present international situation, Japan should not only be regardful of keeping friendly relationship with England and America but should strive further to assume a more conciliatory attitude than in ordinary circumstances.

4. The finance minister remarked that "to make efforts to render assistance from the inside and to avoid outward activities" in (2) of Item 2 is exceedingly satisfactory. He sincerely hoped that it would be carried out in this manner.

5. The foreign minister asked the finance minister that if war should break out, would Japan be able to furnish war expenditures without relying on foreign loans? To this question, the finance minister replied that it would be difficult to rely on foreign loans. There would be no other means than floating national bonds and the issuance of paper currency. The finance minister further explained that the finance minister is at present promoting the merging of local banks to expedite the circulation of currency from local provinces to the Bank of Japan.

6. Finally, the premier said that in general, he had no objections to this plan. The navy minister declared that if there are no objections to this principle, a more concrete plan will be drafted based on this principle.

Remarks: At the conference of the three ministers on July 3rd, the foreign minister inquired whether the concrete plans mentioned in the last part of this report had been drawn up or not by the Army or Navy. The navy minister replied that the plan was not particularly drafted but that his subordinates may possibly be studying it.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. 1634-J

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, MIYASHI, Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document heretofore attached consisting of 6 pages, dated 30 June, 1936, and described as follows: Matters pertaining to basic principles of State policy, a conference of Premier, Foreign, Finance, Army, and Navy Ministers, following a Cabinet conference June 30, 1936.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Foreign Ministry  
-----  
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Signed at Tokyo on this

21st day of Sept, 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official  
S.L.J.

Witness: /s/ T. Sato

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

23 day of Sept, 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
N.S.S.  
Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ J. Curtis, 21Lt

國策大綱三編スル件

極秘

昭和十一年六月前日閣議終了後陸海軍兩大臣ノ求メニ依リ總理、外務、大藏三大臣居現リ以上五大臣會合ノ席上海軍大臣別紙（國策大綱）ヲ提示シ且説明ノ旨ニ當リ

一先ヅ大藏大臣ヨリ一ノ中「列強ノ稱道ヲ是正シ」云クトアル處自分ハ是レ迺其ノ氣持ニテ行ヒ來レハコト、テ大體異議無シ然シ日本亦自ラ稱道ヲ行ハザルコト肝要ナリト述ベ、

外務大臣ヨリ本架ニ對シテハ自分モ大體異議無クノ趣旨ハ自分ノカネテ考ヘ居ル外交方針ト一致スルモ詳細ナル方針ニ付テハ週日三相閣ノ打合せモアリ目下自分ノ手辭ニ於テ準備中ナリト述大藏大臣ノ云ハレタル處ハ自分モ全然同意ニシテ「伊令ヘズ義東特種貿易ノ如キ造方ハ之ヲ避ク勿ラ可トスベシト述ベ、之ニ對シ海軍大臣ヨリ勿論然リ其レハ付ノ前文ニモ「大藏名分ニ即シ」トハズル次第ナリト説明セリ

然レテ今日ノ國際情勢ニ照シ日本ハ孤立ヲ選クルノ裏テリ一ノ曰ニハ「列強トノ友好關係ニ對シテトアル故其ノ精神ハ自分ノ考ト同様ナラント思考スルモ「我輩ニ備ヘ」ノ一句ハ其ノ點ニ於テ多少氣懸リニ思ハル、處其ノ意味如何ト尋ネ

16348-1

Ex. 978



1634 2-2

タルニ對シ海軍大臣ヨリ右ハ只軍備上万一ニ備フ  
ルノ意味ニシテ決シテ英米ヲ模範スト云フ主旨ニ  
ハ非ズト説明セリ。依テ外務大臣ヨリ今日ノ國際  
情勢ニ於テハ英米ニ對シテハ只友好關係ニ留意ス  
ト云フノミニ止マラズ普通ノ場合ヨリモ一層妥協  
的ニ出ヅルヲ要スルコトモアルベシト述べ置ケリ。  
大藏大臣ヨリ二ノ口ニ「內面的援助ニ地メ表面的  
工作ヲ避ク」トアルハ頗ル可ナリ是非左様實行ア  
リ度シト述べタリ、

外務大臣ヨリ万一開戦ノ場合日本ハ外債ニ依ラス  
シテ戦費ヲ賄ヒ得ルヤト大藏大臣ニ問ヒタルニ對  
シ大藏大臣ハ外債ニ依ルコトハ困難ナルベク結局  
内國債ト紙幣ニ依ルノ外無カラシム大藏省ハ現ニ地  
方銀行ノ合併ヲ助長シ紙幣ガ地方ニ廻リ再ビ日銀  
ニ廻リ來ル循環作用ヲ容易カラシムト工夫シツ  
、アル次第ナリト説明セリ。

最後ニ總理ヨリ本業ハ大体異議ナシト述べ海軍大  
臣ヨリ結局此ノ大綱ニ異議ナケレバ之ニ基キ頁ニ  
具体案ヲ作成スベシト云ヘリ。

備考 七月三日三大臣懇談會ニ於テ外相ヨリ末尾ノ  
具体案云々ニ關シ海軍ニテ作成シツ、アリ  
ヤト尋ネタルニ海相ハ若別出來居ラス或ハ下  
條ノ間ニ研究シツ、アルヤモ知シズト答へ居タリ。

証 明 書

「ワシントン」文芸局 第 〇 號  
國 際 檢 察 部 第 一 六 三 四 ノ 丁 號

16348-3

眞實及公正ニ關スル証明

余、林君ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ外務省文書  
課長トシテ、日本政府ト公的關係ニ在ルモノナルコ  
ト、竝ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレタル、六  
頁ヨリ成ル、千九百三十六年ノ昭和十一年ノ六月三  
十日附、下記題名、即チ國策大綱ニ關スル件ノ文書  
ノ保管ニ任シ居ルコトヲ茲ニ証明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナ  
ルコト、竝ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式書類  
及ビ簿ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シアラバ簿番  
號又ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ簿ニ於ケル該文書  
ノ成規所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ)

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／九月二十一日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名欄 林 稔 印

右ノ者ノ公的資格 外務省文書課長

證 人 佐藤武五郎 印

16348-4

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、リチャード・エツヂ・ラーシエハ、余ガ聯合國  
／ RICHARD H. LARSH /  
最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、茲ニ  
上記題名ノ文書ハ余ガ公務上、日本政府ノ上記署名  
官吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／九月二十三日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏 名 欄 Richard H. Larsh

右ノ者ノ公的資格 Investigator IPS

證 人 J. A. Curtis  
2D LF

"The fundamental principle of our national policy", (signed by the five Ministers - the Premier, War, Navy, Finance, and Foreign Ministers - 11 August 1936).

#### Fundamentals of our National Policy

I The fundamental principle of administering the state based on righteousness lies in realizing the ideal of our national foundation by strengthening the foundation of our country internally and prospering externally, thereby making the Japanese Empire develop into the stabilization Power, nominal and virtual, in the East Asia, secure peace in the Orient and contribute to the peace and welfare of mankind throughout the world. In view of the situation of the Empire, both home and abroad, to establish the fundamental national policy consists in securing a steady footing of our empire in the Eastern Continent as well as developing in the South Seas, under the joint efforts of diplomatic skill and national defense. The general basic principles are as follows:

- (1) To exclude the Military Rule Policy of the Powers and follow our policy to share mutual welfare by participating in co-existence and co-prosperity principle is the only way of realizing the ideal of our Imperial Rule of Justice. It should, therefore, be the immutable leading spirit in all times in relation to our overseas development.
- (2) In order to secure the stability of our Empire and to safe-guard its development so as to acquire the position of the real stabilization Power in the East Asia, nominally and virtually, we are to complete our defensive armament.
- (3) We should strive to eradicate the Russian menace on the North, in order to realize a steadfast development of Manchuria, and for the solid defense of both Japan and Manchuria. We should also be prepared for Britain and America, attempting at the same time an economic development by the close cooperation of Japan, China and Manchuria. The above should be our fundamental policy for the Continent. For the achievement of such an object we should always be careful to hold most amicable relations with the Powers.
- (4) For the furtherance of our plan to achieve the social and economic development of our Empire toward the South Seas, especially on the Outer South Sea Islands Area, we should take a gradual and peaceful measure, always avoiding to stimulate other nations, and try to fulfill our national strength correlative with the completion of Manchuria.

II Making the above fundamental principle the pivotal point of our national policy, we expect thereby to unify all our policies, internal and external, and generally innovate the administration in accordance with the present situation of the Empire. The outline of our new policy is as follows:

- (1) The fulfillment of the National Defense Armament.
  - (a) As to the Army armaments, we should aim to counteract all the military forces that Russia can furnish to employ in the Far East; and, especially, so as to enable us to strike a hit at the very out-set of the war upon the Russians, we should complete our military force in Korea and Manchuria.
  - (b) As to the Naval Armaments, we should attempt to fulfill its strength to such an extent as to be sufficient for securing the command of the sea on the Western Pacific counter to the American Navy.
- (2) Our diplomatic policy is solely to make it the first principle to try to prosecute the national scheme in smooth and amicable manner, and thereby to conduct an innovation and improvement in general. The military authorities on their part are required to assist the activities of the diplomatic organ from within in order to have it act fully and advantageously, evading all the time to act from without as far as possible.
- (3) In order to renovate and improve political and administrative organ, to establish financial and economic policies, and to manage other plans and schemes, according to our fundamental principle, the following measures should be taken properly:
  - (a) Lead and unify public opinion at home, and strengthen the will of the people to tide over the extraordinary emergency of our country.
  - (b) In order to advance and further our trade and industry essential to the prosecution of the national policy, an appropriate improvement should be introduced to the administrative and economic organs.
  - (c) An adequate measure should be taken concerning the stabilization of the people's livelihood, the development of their physical strength, and fostering sound and healthy mind and idea.
  - (d) A suitable measure should be taken in order to make a drastic progress in air as well as sea transportation.
  - (e) It is required to accelerate the establishment of a self-supporting and self-sufficient policy for the important resources and materials essential to national defense and industry.
  - (f) By innovating diplomatic organs, as well as completing information and publicity systems we should strive to quicken our diplomatic function, and to enhance the national culture abroad.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. 1634-KStatement of Source and Authenticity

I, H. Y. SHI, Major, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 5 pages, dated 11 August, 1936, and described as follows: Fundamental principles of National policy signed by the five ministers, viz.: Premier, War, Navy, Finance, and Foreign Ministers on Aug. 11, 1936.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
21st day of Sept. 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi  
(Signature of Official)  
(SEAL)

Witness: /s/ T. Sato

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Official Capacity)

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
23 day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis, 2d Lt.

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

1634K-1  
60979

昭和十一年八月十一日

總理、陸海軍、大藏、外務五大臣花押

國策ノ基準

一 國家經濟ノ基本ハ大義名分ニ即シテ内國礎ヲ鞏固  
ニシテ外圍邊ノ發展ヲ遂ゲ帝國ガ名實共ニ東亞ノ安  
定勢力トナリテ東洋ノ平和ヲ確保シ世界人類ノ安  
寧福祉ニ貢獻シテ茲ニ華國ノ理想ヲ實現スルニア  
リ

帝國内外ノ情勢ニ鑑ミ當ニ帝國トシテ確立スベキ  
根本國策ハ外交國防相俟ツテ東亞大陸ニ於ケル帝  
國ノ地歩ヲ確保スルト共ニ南方海洋ニ進出發展ス  
ルニ在リテ其ノ基準大綱ハ左記ニ據ル

(一) 東亞ニ於ケル列強ノ霸道政策ヲ排除シ眞價共存  
共榮主義ニヨリ互ニ幸福ヲ領クントスルハ即チ  
皇道精神ノ具現ニシテ我對外發展政策上常ニ一  
貫セシムベキ指導精神ナリ

(二) 國家ノ安泰ヲ期シ其ノ發展ヲ擁護シ以テ名實共  
ニ東亞ノ安定勢力タルベキ帝國ノ地位ヲ確保ス  
ルニ要スル國防軍備ヲ充實ス

(三) 滿洲國ノ健全ナル發達ト日滿國防ノ安固ヲ期シ  
北方蘇國ノ脅威ヲ除去スルト共ニ英米ニ備ヘ日  
滿支三國ノ緊密ナル提携ヲ具現シテ我が經濟的

1634A-2-

發展ヲ策スルヲ以テ大國ニ對スル政策ノ差違ト  
ス而シテ之ガ遂行ニ方リテハ列國トノ友好關係  
ニ在ラス

(四) 南方海洋線ニ東南洋方面ニ對シ我民族的經濟的  
發展ヲ策スルニ對スル刺戟ヲ避ケツツ漸進的  
和平的手段ニヨリ我勢力ノ進出ヲ計リ以テ滿洲  
國ノ完成ト相俟ツテ國力ノ充實強化ヲ期ス

ニ右根本國策ヲ區域トシテ内外各般ノ政策ヲ統一  
シテ現下ノ情勢ニ照應スル基礎一新ヲ期ス要綱左  
ノ如ク

(一) 國防軍備ノ整備ハ

(イ) 陸軍軍備ハ蘇國ノ極東ニ使用シ得ル兵力ニ對  
抗スルヲ目途トシテ其在極東兵力ニ對シ開  
戦初頭一撃ヲ加ヘ得ル如ク在華總兵力ヲ充實  
ス

(ロ) 海軍軍備ハ米國海軍ニ對シ西太平洋ノ領海權  
ヲ確保スルニ足ル兵力ヲ整備充實ス

(二) 我外交方策ハ一ニ根本國策ノ具備ナル遂行ヲ本  
義トシテ之ヲ綜合刷新シ軍部ハ外交機關ノ活動  
ヲ有力且円滑ニ進歩セシムル爲内面的援助ニ勉  
メ表面的工作ヲ避ク

(三) 政治行政機構ノ刷新改善及財政經濟政策ノ確立



1634A-3

其ノ他各段ノ施設運営ヲシテ右根本國策ニ適應  
セシムルカ爲充記事項ニ就シテハ適當ノ措置ヲ  
講ズ

(イ) 國內異動ヲ指導統一シ非常時局打開ニ關スル  
國民ノ覺悟ヲ鞏固ナラシム

(ロ) 國策ノ遂行上必要ナル産業並ニ重要ナル貿易  
ノ振興ヲ期スル爲行政機構並ニ經濟組織ニ適  
切ナル改善ヲ加フ

(ハ) 國民生活ノ安定、國民體力ノ増進、國民恩惠  
ノ健全化ニ就キ適切ナル措置ヲ講ズ

(ニ) 航空並ニ海運事業振進ノ爲適當ナル方策ヲ講  
ズ

(ホ) 國防及産業ニ要スル重要ナル資源並ニ原料ニ  
對スル自給自足方策ノ確立ヲ促進ス

(ヘ) 外交機關ノ刷新ト共ニ情報宣傳組織ヲ充備シ  
外交機能並ニ對外文化發揚ヲ活潑ニス

1634 K-14

證明書

「ワシントン」文書局 第一六三四ノ五號  
國家検察部

典據及び公正ニ爲スル證明

余、淋滂ハ余ガ下記ノ發落ニ於テ、帥チ外務省文書  
部長トシテ、日本政府ト公的諒解ニ爲ルモノナルコ  
ト、茲ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレタル、五  
頁ヨリ成ル、千九百三十六年ノ昭和十一年ノ八月十  
一日開、下記題名、即チ總理、陸海軍、大藏、外務  
五大臣花押ノ圖樣ノ差違一ノ文書ノ保管ニ任ジ居ル  
コトヲ茲ニ證明ス。  
余ハ夏ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナ  
ルコト、茲ニ右ガ下記ヨリ稱ノ省又ハ郡局ノ公式書類  
及ビ簿ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シテラバ鑑査  
號又ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ標ニ於ケル該文書  
ノ成規所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ待記スベシ)

1634 K-5

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／九月二十一日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名品

右ノ者ノ公的發給

證人

林

塚

佐藤武五郎

公家入手ニ關スル証明

余、リチャード・エツチ・ラーシュハ、余が聯合國  
／Richard. H. Larsh／  
海軍指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、茲ニ  
上記題名ノ文書ハ余が公務上、日本政府ノ上記署名  
官吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ証明ス。

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／九月廿三日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名

右ノ者ノ公的發給

證人

Richard. H. Larsh

Investigator I P S

J. A. Curtis 2d Lt

Doc. No. 219P (58)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 86

THE AMERICAN EMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (CREW) TO THE  
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (UGAKI)

Excerpt.

No. 975

TOKYO, June 28, 1938.

EXCELLENCY: Acting under instructions from my Government I have the honor formally to protest an unwarranted attack on June 15, 1938, by Japanese airplanes upon the American Southern Baptist Mission at Pingtu, Shantung, which resulted in placing the lives of two hundred school children and seven American missionaries in grave jeopardy and in wounding other noncombatants, and which inflicted extensive damage upon American property.

. . . . .

JOSEPH C. CREW

Foreign Relations I, 604

970 219 P (58)

駐日アメリカ大使 (グレイ) / GREW / 司  
日本外務大臣 (宇垣氏) = 呈之書簡 抜萃  
第九七五号 東京

一九三三年 (昭和十三年) 六月二十六日

閣下 本國政府、指令一九三三年 (昭和十三年) 六月十五日  
日本飛行機教機、山東省中度所在、米國南方空軍と教會と  
之間、不法攻撃、對之否、共謀、先導、有之候、右、此等  
二百名並、米國人宣教師七名、生命、重大之危険、前、  
暴露之且也、非戦闘員若干、傷ケ、更、米國人所有財産  
大規模、損害、與之結果、相成申候

謹此、此、行、上、

JOSEPH C. GREW

(外務省附録 一六四)

Q. 981

Doc. No. 219P (59)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 87

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE  
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (UGAKI)

Excerpt.

TOKYO, August 16, 1938.

No. 1026

. . . . .

I am directed to make comprehensive and emphatic representations to the appropriate Japanese authorities through Your Excellency, recalling succinctly the essential facts and circumstances of the attacks of those American mission properties at Wuchang, and to point out that notwithstanding the fact that the mission properties have been marked on maps delivered by the American Consul General at Shanghai to the Japanese authorities the mission properties under reference have been bombed no less than seven times since July 6 last, and particularly to emphasize the fact that in the course of these attacks American lives have been directly imperilled.

. . . . .

JOSEPH C. GREW

Foreign Relations I, p. 619

Doc 219 P(59)

在日米大使(グー) / Grew / 日本  
外務大臣(宇垣) /

抜萃  
第一〇二六号 昭和十三年(一九三八年)八月十六日  
余、武昌ニ於ケル之等アナリカ布教團ノ財産ニ  
對スル攻害ニ關スル主要事實及ビ状況ヲ簡潔ニ想  
起シ、包括的強硬申入シテ閣下ヲ通ジテ適當ナ  
ル日本當局ニテスコトヲ又布教團ノ財産ハ上海  
ノアメリカ總領事ニヨリテ地圖ニ印ヲシテ日本  
當局ニテ又サレト云フ事實アルニモ拘ラス、  
前掲布教團ノ財産ガ去ル七月六日以来、同以  
上爆撃サレト云フコトヲ指摘シ且又之等、攻  
害ノ間ニアメリカ人ノ生命ニ直接ニ危険ニ兩  
サレト云フコトヲ持テ強調スルヤウニ余、指示  
ヲ受ケテナル

「ジョセフ・C・グー」  
/ JOSEPH C. GREW /  
外國關係 I. P 619

E. 1992

Doc. No. 219P (60)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 88

PRESS RELEASE ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF  
STATE ON AUGUST 26, 1938

Excerpt.

. . . . .

EXCELLENCY: Acting under instructions, I have the honor on behalf of my Government to protest to Your Excellency against the unwarranted attack on August 24, 1938, near Icaeo, by Japanese airplanes upon a commercial airplane operated by the China National Aviation Corporation resulting in the total destruction of the commercial airplane, the loss of the lives of a number of noncombatant passengers, and the endangering of the life of the American pilot.

. . . . .

(Signed) JOSEPH C. GREW

Foreign Relations I, p. 619  
at p. 620



Doc 219P (60)

一九三三年、昭和十三年、八月二十六日國務省發行  
新聞記事、  
抜萃

閣下訓令に基き本使は本國政府を代表し  
一九三三年、昭和十三年、八月二十四日、日本飛行機  
が澳門附近に於て支那國民飛行會社の管理  
せる商用飛行機に對し不法攻撃をなすし、  
の商用飛行機を完全に破壊し、多數の非  
戰鬥乗客の生命を奪ひ、米國操縦士の生  
命を危殆ならしめたことに關し閣下は抗議  
を申込むものなり

(署名) ジョーゼフ・C・グレイ

外國關係

JOSEPH C. GREW

七一頁  
七二〇頁

Q. # 983

Doc. No. 219F (61)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 89

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO  
THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (ARITA)

Excerpt.

No. 1105

TOKYO, October 31, 1938.

EXCELLENCY, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that information has reached me that property belonging to the Lutheran Brethren Mission at Tungpeh, Honan, was bombed by Japanese airplanes on October 24, 1938, which action resulted in the death of the American national, Phoebe Nyhus, aged three years, and in the wounding of two other American nationals, her mother, Mrs. Arthur E. Nyhus, and her sister, Ruth Nyhus, aged eight years. The building which was the object of the attack was destroyed.

. . . . .

JOSEPH C. GREW

Foreign Relations I, pp. 627-628

1983

219P (61)

大務外有信使大駐日/ GREW / 氏

抜萃

昭和十三年(一九三三年)十月三十日

第一〇五番

閣下。余閣下ニ對シ河南省桐柏ニ於ケルイセシ  
ブリスン(山ニテル派教徒)布教團所屬ノ資産カ  
昭和十三年十月二十四日日本飛行機ヨリ燦惠サレ  
シ結果「ナリカ」國籍ヲ有スルイニ「ナリカ」

OEBE NYHUS / ナリカノ子ヲ北ニ至ラシメ「地  
」ニ「ナリカ」國民「」母ナル「」ナリカ  
/ MRS. ARTHURE NYHUS / 及ビ「」姉「」ナル「」  
/ RUTH NYHUS / 「」遺像セシ「」及「」  
「」自標「」ナリカ「」建物「」破壊セラ「」タル「」  
余ニ到達セシ「」閣下ニ通告スル「」光榮「」有「」

シヨダノ「」グループ

/ JOSEPH. C. GREW /

外事関係 一 七七一六三番

C. # 924

Doc. No. 219P (83)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 117

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO  
THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (ARITA)

Excerpt.

No. 1111

TOKYO, November 7, 1938

YOUR EXCELLENCY: In the note No. 1076 of October 6, 1938, which I had the honor to address to Your Excellency's distinguished predecessor, mention was made, among other points, of the exclusion from the lower reaches of the Yangtze River of American and other non-Japanese shipping although Japanese merchant vessels are carrying Japanese merchandise between Shanghai and Nanking, to the exclusion of merchandise of other countries. I pointed out to His Excellency Prince Konoye that this treatment of American shipping and commerce, as well as the treatment by Japanese authorities of other American interests in China, not only violates American rights but is in direct contravention of assurances repeatedly affirmed by the Japanese Government to the American Government that the principle of the open door and equal opportunity in China would be supported by the Japanese Government.

. . . . .

Foreign Relations I, p. 794

w 9874  
219 P (83)

駐日米國大使(グラー) / GREW / より日本外務大臣(有田)に  
宛てる書翰 /  
抜萃  
第二二一號

一九三八年 / 昭和十三年 / 十月七日、東京に於て。  
閣下、本使が閣下の前任者 / 前外務大臣 / に宛てる一九  
三八年 / 昭和十三年 / 十月六日附第一〇七六號書簡に特  
に日本商船が他國の商品の輸送を拒絶し日本商  
船等が上海南京間に輸送し居るにも拘らず、  
アメリカ及他國日本以外の船舶が揚子江下流域に航  
行することを極意してゐることを述べたり。

本使はまた米國船舶の航行及商品に對するこの取  
扱並に支那に於ける米國の他の權益に對する日本當  
局の取扱は單に米國の權益を侵害するのみならず日  
本政府が米國政府に對し支那に於ける門戸開放  
機會均等の原則は日本政府により嚴守せらるべ  
しと屢々確言せる保証に完全に違反せるものなる  
ことを近衛公閣下に指摘し置きたり。

Doc. No. 219P (62)

Page 1

B. Lx. 92

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GRHW)  
TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS (ARITA.)

Excerpts

No. 1230

TOKYO, March 30, 1939.

EXCELLENCY: Acting under instructions, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that my Government formally and emphatically protests the continued disregard by the Japanese military forces of American lives and property in China.

In this connection I am directed to invite the attention of the Japanese Government to the ever lengthening list of instances in which, as a result of air raids by the Japanese forces, American properties, although clearly marked and the location thereof previously reported with accompanying maps to the Japanese authorities, have been damaged and in some cases destroyed.

. . . . .

An outstanding example of the instances to which my Government refers is the recent bombing of the American Lutheran Mission at Tungpeh which resulted in death or grave injury to certain members of the Nyhus family. Twenty-eight of the attacks upon American property reported to the Japanese Government since the beginning of this year include three bombings on November 13, 14, and 18, 1938, of property of the Christian and Missionary Alliance at Taiping; bombing of the Peniel Missionary Home at Sai Nam, Kwangtung, in June 1938 and again on October 22, 1938; bombing on October 3 and 5, 1938, of property of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company at Nanchang; bombing on December 24 and again five days later on December 29, 1938, of buildings of the Christian and Missionary Alliance at Kweilin, which resulted in the killing and wounding of members of the staff of the mission and refugees therein; the bombing on December 29, 1938, of the American Southern Baptist Mission Hospital, also at Kweilin, and the bombing on December 29, 1938, of the American Southern Baptist Mission at Shichow. Further bombings occurred on January 10, 1939, which resulted in the demolition of and damage to buildings belonging to the Evangelical Lutheran Mission at Shasi, Hupoh; on November 13 and November 23, 1938, and again on January 12, 1939, which resulted in the destruction of hospital and residence buildings belonging to the American Presbyterian Mission, North, at Fengyang, Hunan; on

Br. Ex. 92

January 15, which resulted in serious damage to the property of the Sutch Girls' School of the American Methodist Episcopal Mission at Chungking; on January 23, which resulted in damage to the American Church Mission at Kuling; on February 4, which resulted in damage to property belonging to the Werner G. Smith Company at Wanhsien; on February 22, which resulted in damage to the hospital of the Covenant Missionary Society at Kingnan; on February 25 which resulted in damage to the American Catholic Mission at Loting, and the serious wounding of Father Kennelly; on March 8, which resulted in damage to two compounds of the American Church Mission at Ichang, bombed in separate raids; and again on March 14, which resulted in damage to the St. James School property of the same mission at Ichang; on March 17, when the American Southern Baptist hospital at Chengchow was bombed twice, causing six casualties; again on March 19, when this same property was bombed for the seventh time since February 1938; on March 20, resulting in serious damage to property of the Covenant Missionary Society at Siangyang, Fupch, and to the Satch Bible School premises of the Lutheran United Mission at Fenchang, Fupch.

• • • • •

JOSEPH C. GREW

Foreign Relations I, pp. 643-645

日本駐英公使館 (Green) 自日本在英領事館 (Green)

抄録 第一三〇號

一九一九年三月三日 東京 三茶亭

本館本使、本國政府、加日本軍隊、支那、及英領事館、  
生命財產、(引續) 主、監視、正、武、且、以、  
其、訓令、遵守、行、是、固、不、生、事、也、一、

此事、因、本、使、自、在、英、領、事、館、  
識、之、且、其、所、在、地、圖、三、十、日、  
通、報、之、事、也、一、人、  
全、體、及、其、事、例、  
一、注意、

本國政府、司、例、  
American Lutheran mission at Yang  
keh / 二、  
Nyhur / 一、

本、事、始、  
以、改、  
本、年、所、  
Christian

and Missionary Alliance at Taiping /  
一、  
不、  
Peniel Missionary Home at Sai Nam, Kwantung /

一、  
日、  
Standard Vacuum Oil Company at Nanchang /

一、  
一、

64  
doc 2197 (62)



100C-219P(52)

桂林新在「...」Christian and  
Missionary Alliance at Kweilin / 建築物二被炸行心該  
「...」職員及傳道員二受傷生之タル爆撃、十月二十九日同

桂林新在「...」American  
Southern Baptist Mission Hospital at Kweilin / 爆撃  
十月二十九日、鄂州新在「...」American

Southern Baptist Mission at Shichow / 爆撃、更ニ爆  
撃、一九三九年二月十日、湖北省沙市新在「...」

Evangelical Lutheran Mission at Shasi, Hupoh /  
所屬建築物、機噐及破損ニ甚タル爆撃、一九三九年十月三日、十月  
及一九三九年十月十日、湖北省衛陽新在「...」比較ノ

American Presbyterian Mission, North  
at Idengyang, Hunan / 所屬建築物及住宅一破損ニ甚タル、  
十月十日、湖北省衛陽新在「...」

SUTEH + 學校 / Suteh Girls' School of the American Methodist  
Episcopal Mission at Chungking / 建築物、機噐、機噐  
及住宅、十月三日、湖北省衛陽新在「...」American

Church Mission at Kuling / 破損ニ加(又ニ、  
湖北省衛陽新在「...」Warner G.  
Smith and Co. of Wanchuan / 建築物、機噐、機噐

Covent  
Missionary Society at Kingmen / 破損ニ甚タル(又ニ、  
湖北省衛陽新在「...」American

Catholic Mission at Loting / 破損ニ甚タル(又ニ、  
Kennelly / 湖北省衛陽新在「...」

American Church Mission at Ichang /

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所有地ニ仰所ニ別仰ノ定規程ヲ加ヘテ損害ヲ致シタルモノ更ニ三月  
 五日同ノクハ身自ノ同ノシヨ、セントジェームス校 / St. James School /  
 財産ニ損害ヲ加ヘタルモノ、三月十七日鄭州所在アメリカカシミア  
 トニシヨ、 American Southern Baptist Mission Hospital /  
 病院が二回爆撃ヲ受ケタル際ニ傷者有六人ニ及ビ更ニ三月十九日  
 該財産ハ一九三二年三月末英國自爆撃ヲ受ケタリ、三月二十日湖北  
 蕪陽所在カシミアニシヨ、 Covent Missionary  
 Society at Siangyang Hupoh / 財産並ニ湖北蕪陽所在ニシヨ、  
 同ノシヨ、 Lutheran United Mission at Fancheng  
 Hupoh / 同ノシヨ、 Santeh 聖書学校ノ地内ニ重大ナル損害ヲ  
 受ケタリ。

x x x  
 及メテ、シヨ、シヨ、  
 Joseph G. Grew

(通外閣外務省 大田三一大田貞)

8.4 986

Document No. 219P (84)  
Br. Ex. 118

Page 1.

ORAL STATEMENT BY THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR  
IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER  
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (ARITA), NOVEMBER 21,  
1938.

Excerpts.

. . . . .

Your Excellency has discussed the question of the "exploitation" of China and spheres of influence therein. I think Your Excellency will agree with me that the historical record shows clearly that the United States of America has never attempted to "exploit" China or to acquire any "sphere of influence" whatever in that country. Our desire always has been and is today to avoid spheres of influence and exploitation by or in any one country.

Our interpretation of the Open Door is totally contrary to those principles. The principle of equality of commercial opportunity has been a fundamental principle of the foreign policy of the United States ever since our country came into existence. The treaties relating to the Far East to which the United States is a party and in which provisions relating to that principle appear were in all instances concluded with a view to decreasing and avoiding frictions which had developed in or which might develop in international contacts in that area.

. . . . .

There can be no doubt that owing to Japan's actions and policies in China there is good reason why both Your Excellency and I should be disturbed with regard to the developing situation in Japanese-American relations. For my part I am more disturbed at present than I have been for a long time and it seems to me that whatever may result from our future conversations and negotiations Japan should now without further delay proceed to take the obvious steps to prevent those relations from steadily deteriorating.

. . . . .

Another obvious step of prime importance on the part of the Japanese authorities would be forthwith to cease the bombings of and other interference with American mission and other property in areas far removed from military or naval operations.

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Page 2.

Such unwarrantable acts are taking place constantly, the reports of which are daily pouring into our Embassy. The plea that these outrages are accidental is obviously untenable in view of the volume and constancy of these depredations which recently have involved not only the loss of American property but the loss of American life, and the desecration of our flag.

. . . . .

Foreign Relations I, p. 898 at  
pp. 809-811

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49986

日本駐美大使ケル／GRFW/ヨ  
日本外務大臣(有田)ノ口頭申入  
一九三八年(昭和十三年)十一月廿一日

按萃

閣下、支那、權取(エクスプロイトイテヨシ)ト其  
内ニ於ル種方國、問題ニ関シテ論セラシタリ。予、  
閣下カ、リカ合衆國ハ未ダ嘗テ支那ヲ權取  
(エクスプロイト)セシテ試ミ、或ハ同國內ニ『勢力國』ヲ  
秩植セシムル事決シテ之無キコトハ歴史的記  
録ノ明ニ示ス所ナルトニ関シテハ予ト同意見ナリ  
ト思考ス。我等ノ願、所ハ從來ト雖モ、予今ニ於  
テモ、孰レハ一國ニヨリテモ、亦、孰レハ國內ニ於テモ  
勢力國或ハ『權取』等ノ避テラシム事ナリ。  
我等、併スル門戶開放トハ亦述、如キ主義ト  
全然相反スルナリ。商業上、機會均等主義  
ハ合衆國建國以來對外政策、一、根本原理  
ニシテ合衆國、固與スル極東ニ係ル諸條約、  
並ニ此原則ニ關スル條項、現ハル所、凡テ場合  
ニ於テ、該地域内ニ於テハ國際的接觸ニ於テ、  
既ニ生起シ、若クハ生起スル事アルベカラシク摩擦  
ヲ減却シ、回避スルニ為ニ締結セラシタリトナリ。

x  
x  
x  
x  
x



Ex. 2927

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Page 1

Br. Ex. 71

MEMORANDUM BY THE COUNSELLOR OF THE BASSY IN JAPAN (DOOMAN)

Excerpt.

(TOKYO,) November 19, 1938.

. . . . .

Mr. Arita went on to say that there prevails a widespread feeling that the Japanese Government has now adopted a new policy--one of closing the open door in China. There had, in fact, been no change in policy. His several predecessors had on several occasions given assurances to the American, British, and other representatives in Tokyo that Japan would respect the principle of the open door. As a matter of fact, those assurances were not intended to be unconditional, for the reason that the time had passed when Japan could give an unqualified undertaking to respect the open door in China. He was not implying that his predecessors had given the assurances in bad faith; on the contrary, he felt certain that they were acting in the best of faith, but what they were attempting to do was to reconcile the principle of the open door with Japan's actual needs and objectives, and that could not be done. As he had previously explained, those objectives are to provide Japan with a market secure against any possible threat of economic sanctions and to acquire safe sources of necessary raw materials; but within those limits Japan was prepared to guarantee equality of opportunity. There would be given full consideration to those enterprises conducted by foreigners other than Japanese which would in no way conflict with or obstruct the carrying out of these primary objectives, and with respect to those enterprises, whether industrial, commercial, or financial, the Japanese Government was fully prepared to give unqualified guarantees. But with regard to other undertakings which overlapped the Japanese economic defense plans, it was no longer possible for Japan to extend any such guarantee. When he came into office, he decided that it would be mischievous as well as useless to attempt to reconcile the principle of the open door, as understood in the United States and elsewhere abroad, with the new situation which Japan was endeavoring to bring about. He therefore declined to repeat those assurances in the note which was yesterday sent to the American Government.

. . . . .

E (UGENL) W. D(DOUMAN)

Foreign Relations I, p. 801 at  
pp. 803-804.



駐日大使館 齊藤官(トウシニ) / DOOMAN / 覺書  
 (東京) 一九三三年 / 昭和七年 / 十月十九日

枝 萃

+++++      +++++      +++++

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有田氏、述ぐに、日本政府、今や新政策、支那ニ於  
 之、内戸開放ヲ肉鎖セトスル一ヲ標トシテ、感情廣ク  
 流布之居リ。然レテ、事實上、政策、変化、無カリトナリ。  
 數人、彼、前任者、若干、機會ニ於テ、東京ニ於テ、來、英、其、  
 他、代表者、達ニ對シ、日本、内戸開放、原則ヲ尊重スル旨  
 保証ヲ與テリ。實際問題上、之等、無條件、内戸開放、保  
 証ヲ要求スルモノハ、其、日本、何等、條件ヲ付ス事ナク  
 支那、内戸開放ヲ尊重スル云フ保証ヲ與テ得、時代、既ニ  
 過去ニモ、ナリ、故テ、彼、前任者、與テ、保証ニ誠實  
 ナリト、言ヒ、モ、譯ス、云、シ、ニ、支、彼、子、如、處、全ニ、誠意ヲ  
 以テ、行動、之、居リ、之、上、確カト、ナリ、唯、彼、子、如、物、ナリ、ト、  
 内戸開放、原則ヲ、日本、現實、必要、目的、上ニ、調和セ、之、上ニ  
 ナリ、但シ、之、實行、之、得、カ、リ、ト、思フ、ト、ナリ、是、曩、ニ、彼、  
 説明、之、如ク、之、等、目的、上、之、起、リ、得、キ、經濟、制裁、亦、自、威、ニ、對シ、  
 安全、市場、ヲ、日本、ニ、確保、之、具、必要、ニ、至、科、品、安全、之、供  
 給、源、ヲ、獲得、ス、ル、併シ、此、限度、内、ニ、於テ、日本、ニ、機會、均等  
 ヲ、保証、ス、ル、用意、ヲ、有、リ、之、等、根本、目標、ヲ、達成、ニ、衝突  
 之、或、ハ、障碍、ト、ナ、ル、心、ナ、リ、日本、人、以外、依、リ、行、ハ、ル、企業、ニ  
 對シ、十、分、先、考、慮、ヲ、拂、ハ、ル、又、工業、者、之、上、之、商業、之、經濟、  
 方面、之、上、同、義、日本、經濟、防、衛、計、画、九、企業、ニ、關、シ、ハ、日  
 本、之、モ、之、カ、ル、保証、ヲ、與、フ、ト、不、可能、ト、ナリ、  
 故、ニ、就、任、ニ、テ、合、衆、國、及、其、他、外國、ニ、於テ、解釈、ヲ、居、ル、標



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十 意味合三 於 中 戶 解 放 原 則 日 本 亦 建 議 也 上 如 大 之  
及 新 能 勢 三 謂 我 已 之 大 上 試 之 事 有 定 口 無 查 上 上 斷 宜  
也 力 心 加 放 二 彼 昨 日 本 政 府 併 送 之 已 見 覺 書 中  
二 之 等 保 証 再 之 否 宜 也

二 (一 心) 上 下 二 (口 心)

/EUGENE H. DOOMAN/

外 交 團 体 I. ( 頁 及 ) ( 一 ) ( 頁

THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN JAPAN TO THE JAPANESE  
MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

## AIDE-MEMOIRE

The American Ambassador on August 23 brought orally to the attention of the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs the desire of the diplomatic representatives at Nanking of the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy that Japanese bombing operations be excluded from an area in that city wherein they and some of their nations reside and where foreign shipping is anchored. The American Government feels, however, that other aspects of the matter demand equal consideration. The extensive bombing of that city on the night of August 26 placed in danger the lives and property of noncombatants, both foreign and Chinese, and it has seemed to the American Government that the appropriate Japanese authorities, when this fact is brought to their attention, may desire to limit future action in accordance with the restraints which considerations of humanity and of international comity usually impose on the bombing of the political capital of a country, especially when no state of war exists. Both before and after the earlier request for the protection of a defined area, there occurred bombing operations over the city which extensively damaged the buildings and killed and injured several of the employees of the National Central University and also resulted in the burning alive of numerous peaceful Chinese in one of the poorer quarters. These scenes of destruction have been visited by foreign diplomatic officers. The Government and people of the United States are in friendly relations with China as with Japan. Basing its appeal, therefore, on these friendly relations and on the principle of ordinary humanity, the American Government requests the discontinuance of activities which, despite their military objectives, result actually in the indiscriminate destruction of property used for educational and other non-military purposes and in the wounding and painful death of civilians.

The American Government is also greatly concerned over the fact that there are American citizens still scattered throughout China who will have to use the railways and motor roads as their only means of leaving for places of comparative safety. In view, therefore,

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of the widespread bombing operations now being carried out by the Japanese military throughout Chinese territory the American Government feels that it may properly make representations to the Japanese Government with a view to persuading it to refrain from attacks upon defenseless cities, hospitals, trains and motor cars, et cetera. There is grave risk that sooner or later some incident will take place resulting in the death or injury to American citizens who are going about their legitimate occupations within the interior of China where such dangers should not exist. Japan declares that it is not at war with China and yet its planes are conducting raids far in the interior, dropping deadly missiles with consequent serious damage to the rights of other nations.

The attention of the Japanese Government is invited to the situation described in the foregoing paragraphs in the hope that appropriate instructions may be issued to its military forces in the field.

TOKYO, September 1, 1937

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日本駐美大使館 日本外務省 對美補助學費  
 自三言日 米國大使、外務次官 對美南市 於此合眾  
 國、英國、俄國、西德、及伊太利、外交代表機關 密請  
 即于南市 於此 軍事外交代表機關 所在之 軍事各國人  
 居住之及外國船、砲台、同市、一部 日本軍、爆發于圍  
 外 置之、一、密請 因之 以、注意 喚起 此、然  
 然之米國政府、爆發 關聯 之外、若干、一面 就  
 是 同樣、其 密請 見解 有、  
 八月三日夜、廣範圍 巨 軍事爆發 計 國人及中  
 國人、雙方、非戰鬥員、生命、財產 於 曝 於  
 米國政府、日本、因 此 事實 指摘 其 密請  
 此 場合、軍事、爆發、此 戰爭 狀態 非 此 場合  
 在、一國、政治的首都 爆發 不 場合、人道、國際  
 間、友誼 不 配 應 其 軍事 區域 之 限 之 欲 之  
 一 看 此 次 密請、一 定 地區、保護 對 此 密請、前後  
 二 於 南市、爆發 之、其 國 際 中 央 大 學、The national  
 Central University、一 建物、破壞 之、其 使 傷  
 人中 數 名、死 傷 者 之 數、且、一 部 貧 民 地 區 於 此、多 數、  
 中國 良 民、生 命 之 燒 死 之 現 狀、此 等 破壞 現 狀、外  
 國 外 交 機 關 關係 官 憲 之 現 狀 也、合 眾 國 政府 此 國  
 民 自 本 三 對 上 同 樣 中 國 三 對 友 交 關 係 也、此 三 米 國  
 政府、其 密請、根據 之 軍事 外交 關係 上 類 等、一般 原則 是  
 也、假 令 之 軍事 目標 向 之 上 之 教育 並 他、非 軍事  
 目的 之 使用 之 施設 事實上 無 差別 破壞 一般 市民 痛 苦 傷  
 之 事 又 行 意、停止 之 要求 也、米 國 政府、又 中 國 三  
 多 數、米 國 人 之 散 在 之 將 來 比較 的 安全 之 地 域 亦 有 移動

1.

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SUMMARY OF JAPAN-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS DURING FOREIGN MINISTER ARITA'S TENURE OF OFFICE (FROM NOV. 1938 UNTIL JULY 1939)

(September 2nd 1941)

RETURN TO ROOM 361

After Minister ARITA assuming his duties as Foreign Minister in November 1938 Ambassador GREW remarked to Premier ICENYU (concurrently holding the post of Foreign Minister) on October 3rd that he wished to discuss orally regarding problems that the U. S. President felt as possessing direct interests, and Minister ARITA replying that, notwithstanding that the respecting of American rights and interests in China as well as the Open-Door Policy as well as Principle of Equal Opportunity had been definitely guaranteed by the former Minister (T.N. Foreign Minister); he regretted to have to declare that the infringing of American rights and interests had not ceased and that the Open Door Policy was still being ignored, and after citing some instances such as Exchange Control and Trade Restrictions etc. in North China, he demanded that prompt and effective measures be taken in order to carry out the guarantee that had been duly made. (Annexed Document No. 1). To this Minister ICENYU replied that Japan's China Policy as well as foreign policy remained unchanged, and that Japan's assertion with regard to the respecting of foreign rights and interests relative to China as well as the maintenance of the Open Door Policy and the Principle of Equal Opportunity remained unchanged, adding that, although in point of fact, there had been cases at times which were not settled satisfactorily due to military strategic necessity or other reasons, he was striving to settle matters as satisfactorily as possible upon the conditions returning to their normal state. He also stated that, with regard to commercial and trade problems, he wished to, after studying same, comply with the Ambassador's request at the earliest possible opportunity.

Ambassador Grew subsequently sent a note embodying the same contents as the foregoing paragraph. (Annexed Document No. 2).

- II. p.2 The manner of reply to the aforesaid American Ambassador's note was studied ever since the appointment of ARITA as Foreign Minister and although it had been decided to put off the said reply until conditions had become settled for awhile as it happened to be just before the fall of Canton with the capitulation of Hankow being close at hand, so that the state of affairs was changing rapidly, in view of this matter representing problems which, after all, possess an important bearing to the Nine-Power Pact, after studying the draft of the reply based on the policy of:

i.3

(a) Avoiding all phraseology whatsoever that would reaffirm the principles of the Open Door and Equal Opportunity based on the Nine-Power Pact,

(b) Making them understand that, although the existing rights and interests of Third Powers will be respected, this is not being done as a corollary of the Nine-Power Pact.

(c) Making them understand that the standard laws governing the future economic activities by Third Powers in New China shall be established in conformity with the new conditions, a reply was sent on November 18th to the following effect, in addition to giving explanations to each of the instances cited in the American note and clarifying the point that their claims regarding Infringement of Rights and Interests were unjustified, viz.:

- (1) It is hoped that, inasmuch as military activities are being conducted on a unprecedented scale in East Asia, the United States will note the fact that there may be times when difficulties may occur in executing our intention regarding the respecting of American rights and interests.
- (2) The Empire believes that it will not solve urgent problems of the moment or aid towards the establishing of permanent peace in East Asia by attempting to gauge the present and future state of affairs by ideas or principles in their original form that were applied to the pre-incident state of affairs, especially at this time when the Empire is dashing ahead with the Establishment of a New Order in East Asia and when new conditions are setting in in East Asia.
- (3) Should any Third Power or Powers participate in the gigantic task of Reconstruction of East Asia in the fields of enterprises and trade by appreciating the afore-mentioned points, the Empire shall have no objection whatsoever towards same. (Annexed Document No.3).

III,  
p.4

When Minister ARITA invited Councillor Dooman of the U. S. Embassy at Tokyo on November 19th and asked about the impressions regarding the recent Japanese Reply, Dooman replied that Ambassador Grew's impression regarding the said Reply seemed to be that "It represented a wholesale denial of the American Demands," whereupon Minister ARITA explained that it would be excusable if the Open Door policy and the principle of Equal Opportunity were applied to the entire world from the start, but it is extremely illogical to apply same today to China only. ARITA then went on to say that his predecessor gave his guarantee regarding the

p.5 respecting of the said principles by being of the belief that the actual prevailing conditions could be made to harmonize with the Open Door Policy and the principle of Equal Opportunity, but that, in his own opinion, it was no longer possible to expect the said harmony, at the same time explaining the great pains taken by Japan in regard to the said reply, to which Dooman stated that it was extremely regrettable that there were over 300 cases recently remaining unsettled despite their having no connections with military actions and being extremely trivial matters, and that the recent official American note was the result of the American commercial concerns in various parts of China exerting severe pressure on their Home Government, at the same time pointing out that the United States did not make any reference to the Nine-Tower Pact.

IV. On inviting Ambassador Grew to Tokyo subsequently on the 21st of the same month and conferring with him on the same principle as per the foregoing paragraph, Grew declared as follows after making the introductory remark that what he would be saying today would not be in the nature of any reply whatsoever to the Japanese Note of the 18th:-

(1) The United States Government has never attempted to exploit China nor extend American influences in China. The United States Government's interpretation of "Open Door" is totally different from the foregoing. In other words, the principle of Equal Opportunity in regard to Commerce has always been the actual basic principle of the United States.

(2) All of the treaties concerning the Far East embodying the said principle, and to which the United States is a signatory, were concluded for the purpose of preventing the occurrence or likely occurrence of international friction in the Far East, and the United States Government is intent upon checking the present day trend of international anarchy as well as contributing towards the adjustment of international relations as well as restoration of international order, and it is the advocacy of the United States that this object can be attained by peaceful negotiations and agreements as well as by faithful fulfillment of international agreements,

p.6

(3) The Commercial Policy of the United States lies in aiming at international concord by striving for the expansion of foreign trade by means of removing obstacles lying in the way of the international distribution of commodities. I believe that the frequent instances of other countries trying to gain most-favored footings do not contribute towards establishing prosperity in the United States and the world.

(4) On November 3rd Premier KONOYE stated that "Japan will cooperate with any Third Power that appreciates Japan's real intentions and adopts a policy that conforms to the new state of affairs," but what is the concrete meaning of this statement? Surely he does not mean the kind of cooperation whereby, as is being generally rumored, Americans can not engage in trade in China without going through the hands of Japanese merchants.

(5) Minister ARITA expressed his wish that the United States should allow Japan sufficient time to see what the results would be, but there is a limit to the patience of the American people. Considering it impossible to pacify public opinion, the Government has, to begin with, demanded the liberation of the Lower Yangtze region as well as the suspension of bombing of and other interference with churches and their properties situated at considerably far-off distances from the scene of military operations. (Annexed Document No. 4).

p.7 To the foregoing Minister ARITA explained that, in regard to Item (4) of the foregoing paragraph, it is difficult, as was made plain in the last part of our Reply dated the 13th, it was impossible for Japan to recognize the unconditional application of Equal Opportunity and Open Door at the present day when the state of affairs in China has become changed, but that Japan possesses the desire to cooperate with Third Powers in the event of the foregoing becoming understood, at the same time remarking in connection with the rumours as specified at the end of the said paragraph that such a thing was totally impossible and could also not be put into practice, whereupon Grew stated that he felt relieved on hearing the foregoing.

p.8 Minister ARITA further explained that the assertion that Japan's Open Door Policy and Principle of Equal Opportunity might clash with the respecting of rights and interests of Third Powers implied that measures necessary for fostering the closer relationship of Japan and China as well as for ensuring Japan and China's rights of existence might at times necessitate eliminating the application of the aforesaid Principles to some extent, so that there was still considerable room left for economic activities of other countries.

As Grew then asked as to what was meant by the New Order, Minister ARITA replied that same implies the establishing of co-operation between Japan, Manchoukuo, and China in regard to Politics, Economy, and Culture, meaning, as for example, that Political Co-operation is indispensable for exterminating the Anti-Japanese Policy as well as Pro-Communist Policy that have so far been the causes of unrest in the Orient, whereas, furthermore, in regard to Economic Cooperation, it may become necessary, as mentioned above, to



eliminate, to some extent, the application of the Open Door and Equal Opportunity principles.

Furthermore, on Grew remarking that he considered it necessary for Japan to make some sort of gesture in order to pacify the excited feelings of the general public in the United States, the Minister replied that, although he recognized the need of some on principle, he was not in a position to say any more as the question of liberation of the Yangtze River had already been replied to.

- V. On December 8th Minister ARITA invited Grew, and after having explained as follows regarding the unanswered points of the foregoing Clause IV, handed to him a written note embodying the said points (Annexed Document No. 5.)

p. 9

(1) Referring to the views of the United States as per the former part of Item 2 of the foregoing Clause IV, the application, in their original form, of the various treaties which were concluded at the time for the purpose of preventing international disputes in the Orient would, with the general change of conditions in the world, as well as the new state of affairs that is developing in the Far East, rather hamper the bringing about of Peace and Universal Prosperity.

(2) Equal Opportunity in regard to Commerce is what the Empire has been hitherto demanding of the world, and although we agree, on principle, to the opinion of the United States that Equal Opportunity in regard to Commerce will bring about World Peace, but, as things are at present, good quality and low-priced Japanese goods are meeting with discriminatory treatment all over the world. As regards the gaining of a most-favoured footing by one country in other countries as per Item (3) of the foregoing Clause IV, the Most-Favoured relations between the British Empire with her colonies as well as co-mutually among her colonies were pointed out, at the same time asserting that the contention that in the case of the British Empire it is unavoidable as it applies to a single political unit but that the establishing of economic relations between Japan, Manchukuo, and China similar to those within the British Empire can not be recognized in view of the said three countries not constituting a single political unit, can not be tolerated.

(3) Moreover, it was reiterated that it was Japan's belief that it would by no means contribute towards stabilizing the world to let an economic unit like that of Japan exist on one hand against such large economic units of the British Empire,

the United States and the Soviet Union on the other, and that, as the relations of Japan, Manchukuo and China in regard to mutual economic cooperation emanated from the afore-mentioned idea, same would not conflict with the prosperity of the world. This collaboration has for its objects:-

(a) In regard to the field of enterprise, the guaranteeing of supply of products that are indispensable from the standpoint of national existence. To attain this object there may be enterprises that require the granting of special monopolistic rights in order to foster their development. In regard to such enterprises, Third Powers will be welcomed, within the sphere of the plans of Japan, Manchukuo, and China, to participate in regard to capital, technique or resources, but the establishment of competitive enterprises shall not be recognized.

(b) Furthermore, in regard to the field of foreign trade, it shall be the principle not to make any special discriminatory treatment by enforcing customs tariffs or other export and import counter-measures.

To this, Grew remarked that he believed it to be the stand of the United States Government that it could not recognize any one-sided alterations to any treaties or other agreements until the necessary procedure regarding alteration of same be taken conjointly by the countries concerned, after which he stated that it would

p.11 be desirable to prove by actual facts that Japan will not show discriminatory treatment.

VI. On December 26th Grew was invited and told that it was regrettable that, whereas it had already been made clear on repeated occasions that Japan entertained no intention of closing the Chinese Market, the editorial tone of some of the American newspapers and magazines went to show that Japan's real intention was not being understood, whereupon Grew stated that, although the said newspapers and magazines were not necessarily expressing the views of the Government, it was nevertheless true that the American public in general were feeling greatly uneasy regarding Japan's actions in China, also adding that the use of restrictive phraseology, on the occasion of the previous interview such as having stated that it would be necessary to give protection to "certain" industries and "special" enterprises is liable to create uneasiness regarding Actual Treatment. To this the Minister replied that such restrictions should not be interpreted in a broad sense, whereupon Grew again expressed his desire to have the foregoing demonstrated by actual facts.

p.12 On that occasion Ambassador Grew remarked that it was regrettable

to have issued a statement like that of November 3rd regarding the Open Door and Equal Opportunity in China notwithstanding that same had been guaranteed by Foreign Minister GHI as well as Minister KONOYE, whereupon the Minister repeated the same explanation that he had made to Councillor Docman on November 19th.

VII. On December 31st Ambassador Grew visited the Vice-Minister (adding that, although he had visited the Vice-Minister due to Minister ARITA being away on a trip, he wished it to be understood that same would have the same results as having visited the Minister) and handed him an official note expressing the views of the United States in regard to Japan's Reply to the United States under date of November 18th. The Vice-Minister asked for an explanation of the main points of the said note, to which Grew explained that same expresses the views of the United States Government as follows:-

(1) The so-called New State of Affairs in the Far East can not be created only by Japan's ex-parte Declaration, but should be recognized only by means of a Conference.

(2) It is true that the Powers including the United States possess special rights in China, and although the United States has always been advocating that such discriminatory special rights should be abolished and that China should be granted an equal (T.N. original says UNEQUAL) position, it is believed that such changes in the state of affairs should also be effected at a Conference of the Powers, and also added that, as the United States possesses special interest in the state of affairs in the Far East, the United States would announce same at the first opportunity. (Annexed Document No. 6).

VIII. Ever since then, the conversations between the Minister and Ambassador Grew became suspended, but on the occasion of Ambassador Grew's temporary return to the United States (T.N. the original specifies KICHO implying return to Japan, probably an error) in May 1939, Minister ARITA handed the said Ambassador a note as per Annexed Document, and Premier HIRAYAMA also requested him to convey a message addressed to Secretary of State Hull. (Annexed Documents Nos. 7 and 8.)

C E R T I F I C A T E

I.I.S. Doc. No. 1573

Statement of Source and Authentication

I, ODO Nagaharu, heroby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 13 pages, dated 2 Sept. 1941, and described as follows:

Summary of Japanese-American Negotiations During Foreign Minister ARITA's Term of Office (from Nov. 1938 until July 1939).

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at TOKYO on this  
31st day of October, 1946.

(s) Nagaharu Odo  
(S.E.L.)

Ass. Chief, Archives Section  
Official Capacity

Witness: (s) M. Saura

Statement of Official Procurement

I, RICHARD H. LASH, heroby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at TOKYO on this  
31 da. of October, 1946

(s) Richard H. Lash  
N.H.E.

Witness: Eric W. Fleisher, 2nd Lt. AUS Investigation Division, L.S  
Official Capacity

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二前記米國大使書翰ニ付テハ有用大臣就任  
以事回答方研究中ナリ之カ當時廣東攻略  
直前ニテ又漢口陥落ニ迫リ事態ハ急遽ニ  
變化ヲ遂ケツツアルヲ以テ一應事態ノ落着ク  
ク待ツコトナル處本件ハ結局九箇國條約ノ  
重要ナル關聯ヲ有スル問題ナルヲ以テ

(イ) 九箇國條約ヲ根據トスル門戶開放機會均等  
ノ原則ヲ再確認スルカ如キ辭句ハ一切ニ避ク  
ルコト

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(ロ) 既存ノ三國權益ハ之ヲ尊重スルコトニ在リ  
九箇國條約ノ「コトヲ



1573.

三 十月十九日在東京帝國大使館門下之參事  
 館ヲ招致之有田大正ヨリ今次日本側回答ニ  
 對スル感想ヲ向ヘテ對シテ「元」大使ハ抗  
 國答ヲ以テ吾國側要求ヲ全面的ニ否定シテ行  
 ト「感想」ヲ「居」カシ「答」ハ以テ有田大正  
 ヨリ「東京」中「開放」機會均等主義決定「ヲ  
 全世界」ニ「宣」行「ス」ル「意」旨「今」自「古」那「村  
 「之」行「ハ」不「甚」不「合理」ト「前任」大正  
 「中」在「原則」尊重「待遇」保證「ヲ」與「自」己「理」案  
 「事」能「心」中「開放」機會均等「尊重」ヲ「調和  
 「得」ハ「信」行「為」此「心」力「自」分「言」本「件  
 「調和」期「待」ハ「至」ル「ト」信「ス」今「次」回答  
 「因」テ「日本」側「苦心」ヲ「諷」明「セ」處「ハ」最近、  
 如「ノ」軍事「行動」ニ「關係」ス「且」極「ル」此「細」心「事  
 柄」ニ「拘束」未「解決」案件。

No 4

Doc 1573

三百餘人居住於此各地、米國商社力喧之、本國ヲ壓迫  
之結果、米國公文トナリタル文ヲ試ニ遠慮ナリト  
述、米國則モ凡箇國際約ヲ云々ナリシ次第ヲ指摘セ

四、次、同月二十日在京、大使ヲ招致シ前項同様、  
趣旨ヲ會談セ、處、日本日中上ノ所、何等十八日附、  
日本側公文ニ對シ、回答ノ性質ヲ有ス、非スト前置シ

後、  
一、支那、榨取及支那於テ勢力範圍、問題ニ付、米國政府  
ハ、曾テ右、如キモノトシ、米國政府、解ニ門  
戶開放、右、如キモノトシ、全然趣ヲ異ニス、即チ通商上、機  
會均等主義、米國、根本原則分ナリ。

二、右根本原則ヲ具體化セ、極東ニ關ス、諸條約ニ、米國  
ノ加入ニ、吾々モ、凡テ極東於テ發生シ、又、發生、限テ國際  
間、摩擦ヲ防ク、コトヲ企圖シ、然レモ、米國政  
府、現下、國際的無政府、傾向ヲ阻止シ、國際間、均  
整及國際秩序、恢復ニ、貢獻シ、度キ意向ナリ、右力平、 equal  
交渉及協定並ニ國際取極、結果、履行ニ依リ、達成セ  
ル、キコト、米國、唱道ニ、吾々ナリ。

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(別紙不也)

Doc. 1573

右付之有口在言有項、回付下如、  
右付我方回答、本段二下明下如及那  
谷之事態更也、今日概概均等、  
門戸開放、無條件適用、日本ト下之ヲ  
認下困難下如、右詳解也、於下、  
日本ト下、亦三國ト、協力ヲ希望下、意  
在言說明、又同項末尾、海三國ト  
右、如カト、合然有、得不又乘下、  
得ト下、元非ト下、述(下)下、右、觀  
下、果心也、上、述(下)

No. 7

更、有口在言日本、門戸開放、概  
均等主義ト亦三國、權益尊重ト  
衛来ト下、為下、日友關係、殊惡化

Doc. 1573

No. 8

並ニ日英生存権確保ノ必要ニ基クテ措置カ時  
 トシテ右主義適用ノ或ル範圍ニ於テ排除  
 スルコトアルヘシト、意味ニテ外國ノ經濟活動  
 ニ大ナル範圍ヲカスル譯ナリト說明  
 セル處「ゾ」ハ新秩序トハ何ノ意味スルヤト  
 問ハルヲ以テ有田大臣ヨリ右ハ日滿支三國間  
 ノ改修、經濟、文化ノ協力ヲ確立スルコトニテ  
 例ヘハ今日近東洋不安ノ原因ナリシ排日  
 改革及黨共改革ノ根絶ヲ期スルコトハ改修  
 的協力ニ缺クハカラカズニテ又經濟的協力  
 ニ於テハ前述ノ通リ或程度迄門戸開放、  
 稅率均等ノ適用ヲ排除スルコトアルヘシト  
 云フカ、如キ協力ノ意味ニモ「ゾ」ト答ヘヨリ  
 尚「ゾ」ハ米國民一般ノ感傷興奮シ居ルニ  
 付之カ鎮靜、爲日本側ヨリ何等カ「ゼ」ス  
 ケ「ア」レヲ示ス「ト」必要ト思考スト述ヘタルニ  
 付「大」臣ヨリ右ノ必要ハ主義トシテ之ヲ認ムル  
 モ謂フ江南政問題、如キハ既ニ回答請ニテ  
 今日ハ是レ以上言ヘ「ト」答ヘヨリ  
 五、十月八日「ゾ」ガ大使、來訪ヲ奉ルル前四、未回答  
 ノ英ニ関シ有田大臣ヨリ左ノ通リ述ヘ其、趣旨、  
 書類ヲ手交サリ（別紙中五）（一）英記四、（二）英較

米側見解、并、締約当時、東洋ニ於テ國際  
紛争防止之目的トシテ作ラレタル諸條約トモ世界ニ於  
テ一般情勢ノ變化ト東亞ニ發展シツツアル新情  
勢ト下ニ於テ之ヲ其ノ儘適用スルハ却テ平和ト一  
般ノ繁榮ヲ齎ス所以ニ非ス

DOC 1573

(2) 商業上ノ機会均等ハ從來帝國主義ニ向テ要  
求スル所ニシテ商業上ノ機会均等カ世界  
平和ヲ齎ストス米側見解ノ原則トシテ發展  
タル現状ニ於テハ良貨低廉ノ日本品ハ世界到ル所  
ニテ差別待遇ヲ受ヘツツ有前記(一)(二)ノ國  
他國ニ於テハ特惠的地位ヲ付テ英本國ト其  
屬領相互間ノ特惠關係ヲ控攝シ英帝國ハ  
一政治的單位トシテ已ク得ルモノ同視ス然レ  
ルコトヲ左ノ三國内ニ英帝國內ニ於ルガ如キ經濟  
關係ノ樹立セラルル事ヲ容認シ得ストノ論旨肯  
シ得ス

(3) 更ニ英帝國及蘇聯ノ如キ大經濟單位カ在リ  
他方日本ノ如キ經濟單位カ在リ之トシテ此ノ如  
キハ決シテ世界ヲ安定セシムル所以ニ非ズ  
ル日本ノ信念ニ日露支經濟相互協力ノ關係  
左右ノ趨向ヲ發見スルニ在リ世界ノ繁榮ト  
矛盾スルモノニ非ズ本協力ノ目的トシテ  
(4) 企業ノ分野ニ於テ國家存立上ノ方缺

no. 9

Doc. 1573

工業生產物，總額，確保  
 之目的，為三強占的特權  
 發展之圖也，凡此企業  
 此種企業，付予三強之  
 計畫，範圍內，於三強在  
 物價上，若加予三強之  
 競爭的企業，設立，以  
 又貿易，各等，於三強  
 了，三強其他，輸出，入  
 特殊，差別待遇，三強之  
 三強

No. 10.

如三強之條約其他，均來  
 三強之國，係國之集，三  
 三強手續，取此三強之  
 承認，得此三強政府，建  
 三強之料，三強，更，日  
 三強之料，三強，更，日

120 11

DOC 1573

事實依此証明之不足望言自述(可)  
 二十三月二十六日之招致之先般來慶次我方  
 之支那市場ヲ閉鎖スル意ヲ示シテ明ニ  
 表スルヲ拘ラズ米國、新聞雜誌等、論  
 調我ノ真意ヲ解セ尤モ之ノ遺憾ナ  
 ト述ベタル處之ニ右新聞雜誌ニ及ニ毛  
 政府意向代辯スルニ非ズ但ニ米國民般  
 カ日本、支那ニ於テ行動ニ付多大ノ不安ヲ懷  
 キ居ル事實ニ之ヲ前國會談ニ於テ例ハ  
 國或種ノ工業、特別ノ企業ニ付テ保護  
 ヲ加ルニ必要ナリ述ベ先カ如キ制限的ニ用辭  
 有ルニ爲實際ニ待遇ニ關シ不安ヲ生ズルカ  
 ナト述ベタル以テ大ニヨリ制限ノ決平云々  
 解釋セシトモ之ヲ非ズ教明セル處ニシテ重キ  
 右ノ實際ニ於テ示ス極高望ナリ  
 甚厚ク之ヲ使、支那ニ於テ開ノ開放機會  
 均等ニ關シテ前在者大ニ保障アリ近衛  
 大ニ保障ヲ爲シ之ヲ拘ラズ

DOC 1573

十一月三日、如平吉朋之辭也、遺憾ナリト述ケタルヲ  
以テ大臣ヨリ十一月十九日「ト」マニ參事官ニ對シテ  
之ニ同様に説明線返シタリ

十二月三日「ト」ル「ト」文使次官ヲ來訪シ（有田大臣旅行  
中先爲次官ヲ來訪セルニ效果ハ大臣ニ對シテモ  
ト同様ナシト諒解シタリ）

十一月十日附「我」對米國答ニ對シテ米國側  
「見解」ヲ表示セル公文ヲ手交セルヲ以テ次官  
ヨリ在公文「要旨」説明ヲ求メタル處「不」

文使ハ在「東亞」新事態ニモ六月本側  
「一方」の眞意依リ作り出シタルニ非ズト會

談依リ「ト」以認メタル「ト」米國「會」列國  
カ支那ニ各種「特權」有之居ル「事實」ニモ斯  
ル「不平等」の特權ヲ排シ出來得ル限リ速ニ

列國「會議」於「爲」セル「事」ニ變更モ  
列國「會議」於「爲」セル「事」ニ變更モ

米國政府「自解」開陳セル「事」ヲ「信」スル

米國「最初」「機會」之ヲ「代表」スル「附言」セリ  
（別紙才六）

No 12

No 13

DOC 1573

六爾來大臣及「ク」大使會談停止也  
 此に至り及「ク」能和「ク」海軍「ク」大使  
 一時歸朝之際之有國大臣同大使別紙  
 姉手書物ヲ手交之及平詔尊稱ヲ无  
 「ク」國務長官宛「ク」爲「ク」傳達  
 方「ク」依頼「ク」別紙ヲ「ク」付「ク」



1573

有国外務大臣在任中 (自昭和十三年十二月  
至昭和十四年七月)  
= 於此日米交渉概要

昭和十三年十二月有国外務大臣(昭和三三九乙)  
 十月三日「ル」大使、近衛兼攝外相ニ對シ米國  
 大統領カ直接ニ利害關係ヲ感シ居ル問題ニ付  
 訪話致度前任大臣乃在支米國權益五門戶  
 開放機會均等主義、尊重ニ付明確ニ保障ス  
 ルニ拘ル又遺憾下ル米國權益、侵害ハ止メ門戶  
 開放主義依然トシテ無視セラルルニ認メテ得  
 ストテ北支ニ於テ爲替管理、貿易制限等、平例  
 保障ヲ履行セシメテ之ヲ要求スルニ對シ(別紙第一)  
 近衛大臣乃帝國、外交方針並ニ對外方針ハ不變  
 ニシテ支那ニ對シ外國權益尊重門戶開放機會  
 均等、維持ニ固スル帝國、主張ハ不動、モ、トリ唯  
 實際上軍作戦上、必要其他、理由ニ付時ニ滿足  
 ナル解決ヲ見ガレモ、モ、トリタル事能カ正常ニ復スル  
 從ヒ出弟ルタニ滿足ニ解決ヲ得ル様努力中ナリ通  
 商ニ至ニ貿易上、問題ニ付テ研究、上成ルハ早キ  
 機會ニ即希望ニ添フ様解決致度旨述べラ  
 次「ル」大使、前項商標、内容、書翰ヲ  
 送付越セリ(別紙第三)

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Doc 1573-

證明書

「三」トシ文書局 第  
國際檢察部 第一五七三 号  
典據及ト公正ニ関スル證明

余、林馨ハ余カ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ外務省文書課長トシテ、日本  
政府ト公的関係ニ在リテ、ナルコト、並ニ該官吏トシテ余カ茲ニ添附セリ  
ル、十三頁ヨリ成ル、十九百四十一年ノ昭和十六年ノ九月二日附、下記題名  
即チ省田外務大臣在任中(自昭和十三年十一月)ニ於テ、日米交渉概要ノ文  
書、保管ニ任シ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

余、更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書カ日本政府、公文書ナルコト、並ニ右カ下記名稱  
ノ省又ハ部局、公文書類ニ屬シ、一節ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シテハ、公的資格  
又ハ引用、其他公文書類又ハ綴ニ於テ、該文書、正規所在、公文名稱ヲ持記ス  
ベシ) 一、外務省

十九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ九月二十二日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名欄

右ノ者、公的資格

證人

林馨 (印)

外務省文書課長

尾崎長春

公文入手ニ関スル證明

余、RICHARD H. LARSEN、余カ聯合國軍軍需物資同令所ニ在リテ、  
ルコト、並ニ下記題名、文書カ余カ公務上日本政府、下記題名官吏ヨリ入手シ  
テ、ナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

十九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ九月二十四日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名欄 Richard H. Larst.

右ノ者、公的資格 檢察官 藤田 信

證人 T. Toguch

E. # 900

Document No. 219P (85)  
Br. Ex. 119

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO  
THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (ARITA)

Excerpt.

No. 1126

TOKYO, November 24, 1938.

. . . . .

It has recently been brought to the attention of my Government that the Chinese Maritime Customs at Canton was taken over by the Japanese consular and military authorities on November 9, 1938, and that the acting deputy commissioner in charge was informed by those authorities that no customs funds then owing or there in banks might be transferred to the Inspector General of Customs without the permission of the Japanese authorities.

Accordingly, acting under instructions from my Government, I have the honor formally to protest against the taking over of the Chinese Maritime Customs house at Canton by the Japanese authorities. My Government is of the opinion that this reported action constitutes an infringement of the international status of the Chinese Maritime Customs. . . .

Foreign Relations I, p. 746 at  
p. 747

駐日公使館(東京) / 總務課 / 檢印本心箱大五宛

板本

第一二二號

東京

一九三八年十一月二日

62990  
2/9/38  
(58) 17/85

此照東京海關(日本領事館)會官於一九三八年十一月九日  
接收受(且是)東京會官(東京)在東京外務省關長代理(當時)  
無有(因此)銀行(保管)之(此)種(關係)會(日本)官(官)承  
取(手)在(關)長(官)手(移)及(事)手(移)之(事)受(手)之(事)官  
一(最近)政府(注意)引(引)之(事)。

之(事)不(當)我(政府)之(命令)從(在)廢(廢)長(長)之(事)不  
官(官)之(事)之(事)之(事)之(事)之(事)之(事)之(事)之(事)之(事)  
一(我)政府(在)取(取)之(事)之(事)之(事)之(事)之(事)之(事)之(事)  
一(候)官(官)之(事)之(事)之(事)之(事)之(事)之(事)之(事)之(事)

外交關係

I

伊之育

池之夏

Ex. # 991

Doc. No. 219F (86)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 120

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE  
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (ARITA)

Excerpts.

No. 1153

TOKYO, December 30, 1938.

. . . . .

In the light of facts and experience the Government of the United States is impelled to reaffirm its previously expressed opinion that imposition of restrictions upon the movements and activities of American nationals who are engaged in philanthropic, educational and commercial endeavors in China has placed and will, if continued, increasingly place Japanese interests in a preferred position and is, therefore, unquestionably discriminatory in its effect against legitimate American interests. Further, with reference to such matters as exchange control, compulsory currency circulation, tariff revision, and monopolistic promotion in certain areas of China the plans and practices of the Japanese authorities imply an assumption on the part of those authorities that the Japanese Government or the regimes established and maintained in China by Japanese armed forces are entitled to act in China in a capacity such as flows from rights of sovereignty and further in so acting to disregard and even to declare nonexistent or abrogated the established rights and interests of other countries including the United States.

The Government of the United States expresses its conviction that the restrictions and measures under reference not only are unjust and unwarranted but are counter to the provisions of several binding international agreements, voluntarily entered into, to which both Japan and the United States, and in some cases other countries, are parties.

. . . . .

The Government of the United States in its note of October 6 requested, in view of the often reiterated assurances proffered by the Government of Japan of its intention to observe the principle of equality of opportunity in its relations with China and in view of Japan's treaty obligations so to do, that the Government of Japan abide by these obligations and carry out these assurances in practice.

Br. Ex. 120

The Japanese Government in its reply appears to affirm that it is its intention to make its observance of that principle conditional upon an understanding by the American Government and by other governments of a "new situation" and a "new order" in the Far East as envisaged and fostered by Japanese authorities.

. . . . .

This country's adherence to and its advocacy of the principle of equality of opportunity do not flow solely from a desire to obtain the commercial benefits which naturally result from the provisions of that principle. They flow from a firm conviction that observance of that principle leads to economic and political stability, which are conducive both to the internal well-being of nations and to mutually beneficial and peaceful relationships between and among nations; from a firm conviction that failure to observe that principle breeds international friction and ill-will, with consequences injurious to all countries, including in particular those countries which fail to observe it; and from an equally firm conviction that observance of that principle promotes the opening of trade channels thereby making available the markets, the raw materials and the manufactured products of the community of nations on a mutually and reciprocally beneficial basis.

The principle of equality of economic opportunity is, moreover, one to which over a long period and on many occasions the Japanese Government has given definite approval. It is one to the observance of which the Japanese Government has committed itself in various international agreements and understandings. It is one upon observance of which by other nations the Japanese Government has of its own accord and upon its own initiative frequently insisted. It is one to which the Japanese Government has repeatedly during recent months declared itself committed.

The people and the Government of the United States could not assent to the establishment at the instance of and for the special purposes of any third country of a regime which would arbitrarily deprive them of the long established rights of equal opportunity and fair treatment which are legally and justly theirs along with those of other nationals.

Fundamental principles such as the principle of equality of opportunity which have long been regarded as inherently wise and just which have been widely adopted and adhered to, and which are general in their application are not subject to nullification by a unilateral affirmation

Br. Ex. 120

. . . . .

In the light of these facts, and with reference especially to the purpose and the character of the treaty provisions from time to time solemnly agreed upon for the very definite purposes indicated, the Government of the United States deprecates the fact that one of the parties to these agreements has chosen to embark--as indicated both by action of its agents and by official statements of its authorities--upon a course directed toward the arbitrary creation by that power by methods of its own selection, regardless of treaty pledges and the established rights of other powers concerned, of a "new order" in the Far East. Whatever may be the changes which have taken place these matters are of no less interest and concern to the American Government than have been the situations which have prevailed there in the past, and such changes as may henceforth take place there, changes which may enter into the producing of a "new situation" and a "new order", are and will be of like concern to this Government. This Government is well aware that the situation has changed. This Government is also well aware that many of the changes have been brought about by the action of Japan. This Government does not admit, however, that there is need or warrant for any one Power to take upon itself to prescribe what shall be the terms and conditions of a "new order" in areas not under its sovereignty and to constitute itself the repository of authority and the agent of destiny in regard thereto.

. . . . .

The Government of the United States has at all times regarded agreements as susceptible of alteration, but it has always insisted that alterations can rightfully be made only by orderly processes of negotiation and agreement among the parties thereto.

The Japanese Government has upon numerous occasions expressed itself as holding similar views.

The United States has in its international relations rights and obligations which derive from international law and rights and obligations which rest upon treaty provisions. Of those which rest on treaty provisions, its rights and obligations in and with regard to China

Ex. Br. 120

rest in part upon provisions in treaties between the United States and China and in part on provisions in treaties between the United States and several other powers including both China and Japan. These treaties were concluded in good faith for the purpose of safeguarding and promoting the interests not of one only but of all of their signatories. The people and the Government of the United States cannot assent to the abrogation of any of this country's rights or obligations by the arbitrary action of agents or authorities of any other country.

. . . . .

Foreign Relations I, p. 820  
at pp. 821-825



駐日米國大使(兒) GREW 日本外務大臣  
(有田) 披露

第一二五三號

東京一九三八年十二月三十日

Doc 219P(86)

事實並三經驗三昭三合眾國政府(皇軍三表明也)見斜(再確言也)得之。即于支那(於)慈善(教育)並三商業方面(努力)三從事之(米國人)運動(及)活動(對)三限制(賦課)日本(權益)復失的(地位)置直(之)三三。又(之)繼續(ス)三(益)此(傾向)三(濃化)ス(之)ト(看)三(又)三(故)限制(賦課)三(效果)三(於)三(合法)的(米國)權益(對)三(疑)三(之)三(差別)的(之)三(完)三(ト)三(言)三(ト)三(リ)。

軍(三)為(督)管理(強制)通(貨)流通(用)稅(改正)及(支)那(或)地(域)於(之)獨立(事業)計(畫)等(如)軍(事)機(關)三(周)三(日)本(當局)計(畫)並(三)實(施)三(日)本(政府)或(日)本(武)裝(兵)官(隊)三(等)支(那)三(創)設(支)府(等)三(政)權(支)那(主)權(權)限(官)吏(不)加(如)三(權)能(持)三(行)動(又)更(三)三(權)三(行)動(不)三(分)三(合)眾(國)三(合)々(諸)外(國)既(得)權(益)無(視)三(判)三(其)不(存)在(或)三(院)兼(三)官(三)三(及)公(法)官(格)三(有)三(加)如(三)三(官)當(局)側(三)三(權)三(意)味(也)三(合)眾(國)政府(以)下(如)キ(所)信(三)表(明)ス。即(于)同(題)詔(制)必(並)措(置)三(學)三(不)三(不)三(三)三(三)三(日)米(兩)國(並)三(或)三(場)合(三)他(諸)國(締)約(國)三(且)合(意)三(下)三(加)盟(也)三(數)個(拘)束(的)國(際)協(定)條(項)三(又)三(事)三(リ)。

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支(那)上(關係)於(機會)均(等)原(則)三(遵)奉(之)三(意)志(三)三(日)本(政府)必(與)三(各)國(保)證(並)三(之)三(踏)踐(之)三(日)本(條)約(上)三(義)務(三)鑑(三)三(合)眾(國)

Doc 219P (26)

政府、其十月六日、覽書ニ於テ日本政府ニ對シテ、義務ヲ遵守スルニ必要ナル保證  
ヲ實際ニ履行スル事ヲ要スセリ。  
日本政府ハ、同答中ニ日本當局傍リ直覺トシ助長セシムル意思ニ於ケル  
「新秩序」及「新秩序」ヲ米國政府並ニ他、諸政府カ諒解スルニ必要ナル條件  
トシテ、原則ヲ遵守スルコトガ、此ノ事ヲ肯定スル様見込ニシテ、

x x x x x x

此國ノ機會均等原則、國事ニ唱導スル此ノ原則規定ニ依リ、當然ニ齊  
ニテ商業上ノ利益ヲ得ニスル事ヲ欲スル由來スルモノニ、又、此ノ原  
則ヲ遵守スルコトハ、諸國民、國內ニ於ケル福祉並ニ諸國氏間相互ニ  
有益ナル社會的親睦關係ニ、亦、經濟的、政治的安定ヲ齎スル  
ニ確固ナル信念ニ由來スルモノナリ。又、此ノ原則ヲ遵守スルコトハ  
思ハレ、凡ソ、國、就中遵守スルニ諸國家ニ對シテ、有害ナル結果  
ヲ伴フ國際間、軋然及ニ敵愾心ヲ生ズルモノト、確信ニ出スルモノ  
ナリ。或ハ、又、此ノ原則ヲ遵守スルコトハ、諸國民、共同社會、市場、原  
料及ニ機噐等、相互ニ互惠的ニ有利ナル條件、下ニ利用、得ルニシテ、  
貿易路、開拓ヲ促進スルモノナリト、確ク信スルガ故ナリ。  
更ニ經濟的機會均等、原則ハ長期ニ亙リ、且、以テ、機會ニ於テ日本  
政府カ明確ナル積意ヲ與ヘタル所ナリ。又、權ハ、國際協定  
及ニ諒解ニ於テ日本政府カ夫レ自身其遵守ヲ約束ニシタルモノナリ。  
又、ハ、他、諸國家カ遵守スル事ヲ日本政府カ自レ同意ニ且、自レ、發意ニ於  
テ屢次主張スルモノナリ。其ハ日本政府カ最近數月間自レ之レ  
ニ拘束ナル、夫レ事ヲ反覆ニ明セタル所ナリ。

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Doc. No. 219P (87)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 121

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE  
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (ARITA)

Excerpt.

No. 1207

TOKYO, March 11, 1939.

EXCELLENCY: The renewed attention of Your Excellency is invited to my note No. 1178, dated February 6, 1939, relating to the imposition by the Japanese naval authorities at Chefoo of various restrictions on the shipment of merchandise, to the informal memorandum relating to unwarranted restrictions placed upon American personal and business interests in Tientsin which was left by the Counselor of the Embassy on (with) the Director of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office on February 6, 1939, and to the aide memoire which was left at the Foreign Office on March 8, 1939, in which the hope was expressed that, in view of the continued imposition of such restrictions at Tientsin, necessary steps would immediately be taken to alleviate those restrictions.

From various sources the Government of the United States has received further information to the effect that the Japanese sponsored regime in North China, with the support of the Japanese authorities, has brought about the imposition of drastic trade restrictions, including the requirement of export permits and controlled money exchange.

The Government of the United States regards these export restrictions as the most comprehensive discrimination against the United States and other foreign countries and in favor of Japan which has yet been established in North China by Japanese authorities and as a virtual nullification in that area of the principle of equal opportunity so far as import and export are concerned.

. . . . .

Doc. No. 219P (87)

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. . . . .

4472  
219P(87)

駐日米大使(ブル) GREN 宛 日本外務大臣(有田)宛

破譯

第二〇七号

東京一九三九年三月十一日

閣下、在支那日本海軍当局ニヨリ加へられたる商品出荷ニ対スル  
諸種ノ制限ニ関スル一九三九年二月六日附拙翰第二七八号  
一九三九年二月六日附大使館参事官ニヨリ貴外務省アメリカ局  
長ニ提出セラレタル天津ニ於ケル米國人個人的及ビ商業上ノ  
利害關係ニ加ヘララル不平等ノ制限ニ関スル非公式覺書及ビ天津  
ニ於テ引續キ行ハル居ル此種制限ノ実施ニ鑑ミ之等ノ制限ノ  
緩和及ビ撤消ノ手段ヲ即時採ラシタキ日希望ヲ表明セシ  
一九三九年三月八日貴外務省へ提出ノ覺書、以上ニ對シ改メ  
閣下、御注意ヲ喚起致候。

合衆國政府ハ更ニ種々タル方面ヨリ、日本ノ支援下ニアル北支  
政權ヲ日本官憲支持ノ下ニ輸出許可制及ビ爲替統制ヲ  
合衆國政府ノ貿易制限ヲ設ケルニ到リタリトノ情報ヲ得居  
リ候

合衆國政府ハ之等ノ輸出制限ガ日本官憲ニ依リ北支ニ於テ既  
ニ設定セラレタル、合衆國及ビ其他ノ諸外國ニ對スル最モ包括  
的ナル差別待遇力モ日本ヲ利スル差別的待遇ニシテ、且  
輸出ニ關スル限り同地域ニ於ケル機會均等ノ原則ノ實質  
上ノ斃害ヲ意味スルモノナリト見做スモノニ有之候

Ex. 493

219P (88)

Dr. Ex. 123  
BT:

THE AMERICAN CHARGE IN JAPAN (DOOMAN) TO THE JAPANESE  
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (ABE)

Excerpts.

No. 1366

TOKYO, September 1, 19.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Japanese military forces at Swatow have continued to occupy the premises of the Chinese Maritime Customs at that port for a period of more than two months.

It is the view of my Government that the actions, as set forth above, of the Japanese authorities at Swatow constitute an effective seizure of the Chinese Maritime Customs at Swatow. I am, accordingly, desired by my Government to protest against such seizure and continued occupation of the customs house which prejudice the integrity of the Chinese Maritime Customs. My Government takes this occasion to reiterate and further to emphasize to the Japanese Government its very real interest in the preservation and integrity of the Chinese Maritime Customs and in the safeguarding of the customs revenues.  
I avail myself, (etc).

Eugene H. Dooan

Foreign Relations I, pp. 748-749

2192(88)

駐日米大使館参事官 (ドーマン) / DOORMAN / 三日本  
外務大臣 (阿部)

振 筆

水三六六

東京 一九三九年九月一日

閣下私閣下以下ノ事、付添報告書上ノ事ヲ先承トスルニ  
アリス、即チ汕頭ニ於テ日本陸軍が同處於於レ、海關建築物  
及其構内ヲ吾月以上ノ期間ニ亘リ引續キ占領スル事アリ  
マス。

汕頭ニ於テ日本官憲ノ上述ノ如キ行動ハ我政府良解ニシテ汕頭  
及那海關ノ事、其ノ接收ヲ構成スルモノアリマス。然レテ私我政府  
カラ友邦海關ノ保全ヲ望ム、右稅關ノ斯ル接收ニ繼續的占  
領ニ對シ抗議ヲ申シ、公權ヲ要請カレニシタ。吾が政府ハ此機會ニ  
於テ友邦海關ノ保全並ニ稅關收入ノ保護ニ對シ深甚ナル意  
ヲ持ツトテ、日本政府ニ對シ之ヲ申入、且更ニ之ヲ強調セテ  
スルモノアリマス。

外交關係一、PP. 七四八—七四九

Eugene H. Doorman  
ドーマン 三六六

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361



REPORT FROM WASHINGTON NO. 707  
(Dated July 26, 1939)

Notification from the U. S. Secretary of State Hull to the Japanese Ambassador to the U. S. HORINOCHI in regard of the abolition of Japanese-American Commercial Treaty.

I take the liberty to inform you that, during the recent years the Government of the United States has been examining the treaties of commerce and navigation in force between the United States and other countries with a view to determining what changes may need be made toward better serving the purposes for which such treaties were concluded.

In the course of this survey, the Government of the United States has come to a conclusion that the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation existing between the United States and Japan which was signed at Washington on February 21, 1911, contained provisions which deserve new consideration.

In order to find an adequate method for such consideration, and with a view to better safeguarding and promoting American interests as new developments may require, the Government of the United States, acting in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Article XVII of the said treaty, hereby wishes to give notice of its desire that this treaty be terminated, and that having thus given notice, the United States expects the treaty, together with its annexed protocol, to expire after six months from this date.

In concluding this letter, I beg to renew my respects to you.

Respectfully yours,

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 713

Statement of Source and Authenticity.

I, HAYASHI Kooru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of one page, dated 26 July, 1939, and described as follows:

JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN REGARD TO THE ABOLITION OF THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN COMMERCIAL TREATY ON 26 JULY 1939, being U. S. notice to Japan of intention to abolish said Commercial Treaty.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):  
Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this  
19th day of Sept., 1946.

(s) K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: (s) Nagahara Odo

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
19th day of Sept., 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME

Witness: /s/ T/4 Toguchi

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

Doc 713

日米通商航海條約廢棄ニ關スル  
北米合衆國ハル國務長官發在米  
堀内大使宛通牒(昭和十四年七月  
二十六日附)

以書翰啓上致候陳者最近數年間合衆國  
政府ハ合衆國諸外國間現行通商航海諸條  
約~~カ締結セラルタル~~諸目的ニ一層副ハシメン

カ爲ニハ如何ナル變更カ爲サルヘキヤヲ決定ス  
ルノ目的ヲ以テ檢討致シ居リ候右檢討中合

衆國政府ハ千九百十二年二月二十日「ワシントン」  
ニ於テ署名セラルタル合衆國、日本國間通商  
航海條約カ新ナル考慮ヲ要スル條項ヲ包含ス  
トノ結論ニ到達致候右考慮ニ對スル方法ヲ準  
備シ且新ナル諸事態カ要求スル如ク「アメリカ」ノ  
諸利益ヲ一層保障シ且伸長センガ爲合衆國  
政府ハ前記條約第十七條ニ掲ケラルル手續ニ  
從ヒ茲ニ本條約カ終了セシメラレシコト、同政府  
ノ希望ヲ通告シ且右通告ニ依リ本條約ハ其  
ノ附屬議定書ト共ニ本日ヨリ六ヶ月ノ期間

No. 1

NO. 2

Doc 71

満了ヲ以テ終了スヘキニトテ豫期致シ候  
右申進旁々本官ハ茲ニ重テ閣下ニ向テ敬  
意ヲ表シ候  
敬具

713 cert-1

證 明 書

「ワシントン」文書局 第 一 號  
國 際 検 察 部 第 七 一 三 號

真 偽 及 び 公 正 に 關 ス ル 證 明

森 林 署 長 林 義 一 氏 余 下 記 ノ 費 裕 ニ 於 テ、 即 チ  
外 務 省 文 書 課 長 ト シ テ、 日 本 政 府 ト 公 的 關 係 ニ 在  
ル モ ノ ナ ル コ ト、 茲 ニ 該 官 吏 ト シ テ 余 ガ 茲 ニ 添 附  
セ タ レ タ ル、 發 行 ヨ リ 成 ル、 千 九 百 三 十 九 年 / 昭  
和 十 四 年 / 七 月 二 十 六 日 附、 下 記 題 名、 即 チ 日 米  
通 商 航 海 條 約 條 文 關 ス ル 北 米 合 衆 國 「ハ ル」 國 務  
長 官 兼 米 賣 内 務 省 大 使 宛 通 牒 ( 昭 和 十 四 年 七 月 二 十  
六 日 ) ノ 文 書 ノ 保 管 ニ 任 シ 居 ル コ トヲ 茲 ニ 證 明 ス。  
余 ハ 更 ニ 添 附 ノ 記 録 及 び 文 書 ガ 日 本 政 府 ノ 公 文 書  
ナ ル コ ト、 茲 ニ 右 ガ 下 記 名 稱 ノ 省 又 ハ 部 局 ノ 公 式  
書 頭 及 び 終 ノ 一 部 ナ ル コ トヲ 證 明 ス。( 若 シ ア ラ ば  
發 行 書 頭 又 ハ 引 用、 其 ノ 他 公 式 書 頭 又 ハ 綴 ニ 於 ケ ル 該 文 書 ノ 成 規 所  
在 ノ 公 式 名 稱 ヲ モ 特 記 ス ベ シ )

千 九 百 四 十 六 年 / 昭 和 二 十 一 年 / 九 月 十 九 日

713 207-2

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名補林

右ノ者ノ公的資格

外務省文書課長

證

人

尾

戸

長

春

公式入手ニ證スル證明

余 *Richard D. Kanf*、余ガ聯合國最高指揮官總司令

部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、並ニ上記順名ノ文番

ハ余ガ公務上、日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入手

シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ九月二十日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏

名

*Richard D. Kanf*

右ノ者ノ公的資格

*Investigator*

證

人

*T/4 G. Jognski*

Q. # 995

Doc. No. 219F (63)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 93

ORAL STATEMENT BY THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN  
(GREW) TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
(ARITA) ON MAY 11, 1939

Excerpts.

.....

I have now been instructed by my Government to call on Your Excellency and, primarily on humanitarian grounds, and in reiteration of the representations made on both occasions mentioned, emphatically to express the most serious concern at the recent indiscriminate bombings of the civilian populations of Chungking, Swatow, Ningpo, and Foochow. According to information reaching my Government, the destruction caused by these air raids by the Japanese forces was confined almost entirely to civilian lives and the property of civilians.

.....

Added to the humanitarian factor applying to non-combatants generally, there exists the emphatic objection of the American Government to the jeopardizing of the lives of its own nationals which must inevitably arise from such indiscriminate attacks. I need hardly remind Your Excellency of the repeated bombings of American property in China, of which approximately 140 separate instances have come to my Government's attention during the present hostilities, in spite of the fact that these properties were clearly marked by American flags and their positions notified to the Japanese military authorities. Loss of American life, wounds and serious property damage were caused. The fact that during a recent period reports of these attacks on American property dwindled, and for a time actually ceased, gave us the hope that effective steps were being taken to meet our representations.

.....

Foreign Relations I,  
pp. 647-648



駐日米大使館より GREW 氏より日本外務大臣有田  
へ口頭ニヨリ申入

一九三九年五月十一日

doc 2192 (13)

私、第一、人道上、立場から且敘上二回ニヨリ申入、  
反覆トシテ、特ニ重慶、汕頭、寧波、福州、中民  
ニ對シテ最近加ヘテハル無差別爆惠ニ就テ閣下ヲ  
訪問シ且最重大関心ヲ表明、選調ナル様本國政  
府ヨリ命ニシラセタ。

本國政府ニ屆クテ情報ニ依ビ之等、日本軍  
ノ空爆ニ依リテ生シテ破壊ノ殆ニド全ク市民  
ノ生命財產ニ限レテナシ。

一般非戰鬥員ニ對スル人道上、理由ニ加ヘ、  
無差別爆惠ニヨリ、必然的ニ起ルテアロウ米國  
ノ生命、危害ニ對シ、米國政府、強キ反對ガ有ル  
今、戰爭中、我政府、接受タル情報ニヨリ、米國  
ノ財產カ明白ニ米國ノ國旗ヲ示サ、且其所在  
ヲ日軍當局ニ通知セシテアルニテ、天不拘、被爆件數  
ガ約四〇件ニ上リテ、リマス、在又米國人  
ノ財產、屢次、無差別爆惠ニ就テ、今更改キ、  
閣下ニ申上リ、必要、恒ニト申ヒマス。  
米人生命、損失、眞傷、財產、重大ノ損害、起リ、  
最近、悉ク米人財產爆惠ノ報告ガ減少、且時全  
ク停止シ、ト云フ事實、ハ、申入レ、應ス、有  
效ノ手段カ取ル、心、テ、希望ヲ吾々ニ抱カシマ。



Q. # 996

Doc. No. 219P (64)

Br. Ex. 94

Page 1

THE CHARGE IN JAPAN (DOOMAN) TO  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Excerpt.

TOKYO, May 22, 1939--6 p.m.  
(Received May 23--9:10 a.m.)

241. Department's 138, May 20, 4 p.m., bombing of American  
properties.

. . . . .

According to reports received from reliable sources, the  
American Lutheran Brethren Mission property at Tangho, Honan  
Province, was bombed on May 4, and on May 2 the property of  
the same mission at Tungpeh was bombed and the church and school  
belonging to the mission were destroyed. Both properties were  
marked, the report concerning the latter case stating specifically  
that a large American flag was flying from a high pole at the time  
of bombing and that the American flag was painted on the roof.  
A bomb was also dropped on April 27 on hospital property at King-  
men, Fupeh, belonging to the Covenant Missionary Society.

. . . . .

DOOMAN

Foreign Relations I, p. 650 at  
p. 651

Doc-219P(64)

二九(天)

駐日代理大使(天)の閣務長官へ

東京一九三九年五月二十二日午後六時發

拔萃

(五月二十三日午前九時十分接迄)

二四、省三八、五月二十日午後四時アメリカ國財産ニ對スル爆撃  
 確ナル筋ヨリ、報告依ハ行南省湯河所在アメリカルートル兄弟傳導  
 團財産ガ自宮爆撃ナリ又五月一日桐柏、同傳導團財産ガ爆撃  
 受テ該團所屬ノ教會及ニ學校ガ破壊ナリト。  
 西財産共ニ標附ナリ後ノ場合、報告ニ爆撃時刻ニアメリカ國旗ガ  
 高キ柱ニ懸リ居リ且アメリカ國旗ガ屋上ニ描カシ居アルコトヲ特ニ陳述ナリ。  
 尚爆撃ガ四月二十七日契約傳導會所屬、湖北省荊門所存病院  
 財産ニ投下ナリト。

ドクマン / Coonan

對外關係第一冊五〇頁ヨリ六一頁

Q# 997

Doc. No. 220 3 (1)

page 1.

Br. Ex. 132

TELEGRAM  
THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (CREW) TO THE SECRETARY  
OF STATE

TOKYO May 18, 1939--7 p.m.  
(Received May 18--10:03 a.m.)

Excerpt

. . . . .

8. The Minister on his own initiative then turned to the subject of the so-called "South Sea advance" and made to me the following confidential oral statement:

"We understand that, since the military occupation of Hainan Island by Japan and the placing of the Sinnan Gunto (Spratly Islands) under the jurisdiction of the Formosan Government General, rumors have spread, giving the impression as though Japan entertained some territorial designs toward the South Seas; that as a result certain interested countries are apprehensive, and that even some Americans have a similar apprehension with regard to the Philippines. The Japanese Government consider it regrettable from the standpoint of Japanese-American friendship that such apprehension has been aroused. They are, therefore prepared, if the United States Government should desire that some step be taken by the Japanese Government for the purpose of dispelling such apprehension, to enter into conversation with the United States Government."

Cipher texts by mail to Shanghai, Chungking, Peiping.

CREW

Foreign Relations II, p. 1 at  
pp. 4-5

Gu 99-  
Doc 220c(1)

電報

駐日大使 (ガル) ヨリ國務長官宛  
東京發 一九三九年(昭和十四年)五月十八日午後七時  
五月十八日午後十時三十分發信

披萃

八、大臣、自ら詰題、所謂南洋進出問題ニ轉シ、口頭ニ次  
ノ如キ機密ノ陳述セシム。

「日本軍、古南島占領以來又新南群島ニ進出シ、  
群島ヲ臺灣總督ノ管轄下ニ置キ、以來、日本ガ南  
洋ニ領土ノ野心ヲ抱キ、如キ印家ヲ與ヘル時ハ  
擴ガリ、其、結果、或ル利害關係ヲ有スル國々ノ危惧、念  
ヲ抱キ、尚米國人ノ中ニサレモ、此島ニ關シテ同様ノ懸念  
ヲ有スル者カアルコトヲ我々ニ知ツテ居リマス。日本政府ハ  
此ノ様ト懸念ヲ生ゼシメタコトヲ、日米親善ノ立場カラ  
遺憾ニ思フテ居リマス。ソレ故ニ茲ニ斯ナル懸念ヲ批  
ヒ去ル爲ニ日本政府ニ於テ何等カノ手段ヲ講ズルコト  
ヲ合衆國政府ガ希望スルナリ、何時ニモ合衆國政府  
ト會談スル用意ガアリマス。」

上海、重慶、北京ノ郵便暗号原文

ガル

外交關係第二卷 第一頁

第四頁乃至第五頁

Ex. 998 9

Doc. No. 219P (65)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 95

THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE  
AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW)  
(Paraphrase)

Excerpts.

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1939--7 p.m.

183. On July 5, and at his own request, the  
Counselor of the Japanese Embassy (Suna) called at the Depart-  
ment.

. . . . .

An informal memorandum was then handed to the  
Counselor in which was described the bombings of certain  
Protestant and Roman Catholic mission properties on June 23,  
24 and 25, and the bombing of the Union High School, Foochow,  
on June 29.

Telegram repeated to Chungking.

FULL

Foreign Relations I, p. 653

6998  
Doc 219P(65)

國務長官ヨリ日本駐劄大使(GREW)-宛  
(パリアーノス)

抄萃

昭和十四年(一九三九年)七月六日午後  
七時ワシントンニ於テ

一八三。 七月五日 <sup>俄日身 王太子 其妻</sup> 招請ニ應ジ 日本大使館  
參事官(須藤)ニ國務省ヲ訪問セリ  
其時 六月二十三日、二十五日及二十五日ニ於ケル  
新敵及ローマ舊敵ノ布教團、資産爆撃及  
六月二十九日ニ於ケル福州、ユニオンハイスクール  
ノ爆撃ヲ叙述シタ非公式ノ覺書ガ參事官  
ニ手交サレタリ。

重慶ニテ轉電セリ

11 / HULL

外事関係一六五三頁

Q. 499

Doc. No. 219P (66)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 96

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Excerpt.

(WASHINGTON) July 10, 1939.

The Japanese Ambassador came in at my request. I then proceeded, without particular preliminaries, to read him the following:

"On two occasions between midnight and 2:00 a.m., July 6, two squadrons of Japanese planes raided Chungking. Bombs fell at random on both banks of the Yangtze River and in the city. One bomb fell within 400 feet of the residence of the Counselor of the American Embassy. Other bombs fell in the same general neighborhood, one landing about 300 yards from the residence of the American Ambassador. The Lewis Memorial Institutional Church at Chungking, an American institution, was badly damaged.

"Another raid was made by Japanese planes on Chungking on July 7 commencing about 12:40 a.m., and lasting until about 2:10 a.m. On this occasion bombs fell in various areas of the city and also on the south bank of the Yangtze, one bomb falling within 50 yards of the quarters of the Counselor of the American Embassy and causing about 30 Chinese civilian casualties.

"During these raids five bombs struck within 200 yards of the U.S.S. Tutuila.

. . . . .

C(ORDILL) F(ULL)

Foreign Relations I, p. 656

二九P(六六)

國務長官覺書

(三ノ下)一九三九年(昭和十四年)六月十日

接奉

日本大使余安謙言、未訂り斯子余、格別、前置ヲ拔キ言次如ク彼讀聞カセリ。

七月六日深夜乃至午前時、間三回、且リ日本航空機三編隊、重慶ヲ爆撃シ、爆彈揚子江兩岸及同市内無差別ニ落下セリ。一彈、要米利加大使館參事官、住宅、四百米以内地点ニ落下シ、他、爆彈若干、同所附近圓ニ落セリ。

一彈、アメリカ大使館即、約三百碼所ニ落セリ、要米利加組織ニ重慶、ルイス記念財團教會 The Lewis Memorial institutional church 酷ク損害ヲ蒙リ、別爆撃ヲ日本航空機ヨリ七月七日午前〇時四分頃ヲ開始セリ。是時、今頃迄、間重慶ニ對シ行ハタリ、其際爆彈市内、各地及揚子江南岸ニ落セリ。一彈、アメリカ大使館參事官、住宅ヨリ五百碼以内ニ落セリ、約二十名、支那人一般民が被害ヲ蒙リ、是等、爆撃、間、爆彈五箇、米國船 USS TULLY 号ヨリ、三百碼以内ニ落セリ。

コर्टン、ハル  
(Cordell) H(ell)

外國關係第二卷六五六頁

5. 9. 99  
Doc. C 1791 (66)



Q. 1000

Dec. No. 210P (67)

Br. Ex. 98

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE  
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (NOBUKI)

Excerpt.

No. 1426

TOKYO, December 5, 1939

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that I have been informed through the American Embassy at Chungking that the property of the Lutheran Brethren Mission at Tungneh, Honan, has again been damaged as the result of an air raid by Japanese planes on August 1, 1939. The location of this property is undoubtedly well known to the Japanese military authorities since the property has been bombed on two previous occasions, first on October 24, 1938, resulting in the death of an American national and the wounding of two other American nationals and again on May 2, 1939. In this connection reference is made to my note No. 1105 dated October 31, 1938, and to my note No. 1273 dated May 22, 1939.

.....  
JOSEPH C. GREW

Foreign Relations I, n. 670

in 500  
Doc 219P(57)

二九P(六七)

駐日アメリカ大使館長ヨリ日本外務大臣  
(野村)

披華

西三六號

一九三九年(昭和十四年)十月五日東京於テ

閣下、余が在重慶アメリカ大使館ヨリ河南省桐柏、ルドルフ兄弟  
傳道會財産が丹一九三九年(昭和十四年)八月日日本航空機、空

襲因破壊ヲシテ、報告接タルコトヲ通告スル光榮ヲ有ス。

該財産、位置、日本軍當局ニ熟知シ居ル疑ヲ答テ、何者該財

産、曩、兩回爆撃ヲシ居、初回一九三八年(昭和十三年)十月十四日

アメリカ國人名ヲ死セシメ、他、アメリカ國民、二名、負傷セシメ、

次回一九三九年(昭和十四年)五月二日ナリ。

本件ニ就テ、余、一九三八年(昭和十三年)十月三十日附一、五號覺書

ヲ一九三九年(昭和十四年)五月二十日附二七三號覺書ニ於テ、

ジョージ・C・グロウ

Joseph C. Grew  
對外關係課(冊六)頁

Ex. # 1001

Doc. No. 219F (29)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 124

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE  
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (ARITA)

Excerpt.

No. 1474

TOKYO, February 6, 1940

EXCELLENCY: The Tax Bureau of the so-called Rehabilitation Commission at Swatow, China, which, as Your Excellency is no doubt aware, is sponsored by agencies of the Japanese Government, has since November of last year levied taxes on imports and exports at that port. This Commission has issued regulations announcing the collection, as of November 1, 1939, of a five per cent ad valorem tax on local produce and a ten per cent ad valorem tax on imports not liable to the Consolidated Tax, and it has also commenced the collection of a forty per cent ad valorem tax on postal parcels entering Swatow. I am instructed by my Government to protest this illegal and unwarranted action of the Swatow Rehabilitation Commission.

Foreign Relations I, pp. 753-754

60/100/  
219P(89)

駐日アメリカ大使(グー) / Grew / 發日本お務不任(有田)宛  
抜萃

第一四七四號

東京

一九四〇年一月六日

閣下

支那汕頭、所謂善後處理本員會、稅務局、閣下と恐らく御  
存心、如く日本政府、出元機關、支援に依るべきに、昨年十月以降  
同港に於ける輸入品に對し課稅ヲナシタリ。

右本員會、一九三九年十一月一日附テ以テ若干、規則ヲ公布シ、此  
方產物ニ五パーセントノ從價稅及整理稅ヲ負擔セザル輸入品に對  
シ、一〇パーセントノ從價稅ヲ徵集スル旨ヲ聲明セリ。又汕頭ニ流  
入スル郵便小荷物に對シ、四パーセントノ從價稅徵集ヲ開始セリ。  
本官、汕頭善後處理本員會、此、違法且不當行為ヲ抗議ス  
ベシ、我が政府ヨリ訓練ヲ受テ居ルモノナリ。

外交關係 I

五三頁ヨリ 五四頁

E. # 1002

Doc. No. 2192 (62)

Br. Ex. 100

THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN TOKYO TO THE JAPANESE  
MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PRO TIBERIA

Excerpt.

In view of the aggravation of this situation, the Ambassador has been instructed to approach the Imperial Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to point out emphatically that the long-continued and unlawful interference by Japanese armed forces and their agencies with the movement of American citizens and of American-owned merchandise at Tientsin has been the subject of repeated conversations between American and Japanese officials, but without cessation of such interferences.

TOKYO, April 22, 1940.

Foreign Relations I, p. 672 at  
p. 620.

80/002  
2/19/D (68)

日本、アメリカ大使館  
日本、外務省へ  
観書  
抄萃

此、状勢、激化、鑑、大使、日本帝國外務省、掛合、日本、  
武装軍及、代理、依、天津、於、アメリカ市民及、アメリカ、  
有、商品、動、對、長期的且非合法的、干渉、日本、  
アメリカ、役人間、繰返、サ、會話、話、題、ア、然、カ  
ル、干渉、中止、ハ、リス、ア、リ、タ、事、ヲ、強調、シ、指摘、ス、ル、ヤ、ウ、ニ、指  
図、サ、ス

昭和十五年(一九四〇年)四月二十八日

東京

外交関係 I

六六頁、六八頁

Q# 1003

Doc. No. 2383 A

Page 1.

Letter from Craigie to Arita dated 15 June 1939

BRITISH EMBASSY  
TOKYO.  
15th June, 1939

Immediate

My dear Minister,

With reference to our conversation yesterday I am sorry to say that I have now received news from His Majesty's Consul-General at Tientsin indicating that the military restrictions now being imposed on communications with the British Concession are being applied in such a way as to constitute definite and grave anti-British discrimination. According to this report all British subjects are being held up for from one-half to one hour and rigorously searched on entering and leaving the Concession in the same manner as, and together with, all Chinese. Other foreigners are being allowed to pass without stoppage or examination. It further appears that some British subjects, including military in uniform, have been refused exit.

By no process of reasoning can such discrimination against British subjects be justified by the Japanese authorities on the plea either of self-defence or in connection with the case of the four Chinese which we discussed yesterday. I cannot believe that such action has the authority or even the approval of the Japanese Government and I must therefore ask Your Excellency to be good enough to arrange for instructions to be despatch to the proper Japanese authorities in Tientsin to ensure that every form of discrimination against British subjects is at once discontinued.

The matter being, as you will see, very urgent, I should be most grateful if Your Excellency would, if possible, let me have a reply to this letter today in order that I may give His Majesty's Government precise information as to the attitude of the Japanese Government in the matter.

Believe me.

my dear Minister

Yours very sincerely,

(signed) R. L. Craigie.

His Excellency  
Mr. Hachiro Arita,  
His Imperial Japanese Majesty's  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Letter from Craigie to Arita, dated 25 June 1939.

BRITISH EMBASSY  
TOKYO.  
June 25th, 1939

Your Excellency,

Under instructions from His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom and New Zealand, I have the honour to bring to Your Excellency's notice a case of gross indignity inflicted on the 23rd instant by agents of the Japanese Army upon Mr. Cecil Davis, honorary New Zealand Government agent at Tientsin. The facts of the case are set out in the enclosed memorandum and, in accordance with my instructions I desire to protest in the strongest possible manner against this insulting behaviour to an official of the New Zealand Government and a well-known and highly respected member of the British community. This act, following on numerous other cases which I brought to Your Excellency's attention on June 15th, 16th, 18th and 20th, leave no doubt as to the deliberate nature of the provocation now being offered by the local Japanese authorities. A further instance of similar inexcusable behaviour which has since come to my notice is shown in the second enclosure to this note.

2. In an interview with representatives of the press on the 21st instant the official Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that he could state categorically that no indignities as reported were being inflicted on British subjects entering or leaving the blockaded British Municipal Area at Tientsin, and that no discrimination was being made against them. This statement is not in accordance with the facts disclosed in the accompanying documents.

3. Your Excellency has informed me that it is not the intention of the Japanese Government to discriminate against British subjects, to restrict their food supplies or to subject them to abuses and indignities. Nevertheless, these intolerable outrages continue and, as stated by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Japanese Ambassador in London on the 23rd instant, are arousing great indignation in Great Britain. I have accordingly received instructions to request that Your Excellency will ensure that immediate steps are taken to put a stop to these acts and to provide that proper respect be given to the rights under which British subjects are entitled by treaty to live and trade peacefully in China.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed)

His Excellency  
Mr. Hachiro Arita  
His Imperial Japanese Majesty's  
Minister for Foreign Affairs.



Enclosure No. 1 in Note to Minister for Foreign Affairs No. 127

Mr. Cecil Davis, Chairman of the Tientsin Country Club and honorary Agent of the New Zealand Government when he attempted to pass the barriers on the night of June 23rd was told when he reached the inspection shed to take off his clothes. He demurred and stated if that were to be the proceeding he would not pass the barriers at all but would stay the night in the Concession. The inspecting officer promptly struck Davis on the face and told him he would have to go. At this stage three other Japanese who were abetting rouse up and Davis felt in the circumstances he had no alternative but to submit to whatever treatment was given him. He was then made to remove all his clothing except his briefs and spent fifteen minutes in full view of the passers-by including women, during which time his clothing et cetera were subjected to delatory examination. On leaving his passport was left on the ground.

Enclosure No. 2 in Note to Minister for Foreign Affairs No. 127

Substance of a Statement Regarding the Treatment of

Mr. Lord and Mr. House at the barrier at Tientsin.

1. Mr. House and Mr. Lord were placed on a straw mat in a hut in full view of all persons passing through, irrespective of sex or nationality. The Chinese police were detailed to search them whilst one Japanese soldier stood in front to watch. There were four other Japanese sitting around.
2. The Chinese police were considered by Japanese to be too inoffensive in their search so they were slapped in the face and the Japanese took charge. Mr. House and Mr. Lord were forced to remove all their clothing and pile it on the muddy floor and all articles were removed from their pockets and placed likewise on the floor. Mr. House was standing absolutely naked for at least five minutes. Mr. Lord still had briefs on which he was not obliged to remove, but he stood clothed in them alone for the best part of ten minutes.
3. Each article of clothing was inspected and thoroughly examined.
4. After examining the men's clothing the Japanese took their passports, which he had thrown on the floor, and ruffled the hair of both men. He made signs for Mr. Lord to open his mouth and being dissatisfied that it was sufficiently widely open he deliberately took Mr. Lord's passport and forced his mouth open with it. He then made both men stand with their legs apart and examined their crutches. This completed the search except that the Chinese police were made to take hold of Mr. Lord's ears and examine them.
6. The whole proceedings lasted approximately twenty to twenty-five minutes, during which time both men were in full view of the public and women were passing through the hut.

Enclosure No. 3 in Note to Minister for Foreign Affairs . No. 127

Tientsin: Interference with food supplies.

The Japanese military spokesman at Tientsin stated in an interview given to the press on the 19th June that the Japanese had no intention of stopping foodstuffs entering the Concession as such a prohibition would be most inhuman. In connexion with this statement the following facts were noted:-

1. The Japanese authorities have turned back boats bringing food up the river for the British Concession.

2. On the 19th June a "Domei" report from Tientsin stated that "three trucks loaded with fresh vegetables were admitted yesterday to the French Concession to ease the vegetable famine there". An arrangement was consequently made by the French authorities with the Japanese authorities that normal supplies should be brought into the French Concession by French Military lorries and the existence of this arrangement was confirmed by a "Domei" report appearing in Tientsin on the 23rd June. Both these reports of special arrangements with the French authorities are admissions that food supplies entering the British Concession are subject at least to interference and obstruction.

3. As a direct result of the Japanese measures perishable foodstuffs are very short in the British Concession. For example it is understood that on the 21st June 10 per cent of the usual quantities of vegetables were available in the Concessions, while no ice was available to the British market at all.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. 2383 A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kōru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 8 pages, dated June, 1939, and described as follows: Proposal presented by the British Ambassador to Tokyo to Japanese Foreign Minister ARITA, on June 15, June 25, 1939, regarding the British Concession in Tientsin.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): \_\_\_\_\_

Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this

23rd day of Sept. 1946

/s/ K. Hayashi

Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Chief, Archives Section  
Official Capacity

SEAL

C E R T I F I C A T E

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Lersh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

25 day of Sept., 1946

/s/ Richard H. Lersh

Witness: /s/ T/4 Toguchi

Investigation Division I.P.S.  
Official Capacity

EQ # 1004

Doc. No. 219P (90)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 125

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE  
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (ARITA)

Excerpts.

No. 1498

The American Ambassador presents his compliments to His Excellency the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs and has the honor to inform Mr. Arita that the Japanese naval authorities in South China refuse to permit American oil companies to ship kerosene to the Hanhoi District, near Canton, which contains the important city of Fatsan.

. . . . .

Mr. Grew is desired by his Government to emphasize to Mr. Arita that the restrictions imposed by the Japanese Navy on the oil companies not only constitute an unwarrantable interference with the legitimate activities of American citizens but prejudice the repeated assurances of the Japanese Government that American rights and interests in China will be respected . . .

TOKYO, March 20, 1940.

Foreign Relations I, p. 860

44-1005

641005

641004

219P(90)

45

△

駐日米國大使(ブル)GRENより日本外務大臣(有田)宛に  
たる書翰

校萃

一四九八號

(敬啓表)

米國大使は日本外務大臣閣下に祝辭を呈し、有田氏に南支に  
於ける日本海軍當局がアメリカ油會社に佛山の如き重要都市  
の存在する廣東附近のミネイ地に燈油を輸送する許可  
を拒絶し居ることも申しお置まなく候。

\* \* \* \* \*

ブル(GREN)は本國政府の懇請に依り、日本海軍がア  
メリカ油會社に課したる束縛は、米國市民の合法的活動に  
對する不當なる干渉なるのみならず、支那に於ける米國の權  
益を尊重するといふ日本政府の屢次行へる保證と矛盾  
せるものなることも有田氏に力説可致候。

一九四〇年、昭和十五年三月二十日、東京に於て

外國關係二八六〇頁

6-10-05

Doc. No. 219F (91)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 126

THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN JAPAN TO THE JAPANESE  
MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AIDE-MEMOIRE

Excerpts.

The Japanese Government will recall the repeated representations of the Government of the United States in regard to the discriminatory treatment accorded American trade in North China as compared with treatment accorded Japanese trade as result of the control exercised by the Japanese-sponsored authorities there over the exchange accrued from exports and thus indirectly over imports. The Government of the United States is not aware that there has been any amelioration of the situation thus complained of. It is now learned that the Japanese Government-controlled authorities in North China have established full exchange control over imports as well as over shipments from Central and South China thus completing their control over the trade of the area.

. . . . .

The Japanese Government has heretofore declared its intention to uphold the principle of equality of treatment in China. The notice issued by the Superintendent of Customs at Tientsin in connection with the new regulations specifically exempts imports from Japan or Manchuria from the application of those regulations and thus publicly advertises that the regulations are discriminatory.

. . . . .

TOKYO, July 15, 1940.

Foreign Relations I, p. 361

6-10-05



△

501005  
2/19 p (91)

駐日米領事館より日本外務省へ  
補助覚書

抜萃

日本政府、輸出ヨリ生じタル為替ニ對シ延テ間接ニ輸入ニ對シ日本  
支援ノ北支ノ官憲ニ依リ実施セラルル管理、結果トシテ日本項目ニ  
對シ待遇ニ比シ北支ニ於ケル對米貿易ニ對シ差別的待遇ニ関ス  
合衆國政府、再三申入テ記憶スル事ナリ。合衆國政府、斯ク抗議  
ノ對照トシタル此局面何等改善ナリシヲ知ラザルモ、北支ニ於  
テ日本支援下ノ官憲、中南支ヨリ出荷ニ對シ同様輸入ニ對シ  
テモ全面ニ為替管理ヲ制定スル事トシテ同地域ノ貿易管理ヲ完成  
スル事ハ現ニ報セラレ居ル所ナリ。

.....

日本政府、従来、支那ニ於テ平等ノ原則ヲ支持スル其意圖ヲ聲  
明シ居ル所ナリ

天津税関長ニ依リ發せラルル新規則ニ関スル告示ハ  
特ニ日本ニ滿洲ヨリ輸入ヲ該規則、適用ヨリ除外スル旨ニ言  
該規則ハ差別的ニ此事ヲ公然表明シ居ル所ナリ

一九四〇年七月五日 (東京)

外交關係本一冊六八三頁



- 1383-B (15), consisting of 3 pages, in original Japanese, being Telegram NO.UR. to MATSUOKA, dated May 15, 1941, No. 310.
- 1383-B (16), consisting of 5 pages in original Japanese, being gist of instructions of the General Government dated May 17, 1941.
- 1383-B (17), consisting of 2 pages in original Japanese, being Telegram to MATSUOKA from MIKAGIETSU, 19 May 1941, No. 367.
- 1383-B (18), consisting of 24 pages in original Japanese, being Telegram OMIYA to MATSUOKA, 20 May 1941, No. 567.
- 1383-B (19), consisting of 5 pages in original Japanese, being Summary of Development, Negotiations with Nippon-American Understanding Plan, dated May 20, 1941.
- 1383-B (20), consisting of 1 page in original Japanese, being Telegram 575 from OMIYA to Foreign Minister, dated May 21, 1941.
- 1383-B (21), consisting of 4 pages in original Japanese, being Conversation of the Foreign Minister published in the Morning Post of 31 May 1941.
- 1383-B (22), consisting of 1 page in original Japanese, being Telegram NO.UR. to MATSUOKA, No. 371, dated June 6, 1941.
- 1383-B (23), consisting of 7 pages in original Japanese, being Telegram dated June 8, 1941, from NO.UR. to MATSUOKA.
- 1383-B (24), consisting of 2 pages in original Japanese, being Telegram NO.UR. to MATSUOKA, No. 384, dated June 9, 1941.
- 1383-B (25), consisting of 15 pages in part Japanese and part English, Telegram dated June 9, 1941, MATSUOKA from NO.UR., No. 373.
- 1383-B (26), consisting of 3 pages, original Japanese, Telegram dated June 9, 1941, NO.UR. to MATSUOKA, No. 379.
- 1383-B (27), consisting of 7 pages in original Japanese, Telegram 280-1, NO.UR. to MATSUOKA, dated June 10, 1941.
- 1383-B (28), consisting of 2 pages, original Japanese, Telegram 380-3-2, NO.UR. to MATSUOKA, dated June 10, 1941.
- 1383-B (29), consisting of 2 pages, original Japanese, Telegram 405, dated June 17, 1941, NO.UR. to MATSUOKA.
- 1383-B (30), consisting of 18 pages, original Japanese, Telegram 234, dated April 17, 1941, NO.UR. to KOIYO.
- 1383-B (31), consisting of 15 pages, original Japanese, Chief Amendments on the Japanese Draft by U. S. ...
- 1383-B (32), consisting of 9 pages, original Japanese, Draft of Understanding Between the two countries.
- 1383-B (33), consisting of 17 pages, original Japanese, Oral Statement of Mr. Hull, June 21, 1941.

- 1383-B (34), consisting of 9 pages, original Japanese, Counter Draft of the United States, conveyed through Japanese Ambassador June 22, 1941.
- 1383-B (35), consisting of 2 pages, original Japanese, Statement Secretary of State to Japanese Ambassador.
- 1383-B (36), consisting of 3 pages, original Japanese, Statement of Japanese Ambassador to Secretary Hill.
- 1383-B (37), consisting of 2 pages, original Japanese, Telegram No. 423, from Ambassador NOMURA to MATSUOKA, dated June 23, 1941.
- 1383-B (38), consisting of 10 pages, original Japanese, Telegram No. 424, from NOMURA to MATSUOKA, June 23, 1941.
- 1383-B (39), consisting of 5 pages original Japanese, Telegram 425, dated June 23, 1941, NOMURA to MATSUOKA.
- 1383-B (40), consisting of 15 pages, original Japanese, American Counter Proposal for Settlement.
- 1383-B (41), consisting of 7 pages, original Japanese, Telegram No. \_\_\_ dated June 29 1941, NOMURA to MATSUOKA.
- 1383-B (42), consisting of 23 pages, original Japanese, Japanese Amendment to draft, dated July 15, 1941.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this  
11th day of Oct. 1946.

Nagabumi Ogo /s/  
 Signature of Official

SLL

WITNESS: T. Sato /s/

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, John A. Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above-described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
11 day of October, 1946.

/s/ J. A. Curtis 2d Lt.  
 NAME

WITNESS: K. Miller

Investigator  
 OFFICIAL C.P. CITY

Doc. No. 1383B (1)

page 1

Top Secret

Economic Policy which should be taken in connection with  
Diplomacy towards U. S. A.

March 3, 1940

- I. Ever since the outbreak of the Incident, the attitude of the U. S. has been to maintain the body of the Nine-Power Treaty and basing her Far East policies upon it, and to absolutely repudiate the establishment of the New Order in East Asia. Taking advantage of the abolition of the Commercial and Navigation Treaty, the high-handed attitude of the U. S. seems to be getting stronger. Recently America laid a "moral embargo" on aviation-oil refining machine, aluminum and molybdenum. The drafts of laws (for example, the PITTMAN proposal) regarding the embargo of war materials for Japan, which was under discussion in the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, was reported to be temporarily postponed. We cannot say when it will be discussed again. On the other hand, we cannot ignore the movement of "moral embargo" against Japan among civilian organizations. According to future situations, the above-mentioned draft of embargo law may be passed, or perhaps moral embargo measures may be carried out.
- II. The internal reason why the Japanese Government could not assume a resolute attitude against America was due to the intense reliance of Japan upon America for acquiring resources necessary for carrying out the divine war.

The American pressure against Japan, however, will become heavier as long as she realizes the reliance of Japan upon her. By taking advantage of the absence of a treaty, America will probably intensify the pressure by gradually broadening the scope of the embargo or perhaps by showing "gestures" of broadening the scope of embargo on all resources necessary for prosecuting the divine war. As long as Japan doesn't get away from the economic reliance upon America, the insincere determination of Japan against America has no positive effect. Therefore, the most urgent measure which Japan should take is the policy of establishing an economic system not threatened by the attitude of the U. S., by eliminating the extreme reliance upon America as at present. There is no doubt that the establishment of such a system itself, has a great effect in making America reconsider the matter.

III. In case the U. S. imposes a moral or legal embargo of the materials which Japan imports from the U. S., Japan will feel the greatest need of scrap iron, petroleum (especially aviation gasoline), electrical copper, molybdenum, vanadium and machine tools. In regards to these materials, we will do our utmost to plan the elimination of reliance upon the U. S. as soon as possible and take the measures listed in the following paragraphs. Although our country imports a great deal of raw cotton from America, America will not dare to forbid the export of it by considering the situation of the American farmers. Even if the embargo is carried out, we will not feel too much difficulty because we will be increasing the amount of purchase of raw cotton from Brazil, Peru, Iran, etc.

1. Scrap Iron.

Concerning manufacturing of iron, we will endeavor to perfect at all costs the method of manufacturing iron from ore so as to be independent from scrap iron (annual amount about 2,000,000 tons) imported from America at present. We will manage to supply our demand with about 1,000,000 tons of domestic product and scrap iron imported from the Straits Settlements, India, Australia, China, etc. (about 300,000 tons can be imported). Note: When America lays embargo, it is hard to import scrap iron by way of a third power. Therefore, we should not expect upon such temporizing measures.

2. Petroleum.

Concerning petroleum, we shall plan on one hand to import it from a third power besides America, and, on the other hand, we will make a plan and carry it out to make rapid expansion in the production of artificial petroleum by reexamining fundamentally the plan of production expansion of artificial petroleum.

Concerning the amount of imported petroleum, we can almost secure the present amount by so negotiating with third powers such as "Mexico," "Arabia," "Iran," "Venezuela," "Netherlands Indies," "Rumania," etc.

The only problem is the "gasoline" for aviation (crude and refined oil) for which we have been exclusively dependent on America. Concerning this matter, we will accomplish refinery plants of "gasoline" for aviation and study method which enables us to refine "gasoline" for aviation from any kind of crude oil, by devoting all wisdom of science of Japan to it, and at the same time, we will plan to import crude oil of high quality from "Venezuela" and others.

### 3. Electrolytic Copper.

At present about half of the domestic demands for electrolytic copper is imported from America, and the other half is supplied by domestic production, but, judging from the attitude of Canada, it is almost impossible to import the amount now imported from America from Canada. Therefore, we shall produce electrolytic copper by expanding largely the equipments of manufacturing the copper in Japan, and by importing a large amount of copper ore from Peru, Chile, etc., and for this purpose, we must consider the expansion of electric power and ships.

### 4. Molybdeum and Vanadium.

These two are necessary for manufacturing 'special steel', but we shall eagerly study to change the method of manufacturing special steel to "tungsten basis" and try to largely decrease demands for "molybdeum" and "vanadium" by using "tungsten" produced in Korea and South China.

5. Concerning machine tools, we have been dependent on America and Germany, but at present, when we cannot expect much of Germany, the amount dependent on America will be increased more and more, but taking it into consideration that America will not export them to us in the near future, we must make up our mind to do without America and take measures to gratify internal demands by improving and expanding domestic production.

6. Any other materials than scrap iron, petroleum, electrolytic copper, "molybdeum", "vanadium" and machine tools that may be subject to "embargo". Therefore, regarding the materials highly dependent upon America some suitable measures must be taken by following the examples from (1) to (5).

IV. It is easily imagined that in order to carry out No.3 which is mentioned above, a great deal of funds (material) is necessary. And so the fund is to be worked out by turning military funds temporarily. Materially speaking, the rationalization of the fund for the China Incident must be considered, and at the same time, the "Expansion Plan for military equipments against the Soviets" must be contented, for the time being, with the equipments not regrettable for the defense against the Soviets. All the fund and material thus spared should exclusively be spent to expand production so as to get rid of the economic condition now dependent on America. Furthermore, the present 'production expansion plan' must fundamentally be revised according to the aforesaid purport. "Real expansion of production is the mother of consolidation of military equipments." Accordingly, it is clear that, by waiting patiently for several years according to the aforesaid principle, the Expansion Plan of the military equipments will be carried out much easier.

V. In order to carry out the above-mentioned policy thoroughly, it is necessary to synthesize and consolidate the organism of 'internal economic control.' Fundamentally speaking, it is all the more necessary to turn the motive of enterprise from the pursuit of profit to the welfare of our nation. Outside our country we should try to consolidate more the intimate relationship between Japan, Manchukuo and China, and at the same time to perfect measures to bring the southern countries in our economic sphere. As for the temporary adjustment of the relation with the Soviets, we have to make much more effort to promote it.

VI. The reason why the Far Eastern Policy of the "Roosevelt regime" is supported by the public opinion of America is that the diplomacy of his regime is attaining or carrying out what is intended by America without danger of involving her in a war, and as long as Japan does not get rid of such economic dependence upon America as at present, it is necessarily sure that such a policy as that of "Roosevelt regime" will be preponderant. But if Japan earnestly tries to find out measures to get rid of the economic dependence upon America, especially the dependence of those resources which are now the object of embargo towards Japan, we shall no longer be threatened by the embargo of America towards Japan. We will strive to secure such situation as to give us firm resolution towards America, and when we are able to hold a resolution and the counter-measure to say that the legal or moral embargo against Japan can be taken as the declaration against Japan, not only the business men who have had dealings with Japan but also isolationists and learned people will, for the first time, recognize that such a diplomatic policy as of "Roosevelt regime" may lead America to war, and those will increase people one after another who hope for "avoidance of war" rather than "isolation of invader." Then the embargo of sanction towards Japan will be dissolved entirely by being opposed by the public opinion.



W/1007  
Doc/383 B(1)

秘

對米外交之國際之採ルべき經濟政策  
(皇紀二六。三三)

一 事變發生以來米國ハ終始九國條約體制、維持ヲ極東  
政策、根幹トシ帝國、東亞新秩序建設ヲ全面的ニ否  
認スル、態度ヲ執リ來リタル如通商航海條約廢棄  
ヲ契機トシ米國、高壓的態度ハ層強化、徴アリ  
即チ最近ニ至リ航空用油精製機械並ニアルミニウム  
「モリブデン」ニ對スル道義的禁輸、舉ニ出テ又上院外交  
委員會ニ於テ審議中ナリシ對日軍需品輸出禁止ヲ  
目的トスル法案(例ハ「ピットマ」之案)ハ一時審議延期ヲ  
見タル日報セラレ居ルカ何時又審議開始、運上ルヤモ  
知ラズ他面民間團體、對日道義的禁輸運動モ亦  
輕視スヘカラズ今後、情勢如何ニヨリテ八成、右ノ如キ  
禁輸案、通過又ハ道義的禁輸措置、實施ヲ見ルヤ  
モ因ラレサル趨勢アリ

No.1

二 右ノ如キ米國、挑戰的態度ニ對シ從來帝國政府力斷乎  
タル態度ヲ以テ反駁シ得サリシ國內的要因ハ聖戰遂行ニ  
必要ナル物資獲得、クモ強クニ米國ニ依存シ居リタルタメ  
ナリ。然レ米國ハ帝國、對米依存關係ヲ知ルシ居ル限、  
無條件狀態ヲ利用シ聖戰遂行ニ必要ナル個々ノ物資  
ニ付漸次禁輸、範圍ヲ擴大シ又ハ擴大セトシ、至ラズ  
ヲ示シツツ對日重圧ヲ加重シ來ルハ帝國ノ經濟的對米  
依存狀態ヲ脱却セサル限、單ニ口先ニシテ對米強硬  
決意ヲ表明スルモ其、迫力極メテ乏シキヲ以テ此際

我國トシテハ現状、如キ高交、対米依存關係ヲ一日元  
速カニ解消シ米國ノ態度ニ留意カサレサル經濟体制ヲ  
樹立スル方策ニ邁進スルコトヲ以テ最モ急務トス右ノ如キ  
態度ヲ採用スルコト自体カ米國ヲシテ反省セシムル上ニ  
效果アルヘキハ疑フ容レサル所ナルヘシ

三、我カ國カ米國ヨリ輸入シ居ル物資中、米國カ道義的  
又ハ立法的禁輸ヲ爲シタル際ニ困難ヲ感スヘキ物資  
ノ主要ナルモノハ屑鐵、石油（特ニ航空用ガソリン）電氣銅  
「モリブデン」、「バナヂウム」及工作機械等ナルカ此等ニ對  
シテハ一日元早ク対米依存狀態ノ脱却ヲ計ル爲メ  
力ヲ擧ケテ在ノ措置ヲ講ズルモノトス尚我カ國カ米國  
ヨリ多量ノ棉花ヲ輸入シ居ルモノ之ニ付テハ先カ米國  
農民ノ立場ヲ考慮シ到底禁輸ヲ爲シ得サルヘク  
假ニ禁輸ヲスルモ我國トシテハ「ブラジル」、「ペルー」、「インド」  
等ノ棉花買付ヲ増額スルコトニ依リ尤程困難ヲ感セ  
サルヘシ

No. 2

Doc / 383 B (1)

(一) 屑鉄

製鉄業ニ関シテ不難ヲ廢シテ鑛石法設備、充實ニ努力シ現在米國ヨリ輸入シ居ル屑鉄(年額約二百萬噸程)度々全ク當ニセス國內生産、約百萬噸並ニ海峽植民地印度、濠洲、支那等ニヨリ輸入シ得ヘキ屑鉄(約三十萬噸程度可能ナルニシ)ヲ以テ間ニ合セ得ルカ如ク措置スルモノトス。

備考、米國カ「エムバーゴ」ヲ行ヒタル際其ノ屑鉄ヲ第三國經由ニテ入ルコトハ實際問題トシテ極大ニ困難ナルヲ以テ寧ロ斯カル姑息ナル手段ニハ多ク期待セサルモノトス。

(二) 石油

石油ニ関シテハ一方ニ於テ米國以外、第三國ヨリ輸入スルコトヲ計ルト共ニ他方ニ於テ人造石油ニ関スル現在、生産力擴充計畫ヲ根本的ニ再檢討シ人造石油、飛躍的増産計畫ヲ立案實行ス(キモノトス)。

輸入石油、數量ニ付テハ米國ヨリ、輸入杜絶スルモ第三國ニ對スル工作如何ニ依リテハ「メキシコ」、「アラビヤ」、「インドネシア」蘭領印度、羅馬尼等ヨリ輸入スルコトニ依リ従来、輸入數量程度ハ一應確保シ得ヘシ唯問題トナルハ従来專ラ米國ニ依存シ居リタル航空機ハソリシ原油及精製油ニカニ関シテ「アエゾエ」其他ノ高價原油、輸入ヲ計ルト共ニ速カニ航空機ハソリシ精製設備ヲ完成ニ當テ國科學ノ全智ヲ傾ケテ原油、種類ヲ問ハズ航空機ハソリシ精製ヲ可能ナラシムル方法ヲ研究ス(キモノトス)。

No. 3

1383B(1)

(三) 電気銅

電気銅ハ現在国内需要、約半分ヲ米國ヨリ輸入シ殊リ、  
半分ハ大体国内生産ヲ以テ賄ヒ居ル處米國ヨリ輸入ノ分ヲ  
加奈肥等ニ振り替フルコトモ現在ノ加奈肥ノ態度ニ徴シ先ツ  
不可能ナルヲ以テ国内、電気銅製造設備ヲ大擴張シ秘魯  
及智利等ヨリ多量ノ銅鑛ヲ輸入シテ之ヲ以テ電気銅ヲ製  
造スルコトトスヘク此レカ爲ニハ電力ノ擴充及充分ナル配給ヲ考  
慮スルノ要アリ

(四) モリブデン及バナテニウム

右ハ何レモ特殊鋼ノ製造ニ必要ナル處然レ國特殊鋼ノ製法  
ヲタンクステンベニウムニ改ムルコトヲ銳意研究シ朝鮮及南  
支那生産ノタンクステンヲ用ヒルコトニ依リ「モリブデン」及  
「バナテニウム」ノ需要ヲ激減セシムル様努力スルモノトス

(五) 工作機械ニ付テハ從來米國及獨逸ニ依存シ居リ獨逸ヨリ、  
輸入ニ大ナル期待ヲ持テ得サル今日ニ於テハ米國ニ對スル依存  
量益々増大スル次第ナルカ之ニ對シテハ米國ト云フモノカ無  
クナルモノト覺悟シ極力国内生産ヲ改良増産シテ同ニ合ス様  
措置スルモノトス。

(六) 屑鐵、石油、電気銅、モリブデン、「バナテニウム」及工作機  
械以外ノ物資ニテ「エムバーゴ」ノ危険アリ且對米依存  
關係高度ノモノハ凡テ右(一)乃至(五)ニ準シテ適當ナル措置ヲ  
講スルモノトス

20.4



7

No. 5

1383B(1)

No. 6

五、上述ノ方策ヲ更ニ徹底セムカ爲ニ、内ニ於テハ國內經濟統  
 制ヲ層有機的ニ綜合強化シ更ニ根本的ニ利國本位ノ企業精神ヲ國  
 家本位ノ企業精神ニ向上セシムルニ必要トシ、外ニ於テハ日滿支ノ緊密  
 ナル關係ヲ強化シ同時ニ南洋諸國ヲ經濟圈ニ取込ム爲メ、施  
 策ヲ充實シ且數國トシテ的國交調整ヲ進捗セシムルニ一段ノ努

力ヲ拂フコト肝要ナリ

六、目下ハローズヴェルト政權ノ極東政策ハ美國輿論一般ノ支持ヲ受ケ  
 ツルハルニ政權ノ外交力何等米國ノ戰爭ニ捲込ム危險ナク米國  
 ノ企圖スルトコロヲ達成セシメ居ルヲトテハ處帝國ニテ現狀ノ如  
 キ對米依存經濟ヲ脱却セサル限ハ將來ト雖ハルニ政權ノ如キ  
 政策力ノ優勢ナルキハ必然ナルニ然ルニ若シ帝國於テ真劍  
 ニ對米依存經濟脱却特ニ不取敢目下對日輸出禁止ノ對象トナリ居  
 物質ノ對米依存脱却ノタメノ方途ヲ講究シ最早米國ノ對日禁輸  
 措置ニ一祀憂スルヲ止メ毅然タル態度ヲ以テ之ニ臨ミ得ルカ如キ事  
 態ヲ速カニ招来スル務努力スルヲ立派的又ハ道義的禁輸措  
 置ハ之ヲ對日宣戰ト見做スモノナリトノ決意ト對策トヲ有スルニ  
 至ラハ從來本邦ト取引關係アリタル業者ハ固ヨリ米國孤立主義  
 者ニ有識者ノ陣營ハ茲ニ初メテハルニ政權ノ如キ外交政策力ハ  
 國ヲ戰爭ニ導ク虞アリトノ攻撃ヲ武器ヲ有スルニ至リ  
 侵略者ノ隔絶ニヨリモ寧ニ戰爭回避ヲ希望スル者續出  
 スルニ至ルヘク最早對日軍需品禁輸措置輿論ノ反對ニ  
 依リ全ク解消スルニ至ルニ

Ex 1008

TOP SECRET

A Copy of Instruction Sent  
to Ambassador Nomuro

/Handed to Ambassador NOMURA on January 22nd/

1. Unless Japan is bold enough to make great changes in national policies, it is impossible for her to seek American understanding for maintenance of peace in the Pacific and to cooperate with her for the conquest /T.N. Japanese character here used is either to conquer or subjugate but it must be a mistake of to restore or return, both of which is pronounced identically/ of world peace.

2. If the present situation develops as it is, no one can guarantee that in the end the U.S.A. may join the European War or declare war on Japan.

3. If such a thing would happen the result will be a terrible world war with several times more damage than that of the last world war and perhaps will mean the downfall of modern civilization.

4. If there should be no means of finding direct and mutual understanding and cooperation between Japan and the U.S.A., then Japan has to join hands with countries other than Great Britain and the U.S.A. even though these may feel some threat and pressure. It is merely because we have to prevent them from declaring war on Japan or participating in the European War. This is not only for the self protection of Japan but also for the survival of all human being.

5. Having decided that there was no other alternative left for the defense of our country or to prevent the world war we have decided to contract /T.N. the Japanese character used here for contract is obviously a mistake for it is the character for "to correct". The word to join or to contract has the same pronunciation but a different character/ alliance with Germany and Italy.

/Page 2/

6. Since we joined the alliance we must hereafter conform our foreign policy as a member of the Axis, in the same way as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of the past years was carried out.

7. If the three powers forming the Alliance regard that a third country, which is prescribed under the third article of the Tripartite Alliance deliver an attack, Japan, as a matter of course, must be faithful to the Alliance.



There can be no room for a doubt on this point. However, when Japan decides on an important matter, it goes without saying that she will deliberate carefully in a Cabinet council.

8. The conduct of the Japanese in China is at present regarded as being illegal, unjust or aggressive, but it is no more than a temporary phenomenon. Japan will finally carry out equal and reciprocal treaties with China. In the not distant future Japan will fulfil her traditional idea of HAKKO ICHIU /T.N. the eight directions of the world under one roof/ laid down since her foundation.

9. The Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere will be built on this great principle, the "HAKKO ICHIU", and my motto is "no conquest, no oppression, and no exploitation". In short our desire is to build a world of international neighbourhood and mutual assistance in Greater East Asia, which will set an example to the whole world.

10. Putting aside such an ideal, and taking up questions of daily affairs, our country /T.N. JAPAN/ is finding it necessary to find a way to settle the problems of both self-supporting and self-sufficiency in Greater East Asia. Are these ideals or desires of Japan unjust and unreasonable, when one considers the position of the U.S.A., dominating as she does the whole Western hemisphere, besides extending her influence over both the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans? Surely the U.S.A. can allow thus much to Japan? What we are thinking about is not exclusion of foreigners. It is well for the U.S.A. to come over and cooperate in the development of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Their fear of losing what they need in the shape of rubber and tin is ridiculous.

Please make the necessary efforts to make the President of the U.S.A., the Secretary of States and other prominent people of the U.S.A. appreciate thoroughly the points mentioned above as well as the remarks I made while talking before the members of the America-Japan Society recently and my Diet speech on foreign policy.

The 16th year of Showa, January 22nd  
/January 22nd, 1939/

His Excellency the Envoy Extra-ordinary and  
Ambassador Plenipotentiary NOMURA

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA

/Note/

The Foreign Minister gave his instruction to the Ambassador when they met just before Nomura's departure, saying that JAPAN has made a definite resolution to stand against the U.S.A. if she enters the war, and this attitude would act as a check for the latter participating in the war. The Ambassador expressed his agreement.



野村大使宛訓令寫

(二月二十二日野村大使ニ付テ)

秘極 Doc. 1383 B(2)

一 我國策ヲ相當思ヒ切リテ變更スルニ非サルニテ了解ヲ付テ以テ太平洋上ノ和平ヲ確保シテ進ニ世界平和克服ノ爲提攜策動スル事所詮不可能也

二 此カモ此儘ニ推移セハ或ハ遂ニ米ノ歐洲參戰若クハ對日開戦ヲ見ルニ至ルナキヲ保シ難シ

三 若シ斯ナル事トモテラハ眞ニ戰慄スルニ至リ世界戦争トシテ其慘禍前大戦ニ幾倍スルニ至リ或ハ遂ニ現代文明ノ没落トナルニ至リ

四 已ニ日米間直接了解提攜ノ途ヲヒトセハ英米以外ノ國ト聯結協力スルニ之ヲ壓迫脅威ニテモ其對日開戦又ハ歐洲參戰ヲ豫防セサル可ラズ且獨ニ皇國自衛ノ爲ニ至リ又實ニ全人類生存ノ爲ナリ

五 我國ヲ守ルニモ將又世界大戦ヲ防グニモ最早此途ヲ取ル外ナシト斷ララルニ爲テ遂ニ日獨伊同盟ヲ訂スルニ至リ

六 苟モ右同盟ヲ訂スル以上祇國ノ外交ノ將來ニ同盟ヲ樞軸トシテ運用サルニ付恰モ往年日英同盟ニ於ケルカ如シ

七 而シテ苟モ三國同盟條約第ニ條ニ規定セル第三國ニ依リ攻撃ヲ發生セリト三國政府ニ於テ認メタルトキハ日本ハ當然同盟ニ忠ナルニ付此點ニ疑ヲ存スヘカラズ日本ハ重大ナル決意ヲナシ付極メテ慎重ナル廟議ヲ遂ク余ノ申述モテイ奉也

No. 1

八 現在日本ノ支那ニ於ケル行動中動モスルニ不審不正若クハ侵略ト見ユルモノアリト雖是一時ノ現象ニシテ我國ノ終局ニ於テ必ズ日支平等互惠ノ主義ヲ實行シ公法ニ守リテ平等國以來傳統的大理想ヲ如實ニスルノ日下ニ至リ

秘極 Doc. 1383 BIRI

九 大東亞共榮圈樹立亦度ニシテ、一統一守ノ大理念ニ因ルモニ  
之ニ no conquest, no oppression, no exploitation 云々、「モット」  
也。要シテ國際的關係互助、天地ヲ先ツ大東亞ニ造出シ以テ世  
界大同ノ範ヲ垂ルニトスルニ在リ

十 斯ナル理想ハ暫ク措キ現實卑近ノ問題トシテ三洲國ハ大東  
亞圈ニ自給自足ノ道ヲ講スルノ必要ニ迫ラレ居リ  
西半球ニ君臨シ更ニ大西洋、兩大洋ニ延ビツアル米國  
ヨリ見テ右日本、理想乃至慾望ヲ不高ナリト稱シ得テ乎  
此位ノ事ハ日本ニ許シテ可ナルニ非カル乎我國、考フル所  
ハ斷リテ排他的ニ非ズ米ヲ來シテ大東亞圈開闢ニ協力ス  
ヘシ其ノ要スル「ゴム、錫等、供給ヲ絶タルヘトスル疑懼、  
如キ笑フニ堪ヘタリ

予、過般日米協會ニ於ケル卓上演說及今般帝國議會ニ  
於ケル外交演說等ニ示シタル所ト併セテ右諸點米大統領  
國務長官始メ米國朝野有力者ニ徹底ヲ期セラシ度

昭和十六年一月二十二日

松岡外相

野村特命全權大使 閣下

(註)

No. 2

尚野村大使出發ニ先ケ同大使ト懇談セル際外相ヨリ米國  
カ參戰スル際ハ日本ハ決然立ツヘトノ毅然タル態度ヲ持  
スルト國國參戰防止ノ爲メ策トシテモ取ルベキ所ナリト  
說示シ同大使ハ之ニ同感ノ意ヲ表シ居リタリ。

Ex. #1009

A Copy of Cable RUNNING Number 4492  
Secret Code  
SHOWA 16 /1941/ Feb. 7  
Sent 7 o'clock  
DIRECTOR OF AMERICAN AFFAIRS

Telegram to Ambassador NOMURA, from Foreign  
Minister MATSUOKA on Feb. 7, 1941

No. 68

I have been endeavouring to answer frankly for the interbellatio at the Diet regarding our attitude and resolution to request America for reconsideration concerning us, and to explain that our national power has not been so much exhausted and enfeebled. Therefore, I beg you, on your arrival there, to endeavour further to explain thoroughly the following points to the President and the influential men both in and out of office to make them fully understand our real intentions.

1. It is the providential mission given to the two countries Japan and America, to save modern civilization from its crisis and to bring peace and prosperity in the Pacific Area, and it is their duty to cooperate for realizing this mission. Upon this belief, Japan expects the development of the friendship between Japan and America. However, unfortunately, the whole nation of America will purposely not understand the real intention of Japan and not a few misconstrue our actions as a threat to America, but this is a serious and dangerous illusion. Japan has a definite resolution with which she will accomplish the established national policy at the risk of the fortunes of our nation. According to reports, there are some people in America who still are opposed secretly to the Tripartite Pact (of course it is natural that there are such elements or people; for in every country such people are to be found), and overestimate the exhaustion of our national power caused by the prolonged China Incident. They presume that if America assumes a firm attitude, she can easily disunite public opinion in Japan, or can make us submit to her. This is really a ridiculous misunderstanding, and we are afraid that such an estimate might bring some unexpected result.

2. The exhaustion of our national power is true to some extent, but it is not so serious as repeatedly propagated in America. Judging from the characteristics of our nation, they will as usual furiously repel pressure from outside, and so if America checks our way on purpose, our whole nation would strengthen its resolution to carry through our national policy by consolidating our union regardless of all sacrifices. If

America were in the circumstances as Japan is at present, the same result would happen, for the character of the American people resembles that of the Japanese. If the American people will just think this over, as a result they will easily understand our mentality. On the contrary, if Japanese people are treated with sympathy and understanding, they will be very thankful, and will sometimes dare to concede and will compromise in any discussion. This is the characteristic of Japanese people that we wish American people to recall in their minds.

3. There may be none in our country who wishes to wage war against America. If, unfortunately Japan and America come to fight, it will certainly be the American people that will initiate the war positively, for America has never opened a war passively.

4. What will America gain by fighting against Japan? Does America desire to conquer Japan and exterminate the YAMATO race? There may be none in America who cherishes such an idea. Even if some may cherish such a dream, it would be absolutely impossible to realize it. Even if America could make Japan surrender, and enforce a cruel treaty upon the Japanese people, that might be comparable with the Versailles Treaty, Japan would break off such fetters or bonds within thirty years. The restoration of Germany is an example. The constitution of Japan is not matched by that of any other country. Japan has always overcome all national difficulties, by virtue of the unbounded grace of the Emperor. There is no doubt that the restoration of Japan will be wonderfully rapid compared with Germany. The Emperor is indeed the eternal source of our national strength. Without understanding this unparalleled constitution, the Japanese nation can never be understood after all. In fine, the war between Japan and America would bring not only ruin upon the two countries, which should always be on friendly terms, but also the downfall of world civilization. America will gain nothing from the war, and calmly thinking, nothing is more absurd than the commencement of war.

5. If Japan and America were to fight each other, the Soviets would certainly move, and if Japan were completely defeated, as America desires, the Soviets would certainly sweep all over China and at once bolshevize the greater half of the Asiatic continent by taking advantage of the circumstances. Does America welcome such an eventuality? If Japan should submit to America, the situation in East Asia would indeed be terribly confused.

6. The diplomacy of our Empire is based upon the great principle of "the World a Home" /T.N. HAKKO ICHIU/ and what

Japan devotes itself to is the establishment of world-peace and the prosperity, and Japan has never had such an intention as to attack America. And so we cannot understand why America is intent on arming against Japan. Japan and America should never be opposed to each other, but cooperate. But the speeches and moves of the statesmen in America against Japan are not only very stimulating, but also they seem to aim at large armaments sufficient to police the world. Such is not only regrettable for peace in the Pacific area, but also not to be recommended for America. I believe that America should not meddle in the "living sphere" of other powers, but be awakened to her original responsibility or mission towards the peace of the world, and devote herself towards breaking the present world crisis, and should promote the welfare of the people in the spirit of mutual assistance and concession of the world.





1383B3

我々進路に阻害を可憐國民の精神益を國籍を強國に  
性で惜み不國策に定遂に其の表意を固く三假り三米國を日本  
上同様ノ環境ニ在リてバクニ我國民は似通シテ米人眞實ナリ  
ニ恐ラリ同結果を生スル米國民は其の理及之ヲ見スル結果ヲ  
ヤスク了解スルニ他國國民ノ同情ト理解トヲ以テ臨ムル  
所ヲ深ク之ヲ多ク其戰場信ニ注シテ高尚ノ感情的ニ讓歩スル  
ヲ敢テ又符號ヲ有スルヲ受テ之レカラズ米國ノ識者ヲモハハ  
此ノ復想列スベキナリ

三 米國ニ對シテ進テ戰爭セト考ル者ハ我國ニ合カズ米事ヲ構ハ  
如ク之ニハ必ズ米國民ヨリ積極的ニ働キカケ用戰スル米國ニ米  
曾テ受身ニテ國戰スル事ナシ

四 米國ハ日本ト戰爭シ米國ニ許ラザルニ中日本ヲ征服シ大和民族ヲ  
絶滅スルニ力ヲ加シ其ヲ抱ケル者米國ニ合カズニ又左様ノ  
夢ヲ三抱キテトシテ絶対實現ノ可能ナリ假リニ日本ヲ屈服セ  
ルニ其ノ條約ニモ比シテ可酷ナル條約ヲ強ヒテトスルニ日本ハ  
恐ラリ三十年ヲ去ルニ此種格ヲ破ルニ其意堅固ニ又復興ノ其  
例ヲ見ヨ日本ハ他國ノ有ルニ其國體ヲ有シ天皇陛下ノ限リテ其後  
威ニ依リ固ク其國體ヲ突破セリ力ハ日本ノ復興ノ復興ノ場合  
ニ此ノ意ヲ急速ニ其國體ヲ破ルニ其意堅固ニ其國體ヲ破ルニ其意堅固ニ  
實ニ我國民ニ力ヲ永遠ノ源泉ナリ此ノ類例ヲ其國體ヲ了解スルニ  
例ニ在リ日本國民ノ理解ニ難ク其日米衝突ノ元來親善關係ニ在  
ルニ其國體ヲ其意堅固ニ其國體ヲ破ルニ其意堅固ニ其國體ヲ破ルニ其意堅固ニ  
其國體ヲ其意堅固ニ其國體ヲ破ルニ其意堅固ニ其國體ヲ破ルニ其意堅固ニ  
其國體ヲ其意堅固ニ其國體ヲ破ルニ其意堅固ニ其國體ヲ破ルニ其意堅固ニ

2

1383B3

五、日米戦争、ソ聯は必ず動ク(之)而シテ假ニ日本カ米國、欲スル如ク全  
敗スルヤ、ソ聯は必ず全支那ヲ蔭捲ク之ヲ赤化シ此勢ニ乘シテ忽  
ク之ヲ東細亞ノ全ヲ赤化ス(之)米國ハ果シテカハ *eventuality*  
ヲ歡迎スルヤ、一モニ日本ニシテ原スル如キ事業、東亞ノ予能ハ實ニ  
戰慄スヘキモノアラシ

六、皇國外交ハ公報一字ノ大體、定テ其調トシ其、經始專念スル所、世  
界ノ平和繁榮ヲ確保スルニ在リ、米國ヲ改數手スルカ如キ意圖ハ勿  
論、毫毛有ラス、米國カ対日軍備減タラハ我カ、理解者ニテ所  
ナリ、日米交渉ニ対立スキニアラスニテ、協調スヘキナリ、然ルニ米國政  
治界最近、対日言動ハ甚シク刺戟的ナルノミナラズ、其目標、恰  
ニ米國ヲシテ全世界ノ警察、高タルニ至ラシムル程度、大軍  
備ヲ整備スルニシト云フニ似タリ、斯ノ如キハ當ニ太平洋中  
和、爲メニ悲シムヘキノミナラズ、米國ノ物ヲ取テカハ所ニシテ  
米國ヲルモ、ハ他列強ノ生活圏ニ干渉スルコトナク、其  
ノ世界平和ニ対スル本然ノ責務、日實ハ互助互讓ノ精神ニ  
依リ、現下危局、打開ト人類福祉ノ増進トニ念及スヘキモノナ  
リト信ス

Doc. No. 219F-69

Br. Ex. 101

PRESS RELEASE ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ON JUNE 13, 1940

Excerpt.

In response to inquiries from correspondents in regard to reports of the bombing of Chungking on June 12, the Secretary of State said that according to information which has reached the Department from official and unofficial sources, Chungking has been extensively bombed on each of several recent days and on June 12 was intensively and indiscriminately bombed by more than one hundred Japanese planes; that casualties of June 12 among the civil populace will probably number several hundred; that various buildings of the American Methodist Mission, including a church, were damaged by concussion;

...

Foreign Relations I, p. 690.

FILE COPY

Dec. No. 21

Br. Ex. 102

RETURN TO ROOM 361

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE  
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MATSUOKA)

Excerpts.

No. 1630

TOKYO, September 13, 1940.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to advise Your Excellency that I have received a report through the American Embassy at Chungking that on August 19, 1940, the Lewis Memorial Church of the Methodist Episcopal Mission in that city, an American institution, was completely destroyed by fire resulting from incendiary bombs during the course of a series of raids upon Chungking by Japanese airplanes.

.....

I must add in this connection, lest it be thought that this case of repeated bombing of the same American property in China is unique, that the instance of multiple Japanese bombings of the same American properties in China have been numerous.

I have the honor to enter a most emphatic protest on behalf of my Government against this renewed attack upon the property of the Methodist Episcopal Mission at Chungking; to request that Your Excellency be good enough to furnish me a prompt report upon this latest flagrant case; to reserve all rights on behalf of the American citizens and property involved; and to point out once more, as I have on many previous occasions to Your Excellency's predecessors, the grave risk to the lives of American citizens in Chungking and in other parts of China entailed by these ruthless Japanese air bombings the damage of which to the property of American nationals alone is sufficient evidence of their indiscriminate character.

.....

Foreign Relations I, pp. 695-696



Doc. No. 220 C (2)

page 1

Br. Ex. 133

PRESS RELEASE ISSUED BY THE JAPANESE EMBASSY ON APRIL  
15, 1940

On being questioned by newspapermen concerning Japan's position with regard to possible involvement of the Netherlands in the European war and its repercussions in the Netherlands East Indies, Foreign Minister Arita replied as follows.

"With the South Seas regions, especially the Netherlands East Indies, Japan is economically bound by an intimate relationship of mutuality in ministering to one another's needs. Similarly, other countries of East Asia maintain close economic relations with these regions. That is to say, Japan, these countries and these regions together are contributing to the prosperity of East Asia through mutual aid and interdependence.

"Should hostilities in Europe be extended to the Netherlands and produce repercussions, as you say, in the Netherlands East Indies, it would not only interfere with the maintenance and furtherance of the above-mentioned relations of economic interdependence and of co-existence and co-prosperity, but would also give rise to an undesirable situation from the standpoint of the peace and stability of East Asia. In view of these considerations, the Japanese Government can not but be deeply concerned over any development accompanying an aggravation of the war in Europe that may affect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies."

Foreign Relations II, p. 281

一九四〇年（昭和十五年）四月十五日 日本大使館  
に上り送せられたる新聞記事解除

2200(2)

歐洲戦争（の）あり得べき和蘭の捲込に關する日本  
の地位と蘭領東印度に於ける其の反響とに關し、新  
聞記者に質問された際、有田外相は次の如く答へた。

「日本は南方海域、殊に蘭領東印度と相互の必需物  
資の供給に於て、親密な相互依存關係に經濟上結び  
ついてゐる。同様に東亞に於ける他の諸國も亦之等地域  
と緊密な經濟的關係を保持してゐる。

即ち日本之等諸國及び之等の地域は共に相互援助  
と相互依存に依り、東亞の繁榮に寄與してゐるものがある。

「歐洲戦亂が若し和蘭にも及び諸國の云ふ如く、蘭領  
東印度に反響を生ずる事にでもなれば、又は單に述  
せる至極的相互依存關係並に共存共榮の維持促進の  
妨げとなるのやならず、亦東亞の平和と安定の見地からし  
て、好ましがらざる事態と惹起する事となる。斯かる  
見地より、日本政府は、蘭領東印度の現状に影響  
を與ふるが如き歐洲に於ける戦争の變化に伴ふか  
なる進展にも深き関心を持たざるを得ない。

外交關係第二卷第二百八十一頁

Doc. No. 220 C (3)

page 1

Br. Ex. 134

PRESS RELEASE ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON  
April 17, 1940

Excerpt.

. . . . .

\*Intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any alteration of their status quo by other than peaceful processes would be prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace, and security not only in the region of the Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area.

\*This conclusion, based on a doctrine which has universal application and for which the United States unequivocally stands, is embodied in notes exchanged on November 30, 1908, between the United States and Japan in which each of the two Governments stated that its policy was directed to the maintenance of the existing status quo in the region of the Pacific Ocean. It is reaffirmed in the notes which the United States, the British Empire, France, and Japan -- as parties to the treaty signed at Washington on December 13, 1921, relating to their insular possessions and their insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean--sent to the Netherlands Government on February 4, 1922, in which each of those Governments declared that 'it is firmly resolved to respect the rights of the Netherlands in relation to their insular possessions in the region of the Pacific Ocean.'\*

. . . . .

Foreign Relations II, p. 281  
at p. 282.



6.10.13

Doc 220c (3)

電報

一九四〇年(昭和十五年)四月十七日國務省發新聞記  
事解釋  
按 按

蘭領印度、内政干渉或、平和的手順ニ依リテ  
領印度、現状變化、即ニ蘭領印度地域、太平洋  
太平洋、安定平和及び安全ヲ言ハル事ニ於テ下  
其、適用ニ普遍性ヲ有スル事ガ出来、アメリカ合衆  
國ガ判然ト支持シ、并ニ主義ニ基キ、此、其、一九〇八年  
(明治四十一年)十一月三十日日米間ニ交換サレタ  
明示スル所ナリ、該覽書ニ於テ兩國政府、夫レ、其、  
政策、太平洋、現状維持ヲ目指ス、ナル事ヲ聲明  
シテ居ル。此、其、一九二一年(大正十年)十二月十三日  
蘭領ニ於テ署名サレタ太平洋方面、島嶼占有並ニ  
島嶼支配權ニ関スル條約、加盟國トシテ、アメリカ合衆國  
大英帝國、佛蘭西及シ日本ガ、一九二二年(大正十一年)二月  
日日和蘭政府ニ送リ、覽書ニ、下再確認サレタ事ニ  
此、覽書、中ニ前記各國政府、太平洋方面、島嶼占  
有ニ関シテ和蘭、權利ヲ尊重スル事ニ留意セリ。上圖  
ニシテ居ル。

外交關係ニ對シテ、其ノ一、及ニ其ノ二、ニ關

CX # 1044

Doc. No. 220 C (4)

page 1.

Br. Ex. 135

MEMORANDUM BY THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW)

(TOKYO.) June 10, 1940

Excerpt

.....

After his opening remark above referred to, the Minister had commented that the bulk of the United States fleet remains in Hawaiian waters. My reply was that Hawaii is American territory and that one of our most important naval ports is that of Pearl Harbor, and I went on to say that the fact that our fleet remains in Hawaiian waters represents no threat whatsoever to Japan. The Minister, however, replied that the continued stay of our fleet in those waters constitutes an implied suspicion of the intentions of Japan vis-a-vis the Netherlands East Indies and the South Seas, and he desired categorically to assert that Japan entertains no territorial ambitions. Quite to the contrary, he added, Japan is exerting her best efforts to promote good relations with her neighbors, and he cited as an example that a non-aggression pact is to be signed within a few days with Thailand. The emphasis which the Minister placed upon this matter is an indication of the important effect on Japanese consciousness of the stay of our naval forces in Hawaii.

.....

Foreign Relation II, p. 67  
at p. 69

Ex/014  
Doc. 220 C (4)

日本駐在大使(クルー)ニヨル書

(東京) 一九四〇年/昭和十五年/六月十日

抜萃

x x x x

先ニ述べた如く、後テ、大臣、米國艦隊、本軍が布哇  
 海域ニ留ラテキルト述べタ。私、布哇、米國合衆國、領土アリ  
 且ツ我國最重要海軍各港、一ツが真珠湾軍港アルト答  
 辯シタ。而シテ私更ニ我國、艦隊が布哇海域ニ留ラテキルト  
 ヲ事實、何等日本ニ対スル脅威ヲ表スモノデナイト云ツタ。  
 併シテ、大臣、我々艦隊が引籠キ之等海域ニ停泊スル事ハ、  
 南領東印及ビ南海ニ対シテ日本ガ意圖ヲ有スルコトイフ言  
 外、疑惑ヲ生ズルト答ヘ、ソレ彼、日本ガ何等領土的野望  
 ヲ抱懷セサル及テ明確ニ断言シタイト云ツタ。其レ所カ日本  
 ハ隣國ト、友好關係ヲ促進ナセル爲ニ最善、努力ヲ拂ッテ  
 キルト附言シ、其、例トシテ教旨中ニ泰國ト不可侵條約ガ調印  
 サルト云フコトヲ引用シ、此、事ヲ大臣ガ強調シタ事ハ、我が  
 海軍、布哇停泊、日本人、意識ニ重大ノ影響ヲ與ヘキナルコ  
 トヲ示スモノデアッタ。

x x x x

外交關係 II

第六十七乃至第六十九頁

4-1015

1589A-1

電信寫 總務三九三〇 昭和十五年二月十三日後發 主筆

昭和十五年二月十四日前着

有田 外務大臣

光 大使

第二二一號（極秘、信長符號扱）

八日會談ノ際「バ」次官ハ「ハ」外相ガ三十日ハ日英  
同盟訂印ノ記念日ナリト述ベタルハ實ハ偶然ノコトニ  
アラズ「ハ」外相ハ「ランヌダワン」卿ガ等シク（外  
相モ同様）印度總督ヨリ外相トナリ日英同盟ヲ締結シ  
タル経緯ヲ平素研究シテ同卿ニ私淑シ居ルニ依ルモノ  
ニシテ外相ハ實際問題ハ交渉ニ依リ解決シ得ラレザル  
モノナシトノ信念ヲ有シ前回大取ノ際一九一七年戦争  
ノ最高潮ニ達シタル際「ラ」卿ガ獨逸トノ交渉ヲ提議  
シタルガ之等ノ點モ外相ノ研究シタル所ナリ尤モ今回  
ノ戦争ニ於テ今日ノ程度ニテ交渉ヲ考フルコトノ不可  
能ナルハ勿論ナルモ兩者ノ共通點ハ興味アリト評リ居  
タリ何等御参考迄 （了）

1589 A-2

照 明 書

「ワシントン」文書局 第 一 五 八 九 A 號  
外 務 省 第 一 五 八 九 A 號

興 城 及 び 公 正 ニ 關 ス ル 證 明

余、尾 戸 長 春 ハ 余 ガ 下 記 ノ 資 格 ニ 於 テ、即 チ 外 務 省  
文 書 課 長 代 理 ト シ テ、日 本 政 府 ト 公 的 的 係 ニ 在 ル モ  
ノ ナ ル コト、竝 ニ 該 條 條 目 ト シ テ 余 ガ 茲 ニ 添 附 セ ラ レ  
タル 一 頁 ヨ リ 成 ル 千 九 百 四 十 年 / 即 同 十 五 年 / 二 月  
十 三 日 附 下 記 題 名 部 チ、在 英 皇 光 大 使 發 有 田 大 臣 宛  
電 報 第 三 九 三 〇 號 ノ 文 書 ノ 保 管 ニ 任 ジ 居 ル コ トヲ 茲  
ニ 證 明 ス。

余 ハ 更 ニ 添 附 ノ 記 録 及 び 文 書 ガ 日 本 政 府 ノ 公 文 書 ナ  
ル コト、竝 ニ 右 ガ 下 記 名 稱 ノ 省 又 ハ 部 局 ノ 公 式 書 類  
及 び 證 ノ 一 部 ナ ル コトヲ 證 明 ス。( 活 シ ア ラ バ 綴 番  
號 又 ハ 引 用、其 ノ 他 公 式 書 類 又 ハ 綴 ニ 於 ケ ル 該 文 書  
ノ 成 期 所 在 ノ 公 式 名 稱 ラ モ 特 記 ス ベ シ )

1589A-3

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 十月三日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名欄 尾 戸 長 春

右ノ者ノ公的資格 外務省文藝課長代理

證 人 佐 藤 武 五 郎

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、R. H. Larsh、余ガ聯合國最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、並ニ上記題名ノ文書ハ余ガ公務上、日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。


千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 十月八日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏 名 欄 Richard H. Larsh

右ノ者ノ公的資格 Investigator. IPS

證 人 Sgt. Takeo Foguchi



Q. 10/6

TELEGRAM No. 7657. From Ambassador SHIGEMITSU to Foreign Minister ARITA. Code cypher. Dispatched P.M. 23 March 1940. Received P.M. 24 March 1940.

No. 459 (Embassy Long Distance Code).

The solution of FINLAND question gave a remarkable blow to the political conditions of both GREAT BRITAIN and FRANCE, consequently general policies of both countries, especially that for SOVIET UNION will be discussed thoroughly. In the coming Easter holidays, as they are just after the political change in FRANCE, the British Government authorities are presumed to contemplate British foreign policies, so I took it advantageous for disposal of China Affairs from the point of view of our international relations to explain fully beforehand the establishment of WANG's government now in progress and our attitude for it to British side, therefore in the evening of 21st, I visited Vice-Minister BUTLER in the Foreign Office and had the following private talk:-

1. First of all, I explained fully the development of new state of things in CHINA based upon the news brought by "Domei" recently, for reference of Foreign Minister:-

(a) As the previous activity of WANG Ching-wei, I explained KONOE's three principles which constitute fundamental relations between JAPAN and CHINA, next as Chinese side, the relation between Peiking and Nanking governments as well as measures for internal relation of Kuomintang.

/p.2/

(b) Next I explained in detail the organization and decisions of the whole national assembly held after WANG's entry into Nanking on 17th and that the new central government would be established on March 30th by the Chinese for CHINA and the Chinese; (omission) and its administrative policies are cooperation for peace at home and abroad as well as anti-communism; and further, I

(c) explained that the Japanese policy for it was to do the purport so often explained thoroughly, that is, to establish peace and order as well as cooperation in CHINA, not to exclude any other than communistic and Bolshevik elements who plot confusion and conflicts, and to offer cooperation and friendship for that purpose; this policy

will be warmly received by both Chinese and foreign nations, therefore it must be a matter for congratulation if some compromise would be found between the new central government and Chungking government based upon the above-mentioned purport; in short, it was a pivotal point to exclude the Bolshevism as a source of confusion and to recover the peace and order; and I told him that British government would understand the Japanese attitude, as the former had the most economic interest in CHINA.

2. BUTLER said that British Government could not immediately change her policy of having recognized Chungking Government as the formal Chinese government, but he understood my explanation and hoped the new government would be successful; as for Tientsin problem, he further issued an instruction today (he explained the contents of the instruction) which would prove of service for the settlement of the problem; the settlement of Tientsin problem just at the time of the establishment of WANG's Government is a "gesture" on the part of Britain expressing her desire to be of any service. (I told BUTLER that, according to newspaper information, recently Ambassador CRAIGIE proposed to our Foreign Minister ARITA the strong attitude of BRITAIN for the execution of the war; for this BUTLER said that, according to the dispatch from the Ambassador, he seemed to have explained Premier CHURCHILL's speech in detail, it was not by their specific instruction.)

3. I asked BUTLER about the expulsion of Brit from Labor Party and SOVIET UNION's problem, for which BUTLER explained as follows:-

"I am a contact man with the Labor Party in reference to diplomatic problems. The Labor Party wishes to avoid to open hostilities against SOVIET UNION, but this opinion is getting in the direction of becoming stronger. The communistic elements in Brit who are under the direction of MOSCOW are being boycotted; consequently the public opinion of BRITAIN, to say nothing of the Government itself, is getting /p.4/ stronger against SOVIET UNION within the limits of avoiding war. The causes may be found in (1) firm attitude of FRANCE against SOVIET UNION, (2) advancement of understanding and realization of dangerous propaganda at home and abroad or destructive activities of SOVIET UNION,

(3) Necessity of beating SOVIET UNION (by the blockade or other means) in the execution of the war against GERMANY. The anti-SOVIET feeling of Scandinavian countries was getting heightened, and anti-Bolshevik sentiments of NORTH and SOUTH AMERICA are observed to be very strong. WELLS also seemed to be aware of danger of SOVIET-UNION".



4. I told him that there seemed to be many reasons why JAPAN and BRITAIN may go further with the understandings in future taking a wide view of things of Anglo-Japanese relations from the point of view of national policy of JAPAN toward CHINA as well as general situations of the world. If my view is not mistaken, the authorities of both countries should strive to take measures to bring about this collaboration and it is also necessary to conquer every difficulty. Vice-Minister BUTLER replied that he had felt the outline of my talk was felt as if a large picture had been painted with reference to international relations of the world and he was of the same opinion.

5. Furthermore I discussed concrete problems. (1) I called his attention based on concrete examples. First of all I asked him how he thought of recent propagandistic activities of left elements in spite of the necessity of striving for not to deteriorate the relations of both countries, especially if there might be any means to guide the attitudes of Reuter and BBC (Radio Broadcast) as the development organs of public opinion; it is hard to understand that BBC broadcast the speech of Lord CECIL who attacked GERMANY and JAPAN as invaders; furthermore it was said that the Information Ministry had offices not only in Tokyo but also in Hongkong and Shanghai; the communications of these reporters should have been guided to go along the line of national policy, without being imposed upon by propaganda.

BUTLER replied that as for BBC, various conditions at the time of its establishment often embarrassed them but by the proper means they would call its attention to this matter; for Reuter the same means would be taken. Times must already have been improved; CECIL had no social influence nowadays and it was quite imprudent to act in such a way; Reuter's actions in Tientsin was also wrong.

In short, he said that he would take into consideration what /p.6/ I had said. (2) Next, as concrete problems of negotiations, I /SHIGEMITSU/ proposed matters of trading and shipping of German goods and I also explained that JAPAN would continue to hold firm insistence on her neutral right; various obstacles for trade had excited both Japanese Government and people and its counter-measures would also affect the general situations. So I expressed my earnest hope to remove such obstacles. Individual problems shall be negotiated by Councillor OKAWOTO but I expressed my earnest hope that the British side would also make her best exertions. Furthermore I have demanded their considerations about the questions of obstacles for trade and shipping of goods.

BUTLER asked me that Japanese side would understand likewise

the standpoint of BRITAIN and also pay attention to the same requirements of British side and he promised that British side had no objection to make her best exertions in this matter.

Finally BUTLER said that he would report today's interview to Foreign Minister tonight. After the interview I met the Foreign Minister myself but asked him that he would hear about the interview from BUTLER.

1589B-1

第百三十九号 (局長符掛紙)  
 亦前停炭ハ英領ニ於ケル炭價ニ相若符違ヲ與ヘテ國  
 ノ一以炭炭價ニ調練シ以テ其ニ符無底納ノ法敷行ハル  
 ヘクハ國炭價ノ後ヲ受クテ「イイヌタ」條條ハ英屬  
 首領部ノ條條ノトキト見ラレタルニ符算ノ前ニ治モ  
 續炭率ノ狂炭維持立及我炭炭價ニ前シ充分炭價則ニ説  
 明ヲ與ヘ以テクモトハ我國際關係上事理處理ノ上ニ於  
 テモ有テト願ハレタルニ依リ二十一日夕刻「バ」家  
 官ヲ外務省ニ往訪シ内容左ノ通り私的會談ヲ行ヒタ  
 リ得也等語  
 一 支那新報週ノ發展ニ符算ニ充分説明シ外空ノ事  
 ニ供シタシトナ最近ノ向度ニ違キ(一)狂炭條ノ事  
 工作トシテ日本トノ關係條約三原則次ニ支那  
 人關係トシテ北京南京政府トノ關係及國民黨黨内情

有田外務大臣

重光大使

郵價 附 大正七年三月二十三日 昭和十三年三月二十三日 附 大正七年三月二十四日	符 附 大正七年三月二十三日	符 附 大正七年三月二十四日
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**FILE COPY**  
 RETURN TO ROOM 361

1589B-2

三権分立ニ付テ説明シ(二) 次イテ十七日 延市東京系  
 後ノ國民生活會議ニ管其ノ海成及榮耀ニ付群衆ヲ  
 前へ急進部及支那人ノ爲ニモ(處?) 且支那人ニ  
 飲ル新中央政府ハ三月三十日ヲ期シテ成立シ其ノ  
 政策ハ内外ニ對スル平和協力及反共ニ在ルコトヲ  
 説明シ其ニ(三) 右ニ對スル日本ノ政策ハ之趣度々説  
 明セル趣旨ヲ實感スルモノニシアリテ支那ニ於テ  
 平和安定ト協力トヲ樹立セントスルモノナリ混亂  
 ト衝突トヲ目前トスル共産赤化分子以外ハ何人ヲ  
 モ排斥セス其ノ目的ノ爲協力ト友情トヲ提供セン  
 トスルモノナリ右ハ悉ク第一ニ支那人ニ取リテ  
 モ外國人ニ取リテモ是モ兼通セラルヘキ事案ト思  
 ハル從テ右ノ大趣旨ニ依リ新中央政府ト舊政府  
 トカ何等愛憎ノ意ヲ見出スコトハ極メテ善クヘキ  
 コトナリ長スルニ混亂ノ原因タル「赤化」ヲ排シ  
 テ秩序ヲ恢復セントスル點カ大眼目ナルカ支那ニ  
 於テ是モ多ク經濟的利益ヲ有スル美國ハ悉ク右  
 ノ日本ノ態度ヲ了解セラルルコトト思惑スト説明  
 セリ

1589 B-3

二 「バ」ハ英國政府トシテ尙重慶政府ヲ支那政府ト  
 シテ承認シ居ル通前ヲ急變スル議ニハ行カサルモ  
 右側説明ハ爲ト了承シ若々成功セラレシトヲ所  
 ル天津問題ニ付テモ實ニ今日訓令ヲ發シタリ（内  
 容ヲ説明シ居タリ）然ラク右ニテ選リ得ルコトト  
 思フ故ニ左政府獨立ノ際ニ天津問題ノ解決ハ何等  
 英國領ノ「マシテニア」ニシテ特設ニ立タンコト  
 ヲ希望スル次第ナリ（本使ヨリ最近「タレイヤ」  
 大使ハ有田大使ニ對シ英國ノ戰爭遂行ニ對スル強  
 硬ナル態度ヲ早入レタリト新聞報道アルコトヲ話  
 シタルニ「バ」ハ同大使ノ電報ニ依レハ「テ」首  
 相ノ演説ヲ充分ニ説明シタル様ナリ特ニ訓令ニ依  
 ルニアラスト言ヘリ）

三 本使ヨリ「ブリット」ノ勞働黨破門ノ件ヨリ對蘇  
 問題ニ入りタルニ「バ」次官ノ説明左ノ通り  
 「自分ハ外交問題ニ關シ勞働黨トノ關係存ナルカ  
 勞働黨ハ蘇聯ト戰爭状態ニ入ルヲ避ケタキ希望ナ  
 ルモ其ノ意見ハ強硬ノ方面ニ在リ「ブリット」ノ  
 如キ美新科ノ指令ヲ受クル共產黨等ノ分子ハ關係  
 セラレツツアリ從テ政府部内ハ勿論英國與門ハ大

1589 B-4

存存意ニ對シテハ戦争ナキ範圍ニ於テ強クナリツ  
ツアリ右ノ原因ハ(一)德國ノ對蘇強硬態度(二)蘇聯ノ  
危険ナル國內外宣傳若クハ破壊工作ニ對スル理解  
ノ増進及危険ノ自覺(三)對獨戦争遂行上蘇聯ヲ叩ク  
(前債其ノ他ノ手段)ニトノ必要ニ及メ得ベシ  
「スカンデナヴィヤ」諸國ノ反蘇感情ハ益々昂マリ  
又北米ノ民「ボルセビイキ」無ク非情ニ強キ様  
ニ思ハル「ラエルズ」モ蘇聯ノ危険ニ付テハ等ニ  
感ズル所アリタル口附ナリシ」

本使ヨリ支那ニ對スル日本ノ政策又世界ノ全局ヨ  
リ見テ日英ノ關係ヲ大局的ニ綜合スルニ時來ニ於  
テ兩國ハ益々諒解ヲ進メテ可然キ點多ノ重合ヲ有  
スル様ニ感ス若シ右ノ見方ニテ觀ナシトセハ兩國  
ノ當局ニ於テモ之ヲ顧慮スベキ手段ニハ努マスベ  
キコト可然キ點多ノ困難ハ之ヲ排除スルコト必要ナ  
リト意見ヲ述ベタルニ「バ」次官ハ對蘇ノ筋ハ世  
界ノ國際關係ニ付テ規模大ナル話ヲ發キ出サレタ  
ル様ニ感セララルル方官分モ同意ナリト應酬アリ

支シテ長官同感ニ入り本使ヨリ

(一)第一兩國關係ニ付テ常ニ空氣ヲ毒セラレサル様

1589B-5

ニスルニト必要ト思フニ抑ラス最近ノ左翼分子ノ宣傳策動ハ如何ニ見ラルルヤ等ニ興信ノ警愆標顯タルBBC(「ラヂオ」放送)及廣透ノ態度ハ其ニ對等ノ方策無キヤBBCカ標顯ト共ニ日本ヲ侵略者トシテ攻撃セル「ロイド・セシル」ノ談話ヲ行フカ如キハ自分等ノ誤解ニ苦シム所ナリ更ニ情報者ハ東京ノ外香港上海ニ於テモ出張アリト云ク之等ニ駐在スル新聞記者ノ通信カ徒ニ宣傳ニ乘セラレス島業ニ激フ業ヲ爲スルコトヲ待ヘキ管ナリトテ社々突突ニ是キ注意ヲ促シタルニ

「バ」ハBBCハ獨立當時ノ事情モアリ口リ居ルモ適當ノ方法ニ依リ充分ニ注意ヲスヘク論議モ同様ナリ「タイムズ」ハ大分改善セリト思フ「セシル」ノ如キハ今日何等ノ身方無キ者ナルカ不正確ノ至ナリ天聲ニ於ケル論議ノ如キ避口モ不都合ナリ長スルニ御話ノ論議ハ充分ニ考慮スベシトノ趣旨ニテ種々説明應答アリ

(二) 次ニ本使ヨリ長谷川交渉員トシテハ親商關係樹造ヨリノ荷役輸出ノ問題アリ又日本ハ中立權

1589B-6

ノ問題ニ付テハ他國同様ナル主權ヲ維持スル次  
第ナリ通商上ノ各道法條ノ問題ハ甚シク我々  
及民間ノ感情ヲ刺戟シ其對策ハ大局ヲモ害スル  
次題ナリ新ル四條ハ之ヲ排除スル様切實ニ進  
ムベキカ英國例ニ於テモ最大ノ努力ヲ爲サルル  
コトヲ切實ストテ其ニ通商條及附屬出シノ  
問題ニ付テ誠ク先方ノ考慮ヲ促シ置キタリ  
「ズ」ハ右ニ對シテ日本例ニ於テ英國ノ立場ヲ  
諒解セラレ英國例ノ同様ナル希望ニ付考慮ヲ請  
ヘルルコトヲ切實スルト共ニ英國例ニ於テモ出  
來得ル限りノ努力ヲ爲スコトニハ兼テヨリ深甚無  
シト強調セリ  
「ズ」ハ要後ニ今日ノ朝報ハ早速今夜ハ外報ニ  
モ報告スベシト接洽シタリ  
右會談後外相ニモ行營ヒタルカ電ニ「ズ」ヨ  
リ傳球ラレタシト報シ置キタリ (了)



證 明 書

「ワシントン」文書局 第 一 五 八 九 B 號  
印 度 松 葉 部

1589B-7

其 實 及 公 正 ニ 關 ス ル 證 明

余、尾月長春へ余が下記ノ文書ニ於テ、印テ  
外務省文書局長代理トシテ、日本政府ト公的關係ニ  
在ルモノナルコト、並ニ該官員トシテ余が並ニ添附  
セラレタル、六頁ヨリ成ル、千九百四十年ノ昭和十  
六年ノ三月二十三日付、下記無名、印テ在美真光六  
使對荷國大臣宛電報第七六五七號ノ文書ノ保管ニ任  
シ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記帳及ヒ文書が日本政府ノ公文書ナ  
ルコト、並ニ石ガ下記在籍ノ空又ハ部局ノ公式證照  
及ヒ其ノ一部ナルコトヲ証明ス。(若シアラバ該證  
照又ハ引用、其ノ他公式證照又ハ其ニ於ケル該文書  
ノ成語所在ノ公式在籍ヲモ證明スベシ)

1589 B-8

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 十月三日

東京ニ於テ書ク

警務局長 田中 貞 彦

右ノ者ノ公的調査 外務省 行政課 長 佐藤

人 佐藤 五郎

公的入手ニ由ルニ證明

余、RICHARD H. LARSENハ、余ガ本國最高警務  
官總司令部ニ配属アルモノナルコト、並ニ上記姓名  
ノ文書ハ余ガ公的ニ、日本政府ノ上記姓名官吏ヨリ  
入手シタルモノナルコトヲ證明ス。

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 十月八日

東京ニ於テ書ク

氏 名 田中 貞彦 RICHARD H. LARSEN

右ノ者ノ公的調査 INVESTIGATOR I P S

人 SGT. TAKEO TOGUCHI

Doc. No. 1589-C

Page 1.

Copy of Telegram. General Number 12998. "Cipher Code,"

From Ambassador SHIGEMITSU to Foreign Minister ARITA

Dispatched from London May 13, p.m., 1940

Received at this Ministry May 14, p.m., 1940

No. 771 (~~Embassy Long Distance Code~~)

1. The invasion of German army into HOLLAND and BELGIUM has caused the direct conflict with British and French armies and it is evident that HITLER made up his mind to stake all on this undertaking as seen from the declaration of the expedition. After occupation of coast lines of HOLLAND and BELGIUM, the German army may be hard to foresee if they settle in positional warfare for a time, but judging from the public opinion of ITALY, although HITLER's present enterprise has been aroused by the positive policy of BRITAIN and FRANCE, the scale may be far larger than that generally supposed. If he will succeed, he will not leave his army only in occupation of HOLLAND and BELGIUM. Therefore, it is of course necessary for us to make arrangements taking into consideration every possibility.

/p.2/

2. Our national policy for South Seas may be determined based upon that already adopted for Dutch East Indian problems and we may make headway on three points, viz., (a) JAPAN has no intention of changing the status quo on the whole, (b) neither belligerent nor neutral country shall interfere with the status quo. (c) Interests of the natives should firstly be considered (of course these three points may be expressed in proper order and circumstances) (Refer telegram No. 1593 of last year).

3. From the above mentioned standpoints, if we investigate the relations with the UNITED STATES or SOVIET UNION or belligerent countries in general, it is the urgent need to take measures to make conciliation of JAPAN and CHINA as Oriental people in order to establish firmly our leading position in EAST ASIA. As we are leading Chinese people in most of the things nowadays, the conciliation of WANG and CHIANG or that of CHIANG and JAPAN may be advantageous to us regardless of its conditions. Unless we shall have promptly settled Chinese questions, we shall be placed in a disadvantageous situation, irrespective of the development of situation.

Even if HITLER's success on land may be decisive, Naval Powers of BRITAIN and FRANCE may remain strong enough. Or even if FRANCE may be overwhelmed, the war will not be ended. GERMANY is in the internal condition to meet the needs of continuing victories, while BRITAIN and FRANCE have special characteristics to solidify the national union by

/p. 3/

the defeat. This is an important matter not to be overlooked. If HITLER's success on land will be kept in check, the powers of BRITAIN and FRANCE will remarkably rally. In any case, the change of situation hereafter is getting more and more important, and by the backing of SOVIET UNION the situation will be more and more complex. Taking into consideration of the superiority of GERMANY on land and that of BRITAIN and FRANCE at sea, we have to apply our national policies for CHINA and SOUTH SEAS, in accordance with the policy to make our situation in the EAST ASIA firm and stable. The most part of this cable may be the repetition of my former one, but I dare to send in view of the present situation.

Cabled to AMERICA, FRANCE, TURKEY, GERMANY and ITALY.

Ask ITALY to cable to GERMANY.

/p. 3/

the defeat. This is an important matter not to be overlooked. If HITLER's success on land will be kept in check, the powers of BRITAIN and FRANCE will remarkably rally. In any case, the change of situation hereafter is getting more and more important, and by the backing of SOVIET UNION the situation will be more and more complex. Taking into consideration of the superiority of GERMANY on land and that of BRITAIN and FRANCE at sea, we have to apply our national policies for CHINA and SOUTH SEAS, in accordance with the policy to make our situation in the EAST ASIA firm and stable. The most part of this cable may be the repetition of my former one, but I dare to send in view of the present situation.

Cabled to AMERICA, FRANCE, TURKEY, GERMANY and ITALY.

Ask ITALY to cable to GERMANY.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No.

I.F.S. No. 1589CStatement of Source and Authenticity

I, CDO Nagaharu hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 3 pages, dated 13 May, 1940, and described as follows: Telegram No. 12998 - Shigemitsu to Arita. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
3rd day of Oct., 1946.

/s/ Nagaharu Cdo  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ T. Sato

\_\_\_\_\_  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
8th day of Oct., 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME

Witness: /s/ Sgt Takeo Toguchi

Investigator, IFS  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Official Capacity

EX. 1017

1589c - 1

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

年往三第一五三第 (三三第)  
右三歸ノカ示ハ前ニ後急ノ別ハ了ルベシハ答  
慮セザルハカ涉ヲサス居住ノ以テ推シ得入(勿  
雖現ル中立國タルヲサトマ居間ノ思ナリ如何ナ  
國於テ所演集ハ歸印ノ及ヒ思ナリ如何ナ  
方ニ於テ所演集ハ歸印ノ及ヒ思ナリ如何ナ  
我對南洋慮サルヲ云ハ計ヲ共ハスルハ一極大  
モ止ラサノテ入テ共ノ共ハスルハ一極大  
ニナルヲ云ハ計ヲ共ハスルハ一極大  
「クヤモ知ラサレサルモ極大知ノ與ニ見ルモ  
ル白ク海岸線ヲ占ムルモ功ニ如キナリ一極大ニ  
坤一擲ノ決意ヲシテ入テ其ノ出ルコト言明カナリ  
」云々トシテ「自便トシテ入テ其ノ出ルコト言明カ  
一、一七七(第一號)信兵符懸(一七七)東京ノ自便トシテ入テ其ノ出ルコト言明カナリ

有田 外務大臣

真光 大使

電 信 局

明治 三十八年 八月 二日

本館昭和十五年五月十三日 發刊

發刊 主 管

1589C-2

三、以上ノ見地ヨリ對米關係ト言ヒ對蘇關係ト言ヒ又  
 交談口ニ對スル關係ト云ヒ我對外的一般關係ヨリ  
 探討スルニ蘇ニ東亞ニ於ケル天乘的地位ヲ確立ス  
 ル爲同シク東洋人タル日支兩國人類和ノ途ヲ開セ  
 サルヘカラス幸ニ支那ヲ大局的ニ抑ヘ居ル今日汪  
 蔣妥協又ハ蔣トノ妥協ノ如キハ條件ノ如何ニ拘ラ  
 ス我方ノ有利トスル所ト思ハル何レニシテモ適ニ  
 支那問題ヲ固メサレハ形勢發展如何ニ拘ラス不利  
 テル立場ニ置カルルニ至ルヘシ  
 若シ「ヒットラー」ノ陸上ニ於ケル成功カ決定的  
 トナリ得トスルモ英佛ノ海軍力ハ勳カサルヘク或  
 ハ休戰ノ席捲セラルルカ如キコトアリトモ恐ラク  
 結末ヲ告ケサルヘシ獨逸カ戰勝ヲ得クルノ必要ア  
 ル國情ニ反シ英佛ハ戰敗ニ依リ益々國民的結合ヲ  
 齎スノ特徵アリ右ハ見逃ス能ハサル所ナリ。若シ  
 「ヒ」ノ陸上ノ成功カ喰止メラルル場合ニハ英佛  
 ノ勢力ハ若シク虛返スヘク何レニスルモ今後形勢  
 ノ推移ハ益々重要トナリ蘇聯邦ノ背後ニ控ヘ居ル  
 爲益々複雜トナルヘシ要スルニ陸上ニ於テハ獨逸  
 カ優勢ニシテ又海上ニ於テハ英佛ノ優勢ハ大体動  
 カヌモノトシテ對ニ我方ハ東亞ニ於ケル地位ヲ確  
 固不費ノモノトスル方針ノ下ニ對支對南洋政策ヲ  
 運用スルノ要アルヘク茲ニ蘇ニ申進シタル所ト大  
 体重積スルモ今日ノ形勢ニ對シ眞ニ右申上ク  
 米、佛、土、獨、伊ヘ草書セリ  
 伊ヨリ獨ヘ電アリタシ



1589c-3

「ワシントン」文藝局 第  
國際検察部 第一五八九〇號

典據及ヒ公正ニ証スル證明

余、尾戸長春ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、  
省文藝課長代理トシテ、日本政府ト公的關係ニ在  
ルモノナルコト、茲ニ當官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附  
セラレタル、三頁ヨリ成ル、千九百四十年ノ昭和  
十五年ノ五月十三日附、下記題名、  
大使登有田大臣宛電報第一二九九八號ノ文藝ノ保  
管ニ任シ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。  
余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ヒ文藝ガ日本政府ノ公文書  
ナルコト、茲ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式  
書類及ヒ綴ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シアラバ  
綴番號又ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於ケル該文藝ノ成裁所  
在ノ公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ)

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ十月三日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名 尾 戸 長 春

右ノ省ノ公的資格 外務省又文藝課長代理

證 人 佐 藤 武 五 郎

1589c-4

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、RICHARD H. LARSH ハ、余ガ聯合國陸軍高指揮官兼司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、故ニ上記題名ノ文替ハ余ガ公務上、日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ十月八日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名 福

RICHARD H. LARSH

右ノ者ノ公的資格

INVESTIGATOR I P S

證人

SGT TAKEO TOGUCHI

COPY OF

TELEGRAM. No. 14597. From Ambassador SHIGEMITSU to Foreign Minister ARITA. Despatched from London, May 25, P.M., 1940. Received at this Ministry, May 26, P.M., 1940. Code Cipher.

No. 868 (Embassy Long Distance Code)

*Ambassador's Code*

1. In spite of desperate efforts of British and French armies, the general trend of the land action on the Belgium-French border line has already been made clear. Although the battle will be further continued under the firm resolution of both BRITAIN and FRANCE, it is needless to say that we are required to cope with whatever change in the international situation may occur. As for JAPAN, as the result of present war, she should shoulder willy-nilly the responsibility for the stability of EAST ASIA, which occupies one third of the world, so I think it may be advantageous to strengthen our position there even a little in order to take an active part in the future international arena. I think this measure will be of service to secure the foundation to cope with international situations after the war regardless of the issue of belligerent powers.

2. From the above-said point of view, as I have already proposed, as far as JAPAN takes the lead of general situations in CHINA, it is necessary to take measures to conciliate with various parts or powers with reference to CHINA problems, but if we leave the China-Japanese relations in the great dispute, EUROPE and AMERICA will take advantage of this chance and our international position will be restricted after the war and our future diplomacy will suffer difficulties.

3. In this case, in order to prevent the war to spread into the EAST ASIA, we had better take measure once again.

- /p. 2/
- (a) JAPAN will inform her intention to various powers formally and at the same time take measure to realize her desire of the withdrawal of the troops of the belligerent powers from CHINA, as expressed by us at the beginning of the war.
  - (b) JAPAN must reconsider the declaration of "Three hundred-niles Principle" (Act of warfare cannot be permitted tacitly in the area three hundred niles off the coast of JAPAN, MANCHURIA and CHINA. This does not involve the territorial waters

of JAPAN) after the fashion of both North and South American countries (according to the explanation of Brazilian Ambassador in this country, "Three hundred-miles principle" will be proposed by NORTH and SOUTH AMERICA after the war to be adopted as an international agreement).

Of course, it is more effective to take these measures by diplomatic procedure, rather than under the pressure of military side nor of public opinion.

I proposed these opinions from the point of view of strengthening our diplomatic foundation in the case of completion of the war.

/p. 3/

Cabled the same to America, Italy and France.  
Asked Italy to cable to Germany.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I.P.S. No. 1589D

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO Nagaharu hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 3 pages, dated 25 May, 1940, and described as follows: Telegram No. 14597 - Shigemitsu to Arita

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):  
Foreign Ministry -----

Signed at Tokyo on this  
3rd day of Oct., 1946.

/s/ Nagaharu Odo  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ T. Sato

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
8th day of Oct., 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME

Witness: /s/ Sgt Takoo Toguchi

Investigator, IFS  
Official Capacity

601018

15897-1

電信局

總務部 一四三九七

待機 陸本館 省教

昭和十五年五月二十五日 後發  
昭和十五年五月二十六日 後着

重光大使

有田外務大臣

第八六八號 (信長符號紙)

一 次傳單必死ノ勢方行ハレ居ルモ自傳團擄匪上殿ノ  
 大勢ハ能ニ決シタルカ如ク美英兩國ノ非常ナル決  
 意ノ下ニ戰爭カ尙續行セラルヘキモ如何ナル國際  
 情勢ノ變化ニ對シテモ對處シ置クノ必要アルハ亭  
 ス適モナシ帝國トシテハ今次戰爭ノ結果好ムト好  
 マサルトニ拘ラス世界三分ノ一タル真正ノ安定ニ  
 對シ責任ヲ負フコトトサリタル次第ニシテ其ノ地  
 位ヲ少シニテモ國ス僅クコトカ將來帝國カ國際地  
 位ニ於テ坐キル途ト思ヒセラル有ハ衣以國ノ勝敗  
 ノ如何ニ拘ラス戰後ノ世界ノ情勢ニ對處スル基礎  
 ヲ失スモノト思ヒ考セラル有ノ見道ヨリ

二 條ニ申述シタル通り支那ニ於テ大局ヲ拘ヘ居ル以  
 上進ニ支那問題ニ於テ各方面ニ對シ妥協ノ道徑ヲ



1589 D-3

陸 防 警

「ワシントン」文書局 第 〇 號  
陸 防 警 部 第 一 三 八 九 D 號

身 證 及 び 公 正 三 國 ス ル 陸 防

余、尾戸長春ハ余ガ下記ノ資料ニ於テ、即チ外務省  
文書課長代理トシテ、日本政府ト公的関係ニ在ルモ  
ノナルコト、並ニ該官真トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレ  
タル、三頁ヨリ成ル、千九百四十年ノ昭和十五年ノ  
五月二十五日附、下記種名、即チ在英重光大使發布  
田代巨宛電報第一四三九七號ノ文書ノ保存ニ任シ居  
ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナ  
ルコト、並ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ公文ハ郵局ノ公式書類  
及ビ簿ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シアラバ該書  
號又ハ引見、其ノ他公式書類又ハ總ニ於ケル該文書  
ノ成程所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ帶記スベシ)



1589D-4

千九百二十六年／西曆二十一年／十月三日

東京ニ於テ署名

官談官更署名編 尾 戸 景 春 印

右ノ者ノ公的職務 外務省文書課長代理

証 人 佐 田 武三郎 印

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、Richard H. Larsh ハ、余ガ聯合國最高指揮官  
總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、且ニ上記題名ノ  
文書ハ余ガ公署上、日本政府ノ上記署名官更ヨリ入  
手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百二十六年／西曆二十一年／十月八日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏 名 編 Richard H. Larsh

右ノ者ノ公的職務 Investigator I.P.S.

証 人 Sgt Takeo Toguchi

Doc. No. 1589-E

Page 1.\*

COPY OF TELEGRAM No. 17724

Code Cipher

From Ambassador SHIGEMITSU  
To Foreign Minister ARITA

Despatched from London, p.m., June 19, 1940  
Received at this Ministry, p.m., June 20, 1940

No. 1040 (Embassy Long Distance Code)

It is needless to say that it is quite advantageous to make use of European War to strengthen the position of Japan in the East Asia. For that purpose I cable following items regarding Outgoing Telegram No. 922, which I have noticed:

1. It is quite important to watch the attitude of the United States to say nothing of paying attention to the condition of France, in the case of taking positive policy for French Indo-China and others. It may be difficult for the United States to enter the war before the election, but no one can foretell that Japanese activity will not excite here. (Full investigation must be done concerning financial and economical matters of both Britain and the United States, to say nothing of their naval powers). If the surrender of France will be realized, her plantations in South Pacific Ocean will be probably interfered with by Australia and in that case Japan may grasp the opportunity to take positive activity; but as for our activity, neither discussion of press will be allowed nor news will be published except those intended by the Government.

2. But it is most important for our foreign policy to state that Japan is gravely concerned with the stability of East Asia (including South Seas), and is resolved that the spread of European war must be prevented, and is taking policy to exclude the conditions destructive to the said stability and also to prevent those which may be destructive, especially to make clear that Japan will not tolerate to leave Orientals and East Asia districts as the plantation and object of trade to be exploited by capitalism of Europe and I think it is the best chance to elucidate our fundamental policy relating to East Asia and Orientals today (which will yield good results in Chinese problems); and it is most important as the background of our foreign policies.

3. If the districts of East Asia and South Seas, which is so-called living area ("Lebensraum"), should be owned by a certain great power, Japan would be driven to dare the risk of war with that country and the stability of East Asia would be deteriorated. Therefore I think it is of necessity to take courage to prevent it today. I believe that Germany and Italy will fully understand this matter.

4. British Empire has elucidated that she will continue the war to the end even if France would surrender and stated her confidence even if the German army should invade England. But, anyhow, it is clear that topographically Great Britain will not be so simply invaded as France and attention must be paid to the future development. As it is evident that the influence of Europe to Orient will be remarkably reduced after the war, Japan had better, I presume, take advantage of this opportunity to establish our position in East Asia firmly.

Cabled to Britain, Germany and Italy.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No.  
I.P.S. No. 1589-E

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO Nagaharu hereby certify that I am officially connect with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 3 pages, dated 19 June, 1940, and described as follows: Telegram No. 17724 - Shigemitsu to Arita. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on  
this 3rd day of October, 1946.

Nagaharu Odo (signed)

Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: (signed) T. Sato

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
8th day of Oct., 1946

(signed) Richard H. Larsh

NAME

Witness: Sgt. Taku Toguchi

Investigator, IPS

Official Capacity

601019

1589E-1

世 信 翁

總番號一七七二五 行號 附 倫敦本省

昭和十五年六月十九日發 時 分發

昭和十五年六月二十日發 時 分發

真 光 大 使

有 田 外 務 大 臣

第一〇四〇號 (館長待呈紙)

歐州以等ヲ東運ニ於ケル帝國ノ地位ヲ堅ムル爲メニ  
利用スヘキハ言ヲ俟タサル所ナルカ右ニ付テ此ノ際  
氣付ノ出往電第九二二號ニ目録シ左ノ要リ御呈送ニ  
供ス

一 印領印度支那等ニ對シテ積極政策ニ出ツルニ合ハ  
ルニト緊要ト思ハ森米國ハ運轉前途ニ阻礙トス  
ヘキモ日本ノ行動ハ之ヲ刺戟セストモ限ラズ(米  
一 英ノ海軍力ハ勿レ其ノ財政經濟方面ノ關係ハ充分  
ノ核實ヲ要スヘシ)若シ帝國ノ屬國實現セハ南太  
平洋ニ於ケル植民地ノ如キハ恐ラクハ濠洲等ニ於  
テ手出シスヘク茲ニ我方モ何等積極的行動ニ出ツ  
ルコトヲ望ミ和ルヤモ知レス但シ我行動等ニ付テ  
ハ一切新聞ノ記載ヲ抹除シ政府ノ意ニ出ツル

1589 乙 - 2

モノノ外流談ヲ守ルヲ何レニシテモ必稔ト恩ハ

ル  
三 德シ我方カ東亞（南洋ヲ含ム）ノ榮名ニ真大用心  
ヲ有シ歐列ノ烽火ヲ渡及セシメサルノ決意ヲ表明  
シ右榮名ニ害テハ其意ハ之ヲ際キ又害テルヘキコ  
トハ之ヲ予防スルノ政策ナルコトヲ一層高調シ得  
ニ東洋人及東亞ノ知境ヲ限断ノ資本主義ノ採取ノ  
目的タル植民地トシテ泉引キノ目的物タルコトヲ  
許ササルコトヲ防断ニシ我東亞及東洋人ニ對スル  
根本方針ヲ區限スルコト（支那高橋ニ對シテモ列  
邦アラン）ハ我對外國ノ背景トシテ我モ宜稔ニ  
シテ且今日ハ其ノ時機來レリト恩考ス

三 若シ日本ノ所轄一レトベシラサムル東亞ハ  
南洋ノ知境カ新ニ大國ノ領有ニ歸スルカ如キコト

アリテハ日本ハ斯來此ノ國トモ此等ノ危險ヲ包蔵  
スルコトトナリテ東亞ノ安危ニ害アリ今日勇氣ヲ  
持ツテ之ヲ防止シ置クノ要アリ私等ハ此ノ點充分  
ニ認識スルコトト恩考ス

四 尙何國高橋ニ至ルモ英帝國ハ東亞ヲ他途竊行スル

コトヲ高橋シ我道軍ノ英國侵入ニ對シテハ自衛ヲ  
表ホツ居レルカ兎ニ角地勢上佛國ノ如ク簡單ニ行  
カサルハ此カニシテ今後ノ發展ハ注意ヲ要スルモ  
以後ハ歐列ノ對東洋勢力ハ其ツク幹流ニ歸コトハ  
明瞭ナルニ付我方トシテハ此ノ際東亞ニ於ケル地  
位ヲ大局上ヨリ確立スルノ時機ト恩考セラレ

英、和、伊へ警戒せり

1589 E-3

証 明 書

ワシントンシ文書庫 第 一 三 八 九 B 號  
國 際 法 務 部

余及と公正ニトスル証 明

余、尾戸長春ハ余ガ下記ノ資力ニ於テ、即チ外務省  
文書課長代理トシテ、日本政府ト公的ニ關係ニ在ルモ  
ノナルコト、茲ニ該官更トシテ余ガ並ニ添附セラレ  
タル、三頁ヨリ成ル、千九百四十年ノ昭和十五年ノ  
六月十九日附、下記ノ名、即チ在英重光大使發有臣  
大臣宛電報第一七七二四號ノ文書ノ保管ニ任シ居ル  
コトヲ茲ニ証 明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナ  
ルコト、茲ニ右ガ下記ノ名簿ノ符又ハ添附ノ公式書  
及ビ該ノ一部ナルコトヲ証 明ス。(若シアラバ該書  
號又ハ引用、其ノ他公式書及ビ添附ニ於ケル該文書  
ノ成規所程ノ公式名簿ヲモ併記スベシ)

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ十月三日

東京ニ於テ行名

當該官更名簿 尾 戸 長 春  
右ノ考ノ公的資力 外務省文書課長代理  
人 佐 藤 武 五 郎

1589 E-4

公式入手ニ付スル証状

余、RICHARD H. LARSHハ、余ガ聯合團長高橋樺言總司  
令部ニ「傳アルモノナルコト」並ニ上記氏名ノ文書  
ハ余ガ公送上、日本政府ノ上記署名官京ヨリ入手シ  
タルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ十月八日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名	RICHARD H. LARSH
右ノ右ノ公的職名	INVESTIGATOR I. P. S.
証人	SGT. TAKEO FOGUCHI



EX 1020

Doc. No. 1589-F

Page 1

TELEGRAM No. 20394. From Ambassador KURUSU  
in Berlin to Foreign Minister RIBB. on July 10, 1940  
No. 870-1 (Chief Code)

Concerning your telegram No. 427

From Ambassador S.TO:-

After long absence of Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP, we could see him at last in Berlin on 8th of this month. I interviewed him for about an hour and twenty minutes accompanied by Ambassador KURUSU and Minister KAWA and exchanged views with him which may be summarized as follows:-

1. To begin with I tendered Japanese Government's congratulation to GERMANY's steady progress towards the establishment of new order in EUROPE and especially great success achieved in FRANCE. I expressed that at this opportunity of passing Berlin, I should like to convey the opinions of the Japanese Government by the order of the same and as I shall soon be back home, I should like to carry the opinion of the German Government to J.P.N, and explained items listed in the telegram stated above. Further I stated that taking for granted RIBBENTROP already knew the views of Japanese Government on problems of DUTCH EAST INDIES and FRENCH INDO-CHINA through the successive explanations of Ambassador KURUSU to Foreign Vice-minister, so I expressed my hope to hear the opinions of RIBBENTROP on the same matter. RIBBENTROP, always paying attention to me, replied that it was great pleasure for GERMANY to know that Japanese Government desired to cooperate with German Government on various problems and it was also a well-known fact that in the past she had endeavored to reach full understanding by close cooperation with J.P.N. However, although he himself knows well what GERMANY wants to do, he is regretful that he does not possess any definite knowledge regarding whereabouts of the Japanese intention, so he was eager to know in concrete form what J.P.N really hopes, regarding as I do that cooperation of both countries is quite necessary. He further said that J.P.N'S actions in the FRENCH EAST had given considerable effect on EUROPE by which GERMANY gained great facilities as I explained and also that it was a real fact that J.P.N obtained various interests concerning CHINA problems by the aid of friendly attitude of GERMANY and if she had not assumed such amicable attitude, the great war successes that J.P.N had obtained in CHINA till now might not be expected.

2. Accordingly I /S.TO/ explained my view on the fundamental policy of seceding from Nine-Power Treaty system with the same principle as explained to the Italian authorities the other day pointing that it is true that former Japanese diplomatic policy might have been apparently difficult to grasp its pivotal points; really it might have been caused by the great change of former policy by reason of change of situations as the result of various diplomatic difficulties and obstacles which J.P.N encountered as long as nine years, since the outbreak of MANCHURIAN Incident, during which Japan was obliged to admit of inviting outward suspicions caused by the change of policies, but the

pivotal point for which JAPAN pushed these nine years, especially these three years was the establishment of new order in CHINA, that is to say, building up of new CHINA, seceded from Washington Treaty system and in friendly relation with JAPAN and consequently she has been struggling with such great powers as BRITAIN, the UNITED STATES and FRANCE.

3. Next RIBBENTROP asked me if the said problem of establishment of new order was the only one which made the understanding between JAPAN and AMERICA difficult among the problems pending between the two countries or besides if the problem of equality of naval power between JAPAN and AMERICA might not endanger the diplomatic relations of both countries. Thereupon I replied that surely CHINA problem was the greatest cause of the disputes between JAPAN and the UNITED STATES; as Americans professed to be a protector of CHINA for right or wrong, they were not pleased of the advocacy of establishing of new order by JAPAN and further it was always the case with the UNITED STATES to harbor desire to maintain predominance of her naval power in the Atlantic Ocean and thereby to secure the police power in the Pacific Ocean, therefore in so far as the matter concerns CHINA problems, the advocacies of both countries would remain contradictory to each other. To this RIBBENTROP said that as the result of saturation of both capital and production in the UNITED STATES, she would be hard up for markets for her commodities after the war, so she would rather seek for arrival of favorable turn of JAPAN-U.S. relation by supplying abundance of raw materials and products voluntarily. He further went on to say that when the political power of any nation becomes stronger, the various economical problems may be settled of themselves in the desired form. For example in GERMANY, recently with the strengthening of her political power, such problems as raw materials and export of manufactured products are being settled in such a manner as satisfactory to GERMANY, in which he implicitly boasted the economical development of GERMANY after her great victory. He continued to say that although the UNITED STATES had come to possess nearly ninety per cent of the gold of the world, gold was no more the medium of exchange for material, so even after the war, GERMANY would construct economy absolutely independent of gold at home with the exception of international trade settlement where a small amount of gold might be used. As the result of having excessive gold and the expansion of productive power in the UNITED STATES, the merchandise would overflow and she would have to concentrate her soul and mind upon acquisition of foreign markets, thus the UNITED STATES would be so pressed with canvassing for selling the goods and she would not be feared as a great nation, he hinted.

4. Therefore, I told him that, as I had stated before, the alienation between JAPAN and the UNITED STATES originated in CHINA problem and since then, as the result of having neither profit nor loss in CHINA, the UNITED STATES had always been adhered to problems of principle, so the understanding between the two countries had been exceedingly difficult. Therefore, if JAPAN would not in a devious way beyond a certain extent, the UNITED STATES' public opinion would burst out and there is a possibility of imposing economical pressure on JAPAN. The JAPAN-UNITED STATES commercial treaty had already been abrogated, nevertheless the economical dependence of JAPAN upon the UNITED STATES at

present is far reaching and the result of economical severance would be a matter of great concern to J.P.N. If there would happen the cessation of supply of oil, J.P.N. would be obliged to turn her eyes on South Seas as her life and death problem and in such a case we cannot say that there would be no danger of J.P.N.-U.S. war. And if once this war would break out, it would give great effect upon EUROPE. I told so far to RIBBENTROP who nodded in affirmative and looked to have been exceedingly impressed.

5. Furthermore RIBBENTROP stated that after the Versailles Treaty, GERMANY was the one who experienced the suffering of blockade most, but now she had overturned her position with BRITAIN. GERMANY believed firmly that, as in the operation against FRANCE, she could also obtain complete war results in an extremely short period in British operation. Consequently, when general trend of the world was viewed from economical standpoint, EUROPE and AFRICA would belong to GERMANY and ITALY, EAST ASIA to J.P.N., the remaining Asiatic region to SOVIET UNION, each of which builds up an economic block, in addition to this an American block would be constituted under the UNITED STATES; then the leading countries of each block would carry out trade with surplus materials left over after consumption in each block.

6. Next RIBBENTROP referred to CHINA problems and as he questioned whether there was any expectation of rapid settlement of the Incident, I replied that there was no expectation which might be termed as rapid settlement, but anyhow, a new government of WANG Chao-ming had been established and J.P.N. was in the midst of negotiation to conclude an amicable agreement with it. Therefore in the event of its formation, the new government would likely to carry out just and appropriate politics at home and abroad. It would greatly contribute to the safety of EAST ASIA and also give favorable effect to the UNITED STATES to induce her to revise her recognition of the new situation in EAST ASIA and consequently this might be the good chance of adjusting J.P.N.-U.S. relations.

7. Further RIBBENTROP expressed that since Russo-German agreement, the boundary between both countries had been settled and made it the eternal one; and also his satisfaction that J.P.N. was endeavoring during these several months, as he previously hoped, to recover friendly relations with SOVIET UNION by solving pending problems between two countries as GERMANY had done.

8. Finally I questioned RIBBENTROP of his view as to the measures to be taken to recover peace in EUROPE after the conclusion of military operation against BRITAIN, for which he replied that at present the nerves of the whole GERMANY were being concentrated into the military operation against BRITAIN and there was no scope to take into consideration of program or procedure of recovering peace; thus he kept himself off going too deep into the subject. As the interview extended more than an hour, I told RIBBENTROP again that he must have understood fully various problems which J.P.N. had great concern and had been explained by Ambassador KURUSU and myself for which I hoped that the German Government would pay consideration. Thus the interview was ended.

9. As you will understand from what I report with this cable, I could not find any definite attitude on German side as shown by Italian premier regarding DUTCH WEST INDIES and FRENCH INDO-CHINA. It is also a great regret that I could not get any promises or pledges and on the contrary it was observed that German side rather avoided to give definite previous promises to these problems. As there was a wish from the German side, I hope you would pay attention not to have the contents of this telegram be leaked outside.

Cabled the same to Italy, the United States, Soviet Union and Britain.

C E R T I F I C A T EW.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I.P.S. No. 1589FStatement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO Nagaharu hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 10 pages, dated 10 July, 1940, and described as follows: Telegram No. 20394 - Kurusu to Brita. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
3rd day of Oct., 1946./s/ Nagaharu Odo  
Signature of OfficialWitness: /s/ T. Sato(SLL)  
Assistant Chief Archives Section  
Official CapacityStatement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
8th day of Oct., 1946./s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAMEWitness: /s/ Sgt. Takeo TomuchiInvestigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

1589 F--1  
Key 1020

電信高

總務部

二〇三九四

符 伯恭昭和十五年七月十日附錄

本省昭和 年 月 日 附錄

分發主 分發管

有 田 外 務 大 臣

第八七〇號ノ一 (館長符恭敬)

貴電第四二七號ニ應シ

佐藤大使ヨリ

「リ」外相久シク不在ノ爲メ本八日伯恭ニテ面會  
來領大使、河相公使ト共ニ會談一時間二十分ニ亘リ  
意見交換ヲ爲セルカ其ノ要領左ノ通り  
一 本使ヨリ先著メ以テ新秩序建設ノ企圖着々進歩シテ

ニ於テ偉大ナル成功ヲ獲得ラレタルコトニ對シ日  
本政府ノ慶祝ヲ呈スル旨發シタル後本使伯恭通  
過ノ機ニ於テ帝國政府ノ命ニ依リ日本政府ノ意見  
ヲ傳達致度ク且自分ハ近々以テ朝スヘキニ付獨政府  
ノ意向モ日本へ齎ラスヘスト前段シテ要領記載ノ  
各項ヲ説述シ更ニ請印、印等ノ關係ニ付帝國政  
府ノ深レル見解ニ對シテハ誠ニ懇次來領大使ヨリ  
外相次官ニ說明セル處アルニ付多分貴國ニ對シ居  
ルコトト存スルモ是等ノ詳細ニ關シ貴見ヲ伺フヲ  
得ハ幸甚ナリト述ベタル處「リ」ハ逐一之ヲ領  
シタル後帝國政府カ各款ノ問題ニ亘リ獨逸政府ト  
協力ヲ欲セラルル點ハ獨逸ノ欣快トスル所ニシテ

末 和 大 使

1589F-2

獨トシテハ過去ニ於テモ日本ト密接ナル行動ニ出  
テ充分ナル了解ニ到達スヘク努力シタルハ御承亮  
ノ通りナリ唯自分ハ獨カ何ヲ欲スルヤノ點ニ付テ  
ハ明カナル認識ヲ有スルモ日本ノ全口ガ榮達ニア  
リヤニ疑フテハ遺憾乍ラ明確ナル知識ヲ持チ兼ヌ  
ル次第ニシテ兩國間ノ協力モ必要乍ラ先ツ日本カ  
果シテ具體的ニ何ヲ希望セラルルヤヲ承知致度シ  
尤モ日本ノ極東ニ於ケル行動カ歐洲ニ對シ大ナル  
影響ヲ與ヘ獨逸ガ之ニ依リ大ナル便宜ヲ得タルハ  
御説明ノ通ニシテ日本モ亦獨逸ノ理解アル程度ニ  
依リ支那問題ニ關シ各級ノ利益ヲ獲得セルハ事實  
ニシテ若シ獨逸ノ新クノ如キ好意的態度ナカリセ  
バ日本カ現ニ支那ニ於テ敵メタルカ如キ大ナル威  
果ハ或ハ期待シ得サリシナルヘット然ヘタリ

ニ仍テ本使ハ成程從來日本ノ外交政策カ外觀ニ於テ  
捕提シ難キ點アリシヤモ知レサルモ右ハ日本カ滿  
洲擊變發生以來九年ニ亘リ直面シタル外交上ノ遺  
々ナル困難障礙ノ爲衰場合ニハ或方向ニ進マント  
ンツツ次ノ場合ニ於テ局面ノ變化ノ爲難場有針ハ  
大ナル改變ヲ加ヘサルヲ得サリシ等ノ事實ノ爲外  
觀ノ疑惑ヲ買ヒタル場合モアリシヤニ認メラルル  
モ日本カ九年此ノ方特ニ過去三年來邁進シ來リタ

1589 F-3

ル兵艦ハ支那ニ於テノ新秩序建設即チ華盛頓條約  
ヨリ離脱シテ日本ト友好的ナル新シキ支那ヲ造ラ  
ントスル點ニシテ之カ爲英米佛等ノ強大ナル勢力  
ニ抵抗シ來リタル次第ナリトテ通商伊太利當局ニ  
對シ通ハタル所！同様ノ通旨ヲ以テ九國團體樹立  
部ノ根本方針ニ臨シ意見ヲ開陳セリ

次ニ「リ」日米間ノ問題ニシテ特ニ相互ノ了解  
ヲ圖謀ナラシムル點ハ果シテ右新秩序ノ問題ノミ  
ナルヘキヤ其ノ他ノ點例ヘバ日米同海軍ノ平等問  
題等カ兩國國交ヲ阻害シ居ルニアラスヤト質問シ  
來レルニ依リ本使ハ日米間紛争ノ最大原因ハ正ニ  
支那問題ニ在リ米人ハ良カレ惡シカレ支那ノ保護  
者ヲ以テ任スルカ故日本ノ新秩序建設ノ主張ハ彼  
等ノ望フ所ニアラス米國ハ常ニ大西洋上於テ海  
軍ノ優勢ヲ保テ之ニ依リ太平洋ノ警察權ヲ把持ス  
ルヲ念トスルモノニシテ支那問題ニ關スル限り日  
米間主張ハ相容レサルモノアリト説明セル處「リ」  
ハ之ニ對シ米ハ資本生産共ニ飽和シ居ル結果以後  
ニ於テ商品ノ出口ニ妨シ寧ロ進ンテ日本ニ對シ原  
料及製造品ノ供給ヲ濶大ナラシムベク新クシテ日  
米關係ハ友好ノ機運ニ向フニアラスヤト想像セラ  
ルト被ベ



1589F-4

莫ニ一國ノ政治力カ強大トナレハ經濟上ノ陸問題  
 ハ自然ニ其ノ欲スルカ如キ形ニ於テ解決セラレル  
 モノニシテ獨逸ノ如キ最近其ノ政治力カ強大ヲ加  
 フルニ從ヒ原料問題ノ如キ製造品輸出問題ノ如キ  
 皆帯ニ得ノ満足スル様解決セラレ居レリトテ略ニ  
 獨逸大勝ノ後ニ於ケル經濟力ノ發展ヲ證示シ且米  
 國ハ世界ノ金ヲ殆ト九割ヲ占有スルニ至リタルモ  
 金ハ既ニ物資交換ノ用具ニアラス戰後ニ於テモ獨  
 逸ハ國內的ニ全然金ニ倚靠セザル經濟ヲ建設シ直  
 ニ國際間ノ貿易決済ニ金ヲ利用スルニ通キサルヘ  
 シ米國ハ有餘ル金ヲ保持シ左産力鐵石ノ特産商品  
 達レ外國市場ノ獲得ニ日モ足ラサル有様トナルヘ  
 シトテ米國カ商品賣込ニ急ニシテ大國トシテ左程  
 恐ルルニ足ラサルヤノ口吻ヲ洩ラセリ

四 依テ本使ハ日米間ノ取隔ハ前述ノ如ク支那問題ニ  
 關シテ獨逸ノ居リ其ノ側米カ支那ニ實利實害ヲ有セザ  
 ル關係上常ニ主義上ノ同趣ニ拘泥シ居ル結果兩國  
 間ノ了解ハ益メテ困難ナリ而シテ日本カ若シ以程  
 度ヲ過脱セシカ米ノ共益ハ甚ニ激發シテ經濟上ノ  
 壓迫ヲ加ヘ來ルヘキ可能ニナリトセス既ニ日米通  
 商條約ハ廢棄セラレ居レリ他國米ニ對スル日本ノ  
 經濟上ノ依存關係ハ現在ニ於テモ可ナリ廣範圍ニ

1589 F-5

シテ經濟前途ノ結果ハ日本ニ取リ廻テスヘカラサ  
ルモノアリ萬一石油輸送ノ途ニテモ燃料スルコト  
アリトセハ日本ハ之ヲ死傷問題トシテ南洋ニ目ヲ  
轉スヘク茲ニ日米戦争ノ完結無ト言ヒ難シ  
而シテ一展戦争後ハ之カ歐洲ニ對シ重大ナル  
影響ヲ與フヘキコトハ多言ヲ要セスト猶ヘタル處  
「リ」ハ言下ニ之ヲ肯定シ可成リ「インプレス」  
サレタル様子ニ見受ケラレタリ

次ニ「リ」ハ獨逸ハ「ベルサイユ」條約以後ニ於  
テ最モ賠償ノ苦惱ヲ受ケタル國ナリソモ現在ニ於  
テハ英型ト其ノ地位ヲ原價セリ知能ハ對等作戦ト  
同様謀共作戦ニ於テ恣メテ江州國ニ完全ナル結果  
ヲ獲得シ得ルモノト確信シ居ル處其ノ結果世界ノ  
大勢ハ經濟的ニ見テ歐州及亞細亞加ハ得管、東亞  
ハ日本、其ノ余ノ亞細亞ハ蘇聯邦ノ各分野トナリ  
之ニ米國ヲ加ヘ各區域國ノ主人公タル國々ニ於テ  
自己利益ノ剩余ヲ交易スルコトトナルヘシト述ヘ  
タリ

次ニ「リ」ハ支那問題ニ言及シ事態急遽解決ノ目  
算アリヤト憂悶セルニ付本使ヨリ迅速解決トハ言  
ヒ得ストスルモ兎モ角今ヤ汪兆銘ノ新政府モ新設  
セラレ日本ハ之ト友好的協定ニ入ルヘク現在交渉

1589F-6

ノ夜中ト心得居レリ之カ成立ノ期ハ新政府ニ於テ  
即ノ内外ニ公正妥當ナル政治ヲ行フコトトナルヘ  
ク右ハ東亞ノ安全ニ要スル所大ナルヘク米國ニモ  
好影響ヲ與ヘ彼ラシテ東亞ノ新事態ニ對スル認識  
ヲ歐メシムルニ至ルヘク之カ日米關係調整ノ契機  
トモナルヘシト考フト答ヘ置キタリ

セ 更ニ蘇聯邦ニ關シ「リ」ハ獨蘇協定以來兩國間國  
境稍定シ互ニ其ノ境界ヲ永久的ニシタル次第ナル  
カ諒テ自分ノ希望シタルカ如ク接近等ケ月ニ亘リ  
日本カ獨逸ト同シク蘇聯邦トノ間ニ善惡ノ條件ヲ  
解決シテ友好ノ關係ヲ恢復スヘク努力セラレ居ル  
ハ自分ノ欣幸トスル所ナリト述ヘ居タリ

ハ 現後ニ本使ヨリ對英作成終了ノ期歐洲平和克復ノ  
爲メラルヘキ手段ニ付何等意見ヲ奔進シ得ヘキヤ  
ト述ヘタルニ對シ「リ」ハ目下獨逸ノ動向ハ對英  
作戰ニ集中セラレ居リ到底平和克復ノ影響乃至ハ  
手續等ニ關シ考慮ヲ凝ラシ居ル余地ナシトテ深入  
リ進ケタリ會見既ニ一時間余ニ及ヒタルヲ以テ本  
使ヨリ意不テ日本ノ關心ヲ有スル範圍内ニ關シテ  
ハ既ニ來稿大要及本使ヨリ斥逐ヘタル所ニ依リ英  
大臣ニ於テ充分得了解ナリタルコトト存ス我ニ對  
シ獨逸政府カ補償ノ考慮ヲ凝ハレシコトヲ希望ス

1589F-7

ト近へ色談ヲ打切リタリ

※以上ノ取廻ニテ御承知相成ルヘキ通リ御駕ニテハ  
前印、侍印等ニ付シテ伊首相ノ共へタルカ如キ明証  
ナル様度ヲ一切見受ケタルヲ待ス種徒言質等ヲ取リ  
付タルヲ得サリシハ甚々遺憾ニシテ御駕ニテハ之  
等證同題ニ對シテ寧ロ禮定前納ヲ與フルヲ望ケン  
トスル様子ニ見受ケラレタリ

尙先方ノ恭呈モアリ本電内容外部ニ洩レサル様侍ニ

御座候相煩度シ

伊、米、藤、共へ取寄セリ

1589F-8 (cert.)

證 明 書

「ラント」文藝局 第一五八九号  
國 際 検 察 部 第一五八九号  
號

典義及と公正ニ關スル證明

余、尾戸長泰ハ余ガ下靴ノ賣宿ニ於テ、即チ外務省  
文藝局長代理トシテ、日本政府ト公約關係ニ在ルモ  
ノナルコト、檢ニ該官長トシテ余ガ檢ニ添附セラレ  
タル、十頁ヨリ成ル、千九百四拾年ノ昭和十五年ノ  
七月十日附、下記欄名、即チ在獨來箱大使務有田大  
臣宛電報第二〇三九四號ノ文藝ノ保管ニ在リ居ルコ  
トヲ茲ニ證明ス。  
余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文藝ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナ  
ルコト、檢ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ那局ノ公文書類  
及ビ檢ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シテラバ廢番  
號又ハ引局、其ノ他公文書類及ハ檢ニ於ケル該文藝  
ノ成規所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ)

外務省

1589F-9 (cert)

千九百三十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 十月三日

東京ニ於テ署名	池戸景春
警務署更張名簿	外務省文藝部長代理
右ノ者ノ公的資格	佐田武五郎
証人	

公的入手ニ關スル證明

余、Richard H. Larsh、ハ、余ガ聯合國軍高階長官  
總司令部ニ配属アルモノナルコト、茲ニ上記署名ノ  
文書ハ余ガ公的ニ、日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入  
手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百三十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 十月八日

東京ニ於テ署名	Richard H. Larsh
氏名	Richard H. Larsh
右ノ者ノ公的資格	Investigator IPS
証人	Sgt Takeo Toguchi

1589F-9 (cert)

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 十月三日

東京ニ於テ署名	加戸 景 春
警務局長署名	外務省文藝部長代理
右ノ者ノ公的資格	佐藤 武五郎
証人	

公文入手ニ關スル証明

余、Richard H. Larsh、ハ、余ガ聯合國警務局長官  
總司令部ニ勤務アルモノナルコト、茲ニ上記署名ノ  
文藝ハ余ガ公認上、日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入  
手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ証明ス。

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 十月八日

東京ニ於テ署名	Richard H. Larsh
氏名	Richard H. Larsh
右ノ者ノ公的資格	Investigator IPS
証人	Sgt Takeo Toguchi

1589F-9 (cert)

24,1020

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 十月三日

東京ニ於テ署名	加戸長春
曾該官更其名	外務省文藝課長代理
右ノ者ノ公的資格	佐田武五郎
證人	

念式入手ニ關スル證明

余、Richard H. Larsh ハ、余が聯合國警務官  
 總司令部ニ在任アルモノナルコト、茲ニ上記署名ノ  
 文藝ハ余が公的ニ、日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入  
 手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 十月八日

東京ニ於テ署名	Richard H. Larsh
氏名	Richard H. Larsh
右ノ者ノ公的資格	Investigator IPS
證人	Sgt Takeo Toguchi



TELEGRAM NO. 20382 Cipher Code - From  
Ambassador KURUSU in Berlin to Foreign  
Minister ARITA. Dispatched from Berlin  
July 10, A.M., 1940. Received at the  
Ministry July 10, P.M., 1940.  
(No. 871 - Chief Code - Urgent)

1. As I could understand the general outline of the policy of the Imperial Government concerning JAPAN-GERMAN cooperation by the aid of your telegram No. 427, by taking advantage of the opportunity of interview of Ambassador SATO with RIBBENTROP as reported in my telegram No. 870 /No. 20394/, I shall proceed with the talk myself at appropriate time.
2. But I am under the impression now that recently in Japan there are some who are too eager and worried about every smile or frown of Germany; it may be needless to say that it is very disadvantageous for our diplomatic policy to show such attitude for Germans who are inclined to urge everything to us as well as in high spirits as the result of glorious victory and I cannot expect good result of the cooperation concluded under such unequal conditions.
3. When Ambassador SATO was going to leave after the above interview, based upon above mentioned consideration, I showed my appreciation to RIBBENTROP to the effect that by the aid of today's interview I came to find Germany's desire of JAPAN-GERMAN cooperation, and also stated that recently there were some who reported me the cool attitude of GERMANY for JAPAN and unfortunately if it were true, I, who hoped for the JAPAN-GERMAN rapprochement, thought there would be no other way than to consider some best policy under the above new situation. At this RIBBENTROP was very much astonished and denied it. Therefore I said to him that for such method of cooperation as desired by JAPAN which RIBBENTROP questioned Ambassador SATO, a solution would be found in so far as both sides had intention of cooperation, and for that purpose I should exchange views hereafter if he wanted to do so.

4. That night at the dinner party, I had an opportunity to talk with STAHRER who was present at the above-mentioned interview. He confidentially told me that RIBBENTROP, taking into consideration the situation after war, is thinking of cooperating with JAPAN and that although it appears that he wants to have it extend over the fields of both diplomacy and economy, it seems that he is hoping for its earliest realization in view of the surrounding circumstances. Cabled the same to Britain, the United States, Italy and the Soviet Union.

C E R T I F I C A T EW.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I.P.S. No. 1589GStatement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO, Nagaharu, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 3 pages, dated 10 July, 1940, and described as follows: Telegram No. 20382, Kurusu to Arima. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation or the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
3rd day of Oct., 1946./Witness/: (s) T. Sato(s) Nagaharu Odo  
Signature of Official (S.E.L.)Assistant Chief Archives Section  
Official CapacityStatement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
8th day of Oct., 1946Witness: (s) Sgt. Takeo Toguchi/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAMEInvestigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

15899G  
1021

電信局  
宛番線

二〇三八二  
待伯赤  
誠信

本署 昭和十五年七月十日 夜着  
前發 昭和十五年七月十日

來 相 大 使

有 田 外 務 大 臣

第八七一號 (局長符號扱 至急)

一日御協力ニ仰スル帝國政府ノ御方針モ貴電第四二七號ニ依リ大陸ノ鞏固拜察セラルルニ付往電第八七〇號佐藤大使「リ」外相會談ヲ模範トシテ今後ハ本使ニ於テ時宜ニ依リ話ヲ進ムルコトト致スベシ

ニ然ルニ最近我國ノ内部ニハ熱心ノ余リ殆ト獨逸ノ一舉一笑ヲ氣ニ掛ケ居ル向モ有之ニアラスヤト印象セラルル處兩事ニモ一應負担ヤ來ル傾向アルニ加ヘ優勝ニ意氣學レル獨逸人ニ對シ右様ノ態度ヲ示スハ外天上願ル不徳業ナルハ甲ヲ然モナク新ル不對等ナル氣持下ニ妥協セル協力ノ如キハ其ノ效果甚タ覺取ナカルヘシト存ス

三以上ノ考慮ニ基キ本使ハ佐藤大使カ前記往電ノ會談ヲ終ヘラレ併去スルニ當リ「リ」外相ニ對シ本

日ノ會議ニ依リ強遠側ニモ日獨協力ノ希望ヲ有セ  
ラルコト判明セルハ本使ノ特ニ欣決トスル所ニ  
シテ實ハ最近時々如邊ノ對日態度冷却ヲ本使ニ傳  
へ來ル言アリ不幸ニシテ萬一事實ナリトセハ豫テ  
日獨協近ヲ希望セル本使トシテモ右程事情ノ下ニ  
豫警ノ万策ヲ考慮スルノ外ナキカト私カニ思察シ  
居リタル次第ナリト述ヘタル處「リ」ニ右ハ續ル  
意見ナリトシ強ク之ヲ否定シタルヲ以テ本使ヨリ  
然ラハ先刻佐藤大使ニ詢問ノ日本ノ希望スル協  
力ノ万策ノ期キハ双方ニ協力ノ意思左スル限り目  
ラ既カトナルヘク右ニ對シテハ今欲細希望ニ察リ  
本使ニ於テ意見交換スヘシト甲斐キタリ、  
照右會議ニ列席セル「スター」ト「ト」ト「ト」ト  
上懸談ノ機會ヲ得タルカ「ト」ト「ト」ト「ト」ト  
後ノ懸懸ヲモ考ヘ日本トノ協力ヲ希望シ居リ其ノ  
範圍ハ外來經濟ノ双方ニ及フコトヲ希望シ居ルモ  
ノノ如ク「ト」ト「ト」ト「ト」ト「ト」ト「ト」ト  
カナルヲ察シ居ル様ナリト内懸シ居タリ。  
英、米、伊、露、蘇ヘ尊敬セリ。

證 明 書

「ワシントン」文書局 第 〇 號  
國 際 文 書 部 第 一 五 八 九 〇 號

真 據 及 ビ 公 正 ニ シル 證 明

余、尾戸長壽ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、内チ、外務省文書課長代理トシテ、日本政府ト公約關係ニ在ルモノナルコト、並ニ該官更トシテ余ガ共ニ添付セラレタル、三頁ヨリ成ル・千九百四十年／昭和十五年／七月十日附、下記姓名、即チ在滿遼來領大使發有田大臣宛電報第二〇三八二號ノ文書ノ保管ニ任ジ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ添付ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公式文書ナルコト、並ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式書類及ビ綴ノ一紙ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シアラバ綴番號又ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於ケル該文書ノ處理所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ待記スベシ)

千九百四十二年／昭和二十一年／十月三日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名欄

右ノ者ノ公約資格

證 人

尾 戸 長 壽

外務省文書課長代理

佐 藤 武 五 郎

公式入手ニ關スル証状

余ハ RICHARD H LARSH ハ余ガ聯合軍兵高指撥宣傳司令部ニ關シタルモノナルコト、近ニ上記署名ノ文警ハ余ガ公榜上、日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年ノ西曆二十一年ノ十月八日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名 同 RICHARD H LARSH

石ノ字ノ公印發給 INVESTIGATOR I p S

証人 SGT TAKEO TOGUCHI

THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE AMBASSADOR  
IN JAPAN (GREW)

Excerpts.

WASHINGTON, August 9, 1940--8 p.m.

297

. . . . .

"At the end of June and during July of this year Japanese-sponsored authorities introduced in portions of China new economic measures and restrictions detrimental to American interests, and there occurred a series of incidents involving Japanese and American nationals. During this period there has been carried on intermittently agitation directed against American interest which has taken the form of mass meetings and demonstrations by Japanese residents and an inflammatory press campaign in the Japanese-controlled press. There were also developments in Japan which have raised questions as to the welfare and security of American nationals residing in that country.

Developments at Shanghai have been of an especially serious character.

At that place, acts of terrorism have been committed against reputable American citizens and established American interests, as well as against other nationals and other interests, and a judge of one of the courts established by international agreement, to which the Government of the United States is a party, has been assassinated. Newspapers subject to Japanese control have been conducting an anti-American and anti-foreign campaign, the inflammatory character of which could not but affect prejudicially peace and order.

. . . . .

The Government of the United States has made due note of and is taking due account of those acts and developments which affect adversely interests of the United States and its nationals.

An illustrative list of recent restrictions and incidents is appended."

The summary of recent illustrative developments and incidents affecting adversely interests of the United States and of its nationals, which I also handed to him, included the following:



Br. Ex. 127

Establishment in North China on June 28 of full import exchange control.

Assault on July 4 at Chafoo on members of the American Presbyterian Mission by Japanese armed soldiers:

July 7 incident at Shanghai involving American Marines and Japanese gendarmes, including reference to restraint and good will shown by American authorities in attempting to effect reasonable adjustment and to the intemperate tone and language of communications from the concerned Japanese authorities;

The refusal since about July 8 of Japanese military authorities of Shanghai to issue permits for shipments by American firms to the hinterland and Yangtze Valley:

Mass meeting on July 10 in Hongkow in connection with the July 7 incident, reported intemperate statements by the commander of the Japanese naval landing party, and sensational and inciting articles published in Japanese-controlled newspapers:

The demand of the Nanking regime for the deportation from Shanghai of six Americans and one British subject, the throwing of bombs at a Chinese language newspaper in which an American claims an interest, and the assassination of Samuel Chang;

Tang Liang-li's reputed letter in the North China Daily News of July 16 and a foreign newspaper commentator's interpretation thereof as a threat to kidnap if not to murder the Americans and Briton concerned:

A report of July 19 from Shanghai that an American missionary woman at Soochow had been searched in a humiliating and insulting manner by a Japanese sentry:

An anti-American demonstration on July 19 at Hangchow by Japanese in uniform riding in Japanese military trucks:

Attack on July 20 at Shanghai on Hallett Abond.

The appeal on July 20 of the Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council to the Consular Body, the public criticism of the appeal by the Japanese Consul General, and the attempt of the Japanese Consul General to cause the Consular Body to indicate in a resolution that "Chungking elements" were responsible for all terrorism in Shanghai:

Doc. No. 219F (92)

Page 2

Br. Ex. 127

The receipt on July 23 by the American Consul at Shanghai of a telegram from Amagasaki demanding apologies and withdrawal of American forces from China;

The demand of the Nanking regime, reported July 23, for the arrest of a large number of Chinese in the Settlement, deportation of certain foreigners, and closing down of foreign newspapers published in the Settlement and newspaper threats that the regime will take over Settlement police rights;

The arrest on July 27 in Tokyo of a number of British subjects, the death of Cox, the arrest and detention of Morin, and the subsequent press warning to foreign correspondents;

The assassination of Judge Chien on July 29 in Shanghai;

A report of July 31 that instructions had been issued to Shanghai representatives of Japanese newspapers to look for stories on which anti-American articles might be based;

The assassination on August 2 of a White Russian employed by an American firm, the kidnaping of a Chinese coal dealer on the same day, and the publication of anti-American articles in a Japanese-controlled paper.

Foreign Relations I, pp. 862-364.

641022  
Sec 219P(92)

NO. 1

國務長官代理ヨリ在日本大使(グルー)へ

拔萃

二九七

ワシントン 昭和十五年八月九日午後八時

今年六月下旬及七月間ニ日本ヨリ支持セシ當局ハ支那各地ニ米國利益ヲ犯ス所アル新ニ經濟上ノ政策ト制限トヲ施行セリ而シテソレハ日本及米國人ヲ含ム一連ノ事件ヲ惹起セリ此間日本ノ居留民ニ依ル大集會又ハ示威形式及日本人ニ依リテ統制セラル新聞ニ依ル煽動的新聞戰形式ヲ取リ米國利益ニ對テ向ケニシラル絶間ナキ煽動行ハレリ又日本ニ於テモ事件ノ發生ナリ同國在住米國國民ノ福祉ト安寧トニ關スレ疑問ヲ生シタリ

上海ニ於テ發生セルモハ特ニ重大ナル性格ヲ持シ同地ニ於テハテロ行為ガ他國利益ニ對テ行ハレシト同様令名ナル米國市民及ビ確立セラル米國利益ニ對テ行ハレタリ而シテ合衆國モ参加セル國際協定ヨリ創立セル法廷一ツ或一名ノ裁判官暗殺セタリ日本統制下新聞ハ又米國又外國論戰ヲ展開シ煽動的性性格ハ平和ト秩序ニ有害ナル影響ヲ與ハザラ得ザリキ合衆國政府ハ然レバ覺書ヲナシ且合衆國及該國民ノ利益ニ不利ナル影響ヲ與ルニシテ行爲及ビ發展ヲ然ルニク重視シテ最近ノ制限事項及ビ其他ノ事件ヲ説明スル表ヲ附シテ

合衆國及該國民ノ利益ニ相又ニ影響ヲ與ヘツアル最近ノ顯著ナル發展及ビ事件ノ概括ハソレモ亦余ガ彼ニテ又マカ次ニモラ包含ス

即北支ニ於ル六月二十八日完全輸入爲替統制ノ制定

七月四日芝罘ニ於ル米國長老教會傳導使連ニ對スル日本武裝兵ノ攻撃

七月七日上海ニ於ル米國海兵隊ト日本ノ憲兵トヲ捲込ナル事件穩當ナル調整ヲ行ヒントスル米國當局ニ依リテ示サレラル抑制ト善意及日本關係當局カラ連絡ノ乱暴ナル音調ト言葉ニ對スル参照ヲ含ム

Doc-219P(92)

上海，日本軍當局，七月八日頃以後，米國會社依<sup>レ</sup>奧地及黃河流域，貨物積出<sup>ル</sup>許可<sup>ヲ</sup>與<sup>ル</sup>ル<sup>ト</sup>對<sup>ス</sup>拒<sup>ス</sup>絶<sup>ス</sup>。

七月七日，事件ト關聯セ<sup>ル</sup>七月十日，虹口ニ於<sup>テ</sup>ル大集會，日本海軍陸戰隊司令官依<sup>レ</sup>亂暴<sup>ス</sup>ル<sup>ト</sup>聲明。又日本統制下，新聞ニ依<sup>テ</sup>テ發表セ<sup>ル</sup>各種動<sup>ク</sup>的<sup>ナ</sup>刺戟<sup>的</sup>ナル論說<sup>ノ</sup>報告。

上海ヨリ六人，米國人一人，英國氏ヲ追放ス<sup>ル</sup>ト對<sup>ス</sup>南京政府，要求。一米國人利益有<sup>ル</sup>支那語新聞ノ投彈及ヒ甘<sup>ク</sup>ナル張<sup>ル</sup>暗殺。

七月十六日，北支每日ニス，(South China Daily News)紙，湯長禮有名ナル紙及外國新聞解說者，右關係米國人及英國人ヲ被害セ<sup>ル</sup>トシテ誘揚ス<sup>ル</sup>トナルト脅迫セ<sup>ル</sup>トナリト，解說。

蘇州，米國婦人宣教師ヲ日本，苛<sup>ク</sup>シテ依<sup>テ</sup>テ屈辱<sup>的</sup>且無禮<sup>ト</sup>取調法<sup>ニ</sup>調<sup>ヘ</sup>テ<sup>シ</sup>タリト言<sup>フ</sup>七月十九日，上海ヨリ，報告。

七月十九日，杭州於<sup>テ</sup>日本軍隊，<sup>ニ</sup>乗<sup>リ</sup>ニ制服<sup>ヲ</sup>着用セ<sup>ル</sup>日本人<sup>ニ</sup>及米國示威行進。

七月二十日上海ニ於<sup>テ</sup>ルハ<sup>ト</sup>一<sup>ニ</sup>ニ<sup>シ</sup>テ襲擊<sup>ス</sup>。

上海，市參事會，會長領事團ニ七月二十日告<sup>シ</sup>セ<sup>テ</sup>ト日本領事<sup>ニ</sup>告<sup>シ</sup>世評<sup>及</sup>重慶<sup>的</sup>要素<sup>ヲ</sup>上海ニ於<sup>テ</sup>ル總<sup>テ</sup>テ<sup>テ</sup>對<sup>ス</sup>責任<sup>ヲ</sup>ト言<sup>フ</sup>決意<sup>ヲ</sup>領事團<sup>ヲ</sup>示<sup>ス</sup>ル<sup>ト</sup>ス<sup>ル</sup>日本總領事<sup>ニ</sup>企圖。

陳謝<sup>ト</sup>米國軍，支那ヨリ，撤退<sup>ス</sup>ヲ要求ス<sup>ル</sup>ガ事ヨリ電報<sup>ヲ</sup>上海米國領事<sup>ニ</sup>送<sup>リ</sup>テ<sup>シ</sup>タリ。

NO. 2

居留地ニ於<sup>テ</sup>ル多教支那人，逮捕或外國人連，追放<sup>及</sup>居留地ニ於<sup>テ</sup>テ發行<sup>ス</sup>ル外國新聞閉鎖<sup>對</sup>ス<sup>ル</sup>七月二十二日報告，南京政府，要求<sup>及</sup>該政府<sup>ガ</sup>居留地警察權<sup>ヲ</sup>讓<sup>リ</sup>受<sup>ケ</sup>テ<sup>シ</sup>タリト，新聞<sup>ニ</sup>感<sup>ズ</sup>。

七月二十七日東京ニ於<sup>テ</sup>ル多教英國臣民，捕縛<sup>ス</sup>ニ及<sup>シ</sup>，死<sup>ス</sup>ル<sup>ト</sup>捕縛<sup>及</sup>拘留<sup>ニ</sup>而<sup>シ</sup>テ<sup>テ</sup>外國通信員<sup>對</sup>ス<sup>ル</sup>新聞警告。

七月二十九日上海ニ於<sup>テ</sup>ル全判事<sup>ノ</sup>暗殺。

NO 3

Doc-219P(92)

日本新聞上海代表者違反米國の論說、基礎となる事証を  
探せしむ指圖を發表し、八月十七日、報告  
八月日米國會社、シムラ、白米露人、暗殺同日支那、石炭商人、誘拐、而して日本統制下なる新聞、反米國論說、發表

外國關係 I P P 八六三一八六四

DOC. NO.  
1250-A

Page 1

Total No.: 23849

Coded Telegram from London to the Foreign Ministry

Despatched: Afternoon August 5, 1940  
Received: Afternoon August 6, 1940

TO: Foreign Minister MATSUOKA  
FROM: Ambassador SHIGEMITSU

Telegram 1356 (Code used by Head of Embassy)

Please accept my hearty congratulations for the establishment and enforcement of the Greater East Asia Policy at this time. In this connection, I wish to inform you of the following points which have occurred to me though there may be parts that duplicate what I have already told you:

1. In the present situation, it is better, in regard to our attitude towards Germany and Italy to push forward an independent parallel policy. As to the extent of its application, it seems to me that the way the Soviet Union is carrying out its parallel policy will be of value.

Italy's policy of Alliance was based on geographical necessity, but Italy will generally maintain a merely subordinate position to Germany in future. As Japan is in a very advantageous geographical position, and as her object is to establish a position in the world, I think it is fundamentally essential to secure independence of policy. Next, in order to establish our position in Greater East Asia, it would be necessary to consider measures for gaining the maximum benefits at the minimum loss by carrying them out at the direct expense of small nations (for instance - France or Portugal) (although indirectly, it may turn out to be at the expense of Britain and America) and by avoiding conflict with other countries so as not to make many enemies at once but to dispose of them one by one.

2. The Soviet Union, by means of its parallel policy towards Germany occupied the Baltic area and East Europe, compromised (with Germany and Italy) in the Balkans and is supposed to be about to advance towards Iran, Turkey and Iraq, (or perhaps also secure a position in Finland). But she is always standing strongly for neutrality, trying to avoid conflict with the big countries, such as Britain (and France), etc. but extending her power over minor countries which have no connection with the war. Actually, the Soviet Union is aiming at a thorough shake-up of the British dominions but it seems to be exercising all the skill at its command to realize the greatest gains at the least loss, while always leaving room for compromise with Britain.

3. The unavoidable diplomatic retreat of Britain from East Europe and the Black Sea area and the same developments in Asia, namely, the transfer of the center of the British sphere of influence from Shanghai to Hongkong some time ago, and then from Hongkong to Singapore, gives some idea of it. Britain is also changing her fundamental policy toward China. Even in the case of America, its strict adherence to the Monroe Doctrine signifies an attitude of retreat from East Asia. And the embargoes on oil and scrap-iron represent not a positive but a negative policy which is defensive (or obstructionist). The policies of Britain and America are not Joint, but Parallel policies but they have not necessarily been completely in accord hitherto as to their purpose and application. That depends upon our attitude. If we carry out our Greater East Asia policy with a reasonable, fair and square attitude, we may properly expect Anglo-American obstructions to be removed in the natural course of events. As to our attitude toward Britain and America, we need to consider fully the actual benefits, while considering at the same time our principles and position.

4. Here we should be on our guard against the fact that there are active, powerful movements afoot to draw Japan into a conflict with Britain and America in the Pacific Ocean thereby precipitating an uncontrollable situation in the Pacific just as Japan was drawn into the China problem by the Lukowkiao Incident, which they could expand into a world war, so that they could fish in troubled waters. In Britain and America, this movement is represented by the reinforcement of the existing anti-Japanese movement sponsored by the Leftists. The other one is a movement to draw Japan into a conflict by making Japan provoke Britain and America. Both movements have the same direct objective, though they differ in their ultimate objectives.

5. In short, though the main object of our policy is to establish a powerful political and economic position in Greater East Asia, I believe that to show a liberal-minded attitude towards settling the China problem expresses, not weakness, but strength on our part. In view of our present high international position, it would be improper for us to be victimized by other countries, not to speak of adopting an attitude of supplication or subordination. I believe it to be the cardinal principle of diplomacy to assert what our country requires and believes, and at the same time to prevent untoward losses in complicated diplomatic relations and to devise all available means towards every country alike within the limits of their potential utility. Needless to say, it is necessary to sweeten our relations with the Soviet Union and also to proceed with scrupulous consideration and prudence in our relations with Britain and America.

(3rd)

Transmitted to America, Germany and Italy.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. 1250-A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 4 pages, dated 5 August, 1940, and described as follows: Telegram from Ambassador SHIGEMITSU to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
1<sup>st</sup> day of Sept. 1946.

s/K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: Nagaharu Odo

\_\_\_\_\_  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
19th day of Sept., 1946

Witness: s/ T/4 P. Toguchi

s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity



641023  
1250A-1

電信 爲 號 三三八四九 符 號 昭 和 十 五 年 八 月 五 日 主  
時 本 省 昭 和 十 五 年 八 月 六 日 鑒 信

松岡外務大臣

真光 大 使

第一三五六號 (館長符號振)

今 日 大 東 亞 政 策 を 確 立 實 行 せ ら れ ば 、 二 對 シ 滿 洲 の 敬  
意 を 表 せ 右 に 示 せ 此 の 際 左 の 點 ( 往 來 の 電 報 ト 重 複  
スル 嫌 ア ル モ ) 氣 附 の 旨 申 進 ス

一、今日ノ形勢ニ於テハ我態度ハ御伊ニ對シテハ御  
自ノ並行政策遂行カ可然ク其ノ程度運用ニ付テ  
ハ蘇聯ノ並行政策ノ遺口ハ非常ニ參考トナルト  
思ハル

伊國ノ同盟政策ハ伊國ノ地理上已ムラ得サルニ  
出テタルモノナルモ伊國ハ將來發達ニ對シテハ  
大体追従的地位ヲ保ツニ過キス日本ハ極メテ有  
利ナル地理的地位ヲ有シ又世界ニ於ケル地位ヲ  
懸念スルコトカ目的ナルニ付根本ニ於テ政策ノ  
獨自性ヲ確保スルコトカ要點ナリト考テ次テ大  
東亞ニ於ケル我地位ヲ短慮スルニハ直接ニハ小  
國 ( 俄 國 或 ハ 葡 ) ノ 犠 牲 ニ 於 テ 行 ヒ ( 間 接 ニ ハ  
英 米 傳 ノ 犠 牲 ト ナ ル ヘ キ モ ) 他 國 ト ノ 衝 突 ラ 避  
ケ 一 時 ニ 相 手 ヲ 多 ク ヤ ス 各 個 處 分 ノ 方 策 ヲ 以 テ  
最 少 限 度 ノ 損 害 ヲ 以 テ 大 ノ 利 益 ヲ 收 ム ル コ ト  
ヲ 考 慮 ス ル 要 ア ラ ン

1250A-2

二、露國ハ獨トノ並行政策ニ依リ「バルト」東歐ヲ  
侵略シ巴爾幹ニ於テ之（獨伊）ト妥協シ次ニ「  
イラン」土耳其「イラク」方面（或ハ芬蘭ノ地  
位ヲモ固ムト思ハル）ニ向フモノト察ヤラルル  
モ常ニ英（佛）等大國トノ直接衝突ヲ避ケツツ  
強ク中立ヲ標榜シ戰爭ニ關係ナキ小國ニ對シテ  
其ノ權益ヲ擴張シツ、アリ結局ハ英國ノ植民地  
ノ根本的動搖ニ向ツテ進ミツ、アルモ常ニ英國  
ニ對シテ妥協ノ余地ヲ存シツ、最少限度ノ振替  
ニ於テ最大ノ効果ヲ擧ケント虚々實々ノ苦心ヲ  
爲シ居ルカ如シ

三、英國カ東歐黑海方面ヨリノ外交的退却ヲ余能ク  
クヤラレ又東亞方面ヨリモ同様ノ状態ニシテ據  
ニ其ノ勢力中心ヲ上海ヨリ香港ニ移シ更ニ又香  
港ヨリ新嘉坡ニ移スニ至リケルハ其ノ間ノ消息  
ヲ物語ルモノニシテ其ノ對支政策ノ根本モ變更  
シツ、アリ米國ト對シ「モンロー」主義擴張堅持  
ハ東亞方面ヨリ退却ノ姿勢ヲ意味シ石油屑鐵ノ  
禁輸モ畢竟進ンテ對ラ希ヘントスル積極政策ニ  
アラスシテ防禦（若クハ妨害）手段ナル消極政  
策ナリ英米ノ政策ハ共同（「ジョイント」）政  
策ニアラスシテ平行（「パラレル」）政策ナル  
モ右平行政策モ今日迄ノ所必シモ目的及運用ニ

1250A-3

付完全ニ一致シ居ラス右ハ我方ノ態度ニ懸ル所  
ナルカ我方ニ於テ條理ト且正々堂々ナル態度ヲ  
以テ大東亞政策ヲ遂行スルニハ英米ヨリノ障礙  
ハ自然ニ除カレ行クモノト見テ然ルヘシ英米ニ  
對スル我方ノ態度ハ尙主義及立場ヲ問題トスル  
必要アルト同時ニ實益ノ點ヲ充分ニ考慮スルヲ  
要スヘシ

四、

茲ニ注意ヲ要スルハ太平洋ニ於テ日本ト英米ト  
ヲ衝突ニ導キ以テ恰モ盧溝橋事件ヨリ支那問題  
ニ對シテ日本ヲ引込ミタルト同シク太平洋ニ於  
テ收拾シ得サル事態ヲ誘出シ臥し戰爭ヲ世界版  
争トシ其ノ間ニ莫大ナル漁夫ノ利ヲ占メントス  
ル有力ナル變動活源ニ行ハレ居ル點ナリ右ハ英  
米ニ於テハ左翼ヲ中心トスル在來ノ反日變動ノ  
強化ニシテ他ハ成可ク日本ヲシテ英米ヲ挑發セ  
シメテ衝突ニ導カントスル變動ナリ何レモ終局  
ノ目的ニハ差アルモ直接ノ目的ハ一致シ居レリ

五、

要スルニ大東亞ニ於ケル政治的經濟的ニ實力ア  
ル地位ヲ建設スルカ我政策ノ眼目ナルモ之ニ付  
テハ支那問題ハ矢張り大キナ點ニテ結束ヲ差ク  
ルノ懸案ヲ示スハ我方ノ意味ニアラスシテ寧ロ  
我意味ヲ表示スル諄ト患ハル我今日ノ大ナル國  
際的地位ニ紅ミ他國ニ對シ哀願若シクハ追從的

1250A-4

慮及ハ勿論他國ヨリ悪用セラル、ヘ不可ニシテ  
國家ノ要求スル所兵ノ信スル所ニ向ツテ主張ヲ  
爲スト共ニ複雜ナル國際關係ニ於テ不慮ノ災  
害ヲ防キ何レノ國ニ對シテモ之ヲ利用シ得ル範  
國內ニ於テハ凡ユル手段ヲ盡スルコト外交上要  
諦ト信セラル對蘇關係ヲ緩和シ對英米關係ニ配  
テモ周到ト考慮ト用意トラ以テ進ムコト案ヨリ  
必要ト思考セラル(三日)  
米、獨、伊へ轉覽ヤリ

1250A-5

證 明 書

「ワシントン」文藝局 第 〇 號  
國 際 検 査 部 第 一 二 五 〇 ノ A 號

真 據 及 ビ 公 正 ニ 駁 ス ル 証 明

余、林 壽ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ外務省  
文藝課長トシテ、日本政府ト公的關係ニ在ルモノ  
ナルコト、茲ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラル  
ケル、四頁ヨリ成ル、千九百四十年ノ昭和十五年ノ  
八月五日附、下記題名、即チ在英皇光大使登松岡  
外相宛電報ノ文藝ノ保管ニ任シ居ルコトヲ茲ニ証  
明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文藝ガ日本政府ノ公文書  
ナルコト、茲ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式  
書類及ビ綴ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シアラバ  
綴番號又ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於ケル該文書ノ成據所  
在ノ公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ)

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ九月十八日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏姓名 林 壽

右ノ者ノ公的資格 外務省文藝課長

證 人 長 戸 長 泰

1250A-6

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、リチャード・エツチ・ライシュハ、余が聯合國最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、茲ニ上記題名ノ文書ハ余ガ公務上、日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／九月十九日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名 Richard H. Larsh  
(署名)

右ノ者ノ公的資格 Investigator I P S

証人 F/4 P. Foguchi  
(署名)

601324

Doc. No. 219P (93)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 128

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE  
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MATSUOKA)

Excerpts

No. 1636

(TOKYO,) September 18, 1940

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to recall to Your Excellency the fact that my Government has frequently found it necessary in recent years to make representations to the Japanese Government in regard to interference with American trade in China by Japanese military authorities or by local organizations under their control. Not only have representations been made in connection with general trade and exchange measures enforced by Japanese-controlled authorities in north China, but also in connection with especially destructive interferences with American trade in individual commodities, notably hides and skins, furs, wool, radios, egg products, and embroideries. It is now necessary to bring to the attention of the Japanese Government widespread interference with American trade in petroleum products.

. . . . .

From Kalgan to Canton, in coastal cities and in the interior, American trade in petroleum products, chiefly kerosene and candles, continues to be subjected, notwithstanding repeated representations to the local authorities by American diplomatic and consular officers, to arbitrary and unwarranted interferences.

. . . . .

26/024  
219P (93)

駐日米國大使(ケル) / 閣下ヨリ日本外務大臣(松岡)へ  
抜萃 一三三六號 一九四〇年九月十八日(東京)

閣下：日本軍當局、或、其、管理下ニアル地方機関ニ依  
在支米國貿易ハ、妨害ニ関シ、米國政府ハ、日本政府ニ對シ  
提議スルニ必要ヲ、近年屢々痛感シ、素々々々等、私閣  
下ニ申シテ、タテ。

此ニ於テ、日本軍當局、依リ施行スル一般貿易ハ、爲  
替方法、關シ、主シテ個別商品、特ニ獸皮類、毛皮、羊  
毛、象牙、卵製品、刺繡製品、米國貿易ニ對シ、石炭、  
妨害ニ関シ、屢々提議サテ、来々。

今々石油製品、米國貿易ニ對シ、價大ニ妨害ニ日本  
政府、注意ヲ促ス事ハ、必要ナリ。

張家口、廣東ニ及ビ沿岸都市、及ビ興地ニ於テ石油  
製品、主トシテ燈用油、燭等、米國貿易ハ、  
米國外交官及ビ領事ヨリ地方當局へ、再三、提議ニ不拘  
續テ、専横ニ許シ難キ妨害ヲ加ヘテ居ル

外交關係 一七三頁



Ex. #1025

Doc. No. 2200 (5)

page 1

Br. Ex. 136

TELEGRAM  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREY)  
(Paraphrase)

Excerpt

WASHINGTON, September 3, 1940. 6 p.m.

334. At earliest moment possible, unless you perceive objection, please obtain further interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs and take up with him the two matters which follow, as under instruction from this Government;

(1) Refer to the conversation you had on August 7 with the Minister (your telegram No. 672, August 7, 10 p.m.) and say to him that within the past few days reports from several sources have come to the Department of State to the effect that the Government of Japan has presented an ultimatum to the French authorities in Indochina on Japan's demands for permission to Japanese armed forces, for purposes of military operations against China, to pass through French territory and to use military bases and other facilities. The Government of the United States is reluctant to believe these reports, and it wishes to point out the unfortunate effect on American public opinion from the point of view of Japanese-American relations if these reports prove to be correct. Especially will this be true in view of statement which the press attributed on June 19 to a representative of the Japanese Foreign Office which said, in effect, that Japan attached importance to maintaining the status quo in French Indochina.

.....

Foreign Relations II, pp. 291-292

4

Doc 220c (5)  
Exp 1025

電報

國務大臣ヨリ日本駐在大使(ケル)へ

(釋義)

拔萃

華盛頓

一九四〇年(昭和十五年)

九月三日午後六時

三三四

異議無キ限リ出来ルカケ早ク外

務大臣ト更ニ會見ヲ求メラレ、當政府ヨリナ指

令トシテ左記二件ヲ取り上げ論ゼラレ度シ

(一) 貴殿ノ八月七日ノ大臣トノ會談ニ言

貴殿六七二号八月七日午後十時、過去數日間

ニ數多ノ筋ヨリ、日本政府ハ中國ニ対スル軍事作

戦ノ爲ニ日本軍隊ノ佛蘭西領土通過並ニ軍

事基地及ビ他ノ便宜使用ノ許可ニ対スル日本

ノ要求ニ関シ最後通牒ヲ印度支那佛蘭西

當局ニ發シタル旨ノ報告ヲ國務省ハ入手セル

旨ヲ外相ニ告ゲラレ度イ。アメリカ合衆國

政府ハ此等ノ報告ヲ信ズルヲ欲セス、尚又當

政府ハ若シ此等ノ報告ガ正シイト言フ事ニナレバ

日米關係ノ見地ヨリ、米國ノ輿論ニ及ボス面白

カラヌ影響ヲ指摘セントスルモ、デアリ。特ニ六月

十九日新聞ガ述ベタ如ク日本ハ佛領印度支那於テ現狀維持

ヲ重要視スル事ハ日本外務省代表者ニ責任アリトシテ亦ル所

ヨリシテ前記ハ眞實ト云ヒ得ヨウ

外交關係第二卷 第二九二頁及二九三頁

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361

DOCUMENT NO. 220 C (7)

Page 1.

Br. Ex. 138

STATEMENT BY THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW)  
TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MATSUOKA)

My Government has instructed me to make the following observations in reply to the oral statement which was handed to me by the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs on September 14.

It is the opinion of my Government that the status quo of a third country is seriously affected when one of two countries which is engaged in hostilities with another insists, in order to attack the other, upon the right of the use of airdromes and the right of passage for troops through the third country. In the light of the Japanese Government's announced desire that the status quo be maintained in the Pacific area there appears to be an inconsistency in connection with the stipulations of this nature which are being made upon the authorities in Indochina by the Japanese Government.

The American Government urges upon all governments the employment of peaceful means only in their relations with all other governments and with all other regions. The attitude of my Government toward the unwarranted use of pressure in international relations is global.

(TOKYO,) September 19, 1940.

Foreign Relations II, pp 296-297



Q# 1027

P. 1 \*

D.C. NO. 2200 (17)

Fr. Ex. 152

THE JAPANESE EMBASSY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Excerpt.

No. 235

.....

In view of the situation of iron and steel scrap markets, the supply and demand of these materials and the volume shipped to Japan, the Japanese Government finds it difficult to concede that this measure was motivated solely by the interest of national defense of the United States.

.....

(WASHINGTON,) October 7, 1940.

Foreign Relations II, p. 223 at p. 224,

4p1027  
doc 220c(17)

日本大使館 → 國務省宛  
抜萃  
第三三五号

原料層鐵並に屑鐵に鋼市場の情況及び其の原  
料の雪崩に似て日本へ送られた量に關する  
に對するに鑑み日本政府は合衆國の國防  
に承認し難い此の處置の動機となつ  
てある

外交關係 二 三三三頁  
二 三四頁

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Doc. No. 699A

Page 1

No. 248 (31/72 E/40)

MEMORANDUM

On the 24th December, 1938, the British Ambassador handed to the then Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs a memorandum respecting outstanding Anglo-Japanese cases in China.

In continuation of that document Sir Robert Craigie now communicates a further memorandum regarding the present position of the most serious cases still outstanding. It will be observed that some of the cases mentioned were included in the representations made in 1938, and these have been marked with an asterisk for convenience of reference. It is requested that special attention may be given to these cases, which have been outstanding for more than 2 years, and in particular to the Yangtze claims, which are perhaps the gravest example. It will be seen that no progress has been made regarding these claims and that no payment whatever has been made in respect of them by the Japanese Government, although the latter's assurance that compensation would be given is now nearly 3 years old.

The

By 1020  
Doc. 699A

標題：英邦於之自英間ノ諸懸案ニ関スル覺書

一九四〇年(昭和十五年)十月二十二日

披平 覺書

一九三八年(昭和十三年)十月十四日英國大使公當時、外務省  
ニ對シテ支那ニ於ケル自英間ノ諸懸案ニ関スル覺書ヲ付シタリ。

該書種類引續キロト・クローキ一卿 SIR ROBERT CRAIGIE  
ノ令尚未解決ノ重要ナル事件若干ノ現情ニ関シテ及一通ノ覺書ヲ  
只今通達スルモナリ。

右に掲ゲラレタル諸事件、或ルモノ一九三八年(昭和十三年)ニ屬サレタル  
若干ノ抗議申入中ニ包含サレタルヲ認メ得ク、之等ノ参照ニ便  
ナラシムルガ爲星印ヲ以テ標示シ置キタリ。

是等事件、二十年以上ニ亘リ懸案トナリ居ルモノニテ、就中  
恐ラクノ最モ重大ナル實例ナル揚子江關係ノ若干ノ要求ニ對  
シ特別ノ注意ノ拂ハシコトヲ要求スルモノナリ。

右ニ依リ御覽ノ通り之等ノ要求ニ對シテ何等ノ進捗モ見セズ、  
又賠償ヲニ拂フベシトノ日本政府ノ保證ガ與ヘラレテ以來約三  
十年ニ亘タル今日其等ニ對シテ日本政府ヨリ何等ノ返拂モ爲サレ  
ズ未済ノ儘トナリ居ル次第ナリ。該明細表ガ一切ヲ網羅スル  
意圖ヲ以テ作製サレタルモノニ非サルコトヲ外務省ニテ了解セラル  
ヲ欲ス。

尚該明細表中ニ含ムル居ル案件中十二件ヲ下テタルモノニ関シ、  
英帝國大使館ガ呈表ニ爲シタル申入ガ今以テ何等ノ回答  
モ與ヘラレズ有リト謂フ事ヲ了解セラルベシ。該事件中ニ多  
數ノ二十年以上モ其再未解決ニアル次第ニ付、是等全無



Doc. 699A.

件ニ對シテ速カニ調査カルヘラレバ英國大使ノ感謝ニ堪ヘ  
ル所ナリ。

在東京英國大使館

一九四〇年(昭和十五年)十一月二十二日。

支那ニ於ケル日英間ノ懸案摘要

A — 一般

鐵道問題

(a) 北京奉天鐵道

(1) 一九三三年(至三年)上海ノ  
SHANGHAI-FENGCHIANGノ  
鐵道ニ對シテ日本鐵道  
借款ニ未詳

(2) METROPOLITAN CAMEL CARRIAGE CO.ノ  
會社ニ對スル債務未詳

(1) 及(2)ノ上ニテ日本軍ノ鐵道復  
用ニ関スル代償未詳(起因ス)

(3) 國際協定ニ違反シテ熱河  
ニ到ル併行鐵道線ノ敷設

(4) 英國關係ノ諸權益  
ニ該鐵道ニ關スル國際條  
約ヲ全ク無視スル北支諸  
鐵道ノ統合

第一回申入  
一九三七年  
(昭和十二年)

十月十一日

現狀  
之等ノ諸問題ハ一九三  
七年(昭和十二年)十月  
以降屢次ノ抗議中  
ニ指摘セラレタル所ナ  
リ  
一九三六年(昭和十三年)七月  
十日石井氏ヨリ英國ノ權利  
ヲ侵害スル意圖無シトノ嚴  
密ノ保證ヲ與ヘラレテ有リ  
タルモ日本軍憲ノ行動ニ  
依リテサレタル條約違反ニ  
對シテ何等満足スベキ説明  
ナシ。又日本側ノ行動ヨリ  
是等種々ナル形ニテ無視  
カレタリタル英國ノ權益ヲ  
尊重スベキ何等満足ナル指  
摘ニ居ラス。京奉鐵道  
ノ建設ニ關スル國際間ノ諸  
協定ニ反シテ支鐵道諸機  
構ガ日本ノ支配下ニ在ル事  
業會社ニ依リ接收サレトシテ  
居ルノ事實ニ關スル諸權益  
ニ對シテ英國大使ハ一九三九年  
(昭和十四年)三月二十四日注意  
ヲ喚起セリ。又斯ノ如キ指摘ヲ  
早クモ答ヘリ。回答ナシ。保證ヲ

Doc. 699 A

支那に於ける日英間、懸念案摘要

A 一般

問題  
鐵道

第二回申入

現 狀

(外) 上海—南京

鐵道並上海

—杭州—寧波

鐵道

(一) 英人社債所有

者、爲三行

鐵道線路調

査し、因る一切

便宜ヲ日本

當局が英人

技術者ニ對シ

拒絕セルコト及

ビ西鐵道ニ

衆ヨリ利用

セラル、故

ヲ牽ケツ、之

事實ニ拘ハ

ラス社債所

有者ニ對シ、債

務支拂ノ措

置ヲ怠リタ

ルコト。

一九三三年  
(昭和十二年)

一月十三日  
(上海)

四月二十日  
(東京)

序壇大將、英國大使ニ九月八日該鐵道ノ  
地域ハ漢口作戰ノ背後ニ位置スル重要  
ナル地域ナリト告ケタリ

英國大使ヨリ爾後ノ申入ニ答テ十二月八日  
外務大臣ハ調査ヲ可能ナラシムル何等  
ノ変化モ起ラザリシ旨答ヘタリ。日本政

府ハ同政府ガ鐵道線路ノ損害ニ對シ部分  
的ニ責任ヲ付ト、英國政府ノ見解ニ同意セ

ズ。一九三九年(昭和十四年)三月二十四日英  
國大使ハ該地方ノ軍事行動ガ終結シタル

コトヲ指摘シ、社債所有者ノ爲ニ當該路  
線ノ視察ヲ許可セシムコトヲ求メ且

社債所有者ニ對スル債務履行ノ爲  
メノ措置ガ執ラレタリヤラ質問セリ、

上海—南京鐵道ノ法的所有權ニ関  
シ更ラニ一九三九年(昭和十四年)十月

十日外務省ニ對シ數項ノ申入ヲセリ  
而シテ一九四〇年(昭和十五年)三月二

日回答ヲ促セリ、回答ナシ。

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支那二於九日英問題懸案摘要

鐵道問題  
A  
關係

(三) 中 部 鐵 道

Central China  
Railways / 鐵道  
併

何二此英屬權益  
之實現及建設計畫  
之日本政府承認  
之日、保證之密請

第一般  
第一回申入  
九三年  
(昭和三三年)

四月二十九日

現 狀

九三年(昭和三三年)五月二  
日及

七月四日二英國大使(英三申令  
十之上海南京地域二在九諸線之  
統制及為中部鐵道會社  
/ THE CENTRAL CHINA RAILWAY CO /  
之創立之事二對之抗議之且  
英國之權利及權益之充分尊重  
之情況速之措置之密請也  
回答也

回答十二

94-

94-

Doc 699A.

支那三鉄路日英間、懸念を摘要

A-1-般

一鐵道關係

本國申入

現 狀

津浦鐵道(1933年3月15日)

1933年3月15日

1933年(昭和十三年)九月十日、日本、河

TIENSIN-PUKOW RAILWAY

(昭和十三年)

省三、該鐵道が相當、損害を蒙る所あり

収入減少

且、全債務、支拂に對し責任を負ふ事

額借金懸案

得、又、日本側、手、修理中、七日、述

急金三兆円

べり。

1933年(昭和十三年)五月十九日

1933年(昭和十三年)五月十九日、英國大使

外國人若輩

館、英國政府、有主張、容認、得

遂行、三條

此旨、説明、ス、兵、英國、亦、工兵隊

備、三、事

、阻止、純粹、三、時、的、一、七、夕、事、保障

ヲ要求ス

ヲ要請セリ

同、信、十二

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支那ニ於テノ日英間懸案摘要

A-一般

船舶関係

第一回申入

現 状

(a) 汽船モリスアリア

リツタ及アリア二船、所有者が歐

及ビイラ抑留事件

種條件ニ是等船舶ノ解除ト

/SEGRES//LILITAX

同時ニ賠償ニ及ビ要索ヲ發シテ

/DHOLERA/

此事ニ同意スル旨提案セシモ拘

英國汽船モリスアリア三九基船知西

ラズ又アリア、所有者が該船、

五三九基(昭知西基)五月二十日

釋放ト同時ニ其西女求テ重索

西貢自領子之港 (モリス)

ト減額スル旨提案セシモ拘

/CHAYUAN-BAY/ (南)

ニ今尚全三隻抑留中ト該同

ニ於テ日本艦隊艦ニ

敷ニ南ノ英國大使ヨリ前後十五回、

ヨリ捕獲セル

通牒ヲ發シタル結果外務省ヨリ

英國汽船リツタ 五三九基(昭知西)

一九四〇年(昭知西)七月三十日附ヲ

/LALITA/ (八日在留) 六月三十日

以テ日本側某業會社(昭知西)船

艦ヨリ福州附近ニ (リツタ)

が備船セラルト場合ニ日英政府

千四月二十七日捕獲

ト同意スルニテ、英國政府ハ該船

セル

船ヲ徵用セザル旨ノ保證ヲ索スル

英國汽船リツタ

場合ニ該船舶ノ釋放ヲ考慮

亦捕獲セル日本

スベシト回答アリ

海軍ヨリ抑留セ

子

支那三在儿日英問、野心博事摘要

二船白関係  
A  
(6) 船名  
事件 (PARTIAL)  
英國海軍部  
保險了附名  
シヤ汽船  
基隆 / KEELUNG

一般  
第四号入  
一九三  
(昭和十三年)  
三月十四日

現狀  
日本高田、支那より申し、  
船籍轉、効力三付之ヲ承認  
スル事ヲ拒絶ス

々

7

正當三案行  
儿次案行  
一九四〇年五月二十九日、日本側回  
答、不正轉籍、疑感、隨心定  
船、取扱、三案、此、三、案、行







doc 699A

(日本系)内外  
工場 集者 横山  
比 三 以 該 工場  
強制 占有 反 之  
運 送 不 當 然  
權 利 不 該  
及 系 會 在 操  
業 三 對 之 日 本 官  
處 三 加 之 居  
以 依 然 之 於 運  
對 之 抗 議 不

更 三 九 三 九 年 (昭 和 十 四 年) 二 月 六 日 及 一 五  
四 〇 年 (昭 和 十 五 年) 三 月 十 日 督 促 狀  
予 發 送 不  
同 案 卷 十 二

支那三在日英間懸案摘要

B-1 上海

Doc 699A

問題  
 二紡績工場  
 (山) 宋興業  
 工場 / SLING  
 SING No. 7 MILL  
 日本人所所有  
 紡績廠 / KLING  
 OAH MILL / 八牛  
 三記工場  
 錦、標、台、並、其  
 化、好、等、行、為、  
 停止、于、要、求、且  
 管、財、人、之、查、港  
 上海銀行 / THE  
 HONGKONG AND  
 SHANGHAI BANKING  
 CORPORATION /  
 為該工場  
 接收、為、便  
 專、子、提、供、之  
 子、子、主、張、之、

第一回申入  
 一九四〇年  
 (昭和十五年)  
 四月四日

現狀  
 回合、之、

支那と於て日英間、懸念案摘要

(一) 北支

Doc 699A

問題  
一、為替並輸入統  
制  
北支に於て英國  
貿易に面する難  
貿易並外國為替  
二、對て日本側  
措置に依り貿易に  
元(元)の措置に  
條約上、權利並  
側保障及及英國  
政府、行動、權利  
留保、

第四回申入  
一九三九年  
(昭和十四年)  
三月十日

現状  
四月十三日、日本自答、該手段、目的  
「聯合準備銀行券の貿易上、通貨  
兌換率の平等と確保」に在り、述べ  
「又何等一般の貿易並為替統制を特  
に何等差別待遇を計畫せざりし。英  
國大使、依て一九三九年(昭和十四年)三月十日  
該制限、英國對て重大且不當に差別  
待遇を構成せしと有假し居る日回答  
也り。  
一九四一年(昭和十五年)八月十日、英國大使  
最近日本之向に依り施行せる輸入  
統制規則對て注意を喚起し英國確  
愈對て何等、差別待遇無効にす  
期に及既、契約済、商品輸入に對  
許可を與へる保障を求めたり。  
十月二十日、日本自答、北支官憲が  
此等事項を満足する方法が既に  
処理せられた。並に言ふべきは情勢の  
事實起り居るに日述べたり。

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支那於九日英領事案摘要

C-1 北支那

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問題  
/TSIAOTSO/  
天津法界各企業聯合會各鈔山

英國重要權益是  
予鈔山。日本官吏，  
故受同。事實上，  
支那官吏沒收其。  
強硬抗議。不。即  
刻返還。亦。不。

不同申入  
一九三九年  
(昭和十四年)  
十月十四日

現狀

一九三九年(昭和十四年)十月十日。  
ROBERT CRAIGIE 卿。該鈔山  
P. H. T. 氏。該鈔山  
返還。心。法。企業聯合。財產  
及機械類。保護。方。要求。且  
之。日本官吏。煽動。就。証  
據。提出。其。  
斯。如。行。而。日本。政府。予  
之。屢。次。保。証。討。之。顯。著。之  
違。背。之。行。之。良。好。關。係。  
復。活。之。上。之。困。難。之。增。大。之。不。可。  
一九四〇年(昭和十五年)一月十日附。  
日本側。同。會。之。機。械。類。之。多。  
日本。軍。占。領。之。方。搬。去。之。之。趣  
述。居。之。  
當。該。確。查。之。英。國。側。代。表。者。正  
常。之。條。件。下。之。支。那。側。地。方。官。憲  
之。該。鈔。山。之。運。營。之。權。利。之。認  
之。

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支那之日本問題要略

三、LINGTAO 英國船  
 船並貿易三訂之  
 差別待遇  
 三、英國船隻  
 運往或種便宜  
 予之公之日本  
 保障定拘之英國  
 船隻依然差別待  
 遇及取扱遲延、  
 對象トナリテ、  
 斯カハ語制限、  
 更ニ優禮要求ス。

北支  
 英同中人  
 一九一九年  
 五月十九日

現狀  
 更ニ教次、連符後外務省、一九  
 〇一年、五月二十日、現地軍務局  
 二依リ、最近一層、便宜ヲ供与  
 ス、仍措置其、序之、旨同答ナリ。  
 卜伊事實ト斯、便真實現之  
 心ニ至ラナリ。而、四月五日、督促  
 後、英國大使、五月六日、呼頭、  
 以、上英國船隻、對之差別待遇  
 一新、カハ、事例若干、付更ニ申入、  
 事例ニ就テ、之、六月十三日、申入  
 三、於、主題、一、採、上、答、次、亦、  
 何、字、同、答、ト、

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抜萃、

(4)

支那ニ於ケル日英間懸案摘要

一 北支那

問題

西武定府、十一名(朱家三)三九四〇年  
 ケル英軍六名ト傳道會焼失(昭和十五年)  
 英國メソヂスト傳道會、支那  
 遊擊隊ニ對スル所謂治療、康  
 ニヨリ其數復トシテ、十二月二十五日  
 日本軍ニ依リ焼拂ハル  
 強硬抗議ニ即時調査ヲ要求  
 ス。且以賠償、請求、權利ヲ留保ス。

第一回申入

一九四〇年  
(昭和十五年)  
一月九日

現狀

該傳道會ハ排日運  
 動中心ト為リ居  
 リテヲ発見セシメ、依ッ  
 テ日衛上焼拂ハル  
 ルモノナリト、日本側  
 ヲリ二月十二日附四答  
 アリタリ。  
 日本軍隊ノ行動ハ  
 全ノ理不盡ニシテ  
 甚指スルモノナリト  
 英國政府ハ思考ス  
 ルモノニテ此種事  
 件再発防止、徹底  
 措置ヲ採ルベシト  
 ナル旨英國公使  
 ハ四月十日附四答

日本外務省ヨリ入手セルモノ

國際檢察部書類番号第六九九号

支那ニ於ケル日英間懸案摘要



支那 = 於十九日英商懸案摘要

Doc 699A

D - 中部支那

問題

一 爆擊事件 (續\*)

(b) 宜昌 (ICHANG)

一九三九年(昭和十四年)八月六日  
 THE ASIATIC PETROLEUM CO.  
 細亞石油會社、施設及三十丁  
 JARDINE, MATHESON & CO.  
 毛の二會社所有、汽船二隻破損  
 該船二在り、英國將校一名及支  
 那人水兵三名日本機、空襲ニヨリ  
 負傷セリ。  
 對國、權利を侵害スル日本政府、保  
 證ニ就キ注意ヲ喚起シ爾後一層  
 嚴重ナル命令、発セラルルヲ要シ  
 賠償要求、權利ヲ留保ス

第六回  
 一九三九年  
 (昭和十四年)  
 八月十日

現狀  
 回答ナシ

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支那ニ在ル日英自衛警察摘要

Doc 699A

(2)

D - 中部支那

問題

(一) 爆撃事件他(續々)  
 (C) パーホイ / PAKHOI /  
 一九三九年(昭和十四年)英國  
 總領事ヨリ香港駐在自本  
 總領事ニ対シテ記兩視察  
 シ詳細暴露ニ通達シテリシ毛  
 拘テ一九三九年(昭和十四年)  
 八月十九日。パーホイ PAKHOI  
 支那停道運子校病院爆撃事  
 カル。調査及再發防止措置等  
 要ス。

送回中入

一九三九年

(昭和十四年)

九月十日

現狀

回答十三

No. 17

支那ニ於テ日英間懸案摘要

③

IV - 中部支那

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問題題

一 漢口租界 (續\*)

(A) 平記

三月十五日英國メソヂヤ會  
會暴動、際エメソヂヤ

牧師 REVEREND AG. LEIGH 喪死

之ニ對シ抗議ニ再從不止

確保ニ死テテ指置及陳謝

表明方ヲ要望ニ且以

賠償要求、權利ヲ留保ス。

答復申入

現狀

一九〇九年

五月十日送附、督使

(昭和四年)

然モ拘テ回答ナシ

三月十六日

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支那ニ於ケル日英間、懸案摘要  
D-1 中部支那

① 向題

爆撃事件 (續キ)

(e) 西安

ハニキス、六トソ  
英國バプテスト傳道會記  
念病院ハ明瞭ニ標識カ  
兼ニ上海ニ於テ該病院  
ハ屢次申入ヲ為シ、  
拍ラズ右病院、一九三九年  
（昭和十四年）三月八日、日本航空  
機ニ依リ爆撃ヲ受ケ、  
市場中ノ處場ハ破壊  
シ、又他ニ被害アリ。  
調査、再發防止保證及  
陳謝表明ヲ要求ス。  
賠償請求ニ對シ權利保  
償ス。

第一回申入

一九三九年  
（昭和十四年）

三月十三日

現狀

五月十日ニ送附セラルル  
督促狀ニ拘ラズ答  
答ナシ。

支那ニ於ケル日英関係懸案摘要

D-1 中部支那

問題

第一回甲八

現狀

二 中央銀行

CENTRAL CHINA BANK

一九四〇年  
(昭和十五年)  
五月二十七日

新發券銀行が南京  
当局ヨリ設立セラルベシト

報道盛ナリ。

カ、ル措置ハ第三國ノ貿

易勿並ニ日英関係ニ最

モ不草ナル影響ヲ与

スベシ、而シテ日本側ノ保

障ト兩立セザルベシ。

情報ヲ要求ス。

十月二十三日英國大使ハ中央

發券銀行ガ十可業務ヲ開

始スベキ旨表明セル南京政府

財政部大臣ノ声明ニ對シ注

意ヲ喚起セリ。

イキ一御

SIR ROBERT

CRAIGIE / 同銀行設立ヲ防

止スベキ措置ノトラルベキ事ヲ

求メタリ。

回答ナシ。

支那ニ於ケル日英同盟案摘要

Doc. 699A

D - 中部支那

問題  
 三州/KUK-ANG/英領  
 臣民自己、賦産ニ再保  
 有又等ニ對シテ拒絕  
 ンヤ会社/BITTERFIELD  
 AND SWIRE/ 煙草  
 公司/ JARDINE  
 MATHESON AND CO./ 石油  
 公司/ ASIATIC PETRO  
 LEUM CO./ 煤油煙  
 公司/ BRITISH-AMERICAN  
 TOBACCO CO./ 代表、大工  
 煙草、許可ヲ拒絕  
 多ク、然レモ他國及  
 ンヤニ於テ在ル石油公  
 司/ THE STANDARD VACUUM  
 OIL CO./ 代表、  
 八、煙草、許可ヲ得ル  
 日本政府、此種、差別  
 待遇ヲ支持スルニ定メ

事實  
 五〇年  
 (昭和五年)  
 五月十四日

現狀

六月十五日、日本側回答ハク、乃  
 一、此ニ下ニ在リヤ会社及、石油公  
 司、煙草、公軍事の必要差  
 二、不可能ナリ之事、此一、云ニ云  
 三、会社場合、同社、利敵行為、  
 為ニ許可ヲ保留スル事然  
 四、英米煙草会社ニ對シテ、條件  
 下ニ帰還、許可ガ既ニ得ニシタ  
 五、此等、諸事、尚英國國權ヲ發奮  
 六、差別待遇、意圖、無ク、ト事。

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ニ非ガレモト推定ハ且無  
商社ノ九江博覽ノ許可  
ガ可及的証クニ亦合ハレキ  
ト主張ス。

支那三港(揚子江、長江、黃河)  
D-1 支那支那

Doc 699

向題  
 田 / YANGTSE DELTA RE-  
 揚子江、三角洲  
 STRICTION ON BRITISH SHIPS  
 國領事對英限制  
 揚子江、三角洲、航行  
 次、如英本軍、行動、  
 國、注意、喚起、  
 (a) 英領事許可制、  
 企圖  
 (b) 英國系船舶、  
 接干涉  
 (c) 支那側、  
 英國船舶、  
 別待遇。  
 英國政府、  
 限制、  
 權利、  
 加之、南京當局、  
 滬、  
 航、  
 官、

英領事  
 一九三九年  
 (昭和十四年)  
 有者

現狀  
 地方官廳、  
 要求、  
 狀、  
 附、  
 局、  
 行、

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最近上海總稅司通達  
凡在稅務管理及倉庫  
的外國貿易，雙方討  
不學，如管工此公  
適等之指令，即刻發  
之，不之，亦不。



支那の海軍と海軍の発展

第一中隊本部

Doc 99A

問題

五揚子江航行  
行英艦船  
對江艦船  
別符

第一中隊本部

九三九年  
昭和三十四年  
四月十日

現状

九三九年(昭和三十四年)七月百支艦  
大領家乙及甲之利船船が女過  
美籍英艦船が損害を蒙り  
九月廿四日以降一般艦船  
は僅三隻に減少し指撥六日  
以答無三

(A) 日本艦船  
二隻以上を  
集めて支荷  
現在新貨倉  
限り行六日  
九時

(B) 西三島  
搬入九隻  
倉庫  
運送  
修火

(C) 支那艦船  
輸送  
支那艦船  
九隻

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支那ニ於テ之月並同懸在來摘要

正一南支那

Doc 699A

問題  
 一 廣東 / CANTON  
 廣東及八廣  
 易  
 十月十日廣東  
 於平定廣東  
 乙乙三條  
 廣東  
 日本  
 禁止  
 資財  
 日本  
 興  
 劃  
 八  
 求

支那  
 五九年  
 (昭和十四年)  
 十二月四日

現狀

九月廿五日日本側國答  
 九月廿七日日本側國答  
 不可



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支那ニ於ケル日英間ノ未解決事件ノ摘要

E - 南支那

題目 第一提議 現況

三、汕頭續ク

ト、輸出入物ニ對スル関税

汕頭復興委員會ハ、税務局ヲ設立シ、輸出入物品ニ對シ、任意寄附ニ依ル刺縫物ノ積出同様ニ課税シテ居ル、支那海關稅權ノ侵害停止ヲ要求ス

一九四〇年二月十日

二月十三日本側、回答ニ依リ、調査中ト、

了

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支那於中日問題之地位摘要

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問題

四香港領海侵  
 紀及三十二次襲擊  
 三艘船隻在天津  
 或八次在塘沽  
 現中日戰爭已告  
 年而揮三十一日  
 日本自本國海軍  
 以艦隊三艘  
 此是等八事件  
 屢次香港領海侵  
 紀事件

中日關係

現狀

英國大位公是等攻擊，停止  
 代之以極度抵抗戰爭，中日  
 此是等八事件。斯此攻擊，依  
 然繼續行將以下。



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之ニ関スル情報ヲ齎スル何方  
ヲ要求セリ。

外務省官吏ト大使館幹部ト

一九三九年／昭和十四年／二月

二十三日、三月二十四日、及四月二十

五日並一九四〇年／昭和十五年／

二月十四日、三月十六日及十月三十一

日、網目ニ関シテ討議セリ。外務省

ハ要求セル詳細ナル情報ヲ今

シ得タルヲ以テ、ソノ間若干ノ

通信ヲ行ヒタリ。然ルニ日本代

表ハ先般クニ等ノ要求取極ニ

対スル具体案ヲアルコトニ言及

セルモ未ダソノ提出ヲ見ズ、



支那ニ於ケル日英同縣憲案摘要

一 損害賠償請求

Doc 699 A

汽船 ASLAN 号  
船アスラン号  
日本海軍ニヨル二月  
七日乃至同月二十日、  
同該船、不法抑留  
ニ因リ生シタル損害  
及抑留中同船上ニ  
在リシ物件、盜難  
ニ對スル賠償請求、

第一回申入

一九三八年/船  
十三年/五月一日

現狀

日本政府、六月三日附回答中、同  
船ニ関スル書類不充分ナル旨申述  
セリ。又、同港、係船長ヨリ領收証書  
通提出サレタリト、コトニテ同船抑  
留中、物件盜難ヲ否認セリ。  
九月九日英國大使、同船ノ文書ニ  
關シ其事情ヲ説明セリ。  
外務大臣、該書類、附請不充足  
ノ理由ニ同船、抑留ヲ合理ニシテ  
努力ニ同港当局者ト、無線打合  
セヨリ抑留ハ避ケ得ラルベカリニ  
旨ヲ指摘セリ。  
船長、與ヘタル領收書ハ全ク個人  
的、モニテ船内用、モナリ。  
日本側、十月四日附回答、日本、全  
責任ヲ取ルコト能ハズ而シテ船長、  
共ノ領收書中、三萬五千元ノ損失申述  
ベシルヲ以テ、申立ラレタル盜難ニ関  
スル該問題ニ對シテ、之以上論議、  
余地無シト主張セリ。

Doc 699 A

支那ニ於テ日英同懸念案摘要

下ノ損害賠償要求

同題  
 三、香港領海、侵犯並ニ漁業ノ妨害事件  
 (四) 一九三七年九月二十日迄漁中、シテ若干日日本潜水艦ニ依リ沈没セリ

一九三六年  
 (昭和十三年) 一月五日

英回中人

現状

一九三六年八月十五日、英國大使ノ覺書ハ日本ノ聲明ヲ承認シ得ザル旨ヲ述ベ且之ニ依リ香港郵債三万四千六百六十九円ノ賠償請求ヲ提出セリ。

九月十九日、日本側回答ハ責任問題ヲ考慮スル旨ヲ拒絶セリ。英國臣民タルノ国籍ヲ有シ且日本軍艦ニ討テル攻撃ニ参加セザリシコトヲ証明シ得ル漁夫對テハ好意的無償支拂ヲ申出ナリ



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支那と於て日英間懸案摘要

下——損害賠償請求

問題	本問申入	現状
四月一日、空襲八	一九三八年 (昭和十三年)	二百十五磅空襲片、損害賠償請求
際、於て福州、三、破海地	七月九日	於、一九三九年三月三日英領事大佐
於、於英領事館、		自ら提出せり
損害		回答し

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△

支那ニ於ケル日英同懸案  
下ノ損害賠償請求

問題	不問申入	現状
五、冬令月十日及 月十日、反英示 成行進、際意 起、 <del>THE FOG</del> 及兵讀、 <del>INSTANT</del> 事會並英國財 産ノ損害	一九三九年 十月十日	十二月十日、英國大使館ヨリ支那債之千五百五 十四兩仙及米帛債三十兩七十五仙ノ損害賠償請求 が提出セラレタリ。一九四〇年三月三日、日本外務省ハ 支那非ナル反英運動ノ自然発生ノ正事、支那 機関が取締ヲナシ居タル事、は英支双方ノ現 地當局同ニ協議セラルベキモノトシ、且日本政府ハ 責任ヲ負フべき義務モ有シ、請求主張ノ受入理由 モ乏事ヲ(回答ニ奉タリ)英國大使館ハ一九四〇年 (昭和十五年)三月二十日附覽書ニ于テ英國政府 ハ支那地方政權ヲ認メタル事、青島並ニ之 界ガ日本軍ノ実力アル占領下ニアル事、且日本故 所ノ騷擾ヲ好ク責任アル事ヲ指摘シ、七月 二十日附條文ハ斯種ナル場合ヲ包含スル如ク 意図セララルモノナリ、故ニ英國大使館、彼 等ノ主張ヲ支持セリトシ、三月二十日附覽書ニ于 英國大使館ハ外務省ノ速ナル回答ヲ 亦ケタルニモ拘ラズ、INSTANTノ回答ヲ得ス。

支那ニ於ケル日英間懸念案摘要  
F——損害賠償請求

問題

第一回申入

現状

六 / IMPERIAL AIRWAYS

英帝ノ航空会社航空機

／ DARDANUS / インドナス

一九三九年(昭和十四年)

一九三九年  
(昭和十四年)

一月八日南支那アキヤウ

惠州ニ於テ攻撃ス

英公大使ハ該事件ニ関

シ強硬抗議ヲ申入レ又

何処ヲ飛翔シ居リタルモ

民間機ニ攻撃スル事ハ

甚カ不當ナル所為ナルコト

ヲ指摘セリ。

該航空機ノ屬籍ハ日本

側當局ニ當テ明確ナリ

シタリ。

英公政府ハ英公大使カ

日本政府先一九三九年

(昭和十四年)二月ニテ

附通告シ置キタル通リ

地域ノ何ヲ同ハズ或ル特

定ノ地域ヨリ英公機

英公大使ハ一九四〇年(昭和十五年)

一月ニ被害及損失ニ対シ一十七百六

ホンド八志三片ノ請求ヲ提出セリ。

該航空機ノ蒙レル相当ノ損害及英公

官憲ニ返還セラレシ際同機ノ航空機

トシテ使用不可能ナル状態ヲ記述セル本

請求ノ明細書ハ二月十三日英公大使館

ヨリ提出セシタリ。之ニ對スル回答ナカ

リシ故急遽ナル解決ヲ期待シ得ルヤ

否ヤヲ同合ニ為外務省定三月三日附

ニ以テ書面ヲ送附セリ。

四月三日附回答中ニ外務省ハ修理

ニ就テ日本官憲ハ當時義務的事項

トシテ何等指留ヲ採ラザリシヲ得ニ

鄭重ナル取扱ヲ與ヘタリ。

故ニ該事件ノ如何ナル損害ニ對シテ

モ日本政府ハ何等責任ヲ取ルベキ

理由ナシト申述ベ居レリ。

38

Doc 699A

ヲ排除スル權利ヲ日本  
 政府側ニ許容セザリシ  
 所ナリ。  
 英公使亦五日間ニ  
 皇國機操縱三名ノ抑  
 留ニ付テ強硬抗議ヲ申  
 入レ賠償請求ノ權利  
 ヲ留保ス且斯如事  
 件反復阻止スル為メ  
 訓令ハ關係日本側出  
 先官憲ニ對シ発せヨ  
 事ノ保障ヲ要求セリ。

支那ニ於ケル日英問題案、摘要

五 — 損害賠償請求

Doc 699A

問題

七、一般請求  
 一九三八年(昭和十三年)六月二十  
 日乃至一九四〇年(昭和十五年)  
 十一月十日、間支那ニ於ケル日  
 本軍作戦、結果英兵八人、  
 蒙リタル損害ニ関スル十四号、  
 賠償請求ヲ提出セリ。  
 加之、M. HAYWARD /  
 加三(イブド氏及  
 MESSRS. BUTTERFIELD & SWIRE /  
 バタフィールド及スワイア社  
 IN RESPECT OF THEIR HOKAI 社  
 (漢口ニ於ケル該社、北極職員  
 STAFF QUARTERS AT HANKOW /  
 宿舎関係) 関係賠償請求ヲ  
 別途提出セリ。

第一回甲入

現状

一九三八年  
 (昭和十三年)  
 六月二十日

請求總額四十一萬  
 四千六百五十四ポンド四  
 シリガセベニスノケ。  
 合計五千ポンド二シリガ  
 セベニスノケノ請求ヲ  
 撤回セリタルモノト見做  
 シ得。  
 外ニ二千九ポンド十七  
 シリガ ニベニス減額セ  
 ラレタルモノモアリ。  
 随テ首題関係ノミニテ  
 未済残額八十四万九千  
 六百二十四ポンド 五シリガ  
 ニベニスノケトナル。

39



MEASURES TO BE TAKEN TOWARDS THE PEOPLES  
OF EAST ASIA.  
(Measures for Burma)

Prepared by the Racial Question  
Committee of the National  
Policy Research Institute  
/Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai/

20 September 1940

SECRET

Kindly note that this report  
is not being published

MEASURES FOR BRITISH BURMA

(1) PURPOSE

p.1

The purpose is to free Burma, as a part of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, from the fetters of British imperialism as soon as possible to make it an independent state composed of the Burmese people, and to admit it into membership of the East Asia Co-operative Body.

(2) EXECUTION

The following two plans are the practical plans conceivable at this time:

- (A) The purpose is to be achieved by occupying Singapore at a favorable opportunity during the progress of Germany's operations against England, and then by taking some proper means (use force if circumstances require it).
- (B) Independence is to be given impetus by pushing forward the reduction of Yunnan and showing every sign of intending to move into Burma via Chiang Kai-shek's supply route.

(3) REASONS

p.2

- (A) To free the Burmese people from British domination, place them under our guidance, and permit them to cooperate with the peoples of Japan, Manchukuo, China, French Indo-China, Thailand, etc., in the system of the New Order in East Asia as a part of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, is the way to develop and manifest the spirit and ideal of Japan's foundation by taking advantage of the present affair.
- (B) Since the First European War, the Burmese people have gradually waked up politically and have developed strong aspirations to free themselves from the yoke of Britain and to establish an independent state. Numerous political organizations were born, and the movement has been continued, although there have been ups and downs. Taking advantage of the development of the present European War as a grand opportunity, there is now a tendency to bring about a movement to achieve their long-cherished hope with Japan's assistance.
- (C) If Japan should look on with folded arms on this occasion, we would in all probability miss the chance to embrace the Burmese in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Not only that, there is the possible danger of placing them under the influence of Germany, Italy, or the United States.

(4) PREPARATIONS

- p.3
- (A) In order to reinforce preparatory measures towards Burma, the Japanese Consulate at Rangoon should be promoted to a Consulate-General and its staff increased by the addition of necessary personnel, whereby the preparatory measures for assisting the attainment of independence may be expedited.
  - (B) British exploitation of Burma should be exposed by means of newspapers and pamphlets with the view to stimulating the race-consciousness of the Burmese.
  - (C) Under the pretense of sight-seeing or the inspection of industries, influential Burmese should be invited to visit Japan in order to discuss measures for attaining independence.
  - (D) Adequate contacts should be maintained with the various political parties whose platforms call for the independence and freedom of Burma, and also with the priest class. The essence of Burmese Buddhism should be studied and in case counter-measures are to be provided, serious consideration should be given to them.

(APPENDIX)

By the way, the political parties which aim at independence are as follows:

(1) The United Party.

This party represents a federation of five parties, namely: the People's Party, 'Ba Shi' Party, Free Burma League, Mandalay 21 Group, and the Ba Shwo Party. Prince TE CHIN HWA, grandson of the last King of Burma is President of this party, which is guided by the influences of BA PE, head of the People's Party, which is the Majority Party.

(2) BA MAW Party.

This is a powerful political party headed by ex-Premier Dr. BA MAW. Leading the masses through communism, this party ultimately aims at the complete independence of Burma. It was reported in the papers recently that BA MAW was held in custody.

(3) CHI HLAING Party.

Headed by CHI HLAING, President of the State Council, this party aims at attaining independence gradually.

(4) THAKIN Party.

This party is also known as the Freedom Fighters League. It is a new party headed by a priest named SOYA MINE. It makes it a principle to appeal, if necessary, to force in order to get freedom for Burma. It has ten thousand members, and looks to Japan for assistance to achieve independence.

The foregoing preparatory measures should be pushed forward side by side with each other.

MEASURES TO BE TAKEN TOWARDS THE PEOPLES  
OF EAST ASIA.  
(Measures for Burma)

Prepared by the Racial Question  
Committee of the National  
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2400 A-1

Ex 1029

(秘)

昭和十五年九月二十日

東亞各民族對策

「緬甸對策」

國策研究會民族問題委員會

英領緬甸對策

(一) 目的

ビルマヲ東亞共榮圈ノ一環トシテ可及的速カニ英帝  
國主義ノ羈絆ヨリ離脱セシメ、ビルマ民族ヲ以テ構  
成スル一獨立國トナシ、之ヲ東亞協同體ニ加入セシ  
ムルヲ目的トスル。

(二) 實行

差當リ考ヘラレル實行案トシテハ次ノ二案デアル。

(イ) 勸進ノ對英作戰進展ノ機會ヲ利用シテ新嘉坡ヲ占

領シ然ル後適當ノ方法(場合ニ依リテハ實力ヲ行

位スル)ニ依リ目的ヲ達成スル。

(ロ) 雲南攻略ヲ進メ據蔣際ヨリビルマニ進入ノ態勢ヲ

示シテ勸立ヲ促進スル。

(三) 理由

(イ) ビルマ民族ヲ英國ノ支配ヨリ獨立セシメ、之ヲ我

2400A-2

國ノ指導下ニ置キ日、滿、支、印及支那、タイ共  
他ノ民族ト共ニ東亞共榮圈ノ一環トシテ東亞新秩  
序ノ體制ニ協同セシムル必キハ、今次事變ヲ契機  
トシテ我々國ノ精神理想ヲ發展顯現セシムル所以  
デアル。

(ロ) ビルマ民族ハ第一次歐洲大戰以來漸ク政治的ニ覺  
醒シ、爾來英國ノ霸權ヲ脱シ獨立國家タラントス  
ル熱望熾ニシテ、幾多ノ政治口實ヲ發生セシメ時  
ニ勢力ノ消長アルモ運動ヲ繼續シ、今次歐洲戰亂  
ノ進展ニ伴ヒ之ヲ絶好ノ機會トシ、我國ノ援助ニ  
依リ多年ノ宿望達セントスル機運ガ醸成サレツツ  
アル。

(ハ) 此際若シ我國ガ拱手傍觀的態度ニ出ヅルナラバ、  
悉クハビルマ民族ヲシテ東亞共榮圈内ニ包摂ス  
ル機會ヲ失スルノミナラズ、或ハ日、伊、米ノ勢  
力下ニ代替セシムルノ危險ガアル。

#### (四) 準備

(イ) 對緬準備工作ヲ強化スル爲、簡資領事館ヲ總領事  
館ニ昇格シ、且ツ之ニ必要ナル人員ヲ増加シ、以  
テ獨立援助ニ關スル準備工作ヲ促進スルコト。

(ロ) 民族的自覺ヲ促ス爲ニ新聞及ビ小冊子ヲ利用シテ  
英國ノ對緬擄取ヲ暴露スルコト。

(ハ) 觀光或ハ産業ノ視察ニ託シ、有力ビルマ人ヲ本部  
ニ招致シ獨立ノ方策ヲ談スルコト。

2400 A-3

(二) ビルマノ獨立自由ヲ綱領トスル各種ノ政黨並ニ倍  
侶階級ニモ充分連絡ヲ保ツコト。但シ同口佛敎ノ  
根本義ヲ研究シ、ソノ對策ヲ講ズル場合慎重ナル  
考慮ヲ拂フコト。

(附) 因ニビルマノ獨立獲得ヲ目的トスル政治口  
體ハ左ノ通りデアル。

(1) 聯合黨 (ユナイテツド・パーティー)

本黨ハ人民黨、バ。シ黨、自由ビルマ聯盟、マン  
ダレイ二十一人組、バ。シユエ黨ノ五黨ノ聯合デ  
ビルマ末王ノ孫テイ。ナン。ワ公ヲ總裁トシ、多  
數黨タル人民黨々主バ。ベノ勢力ニ依リ指導セラ  
レル。

(2) バ。モイ黨

前首相法博バ。モイヲ黨首トスル有力ナル一政黨  
デ、共產主義ニ依リ民衆ヲ率ヒビルマノ完全獨立  
ヲ最終目的トスル。最近バ。モイノ物禁ガ新聞ニ  
傳ヘラレタ。

(3) チー。ライン黨

參議會議長チー。ラインヲ黨首トシ、漸進的ニ獨  
立ヲ目的トスル。

(4) タキン黨

別名自由同爭聯盟 (フリィドム・フアイタース。  
リーグ) トモ稱シ僧侶ソヤ。ミネヲ黨首トスル新  
黨デビルマノ自由獲得ノ爲ニハ敢テ暴力ヲモ辭セ

2400A-4

ザルコトヲ本領トスル。數萬ノ黨員ヲ有シ獨立建  
成ノ爲メ日本ノ援助ヲ求メテキル。  
以上ノ準備工作ハ平行的ニ促進スルコト。

2400.A cert-1

證 明 書

余、矢次一夫ハ元國策研究會事務局長ノ資格ニ於  
テ茲ニ添附セラレタル五頁ヨリ成ル下記題名即チ  
一九四〇年ノ昭和十五年ノ九月二十日附東亞民族  
對策「編」對策」ノ文書ハ國策研究會ノ内ノ民族  
問題委員會ガ作製セルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ九月二十六日

東京ニ於テ署名

署名 欄 矢 次 一 夫 (署名)  
右ノ者ノ資格 元國策研究會事務局長  
證 人 江 村 元 則

Doc 2400A

證明書

余矢次一夫之國策研究会事務局長、資格ニ於テ茲ニ添  
附セラルル五頁ヨリ成ル下記題名即チ一九四〇年ノ昭和十五年  
九月三日附東亞民族対策「緬甸対策」ノ一事、國策研究  
會ノ内、民族問題要員會ガ作製セラルル下ニ茲ニ證明ス  
千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十年九月二十三日

東京ニ於テ署名者

署名者欄

署名者ノ資格

證明人

矢次一夫定

國策研究会事務局長

江村之則

証明

公式ノ年ニ關スル證明

余「リチャード・ワイチ・リアー」之ニ、余ガ聯合國  
指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト並ニ上記題名  
文書ハ余ガ公務上、日本政府、上記署名官吏ヨリ  
ルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

一九四〇年（昭和十五年）九月二十三日

東京ニ於テ署名者

署名者ノ資格

證明人

リチャード・ワイチ・リアー

國際檢査部調査官

對シテ「リチャード・ワイチ・リアー」

國主義ノ霸權ヨリ離脱セシメ、ビルマ民族ヲ以テ構  
成スル一獨立國トナシ、之ヲ東亞協同體ニ加入セシ  
ムルヲ目的トスル。

## (二) 實行

差當リ考ヘラレル實行案トシテハ次ノ二案デアル。

- (イ) 勸道ノ對英作戰進展ノ機會ヲ利用シテ新嘉坡ヲ占  
領シ然ル後適當ノ方法（場合ニ依リテハ實力ヲ行  
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- (ロ) 雲南攻略ヲ進メ援蔣路ヨリビルマニ進入ノ態勢ヲ  
示シテ獨立ヲ促進スル。

## (三) 理由

- (イ) ビルマ民族ヲ英國ノ支配ヨリ獨立セシメ、之ヲ我

2400 A-

昭和十五年九月二十日

秘

東亞各民族對策

「緬甸對策」

國策研究會民族問題委員會

英領緬甸對策

(一) 目的

ビルマヲ東亞共榮圈ノ一環トシテ可及的速カニ英帝

620149



(Statement of Source)

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Kazuo YATSUGI, hereby certify, in my capacity as former Chief of the Secretariat of the National Policy Research Association that the document attached hereto, consisting of five pages and bearing the following title: "The Policies towards the Races of East Asia (The Policy towards Burma)", dated September 20th, 1940 /Showa 15/ was drawn up by the Committee on Racial Problems of the National Policy Research Association.

Signed at Tokyo on this 26th day of September 1946 /Showa 21/

Signature: Kazuo YATSUGI  
(Written seal)

Capacity: Former Chief of the  
Secretariat of the  
National Policy Research  
Association

Witness: Motonori EMURA (Seal)

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
26th day of September, 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
Name

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis, 2nd Lt.

Investigator IPS  
Official Capacity

Outline of Proceedings of the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council Concerning the JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY Tripartite Treaty.

(Written by MATSUMOTO, Chief of the Treaty Bureau.)

The session was opened at 11:20 a.m., September 26, 1940 in the HIGASHI-SAN-NO-MA (TN: East Number Three) Room of the Imperial Palace.

Attendance:

The Privy Council HARA, President of the Privy Council  
SUZUKI, Vice-President of the Privy Council (Chairman of the Investigation Committee)

All Councillors were present as members of the Investigation Committee except KAMEKO and TANAKA who were absent.

The Government (TN: Cabinet) KONOE, Prime Minister  
MATSUOKA, Foreign Minister  
TOJO, War Minister  
OIKAWA, Navy Minister  
KAWADA, Finance Minister  
HOSHINO, President of the Board of Planning.

Moreover, the following persons were present as exponents.

MURASE, President of the Bureau of Legislation  
MORIYAMA, Chief of the Second Section  
MATSUMOTO, Chief of the Treaty Bureau  
MUTO, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau (TN: Army)  
ABE, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau (TN: Navy)  
HARAGUCHI, Chief of the Exchange Bureau  
MATSUKUMA, Chief of the Bureau of Banks  
TSUJI, Chief of the Superintendent Bureau

Proceedings:

1. The chairman of the committee announced the opening of the session and had the secretary read the draft of the treaty.

2. Prime Minister KONOE delivered a formal address as per separate paper No. A.
3. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA gave an explanation as per separate paper No. B.
4. Interpellation began according to rank.

Councillor KAWAI: I thoroughly understood the spirit of the draft. Personally, I have been desiring the conclusion of the JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY Alliance, and I have been expecting its speedy realization since Minister MATSUOKA came into office. Although I have heard talks amongst some factions that the activity of MATSUOKA was slacking, it is a great pleasure to see the treaty being at last concluded. According to the explanation just made by Minister MATSUOKA, the attitude of ITALY is not clarified. I ask your reply on this point.

Minister MATSUOKA: As I have just explained, negotiations of this treaty began between JAPAN and GERMANY. GERMANY said at the beginning that she would be responsible for ITALY. Yesterday the Italian Ambassador called upon me and informed me, according to his home government's instruction, that ITALY has entrusted to GERMANY everything concerning negotiations of the treaty and that ITALY would express wholeheartedly her approval of a draft of the treaty concluded between JAPAN and GERMANY.

Councillor KAWAI: Glancing over the exchange of statements appended to the treaty, I found that it was concerned only with the relations between JAPAN and GERMANY. However, is it not necessary to make a similar exchange with ITALY?

Minister MATSUOKA: As a fact, I think we should attach importance to GERMANY in every point and it would not hurt to consider ITALY as secondary. Therefore, I have had the German Foreign Minister state in the exchange of statements that he has absolute confidence in that, when assistance and co-operation of ITALY is desired, ITALY will no doubt act in concert with GERMANY and JAPAN.

Councillor KAWAI: I consider Article III of the treaty most important. Although I do not believe in a Japanese-American war, I think that, if worst comes to worst, the War and Navy Ministers may have something in readiness to avert defeat, and on this point I beg to have an explanation that will reassure us. Moreover, we cannot say definitely that the U.S.S.R. will not start something against JAPAN. In such a case, what attitude will GERMANY take?

War Minister TOJO: I will give my answer chiefly from the standpoint of the Army. If the worst comes to worst, only a small part of the military strength will be necessary to carry out the operation against the U.S.A. I think that you need not worry on this point. However, an operation against the U.S.A. cannot be said complete unless we consider an operation against the U.S.S.R. Therefore, adjustment of JAPAN-SOVIET relations is a very important matter. I think that, if we could accomplish this effectively, military preparation would be eased considerably, but when we consider the character of the U.S.S.R., JAPAN cannot neglect her own preparation. As to the CHINA Incident, we intend to bring it to a conclusion by making efficient use of this treaty before we find ourselves in the worst situation.

Navy Minister OIKAWA: Since the war preparedness of our present navy is complete, we will definitely not be beaten by the U.S.A., but in event of a prolonged war, it is necessary that we make sufficient preparations to keep up with the realization of the American plan for repletion of her navy. On this point, the Navy is adopting a policy prudent in every respect.

Councillor KAWAI: I fear nothing so much as the question of our materials. In case of a protracted war, how long will they last?

President of the Planning Board HOSHINO: As I explained yesterday (the President gave a detailed explanation of the material mobilization plan at the regular meeting of the Privy Council on the previous day), our country has for the last few years been making preparations for self-sufficiency as regards materials. Out of 2,100,000,000 yen in imports, 1,900,000,000 yen is received from ENGLAND and the U.S.A. If, therefore, the economic pressure is strengthened, it is necessary that we act prudently considering the activation of Article III of the treaty. As for iron, this year's output is expected to be 5,200,000 tons, and even at the worst we can expect an output of 4,000,000 tons. At present, 1,500,000 tons are used for armaments and military purposes, and the rest is allotted for the repletion of productive power and for private and governmental use. If we manipulate the repletion of productive power, and restrict private and governmental demands, giving consideration to cases when imports of scrap iron and iron material may be stopped, we shall not find

ourselves in so serious a situation. As regards metals other than iron, the case is different, but I think that you need not be seriously concerned, for we are now endeavouring to collect them from all parts of the world. Most important is petroleum. We are at present depending greatly on AMERICA, especially for aviation gasoline, almost all of which we must import from AMERICA. We must try to increase its production at home and, at the same time, must find means to secure it from places other than AMERICA. Recently, we have accumulated a considerable "stock" of aviation petroleum. However, in case of a prolonged war with the U.S.A., a self-sufficient supply cannot be obtained solely in JAPAN, MANCHURIA, and CHINA, whereas iron and other metals can be so obtained. Therefore, it is necessary that we speedily secure the right to obtain oil in the DUTCH EAST INDIES or NORTH KARAFUTO. This matter has been touched upon in the recent talk with GERMANY. Furthermore, you must understand that at present negotiations are being carried on for the peaceful acquisition of oil in the DUTCH EAST INDIES.

Councillor KAWAI: In regard to petroleum, at yesterday's talk the military and naval authorities too implied that considerable preparations have been effected. I wish to have some explanation by the War Minister and the Navy Minister.

Navy Minister OKAWA: As for the Navy, we have made preparations for a considerable length of time. Measures are now being taken regarding synthetic oil.

War Minister TOJO: The Army has prepared so that its materials may last for a considerable period. If an unusually prolonged war should occur, consideration must be given to oil for aircraft and mechanized units.

Recess.

Reopened at 1:10 p.m.

Councillor ISHII: In case a power is attacked, are we bound to enter into war immediately according to Article III? Has there been an agreement as regards this?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: In the exchange of statements, it reads: "It is understood that the deliberation of the three signatories will decide whether or not one of the contracting parties has been attacked in the sense of Article III of the treaty." (Letter from the German Ambassador at TOKYO.) This was inserted at my request so

as to clarify the point now in question. If the existence of an attack is deliberated and affirmed, the signatories are automatically bound to fight in co-operation. The time and the manner of assistance are to be decided upon by each of the respective signatories independently and then be referred for deliberation.

Councillor ISHII: I agree with the explanation given by the Foreign Minister, since the term "immediately" is lacking in the text. Furthermore, I have interpreted the joint special committee of Article IV to mean a conference of military specialists as in the case of ordinary treaties of alliance, but according to the explanation given just now by the Foreign Minister, it seems that economic problems would also be discussed by the committee. I would like to hear the explanations on this point.

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: At first, it was planned to have this matter provided for in the annexed secret protocol of the treaty. According to the said plan, a joint committee of the Army and Navy was to be established, one in TOKYO, and one in BERLIN or ROME. In addition, an economics committee was also to be set up, but it was decided not to draw up a secret protocol. This point I should like to have deliberated and decided between the two countries after the treaty is concluded. Since a committee to handle economic problems is thought to be necessary, it should be established.

Councillor ISHII: In this treaty there is no provision, such as almost always exists in treaties of alliance, regarding the non-conclusion of a separate peace. Is there any special object in this?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: I did not mention anything on this matter. To tell the truth, I thought that if the other party spoke of it, I would not object to its insertion, but if the other party did not touch on this subject, I considered it better not to have this provision. The reason is that, according to my idea, the object of this treaty was to prevent war and not to make war. Therefore, one of the reasons was that it was preferable not to have a provision for the non-conclusion of a separate peace, which anticipated the outbreak of war. Another reason was that in event a war should break out, I thought this question might be settled by reaching mutual agreement in the early stage of the war. Therefore, I did not propose this.

Councillor ISHII: Your opinions are quite right. However, Article I of the treaty speaks of the new order in EUROPE, but unless what is meant by the new order in EUROPE is made clear, how are we to know clearly the obligation of JAPAN? Were any understandings given in this respect?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: Although your question is reasonable, I think the meaning of the new order was fully expressed in the preamble. The preamble was our proposal and not a single word of amendment was made by the Germans.

Councillor ARIMA: I agree with government in its desire to avert an American-Japanese war as demonstrated by this treaty, but if JAPAN and the UNITED STATES are destined to fight, I think now is the best time. However, what concerns us most is our lack of petroleum. Although the Navy Minister said that we have made appropriate preparations, it cannot be supposed that, if hostilities began between JAPAN and the U.S.A., they would terminate in one or two years. Particularly since we are bound to use great quantities of petroleum in modern wars, we cannot help worrying whether or not synthetic petroleum and such will suffice in critical times. Therefore, I would like to have a reply on this point from the Navy Minister.

Navy Minister OIKAWA: Since we have just started with synthetic petroleum, we cannot say that it will suffice in critical times. Therefore, there is no other way than to acquire it from the DUTCH EAST INDIES or NORTH KARAFUTO through peaceful means, and it is quite likely this will occur. Consequently, when viewed from this point, I think adjustment of relations with the U.S.S.R. is very important. On the other hand, if the war is prolonged the Navy must consider the economic use of petroleum.

Councillor ARIMA: Would there be a sufficiency of petroleum of high octane rating?

Navy Minister OIKAWA: Yes, in regard to petroleum of high octane rating, the Navy has lately established a special research organ and has been producing it through methods original with the Navy. Moreover, considerable store is on hand.

Councillor KUBOTA: Perusing the wording of Article III of the treaty, we can conceive the U.S.S.R. to be included among countries not participating at present in the European War and the Sino-Japanese dispute. What is the

relation between JAPAN and the U.S.S.R.? Were there any conversations between GERMANY and the U.S.S.R.?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: In order to avoid that doubt, we established Article V. In reply to my inquiry whether any conversation was held with the U.S.S.R. concerning this treaty, STAHRER gave a negative answer. However, I am inclined to think STAHRER talked with the Russians when he passed through MOSCOW. There is one fact which seems to prove this; that is, on August 23, when STAHRER left BERLIN, Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP who happened to have an interview with Ambassador KURUSU on the same day made no reference to this matter. However, on the 24th when STAHRER had an interview with Ambassador TOGO, he said that GERMANY intended to conclude a political treaty with JAPAN. From this, it could be conceived that STAHRER had some conversation with the Soviet authorities during that period.

Councillor KUBOTA: We hear rumors of rapprochement between the UNITED STATES and the U.S.S.R. Is there any fear of this treaty accelerating this?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: As regards the rapprochement between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the Foreign Ministry has been vigilant and has endeavored to secure the real facts from all quarters, but up to now we have not come in contact with any information deemed authentic, and I think that there is still nothing concrete at the present. Furthermore, STAHRER stated very clearly the possibility of meeting success in the adjustment of Japanese-Soviet relations, and has proposed the services of GERMANY as mediator. This point is identical to those as stated in the exchange of statements.

Councillor ISHIZUKA: I have no objection in regard to the text of the treaty. However, as to the relations with GERMANY, we cannot put 100% confidence in her, when we consider the record of the past. At the time the Anti-comintern Pact and the Cultural Pact were concluded, there were opinions that complete unity was impossible, except in special instances. We expect the government to take this into full consideration and put the treaty into effectual operation.

Councillor SHIMIZU: Who were they who signed this treaty?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: RIBBENTROP, CIANO, and Ambassador KURUSU.



Councillor SHIMIZU: This treaty is being put into force simultaneously with its signing. Do you think that it is in accord with the constitution?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: There are many previous examples of treaties like this, and there is no danger of any constitutional difficulties, because it was sanctioned by the Emperor after being referred to the Privy Council for deliberation before it was signed.

Councillor SHIMIZU: According to what I hear there are several German engineers still in CHUNGKING. Is it true?

War Minister TOJO: There are such reports, but the truth is not clear.

Councillor SHIMIZU: It stipulates that some sort of compensation should be paid for our South Seas Mandate. Can you tell me the meaning of this?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: In regard to this point, the set-up is that all of the former German territories now under mandated rule be returned to GERMANY, and that she cannot allow, as a matter of principle, only JAPAN, her ally, to retain the territories. Therefore, they insisted that they wished to receive compensation and /thereby/ resort to the formality that it had been transferred to JAPAN. At first, the term "adequate" was used with compensation, but due to my insistence, "adequate" was deleted in favor of "in a way". Since GERMANY said that she would be satisfied if this compensation be an entirely "nominal" one--giving examples that there have been cases of only six bags of coffee; what she means is of a very light nature.

Councillor SHIMIZU: In my opinion, I think that there is no need of receiving transfer of the mandates from GERMANY now.

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: In my opinion, I think the view taken by Dr. TACHI and other authoritative students of international law that there was no cession of territories is right, and therefore, since GERMANY practically denounced

the VERSAILLES Treaty three years ago, it is correct to regard the Japanese Mandatory rule as the continuation of military occupation. Accordingly, I think it is necessary that we receive transfer of the territories from GERMANY and clarify the situation.

Councillor MINAMI: When did ITALY give her approval to this treaty?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: As I have replied previously, ITALY on the 25th sent her ambassador in TOKYO to call on me to express her approval of the treaty. Prior to this, the German Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP obtained ITALY's approval in ROME. ✓

Councillor MINAMI: In that case, don't you think that it was too early to submit this question to the Imperial Conference of the 19th to obtain Imperial sanction when it was uncertain whether ITALY would approve it or not?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: Not only had GERMANY repeated from the start that she would be able to obtain ITALY's approval, but since the matter discussed at the Imperial Conference was a question concerning the plan for conclusion of a treaty between JAPAN, GERMANY, and ITALY based on a general plan framed by GERMANY and JAPAN, I do not think that it matters much.

Councillor MINAMI: Has the sphere of GREATER EAST ASIA been clearly defined?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: We have talked about it at the time of negotiation and have recorded it.

Councillor MINAMI: What is the particular reason for the exchange of statements when trouble occurred between BRITAIN and JAPAN?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: As BRITAIN is already participating in the European War, Article III of this treaty is not applicable to her; but as for JAPAN, we cannot assert that there will be absolutely no British-Japanese war. That is why we have especially made this point clear, in spite of GERMANY's disapproval.

Councillor MINAMI: Did JAPAN first propose this treaty, or was it GERMANY?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: GERMANY proposed this treaty first.

Councillor MINAMI: Is it not because GERMANY had failed in her campaign against BRITAIN that she has come to offer such a proposal?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: The prolongation of the campaign against BRITAIN may be a reason but this is not the only reason. I think the reason is that GERMANY believed that in the course of half a century or so, complications between AMERICA and GERMANY are inevitable. ✓

Councillor MINAMI: I approve of checking AMERICA by means of this treaty, but is there absolutely no danger of a U.S.-GERMANY coalition?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: We are not positive that there will be absolutely no possibility of a U.S.-GERMANY coalition. However, as we cannot overlook the influence of German-Americans in the UNITED STATES with regard to the improvement of Japanese-American relations, we consider this treaty valuable in this respect also.

Councillor MINAMI: I am informed from the answers of the various ministers on the petroleum problem, but I cannot feel secure in the least because it is like hearing through a wall. I would like to have it explained more clearly and feel a sense of security.

President of Planning Board and Ministers of Army and Navy: As replied before, the Army and Navy have a considerable stockpile. The replies by Councillors KAWAI and ARIMA that peaceful acquisition from abroad is hopeful, we repeat here.

Councillor MINAMI: If the Sino-Japanese Incident continues on one hand, and if war between JAPAN and AMERICA should break out on the other hand, how would the financial situation be? I would like the Finance Minister to answer this question?

Finance Minister KAWADA: It goes without saying that JAPAN will have her finances constrained. There will be no other way, after all, than to increase the savings of the people and try to cut down the government expenditure.

Councillor MINAMI: Next, I would like to hear about the Russo-Japanese relations. If a Japanese-American War should break out, it would be conceived that hands for co-operation by both JAPAN and the U.S.A. will be extended to the U.S.S.R. just as it had been done by the Anglo-French and by the Germans before the European War. Therefore, in consideration

of the Japanese-American relations, can't we first of all adjust our relations with the Soviet and thereafter carry on negotiations on this treaty? Why is it that we must only comply to the words of the Germans and defer the negotiation with the U.S.S.R.?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: In regard to the adjustment of relations with the U.S.S.R., proposal for a neutrality pact had been made during the former Cabinet. I, myself, after assuming office, have tried 'feelers', but the state of affairs were that the U.S.S.R. gave reply of acceptance on condition that the proposal of the former Cabinet will be accepted provided that the "PORTSMOUTH" Treaty be rescru-  
inized, the rights and interests in NORTH SAGHALIEN be returned, etc., presenting conditions which almost had to be rejected. Thus, I came to the conclusion that in the adjustment of relations with the U.S.S.R., there is no other way than to utilize GERMANY. That is why I accepted GERMANY's proposal to this treaty. ✓

Councillor MINAMI: It is said that STAHRER told the Foreign Minister that the UNITED STATES will not participate in the European War; but we cannot ascertain how it will turn out after the presidential election. The U.S.A. may revise her neutrality law and may assist BRITAIN to the utmost. In such a case, would it mean that the U.S.A. will attack GERMANY?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: There is no other way to judge whether the action of the UNITED STATES constitutes an attack or not, except through the situation at that time. ✓ Regarding this point, GERMANY suggested during the negotiation that it was desirable to have in Article III the attack as being made "openly or covertly"..... To this we insisted that we wished to eliminate such words because in the words "the attack being made covertly", there would be a fear of including such things as the transfer of American destroyers to BRITAIN in its meaning. There had been cases when GERMANY explained that those words were inserted rather for the interest of JAPAN. For instance, when the UNITED STATES Fleet enters SINGAPORE, it could be said that a covert attack has been made, and, therefore, the transfer of destroyers would not be included in this interpretation.

Councillor MINAMI: At the meeting with the Germans, did you repeat the fact that they are to exert their efforts in order to have the U.S.S.R. discard their policy of assisting CHIANG KAI SHEK?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: I, as Foreign Minister, have given full consideration to this point and have thought of letting GERMANY, through the U.S.S.R., lead CHUNGKING to terms of peace. However, to have suggested this matter too early would have bared our weak points to GERMANY, and thus it would have caused us many disadvantages without a single advantage. Therefore, even during the early part of August when I had an interview with Ambassador OTT, when he mentioned something of this purport, I told him that JAPAN intended to dispose of the CHINA Incident unaided. Of course, it was my intention to make full use of this treaty hereafter to adjust JAPAN-SOVIET diplomatic relations and find means to promote the settlement of the CHINA Incident.

Councillor NARA: No questions.

Councillor ARAKI inquired about the quality, physical vitality, and the health of the Army and Navy, and especially about the prevention of tuberculosis, etc., to which both the War and Navy Ministers made replies.

Councillor MATSUI: No questions.

Councillor SUGAWARA: I wish to present questions on five points. (1) A little while ago the Foreign Minister spoke of a secret protocol, but were there any suggestions regarding the drawing up of a secret protocol? (2) What connections are there between this treaty and the JAPAN-GERMANY-ITALY Anti-Comintern Pact? (3) Although this treaty is a tripartite pact, the relations between GERMANY and ITALY are so close that when a dispute arises concerning the interpretation of the treaty, don't you think that there is fear of the odds always being two to one against us? (4) In regard to our relations with ITALY, is it completely unnecessary to have it in writing? (5) Although there were explanations a while ago regarding preparedness from the military standpoint in case a war should break out with the UNITED STATES, we are most of all anxious about the financial problem. Although we believe that the Finance Minister is fully prepared on this point, what is the actual situation?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: (1) During the negotiations, proposals for a secret protocol were made, but the contents of the secret protocol became unilateral, including only the demands made by JAPAN. In order to make this perfect, it not only takes time, but it also needs the approval of ITALY. Therefore, we avoided drawing up the secret protocol and decided that I, the Foreign Minister, exchange statements with the German Ambassador in TOKYO and use this in place of the secret protocol. (2) The Anti-Comintern Pact will remain as it now stands. I think that JAPAN must maintain her great

policy of defense against communism irregardless of whatever relations she may have with the U.S.S.R. (3) Although it is true that German-Italian relations are close, I consider it needless to be anxious about whether ITALY's feelings toward JAPAN are greater than those toward GERMANY. (4) I think there is no special need for any document. The Italian Ambassador has quite clearly given the approval of the Italian Government.

Finance Minister KAWADA: In regard to the fifth question presented by Councillor SUGAWARA, I intend to take measures so as to avoid as much as possible the increase of burden on the people.

Councillor MATSUURA: The purport of this treaty is to check the aggravation of Japanese-American relations. I myself desire this most. However, if unfortunately worst comes to worst, I request that adequate preparations be made to meet this situation.

Councillor USHIO: Questions were asked regarding the domestic situation, food problems, etc., if worst came to worse. The President of the Planning Board answered this.

Councillor HAYASHI: Although the principal object of the treaty is concerned with Japanese-American relations, I think it is necessary to give most careful consideration to Soviet relations at this time. According to the explanation given by the Foreign Minister, I had the impression that he possessed an optimistic view in regard to our relations with the U.S.S.R., but from the information I have on hand, there are grounds for considerable pessimism in regard to the future of relations between JAPAN and the U.S.S.R. and between GERMANY and the U.S.S.R. For instance, last year when the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was concluded, the contents of the instruction STALIN gave to the Communists were, according to the reliable information I have, that STALIN stated that the recent coalition between the U.S.S.R. and GERMANY was a means to bolshevize western EUROPE. He further stated that this did not mean that the eastward expansion policy had been discarded, and that when the opportune time arrived, the U.S.S.R. intended to take positive action. In regard to these points, what are the ideas of the Foreign Minister?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: I also do not think the adjustment of JAPAN-U.S.S.R. relations to be so easy. However, we must acknowledge that GERMANY can exert considerable pressure on the U.S.S.R. According to the reliable information I have, one of the most important motives for the U.S.S.R.'s

severance from ENGLAND and FRANCE to act in concert with GERMANY last year, is that HITLER is said to have told STALIN that GERMANY would attack the U.S.S.R. if she did not accede to German demands. Judging from these, I think it would be very effective to have GERMANY act as intermediary in adjusting the relations between JAPAN and the U.S.S.R.

Councillor FUKAI: In the case of Article III of the treaty; that is, in the event of a Japanese-American War, what sort of military assistance can GERMANY give to JAPAN?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: That was also discussed during the negotiations and GERMANY declared that she would supply JAPAN with new weapons and so forth, even prior to the outbreak of the situation mentioned in Article III, and in the event that a Japanese-American War should break out, she is to hold in check the UNITED STATES in the Atlantic area.

War Minister TOJO: The most important assistance would be in the receiving of supplies of excellent military equipment under an understanding with the U.S.S.R.

Navy Minister OIKAWA: Generally, I have the same opinion as the Army.

Councillor FUKAI: In the relations with the U.S.S.R., what is the meaning that GERMANY is to restrain the U.S.S.R.? Would not such an act be an outright contradiction to the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact?

War Minister TOJO: From the standpoint of the treaty, it is as you say, but speaking from the standpoint of actual military movements, GERMANY would be able to check the U.S.S.R. At present, although GERMANY is carrying on military operations against ENGLAND, the greater part of her Army together with mechanized units, are maintained within the homeland. This, militarily speaking, is checking the U.S.S.R.

Councillor FUKAI: Although the Foreign Minister spoke of mutual confidence between GERMANY and JAPAN, the attitude assumed by GERMANY last year at the time of the conclusion of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact cannot but be said to be that of insincerity. Last September when Foreign Minister ABE, who held a concurrent portfolio, gave an explanation of the diplomatic developments at the present session of the Privy Council, the then Vice Foreign Minister SAWADA stated that the HIRANUMA Cabinet filed a protest to GERMANY pointing out that the German-Soviet Pact was an infringement of the secret pact of the JAPAN-GERMANY Anti-Comintern Pact.

What has become of the result of that protest?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: From what I heard, it is doubtful whether the above protest has had any effect or not, and I think that, perhaps, there was no reply whatsoever from GERMANY.

Councillor FUKAI: I think that insertion of sentiments in our foreign relations should be avoided, and that diplomacy must always be practiced realistically. In the preamble of the treaty it says, "let every nation have its rightful place . . . .", but since HITLER's words always give us the impression that according to the laws of nature, the weak are the victims of the strong, do you think that GERMANY will be able to understand the true spirit of this preamble?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: The mission of our diplomacy lies in the propagation of the "Imperial Way". We do not act solely for the purpose of advantages or disadvantages in respect of our interests. I think that such thoughts as "the weak are the victims of the strong" should be absolutely rejected.

Councillor FUKAI: I can understand that, if a Japanese-American war is inevitable, emphasis in diplomacy must be laid to either GERMANY or the Anglo-Americans at this time, but the result of concluding this treaty may hasten the Japanese-American war. Therefore, I wish to ask the Prime Minister his determination, whether or not he has the confidence to be able to overcome shortages of munitions and general commodities; the demoralization of thoughts, etc., when he faces them in the most aggravated times.

Prime Minister KONOE: The basic idea of this pact, of course, lies in the aversion of a Japanese-American clash. However, I think that it is necessary for us to show a firm attitude, because if we act humbly, it will only make the UNITED STATES presumptuous. /TN: May also read "...if we make a blunder, the UNITED STATES will become presumptuous"./ If worst should come to worst, I think that the government must adopt policies with firm resolutions on both diplomatic and domestic affairs. The other day when I presented myself at the Imperial Palace to report on this matter, I found His Majesty, the Emperor, also to have possessed a very firm resolution which was most impressive. I hope that this treaty will be satisfactorily executed, even at the risk of my very life.

Councillor FUTAGAMI: Since there has been much discussion from the standpoint of both diplomacy and economics, I would like to ask some questions on some doubtful points on the treaty itself. First of all, on the point of formality, it



is not clear which of the documents distributed here are for Imperial inquiry. Of these documents, is the Japanese composition the original text? Looking over the contents of the exchange of statements, it seems as if they are international promises. Are these to be submitted for Imperial inquiry?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: The only item submitted for inquiry is the draft of the treaty; the others being used only as references. Although the original texts of the treaty will be in Japanese, German, and Italian, for the time being, signatures will be affixed on the English text.

Chief of the Treaty Bureau MATSUMOTO: The attached exchange of statements is different in contents and form, e.g. numbering, from that of the so-called exchange of official documents, which possesses the same effect as the treaty, although it could hardly be regarded as a kind of a so-called international promise. The interpretation of the Pact and the points of agreement between Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and Ambassador OTT were put in writing and, since it was recognized as an extremely important document, it was attached and presented to the Throne as a reference.

Councillor FUTATAGAMI: Such measures as "the affixing of signatures for the time being on the English text" are unusual, and I do not think that such a procedure will be permissible. Furthermore, since the contents of the exchange of statements are a kind of international promise, I think that it must also be presented as an object of inquiry.

President of the Privy Council HARA: In regard to these problems of formalities, I wish to call an informal meeting later.

(After the Investigation Committee adjourned, the government delegates retired, and it seems that as a result of the informal discussion which followed, it was decided that the composition of the draft of the treaty would be the only item to be presented for Imperial inquiry, that for the time being, only the Japanese text of the treaty draft would be examined, that signatures were to be affixed to the English text, and that the point of the later replacement of the texts written in Japanese, German, and Italian would be overlooked.)

Councillor FUTAGAMI: The wording "participating neither in the European War nor the Sino-Japanese conflict...." in Article III of the treaty is an inaccurate expression. It could be interpreted to mean that in case of an attack by a

nation which is neither a participant in the European War nor in the Sino-Japanese dispute, Article III will operate. Can you clarify this point? Next, according to the previous explanation made by the Foreign Minister, the joint special committee could be construed as a compound of military and economics, but does this not mean a compound of the three nations? Furthermore, comparing Article V and III, since GERMANY is bound by the Non-Aggression Pact with the SOVIET UNION, GERMANY cannot attack the SOVIET UNION even in case JAPAN is attacked by the SOVIETS. On the contrary, JAPAN must attack the SOVIET UNION in order to render assistance to GERMANY if GERMANY is attacked by the SOVIETS. Therefore, is this not a unilateral stipulation?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: The first point of Councillor FUTAGAMI's question is a problem concerned with terminology, but from the practical standpoint of interpretation, I do not think that there is any room for doubt to arise. The second point, of course, means the Joint Committee of the three nations. The argument that Article III, because of Article V, is one-sided against JAPAN, is a disregard of the political significance of this treaty. In such a case as when the U.S.S.R. attacks GERMANY, the political situation now existing between GERMANY and the U.S.S.R. will be subjected to a grave transformation, and in such instances, I think that the path for JAPAN to tread will be outside of the scope of the stipulation of this Article. The purport of this Article states plainly that this treaty is not presently aimed against the U.S.S.R. ✓

Councillor MANO: No questions.

Councillor OSHIMA: Was there any understanding regarding the scope of the Greater East Asia?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: Of course, there was an understanding, as I have explained this morning.

Councillor OBATA: At this time when JAPAN has not yet solved the Sino-Japanese Incident, if JAPAN is under the obligation to aid GERMANY and ITALY in case the UNITED STATES should participate in the European War, JAPAN will be placed under a very heavy responsibility. On the other hand, I think, the possibility of war breaking out between JAPAN and AMERICA is small. Therefore, will not this treaty be very one-sided?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: Whether AMERICA will participate in the European War or not, or whether war between AMERICA and JAPAN will break out or not, I think is a fifty-fifty possibility. Therefore, I do not believe it to be one-sided.

Councillor TAKEGOE: As the result of this treaty being concluded, what kind of support can GERMANY give JAPAN in case worst comes to worst and in case the Japanese Navy aids GERMANY and ITALY, what kind of aid can it give?

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: Such problems as the kind of help that can be mutually given should be thoroughly investigated at the Joint special committee.

Chief of the Investigation Committee SUZUKI: I think a Japanese-American war is inevitable regardless of whether this treaty is concluded or not. We, therefore, must carefully observe the expansion of the UNITED STATES Navy and must not neglect our preparations corresponding to this.

Navy Minister OIKAWA: We are confident of victory in a quick, decisive war against AMERICA, but as for the future, we are steadily drawing various expansion plans.

Councillor ISHII: I see what is written in the last of exchange of statements is that the South Sea Islands under our mandate will remain a territory of JAPAN, provided that we pay a compensation for them. According to Minister MATSUOKA's explanation of this, since the VERSAILLES Treaty has already expired, JAPAN is still continuing a military occupation of the South Sea Islands. Therefore, although it is said that it is necessary for JAPAN to pay compensation to GERMANY to obtain transfer of the islands, according to the VERSAILLES Treaty, the possession of the mandated islands were transferred to the Five Powers, from which powers JAPAN acquired them. I, therefore, think it is proper to interpret that the islands are already the possession of JAPAN and, therefore, I cannot agree to the verbal declarations of the German Ambassador. Since I admit that this problem is not a subject for Imperial inquiry, I am just expressing my opinion for your information.

Foreign Minister MATSUOKA: According to the opinion of famous scholars of international law, as Dr. TACHI, a mandate is not a transfer of territory. Therefore, aside from the standpoint of legal theories, and viewing it from the standpoint of practical politics, it has been my opinion for the past three years that it is a better policy to receive these islands from GERMANY through some means. From what I have heard, three years ago, the Japanese Navy had proposed to GERMANY through the naval attache in BERLIN the cession of these islands under certain compensatory terms.

Councillor ISHII: I have exchanged opinions with Dr. TACHIBANA concerning this problem. Dr. TACHIBANA's opinion was only that a mandate is not a cession of territory. In regards to the point that GERMANY transferred them to the Five Powers, I believe there is no dispute. Therefore, I can hardly agree to having JAPAN pay a compensation now to GERMANY for the cession of these islands.

Councillor MITSUCHI: From the questions and answers I have heard throughout this morning, the discussion seems to be chiefly on matters assuming war with AMERICA. However, the moment this treaty is concluded, I think AMERICA's economic sanctions against JAPAN will be greatly increased. In this case, I think the subsistence problem of our people will become serious. Are sufficient preparations made for this? When a treaty of this sort is concluded, the Japanese people are apt to follow GERMANY blindly and there is danger that some may attempt anti-American movements, etc. It is hoped that such acts will be strictly controlled.

President of the Planning Board HOSHINO: The government is most concerned over the problems of the people's livelihood and will try to meet the situation most satisfactorily.

Prime Minister KONOE: Since I am in full accord with keeping under control anti-American movements, I intend to carry it out very strictly.

Government officials retired at 7:30 p.m.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I.P.S. No. 1603

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 45 pages, dated 26 September, 1940, and described as follows: a summary of the proceedings concerning the Pact between the three powers (Japan, German, and Italy) at the Privy Council Meeting. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry -----

Signed at Tokyo on this 19th day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

\_\_\_\_\_  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 19th day of Sept., 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME

Witness: /s/ T/4 T. Toguchi

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

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W. 1030

於十四日獨伊三國條約之國之樞密院審查委員會議事概要

(私本 條約局長手記)

昭和十五年九月二十六日午前十一時三十分開會

宮中東三ノ間ニ於テ

出席者

樞密院側

原 樞密院議長  
鈴木 樞密院副議長(審查委員長)  
穴原、金子顧問官及田中顧問官  
除上述顧問官審查委員トシテ出席

政府側

近衛 内閣總理大臣  
松岡 外務大臣  
東條 陸軍大臣  
及川 海軍大臣  
河田 大藏大臣  
星野 企画院總裁

他ニ説明員トシテ

村瀨 法制局長官 森山 軍部部長  
松本 條約局長  
武藤 軍務局長  
阿部 軍務局長  
原口 為替局長 松隈 銀行局長  
辻 監理局長

W. 1030

1.

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議事

- 一 委員長開會宣言書記官より條約本文朗讀せしむ
- 二 近衛總理大臣別紙甲號、通牒抄ヲ述フ
- 三 松岡外務大臣別紙乙號、通説明ス
- 四 伊藤大使、質問入ル

河合顧問官

本官、本案、趣旨ヲ完全ニ解リ本官トシ

テ、該ヲヨリ日獨同盟成立ヲ希望シ居リタリ、ニテ松岡大臣就任以來共、遂ニ實現ヲ期シ、一部ニ松岡大臣、活動ヲ主張シ、トシ論ヲ耳ニシ、カ、今同遂ニ之ヲ成立ヲ見タリ、欣快ニ思ヒ、ナリ、且今、松岡大臣、説明ニ依リ、伊藤利、態度、明クナル處此、其ヲ承リ度シ

松岡大臣

本件、該合、先程ヲ述タル通り日獨同盟ニ始メ、トシ

モノ、ニテ獨創、且、最初、伊藤利、カ、引渡シ居リト申述、居リ、昨日、伊藤大使、本大臣ヲ訪問シ、伊藤利、本件交渉、一切、獨創ニ本任ニ日獨同盟ニ纏リ、ル條約、安シ、伊藤利、全面的、終結、其ヲ表シ、日本國政府、訓令ヨリ申入、来リタル次第ナリ

河合顧問官

附呈、交換文書ヲ一覽スルニ日獨同盟、關係、ニテ

述、居ル處、伊藤利ヨリ、同様、モノヲ取付、ル次第ナリ

松岡大臣

案、裁キ、上、ニ、凡、テ、獨逸ニ重要ト置キ、伊藤利、側

ヲ附、且、モ、ト、考、テ、互、ニ、思、考、ス、從、テ、交換文書、中、於、テ、獨逸、外務大臣、伊藤利、援助、及、協力、ヲ、必要、ト、ス、ル、場合、ニ、伊藤利、勿論、獨逸、及、日本、ト、同調、ス、キ、ト、テ、絶対ニ、信、ス、ル、旨、ヲ、揚、ゲ、ル、止、メ、タル、次第、ナリ

河合顧問官

條約、第三條、且、取、テ、重要ト、思、考、ス、本官、日

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米國戰艦信託之非此之是取是、場合ヲ考慮シ、庫部公金  
以テ其狀ヲ取ルル又、曉悟アリト信スル之ニ就テ、何等の本  
官等ニ寄心シ、與テ豫御説明ヲ承取ルル又、蘇聯ガ日本ニ向テ  
重シク起スル事トシ、張ラズ此、場合、福運ニ如何ニ態度ヲ取ル  
ル事、考ヘラレヤ

東條陸軍大臣 本大臣トシテ、陸軍、見地ヨリ御回答ニ最モ、  
奉答ニ付、此際計米作戦ニ寄リ、陸軍、兵力、極一部分ヲ  
使テ、此、運送、其、自、御懸念、無用ト思フ、然、之、計  
米作戦、結局、計、作戦、考慮、カシ、完全ナリト云、難、依  
日、對、國、交、調、整、極、大、重要ナル問題ニシテ、之、有效ニ完  
成シ、陸軍、自、準備、余、程、樂ニシ、ト考ヘ、得、ル、處、蘇、聯  
、性格、上、日本、トシ、準備、之、念、以、認、シ、答、コト、由、思、フ、高、三、那  
、事、業、ニ、付、本、條、約、有效ニ、活用、ス、ル、事、依、リ、最、モ、奉、答、能  
、答、出、前、事、業、解決、ヲ、圖、リ、度、ヲ、考、ヘ、リ

及川海軍大臣 現存艦隊、戰備、完成、シ、信、ス、ル、以、テ、決、シ、米  
國ニ、敗、ル、取、ル、カ、戰、争、ガ、長期、ニ、亙、ル、見、地、會、ハ、米國、海軍  
、充、實、計、畫、之、實現、ニ、付、我、方、トシ、充、分、準備、ヲ、為、ス、事  
、此、自、行、海軍、トシ、充、分、策、ヲ、講、シ、居、ル、事、ナ、リ

河合顧問官 本官、自、最、モ、心配、ス、ル、所、ハ、物資、自、國、保、ト、シ、一、体、長  
、期、戰、争、ト、シ、テ、此、場合、ト、シ、位、同、程度、及、テ、御、考、ヘ、リ、ヤ

星野陸軍大臣 昨日御説明申上ケタリ、進リ、企画院總裁  
、公、前、日、海軍、院、提、例、參、集、於、物資、動員、計、畫、ニ、付、詳  
、細、ニ、説明、ヲ、行、(リ)、數、年、前、ヨリ、我、國、諸、物資、自、給、自  
、足、性、ヲ、準備、ス、ル、事、業、ニ、付、輸入、中、十九、億、六、千、萬、



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米依存に有難き故に経済上、歴直強化、場合條約簽  
 締結動、場合考、千萬金、策ヲ講スル必要アリ、鐵三付、之ハ  
 本年、生産高、又百三十万、自之ハ、万、取要、場合三四百  
 万也、生産之得、見入、現在、備用、之、厚、而、使用、之、百  
 五十万、其、他、生産力、補充、之、以、軍需官需、之、充、當、之、モ、ト、ル、ガ  
 備、然、シ、然、ル、モ、場合、又、鉄材、輸入、之、場合、考、慮、之、中、生産  
 力、補充、之、手、加、減、ヲ、加、以、軍需官需、ヲ、制限、之、以、程、能、境、之、以、立、テ、  
 見、入、ト、シ、非、鐵、金屬、付、之、鉄、條、之、參、之、ニ、モ、世界、中、ヨリ、目下、莫  
 集、之、務、之、居、ル、以、テ、之、亦、左、程、心配、之、要、ト、思、考、ス、最、モ、重大  
 ナ、石、油、之、以、現在、之、多、量、ヲ、米、國、ニ、依、存、之、居、リ、殊、ニ、航空機、用  
 揮、及、油、之、給、下、全、部、ヲ、米、國、ヨリ、輸入、之、仰、居、居、處、國內、之、増、産  
 之、圖、ト、共、ニ、米、國、以、外、ヨリ、獲得、之、方、法、ヲ、講、究、セ、ル、ハ、カ、ニ、ス、且、近、航  
 空、油、三、付、之、相、當、ノ、ア、ト、ウ、ノ、得、タ、リ、然、レ、共、對、米、戰、争、長、期、三、百  
 萬、金、鉄、其、他、之、金屬、類、之、場合、ト、異、リ、日、獨、及、三、國、ノ、中、之、三  
 之、以、自、以、去、米、之、二、條、件、ヲ、求、得、ル、限、リ、速、ニ、南、印、又、北、極、太、洋、  
 石、油、獲得、權、ヲ、確保、ス、ル、必要、アリ、此、之、三、付、之、場合、獨、逸、側、ト、  
 該、會、ニ、於、テ、之、問題、ト、シ、タ、ル、其、ナ、リ、又、目下、南、印、ニ、於、テ、平和、裡、ニ  
 石、油、獲得、之、交渉、カ、行、ハ、居、ル、モ、ト、御、了、解、願、出、之、

河合顧問官 昨日、御詔、時、之、石、油、三、付、之、軍、部、ニ、於、テ、相、當、ノ  
 準備、アリ、ト、云、フ、意味、ハ、ト、テ、軍、部、大、臣、ヨリ、モ、御、答、辭、  
 願、出、之、

及川海軍大臣 海軍、上、之、相、當、長、期、準備、ヲ、有、ス、又、人、生、石、油  
 三、付、之、目下、施策、中、ナ、リ

4

森本陸軍大臣 陸軍、資、材、三、付、之、相、當、期、間、甚、ニ、得、ル、様

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準備ナリ非常ナリ長期戦ナリ統率機用機械化部隊用  
油ニ付テ考慮ニ付テ

石ニ一旦休會  
午後一時十分再開

石井閣下 以三條ニ依リ(國)ヲ攻害セリ時、直ニ参戰  
ヲ裁粉ヲ生ズルニ付、何事カ此ニ付テ詮合スルニ付  
松岡外務大臣 之令換文書中ニ「締約國條約第三條、  
吾等ニ於テ攻害スルニ付、吾等ニ締約國同ノ協議ニ依リ  
決定スルベキコトヲ論トシ、(東京)獨逸大使來朝下ニ、御  
竹問、是ヲ明確ナラシムルニ爲本大臣、要求ニ依リ挿入スル  
天、ニ付テ攻害アリタルニ付、付テ協議ニ協議纏ニ、自働  
的ニ共同ニ戰ハルベカラシム處何時如何ニ付テ、依リ援  
助スルニ、締約國各々自主的ニ決定スルニ付、協定スルニトテ、次  
ニ示ス

石井閣下 檢中ニ直ニトテ之旨向ヒテ、依リ外務大臣、説明、  
自今ニ同意ナリ、吾等ニ四條、混合專門委員會、通常同盟條約  
ニ付テ、軍事問題、家同ノ協議ヲ解、付テカカシテ、外務大臣、説明  
ニ付テ、經濟的問題ニ付、委員會ニ於テ協議スルニ、如キ處、此、  
トテ、付御説明ヲ承リ度。

松岡外務大臣 本、最初條約、附屬秘密議定書中、規定スル條  
ニ、付テ、自今ニ同意ニ依リ、陸海軍、混合委員會ヲ東京ニ、伯  
林、羅馬ニ、設ケ、其、他、經濟委員會ヲ設ケ、トテ、付テ、  
然レ、秘密議定書ヲ作成セカトテ、付テ、此、其、條約、成立後、兩  
國同ノ協議、ニ決定スル處、經濟問題ヲ扱、委員會、必  
要トシ、自今ニ依リ設置スルニトテ、付テ、示(居リ)

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石井顧問官 本條約ニハ同盟條約ニ強ニト必ズ存在シ  
單獨不備和ニ關スル規定ナキ處存ハ何事ヲ特殊ニ思惑  
リタル次第ナリヤ

松岡外務大臣 本件一切話出サリキ實ハ本大臣トシテ  
先方が云ヒ出ル之ヲ挿入スルモ差支ナシト思考スルガ  
先方が之ニ觸ルヤル場合ニ之ヲ設ケル亦可ナリト  
思ヒタリ何トシテ本條約ニ本大臣、考ニテ、戦争  
ヲ防ズルニトカ目的ニテ戦争スルコトが目的ニテ  
之ニ依リ開戦ヲ豫想スル單獨不備和ノ規定ヲ  
設ケル亦可ナリト思ヒタルトガ一理由ニシテ  
他ノ理由ハ一戦争が起ルニ此ト云ハ戦争初期  
ニ互ニ約束スルノ實ニト考ヘタルヲ以テ之が規定

方ヲ申出サリシ次第ナリ  
石井顧問官 御意見御尤ト存ス尚條約第一條  
ニ歐洲ニ於ケル新秩序ト云フコトガアル處何ヲ以テ  
歐洲、新秩序ト云フヤ判然タラズシテ日本  
義務カ判然タリ得サルニ非ズヤ何カ此一點ニ付  
話合アリヤ

松岡外務大臣 御尤、質問ト存ズルモ本大臣トシテハ  
新秩序ノ意義ハ前文ニテ充分現ハル居リト  
思ヒ、前文ハ富方、提案ニテ獨逸側ハ一字  
ノ修正ヲ文中出サリシモノナリ

No6 有馬顧問官 本條約ニ依リ日米戦争ヲ避ケ難キハ  
本家ニ政府ト同感ナルガ日米ノ宿命ニ戰ハル

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「サマ」云々、今日が最良の時期、考へて思ふ  
最良に配するに石油缺乏あり海軍大臣、相違準備  
ありと云ふは、日米開戦より二年三年を以て爲  
す遠くは、石油に於て殊に今日、戦争に於て極  
く大量の石油を使用せざるべからざる處、人造石  
油等も果して急務の間ニ合つて、たりやん既に  
堪へざる次第なり、付以て、點重し海軍大臣ヨリ御  
回答を得候。

及川海軍大臣、人造石油の未だ着年しむに許りに  
中々急務の間ニ合つて、甲せし依り平和的義段  
ニ依り、蘭印又ハ、北極太ヨリ獲得スル他、之が成功  
を以て相當有欲あり、從て蘇聯ト、國交調整ハ  
此、と云ふ言つても重要なりと存ス、又一方海軍トシテ  
ハ、長期戦ニ於て石油、使は延し考へざるを得ん  
有馬顧問官、ハ、オウタニ價、石油の急務間ニ合つて  
第一ニヤ

及川海軍大臣、ハ、オウタニ價、石油、近年海軍ニ  
テ専門、研究機關ヲ設て海軍独自ノ方法ニ製  
造し居し、又相當準備アリ、云々ナリ

陸田顧問官、條約第三條、文の上ヨリ見れば、現ニ  
歐洲戦争、又ハ日支紛争ニ卷入り居らざる國中  
ニ蘇聯ヲ含め、今日ト考へるが蘇聯ト、關係ハ  
如何ナルヲ、たりや、独逸ト、蘇聯ト、何等カ話  
合ふべし、次第ナリヤ

No 7

Doc 1603A

松岡外務大臣 其、疑問ヲ避ルニ爲算五條ヲ諒スル  
 次第ナリ 而モ本大臣ガスタート「ニ對シテ蘇聯ト間ニ  
 何カ本條約ニ付話アリタルヤト訊ネタルニ對シテ  
 了「了」ハ不定的ノ回答ヲ爲シ居リタルガ本大臣  
 ノ相違保スル所ニ「スタート」ハ「マス」ト通過  
 際蘇側ト何等カ話ヲ爲シ居ルモノト考ヘ居  
 レリ 其、證據ト思ハルルハ、事實アルガスタート  
 ハ八月二十三日ニ伯林ヲ出發セル處同日ルズトウ  
 外相ノ來栖大使ト、會見ニ於テ何等言及セザ  
 リ「カ」スタート「」廿四日ニ東郷大使ニ會見  
 際ニ「独逸側ハ日本ト政治條約ヲ締結スル  
 積 七七日ヲ話シ居ルヲ以テ其間スタート「」ハ  
 蘇聯當局ト何カ話ヲ爲セルモノト思考セラル  
 窪田顧問長米蘇接近ノ噂ヲ聞ク處本條約之  
 ヲ促進スルコトトナリ惧キヤ此、其、如何  
 松岡外務大臣米蘇接近ニ付テハ外務省ニ於テモ  
 右方面注意シテ真相ノ把握ニ努メ居ル處今  
 日迄確實ト認メル情報ニ接シ居ラズ本大臣  
 ハ未ダ具体的、何物モナシト考ヘ居リ尚「タ  
 ート」ハ自蘇、國交調整ノ成功ニ付テハ極々明  
 白ニ其、可能性ヲ述ベ獨逸ノ斡旋ヲ申出タル次第  
 ニ「此、其、交換文書」モ記載セラル通ナリ  
 窪田顧問長條約ノ條文トシテ、本大臣ニ於テ思  
 存スル但シ獨逸トノ關係ニ付テハ過去ノ實績ニ

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AOAC/603A

清水閣閣長本條約、署名、同時ニ完成セリト云  
トナリ居ル處之ニ生感上差支ナク、或ハ此ヤ  
柘岡外務大臣斯ク、如キ條約、前例ニ多ク、調  
印前ニ樞密院ニ御諮詢相成、御裁可ナリト云  
依ニ憲法上ノ問題ハ生カレ無キト云

清水閣閣長本條約、署名、同時ニ完成セリト云  
トナリ居ル處之ニ生感上差支ナク、或ハ此ヤ  
柘岡外務大臣斯ク、如キ條約、前例ニ多ク、調  
印前ニ樞密院ニ御諮詢相成、御裁可ナリト云  
依ニ憲法上ノ問題ハ生カレ無キト云

清水閣閣長聞ク所ニ依リ、重慶ニハ未ダ獨逸人  
技師カ數名居ルト云、又實ニ是ト云  
東條陸軍大臣斯カク情報、了レテ皇朝不明  
清水閣閣長我南洋委任統治地ニ對シテ何  
事カハ代價ヲ支拂フコトナリ居ル處如何ト  
尋テ云

柘岡外務大臣此實ニ付テ、獨逸側、且未共任  
認テトナリ居ル、舊獨領、全部返還、及リ運  
前ニナリ居ル、與國々、日本ノ力ニテ返還  
了ルコトヲ認ム、原則ノ問題トナリ、其諾、得  
被ニ代價、得テ日本ニ讓渡、云々、其式、其

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柘岡外務大臣此實ニ付テ、獨逸側、且未共任  
認テトナリ居ル、舊獨領、全部返還、及リ運  
前ニナリ居ル、與國々、日本ノ力ニテ返還  
了ルコトヲ認ム、原則ノ問題トナリ、其諾、得  
被ニ代價、得テ日本ニ讓渡、云々、其式、其



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松岡外務大臣獨逸側ハ最初ヨリ伊太利ノ同意ヲ  
 確實ニ得タルニトテ條約迄ニ達ス居リタルニトテ  
 之ヲ御前會議ニテ審議スルハ日德間ニ應  
 纏リタル案ニ依リ日德伊三國間ニ條約ヲ締  
 結スル方針ヲ附議スルモノトシテ依リ何等差  
 支ナカリシモノト考フ



1603A

南嶺同盟を食糧生産の範圍に限定し、四月十七日、米大臣の答に「ア」

松岡外務大臣、交渉三原則を隨時に改定する旨を記録し、(由々)

南嶺同盟は、自來水供給の確保を主たる目的とする。交渉三原則を尊重し、

如何なる理由よりや  
松岡外務大臣は、既、歐洲戰争に参戦し居る中、米と在米日  
本企業の間、交渉三原則を以て日本に不利な日米交渉が絶えず

二十八年三月に、米と在米日企業の間、交渉三原則を以て、好ま  
り、三原則を明確にせよと云ふ

南嶺同盟は、在米日企業に不利な日本に言出さるゝに、一、米と在米日  
三原則を以て、一、米と在米日

松岡外務大臣は、交渉三原則を以て、一、米と在米日  
南嶺同盟は、在米日企業に不利な日本に言出さるゝに、一、米と在米日

交渉三原則を以て、一、米と在米日  
石が全数、(非)米と在米日企業に不利な日本に言出さるゝに、一、米と在米日

三原則を以て、一、米と在米日  
南嶺同盟は、在米日企業に不利な日本に言出さるゝに、一、米と在米日

松岡外務大臣は、交渉三原則を以て、一、米と在米日  
日本関係の改善、(非)米と在米日企業に不利な日本に言出さるゝに、一、米と在米日

三原則を以て、一、米と在米日  
南嶺同盟は、在米日企業に不利な日本に言出さるゝに、一、米と在米日

隔て、物手間、如何なる米と在米日企業に不利な日本に言出さるゝに、一、米と在米日

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承り安心之ミナリ度ニ

金重院總裁陸海軍大臣 先程毛御答之ミル由リ陸海  
（相海野藏アリ海外ヨリ平和的獲得モ有望ナリト河合  
有臣兩顧問官ニ對スル回答ヲ繰返シテ示シ

南顧問官一方ニ於テ日支事變が繼續スルニ於テ日米戰爭  
が勃發セバ日本ノ取捨ハ如何トシヤ大臣極力任ニ承リ度ニ

河田大臣陸海軍財政が窮乏ニシテハ如何論ナリ諸國國民野  
心ヲ増進スル政策計約ヲ圖ル也トシ

南顧問官次ニ日蘇關係ニ於テ度々日米戰爭が起ル  
場合ニ蘇聯ハ作モ歐洲戰爭等ニ英佛ト對立ヨリ引張帆ナリト

比が如ク日米兩國ヨリ提携ノ手ヲ差延ヌコトノ思ハル故ニ日米  
關係ヲ考フルハ先ツ蘇聯ト國交調整ヲ行ヒテ後此條約

交渉ヲ為スコトハ出来ザリトモナリヤ何故ニ蘇聯ト交渉ヲ  
發想スルニシテ總案ニシテ進ムトナリヤ

松岡外務大臣蘇聯ト國交調整ニ係ルハ内容時行ニ依リ條約ニ  
提議セリ本大臣も就任以來探リテ又見タルに蘇聯自身因國ノ  
提議ヲ受諾スル條件トシテホトシク此條約南族諸國權大削  
權自放棄等如ク在るもの條件ヲ附テ受諾ニ同意スル米比加  
如キ有様ナリ然レ本大臣ハ蘇聯ト國交調整ハ總案ヲ利用  
スル他ニシテ諸論ニ對シ本條約ニ對スル總案提議ヲ受  
諾スルナリ

南顧問官米國ハ歐洲戰爭ニ参加セズト言フコトヲ「ア」ハ  
外務大臣ニ申シテ「ア」トナリモ大統領陸軍大臣ハ如何ナル  
ニシテモ知ル中立法ヲ改正シテ極力英國ヲ援助スルコトニ

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杯飲同席 條約全眼とスル點、在米關係ナルが在蘇關係氏際  
最之慎重ニ考慮スル必要アリトナシ外務大臣、御説明ニ依りては  
蘇關係ニは樂觀的ニ考テ用ニ居ルニテ、何等ノ條件ナルが在否、  
有スル情報ニ依りてハ日蘇關係ニは獨蘇間ニ關係ヲ持テ相者悪  
キ材料モアリ例ハ昨年獨蘇ノ復條約締結セラシタル際スル  
リニが共產黨員ニ其タル訓示ノ内容ニ依りて自命ノ有スル確實ナル情  
報ニ依りてアリシハ蘇聯が今度獨蘇ニ提攜スルハ西歐亦ハ一  
手段アリ又之ニ依リテ東進政策ニ放棄スルモノアリ又時  
期ニハ積極的ニ出ル積リナリト述べタル由ナルハ之等ノ點ニ依りて外  
務大臣ハ如何御考ナリヤ

松岡外務大臣 日蘇國交調整ニ關シテ御答復ナリト自命考居  
ラズ惟獨ハ蘇聯ニ對シテ相者ニ否カヲ知(得)トハ之ヲ認めカ  
ルベキ自命ノ有スル確實ナル情報ニ依りて昨年蘇聯が何故ニ英佛  
ヲ離レテ獨蘇ニ提攜スルニ至リヤト生ク其ノ動靜最モ重要ナルハ  
日ソノハタリシニ對シテ若シ獨逸側ノ要求が容レラザレバ獨逸  
蘇聯ヲ攻撃スベト申傳(タ)リト言フコトナリ之ヲ吾等ニ判斷シ、  
日蘇國交調整ニ獨逸ヲ斡旋セシムルハ相者相者ナリト考(居)  
ル。

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深井顧問官 條約第三條、場合即ち日米戰爭、場合獨逸、如何に軍事上、援助ヲ日本ニ與(得)ルヤ

松岡外務大臣 右(交渉、際ニ)論議スルガ獨逸、第三條、事能發生以前、於(之)新兵兵器ヲ日本ニ供給スルト申(上)信(又)日米戰爭勃發、場合、大西洋方面、於(之)米國ニ序制(ス)トニ(居)リ

東條陸軍大臣 蘇聯ト、諒解、下(ニ)優待(ス)ル軍用器材、供給(ス)ルニ(ト)ガ最(モ)重要(ナル)援助(ナリ)

及川海軍大臣 大体陸軍ト同様(ナリ)

深井顧問官 蘇聯ニ對(シ)同條(ニ)於(テ)獨逸ヲ序制(ス)ルト、如何(ナル)意味(ナリ)ヤ斯(ル)事、獨蘇不可侵條約ニ正面(ヨリ)反(ス)ルモ、(ニ)テ(ラ)ズヤ

東條陸軍大臣 條約上、其(ノ)通(ル)ガ實際、軍事上、動(キ)ヲ云(ハ)獨逸、蘇聯ヲ序制(ス)得(ル)モノ(ナリ)現(ニ)獨逸、對(シ)英作(戦)行(ヒ)コト(アル)モ其(ノ)陸軍、大部分、機械化部隊ト英國(内)ニ保有(シ)居(リ)之(ガ)軍事(的)ニ蘇聯ヲ序制(ス)居(ル)次第(ナリ)

深井顧問官 外務大臣、日獨間、相互信賴ト云(フ)コトヲ申(セ)タリ獨逸側、昨年、獨蘇不可侵條約締結、際、態度(ハ)不信ト云(フ)、外(ニ)シテ昨年九月阿部兼攝外相(ガ)本夜、於(テ)外交經過ヲ説明(ス)ル際、當時、澤田外務次官(ガ)平沼內閣ニ於(テ)獨蘇協定(ガ)日獨所共協長、秘密協定ニ違反(ス)ル点ヲ指摘(シ)獨逸ニ對(シ)抗議(ヲ)提(出)セル旨ヲ述(ベ)タル處(ニ)加(テ)抗議、結果、如何(ナリ)居(ル)ヤ

松岡外務大臣 本大臣、閣(下)所(ニ)依(リ)テ抗議(ノ)果(シ)テ失(テ)

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二通、居ル答ヲ録ハシテ、然ラズ猶、獨逸側ヨリ、何言、回答ナカシ  
シモト思ヘテ

深井顧問官 対外國條ニ感情ヲ文ニシテ、禁物ニテ外交、  
飽ク迄、現実に、行ハルベクニスト、用心者ニ、炭本條約、前文ニ  
為邦ヲ、シテ各其、所ヲ得、ニトアルカ、トナシ、序ニ、之ヲ、  
弱肉強食、自然、法則ナリ、如キ感觸、與、ルガ獨逸側  
ニ果、シテ此、前文、趣旨ヲ、正確ニ理解、シ居ルヤ

松岡外務大臣 我外交、使命、皇道、宣布、在リ、利害得失  
ニ依リ、動クモ、ニテ、弱肉強食、如キ思想、非、シテ之ヲ  
排、建、スベキトナリ

深井顧問官 日米戦争ヲ、不可避トシ、此、際、猶、速リ、英米ヲ  
孰、シテ、外交、重点、ヲ、置カ、ルベクニスト、之、ヲ、以テ、理解、出来、ルモ  
本條約、締結、結果、或、日米戦争ヲ、早ク、ニトナシ、之、ヲ、知  
シ、總理大臣、最、悪、場合、於テ、軍需品、搬、物資、缺  
乏、思想、惡化、等、對、處、之、ヲ、以テ、得、ル、自信、ハ、ヤ、答、中  
覺悟、ヲ、承、リ、度、シ

近衛總理大臣 本條約、根本、考、ヘ、テ、又、日米、衝突、之、向  
避、ス、ル、在、リ、然、レ、共、下手、ニ、去、ル、米、國、ヨリ、上、ニ、セ、ル、文、ニ、依、リ  
毅然、ナル、態度、ヲ、示、ス、必要、ト、思、考、ス、方、一、旦、取、悪、事、態、ヲ  
生、ジ、タ、場合、ニ、政府、外交、内政、ヲ、通、シ、テ、非常、ニ、覺悟  
ヲ、以テ、施策、セ、ル、ベクニスト、考、ヘ、居、リ、又、日本、大臣、ガ、參、内、本  
件、ヲ、上、奏、致、シ、タ、際、天皇、陛下、於、テ、ウ、セ、ラ、シ、テ、之、非常、ニ、御  
決心、有、シ、遊、ハ、ル、ニ、ト、同、レ、度、ニ、恐懼、感激、甚、ク、本、大  
臣、ト、シ、テ、身、命、ヲ、賭、シ、テ、本、條約、遺、憾、ナ、ク、運、用、ヲ、期、シ、度、シ

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ト有リ居リ

二顧問官 外交上、經濟上ニ付テ、大分質疑應答下リタルニ依リ、自今ヨリ、條約其、モ、ニ付、疑問トシテ、領ニ度ニ先形式、トシテ、付テ、茲ニ配付、書類、中何カ御諮詢ニ付、居ルヤ不明ナリ之等、文書、日本文ガ本文ナリヤ交換文書、亦其内容ヨリ見テ、國際約束ト思ヒルガ之ニ付テ、御諮詢トシテ、漢字ナリトシテ、松岡外務大臣 御諮詢ニ相成リ居ル條約其、ニ付テ、他ニ參考ナリ條約、本文、日本文、獨逸文及伊太利文トシテ、各ナルニテ、差處ヨリ、英文、モ、ニ署名スルニ付テ、居リ

松本條約局長 附屬、交換文書、條約ト同様、效力ヲ有スル所ヲ認メ、文上、内容並ニ形式(例ニ、番号ヲ附スルニ於テ、異リ居ル所、所謂國際約束ト、認メ、雖モ、條約、解釋及松岡大臣トシテ、大使トシテ、意見、一致スルニ、莫ク記載スルニ、モ、ニ、極大ニ重要ナル文書ト認メ、參考トシテ、上長安案ニ附屬セシメタル次第ナリ

二顧問官 差處ヨリ、英文ニ署名スルニ付テ、如キ、異例ニ、斯ルニ手續ガ許サレト、思ヒ、又交換文書、内容、國際約束トシテ、以テ、之亦御諮詢、容体トシテ、キモト思フ

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原議長 之等形式、問題ニ付テ、後刻懇談會ヲ開催スルニ付テ、改定ス

(審査委員會終了後政府側退席シ、懇談會ヲ開キタル結果條約案文、ニ付、御諮詢、容体トシテ、立ニ差處ヨリ、條約案日本文、ニ付、原議長、英文ニ署名ニ後、日、獨伊文トシテ、付テ、其、點、過スルニ付テ、決死スルニ趣ナリ)

二顧問官 條約第三條ニ、歐洲戰爭又、日支紛争、各入リ居ルニ付テ、不正確ニ言現シ、亦、ニ、歐洲戰爭又、





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小幡顧問官 日本が日支事変ヲ解決シ居ラザル此  
際ニ當テ歐洲戰爭ニ米國ガ参戰シタル場合ニ獨  
伊ヲ援助スル義務ヲ負フコトハ極メニ重大ナル義  
務ヲ負フモノナルニ反シ日米ガ開戦スルト云フ可  
能性ハ少シト思ハル依テ本條約ハ極メニ先務的  
ナルモノトナラザルヤ

松岡外務大臣 米國ガ歐洲戰爭ニ参加スルヤ否ヤ  
又日米戰爭ガ勃発スルヤ否ヤ、雖亦五分五分、  
可能性アリト見テ差支ナシ依テ先務的ノモノト  
思考セズ

IT越顧問官 本條約締結ノ結果日英惡良場合ヲ  
生ジルトキ德逸ハ如何ナル援助ヲ日本ニ與得ル  
ヤ又日本海軍ガ德伊ヲ援助スル場合ニ如何ナ  
ル援助ヲ爲スヤ

松岡外務大臣 如何ナル援助ヲ與得ルヤ等ノ問題  
混合委員會ニテ充分研究セザルベカラス

鈴木審査委員會長 本條約ノ成立ト否トニ拘ラズ  
日米戰爭ハ不可避ト考フルニ依リ米國海軍擴張  
ヲ充分監視シテ之ニ相應スル準備ヲ怠ル  
ベカラス

No 21 及海軍大臣 差當リ連戰即決ニ米國ニ對シテ  
充分勝算アリ將來ニ付テ是看之各般擴張  
計畫ヲ自論ニ居ル次第ナリ  
石井顧問官 交換文書、最後ノモノヲ見ルニ

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我委任統治下、南洋群島、依然日本、屬地トスルニ  
 之ニ對シテ償ヲ支拂フベキト日記載シアリ之ニ對シテ  
 松岡大臣、説明ニヨリバ「少シハヤイニ條約、既消  
 滅シタルモノナリニ依リ南洋群島、日本、今高軍  
 事占領ヲ繼續スルモノニテ從テ日本、独逸ヨリ償  
 ヲ支拂ヒテ之ヲ讓受クル必要アリトシテトナル處ニ  
 任統治地域ハ「少シハヤイニ條約ニ依リ五大國ニ讓渡  
 セシタルモノヲ日本ガ獲得シタルモノト見ルベク既ニ  
 日本、屬地トシテ解スルヲ以テ正ト自分、思考ス  
 ルニ依リ、独逸大使、口頭宣言ニ、自分、賛意ヲ表  
 シ兼テ尤モ本問題、御諮詢外問題トシテ以テ  
 唯御參考ニ、自分、意見ヲ述ブルニ「置キテ」  
 松岡外務大臣、立博士等有カタル國際法學者  
 意見、委任統治領土、讓渡非ズト爲シ居ルカ故  
 ニ法理論、別トシテ實際政治問題トシテ、應獨逸ヨ  
 リ何等カノ方法ヲ割讓ヲ受クル方可トシテ云ク  
 下カ自分、三年以來、考ナリ聞ク所ニ依リ、三  
 年位前ニ日本海軍ヨリ、任伯林、海軍武官ヲ通  
 シテ獨側ニ對シ、一定代償、下ニ割讓ヲ申出  
 タル趣ナリ

22

No

本井顧問官 本問題ニ付テ、立博士トモ意見  
 ヲ交換シタルコトアリ立博士、意見モ委任統  
 治領土、割讓ニ「アズト云フ」支テ獨逸ガ五大國  
 ニ讓渡シタル事ニ付テ、三年トシテ、林田ノ考、從テ  
 今更日本ガ独逸ヨリ、代償ヲ支拂ヒテ割讓ヲ受  
 ンカ如キ、本官、同意シ難キ所ナリ

Doc/603A

三土顧問官 今朝来、質疑應答ヲ聞キ居ル  
 米國ト、戦争トナリタル場合、ニトテ主トシテ論議  
 ラル所ニ様ナルモ本條約締結後直ニ米國、我國ニ  
 對スル經濟壓迫ハ一層加重セラルルモノト思考ス  
 其ノ場合ニ於ケル我國民生活ノ問題ハ重大ナル問  
 題ナリト思ハル處之ニ付テハ充分ナル用意出  
 来居リヤ又日本人ノ名角此ノ種ノ條約ガ出  
 来ルト独逸ガブレトナリ反米運動等ヲ試ム  
 ルモノ出テ来ル惧アリ斯カル莫ク嚴ニ取締リ  
 頂キタシ

星野企畫院總裁 國民生活ノ問題ハ政府トシテ  
 最も關心ヲ有シ居リ之ガ對策ニ付テハ萬  
 貴感トキヲ期シタシ  
 近衛内閣總理大臣 排米運動ヲ取締ルトハ極  
 大ノ同感トシバ嚴重實施致シタシト存ス

午後七時三十分政府側退場

Doc 1603A

證明書

「以下」文書局 第一六〇三號  
國際檢察部 第一六〇三號

與據及公正之證明

余林馨、余下記資格、於、即、日本外務省文書課長ト、日本政  
府ト公的関係ニ在ルニシテ、此ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添付セラルル四六頁ヲ成  
ル一九四六年一昭和五年九月二十六日付下記題名、即、日獨伊三國條約之関  
ニ樞密院審査委員會議事概要、文書保管ニ任シ居ル下ニ茲ニ證明ス。  
余更ニ添付ノ記録及ニ文書ヲ日本政府、ハ文書トシテ右下記名稱、有文部  
局、公文書類及ニ綴一部トシテ證明ス。若シテハ綴番號又ニ引用其他公文書  
類ハ綴於ニ該文書、正規所在、公文名稱ヲ特記スベシ

一九四六年一昭和五年九月九日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名欄

右有公的資格

證

人

林 馨 (林)

外務省文書課長

スドツカハル一音譯

公文入手之證明

余リチャード・ヒューズハ余ガ聯合國軍總指揮官司令部關係ニ在リテ、此上  
記題名文書、余ハ公務上日本政府トシテ署名官吏トシテ此トテ證明ス。

一九四六年一昭和五年九月九日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名欄

右有公的資格

證

人

リチャード・ヒューズ

國際檢察部調査官

イフ P. 戸口

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Doc 1603A

證明書

文書局 第一六〇三號  
國際檢察部 第一六〇三號

與據及公証之證明

余林馨、余が下記資格に於て、即ち日本外務省文書課長として日本政府との關係に在ることを、並に該官吏として余が茲添附せる四六頁より成る千九百四十六年（昭和二十年）九月十六日附下記題名、即ち日獨伊三國條約關係之樞密院審査委員會議事概要、文書保管に任じ居ることを茲證明す。余更添附、記録及文書が日本政府、公文書として右下記名稱、有文部局、公文書類及綴一部として證明す。若し右綴番號又引用其他公文書類及綴に於て該文書、正規所在公文名稱を特記すべし。

千九百四十六年（昭和二十年）九月九日

東京に於て署名

當該官吏署名欄

右者の公的資格

證人

林馨 (林)

外務省文書課長

ストロガール 音譯

公文入手之證明

余リチャード・H・ラニに於て、余が聯合國軍指揮官總司令部關係に在ることを、並に下記題名文書、余が公務上日本政府より記署名官吏より受けることを茲證明す。

千九百四十六年（昭和二十年）九月九日

東京に於て署名

氏名欄

右者の公的資格

證人

リチャード・H・ラニ

國際檢察部調査官

I. P. 戸口

24

Doc. No. 219F (94)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 129

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (CREW) TO THE  
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MATSUOKA).

Excerpts.

No. 1653

TOKYO, October 11, 1940.

. . . . .

By virtue of a widespread system of exchange and trade controls in North China which culminated on June 23, 1940, in the institution of a complete and discriminatory control of exchange, American trade with that area has come to a virtual halt.

. . . . .

American enterprise having been practically eliminated from Manchuria, and American enterprise and trade in the North China area having been reduced to insignificant proportions, it now appears to be the intent of the military authorities of Japan to force American enterprise and trade out of Shanghai, the most important commercial center in China.

. . . . .

Foreign Relations I, p. 833  
at p. 884

2x 1031

21107 (1111)

駐米國大使(小) / GREU / 日本外務大臣(松岡)

坂本

第六之三

東京 一九四一年十月十一日

為替對之完全且差別之統制制度，形ヲトシ至于一九四一年六月  
二十日經頂之達より北支ニ於テ之為替並ニ貿易統制，廣汎ニ互ニ組  
織シタキ其地域ニ於テ米國貿易ノ實質的中絶スニ至リ

米國企業：事實上滿洲ヲ排除セリ且米國ノ北支地域ニ於テ  
企業並ニ貿易ノ減セリ取ニ定メテ割合多ク至リ更ニ支那  
ニ於テ最モ重要ナル商業中心地上海ヨリ米國企業並ニ貿易ヲ  
排除セリ之上、今日本軍部當局ノ意圖ナリト思ハル。

外交關係一

八三頁

八四頁



Doc. No. 219P (95)

Page 1

Dr. Ex. 130

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE  
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (YATSUKA)

Excerpts.

No. 1665

TOKYO, October 24, 1940.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that my Government has taken note that the Japanese military authorities in North China have since October 1 applied certain so-called "regulations governing the control of inspections and shipments of raw materials for light industries in North China." According to the press the regulations are applicable to cotton, hemp, jute, and other vegetable fibers, animal hair, leather, and furs.

. . . . .

Failing an early modification of the attitude of the military authorities in China, American firms, both in the United States and in North China, are destined (1) to suffer large financial losses on account of stocks held for exportation under already existing contracts and on account of large additional unfilled contracts, and (2) to be eliminated from trade in which they have participated for a long period.

. . . . .

Doc. 219P(95)

駐日米國大使(ケル) / GREW / より 日本外務大臣(松岡)  
に宛てたる普翰

抜萃

第一六六五號

一九四〇年 / 昭和十五年 / 十月三日 東京發

閣下、北支に於ける日本陸軍當局が十月一日以来所謂北支  
に於ける輕工業用原料の検査及船積みの監理に関する  
規定しを適用し居ることに關し米國政府は注目し居る  
ことを閣下に申し上げ置度候

新聞の報道に依れば、此等の規定は棉花、麻、黄麻  
その他、植物性纖維、動物性毛、皮革及毛皮に適用し  
居る由、

\* \* \* \*

北支に於ける陸軍當局の態度が早急に改められしに  
合衆國及北支に於ける米國商館は(既に成立せる契  
約に基き輸出する目的を以て大量の在庫品を有せしため  
に、経済的に大損失を蒙り、又(長、間關係せる留島  
より除外され)運命に有之候

\* \* \* \*

外國關係一 二九一八頁

EX 1032

DOC. NO. 220C (?)

Br. Ex. 139

ORAL STATEMENT BY THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR (GREGG)  
TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MITSUKI) <sup>14</sup>

I am informed by our Consul at Hanoi that certain merchandise owned by American interests is being refused re-export permits from Indo-China by the Indo-Chinese authorities chiefly as a result of Japanese pressure brought upon these authorities.

Detailed information regarding such merchandise is known to the Indo-China authorities, to our Consul, and presumably to the Japanese.

I have been instructed to request that appropriate steps be taken to put an end to this unwarranted interference with the shipments of goods and merchandise owned by Americans.

Foreign Relations II, pp. 298-299.

Footnote:

<sup>14</sup> Notation: "Left with Mr. Terazaki, Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office, by the American First Secretary, Mr. Crocker, November 15, 1940, as from the American Ambassador to the Minister for Foreign Affairs".

米國大使（グルー）ノ日本外務大臣  
（松岡）ニ對スル口頭聲明（註、一四）

予ハ河内駐在領事ヨリ、印度支那當局ハ、主ト  
シテ該當局ニ日本ノ壓迫ガ加ヘラレタル結果、  
米國關係者所有ノ該ル種商品ノ印度支那ヨリノ  
再輸出許可ヲ拒否シアリトノ報告ヲ受ケテキル。  
是等ノ商品ニ關スル詳細ナル情報ハ印度支那當  
局、吾方領事、又悉ラクハ日本側ニモ知レテキ  
ルモノデアル。  
予ハ米國人所屬ノ貨物及ヒ商品ノ船積ニ對スル  
此ノ不當ナ妨害ヲ停止セシムベキ適當ナル手段  
ヲ講ゼラレタキ旨稟請セヨトノ訓令ニ接シテキ  
ル。

外交關係第三卷、第二九八頁及第二九九頁

註（一四）右宛書ハ一九四〇年ノ昭和十五年ノ  
十一月十五日、米國大使ヨリ日本外務大臣  
ヘ宛テタルモノトシテ、米口一等登記官ク  
ラツカー氏ガ日本外務省アメリカ局長寺崎  
氏ヘ手交方ヲ依託セルモノナリ。

WX/1033  
Doc 220C (8)

★

EX 1034

Doc. No. 2199 (71)

Br. Ex. 103

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GROW) TO THE  
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MATSUOKA)

Excerpt.

No. 1700

TOKYO, November 26, 1940.

EXCELLENCY: Acting under instructions from my Government, I have the honor formally to protest against the actions of the Japanese military at Hanoi who recently took into custody Mr. Robert W. Rinden, American Vice Consul, and the United Press correspondent, Mr. Melville Jacoby.

My Government considers that the employment of force and the threat of arms against an American official and the individual accompanying him were especially flagrant. I am constrained to recall that it has been necessary for my Government to point out to Your Excellency's Government, in connection with a deplorably large number of incidents involving American nationals and the Japanese military in China, that if the Japanese Government were to issue strict and effective instructions that American citizens should be treated with civility by the Japanese military, incidents of the character described above would not occur.

With reference to the incident which is the subject of the present note, I wish to invite the particular attention of Your Excellency to the fact that Mr. Rinden and his companion were threatened with rifles which were pointed at them, and were kept in custody by Japanese soldiers, and that the Japanese soldiers did not withdraw until the arrival of the French authorities, despite the fact that Mr. Rinden identified himself as an American Vice Consul to a Japanese officer who spoke and understood English.

.....

Foreign Relations I, pp. 704-705

219 P (71)

駐日米國大使(元) GREW / 日本外務大臣(私爵)に宛て  
一に書簡

板筆

第一七〇號

元四年ノ昭和十五年十月十六日 東京に於て。

閣下。本使は本國政府の訓令に基き、河内に於ける日本  
軍隊が最近米國副領事に R. W. RINDEN 氏

ROBERT W. RINDEN 氏及共同通信記者 R. W. JACOBY  
/ MR. MELVILLE JACOBY 氏と監禁せし行為に關し正式に指  
議を申込む所なり。

本國政府は米國官吏及その隨伴者たる各個人に對し暴力を  
行使し又は武器を以て脅迫する事は特に禁止すべき行為なり  
この見解を有する在又米國國民と日本軍隊との間に遺憾  
なき多數の事件の發生せし事に關聯し、若し日本政府  
が日本軍隊が米國市民を鄭重に待遇せし、且厳格に  
し有効なる訓令を發せしならば上述の如き性質の事件  
が發生せざりしならんことを閣下の政府に指摘すべし

本國政府に對し必要なりしと想はせるに何れなるに  
本書簡の主題たる事件に關聯し R. W. RINDEN 氏

及その隨伴者 R. W. JACOBY 氏を拘捕し日本兵に

て監禁せし又 R. W. JACOBY 氏を監禁し日本

將に米國副領事 R. W. RINDEN 氏を拘捕し佛國

官憲に R. W. JACOBY 氏を拘捕し佛國

下官に R. W. JACOBY 氏を拘捕し佛國

下官に R. W. JACOBY 氏を拘捕し佛國

下官に R. W. JACOBY 氏を拘捕し佛國

下官に R. W. JACOBY 氏を拘捕し佛國

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下官に R. W. JACOBY 氏を拘捕し佛國

下官に R. W. JACOBY 氏を拘捕し佛國

Doc. 13394 (4)

SUMMARY

Memo of Kase, Secretary to the Foreign Minister, dated December 9, 1940, addressed to Ota, Chief of the European Dept, Section 3 of the Foreign Office.

1) Ambassador Craigie, on December 9, called upon Foreign Minister Matsucka, and submitted to the Foreign Minister the statement as per copy herewith. The Foreign Minister, in response, stated that since Japan is one of the signatories of the Tripartite Pact it is quite natural that she gives help and facilities to other Axis States to such an extent as Japan does not violate her neutrality. Craigie acquiesced with this explanation.

2) This move of Craigie's seems like a gesture to indicate to his home government his constant efforts in regard to Anglo-Japanese relations. Further, the Foreign Minister received the impression that Britain still retains the hope for improvement in the relation between the two nations and is contriving to cool off the existing relations between Japan and the Axis powers.

3) In the course of the talk between the Foreign Minister and Craigie the latter also referred to the s/s "Oloyacch" /phonetic?/ incident, the particulars of which he explained. The Foreign Minister merely listened to this, making no comment whatever.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I. I. S. No. 13394 (4)

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 3 pages, dated 9 December, 1940, and described as follows:

SUMMARY. Memo of Kase, Secretary to the Foreign Minister, dated Dec. 9, 1940, addressed to Oka, Chief of the European Dept. Sec. 3 of the Foreign Office.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
21st day of Sept., 1946.

(Signed) K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official  
SEAL

Witness: Nagaharu Oda

Chief, Archives Sect.  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
25 day of September, 1946.

(Signed) Richard H. Larsh  
NAME

Witness: (s) T/4 T. Toguchi

Investigation Division  
Official Capacity I. I. S.



For Sale

4x 1035

1339A (4)

(昭一五・一二・九 歐三)

加瀬秘書官ヨリ歐三太田へ通報左ノ通

- 一、  
「クレイギー」大使十二月九日松岡大臣ヲ來  
訪 別添「ステートメント」ヲ手交シタル處  
大臣ニ對シテ帝國ハ三國同盟ノ一員タル以上中  
立義務ニ違反セザル他國內ニ於テ樞軸體ニ便  
宜ヲ圖ルコトハ當然ナリト述べタルニ「クレ  
イギー」大使ハ之ヲ諒承セリ
- 二、  
右ハ「クレイギー」大使ガ日英關係ニ就テ絶ヘズ盡力  
シテ庸ル旨ヲ本國政府ニ傳ヘンガ爲ナルト同  
時ニ、英國トシテハ尙日英關係ノ打開ニ付望  
ミヲ捨テズ、泡ヨクバ帝國ト樞軸國トノ間ニ  
水ヲ差サントノ下心ヲ有スルモノナラントノ  
印象ヲ松岡大臣ハ待タリ
- 三、  
次テ「クレイギー」大使ハ大臣ニ對シ「オレヤコブ」  
號事件ノ経緯ヲ説明シ、大臣ハ何等ノ「コメ  
ンタリー」ヲ附セズ、疑キ種クニ止メタル趣ナリ。

1239A(4) cert-1

證 明 書

「ワシントン」文書局 第 一三三九△ (四) 號  
國 際 検 察 部

於 採 及 び 公 正 に 出 せ る 證 明

余、林君ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ外務省文  
書課長トシテ、日本政府ト公的関係ニ在ルモノナ  
ルコト、並ニ該官更トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレタ  
ル、三頁ヨリ成ル、千九百四十年ノ昭和十五年ノ  
十二月九日附、下記姓名、即チ加温総督官ヨリ  
三太田へ通報ノ文書ノ保管ニ任シ居ルコトヲ茲ニ  
証明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書  
ナルコト、並ニ右ガ下記名簿ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式  
記録及ビ之ノ一部ナルコトヲ証明ス。(若シテラ  
ハ該記録又ハ引用、其ノ他公式記録又ハ綴ニ於ケ  
ル該文書ノ成規所在ノ公式名簿ヲモ特記スベシ)

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ九月二十一日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官更署名欄

林 稔

右ノ者ノ公的資格

外務省文書課長

證 人

尾 戸 長 春

1339A (4) cert. 2

正式入手ニ付スル證明

余、RICHARD H. LARSH ハ、余ガ聯合國最高指揮官  
總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、茲ニ上記姓名  
ノ文書ハ余ガ公印上、日本政府ノ上記署名官印ヨ  
リ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 九月二十五日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名	編	RICHARD H. LARSH
右ノ者ノ公的資格		總司令部 在 部
証人		F/4 T. TOGUCHI

EX-1036

DOCUMENT NO. 2200 (9)

Page 1.

Br. Ex. 140

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE  
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MATSUOKA)

Excerpt.

No. 1714

TOKYO, December 17, 1940

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to invite the attention of Your Excellency to the fact that on November 15 an oral statement was left with Mr. Terazaki as from the American Ambassador to the Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that, according to information from the American Consul at Hanoi, certain merchandise owned by American interests was being refused re-export permits from Indochina by the Indochinese authorities, chiefly as a result of Japanese pressure brought upon those authorities.

On November 30, in a conversation with Your Excellency, I made further representations in this matter, repeating those made on November 15.

. . . . .

Foreign Relations II, p. 299

Doc, 220 C (9)

4x 10.6

駐日米國大使(タル)ヨリ日本外務大臣(松岡)宛

抜萃

第一七二四号

一九四〇年(昭和十五年)

十二月七日 於東京

閣下、去ル十月十五日附 口頭聲明書ヲ寺崎氏ニ託セシコト 即チ米國領事ヨリ、報告ニ依リ、印度支那當局ハ、主トシテ該當局ニ日本ノ壓迫が加ヘタル結果、米國關係者所有ノ或ル種商品ノ印度支那ヨリ、再輸出許可ヲ拒否シアリト述ベタル米國大使ヨリ外務大臣ニ宛テタル聲明書ニ御留意アラシコトヲ茲ニ申入レマス。

此ノ件ニ関シテ十一月三十日御面接、際、去ル十一月十五日ニ申上ゲタルコトヲ繰リ返シ更ニ開陳致シタル次第デス。

外交關係第三卷第二九九頁

DOCUMENT NO. 2200 (10)

Page 1.

Br. Ex. 141

GRAL STATEMENT BY THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR (CREW)  
TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MATSUOKA)

Referring to the American Ambassador's note to His Excellency the Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs, no. 1714 dated December 17, 1940, relating to the interference by the Indochinese authorities, chiefly as a result of Japanese pressure brought upon those authorities, with the shipments of American owned goods and merchandise, the American Ambassador is now instructed to express to His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs the opinion that it would not be consistent with humanitarian considerations to interfere with the movement of supplies of the Red Cross at present in Indochina, in addition to being unwarranted on other grounds. At least a part of the Red Cross supplies under reference, incidentally, was made possible by the contributions of American citizens.

Foreign Relations II, p. 300

米國大使(ガル)ヨリ日本外務大臣(松岡)ニ  
宛テタル口頭聲明書

主トシテ印度支那當局ニ與ヘタル日本、壓迫ノ結果  
生ジタル該當局ノ米國人所有貨物及ビ商品ノ  
船積ニ対スル妨害ニ關スル一九四〇年(昭和十五年)  
十二月七日附日本帝國外務大臣宛米國大使宛書  
第一七一四号ニ關聯シ米國大使ハ今般日本外務大臣  
閣下ニ対シ目下印度支那ニ在ル赤十字社給與品  
ノ移動妨害ヲナスハ他ノ根據ニヨリ保証サレザル  
ノミナラス人道主義的ナ考ト相容レザルモノナリト  
ノ見解ヲ披瀝スル様指令セラレタ。因ニ右赤十字  
社ノ給與品ノ少クトモ一部ハ米國市民ヨリ寄贈  
ニヨリトトノヘラレタモノデアツタ。

外交關係 第二卷 第三〇頁

EXTRACT FROM "THE TOKYO NICHI NICHI"

May 3, 1941

-----  
DEFENSE SECURITY LAW

MEASURE TO GO INTO EFFECT ON MAY 10.  
-----

The National Defense Security Law will be enforced on May 10, it was decided in the Cabinet Meeting on May 2.

Detailed regulations governing the enforcement of the law will be published on May 10.



C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No.  
I.P.S. No. 2531A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Kataiti Ikawa hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Cabinet and that as such official I have custody of the records of the Cabinet Meeting and the decisions referred to in the attached newspaper article described as follows: Extract from the Tokyo Nichi Nichi, May 3, 1941 entitled Defense Security Law. I further certify that the attached newspaper article correctly represents in substance the decisions of the Cabinet Meeting of the date referred to.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
10 day of Oct, 1946

/s/ K. Ikawa  
Signature of Official  
SEAL  
Secretary of Cabinet  
Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ Tomoo Satow

Statement of Official Procurement

I, John Curtis hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
16 day of Oct, 1946

/s/ J. A. Curtis 2d Lt.  
NAME

Witness: /s/ Sgt T. Toguchi

Investigator  
Official Capacity

64 1038

Doc 2531A

1.

「東京日々新聞」一九四一年／昭  
和十六年／五月三日附カラノ抜萃

。 。 。 。 。 。 。 。 。 。

国防保安法

同法ハ五月十日愈々實施

。 。 。 。 。 。 。 。 。 。

国防保安法ハ五月十日ヨリ實施サレルベク五月二

日ノ國議ニテ決定シタ。

同法施行令ハ五月十日ニ公布サレル。

Doc 2531A (cont)

2.

送 展 香

「ワシントン」文書局 第 號  
閣 際 文 書 部 第 二 五 三 一 A 號

文書ノ出所及ヒソノ真正タルコトノ陳述

余、井川克一ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ内閣書記官トシテ、日本政府ト公的関係ニ在ルモノナルコト、竝ニ該官吏トシテ茲ニ添附セラレアル一九四一年ノ昭和十六年ノ五月三日附東京日々新聞ノ國防保安法ト題スル記事抜萃ニ引用セラレアル陳述記録及決議ノ文書ヲ保管セルコトヲ説明ス。

余ハ頁ニ添附ノ新聞記事ガ件ノ日時ニ行ハレタル閣議決議ノ要領ヲ正確ニ述べ居ルコトヲ證明ス。

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ十月十日

東京ニ於テ署名

管該官吏署名欄 ケー、井川

右ノ者ノ公的資格 内閣書記官

送 展 人 佐藤 朝生



Doc 25.3/1A (cont)

3.

余、シヨシ、カーティスハ、余ガ聯合陸軍最高指揮官  
 總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、並ニ上記證明書  
 ハ余ガ公務上、日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入手シ  
 タルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／十月十六日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名 欄 シエイ、エイ、カーティス少尉  
 石ノ着ノ公的資格 調査官  
 証人 テイ、戸口 軍曹

EJ# 1039

Doc. No. 1339A(2)

Page 1

PROPOSAL FROM FOREIGN MINISTER EDEN  
TO AMBASSADOR SHIGEMITSU ON 7 FEBRUARY  
SHOWA 16, 1941

1. At the first interview with the Foreign Minister after the formation of the KONOYE Cabinet, Ambassador CRAIGIE expressed the hope that the new Cabinet would collaborate and settle the relations between the two countries by friendly measures as did the preceding Cabinet. To this Foreign Minister MATSUOKA replied that the Cabinet was considering carefully the general policy for the future, and added at the same time, as his unofficial idea, that a general improvement of the relation between Japan and England could not be hoped for, and a strained situation between Japan and England in the future was inevitable.

Two days after the interview occurred the arrests of many Englishmen in Japan and Korea, on which a joint statement by the War Minister and Minister of Justice was issued, giving generally the impression of the existence of an English spy ring in Japan. But the result of the trial was that they were punished for trivial matters, and there was nothing about spies.

This was the general situation in July and August. In September Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact and formally joined on the side of Germany and Italy, enemies of Britain. The public speeches of statesmen and the tendency of the press were deepening more and more anxiety on the part of England.

2. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA said in his official statement that the Tripartite Pact was a pact of peace, and you also stated that the main policy of Japan was to overcome the difficulties of the China affair and restore order in East Asia. But judging from facts which have happened since then, and considering all the indications that the sphere of influence of Japan is being enlarged to dominate East Asia, frankly the above explanation is hard to understand.

In this connection the British Government wishes to call your attention to the impropriety of the statement of Foreign Minister MATSUOKA concerning Japanese aspirations in Burma. As regards Indo-China and Thailand also, recent situations have not mitigated the strained relation in the

Far East at all. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA said that only Japan had the right to mediate in the conflicts in the Far East, but the British Government can not approve of this claim.

If the purpose of the mediation were merely to bring about a settlement of conflicts, Britain would welcome it like all the other countries. But we have received the disquieting information that Japan had brought pressure to bear on Indo-China and Thailand, and we have come to entertain misgivings whether Japan were not using this mediation as a pretext to secure far-reaching political and military concessions from both these countries--e.g. newspaper information reports that Camran Bay and all the existing air-fields will be used by Japan.

3. The most important fact is the recent report of Ambassador Craigie, informing us that "In Japan the prevailing impression is that the crisis in the Far East will occur within these two or three weeks".

What do these facts mean? Who is challenging whom? Should we believe that a sort of advance planned by Japan will be carried out simultaneously with the German attack on England proper, and if so should Britain assume that her territories in the Far East are in danger of an attack by Japan? It is hard for me to understand the situation. Geographically Japan is in an advantageous position, so that she can remain entirely aloof from the calamity of war if she so desires, and moreover she is not being threatened by any one, certainly not by England.

If I may be allowed to speak frankly, it seems to me that Japan has many reasons for not intervening in another war after four years of the China Incident. In my opinion, Japan can not but recognize her reason for being on unfriendly terms with Britain and the United States, but as proved by history, it can not be denied that the prosperity of Japan was at its best when she was at friendly relations with Britain and the United States. So it is hard for me to understand the reason why Ambassador Craigie reported of the sphere of crisis increasing in Japan. It seems to me that the aim of the Japanese statesmen is to indicate the approach of a huge confusion.

4. You will be able to understand that it is impossible to disregard the above signs and portents, and that it is necessary to tell you clearly our standpoint. England has territories in the Far East, but she has no aggressive intentions; however, she does not intend to sacrifice these territories by orders from any other country. And furthermore it is impossible to approve of the principle that Japan is the sole country having the right to administer and control the destiny of all the inhabitants (including the English) in the Far East. There is no doubt that Britain will protect her territories in the Far East with the utmost vigor, if they should be attacked, and defend the security and welfare of the inhabitants.

5. In addition, I wish to mention two points.

The first point is as follows: There is no objection to Japan deciding her own policy, but as an old friend and a former Allied Power, I do not think I will bring down the wrath of Japan upon myself for saying the following thing-- that I hope and pray that the policy about to be taken up by Japan will not lead to a terrible disaster. And moreover I can not but hope that, by cooperating with Germany and Italy, Japan will not depart from her wise caution and good sense with which she built up her great national power and prosperity in the past.

The second point is as follows: It is rumored that concerning the war situation, news advantageous to Britain is being suppressed in Japan, and there is propagated an idea that Britain is a decadent country on the brink of ruin. But as you know, the real spirit of the English people of today is no such thing. Not only is there a strong determination of an absolute national unity throughout the whole of the British Empire, but also England possesses vast natural resources and has unlimited assistance from America. Whatever happens it is obvious that the British Empire will not fail in this conflict. Germany is exaggerating that she can conquer this Island Empire, but we are convinced of her failure. We averted the crisis in September last year, and at present England's power on land, on sea, and in the air has increased greatly from that time. The English nation is convinced that Germany will fail in her attempt to conquer England, and be defeated in this war.

Doc. No. 1339A (2)

page 1

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. 1339 A (2)

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify

that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of Six pages, dated 7 Feb., 1941, and described as follows: \_\_\_\_\_

PROPOSAL FROM FOREIGN MINISTER EDEN TO AMBASSADOR SHIGEMITSU

on 7 FEBRUARY SHOWA 16, 1941.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this

21st day of Sept., 1946

/s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Chief, Archives Sect.  
Official Capacity



C E R T I F I C A T E

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Osaka on this

25 day of September, 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh

Witness: T/4 T. Foguchi

Investigation Division I.P.S.  
Official Capacity

9X1039

1339A(2)-1

昭和十六年二月七日「イイデン」外相ヨリ  
重光大使へ申入

一 近衛内閣成立後ノ外務大臣トノ第一回會見ニ於  
 テ「クレイギー」大使ハ新閣モ昔内閣ト同様協  
 力ノ精神ニ依リ友誼的手段ヲ以テ兩國ノ關係ニ  
 對シテラレシコトノ希望ヲ述ヘタルニ對シ松岡  
 外相ハ目下將來ニ關スル全體ノ御方針ヲ慎重考  
 究中ナルコトヲ答ヘラレ其ノ際非公式ノ意思ト  
 シテ日英間ニ於テハ日英關係ノ全般的改善ヲ希  
 望スルコトヲ得ス日英關係ノ今後ノ緊張ハ已ム  
 ヲ得サル旨ヲ述ヘラレタリ

若會見ノ後二日ヲ經テ日本及朝鮮ニ於ケル多數  
 突人逮捕ノ問題起リ之ニ對シ陸相及法相ノ共同  
 聲明發セラレ一様ニ英國ノ「スパイ」劇日本ニ  
 存スルノ印象ヲ與ヘタルカ論判ノ結果ハ其ノ劇  
 セラレ居ルコトハ懸念ナルコトニテ英ニ「スパ  
 イ」ノ事ハナカリキ

以上ハ七、八月ノ概況ナルカ九月ニ至リ日本ハ  
 三國同盟ヲ締結シ公然英ノ敵タル獨伊ノ例ニ投  
 スルニ至リ政治家ノ公ノ演説及新聞論調ニ英國  
 例ニ對シテ益々疑懸（「アングサイエテイ」）  
 ヲ深カラシムルニ至レリ

二 松岡外相ノ公ノ聲明ハ三國同盟ハ平和ノ爲ノ「

1339A(2)-2

バクト「ナリト言ハレ貴大使ニ支那國寇ノ目録  
ヲ克原シテ東亞ニ於ケル秩序ヲ回復スルコトカ  
日本ノ主タル方針ナリト言ハレタルカ其ノ後發  
生セル事實ヨリ判断シ尙日本ヲ「ドミノイト」  
セン爲ニ其ノ勢力範圍ヲ擴張シツツアル總テノ  
兆候ヨリ見たテ以上ノ說明ハ率直ニ眞實ニ昔シム  
所ナリ

此ノ點ニ關シ英國政府ハ松岡外相カ「ビルマ」  
ニ對シ日本ノ「アスピレイション」ニ付不適當  
ナ言辭ナリト感考シ居ル點注意ヲ喚起シ度シ  
ニ印度支那及「タイ」國ノ國境ニ付テモ最近ノ  
事態ハ何等程度ニ於ケル點注意ヲ緩和スルニ至ラ  
ス松岡外相ハ「東亞ニ於ケル紛争ハ日本ノシカ  
爾スルノ權利アリト言ハレタルカ右ノ「クレイ  
ム」ハ英政府ノ承認シ得サル所ナリ

若シ停戦ノ目的カ單ニ紛争ノ解決ヲ冀スモノナ  
ラハ勿論英國モ總テノ他ノ國ト同様歓迎スヘキ  
ナリ然レドモ日本カ荷印及「タイ」ニ壓迫ヲ加  
ヘタリトノ不穩ナル報告アリ此ノ關係カ此等國  
國ヨリ重大ナル政治及軍容上ノ「コンセツシ  
ョン」ヲ確保スル口實ニ居ヒラレ居ルニ非スヤ  
トノ疑念ヲ持ツニ至レリ例ヘハ新聞情報カ「カ  
ムラン」説及總テノ現存飛行機ハ日本ノ使用ニ  
供セラルト報セルカ如シ

1239A(2)-3

三環を直環ナル點ハ最近「ク」大使ノ報告ニシテ  
 同大使ハ「日本ニ於テハ瀝東ノ危局カ茲二、三  
 週間中ニ發生セントノ一紙的感想アリ」ト報告  
 シテカレリ  
 右ヘ如何ナル事ヲ意味スルヤ何人カ何人ニ對シ  
 婉曲スルモノナリヤ日本ニ依リ企テラレ居ル域  
 ル範圍ノ前進カ英本國ニ對スル獨ノ政勢ト同時ニ  
 行ハルル事ヲ信スヘキヤ若シ然リトセハ英國ハ  
 瀝東ニ於ケル英ノ領土カ日本ノ政權ノ危險ニ類  
 シ居レリト觀ムヘキヤ瀝東ハ自分ノ關係ニ苦ム  
 所ナリ日本ハ地理的ニ有利ナル位置ヲ有シ若シ  
 欲スルニ於テハ歐羅ヨリ全然離レ得ル點ニテ又  
 日本ハ何人ヨリモ特ニ英國ヨリハ脅迫ヲ受ケ居  
 ラス  
 若シ自分ニ思憚ナキ言フ辭サルルナラ日本カ安  
 靜ニ四年ノ後更ニ他ノ國等ニ介入セサルヲ可  
 トスルノ多クノ理由ヲ持ツ機運ハルル自分ノ卷  
 ニテハ日本ハ英國及美國ト親友關係ノ關係ニ在  
 ルノ理由ハ之ヲ認メサルニ非ルモ歴史ノ證明ス  
 ルカ如ク日本ノ政策ハ英米ト密好ノ關係ニアル  
 場合最モ著シカリシコトハ等ハレサル所ナリ「  
 クレ」キ「」大使カ日本ニ於テ危機ノ範圍增加  
 シツツアルコトヲ報告シ來レル理由ヲ了解スル  
 ニ苦ム位ナリ日本政觀察ノ目的トスル所ハ殊大

1339A(2) - 14

ナル混亂カ迫リ居ルコトヲ示サントスルモノノ  
如ク見ユ

四 上記ノ如キ徴候及警報ヲ無視スルコトノ不可能  
ニシテ其ノ立場ヲ明瞭ニ御話スルノ必要モ了係  
セラルヘシ英國ハ江東ニ於テ領土ヲ有スルカ英  
國ハ何等侵略的行爲ノ意圖ハ有セサルモ如何ナ  
ル他ノ國ノ指令ニ依リテモ之等領土ヲ維持ニス  
ルノ意圖ヲ有セス尙日本ノミカ江東ニ於ケル凡  
テノ住民（英人ヲモ含ム）ノ運命ヲ管理支配ス  
ルノ權利ヲ有ストノ原則ヲ承認スルコトハ不可  
能ナリ英ハ江東ニ於ケル領土ニ於テ住民ノ安全  
及福祉ニ對シ英ノ領土ニシテ政權ヲ受ケル場合  
ニ何人モ吾人カ江力（「ウイズ、アトモスト、ジ  
イガール」）防禦スルモノナルコトヲ疑フヘカラ  
ス

三 尙江東ニ二ノ點ヲ述ベタシ

第一ノ點ハ日本カ日本自身ノ政權ヲ決定スベキ  
コトハ素ヨリ英亦ナキカ差シ猶及且管ノ同區圖  
トシテ次ノ如キ事ヲ管フモ日本ノ懸ヲ買フコト  
ナカルヘシト亦ス即チ自分ハ日本ノ行ハントス  
ル政策カ恐ルヘキ不平等（「テリブルディーズスタ  
ール」）ニ邁マサランコトヲ希望シ祈願スルモノ  
ナリ尙日本カ獨逸ト協力スルコトニ於テ過去ニ  
於テ偉大ナル四力ト英業トヲ作上ケタル其ノ實

1339A(2)-5

明ナル用意健全ナル判断ヲ喪失セサランコトヲ  
希望シテ止マヌ  
第二ノ點ハ戰局ニ關シ英國ニ有利ナル報道カ日  
本ニ於テハ評ヘラレ英ハ波瀾ニ類セルコトヲカタ  
ンテナリトノ恩惠カ噴進セラルルトノコトナル  
カ貴下ノ御承知ノ通り今日ノ英國人ノ兵ノコト  
ピリットルヘ左様ナモノニ非ス英帝國全部ニ亙  
リ絶對的ニ英國一黨ノ頭キ決意ヲ有シ居ルノミ  
ナラス英國ハ大ナル資源ヲ有シ且米國ノ側面ヲ  
キ援助ヲ得居リ如何ナル場合ニ於テモ此ノ國等  
ニ失敗スルコトナキハ現際ナリ獨逸何ハ此ノ島  
帝國ヲ征服シ得ルコトヲ諒シ居ルモ吾人ハ其  
ノ失敗ヲ確信シ居レリ昨年九月ニモ吾人ハ危瀕  
ヲ避ケ得タリ今日ハ陸上海上空中ニ於テ英ノ力  
ハ英ノ當時ヨリモ遂ニ威力ヲ増シタリ獨逸英征  
服ノ企圖失敗シ戰爭ニ敗ルルコトハ英國國民ノ確  
信スル所ナリ

1339A(2) cert-1

證 明 書

「ワシントン」文書局 第  
國 際 検 察 部 第 一 三 三 九 五 (二) 號

典 據 及 ビ 公 正 ニ 關 ス ル 證 明

余、林 稔ハ余カ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即テ外務省文書課長トシテ、日本政府ト公的関係ニ在ルモノナルコト、竝ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレタル、六頁ヨリ成ル、千九百四十一年ノ昭和十六年ノ二月七日附、下記題名、即テ昭和十六年二月七日「イーデー」外相ヨリ冀光大使ハ申入ノ文書ノ保管ニ任シ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナルコト、竝ニ右カ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式書類及ビ綴ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シアラバ綴番號又ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於ケル該文書ノ成規所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ待記スベシ)

1339A(2) cert. 2

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 九月二十二日

東京ニ於テ署名	
當該官吏署名欄	林 壽
右ノ者ノ公的資格	外務省共警課長
證 人	尾 戸 長 春

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、RICHARD H. LARSH ハ、余カ聯合國最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、竝ニ上記題名ノ文書ハ余カ公務上、日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 九月二十五日

東京ニ於テ署名	
氏 名 欄	RICHARD H. LARSH
右ノ者ノ公的資格	檢察局調査部
證 人	F/4 F. TOGUCHI





of Englishmen in Japan and Chosen, and a joint statement of the War Minister and the Justice Minister was issued, giving the impression that a general British espionage system existed in Japan. However, as the results of trials, they were convicted of only trifles and it was found that no actual espionage existed.

This is the outline of the situation in July and August, but in September Japan concluded the Tripartite Alliance and openly sided with Britain's enemies, Germany and Italy. The public speeches of the statesmen and the tone of the press are more and more increasing Britain's anxiety.

2. In his public statement Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, stated that the Tripartite Treaty was a pact for the sake of peace. Your Excellency also said that the main object of Japan is to overcome the difficulties of the Chinese problem and restore order in East Asia, but judging from facts which have developed since then and from all indications of Japan's expanding her sphere of influence in order to "dominate," it is difficult to understand the foregoing explanation, to be frank about it. (to be continued)

*General*  
~~File~~ No. 3325

Abridged: London to Foreign Ministry

Despatched: 8 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) afternoon

Received: 9 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) evening

Jurisdiction: European Section

(Telegram No. 78 continued)

In this connection the British Government desires to call attention to the fact that it considers Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's reference to Japan's "aspirations" toward Burma to be an "improper reference."

Next in regard to the problem of French Indo-China and Thailand also, the recent situation has not alleviated the tension in the Far East. The British Government is unable to recognize the claim made by Foreign Minister MATSUOKA that Japan alone possesses the right of mediating the disputes in the Far East.

If the object of mediation is simply to bring about the solution of disputes, Britain, like all other countries, welcomes such mediation. However, we have disquieting information that Japan has

exerted pressure on French Indo-China and Thailand, and we have come to harbour the suspicion that Japan is utilizing this mediation as an excuse for securing for herself far-reaching political and military concessions from these two countries. For instance, press dispatches have it that Camranh Bay and all of the existing airdromes will be offered for the use of the Japanese.

3. The most important point is the recent report of Ambassador Craigie, informing us that "there is a general feeling in Japan that a crisis in the Far East will develop within the next few weeks." What does this mean? Who is going to challenge and against whom? Is it some kind of a "forward moving" plotted by Japan? Are we to believe that it will be carried out simultaneously with the German offensive against the British homeland? And if this be true, should Britain deem her dominions in the Far East as being on the brink of danger from Japanese attack? I am at a loss to understand the situation. Since Japan possesses a geographically advantageous position, she can stand aloof, if she desires, from the ravages of war. Moreover, she is of all countries the least threatened by England. (to be continued)

*General*  
File No. 3340

Abridged: London to Foreign Ministry

Despatched: 8 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) afternoon

Received: 9 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) evening

Jurisdiction: European Section

(Telegram No. 78 continued)

If I am permitted to speak my mind freely, there are many reasons why Japan, after four years of the China Affair would be better off if she did not enter into any further war with other countries. It is my opinion that, although we can understand Japan's reasons for holding an unfriendly attitude towards Great Britain and the United States of America, it is an indisputable fact that anti-British feeling in Japan was, as history shows, the strongest at the time when Anglo-Japanese relationship was the most intimate. I am quite at a loss to understand the reasons why Ambassador Craigie reported to us that the scope of a crisis is developing in Japan. "It seems that the purpose of Japanese statesmen is to show that some gigantic convulsion of upheaval is about to take place."

4. I am sure that you will understand the impossibility of disregarding the above indications and warnings, and the necessity of clearly informing you of our standpoint. Great Britain possesses dominions in the Far East. Although we do not entertain any intention of aggressive acts, we also have no intention whatsoever of sacrificing these possessions under the orders of whatever country. Furthermore, it is impossible to acknowledge the principle that Japan alone possesses the right to "control the destiny of and dominate" all the people (including the Englishmen) of the Far East. It should not be doubted that in case the territories of Great Britain in the Far East are attacked and the safety and well-being of the inhabitants of such territories endangered, Britain will defend them "with the utmost vigour." (to be continued)

*General*

~~File~~ No. 3345

Abridged: London to Foreign Ministry

Despatched: 8 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) afternoon

Received: 9 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) evening

*Jurisdiction: European Section*

(Telegram No. 78 continued)

5. I would like to state further two points. The first point is that we, of course, have no objection to Japan's "dictating" her own policies, but we do not think that we will incur Japan's wrath if we, as a former friend and an old ally of Japan, state the following matter. That is, I hope and pray that the policy which Japan is now about to carry out would not lead to a "terrible disaster," and I cannot but wish that Japan would not, by cooperating with Germany and Italy, lose the sagacious prudence and the sound judgment which had enabled her to establish a great national strength and prosperity.

The second point is that with reference to the war situation, reports favorable to Great Britain are being suppressed in Japan, and that the idea that Britain is now a "decadant" nation on the verge of ruin is being circulated. But as your Excellency know, the true spirit of the British people at present is not so. Not only do the whole people of the entire British Empire hold an absolutely strongly united determination, but Britain possesses bountiful resources and enjoys the unlimited aid of the United States of America, such that it is clear that Britain will never lose in this war. Although the Germans exaggeratedly claim that they will be able to conquer our Island Empire, we firmly believe in their failure. We succeeded in averting the crisis last September.

Today Britain's power on land, sea and in air greatly exceed that of that time. It is the firm belief of the British people that Germany will fail in the attempt to conquer Great Britain and will also be defeated in the war.

End

*General*  
~~File~~ No. 3341

In ciphers: London to Foreign Ministry

Despatched: 8 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) afternoon

Received: 9 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) evening

*Jurisdiction: European Section*

To: Foreign Minister MATSUOKA From: Ambassador SHIGEMITSU

No. 79

Ambassador: Will this representation be made in Tokyo also?

Eden: No, I wish to state it as my unreserved opinion through you here.

Ambassador: I do not possess any data to prove that such a critical situation exists. Of course, under the present circumstances, I have no intention of criticizing the report of your Ambassador. However, I would like to be permitted to ask you a few questions from the impression I gained from your "expose," though I shall refrain from exchanging views regarding the detailed substance of it.

Eden: I shall hear them.

Ambassador: From what you have just said, I have received the impression that you have explained to me to make clear for the last time the standpoint of Great Britain under the premise that Anglo-Japanese relations are fast approaching the last stage. However, it is necessary for us to endeavour to the last, to avert the worst, even if no improvement can be made in the relations between the two countries. It is with this purpose in mind that I have done my best so far. In what you have told me just now, you have stated almost solely the unilateral view of Britain, but failed to show an attitude of Japan's assertions, making only refutations and indicating the intention of disapproval. Moreover, I think that, in discussing this unfortunate aggravation of Anglo-Japanese relations, we should commence it from at least ten years ago, if not from 1904. You thoroughly know the history of the past ten years. To cite an instance, you have mentioned in your explanation Japan's cooperation

with Britain's enemy, but Britain has consistently held the policy of aiding Japan's enemies. The fact is that present aggravations of relations actually came mostly from this point.  
(to be continued)

*General*  
~~File~~ No. 3344

In Ciphers: London to Foreign Ministry

Despatched: 8 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) afternoon

Received: 9 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) evening

Jurisdiction: European Section

(Telegram No. 79 continued)

Furthermore, it is geographically quite natural that Japan should hold the leading position in East Asia, and this cannot be helped. It is no different from the special interests which Britain and the United States of America feel in the neighboring geographically related countries. You have mentioned French Indo-China, and seemed to view our movements there, etc., with suspicion, but we have not invaded any British territory. It is beyond my comprehension that you should say that you are unable to understand the important interests, both political and economic, which arise from geographical position. In stating the crisis in Anglo-American relations, you do not try to understand the other party's standpoint, but rather find fault with the Japan's policy and lay the blame on Japan. Do you think that such an explanation will serve to avert the impending crisis?

Eden: My principal aim is to avert the crisis for the sake of the two countries, and nothing more. Having received such a report, I cannot overlook it, but will do everything possible. To your Excellency I have unbosomed myself and frankly informed you of our feelings with the intention of successfully coping with this critical situation. I should be glad to hear further from the Japanese government as to its views on today's conversations.

Ambassador: Ito have spoken to you without reserve, but I have no intention to give my opinion in detail on the points mentioned by you today. Of course I shall transmit to my government what you have said. (End)

*General*  
~~File~~ No. 3338

In Ciphers: London to Foreign Ministry

Despatched: 8 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) afternoon

Received: 9 February 1941 (SHOWA 16) evening

*Jurisdiction: European Section*

To: Foreign Minister MATSUOKA From: Ambassador SHIGEMITSU

Telegram No. 80

In the conference with Foreign Minister Eden, which I mentioned in telegram No. 78, he explained that the report from Graigie pointed out, besides those matters, that Japan's relations with Germany and Italy were becoming "progressively" intimate, and that the German "hold" on Japan was growing tighter.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 1131

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 14 pages, dated Feb., 1941, and described as follows: HANDWRITTEN COPIES OF TELEGRAMS COVERING EDEI-NICHIITSU CONVERSATIONS.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this 23rd day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official  
SEAL.  
Chief Archives Section  
Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 25 day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME  
Investigation Division I.P.S.  
Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ T/h. Tsuchi



~~Message from Matsuda to Eden, 13 Feb 1941.~~

Copy of telegram. General No. 4399. Code Foreign Office.

Transmitted 8 p.m., 13th Feb 1941, Sec. 3. Europe Bureau.

Telegram to Ambassador SHIGEMITSU, London, from MATSUOKA, the Foreign Minister.

No. 46

Concerning your telegram No. 77.

Ambassador Craigie also wishes an interview with me which will be held within a few days. In the meantime, I want you to hand telegram No. 47 to Foreign Minister Eden, and at the same time explain to the minister the reason I express so unreserved an opinion is because I feel so close to him, as I was acquainted with Foreign Minister Eden ever since we were in Geneva. Also Ambassador Craigie's report of the approach of a critical point in Far East, etc. is really a ridiculous fantasy (The Vice Minister also called the Ambassador's attention on this point on the 12th.). Of course it is not only groundless but also there is no intention on our part to make trouble with Britain which I wish you would make a verbal representation to him.

Further some English newspapers, misunderstanding our real motives, are recently publishing stimulative news and editorials as if Japan would try to start military actions at any moment, which would only serve to make the relations of both countries worse and be harmful and there would be nothing to be gained by it. Will you kindly call his attention to this point to stop them?

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. 1132

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO, Nagaharu \_\_\_\_\_ hereby certify that  
I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the  
following capacity: ASSISTANT CHIEF OF THE ARCHIVES SECTION, \_\_\_\_\_  
FOREIGN MINISTRY \_\_\_\_\_

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto  
attached consisting of 2 pages, dated 13 Feb., 1941, and described  
as follows: HANDWRITTEN TELEGRAM MATSUOKA TO SHIGEMITSU CONCERNING  
MESSAGE TO EDEN. (TELEGRAM NO. 46) \_\_\_\_\_

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official  
document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official  
archives and files of the following named ministry or department  
(specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other  
official designation of the regular location of the document in the  
archives or files): FOREIGN MINISTRY \_\_\_\_\_

Signed at Tokyo on this  
31st day of October, 1946.

/s/ Nagaharu Odo  
Signature of Official  
SEAL

Witness: /s/ M. Emura  
SEAL

/s/ Ass't Chief, Archives Section  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, J. A. CURTIS \_\_\_\_\_, hereby certify that I am  
associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander  
for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was  
obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government  
in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
31st day of October, 1946

/s/ J. A. CURTIS 2d Lt.  
NAME

Witness: /s/ Fred Kobayashi 2d Lt.

/s/ Investigator IPS  
Official Capacity

Ex. #1042

DOCUMENT NO. 2200 (11)

Page 1.

Br. Ex. 142

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE  
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MATSUOKA)

Excerpt.

No. 1744

TOKYO, February 13, 1941.

. . . . .

According to recent information received by my Government not only do Japanese officials in Indo-China continue to interfere with the granting of permits by appropriate authorities of Indo-China for the re-export of American-owned merchandise, but in one instance at least have caused these authorities to revoke a valid permit previously issued for the re-export of petroleum products owned by an American firm, the Standard Vacuum Oil Company.

. . . . .

Foreign Relations II, p.308

EX 1042

Doc 220e (11)

駐日米國大使(ケルシー)ヨリ日本外務大臣(松岡)宛  
抜萃

第一七四号

一九四二年(昭和十六年)二月十三日

於 東京

我政府ノ入手セル最近、情報ニ依リ、在印度  
支那日本官憲ハ印度支那ニ於ケル米國所  
属商品ノ輸出ニ関シ適當ナル印度支那當局  
カ許可ヲ與ヘントスルヲ依然トシテ妨害スルニ  
ナラズ、一例ヲ舉ゲルニ、米國會社ノスタ  
ダード石油會社所有ノ石油製品、再輸出ニ  
対シ先ニ發行セラルル適當ナル許可ヲ該當  
局ヲシテ取消サレタルノ舉ニ出タリテアル。

外交關係第二卷第三頁

Br. Ex. 155

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Excerpts.

(WASHINGTON, ) February 14, 1941

I accompanied the new Japanese Ambassador to the President's office and sat through the conference between the President and the Ambassador.....

The President then said that of course it is manifest that the present relations between the two countries are not good; that they are in fact getting worse, or to use a well-known expression, they are "deteriorating" . . . The President affirmed two or three times the view that the American people, while not bitter as yet, are thoroughly and seriously concerned and to a more or less increasing extent, at the course of Japan.

He then referred to the movements of Japan southward down to Indochina and the Spratly Islands and other localities in that area, as having given this country very serious concern. He said that the entry of Japan into the Tripartite agreement is likewise giving this country the same serious concern, especially from the viewpoint that Japan is supposed to have divested herself of her sovereign authority to deal with the question of peace and war and to leave it to the Tripartite signatories led by Germany. The President went over this the second time with increased emphasis as to the heavy signs of concern it had created among the American people.

. . . . .

He then said that in view of all these serious conditions which are becoming increasingly worse and which seriously call for attention, it occurred to him that the Japanese Ambassador might find it advisable and agreeable as he, the President, does, to sit down with the Secretary of State and other State Department officials and review and reexamine the important phases of the relations between the two countries, at least during the past four or five years, and frankly discuss all of their phases and ascertain just when and how points of divergence developed and their effects, and bring the whole situation in these respects up to date in order to see if our relations could not be improved. The President said there is plenty of room in the Pacific area for everybody, and he repeated this statement with emphasis.

. . . . .

220C(20)

EX 1043

國務長官ニ依ル覚書

板 萃

(アニート)

一九四一年(昭和十六年)二月十日

余、新日本大使ニ同伴シテ大統領官邸ニ赴キ大統領ト大  
使向ノ会談ニ至会ツタ。

大統領莫ク際勿論西國向現在關係明ラカニ良クイ事更上意  
ヲツツアリ、ヨク知ラシク表現ヲ用フルヲバ變化ニツツアルコト  
ヲ述ベタ。

大統領ハ再三アメリカ國民ハ日本ノ出ラニ對シ未ダ惡意トイ  
ヘヌデモ重大ナル関心ヲ有シカツツノ傾向ハ増シツツアルトノ意  
見ヲ肯定シタ。

彼又日本ノ印度支那新南群島及ビソノ周辺地ニハ  
南下前進ハ米國ニ於テ極メテ重大ナル関心ヲ起シタモ、アル  
ト述ベタ。彼ハ日本ノ三國協定加入モ亦同様ニ米國ニ於テ  
重大ナル関心ヲ起シ居リ是ハ特ニ日本ハ平和カ戦争カ向  
題ニ關スル自國ノ權威ヲ捨テ去リ之ヲ独逸ノ指導  
スル三國協定加入國ニ委ネルモノト考ヘ

220C(20)

ラシトノ觀点ヨリ起ツタモノデアルト述ベテ。大統領ハ再々  
 前ヨリモ語調ヲ強メソレガ米口民ノ向ニ惹起セル重大な  
 関心ノ様子を就テ繰返シ述ベル所ガアツタ。  
 彼ハ更ニ是等總テ、逼迫セル事態ハ益々惡化ニツツアリ重大  
 ナ程度ヲ要スルニ鑑ミ、日本大使ガ口務長官及他ノ口務  
 省官吏ト会谈ニシクモ過去年間ニ於ケル西口向外交  
 関係ニ関スル重要局面ヲ批評再檢討シアラズル是等、  
 局面ニ就テ率直ニ討議シ、何始如何ニシテ意見ノ分歧  
 点ガ進展ニツカヌノ結果ヲ確メ吾々ノ口交関係ガ改  
 善出来ルカ否カヲ見ルタニ是等ノ諸君ニ於ケル全局面ヲ新テ  
 今日ノ觀点ニ齎スガ大使ニ取ツテモ大統領ニ取ツテモ  
 同様ニ得策アリ又吾々ニイ事デアルト自分ニハ思ヘルト述ベテ。  
 大統領ハ太平洋地域ニスズテノ人二十分ナ余地ガアルト述  
 ベ此ノ聲明ヲ強調シテ繰返シテ。

2

外交関係 (二) 三六—三八頁

Doc. No. 1339-A (1)

Page 1\*

No. 4894. CIPHER TELEGRAM FROM Y. MATSUOKA, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO K. SEIGEMITSU, AMBASSADOR IN ENGLAND

TELEGRAM NO. 49 (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL) SENT ON 14 FEB.  
(SHOWA 16), 1941, "RE THE BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER'S PROPOSAL."

Concerning your telegram No. 77, the present proposal by the British Foreign Minister which is based on the report from Ambassador Craigie seems to have been made under the presumption or fear that Japan would acquire military bases etc. in Thailand and French Indo-China by taking advantage of the arbitration conference between Thailand and French Indo-China, and then commence military action against England in the South Seas concurrently with Germany's landing strategy against England. It is difficult to understand on what grounds Ambassador Craigie based the above alarming report to his home government. When the Vice-Minister visited him on the 12th he said, in reply to the Vice-Minister's question that he knew well from past experiences that Japan's politics and diplomacy were controlled by the military, and that he had made the present report based on the speech and action of military men of responsibility. So, to make sure, I at once carefully privately investigated in various fields whether such facts existed, but I could find no such facts. On the other hand, in view of the fact that every influential newspaper in England is loudly reporting the crisis between Japan and England, the present proposition seems to be trying to check Japan's advance to the South, if only for the present besides containing the strategic motive of turning America's interest toward Thailand and French Indo-China and cementing the cooperation between England and America in this sphere. Although I think you have noticed this matter already, I am sending you our observation for you to bear in mind.

Wired to the Ambassador in America.



C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I.P.S. No. 1339A (1)

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kgoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 4 pages, dated 17 Feb., 1941, and described as follows: No. 4894. CIPHER TELEGRAM FROM Y. MATSUOKA, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO K. SHIGEMITSU, AMBASSADOR IN ENGLAND. TELEGRAM NO. 49 (STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL) SENT ON 17 FEB. (SIDWA 16), 1941. "RE THE BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER'S PROPOSAL."

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the Official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this 21st day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official  
SE:L  
Chief. Archives Sect.  
Official Capacity

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 25 day of September, 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME  
Investigation Division  
Official Capacity I.P.S.

Witness: /s/T/h. F. Toguchi

電送第四八九四號

昭和十六年二月十四日起草

昭和十六年二月十四日午後六時(小電)

添 附 大 三 發

在 英

皇 光 大 使 宛

女

英外相申出ニ關スル件

(附) 第四九號 (極秘)

貴電第七七號ニ關シ

今次英國外相ノ申出ハ「クレイキ」大使ヨリノ報  
 告ヲ基礎トシ帝國ニ於テ泰佛印南洋等々發ヲ利用シ  
 テ泰佛印方面ニ軍事的差地等ヲ獲得シ、以テ獨逸ノ  
 對英上陸作戦ト相呼應シテ南洋方面ニ於ケル對英軍  
 隊行動ニ着手スルニ非ニヤトノ豫慮又ハ危惧ノ下ニ  
 爲サレタルモノト認メラル、處「クレ」大使ガ如何ナ  
 ル事實ヲ根據トシテ右ノ如キ「アライミシング」ナル  
 報告ヲ本國政府ニ爲シタルヤハ誠ル不可解ニシテ、  
 十二日同大使ハ次官來訪ノ際次官ノ質問ニ對シ自分  
 ハ過去ノ經驗ニ依リ日本ノ政治外交ヲ支配シ居ルハ  
 軍部ナルコトヲ熟知シ居リ今回ノ報告モ軍方面ノ發  
 任アル人々ノ言動ヲ根據トセルモノナリト認ベ居ル  
 ルニ依リ爲念早速各方面ニヒキ右邊事實ノ有無ヲ内  
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1339 A(11)-3 cert.

證 明 書

「ワシントン」文書局 第 一三三九 A (一) 號  
國 際 検 察 部 第 一三三九 A (一) 號

典 據 及 ビ 公 正 ニ 關 ス ル 證 明

余、林森ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ外務省文  
書課長トシテ、日本政府ト公的關係ニ在ルモノナ  
ルコト、竝ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレタ  
ル、四頁ヨリ成ル、千九百四十一年ノ昭和十六年  
ノ二月十日附、下記題名、即チ英外相申出ニ關  
スル件（第四八九四號電報）ノ文書ノ保管ニ任ジ  
居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書  
ナルコト、竝ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式  
書類及ビ簿ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。（若シアラ  
バ綴番號又ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ簿ニ於ケ  
ル該文書ノ成規所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ）

1339 A(1) - 4 cert.

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 九月二十一日

東京ニ於テ署在

警備官署署長

右ノ者ノ公的資格

証人

林

外務省次長

長戸 長 林

公式入手シタル証明

余、Richard H. Larsh ハ、余ガ以テ合國警察局長  
官廳司令部ニ記録アルモノナルコト、並ニ上記  
在ノ文書ハ余ガ公署上、日本政府ノ上記局長官更  
ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ証明ス。

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 九月二十三日

東京ニ於テ署在

氏名

右ノ者ノ公的資格

証人

Richard H. Larsh IPS

國際警察局長

F/4 T. Toguchi

DOC 1150

Page 1

Cipher Telegram  
Dated 7 p.m. Feb. 14, Showa 16 /1941/  
Foreign Office Cable #4490, 4492

Charge of U. S. Affairs Dept.

To Ambassador NOMURA from Foreign Minister MATSUOKA

On Enlightening the Government and People of the United States

No. 68 Strictly Confidential.

During the recent interpellations in the Diet, the present Foreign Minister expressed our attitude and determination in a straightforward way to urge reconsideration on the part of the United States, and is making efforts to make it clear that our national resources have not been so much used up. On your arrival at your post please make continuous effort to make the President and the leading members in the Government and among the people know the Japan's real intention thoroughly, explaining to them fully, as you think fit, the following points.

1. It is the inherent mission of both Japan and the U.S.A. to rescue modern civilization from catastrophe and bring peace and prosperity to the Pacific, and it is our duty to cooperate with each other to accomplish this mission. On the basis of this faith, Japan wishes for the development of diplomatic relations between Japan and the U.S.A. But unfortunately, the American Government and people do not try to understand Japan's real intention; instead, they misconstrue Japan's action as a threat towards the United States. This is a grave and very dangerous /p. 2/ illusion, indeed. Japan is strongly determined to execute the already-fixed policy at the risk of the nation's destiny. So if America should believe that, on the basis of information, that there are still some people among the Japanese who are secretly opposed to the Tripartite Pact (of course, there are, but there are such people in any country); or, overestimating the exhaustion of Japan's natural resources due to the prolongation of the China Incident, a strong attitude on the part of the United States would easily cause a split in the public opinion of Japan or make us give in, it would be a ridiculous misconception and we are afraid that such a belief would bring quite unfathomable results.

2. The consumption of our national resources is true to some extent, but not as bad as is propagated in America. It is our national character to repel strongly any pressure from foreign countries, so if the United States should purposely obstruct our way, the Japanese Government and people will unite more firmly and determine strongly to accomplish the national policy, regardless of sacrifice. Suppose the United States should be in the same situation as Japan, the Americans also would probably see the same result as the Japanese, /p.3/ because in this point the American character is very similar to that of the Japanese. So the Americans should easily under-

stand such psychology and also the result caused by this psychology. On the other hand, it should be remembered that the Japanese are very grateful to those who are quite sympathetic and have complete understanding towards them and at times will even make concessions or compromises under the circumstances, even if it is not logical. The intelligent public of America should take these characteristics into consideration.

3. There is not one person in Japan who wishes to fight against America. Should war arise between Japan and America, it would be America that started it. America has never yet gone into a war passively.

4. What does America expect to acquire by starting a war with Japan, anyhow? Does she wish to conquer Japan and wipe out the Japanese race? Surely there is no one in America who has such an idea. Even if they should have such a dream, it is absolutely impossible to actualize it. Supposing that America could subjugate Japan and enforce a treaty as relentless as the Versailles Treaty, Japan will break from the fetters of restraint within thirty years. An example / p.4/ is not far to seek. See it in the restoration of Germany. Japan has a unique national structure unparalleled in the world. She has tided over many difficult situations in the past under the august virtue of His Majesty, the Emperor. It is certain that the restoration of Japan would be accomplished far more rapidly and more wonderfully than in Germany. The Imperial Household is an everlasting source of our national power. Without understanding this unique national structure, it is impossible to understand the Japanese people. After all, a clash between Japan and America will not only lead to the destruction of the two countries where friendly relations should exist by nature, but also lead to the destruction of world civilization. America has nothing to acquire from it, and, when considered coolly, a war between America and Japan is most foolish.

5. If Japan and America should come to war, the Soviet Union will certainly make some move. And if Japan should be defeated as America anticipates, the Soviet Union will overwhelm the whole of China, communize it, and, gaining ground, communize the greater part of Asia. Would America welcome such an eventuality? If, by any chance, Japan should be defeated, the situation in East Asia would be alarming.

6. The Japanese foreign policy is based on the great idea of Eight Corners Under One Roof. Japan devotes herself to insure the peace and prosperity of the world. /p.5/ Of course, Japan has not the least intention of attacking America, so we find it difficult to understand why America is engrossed in making military preparation against Japan. Japan and America should not be pitted against each other, but should cooperate with each other. However, not only are the American statesmen very inciting in their speech and action against Japan recently, but also their aim seems to be to build up a great army, big enough to make America the police of the whole world. This is not only a sad thing for the peace of the Pacific, but also of no advantage to America. America ought not to interfere in the spheres of other strong nations at random, but awaken to her own responsibility towards world

peace, and with the spirit of mutual aid and mutual concession, devote herself in tiding over the present difficulties and promoting the welfare of mankind.

Please send this telegram to Great Britain.

/1.7/ Cipher telegram

Dated p.m. Feb. 12, Showa 16 /1941/

Received a.m. Feb. 14, Showa 16 /1941/

London to Foreign Office Cable, '3699

Charge of European, Asiatic and Southern Affairs Depts.

To Foreign Minister Matsuka from Ambassador Shigenitsu

No. 9 Urgent

1. Anxiety on the part of Great Britain is largely due to fear caused by lively discussion in Japan of the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and the southward advance and because she thinks that Japan intervention in the disputes between French Indo-China and Thailand is to acquire navy and air bases in these districts for the purpose of attacking Great Britain, and that this is concerted operation over both Europe and Asia after consultation with Germany.

2. There are some people who advocate that if Japan should acquire military bases in Thailand, Britain should regard it as a violation of the Non-aggression Pact with Thailand and to take military action against Thailand at once. Many reports are sent in saying that for this purpose Britain is concentrating troops on the Malay-Thailand frontier and sending in air-units. This is stimulating the United States, Australia and also Holland and other countries very much, but England, under CHURCHILL, is quite militant, and the situation cannot be easily predicted, connected with the war situation in Europe and/p.8/ Africa. This has been made much clearer by EDEN's proposal on the 7th and the tone of the press of those days.

3. Japan should dispose of the China Incident at any cost. Especially if Japan could succeed in building up a foundation in French Indo-China, it is quite clear that Japanese power over Britain and the South will become more oppressive gradually. Therefore I would suggest that from the point of tact Japan should regard action without words as the first principle; declare clearly to Britain that Japan has no intention of encroaching upon British territory and also express her strong determination not to allow any country to interfere in Japan's negotiations with other countries. (Moreover, lay stress on the fact that what Japan wants to acquire is economical demands and that between nations it is impossible to close the door economically.) Also I consider that Japan should modify the public cry of advancing to the South, and first of all build up her foundation. Also I feel that it is very necessary that the Tokyo Arbitration Conference be concluded as soon as possible.



1150

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/1.9/ Cipher Telegram

Dated p.m. Feb 13, Showa 16 /1941/

Received a.m. Feb 14, Showa 16 /1941/

Batavia to Foreign Office cable #3655  
Charge of Southern Affairs and Trade Depts.

To Foreign Minister MATSUOKA from Envoy YOSHIKAWA

Negotiation No. 65 (Strictly Confidential)

Cooperative relation between Dutch East Indies and the United States and Great Britain has become much closer recently as America's aid to Britain has become active, and the attitude of the Dutch East Indies towards Japan is nothing but the reflection of the attitude of the United States. It is difficult to notice such a distinction between them as is generally supposed in Japan. America's attitude towards Japan is growing worse even without Secretary of State HULL's speech at Congress. There is no room for doubt that the problem of the South Seas, especially of the Dutch East Indies, is an important cause for America's plan of a huge expansion of naval ships. It should be said that the real problem lying between Japan and America is not China but the Dutch East Indies. Regardless of the result of the Anglo-German war, the United States will persistently regard with hostility Japan who has ambitions towards the South Sea Islands. On the other hand the authorities of Dutch East Indies, consulting their own interests, desire to be in the hands of the United States rather than Japan. And besides, not only are they in such a condition that they can expect positive aid from both the United States and Britain, but also think that not even Germany will agree to the Dutch Indies coming under Japanese authority as a dependency so easily. /p. 10/ On the other hand, in the speech of the Japanese government against the United States and Dutch East Indies there is no consistent underlying strength, and finally it has given one the impression that barking dogs seldom bite; and the Dutch have begun to underestimate Japan's real power. Therefore it is natural for the Dutch East Indies to follow the attitude of the United States. At this time, then, when the United States is about to push on with her oppression against Japan, it is difficult to expect even unsatisfactory success from the Dutch-Japanese negotiations. Its breaking up is only a question of time. The acquiring of those thirteen items of necessary commodities will meet with difficulties. That is, the only means for Japan to settle the problem of the Dutch East Indies is by exercising her real power. Without this determination it will be quite fruitless for Japan to strive to achieve success by peaceful negotiations, shouting loudly for the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere under the leadership of Japan.

p. 11 Ordinary telegram

Dated p.m. Feb 18, Showa 16 /1941/

Received night, Feb. 19, Showa 16/1941/

From Ottawa to Foreign Office Cable #4130  
Charge of U. S. Affairs and Investigation Depts.

To Foreign Minister MATSUOKA from Ambassador YOSHIKAWA

No. 24

On the 17th at the reopening of Parliament, the Prime Minister made a speech on the international situation and also on diplomatic relations. The following is the main point of his speech on the relation between Japan and Canada.

There are some among the authorities on diplomatic and military affairs who believe in the possibility of a world-wide dissension occurring from Japan's attack on Singapore and Germany's capture of Suez and Gibraltar along with Germany's invasion of England. Recent statements of Japanese statesmen have given us an impression that the situation has come to a crisis, and some of these statements seem to confirm the possibility of Japan's southward advance. But the Canadian Government still hopes that the opinion of the moderate element in Japan will be adopted, but, in view of the speeches and action of the Japanese statesmen and the concentration of Japanese troops, it must not be overlooked that there are signs that Japan will be compelled to take an aggressive action at such a time as is most advantageous for /r. 12/ an aggressive nation.

Influenced by the urgent condition in the Orient, the anti-Japanese atmosphere in British Columbia has increased. Unfounded and irresponsible blame was put on the Japanese-Canadian, so that the government appointed a special committee to investigate the real facts of the situation on the Pacific Coast. A report and advice has been sent in, and the Government has acknowledged the report, etc. Details will be sent by official communication. Telegraphed to England and America and mailed to Vancouver.

/r. 13/ Cipher telegram  
Dated p.m. Feb. 17, Showa 16 /1941/  
Received a.m. Feb. 18, Showa 16 /1941/

From Santiago to Foreign Office Cable #4048  
Charge of Investigation and U. S. Affairs Depts.

To Foreign Minister MATSUOKA from Charge d'Affaires KAWASAKI

No. 33 (Confidential)

Concerning your telegram No. 311 (on the collection of information concerning the appeasement policy of the U.S.A. toward Japan), in a meeting with Secretary Lyon, son-in-law of Ambassador Grew, on other business, he mentioned that he had tried as had been indicated to him but that the Tripartite Pact was a death-blow to Japanese-American relations and that so long as this existed the United States could not change her policy suddenly and that his father-in-law was worried.

Doc. No. 1150

C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 1150

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO Nagaharu hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 12 pages, dated 13-18 Feb., 1941, and described as follows: Series of handwritten Telegrams dated 13-18 Feb. 1941 between Foreign Minister and various envoys in London, Washington, and Batavia. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at TOKYO on this  
30th day of Sept., 1946

/s/ Nagaharu Odo  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ T. Sato

Assistant, Chief Archives Sect.  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
1st day of Oct, 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME

Witness: /s/ T/4 Takeo Toguchi

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

Doc. No. 1339A(3)

Page 1

CABLE #51 DESPATCHED 3:00 P.M. FEB. 13, 1941, BY FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA TO AMBASSADOR CRAIGIE ON INTERVIEW BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTER AND CRAIGIE REGARDING CABLE #47.

Craigie, on the 15th, called upon me with a note containing the purport of your cable No. 73 and summary of the discussions between you and Eden. I told Craigie on this occasion that I had already received from you a detailed report concerning this question, and that in response thereto I had requested you to lay my note before Foreign Secretary Eden and handed him a copy of my cable #47. I then pointed out to Craigie that there seemed to be an over-anxiety on the part of Britain about the orientation of Japan's policy, that various reports were reaching us that Britain and the United States had taken up a combined action against Japan, that this was inciting Japan's public opinion, causing doubt and fear and giving rise to the arguments in some quarters that Japan must take some counter-measures to meet this situation, and this would lead to misunderstanding on both sides. I further told Craigie that so long as they refrained from taking any such provocative attitude against us we would under no circumstances initiate action that would lead to anxiety on the part of Britain and the United States, that misunderstandings by either party are the most dangerous factors, and that we wished to do everything possible to eliminate them, and urged that England reconsider. I also explained to him that the major object of the Tripartite Pact was the limitation of the warfare in Europe and encouragement of a peaceful settlement. Also under strict secrecy I made it clear to him that, at the moment of signing of the pact Germany had stressed her desire to avoid provoking the United States and especially to avert Japanese-American hostilities as far as possible. Negotiations for the pact were carried out on the basis of the above. I told him that I myself did not doubt Germany's real intention, that the above seemed to me to be consistent with her real interest, but that Japan's policy also was based on this, and that she would continue to act along this course.

Craigie then, in response, questioned whether I could check the so-called southward march of Japan, views on which were so active at the moment in Japan. Further, Craigie raised a query as to whether Japan did not expect exorbitant compensation for her role as a mediator of the Siam-French Indo-China conflict. I assured him as to Japan's southward advance that I would try to check it to the best of my ability,

but as for the Siam-French Indo-China affairs I preferred to indicate Japan's real intentions by actual fact rather than by making excuses in words, and further, that as far as I myself was concerned, the greatest reward was the restoration of peace, with which I would be satisfied. I told him I believed that this was the first step toward realizing world peace which was Japan's ideal since the beginning of the nation; and I explained to him in detail Japan's policy. I added that since there exists a close intimacy between the Foreign Secretary and myself since our days in Geneva I had expressed my views outspokenly in my memorandum addressed to him, but in regard to that part which concerns arbitration for European peace, this had nothing to do with Germany and Italy, and that I had merely stated the belief which I've always held. The conversation between Craigie and myself lasted for about two hours, and he seemed quite relieved when he left.

Wired to U.S.A.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 I.P.S. No. 1339A (3)

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 18 pages, dated 18 Feb., 1941, and described as follows: CABLE #51 DESPATCHED 8:00 P.M. FEB. 18, 1941, BY FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA TO AMBASSADOR SHIGEMITSU ON INTERVIEW BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTER AND CRAIGIE REGARDING CABLE #47. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this  
 21st day of Sept, 1946

's/ K. Hayashi  
 Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: 's/ Nagaharu Odo

Chief, Archives Sect  
 Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
 25 day of September, 1946

's/ Richard H. Larsh  
 NAME

Witness: 's/ T/4 T Toguchi

Investigation Division  
 Official Capacity I.P.S.

1339A(3)-1

略	電送第 5057 號		管 主 歐亞局長 任 第二課長印 主 第三課長印
	昭和十六年二月五日午後時分發		
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	記録件名		

EX 1046

往電第四七號ニ關シ

十五日「クレーギー」大使貴電第七八號ノ趣旨及  
 貴大使「イ・デン」外相會談要旨ヲ認メタル書物  
 ヲ持參來訪セルニ付本大臣ハ本件ニ付テハ重光大  
 使ヨリ詳細報告アリ當方ヨリモ既ニ同大使ヲシテ  
 「イ」外相ニ對シ覺察ヲ提出方訓令済ナリト述ベ  
 テ往電第四七號ヲ手交シ英國側ニ於テハ我政府  
 ノ動向ニ付適當ノ懸念ヲ有スル模様ナルガ英米ガ  
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FILE COPY RETURN TO ROOM 361

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大臣ハ益々安心ノ條ニテ歸去シタリ

米へ電報セリ

頁ヨリ居ル、千九百四十一年ノ昭和十六年ノ二月十  
八日附、下記題名、即チ松岡大臣「クレイギー」會  
談ノ件電報第五〇五七八號ノ文書ノ保管ニ任ジ居ルコ  
トヲ茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ實ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナ  
ルコト、並ニ右ガ下記各簿ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式書類  
及ビ簿ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シアラバ綴巻  
號又ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ簿ニ於ケル該文書  
ノ所規所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ)

1339.1(3) cert. 1

証 明 書

ワシントン文書局 第 一三三九 A (三) 號

國 際 検 察 部 第 一三三九 A (三) 號

真 實 及 ビ 公 正 ニ 關 ス ル 証 明

余、林 房ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、創 千 外 務 省 文 書

課 長 ト シ テ、日 本 政 府 ト 公 的 關 係 ニ 在 ル モ ノ ナ ル コ

ト、竝ニ該官更トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレタル、  
AT

1339A(3) cert. =

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 九月二十一日

東京ニ於テ署名

管轄官吏署名欄 林 泰

右ノ者ノ公印齎送 外務省文書課長

証 人 尾 戸 長 春

公式入手ニ關スル説明

余、RICHARD H. LARSH ハ、余ガ聯合國最高指揮官  
總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、竝ニ上記署名ノ  
文書ハ余ガ公務上、日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入  
手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ説明ス。

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 九月二十五日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏 名 欄 Richard H. Larsh

右ノ者ノ公印齎送 總務局行政課

証 人 T/4 T. Foguchi

Q. # 1047

DOC. NO. 1339-A (8)

BRITISH EMBASSY,

TOKYO.

21st February, 1941

My dear Minister,

With reference to our conversation of yesterday in regard to the presence of British troops near the Malayan-Thai frontier, I send you the text of a reassuring communique issued by the Thai Government on the 13th instant. You will see from this that that Government is not in any way apprehensive in regard to the precautionary measures taken in Malay.

I am sorry to say that this communique was distorted when published in the Japanese press. Instead of the words "both countries still respect the Treaty and pact of non-aggression concluded between one another", the version given in the Japanese press states "Great Britain should respect the Non-Aggression Treaty which she concluded with Thailand". This can only have  
been/

His Excellency

Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka,

His Imperial Japanese Majesty's

Minister for Foreign Affairs.

DOC. NO. 1339-A (8)

Page 2

been a deliberate misquotation, which I am sure you will agree  
is very regrettable in present circumstances.

Believe me

my dear Minister,

Yours very sincerely,

(Sd) R. H. Craigie

C E R T I F I C A T E

J.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I.P.S. No. 1339A (8)

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 2 pages, dated 21 Feb., 1941, and described as follows: Letter dated 21 Feb. 1941, from Ambassador Craigie to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA regarding presence of British troops near the Malayan-Thai Frontiers.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this  
21st day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official  
SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Chief, Archives Sect  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
25 day of September, 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME

Witness: /s/ T/h T. Toguchi

Investigation Division I.P.S.  
Official Capacity

EX 1047

1339A(8) — 1 ☆

日本帝國外務大臣

松岡洋右閣下

拜啓

マライ・タイ國境附近ニ於ケル英國軍隊ノ集結ニ  
關スル閣下トノ昨日ノ御會談ニヨリ小官ハ本月十  
三日附タイ國政府ヨリ發ヤラレタル兵保護ノ「コ  
ンミュニケ」ノ本文ヲ御送附申上伊右ニヨリ閣下  
ハタイ國政府ハマライニ於ケル防衛費ニ關シテ少  
シモ懸念シ居ラザルコトヲ御了察ノ事ト存ジ候

此ノ「コンミュニケ」ハ日本ノ新聞ニ掲載サレタ  
ルトキ歪曲セラレタルモノナルコトヲ遺憾ニ存ジ  
候日本ノ新聞ニハ「兩國ハ相互固ニ取定メラレタ  
ル不侵略條約及ビ整定ヲ今モ尙尊重ス」トノ條文  
ガ「大英國ハタイ國ト取定メタル不侵略條約ヲ尊  
重スベシ」ト明記サレ居リ候右ハ故意ニ引用ヲ誤  
リタルト見做スヨリ他アク現下ノ狀勢ニ鑑ミ甚ダ  
遺憾ナルコトハ閣下モ御同意ノコト、在ジ候

敬具

一九四一年二月二十一日

在東京

英國大使館

R、H、クレイキ



1329A(2) - 2 cert.

證 明

「ワシントン」文警局

第

號

國際 檢 察 部

第一三三九A (八) 號

典據及ビ公正ニ關スル證明

余、承認ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ外務省文督

課長トシテ、日本政府ト公的關係ニ在ルモノナルコ

ト、茲ニ該官更トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレタル、二

頁ヨリ成ル、千九百四十一年ノ昭和十六年ノ二月三

十一日附、下記題名、即チ在東京「クレーギー」英

大使渡松岡外相宛警務ノ文督ノ保管ニ任ジ居ルコト

ヲ茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文督ガ日本政府ノ公文督ナ

ルコト、茲ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ郵局ノ公式書類

及ビ綴ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シテラバ綴番號又

ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於ケル該文督ノ成規所在ノ公式名

稱ヲモ特記スベシ)

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ九月二十一日

東京ニ於テ署名

常 務 官 東 豐 冬 樹 林 様

右ノ者ノ公的資格 外務省文督課長

實 人 尾 戸 長 泰 様

1339A(8)-3 cert.

公式入手ニ關スル証明

余、RICHARD H. LARSH ハ、余ガ聯合國最高指揮官  
總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、位ニ上記題名ノ  
文替ハ余ガ公務上、日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入  
手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ九月二十五日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名 欄 RICHARD H. LARSH

右ノ者ノ公的資格 檢察局調査部

證人 F. FOGUCHI



1592 A est-1

出 稿

「ワシントン」文書局 第一五九二、A 號

奥 塚 及 び 公 正 ニ ス ル 註 釋

余、亦編入余が下記ノ資料ニ於テ、即チ

外務省文書課長トシテ、日本政府ト公的關係ニ在  
ルモノナルコト、竝ニ該富更トシテ余が竝ニ添附  
セラレタル、二頁ヨリ成ル、千九百四年ノ昭和  
十六年ノ二月二十四日付、下記題名、即チ在美  
光大使發松岡外務大臣宛電報第四八〇八號ノ文書  
ノ保管ニ在リ居ルコトヲ竝ニ註明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書  
ナルコト、竝ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ行及ハ部局ノ公文書  
記録及ビ成ノ一部ナルコトヲ註明ス。(若シテラバ  
該書號又ハ引用、其ノ他公文書又ハ成ニ於テハ該文書ノ成所  
在ノ公文書ヲモ特記ス)

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ九月十九日

東京ニ於テ署名

富田富更者名前

捺

印

右ノ者ノ公的資格 外務省文書課長

人

佐藤 武五郎

印

1592 A cert. 2

公武入手ニ關スル證明

余、John A. Curtis へ、東京聯合山縣商會事務  
司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、並ニ上記通告、  
文書ハ余ガ公場上、日本政府ノ上記署長官更ヨリ  
入手シタルモノナルコトヲ證ニ證ス。

千九百二十一年ノ陽曆二十一年ノ九月二十日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏 名 少 將 J. A. Curtis 2d Lt.

右ノ者ノ公的職務 Investigator

証 人 1/4 P. Toguchi

**\*INTERCHANGE BETWEEN JAPANESE FOREIGN OFFICE AND BRITISH ON MUTUAL RELATIONSHIPS.\***

Note from Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs containing message to his Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has been laid before Prime Minister.

Prime Minister is gratified to observe that Monsieur Matsuoka sees no reason to apprehend any untoward developments in East Asia, and notes with satisfaction his assurance about peaceful intentions of Japanese Government.

Since Monsieur Matsuoka, for his part, makes reference to 'movements of British and American Governments in their attempt to expedite and enlarge warlike preparations', Prime Minister would allow himself to offer certain observations which he hopes may remove any misunderstanding of position of H. M. 's Government.

There is no question of H. M. 's Government making any attack upon or committing any act of aggression against Japan; and Prime Minister is sure that this also represents intentions of United States, though of course he cannot claim to speak for them. All preparations which are being made in Oriental Regions by Great Britain and United States are of a purely defensive character. Incidentally, Prime Minister would wish to assure Monsieur Matsuoka that concern which Mr. Eden expressed to Japanese Ambassador was not based exclusively on reports from H. M. 's Ambassador in Tokyo, but on the course of events in Far East and on a study of the speeches of Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs himself.

Turning now to the war in progress in Europe between Great Britain and Germany it will be within Monsieur Matsuoka's recollection that, before outbreak of war, H.M. 's Government made every offer, by confession and reasonable dealing, to avert hostilities. That is recognised throughout the world, and indeed the Government of the day in this country were severely criticised for having travelled too far along this road. Their efforts were unavailing, and German Government, by attacking Poland after so many breaches of faith and of treaties, chose arbitrament of war. H.M.'s Government, having thus been forced to enter upon this grievous quarrel, have no thought but to carry it to a victorious conclusion. Naturally it takes some time for the peaceful communities which compose British Empire to overtake military preparations of countries which have long been exulting in their martial might, and adapting their industries to war production. But even now H.M.'s Government feel well assured of their ability to maintain themselves against all comers, and they have every reason to hope that within a few months they will, with rapidly increasing supply of materials which is coming from United States, be overwhelmingly strong.

Monsieur Matsuoka makes allusion to help which this country receiving from United States of America. Prime Minister would observe that that help is being given for very reason that battle which this country is waging is for overthrow of system of lawlessness and violence abroad and cold, cruel tyranny at home which constitutes German Naziism regime.

It is this system that people of British Empire, with sympathy and support of whole English-speaking world, are resolved to extirpate from continent of Europe. H.M.'s Government have no designs upon integrity of independence of any other country, and they seek no advantage for themselves except satisfaction of having rid the earth of a hateful terror and of restoring freedom to the many insulted and enslaved nations of European continent. This they would regard as greatest honour that could reward them, and the crowning episode in what, for western world, is a long continuity of history.

Monsieur Matsuoka, with loftiest motives, has hinted at his readiness to act as the mediator between the belligerents. Prime Minister is sure that, in light of what he has said and upon for the reflection, Monsieur Matsuoka will understand that in a cause of this kind, not in any way concerned with territory, trade or material gains, but affecting whole future of humanity, there can be no question of compromise or parley. It would be a matter of profoundest regret to H.M.'s Government if by any circumstance Japan and this country were to become embroiled, and this not only because of their recollection of the years during which two countries were happily united in alliance, but also because such a melancholy event would both spread and prolong the war without however in opinion of H.M.'s Government altering its conclusion.

Foreign Office, W. 1.

24th February. 1941

C E R T I F I C A T E

N.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I.P.S. No. 702

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ODO Nagaharu hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Assistant Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 4 pages, dated 24 Feb. 1941, and described as follows: Conversation between Prime Minister Mr. Churchill and Ambassador Mr. Shigemitsu on Feb. 24, 1941 (in English)

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this  
1st day of Oct., 1946.

/s/ Nagaharu Odo  
Signature of Official  
SEAL

Witness: /s/ T. Yamamoto

Assistant Chief Archives Section  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
1st day of Oct., 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME

Witness: /s/ T/4 Takio Tomuchi

Investigator, I.P.S.  
Official Capacity



702-1

1149

英國外務大臣宛ノメツセーシヲ含ム日本外務大臣ノ覺書ハ、首相ノ下ニ提出サレタ。

首相ハ、松岡氏ガ極東ニ於テ何等不測ノ事態發生ヲ懸念スベキ理由ナシトセルコトニ對シ、筋足ノ意ヲ表シ、且ツ同氏ガ日本政府ノ平和的意圖ニ付確言セラル多トシ居辱ル。

松岡氏トシテハ一國備ノ促進強化ヲ企圖スル英米政府ノ動キニ言及セルヲ以テ首相ハ英國政府ノ立場ニ對スル誤解ヲ拂拭シ得ベキ或種ノ見解ヲ披瀝意ヲ有シテキル。

英國政府ガ日本政府ニ對シ攻撃ヲ加ヘ、或ハ侵略的行爲ニ出ヅルガ如キコトハアリ得ベカラザルトコロデアル。而シテ首相ハ、敢ヘテアメリカ合衆國代辯ヲナスモノニ非ザルモ、恐ラク同國モ同一ノ意圖ヲ有スルモノト確信シテキル、英米ノ手ニヨツテ東洋地域内ニ爲サレツツアル準備ハ凡テ純防衛的性質ノモノデアル。コレニ附隨シテ、首相ガ松岡氏ニ確言セント欲スルコトハ即チ「イデーシ」氏が日本大使ニ對シテ表明セルトコロノ懸念ハ單ニ滯日英大使ノ報告ニノミ基イタモノデハナク、極東ニ於ケル事件ノ推移ト日本外務大臣ノ演說ヲ研究シタ結果ト基イタモノデアルト云フコトデアル。

次ニ現ニヨーロッパニ於テ行ハレツツアル英獨間

102-2

ノ戦争ニツイテアルガ、戦争勃發前、英口政府ガ  
護歩ト妥當ナル處理ニヨツテ戦争行爲ヲ回避スベク  
アラユル申出ヲ爲シタコトハ松岡氏ノ記徳ニモ存ス  
ルトコロデアラウ。コノコトハ全世界ノ認メルトコ  
ロデアアル、而シテ英口ノ時ノ政府ハ、コノ道ニ沿ウ  
テ余リニモ長イ旅ヲシ過ギタ、痛烈ナ批判ノ受ケ  
タノデアアル。彼等ノ努力ハ水港ニ歸シ、獨逸政府ハ  
幾多ノ信儀ト條約ヲ蹂躪シテポーランドニ攻入ヲ加  
ヘルコトニ依ツテ、裁決ヲ戦争ニ求メタ。英口政府  
ハ、カクシテコノ非慘ナル争ヒニ突入スベク余儀ナ  
レタ以上、最早ヤコノ争ヒヲ終局ノ勝利ニ導ク以外  
ニハ何事ヲモ考ヘテキナイ。英帝口ヲ構式スル平和  
的ナ社會ガ、多年ソノ武力ヲ誇リ、ソノ産業ヲ巨額  
生産ニ適合セシメルタメ努力シ來ツタ諸國ノ軍備ニ  
追ヒツクタメニハ、若干ノ時ヲ要スルコトハ素ヨリ  
陸ヲ揆タナイ。シカシナガラ今日ニ於テモ英國政府  
ハ如何ナル侵略者ニ對シテモ自己ヲ守リ得ル能力ノ  
アルコトニ自信ガアリ且ツ二、三ケ月中ニハアメリ  
カ合衆國ヨリノ供給物資ノ急増ニヨリ、壓倒的ニ強  
カトナリ得コトノ確信シテキル。

松岡氏ハ英國カアメリカ合衆國ヨリ受ケツツアル  
援助ニ言及シテキル。首相ハコノ援助ノ與ヘアタヘ  
ツツアル理由ハ英國ノ敗ヒツツアル戦争ガ獨逸ナチ

102-3

主義政體ノ本質トモイフベキ海外ニ於ケル不法、暴  
 行並ニ國內ニ於ケル冷酷ナル專制政治ノ側面ヲ打破  
 スルタメニ行ハレテラルカラテアルト觀メテモル。  
 英帝國國民ガ世界全蓋獲麟國ノ同情ト支持ヲ得テ、  
 ヨロツバ大陸ヨリ根絶セシメント決意セルトコロ  
 ノモノハ實ニコロ制度テアル。英國政府ハ、他ノ如  
 何ナル國家ノ獨立保全ニ對シテモ害意ヲ有スルモノ  
 デハナク、憎ムベキ恐怖ラコノ地上ヨリ取り除キ、  
 ヨロツバ大陸ニ於ケル幾多ノ侮辱セラレ規條化サ  
 レタ國民ノ自由ヲ恢復スルコトガ出来レバ之ニ越シ  
 タ満足ハナク夫レ以外ニハ、自己ノタメニ何等ノ利  
 益ヲモ求メルモノデハナイ。彼等ハコレヲ以テ自己  
 ニ報イラルベキ最大ノ名譽テアリ且又西歐諸國ノ永  
 キ歴史ノ繼續ヲ保ツベキ先幾テハ淨話的諸條テアル  
 ト見做ステアラウ。

松岡氏ハ最も高邁ナル動機ヲ以テ交際國ノ仲裁  
 者トシテ行動スル用意アルコトヲ示唆シタ。首相ハ  
 松岡氏ノ言ニ徴シ、又熟考ノ結果松岡氏が領土、貿易  
 易、物質的利得等ニ何等關係ナクシカモ人類ノ全將  
 來ニ影響ヲ及ボスベキ此ノ種ノ尋柄ニ關シテハ妥協、  
 商談等ノ預地ガテリ得サルコトヲ諒解セラレルコト  
 ト確信シテモル。若シ假リニ何等カノ事情ニ依ツテ  
 日英兩國間ニ紛争ヲ生ズル如キコトガアレバ、ソレ

702-4

ハ英國政府ノ最モ遺憾トスルトコロデアアル蓋シコレ  
ハ、兩國ガ幸福ナル同盟關係ニアツタ往年ヲ同損セ  
シメルノミデナク、カカル痛マシキ出來意ガ英國政  
府ノ意嚮ノ如ク戦争終結ニ關シテハ何等變更ナカル  
ベシトスルモ、戦争ヲ損大シ永ビカセルモノト思ハ  
レルカラデアアル。

外務省 W I.  
一九四一年二月二四日

702 case-1

證明書

「ラッシュ」文庫部 第七〇二號

國際検察部 第七〇二號

典據及び公正ニ關スル證明

余、尾戸長泰ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ外務

省文書課長代理トシテ、日本政府ト公的關係ニ在

ルモノナルコト、故ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附

セラレタル、四頁ヨリ成ル、千九百四十一年ノ昭

和十六年ノ二月二十四日附、下記連名、前チ「チ

アチル」真光會談（二月二十四日、英文ノ文書ノ

保管ニ任ジ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書

ナルコト、故ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式

記録及ビ綴ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。（著テラバ綴

種類又ハ引用、其ノ他公式警察又ハ綴ニ於ケル諸文書ノ成規所在

ノ公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ）

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ十月一日

東京ニ於テ署名

常駐官吏署名摺 尾戸長 泰

右ノ者ノ公的資格 外務省文書課長代理

證明書 山本利忠

702 cert-2

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、RICHARD H. LARSH 人、余が聯合國最高指揮官  
總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、曾ニ上記題名ノ  
文替ハ余ガ公務上、日本政府ノ上記罪名官吏ヨリ入  
手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ十月一日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名	Richard H. Larsh
右ノ者ノ公的資格	Investigator. I P S.
證人	T/4 Takeo Toguchi

Ex. #10501

Doc. No. 1592 B

Page 1.

Copy of Telegram No. 4840

Nature of Telegram: Code

Date: Dispatched 25 February Showa 16/1941/ A.M.  
Received: 25 February Showa 16/1941/ P.M.

To: Foreign Minister MATSUOKA

From: Ambassador OGHIMA, Berlin

No. 160 (Urgent)

At the interview with Ribbentrop reported to you in Telegram No. 157, I stressed that there have been various conjectures concerning Japanese-German relations, especially concerning the Tri-Partite Pact, that there has also been slanderous propaganda by England and the United States; but that although there may be some degree of misunderstanding on the part of Germany, the fact that Japan is absolutely faithful to the Tri-Partite Pact will be clearer when the Imperial Rescript is issued; and that both government officials and people are moving forward with united and steadfast resolve toward the realization of the national policy, with the aforementioned treaty as the keynote of our foreign relations. Ribbentrop agreed, saying that Germany too has a comradely feeling of being in the same boat as Japan, and that Chancellor Hitler has the strongest faith on this point. He said that he hoped that there was no misunderstanding about Germany's real intention by Japan.

For your reference.

Relayed to Germany, Soviet Russia, Turkey, and to the U.S.A.

## C E R T I F I C A T E

W. D. C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I. P. S. No. 1592-BStatement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 1 page, dated 25 Feb., 1941, and described as follows: Telegram No. 4840 from Ambassador OSHIMA to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this19th day of Sept., 1946/s/ K. HAYASHI  
Signature of OfficialWitness: /s/ T. SATO

SEAL

Official CapacityStatement of Official Procurement

I, JOHN A. CURTIS, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this20 day of Sept., 1946/s/ J. A. CURTIS 2d Lt.  
NAMEWitness: /s/ T/L P. TOGUCHIInvestigator  
Official Capacity



電信寫 號四。符 昭和六年三月二十五日午前時 分發 官  
昭和六年三月二十五日午後時 分發 官

松岡外務大臣宛在柏林大島大發發  
第六號(至急)

往電第五七號「上會談」條本使言「日獨關係終  
三國條約之三種、腹測行(居)英米、中傷的直  
傳(予)獨逸側於多少誤解存在(主)計(廿)七  
日本三國條約絕對忠實(大)詔(發)發(依)行(走)  
明(予)官(民)致(不)動(決)決(意)以(加)條(約)或(外)交  
其(制)上(之)國(策)實(現)獨(逸)之(居)強(調)也(二)  
日(之)自(有)獨(逸)下(之)在(日)本(同)之(然)至(不)之(也)  
同(志)氣(持)之(已)總(統)之(付)日(取)強(信)念(有)  
之(予)日(本)側(於)獨(逸)真(實)之(付)誤(解)之(予)切  
望(之)言(述)之(予)御(參)考(之)迄  
獨(蘇)士(米)轉(電)之(予)

Doc 1592AB

Enk, 1050

1592 B cert-1

「リントン」文書局 第 〇 號  
國際私法部 第一五九二ノB號

典據及ビ公正ニ付スル證明

余、林 喜ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ外務省又  
文書局長トシテ、日本政府ト公的関係ニ在ルモノナル  
コト、茲ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレタル、  
一頁ヨリ成ル、千九百四十一年ノ昭和十六年ノ二月  
二十五日附、下記題名、即チ在御大島大使 松岡外  
務大臣宛電報第四八四〇號ノ又書ノ保存ニ任ジ居ル  
コトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナ  
ルコト、茲ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ筆又ハ部局ノ公式書類  
及ビ綴ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(夫ツアラハ綴番號又  
ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於ケル其文書ノ成規所在ノ公式名  
稱ヲモ特記スベシ)

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ九月十九日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名

林 喜

右ノ者ノ公的資格

外務省文書局長

証人

佐藤武五郎

1592 B. cert. 2

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余 J.A. Curtis 氏、余ガ聯合國長高橋推官總司令部  
ニ係アルモノナルコト、竝ニ上記署名ノ文書ハ  
余ガ公務上、日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入手シ  
タルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／九月二十日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名	楠	J. ACURTIS 2DLT.
右ノ者ノ公的資格		INVESTIGATOR
証人		F/4 P. TOGUCHI

Q. # 1051

Doc. 1592-0

Page 7

COPY OF TELEGRAM NO. 4956.  
 NATURE OF TELEGRAM: Code  
 DATE DISPATCHED: 25 Feb. Showa 16, 1941, P.M.  
 RECEIVED: 25 Feb. Showa 16, 1941, P.M.  
 TO: Foreign Minister MATSUOKA  
 FROM: Ambassador SHIBAMITSU in London

No. 137-1.

1. At the interview with Premier Churchill on the 24th he first spoke to me consecutively for about 20 minutes as summarized in my previous telegram No. 136.

2. I answered that I understood what he said. However, with regard to the third point, I told him that Foreign Minister MATSUOKA did not offer to mediate, but that he simply emphasized Japan's spirit toward peace and that he especially expressed his concern over the peace in East Asia. Availing myself of this opportunity I told him that I wanted to express my unreserved opinion to the effect that while the relations between Great Britain and Japan had become very clear, to our satisfaction, by Japan's avowal of having no intention to aggress upon Great Britain and by Britain's declaration that she would not take any offensive policy against Japan, it was very regrettable that Britain, who was well aware that the aggravation of the relations between the two countries arose from the problems in China, has been, together with other countries, giving concrete assistance to the Chungking government, our enemy, thus maintaining a policy enabling the Chungking Government to carry on resistance against Japan. Such a policy is recognized as a challenge to the peace of East Asia for which Japan has deep concern. I continued that Japan has no idea of conquering China and that her unprejudiced stand was clearly pointed out in MATSUOKA's message, and that we are carrying out our policies in that line under the treaties with the Nanking Government. In view of the present world conditions, it is impossible for Japan to go on existing, abandoning the continent of China to a chaotic condition, and therefore that it is only justifiable for her to counter-attack against hostile activities made upon order and peace. Uneasiness could not be eliminated unless this point should be amended. I said that I was convinced that in the Pacific the time has come to require more positive and constructive policies, not just the preventing of general destruction. This would be significant for preventing conditions from becoming aggravated again. If all of the nations concerned had enough self-control to be able to construct peace in this area too through their goodwill and mutual understanding, I went on, it might prove the first step in gradually saving the world from catastrophe. This was why I had been making efforts and exchanging opinions with Lord Lloyd (the Colonial Secretary, a leader of the Upper House and an intimate friend of Churchill. Died lately), Lord Hankey and others, as I said in conclusion, he (Churchill) might have been aware.

3. The Premier answered that he was aware of it; then he said that as he had declared previously (his speech in Parliament at the time of the conclusion

of the negotiations over the Burma Road) to the contrary, he considered it desirable that Japan be active in China, and that peace be brought about between them; so Great Britain has no intention of interfering. He said that rather than giving assistance, Britain's position is indeed tantamount to strict neutrality. Great Britain, he continued, has no objection now or later to the uninterrupted development of Japan as one of the great countries of the world. He said that, at any rate, he is at present doing his utmost to reestablish a righteous peace in Europe. The British Empire alone has a white population of sixty-five millions as against a population of seventy-five millions in Germany, and he was sure that the war should be brought to a final victory for his country by utilizing far bigger resources and with the assistance of the U. S. A.

4. The premier said further that after the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact the intentions of Japan had been so vague as to cause suspicion on the part of Britain and the U. S. A., but instead that conditions have now become good is clear both at home and abroad by the press accounts. To the above I answered that it would be a gross mistake to consider that the latest press campaign by Britain gives favorable effect to Japan. In a word, a campaign of such nature would be only harmful and unprofitable. Then the Premier justified himself, saying that there was no special campaign.

5. At the interview today Premier Churchill tried to emphasize the determination of Great Britain to carry through the war, calling the German actions inhuman aggressive acts, but he did not criticize the past Japanese policies toward China. Instead he appeared to show an attitude of indifference toward it.

Dispatch relayed to United States.

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Dispatch relayed to United States.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W. D. C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.C. No. 1592-C

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 4 pages, dated 25 Feb., 1941, and described as follows: Telegram No. 4956 from Ambassador SHIGEMITSU in London to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this

19th day of Sept., 1946

/s/ K. HAYASHI  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ T. SATO

\_\_\_\_\_  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, JOHN A. CURTIS, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

20 day of Sept., 1946

/s/ J. A. CURTIS 2d Lt.  
NAME

Witness: /s/ T/4 P. TOUCHI

\_\_\_\_\_  
Investigator  
Official Capacity

Q. #1052

DOCUMENT NO. 2206 (12)

Page 1.

TELEGRAM

THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GIDEW) TO THE SECRETARY  
OF STATE

TOKYO, February 27, 1941--2 a.m.  
(Received 4:55 p.m.)

Excerpt.

317. In the course of my conversation today with the Foreign Minister he went out of his way to accuse the British Government of taking measures in the Far East which were a direct incitement to Japan and which rendered very difficult an improvement in the situation. He referred in this connection to the reported mining of Singapore and the sending of Australian troops to the Malaya-Thailand border.

I said that it seemed to me extraordinary that the Japanese should interpret and characterize obviously defensive measures as measures of offense. As I had said to the Minister at the American-Japan Society luncheon, we must inevitably be guided by "facts and actions" and that certainly the facts and actions relating to Japan's southward advance were concrete causes for serious anxiety not only on the part of Great Britain but of ourselves. Having occupied in succession Waichow, Hainan, the Spratly Islands, and other areas, the Japanese military were now pouring troops into Indo-China and, according to our informer, had occupied the airport in Saigon, quite apart from naval activities in those regions, and that these steps, taken in conjunction with the public utterances of many Japanese statesmen, generals and admirals concerning Japanese intentions to the southward, had created a situation which could hardly be regarded with equanimity either by the United States or Great Britain since they threatened not only our interests but our possessions.

. . . . .

Foreign Relations II, pp. 308-309



8x 1052

Doc. 220C (12)

駐日米國大使「クルー」ヨリ國務「長官宛」  
東京 一九四〇年 / 昭和十五年 / 二月二十六日  
午前二時  
(午後四時五十分 受信)

抜萃  
三百十七、今日、外務大臣ト會談、途中、大臣、英王政府ガ日本ニ対シテ直接刺戟ナルコト形勢ヲ改ムル事ヲ困難ナリトシテ東洋ニ於テトツテナルト之ヲ非難スル、舉ニ出ス。コニ閣聯ニテ彼、噂ニホテナル新加坡、檳榔嶼、設及ヒ滿洲軍、馬來、泰、境、滋、造ニ言及シテ、私、日本人ガ明カニ守備方策ヲアルモノ改敵方策ト解シ其、性質ヲ論ズル、法外ニ思ヘルト述ベテ、私ガ日米協會午餐會、同大臣ニ云ツタ如ク、我々、是非共、事實ト行動ニヨリテ帰向ヲ定メナケルナラズモ、然レ日本、南方進出ニ関スル事實ト行動ハ明カニ英王側、ミナラス我々方ニ対シテモ重大ト懸念、具體的原因ナル。暹州、海南、新南群島及ビ他、地区ト引渡キ占領シ、日本軍、今ヤ軍隊ヲ印度支那ニ殺倒セシメ尙我々方通報者、報告ニヨリ、此、地区、海軍、行動ト、今、別個ニ西貢、飛行場ヲ占領シ且、多ク、日本、政治家、陸軍大將、<sup>海軍</sup>此、日本、南方ニ対スル意圖ニ関スル公言ニ閣聯ニテ取ラレタ之等、措置、我々、利益、ミナラス領エラヌカス、故、米國モ英國モ平氣ヲ去ラシテ、<sup>海軍</sup>情勢、甚起シタヘアル

\* 外交關係 中二卷 第三八頁及第三九頁 \*

## Japan's Second Offer (Handed by Ambassador SHIGEMITSU to CHURCHILL)

His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs acknowledges the receipt of the note of His Britannic Majesty's Prime Minister, dated February 24, 1941, and takes pleasure in apprising the latter that the statement and remarks contained therein have been duly noted.

The Foreign Minister trusts that Mr. Churchill is not necessarily expecting observations to be made upon them. He wishes, however, to take advantage of the opportunity to state that no hint whatever of his readiness to act as a mediator between the actual belligerents was intended to be conveyed in his Memorandum addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, nor did he imagine for a moment any possibility of such a hint being read in any part of the text. The Foreign Minister took occasion in his Memorandum to refer to the mediation now taking place in Tokyo as Mr. Eden had made allusions to it and incidentally took the liberty of stating in a general and abstract manner the views he has always cherished, in order to make clear the aspiration and attitude of his country concerning the problem of peace or the recovery of normal conditions throughout the world.

The Foreign Minister believes that it will not be entirely out of place to reiterate what he has said on more than one occasion in reference to the Tripartite Pact, inasmuch as this matter was touched upon by Mr. Eden in his conversation with Ambassador Shigemitsu. The Tripartite Pact was concluded as, and remains, a peace pact in the sense that it was entered into largely with a view to preventing a third Power from participating in the European war or Sino-Japanese conflict, thus limiting the participants and dimensions of the war and also to bringing about peace at the earliest possible date. Japan's ideals were epitomized in the preamble of the Pact, and it is needless to say that Japan, remaining absolutely loyal to the aims and ideals enunciated, will always find herself standing by her allies in carrying out her duty under the Tripartite Pact.

The Foreign Minister would equally deplore and regret, if by any untoward circumstances, Great Britain and this country were to become embroiled, not only because of the recollection of the years during which the two countries were united in alliance, but also because such a tragic eventuality would be fraught with the danger of destroying modern civilization to the undoing of the best part of humanity.

February 27, 1941.

C E R T I F I C A T E

J.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I.P.S. No. 1339A (7)

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 3 pages, dated 27 Feb., 1941, and described as follows: JAPAN'S SECOND OFFER (HANDED BY AMBASSADOR SHIGEMITSU TO CHURCHILL).

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this  
23rd day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official  
SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Chief, Archives Sect  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
25 day of September 1946.

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME

Witness: /s/ T/4 T. Toruchi

Investigation Division I.P.S.  
Official Capacity

6X1053

1339A-(7)-1

第二次我方申入（三月四日重光大使「チ  
ヤ」キール」ニ手交シ

日本帝國外務大臣ハ英國總理大臣ノ一九四一年二  
月二十四日附「ノート」ノ受領ヲ確認シ英國總理  
大臣ニ對シ右「ノート」ニ包含セラレタル聲明及  
言明ハ充分ニ「ノート」セラレタル旨通報スルヲ  
欣幸トス

外務大臣ハ「チヤ」キール」氏ハ必スシモ其ノ聲明  
及言明ニ對シ意見ヲ述ヘラルルコトヲ期待シ居ラ  
サルモノト信ス

然シ乍ラ外務大臣ハ此ノ機會ヲ利用シ英國外務大  
臣ニ宛テラレタル其ノ覺悟ニ於テハ現實ノ交戦島  
間ノ調停者タルノ用意アル旨何等ノ暗示ヲ與フル  
ノ意圖無カリシコト、將又「テキニスト」ノ如何ナ  
ル部分ヨリモ斯カル暗示カ得ラルルノ可能性アリ  
トハ際時モ想像セサリシコトヲ謂ハント欲ス。外  
務大臣ハ「イ」テン」氏カ同問題ニ言及セラレタ  
ルニ付其ノ覺悟ニ於テ目下東京ニ於テ降巻中ノ調  
停ニ言及セル次第ニテ且偶々一般的且抽象的ナル  
方法ニ於テ平和問題若クハ世界ヲ迫スル正常狀態  
ノ回復ニ關スル當國ノ抱負及態度ヲ明瞭ナラシム  
ル爲其ノ常ニ抱懐スル見解ヲ述ヘタルモノナリ  
外務大臣ハ「イ」テン」氏カ重光大使トノ會談ニ

1339A(7)-2

於テ之ニ觸レラレタルヲ以テ、三國條約ニ關シ其  
ノ一度ナラス謂ヘルコトヲ反駁スルハ全く場所ヲ  
得サルモノニハ非ザルニキコトヲ信ス。三國條約  
ハ大体ニ於テ第三國ノ歐洲戰爭若クハ日支紛争ニ  
參加スルヲ防止シ、新クシテ戰爭ノ參加者及範圍ヲ  
局限シ且景モ早日ニ平和ヲ招來スルコトヲ目的ト  
シテ締結セラレタル意味ニ於テ平和條約トシテ結  
ハレタルモノニシテ現在モ亦然リ、日本ノ理想ハ  
右條約ノ前文中ニ概説セラレタル所ニシテ日本ハ  
宣明セラレタル目的及理想ニ對シ絕對ニ忠實ニシ  
テ三國條約ニ基ク義務ノ履行ニ付常に其ノ同盟國  
ノ側ニ立ツヘキハ言ラ俟タズ外務大臣ハ若シ何等  
不幸ナル狀況ニ依リ英國ト當國ガ戰爭ニ捲込マル  
ルトセハ同様ニ之ヲ拒絶シ遺憾トスヘシ、右ハ單  
ニ兩國ガ同盟ニ結合セラレ居リタル時代ヲ回顧ス  
ルカ故ノミナラス又新カル悲劇的出來事ハ近代文  
明ヲ破壞シ人類ノ大部分ヲ破滅セシムルノ危險ニ  
充テ居ルヘケレハナリ。

一九四一年二月二十七日



1339 A(7) cert. 2

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、 RICHARD H. LARSH ハ、余が聯合國最高指揮官總司令部ニ歸属スルモノナルコト、竝ニ上記題名ノ文書ハ余が公認上、日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ九月二十五日

東京ニ於テ署名  
氏 名 田  
証 石 / 着、公的資格 人  
人

RICHARD H. LARSH  
極家局副長部  
F. FOGUCHI

Ex. # 1054

Doc. No. 1593-A

Page 1

No. 6915 (Total number)

Date; 7.00 P.M. March 4, 1941

Sender; Foreign Minister MATSUOKA

Addressee: HIGUCHI, Japanese Ambassador to the U.S.A.

Subject: Ambassador HIGUCHI's denial of the war with  
America

No. 107

Concerning No. 123 of your telegram. I fully appreciate the circumstances under which you had to make your answer in a cautious way. However, as I have already made an affirmative reply to the question as to whether Japan will participate in a warfare in case the United States should attack Germany, at the general meeting of Budget Committee in the House of Representatives and on other occasions, I hope that hereafter you will act in concert with me when you answer questions of like nature.



Doc. No. 1593-A

Page 2

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. 1593-A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity. Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of one pages, dated 4 March, 1941, and described as follows: Telegram No. 6915, MATSUOKA to NOMURA.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry - - - - -

Signed at Tokyo on this  
20th day of Sept., 1946

/s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Gdo

\_\_\_\_\_  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am, associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
23 day of Sept., 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAFE

Witness: J.A. Curtis 2d Lt.

/s/ Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

電信局 第六九一五號 行本 昭和十六年三月廿七日后七時 分發三三二

在米野村大使

松岡外務大臣

1593A-1

野村大使ノ對米賦否定ノ件

第一〇七號

電報第一二三號ニ付シ

米大使カ帯ニ候 眞ヲ期シ 應副モラレタル事情ハ充分 諒ト  
致スモ 米賦カ獨 越ヲ攻撃シタル際ニハ 日云ハ 參照スルヤ  
トノ 間ニ 對シテハ 本大臣ハ 米穀統制委員會ニ 於テ 肯定  
的ニ 答辯シ 居ル 次第ニ モアリ 以 大使ノ 質問 照リニ 付テハ  
今後 類似ノ 質問ニ 對シテハ 萬 勿ト 歩調ヲ 合セ 御 答 答アリ  
タシ

WX 1054

証 明 書  
トクシントン工務局 第 一 五 九 三 ノ A 號  
國 際 自 衛 隊 第 一 五 九 三 ノ A 號

余、深 敬 余 下 記 ノ 文 據 ニ 於 テ、  
與 據 及 ビ 公 正 ニ 則 ス ル 證 明  
モ ノ ナ ル コ ト、並 ニ 該 官 長 ト シテ、日 本 政 府 ト 公 約 關 係 ニ 在 ル

レタル、聖 貞 ヲ リ 認 ル、千 九 百 二 十 一 年 ノ 附 録 十 六  
年 ノ 三 月 四 日 附、下 記 通 達、門 子 公 制 所 務 大 臣 發 達  
米 地 村 大 佐 憲 號 第 六 九 一 五 號 ノ 文 據 ノ 係 等 ニ 符 シ

居 ル コ トヲ 茲 ニ 證 明 ス。  
余 ハ 實 ニ 添 附 ノ 証 據 及 ビ 文 據 ガ 日 本 政 府 ノ 公 有 警 察  
ル コ ト、並 ニ 右 ガ 下 記 名 稱 ノ 警 署 ハ 該 局 ノ 公 式 上 須  
及 ビ 該 ノ 一 部 ナ ル コ トヲ 證 明 ス。(三 三 シ イ ラ バ 接 送 證 據 又  
ハ 引 用、其 ノ 公 式 警 署 又 ハ 該 ニ 於 ケ ル 警 署 ノ 警 署 牙 在 ノ 公 式 名 稱  
ヲ モ 證 明 スベシ)

千 九 百 四 十 六 年 ノ 西 曆 二 十 一 年 ノ 九 月 二 十 日

東 京 ニ 於 テ 署 長

當 該 官 長 名 稱  
林 權 敬 署 長

右 ノ 者 ノ 公 約 發 達 係 等 署 長

證 人

1593A-3

公式入手ニスル証書

余、リチャード・エツチ・ラーシェン、余ガ一合意  
Richard 子, harsh  
公認權者官、司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、實ニ  
上記公認ノ買入ハ余ガ公認上、日本政府ノ上訴ニ  
官長ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百二十五年ノ四月二十一年ノ九月廿三日

東京ニ於テニ行

氏名 同

右ノ者ノ公認者

証

Richard H. harsh  
Investigator J.P.  
J. A. Curtis  
2d Lt.

Ex. # 1055-1

EXTRACT FROM "THE TOKYO NICHI NICHI"

March 8, 1941

NATIONAL MOBILIZATION LAW

Revised Regulations Will be  
Put in Force on March 20.

The detailed regulations relative to the application of the revised National Mobilization Law, which were approved in the 76th session of the Diet, will be put in force on March 20, it was decided at the Cabinet Meeting on March 7.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I.P.S. No. 2530-A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Katuti IKAWA, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Cabinet and that as such official I have custody of the records of the Cabinet Meeting and the decisions referred to in the attached newspaper article described as follows: Excerpt from the Tokyo Nichi Nichi, March 8, 1941 entitled National Mobilization Law. I further certify that the attached newspaper article correctly represents in substance the decisions of the Cabinet Meeting of the date referred to.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
10th day of October, 1946.

/s/ K. Ikawa  
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Tomoo Satow

SEAL  
Secretary of Cabinet  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, John Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
16 day of October, 1946

/s/ J. A. Curtis, 2nd Lt.  
NAME

Witness: Sgt. T. Toguchi /s/

Investigator IPS  
Official Capacity

4x 1055

Dec 2530A

1.

「東京日々新聞」一九四一年／昭  
和十六年／三月八日附ヨリノ抄萃

。。。。。。。。。。

國家總動員法

改正規定ハ三月二十日施行

。。。。。。。。。。

第七十六議會ヲ通過シタル改正國家總動員法ノ適  
用ニ關スル細則ハ三月二十日ニ施行サルベキ旨三月  
七日ノ閣議ヲ決定シタ。

Doc 2530A (cont)

2.

證 明 書

「ワシントン」文書局 第 〇 號

國 際 検 察 部 第 二 五 三 〇 A 號

又替ノ出所及ビソノ眞止ナルコトノ陳述

余、井川克一ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ内閣書記官トシテ、日本政府ト公的關係ニ在ルモノナルコト、竝ニ該官更トシテ茲ニ添附セラレアル一九四一年ノ昭和十六年ノ三月八日附東京日々新聞ノ國家總動員法ト題スル記事茲ニオイテ引用セラレアル閣議記録及ビ決議ノ文書ヲ保管セルコトヲ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ新聞記事ガ件ノ日時ニ行ハレタル閣議決議ノ要領ヲ正確ニ述ベオルコトヲ證明ス。

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ十月十日

東京ニ於テ署名

官該官吏署名	ケ一、井川
石ノ者ノ公的資格	内閣書記官
證 人	佐藤 朝生





3.  
Dic 2530 A (cont)

公式入手ニ關スル原述

余、ジヨシ、カーテイスハ、余ガ聯合國軍高級指揮官  
總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、應ニ上記證明書  
ハ余ガ公榜上、日本政府ノ上記著名官吏ヨリ入手シ  
タルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ十月十六日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名 欄 ジエイ・エイ、カーテイス少尉  
石ノ着ノ公的資格 調査官  
証人 テイ、戸口 眞實

## MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Excerpts.

(WASHINGTON, ) March 8, 1941.

\* \* \* \* \*

The Ambassador then said that it would be well-nigh unthinkable for our two countries to fight each other on account of the destructive effects that would inevitably result in any event. I here spoke and said that my country entertained the same idea about the destructive effects of a military clash between our two countries. I then inquired of the Ambassador whether the military groups in control of his Government could possibly expect important nations like the United States to sit absolutely quiet while two or three nations before our very eyes organized naval and military forces and went out and conquered the balance of the earth, including the seven seas and all trade routes and the other four continents. Could they expect countries like mine to continue to remain complacent as that movement is going on? I inquired further what countries like mine would have to gain by remaining complacent in the face of a movement to substitute force and conquest for law and justice and order and fair dealing and equality. The Ambassador sought to play down the view that such military conquest was really in the mind of his Government and he then said that embargoes by this country were, of course, of increasing concern, and that he did not believe there would be any further military movements unless the policy of increasing embargoes by this country should force his Government, in the minds of those in control, to take further military steps. To this I replied that this is a matter entirely in the hands of his Government for the reason that his Government took the initiative in military expansion and seizures of territory of other countries, thereby creating an increasingly deep concern on the part of my own and other countries as to the full extent of Japanese conquest by force which was contemplated; that my country has not been at fault and none of the nations engaged in conquest have pretended seriously to charge it with any action of omission or commission in relation to the present movement of world conquest by force on the part of some three nations, including Japan. The Ambassador sought here to minimize and mildly to controvert the idea that Japan is engaged in broad unqualified military conquest. I then repeated the terms of the Tripartite Agreement and the public declaration of Hitler and Matsuoka and other high authorities in Japan to the effect that their countries under the Tripartite arrangement were out by military force to establish a new order not for Asia alone

not for Europe alone, but for the world, and a new order under their control. I said that whatever interpretation the Ambassador might give these utterances and military activities in harmony with them thus far, the American people who were long complacent with respect to dangerous international developments have of late become very thoroughly aroused and awakened to what they regard as a matter of most serious concern in relation to movements by Japan and Germany, presumably to take charge of the seas and the other continents for their own personal arbitrary control and pecuniary profit at the expense of the welfare of all of the peoples, who are victims of such a course and of peaceful nations in general. I said, of course, these apprehensions and this tremendous concern will remain and continue so long as Hitler continues his avowed course of unlimited conquest and tyrannical rule and so long as the Japanese Army and Navy increase their occupation by force of other and distant areas on both land and sea, with no apparent occasion to do so other than that of capture and exclusive use of the territory and other interests of other countries. The Ambassador again sought to allay the idea of military conquest on the part of his country, and I again replied with emphasis that so long as Japanese forces were all over China and Japanese troops and airplanes and naval vessels were as far south as Thailand and Indochina and Saigon, accompanied by such threatening declarations as Japanese statesmen are making week after week, there can only be increasing concern by nations who are vitally interested in international affairs both on land and sea as they are also vitally interested in the halt of world conquest by force and barbaric methods of government.

I proceeded to comment on Japan's line of activities and utterances by saying that this country and most other countries only proclaim and practice policies of peaceful international relationships, political, economic, social and cultural. Sometimes the policy to promote these mutually beneficial relationships is proclaimed, such as our good neighbor policy with special reference to Pan America. And yet all of our acts and programs and policies adopted by the twenty-one American nations in their conferences from time to time are made universal in their application, so that Japan and all other nations receive the same equal opportunities for trade and commerce generally throughout the Americas that each of the American nations receives itself. In striking contrast the new order in greater Eastern Asia is unequivocally believed to be purely a program of military aggression and conquest with entirely arbitrary policies of political, economic and military domination.

國務長官覽書

一九四三年三月八日(ロンドン)

抜萃

次ニ大使、如何ニストモ有害ナル結果、之ヲ避ケ得ベキニ非ルガ故ニ我等西國間、戦争、如キヲ始メド考ヘシト言ヘリ。斯ノ下余、我等西國間、軍事衝突、有害ナル結果ニ関シテ、我、國ニ於テモ同感ナル旨陳述セリ。次ニ余、大使ニ三國が我が眼前ニ於テ海陸軍、部隊ヲ編制進出シテ、海ヲ又全交易勿ルトシ、又他、四大陸ヲ含ム世界制覇ヲナスヲ合衆國、如キ重要諸國ガ他對ニ監視スルニ、ト、彼ノ政府麾下、軍部、或子期スルニ非ズヤヲ質問セリ。斯ル活動、行ル、際ニ我、國、如キ諸國が是、如トシテキ、ト彼等ガ子期セル害ガアラハカ。余、更ニ我、國、如キ國家ガ法規、正義、秩序、公平、平等ニ代ルニ武力ヲ行服ヲ以テスル行動ヲ依然、進メ、テ、何ヲ得ベキヤヲ質問セリ。大使、事實、彼、政府、心中ニカル、軍事、征服、思想アリトスル見解ヲ輕視セトセカ、且、吾、國ニ依ル輸出禁止、勿論、漸次、関心ヲ増大スル事柄ニテ、吾、國ニヨリ輸出禁止、拓大、政策ガ彼、國、政府ヲ掌握セル者、眼ニ彼、國、政府ヲ以テ、之、以上、軍事、處置ニ出テセムルト由、心、ニ、サ、ル、限リ、今日、以上、行動ヲナスコトナルベシト由、心、ヲ、口、頭、認、知、シ、リ。

No. 220C(21)

EX 1056

No. 1

Doc 2200 (21)

之對、余は、如何の適合を以て  
 政府、掌中ニアル問題ナリ。即ち、此問題、余は、彼  
 軍事侵略並ニ他國領土獲得、何故ナリ、彼政府、  
 為我國甚、他諸國側、先鞭ヲ著ケ、之ガ  
 軍事征服、最大限度ニ関シ、計畫サレタル日本  
 カセシトシタリ、我ガ國、非難ヲ受ケ、深キ関心ヲ抱  
 然、征服ニ從事セル諸國、日本ヲ合口、或三國側、於  
 ケル現行、武力世界征覇運動ニ関シ、如何ナル不  
 履行又、干犯、行為ニ對シ、天真劍ニ我國ヲ  
 責トスル國、一國ヲカリス、日答ハタリ。茲ニ  
 於テ、大使、日本ガ広範圍ニ且ル不當、軍事征覇  
 ヲ行ヒ、アリト、見解ヲ最、限ニシ、且、婉曲ニ之  
 ヲ論駁セトセリ。サレ、余ハ、三國同盟、條項、及  
 之、トシ、松岡、並ニ甚、他、日本高官ニ依ル、三  
 國協定下、三國、武力ニヨリ、帝、東亞、新秩序  
 建設、又、帝、歐洲、新秩序建設、ニ、トシ、ス、實ニ  
 全世界、新秩序、彼等、統制下、新秩序建設  
 為ニ、出動セリ、トイフ、百、宣言ヲ繰返シタリ。余ハ、大  
 使ガ、之等、言辭、及、夫ト、致スル、今日、迄、軍事  
 行動、如何ニ、解釋、トルト、國際情勢、危険  
 ナル、進展ニ、関シ、長ク、日安、如ク、リ、米國民、天、近、晴  
 全ク、自覺、大、日、独、一、軍事、行動、ト、恐、ク、ハ、カ、ル  
 過程、被害者ニ、シ、大、体、ニ、於、テ、平和、的、國民、タ  
 ル、全國民、福祉、ヲ、犠、牲、ニ、シ、テ、彼等、自身、專

No 2

No. 3

Doc 220c(21)

當時支配及ヒ金錢上ノ利益ヲ得ニカ爲ニ海洋及諸  
 大陸ヲ處理スルニ行動ニ就キ、最大關心事ヲ考  
 了トニ奮起セリト言ヘリ。余、勿論トシテ、考  
 彼ノ公言セル無限ノ征服ノ道ヲ述リ、續テ非道トシテ  
 配ヲ繼續スル限リ、又日本ノ陸海軍力他國ノ領土  
 其他ノ權益ヲ略取ニ專用スルト言フ以外、何  
 等之ヲトス判然タル理由ナシト他ノ又遠隔テ陸  
 海兩域ノ武力占領擴大ヲ續行スル限リ、如上ノ危險  
 並ニ此ノ絶大ナル關心ノ存續スベシト言ヘリ。大使  
 「又天自國側ニ軍事征服ノ見解ヲ緩和セリト  
 サレバ、余ハ日本ノ軍隊ガ中國全域ニ在リ、又日本  
 軍隊航空機海軍艦船ガ泰國印度支那西貢  
 如キ南方迄進出シ、一方日本政治家ガ毎週毎  
 週ナルガ如キ喧嘩的聲明ヲ發スル限リ、海陸兩域  
 ニ於テ國際情勢ニ大關心ヲ持ツ諸國、武力及ヒ  
 裏的支配手段ニ依リ世界征覇ニ休止ニ極メテ関  
 心ヲ有スルガ故ニ之等諸國ノ關心ノ増大ニ停止  
 スルコトヲ知ラサルベキヲ再度強調セリ、  
 余ハ言明ヲ續テ當國及ヒ他諸國ノ政治  
 政治上、經濟上、社会上、文化上ニ平和的國際親善  
 政策ヲ主張シ之ヲ實行スルニシテ、日本ノ  
 言動ノ範圍ニ関シ評論セリ。況ニ米ニ特ニ關係  
 善隣政策、如キ互惠關係助長政策ガ特ニ  
 揚言サレテ、而モ米國ニ一國民ニ依リ、其

doc 220c(21)

屢次、會議ニ於テ採用セラレタル議決、企畫、改  
策、皆其ノ適用於普遍代サレテ井ル。從ツテ日本  
其、他各國、米國民ト同シク通商機會均等  
ヲ大體全米ヲ通達シテ受ケル、テ了ル。然ルニ全米之  
ニ反シテ大東亞新秩序ニ了リテ、政治、經濟、軍  
事、官轄、全ク、專制政策ヲ伴フ純然タル  
軍事、的侵略、征服計畫ナルコト、明カニ信セラ  
ル、所ナリ。

外交關係 第二卷

P389  
R.392-3  
395.

No. 4

Q. # 1057

P. 1

Doc. No. 220 C (22)

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(WASHINGTON,) March 14, 1941

Excerpts.

.....

The President again returned to the Tripartite Agreement and said that it had upset the American people because they think that a concerted effort is being made by Germany and Italy to reach the Suez Canal and by Japan on the other hand to approach Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies and the Indian Ocean. The Japanese Ambassador spoke more strongly than he had in his earlier talk with me, expressing his belief that his country would not go South.

.....

The President finally remarked that, as the Ambassador indicated, matters between our two countries could undoubtedly be worked out without a military clash, emphasizing that the first step in this direction would be the removal of suspicion and fear regarding Japan's intentions. I here remarked that, of course, with Matsuoka astride the Axis on his way to Berlin and talking loudly as he goes, and Japanese naval and air forces in the vicinity of Indochina, Thailand and Saigon, with no explanation but with serious inferences, the Ambassador must realize how acute feeling and opinion in this country have become.

.....

Foreign Relations II, p. 396  
at pp. 397-398



國務長官<sup>ニ</sup>依<sup>リ</sup>變書

Doc 220c(22)

拔萃

(アヒトニ)一九四一年三月十四日

大統領、再び三國協定ニ言及シ獨伊ガ「スエズ」運河ニ達セシトシ一方日本ガ「シカゴ」蘭領印度及印度洋ニ接近セトスル努力ガ拂ヒテキルト米國民カ考ヘタ爲 其ハ米國民ヲ轉倒セシメタト語ツタ 日本大使、日本ハ南進セザルベシト彼、信念ヲ披瀝シ 彼ガ從來私ト、會談ニ於テナシタリヨリ一層力強ク語ツタ 大統領、最後ニ大使、亦タ如ク 吾ガ兩國間ニ介在スル事件、武力衝突ナクニテ解決ニ得ルニトハ疑ヒナシデアラウト述ベク 又此方向ニ向ツテ、第一歩ハ日本、意圖ニ関スル疑念ト驚怖、除去デアルトカラ龍々語ツタ

コノ時私ハ 松岡ガ樞軸、勢ニ駕<sup>シ</sup>テ氣焰ヲ上ケ作ラベルリニハ、途上ニアリ 又日本海空軍ガ印度支那、泰西貢、近辺ニ在リシカモソレニ對シ何等、説明モ加ヘズ事態、重大ナルヲ暗示シタルコトヨリ、吾國、國民、感情及ビ意見ガ如何ニ鋭敏トナツテ來テキルカラ 大使ハ勿論悟ラレテエタト述ベク

4X 1057

外交關係

II p 396 at PP.

397-398

☆

Exh. No. 1088  
Doc. No. 16320(48)

"Extract from Entry From Marquis KIDO's Diary, 3 Apr 41."

April 3rd, 1941 - (Extract)

In the anteroom of the Imperial Palace Premier KONOYE consulted me about the prospective appointment of Admiral TOYODA as the Minister of Commerce and Industry and Lieut.-General SUZUKI as the President of the Planning Board. I agreed with him. At 4:40 p.m. Premier KONOYE telephoned me saying that since the plan he had intimated to me this morning had been approved by both the War Minister and the Navy Minister, necessary arrangements for the appointments would be made at once.

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

木戸侯爵日記

昭和十六年四月三日分

四月三日（木）

晴 午前九時半賓所ニ至り神武天皇祭ニ参列ス  
[浴室ニテ近衛首相ヨリ豊田海軍次官ヲ商工  
大臣ニ鈴木中將ヲ企鵝院總裁ニ起用ノ案ニツ  
キ相談アリ同意ス]  
一時博通君來邸博則君ノ縁談ニツキ相談ス  
[四時四十分近衛公ヨリ電話ニテ今朝ノ案ニツ  
イテハ陸海兩相ニ大ニ乘氣ナレバ早速取進デ  
旨ノ話アリタリ]  
信男大阪ヨリ上京ニツキ周津、田君ヲ招キ夕  
食ヲ共ニス

47.1058

Doc 16.32 W (48)

☆

Ex. # 1059

PROPOSAL PRESENTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF  
STATE THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF PRIVATE  
AMERICAN AND JAPANESE INDIVIDUALS ON  
APRIL 9, 1941

The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement disposing the resumption of our traditional friendly relations.

Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment among our people should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.

It is our present hope that, by a joint effort, our nations may establish a just Peace in the Pacific; and by the rapid consummation of an entente cordiale, arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening. We, therefore, suggest that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general agreement which would bind, meanwhile, both Governments in honor and in act.

It is our belief that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated at a Conference and appropriately confirmed by our respective Governments.

We presume to anticipate that our Governments could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit:

1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.
2. The attitudes of both governments toward the European War.
3. The relations of both nations toward the China affair.
4. Naval, aerial and mercantile marine relations in the Pacific.
5. Commerce between both nations and their financial cooperation.
6. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.
7. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific.

Accordingly, we have come to the following mutual understanding subject, of course, to modifications by the United States Government and subject to the official and final decision of the Government of Japan.

I. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.

The Governments of the United States and of Japan might jointly acknowledge each other as equally sovereign states and contiguous Pacific powers.

Both Governments assert the unanimity of their national policies as directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of respectful confidence and cooperation among our peoples.

Both Governments might declare that it is their traditional, and present, concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others.

Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.

II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European War.

The Government of Japan maintains that the purpose of its Axis Alliance was, and is, defensive and designed to prevent the extension of military grouping among nations not directly affected by the European War.

The Government of Japan, with no intention of evading its existing treaty obligations, desires to declare that its military obligation under the Axis Alliance comes into force only when one of the parties of the Alliance is aggressively attacked by a power not at present involved in the European War.

The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue to be, determined by no aggressive alliance aimed to assist any one nation against another. The United States maintains that it is pledged to the hate of war, and accordingly, its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue to be, determined solely and exclusively by considerations of the protective defense of its own national welfare and security.

III. China affairs.

The President of the United States, if the following terms are approved by His Excellency and guaranteed by the Government of Japan, might request the Chiang-Kai-Chek regime to negotiate peace with Japan.

- a. Independence of China
- b. Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory, in accordance with an agreement to be reached between Japan and China
- c. No acquisition of Chinese territory
- d. No imposition of indemnities
- e. Resumption of the "Open Door"; the interpretation and application of which shall be agreed upon at some future, convenient time between the United States and Japan.
- f. Coalescence of the Governments of Chiang-Kai-Chek and of Wang-Ching-Wei
- g. No large-scale or concentrated immigration of Japanese into Chinese territory
- h. Recognition of Manchukuo.

With the acceptance by the Chiang-Kai-Chek regime of the aforementioned Presidential request, the Japanese Government shall commence direct peace negotiations with the newly coalesced Chinese Government, or constituent elements thereof.

The Government of Japan shall submit to the Chinese concrete terms of peace, within the limits of aforesaid general terms and along the line of neighborly friendship, joint defense against communistic activities and economic cooperation.

Should the Chiang-Kai-Chek regime reject the request of President Roosevelt, the United States Government shall discontinue assistance to the Chinese.

IV. Naval, aerial and mercantile marine relations in the Pacific.

a. As both the Americans and the Japanese are desirous of maintaining the peace in the Pacific, they shall not resort to such disposition of their naval forces and aerial forces as to menace each other. Detailed, concrete agreement thereof shall be left for determination at the proposed joint Conferences.

b. At the conclusion of the projected Conference, each nation might despatch a courtesy naval squadron to visit the country of the other and signalize the new era of Peace in the Pacific.

c. With the first ray of hope for the settlement of Chinese affairs, the Japanese Government will agree, if desired, to use their good offices to release for contract by Americans certain percentage of their total tonnage of merchant vessels, chiefly for the Pacific service, so soon as they can be released from their present commitments. The amount of such tonnage shall be determined at the Conference.

V. Commerce between both nations and their financial cooperation.

When official approbation to the present understanding has been given by both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other to mutually supply such commodities as are respectively available or required by either of them. Both Governments further consent to take necessary steps to the resumption of normal trade relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Navigation and Commerce between the United States and Japan. If a new commercial treaty is desired by both governments, it could be elaborated at the proposed conference and concluded in accordance with usual procedure.

For the advancement of economic cooperation between both nations, it is suggested that the United States extend to Japan a gold credit in amounts sufficient to foster trade and industrial development directed to the betterment of Far Eastern economic conditions and to the sustained economic cooperation of the Governments of the United States and of Japan.

VI. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.

On the pledged basis of guarantee that Japanese activities in the Southwestern Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means, without resorting to arms, American cooperation and support shall be given in the production and procurement of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which Japan needs.

VII. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific.

a. The Governments of the United States and of Japan will not acquiesce in the future transfer of territories or the relegation of existing States within the Far East and in the Southwestern Pacific area to any European Power.

b. The Governments of the United States and of Japan jointly guarantee the independence of the Philippine Islands and will consider means to come to their assistance in the event of unprovoked aggression by any third Power.

c. The Government of Japan requests the friendly and diplomatic assistance of the Government of the United States for the removal of Hongkong and Singapore as doorways to further political encroachment by the British in the Far East.

d. Japanese Immigration to the United States and to the Southwestern Pacific area shall receive amicable consideration--on a basis of equality with other nationals and freedom from discrimination.

Conference.

a. It is suggested that a Conference between Delegates of the United States and of Japan be held at Honolulu and that this conference be opened for the United States by President Roosevelt and for Japan by Prince Konoye. The delegates could number less than five each, exclusive of experts, clerks, etc.

b. There shall be no foreign observers at the Conference.

c. This Conference could be held as soon as possible (May 1941) after the present understanding has been reached.

d. The agenda of the Conference would not include a reconsideration of the present understanding but would direct its efforts to the specification of the prearranged agenda and drafting of instruments to effectuate the understanding. The precise agenda could be determined upon by mutual agreement between both governments.

Addendum.

The present understanding shall be kept as a confidential memorandum between the Governments of the United States and of Japan.

The scope, character and timing of the announcement of this understanding will be agreed upon by both Governments.





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ト期待スルモノデアル即チ

一 米國及ビ日本、實際關係及ビ國家、性格關スル概念

二 歐洲、戰爭ニ對スル兩國政府、態度

三 日華事變ニ對スル兩國ノ關係

四 太平洋ニ於ケル海軍、航空及ビ商船關係

五 兩國官、通商及ビ金融的協力

六 西南太平洋ニ於ケル兩國、經濟活動

七 太平洋ニ於ケル政治的安定ニ影響スル兩國、政策

故ニ我々、如キ相互的了解ヲ遂ケルニ勿論是、米國政府ニ依リ修正セリシ。又日本政府、正式且嚴然の決定ヲ受ケルモノトス。

一 米國及ビ日本、實際關係並ニ國家、性格ニ關スル概念

米國政府及ビ日本政府、各々平等ナル主權ヲ享

アリ 太平洋ニ於ケル隣接ニテアルニトシテ共同ニ認識

兩國政府、兩國國家が永久平和、確立並ニ兩國民

間、尊敬の信頼及ビ協力、新時代、創設ニ指向

セリテ是ノトニ就キ完全ナル意見、一致ヲ確言スル。

兩國政府、國家及ビ民族が存続、各負、如ク一家

ヲ構成ス。平和的手段ニ依リ規律セリ且他人ノ善ニ

モ之ヲ言スベカラザルカ如ク彼等自身、為ニ道德

的物質的福祉、追求ニ向ケリテ居ル。

利害、相互關係ヲ以テ各自が平等ニ權利ヲ享有

責任ヲ認メルト云フ事ハ兩國政府、傳統的ニ之ヲ現在

ニ於テモ變リテキ概念アリ又確信アリトシテ宣言スル。

No. 2.

兩國政府、其政治、性格、社會、秩序、並之民生、  
治、基礎タル道義ニ準スル夫々、傳統的概念亦  
依然トシテ保存セリ是等、道義及ビ概念ト相容  
シガ外來思想又ハ「イデオロギ」ニ依リ些カモ變更  
セシガハニトニ就キ確乎タル決意ヲ有スル。

二.

歐洲戰爭ニ對スル兩國政府、態度

日本政府、樞軸同盟、目的が防衛的ナリニテ  
且現在ニ於テモ同様ナルニト。又歐洲戰爭、直接影  
響ヲ受テ居ラザルニシテ、軍事的集團化、拡大ヲ  
防止セニカガナルコトヲ主張スル。

日本政府、現存スル條約上、義務ヲ回避スル意圖  
ナク、樞軸同盟ニ依リ日本政府、軍事的義務ニ加盟  
ス、或ハ歐洲戰爭ニ現在關係ナクモニ依リ攻  
勢的ニ攻撃セラルル場合ニ、ミ効力ヲ充スルモ、ナ  
コトヲ宣言セテ欲スル。

米政府、米政府、歐洲戰爭ニ對シ態度、他、  
ニ對シ或ハ一ニテ援助スル目的ヲ有スル攻勢的  
同盟ニ依リ現在ニ於テモ又將來ニ於テモ決シテ決定  
セシガハニトヲ主張スル。米政府、米政府、戰爭、憎惡  
ヲ誓約ニテ居ルコトヲ主張スル。從ツテ歐洲戰爭上  
對シ米政府、態度、專ラ自身、福祉及ビ安全、保  
護的防衛ヲ目的トスル考慮ニ依リ、ミ現在ニ於  
テモ又將來ニ於テモ決セラルルモノナリ。

三 日華事變

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若之左記ノ條件ヲ閣下ニ依リ承認セラシ且日本政  
府ニ依リ保證セラシク場合ニ米皇大統領ハ蔣介石政  
權ニ對シ日本トノ平和ヲ交渉スベキコトヲ要請スシ。

イ、中玉ノ獨立

ロ、日本、中玉官ニ締結セラレベキ協定ニ從ヒ日本軍隊、  
中玉領土ヨリ撤退

ハ、中玉ノ領土ヲ獲得セザルコト

ニ、賠償ヲ課セザルコト。

ホ、門戶開放ノ再開、是、解釈及ビ適用ニ就キハ將來  
適當ナル時機ニ於テ日米官ニ協定スベシ

ヘ、蔣介石政權及ビ王精衛政權ノ合作

ト、中玉領土ニ對シ日本移民ガ大規模ニ且集中的ニ移  
住セザルコト

六、滿洲國ノ承認

大統領ノ左記要請ヲ蔣介石政權ガ承諾スル場合、日  
本政府新ニ合體ヲ中國政府スル、構成機關ト直接交渉ヲ開始スシ。

日本政府ハ中玉ニ對シ左記ノ全般ノ條件ノ範圍  
内並ニ善隣友好、共產主義、活動ニ對シ防衛  
及ビ經濟的協力、線ニ從ヒ具體的條件ヲ提出スシ。

若シモ蔣介石政權ガ「レズベト」大統領、要請ヲ  
拒否セル場合ニハ米皇政府ハ中玉ニ對シ援助ヲ停止  
スベシ

No 4

四、太平洋ニ於ケル海軍航空、並ニ商船運係

イ、米玉人及ビ日本人ハ双方共太平洋ニ於ケル平和維

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持ヲ欲スルが故ニ彼等ハ互ニ相手ヨリ脅威スルが也  
キ海軍及ヒ空軍ノ配備ヲ為サザルニ是ニ採ル詳  
細ナル具体的協定ノ提議セラルル共同會議ニ於  
テ決定セラレルベシ。

四. 計畫セラレタ會議、終了後兩玉ハ太平洋ニ航シ平和  
ノ新時代ヲ特記スル者メ儀禮的艦隊ヲ末々相手  
玉ニ派遣スベシ。

ハ支那ノ事變解決、亦一曙光が見エタ時日本政府ハ  
若シ米玉が欲スルナラバ日本、所有スル船舶ノ噸數  
ノ何割カラ主トシテ太平洋ニ運航スル者米玉人  
ガ契約去来ル様解放セシメルコトヲ是等、船舶  
ガ現在ノ契約カラ解放去来次第斡旋スルコトヲ約  
ス。右ニ採ル噸數ノ會議ニ於テ決定セラレルベシ。

五. 兩玉間、通商及ヒ金融的協力

本了解ニ對シ兩玉政府、公式承認アリタリタ時ニハ米玉  
及ヒ日本米々が保有シ且兩玉、孰シカガ必要トスル物  
質ヲ相互ニ供給スベキコトヲ確約スル。更ニ兩玉政  
府ハ以テ日米通商及ヒ航術條約ニヨリ確立セ  
ルニ通常ノ貿易關係ヲ再開スルニ必要ナル手段  
ヲ講ズルコトニ同意スル。兩玉政府ハ新通商條約  
ヲ希望スル時ハ是ハ提議セラレタ會議ニ於テ仕上  
ル通常ノ手續ニ依リ締結シ得ル  
兩玉言、經濟的協力ヲ促進スル者ニ米玉ハ日本ニ  
對シ極大ニ於テハ經濟狀態ノ改善及ヒ日米兩玉政府

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不斷，經濟的協力之向方，以貿易及工業之發展，促進之。此為必要之金額，遠不及此，其理由如下，與之提出建議。

六、西南太平洋之經濟活動，經濟活動西南太平洋之於此，日本，活動之平和的步驟，依之進行せらるべし，誓約保證，下之米本，日本，必要トスル天然資源（例ハ石油、ゴム、錫、ニッケル等），生産及獲得ニ協力ヲ受スベシ。

七、太平洋ニ於ケル政治的安定ニ影響アル西島政策

一、米國政府及日本政府，將來極東及西南太平洋ニ於ケル領土，讓渡又ハ現存王家，歐洲諸國，帰屬ヲ默認セザルベシ。

二、米國政府及日本政府，フィリピン之群島，獨立ヲ共同ニ保證ス。且チ三者之依ル能ハシキル侵略，場合同群島ヲ援助スル手段ヲ講スベシ。

三、日本政府，英領，東亞ニ對シ是以上ノ政治的侵略，為，不口トシテ，香港及ビルマニ加ホルヲ除去スルニ對シ米本政府，好意的且外交的援助ヲ要請ス。

四、米本及西南太平洋地域，日本移民ニ就テ，他國民ト平等ニシテ差別トキ基礎，下ニ友誼的考慮ガ興ヘラレベシ。

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No 7

會議

1. 米國及日本、代表、會議ヲ「本、ル」ニ開催ス。此、會議ハ米玉側ハ「ル」ズベルト「大統領」日本側ハ近衛公ニ依リ開カレルコトヲ提議スル。代表、數、専門、委員及ビ「事務員」ヲ除キ、各五名以下トス。
2. 會議ニ他玉「オブザ「リア」」ノ列席ヲ許サズ
3. 本會議ハ本了解が遂ゲラレシ次第（一九四一年昭和十六年五月）開催ニ得ベシ
4. 會議、議題ハ本了解、再考ヲ含マズ、豫メ打合、ノ議題、明記並ニ了解ヲ有効化スル為、手段、起草ニ効力が向テラレル。明確ナル議題ハ兩玉政府、合意ニ依リ決定ニ得ベシ。

追加

- 本了解ハ米玉政府及日本政府官、秘密書トシテ保存セラルベシ
- 本了解、発表、範圍、性格及ビ時期ハ兩玉政府ヨリ決定セラルベシ

外交關係 五 四九八—五〇二頁

Q. # 1060

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p /

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Excerpt.

(WASHINGTON,) April 14, 1941

The Ambassador of Japan called at my apartment at the Wardman Park Hotel at my request. I stated that as the Ambassador would recall, both the President and I suggested during our conversations with him that he might care in discussions with me to explore the question of improving relations between the United States and Japan; that such a procedure might involve a review of relations during recent years in an attempt to ascertain where and in what respects the courses of the two countries had diverged; and that this would be done with a view to ascertaining whether something practicable might be done toward restoring the relations of our two countries to that harmonious state which existed for so many decades. I said that I referred to this again at this time because of the reports which have been coming to me that certain of the Ambassador's compatriots have been working on formulation of proposals and plans for improving relations between the United States and Japan. I had been told that the Ambassador's compatriots have been in touch with the Ambassador in connection with their proposals and that the Ambassador has participated in and associated himself with these plans. I added that I did, of course, not know whether these reports are entirely accurate and, as mentioned previously to him, we can deal only with the Ambassador in addressing ourselves to consideration of problems outstanding between our two Governments.

I then emphasized the point that I had sent for the Ambassador primarily to clear up the matter of the extent of his knowledge of the latest document handed to my associates in the State Department by those Americans and Japanese who are collaborating as individuals in an effort to make some sort of contribution to better relations between the two countries, and as to whether it was his desire to present that officially as a first step in negotiations between the two Governments. I again cited those phrases previously referred to, which called for preliminary conversation on certain subjects before a stage of negotiations could be reached, and which discouraged the immediate presentation of the document by the Ambassador in an official way. The Ambassador promptly replied that he did know all about this document and that he had collaborated more or less with the individual Japanese and Americans referred to, and that he would be disposed to present it as a basis for negotiations. He proceeded to refer to his great desire to preserve peace between the two countries and therefore to do anything within his power to that end. He emphasized the utter disaster it would be to both countries to go to war, which would last perhaps for many years with the complete exhaustion of all concerned. He spoke strongly expressing the view that his Government did not intend to invade the South Sea area.

. . . . .

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國務長官ノ電書

「三月二十一日一九四三年(昭和十八年)三月廿四日

日英大使ハ余、懇請ニ應ジテ「中ノ上ノ下ノバクホキ」  
 此レ余ノ部ニテ話シタ。余ハ次ノ如ク彼ニ語シタ。  
 即チ大使ガ記憶セラルル如ク大使ト、余ニ「中ノ上ノ下ノバクホキ」  
 及ビ余ハ日米關係改善ノ問題ヲ大使ガ余ト協議  
 ニ於テ探見シテ「如何」ト提議シタ。而シテ斯ル  
 方法ハ兩國ノ進路ガ何処ニ於テ又如何ナルニ異ニシテ  
 今後ニテ多ク難シク爲ル。蓋シ世界ノ間ニ國無難言  
 日英會社ニ於テ、是レ兩國關係ノ進歩ニ於テ  
 存在シタ。雖ニキ然ルモ、引度ニテ力更ニ行ハ  
 ルガアハヤ否ヤヲ確ルル目的ヲ以テ行ハルル  
 ことガ提議シタトテ語シタ。

6X1060

1. 今亦余ガ是ニ言及ルル由ニ大使、同僚ガ日米  
 關係改善ノ提議及ビ此ノ提議ヲ以テ上ノ切力ニ以  
 テレ報告ヲ受ケタリトシ。余ハ大使、同僚ガ彼等ノ  
 提議ニ對シテ大使ト接 触シ保シテ居ル。又大使ハ

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是等、計畫 = 参考之且提携之ヲ南イ。余ハ  
勿論是等、報告が全ク正確ナルヤ否ヤ、知らズ、且  
以テ大使之言ハ如何、両国皆、未決問題ヲ検討  
スルニ當リ、我方ノ大使ノミヲ亦モ又ル外ナク附言  
シタ。

次ニ余ノ大使、来訪ノ事々々、理由ハ兩國關係改  
善ニ何カ貢獻セシトスル努力ニ協力シ、下ル米國人  
及ビ日本人ニテ國務省、余ノ關係ニ支セラシムニ近  
ノ文書ニ関シ大使が如何ナル結果承知ニ至ルカ。  
又大使ハソレヲ日米兩國政府省、支障ノ一歩上  
シテ心算ニ提出セシト欲スルニ至リ、至ヤリカ  
スル爲デアルト強調シタ。余ハ以テ言及シテ諸局  
面ヲ再ビ引用シタ。是等、局面ノ交渉開始ニ至ル

2

近ニ必要ナル或問題ニ関スル予備會談ヲ必要トシ  
且大使が右文書ヲ直ニ心算ニ提出スルコトヲ阻止  
スルモノナル。大使ハ右文書、全般ニ関シテ如何  
下。個々、日本人並ニ米國人ト多少少協力シタコト  
且彼ト是ヲ交渉、基礎トシテ提出シタ事實同シ

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アルト即答ニク。彼ハ西國者。平和ヲ維持シ、ソノ  
目的ノ爲ニハカ、及ブ限リ盡サントスル彼、大ナル希望  
ニ就キ言及シク。彼ハ若シ西國が干戈ヲ交ユルニ  
至ラバ戦軍ハ數年中價キ双方完全ニ消耗シ、大慘  
ヲ生ルルト強調シク。彼ハ日本政府ハ南方地域  
ニ侵スル意ヲ持トシ、意見ヲ強ク披瀝シク。

外交關係 卷 四〇二—四〇三頁

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P. 1.

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Excerpt.

(WASHINGTON, ) April 16, 1941

.....

With reference to the question of gradually developing a settlement in the Orient, I said that I had been told that the document on which the Ambassador and the private group of individual Americans and Japanese were collaborating contained numerous proposals with which my Government could readily agree; on the other hand, however, there were others that would require modification, expansion, or entire elimination, and, in addition, there would naturally be some new and separate suggestions by this Government for consideration. I then remarked that the one paramount preliminary question about which my Government is concerned is a definite assurance in advance that the Japanese Government has the willingness and ability to go forward with a plan along the lines of the document we have referred to and the points brought up in our conversation in relation to the problems of a settlement; to abandon its present doctrine of military conquest by force and the taking of title to all property and territories seized, together with the use of force as an instrument of policy; and to adopt the principles which this Government has been proclaiming and practicing as embodying the foundation on which all relations between nations should properly rest.

I said:

"I will, therefore, hand to you as the basis for my preliminary question, the following four points on a blank piece of paper:

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations.
2. Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.
4. Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

"You can answer the questions or submit them to your Government for its answer through you, as you prefer. You understand that we both agree that we have in no sense reached the stage of negotiations; that we are only exploring in a purely preliminary and unofficial way what action might pave the way for negotiations later.

.....

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EX 1061

國務長官覚書

(アミントン)一九四五年(昭和二十年)四月十六日 板 梓

東洋に解決を交渉的にもたらす問題に關し、  
 私は大使や個々のアメリカ人と日本人との私的関係が  
 會作中の文書が我が政府が輸入に同意出来る  
 提案を多々輸入に居ると聞かされて居る。他面  
 修訂や拡張や全面的削除を要する提案も有り。  
 更に會衆も政府は勿論或る形に別個の提案を  
 考慮の爲持ち居るであろうと語つた。次に私は  
 會衆も政府が関心を抱くもの、非常に重大な平  
 備の問題は日本政府が承認文書及び解決の諸問  
 題に關する各々の會談に於て言及せられ在るに於  
 て討議を押進めり。現在の武力による軍事的  
 征服主義と政策の手段としての武力行使と共に  
 奪取せる凡ての財産と欲立とに對する権利を取得す  
 る事を放棄する事、又國協中の凡ての關係が堅固  
 立脚すべき基礎を具現する事として會衆も政府が

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宣言之実行に必要主義を採用するべきを快く  
爲し且実行に得る能力を有するとの事以下の  
明白保証である。 松村次の如く言ふに。

「松村次故松の準備の問題の基礎として白紙に次の  
四点を言ふ貴君はと交す。

- 一、各國及び總ての國の領土保全と主權の尊重
- 二、他國の國內紛争に對する不干渉主義の支持
- 三、通商上の機會均等を念む均等主義の支持
- 四、平和的手段による現狀變更以外太平洋に於ける現狀の不擾亂

「貴君は貴君の好む所は修む一問題に答へるか  
又は貴君は述べざる解答を得るためは。

日本政府へ提出するに。貴君は吾々が如何なる

意味に於て交渉の段階に到達し得るか云

ふ。又如何なる行為が爾後の交渉

を容易にするかを純然たる準備的非常

の方法を以て探求するのみならず

果し其の二人の意見が一致するならば

了解するに。 外交關係四〇六—四〇七頁

又

Ex. # 1062

DOC NO. 1339-A (9)

Message from the Right Honourable Winston Churchill, Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to His Excellency Mr. Yosuke Matsuoka, His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs, of which a copy was handed unofficially to Mr. Matsuoka by His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow on April 12th, 1941.

(Note. - It had originally been intended that this letter should be delivered to Mr. Matsuoka by Mr. Shigemitsu who had expected to meet the Japanese Foreign Minister during his stay in Europe).

-----

Your Excellency,

I take advantage of the facilities with which we have provided your Ambassador to send you a friendly message of sincerity and goodwill. I venture to suggest a few questions which, it seems to me, deserve the attention of the Imperial Japanese Government and people:

(1) Will the Germans, without command of the sea or command of the British daylight air, be able to invade and conquer Great Britain in the spring, summer or autumn of 1941? Will the Germans try to do so? Would it not be in the interests of Japan to wait until these questions have answered themselves?

(2) Will the German attack on British shipping be strong

enough to prevent American aid from reaching British shores with Great Britain and the United States of America transforming their whole industry to war purposes?

(3) Did Japan's accession to the triple pact make it more likely or less likely that the United States would come into the present war?

(4) If the United States entered the war at the side of Great Britain and Japan ranged herself with the Axis Powers, would not the naval superiority of the two English-speaking nations enable them to deal with Japan while disposing of the Axis Powers in Europe?

(5) Is Italy a strength or a burden to Germany? Is the Italian fleet as good at sea as on paper? Is it as good on paper as it used to be?

(6) Will the British Air Force be stronger than the German Air Force before the end of 1941 and far stronger before the end of 1942?

(7) Will the many countries which are being held down by the German army and Gestapo learn to like the Germans more or will they like them less as the years pass by?



(8) Is it true that the production of steel in the United States of America during 1941 will be 75 million tons and in Great Britain about 12-1/2 million tons, making a total of nearly 90 million tons? If Germany should happen to be defeated as she was last time would not the 7 million tons of steel production of Japan be inadequate for a single-handed war?

From the answers to these questions may spring the avoidance by Japan of a serious catastrophe and a marked improvement in the relations between Japan and Great Britain, the great sea Power of the West.

I remain, with great truth and respect,

Your Excellency's obedient Servant,

(Sd) WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

Doc. No. 1339A (9)

page 1

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. 1339A (9)

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kazuo, hereby certify  
that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the  
following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign  
Office

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto  
attached consisting of 3 pages, dated 12 April, 1941, and  
described as follows: \_\_\_\_\_

Letter from Churchill to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA handed to  
MATSUOKA at Moscow on 12 April 1941.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an  
official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of  
the official archives and files of the following named ministry or  
department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or  
any other official designation of the regular location of the  
document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this

21st day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

Witness: Nagaharu Ooo /s/

SEAL  
Chief, Archives Sect  
Official Capacity

C E R T I F I C A T E

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Marsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by an authorized signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

25 day of September, 1946

Richard H. Marsh /s/  
NAME

Witness: T/4 T. Toguchi /s/

Investigation Division I.P.S.  
Official Capacity

1062 / 339A (9) - 1 文

外務大臣代理「ウインストン。チャーチル」閣下  
ヨリ日本帝國外務大臣松岡洋右閣下へノ書翰、本  
書翰ノ寫シハ一九四一年四月十二日モスコイニ於  
テ貴大使ヲ通シ非公式ニ松岡氏ニ渡サレタ。  
(註、本書翰ハ最初重光氏が日本外務大臣ノ歐洲  
滞在申渡ト言見ノ決定デアツタノテ重光氏ヲ通シ  
テ松岡氏ニ渡サレル旨デアツタ。)

閣下、  
私ハ貴國大使ノ爲取計ラヒシ便宜ヲ利用シ閣下ニ  
誠意ト好意アル友好的手紙ヲ差上ゲマス。  
私ハ日本帝國政府及ビ國民ノ熱心ヲ呼ブニ値ヒス  
ルト思ハレルニ、三ノ問題ヲ提議致シ度イト存シ  
マス。

(一) 初選ハ一九四一年(昭和十六年)ノ春、夏、或  
ハ秋ニ於テ海峽英ハ英領ノ自衛ノ信望極ナク  
シテ英國ヲ攻撃シテ征服シ得ルテセウカ、福建  
ハ是ヲ試ミルテセウカ。是等ノ間にガ製鋼スル  
迄待ツノガ日本ニトリ有利テハナイテセウカ。

(二) 英國及ビ米國ガ其ノ益工業力ヲ競争目的ニ競取  
シタトシテモ米國ノ援助ガ英國標準ヲ超過スル  
キ程英國ノ海上交通ニ對スル(海峽)支配力  
ヲ増ルテセウカ

(三) 三國同盟ヲ日本ハ大分現在對シ米

RETURN TO ROOM 664

國ノ参取ヲ容易ニシタデセウカ、或ハ困難ニシタデセウカ。

(四) 若シ米國ガ英國ニ味方シテ参取シ、日本ガ極東ニ参加スルト假定シテ、英米兩國ノ優勢ナル海軍ハ歐洲ニ於テ極東國ヲ處分スルト同時ニ日本ヲ處分スルコトヲ可能ナラシメナイデセウカ。

(五) 伊太利ハ獨逸ニトツテ力トナルモノデセウカ、直荷デセウカ、伊太利ノ艦隊ハ机上陸程海上ニ於テモ實際ニ強イデセウカ、伊太利艦隊ハ机上ニトシテモ曾ツテノ様ニ強力デセウカ。

(六) 一九四一年（昭和十六年）末迄ニ英國ノ空軍ガ獨逸ノ空軍ヨリ強クナルデセウカ、一九四二年（昭和十七年）末迄ニ英國空軍ガ獨逸ノ空軍ヨリ強クナルデセウカ。

(七) 獨逸軍及獨逸「ゲスタポ」ニ依リ抑ヘツケラレテ居ル國々ガ年ノ進退ト共ニ獨逸ニ益々好意ヲ持ツ様ニナルデセウカ、或ハ持タヌ様ニナルデセウカ。

(八) 一九四一年（昭和十六年）ニハ米國ノ鋼鐵ノ生産高ハ七千五百萬噸ニナリ、英國ニ於テハ約千二百五十萬噸ニナリ、合計シテ殆ンド九千萬噸ニナルト云フノハ眞實デセウカ。萬一獨逸ガ以前ノ如ク敗北スレバ日本ノ鋼鐵生産高ノ七百萬

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原ハ日本軍艦ノ長等ノ爲ニハ不充分ナイテセ  
ウカ。

長等ノ同じニ對スル解答ヲ考フルナラバ日本ハ  
恐ルベキ災難ヲ避ケテ西方ノ偉大ナル海軍國  
ト益々發揚ノ兵ヲ應ズルテセウ。

心 長

ウインストン。S。チヤ―テル

(署名)

史 侍 下 圖

1339A(9)---4 c.c.f.

證 明 書

「ワシントン」文書局 第 一三三九A (九) 號  
國 際 検 察 部

典 據 及 ビ 公 正 ニ 關 ス ル 證 明

余、林 總 長ハ余ガ下 記ノ資 格ニ於テ、即チ外 務省文 書 課長トシテ、日 本政府ト公 的關係ニ在ルモノナ ルコト、並ニ該 官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添 附セラレタ ル、三頁ヨリ成ル、千 九百四十一年ノ昭和 十六年ノ四月十二日 附、下 記題名、即チ英 外相「チャーチ ル」氏ヨリ松 岡外相宛發給ノ文書ノ 保管ニ任ジ居 ルコトヲ茲ニ證 明ス。

余ハ更ニ添 附ノ記 録及ビ文書ガ日 本政府ノ公文書 ナルコト、並ニ右ガ下 記名稱ノ省又ハ部 局ノ公式 書類及ビ綴ノ一 部ナルコトヲ證 明ス。(若シテラ ハ綴番 號又ハ引 用、其他公式 書類又ハ綴ニ於ケル 該文書ノ成 規所在ノ公式 名稱ヲモ稱 記スベシ)

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ九月二十一日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名 林 總 長  
右ノ者ノ公 的資格 外 務省文書課長  
證 人 尾 戶 長 春

1339A (9) - 5 cert.

公式入手ニ付スル證明

余、RICHARD H. LARSH、余ガ以合團長高指揮官司令部ニ在在アルモノナルコト、茲ニ上記姓名ノ文書ハ余ガ公認上、日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 九月二十五日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏 名

RICHARD H. LARSH

右ノ者ノ公認資格

松森民部省

証 人

F/4 T. TOGUCHI



Q. # 1063

DOC. NO. 1339-A-(10)

April 22, 1941

Your Excellency,

I have just come back from my trip and hasten to acknowledge the receipt of paper, handed to me at Moscow on the evening of the 12th instant by Sir Stafford Cripps with remark that it was a copy in substance of a letter addressed to me dated London, April 2nd 1941, and forwarded to Tokyo.

I wish to express my appreciation for the facilities with which your Government made efforts to provide our Ambassador when he wanted to meet me on the continent. I was keenly disappointed when I learned that he could not come.

Your Excellency may rest assured that the foreign policy of Japan is determined upon and after an unbiased examination of all the facts and a very careful weighing of all the elements of the situation she confronts, always holding steadfastly in view the great racial aim and ambition of finally bringing about on the earth the conditions envisaged in what she calls *Hakkōichiu*, the Japanese conception of a universal peace under which there would be no conquest, no oppression, no exploitation of any and all peoples. And, once determined, I need hardly tell Your Excellency, it will be carried out with resolution but with

utmost circumspection, taking in every detail of changing  
circumstances.

I am, believe me,

Your Excellency's obedient servant,

Yosuke Matsuoka.

His Excellency

The Right Honorable Winstor Churchill

Prime Minister of Great Britain.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I.P.S. No. 1339A(10)

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 2 pages, dated 12 April, 1941, and described as follows: Telegram from MATSUOKA to CHURCHILL dated 12 April 1941. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):  
Foreign Ministry -----

Signed at Tokyo on this  
2 day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official  
SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Chief, Archives Sect  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
25 day of September, 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME

Witness: /s/ T/4 T. Tguchi

Investigation Division IPS  
Official Capacity

47x 1063

1339A(10)-1

★

電話第二三五五三號

昭和十六年四月廿二日起草

昭和十六年四月二十二日午後八時二十分

在 業 松 岡 大 臣 後

重 光 大 使 宛

松岡大臣ノ英首相へ手交ノ英文書ノ件

(略) 第一三九號

閣下

唯今麗察ヨリ歸任、早速本月十二日夕刻「モスコ  
 コ」ニ於テ「スタツアポード・クリツプス」編  
 ヲリ發給雜カニ手交サレタル旨御知ラセ京上候  
 同文書ハ趣旨ニ於テ一九四一年四月二日附信致ヨ  
 リノ小官宛發給ニシテ東京ニ送達セラレタルモノ  
 ノ復寫ナル旨承ハリ候  
 日本大使ノ歐洲天位ニテ小官ニ面談セント欲セシ  
 原貴政府ノ吾ガ大使ニ便宜ヲ與ヘント極力努メラ  
 レシ御好意ニ對シ厚ク感謝京上候 大使ノ來訪能  
 ハザル事ヲ知リタル時漸ク美望誠候  
 日本ノ外交政策ハ總ニス伴大ナル民族的目的及所  
 謂八紘一字ニ具現セル状態ヲ地球上ニ終局的ニ具  
 體化スルコトヲ總然企圖シ、凡ユル事案ノ檢討及

1339 A(10) - 2 ★

日本ノ直画セル事ノ凡ユル長業ヲ益メテ周到ニ  
考慮スル事ニ依リ又然ル後ニ決定サレルモノナル  
故御安心後下度、尙右八法一字ハ如何ナル民族ヲ  
モ征服セザル、侵略セザル、利用セザル日本ノ字  
宙上ノ平和理念ナリ  
尙一度決定サレタル以上決然ト、シカモ變革シツ  
ツアル事態ニ詳細ニ調査シ極度ノ留意ヲ以テ、ソ  
ノ政策ハ遂行サレルコトヲ敢テ申上グルニ及バザ  
ルコトト愚考職候

敬 具

松 岡 洋 右

大英帝國首相

ウインストン・チャーチル 閣下

1339A(10)-3 (cont)

ワシントン文書局 第  
西 條 法 務 部 第 三 三 九 A (10) 號

真実及び公正ニ由スル證明

余、林 總 務 長ハ余ガ下記ノ資料ニ於テ、即チ外務省文  
書課長トシテ、日本政府ト公同關係ニ在ルモノナ  
ルコト、並ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレタ  
ル、二頁ヨリ成ル、千九百四十二年ノ昭和十六年  
ノ四月廿二日附、下記題名、即チ松岡大臣、一  
テヤ―ナル―英首相ヘ手次ノ英文書ノ件ノ文書ノ  
保管ニ任ジ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書  
ナルコト、並ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式  
書類及ビ該ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シテハ  
該書類又ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ該ニ於ケル該文書ノ處所  
在ノ公式名稱ヲモ得記スベシ)

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ九月廿一日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏者名稱 林 總 務 長

右ノ者ノ公同資料 外務省文書課長

証 人 尾 戶 長 春

1339 (10) - 4 (cert)

公式入手ニシテスル証

余、RICHARD H. LARSH、余が聯合國最高裁判官兼司  
事部ニシテモナルコト、茲ニ上記証書ノ文  
書ハ余ノ公認上、日本裁判ノ上記署名官更ヨリ入  
手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ証明ス。

千九百四十六年ノ四月二十一年ノ九月二十二日

取次ニ於テ署名

氏名 RICHARD H. LARSH

在任者ノ公認官署 最高裁判官兼司事部

証人 W. FOGUCHI

Doc. 219<sup>D</sup> (73)

Br. Ex. 105

1064

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE  
JAPANESE ACTING MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
(PRINCE KONOYE)

Excerpt.

No. 1779

TOKYO, April 14, 1941

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to my note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, No. 173<sup>D</sup> of February 4, 1941, with reference to the aerial bombardment of Kunming, China, by Japanese aircraft on January 29, 1941, at which time the American Consulate at that place was seriously endangered, and to inform Your Excellency that American lives and property were again endangered at Kunming on April 8 by a wanton and indiscriminate bombing attack by Japanese airplanes.

On this occasion, according to the American Consul at Kunming, the China Inland Mission, where seven American citizens including three children were residing, was badly damaged by explosions and barely escaped destruction by fire. At the same time, the house occupied by the American-citizen clerk of the Consulate, adjacent to the Mission, suffered concussion and damage in the form of broken glass, fallen plaster and tiles, and demolished electric light fixtures.

. . . . .

Foreign Relations I, pp. 710-711



Doc 219P(93)

駐日米大使(ケル) / GKEW / ヨリ 日本 休雅 外務大臣 代理 (近衛公)

一九四一年四月十日 東京

閣下: 一七七九号

一九四一年一月九日、日本空軍ヨリ支那、昆明、  
爆轟時、現地米國領事館が非常ニ危険ニサ  
ル事ニ関スル私、外務大臣ニ對スル通知書  
(九四一年二月四日、一七三六号)ヲ参照、且又米人ノ生命  
財産、四月八日、昆明ニ於テ日本軍飛行機ニ依ル  
乱暴無差別、爆轟ニ依リ、再ニ危険ニ晒サレ  
事ヲ閣下ニ申上テ度

昆明米國領事、言ニ依リ、此ノ時ニ於テ三人、  
子供ヲ含メ、米國市民ガ支那、真地ニシテ、  
ニ居住シ居リ、爆轟ヤ火災ニ依リ、破壊ヲ并シテ  
脱ス。同時ニ同シク、ヨリニ近接セル領事館  
米市民書記、家、震動ヲ蒙リ、ガラス、壊サレ  
漆喰、タイル、落テ、電燈器具、破壊サレタ

Doc. 219<sup>D</sup> (73)

Br. Ex. 105

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE  
JAPANESE ACTING MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
(PRINCE KONOYE)

Excerpt.

No. 1779

TOKYO, April 14, 1941

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to my note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, No. 173<sup>D</sup> of February 4, 1941, with reference to the aerial bombardment of Kunming, China, by Japanese aircraft on January 20, 1941, at which time the American Consulate at that place was seriously endangered, and to inform Your Excellency that American lives and property were again endangered at Kunming on April 8 by a wanton and indiscriminate bombing attack by Japanese airplanes.

On this occasion, according to the American Consul at Kunming, the China Inland Mission, where seven American citizens including three children were residing, was badly damaged by explosions and barely escaped destruction by fire. At the same time, the house occupied by the American-citizen clerk of the Consulate, adjacent to the Mission, suffered concussion and damage in the form of broken glass, fallen plaster and tiles, and demolished electric light fixtures.

.....

Foreign Relations I, pp. 710-711

Ex. No. 1065  
Doc. No. 1632V(49)

Page 1

"Extract from Entry From Marquis KIDO's Diary, 18 Apr. 41."

April 18th, 1941 - (Extract.)

From 1:20 p.m. to 1:45 p.m. I was received in audience by the Emperor and reported Japan's relations with the U.S. and also German-Soviet relations. Ambassador KURUSU came to report to the Throne. I was allowed to hear his report. I talked with Premier KONOYE concerning Ambassador NOMURA's request for instructions. It was our conclusion to endeavor to realize this. That we must make careful study in order to keep good faith with Germany and Italy, and at the same time not interfere with the establishment of a new order in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, which is our fixed national policy.

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Document No. 1672 W (50)  
April 28th, 1941 - (Full)

"Entry from Marquis AICHI's Diary,  
28 Apr 41"

Having caught a cold I took a rest. At 11.30 a. m. Chief Secretary Matsudaira came to say that his opinion had been asked by the Emperor what official His Majesty should turn to for advice on diplomatic questions when the Premier, Foreign Minister and Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal were ill simultaneously as is the case today, and he also asked about the progress of deliberations on our policy towards the U. S. A.

I expressed my opinions about these questions and then asked MATSUDAIRA to submit them to the Throne. In the afternoon the Chief Secretary telephoned me to say that the Emperor was well pleased with my answer, and also conveyed to me a gracious Imperial message which advised me always to take good care of my health.

水戸侯爵日記

昭和十六年二月廿八日

四月二十八日 (月)

曇

風邪ノ為メ静養ス

十一時半松平官長來訪音聲寺次長ヲ以テ御

下向ノ由ニテ在ノ二箇ニツキ意見ヲ徴セラ

ル、

一 今同ノ如ク首相モ外相モ内大臣モ病氣引

籠ノ場合外交問題等ニ對シ御下向ノ方法

二 米穀政策其後ノ進退

右ニ對シ余ノ意見ヲ述べ且ツ米穀政策ノ進

退ヲ述べ政策ヲ依頼ス

午後官長ヨリ電話ニテ答答ニツイテハ御

満足ニ思召サレタル 官長尙充分養生セヨ

トノ御言葉アリシ旨通報シ來レリ

ex 1066

Dec 1632 W (5c)

EXTRACT FROM "JAPAN TIMES & ADVERTISER"

January 23, 1941.

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CABINET TAKES STEP TO 100,000,000 GOAL  
IN POPULATION DRIVE

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EAST ASIA LEADERSHIP REQUIRES EXPANDING  
NUMBERS, IMPROVED QUALITIES, OFFICIALS  
SAY

-----

DUAL POLICY OUTLINED

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GOVERNMENT WILL ATTEMPT TO RAISE BIRTH RATE, CUT  
DEATH TOLL

-----

VARIOUS AIDS PROPOSED

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Fundamental principles of Japan's population policy were decided on at the special Cabinet meeting in the official residence of the Premier Wednesday, Domei reports.

Mr. Naoki Hoshino, president of the Cabinet Planning Board, made detailed explanations on the policy while the Welfare, Education, and War Ministers expressed their opinions.

With minor changes, in wording, however, the draft of a bill relating to the population policy was unanimously approved by the members of the Cabinet. In this connection a statement was issued by the Board of information immediately after the meeting.

According to this statement, the Government has been brought to establish a new population policy to increase the population of this country quickly and incessantly, to enhance the quality of the Japanese, and to correct the distribution of the Japanese race so as to secure the leadership of Japan over East Asia.

GOAL at 100,000,000

To this end, the goal for the total population of Japan proper in 1935 has been set at 100,000,000. This is to enable Japan to expand its population without stop, to surpass other countries in the rate of population increase as well as in the quality of race, to secure adequate man power for military and economic purposes, and to keep the supremacy of Japan over other races in East Asia.

The Government will make payments to newlyweds, cut the marriageable age by three years. The goal is five children per couple.

Efforts will be made to heighten the birth rate, and lower the death rate, and for the propagation of the view of the world based on family and race instead of the individual.

For heightening the birth rate in this country, marriages will be promoted by special bureaus designated by the Government, expenditures on weddings will be restricted, employment of women over 20 will be restricted as much as possible, and priority in materials will be given to prolific families.

#### Birth Control Banned

At the same time, various systems will be instituted for the protection of mothers and infants, and birth control through the practice of abortion and use of medicines will be prohibited strictly.

In order to lower the death rate, the Government will make special efforts for the prevention of tuberculosis as well as the protection of infants from death. According to a Government plan, the death rate in Japan will be reduced by 35 per cent in the next 20 years.

As a means of elevating the quality of the nation, the Government will try to redistribute population with stress laid on the reduction of the population of large cities such as Tokyo and Osaka.

#### Farmers Held Static

At the same time, it will keep the farming population in this country at a certain level as the farming villages are considered to be the best source of soldiers and laborers.

It will expand sports facilities for the rearing of stout and healthy youths, and institute a system through which young men can receive special spiritual and physical training for a certain period of time.

In this connection, Dr. Nobumi Ito, president of the Board of Information, told Domei that since the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere is the greatest mission ever delegated to the Japanese, they must hold the responsibility as the leaders of East Asia.

"To become the leader of the Orient," he said, "the Japanese must not only expand greatly in number but elevate themselves in quality.

"To achieve this end, individualistic ideas, and the practice of birth control in various forms, must be driven out of the minds of the public; the view of the world based on the family and race must be filtered into them, and early marriages and child-bearing in many numbers should be encouraged."

#



C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I.P.S. No. 2529A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Katuiti Ikawa hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Cabinet and that as such official I have custody of the records of the Cabinet Meeting and the decisions referred to in the attached newspaper article described as follows: Extract from the Japan Times & Advertiser, Jan 23, 1941 entitled Cabinet takes step to 100,000,000 goal in population drive. I further certify that the attached newspaper article correctly represents in substance the decisions of the Cabinet Meeting of the date referred to.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
10 day of Oct, 1946

/s/ K. Ikawa  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Tomoo Satow

Secretary of Cabinet  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, John Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
16 day of Oct., 1946

/s/ J. A. Curtis 2d Lt.  
NAME

Witness: /s/ Sgt T. Toguchi

Investigator  
Official Capacity

6X1067

Doc 2529A

一九四二年／昭和十六年／二月二十三日附「シヤペンタイムス・ア  
ンドアドヴァタイサー」ヨリノ抜萃

一億人ヲ目標トスル人口増加運動ニ内閣對策ヲ講  
ズ

東亞指導ニハ人口ノ以的増殖ト資質ノ向上トガ必  
要ト當局者談

二元的政策ノ要綱

政府ハ出生率増加、死亡率低下ヲ企圖ス

是々ノ助成策ヲ定サル

同盟ノ報ズル所ニ依レバ日本ノ基本的人口政策ハ水  
戸日首相官邸ニ於ケル臨時閣議ニ附議決定サレタ。  
星野直樹内閣企畫院總裁ハ右政策ニ付詳細説明ヲナ  
シ、厚生、文部、陸軍ノ各大臣ハ各自ノ意見ヲ述べ  
タ。結局人口政策ニ關スル長綱案ハ全文ニ僅カノ變  
更ヲ加ヘラレタダケテ閣員ニ依リ當場一致承認サレ  
タ右ニ關シ、閣議直後情報局ハ星野閣員ヲ發表シタ此  
ノ聲明書ニ依レバ政府ハ東亞ニ於ケル日本ノ指導力

Doc. 2529A

ヲ確保センガ爲メニ吾國人口ヲ急速且間斷ナク増殖  
サセ日本人ノ資費ヲ同上セシメ且又其ノ分布ヲ適正  
ナラシムル爲メニ新ナル人口政策ヲ確立スルニ至ツ  
タノデアアル。

目 標 一 億

右ノ趣旨ニ基キ一九三五年ノ昭和十年ノ内地全人  
口目標ハ一億トス之ハ日本人口ヲ高クナク増加サセ  
増殖率及資費ニ於テ他國ヲ凌駕シ單專的竝ニ經濟的  
目的ニ應ズル人カヲ確保シ且又東亞諸民族ニ對スル  
優越性ヲ確保センガ爲メデアアル。

政府ハ新婦者ニハ婚資ヲ給スルコトトシ婚姻年齡ヲ  
三年早ム。一夫婦ニ子供五人ヲ目標トス。  
出生率ノ増加、死亡率ノ低下及ビ個人ニ代フルニ家  
ト民族トヲ差壓トスル世界觀ノ徹底等ニ努力ス。  
吾國ニ於ケル出生率ヲ増加セシムル爲政府ハ特別ノ  
機口ヲ指定シテ結婚ヲ獎勵シ結婚費用ハ輕減シ二十  
オラニ女子ノ雇傭ハ出來ル限り制限シ且多子家族  
ニ對シテハ物費ヲ優先的ニ配給ス。

産兒制限ハ禁止

同時ニ、母性並ニ乳幼兒ノ保護ノ爲ニ種々ナル制度  
ヲ樹立シ又墮胎行爲及藥品ノ使用ニヨル産兒制限ハ  
嚴重ニ禁止ス。

2.

Doc 2529A

3.

死亡率ヲ低下セシムガ爲メ政府ハ結核預防及ヒ乳幼児ノ死亡防止ニ特別ナ勞力ヲ拂フ。政府ノ計費ニ依レバ日本ニ於ケル死亡率ハ今後二十年間ニ、三割五分ヲ減少ス。

國民ノ資質向上ノ手段トシテ政府ハ大都市特ニ東京、大阪等ニ於ケル人口ノ減少ニ重點ヲ於キ人口再配置ニ勞力ヲ拂フ。

#### 農村ハ現狀維持

同時ニ農村ガ兵力及勞力ノ供給源タルニ對シテ吾國農業人口ヲ一定水準ニ維持ス爲メ青年養成ノ爲メ體育施設ヲ擴充シ青年ヲシテ一定期間特別ナ精神及肉體の訓練ヲ受ケシム制度ヲ創設ス。之ニ關シテ情報局長伊藤延史博士ハ同盟ニ對シ「大東亞共榮圈確立ハ日本人ニ託サレタル一大使命ナルカニ於テ我々日本人タルモノハ東亞ノ指導者トシテノ責任ヲ負ヒシキクレバナラヌト斷リ又「東亞ノ指導者タランガ爲メニハ日本人ハ彼ニ於テ大イニ増加スルノミナラズ資質ニ於テモ向上ヲ計ラネバナラナイ此ノ目的ヲ達セシムガ爲メニハ個人主義的愚癡及種々ナル方式ノ産兒制限行爲ハ民衆ノ心カラ根絶セシメ家ト民族トニ基礎ヲ固メイタ世界觀ガ民衆ノ心ノ内ニ浸透セシメラレホベナラヌ且早暈ト多産ガ奨励サルベキデアルト斷言ス。

Doc 2529A (cert)

4.

ワシントン文書局 第  
國際検察部 第三五二九 A 號

文書ノ出所及ビソノ真正ナルコトノ陳述  
余、井川克一ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、内閣  
書記官トシテ、日本政府ト公的関係ニ在ルモノナ  
ルコト並ニ該官吏トシテ茲ニ添附セラレアル一九  
四一年ノ昭和十六年ノ一月二十三日附「ジヤパン  
タイムス・アンド・アドヴァタイザー」紙ノ一億人  
ヲ目標トスル人口増加運動ニ内閣對策ヲ講ズト題  
サレタ新聞記事抜萃ニオイテ引用サレタ閣議記録  
及ビ決議ノ文書ヲ保管セルコトヲ證明ス。  
余ハ更ニ添附ノ新聞記事ガ件ノ日時ニ行ハレタ閣  
議決議ノ長短ヲ正確ニ述ベテ居ルコトヲ證明ス。

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ十月十日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名 井川 印

右ノ者ノ公的資格 内閣書記官

證人 佐藤 朝 生

Dec 25 29 A (cont)

公式入手ニ關スル陳述

余、ジョン・カーティスハ、余ガ聯合國最高指揮官  
總司令部ニシテ係アルモノナルコト、竝ニ上記證明書  
ハ余ガ公榜上、日本政府ノ上記著名官吏ヨリ入手シ  
タルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／十月十六日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名	福	ジエイ・エイ・カーティス
右ノ者ノ公的資格	副	少尉
證人	テイ・戸口	軍曹

Ex. 1068

Document No. 4059-A

Page 1.

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 6 May 1941  
Arrival 7 May 1941  
No. 685 of 6 May

1110 S.  
100 Hours  
Most urgent !

Re: Telegram No. 676 of 5 May for the German Foreign Minister  
For the German Foreign Minister.

Today I had a rather long conversation with MATSUOKA whom I told the points of view contained in the foregoing telegram. MATSUOKA entirely agreed with my trend of thought, asking me to explain his conception of the present situation to the German Foreign Minister as follows.

He read the speech of the Fuehrer yesterday and is extremely impressed by the sureness and wisdom of the arguments. On the other hand, ROOSEVELT seems to him to have completely lost his head, judging from his hysterical invectives. Impressed by the Fuehrer's speech, he has sent to the German Foreign Minister through the Japanese Embassy in Berlin a telegram, of which he handed me a copy.

Turning to a discussion of the overall situation MATSUOKA stated that he intended to acquaint me with the American proposal as soon as he had achieved acceptance of his viewpoint by the authoritative quarters within the country. The American proposal probably originates in a report to WASHINGTON by the American ambassador in MOSCOW; he has known him for a long time and had a frank discussion with him at MOSCOW while on his trip back. The American ambassador, who did not conceal his critical attitude towards ROOSEVELT, asked him what JAPAN would do in case the United States should join the war. He replied that then Japan likewise would in any case immediately join the war on the side of the Axis powers. The Ambassador tried to soften this view point in that he tried to represent Japanese interference as possible in his report to WASHINGTON. He (MATSUOKA), however, emphasized most clearly that Japan would then strike.

Even on his way back to TOKYO he expected the American Counter move. When he arrived he found the American proposal of which I had been informed, and which skillfully caters to the needs of certain domestic political groups. At first, not only industry but likewise high Navy leaders had favored a serious discussion of the American proposal. Meanwhile he has used the interim to influence the Admiral, especially pointing

to the activist groups of young officers in the Army and Navy who would determinedly resist such a policy. On Saturday a solemn group consisting of the Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior HIRANUMA and the Chief of the Army gave their consent to the interim reply which was communicated in the foregoing report; and gave a vote of confidence. At any rate, dealing with the American proposal will lead to strained relations with economic circles. He will try to manoeuver tactically in such a way that AMERICA will be pledged to non-participation in the European war, the more so since from the Fuehrer's speech he has gained the impression that German policy is pursuing this aim. However, he cherishes only meagre hopes as far as this is concerned since he personally presumes that the American developments in the direction of a participation in the war will continue at a quick pace. Just now he is having investigated the question whether a Japanese protest is not called for even against patrolling activity on the part of American armed forces amounting to the arbitrary creation of an American safety zone.

He would be grateful for the earliest possible information on the views of the German Foreign Minister concerning the American proposal /T.W. to be used/ for the unavoidable domestic political discussion.

As to the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese neutrality pact, MATSUOKA reported that right after his departure from BERLIN, he did not envision the possibility of the settlement. During the conversation with the German Foreign Minister he also voiced this saying he would accept only in case RUSSIA showed readiness. In his opinion the neutrality pact was the off-shoot of Russian fear of Germany. He found STALIN absolutely willing to keep the peace. STALIN assured him that there could be no question of RUSSIA's concluding a pact with the Anglosaxon powers. One of his (MATSUOKA's) motives for concluding the neutrality pact had been to provide another hinderance to this pact. According to STALIN, the SOVIET Union did not join the Tripartite pact because the allied powers were not in need of Russian assistance. However, in case this was necessary, RUSSIA is prepared to co-operate extensively with the Tripartite powers. When I remarked that the SOVIET Union wanted to protect its rear and asked what attitude Japan would adopt regarding American shipments of armaments via VLADIVOSTOK in case of a German-Russian conflict, MATSUOKA answered as follows:



No Japanese Premier or Foreign Minister would ever be able to keep Japan neutral in the event of a German-Russian conflict. In this case, Japan would be driven, by the force of necessity to attack Russia at Germany's side. No neutrality pact could change this. Finally MATSUOKA voiced his opinion that American participation in the war could induce the Fuehrer to resolve upon a solution of the Russian question by violent means in order firmly to secure areas of supply, because the war would then probably drag on for a longer term. He is personally convinced of a speedy victory of the German forces in this case

I thanked MATSUOKA for his frank utterances, promising him to ask the German Foreign Minister for an opinion as soon as possible.

During my conversation today I have, of course, continued in my endeavors to direct Japanese policy toward SINGAPORE, in opposition to American interference manoeuvres and against the existing Japanese tendency to pay attention primarily to RUSSIA.

OTT.

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4059-A.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cummins, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the staff of the United States Political Advisor on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cummins  
W. P. CUMMINS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. E. Garde  
G. E. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)



4059A

干渉、可能性ヲ表示シタイト云フ風ニシヨラト試ミタ。然レ彼  
(松岡)ハ最モ明瞭ニシ、時日本ハ戦フダラト強調シタ。

既ニ東京ヘ、帰途彼ハ「アメリカ」ノ及響ヲ期待シテ其  
ノ下ニ依リ到着シテ、内政上、諸派ノ要求ニ巧ミニ應ジテ其  
私ニ既ニ報告セシタ「アメリカ」ノ提案ヲ受取リタ。先ク第一ニ  
ニ産業界、ニマス海軍、指導幹部モ亦「アメリカ」ノ提案ノ真  
劍ニ討論ニ傾キテ其タ。彼ハ其間、時ヲ利用シテ提督  
特ニ斯カル政策ヲ断時トシテ拒否スルテ「陸海軍」ノ積極的  
ナ青年將校連中ヲ因指シテ働キ掛ケタ。二曜日ニ首相平沼  
内相及ビ陸軍長官ニ成ル嚴肅ナル一團ニ依リ對シ前報告ニ  
報告ニタル中間解答ニ對シ同意ヲ表シ信任投票ヲ言明シタ  
然レ「アメリカ」ノ提案ノ取扱ハ「經濟界」ト「緊張」導クテ下リタ。  
彼ハ「アメリカ」ヲ歐洲戰ハ、不参加ヲ確定セシ。特ニ彼ハ總統ノ演說  
カラ猶速ニ政策ガ「目標」ヲ追及シテ其ト云テ「印象」ヲ受ケテ其タ  
ヲ「戰術」的ニツイテ風ニ行動スルヲ復ニ試ミタ。彼ハ個人的ニ「参謀」  
カ「参謀」方同ニ發展迅速トテ示テ進上想像シテ其カス勿論此等  
對テハ僅カ弱イ却テ要進イテ其ルニ及ビヌ。

彼ハ結局「アメリカ」ノ安全保障ノ勝者ヲ創設トイフ結果ニ其所「下」リ  
軍側ノ偵察活動モ亦日本ノ抗議ヲ起シ「シナイカ」ラカノ問題ヲ目下吟  
味セテ其ル

2

彼ハ不可避ニ内政上、議論ノ為メ「アメリカ」ノ提案對シ「猶速」外務大臣  
ノ見解ガ出テ其下ニ其ヲ復ニ報告セシルナラハ有難イト思フダラウ。  
日蘇停戰條約成立後「松岡」ハ此レ「カ」ラ、歸途彼ハ差シテ「リ」締結  
ノ可能性ヲ考慮シ「中」カ「タ」ト報告シタ。猶速外務大臣ノ念談於テ

4059A

後此、事述べ、口之、用意ナル場合ニ受諾之タイト言明シタ。  
中立條約ハ彼見解ニ依リ独逸ニ対スル口之、畏怖、產物ヲ以テ  
彼ハ「スターリン」ガ絶對的ニ平和保持ノ用意ヲ持ツテ居ルコトヲ発見シ  
「スターリン」ハ彼ニ「口之」ノ「アノ口之」ニ至リテ「家ト、協約  
云々事ハ問題ニナリ得ヌト保證シタ。今迄、協約ヲ邪魔スル事  
モ中立條約締結ノ彼ノ（松岡）動機、一テアツタ。

「スターリン」ノ言ニヨリテ同盟國ハ「口之」ノ援助ヲ必要トシカッタカラ蘇  
聯邦ハ三國同盟ニハ参加シカッタ。然レ必要ノ場合ニハ「口之」ハ三國同  
盟國トシテ廣汎ノ協力ノ用意ガアル。蘇聯邦ハ背後ノ掩護ヲ得ニ欲シ  
キルト云フ私言ニ對シ且ツ独逸ノ蘇聯邦ト衝突ノ場合「ワラヂオストック」經由ノ  
「力」軍需品ノ供給ニ對シ日本ハ如何ナル態度ニ出ブルヤノ私  
質問ニ對シテ松岡ハ次ノ如ク答ヘタ。

独逸ガ蘇聯邦ト衝突スル場合日本ハ如何ナル総理大臣モ如何  
ナル外務大臣モ日本ヲ中立ニ保ツ事ハ決テ出来ナイデアラウ。コ  
ノ場合日本ハ自然必然性ヲ以テ独逸側ニツイテ「口之」ヲ攻撃スル採  
ニ進出スルデアラウ。如何ナル中立條約ト雖モ、事ヲ変更シ  
得ナイデアラウ。松岡ハ最後ニ彼見解ヲ概擧シタ。即チ「アメリカ」參  
戰ハ、時ハ戦争ガ恐ラク長ビクデアラウカラ補給地域ヲ確保スル  
為ニ「口之」問題ヲ腕ガテ解決スル決意ヲ總統ニ促シ得ルト。  
彼ハ個人的ニコノ場合独逸ノ武力ノ迅速ナル勝利ヲ確信  
シテ居ル。

3

私ハ松岡ニ彼ノ率直ト意見開陳ニ感謝シ且ツ独逸外務大  
臣ニ去來ルガ早ク見解ヲ才願ヒスル様彼ニ約束シタ。

No 4  
Doc 4059A

松本、本日、會談ニ於テ「アメリカ」ノ妨害運動ニ抗シテ且ツ  
何レニシテモ、先ヅ第一「ロシヤ」ニ注意スル現在、日本、  
傾向ニ抗シテ、日本、政策ヲ「モリカホ」ニ向ケントスル松、  
努力ヲ續ケタコトハ勿論デアル

トット

Doc. 4059A

No 5

書類第四。五九A 號

證

余 Ulrich Strass の 余が獨逸語及び  
日本語ニ精通セル者ナルコト 並ニ 獨逸語原  
文及び 日本語原文ヲ對照、上右ハ本書  
類ヲ眞實ニ且正確ニ翻譯セルモノナルヲ  
確證セルコトヲ茲ニ證ス。

Ulrich A. Strass

EJ. 41069

Doc. No. 219P (74)

Br. Ex. 106

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GEE) TO THE  
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MATSUOKA)

Excerpt

No. 1793

TOKYO, May 6, 1941.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to my note No. 1779 of April 14, 1941, addressed to Prince Konoye during Your Excellency's absence from Japan, concerning the repeated indiscriminate bombing of Kunming by Japanese aircraft, and the danger to American lives and damage to American property caused thereby, and to inform Your Excellency that according to information received from the American Consul at that city, the Consulate was again seriously damaged during an air raid on April 29, 1941. Window glass and screens were blown out; plaster, a large memorial tablet, and part of a wall were knocked down; and dirt and debris were blown into the Compound. Fortunately, there appear to have been no casualties.

Foreign Relations I, p. 711



ex 1069

Doc 219 P(74)

駐日米使(クルー) / GREW / ヨリ日本外務大臣  
 (松岡) / 松岡 / 松岡  
 抜萃 東京一九四二年五月六日  
 閣下： 民明ニ於ル日本軍飛行機ノ屢次無  
 差別爆患而シテハ因ル米國人ノ生命財産  
 危険及ヒ損害ニ関シ閣下ガ日本ヨリ不在中  
 近衛公ニ提出シタル一九四二年四月十四日附私  
 事ヨリノ報ニ依リ一九四二年四月廿九日ノ空  
 襲時同領事館ガ再度踏ミ破壊サシ事ヲ  
 閣下ニ申上ガタリ。窓心ガラス及衝立ハ吹キ飛ビ  
 津浪及ビ大記念額又壁一部分ハ破壊サシ  
 塵芥及ビ破片ハ領事館構内ニ吹飛ビサレ  
 等ノ被害ヲ蒙リ。幸ニ死傷ハ無カリシ模様ナリ。

外交関係第一冊 七二頁

DRAFT PROPOSAL HANDED BY THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA)  
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON MAY 12, 1941

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN.

The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement disposing the resumption of our traditional friendly relations.

Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment among our peoples should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.

It is our present hope that, by a joint effort, our nations may establish a just peace in the Pacific; and by the rapid consummation of an entente cordiale (amicable understanding), arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening. Both Governments, therefore, desire that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general agreement which would bind, meanwhile, both Governments in honor and in act.

It is our belief that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated at a conference and appropriately confirmed by our respective Governments.

Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit:

1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.
2. The attitude of both Governments toward the European War.
3. The relations of both nations toward the China Affair.
4. Commerce between both nations.
5. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.
6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

Accordingly, we have come to the following mutual understanding:-

I. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.

The Governments of the United States and of Japan jointly acknowledge each other as equally sovereign states and contiguous Pacific powers.

Both Governments assert the unanimity of their national policies as directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of respectful confidence and cooperation among our peoples.

Both Governments declare that it is their traditional, and present, concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of backward nations.

Both governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to these moral principles and concepts.

II. The attitude of both Governments toward the European War.

The Governments of the United States and Japan make it their common aim to bring about the world peace; they shall therefore jointly endeavour not only to prevent further extension of the European War but also speedily to restore peace in Europe.

The Government of Japan maintains that its alliance with the Axis Powers was, and is, defensive and designed to prevent the nations which are not at present directly affected by the European War from engaging in it.

The Government of Japan maintains that its obligations of military assistance under the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy will be applied in accordance with the stipulation of Article 3 of the said Pact.

The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue to be, directed by no such aggressive measures as to assist any one nation against another.

The United States maintains that it is pledged to the hate of war, and accordingly, its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue to be, determined solely and exclusively by considerations of the protective defense of its own national welfare and security.

III. The relations of both nations toward the China Affair.

The Government of the United States, acknowledging the three principles as enunciated in the Kono Statement and the principles set forth on the basis of the said three principles in the treaty with the Manchu Government as well as in the Joint Declaration of Japan, Manchukuo and China and relying upon the policy of the Japanese Government to establish a relationship of neighborly friendship with China, shall forthwith request the Chiang Kai-shek regime to negotiate peace with Japan.

IV. Commerce between both nations.

When official approbation to the present Understanding has been given by both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other to mutually supply such commodities as are, respectively, available or required by either of them. Both Governments further consent to take necessary steps to the resumption of normal trade relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan.

V. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.

Having in view that the Japanese expansion in the direction of the Southwestern Pacific area is declared to be of peaceful nature, American cooperation shall be given in the production and procurement of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which Japan needs.

VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

a. The Government of the United States and Japan jointly guarantee the independence of the Philippine Islands on the condition that the Philippine Islands shall maintain a status of permanent neutrality. The Japanese subjects shall not be subject to any discriminatory treatment.

B. Japanese immigration to the United States shall receive amicable consideration--on a basis of equality with other nations and freedom from discrimination.

Addendum.

The present Understanding shall be kept as a confidential memorandum between the Governments of the United States and of Japan.

The scope, character and timing of the announcement of this Understanding will be agreed upon by both Governments.

(ANNEX)

ORAL EXPLANATION FOR PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE ORIGINAL DRAFT

II. Par. 2.

Attitude of Both Governments toward the European War.

Actually the meaning of this paragraph is virtually unchanged but we desire to make it clearer by specifying a reference to the Pact. As long as Japan is a member of the Tripartite Pact, such stipulation as is mentioned in the Understanding seems unnecessary.

If we must have any stipulation at all, in addition, it would be important to have one which would clarify the relationship of this Understanding to the aforementioned Pact.

III.

China Affair.

The terms for China-Japan peace as proposed in the original Understanding differ in no substantial way from those herein affirmed as the "principles of Konoé." Practically, the one can be used to explain the other.

We should obtain an understanding, in a separate and secret document, that the United States would discontinue her assistance to the Chaing Kai-shek regime if Chaing Kai-shek does not accept the advice of the United States that he enter into negotiations for peace.

If, for any reason, the United States finds it impossible to sign such a document, a definite pledge by some highest authorities will suffice.

The three principles of Prince Konoé as referred to in this paragraph are:

1. Neighborly friendship;
2. Joint defense against communism;
3. Economic cooperation--by which Japan does not intend to exercise economic monopoly in China nor to demand of China a limitation in the interests of Third Powers.

The following are implied in the aforesaid principles:

1. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories;
2. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neighbors and forming a Far Eastern nucleus contributing to world peace;
3. Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between Japan and China;
4. No annexation, no indemnitees;
5. Independence of Manchoukuo.

### III.

#### Immigration to China.

The stipulation regarding large-scale immigration to China has been deleted because it might give an impression, maybe a mistaken impression, to the Japanese people who have been offended by the past immigration legislation of the United States, that America is now taking a dictating attitude even toward the question of Japanese immigration in China.

Actually, the true meaning and purpose of this stipulation is fully understood and accepted by the Japanese Government.

### IV.

#### Naval, Aerial and Mercantile Marine Relations.

(a) and (c) of this section have been deleted not because of disagreement but because it would be more practical, and possible, to determine the disposition of naval forces and mercantile marine after an understanding has been reached and relations between our two countries improved; and after our present China commitments are eliminated. Then we will know the actual situation and can act accordingly.

#### Courtesy visit of naval squadrons.

This proposal, (b) of IV. might better be made a subject of a separate memorandum. Particular care must be taken as to the timing, manner and scope of carrying out such a gesture.

V.

Gold Credit.

The proposal in the second paragraph of V. has been omitted for the same reasons as suggested the omission of paragraphs (a) and (c).

VI.

Activity in Southwestern Pacific Area.

The words, in the first paragraph, "without resorting to arms" have been deleted as inappropriate and unnecessarily critical. Actually, the peaceful policy of the Japanese Government has been made clear on many occasions in various statements made both by the Premier and the Foreign Minister.

VIII. (VII.)

Political Stabilization in the Pacific Area.

As the paragraph (a) implying military and treaty obligation would require, for its enactment, such a complicated legislative procedure in both countries, we consider it inappropriate to include this in the present Understanding.

Paragraph (b) regarding the independence of the Philippine Islands has been altered for the same reason.

In paragraph (c) ((d)) the words "and to the Southwestern Pacific Area" have been omitted because such questions should be settled, as necessity arises, through direct negotiation with the authorities in the Southwestern areas by the Governments of the United States and of Japan respectively.

Conference.

The stipulation for holding a Conference has been deleted. We consider that it would be better to arrange, by an exchange of letters, that a conference between the President and the Premier or between suitable representatives of theirs will be considered when both the United States and Japan deem it useful to hold such a conference after taking into due consideration the effect resulting from the present Understanding.

Announcement

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No. 220c (26).

我々、斯ル了解が緊急ナル樞要問題、之ヲ  
合ニ後日會議ニ於テ審議可能ナリ。且夫  
々、政府ニヨリ適宜ニ確認可能、第二義問題  
ヲ合マザル天ト信ズル。

兩國政府或ル事態並ニ態ヲカ鮮明ニシ  
又、改善セラル、ナシ、兩國政府ガ友好關係ニ到  
達シ得ルニト期待スル天トナリ。即チ

一、米國及ビ日本、國際關係及ビ國家、性格關  
スル概念

二、歐洲戰爭ニ對スル兩國政府、態度

三、日華事變ニ對スル兩國、關係

四、兩國間、通商

五、西南太平洋地域ニ於ケル兩國、經濟活動

六、太平洋地域ニ於ケル政治的安定ニ影響セリ  
兩國、政策

故ニ兩國、次、如キ相互了解ニ達セタ。

一、米國及ビ日本、國際關係並ニ國家、性格ニ  
關スル概念。

米國政府及ビ日本政府、各々ガ平等ナル  
主權國ナリ、太平洋ニ於ケル隣接國ナ  
リ、之ヲ共同ニ認ム。

兩國政府、兩國、國策カ永久平和、確立  
並ニ兩國民間、尊敬的信頼及ビ協力、新  
時代、創設ニ指向セリ、之ニ就テ、

No. 2



Doc 220c (26)

此意見一致ヲ確言スル。  
 西國政府、國家及ニ民族ノ  
 家ヲ構成シ、平和的手段ヲ依リ、各員、如  
 人、為ニ天ノ宰スルカサザルガ規律ニ且他  
 為ニ天ノ道德的抑限的福祉、追求ニ向ケテ  
 居ル利害、相互關係ヲ以テ各自ガ平等ニ權  
 利ヲ享有シ、責任ヲ認ムトシ、兩國政府  
 府傳統的ニ現在ニ於テモ變リナキ概念ヲ  
 又確信テモ了シ、ユトヲ宣言スル。更ニ兩  
 國政府、文明ニ後、國民ニ對シ、更ニ兩  
 採取ニ反對スルニ西國政府、義ヲ認メ、  
 西國政府、國家ノ性格、社會秩序、並ニ國民  
 生活、基礎タル道義ニ關スル夫々ノ傳統的  
 概念ヲ保持スルニ依リ、是等ノ道義及ニ概  
 念ヲ相違シ、外來思想又ハ「イデオロギ」ニ依  
 此カモ變更スルニ就キ確平タル決意  
 ヲ有スル。

一、歐洲戰事ニ對シ、兩國政府、態度  
 米國政府及ニ日本政府、世界平和ヲ招来ス  
 ルトヲ甚、共通目的トス。從テ、兩國政府、  
 歐洲戰事、是以上ノ擴大ヲ防止セ、  
 共同ニ努力スル。急速ニ復元セ、カタキニ  
 日本政府、其ノ極東國ト、同盟ヲ防衛的

Doc 2020c (26)

ナリト目現在ニ於テ天同構ナリト又歐洲戰  
争ノ直接影響ヲ目下受テ居ニサル國々ガ  
其ノ戰爭ニ突ルコトヲ防止セリガタキレ  
トヲ主張スル。

日本政府、日本德逸及ビ浮太利間ノ三國協  
定ニ依リ軍事的援助、義務、該協定ノ第  
三條、規定ニ準據シテ適用セラルズキコトヲ主  
張ス。

米國政府、米國政府、歐洲戰爭ニ對スル態  
度、他ノ國ニ對シ或ノ國ヲ援助スルガ如キ攻勢的  
手段ニ現在ニ於テ又將來ニ於テモ向ケラレサル  
コトヲ主張スル米國、米國ガ戰爭ノ憎惡ヲ摺  
從リテ居ルコトヲ主張ス。

從リテ歐洲戰爭ニ對スル米國、態度、專ニ自  
國ノ福祉及ビ安全、保護的防衛ヲ目的トスル  
考慮ニ依リテ、現在ニ於テ又將來ニ於テ  
天決マレル天ノ下ナリ。

三月華事及ニ對スル兩國、關係

米國政府、近衛聲明ニ明言セリタル三原  
則並ニ該三原則ニ基キ日本政府ト南京政府  
ト、條約及ビ日本、滿洲國及ビ中華民國、共  
同宣言ニ記載セリタル諸原則ヲ承認スルト

1604

日本政府、不針ニ區類ノ聯合行政權ニ對

No 5

Doc 220C(26)

日本と平和を交渉スル事ヲ要請スル。

四 兩國間ノ通商

本了解ニ對シ、兩國政府、公式承認アリタル時ニ、米國及ビ日本、夫々カ保有シ且兩國、孰カ必要トスル物資ヲ相互ニ供給スベキニトテ確約スル。更ニ兩國政府、以前、日米通商及ビ航海條約ニ依リ確立セラレタル正常ノ貿易關係、再興ニ必要ナル手段ヲ講ズルニト同意スル。

五 西南太平洋地域ニ於ケル兩國ノ經濟活動

西南太平洋地域方面ニ向テシテ日本ノ發展ハ平和的性質トテ、ナリト聲明セラレ居ルニトテ、考慮シ米國、日本、及西オーストラリア天然資源例ハ石油、錫、ニッケル等、ノ生産及獲得ニ協力及ビ支持ヲ與フベシ。



Doc 220c (26)

之ノ下ニ、實際上ニ方、他方ヲ説明スルニ用ヒ得ルモノナラシ。  
若シ和平交渉ヲ爲スルト、米ノ忠告ヲ將介石ガ受諾セ  
ザル場合、米ニハ對シテ政權ノ援助ヲ中止スルニトシテ了解ヲ  
我々別國、秘密書類ニ依リ確保スベキナラシ。

若シ何カ理由ニ米ニカス、如キ書類ニ署名ニ得ザル場  
合ニ成最高當局者ニヨリ明確ナル誓約ヲ以テ充テトスニ  
本項ニ引用セラレタル近衛公ノ三原則ハ次ノ如シ。

- 一、善隣友好
- 二、共產主義ニ對スル共同防禦
- 三、經濟的協力

日本ハ之ニ依リ中東ニ於テ經濟的独占ヲ行使スル意志ナク、  
又第三ノ權益ヲ制限スルニ中東ニ強奪スル意志ナク。

上述ノ原則中ニ六次ノ事項ガ包含セラル。

- 一、主權及領土相互尊重。
- 二、善隣友好ニトシテ協力ニ含ヒ世界平和貢獻スル極東  
ノ中東ヲ形成スル各々國有特徵ヲ相互ニ尊重スルニト。

三、日本軍隊ノ日華間ニ締結セラルル

協約ニ準據スル中東領土ヨリノ撤退。

四、領土ノ併合及不賠償。

五、滿洲ノ獨立。

二、中東ノ移民

中東ノ大規模ノ移民關スル條項ハ次ノ理由ニ依リ削除

セラル。即チ是ハ米ニカ今ノ中東ノ日本移民問題ニテ無指  
令的態度ヲ取リ得ルカ、如キ印象恐クハ間違ッタ印象

No. 7

Doc 220c (26)

ヲ半量ニ過去ノ移長法ニ依リ感情ヲ害セル日本ノ三項（此カ元知トナシテナシ）

實際ニテ條項ノ真意ノ意味及ビ目的、日本政府ニヨリ充分ノ解セラシテ居リ且承認セラシテ居ルノナリ。

四、海軍、航空及商船關係

本節ノ（ハ）及（ニ）ノ意見、不一致ト云フ理由カ、テノテノ審判  
西ノ側ニテ解が達成セラシテ西ノ側ノ關係が改善セラレタ後  
ニ於テ且中東ニ付スル材々、現在、約束が解除セラレタ後  
ニ於テ海軍力及商船ノ配備ヲ決定スルコトガ一層實際的ナ  
アリ又可能ナラシムル理由ニ依リテ削除セラレタナリ  
其時ニ於テ我々ノ實際ノ意思ヲ知リ且シテヨリ行動ニ  
得ルナリ。

艦隊ノ儀禮的訪問

一、提案即チ本節ノ（ハ）別箇ノ覽書ノ項目トシテ分  
置スルニモ知ル又新ノ如キ表示ヲ爲スニ望ミ、其時期方法  
及ビ範圍ニ關シ特ニ注意ヲ要スル。

五、金ツケ上

本節ノ一、二項ノ提案、同節ノ（ハ）及（ニ）ノ二項ヲ省略セラ  
シテ同様ノ理由ニ依リ省略セラル。

六、西南太平洋地域ニ於テノ活動

本二項ノ字句或カ行使セテ三、四ノ不適当且不必要ニ  
醜評的ナラシムル故ニ削除セラル。實際ニ日本政府ノ平和的  
政策、首相及外務大臣兩者ニヨリ爲サレタ各種ノ聲明ニ  
於テ屢々明カセラル。

No. 8

No. 9

Doc 220c(26)

(三) 太平洋地域ニ於テ之ヲ安定

軍事的及ニ條約上ニ義務ヲ含ムル項下ニ以テ制定スル事  
ニ向テ之ヲ予テ復雜ニ立法的ノ手續ヲ必要トスル事ノ下ニ  
ガ故ニ是ニ本ヲ解ニ定ムルニ此レ不適當ト裁キテ之

了リ之ニ群島ノ獨立ニ因テ此項ニ同様ノ理由ニ依  
リ修正セラル

(四) 西理ニ於テハ(五) 西南太平洋地域ノ字句ハ  
斯レ問題ハ必要ニ應ジ米及日本ノ各政府ト西南太平  
洋地域ノ當局ト直接交渉ニ決定セラルル事ノ下ニ此レガ故ニ  
省略セラル

### 會議

會議ヲ開催スル條款ハ削除セラル。本ヲ解ニ生ズル<sup>結果</sup>  
若シ憲法上米及日本ノ両方ガ斯レ會議ヲ開催スル  
コト有知ナリト考ヘ場合ニ大統領及首相又政府  
邊事ト代表者間ノ會議ヲ書翰交換ニヨリ取極ムルニ  
トシ邊事ト於テ思考スル

### 發表

本ヲ解ガ成功理ニ締結セラルル晚ニ發表セラルル事  
至明ノ草案ハ東京ニ於テ準備セラルル米政府ノ考慮  
ヲ得ル爲メ電送セラル

外交關係 (四) 四〇—四三五頁

Ex. # 1071

Doc. No. 2200(27)  
Br. Ex. 172

Page 1 \*

(Annex 2)

DRAFT SUGGESTION A HANDED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE  
JAPANESE AMBASSADOR ON MAY 16, 1941

II THE ATTITUDES OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF JAPAN  
TOWARD THE EUROPEAN WAR

The Government of Japan declares that the purpose of its Axis Alliance was and is defensive and is designed to prevent the nations which are not at present engaged in the European war from participating therein, and declares that its obligations of military assistance under the Tripartite Pact between Germany, Japan and Italy come into force only if and when one of the parties of the pact is aggressively attacked by a power not at present involved in the European hostilities.

The Government of the United States declares that its attitude toward the European hostilities is and will continue to be determined solely and exclusively by considerations of protection and self-defense: its national security and the defence thereof.

The Government of Japan further declares that it is under no commitment under its Axis Alliance or otherwise which is inconsistent with the terms of the present declaration of policy and intention agreed upon between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States.

(Annex 3)

DRAFT SUGGESTION B HANDED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE  
JAPANESE AMBASSADOR ON MAY 16, 1941

III CHINA AFFAIRS

When this declaration of policy and intention, including the provisions of this section, is agreed upon and both Governments have given it their approval and commitment, the President of the United States will suggest to the Government of Japan and the Government of China that those Governments enter into a negotiation for a termination of hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations on a basis as follows:

- a. Neighborly friendship.
- b. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.
- c. Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory in accordance with a schedule to be agreed upon.
- d. No annexation.
- e. No indemnities.
- f. Equality of commercial opportunity in terms of and with conditions of fair treatment for all concerned.
- g. Parallel measures of defense against subversive activities from external sources.



Br. Ex. 172

p. 2

h. The question of the future of Manchuria to be dealt with by friendly negotiations.

(Annex 4)

DRAFT SUGGESTION C HANDED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR ON MAY 16, 1941

V. ECONOMIC ACTIVITY OF BOTH NATIONS IN THE SOUTHWESTERN  
PACIFIC AREA

On the pledged basis of guarantee that Japanese activity and American activity in the Southwestern Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means, the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other toward ensuring on the basis of equality of opportunity equal access by Japan and by the United States to supplies of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which each country needs for the safeguarding and development of its own economy.

Foreign Relations II, pp. 432-434

220C (27)

附屬書類ニ

昭和十六年五月十六日國務長官ヨリ日本大使ニ手交サレタ  
提案A

二、歐洲戦争ニ対スル日米兩國ノ態度

日本政府ハ杞軸同盟ノ目的トスルトコ只過去ニ於テモ現在  
ニ於テモ防禦的デアリ、現在歐洲戦争ニ加入シテ中ナイ國々  
ガソレニ關係スルトコ防グニアルト言明シ且日独、伊三國同盟  
ニ基ク軍事的援助ノ義務ハ同盟國ノ中ノ一國ガ現在  
歐洲戦争ニ捲込マレテ中ナイ他一國ニヨツテ侵略的攻  
撃ヲ受ケル始初メテ効力ヲ生ズルモノデアルト言明シタムデ  
アル。

米國政府ハ、歐洲戦争ニ対スル米國ノ態度ハ現在ニ  
於テモ將來ニ於テモ保護ト正當防衛即チ國家安全  
全ト國防トヲ考慮シテノミ特ニ決定スベキデアルト言  
明シタノデアル。

日本政府ハ更ニ杞軸同盟及其ノ他ニ基キ、日米兩國  
政府ノ間ニ現在約束サレタ政策又ハ意圖ニ關スル宣

4x1071

220C (21)

言ノ條ニテ相入レテノ様ナ如何ニテ該約ヲ廢シヨク

トノ事トクノ明ニクニテ

附屬文書ニ

昭和十一年五月十日日國務長官ヨリ日本大使ニ送リ交サ

レノ提案B

三、支那事變

本節題正モ合ハル政策意見一國一國ニ對シテ所望ノ領  
國政府カシテ承認スル公約ニ對シテ此ノ場合ニ對シテ  
日華兩國政府ニ對シテ此ノ項目ニ對シテ  
戰事終結及平和的因條ノ再始ニ交渉スル  
ト提案スルヲ

a 善隣友交關係

b 主權領土相互尊敬

c 協定條目ニ從テ中華領土內ヨリ日本軍

撤退

a 不併合

b 不賠償

Doc 220C(27)

手 下ニハ平等係者ニ対シテ公平ナル待遇ノ條文條件ニ於  
テ貿易ノ機會均等  
手 外部ヨリ、破壊的策動ニ対スル同等ノ防禦手  
段  
左 滿洲、將來ニ関スル問題、親和的交渉ニヨリ処理

附属文書四

昭和十六年五月十六日 外務長官ヨリ 回奉 大使ニ手  
交サレタ 提案ニ

五. 西南太平洋地域ニ於ケル兩國ノ經濟的活動  
西南太平洋地域ニ於ケル日米兩國ノ活動が平和  
的ニ進ムニヨリテ遂ニセシムコトヲ保證スル基  
準ニヨリ兩國政府ノ機會均等ノ原則ニ基キ、兩  
國ノ政治、經濟、安全及發展ノ多クニ必要ト  
スル天然資源(油、コハ、錫、ニケル等)ノ供給ヲ同  
等ニ得ルコトヲ保證スル様ニ互ニ協力スルコトヲ  
契約スル

103

67 1072

Doc. No. 219<sup>D</sup> (75)

Br. Ex. 107

THE AMERICAN LEGATION IN TOKYO (GROW) TO THE  
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MITSUOKA)

Excerpt.

No. 1802

TOKYO, May 17, 1941.

EXCELLENCY: With reference to my note No. 1793 of May 6, 1941, concerning repeated indiscriminate bombing of Kunming by Japanese aircraft, and the consequent danger to American lives and damage to American property, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the American Consul at Kunming has reported that the Consulate was again damaged during a Japanese air raid on May 12, 1941. Fragments of bombs were scattered in the Consulate compound and one piece broke through a window into a residence bedroom.

Moreover, during this same raid, the larger part of the compound occupied by Mr. Stanley McGeary, an American clerk of the Consulate, was destroyed and his residence so damaged as to render it barely habitable, and for the third time recently the China Inland Mission, where a number of Americans live, was damaged and the residence there of Mr. E. L. Crauchettes, an American citizen, was partly demolished.

.....

Foreign Relations I, p. 713

駐日米國大使(第一) / 分海 / 日本外務大臣(松岡) /

接奉

第六三 東京 一九四一年五月十二日

2/19 P (18)

閣下日本機二架北昆明、及機無事別機擊三機、一九四一年五月六日、余、覺書才七九三、其、在野生、九、米國、人、生命、二、時、危、及、日、米、國、人、財、產、三、與、之、損、害、二、國、以、下、拿、之、閣、下、御、母、善、之、先、知、之、有、

即、北、昆明、二、於、九、十、本、國、領、事、一、九、四、一、年、五、月、十、三、日、日、本、軍、(空、軍、中、領、事、館、) 再、以、損、害、之、受、之、事、報、米、方、二、上、一、機、擊、破、片、於、領、事、館、構、內、二、飛、之、散、二、一、此、二、意、之、事、(在、之、報、(或、飛、之、事、) 與、二、國、空、軍、中、領、事、館、米、國、人、書、記、又、之、事、日、方、領、事、Mr. STANLEY

McGeary / 氏、於、是、(在、之、報、) 二、部、命、被、損、壞、也、(其、他、之、報、) 損、害、之、事、及、為、致、之、原、因、二、可、能、二、(二、又、最、近、) 二、機、米、國、人、於、領、事、館、內、也、及、那、教、會、

China Inland Mission / 之、第、三、面、目、損、害、之、事、同、前、之、米、國、報、二、之、事、之、事、二、(二、又、最、近、) 二、機、米、國、人、於、領、事、館、內、也、及、那、教、會、

MR. E. L. CRUICKSHANKS / 二、在、之、報、(或、飛、之、事、) 與、二、國、空、軍、中、領、事、館、米、國、人、書、記、又、之、事、日、方、領、事、Mr. STANLEY McGeary / 氏、於、是、(在、之、報、) 二、部、命、被、損、壞、也、(其、他、之、報、) 損、害、之、事、及、為、致、之、原、因、二、可、能、二、(二、又、最、近、) 二、機、米、國、人、於、領、事、館、內、也、及、那、教、會、

WX 1072

外交團信一 七三頁

Q. # 1073

Telegram (Secret Ciphar Process)

Tokyo,	18 May 1941	1.40 P
Arrival	18 May 1941	1.00 hours
No. 759 of 17 May		Most urgent !
		To be kept in a locked file

Marginal

Note:

Sent on to

FUSCHL

under

For the German Foreign Minister

No.1573

Re: Telegram of 15th, No. 622.

18 May

3.25

hours

Tel.

Ktr.

Today I have carried out the instructions of the above mentioned telegram during a long conversation with Foreign Minister Matsuoka.

I stressed the especially immense regret of the German Government that the German views of 11 May were not awaited before the reply to WASHINGTON was sent off. Making use of the arguments of telegram No. 592 of 11 May and No. 622 of 15 May, I have pointed to the necessity of making America give the most clear and precise assurance not to participate in the European conflict; I also pointed out that the formulation employed in the Japanese reply re Article 3 of the Tripartite Pact, constitutes the absolute minimum of what must be demanded in view of the Tripartite Pact. The German Government must insist on being immediately informed on the American reply, as well as to be admitted to further negotiations between JAPAN and the USA.

Matsuoka pointed to his oral communication to HULL, reported in telegram No. 733 of (groups garbled), as well as to his conversations with the British and American ambassadors, reported in telegram 750 of 15 May, which showed that he would not jolt the Tripartite Pact. During a secret Cabinet Session he had called upon all members of the Government clearly to acknowledge Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact on their part too, in all of their conversations. All members of the Cabinet had agreed unanimously. Besides he views the chances of the Japanese-American Negotiations most skeptically, and as heretofore he counts on America's entry into the war in the near future. His sole motive in the negotiations with USA is, if possible, to postpone or prevent the entry of the United States into

the war and furthermore to eliminate the increase of the present American assistance to England.

HULL has not yet taken a stand regarding the Japanese proposal, merely promising a study which would take a certain amount of time. He will immediately inform us of the American reply, also keeping abreast, and as far as possible consulting with the allied governments of Germany and Italy on the further course of the negotiations. When I demanded to be admitted to the coming phase, he replied that he would meet our desire to a great extent; he could however not promise always to await the views of the axis powers, especially when a quick utterance was absolutely essential. I cogently requested MATSUOKA to do nothing without Japan's allies in these negotiations, which concerned the Tripartite Pact in its entirety.

Domestic political influences, to whose pressure MATSUOKA has yielded in the face of the allegedly imminent American entry into the War, can be found among certain anglophiles of the Court, such as Imperial Household Minister MATSUDAIRA, exponent of industry and big money, such as Minister Without Portfolio OGURA, and some influential Navy officers with whom Ambassador Admiral OPTUPA /TM: NOGURA/ has apparently worked together in WASHINGTON. This group was joined by elements of the army who want to gain time in order to retain freedom of action in view of the uncertainty of RUSSIA's future attitude. Minister of the Interior, HIRANUMA, has probably acted in the same way - he had to resign when the German-Russian non-aggression pact was concluded, being a champion of a German-Japanese alliance against RUSSIA. Finally, the activist group which is closely working together with the Embassy, is at present weakened by the serious illness of SHIRATORI who has left the political struggle on account of a serious and apparently incurable illness.

OTT.

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4060A.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus



AFFIDAVIT

I. W. P. Cuning, being first duly sworn, or oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cuning  
W. P. CUNING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. E. Gerde  
G. E. GERDE

Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General.

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)





Doc 14060A

Handwritten notes in Chinese, appearing to be a list or series of entries, possibly related to a collection or inventory.

Handwritten characters, possibly a signature or a date.

Handwritten characters, possibly a date or a reference number.

Doc 4060A

著者才也 天 月子

謝

余 Ulrich Schue 余

自 著 者 才 也 天 月子

原 著 者 才 也 天 月子

著 者 才 也 天 月子

著 者 才 也 天 月子

著 者 才 也 天 月子

Cumming's Certificate

供 送 書

余、W. P. カミング ( W. P. CUMMING ) ハ  
正式ニ宣誓シテ次ノ諸項ヲ證言ス

一 余ハ合衆國國務省附、同國獨逸關係專項政治原  
因部員タル事、及右ニ據リ余ハ(合衆國)獨逸  
軍政部代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上表明セル資  
格ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸柏林所在、柏林文書本部ニ  
於ケル爾獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫、原本  
ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任ジアル事、

二 上述獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合  
國遠征軍最高司令部ノ指揮下ニ在ル軍隊ニヨリ  
テ爾獨逸取得セラレ、其確保ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國  
マールブルグニ於テ該軍隊ニヨリテ軍文書本部  
ニ蒐集セラレ、後該聯合軍總任官ヨリ上述セル  
／＼柏林／文書本部ニ移管セラレタルモノナル事

三 余ハ一九四五年八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグ  
ニ於テ、上述文書本部擔當ヲ命セラレタル事。  
是ニ仍リテ該爾獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫原  
本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ駐在當時、初メテ  
余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任シ、爾來引續キ余  
占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事

Cum gratia Certificate

四 余ノ此供送書ノ添附セラル、所ノ文書ハ上述ノ  
獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ支庫トシテ、尙撰セラ  
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ歸シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ  
置カレタル、獨逸外務省文書原本ノ、真正精確  
ナル直接復寫寫眞ノ贋本タル事

五 茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫寫眞贋本ノ文書原  
本ハ、余ノ保管、留保ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ  
點檢閱覽ニ資スル如クナシアリ、爲ニ該原本ヲ  
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫眞贋本ヲ擬  
供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユー・ビー・カミング  
(W. P. CUMMING)

一九二六年四月二十三日余ノ口前ニ於テ署名且  
宣誓ス

中佐 ジー・エツナ・ガード  
G. H. GARDE  
高級副官事務取扱  
LT. COLONEL. AGD  
ACTING ADJUTANT GENERAL  
(合衆國) 獨逸置政部

2.

Ex 1074

DOCUMENT 2200 (18)

Page 1.

Br. Ex. 153

SUMMARY OF CONVERSATIONS  
MEMORANDUM PREPARED IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

(WASHINGTON, ) MAY 19, 1942.

ACCOUNT OF INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE  
UNITED STATES AND THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN, 1941.

Excerpts.

. . . . .

" . . . . The equilibrium in the Far East which had been established by the Washington Conference treaties of 1921-1922 became seriously disturbed by the setting up by forceful means in a part of China of a regime under Japanese control under the name of 'Manchukuo'. This control over Manchuria has been marked by the carrying out of a policy of discrimination which has resulted in forcing out American and other foreign interests.

"During the years that followed, Japan went steadily forward in her preparations for expansion by force of arms. In December 1934, she gave notice of her intention to terminate the naval treaty of February 6, 1922. She then proceeded with intensified construction of military and naval armaments, at the same time undertaking, from time to time, limited actions directed toward an extension of her domination over China and involving disregard and destruction of the lawful rights and interests of other countries, including the United States.

"In July 1937, the armed forces of Japan embarked upon large-scale military operations against China. Invading forces of more than a million men occupied large areas along the seaboard and in the central provinces. In these areas there were set up puppet regimes which instituted systems of controls and monopolies discriminatory in favor of the interests of the invading country.

"It has been clear throughout that Japan has been actuated from the start by broad and ambitious plans for establishing herself in a dominant position in the entire region of the Western Pacific. Her leaders have openly declared their determination to achieve and maintain that position by force of arms and thus to make themselves masters of an area containing almost one-half of the entire population of the world. As a consequence, they would have arbitrary control of the sea and trade routes in that region.

"Previous experience and current developments indicate that the proposed 'new order' in the Pacific area means, politically, domination by one country. It means, economically, employment of the resources of the area concerned for the benefit of that country and to the ultimate impoverishment of other parts of the area and exclusion of the / interests



interests of other countries. It means, socially, the destruction of personal liberties and the reduction of the conquered peoples to the role of inferiors.

"It should be manifest to every person that such a program for the subjugation and ruthless exploitation by one country of nearly one-half of the population of the world is a matter of immense significance, importance and concern to every other nation wherever located.

"Notwithstanding the course which Japan has followed during recent years, this Government has made repeated efforts to persuade the Japanese Government that her best interests lie in the development of friendly relations with the United States and with other countries which believe in orderly and peaceful processes among nations. We have at no time made any threats."

. . . . .  
Foreign Relations II, p. 525 at  
pp. 329-330

220C(18)

支那(五三)

# 談話大略

## 國務省外ニテ準備セル覚書

(ワシントン)一九四二年(昭和十七年五月九日)

一九四一年(昭和十六年)合衆國政府及日本政府ト間  
行ハク非公式會談、説明授受

6x1074

「……一九二二年カラ一九三二年(大正十一年—大正十一年)ノワシントン  
會議條約ニ依リ制定セル極東ニ於ケル均衡ハ滿洲國ト稱スル  
政權ガ日本ニ管理ナリニ中國(一部ニ強引ニ樹立サレタコト)係リ  
非常ニ侵害セルニ至ルヲケル。此ノ滿洲國管理ハ差別待遇  
政策ヲ實施シタコトガ注目スベキ点アリ。其ノ結果米國及其他  
諸外國ノ權益ヲ排斥スルニ至ルヲケル。

其ノ後 數年間日本ノ武力ニヨリ發展ノ爲着々トシテ  
準備ヲ進タリキタケル。一九三四年(昭和九年)十一月日本ハ  
一九二二年(大正十一年)二月六日ノ海軍條約ヲ打切ル旨通  
告シタ。

シカラ日本ハ陸海軍軍備擴張ニ取リ掛ケタルガ、同時ニ  
中國ニ於ケル勢力擴張ノ方向ノ同クテ屢々限定セル行動ニ出  
タ。又アメリカヲモ含メ諸外國ノ正當ナル權益、無現及  
破壊ニ没頭シキタケル。

「一九三七年(昭和十二年)七月、日本軍ハ中國ニ對シテ廣範  
圍ニ亘ル軍事作戦ニ發シタ。百萬以上ノ侵入部隊ガ  
中國ノ海岸地及中部諸省ノ廣ク地域ヲ占領シタ。

220C (18)

果等ノ地ニハ侵ノ國ノ利益ニ有利ト差別ノ統制及巴獨  
占制度ヲ敷ク俾僞政權ヲ樹テナシ。

「最初ヨリ日本ガ西太平洋全地域ニ於テ有力ナル地位ヲ占メ  
トスルハ且野心滿々ナル計畫ニ驅ラレテ半トシテ事ハ首  
尾一貫シテ明カニアル。日本ノ指導者達ハ武力ニ依リ此  
地位ヲ獲得シ之ヲ維持シテ以テ世界ノ全人口ノ殆ド半分ヲ  
含ム地域ノ支配者ニトシテ決心ヲハキリ言明シタガハル。  
其ノ結果彼等ハ其ノ地域ニ於ケル海路及商業路ニ對シテ  
任意ノ支配權ヲ得ルコトニシタルガハル。

「前ノ經驗及現今ノ發展ハ太平洋地域ニ於ケル所謂  
新秩序トハ政治的ニ云フ。一語ニヨリ統治ヲ意味スルコトイフ  
コトヲ明カニスルガハル。經濟的ニハ該地域ニ於ケル資源ヲ  
日本ノ利益ノ爲ニ使用スル事及該地域ノ他ノ部分ノ究極  
ノ窮乏化ヲ意味シ。又他諸外國ノ利益追放ヲ意味  
スルガハル。

社會的ニ個人ノ自由ノ破壞ト戰ニ敗ラシメ人々ヲ劣等國  
民ノ地位ニ追テキ墜スルコトヲ意味スルガハル。

「一國ガ世界人口ノ半分近クノ人類ヲ征服シ殘酷ニ搾取ス  
ルコトヲ斯ル計畫ハ何處ニ在ルコトヲ問ハズ總テ國政ニ聚  
テ大ニ注目スル事ヲ極テアリ重大且固保障ノ事ヲ極テ  
ルコトヲ總テ人々ニ明カニスルガハル。

2

220C (1P)

「日本が昨今取つて來た行動ニモ摺り、米國政府ハ日本政  
 府ニ対シテ米國及其、他ノ國家間ニ於ケル正當ナル平和的手段  
 ヲ信スル諸國ト間ニ友好關係ヲ開始スルヲ日本ニ願フ最善  
 ノ利益ヲ見ト云フ事ヲ網得キル為、努力ヲ盡キタリ、  
 我々政府ハ如何ナル時トイハレモ努力ヲシタリハナカド、

外交關係ニ

P 五三五頁

三九頁及三三〇頁

Doc. No. 1383B(18)

Page 1

TOP SECRET

Copy of the Telegram of Ambassador OSHIMA to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, dispatched on 20 May (T.N. Year is missing) (1941?) No. 567.

In connection with the rumor that you are going to America, I heard various rumors here concerning the problems of the negotiation between Japan and America. Although from the interview with RIBBENTROP on 5th May, I learned that it was not a mere rumor. Although I intended to go on without touching this matter, in view of the tendency of this matter, and considering the future of Japan and of the influence of the Tripartite Pact, I can not remain without some deep thoughts. As I believe that it is my duty to inform you of the opinion of the German staff and also of my frank opinion, I send the separate telegrams no. 568 and no. 569.

What I want to mention to you now is as follows:

You showed me the reason why you did not inform this matter to the Italian Ambassador in Germany two times recently. However, presently I have no intentions of sounding out the problem of the confidence in me or of my position towards the people during the present critical period when the whole of our nation should act upon the "Way of the Imperial Subjects" as its primary principle. Much less do I try to sound your opinion, for the practice and technique of diplomacy belong to your department.

But what I cannot understand is that you think it is unnecessary to have me report the opinions of the Staffs of Germany and Italy, when the Japanese-American Agreement which has a very delicate relation with the Tripartite Pact, is about to be concluded. Therefore, from the standpoint of my duty as an Ambassador to Germany, I could not keep silent, and I expressed my opinion frankly in the separate telegrams, although it might be unnecessary. I beg you to take these circumstances into consideration. (End)

Copy of the Telegram from Ambassador OSHIMA to  
Foreign Minister MATSUOKA.  
No. 568

1. On 3rd May Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP asked me to visit him. When I called on him I was informed about the telegram regarding the Japanese-American negotiation. He said that although the telegram was to be kept a secret from me and the Italian Ambassador, as a friend to me, he revealed it to me for my personal understanding, since the matter is extremely serious. He then showed me the draft regarding the agreement proposed by America on 16 April. The draft consisted of four articles. He (RIBBENTROP) confessed that he was quite at a loss to understand the real intention of the Japanese government, so I answered him that Japan was observing the Tripartite Pact as the basis of its diplomacy, as you (Foreign Minister MATSUOKA) had clearly stated on your previous visit to Germany. I further told him that, accordingly, there was no reason to conclude such a treaty between Japan and America contrary to the Tripartite Pact. Thus, I avoided being concerned in this matter.

2. But on 9th of May RIBBENTROP asked me to visit him again, and he showed me OTT's telegram of the draft of the intermediary answer of Japan to America and also the telegraphic record of the conference between you and OTT which was held on 6th of May. RIBBENTROP seemed to have understood the affair clearly from the frequent telegrams sent by OTT, and according to the said intermediate reply, it is supposed that Japan has consulted regarding the understanding with America to a considerable extent, and to tell you frankly, according to the informations that Germany has gathered, from various sources, there is a report that the proposal was made by Japan. Gathering from the conversation of Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and OTT, it seems to me that Foreign Minister MATSUOKA was compelled by a certain group to consent to it. Moreover, it is reported that Foreign Minister MATSUOKA during the course of that conference stated that Japan will participate in a Russo-German war, if it should breakout. When Foreign Minister MATSUOKA visited Germany recently, he said, as his personal opinion, that Japan was going to attack SINGAPORE, but it seems that you have changed your opinion.

I have some doubts as to the true intention of ROOSEVELT.

If you should become obliged to conclude this agreement in order to avoid the participation in a remotely possible war, the Tripartite Pact would in reality become meaningless even if it may be possible to hit upon some legal pretext. Moreover, I believe that in Japan's progress, she will lose the chance to establish her right for leadership in East Asia. After lengthy thoughts concerning this problem, I thought of the following two plans from the German viewpoint.

- (a) Plan to refuse the proposal of America.
- (b) Plan to conclude the Japanese-American agreement under the condition that America maintain a neutral attitude without extending 'convoy' patrol lines.

RIBBENTROP asked my (Ambassador OSHIMA) opinion, saying that he wished to report plan (a) to the Fuhrer as he believed it to be a good one. Therefore, although I did not receive any instruction, I conjectured the intention of the Japanese government from common sense, and as my personal opinion, insisted upon plan (b) explaining that (b) would be much more advantageous to Germany. The reasons that I explained to RIBBENTROP were as follows:

If plan (b) are adopted, Germany will be able to fight a single combat against Britain and terminate the war in a short time. Again, although it might be wishful thinking, perhaps the "ROOSEVELT faction" may recognize the fact that America's assistance to Britain would be useless, and would make it a reason to alleviate America's assistance to Britain.

Even in case of its failure, it is useful at least for ascertaining ROOSEVELT's actual intentions concerning the assistance to Britain. Thirdly, it will enable those Japanese who want the cooperation with America to realize its impossibility. However, RIBBENTROP said that America would utilize this negotiation to estrange Japan from Germany, as long as this negotiation continued, and he repeated the same thing in telegram no. 545 (dispatched to TURKEY, no. 11). He further stated that it is possible for America to utilize it as propaganda material to convince the anti-war faction in America that America could now advance to the Atlantic Ocean because of the elimination of apprehension in Pacific area, and consequently the situation would become very dangerous to Germany. Therefore, he did not agree with my opinion, and said that at any rate this problem has not yet been decided by the Fuhrer, so he wanted

to send a telegram on the evening of the same day to the Fuhrer, who was out of BERLIN, for a decision. At the same time, he wished to report my opinion to the Fuhrer. Then I asked him whether or not he had consulted with Italy already. To my question, he answered that Italy has already received all the reports from Ambassador INDERLI, but he had not yet consulted directly with the Italian government, but that as soon as he received the decision of the Fuhrer, he wished to send the telegram to OTT so that he might consult Italy.

2. As I made a promise to Prime Minister MUSSOLINI to visit him at the beginning of this month, I started for ROME on the night of the 10th. On the morning of the 12th, Minister BISMARCK visited me, and by orders of RIBBENTROP, he showed me the telegraphic instructions to OTT and added that the Italian government had the same opinion as Germany. After I read that instruction, I recognized that the Fuhrer had made a different decision from that of RIBBENTROP. In the afternoon of 13th, RIBBENTROP flew unexpectedly to ROME and met MUSSOLINI and CIANO on the same day, and asked me to visit him on the morning of the 14th. When I went to see him, he showed me the telegram from OTT concerning the interview on the 12th, between you (Foreign Minister MATSUOKA) and the two Ambassadors of Germany and Italy in Tokyo. He expressed deep discontentment at your statement that you had been in a position where you were compelled to commence with the negotiation with America and that because of internal reasons, you were unable to await the arrival of opinions from Germany and Italy. He asked reproachfully why couldn't you await the telegraphic instructions when they were sure to arrive in several days. I told him that although I was not aware of the circumstances, I guessed that Japan was compelled to take such a measure because of the following reasons: It was necessary for Japan to conclude the agreement as soon as possible to maintain secrecy, and in Japan such important negotiations as this must be privately reported to the Emperor. I added that I believed that the agreement was not made out of inconsideration to Germany and Italy. RIBBENTROP, however, would not readily accept my words. He said that when you (Foreign Minister MATSUOKA) visited Germany, he met you (MATSUOKA) many times but he did not hear anything substantial concerning the Japanese-American agreement which is closely related to the Tripartite Pact. He said that it came as a great surprise to him when he received such a report soon after you (Foreign Minister MATSUOKA) returned to Japan. He continued that frankly he was much afraid that the agreement might make the Tripartite Pact automatically meaningless. He also said that as he



(RIBBENTROP) had remarked the other day, he did not believe ROOSEVELT from the very beginning, and that although his opinion was to advise Japan to refuse the American proposal he had to send a telegraphic instruction contrary to his own opinion. Hearing that I told him that it was a great pity to have a misunderstanding between Japan and Germany concerning this matter, so I gave advice to him that it was very necessary to inform OTT of his opinion, to make the facts clear and certain. When I visited Foreign Minister CIANO on the evening of the same day, it seemed that an interview had already taken place between RIBBENTROP, MUSSOLINI and CIANO, since CIANO expressed the same opinion as RIBBENTROP.

3. No sooner did I return to BERLIN on May 17th, than I was asked by Vice Minister WEISEGGER to visit him. When I called on him, he, by the telegraphic order of RIBBENTROP at FUSSELL, showed me a draft of Japan's answer to America which was telegraphed by OTT on the 14th, and the draft of the instruction of the German government to OTT concerning Japan's answer to America. He (WEISEGGER) said that as he received the order only to show me (Ambassador OSHIMA) the telegram, he will not express any opinion, but that in view of the present political situation, the German government had a deep concern about the result of this problem. He added that the German government attached great importance to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's statement to OTT to the effect that Japan would attack the U.S.S.R. in case of a Russo-German war. He (WEISEGGER) then asked me whether or not Foreign Minister MATSUOKA understood the true state of affairs between Germany and Russia when he returned from his stay in Germany. I told him that I did not know what the Foreign Minister had revealed concerning Japan's attitude toward a Russo-German war, but that in Japan, such an important matter as this should be decided by the Emperor, and that probably Foreign Minister MATSUOKA must have expressed his personal opinion. I further added that since the Foreign Minister had many interviews with Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP during his stay in Germany I had no doubt that you (MATSUOKA) were aware of the real relationship between Germany and Soviet Russia.

(End)

Telegram No. 569 sent by Ambassador OSHIMA to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA.

1. As I reported in the separate telegram, the German government has a deep dissatisfaction concerning the problem of the Japanese-American agreement, and has much apprehension about the future of the Tripartite Pact. Since America is actually participating in the war, if Japan, ignoring the present circumstances, should conclude an agreement with America, it would be very natural for Germany to suspect that Japan is trying to check America's participation in the war, and at the same time trying to avoid her own obligation of participating in the war. When you came to Germany, all the people in Germany heartily welcomed you, and delighted in the strengthening of the 'Axis'. Since this is directly after that occasion, the feeling that Germany was betrayed is very strong.

2. I am well aware of Japan's desire to solve the China Incident as soon as possible in order to have time to spare for politics, economy and other fields. However, the European war is developing very favourably for Germany and Italy. In a few months, very important developments are expected, and if at this time Japan should lose the confidence and trust of Germany and Italy who will become the leaders in Europe, simply for an immediate profit, it is very unfavourable. Needless to say, America seems to have proposed the agreement as a temporary measure for estranging Japan from the Tripartite Alliance. I am afraid that such a two-faced diplomacy should lead Japan to an absolute international isolation during the critical period which may arise after the war.

3. Aside from the point that if Japan solves the China Incident with the support of America, she will leave an uneradicated root of future calamity, I express my apprehension that should Japan lose this opportunity to expand southward and the possibility of attacking SINGAPORE at random, she will invite the contempt of not only America and Britain, but also those of Germany and Italy. And, should America, taking advantage of the elimination of fear in the Pacific area, reinforce her assistance to Britain, the development of the European War would greatly be affected although America may avoid nominal participation in the war. Subsequently, Japan may suffer from some unexpected calamity. Moreover, should Japan abandon her right to leadership in the Southern regions for the sake of America, it is clear that Japan cannot stress the leadership to Germany and Italy.

This will mean that Japan abandoned her great mission to establish a new order in the Greater East Asia.

4. Last autumn, Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact, and the road our people should follow was made clear. But, if Japan should conclude the Japanese-American Agreement now, our people in Japan would be bewildered as to which path they should follow. Moreover, our friendly countries will despise Japan and will not trust Japan any longer. Subsequently, Japan will fall into international isolation, and will gain nothing. Therefore, I hope earnestly that the Japanese Government will embody the following two points, if the conclusion of the agreement is unavoidable:

- (a) As conditions to the conclusion of the Japanese-American agreement, it is absolutely necessary for Japan that she should make use of her situation over America, and establish the idea of the Tripartite Pact, by upholding the principle that Japan is to facilitate the battle of Germany and Italy against Britain. Again, Japan should demand America's neutrality in the European war, and at the same time, make clear that Japan has an obligation to participate in the war, based upon the Tripartite Pact. If America does not accept our proposal, Japan must not conclude the agreement.
- (b) It is most unfavourable for Japan to give the impression to Germany and Italy that the Japanese government is compelled to conclude the agreement on account of the increasing influence of a party in Japan that wants status quo. The conclusion of the Japanese-American agreement will only make Germany and Italy increasingly suspect that Japan took this action in order to avoid the obligation to participate in the war. Therefore, concerning the Japanese-American negotiation, Japan has to exchange frank opinions with Germany and Italy, and must thoroughly convince Germany and Italy about the purport of article (a).

Doc 1383B(18)

極秘

外機密

No 1

五月二十日大島大使從松岡大臣宛電報寫

第五六七号

日米交渉問題ニ付テ、貴大臣ノ渡米說ト關聯シ、當地ニ於テ種々ノ風説ヲ耳ニシ、居リシカ、五月五日、外相ト會談ニ依リ、在カ早キ風説ニ付、此コトヲ承認シ、貴大臣ノ意圖ヲ付度シ、本使トシテ、本件ニ干與セザル建前ニ進出ス存セシカ、本件、推移ヲ見テ、本使、帝國ノ前途甚ク三國條約ノ影響ヲ考ヘ、深慮ニ堪ヘズ、一カニテ、獨逸首腦部ノ意向並、卑見ヲ率直ニ貴大臣ニ披瀝シ、本使、當然ノ義務トシテ、信ノ別電、第五六八号及第五六九号、通事申入

尚此ノ際、併セテ申上度、最近兩國ニ亙リ、本件ヲ在、獨伊、使通報セザル理由ヲ示シ、在カ、本使、現下、重大時局ニ於テ、万民、正道實踐ヲ第一トシ、キ、信任ノ問題、トカ、國民ノ立場トカ、ヲ、論索セ、トスルカ、如キ、意志、毫末、トシ、況ニ、外交、實質、施及、技術、ハ、貴大臣、主宰、セラシ、居ル、前、此、ニ、於テ、不、可、唯、本使、理解、心得、此、三國、條約、ト、極、大、ノ、機、微、關係、ニ、在ル、日米、協定、ヲ、結、ハ、ト、セラ、ル、ニ、當リ、本使、等、之、ヲ、獨伊、首腦、部、ノ、意向、高、ヲ、報告、セ、ル、ニ、要、ト、シ、ト、セラ、ル、ニ、在リ、從テ、別電、亦、蛇足、感、ス、ル、モ、本使、駐、獨、大使、ノ、任、ニ、在、ル、限リ、職責、上、默、ス、ル、能、ハ、不、盡、心、悃、懷、ニ、所、信、ヲ、述、ス、ル、ニ、在リ、ヲ、諫、セ、ラ、ル、ト、ス、

五月二十日大島大使從松岡大臣宛電報寫

第五六八号

五月三日、外相、本使、來訪ヲ、承、メ、本日、不、以、リ、日米

Doc/383B(1A)

交渉ニ関スル電報ヲ接受セリ本件ハ貴大使及在伊大使  
知ラザルコトニシテ、趣ニ付貴大使ニ申上テ得ル脚コト  
ルニ何分事極大ニ重大ナルヲ以テ、貴大使ニ極匿  
スル能ハズ、貴大使個人ノ命ニ迄ニ申上テ、次才ナリ以テ  
在伊承知アリタリトシテ、四月十六日米國提案協定案  
骨子四條ノ電報ヲ不シ自命(可)ニ、突然日本ヨリ斯ル提  
案ヲ受テ、實ハ日本政府ノ真意ヲ知ルニ若シ、アル日ヲ述  
ヘタルニ付、本使ハ先般松岡外相訪独、際判然述テ、如  
ク日本ハ三國條約ヲ外交ノ基調ト爲シ、アルヲ以テ、日米間ニ  
之ニ背馳スルカ如キ約ヲ結ブ録テ、上答ニ本件ニ關係否  
避ケ置キタリ

ニ、此レ五月九日更ニ、本使ハ來訪ヲ求メ、不以上ヨリ電報  
アリタル米國ニ對シ、日本ハ中間回答案並ニ五月六日ニ於ケル  
貴大臣ト不以上ノ會議記錄電報ヲ不以上ノ、厚次、不以上  
電ニヨリ明カトナリタルカ、在中間回答ニ依リ、日本ハ既ニ中  
題ニ関シ相當米國ト深クシタル協議ヲ爲シ、アルト察セ  
テ、又打明テ申上テ、ハ、独逸、今日迄諸方面ヨリ接取  
セル情報中ニ、本件ハ日本ヨリ提案セシタリト爲セル  
アリ、又松岡外相ノ不以上ニ對スル才語ヨリ察スルニ、松岡外相  
カ、或一派ニ引摺シ、己ヲ得ヌ之ニ同意セルカ、如ク見ラ、猶又  
該會議中、松岡外相ハ、独逸ノ戰爭起ラ、日本ハ之ニ參加  
スルニ至ルキコトヲ述ヘラ、タルカ、松岡外相ハ先般來独、際  
私見トシテ、承リタル新嘉坡攻撃ヲ行ハトスル御意見ハ

No.2

Doc/383B(18)

全ヲ中改ニナリタレト考ヘル

予ハ心スルニ、真意ヲ疑フ元ニシテ若シ此等ニ乘モ之又  
萬一場合ニ於テハ吾等ノ義務ヲ回避スル為本協定ヲ締結  
セラルト、元ニハ法理上何トテ之理窟ヲ着目シ得ルニ事實上  
三國條約ハ骨板トナレク又日本前途ニ執リテモ其要ニ  
於テハ指導權確立ノ機ヲ失セラルト考ヘ予ハ本問題  
取扱ニ固シ熱慮、結果他逸側意見トシテ決シ案ヲ考  
フ

(1) 米國、提案ヲ拒否セラル、案

(4) 米國カコトホシ、哨戒線擴張等ヲ行ハス中、立、能  
度ヲ保持スルニテ條件トシテ日本協定ヲ結ブ案

自命(リ) (1) 案ヲ可ト信シ之ヲ總統ニ具申シ、之ヲ存スル

貴見如何ト向ヒテ之ヲ以テ本使、何等訓令ニ按シ居テ是  
部識的ニ帝國政府、意圖ヲ忖度シ本使、私見トシテ

ニ對シ(4) 案ヲ有利トスルヲ主張シ之ヲ理由トシテ若シ該案  
成立セ、他逸、英國ト一騎打ヲ為シ得、對英戰爭、締結

ヲ速カクシテ之ヲ得、又之、虫ノ良キ考カクモ知ラズ  
或ハ心スルニ、一派カ對英援助、無效ナルヲ知リ之ヲ緩

和セトシ理由ニ利用スル場合ニ全然ナシト考ヘ之ヲ  
不成立、場合ニ於テモ少クモ之ヲ不レシ、對英援助ニ固スル

真意ヲ確得ル利益ヲ、又我國內ニ於テ日本協調ヲ  
考フル者ニモ其、不可能ナルトヲ納得セシメ得ト述ベ

然レ、自命、本交渉ヲ繼續スル間米國ハ之ヲ日離  
間ニ利用スルトテ往電才五四五号(上耳古宛才一)号、件

ヲ述ベ又米國內ニ於テモ非戰派ニ對シテ說得材料ニ利用  
シ之ヲ以テ太平洋、既ニ心配ナキ故ニ大西洋ニ進出シ奇

No. 3

1

Doc 1383B(18)

ナリト云々之誠ニ危険ナリト述(本使意見ニ種々成セニ免毛自毛本件  
各名ニ總統裁決ヲ懸念シテ以テ今後皇伯孫外ニ在ル總統下電報  
裁決ニ依テ下之其際貴大使ノ意見ニ併セ述フニト以テ  
ハタリ依テ本使ハ伊太利側ト既ニ協議セシタリヤト問  
ハルニ伊太利側元ノイニ完リ大使ヨリ一切ヲ報告セラズルモ  
未タ直接伊太利ト協議シテラストハ裁決アリ次ハ  
「大ツ」ニ對スル訓電ヲ起草スルヲ以テ之ニ依リ伊太利ト  
協議スル答ナリト答(タリ)

ニ本使既ニ本月初メハ首相訪問ノ約ナリ居リ十日夜發  
「ロ」ニ赴キニ十二日朝「ロ」ニ公使本使ヲ來訪シ  
命ナリトテ「ロ」ニ對スル訓電ヲ示スト共ニ伊太利政府之  
之ト同意見ナル旨述(タリ)該案ヲ讀ムニ及ビテ總統  
「ロ」ノ意見ニ及ビタル裁決ヲ知リ、此ニ十三日午「ロ」突  
然「ロ」ニ飛來ニ同日「ロ」ニ「ロ」ト會見シ十四日午前本使  
「ロ」來訪ヲ求タリ依テ彼ヲ往訪セルニ十三日東京ニ於ケル  
貴大臣ト獨伊大使ト會見ニ因テ「ロ」ノ電報ヲ示シ  
貴大臣力内政ノ關係上獨伊意見到着ヲ待ツ能ハス  
米國ニ對シ交渉ヲ開始セザルハ「ロ」ノ事情ニ在ルヲ述  
「ロ」タリトテ大ニ不滿ヲ表シ僅力數日間待テ「ロ」獨伊訓電  
到着ス「ロ」答ナリニ何故之ヲ待テ得サリヤト云「ロ」以テ  
本使全然其ノ事實ヲ知「ロ」ヲ以テ何モ申上ケラズル科  
密保持ノ關係上速ニ之ヲ解決スル必要アリ又日本ニ於テハ  
此ノ種重要交渉ハ陛下ニ内奏申上ル關係モナリ或ハ  
此等ノ理由ニヨリ己ノ行ハルニ出ラズト相傳不レモ  
獨伊ニ對スル不親切ニ非ルコトハ確信不述(タリ)

No. 4

Doc 1383 B (外)

然ルニ「ハ容易ニ納得セ又実ハ松岡外相訪独、陰度々  
 面接セハ三國條約ニ密接ナル關係ヲ日本協定ニ関シ  
 何等具體的、御諾モテハ松岡外相停朝早々斯ノ如キ  
 通知ニ接セルコト實ニ意外ニ感シ居ル所ニシテ率直ニ申セ  
 ハ自分「ハ三國條約ニ自ラ弛緩ヲ致スモノト痛ク憂  
 慮シ居ル」先日モ申上ケタル如ク自分「ハ始メテ  
 「ル」ニシテ「ハ」ヲ信セス日本ニ米國ノ提案拒絶ヲ即勸メ  
 セトスル意見ナリ」モ自分、オト違ヒタル案ヲ訓令ニ  
 子「ナリ」ト述ケタルヲ以テ本件ニ関シ日獨兩國政府  
 間ニ於テ誤解起ルコトハ最モ忌ムヘキコトヲ以テ申懸念ハ  
 「オ」ト「ニ」訓令セラシ「ニ」命ニ申確メタルコト極大ニ緊要ニ  
 「ヲ」保護「ハ」注意シ置ケリ 同夕「ハ」外相ヲ訪問セハ既  
 「リ」カ「ハ」及「テ」ト語合ヒタルニ「ハ」リ「ト」同様意見ヲ  
 述セリ

三 五月十七日日本使停伯スルヤ「ハ」自「ハ」次官「ハ」來ニ  
 三「リ」往訪セル「ハ」ハ「在」「ハ」シ「ハ」リ「ハ」電命ニ依ル「ハ」  
 十四日附「ハ」オ「ハ」米電日本ノ對米國答復並ニ之ニ基キ「ハ」  
 三「ハ」對「ハ」獨逸政府ノ訓令案ヲ提示シ自分「ハ」ハ「貴」又便  
 二電文ヲ提示ス「ハ」キ訓令ヲ受ケタル「ハ」ニ「ハ」以テ何等意見  
 述「ハ」トスルニ非サルモ特ニ現在ノ政局上獨逸政府ハ本件問題  
 成行ニ深キ關心ヲ有シ「ハ」コトヲ述「ハ」又松岡外相カ若シ獨逸  
 開戦セハ日本ハ「ハ」聯邦ヲ攻撃ス「ハ」キコトヲ「ハ」オ「ハ」述「ハ」  
 乙「ハ」タルコトハ独「ハ」乙「ハ」之ヲ重要視「ハ」シ「ハ」外相ハ「ハ」獨逸中獨

No. 5



Doc 1383 B (18)

蘇蘭係，真相ヲ了解シテ得ルヤト問ルヲ以テ本便  
ハ獨蘇開戰ニ際シ日本，熱ルニ能ク度ニ問ル外相何  
ト云ハタカハ知ラサレト是斯ク重大ナル事柄ハ我國ニ於テハ  
聖斷ニ俟ツ（キモ）其ハ恐ラカク外相ハ私見ヲ述ベテ之ヲ定メ  
タルヲ又外相ハ滯獨中應ル外相トモ會見セザルニ  
付獨蘇關係，真相ヲ知ラシムルヲ疑ハト答（置キテ）

### 大島大使發松岡大臣宛第五九号電報

日米協定問題ニ関シ獨逸側ニ於テ深刻ナル不滿ヲ  
有シ三國條約，前途ニ関シ多大ノ危惧ヲ有シ居ルヲ列  
電，如シ蓋シ米國力既ニ事實上參戰ニ居ル今日  
其ノ現状ヲ默過シ日米間ニ於テ協定ヲ結ビ，恰ニ  
日本ハ米國，參戰ヲ阻止シ行キテ自國，參戰義務  
ヲ回避スルヲリト，疑惑ヲ抱クハ獨逸トシテ，己方ヲ得ル  
所ナルヲ殊ニ先般貴大臣，日米獨ニ際シ獨乙朝野力  
舉テ之ヲ歡迎，意ヲ表シ杞軸，強化ヲ記歌シテ直接  
トシテ獨乙トシテ意切ニシテリト，威ヲ強クシ居ル次ナリ  
ニ帝國力支那事變，速ニ解決ヲ圖リ政治經濟各般  
ノ餘福ヲ得テスル必要ハ本便トシテ之ヲ了解スル所ナリト  
雖モ今ヤ歐洲戰爭，公益ニ獨行ニ有利ニ進展シ此處數  
日ノ中ニ重大ナル發展，豫測セシ居ル際目前，利益，  
為ニ歐洲ニ於テ指導的地位ヲ確保スルニ獨行ニ不信  
ヲ抱キテ米國之ヲ妥當ニシテ多大ノ疑問ナリ，況ニ米國  
提案ハ早ニ日本ヲ三國同盟ヨリ切離セテスル一時の

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策謀<sup>二</sup>過<sup>一</sup>于<sup>レ</sup>其<sup>レ</sup>解<sup>レ</sup>力<sup>二</sup>于<sup>レ</sup>其<sup>レ</sup>中<sup>一</sup>本使<sup>レ</sup>所<sup>レ</sup>、  
 如<sup>レ</sup>而<sup>レ</sup>面<sup>レ</sup>外交<sup>一</sup>、戰<sup>レ</sup>後<sup>レ</sup>未<sup>レ</sup>（<sup>レ</sup>于<sup>レ</sup>重<sup>レ</sup>大<sup>レ</sup>危<sup>レ</sup>局<sup>一</sup>）<sup>二</sup>于<sup>レ</sup>高<sup>レ</sup>國<sup>一</sup>、  
 完<sup>レ</sup>全<sup>レ</sup>于<sup>レ</sup>國<sup>レ</sup>際<sup>レ</sup>的<sup>レ</sup>孤<sup>レ</sup>立<sup>一</sup>、<sup>二</sup>陷<sup>レ</sup>之<sup>レ</sup>以<sup>レ</sup>其<sup>レ</sup>力<sup>一</sup>、<sup>二</sup>其<sup>レ</sup>力<sup>一</sup>、  
 三<sup>レ</sup>更<sup>レ</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>米<sup>レ</sup>國<sup>一</sup>、口<sup>レ</sup>添<sup>レ</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>依<sup>レ</sup>り<sup>一</sup>友<sup>レ</sup>邦<sup>レ</sup>事<sup>レ</sup>業<sup>一</sup>、解<sup>レ</sup>決<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>二</sup>討<sup>レ</sup>之<sup>レ</sup>力<sup>一</sup>、  
 將<sup>レ</sup>來<sup>レ</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>關<sup>レ</sup>之<sup>レ</sup>重<sup>レ</sup>大<sup>レ</sup>之<sup>レ</sup>禍<sup>レ</sup>根<sup>レ</sup>ヲ<sup>レ</sup>殘<sup>レ</sup>及<sup>レ</sup>之<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>二</sup>其<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>レ</sup>暫<sup>レ</sup>ク<sup>レ</sup>措<sup>レ</sup>生<sup>一</sup>、  
 此<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>二</sup>絕<sup>レ</sup>好<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>レ</sup>機<sup>レ</sup>會<sup>一</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>南<sup>レ</sup>方<sup>レ</sup>經<sup>レ</sup>略<sup>一</sup>ヲ<sup>レ</sup>抛<sup>レ</sup>棄<sup>一</sup>、<sup>二</sup>況<sup>レ</sup>シ<sup>レ</sup>ヤ<sup>一</sup>何<sup>レ</sup>時<sup>レ</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>是<sup>一</sup>、  
 新<sup>レ</sup>嘉<sup>レ</sup>坡<sup>一</sup>ヲ<sup>レ</sup>攻<sup>レ</sup>略<sup>一</sup>之<sup>レ</sup>得<sup>レ</sup>合<sup>レ</sup>ト<sup>一</sup>、<sup>二</sup>見<sup>レ</sup>込<sup>レ</sup>ス<sup>レ</sup>ヲ<sup>レ</sup>失<sup>レ</sup>カ<sup>レ</sup>如<sup>レ</sup>キ<sup>一</sup>、<sup>二</sup>八<sup>レ</sup>單<sup>一</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>、  
 英<sup>レ</sup>米<sup>一</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>力<sup>一</sup>又<sup>レ</sup>獨<sup>レ</sup>伊<sup>一</sup>、<sup>二</sup>輕<sup>レ</sup>侮<sup>レ</sup>ス<sup>レ</sup>ヲ<sup>レ</sup>招<sup>レ</sup>ク<sup>レ</sup>モ<sup>レ</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>于<sup>レ</sup>其<sup>レ</sup>中<sup>一</sup>而<sup>レ</sup>言<sup>一</sup>、  
 今<sup>レ</sup>後<sup>レ</sup>米<sup>レ</sup>國<sup>一</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>于<sup>レ</sup>太<sup>レ</sup>平<sup>レ</sup>洋<sup>一</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>在<sup>レ</sup>ケ<sup>レ</sup>ル<sup>一</sup>後<sup>レ</sup>顧<sup>レ</sup>慮<sup>レ</sup>憂<sup>レ</sup>于<sup>レ</sup>其<sup>レ</sup>中<sup>一</sup>、  
 良<sup>レ</sup>キ<sup>レ</sup>コト<sup>一</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>之<sup>レ</sup>名<sup>レ</sup>義<sup>一</sup>上<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>二</sup>參<sup>レ</sup>戰<sup>一</sup>、<sup>レ</sup>避<sup>レ</sup>ケ<sup>レ</sup>ル<sup>一</sup>、<sup>二</sup>對<sup>レ</sup>英<sup>一</sup>援<sup>レ</sup>助<sup>一</sup>ヲ<sup>レ</sup>強<sup>レ</sup>化<sup>レ</sup>シ<sup>レ</sup>カ<sup>レ</sup>、  
 如<sup>レ</sup>于<sup>レ</sup>場<sup>レ</sup>合<sup>一</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>于<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>二</sup>歐<sup>レ</sup>洲<sup>一</sup>戰<sup>レ</sup>局<sup>一</sup>、<sup>二</sup>發<sup>レ</sup>展<sup>一</sup>之<sup>レ</sup>影<sup>レ</sup>響<sup>一</sup>亦<sup>レ</sup>不<sup>レ</sup>鮮<sup>一</sup>也、  
 力<sup>レ</sup>于<sup>レ</sup>其<sup>レ</sup>中<sup>一</sup>、<sup>二</sup>高<sup>レ</sup>國<sup>一</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>于<sup>レ</sup>不<sup>レ</sup>測<sup>一</sup>、<sup>二</sup>害<sup>レ</sup>生<sup>レ</sup>ス<sup>レ</sup>コト<sup>一</sup>ヲ<sup>レ</sup>保<sup>レ</sup>セ<sup>レ</sup>ス、  
 尚<sup>レ</sup>米<sup>レ</sup>國<sup>一</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>對<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>二</sup>大<sup>レ</sup>東<sup>一</sup>亞<sup>一</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>包<sup>レ</sup>含<sup>レ</sup>セ<sup>レ</sup>ル<sup>一</sup>、<sup>二</sup>于<sup>レ</sup>南<sup>レ</sup>方<sup>一</sup>地<sup>レ</sup>域<sup>一</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>對<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>二</sup>不<sup>レ</sup>能<sup>一</sup>、  
 指<sup>レ</sup>導<sup>レ</sup>權<sup>一</sup>ヲ<sup>レ</sup>抛<sup>レ</sup>棄<sup>一</sup>ス<sup>レ</sup>ル<sup>一</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>于<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>二</sup>獨<sup>レ</sup>伊<sup>一</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>對<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>二</sup>之<sup>レ</sup>主<sup>レ</sup>張<sup>一</sup>不<sup>レ</sup>下<sup>一</sup>、  
 能<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>二</sup>其<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>レ</sup>明<sup>レ</sup>カ<sup>レ</sup>シ<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>二</sup>大<sup>レ</sup>東<sup>一</sup>亞<sup>一</sup>新<sup>レ</sup>秩<sup>レ</sup>序<sup>一</sup>建<sup>レ</sup>設<sup>一</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>固<sup>レ</sup>ス<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>二</sup>我<sup>レ</sup>大<sup>レ</sup>使<sup>レ</sup>命<sup>一</sup>、  
 ヲ<sup>レ</sup>抛<sup>レ</sup>棄<sup>一</sup>シ<sup>レ</sup>ル<sup>一</sup>モ<sup>レ</sup>ト<sup>一</sup>云<sup>レ</sup>ハ<sup>レ</sup>ル<sup>一</sup>、<sup>二</sup>力<sup>一</sup>又<sup>レ</sup>

No. 7

四<sup>レ</sup>昨<sup>レ</sup>日<sup>一</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>國<sup>一</sup>條<sup>レ</sup>約<sup>一</sup>締<sup>レ</sup>結<sup>一</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>依<sup>レ</sup>り<sup>一</sup>國<sup>レ</sup>民<sup>一</sup>、<sup>二</sup>向<sup>レ</sup>テ<sup>レ</sup>所<sup>レ</sup>明<sup>レ</sup>カ<sup>レ</sup>ト<sup>レ</sup>シ<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>二</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>、  
 今<sup>レ</sup>又<sup>レ</sup>日<sup>レ</sup>米<sup>一</sup>協<sup>レ</sup>定<sup>一</sup>ヲ<sup>レ</sup>締<sup>レ</sup>結<sup>一</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>于<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>二</sup>內<sup>レ</sup>國<sup>レ</sup>民<sup>一</sup>ヲ<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>二</sup>其<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>レ</sup>歸<sup>レ</sup>趨<sup>一</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>迷<sup>一</sup>、  
 之<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>二</sup>外<sup>レ</sup>交<sup>一</sup>友<sup>レ</sup>邦<sup>一</sup>、<sup>二</sup>不<sup>レ</sup>信<sup>レ</sup>ト<sup>レ</sup>輕<sup>レ</sup>侮<sup>レ</sup>ス<sup>レ</sup>ヲ<sup>レ</sup>招<sup>レ</sup>キ<sup>一</sup>、<sup>二</sup>實<sup>レ</sup>利<sup>一</sup>ヲ<sup>レ</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>無<sup>レ</sup>國<sup>一</sup>、  
 際<sup>レ</sup>的<sup>レ</sup>孤<sup>レ</sup>立<sup>一</sup>ヲ<sup>レ</sup>招<sup>レ</sup>來<sup>一</sup>ス<sup>レ</sup>ル<sup>一</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>過<sup>レ</sup>キ<sup>レ</sup>ル<sup>一</sup>コト<sup>一</sup>ヲ<sup>レ</sup>懼<sup>レ</sup>ル<sup>一</sup>、<sup>二</sup>次<sup>レ</sup>第<sup>一</sup>在<sup>レ</sup>于<sup>レ</sup>高<sup>レ</sup>國<sup>一</sup>、  
 國<sup>レ</sup>際<sup>レ</sup>府<sup>一</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>于<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>二</sup>協<sup>レ</sup>定<sup>一</sup>締<sup>レ</sup>結<sup>一</sup>ヲ<sup>レ</sup>己<sup>レ</sup>コ<sup>レ</sup>得<sup>レ</sup>不<sup>レ</sup>ト<sup>レ</sup>セ<sup>レ</sup>ル<sup>一</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>何<sup>レ</sup>ヲ<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>二</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>、  
 上<sup>レ</sup>之<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>二</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>レ</sup>切<sup>レ</sup>望<sup>一</sup>又<sup>レ</sup>、  
 (一)日<sup>レ</sup>米<sup>一</sup>協<sup>レ</sup>定<sup>一</sup>ヲ<sup>レ</sup>締<sup>レ</sup>結<sup>一</sup>ス<sup>レ</sup>ル<sup>一</sup>、<sup>二</sup>日<sup>レ</sup>本<sup>一</sup>力<sup>レ</sup>米<sup>レ</sup>國<sup>一</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>對<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>二</sup>其<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>レ</sup>地<sup>レ</sup>位<sup>一</sup>ヲ<sup>レ</sup>利<sup>レ</sup>用<sup>一</sup>、  
 三<sup>レ</sup>國<sup>一</sup>條<sup>レ</sup>約<sup>一</sup>、<sup>二</sup>精<sup>レ</sup>神<sup>一</sup>ヲ<sup>レ</sup>擴<sup>レ</sup>充<sup>一</sup>シ<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>二</sup>獨<sup>レ</sup>伊<sup>一</sup>、<sup>二</sup>對<sup>レ</sup>英<sup>一</sup>作<sup>レ</sup>戰<sup>一</sup>ヲ<sup>レ</sup>容<sup>レ</sup>易<sup>一</sup>、  
 之<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>二</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>レ</sup>主<sup>レ</sup>義<sup>一</sup>ヲ<sup>レ</sup>確<sup>レ</sup>立<sup>一</sup>シ<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>二</sup>米<sup>レ</sup>國<sup>一</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>對<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>二</sup>歐<sup>レ</sup>洲<sup>一</sup>戰<sup>レ</sup>争<sup>一</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>、  
 固<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>二</sup>其<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>レ</sup>中<sup>一</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>于<sup>レ</sup>要<sup>レ</sup>求<sup>一</sup>ス<sup>レ</sup>ル<sup>一</sup>、<sup>二</sup>其<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>レ</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>國<sup>一</sup>條<sup>レ</sup>約<sup>一</sup>三<sup>レ</sup>基<sup>レ</sup>ヲ<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>二</sup>其<sup>レ</sup>、<sup>レ</sup>參<sup>レ</sup>戰<sup>一</sup>

No. 8

Doc 1383B(18)

義務ヲ明カシテ之ニト絶対ニ必要ナリト存ス。而シテ米國  
ニシテ之ヲ容シサレハ協定ハ締結スヘカラズ  
(四) 然レ伊ヲシテ本件ヲ以テ日本ニ於ケル現状維持派力勢力  
ヲ得来ルニ爲己ト得ス。而シテ協定ヲ締結スルニ付テハ、  
印名家ヲ抱カシテ之トハ最モ我ニ不利ニシテ右ハ独伊ヲシテ  
日本ハ吾我回避ノ念ヨリ此舉ヲ出テタリトノ疑惑ヲ  
深カラシムルノミナルニ依リ日本交渉ニ付テハ独伊トノ間意  
トキ意見ノ交換ヲ行ヒ(一) 趣旨ヲ独伊ニ徹底セシムル必要  
アルニ付(了)

Minister	) submitted separately)	) (T.N. these notations were marked in the margin)
Vice-Minister		
Chief of AMERICA Bureau	)	
Chief of EUROPE-ASIA Bureau	)	

(50 13743)

SECRET -- Embassy CHO Code

(T.N. In the copy, there are 2 stamps indicating TOP SECRET.)

Dispatched A.M. May 21, 1941  
from BERLIN.  
Arrived P.M. May 21, 1941  
this office.

To the Foreign Minister

from Ambassador OSHIMA

No. 575

The JAPANESE-AMERICAN Agreement now under negotiation, is thought to be important change in the national policy, and it concerns greatly with the plans of the JAPANESE military and naval attaches in Germany. Therefore, recognizing the fact that it is necessary to transmit this agreement to them beforehand, telegrams No. 567, No. 568, and No. 569 were sent exclusively to both attaches today, the 20th. As regards this matter, I wish you will inform the War Minister, the Naval Minister, the Chief of General Staff, and the Chief of the Navy General Staff.

東洋館長 (印)

明治二十一年一月二十一日 前使伯林發 (機) (機)  
外務省 本館着

383 B (20)

(總) 13/149

外務省 總務課

外務大臣

大島大使

至  
至  
至  
至

等五號

御交渉中、日米協定、意天北國策、美更下志、以陸海軍、  
武官林達、於此諸企劃、國保元所、大北以、之、豫、  
會、父要、下、誠、本、日、兩、武、官、限、合、信、下、行、往、還、家、交、  
手、處、第、五、八、號、第、五、九、號、兩、武、官、提、示、三、付、者、其、大、臣、主、  
陸、海、軍、大、臣、參、謀、總、長、詳、令、部、總、長、備、示、之、願、身、了、了、

No. 4x1076

Doc / 383B(20)

No. 2

五月三十一日 齋藤實任 外務大臣宛電報

第五十五號

御交渉中、日米協定之重要ナル國策、變更ヲ考  
 へ、我陸海軍武官、独逸ニ於テ諸企劃ニ関  
 係スル所、大ニ以テ之ヲ豫メ傳ヘ置ク必要アリト認  
 め、本三十日、兩武官限リ、合ニトシテ、往電第五十六號  
 第五十八號、第五十九號ヲ、兩武官ニ提示セラル付、  
 貴大臣ヨリテ、陸海軍大臣參謀總長、軍令部  
 總長ニ御示シ、願ヒタシ

(了)

Br. Ex. 173

MINORITIES OF A CONFERENCE

Excerpts

(WASHINGTON) May 28, 1941

.....

The Ambassador commented that under the Japanese constitutional system other ministers in addition to the Foreign Minister are consulted in matters relating to foreign policy.

The Secretary said that in his consideration of the matters we have been exploring a difficulty has been presented by questions involving the relations of our respective countries toward the European war. Mr. Matsuda since his return from Europe, according to reports widely published in the press, has been making declarations on every occasion in regard to Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Alliance in the matter of supporting Germany in the event of American entry into the war. He said that, if we went into an agreement with Japan, critics would assert, unless the Japanese Government could clarify its attitude toward its obligations under the Tripartite Alliance in the event that the United States should be drawn into the European war through action in the line of self-defense, that there was no assurance as to Japan's position. The Secretary referred to the President's speech of the previous evening and reviewed what the Secretary had previously said publicly and also to the Ambassador in regard to the attitude of this country toward maintaining the freedom of the seas against Hitler as an essential measure of self-defense.

.....

The Secretary then brought up the question of the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and asked the Ambassador to indicate what the Japanese Government had in mind.

.....

The Ambassador indicated, in reply to specific questions, that such occupation would not include troops retained in China under the provision of cooperative defense against communistic activities. He contemplated an arrangement being negotiated with China similar to the Boxer Protocol under which Japanese troops would be stationed for an indefinite period in North China and Inner Mongolia. The Ambassador said he could not indicate approximately how many troops it was proposed to station in China under such an arrangement or define precisely the areas in which the arrangement would be operative.

Doc. No. 2200(28)

Page 2

Pr. Ex. 173

The Secretary commented that it seemed to him important that relations between China and Japan should be adjusted on a basis which would offer permanent promise of friendship between the two countries; that the continued presence of Japanese troops in China would be a factor operating against such friendship, as the presence of these troops tended to produce incidents and friction.



220C(28)

會談覚書

(アソント)一九四一年(昭和十六年)五月廿八日披露

大使は日本の憲法制度では外交政策に關係あるものは外務大臣の外に他の大臣に相談する事にはなからぬと説明した。

221077

國務長官は彼の考へる所を右々は歐米戦争に對する日米兩國の關係を含む種々の問題から生じた困難を探究し来たを述べた。新嘗に度々發表された報道に依れば松本氏は歐米戦争歸つて以來凡そ機會を得てアメリカが戦争に参加した場合三國同盟に基いて船隻を援助するといふ日本の義務に關する意見を述べた。彼は若し我が國が日本と協定を結んだとしてアメリカが正當防衛の為に航行船隻をヨロシク戦争に捲き込まれる場合に若し日本政府が三國同盟に基く義務に對する態度を何とするか出来ぬならば日本の地位には何等保證がなせぬ

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くまふと批評家は確言するであらうと述べて居る。  
長官は大統領の演説に於ける演説に言及し  
又且、自分が公使及び同大使に述べた事のある事は  
防衛の重要手段としてトラップに對抗する航海の自由  
を維持する事に関するアメリカの態度を批評した  
のである。

よから長官は日本の中華民国撤兵問題を取り  
上げ大使に日本政府の考えを示すやう依頼した

大使は此の特殊な向に答へ、所構な撤兵は共産  
主義活動に對する共同防衛の規約に基き、

中國に駐屯せしめてある軍隊は合意な事と述べた  
彼は此項條約に似た協定の中華民国と交渉さ

2 れる心ありう事を豫期した。その協定に依れば  
華北及び内蒙古に日本軍が各期限に駐屯される  
事となる。所が協定に依り大凡どの位の軍隊が  
中國に駐屯される標念とされべきかを明示する事

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も出来なければ又その地域にこの協定が効力を生ず  
るかを詳細に説明することは出来ないと大使は語  
らなれた。

長官は日華関係が兩國の友誼を永久に約束す  
様な基礎の上に整へられねばならぬといふ事か自身には  
重要な事だと思はれ、又日軍が引退き中國に  
駐在する事は予仲騒擾を起し易いから新様な  
友誼に對し悪い影響を及ぼす因らざるべから  
ずと批評する。

外交関係Ⅱ、四四〇—四四三頁。

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Page 1

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AMERICAN DRAFT PROPOSAL SUBMITTED TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR  
(NOVUM.) ON MAY 31, 1941

(unofficial, Exploratory  
and without Commitment)

(WASHINGTON) May 31, 1941.

The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement of understanding as expressed in a joint declaration.

Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment between their countries should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.

It is our present hope that, by a cooperative effort, the United States and Japan may contribute effectively toward establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and, by the rapid consummation of an amicable understanding, arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening. Both Governments, therefore, desire that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general understanding which would bind, meanwhile, both Governments in honor and in act.

It is the belief of the two Governments that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated at a conference.

Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit:

1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.
2. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.
3. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.
4. Commerce between both nations.
5. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.
6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.
7. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

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Accordingly, the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan have come to the following mutual understanding and declaration of policy:

I. The Concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.

Both governments affirm that their national policies are directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation among our peoples.

Both Governments declare that it is their traditional, and present, concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of other nations.

Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.

II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.

The Government of Japan maintains that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was, and is, defensive and is designed to prevent the participation of nations in the European war not at present involved in it. Obviously, the provisions of the Pact do not apply to involvement through acts of self-defense.

The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European hostilities is and will continue to be determined solely and exclusively by considerations of protection and self-defense; its national security and the defense thereof.

III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.

The Japanese Government having communicated to the Government

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of the United States the general terms within the framework of which the Japanese Government will propose the negotiation of a peaceful settlement with the Chinese Government, which terms are declared by the Japanese Government to be in harmony with the Konoe principles regarding neighborly friendship and mutual respect of sovereignty and territories and with the practical application of those principles, the President of the United States will suggest to the Government of China that the Government of China and the Government of Japan enter into a negotiation on a basis mutually advantageous and acceptable for a termination of hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations.

NOTE: (The foregoing draft of Section III is subject to further discussion of the question of cooperative defense against communistic activities, including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory.)

IV. Commerce between both nations.

When official approbation to the present understanding has been given by both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other mutually to supply such commodities as are, respectively, available and required by either of them. Both Governments further consent to take necessary steps to resume normal trade relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan. If a new commercial treaty is desired by both Governments, it would be negotiated as soon as possible and be concluded in accordance with usual procedures.

V. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.

On the basis of mutual pledges hereby given that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations, the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other toward obtaining non-discriminatory access by Japan and by the United States to commercial supplies of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which each country needs for the safeguarding and development of its own economy.

VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

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The Japanese Government and the Government of the United States declare that the controlling policy underlying this understanding is peace in the Pacific area; that it is their fundamental purpose, through cooperative effort, to contribute to the maintenance and the preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and that neither has territorial designs in the area mentioned.

VII. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

The Government of Japan declares its willingness to enter at such time as the Government of the United States may desire into negotiation with the Government of the United States with a view to the conclusion of a treaty for the neutralization of the Philippine Islands, when Philippine independence shall have been achieved.

(Annex 1)

ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.

The basic terms as referred to in the above section are as follows:

1. Neighborly friendship.
2. (Cooperative defense against injurious communistic activities--including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory.) Subject to further discussion.
3. Economic cooperation--by which China and Japan will proceed on the basis of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
4. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.
5. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neighbors and forming a Far Eastern nucleus contributing to world peace.
6. Withdrawal of Japanese military and naval forces from Chinese territory and Chinese waters as promptly as possible and in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between Japan and China.
7. No annexation.
8. No indemnities.
9. Amicable negotiation in regard to Manchukuo.

(Annex 2)

ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.

The position of the Government of the United States toward the military movement of conquest inaugurated by Mr. Hitler is set forth in a public address made by the Secretary of State on April 24, 1941. Some extracts which are directly in point and which are basic in relation to the entire situation are as follows:

" . . . As waged by them (the aggressor powers) this is not an ordinary war. It is a war of assault by these would-be conquerors, employing every method of barbarism, upon nations which cling to their right to live in freedom and which are resisting in self-defense. . . Such is the movement which is extending rapidly throughout the world.

"If experience shows anything, it shows that no nation anywhere has the slightest reason to feel that it will be exempted from attack by the invader, any more than, in a town overrun by bandits, the wealthiest citizen might expect to be free from attack.

" . . . Every thinking man can answer the question for himself by simply calling the roll of the wretched victims of world aggression who are now in a condition of semi-slavery, and whose every hope of again enjoying the blessings of civilization depends only on the defeat or failure of the movement of conquest. So it is in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Albania, Luxemburg, France, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia.

" . . . The conclusion is plain. Now, after some fifteen nations have lost everything that makes life worth living, it is high time that the remaining free countries should arm to the fullest extent and in the briefest time humanly possible and set for their self-preservation.

" . . . Events have shown beyond possible question that the safety of this hemisphere and of this country calls for resistance wherever resistance will be most effective. . . This policy means, in practical application, that . . . aid must reach its destination in the shortest of time and in maximum quantity. So--ways must be found to do this.



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" . . . Those nations that are making resistance are primarily seeking to save themselves, their homes and their liberties. Great Britain for instance is acting primarily for her own safety. The United States both in its direct defense effort and in the aid which it extends to the resisting nations is likewise acting primarily for its own safety. As safety for the nations that are offering resistance means security for us, aid to them is an essential part of our own defense. Every new conquest makes available to the aggressor greater resources for use against the remaining free peoples. Our aid to the resisting nations is not the mere crusading of a world benefactor. It is based on the definite knowledge that every free nation anywhere is a bastion of strength to all the remaining free peoples everywhere.

" . . . Those Americans who, in effect, are saying that a British defeat would not matter to us, signally overlook the fact that the resulting delivery of the high seas to the invader would create colossal danger to our own national defense and security. The breadth of the sea may give us a little time. It does not give us safety. Safety can only come from our ability, in conjunction with other peace-loving nations, to prevent any aggressor from attaining control of the high seas.

" . . . Some among us, doubtless with the best of intentions, still contend that our country need not resist until armed forces of an invader shall have crossed the boundary line of this hemisphere. But this merely means that there would be no resistance by the hemisphere, including the United States, until the invading countries had acquired complete control of the other four continents and of the high seas, and thus had obtained every possible strategic advantage, reducing us to the corresponding disadvantage of a severely handicapped defense. This is an utterly shortsighted and extremely dangerous view."

The foregoing statements make it clear that the attitude of the Government of the United States is one of resolve to take measures of self-defense in resistance to a movement, which, as has been made unequivocally clear by the acts and utterances of Hitler, is directed to world conquest by force from which no country and no area are excepted. This attitude is based upon a most fundamental consideration-- that of the inalienable right of self-defense. The only other attitude this Government could assume would be the suicidal attitude of some fifteen countries in Europe which also were told, as our country is being told, that they would not be molested but that if they should undertake to resist beyond their own boundaries they would be charged with being

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aggressors and with having assumed the offensive. A similar course by this nation from the standpoint of effective defense against the Hitler movement of world conquest would be absurd, futile and suicidal from the standpoint of reasonable precautions for its safety.

In the light of the existing situation, Hitler is the one person who can promptly remove the necessity for efforts at effective self-defense by this country and other countries similarly situated, whereas for any other nation to request that the United States desist from any such resistance would in its actual effect range the country making such request on the side of Hitler and his movement of aggression by force. Hitler is therefore the person who should be addressed in support of peace, rather than those whom he is attacking for the purpose of bringing about their complete subjugation without color of law, or of right, or of humanity.

"Yes, it makes a difference who wins--the difference whether we stand with our backs to the wall with the other four continents against us and the high seas lost, alone defending the last free territories on earth--or whether we keep our place in an orderly world."

Foreign Relations II, pp. 446-45.

Doc 2200(29)

(夏)

一九四二年(昭和十六年)五月三十一日日本大使野村三手交  
セリタル米國提案、草案

(ア三三トニ)一九四二年(昭和十六年)  
五月三十一日

(非公式探究的且不拘束的)

米國政府及日本政府、共同宣言ニ於テ表明セリタル  
了解ヲ遂ゲル為、全般の協定、開始及ニ締結ニ關シ共  
同ノ責任ヲ負フモゾアル。

近時西國間、疎遠ナリタル特殊原因ニ論及スル  
コトナク西國政府、西國間、友好的感情ヲ無化セリタル  
諸事件、再發、防止シ、其見之得ル耳不幸ナル結果  
ヲ招カザル如ク之ヲ匡正スベキコトヲ衷心ヨリ希望スル。

共同ノ努力ヨリ米國及ニ日本、太平洋地域ニ於テ平  
和ヲ確立及ニ維持シ、其ノ効果的ノ貢獻及ニ友好的了解  
ヲ早急ニ遂ゲルニトヨリ、今ヤ文明ノ危殆ニ陥ルニトシテ  
アル悲劇的混亂ヲ消散セズトテ阻止スルコト、我々、目下、  
希望スル。

斯ル決定的措置、為ニ交渉、遲延、不適ニシテ  
消極的ナル從テ西國政府、同西國政府、德義  
上及ニ行動上拘束スル全般的了解ヲ遂ゲルニ充分ナル  
方便ヲ講セラレニトテ希望スル。

斯ル了解、緊要ナル樞要問題、ニテ、今ニ後日會  
議ニ於テ審議可能、第三義的問題ヲ含ミテ、

Ex 1078

No. 1

Doc 220c (29)

ト西國<sup>政府</sup>信ズル

西國政府、若之威權、事能<sup>進</sup>ニ態度、<sup>解</sup>明セリ又、  
改善<sup>ト</sup>ル<sup>ハ</sup>、西國政府、融和的<sup>關係</sup>到達<sup>ニ</sup>得<sup>ル</sup>ト  
ト期待<sup>ス</sup>ル<sup>ニ</sup>シテ

即チ

- (一) 米國及日本、國際關係並ニ國家、性格<sup>ニ</sup>關スル概念
  - (二) 歐洲戰爭<sup>ト</sup>對<sup>シ</sup>テ西國政府、態度
  - (三) 日本、中國間、平和的解決<sup>ノ</sup>行動
  - (四) 西國間、通商
  - (五) 太平洋地域<sup>ニ</sup>於<sup>テ</sup>ル<sup>西國</sup>、經濟活動
  - (六) 太平洋地域<sup>ニ</sup>於<sup>テ</sup>ル<sup>政治的</sup>安定<sup>ニ</sup>影響<sup>ス</sup>ル<sup>西國</sup>、政策
  - (七) <sup>ニ</sup>關<sup>ス</sup>ル<sup>群島</sup>、守<sup>護</sup>化
- 故ニ米國政府及日本政府、以下、如キ相互了解  
並ニ政策宣言<sup>ニ</sup>到達<sup>ス</sup>ル<sup>ヲ</sup>テ

(三頁)

(一) 米國及日本、國際關係並ニ國家、性格<sup>ニ</sup>關スル概念  
西國政府、其國家<sup>ヲ</sup>永久和平<sup>ヲ</sup>確立<sup>ス</sup>並ニ西國間  
相互的<sup>信賴</sup>及<sup>協</sup>力、新時代<sup>ノ</sup>齋<sup>ニ</sup>向<sup>ス</sup>ル<sup>旨</sup>指向<sup>ス</sup>  
ヲ<sup>シ</sup>テ<sup>止</sup>事<sup>ヲ</sup>確言<sup>ス</sup>ル

西國政府、國家及<sup>シテ</sup>民族<sup>ノ</sup>家庭<sup>ノ</sup>各員<sup>ノ</sup>如<sup>ク</sup>一家<sup>ノ</sup>構  
成<sup>ス</sup>ル<sup>平和的</sup>手段<sup>ニ</sup>依<sup>リ</sup>規律<sup>ス</sup>ル<sup>且</sup>以<sup>テ</sup>公<sup>益</sup>之<sup>ヲ</sup>害<sup>ス</sup>  
ヘ<sup>ル</sup>事<sup>ヲ</sup>如<sup>ク</sup>彼等<sup>自身</sup>、為<sup>ス</sup>道德<sup>的</sup>國際<sup>的</sup>福祉<sup>ノ</sup>  
達成<sup>ニ</sup>向<sup>ス</sup>ル<sup>ト</sup>シ<sup>テ</sup>利害<sup>相互</sup>關係<sup>ノ</sup>以<sup>テ</sup>各員<sup>ノ</sup>平等<sup>ヲ</sup>

No. 2

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權利，享有之責任，認此之法律，西國政府傳統的  
之且現在於此變行于概念より又確信之上下より  
高言之使西國政府，他國家，對此之壓迫又榨取  
及對此之責任，此より認之。

西國政府，國家，性根社會秩序並國民生活，基  
礎之主義，國家，傳統的概念，依然として保存  
之，且平等，道義及此概念上相成之，外來，思想不  
可之，不之，此カを變更セ，此より上就確乎タル決意  
有之。

(二) 歐洲戰爭，對之西國政府，態度

日本政府，三國協長，目的，防衛的，トリ，此ト又現  
在，於，之，同様，ア，此ト，且，目下，歐洲戰，亦，之，居，之，ザル  
國家，之，戰，ヲ，防止，セ，之，ガ，為，ト，此ト，ヲ，主張，ス，協長，條  
項，自己，防衛，行為，ト，此，亦，之，明，之，カ，之，ヲ，適用，セ，之，ト，  
之。

米國政府，其，歐洲戰爭，對之，態度，現在，及，之，將來  
ト，等，之，防禦，及，之，自衛，即，之，國家，安全，及，其，防禦  
ト，國，之，考慮，ヨリ，決定，セ，之，ト，ヲ，主張，ス。

(三) 日本，中國間，平和的解決，之，行動

日本政府，米國政府，對之，日本政府，其，其，內，於，  
中國政府，ト，間，平和的解決，折衝，提案，之，全般の  
條件，ヲ，通報，ス，而，之，日本政府，且，又，平等，條件，之，善  
隣友好，並，主權，及，之，領土，相互尊重，國，之，近衛

No. 3

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原則及其實際的適用，調和之ヲナシテ公言セリ。依テ  
米國大統領中國政府對中國政府及日本政府之敵對  
行為終結及平和關係再建，為相互有利之手段  
諾可能，基礎基ヲ打倒南始スベキトヲ提議スベシ。

(三頁)

註(第三章，前記草案，日本軍，中國領土內駐屯  
ヲ始メ兵產運動對其共同防衛問題ニキテ變計  
議ヲ要スルモノナル)

### 兩國間，通商

現在，了解對其兩國政府，公認アルトキ，米  
國及日本夫々保有，且兩國，熟シク必要ナル物資  
ヲ相互供給スベキトヲ確約ス。變兩國政府以前，  
日米，通商航海條約ヲ確立セラシムル事，貿易開  
係ヲ再建スルニ必要ナル手段ヲ講ズルニ同意ス。兩國政府  
新通商條約ヲ締結スル時，之ヲ可及的速ニ交渉シ通  
商，手續ヲ行フ事ヲ望ム。

### 太平洋區域，於此兩國，經濟活動

太平洋區域，於此日本活動及米國活動，平和的  
手段ヲ用テ且國際通商關係ヲ此等範圍，原則則  
行ハシムル事，茲ニ為ルニ相互誓約，其基，日本政府及  
米國政府，各自，經濟安全及繁榮ヲ要スル天然  
資源(例ニ石油ニシテ)通商相互供給  
日本及米國，無差別の求得ルニ殊相互協

No. 4.

No. 5

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力不平等ヲ為ス。

- (六) 太平洋地域ニ於テ政治的安定ニ影響有ル西國政策  
 日本政府並ニ米國政府、此ノ解、基礎ヲ為ス支配  
 的政策、太平洋地域ニ於テ平和ヲアルコト、西國政府、  
 根本的目的、太平洋地域ニ於テ平和維持及ニ保全  
 対ニ共同、努力カヨリ貢獻セトスルコト、又西國政府、孰  
 シモ上述地域ニ於テ領土の野ハナクトテ宣言スル。
- (七) フリック之群島、中立化  
 日本政府、フリック之、独立達成セラレタリ時、米國  
 政府、欲スル時、同政府ト其、中立化、タス、條約締  
 結ニ同意シ、然レ交渉ヲ開始スルコトヲ宣言スル。

No. 6

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頁

(一) 附屬書

日本政府對附屬書及補足書

(二) 日本與國際關係，平和的解決對之行動

上記對之於言及之其基本的條件次，如之

一 善隣友好

二 有益之共產主義活動對之共同防衛，日本  
與中國領土內駐屯之各更討議要之

三 以下

三 (經濟的協力) 一 之三 日華兩國國際通

商關係之於此無差別，基礎其基連公(キネト)

四 主權及領土，相互尊重

五 東隣人之協力之念，世界平和貢獻之極

一 中核之形成之國家上之各，固有特徵相

互尊重之以上。(次頁續之)



- 六、日本陸海軍ノ中國領土及ビ領海ヨリノ可及的速カタル且日華間ニ締結セラルベキ協約ニ準テ據スル撤退
- 七、領土ノ不併合
- 八、不賠償
- 九、滿洲國ニ関スル友好的交渉

(附屬書ニ)

米國政府側ノ附屬書並ニ補足書

(一) 歐洲戦争ニ対スル兩國政府ノ態度

ヒットラー氏ニヨリ始メラレタル征服的軍事行動ニ對スル米國政府ノ立場ハ一九四一年(昭和十六年)四月ニ高日ノ國務長官ニヨル公開演説ニ於テ述ベラレテ直接要點ヲ衝キ且全局面トノ關係ニ於テ基本的ナル拔萃ヲ以下ニ示ス

「……彼等(侵略國)ニヨリ遂行セラレテ来ルモノハ普通ノ戦争デハナイ。是ハ是等ノ征服者タラントスル者が自由ニ生活スル權利ヲ守リ自衛ノ爲抵抗シツアル國家ニ対シテ凡エル野蠻的手段ヲ用ヒテ行ハントスル強襲戰デアル。……斯ル動向ハ今ヤ急速ニ世界ニ擴ツテ来ル。」

「經驗が何かヲ示スモノナラバソレハ匪賊ニ荒サレタ町ニ於テ最裕福ナル市民モ其ノ襲撃ノヨリ免レルコトヲ期シ得アルガ如ク如何ナル國家モ侵略者攻撃ヨリ免

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除せしむるモノト考ふべき理由ハ毫モ存スルヲ示ス  
ハテアル  
五頁

「……思考力ハ者ハ誰ヲモ今キ半奴隷狀  
態ニテリ再ビ文明ノ福祉ヲ享有セシムル望ヲ  
全ク此ノ征服運動ノ敗北ニ失散ニシテ賴ル世界  
侵略ノ憐シキ犠牲者ト呼フトシテ果シテ直ニ此  
ノ問ニ對スル答ヲ自ラ爲シ得ルヲテ「ホーストリ  
リア」「チエツニスロザアキア」「ホーニク」「ルウテ  
」「キニマク」「オニク」「ズルギ」「下ルニク」「ルクセン  
ブルク」「アニス」「ルーニク」「アルガリア」「トゴスニグヤ  
」ト然リテアル。

「……結論ハ明白ナリ。約十五ヶ國ノ國民ガ人生ニシテ生甲斐  
アルニシテ凡テノモノハ今ノ將ニ殘存スル自由諸國ノ國民  
ガ人間トシテ能ク限リ十分ニソレヲ短期間ノ内ニ武装シ遂  
ガ自己保存ノ爲ニ行動スル時ヲアル。

「……成行ハ此ノ半球及此ノ國ノ安全ガ道程ガ最も効  
果的ナル場合ニ何處ニ於テモ抵抗スルノ事ヲ要求ス  
ルモノナリコト可疑ニ餘地モナク證明シテ……此ノ政策ノ  
ノ實際的適用ニ於テ……提議ノ最も短時日ニ最大量  
ニ目標ニ達セシムルコトヲ意味スル。故ニソレヲ爲スベ  
キニ決テ見出サレタリ又。

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「……抵抗シツ、アル國々ハ第一ニ彼等自身ヲ彼等ノ家庭ヲ  
彼等ノ自由ヲ救ハシムルヲナスル。例ヘシ英國ハ第一ニ  
自らノ安全ノ爲ニ戦ツテナル。米國モソ、直接防禦努力ニ  
於テモ又抵抗シツ、アル國々ニ対スル援助ニ於テモ同様ニ  
先ズ第一ニ其ノ自己ノ安全ノ爲ニ戦ツテナル。抵抗  
シテナル國々ノ安全ハ我々ノ保全ヲ意味スルが故ニ、彼等ニ対  
スル援助ハ又我々自らノ防禦ノ重要ナル一部ナラシムル。新々  
ナル征服が成功スル度ニ侵略者ハ残存スル自由諸國ニ対シ  
利用スル爲ニ其ノ大キキ資源ヲ獲得スルヲナスル。抵抗シツ  
ツアル國民ニ対スル我々ノ援助ハ單ニ世界ノ國人ノ救ヒ運  
動ヲナシ。ソレハ場所ノ如何ヲ問ハズ凡テノ自由國家ハ残  
存スル自由國民ニトツテ力強キ裨益ヲナルト、競争スル認  
識ニ基キテナル。

「……英國ノ敗北ハ要スルニ我等ニハ何ノ影響モナシト  
言フ米國人ハ英國ノ敗北ノ結果、公海が侵略者ノ手ニ渡ル  
ト云フ事ガ我々自身ノ國防及ビ安全ニ重大ナル危険ヲモ  
タシヌモ、テアルト云フ事莫ク甚クシク見出シテナル。海  
ノ廣サハ我々ニ對シ、時ヲ俟テ果シルカモ知ラナシ。併シ  
ソレハ我々ニ安全ヲ與ヘヌ。安全ハ侵略者ガ公海ヲ支配スル  
ヲ他ノ平和愛好國民ト提擧シテ防グ我々ノ能力ニヨリテ  
ノミ保ラシルヲナスル。

No. 9



No. 11

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現下時局を鑑み、ヒトラーは北、國及他、同様、位置する國及びヨリナ  
ル効果的自衛手段ヲ採ル努力、必要ヲ直ニ除キ得ル唯一ノ人ナリ。  
之又、他、國家が米國が斯ル對抗手段ヲ止ムル様要求スルコト、事實  
上斯ル要求ヲナス國家がヒトラー及ビ、暴力ナル侵略運動ニ味方スルコ  
ト。從テ、法ヲ權利モ、人道モ無視シテ完全ニ屈從セシムルが為、自的  
ニヒトラーが攻撃シテナル人々ヨリテ寧ろヒトラー自身ニ對シ平和支持  
ノ為ニ呼ビ掛ケルベキナリ。  
然リ、誰が勝ラハムルカ、大キキ相違ヲモクラス、我々が他、四大陸ヲ敵トシ、  
公海ヲ失ヒ、地球上ニ獨リ殘カシ、最後、自由ノ領土ヲ守ルカ、又、秩序  
ナク世界ニ我々所ヲ維持シ得ル勢相違ナリ。

外交關係(三) 四四六—四五二頁。

Doc. No. 2200(30)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 175

AMERICAN SENTIMENT HANDLED TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR  
(NOFORN.) OF MAY 31, 1941Unofficial, Exploratory  
and without Commitment

(WASHINGTON) May 31, 1941.

ORAL EXPLANATION FOR SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO THE JAPANESE DRAFT

Introductory statement.

A few minor changes have been made in phraseology with a view to clarifying the meaning.

In the list of points enumerated on page two of the Japanese draft, the title of section III has been altered to conform more accurately to the subject matter, the word "southwestern" has been omitted from point numbered five and, in view of the new subject matter under point six (for explanation see infra), part of the subject matter under point six in the Japanese draft has been incorporated in an additional section, the title of which is therefore listed, and part of the subject matter in Section VI of the Japanese draft has been omitted (for explanation see infra).

I. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of notions.

The first paragraph has been omitted in as much as the statement of fact is a self-evident one.

In the third paragraph of the Japanese draft there has been substituted for the word "backward" the word "other" in order to maintain consistency with principles relating to equality of races and peoples.

II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.

The first paragraph of the Japanese draft has been omitted in order to avoid any implication of inconsistency with statements made by the President to the effect that the present is not an opportune time for the American Government to endeavor to bring about peace in Europe.

To the second paragraph of the Japanese draft a new sentence has been added to emphasize the aspect of self-defense.

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The third paragraph has been omitted in as much as the text of the Tripartite Pact has been published and no purpose would appear to be served by express reference to any of its provisions.

The fourth paragraph of the Japanese draft has been revised to emphasize the protective and self-defense character of the attitude of the United States toward the European hostilities.

A statement in the Annex and Supplement on the part of the Government of the United States contains an elaboration of this Government's viewpoint toward the military movement of conquest inaugurated by Chancellor Hitler.

### III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.

As already stated, the title has been altered to describe more accurately the contents.

The statement in the Japanese draft has been rewritten to keep the underlying purport and at the same time to avert raising questions which do not seem fundamental to the basic subject and which are controversial in character and might present serious difficulties from the point of view of the United States.

The statement in the Japanese Annex and Supplement in regard to this section has also been revised in a few particulars in conformity with the considerations mentioned in the preceding paragraph. In addition, point numbered three in regard to economic cooperation has been rephrased so as to make it clear that China and Japan intend to follow in their economic relations the principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations, a principle to which it is understood the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government have long subscribed and which principle forms the foundation of the commercial policy of the United States. As it is assumed that the term "troops" in point numbered six is meant to include all armed forces, the language of this point has been slightly rephrased to avoid possible ambiguity.

As already stated, the question relating to communistic activities, including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory, is subject to further discussion.

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IV. Commerce between both nations.

A statement is included in the Annex and Supplement on the part of the United States clarifying the point that as a temporary measure during the present international emergency it is understood that each country may restrict export of commodities which it needs for its own purposes of security and self-defense.

V. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.

The language of this section has been rephrased to make the provisions thereof applicable equally to the United States and to Japan.

VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

This section has been revised to make it consist of a clear-cut statement of the fundamental purpose of the understanding. The thought in mind is to give emphasis to this purpose so that the document may speak for itself on this all-important subject.

The statement of fundamental purpose has been assigned a section by itself in order that it may gain added emphasis.

The statement in the Japanese draft in regard to the Philippine Islands has been dealt with in a new section bearing number VII.

The statement in regard to Japanese immigration has been omitted in view of the established position of the United States that the question of immigration is a domestic matter. For that reason, to attempt to include a statement on this subject would stand in the way of the underlying purposes of the agreement.

VII. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

The phraseology of this section has been altered so as to bring it into conformity with the language of the Tydings-Mcuffie Act, approved March 24, 1934.



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Page 4

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Agendum

In view of the traditional policy of the United States and various practical considerations in the United States, important difficulties would be presented should the Government of the United States endeavor to keep secret the understanding under reference together with its annexes. This Government could probably arrange to keep the understanding secret for a period of a few weeks, during which time it believes that the two Governments should work out procedures covering the scope, character and timing of the announcement of the understanding and of at least the definitive substance thereof.

Foreign Relations II, pp. 451 - 454

EX 1079

一九四一年 五月三十一日 日本大使(野村)ニ手交サレタ  
ル米國側聲明 非公式踏査的且委員ニ附託セズ

(華盛頓)一九四一年(昭和十六年)五月三十一日

日本側草案ニ対スル修正提案ノ口頭説明

豫備聲明

憲法ヲ明確ナラシメル目的ヲ以テ諺句ニ多少ノ些細ナル  
訂正が行ハレタ。

日本側草案第二頁ニ列挙セラレタル諸項、表ニ於テ  
第三部ナル標題ハ一層精確ニ論題ノ事項ニ適合セ  
シムベクニ変更セラレ西南方「ノ」ヲハ「五」番号ヲ附サレタル  
項ヨリ削除セラレ而シテ第六項下ノ新論題ノ事項ニ鑑  
ミテ下記ノ説明参照(日本側草案第六項下ノ論題ノ事  
項ノ一部ハ追加ノ部ニ編入セラレ其ノ標題ハ從ツテ表中ニ  
記載セラレ亦日本側草案第六部中ノ論題ノ事項ノ一部  
ハ削除セラレタ

(下記ノ説明参照)

一、國際關係及び國家ノ性格ニ対スル合衆國及び日本ノ  
觀念。該事實ノ論述ハ自明ノモノナルヲ以テ第一項ハ削  
除セラレタ。

諸民族諸種族平等ニ関スル原則トノ一致ヲ保タンガ  
タメ日本側草案第三項ニ於ケル「未開」ナル語ハ「他」  
ナル語ニ取替ハラレタ。

No. 1  
ニ、改訂戦争ニ対スル西政府ノ態度

現在ハ米國政府ニ取り歐洲ニ平和ヲモタラスベク努力スベキ  
好機ニ非ズトノ大統領聲明ニ不一致トナルコトヲスベテ避ケ  
ニガタメ日本側草案第一項ハ削除セラシタ。

自衛狀況ヲ強調セニガタメ日本側草案第二項ニ新ナル一  
文章が添加セラシタ。三國條約ノ原文が公ニセリ其ノ明文規定  
ノ何ヲ引用スルモ何等ノ益ナシト思惟セリルヲ以テ第三項  
ハ削除セラシタ。

歐洲戰爭ニ対スル合衆國ノ態度が防禦的且自衛的性  
格ヲ有スル旨強調セニガタメ日本側草案第四項ハ改訂セ  
ラシタ。合衆國政府側附屬書及ビ補遺中、一聲明ハトシテ  
總統ニ依リ開始セラシタル征服ノタメノ軍事的行動ニ対ス  
ル該政府ノ見解ノ敷衍ヲ含ム。

ニ日華間ノ平和的協定ニ対スル行動

既ニ述べラシタルが如ク内容ヲ一層精確ニ表現セニガタメ標  
題ハ変更セラシタ。

裏面ニ潜ム趣意ヲ捕捉シ同時ニ根本的論題ニ取り基本  
的ナラズト思惟セリ且其ノ性質上論争的トナリ且又合  
衆國側見解ノ尖ヨリ見テ重大ナル困難ヲ醸スヤモ知シ  
ザル問題基起ラシテ避ケニガタメ日本側草案中ノ聲明ハ書  
改メラシタ。

日本側附屬書及ビ補遺中此ノ部分ニ關スル聲明モ亦前  
項ニ述べラシタル考慮ニ準ジ若干ノ細部ニ於テ改訂セラ  
シタリ。更ニ日本及ビ中華民國ノ其ノ經濟的關係ニ於テ  
日本政府及ビ中國政府が長ク保持シ来リシコトヲ解セラル

目下ノ國際的危機ノ間ノ一時的措置トシテ各國ハ自國ノ保全  
自衛ノ目的ニ要スル商品ノ輸出ヲ制限シ得ルト解セラレル  
旨ヲ明ニセル一聲明ガ合衆國側附屬書及ビ補遺ニ包含  
セラレタ。

五、太平洋水域ニ於ケル兩國ノ經濟活動

此ノ部分ノ語句ハ其ノ規定ヲ合衆國及ビ日本ニ等シク適  
用シ得ルガ如クセンタメ改メラレタ。

六、太平洋水域ニ於ケル政治的安定ニ影響アル兩國ノ政策

此ノ部分ハソレヲ諒解トイフ基本的目的ニ即セル明確ナル聲明  
トナサンガタメ改訂セラレタリ。其ノ意圖ハ本文書ガ此ノ全ク  
重要ナル論題ニ就キ自ラノタメ辨ジ得ルガ如ク此ノ目的ヲ  
強調スルニ在ル

No. 3  
基本的目的ノ聲明ハソレヲ一層強調セシガタメソレノミニ一  
ノ部ガ割リ當テラレタリ。

Doc 220c(30)

ル原則、且令衆國商業政策ノ基礎ヲ成ス原則タル國際商業關係ニ於ケル無差別ノ原則ニ從ニ意向ナル事ヲ明クニセシガタメ經濟的協同ニ關スル第三ト番号ヲ附シアル項目ハ其ノ語句ヲ改メラレタ。

第六ノ番号ヲ附シアル項目中「軍隊」ノ語ハ凡テノ武裝兵力ヲ含ムコトヲ意味スルモノト推定セラレ、ヲ以テアリ得ベキ不明瞭ヲ避ケンガタメ此ノ項ノ語句ハ多少改メラレタ。

既述ノ如ク中國領土内ニ日本軍隊ヲ駐屯セシムル件ヲ含ム共產主義運動ニ關スル問題ハ以後ノ討論ニ議ラレタ。

四、西國間ノ商業

合衆國ノ傳統的的政策及び合衆國內ノ各種實際的考慮ニ鑑ミ若シ  
 合衆國政府ニシテ参照文スル其ノ附屬書ニ於ケル諒解ヲ  
 秘密トスバク努メンカ重大ナル困難ハ惹起セラシテアラフ。  
 又本政府ハ恐ラク諒解ヲ數週間ノ期間秘密ニスバク志置  
 シ得ルデアラフ。本政府ハ其ノ期間中ニ兩政府が諒解或ハ  
 少クトモ其ノ確定的内容ノ範圍、性格及び發表ノ時期  
 ニ亙ル手續ヲ作成スベキナリト信ズ

Doc. 220c (30)

比律賓諸島ニ関スル日本側草案中ノ聲明ハ第七ナル番号  
ヲ有スル新ナル部ニ於テ取扱ハレタ。

日本移民ニ関スル聲明ハ移民問題ヲ國內問題トナス合衆國ノ確  
定セル態度ニ鑑ミ削除セラレタ。此ノ理由ニ依リ此ノ問題ニ  
就キテノ聲明ヲ包含セシメントスル企テハ協定ノ基礎目  
的ヲ妨ゲルモノデアル。

セ比律賓諸島ノ中立化

此ノ部分ノ語句ハシレヨ一九三四年(昭和九年)三月二十四日  
可決セラレタルタイディング・マックダファイ法ノ語句ト一致セシメ  
ンガタメニ変更セラレタ。

Q. # 1080

Document No. 220 C (31)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 176

AMERICAN INFORMAL AND UNOFFICIAL ORAL STATEMENT HANDED  
TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) ON MAY 31, 1941

The Government of the United States will at some appropriate stage prior to any definitive discussion talk over in strict confidence with the Chinese Government the general subject matter involved in the discussions, especially as it relates to China.

Foreign Relations, II, p. 454



ex 1080

doc 220c(31)

一九四三年(昭和十八年)五月三十一日日本大使(野村)に手交された米國の非正式且非公式口頭聲明

合衆國政府は如何なる決定的討議に先立たる或る適當な段階に於いてその討議に含まれる一般問題、殊にそれら支那に關係する所の事項を極秘裡に支那政府と相談するを要する。

外交關係ニ四五四頁

E. # 1881?  
(1081?)

Doc. No. 220 C (32)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 177

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Excerpts

(WASHINGTON) June 2, 1941.

The Ambassador of Japan came to my hotel apartment at his request.

...

I then very slowly and deliberately asked the Ambassador whether it was his considered judgment that his Government seriously and earnestly desired to enter into a settlement, for peace and non-discriminatory commercial relations and friendship generally in the Pacific area. He promptly replied that that was his judgment. I remarked that, in the light of the loud statements which Matsuoka and others were daily making, the question which I propounded was sharply raised, and that one was forced back to the inquiry of whether Japan really is seeking this sort of settlement, or whether she is only seeking a way to get out of China, and otherwise to go forward with methods and practices entirely contrary to the principles which would have to underlie a settlement establishing peace, non-discriminatory commerce and fair friendly relations in the Pacific area. The Ambassador reiterated his view that an earnest and fair settlement was desired.

.....

Foreign Relations II, pp. 454-455

EX-108-1

Doc 220c (32)

國務長官ニ依ル貴書(華盛頓)

披幸

一九四二年六月二日

日本大使、彼、願ニ依リ、私、ホタルニ来タ、……ソコニ  
 予、大使ニ日本政府ガ、太平洋地域ニ於テ平和、  
 無差別貿易関係及友誼ヲ自途トスル取極ヲナス  
 下ラ熱心且真面目ニ希望言ハシ、大使、慎重  
 判断ハシカド、ソコ、非常ニ緩ニ、且入念ニ尋ネタ  
 彼、即屬然判断アルト答テ、予、松岡、他、者ガ  
 日母ニ聲ヲ大ニシテ、此聲明ニ照シテ、先ニ予ガ提  
 起セシ問題、非常ニ問題トナシ、並ニ吾人、日本、  
 真ニ此種、解決ヲ求メ、キルカ、若、單ニ支那ヲ脱スル  
 道ヲ求メ、キルカ、或、太平洋地域ニ於テ平和、無差別貿  
 易及公正ナル友好関係樹立取極、基礎トナルベシ原  
 則ニ全ク背馳スル方法ト実行トシ、以テ前進スル道ヲ標  
 示シ居ルニ過ザラ、カトシ、簡言ニ申サ、ホタル又ニソコニ  
 言ハシ、予、大使、真面目且公正ニ解決ヲ望ムニ、予  
 實見ヲ繰返シ述ベタ。

外交関係Ⅱ 四四—四五頁

Doc. No. 219P (76)

Br. Ex. 108

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GRFW) TO THE  
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MATSUOKA)

Excerpt

No. 1817

TOKYO, June 4, 1941

EXCELLENCY: With reference to my note to Your Excellency No. 1803 of May 22, 1941, concerning damage inflicted on properties of the Methodist Episcopal Mission at Chungking by Japanese aircraft on May 9 and May 10, 1941, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that properties of the same Mission at Chungking were again seriously damaged by Japanese aerial bombardment on June 1, 1941.

According to information received from the American Embassy at Chungking, a section of the hospital of the Mission at Tai Chishang, in the center of the city, was badly damaged by a direct hit. A second bomb damaged the compound wall, and the home of an American missionary received damage from stones through the roof. This property has been damaged on at least four previous occasions.

In addition, the newly built Lewis Memorial Institutional Church of the same Mission, located at a distance of about seven hundred yards from the hospital mentioned above, was completely wrecked by a direct hit. This property has likewise been damaged on at least four previous occasions.

.....

Doc-219P(76)

Ex 1082

駐日アメリカ大使館(ト)ヨリ日本外務大臣(松岡)宛書簡

抄筆

第六七號

東京

一九四一年六月四日

閣下。

一九四一年五月九日及五月十日日本航空機ニ依リ重慶ノメイト監督傳導會資産家ノタル被害ニ關スル一九四一年五月二十日附第八。三號閣下宛本官覺書ニ關シ本官、重慶自傳導會、資産ヲ丹ニ一九四一年六月十日空軍ノ空爆ニ依リ相當被害ヲ受ケタル旨御通告申上テ度ニ在重慶アメリカ大使館ヨリ收受セル報告ニ依リ中、中央部ノ本家行柱自傳導會病院一部ニ直撃彈ニ大損害ヲ受ケタリ。ニ發着ノ爆彈、構内壁ニ被害、奥ニアメリカ人宣教師ノ家ノ屋根ヲ穿テタル石ヲ被害ヲ受ケタリ。此資産ハ少トモソ、以前四回、被害ヲ受ケタリ。更ニ此病院ヨリ約七百碼距離ニル自傳導會附屬新築セル公記念會設立教會、直撃彈ニ完全破壊サタリ。此資産同様に少トモ西回以前ニ被害ヲ受ケタリ。

外交關係工之四

Br. Ex. 178

## MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION

Excerpts

(WASHINGTON) June 4, 1941

## ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

II. The Attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.

The Government of the United States declares that, so far as its attitude toward the European war is concerned, it does not and will not resort to any aggression aimed to assist any one nation against another.

Colonel Iwakuro said that the Japanese would be quite prepared to drop the foregoing suggestion if we on our part would be prepared to drop our proposed sentence in the first paragraph reading, "Obviously, the provisions of the Pact do not apply to involvement through acts of self-defense."

Mr. Wakasugi said that they desired to have inserted at the beginning of Section II a new paragraph reading as follows:

"It being the common aim of both Governments of Japan and the United States to establish world peace, they will join forces with a view to preventing the extension of the European war and restoring peace."

Mr. Hamilton raised for consideration the question of whether the idea underlying the proposed paragraph could not be incorporated in the first section. He pointed out that an express reference of this kind under Section II, which deals with the attitude of the two countries to the European war, might be regarded as inconsistent with the President's declared attitude in regard to the question of a present American effort to bring about peace in Europe. He suggested also for consideration whether it might not serve the purpose desired to change the word "our" to "all" in the first paragraph of Section I, which in our draft reads as follows:

"Both Governments affirm that their national policies are directed to (toward) the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation among our peoples."

Mr. Wakasugi said that they would leave this point for further consideration and that we might also consider whether the words could not be incorporated in some other section or in a section by itself.

With reference to Section III, Mr. Wakasugi proposed an entirely different formula. The formula in our draft and the formula he proposed are shown in parallel columns as follows:

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FORMULA IN OUR DRAFT OF  
MAY 31

The Japanese Government having communicated to the Government of the United States the general terms within the framework of which the Japanese Government will propose the negotiation of a peaceful settlement with the Chinese Government, which terms are declared by the Japanese Government to be in harmony with the Konoe Principles regarding neighborly friendship and mutual respect of sovereignty and territories and with the practical application of those principles, the President of the United States will suggest to the Government of China that the Government of China and the Government of Japan enter into a negotiation on a basis mutually advantageous and acceptable for a termination of hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations.

The reason adduced by Mr. Wakasugi for this change was that it was desired to avoid giving any impression to the Japanese people that there was involved any question of an American mediation between China and Japan.

The Japanese then offered an alternative formula, concerning which they wished to make reservations on minor points, reading as follows:

"The Government of Japan having announced the general terms within the framework of which the Government of Japan will propose the negotiation of a peaceful settlement of the China conflict, which terms are declared by the Government of Japan to be in harmony with the Konoe principles and with the practical application of those principles, the President of the United States, relying upon the policy of neighborly friendship with China, will suggest to the Chinese Government at Chungking that that Government and the Government of Japan enter into a negotiation for a termination of hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations."

Mr. Hamilton then asked Colonel Iwakuro whether it was his conception that upon the conclusion of this agreement it would be the Wang Ching-wei regime or the Government at Chungking which would con-

FORMULA PROPOSED BY  
JAPANESE

The President of the United States will suggest to the Government of Chiang Kai-shek that it will enter as soon as possible into a negotiation with Japan on the basis of the Konoe three principles and the practical application of these principles for a termination of hostilities and the resumption of peaceful relations.

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stitute the Government of China.

Colonel Iwakuro said that the Japanese now recognized the Wang Ching-wei regime as the Government of China and regarded the Government at Chungking as a local regime. The proposed understanding contemplated negotiations by the Japanese Government with Chungking. As regards the outcome of the negotiations, there were three possibilities, which he charted on a piece of paper, attached: (a) that the Chungking Government might become absorbed into the Nanking Government of Wang Ching-wei, (b) that the Nanking Government of Wang Ching-wei might become absorbed into the Chungking Government, and (c) that both the Nanking Government and the Chungking Government might be coalesced into a new government. The Japanese Government proposed to leave this matter to be decided by the Chinese themselves.

Mr. Wakasugi then offered an amended annex on the part of the Japanese Government in connection with Section III. The formulae in the draft of May 31 and in the Japanese redraft are shown in parallel columns:

FORMULA IN OUR DRAFT OF  
MAY 31

The basic terms as referred to in the above section are as follows:

1. Neighborly friendship.
2. (Cooperative defense against injurious communistic activities—including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory.) Subject to further discussion.
3. Economic cooperation—by which China and Japan will proceed on the basis of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
4. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.
5. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neighbors and forming a Far Eastern nucleus contributing to world peace.

FORMULA PROPOSED BY  
JAPANESE

The basic terms as implied in the Konoe three principles and the practical application of those principles are as follows:

1. Neighborly friendship.
2. Cooperative defense against communistic activities—including the stationing of Japanese troops in the Inner Mongolia and certain areas of the North China.
3. Economic cooperation.
4. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.
5. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neighbors and forming an Eastern Asia nucleus contributing to world peace.



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6. Withdrawal of Japanese military and naval forces from Chinese territory and Chinese waters as promptly as possible and in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between Japan and China.

7. No annexation.  
8. No indemnities.  
9. Amicable negotiation in regard to "Manchukuo."

6. Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory in accordance with agreement between Japan and China.

7. No annexation.  
8. No indemnities.  
9. Recognition of "Manchou-kuo."

Mr. Wakasugi explained that, with reference to caption three of the foregoing annex, the Japanese did not wish to expand the wording in the caption beyond the mere statement "economic cooperation", as they wished to leave the matter to be dealt with by negotiations between Japan and China. Mr. Hamilton observed that in the Japanese Oral Explanation of May 12 this point had been expanded by the statement "by which Japan does not intend to exercise economic monopoly in China nor to demand of China a limitation in the interests of Third powers and that we had substituted the phraseology "by which China and Japan will proceed on the basis of non-discrimination in international commercial relations" in the interest of clarity. Mr. Hamilton here emphasized the importance which this Government attached to the application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.

Mr. Hamilton noted that in caption six where we had suggested the wording "military and naval forces" the Japanese in their new draft had restored the term "troops". He asked whether it was not intended by Japan to withdraw their naval forces. Colonel Iwakuro said that in normal international intercourse war vessels visited ports of other countries, and, moreover, at Shanghai foreign powers, including the United States, normally maintained marines or corresponding naval units. They had used the English word "troops" as translation of the Japanese term "guntai" which was not restricted to army forces. He said that it was Japan's clear intention to withdraw all armed forces whether of the army or the navy engaged in the present hostilities, and he had no objection to the use of the term "armed forces" if that would cover better what was meant. He added that it was his understanding that "Chinese Territory" included Chinese territorial waters.

Mr. Hamilton said that we would take note of all the points made in connection with Section III and the annex pertaining thereto.

Mr. Wakasugi said that the Japanese had no changes to offer with respect to the text of Section IV, but that they desired the

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withdrawal of our annex relating to restrictions upon trade during the present international emergency. He stated that such an annex would weaken the force of the stipulation in Section IV. He said that they thought that the word "available" in Section IV would cover what we had in mind. Mr. Hamilton said that we would take note of the point.

Mr. Wakasugi said that they wished to offer an alternative wording for Section V. The formula of our draft of May 31 and of the Japanese alternative draft are shown in parallel columns, as follows:

FORMULA IN OUR DRAFT  
OF MAY 31

V. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area

On the basis of mutual pledges hereby given that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations, the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other toward obtaining non-discriminatory access by Japan and by the United States to commercial supplies of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel,) which each country, needs for the safeguarding and development of its own economy.

Asked what were the reasons for the proposed changes. Colonel Iwakuro explained that Japan had no suspicion that the United States would engage in activities other than peaceful in the Southwest Pacific area, and he felt that the United States should accept Japanese declarations in regard to the peaceful character of their aims. The reason for restricting the application of this section to the Southwestern Pacific area, which we had broadened to include the whole Pacific area, was that it was the Japanese desire to devote this section specifically to the Southwestern Pacific area on account of the special interest which the Japanese people had developed therein.

FORMULA PROPOSED  
BY JAPANESE

V. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.

Noting that Japanese expansion in the direction of the Southwestern Pacific area is declared to be of peaceful nature. American cooperation and support shall be given in the production and procurement of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which Japan needs.

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He pointed out that Section VI covered the whole Pacific area. Mr. Hamilton raised the question whether the pledge in regard to peace might be incorporated in Section VI, retaining, however, in Section V a statement pledging both countries to the application of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. He emphasized the importance which this Government attached to such statements. He pointed out in reference to commercial relations that in an earlier draft we had proposed the wording "on the basis of equality of opportunity"; that the Japanese had objected to that phraseology on the ground that Japanese had no clear concept of the implications of the term; and that, as we had been given to understand that the Japanese would not object if we used phraseology contained in a recent speech by the Secretary, we had in our draft of May 31 substituted such phraseology. Mr. Hamilton said that we would make note of the question of a possible change in the draft.

With reference to Section VI, Mr. Wakasugi offered an alternate draft, which includes an additional paragraph. The formulae of our draft of May 31 and of the Japanese alternative draft are shown in parallel columns, as follows:

FORMULA IN OUR DRAFT  
OF MAY 31

The Japanese Government and the Government of the United States declare that the controlling policy underlying this understanding is peace in the Pacific area; that it is their fundamental purpose, through cooperative effort, to contribute to the maintenance and the preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and that neither has territorial designs in the area mentioned.

FORMULA PROPOSED  
BY JAPANESE

The Japanese Government and the Government of the United States declare that it is their fundamental purpose, through cooperative effort, to contribute to the maintenance and the preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and that neither has territorial designs in the area mentioned.

The Government of Japan declares that it has no intention to establish military bases within the area of the Western Hemisphere nor to entertain any political designs therein. Similarly, the Government of the United States declares that it has no intention to establish military bases in East Asia or in the Southwestern Pacific area; nor to entertain any political designs therein. The Government of Japan and the United States mutually recognize the defensive position each maintains respectively in the East Asia area and in the Western Hemisphere.

Their objections to the wording of our draft were that they thought the phraseology somewhat redundant and that they did not understand what we meant by the word "controlling". They indicated a willingness to accept the word "basic" for "controlling" after Mr. Hamilton had endeavored to explain. There was no discussion of the second paragraph other than a statement by the Japanese that they would be willing to have the contents embodied in an annex. Mr. Hamilton said that we would take note of the proposal.

Mr. Wakasugi said that they desired to offer no changes with respect to Section VII, but they desired the inclusion of an annex on the part of the Government of Japan reading as follows:

ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

VII. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

The Government of the United States will accord in the Philippine Islands to the Japanese subjects a non-discriminatory treatment.

Mr. Matsudaira said that what they had in mind in this point was to provide for non-discrimination in matters both of Japanese immigration and establishment. Mr. Hamilton observed that the quota system in the Philippine Immigration Law was on a non-discriminatory basis. Mr. Matsudaira admitted this, but indicated a desire for a larger quota.

There was no further discussion. Mr. Hamilton said that we would report to the Secretary and it was agreed that Mr. Matsudaira and Mr. Bellantine would keep in touch as to the next step.

若杉氏ハ日本側ハ第一節ノ始メニ次ノ如キ新タル項ヲ挿入  
 シタイト述ベタ、即チ「世界平和ノ確立ハ日米兩政府ノ共  
 同目的ナル故歐洲戰ノ拡大防止及ビ平和克復ノ目的ヲ以  
 テ協力ス」

「ハミルトン」氏ハ前記提案ノ項ノ基礎トナツテナル概念ハ之  
 ヲ第一節内ニ組入レル事ガ出来ナイカ如何カトイフ問題ヲ考  
 慮サシナイト提起シタ。彼ハ歐洲戰ニ対スル兩面ノ態度  
 ヲ論ズル第一節ニ、斯ノ如キ種類ノ明確ナル言及ヲナス事ハ

EX 1083

2200 (33)

## 會談覺書

(ワシントン) 於テ一九四一年(昭和十六年)六月四日

拔萃

合衆國政府側、附屬書及び補足書

ニ、兩國政府、歐洲戦争ニ對スル態度

合衆國政府ハソノ歐洲戦争ニ對スル態度ニ關スル限りニ於テハ米國政府ハ他ノ五ニ對シテ或一國ヲ援助スル目的ヲ持ツ如ク何ナル侵略行爲ニモ訴ヘル事ヲシテ居ラズ。又將來ニ於テモ訴ヘナイト云フコトヲ宣言スル。

岩崎陸軍大佐ハ若シモ我々合衆國側ガ「協定ノ條項ハ自己防衛ノ行爲ニ因ル介入ニ明ニ之ヲ適用セス」ト云フ一項内ニアル提案文ヲ削除スル用意ガアルナラバ日本側モ前述ノ提議ヲ取り消ス用意ガアルト述ベタ。

若杉氏ハ此ノ案ハ後ノ考慮ニ委ネ。又ソノ言葉ヲ他ノ節ニ組  
入レルガ出来ナイカ、ソレトモソレヲソノ獨立シテ即ニ組入レルガ  
出来ナイカラ考ヘテヨイノテハナイカト述ベク。

No 2

第三節ニ関シテ、若杉氏ハ金ク異ナル形式ヲ提案シタ。我が  
草案ノ形式及ビ若杉氏提案ノ形式ヲ次ニ並ベテ示ス。

220C (33)

歐洲ニ平和ヲ齎ラサントスル米國ノ現在ノ努力ノ問題ニ関スル  
大統領ノ宣言ニシテ態度ト兩立セヌモノデアルト考ヘラレルカモ  
知レヌト指摘シタ。彼ハ又第一節第一項ノ「我々」トイフ言葉  
ヲ「凡テ」トイフ言葉ニカヘルト云フ事ハ所期ノ目的ニ適ハヌモノニ  
ナルノデアライカトイフ事ヲ考慮スル程ニト提案シタ。因ニ我方  
草案ハ次ノ如クデアル

兩國政府ハ、ソノ互策ハ永久平和ノ確立並ニ兩國間ノ相互的  
信賴ト協力ノ新時代ヲ齎スベキ方向ニ指向セラレテキル事ヲ  
確言スル



220C (33)

五月三十一日附我草案四一式

日本側提案，一式

日本政府、米國政府ニ對シ其條件  
 ニ於テ中國政府ト、同ニ平和的解決、折衝ヲ提案ス。而シテ其條件ハ「是等、條件ハ善隣友好並ニ主權及自領ト、相互尊重ニ與テ近衛原則及其、實際的適用ト調和スルモノ」依テ米國大統領ハ中國政府ニ對シ中國政府及「日本政府ガ敵對行為、終結及「平和的關係再建、為相互ニ有利ニテ受諾不能、基礎ニ基キ折衝ヲ開始スル」ヲ提唱ス。

米國大統領ハ蔣介石政府ニ對シ「戰爭終結及「平和的關係再建、為近衛三原則及其、實際的適用ニ基キ日本ト折衝ヲ出來ル」ヲ早ク開始スル」ヲ提議ス。

No. 3

此、變更ニ関シ右杉氏ガ提示スル理由ハ日華間ニ米國、相停カ  
 ンタト言フ印象ヲ日本國民ニ与ヘルトヲ避ケルニ為ラン。  
 次ニ日本側ハ此ニ代ルモノトシテ、如キ一式ヲ重要トシテ其ニ  
 與テ保留附テ提議ス。  
 「日本政府、日本政府ガ、折衝ニ於テ日華衝突、平和的解決、為折衝ヲ提案スルニ基キ其條件ヲ發表セリ。而シテ日本政府ハ「是等、條件

ハ近衛原則及其ノ實際的適用ト相和スルモノナリト公言セリ。  
依ツテ宋大統領ハ支那トノ善隣友好政策ヲ信頼シテ重慶ニ在ル  
中國政府ニ對シテ戰爭終結及ビ平和的関係再開ノ為、中國政府ト自  
本政府ガ折衝ヲ開始スベキコトヲ提議スベシ。

「ハミルトン」氏ハ岩畔陸軍大佐ニ對シテ同大佐ノ考ヘテハ此ノ協定ノ締  
結ニ依テ中國政府ヲ構成スルモノ汪精衛政権ナルカ又ハ重慶テ  
アルクト事ナク。

岩畔大佐ハ今テハ汪精衛政権ヲ中國政府ト認メ重慶ニ在ル政  
府ハ地方政權ト看做シテアルト述ベク。提案サレテ了解ハ某政府ガ  
重慶政府ト交渉スルコトヲ企圖シテアル。交渉ノ結果ニ就イテハ彼ハ  
三ノ可能性ヲ與テ是ヲ別紙ノ如ク圖テ表シタ。

即チ (A) 重慶政府ガ汪精衛ノ南京政府ニ吸収セルコト。

(B) 汪精衛ノ南京政府ガ重慶政府ニ吸収セルコト。

(C) 南京及ビ重慶兩政府ガ一体トナラテ一ノ新シイ政府  
トナルコト。日本政府ハ此ノ事ニ就イテハ中國側自身ガ  
キルコトヲ提議シタ。

次ニ岩畔氏ハ第三章ニ關スル日本政府ノ修正附屬書ヲ提議  
シタ。五月三十一日附草案ノ形式及ビ日本ノ改正草案ノ形式  
ヲ次ニ並ベテ示ス。

220 C (33)

吾等不可附就草案之式

上記三事三於言及見其基本的條件次、如之

- 一、善隣友好
- 二、有害於共產主義、活動三對之共同防衛……日本軍、中國領土、輕重之合意更三討議ヲ要スルモノ又、
- 三、經濟的協力……是依リ日華兩國、國際通商關係三於之無差別基礎ニ基キ進ムベキモノ又、
- 四、主權及領土、相互尊重
- 五、良隣人トシテ協力ニ合シ甚重平等知三貢獻スル極限、一中核ヲ形成シ國家トシテ各々、固有特徴ヲ相互ニ尊重スルモノ、
- 六、日本陸海軍、中國領土及領海ヨリ、可及的迅速ニ縮小シ撤退スルモノ
- 七、領土不併合
- 八、不賠償
- 九、滿洲國三獨立友好之交誼

265

日本側之提案之式

近衛三原則及之、實際的

適用三明白合意ニ其基本的條件次、如之

- 一、善隣友好
- 二、共產主義活動三對之共同防衛……四蒙古各華北或ハ地ニ於テ日本軍駐在スルモノ
- 三、經濟的協力
- 四、主權及領土、相互尊重
- 五、良隣人トシテ協力ニ合シ、世界平和ニ貢獻スル極限、一中核ヲ形成シ國家トシテ各々、固有特徴ヲ相互尊重スルモノ、
- 六、日華協定ニ從ヒテ、中國領土ヨリ、日本軍隊、撤退スルモノ
- 七、領土不併合
- 八、不賠償
- 九、滿洲國承認

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若松氏、外記附原書、中三番目、題目讀之、日本側、官華  
交渉ヨリ、此問題ヲ処理スルコトヲ望ミ「軍」ヲ「經濟協力」トシ、單  
ニ聲明以上ニ其、題目、言葉ヲ敷衍スルコトヲ欲シトト説明多。  
ハルト之氏ハ此、英、五月十二日、日本、口頭説明即、日本之  
ニ依リ中國、於テ經濟的独占ヲ行使スル意志ナク又、第三國、權益  
ヲ制限スルコト中國ヲ強要スル意志ナシトシ、於テ敷衍セラレ居ル旨  
具、文体ヲ明快ニスル為、我々、其、字句ヲ「中國及日本人之依  
リ國際通商關係ニ於テ無差別、基礎ニ基キ進ムトシ」ニ  
替ヘテ自述セタ。茲ニ「ハルト」之氏ハ我が政府が通商關係ニ於テ  
無差別、原則、適用ニ重キヲ置ク事ヲ強調多。

ハルト之氏ハ我々が陸海軍部隊トイフ言葉遣ヲ提議多  
此之題目ニ於テ日本政府、其、新草案ニ於テ軍隊トイフ言葉ヲ  
再ニ使用シヤルト指摘多。彼、日本、海軍部隊ヲ撤退セル  
意志ガナシト尋ネタ。之ニ對シ、若松陸軍大佐ハ正常國際交  
際ニ於テハ一國、軍艦ガ他國、港ヲ訪問スル、又更ニ合衆國  
モ合ハ諸外國ハ上海ニ於テ海兵又ハ之ニ相當スル海軍部隊ヲ平  
常維持シヤルト述ベタ。彼等日本側、可ル、下言フ英語ヲ  
單ニ陸軍部隊ト限定セテ日本語「軍隊」トイフ言葉  
ノ譯語トシテ使用シタテアタ。

No. 6.

彼ハ陸海軍ヲ向テ現在、戰爭ニ從テ之ヲ日本、全軍隊  
ヲ撤退セルコト、日本、明ラカニ意向テシト述ベタ。彼ハ若シ  
可ル、下言フ「軍」ト云フ字句ガ茲ニ意圖セラレヤルコトヲヨリ良ク

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表ハモナラバ、ハノ字句ヲ用ヒルニ何等異議ガナラズ。  
又彼ハ彼ノ解スル所ハ「由國領土トイフ言葉ハ中國ノ領海  
ヲ包含ト附テ加ヘタ。

「ハミルト」氏ハ我々ノ第四節及第五節ニ關係アル附屬書三箇  
トノ關係ヲ言フ凡テ、實ニ考慮スル所ナラズ。

若松氏ハ日本側ハ第四節ノ原文ニ「何等変更スル所ナ  
カ、現下ノ國際危急ニ於テ通商上ノ制限ニ關スル我々ノ附屬  
書ヲ取止メテ欲シト云フ。彼ハ斯ル附屬書ハ第四節ノ規  
定ノ弱ナルモノナルト述ベタ。彼ハ第四節ノ「保有」トイフ言葉  
ハ我々ノ果國側ガ考ヘテ中下ヲ十分ニ表スル日本側ノ考ヘ  
テ中下ト云フ。ハミルト」氏ハ我々ハ此ノ實ニ考慮スル所ナラズ。

若松氏ハ第五節ノ字句ト「今」ハ「字句ヲ提議」シト云  
ツタ。五月三十一日、我々ノ草案、亦我々日本側ノ「今」ハ「草  
案」亦我々提議スル所ナラズ。

五月三十一日我々草案、亦我

日本側提議、亦我

No. 7.

五. 兩心、太平洋地域ニ於テノ經濟  
活動

太平洋地域ニ於テノ日本、  
活動及結果、活動ノ平和

五. 南西太平洋地域ニ於テノ兩心、  
經濟活動

西南太平洋地域ニ於テノ  
日本ノ發展ノ平和的性質、

220C (33)

的手段ヨリ、且實際通商關係ニ於ケル無差別ノ原則ニ則リ行ハルベシト、茲ニ為サタル相互誓約ニ基キ日本政府及米心政府各自ノ經濟、保全及ビ發展ニ必要ナル天然資源例ヘバ(石油、ゴム、錫・ニッケル等)、通商ニヨリ供給ヲ日本及ビ米國ガ無差別的ニ亦々得ラルベシ相互ニ協力スベキ事ヲ約ス。

モナリト声明モシテアルヲ注目シ米心日本ノ必要トスル天然資源例ヘバ(石油、ゴム、錫・ニッケル等)、生産及ビ獲得ニ協力及ビ支持ヲスルベシ。

提案ノ變更理由ハ如何ト向ニ討テ、岩畔大佐ハ日本ハ米心ガ西南太平洋ニ於テ平和的活動以外ノ活動ニ從ズル疑ヲ抱ケ居テト説明シ、米心ハ且ク日本ノ目的ハ平和的性質ヲ持ツモノナリト日本ノ言明ヲ容認スベキナルト思フ述ベク。

此ノ節、適用ヲ我方ガ全太平洋地域ヲ含ムク拡大シタリト對シテ西南太平洋域ニミテ制限シタ理由ハ同地域ニ日本ハ開港シタ特殊權益ガ在ル故ニ此ノ節ヲ特別ニ西南太平洋ニミテ充テタイト、日本側ノ希望ニヨルモデアル。彼ハ第六節ハ全太平洋地域ヲ含ムモノナルト指摘ス。

no 8.

「ミルト」氏ハ平和ニ関スル誓約ハ第六節ニ組入テハ如何ト唱ヘテ、但シ兩心ガ實際通商關係ニ於テ無差別ノ適用ヲ約束スルニテノ声明ハ第六節ニ殘テ置クベシ。彼ハ我が政府ガ斯ル声明ニ重要性ヲ過シテ強調ス。通商關係ニ就テ

五月三十一日附我が草案ノ方式

日本側提案ノ方式

209.

日本政府及ヒ果而政府ハ此ノ  
了解ノ基礎ヲ為ス支配的政  
策ハ太平洋地域ニ於ケル平和  
テアルヲ兩國政府ノ根本的目的  
ハ太平洋地域ニ於ケル平和維持  
及ヒ保全ニ対シ共同ノ努力ニテ  
貢獻セントスルコト、又、兩國政府ハ  
前述ノ地域ニ於テ領土の野心  
ナキコトヲ宣言ス。

日本政府及ヒ果而政府ハ兩國  
政府ノ根本的目的ハ太平洋  
地域ニ於ケル平和ノ維持及  
保全ニ対シ共同ノ努力ニテ  
貢獻セントスルコト、又、兩國政府  
ハ前述ノ地域ニ於テ領土の  
野心ナキコトヲ宣言スル。

日本政府ハ西半球地域内ニ單

彼人、先ノ草案中ニ我々が「機会均等ヲ基準トシトイフ字  
 句ヲ提案シタコト又、日本側ハ此ノ字句ニ対スルハキリトシタ  
 概念ヲ持ツテ居ナカッタ爲ニ此ノ字句ニ異議ヲ申シ立テタコト  
 又若シモ我々が必務長官ノ最近ノ演説中ニ含ミテキル字  
 句ヲ用ヒルナラバ日本側ハ何ノ異議申立ヲシナイデアラウト云フ  
 ヲ知ラサレタカテ果田側ノウノ五月三十一日附ノ草案デ斯ル  
 字句ヲ取換ヘタコトヲ指摘シタ。ハミルトシ氏ハ草案ノアリ  
 得ル変更向題ヲ考慮スルト述ベタ。

才六節ニ與ヒテ若杉氏ハ追加文節ヲ含ム代案ヲ提議シタ  
 我が五月三十一日附草案ノ形式及ビ日本側ノ代案草案ノ  
 形式ヲ並ベテ示ス。



No. 10

220C (33)

(波真之疏)

予基地ヲ建設シ又ハソ地域ニ  
於テ政治的野心抱ク意圖ナ  
キコトヲ宣言スル。  
同様ニ米心政府モ東亞又ハ南西  
太平洋域ニ軍ヲ基地ヲ建設シ  
又ハソ地域内於テ何等カ政治的  
野心ヲ抱ク意圖ナキコトヲ宣  
言スル。  
日米兩國政府ハ互ニ東亞地域  
及ハ西半球ニ於テソノ一カ  
維持シテ其ノ防禦不能勢ヲ認  
ムル。

Doc 2200 (33)

或然其言自謂日本側無識、此亦向以彼方促其言也  
若其言又云、此乃日本之言也、然其言亦無非、其事亦未  
可上言、言下也、此其言或如力言、說此之後、日本側、  
言下云、此乃日本之言也、代其言、此亦日本之言也、此之後  
謀以自表、以言、才、項、就、此、乃、內、容、附、屬、書、具、體、化、不  
凡、其、言、受、諾、云、云、日本側、聲明、以外、議論、交、涉、亦、有、之。  
此、其、氏、之、此、提、案、亦、考、慮、正、不、言、明、之、也。

若松氏、日本側、才、之、節、則、云、何、時、亦、要、使、之、上、乃、上、論、才  
乃、左、記、如、日本、政府、側、附、屬、書、之、包、含、也、此、乃、上、論、才、上、述  
云

### 日本政府側附屬書及補足書

其、一、之、詳、論、中、立、化  
東京政府、其、一、之、詳、論、於、日本、人民、世、是、則、得、過、  
與、此、也、  
松平氏、日本側、此、五、三、年、若、居、此、時、日本、人民、及  
心、定、能、對、無、差別、之、圖、此、事、下、上、言、云、云、此、其、氏、  
一、所、言、之、稱、良、法、一、則、其、實、則、度、無、差別、之、基、準、上、言、云、  
上、述、之、矣。松平氏、其、言、認、為、云、云、太、上、等、則、當、予、以、意、  
向、可、表、明、之、也。

討論、且、終、然、以、一、三、三、三、之、氏、長、官、報、告、云、云、上、述、之、矣。  
而、三、次、毀、階、就、在、松、平、氏、之、言、云、云、其、言、云、云、云、交、涉、行、  
下、取、極、之、也。

2611

Ex. # 1084

Doc. No. 16327(51)

Page 1

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 6 June 41"

At 9 a.m. Prince KONOYE telephoned me to say that Ambassador OSHIMA had an interview with Hitler at Berchtesgaden and that Germany had at last decided to attack Russia. Hitler had intimated his desire for Japan's participation in this war against Russia, though he did not say so. Prince KONOYE also said that the Liaison Conference in this connection would be held this morning, and he asked me to report this fact to the Throne. I proceeded to the Palace in response to a summons from His Majesty, and was received in audience from 10:20 a.m. to 11:05 a.m. His Majesty discussed at full length the matter mentioned above during the whole period. I had a talk with the Chief Aide-Camp at 11:10 a.m. and asked him to keep in close touch with me with regard to the same. Premier KONOYE made Mr. HOSOKAWA, Secretary to the Premier, bring the telegram of Ambassador OSHIMA to me, and he asked me to study it. I read it and returned it. I was granted an audience with the Emperor from 1:10 p.m. to 1:30 p.m. to report on the substance of the telegram. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA proceeded to the Palace, and was received in audience by the Emperor to report on the recognition of Croatia and on the telegram from Ambassador OSHIMA. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA intimated to me his opinion as to the future outlook of the relations between the Soviet and Germany. According to his opinion as regards the German-Soviet relations, the conclusion of an agreement was 60% possible and the outbreak of war 40%, in spite of Ambassador OSHIMA's observations. I had a visit from MATSUDAIRA, Minister of the Imperial Household Department at 2:10 p.m., and he informed me of such matters as the visit to Japan of Wang Ching-Wei and the circumstances concerning the change of the Lord Chamberlain. At three in the afternoon the Chief Aide-de-Camp informed me of the opinion of the War Minister concerning relations between the Soviet and Germany, which confirmed the opinion of the Foreign Minister, which was that the outbreak of war was not so imminent as Ambassador OSHIMA expected.

Doc 1632 W (51)

EX 1084

木戸侯爵日記

昭和十六年六月六日分

六月六日(金)孝澄本日徴兵検査終了第二乙トナル

雨

午前九時近衛公ヨリ電話ニテ「大嶋大  
使と總統ニ呼バレベルヒテスガルテン  
ニテ面回ス獨ハ愈々蘇聯ヲ討ツトノコ  
トナリ日本ニ對シテハ之ニ參加ヲ希望  
ストハ云ハザルモ暗ニ之ヲ望ム居ル様  
子ナリ右ニツキ今朝連絡會譯ヲ願僣ス  
右言上ヲ乞フトノコトナリキ

九時五十分ヨリ同五十五分迄拜謁右ノ  
趣ヲ言上ス

十時二十分ヨリ十一時五分迄御召ニヨ  
リ拜謁

右ノ件ニツキ種々御話アリタリ

十一時十分武官長ト面談右ノ件ニツキ

今後緊密ナル連絡ヲ依頼ス

近衛首相ヨリ細川秘書官ヲ以テ大嶋大

使ノ電報ヲ届ケ越サルヨツテ詳細披見

返却ス

Doc 1632 W (51)

2.

一時十分ヨリ同三十分迄拜謁電報ノ概  
要ヲ言上ス

二時松岡外相参内クロアチヤ國ノ承認並  
ニ大嶋大使ノ電報ニツキ言上ス外相ノ  
見透ハ大使ノ觀測ニモ不拘獨ソノ關係  
ハ協定成立六分餘戰四分ト見ルトノコ  
トナリキ

二時十分松平宮相來室汪來朝ノ侍從  
長發送開河ノ紀錄等ヲ聽ク

三時武官長來室獨ソ關係ニ關スル陸軍ノ見  
解モ亦様々急迫セリトハ見ザル旨語ア  
リタリ

四時四十五分ヨリ五時半迄松岡外相ト  
會談

五時三十五分御石ニヨリ拜謁六時迄松  
岡ノ奏上其他ニツキ承ル

六時半一旦舊宅ノ上紅葉館ニ於ケル六  
日會ニ出席ス

EX. 1085

Document No. 220 C (34)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 179

INFORMAL AND UNOFFICIAL ORAL STATEMENT HANDED BY THE  
SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) ON  
JUNE 6, 1941

Excerpts

. . . . .

From such study as it has so far been possible to make of the revisions which the associates of the Japanese Ambassador offered on June 4 it is disappointing to note a vast difference between the proposal as it now stands with these revisions and the original document on which earlier discussions were based. The successive Japanese revisions appear to have gradually narrowed down the extent of the advances in the direction of a liberal policy and to have carried the proposal away from the fundamental points which the Government of the United States considers are involved in establishing and preserving peaceful conditions in the Pacific area. The impression that the Secretary of State derives from the proposed revisions as a whole and from recent manifestations of the Japanese Government's attitude is that they evince a disposition (1) to stress Japan's alignment with the Axis, (2) to avoid giving a clear indication of an intention to place Japan's relations with China on a basis which in the opinion of the Government of the United States would contribute to a lasting peace and thus to future stability in the Far East, and (3) to veer away from clear-cut commitments in regard to policies of peace and of nondiscriminatory treatment which are the fundamentals of a sound basis for peace in the Pacific area. As the Secretary of State has indicated, this Government has not wished to take an initiative in commenting upon the merits of the proposed peace terms between Japan and China; comment has been offered upon this matter because under the proposed understanding this Government would be expected to take some action with regard to these terms.

. . . . .

Foreign Relations II, pp 467-468

Doc 220c(34)

ex 1085

No. 1

一九四二年(昭和十七年)六月六日國務長官ヨリ日本  
大使(野村)ニ手書セラルル非正式且非公式口頭聲明書  
抜萃

六月四日日本大使同僚ノ提議ニテ諸修正案ニテ今迄研究未タ所ヨリ判断スルニ是等修正事項、今ハ現在提案ト以前ノ協議ノ基礎ヲマツテ最初ノ文書ト向テ重大ノ相違カアルヲ見テ失望シ、日本側ノ相違修正、自由主義政策、方向進展ノ範圍、シテニ縮小セシメ多慮アリ。又提案ヲ米國政府ハ太平洋地域於テ平和状態ノ確立及ニ保存ニ含ミテナルト考ル基本的要求ヨリ引離シテ如何思ハル。提議ニテ修正事項全体ヨリ、又最近、日本政府、態度及表示ヨリ國務長官得テ印象、是等、モ、今、傾向ヲ表示スルモ、テアル。即チ(一)日本ト枢軸トノ連繫ヲ強調シテ(二)米國政府ノ永久平和徒ラ極東ニ於テ爾將來、安長ニ貢獻スルモノト思惟ニ基礎ニ日華關係ヲ置ク意思、明確ナル表示ヲ與ヘルニテ(三)太平洋地域ニ於テ平和、健全ナル基礎、根本原則アル平和政策ト無差別待遇政策同スル明確ナル公約ヨリ方向ヲ転ズルコト。

國務長官ガ表示セ之如ク、當政府、日華間提議ニテ平和條件ノ價值ヲ自ラ率先ニ批評スルコト

No. 2

Doc 220c (34)

欲ニカクモ其提議カクノ解、下テ、痛成所、是等、  
條件、自之何カ行動ヲ取ルベク期待セラル、故ニ此件  
ニ就テ批評ヲ為シタリ。

外交関係第三卷 四六七—四六八頁



Ex. # 1086

Doc. No. 4061 B

Page 1

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo	11 June 1941	1140	S hours
Arrival	12 June 1941	30	hours

No. 927 of 11 June.

Prince URACHI has informed us of a conversation with the Commander-in-Chief of the KWANTUNG army, General UREZU, in HSINKING: "Commander-in-Chief of the KWANTUNG army, General UREZU, stressed that he welcomed the Neutrality pact JAPAN-RUSSIA for the moment. Since, however, the Tripartite pact is the unchangeable basis of Japanese foreign policy, Japan's attitude towards the Neutrality pact must undergo a change just as soon as the hitherto existing German-Russian relations undergo an alteration.

OTT

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4061B.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

No 1

EX 1080

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Doc 4061 B

電報（秘密手紙）

東京

一九四一年（昭和十六年）六月十一日十一時四十分

着

十二日〇時三十分

六月十一日附 第九二七号

「ワルアハ」公爵ハ新京ニ於ケル関東軍総司令官梅津  
將軍ト會談ニ就イテ當方ニ次ノ如ク報告シタ  
『関東軍総司令官梅津將軍ハ、日蘇中立條約ヲ  
目下ニ起歓迎シテ其ル旨強調シタ。然レ三國同盟

ハ日本ノ外交政策ノ不変ノ基本ヲナシテ其ルカラ、

中立條約ニ対スル日本ノ態度モ、從來ノ独蘇ノ

關係ガ變更ヲ受ケル様ニナルヤ否ヤ、變更シナケレバ

Doc 4061B

No 2

書類第五〇六一目録

證

余 Ulrick Straus 八余亦獨逸語及ビ日本語ニ  
精通セル者ナリト並ニ獨逸語原文及ビ日本語  
原文ニ對照シテ右ノ本音類ヲ真実ニ且正確  
ニ翻譯セルモノヲ確證セルコトヲ茲ニ證ス

Ulrick A. Straus

Br. Ex. 180

DRAFT DOCUMENT RECEIVED INFORMALLY FROM ASSOCIATES OF THE  
JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOJURA) ON JUNE 15, 1941

The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement of understanding as expressed in a joint declaration for the resumption of traditional friendly relations.

Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment between their countries should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.

It is our earnest hope that, by a cooperative effort, the United States and Japan may contribute effectively toward the establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area and, by the rapid consummation of an amicable understanding, encourage world peace and arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening. Both Governments, therefore, desire that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general understanding which would bind, meanwhile, both Governments, in honor and in act.

It is the belief of the two Governments that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated later at a Conference.

Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit:

1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting the international relations and the character of nations.
2. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.
3. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.
4. Commerce between both nations.
5. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.
6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.
7. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

Accordingly, the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan have come to the following mutual understanding and declaration of policy:

I. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.

Both Governments affirm that their national policies are directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation between our peoples.

Both Governments declare that it is their traditional, and present, concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household living under the ideal of universal concord through justice and equity; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others, they further admit their responsibilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of other people.

Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.

II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.

The Government of Japan maintains that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was, and is defensive and is designed to prevent the participation of nations in the European war not at present involved in it.

The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European hostilities is and will continue to be determined solely and exclusively by considerations of protection and self-defense; its national security and the defense thereof.

III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between Japan and China.

The Government of Japan having declared that the general terms, within the framework of which the Government of Japan will propose the negotiation of a peaceful settlement of the China Affair, are implied in the Konoe principles and in the practical application of those principles, the President of the United States, relying upon the policy of the Government of Japan to establish a relation of neighborly friendship with China, will suggest to the Government

Br. Ex. 180

at Chungking that it enter with the Government of Japan into a negotiation for a termination of hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations.

IV. Commerce between both nations.

When official approbation to the present understanding has been given by both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other mutually to supply such commodities as are, respectively, available and required by either of them. Both Governments further consent to take necessary steps to resume normal trade relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan. If a new commercial treaty is desired by both Governments, it would be negotiated as soon as possible and be concluded in accordance with usual procedure.

V. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.

On the basis of mutual pledges hereby given that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations, the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other toward obtaining non-discriminatory access by Japan and by the United States to commercial supplies of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which each country needs for the safeguarding and development of its own economy.

VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

Both Governments declare that the controlling policy underlying this understanding is peace in the Pacific area, that it is their fundamental purpose, through cooperative effort, to contribute to the maintenance and the preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and that neither has territorial designs in the area mentioned.

VII. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

The Government of Japan declares its willingness to enter at such time as the Government of the United States may desire into negotiation with the Government of the United States with a view to the conclusion of a treaty for the neutralization of the Philippine Islands, when Philippine independence shall have been achieved.

(Signature)

Br. Ex. 180

ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

IV. Commerce between both nations.

It is understood that during the present international emergency Japan and the United States each shall permit export to the other of commodities in amounts up to the figures of usual or pre-war trade, except, in the case of each, commodities which it needs for its own purposes of security and self-defense. These limitations are mentioned to clarify the obligations of each Government. They are not intended as restrictions against either Government; and, it is understood, that both Governments will apply such regulations in the spirit dominating relations with friendly nations.

Foreign Relations II, pp. 473-476.







Doc 220c(35)

兩國政府，其政策，永為和平，確立並兩國民間  
相互的信賴及協力，新世紀之齊進之各方面，指向上  
之和平，言之不謬。

兩國政府，國家及民族之發展，各負其責，如不正義及  
不平等，依普遍之標準，理想下之生活，國家之權威，不  
和平之手段，依規律也，且他人之為之，實不為  
其如，彼等自身，為道德的物質的福祉，  
追求，向之利益，相互關係，各各自之對，  
權利，言有責任，認之，兩國政府傳統的  
之，現在之變遷，其概念，又確信之，實言  
之，更不政府，他，不之，對之，壓迫，又採取反對  
之責任，認之。

兩國政府，國家，性格，社會秩序，並人民生活，基礎  
之道德義，固不矣，傳統的概念，依然之，係存之，  
之，道德義，及概念，相合之外，未也，又「和平也」  
依此，之，更之，之，之，就，離，之，決，莫，有之。

二 歐洲戰爭對兩國政府之態度

日本政府，三不協定，目的，防衛的，之，又現在  
於之，同樣，之，且現在歐洲戰爭，參加之，居，之，國家，向  
戰爭，參加，防，之，志，之，之，之，主張，之，之，之。

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本國政府，其，歐洲戰爭，對之，態度，現在，及，將來

Doc 220 (25)

上元寧言防禦不及自衛即至家，安全及其防禦之固之  
考慮之餘決也此其主張心。

三 集中共同，平和的解決之行動。

日本政府：日本政府其，符合「於中日華，軍事，平和  
的解決，非衛提案之主要條件，自衛原則並  
該原則實際的適用之旨旨言明也。此，  
米皇大統願，中心，同一善隣友好，誼，確立之，  
不與日本政府，改裝，倚信，重要政府，同一政府敵  
對行為，終結及，平和的關係再同一，日本政府，  
非衛開始不其，提唱之。

四 兩國共同通商。

現在了解對之西政府，正式承認之時，米皇  
日本，夫之保有之且兩國，孰，が必要，之物質，相互  
供給之，確約スル。更，兩國政府，以所，日米通商及  
三航海條約，確立之，正常，貿易關係，再同一  
之要，手段，講之，同一同意スル。西政府，對通商條  
約，希望スル時，之，可及的，交渉，以通常，手續，  
終結之。

五 太平洋區域，兩國，經濟活動。

太平洋區域，兩國，活動，及，米皇，活動，平和，手段  
依，且，實際，通商關係，之，無差別，原則，則，行

764

Doc 2200 (35)

此等之約為相互誓約之基本。日本政府及米  
國政府之各自經濟、保安及發展之需要。天然資源  
例：油、錫、錳、等。通商之依此供給之  
果是亦亦無差別之求得之樣相互協力不  
可下之約。

六 太平洋地域之政治的安定影響下兩國政策。  
兩國政府以了解基礎之為支配的政策。太平洋地  
域之和平和。維持及保全。對之共同。努力。依  
貢獻之。又兩國政府就上述地域之領土之野  
心。下之宣言。

七 菲律賓群島之中立化。

日本政府。菲律賓。獨立。遂成。其時。米國政府。欲  
其時。同政府。其。中立化。之。條。約。締結。因。之。然  
交涉。用。始。又。之。下。之。宣言。

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外交關係才三卷四三頁一四七頁

(別紙)

米國政府側、附屬書及之補足書

四、  
兩玉間、通商。

現下ノ玉際非常時中、日本及之米玉ハ各々其ノ安  
全及之自己防衛ノ目的ノ爲ニ要スル物資ヲ除キ、平  
常又ハ戰前ノ貿易ノ數子ニ達スル迄ノ數量ノ物資  
ヲ相手玉ニ輸出スルコトヲ許可スルモノト了解セラレル。是等  
ノ制限ハ各々ノ政府ノ責任ヲ明瞭ナラシムル爲ニ與テラレ  
夫ハ孰レノ政府ニ對スル制限ニモ非ラシテ兩玉政府ハ右規  
則ヲ友好玉トノ關係ヲ支配スル精神ヲ以テ適用スルモノト  
了解セラレル。

E. #1088

Doc. No. 219<sup>d</sup> (77)

Br. Fr. 109

TELEGRAM  
THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE SECRETARY  
OF STATE

TOKYO, June 16, 1941--9 p.m.  
(Received June 16--10:35 a.m.)

Excerpts

830. Chungking's 240, June 15, 3 p.m. Without delay I immediately sought an appointment with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and delivered to him in person a signed note quoted below. I made the most emphatic representations and pointed out the grave danger to American-Japanese relations involved in recent bombing attacks on Chungking which have now resulted in heavy damage to our Embassy property, including the residence of the Ambassador, and seriously jeopardizing both the lives of the Ambassador and other American nationals and the U. S. S. Tutuila.

.....

"Excellency: I have the honor to inform your Excellency that according to information just received from the American Ambassador at Chungking, during an air raid early on the afternoon of June 15, 1941, twenty-seven Japanese airplanes flying high bombed Chungking and also dropped several, about five, bombs within areas of one to three hundred yards of the Embassy Chancery and the United States ship Tutuila. A bomb which dropped within fifty yards of the entrance to the Embassy dugout hit alongside of and heavily damaged the offices of the assistant military attache, about half way between the Chancery and the United States ship Tutuila. The concussion and flying debris damaged the Chancery, including the windows, transoms, tile roof, screens and shutters. Some damage was also caused at the Ambassador's residence a half mile away and at the Standard Oil offices near the Chancery.

.....

Foreign Relations I, pp. 715-716



1941 (177)

駐米國大使(ルー) / GREEN / より國務長官に宛たる電報。  
東京發信 一九四一年 / 昭和十六年 / 六月十六日午後九時  
(受信 六月十六日午前二時三五分)

抜萃。

八言番 重慶西。番。 六月十五日 午後三時。  
早速外務大臣會見を求め下記の様、書簡を手交せり。本使は最も強硬なる表現を用ひ、最近リ重慶爆撃は大使の住宅は勿論米國大使館の財産に甚大なる損害を與へ、又大使及他の米國國民の生命並に米國汽船「テニタウ」 / USS TUTUILA / を危くせしものにして日米関係を甚しく危殆ならしむるものなることを指摘せり。

閣下、只今重慶駐在米國大使より受領せる情報に依れば、一九四一年 / 昭和十六年 / 六月十五日午後半、行はれた空襲に於て、高高度を飛行せる日本航空機は重慶を爆撃し、而して數個約五個の爆弾を大使館記録所及合衆國汽船「テニタウ」 / USS TUTUILA / より百碼乃至三百碼の地域以内の所に落下せり。大使館撃墜壕の入口より五百碼以内に落下せる爆弾は記録所と合衆國汽船「テニタウ」 / USS TUTUILA / の中間にある大使館付陸軍武官補佐官事務所の傍に命中し、本事務所に甚大なる損害を與へたり。震動及崩壊物が飛び來りため、記録所の窓欄間窓ノミ張の屋根、襖及シヤツタ等破壊せられ、記録所は損害を蒙りたり。記録所より半哩離れたる大使邸宅及その附近にあるスタンダード・オイル会社の事務所にも若干の被害あり。

Doc. No. 16327(52)

Page 1

"Extract from Entry From Marquis KIDO's Diary, 18 June 41."

June 18th, 1941 - (Extract)

.....I had a visit from the Premier and the Foreign Minister at 11 a.m.  
The Foreign Minister told me that instructions had been sent to have the German  
Government negotiate with the Vichy Government in connection with the French  
Indo-China Problem.

Feb 1089

水戸侯爵日記

昭和十六年六月十八日分

六月十八日（水）曇

午前九時御木本公羽來邸面談

十時出勤

十一時首相外相來室外相ヨリ御印問書ニツキ獨ヨ  
リウイシ一政府へ交渉セシムベク訓令セル旨話ア

リタリ  
十一時半汪首席參内官中ニテ午饗會御催ニツキ陪  
席ス

二時三十五分ヨリ三時遊拜謁公同外相ヨリノ前掲  
ノ話ヲ言上ス

周雄君來訪秋山辯護士ノ件ニツキ相談ス

倉茂氏來訪憲治ヲ受ク

Doc 1632 W (52)

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary,  
20 June 1941"

.....Prince KONOYE called on me at 5.50 p.m. and informed me confidentially that there was something hard to understand about the Foreign Minister's opinion in view of the present strained international relations including the outbreak of the war between the Soviet and Germany. He took this occasion to refer to the responsibility of the Cabinet, but I advised him that it was still too early to discuss this. I promised him that we would talk over the matter with Mr. HIRANUMA, Minister of Home Affairs, at the earliest opportunity. He went home after about an hour's talk.

7-1090

水戸侯管日記

昭和十六年六月二十日

六月二十日(金) 曇雨

午前十時参議院議員ヲ小山阿ノ宅ニ訪フ  
三笠官、森友官大官御所ニ賜物御禮ノ記録ヲ爲  
シ出勤

一時五分ヨリ同三十三分迄拜禮  
栗次郎氏來屆面談

一時半高松官ニ伺参賜物御禮記録  
博愛公、男來訪昨日ノ趣ナリ

三十分近衛公來訪獨ノ閣談等國際情勢  
折柄外相ノ意見捕提シ難キ點アル等ノ問題  
キ内閣アリ内閣ノ責任ニ及ヒシカ余ハ  
理論等ノ問題ニアテサル官ヲ遣テ他最近ニ平  
報ト三人ニテ参談ヲ納ス約一時間ニシテ併

FILE  
RETURN  
TO  
OFFICE  
72 W (53)

Br. Ex. 181

ORAL STATEMENT HANDED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO  
THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) ON JUNE 21, 1941

Excerpt.

. . . . .

The Secretary of State has no reason to doubt that many Japanese leaders share the views of the Japanese Ambassador and his associates as indicated above and would support action toward achieving those high objectives. Unfortunately, accumulating evidence reaches this Government from sources all over the world, including reports from sources which over many years have demonstrated sincere good will toward Japan, that some Japanese leaders in influential official positions are definitely committed to a course which calls for support of Nazi Germany and its policies of conquest and that the only kind of understanding with the United States which they would endorse is one that would envisage Japan's fighting on the side of Hitler should the United States become involved in the European hostilities through carrying out its present policy of self-defense. The tenor of recent public statements gratuitously made by spokesmen of the Japanese Government emphasizing Japan's commitment and intentions under the Tripartite alliance exemplify an attitude which cannot be ignored. So long as such leaders maintain this attitude in their official positions and apparently seek to influence public opinion in Japan in the direction indicated, is it not illusory to expect that adoption of a proposal such as the one under consideration offers a basis for achieving substantial results along the desired lines?

Another source of misgiving in the Japanese proposal relates to the desire of the Japanese Government to include in its terms for a peaceful settlement to be offered to the Chinese Government a provision which would permit the stationing of Japanese troops in certain areas in Inner Mongolia and North China as a measure of cooperation with China in resisting communistic activities. While this Government has given careful thought to the considerations which have prompted the Japanese Government to make such a proposal, and while this Government does not desire to enter into the merits of such a proposal, it feels that the liberal policies to which the United States is committed, as explained on numerous occasions to the Japanese Ambassador and his associates, would not permit this Government to associate itself with any course which appears to be inconsistent with these policies. Furthermore, although in matters affecting only this country there might be some latitude of decision as to the qualifying of rights, the matter under discussion affects the sovereign rights of a third country, and accordingly it is felt that this Government must be most scrupulous in dealing with such a matter.

Br. Ex. 181

The Secretary of State has therefore reluctantly come to the conclusion that this Government must await some clearer indication than has yet been given that the Japanese Government as a whole desires to pursue courses of peace such as constitute the objectives of the proposed understanding. This Government sincerely hopes that the Japanese Government will manifest such an attitude.

NOTE: In order to bring the current discussions up to date as far as the American attitude is concerned, there is being handed the Japanese Ambassador separately a revision, bearing the date of June 21, of the document marked "Unofficial, Exploratory and without Commitment" which was handed the Japanese Ambassador on May 31.

Foreign Relations II, pp. 485-486.

220C(36)

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一九四一年(昭和十六年)六月二十一日國務長官から  
日本大使(野村)に手交された口述聲明抜草

國務長官は多数の日本指導者達が野村大使及び其の同僚  
 の有する前述の意見と同意であり、その高き目的を達成する  
 爲に援助するであらうことを疑ふ理由を知らぬ。不幸にして  
 多年に亘つて日本に眞面目な好意を表明して来た助を  
 念ひ金在野、各助から入手せる積る証拠は有力な官  
 職に在る日本の指導者中。或者は「ナチス」独乙との。征  
 服政策に対する支持を促す方向には是れと異なる。然る  
 居り、且是等の指導者が是認するアメリカの唯一の了  
 解は若しもアメリカが現在として自ら自己防衛の政策を  
 遂行するに依りヨーロッパ戦争に捲き込まれる様になら  
 ば場合日本がヒトラーの側に立つて戦ふことになること  
 を予してゐる。三國同盟に基く日本の約束及び意図を強  
 調せる日本政府代弁者が理由を以て發表せる最近の公式聲  
 明の趣意は無視出来ぬ態度の犯を予してゐる。且是等の  
 指導者達が彼等の官職上斯る意見を有し、明らに日本  
 の輿論を其の指する方向に向けんとし、以上、現在検討  
 中の提案。格用が希望する方向に實質的結果を齎す  
 基盤を提供するも、なりと懸念するは誤解ではなからうか。  
 日本の提案中、も一つの疑念の所因は日本政府が中国政府  
 に申し出する迄の平和解決。此件中に共産主義的活動を



防止する爲の甲國との協力手段として、切實な反が蘇北の或る地にて日本軍隊の駐屯を許す規定を含めようと欲してゐることに固まらる。我が政府は日本をして斯様な提案をなせしめた理由に關して、念ふを慮るを憚らざりし、又斯様な提案の價值に關して論議することを欲しなかつた。一可に於て凡ゆる機會に日本大使及び其の同僚に説明した如く、アメリカの採らざる自由政策は我が政府として此の政策に矛盾する様な方針と協同することを許さないのである。更に我が國のみに影響する事柄に關する事柄は權利制限に就て或程度決定の自由があるかも知れぬが、現に検討されてゐる事柄は第三國の主權に影響を及ぼすものであり、従つて我が政府は斯様な事柄を處理するに當つて非正式に弼にやらなければならぬと思ふ。

此れが國務長官は嫌な所から次の如き結論に達した。即ち提案を此れを了解の目的。如き一平和方針を進めることを日本政府が欲してゐるといふことを今日亦も一層明瞭に表示せしむ。我が政府は得たならばならぬといふことによる。我が政府は日本政府が斯る態度を明かにはするともにならざるを望んでゐる。

「註」

アメリカ態度に關する限り、今日迄の協議を今日の事態に即したものとす爲に五月卅日に日本大使に手交した「非正式、採究的且不拘束的」と記した書類を六月二十日、日付を以て改訂したものが日本大使に別に手交した。

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Br. Ex. 182

DRAFT PROPOSAL HANDED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) ON JUNE 21, 1941

Unofficial, Exploratory  
and Without Commitment

(Washington,) June 21, 1941.

The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement of understanding as expressed in a joint declaration for the resumption of traditional friendly relations.

Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment between their countries should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.

It is our earnest hope that, by a cooperative effort, the United States and Japan may contribute effectively toward the establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area and, by the rapid consummation of an amicable understanding, encourage world peace and arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening. Both Governments, therefore, desire that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general understanding which would bind, meanwhile, both Governments in honor and in act.

It is the belief of the two Governments that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated later at a conference.

Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit:

1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.
2. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.
3. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.
4. Commerce between both nations.
5. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.
6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.
7. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

Accordingly, the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan have come to the following mutual understanding and declaration of policy:

I. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.

Both governments affirm that their national policies are directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation between our peoples.

Both Governments declare that it is their traditional, and present, concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household living under the ideal of universal concord through justice and equity; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of other peoples.

Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.

II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European war.

The Government of Japan maintains that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was, and is, defensive and is designed to contribute to the prevention of an unprovoked extension of the European war.

The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European hostilities is and will continue to be determined solely and exclusively by considerations of protection and self-defense; its national security and the defense thereof.

NOTE (There is appended a suggested draft of an exchange of letters as a substitute for the Annex and Supplement on the part of the Government of the United States on this subject which constituted a part of the draft of May 31, 1941. For discussion of the fundamental question underlying this whole section, vide the Oral statement handed the Japanese Ambassador on June 21.)

III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.

The Japanese Government having communicated to the Government of the United States the general terms within the framework of which the Japanese Government will propose the negotiation of a peaceful settlement with the Chinese Government, which terms are declared by the Japanese Government to be in harmony with the Kono principles regarding neighborly friendship and mutual respect of sovereignty and territories and with the practical application of those principles, the President of the United States will suggest to the Government of China that the Government of China and the Government of Japan enter into a negotiation on a basis mutually advantageous and acceptable for a termination of hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations.

NOTE (The foregoing draft of Section III is subject to further discussion of the question of cooperative defense against communistic activities, including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory, and the question of economic cooperation between China and Japan. With regard to suggestions that the language of Section III be changed, it is believed that consideration of any suggested change can most advantageously be given after all the points in the annex relating to this section have been satisfactorily worked out, when the section and its annex can be viewed as a whole.)

IV. Commerce between both nations.

When official approbation to the present understanding has been given by both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other mutually to supply such commodities as are, respectively, available and required by either of them. Both Governments further consent to take necessary steps to resume normal trade relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan. If a new commercial treaty is desired by both Governments, it would be negotiated as soon as possible and be concluded in accordance with usual procedures.

V. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.

On the basis of mutual pledges hereby given that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations, the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other toward obtaining non-discriminatory access by Japan and by the United States to commercial supplies of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which each country needs for the safeguarding and development of its own economy.

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VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

Both Governments declare that the controlling policy underlying this understanding is peace in the Pacific area; that it is their fundamental purpose, through cooperative effort, to contribute to the maintenance and the preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and that neither has territorial designs in the area mentioned.

VII. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

The Government of Japan declares its willingness to enter at such time as the Government of the United States may desire into negotiation with the Government of the United States with a view to the conclusion of a treaty for the neutralization of the Philippine Islands, when Philippine independence shall have been achieved.

(Annex 1)

ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.

The basic terms as referred to in the above section are as follows:

1. Neighborly friendship.
2. (Cooperative defense against injurious communistic activities-- including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory.) Subject to further discussion.
3. (Economic cooperation.) Subject to agreement on an exchange of letters in regard to the application to this point of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
4. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.
5. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neighbors and forming an East Asian nucleus contributing to world peace.
6. Withdrawal of Japanese armed forces from Chinese territory as promptly as possible and in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between Japan and China.
7. No annexation.
8. No indemnities.
9. Amicable negotiation in regard to Manchoukuc.

(Annex 2)

ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

IV. Commerce between both nations.

It is understood that during the present international emergency Japan and the United States each shall permit export to the other of commodities in amounts up to the figures of usual or pre-war trade, except, in the case of each, commodities which it needs for its own purposes of security and self-defense. These limitations are mentioned to clarify the obligations of each Government. They are not intended as restrictions against either Government; and, it is understood, both Governments will apply such regulations in the spirit dominating relations with friendly nations.

(Annex 3)

SUGGESTED EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND  
THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR

The Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador:

EXCELLENCY: In Section II of the Joint Declaration which was entered into today on behalf of our two Governments, statements are made with regard to the attitudes of the two Governments toward the European war. During the informal conversations which resulted in the conclusion of this Joint Declaration I explained to you on a number of occasions the attitude and policy of the Government of the United States toward the hostilities in Europe and I pointed out that this attitude and policy were based on the inalienable right of self-defense. I called special attention to an address which I delivered on April 24 setting forth fully the position of this Government upon this subject.

I am sure that you are fully cognizant of this Government's attitude toward the European war but in order that there may be no misunderstanding I am again referring to the subject. I shall be glad to receive from you confirmation by the Government of Japan that, with regard to the measures which this nation may be forced to adopt in defense of its own security, which have been set forth as indicated, the Government of Japan is not under any commitment which would require Japan to take any action contrary to or destructive of the fundamental objective of the present agreement, to establish and to preserve peace in the Pacific areas.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

The Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State

EXCELLENCY: I have received your letter of June 10.

I wish to state that my government is fully aware of the attitude of the Government of the United States toward the Axis Powers in Europe as explained to me by you during our recent conversations and as set forth in your address of April 2nd. I did not fail to report to my Government the policy of the Government of the United States as it had been explained to me, and I may assure you that my Government understands and appreciates the attitude and position of the Government of the United States with regard to the European war.

I wish also to assure you that the Government of Japan, with regard to the measures which the Government of the United States may be forced to adopt in defense of its own security, is not under any commitment requiring Japan to take any action contrary to or destructive of the fundamental objective of the present agreement.

The Government of Japan, fully cognizant of its responsibilities freely assumed by the conclusion of this agreement, is determined to take no action inimical to the establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my most distinguished consideration.

(Annex 1)

SUGGESTED LETTER TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR IN CONNECTION WITH THE NORTH PACIFIC AGREEMENT

EXCELLENCY: In the informal conversations which took place in the conclusion of a general agreement of understanding between the two Governments, you and your associates expressed your views on the intentions of the Japanese Government in applying to Japan's proposed economic cooperation with the principle of non-discrimination in international trade relations. It is believed that it would be helpful if you would be good as to confirm the statements already expressed and give the form of replies on the following points:

1. Does the term "non-discrimination" contemplated in the Japanese Government or its nationals of a particular country or countries rights which would discriminate against the citizens and nationals of the United States and of other friendly countries? Is it contemplated that upon the conclusion of negotiations for a

peaceful settlement between Japan and China the special Japanese companies, such as the North China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company and their subsidiaries, will be divested, in so far as Japanese official support may be involved, of any monopolistic or other preferential rights that they may exercise in fact or that may inure to them by virtue of present circumstances in areas of China under Japanese military occupation?

2. With regard to existing restrictions upon freedom of trade and travel by nationals of third countries in Chinese territory under Japanese military occupation, could the Japanese Government indicate approximately what restrictions will be removed immediately upon the entering into by the Government of Chungking of negotiations with the Government of Japan and what restrictions will be removed at later dates, with an indication in each case in so far as possible of the approximate time within which removal of restrictions would be effected?

3. Is it the intention of the Japanese Government that the Chinese Government shall exercise full and complete control of matters relating to trade, currency and exchange? Is it the intention of the Japanese Government to withdraw and to redeem the Japanese military notes which are being circulated in China and the notes of Japanese-sponsored regimes in China? Can the Japanese Government indicate how soon after the inauguration of the contemplated negotiations arrangements to the above ends can in its opinion be carried out?

It would be appreciated if as specific replies as possible could be made to the questions above listed.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.



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一九四一年/昭和十六年/六月廿一日國務長官より日本大使(野村三平)宛の文書(丸根案、草案)

「三」= 於

一九四一年/昭和十六年/六月廿一日

(非正式探究的、且不拘束的)

米國政府及日本政府、傳統的友好關係再開、為共同宣言於此、表明言、為了了解、遂此為、全般的協定、開始及締結、關係之共同、責任、負つて、行ふ。

近時兩國間、疎遠したる、特殊原因、關係、兩國政府、兩國間、友好的感情、を惡化せしむる、諸事件、再發、防止、予見、得ず、且、不幸、な結果、を招かぬ、之、防止、を、衷心、より、希望、する。

共同、協力、を、依り、米國、及、日本、が、太平洋、地域、に、於て、平和、確立、を、維持、對、効果的、貢獻、を、又、友好的、了解、を、早急、遂げ、る、に、依り、世界、平和、を、助長、し、且、今や、文明、の、危機、に、陥、つ、た、悲劇的、混亂、を、消散、せ、且、阻止、する、之、衷心、より、真摯、に、希望、する。

斯、の、決定的、措置、を、交渉、遲延、不調、を、予、預、め、防止、後、於、兩國、政府、間、兩國、政府、之、德、義、上、及、行動、上、向、來、を、全般的、了解、遂げ、る、に、充、分、な、方便、を、講、じ、る、に、衷心、より、希望、する。

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斯已了解「緊急之極問題」之旨。後日會議  
議「於于會議可能」第三義的問題「旨」之「一」兩國  
國政府「之」

兩國政府「若」之「或種」事態並「態度」鮮明「之」不  
改善「之」之「兩國」政府「融」和「關係」到「達」之「旨」  
「期」待「之」下「旨」 即今

- 一、米國對日本國際關係並「國家」性「之」關係「之」概念。
- 二、歐洲戰爭對「之」兩國政府「之」態度。
- 三、日本中國間「平和」的解決「之」行動。
- 四、兩國間「通商」。
- 五、太平洋地域「之」兩國經濟活動。
- 六、太平洋地域「之」政治的安定影響「之」兩國政策。
- 七、「之」之「群島」中「之」化。

改「米國政府」及「日本政府」以下「如」相互了解並  
「政策宣言」到「達」之「旨」下「旨」。

三頁

一、米國及日本國際關係並「國家」性「之」關係「之」概念  
兩國政府「之」關係「永」久「平和」確立「之」兩國民間相  
互的「信賴」及「協力」新世紀「之」有「之」之「方向」指「向」之「旨」  
中「之」「旨」確「定」之「旨」。

兩國政府「之」國家及「之」民族「之」民族「之」之「正義」  
及「公平」之「旨」普「通」的「和」平「之」旨「之」生活「之」旨「之」旨「之」旨  
平和「之」旨「之」旨「之」旨「之」旨「之」旨「之」旨「之」旨「之」旨  
如「之」旨「之」旨「之」旨「之」旨「之」旨「之」旨「之」旨「之」旨

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之在利害相關性之自平等權利享有者信託上  
之事，兩國政府傳統的，其現在在於之概念，又確信其  
已之宣言，更兩國政府，他國家對之，且又探取及訂之長  
信之之認也

兩國政府國家性之社會秩序，並國民生活，其應入道義。  
國之天傳統之概念，依然之保存，且是乎，道義及概念上相  
容之之思想，又，之亦，之依，些之變，更之，之，就，確，之，之  
決意，有之。

二 歐洲戰爭對之兩國政府，態度

日本政府，三國協定目的之防衛的，之，又現在於之共同存之，  
且歐洲戰爭，其依之，其防，止，有，蘇，之，為，之，主，張，之。  
美國政府，之，歐洲戰爭，訂，之，態，度，現，在，及，將，來，之，防，衛，及  
自衛即國家安全之防衛，之，關，之，考，慮，依，之，決，之，之，主，張，之。

註：一九四一年，昭和十五年，五月廿日，附，原，案，一，部，之，本，件，關，之，本，國，例，  
附，屬，書，及，補，之，書，之，之，交，換，書，翰，提，議，原，案，之，附，之，本，  
事，全，體，其，應，之，為，根，本，問，題，一，討，議，一，就，之，之，之，以，之，日，不，便  
之，交，之，之，口，頭，辭，之，之，參，照，之，之。

三 日本中國間，平和之解決，之行動

日本政府，之，美國政府，對，之，日，本，政，府，之，之，內，之，於，之，中，國，政，府  
之，間，之，平和之解決，折衝，提，案，之，之，全，般，之，條，件，之，通，報，之，  
而，之，日，本，政，府，聲，明，之，依，之，是，之，等，之，條，件，之，善，隣，友，好，之，主，權，之，  
領，土，之，相，互，尊，重，之，關，之，止，衛，原，則，及，之，之，實，際，之，適，用，之，調，和，之，  
之，之，依，之，美，國，之，統，領，之，中，國，政，府，之，對，之，中，國，政，府，之，  
日，本，政，府，之，敵，對，行，為，之，終，結，及，之，平和之關係，再，開

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、為相互有利、受諾可能、基礎ニ基テ折衝ヲ開始スベキコトヲ提唱スベシ。

三頁ノ

註(第三章、前記草案、日本軍、中國駐屯ヲ始メ共產黨動ニ對シテ共同防衛問題並ニ日華經濟協力ニ就テ更ニ討議ヲ要スルモノナリ。第三章、又何ヲ變更スベシト、提案ニ對シテ提議セララル變更改ト本章ニ關スル附屬書ニ合セザル凡テ事項が満足スベキ程度ニ解決セラレタ後ニ考慮スルコトが取モ有効ナルト思考セラルル。

其時ニ於テ當該章及ビ附屬書ヲ一括ニ檢討シ得ベシ。

#### 四 兩國間、通商。

現在、了解ニ對シテ兩國政府、公認承認セリタル時ニ米國及ビ日本、夫々が保有スル兩國、孰レが必要トスル物資ヲ相互ニ供給スベキコトヲ確約スル。更ニ兩國政府、以前、日米通商及ビ航海條約ニ依リ確立セリシ正常、貿易關係ヲ再開スルニ必要ナル手段ヲ講スルニ同意スル。兩國政府が新通商條約ヲ希望スル時、之ヲ可及的速ニ交渉ニ通常手續ニ依リ締結スベシ。

#### 五 太平洋地域ニ於ケル兩國經濟活動。

太平洋地域ニ於ケル日本活動及ビ米國活動平和的手段ニ依リ且、國際通商關係ニ於ケル無差別原則ニ則リ行ハルニシテ、茲ニ為サレシ相互誓約基テ日本政府及ビ米國政府、各自、經濟、保全及ビ發展ニ必要ナル天然資源(例ニ油、ゴム、錫、ニアル等)、通商ニ依リ供給ヲ日本及ビ米國が無差別の儀ニ依リ相互協力スベキコトヲ約ス。

#### 六 太平洋地域ニ於ケル政治的安定ニ影響スル兩國政策

兩國政府、此ノ了解基礎ヲ為シ支配的政策、太平洋地域ニ於ケル平和

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三、以下

兩國政府，根本的目的，太平洋地域，在於和平，維持及保全，對之共同努力，依貢獻之上下，又兩國政府，就上述地域，領土之野心，予以宣言。

七、關於之群島，中立化

日本政府，於此之獨立達成之時，美國政府，欲之時，同政府，中立化，為一條件締結，關於欣然交涉，開始之，此，予以宣言。

(附屬書一)

日本政府側附屬書及承諾書

(一) 日本中國間，平和的解決，對之行動，此，即，於，言及，此，基本的條件，如下：

一、善隣友好。

二、有害於共產主義，活動，對之共同防衛，日本軍，中國領土內，駐屯，之，會，更，討議，要之，此，上。

三、經濟的協力，國際通商關係，於之無差別，原則，是，適用，此，為，交換，輸，依，物定，要之，此，上。

四、主權及領土，<sup>相互</sup>尊重。

五、良隣人，上，之協力，世界平和，貢獻，之，極，東，之，中，核，之，形成，之，國家，上，之，各，國，固有，特徵，相互，尊重，此，上。

六、日本軍隊，中國領土，より，可及的，速，之，日本，中國間，締結，之，此，上，協約，準據，之，撤退。

七、領土，不併合。

八、不賠償。

5

6

Doc 2200 (37)

九滿州國ニ關スル友好的交渉

五頁ノ

(附屬書ニ)

米國政府側ノ附屬書並ニ補定書

(四) 西國間ノ通商

現下ノ國際非常時中、日本及ヒ米國ハ各々ソノ安全及ヒ自己防衛ノ目的ノ爲ニ要スル物資ヲ除キ平常又ハ戰前ノ貿易ノ數字ニ達スル迄數量ノ物資ヲ相手國ニ輸出スルニテハ許可スルモノトシテ解セラル是等ノ制限ハ各々政府責任ヲ明瞭ナラシムル爲メニ舉ゲラルトシテ孰レモ政府ニ對スル制限モ非ズシテ兩國政府ハ右規則ヲ友好國トシテ關係ヲ支配スル精神ヲ以テ適用スルモノト了解セラレル。

Pac 220c (37)

(附原書三)

提果之ヲタル事務長官及日本大使間、書翰交換

事務長官ヨリ日本大使宛

拜啓 閣下、本國政府ヲ代表シ締結シタル共同宣言  
ノ中ニ亭々歐洲戰爭ニ對スル兩國政府ノ態度及國又ハ聲  
明有之候。本共同宣言、締結ヲ招来セシ非公式會談ニ於  
テ余、閣下ニ辱ク歐洲戰爭ニ對スル我が政府ノ態度及  
ビ政策ヲ説明シ、此ノ態度及政策ハ奪フカテ予シ自己防衛ノ  
權利ニ基クニトテ指摘致候。尚余ハ本問題ニ對スル我が政府  
ノ立場ヲ完全ニ表明セ、四月廿四日余ガセシ演説ニ特ニ注  
意ヲ促シ候

閣下、歐洲戰爭ニ對スル我が政府ノ態度ヲ完全ニ承知  
セラルルモノト余ハ確信致候。得共誤解ヲ避ケル爲余ハ再  
ビ本問題ニ言及致候。當カ自己ノ安全、及ニ餘儀ヲ取  
ルコト下ルニ才、諒ニ表明セ、タル處置ニ關シ、日本政府ハ  
太平洋地域ニ平和ヲ確立シ維持セ、トスル本協定ノ根本  
目的ニ反スル又ハ之ヲ破壞スル行動ヲ取ルコトヲ日本ニ要求  
スル誓約ヲ行等、辱ク居テ、日本政府ノ確認ヲ閣下  
ヨリ得、公平甚ニ幸存候。閣下ニ對シ亭々、予、最高  
敬意ヲ表シ候

敬具



Doc 220c(371)

六頁

日本大使ヨリ五務長官宛

科復 二月

日附貴前拜受は候

最近、會議中閣下が余に説明せられたる閣下が四月に  
四自片セル演説に述べられたる歐洲戦争に對する米政府、  
態度ヲ我が政府に充分承知セル旨ヲ余に申述度候。  
余米政府ノ政策ヲ閣下が余に説明せられたる通り、確ニ我  
が政府ニ報告致候。而シテ余ハ我が政府が歐洲戦争ニ  
對スル米政府ノ態度及立場ヲ了解シ且認識スル  
コトヲ閣下ニ確言致候。

更ニ余ハ日本政府ハ米政府が自己ノ安全ノ為ニ餘  
儀ナク取ルコトアルニ甚慮是レ閣下、本協定ノ根本目的  
ニ及ビ又ハ之ヲ破壊スル行動ヲ取ルコトヲ日本ニ要求スル  
誓約ヲ侵奪及シ格ナリ旨ヲ閣下ニ確言致候。

日本政府ハ本協定ノ締結ニ依リ任意ニ負ヒタリ、  
責任ヲ充分ニ認識シ太平洋地域ニ於テ平和ノ確立及  
心維持ニ有害ナル行動ヲ取ラザル決意ヲ有スルモノニ  
有之候。

閣下ニ對シ特別ノ敬意ヲ表之候。

石井

Doc 220c(37)

(附原書抄本)

共同宣言二箇及此五務長官ヨリ日本大使宛書問提議草案

科塔閣下我等西政府向了解二箇及此全般の協定、  
締結ヲ程未也非公式會議ニ於テ閣下及此閣下、同僚八日  
本が提案不中、小、經濟協力ニ實際適用關係ニ於テ  
其差別主義、原則ヲ適用スルコトニ關シ、日本政府ノ意向  
ニ就キ充分且率直ニ所見ヲ表明セシ候。若シ閣下が假ニ  
口頭ニ述ベテ之ヲ陳述スルノ諸点ニ就キ回答ノ形式ヲ確  
認被下候ハ有益ナリト信ジ候。

一、日華間ノ經濟協力ニ關シ、中ニ政府ニ依リ日本政府又  
ハノ國民ニ對シテ政府及此國民並ニ他ノ國民ニ比較シ  
テ有利ニ差別待遇ヲ優先的又独占的權利ヲ与ヘ  
コトヲ企圖スルコトナシ。日華間ノ平和的解決ノ爲メ交渉  
開始ニ至リ、日本ノ特殊會社例ニ於テ、即ち南支那株式會社  
及此中支那振興株式會社及此十會社、日本政府ノ公  
的支拂ニ關シテ限リ、彼等が實際ニ行使スルコトアル  
ニシテ、日本軍占領下ノ中、諸地ニ於テハ現狀ニ依リ、  
彼等ニ與スルコトアルニシテ、独占的又他ノ優先的權利ヲ  
利益セシムルコトヲ企圖セシムルコトナシ。

二、日本軍占領下ノ中、領土内ニ於テハ亦、貿易及  
此旅行ノ自由ニ對シテ現在ノ制限ニ關シ、日本政府ノ重要  
政府トノ交渉ヲ開始スルコト同時ニ凡ソ如何ノ制限ガ撤  
廢セラルニシテ、<sup>只限於此種場合</sup>各々ノ場合若限撤廢ノ實施セラルニキ  
凡ソノ時機ヲ與テ得ル限リ、亦ニ得ル中。

Doc 220c (37)

三 日本政府<sup>(外國政府)</sup>貿易通貨為替三國之事項，完全由  
管理之行使之去下之吾國之也。日本政府之中之  
流通之日本軍票及日本後援，中不請政權，紙幣之  
回收之償還之是意圖之也。日本政府之企圖之是之  
涉，開始後何時頃上記諸目的之對之取極之實施之  
得之也。之考之也。之也。

上記列舉，曾同三對之，未得之限，明確之  
國策之得之幸甚之存存候。

敬具  
外交關係中三卷 四六—四九三頁

"Extract from Entry From Marquis KIDO's Diary, 22 June 41."

June 22nd, 1941 - (Extract)

At 2 p.m. General SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board, telephoned me saying that the report relating to the outbreak of war between Soviet Russia and Germany had been received. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA also telephoned me to say that the official report of the commencement of the war between Soviet Russia and Germany from Ambassador OSHIMA had been received. So I asked TOKUGAWA, the gentlemen in waiting on duty, to consult the Imperial convenience to see Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, and it was decided that he would be granted an audience with the Emperor at 5.30 p.m. Before Foreign Minister MATSUOKA had his audience with the Emperor, I was received in audience by the Emperor to present my opinion based on my talk with Prince KONOYE and Baron HIRANUMA last night as follows: There has been a difference of opinion between the Premier and the Foreign Minister concerning our foreign policy to be followed in case of war breaking out between Germany and Soviet Russia. As this war would have a predominant influence upon the future of this country, it was very desirable that his Majesty the Emperor should ask Foreign Minister MATSUOKA whether he had already consulted the Premier about it or not, and if not, prevail upon him to follow Prince KONOYE's opinion.

At 5.30 p.m. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA had his audience with the Emperor. After that I was requested to proceed to the Palace and was received in audience from 6.40 to 6.50 p.m. On this occasion, the Emperor was pleased to point out that the Foreign Minister's policy would mean Japan's positive advance to both the Northern and Southern regions and that it was quite doubtful

whether or not the Government and the Supreme War Command would agree and whether or not such policy would ever be appropriate in consideration of our national strength. His Majesty looked very anxious about this matter. I therefore telephoned Prince KONOYE to consult with him, but found he was not at home. Then I telephoned Baron HIRANUMA to say that it was desirable for him to pay careful consideration to this matter. At 9.30 p.m. I telephoned Prince KONOYE to report the progress of Mr. Matsuoka's audience with the Emperor, and to ask him to act with prudence at the Liaison Conference. At 00.30 a.m. Prince KONOYE telephoned me to say that he had just had a visit from Foreign Minister MATSUKA, who explained that what he had reported to the Throne yesterday was his prospect of the future and was never meant as a matter to be put into action immediately.

FILE COPY 1632W(55)  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Ex. 1093

木戸侯爵日記

昭和十六年六月二十二日分

六月二十二日 日 曇時々晴

午前十時徒歩ニテ深澤氏ヲ訪ヒ齒ノ治療ヲ受ク

十一時丹松君來訪區談

二時清水洋服店來リ國民服ノ假縫ヲ貸ス

二時鐘木總裁ヨリ電話ニテ獨ソ門階ノ報入りタル旨連絡アリタリ

四時近松岡外相ヨリ電話ニテ獨ソ門階ノ公電

大島大使ヨリ入りタル趣ニテ拜謁ヲ願出來ル

ヨツテ當直ノ徳川侍從ヲ經テ御都合ヲ伺ヒタ

ル結果午後五時半ニ拜謁被仰付コトトナリヨ

ツテ昨夜近衛首相平治内相ト懇談ノ際ニ得タ

ル印象ニ基キ松岡外相拜謁前拜謁ヲ所ヒ大要

左ノ通り言上ス

獨蘇開戦ノ場合我國ノ執ルベキ態度方針ニツ  
イテハ外相ノ意見ハ必シモ首相ノ意見ニ一致  
セザル様見受ケラル而ンテ今回ノ問題ニ對ス  
ル我國ノ處置ハ國運ノ將來ニ重大ナル影響ヲ  
與フルモノナレバ外相本日ノ拜謁ニ當リテハ  
種々之方對策ニツキ見解ヲ申上グベキモ右ニ  
ツイテハ首相ト相談済ナリヤ今回ノ事件ハ極

Doc 1632 W (55)

2.

メテ意大ナレバ充分首相ト協議スベシトノ意  
味ヲ仰セザルキ度ク首相中心ノ御心算ヲ御示シ  
願ヒ度シ甚ダ差出ガマシケレドモ言上ス。

五時半松岡外相参内拜謁ス

拜謁後御召アリ六時四十分ヨリ同五十分迄拜  
謁ス。松岡外相ノ對象ハ北方ニモ南方ニモ積  
極的ニ進出スル結果トナル次第ニテ果シテ政  
府統帥部ノ意見一致スベキヤ否ヤ又国力ニ省  
ミ果シテ妥當ナリヤ否ニツキ歐ル御憂慮甚遊  
ル

依ツテ御前ヲ退出後近衛平沼兩相ニ電話ス、  
近衛公ハ留守ナリシ故平沼内相ニ充分慎重  
ノ考慮ヲ希望ス

星ヶ岡茶寮ニ於ケル和田ノ呈郎リ宴ニ出席  
ス

歸宅後九時半近衛公ニ電話シ外相拜謁ノ概  
略ヲ傳へ連絡會談ニ於テ輕便方ヲ希望ス

十二時半近衛公ヨリ電話ニテ只今迄松岡外  
相來リ懇談シタルカ否日拜謁ノ際言上シタ  
ルハ將來ノ見透ヲ申上タルモノニシテ直ニ  
實行スル意味ニハ非ストノコトナリキ。

Ex # 1094

DOC. NO. 1632W(56)

Page 1

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO'S Diary, 23 June 41"

I went to my office at 10 a.m. I talked with the Chief Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor concerning the war between Germany and Soviet Russia. From 10:30 a.m. to 11 a.m. I was received in audience by the Emperor, and expressed my opinion about such matters as the Foreign Minister's report submitted to the Throne yesterday and the future outlook of the international situation. The Lord Chamberlain called on me at my office at 11:30 a.m. I informed him what I had just reported to the Throne. At 1 p.m. the Chief Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor called on me to report on matters relative to the Chief of the General Staff's audience with His Majesty, the Emperor. Prince Konoye proceeded to the Palace. We talked from 2:40 p.m. to 4 p.m. exchanging frank opinions on the changed situation caused by Germany's war against Soviet Russia. I went to my official residence at 4:20 p.m. when I had a call from General SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board, with whom I exchanged opinions. He put forth his opinion as to the unification and reinforcement of the Imperial General Headquarters. I agreed in principle, but called his attention to the matter concerning consultation with the Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals.



木戸候舊日記

昭和十六年六月二十三日分

六月二十三日 月 曇

FILE COPY (56)

RETURN TO ROOM 301

午前十時出勤 武官長ト獨ソ開談ニツキ面談  
 十時半ヨリ十一時迄拜謁 昨日松岡外相拜謁  
 ノ際言上シタル趣旨將來ノ見透云々ニツキ言  
 上ス  
 十一時半待從長來室同上ノ件ニツキ詳ス  
 一時武官長來室參謀總長ノ奏上ニツキ詳ヲ聽  
 ク  
 一時半近衛首相參内拜謁後二時四十分頃四時  
 頃迄面談爲ソ開談ニ伴フ情勢ノ變化ニツキ臨  
 意ナク意見ヲ交換ス  
 四時二十分官邸ニ入り鈴木企畫院總務ノ來訪  
 ラ受ケ種々意見ヲ交換ス、大本營管理化單一化  
 ノ點アリ趣旨ニ於テ長成ナルモ元~~際~~際詰詢云  
 々ニツキ注意ヲ受フ  
 五時山崎總監來訪 獨ソ開談ノ興ヘタル各方  
 面ニ於ケル影響ニツキ情報ヲ聽キ意見ヲ交換  
 ス  
 高橋氏來訪正体徭ヲ知ス

Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 25 June 41June 25th, 1941 - Full

Mr. HASHIMOTO, Director of the Police Bureau, came to my house and reported about repercussions in various circles in this country. At 9 a.m. I went to Tokyo Station to send off President WANG CHING WEI. After this I had an interview with Prince KONOYE who said that he had a private talk with WANG CHING WEI last night, when the latter had expressed his opinion regarding general peace between China and Japan, saying that for the purpose of bringing about general peace, it was quite necessary as a matter of course to win over LI Tsung-jon and PAI Chung-Hsi, but at the same time our political demarche to CHIANG Kai-Shek was also necessary. Since we have to ask for the United States assistance for this purpose, Wang further said, the pro-American politicians would inevitably gain influence once more, but to meet this situation we would have to get our comrades properly posted in the Government. The matter of the adjustment of relations between CHIANG Kai-Shek and WANG Ching-Wei would be placed in the hands of TOYAMA. As regards the Japanese General Army Headquarters in China, the senior officers have a good understanding of our Chinese policy but the contacts between "superiors and inferiors", "left and right", and "front and rear" are bad. In consequence, it is no easy task to carry out our Chinese policy on the spot. Corrupt practices of the Army in China also have been indeed rife.

At 9.20 a.m. Karoku NOMURA paid me a visit to talk with me. From 10.45 a.m. to 11.35 a.m. I was received in audience by the Emperor. At 1 p.m. I consulted the Chief Aide-de-camp to the Throne as to the holding of the Liaison Conference and on other problems. I went home, and then I left home again for the Empress Dowager's Palace to offer my congratulations on her birthday. At 4 p.m. the Premier, the Chief of the Army General Staff, and Chief of the Naval General Staff proceeded to the Palace to report on the decisions of the Liaison Conference regarding the Japanese troops' entry into French Indo-China. I met Prince KONOYE at 4.30 p.m. and had a talk with him.

Doc 1632 W (57)  
9X1095

木戸侯私日記

昭和十六年六月二十五日分

六月二十五日 水 晴

午前七時半橋本局長來勸各方面ノ反響ヲ聽ク  
午前九時東京肆ニ汪院長ヲ見送ル同殿ニテ見  
送後近衛公ト面談ス同公ヨリ昨夜汪氏ト人ツ  
交ヘズ意見ヲ交換シタルガ全面和平策ニ對ス  
ル汪ノ意見ハ目下努力セラル李崇仁伯崇真等ノ  
獲得ハ勿論必要ナルモ之ト同時ニ蔣ニ對スル  
工作モ必要ニシテ之ニハ米國ノ盡力ヲ求ムル  
ハ不得止ベク、之ガ實現ノ場合親米派ノ抬頭  
ハ必至ナルガ之ニ對シテハ我々ノ原志モ政府  
ノ中ニ適當ニ配置スルノ要アリ只汪ト蔣ノ關  
係ハ頭山翁ニ御任ヤスル積リニテ頭山翁ニ其  
意ヲ通シ置ケリ云々  
現於總算司令部方面ハ上尾ハ良ク理解シ居ル  
モ上下、左右、前後ノ連絡懸ク仕事ガ誠ニヤ  
リ悪キコト多シ尙算方面ノ演習問題ハ誠ニ甚  
シキモノアリ 九時二十分村松六氏來訪面  
談十時四十五分ヨリ十一時三十五分迄拜謁一  
時武官長來室、連絡會談ノ開催其他ニツキ懇  
談ス 一旦歸宅、二時五十分大官御所ニ參入

2.

Doc 1632 W (57)

皇太后陛下御誕辰ニツキ拜賀ス

一旦歸宅ノ上再ヒ出勤

四時首相兩總長參内運輸會議ノ決定事項ヲ奏

上ス 依印進駐云々ナリ

四時半近衛公ト會談ス

Doc. 4081C

Page 1

(Item 8)

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

To be kept in locked file

Special Train 28 June 1941, 2010 hours  
Arrival: 28 June 1941, 2030 hours

No. 267/R German Foreign Office, 28 June  
No. 560 of 28 June 1) German Embassy Tokyo  
2) Cipher-Bureau, Secret remark for  
officials in charge (M.B.D. 36II)

(Marginal note: Sent on to Tokyo under No. 916 Telko,  
28 June 1941 2130 hours)

I have agreed with Ambassador OSHIMA that he should influence his government to the effect of a speedy military action against Soviet Russia. I also request you now to utilize all available possibilities to influence to the same effect the government there, and other influential circles. Please make use of the following arguments:

- 1) The war between Germany and Soviet Russia will not merely lead to the solution of more or less limited individual problems, but will result in a final solution through a fight to the finish /Endkampf-lösung/ of the Russian question.
- 2) The annihilation of Russian power by our military action, to be expected in relatively short time, will also make Germany's victory over England an irrevocable fact. If Germany gets hold of the Russian oilfields and wheat fields, sufficient provisions for the whole of Europe is thereby guaranteed, so that the British blockade becomes entirely senseless. Direct land communication to East Asia will likewise be established at this occasion.
- 3) In this way all requirements then exist for making possible the New Order of the European Sphere as intended by the Axis Powers.
- 4) The present situation provides Japan, too, with a unique opportunity just as Germany in Europe. Japan can now create the basis for the New Order

planned by it in East Asia by a military action against Soviet Russia. After the elimination of Soviet power in the Far East also, the solution of the Chinese problem: as desired by Japan, will meet with no further difficulties.

- 5) From the point of view of Japan's interests, the idea of a move to the South in the direction of Singapore is and will be of great importance. Since, at present, Japan is not ready for this, and in addition such move is not yet possible in the present phase of the war, it is in the utmost Japanese interest not to leave unused the at present available opportunity to solve the Russian problem in the Far East as well. She would thereby protect her rear for the move to the South.
- 6) In view of the speedy course of events to be expected, Japan should, without delay, decide upon a military attack against Soviet Russia. A Japanese move against an already beaten Soviet Russia would considerably injure Japan's moral and political position.
- 7) It may be counted upon that the speedy conquest of Soviet Russia, especially if Japan takes part in it from the East, will probably be the best way to convince the United States of the absolute futility of entering into the war on the side of England, then completely isolated and facing the most powerful alliance of the earth.

RIBBENTROP

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that: I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4081C.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cummins, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cummins  
W. P. CUMMINS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. E. Garde  
G. E. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

4081 C-1

gx 1096

電 報 (秘密暗號法)

袋ヲ封ケ保管スベシ

特別列章 一九四一年(昭和十六年)六月二十八日二〇時一〇分

着 " " 六月二十八日二〇時三〇分

六月二十八日附獨逸外務省第二六七號 B 緊 急

六月二十八日附第五六〇號 (一)東京獨逸大使館

(二)陸 軍 局

官廳責任者ノ爲ノ秘密記號 (M・B・D・三六五)

獨外註 第九一六號ニテ東京宛轉送セリ。T. 5. 1. 5. 0

四一年六月二十八日 二一時三〇分

余ハ大島大使ト彼ガ「ソビエツト」露西亞ニ對シ  
急遽ナル軍事的前進トイフ意味ヲ以テ彼ノ政府ニ衝キ  
拮ケルトイフ事ヲ協約シタ。而シテ今ヤ貴下ニ對シ  
貴地ノ政府竝ニ他ノ貴地ノ有力者層ニ同趣旨ノ影響  
ヲ與ヘル爲ニ貴下ノ方ニ於テモ與ヘラレタ凡ユル可  
能性ヲ利用スル様ニ要請スル。此ノ際次ノ立場ヲ利  
用サレシムラフ。

(一)獨逸ト「ソビエツト」露西亞間ノ戰爭ハ單ニ多少  
共限定サレタ個々ノ問題ノ解決ヲ齎ス許リザナク  
全体トシテ露西亞問題ノ終局的ナ戰爭ニヨル解  
決ニ終ルデアラウ。



(二) 我々ノ軍事行動ニヨリ比較的短期間内ニ規程セラ  
 レル西亞勢力ノ崩壞ハ亦獨逸ノ英國ニ對スル勝  
 利ヲモ打消シ難キ事案トスルデアラウ。獨逸ガ露  
 西亞ノ油田及鐵礦ヲ所有スルニ至レバ是ニヨリ  
 全歐諸ニ對シ充分ナル食糧ヲ確保セラレ、其ノ精  
 果英國ノ封鎖モ完全ニ無意味トナルデアラウ。東  
 亞ヘノ直接陸上連絡ハ此ノ機會ニ因テ三開カレ  
 テアラウ。

(三) 斯クシテ其ノ時ニハ獨逸國ニヨリ計畫セラレタ、  
 「ヨーロッパ」地帯ニ於ケル新秩序ヲ可能ナラシ  
 メル事テノ前提ガ存在スル。

(四) 日本ニ對シテモ現在ノ情勢ニヨリ、唯一ノ機會ガ  
 存在スル。獨逸ガ之ヲ「ヨーロッパ」ノ爲ニ爲シ  
 テキルト同様ニ日本ハ今「ソビエツト」爲西亞ニ  
 對スル軍事的前進ニヨリ日本ニヨリ計畫サレタ東  
 亞ニ於ケル新秩序ノ基礎ヲ創ル事ガ出来ル。極東  
 ニ於ケル「ソビエツト」勢力ヲ一掃後ハ日本ガ希  
 望スル意味テノ支那問題ノ解決ハ最早如何ナル函  
 達ニモ出會ハナイデアラウ。

(五) 日本ノ利害關係ノ立場カラ見レバ然シ「ソビエ  
 ト」ヲ目指ス南進思想モ亦現在モ又將來モ實現  
 テアル。然シ乍ラ日本ハ之ニ對シ目下未ダ準備ヲ

シテ居ラス。従ツテ現在ノ以學ノ段階ニ於テハ概  
カル前進ヲナス可能性ハ未ダ存在シテ居ナイカラ  
極東ニ於テモ亦亞西亞問題ノ解決ノ爲ニ今示サレ  
タル機會ヲ利用セズニ置カヌ事ハ切實ナ日本ノ利  
害關係デアル。是ニヨリ前進ノ爲背後ハ亦心配ガ  
無クナルデアラウ。

(六) 事件ノ期待スベキ急速ナル経過ニ鑑ミ、日本ハ、  
「ソビエツト」亞西亞ニ對スル軍事的前進ノ懸望  
ノ決定ヲ躊躇ナク爲スベキデアル。既ニ叩キ付ケ  
ラレタ「ソビエツト」亞西亞ニ對スル日本ノ前進  
ハ日本ノ道德的且ツ政治的地位ヲ著シク害スルデ  
アラウ。

(七) 急速ナル「ソビエツト」亞西亞ノ打倒ハ殊ニ日本  
ガ東カラ参戦シタ場合ハ完全ニ孤立シ、世界ノ最  
強ノ結合ニ對抗シテキル英國ノ例ニ立ツテ参戦ス  
ル事ガ絶対ニ無意味ナ事ダトイッテ米國ヲ誑キ伏  
セル最上ノ手段デアラウ事ハ考慮セラレ得ルコト  
デアル。

リスベントロツブ

4081C-4

巻類第四〇八一〇號

證

余、Ulrich Straus へ余が獨逸語及ビ日本語ニ精通セル者ナルコト竝ニ獨逸語原文及ビ日本語原文ヲ對照ノ上右ハ本巻類ヲ眞實ニ且正編ニ復譯セルモノナルヲ證セルコトヲ茲ニ證ス。

Ulrich A. Straus

Cumming's Certificate

供 述 卷

余、W. P. カミング ( W. P. CUMMING ) ハ  
正式ニ直轄シテ次ノ諸項ヲ証言ス

一 余ハ合衆國國務省附、同國獨逸關係專項政治原  
岡部長タル事、及右ニ據リ余ハ(合衆國)獨逸  
軍政代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上表明セル資  
格ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸柏林所在、柏林文藝本部ニ  
於ケル獨逸獨逸外務省集綴文藝並ニ文庫、原本  
ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任シアル事、

二 上述獨逸外務省集綴文藝並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合  
國遠征軍最高司令部ノ指揮下ニ在ル軍隊ニヨリ  
テ鹵獲取得セラレ、其確保ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國  
マールブルグニ於テ該軍隊ニヨリテ軍文藝本部  
ニ蒐集セラレ、後該聯合軍總任官ヨリ上述セル  
ノ柏林ノ文藝本部ニ移管セラレタルモノナル事

三 余ハ一九四五年八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグ  
ニ於テ、上述文藝本部適當ヲ命セラレタル事。  
是ニ仍リテ該鹵獲獨逸外務省集綴文藝並ニ文庫原  
本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ駐在當時、初メテ  
余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任シ、爾來引續キ余  
占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事

Cummings Certificate

四 余ノ此供遞書ノ添附セララル、所ノ文卷ハ上記ノ  
獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫トシテ、自置セラ  
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ歸シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ  
置カレタル、為獨逸外務省文書原本ノ、真正精確  
ナル直接復寫寫眞ノ原本タル事

五 茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫寫眞原本ノ文書原  
本ハ、余ノ保管、留保ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ  
點檢點覽ニ資スル如クナシアリ、爲ニ該原本ヲ  
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫眞原本ヲ提  
供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユイ。ピー。カミング

(W. P. CUMMING)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且  
宣誓ス

中 佐 ジー。エツチ。ガード

G H GARDE

高級副官事務取扱

I. F. COLONEL, AGD  
ACTING ADJUTANT GENERAL,

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部

2.

Doc. No. 4081-D

Page 1

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo 28 June 41 1145 hours  
 Arrival 28 June 41 2210 hours

To be kept in  
 locked file

No. 1009<sup>6</sup> of 28 June Secret!

Re Telegram No. 1034 with Pol VIII, of 25 June

Within the last days the leadership committee of the Cabinet has repeatedly met in the presence of the Chief of Staff, the entire Cabinet and deliberating committees without reaching a clear-cut decision as to Japan's future attitude to the German-Russian war. As far as could be found out, only preparatory measures for the various possible actions on the part of Japan have been ordered thus far. As Army memorandum confirms, preparatory measures have indeed begun with zest. Under the circumstances the preparations for attack against Russia will take at least six weeks, unless a decisive material and moral weakening of Russia in the Far East takes place beforehand. According to reliable, confidential information, Premier Konoye and the majority of Cabinet Ministers, to be sure, seem to maintain the view that nothing must be undertaken that would injure Japan's military position in China. Hence, the Cabinet seems thus far merely to have resolved on tightening their grip on Indo-China for which purpose three divisions are allegedly being prepared.

In public and behind the scenes discussions concerning the attitude to be taken are in full swing. Noted nationalists, who always closely work together with the Embassy, have held various confidential conversations -- cf. DNB No. 244 of 26 June -- in which caution towards the Soviet Union and determined action in the South was advocated.

The danger exists that the Southern expansion desired by this group will at first be limited to French Indo-China, while their efforts\* could hinder Japan's activity in the North. Under these circumstances, the question arises whether the general directions, given to me at Berlin, to work, in the first place, for Japan's activity

\*) Clear text  
 evidently  
 missing

in the South while ignoring the Soviet Union, are still valid if a successful move to the South beyond Indo-China cannot be counted on at present. According to confidential reports coming to me from the Japanese Foreign Office, Ambassador OSHIIA is said to have urgently advised the Japanese government to attack Russia soon.

I request telegraphic instructions.

OTT.

Certificate:-

I Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the german and english languages, and as a result of the comparison between the german and the english texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4081D.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

AFFIDAVIT

I. W. F. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State or the staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. F. Cumming  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Gerde  
G. H. GERDE

Lt. Colonel, ASD  
Acting Adjutant General.

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)



Doc 4081b

電報 (秘密暗号法)

△

東京 一九四一年六月二十八日 一時四十分  
着 一九四一年六月二十八日 二時十分  
六月二十八日附第一〇九号

六月二十五日附第一〇三四号電報を参照  
六月二十五日附第一〇三四号電報を参照

9X 1097

No. 1

最近參謀本部長全閣僚並ニ評議委員會參加、下ニ度ニ  
内閣、指導委員會が開催サレタカ独リ戦ニ関シ日本、將來  
ノ態度ニ関スル明確ノ決定ニ到達シタカシム。  
確認サレ得ル限リニ於テ、從來、只、日本、種々可能ナル  
諸行動ニ対スル諸準備處置が命令サレテナリ。軍、備忘録  
ノ確認スル所ニ依リ、實際ニ準備工作ノ熱心ニ開始サレテナリ。  
事情ニ依リ、ロニヤニ対スル侵略、爲、諸準備ノ豫メ極東  
ニ於テロニヤ、決定的、道德的並ニ物質的詞味が現シタカ  
シタカシム。少クモ六週間ノ要スルテアラハ、確實ノ内々、情報  
ニ依リ、勿論内閣總理大臣近衛ト内閣、大臣、多クハ支那  
ニ於ル日本、軍事的地位が侵害サレ得ルナリト何事ヲモ企圖  
サレハナリト三ノ意見ヲ固執スル様ニ思ハレル。内閣、從テ  
從來佛領印度ヲ確實ニ掌中ニ收メル事ヲ、決定シ此、目的  
ノ爲メニ所謂三ノ師團が準備サレテナルト云ハレテナリ。  
取ルベキ態度ニ関スル討議ハ、公ニ且秘密裡ニ着々進行シ  
テナリ。大使館ト共ニ常ニ親シク働キテナリ。著名ノ國家主義  
者達ノ種々秘密會議ヲ催シ又、六月二十六日附第一〇三四号

Doc. 40815

No 2

号参照——ソ、中ニ於テハソビエト聯邦ニ對スル警戒並ニ  
 ニ南スル、決然タル行勢ヲ辯護サレタ  
 之等、團體ニヨリテ希望サレテナル南スル擴張、當今、間  
 佛領印度支那ニ制限シ續クニテ彼等、努力ハ北方ニ於  
 ケル日本ノ活動ヲ阻止シ得ル危険ガ存在スル。カニル状態  
 ニ於テ起ルテ来ル問題ハ印度支那ヲ越エテ南スル、效果  
 的進撃ガ目下當ニナラナイニテ、先ヅ第一ニソビエト聯  
 邦ヲ等閑視シテ日本ノ南スル活動、又々ニ働キカクルト云フ  
 私ニベリニニ於テ與ヘテシテ指導原則ガ保持シ續ケラレルヤ  
 否ヤト云フ事デアル。日本、外務省カラ私、手ニ入ル秘密報  
 告ニ依リテ大島大使ハ日本政府ニ切ニ「ロシヤニ速クニ攻撃ス  
 ル様ニ警告」ニヌト云ハシテナル

電會ヨリテ

オット

Doc 4081

書類探目<10冊

余

余 Ulrich Strau < 余が獨逸語及び日本語に關する  
儿著十三冊 = 獨逸語原文及び日本語原文の對照、其の  
本語類の譯文 = 其の譯文 = 獨逸語及び其の譯文の對照  
等二冊也

Ulrich A. Strau

Cumming's Certificate

供 述 卷

余、W. P. カミング ( W. P. CUMMING ) ハ  
正式ニ宣誓シテ次ノ諸項ヲ証言ス

一 余ハ合衆國國務省附、同國獨逸關係專項政治原  
局部長タル事、及右ニ據リ余ハ (合衆國) 獨逸  
軍政部代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上表明セル資  
格ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸柏林所在、柏林文書本部ニ  
於ケル國獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫、原本  
ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任ジアル事、

二 上述獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合  
國憲征軍最高司令部ノ指揮下ニ在ル軍隊ニヨリ  
テ國獨逸取得セラレ、其確保ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國  
マールブルグニ於テ該軍隊ニヨリテ軍文書本部  
ニ蒐集セラレ、後該聯合軍總任官ヨリ上述セル  
ノ柏林ノ文書本部ニ移管セラレタルモノナル事

三 余ハ一九四五年八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグ  
ニ於テ、上述文書本部滿當ヲ命セラレタル事。  
是ニ仍リテ該國獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫原  
本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ駐在當時、初メテ  
余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任ジ、爾來引續キ余  
占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事

Cummings Certificate

四 余ノ此供証書ノ添附セララル、所ノ文套ハ上巻ノ  
為ニ遼外務省宗簿文書並ニ文庫トシテ、由來セラ  
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ歸シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ  
置カレタル、為ニ遼外務省文書原本ノ、真正精確  
ナル直接復寫寫眞ノ原本タル事

五 茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫寫眞原本ノ文書原  
本ハ、余ノ保管、留保ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ  
點檢點覽ニ費スル如クナシアリ、爲ニ該原本ヲ  
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫眞原本ヲ提  
供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユー・ピー・カミング  
(W. P. CUMMING)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且  
宣誓ス

2.

中佐 シー・エツチ・ガード

G H GARDE

高級副官事務取扱

L. F. COLONEL, AGD  
ACTING ADJUTANT GENERAL,

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部

E. # 1098

Doc. No. 1632W (58)

Page 1

"Extract from Entry From Marquis KIDO's Diary, 28 June 41"

.....War Minister TOJO proceeded to the Palace, and after his withdrawal from the presence of the Emperor, he had a talk with me. He explained the following matters: (1) The Army's policy dealing with the German-Soviet War is that the attitude of the Kwantung Army towards that war should be calm and prudent. (2) Various information from Ambassadors *in China* abroad regarding that war. (3) Political moves or demarches towards YEN Hsi-shan, LI Tsung-jen and PAI Chung-hsi. (4) The strengthening of the Imperial General Headquarters, and arrangements for them to meet every day in the Palace.

8601X3

木戸侯爵日記

昭和十六年六月二十八日分

六月二十八日

(土) 曇雨

午前九時松井氏來訪

兒玉友雄氏來訪面談

東條陸相參内拜謁後來室

左記ノ諸件ニツキ説明ヲ終ク

一獨ソ戰ニ對スル軍ノ方針、關東軍ノ態度等詳細ニ

一獨ソ開戦ニ關シ支那駐在外國大使方ノ本國ニ與ヘタル情報

一圓錫山工作、季宗任、伯崇季ニ對スル工作其後ノ情況

一大本營強化官中ニ毎日參榮榮

正午梶原次郎氏邸ノ午饗會ニ赴ク

星野梅子三五日御遠夜ニア紅葉館ニ

招カレ母上鶴子真子ト共ニ出席ス

Dec 16 32 W (58)

Doc. No. 219F (78)

Page 1

Br. Ex. 110

THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREY) TO THE  
JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (HATSUOKA)

Excerpt.

No. 1845

TOKYO, July 8, 1941.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform Your  
Excellency that during a severe Japanese air raid  
on Chungking on June 29, 1941, at which time the  
British Embassy was badly damaged, the concussion  
from bombs dropped on the south bank of the river  
caused some damage to the staff residence of the  
American Embassy.

. . . . .

Foreign Relations I, p. 718



Doc-219P(78)

ax 1099

中華民國二十九年十一月二十一日  
外交部  
第一四五號

九日三時三十分至十七日六時八十分  
於十一月四日三時三十分至十一日六時  
日本館在東京日本領事館二號樓  
日本領事館二號樓日本領事館二號樓  
日本領事館二號樓日本領事館二號樓  
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日本領事館二號樓日本領事館二號樓

外國關係部 十一日

Q. #1100

DOCUMENT NO. 220C (13)

Page 1.

Br. Ex. 144

ORAL STATEMENT BY THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN  
(GREW) TO THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
(MATSUOKA)

Excerpt.

. . . . .

Since that time, information has been received to the effect that certain cargo at Hanoi as well as at Haiphong has been seized by the Japanese military, but that it was impossible to check the amount and nature of the cargo so seized because the rightful owners were not permitted to inspect the warehouses where their merchandise was stored. Nevertheless, it is known that a substantial amount of American cargo has been taken away.

In bringing this subject again to the attention of the Foreign Office, it is urgently requested that immediate steps be taken to restore the merchandise to its rightful owners. The Government of the United States, as has been stated before, does not recognize the right of the Japanese military to take any action whatsoever in French Indochina against property in which there is an American interest. The American Embassy has been instructed to state that the result of persistence by the Japanese in action such as that described above can only be further deterioration in relations between the United States and Japan.

TOKYO, July 8, 1941.

Foreign Relations II, p. 315.

Doc 220 c (13)

日本外務大臣(秘圖)ニ對スル駐日米子大使(ケル)ノ  
口頭聲明

抜萃

其ノ後「ハイ」及「ハイ」ヲ「オ」ニ於ケル或ル種ノ船荷ヲ日本  
軍ヨリ差押ヘラシクガ、正當ナル所ノ所有者ニシテ、商品ヲ收  
メテ倉庫ヲ兵檢スルコトガ許サレナイタメ、該差押商品ノ量  
及品目ハ判明セナイト、情報ヲ接受スル。併ニ乍ラ米國、  
船荷ノ適當量ガ持去ニシタコトハ明カデアル。

本問題ニ就テ再ビ外務省ノ注意ヲ促スニ際シテ商品ヲ正當  
ト存主ニ返還スベク措置ヲ直ニ採ル様緊急要請スル。

亦述、如ク、米子政府ハ佛領印支支那ニ於ケル米  
國ノ利益ヲ含ム財産ニ對シテ日本軍ガ如何ナル行動ヲ  
取ル權利ヲモ認メナイデアル。米國大使館ハ日本軍

ノ上述ノ如キ行動ガ尚續ケラレルニ於テハ、日米關係  
ヲ更ニ惡化スル結果トナルノミデアルト述ビル様指令ヲ  
受ケテ居ル。

6X 1100

(東京) 一九四二年(昭和十六年)七月八日

外交關係(二) 三五頁

Ex. # 1101

FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA'S REPLY OF FEB. 17 TO FOREIGN SECRETARY EDEN

His Imperial Japanese Majesty's Minister for Foreign Affairs is rather surprised to learn about the undue concern shown on the part of His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary for Foreign Affairs which is, no doubt, based upon information emanating from the British Embassy in Tokyo and other sources. There is, of course, no way to ascertain what kind of information the British Government has been receiving, but the Minister for Foreign Affairs would like to avail himself of this opportunity to state that so far as he can see there is no ground for entertaining such alarming views on the situation in East Asia.

On more than one occasion the Minister for Foreign Affairs has explained to the British Ambassador in Tokyo and even to the public at large that one of the primary purposes of the Tripartite Pact is to limit the sphere of the European war by preventing those Powers not engaged in hostilities at present from joining the war and also to bring about its termination as quickly as possible. The Japanese Government has so far found no reason or occasion to alter this avowed aim which constitutes a fundamental basis of its policy. The British Government may rest assured on this point.

However, the Minister for Foreign Affairs feels obliged to say candidly that he cannot help entertaining a certain amount of anxiety, if not misgivings, on the movements of the British and American Governments in their attempt to expedite and enlarge warlike preparations with an eye to meeting supposed contingencies in the Pacific and the South Seas. Press reports about these movements originating from American sources and elsewhere are causing increasing misgivings in Japan with the consequence that in some quarters it is even contended that Japan should lose no time in taking measures to meet the worst eventuality in these regions. The concern felt is quite natural in the face of these disturbing reports. If the American Government could only be persuaded to restrict its activities to the Western Hemisphere, and prudently avoid causing unnecessary anxiety to the Japanese, the situation would indeed be very much mitigated.

Having had the privilege of forming personal acquaintanceship at Geneva with His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary for Foreign Affairs and prompted by the belief that a general exchange of frank views at this juncture will be of some service in enabling the two nations to see eye to eye, the Minister for Foreign Affairs wishes to take the liberty of making further observations. The uppermost thought in my mind has always been world peace. He sincerely hopes that on the one hand, the China Affair will be brought to an end as soon as possible and on the other, the European war will see an early termination. It is my earnest and constant prayer that the Powers may gather again to discuss at a round table their differences and disputes and deliberate on the great question of organizing an

enduring peace upon a just and equitable world order. In this connection, I desire to assure my eminent colleague that far from aspiring to control the destinies of, or to dominate, other peoples, it is Japan's established policy to inaugurate an era of peace and plenty and mutual helpfulness throughout the region of Greater East Asia by promoting the spirit of concord and conciliation. As repeatedly affirmed, Japan's motto is "no conquest, no oppression, no exploitation." I, therefore, strongly deprecate those biased reports designed to calumniate Japan.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs frankly confesses his utter inability to see any good purposes served by prolonging the war whatever the motive. Whatever the outcome, whoever the victor, there are present in the world situation, especially in Europe, elements of great danger such as would bring about a fearful state of chaos and confusion, possibly eventuating in the downfall of modern civilization. It takes statesmanship of a high order to foresee and meet in time such catastrophic contingency. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has not lost hope yet that such statesmanship is not wanting in the British Empire.

Lastly, the Minister for Foreign Affairs would like to make it clear that Japan, deeply concerned as she is with an early restoration of peace, is fully prepared to act as a mediator, not only in Greater East Asia but anywhere the world over, or to take whatever action is calculated to recover normal conditions.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs trusts that His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary for Foreign Affairs will not hesitate to share with him the conviction that upon the shoulders of the leading Powers rests the great and grave responsibility of restoring peace and saving modern civilization from the impending collapse. Such a responsibility can only be fulfilled by a wise and courageous statesmanship willing to display an accommodating and generous spirit in listening to others' claims and contentions. It is hardly necessary to add that whatever Japan may do, she will always be actuated by the consciousness of the responsibility she owes to Humanity.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No.

I.P.S. No. 1339A (5)

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify  
that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the  
following capacity. Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese  
Foreign Office

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto  
attached consisting of Six pages, dated 17 February, 1941, and  
described as follows: \_\_\_\_\_

FOREIGN MINISTER MAISUOKA'S REPLY OF FEB. 17 TO FOREIGN SECRETARY  
EDEN

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official  
document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the  
official archives and files of the following named ministry or  
department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any,  
or any other official designation of the regular location of the  
document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this

21st day of Sept., 1946

/s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Chief, Archives Sect  
Official Capacity

C E R T I F I C A T E

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

25 day of September, 1946.

/s/Richard H. Larsh  
NAME

Witness: /s/i/4 T. Foguchi

Investigation Division I.P.S.  
Official Capacity

Ex. 4 1102

Br. Ex. 145

PRESS RELEASE ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ON JULY 24, 1941

Excerpts.

In response to inquiries by press correspondents, the Acting Secretary made the following statement:

"It will be recalled that in 1940 the Japanese Government gave expression on several occasions to its desire that conditions of disturbance should not spread to the region of the Pacific, with special references to the Netherlands East Indies and French Indochina. This desire was expressly concurred in by many other Governments, including the Government of the United States. In statements by this Government, it was made clear that any alteration in the existing status of such areas by other than peaceful processes could not but be prejudicial to the security and peace of the entire Pacific area and that this conclusion was based on a doctrine which has universal application.

"On September 23, 1940, referring to the events then rapidly happening in the Indochina situation, the Secretary of State stated that it seemed obvious that the existing situation was being upset and that the changes were being achieved under duress. Present developments relating to Indochina provide clear indication that further changes are now being effected under duress.

. . . . .

"There is no doubt as to the attitude of the Government and people of the United States toward acts of aggression carried out by use or threat of armed force. That attitude has been made abundantly clear.

"By the course which it has followed and is following in regard to Indochina, the Japanese Government is giving clear indication that it is determined to pursue an objective of expansion by force or threat of force.

"There is not apparent to the Government of the United States any valid ground upon which the Japanese Government would be warranted in occupying Indochina or establishing bases in that area as measures of self-defense.

"There is not the slightest ground for belief on the part of even the most credulous that the Governments of the United States, of Great Britain, or of the Netherlands have any territorial ambitions in Indochina or have been planning any moves which could have been regarded as threats to Japan. This Government can, therefore, only

conclude



DOCUMENT NO. 220C (14)

PAGE 2

conclude that the action of Japan is undertaken because of the estimated value to Japan of bases in that region primarily for the purpose of further and more obvious movements of conquest in adjacent areas."

. . . . .

Foreign Relations, pp. 315-316

DOC2200 (英)

一九四二年(昭和十七年)七月二十四日國務省發表

新聞紙掲載 (坂本)

新聞通信員の間には、(一)國務長官代理は次の如き聲明を  
發した。一九四二年(昭和十七年)に日本政府が歐州に亘つて擾亂状態  
を太平洋地区特に蘭領東印度及び佛領印度支那に擴大し  
る事を希望する旨、亦(二)此事が相次起れること、此の希望は  
アメリカ合衆国政府を始め多數の政府が特に警戒したるが  
故に政府の聲明は平和的手段以外に、この地域の状態を  
変更する事は必然的に太平洋全地域の安全と平和を害する  
事になり、又此の決定は世界的に適用される主義に基きものである  
といふ事が明示されたのである。

一九四二年(昭和十七年)九月二十五日印度支那地域に於て相次いで起  
りつゝある事件に、國務長官は該地域に於ける現状は混乱  
のあり、又その変更は疑念を強  
迫の下に達成せらるる程に思はれると聲明し、印度支那に関する  
現在の進展は強迫の下に今後変更が行はれる事を明瞭に指示  
したる。

x x x x

アメリカ合衆国政府及び國民の武力の使用が武力威嚇に依り  
決行される侵略行為に對する態度は、はつきりと決まらざるが  
あらず、その態度は既に先令明らなされてゐるのである。

印度支那に關して過去に於て取つた行動及現に取つてある行  
動は日本政府が武力に依り又は武力威嚇に依つて領土擴張の  
目的を達成しようと決心してゐる事を明示してゐるのである。

WX 1102

NO1

Doc 220c (後).

アメリカ合衆国政府としては日本政府が印度支那を占領し、  
自衛手段として其の地域に根拠地を造つてゐる事を見做さ  
る正しい根拠があるとは思はれない「最も軽きと物事を言ふ  
人ぞ」とアメリカ合衆国大使師国或は和蘭政府が印度支那  
に領土野望を有したり日本を脅威すると思はれる行動を  
企圖してゐると言ふ根拠は全然ないが、其の故に、  
政府は日本の行動はその地域に於ける基地が日本に取つて特に其の  
隣接地域に對する征服行動を更に進め更に顯著なる目的に  
價值あるものと見做つて奪取したと云ふと結論を下すより他  
ないのである。.....

外交関係 三五—三二六頁

NO 2

Liaison Conference<sup>S</sup> held during(An Abstract<sup>1941</sup> from article in ASAHI)

<u>Date and place</u>	<u>Attendance</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
6.00-9.30 p.m. on 13 January at Meguro-Saryo (Japanese Res- taurant)	KONOE (Prime Minister) TOJO (War Minister) SUGIYAMA (chief of Army General Staff) TOMIDA (Chief Secretary of the Cabinet) ANAMI (Vice Minister of War) MUTO (Chief of Military Bureau) TSUKADA (Vice Chief of Army General Staff) TANAKA (Director of Army General Staff) TOYODA (Vice Minister of Navy) OKA (Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau) KONDO (Vice Chief of Naval General Staff) UGAKI (Vice Chief of Naval General Staff)	exchange of views
11.00 a.m.- on 16 January at the official residence of the Prime Minister	KONOE HIRANUMA (Home Minister) MATSUOKA (Foreign Minister) TOJO OIKAWA (Navy Minister) TSUKADA KONDO	exchange of informa- tions and views on important matters.
9.00-11.00 a.m. on 17 January at the official residence of the Prime Minister	KONOE HIRANUMA MATSUOKA TOJO OIKAWA SUGIYAMA KONDO	discussion of important matters
10.30 a.m.- on 19 January "	"	"
11.00-12.00 a.m. on 23 January "	"	conference on vari- ous matters of the day.

4.30-6.30 p.m. on 30 January at the official residence of the Prime Minister	KONOE MATSUOKA TOJO OIKAWA HIRANUMA SUGIYAMA KONDO MUTO OKA TOMIDA	exchange of in- formations and views
4.00 p.m.- on 3 February "	KONOE MATSUOKA TOJO OIKAWA HIRANUMA SUGIYAMA KONDO MUTO OKA	exchange of views on matters of the day
11.15 a.m.- on 13 February "	MATSUOKA TOJO OIKAWA HIRANUMA SUGIYAMA KONDO TOMIDA MUTO OKA	exchange of views
11.00 a.m.- on 20 February "	MATSUOKA TOJO OIKAWA HIRANUMA SUGIYAMA KONDO MUTO OKA	exchange of views on problems con- cerning latest international affairs
11.00 a.m. on 23 February "	MATSUOKA TOJO OIKAWA HIRANUMA SUGIYAMA KONDO MUTO OKA	exchange of views on matters of the day
5.00-7.30 p.m. on 2 March at Konoe's private residence at Ogikubo, Tokyo	KONOE TOJO OIKAWA MATSUOKA HIRANUMA MUTO TOMIDA SUGIYAMA KONDO	exchange of views

11.00-12.30 a.m.  
on 6 March  
at the official  
residence of  
the Prime  
Minister

KONOE  
MATSUOKA  
TOJO  
OIKAWA  
HIRANUMA  
SUGIYAMA  
KONDO  
TOMIDA  
MUTO.

exchange of views

5.20-7.30 p.m.  
on 7 March

KONOE  
MATSUOKA  
TOJO  
OIKAWA  
HIRANUMA  
SUGIYAMA  
KONDO  
TOMIDA  
MUTO

"

9.30-10.10 a.m.  
on 11 March

KONOE  
MATSUOKA  
TOJO  
OIKAWA  
HIRANUMA  
SUGIYAMA  
KONDO  
TOMIDA  
MUTO

"

4.30 p.m. -  
on 10 April

KONOE  
TOJO  
OIKAWA  
HIRANUMA  
HASHI (Vice Minister of Foreign Ministry)  
SUGIYAMA  
NAGANO (Chief of Naval General Staff)  
MUTO  
OKA  
TOMIDA

"

In the fore-noon  
on 17 April

KONOE  
TOJO  
OIKAWA  
HIRANUMA  
SUGIYAMA  
NAGANO  
HASHI  
MUTO  
OKA  
TOMIDA

exchange of views  
on matters of  
the day

1.00 p.m.-  
on 3 May  
at the official  
residence of  
the Prime  
Minister

KONOE  
MATSUOKA  
TOJO  
OIKAWA  
HIRANUMA  
SUGIYAMA  
NAGANO  
MUTO  
OKA  
TOMIDA

exchange of views

11.00-12.15 a.m.  
on 8 May

KONOE  
HIRANUMA  
MATSUOKA  
TOJO  
OIKAWA  
SUGIYAMA  
NAGANO  
TOMIDA  
MUTO  
OKA

5.00-6.10 p.m.  
on 12 May

KONOE  
MATSUOKA  
TOJO  
OIKAWA  
HIRANUMA  
SUGIYAMA  
NAGANO  
TOMIDA  
MUTO  
OKA

11.00 a.m.-  
on 15 May

KONOE  
MATSUOKA  
TOJO  
OIKAWA  
HIRANUMA  
TOMIDA  
MUTO  
OKA  
SUGIYAMA  
NAGANO

11.00 a.m.-1.00 p.m.  
on 22 May

KONOE  
MATSUOKA  
TOJO  
OIKAWA  
TOMIDA  
MUTO  
OKA  
SUGIYAMA  
NAGANO

1.00 p.m.-  
on 3 May  
at the official  
residence of  
the Prime  
Minister

KONOE  
MATSUOKA  
TOJO  
OIKAWA  
HIRANUMA  
SUGIYAMA  
NAGANO  
MUTO  
OKA  
TOMIDA

exchange of views

11.00-12.15 a.m.  
on 8 May  
"

KONOE  
HIRANUMA  
MATSUOKA  
TOJO  
OIKAWA  
SUGIYAMA  
NAGANO  
TOMIDA  
MUTO  
OKA

5.00-6.10 p.m.  
on 12 May  
"

KONOE  
MATSUOKA  
TOJO  
OIKAWA  
HIRANUMA  
SUGIYAMA  
NAGANO  
TOMIDA  
MUTO  
OKA

11.00 a.m.-  
on 15 May  
"

KONOE  
MATSUOKA  
TOJO  
OIKAWA  
HIRANUMA  
TOMIDA  
MUTO  
OKA  
SUGIYAMA  
NAGANO

11.00 a.m.-1.00 p.m.  
on 22 May  
"

KONOE  
MATSUOKA  
TOJO  
OIKAWA  
TOMIDA  
MUTO  
OKA  
SUGIYAMA  
NAGANO



11.00 a.m.-1.00 p.m.  
on 29 May  
"

KONOE  
MATSUOKA  
TOJO  
OIKAWA  
HIRANUMA  
SUGIYAMA  
NAGANO  
TOMIDA  
MUTO  
OKA

9.30-10.35 a.m.  
on 6 June  
"

KONOE  
MATSUOKA  
HIRANUMA  
TOJO  
OIKAWA  
NAGANO  
TSUKADA  
MUTO  
OKA  
TOMIDA

conference on problems  
of the day

3.00 p.m.-  
on 11 June  
"

KONOE  
HIRANUMA  
MATSUOKA  
TOJO  
OIKAWA  
SUGIYAMA  
NAGANO  
MUTO  
OKA  
TOMIDA

exchange of views  
on important  
matters of the day

11.10 a.m.-1.55 p.m.  
on 12 June  
"

KONOE  
HIRANUMA  
MATSUOKA  
TOJO  
OIKAWA  
SUGIYAMA  
NAGANO  
MUTO  
OKA  
TOMIDA

exchange of views

2.30 p.m.-  
on 16 June  
"

KONOE  
MATSUOKA  
TOJO  
OIKAWA  
HIRANUMA  
SUGIYAMA  
NAGANO  
MUTO  
OKA  
TOMIDA

exchange of views  
on important  
problems of the day

3.00 p.m.  
on 23 June  
"

KONOE  
MATSUOKA  
TOJO  
OIKAWA  
HIRANUMA  
SUGIYAMA  
NAGANO  
MUTO  
OKA  
TOMIDA

conference on matters  
of the day

1.00 p.m.- on 25 June "	KONOE MATSUOKA HIRANUMA TOJO OIKAWA SUGIYAMA NAGANO MUTO OKA TOMIDA	conference on matters of the day
10.10 a.m.- on 26 June "	KONOE TOJO OIKAWA MATSUOKA HIRANUMA HASHI SUGIYAMA TSUKADA NAGANO KONDO MUTO OKA TOMIDA	exchange of views on important problems of the day
1.30 p.m.- on 27 June "	same persons as yesterday	continuous conference on the same subject as on previous occasion
2.00 p.m. on 28 June "	KONOE MATSUOKA HIRANUMA TOJO OIKAWA SAKAMOTO (Director of Euro Asiatic Bureau of Foreign Ministry) SUGIYAMA TSUKADA NAGANO KONDO TOMIDA MUTO OKA	exchange of views on the important problems of the day
5.00 p.m.- on 30 June "	same persons as above	exchange of views
4.00 p.m.- on 21 July at the office of the High Command situated at the Imperial Grounds	It was decided that the Prime Minister, accompanied by the Foreign Minister and other Ministers concerned, should attend this place occasionally and exchange views and project national policies with War, Navy ministers and Staffs of the High Command.	

Doc. No. 1699

C E R T I F I C A T E

U.S.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.F.S. No. 1699 Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, KURIYAMA, Rempo, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Cabinet Secretary and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 21 pages, dated \_\_\_\_\_, 1941 and described as follows: Extracts from Reports which appeared in -sahi re Liaison Conferences held during 1941.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Cabinet Secretariat.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
16 day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ R. Kuriyama  
Signature of Official (S.L.)

Witness: /s/ N. Hirayama

Cabinet Secretary  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, 2d Lt. Eric W. Fleisher, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
16 day of Sept., 1946

/s/ Eric W. Fleisher, 2d Lt., US, III

Witness: /s/ A.R. H. Larsh

Investigator  
Official Capacity

Ex. # 1104

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, THE UNION OF THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE REPUBLIC OF FRANCE, THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, INDIA, AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES.

-AGAINST-

ARAKI, Sadao; BOHARA, Kenji; HASHIMOTO, Kingoro; HATA, Shunroku; HIRANUMA, Kiichiro; HIROTA, Koki; HOSHINO, Naoki; ITAGAKI, Seishuro; KAYA, Okinori; KIDO, Koichi; KIMURA, Heitaro; KOISO, Kuniaki; MATSUI, Iwane; MATSUOKA, Yosuke; MIYAGI, Jiro; MUTO, Akira; NAGANO, Osami; OKA, Takasumi; OKAWA, Shumei; OSHIMA, Hiroshi; SATO, Kenryo; SHIGEMITSU, Naroru; SHIMADA, Shigetaro; SHIMAZUMI, Toshio; SUZUKI, Teiichi; TOGO, Shigenori; TOJO, Hideki; UMEZU, Yoshijiro. Defendants.

COUNTY OF SUFFOLK )  
STATE OF NEW YORK ) ss  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. )

I, HENRY L. STIMSON, being duly sworn, on oath depose and say:

I was Secretary of State of the United States of America from March 5, 1929, to March 4, 1933. Prior to that time, in 1928, I was appointed Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, which office I held until I was named Secretary of State.

On the basis of my personal observation and contacts, as well as on the information coming to me in the course of my official duties, I verily believe the following statements to be true:

When I took office as Secretary of State, Japan, together with the United States and various other nations, was a party to the following treaties, pacts, and agreements, and others, or had subscribed to the principles therein announced:

- (1) The Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, signed at the Hague 29 July 1899;
- (2) The Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, signed at the Hague 18 October 1907;
- (3) The Hague Convention No. III relative to the Opening of Hostilities signed 18 October 1907;
- (4) Agreement effected by exchange of notes between the United States and Japan, signed 30 November 1908, declaring their policy in the Far East;

- (5) Treaty between the British Commonwealth of Nations, France, Japan, and the United States relating to their Insular possessions and Insular Dominions in the Pacific Ocean, 13 December 1921;
- (6) The Treaty between the United States of America, the British Commonwealth of Nations, Belgium, China, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Portugal, concluded and signed at Washington 6 February 1922, known as the Nine-Power Treaty;
- (7) The Treaty concluded and signed at Paris 27 August 1928, known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact and as the Pact of Paris;
- (8) Convention respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War on land, signed at the Hague 18 October 1907.

As a party to the above-listed treaties, pacts, and agreements, and others, or as a subscriber to the principles therein announced, Japan had agreed, inter alia:

to use its best efforts to insure the Pacific settlement of international differences; in case of serious disagreement or conflict, before an appeal to arms, to have recourse, as far as circumstances allow, to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly Powers; not to commence hostilities without previous and explicit warning; to maintain the existing status quo in the region of the Pacific Ocean and to defend the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China and to support the independence and integrity of China; in event of controversy in any Pacific questions to invite other Parties to a joint Conference; to respect the sovereignty, independence, and the territorial administrative integrity of China; to use its influence to effectually establish and maintain the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China; to refrain from seeking special or monopolistic privileges in China detrimental to the rights or interests of other foreign powers or their nationals; to condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and to renounce war as an instrument of national policy; not to move troops or convoys across the territory of a neutral Power.

In 1931 Manchuria was actually and legally part of China. Japan claimed some exceptional rights in Manchuria, and many of these rights, while always asserted with emphasis, were not attested by documentary evidence which was unchallenged. Some of the treaties upon which Japanese claims rested were asserted by China to be either unauthentic or to have been executed under duress. Under cover of these treaties, however, Japan exercised powers of the administration and police throughout a zone which bordered the South Manchuria Railway, based upon the armed forces she was permitted to maintain. These areas included towns and portions of cities like Mukden and Changchun.

While there was no cleavage in Japanese feelings as to the existence and importance of special interests in Manchuria, there was a very fundamental difference in political thought in Japan as to the method by which that interest should be supported and enforced. This difference in general corresponded with the alignment between those leaders who were following the ideals of popular government on the one hand, and the conservative and military leaders on the other. The policy of the latter group rested ultimately upon military force, and assumed that Japan's rights were political and sovereign.

On the night of September 18, 1931, armed hostilities broke out in Manchuria, and Japanese forces occupied not only the city of Mukden, but other cities in South Manchuria. The incident which was claimed by the Japanese to have caused their action, namely an alleged act of sabotage by the Chinese on the South Manchurian Railway, diminished to such small proportions as strongly to suggest its actual non-existence. Meanwhile the Japanese army was found to have acted with such promptness as to make it evident that they were moving under a previously arranged strategic plan. By the afternoon of September 19, 1931, cities like Antung, Changchun, and Newchwang, several hundred miles from one another, had been occupied by the Japanese forces, who at once assumed the place of the civil authorities in those cities. Within forty-eight hours the whole of southern Manchuria, not only along the Japanese South Manchuria Railway, but also along some of the railroads built by the Chinese had thus been effectively occupied. The evidence pointed to a deliberate action planned and authorized by the highest Japanese authorities in Manchuria and possibly with direction from the high military command in Tokyo.

On September 25, 1931, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington left with the Under Secretary of State a Statement issued after an extraordinary meeting of the Japanese Cabinet on September 24, 1931. This Statement contained an assurance that while on September 21 a detachment was despatched from Changchun to Kirin it was not with a view to military occupation but only for the purpose of removing the menace to the South Manchuria Railway on flank, and that as soon as that object had been attained it would be withdrawn. The Statement contained a firm assurance that the Japanese Government harbored no territorial designs in Manchuria. As early as October 8, following this firm assurance on the part of Japan, I was informed by the American Charge in Tokyo that the Japanese General Staff had issued an information bulletin to foreign military attaches stating that Japan found it impossible to withdraw the Japanese Army to their original stations or even to the contiguous territory.

After the capture of Mukden by the Japanese on September 19, 1931, the headquarters of the Chinese Government and forces had been removed to Chinchow. Soon after September 30, General Honjo, the Japanese Commander-in-Chief in Manchuria, publicly announced that the Government of Marshal Hsueh-liang would no longer receive Japanese recognition. Other statements followed to the effect that Japanese forces would not cease their activities until Marshal Chang and his government were driven entirely out of Manchuria. Not only were these statements left without

reprimand from the Tokyo government, but Japanese military planes began to enforce this policy in a most drastic manner. On October 8, 1931, a squadron of eleven Japanese planes dropped thirty or forty bombs upon the unarmed and unwarned city of Chinchow, killing and wounding a number of the inhabitants. On its face this was an indefensible act of aggression. In the latter part of October, the Japanese high command in Manchuria sent a military expedition to Tsitsihar in northern Manchuria. This was several hundred miles north of any portion of the South Manchuria Railway and far outside the zone of any of the treaty rights which Japan claimed. This expedition defeated and destroyed the forces of Chinese General Ma Chan-shan and thus destroyed all the organized forces of Marshal Chang in North Manchuria.

The capture of Tsitsihar left the Chinchow District as the only fragment of Manchuria in which Marshal Chang's authority remained intact, and towards the latter part of November the Japanese forces began to move towards Chinchow. On behalf of the United States I made vigorous representations through diplomatic channels, and the Japanese forces were withdrawn to Mukden on November 28, 1931. On November 24, 1931, the Japanese Foreign Minister stated to the American Ambassador that "the Premier, the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff and he are agreed that towards Chinchow there shall be no hostile operations and orders have been issued to that effect". After December 11, 1931, however, the movement towards Chinchow was resumed and that city was seized by the Japanese army on January 3, 1932. This completed the destruction of the organized forces of Marshal Chang and left the control of all Manchuria in the hands of the Japanese.

On October 26, 1931, the Japanese Government made public fundamental points upon which normal relations between China and Japan should be based, and it appeared then that they included the settlement of the entire question of the disputed treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria. While Japanese representatives disclaimed her intention to use military force to achieve her national objectives, it seemed clear that she was bent on doing just that very thing. Her army was not withdrawing; it was actually pushing forward and the Japanese government was declining to interfere until all these fundamental questions of national policy between the two nations should be settled.

On December 22, 1931, I received from the American Ambassador in Tokyo a telegram in which the Ambassador stated that the Prime Minister of Japan had called at the American Embassy and assured him that Japan would never allow a situation to arise in Manchuria which would be fraught with the danger of war, and that Chinese sovereignty would never be impaired. The Prime Minister reiterated that Japan merely desired the protection of Japanese persons and interests. In the same telegram the American Ambassador reported that active preparations were continuing for further operations in Manchuria where a free hand seemed to have been given to the military.

On December 22, 1931, I requested the American Ambassador in Japan to inform the Foreign Minister of my apprehension of Japanese forces taking action against Chinese regulars south of Chinchow. I requested the Ambassador to inform the Foreign Minister that a new

attack by Japanese forces on Chinese regulars would be regarded as unwarranted and would be interpreted as indicative of indifference to obligations assumed in various treaties to which Japan and China, as well as the United States, were parties. On December 27, 1931, I received a memorandum from the American Ambassador which had been delivered to him by the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs in which it was stated that the Imperial Government was determined to remain loyal to the League of Nations Covenant, the No War Treaty, other various treaties and the two resolutions adopted by the Council of the League of Nations regarding the Manchurian situation. On December 29, 1931, the American Minister in China informed me that Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang ordered withdrawal of all Chinese forces from Manchuria, stating that he was motivated by a desire to deprive Japanese of any excuse for further aggression in North China.

On January 7, 1932, I sent a note to Japan and China informing them that the United States could not admit the legality of any situation de facto and did not intend to recognize any treaty entered into between those Governments which might impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open door policy, and that the United States did not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which might be brought about by means contrary to the obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928. On January 16, 1932, the Japanese government replied to our note of January 7. The argument made in that note was to the effect that China was in an "unsettled and distracted state" and that this fact relieved Japan from the obligation to carry out the covenants of the Nine Power Treaty and the League of Nations Covenant, which may be fairly said to have become the argument upon which Japan thereafter relied with the greatest assurance, but which was rejected as untrue and unsound by the unanimous report of the Lytton Commission.

In the middle of January, 1932, Japan's aggression in Manchuria seemed to have achieved success. By May 1, 1932, Japan had attempted to extend her aggressive action to the Yangtze River and to break up the efforts of the Chinese at Shanghai to maintain an economic boycott against her business. There Japan received a military set-back in being checked by Chinese soldiers. In the hostilities around Shanghai, on January 28, 1932, the Japanese forces bombed the unwarned and helpless civilian native quarter of Chapei. This was an act of inexcusable cruelty. Not only were bombs dropped upon positions held by Chinese troops, but incendiary bombs were used which soon had the entire quarter in flames. Thereafter, the Japanese barricaded the streets in the International Settlement of Shanghai, disarmed the police, and paralyzed all regular municipal functions. Numerous excesses against the Chinese population were committed, including many summary executions, and a veritable reign of terror resulted. The Japanese troops even invaded the American sector of defense at Shanghai where they committed acts of violence against Chinese. On February 24, 1932, I sent to Senator Borah, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, a letter in which was outlined the position and policy of the American Government with respect to the situation in China in relation to the application of treaties.



Almost immediately after its army had overthrown the Chinese Government of Manchuria, Japan commenced to establish political and economic control over that country. This was done by forcible creation of an ostensibly independent but really puppet state controlled by Japan and known as Manchukuo. Thereafter, as soon as other nations had announced their intention not to recognize as valid any fruits of this conquest, the Japanese government proceeded to take further steps designed to make this policy of the rest of the world as difficult and ineffective as possible.

On April 4, 1932, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington called upon me and in the course of discussion, admitted that promises made by Japan had been broken but said that chauvinist conditions were so acute in Japan that the Government could not take any other position. On June 23, 1932, I received a telegram from Ambassador Grew in Tokyo that the press had cabled to America a statement by General Araki, Minister of War, before the Supreme Military Council to the effect that the resolutions of the League of Nations and statements made by Japan in regard to Manchuria before the establishment of Manchukuo could no longer be considered as binding on Japan.

On January 5, 1933, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington called upon me and stated that in any event Japan had no territorial ambition south of the Great Wall. He stated that his information as to the affair in Shanhaikwan was that it was a local incident, provoked by a minor outbreak of Chinese against Japanese there. On February 23, 1933, the Japanese Ambassador came to tell me on the instruction of his Government that the State of Manchukuo was determined to suppress irregular forces in the Province of Jehol, and that under the treaty between Manchukuo and Japan, Japan was obliged to support Manchukuo and therefore the Japanese forces were co-operating in this movement in Jehol. On February 27, 1933, I reminded the Japanese Ambassador that when the Manchurian outbreak occurred in September 1931, I had not attributed it to the Government of Japan or to the statesmen whom I used to know or to the people of Japan but to the efforts of a small group of persons of militaristic ambitions and desires. The Ambassador said that he knew this very well. I pointed out the importance of the treaties as instruments to preserve peace and the Ambassador said that he recognized this. He also said that on his part although he had been disappointed many times when he had given me assurances which were afterwards not carried out in Manchuria he still believed in his people and that sooner or later the moderate elements would not disappoint us. I told him at that time that I joined in his hope that this would be so.

I retired as Secretary of State on March 4, 1933 and was succeeded by the Honorable Cordell Hull who then assumed the burden of office in connection with Japanese-American relations.

(SEAL) /s/ Henry L. Stimson  
HENRY L. STIMSON

Subscribed to and sworn to before me  
this 7 day of June, 1946.

/s/ Clifton F. Gardner  
Notary Public in and for the County of Suffolk  
State of New York. Commission expires March 30, 1947.

STATE OF NEW YORK )  
 ) ss:  
 County of Suffolk )

Form No. 115

I, R. FORD HUGHES, Clerk of the County of Suffolk, and also Clerk of the Supreme Court for said County, the same being a Court of Record, DO HEREBY CERTIFY that

Clifton F. Gardner

whose name is subscribed to the deposition or certificate of the proof or acknowledgment of the annexed instrument and thereon written was at the time of taking such deposition or proof or acknowledgment a NOTARY PUBLIC in and for such County, duly commissioned and sworn, and authorized by the laws of said State to take depositions and to administer oaths to be used in any Court of said State and for general purposes; and also to take acknowledgments and proofs of deeds of conveyances for land, tenements or hereditaments in said State of New York. And further that I am well acquainted with the handwriting of such NOTARY PUBLIC and verily believe that the signature of said deposition or certificate of proof or acknowledgment is genuine.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the Seal of the said Court and County the 11 day of June 1946.

(SEAL)

\_\_\_\_\_/s/ R. Ford Hughes\_\_\_\_\_  
 Clerk.

The signature of the notary public, Clifton F. Gardner, we have caused by these presents to be exemplified and the seal of our said Court for said County to be hereunto affixed.

Witness, Hon. Thomas J. Cuff, Justice of our Supreme Court, in and for the Second Judicial Department of said State, this 11th day of June 1946, and in the 170th year of the Independence of the United States.

(SEAL)

\_\_\_\_\_/s/ R. Ford Hughes Clerk

I, Hon. Thomas J. Cuff, Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, in and for the Second Judicial Department thereof, Do hereby certify, that R. Ford Hughes, whose name is subscribed to the preceding exemplification, is the Clerk of the County of Suffolk and Clerk of the Supreme Court, in and for said County, duly elected and sworn, and that full faith and credit are due to his official acts.

I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Seal affixed to said exemplification is the proper Seal of said Court for said County, and that the attestation thereof is in due form of law and by the proper officer.

Witness my hand at the City of Brooklyn, this 11th day of June in the year 1946.

\_\_\_\_\_/s/ Thomas J. Cuff\_\_\_\_\_  
 Justice of the Supreme Court of the State  
 of New York, in and for the Second Judicial  
 Department.

STATE OF NEW YORK, )  
County of Suffolk, ) ss:

I, R. Ford Hughes, Clerk of the County of Suffolk,  
and Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State  
of New York, in and for said county, Do Hereby  
Certify that

Hon. Thomas J. Cuff

(SEAL)

Whose name is subscribed to the preceding  
certificate is Presiding Justice of the  
Supreme Court of said State in and for the  
second Judicial District, duly elected and  
sworn, and that the signature of said Justice  
to said certificate is genuine.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF I have hereunto set  
my hand and affixed the Seal of said county  
and Court, this 11th day of June 1946.

/s/ R. Ford Hughes Clerk.

E. # 1105

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, THE UNION OF THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, CANADA, THE REPUBLIC OF FRANCE, THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, INDIA, AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES.

- AGAINST -

ARAKI, Sadao; DOIHARA, Kenji; HASHIMOTO, Kingoro; HATA, Shunroku; HIRANUMA, Kiichiro; HIROTA, Koki; HOSHINO, Naoki; ITAGAKI, Seishiro; KAYA, Ckinori; KIDO, Koichi; KIMURA, Heitaro; KOISO, Kuniaki; MATSUI, Iwane; MATSUOKA, Yosuke; MIYAKI, Jiro; MUTO, Akira; NAGANO, Osami; OKA, Takasumi; OMIYA, Shumei; OSHIMA, Hiroshi; SATO, Kenryo; SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru; SHIMADA, Shigetaro; SHIRATORI, Toshio; SUZUKI, Teiichi; TOGC, Shigenori; TOJO, Hideki; UMEZU, Yoshijiro.  
Defendants.

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City of Washington, )  
District of Columbia, ) ss.  
United States of America.)

I, JOSEPH CLARK GREW, being duly sworn, on oath depose and say:

I served as United States Ambassador to Japan, at Tokyo, from June 1932 until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941. Diplomacy has been my life work since 1904. Prior to World War I, I served in the United States Foreign Service in Egypt, Mexico, Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany. I was counselor at the American Embassy in Berlin during World War I. In 1918 I became acting head of the Western European Division of the United States State

Department. I took part in the peace negotiations at Paris and also represented the United States during the negotiations with Turkey, at Lausanne, in 1922. I also served as Minister to Denmark and to Switzerland, as Under Secretary of State, and, just prior to my appointment to Tokyo, as Ambassador to Turkey.

The statements hereinafter set forth relate to matters which arose from time to time in connection with the carrying out of my duties at Tokyo as diplomatic representative of the American Government in Japan, and I vouch for the truth thereof.

At the time I became Ambassador to Japan, as aforesaid Japan, along with the United States and other nations, was a party to the following treaties, pacts and agreements, and others, or had subscribed to the principles therein announced:

- (1) The Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, signed at the Hague 29 July 1899;
- (2) The Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, signed at the Hague 18 October 1907;
- (3) The Hague Convention No. III relative to the Opening of Hostilities, signed 18 October 1907;
- (4) The agreement, signed 30 November 1908, effected by exchange of notes between the United States and Japan, declaring their policy in the Far East;
- (5) The Treaty between the British Commonwealth of Nations, France, Japan and the United States relating to their Insular possessions and Insular Dominions in the Pacific Ocean, 13 December 1921;
- (6) The so-called "Nine-Power Treaty" concluded and signed at Washington 6 February 1922;
- (7) The so-called "Kellogg-Briand Pact" concluded and signed at Paris 27 August 1928;
- (8) The Convention respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Wars on Land, signed at the Hague, 18 October 1907.

As a party to the above-listed treaties, pacts and agreements, and others, or as a subscriber to the principles therein announced, Japan had agreed, inter alia:

to avoid the use of force in the settlement of international differences; in case of serious disagreement or conflict to have recourse to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly power; not to open hostilities without a declaration of war; to submit international disputes to arbitration; to respect and support the sovereignty, independence and territorial administrative integrity of China; to use its influence to effectually establish and maintain the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China; to refrain from seeking special or monopolistic privileges in China detrimental to the rights or interests of other foreign powers or their nationals; to renounce war as an instrument of national policy; not to violate the territory of neutral powers.

At the time I became Ambassador as aforesaid Japan had gained military control of Manchuria and had established there the Japanese controlled puppet state of Manchukuo. The official records of the United States Department of State with respect to the Manchurian affair, with which I had familiarized myself, indicated that Japan had pursued its course of action in Manchuria despite frequent protests by the United States and other nations that its aggressive action was in contravention of Japan's treaty obligations. The Department's official records further indicated that Japan had consistently defended its aggressive action as a purely defensive measure for the protection of Japanese nationals, and had repeatedly assured the United States Government that Japan had no territorial ambitions or intentions of disturbing the rights and interests of third parties, in China.

During all of my stay in Tokyo as United States Ambassador I repeatedly called to the attention of the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, and occasionally the Japanese Prime Minister, and other responsible government officials the fact that the American Government considered the Japanese military operations in China as a violation of Japan's obligations, under various treaties and agreements heretofore mentioned, to respect the territorial integrity of China, to maintain the principle of the Open Door in China and to refrain from endangering the lives and interests of nationals of the United States and other powers, to refrain from the use of force in settlement of disputes, to submit disputes to arbitration and abide by results thereof. I pointed out that Japan was rapidly losing the good will of the American Government and people and of other peoples of the world by its aggressive policy and by the excesses of its military forces. The excuse given was that the military operations were purely defensive measures against Chinese bandits or Communists whom the Chinese Government was unable to control, or were for the protection of Japanese nationals and interests in China from abuses resulting from the anti-Japanese feeling deliberately aroused by the irresponsible Chinese Government. I was repeatedly assured by the officials referred to that Japan had no territorial ambitions in China, that Japan was solicitous of the rights and interests of third parties and was earnestly endeavoring to protect them and

preserve the status quo, and, up until the end of 1938, that Japan intended to preserve the principle of the Open Door in China.

I protested repeatedly against the indiscriminate bombing of non-military objectives which endangered the lives and properties of non-combatant Chinese and foreigners. A few of the more flagrant examples were the bombing and sinking of the U.S.S. Panay on the Yangtze, in which two American nationals were killed, and the machine-gunning of the small boat in which the Panay's captain and others were being taken ashore, the deliberate bombing of the U.S.S. Tutilla at Chungking, the reckless and wanton bombing of residential and business districts of Nanking after a totally inadequate warning had been given, the machine-gunning by a Japanese plane of five Americans while horseback riding within the International Settlement at Shanghai, the bombing of American owned mission property in Tungpeh in which an American national (Phoebe Nyhus) was killed, the destruction by Japanese planes of a commercial passenger plane belonging to the Chinese National Aviation Corporation (in which Pan-American Airways had a large interest) resulting in the loss of lives of a number of noncombatant passengers and the endangering of the life of the American pilot, the destruction by five Japanese planes of another properly marked Chinese Aviation Corporation commercial passenger plane, which had just landed at Chanyi,



and in which the American pilot was killed, the bombing and complete destruction of an American church at Chungking after eight previous bombings all of which had been made the subject of separate protests. The number of instances in which churches, schools and other American properties were repeatedly bombed and damaged could not but compel the conclusion that the attacks were intentional. Furthermore, in most cases the Japanese had been furnished beforehand with maps on which had been marked the locations of the properties in question. In virtually all instances the Japanese Government disclaimed responsibility on one pretext or another, claiming, among other things, that the property was too close to a military objective or was used by Chinese forces (which excuses were not justified by facts brought out by investigations), or that the bomb release mechanism in the plane apparently did not function properly, or merely that a mistake had been made.

In spite of my protests American business men and missionaries were prevented from returning promptly to Nanking even after hostilities in that area had ceased, as, for instance, when the Shanghai University property was evacuated by Japanese troops and the American missionary societies which owned the property were not permitted to immediately reoccupy it, even for the purpose of preventing its further deterioration. In refusing American nationals permission in such cases to return and resume business or

or protect and preserve their property, the excuse given was that peace and order had not been sufficiently restored. The lack of any basis for this excuse was usually illustrated by the presence of many Japanese merchants and their families in the areas in question.

On July 7, 1934 I forwarded to the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs an informal memorandum regarding the establishment by the authorities in Manchuria of a discriminatory petroleum selling monopoly. Attention was invited to the fact that the cooperation and approbation of the Japanese Government in the project, which would close the door in Manchuria to sales by American oil companies of their products, would violate the principles of the Open Door, to which Japan was committed, and which it had declared it would uphold, and, further, that the proposed project would contravene the provisions of Article 3 of the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922 and the explicit provisions of the Sino-American Treaty of 1884. In a reply thereto dated August 2, 1934, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that since Manchukuo was an independent state the question was one concerning the American and Manchukuo Governments, and denied that contravention of any treaty obligations by Japan was involved. I again addressed an informal memorandum to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, pointing out that the project planned would unquestionably result in a monopoly prejudicial to the treaty rights of American nationals and counter to the principles of the Open

Door, and that since plans therefor were being formulated with the concurrence and cooperation of Japanese nationals, the participation of quasi-official organizations such as the South Manchuria Railway, and the assent or approval of the Japanese Government, the carrying out of the project would be in contravention of Japan's treaty obligations as well as of her unqualified assurances previously given to the American and other governments.

It was undeniable, of course, that Japan had assured maintenance of the Open Door policies in Manchuria even after the establishment of the so-called independent regime of Manchukuo, for the maintenance of those policies had been promised in the speech of Count Uchida (then Minister for Foreign Affairs) before the Diet on August 25, 1932, and in the Japanese Government's public statement of September 15, 1932, issued on the occasion of the recognition of Manchukuo. Moreover, the protocol between Japan and Manchukuo, of September 15, 1932 itself was predicated upon observance by Manchukuo of international obligations applying to that territory, as shown by the second paragraph of the Preamble of the Protocol, reading:

"Whereas Manchukuo has declared its intention of abiding by all international agreements entered into by China in so far as they are applicable to Manchukuo, \* \* \* "

Consequently, on November 30, 1934 I delivered another memorandum to the Minister for Foreign Affairs reiterating my previous

protests at establishment of the oil monopoly in Manchuria in violation of treaty obligations and assurances to the contrary. I had a long discussion with Mr. Hirota on the subject. He remarked that Americans were free to purchase stock in the petroleum company and that, therefore, the door was not being closed to them. The fact was, however, as I informed him, that 40% of the stock had already been issued to the South Manchuria Railway, a quasi-official Japanese organization, 20% to the Government of Manchuria and 40% to four Japanese companies. Mr. Hirota said he thought we and the British were taking too legalistic an attitude. The discussion continued for half an hour, but the Minister's arguments were specious, and it was obviously impossible for me to get anywhere.

On April 10, 1935, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs forwarded to me an answer to my note of November 30, 1934, on the Manchurian oil matter, which consisted of a repetition of the previous denials of Japan's responsibility for the actions of the Government of Manchukuo. I communicated the contents thereof to the American Government, and, as instructed by the Secretary of State, advised the Japanese Foreign Minister, by note dated April 15, 1935, of the American Government's refusal to recognize the contentions advanced by Japan, and of the American view that the ultimate responsibility for injury to American interests would rest upon Japan. I called on the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs on April 16, 1935 to point out again the American view that Japan was

violating its treaty obligations and also the assurances it had made on prior occasions (identifying them specifically) that the principles of the Open Door would be maintained. His only reply was that these assurances were conditioned upon recognition of Manchukuo by the interested powers.

On December 1, 1927 I registered with the Japanese Foreign Minister an objection to the manifesto issued by the Manchurian Government regarding extra-territorial rights of foreigners other than Japanese, and to the promulgation of a law under which an American branch bank at Harbin had been advised to prepare to register and to appoint a representative and I called attention to the fact that the extra-territorial rights of United States nationals in Manchuria were governed by treaties between the United States and China and that the law by which the Manchurian Government sought to assert jurisdiction over American nationals was in direct contravention of American treaty rights. The Foreign Minister's reply merely disclaimed any responsibility on Japan's part for the acts of the Government of Manchukuo.

As in the case of the oil monopoly in Manchuria, I protested frequently and strongly against the taking over of the Chinese Customs Administration by the Japanese at Shanghai Canton, Swatow and other places, and the revision of customs regulations to favor Japanese imports. I protested further in the case of the seizure of the Salt Tax Administration. I pointed out that large American and other foreign loans had

been secured against customs revenues and salt tax revenues and that the United States and other nations had vital financial interests in the administrative integrity of the Chinese Maritime Customs and the Salt Administration and were entitled to be consulted in connection with any change in regulations or procedure or diversion of revenues. These protests were, like all others, to no avail, the Japanese Foreign Minister and other officials claiming that the steps taken were required by military necessity and by the fact that Chinese officials would not cooperate.

Other specific instances when assurances which were later violated were given to the American Government, through me or in statements issued to the press by the Japanese Government for publication, were the following:

- (1) On April 27, 1934 the Japanese Foreign Minister (Hirota) assured me personally that Japan had no intention whatever of seeking special privileges in China, of encroaching upon the territorial and administrative integrity of China, or of creating difficulties for the bona-fide trade of other countries in China. He further stated that there was no intention or desire on the part of Japan to claim a privileged position in derogation of the rights and responsibilities to which the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty were entitled, and that the policy of Japan was complete observance and support of the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty in every respect. I observed to him that the American Government and people would be less impressed by statements of policy than by more concrete evidence.
- (2) On September 1, 1937 the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs (Horinouchi), in a radio broadcast to the United States, defended Japan's actions in China on the ground of China's anti-Japanese acts and asserted that Japan's intentions were

peaceful; he stated that the ultimate object of the current hostilities in North China and Shanghai was the realization of a state permitting genuine cooperation between the two countries; and declared that the Japanese forces in China had not been sent there for aggressive purposes and that Japan had no territorial designs. Mr. Horinouchi's radio address was similar to speeches subsequently made in the diet by the Foreign Minister (Hirota) and the Prime Minister (Konoyo).

- (3) On February 17, 1939, in an interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Arita), I reminded him of his government's previous statements to the effect that Japan had no territorial ambitions in China; I called his attention to the recent occupation of Hainan Island by Japanese forces; and I asked for an expression as to the intentions of the Japanese Government in connection with the occupation of the island in view of the fact that there were numerous American residents and substantial American missionary and educational properties on the island. The Minister replied that the purpose of the occupation was to strengthen the blockade of the South China coast and to hasten the suppression of the Chiang Kai Shek regime; he repeated the former statements of the Japanese Government that Japan had no territorial ambitions in China and added that the occupation "will not go beyond military necessity."
- (4) On April 15, 1940 the Foreign Minister (Arita), on being questioned by newspapermen concerning Japan's position with regard to the possible involvement of the Netherlands in the European war and its repercussions in the Netherlands East Indies, stated that "the Japanese Government can not but be deeply concerned over any development accompanying an aggravation of the war in Europe that may affect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies."

In July, 1941 the Japanese Foreign Minister assured me that Japan had not so far considered the possibility of joining the hostilities against Russia. During that month I had forwarded to the Japanese Prime Minister a memorandum

expressing the hope of the United States Government that there was no truth in the reports that Japan intended to enter upon hostilities against Russia, referring to contemporaneous statements of responsible Japanese officials that Japan desired to maintain and preserve peace in the Pacific area. The reply thereto, which came from the Japanese Foreign Minister, recited that maintenance and preservation of peace in the area of the Pacific had always been the sincere and genuine desire of the Japanese Government which had consistently contributed earnest efforts toward achieving that purpose and that Japan had not so far considered the possibility of joining the hostilities against the Soviet Union.

During 1938 the establishing of a new order in East Asia began to be mentioned. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister referred to the extension of the campaign in China from Manchuria to North China and thence into Central and South China and expressed the hope for the emergence of a new regime in China cooperative with Japan, repeating, however, the customary assurances of intention to continue the policies of the Open Door and to protect the rights and interests of third powers. Later the Foreign Minister indicated that the hostilities in China would go on to a finish; that no dealings would be had with General Chiang Kai-shek even if he should sue for peace; and (significantly) that since the main purpose of the campaign was to make possible economic and social cooperation of China and Japan, it was a "small



matter" whether the territory was Chinese or Japanese, and that China should be powerful enough to put itself in order before extra-territoriality and unequal treaties could be abolished in that country. Then, in November, 1938, the Japanese Foreign Office, in announcing the fall of Canton and three Wuhan cities, stated "all vital areas of China have thus fallen into our hands." No mention was made of the rights or interests of third parties, the statement merely expressing Japan's confidence that other powers would adapt their attitude to the new conditions prevailing in East Asia. The Japanese people were cautioned, however, that these victories would not bring an era of peace but rather that since Japan was entrusted with the task of constructing a new Far East "the actual fighting has just started." By the end of 1940 the idea of a new order in East Asia had progressed and developed to the point where the Japanese Government openly admitted it was determined to secure for Japan the position in "greater East Asia including the South Seas" to which it considered itself entitled as a result of its growth as a first-class power in the modern world, and which would remove the territorial and economic restrictions previously hampering it.

In making the representations, protests and objection on behalf of the American Government, as herein set forth, I was always dealing with the Japanese individual or individuals who, as the official records of the Japanese Government will

show, were filling the indicated civil office in the Japanese Government at that time. In most cases I took up the matter in question with the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs; some were referred to the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, and some to responsible subordinate officials of the Foreign Ministry; and a few cases were referred to the Prime Minister. The matters herein related constitute a small, but representative, proportion of all those which occurred during my Ambassadorship. At the end of 1938 over 400 separate protests had been filed by me and the number of instances of depredation against American property, discriminations against American business men, and endangering of American lives by the Japanese in China was steadily increasing and continued to do so until the end of my term as Ambassador.

/s/ Joseph Clark Grew  
JOSEPH CLARK GREW

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS 28TH DAY OF MAY, A.D. 1946.

/s/ Edgar M. Ford

Doc. 239

極東國際軍事裁判所  
聖米利加合衆國、中華民國、大不列顛北愛爾蘭聯合  
王國、ソビエト社會主義共和國聯邦、濠洲聯邦、  
加奈院、佛蘭西共和國、和蘭王國、新西蘭、印度  
及比律賓國

對

被告一 荒木貞夫、土肥京賢二、橋本欣五郎、畑俊六、  
平沼騏一郎、廣田弘毅、星野左衛門、板垣征四  
郎、寔屋興宣、木戸幸一、木村兵太郎、小磯國昭、  
松井石根、松岡洋右、南次郎、武藤章、永野  
修身、岡敬純、大川周明、大島浩、佐藤實了、  
重光葵、嶋田繁太郎、白鳥敏夫、鈴木貞一、  
東鄉茂徳、東條英機、梅津美治郎

94 1105

米國 コロムビア地区 ワシントン市  
余、シヨセフ グラウ グループに宣誓し  
所ニテ次ノ如ク證言スル

No. 7

No. 2

廿七ノ原則ニ對シテ署名ナキモノアリ。此ノ中ニ學界協  
 協米國及其他ノ當國ノ代表トシテ署名セシモノアリ。此ノ中ニ學界協  
 上ニ於テモ如ク私駐日大使トシテ署名セシモノアリ。此ノ中ニ學界協  
 下ニ於テモ如ク私駐日大使トシテ署名セシモノアリ。此ノ中ニ學界協  
 務ヲ遂行シテ外交トシテ署名セシモノアリ。此ノ中ニ學界協  
 米國ニ陳列シテ署名セシモノアリ。此ノ中ニ學界協  
 以下ニ直前ニ署名セシモノアリ。此ノ中ニ學界協  
 公使ヲ勸メ又國交事務トシテ署名セシモノアリ。此ノ中ニ學界協  
 米國ヲ代表シテ署名セシモノアリ。此ノ中ニ學界協  
 又九十二年トシテ署名セシモノアリ。此ノ中ニ學界協  
 長代理トシテ署名セシモノアリ。此ノ中ニ學界協  
 一年ニ於テ署名セシモノアリ。此ノ中ニ學界協  
 勸メシモノアリ。此ノ中ニ學界協  
 界大野ニ於テ署名セシモノアリ。此ノ中ニ學界協  
 外交ニ於テ署名セシモノアリ。此ノ中ニ學界協  
 下ニ於テ署名セシモノアリ。此ノ中ニ學界協  
 眞珠灣攻撃ヲ東京ニ於テ署名セシモノアリ。此ノ中ニ學界協  
 九三年七月廿七日日本

Doc 239

- 一、一九一九年二月二十八日、ヘーグニ於テ署名サレタル「國際紛争ノ平和的解決ニ関スル會議」
  - 二、一九〇七年十月十八日、ヘーグニ於テ署名サレタル「國際紛争ノ平和的解決ニ関スル會議」
  - 三、一九〇七年十月十日、ヘーグニ於テ署名サレタル、ヘーグ會議ノ第一、二、三、四、五、六、七、八、九、十、十一、十二、十三、十四、十五、十六、十七、十八、十九、二十、二十一、二十二、二十三、二十四、二十五、二十六、二十七、二十八、二十九、三十、三十一、三十二、三十三、三十四、三十五、三十六、三十七、三十八、三十九、四十、四十一、四十二、四十三、四十四、四十五、四十六、四十七、四十八、四十九、五十、五十一、五十二、五十三、五十四、五十五、五十六、五十七、五十八、五十九、六十、六十一、六十二、六十三、六十四、六十五、六十六、六十七、六十八、六十九、七十、七十一、七十二、七十三、七十四、七十五、七十六、七十七、七十八、七十九、八十、八十一、八十二、八十三、八十四、八十五、八十六、八十七、八十八、八十九、九十、九十一、九十二、九十三、九十四、九十五、九十六、九十七、九十八、九十九、百ニ関スル項。
  - 四、一九〇八年十二月三十日、署名サレ、日米間ニ覺書ヲ交換セルニ依リ、効力ヲ發シタル「極東ニ於ケル彼等ノ政策本シテ宣言セル協定」。
  - 五、一九二二年三月十三日、英聯邦、佛蘭西、日本及米國ノ間ニ「太平洋ニ於ケル嶼嶼ノ所有及其統治權」ニ関シ（取極メラレタル）協商。
  - 六、一九三三年二月六日、ワシントンニ於テ締結サレ署名サレタル所謂「九ヶ國條約」
  - 七、一九二八年六月二十七日、パリニ於テ締結サレ署名サレタル所謂「ケロギーリアン協約」
  - 八、一九〇七年十月十八日、ヘーグニ於テ署名サレタル「地上戰ニ於ケル、中立國及び國民ノ權利義務ニ関スル會議」
- 上記ノ條約、協商、協約其他ノ當事者トシ

NO. 4

第三國或ハソノ國民ニ有害ナル、特權或ハ独占的特  
惠ヲ其邦ニ於テ求ムルコトヲ差控ヘル事。國策不  
ノ手段トシテノ戰争ノ拋棄、中立國ノ領土ヲ  
侵犯セザルコト。

私ガ上述ノ如ク大使トナツタ時ハ、日本ハ滿洲ノ軍  
事的支配ヲ握リ、ソコニ日本ニヨリ統制サレタル傀  
儡滿洲國ヲ建設シラサタ。

滿洲事情ニ附テノ米國々務省ノ公式記録ハ、ソレニ附  
テハ私ハ熟知シテアルノデアルガ、日本ハソノ侵略的行爲  
ハ日本ノ條約義務違反ナリトスル米國及ビソ  
ノ他ノ國々ノシバシバノ抗議ニモ不拘、滿洲ニ於  
ケル行動ノ筋書ヲ遂行シタ事ヲ指示シテナル。  
國務省ノ公式記録ハ更ニ、日本ガ一貫シ

Doc. 239

テ又其ノ中ニ聲明サレタル原則ニ對スル署名者ト  
シテ日本ハ次ノ他ノ事柄ニ同意シタルデアル。即チ  
國際間ノ不和解決ニ武力ノ使用ヲ避ケルヲ人  
一又ハソレ以上ノ友好國ノ仲リ或ハ親善ニ依頼スベ  
キ紛争又ハ深刻ナ不一致ノ場合ハ、宣戰ノ布告  
ナシニ戰争ヲ開始シテハナラス。國際間ノ紛議  
ハ仲介ニ委ヌベシ。支那ノ領土ノ政治的保全、獨立  
及主權ノ面ナ重ト援助。支那全領土ヲ通ジ、凡ソ  
ル國々ノ商、工業ニ對スル機會均等ノ原則ヲ  
有効ニ樹立シ維持スル如クソノ影響力ヲ用ヒル  
コト。

Doc. 239

テソ、侵略的行為ヲ辯護シ、日本國民ノ保護、夕  
メノ軍ナル自衛手段アリ、決シテ領土の野心  
ナキ事或ハ支那ニ於テハ亦三國ノ權益ヲ妨  
害スル意思ナキ事ヲ繰返シテ米國政府ニ保  
証スルコトヲ指示シテナル。

米國大使トシテ東京ニ在リシ全期間、私ハ日本  
外相ニ時々面會シ、又當時、官吏ニ對シ、  
米國政府ハ日本ノ支那ニ於テハ軍事行動ヲ  
前送セル支那ノ領土保全、尊重、支那ノ門戶解  
放原則、維持、米國及ビ其他ノ國民ノ生命財  
産ノ危害ヲ與ヘザルコト紛争解決ニ武力ヲ行  
使セザルコト、紛争ノ調停ニ先ネソシヨリ生ズル  
結果ヲ守ル等ノ各種ノ條約、協商ニ對スル義務  
侵犯ナリト思考スル日ノ事實ヲ繰返シ注意ヲ  
喚起シタ。

私ハ日本ノ其ノ侵略政策トシテ、軍事力過大トニ  
因リ急速ニ米國政府、米國民及ビ世界ノ人々ノ  
同情ヲ失ヒツ、アトヒ日ヲ指摘シタ。辭解ハソノ  
軍事行動ハ軍ニ支那政府ガ統御得テハ匪賊  
共產黨員ニ對スル自衛手段アリ、又無責任ナ  
ル支那政府ニ依リ惹起セタル計畫的及ビ感情カラ  
惡用サレテ耳心支那ニ於テハ日本國民及ビソノ  
利益ヲ保護スル夕人トイフニアツタ。私ハ當時  
官吏ニ依リ、日本ノ支那ニ於テ領土の野心ナキ

45



doc 239

事、日本ハ第三國、權益ヲ心配シ在リ、ソレ等ヲ  
守ルル又現狀ヲ維持スル爲、熱心ニ努力シ日本  
ハ自ラ締結シ保証サレタ、ソレヲ日本ハ支那ニ  
於テル門戶解放ノ原則ヲ維持スベク考慮シ  
テ亦ル旨一九三六年末迄保証サレテ来タリテ  
アル。

NO 6

私交邦人及び外國人、非戰鬥員、生命財産ニ危  
害ヲ加ヘル非軍事的目標ニ對スル無差別爆撃ニ  
對シ締結シ抗議シタ、且取テ甚クシキ事例、若干ハ、  
揚子江ニ於テル米艦ハネ一號、爆撃及撃沈テアリ  
其、中ニアワタニ人ノ米國人、殺害サレ、又上陸セシ  
ツ、アリシハネ一號艦長及其他、者、小艇  
ニ對スル機銃掃射アル。又重慶ニ在リシ米艦  
トウトウイニ對スル計畫的爆撃アリ、金ウ不充  
分ナル警告ノ後、無謀ニテ亂暴シ、南京位宅  
街商業街、爆撃アリ上海共同租界ヲ騎馬ニ  
テ通行中、五名、米國民ニ對スル日本機、機銃  
掃射アリトシ、在リシ米國教會資産爆撃  
テアリ、中ニ在リシ米國人「ブニクス」殺サレタ  
リテアル。又日本飛行機ニ依ル中華航空會社  
所屬輸送機、破壊アリ(右ニハ汎米航空會  
社が大ナル利害ヲ有スル)、ソノ結果数名、非戰鬥  
員タル旅客が殺害セリ、而シテ米國探偵士ニ生  
命、危険ヲ加ヘ、更ニ又日本飛行機五機ニ依ル他

Doc 239

此ノ標識ヲ附シ「チヤニ」ニ着陸シタハカリ、中華航空會社商業旅客機、破壊ハシ、中、操縦士ヲ殺害シ、前、回、爆撃後、重慶、米國故會、爆撃並ニ完全ニ破壊等之事、各利涸抗議ノ主眼トツテ、故會、學校其他米國資産、度重タル爆撃破壊、多クノ实例ハ、ソレ等、攻撃ガ計畫的デアツト結論セラル得ガフニメタレアル。更ニ殆ニトノ場合日本人ハ事前ニ問題ノ資産、位置ヲ標示セル地圖ヲ有シテキタノデアリ。事実ニテノ实例ニ於テ日本政府ハ、三ノ口實、下ニ責任ヲ否認シ、他ノ物、中ニ於テソノ資産ハ軍事目標ニ余リニ近ク接近シテキタトカ又ハ支那人ニ依リ使用サレタキタ（コノ辯解ハ調査ヨリ公平ニサレタ事実ニヨツテ否認セラレタカ）トカ或ハ飛行機、投弾機構ガ明クニ正ニク機能シタツタトカ又ハ単ニ誤テデアツト主張シテキタレアル。

No 7

和ノ抗議ニモ不拘、南京方面、戦闘終了後ト雖モ米國經濟人並ニ宣教師達ハ早急ニ南京ニ歸ルコトヲ阻止セラレタキタ。例ハ上海大學ハ早速ニ日本ガ撤退シタカ、ソレヲ所有シタキタ米國宣教師協會ハ、ソレ以上ノ忠化ヲ防止スル目的ノタメニ、早急ニ再々占居

Doc. 239

スルニトハ許サレナクツタ。ソレ等ノ場合、歸ル  
事、仕事ヲ関心スル事、或ハ復等ノ財產ヲ維持シ  
又等ノ事ノ許可ヲ米國民ニ拒否シテラ、辯解ハ  
平和ト秩序ノ回復ハ不充分デアルトイフイデツ  
タ。此ノ辯解ニハ如何ナル根據モナイ事ハ問題、  
地區ニ多ク、日本商人及彼等ノ家族ガ居タトイ  
フ事ニヨリ、事ニ説明ガツイテナク。

一九三四年七月七日、私ハ日本外務省ニ打テ滿洲  
ニ於テル官憲ニヨル石油ノ差別的專賣機關ニ  
附テノ覺書ヲ提出シテ。

米國石油會社、生産品ヲ販賣スル事ニ打テ滿洲  
ニ於テ門戶ヲ閉鎖スルノテアラウ此ノ計畫ニ打テ  
ル日本政府ノ協カ及是認ノ事實ニ附、注意  
ガ喚起セラレタラナル。即チソレハ門戶解放  
ノ原則、ソレニ打テ日本ハ復犯シテナルノデアルガ  
ヲ犯スラウ事、更ニ右計畫ハ一九三三年ノ  
九ヶ国條約ノ第三條ノ規定並ニ一八四四年ノ米支  
條約ノ明白ナル條項ニ違反スル事ヲ支持スルテ

No 8x

アウツト言明シテ、一九三四年八月二日附、右ニ打テ  
同答ニテ、日本外務大臣ハ滿洲國ガ獨立國トシ  
テカラハコノ問題ハ米國政府及滿洲政府ニ關  
スル問題デアルト述ビ、日本ニ依ル如何ナル條約義  
務違反モ含ムテナイト、否定シタ。

1. 1919年1月28日，在巴黎召开的凡尔赛和会，是第一次世界大战后，战胜国对战败国进行处置的会议。会议签订了《凡尔赛和约》，对德国进行了严厉的惩罚。

2. 1919年1月28日，在巴黎召开的凡尔赛和会，是第一次世界大战后，战胜国对战败国进行处置的会议。会议签订了《凡尔赛和约》，对德国进行了严厉的惩罚。

3. 1919年1月28日，在巴黎召开的凡尔赛和会，是第一次世界大战后，战胜国对战败国进行处置的会议。会议签订了《凡尔赛和约》，对德国进行了严厉的惩罚。

4. 1919年1月28日，在巴黎召开的凡尔赛和会，是第一次世界大战后，战胜国对战败国进行处置的会议。会议签订了《凡尔赛和约》，对德国进行了严厉的惩罚。

5. 1919年1月28日，在巴黎召开的凡尔赛和会，是第一次世界大战后，战胜国对战败国进行处置的会议。会议签订了《凡尔赛和约》，对德国进行了严厉的惩罚。

6. 1919年1月28日，在巴黎召开的凡尔赛和会，是第一次世界大战后，战胜国对战败国进行处置的会议。会议签订了《凡尔赛和约》，对德国进行了严厉的惩罚。

7. 1919年1月28日，在巴黎召开的凡尔赛和会，是第一次世界大战后，战胜国对战败国进行处置的会议。会议签订了《凡尔赛和约》，对德国进行了严厉的惩罚。

8. 1919年1月28日，在巴黎召开的凡尔赛和会，是第一次世界大战后，战胜国对战败国进行处置的会议。会议签订了《凡尔赛和约》，对德国进行了严厉的惩罚。

9. 1919年1月28日，在巴黎召开的凡尔赛和会，是第一次世界大战后，战胜国对战败国进行处置的会议。会议签订了《凡尔赛和约》，对德国进行了严厉的惩罚。

10. 1919年1月28日，在巴黎召开的凡尔赛和会，是第一次世界大战后，战胜国对战败国进行处置的会议。会议签订了《凡尔赛和约》，对德国进行了严厉的惩罚。

No 9

No 9

Doc = 39

一九三九年九月三日自東京發行之「新華日報」載有  
蘇聯對日本之保證書云：「蘇聯對日本在滿洲之利益與  
權利之保證，係根據一九三九年九月二日蘇聯與日本所  
簽訂之蘇日中立條約之精神而發行者也。」

彼等米國人，在田舍社，不以為憐人之自取，故其「保證書」  
之錄，其內容如下：「蘇聯與日本之保證書，係根據一九三九年九月二日  
蘇聯與日本所簽訂之蘇日中立條約之精神而發行者也。」  
一九三九年九月三日，日本商社三聯社，在東京，發行「保證書」  
云：「蘇聯與日本之保證書，係根據一九三九年九月二日蘇聯與日本所  
簽訂之蘇日中立條約之精神而發行者也。」

一九三九年九月三日，日本外務省，在東京，發行「保證書」  
云：「蘇聯與日本之保證書，係根據一九三九年九月二日蘇聯與日本所  
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簽訂之蘇日中立條約之精神而發行者也。」

No 10

1935 日本外務大臣三忠告。  
 一九三五年四月十六日。日本外務大臣于詩  
 自本條約義務並三所同三十七條證(特三同)  
 視也部本開校(原則)維持其也三(日  
 )深證三違反之三十八米國。見解  
 三有也國三滿洲國承認三條件權  
 三十八米國三

一九三七年十二月一日。日本以外、外國人、  
 治外法權三關於滿洲國政府發行、宣言書  
 三附三又也三三米國銀行支店及  
 錄三三三其代表者任命三三  
 也法律、公本三關於日本外務大臣三批議  
 三提出三。而三三滿洲三於三米國民治外  
 法權三米三三國間、條約三三有也事  
 實三對三且三滿洲國政府三米國民三對三三權  
 國、條約權三三三三三三三三  
 三三起三。外務大臣、返答三滿洲國政府、行  
 爲三附三日本側三三何三三三三三三三

111  
 滿洲、石油、出、場、合、如、私、日本、人、三、上海、  
 廣東、汕頭、及、其他、場、所、三、於、此、稅、關、行、  
 政、引、進、三、且、日本、人、輸、入、三、好、都、會、也、如、



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的地位ヲ主張スル。意思キニテ又日本、政策ハ凡ニ此點ニ於ケル九ヶ國條約ノ條項、完全ニ遵守ニテト述ベル。彼ニ對シ米國政府並ニ米國民ハ且以上具體的證據ニヨリ又政策、スナハトシテ依ル方ガ感銘ヲ少キト述ベリ。

一、一九三九年九月一日、外務次官(堀内)ハ對米放送ニ於テ支那、及日、的、行、爲、理、由、以日本、行、動、ヲ、辯、護、シ、日、本、意、思、平、和、的、旨、ヲ、張、テ、。彼、現、在、北、支、及、上、海、於、此、戰、闘、終、局、目、的、ハ、西、國、間、真、協、力、ヲ、許、容、シ、狀、態、ヲ、實、現、ス、在、此、ト、述、ベ、リ。而、言、支、那、一、派、遣、シ、テ、日、本、軍、ハ、侵、略、的、的、ヲ、遂、シ、ス、非、ス、又、日、本、ハ、領、土、的、欲、望、ヲ、有、ル、旨、ヲ、述、ベ、リ。堀、内、ハ、支、那、不、放、送、機、説、其、後、議、會、於、十、月、日、外、務、大、臣、廣、田、兼、武、總、理、大、臣、近、衛、ハ、演、説、ト、同、一、旨、ヲ、述、ベ、リ。

一、一九三九年三月十日、外務大臣(有田)ト會見ニ於テ、日本ハ支那ニ對シ領土的野心ヲ有、ル、旨、ヲ、述、ベ、リ。從、前、日、本、ハ、支、那、領、土、的、野、心、ヲ、促、シ、テ、在、最、近、日、本、軍、ハ、依、ル、海、南、島、ハ、領、土、的、行、動、ヲ、注、意、ヲ、喚、起、シ、。而、言、支、那、島、多、ク、米、國、所、有、教、育、施、設、發、會、



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施設、米國住民が在米事實ニ鑑ミ、同島占領  
ニ關シ日本政府、意思ニ付テ諒以テ要求シ  
テ。大臣占領、目的、南支那海岸、封鎖  
ヲ強化シ、蔣介石政権、打倒ヲ企テ、在  
ト答ヘテ。

彼、日本、支那、對領土の野心ヲ有セト  
後方、ステートメントヲ發表シ、占領、軍  
事的必要以上ニ、去ク、ト附ケ加ヘテ。

四

一九四〇年四月十五日、外務大臣(有田)ハ  
歐洲戰、不サシラント(和蘭)、包含シ  
ル可能性並ニ蘭印ニ於ケル、及響聞ニ、  
日本、地位ニ付テ新聞記者、質問ニ答テ、  
「日本政府、蘭印、現状維持ニ影響ヲ具  
スルヲ欲ス、激怒ヲ伴フ如キ如何ナルヨリ  
口ハ、展開ニ支障ヲ聞ク有セザルヲ得ト  
ト述ベテ。

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1

一九四一年七月ニ日本外務大臣、日本、口  
ヲ對スル戰爭ニ参加スルヲ、考ヘテ平不  
自保証ト名其、月、間ニ秘シ、日本首相  
ニ對シ、實書ヲ送リ、日本、對露戰爭ニ立入ル  
ノ事、付テ何等、真実、報道シテ事、又日本  
ノ責任ハ定メ、日本、太平洋方面、平和維  
持ヲ希望スル旨、同時、ステートメントニ

付テ米國政府、希望ヲ聞陳シタ。右ニ對スル  
 回答、日本外務大臣ラウモク、サレタガソレハ、次  
 ヲ述ベラシキナリ。  
 太平洋、平和、維持並ニ停戦ノ事ニ熱心ナリ且  
 眞實ナル日本政府、願望ヲ下シ、日本政府  
 「常ニソ、目的ヲ達成セシメ熱心ナル協カヲ  
 与テシキナリ。而シテ對シ聯戰事ニ卷カス  
 ル可能性、付テ今迄考慮シテ来ナリ。ト  
 一九三八年、中ニ東亞新秩序、建設ノ記録ヲ  
 示シテ来ラシキナリ。首相並ニ外務大臣、  
 支那ニ於テハ、滿洲カウ北支更ニ中支、及  
 ビ南支、軍事行動、發展ニ言及シ、日  
 本ト協カス支那政權、出現ニ對シ希望ヲ  
 批擲シタ。然レ乍ラ第三國、權益ヲ保護シ  
 事、門戶解放政策、継続意思、例、如キ保  
 証ヲ變遷シテ来ナリ。其後、外務大臣、支  
 那ニ於テハ戰闘、終局ヲ行ハシメテ来ラシ、  
 假令將介石ノ平和ヲ訴求スルトモ相半ニ  
 支テ来ラシト述ベ、而シテ意味有リケニ、  
 「軍事行動、主目標ガ或ニ種、經濟的並  
 社會的、日支間、協カニアラハ、領土  
 日本、モ、テアルカ支那、モ、アルカハ、ナリ  
 問題ニ人キタイト指シ、支那ハ、ソ、國

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内、不平等條約並其治外法權、實際を自ら  
 得た。強カトナリテハナラヌト指示シタ  
 下。而シテ一九三八年十一月ニ、日本  
 外務省、廣東及ハ武漢三鎮、陥落ヲ声  
 明シテ、重要ナル支那、地區、斯ル  
 テ我々、予中ニ落トシテ進ム。第三國、  
 權益付テ、何事言及ス。ソ、ステトメ  
 下。即チ、東亞ニ於テ行ハル、下ニ新條  
 件、第三國、被害態度ヲ適應セシメテ  
 下。ソ、日本、自信ヲ表示シタニシテカ  
 多。然レ、作ラ日本國民、是等、勝利ノ平和  
 時代ヲ招来ス。非、寧、口日本ノ新  
 東亞建設、課題ヲ得ル。ソ、新  
 下戰心ニ始リ下。上、警、告、下  
 名。一九四〇年末迄、新東亞思想、日本  
 政府カ、南洋ヲ包含スル「東亞」中  
 日本、地位ヲ獲得セシメ、進、進、進  
 下發展シタ下。

「南洋ヲ包含スル東亞」ニ對シテ、日本、  
 自身近代的世界ニ於テ、三國ニ成  
 長セ、結果トシテ、實、力、ト、普、通、下、從、前  
 障、碍、下、加、下、領、土、的、經、濟、的、利、益、的  
 下除、去、セ、下、下、下、下。

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米國政府三行り茲ニ述べたる言明又ハ抗議ト云ハ三國ノ  
 私人等ニ多ク、日本ノ個人ノ委託トシテ、  
 ソノ事、人々ハ日本政府ノ登記記録ヲ示ス事ヲ如何ク時、  
 且テ政府、指示セリト云々云々ト云フ事、  
 多ク、場合私人間ノ事柄ヲ日本外務大臣ト交渉スル、  
 時トシテ外務次官而シテ又職比長任リ外務省、從御的官等ニ  
 間合ヒテ之ヲ事トスル、  
 然レ首相ニ間合ヒテ事、殆トカキテ、茲ニ述べたる事柄ノ事、  
 分ルガ私ト大使ト云テ、由リ起ルメ、事共、從御的ト被テ余カ、  
 元三、事末ニ八四〇、以テ、別々、抗議ヲ私ノ提出スル、  
 ソノ事多ク、米國海軍ニ對テ、採擷事件、實例ガ米國經濟  
 人ノ主權ニ對テ、危害ガ又米國人ニ對テ、差別(差價)が次々  
 ト増加シツテ、余トシテ、私人ト大使トシテ、期間、終ル迄、ハ  
 續ク事トナレ、

シヨヤ、ク、ク、ク、ク、ク、ク、ク、ク、

No 17

聖紀一九四五年五月廿日會余ノ期ニ於テ、此日、聖日、且、以、番  
 名、ナシ、アリ、

エドガ、エム、ノ、ド

Ex. #1106

EXCERPTS FROM TESTIMONY OF SECRETARY OF STATE  
HULL GIVEN BEFORE THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL  
COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL  
HARBOR ATTACK

pp. 1076 to 1083

I. BACKGROUND OF 1941 CONVERSATIONS

The Japanese proposal for conversations was directed toward the conclusion of an agreement between Japan and the United States relating to the Far East. It was made early in 1941. Before accepting or rejecting this proposal, the President and I gave the subject thorough consideration against the background of such factors as Japan's record of international aggression, her record of duplicity in international dealings, the sharp divergence between the policies traditionally and currently pursued by Japan and by the United States, and the current situation in the Far East, in Europe, and in the United States.

A. Japan's Record of Aggression:

The President and I had to bear in mind and to take into account Japan's past record of aggression and the trend of contemporary developments in the Far East.

Almost from the outset of Japan's emergence as a modern state she had been pursuing a policy of military aggrandisement. For the most part, except during certain brief periods when forces of moderation appeared to be in the ascendancy, the intervals between one aggressive step and the next were but periods of consolidation.

In 1895, following Japan's successful war against China, Japan annexed Formosa and tried unsuccessfully to establish a foothold in Manchuria.

In 1905, after the Russo-Japanese war, Japan established herself securely in Manchuria by acquiring a lease of the Kwantung territory and ownership of the South Manchuria Railway. At that time Japan also acquired southern Sakhalin.

In 1910 Japan annexed Korea after years of encroachment by pressure and intrigue.

In 1915 Japan took advantage of the preoccupation of her European allies with the war against Germany to present to China the notorious Twenty-one Demands.

At the end of the first world war Japan participated in the Washington Conference of 1921-22 and became a party to the treaties concluded there. Among those treaties was the Nine Power Treaty relating to principles and policies concerning China. That treaty envisaged the creation of conditions designed to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government. Japan pledged herself to the policies of self-restraint toward China on which the Nine Power Treaty rested.

In 1928, however, following the advent of the cabinet of General Tanaka in 1927, Japan adopted a so-called "positive" policy toward China under which it manifested an increasing disposition to intervene in China's internal affairs.

In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria and subsequently established there a puppet regime under the name of "Manchukuo". By that action, which was a flagrant violation of the Nine Power Treaty, Japan broke completely away from the policy of cooperation agreed upon in the Washington Conference treaties.

I recalled how early in 1934 I welcomed an approach by the Japanese Government in the form of a note (February 21, 1934) by Mr. Hirota, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which he stated that he firmly believed that no question existed between the United States and Japan "that is fundamentally incapable of amicable solution". In my reply (March 3, 1934) I concurred in that view and emphasized our Government's belief in adjustments of questions by pacific processes.

Only a short time after that exchange of notes, however, Japan again unmasked the basic purpose of aggression consistently adhered to by powerful policy-making elements in Japan. On April 17, 1934 the Japanese Foreign Office spokesman gave out a truculent official statement known as the "hands off China" statement. In that statement Japan made clear a purpose to compel China to follow Japan's dictate and to permit other countries to have relations with China only as Japan allowed.

On December 29, 1934 Japan gave formal notice of its intention to withdraw at the end of 1936 from the Naval Limitation Treaty signed at Washington on February 6, 1922. That notice was another clear and significant move in the direction of a course of conquest. Following the giving of that notice, Japan proceeded energetically to increase her armaments, preparatory to launching her invasion in China.

About that time Japan entered into conversations with Nazi Germany which resulted in the conclusion by the two countries, on November 25, 1936, of the Anti-Comintern Pact. In 1937

Italy adhered. While the Pact was ostensibly for self-protection against communism, actually it was a preparatory move for subsequent measures of forceful expansion by the bandit nations -- the first step in the creation of the so-called "Axis".

In July 1937, Japan deliberately took advantage of a minor incident between Chinese and Japanese forces at a point near Peiping and began flagrantly to invade China on a huge scale. She poured into China immense armies which spread fan-like over great areas, including industrial and other key centers. These armies raped, robbed, murdered, and committed all kinds of lawless acts. Particularly barbarous were the outrages in Nanking following occupation of that city by Japanese military on December 13, 1937.

On December 12, 1937 Japanese aircraft bombed and sank the U.S.S. Panay in the Yangtze River.

To gain public support in Japan for its program of military expansion, slogans were used such as "the new order in Greater East Asia" and "the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere". The United States and other countries were charged with attempting to choke Japan's development.

In August and September 1940 Japan with German assistance extorted an agreement from Vichy France under which Japanese troops moved into northern Indochina.

In September 1940 Japan entered into the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. That alliance was aimed directly at the United States. It was designed to discourage the United States from taking adequate measures of self-defense until both Japan and Germany had completed their programs of conquest in Asia and Europe, when they could turn on the United States then standing alone.

On October 4, 1940 Premier Konoe was quoted by the press in a statement on the Tripartite Pact as having said in part:

"If the United States refuses to understand the real intentions of Japan, Germany and Italy and continues persistently its challenging attitude and acts ... those powers will be forced to go to war. Japan is now endeavoring to adjust Russo-Japanese political and economic relations and will make every effort to reduce friction between Japan and Russia. Japan is now engaged in diplomatic manoeuvres to induce Russia, Britain and the United States to suspend their operations in assisting the Chiang regime

B. Japan's Record of Duplicity:

The President and I also gave thought to the fact that Japan had a long record of duplicity in international dealings. This duplicity was due largely to the fact that the Japanese military were a law unto themselves and consistently overrode commitments which civilian Japanese had given.

In 1904, Japan guaranteed Korea's independence and territorial integrity. In 1910, Japan annexed Korea.

In 1908, Japan pledged with the United States to support the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity there. In 1915, Japan presented to China the notorious "twenty-one demands."

In 1918, Japan entered into an inter-allied arrangement whereby forces, not exceeding above 7,000 by any one power, were to be sent to Siberia to guard military stores which might be subsequently needed by Russian forces, to help the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense, and to aid the evacuating Czechoslovakian forces in Siberia. The Japanese military saw in this enterprise an opportunity, in which they were eventually unsuccessful, to annex eastern Siberia and sent more than 70,000 troops.

In the Nine Power Treaty of 1922, Japan agreed to respect China's sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity. Japan also agreed to use its influence to establish the principle of equal opportunity there. Japan's whole course in China since 1931 of military occupation and economic domination was in violation of those pledges.

On November 21, 1932, Mr. Matsuoka, then Japanese delegate to the League of Nations, said: "We want no more territory." By the end of 1932 Japanese forces had occupied the whole of Manchuria and in subsequent years they moved southward and westward occupying a vast area of China.

On July 27, 1937, Prince Konoe, then Japanese Premier, said "In sending troops to North China, of course, the Government has no other purpose, as was explained in its recent statement, than to preserve the peace of East Asia." In order to "preserve the peace of East Asia," Japanese forces for four years had carried warfare and suffering over the greater part of China.

On October 28, 1937, the Japanese Foreign Office said, "Japan never looks upon the Chinese people as an enemy..." Japan showed its friendly feeling for China by bombing Chinese civilian populations, by burning Chinese cities, by making millions of Chinese homeless and destitute, by mistreating and killing civilians, and by acts of horror and cruelty.



On April 15, 1940, Mr. Arita, then Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, said the "Japanese Government cannot but be deeply concerned over any development ... that may affect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies". Following the occupation of the Netherlands by Germany that spring, Japan sent a Commercial Commission to the Indies which asked concessions so far reaching that, if granted, they would have reduced the Indies practically to a Japanese colony.

After the outbreak of Japan's undeclared war against China in July 1937, Japanese civilian leaders time and again gave assurances that American rights would be respected. Time and again the Japanese military acted in violation of those assurances...

pp. 1084- to 1088

Time and again the Japanese gave assurances that American lives and property in China would be respected. Yet there were reported in steadily mounting numbers cases of bombing of American property with consequent loss or endangering of American lives.

Time and again the Japanese gave assurances that American treaty rights in China would be respected. Unnumbered measures infringing those rights were put into effect in Japanese occupied areas. Trade monopolies were set up, discriminatory taxes were imposed, American properties were occupied, and so on. In addition, American nationals were assaulted, arbitrarily detained, and subjected to indignities.

C. Divergence between Japanese and American Policies:

The President and I have very much in mind the fact that the United States and Japan had widely different concepts and policies. We went over the successive steps our Government had taken to influence Japan to adopt peaceful policies.

We recalled that Japan's action in 1931 in embarking on a course of aggression, expansion by force and of disregard of treaties had ushered in an ever widening conflict between force of aggression and those desirous of maintaining peace. Our Government's opposition to Japan's course in Manchuria was set forth in a communication addressed by the then Secretary of State, Mr. Stimson, to the Japanese Government on January 7, 1935, and in a further communication of February 25, 1935, to the Secretary General of the League of Nations.

On January 17, 1933 the President-elect, Mr. Roosevelt, made clear his support of the principle of sanctity of international

treaties by writing out, in reply to a question, a statement as follows:

"I am ... wholly willing to make it clear that American foreign policies must uphold the sanctity of international treaties. That is the cornerstone on which all relations between nations must rest."

In his first inaugural address, on March 4, 1933, President Roosevelt said that in the field of world policy he would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor--"the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others--the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors."

Thus in 1931-1933, while Japan was carrying forward its program of aggression, the American Government was moving steadily ahead in advocacy of world support of sanctity of treaties and peaceful processes.

On May 16, 1934 I had a general conversation with Japanese Ambassador Saionji, one of many conversations in which I endeavored to convince the Japanese that their best interests lay in following policies of peace.

Three days later I talked again with the Japanese Ambassador. During the conversation the Ambassador repeated the formula which his Government had been putting forward publicly for some weeks to the effect that Japan had a superior and special function in connection with the preservation of peace in Eastern Asia. I brought to the Japanese Ambassador's attention the clear implications contained in the Japanese formula of the intention on the part of Japan to exercise an overlordship over neighboring nations and territories.

On June 12, 1936 in a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador to Great Britain, I told the Ambassador that the impression of the American people was that Japan sought economic domination first of eastern Asia and then of other areas such as it might select, and that this would ultimately mean political as well as military domination. I urged upon the Ambassador the benefit to Japan from its associating itself in a peaceful and constructive program.

Despite all our pleas and efforts, Japan in July 1937 proceeded to invade China. Therefore, on July 16 the Government of the United States issued a statement of fundamental principles of international policy which was directed at rallying all countries to the support of peaceful processes.

In a further statement of August 23, 1937, I applied the principles of the July 16 statement expressly to the situation in China. I stated that the issues, in that situation, of concern to the United States went far beyond the immediate question of the protection of American nationals and American interests. Serious hostilities in any part of the world were of concern to all nations. Accordingly, I urged on both the Chinese and Japanese Governments that they refrain from hostilities.

On October 6, 1937 the American Government stated that the action of Japan in China was inconsistent with the principles which should govern relationships between nations and was contrary to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and of the Briand-Kellogg Pact.

In November 1937 the United States participated with eighteen other nations in a conference held at Brussels to "study peaceable means of hastening the end of the regrettable conflict which prevails" in the Far East. The conference was held in accordance with a provision of the Nine Power Treaty of 1922. The repeated refusals of the Japanese Government to participate in the conference effectively prevented efforts to bring about an end to the conflict by mediation and conciliation. On November 24 the conference suspended its sittings.

pp. 1089.

On April 15, 1940 the Japanese Foreign Minister issued a statement disclosing an underlying purpose to extend Japanese control to the South Seas regions, especially the Netherlands East Indies. On April 17 I took cognizance of that statement. I pointed out the importance of the Netherlands Indies in international relationships. I said that intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any alteration of their status due by other than peaceful processes would be prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace, and security, not only in the region of the Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area. I urged that peaceful principles be applied not only in every part of the Pacific area but in every part of the world.

p. 1090

During the winter of 1940 and the spring of 1941 I had clearly in mind--and I was explaining to members of Congress and other Americans with whom I came in contact--that it was apparent that the Japanese military leaders were starting on a mission of conquest of the entire Pacific area west of a few hundred miles of Hawaii and extending to the South Seas and to India. The Japanese were out with force in collaboration with Hitler to establish a new world order, and they thought they had the power to compel all peaceful nations to come in under that new order in the half of the world they had arrogated to themselves.

I was saying to these Americans that beginning in 1933 I had commenced a systematic and consistently earnest effort to work out our relations with Japan. I had been trying to see whether it was humanly possible to find any way to approach the Japanese and prevail on them to abandon this movement of conquest. We had been urging the Japanese to consider their own future from the standpoint of political, economic, and social aspects.

p. 1092

The President had an eye to the situation in the Far East when on January 6, 1941 in his address to Congress he declared that "at no previous time has American security been as seriously threatened from without as it is today". The President said that the whole pattern of democratic life had been blotted out in an appalling number of independent nations and that the assailants were still on the march threatening other nations, great and small.

p. 1093

On January 15, 1941, in a statement in support of the Lend-Lease Act before the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives, I said:

"It has been clear throughout that Japan has been actuated from the start by broad and ambitious plans for establishing herself in a dominant position in the entire region of the Western Pacific. Her leaders have openly declared their determination to achieve and maintain this position by force of arms and thus to make themselves master of an area containing almost one-half of the entire population of the world. As a consequence, they would have arbitrary control of the sea and trade routes in that region."

I pointed out that mankind was face to face with an organized, ruthless and implacable movement of steadily expanding conquests, and that control of the high seas by law-abiding nations "is the key to the security of the Western Hemisphere".

pp. 1103 to 1109

## II. CONVERSATIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO JULY 1941.

On February 14, 1941 the President received the new Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Nomura, in a spirit of cordiality and said that they could talk candidly. He pointed out that relations between the United States and Japan were deteriorating and mentioned Japanese movements southward and Japanese entry into the Tripartite Agreement. The President suggested that the Ambassador might like to re-examine and frankly discuss with the Secretary of State important phases of American-Japanese relations.

On March 8, in my first extended conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, I emphasized that the American people had become fully aroused over the German and Japanese movements to take charge of the seas and of the other continents for their own arbitrary control and to profit at the expense of the welfare of all of the victims.

On March 14 the Japanese Ambassador saw the President and me. The President agreed with an intimation by the Ambassador that matters between our two countries could be worked out without a military clash and emphasized that the first step would be removal of suspicion regarding Japan's intentions. With the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka on his way to Berlin, talking loudly, and Japanese naval and air forces moving gradually toward Thailand, there was naturally serious concern and suspicion.

On April 16 I had a further conversation with the Japanese Ambassador. I pointed out that the one paramount preliminary question about which our Government was concerned was a definite assurance in advance that the Japanese Government had the willingness and power to abandon its present doctrine of conquest by force and to adopt four principles which our Government regarded as the foundation upon which relations between nations should rest, as follows:

- (1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations;
- (2) Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries;
- (3) Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity;
- (4) Non-disturbance of the status quo in the

Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

I told the Japanese Ambassador that our Government was willing to consider any proposal which the Japanese Government might offer such as would be consistent with these principles.

On May 12 the Japanese Ambassador presented a proposal for a general settlement. The essence of that proposal was that the United States should request Chiang Kai-shek to negotiate peace with Japan, and, if Chiang should not accept the advice of the United States, that the United States should discontinue its assistance to his Government; that normal trade relations between the United States and Japan should be resumed; and that the United States should help Japan acquire access to facilities for the exploitation of natural resources--such as oil, rubber, tin and nickel--in the southwest Pacific area. There were also other provisions which Japan eventually dropped, calling for joint guarantee of independence of the Philippines, for the consideration of Japanese immigration to the United States on a non-discriminatory basis, and for a joint effort by the United States and Japan to prevent the further extension of the European war and for the speedy restoration of peace in Europe.

The proposal also contained an affirmation of Japan's adherence to the Tripartite Pact and a specific reference to Japan's obligations thereunder to come to the aid of any of the parties thereto if attacked by a power not at that time in the European war or in the Sino-Japanese conflict, other than the Soviet Union which was expressly excepted.

The peace conditions which Japan proposed to offer China were not defined in clear-cut terms. Patient exploring, however, disclosed that they included stipulations disguised in innocuous-sounding formulas whereby Japan would retain control of various strategic resources, facilities and enterprises in China and would acquire the right to station large bodies of Japanese troops, professedly for "joint defense against Communism," for an indefinite period in extensive key areas of China proper and Inner Mongolia.

Notwithstanding the narrow and one-sided character of the Japanese proposals, we took them as a starting point to explore the possibility of working out a broad-gauge settlement, covering the entire Pacific area, along lines consistent with the principles for which this country stood.

On May 14, Mr. Matsuka, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the course of a conversation with Ambassador Grew, said that both Prince Kono and he were determined that Japan's southward advance should be carried out only by peaceful means, "unless," he added significantly, "circumstances render this impossible."

In reply to the Ambassador's inquiry as to what circumstances he had in mind, Mr. Matsuoaka referred to the concentration of British troops in Malaya and other British measures. When the Ambassador pointed out that such measures were of a defensive character, the Minister's reply was that these measures were regarded as provocative by the Japanese public, which might bring pressure on the Government to act.

On May 27, 1941, President Roosevelt proclaimed the existence of an "unlimited national emergency" and in a radio address on the same day he declared that our whole program of aid for the democracies had been based on concern for our own security. He warned of the conditions which would exist should Hitler be victorious.

The President and I were sure that the proclamation would be noticed not only by Hitler but also by the Japanese war lords.

On May 28 I told the Japanese Ambassador that I had it in mind before passing from our informal conversations into any negotiations with Japan to talk out in strict confidence with the Chinese Government the general subject matter involved in the proposals.

During the next few weeks there were a number of conversations for the purpose of clarifying various points and narrowing areas of difference. We repeatedly set forth our attitude on these points--the necessity of Japan's making clear its relation to the Axis in case the United States should be involved in self-defense in the war in Europe; application of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another country and withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory; application of the principle of non-discrimination in commercial relations in China and other areas of the Pacific and assurance of Japan's peaceful intent in the Pacific. I emphasized that what we were seeking was a comprehensive agreement which would speak for itself as an instrument of peace.

The Japanese pressed for a complete reply to their proposals of May 12. Accordingly, on June 21, the Ambassador was given our views in the form of a tentative redraft of their proposals. In that redraft there was suggested a formula which would make clear that Japan was not committed to take action against the United States should the latter be drawn by self-defense into the European war. It was proposed that a further effort be made to work out a satisfactory solution of the question of the stationing of Japanese troops in China and of the question of economic cooperation between China and Japan. There also was eliminated any suggestion that the United States would discontinue aid to the Chinese Government. Various other suggested changes were proposed in the interest of clarification or for the purpose of harmonizing the proposed settlement with our stated principles.

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二〇七B

與珠江攻敵之審查三對及議會共同委員會，  
前二行公之八國國務長官，證言披萃

一〇六—一〇三頁

一 一九四一年/昭和十六年/會談背景

會談二對日本，提議六極東三國及日米間，協定締結  
指開之序。其一九四一年/昭和十六年/初期提起之。  
此，提議，受諾及拒否及前二大統領，余此問題因  
日本，國際的侵略，記錄，日本，國際的行動，於此重性  
，記錄，日本，念衆國，依リ，傳統的，又現在遂行之，  
居此兩國政策，確然之相逢及極東，歐洲，並之念衆國  
於此現情勢等，原因背景二對，十命，考慮，拂之。

gx 1106

### A 日本，侵略記錄

No. 1

大統領及余，日本，過去，侵略的記錄，同時代，極東，  
於此發展之傾向，念頭，要道，上共，又之，考慮，之，  
レ，カ，ツ。

日本，近代，國家，上，發生，之，始，最初，軍事，的，擴大  
政策，續行，之，カ。穩健，勢力，得，之，短期間，除，



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No. 2

其大部分，期間中一侵略階段下次，階段上，中間期間，  
單三環宇國整理，期間之此過キカシク。

一九〇五年(明治廿八年)日中，六支那三村スル戰爭ニ成功シテ後  
台灣ヲ併合シ高滿洲ニ於テ是場ヲ建設シヨクシカニ失敗  
シ。

一九〇五年(明治卅年)日露戰役，後日中，六關東州三村在租  
借權ヲ獲得シ南滿洲鐵道ヲ領有シ，滿洲ニ確キ名地盤  
ヲ築ク。同時ニ日中，六南滿洲ヲ獲得シ。

一九〇九年(明治卅二年)日中，六多年，侵佔，後壓迫陰謀言  
朝鮮ヲ併合シ。

一九一九年(大正四年)日中，六歐洲聯合國對獨裁戰爭ニ夢中  
ニシテ其ヲ利用シカ，英名凡ニ二國條，要求ヲ中國ニ交  
シ。第一次世界大戰，終末ニ於テ日中，六一九二一二年(大  
正十年十一月)ノ華盛頓會議ニ參加シ，同會議ニ於テ締結セ  
諸條約，謂印國トシ。是等，條約中ニ中國ニ關スル原則  
及政策ニ關連シ有ル各國條約ヲ包含セリ。居テ，條約  
中國ノ實力ノ此安定シ政府ヲ完成シ且維持スルニ充分具  
最ニ無障礙，機會ヲ與ル狀態ヲ創造スルニ此ヲ期待シ。

日中，六國條約，基礎ヲ置ク上ニ，中國ニ對テ自治的改策ヲ  
誓約シ。然レテ一九二七年(昭和二年)田中內閣出陣後，日中，  
一九二八年(昭和三年)ニ中國ニ對テ所謂「積極改策」ヲ採用シ  
テ，改策，下ニ益々中國ノ內政ニ干涉スル傾向ヲ表シ。

一九三二年(昭和六年)ニ日中，六滿洲ヲ侵略シ其地ヲ滿洲國  
名稱ノ下ニ之ヲ統治スル傀儡政府ヲ樹立シ。九ノ國條約，

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極惡之手段予以之、行為三月、日本公華盛頓會議諸條約之協定より協力政策ヲ完全ニ放棄シタリ。

一九三四年(昭和九年)、始メ日本、外務大臣廣田氏ヨリソノ覺書、形式ニ(一九三四年二月二十日附)日本政府ヲ接近シタリ如何ニ余ガ歡迎シタリカヲ想ス。ソノ覺書ニ廣田氏ハ力ニ合衆國ト日本ト、向テ「友誼的解決」根本的ニ不可能ト問題ニ存在シタリト確信スル言ハシ、余ハ之ニ對テ回答(一九三四年三月三日附)ニ於テ廣田氏、意見ニ賛同シ且然ガ政府年報的方法ヨリ諸問題、調整ヲ確信スルヲ強調シタリ。

然ルニソノ覺書ヨリ交換シテ聞カシク日本ハ再ビ國內強有力ニ政策樹立者達ガ終始一貫固執スル侵略、根本目的暴露シタリ。

一九三四年四月十七日、日本外務省、代辯者ハ力、支那ニ年ヲ出スルハ「聲明」トシテ答ヘル上ヨリ、野蠻的公然聲明ヲシタリ。ソノ聲明ニ於テ日本ハ中國ヲ「日本、指圖ニ從テ」トシ強制シ且日本ガ許容ニ場合ニ限リ他、國ト中國ト、交渉ヲ許スト言フ目的ヲ明カシタリ。

No. 3

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一九三四年/昭和九年/十一月十九日日本/一九三六年/昭和十一年末。

一九三三年/大正十三年/二月六日「ワシントン」に於て調印セラルル

海軍制限條約より撤退之意圖を公式に通告シタ。

其、通告、征服、行程、向、明瞭、其、意、議、ハ、動、キ、テ、リ、タ。

其、通告、提出、次、年、日本、ハ、中國、侵略、開始、ヲ、志、シ、テ、其、軍、備

増強、邁進、シ、タ。

其、頃、日本、ハ、ソ、ノ、獨、逸、ト、會、談、シ、テ、其、結果、

一九三六年/昭和十一年/十一月三日、防共協定ハ兩國ヨリ締結セラル。

一九三七年/昭和十二年/伊、太、利、ハ、調、印、シ、タ。同、協、定、表、面、上、ハ、共、産

主義、對、シ、テ、自、己、防、衛、ヲ、以、テ、カ、實、際、ハ、其、後、匪、賊、國、家、ニ、依

テ、武、力、的、發、展、手、段、ヲ、為、シ、準、備、工、作、——所、謂、石、軸、——創、造、

第、一、步、——ヲ、以、テ、リ、タ。

一九三七年/昭和十二年/七月、日本、ハ、北、京、附、近、ノ、一、地、點、ニ、於、テ、ハ、中、國、軍、隊

ト、日、本、軍、隊、間、起、リ、シ、小、事、件、ヲ、故、意、ニ、利、用、シ、大、規、模、中、國、侵、略

ヲ、非、道、ニ、開、始、シ、タ。日、本、ハ、尤、モ、大、軍、隊、ヲ、中、國、ニ、注、入、シ、テ、

産、業、其、他、重、要、中、心、地、ヲ、含、ム、廣、大、土、地、威、ニ、扇、狀、ニ、擴、充、シ、且、軍

隊、凌、辱、掠、奪、殺、人、其、他、凡、テ、不、法、行、為、ヲ、犯、シ、タ。特、ニ、野、蠻

ク、一、九、三、七、年、昭、和、十、二、年、十、月、十、三、日、日、本、軍、隊、ノ、南、京、占、領、三、次

大、行、ハ、多、國、市、ニ、於、テ、暴、徒、甚、シ、ク、シ、タ。

No. 4

一九三七年/昭和十二年/十一月十二日、日本航空機、揚子江、ニ、於、テ、合、衆、國、軍、艦

ト、對、シ、テ、爆、撃、シ、テ、之、擊、沈、シ、タ。

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軍事的發展計畫云、日本於本國民之支持、得之為「東京新秩序」  
又「東京英策團」之「不干涉」標語不用云々。合衆國其他國、日本、  
發展之抑圧之非難を蒙り、

一九四〇年/昭和十五年八月及九月、日本「獨逸後助下」云々之  
佛蘭西上協定を無理に強行、其協定下ニ日本軍隊、北部印度支那  
ニ進入す。

一九四〇年/昭和十五年九月、日本「獨逸及び伊太利」三國同盟ヲ  
締結す。右同盟は直存合衆國ヲ目的とし之を以て、ソレハ日本「獨  
逸兩國」を「亞細亞及シテ歐洲」に「征伐」計畫を以て、兩國が獨立、合衆國  
ニ「對」向して出来、合衆國が「自衛手段」を採らざるが故に  
爲ニ合衆國が「非難」を蒙る。

一九四〇年/昭和十五年十月四日、近衛首相「三國同盟」云々を「聲明」中、  
「報」次、如ク言フ「新聞」云々。

合衆國が「日本獨逸及び伊太利」其意ヲ理解スルコトヲ「拒否」し、執拗  
ニ「挑戰」的態度及ビ「行爲」を續け、是等諸國ハ「戰」ハルヲ得  
「テ」ルコトヲ「日本」目下「日露」政治及シテ「經濟關係」ヲ調整スルヲ「努力」す  
「居」リ、又「日本」上「露西亞」上、同「摩擦」ヲ減スル為「凡」テ「努力」ヲ為スルコトヲ、  
日本、合衆國、露西亞、英國、及シテ「合衆國」が「彼等」ノ「將」政權「後助」行動ヲ「中止」  
スル「様」彼等ノ「諒解」云々「外交」工作ヲ「行」フ「居」ル

No. 5

No. 6

一九一八年(大正七年)ニ日本ハ露西亞軍カ其ノ後心要トスルカモ知シ又  
軍需品ヲ保護スル爲、露西亞人自身ノ自衛機關ノ組織ヲ援助  
スル爲、及ビ「シベリア」ニ於ケル「キエツコスロキア」軍ノ撤退ヲ救済ス  
ル爲ニ各國ハ夫々七十人ヲ超ヘサル兵力ヲ「シベリア」ニ派遣スルトシテ  
聯合國間ノ取極メニ参加シタ。日本軍部ハコノ事業ニ東部「シ  
ベリア」併合ノ好機アリト見テ(結局成功シナカッタ)七万人以上ノ兵  
力ヲ派遣シタ。

一九三二年(大正十一年)ドリ九ヶ國條約ニ於テ日本ハ中國ノ主權  
獨立及ビ領土の行政的保全ヲ尊重スルコトニ同意シタ。日本ハ  
亦中國ニ於テ機會均等ノ原則ヲ樹立スルコトニ盡カスルコトニ同意  
シタ。一九三三年(昭和六年)以降中國ニ於ケル日本ノ軍事的占領各  
經濟的支配ノ全課程ハ是等ノ誓約侵犯デアリタ。  
一九三三年(昭和七年)十一月二十日、當時國際聯盟ヘ派遣ノ日本代表デ

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B. 日本ノ表裏的言動ノ記録

大統領ト余ト亦日本ノ國際關係ニ於テ表裏的言動ヲ爲シタル  
イ記録ヲ有スル事實ヲ考ヘタ。コノ表裏的言動ハ日本軍部が彼自  
身ノ法律デアリ日本ノ文官が約束シタ事ヲ終始一貫シテ蹂躪シテキ  
タト云フ事實ニ大イニ起因スルモノデアル。

一九〇四年(明治廿七年)日本ハ朝鮮ノ獨立ト其ノ領土保全トヲ保證  
シタ。一九〇五年(明治四三年)ニ日本ハ朝鮮ヲ併合シタ。

一九〇八年(明治四二年)日本ハ「アメリカ」合衆國ト共ニ中國ノ獨立ト保  
全及ビ中國ニ於ルル機會均等ノ原則ヲ支持スルコトヲ誓言約シタ。

一九一五年(大正四年)ニ日本ハカノ惡名アル「二十一ヶ箇條ノ要求」ヲ中國ニ

突きツケタ。

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松岡氏、我々以上、領土ヲ欲セシト言フ。一九三三年(昭和八年)、未迄ニ日本軍ハ滿洲全土ヲ占領シ、其後、歲月ニ南方及西  
方ニ行動シテ廣大ナル中國ノ地域ヲ占領スルニ至リ。

一九三七年(昭和十二年)七月二十七日、當時、日本首相近衛公爵ハ北支ハ軍隊派遣ニ當ツテハ政府ハ最近、ハノ聲明ニモ述ベク  
ル如ク、東亞ノ平和維持以外何論何等ノ目的モ有スルモテハナイト  
述ベテ并ニ「東亞ノ平和ヲ維持スルヲ以テ日本軍ハ四年ニ亘ツテ中國  
大部分ノ地域ニ戰爭ト苦難ヲ齎シタリ。」

一九三七年(昭和十二年)十月二十六日、日本外務省ハ「日本ハ未レテ中國民衆  
ニ敵ト視ルモテハナイ……」ト述ベテ并ニ「日本ハ中國ニ對スル  
ノ同情ヲ、一般中國民衆ヲ爆撃シテ中國ノ諸都市ヲ燒キ、幾百  
萬ノ中國人ノ家ヲ奪ヒテ生計ヲ絶テ、一般人ヲ虐待殺戮スル  
コトニ依ツテ又恐怖、慘虐ノ行爲ニ依ツテ示シタリ。」

一九四〇年(昭和十五年)四月十五日、當時、日本外相有田氏ハ「日本政  
府ハ蘭領東印度ノ現状ニ影響ヲ及ボスベキ如何ナル進展……  
ニ對シテモ深ク憂慮セザルヲ得ナイ」ト述ベテ、ハノ春、独逸ニ  
ヨリ和蘭陀ヲ占領シ、次いで日本ハ商業使節團ヲ蘭印ニ送リ、  
其ノシカ容レル場合ハ蘭印ヲ以テ實際ニ日本ノ殖民地トシ、  
ハノ如キ讓步ヲ要求ス。

No. 7

一九三七年(昭和十二年)七月、中國ニ對スル日本、宣戰ノ布告ヲ戰  
争勃発後モ、日本ノ民間指導者達ハ「ハノ如キ權利ノ尊重  
ナルベキ自國々ヲ保證ス。日本陸軍ハ屢々ハ保證ニ違背

No. 8

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スル行動ニ由ル。

自一〇八頁一〇八頁

日本ハ屢々中國ニ於テアメリカ人ノ生命及ビ財産ハ尊重サルニ  
キ旨保證シタ。

シカモアメリカ人ノ生命ノ損失ト危險ヲ伴フアメリカ財産爆撃  
事件ハ確實ニ増加スル數ヲ以テ報告セラレツ、アツタ。

日本ハ屢々中國ニ於テアメリカノ條約上ノ權利ハ尊重サルニ旨  
保證シタ。コレヲ、權利ヲ侵犯スル數ノ措置ハ日本占領地域ニ於

テ実施セラレタ。通商独占ガ行ハル差別的ノ稅ヲ課セシ、ア  
メリカ財産ガ差押合シタ等々。加アルニアメリカ人ノ襲撃

サレ、不法ニ抑留サレ侮辱ヲ受ケタ。



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○日本、政策と米國、政策と、相違

米國と日本との非常ニ懸隔セル概念と政策と有又ル事實  
ヲ大統領ト余ハ深ク念頭ニ置キテ居ク、吾々ハ我が政府が  
日本ヲ三テ平和的政策ヲ採ルベシニ任向ケル為ニ順次移リ来  
ルテ手段ヲ検討シク。

吾々ハ一九三一年(昭和六年)ニ日本が武力ト條約無視トニ  
侵略及擴張ノ行動ニ兼出シテ行動ハ侵略的實力ト平和  
維持ノ希望若ト、向ニ益々此ニ衝突ノ先驅ヲ爲シテモ、  
テアトク思ヒ出シク。滿洲ニ於ケル日本ノ行動ニ對スル我が  
政府ノ反對ハ一九三一年(昭和六年)一月七日附當時國務  
長官ノ告ソクニヨリ日本政府宛ト通達及一九三五年  
(昭和十年)三月二十五日附國際聯盟事務局長宛ト  
通達ニモ述ベラレタ。

No. 9

No. 10

カクシテ一九三一年ノ昭和六年ノヨリ一九三三年ノ昭和八年ノ  
三且ツテ日本ガソノ侵略計畫ヲ進メツツアツタ時、アメリカ政  
府ハ條約ト平和的方法ヲ神聖ヲ世界的ニ支持スルコトヲ提唱シテ  
着實ニ前進シツツアツタリタル。

一九三四年五月十六日余ハ日本大使齋藤ト一般的全談ヲ行フ  
ソレハ余ガ日本側ニ彼等ノ最大ノ利益ハ平和政策ニ從フコト  
デアルトコトヲ説得シヤウト努メタ所ノ多クノ全談ノ一ツデアツタ。

三日後ニ余ハ再び日本大使ト全談シタ。全談中大使ハ

日本政府ガ日本ハ重要ノ平和維持ニ固シテ優越セル特殊ナ任  
務ヲ持ツキルトイフ趣旨ヲ數回全談ニ亘リ公ニ提唱シテ居タ

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一九三三年ノ昭和八年ノ一月十日選出大統領ルーズヴェルト  
氏ニ或ル質問ニ對スル回答トシテ、次ノ如キ声明書ヲ出スコトニ  
依ツテ彼ノ國際條約神聖原則ヲ支持ヲ明カニシタ。

「余ハ、アメリカノ外交政策ハ國際條約ノ神聖ヲ支持セ  
ネバナラヌトイフコトヲ以テ造<sub>レ</sub>ンデ明カニスル。コレコソ國家間ノ  
凡テノ關係ガ依ツテ以テ立ツベキ礎石デアル。」

ルーズヴェルト大統領ハ一九三三年三月四日ノ最初ノ就任  
演説ニ於テ彼ハ世界政策ノ領野ニ於テ「國ヲ善隣政  
策」ニ断乎トシテ自己ヲ尊重スシソレガ故ニ他ノ權利ヲモ  
尊重スル隣人ノ自己ノ義務ヲ尊重シ隣人ノ世界ニ於ケル  
又ハソレトノ間、彼ノ協定ノ神聖ヲ尊重スル隣人ニ捧ゲル  
ト曰フ述ベタ。

No. 11

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常套語ヲ繰返シタ。近隣諸國ト領土ニ對シ覇權ヲ振ハ  
ントスルハ日本側ノ意圖デアルトイフ意味ガ明瞭ニ日本側ノ  
常套語ニ合マレテ居ルヲ日本大使ノ注意ヲ喚起シタ。

昭和十一年六月十二日駐英日本大使トノ會談ノ際日本ハ  
東亞ヲ始メ次イデリノ外ニ好ム地域ニ對シ經濟的支配ヲ及  
ボサントシテ半世紀以上ハ該局軍事的支配ノミナリ  
政治的支配ヲモ意味マルトイフハ米國市民ノ受ケタ印象  
デアルトイフタ。余ハ大使ニ平和的且建設的計畫ニ自ラ意  
シハスヲ日本ニ利益ナル點ヲ以テ力ヲ説シタ。

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我々之見此說得々努力ニ天拘ニ日本一九三七年六月  
及那優越ヲ開始シタリ七月十六日合衆國政府平和的立場  
支持ニ對シ凡國科會ニ上凡國際的政策、根本原則、國元  
聲明書ヲ出シタリ。

更一九三七年八月二十三日、聲明書於一九三七年七月十六日、聲明  
書、原則ヲ明白ニ支那ニ於ケル事態ニ適用シタリ。  
余ハ、予變當シテ、合衆國ガ因心不論爭矣、米國國民並  
ニ米國利權ノ保護ト云フ自下問題ヲ逸リ以テモ、予此ト述ベ  
重文ノ戰亂狀態世界、如何ニ部會於テモ凡此國家、因  
心ヲ守リタリ。故ニ余、中國並ニ日本兩政府ニ對シ敵對行為ヲ  
制止スルヲ勸告シタリ。

No. 12

一九三六年、日華十年十月六日米國政府、支那ニ於ケル日本、  
行動、國家同、關係ヲ律スルニ原則ニ合致セズ又九國條  
約、條約アリテ之ヲ以テ「協定」規定、指クモ、トリスヲ聲明シタリ。  
一九三三年十月、合衆國、他十六國、支極東ニ「蔓延」  
遺憾ニ關シテ、終息ヲ促進スル平和的手段ヲ研究スルニシテ  
「ワシントン」ニ於テ開催カレ凡會議ニ參加シタリ。右會議ハ  
一九二二年、九國條約、規定ニ從テ開催カレタリ。右會議ニ參  
加シタル日本政府再三、拒否、調停ト和解ニ依リ關爭

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機。飛蘭言サト北路力ヲ予實上阻害シ。十一月二十四日會議  
シ、開會ヲ停止シ。

一九四十年（昭和十五年）四月十五日日本外相、南洋  
地域殊ニ蘭領東印度日本ノ支配ヲ擴張スルニ根本目的ヲ顯  
シテ聲明ヲ發表シ。四月十七日ニ余、其ノ聲明ヲ知リ、余、國際間  
係ニ於テ蘭領印度、重西性ヲ指摘シ。

余、平和的方法ニ依リテ、蘭印、内政問題ニ干渉シ、又、其ノ現狀  
ヲ變更スルニシテ、蘭印、地域於ケルノミテ、全太平洋地域ニ於  
テ、完全平和無不安全ノヲ、有言フル可キヲ信ス。余、平和  
諸原則ガ太平洋、各域於テラノミテ、世界、各域ニモ適用スル  
可キヲ主張シテ、言ハル。

一九四十年（昭和十五年）終カラ一九四一年（昭和十六年）  
春カケテ余、日本軍部、指導者達カ布陸、數百哩西方ヨリ南  
洋及印度ニ亘リ、全太平洋地域征服ノ使命ニ發足シ、ツナヒ標  
榜ニシテ、心ニ銘記シ、且、其旨、國會議員及余接觸シ、  
其他、衆人説明シテ居テ、日本人、世界新秩序ヲ建設スル  
爲メ、ソットソット合作、武力ヲ以テ立上リ、而シテ、彼等、彼等ガ自己  
ノミテ、僞稱スル世界、半分於ケル新秩序、即チ、全平和的國家  
ヲ參加セシムル力ヲ持ツト思フ。

No. 13

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余一九三三年、昭和八年、カラ余が對日關係ヲ解決スルタメ、  
組織的且堅實ニシテ眞摯ナル努力ヲ開始シテキコトヲ又  
呼ビ米人ニ語シテ居タ。余日本人ニ接近シテ征服、行動ヲヤメル  
様ニ彼等ヲ説服スル何等カノ方途ヲ見出スコトガ余智ヲ出来得  
ルコトカ否カヲ知ラウト試ミテ居タ。我々日本人ニ對シテ政治  
經濟及社會的見地カノ彼等自身ノ將來ヲ考慮スル様強調  
シテ居タリテ也。

大統領が千九百四十一年、昭和六年、一月六日議會ニ對スル演  
說中、米國ノ安全ガ今日程外部ヨリ由々シク脅威ヲ受ケタコト  
ハ言フ無クト公言シタ時彼極東ノ情勢ニ着眼シテキタ。大統領  
領ノ民主主義的生命ノ全型式ガ懣々程多敷ク、獨立國家ニ  
於テ抹殺セシメテ之ヲ侵略者ニ他、大小諸國家ヲ脅カシテ更  
ニ行進ヲ續ケテ居ルト述ベタ。

千九百四十一年、昭和十六年、一月十日下院ノ外交委員會ニ提出  
ノ武裝貸與法案ヲ支持スル陳述中余ハ左ノ如ク述ベタ。

日本ハ西太平洋ノ全域於テ支配的ノ地位ニ自己ヲ確立セトス  
ル意欲ニシテ霸氣滿々ル計畫ニ依リテ最初カラ活動シテ來ルコ  
トハ終始一貫言明自ラシキ。日本ノ指導者達ハ武力ニ依リ其ノ  
地位ヲ獲得維持シ斯クニ自己ノ世界全人口ノ約三分一ヲ愈  
々地域ノ支配者トシテトスル彼等ノ決意ヲ公然ト宣言シタ。

其ノ結果トシテ彼等ハ其ノ地域於テ海上航路及通商路ノ專  
斷的支配ヲ獲得スルコトニ力ヲ用ヒ

余着目トシテ強クシテ征服ノ組織的殘忍且ツ執拗ナル行動  
ニ人類亦直ニ居ルコト並ニ法ヲ遵守スル諸國家ニ依ル公海  
ノ支配ハ西半球ノ安全ノ鍵トナルコトヲ指稱シタ。

No. 14



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自一〇三頁至一〇九頁

一九四一年／昭和十六年／七月以前、会談及び展開

一九四一年／昭和十六年／三月十四日大統領、新日本大使野村吉三郎、衷心喜ぶ、二人の率直な語り合ふことが出来たと云ひました。彼、日米間の関係が悪化しつつあることを指摘し日本、南進や三國同盟加入を云及ぼした。大統領、大使が國務長官と日米関係の重大局面を再検討し率直に協議するが望ましいことをアルト申した。

三月八日日本大使に、最初、長時間、会談を於て余はドイツ及び日本が身勝手な太平洋及び北極大陸を支配せしむる進軍の且様然者達、アラスカ幸福を無にする利益を得んとする活動に對し米國民は、上毛する激昂を示すこと強調した。

三月十四日日本大使、大統領と私に會見した。大統領、我々三國間の問題を武力的衝突を免れしむる解決出来ると言ふ大使、暗示を預成し先少一、年順に日本、意圖三國を疑惑を除去するにアラムト力説した。日本外相松岡氏が華々しく豪語を述べりしに何れも日本、海空軍部隊が漸次泰國、方ニ移動するに於て重大なる關心や疑惑が存するに居たり、と言ひしに及ぶ。





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右提案中三尚日本之三国同盟可通事不其力確言也又  
以之ト、联邦、有ニ際外ト云々以外ニ其語、自ニ公戰或  
日支紛争ニ参加シテ、自國ノ同盟諸國、何カ攻撃ノ受  
傷合ニテ援助又其自本ノ義務ニ就キ行ニ言及スルヲ云々

「十頁」

日本中國ニ提出スル和平條件ハ公キリテ用語ヲ明確ニ規定セ  
ザルコト、之レガ原因ニ吟味スルニシテ、條件ニ一見何モ差障リモ  
ナシトモテ、又尙、假面ヲカケテ規約ヲ示ルコトヨリテ日本、中國、於  
テ、戰略資源、便宜、諸事業、支配ヲ保持シ、又表面上ハ、是  
ニ對シテ、大同所稱、多トシテ無期限、中國全土及内蒙古、於  
テ、廣範圍、要衝地、日本軍、大部隊ヲ駐屯セシムル權利ヲ獲得  
スルコト、之レ事ヲ判明ス。

日本側申公、偏狭ヲ具シ、一方的ニ其構造ヲ我ニ廣範圍、解決  
成ラズ可能性、見出スルコト、其發見トシテ、日本、取テクニ、  
解決、此國、則テ、互ニ此、原則ニ一致スル線、沿テ、全太平洋域、  
包括スルモノトシテ、

五月十日日本外相松岡氏、見ルニ「方便對談、際、近衛首相」  
云々、日本、南方進出、其管平和の手段ニ見テ、遂行スル事トシテ、

No. 17

決意ヲト云フガ同代ノ事態ガシラ不可能ナラニテ限リト意味深  
長ト言フ附加ス。

Doc. 2007 B

事態トイフハ何ヲ意味シキルカト大使、問ニ答テ、松岡  
氏ハ「イギリス軍ハ「集結」他「イギリス側對策」言及ス。大使斯  
ル對策ハ何モ防衛的ナモノナラトシテ外相「日本國民」彼「シラ」般  
對策ヲ政府「何等」行動ヲ取ル事ヲ強ヒル挑発的ナモノナラト見  
做シキルト答テ。

元四年五月二十七日「ルーズベルト大統領」國家的超非常時ト事ヲ  
宣言同日「ト」演説「我々民主主義擁護策」總テ我國保全ヲ  
計ル事基キキル「ルーズベルト」言明テ。大統領「シラ」「ガ」勝利  
ヲ多場合ニ發生スルト思ハル事態就テ警告テ。大統領ト余ハ  
「宣言」ガ「シラ」「シ」ニテ「日本軍部將官」達ニテ留意サシク事ヲ確信  
シキル。五月十八日私ハ「我々」非武「合談」カラ「日本」交渉ニ入ル前ニ「中國政  
府」胸襟ヲ開キ「申出」ニ包含セシキル「般事項」関テ「語」合シテ考  
ヘキルト「日本大使」話テ。

引續キ三週間、問ニ種々「シラ」明カニ「噲」違ヒラ「シラ」為ニ何  
因トク會談ガ行ヒテ。我々「練」選ニ「次」諸点ニ関スル「我國」態  
度ヲ説明シテ。即チ「合衆國」自衛上「歐洲戰爭」捲込ニテ場合ニ於  
ケル「日本」對「樞軸」關係ヲ明カニスル事、必要也。他國「國內問題」對  
スル「不干涉原則」適用及「日本軍」中國領土カラ「撤退」中國及「他  
太平洋諸地域」ニ於ル「通商關係」平等原則、適用及「太平洋」於  
ル「日本」平和意圖ヲ確信スベキ事等「我國」ガ亦「シラ」平和手  
段トテ物ヲ云フ様ニ「廣汎圍」ニ「協定」キルト「シラ」「シラ」協調テ。

No. 18

日本側ハ五月十二日「彼等」申出ニ對スル完全ナル回答ヲ強要シ  
キル。シテ六月二十日大使「日本側」申出ニ對スル「願」再成案「形式」

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我國、意向が甚しき、以て其成案ニシテ合衆國が自衛上歐洲戰ヲ引  
 込レテ日本、合衆國ニ對シテ行動ヲ起スル事ニ付、事ヲ引  
 キテセル爲、方法ヲ提議サレテ居ル。

中國、亦日本軍駐屯、問題及中國ト日本、間、經濟協調、問題  
 ノ満足ナル解決ヲ成シトセル爲、尙一層、努力ヲ爲サレテ居ルニ付、  
 提言サレタ。又合衆國が中國政府ニ對スル援助ヲ中止スル意圖ヲ  
 示シ、種々提言、除去サレテ居タ、此種々提言サレタ、變更、明確化  
 爲、至、我々分述スル條則ト提言サレタ解決案トヲ致サレル爲、  
 之モ、示シタ。

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IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT  
CENTRAL LIAISON OFFICETO : GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER  
FOR THE ALLIED POWERS.

FROM : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo

SUBJECT : Personnel who Attended the GOZENKAIGI.

C.L.O. No. 2781(PP)

- 10 June 1946

1. Reference: Memorandum of Colonel C. S. Myers, dated 23 May 1946, subject as above.

2. Official records of the GOZENKAIGI consisted of the documents deciding to hold the Conference and bills to be put before the Conference. There were no records showing the details of the Conferences (the proceedings of the Conference, etc.)

3. The above-mentioned records of the GOZENKAIGI were held in custody of the Cabinet Secretariat, but they were destroyed by air-raid fire on the night of 25-26 May 1945.

4. Premier, Foreign Minister, War Minister, Navy Minister, Chief of Army General Staff and Chief of Naval General Staff were always included among those who attended the Conference. It was an established usage with President of the Privy Council to attend the Conference. In addition to the above, Finance Minister, President of the Planning Board and certain Minister attended the Conference continuously during a specified period, and other Cabinet Ministers were asked, from time to time, to attend the Conferences in case their presence was felt necessary. As secretaries of the Conference, Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, Director of Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry and Director of Military Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry attended the Conference for the purpose of giving explanations to the bills. In most cases Vice-Chief of Army General Staff and Vice-Chief of Naval General Staff were attendants of the Conference.

5. According to the investigation those persons whose names are listed in the enclosure attended the respective Conferences held on the following dates:

2 July 1941  
6 Sep. 1941  
5 Nov. 1941  
1 Dec. 1941

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

/s/ S. Iguchi  
S. IGUCHI  
Director of General Affairs  
Central Liaison Office

Enclosure: 3 copies of a report as indicated in Para. 5 above.

-----

Attendants of the GOZENKAIGI

I	2 JULY 1941	
	KONOE .	Prime Minister
	MATSUOKA	Foreign Minister
	TOJO	War Minister
	OIKAWA	Navy Minister
	KAWADA	Finance Minister
	SUZUKI	President of Planning Board
	HIRANUMA	Home Minister
	SUGIYAMA	Chief of Army General Staff



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	SUZUKI	President of Planning Board
	HIRANUMA	Home Minister
	SUGIYAMA	Chief of Army General Staff

NAGANO	Chief of Naval General Staff
TOMITA	Chief Secretary of the Cabinet
OKA	Director of Military Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry
TSUKADA	Vice-Chief of Army General Staff
FONDO	Vice-Chief of Naval General Staff
HARA	President of the Privy Council

II 6 SEPTEMBER 1941

KONOE	Prime Minister
TOYODA	Foreign Minister
TOJO	War Minister
OIKAWA	Navy Minister
OGURA	Finance Minister
SUZUKI	President of Planning Board
TANABE	Home Minister
SUGIYAMA	Chief of Army General Staff
NAGANO	Chief of Naval General Staff
TOMITA	Chief Secretary of the Cabinet
MUTO	Director of Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry
OKA	Director of Military Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry

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TSUKADA	Vice Chief of Army General Staff
ITO	Vice-Chief of Naval General Staff
HARA	President of the Privy Council

III 5 NOVEMBER 1941

TOJO	Prime Minister and War Minister Concurrently
TOGO	Foreign Minister
SHIMADA	Navy Minister
KAYA	Finance Minister
SUZUKI	President of Planning Board
SUCIYAMA	Chief of Army General Staff
NAGANO	Chief of Naval General Staff
HOSHINO	Chief Secretary of the Cabinet
MUTO	Director of Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry
OKA	Director of Military Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry
TSUKADA	Vice-Chief of Army General Staff
ITO	Vice-Chief of Naval General Staff
HARA	President of the Privy Council

IIII 1 DECEMBER 1941

TOJO	Prime Minister and War Minister Concurrently
TOGO	Foreign Minister
SHIMADA	Navy Minister
KAYA	Finance Minister
SUZUKI	President of Planning Board
IWAMURA	Justice Minister
HASHIDA	Education Minister
INO	Agriculture Minister
KISHI	Commerce Minister
TERASHIMA	Communication Minister
KOIZUMI	Welfare Minister
SUGIYAMA	Chief of Army General Staff
NAGANO	Chief of Naval General Staff
HOSHINO	Chief Secretary of the Cabinet
MUTO	Director of Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry
OKA	Director of Military Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry
TANABE	Vice-Chief of Army General Staff
ITO	Vice-Chief of Naval General Staff
HARA	President of Privy Council

EX. # 1108

Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 2 July 1941

2 July: (Wed) Cloudy

Mr. ANIC, Chief of Kyoto Prefecture, visited me at 9 A.M., and we had a talk.

At 10 A.M., Imperial Conference was held in the Imperial Palace, and the national policy to cope with the new situation accompanying the outbreak of the Russo-German War was decided.

At 12.20, Finance Minister KAWADA came to my office and explained about the permission for the threefold increase of loan to the WANG Government.  
*Loan of three hundred million yen.*

At 1 P.M. Prince KONOYE called me at my officeroom, and we talked. He said that he found it difficult to understand the true intention of Foreign Minister MATSUOKA.

From 2 to 3 P.M., was received in audience by the Emperor, and was told about the progress of the Imperial Conference. At 3:20 P.M., made arrangements with the chief aide-de-camp for the establishment of the Imperial General Headquarters within the Imperial Court and for the Imperial visit to N.Y.

At 3:30 P.M. Mr. Sakichi Shimozone came to my office and we had a talk.

At 7:30 P.M. Mr. HISATAKA HIRASE visited me and we had a talk.

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"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 5 July 41"

.....Foreign Minister MATSUOKA proceeded to the Palace at 2 p.m., and we talked after his withdrawal from the Imperial presence. He said that information of the diplomatic parley between France and Japan relative to the Japanese Army's entry into French Indo-China seemed to have leaked out, for Ambassador CRAIGIE had lodged a protest with us through Mr. OHASHI, Vice Foreign Minister, saying that if the understanding reached between France and Japan were true, England would consider it a serious problem. Therefore the negotiations which had been originally scheduled to start today or thereabout were decided to be postponed for another five days in order to watch necessary developments.

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 15 July 41"

MATSUDAIRA came from Tokyo at eight a.m. to report on the outcome of his meeting with Premier KONOYE. There still remained a certain vagueness about Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's attitude towards the proposal formula for a Japan-American understanding. Under the circumstances, up to yesterday the Premier was of the opinion that should the Foreign Minister agree to the formula prepared by the Director of Military Affairs and the Director of Naval Affairs, with a few alterations he would push the policy as it was. Although the Foreign Minister had no objection to the formula, he insisted on giving instructions to Ambassador NOMURA in Washington to the effect that the Government would reject the oral statement of Mr. Cordell Hull, as it was of a disgraceful nature for Japan. After that he said that he would wire a compromise formula to Admiral Kichisaburo NOMURA. But Prince KONOYE was of the opinion that our formula should be wired at the same time, because if we followed MATSUOKA's idea, there would be a possibility that America might take it as our intention to discontinue the negotiations. Advisor SAITO advised that since it could be done by the Ambassador as deemed best, how about carrying it on according to the Foreign Minister's view? But the Premier contradicted him and sent him to Mr. MATSUOKA in order to persuade him to agree with the Premier's opinion. Such was the position about 10:30 yesterday evening. At 1:30 this morning Prince KONOYE telephoned me to say that he had waited long for MATSUOKA's answer in vain, so he had sent Director TERAZAKI to Mr. MATSUOKA to hold an enquiry into the circumstances. It became clear that he had sent his instructions to NOMURA by himself and not through the medium of the competent director, and that he intended to call on me at Hayama to work out remedial measures. I had a conference with the chief secretary regarding policy in the event of the expected resignation en bloc of the Cabinet. At this time when the tension prevailing over the people regarding the present political situation was so strong that even some higher schools closed lest disturbances should arise an overall political change for some unknown reason should be avoided by all means. For this purpose we should try everything possible to obtain, first of all, the resignation of the Foreign Minister. In the case of failure of our effort to make the Foreign Minister resign, resulting in the resignation 'en bloc' of the Cabinet, we resolved to prevail upon the Emperor to issue an Imperial command to Prince KONOYE to form a new Cabinet in order to tide over the difficult political situation.



I went to my office at 11 a.m. I was received in audience by the Emperor from 1:35 p.m. to 2 p.m. to report on the above circumstances. Prince KONOYE came to see me from Tokyo at 3 p.m. We had a talk until 4:20 p.m. What I heard from the Premier was almost the same as the information I had received from the Chief Secretary.

I thought it was advisable to urge Mr. MATSUOKA's resignation to avoid a change of Cabinet, but the Premier disagreed with me saying that if this were done Mr. MATSUOKA and his party would make propaganda to the effect that the cause which had compelled his resignation was nothing but pressure on the part of the U.S.A. upon our Government.

Q. # 1116

Doc. No. 16327 (61)

Page 1

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 16 July 41"

At 4 p.m. Marquis MATSUDAIRA telephoned me to say that the resignation 'en bloc' of the cabinet had been decided at a special Cabinet meeting. I had my audience with the Emperor from 4:10 p.m. to 4:20 p.m. Prince KONOYE tendered the general resignation of his Ministry at 9 p.m. I proceeded to the Palace in response to a summons from His Majesty to receive an Imperial order as to the incoming Cabinet as follows: "As the Premier has tendered the general resignation of his Ministry, we have ordered the Lord Chamberlain to invite the President of the Privy Council and the ex-Premiers to gather at the Palace and to ask their opinions in order to reply to our question as to who was the suitable person for the post of Premier in the succeeding Cabinet." I talked with the Chief Secretary to arrange tomorrow's procedure and went back home at 10:30 p.m.

Q 1117

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 17 July 41"

I left for Tokyo by train, leaving at 8:44 a.m. and proceeded to my office. I met HARA, President of the Privy Council, WAKATSUKI, OKADA, ABE, YONAI, HAYASHI and HIROTA at 1 p.m. Mr. KANROJI, Vice Lord Chamberlain, delivered an Imperial message, and then I expressed my opinion as follows:

"The Emperor has ordered me to gather your opinions before I make a reply to the Throne regarding the Premier of the succeeding Cabinet. I, therefore, would like to have your frank opinions on this matter as I had on a previous occasion. Of course as you all know this is not a formal conference and no resolutions will be passed, but I should like to have a heart-to-heart talk in a friendly atmosphere. Our utterances in this place are expected to be kept confidential."

A copy of the Premier's resignation was circulated for reference.

WAKATSUKI questioned me as to the purpose of the resignation and the diplomatic problems (i.e. the clash of opinions between the Premier and Foreign Minister). ABE stressed the necessity of having Prince KONOYE as Premier; OKADA recommended Prince KONOYE, saying that no other person could exercise general control over both the Army and political circles; HAYASHI held the same opinion as ABE and OKADA; HARA did not differ from the above-mentioned; HIROTA laid stress upon the reinforcement of G.H.Q. and the formation of a military Cabinet, but he consented to the opinion of the rest upon my explanation of the establishment of G.H.Q. YONAI said that Prince KONOYE was the most suitable man to cope with the present difficulty. WAKATSUKI supported Prince KONOYE though his attitude was not positive. We recommended Prince KONOYE unanimously and closed our meeting at 2 p.m. The Emperor and Empress returned to Tokyo from their Hayama Villa. I visited the Emperor from 3:30 p.m. to 4:10 p.m. to report on the progress of our meeting, while the Lord Chamberlain telephoned to Prince KONOYE to request his presence at the Palace. At 5:05 p.m. Prince KONOYE proceeded to the Palace to receive the Imperial command to form a cabinet. OHASHI, Vice Foreign Minister, visited me at 5:50 p.m. to explain the draft understanding between the U.S.A. and this country.

EX 1134

Document No. 1637(67)

Page 1

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 5 Sept 41"

September 5th, 1941 - (Extract)

..... At 4.30 p.m. the Premier proceeded to the Palace and submitted to the Throne a plan relative to the holding of a Council in the Imperial presence. The Premier said that as the Emperor asked many questions as to our policy towards U.S.A. from the point of view of war strategy, he had advised the Emperor to summon the Chief of General Staff and the Chief of the Naval General Staff. I, therefore, proceeded to the Palace to advise the Emperor to follow the Premier's advice. I requested Aide-camp YOKOYAMA to call the Chief of the General Staff, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, and the Premier to the Palace. At 6 p.m. they were granted an audience by the Emperor to answer the Imperial questions.

Q # 1135

Document No. 1632W(68)

Page 1

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 6 Sept 41"

September 6th, 1941 - (Extract)

.....From 9.40 to 9.55 a.m. I visited the Emperor in response to the Imperial summons. He said that he would like to ask some questions at the Conference in his presence. Then I advised His Majesty that since HARA, the President of the Privy Council, would ask important questions on His Majesty's behalf, the Emperor should only give a warning in conclusion that the Supreme War Command should exert every effort in order to bring about a diplomatic success inasmuch as the present decision was such an important one that it might lead to a war in which our national fortunes would be staked. I visited the Emperor again from 1.10 p.m. to 1.30 p.m. and he acquainted me with the progress of the <sup>Imperial Council</sup> ~~Council in the Imperial presence~~. I understood that the Supreme War Command simply did not answer the questions put by <sup>HARA</sup> the President of the Privy Council concerning diplomatic moves. At the close of the meeting, the Emperor declared it was regrettable that the Supreme War Command did not give any reply. Also quoting the Emperor Meiji's poem entitled "The Sea on All Four Sides", His Majesty emphasized that wholehearted efforts should be made in the conduct of diplomatic negotiations with the United States. <sup>But</sup> ~~He added~~ that the Navy Minister made an answer to HARA's questions.

Entry from Marquis KIDO'S Diary, 15 Oct 41October 15th, 1941 (Full)

YAKATA visited me at 9 a.m. At 9.30 a.m. Lieut.-General SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board, visited me to deliver War Minister TOJO's message, the purport of which is as follows: If the Premier would not change his mind, the general resignation of the Cabinet would be unavoidable. And as for the succeeding premier, although the War Minister did not mention his name, he made it essential that the next Premier should be able to bring the Army and the Navy together, and follow the Imperial will. When one considered this point, it seemed very difficult to find a suitable person among ordinary Japanese subjects. He mentioned Prince HIGASHI-KUNI as a possibility for the next Premier. To this I answered that we should be very careful as it was a matter concerned with the Imperial family, and if we had to ask the Prince's acceptance of the premiership, a common policy between the Army and the Navy should be worked out beforehand; the establishment of an independent policy would take precedence of all other questions. I asked if the War Minister had any accurate forecast to make on this point.

I went to the office at 11 a.m. Prince KONOYE visited me to ask my opinion regarding the HIGASHIKUNI cabinet. I answered that it was still under consideration. I requested MATSUDAIRA, Chief Secretary, to study the procedure of the materialisation of the HIGASHIKUNI plan. I visited the Emperor from 1.15 p.m. to 2 p.m. to report upon the pressing political situation. Premier KONOYE visited me at 4 p.m. to say that he could not hold his Premiership any longer, for the breach with the War Minister was becoming wider every day until at last the War Minister gave vent to his discontent saying that he did not like to hold any further conversation with the Premier, as he was not sure if he could stifle his feelings. Finally he asked my opinion regarding the proposed HIGASHIKUNI Cabinet, so I told him that I did not know whether the War Minister had changed his opinion in order to effect a compromise with the Navy or whether he intended to put the Prince's shoulder to the wheel, and I had yet to know the real intentions of the War Minister.

I telephoned to the President of the Planning Board to request him to visit me. I visited the Minister of the Imperial Household Department to talk about the HIGASHIKUNI Cabinet plan. The Minister seemed astonished and strongly objected to this plan. At 4.30 p.m. SUZUKI,

President of the Planning Board, visited me. I asked him as to the real meaning of the War Minister's intentions, but in vain. I urged him to supply me with a definite report on this matter. The Premier, who joined our conversation on his withdrawal from the presence of the Emperor, said that the Emperor had not shown any particular objection to the HIGASHIKUNI Cabinet as it might be said to be the outcome of necessity, not of choice.

I talked with the Premier until 8.30 p.m. regarding the political situation. At night SUZUKI telephoned to report on the result of his conversation with War Minister TOJO. According to his report, TOJO's purpose was to establish harmony between the Army and the Navy by the influence of the Prince. So I objected to the plan. The Premier also telephoned me to say that he wanted to secure an informal consent of Prince HIGASHIKUNI. I answered that it would be too early to do so, though I had no objection to him so long as his action was in his capacity as Premier. At midnight the Premier sent me a report saying that Prince HIGASHIKUNI had asked for a few days consideration on his part and a meeting with War Minister and the Home Minister. From 5.35 a.m. to 5.50 a.m. I made a report to the Throne concerning Prince Konoye's talk and asked the Imperial opinion as to the matter.

E. # 1157

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIOD's Diary, 16 Oct 41"

At 8:30 a.m. President SUZUKI visited me, and we discussed the Prince's Cabinet. The reasons I gave him for opposing the Prince's Cabinet are as follows:

1. The formation of a Prince's Cabinet should be carried out only when unavoidable, for example, when, even if the Army and Navy agree, force of circumstance makes it necessary to have a Prince of the blood solve their difficulties.

2. The difficulties which were discussed last night have not been solved, and the Prince should not be expected to overcome them.

3. In a way the formation of this Prince's Cabinet would indicate that we lacked a suitable person among our subjects, and a great problem would be created if war with the U.S.A. were to break out when such a Cabinet existed. There were important reasons why even Prince Konoze was prevented from carrying out the policies decided at Councils in the Imperial presence, and if we ask a member of the Imperial House to assume a responsibility he cannot fulfil, it would cause the Imperial House to become an object of public hatred.

At 3:00 p.m. War Minister TOJO called on me to report on the pressing political situation. I opposed his idea of the Prince's Cabinet for the same reasons which I had made clear to SUZUKI. I urged the revision of the resolution of the Council in the Imperial presence, and a unified policy for the Army and the Navy, two fundamental factors without which no national progress could be expected.

At 4 p.m. Prince KONOYE telephoned to say that the Cabinet was going to resign 'en bloc'. I was astonished by the suddenness of this announcement. I visited the Emperor at 4 p.m. to report upon the general resignation of the KONOYE Cabinet. At 5 p.m. Prince KONOYE tendered the Cabinet Ministers' resignations to the Throne. I was received in audience by the Emperor from 5:30 p.m. to 5:45 p.m. to answer his questions regarding the succeeding Cabinet.

*He pointed out that the decisions made at the Imperial Conference on Sept. 6th were rather careless, and I urged --*



Q# 1154-52  
"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 17 Oct 41"

At 11 a.m. Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA visited me to make arrangements for a senior statesmen's conference. It was held from 1:10 p.m. to 3:45 p.m. in the west ante-chamber of the Palace. Those present were Viscount KIYOURA (92 years old), Mr. WAKATSUKI, Admiral OKADA, General HAYASHI, Mr. HIROTA, General ABE, Admiral YONAI, all ex-Premiers and President of the Privy Council HARA. I explained the situation of the general resignation. Mr. WAKATSUKI recommended General UGAKI as the succeeding Premier, and General HAYASHI discussed the HIGASHIKUNI Cabinet.

I asserted that the most important things were the revision of the decision of the last Council in the Imperial presence and the unity of opinion between the Army and Navy. I suggested a TOJO Cabinet as a solution of these problems, with TOJO as Premier and War Minister, even though he is on military service. I met no objection to my proposal, Mr. HIROTA, General ABE, and Mr. HARA, giving me positive approval. The meeting broke up at 4 p.m. I reported to the Emperor the details of the progress of the ex-Premiers Conference and talked with him until 4:15 p.m. The War Minister proceeded to the Palace at the request of the Emperor to receive the Imperial Order for the formation of a new Cabinet. This was followed by the visit of Navy Minister OIKAWA to whom the Emperor gave advice to the effect that the unity of opinions between the Army and the Navy were very desirable. I passed on to them in an ante-room the following message as ordered by the Emperor. In deciding the fundamental policy of our country we need not necessarily follow the decisions of the Council in the Imperial presence on the 6th of September, but should study carefully conditions both at home and abroad.

## Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 18 October

18 October (Saturday)

Cloudy and rainy.

I proceeded to the palace at 9 a.m. and was received in audience by the Emperor at 9:15 to present a memorial to the throne from Prince KAMIN, to which the Emperor gave his sanction. The memorial was concerned with War Minister TOJO's remaining on active service and with his promotion to full general.

Went to Yasukuni Shrine at 10 and attended the Imperial worship. Went to my office at 1 p.m. and was at once received in audience to explain the circumstances under which War Minister TOJO is forming a cabinet.

War Minister TOJO was received in audience at 3 and presented the list of his cabinet members.

The Emperor summoned me and inquired about the cabinet members.

The investiture of the new Premier was conducted by the Emperor at 4.

Came home at 5.

Ex. # 1156

Doc. No. 16327(82)

Page 1

"Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 20 Oct 41"

October 20th, 1941

"I received gracious words from His Majesty on account of my efforts in connection with the cabinet change. I was truly moved.

"I told His Majesty that one mistaken step taken in the present cabinet change might have inadvertently plunged us into war. After careful consideration I believe this to be the only way of giving a new turn to the situation and had thus recommended it. His Majesty understood me well replying 'As it is said you know, -- 'He who will not go into the tiger's den will not get the tiger cub.'

"I was impressed."

Ex #1149

Doc. No. 1632W (78)

page 1.

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 13 Oct 41"

October 13th, 1941 (Extract)

.....SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board, visited me at 8 p.m. to talk about his political views which might contribute in some way to the making of a new turn in our political condition. I expressed my opinion to him. Our conclusion of the talk was this: The Premier should make an effort to promote mutual understanding with the War and Navy Ministers.

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's  
Diary, 29 November 1941"

From 2 p.m. to 3 p.m. the Emperor asked Senior Statesmen's opinions concerning the present political situation.

The Emperor remarked on the difficult times we were going through.

Baron WAKATSUKI said that we were equal to a prolonged war with the U.S.A. in spiritual power, but regarding material power we must make a careful study.

Admiral OKADA said that he had grave doubts as to our supply capacity in regard to war materials, and thought the Government's statement about this matter to date was quite incomplete.

Baron HIRANUMA agreed with Mr. WAKATSUKI's opinion as regards the spiritual strength of the Japanese nation, and urged further measures to awaken patriotic sentiment.

Prince KONOYE stated that it was quite regrettable that our negotiations were going to be a failure in spite of our strenuous efforts since last April. But he was of the opinion that there would be no need to resort to a hasty war just because of the rupture of the negotiations as we might be able to reach a wise solution in some way or other, while continuing our struggle against difficulties.

Admiral YONAI said that he could not base his opinion on definite data, but it was his desire that we should be careful not to lose what little we possess by trying to avoid becoming poorer by inches.

Mr. HIROTA said that although our policy had been to prevent Anglo-American interference in the China Incident, things had reached their present situation. We should be able to seize an opportunity to solve the pending problems between the two countries even after the commencement of hostilities, if we were sincere enough in our diplomatic efforts.

General HAYASHI stated that as he had no data for his opinion, he could do nothing but believe the decisions of the Imperial Headquarters and the Government.

General ABE said that according to the Government statement the negotiations had come to a deadlock in spite of strenuous efforts on our part. He was sure that the Government had studied the world political situation from various angles with laborious minuteness, for which we were thankful. But it would be quite necessary to pay much more attention to the attitude of the Chinese people than to the war with the U.S.A., otherwise we would lose the fruits of victory in the Chinese Incident.

Mr. WAKATSUKI said that the war should be fought to the last, even if there was no chance to win, if it was a defensive one for the cause of our national existence and self-defence, but we should avoid the war if we intended to realise our ideals such as "the Asiatic Co-prosperity Sphere" or "the stabilising of power in Asia", because such a war would be very dangerous.

Document No. 1632W(87)

Page 1.

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's  
Diary, 30 November 1941"

I visited the Emperor at 3.30 p.m. in response to his request. He said that Prince TAKAMATSU had told him that the Navy's hands were full and it appeared that he wished to avoid war, but did not know what to do. I advised the Emperor to ask the opinions of the Navy Minister, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, and the Premier, for the situation was really grave. We could not be too prudent in the matter. At 6.35 p.m. I again visited the Emperor in response to his request. He said that he had ordered the Premier to act according to program on account of the affirmative answers of the Navy Minister and the Chief of the Navy General Staff concerning the question as to the success of the war.

Item 24

From: Tokyo  
To: Berlin  
November 30, 1941  
Purple

#936 (Strictly Secret) (To be handled in Government Code) (Part 1 of 2)  
(Secret outside the Department)

1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these negotiations.

2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested, (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.

Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East, that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance. As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.

ARMY

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SECRET

Trans. 12/1/41 (NR)

TOP SECRET

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Doc. No. 2593D (22)

Page 2

Item 24

From: Tokyo  
To: Berlin  
November 30, 1941.  
Purple.

#986. (Part 2 of 2)

3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China -- they do so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy.

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Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

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TOP SECRET

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE  
Colonel, G.S.C.

Ex. #1276

Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 6 Jan 44

January 6th, 1944.

*at 10:00 a.m.*

Went to my office at 10:00 a.m. and had a talk with Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA concerning the fate of Germany and measures we must take thereafter regarding the situation, and asked him to investigate the subject.

I am wondering during the beginning of this year about the progress of the war during the coming year. No matter what is said, the fate of our ally, Germany, is the most important problem. If she has reserve power great enough to fight through the year and to assume the initiative, it will relieve the situation but if, on the contrary, she should be defeated during the coming year, it will be critical for our country. Although I am not wishing for such a thing to occur, it is necessary to prepare for that emergency.

First, we must consider whether we should take measures to bring the war to an end, in case Germany is beaten or surrenders unconditionally. In that case Japan should, of course, take action based on decisions independently arrived at relating to the situation at the time. It is reasonable to suppose that the enemy will intensify their political offensives on us. Therefore, we must take greatest care to devise counter policies lest traitors like Badoglio make their appearance in large numbers even within the country.

The continuance of TOJO's Cabinet will no doubt become quite difficult in such an event and upon its retirement, the big problem will be whether the mere recommendation of a successor to the Throne through the elder statesmen's council as usual, will be enough or not. If things get to such a pass it is a problem worthy of investigation whether or not the council should further determine beforehand an outline of the diplomatic course Japan should follow and recommend the succeeding cabinet to undertake the execution of the policy.

Secondly, under such a situation, I believe that there will be no hope in setting up such a plan unless it includes very considerable concessions on our part. As is clear in the Imperial proclamation of war the aim of the Greater East Asia War from the beginning was the breaking down of the so-called encirclement by the ABCD. We can regard it as a conclusion for the time being if this object is accomplished. From that point of view, it is possible to outline the plan as follows:

1. The problems of the Pacific Ocean shall be dealt with by the principal nations bordering that Ocean.
2. Japan, U.S.S.R., China, U.S.A. and Great Britain shall organise a commission.
3. The regions occupied by Japan and the islands in the Pacific Ocean shall be a non-fortified zone.
4. With the exception of Manchuria, the independent nations other than the principal nations in those regions, shall be made permanent neutral countries similar to Switzerland. The remaining occupied regions shall be placed under the administration of a joint commission composed of the principal nations.
5. The economic policies in the regions should, in principle, be based on freedom, reciprocity and equal opportunity.

When and how the plan is to be proposed is a matter which should be studied most carefully. The time should not coincide with the collapse of Germany but should be prior to the time when U.S.A., Great Britain and U.S.S.R. unite in their hostility against Japan. Measures may be taken with the U.S.S.R. as the go-between.

The plan may at a glance be considered as too conciliatory and weak-kneed, but looking over the future trend of the world, I believe we must nurture and cultivate our actual powers within the state for about one century to come, due to the experience gained as a result of the China Incident and the German-Soviet war to the development of aircraft, and to the actual strength of U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. and moreover in view of the terrible attrition of our national power.

If this judgment is correct; we should carefully avoid being isolated and attacked all at once by the nations of the world as a coloured race, and from this point of view, I believe the best way for us is to maintain cooperation against Anglo-Saxon America and Britain with Soviet Russia and China which are essentially oriental, prepare our organization to meet the changing circumstances, and quietly save our real strength.

Ex. # 1217

Entry for 17 July 1944 from KIDO's Diary

17 July (Monday) clear

At 12.20 A.M. Premier TOJO came to my house and explained the Cabinet policy as is given in the separate paper. I acknowledged it.

At 8 Mr. HIROSE called, and I listened to information from all quarters.

Received in audience from 9.40 to 10.20. I reported to the Throne on the policy which Premier TOJO talked about.

At 10.30 Minister of State, KISHI, came to the office. He told me that he had been requested to resign by Premier TOJO, and he asked me for advice as to deciding how he should move. He said that he had come to me for talk advice after obtaining the Premier's consent. At 11.30, as is given in the separate paper, Chief of the Imperial Guards, NAKAMURA came to the office. At 2 o'clock, Premier TOJO came to the office after his audience with the Emperor. Talked to me about appointing General UMEZU as Chief of the Army General Staff.

Received in audience from 2.40 to 2.50. Went to the official residence at 3 o'clock, and had a talk with Mr. HIROSE and with Prince KONOYE at 4. Came home late in the afternoon. Received "SHINTAIJITSU" /T.N. Type of physical culture remedy./ from Mr. TAKAHASHI. At 8, WADA came. Had a talk with him. Admiral OKADA came at 9.30.

At 9.30 P.M. on 17 July, 1944, Admiral Keisuke OKADA called and talked to me as follows:

1. A Senior Statesmen's council was held at Baron HIRANUMA's house today.

1. Those who attended were Messrs. WAKATSUKI, OKADA, HIRANUMA, HIROTA, ABE, KONOYE and YONAI.

1. Mr. WAKATSUKI is made chairman, and he begins to talk first. This Cabinet has completely lost the sympathy of the public; and he thinks that the present situation is really serious. He asks for opinions.

1. YONAI: The matter /T.N. portion illegible/ has been under discussion since the 13th, and after careful

consideration, I have written declining the offer. As OKA, Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau came and talked to me about the general opinion of the Navy and all, I replied that it would be reasonable for me to be returned to active service again and serve as Supreme War Councillor or in any other capacity; but that even if I entered the Cabinet as Minister of State I could be of little service, and that it would not be the thing to do. I have no intention of joining the Cabinet.

ABE: Although the people are completely out of sympathy with this Cabinet, the situation would become more difficult if it were replaced by a still weaker Cabinet. We must think about such points. As President of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, I must decide my attitude according to the attitude of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society.

HIRAFUMA: Whether the Cabinet is overthrown or not, or whether the next Cabinet will be a weak one or not is not the point. The point is that we are really concerned about our country, and we must make up our minds to do something.

HIROTA: I also was asked to help by KARASAWA who talked about diplomatic policy vis a vis the Soviet Union, but no one has talked to me since then. Even if I were asked to, I should not join the Cabinet.

Questions and answers were exchanged between OKADA and ABE over the question of the Navy. Finally the following decision was made and the meeting adjourned.

Accordingly, I asked him /T.N. OKADA/ if I might understand by the above talk that I have been given information concerning the gathering of the senior statesmen, that is, if I might take it that he had come with the intention of keeping contact, and as he replied in the affirmative, I acknowledged that such was the case. I asked him because I thought that I should have to give careful consideration, if he intended to ask me to report it to the Emperor.

"In order to find our way through the current difficult situation, it is necessary to renew the popular mind. All people must rally and cooperate to build a powerful national Cabinet which will surge forward unswervingly. A partial reorganization of the cabinet will not be of any use."

At 12.20 on 17 July, 1944, Premier TOJO called and explained the Cabinet policy which may be summed up as follows:

"As we are told of the Emperor's intention regarding the three points to which the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal called attention some time ago, we have decided to carry out the consolidation of the Supreme Command as well as a change of Navy Ministers. I had a talk with the candidate for Navy Minister, Admiral Naokuni NOMURA, tonight, and we agreed."

"When we decided our policy at first, we were not thinking of the question of the Supreme Command. But things have reached a point where this has had to be taken into consideration because of the general situation, since it was feared that a state might arise in which there would be insufficient unity between Army and Navy. From this point of view, we have changed our policy on reorganization of Cabinet and other problems to minimum."

"Reinforcement of Headquarters. The Liaison Conference which has been inclined to be businesslike and has not been made use of to the fullest extent, shall be renovated and strengthened. It shall consist of two ministers of state of the Premier class (ABE and YONAI considered) besides both Chiefs of Staff and the Minister of War and Navy, Munitions, Finance and the Foreign Minister."

Cabinet reorganization.

"In order to strengthen the air force, FUJIWARA shall serve full time as Minister of Munitions, and, therefore, we request retirement of Mr. KISFI as Minister of State. MAEDA or SHIMADA shall be appointed Welfare Minister in order to have a member of the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society in the Cabinet. General ABE and Admiral YONAI will be asked to join the Cabinet as Ministers of State in order to reinforce the Imperial Headquarters."

In connection with the Senior Statesmen:

"We are prepared to consider the revival of the Cabinet Advisory system, if it is desired by the Senior Statesmen. Hereafter, the Cabinet members shall always keep close contact with the Senior Statesmen and fully reflect their intentions."

In connection with the Imperial Rule Assistance  
Political Society:

"The advisory set-up shall be divided into two  
departments, technical and political, and five advisors  
shall be appointed from among the members of the House  
of Peers and the House of Representatives."



as well as among neutral powers. Therefore, such a step must be avoided by all means.

After asking the Emperor to summon the Grand Chamberlain and to order him to make arrangements for summoning General KOISO, I withdrew.

I was summoned and was received in audience from 10:10 to 10:25 p.m. The Emperor revealed to me his impression that judging from the line-up at the installation ceremony, TOJO might resume the post of War Minister after all and asked me if I didn't think so. I replied that I feared that it would have an unfavorable effect on the political situation.

It was past eleven when I returned home and at last had dinner.

\* \* \*

E. # 1125  
5

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 31 July 41"

.....From 10:15 a.m. to 11 a.m. I was received in audience by the Emperor, and His Majesty was pleased to inform me about the report of Admiral NAGANO, Chief of Naval General Staff, in reply to The Imperial question regarding our policy toward the U.S.A. as follows:

1. His opinion regarding war was the same as that of the former Chief of Naval General Staff, Prince FUSHIMI, in that we should try to avert war as much as possible.

2. He seemed very strongly opposed to the Tri-Partite Alliance. He also seemed to be of the opinion that so long as such an alliance existed, the adjustment of Japanese-American diplomatic relations would be impossible.

3. Suppose the adjustment of diplomatic relations between the U.S.A. and Japan were impossible and we were cut off from supplies of oil, our oil stored up would run out in two years. In case a war with the U.S.A. breaks out the supply of oil would be only sufficient for one and a half years. Under these circumstances, there would be no other alternative but to take the initiative in operations against them.

4. According to the written report submitted, the Emperor believed that we would win, since it is so stated there. When NAGANO was asked if it would be possible to win a sweeping victory as in the Russo-Japanese War, he replied to the Emperor that it was even doubtful whether or not we would ever win, to say nothing of a great victory as in the Russo-Japanese War.

5. I was filled with trepidation by the Imperial anxiety about the danger of having to wage a desperate war.

My answer to the Imperial speech was as follows:

1. Admiral NAGANO's opinion was too simple.

2. The U.S.A. recognized the existence of the Tri-Partite Pact in our previous parley with America, and I was very doubtful whether we could deepen the confidence of the U.S.A. for us by the act of annulment of the Pact, as the U.S.A. was a nation which showed respect for international treaties. We would only be held in contempt by the U.S.A. We were not quite without means of restoring the friendship between America and Japan. We must deliberate on the matter in a constructive manner. I would demand the Premier's careful consideration on this point. I met Navy Minister OIKAWA at noon to talk over Admiral NAGANO's report to the Throne. The Chief Aide-de-Camp to the Emperor visited me at 1 p.m. to talk with me on the same subject.

Entry for 18 July 1944 from KIDO's Diary

18 July 1944. (Clear).

Hottest weather of the year. Today's entry is on separate sheets.

At 8 A.M. Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA visited me. Received report on the circumstances of the Senior Statesmen's Conference at HIRANUMA's house.

Mr. Hisatada HIROSE came and talked to me about the pressing situation.

Went to the office at 9 A.M.

Was received in audience from 9:15 to 9:30. Reported to the Throne concerning the trend of the Senior Statesmen, principally about their meeting at HIRANUMA's residence. At 9:30 Premier TOJO proceeded to the Imperial Palace to be received in audience. Saw him and talked with him in the First Anteroom. The Premier revealed to me that he had decided on a resignation en bloc. Accordingly, I said that in order to carry out the political change smoothly, in view of the importance of the Army's position in the domestic picture, I should like to be informed, for my own information, of the succeeding Prime Minister, if he had one in mind. The Premier answered that the Senior Statesmen have a heavy responsibility for the present political change; therefore, he supposed that they must have a plan in mind and he would not venture to give his opinions. However, in case a cabinet headed by an Imperial prince were considered, he hoped that none of the Army royalty would be taken into consideration.

Received in audience from 10:05 A.M. to 10:25. Reported among other things to the Emperor about the Senior Statesmen's Conference, to be held following the resignation en bloc of the cabinet.

Was received in audience from 11:25 to 11:40, and was shown the written resignation of TOJO and the other cabinet members.

TSURUKO was preparing lunch at the official residence so I went there at noon with Chief Secretary, MATSUDAIRA. Mrs. Keiko SOMA came with her daughter Hisako and they had lunch with us.

Went to work at 1:30. In response to a summons from His Majesty, had an audience from 4 to 4:02. His Majesty asked me

if HIRANUMA intended to form a cabinet. I replied that he probably did not.

Then I went at once to the Senior Statesmen's Conference.

The Details of the Senior Statesmen's Conference

Having been summoned by the Emperor former Prime Ministers WAKATSUKI, OKADA, HIROTA, KONOYE, HIRANUMA, ABE and YONAI, President of the Privy Council HARA and Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO met in conference, at 4 P.M. on 18 July Showa /1944/. Discussion was held as to who should be recommended to the Throne as premier of the succeeding cabinet, Premier TOJO having tendered his resignation. The conference was closed at 8:45 P.

Grand Chamberlain HYAKUTAKE, who attended the meeting in accordance with the Emperor's wish, notified those present of the import of the Imperial summons. Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO gave a detailed explanation of the circumstances which had led to the resignation en bloc of the TOJO Cabinet.

The members then went into a discussion. First of all, Mr. YONAI reported on how he had been asked by the cabinet to join it. His report was as follows:

(1) At about 5:30 A.M. of the 13th Secretary AKAMATSU informed me that the Premier intended to visit me. He, however, did not come, tho I do not know the reason.

(2) On the 17th Finance Minister ISHIWATA called and urged me to join the Cabinet. Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau OKA visited me also and earnestly urged me to join the Cabinet, for the sake of the Navy. But I replied that it was unreasonable, that it might be a different matter if, for the sake of the Navy I returned to active service in the Navy and became a member of the Supreme War Council but I could be of no use by becoming a State Minister. I wrote a note to Mr. OKA saying, "After deep consideration I have decided to reject the proposal," and thus indicated my decision.

(3) A little past 9 P.M. on the 17th, SATO, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau called on me. Navy Minister NOMURA was here also. They urged me by turns to join the Cabinet but in the end failed to make me change my mind.

Then the discussion began, the important questions and answers being as follows:

WAKATSUKI: What is your opinion, Mr. KIDO?

KIDO: I have no definite opinion as yet, but would like to hear you all first. Isn't it a good idea to consider the matter along the lines of the agreement made at the meeting at BARON HIRANUMA's residence?

HARA: What meeting was that?

WAKATSUKI: The Senior Statesmen met at Baron HIRANUMA's home, out of anxiety over the national situation. No special discussion occurred at the time concerning a new Cabinet.

ABE: Let me express my views to expedite the discussion. As a split between the civil government and the Supreme Command will be dangerous, it is necessary that they keep in close contact. In short, I think a military man on the active list will be suitable at this time. And as the Navy plays the most important role at the present, isn't it better that a Navy man should take up the premiership? For this reason, what do you say to asking Admiral YONAI to assume the duty?

YONAI: In my opinion, the military man's original duty is to devote himself to the particular field of strategy and command, and it is most proper that the civil officials handle political affairs. It is unwise to appoint now from the Army and now from the Navy, like GENJI and HEIKE.

ABE: That's not my idea.

YONAI: If there is no <sup>that</sup> suitable man among the civil officials, it will be better than an Army man assume the post. I would not be able to hold the position for a month, and judging from my past experience, I feel that I would cause you trouble instead.

WAKATSUKI: For the purpose of discussion I suggest this as a tentative plan. I think a military man is preferable during wartime. At present we must rely upon the Navy as our first line of national defense. Hence, if any Navy man were to be suggested for the premiership I wonder if he wouldn't feel scruples about taking it. Therefore, I think it is better that some one from the Army take the post. A Premier should have political ability. In this sense, I think General UGAKI would be most competent though I do not know the latest conditions. General ABE seemed to have an objection to the idea previously, but--.

ABE: I do not know how General UGAKI is getting along.

YONAI: I understand the fact that the Navy stands at the forefront. After all, the Military should concentrate on warfare. The Military men have naturally received a one-sided education, and I believe that it is for this very reason that they are

strong. And for this reason also they are unsuitable for politics.

WAKATSUKI: Mr. YONAI's view is not without reason, but our country's practice is quite different from that of England and America. Also, our nation is not educated according to the same custom as that of America and Britain. It would be difficult for Japan to reach that point in one jump.

YONAI: Unless it is corrected now, our country will be done for.

KONOYE: If the military authorities themselves do not correct this point, the civilian officials certainly can't do it. It is an idealistic thing. Taking the matter practically ---- /original illegible/ a military person would be better. A military man with such ideas will do. The question of whether he be Army or Navy shall be decided by narrowing down the discussion.

KIDO: In short, it is a practical problem. Our first object is to finish the war. Even if we tried to reform the political system simultaneously it would be impossible to do. To think on two planes at this time will obscure our objective.

HIRANUMA: I quite agree with Prince KONOYE. We are now at the stage where we must think of how to protect our national structure and the security of the Imperial Family. The matter of increased munitions production alone could not be handled by anybody but a military man.

WAKATSUKI: How about making it a military person, not limiting it to a man on the active list?

KONOYE: We had better gradually narrow our process of selection.

YONAI: I have no self-confidence, judging from my past experience as a premier.

WAKATSUKI: That was peacetime.

HARA: To be sure, my official position is such that I do not know how the political situation stands. The present situation is so grave that the next Cabinet will decide the fate of our country. It would be too much to place the full responsibility on a single military man alone. It should be a national cabinet of influential and popular people. Accordingly, won't it be a good idea to let about five men cooperate and accept the responsibility. As the Emperor has commanded, "Organize a cabinet in cooperation," this might be all right. The Imperial command will fall upon the five men here and they, choosing the premier from among themselves, will cooperate in administering state

affairs. Unless this /T.N. illegible/ no one can undertake it alone in this grave situation.

KIDO: I can well understand what Mr. HARA means. I don't suppose that any one objects so far, but I believe that the practical application would be very difficult.

WAKATSUKI: Just as the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal says, we should indicate one individual in replying, or His Majesty may have trouble.

HIROTA: The situation may become such that a desperate act will become necessary. We must also think of the security of the Imperial Family. The new Cabinet must be the highest and most powerful organization. At this time, should we not have a Prince of the blood at the head of the new Cabinet? I feel that a good number of General Officers should closely assist the Emperor.

Prince KONOYE: A Cabinet of the Imperial Family is not proper at the present stage.

HIRANUMA: I, too, think it is not good, though the time may come when we must consider such a thing.

WAKATSUKI: An Imperial Family cabinet is not good.

OKADA: The next Cabinet should be a strong national cabinet, whether viewed from abroad or from home. It must fight out the war, and it must wage an impossible war. The question is how to make a real national Cabinet.

HARA: I think so too. One man cannot do it. If one individual is to be recommended, I shall keep silence.

OKADA: The next Cabinet ought not be a cabinet of any one, but should be the Emperor's cabinet.

KIDO: I can well understand what you mean, but practically speaking what do you want to do?

HARA: The Cabinet should not belong to this man or that.

HIRANUMA: That is the very way I feel, but at any rate we must decide who will occupy first place. At the present stage, it must be some one from the military. It goes without saying that the Cabinet is under direct Imperial rule.

WAKATSUKI: That is right.

OKADA: As far as this point is concerned, I am of the same opinion as YONAI. It might be best if the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal who has a clear idea of the Emperor's wishes and of the home situation were to do it.

HARA: That will do because the Ministers of War and Navy will select both Chiefs of General Staff in the field of military command.

KIDO: Judging from the domestic and foreign situations, and especially the strengthening of home defense, I believe that the next premier should be an army man.

WAKATSUKI: Our answer to the Throne should not be too vague. Mr. HARA's suggestion will need further discussion.

ABE: In plain words then, it has been generally agreed that a military man is preferable. However, a man who is a military man alone is not enough. Judging from the actual conditions in all-out warfare, civil officials and retired military men cannot keep satisfactory contact with military operations. Navy men would be suitable for brightening up our nation.

HIROTA: I think it is necessary at this time to form a real national Cabinet, with a member of the Imperial Family in the central post.

WAKATSUKI: It is not good to impose political responsibility upon the Imperial Family.

KIDO: That is right.

HIRANUMA: At this stage it's still not right.

*KONO E. The same.*

KIDO: The strengthening of home defense, the increase of Army strength in the homeland and that of the military police require that we choose some one from the Army.

ABE: That will not renew the people's morale.

WAKATSUKI: An army man seems better.

YONAI: Though I recommended a civilian at first, I think that an Army man is best after all, having heard the explanation of the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal. I wish to take back my previous opinion on this point.

ABE: The Army is unpopular. The nation's trust in the Navy is apparent.



HIRANUMA: At present there are two viewpoints prevalent among the people, and the Army is on the unpopular side.

HIROTA: Does the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal mean martial law by his previous explanation?

KIDO: No, I do not mean that. I mean the stationing of army forces all over the country.

YONAI: How about Marshal TERAUCHI?

ABE: There is reason to think it would be difficult in practice.

HIRANUMA: It is not good, to delay the formation of the Cabinet at this time.

KONOYE: Why did the TOJO Cabinet fall? -- Because it had declined in public favor. Therefore, the Army must change its attitude in order to renew popular confidence.

HIRANUMA: The desire in all quarters is that the Army stop interfering with them.

KONOYE: There have been leftist thoughts among some men in the army for more than ten years. Today there is an attempt to carry out a left-wing revolution through the cooperation of the Military, the officials, and the people. This is more dangerous than defeat itself, and I fear a left-wing revolution more than defeat, for even if defeated, we can maintain the Imperial Family and the national structure, but in case of a leftist revolution we cannot do so. From this viewpoint the selection of the War Minister is most important.

YONAI: Judging from that point, an army man is better.

WAKATSUKI: I've entertained doubts on that point for some time.

HIRANUMA: So have I.

KONOYE: Can TERAUCHI control that?

ABE: He is a straightforward man, but in the first place to call him back from the front would be difficult.

ABE: The next premier must be some one popular among the Army.

WAKATSUKI: Isn't UGAKI popular among the Army?

ABE: I do not know how popular he has been recently.

YONAI: Mr. ABE, isn't there anyone who is popular?

ABE: UMEZU is a man of character. There are a few others but they are all at the front and it will be difficult to call them back.

FIRANUMA: UMEZU is out of the question. Isn't there any other Navy man?

YONAI: In view of what the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal has said, it might be better to choose someone from the Army.

FIRANUMA: Considerable experience would be needed to suppress the leftism referred to by Prince KONOYE.

KONOYE: There are some people who recommend Mr. Kantaro SUZUKI.

YONAI: We had better not recommend him.

FIRANUMA: Putting aside individual reasons, I think it proper that he take the post for the sake of the state. I know him very well and think he is an honorable man.

YONAI: I said that from the standpoint of the nation's interest.

FIROTA: He seems to be a moderate person.

FIRANUMA: The more so, the stronger he is a man who can accept other people's opinions.

FIRANUMA: I know him very well, too, after working together with him in the Privy Council. Mr. SUZUKI has always said he will never take a political seat as he is a soldier. He has even said that even if commanded by His Majesty /T.N. to form a cabinet/ he would never accept it. I'm telling you this for reference.

OKADA: As a man he is a fine person, but when I think of the soldiers at the front, I think an Army man is better.

FIROTA: I feel that we are in an important stage where we must reform the basis of the Japanese system. Everybody should be present at Imperial Headquarters.

FIRANUMA: In practice, this is impossible.

FIROTA: As the prosecution of the war is first and foremost, as long as the four pillars of the Army and the Navy are firm, that is enough.

KIDO: A man like Marshal TERAUCHI is one of them too.

WAKATSUKI: Now that we are conferring, the people may feel uneasy unless the Imperial Command to form a cabinet is issued in a day or two. Therefore I think we had better choose either UGAKI or General UMEZU.

KIDO: How about  
Marshal HATA?

KONOYE: As I have stated before, if an army man is to be recommended, it is a necessary condition that he make a change in the Army so as to renew the public confidence and that he suppress the leftist element. If UMEZU can do this, he may be all right.

FIRANUMA: Political experience is necessary.

KIDO: What is the comment at the front about Mr. UGAKI?  
As there is the enemy's propaganda offensive to be feared, it is no good if Mr. UGAKI's appointment causes discontent and unrest among the soldiers at the front.

ABE: Is the idea of a Navy man in the minority?

ABE: If an army man is preferred, the next question is who?

KIDO: If circumstances permit, how about TERAUCHI or HATA?

ABE: The order may be (1) TERAUCHI, (2) UMEZU, and (3) HATA.

KIDO: As to UMEZU, the fact that he has only recently been appointed Chief of the Army General Staff and that he has had no ministerial career should be considered.

FIRANUMA: The next is YONAI, a Navy man.

KONOYE: There is also Mr. Kantaro SUZUKI.

KONOYE: And what about the question of Mr. UGAKI?

FIRANUMA: I don't know about him lately.

KIDO: What other army generals are there besides these?

ABE: Well, there are HONJO, ARAKI, KOISO, and then of course there's TOJO.

KIDO: How about KOISO?

YONAI: KOISO is a good man, capable and courageous.

Doc. No. 16327 (113)

KONOYE: Isn't he a man of UGAKI's type but of smaller calibre?

ABE: Absolutely different.

KIDO: How does he get along with Army men of the active list?

ABE: Not so badly, I believe. He is a different sort of man from TOJO.

HIRANUMA: He is a high calibre man and a pious one.

KIDO: What are his ideas?

WAKATSUKI: I have no objection, although I don't know him.

OKADA: KONOYE: We don't know him too well. What are the opinions of Mr. YONAI and Mr. HIRANUMA? He was a member of each of your cabinets.

HIROTA: No objection.

ABE: No objection.

OKADA: Now we must reexamine the question of whether KOISO can organize a truly national Cabinet. This is an extremely important time and, as we need not come to a final decision in one or two hours, I want to study the matter fully.

KIDO: I have in mind a plan to request the Emperor to call a conference of Senior Statesmen and Ministers in the Imperial Palace-like the conferences of Elder Statesmen and Ministers of past years. I am now studying that matter.

OKADA: The formation of a cabinet requires careful thought.

HIROTA: How about a cabinet by direct Imperial order /CHONMEI NAIMARU/ or a coalition cabinet of Army and Navy?

WAKATSUKI: Actually there is a vice-premier in every cabinet.

KIDO: I must submit to the Throne Mr. FUKUDA's opinion in detail.

KIDO: What is the order of the candidates?

WAKATSUKI: TERAUCHI, FATA, KOISO, and a naval man.

HIRANUMA: TERAUCHI, KOISO, FATA, and a naval man.

YONAI: TERAUCHI, KOISO, FATA. By the way when I recommended KOISO as a cabinet member before, the Emperor asked for the reason.

Doc. No. 1632 W (113)

MIRANUMA: Speaking of KOISO I was asked by the Emperor about his connection with the UGAKI affair.

KONOYE: I don't know any of the three.

MIKOTA: TERAUCHI, KOISO, YAMA.

ABE: TERAUCHI, KOISO, YAMA.

OKADA: I don't know any of the three.

KIDO: I would like to have a meeting of the Senior Statesmen and the Imperial nominee in order that the former may support the latter.

NAKATSUKI: If they were to hamper the nominee, of course it would be very bad, but if the nominee himself wishes it, we will meet with pleasure.

KIDO: Thank you for taking part in this long discussion. I will submit your opinions in detail to the Throne.

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The meeting being closed, I was immediately received in audience by the Emperor in his study from 8:50 to 9:15. I reported the results of the conference in detail. I asked the Emperor to inquire of the Army High Command whether the appointment of Field-Marshal TERAUCHI, the first candidate, would affect the military operations as he is the Supreme Commander of the Southern Area Army. The Emperor replied that he would have the Chief Aide-de-Camp ask the Chief of the General Staff TOJO (who happened to be at the palace for the installation ceremony for new Chief of the General Staff UMEZU). At 9:50 p.m., I was received in audience again. His Majesty told me as follows:

Upon the Emperor's asking Chief of the General Staff TOJO as to the effect upon the military operations of Field-Marshal TERAUCHI's appointment, the latter opposed the idea for the following two reasons. The Emperor thought them reasonable and has decided to appoint General KOISO.

1) When the enemy's counter-offensive is at its height, it is impossible to leave the post of front line Supreme Commander vacant even for a single day.

2) To allow the domestic political situation to affect the front lines is bad for morale, and is certain to cause serious repercussions in the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,

"Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 19 July 1944"

19 July, Wednesday. Fine.

At 2:30<sup>6</sup> A.M. Mr. SUZUKI, Teichi, at 8 Mr. ABE, Genki, and at 8:30 Mr. HIROSE visited me and each discussed the political situation.

At 10 the Chief Aide-de-Camp came to my office and consulted me about the Imperial message to the Commander of the Kwantung Army.

From 10:20 to 11:35 I was received in audience by His Majesty and reported on the political situation and on other matters.

At 1:00 Mr. KAYA visited me at my office and talked to me about the monetary policy towards China.

At 2 the Chief Aide-de-Camp came to my office and conferred with me regarding the Imperial message to Chief of Army General Staff TOJO.

At 3 Imperial Household Minister MATSUDAIRA came to my office and told me about the circumstances of the change of government.

At 4 Director of the Police Bureau MACHIMURA came to my office and informed me of the conditions of peace and order, etc.

At 6 Prince KONOYE called on me at my home and asked me what I thought about making the next cabinet a coalition cabinet of KOISO and YONAI for the purpose of forming a true national unity cabinet, adding that Baron HIRANUMA had also agreed. As I had been feeling the need of taking some steps to put up a united front, I agreed to the idea, and at 6:30 called in Chief Secretary MATSUDAIRA and asked him to find out the views of other elder statesmen before tomorrow morning.

INOUE, Goro came and stayed for the night.

Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 4 April 1941

4 April Wednesday Rain

Alarm at 12:30 A.M. Air-raid from 1 to 4:30. The use of a rather large number of time bombs was the characteristic of this raid.

Went to the OBUNKO /T.N. Literally "Imperial Library" but it actually means underground rooms built for air-raid shelter/ at 1:10 to attend to my work. Came home at 5.

I was received in audience in the Imperial Library from 10:55 to 11:25, and was told by His Majesty of what he told Koiso in regard to the MIU-Pin matter. I cannot understand the Premier's attitude, his lack of confidence in himself.

Visited the Chief-Aide-de-Camp in his room and told him of my intention in case of a political change to meet with the two Chiefs of Staff as well as with the two Ministers /T.N. War and Navy/ and asked him to exert his good offices for it.

At 2 o'clock, Premier KOISO came to the office and talked as per the separate sheet.

At 2:30, HACHIMURA, Governor of NIIGATA Prefecture came to the office for a talk.

I was received in audience in the Imperial Library from 2:45 to 3:05, and reported to the Throne Premier KOISO's intention to resign from office.

Visited the Grand Chamberlain at 3:15 to discuss with him the question of the mass resignation of the cabinet.

At 3:30, Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU came to my room and informed me of the details of his talk with the Premier regarding the MIU matter.

Came home at 5. NOBUO left for TOYAMA.

## /T.N. - Separate Sheet/

4 April 1945

At 2 P.M. Premier KOISO came to the office and talked to the following effect.

As I have previously discussed with you, I am of the opinion that, in the war situation of today the present organization and character of the government as the highest national organ are by no means, good. That is why, with the Emperor's permission, I was admitted to Imperial Headquarters. I have also given my opinion /T.N. there/ concerning the direction of the war but to little avail. From now on, we must have, at any cost, an Imperial Headquarters Cabinet or cabinet which will direct the war. Toward the end of last month, therefore, I talked with YONAI and we discussed the matter from various standpoints. We could think of a reform, but whether we should have it or not was a matter of doubt as we have never known of a cabinet being strengthened by reform. In fact, I informed His Majesty of this question at the end of last month. I had also thought at that time of opening the second Greater East Asia Conference in the middle of the month. Also in view of the war situation in OKINAWA, I had been thinking of deciding on my step at about the end of the month. However, not only has the second Greater East Asia Conference come to be suspended (a meeting of Ambassadors is now under consideration in its place) but also it is likely that the war in OKINAWA may take several months more. Meanwhile it happens that in the Army Marshal SUGIYAMA and Marshal HATA have been decided upon to go out as Commanders-in-Chief in order to strengthen the defense structure. Accordingly, the Army is going to recommend General ANAMI to the Throne as War Minister and I hear that the Army wants to realize the above plan by about the 6th. Such being the case, it would not be fair to recognize this change now and then carryout the mass resignation at the end of the month."/ Therefore, KOISO upon consultation with Navy Minister YONAI today, has decided that a resignation en bloc is desired for the reasons given in the separate sheet.

Then I asked KOISO when he proposed to do this. He answered that if it suited the Emperor, he was thinking of having a special cabinet meeting today to gather the letters of resignation, but I suggested that he had better do so tomorrow morning as there would be no time for His Majesty to consider the question if it happened too suddenly. KOISO agreed with me.



Was received in audience at 2:45 and reported the matter to the Throne. I stated that this time the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal would like to see the Ministers of the Army and Navy and the two Chiefs of Staff prior to the Senior Statesmen's Conference, and received the Emperor's permission.

/T.F. Text of Koiso's reasons for resigning/

Since we are convinced that at this moment when the situation of the Empire is getting more and more urgent, with changes on both political and war fronts east and west, and when there should exist no discrimination between the battlefield and the home front or between the Supreme Command and the Civil Government a fundamental change should be made in the organization and character of the cabinet so that they may cope with the present situation and so that the cabinet, together with the whole nation with renewed resolution may be powerful enough to go straight forward for the accomplishment of the great task of assisting the Throne. To this end we have decided to ask permission of the Emperor to tender our resignation and carry out a resignation en bloc.

Ex. # 1282

Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 5 April 1945.

At 5:30 Welfare Minister AIKAWA called at my residence for an interview.

April 5 Thursday Clear

At 10:30 A.M. Prime Minister KOISO proceeded to the Imperial Palace to tender his resignation to the Throne.

From 10:45 to 10:55 I was received in audience by His Majesty and was shown Prime Minister KOISO's resignation.

At 11:00, Prime Minister KOISO called at my room to talk about the time of announcement and other matters. It was generally agreed to announce it at the 7:00 P.M. news broadcast.

As previously arranged with the Chief Aide-de-Camp to His Majesty, I conferred with the Chief of the General Staff UMEZU at 11:35, Navy Minister YONAI at 11:55, War Minister SUGIYAMA at 1:00 and Chief of the Naval General Staff OIKAWA at 2:00, as described in the attached report. At 12:55 P.M. air raid alert warning was issued. From 2:55 to 3:15 I was received in audience by His Majesty in the library.

At 3:20 Admiral OKADA called at my room and conferred with me.

From 5:00 to 8:00, we borrowed the Reception Room to hold a meeting of JUSEIN /T.N. Senior Statesmen/. Baron WAKITSUKI joined us at 6:00 P.M. because his train was delayed.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the Senior Statesmen were asked to affix their private seals.

At 8:30 I talked with President of the Privy Council SUZUKI.

From 8:45 to 9:15 I was received in audience by His Majesty (at the library) and reported in detail the opinions of the Senior Statesmen. The Imperial mandate was issued to Baron KANTARO SUZUKI. I replied that it would be considered in accordance with His Majesty's discretion.

At 10:00 the Imperial mandate was issued to Admiral SUZUKI. After being received in audience, he called at my room and conferred with me on various matters. Came back here at 11:30.

20.4.5 /T.F. - 5 April 1940/<sup>5</sup>

I asked Chief of the General Staff UMEZU to call on me at 11:30 A.M. The interview was as follows:

"Premier KOISO presented his resignation to the Throne today. The reason is that in view of the present war situation, the organization and characteristics of the cabinet must be altered to make it more powerful. In other words, it should be an Imperial Headquarters Cabinet or a War Directing Cabinet. In this connection, from the Supreme Command's viewpoint, I would like to ask whether you desire to express any opinions. I would also like to ask you of your opinions concerning the forecast of the war, the collapse of Germany and the political aggression of the San Francisco Conference.

1. In regard to the forecast of war, the battle of OKINAWA is bitterly contested and although the forecast is not favorable, we must be determined to fight it out to its bitter end regardless of whether the enemy can be routed or not. If the morale of the people can be uplifted to display its total power, it is no doubt difficult but not impossible. In this connection, the army is steadily making preparations. I therefore earnestly hope that a cabinet will be formed which will be in conformity to this desire. One plan would be to adopt a war-time cabinet or minority cabinet which was adopted by various countries in the previous World War.

1. The Imperial Headquarters Cabinet and War Directing Cabinet are worth considering but it is difficult to link together the supreme command and state affairs.

1. Petroleum is the chief source of worry but there is enough to last several months. At present, permission has been granted to organize special corps to dig for oil in Japan proper. We desire to double the present production.

0.4.5 /T.N. Probably April 5th/

Interviewed Navy Minister YONAI at 11:55 A.M. In general, I asked him the same thing I inquired of Chief of the General Staff UMEZU. Conclusion was that although it is called a powerful cabinet, nothing in particular could be thought of. Since Navy Minister YONAI is one of the senior statesman /JUSHII/ I took this opportunity to ask his opinions regarding the succeeding premier. He approved of Admiral Kantaro SUZUKI.

Furthermore, regarding the successor to the Naval Minister, he confided to me that since Vice-Admiral Seibi INOUE would not accept by all means, he decided to recommend Admiral HASEGAWA.

Interviewed War Minister SUGIYAMA at 1:00 P.M. In general, I said the same thing I inquired of the Chief of General Staff UMEZU.

The War Minister said that viewed from his own experience, the unification of supreme command and state affairs with one man holding concurrently several posts, it cannot, factually, produce results. It is impossible. The perspective of war is extremely difficult as seen from the shortages in material and the difficulties of transportation. It could be surmised that the U.S.S.R. may loudly make proposal for peace after she defeats Germany. I think it is necessary for us to make preparations beforehand with consideration to the effect whether the U.S.S.R. would attempt it independently or together with Britain and the U.S. at this opportune moment when the war situation is favourable (the OKINAWA Operation) or at an unfavourable moment when she may attempt it independently or in combination. UMEZU is the best qualified person for the succeeding Premier from the Army.

At 2:00 P.M., I had an interview with OIKAWA, Chief of the Naval General Staff. Questions I asked him were about the same as that asked of UMEZU, Chief of the Army General Staff.

OIKAWA, Chief of the Naval General Staff registered shock upon hearing of the resignation of the cabinet and so forth, and frankly stated that it was bad at such a critical time. Speaking about the future prospect of the war, he stated that up to about the MARIANA Line, although the difference in strength between our forces and that of the enemy was considerable, nevertheless, we fought a regular war. However, it was later continued under guerrilla warfare. That it was a big stake can also be said.

As for the battle of OKINAWA, even if we could fortunately drive the enemies out, the battle would not thereby end. The war situation would become more serious whether the enemy launches another attack on OKINAWA or advance in another direction.

In regard to the maintenance of war strength, we are now waiting for the time to arrive, since an immediate enforcement would contrarily produce disadvantageous results. In the future, it is my idea to have the surplus men of the navy sent to the factories and maintain the strength. A monthly production of 1200 airplanes and about 20 submarines will be maintained and effort shall be given to manifest the guerrilla power. Of course we cannot be optimistic but need not be so pessimistic. There is, however, one condition, that is, the backing by a firm cabinet which is trusted by the people.

Oil will keep till about June. Thereafter, we think of relying only on pine-wood oil.

Hereafter, our worries are the breakdown of internal set up.

Although they talk of a cabinet formed solely by members of the Imperial General Headquarters, it will be quite difficult to conduct war and state affairs together. I think the present form of organization is the best one in carrying out the war.

The meeting of Senior Statesmen was held in the front Reception Room from 5:00 P.M. on 5 April 1945.

KONOY, HIRANUMA, SUZUKI, HIROTA, KIDO, YAMAMOTO, OKADA, TOJO (Baron YAMAMOTO attended from 6 o'clock)

1. The Grand Chamberlain made formal address -- the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal explained the situation leading to the political change and after reading KOISO's resignation, passed it around.

1. TOJO: The resignation states that both the state affairs and supreme command require revision. What is the meaning /of this statement/?

1. KIDO: There was no particular explanation given by Premier KOISO.

/ TOJO: Frequent changing of cabinets in war time is deplorable. I think the San Francisco Conference on April 25 is especially the most important period. The cabinet to be formed should be the final one. Within the country at present, there exists, on one hand, the opinion that we should fight to the last to provide for future developments of the country and on the other hand, the opinion to accept the unconditional surrender terms to restore peace immediately. I think it is necessary to decide on this first.

1. OKADA: The new cabinet to be formed must consider a great number of problems. It must be a cabinet that will shoulder the destiny of the country till the very end and a cabinet that will solidly combine the total power of the country. Such a problem as war or peace can be determined only at a later stage. I believe we must first carefully study these problems before determining this question /peace or war/.

/L. 58/ 1. HIRANUMA: As their Excellencies have said, the acute war situation today has given rise to various opinions which must be unified. There is no way out but to fight to the end. That problem, I think, is simple. Frankly, I am bewildered because of this sudden political change and it would have been desirable not to have replied to the Throne immediately as in previous cases. I wish we could also have heard carefully, if possible, the opinions of Ministers KOISO and YONAI but since the resignations have been tendered /T.N.--word "tendered obliterated/" it is too late. Frankly, since my opinions are being presented without any preparation, I do not have sufficient grounds to back up my contentions. I suggest that we carefully discuss such problems as their Excellencies have presented.

1. KIDO: I am quite of the same opinion. The fact is that for a time it appeared as if a total resignation would occur but I heard thereafter that it was changed to the policy of reorganizing and both Field Marshals, SUGIYAMA and HATA, were to be transferred to the posts of Commanders-in-Chief of the General Defence Commands. Accompanying this, it became necessary to change the War Minister, and therefore, the Army offered to the cabinet, General AFAMI as its successor. Premier KOISO states that to effect reorganization now and then to execute a total resignation a little later on would be betraying the Army. (Personally I do not know what is meant by this.) So that is why he made up his mind so suddenly, which is really so sudden and I, myself, am much perplexed.

Q. OKADA: Before giving out names, how about discussing the total power concentration and powerful cabinet.

A. HIRANUMA: Formerly, the Premier was first of all decided, and that Premier was to recommend the ministers for the portfolio to the Throne. But, at this time, if the principal ministers are not decided, the cabinet will not become powerful. If we adhere to the conventional way on Army, Navy, Peace Preservation, etc., we shall reach no conclusion.

Q. TOJO: If we decide the cabinet ministers, then, doesn't it mean that the Emperor is to bear the responsibilities after the cabinet formation?

A. HIRANUMA: It would not be right for the Emperor to give orders directly.

Q. TOJO: Avoid having the good and bad of the cabinet formation falling back on the Emperor.

A. HIRANUMA: From the point of formalities, it is as you say, but what I meant to say was that how about deciding it after soliciting our opinions a little more.

Q. HIROTA: We must win by any means. Although there are pessimistic views, in this current war, no country has so far been winning straight through from the start. All of them have been, one time or another, on the verge of being defeated and have rallied back again. The next cabinet should be one that would fight through to win the war. I think it was really an appropriate action of the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal to have interviewed the leaders of the Army and Navy authorities, but don't you think that it is necessary to ascertain the intentions of the Army and Navy authorities, a little more?

A. KIDO: I did ask them considerably but there was no special opinions expressed.

Q. HIRANUMA: Speaking outright, Mr. KOISO's cabinet formation was a failure. He should have consulted us a little more. The reorganization, if speaking candidly, was a failure. Speaking of formalities, it is as His Excellency TOJO said, but in actuality, he should have consulted us a little more without being apprehended by theories.

1. KIDO: As Mr. HIRANUMA says, it means that after the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal makes a recommendation to the Emperor, he must not interfere with the organization of the cabinet. It is very strange that if the organization of the cabinet is unsatisfactory, he will be held responsible. Therefore, I think that as a system it is poor. However, at the present time, there is no alternative, and therefore, we cannot help but be resigned to accept this system.

1. HIRANUMA: I think that it is unreasonable that the responsibility should be taken by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, alone, and that we must also share the responsibility. To this end, I think that it is best that the one who organizes a cabinet should seek more advice.

1. OKADA: Some people say that considerable surplus power still exists in our country and ask why we do not utilize this potential fighting power. Before amassing the total power of military officials, government officials, and civilians, unity among the leaders is strongly desired. It is necessary that we study as to whether the procedure we have followed until today, is right or wrong.

1. HIRANUMA: After the decision is made in this room and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal makes an informal report to the Throne, a situation would develop where he cannot interfere. As for telling him to do as he pleases, I wonder.

1. KOHOYE: Although you are right, the problem is in what form it should be carried out.

1. KIDO: There are many who desire a firmer unity among the leaders.

1. HIRANUMA: Setting aside discussions from the legislative and constitutional standpoints, I think it is better to have closer contact in the organization of the cabinet since the responsibility must be assumed.

1. OKADA: I agree.

1. SUZUKI: I think that there is no necessity of fixing a limit on the scope of the Emperor's summons. I would like to ask the opinion of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. I remember to the effect that whenever the occasion demanded, Prince SAIOJI sought the advices of Count YAMAMOTO and Fleet-Admiral TOGO. After obtaining the Emperor's consent, should we solicit the views of Count MAKINO?



/. KIDO: Although you are right, the procedure today is different from that at the time of Prince SAIONJI /T.N. approximately 3 Jap. characters illegible/. At any rate, we cannot immediately request his participation, since we have decided on the matter, with the full consent of the Emperor, that we should . . . . /T.N. Several words illegible/ . . . . with those who had once carried out the general administration of our country under the complete confidence of his Majesty.

/. HIROTA: Unification in the upper-classes is indeed most necessary, and I think that it would be better to have such person as Count MAKINO participate. In the case the cabinet changes, will the Supreme War Guidance Council still continue? And speaking of the Premier attending the Imperial General Headquarters, was this permitted only to KOISO or that hereafter, the Prime Minister will always be able to attend it?

/. KIDO: At present there are opinions that since the Premier attends the Imperial General Headquarters, the Supreme War Guidance Council is unnecessary. This is a problem that should be considered in future. The next question is that although I do not know the details, I think that hereafter the Premier will be able to attend the Imperial General Headquarters.

/. TOJO: The Premier will attend as a participator in the war council, and will witness the manipulation of troops in national defense.

/. SUZUKI: Although I can understand the case of Count MAKINO by your explanation, I dare say that only when we include him the scope will not become obscure but that I think there is no other qualified person similar to Count MAKINO.

/. WAKITSUKI: I don't understand the purport of the resignation. It is a very queer resignation to explain the character of the forthcoming cabinet.

/. KONOE: Since the case was so sudden, I have no idea. I think that, in regard to the opinion of His Excellency TOJO, it cannot be decided at this stage when the Supreme Command is not represented here. At this meeting, as at the time of the last meeting, first of all how about gradually limiting the field /in choosing the Premier/, whether it must be from the military circles, and whether it will be from the Army or from the Navy.

1. TOJO: I do not mean to say that the Premiers should be decided at this meeting. I meant that it should be submitted as a material to His Majesty so that he can prepare himself.

1. WAKATSUKI: The purport of His Imperial summons was to have us choose the Premier for the succeeding cabinet, and I believe it is against His Imperial will to discuss on things which TOJO mentioned. To discuss whether we should fight the war to the last, or whether we should seek peace halfway is an out of way question. I think it goes too far.

1. SUZUKI: According to Mr. WAKATSUKI's opinion, we must now fight this war to its bitter end. I think this problem must be settled first. Therefore, if the leader of the succeeding cabinet does not possess this will, I think he is unsuitable.

1. WAKATSUKI: I thought I was requested to state my opinion regarding this.

1. TOJO: It is not so. It is meant to be merely an assumption.

1. KIDO: Today when the situation is such that the homeland is about to be a battlefield, the actual national conditions give rise for grave concern. The public does not always cooperate earnestly with the measures taken by the government. A large number tend to be indifferent. Viewed from the food problem, production increase problem and peace preservation problem, the incoming cabinet must be one that will place confidence in the people. Of late, anti-militarism tendencies have appeared substantially and I think this also must be given careful attention.

1. HIRANUMA: The basic idea is that eminent subjects of the state should be held responsible to the Throne.

1. WAKATSUKI: Twenty years have already elapsed since I had once been a premier so I have no knowledge of the present men. I really sense deep trepidation in feeling incapable of fulfilling my duty. I am willing to take all responsibilities but in regards to this duty, I believe that I am most unsuitable. I request that the system itself also be given consideration.

If the opinions of Baron HIRANUMA should be adopted, (select principle cabinet members beforehand) nobody will be willing to accept the premiership and it will not be possible to form a cabinet. It will thoroughly restrict the activities of the premier.

I cannot express any opinion as to whether the purport of Premier KOISO's resignation could be carried out or not.

1. KONOYE: On the previous occasion, the matter of state affairs and supreme command was also the focus of our consideration. For this purpose, a military man was thought to be most appropriate and was decided after boiling down the issue. Would it not be better to use the same process?

1. WAKATSUKI: On the previous occasion, I was the one that suggested it but the purport of this resignation is different.

1. KIDO: This resignation is but an expression of Premier KOISO's opinion, and it does not necessarily mean that we should stick to this.

1. HIROTA: It is better to have either the War Minister or the Navy Minister be the chief of the new cabinet.

1. HIRANUMA: There are two phases of opinion at home in regard to the conclusion of the war. At this time we must have a person who will fight it out. We cannot recommend any peace advocator who favors cessation of hostilities. From this import, the choosing of a Premier has important bearings. Incidentally, I am unable to voice any opinion if it means that all we have to do is to appoint the Premier and the rest to be left to him. I am strongly opposed to any advocacy for peace and cessation of hostilities. From the point of formalities, it is as what Mr. WAKATSUKI stated, but actually, they are inseparable.

In the manifestation of the whole national strength influential persons from the civilian populace must be employed.

1. KIDO: We must formulate a system whereby the people will follow us.

1. HIRANUMA: Viewed from the relations between state affairs and supreme command, do you mean that the Premier must be a soldier in active military service?

1. HIROTA: After all, difficult situations may arise if the Premier was not a soldier of the active military service, but that is not always necessary if he is authorized to present himself at the Imperial General Headquarters.

1. HIRANUMA: At the least, he must be in the first or second reserve.

2. SUZUKI: At the time of the Sino-Japanese War we had Premier ITO. The Premier need not always be a soldier.

1. HIRANUMA: Practically speaking, the Premier will not understand war, unless he was a soldier at least in the first or second reserve. Nevertheless, my assumption is that, if it is to be fought, it must be fought out.

2. OKADA: Through the conversations carried until now, it seems that the character of the Premier, in general, is distinctive.

1. KONOYE: Then we may conclude that he must be a soldier either in the first or second reserve who will fight it out.

2. HIRANUMA: I hope no one will say that it is improper at this time, such as said by Mr. WAKATSUKI.

1. WAKATSUKI: Actually, it is inappropriate -- I fear that he might say something thoughtlessly. The question is not of a man who will fight it out to a final victory. If we propose peace now, it will evidently lead to unconditional surrender.

2. HIRANUMA: From the relations between supreme command and state affairs, I think, we need a man from the Army or the Navy, but not necessarily in active service.

1. WAKATSUKI: The fundamental principle has been clarified but how about its application?

2. HIRANUMA: What is Prince KONOYE's opinion?

1. KONOYE: A person that has had no connection hitherto should be recommended.

2. HIRANUMA: It must be necessary that the person has had no connection and that he can be relied upon, as seen from the public and people.

1. WAKATSUKI: On the previous occasion, it was decided to be from the Army and although a certain person was named, he was not selected. Today, it can be either from the Army or Navy. What is your opinion, Mr. OKADA?

1. OKADA: My mental vision is also narrow but gathered here are men from a wide field so a competent man can be selected.

2. WAKATSUKI: Does the Lord Keeper of Privy Seal approve of this measure?

1. KIDO: Yes.

2. WAKATSUKI: What is your opinion?

1. KIDO: In the first place, since it is my duty here to listen to your opinions, I wish you would state your unreserved opinions. What is your opinion Mr. SUZUKI?

2. SUZUKI: How would it be if the hitherto Senior Statesmen make an effort. We have the responsibility and are prepared to die for the country. The resolution to die fighting for the Emperor is necessary. Since the Premier must be physically strong to stand the strain, I suggest Prince KONOYE who is the youngest. After that, we all will try. How would it be if he tries first? I have heard that previously President /of the Privy Council/ HAMA also made this suggestion. A week before the former President /of the Privy Council/ died, I intimately heard him talk on this subject and I recall being greatly impressed. I suggest he accept by all means.

1. KONOYE: Then it differs from aforementioned fundamental principle.

1. HIRANUMA: The candidate should be a military man. I also agree with Prince KONOYE in that the new premier should be one with no previous connections. With the purport of winning the confidence of the people in mind, it is my wish to have Admiral SUZUKI accept the premiership. As in the past, shall we appoint him after consulting him? In the present situation, is this procedure proper or is it not? I think it is proper to have him appointed by submitting the Ministerial Scroll to His Majesty without consulting him.

1. WAKATSUKI: Wasn't it so until now?

1. HIROTA: That is, there is no need of having the consent of the person himself.

2. WAKATSUKI: Do you mean to say that we shouldn't accept their private consent?

2. HIROTA: I didn't mean that we must not accept.

2. KIDO: I shall also give my opinion. As I had said previously, now that the Japanese soil is on the verge of becoming a battlefield, strengthening of the government has become all the more necessary, and therefore an imposing and sedate cabinet which has the confidence of the people must be established. From this point, I think the opinion of His Excellency TOJO is plausible but, personally, I hope to have His Excellency SUZUKI rise to the occasion.

2. TOJO: At the present when our land is about to become a battlefield we must take special care, or else there is a fear that the Army may take an aloof standing. If the Army takes an aloof standing, the cabinet will collapse.

2. KIDO: At this time it will be most grave if the Army takes an aloof standing. Is there any omen or premonition of it?

2. TOJO: Can't say there is none.

2. KIDO: As I have said a little while ago, the anti-militaristic sentiments are quite strong and there are possibilities of having the people take an aloof standing.

2. OKUDA: At this occasion when we are confronted with a grave situation, a national crisis, -- what do you mean by "taking an aloof standing" to a person who received the Imperial Command! Whose responsibility is the national defense? Are they not the Army and Navy?

2. TOJO: Because of that apprehension, I said to take care.

2. WAKATSUKI: If there is such apprehension now, it is a serious matter. I believe that in so far as the Japanese people is concerned, there isn't a bit of such a thing.

Meeting adjourned at 8:00 P.M.

EX # 1109

Certificate of Interpreter

I, Yale Maxon, Commander USNR, Serial No. 11-35-72, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the transcriptions enumerated below, of such questions and answers, consisting of 39 interrogations in documentary form, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Yale Maxon  
Yale Maxon, Commander, USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25 day of October, 1946

/s/ John W. Fihelly  
John W. Fihelly

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,  
International Prosecution Section.  
GHQ, SCAP

Certificate of Stenographer

I, Myrtle B. Mills, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogations set out below, and that I transcribed the questions and answers contained therein, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Myrtle B. Mills  
Myrtle B. Mills

Certificate of Interrogator

I, John W. Fihelly, certify that on

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|------------------|---------------------|
| 7 February 1946  | (Document No. 2499) |
| 8 February 1946  | (Document No. 2500) |
| 11 February 1946 | (Document No. 2501) |
| 13 February 1946 | (Document No. 2502) |
| 18 February 1946 | (Document No. 2503) |
| 19 February 1946 | (Document No. 2504) |
| 20 February 1946 | (Document No. 2505) |
| 21 February 1946 | (Document No. 2506) |
| 23 February 1946 | (Document No. 2507) |

1 March 1946	(Document No. 2508)
11 March 1946	(Document No. 2509)
12 March 1946	(Document No. 2510)
14 March 1946	(Document No. 2511)
15 March 1946	(Document No. 2512)
18 March 1946	(Document No. 2513)
25 March 1946	(Document No. 2514)
26 March 1946	(Document No. 2515)
16 January 1946	(Document No. 4152)
17 January 1946	(Document No. 4153)
18 January 1946	(Document No. 4154)
23 January 1946	(Document No. 4157)
24 January 1946	(Document No. 4158)
25 January 1946	(Document No. 4159)
28 January 1946	(Document No. 4160)
29 January 1946	(Document No. 4161)
30 January 1946	(Document No. 4162)
1 February 1946	(Document No. 4163)
4 February 1946	(Document No. 4164)
15 February 1946	(Document No. 4167)
5 March 1946	(Document No. 4173)
6 March 1946	(Document No. 4174)
7 March 1946	(Document No. 4175)
8 March 1946	(Document No. 4176)
13 March 1946	(Document No. 4177)
19 March 1946	(Document No. 4178)
20 March 1946	(Document No. 4179)
27 March 1946	(Document No. 4181)
28 March 1946	(Document No. 4182)
29 March 1946	(Document No. 4183)

personally appeared before me TOJO, Hideki, and according to Commander Yale Maxon, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

/s/ John W. Fihelly  
John W. Fihelly

TOKYO, Japan  
Place

October 25, 1946  
Date



木戸侯日記ヨリ抄萃

昭和十六年 / 一九四一年 / 七月二日

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1632FE

七月二日(水)曇

午前九時安藤京都府知事来訪面談

午前丁時ヨリ宮中ニ於テ御前會議催サレテ少用戰三件ノ新  
情勢ニ對應スル國策決定セリ

十二時三十分河田藏相来室汪政府ニ三億借款許容ニテ説明  
アリタリ。

一時近衛公来室面談松岡外相ノ真意ヲ捕捉スルニ苦心アリ、  
話アリタリ

二時ヨリ三時十分迄拜謁御前會議模様等ニテ承ル

三時三十分武官長ト宮中ニ大本營設置ト某山行幸ノ件ニテ  
打合ス

三時半下園佐吉来廳面談

七時半廣瀬久忠君来前面談

Certificate of Interpreter

I, Yale Maxon, Commander USNR, Serial No. 11-35-72, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the transcriptions enumerated below, of such questions and answers, consisting of 39 interrogations in documentary form, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Yale Maxon  
Yale Maxon, Commander, USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25 day of October, 1946

/s/ John W. Fihelly  
John W. Fihelly

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,  
International Prosecution Section.  
GHQ, SCAP

Certificate of Stenographer

I, Myrtle B. Mills, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogations set out below, and that I transcribed the questions and answers contained therein, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Myrtle B. Mills  
Myrtle B. Mills

Certificate of Interrogator

I, John W. Fihelly, certify that on

7 February 1946	(Document No. 2499)
8 February 1946	(Document No. 2500)
11 February 1946	(Document No. 2501)
13 February 1946	(Document No. 2502)
18 February 1946	(Document No. 2503)
19 February 1946	(Document No. 2504)
20 February 1946	(Document No. 2505)
21 February 1946	(Document No. 2506)
23 February 1946	(Document No. 2507)

1 March 1946	(Document No. 2508)
11 March 1946	(Document No. 2509)
12 March 1946	(Document No. 2510)
14 March 1946	(Document No. 2511)
15 March 1946	(Document No. 2512)
18 March 1946	(Document No. 2513)
25 March 1946	(Document No. 2514)
26 March 1946	(Document No. 2515)
16 January 1946	(Document No. 4152)
17 January 1946	(Document No. 4153)
18 January 1946	(Document No. 4154)
23 January 1946	(Document No. 4157)
24 January 1946	(Document No. 4158)
25 January 1946	(Document No. 4159)
28 January 1946	(Document No. 4150)
29 January 1946	(Document No. 4161)
30 January 1946	(Document No. 4162)
1 February 1946	(Document No. 4163)
4 February 1946	(Document No. 4164)
15 February 1946	(Document No. 4167)
5 March 1946	(Document No. 4173)
6 March 1946	(Document No. 4174)
7 March 1946	(Document No. 4175)
8 March 1946	(Document No. 4176)
13 March 1946	(Document No. 4177)
19 March 1946	(Document No. 4178)
20 March 1946	(Document No. 4179)
27 March 1946	(Document No. 4181)
28 March 1946	(Document No. 4182)
29 March 1946	(Document No. 4183)

personally appeared before me TOJO, Hideki, and according to Commander Yale Maxon, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

/s/ John W. Fihelly  
John W. Fihelly

TOKYO, Japan  
Place

October 25, 1946  
Date

No. 1.

ex 1109

Doc 2731

書類番號二七三

私邸ヲ認識通譯者證明書

「イニルマクニ」署名  
 米國海軍豫備役中佐  
 宣誓、上左ノ通り陳述ス私為サレテ又問答ヲ英  
 語ヨリ日本語ニ又日本語ヨリ英語ニ夫々眞實ニ翻譯シテ  
 而シテ左ニ列舉セル文書、式ニヨル三十九、訊問ヨリ成ル前記問  
 答、記録、私、知リ且ツ信ス、限リ眞實ニテ正確ニテ之ヲ  
 米國海軍豫備役中佐「イニルマクニ」署名  
 在、舊本一九四六年、昭和二十年、十月二十五日、余、面前ニ於テ  
 宣誓、上署名セリ。

併合國最高司令官總司令部

國際檢察部

特派調査官「イニルマクニ」署名

△

doc 2731

速記者證明書

私即「マートルビル」に在りて其列擧ナル訊問ニ際シ速記者ヲ勤メ其問答ヲ記録シタリ而シテ其記録ハ私ノ知リ且信スル限ニ莫大ナリ且正確ナル事ヲ茲ニ證明ニス

「マートルビル」署名

訊問者證明書

私「マートルビル」に在りて其列擧ナル訊問ニ際シ速記者ヲ勤メ其問答ヲ記録シタリ而シテ其記録ハ私ノ知リ且信スル限ニ莫大ナリ且正確ナル事ヲ茲ニ證明ニス

No. 2.

- 一九四六年二月七日 (書類番號 二四九九)
- 一九四六年二月八日 (書類番號 二五〇〇)
- 一九四六年二月十日 (書類番號 二五〇一)
- 一九四六年二月十三日 (書類番號 二五〇二)
- 一九四六年二月十八日 (書類番號 二五〇三)
- 一九四六年二月十九日 (書類番號 二五〇四)
- 一九四六年二月二十日 (書類番號 二五〇五)
- 一九四六年二月二十一日 (書類番號 二五〇六)
- 一九四六年二月二十三日 (書類番號 二五〇七)
- 一九四六年三月一日 (書類番號 二五〇八)
- 一九四六年三月十日 (書類番號 二五〇九)
- 一九四六年三月十二日 (書類番號 二五一〇)
- 一九四六年三月十四日 (書類番號 二五一一)
- 一九四六年三月十五日 (書類番號 二五一二)

Doc 21731

No. 3

一九四六年三月十八日	(書類番號)	四一八三
一九四六年三月十五日	(書類番號)	四一八二
一九四六年三月十六日	(書類番號)	四一八一
一九四六年二月十六日	(書類番號)	四一八〇
一九四六年二月十七日	(書類番號)	四一七九
一九四六年二月十八日	(書類番號)	四一七八
一九四六年二月十九日	(書類番號)	四一七七
一九四六年二月二十日	(書類番號)	四一七六
一九四六年二月二十一日	(書類番號)	四一七五
一九四六年二月二十二日	(書類番號)	四一七四
一九四六年二月二十三日	(書類番號)	四一七三
一九四六年二月二十四日	(書類番號)	四一七二
一九四六年二月二十五日	(書類番號)	四一七一
一九四六年二月二十六日	(書類番號)	四一七〇
一九四六年二月二十七日	(書類番號)	四一六九
一九四六年二月二十八日	(書類番號)	四一六八
一九四六年二月二十九日	(書類番號)	四一六七
一九四六年二月三十日	(書類番號)	四一六六
一九四六年三月一日	(書類番號)	四一六五
一九四六年三月二日	(書類番號)	四一六四
一九四六年三月三日	(書類番號)	四一六三
一九四六年三月四日	(書類番號)	四一六二
一九四六年三月五日	(書類番號)	四一六一
一九四六年三月六日	(書類番號)	四一六〇
一九四六年三月七日	(書類番號)	四一五九
一九四六年三月八日	(書類番號)	四一五八
一九四六年三月九日	(書類番號)	四一五七
一九四六年三月十日	(書類番號)	四一五六
一九四六年三月十一日	(書類番號)	四一五五
一九四六年三月十二日	(書類番號)	四一五四
一九四六年三月十三日	(書類番號)	四一五三
一九四六年三月十四日	(書類番號)	四一五二
一九四六年三月十五日	(書類番號)	四一五一
一九四六年三月十六日	(書類番號)	四一五〇
一九四六年三月十七日	(書類番號)	四一四九
一九四六年三月十八日	(書類番號)	四一四八
一九四六年三月十九日	(書類番號)	四一四七
一九四六年三月二十日	(書類番號)	四一四六
一九四六年三月二十一日	(書類番號)	四一四五
一九四六年三月二十二日	(書類番號)	四一四四
一九四六年三月二十三日	(書類番號)	四一四三
一九四六年三月二十四日	(書類番號)	四一四二
一九四六年三月二十五日	(書類番號)	四一四一
一九四六年三月二十六日	(書類番號)	四一四〇
一九四六年三月二十七日	(書類番號)	四一三九
一九四六年三月二十八日	(書類番號)	四一三八
一九四六年三月二十九日	(書類番號)	四一三七
一九四六年三月三十日	(書類番號)	四一三六

シヨクインガツニマシ

場所 日本 東京

附 昭和二十年三月十五日

Ex. 1110

Extract from  
Interrogation of Hideki TOJO  
13 February 1946  
p. 8-9

Q. Who requested this Imperial Conference of July 1941?

A. Since the problem of stationing troops in southern French Indo-China was the principal problem, it may have been the War Minister, I believe.

Q. Do you not recall whether or not you called this meeting? You were War Minister.

A. Actually, I think I probably requested it. However, things were decided usually at the Liaison Conferences where they were decided practically by common consent. You asked me who requested this conference and I cannot answer because usually the War Minister, the Navy Minister, Foreign Minister, and the Premier got together and agreed on a subject. Then the actual drafting of the plan was left to the three secretaries, to whom I have referred in previous interviews. The plan was then presented to the Liaison Conference from which the decision to request an Imperial Conference might come. Just now you looked very solemn when you asked me the question of who called the conference. It was called by the process I have described, but the responsibility in connection with the movement of troops into southern Indo-China was my responsibility as War Minister. It is distasteful to me to try to avoid responsibility.

1110A

25026

第八十九頁

一九四六年二月十三日

東條文相三對不問同リ、披草

問、誰知昭和十六年七月、此、南、前會議、奏請、ヲ、シ、タ、ラ、ド

答、今、印、度、支、那、南、部、三、軍、隊、早、進、駐、ヲ、凡、同、題、ヲ、主、要、十、間

問、貴方、前、會議、奏請、ヲ、三、次、申、カ、ド、カ、リ、ト、ス、ル、人、思、ヒ、セ、テ、中、ニ、カ、

答、一、九、三、九、年、三、月、三、日、閣、議、決、定、シ、タ、ク、三、回、申、上、リ、テ、

問、貴方、前、會議、奏請、ヲ、三、次、申、カ、ド、カ、リ、ト、ス、ル、人、思、ヒ、セ、テ、中、ニ、カ、

答、一、九、三、九、年、三、月、三、日、閣、議、決、定、シ、タ、ク、三、回、申、上、リ、テ、

問、貴方、前、會議、奏請、ヲ、三、次、申、カ、ド、カ、リ、ト、ス、ル、人、思、ヒ、セ、テ、中、ニ、カ、

答、一、九、三、九、年、三、月、三、日、閣、議、決、定、シ、タ、ク、三、回、申、上、リ、テ、

問、貴方、前、會議、奏請、ヲ、三、次、申、カ、ド、カ、リ、ト、ス、ル、人、思、ヒ、セ、テ、中、ニ、カ、

答、一、九、三、九、年、三、月、三、日、閣、議、決、定、シ、タ、ク、三、回、申、上、リ、テ、

問、貴方、前、會議、奏請、ヲ、三、次、申、カ、ド、カ、リ、ト、ス、ル、人、思、ヒ、セ、テ、中、ニ、カ、

答、一、九、三、九、年、三、月、三、日、閣、議、決、定、シ、タ、ク、三、回、申、上、リ、テ、

25026



Q. # 1111

Item 3

Teletype  
Berlin, 3 July 1941  
To German Minister of Foreign Affairs.

At the occasion of a conversation with Ambassador OSHIMA concerning the recognition of WANG CHING-WEI by Denmark and Finland, I have drawn the Ambassador's attention to the latest "Revue Diplomatique". In this the Japanese attitude after the Cabinet Session is familiarly described as iridescent.

In this connection OSHIMA told me he had last night received an interim report from Tokyo concerning the present Japanese attitude, running about as follows:

1. Substance and spirit of the Tri-Partite Pact will remain the basis of Japanese foreign politics.
2. Japan wants to continue fighting the Communist organizations with Germany and strengthen her military preparations for this purpose (presumably in Manchuria.)
3. By bringing pressure to bear on England and the United States in the Southwest Pacific, Japan wants to tie down both of the Anglo-Saxon states.
4. All efforts shall be directed towards the termination of the Chinese conflict.

OSHIMA said that in this report he especially did not understand item 2. He has wired to Tokyo for commentary and has pointed out the great danger of missing an historic opportunity. He finally stated his unwillingness to help champion a wear policy on the part of Japan.

I confirmed this surprising communication to Ambassador OSHIMA with the information that Ambassador OTT has just informed us of the unsatisfactory outcome of the Cabinet Session.

WEIZSAECKER

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document # 4062 J.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

AFFIDAVIT

I. W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn or oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attaché of the United States Department of State on the staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. E. Garde  
G. E. GARDE

Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General.

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

伯林 九四年(昭和十三年)七月三日

独逸(國)外務大臣宛 テレタイプ

4062J

Item 3

丁林及芬蘭二國ハ至精備承認三國之大島大使ト討議シタ機會ニ依リ、大使ヨリ取進、外交評論ニ付テ語ニ掛ケタ。此ノ中三國議以後、日本ノ態度ガ周知ノ如ク様々ニ表現サレテ居ルベシ。

大島ノ保リトシテ就テ次ノ如ク語ツタ。彼ハ今晚東京ヲ現在ノ日本ノ態度ニ関スル假報告ヲ得ルニ大略次ノ如ク述ベテ居ル。

(一) 三國協定ノ内容及精神ニ依リ今後モ日本ノ外交政策ノ基礎トシテ殘

(二) 日本ハ独逸ト共ニ今後モ共產主義的諸組織ト闘ハムト欲シ此ノ爲ニノ軍備(英ラウ滿洲國ニ於ケル)ヲ強化セテ欲シラ中ニ

(三) 南西太平洋ニ於ケル英國及米國ニ對シテ壓迫ニ依リ、日本ハ兩國ニ對シテ東緯セテ欲シラ中ニ

(四) 丁元子段ヲ以テ支那事變ノ終了ニ努力ガ爲サレシヤル、大島云々。彼ハ此報告中特ニ矛盾ガ不可解デアリ。彼ハ電報ヲ註釋ヲ東京ニ照シタ。彼ハ使的機会ヲ逸スル大ナル危險ヲ指稱シタ。結論トシテ、彼ハ軟弱ノ日本、政策ヲ共同ニテ代表シ度クハ無クハ明言シタ。

余ハ大島大使此ノ故寫ラ可キ報告ヲ更ニオシト大使ガ我々唯今何議ノ不満足ヲ經過ニ付報告ニ兼テ三ノ情報ニ依ツテモ亦保證シタ。

ヴァイスゼツカー

EX 1111

書類 中 西 〇 六 二 丁 号

證

4062  
Stem 3

余 Ulrich Straus 八 余ガ独逸語及心

日本語ニ精通セル者ナレト並ニ

独逸語原文及心 日本語原文ヲ对照、

右ハ本書類ヲト具実ニ且正確ニ鑑認セルモ

ノナリヲ確認セルコトヲ茲ニ證ス

Ulrich A. Straus

供 送 書

余、W. P. カミング ( W. P. CUMMING )

ハ正ニ直營シテ次ノ諸項ヲ証言ス

一 余ハ合衆國國務省附、同國獨逸國領事館政治顧問部員タル事、及右ニ據リ余ハ(合衆國)獨逸軍政部代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上表明セル資格ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸領事所在、柏林文書本部ニ於ル鹵獲獨逸外務省業綴文書並ニ文庫、原本ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任シアル事。

ニ 上述獨逸外務省業綴文書並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合國寇征軍最高司令部ノ指揮下ニ在ル軍隊ニヨリテ鹵獲取得セラレ、其確保ノ下ニ、初メ石邊國マールブルグニ於テ該軍隊ニヨリテ軍文書本部ニ蒐集セラレ、後該聯合軍責任官ヨリ上述セル/柏林/文書本部ニ移管セラレタルモノナル事

三 余ハ一九四五年八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグニ於テ、上述文書本部擔當ヲ命ゼラレタル事。是ニ仍リテ該鹵獲獨逸外務省業綴文書並ニ文庫原本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ駐在當時、初メテ余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任シ、爾來引續キ余ノ占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事

*Cumming's Certificate*

1.

Cummings Certificate

四 余ノ此供遞眷ノ添附セラル、所ノ文卷ハ上遞ノ  
獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫トシテ、自發セラ  
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ歸シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ  
置カレタル、獨逸外務省文書原本ノ、眞正精確  
ナル直接復寫寫眞ノ原本タル事

其 茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫寫眞原本ノ文書原  
本ハ、余ノ保管、留保ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ  
謝徳恊寛ニ賛スル如クナシアリ、爲ニ該原本ヲ  
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫眞原本ヲ提  
供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユイ。ディ。カミング  
(E. E. CUMMINGS)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且  
宣誓ス

中佐 ジー。エツチ。ガード  
G H GARDE

高級副官專務取扱  
I. F. COLCNEE, AGD  
ACTING ADJUTANT GENERAL

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部

2.

IPS Doc. No. 1632W (59)

Exhibit 1112

Corrected in accordance with Language  
Board decision, as shown on Court  
Record 10,666

D-c. Div.

Page 1

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 5 July 41"

.....Foreign Minister MATSUOKA proceeded to the Palace at 2 p.m., and we talked after his withdrawal from the Imperial presence. He said that information of the diplomatic parley between France and Japan relative to the Japanese Army's entry into French Indo-China seemed to have leaked out, for Ambassador CRAIGIE had lodged a protest with us through Mr. OHASHI, Vice Foreign Minister, saying that if the above were true, England would consider it a serious problem. Therefore the negotiations which had been originally scheduled to start today or thereabout were decided to be postponed for another five days in order to watch necessary developments.

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

EX1112

Doc No 32 W (59)

木戸侯爵日記

清和十六年七月五日

七月五日 (土) 晴

午前九時植建氏來訪面談

十時二十分ヨリ十一時三十分海軍令部ノ預  
諭云々等ニツキ御話アリタリ

一時半山崎總監來露給安ニツキ秘百ヲ預ク

三時松岡外相參内面談 印達應ニツキ察ハ今日預

ヨリ右ノ外交々渉ヲ進メソトシムバトコロ外部ニ

揚シタルト見ヘクレীগーヨリ石ノ事案ナレバ莫

國トシテハ極メテシーリアスナ向廻ト考フル旨ノ

申入リ大橋次官ニナシタル事實ヨリ之ヲ推移シ見

ル爲メ五日許リ延期スル決心ナリトノ話アリタリ

四時歸宅四時半岡田文琴氏來訪面談



Doc. No. 4062 K  
Item 15

Page 1

To be kept in locked file.

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 7 July 1941 3.45 hours

Arrival: 7 July 1941 14.30 hours

No. 1151 of 7 July

*Memorandum Note: Sent to  
Special Train under No. 2196.  
Tel. Rt — 17 July.  
Most urgent!*

Re: Telegram of 3rd, No. 965, Foreign Ministry.  
For the German Foreign Minister.

Had the opportunity to talk personally to SHIRATORI in a spa, where he is living on account of illness. At this occasion he amplified as follows to news regarding his illness already conveyed to me and the Italian Ambassador from his intimate circle: Since the end of April he is suffering from kidney trouble and was in danger of his life for weeks. Recently there had been an improvement, to that the doctor hopes for recovery until fall. He has had to abstain from all political work and today, with me, has had his first talk outside of his closest circle. SHIRATORI made the impression of needing rest and being mentally tired; he visibly suffered from a difficulty at walking, and also complained of it. I transmitted him the best wishes of the German Foreign Minister for his recovery which evidently greatly pleased him. He asked me to thank the German Foreign Minister and to assure /him/ that as soon as he was able to take up his political work again, he wants unchangedly to advocate an active course for JAPAN, and that he regarded the entry into the war against RUSSIA as the most urgent goal.

CTT

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the german and english languages, and as a result of the comparison between the german and the english texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4062K.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

AFFIDAVIT

I. W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attaché of the United States Department of State on the staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde  
G. H. GARDE

Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General.

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

Doc 4062k  
Kiam, J.

9X1113

No. 1

電報 (秘密音字)

電報 戶項 取款

來美 一九五五年六月廿七日

者 六月廿七日 下午三時

六月廿七日 下午三時

緊急

傳話

十 隱匿外務部

九二一九六三六三

十二日附電報六三六三

特別訓令三三三

Tel. 1113

隱匿外務部之三

白馬小姐與其兄，為其在上海之溫床場，個人之生活  
 機會多，得自彼其，際彼彼心，在中之，私亦一伊不利大獲  
 二已感之，如以前，彼，病氣三國之，報告，補足，即  
 自彼四月以來，野病，程，而，字，數，週，有，危，病，狀，態，陷  
 于，平，心，最近，快，意，向，以，其，心，從，其，要，言，心，報，其，快，便，可，設  
 字，平，心，彼，六，三，五，九，被，檢，約，十，行，子，行，年，引，多，心，公，子，心，公  
 而，多，令，白，私，小姐，最，主，親，才，仰，向，外，子，才，回，會，換，行，不  
 自，島，人，保，護，子，心，要，上，心，精，神，的，三，據，及，印，發，各，各，人，及，請  
 力，一，彼，不，款，不，年，心，步，行，國，難，三，無，惱，子，才，人，私，人，松，逸，不，人，自，身

Doc 4062.K  
Item 15.

No. 2.

、彼、回復ニ対スル最上、熱望ヲ彼ニ傳達シタコトハ明ニカニ彼  
ヲ非常ニ喜ビタ。彼、独逸ニ大臣ニ感謝シ又彼ガ政治的仕事  
ヲ再ニ始メトガ出スルヤ、吾々、日本、能動的行動ニ対シテ不変  
ニ一役買ハルコトヲ欲シタリ。而シテロヤト、戦争開始ヨ最ニ差  
違ハク目的ト別做シテ中心ヲ獨逸ニ大臣ニ断言スル様ニ懇願  
シタリ

オット

Doc 4062K  
Item 15

書類 四〇六二K 號

證

余 Ulrich Strass の余が独逸語及び  
日本語ニ精通スル者ナルコト並ニ独逸語  
原文及び日本語原文ヲ对照シ上右ノ本書類ヨリ具定  
ニ且正確ニ翻譯セルモノタルヲ確證スルコトヲ茲ニ證ス

Ulrich A. Strass

no3

*Cumming's Certificate*

供 題 卷

余、W. P. カミング ( W. P. CUMMING ) ハ  
正式ニ宣誓シテ次ノ諸項ヲ証言ス

一 余ハ合衆國國務省附、同國獨逸關係事項政治原  
因部員タル事、及右ニ據リ余ハ (合衆國) 獨逸  
軍政部代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上表明セル資  
格ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸柏林所在、柏林文藝本部ニ  
於ケル獨逸獨逸外務省集綴文藝並ニ文庫、原本  
ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任シアル事、

二 上述獨逸外務省集綴文藝並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合  
國遠征軍最高司令部ノ指揮下ニ在ル軍隊ニヨリ  
テ鹵獲取得セラレ、其確保ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國  
マールブルグニ於テ該軍隊ニヨリテ軍文藝本部  
ニ蒐集セラレ、後該聯合軍擔任官ヨリ上述セル  
ノ柏林ノ文藝本部ニ移管セラレタルモノナル事

三 余ハ一九四五年八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグ  
ニ於テ、上述文藝本部適當ヲ命セラレタル事。  
是ニ仍リテ該鹵獲獨逸外務省集綴文藝並ニ文庫原  
本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ駐在當時、初メテ  
余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任シ、爾來引續キ余  
占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事

*Cummings Certificate*

四 余ノ此供遞書ノ添附セラル、所ノ文書ハ上述ノ  
獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫トシテ、自達セラ  
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ歸シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ  
置カレタル、獨逸外務省文書原本ノ、真正精確  
ナル直接復寫寫眞ノ原本タル事

五 茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫寫眞原本ノ文書原  
本ハ、余ノ保管、管理ノ下ニ、希方國代表者ノ  
點檢點覽ニ費スル如クナシアリ、爲ニ該原本ヲ  
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫眞原本ヲ提  
供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユイ。ディ。カミング

(W. P. CUMMINGS)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且  
宣誓ス

中 佐 シー。エツチ。ガード

G H GARDE

高級語言專務取扱

L. F. COLONEL, AGD

ACTING ADJUTANT GENERAL

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部

2.



Ex # 1114

Document No. 4052-C

Page 1

Item 2

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo - 15 July 1941 - 1150 hours  
Arrival 16 July 1941 - 7.30 hours

No. 1246 of 15 July            MOST URGENT!  
Secret.

MARGINAL NOTE: Sent to Special Train without a number Tel. Kt. -  
16 July.

Japanese Vice Foreign Minister just asked me to see him and informed me of the following with the request for handling it strictly confidentially.

The Japanese Government has commissioned its Ambassador in VICHY to enter into negotiations with the French Government in order to obtain their consent to station a number of Japanese troops in South Indo-China and to set up one naval base each in SAIGON and COMCHAM/sic. CAMBANE/as well as several air bases. The object was a common defense with the French authorities against harmful influences on the part of the De Gaulle movement fostered by England and America. The Japanese Government is vitally interested in a peaceful development of Indo-China politically and economically, especially economically, in order to secure the vital supply of foodstuffs and raw materials. The Japanese Government has no territorial intentions--does not wish to infringe on the sovereignty of Indo-China and intends to stand by the agreements of August of last year and the treaties recently signed with the French Government re Indo-China. She hopes to reach her goal by peaceful means but is determined to definitely succeed against any eventual interference by England or America. Japan expects the negotiations to be successfully terminated by 30 July and will then commence the occupation. Should the French Government claim the help of the German Government against the Japanese request, Japan requests the German government to influence VICHY in the sense of a peaceful settlement.

The Italian Ambassador will be informed to the same effect. One group missing. Other governments and the French ambassador in Tokyo will not be informed.

CTT

Certificate

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of Internation Prosecution Document No. 4052C.

/S/ Ulrich A. Straus

AFFIDAVIT

I. W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. E. Garde  
G. E. GARDE

Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General.

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

doc 4052c. 20m2

電報 (秘密暗号法)

東京 一九四三年(昭和十七年)七月十五日 十時五十分  
着 " " " 十六時三十分  
七月五日 信第一三四六號 大至急

欄外註

番號 1-1 特別列車 轉送 七月十六日 信電 如  
日本外務次官ハ印度私ヲ来訪ヲ求メ極秘ヲ取扱ヒ可敷トタシ  
テ此事ヲ傳ヘテ日本政府ハ「ガーンシー」日本大使ニ南備印  
多額ノ日本軍隊ヲ駐屯セシメ「ガーンシー」コモラシム此種シ  
各ノツビノ油庫其地上敷設機航定基地ヲ設定スルヲナス  
政府ノ許シヲ得ル爲メフランス政府ト交渉スルニ指令ヲ發シ  
テ其目的ハ英側ヨリ進メシル「ゴール」運搬ノ有等ト  
ル影響ニ對シフランス当局ト共同防衛スルニ日本政府ハ  
印度支那本和的發展ニ(政治的經濟的ニ持ニ經濟的ニ食  
糧ト原料重大ニ供給ヲ確保スル爲ニ非常ニ關心ヲ有スル日  
本政府ハ何れも領土の意圖ハナク印度支那ノ主權ヲ侵害  
スル積ムナシ昨昔會ノ協定及最近署名セラル「フランス政府  
ト印度支那ニ關スル條約ヲ遵守スル積ムナク日本政府ハ自  
己ノ目的ヲ平和的方法ニ以テ達成セト希望シテ其間  
英米側力ヲ干渉ニ對シテ「絶對」ノ主張ヲ貫徹スル決  
心アリ日本ハ交渉ガ七月三日ニ成功裡ニ終了シ「ソレカラ  
首領ガ始ム事ヲ期待シテ居ル「フランス」政府ガ萬一日本ノ  
依頼ニ對シテ獨乙政府ノ援助ヲ要求スルニ日本ハ獨乙  
政府ニ平和的解決ノ意味ヲ「ガーンシー」ニ働キカニルニ  
御意ニシタス

6x 1114

Doc HASZC stam2

伊太利使(同)趣事(事)知(知)ル(ル)ハ(ハ)シ(シ)ク(ク)他(他)一(一)政(政)府(府)也(也)  
東京駐在(在)ノ(ノ)公(公)使(使)ニ(ニ)何(何)事(事)ヲ(ヲ)知(知)ル(ル)ハ(ハ)シ(シ)ク(ク)

グット

x x x

書教第田五三〇號  
證

余 Ulrich Straus (余) 所(所)著(著)之(之)語(語)及(及)日(日)本(本)語(語)ニ(ニ)精(精)  
ニ(ニ)通(通)ジ(ジ)ル(ル)者(者)ト(ト)シ(シ)テ(テ)其(其)語(語)原(原)文(文)及(及)日(日)本(本)語(語)原(原)文(文)ヲ(ヲ)對(對)照(照)  
シ(シ)テ(テ)本(本)書(書)類(類)ヲ(ヲ)撰(撰)集(集)ス(ス)且(且)正(正)確(確)ニ(ニ)翻(翻)譯(譯)セ(セ)ル(ル)ト(ト)シ(シ)テ(テ)確(確)  
證(證)セ(セ)ル(ル)ト(ト)シ(シ)テ(テ)証(証)ス(ス)

Ulrich, A. Straus

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 15 July 41"

MATSUDAIRA came from Tokyo at eight a.m. to report on the outcome of his meeting with Premier KONOYE. There still remained a certain vagueness about Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's attitude towards the proposal formula for a Japan-American understanding. Under the circumstances, up to yesterday the Premier was of the opinion that should the Foreign Minister agree to the formula prepared by the Director of Military Affairs and the Director of Naval Affairs, with a few alterations he would push the policy as it was. Although the Foreign Minister had no objection to the formula, he insisted on giving instructions to Ambassador NOMURA in Washington to the effect that the Government would reject the oral statement of Mr. Cordell Hull, as it was of a disgraceful nature for Japan. After that he said that he would wire a compromise formula to Admiral Kichisaburo NOMURA. But Prince KONOYE was of the opinion that our formula should be wired at the same time, because if we followed MATSUOKA's idea, there would be a possibility that America might take it as our intention to discontinue the negotiations. Advisor SAITO advised that since it could be done by the Ambassador as deemed best, how about carrying it on according to the Foreign Minister's view? But the Premier contradicted him and sent him to Mr. MATSUOKA in order to persuade him to agree with the Premier's opinion. Such was the position about 10:30 yesterday evening. At 1:30 this morning Prince KONOYE telephoned me to say that he had waited long for MATSUOKA's answer in vain, so he had sent Director TERAZAKI to Mr. MATSUOKA to hold an enquiry into the circumstances. It became clear that he had sent his instructions to NOMURA by himself and not through the medium of the competent director, and that he intended to call on me at Hayama to work out remedial measures. I had a conference with the chief secretary regarding policy in the event of the expected resignation en bloc of the Cabinet. At this time when the tension prevailing over the people regarding the present political situation was so strong that even some higher schools closed lest disturbances should arise an overall political change for some unknown reason should be avoided by all means. For this purpose we should try everything possible to obtain, first of all, the resignation of the Foreign Minister. In the case of failure of our effort to make the Foreign Minister resign, resulting in the resignation 'en bloc' of the Cabinet, we resolve to prevail upon the Emperor to issue an Imperial command to Prince KONOYE to form a new Cabinet in order to tide over the difficult political situation.

RETURN TO ROOM 361

I went to my office at 11 a.m. I was received in audience by the Emperor from 1:35 p.m. to 2 p.m. to report on the above circumstances. Prince KONOYE came to see me from Tokyo at 3 p.m. We had a talk until 4:30 p.m. What I heard from the Premier was almost the same as the information I had received from the Chief Secretary.

I thought it was advisable to urge Mr. MATSUOKA's resignation to avoid a change of Cabinet, but the Premier disagreed with me saying that if this were done Mr. MATSUOKA and his party would make propaganda to the effect that the cause which had compelled his resignation was nothing but pressure on the part of the U.S.A. upon our Government.

水戸侯爵日記

昭和十六年七月十三日分

七月十五日 (火)

Dec 16.32 W (60)

EX 1115

曇

午前八時松平總督官長東京ヨリ來訪  
 近衛首相ト連絡ノ結果ニツキ報告ヲ得タリ  
 一日米穀採集ニ就テハ依然松岡外相ノ態度ニ  
 釋然タラザルモノアリ  
 一昨日迄ノ情況ニテハ首相ハ陸海兩軍務局長  
 ノ手許ニテ作製セル案ニ對シ外相ニ於テ些  
 少ノ修正ニテ應答スル様ナレバ此儘ニテ進  
 ム考ヘナリシガ  
 外相ハ昨日軍務局長案ヲ見テ案ニハ異存ナキ  
 モハル長官ノオーラルステートメントハ國辱  
 ナレバ先ヅ之ヲ拒否スル旨ノ電報ヲ野村大使  
 ニ與ヘ然ル後ニ諒解案ヲ電報シタツトノ意見  
 ナルガ之ニ對シ首相ハ若シ右ノ如ク起ベバ米  
 國側ハ當然從來ノ交渉ヲ打切ルモノト考フル  
 ノ良アレバ之ヲ同時ニ電報スルヲ可トストノ  
 意見ナリキ右ニ對シ野村顧問ハ大使ニ於テ可  
 然取計フベケレバ外相ノ意見ノ通り進ビテハ

Doc 1632 W (40)

2.

如何トノコトナリシガ首相ハ之ニ同意セズ同  
 顧問ヲ外相ノ辭ニ遣シ首相ノ意見ニ同意ヲ求  
 メシメタリ以上ガ昨夜十時半頃迄ノ状況ナリ  
 然ルニ今晨一時半首相ヨリ電話ニテ英後一向  
 返事ナキヲ以テ寺衛局長ヲシテ兵調サセタル  
 ニ大佐ハ之ヲ前ハ十一時半頃ニ局長ヲ通サズ  
 候ニ致セラシタル事實判明セリヨツテ本日午  
 後ニテ業山ニ至リ内大臣ト今後ノ處置ニツキ  
 談合ヒタシトノコトナリト  
 右ニツキ總督管長ト萬一總辭職ノ場合ニ處ス  
 ル方針ニツキ打合ス  
 今日ノ實情ヨリスレバ高等學校ノ生徒等迄足  
 止メシテ暴發セル國民ニ對シ政變ソレモ理由  
 ノ不明瞭ナル政變ハ絕對ニ避クルコトヲ要ス  
 ル故先ヅ第一ハ外相ヲ辭職セシムルコト萬一  
 ソレガ實現出来ザル事情アリタル場合ハ總辭  
 職ノ外ナキモ英ノ場合ニハ降下ノ方針ヲ以  
 テ飽ク迄モ迂回公ラシテ真大驛局ノ收拾ニ當  
 ラシムルコトニ決意ス  
 十一時出勤  
 一時三十三分ヨリ二時迄拜謁以上ノ事情ノ大  
 要ヲ書上ス  
 三時近衛首相東京ヨリ沙島



3.

小松侯令嬢のぶ子さんヲ孝澄ノ旧偶ニトノ話  
ハ願詞ニ違ミ小松侯ノ方ニテモ異存ナシトノ  
コトニテ尋決定スタ食ヲ共ニス孝澄孝彦夜來  
運

Doc 1632 W (60)

直ニ國會ニ時二十分迄懇談ス。大隈秘書官長ヨリ聽キタルト同様ノ事情ナリヨツテ余ハ此際出來得ル限り政變ヲ避クル爲メ外相ノ處決ヲ求ムルコトヲ勸メタルモ首相ハ其ノ場合ニハ松岡尙ハ必ズ米國ノ注文ニテ内閣ヲ改遣シタリト云フ旨信ヲナスベク之ハ其ノ影響口白カラズト思考スル。故紙辭職ノ外ナシトノ旨ニテ答返ニ編得セラレザリキ

國時二十分近衛公拜謁ス御前ヲ退下後五時二十分ヨリ國會十分迄更ニ面談設得シタルモ續得セシル、ニ至ラザリキ

六時通運子ニ歸ル東京ヨリ宮田亞次郎君同夫人徳子ト共ニ來訪

Mem. No. 1116

Doc. No. 1632W (61)

Page 1

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 16 July 41"

At 4 p.m. Marquis MATSUUDAIRA telephoned me to say that the resignation 'en bloc' of the cabinet had been decided at a special Cabinet meeting. I had my audience with the Emperor from 4:10 p.m. to 4:20 p.m. Prince KONOYE tendered the general resignation of his Ministry at 9 p.m. I proceeded to the Palace in response to a summons from His Majesty to receive an Imperial order as to the incoming Cabinet as follows: "The Premier has tendered the order the general resignation of his Ministry we have ordered the Lord Chamberlain to invite the President of the Privy Council and the ex-Premiers to gather at the Palace and ask their opinions in order to reply to our question as to who the suitable person I talked with the Chief Secretary to arrange tomorrow's procedure and went back home at 10:30 p.m.

- In regard to the selection of a Premier of the next Cabinet
- the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal will

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 301

木戸侯爵日記

昭和十六年七月十六日分

Doc 1632 W (61)

七月十六日  
赤 雲

午前十時出勤

十一時ヨリ十二時遊弄園

二時ヨリ山下泰文中將ノ御遊園アリ陪臨

ス

四時松平侯ヨリ電話ニテ内閣ハ五時半ヨ

リ臨時閣議ヲ開キ總辭職ニ決セリト

四時十分ヨリ二十分遊弄園右ノ趣ヲ言上

ス

四時四十九分發電草ニテ歸京一旦歸宅獨

子孝達同伴ムラシニ於クル富田豊二郎氏

ノ招宴ニ臨ミ小松侯夫妻令息令嬢廿盛寺

信夫妻ト會食ス

七時二十五分新に發電草ニテ松平ノ秘書

官長同伴返子ニ至リ直ニ兼山御用邸ニ入

ル

6x 1116

1.

Doc 1632W (61)

2.

九時近衛公参内併表ヲ導出ス

九時十分御召アリ後繼内閣ニツキ左ノ如ク御命ヲ弁ス

近衛内閣總理大臣ハ併表ヲ差出シタ

後繼内閣主班者ヲ選定スルニ付キ近衛

院議長及元總理大臣タリシモノヲ侍從

長ニ命シテ招集サセルカラ内大臣ハ是

等ノ人々ノ意見ヲ徴シ適任者ヲ奉答セ

ヨ

秘書官長ト明日ノ打合ヲナシ午後十時半

退出選手別荘ニ入ル

備子孝彦來返

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 17 July 41"

I left for Tokyo by train, leaving at 8:44 a.m. and proceeded to my office. I met HARA, President of the Privy Council, WAKATSUKI, OKADA, ABE, YONAI, HAYASHI and HIROTA at 1 p.m. Mr. KANROJI, Vice Lord Chamberlain, delivered an Imperial message, and then I expressed my opinion as follows: As stated by the Vice Lord Chamberlain, I received the Imperial Order to give a reply after gathering Your Excellency's opinions.

"The Emperor has ordered me to gather your opinions before I make a reply to the Throne regarding the Premier of the succeeding Cabinet. I, therefore, would like to have your frank opinions on this matter as I had on a previous occasion. Of course as you all know this is not a formal conference and no resolutions will be passed, but I should like to have a heart-to-heart talk in a friendly atmosphere. Our utterances in this place are expected to be kept confidential."

A copy of the Premier's resignation was circulated for reference.

WAKATSUKI questioned me as to the purpose of the resignation and the diplomatic problems (i.e. the clash of opinions between the Premier and Foreign Minister). ABE stressed the necessity of having Prince KONOYE as Premier; OKADA recommended Prince KONOYE, as a person good for the military and capable of exercising general control over all lines of political circles; HAYASHI held the same opinion as ABE and OKADA; HARA did not differ from the above-mentioned; HIROTA laid stress upon the reinforcement of G.H.Q. and the formation of a military Cabinet, but he consented to the opinion of the rest upon my explanation of the establishment of G.H.Q. In the palace YONAI said no other person than Prince KONOYE would do, that Prince KONOYE was the most suitable man to cope with the present difficulty. WAKATSUKI supported Prince KONOYE though his attitude was not positive. We recommended Prince KONOYE unanimously and closed our meeting at 2 p.m. The Emperor and Empress returned to Tokyo from their Hayama Villa. I visited the Emperor from 3:30 p.m. to 4:10 p.m. to report on the progress of our meeting, while the Lord Chamberlain telephoned to Prince KONOYE to request his presence at the Palace. At 5:05 p.m. Prince KONOYE proceeded to the Palace to receive the Imperial command to form a cabinet. After his audience, I met and talked with him. OKASHI, Vice Foreign Minister, visited me at 5:50 p.m. to explain the draft understanding between the U.S.A. and this country.

FILE COOPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

木更保書日記

昭和十六年七月十七日

七月十七日 (木)

曇

午前八時三十分發ニテ上京直ニ出陣  
 午後一時西三ノ岡ニ原相相、若槻、岡田、阿部、米  
 内、赤原、田ノ越氏、森田、泊田ニ於テ會談ス  
 首領寺待從次長ヨリ連官ノ待從アリ次イテ余  
 ヨリ左ノ如ク陳述ス  
 只今待從次長ヨリ御話ガアリマシタ通り陛下  
 ヨリ常ニ陛下方ノ御意見ヲ承リタル上奉答ス  
 ル御下命ガアリマシタ就キマシテハ前山ノ  
 通り充分御都合ヲ願ヒ臨志ナキ御志見ヲ承ル  
 趣意ヲ御一所ニ御願ヒ談シタ次第デアリマス  
 又尋ノ性質上卓スマテモナイコトト存シマス  
 ガ會議テハアリマセンカラ次等ハ取リマセン存ス  
 テ懇談的ニ御都合ヲ願ヒ意ヲ盡シ度ト存シマ  
 ス  
 申ス趣モナイコトデアリマスガ此趣テノ御發  
 言ハ與極限リト云フコトニ御願ヒ談シマス、  
 邊寺ノ愛ス先ツ近衛總理ノ御要ヲ願ヒ、

EX 1117  
Doc 1632 k1 (62)

EX 1117

1.

Doc 16.32 W (62)

若槻氏ヨリ辭表ノ趣旨、外交上ノ問題（意見ノ相違等）ニツキ質問アリ

阿部氏ヨリ此際近衛公ニ幕府下参兵ノ意見開陳アリ岡田氏ヨリモ軍ニモヨク政治ノ各方面ノ線ヲ線指シ得ル人トシテハ近衛公以外ニハナシトノ理由ニテ近衛公ヲ推選ス林氏モ雨氏ト同意見ナリト述ベラル原首相モ同様ノ意見ナリ兵農田氏ハ大本營強化軍隊的內閣ヲ方説セラレシガ余ヨリ大本營官中ニ誤區ノ危險ヲ説明セシ結果近衛公ニ同意セラル米内氏モ近衛公ヲ推選ス米内氏モ一談ニテ近衛公推選ニ決シ二時退會ス

三時二十分栗山ヨリ幕府下参兵推選  
三時半ヨリ四時十分近衛公推選ノ經過ヲ報告  
皆卓上ク此間待從長ヨリ近衛公推選ノ趣旨ヲ謝ク

五時五分近衛公推選大合ヲ辨ス。御世ヲ退下後山談ス

五時五十分大藏省茶屋日本米穀局長ニツキ説明ヲ請ク



Ex. # 1118

Doc. No. 4052F

Page 1

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 20 July 1941 1.50 hours  
Arrival, 20 July 4.20 hours

To be kept in  
Locked File

No. 1297 of 19 July

Most Urgent!

In reference to telegram No. 1295 Pol VIII of 19 July.

The translation of the Foreign Minister's declaration follows:

"Entrusted with the post of Foreign Minister, I permit myself to hereby introduce myself to the German (the Italian) Ambassador in Tokyo.

I respectfully request that you transmit my regards to your Foreign Minister and to inform him that I was unexpectedly entrusted with the post of Foreign Minister, now forming of the Cabinet.

At the same time I would like to officially inform you and your government of the change of the Imperial Japanese government. As you have perceived from the announcement by the Imperial Government, this governmental change was effected in order to firstly carry out political measures suitable to the international situation, and further to be able to take, as soon as possible, the necessary steps for strengthening the inner political situation of the country. Outside of these points there existed no grounds for the governmental change, and the hitherto policy of the Japanese Empire will in no case undergo any change. I request that you take particular cognizance of the fact /that/ Japan's policy will rest on the basis of the spirit and aims of the Tripartite Pact, concluded between Japan, Germany, and Italy. No change whatever will take place in Japan's attitude toward Germany and Italy, as former Foreign Minister MATSUOKA clearly expressed to you, based on the cabinet decision of 2 July. I respectfully request that you also notify your government of the above. I personally was active in the Navy at the time of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, and had a share in its realization. As successor of former Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, I intend to continue his foreign policy and to still strengthen the close unity of Japan, Germany, and Italy, and march forward in the common spirit. I express the hope that you, Mr. Ambassador, will bestow upon me, just as the former Foreign Minister, your valued friendship and collaboration.

OTT.

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4052F.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus, 2d Lt.

AFFIDAVIT

I. W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. E. Gerde  
G. E. GARDE

Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General.

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

EX 1118

Doc 4052 F

記

報 (電報附録)

電報事務トシテノ取扱ノ事

東京一九四一年七月二十日 一時五十分

着 〃 〃 二十日 四時二十分

七月十九日附第一二九七號

急 繁

七月十九日附電報第廿一二九五號對照

外務大臣ノ宣言ノ要旨ノ翻譯次ノ如シ

一 外務大臣ノ職ヲ引受ケ私ハ茲ニ東京獨逸 (伊太利)

大使ニ自己ヲ紹介スル事ヲお許シ下サイ。

私ハ貴國ニ感謝ニ獨逸外務大臣閣下ニ宣敷ク御

儀へ下サレ又閣下ニ私ガ内閣改選ニ際シ四ラズモ外

務大臣ノ地位ヲ委託サレタ事ヲ知ラサレシ事ヲ御願

敬シマス。

同時ニ私ハ貴國並ニ獨逸政府ニ公式ニ日本帝國政府

ノ更迭ニ處キオ知ラセシテ頂キ度イ。貴國ガ帝國政

府ノ告示カラ御承知ノ如ク今度ノ政府更迭ハ一ツニ

ハ國際情勢ニ相應ジケル政治的處置ヲ行シ、且更

ラニ出來ル限リ速ニ此ノ國ノ内政状態ヲ強化ノ爲必

要ナル處置ヲ執リ得ル爲實行サレタノ事ナル。之等ノ

點以外ニ政府更迭ニ對スル何等ノ理由ナク又日本帝

國ノ從來ノ政策ハ如何ナル場合ニモ變更モ行ハレナ

イテアラウ

Doc 4052 F

2.

私ハ貴殿ニ對シ日本ノ政策ハ日本獨逸伊太利國ニテ  
 締結サレタ三國同盟ノ締結並ニ目的ノ達成ニ立ツテ  
 アラウトイノ學ヲ承知サレシ事ヲオ願ヒスル。前外  
 務大臣松岡が去月二日ノ内閣決議ニ基キ貴殿ニ明瞭  
 ニ述べた如ク日本ノ獨逸伊太利ニハ何等ノ變更モ行  
 ハレナイヲアラサ。私ハ貴殿ニ致モ敬意ニ上達ノ事  
 モ同様ニ貴國政府ニ傳達サレシ事ヲオ願スル

私ハ個人的ニハ三三條締結當時海軍ニ勤勞シテ  
 キタ、而シテソノ成立ニ際シテハ無關係ヲハナカツ  
 タ。前外務大臣松岡ノ後任トシテ私ハ彼ノ外交政策  
 ヲ繼續シ而シテ更ニ日、獨、伊ノ羣國タル團結ヲヨ  
 リ強化シ共同精神ニ於テ前途ニ邁進スル意圖デアリ  
 マス、私ハ貴殿大使閣下ニ前外務大臣ト同ジ様ニ私  
 ニ貴殿ノ尊重サレテキル友誼並ニ共働ヲ與ヘラレン  
 事ヲ希望シマス。

オ ツ ト

登録第四〇五二五號

證

Doc 4052 F

余 Ulrich Straus 余が獨逸語及ビ日本語  
 ニ精~~通~~通<sup>通</sup>セル者ナルニト並ニ獨逸語原文及ビ  
 日本語原文ヲ對照ノ上右ハ本登録ヲ眞實ニ  
 且正確ニ翻譯セルモノナルヲ確證セルニト  
 ラ茲ニ證ス

Ulrich A. Straus 2d Lt.

3.

Cumming's Certificate

供 述 卷

一 余、W. P. カミング ( W. P. CUMMING ) ハ  
正式ニ宣誓シテ次ノ諸項ヲ証言ス

一 余ハ合衆國國務省附、同國獨逸關係事項政治原  
因部長タル事、及右ニ據リ余ハ (合衆國) 獨逸  
軍政代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上表明セル資  
格ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸柏林所在、柏林文書本部ニ  
於ケル鹵魯獨逸外務省集綴文書竝ニ文庫、原本  
ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任シアル事、

二 上述獨逸外務省集綴文書竝ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合  
國遠征軍最高司令部ノ指揮下ニ在ル軍隊ニヨリ  
テ鹵魯取得セラレ、其確保ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國  
マールブルグニ於テ該軍隊ニヨリテ軍文書本部  
ニ蒐集セラレ、後該聯合軍總任官ヨリ上述セル  
ノ柏林ノ文書本部ニ移管セラレタルモノナル事

三 余ハ一九四五年八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグ  
ニ於テ、上述文書本部擔當ヲ命セラレタル事。  
是ニ仍リテ該鹵魯獨逸外務省集綴文書竝ニ文庫原  
本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ駐在當時、初メテ  
余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任シ、爾來引續キ余  
占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事

*Cum gratia Certificate*

四 余ノ此供進書ノ添附セラル、所ノ文書ハ上述ノ  
獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫トシテ、鹵獲セラ  
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ歸シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ  
置カレタル、獨逸外務省文書原本ノ、真正精確  
ナル直接復寫寫眞ノ謄本タル事

五 茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫寫眞謄本ノ文書原  
本ハ、余ノ保管、習保ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ  
點檢閱覽ニ資スル如クナシアリ、爲ニ該原本ヲ  
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫眞謄本ヲ擬  
供シ且ツ之ガ證防ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユー・ビー・カミング  
(D. B. CUMMING)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且  
宣誓ス

中佐 ジー・エツチ・ガード

G. H. GARDE

高級副官警務取扱

Lt. COLONEL. AGD

ACTING ADJUTANT GENERAL

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部

*2.*



Q. 1119

Extract from  
Interrogation of Hideki Tojo  
15 March 1946  
p. 2-3

Q What members of the Liaison Conferences were concerned with agreements or disagreements?

A The ones who normally had this right were, on the cabinet side, the Premier, Foreign Minister, the War Minister, the Navy Minister, the President of the Cabinet Planning Board. On the Supreme Command side, there were the two Chiefs of Staff. As necessary, other cabinet members from the cabinet side, and the Assistant Chiefs of Staff from the Supreme Command side, also attended with this power, but the decisions were not by majority. They were unanimous. Discussions were continued until there was unanimous agreement.

Q Is it not true that the subject matter of all the Imperial Conferences held in 1941 had been, a short time previously, discussed by one or more Liaison Conferences and a decision made?

A Generally speaking, yes. That is to say, in each case a proposal was decided upon which was put before the Imperial Conference for a decision.

Q All of the seven regular members of the Liaison Conference, whom you have mentioned, also attended the Imperial Conferences and voted, did they not?

A Yes, of course.

△

Doc-2512B

問 逕上三頁 東條英機 對ル 訊問ニ、披萃 一、四年三月十日  
 問 連絡會議 議員中 如何ナル人々 某 登 否 決 定 係 屬 係 三 居 三 力  
 答 普通 此 權限ヲ 持 了 居 人 々 内閣 總理 大臣 外務 大臣 陸軍 大  
 臣 海軍 大臣 内閣 企劃 院 總裁 等、統帥 部 側 長 官 等、  
 必 定 係 内閣 側 他 閣 僚 又 統帥 部 側 參謀 次 長 及 軍 令 部  
 次 長 亦 登 否 決 定 關 與 之 權 限 持 了 列 解 三 力  
 然 決 定 之 數 決 了 三 力 三 力 全 員 致 了 三 力 議 論 全 員 致 了 三 力  
 續 了 三 力 三 力

問 昭和六年三月三日總て、御前會議 議題 某 少 前 三 開 了 同 三  
 數 回 連絡 會議 三 論 議 了 決 定 了 三 力 三 力 本 當 三 力 三 力  
 答 大 体 決 定 了 三 力 三 力 各 々 場 合 三 力 三 力 決 定 了 三 力 三 力 提 案 三 力 御 前  
 會 議 了 決 定 了 三 力 三 力 三 力

問 書 示 三 力 三 力 連絡 會議 三 力 何 時 三 力 議員 亦 總 三 力 御 前 會 議 三 力 出 席  
 三 力 議 決 三 力 三 力 三 力 三 力  
 答 勿 論 其 通 三 力 三 力

Ex 1119-A

RETURN TO ROOM 361  
 COPY

Ex # 1120

/p. 620/

Top Secret

Dispatched: 23 July 1941, P. M., WASHINGTON  
Received: 24 July 1941, A. M., Foreign Office

To: Foreign Minister TOYODA  
From: Ambassador NOMURA

No. 550 (Urgent - Top Secret - Ambassador's Code)

In the telegrams of July 3 and July 19, I have mentioned what the effects on Japanese-American relations would be when our southern advance is contemplated. Today, these effects have rapidly developed to a stage where there is danger that diplomatic relations between these two countries may be severed. Sensing the urgency of the situation from the conversation on Monday between WAKASUGI and the Assistant Secretary of State, on Tuesday I requested an interview with the Assistant Secretary of State. The request was finally granted and I am scheduled to interview him at 3:00 p.m. this coming Wednesday. Last night I met a cabinet member who had hurriedly returned from his trip. He too told me that Secretary HULL was taking a rest for his health and that WELLES was at a loss for what to do, and he intimated that he could not do anything for us. He asked for my opinion so I replied that I have not lost hope and will do my best according to my belief. However, it is believed that things will develop to a point just short of a diplomatic break.

/p. 621/

The cause for the rapid change of American public opinion toward JAPAN lies in the southward advance. They consider that the southward advance is the first step which will eventually lead to SINGAPORE and the DUTCH EAST INDIES. The U. S. Navy officers are presumed to have the same opinion. There is criticism that on one hand JAPAN is planning her southward advance, and on the other hand is trying to conclude an agreement with AMERICA, and that the Secretary of State is being deceived. With his physical condition as such, there are also rumors that he may resign. Furthermore, reports from TOKYO, which tend to make our real intentions questionable, keep coming in frequently. Some of the outstanding ones are: (a) The negotiations carried on by us here will be "torpedoed" in TOKYO. (b) JAPAN has explained to the Axis Powers that the adjustment of Japanese-American diplomacy is a strategem to complete preparations for a southward advance. There are rumors that even the highest authorities have begun to listen to these reports. Briefly speaking, even while the negotiations are going on, there are attempts at

/p. 622A/

alienation and slander by the third countries. It is obvious that there are opposition movements both in JAPAN and AMERICA and the situation now is really difficult.

I suggest that the Japanese government lose no time in manifesting to the American ambassador the sincere intentions of JAPAN in regard to the adjustment of Japanese-American diplomacy and the real intentions of JAPAN's occupation in FRENCH INDO-CHINA. It is also requested that you notify me as soon as possible of the new cabinet's policy toward AMERICA. As a man given a new lease on life, I am resolved to do my utmost. (End)

1. 941120

Doc 1383 E

昭和十六年七月二十三日後奉府發

七月二十四日前本省着

豐田外務大臣

野村大使

第五五〇號（至急、極秘、館長符號）

我南進ノ場合日米關係ニ及ホス影響ニ付テハ七月  
 七月十九日電ヲ以テ申進セシ處今日其ノ影響ハ可成リ  
 急速度ヲ以テ進展シ國交斷絶一步手前迄進ムノ悞大ナ  
 リ月臨若杉國務次官會談ニ依リ事態ノ急迫ヲ感シ火曜  
 日國務次官ニ會見ヲ申込ミシ處漸ク今水曜午後三時會  
 見ノ答ナリ昨夜急據旅行先ヨリ歸來セル一閣僚ニ面  
 セル處同氏モ「ハル」長官ハ保養中ナリ「ウエ」ルズニ  
 モ因却シツツアリトテ何トモシ難キ口吻ナリ本使ノ意  
 見ヲ問ヘルヲ以テ本使ハ決シテ希望ヲ失ハス所信ニ從  
 ヒ最善ヲ盡スト答ヘ置キタルモ國交斷絶一步手前迄行  
 クモノト認メラル

當方面ノ對日空氣急變ノ原因ハ南進ニ在リ而シテ南進  
 ハ總テ新嘉坡、蘭印ニ進ム第一歩ナリト認ムルニ在リ  
 當國海軍軍人モ爾ク認メツツアル模樣ナリ又日本ハ一  
 面日米了解ヲ變物ト爲シ反面南進ノ策ヲ立テ國務長官

FILE COPY  
 RETURN TO ROOM 361

Doc 1383E

2.

シタキ覚悟ナリ（了）  
相成度ク本使モ起死同生ノ積リニテ十二分ノ努力ヲ致  
度シ又本使ニ對シテハ至急新内閣ノ對米御方針御内示  
調節ニ關スル誠意ト御印進駐ノ眞意トヲ御披露相成様致  
就テハ一面米國大使ニ様ヲ失セズ日本政府ノ日米國交  
相違ナシ今ヤ眞ニ六ヶ敷キ形勢ニ在リ  
劍ノ離間中傷アリ日米双方ニ六々反對運動アリタルニ  
リタリト云フ説モアリ要スルニ交渉進行中既ニ第三國  
リ此等ノ情報ニハ最高責任者モ漸ク耳ヲ傾ケ出スニ至  
備完成迄ノ謀略ナリト云フ説明ヲ與ヘタリト云フニ在  
サルヘシ（口）日本ハ樞軸側ニ對シ日米國交調節ハ兩進準  
ハ（イ）本使等ノ交渉ハ東京ニ於テ爆發（「トルビド」）  
意ヲ疑ハシムル情報類々トシテ來リ最モ顯著ナルモノ  
康狀況ト相俟テ辭職説モアル由ナリ又東京ヨリハ我眞  
ノ如キハ國サレタルナリトノ非難モアル運ニテ長官ノ健

Q. 1121

Doc. No. 4052-G  
(Item 39)

Page 1

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo 24 July 41 1150 hours  
Arrival 25 July 41 1.30 hours

No. 1353 of 24 July

Most urgent!

The Japanese Foreign Minister who asked me to see him this afternoon received me in the presence of an interpreter in order to inform me that the Japanese - French negotiations re occupation of bases in Indo-China had resulted, according to him, in an agreement on 20 July in VICHY. At present a protocol and a communique are being agreed upon by the two governments, according to which, among other things; it will be determined that the integrity of Indo-China and French sovereignty over the area will not be impaired. Presumably, the communique would be published on 26 July.

The Foreign Minister then expressed his thanks for the cooperation rendered by Germany to Japan.

When I asked whether the preparations and agreements were of such a kind that no local difficulties had to be reckoned with, Admiral TOYODA replied that the agreements are guaranteeing the frictionless course of events, the more so since the Chief of the Japanese military mission in Indo-China, General SUMITA, has conferred about all details with Governor-General DECOUX. I then transmitted to the Japanese Foreign Minister, according to my instructions, the thanks of the German Foreign Minister for the statement handed me at my last visit.

Concerning his request, I then explained to the Foreign Minister how things stood in regard to our military action in SOVIET RUSSIA on the basis of the available material. The Foreign Minister received my information with visible satisfaction. I then asked him to keep us informed, as heretofore, of the reports by the Japanese missions in Soviet Russian and England. He promised to do this. Then I asked him, whether there was a report, by now, of the Japanese Ambassador in Washington concerning the reception on the part of the American government of the Japanese reply. Foreign Minister replied that he had not yet found time to deal with American problems owing to the Japanese-French negotiations. I drew the attention of the Japanese Foreign Minister to our urgent interest to be completely informed in time of the state of the conversation.

OTT.

Doc. No. 4052-G  
(Item No. 39)

Page 2

Certificate:

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the german and english languages, and as a result of the comparison between the german and the english texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4052-G.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus



AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the staff of the United States Political Advisor on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)



Doc. HASS2 of stem 59

外相ハ日佛交渉ノタメニ未ダアメリカ問題ヲ取扱ツテ居ル暇  
ガナカク上英(タ)私ニ會談現況ヲ適時且ツ完全ニ知ラ  
サレタト云フ物ニ一印実ナル関心ヲ日本外相ニ指摘ス。  
キット

書籍第四〇九ニ付  
証

余 Ulrich Straus (余が著る語及日本語ニ  
精ニ通ル者ナリ)ト著ニ著る語原文及日本語原文ヲ著  
ル。ト右ノ本書籍ヲ具實ニ且正確ニ翻譯セルコトヲ  
確證セルコトヲ著ニ證ス

Ulrich, A, Straus

Cumming's Certificate

供 送 書

余、W. P. カミング ( W. P. CUMMING ) ハ  
正式ニ宣誓シテ次ノ諸項ヲ證言ス

一 余ハ合衆國國務省附、同國獨逸關係專項政治原  
問部員タル事、及右ニ據リ余ハ(合衆國)獨逸  
軍政部代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上表明セル資  
格ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸柏林所在、柏林文藝本部ニ  
於ケル爾等獨逸外務省集綴文藝並ニ文庫、原本  
ノ占有、保管、管理ニ任ジアル事、

二 上述獨逸外務省集綴文藝並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合  
國遠征軍最高司令部ノ指揮下ニ在ル軍隊ニヨリ  
テ爾等取得セラレ、其確保ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國  
マールブルグニ於テ該軍隊ニヨリテ軍文藝本部  
ニ蒐集セラレ、後該聯合軍總任官ヨリ上述セル  
ノ柏林ノ文藝本部ニ移管セラレタルモノナル事

三 余ハ一九四五年八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグ  
ニ於テ、上述文藝本部擔當ヲ命セラレタル事。  
是ニ仍リテ該爾等獨逸外務省集綴文藝並ニ文庫原  
本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ駐在當時、初メテ  
余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ歸シ、爾來引續キ余  
占有、保管、管理ノ下ニアル事

Cummings Certificate

四 余ノ此供述書ノ添附セラル、所ノ文書ハ上述ノ  
為遠外務省宗廟文書並ニ文庫トシテ、由差セラ  
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ歸シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ  
置カレタル、為遠外務省文書原本ノ、真正精確  
ナル直接復寫寫眞ノ原本タル事

五 茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫寫眞原本ノ文書原  
本ハ、余ノ保管、管理ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ  
謝儀閲覧ニ資スル如クナシアリ、為ニ該原本ヲ  
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫眞原本ヲ提  
供シ且ツ之ガ證明ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユー。ピー。カミング

(W. P. CUMMINGS)

一九四六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且  
宣誓ス

中 佐 ジー。エッチ。ガード

G H GARDE

高級陸自專務取扱

Lt. COLONEL, AGD

ACTING ADJUTANT GENERAL,

(合衆國) 獨逸軍政部

2.

Q. 1122

DOCUMENT No. 847-C

Page 1.

Foreign Ministry File of Miscellaneous Items. Item 4:

July 29 (SHOWA 16) 1941

Announcement of the Information Bureau:

With regard to the conclusion of the protocol between Japan and France, pertaining to the joint defense of French Indo-China, having hitherto been proceeding with the necessary measures for its conclusion and having obtained the Imperial sanction thereto on the 28th instant (yesterday), the Government has immediately instructed Ambassador KATO in France by telegram to sign the protocol. Ambassador KATO has signed and sealed the protocol on this 29th instant at Vichy, together with the Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Darian, thus making it effective immediately.

The full text of the protocol is as follows:

The protocol between Japan and France for the joint defense of French Indo-China.

In view of the present international situation, the Japanese Government and the French Government, recognizing a good reason for Japan to consider that the general peace tranquility and her safety are at danger, if the security of French Indo-China is menaced, do hereby conclude the following agreement, by confirming and renewing, on the one hand, the promise made by Japan to France that she will respect the rights and interests of France in the Far East, especially the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and sovereignty of France in the lands of the whole of the federated states of Indo-China, and on the other hand, the promise made by France to Japan that she will neither conclude any agreement nor enter into any understanding with a third power, in so far as Indo-China is concerned, which may presuppose directly or indirectly political, economic or military cooperation against Japan. The following stipulations are agreed upon.

1. The two Governments promise military cooperation for the joint defense of French Indo-China.
2. The measures to be taken for the above-mentioned cooperation are to be the aims of a special arrangement.
3. The above provisions shall only remain in force so long as the situation which prompted their adoption exists.

In witness thereof, we, the undernamed, duly authorized by our respective government, do hereby have set hands and seals to this protocol which will become effective from this date.

This document is made out in duplicate, one in Japanese and the other in French at Vichy on the 29th July of the 16th year of Showa, or the 29th July 1941.

KATO S<sup>o</sup>tomatsu

Darlan

6X 1122

847C-1

情報局發表 佛領印度支那ノ共同防衛ニ関スル日本  
 國「フランス」國閣議定書締結ニ付テハ、所冀ノ手  
 續ヲ進メ居タル間、昨二十八日御裁可アリタルヲ以  
 テ、直ニ在佛加藤大使ニ對シ、右議定書ニ署名方訓  
 電ヲ發シ、同大使ハ本二十六日「ロンドン」ニ於テ  
 「ダラン」に締結理業證明トシ、署名訓印ヲ了シ  
 即日實施セラレタリ議定書ノ全文左ノゴトシ

佛領印度支那ノ共同防衛ニ関スル日本國

「フランス」國閣議定書

大日本帝國政府及「フランス」國政府ハ現下ノ國際  
 情勢ヲ考慮シテノ結果佛領印度支那ノ安全カ脅威セ  
 ラルル場合ニ於テハ、日本國カ東亞ニ於ケル一般  
 利益及自國ノ安全カ危殆ニ曝サレタリト爲ス理由ア  
 ルヲ認メ此ノ機會ニ一方日本國ニ依リ爲サレタル東  
 亞ニ於ケル「フランス」國ノ權利及利益特ニ佛領印  
 度支那ノ領土保全及印度支那聯邦ノ全部ニ對スル  
 「フランス」國ノ主權ヲ尊重スル旨ノ約束ヲ、他方  
 「フランス」國ニ依リ爲サレタル日本國ニ對シ直接  
 又ハ間接ニ對抗スルガ如キ性質ノ政治上、經濟上又  
 ハ軍事上ノ協力ヲ豫見スル何等ノ協定又ハ諒解ヲモ  
 印度支那ニ關シ第三國ト締結セザル旨ノ約束ヲ新ニ  
 シ左ノ諸規定ヲ協定セリ



847C-2

一 兩國政府ハ得價即既支取ノ共同防衛ノ爲互享上協  
カラ爲スモトヲ約ス

ニ 前記協力ノ爲執ルベキ措置ハ特別取極ノ目的タル  
ベシ

三 前記諸規定ハ其ノ採用ノ機運ト爲リタル情勢ノ存  
續スル限リニ於テノ其效力ヲ有スベシ

右証據トシテ下迄ハ各本國政府ヨリ正當ノ委任ヲ  
受ケ本日ヨリ實施セララル本議定書ニ署名訂印セ  
リ

昭和十六年七月二十九日即チ千九百四十一年七月二  
十九日「ヴァイシー」ニ於テ日本文及「フランクス」文  
ヲ以テ本書ニ訂ラ作處ス

加 藤 外 松  
ダ ル ラ シ

EX. 1123

Doc. No. 2502A

Page 1

Extract from

Interrogation of Hideki TOJO  
13 February 1946, Case File #20, Serial #57, pp. 5.

"Q. When was the first Imperial Conference called in 1941?

"A. It was in July, I believe. I do not remember definitely.

"Q. What was the basic reason for the Imperial Conference of July 1941?

"A. I think that the basic reason was the problem of dispatching troops to south Indo-China.

"Q. Whose plan was considered in reference to this problem?

"A. I don't remember definitely, but essentially I think it was probably the War Minister's plan. Before the Imperial Conference, there had been a Liaison Conference which had practically settled the matter. This was attended by the Prime Minister, the Ministers involved and the Chiefs of Staff.

"Q. What Ministers were involved?

"A. I don't remember clearly, but the Premier, the Foreign Minister, and the Army and Navy Ministers were involved. I am not sure whether the President of the Planning Board was there or not. The two Chiefs of Staff were also present. That was the conference."

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361

Extract from

Interrogation of Hideki TOJO  
13 February 1946, Case File #20, Serial #57, pp. 9

- "Q. What was there about the stability of Indo-China that necessitated calling an Imperial Conference in July 1941?
- "A. The China Incident was in progress and Japan was exerting every effort to successfully conclude it. Any disturbed area to the south would have an unfavorable effect on the solution of the incident. Moreover, it had been a Japanese idea for a very long time before this to maintain the stability of East Asia. A third reason is that foodstuffs, principally rice, which were imported from French Indo-China, would be unavailable if conditions were unsettled in French Indo-China. These foodstuffs were very necessary for Japan.
- "Q. Was it considered by you, as War Minister, that French Indo-China would be militarily useful in connection with the China Incident?
- "A. Of course, I thought of it. Of course, from the military point of view, there was a practical relation as far as northern French Indo-China was concerned. The supply route north from French Indo-China was of assistance to the Chinese and, furthermore, we wanted, from the military point of view, to establish air bases in northern French Indo-China so as to be able to cut off the route from Burma. However, the fact that French power had declined, as a result of conditions in Europe, necessitated the stationing of troops not only in northern Indo-China but also in the central and southern parts for the maintenance of stability."

Extract from  
Interrogation of Hideki TOJO  
13 February 1946, Case File #20, Serial #57, pp. 13.

- "Q Those same troops [referring to stationing of troops in French Indo-China] would also be of offensive assistance in case of war against those countries named [England, America and Holland]?
- "A This is a matter which will be very serious if not understood. After the decision for war on the 1st of December 1941, offensive operations were taken. The character of the operations changed and they became offensive. However, at this time, operations were defensive in character.

ex 1123

2502A-1

東條 首相ヨリノ 答ニ 依リテ  
千九百四十六年（昭和二十一年）二月十三日  
RETURN TO ROOM 2502

問 千九百四十一年（昭和十六年）ニ於テ何日最初ノ御前會議が開カレシカ。

答 其レハ七月デアツタト思ヒマス。私ハ正確ニハ覺エテ居リマセン。

問 千九百四十一年（昭和十六年）七月ノ御前會議ハ如何ナル根本的理由ニ依ルカ。

答 根本的理由ハ南部印度支那ニ軍隊ヲ派遣センガ爲メデアツタト思ヒマス。

問 此ノ問題ニ關シ誰ノ計畫ガ考慮サレシカ。

答 私ハ正確ニハ記憶シテ居リマセンガ然シ性質上多分陸軍大臣ノ案デアツタト思ヒマス。御前會議ノ前ニ連絡會議ガアリマシテ其所デ大体問題ハ解決サレテ居リマシタ。此ノ會議ニハ總理大臣、關係各大臣及ビ參謀總長並ニ軍令部總長ガ出席致シマシタ。

問 關係大臣ハ誰々ナリシヤ。

答 私ハ明確ニハ覺ヘテ居リマセンガ、首相、外務大臣、陸海軍大臣ガ含まレテ居リマシタ。企畫院總裁ガ出席セシカ否カハ確信ガアリマセン、參謀總長及ビ軍令部總長モ亦出席致シマシタ。其レガ連絡會議デアリマス。

2502 A-2

問 印度支那ノ安定ニ付キ如何ナル問題ガ千九百四  
十一年（昭和十六年）七月ニ御前會議ヲ招集ス  
ル必要ヲ生ゼシカ

答 當時支那事變ガ進行中デアリ日本ハ其ヲ成功程  
ニ終ラント凡ユル努力ヲ拂ツテ居リマシタ。  
南方ニ於ケル如何ナル不穩ナル地域ト雖事變ノ  
解決ニ好マシカラザル影響ヲ與ヘル恐レガアリ  
マシタ。加フルニ東亞ノ安定ヲ維持セントイフ  
コトハ此ノ事件ヨリツツト長キ以前ヨリノ日本  
人ノ理想デアリマシタ。

第三ノ理由ハ若シ佛印ニ於ケル狀勢ガ不安デア  
ルナラバ佛印カラ輸入サレル食糧、主トシテ米  
ガ得ラレナクナルト云フ事デアリマス。是等ノ  
食糧品ハ日本ニ取り必要缺クベカラザルモノデ  
アリマス。

問 佛印ガ支那事變ニ關係シテ軍事上有要デアルダ  
ロウト云フ事ハ陸軍大臣トシテノ貴君ニ依リ考  
ヘラレタ事デアリシヤ。

答 勿論私ガソウ考ヘマシタ。勿論軍事上ノ見地カ  
ラ北部佛印ニ關スル限リ實際上關係ガアリマス。  
佛印ヨリ北ニ向ケテノ供給路ハ中華人ニ取り大  
ナル援助デアリマシタ。加フルニ軍事上ノ見地  
地カラ緬甸「ルート」ヲ遮斷スル爲メニ北部佛

2502-A-3

印ニ飛行基地ヲ建設スル事ヲ欲シマシタ。

然シ歐洲ニ於ケル狀勢ノ結果トシテ俄爾西ノ勢力ガ劣ヘタ爲ニ安定維持ノ必要上單ニ北部僑印ノミナラズ中部及南部ニモ軍隊ヲ駐屯セシムル必要ガ生ジマシタ。

問 其等、軍隊ハ今述ベタ國々ニ對シ開戦ノ場合之ヲ攻撃スルニ大ニ役ニ立ツタノデセウ。

答 是ハ好ク了解シテ貰ハナケレバ非常ニ重大ナル結果ニナル問題デアリマス。千九百四十一年（昭和十六年）十二月一日開戦ニ決定シタ後初メテ攻撃的軍事行動が行ハレマシタ。即チ、軍事行動ノ性質ガ改變サレ攻撃的トナリマシタ。然シ其レ迄ハ軍事行動ノ性質ハ防禦的デアリマシタ。

「僑印ニ於ケル軍隊ノ駐屯ニ關シ」

Doc. No. 4167 B

Page 1

Extract from  
Interrogation of Hideki Tojo  
15 February 1946  
p. 3-4

Q. When Japan attacked the United States, what attacks were launched from French Indo-China?

A. An attack was made from Saigon, I believe, in French Indo-China southwest toward the east coast of Thailand. Planes based in southern French Indo-China also cooperated with the forces that were making the landings. That was the main force, I believe. However, there may have been some troop movements south from Canton by ship. At the same time, Navy carrier-based planes attacked Singapore. These matters are from my recollection. They were really command problems.



AFFIDAVIT

I. W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the staff of the United States Political Adviser on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. E. Garde  
G. E. GARDE

Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General.

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

1124-D

4167B

第...頁

文部省

一九四二年一月十五日

第三頁—四頁

問、日本が合衆國ヲ攻撃シテ、佛領印度支那方如何  
ナル攻撃ヲ開始スルコトナラシムルカ。

答、佛領印度支那、西貢方ニ南西方ニ泰國ノ東海岸ニ向テ  
攻撃ガ加ヘラレタト見ユ。又南部佛領印度支那ニ基  
礎ヲ持ツテ居リ飛行機ハ上陸シテ下ツル軍隊ト協力  
スルコト。

ソレハ軍方部隊ヲ下ツテ上退ス。然レニ船舶ニリテ東部  
ヲ軍方ニ或部隊ノ移動ガナラシムルコトヲ知ル。同船ニ海  
軍航空隊ノ飛行機ハ上陸スルコトヲ攻撃スルコト  
ト見ユ。又、軍方稱ハ私、記憶ニ此ナラズ。ソレハ實際  
統帥部ニ事ナリト云フ。

FILE COPY  
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7. 125

水戸侯爵日記

昭和十六年七月三十一日分

七月三十一日(木)

雨

午前九時橋本警保局長來訪治安ノ狀況等ヲ聽

十時十五分ヨリ十一時迄拜謁對米施策其他ニ

ツキ永野軍令部長ノ拜謁ノ際御下問ニ對シ奉

答ニツキ御話アリ其ノ要旨左ノ如シ

戰爭ニ關スル考へ方ハ伏見前總長官ト同様出

來得ル限り避ケ度シトノ意見ナリ

三國同盟ニハ強ク反對ナルモノノ如ク之アリ

テハ日米國交調整ハ不可能ナリト見居ル様ナ

國交調整不可能ナリトシ從ツテ油ノ供給源ヲ

有試ルノミ戰爭トナレバ武糧ニテハ二年ノ貯藏量ヲ

トナルヲ以テ寧ロ此際打ツテ出ルノ外

ナシト考へナリ

1632 W(63)  
COR  
ROOM 361

2.

Doc 1632 W (165)

然ラバ兩國戰爭トナリタル場合其結果ハ如何  
ト云フニ提出シタル書面ニハ勝ツト説明シテ  
リタル汝自分モ勝ツトハ信ズルガ而シ日本海  
海戦ノ如キ大勝ハ困難ナルベシト御下問ニナ  
リタルニ永野ハ日本海々戦ノ如キ大勝ハ勿論  
勝チ得ルヤ否モ懸案ナシト奉答セリ

斯クテハツマリ給バチノ戦ヲスルトノニトニ  
テ誠ニ危険ナリトノ御懸想ニテ眞ニ恐懼ニ堪  
ハザル次第ナリ

右ニ對シ左ノ如ク奉答ス

一 永野ノ意見ハ余リニ單純ナリ

一 先般ノ日米國交調整交渉ノ際ニモ米國ハ三國  
同盟ノ存在ハ承認セル次第ニテ米國トシテハ  
國際條約ヲ極メテ尊重スル國柄ナレバ今日之  
ヲ日本ガ廢棄スルコトガ果シテ米ノ信頼ヲ深  
ムル途ナリヤ或ハ瀝敵ヲ買フコトトナルニテ  
ラザルヤ頗ル疑問ナリ

日米國交調整ニツイテハ赤々幾段階ノ方法ヲ  
ルベク粘リ強ク建設的ニ熟慮スルノ要アルベ  
シ

Doc 1432W (63)

此點爲ト首相ノ考慮ヲ促スコトニ決スベシ  
正午及川海相ト西談永野總長ノ奏上セル意見  
ニツキ懇談ス  
一時武官長來室同上ノ件懇談  
一時半甘露寺伯來室小松侯ヨリノ返答到着  
孝彥ト鈴子嬢トノ談ハ進メラレタシトノコ  
トナル由ヲ聽キ安心ス  
二時二十分近衛公來室拜謁後西談  
三時四十分ヨリ四時五分迄拜謁ス  
七時寺崎アメリカ局長來邸電報ヲ受取ル

3.

Doc 1432W (63)

此點爲ト首相ノ考慮ヲ促スコトニ決スベシ  
正午及川海相ト面談永野總長ノ奏上セル意見  
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二時二十分近衛公來室拜謁後面談  
三時四十分ヨリ四時五分迄拜謁ス  
七時寺崎アメリカ局長來邸電報ヲ受取ル

3.

Doc. No. 2495-A

Page 1 \*

Extract from  
Interrogation of Osami NAGANO  
21 March 1946, p. 7, 8, 9

Q Admiral, who was the originator of the plan to attack Pearl Harbor?

A After being studied by the Combined Fleets the plan was brought forth in the spring of 1941 by Admiral YAMAMOTO. It was a great secret in the Combined Fleets whereby Admiral YAMAMOTO and only one or two other officers knew of it.

Q When was the plan as prepared by Admiral YAMAMOTO first called to your attention, Admiral?

A I first found out about this plan officially in October 1941. I heard prior to that that such a plan was being studied.

Q Admiral, when did you become Chief of the Naval General Staff?

A In April 1941.

Q And is it not a fact that this plan of Admiral YAMAMOTO's was called to your attention at that time?

A No, it was not. I believe it was at that time that YAMAMOTO first thought of the plan.

Q Now, Admiral, you stated that the first time the plan had been called to your attention officially was in October 1941. When was the plan called to your attention unofficially?

A About July I heard that they were training or practicing such a plan.

Q And is it not a fact, Admiral, and again I ask you not to answer me too literally but to answer my questions from your knowledge even though you were not personally present and from your knowledge as Naval Chief of Staff as to what was going on in connection with Naval activities in the light of the fact that you were Chief

of Staff and as such had general knowledge of Naval Naval activities. Is it not a fact that the Japanese Navy started practicing to place into execution the YAMAMOTO plan to attack Pearl Harbor in the spring of 1941?

A The plan came into being in the spring but it was not practiced until summer.

Q And what do you mean by summer?

A I am not sure but I believe it was about the beginning of July. The Combined Fleets went into Kagoshima and there they practiced coming in low over the mountains and dive bombing.

Q And is it not a fact also, Admiral, that in addition to those maneuvers, that the fleet also practiced with a specially designed torpedo for use in shallow water such as was known to be the situation in Pearl Harbor?

A The torpedo was completed during those maneuvers. The Combined Fleets spent a lot of time trying out this torpedo and experimenting with it.

\* \* \* \*



Doc 2495A

書類第三四九五号, A

一九四六年(昭和二十一年)三月二十日永野修身訓問書  
抜萃

第七八九頁

(問) 大將閣下、真珠灣、攻意、計畫者、誰シテシタカ。

(答) 聯合艦隊ヲ研究セタ後、此、計畫、山本大將ニ依リ一  
九四一年(昭和十六年)、春發表セシメシタ。

此、計畫、聯合艦隊テハ極秘ニサシテ居リマシタカラ、  
山本大將ト他一二名、將校タケガ知ツテ居ルガトシ  
シタ。

(問) 山本大將、準備シタ此、計畫ガ取初ニ貴方ノ耳ニ  
入ツタノハ何時デシタカ。

(答) 一九四一年(昭和十六年)十月ニ初メ公式ニ此、計畫  
ニ就テ承知シマシタ。此ノ様ニ計畫ガ研究村ニ行ヒテ居  
ト云フ事ハ、其ノ前カラ聞イテ居マシタ。

(問) 大將閣下、貴方ノ何時軍令部長ニナリテ此、計畫  
ガ取初ニ貴方ノ耳ニ入ツタノハ何時デシタカ。

(答) 一九四一年(昭和十六年)四月デス。

(問) 所デ、其、時山本大將、此、計畫ガ貴方ノ耳ニ  
入ツタノハ何時デシタカ。

(答) イ、ヤ、サウテハアリマセン。山本ガ取初ニ此、計畫  
ガ取初ニ貴方ノ耳ニ入ツタノハ、其ノ頃テアツタト思ツテ居  
マシタ。

(問) サテ、大將閣下、貴方ハ此、計畫ガ初ニ貴方ノ耳  
ニ入ツタノハ一九四一年(昭和十六年)十月デア  
リト云フ事ハ、其ノ前カラ聞イテ居マシタ。此、計畫ガ  
取初ニ貴方ノ耳ニ入ツタノハ何時デシタカ。

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Doc. 2495A

(答) 七月頃、私ハ新カニ計畫ノ訓練ヲシテナルトカ演習カ  
行ハテ居ルカ云フ事ヲ聞キマシク。

(問) 實際ハソノ(大將)閣下、更ニ御願ヒシラスガ、餘リ  
厳密ニシテ、假令貴方ガ自ラ出陣シテトモ、貴方  
ガ軍令部長ニアルトシテ事實ニ鑑ミテ、海軍ノ活  
動ニ関聯シテトシテ事カ行ハレテマシカト云フ事ニ関  
スル軍令部長トシテ、知識カス又海軍ノ行動ノ一  
般知識ヲ有スルモノトシテ答ヘテ頂キタリ、然ガ日本  
海軍ハ真珠灣攻撃ノ山本安兵衛ノタメ一九四  
一年(昭和十六年)ノ春ニ演習ヲ始メテマシク、デハナ  
シカ。

(答) 此ノ計畫ハ春ニ出来マシク、然レ自夏迄演習ニトリカ、  
リマシマシク。

(問) 夏ト云フト何時ヲスカ。

(答) 確カテハ下リマシカ、七月、初メ頃テアツト思ヒマス。  
聯合艦隊ガ鹿兒島ニ行キ、其處テ山越ニ低空ヲ入  
ルコトヤ急降下爆撃ヲスル演習ヲシマシク。

(問) ソノカラ(大將)閣下、此ノ様ニ演習、外ニ艦隊ハ又真  
珠灣ニアラウナ浅瀬ヲ用ヒル特殊ノ設計ニテ水  
雷ノ演習モ行ツタトイフ事實ニアルデセウ。

(答) 其ノ様ニ水雷ハコノ演習中ニ完成シマシク。  
聯合艦隊ハ其ノ水雷ノ精製ト又其ノ試験トニ多  
大ノ時間ヲ費シマシク。

No. 2



Doc 495

証 明 書

本職字シタノニシハシクハ一九四六年三月  
三月三日、永野修身が本職面前ニ出頭シ爲シ其  
通譯者「ワリウ、アラン、ヤ」陸軍少尉ニ依リ予前記  
應答ヲ右ニ記載セル器個ノ領内ニ対シテ爲シタル  
コトヲ證明ス

「ワリウ、アラン、ヤ」署名

場所 於日本東京

期日 一九四六年三月三日

又

Q. # 1127

Extract from

Interrogation of Osami NAGANO  
27 March 1946  
P. 1, 2, 3.

"Q Now, Admiral, I believe yesterday or the day before you mentioned, or you stated that the Japanese Navy started practicing on the Pearl Harbor plan some time in the summer of 1941. That was correct, was it not?

"A Yes, I believe the Fleet started training in the summer as you say.

"Q Do you remember just about what month in the summer of 1941, Admiral?

"A I don't remember too clearly but I am sure it was some time in the summer.

"Q Would you say it was possibly some time in July, 1941?

"A Yes.

"Q As I have the details here, the experiments and training were held at Sukamo, Saiki, Kagoshima and Koncye. Is that correct?

"A Sukamo is a very suitable place for training and the Navy has consistently used it for such, but I believe the training of dive bombing and coming in low over the mountains which was utilized in the attack on Pearl Harbor was practiced at Kagoshima.

"Q And later in August of 1941, is it not a fact, Admiral, that the final plans were made at the Naval War College in Tokyo?

"A I believe preparations by the Naval War College were started in October and a considerable amount of research was done. The results were later given out to us, and that was how we first heard of the attack officially, and at that time the Commander of the Fleets put forth the plan which was later adopted.

"Q When you say, Admiral, that you later were first officially advised of the results, do you mean by that that you were advised of the results of the attack on Pearl Harbor?

"A After the results of the research of the Naval College had been put forth the Commander of the Fleets explained the Pearl Harbor plan.

Extract from

Interrogation of Osami NAGANO  
27 March 1946  
P. 1, 2, 3 - cont'd

"Q As a matter of fact, Admiral, the time in which the plans were perfected at the Naval War College was in late August and early September, 1941 rather than in October, was it not?

"A Do you mean the plan for the attack of Hawaii or the general research which was carried on by the Naval College?

"Q I refer to the time, Admiral, when the plans were perfected at the Naval War College in Tokyo, at which time various teams were made up such as the "N" Team, the "A" Team, and the "E" Team.

"A I don't remember very well but I believe it may well have been toward the end of September.

"Q And in these games at which the plans were perfected for the attack upon Pearl Harbor, Admiral, you acted as umpire, did you not?

"A No, the head umpire was Admiral YAMAMOTO. I had no connection with the war games but I went to see the results when they were over.

昭和二十一年三月二十五日(行)の永日修身記聞  
り、披露

2499A

問、サテ提督、貴下、昨日デシタカ一昨日デシタカ、一九四一年  
夏、或は日本海軍に真珠湾攻撃ノ演習ヲ始メタ  
ルト云フ事デシタカ、或ハ迷フ事ト思ヒマスガ、ソレハ同  
違フ事デシタカ

Ex. 1127A

答、然リ、貴方、言ハ、如ク其夏ニ艦隊ハ訓練ヲ開  
始シタト思ヒマス

問、提督、貴下、一九四一年、夏、何月頃カ記憶ニテ  
居リシタカ。

答、然レ、明確ニ記憶ニテ居ラセシ、然レ、ソレハ其夏  
ノ或ハ始テアツタノ、確實デアリマス。

問、ソレハ一九四一年七月、或ハ始テアツタカモ知レナイ  
ト云フ事デシタカ。

661

答、然リ。  
問、此處ニ其ノ詳報ガアリマスガ、其実験ト訓練ト  
ガ、スカモ、佐伯鹿兒島及、コノ正ニ於テ実施カシ

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2497A

ヲ中心。其ノ通りデスカ。

答 「スカモ」訓練ニ好適地デアリマス、レデ海軍大學  
ニ斯ノ如キ訓練ニ其地ヲ使用シタ、然レ眞珠湾  
攻撃ニ応用シテ急降下爆撃及山越、但空飛行  
訓練ハ鹿兒島於テ行ハシタモノト思ヒマス。

問 提督、後ニ一九四二年八月ニ東京ノ海軍大學ニ於テ  
最後ノ計畫が作ラシタ事ハ事実デアリマセカ。

答 海軍大學ニ依ル準備ハ十月始メラシ、大掛リノ調査  
ガ行ハシタト思ヒマス。其成果ハ後ニ吾々ニ公表サシマシタ。  
レシガ吾々が攻撃ニ関シテ公ニ聞知シタ最初デアリマス。  
ソシテ其時艦隊司令官ハ後ニ採用セラシタ計畫ヲ  
発表シマシタ。

問 提督、貴下ガ後ニ其結果ニ就イニ始メテ公式ニ通知  
サシタト云ハ、ハ眞珠湾攻撃ノ結果ニ就イテ消息  
ヲ受ケタト申サル、ノデスカ。

答 海軍大學ノ調査ノ結果ガ発表サシタ後、艦隊司  
令官ハ眞珠湾計畫ヲ説明シタデス。

問 事実上、提督、海軍大學ニ於テ計畫ガ完

No 2



昭和九年

成サレタ日時ハ一九四一年、十月ト云フヨリモ寧ク八月末  
或ハ九月早々ト云フカシクイデス。

答、貴方ハ布哇攻撃ノ計畫ハコトヲ言ヒテスガ或  
ハ海軍大学ニ於テサレタ一般調査ノコトヲ云ヒルガ。

問、提督、私海軍大学ニ於テ計畫ガ完成サレタ時  
事ニ就テ何事ニテ居ルデス。又「組」カ「エ」組ト  
カ或ハ「シ」組カ也ト「組」カシクイデス。

答、私余リヨリ記憶ニテ居リマセシ。然シ成程九月、終リ  
頃ト申シテ方ガ良クモ知ラナイト思ヒマセ。

問、提督、真珠湾攻撃ノ計畫ヲ完成サシタ此ノ模  
擬戦ヲ貴下ハ審判官ノ役ヲサシタデハアリマセカ。

答、否審判長ハ山本大將ニアリマシク。私ハ模擬戦ニ何等  
ノ関係モアリマセシ。然シ模擬戦ガ終リタ時ニ  
其結果ヲ見ニハ作キマシ。

Ex. # 1128

Excerpts from Interrogation of Shigetaro SHIMADA on 23 January 1946

- "Q. YAMAMOTO proposed his Pearl Harbor attack plan to the General Staff early in 1941, did he not?
- "A. I heard that he offered it in January of 1941.
- "Q. At that time he was Commander-in-Chief of the combined fleet, was he not?
- "A. Yes.
- "Q. Admiral NAGANO authorized him to proceed with a study of the plan in March of 1941, did he not?
- "A. In that point I don't know the date, but I think it was later.
- "Q. But it was early in 1941, wasn't it?
- "A. I think it was perhaps May or June.
- "Q. May or June when his plan was adopted for study?
- "A. At first the ordinary plan did not have any plans for the attack on Pearl Harbor, but it was made formal in May or June. The studying and training of a squadron by YAMAMOTO was begun in May or June of 1941, I think...
- "Q. You know that the Navy started developing a shallow water torpedo early in 1941, don't you?
- "A. Yes, I know very well.
- "Q. That was because the Navy was well aware that the water at Pearl Harbor was shallow water, wasn't it?
- "A. Yes.
- "Q. And the fleet practiced with the use of such a torpedo throughout the summer of 1941, did it not?
- "A. Yes, I think so..."
- "Q. Now, on November 10, 1941, didn't Vice-Admiral NAGUMO issue aboard his flagship, aircraft 'Akagi' striking force operation order No. 1, which ordered all forces to complete battle operations by November 20, 1941?
- "A. I think that is so.
- "Q. Tankan (Hitokappu) Bay of Etorofu Island in the Kuriles was designated in the striking force order No. 1 as the rendezvous for the task force, wasn't it?
- "A. Yes.
- "Q. Between November 21 and November 27, 1941, the task force rendezvoused at Tankan Bay, didn't it?
- "A. Yes.
- "Q. The task force left Tankan Bay on November 27, 1941, and sailed East until December 4th or 5th, didn't it?
- "A. Yes.
- "Q. Then it altered its course to the Southeast toward Hawaii?
- "A. Yes.

"Q. Upon reaching a point approximately 250 miles from Hawaii the first wave of planes was launched, wasn't it?

"A. Yes.

"Q. A fleet of from 20 to 30 Japanese submarines from the Sixth Fleet was patrolling outside Pearl Harbor before the strike, wasn't it?

"A. Yes.

"Q. And a fleet of some 5 or 6 midget submarines attempted to gain entrance to the Harbor, didn't it?

"A. Yes...."

Q. # 1124

"Extract from Entry From Marquis KIDO's Diary, 2 Aug 41"

August 2nd, 1941 - (Extract)

I went to my office at 10 a.m. Prince KONCYE visited me at 11 a.m. He said he was annoyed to find that there was an observable tendency for the tough elements in the Navy to gather strength, a tendency which would be a great hindrance in the way of the maintenance of harmony between the Supremo Command and the Government. If the U.S.A. adopted decisive measures such as to cut us off from supplies of oil, we would run out of oil. Under these circumstances, we would be threatened by an acute national crisis, if we made any mistake in our diplomatic moves. Hence an understanding between the War and Navy Ministers concerning our fundamental national policy should be secured as soon as possible, and if a complete agreement is not reached, there would be nothing for the Government to do but to resign en bloc.

The Army and the Navy would then assume charge of the administration of the country. I talked with the Chief Secretary on the same matter.

答 合 基 其 一 第 一 号 関 連 関 係 取 引 取 引 取 引 取 引 取 引

指 導 指 導 指 導 指 導 指 導 指 導 指 導 指 導 指 導 指 導

同 水 野 大 将 計 画 研 究 進 行 方 法 研 究 進 行 方 法

同 庄 様 行 方 法 研 究 進 行 方 法 研 究 進 行 方 法

同 吉 野 氏 関 連 関 係 取 引 取 引 取 引 取 引 取 引

同 吉 野 氏

答 合 氏 一 九 四 一 年 一 月 二 日 夫 夫 提 議 提 議 提 議

同 吉 野 氏

提 議 提 議 提 議 提 議 提 議 提 議 提 議 提 議 提 議

同 山 本 氏 其 一 第 一 号 関 連 関 係 取 引 取 引 取 引

同 山 本 氏 其 一 第 一 号 関 連 関 係 取 引 取 引 取 引

照 和 二 十 一 年 一 月 二 十 三 日 由 大 阪 大 学 研 究 所 同 様 取 引

2498-B

2498-B

No. 1

答日取部ハ一船計ハ西ニ眞珠灣攻撃手圖ニ計  
用ニ成正ニ場間ハ六月廿五日カニ行ヒセリ有ハ  
サレテ一ノノカニ行ヒセリ有ハ

同五月廿二日ニハ公ニ氏計ハ圖カ研究九的ニ採  
取心ヲカニ行ヒセリ有ハ  
同九月廿二日ニハ公ニ氏計ハ圖カ研究九的ニ採  
取心ヲカニ行ヒセリ有ハ

イ 後 事 様 下 下 入

2498 B

ヒルコトニナラズ。小本氏ニ依リテ為サシテ艦隊訓練  
ヲ研究シ一九四一年五月カ六月頃ニ開始セシメト思  
ヒマス。

問 海軍が浅海魚雷、製作ヲ開始スルハ一九四一年  
(昭和十六年)ニシテタラシト云フコトハ内務省知事ニ

答 ハイ。能ク承知シテ居リマス。

問 其レハ具珠湾が浅瀬ナルコトヲ海軍が能ク  
知ラザルカニテハ有リマセンカ。

答 ハイ。其レ通りデス。

問 慶子艦隊(其レ魚雷ヲ用ヒテ訓練ヲ一九  
四一年、夏一杯ヤリマス)

答 ハイ。左様ト思ヒマス。

問 諸一九四二年(昭和十六年)十月十日南雲海軍  
中將(其旗艦航空母艦赤城艦上ニ於テ攻撃)  
作戰命令第一号ニ於テ一九四一年十一月二十日迄ニ  
ハ全軍ニ戦闘準備ヲ完了スルコトヲ命ジマス  
又テ

答 左様ニ思ヒマス。

No. 2

2498B

同 午島列島中擇提島軍冠湾が機動部隊、  
集合地奥トシ攻撃作戦命令第一号ニ指定  
セリナラズ。

答 其通リデアリマス。

同 一九四一年十月廿一日から廿七日、同ニ於テ攻撃部  
隊八軍冠湾ニ集合シテ居リマシタス。

答 イソウデアリマス。

同 攻撃部隊、一九四一年十月廿七日軍冠湾ヲ進者  
十二月四日又、五日ニ至ルニテ東方ニ向ケ航海シマ  
シタス。

答 其通リデアリマス。

同 ソレカラ進路ヲ南東ニ變ジテ吐ニ向ヒマシタス。

答 イソウデアリマス。

同 布吐ヲ去ル約ニ五〇哩、地奥ニ到達シタル時不同、  
飛行機隊ガ前進セシマシタス。

No. 3 答 イソウデアリマス。

同 第六艦隊中、二十隻カ三十隻、日本潜水艦、一隊  
ガ攻撃ニ先立テ奥珠湾、外側ヲ偵察シマシタス。



no. 7

2498B:

答ハイ、ソウデス。

同、ソウデス、五、六、隻、カ、ラ、ハ、ル、小、型、潜、水、艇、一、隊、(四、隻)

= 侵、入、セ、ン、ト、試、ミ、マ、ス、ネ。

答、ハ、イ、ソ、ウ、デ、ス。

"Extract from Entry From Marquis KIDO's Diary, 2 Aug 41"

August 2nd, 1941 - Extract)

I went to my office at 10 a.m. Prince KONOYE visited me at 11 a.m. He said he was annoyed to find that there was an observable tendency for the tough elements in the Navy to gather strength, a tendency which may lead to political difficulties and cause anxiety in the maintenance of harmony between the Supreme Command and the Government. I said if the U.S.A. adopted measures such as to cut us off from supplies of oil, we would run out of oil. Our oilen hand will not last two years at the longest. Under these circumstances, we would be threatened by an acute national crisis, if we made any mistake in our diplomatic moves. Hence a thorough discussion between the War and Navy Ministers concerning our fundamental national policy should be held as soon as possible, and if a complete agreement is not reached, there would be nothing to do but to resign.

The Army and the Navy would then assume charge of the administration of the country. I talked with the Chief Secretary on the same matter.

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8x 1129

Doc 1632W (64)

木戸侯爵日記

昭和十六年八月二日分

八月二日 (土)

曇

午前十時出勤

十一時通近衛公茶室對米國預備新次海軍  
部内ニ拾頭シ奈ル形勢ニアリ將來ノ設備

ヲ探査セラレ統帥部トノ國籍ナル擧動ニ

モ不安ヲ懷カレ居ル様子ナリ余ハ米國ニ

シテ泊ノ供給ヲ斷ツカ如キ豫想ニ出ル場

合ニハ石油ノ給源ヲ失フニ至ルベク罷シ

テ貯油置ハ多ク見積リテモ二年ヲ出デズ

テスレバ餘程外來工作方ヲ懷憂ニセザレ

ハ取返シノツカザル國ニ還却スベシ就

テハ至急陸海軍大臣ト國策ノ根本ニツキ

徹底的ニ精練シ活シ悉免管ハザレバ艦艇

スルモ不待止ベシ此場合ニハ余ハ陸海軍

ヲシテ救済ニ當ラシムルノ外ナカルベシ

ト意見ヲ述フ

秘書官長ト右ノ件ニツキ打合せ

二時半岡田文相氏來島西殿

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 7 Aug 41"

August 7th, 1941 - (Extract)

.... Prince KONOYE proceeded to the Palace at 3.30 p.m. He talked with me from 4 p.m. to 4.30 p.m. after his interview with the Emperor. I expressed my opinions as follows, and asked him to give them full consideration.

1. The situation we are facing now is very serious.
2. We must immediately decide our national policy by holding a meeting between the Government and the Army without loss of time.
3. According to reports received to date, we are not strong enough to fight with the U.S.A. and the Soviet at the same time.
4. We are facing a very serious situation which could be easily reduced to a simple problem such as oil, by making a little difference in our viewpoint.
5. According to the Navy, the quantity of oil in store was so moderate that it would barely supply us throughout two years during peace, and in case of war we would not have enough for more than 1½ years, but the Army estimates there is 1 year's supply for war.
6. If the above mentioned were true, we must reach the conclusion that our war with the U.S.A. would be a hopeless one.
7. The Dutch East Indies and the northern part of Saghalien would be the chief source of oil supply after we were cut off from our American supplies.
8. To occupy Singapore and the Philippine Islands was an essential prerequisite to a successful landing in the Dutch East Indies. Since oil wells would be destroyed during these actions, it would not be possible to obtain oil in necessary quantities for 1½ years.
9. If we attack the Dutch East Indies, the U.S.A. would declare war against Japan. The long-distance transportation of oil under a constant menace of submarines and airplanes would be very dangerous and the result would fall short of our expectations.

10. If there were miscalculation about oil supplies, we would face a very serious situation which might lead to our defeat.

11. We could not do what we wanted on account of the lack of our national power. Although the situation was different in its external appearance, we might be compelled to exercise the same self-restraint as we did after our victory in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895.

12. We should be resolved to toil through ten years of hard struggles.

13. Meanwhile we should do everything to restore friendly relations between the U.S.A. and Japan. And we must try to secure the materials which we need.

14. Our ultimate objective is Japan's advance to the Southern Regions, and in order to attain this object, a ten-year plan has been mapped out as follows:

- a. Establishment of heavy industries and machine-tool industries.
- b. Establishment of a synthetic oil industry.
- c. Expansion of ocean lines and shipping.

木 戸 侯 参 日 記

西 和 十 六 年 八 月 七 日 分

八 月 七 日 ( 木 ) 附

午 前 九 時 中 島 山 上 次 氏 茶 談 日 記。

十 時 四 十 分 ヨリ 十 一 時 遊 舞 日 記。

武 官 長 平 辰 來 靈 送 進 軍 令 部 次 長 ト 下 談 ノ 終 長 ニ ツ  
キ 語 アリ ムリ。

一 時 五 分 ヨリ 一 時 二 十 分 近 野 清 遊 軍 次 長 ノ 評 語 ノ  
原 會 上 ヲ ル 津 守 ノ 語 向 ニ ツ キ 御 語 アリ タリ。

一 時 半 小 倉 大 將 大 臣 來 靈 資 金 稟 給 ノ 旨 宣 讀 日 記 ニ  
ツ キ 語 ラ 聽 ク。

二 時 半 津 守 來 靈 資 金 稟 給 ノ 旨 宣 讀 ニ ツ キ 御 語 ス。

三 時 半 近 野 首 在 津 守 内 務 部 ノ 後 四 時 ヨリ 四 時 半 原 遊  
舞 日 記。

余 ハ 大 臣 左 ノ 如 キ 事 見 ラ 起 べ 深 道 ナ ル 事 也 ラ 察 ム。

一 今 日 ノ 事 甚 ハ 眞 ニ 二 大 ナリ ト 思 フ

一 卷 符 日 ヲ 逃 ス コト ハ 許 サレ ス 逃 ニ 政 府 總 務 部 ノ  
往 底 的 ナル 歸 還 ニ ヨリ 方 針 ヲ 決 定 スル ノ 事 アリ  
ト 思 フ

一 今 日 遊 余 ノ 想 タル 實 際 テ ハ 參 米 部 ノ 原 正 作 隊 へ  
余 種 目 難 ナリ ト 思 フ

一 而 シ テ 思 慮 ニ ヨ ツ テ ハ 兵 兵 へ 補 メ テ 簡 算 ニ 變 示  
サレ タ ト モ 云 ベ ル 能 手 治 ノ 間 長 矣

Dec 1632 W (64)

1. ex 1130

Doc 1632W (66)

2.

一 油ハ海軍ガ二年是トテモ取テスレバ一年半シ  
カナイト云フ艦隊ハ一年位トノコトダ

一 ソコデ緒言カラ云ヘバ右ガ事實ナリトスレバ則  
底米國ニ對シテ必勝ノ取ヲ爲スコトハ出来ナイ  
ト云フ外ハナイ

一 米國ヲ外ニシテ手近ニ油ノ供給源ヲ求ムレバ  
印ト北緯太シカナイ

一 印ヲ攻めスルニハシンガポール、フィリッピ  
ン、マラヤ、暹羅スルニアラザレバ困難デアラウ而  
シテ之等ノ行爲中ニ油井ハ破壊サル、デアラウ  
カラ必要量ノ油ヲ得ルニ至ラズ一年半ニ達シ  
ト思フ

一 印ニ手ヲ出セバ米國ハ参加スルデアラウソウ  
スレバ假リニ油ガ出ルトシテモ英米ノ潜水艦航  
空機ノ脅威下ニ長距離ノ輸送ハ非常ニ危険率多  
ク果シテ所期ノ成果ヲ擧ゲ得ルヤハ懸ル疑ハシ  
イ

一 若シソコニ誤算ガアツタトスレバ由々重大事デ  
我國ハ油ノ不足文テ手ヲ擧グル外ナイト云フコ  
トニナル

一 然ラテ今日ノ情勢ヲ單的ニ云ヘバ國力足ラスシ  
テ思フコトガ出来ナイト云フコトデアツテ表面  
ノ形ハ變ツテ是ルガ日清以後ノ三國干渉ノ場合  
ト同ジ決意ヲスル外ナイト云フコトデハナイカ  
ト思フ

Doc 16.32 W (64)

3.

- 一 國ヲ今後十年ヲ目標トシ臥薪嘗膽ノ決心ヲナシ
  - 一 差宿リ日米國策ノ調整ヲ為シ所長ノ職責ヲ重ル  
ト米ニ
  - 一 國內ニアリテハ島嶼ノ目的ヲ精選ニ置キテ此ノ  
目的達成ノ爲メニ大體十年ヲ目標トシ
  - 一 重工業、工作機械工業ノ確立、
  - 一 人造石油工業ノ建設ナル確立
  - 一 海洋航路船隻ノ大發展
- 是ニ益力ヲ與フルコト
- 而シテ右計畫ノ完成トシテ至急ニ國土計畫ノ實施  
ヲ促進スルコト



Ex. # 1131

EXCERPTS FROM JAPANESE FOREIGN OFFICE FILE  
(AUG. 5, 1941 to Nov. 5, 1941)

Telegram from Ambassador NOMURA to Foreign Minister TOYODA, dated 16 Aug. 1941 (No. 703 Secretariat Code, Secret.)

p.206

Concerning your telegram No. 480.

I. As I often reported, the relations between Japan and U. S. were brought to a very critical moment and it hangs now on a hair. The next movement on the part of Japan may lead to a sudden change. It is generally feared by both Japanese and Americans that it will do so in case Japan advances into Tai-land. As we said before, the American public is not yet in agreement as to whether they will take part in the European War or not. And it is understood that the president himself is worried about it, but as to the stern attitude toward the Far East, public opinion is unified and, according to well-informed quarters, it is said that Britain approved of it and both China and Germany also wanted it. We don't think both the President and the leaders in the navy will easily go to excess as they are aware of what a matter of grave consequence the Pacific War is. But it is said that Britain thinks, on the other hand, if she succeeds in having the U. S. fall in with Japan at the back door first, she will be sure to induce the U. S. to take a hand in the European War next. By the way, according to the prospects that are going on here, Germany will surely win over Soviet Russia, the war has now passed the stage of lightning war and entered that of wear and tear. And the battles by submarines in the Atlantic are turning to be advantageous to England and America. In the course of a war of long duration they may accomplish their desired purpose. The conditions at present bear close resemblance to those of the beginning of 1917. And it is said that they are now getting firmer and firmer belief in their victory in the war.

II. As the condition in this country is such as we described above, in preparing the conference as you directed me, I must first ask the State Department for the work of an intermediary. But as the Secretary of State is against it, as I said before, I tried to persuade another one in the Cabinet to make the Secretary think the matter over again, but the man does not seem to be earnest in the matter. Besides it is usual with the State Secretary to attend these conferences. The president at one time thought of holding

conferences among the leaders of both countries. But after the Japanese advance into French Indo-China, he began to think that what Japan aims is not to fundamentally regulate the relations between Japan and the U. S., but uses the stratagem for appeasing America, and that the government at Tokyo is making a fool of me. And it is said that his special interview with me the other day was an unusual one.

p.211 Moreover, the press in Tokyo harshly commented on the proclamation recently made by both England and America and the general feeling in this place is very much against us. Anyway, unless we do not clear up all of the misunderstandings they hold now, we should never be able to accomplish our purpose. Thinking the matter politically, it is also plain that the head of a country will never go to negotiate in person with others without successful prospects. Accordingly I presume that he will surely require us (before

p.212 entering into negotiation) to promise him at least something about the three points -- that is: matter of self-defense, withdrawal of the army from China, and the principle of impartiality in trade -- which were matters of great difficulties (and were not overcome) in the previous conferences, and now that we are already rejected by the Secretary of State, I am convinced that in order to accomplish the design you instructed me, I must think the matter over carefully and prepare it from the beginning. As it is said that the president will come back in a few days, please think over the above-mentioned points once again and send me a telegram of instructions in any case in haste. (The end).

No. 35375-135-378, 13 Sept, 1941. at 11:30 p.m.

p.715 Telegram from Foreign Minister TOYODA to Ambassador NOMURA, dated 13 Sept. 1941 (No. 560, Secretariat Code). *(urgent)*  
*(Ambassadors)*  
Concerning our telegram No. 529.

p.716 1. According your telegram No. 798, I understand that the matters in the above said telegram are not yet taken into consideration by the president, but our government presented the matters in the telegram to America because substantially they cover all the points hitherto unsettled and (a) thinking of preparatory negotiations, (b) but at the same time avoiding the prolongation of the negotiation after we enter into the minute discussion about the details as such a negotiation is bound to be (c) thus hastening to realize the conference between the heads of the two countries. (We can hardly expect a prompt settle-

ment if the staff officers have discussions with elaborate arguments; thus we believe it imperative that the heads of state of the two countries meet and hold discussions in a political manner.) I wrote the draft of agreement that is to be negotiated from a wide view of things between Japan and America at the meeting, and confidentially showed it beforehand. (Your explanation to Secretary HULL concerning this is very much to the point and I am glad of it).  
p.717 And wishing to have the matters in the above said telegram shown to the president himself in a hurry and to hear from him his opinions concerning them, I presented the draft to the American Ambassador on the evening of the 13th. So take measures as you think fit in your place considering all I mentioned above.

p.718 II. It can be clearly seen from our previous telegrams and part one of the present telegram that we do not narrowdown the topics we had in the private conferences hitherto held as HULL remarks, but rather expanded the substances of the topics as you will clearly see in the telegram, I quoted at the beginning of the present one (tel. 529). That is the reason we are stressing that the matter  
p.719 should be settled from a wide view of things. Therefore I wish to realize the two countries' heads meeting at the earliest time with the telegram (tel. 529) I quoted at the beginning of the present one, as the text of their talk for the time being and with as few business and legal discussions as possible, and after that they may resume the former negotiation in case of need.

p.720 III. I understand that the U. S. wants us to acknowledge her so-called four fundamental principles. But without even settling the matters in the telegram quoted at the beginning (tel. 529) of the present one we are not in a position to swallow it at present. Besides (if we do so) it is very much feared that the world may think we did it owing to American pressure as we pointed out before, and judging from American views that she wants to negotiate beforehand with England, Holland, China and other countries, I entertain some apprehensions lest they may try to revive the organization of the "Nine Countries Treaty". So it is  
p.721 also not proper to do so at present. The form of negotiation between Japan and the U. S. should be adopted. As this is of special importance, beware of it please! (We are not in a position to hinder U. S. from her actual negotiation with Britain, Holland and others, and in reality it is impossible to do it, and again we will not concern ourselves with it. At the bottom, what we want to say is that we refuse to be induced to a council or an agreement among numerous countries.)

p.722

IV. What I said above does not intend to reject the questions raised in your telegrams No. 804 and nine No. 557. But I presented aforesaid two plans and stress the more importance on what I said in the telegram I quoted at the beginning of the present one (tel. 529). I am going to reply to the above two telegrams in the near future. I tell this for your information.

Doc. No. 1457

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No.

I.P.S. No. 1457 (Part 1)

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 7 pages, dated 16 Aug. 1941, and described as follows: Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Foreign Minister Toyoda, dated 16 Aug. 1941

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this  
1st day of Nov., 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Chief, Archives Section  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, 2d. Lt. Eric W. Fleisher, O-935000, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
1st day of Nov., 1946

/s/ Eric W. Fleisher, 2d. Lt. AUSMI  
NAME

Witness: /s/ William C. Prout

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.F.S. No. 7457 (Part 2)

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 8 pages, dated 13 Sept., 1941 and described as follows: Telegram from Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura dated 13 Sept. 1941.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number of citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this  
1st day of Nov., 1946.

/s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Chief, Archives Section  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

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Signed at Tokyo on this  
1st day of Nov., 1946

/s/ Eric W. Fleisher, 2d Lt. AUSMI  
NAME

Witness: /s/ William C. Prout

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

Not read

Ex 1131

九月十七日 (見十六日)  
前本省署 (機)

野村大使

豊田外務大臣

第七〇三号

貴電第四〇号ニ関シ

(一) 果次第報告致之通日米関係ニシテ真ニ危機ニ至リテ到  
着シ日本次第、動キ依リ急轉ス、限ナリ、榮進駐ニ見ニ  
於テ形勢、急変ヲ見セラルトハ殆ビ日米二人一般見解  
ナリ、既報、通「歐洲参戦」ハ本々輿論一致ニ至ラズ、大領  
ニ願ハシ、心越ヒ力之ニ反シ、極東ニ對シ強硬論ニ對シ、  
輿論一致ノ消息通、云々并ニ依リ、夫ハ英國ニ贊成シ、其  
國ニ望ム所ナリトナリ

米大統領ニ海軍省艦ヲ大平洋艦隊ニ、大專業及知力故  
艦隊、決定容易ニ動カスルハ、人ト云フニ、固シク英國ハ英國ニ

No. 1

此ノ下ニ、於テ日米關係ニ對シ、英米關係ニ對シ、  
此ノ見ハ、  
FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 561





1457

三委擬決自衛隊問題，友邦三、撤兵通商、無  
別主義，三委付十八日下完成程度，言實也，要望之。相違  
十、上考久考、既三國務長官三拒否也、今日御前  
令、越旨達成之、相當考慮、上均之工作、必要、痛  
感之、如十一。

No. 3

大統領、一兩月中三將、由上三付右諸長、考慮、上何分  
、御前三三、速三電報三請了、了。

(三六十一三三頁)





1457

No. 5


1457

不(夏十)

四. 尚右(實錄第(四三)往(第五五七号)一如其問  
担否(先)一非(右)一(本)建(上)一主(其)冒(頭)一(實)二(上)一(先)  
一(前)記(一)一(對)一(用)一(啓)一(近)一(報)一(御)一(舍)一(此)

(七五—七三夏)

# Asahi Nichi Nichi



### TODAY'S WEATHER

Tokyo: Fair, showers. (S).  
 Yokohama: Generally fair. (SE).  
 Nagoya: Generally fair. (S).  
 Kyoto: Generally fair. (S).  
 Osaka: Generally fair. (SW).  
 Kobe: Generally fair. (SW).  
 Shimonoseki: Generally fair. (E).

SATURDAY, AUGUST 23, 1941

SATURDAY, AUGUST 30, 1941

## Speedy Expansion Of Armaments And Autarchy Of East Asia Sought

### COMMODITY MOBILIZATION PLAN STUDIED

#### Program For 2nd Quarter Of Fiscal Year Decided As Proposed By Governor Of Planning Board; Key Points Of Scheme Announced

The Government, at the Cabinet meeting on August 22, formally decided the national commodity mobilization plan for and after the 2nd quarter of the 1941-2 fiscal year, as proposed by Lieut.-General Teiichi Suzuki, governor of the Planning Board.

The key points of the scheme are: (1) Prompt expansion of armaments; (2) Establishment of a system of autarchy for important resources in the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, especially the maintenance of steel and coal production; (3) Maintenance of the lowest limit for the nation's living necessities; and (4) Strict harmony between the commodity mobilization scheme and the marine transportation plan.

### Verbal Statement Issued By Governor Suzuki

The scheme had eagerly been studied by the Planning Board and the related Offices in order to establish a strong wartime system in the midst of the complicated international situation.

Governor Suzuki of the Planning Board introduced and explained the scheme in detail at the August 22 Cabinet meeting, it having been drafted among those concerned. The plan was formally approved after discussion.

The Government the same afternoon issued a communique in the form of verbal statement by Governor Suzuki, as follows:

"The Government previously set the scheme for the enforcement of the commodity mobilization plan for the 1st quarter of the 1941-2 fiscal

year. The Government however has examined and studied various measures necessary for the completion of the wartime system in response to the international situation which has since undergone a sudden change. The Government thus drafted the commodity mobilization scheme for and after the 2nd quarter of the 1941-2 fiscal year and obtained the Cabinet decision on it today.

"In the current scheme, importance is attached to the 4 points (already listed) aimed at the complete execution of the China Emergency and the prompt completion of the wartime system to meet the new international situation.

"As regards the supply of commodities for the 1941-2 fiscal year, various counter-measures have been taken in anticipation of a situation in which imports from third powers might become difficult. Accordingly, there is no fear that a hitch will occur in the execution of this commodity mobilization scheme.

"A proper cut has been effected in commodities for Government or civilian consumption. Efforts will be made in order to be able to secure the best results with the minimum resources, through such measures as the increase of efficiency, rationalization of consumption, and adjusting of distribution organs based on their relative importance.

"Simultaneously the Government will urge the reclamation of more resources and strengthen consumption control designed for the smooth execution of the commodity mobilization scheme.

"The enforcement of the commodity mobilization scheme depends upon a strong war sense and the cooperation of officials and the people. The nation, with indomitable determination to deal with the situation, is requested to strive, acting with the Government as one body, for the establishment of the foundation of national prosperity."

Doc #2534-D  
23 AUG 1941  
-11-

## Ambassador Nomura Sees Roosevelt; Premier Konoe's Message Delivered

### CONVICTION TOLD ON PACIFIC PROBLEMS

#### Japanese Envoy Confers With USA Chief Executive For 45 Minutes; Secretary Of State Hull Present; Pending Matters Discussed

The Cabinet sat in an extraordinary session on Friday, August 29, from 1.30 to 2.10 p.m., in addition to the regular Cabinet meeting in the morning, in view of the mounting tension in the international situation.

Admiral Teijiro Toyoda, Foreign Minister, reported in detail the latest diplomatic negotiations with the United States to his Cabinet colleagues in the presence of Major-General Akira Muto, chief of the military affairs bureau; Rear-Admiral Masazumi Oka, chief of the naval affairs bureau; and Iaro Terasaki, director of the Foreign Office's American bureau.

Doc #2534-E  
30 AUG 1941  
-11-

Friday August 8, 1941

### Thought Problems Council

The first meeting of the Thought Problems Council since the formation of the third Konoe Cabinet was held at the official residence of Premier Prince Fumimaro Konoe on August 7 at 2 p.m.

The future policy of the unit was discussed among Minister Without Portfolio Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma, Minister Without Portfolio Lieut.-General Heisuke Yanagawa, Minister Without Portfolio Lieut.-General Sadaichi Suzuki, Home Minister Harumichi Tanabe, Justice Minister Michiyo Iwamura, and Privy Councilor Hiroshi Minami.

Doc #2534 C  
8 AUG 1941  
-11-

A National



# The Tok

We Also Publish  
In Nipponese  
The Osaka Mainichi  
The Tokyo Nichi Nichi  
With Combined Circulation  
of 3,500,000 Daily

Sunday Mainichi, Braille Mainichi,  
Economist, Year Book, Home Life,  
Mainichi Children's Daily, Tonichi  
Children's Daily, 'Dai Nippon  
Seinen', Chinese Mainichi

E. # 1133

EXCERPT FROM "THE OSAKA MAINICHI & THE  
TOKYO NICHU NICHU", SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1941

GOVERNMENT'S TRAFFIC MOBILIZATION PLAN  
AND PROJECTS

-----  
TRAFFIC MOBILIZATION  
-----

Concrete Plans Being Drafted by  
Communications and Railway  
Offices  
-----

Based on the traffic mobilization plan for the 1941-42 fiscal year, the Railway Office will positively embark on the construction of freight cars, while the Communications Office will establish the shipbuilding control association in order to systematize the shipbuilding industry, it is expected.

The Government, at the Cabinet meeting on Friday, September 5, decided the traffic mobilization plan in order to place land and sea transportation on a wartime basis to meet the requirements of the times.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I.F.S. No. 2535-A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Kiatuiti Ikawa hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Cabinet and that as such official I have custody of the Cabinet Meeting Records hereto referred to and that the newspaper account hereto attached and described as follows: Tokyo Nichi Nichi account of Cabinet meeting of 5 September 1941 correctly represents in substance the decisions of the Cabinet meeting of the date referred to. -----

Signed at Tokyo on this  
23 day of Sep, 1946.

/s/ K. Ikawa  
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ T. Satow

SEAL  
Secretary of Cabinet  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
23 day of Sep, 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME

Witness: /s/ T/4 Toguchi

Investigator, IFS  
Official Capacity



D002535-A

一九四一年/昭和十六年/九月七日附

「東京日日新聞」抜萃

政府船舶及貨車建造促進

運輸機関動員

逓信省及鐵道省が具体案立案中

EX 1133

昭和十六年度/一九四一—四二年/輸送動員計画「基本方針」鐵道省「積極的貨車建造」案より出之

一方逓信省「造船業組織化」為造船統制會「設立」案出之

政府九月五日金曜日閣議「於」時、現代「要務」應「陸海輸送」戰時態勢下「不」為輸送動員計画「決議」云々

76 /

002535A

證明書  
文書局 第一號  
實際檢察部 第三三三號 A

余等曾於一九四五年九月三日，在東京，即於內閣書記官廳，  
果政府之公的關係在於此，並該官吏之言，余等曾引用  
之，此項證據及之公正之證明  
左記題名，即於一九四五年九月三日，昭和十六年九月三日，  
九月三日，閣議，閣議，閣議，閣議，閣議，閣議，閣議，閣議，閣議，閣議，  
當該期日，於此項閣議，決定之正確表示，亦於此項閣議，  
證明之

一九四五年九月三日 / 昭和十六年九月三日

康希於署署名

當該會交署名欄

井川 曾 署名

在署之負責者

內閣書記官

證明人  
一九四五年九月三日證明

佐藤 署名

余 RICHARD H. LARSH，余於聯合公署最高指揮官總司令部  
關係之公的，並之記題名，文書，余等曾於一九四五年九月三日，  
府，之記題名，即於一九四五年九月三日，昭和十六年九月三日，  
證明之。

702

一九四五年九月三日 / 昭和十六年九月三日

康希於署署名

姓名欄

RICHARD H. LARSH 署名

在署之負責者

實際檢察部調查官

證明人

戶口

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDC's Diary, 5 Sept 41"

September 5th, 1941 - (Extract)

.....At 4.30 p.m. the Premier proceeded to the Palace and submitted to the Throne a plan relative to the holding of a Council in the Imperial presence. The Premier said that as the Emperor asked many questions as to our policy towards U.S.A. from the point of view of war strategy, he had advised the Emperor to summon the Chief of General Staff and the Chief of the Naval General Staff. I, therefore, proceeded to the Palace to advise the Emperor to follow the Premier's advice. I requested Aide-de-camp YOKOYAMA to call the Chief of the General Staff, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, and the Premier to the Palace. At 6 p.m. they were granted an audience by the Emperor to answer the Imperial questions.

No. 1134 Doc 1632 W (67)

木 戸 侯 舊 日 記

昭和十六年九月五日分

九月五日（金）晴

午前九時砂田寛政氏來訪面談

十時二十五分ヨリ十一時迄拜謁

侍從長來室懇談

一時半中村警備局長來室最近ノ治安狀況等ヲ豫ク

四時半首相參内御前會議ノ衆ニツキ奏上ニ對米施策

ニツキ作廢上ノ御疑問等モ致々アリ首相ハ兩總長ノ

御召ヲ御願シ尙内大巨トモ相談スベキ旨言上一旦退

下ス因ツテ五時ニ拜謁ヲ願ヒ右ニ對シ御下問ニ琴答

首相ノ奏上ノ通り兩總長ヲ御召相成度旨奏上ス

一旦退下更ニ同十分拜謁ノ手續ニツキ御許ヲ徑直ニ

披山武官ニヨリ兩總長ニ傳達セシム

六時首相兩總長打揃ヒテ拜謁御下問ニ琴答ス

御前

ヲ退下ノ後首相ハ立寄り小聯會談七時退出ス

RETURN TO ROOM 361 COPY

7-135

水戸侯 覺 日 記

西 曆 十 六 年 九 月 六 日 分

九 月 六 日 ( 土 ) 晴

午 前 九 時 半 出 勤

Handwritten notes: 16324088, ROOM, etc.

九 時 四 十 分 ヨ リ 九 時 五 十 五 分 迄 御 召 ニ ヨ リ 拜 謁 ス 本  
日 ノ 御 前 會 議 ニ テ 御 質 問 相 成 度 恩 召 ニ テ 種 々 御 下 問  
ア リ タ ル ヲ リ テ 余 ト シ テ ハ 御 察 問 ノ 真 畏 ナ ル 點 ハ 原  
相 ニ 於 テ 質 問 ス ベ キ 筈 ナ レ バ 陛 下 ト シ テ ハ 最 後 ニ  
今 同 ノ 決 定 ハ 國 運 ヲ 賭 シ テ ノ 戦 争 ト モ ナ ル ベ キ 重 大  
な 決 定 ナ レ バ 統 帥 部 ニ 於 テ モ 外 交 工 作 ノ 成 功 ヲ 齎  
ス べ ク 全 體 ノ 協 力 ヲ ナ ス ベ シ ト ノ 意 味 ノ 御 警 告 ヲ 被  
シ 事 々 最 モ 可 然 カ ト 奉 答 ス

十 時 本 警 保 局 長 來 訪 治 安 狀 況 ヲ 尋 問

十一 時 於 テ 東 宮 御 教 育 ニ 關 ス ル 會 議 ア リ 出 席 ス

十二 時 四 十 分 武 官 長 ト 御 前 會 議 ニ ツ イ テ 懇 談 ス

一 時 十 分 ヨ リ 一 時 三 十 分 迄 拜 謁 御 前 會 議 ノ 様 様 ニ ツ  
キ 御 話 ア リ 、 原 證 長 ノ 外 交 工 作 ヲ 主 ト ス ル ノ 趣 旨 ナ  
リ ヤ 云 々 ノ 質 問 ニ 對 シ 海 軍 大 臣 ヨ リ 答 辯 シ 統 帥 部 ハ  
發 言 セ ザ リ シ ニ 對 シ 最 後 ニ 御 發 言 ア リ 統 帥 部 ノ 答 辯  
セ ザ ル ヲ 遺 憾 ト ス ト 仰 セ ア リ 明治 天 皇 ノ 御 製 「 四 方  
ノ 海 」 ノ 御 歌 ヲ 御 引 用 ニ 相 成 リ 外 交 工 作 ニ 全 體 ノ 協  
力 ヲ ナ ス ベ キ 旨 仰 セ ラ レ タ ル 旨 奉 答 ス

Extract from Interrogation of Hideki TOJO, 23 February 1946, pp 1-2, 3, 5-6.

(pp. 1-2)

"Q At what time was the last message of the President to the Emperor received in Japan?

"A As I said before, I was telephonically advised of that message by the Foreign Minister somewhere around 1 o'clock in the morning of the 8th of December 1941.

"Q Since this message was addressed to the Emperor, why was it not reported directly to him?

"A I don't know. That is a Foreign Ministry and an Imperial Household Ministry problem. A message of that character is not handled by the cabinet, but by the Imperial Household, though perhaps it may have come via the Foreign Minister.

"Q Why did the Foreign Minister call you?

"A He called me because I was a Minister of State and this was a matter affecting the nation.

"Q What did he say to you in connection with the President's message?

"A The Foreign Minister reported to me the fact that the message had come and said that he proposed to deliver it to the Emperor. I assented.

"Q When did the Foreign Minister say he was going to deliver it to the Emperor?

"A He said he was going to report it right away so I think that as soon as he hung up, he went to report it.

"Q Do you know when the message was delivered to the Emperor?

"A I don't know. It was about 1 o'clock, as I said before, when it was reported to me and I have the impression that it was reported to the Emperor soon after that. When I was informed of the personal telegram, I inquired if any points were conceded. The answer was that there wasn't much of any concession.

"Q Do you not know that the message was not delivered until after the attack on Pearl Harbor?

"A The attack, if everything went smoothly, was to have been about 3 o'clock on the morning of the 8th, Japan time. Of course, we had had no reports, but the message came to me about 1 o'clock, so I think it was delivered to the Emperor soon after that and before the attack.

(p. 3)

"Q Were there not certain individuals in favor of an attack on America without any warning?

"A No. It was felt, however, that this was properly a matter of justifiable self-defense. The diplomatic procedures, though disadvantageous from the military standpoint, had to be submitted to and complied with.

"Q What diplomatic procedure had to be complied with?

"A The final note had to be transmitted. Since this was a matter of legitimate self-defense, we were not bound by the anti-war treaty, but as much as possible we decided to follow diplomatic procedures and see that there were no slips."

\* \* \* \* \*

(pp. 5-6)

"Q For what purpose was the Imperial Conference of 6 September called?

"A It was called to decide the question of what national policy should be adopted in view of the situation at that time. As I recall, the main question was that of war or peace and what attitude should be decided upon in either case.

"Q At this conference, it was decided to continue negotiations with America and hope for a break by the middle ten days of October, was it not?

"A Yes, of course I think so, but I have no materials here and it is difficult for me to make categorical statements.

"Q It was also decided that if the break did not come by the middle ten days of October that war would be undertaken against America?

"A It was decided to plan for a break by the middle ten days of October. The decision for war was not made at this conference.

"Q Who attended the meeting at KONOYE's home on or about October 12, 1941?

"A It is hard for me, but I am sure that the War Minister, the Navy Minister, and the Foreign Minister was there. I am not sure whether the President of the Planning Board was there or not, but the three important ones were the three I have mentioned.

"Q What was the purpose of the meeting and what occurred there?

"A As I recall them, I think the reasons for the conference were as follows: In the first place, the middle ten days of October, which had been set as the time by which we would strive for a favorable

diplomatic turn, were upon us. The Japanese proposal for a meeting between Prince KONOYE and the President of the United States had been turned down by America. The international situation was becoming more tense all the time. In these circumstances, it was necessary for the Government of Japan to decide more definitely just what its policy was to be, and I believe that was the basic purpose of the conference at Premier KONOYE's home.

"Q Did you not quarrel with KONOYE at that meeting?

"A No, it was not a quarrel. Our opinions differed.

"Q Differed on what?

"A My opinion was as follows: Japan was making concession after concession in the effort to effect a diplomatic break before the middle ten days of October, but on the other hand, America refused to budge from her position and made no concessions. The meeting between Premier KONOYE and the President, by which it had been hoped that a political settlement could be reached, had been turned down. As War Minister, my opinion was that there remained practically no hope of a diplomatic break and I suggested that the time had come when we had better make up our minds for war. The longer we delayed in making this decision, the more disadvantageous the situation would be for Japan if war were decided upon later. I felt thus because we were now in the middle ten days of October."



一九四六年二月二十三日

オ一ニ、六、五、一、六、頁

「第一一二頁」

問、天皇ニ對スル大統領ノ最後ノ親誓ハ何時日本ニ

於テ受領セラレマシタカ。

答、前三甲上ゲタ通リ、私ハ昭和十六年十二月八日

午前一時頃外務大臣カラ電話ヲソノ親誓ノアツ

タコトノ知ラセラ受ケマシタ。

問、ソノ親誓ハ天皇ニ宛テラレタモノナルニ何故直

接ニ天皇ニ上奏セラレナカッタノデスカ。

答、私ハ知りマセン。ソレハ外務省及宮内省ノ問題

ナス。斯カル種類ノ親誓ハ、外務大臣ヲ通ジテ

來タカモ知レナイガ、内閣ニ於テハ取扱ハレ

マセン。何時モ宮内省ニ於テ處理セラレマス。

問、何故外務大臣ハ貴方ニ電話ヲ掛ケタノデスカ。

答、私ガ國務大臣デアリ、ソレハ國家ニ影響ヲ及ボ

ス幕柄デアツタカラ私ニ電話シタノデシタ。

問、大統領ノ親誓ニ關シテ彼ハ貴方ニ何ト申シマシ

タカ。

答、外務大臣ハソノ親誓ノ來タ事實ヲ私ニ報告シ、

ソシテ之ヲ陛下ニ御座シスル積リデアルト申シ

マシタ。私ハ同憲政シマシタ。

EX 1136-A

2507A-1

2507A-2

問、外務大臣ハ何時天皇ニソレヲ渡ス積リデアルト  
申シマシタカ。

答、直チニソレヲ上奏スルト申シテ居リマシタ。  
ソレ故電話ガ濟ムト直グ上奏ニ出カケタモノト  
私ハ息ヒマス。

問、ソノ親書ガ何時天皇ニ渡サレタカ貴方ハ知ツテ  
キマスカ。

答、存ジマセン。先程申上ゲタ通り、ソレガ私ニ報  
告セラレタノハ一時頃デアリ、私ハソノ後間モ  
無クソノ事ガ上奏セラレタモノトノ印象ヲ受ケ  
テ居リマス。

ソノ親電ノ事ヲ知ラサレタ際私ハ何か譏歩セラ  
レタ點ガアルカト問ヒ訊シマシタ。之ニ對シ大  
シテ譏歩サレタ所ハナイトノ答デシタ。

問、貴方ハソノ親書ハ眞珠灣攻撃ノ後マデ天皇ニ渡  
サレナカツタ事ヲ知リマセンカ。

答、全ベテガ順調ニ運ベバ眞珠灣ノ攻撃ハ日本時間  
ニシテ八日ノ午前三時頃ニナル筈デシタ。  
勿論ソレマデニ何等ノ報告モアリマセンデシタ。  
然ルニ親書ハ一時頃ニ私ニ知ラサレタノデス。  
從ツテソレハソノ直グ後、即チ眞珠灣攻撃ノ以  
前ニ天皇ニ渡サレタモノト思ツテ居リマス。

X

X

X

2507A-3

「第三頁」

問、何等ノ警告ナシニ米國ヲ攻ムルコトニ贊成シ  
タ人々ガアリマセンデシタカ。

答、アリマセンデシタ。然シ、之ハ正シク正當防衛  
ノ事デアルト感シテマシタ。

算學的見地カラハ不利デアツテモ外交上ノ手續  
ニ服シソシテ從ハネバナリマセンデシタ。

問、ドンナ外交上ノ手續ニ從ハネバナリマセンデシ  
シタカ。

答、最後通牒ガ送達サレネバナリマセンデシタ。之  
ハ正當防衛デアル以上不戰條約ニハ拘束サレマ  
センデシタ。然シ我々ハ出來得ル限り外交上ノ  
手續ニ從ヒ手落ナキヲ期スル様決定シマシタ。

× × ×

「第五―六頁」

問、九月六日ノ御前會議ハドンナ目的ヲ召集サレ  
タノデスカ。

答、ソレハ當時ノ情勢ニ鑑ミドンナ國策ヲ採ルベ  
キカノ問題ヲ決定スル爲ニ召集サレマシタ。  
私ノ記憶ニ依レバ、主要問題ハ戰爭カ平和カ、

2507A-4

又ソノ何レカノ場合ニ於テドンナ態度ヲ執ル  
ベキカトイフコトデアリマシタ。

問、コノ會談ニ於イテ米國トノ交渉ヲ繼續シ十月  
中旬迄ニ打斷ヲ見ル極期待スルコトガ決定サ  
レタノデアリマセンカ。

答、ハイ、勿論サウ思ツテ居リマス。然シ茲ニ資  
料ヲ持合セテ居リマセンノテ既定的ナコトヲ  
申上ゲルコトハ困難デアリマス。

問、十月中旬迄ニ打斷スルニ至ラナカツタナラバ  
米國ニ對シ戦争ヲ開始スベキコトヲモ決定シ  
タノデアリマセンカ。

答、十月中旬迄ニ打斷スル極ニ計ルコトヲ定メマシ  
タ。戦争ノ爲ノ決定ハコノ會談デハナサレマ  
センデシタ。

問、昭和十六年十月十二日珍ハソノ頃ノ近衛邸ニ  
於ケル會合ニハ誰ガ出席シマシタカ。

答、正確ニオ答ヘ出来ヌマス。然シ陸軍大臣、海  
軍大臣、外務大臣ハ確ニ居リマシタ。企蹙院  
総裁ガ出席シテ居ツタカドウカハツキリシマ  
セン。然シ重立ツタ三人ノ出席者ハ今私が申  
上ゲタ三人デアリマシタ。

問、會合ノ目的ハ何デシタカ、又會合デハドンナ  
事ガ起リマシタカ。

2507A-5

答、私ノ記憶スル所デハソノ會談ノ理由ハ次ノ通  
リデアツタト思ヒマス。先ヅ彼ノ十月中旬、  
即チ我々が藝ニソノ時迄ニ有利ナ外交上ノ打  
開ヲ對ス様努力スルコトニ決定シテキタ時カ  
既ニ到來シテ居リマシタ。  
近衛公爵ト合衆大總統ノ會見ニ付スル日本  
ノ申出ハ米國ニ依リ却下セラレテキタ。國際  
情勢ハ引續キ一層ノ緊張ヲ示シテ居リマシタ。  
コノ様ナ情況ニ於テ日本政府トシテハ之ニ對  
處スル政策ヲモット決定的ニ決定スルコトガ必キテ  
リマシタ。コレガ近衛首相即ニ於ケル會合ノ  
根本ノ目的デアツタト信ジマス。

問、ソノ會合ニ於テ貴方ト近衛公ト口辭シマセン  
デシタカ。

答、イ、エ、口辭デハアリマセンデシタ。唯意見  
ガ相異シタノデス。

問、如何ナル點デ意見ノ相異ガアリマシタカ。

答、私ノ意見ハ次ノ通りデシタ。即チ日本ハ十月  
中旬迄ニ外交的打開ニ邁スル様努力ヲシテ進  
歩ニ讓歩ヲ重ネテ來タ。然シ他方米國ハ自己  
ノ地位ヲ些カニテモ動カス事ヲ拒絕シ、何れ  
ノ讓歩ヲ爲サナカツタ。政治的解決ノ到達ニ  
望ミヲ懸ケタ近衛総理大臣ト大統領ノ會見モ

2507A-6

却下サレタ。ソコデ陸軍大臣トシテ私ノ意見  
ハ最早外交的打聞ノ望ミハ畢竟上程サレテキ  
ナイトイフノデアリ、ソコデ私ハ戦争ノ決定  
ヲナスベキ時期ガ到来シタト云フノデアツタ、  
コノ決定ヲ遅ラセバソレ丈、後ニナツテ戦争  
ヲスルコトガ決定サレタ場合ニ日本ノ立場ハ  
不利トナツタデアラウ。今ヤ、十月中旬ガ到  
来シテ居マシタカラ私ハ斯ク考ヘタノデシタ。

Doc. No. 2509 A

Page 1

Extract from Interrogation of  
General Hideki TOJO  
11 March 1946  
P. 4

Q Is it not true that, during the period between  
6 September 1941 and 10-20 October 1941, prepara-  
tions for war were pushed?

A As I said before, at that conference which dealt  
with peace or war, it was decided that both peace  
preparations and war preparations would be pushed.  
/Read back to the witness who agreed as to its  
correctness./ It was only after that decision  
that preparations were pushed.

x x x

471137-A

2509 A

東條英機ニ對スル訊問ヨリノ抄録

一九四六年三月十一日

「第四頁」

問、昭和十六年九月六日カラ同年十月中旬迄ノ間ニ  
戦争ノ準備ガ進メラレタトイフコトハ本營デハ  
アリマセンカ

答、前ニ申上ゲタ通り平和カ戦争カラ辭讓シタアノ  
會議ニ於テハ平和ノ準備ト戦争ノ準備ノ両方ヲ  
進メルコトガ決メラレマシタ。ノコノ部分ハ諸  
人ニ尋問セラレ諸人ハソノ相違ナキコトヲ認メ  
タリノ戦争ニ對スル該準備ガ進メラレタノハコ  
ノ決定ガアツテカラ後ノコトデアリマシタ

× × × ×



Ex. 1138

Doc. No. 1632W(69)

Page 1

"Extract from Entry From Marquis KIDO's Diary, 11 Sept 41."

September 11th, 1941 - (Extract)

War Minister TOJO visited me after his withdrawal from the presence of the Emperor and explained the result of an investigation concerning the preparations for war with the U.S.A.

Ex 1138

木戸重信日記

明治十六年九月十一日分

九月十一日 水 候

午前十時半 東條監相拜謁後 米穀奉備

等ニツキ調査ノ結果ヲ稟ク

正午 近衛首相嬢メ 御禮儀ニ 御座食板仰付座  
席ス

二時 夏田外相拜謁 其後 面談 米友沙ノ経過  
ナリ

二時五十五分ヨリ 三時四十分迄 拜謁ス

四時半 山崎總務長 治安ノ狀況等ヲ稟ク

Doc 1632W (69)

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Ex. 1139

TRANSLATION OF TELEGRAM FROM NOMURA TO TOYADA,  
dated September 12, 1941

Top Secret by Embassy Code

From Ambassador NOMURA  
Afternoon, September 11,  
Showa 16 (1941)  
Washington (by secret)

To Foreign Minister TOYADA  
Arrived at the Ministry, Afternoon  
September 12, Showa 16 (1941)

Telegram No. 810.

The difficult points of the present Japanese-American negotiations for the adjustment of diplomatic relations are, as you are well aware of by my repeated telegrams, the problems regarding the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and stationing of troops for anti-Comintern purposes, and I think the U.S.A. is in the position where she cannot recognize the stipulated terms between our side and the Nanking Government upon this matter, not only in the light of the public opinion in the country, but also from the viewpoint of her obligation as a mediator toward China. Consequently in the American proposal of 21 June there is included a clause to the effect that the evacuation should be effected as soon as possible in compliance with the stipulations to be newly agreed upon between Japan and China. And her attitude having been more stiffened of late, she has mentioned the complete evacuation of troops within two years after the restoration of peace (one of the causes of the above stiffening is believed to be the result of her talks with the Chinese side), and it is felt that toward the new proposal advanced from our government, the U.S.A. apparently shows no serious disapproval in points other than that of the evacuation, against which she seems to have strong opposition.

And, after all, according to my observation, there is a great possibility for the negotiation to split on the rocks in the final stages due to this evacuation problem. To avoid it, therefore, I earnestly wish that following the general line of the American request and without making reference to the stationing of troops, you deliberate how to deal with the proposal for the evacuation of troops within two years after peace restoration.

When an official of the State Department visited me yesterday, I postponed the explanation of this matter to a later occasion. For the sake of negotiating and partly for the above reason, your final decision upon this matter is earnestly desired at the earliest moment.

Essentially the evacuation problem concerns exclusively Japan and China, and the U.S.A. refers to it only to exercise good offices. In any case, should negotiations develop after our government adopts this proposal, considerable time will surely be needed from the time of the meeting of the responsible heads of both countries, to the conclusion of detailed agreement, until the holding of the Sino-Japanese truce and peace conference. It may possibly require more than one year. And so, even if we should now promise the evacuation within two years, there may arise during the interval, on account of the development in the international situation and of the circumstances at the actual places concerned, some opportunities of renewing talks between Japan and China to prolong the period of stationing troops. Moreover, it may be possible that we can remain under the excuse of protecting the lives and properties of the Japanese in China. Therefore, in my opinion, the concession to this proposal will not necessarily lead to the result contradictory to the policy adopted so far by our government. And although I believe that it must be a very difficult national problem, I earnestly request you to send me my instructions as soon as possible.

With reference to the above, the item of "stationing troops for anti-Comintern purposes," should be eliminated, but it is permissible to retain one section pertaining to Sino-Japanese cooperation (non-military) to prevent actions detrimental to national peace.

Incidentally, it appears that the Japanese press has been making some optimistic broadcasts in the last few days that the Japanese-American agreement was near at hand. But, as we have difficult questions such as the evacuation of troops, etc., it is better not to have such premature optimistic opinions. Over here, Hull himself denied the above-said optimistic broadcasts at a press interview, and I request that you give some attention to the directing of the press. (End)

Extract from "The Tokyo  
Nichi Nichi" - September  
13, 1941

'TOTAL LABOR SERVICE BY PEOPLE'  
SYSTEM DEFINITELY LAUNCHED

Cabinet Approves

1941 Workers Mobilization  
Plan Is Adopted At Friday Meeting

- - -

As a preparatory step for the establishment of the people's total labor service system, the plan for the people's labor mobilization during 1941 was adopted in the regular Cabinet meeting on September 12.

The scheme, jointly formulated by the Planning Board and the Welfare Office, is based on the emergency labor policy decided in a recent Cabinet session, and is aimed at insuring the supply of sufficient labor for the increased production of munitions.

In view of the importance of the project, the Cabinet Ministers present posed pointed questions to Governor Lieut.-General Teiichi Suzuki of the Planning Board, who explained the plan to them.

The scheme contains concrete measures for the creation of the people's total labor service system. . . .

C E R T I F I C A T E .

I.P.S. No. 2536A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Katsuichi Ikawa hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Cabinet and that as such official I have custody of the Cabinet Meeting Records hereto referred to and that the newspaper account hereto attached and described as follows: Tokyo Nichi Nichi account of Cabinet meeting of 12 September 1941 correctly represents in substance the decisions of the Cabinet meeting of the date referred to.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
23 day of Sep., 1946

/s/ K. Ikawa  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ T. Satow

Secretary of Cabinet  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
23 day of Sep., 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME

Witness: /s/ T/4 Toguchi

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

東京日日新聞

昭和十六年(一九四一年)九月十三日

土曜

2536-A

國民皆勤勞態勢愈々締<sub>め</sub>こ<sub>ま</sub>る<sub>か</sub>?

閣議決定

金曜日、閣議、於<sub>て</sub>昭和十六年度勞務動員實施計  
画決<sub>ま</sub>る<sub>か</sub>。

國民皆勤勞態勢確立、準備的措置上、於<sub>て</sub>昭和十六年度國  
民勞務動員實施計畫案、九月十二日、定例閣議、附議  
決定せ<sub>ら</sub>る<sub>か</sub>。

本計畫、企畫院及厚生省、共同立案、成<sub>る</sub>に<sub>て</sub>、廿三日閣  
議、於<sub>て</sub>決定、見<sub>え</sub>る<sub>か</sub>勞務動員對策、基本軍需物資増  
産、為<sub>る</sub>要員充足、確保<sub>す</sub>る<sub>か</sub>目<sub>的</sub>と<sub>す</sub>る<sub>か</sub>。

計畫、重要性に鑑<sub>み</sub>、閣議列席、各大臣、企畫院總裁  
木下、一佐軍中將、對<sub>し</sub>て忌憚<sub>ら</sub>ず質問、矢<sub>を</sub>向<sub>け</sub>たり、同總裁  
「彼等、当該計畫、付<sub>き</sub>説明<sub>さ</sub>る<sub>か</sub>と<sub>す</sub>る<sub>か</sub>。

本計畫、國民皆勤勞態勢設定、為<sub>る</sub>、具體的措置<sub>を</sub>含<sub>み</sub>  
たり。

4x/1140

第530-A

國際檢察部 第二五三六號 A

證據及公正之證明

余井川克一、余如下記資格、於于部內閣書記官上、日本政府  
上之關係、在於、此、上、並、該、官吏、上、為、引、用、也、又、閣、議、記、錄、  
係、管、理、上、及、該、添、附、之、以、左、記、題、名、新聞、記事、即、十、九、百、  
十、年、一、即、和、十、六、年、一、九、月、十、日、閣、議、之、開、及、東京、日、報、新、聞、記、事、其、其、一、  
於、當、該、期、日、於、此、閣、議、決、定、之、正、確、之、衣、亦、也、之、上、予、證、明、也。

十九百四十六年一昭和二十一年九月二十三日

東京、於、署、右

當、該、官、吏、署、名、欄

右、者、公、的、資、格

證、人

井川、克一

內閣書記官

佐藤、才

公正之證明

余、此、上、之、於、此、上、六、余、於、聯、合、國、最、高、指、揮、官、部、內、閣、係、  
之、上、上、之、此、上、記、題、名、文、書、公、務、上、日、本、政、府、上、記、署、名、官、也、  
引、入、予、之、此、上、予、證、明、也。

十九百四十六年一昭和二十一年九月二十三日

東京、於、署、右

氏、名、欄

右、者、公、的、資、格

證、人

井川、克一

國際檢察部調查官

戶口、軍、曹



EX # 1141

Document No. 1632W(71)

Page 1

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDC's Diary, 26 Sept 41"

September 26th, 1941 - (Extract)

I met Prince KONOME at 4 p.m. and talked with him until 5.15 p.m. He stated that he had no confidence, and there was no choice for him but to consider his resignation if the Military insisted on starting a war on 15 October. I hoped that he would be prudent.

30 = 41

木戸侯御日記

昭和十六年九月二十六日分

九月二十六日 (金)

曇

Doc 1632 W (71)

午 齋九時山下龜三郎氏來訪面談  
 十時二十分ヨリ十一時五分迄拜謁  
 十一時半武官長來望園内同趣ニ對ス  
 ル軍ノ見舞ヲ豫ク  
 三時高松官邸ニ伺候殿下ニ拜謁先般  
 御申付ノ談父官ニ重長口籠等ヲ言上  
 云々ノ件 陛下ノ息召又官相其他ノ  
 意向中御志治體ノ見舞等ヲ以テ判  
 スルニ未ダ其ノ時期ニアラス專ラ御  
 静養ヲ要ストノコトナル故長官ノ万  
 面ヨリノ言上ハ今暫ク差延ヘルコト  
 トシ只高松官邸御見舞ヒ後遊場合ニハ  
 陛下ノ息召ヲ俾シ適宜言上ヲ願フコ  
 トトシタク右ハ陛下ノ御許ヲモ待タ  
 ル旨言上御承諾ヲ得たり

文ニ  
 殿ニ  
 御下  
 下シタ

RECEIVED  
 10 NOV 1941

2.  
Doc 1632 W(71)

D

近衛首相ト西時ヨリ五時十五分頃  
海軍大臣、軍部ニ於テ十月十五日ヲ  
期シ長官ヲモ以テ開始ト云フコト  
ナシバ自分ニハ自信ナク通過ヲ考フ  
ル外ナシト苦衷ヲ述ベラレシ故例ニ  
似テハ其意ヲ希望ス

Document No. 16327 (72)  
Exh. 1142 (Corrected Copy)

Page 1

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 29 Sept 41"

: September 29th, 1941 - (Extract)

I visited the Emperor from 10:55 a.m. to 11:35 a.m. He requested me to make an investigation regarding the stock of rubber and tin in the U.S.A., the amount of rubber resources in South and Central America, and other places where the United States would be able to obtain these resources. Hence I contacted the President of the Planning Board through the Chief Secretary to the Cabinet. The President HARA said that if our diplomatic parley with Washington would end in an entire failure and as we would have to make our grave resolution, the coming Council in the Imperial presence should not be such a formal one as usual, but we must have a full discussion of the matter instead and include senior statesmen in the Council. I promised him that I would consider this carefully.

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Q. # 1142

Document No. 16327(72)

Page 1

"Extract from Entry from Marcus KIDO's Diary, 29 Sept 41"

September 29th, 1941 - (Extract)

I visited the Emperor from 10.55 a.m. to 11.35 a.m. He requested me to make an investigation regarding the <sup>stock</sup> amount of rubber <sup>and tin</sup> resources in the U.S.A., the <sup>amount of rubber</sup> stock of tin and the tin resources in South and Central America, and other places where the United States would be able to obtain these resources. Hence I contacted the President of the Planning Board through the Chief Secretary to the Cabinet. The President HAMA said that <sup>if</sup> as our diplomatic parley with Washington would end in an entire failure and as we would have to make our <sup>grave</sup> ~~final~~ resolution ~~as to war with the U.S.A.~~, the coming Council in the Imperial presence should not be such a formal one as usual, but we must have a full discussion of the matter instead and include senior statesmen in the Council. I promised him that I would consider this carefully.

1. 1142 Dec 16 32 W (72)

木戸侯爵日記

昭和十六年九月二十九日分

九月二十九日（月）雨

午前九時半奇松寺僧ヲ招キ松本奇松御命日ニツキ  
讀經ヲ爲ス

十時退出勤今村別當來室高松宮ニ目上ノ件ヲ傳フ

十時五十五分ヨリ十一時三十五分始拜禮

高松宮ヨリ御話ノ件ニツキ秩父官知殿下ニ御話ア  
リタル旨御話アリタリ

米國ノゴム保有量並ニ中南米ニ於ケル生産高及、

錫ノ保有量並ニ米國が獲得シ得ル量地

右調査方御下命アリ依ツテ秘書官長ヨリ企務院總  
裁ニ連絡ス

十一時四十分武官長來室總長拜禮ニツキ連絡アリ  
タリ

一時半橋本伯來訪豫テ勸メ置キタル養子ノ件ヲ斷  
リニ來ラレタルナリ

二時半原信相來訪萬一日米國交調整不調ニ終リ重大  
決意ヲ爲サザルベカラザルニ至リタル場合ニハ從

2.  
Doc 1632 W (72)

來ノ如キ形式的ノ御前會議子ナク甚巨等ヲモ加へ  
與ニ意見ノ關隙ヲ主トスル會議ノ由クノ疑アルベ  
ク考慮セラレタシトノコトナリシ誠懷重考慮ヲ約  
ス  
三時半廣橋大夫來望樂山行幸御希望云々ノ話アリ  
シ故外交々沙ノ經過ニ精ミ今宵ノ御待ノ間ヲ旨希  
望ス外相參内拜謁後五時半ヨリ六時半頃迄懇談ス  
七時山口恭右氏來邸面談

Ex. # 1143

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KATO's Diary, 7 Oct 41"

October 7th, 1941 - (Extract)

TOMITA, the chief Secretary to the Cabinet, visited me at 12.40 a.m. to talk about our negotiations with the U.S.A. He stated as follows: "The Army was of the opinion that there was no room left for the continuance of the parley, while the Navy held the reverse view. But the officers of medium standing of the Army and Navy were agreed in their strong determination. The Navy's desire for the Premier was that he should immediately declare his resolution and assume leadership in order to meet the serious situation. First of all, the Premier should talk with the War Minister who has a resolute opinion, in order to promote a better understanding between them, after that a meeting between the Premier, the War Minister and the Navy Minister would be desirable to settle our national policy in respect of the war against the U.S.A."



木戸侯爵日記

昭和十六年十月七日分

十月七日（火）

時 晏

午後十時出勤

十一時官相來 皇族官裁御婚産ノ日ニツキ話アリ  
タリ

十一時三十分ヨリ十二時十五分迄舞廳

十二時半中村警衛局長來 皇時局情報ヲ聴ク

十二時四十分宮田登記官長來訪 對米交渉ニ  
ツキ左ノ如ク話アリタリ

米國ノ始發ニツキ陸軍ハ甚ナシトノ解釋ナル

ガ海軍ハ見込アリトシテ交渉繼續ヲ希望ス而

シ陸軍トモ中堅ハ一筆シテ強硬決意ヲ要望

ス海軍側ハ首相ハ此際潤滑ナク決意ヲ宣明シ

政局ヲ指導セラレタシト要望ス先ツ首相ハ強

硬意見ヲ有スル陸相ト充分意見ヲ交換シタル

後陸海外ノ三相ヲ招キ自己ノ決意ヲ披瀝シ協

力ヲ求ムル管ナリ

一時秋山厨司長 一時半下園佐吉氏來訪 面談

三時半ヨリ四時十五分迄舞廳

EX 1143

Doc 1632 W (75)

Ex. # 1144

(Item 5).

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)  
To: Tokyo  
October 8, 1941  
Purple

#907

(Part 1 of 4)<sup>a</sup>

(To be handled in government code. Departmental Secret)  
Re your #637 b.

I will tell you more about this after I interview the Secretary of State a little later on. However, my views at present are as follows:

(1) According to the American memorandum of the 1st, the Americans realize that there is unanimity on the various principles and fundamentals which they have stuck to. However, they are dissatisfied because you did not express a desire to go into a detailed discussion. The Americans believe in the four principles as the basis on which relations between the two countries must be adjusted. The Americans consider that it is necessary to achieve unanimity on the various questions which have been fundamentally explored by both nations in the unofficial talks held so far in order to settle the Pacific question. They have always felt that if conversations between the leaders of the two countries are to be realized immediately, it must be definitely understood that these principles are to be applied to the concrete problems in the Pacific, and they desire a further clarification of our views.

a - For Part 3 of 4, see S. I. S. #23293.

b - S. I. S. #23118 in which the Foreign Minister, TOYODA, asks Ambassador NOMURA to immediately clarify with the U. S. Government two points.

(Item 5).

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)  
To: Tokyo  
October 8, 1941  
Purple  
#907

a  
(Part 3 of 4)  
(To be handled in government code.)

Judging by the impression I got from the above mentioned facts and my contacts with them so far, they figure on first bringing about unanimity on the fundamental questions on which our two countries have so far failed to see eye to eye, and then gradually to turn to the other matters. They evidently feel that so long as there is disagreement on the aforementioned points it would be vain and futile to discuss the various other problems, therefore, up to now the United States has done no more than express her opinions on the other matters in the proposal of June 11. (As I have wired you, some changes were made in the last clause.)

In their proposal of June 21, they made it evident that they were going to stick to this as the basis for negotiations. The latest reply of theirs shows, I am sure, that they are entirely disregarding our own proposal of the 25th. This shows that they are going to stick to their ideas as they stand; however, it will still be necessary for us to talk through certain matters concerning .

A. The matter mentioned in the annex of the clause concerning the China incident. B. Discontinuing activities designed to help CHIANG. C. The stipulation concerning Jenkins Treaty in the clause concerning the China incident (an agreement between Japan and China); joint mediation and the right of self-protection mentioned in the clause concerning our attitude toward the European war; the question

ARMY 23293

Page One

SECRET

(Item 5).

SECRET

of eliminating the annex to the clause concerning commerce  
between the two nations.)

a - Parts 1 and 2 not available.

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE  
Colonel, G.S.C.

Ex 1144

Doc 2593D (4) a.i.  
Item 5

発信 ワシントン (政府)

受信 東京

一九四一年十月八日 柴

第九〇七號 (四ノ一部) A

(政府階級ニテ取扱ノコト、當該官廳秘密)

覚覽六三七號 B ニ照シ

本件ニ就テハ後刻四ノ長官ト會見後更ニ通報ス  
 ベシ。然シ現下ニ於ケル余ノ見解ハ左ノ通ナリ、  
 (一) 日米兩國政府ノ覺悟ニ依レバ米國ハソノ國執  
 スル諸原則並ニ本質ニ就テ一致點アルコトヲ認  
 シ居レリ。然シ貴下ガ詳細ニ互リ討議ノ希望ヲ表  
 示セザリシ理由ヲ以テ彼等ハ不満足ヲ感シ居レリ。  
 米國政府ハ四ツノ原則ヲ基礎ニ兩國關係ヲ調整ス  
 ベキコトヲ信シ居ル次第ナリ。米國政府ハ太平洋  
 問題解決ノ爲メコレ迄四回ニ於テ非公式會議ニ  
 於テ根本的ニ探究サレタル諸問題ニ就テ一致點ヲ  
 見出ス必要アルモノト考ヘ居レリ。米國ハ兩國ノ  
 指導者間ニ於テ交渉ガ速刻實現スルナラバ前述ノ  
 四原則ヲ太平洋ノ具體的適用ニ適用スルコトヲ尚  
 確ニ理解シ且見解ヲ更ニ明確ニサレン希望ヲ常ニ  
 抱キ來レリ。

Doc 2593 D (4)  
Item 5

A、四ノ三郡へS、I、S、第二三二九三號参照  
B、S I S 第二三一八號ニ於テ外相盟國へ野村  
大使ニ對シ米政府ニ二條ニ對テ直チニ聲明ス  
ルヤウ要求セリ  
陸軍二三三一九 郵便 附 10 / 10 / 41

発信 ワシントン (野村)

受信 東京

一九四一年十月八日 紫

第九〇七號 (四ノ三郡) A

(政府書院ニテ取扱ノコト)

前述ノ事實及是迄米國政府トノ交渉ニヨリ得タ  
余ノ印象カラ判断スレバ米國ハ今迄兩國ガ直視シ  
得ナカッタ根本問題ニ就テ先ヅ合致點ヲ發見シ、  
ソレヨリ逐次他ノ問題ニ對スベク考へ居レリ。  
米國政府ハ前述ノ點ニ關シ一致ヲ見ザル限リ他ノ  
諸問題ヲ討議スルハ無益ナリト滿慮シ居ル次第ナ  
リ。故ニ現在マデ米國ハ六月十一日ノ吾ガ提案中  
ニ述べタ他ノ問題ニ就テ自己ノ意見ヲ表示スル以  
外ハ何等知ス所ナカリキ。(貴下ニ對スル弊害ノ  
通り是後ノ條約ニ幾分ノ變更アリタリ)

2.

Doc 2593 D (4)  
Item 5

六月二十一日前米國政府ノ提案ニハ米國ノ政策  
若シトシア右提議ヲ採納スルコトヲ願ハニシタリ。  
米國政府最近ノ回答ニ使レバ二十五日附ノ答ガ提  
案ヲ全々採納シ居レリ。コレハ米國政府ガ所持ス  
ル理念ヲ反映スルコトヲ要ハスモノナリ。然レテ  
ハ尙左記諸條項ニ就テ話シ合フ必要ヲ認ム。

- (A) 支那警察ニ關スル協定條項ニ記載セル事項
- (B) 蔣介石氏助ニ對スル計画的活動ノ中止
- (C) 支那警察ニ在ヘル條項中兩東條約ニ關スル協定  
(日支條約) 歐州戰爭ニ對スル吾ガ利益ニ代テ  
記述セル共同仲談及自衛權ノ範圍内ニ於ケル  
貿易ニ關スル附帶事項ノ撤去同意。

A、二ノ一部ハ取持不能

二三二九三 秘密 録

一九四六年十月十日

3.



Doc 2593 cert.

機 密 陸 軍 省

陸 軍 省 參 謀 本 部

情 報 局

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り證明ス。即チ、  
添附敷通ノ日本文電報ノ複寫寫眞ハ陸海軍兩省ノ熟  
練セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ツテ傍  
受カレ、解讀セラレ而シテ翻譯セラレシモノニシテ  
予ノ知り且信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ翻譯スル爲  
メ西洋人ニトリ人力ノ可能ナル限度ニ於テ正確且ツ  
典據ノアルモノナリ。

參 謀 本 部 付 大 佐

CARTER. W. CLARKE

カーター・ダヴリウー・クラーク

Doc. No. 151

Page 1

(Confidential) 79th Congress, 1st Session,  
Joint Committee Print, Pearl Harbor, Intercepted  
Diplomatic Messages Sent by the Japanese Govern-  
ment Between July 1 and Dec. 8, 1941  
Telegrams, pp. 59 and 60  
/Secret/

From: Washington (Houma)  
To: Tokyo  
October 8, 1941  
#907 (Part 2 of 4)

(To be handled in government code. Departmental Secret)

Thus, they hope that we will make ourselves clearer on these points. In our proposal of the 6th and in the explanation thereof, not only did we limit them and narrow what we had discussed in our informal conversations thus far, but we also curtailed extremely the guarantees we offered concerning the aforementioned principles. We equivocated concerning guarantees that we would not engage in armed aggression. We limited the area to which the principle of non-discriminatory treatment would apply in the Pacific, and on the excuse that China was geographically near to us, we limited the very principle itself. On the question of stationing and evacuating troops in and from China (including French Indo-China), the Americans are making some demands which we in principle have objections to. Moreover, they figure that they must be much surer of our attitude toward the three-power pact. These points you probably already know.

Army 23320

Trans. 10/10/41 (1)

Doc. No. 151

Page 2

/Secret/

From: Washington (Morura)  
To: Tokyo  
October 8, 1941  
#907 (Part 4 of 4)

-----  
Concerning the four principles mentioned in (2) during the conversation mentioned in your #634<sup>b</sup>, the American Ambassador talked like I had already reached an understanding with Secretary FULL on this. As I have told you in various messages, they shelved the question in both letter and spirit, but on April 16 when Secretary FULL presented me with these four points (see my #277<sup>b</sup>), I certainly was in no position to accept such a proposal before getting instructions from my home government, nor would I give the impression that we would accept them. Please note that. Nevertheless, these are very abstract principles, and I figured that there would be some elasticity in their application. This country applies them with prudence to other foreign nations; for example, in peace conferences, discussions of principles are extremely circumspect, so I do not think you need to be troubled over this.

Army 23321

Trans. 10/10/41 (2)

Doc. 15 I

(機密) 第七十九議會第一會議ニ提出セシムル真珠灣其  
同委員會印刷物中一九四二年七月一日ヨリ同年十二  
月八日止ノ間ニ於テ日本政府ヨリ發セシムル傍受  
外交通牒ヨリ、電報

五九一六十頁

ワシントン野村ヨリ

東京へ

一九四二年/昭和十六年/十月八日

九〇六号(四、二部)

(政府暗号ニ依リ處理サル可キ下。省社)

斯ル次第ニ彼等ハ是等ノ案ニ對シ我方カ態度ヲ鮮  
明ニセニトラ希冀セリ。六日、我方申出並ニ右ニ關スル説明  
ニ於テハ是ヲ非公式會談ニ討議シタル處ヲ制限具  
狹縮シタルニテラズ前述ノ諸原則ニ關シ我等カ與ヘル  
保證ヲ極力削減セリ。武力侵略ノ行方ト保證ニ關シ  
テハ我等ハ言ヲ曖昧ニ附シ置キタリ。太平洋ニ於テハ無  
差別待遇原則、適用地域ヲ局限シ且ツ中國カ地理的  
ニ我ニ近接セルヲ以テ我等ハ右原則ソノモノヲ制限  
シタリ。中國ニ於テハ駐兵並ニ撤兵(佛領印及支那ヲ含ム)  
ニ關スル問題ニ對シハ米國側ノ若干ノ要求ヲ爲シツ、アルモ  
我等ハ主義ニ於テ之ニ反對ナリ。尚亦彼等ハ三國條約  
ニ對シテ我方カ態度ヲ一層明確ニサシメキ旨求メタリ。是  
等ノ上ニ多分既ニ御承知ナラン。

軍ニ三三三ニ

翻譯四一〇一〇(二)

64/145

Doc. 15 I

華盛頓(野村)宛

一九四一年(昭和十六年)十月十日

第九〇七号

(四、本四部)

東京宛

貴電第三四号中言及、會議中、(2) 於言  
 及之原則、關於未國之便、本件、付本便、於既  
 長官上、問了解、達之如何、語、居、屢  
 次、電報、申上、通、先、文字上、於、花  
 神、於、右問題、不問、附、四月十日  
 右問題、長官、提、往、電、二七号  
 答、勿論、本國政府、訓令、候、不、斯、提  
 實、受、諾、不、立、場、又、我、方、反、諾、可、能  
 性、如、印、象、先、方、與、之、無、之、此、矣  
 印、諒、承、相、成、度、サ、リ、カ、右、極、今、抽、象、的、原、則  
 其、適、用、付、之、幾、分、彈、力、性、也、ト、思  
 惟、當、國、於、此、諸、外、國、之、適、用、際、之、  
 慎重、例、之、平、和、會、議、於、此、原、則、論  
 議、極、大、迂、遠、ト、シ、本、件、關、之、印、象  
 慮、必、要、ト、思、惟、也。

2

陸軍第三三三二一号

四年十月十日譯(2)

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 9 Oct 41"

October 9th, 1941 - (Extract)

I met Prince KONOYE at 10.30 a.m. after his audience with the Emperor. He was quite uneasy about the future of the parley with Washington, and his hopes for a satisfactory compromise were very discouraging. I expressed my opinion for his information as follows:

1. The resolution of the Council in the Imperial presence on the 6th of September seemed to me too outright. It was not the conclusion of exhaustive discussion in my opinion.

2. Judging from the situation both at home and abroad, the war with the U.S.A. would offer us little chance of victory, so we had better reconsider it.

3. It would be inadvisable to declare war against the U.S.A. immediately.

4. The Premier should clarify his intention to concentrate our national efforts upon the completion of the Chinese Incident.

5. We should acquire freedom without paying any attention to economic pressure by the USA.

6. The Premier should demand ten or fifteen years of hard struggle on the part of our nation to establish a highly defensive nation.

7. If necessary, we were ready to put belligerency in action to promote the completion of the Chinese Incident and to use our whole military force in China in order to realize our plans against Kunning and Chungking.

Hachiro ARITA visited me to talk about the American problems and the general resignation of the cabinet.

EX 1146

Doc 1632W (7i)

木戸侯爵日記

昭和十六年十月九日分

九月九日 木曜

午前十時十分ヨリ向三十分迄拜謁

十時半近衛公参内拜謁後正談日米國交際整理ニ  
ツキ妥結ノ見込容易ニ付カズ首相モ大ニ心配  
シ居ラレシ故余ハ大塚左ノ如キ意見ヲ述べ参  
考ニ資ス

九月六日ノ御前會議ノ決定ハ余ヨリ見レバ  
聯カ居突ニシテ敵ノ熱ヤザルキノアルヤニ  
思ハル

内外ノ諸情勢ヨリ判断スルニ對米取ノ結  
ハ容易ニ逆戻シ難ク再検討ヲ要スルモノト  
思フ

政府ハ此ノ際直ニ對米取ヲ決意スルコト  
ナク

寧ロ支那事情ノ完遂ヲ第一義トスルコトヲ  
表明シ

米國ノ經濟壓迫ヲ顧慮スルコトナク我國ハ  
自主的立埒ヲ堅持シ

十年乃至十五年ノ臥薪嘗膽ヲ國民ニ宣明シ  
高度國防國家ノ新立能力ノ培養ニ専念努力  
スルコト

2. Dec 1632 W (76)

一 支那軍獲完遂ノ爲ニハ至スレバ交際樽ノ至  
 劍モ餘ヤズ陸軍ノ動員兵力ハ之ヲ支那ニ使  
 用シ重慶、昆明等ノ作戦ヲ敢行シ獨力、實  
 カヲ以テ解決スルコトヲ決意スルコト  
 一 時半有田八郎氏來訪對本臣題内閣總務  
 院等ニツキ懇談ス  
 三時半朝香宮邸ニ伺候陛下ニ湛官様ニ拜  
 謁勸許ノ御祝詞ヲ言上ス  
 五時半富田督記官長來邸政局ニ付シ懇談ス  
 七時近衛首相來邸對米尚趣其他ニツキ懇談  
 ス。



Q. # 1147

Extract from Marquis KIDO DiaryOctober 12th, 1941

At 10 a.m. Kango KOYAMA called on me to express deep resentment at the recent political situation, urging all possible efforts of the Premier. Major-General KATO visited my house to explain the Gendarmerie's interpretation of present conditions. TOMITA, Chief Secretary to the Cabinet, visited me and stated as follows, "The War, Navy and Foreign Ministers and President of the Planning Board held a meeting in the Prince's house at Ogikubo at 2 p.m. to discuss the adjustment of diplomatic relations between the U. S. A. and Japan. The War Minister calls for great resolution since he sees no hope for arrival at an understanding between Japan and the U. S. A.; however, that if he could hear an explanation such that he could persuade himself to be sure of arrival at an understanding why of course he didn't like war. The Navy Minister said that we should try to avoid war as much as possible. Now this country was standing at the cross-roads, having two ways to choose; one is the restoration of friendly relations by diplomatic negotiations; the other the declaration of war on the U. S. A. If the former was our choice, we must bring about a full understanding between the two countries by convincing the U. S. A. of the sincerity of our friendship towards her, for a war after a patched-up compromise would be most undesirable. Anyhow, the Premier's strong leadership was the most urgent matter. The Premier expressed his firm conviction of the successful conclusion of the parley, asking their cooperation with his policy. The Foreign Minister was of the opinion that he was not quite sure of the outcome of the parley, although he could not flatly deny that the meeting would end in success. They made the following agreement among themselves on the advice of the War Minister: Our demands regarding the stationing of troops in China should not be altered; the successful results of the Chinese Incident should be made secure by all means; and we should further our parley based on these agreements, ceasing our preparations for war.

Wt 1147

1.

陸相ハ日米諒解案ノ成立ハ見込ナシトシテ重大  
決意ヲ要望ス但シ成立ニ確信アリトノ納得シ得  
ル説明ヲ聽クヲ得バ勿論戦争ヲ好ムモノニアラ  
ズ

海相ハ戦争ハ出來得ル文憑クベキモノトス

今日我國ハ二隣ノ驕頭ニ立テルモノニシテ外交  
ニヨル打開カ戦争カソノ何レカナリト思ハル、  
外交ヲ以テ打開セントセバ之ニ徹底スルヲ要シ

Doc 1632 W (77)

木戸侯館日記

昭和十六年十月十二日分

十月十二日（日）晴

午前九時末松氏來訪面談

十時小山完五氏來邸近時ノ政局ヲ痛憤近衛公ノ

一段ノ努力ヲ要望セラレ

四時半加藤少將來邸憲兵側ヨリ見タル政治情勢

ノ話アリタリ

夜倉茂氏ノ療治ヲ受ク

九時富田書記官長來邸大要左ノ如キ話アリタリ

本日午後二時ヨリ荻窪首相邸ニ於テ陸海外三相

企畫院總裁會合シ日米國交調整問題ニツキ審議

Doc 1632 W (77)

イ、加波ナ交渉ノ後出奈ヅルガ故ニトテ戦争ニ  
 関スルハ不可ナリ、首相ハ何レニヨルモ強ク擔  
 當セラレタシ  
 首相ハ自分ハ今尙此交渉ハ見込テリト思フ故ニ  
 自分ハ此意思ニテ進ミタシ  
 外相ハ確信アリヤト云ハレテモ相手ノテルコト  
 故道確ニハ云ヘサルモ未ダ見込テリト思フ  
 總相ノ提案ニテ左ノ如キ稟合セヨナセリ  
 日米交渉ニ於テハ  
 イ陸兵間關係之ヲ中心トスル體裁ヲ變更セサ  
 ルコト  
 ロ支那事變ノ成果ニ動搖ヲ興ヘザルコト  
 ラ以テ外交成功ヲ取メ得ルコトニ關シ陸々統帥  
 部ノ所望時期迄ニ確信ヲ得ルコト  
 右確信ノ上ニ外交ノ妥協ノ方針ニ違ム  
 右決心ヲ以テ進ムヲ以テ作戦上ノ警備ヲハ之ヲ  
 打切ルコト  
 右ニ關シ外相トシテノ能否ヲ研究スルコト

以上

Facts Pertaining to the Resignation of the 3rd  
KONOYE Cabinet.

The 3rd KONOYE Cabinet started off with the great mission of readjusting the Japanese-American relations. For this reason, the retirement of Foreign Minister MATSUOKA was brought about and as only that was done, it can be said that all efforts were solely exerted toward the accomplishment of this great mission ever since the formation of the cabinet. However, America's attitude was by no means definite. There were various opinions as to why her attitude was not definite, but the opinion of the War Minister was that since America's basic policy is to advance into Asia, the reason for America's indefinite attitude is fundamental and consequently she lacks sincerity even in her negotiation. However, we continued our negotiation with the view that a temporary compromise and conciliation may be possible in regard to the current situation, even if our basic traditional policies may have been different.

Recently the negotiation reached a state of temporary deadlock due to the occupation of French Indo-China by our troops, but as it became known that we wouldn't go any further, the situation eased somewhat and the negotiation was again resumed. Hence, a message was sent to President Roosevelt on August 28 proposing a conference. Nevertheless, since President Roosevelt, in reply to this, stated that he was willing to hold a conference, but would like to have a general agreement reached in regard to the important matters, at least, as a premise, an Imperial conference was held on September 6 to determine the basis of the counter-measure for this.

As a result of the Imperial conference, it was decided to direct all our effort toward the diplomatic negotiation to the end, but to resolutely assume a war policy in the event no means for the conclusion of the negotiation is reached by early October.

Since there was a time limit of by early October, the negotiation was carried on hurriedly and as it didn't progress as expected, September passed and October came with the negotiation still not going smoothly. At about that time, the supreme command group became boisterous and stated that they will wait until October 15, but won't extend it beyond that. Therefore, I requested the assembly of the war minister, the navy minister, the foreign minister and the president of the Planning Board at OGIGAIISO for a final conference on the afternoon of October 12.

However, on the day before the conference, Chief Oka of the Naval Affairs Bureau came and in talking with him, he stated that with the exception of the Naval General Staff, the brains of the Navy don't want a Japanese-American war, but since the Navy, herself, can not say "she can't do it" in view of her approval of the decision of the Imperial Headquarters, the Navy Minister will propose to leave it in the hands of the Prime Minister at tomorrow's conference; so we would like you to decide on continuing the diplomatic negotiation.

Under such circumstance, this important conference was held at 2 p.m. on October 12 at OGIGAIISO. When the Prime Minister in opening the conference, stated:

At last, we have come to the stage where we must decide whether it is to be war or peace. In regard to this, let us first study whether there is any hope for a successful conclusion of the diplomatic negotiation,

War Minister TOJO, expressing the Army's point of view, stated:

There is absolutely no hope for a successful conclusion of the diplomatic negotiation.

However, Navy Minister OIKAWA stated:

Let us leave the decision as to whether there is any hope for a successful conclusion of the diplomatic negotiation in the hands of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister and as for the Navy, she will comply with that decision. If there is any hope for a successful conclusion of the diplomatic negotiation, we want the negotiation to be continued. Today, we are standing on the cross-road of peace or war. Until today, we have been making preparations for war on the one hand, while carrying on diplomatic negotiation on the other, but today we are actually confronting the crisis of peace or war. That is, if we are to rely on diplomatic negotiation, we would like it to be carried out thoroughly. Our preparations will fall behind if our attitude is to carry on diplomatic negotiation and then decide on war in the midst of it because it won't go smoothly. If we are to depend on diplomatic negotiation, we want to make it a success at all cost. Since we are standing on this important cross-road today, we want the decision of the Prime Minister at this time. We want to comply with this decision and go ahead.

Against this opinion of the Navy Minister, the War Minister replied:

The Premier, of course, is shouldering a grave responsibility, but we, too, are responsible as advisers. Hence, the determination of this great problem cannot be left solely in the hands of the Premier. I believe that there is no hope for a successful conclusion of the diplomatic negotiation, but if the Foreign Minister is fully confident of success, it may be given further consideration. Does the Foreign Minister have a confidence of success?

Since Foreign Minister TOYODA's views were asked, the Foreign Minister stated:

Since there is the second party, I can't say that I am confident of success, but, generally speaking, the important points in the negotiation with America are:

- (1) The Tripartite Alliance.
- (2) The economic problem in China.
- (3) The question of keeping our troops /T.N. in China/.

These three items are the obstacles. Of these, some sort of agreement can be reached in regard to item 1 and 2, but the third item pertaining to the question of keeping our troops /T.N. in China/ is the most difficult one. Since America is emphatically demanding for the complete withdrawal of our troops, I believe a compromise may be reached if we agree to a complete withdrawal of troops as a principle and station troops according to the time and place as specifically designated by an agreement or something between Japan and China, but I believe even this will be considerably difficult.

When this opinion was expressed, the War Minister, objecting emphatically, stated:

We can't yield on the question of withdrawal of troops. It must be done with occupation as its general principle and the remaining troops withdrawn. Since we have made such a tremendous sacrifice in this China Incident, it would be alright, properly speaking, to sever her territory, but in view of the KONOYE statement, that, too, cannot be done. Besides, a complete withdrawal of troops now cannot be done.

Hence, the Prime Minister stated:

If the War Minister insists as he does, it is not a question of whether there is any hope for a successful conclusion of the diplomatic negotiation. There definitely is no hope. As for the Foreign Minister, he could consider it

from the standpoint of the general situation and yield more. Only then can it be said that there is hope for a successful conclusion of the negotiation. The Navy Minister is incessantly clamoring for the decision of the Premier, but I cannot decide on war at this time. Since I, as expressed in the opinion of the Foreign Minister, believe there is still hope of success, I cannot help but adopt the Foreign Minister's opinion if I must decide on one or the other.

At this point, the War Minister retorted:

It is still early for the Premier to cast a decision. We would like to have him consider the matter once more.

As it was mutually decided to reconsider the matter, the conference of four and a half hours was brought to an end at 6:30 p.m. However, through this conference, the position of each became clear.

Upon considering this matter fully, I find that, if I, at the conference, had accepted the proposal of the Navy Minister to leave it in the hands of the Premier and decided on "war" by yielding to the opinion of the War Minister, the decision would have stood since the Navy Minister could not have opposed it and that it certainly would have brought about a matter of grave concern to the Empire. On looking back, I cannot help but feel my flesh creeping.

On the night (8:00 - 10:30) of October 13, I requested Foreign Minister TOYODA to call on me in the Japanese room of my official residence. When I inquired about the subsequent developments of the negotiation with America, he expressed the opinion that we inevitably must give up our occupation, that it wouldn't matter if the withdrawal is made with a time limit or summarily without it and that there is no means of settlement other than this.

Prior to the cabinet meeting on the morning of October 14, I requested the War Minister to call on me. As a result of my deliberation and based on last night's opinion of the Foreign Minister, I told him as follows:

In regard to the question of occupation, the result is clear if done according to the War Minister's contention, but if we were to yield on our pretence and take the reality, I believe that there is still hope in the negotiation. At this time, I wonder if we shouldn't make up our mind to readjust the Japanese-American relationship, the future of which is very risky? I deeply realize my responsibility for the Sino-Japanese Incident, but with the China



Incident still unsettled after four years, I wonder if we should further extend our hands toward the South. If it can be settled in one or two years, that is another matter, but judging from the opinion of experts, I find that no one thinks that it can be settled in one or two years. The concensus of opinions, practically, is that if the arrow should leave the bow, it may take five or ten years.

This is Count KANEKO's story, but at the time of the commencement of hostilities between Japan and Russia, Emperor Meiji, too, was unable to make a decision. So, early on the morning of February 4, when the final Imperial conference was to be held, he called in Prince ITO and asked him if there was any hope of winning the war with Russia. Hence, Prince ITO replied, "There isn't any hope of winning, but it may be possible to prevent the invasion of Korea by the Russian Army for about a year or a year and a half. In the meantime, we must request a third power to intervene and end the war, but since England and France are our allies, respectively, we have no third power other than America whom we can ask to intervene." Hence, it was finally decided at the Imperial conference of that day to commence hostilities, but that night Prince ITO reportedly called Count KANEKO and asked him to go to America immediately after telling him of the above. In other words, they were thinking of the ending of the war at the time of the starting of the war.

When Field Marshal OYAMA was about to leave for Manchuria as commander-in-chief of the Manchurian Forces, he reportedly stated, "I will have nothing to do. Mr. KODAMA will do the fighting for me. But I may be of some help when the war is to be ended". The preparedness of our elders of that period is worthy of note.

If we should start a war with America this time, it will be a real world war and there'll be no one to intervene. Even the international situation is very different from that of the Russo-Japan War period and even our ally Germany, she is extremely powerless in the Orient.

If hostilities should commence, Japan will have to take the initiative and attack the Philippines. As for America, since it will be the first time her domain will be attacked, the flaring up of her public sentiment is more than imaginable and it, I believe, will be more than the down with Germany sentiment expressed to date. The reason for Lindberg's opposition to participation in the war is the hopelessness of winning against Germany, but since the relationship in the event of an attack on the Philippines

by Japan is different, there is the danger of such sentiment as down with Hitler being blown away and changing completely into an anti-Japanese sentiment.

Furthermore, since England is strengthening her sentiment of resistance against Germany on the strength of America's aid, it is a natural course for a peace movement to stir up within England if a Japanese-American war should break out and decrease the aid to England and if Germany would undertake her landing operation at this opportune time, it would be fine. But since Germany, too, has considerably depleted her national strength in her war with Soviet Russia and since naval strength will be involved if a landing operation is to be undertaken, it may be proper to regard that the peace feeling in Germany, too, will become strong in proportion to the peace feeling in England. That is, it seems as if a Japanese-American war will hasten the peace in Europe, and it must be viewed that there is the danger of peace being brought about among England, America, Germany and Soviet Russia at the cost of the Far East.

In other words, considerable thought should be given to the opening of hostilities between Japan and America. Hence, I believe that it would be better first to bring an end to the China Incident and to have at the peace conference a reasonable voice backed by a faultless Navy. What do you think?

In reply to this, the War Minister stated:

In view of so much sacrifice, withdrawal of our troops cannot be undertaken as a principle. I can't yield to this even if I were to risk my position. Since America's real intention is control of the Far East, if we were to make one concession, the situation will probably be that she'll demand for another and not know where to stop her demands.

The Premier makes such remarks because he fully knows our domestic weaknesses, but since America too, should have her weaknesses, I must say that the Premier's view is too pessimistic.

Since such was his retort, I took leave of the War Minister remarking that such being the case nothing can be done because it's a difference of opinion and that I wanted him to make the same statement at the cabinet meeting.

At the cabinet meeting from 10:30 a.m. on that day, the War Minister expressed his above-mentioned opinion and the War Minister was the absolute master of the situation with no one among the cabinet members voicing approval or disapproval. Thus, the cabinet reached a complete deadlock.

In the meantime, it became gradually known within Army quarters that since the Navy, her self, had no will to fight, but couldn't say so her self, she was appealing to the Premier through Bureau Chief OKA via Chief Secretary TOMITA for the Premier to express it. Consequently, the Army came forward with the remark that since war with America, in the first place, is a naval matter, it cannot be carried out no matter how persistent the Army may be if the Navy does not approve of it and that if the Navy would say she can't do it if she can't do it, then we can find a way to dissuade our subordinates and bring order within the service, but order can't be brought about within the service within only the Premier stating it.

As an outcome of it, Chief MUTO of the Military Affairs Bureau called on Chief Secretary TOMITA and reportedly requested that the Navy be asked to make a definite statement at this time. Hence, when Chief Secretary TOMITA relayed this to Chief OKA of the Naval Affairs Bureau, Bureau Chief OKA reportedly stated that the Navy, as usual, cannot say it and that she can say no more than that she will comply with the decision of the Premier. Nevertheless, since the Army, too, insisted that it's of no use without the Navy saying it, but only vaguely stated by the Premier, the attempt to break the deadlock was abandoned.

However, late on the night of the 14th (10:30 p.m. -- 00:30 a.m. of the next day), President SUZUKI of the Planning Board came to OGIGAWA as messenger of War Minister TOJO. According to his statement, /TOJO/ had stated:

Nothing can be done since the opinions of the Premier and mine (the War Minister) had clashed head on. However, on inquiring more and more about the circumstances, I have found that it is the navy that is staggering the determination of the Premier. If only the navy would definitely say so, things would be all right, but if she claims she can't say it, the situation will only check and counter-check itself. Therefore, I have reached this conclusion. I believe that there is no other alternative but to return the decision of the recent Imperial conference back to a clean slate once more by all of us, even including all of the supreme command, resigning and to start anew with new men coming forward. Then, if the new men coming forward should decide that we won't fight, that may appear to be the end of it, but the Army is straining at the leash. There is no one among the Emperor's subject other than Prince KONOYE who can shoulder this grave crisis, but since he ought not to be troubled this time in view of the circumstances of the Prince to date, I believe that there is no alternative but to request Prince HIGASHI-KUNI to take over at this time. Please relay this to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO, also.

This is highly out of the ordinary, but it is a plan. I replied that this be relayed to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO, also. When President SUZUKI called on the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO on the morning of the following day, the 15th, and informed him of this the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal reportedly did not express approval or disapproval, but it appeared as if the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal had reported this to the Emperor immediately and since the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal requested the Premier to come forward and report the present situation to the Emperor, I went to the palace at 4 p.m. on the 15th and reported in detail the developments to date. When I reported:

The navy does not want war, but she can't say so in view of the decision of the Imperial Conference. On hearing that, I, as Premier, can't agree to war all the more. I do think that the plan of the War Minister to request Prince HIGASHI-KUNI to take over is a means that would break the deadlocked situation, the Emperor replied:

I would like to maintain peace to the very end. Since the appearance of an Imperial prince would make him appear to be my personal representative, it would be bad for an Imperial prince to take over and decide on war. If an Imperial prince takes over, he must decide on peace. If it should be decided on peace, will the army submit to

the regulation? Besides, since it is an unprecedented thing for an Imperial prince to take over, the selection of cabinet members must be done very carefully.

Thus, the Emperor seemed to have accepted the resignation of the KONOYE cabinet tacitly.

Generally speaking, I wonder if War Minister TOJO's reason for bringing out an Imperial prince is to take the issue to a strong group or to take it to a weak group? According to President SUZUKI, it appears to be for a change of direction, but in view of a report that a group of advocates of positive action is planning to use the Imperial prince as a figure-head and carry out their positive view and since the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal requested that the intention of the War Minister be ascertained once more, I called President SUZUKI and had him ascertain the intention of the War Minister as well as whether the army will submit to the regulation in the event it were to be decided on "peace," a matter of concern to the Emperor. The reply of the War Minister reportedly was that he could not state definitely that the army would submit to the regulation in the event it is decided on "peace." He further added though ambiguously:

Assuming that it is decided on "peace," there wouldn't be anyone other than an Imperial prince who would be able to suppress the army.

Therefore, at 8 o'clock on the night of the 15th, I secretly visited the residence of Prince HIGASHI-KUNI and informed him of the circumstances to date. And then I told him:

In connection with our desire that the war must be prevented somehow, to solicit for the aid of an Imperial prince is an unprecedented thing, but there is no means other than this to return the decision of the past to a clean slate. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO is afraid that it may affect your reputation, but since it will bring trouble to not only your highness, but also to the Imperial Household if war should break out, I beg that you consider yourself to be Prince MORINAGA and put forth your whole effort at this time.

His Imperial Highness stated that he would like to think it over since it was a grave matter and wondered if he could suppress the army with his own strength.

On the 16th, I began collecting the letters of resignation of the cabinet members from morning and when I informed the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO that I was going to the palace to present them to the Emperor now as I had collected all of them in the afternoon, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal asked me to hold off. Stating that because I had collected all of the letters of resignation, I visited the palace

at 5 o'clock and explaining the reason as disagreement of opinion within the cabinet, I presented the resignation of the entire cabinet members and retired from the presence of the Emperor. I met the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO and inquired as to what he thought of the Imperial prince. According to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, since His Majesty claims that it would be very embarrassing, he has finally decided to summon both, TOJO and OIKAWA, simultaneously, issue the Imperial Mandate for the formation of the succeeding cabinet to one of them and order the other to cooperate and, at the same time, he also issued an instruction to the effect that the decision of the Imperial Conference of September 6 be reconsidered.

As to whom it shall be, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal explained that since the War Minister had clashed head-on with the Premier, it would be like recognizing his contention if it is given to him. Hence, he believes that it would be better to take the middle course and offer it to the Navy Minister--since the Navy Minister actually does not want war, but this has not been brought to light. The Emperor, too, has been informed to that effect.

However, it can be thought in this manner, also. Since the problem is the army, there would be a danger of the army springing back all the more if it is offered to the Navy. Hence, wouldn't it be better to offer it to the stronger side and alleviate the situation? Since America is of the opinion that the army would reverse things even if decided upon by the KONOYE cabinet, she will be all the more surprised if TOJO cabinet is formed after it, in view of the fact that she already is all the more convinced that it will be war with the resignation of the KONOYE Cabinet. But if the TOJO Cabinet, contrary to expectations, should continue to carry on the negotiation, it may instead make her feel relieved and bring about a better result. /TN: The following sentence is crossed out/ As to whom it should be, I believe that it would be better to have TOJO.

Upon expressing my opinion thusly /TN: crossed out/, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal asked me to consider the above advantages and disadvantages until tomorrow.

In the morning of the 17th, I sent a message to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal that TOJO would be better (if guarantee of peace is obtained).

On the 17th, the chief retainers' conference will be held in the palace at 1 p.m., after which the Emperor is expected to summon both TOJO and OIKAWA and issue the Imperial Mandate and, at the same time, an instruction to the effect that the Army and the Navy should cooperate and that the decision of the Imperial Conference of September 6 should be reconsidered.

A F F I D A V I T

I, Tomohiko USHIBA, Japanese nation, former private secretary to the late Prince KONOYE, first being duly sworn, do make affidavit as follows:

THAT, the writing to which this affidavit is attached, consisting of 37 pages (now marked for identification as International Prosecution Section Document No. 497) entitled "Facts Pertaining to the Resignation of the Third Konoye Cabinet" is in the handwriting of Shigeki ARAYA, one of the former private secretaries to the late Prince KONOYE and was dictated to him by Prince KONOYE, excepting only that portion of the writing which appears on page 35 and the two unnumbered pages following, which has been written in red, and that the portion written in red is in the handwriting of the late Prince KONOYE.

In witness thereof I have hereunto affixed my signature  
this 5 day of November 1946.

/s/ Tomo. Ushiba

Subscribed and sworn to before  
me by Tomohiko USHIBA this  
5 day of November 1946.

/s/ Douglas L. Waldorf  
Douglas L. Waldorf  
Chief, Investigation Division  
International Prosecution Section

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 13 Oct. 41"

October 13th, 1941 (Extract)

.....SUZUKI, President of the Planning Board, visited me at 8 p.m. to talk about his political views which might contribute in some way to the making of a new turn in our political condition. I expressed my opinion to him. Our conclusion of the talk was this: The Premier should make an effort to promote mutual understanding with the War and Navy Ministers.



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EX 1149

木戸侯爵日記

昭和十六年十月十三日

十月十三日 (月) 晴

午前九時長松君來邸面談

十時出勤

十時二十分松平官相來室神嘗祭御告文ニツキ  
相談アリ賛成ス

十時三十五分ヨリ十一時四十五分迄日米問題  
ヲ中心ニ種々御物語アリ其ノ中左ノ如キ御話  
アリタリ

一時今ノ情況ニテハ日米交渉ノ成立ハ漸次望  
ミ薄クナリタル様思ハル慶眞一侯爵トナルガ  
如キ場合ニハ今度ハ宣戰ノ詔勅ヲ發スルコト  
ナルベシ其ノ場合今迄ノ詔書ニツイテ見ルニ  
聯盟脫退ノ際ニモ特ニ文武格從ト世界平和ト  
云フコトニ就テ述ベタノデアアルガ國民ハドウ  
モ此點ヲ等重シテ居ル様ニ思ハレル又日獨  
伊三國同盟ノ際ノ詔書ニ就テモ平和ノ爲メト  
云フコトガ忘レフレ如何ニモ英米ニ對抗スル  
カノ如ク國民カ考ヘテ居ルノハ誠ニ面白クナ  
ト思フ就テハ今度宣戰ノ詔書ヲ出ス場合ニハ

Dec 1632 W (18)

2.

長非近衛ト木戸モ参加シテ貰ツテ管ト自分ノ氣  
持ヲ越ベテ之ヲ取リ入レテ貰ヒタイト思フ  
一發米米段ヲ決意スル場合ニハ尙一層歐洲ノ情  
勢殊ニ英獨、獨ソ、ノ和平説等ヲ中心トスル見  
透シ及ビ獨ノ單獨ノ和平ヲ對シ日米段ニ協力セ  
シムルコトニツキ外交ニ涉ノ必要アリ、又戰爭  
終結ノ場合ノ手段ヲ初メヨリ充分考究シ置クノ  
要アルベクソレニハローマ法皇傳トノ使臣ノ交  
換等親善關係ニツキ方策ヲ樹ツルノ要アルベシ  
二時近衛首相參内拜謁後三時ヨリ四時頃迄日米  
問題ヲ中心ニ懇談ス  
五時豊田外相拜謁後五時半頃ヨリ六時半頃迄面  
談ス  
八時金木總裁來邸政局ノ緊迫ヲ憂慮シ打斷策ニ  
ツキ述べ話アリ余モ意見ヲ述ブ要スルニ首相ハ  
一發ト海軍備増ト適合ヒテ更ニ打斷ニ導クノ要  
アルベシト述ブ

6x1150

Doc 1632 W (79)

1.

水戸侯爵日記

昭和十六年十月十五日分

十月十五日(水)

晴

午前九時館氏來訪面談  
 午前九時半企畫院總裁鈴木中將來  
 訪東條陸相ノ意向ヲ傳達セラル概  
 要左ノ如シ近衛首相ニシテ留意セ  
 サル限リ政變ハ避ケ難キモノト思  
 ハル之カ後任ニ就テハ誰レ々々ト  
 名刺スコトハ如何ト思ハル、カ原  
 則論ヲ爲セバ聖上ノ御意ヲ隔テナ  
 ク拜承シ得ルコト陸海軍ヲ纏メ得  
 ルコトノ二資裕ヲ必娶トス此ノ點  
 ヨリ見テ臣下ニハ人ナク結局東久  
 通官邸下ノ御出馬ヲ煩ハスノ外ナ  
 カルベシ云々  
 余ハ羣皇室ニ懸スルコトナレバ慎  
 重ナル考慮ヲ要ス尙左御出馬ヲ願  
 フ場合ニハ露前ニ陸海一致ノ方針  
 即チ自重的ノ方針ノ決定セラレル  
 コトガ先決必須ノ問題ナリ此ノ見  
 透ハ確實ナリヤト問ヒ尙充分研究

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2

ノ長アルベキ旨ヲ答フ  
由喜子、紀子ヲ伴ヒ來訪久振リニ  
元氣ナル顔ヲ見ル  
午前十一時出勤近衛首相來室久  
通官、下御出馬、如何トノコ  
トナリシ故尙考究中ナル旨ヲ答フ  
尙松平秘書官長ニ真一右ノ案ヲ  
行ノ場合ノ手續カド研究ヲ依頼ス  
一時十五分ヨリ二時迄拜謁政情急  
迫ノ事情ヲ言上ス  
二時山崎樵親總監來應政情ヲ聽ク  
四時近衛首相參内來室、下ノ政情  
ニ就キ、陸軍大臣トノ關係若シク  
緊張ヲ見ルニ至リ陸相ハ日米交渉  
見透ノ問題ニツキ此上首相ト會見  
スルトキハ感情的トナルノ虞アリ  
好マストノ意ヲ獲スニ至リシヲ以  
テ到底此種政治ヲ博營シ行クコト  
能ハズ就テハ真久通官、下御出馬  
之ニハ如何トノ答ナリシ故余ハ大  
体朝餞木總裁ニ語りタル意見ヲ弁  
べ尙、陸相ガ、海軍協同ノ案メ  
政策、總同ニ同意シタルモノナリヤ

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3.

或ハ皇族ニ此困難ナル所懸ヲ御解決願  
 フ意思ナリヤ不分明ナル點アルヲ以テ  
 先ツ之ヲ種メ置クコトノ必要ヲ認メ鈴木  
 木總裁ニ電話ヲ以テ來訪ヲ求ム  
 近衛首相拜謁中余ハ皇族ニ對スル問  
 題ナレバ松平官相ヲ其室ノ訪ヒ今朝ヨ  
 リノ経緯ヲ話ス官相ハ驚キタル様子ナ  
 リシカ意見ハ此際皇族ノ御出馬ニハ反  
 對ナリキ  
 四時半鈴木總裁來訪眞條陸相ノ眞意ニ  
 ツキ尋ネタルモ遂ニ導領ヲ得ズ依ツテ  
 至急確ニ貰フコトトス近衛首相モ御前  
 ヲ退下シ來室参加セラル首相ハ右ノ案  
 ヲ言上シタルニ眞條買一致ニテ平定ノ  
 方針ニ決定セルナレバ萬不得止裏情ナ  
 レバ致方ナシトノ意味ノ御誓アリタリ  
 トノ話アリタリ、  
 首相トハ五時半頃迄ハ程々政局ノ拾収  
 ニツキ懸談ス  
 夜至リ鈴木總裁ヨリ眞條陸相ト會見ノ  
 結果ニツキ電話ニテ話アリ右ニヨレバ  
 首相ノ訪ヘハ御前ニ陸海軍ノ協同ヲ策

44

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以上

由喜子美子一泊又  
 晚盤ノ御廻走ニ去ル  
 伴松平侯邸ニ至リ小松侯夫人ト共ニ  
 六時半鶴子参儀來訪中ノ獅子サソ同  
 對シテノ御尋ヘラ豫ル  
 久遠宮殿下ノ侍ニツキ首相ノ言上ニ  
 五時三十分ヨリ同五十分迄拜謁東  
 シ由ナリ  
 内大臣ノ面談シタシトノ御希望ナリ  
 ハ二三日参儀シタク且ツ陸軍大臣、  
 勸ノ結果ノ報告アリ右ニヨレバ陛下  
 以上異様ナキ旨ヲ答フ夜半ニ至リ拜  
 レタルモ右ハ政府ノ責任ニ於テ行フ  
 奈トシテハ稍々時期尙早トハ端ヘラ  
 勸ラコトヒ御内話ニ對シ置キ厚旨ヲアリ  
 又首相ヨリ電語ニテ尙久遠陛下ニ拜  
 スルコト能ハザルナリ  
 ニ提案セラレ之ニテハ尙ニ賛意ヲ表  
 之シテ行ハントスルモノナルコト異  
 ナルニツラバニ皇族ノ御力ニヨリ

Corrected in accordance with Language  
Board decision, as shown on Court  
Record 11,141-2

Doc. Div.

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 16 Oct 41"

At 8:30 a.m. President SUZUKI visited me, and we discussed the Prince's Cabinet. The reasons I gave him for opposing the Prince's Cabinet are as follows:

1. The formation of a Prince's Cabinet should be carried out only when unavoidable, for example, when, even if the Army and Navy agree, force of circumstance makes it necessary to have a Prince of the blood solve their difficulties.

2. According to what developed last night, the difficulties have not been solved, and a member of the Imperial family should never be asked to overcome these obstacles.

3. In a way the formation of this Prince's Cabinet would indicate that we lacked a suitable person among our subjects, and a great problem would be created if war with the U.S.A. were to break out when such a Cabinet existed. There were important reasons why even Prince Konoye was prevented from carrying out the policies decided at Councils in the Imperial presence, and if we ask a member of the Imperial House to assume a responsibility he cannot fulfill, it would cause the Imperial House to become an object of public hatred.

At 3:00 p.m. War Minister TOJO called on me to report on the pressing political situation. I opposed his idea of the Prince's Cabinet for the same reasons which I had made clear to SUZUKI. I pointed out that the decisions made at the Imperial Conference on September 6 were rather careless and I urged the revision of the resolution of the Council in the Imperial presence, and I also stressed the necessity of a true unity between the Army and the Navy. I stressed the fact that this was the least our country is asking for without which no national progress could be expected.

At 4 p.m. Prince KONOYE telephoned to say that the Cabinet was going to resign 'on bloc'. I was astonished by the suddenness of this announcement. I visited the Emperor at 4 p.m. to report upon the general resignation of the KONOYE Cabinet. At 5 p.m. Prince KONOYE tendered the Cabinet Minister's resignations to the Throne. I was received in audience by the Emperor from 5:30 p.m. to 5:45 p.m. to answer his questions regarding the succeeding Cabinet.

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

## "Extract from Entry from Marquis KIOD's Diary, 16 Oct 41"

At 8:30 a.m. President SUZUKI visited me, and we discussed the Prince's Cabinet. The reasons I gave him for opposing the Prince's Cabinet are as follows:

1. The formation of a Prince's Cabinet should be carried out only when unavoidable, for example, when, even if the Army and Navy agree, force of circumstance makes it necessary to have a Prince of the blood solve their difficulties.

2. The difficulties which were discussed last night have not been solved, and the Prince should not be expected to overcome them.

3. In a way the formation of this Prince's Cabinet would indicate that we lacked a suitable person among our subjects, and a great problem would be created if war with the U.S.A. were to break out when such a Cabinet existed. There were important reasons why even Prince Konoje was prevented from carrying out the policies decided at Councils in the Imperial presence, and if we ask a member of the Imperial House to assume a responsibility he cannot fulfil, it would cause the Imperial House to become an object of public hatred.

At 3:00 p.m. War Minister TOJO called on me to report on the pressing political situation. I opposed his idea of the Prince's Cabinet for the same reasons which I had made clear to SUZUKI. I urged the revision of the resolution of the Council in the Imperial presence, and a unified policy for the Army and the Navy, two fundamental factors without which no national progress could be expected.

At 4 p.m. Prince KONOYE telephoned to say that the Cabinet was going to resign 'en bloc'. I was astonished by the suddenness of this announcement. I visited the Emperor at 4 p.m. to report upon the general resignation of the KONOYE Cabinet. At 5 p.m. Prince KONOYE tendered the Cabinet Ministers' resignations to the Throne. I was received in audience by the Emperor from 5:30 p.m. to 5:45 p.m. to answer his questions regarding the succeeding Cabinet.

*It is noted that at the discussion held at the Imperial Palace on Sept. 6th the following points were urged -*



十月十六日(木)

晴

午前八時半鈴木總裁來訪、皇族内閣云々ノ

話アリシヲ以テ昨日來燕考シタルトコロ、

ニヨリ大婁左ノ如キ理由ニヨリ反撥ナル旨

ヲ明瞭ニス

一皇族ノ御出馬ヲ願フハ甚不得止揚合ニテ

例ヘバ陸海軍ニ於テ意見ハ一致シタルモ

行辨リアリ皇族ノ御力ニスガリ解決シタ

シト云フガ如キ揚合ナレバ我ハ實現ノ可

能性ナキニアラザルモ

一昨夜來ノ話ニテハ難問題ハ未解決ノ處ニ

テ此ノ打倒算ヲ皇族ニ御願スルト云フハ

絶望ニ不可ナリ

一一面ニ於テハ臣下ニ人ナキカト云フコト

ニモナルベク又高一皇族内閣ニテ日米以

ニ突入スルガ如キ揚合ニハ之ハ重大ニテ

劇テ近衛首相カ御前會議ニテ決定シタル

方針ヲ敢テ實行シ能ハザリシ程重要ナル

何等カノ理由アル此ノ問題ヲ皇室ノ一員

タル皇族ヲシテ實行セシメラレ萬一豫期

ノ結果ヲ得ラレザルトキハ皇室ハ國民ノ

怨府トナルノ長アリ

Ex 1151

Doc 1632W (80)

1.

Doc 1632W (80)

2.

十時出勤

十時二十分ヨリ十一時十分迄拜謁急迫セル

政情ニツキ言上ス

十二時半支那大使ニ御陪食俾付ラル陪席ス

二時豊田外相來室談米交渉其他ニツキ懇談

ス

二時半河合大將ノ告別式ニ参列ス

三時東條首相來室政情ノ急迫セルコトニツ

キ話アリ東久通官以下云々ノ話アリ余ハ鈞

木總裁ニ述べタル處ヲ以テ反詰ノ意ヲ附ニ

ス尙九月六日御前會議決定ノ不用意ナル點

アルコト此際御前會議決定ヲ再演説スルノ

要アルコト及び國海軍ノ眞ノ一致ノ必要ヲ

力説之ハ我國ノ弱小程度ノ長奈ニシテ之ナ

クシテハ國家ノ發展ハアリ得ザルコトヲ論

ブ

四時近衛公ヨリ國條ノ辭表ヲ取置メタル旨

電話アリ餘り突然ナルニ感ク

四時ヨリ兩十五分迄拜謁内閣總辭職云々ヲ

言上ス

五時近衛首相參内辭表ヲ捧呈ス

五時半ヨリ同四十五分迄拜謁後内閣ニ歸

シ御下問ヲ拜ス

Ex. # 1152

LETTER OF RESIGNATION AS PRIME MINISTER  
BY PRINCE FUMIMARO KONOYE TO H. M. THE  
EMPEROR

.....

By His Majesty's Humble Servant, Fumimaro

When I, Your Majesty's humble servant unexpectedly received an Imperial Command to organize a Cabinet for a third time, it was my firm conviction that, in order that we can manage the present political situation so as to enable future national expansion, we must find a speedy solution for the China Incident by adjusting relations with the United States on friendly terms. Therefore, I have expressed my wishes to the United States Government soliciting an opportunity for friendly parleys.

Recently, however, Army Minister TOJO, who judged that such negotiations could not possibly be materialized before the desired time (about the middle or latter part of October), and who believed the situation had come to a point "When no other means can be found to carry through our demands ..." found in the 3rd article of "An Outline of How to Execute the National Policies of Our Empire," which met Imperial sanction following the conference in the presence of His Majesty held on the 6th of September, this year, has come to the conclusion that the time has arrived to open war against the United States.

When I consider the matter carefully, however, I still believe that provided we have ample time, not only is it erroneous to think that all negotiations with the United States are hopeless but that even the most difficult question involved, the question of withdrawing our troops, can be settled if we take the attitude of yielding to her in appearance by keeping for us the substance and casting away the name. It is utterly impossible for Your Majesty's humble servant Fumimaro, who is feeling much responsibility ever since the outbreak of the China Incident, to endure plunging the nation again into a titanic war the outcome of which cannot be forecast when even the China Incident has not yet been settled.

For these reasons Fumimaro believes that now is the time for the Government and the military to cooperate in unity towards materializing our negotiations with the United States by exerting our very utmost, thus to bring about settlement with China, which is now urgent necessity from the standpoint of recovering national strength as well as stabilizing popular morale. And if we have any desire for advancing our national fortunes now is the very time for us to step back a bit to prepare for a forward leap, and to make the people struggle forward more bravely for the sovereign and the state enduring hardship and privation.

I, Your Majesty's humble servant, have done my best to prevail upon Army Minister TOJO by laying open to him my inmost feelings. However, the Army Minister persistently claimed that though he perfectly understood the toil and feelings of the Prime Minister, it was impossible to consent to the withdrawal of troops from the standpoint of maintaining their morale, and moreover, that once the United States was yielded to, she would apply still more overbearing measures and might even forget where to stop; and that even if the China Affair was settled, it was possible that a rupture might occur again in two or three years; and that as internal weaknesses were existent both in the United States and Japan we should not lose this opportunity for a war with her.

I, Fumimaro, conferred with him on four separate occasions but have failed to make him agree with me, and am now unable to carry on the grave responsibilities of assisting the Throne according to my own convictions, due solely to my want of abilities, for which I humbly beg Your Majesty's pardon.

I, Your Majesty's humble servant, beseech Your Majesty to release me from this important post.

October 16, 16th year of Showa (1941)  
Prime Minister of Cabinet,  
Prince Fumimaro KONOYE.

## C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 I.P.S. No. \_\_\_\_\_

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Marquis YASUNASA MATSUDAIRA, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Imperial Household in the following capacity: President of the Peerage Bureau, Imperial Household, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of two pages, dated 16 October, 1941, and described as follows: Letter of resignation as Prime Minister, by Prince FUJIWARA KONOYE to H. M. The Emperor. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Imperial Household, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): of the Board of Chamberlains, Imperial Household.

Signed at Tokyo on this

2nd day of July, 1946.

/s/ Y. MATSUDAIRA  
 Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ M. KURUDA

SEAL  
President of the Peerage Bureau  
 Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, EDWARD P. MONOGHAN, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

3rd day of July, 1946

/s/ EDWARD P. MONOGHAN  
 NAME

Witness: /s/ WILLIAM C. PROUT

Investigator, I.P.S.  
 Official Capacity

C E R T I F I C A T E

I hereby certify that I am conversant with both  
the Japanese and English languages and that the above  
is a true and exact copy of the original document

Letter of Resignation from Premiership  
submitted to H. M. the Emperor of Japan,  
by Prince Fumimaro KONOYE.

/s/ TOSHIO TOMISHIGE

/s/ WARREN H. WAGNER

WITNESS:

/s/ EDWARD P. MONOGHAN

Tokyo

July 3rd, 1946.

巨 文 書

議ニ回ラスモ三度大命ヲ辱ウシテ内閣ヲ組織スル  
 ヤ現下ノ國際政局ニ處シテ國家將來ノ存続ヲ期セ  
 ンガ爲ニハ速ニ米國トノ友好關係ヲ調整シ以テ支  
 那事變ノ急遽解決ヲ圖ラザルベカラスト確信シ米  
 國政府ニ對シテハ親シク兩者會談ノ機ヲ具ヘラレ  
 ンコトヲ希望シ以テ今日ニ及ベリ然ルニ最近ニ至  
 リ東條陸軍大臣ハ右交渉ハ其ノ所望時期（概テ十  
 月中一下旬）迄ニハ到底成立ノ望ミナシト判断シ  
 乃チ本年九月六日御前會議ノ議ヲ拒テ放談ヲ仰キ  
 タル「帝國國策進行要領」中三ノ「我軍米ヲ貫徹  
 シ得ル目途ナキ」場合ト認メ今チ對米關係ヲ決意  
 スベキ時期ニ到達セリト爲スニ至レリ熟々惟ミル  
 ニ對米交渉ハ假スニ時日ヲ以テスレバ尙其ノ成立  
 ノ望ミナシトハ斷ズベカラザルト共ニ最モ難關ナ  
 リト思考セラルル當兵問題ニ在ラ捨テ安ヲ取ルノ  
 主旨ニ依リ形式ハ彼ニ譲ルノ態度ヲ採ラバ今尙安  
 續ノ望ミアリト信ゼラルルヲ以テ支那事變ノ未ダ  
 解決セザル現在ニ於テ更ニ前途ノ遠見スベカラザ  
 ル大膽爭ニ突入スルガ如キハ支那事變勃發以來重  
 大ナル責任ヲ痛感シツツアル巨文書ノ到底及ビ難

1468A-1

115

1468A-2

幸而ナリ臣ノ際ハ政府軍部衙方一致兵ノ妥善  
 ラ難シテ池久造詣未交渉ヲ成立セシメ以テ一慮或  
 事察變ヲ解決セントスルハ臣方培養ノ時ヨリ云フ  
 モ影々又民心安定ノ上ヨリ見ルモ陛下良策ノ其等  
 ニシテ臣等ノ後屋ヲ望マバ寧ロ今日コソ大ニ待ビ  
 ソガ爲ニ難ク願シ國民ヲシテ臥薪嘗膽益々君國ノ  
 爲ニ進退セシムルヲ以テ取モ時宜ヲ待カルモノナ  
 リト信シ臣ハ衷情ヲ披瀝シテ其條陳巨大臣ヲ説得  
 スベク努力シタリ之ニ就シ陸軍大臣ハ總理大臣ノ  
 苦心ト衷情トハ探ク諒トスル所ナルモ親兵ハ軍ノ  
 士氣難養ノ上ヨリ到底同意シ難ク又一度未臣ニ面  
 スルトキハ後ハ益々積積ノ難重ニ出テ殆ソト底止  
 スル處ヲ知ラザルベク假令一慮未察等變ノ解決ヲ  
 見タリトスルモ日支ノ關係ハ前三年ヲ出テズシ  
 テ寧ビ破綻スルニ至ルコトモ亦難測セラル且國內  
 ノ政局ハ彼我共ニ存スルヲ以テ時期ヲ失セズ此ノ  
 際臣等ヲ決意スベキコトヲ主張シテ臣等ニ懸望四  
 處ニ及ビタルモ終ニ同意セシムルニ至ラズ是ニ於  
 テ臣ハ遂ニ新債ヲ募集シテ債額ノ重積ヲ完サス  
 ルコト能ハザルニ至レリ是爲ニ臣ガ諍才ノ致ス所  
 ニシテ拘ニ急懼ノ至リニ達ヘズ御幸願ハクハ理儘  
 ヲ察レ給ヒ臣ガ重責ヲ解キ給ハシコトヲ臣文臣敢  
 懼誠懇謹ミテ奏ス



1468A-3

民國十六年十月十六日

內田總理事務會 送 備 文 函

1468A-4

證 明 書

小宮ハ日本語及ヒ英語ノ両言語ニ通曉セルコト並ニ上記ハ

日本天皇陛下ニ公使近衛文相ガ上奏セル内閣總理大臣辭職願ノ原文書ノ眞實ニシテ正確ナル爲シタルコトヲ證ス。

證 明 ト シ タル

證 人

ワレン・ニイテ・ワグナア  
エドワード・ビー・モネハン

一九四六年（昭和二十一年）七月三日、東京ニ於テ

出所及ヒ確實性ニ關スル陳述

余、候爵松平康昌ハ余ガ宮内省宗秩寮總裁トシテノ要職ニ於テ職掌上宮内省ニ關係アルコト、並ニ茲ニ添附セラレタル一九四一年（昭和十六年）十月十六日附ノ二頁ヨル成ル文書即チ公使近衛文相ヨリ天皇陛下ニ上奏セル内閣總理大臣辭職願ト記

1468A-5

送セラレタル文書ヲ前述ノ官吏トシテ保管シ居ル  
コトヲ證ス。

茲添附セラレタル記録及ビ文書ハ日本官内省ノ  
公文書ニシテ左記ノ省又ハ部（茲リ香島或ハ若シ  
アラバ引用、又ハ官文書類又ハ送込ニ於ケル該文  
書ノ保存箇所ノ公式名稱ヲ詳記スベシ）ノ官文書  
類及ビソノ送リノ一部タルコトヲ證ス

官内省侍從職

一九四六年（昭和二十一年）七月二日、東京ニ於テ  
署名ス

公 職	宗 務 宗 務 員
	松 平 康 昌
監 人	エ ム、 黒 田

公式入手ニ關スル陳述

余、フエドワード・ビー・モネハンハ余ガ聯合  
國最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルコト、且上記ノ  
文書ハ余ガ職務執行上前記署名ノ日本政府官吏ヨ  
リ入手セルモノナルコトヲ證ス

14-68A-6

一九四六年（昭和二十一年）七月三日、東京ニ於テ

公 啓

國際警察顧問 志 曾

エドワード・ビー・モネハン

ウイリアム・シー・ギブソン  
フランク

Q. 1153

Extracts from interrogation of General Hideki TOJO  
11 February 1946, PP. 2-3, 4,5

/pp. 2-3/

Q Who presided at the Imperial Conference of December 1st or 2nd, 1941?

A I did, as Prime Minister. The others were seated down both sides of the table in accordance with their court rank.

Q Did you state the purpose of the meeting or was it known by them before they came to the meeting?

A Of course I explained the purpose of the meeting at the very first. After I had explained the purpose of the meeting, each of the ministers and the two Chiefs of Staff discussed the question from the standpoint of his own responsibilities.

\* \* \* \* \*

/pp. 4/

Q Did you feel, at the time the KONOYE Cabinet fell on or about 17 October 1941, that war should be declared against the United States and the other three nations?

A At that time I felt, as War Minister, that the opportune time for fighting was in danger of being lost and the Imperial Conference had set the middle ten days of October as the limit for waiting for a favorable diplomatic break.

\* \* \* \* \*

/pp. 5/

Q Was it not because of the fact that you, as War Minister, favored war with the United States that the KONOYE Cabinet fell on or about 17 October 1941?

A Theoretically, yes. KONOYE thought that a diplomatic solution was still possible if Japan would withdraw troops from China, but the Army felt that there would be no guarantee that the unlawful acts of the Chinese, which had caused the Incident, would not be resumed if the troops were withdrawn before their purpose had been achieved, and the Army could not bear to so withdraw the troops.

2501A-1

9X 1153A

一九四六年二月十一日東條英機ニ對スル訊問ヨリノ抜萃

二一三、四、五頁

問、昭和十六年十二月一日カ二日ノ御前會議ハ誰  
ガ主宰シマシタカ

答、總理大臣トシテ私が致シマシタ。他ノ人々ハ  
「テーブル」ノ兩側ニ官中席次ニ從ヒ席ヲ占  
メテ居リマシタ。

問、會議ノ目的ヲ貴方ハ述べテレタカ、又ハ會議  
ニ出席前ニ貴方等ニ知ラレテ居リマシタカ。

答、勿論、私が最初ニ會議ノ目的ヲ説明シマシタ。  
コノ説明ノ後各大臣並ニ兩總長ハ各自ノ責任  
ノ立場カラ問題ヲ論議シマシタ。

× × ×

「第四頁」

問、昭和十六年十月十七日カ或ハ其頃近衛内閣ガ  
倒レタ時、貴方ハ米國及ビ他ノ三ヶ國ニ對シ  
戰爭ヲ宣言シテケレバナシナイト感ジマシタ  
カ。

2501A-2

答、陸軍大臣トシテ在任私ハも戦ノ好機ヲ失フ危  
険ガアル事ヲ察シマシタ。而シテ御前會議ハ  
好都合ナ外交的打撃ヲ得ツニ十月中旬ヲ限度  
ト決定シテ居リマシタ。

× × ×

「第五頁」

問、昭和十六年十月十七日又ハ其頃近衛内閣ガ例  
レタノハ陸相タル貴方ガ米國ト戦争ヲスル方  
ガ良イト言ツタ事案ニ因ツタノデハアリマセ  
ンデシタカ。

答、型輪劇ニハサウデス。近衛ハ日本ガ若シ中  
カラ撤兵スルナラバ、外交的解決ハマダ可能  
ナリト考ヘタ。然シ乍ラ若シ日本軍ガ目的ヲ  
果ス前ニ撤兵シタナラバ中国人ノ不法行爲ヲ  
ソレガコノ事變ヲ惹起シタノダガ、ソレヲ繼  
續シナイトイフ保障ガナイト陸軍ハ思ヒ、ソ  
ノマ、撤兵スル事ガ忍ビラレマセンデシタ。



Exhibit 1154

Corrected in accordance with Language  
Board decision, as shown on Court  
Record pp 11, 142-3  
Doc. Div

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 17 Oct 41"

At 11 a.m. Chief Secretary MITSUDAIRA visited me to make arrangements for a senior statesmen's conference. It was held from 1:10 p.m. to 3:45 p.m. in the west ante-chamber of the palace. Those present were KIYOURA (92 years old), Mr. WAKATSUKI, Admiral OKADA, HAYASHI, Mr. HIROTA, ABE, YONAI, all ex-premiers and president of the Privy Council HARA. I explained the situation of the general resignation except for the recommendation of Gen. UGAKI by Baron WAKATSUKI and the suggestion of a cabinet under a member of the Imperial family Premier by General HAYASHI. No one had a definite opinion.

I asserted that the most important things were the revision of the decision of the last Council in the Imperial presence September 6 and the unity of opinion between the Army and Navy. I suggested a TOJO Cabinet as a solution of these problems, with TOJO as Premier and War Minister, even though he is on active duty. I met no objection to my proposal, Mr. HIROTA, General ABE, and Mr. HARA, giving me positive approval. The meeting broke up at 4 p.m. I reported to the Emperor the details of the progress of the ex-premiers Conference and talked with him until 4:15 p.m. The War Minister proceeded to the palace at the request of the Emperor to receive the Imperial Order for the formation of a new Cabinet. Subsequently he summoned Navy Minister OIKAWA and talked to him regarding cooperation between the Army and the Navy were very desirable. I passed on to them in an ante-room the following message as ordered by the Emperor. His majesty has talked to you in regard to cooperation between the Army and Navy. In deciding the fundamental policy of our country you need not necessarily follow the decisions of the Council in the Imperial presence on the 6th of September, but should study carefully conditions both at home and abroad.

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

水戸侯爵日記 明治十六年十月十七日分

十月十七日(金)

晴

午前九時四十分實所参集所ニ参入拜啓祭ニ

参列ス

高松官ヨリ同所ニ於テ政變ニツキ御辱ネテ

リ大体ヲ言上ス

十一時松平秘警官長奈耶重臣會議ニツキ打

合ス

午後一時十分ヨリ三時四十五分總官中百福

ノ間ニ於テ重臣會議ヲ開ク清浦若槻岡田赤

良田阿部米内各閣首相原福審院議長参集ス

清浦子ノ九十二方ノ高齡ニテ出席セラレタ

ル、一同極誠スルトコロデアツタ

余ヨリ政變ニ至リタル原因ヲ説明ソレヨリ

各々實向意見ノ開陳アリ若松氏ヨリ宇垣大

將ヲ推選セザル外赤大將ヨリ皇族内閣云

々ノ説ヲ出サレタルノミ特別意見ナク余ハ

此際何ヨリモ必衰ナルハ陸海軍ノ一致ヲ圖

ルコトト九月六日ノ御前會議ノ存続辭ヲ必

要トスルトノ見地ヨリ東條西相ニ大命降下

ヲ主張ス但シ東條首相ハ現役ニテ西相ヲ象

ネシムルコトトス、反討圖ハナク、貞田阿

部原ノ請氏贊成セラル、散會後四時ヨリ西

時十五分迄拜謁重臣會議ノ模様ヲ詳述奏上

EX 1154

Dec 16 32 W (81)

2.

Dec 1632 W (81)

東條陸相ヲ御召アリ大倉陣下ス頼イテ及川海  
 相ヲ御召アリ陸海軍ノ協カニツキ御言察アリ  
 タリ  
 遠望ニ於テ爾相ニ討シ届マテ左ノ通り候  
 進ス  
 只今陛下ヨリ陸海軍毎刀云々ノ御言察ガアリ  
 マシタコトト昇察試シマヌガ尙山嶺ノ大本ヲ  
 決定セラレマヌニ就テハ九月六日ノ御前會議  
 決定ニトテハル、陸ナク内外ノ情勢ヲ更ニ  
 廣ク深ク検討シ慎重ナル考究ヲ加フルコトヲ  
 褒ストノ恩召テアリマヌ命ニ依リ其旨申上置  
 キマヌ  
 六時廻廊宅ヌ由喜子夫婦美子夫婦舒子サソ等  
 來リ合セ種松ノ料理ニテ辰ニ食事ス  
 爾院宮以下ヨリ御召ノ見舞アリ八時半退院  
 下ニ拜請政變前似ノ事情ヲ言上尙殿下ヨリ御  
 依頼ノ奏上旨ヲ拜受九時退院ス  
 阿部夫婦也口夫婦一道ス

Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 18 October

1155

18 October (Saturday)

Cloudy and rainy.

I proceeded to the palace at 9 a.m. and was received in audience by the Emperor at 9:15 to present a memorial to the throne from Prince KAMIN, to which the Emperor gave his sanction. The memorial was concerned with War Minister TOJO's remaining on active service and with his promotion to full general.

Went to Yasukuni Shrine at 10 and attended the Imperial worship. Went to my office at 1 p.m. and was at once received in audience to explain the circumstances under which War Minister TOJO is forming a cabinet.

War Minister TOJO was received in audience at 3 and presented the list of his cabinet members.

The Emperor summoned me and inquired about the cabinet members.

The investiture of the new Premier was conducted by the Emperor at 4.

Came home at 5.

9x 1155

Doc 1632w (110)

木戸侯日記、拔萃、十月十八日(三曜)曇雨

午前九時参内九時十五分至高円院宮殿下ヨリ御依頼上  
 奏書ヲ奉呈御允諾ヲ得テ更條陸相ヲ現役ニ止ル件  
 ト大將ニ旨下シ侍リ  
 十時該公神社ニ至リ所懸拜ニ参列ス(時出勤直三拜詣  
 更條陸相組周ノ筆帽ヲ言上ス  
 三時更條陸相參内閣員名簿ヲ察ス又  
 所召上ノ閣員ニ公事ヲ尋テ侍リ  
 四時首相親任式ヲ如儀舉行シ遊  
 五時帰宅ス

Ex. 1156

Doc. No. 16327(82)

Page 1

"Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 20 Oct 41"

October 20th, 1941

"I received gracious words from His Majesty on account of my efforts in connection with the cabinet change. I was truly moved.

"I told His Majesty that one mistaken step taken in the present cabinet change might have inadvertently plunged us into war. After careful consideration I believe this to be the only way of giving a new turn to the situation and had thus recommended it. His Majesty understood me well replying 'As it is said you know, -- 'He who will not go into the tiger's den will not get the tiger cub.'

"I was impressed."

**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

EX 1156

Doc. 1632 W (82)

木 戸 候 登 日 記

昭和十六年十月二十日分

昭和十六年十月二十日（月曜）

× × × ×

内閣交送ニツキ余ノ筆力ニ對シ優遇ナル御言葉ヲ拜  
シ候ニ恐懼ス、今回ノ内閣ノ交送ハ眞ニ一步ヲ退レ  
ハ不用意ニ競争ニ突入スルコトトナル虞レアリ、熱  
慮ノ結果之ガ唯一ノ打開策ト信ジタルガ故ニ奏請シ  
タル旨ヲ詳細言上ス極メテ宜ク御瞭解アリ所謂虎穴  
ニ入ラズンバ虎兇ヲ得ズト言フコトダネトノ仰セア  
リ感激ス

× × × ×

Extract from  
Interrogation of Hideki Tojo  
28 January 1946  
p. 1-2

Q. On 20 January 1941, Mr. Yosuke MATSUOKA, who was then Foreign Minister in the Japanese Government, is reported to have said to the Diet in part:

"Needless to say, the aim of Japanese foreign policy is that of enabling all nations of the world each to take its own proper place in accordance with the spirit of Hakko Ichiu, the ideal which inspired the foundation of our Empire. The object of the Three-Power Pact, concluded between Japan, Germany, and Italy, on September 27 last, is none other than the realization of the same great ideal..... The pact states that Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of the Japanese in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia."

Did you agree with this at that time?

A. I do not remember whether this was spoken on the main floor of the House or not, but I think it is reasonable. I did agree with it at that time.

Q. Did not Japan, by the terms of the Three-Power Pact, also recognize the leadership of Germany and Italy in the European sphere?

A. Yes. I have explained before that by the word "leadership", it was intended that the one Power would have the initiative. The language of the Three-Power Pact differs slightly from this quotation in that the words "position of leadership" are specifically mentioned. One thing I would like to remind you of - at that time I was not Premier, I was only War Minister so I didn't have the responsibility for administration.

Q. You became Premier in October of 1941, did you not?

A. Yes.

Q. Did not you and the members of your cabinet, from that time on, work and act in accordance with those same principles stated, first, by MATSUOKA and, secondly by the Tripartite Pact?

A. Yes. Of course we did.



真條英機ニ對スル訪問ヨリノ挨拶

一九四六年一月二十八日

4160 A-1

「第一二三頁」

問、昭和十六年一月二十日ニ當時日本政府ノ外務大臣  
アツタ松岡洋右氏ガ議會ヲ述ベタ演説ノ一部  
ニ次ノ様ナ言葉ガアルト報ゼラレテ居リマス。

「皇國ノ外交ガ我々國ノ理想タル八款一字ノ大  
精神ニ隨ヒ、万邦ヲシテ各々ソノ所ヲ得シムル  
ニ存スルコトハ申ス迄モナイ所デアル。昨年九  
月二十七日締結サレタ日獨伊三國同盟條約ノ目  
録トスル所モ又カ、ル大理念ノ實徴ニアルノデ  
アツテ、。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。  
本條約ニ於テ獨伊兩國ハ皇國ガ大東亞ニ新秩序  
ヲ建設シ且ツソノ國內ニ於テ指導力ヲ保有スル  
コトヲ承認シタノデアル。」

貴方ハ當時之ニ同意シテ居リマツタカ、  
答、私ハソレガ議會ノ本會議ノ席上テ述ベラレタカ  
ドウカ今記憶シテ居リマセンガ、當然ノコトヲ言  
ツテ居ルト思ヒマス。當時私ハソレニ同意致シテ  
居リマツタ。

問、三國同盟條約ノ條件ニヨリ日本ハ又歐洲ノ國內  
ニ於イテ獨逸及ヒ伊太利ガ指導力ヲ持ツコトヲ承  
認シタノデアリマセンデシタカ、

EX 1157-A

4160A-2

答、サウアス。前ニ説明シタ通り「指導力」ト謂フ  
 言葉ハ當該一國家ガ率先スルコトヲ意味シタモノ  
 デアリマス。三國同盟條約ノ條文ニヨルト「指導  
 的地位」ト明白ニ述ベフレテ唐リコノ比テ此ノ引  
 用トハ若干ノ相異ガアリマス。私ハ一ツノ事ヲ貴  
 方ニ申上げタイノデスガ――  
 當時私ハ總理大臣デハナク陸軍大臣ニ當ギマセン  
 デシタ、ソレ故行儀ニ就イテハ責任ヲ有シナカツ  
 タノデアリマス。

問、貴方ハ爾年十月ニ總理大臣ニナツタノデ  
 スネ、

答、サウアス。

問、貴方及貴方ノ閣僚等ハソノ時以來先ツ松岡ニヨ  
 リ述ベラレ、次ニ三國同盟條約ニヨリ規定セラレ  
 タ諸原則ニ従ヒ行動シタノデアリマセンカ、

答、左様アス、勿論我々ハソノ様ニ行動シマシタ。

Doc. No. 41603

Page 1

Extract from  
Interrogation of Hideki Tojo  
28 January 1946  
p. 3

Q Did not the sphere of influence to be allotted to Germany and Italy in Europe also include countries they were then at war with, such as England?

A No. England was not, I believe, included, nor were Spain or Portugal included in this sphere. I believe that the general matter of what countries were to be included in the new order in Europe and the new order in Asia was probably discussed between Japan and Germany based upon the distribution of forces at that time.

Q Then as soon as countries were conquered, they were to be added to this sphere?

A Yes.

東條英機三對心訊問言、後華

一九四二年一月三日

第三頁

Doc 4160B

問 歐洲ニ於テ獨逸及伊太利ニ與リテ其勢力圏内ニ  
當時彼等其戰爭ヲ三年ノ國々例ニ共ニ英國、北米合  
シテ其勢力アリトセシカ。

答 又英國合シテ其勢力アリト思ヒ之。又西班牙葡  
牙ルノ國々ニ合シテ其勢力アリト思ヒ之。如何ニ此國々  
が歐洲及亞細亞ニ於テ其新秩序内ニ包含シ得カ  
一般的問題ニ當時ノ戰況ニ基テ日本ト獨逸ノ間  
テ多ク合シテ其勢力アリト思ヒ之。

問 今ノ國々が征服カシト同時ニ之ノ國々ノ内ニ  
包含セシムルハ其力ナシカ。

答 左様ナリト云。

WX 1157-B

Q # 1157C

Doc. No. 4160C

Page 1

Extract from  
Interrogation of Hideki Tojo  
28 January 1946  
p. 4-5

Q Then both in Europe and in Asia the sphere to be included in the new order decreased or increased with the military situation?

A That was about the long and short of it.

Q Was all of this then in accordance with the spirit of Facko Ichiu?

A Yes. As I explained before, it is a concept of virtue, not a territorial concept.

Q Was the same concept of virtue to be a part of the sphere to be controlled by Germany and Italy in Europe?

A Japan's interpretation was that it was to be similar, with no exploitation or special interests. In fact, in the Three-Power Treaty, it is expressly stated that each country is to have its own place and that there is to be co-existence and co-prosperity in both the East Asiatic and European spheres.

Q What reason was there to believe that Germany and Italy would have this virtuous understanding of the new order in Europe?

A (Laughter by the witness.) I believe that Germany and Italy, both of whom had been exploited as a result of defeat in World War I, had found it necessary in order to exist to set up a sphere within which the various countries could minister to each other's needs. This was a concept within the meaning of the word "virtue".

Q But this ministrations was to be done under the supervision of Germany and Italy?

A It was not supervision but leadership. Germany and Italy were to have the initiative in bringing about a new order of co-existence and co-prosperity of all the countries concerned.

28 January 1946  
p. 4-5 cont'd

Q What would happen if one or more of the  
conquered countries did not wish to join such  
an order?

A I have been speaking of the treaty as it was  
understood in Japan. When you get down to  
specific problems like that, I cannot answer.  
I might say that I believe that any country is  
not uninterested in its own prosperity.

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夏條及護對之詢問及返答

一九四六年一月二十八日

44/60C

第四一五頁

問、ソノハ歐洲及亞細亞、兩者ニ於テ新秩序ニ包含スル地域ハ軍事的情勢ニテ減少タリ増大シタリシク、ナラカ。

答、大體テ、ソノヤクナ。

問、ソノハ之ハ凡テハ「結」字、精神ニ從フモノナラカ。

答、サカス、前ニ説明シタ通り、ソノ道義的ノ概念ヲソノ領土ノ概念トアリマス。

問、歐洲ニ於テ獨逸及伊太利ニヨリ支配サル地域ニ含メテ居タルハ、ソノ同ノ道義的ノ概念トナラカ。

答、擧取、特殊權益モナク同様ニソノヤクナ言フカ日本解釋テ、名ニ事實上ニ兩國同盟條約ハ明ニ各國ハ各々ソノ處ヲ得東亞及歐洲、西地域ニ於テ共存共榮ヲ為スベキモノト述ベテ平ニ。

問、獨逸及伊太利ハ歐洲新秩序ニ就キソノ様ニ道義的ノ理解ヲ持ツトスル理由ガ何カアリマス。

答、(證人等) 獨逸、伊太利共ニ第一次歐洲ノ戰、敗北、結果擧取テキルモ、各國ハ互ニ必要ニ貢獻シ得ル地域ヲ設定スルニ存心ニ必要ナラシメテ認メテナク思ヒマス。之カ「道義」ト謂フ言葉、意味ハ概念トアリマス。

問、然レソノ實際ハ獨逸及伊太利ノ監視、下ニ為ルベキモノナラカ。

答、ソノ監視モノ指導モノハ獨逸及伊太利ハ、凡テ關係各國ガ共存共榮スル様ニ新秩序ヲ序先ニ承認スベキナラシム。

問、若シ被征服國ハ、ソノ様ニ秩序ニ加入スベキナラシメテ、

44/1

No. 2

4/60C

場合に於ては、

答. 本条約を日本に於て了解せしむるに付し、甲述べたる如く、  
るソ様~~に~~問題~~を~~おき、又答へるに、お答へる。如何に、  
雖も自國警察に無関係に、お信に、信に申の上、



Extract from interrogation of  
General Hidiki TOJO  
of 12 March 1946

/pp. 1, 4, 6-8, 9-10/

"Q You were chosen Premier, were you not, chiefly because it was felt that you could control the actions of the Army?

"A Yes, from the standpoint of military administration."

\* \* \*

/p. 4/

"Q Yesterday, you explained that the policy, after the 6 September 1941 Imperial Conference, was, on the one hand, to negotiate for peace, and on the other, to prepare for war. Did you continue that policy?

"A Yes. I undertook the work as Premier.

"Q What matters were discussed and what policies decided on at the Imperial Conference of 5 November 1941?

"A There wasn't any Imperial Conference on the 5th of November."

\* \* \*

/pp. 6-8/

"Q When and why was a meeting of ex-premiers held prior to the last Imperial Conference of 1 December 1941?

"A You mean the Senior Statesmen?

"Q Yes.

"A That was convened by the Emperor.

"Q When?

"A It was either on the 1st or the 31st.

"Q What was the purpose of calling that meeting?

- "A The Emperor was very anxious about the question of war with America and he convened them in order to hear each man's opinion.
- "Q Who presided at that meeting?
- "A Let's see - those were WAKATSUKI, OKADA, Senjuro HAYASHI, YONAI, Nobuyuki ABE, KONOYE, HIRANUMA.
- "Q You still have not answered who presided.
- "A I think perhaps WAKATSUKI presided. I don't really know.
- "Q Did you make any statements at that meeting?
- "A Of course I was there too, as the Premier at that time. Yes, I did. The Emperor was there and heard each man's opinion in turn. I was there and from time to time spoke, giving the government's point of view.
- "Q What did you state as the government's point of view?
- "A I explained various things, but I don't remember the details now. I explained the inevitableness of war.
- "Q Did the Emperor make any statement at all at that meeting?
- "A No, he only listened. This was not a conference. It was only that the Emperor wished to hear the opinion of each man.
- "Q Did you express your opinion before any of the others expressed theirs?
- "A It was this way: The Army, Navy and Foreign Ministers, President of the Cabinet Planning Board, and I, as Premier, met with the Senior Statesmen in the morning and explained the situation to them. Then after a Court dinner with the Emperor, the former Premiers and I met with the Emperor who heard each man's opinion in turn. The other cabinet members were not present at that time, only I from the government. There was one other former Premier present - HIROTA.

\* \* \*

/pp. 9-10/

"Q Were there any differences between TOKO and the others relative to this? /Referring to the delivery of the final note to the United States./

"A No, there were not. They were the same - to deliver it before the attack.

"Q Was any decision arrived at in the Liaison Conference as to how long it was to be delivered before the attack?

"A I have explained this before. The decision as to the time was not made at the Liaison Conference. The Supreme Command and the Foreign Minister were to meet together and decide the time which would comply with the diplomatic and also the strategic requirements.

"Q Was this delegation of authority decided upon at this same final Liaison Conference?

"A Yes.

"Q Do you know that such meeting or meetings were held pursuant to this delegation of authority?

"A No, I don't know.

"Q Did you learn what decision had been arrived at in regard to timing by these men to whom the authority had been delegated?

"A I did not learn precisely the time set, but it was decided that the Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Minister would settle that so as to comply with both the diplomatic and military requirements. It was settled at the Liaison Conference that the delivery of the final note would precede the attack. /Last sentence of this answer read back to the witness who agreed as to its correctness./

"Q You stated recently during an interrogation that Japan declared war on the United States and Great Britain. On what do you base that statement?

"A It is based on the Imperial Rescript.

"Q That Imperial Rescript was announced to the Japanese people and to the world some eleven or twelve hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Do you deny this?

"A It was afterwards, all right.

"Q How many hours afterwards do you admit that it was?

"A It was announced at about 11 or 11:30 on the morning of the 8th in Japan.

"Q And the Pearl Harbor attack was at 3:00 A.M., Japan time?

"A Yes, about that. I am not absolutely sure of the time, but I think it was about like that."

\* \* \*

1158 - A2510A-1

東條英機ニ對スル訊問ヨリノ抜萃

一九四六年三月十二日

第一、四、六、八、九、十頁

「第一頁」

問、貴方ハ主トシテ貴方ガ國軍ノ行動ヲ統制スルコトガ出来ルト思ハレタ否メニ海軍大臣ニ通告セラレタノデハアリマセンカ、

答、サウデス軍医上。  
× × ×

「第四頁」

問、昨日貴方ハ昭和十六年九月六日ノ御前會議以後ノ政策ハ一方ニ於テ平和ノ爲ノ交渉ヲナシ他方ニ於テ軍事ノ準備ヲナスモノデアツタト説明シマシタ。貴方ハソノ政策ヲ如何マシタカ、

答、サウデス。私ハ海軍大臣トシテソノ仕事ヲ引受オマシタ。

問、昭和十六年十一月五日ノ御前會議ニ於テ如何ナル事情ガ考慮セラレ如何ナル政策ガ決定セラレマシタカ、

答、十一月五日ニハ御前會議ハアリマセンデシタ。  
× × ×

2510A-2

「第六十八頁」

問、昭和十六年十二月一日ノ長途御前會議ノ以前ニ  
前總理大臣等ノ會合ガアツタノハ、何時又如何  
ナル迄出カラテシタカ。

答、爲臣ノコトデスカ、

問、サウテス、

答、ソレハ天皇陛下ニ依リ召集セラレマシタ。

問、何時デスカ、

答、ソレハ一日カ三十一日カノ何レカデシタ。

問、ソノ會合ガナサレタ目的ハ何デシタカ、

答、陛下ハ米國トノ戰爭ノ問題ニ付甚ク震慄ヲ悟マ  
セラレテ居ラレマシタ。ソコテ各人ノ意見ヲ聽  
セラルル爲爲重臣達ヲ集メラレタノデアリマシタ。

問、ソノ會合テハ誰ガ主宰シマシタカ、

答、エイト、居ツタノハ若槻、岡田、林銑十郎、米  
内、阿部信行、近衛、平沼、デシタ。

問、マダ誰ガ主宰シタカ答ヘテイナイテスネ、

答、多分若槻ガ主宰シタト思ヒマス。確實ナトコロ  
ハ分リマセン。

問、貴方ハソノ會議ニ於イテ何か申述バマシタカ、

答、勿論私モソコニ當時ノ總理大臣トシテ居リマシ  
タ。サウテス、私ハ發言シマシタ。陛下ガ臨御  
セラレ頃々ニ各人ノ意見ヲ聽取セラレマシタ。

2510A-3

私ハ出席シ時々發言シ政府ノ見解ヲ申述べマシ  
タ。

問、貴方ハ政府ノ見解トシテ如何ナルコトヲ述べマ  
シタカ、

答、猶々ナコトヲ説明シマシタ、然シ今細カイコト  
ハ覺エテ居リマセン。私ハ戦争ノ避クベカラザ  
ルコトヲ説明シマシタ。

問、天皇ハソノ會合テ何か少シテモ發言シマシタカ、

答、イヤ、陛下ハ唯唯イテ居ラレタ文デシタ。之ハ  
協議會テハアリマセンデシタ。唯陛下ガ各人ノ  
意見ヲ聽取シ度イト思召シタノデシタ。

問、貴方ハ他ノ者達ガ彼等ノ意見ヲ述べル前ニ自分  
ノ意見ヲ述べマシタカ、

答、ソレハコソ云フ具合デシタ、陸、海軍及外務ノ  
各大臣、企畫院總裁及總理大臣トシテノ私ガ午  
前中ニ皇臣達ト會ヒ彼等ニ情勢ヲ説明シマシタ。  
ソレカラ御陪食ノ後前總理大臣達及私ガ陛下ノ  
御前テ會合シ陛下ハ辰々ニ各人ノ意見ヲ御聽取  
ニナリマシタ。他ノ閣員ハソノ時ニハ出席セズ  
政府カラハ私文ガ出席シテ居リマシタ。モウ一  
人他ニ前總理大臣ガ出席シテ居リマシタ。廣田  
デス。

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×

×

2510A-4

「第九十頁」

問、コノ點ニ關シノ合衆國ニ對シ最後通牒ヲ手交スルコトニ關シノ東郷トソノ他ノ者達ノ間ニ意見ノ相異ガアリマシタカ、

答、イ、エ、アリマセンデシタ。皆一致シテキマシタ。ソノアレクサンドル前ニ手交スルコトニテス。

問、アレクサンダー前何ノ位ノ時間ニ於イテソレガ手交サレルベキカニ就イテ連絡會議テ何等カノ決定ニ到達シマシタカ、

答、ソノコトハ前ニ説明シマシタ。ソノ時間ニ關シテノ決定ハソノ連絡會議ニ於イテ爲サレナカッタノデス。統帥部ト外務大臣ガ一緒ニ會合シテ外交上及作戰上ノ各長官ニ應スルヤウナ時間ヲ決定スル管テアリマシタ。

問、ソノ權限ノ委任ハ管謀長終ノ連絡會議ニ於テ決定セラレタノデスカ、

答、サウデス。

問、ソノ様ナ會合ガ一度或ハ數度右權限ノ委任ニ從ツテ歸カレタコトヲ貴方ハ知ツテ居マスカ、

答、イヤ、知りマセン。

問、ソノ權限ヲ委任セラレタ者達ニ就ツテ時間ニ關シ何等カノ結論ニ達シタカ貴方ハ聞キマシタカ、

答、私ハ定メラレタ時間ヲ正確ニハ聞キマセンデシ





Dec. No. 15E

Page 1

(Confidential) 79th Congress, 1st Session,  
Joint Committee Print, Pearl Harbor, Intercepted  
Diplomatic Messages Sent by the Japanese Govern-  
ment Between July 1 and Dec. 8, 1941  
Telegram, pp. 71 and 72

[Secret]

From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
October 16, 1941  
#672

The Imperial Japanese Government has repeatedly affirmed to the American Government that the aim of the Tripartite Pact is to contribute toward the prevention of a further extension of the European war. Should, however, the recent tension in the German-American relations suffer aggravation, there would arise a distinct danger of a war between the two powers, a state of affairs over which Japan, as a signatory to the Tripartite Pact, naturally cannot help entertain a deep concern. Accordingly, in its sincere desire that not only the German-American relations will cease further deterioration but the prevailing tension will also be alleviated as quickly as possible, the Japanese Government is now requesting the earnest consideration of the American Government.

Army 23571

Trans. 10/16/41 (S)

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(機密) 第七十九議會第一會議ニ提出セラレタル眞  
珠灣共同委員會印刷物中一九四一年七月一日ヨリ同  
年十二月八日迄ノ間ニ於テ日本政府ヨリ發セラレタ  
ル傍受外交通信ヨリノ電報七十一―七十二頁

Doc 15E

「秘」

東京發

「ワシントン」宛

一九四一年十月十六日

第六七二號

日本帝國政府ハ三國條約ノ目的ガ歐洲戰爭擴大防止  
ニ寄與スル爲ナリト米國政府ニ對シ繰返シ確言シタ  
然シ乍ラ若シ最近ノ緊迫シタ米獨關係ガ惡化スレバ  
兩國間ノ戰爭ノ危險ハ明カニ起ルベク新カル狀態ニ  
於テハ三國條約ノ調印國タル日本ハ、當然深イ關心  
ヲ持タザルヲ得ナイ。從ツテ、獨米關係ガ此レ以上  
惡化シナイバカリテハナク、深ツテ居ル緊迫狀態モ  
可及的速カニ緩和スル事ヲ切望スルヲ以テ日本政府  
ハ今、米國政府ノ兵劍ヲ考慮ヲ附願シテ居ル。

Ex 1159

陸軍二三五七一

譯 10 / 16 / 41 (S)

C E R T I F I C A T E

H.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. 2745Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the documents enumerated below and described as follows:

Doc. No.1532 D-1 Telegram from Nomura to Togo October 22, 1941 asking to be relieved from his official duties so as not to deceive himself and others.

Doc. No.1532 D-2 Telegram 722. Wire from Togo to Nomura November 2, 1941 stating that the Government for days had been holding Liaison Conferences preparatory to an Imperial Conference on November 5, 1941.

Doc. No.1532 D-3 Telegram 730. Wire from Togo to Nomura November 4, 1941 stating that Kurusu was leaving for the U.S. on November 7, 1941.

Doc. No.1532 D-4 Telegram 757. Wire from Togo to Nomura in connection with a conversation the former had with Ambassador Grew in connection with the China War. (November 10, 1941).

Doc. No.1532 D-5 Telegram 1133. Kurusu reports by wire November 18, 1941 to Togo stating that the U.S. has a genuine desire to settle negotiations and advising Japan to start evacuating southern Indo-China at once.

Doc. No.1532 D-6 Telegram 800. Wire from Togo to Nomura November 19, 1941 stating that the U.S. must cease help to China and that Japan's offer to move troops from south and north Indo-China was an important concession.

- Doc. No. 1532 D-7 Telegram 1159. Wire from Nomura to Togo in re interview with Hull and Ballantine, sent on Nov. 23, 1941.
- Doc. No. 1532 D-8 Telegram 822. Wire from Togo to Nomura November 24, 1941 in re conversation with Grew.
- Doc. No. 1532 D-9 Telegram 823. Wire from Togo to Nomura November 24, 1941 that the time limit was now November 29, 1941.
- Doc. No. 1532 D-15 Telegram 844. Wire from Togo to Nomura 28 November 1941.
- Doc. No. 1532 D-10 Telegram 857. Wire November 29, 1941 Togo to Nomura with instructions to urge the U.S. to accept the proposal of November 20, 1941 and to withdraw theirs of November 26 but not to break off negotiations.
- Doc. No. 1532 D-11 Telegram 875. December 3, 1941. Wire from Togo to Nomura telling him to explain that troop movement in Indo-China due to unusual amount of activity by Chinese forces.
- Doc. No. 1532 D-12 Telegram 901. Wire December 6, 1941 Togo to Nomura in connection with Japan's reply to the American proposal of November 26, 1941.
- Doc. No. 1532 D-13 Telegram 904. Wire December 6, 1941 Togo to Nomura requesting that in preparing the document replying to the November 26, 1941 American proposal that he was not to use a typist or any other person and to preserve caution and secrecy.

I further certify that the above listed documents are official documents of the Japanese Government, and they are part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Japanese Foreign Office

Signed at Tokyo on this  
30th day of October, 1946

/s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official  
SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

Chief of Archives Section  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, John A. Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
30th day of October, 1946

/s/ J.A. Curtis. 2d Lt.  
NAME

Witness: /s/ William C. Prout

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

證明書

ワシントン文書局第 號

國際檢察部 第三四五號

典據及公正ニ關スル證明

Doc-2745

余林馨、余が下記資格ニ於テ日本外務省文書課長トシテ、日本政府ト公的資格ニ在ルモノトシテ、並ニ該官吏トシテ左ニ列記セル文書保管ニ任シ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。  
文書番號一五三三D一

一九四二年十月十二日野村ヨリ東郷ニ彼自身及ヒ他ヲ欺カサル為メ彼の公的任務ヲ解ク様要請セル電報。  
文書番號一五三三D二

一九四二年十月五日政府ガ一九四二年十月五日、御前會議、準備トシテ数日間ニ亘リ聯絡會議ヲ開催中ナリシ旨、東郷ヨリ野村ニ述ベシ電報第七三號

文書番號一五三三D三

電報第七三號。東郷ヨリ野村ニ末樞ガ一九四二年十月七日、合衆國ニ向ケ出發スル旨ヲ述ベタル電信。

文書番號一五三三D四

電報第七五七號。東郷ヨリ野村宛、東郷ガ支那事變ニ關シテ、

ブルイ大使 / Ambassador Brew / ト行ヒシ會談ニ關スル電信

一九四二年十月十日

文書番號一五三三D五

電報第二三三號。一九四二年十月十八日、末樞ハ東郷ニ對シ電信ニテ合衆國ガ交渉解決ニ真摯ナル意圖アル事ヲ報シ

EX 1160

No. 1.

7A5.

且日本、南部印度支那ヨリ直々ニ撤兵スルコトヲ助言ス。

文書番號一五三三D一六

Doc- 電報第八〇號、一九四一年十月十九日、東郷ヨリ野村ニ、合衆國ノ對支援助ヲ中止スベキニアル事及ビ南部及ビ北部印度支那ヨリ軍隊ヲ移動スルトノ日本、提案ハ重大ナル讓歩ニアルコトヲ述ビ  
ル電信

文書番號一五三三D一七

電報第二五九號、野村ヨリ東郷ニハル及ビバラント、再度  
會見ニ關シ一九四一年十月二十三日ニ送リタル電信。

文書番號一五三三D一八

電報第八二號、一九四一年十月二十四日、東郷ヨリ野村宛「<sup>Grew.</sup>ブル」ト、再度會談ニ關スル電信。

文書番號一五三三D一九

一九四一年十月二十四日、<sup>電報一三三</sup>東郷ヨリ野村宛ニ期限ヲ一九四一年十月二十九日トセル旨、電信。

文書番號一五三三D一十五

No. 2. 一九四一年十月二十八日、東郷ヨリ野村宛、電信。  
電報八四号



Doc 2745

文書番号一五三三〇一〇

電報本八五号 一九四二年十一月廿九日 東郷ヨリ野村ニ合衆國ニ対  
シテ一九四二年十一月廿日、提督布ヲ受諾シ、且、先方、十一月廿六日、提督  
ヲ撤回スルヲ要請スル事、但シ交渉ハ中止セザル様ト、指令ヲ受テ  
シテ電信

文書番号一五三三〇一一

電報本八五号 一九四二年十二月三日 東郷ヨリ野村ニ  
印支支那ニ於テ軍隊行動ハ支那軍、非常ニ活動ニ依リタリト  
説明スル様ニ電シテ電信

文書番号本一五三三〇一二

電報本九〇一号 一九四二年十二月六日 東郷ヨリ野村宛  
一九四二年十一月廿六日 アメリカ側提督ニ付テ

日米側回答ニ関スル電信

文書番号一五三三〇一三

電報本九〇四号

一九四二年十二月六日 東郷ヨリ野村ニ一九四二年十一月廿六日、アメリカ側提  
督ニ付テ回答文書、準備ニ付、多クスト或ハ其他ノ者ヲ使用  
スル事、且、慎重ヲ期シ秘密ヲ守ルノ要ナルニ電信

余ハ東ニ上記書類カ日本政府、公文書タルト注ニ在リ下記名稱  
ノ省又ハ部局、公文書類及ハ綴、(部)タルヲ証明ス(若シテハ綴  
番号又ハ引用其他公文書類又ハ綴ニ於テ該文書、正規ナリ、  
公文名稱ヲ持記スル)

日本外務省

一九四六年(昭和二十一年)十月三十日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名欄

右ノ者、公印資格

林 啓 署名捺印

文書課長

No. 3

No. 4

Doc 2745

証人

心成 年二周元 証明

(John A. Curtis)

余 以 此 手 不 力 不 又 余 中 聯 合 國 最 高 指 揮 官 總 司  
令 部 三 國 傳 見 之 十 三 日 註 上 記 題 名 文 書 余 公 務 上 日  
本 政 府 上 記 署 名 官 吏 三 十 年 三 月 三 日 十 二 軍 之 該 註 明

長春 署名

千九百四十六年 昭和二十一年 十月三十日

東京 行 署 名

氏 名 欄 少 尉 J. A. カーティス (Curtis)

右 署 公 務 官 國際 檢 察 部 調 査 官

証人

WILLIAM C. PROUT  
William C. Prout

Doc. No. 1532-D (1)

Page 1

Item 10 *Total NO. 32 49 9*

~~Page 81 of "Pearl Harbor"~~

/61/ Dispatched from WASHINGTON, Oct. 22, p.m., 1941  
Received by the Foreign Ministry Oct. 23, a.m.

To: Foreign Minister TOGO  
From: Ambassador Nomura

(Strictly confidential. Ambassador's Code.)

/62/ I have already wired you about my present position. I am sure that I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. I know that for some time the Secretary of State has known how sincere I was, yet knew how little influence I have in TOKYO. I hear that the President also holds the same opinion. There are some Americans who trust me and say that I am the hope for preventing disaster, but, alas, their encouragement is not enough. Among my countrymen here in the UNITED STATES there are also some who feel the same way, but it is a superstitious misunderstanding.

/63/ As for Your Excellency's instructions, WAKASUGI can carry them out fully. Nor do I imagine that you all have any objections at the /Foreign/ Ministry when I am already done with. I don't want to continue this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people. Please do not think I am trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a man of honor this is the only way that is open for me to tread. Please send me your permission /to return to JAPAN/. Most humbly do I beseech your forgiveness if I have injured your dignity and I prostrate myself before you in the depth of my rudeness.

\* \* \* \* \*

Doc No 1532D(1)  
Sim 10

(總32497)

電信課(電)

昭和六年十月廿二日發給 府發

十月廿二日發給本省 署 (略) (機)

極秘 倉長符号

野村大使

東郷 外務大臣

大臣 本

Ex 1

是日小生身土國之感情言然小生以前内閣、退場、初不(キモト)確信  
 及東京事務長官小生ノ誠意ヲ認メシ東京ニ對シハ、不之レニ、不之レニ、  
 不ト認定ナリ、不誠、領、亦然リト聞キ及(リ)東京、同、小生ノ存在、囑  
 切ニ之ヲ破局、望ナリト云モ、ア、此、一、座、換、取、取、取、取、取、取、  
 又在某同胞ノ同、同、同、同、同、同、同、同、同、同、同、同、同、同、同、同、  
 貴大臣、海軍、公、若、若、若、若、若、若、若、若、若、若、若、若、若、若、若、若、  
 何等、海、軍、存、存、存、存、存、存、存、存、存、存、存、存、存、存、存、存、  
 他人、欺、欺、欺、欺、欺、欺、欺、欺、欺、欺、欺、欺、欺、欺、欺、欺、  
 カ、如、心、持、ア、ラ、ス、シ、テ、公、人、ト、シ、テ、履、マ、ル、カ、ラ、サ、レ、道、ナ、リ、ト、信、ス  
 ル、付、微、衷、情、愚、察、何、卒、連、中、認、許、相、成、度、ク、シ、ド、ク、傳、  
 取、テ、汚、シ、失、礼、段、平、ニ、序、安、見、怒、ヲ、請、フ

了)

Ex 1162

DOC. No. 1632-W (112)

Page 1

ENTRY FROM MARQUIS HIDO'S DIARY, 29 October 1941.

29 October 1941 - (Wednesday) Clear

At 8:30 Chutaro called on me.

At 9 a.m. General Suzuki, President of the Planning Board called on me, reported on the progress of the liaison conference /Renraku Kaigi/ and we had a talk. Mr. HA'A President of the Privy Council, visited me at 10:30 a.m., to consult about the recommendation to the Throne of Mr. Seihin IKEDA as a member of the Privy Council. At 11:30 a.m. I heard from Premier TOJO of the progress of the liaison conference, the extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact and our maneuvers vis a vis Yen Hsi-Shan. The Chief Aide-de-camp visited me at 12:45 p.m., and we talked about the latest political situation. Had an audience with His Majesty from 1:15 to 1:55. The Juichi-Kai /T.N. Literally: The Party of Eleven/ was held to exchange views regarding the recent political situation. Those present were Prince KONOYE, HIROPATA, URAMATSU, OKABE, KUROKI, SAKAI, ODA and YANAGISAWA.

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

本庄侯日記より抜萃

昭和十六年十月二十九日(水)晴

1632 W (112)

午前八時半忠太郎御来訪

九時鈴木總裁来訪連絡会議、様様ヲ聴キ懇談ス

十時半原起相来室池田成彬氏ヲ顧問官ニ奉請云々ノ話下ル

十一時半東條首相ト面談連絡会議、経過防共協定、延長固  
二作等ニ以テ詔ヲ聴ク

十二時四十五分侍從長来室最近政情ヲ以テ懇談ス

一時十五分ヨリ同五十五分迄行儀ス

十二会ヲ催ス近衛公廣幡、原私岡部黒木酒井等ヲ招キ  
ノ諸君来会最近政情ヲ中心ニ意見ヲ交換ス

EX 1162

Doc. No. 1532-D (2)

Page 1

Item 20

To: Ambassador Nomura

From: Foreign Minister Togo

Despatched: 2 November 1941, 6:15 p.m.  
Telegram 722 (Ambassador Telegram)

Since the formation of the new Cabinet, the Government has been holding conferences for a number of days with the Imperial Headquarters. We have carefully considered and discussed a fundamental policy for the improvement of relations between Japan and America, but we expect to reach a final decision at the meeting in the presence of the Emperor, on the morning of the 5th, and will let you know the result immediately. This will be our government's last effort to improve diplomatic relations. The situation is very grave. When we resume negotiations, every aspect of the situation makes it urgent that we reach a decision at once. This is to be strictly kept only for your information. Now we trust your most prudent attitude towards handling everything before we take up the negotiations once more in the very near future.

100-502000

861163

Handwritten notes at the top of the page, including the number "100-502000" and other illegible characters.

Main body of handwritten text, appearing to be a list or series of notes, though the characters are difficult to decipher.

FILE COPY

RETURN TO ROOM 361



Doc. No. 2593-D (7)

Page 1

Item No. 8

SECRET

From: Tokyo  
 To: Washington  
 November 4, 1941  
 Purple (CA) (Urgent)

# 725 (Part 1 of 3)

a  
 Concerning my #722 .

1. Well, relations between Japan and the United States have reached the edge, and our people are losing confidence in the possibility of ever adjusting them. In order to lucubrate on a fundamental national policy, the Cabinet has been meeting with the Imperial Headquarters for some days in succession. Conference has followed conference, and now we are at length able to bring forth a counter-proposal for the resumption of Japanese-American negotiations based upon the unanimous opinion of the Government and the military high command (ensuing Nos. 726 b and 727 b). This and other basic policies of our Empire await the sanction of the conference to be held on the morning of the 5th.

2. Conditions both within and without our Empire are so tense that no longer is procrastination possible, yet in our sincerity to maintain pacific relationships between the Empire of Japan and the United States of America, we have decided, as a result of these deliberations, to gamble once more on the continuance of the parleys, but this is our last effort. Both in name and spirit this counter-proposal of ours is, indeed, the last. I want you to know that. If through it we do not reach a quick accord, I am sorry to say the talks will certainly be ruptured. Then, indeed, will relations between our two nations be on the brink of chaos. I mean that the success or failure of the pending discussions will have an immense effect on the destiny of the Empire of Japan. In fact, we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this die.

a - S.I.S. #24292 which states that meetings are being held with the Imperial Headquarters to consider a fundamental policy for improving relations between Japan and America and that a final decision is to be made on the morning of the 5th.

b - Not available.

SECRET

24330

Trans. 11/4/41 (8)

From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
November 4, 1941  
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

#725 (Part 2 of 3)

When the Japanese-American meetings began, who would have ever dreamt that they would drag out so long? Hoping that we could fast come to some understanding, we have already gone far out of our way and yielded and yielded. The United States does not appreciate this, but through thick and thin sticks to the self-same propositions she made to start with. Those of our people and of our officials who suspect the sincerity of the Americans are far from few. Bearing all kinds of humiliating things, our Government has repeatedly stated its sincerity and gone far, yes, too far, in giving in to them. There is just one reason why we do this--to maintain peace in the Pacific. There seem to be some Americans who think we would make a one-sided deal, but our temperance, I can tell you, has not come from weakness, and naturally there is an end to our long-suffering. Nay, when it comes to a question of our existence and our honor, when the time comes we will defend them without recking the cost. If the United States takes an attitude that overlooks or shuns this position of ours, there is not a whit of use in ever broaching the talks. This time we are showing the limit of our friendship; this time we are making our last possible bargain, and I hope that we can thus settle all our troubles with the United States peaceably.

Trans. 11/4/41 (8)

24331

From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
November 4, 1941  
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

#725 (Part 3 of 3)

3. It is to be hoped earnestly that looking forward to what may come at the end--at the last day of Japanese-American negotiations--the Government of the United States will think ever so soberly how much better it would be to make peace with us; how much better this would be for the whole world situation.

4. Your Honor will see from the considerations above how important is your mission. You are at a key post, and we place great hopes in your being able to do something good for our nation's destiny. Will you please think deeply on that and compose yourself and make up your mind to continue to do your best. I hope you will. Now just as soon as the conference is over, I will let you know immediately, and I want you to go and talk to President ROOSEVELT and Secretary HULL. I want you to tell them how determined we are and try to get them to foster a speedy understanding.

5. In view of the gravity of these talks, as you make contacts there, so I will make them here. I will talk to the American Ambassador here in Tokyo, and as soon as you have got the consensus of the American officials through talking with them, please wire me. Naturally, as these things develop, in case you take any new steps, I want you to let me know and get in contact with me. In this way we will avoid letting anything go astray. Furthermore, lest anything go awry, I want you to follow my instructions to the letter. In my instructions, I want you to know there will be no room for personal interpretation.

Trans. 11/4/41 (3)

24332

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE  
Colonel, G.S.C.

1

EX 1164

Doc 2593 D (7)  
Stein 8

東京ヨリ「クシツ」  
一九四一年十一月四日  
第(0A) (至急)  
第七二五號 (三ノ第一節)

秘

一 往電第七二二號 (註a) ニレシテ

翌チ、日米關係ハ其ノ破綻ニ類シ、吾國民ハ國  
交調整ノ可能徑ニ信ヲ置カザル様ニナリツツア  
リ。國策、根本方針ヲ審議スル爲、内閣ハ連日  
大本營連會談ヲ繼續シ熱議ニ熱議ヲ重ネタル  
結果茲ニ政府及軍部高司令第一致ノ意見ニ基キ  
日米交渉再開ニ對スル反對提案ヲ擯却シ得ルニ  
至レリ (第七二六號 / 註b / 及第七二七號 / 註  
b / ト續ク)。本政策並ニ帝國ノ他ノ諸政策ニ  
於テハ、近日午前閣會議決定ナル會議ノ確認ヲ得

ツモノナリ。  
二 吾ガ帝國内外ノ騷擾ハ極メテ急迫ヲ告ゲン今ヤ延  
擱ヲ許サザル状態ニアルモ、日本帶コト合衆國  
トノ平和的友好關係ヲ維持セントスル誠意ヨリ  
熱議ノ結果、今一反交恢復案ヲ著ス事ニ決セリ。

2.

Doc 2593 D (7)  
Stein 8

但本交渉ハ吾々波家ノ誠ニシテ、名實共ニ此ノ  
 反對意見ハ、實ニ最後案ナリト御承知アリ度ク  
 此ヲ以テシテ尙急遽安結ニ到ラザルニ於テハ、  
 遺憾ナガラ會議ハ決烈ニ到ルノ外ナク、其ノ結  
 果兩國友好關係ハ實ニ潭地ノ隙ニ墮ムノ已ムナ  
 キニ至ルモノナリ。即チ今次沉痾ノ成否ハ帝國  
 國運ニ甚大ナル影響アリ。實際、吾々ハ此ノ俄  
 子ノ一擲ニ吾方國土ノ運命ヲ賭セル次第ナリ。  
 註 a、日米關係改善ノ爲ノ根本方針考研ノ爲、大本  
 營トノ間ニ會合開催サルベキ旨及最後の決定  
 ハ五日午前十時ナサレル旨ヲ述べタル S . I . S  
 第二四二九二號ヲ指ス。  
 入手シ得ヌ。

Dec 25 93 D (7)  
Q. 25. 8

東京ヨリ「ワシントン」へ

一九〇一年十一月四日

案（0 A）（至急）

第七三五號（三ノ第二部）

日米會議開始ノ際、誰レカ其會議ノ新ク永引クラ夢  
 想セシ。吾々ハ急遽妥結ヲ計ル爲、從來難キヲ忍ビ  
 テ譲歩ニ譲歩ヲ莫ク來リタルニ抑ラズ、合衆國ハ之  
 ニ響應スル所ナク、終始當初ノ提案ヲ固執シ居ル現  
 狀ニシテ我々萬朝野ニモ米國ノ誠意ニ疑霧ヲ感ズルモ  
 ノ渺ラザル議ナリ。我々政府ハ凡ユル範圍ノ願望的專  
 断ヲ忍ビ迴避誠意ヲ披瀝シテ更ニ譲歩ヲ許テセリ。  
 然リ彼等ニ對シ屈服スル迄ニ譲歩セリ。  
 其ノ所以ノモノハ一ニ太平洋ノ平和維持ヲ懸念スル  
 ニ出ヅルモノニシテ米國一部ニ於テハ吾々ガ一万の  
 譲歩ヲオサント欲セルガ如ク考ヘルモノアル如ク見  
 ヲモ、吾々ハ目前ハ勇氣ニ發スルニ非ズ、從ツテ  
 吾々ノ隱忍ニモ目ヲ限度アリ、吾々ノ左立ト權限  
 トハ必長ニヨリテハ犧牲ノ如何ヲ問ハズ擁護セザル  
 ベカラザル次第ニシテ、合衆國ニシテ此ノ上吾國ノ  
 立場ヲ無視シ、又ハ之ヲ避クルガ如キ態度ニ出ズル  
 ニ於テハ、交渉ヲ開始スルモ何等益ナキニシテ今ヤ

4.

Doc 2593 D (7)  
Station 8

吾々ハ能フ限リノ友誼的藉障ヲ發揮シ進テ能フ限リ  
ノ誠歩ヲナシ以テ肩面ノ平和的收拾ヲ計ラント欲ス  
ルモノナリ。



Doc 2593 D (7)  
S. 8

東京ヨリワシントンへ  
一九四一年十一月四日  
紫(0A) (至急)  
第七三五號(三ノ第三部)

三 貴後ノロ、即チ日米交渉ノ貴後ノ日ニハ如何ナル事案ノ生ズルカニ思ラ致シ合衆國政府ニ於テハ吾万ト和平ヲ結ブコトノ如何ニ有效ナルヤラ又之ガ全世界ノ情勢ニ如何程良キカラ眞剣ニ考察サレル様衷心ヨリ安望スルヤ切ナリ。

四 如上ノ次第ニテ貴大使ノ使節ノ如何ニ重大ナルカラ御承知セラレシ事ナラン。貴使ハ問題解決ノ鍵ヲ握ル重要ナル地位ニアリ、吾々ハ、吾ガ帝國國運進長ノ爲何事カ有效ナル事ヲ貴使ガナシ得ラルベシト大ナル希望ヲ懐シテ居ル次第ナリ。此上共右詰點寫ト御諒承ノ上沈着以テ改善ヲ望シテ御努力ヲ、繼續スル決意ヲ致サレ度シ余ハ、貴下ガ然致サレシコトヲ希望スルモノナリ。但、會議終了次第其ノ旨實万ニ痛報致スベキニ付、其ノ上實万ニ於テハ、ハルーズベルト大統領及ビ、ハル一國務長官ト會見シ我方ノ決意ヲ徹底セシメ盡力交渉ノ結果安堵ヲ計ラルル

5.

Doc 2593D (7)  
Oct. 8

6.

様御勞アリ度シ。

五 是等會談ノ重大性ニ鑑ミ、實地ノ接觸ト並行シ  
余モ亦當地ニ於テ接觸スベシ。  
余ハ在京米國大使ト會談ヲ行フ豫定ニ付、大使ニ  
於テハ米國官邊トノ會談ニヨリテ其ノ意見ノ趨  
勢ヲ待次第當万ニ電報アリ度ク今後ノ交渉經過  
ハ勿論實万ニ於テ新ナル措置ヲ取ル際ハ逐一報  
告ノ上連絡ヲトラレ度シ。右邊ノ關係上手違ヒ  
ヲ避ケル爲ニモ當万訓令ハ砲クマテ嚴守アリ度  
當万訓令ハ實万ニ於テ取捨選擇ノ餘地ナキコト  
ト御承知アリ度シ。

Doc. 7593 cert.

機 密 陸 軍 省

陸 軍 省 参 謀 本 部

情 報 局

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り證明ス。即チ、  
添附致通ノ日本文電報ノ複寫寫眞ハ陸海軍兩省ノ熟  
練セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ツテ傍  
受サレ、解讀セラレ而シテ翻譯セラレシモノニシテ  
予ノ知り且信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ翻譯スル爲  
メ西洋人ニトリ人力ノ可能ナル限度ニ於テ正確且ツ  
典採ノアルモノナリ。

参 謀 本 部 付 大 佐

CARL E. M. CLARKE  
カーター・ダグリック・クラーク

EQ # 1165

Doc. No. 2593-D (8)

Page 1

Item No. 9

SECRET

From: Tokyo.  
To: Washington  
November 4, 1941  
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

#726

(Part 1 of 4.)

Proposal "A".

1. This proposal is our revised ultimatum made as a result of our attempts to meet, in so far as possible, the wishes of the Americans, clarified as a result of negotiations based on our proposals of September 25. We have toned down our insistence as follows:

(1) The question of non-discrimination in trade.

Should they appear not to accede to our proposal of September 25 in this respect, insert the following statement. "The Japanese Government is prepared to carry out this principle in the entire Pacific area; that is to say, China as well, providing the principles of non-discrimination are applied to the entire world."

(2) The question of our understanding and application of the Tripartite Alliance.

At the same time that you clarify to them that we intend no expansion of our sphere of self-defense, make clear, as has been repeatedly explained in the past, that we desire to avoid the expansion of Europe's war into the Pacific..

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

24334

SECRET

SECRET

From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
November 4, 1941  
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

# 726

(Part 2 of 4.)

(3) The question concerning the evacuation of troops.  
We are toning down our stipulations in this connection

as follows:

(A) The stationing and evacuation of troops in China since the outbreak of the China Incident.

Japanese troops which have been sent to China will be stationed in North China, on the Mongolian border regions, and on the Island of Hainan after the establishment of peace between Japan and China, and will not be evacuated until the elapse of a suitable interval. The evacuation of other troops will be carried out by Japan and China at the same time that peace is established. In order to maintain peace and order, this will be carried out within a period of two years. (Note: Should the American authorities question you in regard to "the suitable period", answer vaguely that such a period should encompass 25 years.)

(B) The stationing and evacuation of troops in French Indo-China.

The Japanese Government respects the territorial integrity of the French possession, Indo-China. In the event that a just peace is established, or that the China Incident is brought to a successful conclusion, Japanese troops which have been dispatched to French Indo-China and are there now shall be evacuated.

(4) As a matter of principle, we are anxious to avoid having this inserted in the draft of the formal proposal reached between Japan and the United States (whether it is called an understanding proposal or some other sort of a statement.)

Trans. 11/4/41 (5)

24335

SECRET

SECRET

From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
November 4, 1941  
Purple (CA) (Urgent)

#726 (Part 3 of 4)

2. Explanation.

(1) Of course, there is the question of geographical proximity when we come to consider non-discrimination in commerce. However, we have revised our demands along this line hitherto and put the question of non-discrimination on a world-wide basis. In a memorandum of the American Government, they state in effect, however, that it might be feasible for either country within a certain specified area to adopt a given policy and for the other party within another specified area to adopt a complementary policy. Judging from this statement, I do not believe they will oppose this term. I think that we can easily reach an understanding on this matter.

(2) As for the question of the Three-Power Pact, your various messages lead me to believe that the United States is, in general, satisfied with our proposals, so if we make our position even more clear by saying that we will not randomly enlarge upon our interpretation of the right of self-defense, I feel sure that we will soon be mutually agreed on this point.

24336

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

SECRET

SECRET

From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
November 4, 1941.  
Purple (C.) (Urgent)

#726 (Part 4 of 4)

(3) I think that in all probability the question of evacuation will be the hardest. However, in view of the fact that the United States is so much opposed to our stationing soldiers in undefined areas, our purpose is to shift the regions of occupation and our officials, thus attempting to dispel their suspicions. We will call it evacuation; but although it would please the United States for us to make occupation the exception rather than the rule, in the last analysis this would be out of the question. Furthermore, on the matter of duration of occupation, whenever pressed to give a clear statement we have hitherto couched our answers in vague terms. I want you in as indecisive yet as pleasant language as possible to euphemize and try to impart to them the effect that unlimited occupation does not mean perpetual occupation. Summing this up, Proposal A accepts completely America's demands on two of the three proposals mentioned in the other proposal, but when it comes to the last point concerning the stationing and evacuation of forces, we have already made our last possible concession. How hard, indeed, have we fought in China for four years! What tremendous sacrifices have we made! They must know this, so their demands in this connection must have been only "wishful thinking." In any case, our internal situation also makes it impossible for us to make any further compromise in this connection. As best you may, please endeavor to have the United States understand this, and I earnestly hope and pray that you can quickly bring about an understanding.

Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

24337

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE  
Colonel, G.S.C.



Doc 2593D (8)  
Item 9

東京  
ワシントン宛

秘

一九四一年 / 昭和十六年 / 十一月四日

衆色 (GA) (至急)  
第七二六號 (四ノ第一部)

甲 衆

一 本衆ハ九月二十五日ノ我方提案ヲ既往ノ交渉経過ヨリ判断セル米國側ノ希望ニ出テ得ル限リ「ミート」スル趣旨ヲ以テ修正セル最良案ニシテ我方主張ヲ左記ノ通り緩和セルモノナリ。

(一) 通商無差別問題

九月二十五日衆ニテ到底妥結ノ見込ナキ際ハ、「日本國政府ハ無差別原則カ全世界ニ適用セララルモノナルニ於テハ太平洋全地域自ラ支那ニ於テモ本原則ノ行ハルルコトヲ承認ス」ヲ挿入ス。

(二) 三國同盟ノ解消及履行問題

我方ニ於テ自衛福ノ見地ヲ擴大スル意圖ナキコトヲ更ニ明瞭ニスルト共ニ、從來屢々説明セル如ク我方ハ歐州戦争ノ太平洋へノ擴大ヲ避ケ度キ希望ナル旨ヲ鮮明サレ度シ。

Doc 2593D (8)  
Item 9

東京發華盛頓宛

一九四一年十一月四日

紫色 (O.A.) (至急)

第七二六號

秘

(四ノ第二部)

(三) 撤兵問題

本件ハ左ノ通り緩和ス、

(A) 支那事變勃發以來中國ニ於ケル駐兵及ビ撤兵

中國ニ派遣セラレタル日本國軍隊ハ華北、蒙疆地域及海南島ニ關シテハ日華間平和成立公ニ、駐屯シ、適當期間ヲ經過スル迄撤退セザルベク、爾後ノ軍隊ノ撤退ハ平和成立ト同時ニ日本及ビ中國ニヨリ實行セラルベシ。治安維持ノ爲、二箇年以内ニ實行セラルベシ。

(註「適當期間」ニ付米國當局ヨリ質問アリタル場合ハ、概シ二十年ヲ目途トスルモノナル旨ヲ以テ漠然ト應酬スルモノトス

(B) 佛印ニ於ケル駐兵及撤兵

日本國政府ハ佛領印度支那ノ領土主權ヲ尊重ス、現ニ佛領印度支那ニ派遣セラレ居ル日本國軍隊ハ、公正ナル平和ノ確立スルカ、

2.

5.

東京 東京 東京 東京

又ハ支那發達ニシテ解決スルニ於テハ...

(四) 原則トシテハ之ヲ日米間ノ正式妥結事項(了)

探察タルト又ハ其ノ他ノ障礙タルトシテ同(ス)

中ニ包含セシムルコトハ極力回避スルモノト

東京 東京 「クワン」 一九四二年十一月五日

紫色 (GA)

第廿二次 閣

二、説 閣

(I)

通商無差別原則ニ付テハ、勿論地理的距離

ノ問題アルモ我々方ハ從來、此ノ線ニ沿フ主

張ハ之ヲ訂正シ、無差別原則問題ヲ世界間

問題ニ置キタルモノナルガ、未政府発給中

ニ何レカノ國ガ特定地域内ニ於テ所定ノ政

策ヲ取リ、他ノ一方ガ別ノ特定地域内ニ於

テ是種是國政策ヲ探ルコトハ實行シ易キコト

ナルベシトノ趣旨ノ記述アリ。右ニ徴スル

モ何等反論ヲカルヘク、従ツテ本件ニ付テ

ハ之ニテ容易ニ合意成立スルモノト信ズ。

(2)

三國同盟ノ問題ニ付テハ屢次質問ニ依レバ

47

兵ハ永久駐兵ニ非ル旨ヲ印象ツケル爲御努力  
 ナ然モ快通ナ言辭ニテ婉曲ニ述ベ、無期限駐  
 タル所貴便ニ於テハ固來待ハ限リ不懣慮ニシ  
 ハ、從來常ニ曖昧ナル言辭ヲ以テ蒙ハシ來リ  
 ニ諷シテハ、明瞭ナル辯明ヲ懇懇サレタル際  
 結局ノ所此ハ固極トナラザルベシ。駐兵期間  
 リハ例外トスル方米側ノ希望ニ副フベキモ、  
 我方ハ之ヲ撤兵ト稱ス。駐兵ヲ延前トスルヨ  
 スルモノナリ。  
 官更ノ變動ヲナシ、以テ其ノ疑慮ヲ屏カント  
 遊兵ニ強ク反証スルニ望ミ、占領地換ヲ換ヘ  
 レサルモ、我方ハ米側ガ不協定地換ヘノ換ガ  
 (三) 駐兵問題ハ或ハ或キ自願ナル請トナルヤモ知

東京警察廳員宛  
 一九四一年十一月四日  
 紫色 (9A)  
 (至密)  
 第七二六號  
 (西ノ邦國部)



米山側ハ我方提案ニテ大体満足シ居ルヤノ  
 懸ナルニ符旨確ノ解釋ヲ遣ニ續大スル懸  
 固ナキコトヲ一層明確ニスルニ於テハ、本  
 部モ妥協ヲ見ルベキモノト信ズ。

W.C. ...  
 Station ...  
 (9A)

Doc. No. 101 (10)  
2000

相成候シ。之ヲ莫スルニ、甲案ハ他ノ提案テ  
述ヘラレタル三案中ノ二案ニ關シテハ全面的  
ニ米側主張ヲ受請セルモノニテ、最後ノ一語  
タル駐兵及ヒ撤兵問題ニ付テモ最大限ノ譲歩  
ヲ爲セル次第ナリ。吾々ハ嘗ニ四年ノ間中國  
ニ於テ一心ニ戦ヒ來リ、嘗テナル犠牲ヲ御ヒ  
タリ。  
彼等又之ヲ承知セリ、然レバ此ニ關シテモ彼  
等ノ主張ハ單ナル「長望スル意見」ナリシト  
ルベシ。兎モ尙此ノ點ニ關シテ以上ノ譲歩ハ  
國內的ニ不可能ナリ。彼等精々御努力ノ上米  
側ヲシテ右ヲ諒解セシメ起ニ交渉妥結ニ導ク  
様切望ス

機 密 陸 軍 省

陸軍省参謀本部

情 報 局

ワシントン、二十五、D O

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り諷訳ス。即チ

添附紙通ノ日本文電報ノ原文ヲ爲眞ハ陸海軍兩省ノ  
熟練セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ツ  
テ傍受サレ、解読セラレ而シテ翻譯セラレシモノ  
ニシテ予ノ知り且信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ翻  
譯スル爲メニ洋人ニトリ人刀ノ可能ナル限度ニ於  
テ正確且ツ典據ノアルモノナリ。

参謀本部附大佐

CARTER W CLARKE

カーター・ダブリュ・クラーク

Item 28

/138/ ~~Secret~~

From: The Foreign Minister TOGO  
 To : The Ambassador NONURA, in U.S.A.  
 Despatched: 8.50 p.m. November 4, 1941 (Showa 16)  
 #730 (Ambassador Code)

Re my #725

/139/

In view of the gravity of the present negotiations and in view of your request, we are sending Ambassador Kurusu to you by clipper leaving Hongkong on the 7th (through the kind offices of the U.S.A. Government). Secretary Yuki shall accompany Ambassador Kurusu, if we can manage to get a seat for him.

We are despatching Ambassador Kurusu to assist you in the parleys. He is carrying with him no additional instructions besides what I have wired you already. I want you to facilitate future talks, to make arrangements so that he will be able to see the President immediately upon his arrival.

/140/

By the way, we are keeping Ambassador Kurusu's activities strictly secret for the time being.

\* \* \*

電信課表 (電)

1532D(3)

9月28

電送本 昭和16年11月4日午後8時50分發	号 41927	在米 野村大使	主 米利加局長了 主 米利加局中課長	昭知十二年十月四日起算
件名	名	野村大使	發 東郷大臣	
件名	記録件名			
本帳	オ七三〇号			(倉長件名)

大臣署名

次官署名

令課長

台、野村  
倉宛電  
報(平電)

任電事七二五号 閣下今次交渉、重大性ニ鑑ミテ、貴大使、  
 市野望ヲ以テ、七日香港發アリ、ニアリテ、(米心政府、好意的幹  
 旋ニ依リ)米極大使ヲ貴地ニ出張セシム尚生席、都合付カ、結城  
 書記官隨行スニ  
 尚米極大使、交渉ニ當リ、貴大使ヲ援助スル為、派遣スルモ、二三  
 同大使、既ニ貴方(電報ナル以外何等勅ニテ)言、令等携行  
 之屋舟、此次亦、交渉ニ便シラシムル為、令大使着、六百斤ニ  
 大統領ニ面謁、得ル様、市津備置アリ、日ニ為念  
 尚同大使、行動ニ差當リ、秘密ニ附之屋、リ

991166



MOST SECRET

Policy for Guiding Public Opinion on  
British and American Problems

Information Plan A No. 10  
Agreed by the Cabinet on  
Nov. 4, 1948. *meeting*  
Board of Information

(Precautions for handling). Same as Information Plan A  
No. 8

1. The suppression of reports on objective facts concern-  
ing the tenseness of diplomatic relations with Great Britain  
and the United States shall be eased as compared with that  
of the past.

2. We shall endeavour to guide public opinion so as to  
raise the spirit of the people naturally and to make them  
hold hope for the future. We shall be careful not to let  
public opinion become a single uniform pattern.

3. The following types of news and speeches shall be  
excluded:

- (A) Such news and speeches as will enable the enemy  
to perceive our war preparations and strategic  
activities.
- (B) Such sensational speeches and activities as will  
cause the public to lose the pride of a great  
people and take direct actions against residents  
of third powers. (The End).

Doc 1449D (Item 5)

極秘

對英米問題一関スル輿論指導方針	情金甲第十號
金昭三三島閣議案	情報局

(取扱上注意) 情金甲第十號同シ

- 一、對英米國交緊張ニ関スル客觀的事實、報道ニ從來ニ比シ之ガ抑制ヲ緩和ス
- 二、輿論ニ妨カレタラシム自然的ニ却却セシメ且前途ニ希望ヲ抱カシムル如ク指導ニ劃一的形式ニ陥ラシメザルコトニ留意ス
- 三、左ノ如キ報道並ニ言論ニ之ヲ排除ス
  - (一) 此際我、戰備又ハ戰艦行動ヲ察知セシムルカ如キ報道並ニ言論
  - (二) 大國民ノ矜持ヲ失シ在留第三國人ニ對スル直接行動等ヲ使發スルカ如キ煽情的言動

Ex. 1167

Doc. No. 1632W (83)

page 1.

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 5 Nov 41"

November 5th, 1941 (Extract)

The Council in the presence of the Emperor was held at 10.30 a.m. and continued until 3.10 p.m. and a policy towards the U.S.A., England, and the Netherlands was decided. At 3.40 p.m. Premier TOJO visited me to inform me of such matters as the formation of the Southern Army and the dispatch of Mr. KURUSU to the U.S.A. Mr. HIROSE visited me at 7 p.m.

Ex 1168

Doc 1632 W (8.3)

本戶侯爵日記

昭和十六年十一月五日

十一月五日 (水)

晴

午前十時半ヨリ三時十分迄御前  
 會議爾儘セラレ對米英蘭ニ對ス  
 ル方策決定セラル  
 三時四十分東條首相來室南方軍  
 編成ノ件來福氏ヲ米蘭ニ派遣云  
 タニツキ話アリタリ  
 七時廣瀬氏來訪面談  
 夜理髮

E. # 1169

MEASURES TOWARDS FOREIGN COUNTRIES IN RELATION TO THE  
"PRINCIPLE OF EXECUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY OF THE EMPIRE"  
WHICH WAS DECIDED AT THE MEETING IN PRESENCE OF EMPEROR  
ON NOVEMBER 5.

I. Towards Germany and Italy.

When it is recognized that the Japanese-American negotiation comes to an end and warfare is inevitable (imagined to be after November 25, probably), we inform Germany (Italy), without delay, Japan has an intention to open hostilities against the U.S.A. and Britain before long as soon as the preparation will be completed and being a part of the preparation, we negotiate on the following items:

- A. Germany's (Italy's) participation in the war against the U.S.A.
- B. Non-separate peace making.

Note: In case when Germany demands Japan's participation in the war against Soviet, we answer Japan cannot do it for the present. Even if the Germany's participation in the war, because of it, would be postponed, it cannot be helped.

II. Towards Britain

We take measures previously so as to get Britain to accept and to cooperate positively the subjects concerned to Britain in the understanding which is the fruit of the negotiation with America. We will not adopt any other diplomatic schemes purposely to keep the intention in secret.

III. Towards Dutch Indies

In order to hide and camouflage our intention, we shall open the diplomatic negotiation at the earliest opportunity with her one by one, after the manner of continuing the former negotiation, principally aiming at the supply of necessary materials for the Empire.

IV. Towards the Soviet Union.

We continue the negotiation founded on the clause No. 1 of the "Principle of negotiation with the Soviet Union" decided at the Liaison Conference between the Government and the Imperial Headquarters on August 4, 1941.

V. Towards Thailand.

A. We request and get it to admit quickly the following just before dispatching troops.

Even if Thailand does not consent it, the troops shall be dispatched as prearranged. However, we avoid with all our might the outbreak of hostile activities between Japan and Thailand.

1. Passage of the Japanese military forces and affording facilities for it.
2. Instant execution of measures to avoid conflicts between soldiers of both countries on the occasion of the passage of the Japanese forces.
3. Conclusion of a joint defense pact, if she hopes.

Note: Before the said negotiation is begun, there must not be any peculiar change (in our attitude towards Thailand) than usual, and we should pay attention to hide the intention of opening a war.

B. Soon after the dispatch of the Japanese military forces, we make arrangements of a concrete nature in that place in regards to the following items:

1. Concerning the passage and occupation of the Japanese forces.
2. Offering for the use of the Japanese forces, new construction and strengthening of the military establishments.

3. To furnish the necessary communication and transportation measures and factory establishments.

4. Billets and supplies for the military forces passing and stationing.

5. To give a loan for the necessary military expense.

Note: In order to make those negotiations favorable, at the negotiation of Item Nos. 1 and 2, we will promise to respect her sovereignty and territory and, further, we will suggest in the effect that "according to her attitude, we will consider to give a portion of Burma or Malaya to her in the future".

#### VI. Towards China

Paying attention to the securing of the Japanese synthetic war power with which we must prepare the long world war, avoiding consumption of national energy and taking precautions against diminution of military forces in the future, we take the following measures:

A. To clear away the armed forces of the U. S. and Britain out of China.

B. To secure the hostile concessions in China (including the Peking Legation area) and the important rights and interests (customs, mines, etc.) of the hostile countries under our power, materially. But we must be careful to diminish as far as possible our personal and material burdens.

Note: Though we clear up the hostile forces out of the Common Concessions and Peking Legation area and take them under our real power, they contain interests which belong to the friendly countries, and so we will not take such a measure as to occupy them.

C. The commencement of the above measures shall be postponed until after we open the war against the U. S. and Britain, for the purpose of not exposing our intention.

D. The motion of belligerent rights against Chungking shall not be taken in such a special manner as to declare it, but we shall gain its real effect materially by beginning war against the U. S. and Britain.

E. Even hostile countries' rights and interests which are concerned with the National Government shall be secured under our power, for the present, according to our necessity, and measures to arrange their interests shall be taken on another occasion.

F. Through measures to induce and accelerate as strong as possible the activities of influence of the Chinese in the occupied area, and endeavoring to gain the people's feeling in cooperating with Japan and China. We will realize gradually partial peace, district by district beginning from the possible area.

G. As for the economical relations to China, we attach importance in gaining goods from the unoccupied area and we adjust reasonably the existing various controls.



PRINCIPLE OF ACCELERATION OF TERMINATION  
OF THE WAR AGAINST THE UNITED STATES,  
BRITAIN, HOLLAND AND CHIANG.

(Foreign Office)

1. To conclude arrangement with Germany and Italy not to cease war individually.
2. We shall manage to assist to make peace between Germany and the Soviet, according to results of talks between Germany and Japan, to restore the continental connection between Germany and Japan and readjusting, on the other hand, the relation between Japan and the Soviet (if possible, we shall conclude a treaty of territorial inviolability), we will take measures so as to help the Soviet to advance to the direction of India and Persia.
3. To contribute to the settlement of the Incident, we shall cut the "Burmese and Hongkong Chiang-supporting Route", restore the concessions for China, and leading and utilizing the Chinese merchants in the South Seas regions, we shall intensify the pressure on the Chiang Regime.
4. We shall admit the Philippines' independence after our occupation and declare to the world as fast as possible.
5. We shall make a portion of Dutch Indies independent and secure the necessary portions for the Empire.
6. We shall make Burma independent and stimulate and assist the independence movement of India.
7. We shall support the restoration of Thailand's lost territories from Britain. (As for French Indo-China, we shall maintain the present conditions.)
8. We shall not restrain the people's life in the occupied area and keep strictly the policy not to interfere in its internal administration.

9. When a suitable time arrives, we shall make it clearly known that we shall be ready to secure impartial supply of tin and rubber in the South Seas regions.

10. Though it is possible to take into consideration for once to utilize Americans of German descent to make public opinions of America disunited, it is impractical and ineffective, as was shown in the example of the former World War.

11. We cannot expect much in manouver towards Central and South America.

E N D

e - No. 1 Ex 1169

Doc. 790 Ⅱ

十一月五日

御前會議決定  
帝國國策遂行要領  
閣聯在外措置

Doc. 790

一、对独伊

日米交渉決裂後之戦争不可避ト認めラルル際(大体十一月二十五日以後ト想定ス)ニハ遲急ナク独(伊)ニ対シ帝國ハ近ク準備成リ次第英米ニ対シ開戦スルノ意嚮ナル旨ヲ通報シ右準備ノ一部ナリトシテ左記事項ニ付必要ナル交渉ヲ行フモトス

- 一、独伊、対米戦争参加
- 二、單獨不講和

備考独逸側ヨリ対ソノ参戦ノ要求アリタル場合ニハ差当リ参戦不能ノ旨ヲ以テ應酬ス但シ之カ爲獨側、対米参戦ノ時期カ遅ルカ如キ事態生スルモ止ムヲ得ス

一、对英

対米交渉、結果タル了解事項中英國ニ關係アル事項ヲ英國ヲテ受諾セシメ且之ニ積極的ニ協力セシムル様速ニ措置シ置クモトス

右以外企圖陰匿ノ見地ニ於テ特別ノ外交措置ヲ行フコト無し

一、对蘭印

我企圖社匿欺騙ニ資スルタメ成ルハク速ニ從來交渉繼續形式ニ於テ帝國ニ対スル所要物資ノ供給ヲ主眼トスル外交交渉ヲ逐次開始ス

一、对ソ

概シ昭和十六年八月四日大本營政府連絡會議決定ニ係ル対ソ外交交渉要綱第一項ニ準據シテ交渉ヲ續行ス

e - No. 2

Dec. 790

討表

1. 進駐開始直前左記ヲ要旨ニ迅速ニ之ヲ承認セシム。秦ニ  
之ヲ帝國、要旨ニ態セシム場合ニ於テ軍隊ハ豫定ノ如ク  
進駐ス。但シ日秦間戰爭狀態、發生ハ極力之ヲ回避ス。

左記

- 1. 帝國軍隊、通過並ニ之ニ伴フ諸般、便宜供與。
- 2. 帝國軍隊、通過ニ伴フ日秦軍隊、衝突回避措置、即時実行。

ハ秦、又希望ニヨリテ、共同防衛協定、締結

(註)本交渉開始前ニ於ケル對秦態度、從來ト特別、變化

シタリ。又特ニ開戦企圖、秘匿ニ萬全、考慮ヲ拂フ  
元トス。

2. 進駐後速クニ概テ左ノ諸件ニ關シ具體的ニ現地ニ於テ  
取極ヲ行フ。

- 1. 帝國軍隊、通過及駐屯ニ關スル事項。
- 2. 軍用施設、供用及新設増強。
- 3. 所要、交通通信機關及工場施設等、供用。
- 4. 通過並ニ駐屯軍隊ニ對スル宿營給養等。
- 5. 所費軍費、借款。

備考

第一等事項、交渉ニ當リテハ秦、主權及領土、尊重ヲ  
確約シ尙秦ノ態度ヨリテ、將來「北」若クハ「南」部  
ヲ割讓スルキ事ヲ考慮スルヘキ旨ヲ仄カシ以テ交渉ヲ  
有利ナラシム

e- No. 3

Doc. 790

一 对支

出来得ル限、消耗ヲ避ケ以テ長期世界戦ニ対處スヘキ帝國  
綜合戦力、確保及將來兵力減少、場合等ヲ念頭ニ置キ左  
ノ通り措置スルモノトス。

1. 在支米英武力ヲ一掃ス

2. 在支敵性租界(北京公使館区域ヲ含ム)及敵性重要  
權益(海關、鉅山等)ヲ我實權下ニ把握ス。但シ我國、人  
的並ニ物的負擔ヲ成ルベク輕カシムル様留意スルモノトス

(註) 共同租界及北京公使館区域ノ敵性武力ヲ一掃シテ我實  
權下ニ收ルニ友好國權益ヲ混入スルヲ以テ接收等、形  
式ヲ取ラザルモノトス

3. 前諸項ノ發動ハ我企圖ノ暴露セサル為ニ我對米英開戦  
後トス。

4. 重慶ニ對スル交戦權ノ發動ハ特ニ宣言等ノ形式ヲ以テス  
ルコトナク對米英開戦ヲ以テ事實上其實効ヲ收ルモノトス。

5. 在支敵國系權益中國民政府ニ關係アルモノモ必要ニ應ジ  
差當リ我方實權下ニ把握スルモノトシ之ヲ調整、別ニ措  
置ス

6. 占領地内ニ於ケル支那側要人ノ活動ヲ出来得ル限リ誘  
導促進シ日支協力ノ下ニ民心ヲ把握シ力メ以テ可能ナル地  
域ヲ漸次局部和平ヲ實現セシム。

7. 对支經濟關係ニ於テハ非占領地ヨリスル物資獲得ニ重  
點ヲ置キ現行諸制限ニ合理的調整ヲ加フルモノトス。

對米英蘭荷戰事終未定進要項 (外務省)

Doc. 790

- 一 獨任兩國、商軍獨不講和取極、抑詰ス
- 二 日獨間、詰合ニ依リ、獨ニ對シ、講和ヲ斡旋シ、日獨間、大規模給ヲ復活シ、他方日蘇關係ヲ調整シ、(五未得シハ不可侵條約ヲ締結ス) 蘇聯、印度波斯方面進出ヲ助長シ、此種保護ス。
- 三 香港「ブル」後將「ル」上ヲ遮斷シ、在支租界ヲ回收シ、在南洋華僑ヲ誘導利用シ、將政權ニ對スル壓迫ヲ強化シ、事變解決ニ資ス。
- 四 比島、占領後其獨立ヲ詆メ可成速ニ之ヲ中外ニ聲明ス。
- 五 蘭印、一部ヲ獨立セシメ所要地域ヲ帝國ニ為ニ確保ス。
- 六 「ブル」ヲ獨立セシメ、印度、獨立運動ヲ刺戟則最ス。
- 七 「タイ」、對英失地恢復ヲ支持ス(佛印ノ現狀ヲ維持ス)
- 八 占領地、民生ヲ壓迫セズ、內政不干渉政策ヲ堅持ス。
- 九 適當、時期ニ至ルハ南洋方面ニ於ケル錫及「ゴム」公平ナル供給ヲ確保スル用意アル旨ヲ聲明ス。
- 十 獨系米人ヲ利用シ米國、輿論ヲ分裂セシメトスル手法ハ「應考慮」ニ得ルモ前回大戦、例ニ徴スルモ非實際的ニシテ效果ナシ。
- 十一 對中南米工作ニ多クヲ期待シ得ス。

e - No. 5

Doc 2593.D (7)  
Hans 16

Ex 1170

東京 發

「ワシントン」宛

一九四一年 / 昭和十六年 / 十一月五日

(案 I C A)

第七三五號

一 往電案第七二五號、日米交渉對案ハ本五日ノ御前會議ニ於テ決定ヲ見タリ。就テハ貴大使ハ前電訓令ノ趣旨ヲ体シ折衝ヲ開始サレ度シ。

二 從來ノ経緯ニモ概シ差當リ六月二十一日案、從ツテ我方ヨリ言ヘバ九月二十五日案ヲ新規會談ノ基礎トシ交渉ヲ進ムルコト、米側側ノ期待ニ副フモノト推察セラルルニヨリ交渉ヲ急速ニ取進ムル見地ヨリシテ (往電案第七二六號中ノ) 我方甲案ヲ提示スルコト可然ト存セラル。 (當方トシテハ、實ハ米案形式、表現ニ就テモ面白カラズト認ムル點多多アルモ便宜上又進捗上、甲案ヲ先ツ提示セントスルモノナリ。) 就テハ右ノ趣旨ヲ米側ニ對シ説明セラルルト同時ニ往電第七二五號ノ事情ヲ爲ト先方ニ納得セシメ、以テ最短期間内ニ同案ニヨリ妥結方極力御盡力アリ度シ。

三 米側ニ於テ甲案ニ對シ餘リニ難色アリ。妥結不能ナルコト明白トナリタル際ハ、最後ノ局面打開策トシテ乙案 (往電案第七二七號) ヲ提示スル意

※※



2

Doc 2593 D (19)  
Sta. 10

簡ナルニヨリ、甲案ニ對スル米側態度ヲ大至急突  
キ止メ本省宛御通知アリ度シ。尙乙案ヲ米側ニ提  
示スル際ハ必ズ豫メ御道報アリ度シ。

四 前電ニ申進メノ通り、是ハ帝國政府ノ最後案ナリ  
時日極メテ短ク、事態頗ル切迫シ絕對ニ遷延ヲ許  
サザルニ付、其ノ御含ミニテ御努力アリ度ク、此  
ノ點重ネテ申進ス。

其 尤モ「タイム・リミット」ヲ附シ若クハ最後通牒  
的態度ヲ取ルガ如キ印象ハ之ヲ避ケタキニヨリ、  
米側ニ於ケル本案ノ受諾ヲ切望シテ已マヌ旨友好  
的態度ヲ以テ示サレ度シ。

(往電\*\*第七二七號本文冒頭ニ「ト記サレタル  
及其ノ必要ナキニ付、削除サレ度シ)

註 \*JDノ一、第六二四八號 (SIS 第二四三〇一三二號)  
\*\*JDノ一、第六二四九號 (SIS 第二四三三四一三七號)  
\*\*\*JDノ一、第六二五〇號 (SIS 第二四三三八號)

機 密 陸 軍 省

陸 軍 省 参 謀 本 部

情 報 局

ワシントン、二十五、D O

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り謹明ス。即チ

添附 秘 通 ノ 日 本 文 電 報 ノ 仮 爲 爲 眞 ハ 陸 海 軍 兩 省 ノ  
熟 練 セ ル 職 員 ニ 依 リ 電 氣 的 取 ハ 物 理 的 方 法 ニ 依 ツ  
テ 傍 受 サ レ、 辨 認 セ ラ レ 而 シ テ 認 識 セ ラ レ シ モ ノ  
ニ シ テ 予 ノ 知 リ 且 信 ズ ル 限 リ 正 確 ニ 日 本 文 字 ラ 翻  
譯 ス ル 爲 メ 西 洋 人 ニ ト リ 人 刀 ノ 可 能 ナ ル 限 度 ニ 於  
テ 正 確 且 ツ 典 據 ノ ア ル モ ノ ナ リ。

参 謀 本 部 附 大 佐

CAREER W CLARKE

カーター・ダザリニー・クラーク

Q. 1171

Doc. No. 2593D (10)

page 1

Item 11

SECRET

From: Tokyo  
To : Washington.  
5 November 1941  
(Purple-G.)

#736

(Of utmost secrecy).

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese U.S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

This information is to be kept strictly  
to yourself only.

24373  
JD-1: 6254

(D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (S-TT)

SECRET

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE  
Colonel, G.S.C.

EX 1171

Lib. Ross D (100)  
Stein 11

書類第二五九三號D 1十

第十一卷

自東京宛ラッシュトシ

一九四一年(昭和十六年)十一月五日 (系包10A)

第七三六號 (複製)

本鑑定ハ、證據ノ顯然上、本月二十五日迄ニハ、  
郵印ノ寫撮ノ手續完了スルコト絶對ニ必要ナル處、  
若ハ至難ヲ顯ヒルガ如キモ、西國ノ狀勢上致方ナキ  
端ニ付、右篇ト稱了承ノ上、日本國吏ノ破綻ヲ數フ  
ノ大決意ヲ以テ我々御勢刀アラムコトヲ願フス。  
右鑑定ニ資大証據リノ御舎ミ趣。

Doc 2593 (cont)

機 密 陸 軍 省

陸軍省参謀本部

情 報 局

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り證明ス。即チ  
添附致通ノ日本文電報ノ複製複製ハ陸海軍兩省ノ  
熟練セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ッ  
テ傍受サレ、解読セラレ而シテ機密セラレシモノ  
ニシテ予ノ知り且信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ以  
テ正しく且ツ典據ノアルモノナリ。

参謀本部附大佐

CARTER, W. CLARK

カーター・ワグリアー・クラーク

Cx. # 1172

Doc. No. 4058A

Page 1

Telegram 1Z (Secret Cipher Process)

Berlin, 8 Nov 1941

Dg. Pol  
U.St.S.Pol. /TN.  
meaning unclear/

German Embassy: a) Rome  
b) Washington  
Reviewer: I.V.L.S./TN?/ Dr. Braun

Re: Conversation OTT-TOGO on KURUSU Mission

Embassy Tokyo wires the following on the KURUSU Mission:

"Ins. /TN ?/ from telegram No. 2354 of 6 November from Tokyo  
from [ ] to [ ]"

TOGO stated that a firm attitude on the part of JAPAN had been expressed in the instructions for KURUSU. In his negotiations with the United States he was given a definite limit which he could not cross. The dispatch of KURUSU was only recently decided upon, as is borne out by his hurried departure itself.

"Ins. /TN. ?/ from Telegram No. 2354 of 6 November from Tokyo  
from (( to ))"

End of the report.

ERDMANNSDORFF.

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4058A.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the staff of the United States Political Advisor in German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first secured by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. P. Cumming  
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde  
G. H. GARDE  
Lt. Colonel, AGD  
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY  
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)



4058A

6x 1172

Dr Pol  
U. S. SPOL

(譯者註意味不詳)

電報 12 (秘密暗号送)

ベルリニ九五一年(昭和十六年)十一月八日

(一) 独逸大使館 (a) P-2 (b) W-3-10-1

検閱者 I. V. S (譯者註?) グラウマン博士

件名 来栖、使命ニ就イテ「オット」東郷会談

東京大使館、来栖、使命ニ就イテ次ノ如ク打電シテ中。

INS (譯者?) 東京カラ、十一月六日付電オ三五四号中

「        」  
「        」

東郷ニ来栖対スル指令中ニ日本ノ確固タル態度ガ表明サレ  
テ中ルト言明ニテ。合衆國ト、彼ノ交渉ニ対シテ彼ガ起スル事出  
来イ確固タル限界ガ定テ中ルト。来栖ノ派遣ハ彼ノ早急出  
発ガ証明充テ、最近ニテ漸ク決定サレタリテ中ルト。

INS (譯者?) 東京カラ、十一月六日付電オ三五四号中

「        」  
「        」

報告ノ終

エルドニスドルフ

4058A

2

書類才 四〇五八A号

證

余 Ulrich Strass (余が独逸語及び  
 日本語二精通也此卷十九下並二独逸語原文及  
 日本語原文ヲ对照ノ上右ノ本書類ヲ眞實  
 二且正解辭訳也凡十九ノ確證セリトヲ叙シ  
 證ス

Ulrich A. Strass

*Cum gratia Certificate*

証 書

余、W.P. カミング ( W. P. CUMMING )

ハ正ニ宣誓シテ次ノ証項ヲ証言ス

一 余ハ合衆國國務院、同國獨逸軍軍政官  
同部員タル事、及左ニ記リ余ハ(合衆國)獨逸  
軍政官代表ノ一員タルコト、且如上表明セル資  
格ニ於テ、余ハ獨逸軍政官、柏林文書本部ニ  
於ル獨逸獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫、原本ノ  
占有、保管、管理ニ在リタル事。

二 上述獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫ノ原本ハ聯合  
國總征軍最高司令部ノ管轄下ニ在リ軍政ニヨリ  
テ獨逸軍政官ニ得セラレ、其管轄ノ下ニ、初メ獨逸國  
マールブルグニ於テ該軍政官ニヨリテ軍文書本部  
ニ蒐集セラレ、後該聯合軍軍政官ヨリ上送セル  
ノ始末ノ文書本部ニ移管セラレタルモノナル事

三 余ハ一九四五年八月十五日、獨逸マールブルグ  
ニ於テ、上述文書本部遺留ヲ命ゼラレタル事。  
是ニ仍リテ該獨逸獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫原  
本ハ、余ハ獨逸マールブルグ軍政官在官時、初メテ  
余ノ占有、保管、管理ニ在リ、爾來引續キ余ノ  
占有、保管、管理ノ下ニ在リタル事

*Cumming's Certificate*

四 余ノ此供通書ノ添附セラル、所ノ文書ハ上述ノ  
獨逸外務省集綴文書並ニ文庫トシテ、鹵獲セラ  
レ、余ノ占有、保管ニ歸シ、且余ノ管理ノ下ニ  
匿カレタル、獨逸外務省文書原本ノ、真正精確  
ナル直接復寫寫眞ノ謄本タル事

五 茲ニ添附セラレタル直接復寫寫眞謄本ノ文書原  
本ハ、余ノ保管、留保ノ下ニ、各方面代表者ノ  
點檢閱覽ニ資スル如クナシアリ、爲ニ該原本ヲ  
流用ナシ得サルガ故ニ、該原本ノ寫眞謄本ヲ提  
供シ且ツ之ガ監防ヲナスモノナル事

ダブルユー・ビー・カミング  
(W. P. CUMMING)

一九〇六年四月二十三日余ノ面前ニ於テ署名且  
宣誓ス

中佐 ジー・エツチ・ガード

G. H. GARDE

高級副官事務取扱

Lieutenant Colonel

ACTING ADJUTANT GENERAL

(合衆國) 勸進軍政部

2.

EXTRACT FROM "THE TOKYO NICHU NICHU"

November 12, 1941

CHURCHILL CLAIMS BRITAIN IS READY FOR  
ACTION IN INDIAN, PACIFIC OCEAN.  
WILL FIGHT NIPPON IF AMERICA DOES

LONDON PRIME MINISTER DECLARES NO NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED WITH HITLER  
OR NAZI REGIME; LEND-LEASE BILL AND CHUNGKING GIVEN LAVISH PRAISE.

---

Special to Mainichi-Nichi Nichi

LONDON, Nov. 10. "Prime Minister Winston Churchill, in a speech at the  
Lord Mayor's luncheon at Mansion House, warned that the war might soon  
spread throughout the world.

"Should the United States be involved in a war with Japan," the Prime  
Minister declared, "a British declaration will follow within an hour."

.....

"We do not know whether the efforts of the United States to preserve  
peace in the Pacific will be successful."

"But if they fail, I take this occasion to say - and it is my duty  
to say - that should the United States be involved in a war with Japan,  
a British declaration will follow within an hour."

# 2537A

「英米英京日報 一九四一年十月十二日附 第六四號  
第一頁より、抜萃」

英領印度洋、太平洋に戦闘用意ありト、チャーチル  
揚言

「チャーチルが戦(英)に日本と戦ふト

チャーチル首相は「トニー」若クハナチ政権ト交渉行ハスト  
言明、試み代真法ト重慶ヲ絶言ス

毎日、日、特電

以下十月十日迄 —— 「チャーチル」チャーチル首相ハ

「チャーチル」ハ之ニ於テ、ロンドン市長、午餐会ニ演説中  
戦争、チャーチルハ「擴ルルニ」ト警告ス。若シ合衆國が  
日本ト、戦争ニ捲込スルニハ英國、宣戦布告(一時間以内ニ  
発スル)ト首相ハ言明ス。

EX 1173

「太平洋ニ於テ平和ヲ維持セ下ル合衆國、努力が成功  
スルニシテハ我々ニ命ヲ与ヘ。

併シ若シ我々が失敗スレバ、コトヲ機会ニ私ハ争ヒ上ゲタイ。

—— 又「チャーチル」上ゲルカガ、義務ヲ了スルガ—— 若シ合衆  
國が日本ト、戦争ニ捲込スルニハ英國、宣戦布告(一時間以  
内ニ発スル)ト「チャーチル」。

EQ. #1174

Doc. No. 2593-D (11)  
Item 12

Page 1

From: Tokyo.  
To : Washington.  
11 November 1941  
(Purple)

#764 (In 3 parts, complete).

1. On the 11th, the British Ambassador, while calling on me on some other business, brought up the subject of the conversations. He advised me that he reported my talks of the other day (see contents of 2 of my message #723\*) to his home government, to which his government replied along the following lines, he said:

"The British Government is not aware of the details of the conversations being conducted in Washington. Since its success would be of interest to Britain and Japan, it is fervently hoping for the success thereof. However, unless the basis of discussion is first settled upon, it would be useless to go ahead and enter into negotiations of the details. The British Government feels that discussions as to the basic principles could safely be left up to the U. S. Government. However, as soon as the real negotiations begin, the United States is to confer with Great Britain according to arrangement. Therefore, when that time arrives, negotiations will be carried on jointly with the United States and Japan."

2. I replied that in the matters being discussed between Japan and the United States there were some phases which greatly affected Great Britain. In the event of an agreement between Japan and the United States, Japan will simultaneously seek Britain's agreement. I wish to arrange matters so that the two agreements may be signed at exactly the same time. In view of the fact that to do the above is necessary, we have already requested the United States to give their approval to the terms, I said to the British Ambassador.

The British Ambassador said that he was not aware as to how much progress had been made between the United States and Japan, but he assumed that they were still in the preliminary stages.

I, therefore, replied that his assumption may have fitted in the past, but that at present they had already entered into the realm of the actual negotiations. Moreover, the Imperial Government has already submitted its final proposal, thus bringing the negotiations to the final phase. We have made this fact absolutely clear to the United States, I added.

I went on to say that I hear that the British Prime Minister made a speech at a luncheon given by the Mayor of London in which he stated that though he did not know the developments in the U.S.-Japanese negotiations, he would issue a warning to Japan. Would it not be more to the point, I challenged, if, instead of making threats without knowing of what he spoke, he were to try to more clearly understand the issues and to cooperate in an effort to clear them up? However, I said, with the U.S.-Japanese talks in the phase they are today, and in view of the fact that I realized that there were certain relationships between the United States and Great Britain, I have no intention of urging or opposing British participation in these talks at this time.

The Imperial Government has made the maximum concessions she can in drawing up its final proposal, I explained. We are of the opinion that the United States will find no objectionable points in it. I believe that it will be possible to sign the agreement within a week or ten days, I said. If, unfortunately, the United States refuses to accept those terms, it would be useless to continue the negotiations. Our domestic political situation will permit no further delays in reaching a decision.

I am making superhuman efforts at this time, I pointed out, in the attempt to ride out the crisis in the U.S.-Japanese and the British-Japanese relations. There are factions in the country which insist that there is no need for negotiating and point out the uselessness of doing so. The negotiations are being continued only after these factions were checked.

For these reasons, it is absolutely impossible that there be any further delays.

A speedy settlement can be made depending entirely upon the attitude of Britain and the United States, I said, and suggested that his country give serious consideration to this, and cooperate in bringing about an early agreement.

In the above manner, I pointed out the criticalness of the situation. The Ambassador listened to what I said very attentively, giving indications that he was realizing for the first time how critical the situation was. He advised me that he would send his government a report of the above conversation and that he himself would do his best to bring about a speedy settlement.

3. Thus, there are indications that the United States Government is still under the impression that the negotiations are in the preliminary stages and that we are still merely



exchanging opinions. This is further supported by the words of President Roosevelt reported by you in your message #1070\*\* (that part in which he says that he hopes that these preliminary discussions will lead to the basis of the real negotiations, etc.)

That the United States takes this lazy and easy going attitude in spite of the fact that as far as we are concerned, this is the final phase, is exceedingly unfortunate. Therefore, it is my fervent hope that Your Excellency will do everything in your power to make them realize this fact and bring about an agreement at the earliest possible moment.

\*JD-1: 6228. (SIS #24293-94)

\*\*Not available.

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE  
Colonel, G.S.C.

東京 譯局 宛

一九四二年 (昭和十六年) 十一月十一日

(案)

第七六四號 (三編ニテ完結)

十一月十一日、他國ヲ以テ來訪ノ際、英國大使ハ會談ノ

件ヲ歸題ニ出シ、通日ノ余ノ談話 (往時米第七二

三號第二ノ内容参照) ヲ、本國政府ニ報告セル處

之ニ對シ同政府ハ左記發言ノ回答ヲ爲シタル旨、

余ニ通告アリタリ。即チ曰ク

「英國政府ハ政府ニ於ケル諸合ノ難題ヲ承認セザ

ルモ、右ノ成功ハ、英國及ビ日本ノ利益ナルニヨ

リ之ヲ熱望ス。然レドモ諸議ノ進歩ガ先ヅ以テ成

立セザレバ進テ交渉ニ入ルノ必要ヲ認メズ。

英國政府ハ、根本原則ニ歸スル諸議ハ、英國政府

ニ對シ不遜突ナシト考ヘ居レリ。尤モ現實ノ交渉可

能トナラバ、英國政府ハ、甚ニ英國政府ト諸議ス

ルコトトナリ居ルニ付、其ノ原ハ、日米政府ト共

ニ協議スベシ。」

ニ依テ余ハ、日米間ニテ諸議中ノ種間懸隔ニハ、大

國ニ對シ大利益關係アリル事項ヲ以テ日米間合意

1.  
84 1174

Doc 2593 D (11)  
Return 12

Dec 25 (11)  
1.2

ノ成立ノ際ハ、日本ハ之ト同時ニ、英領領ノ合意  
ヲモ直ムベク、爾合意ヲ全ク同時ニ訂印シ得ル様  
警察ノ手管ヲ或シメ度キ意圖ニシテ、右邊ビノ必  
要ナルニ信ミ、既に米國ニ對シ右様取計方希望シ  
置キタリ、ト英國大使ニ回答シ置キタリ。  
英國大使ハ、日米交渉ノ進捗程度ハ知ラザルモ、  
今種豫備的合意ノ成ヲ尚テザルモノナリト了解シ  
居レリ、ト答へタリ。  
俄テ余ハ、過去ニ於テハ此ニ向、現在ハ、就ニ、  
本協約英領トナリ居リ、而モ今ヤ帝國政府ノ政策  
的對策提示ヲ以テ其後ノ變遷ニ入りタル狀况ナリ  
ト答へ、尙右ノ次第ハ、米國側ニ完全ニ兩明シ置  
ケリト附言セリ。  
余ハ語ヲ聞ケ英國首相ハ、ロンドン市長午儀會ノ  
演說ニテ、日米交渉ノ進捗ニツキテハ、熟知セザ  
ルモ、日本ニ對シテ警告セントス、ト答へ居ル由  
ナルモ、氏トシテハ、其ノ語所ノ可タルカラ知  
ラズシテ尚進ヲナスヨリモ、諸論點ヲ辨カニシテ、  
之ガ解決ニ協力スル方妥當ナラズヤ、ト復詰シ置  
キタリ。但シ日米會談ハ今日ノ如キ段階ニ在ルヲ  
以テ、又米英間ニハ米英トシテノ關係アルニ信ミ、  
此ノ際、本會談ニ英國ノ參加ヲ欲望シ、或ハ之ニ

Doc 2593 D (11)  
Oct. 12

ノ成立ノ際ハ、日本ハ之ト同時ニ、英國側ノ合意  
ヲモ望ムベク、兩合意ヲ全ク同時ニ實現シ得ル様  
態保ノ手筈ヲ取極メ度キ志固ニシテ、右遲ビノ必  
要ナルニ信ミ、既に米國ニ對シ右様取計方希望シ  
置キタリ、ト英國大使ニ回答シ置キタリ。

英國大使ハ、日米交渉ノ進捗程度ハ知ラザルモ、  
今兩側側約合意ノ成ヲ尚テザルモノナリト了解シ  
居レリ、ト答へタリ。

俄テ余ハ、過去ニ於テハ見ニ角、現在ハ、我ニ、  
本協約交渉トナリ居リ、而モ今ヤ帝國政府ノ最後  
的對策表示ヲ以テ今後ノ變遷ニ入りタル狀況ナリ  
ト答へ、尙右ノ次第ハ、米國側ニ完全ニ兩關シ置  
ケリト附言セリ。

余ハ語ヲ斷ケ英國首相ハ、ロンドン市長午饗會ノ  
演説ニテ、日米交渉ノ進捗ニツキテハ、熟知セザ  
ルモ、日本ニ對シテ警告セントス、ト述べ居ル由  
ナルモ、氏トシテハ、其ノ語ヲ所ノ可タルカラ知  
ラズシテ常道ヲナスヨリモ、斷斷斷ヲ駁カニシテ、  
之ガ解決ニ協力スル方妥當ナラズヤ、ト疑詰シ置  
キタリ。但シ日米會談ハ今日ノ如キ段階ニ在ルヲ  
以テ、又米英間ニハ米英トシテノ關係アルニ信ミ、  
此ノ際、本會談ニ英國ノ参加ヲ懇願シ、或ハ之ニ

Doc 2593D (11)  
Item 12

反響スル私意ナシト述ベ置ケリ。

帝國政府ハ、其ノ要約案起草ニ際シテ大限ノ議  
事ヲ取テシタル次第ナル旨説明シ、米朝側ハ之ニ  
反對ナカルベク、一週向乃至十日以内ニ、協定ノ  
調印可能ナルベシト述ベ置ケリ。不審ニシテ米  
國ガ其旨條項ノ受諾ヲ拒否セバ、交渉ヲ極端スル  
モ無益ナルベク、我が國內情勢ハ、妥結ニ、此ノ  
上ノ遅延ヲ許サズ。

余ハ日米、日英關係ノ危局ヲ突破スル爲、目下  
學生ノ努力ヲ傾注シ居ル旨指摘セリ。國內ニハ交  
渉無附随アルモ、之ヲ伺シテ漸ク交渉ハ組織シツ  
ツアリ。

是故ニ此上少シテモ遅延セシムル事ハ全ク不可  
能ナリ。

米米ノ態度如何ニ依リテハ迅速妥結ノ方法モア  
ル次第ナレバ、先方政府ニ於テモ此ノ善ノ事情ヲ  
充分ニ考慮シ交渉迅速成立ニ盡力アリ度シト述  
ベ置ケリ。

如上專断ノ態度ヲ所以ヲ論述シタルニ、同大校ハ  
右ヲ遺憾シ初メテ緊急ノ候ニ逼迫セルヲ痛感セル  
モノノ如ク、右ヲ早速政府ニ報告スベク、自分モ  
迅速ナル妥結ノ爲、盡心ノ努力ヲ試ミルベシト

Doc 2593D (11)  
Item 12

級ヘクリ。

右ノ如ク米國政府ハ今私交渉ハ、未ダ預備的段階ニアルヤニ考ヘ居ル節アル處右ハ實電\*第一〇七〇號ヲ以テ實使報告ノ「ルーズベルト」大統領ノ言（此等豫備的會談ガ換ノ交渉ノ基礎トナル事ヲ甚ム云々ノ部分）ニ依スルモ明白ナリ。

我方ノ懸スル處リ、此ハ最後の段階ナルニモ拘ラス、米側ガ依然トシテ折カル意長續使ナル意度ヲ待スルハ、事ニ不祥ナリ。此テハ即下ニ於テハ、米側ヲ監視シ、速ニ本件妥結ニ意ヲ決セシムル機運ヲアラン事ヲ切望ス。

註\* J D ノ一第六二二八號

(S I S [料事情報(定例)] 第二四二九三一九四號)

\* \* 入手シ得ス

機 密 陸 軍 省

陸軍省参謀本部

情 報 局

ワシントン、二十五、D O

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り説明ス。即チ

添附紙類ノ日本文電報ノ複製寫眞ハ陸海軍兩省ノ  
熟練セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ツ  
テ傍受サレ、解読セラレ而シテ翻譯セラレシモノ  
ニシテ予ノ知り且信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ翻  
譯スル爲メニ洋人ニトリ人刀ノ可能ナル限度ニ於  
テ正確且ツ典據ノアルモノナリ。

参謀本部附大佐

CARTER W CLARKE

カーター・ダヴリユー・クラーク



990  
4 of 5 parts  
(State Secret)

Principal reasons alleged for the commencement  
of hostilities against the U.S.A. and Britain."

(Draft)

11 November SHOWA 16 (1941)  
Draft adopted at the Liaison Conference

1. That it is the unshakable national policy of our Empire to establish permanent peace by creating a new order in Greater East Asia, and to voluntarily contribute to world peace.
  2. That the China Affair aims, in accordance with this national policy, to do away with all causes which disturb the stability of Greater East Asia, and to realize the results of co-prosperity of all peoples, building up peace on the basis of the new order, and that Japan must do all in her power to bring it to a successful issue.
  3. That the United States and Britain have been trying for a long time in the Far East to obstruct the measures and actions of the Japanese Empire. Above all, with the outbreak of the China Affair, they have openly increased their measures of assistance of the Chungking Regime and stealthily gave rein to their inordinate ambition to dominate the Far East at the expense of China. In addition, they have persuaded other powers to strengthen the encirclement of Japan, and also adopted such measures as the direct disruption of economic relations with our Empire, and reinforced military preparations. Thus they have threatened the security of our Empire by daring to conduct virtual war operations against us.
  4. That our Empire, exhausting every possible means and putting up with the unbearable, has proposed to the United States the peaceful settlement of the situation and has already conducted negotiations with the United States for the past 8 months. However, there is a fundamental opposition between the assertions of Japan and the United States in regard to the establishment of a lasting peace in the Far East. We can hardly realize our national policy and can by no means bring about the stability of Greater East Asia if we once accede to the assertions of the United States.
- Under such circumstances, all the efforts exerted by us during the past four years in order to successfully prosecute the China Affair would come to naught. This our Empire cannot tolerate from the standpoint of her exist and prestige.

Ex. # 111

990  
4 of 5 parts  
(State Secret)

Principal reasons alleged for the commencement  
of hostilities against the U.S.A. and Britain.

(Draft)

11 November SHOWA 16 (1941)  
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Under such circumstances, all the efforts exerted by us during the past four years in order to successfully prosecute the China Affair would come to naught. This our Empire cannot tolerate from the standpoint of her existence and prestige.

5. That in the attitudes of the United States and Britain we can read nothing but a hasty race to satisfy their own inordinate ambitions, and see no trace of a sincere desire on their part for world peace, and to rescue mankind from its unfortunate disasters.

Greater East Asia is now on the brink of a crisis, and the existence of our Empire is in jeopardy.

Such being the situation, we are compelled to rise up to take up arms on the side of our allies to smash all the obstacles in our way.

9x11/75

五部中四編

日家編

東洋楽園名目骨子 (兼)

昭和二年一月二日

憲法會議決定案

一 大東亞ノ利益ヲ保護シテ永遠ノ平和ヲ確立シ  
進ノ世界秩序ヲ維持スルハ帝國不動ノ  
固長ナルコト

二 支那ノ領土ノ右認定ニ基テ大東亞ノ安全ヲ担保ス  
ル際ニ  
支那ノ領土ノ保護ヲ期セントスルモノニ  
シテ  
支那ノ領土ノ保護ヲ期シテ之ヲ完遂セサルヘカラ  
サルコト

三 支那ノ領土ノ保護ニ於テ帝國ノ施策ヲ妨害シ來リ  
得ル者ニ對シテ是レヲ懲罰スルヤ益々表ニ重臣政權援助  
ノ策ヲ強化シテ是レヲ支那ノ利益ニ於テ極東制覇ノ  
展望ヲ進マシムルヘシトシテ帝國包圍ノ態勢  
ヲ強化スルト共ニ帝國ニ對シテ直接經濟外交等ノ  
利益ヲ謀リ得ル爲メ軍備ヲ増強シ實質上ノ競争行爲  
ヲ致テシ帝國ノ利益ヲ危殆ニ陥ラシメタルコト

四 帝國ハ凡ソル手段ヲ盡シ忍ビ難キヲ忍ビテ事ヲ  
成ラズ平和的ニ解決セシムルヲ期シ既ニ提議シ既ニ  
八月三日重リ折衝セリ

496

然レトモ東亞ノ平和確立ニ對スル彼我ノ主權ハ  
根柢ニ於テ尊重シ米ノ主權ヲ容認セシ乎帝國是  
ハ  
ムハカラス

新クテハ支那事變完結ノ爲四年有餘ニ亘リ傾倒  
セル凡有勢力ハ永世ニ保スルモノニシテ帝國ハ  
其ノ存立ト威權トニ懸ケテ忍ビ得ル所ニ非サル  
コト

米英ノ利益ハ其ノ國運達成ニ意ニシテ世界ノ平  
和ヲ圖シテ人我ノ不幸ナル慘禍ヨリ救ハントス  
ル誠意ノ顯ルヘキモノナシ  
今ヤ大東亞ノ前途危急ヲ告ケ帝國ノ存立危殆ニ  
懸ケントス事變ニ至リ帝國ハ陝郭ト共ニ干戈ヲ  
興リテ一切ノ障礙ヲ破砕スルノ已ムナキニ立至  
リタルコト

DOC. NO. 1443

GENERAL OUTLINE FOR HASTENING THE CONCLUSION OF WAR  
AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, NETHERLANDS, AND  
THE CHUNGKING REGIME.

(FOREIGN MINISTRY

Dated: Nov 12 1941 (Showa 16)).

1. A "No-Separate-Peace Agreement" shall be concluded with both Germany and Italy.

2. Through mutual consent with Germany, we shall mediate for peace between Germany and the Soviet Union and restore our trans-continental communication with Germany. On the other hand, while adjusting our relation with the Soviet Union, we shall take measures to promote her advancement into the direction of India and Persia.

3. We shall completely cut off the supply route to the Chungking Regime, and bring all the concessions in China under Japan's power. On the other hand, we shall induce and utilize the Chinese merchants residing in the South Seas to strengthen our oppression upon the Chungking Regime, thereby contributing to the settlement of the Incident.

4. The independence of the Philippine Islands shall be recognized and proclaimed to the world at the earliest possible occasion after the occupation of the Islands.

5. Independence shall be allowed to part of the Dutch East Indies while other necessary areas shall be maintained by Japan.

6. We shall give independence to Burma and thus incite and promote India's independent movement.

7. We shall support Thailand's movement against England for the recovery of lost territories. (French Indo-China shall maintain her status-quo).

8. Regarding our administrative policy in the occupied areas, we shall not oppress the lives of the people; and shall adopt, as far as possible a non-interference policy towards the internal affairs, thereby shall earn the hearts of the people.

9. When the time becomes suitable, we shall declare our intentions to guarantee an equal supply of tin and rubber in the South Seas to the United States and Great Britain.

## (Remarks)

(1) Judging from the fact proved in World War I, the policy to utilize Americans of German descent for the purpose to break up the public opinion in the United States may at least be considered, but it will prove impracticable and fruitless. (2) We cannot expect much from activities in Central and South America.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W. D. C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I. P. S. No. 1443

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section Japanese Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 3 pages, dated 12th Nov., 1941, and described as follows: Basic Principle for Rapid Conclusion of War against America, England, Netherlands and Chungking Regime  
I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this  
17th day of Sept., 1946

/s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo

\_\_\_\_\_  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, 2d Lt., Eric W. Fleisher, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
17 day of Sept, 1946

/s/ Eric W. Fleisher 2nd Lt AUS  
NAME

Witness: R. H. Larsh

Investigator  
Official Capacity

EX # 1177

Doc. No. 2593-D (13)  
Item No. 14

page 1

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)  
To: Tokyo  
November 14, 1941  
Purple

#1090 (Part 1 of 3)<sup>a</sup> (Departmental Secret)  
(To be handled in Government Code)

I am telling Your Excellency this for your own information only.

I believe that I will win out in the long run in these negotiations, and I will fight to the end. I will do my very best with infinite patience and then leave the outcome up to God Almighty. However, I must tell you the following:

1. As I told you in a number of messages, the policy of the American Government in the Pacific is to stop any further moves on our part either southward or northward. With every economic weapon at their command, they have attempted to achieve this objective, and now they are contriving by every possible means to prepare for actual warfare.

2. In short, they are making every military and every other kind of preparation to prevent us from a thrust northward or a thrust southward; they are conspiring most actively with the nations concerned and rather than yield on this fundamental political policy of theirs in which they believe so firmly, they would not hesitate, I am sure, to fight us. It is not their intention, I know, to repeat such a thing as the Munich conference which took place several years ago and which turned out to be such a failure. Already I think the apex of German victories has been passed. Soviet resistance persists, and the possibility of a separate peace has receded, and hereafter this trend will be more and more in evidence.

3. The United States is sealing over-friendlier relations with China, and insofar as possible she is assisting CHUNG. For the sake of peace in the Pacific, the United States would not favor us at the sacrifice of China. Therefore, the China problem might become the stumbling block to the pacification of the Pacific and as a result the possibility of the United States and Japan ever making up might vanish.

a - For Part 2, see S.I.S. #24857; Part 3 of 3 not available.

24877

SECRET

Trans. 11/17/41 (2)



SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)  
To: Tokyo  
November 14, 1941  
Purple (Urgent)

#1090 (Part 2 of 3)<sup>a</sup> (Departmental Secret.) (To be handled in Government Code)

4. There is also the question of whether the officials of the Japanese Government are typing up very intimately with the Axis or not. We are regarded as having a very flexible policy, ready, nevertheless, in any case, to stab the United States right in the back. Lately the newspapers are writing in a manner to show how gradually we are typing up closer and closer with the Axis.

5. If we carry out a venture southward for the sake of our existence and our lives, it naturally follows that we will have to fight England and the United States, and chances are also great that the Soviet will participate. Furthermore, among the neutral nations, those of Central America are already the puppets of the United States, and as for those of South America, whether they like it or not, they are dependent for their economic existence on the United States and must maintain a neutrality partial thereto.

6. It is inevitable that this war will be long, and this little victory or that little victory, or this little defeat or that little defeat do not amount to much, and it is not hard to see that whoever can hold out till the end will be the victor.

7. It is true that the United States is gradually getting in deeper and deeper in the Atlantic, but this is merely a sort of convoy warfare, and as things now stand she might at any moment transfer her main strength to the Pacific.

a - Part 3 not available

SECRET

24857

JD 6553

Trans. 11/17/41 (7)

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT  
NAVY DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE  
Colonel, C.S.C.

67 1177

Shohei Yoda (1941)  
Steno 14

華盛頓 (馬府) ヨリ

東京宛

一九四一年 (昭和十六年) 十一月十日 日

照

第一〇九〇號 A (三ノ第一部) (海外誌)

(政府消息ニ依リ取扱ハルベシ)

本電閣下照リノ御告ミ趣申シ知ス。

本交渉ニツイテハ、必屬ヲ積極シ、最後ノ最後  
経過開成スベク、其ノ上人等ヲ達シテ天命ヲ待ツ  
ノ心境ナリ。然ルニ、現下ノ状況正ノ通り観測ス。

下已ニ果テ報告ノ通り、米國政府ノ太平洋政策ハ、  
日本ノ是以上ノ南滿北滿ヲ阻止スルニアリ。而シ  
テ其ノ掌中ニアル凡ユル軍需物資ヲ以テ、其ノ  
目的ヲ達成セントスルモ、今ヤ實際ニ對スル  
準備ヲ若々進メ居レリ。

是レヲ、我々が北滿及ハ南滿スル機會ニ對シ、作  
戰其ノ他滿洲ノ準備ヲナシ、關係國トハ極力協力  
シ、彼等ノ信託タル政治的資本財源ヲ能ク安撫ス  
ル位ナラバ、寧ろ戦争ヲ待セザルニ望ニシテ、今

Die Kōryū (101)  
Stem / X

ノトコロ失敗ノ弱印ヲ得サレタル數年前ノ「シユ  
ンペン」會談ノ如キコトヲ繰リ返ス意思アリト思  
ハレズ。獨逸全土ノ峙モ統ニ見エタリト認メラル。  
「ソ」聯ノ誠意ハ今尙懸存シ、單獨講和ノ危險モ  
薄ラギタル今日、一層然ルモノアルベシト思料セ  
ラル。

米國ハ餘リニモ疑懼ナル關係ヲ中國ニ種認シ其  
情許ス限リ將ノ要助ヲナシツ、アリ。太平洋安定  
ノ爲ニ、中國ヲ犠牲ニシテ我方ニ厚意ヲ寄セルガ  
如キハ米國ノナサザルトコロナルベシ。故ニ中國  
問題ガ太平洋安定ノ「スタンプリング・ブロック」  
トナリ、其ノ爲ニハ日米國交ノ調節モ亦不可能ト  
ナリ得ル次第ナリ。

註 A 第二部ニ就テハ S・I・S 第二四八五七號  
ヲ参照セラレ度シ、三ノ第三部ハ入手シ得ズ

二四八七七

秋 (101)

2

No 259.50 (13)  
Date Nov 14

詳盛 (野村) ヨリ

東京宛

一九四一年

(至急)

第一〇九〇號 A (三ノ第二都) (省外秘)

(政府機構ニ依リ取扱ハルベシ)

四 尚、日本政府當局が短輸ト認メテ緊密ニ密トナ

リツツアリヤ否ヤノ高江サアル。併シ年々取スル

ニ形勢如何ニヨリテハ、直ニ管後ヨリ米口ヲ刺ス

ノ姿勢ニアルモノト認メ居リ、最近新雨ハ、新米

我方ノ短輸トノ緊密ニ一体化ヲ認ムル様ノ難辛振リ

ナリ。

我々が自存自活ノ為南進ヲ執行スル都合ニハ、

當然ノ結果トシテ對英米ノ戰トナリ、且「ソ」聯

モ参加スルニ至ルノ算多キモノト認メラル。又中

立國中、中米諸國ハ既ニ米價ノ他價タリ、爾米ノ

中立諸國ハ、其ノ好ムト好マザルトシテ、其

ノ經濟上ノ存在ヲ米價ニ依存シテリ、米價ニ有利

ナル中立ヲ保ツニ至ルベシ。

此ノ戰線ハ長期トナルモノトハ必然ノ勢ニシテ、

一局部ノ成敗ハ、サホド大關係ニ非ズ、戦後マテ

新機ヲ得タルモノヲ勝者タルモノトモ斷々豫想スル

ニ難カラズ。

4.

Doc 2593D (13)

Item 14

米口ハ一歩シタ大西岸ニ深入リツツアルガ如  
 キモ、該方面ハ兵スルニ「コンザホイ」ニ出動ス  
 ル作戦ニ止マリ今日ノ形勢ニテハ、何時ニテモ主  
 力ヲ太平洋ニ集中シ得ベシ。  
 註 A 第三部入手シ得ズ

二四八五七  
 九二五五三

(秘 密)

Doc. 2593 cert.

機密 陸軍省  
陸軍省参謀本部  
ワシントンニ在リ。C.  
情報局

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り證明ス。即チ、  
添附致通ノ日本文電報ノ複寫寫眞ハ陸海軍兩省ノ熟  
練セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ツテ傍  
受サン、解讀セラレ而シテ機譯セラレシモノニシテ  
予ノ知リ且信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ翻譯スル爲  
メ西洋人ニトリ入力ノ可能ナル限度ニ於テ正確且ツ  
典據ノアルモノナリ。

参謀本部付大佐

CARTER. W. CLARKE  
カーター・ダウリウ・クラーク

Q. # 1178

Doc. No. 2593-2044

Page 1

(Item 15)

TOP SECRET

From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
November 16, 1941  
Purple (Ca) (Urgent)

#---

For your Honor's own information.

1. I have read your #1090<sup>a</sup> and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.

2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725.<sup>b</sup> Will you please try to realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736,<sup>c</sup> and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution.

- a - See JD-:6553 in which KOMURA gives his views on the general situation. Part 3 not available.
- b - S.I.S. #24330 in which TOGO says that conditions both within and without the Japanese Empire will not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement with the United States.
- c - S.I.S. #24373 in which TOGO says that it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

NAVY 24878 JD-1:6638 SECRET Trans. 11/17/41 (S)

TOP SECRET



Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE  
Colonel, G.S.C.

Doc 2593D (14)  
Stan 15

Ex 1178

書類番號第二五九三號D十四

第十五番

証 符

東京ヨリ幸府へ

一九四一年十一月十六日

第 紫 (ca) (至急)

第 號

閣下限り御含み述

- 一、貴電第一〇九〇號(註a)拜讀、御辛勞ト御努  
力トハ深ク感謝ニ堪へザル處ナルガ帝國安危ハ茲  
數日ノ一線ノ望ミニカ、ル、切ニ一層御奮勵ヲ願  
フ。
  - 二、貴電未段ノ御趣旨ハ元モノ次第ニテ、右ノ點ニ  
就テモ既ニ充分參照ヲ加へタル次第ニテ唯往電第  
七二五號(註b)ニ述べタル基本政策御參照ノコ  
トヲ申上グルノミナリ。何卒眞意御汲ミ取りノ程  
ヲ乞フ。
- 貴見ノ如ク戰爭趨勢ノ見透判明スル迄堅忍自制スルコ  
トハ諸般ノ事情ヨリ遺憾乍ラ不可能ニシテ從電第七三六  
號(註c)期日迄ニ交渉ノ急速妥結ヲ必兵トスル  
コトハ絕對ニ變更ヲ許サザルモノナルニ付、右御  
承知アリ度ク、從ツテ餘日ハ極メテ僅少、米價ヲ  
シテ交渉ヲ多岐ニ涉ラシメ、之ヲ遲延セシメズ、

2.

Doc 2593 D (14)  
Sta. 15

我方提議ヲ基礎トシテ先方ニ迫リ、以テ妥結ニ致シ、  
ク様御努力有度慶シ。

註 a、Jカ第六五三號参照、右ニ於テ野村ハ一

般妥結ニ關スル其ノ見解ヲ述ベテ居ル。第三部

入手シ得ズ。

註 b、S I S 第二四三三〇號、右ニ於テ東郷ハ、

日本帝國ノ内外ノ情勢ハ米國トノ妥結ハ此以上

ノ遅延ヲ許サズ、ト語ツテ居ル。

註 c、S I S 第二四三七三號、右ニ於テ東郷ハ本

了解案調印ニ對スル一切ノ準備ハ今月二十五日

マテニ完了スルコトガ絕對ニ必要ナル旨述ベテ

居ル

機 密 陸 軍 省

陸軍省参謀本部

情 報 局

ワシントン、二十五、D O

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り證明ス。即チ  
添附製通ノ日本文電報ノ復寫寫眞ハ陸海軍兩省ノ  
熱線セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ツ  
テ傍受サレ、解読セラレ而シテ探知セラレシモノ  
ニシテ予ノ知り且借ズル限リ正確ニ日本文字ヲ翻  
譯スル爲メ西洋人ニトリ人刀ノ可能ナル限度ニ於  
テ正確且ツ典據ノアルモノナリ。

参謀本部附大佐

CARTER W CLARKE

カーター・ダザリユークラーク

Doc. No. 1532-D (5)

Page 1

(Item 121)

Despatched: 18 November 1941. P.M. WASHINGTON

Received: 19 November 1941. P.M. *Foreign Ministry*

Strictly Confidential -- Ambassador's Code

From: Ambassador NOMURA

To: Foreign Minister TOGO

#1133

KURUSU states:

(1)-----According to the views held by Ambassador NOMURA and myself, although the President maintains calm attitude outwardly, we feel that the President possesses keen desire to conclude the U.S.-Japanese negotiation. Now, that just because the other party does not take in whole-heartedly our proposal there is no reason for an immediate conjecture that it is a willingly-delayed policy. Moreover it is most important at this time not to resort to actions that could not be amended afterwards.

(2)-----Through the establishment of the Revised Neutrality Law, etc., the U.S. interests were all the more focused to the Atlantic, and therefore, although they are affirming preparations and determination to fight Japan if compelled to, it seems that they are seeking if possible to maintain security in their back front by negotiating with our country. In both of our interviews, with the President on the 17th and with HULL on the 18th, much emphasis was placed on the question of the Tri-Partite treaty. The reason for their giving more force to their assertion than is usual could be attributed chiefly to the consideration given therein. That is, as an assumption to U.S.-Japanese compromise, the U.S. Government shall give the American public in general, the impression of Japanese-German estrangement. To do this, it is desired that utilization be made regarding U.S.-Japanese joint declaration concerning non-discrimination in trade, or to let Japan participate in the agreement regarding the same question now being negotiated between the U.S. and Britain, or to utilize messages manifesting peaceful aims on the part of JAPAN as suggested by the Secretary of State HULL in our interview of the 18th.

(Item 121)

(3)-----An acute change in the present state of Japanese-German relations is, of course, an impossibility, and in view of the aforementioned conditions, I believe it is most important for our country to give the United States sufficient security possible so that they could all the more concentrate deeply to the Atlantic, thereby enabling us to occupy favourable positions in the international situation that is to arrive after the war, not mentioning our full scale execution of the present Sino-Japanese hostilities. (Part 2) In regard to the question of whether the U.S. and Britain will, or will not turn the point of their swords to us after the present war and start suppressing us, I stated this at the conference on the 17th pointing out the bitter experience our country underwent during after the last World War (I) and bluntly explained the suspicion embraced by a group of our people toward the Anglo-Americans. To this, the President unhesitatingly replied that the new agreement also covers such points. (Cover it all).

(4)-----In view of the present state of affairs in our country's internal situation, I believe there are various difficulties to be met before being able to attain some measures along the lines desired by the United States. For the time being, as a link to fill the lapse in time, it is most desirable that a time limit be set in regard to American-Japanese negotiation and to pave a way through this confronting situation, I think that it is necessary to ask for an assurance to import a set quantity of petroleum and also the rescinding of freezing orders. In my interview of the 18th, I together with Ambassador NOMURA suggested a return to the condition prior to 24 July. As an equivalent to this, I think that the U.S. might not consent with only our B proposal stipulating the non-advancement of our armed forces outside French Indo-China, and our testimony given vague in condition regarding evacuation of troops from French Indo-China, as evidenced by our past negotiation. I suggest that at this time, you will show in advance, some degree of sincerity such as to commence evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China.

Now, as there is the question of your instructed time limit, I would like, if possible, to effect immediate disposal of the matter while the President is still in Washington, which I am urgently advising.







Doc. No. 1532-D (6)

Page 1

Item 134

To: Ambassador FOMER in America

From: Foreign Minister TOGO

Despatch No. 43905

Despatched: <sup>20</sup>19 November 1941 - 0030 *Drafted: 17; Nov., 1941.*

Telegram No. 800 (Ambassador Code) Very Urgent.

Re my Telegram No. 799

Re paragraph 1 of my telegram No. 780. Southeast Asia and South Pacific includes Dutch Indies and Thailand, but not China.

Re item 2 of paragraph 3, it is desirable that the required quantity be decided upon by agreement of both governments before the signatures are affixed to this present agreement.

Re paragraph 4, please bear in mind that it means the cessation of aid to Chiang by the United States.

Re paragraph 5. Article 2 (my #801) is an important concession we venture to make for the sake of speeding the conclusion of the agreement.

Re paragraph 6. We could not agree to the principle of non-discrimination in trade being applied only to China, as I have stated in my #784.

Re paragraph 7, latter part of item 2. As an explanation of our attitude as expressed in "Japan would decide entirely independently" in case the U.S. should enter the European War, you may point out that the Empire can decide independently as to whether or not there had been an attack, without being bound to the interpretations of the other countries involved in the Tripartite Treaty. You may make it clear that there are no secret agreements in the Tripartite Treaty. (However, you will please withhold your explanation of this item until you see prospects of this agreement materializing).

Doc. No. 1532-D (6)

Page 1

Item 134

To: Ambassador FOMER in London

From: Foreign Minister TOGO

Despatch No. 43905

Depatched: <sup>20</sup>19 November 1941 - 0030 *Drafted: 17, Nov., 1941.*

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Doc 1532-0110  
 13年

中華民國二十九年十月二十日 外交部	
收發號碼 1532-0110	寄件人 外交部
收件人 駐英大使館	事由 外交部
日期 十月二十日	地點 外交部

VERY URGENT

駐英大使館

外交部

外交部為處理駐英大使館電報，業經呈請外交部長核准，由外交部轉發駐英大使館，仰即遵照辦理。此令。

外交部

外交部為處理駐英大使館電報，業經呈請外交部長核准，由外交部轉發駐英大使館，仰即遵照辦理。此令。

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Wx 1180

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 19 Nov 41"

I talked with the Emperor from 10:25 a.m. to 10:50 a.m. I made a statement to the following effect.

The prospects of our negotiations with Washington were incalculable, but if the Emperor was resolved on war with America by the end of November, the following situations might arise.

1. The remainder of the parley would not advance beyond its preliminary stage.
2. The acceptance of our demands.
  - a. Partial acceptance of our demands.
  - b. Acceptance of half of them.
  - c. Acceptance of the majority of them.
3. The successful conclusion of our negotiations with the U.S.A., but consent would be required on the part of England and the Netherlands.

It would not be a good policy to plunge into a war merely by reason of the fact that the month of November had expired, and if we did so, the unification of public opinion would be very difficult. Therefore when the Premier had to decide his final attitude, he should be ordered to convene a conference of senior statesmen in the Imperial presence.

EX 1181

Dec 16 32 W (84)

木 戸 繁 日 記

昭和十六年十一月十九日 金

十一月十九日 (水) 雨

午前十時二十五分ヨリ十時五十分迄待駕ス

左ノ取置ヲ置上ス

農米交渉ノ旨給ハ末々進階シ進キモ本月末所謂對米  
御決意ノ場合ヲ窺見スルニ左ノ如キ進々ノ場合ヲ  
生ズベシ

一 末々對米交渉ノ域ヲ出ズ現在ノ狀況ニテ推察セル  
場合

一 我要求ヲ大部分ニ承認セル場合

(イ) 租メテ一部ヲ容レタル場合

(ロ) 半分位ヲ容レタル場合

(ハ) 一部ヲ容シ大部分ヲ容レタル場合

一 米トノ交渉ハ妥結シタルモ美英等ノ同意ヲ求メ居  
ル場合

如蒙進階ヲ望見シ得ルトコロ單ニ十一月末日ヲ徑  
過シタリトノ強迫的理由ヲ以テ以等ニ突入スルハ如  
何ガト考ヘラレ得テハ將來ノ巨額統一上ニモ面白カ  
ラザル事情ヲ生ズル虞レアルヲ以テ首相ニ於テ身後  
ノ御決意ヲ察知セル場合ニハ事宣ニヨリテハ重臣ヲ  
加ヘタル御前會議ノ開催ニツキ首相ニ御下命ヲ願ヒ

Doc 1632 W (84)

多キコト

正午竹葉ニ於テ岩倉男ノ招宴ニテ近衛公、經川侯、

松平侯ト會食ス

二時官會ニ至リ原田三氏ト面談

華道大座ノ担任ノ内命ヲ受ク

2.

The Excerpts from "Records of the Investigation Committee Meeting of Privy Council in re: Prolongation of Anti-Comintern Pact."

PP 1-7 inclusive; PP 11, 14, 15

1. Investigation Committee Meeting, about the conclusion of protocol on the prolongation of Anti-Comintern Pact among Japan, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Manchukuo, and Spain, and about the interchange of secret documents between Japan and Germany concerning the abrogation of the secret attached protocol of above pact.

Held on November 21st (Friday), 1941, in the Privy Council Office.

Attendants: President HARA

2. Vice President SUZUKI

Chairman of the Committee ISHII,  
Councillor

Members of the Committee:

- ARIMA, Councillor
- ISHIZUKA, Councillor
- YONAKI, Councillor
- NARA, Councillor
- FUTAKAMI, Councillor
- ORAMA, Councillor
- TAKEKOSHI, Councillor
- IZAWA, Councillor

3.

Ministers of State Affairs:

- TOJO, Prime Minister, Minister of Home Affairs and War Minister
- IWAHARA, Minister of Justice
- TOGO, Minister of Foreign Affairs and concurrently of Overseas Affairs ( )

Explainers:

4.

- MORIYAMA, Directory-General of the Legislative Bureau
- SATO, Councillor of the Legislative Bureau
- MIYAUCHI, Councillor of the Legislative Bureau
- MATSUNOTO, Director of the Bureau of Treaties ( ) in the Department of Foreign Affairs.
- SANAYOTO, Director of the Bureau of European and ( ) Asiatic Affairs in the Department of Foreign Affairs
- NISHIMURA, Chief of the Second Section of the Bureau of Treaties in the Department of Foreign Affairs
- NEITACHI, Chief of the Third Section of the Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs ( ) in the Department of Foreign Affairs
- NARITA, Chief of the First Section of the Bureau of European and

Asiatic Affairs in the Department  
of Foreign Affairs  
YOZANO, Chief of the Second Section  
of the Bureau of European and  
Asiatic Affairs in the Department  
of Foreign Affairs  
IDE, Secretary of the Department  
of Foreign Affairs  
I. MATSU, Director of National Police  
Bureau in the Department of Home  
Affairs  
NAGANO, Chief of the Public Order  
Section of National Police Bureau  
in the Department of Home Affairs  
IINEDA, Director of the Criminal  
Bureau in the Ministry of Justice

5.

HORIE, Chief Secretary  
TOROHASHI, Secretary  
TAKATSUJI, Secretary

(Meeting opens at 1.35 P.M.)

Chairman of the Committee ISHII declares the opening of the meeting.

Foreign Minister TOGO explains the circumstances leading to the settlement of this proposal and the outline of the contents.

Committee Member ISHIZUMI asks a question about the relation between Japan and Germany regarding the South Sea regions. Foreign Minister TOGO replies that Germany has already recognized Japan's construction of a New Order in East Asia, and as for such a problem as how to deal with Dutch East Indies, consultation shall be effected by degrees. MATSUMOTO, the Director of the Bureau of Treaties in the Department of Foreign Affairs answers that concerning the South Seas Mandated area, former Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and German Ambassador OTT had exchanged letters to make the islands Japanese territory for a nominal compensation by Japan to Germany.

Committee Member MINAMI asks many questions, namely,

(1) He thinks that Germany's conclusion of the Treaty of Territorial Inviolability with Soviet is an infringement on the spirit of the preamble of the Anti-Comintern Pact and, therefore, the Pact had already lost its validity as far as Germany is concerned. He asks the opinion of the authorities concerned. Foreign Minister TOGO replies that though there is clearly a close connection between the Third International and the Soviet Government, still there exists a slight difference between them, so, it is not impossible to think of them separately, from which viewpoint, Japan has concluded the neutrality treaty with Soviet.

(2) MINAMI asks about the change of circumstances which made the Secret Protocol between Japan and Germany unnecessary. Thinking of the possibility of reconciliation between Germany and Soviet, he doubts if it would be better to continue the Secret Pact.



8. Foreign Minister TOGO responds that the changes in circumstances are (A) the outbreak of war between Germany and Soviet and the conclusion of the Neutrality Pact between Japan and Soviet, (B) Formation of alliance between Japan and Germany. He adds in the case if Germany would make peace with Soviet, Japan would resort to different means, beforehand or at the same time, to protect her interests.

/P. 11 Line 4-10/ Committee Member FUTAKAMI asks about Japan's present foreign relations. Foreign Minister TOGO, after the explanation about the whole circumstances of the Japanese-American negotiations, states that America, after all, sticks to her traditional theory on international policy and assumes an unrealistic attitude which makes it difficult to come to terms; for all this, however, a compromise is being attempted: As for the relation between Japan and Soviet, it is going, at present, on the foundation of the Neutrality Treaty.

/P. 13, line 10/ Committee Member IZAWA asks what are the concrete results of the Anti-Comintern Pact during these five years since it was concluded.

/P.14/ IIMATSU, the Director of the National Police Bureau in the Department of Home Affairs, answers that by mutual information and connection, changes of the methods of communist' movements or such were learned, and thus, not a few facilities are given by it. Prime Minister TOJO states he will utilize more and more the Anti-Comintern Pact to control communism.

President HARA says it is very doubtful that the Anti-Comintern Pact has been used fully to realize its object, and he hopes now that the Government is going to prolong it, they ought to utilize it completely so as to destroy the Communists at the root.

/15/ After this, Chairman ISHII asks the Ministers and the Explainers to retire.

(Ministers and Explainers go out)

Then after the discussion among the committee members, it is decided unanimously to pass it as it is with request that the Government will make effort to make the Pact effective, positively making the most of its provisions. The drawing of the record of the investigation is committed all to the chairman.

Then Chairman of the Committee ISHII declares the closing of the meeting.

(Closed at 4.20 P.m.)

C E R T I F I C A T E

W. D. C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I. P. S. No. 1072

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, M. Takatsuji hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Privy Council and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 15 pages, dated 21 Nov, 1941, and described as follows: Records of Investigation Committee Meeting of Privy Council re "Prolongation of Anti-Comintern Pact and Abrogation of Secret Protocol". Dated 21 November 1941.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Privy Council, Imperial Palace ground

Signed at Tokyo on this  
17th day of Sept, 1946

/s/ M. Takatsuji  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: /s/ T. Swzuki

\_\_\_\_\_  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
17th day of Sept, 1946

/s/ Edward P. Monaghan  
NAME

Witness: s/Eric W. Fleisher 2d Lt.

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

Ex. 1183

Doc. No. 2593

Page 1

(Even 17)

TOP SECRET

From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
November 22, 1941  
Purple CA (Urgent)

#812

To both you Ambassadors.

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736,<sup>a</sup> as you know. However, I know you are working hard. The Imperial Government is maintaining its fixed policy and doing its very best, sparing no efforts to try to bring about the solution we desire. We desire by all means to prevent a breakdown<sup>b</sup> in Japanese-American relations, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th;<sup>c</sup> if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands through the exchange of notes and so forth; and in short if everything can be finished, despite difficulties unbelievably great, we (will?) make arrangements to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work as hard as you have in the past. This is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.

a - See S.I.S. #24373. Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various circumstances it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of the agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

b - HAKYOKU. c - Date repeated in code text for emphasis.

ANNY 25138

JD 6710

Trans. 11/22/41 (S)

TOP SECRET

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT  
NAVY DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

C CARTER W. CLARKE  
Colonel, G.S.C.

往電第七三六號(註ヨ)ノ初日ハ變更シ置キ尋ハ  
 御家知通りナルガ、貴方ニ於テモ切角御察力中  
 ニモアリ、帝山政府トシテハ疑方針ヲ置テシツ  
 ツ義方精進ノ解決招茶ニ允ユル勢刀ヲ惜マズ、以  
 テ是非共日茶園交ノ決局(註ロ)ヲ阻止シ置キラ  
 以テ茲三四日間中ニ米割トノ都合ヲ終了シ、二十  
 九日(註オ)一週ニ即印シ了スルノミナラス、公衆  
 交談等ニヨリ突園前口ノ了済ヲ求極メ得レバ、之  
 ヲ長スルニ徳懐ニ據リアル絶大ナル困難アリタル  
 ニモ拘ラス一切ノ手續完了ヲ見待ルニ於テハ夫迄  
 待ツコトニ決断フベシ(決断ヲ懸置ク)一處テハ右  
 期日ハ此上ノ變更ハ絶對不可能ニシテ、其ノ後ハ  
 債務ハ自刻固ニ起長スルノ他ナキニ付、如彼ハ上  
 ノ次第編ト御合シノ上、從來同様御勢刀積成置ク。  
 本電貴府大便廣リノ御旨ニ遵

EX/183 Doc 2593D (10)  
 2593D (10)  
 2593D (10)  
 2593D (10)

300

2.  
Doc 2593D (4)  
sten. 17

註 c || S . I . S . 第二四三七三號 芝罘、東京

リワシントシ宛、請取ノ事情ニ依ツテ尚定

郵印ノ手配ハ本月二十五日迄ニ完了スルコ

ト絶對ニ必要ナリト打電シテ居ル、

註 d || 復局

註 u || 此ノ期日ハ強弱ノ爲階級文ニ減速サレテ后

ル

1916 # 5

陸軍省 陸軍省

陸軍省参謀本部

情報局

ワシントン、二十五、D。

一九一六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ正ノ起リ諒防ス。即チ  
 添附紙刺ノ日本文書報ノ傾寫寫眞ハ陸海軍兩省ノ  
 熟練セル職員ニ依リ絶氣的取ハ物理的方法ニ依ツ  
 テ傍受サレ、辨認セラレ高シテ誤解セラレシモノ  
 ニシテ予ノ知り且信ズル誤リ正補ニ日本文字ヲ翻  
 譯スル爲メニ洋人ニトリ人刀ノ可能ナル限度ニ於  
 テ正誤且ツ典據ノアルモノナリ。

参謀本部附大佐

CARTER W CLARKE  
 カーター・ダヴリユール・クラーク

Doc. No. 1532 D (7)

Page 1

(Item 142)

From: Ambassador NOMURA  
To: Foreign Minister TOGO  
Despatched: AM 23 November 1941, WASHINGTON  
Received: PM 23 November 1941, Foreign Ministry  
Machine cipher #1159 (Most Secret; Ambassador Code)

On the 22nd, I, together with Ambassador KURUSU, had a meeting with Secretary of State, HULL (BALLANTINE attended). The resume was as follows:

The Secretary conferred with the Ambassador and Ministers of Britain, Australia and the Netherlands on the 22nd, (according to the press reports, about two and a half hours) and he asked for their opinions on the Japanese proposals. They all said that if Japan has firm intention for carrying out a peaceful policy, they would naturally welcome it and they would be glad to cooperate in resuming normal trade relations. However, they said, Japan is expressing her peaceful intention even to the extent of dispatching a special envoy while on the other side, the speech of the politician and the commentary of the press of Japan seem to be moving in a completely opposite direction, and so, there are some greatly incomprehensible points in Japan's real intentions. Furthermore, they pointed out that the amount of Japanese petroleum imports up to the execution of the freezing order took a very sudden upward swing and that it wasn't to be used solely for peaceful undertakings but was being stored away by the navy. Moreover, there was an opinion that it would be best to lift the embargo in slow degrees. However, he said, as it is expected that all the concerned ambassadors and ministers will seek their home government's instruction and will receive replies by Monday, he will make a reply again one way or the other at that time. (PART II) Then he expressed much concern over the recent trend of public opinion in Japan. He emphasized that the clarification of peaceful intention by the Japanese Government would be very important for making the American public opinion accept compromise with Japan. (BALLANTINE said that the conveyance abroad of sincerity of the Japanese Government heads toward the Japanese themselves would be more effective than the propaganda for foreign consumption sent through foreign press correspondents and others.) He even went on to say that, to speak the truth, was it not the duty of every politician to strive for peace up to the very day before war is unavoidable? He said that the president and he made the policy of peace clear five times and so it is desired that a response be made at least once. Then we asked,



(Item 142)

leaving British, Australian, and Dutch opinion aside for the time being, what the intention of America herself was regarding our proposal. To this, recognizing that an item by item reply was seemingly our demand, he showed a perplexed look and avoided to answer. In short, he said, the desire of AMERICA, BRITAIN, AUSTRALIA, etc., is to dissolve the pressing situation in the South Pacific area and they are eagerly desiring that the forces kept in check in the same area may be transferred for action in other parts. (PART III) And he said, from the viewpoint they, unfortunately, cannot recognize that our proposal is sufficient. I pointed out that our troop concentrations in the northern part of FRENCH INDO-CHINA were aimed at cutting CHUNGKING's lifeline, therefore, they were for the most part directed toward YUNNAN and were not intended to menace the South Pacific area. Then KURUSU said that the acceptance of our proposal would naturally lead to the conditions desired not only by AMERICA but by the other nations as well. To this, he /HULL/ replied, what these countries desired lay in the quick turn-about in the situation and with regard to resumption of normal trade relations, a gradual advance is desirable for the time being, but when JAPAN's peaceful intention becomes clear, a rapid change will be seen in a few days. He further replied that with regard to stopping aid to CHIANG, they cannot be a fair mediator if they make such a promise to JAPAN, considering the case when AMERICA acts as an intermediary. (PART IV) Furthermore, if they stop the aid with the opening of the negotiations, even though they made such a promise, its value will not be so high. In view of the fact that in any event, the so-called aid to CHIANG KAI-SHEK is not as great as it is propagandized, he replied he cannot accept the insertion of the above items considering the substance of Japanese proposals which intends to improve the pressing situation by the solution of immediate problems and to reach fundamental solution by going further on.

Furthermore, he replied that the time was not yet ripe for the president's mediation at present. I believe that on Monday, AMERICA will submit some sort of a counter proposal, but as I discerned that she would seek out participation in some kind of a proposal which aims to maintain peace on the Pacific and promote trade, I hastened to suggest that it is necessary to make the present problem on hand the agreement between AMERICA and JAPAN, and take the formality of making the other nations participate in this, and KURUSU stated that if it was intended that the above be a sort of a group organization and if it was an arrangement such as to vote us down by majority of voters, we would not accept such a proposal. (End)

Exp 134 Doc 15-32D(7)

Item 142  
36069  
36071  
(總 36066  
36068)

電信課長 (三)

昭和十六年十一月廿三日亦華府發  
十一月廿三日及本省着 (機)

極秘 館長符號

野村大使

大臣 東郷外務大臣

第一一五九號

臣木利加島本

亦日本使來栖大使ト共三山外務長官(公)ト  
列席ト會談要領左ノ通

長官ハ先ツ亦二日英、澳、蘭、大公使ト會見(新聞報)依  
約(時)事)我々提議ニ付意見ヲ求メタル如何ト七日亦  
平和的政策遂行、意圖確固ナルモノナル次第十二  
勿論歡迎スル所ニシテ通商關係、常態復歸、如  
此ニシテ協力ス(キ)天日本カ特使近派シテ平和的意圖  
ヲ表明スル、アル一方日本政治家、言論及新聞論調等ハ全  
クニト反對、方向ニ走リ、オレト見受ケラレ日本、真意甚  
多可解ナル兵下ルニ及凍結令実施ニ至ル迄、日本、石油  
輸ノ量カ急速度ヲ以テ激増ヲ重シキ事、平和的意圖  
ニシテ使用セラルルモノニ非ズニテ恣意ニ發射有シ、下ル等  
指摘スル且「エニハ」ニ「解除ハ條々ニ之ヲ行フコト、而然  
等、意見アリタルカ關係大公使、何レモ本島政府ニ重請  
月曜日迄ニ回訓ヲ得ルコト、ナリオレヲ以テ其上ニテ更ニ改テ

Doc 1532 D (7)

Item 142

何、儀同答スニト述(「日本ニ於ケル言論最近傾向  
 二関ニ多ク、関心ヲ表明シ日本政府、平和的意図濃厚  
 明(同ニタイニハ外ニ新聞記者等ヲ通シタル対外的宣  
 傳ヨリ、寧ロ日本ニ懸望スル政府首脳部識者カ  
 海外ニ傳達セラルコト效果大ナル(ニト述)カ米側輿論  
 ヲテ対日妥結ヲ承服セシムル上ニ頗ル重要ナルコトヲ力  
 説シ本末開戦己ムヲ得サル場合ニ於テスラ亦日迄平  
 和ヲ攻究スルコトヨリ政治家、道士、スヤト迄極言ニ大統領  
 及自らが五回平和政策ヲ闡明スルニ對シセタヘ一言  
 モ呼應セラシタキ元、ナリト述(タリ)

次ニ當方ヨリ英、豫、蘭等、意向ハ免ニ角トシ米  
 己、自身、我々提案ニ對スル意向如何ト尋ネタルニ對シ  
 項目ヲ追テ、答弁ハ恰モ要成ト認メ(約行不明)ニ(ニ書意)  
 ヲ避ケタルニ要スルニ米及英、豫等、欲スル所ハ南太平洋、亦面  
 へ緊迫セル現状ヲ解消シ同方面ニ抑制セシムル勢力ヲ他  
 ニ活用シ得ルコトヲ切望シオレ次第ニテ此矣ヨリ見テ我々提  
 案ハ遺憾乍ラ充分ト認メラシト述(「本使ヨリ北佛  
 印、兵力結集カ重慶、江路ヲ遮断スル目的ヲ以テ主トシテ  
 雲南方面ニ向ケラシオルモノニテ南太平洋地域ニ脅威ヲ及ボ

No 2

サントスルモノニアラサルコトヲ指摘シ米側ヨリ我々案、受諾カ自然  
 米始メ各否、希望スルカ如キ事態ヲ馴致ス(キ端縮トナルキ  
 ヲ述(タルニタイニ各否、欲スル所ハ局面、急速ナル轉換ニ  
 存スル旨ヲ應酬セリ)又通商常ニ体復帰ニ関シテモ先差  
 之當り漸進ヲ可トス(キモ右ハ日本、平和的意図明確ト

Doc. No. 1532 D (8)

Page 1

Item 151

Supervised by: Chief of the America Bureau  
YAMAMOTO

Person in Charge: Chief of the First Sect. of  
the America Bureau.

Drafted on November 24, 1941

Cable No. 44502

Despatched: 8:10 P.M. November 24, 1941

Sent to Ambassador NOMURA in the U.S.A.

Sent by Foreign Minister TOGO

Subject: Negotiations between Japan and the U.S.A.

(Conference with Ambassador GREW.)

By Code: No. 822 (Ambassador's Code)

Re: My former telegram 821 A.

I asked the American Ambassador in Tokyo to call on me on the 23rd and explained to him according to the purport of my former telegram mentioned above. I stated at that time that the removal of the Japanese troops from the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part is of great military significance, that our advance into the northern part of French Indo-China was originally undertaken in connection with the settlement of the China Incident, and the details of how America and Britain have frozen our capital upon our advance into southern French Indo-China. Further I related that it is now absolutely impossible to withdraw the troops entirely; that it is not only the natural, but also the only and best way for the settlement of the Chinese problem that we demand that U.S.A. not interfere with our efforts for peace, on the occasion that the American President as a mediator in connection with the Chinese problem has CHANG Kai Shek propose peace to Japan and Japan enters upon negotiation in acceptance of the proposal; that it is also absolutely impossible, from the point of Japanese national feeling to settle the negotiation between Japan and U.S.A. before this point is clarified, and that we cannot understand why the U.S.A. does not agree to this point. I added that in our new proposal I have made the utmost effort to simplify the situation and to reduce the

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desired terms of the Japanese side in order to cooperate with the U.S.A. in her peace policy and we intend to advance the Japanese policy more and more peacefully according to the above purport after conclusion of these negotiations. The Ambassador took his leave saying that he would immediately cable the above to his home government.

Doc 1532D (P)  
Item 151

電信課長 (尾山)

發電係

主信 亞米利加局長 年	主任 亞米利加局長一課長 位	昭和六年二月三十一日
電送第 44502 號	宛 在米 野村大使	發 東郷大臣
件 名 日米交渉 (元日大使ト會議件)	件 記 録 係 名	
第 八 二 二 號 (館長行号)		

85 大臣 往電第八二二号同  
答(物) = 二十三日在京米國大使、來訪、亦、冒頭往電、趣旨、

ヨリ諒明、加、要道、ナル、高、其、際、南、部、伸、印、日、本、軍、隊、北、部、移、駐、軍、事、的、ニ、重、要、意、義、有、ス、ト、北、部、伸、印、進、駐、ニ、來、テ、又、那、事、要、處、理、ト、同、聯、行、ハ、ル、モ、ニ、南、部、進、駐、ト、亦、要、米、側、資、産、凍、結、ヲ、廣、延、セ、ル、終、續、ト、シ、テ、述、レ、テ、全、面、撤、兵、令、旨、祈、絶、對、不、可、能、ト、シ、ト、又、又、那、問、題、ニ、付、米、大、統、領、ノ、紹、介、者、ト、シ、將、介、名、ヲ、日、本、ニ、對、シ、和、平、ヲ、提、議、セ、レ、日、本、ノ、之、意、ニ、テ、交、渉、ハ、入、ル、際、我、方、ニ、於、テ、米、國、ノ、和、平、ノ、格、力、ヲ、妨、碍、セ、ル、ト、シ、テ、要、求、ス、ル、事、然、レ、儀、ト、シ、ミ、テ、之、ヲ、解、決、最、善、唯、一、ノ、方、法、ト、シ、テ、向、此、ト、大、ク、明、確、ニ、モ、ス、ト、日、米、交、渉、ヲ、取、纏、ル、日、本、國、民、感、情、上、ヨリ、之、亦、絶、對、不、可、能、ニ、シ、テ、米、國、ノ、此、意、ヲ、承、諾、セ、ル、ノ、理、解、之、難、ト、日、ノ、述、レ、我、方、新、提、議、

2

Doc 1532 (D) (8)  
stem 151

本大臣トシテハ米國ノ平和政策ニ協調スル見地ヨ  
リ最大ノ盡カテ以テ日本側ノ希望條項ヲ減少スリ  
テトシテ事態ヲ簡明ニセシトナリメタルモノニテ本大臣  
涉成立ノ上ハ右ノ趣旨ニテ日本ノ政策ハ益々之ヲ平和  
的ニ進メ度キ意嚮ナリト、趣旨ヲ附加シ置キタル  
カ今大使ハ早速右ヲ本國政府ニ電報スヘシトテ  
辭去セリ



Doc. No. 1532-D (9)

Page 1

Item 152

Supervised by: Chief of the America Bureau  
YAMAMOTO

Person in charge: Chief of the First Sect. of the America Bureau

Drafted on November 24, 1941

Cable No. 44503

Despatched 8:15 p.m. November 24, 1941

Sent to Ambassador NOMJRA

Sent from Foreign Minister TOGO

By Code: No. 823 (Ambassador's code)

To both Ambassadors

The date of my former telegram No. 812 is in Tokyo-time.

By Way of Precaution.

Doc 1532-D(9)  
Item 152

電信局長 (印)

岩倉

主権	西米新如局長 作 米一長修 既下下下下下下下下下下 越利		
電送第 44503 號	昭和11年11月24日	宛 野村大使	送 東京御大臣
(附) 平	第(二三)編 (館長符牙)		
<p>西工使 往電業(一三三)期日(既下下下下下下下下下下) 為念</p>			

Ex. # 1187

Doc. No. 220J

Page 1

Extract from Foreign Relations of the United States-Japan

1931-1941 Vol. II

Page 784

Statement handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to  
the Secretary of State on December 5, 1941

Reference is made to your enquiry about the intention  
of the Japanese Government with regard to the reported  
movements of Japanese troops in French Indo-China. Under  
instructions from Tokyo I wish to inform you as follows:

As Chinese troops have recently shown frequent signs  
of movements along the northern frontier of French Indo-  
China bordering on China, Japanese troops, with the object  
of mainly taking precautionary measures, have been reinforced  
to a certain extent in the northern part of French Indo-China.  
As a natural sequence of this step, certain movements have  
been made among the troops stationed in the southern part  
of the said territory. It seems that an exaggerated report  
has been made of these movements. It should be added that  
no measure has been taken on the part of the Japanese  
Government that may transgress the stipulations of the  
Protocol of Joint Defense between Japan and France.

書類番號

十五丁號

Doc. 15-J

一九四一年(昭和十六年)十月二十五日  
第二八號

ハイン登  
(東京冠極社)

吾々ハ二十五日ニ合衆國ヨリ回答ヲ得ル旨ト軍  
ヨリ通知サレテ斗ル。若シ是ガ眞實ナルハ勿  
論政府ハ其翌日或ハ其次ノ日以内ニ平和  
カ戦争カラ決定スルコトニテラウ。勿論、若シ  
日米交渉ガ成功裡ニ終ルハ既ニ立テラウ計畫  
ニ從ツテ各種ノ企圖ガ着手セラルハ言フ後クナ  
イコトデアル。

1187

然レ萬一交渉ガ成功裡ニ終結セヌトアルハ全  
ク凡テノ戦争準備ハ完備ニテ居ル故、吾軍ハ  
其日ノ中ニ行動ヲトルコトモ出来ん。

Ex

然レ斯カル状況下ニアツテハ、吾々が従来諸企  
圖ニ為立テラウ計畫ニ若干ノ変更ヲス必要アリ  
ルカラウ。勿論吾々ハ機關ヲ設ケ、戦争ト衝突  
セザル商議ヲナスベキデアル。吾々が最モ關心ヲ  
寄セル事柄ハ戦争勃発、曉ニ佛領印度支那

No. 1



Ex. # 1158

Doc. No. 2593-D (41)

page 1

Item 44

From: Bangkok.  
To : Tokyo.  
25 November 1941  
(Purple)

#849 (In 2 parts, complete)

In the event of the Empire's taking decisive action in a southward advance, it will of course be necessary in the exercise of a belligerents rights to make clear the relations of sovereign and subjects. On the one hand it will be absolutely necessary to bring Thai into our camp. My conversation with Pibul as reported in my #834\* was undertaken with this as the underlying motive. If and when Japan at last does make her proposals of joint defense, the following three points should be made especially definite, and Thai should be led to voluntarily take an attitude of cooperation with us.

(1) In the event of an attack upon Burma and Malay, there would of course be a temporary infringement upon the territorial sovereignty of Thailand, but after our objectives have been attained, restoration would immediately be made, and the independence of Thai would be respected even more than at present while Thai is maintaining neutrality.

(2) In case she cooperates in a positive way with Japan, full assurances will be given that Thailand's swamp lands will be reclaimed in the areas concerned.

(3) In the event of Thai's assets in England being frozen great fluctuation would result in the value of Thai's money, but Japan would make available sufficient funds to create a foundation for a yen "bloc" money system, and also give every consideration to providing petroleum and other essential commodities.

To summarize: By cooperating with Japan the racial longings of Thailand will be realized, and with indivisible relations with Japan her existence as an independent nation will be strengthened ----- (three lines missed) --- stop with as simple a ----- as possible to the effect that "will cooperate in every way for the realization of the objectives of East Asia coprosperity and stability", while the particulars as necessity may require will be put into a secret treaty -----

Furthermore, in the light of Japan's basic national policy which has for its purpose the establishment of an East Asia coprosperity sphere, and the emancipation of the

25389

JD-1:

6844

(continued) (F) Navy Trans. 11-27-41 (S-TT)

SECRET

Item 44

Asiatic peoples, it goes without saying that Thailand's sovereignty must not be impaired beyond the minimum limits of necessity, and that her standing as an independent nation must be maintained to the very last; while strictest military discipline must be used to reassure the Thai populace and strict control should by all means be exercised over any attempts at profiteering.

Have sent - - - by the hand of Consul General Asada who has returned to Japan, but to make doubly sure I am also cabling it to you.

\*Available, Purple dated 21 November.

25389  
JD-1:

SECRET

(F) Navy Trans. 11-27-41 (S-TT)

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electronic or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE  
Colonel, G.S.C.



Doc 2593D (41)

6x 1188

バンコック 叢  
東京 東京 苑

一九四二年（昭和十六年）十一月二十五日

（衆）

第八四九號（二部ヨリ成ル・完結部）

希圖が前方進出ニ於テ然ル行動ヲ採ル場合ニハ交  
戦利益ノ行使トシテ第三ト国民ノ利益ヲ明白ニ  
スルニトガ勿論必要トナル。一方ニ於テ泰山ヲ我  
カ隊營ニ引入レルニトガ組織ニ必要トナル。特電  
第八三三號ニテ報告セシ通り一ト私トノ  
合談ハ之レヲ第一ノ動機トシテ始メラレ、若シ日  
本ガ後進ニ於テ共同防衛ノ設備ヲ爲セバ下記ノ三  
點ハ特ニ明確ニサレ而シテ泰山ハ自意的ニ我方ト  
協働ス可ク態度ヲ深ラシムル必要アリ、

(一) 一ビルマ一及一マロ一ヲ改竄スル場合ニハ  
泰山ノ領土的主権ヲ一時侵害スルコトアルハ  
勿論ナルモ然シ我方ノ目的ノ達成サレタル後  
ハ直ニ退避ヲ爲シ而シテ泰山ノ獨立ハ泰山方  
中立ヲ保持シテ居ル一現在ヨリモ一層尊重サ  
レル可シ。

(二) 泰山ヲ日本ニ對シテ管理ニ委ナスル場合ニハ

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Item 44

泰國ノ經濟地ノ開拓地盤ノ中ニ取長クテ、充  
分ナル保証ガ具ヘラレル可シ

(三) 泰國ノ資源ガ其國ニテ凍結サレル場合ニハ泰  
國貨幣價值ハ大ナル變動ヲ來タスモ日本ハ國  
ブロットク等備度ノ益積ミ付置スベク十分ニ  
ル資金ヲ流通シテ亦石油及其他ノ重要物  
資ヲ供給スルニ凡テノ準備ヲ拂フベシ。

暗説スレバ日本トノ協力ニヨリ泰國ノ民族的熱  
望ガ實現サレ而シテ日本ト不可分ノ關係ニ於テ獨  
立國家トシテノ其存在ハ強固トナリ

――――（三行脱着）――――。  
簡單テ――――ヲ以ツテ止メ――――可能ナル、一東  
亞ノ榮榮ト安定トノ目前實現ノ爲ニ凡テノ方法ニ  
テ力カスベク――――

他方ニ於テハ必要ヲ要スル詳細ハ秘密條約ニ入記  
サレル可シ。――――

茲、東亞共榮圈ノ建設ト東亞民族ノ解放トヲ  
其目的トスル日本ノ基本政策ニ屬シテ泰國ノ主權  
ガ必要ノ最少限度以上ニハ尊重サレザルコト獨立

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Item 44

國家トシテノ其立場ガ良ニ最後マテ維持サレル可  
 キハ云フマテモナイ。

尙ホ泰國民衆ヲ安心サセルニ際格ナル軍規ガ行使  
 サレホベカラヌ。又嚴重ナル統帥ニヨツテ如何ナ  
 ル不當利得行爲ニモ此レヲ適用スベシ。――

ヲ日本ヘ歸國セシ海軍總領事ニ手交シ送達セリ尙  
 ホ之レヲ重大確證スル意味ニ於テ貴下ニ對シ又打  
 電致シタル次第ナリ。

\*入手可能 案十一月三十一日附

二五三八九 JD 1 / 秘密

(F) 海軍 備 11 / 27 / 41 (S TT)

Doc. 2593 cert.

機密陸軍省

陸軍省参謀本部

情報局

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り證明ス。即チ、  
 添附致通ノ日本文電報ノ複寫寫眞ハ陸海軍兩省ノ熟  
 練セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ツテ傍  
 受サレ、解讀セラレ而シテ翻譯セラレシモノニシテ  
 予ノ知り且信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ翻譯スル爲  
 メ西洋人ニトリ人力ノ可能ナル限度ニ於テ正確且ツ  
 典據ノアルモノナリ。

参謀本部付大佐

CARTER, W. CLARKE  
 カーター・ダヴリウィークラーク

(Item 20)

TOP SECRET

From: Washington  
To: Tokyo  
November 26, 1941  
Purple. (Extremely urgent)

#1180. (Part 1 of 2)

From NOMURA and KURUSU.

As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)

ARMY 6891 25435 Secret Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

TOP SECRET

(Item 20)

From: Washington  
To: Tokyo  
November 26, 1941  
Purple. (Extremely urgent)

#1180. (Part 2 of 2)

We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.

In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire us back instantly.

ARMY 25436

SECRET

Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

TOP SECRET

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE  
Colonel, G.S.C.

(Item 20)

TOP SECRET

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To: Tokyo  
November 26, 1941  
Purple. (Extremely urgent)

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/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE  
Colonel, G.S.C.

野村、茶樹ヨリ

廣次往電ノ如ク乙茶室部シ若慮セシムル見込ハ

殆ソド無ク、一方昨日ハ切迫、此ノ程ニテハ遺憾

存ラ交渉ハ先ツ決裂ノカカク、我々ノ失敗ト百辱

ハ決意固ナリ。此際唯一ノ打開策トシテハ、益々

悲憤ニ溢ヘザルモ、先ツ「ル」ニスベルト「大統領

ガ後世ノ爲日米ガ太平洋平和維持ノ爲ニ「ル」カスル

コトヲ望ム旨ヲ貴方ニ電報スルコト「此」ノ旨ニ臨

シ貴方ノ意見當方ニ打電サレ次第至方ヲ察シテ之

ガ手替ヲ交渉ス「及」ビ折返シ貴方ヨリ懸念ナル「

メツセ」ジ「ム」同答スルコトヲ提案シ得ベシ。之

ニ依リ望氣「一」新「ム」ルト同時ニ今少シク時機ノ猶

豫ヲ得ベシ。我々ガ「中」ノ依託古儀ニ因テ「泰」ル

可慮性ヲモ考慮シ、我方ヨリ先手ヲ打チ、荷印、

蘭印、泰ヲ包圍スル中「立」山「立」テ提案スルコト可

然ト意考ス。「去」ル九月「ル」ニスベルト「大統領

Ex 1189

Doc 2593D (11)

株 案

カ印及泰西ノ中立ヲ提案セルハ制承知ノ通り。

*Doc. 2573 D (1911)*  
*Ann. 20*

皇朝書院三五九三號 D十九號 第二十卷

ワシントン發 東京宛

一九一一年ノ昭和十六年ノ十一月二十六日

紫色(大臣急)

第一一八〇符(三ノ第二部)

我々ハ今回交渉ノ決裂ガ必ズシモ日米段等ヲ意味セザルヤノ観測存スベキモ、決裂後ハ前途ノ如ク英米側ノ簡印進駐モ豫想セキレ、延イテハ我方ノ政體ニヨル對英米衝突不可避ナルベク、右ニ對シ獨道ガ條約第三條ニ依リ我方援助ノ義務ヲ廢スルヤ否ヤハ、頗ル疑問ニシテ、且日支事變ノ解決ハ今次世界戰ノ終局迄持テ越スノ外ナキニ至ルベシ。

本電ハ本使トシテ、最後ノ意見具申タルニ付、少ク共海軍大臣迄ハ御示シノ上至急折返シ何分ノ御回電切望ス。

*21*

機密 陸軍省

陸軍省参謀本部

情報局

ワシントン、二十五、D O

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り説明ス。即チ

添附取通ノ日本文電報ノ復寫寫真ハ陸海軍兩省ノ  
熟練セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ツ  
テ傍受サレ、辨認セラレ而シテ翻譯セラレシモノ  
ニシテ予ノ知り且信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ翻  
譯スル爲メ此洋人ニトリ人刀ノ可能ナル限度ニ於  
テ正確且ツ典據ノアルモノナリ。

参謀本部附大佐

CARTER W CLARKE

カーター・ダヴリニー・クラーク

"Extract from Entry from Marouis KIDO's Diary, 26 Nov 41"

I met HARA, President of the Privy Council, to consult with him about a Senior Statesmen's conference. I saw the Emperor from 11:15 a.m. to 11:45 a.m. He said that as for the future outlook of the Japanese-American talks it was feared to our regret that the worst might come to the worst. Under these circumstances, our final decisions as to the war should be carried into practice after another Senior Statesmen's conference which should be convened to have broader and more complete discussions on the matter. The Emperor also said that he wanted to tell his idea to Premier TOJO.

I answered as follows: "As we are going to decide on the final course of a grave action which can never be undone, Your Majesty had better freely put any questions and express your opinions, so that we may not rue the day when we were tempted to do such a thing."

木 戸 儀 儀 目 註

昭和十六年十一月二十六日分

十一月二十六日（水）晴

午前九時半管轄文吉男ヲ訪問金子氏ヨリ儀原ノ  
總談ニツキ語ス

十時半出陣 原江村ト真田會議云々ニツキ總談  
ス

十一時十五分ヨリ同四十五分進舞謁ス

日米會議ニツキ御話アリ見送トシテハ遺憾ナガ

ク最悪ナル場面ニ送着スルニアラスヤト恐レラ

ル、トコロ愈々最後ノ決意ヲナスニ就テハ尙一

度度ク重臣ヲ會シテ意見ヲ行シテハ如何カト思

フ處テハ右ノ氣勢ヲ東條ニ語テ見タイト思フガ

ドウテアラウカトノ御下問アリ仕ツテ大要左ノ

如ク察卷ス

今度御決意 ~~概~~ 進ハ眞ニ急ヘハ引カレヌ最後ノ御

決定テアリマスノテ御不審ノ點其ノ他ニウモシ

テ見ヨウア、モシテ見ヨウト云フ様ナ御氣勢ガ

アル様テアレバ御遺憾ナク仰セ職キ御上トシテ

モ後ニ省リテ悔ノケイ文ノ御處置ガ願ハシイト

存ジマス其ノ意味テ御遠慮ナク首相ニ御申付相

成リマシテ宜シイト存ジマスニ

EX 1190

Doc 1632W (85)

1.

2.

Doc



1632 W (85)

今朝六時半賀陽宮大扨殿下苑去致進タルニツキ  
午後一時官邸ニ伺候記帳

松浦別宅ニ國會御修言上方シ依頼ス

二時半東條首相拜謁後面談重巨會議ニツキ御下  
問アリタル趣ヲ以テ相談アリシ故通ニ奉答ノ趣  
旨ヲ傳へ御上ノ御氣持ノ達セラルル様希望ス

三時半外務次官官舎ニ於ケル小村侯三十年祭式  
場ニ至リ拜禮シテ歸宅

五時は松濱來訪面談

Extract from "PEARL HARBOR - Intercepted Diplomatic Messages Sent by the Japanese Government Between July 1 and December 8, 1941" - Printed for the use of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack by the United States Government Printing Office, Washington.

p. 188 - 191, inclusive

(Secret)

FROM: Washington

TO : Tokyo

27 November 1941 (2327-2334 EST)  
(Telephone Code)--(See JD-1: 6841) (S.I.S. #25344)

Trans-Pacific  
Telephone

(Conversation between Ambassador Kurusu and Japanese Foreign Office American Division Chief, Yamamoto)

Literal translation

Decode of Voice Code

(After connection was completed:)

KURUSU: "Hello, hello. This is Kurusu".

YAMAMOTO: "This is Yamamoto."

KURUSU: "Yes, Hello, hello."

(Unable to get Yamamoto for about six or eight seconds, he said aside to himself, or to someone near him:)

KURUSU: "Oh, I see, they're making a record of this, huh?"

(It is believed he meant that the six second interruption was made so that a record could be started in Tokyo. Interceptor's machine had been started several minutes earlier.)

Literal translation

Decode of Voice Code

KURUSU: "Hello. Sorry to trouble you so often."

YAMAMOTO: "How did the matrimonial question get along today?"

KURUSU: "Oh, haven't you got our telegram\* yet? It was sent--let me see--at about six--no, seven o'clock. Seven o'clock. About three hours ago.

"There wasn't much that was different from what Miss Umeko said yesterday."

YAMAMOTO: "Oh, there wasn't much difference?"

KURUSU: "No, there wasn't. As before, that southward matter--that south, SOUTH--southward matter, is having considerable effect. You know, southward matter".

YAMAMOTO: (Obviously trying to indicate the serious effect that Japanese concentrations, etc. in French Indo-China were having on the conversations in Washington. He tries to do this without getting away from the "Miss Umeko childbirth, marriage" character of the voice code.)

YAMAMOTO: "Oh, the south matter? It's effective?"

KURUSU: "Yes, and at one time, the matrimonial question seemed as if it would be settled."

KURUSU: "But--well, of course, there are other matters involved too, but--that was it--that was the monkey wrench. Details are included in the telegram\* which should arrive very shortly. It is not very long and you'll be able to read it quickly."

:  
:"How did the negotiations go today?"  
:

:  
:"There wasn't much that was different from Hull's talks of yesterday."  
:

:  
:"Yes, and at one time it looked as though we could reach an agreement."  
:

Literal Translation

Decode of Voice Code

YAMAMOTO: "Oh, you've dispatched it?"

KURUSU: "Oh, yes, quite a while ago. At about 7 o'clock."

(Pause.)

KURUSU: "How do things look there? Does it seem as if a child might be born?"

YAMAMOTO: (In a very definite tone): "Yes, the birth of the child seems imminent."

KURUSU: (In a somewhat surprised tone, repeating Yamamoto's statement): "It does seem as if the birth is going to take place?"

(Pause)

KURUSU: "In which direction..." (stopped himself very abruptly at this slip which went outside the character of the voice code. After a slight pause he quickly recovered, then to cover up the slip, continued:)

KURUSU: "Is it to be a boy or a girl?"

YAMAMOTO: (Hesitated, then laughing at his hesitation took up Kurusu's cue to re-establish the voice code character of the talk. The "boy, girl, healthy" byplay has no other significance):

YAMAMOTO: "It seems as if it will be a strong healthy boy."

KURUSU: "Oh, it's to be a strong healthy boy?"

(Rather long pause.)

:  
:"Does it seem as if a  
:crisis is at hand?"

:

:

:

:"Yes, a crisis does  
:appear imminent."

:

:"A crisis does appear  
:irminent?"

:

Literal Translation

Decode of Voice Code

YAMAMOTO: "Yes.  
"Did you make any statement  
(to the newspapers) regarding your  
talk with Miss Kimiko today?"

: "Did you make any state  
: ment regarding your  
: talks with the  
: President today?"

KURUSU: "No, nothing. Nothing except  
the mere fact that we met."

YAMAMOTO: "Regarding the matter con-  
tained in the telegram\*\*of the other  
day, although no definite decision  
has been made yet, please be advised  
that effecting it will be difficult."

KURUSU: "Oh, it is difficult, huh?"

YAMAMOTO: "Yes, it is."

KURUSU: "Well, I guess there's nothing  
more that can be done then."

YAMAMOTO: "Well, yes."

(Pause.)

YAMAMOTO: "Then, today..."

KURUSU: "Today?"

YAMAMOTO: "The matrimonial question,  
that is, the matter pertaining to ar-  
ranging a marriage--don't break them  
off."

: "Regarding negotiations  
: don't break them off."  
:  
:

KURUSU: "Not break them? You mean  
talks."

(Helplessly:)

KURUSU: "Oh, my."

(Pause, and then with a resigned laugh:)

KURUSU: "Well, I'll do what I can."

(Continuing after a pause:)

KURUSU: "Please read carefully  
what Miss Kimiko had to say as con-  
tained in today's telegram\*."

: "Please read carefully  
: what the President had  
: to say as contained  
: in today's telegram\*."

Literal Translation

Decode of Voice Code

YAMAMOTO: "From what time to what time were your talks today?"

KURUSU: "Oh, today's was from 2:30."

(Much repeating of the numeral 2)

KURUSU: "Oh, you mean the duration? Oh, that was for about an hour."

YAMAMOTO: "Regarding the matrimonial question."  
"I shall send you another message. However, please bear in mind that the matter of the other day is a very difficult one."

:"Regarding the negotiations."

KURUSU: "But without anything,--they want to keep carrying on the matrimonial question. They do. In the meantime we're faced with the excitement of having a child born. On top of that Tokugawa is really champing at the bit, isn't he? Tokugawa is, isn't he?"

:"But without anything, they want to keep on negotiating. In the meantime, we have a crisis on hand and the army is champing at the bit. You know the army

(Laughter and pause).

KURUSU: "That's why I doubt if anything can be done."

YAMAMOTO: "I don't think it's as bad as that."

YAMAMOTO: "Well, -- we can't sell a mountain."

:"Well, -- we can't yield."

KURUSU: "Oh, sure, I know that. That isn't even a debatable question any more."

YAMAMOTO: "Well, then, although we can't yield, we'll give you some kind of a reply to that telegram."

KURUSU: "In any event, Miss Kimiko is leaving town tomorrow, and will remain in the country until Wednesday."

:"In any event, the President is leaving town tomorrow, and will remain in the country until Wednesday."

Literal Translation

Decode of Voice Code

YAMAMOTO: "Will you please continue to do your best."

KURUSU: "Oh, yes. I'll do my best. And Nomura's doing everything too."

YAMAMOTO: "Oh, all right. In today's talks, there wasn't anything of special interest then?"

KURUSU: "No, nothing of particular interest, except that it is quite clear now that that southward--ah --the south, the south matter is having considerable effect."

YAMAMOTO: "I see. Well, then, good bye."

KURUSU: "Good bye."

25443  
JD-1: 6890

(M) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 ( )

\*JD-1: 6915 (S. I. S. #25495). Outline of interview on 27 November with Roosevelt-Hull-Kurusu-Nomura.

\*\*Probably #1189 (S.I.S. #25441-42). (JD-1: 6896). Washington reports the two proposals presented by the U.S. on 26 November.

Doc 15-G

4x 1191

「真珠湾」一九四一年／昭和十六年／七月一日ヨ  
リ十二月八日迄ニ傍受セル日本政府ヨリ送ラレタ  
ル外交電報」ヨリノ抜萃。——真珠湾攻撃計画  
合同委員会ノ使用ニ供ス爲シ盛岡ニテ合衆國政府印  
刷局ニヨリ印刷セラル。

一八八頁ヨリ一九一頁迄  
(秘 密)

譯 監 頓 發  
東京 宛

一九四一年十一月二十七日 (二三時二七分—二三  
時三四分東部標準時)

(暗號電話) I (J D I I、六八四二参照)  
(S · I · S · 第二五三四四)

太平洋横濱電話

(來栖大使ト日本外務省山本重光利加局長トノ會  
話)

直 譯

暗號電話ノ解讀

(接續ガ完了セル後)  
來栖「モシモシ。コチラ  
ハ來栖デス」  
山本「コチラハ山本デス」  
來栖「ハイ。モシモシ」



Doc 15-G

(約六秒カ八秒山本ノ聲ガ

鳴キ取レナカツタノテ、

彼ハヒソカニ獨語哉ハ誰

カ傍ニ居ル者ニ云フ、)

栗栖「ア、剣ツタ。彼等

ハ之ヲ録音シテキルナ、

フン?。」

(彼ハ此ノ六秒間ノ中断ハ

東京テ録音が始メラレル

爲ニ生ジタノダト云ツタ

モノト信ゼラレル。傍受

者ノ被檢ハ數秒前カラ例

イテキタ。)

栗栖「モツモツ。何度モ録

面側ヲ掛ケテ相濟ミマセ

ン。」

山本「結婚問題ハ今日ハ何

「栗栖ハ今日ハ何シナ工

シナ工合テシタカ?。」

合テシタカ?。」

栗栖「オヤ貸方ハ末ダ我々

ノ電報ヲ受ケ取ツテキナ

イノテスカ?

アレハ...エイト...

六時頃...否、七時頃、

Doc 15-G

3.

七時頃送リマツタ。 綱三  
時尙前テス。  
梅子サンガ昨日云ツタ。 學  
ト余リ違ヒハアリマセン  
テツタ。 一

山本「オウ、余リ違ヒハ 疑  
カツタノデスカ？」  
栗栖「其一、有リマセンテ  
ツタ。以前ト同ジニアノ  
南方問題・・・アノ南、  
南・・・南方問題ガ不イ  
ニ影響シテキルノテス。  
判リマスネ。南方問題テ  
スヨ。 一

山下「日本ノ従印ニ於ケル  
兵力集中等ガ華盛權ニ於  
ケル會談ニ及ボシタ莫大  
ナ影響ヲ指摘セント明ラ  
カニ務メツ、アル。彼ハ  
之ヲ「梅子サン、子供ノ  
誕生、結婚ト云フ時號  
電詩ノ記號カラ辨レズニ

「ハル」ガ昨日云ツタ  
ト余リ違ヒハアリマ  
センテツタ。 一

Doc 15-G

4

シヨウト試ミル、)

山本「オウ、南方問題? ソレ

ガ影響サレテキルノデスカ  
?。」

來村「ソウデス。一時ハ結婚  
問題ハ極ツタ様ニ見エタ程  
デシタ。」

來栖「然シ。 . . . エー、勿論

他ノ事情モ含マレテキマス

然シ。 . . . ソレガアレテシ

タ。 . . . ソレガ破滅ヲ招イタ

詳細ハモウ直グ着ク管ノ電

報ノ中ニ含マレテキマス。

アレハソレ程長クアリマセ

ンカラ貴方ハ迅クソレヲ話

メルテセウ。」

山本「オー、貴方ハソレヲ送

ツタノデスカ?。」

來栖「オウ、ソウデス。モウ

可ナリ前デス。七時頃テシ

タ。」

(合間)

來栖「貴方ノ様様ハ何ウデス

「ソウデス。一時ハ我  
々ハ協定スル事が出來  
タ候ニ見エタ程デシタ。」

「危機が到来シテキル

Dec 15-6

カ？。子供が生レソウデス

様ニ見エマスカ？」

か？」

山本（非常ニキツバリトシタ

口謝テ、

「ソウデス。子供ノ生レル

「ソウデス。危機ハ、

ノハ差ッ迫ッテキル様デス。

確カニ抑迫ッテキル

栗栖（後ラカ寫イタ様ナ口謝

様デス。」

テ山本ノ言ツタコトラ繰返

シナガラ、

子供が生レ様トシテキルト

「危機ハ確ニ切迫シテ

確カニ見エマスカ？」

キル様デスカ？」

（合同）

栗栖「何ノ方面・・・」

（暗號電話ノ記號ヲ選取シ

タ此ノ失言ヲ突然中止シタ

一寸黙ツタ後、彼ハ直グニ

立直ツタ。ソレカラ此ノ失

言ヲ覆ス爲ニ語ヲ續ケタ。

栗栖「男ノ子が生レルダラウ

カ、女ノ子が生レルダラウ

カ？」

山本（躊躇シタ、ソレカラ自

分ノ躊躇ヲ笑ヒテガラ、會

5.

6.

Doc 15-67

新ノ暗號電語ノ記號ヲ再々  
 ビ用ヒ様トスル來稿ノ註  
 ノ末語ニ應ジタ。一男ノ子  
 女ノ子、丈夫トイフ處狂  
 言ハ別ニ取ルニ足リナイ  
 山本「強イ丈夫ナ男ノ子ガ生  
 レサウテス」  
 來稿「オ、強イ丈夫ナ男ノ  
 ノ子ガ生レルノテスカ？」  
 直註  
 山本「ソウテス。」  
 今日ノ君子サントノ語ニ就  
 イテ何カ瞭明（新聞）ヲ發  
 シマツタカ。」  
 來稿「イ、エ、出シマセン。」  
 私選ガ實ツタ幕ヲ言ツタダ  
 ケテス。」  
 山本「先日ノ電報ノ件ハ未ダ  
 ハツキリ決ツタ譯テハアリ  
 マセンガ、實行ハ難カシイ  
 ト言フ事ヲ御承知下サイ。」

「今日ノ大統領トノ會  
 談ニ關シテ何カ瞭明ヲ  
 行ヒマシタカ。」

暗號電語ノ傳記

Doc 15-G

7

栗栖「エ、難カシイテスカ。  
 〃。〃。〃。エ？」  
 山本「ハア、ソウテス。」  
 栗栖「ソレテハ、モウコレ以  
 上ドウニモ出ヌナイ事デス  
 ネ。」  
 山本「マア、ソウテスネ。」  
 (合間)  
 山本「テハ、今日。〃。〃。〃。」  
 栗栖「今日？」  
 山本「結婚問題、ツマリ、結  
 婚式ニ就キテノ話ハ打切ラ  
 ナイテ下サイ。」  
 栗栖「打切ラナイト言フト  
 曾談ノコトテスネ。」  
 (力ナク)  
 栗栖「コリヤ、ドウモ。」  
 (合間、ソレカラ仕方ナク  
 笑ツテ)  
 栗栖「マア、出ヌルダケヤリ  
 マセウ。」  
 (一寸間ヲ置イテカラ續ケ  
 テ)

「交渉ニ就イテハ打切  
 ラナイテ下サイ」

Dec 15 G

8

來栖「今日ノ電報ニアル君子  
サンノ云ツタ事ヲ注意シテ  
讀ンテ下サイ。」

山本「今日ハ何時カラ何時マ  
テ話ヲシクノテスカ。」

來栖「エー、今日ハ二時半カ  
ラテシタ。」  
(數字ノ二ヲ何度モ繰リ返  
ス)

來栖「ア、ソノ時間テスカ。  
エー、ソレハ一時間位テシ  
タ。」

山本「結婚問題ニ就イテ。」  
「又御停ヘシマス。然シ、  
先日ノ問題ハ非常ニ困難ダ  
ト言フコトヲ憶ヘテ下サイ。」

來栖「然シ、手ブラテハ一相  
手ハ結婚話ヲ進メル事ヲ望  
ンテキマス。希望シテ居ル  
ンテス。トコロガ、コチラ  
ハオ産テ興奮シテキル。ソ  
ノ上、徳川ハ、ジツトシテ  
居レナクナツテキルトイフ

「今日ノ電報ニアル大  
統領ノ言ツタ事ヲ注意  
シテ讀ンテ下サイ。」

「交渉ニ就イテ。」

「然シ、手ブラテハ一  
彼等ハ交渉繼續ヲ望ン  
テキマス。トコロガ我  
我ニハ危機ガ切迫シテ  
陸軍ハ要領シ切レナク  
ナツテキル。陸軍ノ事  
ダカラ。」

Doc 15-F

誰デスネ? ソウテセウ...

徳川ガ?」

(笑聲 合間)

來栖「ダカラ私ハ何カヤレル

カドウカ疑問ト思ヒマスネ」

山本「私ハソシナニ悪イトハ

思ヒマセンカネ。」

山本「トニカク」山ヲ賣ルコ

トハ出衆マセンネ。」

來栖「イヤ、全ク、ソレハ解

ツテキマス。ソレハ、モウ

議論ノ余地ノ無イ問題テス」

山本「ソレテハ、コチラハ議

歩ハ出衆マセンケレドモ、

何カ電報ニ對スル返書ヲ御

送りシマセウ。」

來栖「トニカク、君子サンハ

明日、町ヲ發ツテ水曜日マ

テ田舎ニ滞在シマス。」

山本「ドウカ最善ノ努力ヲ續

ケテ下サイ。」

來栖「エ、ヤリマス。出衆

ルダケヤリマス。野村サン

「トニカク」議歩スル

争ハ出來マセン。」

「トニカク、大統領ハ

明日、町ヲ發ツテ水曜

日マテ田舎ニ滞在シマ

ス。」

7.



Doc 15-G

モ最善ヲ畫シテ居ラレマス。  
 山本「ハア、結構デス。ソレテ  
 ハ、今日ノ會談デハ別ニ重要  
 ナ事ハナカツタノデスカ。一  
 來稿「エ、別ニ重要ナ事ハア  
 リマセンデシタ。唯、極メテ  
 明瞭ナ事ハ兩方「エ」、南、  
 南ノ間題ガ相當ナ影響ヲ齎シ  
 ツ、アルコトデス。一  
 山本「ソウデスカ。デハ、コレ  
 テ失禮シマス。一  
 來稿「サヨウナラ」

二五四四三

J D I - 六八九〇 (M) 海軍誌

一九四一年十一月二十八日 ( )

米 J D I - 六九一五 (S . I . S . 二五四九五號) 十一月  
 二十七日 ルイスヴェルト、ハル、來稿、野村會見  
 概要。

米米 恐ラク一八八九號 (S . I . S . 二五四四一四二號)  
 (J D I - 六八九六)ニ提答ハ十一月二十六日アメ  
 リカ領カラ提出サレタワシントンハ報シテキル

10.

Doc. No. 2539-A

Page 1

EXTRACT FROM "THE TOYO NICHU NICHU"

November 29, 1941.

CABINET RECOGNIZES PRESS NEW SYSTEM

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JOURNALISTIC PLAN PROPOSED BY NEWSPAPER LEADERS  
GIVEN APPROVAL.

-----

A plan for the establishment of a new system in press circles, formulated by the board of directors of the Press Federation, was recognized in the regular Cabinet meeting on November 28.

For the early execution of the scheme, an Imperial ordinance concerning the creation of the new system will be issued by virtue of Articles 16 and 18 of the National Mobilization Law.

The new system is aimed at placing newspapers on the wartime basis for the fulfilment of their national mission as an organ of the state and the people in the face of the present strained situation.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I.F.S. No. 2539-A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I Hiatviti Ikawa hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Cabinet and that as such official I have custody of the Cabinet Meeting Records hereto referred to and that the newspaper account hereto attached and described as follows: Tokyo Nichi Nichi account of Cabinet meeting of 28 November 1941 correctly represents in substance the decisions of the Cabinet meeting of the date referred to. -----

Signed at Tokyo on this  
23 day of Sep, 1946.

/s/ K. Ikawa  
Signature of Official  
SEAL

Witness: /s/ T. Satow

Secretary of Cabinet  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
23 day of Sep, 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh  
NAME

Witness: /s/ T/4 Toguchi

Investigator, IFS  
Official Capacity

民國三十一年(即十月十一日)附 東京日之新聞

三、按字

「我國新聞制度，永記」

-2539 A

新聞界，自三民主義，提倡以來，特道「國人訂國承記」與之  
新聞界，自三民主義，提倡以來，特道「國人訂國承記」與之  
「十有三年，在新聞界，永記」

全計畫，近來三民主義，特道「新制度創設國之初念」  
國家總動員法，第十條，依「警備法」之規定，  
新制度，自應長足之責任，警備法，事關「治安」國家  
治安，國家，應予「國家」之使命，事關「治安」新聞，在  
此，戰爭時期，應予「治安」

以上

EX 1192

Ex. 1193

Doc. No. 1532D (15)

page 1

Item 184

To: Ambassador NOMURA  
From: Foreign Minister TOGO  
Dispatched: 28 November 1941 8:05 P.M.  
Subject: Japan - United States Negotiation  
Telegram No. 844 (Ambassador's Copy)

Your telegram No. 1189 and others have been received. In spite of the efforts you two ambassadors have made, it is surprising and regrettable that such a proposal as the recent one had been made toward Japan by the United States. It is impossible for us to negotiate on the basis of their proposal. With the submission of the Imperial government's opinion of the American proposal (which will be telegraphed in two or three days), the situation will be such that there will be nothing left but to practically drop the negotiation. But we wish you to refrain from giving the impression to the United States government that the negotiation is broken off. Tell them that you are waiting instructions from the home government and while not making clear to them the intentions of the government, explain to them, as your personal opinion, that Japanese claims have been just and especially that although Japan has made intolerable concessions and has taken a conciliatory attitude in maintaining peace in the Pacific area, the United States government has not reacted to cooperate and has made the solution of the negotiation extremely difficult.

Furthermore, because of the aforementioned situation, the measures which you have suggested in your telegram No. 1180 have all been considered improper at this time, although they had been referred to the parties you mentioned. Please acknowledge the above-mentioned situation.

/end/

PEARL HARBOR. Intercepted Diplomatic Messages Sent by the Japanese Government Between July 1 and December 8, 1941. Printed for the use of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack by United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1945, p. 199.

\* \* \* \*

(Secret)

FROM: Tokyo

TO : Washington

29 November 1941

#857

Re my #844.

We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines:

The United States government has (always?) taken a fair and judicial position and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the claims of both sides.

However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which ignore actual conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government.

With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem, what has become of the basic objectives that the U.S. government has made the basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points we would request careful self-reflection on the part of the United States government.

(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.)

國際檢察部 書類第五号ノ片

Doc. / 5 H

真珠湾、一九四一年（昭和十六年）七月一日ヨリ同年十二月八日ノ  
間ニ於テ日本政府、宛信セシ外交通信ノ傍受文。其真珠湾  
攻撃ノ共同調査委員会用トシ、一九四五年華盛頓ニ在ル合衆  
國政府印刷所ニ依リ印刷セラレタリ。一九九頁。

秘

卷一 東京

宛一 華盛頓

一九四一年（昭和十六年）十一月二十九日

第五号

余ノ任電 才八四号ニ因シ

貴方ノ貴下ガ次ノ線ニ沿ヒ、尚一度口頭ニテ試ミラシコトヲ希望ス。

合衆國政府ノ常ニ「公明正大」立場ヲ執リ、且兩者ノ主張ヲ十

分考慮シ、其政策ヲ定メ来リ。

然ルニ何故今、合衆國政府、我方ノ新提案ヲ以テ論議、基  
礎ト為シ得ズトスル態度ヲトリ、別ニ東亞ニ於ケル現實ノ情勢ヲ  
無視シ、且帝國政府ノ威信ヲ大ニ損入ルガ如キ新提案ヲナセル  
モノナリヤ帝國政府、諒解ニ吾ニ公トコナリ。

中國問題ニ対スル我方態度、斯ク、如キ表面變化ヲ以テ之ヲ見シ、  
合衆國政府、此ノ七月間交渉基礎トナセル根本方針ニ何  
ナリタルモノナリヤ。

在諸点ニ因シ、我方、合衆國政府側、慎重ナル自己反省ヲ要請セト  
スルモノナリ。

（本訓令ノ実施ニ當リ、之ニ依リテ交渉決裂ニ類スルガ如キ事  
ノ發生ニシテ、其御注意有リ度ニ）

6x 1194

Doc. 15 H

國際檢察部書類第五号ノ片

真珠灣。一九四一年（昭和十六年）七月一日ヨリ同年十二月八日ノ  
向ニ於テ日本政府 宛信セル外交通信ノ傍受文。ニ真珠灣  
攻撃ノ共同調査委員會用トシテ一九四五年華盛頓ニ在ル合衆  
國政府印刷所ニ依リ印刷セラレタルモノ。一九九頁。

秘

卷一東京

宛一華盛頓

一九四一年（昭和十六年）十一月二十九日

第八五七号

余ノ往電 才八四四号ニ関シ

此方ハ貴下ガ次ノ線ニ沿ヒ、尚一度口頭ニテ試ミラレシコトヲ希望ス。  
合衆國政府ハ常ニ公平ナル立場ヲ執リ、且兩者ノ主張ヲ十  
分考慮シ上其政策ヲ定メ来セリ。

然ルニ何故今ヤ合衆國政府ハ我方ノ新提案ヲ以テ論議ノ基  
礎ト爲シ得ズトスル態度ヲトリ、別ニ東亞ニ於ケル現實ノ情勢カヲ  
無視シ且帝國政府ノ威信ヲ大イニ損スルガ如キ新提案ヲナセル  
モノナリヤ帝國政府ノ諒解ニ苦シムトコトナリ。

中國問題ニ対スル先方態度ノ斯クノ如キ表面變化ヲ以テ之ヲ見ルニ  
合衆國政府ガ此ノ七ヶ月間交渉ノ基礎トナセル根本方針ハ一体如何  
ナリタルモノナリヤ。

右諸点ニ関シ我方ハ合衆國政府側ノ慎重ナル自己反省ヲ要請セント  
スレモナリ。

（本訓令ノ實施ニ基ツテハ、之ニ依ツテ交渉決裂ニ類スルガ如キ事  
ヲ招来スルコトハ、謀御注意有ラ度シ）

WX 1194



Ex. # 1195

Doc. No. 1532-D(10)

Page 1

Item 193

To: Ambassador NOMURA in U.S.A.

From: Foreign Minister TOGO

Subject: U.S.-Japanese Negotiations

Dispatched 30 Nov. 1941 4:20 A.M.

Telegram No. 857 (Ambassador Code)

Re my telegram No. 844 /Explanation of the telegram missing in English/

We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines:

The U. S. Government considers that it is difficult for them to base discussion on our new proposal of the 20th, which was drawn up after considerable deliberation bearing in mind the claims of both sides and based on our just standpoint.

The Imperial Government is at a loss to understand the new proposal of the 26th which has ignored actual conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government.

We cannot but hold a doubtful attitude towards the fundamental plans of the American Government in the negotiations during the past seven months. / Sentence in the margin not translated/ On these points we request careful self-reflection on the part of the United States Government.

(S-TT)

1532-D(10)

電送 193

時 電送 4570号  
昭和16年11月26日  
前4時20分送

山本 信謀 (印) 長

班 學 級

昭和十六年十一月十三日 奉

件名	日米交渉	記録件名	東郷大臣
宛	野村大使	送	東郷大臣
在	野村大使		
第	八五七號		

( 長符子 )

往 電 ( 第四号 ) 之 今 之 態 在 記 一 般 言 以 口 頭 申 入 相  
成 後 不 敢 取 美 國 政 府 之 力 我 方 於 正 公 心 上 几 几 在 場 立 脚 之 從 未  
彼 我 主 張 之 几 几 分 考 慮 上 作 成 之 日 以 來 我 方 對 提 案 之 審  
議 一 基 礎 上 之 難 之 十 為 之 日 六 日 之 東 亞 現 實 之 無 視 之 帝 國  
一 威 威 之 國 之 少 力 之 提 案 之 帝 國 政 府 之 如 未 始 之 七  
解 苦 之 十 之 殊 之 支 那 國 題 之 其 態 之 美 之 如 未 始 之 七  
月 之 日 之 交 涉 之 於 一 美 國 政 府 之 企 圖 之 以 根 之 那 之 在 在  
之 之 疑 之 之 之 美 國 政 府 之 對 之 深 基 礎 之 及 省 之

5x 1195

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

十一月二十九日

土 晴

午前九時池田季雄氏來訪面談  
 十時出勤待從長千時局ニツキ該政  
 府ハ九時半ヨリ官中ニ於テ對米交渉  
 タ中心トスル時局問題ニツキ重臣ト  
 懇談終リテ御陪食ヲ仰付コトトナリ  
 居リシガ遂ニ一時ニ及ビ漸ク一時休  
 憩シ御陪食ニ列スルト云フ有様ニテ  
 熱心ニ要談願ヒ行ハレタル模様ナ  
 リ御陪食後二時ヨリ約一時間御學問  
 所ニ於テ陛下親シク重臣ノ意見ヲ御  
 講求被達タリ其概長左ノ如シ  
 陛下ヨリ大變態シイ時代ニナツタホ  
 トノ御言葉アリ若槻男直ニ之ニ奉答  
 シ大長左ノ如ク述ブ  
 活機一我國民ハ總努力ニ於テハ必  
 ナキモ切實ノ方面ニ於テ呆シテ長期  
 戦ニ堪ヘ得ルヤ否ヤ慎重ニ研究スル  
 ノ要アリ午前中政府ノ説明モアリタ  
 ルカ之ヲ心記ス

岡田一今日ハ眞ニ非常ノ憂慮ニ直面  
 セルモノト思フ彼等ノ補給能力ニツ  
 キ充分成熟アリヤ否ヤ心記ナリ先刻

Dec 1632 W (86)

9611196

1.

Doc 1632 W (86)

子

米政府ノ詔アリタルモ未ダ精得ス  
 ルニ至ラス  
 平沼一若槻閣下ヨリ我國民ノ精勵力  
 ニツイテ御誓ガアリマシタガ私モ真  
 ノ結固感デアリマス只既ニ四年ノ戦  
 争ヲ遂行シテ居リマス今日更ニ長期  
 ノ戦トナレバ困窮候之ニ達ヘナケレ  
 バナリマセンノテ民心ヲ引離テ行キ  
 マス誠ニツイテハ充分ノ施策ト努力  
 ガ必要ト存シマス  
 近頃一四月以來自分ハ日米口交調整  
 ニ努力シ來リタルガ遂ニ其ノ成果ヲ  
 擧クルコトヲ得ザリシハ誠ニ遺憾ト  
 スルトコロナルガ國內モ亦熱心ニ  
 此ノ目的ノ達成ニ努力セラレ居ルハ  
 感謝スルトコロデアアル、午前中政府  
 ノ詔切ニヨリ乍遺憾外交々渉ノ口交  
 ハ此上見込ナシト判スルノ外ナキ  
 加外交々渉決裂スルモ直ニ戦争ニ既  
 フルヲ畏ルヤ、此ノ位ノ状態ニテ  
 臥薪嘗膽ノ状態ニテ進スル中又打  
 撃ヲ受テ出スニアラザルカトモ恩  
 ハレ此ノ間尙後刻當局ニ負シタイト

Doc 1632 W (86)

3.

思シテ居リマス  
米内ト資料ヲ持テマセンノテ具体的  
ノ意見ハ申上ラレマセンガ俗語ヲ使  
イマシテ忍入リマスガテリ貧ヲ避ケ  
ントシテドカ貧ニナラナイ様ニ充分  
ノ御注意ヲ願ヒタイト思ヒマス  
眞田ト世界大戦後ノ各山ノ状態ヲ述  
ベテ却テ事變ニツイテモ米内ノ介入ヲ  
極力避クル方針ヲ以テ願ミタルガ邊  
ニ今日ノ様ナ状況トナレリ政府ノ説  
明ニヨレバ今日ハ外交上ノ危期ニ立  
テル様ニ思ハル、ガ之ハ野田閣員ト  
ノ關係モアルトコロ由來外交談判ノ  
危機ハ二度三度繰返シテ始メテ双方  
ノ覺悟ガ判ルモノト思フ今回危機ニ  
直面シテ直ニ戦争ニ突入スルハ如何  
ナモノニヤ假ニ不待止トスルモ假令  
打テ合ヒタル後ト雖モ常ニ細心ノ注  
意ヲ以テ緩急ヲ握ヘテ外交々々ニテ  
解決ノ途ヲトルベキナリト思フ  
赤ト資料ヲ持タザルカ大體政府カ大  
本營ト充分働カシメテラレタル結句  
ニ信願スル外ナシト思フ

Doc 1632W (86)

4.

阿部一政府ノ説明ニヨレバ外交々渉  
 ノ進展ハ困難ナルベク今ヤ眞ニ重大  
 ナル困難ニ立テルモノト思フ政府ハ  
 非常ニ周旋ニアラユル角度ヨリ研究  
 セラレタル様ニ思ハレ是以上ノコト  
 ハ望メスト思フ只支那人心ノ動向ニ  
 ツイテハ慎重ニ討議セラル、コトヲ  
 疑スベク一度誤ラバ今日迄行タル成  
 果ヲモ失フニ至ル長アリト思フ  
 若し今日ハ眞ニ重大ナル時機ニ到  
 達セルモノト思フ爰ニ一言申上タキ  
 ハ常山ノ自存自衛ノ必兵トアレバ假  
 令敵軍ヲ謀見シ得ル場合ト雖モ口ヲ  
 焦上トナシテモ立タナケレバナリマ  
 センガ只理想ヲ論イテ口業ヲ御進メ  
 ニナルコト何ヘバ大東亞共榮國ノ確  
 立トカ東亞ノ安定勢力トカノ理想ニ  
 トラハレテ口ヲ使ハル、コトハ誠  
 ニ危以テアリマスカラ之ハ御考ヘラ  
 願ハナケレバナラナイト存シマス  
 四時真臣ヘノ政府ノ説明終リタル由  
 ニテ近衛公家室宮米岡題ヲ中心ニ進  
 タ々懸候ス午後七時賓陽官邸ニ伺候故  
 大石殿下正社移箱ノ儀ニツキ拜禮ス

EX 1197-A

2496A-1

一九四六年三月廿六日、永野護衛三對スル訊問ヨリノ抜萃

問 大將、閣下ハ何時頃眞珠灣攻撃計畫ニ完成シマシタカ。

答 十月ノ終リカ十一月ノ始メテス。實際例ト軍令部トノ間ニハ可成リノ議論ガアリマシタ。海軍ハ眞珠灣攻撃ヲ操ビ海軍軍務局ハ之ヲ余リニモ授け向トシ米艦隊ヲ南太平洋群島ニ遊撃スル温存戦法ヲ選ビマシタ。山本大將ハ彼ノ眞珠灣攻撃作戦ノ信念ニ凝リ固マツテキマシタ。ソツテ若シ彼ノ計畫ガ実行ニ移サレナイナラバ幕僚ヲ引退レテ身ヲ退クト成シマシタ。

問 大將、此ノ時既に此ノ計畫ハ海上陸上ニ海軍々令部ノ机上ニ於テ幕前ノ機動演習ガ完結シテキタノデハアリマセンカ。

答 ソウデス。艦隊ハ非常ニ訓練シマシタ。

問 ソレデ、大將、海軍々務局ト山本大將トノ意見ノ衝突ヲ眞珠灣攻撃ニアナタガ決意シタノハ何時デスカ。

答 私ハ海軍令部ニ賛成シテキマシタガ、山本ガ非常ニ強硬ダツタノデ先ニ申シ給ベク通り十月ノ終リカ十一月ノ始メニ眞珠灣攻撃ノ計畫ニ賛成シマシタ。海軍々務局ハ彼等ノ長年ノ計畫デアル所ノ南太平洋群島ニ米艦隊ヲ遊撃スル作戦

2496A-2

ヲ決行スル事ニ賛成デシタ。

問一 而シ大將、私ノ解釋スルトコロテ、閣下ハ海軍  
軍務局長ガ長年ノ歳果ニ依ル計畫ヲ固執シタニモ  
拘ラズ、真珠灣攻撃ガ最ニデアルトノ結論ニ達  
シ、真珠灣攻撃ヲ是認シテ此ノ意見ノ衝突ヲ解  
決シタノデアリマスネ、ソウテ有リマセンカ。

答一 私ニハ軍令部ノ對策ノ方ガ合理的デアルト思ハ  
レタノテ、之ヲ希望シマシタガ若シ艦隊司令長  
官ノ計畫ガ通ラナケレバ彼ハ辭職スルダラウカ  
ラ艦隊司令長官ヲ辭職サセヌタメニハ賛成スル  
ノガ最良ノ策ダト考ヘマシタ。

問一 ソレテ閣下ハ真珠灣攻撃計畫ニ賛成シタノデス  
ネ。

答一 ソウデス。

問一 其ノ間ノ事情ヲ解釋スルニ、大將、閣下ノ此ノ  
賛成ガ真珠灣攻撃ノ決定長因ダツタノデアリマ  
スネ、ソウテハ有リマセンカ。

答一 ソウデス。

問一 ソレテ私ノ考ヘテハ大將ハ事實ニ徴シ之ニ對シ  
喜ンテ責任ヲ負フモノト考ヘマスガ、閣下如何  
テセウカ。

答一 勿論。

問一 大將、艦隊ガ真珠灣攻撃ヲ決行スル爲、配區ニ



2496A-3

就ク最初ノ命令ヲ受ケタノハ何時頃デスカ。

答一 陸隊ハ十一月中尙三千島ニ集結シ、十一月二十

六日乃至二十七日ニ真珠灣ニ向ケ出發シマッタ。

問一 大將、實際ノ處、一九四一年（昭和十六年）十

一月二十八日乃至二十九日頃、海陸會議ガ催サ

レタノテハアリマセシカ。之ニハ東條首相、東

郷外相、賀屋藏相、鈴木内閣企畫院總裁、杉山

參謀總長、同次長田邊大將、軍令部總長ノ目下、

同次長伊藤少將、寺島通相、井野農相、星野内

閣書記官長、陸軍々務局長武蔵將監、海軍々務

局長岡中將ガ對米戰爭決定ヲ完結スベク參集シ

タノテハアリマセシカ。

答一 私ハ期日ニ就イテハ明確デアリマセシガ其ノ通

リダト愚ヒマス。然シ我々ハ益クギリ々々侵襲

逆平和穩立ヲ希望シ本當ノ最後逆襲珠灣攻撃ノ

計畫ヲ放棄スル用意ハ持ツテキタ。此ノ名簿ニ

ハ海軍大臣島田大將ガ管テテキマス。

木戸侯會日記 昭和十六年十一月三十日分

十一月三十日(日) 下野 晴

午後一時半高松宮邸御餐三坐官モ御同席  
ニテ以下ニ拜謁前米施策ヲ中心ニ最近ノ  
情況ヲ言上ス

二時半出仕

三時半御石ニヨリ拜謁ス

今日午前高松宮殿下御上リニナリタルガ  
其時ノ謁ニドウモ海軍ハ手一杯ヲ出來ル  
ナレバ日本ノ戦争ハ進ケタイ様ナ氣持ダ  
カ一落ドウナノダラウカネトノ御尋ネア

リ  
候ツテ今度ノ御決意ハ一度斷續進ルレ  
バ後ハ引ケス重大ナルモノデアリマス  
故少シテモ御不安ガアレバ充分念ニハ念  
ヲ入レテ御前様ノ行ク様ニ被進ホバイケ  
ナイト存シマス就テハ直ニ海軍大臣軍令  
部部長ヲ御石ニナリ海軍ノ眞ノ眞ヲ御タ  
シカメ相成度此ノ事ハ首相ニモ留意ナク  
御謁益キ願ヒ度イト存シマスト奉答ス

三時半東條首相參内拜謁ス其後海軍大臣  
軍令部部長ヲ御召アリ御下問アリタリ

四時武官長六時侍從長ト百談ス

Dec 16.32 W (87)

9x1198

1.

2.  
Doc 1632W (87)

六時三十五分御召ニヨリ拜謁海軍大臣總  
長ニ先程ノ件ヲ尋ネタルニ何レモ相嘗ノ  
確信ヲ以テ答セラル故決定ノ通り進ムル  
嶽首相ニ傳ヘヨトノ御下命アリ  
直ニ右ノ趣ヲ首相ニ電話ヲ以テ傳達ス  
周雄夫篤夕食後遼子ニ歸ル

Doc 2593D (22)  
Stm 24

EX 1199

1.

書類番號

如二五九三號D二十二

第二十四番

東京發

柏林宛

一九四一年（昭和十六年）十一月三十日

紫色

第九八六號（極秘）（政府暗號ニテ取扱ノコト）

（二ノ部一）

（省外秘密）

一 日米交渉ハ本年四月中旬ヨリ開始シ、半歳有余  
繼續セルガ、其ノ間帝國政府ハ實際情勢ノ推移  
ヲモ順ミス、三國同盟ヲソノ政策ノ礎石トシテ  
固ク固執シ、日米國交關係モ明確ニ右同盟ノ範  
圍内ニ於テ妥結ヲ期シ、常ニ毅然タル態度ヲ以  
テ交渉ニ臨ミ、米國ノ參戰牽制ニ努メタル次第  
ナリ。

ニ 從ツテ現内閣ハ、實情ニ從ヒ、正常且公正ナル  
態度ニ基キ帝國ノ存立ト保全ヲ擁護センガ爲ニ  
從來ノ交渉ヲ繼續セル處、交渉ノ果レル撤兵問  
題ニ關スル彼、我ノ見解ハ（先方ハ中國及荷印  
ヨリ臯軍ノ撤退ヲ學望ス、完全ニ對立セリ）

Doc 2593D (22)

Item 24

2.

從來交渉ノ経緯ニ従スレバ、米國側ニ於テ、日  
露關係處理ニ關スル其ノ傳統的理念的傾向ニ從  
ヒ、大西洋上米英會議ニ於テコノ傳統的政策ニ  
對スル同國ノ基本的依存ヲ存強シセシ際ニ我等  
ハ先ツ衝突セルナリ、米側ノコレニ對スル動機  
ハ、日露伊ノ歐陸ニ於ケル新秩序確立、即チ、  
三國同盟ノ目的ヲ阻止セントスル所長ノ希望ニ  
依リテ表明セラレタリ、  
日本帝國ガ獨伊ト同盟シ居ル故リ、日米友好協  
係ノ維持ハアリ得ストハ先方ノ取リシ立場ナリ、  
此ノ見地ヨリ、彼等ハ恰モ帝國政府ノ三國同盟  
離脱ヲ要求スルカノ傾向ヲ示スニ至リタルガ、  
右ハ最後ノ會議ニ於テ表明セラレタリ。即チ、  
帝國政府ハ最早米國ト交渉ヲ繼續スルコト能ハ  
ザルベシトノコトガ漸次益々明瞭トナリシハ最  
後ノ數日ノ交渉中ナリ。交渉ノ繼續ハ必スヤ我  
方ノ主義ニ有害ナルベキコトモ亦明瞭トナリタ  
リ。

3.

Doc 2,593.D (22)

stan 24

警須答號

第二五九三號D二十一

第二十四卷

東京發

伯祿宛

一九四一年 (昭和十六年) 十一月三十日

紫色

第九八六號 (二ノ第二部)

二十六日米國ノ提出セル對案ハ、前記態度ヲ賈  
 三 明カニセラルモノニシテ、ソノ内ニ、如何ナル  
 條約ヲ孰カノ一方ガ第三國ト締結スルモ、ソレ  
 ハ本協定ノ根本目的、即チ太平洋ノ平和確保ニ  
 關係アリト解釋セラレザルベキコト、トノ侮辱  
 的一項アリ。右ハ特ニ三國同盟ヲ意味ス。即チ  
 米國ガ何時歐洲戰ニ參加ストモ日本帝國ハ獨伊  
 ニ援助ヲ與フルコトヲ許サレザルベシトノ意ナ  
 リ。右ハ明ニ細工ナリ。他ノ諸國トハ兎ニ角ト  
 シ本項ノミヲ見ルモ米側提案ハ交渉ノ基礎トナスコトヲ  
 不可能ナラシムルモノナリ。尙米國ハ本案提示  
 ニ先チ英國、蘇洲、和蘭及中國ト協議ヲ重ネタ  
 ル事實アリ。從ツテ米國ハ今ヤ右諸國ト共々日  
 本ヲ、獨伊ト共ニ敵視スルニ決セルコト明瞭ナリ。

機密 陸軍省

陸軍省参謀本部

情報局

ワシントン、二十五、D O

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り説明ス。即チ

添附致知ノ日本文電報ノ復寫寫眞ハ陸海軍兩省ノ  
熱線セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ傳ツ  
テ傍受サレ、解読セラレ而シテ探知セラレシモノ  
ニシテ予ノ知り且信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ翻  
譯スル爲メ此洋人ニトリ人刀ノ可能ナル限度ニ於  
テ正確且ツ典據ノアルモノナリ。

参謀本部附大佐

CARTER W CLARKE

カーター・ダヴリユー・クラーク

Doc. No. 2593-D (23)  
 Item 25  
 From: Washington  
 To: Tokyo  
 30 November 1941 (2230 to 2238 EST)  
 Telephone Code

page 1

TransPacific  
Radio Telephone

(NOTE: Following is a preliminary, condensed version of conversation between Ambassador Kurusu and the Japanese Foreign Office American Division Chief Yamamoto on Sunday night)

Kurusu: "It is all arranged for us to meet Hull tomorrow. We received a short one from you, didn't we? Well, we will meet him in regard to that. There is a longer one coming isn't there? In any case we are going to see him about the short one." (i.e. telegram. The longer one is probably Tokyo's reply to Mr. Hull's proposals.)

Yamamoto: "Yes, I see."

Kurusu: "The President is returning tomorrow. He is hurrying home."

Y: "Is there any special significance to this?"

K: "The newspapers have made much of the Premier's speech, and it is having strong repercussions here."

Y: "Is that so?"

K: "Yes. It was a drastic statement he made. The newspapers carried large headlines over it; and the President seems to be returning because of it. There no doubt are other reasons, but this is the reason the newspapers are giving."

(Pause)

"Unless greater caution is exercised in speeches by the Premier and others, it puts us in a very difficult position. All of you over there must watch out about those ill-advised statements. Please tell Mr. Tani."

Y: "We are being careful."

K: "We here are doing our best, but these reports are seized upon by the correspondents and the worst features enlarged upon. Please caution the Premier, the Foreign

25497

JD-1: 6922

SECRET

(M) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941

(R-5)



Minister, and others. Tell the Foreign Minister that we had expected to hear something different, some good word, but instead we got this." (i.e. Premier's speech.)

(After a pause, Kurusu continues, using voice code)

K: "What about the internal situation?" (In Japan)

Y: "No particular - - (one or two words faded out)--."

K: "Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue?"

Y: "Yes."

K: "You were very urgent about them before, weren't you; but now you want them to stretch out. We will need your help. Both the Premier and the Foreign Minister will need to change the tone of their speeches !!!!! Do you understand? Please all use more discretion."

Y: "When will you see them. The 2nd?"

K: "Let's see...this is Sunday midnight here. Tomorrow morning at ten. That will be Monday morning here."

(Pause)

"Actually the real problem we are up against is the effects of happenings in the South. You understand don't you?"

Y: "Yes. Yes. How long will it be before the President gets back?"

K: "I don't know exactly. According to news reports he started at 4:00 this afternoon. He should be here tomorrow morning sometime."

Y: "Well then - - Goodbye."

25497

JD-1: 6922

SECRET

(M) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941  
(R-5)

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE  
Colonel, G.S.C.

ex 1200

ワシントン發

東京宛

一九四一年十一月三十日（東部標準時間二二時三〇分ヨリ二二時三八分）暗號電報

太平洋横斷

無線電話

（註 左記ノ來種大使ト日本外務省  
アメリカ局山本局長トノ間ニ日  
夜行ハレタ會談ノ要約的翻譯ノ序  
文デアル）

來稿一

「我々が明日ノハルト會見スル準備ハ  
万端整ツテキマス。我々が貴下ヨリ短  
カイ電報ヲ受取りマシタネ。ソレニ關  
シテ彼ト會見シマスモツト長イノガ來  
ルノデセウ？、兎モ角短イ方ニ就テ彼  
ト會見スル事ニシテキマス。（即チ電  
報長イ方トハ多分ハル氏ノ提案ニ對ス  
ル東京ノ返答デアル）

山本一

サウデスカ。ワカリマシタ。

來稿一

大統領ハ明日歸華スル事ニナツテキマ  
ス。今急イテ家ニ歸ツテキル所デス。

EX 1200

Doc 2543 D (23)

etc. 25

1.

Doc 2593.1 (23)  
Item 25

山本 ！ コレニ對シ何カ特別ノ意味ガアリマスカ。

來栖 ！ 新聞ハ首相ノ演説ヲ重視シテキマス。  
當地デハ大キナ反響ガアリマシタ。

山本 ！ サウデスカ。

來栖 ！ サウデス。アレハ激烈ナ聲明デシタカラ  
ホ。新聞ハ大キナ見出シヲ擧ゲ大統領ハ  
ソノ爲歸華途上ニアル様ニ思ハレマス。  
疑ヒナク他ニ理由ハアルノデセウガ新聞  
カ傳ヘタ所ハソノ理由ナノデス。

(問)

總理大臣及ビソノ他ノ人々ニモット其演  
説ニ注意ヲ拂ツテ貰ハナイト私達ハ非常  
ニ困難ナ立場ニ置カレマス。ソチラニキル  
諸君ハ皆コノ様ナ思慮ノ無イ聲明ニ對シ  
テハ注意シナケレバナリマセン。コノ事  
ヲ谷氏ニ言ツテ下サイ。

山本 ！ 我々ハ目下注意ヲ拂ツテ居リマス。

來栖 ！ 我々ハ此處デ最善ヲ盡シテキマスカ之等  
ノ報告ハ新聞記者ニ取押ヘラレ、最悪ノ

Loc 201.3.1 (20)  
Star 25

3.

事柄が擴大サレテキマス。

ドウゾ總理大臣、外務大臣、ソノ他ノ人々ニ警告シテ下サイ。外務大臣ニハ我々ハモット遠ツタ何カ良イ言葉ヲ期待シテキタノニコシナノヲ頂キマシタト言ツテ下サイ（即チ首相ノ演説ノ事）

（問ヲ置イテ、來栖ハ陪駮ヲ使ヒ乍ラ續ケタ）

- 來栖 | 國內事情ハ如何デスカ。（日本ニ於ケル
- 山本 | 別ニ大シテ・・・（一、二語消エタ）
- 來栖 | 日米交渉ハ續ケラレルノデスカ。
- 山本 | サウデス
- 來栖 | 貴下方ハ前ニハソレニ對シテ非常ニアセツテ居マシタネ。今ハ延引スル事ヲ望ンデ居ラレル様デス。我々ハ貴方下ノ助力ガ必要デス。總理大臣モ外務大臣モソノ演説口調ヲ變更スル事ガ必要デセウ。オオワカリデスカ。ドウゾ皆モット思慮シア下サイ。

Doc 259211 (23)  
Item 25

山本 I 何時彼等ト才會ヒニナリマスカ。二日ニ  
?

來栖 I サウテスオ。 . . . 營地テハ今日曜ノ夜テ  
ス。明日十時ニコ、テハ月曜日ノ朝ニナ  
リマス。

(問)

「現實ニ今我々カ直面シテキル實際問題  
ハ南方ニ於ケル出來臺ノ結果テス。  
オワカリニナリマスカ。」

山本 I ワカリマストモ、大統領カ齟齬スルマテ  
ドノ位アリマスカ。

來栖 I 正確ニハワカリマセンカ情報ニ依レバ彼  
ハ本日ノ午後四時ニ出發シタトイフカラ  
明朝何時カニ此處ニ着クテセウ。

山本 I ソレテハ . . . . 失禮

二五四九七 J D 一六九三二 秘密 (M) 海軍機

型十二年十一月三

十日 (R15)

4.

Doc 2593 cert.

機密陸軍省

陸軍省参謀本部

情報局

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り聲明ス。即チ、  
添附數通ノ日本文電報ノ複寫寫眞ハ陸海軍兩省ノ熟  
練セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ツテ傍  
受サレ、解讀セラレ而シテ翻譯セラレシモノニシテ  
予ノ知り且信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ翻譯スル爲  
メ西洋人ニトリ人力ノ可能ナル限度ニ於テ正確且ツ  
典據ノアルモノナリ。

参謀本部付大佐

CARTER. W. CLARKE

カーター・ダヴリウー・クラーク

Extract from Interrogation of Hidoki Tojo  
20 February 1946, pp. 2, 4-5

"Q What was the date of that last Liaison Conference before the Imperial Conference of 1st or 2nd of December?

"A I think that last Liaison Conference before the Imperial Conference was on the 30th of November. However, as I have said before, I am not sure of the date of the Imperial Conference. I rather think it was the 1st, but it may have been the 2nd."

\* \* \* \*

(pp. 4-5 )

"Q How many times did the Emperor ask you to be certain that the note was to be delivered before the attack?

"A Repeatedly.

"Q Can you give us any idea of the number of times? Was it three times, six, a dozen?

"A I was going to the Emperor about every other day and he warned me many times about it.

"Q What was the earliest date he warned you, as you recall?

"A He was always warning me about matters having to do with foreign relations, but I think the first time he warned about the delivery of the final note was just after the Imperial Conference of the 1st or 2nd of December 1941.

"Q Was not the Emperor afraid that the actual attack might take place before the note was delivered?

"A Yes, he was afraid of it. He said to be careful to see that it did not happen."

\* \* \* \*



Ex. 1001

Extract from Interrogation of Hidoki Tojo  
20 February 1946, pp. 2, 4-5

"Q What was the date of that last Liaison Conference before the Imperial Conference of 1st or 2nd of December?

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\* \* \* \*

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"Q Was not the Emperor afraid that the actual attack might take place before the note was delivered?

"A Yes, he was afraid of it. He said to be careful to see that it did not happen."

\* \* \* \*





Extract from Interrogation of Hideki Tojo  
18 March 1946, pp. 1-2, 3, 4.

(page 1-2)

- "Q The text of the final note to America was approved, first by the Liaison Conference, and later by the Cabinet, was it not?
- "A The gist of it was approved by the Cabinet, but the final text was the responsibility of the Foreign Minister. Of course, it is my responsibility too.
- "Q Did not also the Liaison Conference first approve the gist of it?
- "A Yes, of course. They did.
- "Q TOGO says that he composed the text of that note on a basis of the views furnished by the Liaison Conference and that the text, after being written, was presented to and approved by the Liaison Conference. Is this correct?
- "A Yes.
- "Q After this had happened, the cabinet also approved it, did it not?
- "A As I recall it, after the Liaison Conference had approved it, the gist of it was given to the Cabinet by the Foreign Minister, after which they approved it. In any case, if my memory is correct, I do not believe that the text was distributed to all the members of the Cabinet.
- "Q After TOGO and the two Chiefs of Staff had decided that 1:00 P.M., 7 December 1941, Washington time, was to be the time for the delivery of the final note, this fact was reported to and approved by the Liaison Conference, was it not?
- "A No. The Liaison conference, which I was, you might say, head of, delegated to the two Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Minister the task of setting a time prior to the attack. The three-man committee did not report back to the Liaison Conference. I don't remember that the three-man committee reported back to the Liaison Conference on the time. I am reporting to you the facts, but the results of those facts are my responsibility."

\* \* \* \*

(p. 3)

"Q Did the Foreign Minister know of the time and the day set for the attack? /Referring to the Pearl Harbor attack./

"A Yes, the Foreign Minister knew it too. The President of the Planning Board also knew.

"Q As you recall it, the Liaison Conference did not approve the time set for the delivery of the note nor approve of the length of time between the delivery of the note and the attack?

"A The Liaison Conference delegated the carrying out of this matter to the Foreign Minister and the two Chiefs of Staff and, in that sense only, approved."

\* \* \* \*

(p. 4)

"Q In addition to the Minister of War and Foreign Minister, were there any other cabinet members present at the Liaison Conferences immediately preceding the Imperial Conference of 1 December 1941?

"A I do not remember exactly, but I suppose that the Commerce and Industry Minister and the Communications Minister attended because raw materials were involved for factories and shipping was involved. Of course, the President of the Planning Board and the Navy Minister were also there.

"Q Was the Minister of Finance there?

"A Yes, he was always at Liaison Conference meetings. Those five were always there - War, Navy, Planning Board, Foreign, and Finance Ministers."

\* \* \* \*

東條英樹ニ對スル質問ヨリノ答

昭和二十一年三月十八日

第一一二、三、四頁

2513A-1

「第一一二頁」

問、米國ニ對スル野呂近原ノ本文ハ最初ニ連綿會議ニ於テ、ソレカラ内閣ニ依ツテ承認サレタノデハアリマセンデシタカ

答、ソノ野呂ハ内閣ニ依ツテ承認サレマシタガ野呂ノ本文ハ外務大臣ノ責任デアリマシタ。勿論私ノ責任デモアリマス

問、連綿會議モ亦ソノ野呂ヲ最初ニ承認シマセンデシタカ

答、ハイ、勿論シマシタ

問、ソノ野呂ノ本文ハ連綿會議カラ採録サレタル意見ニ基イテ東條ガ作製シタモノデ、ソレガ野呂カラ連綿會議ニ提出サレ而シテソレニ依ツテ承認サレタノダト東條ハ言フガ是ハ正シイデスカ

答、ハイ

問、コノ内閣モ亦ソレヲ承認シタノデハアリマセンデシタカ

EX 1202-A

2513A-2

答、私ノ記憶ニ依ルバ選給會議ガ承認シテカラソノ  
 要旨ガ外務大臣ニ依ツテ内閣ヘ渡サレ、ソレカ  
 ラ内閣ガコレヲ承認シマシタ。何レニシテモ私  
 ノ記憶ガ正シイナラバ本文ハ内閣員全部ニ配布サ  
 レタトハ思ヒマセシ

問、最後通牒手交ノ時期ハ一ラシトシ「時間ヲ臨  
 和十六年十二月七日午前一時トイフ事ニ東條及  
 ビ西澤長ガ決定シテ後ニ、コノ事實ガ選給會議  
 ニ報告サレソシテ承認サレタノデハアリアセシ  
 テシタカ

答、イ、エ、言ハバ私ガ議長デアツタコノ選給會議  
 ガ投票前ノ時期ヲ決定スル任務ヲ右ノ西澤長ト  
 外務大臣ニ委任シタノデス。コノ三人ノ委員會  
 ハ選給會議ヘ任命シマセシマシタ。三人ノ委員  
 會ガ選給會議ニ出席イテ復命シタトハ第五  
 テ居リアセシ、私ハ事實ヲ貴方ニ御話シテ居リ  
 マスガソノ事實ノ結果ハ私ノ責任デアリマス

「第三頁」

問、外務大臣ハソノ投票日臨ニ行イテ知ツテ居ツタ  
 ノデスカ  
 「東條選給會議ニ依リテ」

2513A-3

答、ハイ、外務大臣も知ツテ居リマシタ、金齋院總

裁も亦知ツテ居リマシタ

問、貴方ノ記憶ニ依レバ選給會議ハ選給手続ノ時刻

又ハ選給手続ト攻撃トノ間ノ瞬間ヲ承認シテカ

ツタノデスカ

答、選給會議ハコノ事柄ノ遂行ヲ外務大臣ト有總長

ニ委任シマシタ、ソシテソノ意味ニ於テ承認シ

マシタ

「第四頁」

問、昭和十六年十二月一日ノ御前會議直前ノ選給會

議ニ對シテ外務大臣以外ノ閣員ガ出席シテ

居リマシタカ

答、ハツキリ答エテ居リマセンガ工場ニ對スル原料

及ビ繰廻ニ關連シテイマシタカラ前工大臣並ニ

選給大臣ガ出席シタト思ヒマス、勿論金齋院總

裁ト選給大臣モ出席シマシタ

問、大藏大臣ハ居リマシタカ

答、ハイ、彼ハ常ニ選給會議ニ出席シマシタ、是

等五人ハ何時モ出席シマシタ。即チ陸軍、海軍、

外務、大藏ノ各大臣ト金齋院總裁ナス。

×

×

×



Ex. #1203

Extract from Interrogation of Hideki Tojo  
21 February 1946, Case File #20, Serial #80, pp. 2-3, 4

"Q You and the cabinet realized, did you not, that the shorter the notice given the United States, the more probability there was of a mishap?

"A It can be said so, theoretically.

"Q Did you and the cabinet not recognize that as a practical possibility?

"A Yes, from the practical point of view, it is also true that the shorter the time allowed, the more chance of a hitch, but it is not enough to leave it at that. Ambassador NOMURA was a very responsible official and we relied upon his carrying out so grave a responsibility perfectly. Also, the Foreign Office had time to study and perfect all phases of the procedure in the light of its great responsibility.

"Q Why was not the message itself sent sooner to Ambassador NOMURA so that there would be sufficient time?

"A I can't answer such a question as that. It is a problem for the Foreign Minister. The orders were that the final note was to be surely delivered. Since the Foreign Ministry had such an order, the question of how or why it was not carried out is a technical one which is the responsibility of the Foreign Minister.

"Q Did not you and the members of the cabinet see the contents of the note before it was sent?

"A I heard the gist of it. The cabinet all heard it at the Liaison Conference just preceding the Imperial Conference.

"Q Did not you and the cabinet agree with the contents of that message?

"A Yes, we did agree. The gist of the note was explained by the Foreign Minister at the Liaison Conference meeting. The whole text was not read and passed about. After the meeting, the matter became the responsibility of the Foreign Ministry.

"Q This Liaison Conference, at which the gist of the final note was read, was the last one before the Imperial Conference of December 1st or 2nd, was it not?

"A Yes.

"Q And all members present agreed with the substance of the message as it was read to them?

"A Yes.

"Q Why was it that that message was not sent to NOMURA until practically a week later?

"A I can't help it if you keep asking me questions about specific matters like that that were the responsibility of the Foreign Minister. I can't answer them."

\* \* \* \*

(p. 4)

"Q You knew the attack was going to be made and approved it, did you not?

"A I knew that it was to take place, but I did not approve it because, under the Japanese system, approval by the Premier or Minister of War is not called for in a problem of command.

"Q Regardless of approval, you were in favor of such an attack being made, were you not?

"A I thought it would be good if it was successful. I thought that if the Supreme Command was confident of success that it was a good idea.

"Q You knew for a month or more previous to the attack that Admiral YAMAMOTO's plan for a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor had been decided on in case of war with America?

"A No, I didn't know about it. In Japan those matters are matters of command. It was a strategic plan. Neither the government nor the War Minister would know about a Navy operating plan. That is positively the case. Command matters were kept highly secret. They were the most important secrets of all.

"Q When did you first know that, in case of war with the United States, Pearl Harbor was to be attacked?

"A I learned at the Liaison Conference just before the Imperial Conference. Before that, it was very secret."

\* \* \* \* \*

東條英機ニ對スル訊問ヨリノ要約

一九四六年二月廿一日

(第二十三、四頁)

2506A-1

「問」貴方ト内閣ハ合衆國ニ與ヘンレル通告ガ周近ニナサレレバナサレル様ソレダケ間違ノ記ル可能性ガ多イ事ヲ自認シテ居リマシタカ居リマセデシタカ。

「答」理論的ニハサウ云ヘマセソ。

「問」貴方トソノ内閣ハソレソ實際上ノ可能性トシテ認メナカッタノデシカカ。

「答」シマシタ。實際上ノ見地カラハ時日ノ餘裕カ短カケレバ短イ丈ケ手滑ン生ズル機會ノ多クナルトイフ事モ亦事減テハアリマスガ、シカシソウ言ツテ了フ丈ケテハ足リマセソ。野村大使ハ非常ニ責任感ノ強い人デシタ。従ツテ我々ハ彼ガ非常ニ重大ノ責任ヲ完全ニ果タス事ヲ信頼シテ居リマシタ。ソレカラ又外務省ハソノ責任ノ重大サニ鑑ミアラユル面ニ亙ツテ手續ノ點ノ事ヲ研究シテ手落ノナイ様ニスルタメ時間ヲカケマシタ。

「問」充分ノ時間ガアル様ニ何故野村大使ニモツ

EX/203-A

2506A-2

ト早く通牒ソノモノヲ送ラナカツタノデスカ。

「答」私ハソノ様ナ質問ニ御答ヘスルコトハ出来マセヌ。ソレハ外務大臣ノ問題デス。最近通牒ヲ確實ニ手交スル様ニトノ訓令デアリマシタ。外務省ガサウイフ訓令ヲ受け取ツタカラ、如何ニシテ又ハ何故ソノ訓令ガ遂行サレナカツタカトイフ問題ハ外務大臣ノ責任タルベキ技術的問題デアリマス。

「問」貴方ト内閣ハ最後通牒ガ發送サレル前ニ其ノ内容ヲ見ナカツタノデスカ。

「答」私ハソノ要旨ヲ聞キマシタ。内閣全員ハアノ御前會議直前ノ連絡會議ニ於イテソレヲ聞キマシタ。

「問」貴方ト内閣ハソノ通牒ノ内容ニ同意シナカツタノデスカ。

「答」イ、エ、我々ハ同意シマシタ。通牒ノ要旨ハ連絡會議ニ於テ外務大臣カラ説明ガアリマシタ。全文ハ讀マレナカツタシ廻サレモシマセンデシタ。コノ會議後ハ、本件ハ外務省ノ責任トナリマシタ。

「問」最後通牒ノ要旨ガ讀マレタ此ノ連絡會議ハ

2506A-3

十二月一日又ハ二日ノ御前會議前ノ最後ノ  
連絡會議デアツタノデスネ。

「答」 サウデス。

「問」 ソシテ出席全員ガ彼等ニ諷ミ聞カサレタ通  
牒ノ趣旨ニ同意シタノデスネ。

「答」 サウデス。

「問」 ソノ通牒ガ實際ノトコロ一週間後迄野村大  
使ニ送ラレナカツタノハドウシテデスカ。

「答」 外務大臣ノ責任デアルソノ様ナ細カイ事ニ  
ツイテ貴方ガ質問シ續ケラレテモ私ニハド  
ウニモ仕様ガアリマセン。私ハソレニ御答  
へ出来マセン。

× × ×

「問」 貴方ハ攻撃ガナサレ様トシテイル事ヲ知ツ  
テ居リ且ツソレヲ承認シタノデスネ。

「答」 私ハ攻撃ガ行ハレル事ヲ知ツテ居リマシタ、  
シカシ私ハソレヲ承認シタノデハアリマセ  
ン。何故ナラバ、日本ノ組織ノ下デハ、統  
帥問題ニツイテハ首相ヤ陸相ノ承認ハ必要  
トセザレテ居ラナイカキデアリマス。

「問」 承認トイフ事ハ擬テ措イテ、貴方ハソノ様  
ナ攻撃ガ行ハレル事ニ賛成ダツタノデハア

2506A-14

リマセンカ。

「答」私ハ若シソノ攻撃ガ成功スルナラバヨイ事  
ダト思ヒマシタ。私ハ若シモ統帥部ガソノ  
成功ニツキ確信ヲ有シテ居ルナラ、ソレハ  
良イト思ヒマシタ。

「問」貴方ハ攻撃ノ一ヶ月以上モ前ニ山本大將ノ  
真珠灣奇襲案ガ米國トノ戦争ノ場合ノ爲ニ  
決定サレテ居ル事ヲ知ツテ居マシタネ。

「答」イ、エ、私ハソノ事ニツイテ知リマセンテ  
シタ。  
日本デハ、此等ノ事ハ統帥部頂デアリマス。  
ソレハ作戦計畫デアリマシタ。政府モ陸軍  
大臣モ海軍ノ作戦計畫ニツイテ知ル管ガア  
リマセン。ソレハ確カデアリマス。統帥部  
頂ハ極ク秘密ニセラレテ居リマシタ。ソレ  
等ハ秘中ノ秘トセラレテ居リマシタ。

「問」合衆國ト戦争ノ場合、真珠灣攻撃ノ手管デ  
アル事ヲ貴方ガ最初ニ知ツタノハ何時デシ  
タカ。

「答」アノ御前會議直前ノ連絡會議ノ折ニ私ハ知  
リマシタ。ソレ以前ニハ極秘デアリマシタ。

× × ×

Extract from Interrogation of Hideki Tojo  
19 February 1946, Case File #20, Serial #73, pp. 1-2, 4-5, 6-7, 8, 11.

(pp 1-2)

- "Q You stated at the last interrogation that Japan felt that, by her final note breaking off diplomatic relations, she acquired freedom of action from the standpoint of international treaties. Did she acquire the same freedom from the standpoint of international law?
- "A I think so.
- "Q Prior to making the attacks on the United States and Great Britain, this whole matter of the responsibility under treaties and under international law had been considered by you and the cabinet?
- "A Of course they were. It is important to remember that this matter was the grave responsibility of the Foreign Ministry.
- "Q What did the Foreign Ministry report to the cabinet on the matters of treaties and international law prior to the cabinet making its decision?
- "A The Foreign Minister reported only the gist of it to the cabinet. What was done afterwards was the sole responsibility of the Foreign Minister.
- "Q And the gist of what was reported by the Foreign Minister to the cabinet was that there was nothing in the treaties or international law that prevented the attacks on the United States and Great Britain after the last note had been delivered?
- "A The whole cabinet attended the Imperial Conference on the 1st or 2nd which made the decision for war. Hence, the whole cabinet knew, generally speaking, that that decision had been made, since everyone attended, but the problem of how the final note was to be dispatched was a technical question which was handled by the Foreign Minister.
- "Q Who informed you and the cabinet that there was nothing in any treaty or in international law that would preclude the attack being made on the United States and Great Britain?
- "A It was the result of my research. We had been challenged and were acting in self-defense. Therefore, I thought that we were not impeded from the standpoint of international law or treaties.



"Q Did the cabinet agree with you?

"A Yes. They all agreed.

"Q Did the Foreign Ministry agree?

"A Yes. They also studied the question and agreed.

"Q We will read all that back to you to make sure there is no mistake as to the questions and your answers.

"A /This was done and the witness agreed as to its correctness./

"Q When did you begin to study these matters?

"A From the time that the problem arose."

\* \* \* \* \*

(pp 4-5)

"Q At this last Liaison Conference preceding the Imperial conference of December 1st or 2nd, you expressed the same views on international laws and treaties which you arrived at as a result of your studies?

"A Yes.

"Q So that when the Liaison Conference arrived at a final decision to attack America and Great Britain, they had accepted your views on these matters?

"A Yes, of course they had.

"Q Who, in addition to yourself, spoke at that conference, expressing similar views in regard to international laws and treaties?

"A The Foreign Minister spoke on this point since he was the one chiefly responsible, and my researches resulted in my agreement with his views. There was no question raised by any other member present since the responsible officials had made that decision.

"Q Prior to the attacks on Great Britain and the United States, why was not a declaration of war made to either?

"A We thought that when the final note, implying a rupture in diplomatic relations, was delivered, that treaty procedure was finished and that we acquired freedom of action. Especially on the assumption of acting in self-defense in response to the challenge from the Anglo-American side, we thought that it was particularly appropriate."

\* \* \*

(pp 6-7)

"Q How long before the actual attack was the note to be delivered?

"A There were various opinions advanced and argued about between the Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Minister. There was one idea that the delivery of the note should precede the attack by an hour and a half; another, that it should precede it by an hour, another, by thirty minutes, and so forth. I do not clearly remember what was the final decision.

"Q But all views were to the effect that the hour set for the time of the delivery of the note was to be one that would not interfere with the success of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?

"A It should not interfere with the success of the surprise attack, but also, from the Foreign Minister's point of view, the note had to be delivered before the attack.

"Q But the primary matter was to have the attack a successful one, was it not?

"A Since it was a matter of war, the success of the surprise attack was very important, but also the diplomatic procedures were of great importance. It was not a question of which was most important - they were both extremely important. Especially since the Emperor had cautioned us in regard to it, the latter point was important.

"Q If the diplomatic procedure was so important and the Emperor had specifically cautioned you about it, why was it not arranged so that more notice would be given to the United States?

"A From the standpoint of strategy, since it was war, the necessity for victory had to be considered also, and the possibility of victory was intimately related to the question of time. I was extremely anxious as to the success of this surprise attack. That also was a grave matter.

"Q We will read the answers back to you so there will be no misunderstandings.

"A /This was done and the witness agreed that they were correct/."

\* \* \*

(p. 8)

"Q Do you not agree that the attack made under such circumstances was nothing but murder and not warfare?

"A No, I don't agree. I think it was legal defense in the face of challenge.

"Q Do you, as a Japanese, feel proud of the fact that several thousand Americans were killed at Pearl Harbor in this manner?

"A No, I am not proud of it.

"/Session adjourned at 12:25 for luncheon/

\* \* \* \* \*

"/Session resumed at 1345 hours/

"A I should like to make a supplementary explanation of my answer to the last question as to whether I was proud that several thousands of Americans were casualties as a result of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

"I sympathize with those who died, but Japan had been challenged and so she took justifiable self-defense. The English and American Governments had menaced Japan militarily and economically and they should have had a suitable attitude of readiness. Furthermore, the attack was against military objectives."

\* \* \* \* \*

(p. 11)

- \*Q you and the cabinet intended four surprise attacks to be executed at the same time against possessions of the United States and Great Britain?
- \*A The cabinet did not know. I knew, in my capacity as War Minister.
- \*Q The cabinet did know that America and Great Britain were going to be attacked without warning?
- \*A No. At that time they and I thought that Ambassador NOMURA would have delivered the note before the attack.
- \*Q How much notice did you and the cabinet believe that either the United States or Great Britain was going to get in this connection?
- \*A As I explained before, there were various theories as to the amount of time - an hour and a half, one hour, thirty minutes. I thought that there would be at least thirty minutes."



東條英樹ニ對スル 訪問ヨリノ 抜萃

一九四六年二月十九日

第一、二、三、四、五、六、七、八頁 ~~第十一、十二頁~~

2504A-1

「問」貴方ハ此ノ前ノ訪問ノ時、日本ハ外交ヲ斷絶スルソノ以後通牒ニヨリ、國際條約ノ見地カラ行動ノ自由ヲ獲得シタト感ジタ旨ヲ述ベマシタ。ガ日本ハ國際法上ノ見地カラモ同様ノ自由ヲ獲得シマシタカ。

「答」私ハサウ思ヒマス。

「問」合衆國ト英國ニ對シ攻撃ヲ開始スルニ先立チ此ノ國際條約ト國際法下ノ責任トイフ事ニツイテノ全問題ガ貴方ト内閣ニヨツテ考慮サレマシタカ。

「答」勿論サレマシタ。此ノ向是ハ外務省ノ重大責任<sup>ヲ</sup>アツタ事ヲ銘記シテ置ク事ガ大切デアリマス。

「問」外務省ハ閣議決定ニ先立チ、條約ト國際法ノ事柄ニツイテ何ント内閣ニ報告シマシタカ。

607 1204-A

2504A-2

「答」 外務大臣ハ職員ニ其ノ旨ヲ内閣ニ報告シ  
タ。其ノ後ニナサレタ事ハ外務大臣ノ専斷  
責任デアリマシタ。

「問」 ソシテ、外務大臣ノ内閣ヘノ報告ノ要旨ハ  
最近通商手交後ハ合衆國ト對シニ對スル取  
手ヲ妨ゲベキ何レモ實際係終リハ國際法上  
ナイトインフ難テアリマシタカ。

「答」 全局長ハ辭職ノ決意ヲシタ一日又ハ二日ノ  
御開會談ニ出席シマシタ。ソレ程全局長ノ  
一私的ニ言ツテ局長ノ決意ガナサレタ事ハ  
知ツテ居マシタ。何故ナレバ全局長出席シタ  
カフテス。  
シカシ長後遺跡ガ如何ニ渡送サルベキテア  
ルカトインフ局長ハ外務大臣ニヨツテ内閣  
ハレタ技術的責任デアリマシタ。

「問」 誰ガ貴方ト内閣ニ、如何ナル條約中ニ於イ  
テモ實際法上ニ於イテモ合衆國ト英國ニ對  
シ攻撃ヲナスヲ妨ゲル何レモナイト告ゲマ  
シタカ。

2504 A-3

「答」ソレハ私ノ研究ノ結果デアリマシタ。  
挑戦セラレ、自衛ノタメ行動シテ居ツタ譯  
デス。ソレ故國際法又ハ條約ノ見地カラ差  
支ヘナイモノデアルト私ハ考ヘタノデス。

「問」關員ハ貴方ノ意見ニ同意シマシタカ。

「答」サウデス、彼等ハ凡テ同意シマシタ。

「問」外務省モ同意シマシタカ

「答」サウデス。外務省ノ首モ亦ソノ問題ヲ研究  
シテ、同意シマシタ。

「問」我々ハ問題ト貴方ノ答ニ誤謬ノナイ事ヲ確  
カメルタメ以上ノ事スペテ貴方ニ讀ミ返  
シマス。

「答」「此ノ讀ミ返シガナサレ、證人ハソノ正シ  
イ事ニ同意ヲ表シマシタ」

「問」何時頃カラ貴方ハ此等ノ事ヲ研究シ始メマ  
シタカ。

「答」ソノ問題ガ起ツタ時カラデス。

× × × × ×



2504A-4

「第四、五頁」

「問」十二月一日又ハ二日ノ御前會議ニ先立ツ此  
ノ最後ノ連絡會議ニ於イテ貴方ハ貴方ノ研  
究ノ結果到達シタル國際法ト國際條約ニ關ス  
ルソノ見解ヲ披瀝シマシタカ。

「答」サウデス。

「問」ソレ故、該連絡會議ガアメリカト英國攻撃  
ノ最後決定ニ到リシタトキニハ既ニ彼等ハ  
此等ノ問題ニツイテノ貴方ノ見解ヲ承認シ  
テ居タノデスネ、

「答」サウデス。勿論彼等ハ承認シテ居リマシタ

「問」貴方以外ニソノ會議ニ於イテ誰レガ發言シ  
國際法ト條約ニ關シ同様ノ見解ヲ表明シマ  
シタカ

「問」外務大臣ハ主ナル責任者デシタノデ、此ノ  
點ニツイテ發言シマシタ。ソシテ私ノ研究  
ハ彼ノ見解ト一致シマシタ。責任官廳ガサ  
ウイフ決定ヲシタ故ニ他ノ出席員中誰レ一  
人トシテ盾疑ヲ提起シタモノデハアリマセン  
デシタ。

7504A-5

「問」 英國ト合衆國ニ對スル攻撃ニ先立ツテ、ド  
チラニモ何故開戦宣言ガナサレナカツタノ  
デスカ、

「答」 我々ハ、外交關係ノ斷絶ノ意味ヲ含ンテイ  
ル最後通牒ガ手交セラレタ時ソノ條約上ノ  
手續ハ終ツテキルノデアツテ我々ハ行動ノ  
自由ヲ獲得シタト考ヘマシタ殊ニ英米側カ  
ラノ挑戦ニ對應シテ自衛行動ニ出テ居ルノ  
デアルトノ假定ニタツテキルノデ我々ハソ  
レハ特ニ妥當デアルト考ヘマシタ。

X X X X X

2504A-6

「第六十七頁」

「問」 實際ノ政見ノドノ位前ニ塚後通勝ガ手交セラレテシタカ

「答」 色々意見ガ出テ高橋長ト外務大臣トノ間テ協議サレマツタ。

塚後通勝ノ手交ハ政見ニ允立ツ事一時間半ニナサルベキデアルトノ意見モアリ、一時間前ニナサルベシトカ三十分前トカ其他色々ノ意見ガアリマシタ。塚後の決意ガ何ンデアツタカ私ハ明確ニ記憶シテ居リマセン。

「問」 シカシ、ドノ意見モ塚後通勝手交ノ時ニキメラレタ時刻ハ辰採海ニ對スル奇襲ノ成功ノ妨ゲトナラナイ時刻デアルベキダトイフ懸念ノモノデアリマシタカ。

「答」 ソレハ奇襲ノ成功ヲ妨ゲルベキデアリマセンテシタガ、シカシ又外務大臣ノ見地カラ塚後通勝ハ政見前ニ手交サレヌバナリマセンテシタ。

「問」 シカシ主タル問題ハ政見ノ成功トイフ事デアリマセンテシタカ。

2504A-7

「答」 ソレハ戦争ノコト故ニ奇襲ノ成功トイフ事  
ハ非常ニ大切ナ事デアリマシタ、シカシ又  
外交上ノ手續トイフ事モ非常ニ重要ナ事デ  
アリマシタソレハドチラガ重要デアツタカ  
トイフ問題デアリマセンデシタ  
双方共態度ニ重要デアリマシタ。  
殊ニ陛下ヨリソノ點ニツイテ吾々ニ御注意  
ヲ賜ハツタノデ後ノ點ハ重要デアリマシタ

「問」 若シモ外交上ノ手續ガソノオニ重要デアリ  
且ツ天皇ガソノ點ニ付テ貴方ニ特ニ注意ヲ  
與ヘラレタノデアルナラバ、何故合衆國ニ  
對シテ、モット前ニ知ラセル様ナ手配ヲシ  
ナカツタノデスカ

「答」 戦争ノコト故、作戦上ノ見地カラ、勝利ノ  
必稟モ亦考慮サレネバナリマセンデシタ。  
ソシテ勝利ノ可能性ハ時ノ問題ト密接ニ關  
係シテ居リマシタ。私ニハ此ノ奇襲ノ成否  
ガ非常ニ氣懸リニナツテ居マシタ。ソレモ  
亦重大ナ事デアリマシタ。

「問」 誤解ガナイ様ニスルタメ右ノ答辯ヲ貴方ニ  
讀ミ返ヘシマス

2504A-8

「卷」 「コノ讀ミ返シガナサレマシタ。ソシテ證  
人ハソノ正確ナル亭ニ同意ヲ表シマシタ。」

X X X X X

2504A-9

「第八頁」

「問」 ソノ様ナ狀況ノ下ニナサレタ攻撃ハ戦争デ  
ハナク殺人ニ外ナラスト貴方思ヒマセンカ

「答」 イ、エ、私ハサウ思ヒマセン、ソレハ逃戰  
ニ直面シテノ正當ナ防衛デアツタト思ヒマ  
ス

「問」 貴方ハ日本人トシテ數千ノアメリカ人ガコ  
ノ様ニシテ眞珠灣ニ於テ殺サレタトイフ事  
實ヲ誇リニ感ジマスカ

「答」 イ、エ、私ハソノ事ヲ誇リト思ヒマセン。

「訊問」 タメノ會見ハ十二時二十五分晝食  
ノタメ休憩」

「訊問」 タメノ會見ハ十三時四十五分再開  
セラル」

「答」 私ハ數千ノアメリカ人が眞珠灣攻撃ノ結果  
トシテ死傷スルニ至ツタ事ヲ誇リニ思ツタ  
カ否カトイフ最後ノ盾問ニ對スル私ノ答辯  
ニツイテ補足説明シタイト思ヒマス

7504A-10

「私ハソノタメ死ンダ人々ニ對シテ同情致  
シマス、シカシ日本ハ挑段セラレタノデア  
ツテ、ソノタメ正當防衛ニ出タノデアリマ  
ス。

英國ト米國政府ハ日本ヲ軍事的ニ經濟的ニ  
脅威シタノデアリマシタ。從ツテ彼等ハ相  
當ノ覺悟ヲシテ居ル可キデアリマシタ。  
ソノ上攻撃ハ軍事目標ニ對シテ行ハレタノ  
デアリマス」

X X X X X

2504A-11

「十一頁」

「問」 貴方ト内閣ハ合衆國ト英國ノ領地ニ對シ同時ニ四ツノ奇襲ヲ實行サセルツモリデシタカ。

「答」 内閣ハ知りマセンデシタ、私ハ陸軍大臣ノ資格ニ於テ知ツテ居リマシタ

「問」 内閣ハ米國ト英國ガ無警告テ攻襲サレル事ニナルノヲ知ツテ居マシタカ

「答」 イイエ、ソノ當時彼等ト私ハ野村大使ガ攻襲前ニ通牒ヲ手交シタデアツタダラウト思ツテ居マシタ。

「問」 貴方ト内閣ハ合衆國カ英國ノドチラカガコノコトニ付テドノ位前ニ知ラサレルト思ツテ居マシタカ

「答」 私ハ前ニモ説明シタ様ニ時間ノ長サノ點ニツイテハ一時間半、一時間卅分、トイフ様ニ色々ノ説ガアリマシタ。私ハ少クトモ卅分間ハアルモノト思ツテ居リマシタ。



Ex. # 1205

Extract from Interrogation of  
General Hidiki TOJO  
of 18 Feb. 1946

/pp. 1-2/

"Q Last week I was talking to Admiral NOMURA and asked him if he considered the final note sent by Japan to the United States a declaration of war. He said that he absolutely did not. Do you agree that it was not?

"A I think it was a final note. It was a final note breaking off diplomatic relations.

"Q You have not answered the question. Do you agree with him that it was not a declaration of war?

"A It was a note breaking off diplomatic relations but it was different from a direct declaration of war. It was a note breaking off diplomatic relations and, hence, making possible freedom of action. That point is in reference to international treaties. This is an important matter though and this next point also applies. Japan had been challenged militarily and economically by various countries, especially England and America, and her existence was threatened. She exercised the right of self-defense."

\* \* \*

/pp. 3-4/

"Q Was not everything connected with this note your responsibility and the responsibility of the Cabinet?

"A It was my responsibility and also that of the Foreign Minister.

"Q Didn't the cabinet know that the note was to be sent and approve it?

"A Yes. They knew about it and of course they approved it.

"Q What international treaties were you speaking of in connection with sending the note?

"A I am not just sure of the names now. At the time, of course I knew them, but I am not so sure now. Isn't there a Hague Treaty, or something, that applies to these matters?

"Q Did not the Hague Convention call for a declaration of war prior to an actual attack?

"A I think that if a nation is challenged, it is not restrained from exercising the right of self-defense.

"Q You still have not answered the question. I repeat: Did not the Hague Convention call for a declaration of war prior to an actual attack? This is a question that can be answered 'yes', or 'no', or 'I don't know'."

"A At that time I studied this matter carefully, but now it is five years later and I have not the treaty here and I don't remember too well about it, but I believe that we had freedom of action under international treaties.

"Q In connection with the attack on America and Great Britain did you or the members of the cabinet give any thought to the Kellogg-Briand Pact being violated by Japan?

"A Of course, we did.

"Q So that you and the members of your cabinet felt that it was necessary to disregard treaty provisions and make the attack on America and Great Britain?

"A No, we had regard for them, but we did not feel that we were bound because of the reasons I have mentioned. That applies to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, too.

"Q So that you and the members of the cabinet, because of the reasons given, felt that Japan was not bound by any treaty provisions in connection with the attack on the United States and Great Britain?

"A Yes."

\* \* \*

EX 1205-A

2503-1

一九四六年二月十八日

東條英機ニ對スル詠詞同ヨリノ抄萃

一 一 二 三 一 四頁

問、先週私ハ野村提督ト會談シテ居リマシタ。ソ  
シテ日本カラ米價ニ送ラレタ最後通牒ハ宣戰  
布告ト考ヘタカト尋ホマシタ。彼ハ全然左様  
ニハ考ヘナカツタト云ヒマシタ。貴方ハ宣戰  
布告デナカツタト云フ彼ニ同意シマスカ。

答、私ハ最後通牒デアツタト思ヒマス。外交官紀  
スル最後通牒デアリマシタ。

問、貴方ハ私ノ質問ニ答ヘテ居リマセン。宣戰布  
告デナカツタ事ニ付テ彼ニ同意シマスカ。

答、ソレハ外交官紀通告デアツタガ直接ノ宣戰布  
告トハ云ヒマシタ。外交官紀ノ通牒デアツタ  
故ニ行動ノ自由ヲ可能ナラシムルモノデアリ  
マシタ。ソノ點ハ國際條約ニ既明シテ居リマ  
ス。コレハ重兵ナ件デアルガ又次ノ點モ亦ソ  
レニ當然ガアリマス。日本ハ諸外國幣ニ英國  
ト米價トカラ算算的經濟的ニ採戰サレマシタ。  
ソシテ生存ヲ脅カサレマシタ。日本ハ自衛權  
ヲ發動シマシタ。

× × ×

2503-2

問、右通牒ニ記スル凡テハ貴方ノ責任テアリ又内閣ノ責任テハニカツタカ。

答、私ノ責任テアリ又外務大臣ノ責任テモアリマシタ。

問、内閣ハ右通牒ガ承認サル可キ事ヲ知ラナカシタテスカ又ソレヲ承認シナカシタテスカ。

答、ハイ、閣僚ハ知ツテ居リマシタ、ソシテ勿論承認シマシタ。

問、通牒ヲ發送スル事ニ就テ如何ナル國際條約ヲ貴方ハ執ベテ居ラレマシタカ。

答、只今我等ノ名稱ニ付テ確カテアリマセン、勿論ソノ當時ハ知ツテ居リマシタ、然シ今ハ余リ確カテアリマセン。「ヘーグ」條約カ又ハ右ノ事件ニ適用スル何方アリマセンカ。

問、「ヘーグ」條約ハ直接適用ヲ關涉スル前ニ宣戰布告ヲ要求シマセンデシタカ。

答、若シ或ル一國ガ攻撃サレタ時ハ自衛權ノ發動ハ自由テアルト思ヒマス。

問、貴方ハマダ聖崗ニ答ヘテ居リマセン、繰り返シテ言ヒマスガ「ヘーグ」條約ハ實際攻撃ヲ關涉スル前ニ宣戰布告ヲ要求シマセンデシタカ、コレハ「サウテス」トカ「采ヒマス」トカ「知リマセン」テ答ヘラレル質問テス。

2503-3

答、ソノ營業私ハコノ件ニ付テ慎重ニ研究シマツ  
タ、應ガ三年後ノ今日テハ條約モ此處ニ待ツ  
テ居リマセンシ及ソレニ付イテ殆余記憶シテ  
居リマセン、然シ國際條約ノ下ニハ行動ノ自  
由ガアツタト思ヒマス。

問、米國並ニ英國ニ對スル攻撃ニ關シテ貴方等ハ  
閣員ハ「ケロツグ・ブリアン」條約ガ日本ニ  
從ツテ犯サレタトイフ事ヲ考ヘマセンデシタ  
カ。

答、勿論等々ハ考ヘマシタ。

問、ソレテハ貴方ト閣員ハ條約條項ヲ無視シ米國  
並ニ英國ヲ攻撃スル必要ガアツタト思ツタノ  
デスカ。

答、イエ、條約條項ハ考慮シマシタガ既ニ申シ  
給ヘマツタ通りノ理由ヲ等々ハ拘束ヲ受ケテ  
ハ是ナイト考ヘマシタ。コレハ「ケロツグ・  
ブリアン」條約ニモ適用シマス。

問、ソレテハ貴方並ニ閣員ハ右ニ述ベラレタル理  
由ニ依リ日本ハ米國及ビ英國ニ對スル攻撃ニ  
關シテ如何ナル條約條項ニモ拘束サレナリツ  
タト考ヘマシタカ。

答、サウデス。

X X X

Ex. 1206

Excerpt - From interrogation of Shigenori TOGO  
dated 26 March 1946 (page 4)

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- Q. Did you have the prime responsibility for the contents of the final note delivered by KURUSU and NOMURA on December 7, Washington time, to Hull?
- A. The note was written by the Foreign Office but in accordance with the views expressed in the discussions in the liaison and other conferences and the note was a general summary of those views. Therefore, the Foreign Office and I, as Foreign Minister, cannot take the responsibility. Furthermore, as the matter was related to the question of war, the high command naturally had to be consulted and various matters discussed with them in regard to the note. Such being the case, the government alone cannot take the responsibility, for the high command is also connected with the matter. And that being the case, even within the government, I alone as Foreign Minister cannot take sole responsibility on a matter of such supreme or major importance.
- Q. Would you name the individuals who you would consider as equally responsible with you for the contents of the note.
- A. All members of the liaison conference and even some members of the Cabinet who were familiar with this question.

Excerpt - From interrogation of Shigenori TOGO  
dated 26 March 1946 (page 7)

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- Q. Did you say anything to the Emperor concerning the telegram from KUHUSU and NOMURA with respect to President Roosevelt?
- A. As I recall, I did not mention that telegram to the Emperor, in that the matter had previously been discussed with both KIDO and TOJO, at which time the opinion was that such a step would not contribute toward the satisfactory settlement of negotiations between the two countries, therefore, the matter was not reported to the Throne.
- Q. Don't you think that the Emperor was entitled to know of such a proposal?
- A. The Emperor actually was entitled to ask questions on any or all subjects, but in so far as this particular telegram was concerned the general view within the government was that it was not of a nature that would contribute to a settlement and that, such being the case, it was not worth putting so much weight to and so it was not brought up to the Emperor.

Doc. No. 4119

**Certificate of Stenographer:**

I, Mildred Rich, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out herewith, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Mildred Rich

**Certificate of Interrogator:**

I, Roy L. Morgan, certify that on 26 March 1946 Shigenori TOGO personally gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth herein.

/s/ Roy Morgan



書類四一九號

一九四六年（昭和二十一年）三月二十六日附

泉郷茂徳訪問書ヨリ（四頁）ノ挨拶

× ————— ×

問。貴方ハ養正院時間十二月七日ニ來栖及ビ野村ヨリ「ハル」ニ手交サレタ後通牒ノ内容ニ對シテ首タル責任ヲ持ツテキマシタカ。

答。真ノ通牒ハ外務省テ書クニハ書キマシタガ、迎給會議ヤ其ノ他ノ會議テノ討論ノ際ニ述べラレタ見解ニ從ツタモノデ、其ノ通牒ハソレヲ見解ノ全般約摘要デアリマシタ。  
從ツテ、外務省並ニ外務大臣トシテノ私ハ、責任ヲ負フコトハ出来マセン。更ニ、幕僚院等問題ニ懸念ツテキタノデ、當院統帥部トモ相談シナケレバナラナカツタシ、通牒ニ就イテ統帥部ト密々ノ討議シナケレバナリマセンデシタ。ソウ云フワケテ統帥部モ此ノ事ニ關係シテ居マシタカラ、政府獨リガ其ノ責任ヲ負フコトハ出来マセン。  
事情類クノ如クデアリマシタノデ、政府内ニ於

4119-1

EX 1206-A

4119 - 2

テモ外務大臣タル私一人が漸カル意見大ナル同  
題ノ全責任ヲ引受ルコトハ出来マセン。

問。通牒内容ニ對シ、貴方ト同等ニ責任アット思ハ  
レル人ノ名前ヲ尋ゲテ下サイ。

答。通牒會議ノ全員、實ニ此ノ問題ニ關係シテ居タ  
る員モ含ム。

書類第四一一九號

一九四六年（昭和二十一年）三月二十六日附

東郷茂徳訊問書ヨリ（七頁）ノ抜萃

4119-3

問。貴方ハ「ルースヴェルト」大統領ニ話スル來朝、野村カラノ電報ニ就テ、何か天皇ニ申上ゲマシタカ。

答。私ノ記憶スル所デハ、其ノ電報ノ裏ハ天皇ニ申上ゲマセンデシタ。ト云フノハ此ノ件ハ先ニ木戸ト東條トノ間ニ討議サレ、其ノ際其ノ様ニ當ルニハ兩國間ノ交渉ノ満足ナ解決ニハ何ラ役ニ立タナイトイフノが見解デアツタノデス。從ツテ其ノ裏ハ陛下ニハ報告サレマセンデシタ。

問。貴方ハ天皇ハ斯ル娛樂ヲ知ルベキデアツタトハ思ヒマセンカ。

答。天皇ハ實際ニ、トシテ其ノ又スベテノ事ニ就テモ質問ヲスル事ガ出来タノデアリマス。併シ乍ラ、此ノ特別ニ電報ニ話スル限リ、政府内ノ一般的見解ハ、其ノ電報ハ問題ノ解決ニ役立ツ性質ノモノデハナク、又事情ガソウデアツタノデ其ノ電報ハソレ程重キヲ置ク價値ノアルモノデハナイ、トイフノデアリマシタ。ソレデ其ノ電報ハ天皇ニ呈出サレナカツタノデス。

Doc #119

速記者ノ証明書

私「ミッドリッド・リッチ」ハ此所ニ陳述セラレタ。  
訊問ニ私が速記者ノ役目ヲ勤メタコト私が  
前記偵問及答辯ヲ轉寫ニシタコト及右轉  
寫ハ私ノ知識及信念ノ範囲内眞實ナ  
ルト共ニ正確ナルトヲ茲ニ証明ニマス。

署名「ミッドリッド・リッチ」

訊問者ノ証明書

私「ロイ・エルモ」ガ「東郷茂徳」ガ  
一九四九年三月二十六日此所ニ陳述セシ  
タ數個ノ偵問ニ對シテ自己前記答  
辯ヲ存シタコトヲ証明ニマス。

署名「ロイ・エルモ」

From interrogation of Shigenori TOGO  
dated 11 March 1946, 1000-1200 hours (page 1)  
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- Q. Who would be considered responsible, who would you consider responsible for the composition of that note?
- A. That notification, as I have previously explained, was a summation of the results of the studies and discussions which took place at the liaison conferences regarding negotiations with the United States. The note itself was written by the Foreign Office, but the responsibility for the composition rests with the participating members of the liaison conferences. The responsibility for the contents of the notification rests with the members of the liaison conferences. Furthermore, the matter was also reported to the Cabinet and passed the Cabinet without objection.
- Q. Could you give me the names of the individuals at the liaison conferences and the Cabinet members who would be considered responsible for the contents of the note?
- A. As I have said at a previous meeting, members of a liaison conference who were responsible for the study and discussions on the matter were TOJO, SHIMADA, SUGIYAMA, NAGANO, TSUKADA, ITO, KAYA, SUZUKI, and the three secretaries, HOSHINO, MUJIO and OKA. As to the members of the Cabinet, under the constitution they are responsible for decisions of the Cabinet, even on matters outside of the competence of their respective offices.

From interrogation of Shigenori TOGO  
dated 11 March 1946, 1000-1200 hours (page 3)

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- Q. I understood from you that the note was composed by the Foreign Office after the contents of what the note should contain had been decided upon at the liaison conferences. I also understand that after the note was composed by the Foreign Office it was presented for approval to the Cabinet on December 1, 1941, at which time the Cabinet approved it. Is my understanding correct?
- A. The first part of your understanding is correct, that is, that the writing of the note took place in accordance with the decision of the liaison conference as to its contents. However, I should like to make some correction as to the date. December 1 was the date of the Imperial Conference, at which the decision for war was made. However, previous to the Imperial Conference the main points of the note to be sent were reported to the Cabinet; but as to the drafting of the note, that came afterwards, and at a later Cabinet meeting the main points were further explained and the continuation of the explanation that was made at the former Cabinet meeting. I cannot recall definitely, but it seems to be around November 30, but I could have the date more definitely confirmed later.

From interrogation of Shigenori TOGO  
dated 11 March 1946, 1000-1200 hours  
(bottom of page 4 and top of page 5)

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- Q. From what you have stated would you consider that the members of the Cabinet and members of the liaison conference, whose names you have mentioned, are equally responsible with you as regards to the contents of the note and its delivery?
- A. As to the contents of the note, I think it is but natural that all the members of the liaison conference are responsible. As to the Cabinet, they would have at least a final responsibility in that they expressed no objection, that is, from the legal point of view. Of course, it all depends whether you view the matter superficially or formally, or whether you would like to view it more profoundly. But, practically speaking, in the light of actualities it might be said that there is a difference in the degree of responsibility by the liaison conference and the Cabinet because not all the Cabinet members attended the liaison conference, but the situation was such that whatever was approved by the liaison conference was approved by the Cabinet. Although there may be a difference in degree of responsibility, the Cabinet might have at least a nominal responsibility.
- Q. Who knew and approved of the details concerning the manner of the delivery of the note?
- A. As to the delivery of the note, instructions were sent previously to the Embassy in Washington stating that it was to be delivered at 1:00 PM, December 7, Washington time, as much as possible to the Secretary of State, and that all preparations be made for the purpose of delivering the note at the specified time. The instructions themselves were dispatched by the Chief of the Cable Section of the Foreign Office. Regarding the sending of such instructions, all members of the liaison conference knew. It is naturally a matter on which there should be no objections, and, therefore, it was approved as a matter of course.

From interrogation of Shigenori TOGO  
dated 11 March 1946, 1000-1200 hours  
(bottom of page 5 and top of page 6)

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- Q. Why was England not advised of declaration of war?
- A. In the latter stages of the negotiations, when I became Foreign Minister, our relations with Britain were naturally considered. As a matter of fact, in case understanding was reached with the United States, agreements with Britain, the Netherlands, and other countries concerned would be necessary. Therefore, inquiry was made of the United States government on this matter. Regarding this point the Secretary of State informed Ambassador NOMURA that such matters would be handled by the United States and that the United States government would duly inform Britain and the other countries concerned. That being the case, it was not considered necessary to make any notification in London, since it would be going from Washington. However, on the morning of December 8, Tokyo time, shortly after the visit of Ambassador GREW at 7:00 AM, I asked for the visit of Ambassador CRAGIE of Britain. At that time I informed the British Ambassador the results of our negotiations with the United States and for reference gave him a copy of the Japanese note to the United States. Thereafter, around noon, the British Ambassador was duly notified, in writing, that a state of war existed between Japan and Britain. And, as I recall it, that notification was delivered before the commencement of hostilities with Great Britain.



Doc. No. 4115

Shigenori TOGO

11 March 1946  
1000-1200 hours

**Certificate of Stenographer:**

I, Mildred Rich, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out hereunder, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

/s/ Mildred Rich

**Certificate of Interrogator:**

I, Roy L. Morgan, certify that on 11 March 1946 Shigenori TOGO personally gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth herein.

/s/ Roy L. Morgan

九四六年三月十一日(下略、月十二日)附東郷茂徳  
ノ 質問書ヨリニ六枚等

RETURN TO ROOM 381

4115

問 ヲノ覚書ノ作成ニ当リテ誰ガ責任者ナリト考ヘラ  
レバ其方ハ誰ト思フカ?

答 先ニ私が説明ニ付テ下、通告ハ合衆口ト交  
渉ニ関スル連絡会議ニ於テ討議研究ニテ結  
果ノ要旨ヲ下シタ。覚書ノ一モハ外務省ニヨリテ  
書カレタガ、作成ノ責任ハ連絡会議ニ參與シ  
タ方ニ在リ。

41207

問 ヲノ覚書ノ内容ニ於テハ責任ハ連絡会議  
議員ニカ、ツキ中心  
更ニ下ノ問題ハ閣議ニ付テハ其議無ク因  
議ヲ通過ス。

41

問 ヲノ覚書ノ内容ニ責任アリト思ハル連絡  
会議ノ員及閣員個々ノ名前ヲ挙ゲラレバ  
答 先ノ意見ニ於テハ云フテ下ニ付、問題ニ付テハ  
ノ 研究・討議ニ責任アリ連絡会議ノ員ハ

No. 2

4/15

東條、島田、杉山、永野、塚田、伊藤、賀屋、  
鈴木、及三名、書記官星野、武井、岡下  
也。閣員ニ関シテハ彼等ハ憲法上、閣議  
決定ニ對シテ假令其ハ閣員、擔當以外、  
事項デアツテモ之ニ對シテ責任ガアル。

一九四六年三月十一日(一。一三物)附

東郷茂徳(詢問書白司)

4/15

問、

私(貴方)ニ伺ヒテ、ソノ覚書ガ、ソレニ合スル  
ルベキ内容ガ運絡會議デ決定サレタ後、  
外務省デ作成サレタモノデアルト解釈シタ。  
同時ニ私(貴方)覚書ガ外務省ニヨリテ作成サレ  
タ後、一九四二年(昭和十六年)十二月一日  
承諾ヲ得ルタメ國議ニ提出サレ、ソレニ  
同國議ガ之ヲ認可シタト解釈シタ。私  
ノ解釈ニ同意シタ。

答、

貴方ノ解釈、最初ノ部分正シ不即チ  
覚書作成スルノ内容ニ因テラ運絡會  
議ノ決定事項ニ從ツテ為サレタ。  
併シ、日附ニ因テラ多少訂正シタ。  
十二月一日ノ完戦ヲ決定シテ前會議  
ノ日デアッタ。之カ前會議ノ行ハル前  
ニ送ラレキ覚書ノ主要項目ノ國議ニ報

No 3.

4115

告サレタ。之カニ覚書ノ起草ニ関シテハソ  
シ後テサレソノ後閣議ニ於テ、主要ナル  
ハ更ニ説明サレ、前回閣議ニ於テサレタ  
説明が継続サレタ。然レハツキリ思出スル  
事ナク、多分十二月三十日頃グツタト思  
フ。之カニ此ノ日附ハ後テツキリ調べル  
事が出スル。

No 4

一九四六年三月十一日(一〇時—一二時)附

東郷茂徳ノ質問書ヨリ

4/15

問、貴方が陳述された通り、貴方が名指す所、閣議  
議員及連絡会議各員ハ貴方ト同等ニ覚  
書ノ内容及及行ニ関シ責任アリト思フ。

答、覚書内容ニ関シハ連絡会議各員全員ニ  
責任アリトハ至極当然ナルト思フ。閣議ニ  
関シハ他等ハ少クモ前々ノ反対ヲ示サナカッタ  
下ニ於テ取後ノ責任ガ凡テアラウ。即チ法  
律的見地ヨリ不バナル。又論ッシハ凡ソ貴  
方ガソノ問題ヲ皮相的ニ若クハ形勢的ニ見ルガ  
或ハソレヨリ深ク見ルガカッタルモナ  
ル。方ニ有実ニ鑑ミテ實際的ニ云ハ連絡  
会議各員責任ト、閣議各員責任トノ間ニ  
程度ノ差ガアルト云ヒ得ルト思フ。セテハ閣  
員スベテガ連絡会議ニ臨ミテ分ク力  
ラザルニカシキ態ガ有態ナラツタカス

6/5

連絡會議が可決せしむること何にヨリ又開  
議が可決せしむるにアツタ。責任ノ程度  
ニ差コトアルカモシナイが、開議モソクモ名  
義上ノ責任アルト思フ。

4115 問  
答

覚書交付ノ方法ニ関スル詳細ハ誰が知ツテ中  
タカ、又誰ノ同意ヲ得タカ。

覚書、交付ニ関シテハ豫メワシントンニ於ケ  
ル大使館ニ訓示ヲ送テラシ、即チワシントン  
刻十二月七日午後一時ニ覚書が成ルベク國務  
長官宛ニ渡サレルコト及び指定時刻ニシテ覚  
書ヲ交付スル目的ノタメ、凡テノ準備がナシ  
ルコトト云フベシ。訓示ノモノハ外務省海陸  
電信課長ニヨリテ送テラシタ。此ノ訓示ヲ送  
テ關シテ連絡會議ノ全員が承知シテ之ノ  
当然ノ反対スベキ事柄デハク故ニ当前ノ事ト  
シテ同意セシムラゲベシ。

706

一九四六年三月十一日(一〇一二號)付

東郷茂徳ノ質問書ヨリ

4115

答 問

何故英口ハ宣戦ニ就テ通告セシメカッタカ。  
 交渉、後段ニ至リ私ハ外務大臣ニツク当り、  
 我口ノ対英關係ハ自然考慮セシメ。實際  
 ノ問題トシテ、合衆口トシテ解ガ成レシ場合  
 合ニ英、蘭、他國係諸口トシテ協定ガ  
 必要トツテ来ルソコニ問題ニ関シテ、  
 アリカニ照会セシメ、コノ英ニ関シテ口務長  
 官ハ野村大使ニ斯ル問題ハ合衆口ガ  
 取扱フニ又合衆口政府ガ正式ニ英口及  
 關係諸口ニ通告スルデアラウト告ゲタ。  
 斯ク云フ事、横デアツタノデ、ワシニトシテ  
 ラ通告ガ行クコトシテロンドンニ何ノ  
 通告ヲ發スル必要モナイト考ヘラシメ  
 居タ。方シ然ル東京時刻十二月八日  
 朝、ブル大使ノ午前七時訪問ノ直

167



後 英曰、もし一様一大使、来訪ヲ請フ  
 タ。ソノ時私ハ、英曰大使ニ合衆曰トノ交  
 渉ノ結果ニ就テ知ラセ、尚餘者ノタ  
 メ日本ノ合衆曰ニ付スル覚書ノ旨  
 ヲ彼ニ渡シタ。

ソノ後、正年頃、英曰大使、正式ニ文書  
 ニヨリテ、日英ハ戦争状態ニアルコトヲ通  
 告サシタ。

ソレニテ私ノ記憶スル所デハ、英曰ト戰  
 争ヲ交ヘル前ニシテ、通告が渡サシタト思  
 フ。

4115

東郷茂徳

一九四六年三月十日 十時—十二時

速記者、証書

私ニリドリドリツタハ茲ニ陳述セラシク質問ニ  
私ガ速記者、役目ヲ勤メタコト、私ガ前記質問  
及答辭ヲ轉寫シタト、及右轉寫ハ私ノ知識  
並ニ信念ノ範圍内ニ於テ眞實ナルト共ニ  
正確ナルコトヲ茲ニ証明シマス。

署名ニリドリドリツタ

質問者、証書

私、ロイヤルモーションハ東郷茂徳ガ一九四六年  
三月十日 茲ニ陳述セラシク質問、質問ニ對シテ  
自ラ前記答辭ヲ爲シタコトヲ証シマス。

署名ロイヤルモーション

Doc. No. 2593-D(26)  
(Item 28)

Page 1

S E C R E T

From: Tokyo  
To : Washington.  
1 December 1941  
(Purple-CA)

#865

Re my #857\*.

1. The date set in my message #812\*\* has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information).

2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U.S. Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124\*\*\*. Please make the necessary representations at your end only.

3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter.

\*JD-1: 6921. (SIS #25496)

\*\*JD-1: 6710. (SIS #25138)

\*\*\*Not available.

25605

JD-1: 6983

S E C R E T

(D) Navy Trans.  
12-1-41 (S-TT)

COPY

S E C R E T

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE  
Colonel, G.S.C.

Dec 2593D (26)  
Sten 28

秘

東京發

「ワシントン」宛

一九四一年十二月一日

(紫一〇A)

第八六五號

往電米第八五七號ノ件

一往電米米第八一二號ノ期日ヲ經過シ情勢ハ急々  
危局ニ進ミツ、アルモ、我方ハ此際不必憂ニ合衆  
國側ノ疑霧ヲ増サザル様警戒スル見地ヨリ新聞其  
ノ他ニ對シテハ、彼我ノ主張ハ距離大ナルモノア  
ルモ、交渉ハ繼續中ナル旨ヲ指導シ居レリ。(以  
上貴使限リノ御含迄)

ニ貴電...米...第一一二四號ノ末段ニ於テ御提言ノ  
通り、東京駐在米國大使ヘノ同覺書提出ノ件ハ、  
此際控へル事ニ決定セルニ付必要ナル申入ハ單  
ニ貴方ニ於テノミ爲サレ度シ。

ニ當方ニ於テハ、大統領ノ急據首都保護ハ、東條  
首相ノ聲明ノ影響ナルヤノ報道モアルモ、大統領  
ガ斯クセシコトハ、極東ニ於ケル危局ニ關心ヲ持  
ツガ故ト思惟セラル、モ、右ニ就キ真相御探究ア  
リ度シ。

2.  
Doc 2573D (26)  
Jan 28

\*\*\* 原文無シ  
\*\* JD 1-16921 號 (SISSIS 第二五四九六號)  
\*\* JD 1-16710 號 (SISSIS 第二五一八號)

Doc. 2593 cert.

機 密 陸 軍 省

陸 軍 省 参 謀 本 部

情 報 局

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り聲明ス。即チ、  
 添附 數通ノ日本文典類ノ發行爲其ノ陸海軍兩省ノ熱  
 意セル職員ニ依リ等氣尙更ニ合理的ノ方法ニ依リテ得  
 受サレ、解體セラレ朝シテ繼續セラレシモノニシテ  
 予ノ知リ且信ズル限リ其類ニ日本文字ヲ翻譯スル爲  
 メ西洋人ニトリ入力ノ可能ナル限度ニ於テ正確且ツ  
 典據ノアルモノナリ。

参 謀 本 部 付 大 佐

OSAKI, M. STARKH  
 大 佐 参 謀 本 部 情 報 局

2.



Doc 2593 D (26)

Item 28

***	米	米
原文無シ	J E	J D
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三八

Doc. 7593 cert.

機 密 陸 軍 省

陸 軍 省 参 謀 本 部

清 報 局

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り證明ス。即チ、  
添附致通ノ日本文電報ノ複寫寫眞ハ陸海軍兩省ノ熟  
練セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ツテ傍  
受サレ、解讀セラレ而シテ機譯セラレシモノニシテ  
予ノ知り且信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ機譯スル爲  
メ西洋人ニトリ入カノ可能ナル限度ニ於テ正確且ツ  
典據ノアルモノナリ。

参 謀 本 部 付 大 佐

C. W. CLARKE  
カーター・グザリック・クラーク

Extract from Interrogation of  
Hideki Tojo, 8 February 1946  
P. 2

Q Who attended the Imperial Conference on December  
1st or 2nd, 1941?

A I was there as Premier; the President of the Privy  
Council was there, and all or nearly all of the  
other Cabinet Ministers, as I recall. The two  
Chiefs of Staff were there. I am not sure whether  
the Assistant Chiefs of Staff were there or not,  
but the Cabinet would know. Those were the respon-  
sible people that were there. There were also  
probably three other persons in the capacity of  
secretaries for these three usually came to  
Imperial Conferences. The three were the Chief  
Cabinet Secretary, Mr. HOSHINO; the Chief of the  
Military Affairs Section of the War Ministry,  
Mr. Shō MUTO, who was then a Major General, I  
believe. (At the end of the war, he was General  
YAMASHITA's Chief of Staff); and the Chief of the  
Military Affairs Section of the Navy Ministry,  
Vice Admiral OKA. These last three are according  
to my recollection. I am not positive that they  
were there...

6212071

一九四六年二月八日東京会議ニ對スル質問ヨリノ敬答

二 頁

2500 A

問、昭和十六年十二月一日カ二日ノ御前會議ニハ誰ガ出席シマシタカ

答、私ハ首箱トシテ席ニ居リマシタ、樞密院議長ガ出席シマシタ私ノ記憶ニ依ルト、ソレカラ他ノ關係ノ全部カ大部分ガ居リマシタ、兩總長モ居リマシタ、參謀次長廻ニ草谷部長ガ居ツタカ否カ確カデアリマセンガ内閣ハ知ツテ居ル筈デス。是等ノ人々ガ出席シタ責任者デアリマス、他ニ長官ノ資ヲ以テ三人ガ居ツタ事デシタ何故ナラバ彼等ハ御前會議ニ出席スルノガ理デシタカラデス、コノ三人ハ内閣書記官長星野氏、陸軍總務局長于澤時少將デアツタト、是ハレル武蔵五氏（終戦當時ニハ山下大將ノ參謀長デアリマシタ）廻ニ海軍省參謀長長岡海軍中將デアリマシタ、是等三人ハ私ノ記憶ニ基クモノデアリマス彼等ガ出席シテ居ツタカ否カ確デアリマセン。

Ex 1210

Dec 16 3 24 (88)

木戸侯爵日記 昭和十六年十二月一日分 十二月一日(月)

午前八時半 佐川氏家訪問談

九時山下三郎氏家訪問談

午前十一時半 羽田内物百倉蔵ノ管ニツキ話ヲ聴ク

二時御前會議 御値セラレ遊ニ遊米田殿ノ御決定アリタリ

四時半 首相來室 宣讀詔書ニツキ協議ス

四時四十五分ヨリ同五十五分迄 拜謁ス

七時 賀陽宮邸ニ伺儀 御通夜ス

Ex. # 1211

Doc. No. 2593-D (30)

page 1

Item 32

SECRET

From: Tokyo (Togo)  
To: Havana  
December 2, 1941  
J19-k9

Circular #2445

Strictly Secret.

Take great pains that this does not leak out.  
You are to take the following measures immediately:

1. With the exception of one copy of the O<sup>a</sup> and L<sup>b</sup> code, you are to burn all telegraph codes (this includes the code books for communication between the three departments and the code books for Army and Navy communication.
2. As soon as you have completed this operation, wire the one word Haruma.
3. Burn all secret documents and the work sheets on this message.
4. Be especially careful not to arouse the suspicion of those on the outside. Confidential documents are all to be given the same handling.

The above is preparatory to an emergency situation and is for your information alone. Remain calm --- --- ---.

Also sent to Ottawa, Vancouver, Panama, Los Angeles, Honolulu, Seattle and Portland.

- a - PA-K2 system.
- b - LA system.

ARLY

25879

SECRET

Trans. 12/8/41 (3)

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter V. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE  
Colonel, G.S.C.



6x 1211

Doc 2070 L (30)  
Item 32

東京（東京）發  
ハバナ 宛

一九四一年 / 昭和十六年 / 十二月二日

J I 9 I K 9

同電 第三四四五號 嚴秘

本件ノ漏洩セザル様大イニ努メセラレ度シ

貴官ハ即時次ノ長區ヲ取ラレ度シ

I 〇 及ビ 上階機密 一部宛ヲ除キ

一切ノ電信暗號簿ヲ焼却セラレ度シ（コレハ三  
部門ノ通信用暗號簿及ビ陸海軍通信用ノ暗號簿  
ヲ含ム）

2 右處分ヲ完了ト同時ニ、「ハルナ」ノ一語  
ヲ打電サレ度シ。

6 一切ノ機密書類及ビ本通信ノ原稿ヲ焼却  
サレ度シ。

4 外部者ノ嫌疑ヲ起サシメザル様等ニ注意  
セラレ度シ。機密書類ハ凡テ同様取扱ヲ具ヘラ  
ルベキデアル。

上記ハ緊急事態ノ用意ノタメデアリ、貴官  
ノ参考ノタメノミノモデアル。冷害タレ

尚オツタワ、バンクイバー、バナマ、ロス

373

2.  
Doc K0400H (00)  
Item 32

アンゼルス、ホノルル、シアトル及びボストンド  
へ送信セラレタリ。

PIPA 法  
JA 法  
二五八七九

秘 録 伊 8 / 4I (6)

Doc 2593 cert.

陸軍省

陸軍省参謀本部

情報局

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り證明ス。即チ、  
 添附數通ノ日本文電報ノ複寫寫眞ハ陸海軍兩省ノ熟  
 練セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ツテ傍  
 受サレ、解讀セラレ而シテ翻譯セラレシモノニシテ  
 予ノ知り且信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ翻譯スル爲  
 ×西洋人ニトリ人力ノ可能ナル限度ニ於テ正確且ツ  
 典據ノアルモノナリ。

参謀本部付大佐

CAREER. M. CLARKE

カーター・ダヴリウー・クラーク

Doc. No. 1532-D (11)

Page 1

Item 107

Telegram No. 875 (Ambassador Code)

To: Ambassador ROMER (Washington, U.S.A.)  
From: Foreign Minister 9360

Despatched 3 Dec. 1941  
9:00 P.M.

Most Urgent.

Re:- American-Japanese Negotiations.

Referring to your telegram No. 1232, we request that you will respond to the American side with the following purport.

We consider the rumor concerning the increase and strengthening of our troops in French Indo-China to be caused from reports exaggerating the facts of our increasing and strengthening of troops, in parts of northern French Indo-China, providing against Chinese troops which have been carrying on repeated activities recently on the French Indo-China and China borders; and, that in connection with this, of the troop movements of the southern area which was just natural.

We have never crossed the limits of the Franco-Japanese Joint Defense Protocol.



Doc. No. 2593-D (34)

page 1

Item 37

SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)  
To: Tokyo  
December 3, 1941  
Purple (Urgent)

#1256. Re your 875<sup>a</sup>.

I received your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this reply was a result of consultations and profound consideration. The United States Government is attaching a great deal of importance on this reply. Especially since the President issued his statement yesterday, it is being rumored among the journalists that this reply is to be the key deciding whether there will be war or peace between Japan and the United States. There is no saying but what the United States Government will take a bold step depending upon how our reply is made. If it is really the intention of our government to arrive at a settlement, the explanation you give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy them nor prevent them taking the bold step referred to - even if your reply is made for the mere purpose of keeping the negotiations going. Therefore, in view of what has been elucidated in our proposal which I submitted to the President on November 10th, I would like to get a reply which gives a clearer impression of our peaceful intentions. Will you, therefore, reconsider this question with this in mind and wire me at once.

a - See S.I.S. #25725 - Explanation of Japan's increase of their forces in French Indo-China.

ARMY 25849

JD 7128

Trans. 12/7/41 (1)

SECRET

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPT. STAFF  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE  
Colonel, G. S. C.

64/213

Doc. 257311 (34)  
Sta. 37

ワシントン (野村) ヨリ

東京 へ

一九四一年 / 昭和十六年 / 十二月三日

案 (至急)

第一二五六號、貴電第八七五號 (註参照) ノ件  
 早速御回電ニ接セル處、右ハ勿論協議ト深甚ナル  
 考慮ノ結果ト拜察スルモ米國政府ニ於テハ、本件回  
 答ヲ極メテ重要視シアリ。  
 殊ニ昨日ノ大統領聲明以來、新聞方面ニ於テモ本  
 件回答ハ、日米和戰ヲ決スル鍵ナリトノ報道傳へ  
 ラレ居リ、我方回答振り如何ニ依ツテハ、米國  
 政府モ相當思ヒ切リタル措置ニ出ツヤモ計ラレザ  
 ル處、政府ニ於テ眞ニ問題妥結ヲ期セラルルニ於  
 テハ勿論單ニ交渉ヲ繼續シテ御意嚮ノ場合ニ於  
 テモ、御來示ノ説明ヲ以テシテハ先方ヲ納得セシ  
 メ又ハ前記如キノ思ヒ切ツタル措置ヲ阻立スルコ  
 ト困難ト存セラルルニ付、現ニ十一月十日大統領  
 ニ提出セル我方案ニモ附示アル次第ニ有之、今  
 少し我方ノ平和的意圖ヲ明カニセル回答振望  
 マシキヲ以テ、右趣旨ニテ御再考ノ上至急御回電  
 相煩度。

註、S. I. S 第二五七二五號ノ印ニ於ケル日  
 本算ノ説明。



Doc. 2593 cert.

機 密 陸 軍 省  
陸 軍 省 参 謀 本 部  
情 報 局

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り聲明ス。即チ、  
添附致通ノ日本文電報ノ複寫寫眞ハ陸海軍兩省ノ熟  
練セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ツテ傍  
受サレ、解讀セラレ而シテ機譯セラレシモノニシテ  
予ノ知り且信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ機譯スル爲  
メ西洋人ニトリ入カノ可能ナル限度ニ於テ正確且ツ  
典據ノアルモノナリ。

参謀本部付大佐  
CARPENTER, CLARKE  
カーター・ダヴリウ・クラーク

Doc. 2593D (35)  
Item 38

Page 1

From: Tokyo  
To : Hsinking  
December 4, 1941  
Purple

#909

(Strictly Secret.)

Re my #892<sup>a</sup>.

On the fourth, in a joint conference with the Government Control Board, we decided upon steps which we will have Manchukuo take in case the international situation turns critical. Differing from what I said in my #873<sup>a</sup> our policy was changed as follows:

"When the Japanese Empire commences hostilities, for the time being Manchukuo will not participate. Because Manchukuo is closely bound up with the Japanese Empire and because England and the United States and the Netherlands have not recognized the Government of Manchukuo as a matter of fact, Hsinking will regard these three nations as de facto enemies and treat them accordingly."

Wherever "England and the United States" and "English and Americans" occur in the text, we changed them to "England, the United States, and the Netherlands" and "English, Americans and Netherlanders."

a - Not available.

26142

(Japanese)

Trans. 12/11/41 (5)

Q. # 1214

Doc. 2593D (35)  
Item 38

Page 1

From: Tokyo  
To : Hsinking  
December 4, 1941  
Purple

#909

(Strictly Secret.)

Re my #892<sup>a</sup>.

On the fourth, in a joint conference with the Government Control Board, we decided upon steps which we will have Manchukuo take in case the international situation turns critical. Differing from what I said in my #873<sup>a</sup> our policy was changed as follows:

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Wherever "England and the United States" and "English and Americans" occur in the text, we changed them to "England, the United States, and the Netherlands" and "English, Americans and Netherlanders."

a - Not available.

26142

(Japanese)

Trans. 12/11/41 (5)

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 JULY 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE  
Colonel, G.S.C.

Ex. #1215

Doc. No. 220J

Page 1

Extract from Foreign Relations of the United States-Japan  
1931-1941 Vol. II

Page 784

Statement handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to  
the Secretary of State on December 5, 1941

Reference is made to your enquiry about the intention of the Japanese Government with regard to the reported movements of Japanese troops in French Indo-China. Under instructions from Tokyo I wish to inform you as follows:

As Chinese troops have recently shown frequent signs of movements along the northern frontier of French Indo-China bordering on China, Japanese troops, with the object of mainly taking precautionary measures, have been reinforced to a certain extent in the northern part of French Indo-China. As a natural sequence of this step, certain movements have been made among the troops stationed in the southern part of the said territory. It seems that an exaggerated report has been made of these movements. It should be added that no measure has been taken on the part of the Japanese Government that may transgress the stipulations of the Protocol of Joint Defense between Japan and France.

采國、外交關係—日本  
一九三一年—一九四二年 第三卷ヨリ、抜萃

第六四頁

Doc 220J

一九四一年、昭和十六年、十二月五日 日本大使(野村)ヨリ  
國務長官ニ手交サレタ聲明書  
報道サレタ佛領印度支那ニ於ケル日本軍ノ行動ニ就テ  
日本政府ノ意圖ニ関スル貴下ノ御質問ニ言及致  
シマス。余ハ東京ヨリノ訓令ニ基キ貴下ニ次ノ如ク  
御通知申上ゲマス。

最近支那軍隊ガ支那ニ接スル佛領印度支那ノ北方  
國境ニ沿ヒテ行動ヲ起ス徴候ヲ屢々示シマシタ  
テ日本軍ハ是ニ對シ主トシテ警戒手段ヲ取ル目  
的ヲ以テ佛領印度支那ノ北部ニ於テ或ル程度強  
化サレマシタ。此ノ措置ノ自然的結果トシテ上記  
領土ノ南部ニ駐屯スル軍隊間ニ若干ノ移動が行  
ハレマシタ。是等ノ移動ニ関シテ誇大ナル報導  
ガナサレタルモノノ如ク思ハマス。日本政府ハ日佛  
間ノ共同防衛議定書ノ條項ニ違反スルカ如キ手  
段ヲ何等執ラカシタ事ヲ茲ニ附加ヘテ申述  
ベマス。

Ex 1215

Doc. No. 1532D (12)

Page 1

Item 224

Cipher Telegram No. 901 (Ambassador's Code)

Sent: December 6, 1941 8:30 p.m.

To: Ambassador NOMURA in U.S.A.  
From: Foreign Minister TOGO (6th of Dec. 1941)  
In reference to: Outgoing Telegram No. 844

- 1) The government has given careful deliberation in the Imperial presence to the proposal of the U. S. of the 26th of NOV. and has decided upon the memorandum to America (in English) as per telegram No. 902.
- 2) It is possible that the receipt of the said memorandum in its entirety (to be telegraphed in 14 parts), will be delayed till tomorrow as it is long. However, as the situation at present is exceedingly delicate, it is hoped that the receipt of it will be kept strictly confidential for the time being.
- 3) Although the exact time for presenting the said memorandum to America will be telegraphed later, all necessary preparations, such as arranging documents, etc., should be made, upon receipt of the said memorandum, for presentation to America, so that it can be carried out as soon as instructions for such action is received.

15320(12)

電送 加 224

電送 昭和16年12月6日 8時30分	46715	在米 野村大使宛	東郷大臣
件名 昭和十六年 十二月六日附			記録印名
暗 加	カ九〇一 号		(館長付号)

電信課長 (免)

發電係

昭和十六年十二月六日 起草

大臣署名

次官署名

電信課  
書記人

(往電カ八四号三関三)  
 一政府於三十月十六日、米側提案付慎重廟議ヲ垂テ凡結果  
 (別電カ九〇二号 對米演書(英文)ヲ決定セリ  
 二右別電演書ニ長文ニ關係モナリ全部(十四部)分割打電ス  
 接受セラルル日十時中無知シカレモ刻下ノ情勢ハ極大ヲ機微ニ  
 付右岸受領相成リ凡ソトハ差アリテ附テ凡ル様致サレ度ニ  
 三右演書ヲ米側提案ニ付期付テ進テ別ニ電報スベキモ右別電  
 接到ニ上訓令次第何時ニテ米側ニ手交シ得ル様文書ノ整理  
 其他豫メテ手配ヲ了スニ置カレ度ニ

Ex 1216



Q. # 1217

Doc. No. 1532-D(13)

Page 1

Item 226

Cipher Telegram No. 904 (Ambassador's Code)

Sent: December 6, 1941. 11:00 p.m.

TO: Ambassador NOMURA in U.S.A.

FROM: Foreign Minister TOGO (6th of Dec. 1941)

In reference to: Outgoing telegram No. 902

Although it is not necessary to give this caution, we trust that you will leave nothing to be desired in keeping the memorandum strictly confidential, by absolutely avoiding the use of 'typists' etc. in its preparation.

1532-D(13)

Item 226

電信課長 加(署名)

宛電係

管 亞米利加局長 了 在 亞米利加局才課長俊 昭和十六年十二月六日起算

電送才 46787号	宛 在米 野村大使	宛 東郷大臣
昭和16年12月6日午後11時発	件名	記録係
(暗)	(第九〇四号 (館長符号))	

(往電第九〇二号ニ関シ)

申又込 元才キコト作ラ本件覚書ヲ準備スルニ基リテ、又、分志子  
等ハ絶對ニ使用セサル様機宛保持ニ、此上共慎重ニ慎重ヲ期セ  
ラシ度云。

EX 1217

Ex. # 1218

Doc. No. 2593-D (39)

page 1

Item 42

TOP SECRET

From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
December 7, 1941  
Purple (Urgent - Very Important)

#907. To be handled in government code.

Re my #902<sup>a</sup>.

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p.m. on the 7th, your time.

a - JD-1:7143 - text of Japanese reply.

RLY 7145

25850

TOP SECRET

Trans. 12/7/41 (s)

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese

script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE  
Colonel, G.S.C.

EX 121A

Doc 2593D (39)

2593D 42

書類第二五九三號D 一三九  
第四二番

秘 録

東京發

「ワシントン」誌

一九四一年（昭和十六年）十二月七日

紫色（大五線、極重要）

第九〇七號 公用暗號電信

往電第九〇二「ワシントン」件實地時間七日午後一時ヲ期  
シ合衆國政府（版ル可ク國務長官ニ）實使ヨリ吾國  
答ヲ提出相成度シ。

「ワシントン」第七二五三號「日本ノ回答」  
原文

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

Box. 2593 cert.

機密陸軍省

陸軍省參謀本部

情報局

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り證明ス。即チ、

添附致通ノ日本支電報ノ複寫寫眞ハ陸海軍兩省ノ熟練セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ツテ傍受サレ、解讀セラレ而シテ機譯セラレシモノニシテ予ノ知り且信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ機譯スル爲メ西洋人ニトリ人カノ可能ナル限度ニ於テ正確且ツ典據ノテルモノナリ。

參謀本部村大佐

OMURA, MA. CLARK  
カミタリ・ダブリウ・クラーク

Ex. # 1219

Doc. No. 2593-D (38)

page 1

Item 41

From: Tokyo  
To : (Circular)  
7 December 1941  
(Purple)

Circular #2499 (Part 1 of 3) (Part 2 not available).

In the event of international crisis following upon our pursuance of our national policy regarding the China affair, which was decided on at the liaison-conference held on November 13th, the following steps will be taken in China:

(1) British concessions - upon issuance of orders, the present force will occupy and take over these areas. However, every effort will be made to accomplish this end through the instrumentality of existing set-ups.

(2) Shanghai International Settlement and the Peking Legation compounds: Upon issuance of orders, our troops will take over these grounds, however, without exceeding their present strength they will make every effort to maintain order and avoid causing confusion.

Also this will be accomplished by the aid of the existings set-ups and their staffs as well as that of various important Chinese agencies.

(3) Army settlement: The same procedure as the above will be employed.

(Part 2 not available)

25937

JD-1: 7210

SECRET (h) Navy Trans. 12-8-41 (6-AR)



Item 41

From: Tokyo,  
To : (Circular)  
7 December 1941  
(Purple)

Circular #2499 (Part 3 of 3) (Part 2 not available).

Upon declaration of war by Japan, the Nanking government will not be directed to participate in war but will be directed to maintain close relations and absolute cooperation with Japan.

(10) In maintaining close relations with our country the Nanking Government will be directed and guided in strengthening its morale and organization so that it may help alleviate Japan's burden in participating in a protracted world war.

(11) Steps will be taken to propagate among the people through the cooperation of the Nanking Government, the true meaning of the present war, and to issue orders to maintain quiet and order among the general public.

(12) Regarding economic plans in China, with a view to retaining and increasing mutual economic self-sufficiency, the emphasis will be placed on the utilization of productive powers, solicitation of local capital and investments, increased production of commodities. For this purpose efforts of every department will be made use of.

Note: Those departments in the above category which are connected with the Nanking Government will continue to maintain even closer contact with that government.

25937

JD-1:

SECRET

(A) Navy Trans. 12-8-41  
(6-AR)

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 July 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE  
Colonel, G.S.C.

EX 1219

Doc 2593D (38)  
Item 41

東京發

宛先 (同覽)

一九四一年 / 昭和十六年 / 十二月七日

(紫)

同覽第二四九九號 (三ノ第一節) (第二部入手不能)

十一月十三日陣營ノ連絡會議ニ於テ決定サレタル又那問題ニ關スル我國策遂行ニ伴フ國際危機發生スレバ、支那ニ於テ左ノ處置ガトラレルデアラウ

- (1) 英領租界一發令ト同時ニ、之等地區ヲ現在ノ軍隊ハ占領接收セン。併シ現在ノ組織ヲ使用シテ、コノ目的達成ニ凡ユル努力ガ行ハレルデアラウ。
- (2) 上海國際租界及ヒ北京公使館轄内一發令ト共ニ我國軍ハコノ地域ヲ接收セン。併シ現在ノ兵力ヲ超過スルコトナク、秩序ヲ維持シ混亂發生防止ノタメ凡ユル努力ヲ拂フデアラウ。亦以上ハ現在ノ組織トソノ黨性ノ助力ニヨリ、又參多ノ重要ナ支那機關ノ助力ニヨリ達成セラレン。

(3) 厦門租界一 上記ト同一手續ヲ用ヒルデアラウ。

(第二部入手不能)

2.

Doc 2573.D (38.)  
Item #1

東京發

宛先

(同前)

一九四一年/昭和十六年/十二月七日

(案)

閱覽第二四九號(三ノ第三部)(第二部入手不

能)

日本ニヨル宣戰布告ト同時ニ、南京政府ハ參戰

ノ指令ヲ受ケザルモ日本ト密接ナ關係ト懸對ノ協

力ヲ保ツベク指令サレシ。

(10)カ我ガ同ト密接ナ關係維持ニ當リ、南京政府ハ、

本ガ長期世界戰爭ニ參加スル上ニ於テ日本ノ負

担ヲ輕減ノ一助トモナルベクソノ士氣ト組織體化

ニ指示ト指導ヲ受ケルテアラウ。

(11)南京政府ノ協力ヲ進シ人民ノ間ニ今次戰爭ノ眞

意ヲ宣傳スベク且一億民衆ノ間ニ平和ト秩序維持

ヲ命令令發布スベク虞懼ガ取ラレテアラウ。

(12)支那ノ經濟計費ニ關シテハ、相互ノ經濟的自活

ヲ維持増大スル目的ヲ以テ、生産力ノ利用、地方

資本ト投資ノ誘致、物資ノ増産ニ積極ガ努力カレ

テアラウ。コノ目的ノタメニ各部門ノ努力ガ利用

サレテアラウ。

計、南京政府ニ關係セル上記範圍ノ該部門ハ更

ニ一層密接ナル接觸ヲ同政府ト維持シ懸ケ

ルデアラウ。

Doc 2593 cert.

機密 陸軍省  
陸軍省参謀本部

情報局

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り證明ス。即チ、  
添附敷通ノ日本文電報ノ複寫寫眞ハ陸海軍兩省ノ熟  
練セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ツテ傍  
受サレ、解讀セラレ而シテ翻譯セラレシモノニシテ  
予ノ知り且信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ翻譯スル爲  
メ西洋人ニトリ人カノ可能ナル限度ニ於テ正確且ツ  
典據ノアルモノナリ。

参謀本部付大佐

CAREER, W. CLARKE

カーター・ダヴリウー・クラーク

Ex. # 1220

Doc. No. 1632W(89)

page 1.

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 7 Dec 41"

December 7th, 1941 (Extract)

At 9.30 p.m. HOSHINO, Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, visited me to consult about the war with the U.S.A. and England.

EX 1220

Doc 1632W (89)

木 戸 侯 爵 日 記

西 曆 十 六 年 十 二 月 七 日 令

十 二 月 七 日 ( 日 ) 晴

午 前 十 時 和 國 來 訪 援 衛 院 政 長 云 々 ノ 語 ヲ 積 ク 昭 允 語  
ヲ 呼 ビ 尋 意 ト 國 人 ニ ア 、 ク ロ ヅ ケ ー ノ 對 抗 試 合 ヲ ナ  
シ 備 歎 ス

三 時 倉 茂 氏 ノ 療 治 ヲ 受 ク

二 時 村 井 貞 之 助 氏 告 別 式 ニ 参 列 ス

六 時 十 五 分 大 宮 御 所 ニ 伺 候 御 膳 會 ニ 列 ス

九 時 半 皇 室 聖 記 會 長 來 訪 試 米 其 際 ニ ツ キ 打 合 ス

Ex. # 1221

Doc. No. 220-I

Page 1

Extract from Foreign Relations of the United States-Japan  
1931-1941, Vol. II, page 784.

President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State.  
The White House, Washington (December 6, 1941).  
Dear Cordell: Shoot this to Grew - I think it can go in  
gray code-saves time-I don't mind if it gets picked up.

F.D.R.



220-1

一九三二年—一九四二年米日外交関係ヨリノ抜萃

オ十一卷

七八頁

「ルーズベルト大統領ヨリ事務長官宛

自聖館・ワシントン（一九四二年十二月六日）

親受ナルコトヲ

此「プログラム」ニ打電セヨ—灰色符号ヲ打テト思フ—

！時間節約ニテ！—傍受サシテモ構ハス。

F. D. R

EX 1221

Ex. 1222

DOCUMENT NO. 2665.

TIME CHART

for December 6, 7, 8, 1941.

<u>TOKYO TIME</u>	<u>PLACE</u>	<u>LOCAL TIME</u>	<u>EVENTS</u>
1. <u>17th</u> 0940	Washington	1940 - 6th	American Press told telegram going to Emperor.
2. 1000	Washington	2000 - 6th	Mr. Hull cables Mr. Grew that telegram on way
3. 1100	Washington	2100 - 6th	Mr. Hull sends President's message to Emperor to Mr. Grew; both Mr. Hull's cables marked "Triple Priority". By President's order message sent in easily decipherable code.
4. 1200	Tokyo	1200 - 7th	President's message received in Tokyo.
5. 1500	Tokyo	1500 - 7th	U.S. Radio announces a message on the way.
6. 1800	Tokyo	1800 - 7th	By this time at latest contents of message known in Japanese Government offices.
7. 2230	Tokyo	2230 - 7th	Mr. Grew gets the message from Mr. Hull.
8. <u>8th</u> 0015	Tokyo	0015 - 8th	Mr. Grew sees Foreign Minister TOGO, reads message to him, asks for appointment to deliver it personally to the Emperor, and goes home.
9. 0045	Shanghai	2345 - 7th	The Shanghai Bund (International Settlement) occupied by Japanese troops.
10. 0140	Kota Bahru	2400 - 7th	British beach defences shelled from the sea.
11. 0200	Washington	1200 - 7th	Mr. Nomura asks to see Mr. Hull at 1300 hours.
12. 0205	Kota Bahru	0025 - 8th	Japanese landing at Kota Bahru in Northern Malaya.
13. 0300	Washington	1300 - 7th	Mr. Nomura asks for postponement of meeting with Mr. Hull to 1345 hours.

	<u>TOKYO TIME</u>	<u>PLACE</u>	<u>LOCAL TIME</u>	<u>EVENTS</u>
14	<u>December</u> <u>8th</u> 0305	Singora	0125 - 8th	About this time at Singora and Patani in Southern Siam, Japanese landed and advanced towards Malayan border.
15.	0320-25	Pearl Harbour	0750-55 - 7th	Attack at Pearl Harbour.
16.	0405	Washington	1405 - 7th	Mr. Nomura arrives at Mr. Hull's office.
17.	0420	Washington	1420 - 7th	Mr. Nomura hands Mr. Hull Document No. 2215 N, the document terminating negotiations.
18.	0520	Shanghai	0420 - 8th	K.M.S. Petrel sunk with casualties.
19.	0530	Siam	0330 - 8th	Japanese troops invade Siam from Indo-China
20.	0610	Singapore	0430 - 8th	Air Raid on Singapore.
21.	0700	Tokyo	0700 - 8th	Tokyo Radio gives first announcement that hostilities have begun.
22.	0730	Tokyo	0730 - 8th	Mr. Grew calls on Foreign Minister TOGO at his request and TOGO hands him copy of document handed by Mr. Nomura to Mr. Hull, describing it as Emperor's answer to President's message.
23.	0800	Tokyo	0800 - 8th	Sir Robert Craigie calls on Foreign Minister TOGO at his request and is handed a copy of the same document
24.	0805	Guam	0305 -. 8th	Guam attacked.
25.	0900	Hong Kong	0800 - 8th	Hong Kong attacked.
26.	Between 1140 and 1200	Tokyo	Between 1140 and 1200	Imperial Rescript issued.

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No 1 EX 1222

Doc 2665

一九四二年(昭和十七年)十二月之白、廿一日、三日前中、  
 (重要事件発生) 時間表

東京十二月時間	場所	当地時間	発生事件
廿日 九時	華盛頓	廿日 九時	「アメリ、新聞、天皇ニ電報發送中ナリト」 報ヲ受ク
〇〇	華盛頓	廿日 〇時	「ハル氏、電報發送途ニ在リ、ハル氏打電
二〇〇	華盛頓	廿日 二時	「ハル氏、大統領、天皇死、ヲセシムル ハル氏傳達ス、ハル氏ヨリ、電報ニ通シ 「信優先」ト記ス。大統領、命ヨリ、 セシムル、官房、解讀、傳、踏號、發送
廿日 三時	東京	廿日 三時	大統領、ヲセシムル東京ニ送信スル
五時	東京	廿日 五時	合衆國ヨリ、通牒ヲ送信、途ニ其發送 ス
六時	東京	廿日 六時	日本政府當局、遲ニ此、時間迄、ヲセシム 、内容ヲ未カス
廿日 三時	東京	廿日 三時	ハル氏、ハル氏ヨリ、通牒ヲ受取ル
廿日 五時	東京	廿日 五時	ハル氏、東郷外相ト會見、ヲセシムル 「天皇ニ直接ニ傳達スル、謁見ニシテ、
〇時	上海	廿日 〇時	上海、吳淞、(共同租界) 日本軍ニ占領スル
廿日 四時	コタバル	廿日 四時	英海岸砲隊、海上ヨリ、砲撃スル
廿日 三時	華盛頓	廿日 三時	野村氏、ハル氏ト三時ニ會見、ヲセシム 申出

Doc 2665

No 2

日付	場所	出来事	発生事件
二	上海	英軍艦「テレル」号重沈シテ死傷者ヲ出ス	
三	東京	「パール」氏東御外務大臣ノ要請ニヨリ同氏ヲ訪問	
四	東京	野村氏ヨリ「パール」氏ニ手交セル文書	
五	東京	「パール」氏ニ手交セル大統領ノメッセー	
六	東京	「パール」氏ニ對スル天皇回答ナリト説明ス	
七	東京	「パール」氏東御外務大臣ノ要請ニヨリ同氏ヲ訪問	
八	東京	上記ト同一文書ヲ受取ル	
九	香港	「パール」島政專セラル	
一〇	東京	香港政專セラル	
一一	東京	詔敕頒布セラル	
一二	東京	野村氏ハ「パール」氏ニ手交ス	
一三	東京	野村氏ハ「パール」氏ニ手交ス	
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Ex. # 1223

Doc. No. 2581

Page 1

War Ministry Building )  
 )  
 City of TOKYO ) S.S.  
 )  
 JAPAN. )

I, PHILIP EARL SANDERS, Chief Boatswain's Mate, United States Navy, now attached to the International Prosecution Section of S.C.A.P., being duly sworn, depose and say that I am qualified in Navigation and have recently examined United States Navy Hydrographic Time Tables.

I have examined the variations in time between places marked on the first line of the attached Time Table and say that they are accurately set out. I have, by arithmetical calculations, prepared the said Time Table for the 24 hours of December 8th, 1941, Tokyo Time, and these calculations are, to the best of my knowledge and belief, true. Variations in time for any other date can be calculated accordingly.

/s/ Philip Earl Sanders

PHILIP EARL SANDERS,  
 Chief Boatswain's Mate,  
 United States Navy.

Subscribed and sworn  
 to before me this  
 8th day of August, 1946.

/s/ Harryman Dorsey

HARRYMAN DORSEY,  
 Captain, JAGD.

COMPARATIVE TIME TABLE BASED ON TOKYO, PROCEEDING EASTWARD, on  
7th - 8th DECEMBER

TOKYO      PEARL HARBOR      WASHINGTON      GREENWICH      BANGKOK      KOTA BHARU,  
SINGAPORE.      HONG KONG  
SHANGHAI,  
MANILA.

<u>8th Dec.</u> 0000	<u>7th Dec.</u> 0430	<u>7th Dec.</u> 1000	<u>7th Dec.</u> 1500	<u>7th Dec.</u> 2200	<u>7th Dec.</u> 2220	<u>7th Dec.</u> 2300
05	35	05	05	05	25	05
10	40	10	10	10	30	10
15	45	15	15	15	35	15
20	50	20	20	20	40	20
25	55	25	25	25	45	25
30	0500	30	30	30	50	30
35	05	35	35	35	55	35
40	10	40	40	40	2300	40
45	15	45	45	45	05	45
50	20	50	50	50	10	50
55	25	55	55	55	15	55
0100	30	1100	1600	2300	20	<u>8th Dec.</u> 0000
05	35	05	05	05	25	05
10	40	10	10	10	30	10
15	45	15	15	15	35	15
20	50	20	20	20	40	20
25	55	25	25	25	45	25
30	0600	30	30	30	50	30
35	05	35	35	35	55	35
40	10	40	40	40	<u>8th Dec.</u> 0000	40
45	15	45	45	45	05	45
50	20	50	50	50	10	50
55	25	55	55	55	15	55
0200	30	1200	1700	<u>8th Dec.</u> 0000	20	0100
05	35	05	05	05	25	05
10	40	10	10	10	30	10
15	45	15	15	15	35	15
20	50	20	20	20	40	20

TOKYO      PEARL HARBOR      WASHINGTON      GREENWICH      BANGKOK      KOTA BHARU,  
SINGAPORE.      HONG KONG,  
SHANGHAI,  
MANILA.

<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>7th Dec.</u>	<u>7th Dec.</u>	<u>7th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>
0225	0655	1225	1725	0025	0045	0125
30	0700	30	30	30	50	30
35	05	35	35	35	55	35
40	10	40	40	40	0100	40
45	15	45	45	45	05	45
50	20	50	50	50	10	50
55	25	55	55	55	15	55
0300	30	1300	1800	0100	20	0200
05	35	05	05	05	25	05
10	40	10	10	10	30	10
15	45	15	15	15	35	15
20	50	20	20	20	40	20
25	55	25	25	25	45	25
30	0800	30	30	30	50	30
35	05	35	35	35	55	35
40	10	40	40	40	0200	40
45	15	45	45	45	05	45
50	20	50	50	50	10	50
55	25	55	55	55	15	55
0400	30	1400	1900	0200	20	0300
05	35	05	05	05	25	05
10	40	10	10	10	30	10
15	45	15	15	15	35	15
20	50	20	20	20	40	20
25	55	25	25	25	45	25
30	0900	30	30	30	50	30
35	05	35	35	35	55	35
40	10	40	40	40	0300	40
45	15	45	45	45	05	45
50	20	50	50	50	10	50
55	25	55	55	55	15	55



TOKYO PEARL HARBOR WASHINGTON GREENWICH BANGKOK KOTA BHARU, SINGAPORE HONG KONG, SHANGHAI, MANILA

<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>7th Dec.</u>	<u>7th Dec.</u>	<u>7th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>
0500 0505	0710 0935	1500 1505	2000 2005	0300 0305	0320 0325	0400 0405
10	40	10	10	10	30	10
15	45	15	15	15	35	15
20	50	20	20	20	40	20
25	55	25	25	25	45	25
30	1000	30	30	30	50	30
35	05	35	35	35	55	35
40	10	40	40	40	0400	40
45	15	45	45	45	05	45
50	20	50	50	50	10	50
55	25	55	55	55	15	55
0600	30	1600	2100	0400	20	0500
05	35	05	05	05	25	05
10	40	10	10	10	30	10
15	45	15	15	15	35	15
20	50	20	20	20	40	20
25	55	25	25	25	45	25
30	1100	30	30	30	50	30
35	05	35	35	35	55	35
40	10	40	40	40	0500	40
45	15	45	45	45	05	45
50	20	50	50	50	10	50
55	25	55	55	55	15	55
0700	30	1700	2200	0500	20	0600
05	35	05	05	05	25	05
10	40	10	10	10	30	10
15	45	15	15	15	35	15
20	50	20	20	20	40	20
25	55	25	25	25	45	25
30	1200	30	30	30	50	30
35	05	35	35	35	55	35
40	10	40	40	40	0600	40
45	15	45	45	45	0605	45
50	20	50	50	50		50
55	25	55	55	55		55

TOKYO      PEARL HARBOR      WASHINGTON      GREENWICH      BANGKOK      KOTA BAHRU,  
SINGAPORE      HONG KONG,  
SHANGHAI,  
MANILA

<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>7th Dec.</u>	<u>7th Dec.</u>	<u>7th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>
0750	1220	1750	2250	0550	0610	0650
55	25	55	55	55	15	55
0800	30	1800	2300	0600	20	0700
05	35	05	05	05	25	05
10	40	10	10	10	30	10
15	45	15	15	15	35	15
20	50	20	20	20	40	20
25	55	25	25	25	45	25
30	1300	30	30	30	50	30
35	05	35	35	35	55	35
40	10	40	40	40	0700	40
45	15	45	45	45	05	45
50	20	50	50	50	10	50
55	25	55	55	55	15	55
0900	30	1900	<u>8th Dec.</u> 0000	0700	20	0800
05	35	05	05	05	25	05
10	40	10	10	10	30	10
15	45	15	15	15	35	15
20	50	20	20	20	40	20
25	55	25	25	25	45	25
30	1400	30	30	30	50	30
35	05	35	35	35	55	35
40	10	40	40	40	0800	40
45	15	45	45	45	05	45
50	20	50	50	50	10	50
55	25	55	55	55	15	55
1000	30	2000	0100	0800	20	0900
05	35	05	05	05	25	05
10	40	10	10	10	30	10
15	45	15	15	15	35	15
20	50	20	20	20	40	20

TOKYO	PEARL HARBOR	WASHINGTON	GREENWICH	BANGKOK	KOTA BAHU, SINGAPORE	HONG KONG, SHANGHAI, MANILA
<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>7th Dec.</u>	<u>7th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>
1025	1455	2025	0125	0825	0845	0925
30	1500	30	30	30	50	30
35	05	35	35	35	55	35
40	10	40	40	40	0900	40
45	15	45	45	45	05	45
50	20	50	50	50	10	50
55	25	55	55	55	15	55
1100	30	2100	0200	0900	20	1000
05	35	05	05	05	25	05
10	40	10	10	10	30	10
15	45	15	15	15	35	15
20	50	20	20	20	40	20
25	55	25	25	25	45	25
30	1600	30	30	30	50	30
35	05	35	35	35	55	35
40	10	40	40	40	1000	40
45	15	45	45	45	05	45
50	20	50	50	50	10	50
55	25	55	55	55	15	55
1200	30	2200	0300	1000	20	1100
05	35	05	05	05	25	05
10	40	10	10	10	30	10
15	45	15	15	15	35	15
20	50	20	20	20	40	20
25	55	25	25	25	45	25
30	1700	30	30	30	50	30
35	05	35	35	35	55	35
40	10	40	40	40	1100	40
45	15	45	45	45	05	45
50	20	50	50	50	10	50
55	25	55	55	55	15	55
1300	30	2300	0400	1100	20	1200

TOKYO	PEARL HARBOR	WASHINGTON	GREENWICH	BANGKOK	KOTA BAHRU, SINGAPORE	HONG KONG SHANGHAI, MANILA
<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>7th Dec.</u>	<u>7th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>
1305	1735	2305	0405	1105	1125	1205
10	40	10	10	10	30	10
15	45	15	15	15	35	15
20	50	20	20	20	40	20
25	55	25	25	25	45	25
30	1800	30	30	30	50	30
35	05	35	35	35	55	35
40	10	40	40	40	1200	40
45	15	45	45	45	05	45
50	20	50	50	50	10	50
55	25	55	55	55	15	55
1400	30	<u>8th Dec.</u> 0000	0500	1200	20	1300
05	35	05	05	05	25	05
10	40	10	10	10	30	10
15	45	15	15	15	35	15
20	50	20	20	20	40	20
25	55	25	25	25	45	25
30	1900	30	30	30	50	30
35	05	35	35	35	55	35
40	10	40	40	40	1300	40
45	15	45	45	45	05	45
50	20	50	50	50	10	50
55	25	55	55	55	15	55
1500	30	0100	0600	1300	20	1400
05	35	05	05	05	25	05
10	40	10	10	10	30	10
15	45	15	15	15	35	15
20	50	20	20	20	40	20
25	55	25	25	25	45	25
30	2000	30	30	30	50	30
35	05	35	35	35	55	35
40	10	40	40	40	1400	40

TOKYO	PEARL HARBOR	WASHINGTON	GREENWICH	BANGKOK	KOTA BAHRU, SINGAPORE	HONG KONG, SHANGHAI, MANILA.
<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>7th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>
1545	2015	0145	0645	1345	1405	1445
50	20	50	50	50	10	50
55	25	55	55	55	15	55
1600	30	0200	0700	1400	20	1500
05	35	05	05	05	25	05
10	40	10	10	10	30	10
15	45	15	15	15	35	15
20	50	20	20	20	40	20
25	55	25	25	25	45	25
30	2100	30	30	30	50	30
35	05	35	35	35	55	35
40	10	40	40	40	1500	40
45	15	45	45	45	05	45
50	20	50	50	50	10	50
55	25	55	55	55	15	55
1700	30	0300	0800	1500	20	1600
05	35	05	05	05	25	05
10	40	10	10	10	30	10
15	45	15	15	15	35	15
20	50	20	20	20	40	20
25	55	25	25	25	45	25
30	2200	30	30	30	50	30
35	05	35	35	35	55	35
40	10	40	40	40	1600	40
45	15	45	45	45	05	45
50	20	50	50	50	10	50
55	25	55	55	55	15	55
1800	30	0400	0900	1600	20	1700
05	35	05	05	05	25	05
10	40	10	10	10	30	10
15	45	15	15	15	35	15
20	50	20	20	20	40	20

TOKYO	PEARL HARBOR	WASHINGTON	GREENWICH	BANGKOK	KOTA BAHU, SINGAPORE	HONG KONG, SHANGHAI, MANILA.
<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>7th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>
1825	2255	0425	0925	1625	1645	1725
30	2300	30	30	30	50	30
35	05	35	35	35	55	35
40	10	40	40	40	1700	40
45	15	45	45	45	05	45
50	20	50	50	50	10	50
55	25	55	55	55	15	55
1900	30	0500	1000	1700	20	1800
05	35	05	05	05	25	05
10	40	10	10	10	30	10
15	45	15	15	15	35	15
20	50	20	20	20	40	20
25	55	25	25	25	45	25
30	<u>8th Dec.</u> 0000	30	30	30	50	30
35	05	35	35	35	55	35
40	10	40	40	40	1800	40
45	15	45	45	45	05	45
50	20	50	50	50	10	50
55	25	55	55	55	15	55
2000	30	0600	1100	1800	20	1900
05	35	05	05	05	25	05
10	40	10	10	10	30	10
15	45	15	15	15	35	15
20	50	20	20	20	40	20
25	55	25	25	25	45	25
30	0100	30	30	30	50	30
35	05	35	35	35	55	35
40	10	40	40	40	1900	40
45	15	45	45	45	05	45
50	20	50	50	50	10	50
55	25	55	55	55	15	55
2100	30	0700	1200	1900	20	2000

TOKYO	PEARL HARBOR	WASHINGTON	GREENWICH	BANGKOK	KOTA BAHU, SINGAPORE	HONG KONG, SHANGHAI, MANILA.
<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>
2105	0135	0705	1205	1905	1925	2005
10	40	10	10	10	30	10
15	45	15	15	15	35	15
20	50	20	20	20	40	20
25	55	25	25	25	45	25
30	0200	30	30	30	50	30
35	05	35	35	35	55	35
40	10	40	40	40	2000	40
45	15	45	45	45	05	45
50	20	50	50	50	10	50
55	25	55	55	55	15	55
2200	30	0800	1300	2000	20	2100
05	35	05	05	05	25	05
10	40	10	10	10	30	10
15	45	15	15	15	35	15
20	50	20	20	20	40	20
25	55	25	25	25	45	25
30	0300	30	30	30	50	30
35	05	35	35	35	55	35
40	10	40	40	40	2100	40
45	15	45	45	45	05	45
50	20	50	50	50	10	50
55	25	55	55	55	15	55
2300	30	0900	1400	2100	20	2200
05	35	05	05	05	25	05
10	40	10	10	10	30	10
15	45	15	15	15	35	15
20	50	20	20	20	40	20
25	55	25	25	25	45	25
30	0400	30	30	30	50	30
35	05	35	35	35	55	35
40	10	40	40	40	2200	40

TOKYO      PEARL HARBOR      WASHINGTON      GREENWICH      BANGKOK      KOTA BAHU,  
SINGAPORE      HONG KONG,  
SHANGHAI,  
MANILA.

<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>2th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>	<u>8th Dec.</u>
2345	0415	0945	1445	2145	2205	2245
50	20	50	50	50	10	50
55	25	55	55	55	15	55

This is the time table referred to in my affidavit sworn before Capt. Dorsey on 8 day of August, 1946.

/s/ Philip Earl Sanders.  
C.B.M. U.S.N.

Witness:

/s/ Harryman Dorsey  
Captain, JAGC.



2405

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR  
THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, THE UNION OF THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE COMMONWELTH OF AUSTRALIA, CANADA THE REPUBLIC OF FRANCE, THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, INDIA, AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILLIPINES.

-AGAINST -

ARAKI Sadao; DOHIMARA, kenji; HASHIMOTO, Kingoro; HATA, Shunroku; HIRANUMA, Kiichiro; HIROTA, Koki; HOSHINO, Naoki; ITAGAKI, Seisharo; KAYA, Okinori; KUBO, Koichi; KIMURA, Heitaro; KUBO, Kuniaki; MATSUDA, Iwane; MATSUOKA, Yosuke; MIYAMA, Jiro; MUTO, Akira; NAGANO, Osami; OKA, Takasumi; OKAWA, Shumei; UHAMA, Hiroshi; SATO, Kenryo; SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru; SHIMADA, Shigetaro; SHIRATORI, Toshio; SUZUKI, Teiichi; TOGO, Shigenori; TSUJII, Hideki; UMEZU, Yoshijiro. Defendants.

Town of Manchester, )  
County of Essex, )  
Commonwealth of Massachusetts ) ss.  
United States of America. )

I, JOSEPH CLARK GREW, being duly sworn, on oath, depose and say:

1. I was in Japan as United States Ambassador from 6 June 1932 to 25 June 1942. At about 1500 hours in the afternoon on 7 December 1941 (Tokyo time) it was announced by a radio

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station in the United States that the President of the United States had sent a message to the Emperor of Japan, but no information was given as to its substance or the channel of transmission.

2. At about 2100 hours (Tokyo time) there was delivered to me a telegram, marked "triple priority," from Mr. Cordell Hull which had been dispatched at 2000 hours on 6 December (Washington time) and received in Tokyo 7 December (Tokyo time) stating that a telegram was then being encoded containing a message from the President which I was to communicate to the Emperor at the earliest possible moment.

3. At about 2230 hours (Tokyo time) 7 December, the actual message was delivered at the United States Embassy in Tokyo. The telegram was officially stamped as having been received at the Japanese telegraph office at 1200 hours and was marked "triple priority" dispatched 6 December, 2100 hours (Washington time). The text is printed at pages 784-6 of

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"Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan 1931-1941" Vol. II.

4. I immediately caused a telephone message to be sent to the Secretary to the Japanese Foreign Minister Togo, asking for an urgent appointment with the Minister around midnight. The Secretary asked if the matter was so urgent that it could not wait until the next day, but ultimately made the appointment. As soon as the telegram was decoded and typed, I took it to the Minister's official residence and saw him at about 0015 hours, 8 December (Tokyo time). I requested an audience with the Emperor in order to present the President's message which I then read aloud and of which I then handed a copy to Togo. The latter at first said that he would study the document, but when I asked if that meant some doubt as to whether he would ask for an audience for me, he replied that he would present the matter to the Throne. He made some further remarks about the Washington Conversations, but when I said that I had not yet received a report of the conversation of 5 December

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and it would merely complicate matters if I undertook to repeat his comments to the Department, he said it was not necessary. I left him at about 0030 hours.

5. At about 0700 hours on 8 December (Tokyo time) I was awakened by a telephone call from an official of the Foreign Ministry asking me to come to see the Minister as soon as possible. He said that he had been trying to telephone to me ever since 0500 hours, but could not get through. I arrived at the Minister's official residence and saw him at about 0730 hours. He said that he had seen the Emperor and handed me a copy of the memorandum which is reproduced at pages 787-792 of the above-mentioned Volume headed "Memorandum handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State at 2.20 p.m. on

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and it would merely complicate matters if I undertook to repeat his comments to the Department, he said it was not necessary. I left him at about 0030 hours.

5. At about 0700 hours on 8 December (Tokyo time) I was awakened by a telephone call from an official of the Foreign Ministry asking me to come to see the Minister as soon as possible. He said that he had been trying to telephone to me ever since 0500 hours, but could not get through. I arrived at the Minister's official residence and saw him at about 0730 hours. He said that he had seen the Emperor and handed me a copy of the memorandum which is reproduced at pages 787-792 of the above-mentioned Volume headed "Memorandum handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State at 2.20 p.m. on

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7 December 1941." Togo said that he had seen the Emperor (at about 0300 hours I understand) and that this memorandum constituted the Emperor's reply to the President's message. I immediately reminded Togo that I had asked for an audience with the Emperor and that I still wished to present the President's message to the Emperor personally. Togo merely replied that he had no desire to stand between the Throne and myself. He then made a little speech thanking me for my cooperation during the conversations and came downstairs to see me off at the door. Not a word was said about war having broken out anywhere or about Pearl Harbor.

6. Shortly after returning to the Embassy I was informed through a newspaper bulletin (gogai) that Japan was in armed conflict with the United States and Great Britain.

Later in the morning of 8 December (Tokyo time) an Official of the Foreign Office called at the United States Embassy and read the official announcement that armed conflict

had commenced.

*Joseph Clark Grew*

JOSEPH CLARK GREW

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of June,  
A.D. 1946.

*Raymond B. Roberts* Notary Public

My commission expires  
December 10, 1948.

CL. 10m (a)-4-62-0223

# The Commonwealth of Massachusetts

Nº B 1068

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Boston, *June 24*, 19*66*.

I hereby certify, That at the date of the attestation hereto annexed,

*Raymond B. Roberts*

whose name *is* signed to the attached certificate of acknowledgment, proof  
or affidavit, *was* at the time of taking the same, *a*  
NOTARY PUBLIC for the said Commonwealth duly commissioned and consti-  
tuted; that to *his* acts and attestations, as such, full faith and credit are and ought



to be given in and out of Court; that as such Notary Public, he is by law authorized to administer oaths and take acknowledgments of deeds or conveyances of lands, tenements or hereditaments and other instruments throughout the Commonwealth to be recorded according to law; and that I verily believe his signature to the annexed attestation to be genuine.



In Testimony of which I have hereunto affixed the  
**GREAT SEAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH**  
the date above written.

*F. C. G. G. G.*

Secretary of the Commonwealth.

July 30th 1946

FWT

Ex. # 1225

AFFIDAVIT SWORN BY SHIRAO, TATEKI, of TOKYO-TO, SUGINAMI-KU, NISHI TAKAIDO, 1 CHOME, 139.

I am SHIRAO, Tateki, at present employed at the Ministry of Communications in Tokyo and I live at: Tokyo-to, Suginami-ku, Nishi Takaido, 1 Chome 139.

In November 1941 I was in charge of the department of Censorship which is a section of the Ministry of Communications.

On November 29th 1941, my friend Lt. Colonel TOMURA Morio, who was then employed in the communications section of the Chief of Staff, telephoned me at my private house in the evening and told me that for security reasons all foreign telegrams were to be delayed in delivery by five hours. I at once telephoned to the central telegraph office, and gave orders that all in-coming and out-going telegrams should be delayed for five hours. This applied to all telegrams except those of the Japanese Government and, I think, those concerning the German and Italian Governments. At the time I did nothing more in the matter.

On December 4th, having discussed the matter with members of the Ministry, I issued written instructions to all branch telegraph offices in the Tokyo area and to all other sections of my censorship staff. I do not think it likely that any copy of these written instructions still exists. At no time, so far as I remember, did I ever receive written confirmation of the telephone instructions of Colonel TOMURA.

On December 6th my orders from Colonel TOMURA as to the delay in telegrams was varied and, in future, I was told to delay the delivery by five hours and ten hours on alternate days.

On December 7th I knew, certainly before 6.00 p. m. when I left the office, and I think some time between four and six p. m. of the contents of the message of the President of the U. S. A. to the Emperor of Japan. I cannot remember, for certain, who told me, but I think it was Colonel TOMURA who gave me this information in the course of a conversation on the telephone that afternoon. He telephoned me to say that henceforth all telegrams were to be delayed by fifteen hours and I gave instructions to my subordinates accordingly.

It was the custom at this time for the Foreign Office and for the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and of the Navy to send a messenger to my department at least once a day, generally in the morning, to take away copies of telegrams in code which they thought might interest them. As December 7th was a day of great excitement, there were probably messengers in and out all day, and I cannot say at what time the President's telegram would have been taken away by any of these messengers. I do know, however, as I have already explained, that

Colonel TOMURA of the War Ministry was telling me the contents of the telegram probably by 4 o'clock and certainly by 6 o'clock that evening.

I should explain that, although my department is called the department of Censorship, and was therefore responsible for decoding telegrams in code, it was operating for public and commercial codes only and did not handle secret codes.

On December 8th I was called on the telephone about 4.30 a. m. by Mr. HAKAYAMA, who was Chief of the Foreign Telegram Section of the Telecommunication Bureau of the Ministry of Communications and, as such, my immediate superior officer. He told me that he had received an order from the Army to stop all communication with Foreign Countries. I immediately telephoned the order to my office, dressed and went there, arriving about 6.0 a. m. There I found Colonel MURAKAMI of the War Ministry, and Lt. Colonel TOMURA, waiting for me, and we discussed all future control of communications.

At noon on this day, the Minister of Communications read out to the Staff of the Ministry the Imperial Rescript of the declaration of war.

I am certain of many of my times and all my dates in this period as I kept a Diary, and it is after refreshing my memory from this Diary that I have made the present Affidavit.

I, SHIRAO, Tateki have read the above statement in English, a language which I understand. I swear on my conscience that the contents of the above statement are true to the best of my knowledge and recollection of facts.

T. Shirao

Sworn and subscribed to before  
the undersigned by the above  
named SHIRAO, Tateki at the War  
Ministry Building, Tokyo, this  
18th day of August 1946

101 *John F. Hummer*  
Major, J. A. G. O.

Doc 2597

一九四六年昭和二十年七月三十一日

東京都板桥区西高井戸一丁目二三九番地

白尾千城氏、宣誓口供書

私、現在東京、逓信省ニ勤務シテ居ル白

尾千城アリマスニ、東京都板桥区西高井

戸一丁目二三九番地ニ住シテ居リマス。

一九四二年昭和十六年十一月私、逓信省

一部ニアル検閲室ニ監督ニテ居リマス。

一九四二年昭和十六年六月二十七日ニシテ、頃

参謀本部通信課ニ勤メテ居リマシタ友

人陸軍中佐戸村益雄加私、自定メテ

方電話ヲ研ケテ奇コシ、警戒、為外國

電報ニ總テ五時間配達ヲ後ニ又事

ニナシテ日私ニ告ゲマシタ。私、直ニ

中央電信局ニ電話ヲカケテ發送電報ニ

到着電報ニ皆五時間差立メニル様

命令シマシタ。

此、命令ニ日本政府、電報ト多分関係

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No. 2597

兩國政府ニ関スル電報ヲ除ク他ノ一切ノ電報ニ適用サレマシタ

當時私其ノ事ニ関シテハコレヲ何モシテシタ

十二月四日ニ省内ノ官吏達ト此ノ事ヲ討議シテ後私指令文ヲ東京地区ノ全電信支局ト私ノ檢閲本部、他ノ課全部ニ配布シタ。此ノ指令文寫シテ今テハ殘リテ居ラト思ヒマス。私ノ記憶、及ビ限リテ村陸軍中佐ノ電話指令、確認狀ニ受取リテ居リマシタ

十二月六日電信滯滞ニ関スルテ村中佐力ヲ指令ニ定セテ自將來於テハ一旦交互ニ配達ヲ五時間ト十時間ノス様ニト言ハシマシタ

十二月七日ニ私ノ事務所ヲ出テ午後六時前テアツタ事ハ確カデアリマスガ何シヨ  
午後四時カニ六時迄ノ間ニ私ノ「アリカ」令象國大統領ヨリ天皇陛下ニ送リシタ

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電報内容可知シタ。如ハハツキリト誰カ之  
ノ教テククシカカ思出ス事ハ出来マセシガ  
ソノ日ノ午後電話ノ念話中テ此ノ事ニシ  
テ行教テククシカカ村中佐テマシカト思ヒマス。  
彼電報ノ今後全部十五時間遅ラセシ様ニ電  
話ヲ言テマシカカテマシカカ自自命ノ配下ニ命令シ  
マシタ。

此ノ頃外務省並ニ參謀本部及軍令部ニ通  
常ノ前中テマシカカ分少トモ一日ニ田ノ使ニ  
松高ニ寄シテ自命達ニテテ役立テマシカト  
思ヒ様ニ暗号電報ノ寫シテ行テ行クガオキ  
マシカカマシタ。十月七日ノ非常ニ種々ト興奮  
シテ自命ノ列マシカカテテ日中使ニ者達ガオキテ  
アリシテ居タニ様ニマシカカテテ使ニガ大統領  
ノ電報ヲ行テ行テマシカカトテ事ハ言ハマセ  
シ。然レ前ニ先申シマシカカテテ陸軍省ノ村  
中佐ガ電報ノ内容ヲ話シテククマシカカガ  
ソノ時間ハ多分四時遅クトモタカハ六

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時前ト云々事ハ確言ナリ又。  
自分ノ居タ局ハ檢閲局ト云ハ其ノ故ニ  
暗号電文ヲ機取スル事ヲ引受ケテ居リ  
マスガタガ萬國共通暗号又同業暗号  
シカ機取セズ秘密暗号ハ一切取リテ  
居リマセテシタ。

十二月八日私ノ所ニ午前四時三十分頃中山氏  
カテ電話ガカハシテ来リマシタ。中山氏ハ總  
信省電務局外國電信課長ナリマシタ  
テ此ノ名義ニ私ニトシテ直接ト上官ナ  
リマシタ。彼ハ外國トノ通信ヲ全部止メル  
様ニト云フ指令ヲ修學カテ受テ取リテ私ニ  
言ヒマシタ。私ハ直ニ自分ノ事務所ニ電話  
テ此ノ命令ヲ傳ヘ洋服ヲ着テ事務所ニ向  
ケ参拜シテ午前四時頃着キマシタ。事務所ニ  
ハ陸軍省ノ村上中佐ト云フ村中佐ガ私ノ来ル  
ヲ待テ居リマシタ。ソコニ私達ハ將來ノ  
通信ニ関スル統制ノ全体ニ関シ討議致

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シマシマ。此、日、正午遊信大渠、省内職  
 員ニ宣戰、而詔勅ヲ奉讀致シマシマ。  
 日記ヲツケテ居リマシタ、テ此頃ニ周スル  
 時間ハ殆ド又、日附ハ全部間違ヒアリマ  
 シ。又日記ヲ讀ムガ記憶ヲ新タニシタ後  
 ニ此、口供書ヲ作製シタ、デアリマス。  
 白尾干城ハ記、陳述書ヲ英語ヲ讀ミ  
 且其、内容ヲ諒解シマシタ。私、知ル限リ  
 又事實ヲ思ヒ出シ得ル限リニ於テ上記ノ  
 陳述、内容ガ眞実ナル事ヲ良心ニ誓ヒ  
 テ申シ上ゲマス。

白尾干城

元西六年昭和三十年八月十八日不記署名  
 者ノ前ニ東京都陸軍省内ニ於テ前記  
 白尾干城ニヨリ宣誓セシ署名者ナリ  
 シマシマ。

法務課

陸軍少佐 三ノエハニ  
 (署名)

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Q. # 1227

A F F I D A V I T

I, FREDERICK CHARLES PAIR, British Subject, of 13, The Bund, Shanghai in the Republic of China, MAKE OATH and say as follows: -

1. I am and at all times material hereto have been a Tide Surveyor of the Chinese Maritime Customs at Shanghai.

2. I was on duty on the Shanghai Settlement Bund on the night of December 7th and the morning of December 8th, 1941. At 23.45 on the night of December 7th, 1941, I saw Japanese personnel dressed in khaki crossing the Garden Bridge over Soochow Creek and running military telephone lines as they went. They ran the wires alongside the Bund garden and along the Bund pontoons.

3. As they reached each pontoon the Chinese Maritime Customs' Officers withdrew and the Japanese did not cross the said Bridge in any large party but in small groups, and the Japanese military were accompanied by Japanese gendarmes.

4. To the best of my knowledge and belief there was no actual fighting on The Bund and no Allied person was then or there shot or injured. The Chinese who were standing in the neighbourhood, particularly those who were gathered near the Custom House, were herded by the Japanese up the streets leading off The Bund and thus The Bund was cleared of civilians.

5. The Japanese personnel were armed with small arms but had no armed vehicles and the taking over of The Bund continued until 0300 on December 8th, 1941. Prior to that time Officers of the Chinese Maritime Customs returned to the Custom House and reported that they had been driven from their pontoons by Japanese and one of these Officers reported to me that the launches at the Customs Jetty had been shifted by the Japanese.

6. At about 0250 on December 8th, 1941, I proceeded to the Jetty for purposes of investigation and found that the launches had been shifted and that the Customs Jetty had been occupied by Japanese soldiery.

7. At 0330 on December 8th, 1941, the Customs guard outside the Customs Jetty informed me that a Japanese

destroyer had berthed outside the Customs Jetty. I proceeded to the Jetty to investigate this report and was told by the Japanese that I could not enter the Jetty area.

8. Prior to this and at about 0230 I had heard a noise behind the Custom House. I investigated the cause of this noise which I found to be caused by three howitzers drawn on tractors which must have crossed Szechuen Road bridge and were passing along Szechuen Road to Avenue Edward VII. These guns were mounted at the foot of Avenue Edward VII and pointed towards the river and F.B.M. Gunboat "Petercl".

9. At 0415 I left the Custom House to visit the Customs Jetty and gave orders that the large bronze gates should be closed and also ordered all gates leading into the Custom House to be locked. At 0420 I heard a heavy detonation South of the Custom House which I attributed to the howitzers opening fire. Very soon I saw fire aboard F.B.M. "Petercl" and she was soon a mass of flames.

10. At exactly 0423 the Japanese destroyer at the Customs Jetty opened fire on F.B.M. "Petercl" with her forward main armament. Almost immediately afterwards Japanese ship Idzumo opened fire with tracer ammunition.

11. F.B.M. "Petercl" was then a mass of flames and was the target for Japanese guns of all calibre, so that it is probable that seamen endeavouring to leave the burning "Petercl" were subjected to machine gun fire.

12. Next I telephoned for the Chief Fire Officer of the Chinese Maritime Customs who came to the Custom House at once. He then proceeded to the Customs Jetty but was refused permission by the Japanese to go on board the "Poochi", the Customs Fire Float. If he had been allowed to do so, the fire on F.B.M. "Petercl" might have been dealt with. I also rang up the Harbour Master but was unable to locate him.

13. Firing was continued by the Japanese till about 0450 on December 8th, 1941, by which time F.B.M. "Petercl", which was still burning, was in a sinking condition and was drifting slowly towards the Mackenzie's Wharf where she finally sank.

14. A Chinese Maritime Customs Officer who was stationed at Kin Lee Yuan Wharf at the material time reported to me later on that a number of British sailors had landed

barefooted on Kin Lee Yuan Wharf and had been taken prisoners by the Japanese.

15. After firing had ceased I observed that the howitzers were withdrawn along Szechuen Road and that the Japanese continued to occupy the Settlement, but there was no more firing.

16. The U.S.S. "Wake" was taken down stream at about 0830 on December 8th, 1941, by the Japanese with her crew still aboard.

ALL of which is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

SWORN by the above named FREDERICK )	
CHARLES PARR at F.B.M. Consulate- )	
General at Shanghai in the Republic )	/s/ F. C. Parr
of China on the <u>27th</u> day of <u>March</u> )	
1946. )	

Before me:

/s/ John Ladsby

British Pro Consul  
at Shanghai

*John Ladsby*  
SIAL

gratis

Ex 1227

Doc 1420

宣 誓 口 供 書

私コト申テリト中華長官上海黃浦灘路十三番ノ英國臣民アレ  
 一、述べマス。チャールズ・バーハ宣誓ヲシテ次ノ如ク  
 私ハ中華民國上海海關ノ潮流測量官デアリ又  
 本年ニ臨スル重要ナ件ニ際シテハ絶エズ此ノ職ニ  
 在ツタ。私ハ一九四一年（昭和十六年）十二月七日ノ夜  
 及ビ同十二月八日ノ朝、上海租界黃浦灘テ當直ヲ  
 シテキタ。一九四一年十二月七日夜二十三時、四  
 十五分ニ私ハカーキ色ノ草履ヲ着タ日本人ガ蘇州  
 河上ノ外大橋（ガートン・ブリッジ）ヲ渡リ、其  
 ノ日本兵ノ進ムニ進レテ軍隊電話線ガ筋ヲ引イテ  
 行クノヲ見タ。彼等ハ其ノ電話線ヲ黃浦灘ノ河側  
 ト黃浦灘ノ舟橋ニ沿ツテ敷設シタ。  
 三、日本兵ガ各舟橋ニ到達シタ時ニ中華民國海關ノ  
 税關吏達ハ撤去シテシマヒ日本人ハ大キナ築固テバナシ小キナ築固  
 ヲナシテ前記外大橋ヲ渡ツタ。而シテ其ノ日本軍隊  
 ハ日本憲兵隊ヲ伴ツテキタ。  
 四、私が知ツテアリ又信シテキル限リテハ黃浦灘テ  
 ハ實際ノ税關ハナカッタシ其ノ時其ノ場所テ射タ  
 レタリ傷ケラレタリシタ聯合國人ハナカッタ。近  
 クニ立ツテキタ中華民國人特ニ税關附近ニ集メラ

レタ 中華民國人ハ日本人ニ依ツテ黃浦ヲ離レテ  
 行ク道路上ニ築メラレヌクテ黃浦灣カラ一般市民  
 ハ一掃サレタ。

五、日本兵ハ小兵器ヲ持ツテハキタガ、武装シタ聚  
 物ハ持ツテキナカツタ、而シテ黃浦灣ノ受渡ハ一  
 九四一年十二月八日三時迄續イタ。ソレヨリ前ニ  
 中華民國海軍稅關吏邊ガ歸ツテ來テ日本人ニ舟楫  
 カラ追ヒ出サレタト私ニ報告シタ、ソノ稅關吏ノ  
 中ノ一人ハ稅關埠頭ノラソチモ日本人ニ依ツテ移  
 サレテシマツタト私ニ告ゲタ。

六、一九四一年十二月八日二時五十分頃、私ハ圓蓋  
 ノ目的テソノ棧橋ヘ行ツタララソチハ既ニ移サレ  
 稅關埠頭ハ日本兵ニ依ツテ占領セラレテキタ。

七、一九四一年十二月八日三時三十分ニ稅關埠頭外  
 廓ノ稅關ノ守備ガ一隻ノ日本艦艇ヲ稅關埠頭ノ  
 外ニ碇泊シテキルト知ラセテ來タ。私ハ此ノ報告  
 ラ聞ベル積テ埠頭ノ方ヘ行ツタガ日本人ニ埠頭地  
 域ニ入ツテハナラヌト言ハレタ。

八、此ノ時ヨリ前二時三十分頃ニ、私ハ稅關ノ後チ  
 物音ヲ聞イタ。私ハ此ノ物音ノ原因ヲ翻ベテミテ  
 ソレハ四川階梯ヲ渡ツテ來タニ違ヒナク又現ニ四  
 川路ヲエドクアイド七世通りノ方ヘ行キツツアル。  
 兼引草ニ鐵セタ三門ノ榴彈砲ニヨツテタテラレタ

Doc 1420

3.

音テアル事ガ分ツタ。此ノ大砲ハエドワード七世  
通りノ袂ニ据エ付ケラレ、川ト英國寶艦「ベテレ  
ル」號ノ方ニ向ケラレテキタ。

九、四時十五分ニ、私ハ税關ヲ出テ税關埠頭ニ行キ  
ソノ大キナ背銅ノ門ヲ閉メル様又税關へ通ズル門  
ハ全部錠ヲカケル様命ジタ。四時二十分ニ、私ハ  
税關ノ兩方ニ重々ツイ燧發音ヲ聞イタ。私ハソレ  
ヲ例ノ榴霰砲ガ射撃ヲ開始シタノダト考ヘテキタ。

十、丁度四時二十三分カツキリニ、税關埠頭ニ碇泊  
シテキタ日本ノ驅逐艦ガ英國軍艦「ベテレル」號  
ニ對シテ前備主砲テ砲火ヲ開イタ。殆ド其ノ直後

十一、英國軍艦「ベテレル」號ハ其ノ時ニハ火ノ塊  
テ、凡ユル口径ノ日本ノ大砲ノ的デアツタ。ソレ  
故此ノ燃エ盛ル「ベテレル」號ヲ去ラウトモガイ  
タ水兵ハ多分機關銃ノ射撃下ニ曝サレタデアラウ  
ト思フ。

十二、次イデ、私ハ中華民國海關ノ消防部長ニ電話  
シ、彼ハ直ニヤツテ來タ。彼ハソレカラ税關埠頭  
ノ方へ行ツタガ日本人ニ依ツテ税關ノ防火絆「ブ  
ー」號ニ乗船スル事ヲ拒否サレタ。若シモ彼ガ

Doc 1420

4.

乗船スル事ヲ許サレタナラバ、英國軍艦「ベテレ  
ル」號ノ火災ハ處置出來タカモ知レナイ。私ハ亦  
港務長ニ電話ヲカケタガ居所ガ分ラナカツタ。

十三、日本ノ砲撃ハ一九四一年十二月八日ノ四時五  
十分頃迄續イタ。未ダ燃エ上ツテキタ英國軍艦「  
ベテレル」號ハ其ノ頃迄ニハ沈没ノ姿勢ニナリマ  
ツケンジ、波止場ノ方ヘ徐々ニ動イテキタガ、其  
ノ波止場テ遂ニ沈ンダノデシテタ。

十四、此ノ重大ナ時ニ金利源波止場ニキタ或ル中華  
民國海關稅關吏ハ、後テ私ニ多數ノ英國水兵ガ沈没  
足テ金利源波止場ニ上陸シ、日本人ニ捉ヘラレタ  
ト告ゲテ呉レタ。

十五、砲撃ガ止ンテカラ、私ハ榴弾砲ガ四川路ヲ撤  
去シテ行キ日本軍ガ租界ヲ占領ワシテキルノヲ見  
タガ、モウ砲火ハ無カツタ。

十六、アメリカ合衆國軍艦「ウエイク」號ハ下流テ  
一九四一年十二月八日八時三十分頃乗組員乗船ノ  
儘日本軍ニ拿捕サレタ。

右記ノ事ハ全テ私ガ知リ又信ジテキル限りテハ  
眞實デアリマス。

一九四六年（昭和二十一年）三月二十七日中華  
民國上海大不列顛國總領事館ニ於テ前記フレテリ  
ック・チャールズ・パー宣誓ス。

5.

Doc 1420

本職ノ前ニテ

上海英國代理領事

ジョン・ラッズビー (署名)

エフ・シイ・バー (署名)



無料



Q#1228+

142)  
2405

A F F I D A V I T

I, EDWARD AUSTEN IRWIN CROWDER, a British subject, and a temporary Lieutenant of the Royal Naval Reserve at present on the Staff of the British Naval Staff Officer at Shanghai in the Republic of China, MAKE OATH and say as follows:

1. That on the 4th day of April, 1946, at about 10.45 in the forenoon I attended at the Hospital Ste. Marie at 197, Route Père Robert, Shanghai aforesaid, and was shewn by the Clerk in charge of it a book marked on the outside or cover thereof "Des Entrées et Sorties

---

des Malades, Service Payants, 1941".

2. That the following is a true and exact copy of the entries numbered 352, 353 and 354 which I inspected in the said book: -

<u>No.</u>	<u>Nom</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Sexe</u>	<u>Profession</u>	<u>Date</u>		<u>Nombre de</u>	<u>Diagnos-</u>
	<u>Nationalité</u>				<u>D'entrée</u>	<u>De Sortie</u>	<u>jours</u>	<u>tique</u>
352	Holwan Harold		Angl.	Marine S/L Petrol	8.12	11.12.41		Plaie tem- poral par eclat d' obus
353	Dunbar James		Angl.	Ingenieur S/L Petrol	8.12	12.12.41 D.CD		Plaie pro- fond de la cuisse par eclat d'obus
354	Honeywill Jock		Ang.	Marine S/L Petrol	8.12	9. 6.42		Fracture sans dé- placement du tibia d.

3. That immediately after having inspected  
the said book and having copied the said entries  
I proceeded to the Office of Doctor Santelli in

---

the said Hospital Ste. Marie and shewed to him the documents attached hereto and marked "A", "B" and "C" and initialled by me by way of reference which had been received in the Office of the British Resident Naval Officer in Shanghai from the Swiss Consulate-General then in charge of British Interests. Each of these documents was identified by the said Doctor Santelli to me and those marked "A" and "B" were then and there marked by him in my presence "Remis au Consulat Gal de Suisse" and the document marked "C" was then and there marked by him in my presence "Delivre par le Dr. R. Santelli et remis au Corsulat Général de Suisse".

4. At my request the said Doctor Santelli then and there made signed and handed to me the English translation of the said three documents

which is attached hereto and marked "D" and initialled by me by way of reference.

5. In the said document marked "D" and initialled as above the translation of the document marked "C" is numbered "I", of the document marked "B" is numbered "II" and of the document marked "A" is numbered "III".

6. I then and at about 11.15 o'clock of the same forenoon proceeded to the offices of the International Funeral Directors at 207, Kiaochow Road, Shanghai aforesaid, where I was received by Mr. R. O. Scott who to the best of my knowledge and belief is in charge of the said concern, who produced to me his records from

which I then and there extracted the entry which appeared in its proper place with regard to date between the entries in the said book of which the following is a true and exact copy of a copy of the said entry made by me at the time from the said records: -

"No. Funeral 4906. Funeral of James Dunbar.  
Date of death 13th Dec. 41.  
Place of Death St. Marie's  
Hospital.  
Service in Chapel at Funeral  
Parlous Dec. 15th.  
BURIED Dec. 17 Burial  
( Hungjao Road Cemetery  
Grave No.H-241  
Age 24. "

All of which is true to the best of my know-  
ledge and belief.

SWORN/

SWORN by the said EDWARD  
AUSTEN IRWIN CROWDER in  
His Britannic Majesty's  
Consulate-General at  
Shanghai this 6th day of  
April, 1946.

*Edward Irwin Crowder*

Before me:

*John L. Gadsby*  
BRITISH PRO CONSUL  
*at Shanghai.*



*John L. Gadsby*

This is the exhibit marked "A" referred to  
in the Affidavit of Edward Austen Irwin Crowder  
sworn before me this 6th day of April, 1946.

*W. J. Cassidy*  
BRITISH CONSUL  
*at Shanghai*



DR. VELLIOT, SANTELLI,  
MALVAL  
481 AVENUE JOFFRE  
TEL. 81109  
SHANGHAI

"A" 73408  
法 上 70044  
房

H. M. J. Petrol 8-XII-1941

*WJ*  
Honywell - (Walsh)

*23*  
Rue de Genoa Court





Special thanks unit.

En hautement à l'attention

S. F. Le vie

En vue de instructions

will at the Bureau Jan. 13th



24

Informations  
Rensons sur le matériel de la division

This is the exhibit marked "B" referred to  
in the Affidavit of Edward Austen Irwin Crowder  
sworn before me this 5th day of April, 1946.

*Wm J. Kelly*  
BRITISH PRO CONSUL  
*at Shanghai*



"B" A

DRS. VELLIOT, SANTELLI,  
MALVAL  
461 AVENUE JOFFRE  
TEL. 81109  
SHANGHAI

法  
上  
病  
房

*EGS.*

*H. H. S. Petrel*

*8 Dec 1941*

*J. G. Jumbor - Stocker*

*Plaire pincelat d'obus velle l'arme  
gauche avec fracture*

Committed on form -

Reed Car 2 Dec 12

Ampliatas de fideis

in fidei

Revis on amount of H. de fuisse .

This is the exhibit marked "C" referred to  
in the Affidavit of Edward Austen Irwin Crowder  
sworn before me this 6th day of April, 1946.

*J. M. J. J. J.*  
BRITISH PRO CONSUL  
*at Shanghai.*



"C"

Drs VELLIOT, SANTELLI,  
MALVAL  
461 AVENUE JOFFRE  
TEL. 81109  
SHANGHAI

法  
上  
病  
房

*esp*

H. H. S. Petrel  
*english*

8 Dec 1941

*Holman - Leading Seaman*

*Place du Curé Beaulieu*

*Exhaustion d'un petit Écolat.*



En menu le 11 Dec  
par le paquebot japonais  
au Japonese Naval Hospital

SVZ

27


Handell



Délivré par le Dr. R. Sandell  
et remis au Consul Général Suisse

This is the exhibit marked "D" referred to  
in the Affidavit of Edward Austen Irwin Crowder  
sworn before me this 6th day of April, 1946.

*John L. ...*  
BRITISH PRO CONSUL  
*at Shanghai*



HOPITAL ST. MARIE  
197 Route Père Robert  
Téléphone 70044  
SHANGHAI  
CHINE

"D"

D

Shanghai le 4<sup>th</sup> April 1946  
*English Translator*

*exp.*

H. M. S. Pabrel

8<sup>th</sup> December 1944

I

Holman - Landing Seaman.

Scalp's wound.

*J. M.*

Taken on the 11<sup>th</sup> of December by the *[Signature]*

Japanese Name Authority to the

Japanese Naval Hospital

II Henry Well.

Wounded on the Right knee and

Right leg

Gunshot

Remained in ST Henry's Hospital till June 1942.

III Senbon - Stocker

Wounded by a piece of Shapwell

Compound fracture of the left femur

Died from infection on the

12<sup>th</sup> December 1942.

Wounded by  
Walter R. Vandelli

(SEAL)

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL  
COURT FOR THE TRIAL OF JAPANESE  
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

---

A F F I D A V I T

I, Major-General ARTHUR ERNEST PERCIVAL, CB, DSO, OBE, MC, of 'Westfield', Westland Green, Little Hadham in the County of Hertford make oath and say as follows:-

1. From May 1941 until my capture by the Japanese in February 1942 I was General Officer Commanding Malaya.
2. At about 2345 hours on the 7th December 1941, beach defence troops on the BADANG and SABAK Beaches, the point of junction of which at KUALA PAAMAT was about one-and-a-half miles north-east of KOTA BHARU Airfield, reported ships anchoring off the coast.
3. Shortly after this beach artillery opened fire and the Japanese ships started shelling the beaches.
4. At about 0025 hours on the next day (8th December 1941), the leading Japanese troops landed at the junction of BADANG and SABAK Beaches.
5. By about 0100 hours after heavy fighting they had succeeded in capturing the adjacent pill-boxes, manned by troops of the 3rd/17th Dogras.
6. The garrison of the pill-boxes during the fighting inflicted very heavy casualties upon the enemy before they were eventually wiped out almost to a man.
7. At about 0430 hours on the 8th December 1941, a Japanese air formation raided the SINGAPORE Area. It had probably come from FRENCH INDO-CHINA, a distance of about 700 miles. The air-raid warning had been sounded, but SINGAPORE was not completely blacked-out when the aircraft arrived.
8. Bombs were dropped by this formation on the Seletar and Tengah airfields, and in the city area. Damage, however, was slight.



9. This was the first indication that citizens of SINGAPORE had that war had broken out in the Far East.

/s/ A. E. Percival  
Maj - Gen.

SWORN by the said ARTHUR ERNEST PERCIVAL  
at 6 Baldack Street, Ware in the County of Hertford  
this 20th day of July 1946

BEFORE ME

/s/ Hugh Gisby

A Commissioner for Oaths

I hereby certify that I believe the signature "Hugh Gisby"  
hereto appended to be in the true handwriting of Hugh Marshall  
Gisby, Esquire, Commissioner for Oaths, Ware, Herts.

(SEAL) /s/ F. J. Dodd

WHITEHALL

29th July, 1946 For Assistant Secretary  
Home Department

Certified at the Foreign Office  
for Legalization  
(SEAL) of the foregoing  
signature

LONDON "F. J. Dodd"

30 Jul 1946 /s/ Scott  
For the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

日本人主要戦争犯罪人三對スル國際  
法廷ニ對スル件

1577 - 1

口 供 登

余「ハートフォード」州「リッツル・ハドサム」  
「ウエストランド・グリーン」、「ウエストフィールド」  
「ノ第三級」バス「勲章、祭勲章、大英帝國勲章、  
武功十字勲章、勳章、  
「アーサー、アーネスト・パー  
シバル」少将ハ、宣旨ノ上以下ノ如ク供越スルモ  
ナリ。

(一)一九四一年(昭和十六年)五月ヨリ一九四二年(昭和十七年)二月日空軍ノ将校トナル迄、余ハ「マレイ」縣指揮官タリ。

(二)一九四一年(昭和十六年)十二月七日二三時五  
分頃「バタン」及ビ「サバク」海岸ノ海岸防備軍  
ハ沖合ニ艦隊(複数)ガ發給シアリト報告セリ、  
而シテ「クアラ・バーマット」ニ於ケル「バタン」  
「海岸」ト「サバク」海岸トノ法合點ハ「コタ・パ  
ル」飛行場ノ北東一處半附近ナリ

(三)此ノ盾兵モナク海岸他兵ハ後進シ、日本軍艦隊モ  
海岸砲臺ヲ砲撃セリ。

Ex 1229

- (四) 翌日(一九四一年十二月八日)零時二五分頃、日本軍先導隊ハ「バックス」・「サバク」兩海岸ノ擦合點ニ於テ上陸セリ。
- (五) 一時頃迄ニ激戦ノ後、彼等ハ「ドグラス」第十七師団第三大隊守備ノ岬濱機銃陣地ノ略取ニ成功セリ。
- (六) 機銃陣地守備隊ハ、敵軍方邊ニ殆ソド一兵ニ剩ルマテ全滅セラレル迄ニ交戦中甚大ナル損害死傷ヲ蒙ヘタリ。
- (七) 一九四一年(昭和十六年)十二月八日零時三〇分頃日本空軍ノ一編隊ハ「シツガポール」機軍ヲ襲撃セリ。該編隊ハ恐ラク加須即度支隊ヨリ飛來セシモノナルベク、巨艦ニシテ約七百噸ナリ。迎撃機報ハ吹聴セラレアリタルモ、飛行機ノ飛來セシ時ハ、「シツガポール」機火雷制空全ナラザリキ。
- (八) 同編隊ニ振り爆弾ハ「セレター」、「テシガール」兩飛行機及ビ市街地區ニ投下セラレタルモ、被害ハ輕微ナリ
- (九) 之ガ「シツガポール」市民ガ壽チタル戦争ガ結果

1577-3

ニ於テ發見セリトノ最初ノ表示ナリ

署名 (エイ、イー、パーシウアル) 少將

一九四六年七月二十日「ハートフォード」州「ウ  
エイガ」<sup>1</sup>「ボールドク」街六番地ニ於テ前記「ア  
ーサー、アーネスト、パーシウアル」<sup>2</sup>、余ノ面  
前ニテ宣誓ス

署名 (ヒュー・ギズビー)

宣誓官



コトバン

外務大臣 署名 (ダツド・スコット)

一九四六年七月三十日

前記署名「エフ・ジエイ・ダツド」ノ合供ナ  
ルコトヲ外務省ニ於テ證明セラル



白費館

内務次官 署名 (エフ・ジエイ・ダツド)

一九四六年七月二十九日

余ハ茲ニ附サレアル「ヒュー・ギスビー」ナ  
ル署名ガ「ハートフオード」州「ウエイザ」  
ノ宣誓官「ヒュー・マイシヤル」ギスビー「氏  
ノ眞譯ナルモノト信ジ茲ニ之ヲ證明ス

1577-4

IN THE MATTER OF JAPANESE WAR CRIMES AND IN THE MATTER  
OF THE ATTACK ON MALAYA BY THE JAPANESE FORCES IN  
DECEMBER, 1941

AFFIDAVIT

I, Wing Commander WILLIAM HARRY FRANKLIN, No. 42442, Royal Air Force, late Senior Personnel Staff Officer, Far East Command, make oath and say as follows:-

1. The names contained in Paragraph 2 hereof I have extracted from a copy of a report submitted by Wing Commander R. H. DAVIS, No. 1 Squadron, R.A.A.F., which Squadron was in action at KOTA BAHU, MALAYA on 8th December, 1941, and on which day these casualties occurred. I, as Senior Personnel Staff Officer, Far East Command, would be responsible for the reporting of these casualties by signal to Air Ministry, LONDON and Air Board, MELBOURNE, and to the best of my recollection, this was done.

2. The following officers and N.C.O's of the R.A.A.F. are reported "Missing, Believed killed in action" on 8th December, 1941:-

- F/Lt. JOHN CHRISTOPHER RAMSAY.
- F/Lt. DONALD GILMAN LEIGHON-JONES.
- F/O. DONALD ALEXANDER DOWIE. *Waters*
- F/O. RONALD NEWELL SLOTTES.
- Aus. 3902 Sgt. COLLEBY, JEFFREY CYRIL.
- Aus. 407307 Sgt. HARRIS, DAVID WARD.
- Aus. 404294 Sgt. HENNESSY, GRAHAM JOHN.
- Aus. 407309 Sgt. WILLE, GREGG SIDNEY.

3. I have been informed by the Casualties Staff, Overseas Headquarters, R.A.A.F., LONDON, that Flying Officer DONALD ALEXANDER DOWIE was subsequently reported prisoner of War and has now been repatriated to AUSTRALIA.

SWORN by the said WILLIAM HARRY FRANKLIN )  
at 29, Queen Anne's Gate in the City of )  
WESTMINSTER this sixth day of March 1946.)

/s/W. H. Franklin  
(W.H.FRANKLIN)

BEFORE ME:

/s/ F. G. Fletcher

(F.G. FLETCHER)  
Captain, Legal Staff.

(SEAL)

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL  
COURT FOR THE TRIAL OF JAPANESE  
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

---

A F F I D A V I T

I, Major-General ARTHUR ERNEST PERCIVAL, CB, DSO, OBE, MC, of 'Westfield', Westland Green, Little Hadham in the County of Hertford make oath and say as follows:-

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6. The garrison of the pill-boxes during the fighting inflicted very heavy casualties upon the enemy before they were eventually wiped out almost to a man.
7. At about 0430 hours on the 8th December 1941, a Japanese air formation raided the SINGAPORE Area. It had probably come from FRENCH INDO-CHINA, a distance of about 700 miles. The air-raid warning had been sounded, but SINGAPORE was not completely blacked-out when the aircraft arrived.
8. Bombs were dropped by this formation on the Seletar and Tengah airfields, and in the city area. Damage, however, was slight.

9. This was the first indication that citizens of SINGAPORE had that war had broken out in the Far East.

/s/ A. E. Percival  
Maj - Gen.

SWORN by the said ARTHUR ERNEST PERCIVAL  
at 6 Baldack Street, Ware in the County of Hertford  
this 20th day of July 1946

BEFORE ME

/s/ Hugh Gisby

A Commissioner for Oaths

I hereby certify that I believe the signature "Hugh Gisby" hereto appended to be in the true handwriting of Hugh Marshall Gisby, Esquire, Commissioner for Oaths, Ware, Herts.

(SEAL) /s/ F. J. Dodd

WHITEHALL

29th July, 1946

For Assistant Secretary  
Home Department

Certified at the Foreign Office  
for Legalization  
(SEAL) of the foregoing  
signature

LONDON

"F. J. Dodd"

30 Jul 1946 /s/ Scott  
For the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs



日本人主要戦争犯罪人三對スル國際  
法廷ニ對スル件

口 供 登

1577 --1

余「ハートフォード」州「リッツル・ハドサム」  
「ウエストランド・グリーン」、「ウエストフィールド」  
ノ第三級「バス」勲章、殊勲章、大英帝國勲章、  
武功十字勲章佩用者「アーサー、アーネスト・パー  
シバール」少将ハ、宣旨ノ上以下ノ如ク供述スルモ  
ノナリ。

(一)一九四一年(昭和十六年)五月ヨリ一九四二年(昭和十七年)二月日迄ノ洋隊トナル迄、余ハ「マレイ」島指揮官タリ。

(二)一九四一年(昭和十六年)十二月七日二三時五  
分頃「バタン」及ビ「サバク」海岸ノ海岸防備軍  
ハ沖合ニ艦隊(複数)ガ碇泊シアリト報告セリ、  
而シテ「クアラ・バスマット」ニ於ケル「バタン」  
「海岸」ト「サバク」海岸トノ接合部ハ「コタ・パ  
ル」飛行場ノ北東一處半附近ナリ

(三)此ノ后ハモナク海岸砲兵ハ接應シ、日本軍艦隊モ  
海岸砲臺ヲ砲撃セリ。

Ex 1229



1577-3

ニ於テ發見セリトノ數初ノ表示ナリ

署名 (エイ、イー、パーシウアル、少將)

一九四六年七月二十日「ハートフォード」州「ウ  
エイガ」<sup>1</sup>「ボールドク」街六番地ニ於テ前記「ア  
ーサー、アーネスト、パーシウアル」<sup>2</sup>、余ノ面  
前ニテ宣誓ス

署名 (ヒュー・ギスビー)

宣誓官

1577-4.




ロンドン

外務大臣 署名 (ダッド・スコット)

一九〇六年七月三十日

前記署名「エフ・ジエイ・ダッド」ノ合共ナ  
ルコトヲ外務省ニ於テ證明セララル



白世館

内務次官 署名 (エフ・ジエイ・ダッド)

一九〇六年七月二十九日

余ハ茲ニ附サレアル「ヒュー・ギスビー」ナ  
ル署名ガ「ハイトフオイド」州「ウエイザ」  
ノ宣達官「ヒュー・マクシヤル、ギスビー」氏  
ノ眞譯ナルモノト信ジ茲ニ之ヲ證明ス

DOCUMENT 1508

IN THE MATTER OF JAPANESE WAR CRIMES AND IN THE MATTER  
OF THE ATTACK ON MALAYA BY THE JAPANESE FORCES IN  
DECEMBER, 1941

AFFIDAVIT

I, Wing Commander WILLIAM HARRY FRANKLIN, No. 42442, Royal Air Force, late Senior Personnel Staff Officer, Far East Command, make oath and say as follows:-

1. The names contained in Paragraph 2 hereof I have extracted from a copy of a report submitted by Wing Commander R. H. DAVIS, No. 1 Squadron, R.A.A.F., which Squadron was in action at KOTA BAHU, MALAYA on 8th December, 1941, and on which day these casualties occurred. I, as Senior Personnel Staff Officer, Far East Command, would be responsible for the reporting of these casualties by signal to Air Ministry, LONDON and Air Board, MELBOURNE, and to the best of my recollection, this was done.

2. The following officers and N.C.O's of the R.A.A.F. are reported "Missing, Believed killed in action" on 8th December, 1941:-

F/Lt. JOHN CHRISTOPHER RAMSAY.  
F/Lt. THOMAS GRHAM LEIGHTON-JONES.  
F/O. DONALD ALEXANDER DOWIE. *Waters*  
F/O. RONALD HEWITT SLOTTES,  
A/S. 5002 S/Lt. COLMEY, JEFFREY CYRIL.  
A/S. 407307 S/Lt. HENNERS, DAVID WARD.  
A/S. 404294 S/Lt. HENNERS, GRAHAM JOHN.  
A/S. 407309 S/Lt. WILIE, GREGG SIDNEY.

3. I have been informed by the Casualties Staff, Overseas Headquarters, R.A.A.F., LONDON, that Flying Officer DONALD ALEXANDER DOWIE was subsequently reported Prisoner of War and has now been repatriated to AUSTRALIA.

SWORN by the said WILLIAM HARRY FRANKLIN )  
at 29, Queen Anne's Gate in the City of )  
WESTMINSTER this SIXTH day of March 1946.)

/s/ W. H. Franklin

(W. H. FRANKLIN)

BEFORE ME:

/s/ F. G. Fletcher

(F. G. FLETCHER)  
Captain, Legal Staff.

1508-X7

EX/230

種類第一五〇八

日本ノ戦争犯罪關係並ニ一九四一年十二月ニ於ケル日本軍ノ「馬來」攻撃關係證據書類

：：：：：：：：：：：：：：：

宣 誓 書

私ハ、(一)美國ノ空軍、飛行兵中佐、認識番號四四四四二、(二)イリヤム・ハリイ・フランクリンデス、元極東指揮、高級人謀對參謀將校デアリマシタ。宣誓シテ來ノ証言ヲ致シマス。

1、茲ニ、第二項ニ誓イテアル人名ハ、濠洲航空隊、第一飛行中隊、(一)アール・エツチ・デービス飛行兵中佐ガ提出シタ報告書ノ寫シカラ、私ガ致キ誓シタモノデス。第一飛行中隊ハ、一九四一年十二月八日、「コタバル」、「馬來」ニ於テ行動中デシタ。ソシテ其ノ日ニ、是等ノ事件ガ起リマシタ。當時、私ハ極東指揮、高級人謀對參謀將校トシテ、是等ノ事故者ヲ、「倫敦」ノ航空省ト「メルボルン」ノ航空局ニ、信號ヲ報告スル責任ガアリマシタ。ソシテ私ガ記憶シテキル限りテハ、此ノ任務ハ遂行サレマシタ。

2、下記ノ濠洲航空隊ノ將校並ニ下士官ハ、一九

1508-2

四一年十二月八日ニ、一行方不明トナリ、戦死シムト傳ゼラルト報導サレテキマス。

大尉 ショーン・ダリスタフ・ラムシヤウ

大尉 ショーン・ダラハ・レイトニー・ジョンス

中尉 ドウナルド・アレキサンダー・ダウイー

中尉 エナルド・ベリット・セギン

濠洲兵、認識番号三三八二軍曹 コーネイ・シラレイ・シロ

濠洲兵、認識番号四〇七三〇七軍曹 オルタス・ラビド・ウオド

濠洲兵、認識番号四〇四一九四軍曹 ヘクス・クム・ジョシ

濠洲兵、認識番号四〇七三〇九軍曹 ホウト・ガレット・ドネ

3、在「倫敦」濠洲航空隊・海外司令部・戦死傷者部カラ、飛行將校ドウナルド・アレキサンダー・ダウイーハ、其後俘虜ト報ゼラレテキタガ、今回、「オーストラリア」ニ送還サレタトノ通知ヲ私ハ受ケマシタ。

右ウイリヤム・ハリイ・フランクリンハ、一九四六年三月六日、ウエストミンスター市アン女王門二九ニ於テ、宣誓シタリ。

ダブリエー・エッチ・フランクリン（署名）

法務局大尉、エフ・デー・フレツチャイノ前ニテ

エフ・デー・フレツチャイ（署名）

I, SIR ORME GARTON SARGENT, K.C.M.G., C.B., Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, HEREBY CERTIFY:-

1. THAT the Japanese Government did not, before the opening of hostilities by the Japanese forces on December 8th, 1941, against the British territories in South East Asia, have recourse to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly Powers, for the purpose of effecting a settlement, by peaceful means, as provided for in Article 2 of the Hague Convention of 1899 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, of the differences that existed at December 8th, 1941, between the Japanese Government and the Governments of the United Kingdom and of other members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and that the Japanese Government did not submit or offer to submit these differences to mediation, enquiry, arbitration, or any other method of peaceful settlement referred to in the said Convention, except in so far as may appear from negotiations or discussions which the Japanese Government conducted with the Government of the United States of America.

2. THAT the Japanese Government did not, before the said opening of hostilities on December 8, 1941, deliver to the Government of the United Kingdom or to any representative of that Government, or to the Government of any other member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, any previous explicit warning in the form either of a declaration of war, giving reasons, or of an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war, in accordance with the provisions of the Hague Convention of 1907 relative to the opening of hostilities. A certified copy of a protest on this point, addressed to the Japanese Charge d'Affaires, dated the 8th December, 1941, is annexed to this certificate and marked "A."

3. THAT the Japanese Government did not, as provided for in the Treaty of 1921 between the British Empire, France, Japan, and the United States of America, relating to their Insular Possessions and Insular Dominions in the Pacific Ocean, before December 8th, 1941, invite the Government of the United Kingdom to participate with the Governments of the other High Contracting Powers in a joint conference, to which the whole subject of any controversy arising out of any Pacific question and involving the rights of the High Contracting Powers in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean could be referred for consideration and adjustment.

(SEAL)

/s/ O. G. Sargent

O. G. Sargent

LONDON

Foreign Office, London, S.W. 1.

25th March, 1946



COPY.

"A"

OUT FILE

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

8th December, 1941

Sir,

On the evening of December 7th His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom learnt that Japanese forces, without previous warning either in the form of a declaration of war or of an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war, had attempted a landing on the coast of Malaya and bombed Singapore and Hong Kong.

2. In view of these wanton acts of unprovoked aggression, committed in flagrant violation of international law, and particularly of Article 1 of the Third Hague Convention, relative to the opening of hostilities, to which both Japan and the United Kingdom are parties, His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokyo has been instructed to inform the Imperial Japanese Government in the name of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that a state of war exists between the two countries.

I have the honour to be with high  
consideration,  
Mr. Shinichi Kamimura, : Sir,  
etc., etc., Your obedient Servant,  
(Sgd.) WINSTON S. CHURCHILL.

-----  
I, SIR ORME GARTON SARGENT,  
K.C.M.G., C.E., Permanent Under-  
Secretary of State for Foreign  
Affairs, HEREBY CERTIFY THAT the  
foregoing is a TRUE COPY of a  
document preserved in the Archives  
of the Foreign Office, London.

(SEAL)

LONDON.

Foreign Office, London, S.W.1.

/s/ O. G. Sargent

25th March, 1946

Ex 1231

Doc No. 1500

外務事務次官、サー・オーム・ガートン・サイジエント  
 K. O. H. G. ; O. B. ; ハ按ニ左記事項ヲ證明ス

一、日本國政府ハ千九百四十一年（昭和十六年）十二月八日東南亞細亞ニ於ケル英吉利領土ニ對シ日本國軍ガ敵對行爲ヲ開始セシ以前ニ、千八百九十九年（明治三十三年）締結ノ國際協定ノ平和的處理ニ關スル海牙條約第二條ニ規定セル如キ平和的手段ニ依リ千九百四十一年（昭和十六年）十二月八日當時日本國政府ト英帝國政府並ニ全英聯邦ノ他ノ構成諸領政府トノ間ニ存在セシ意見ノ衝突ヲ解決センガ爲メニ交親國中ノ一國又ハ數國ノ周旋又ハ居中調停ヲ求メザリシ藝及ビ日本國政府ハ、日本國政府ガ亞米利加合衆國政府ト行ヒタル交渉又ハ討論ヨリ擧取セララル以外ニハ、何等此等ノ意見ノ衝突ヲ前記條約中ニ言及セラレタル層中調停、仲裁、仲裁々判其ノ他ノ平和的解決方法ニ附託スルカ又ハ附託セントノ申出ヲ爲サザリシ事

二、日本國政府ハ前記千九百四十一年（昭和十六年）十二月八日ノ敵對行爲ヲ始以前ニ、英帝國政府又ハ該政府ノ如何ナル代表者又ハ全英聯邦ノ他

本 官 印

Ex 1231

ノ如何ナル構成諸國ノ政府ニ對シテモ、彼對行爲  
與給ニ關スル千九百七年（明治四十年）ノ海牙  
條約ノ規定ニ從ヒテ、理由ヲ付シタル開戰宣言  
ノ形式又ハ條件附開戰宣言ヲ含ム最後通牒ノ執  
レカノ形式ヲ有スル開戰且ツ事前ノ通告ヲ與ヘ  
ザリシ事、千九百四十一年（昭和十六年）十二  
月八日附日本代理大使宛ノ此ノ點ニ關スル抗議  
ノ認證アル寫ハ本證明書ニ添付セラレ「A」ト  
標示セラレアリ

### 三、

英帝國、佛蘭西國、日本國及ビ暹羅、利加合衆國  
間ノ太平洋ニ於ケル其ノ島嶼タル屬地及ビ島嶼  
タル領地ニ關スル千九百二十一年（大正十年）  
ノ條約ニヨリテ規定セラレタル如ク、太平洋開  
闢ニ起因シ且ツ太平洋地域ニ於ケル右島嶼タル  
屬地及ビ島嶼タル領地ニ關スル條約國ノ權利ニ  
影響ヲ及ボス線ヲノ紛争問題ヲ考慮調整ノタメ  
付議シ得ル共同會議ニ、日本國政府ハ千九百四  
十一年（昭和十六年）十二月八日以前ニ他ノ締  
約國ト共ニ參加スベク英帝國政府ヲ招請セザリ  
シ事、

(印)

オ・イ・サ・エント

倫敦

外務省、 倫敦 南、西、一

千九百四十六年（昭和二十一年）三月二十五日

「A」  
出納文書

寫

千九百四十一年（昭和十六年）十二月八日

讀

十二月七日夕刻英帝國皇帝政府ハ、日本國軍ガ兩歲  
宣言ノ形式又ハ條件附屬宣言ヲ含ム最後通牒ノ形  
式ノ孰レカニ於ケル何等ノ豫告ナクシテ馬來半島沿  
岸ヘノ上陸ヲ企テ、且ツ新嘉坡及ヒ香港ヲ擧奪セル  
事ヲ確知致シ候

三、國際法、殊ニ日本國並ニ英帝國ガ共ニ其ノ締約  
國ノ一員タル歐戰行為ノ開始ニ關スル第三回海  
牙條約第一條ノ規定ノ由々シキ違反タル此等ノ  
挑擧ニ基カザル無法ナル侵略行為ニ鑑ミ、東京  
使節ノ英皇皇帝ノ大使ニ對シ、英帝國皇帝政府  
ノ名ニ於テ、日本國政府ニ兩國間ニ戰爭狀態ノ  
存在スルコトヲ通告スベキ旨訓令致シ候  
余ハ閣下ニ對シ榮若ナル敬意ヲ表スルノ光榮ヲ  
有シ候

頓首

ウイinston・エス・チャーチル署名

上村 信一

等々、

本官即

外務省専務次官サー・オリム・ガートン・サージエント

ハ茲ニ上記ハ倫敦ニ於ケル外務  
省文書保存庫ニ保存中ノ原本ノ爲ナル專ヲ認證ス

オリム・ガートン・サージエント署名

印

倫敦

外務省、倫敦、情、函、一

千九百四十六年（昭和二十一年）三月二十五日

Ex. # 1232

Doc. No. 220-F

Page 1

Extract from "Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. Japan: 1931-1941., Vol. II, pp. 786-7

"Memorandum of a Conversation"

(Washington), December 7, 1941

The Japanese Ambassador asked for an appointment to see the Secretary at 1:00 p.m., but later telephoned and asked that the appointment be postponed to 1:45 as the Ambassador was not quite ready. The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu arrived at the Department at 2:05 p.m. and were received by the Secretary at 2:20.

The Japanese Ambassador stated that he had been instructed to deliver at 1:00 p.m. the document which he handed the Secretary, but that he was sorry that he had been delayed owing to the need of more time to decode the message. The Secretary asked why he had specified one o'clock. The Ambassador replied that he did not know but that that was his instruction. The Secretary said that anyway he was receiving the message at two o'clock. After the Secretary had read two or three pages he asked the Ambassador whether this document was presented under instructions of the Japanese Government. The Ambassador replied that it was. The Secretary as soon as he had finished reading the document turned to the Japanese Ambassador and said:

"I must say that in all my conversations with you (the Japanese Ambassador) during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infernal falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them."

The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu then took their leave without making any comment.

A copy of the paper which was handed to the Secretary by the Japanese Ambassador is attached.

Joseph W. Ballantine.

\*The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, took place on December 7, 1941, at 1:20 p.m., Washington time (7:50 a.m., Honolulu time), which was December 8, 3:20 a.m. Tokyo time. On December 8 at 6 a.m. Tokyo time (December 7, 4 p.m. Washington time), the Japanese imperial headquarters announced that war began as of "dawn" on that date.

21. 232

Doc 220H

合衆国外交関係閣議之文書ヨリ、抜萃  
圖書日本之部目一九三三年至一九四三年會報第一年至十  
三年第三卷七、六頁及七、七頁  
合談備忘録

一九四三年會報第十三年十二月七日

日本大使、午後一時國務長官會見之儀を要請  
スルヲ以テ午後三時電話ニテ大使、進上備書ヲ送ルルニ付、  
午後一時五分ニ延ハスルヲ要請スルニ付、大使ト末栖氏、午  
後一時五分國務省ニ到着シ、二時三十分長官ニ面接セ  
日本大使、文書ヨリ長官ニ手交シ、午後一時三十分  
渡シスルヤハ訓令ヲ受ケタルニ付、無線電文ヲ譯シ、  
想以上ノ時間ヲ要セ、クモ遅シキリト求メ、長官、  
何故彼(大使)ノ時ヲ指定セシメテ呼ボラリ、大使、理  
由ヲ知ラザルニ付、訓令ニ依ルニ付、ト答ヘ、長官  
ハ何レモ彼、二時ニ右通譯ヲ入ルルニ付、ト答ヘ、  
ガト云リ、長官、二三頁讀ム、後、文書ヨリ日本  
政府ノ訓令ニ依リ提出カシラシメ、ト答ヘ、大使、譯書  
ナリ、大使、然リト答ヘ、長官、以テ文書ヲ讀ム、  
ルニ及ラズ、大使、向

No. 1

利根 基九月、閣議(日本大使會談)ニ於テ、  
此ノ文書ヲ送リ、ト答ヘ、長官、以テ文書ヲ讀ム、  
ニ在リ、ト云フ、閣議ニ付、ト答ヘ、長官、以テ文書ヲ讀ム、  
ニ在リ、ト云フ、閣議ニ付、ト答ヘ、長官、以テ文書ヲ讀ム、

COOPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361



日本文書得此日合口之想像... 天力... 得此... 大  
 仕掛... 取... 之... 在... 以... 満... 之... 文書... 見...  
 此... 上...  
 次... 大... 使... 来... 栖... 成... 之... 對... 三... 氏... 言... 以... 眼... 者...  
 日... 本... 大... 使... 自... 長... 官... 三... 平... 次... 之... 相... 文... 書... 一... 寫... 通... 添... 附... 之...  
 三... 一... 之... 又... 之... 一... 之... 一... 之... 一... 之...  
 (Joseph W. Ballantine)

\*  
 日本、在... 真... 珠... 灣... 攻... 奪... 之... 時... 間... 一... 九... 四... 年... 十... 二... 月...  
 十... 日... 午... 後... 一... 時... 三... 十... 分... (亦... 此... 時... 間... 午... 前... 七... 時... 五... 十... 分... 部... 于...  
 東... 京... 時... 間... 一... 二... 月... 十... 日... 午... 前... 三... 時... 三... 十... 分... 二... 行... 之... 夕...  
 東... 京... 時... 間... 十... 二... 月... 八... 日... 午... 前... 三... 時... 三... 十... 分... 二... 行... 之... 夕...  
 午... 後... 四... 時... 日... 本... 大... 本... 營... 公... 日... 辨... 曉... 之... 期... 之... 戰...  
 争... 之... 開... 始... 也... 其... 之... 表... 示... 之... 也...

No 2 ☆

## UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, TO WIT:

I, James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, being first duly sworn, do hereby, according to my best knowledge and belief, make affidavit as follows:

1. That I am the duly designated and qualified Secretary of State of the United States of America.

2. That the Japanese Government in 1941 approached this Government with a proposal for an agreement providing for a pacific settlement covering the whole Pacific area, and accordingly conversations were entered into. Various drafts and counterdrafts of proposals were exchanged, but no reconciliation of views on a number of fundamental points was reached. While the conversations were still in progress the Japanese Government on November 20 presented this Government with an extreme proposal which this Government could not accept. It offered the Japanese Government on November 26 as an alternative a plan of a broad but simple settlement as a basis for further conversations looking to an agreement. On December 7 the Japanese Government made a reply announcing its intention to break off negotiations, but more than an hour prior to delivery of that reply it attacked without any warning American territory in Hawaii.

3. That Japan did not on or before December 7, 1941, so far as the Government of the United States is aware, have recourse to the good offices or mediation of any friendly power, or to arbitration of pending questions at issue with the Government of the United States prior to Japan's making an armed attack on the United States.

4. That the Government of Japan did not on or before the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor deliver to the Government of the United States any previous or explicit warning either in the form of a declaration of war or an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war.

## UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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I, James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State, being first duly sworn, do hereby, according to my best knowledge and belief, make affidavit as follows:

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
3. That Japan did not on or before December 7, 1941, so far as the Government of the United States is aware, have recourse to the good offices or mediation of any friendly power, or to arbitration of pending questions at issue with the Government of the United States prior to Japan's making an armed attack on the United States.

4. That the Government of Japan did not on or before the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor deliver to the Government of the United States any previous or explicit warning either in the form of a declaration of war or an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war.

1424

5. That, except as set forth in paragraph numbered two, Japan made no effort to reach a pacific settlement in 1941 of issues on which there were differences between Japan and the United States.

Given under my hand and the official seal of the Department of State this 6th day of April, 1946.



James F. Bynes  
Secretary of State

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia, this 6th day of April, 1946.

Marvin W. Will  
NOTARY PUBLIC

アメリカ合衆國  
國務省

於アメリカ合衆國コロムビヤ地區

1424

本國務長官　ゼエムス・エフ・パーソンズ　ハ正式  
ニ宣旨ヲ爲シ而シテ余ノ熟知シ且ツ信ズル處ニ從  
ヒ茲ニ下記ノ通り陳述書ヲ作成スルモノナリ。

- 一、余ハアメリカ合衆國々務長官トシテ正當ニ任命セ  
ラレ且ツ其ノ權能ヲ附與セラレタルモノナリ。
- 二、日本政府ハ一千九百四十一年（昭和十六年）本政  
府ニ對シ太平洋全般ニ亘ル問題ノ平和的解決ヲ齎  
ス協定ヲ爲サントノ申出ヲ爲シ來レリ、仍テ會談  
ハ開始セラレタリ  
提議ノ許多草案並ニ回答草案ガ交換セラレタルモ  
根本的數點ニ付キ意見ノ一致ヲ缺キタリ、會談ノ  
尙進行中十一月二十日日本政府ハ本政府ニ其ノ承  
認シ得サル極端ナル提議ヲ爲シ來レリ本政府ハ十  
一月二十六日右ノ代替案トシテ妥協ヲ期待スル兩  
後ノ會談ノ基礎トナルベキ眞況ナレドモ、簡單ナ  
ル取極ノ草案ヲ提出シ十二月七日日本政府ハ交渉  
打切ノ意圖ヲ説明セル回答ヲ爲シタリ  
然ルニ右回答手交ノ一時間余以前ニ日本ハ何等ノ  
豫告ナクシテ布哇ニ於ケル亞米利加領土ヲ攻撃セ

Ex 1233

リ

三、合衆國政府ノ知レル限りニ於テ、日本ハ一千九百四十二年（昭和十六年）十二月七日又ハ其以前ニ於テ、日本ノ合衆國ニ對スル武裝攻撃ニ先チ合衆國政府ト論議中ノ未解決問題ニ關シ如何ナル友邦國ニモ周旋又居仲調停ヲ依頼シタルコトナク又ハ之等ヲ仲裁大判ニ附シタルコトナシ

四、眞珠灣攻撃ノ當時又ハ其以前ニ於テ日本政府ハ合衆國政府ニ對シ宣戰布告、或ハ宣戰ノ條件附最後通牒ノ何レノ形式ニ依ル豫告的若クハ明確ナル警告ヲモ何等合衆國政府ニ與ヘタルモノニ非ズ

五、第二項ニ記載セルモノ、他一千九百四十一年中日本ハ合衆國トノ懸隔セル争點ヲ平和的ニ解決スベキ何等努力ヲナシタル事ナシ

（昭和二十一年）

一千九百四十六年四月六日國務省官印並本官ノ署名ニ依リ

ゼエムス・エフ・パインズ

國務長官

（昭和二十一年）

一千九百四十六年四月六日コロムビヤ地方公證職

タル本廠ノ固前ニ於テ署名並ニ宣誓セラレタリ

マールヴィン・ダブリユ・ウイユ

公 証 人

極東國際軍事裁判所

了り力合參國其他討荒木自定其他宣誓書

松館野守男以下、事が真実なら、此等ヲ良心ニカケテ誓フ。  
松館野守男、大正五年(昭和十六年)十二月七日(夜ヨリ八日ニ  
カケ、東京放送局ニ放送員トシテ勤務シテ午九時、私、廿勤  
務時間十二月七日(夜)六時カラ翌八日、午前七時ニテアリ。  
ソレ後報道部主任種山ニケテ、勤務員全員ヲ点檢シ、何  
時モ其報道ノ心モ知ラズ事ヲ私達ニ告ゲタ。十二月八日午前  
七時、數分前、又、松館野守男ノ報道ヲ受取リ、放送、原稿ヲ用意  
スルモノヲ檢トシ、午九時中順之助ハ私、居ル前テ電話ヲ  
應答シタ。

彼が電話ヲ懸キ、自筆ニ、何カ書キテ午九時見タ。彼が書イタモ  
ハ、私ノ原稿トシ、十二月八日午前七時ニシテ放送スベシト言フ  
指令トシ、私ニ渡サシタ。

私ハ書類(六二二号)圖キ、又書類(六五七号)ヲ見、前  
者ハ報道録ニテアリ、後者ハ報道放送、公務日誌ニテ、此  
等、書類ニシテ書類(六三三号)ニ記サシタ。如ク午前六時

ニ、私、彼ノ放送ノ為、正確時間(一九四一年(昭和十六年))  
十二時、午前七時(分)アリ、ソレハ全世界ニ、何ケ議長ヲ行  
ヒ、上ニ、録ノ記憶ヲ新クシタ。

本、當分ノ、録、此等ノ開始セリ、タト既ニ、發表ニ、タリ、私  
ノ放送ノ、明、時、内、録、事、ト、私、私、放送ガ、此、報道、才  
圖、從、意、分、ハ、現、下、午前六時ト、言フ、時間、内、私、私、電話ヲ、通  
シ、私、私、録、ノ、事、取、リ、十二月八日、早稿、又、書、ニ、記、サシ、タ、

2543

EX1234

☆





極東國際軍事裁判所

了り力合、警國共他村荒木自定其他宣誓書

2543

松館野守男以下、事が真実なり、此事ヲ良心ニカケテ誓フ。  
松館野守男、一九四一年(昭和十六年)十二月七日、夜ヨリ八日ニ  
カ、東京放送局ニ放送員トシテ勤務シテ居タリ。夜、私、勤務  
時間同、十二月七日、夜、六時カラ翌八日、午前十時ニテ居タリ。  
ソ、夜報部部長金子種山ニケトウ、勤務員全員ヲ点検シ、何  
時モ本報部亦此ニモ知リ、事ヲ私達ニ告ゲタリ。十二月八日午前  
七時、数分前、又本報部カ、報道ヲ受取り放送、原稿ヲ用テ  
此事ヲ台録トシテ、井々田中順之助公私、居ル前、テ電話ヲ  
應ジタリ。

彼が電話ヲ懸キ、自分ニ、何カ書キツケテ居ルノヲ見タ。彼が書イタ  
ハ、私ノ原稿トシテ、十二月八日午前七時ニシテ放送スベシト云フ  
指令ト云ニ似テ讀カレタリ。

私ハ書類中、一六三三号ヲ聞キ、又書類中、一五七号ヲ見、前  
者ハ報道録ニテ、下リ後者ハ報道放送、公務日誌ニアリ、此  
等ノ書類ニシテ書類中、一六三三号ニ記サレテ居ルヲ、午前六時  
ニテ、私、放送ノ爲メ、正確時間、一九四一年(昭和十六年)  
十二月八日午前七時、分下アリ、ソレハ全世界ニ向ケ、波長ヲ行  
ヒ、ト云テ、記憶ヲ新タシタリ。

本年、彼等ノ報、六時ニ於テ、亦開始セシメ、ト既ニ發表セタリ、ト云フ私  
ノ放送ニ、明ク、多分、座下ラリ、ト云フ。私、私ノ放送ガ此ノ報道ノ才  
回答、意中、ト云フ。午前六時ト云フ時間、多分、私、電話ヲ通  
シ、私、私ノ台録ニ、受テ、報シ、ト云フ。又、原稿又書ニ記サレタリ、

EX1234

☆

2543

日、夕、の、以、向、大、受、際、後、送、亦、二、三、十、粉、一、時、間、カ、裕、余、ヲ、見、了、  
原、稿、被、送、進、前、東、京、被、送、高、三、野、ヲ、ラ、シ、タ、デ、テ、シ、タ、  
書、類、天、三、三、号、ヲ、向、手、紙、ノ、記、憶、ヲ、新、々、三、三、紙、ノ、被、送、讀、ム、但、  
充、分、解、ル、テ、此、ガ、以、下、紙、一、九、四、一、年、(昭、和、十、六、年)、十、三、日、八、日、午、  
前、十、時、〇、分、ヲ、十、五、分、ヲ、讀、ム、上、テ、多、原、稿、ノ、主、外、被、送、文、字、ノ、上、  
本、堂、ノ、記、録、三、紙、ノ、被、送、時、間、六、年、前、不、時、十、七、日、午、此、事、三、行、  
イ、日、之、前、三、三、号、三、日、通、リ、向、還、シ、テ、下、以、夫、此、報、道、ヲ、回、被、送、  
七、時、〇、分、以、前、六、日、六、時、居、テ、也、

以、下、紙、被、送、ノ、被、送、文、字、ノ、心、  
「昭、和、三、十、一、又、三、日、申、ノ、午、之、又、。路、時、三、十、一、又、三、日、申、ノ、午、之、又、。十、三、日、八、日、午、  
前、六、時、本、堂、陸、海、軍、部、隊、表、  
帝、國、陸、海、軍、部、隊、合、併、時、西、太、平、洋、方、面、於、テ、米、英、  
軍、ノ、戰、斗、狀、態、ノ、入、リ、以、上、本、堂、陸、海、軍、部、隊、表、ヲ、リ、テ、

館 評 寸 男

Morie Jataka

夕、夕、ノ、元、日、才

上、記、宿、野、字、第、三、三、号、一、九、四、一、年、(昭、和、十、一、年)、七、月、十、四、日、  
東、京、被、送、局、於、テ、署、名、者、前、於、テ、宣、讀、之、署、名、者、ト、シ、タ、ル、  
有、リ、

陸 軍 少 佐 丁、A、G、D、  
シ、ヨ、シ、ト、ノ、元、日、

二 女

Ex # 1235a

Doc. No. 1633-A

Page 1

1941

- (1) December 8, 6:00 A.M. News of war outbreak.
- (2) December 8, 11:40 A.M. Attack on Hongkong.  
11:50 A.M. Landings on Malay.
- (3) December 8, 1:00 P.M. Air-raid on Hawaii and others.

Recorded by the Japan Broadcasting  
Association.

AK-464  
1 JO-505

- (1) December 8, 5:00 P.M. Air-raid in the Philippines Areas.
- (2) December 8, 9:00 P.M. Air-raid on aerodromes in the  
Philippines.
- (3) December 8, 9:00 P.M. Advance into Thailand (Siam).

Recorded by the Japan Broadcasting  
Association.

AK-464  
2 JO-507

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"Special news will be announced"

"Special news will be announced"

Announcement by the Army and Navy Sections of the Imperial  
General Headquarters, December 8, 6:00 A.M..

The Imperial Army and Navy entered into a state of war  
with the American and British forces in the Western  
Pacific before dawn today, the 8th. It was so announced  
this morning by the Army and Navy Sections of the Imperial  
General Headquarters.

---

Our forces commenced the attack on Hongkong before daybreak  
this morning.

Announcement by the Army and Navy Sections of the Imperial  
General Headquarters today at 11:40 A.M. As soon as our  
forces entered a state of war before dawn today, the 8th  
our forces lost no opportunity in opening an attack on  
Hongkong.

Next:

Our forces carried out landing operations on the Malayan Peninsula.

Announcement by the Army and Navy Section of the Imperial General Headquarters at 11:50 A.M. Our forces under close Army-Navy cooperation, carried out a surprise landing operation in the Malay Peninsula area early this morning of the 8th and are now steadily expanding our battle achievements.

---

Announcement by the Navy Section of the Imperial General Headquarters:

1. The Imperial Navy carried out a determined air-raid against the U.S. Fleet and air forces in the Hawaiian area before dawn today, the 8th.
2. The Imperial Navy sank the British gunboat, "PETORE" /phonetic/ at Shanghai before daybreak today, the 8th. The U.S. gunboat, "WAKE" also surrendered to us at the same time.
3. The Imperial Navy bombed Singapore before daybreak today, the 8th, reaping huge war successes.
4. The Imperial Navy bombed enemy military establishments in DAVAO, WAKE and GUAM early this morning, the 8th.

---

Announcement by the Army Section of the Imperial General Headquarters issued at 5:00 P.M.

Our Army Air Force attacked en masse enemy strategic points in the Philippines early this morning of the 8th, inflicting great damages upon them.

The next is also an announcement made at 5:00 P.M.

The Army Air Force in the South China Area also raided enemy air-fields, early this morning of the 8th, north of Hongkong and strafing at low altitudes on this air-field, they set fire to 12 of the 14 planes on this field. We suffered no casualties.

---

Our Army and Navy Air Forces reaped huge war successes in the air-raids made in the Philippines.

Announcement by the Army and Navy Sections of the Imperial General Headquarters at 9:00 P.M.

Today, the 8th, the Imperial Army and Navy Air Forces in close cooperation raided enemy air forces and principal enemy air fields in the Philippines and 4 planes at IBA /phonetic/ and 50 to 60 planes at CLARK FIELD were shot down. Our casualties were 2 planes. This is the announcement made at 9:00 P.M. by the Army and Navy Sections of the Imperial General Headquarters.

Announcement by the Army and Navy Sections of the Imperial General Headquarters at 9:00 P.M.

Under close cooperation, the Imperial Army and Navy commenced friendly advancement into Thailand /Siam/ this afternoon of the 8th. This is an announcement made by the Army and Navy Sections of the Imperial General Headquarters at 9:00 P.M. Regarding the passing of Japanese troops through her country, Thailand facilitated their passage. This afternoon, at 12:30 P.M., negotiations in regard to this has been concluded between Japan and Thailand and the Imperial Army and Navy commenced friendly advance into Thailand this afternoon.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Takeji TAKAHASHI, formerly Chief of the News Section of the Broadcasting Corporation of Japan, hereby certify that the attached electrical recording entitled "International Prosecution Section Evidentiary Document No.1633, Record Transcription of Radio Announcement of Attack on Pearl Harbor, 6 a.m. December 8, 1941", is a true and accurate transcription made from the original master record now in the possession of Radio Tokyo, and that IPS Document No.1633-A is an accurate script of the original record's text ( in Japanese), IPS Document No. 1633.

/s/ Takeji Takahashi  
Takeji TAKAHASHI

On the staff of the Consultant  
Consultant Chamber of the Broad-  
casting Corp. of Japan.  
Official Capacity.

Witness: /s/ Kichibei Hoshi

Signed at Tokyo, Japan on this  
23rd. day of October, 1946.

Statement of Official Procurement

I, John A. Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Broadcasting Corporation of Japan in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
23rd day of October, 1946.

/s/ J.A. Curtis 2nd Lt.  
Name

Investigator  
Official Capacity.

Witness: /s/ William C. Prout

EX/235-A

1633 A

昭和十六年

- (1) 十二月八日 前六〇〇 南戦ニ工一ス
- (2) 十二月八日 前二四〇 香港攻撃
- (3) 十二月八日 前二五〇 マニラ上陸
- 後一〇〇 ハン空襲他

日本放送協会録音

AK-464  
150-505

- (1) 十二月八日 後五〇〇 比島方面空襲
- (2) 十二月八日 後九〇〇 飛行場空襲
- (3) 十二月八日 後九〇〇 泰国進駐

日本放送協会録音

AK-464  
250-507

臨時ニ工一スヲ申上げマシ

大本營陸海軍部十二月八日午前六時発表  
 帝國陸海軍八日未明西太平洋ニ於テアリカ  
 イギリス軍ト戦闘状態ニ入リ  
 今朝大本營陸海軍部カラフニ様ニ発表サレマシタ  
 我軍八日未明カラ香港ノ攻撃ヲ開始シマシタ  
 大本營陸海軍部今日午前十二時四十分発表  
 我軍八日未明戦闘状態ニ入ルヤ機ヲ逸セズ香港  
 ノ攻撃ヲ開始セリ

OFFICE  
RETURN TO ROOM 301



1633 A

次

我軍ハマレー半島上陸作戰ヲ敢行シタ

大本營陸海軍部午前十二時五十分発表

我軍ハ陸海軍緊密ナル協同ノ下ニ本八日早朝マレー半島方面ノ奇襲上陸作戰ヲ敢行シ着々戦果ヲ拡張中ナリ

大本營海軍部発表

一、帝國海軍ハ本八日未明布哇方面ノ米國艦隊並ニ航空兵力ニ對シ決死的空襲ヲ敢行セリ

二、帝國海軍ハ本八日未明上海ニ於テイギリス砲艦「ベト」トシタヲ撃沈セリ

アメリカ砲艦 WAKE モ同時刻我ニ降伏セリ

三、帝國海軍ハ本八日未明シガホールヲ爆撃シ大ナル戦果ヲ收メタリ

四、帝國海軍ハ本八日早朝「カウチ」トシタ「カ」ノ敵軍ヲ施設ヲ爆撃セリ

大本營陸軍部発表

午後五時ノ発表

我加陸軍飛行隊ハ本八日早朝比律賓方面ノ要所ニ對シ大規模空襲シ甚大ナル損害ヲ與ヘタリ

次ニ午後五時ノ発表

南支那方面ノ陸軍航空隊ハ本八日早朝香港北方敵飛行場ヲ空襲シ同飛行場ニ在リシ十四機ノ中十三機ニ低空銃撃ヲ加ヘ炎上セシメタリ

我ニ損害ナシ

乙

1633 A

紙が陸海軍航空部隊がヒリヒリ空襲が大戦果ヲアゲマシ

大本營陸海軍部午後九時発表

帝國陸海軍航空部隊八本八日緊密ニ協力シテ比律賓

敵航空兵力並ニ主要飛行場ヲ空襲シ「ハ」ニ於テ四機

「フ」ク「フ」イルド、ニ於テ五十乃至六十機ヲ撃墜セリ

我方ノ損害ニ機

之が午後九時、大本營陸海軍部、発表デアリマス。

大本營陸海軍部午後九時発表

帝國陸海軍八緊密ニ協同シテ本八日午後泰國ニ於

テ友好的ニ進駐ヲ開始セリ

大本營陸海軍部午後九時、発表デアリマス。

泰國ノ日本軍ノ泰國內ニ通過ニシキ便宜ヲ計ツテ今日午後

四時三十分日本ト泰國ト、同ニ之ニ關スル交渉が成立シ

帝國陸海軍八今日午後泰國友好的ニ進駐ヲ開始シマシ



Ex. # 1235C

Title - Log of Radio News Broadcasts Given on  
Dec. 8 (Japanese Time), Japan Broad-  
casting System.

Book Title - Broadcasting Division  
News Section

Broadcasted at 6:20 a.m.  
by Announcer UMINO

Foreign 27

December 8, 6:20 a.m., broadcast  
Broadcaster Mr. UMINO, Announcer

Orders for general mobilization have been  
issued at HONG KONG

NEW YORK - DOMEI - very urgent. According to AP telegram from  
HONG KONG to NEW YORK, it is said that orders for general  
mobilization have been issued at HONG KONG.

- - - - -

East. 2

BANGKOK, DOMEI -- As the crisis in the FAR EAST grows, GREAT  
BRITAIN, in trying daily to arouse anti-Japanese feelings in  
THAILAND through the media of the press and the radio, has be-  
come frantic. However, recently, the general public of THAILAND  
has lost faith in her very malicious propaganda. On the con-  
trary, an anti-British feeling is growing among them.

That is to say, on the one hand, the BANGKOK telegram of  
the 30th, by the REUTER news agency, threatens THAILAND by  
reporting that 50,000 Australian soldiers have completed prepa-  
rations for a THAILAND invasion, and on the other hand it  
fabricated false news against JAPAN, cunningly trying to create  
an anti-Japanese atmosphere. However, the results were reversed  
important officials in the THAILAND government are extremely  
indignant at such malicious propaganda by GREAT BRITAIN which  
they considered as being calculated to disturb the strict  
neutrality of the country.

Again, in the city of BANGKOK towards the end of last  
month, rumours were current that the Japanese were freely  
using yen notes at restaurants and other places. However, in

regard to this, a THAILAND radio commentator denied the rumor by saying,

"Although there is a rumour that the Japanese are using yen notes, an investigation by government authorities revealed that this was utterly false. If yen notes are being used, perhaps a certain country is probably using nationals who look like Japanese in order to arouse anti-Japanese feelings."

He thus indirectly hinted at the British false propaganda. Thus, at present, faith in GREAT BRITAIN has suddenly been lost and anti-British feelings are spreading everywhere like wild-fire. GREAT BRITAIN, being confused by this, is trying every means to alleviate anti-British feelings, and is extremely watchful against the development of THAILAND's pro-Japanese tendency.

- - - - -

#### Political 4

The second Central Joint Conference of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association will finally meet today for a scheduled 5-day period in the great conference hall on the fourth floor of the headquarters.

In view of the extreme urgency of the present situation in the Southwest Pacific, the present conference is a regular national meeting for preparedness, which endeavors to concentrate the general will of 100,000,000 people, to unify the entire nation, and to set up a system to overcome national difficulties. Furthermore, the headquarters of the Assistance Association, through these speeches are faced with the policy of elevating the morale of the people to overcome national difficulties, together with the unification of the general will of 100,000,000 people. And since the government is actively endeavoring to express their belief and determinations in regard to the overcoming of national difficulties, and to disseminate the Imperial will to the people, the results of this present Joint Conference is attracting much attention.

Today, on the first day of the conference, the opening ceremony is to be held from 9:30 a.m., when Prime Minister TOJO will make a formal address as President of the Assistance Association. At the general meeting which is to be opened at 10, Foreign Minister TOGO and Navy Minister SHIMAZU is scheduled to request that they be allowed to express their respective

opinions in order to stir up the people. Next, from 11:20 a.m., each representative will make a speech. Today, the discussions will be on the subjects: Part I, the elevation of the national morale and the establishment of a national belief in the promotion of Asia, and Part II, the establishment of a system for national mobilization. After their conclusion, the conference is scheduled to adjourn at 5:00 p.m. Now, on the one hand, President TOJO's address at the opening ceremony will be relayed from the Assistance Association conference hall at 9:30 a.m. together with the account of the opening ceremony, and the speeches of each Minister of State will be recorded and broadcast with the NEWS broadcast. On the other hand, the speeches of the members at the Joint Conference will be recorded if deemed fit and broadcast from 8:15 tonight.

-----

East 4

PEKING - DOWEI -- Colonel William ASHFORD, the commander of the U. S. Marines stationed in PEKING, and 119 men will finally make a general withdrawal. Day after tomorrow, the 10th, the first party consisting of 40 men, and on the 12th, the second party consisting of 80, will take special trains leaving from CHIENTEN Station of Peking for CHINGHUANGTAO. There, the party, together with 58 men who had previously withdrawn from TIENSIN, is scheduled to leave for MANILA via SHANGHAI.

-----

Foreign 26

BEY LIN - DOWEI -- The German Headquarters yesterday announced as follows:

The Soviet forces on the outskirts of LENINGRAD attempted to break through German positions with the co-operation of tanks and fighter planes, but met with failure by German counter-attack. German bombardment of Leningrad's vital military installations were also continued yesterday.

German mine-sweepers fought a heroic sea battle with the English mosquito fleet in the English channel, sinking one, and seriously damaging another.

Off the coast of CYRENAICA a German submarine sighted an English convoy, seriously damaging one transport ship and one merchantman.

German airforces executed a night bombardment of English airbases on Malta, night before last, and destroyed hangers and barracks.

In the week of November 29 to December 5, the Soviet air forces lost 228 planes, 139 of which were lost in air combats.

The German Headquarters have made such an announcement.

- - - - -

HELSINKI-DONEI -- The Finnish Headquarters announced night before last that Finnish forces fighting in eastern Karelia captured KALVIK, a strategic point on the MURMANSK railway north of Lake Onega, and besieged and annihilated Soviet forces in that area.

- - - - -

Special News

7:00 and 7:18 a.m. broadcast  
Broadcaster - Announcer TATENO

Announcement by the Army and Navy Sections of the Imperial General Headquarters, 6:00 a.m., December 8.

"The Imperial Army and Navy entered a state of war with the armed forces of the U.S.A. and GREAT BRITAIN in the west Pacific before dawn today, the 8th."

This morning the Imperial General Headquarters announced to the above effect. Since important news may follow, we request all listeners not to switch off their radios.

- - - - -

Special news

7:41 and 8:30 a.m. broadcasts  
Broadcaster - Announcer TATENO

- - - - -

Special News

December 8 (Monday)  
7:41 and 8:30 a.m. broadcast

As already reported in Special News and Regular News broadcasts, the Imperial Army and Navy entered a state of war with the armed forces of the U.S.A. and Great Britain in the west Pacific before dawn today.

Next, announcement by the Army and Navy Sections of the Imperial General Headquarters at 6:00 a.m. this morning:

"The Imperial Army and Navy entered a state of war with the armed forces of the U.S.A. and Great Britain in the west Pacific."

The Army and Navy Sections of the Imperial General Headquarters made announcements to the above effect.

Since our forces opened hostilities against the armed forces of both America and Great Britain in the west Pacific before dawn this morning, the Government held an emergency Cabinet meeting at 7 a.m. today at the official residence of the Prime Minister, attended by Prime Minister TOJO and all other ministers of State excepting Foreign Minister TOGO. In the beginning, Navy Minister SHIMAZU gave a report of the process of the battle with the armed forces of the U.S. and Great Britain and based on this report, the Government decided on the policy to be adopted. The meeting was adjourned at 7:20.

-----  
December 8 (Monday)  
Foreign 6

Next, news gathered up to now will be assembled and announced.

WASHINGTON - Domei -- Ambassadors NOMURA and KURUSU visited the State Department at 2:20 p.m. of the 7th or 4:20 a.m. of the 8th, Japanese time, and handed Japan's reply to Secretary of State HULL.

At 7:30 this morning, Foreign Minister TOGO summoned American Ambassador GLENN to his official residence, and handed



him the same formal reply of Japan as was handed to Secretary of State HULL in WASHINGTON. Then, at 7:45 a.m. he summoned British Ambassador CIATGIE and explained to him the substance of this reply.

- - - - -

December 8 (Monday)  
Foreign 3

According to a Washington dispatch by Domei, Secretary of State HULL told Ambassadors NOMURA and KUEUSU who visited the State Department on the 7th,

"JAPAN's reply to my note is unsatisfactory."

- - - - -

December 8 (Monday)  
Foreign 4

NEW YORK - Domei -- According to an U.P. telegram that reached NEW YORK from PANAMA, the PANAMA Government has issued an order for the arrest of all Japanese residents in PANAMA.

- - - - -

December 8 (Monday)  
Foreign 1

President ROOSEVELT has ordered the U.S. Army and Navy into action.

WASHINGTON - Domei - very urgent -- President ROOSEVELT ordered the U.S. Army and Navy to immediately execute the already prepared order for action.

- - - - -

December 8 (Monday)  
Foreign 2

WASHINGTON - Domei - very urgent. -- Setting the date as of the 8th, U. S. Secretary of War STILSON announced, in the afternoon of the 7th, that he had issued an order for general mobilization to the entire U. S. Army.

- - - - -

December 8 (Monday)  
Foreign 5

President ROOSEVELT summoned an emergency Cabinet meeting.

WASHINGTON - Domei -- President ROOSEVELT summoned an emergency Cabinet meeting at 8:30 p.m. of the 7th.

After the closing of the Cabinet meeting, President Roosevelt is expected to confer with Congressional leaders of the Democratic and the Republican parties.

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December 8 (Monday)  
Foreign 27.

An Order for General Mobilization has been issued in HONG KONG.

NEW YORK - Domei. -- very urgent.

According to an AP telegram from HONGKONG which reached NEW YORK, an order for general mobilization has been issued in HONG KONG.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, SUPREME COMMAND ALLIED POWERS  
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Document No. 1657

May 18, 1946

CERTIFICATE

I, Ray P. Normile, hereby certify that I am associated with the International Prosecution Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Command Allied Powers, and that the attached document, consisting of 1 bound volume and described as follows: Radio Log of Official Japanese War announcement as of 6 a.m. Dec. 8 - 1941 and dated Dec. 8 - 1941, was obtained by me on the date above set forth in my above capacity and in the conduct of my official business and in the following manner, to wit: (place and from whom obtained, including specific Japanese archives, records and files involved, if any) Japanese Section - Radio Tokyo.

Ray P. Normile (signed)  
Investigator  
IPS

№1 Ex 1235-C

Doc 165-7A

十二月八日(日本時間)放送の  
『女子報道』記録  
日本放送協会

報道部

「ユース係」ヨリ、抜萃。

午前六時二十分放送

放送者 梅野放送員

Doc/6577A

外セ七

◎香港に總動員令が発せられました。

ニューヨーク英同盟至急報

香港からニューヨークに、たA P電報によりますと  
香港では總動員令が発せられたと云ふ事です

池

東二

◎  
バンコック英同盟

極東の危機が増大するとともに イギリスは毎日のやう  
に新聞、ラジオを通じ泰國の反日感情をあふるのに  
躍起となつておますが最近に至りその悪質極まる宣  
傳に對してもはや泰國の一般民衆は信用しなくなり  
返つて反英感情がまき起つておます。

No 2

即ち、去る廿日のロイテル通信のバンコック電報は英  
のオーストラリア兵が泰國侵入の準備を完了したと泰  
國を威嚇する一方、日本に對する事實無根のニュースを  
捏造巧みに反日空気を作り出さうとしましたが却  
つて逆効果を來し、泰國政府部内の要人もイギリス側  
のこれ等悪質宣傳は泰國の嚴正中立を殊更に紊  
らうとするものとして極度に憤激しておます。

Doc 1657A

又先月末頃バンコック市内で日本人が飲食店その他で盛んに円札を使つてゐるといふ噂が飛びましたが、これに對し泰國のうダオ解説者はこの噂を否定し「日本人が円札を使つてゐるといふ噂があるが政府當局が調べた所、全く事實無根である事判明した。若し使つてゐるとすれば、これは凡らく某國が日本人と似てゐる國民を使つて、泰人の反日感情を刺戟せんとしたもつであらう。」

と暗にイギリス側の悪質宣傳をやりました。かくて今やイギリスの信用は急激に失墜、又英感情が燎原の火の如く各所にひろがるに至りましたが、これに狼敗したイギリスは反英感情緩和の對策に腐心し泰國の親日的な傾向の深まるのを極度に警戒しておます。

池

政四

163

大政翼賛會の第二回中央協力會議は愈々けふから五日間の豫定で本部四階の大會議室で開かれます。今回の會議は西南太平洋の情勢が極めてせしさまつてゐる現狀に鑑み一億國民の總意を集めて舉國一致國難突破の体制をどのやうとする臨戰國民常會でありますだけに翼賛會本部側としてもその発言を通じて一億一心の總意を結集するとともに國難突破に對する國民の志氣を昂揚させる方針で臨んでせり、又政府としても

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進んで國難突破に對する何信と決意を表明し、  
達に努める方針でありますので今回の協力會議の成果  
は極めて注目されております。

會議第一日、けふは、午前九時半から開會式が行はれ  
東條總理大臣が翼賛會總裁として挨拶を行いますが、  
十時から開かれる總會には、東郷外務大臣と嶋田海軍大臣  
が発言を求め、夫々所信をのべて、國民の奮起を促す事にな  
っております。

次で十一時五分から各代表の発言にりますけふは第一  
部國民志氣の昂揚と興亞國民信念の確立と、第二  
部國民勤貢体制の確立を議題として論議が行はれる  
ことになつてをり終つて午後五時散會する豫定です。  
尚開會式における東條總裁の挨拶は午前九時半  
翼賛會議場から開會式状況とともに中継放送する  
ことになつてをり總會における各大臣の演説は録音に  
よりニュースの時間にお傳へする豫定ですが、一、協力會  
議席上の會議員の発言等は適宜録音して、今晚八時  
五分からお傳へする事になつております。(4)

東四

No 4

北京発同盟 ◎

◎

北京駐屯の米國海兵隊司令官

ウィリアム・アムヤースト大佐以下百廿名は愈々總引揚中  
を行ふこととなり、その第一陣四十名は明後十日に、  
第二陣八十名は来る十二日に、何れも北京の前門驛発

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No 5

臨時列車で秦皇島に向ふことになりきた。

尚一行は秦皇島でたぎりに天津から引揚げた五十八名とともに上海經由スミラに向ふ事となつておます。(4)

外世六

ベルリン発同盟

ドイツ軍司令部はきのふ次の様に発表しました。

シニングラード外廓のソヴイェト軍は戦車と戦闘機の協力を得てドイツ軍陣地突破を企てたがドイツ軍の反撃により失敗に帰した。

シニングラードの重要軍事施設に對するドイツ軍の爆撃はきのふも續けられた。

ドイツ掃海艇は英佛海峡でイギリス快速艇と壮烈なる海戦をしイギリス快速艇の一隻を沈没他一隻に大損害を與へた。

キレナイカ沖ではドイツ潜水艇はイギリス護送船團を発見輸送船一隻と商船一隻に大損害を與へた。

ドイツ空軍部隊は一昨日夜マルタ島のイギリス空軍基地に夜間爆撃を敢行格納庫と兵營を粉砕す。十一月廿九日から十二月五日までの一週間にソヴイェト空軍は二百二十八機を失つた。

このうち百三十九機は空中戦で失つたものである。

ドイツ軍司令部ではこの様に発表しました。(4)

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ヘルミンギ登同盟

②  
③  
アイランド軍司令部はカレリア東部に作戦中の  
アイランド軍部隊がオネガ湖北部ヘルミンギス鉄道  
の要衝、カルマエキを占領し、この方面のソビエト軍  
を包圍殲滅したと昨夜発表しました。(6)

臨時ニュース

「午前七時及七時十八分放送」

放送者 館野放送員

No 6

大本営陸海軍部十二月八日

午前六時発表

◎ 帝國陸海軍本八日未明西太平洋に於て、アメリカ  
イギリス軍と戦闘状態に入れり。

けさ大本営陸海軍部かうこのやうに発表せられた。



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なほ今後重要な放送があるかも知れませんが、聴取者の皆様には、どうか今までのスイッチをお切りにならないうやうお願いいたします。

臨時ニュース

(午前七時四十分及  
午前八時三十分放送)

放送者 館野放送員

帝國陸海軍はけふ未明から西太平洋でアメリカ、イギリス軍と戦闘状態に入りました。

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次に大本営陸海軍部は六時発表

帝國陸海軍は本日未明西太平洋に於てアメリカ、イギリス軍と戦闘状態に入りました。

大本営陸海軍部はさうのやうに発表をしました。

政府はけふ未明

西太平洋に於て我が軍がアメリカ、イギリス兩軍と戦闘を開始するに至りましたので、けふ午前七時、總理

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大臣官邸に緊急内閣議を開き 東條總理大臣以下、東郷外務大臣を除く各大臣が出席。劈頭島田海軍大臣がアメリカ、イギリス軍との交戦 経過につき報告。これに基づき政府のとるべき方針を決定し七時三十分散會しました。ヤ。

外六

次に唯今までに入りましたニュースを取まとめ申上げます。(ペニ書き)

ワシントン発同盟

野村、末栖兩大使は六日午後二時三十分、日本の午前四時三十分國務省を訪問ハル長官に日本の回答を手渡しました。

東郷外務大臣はけさ六時半外務大臣官邸にブル、アメリカ大使を招きワシントンに於て我がオオハル國務長官に手渡したものと同様のアメリカへの正式回答を手渡しました。次に午前六時四十五分

クレギー、イギリス大使を招きこの回答の趣旨を説明しました。ヤ。

No 8

外三

なほワシントン発同盟によりきすとハル國務長官は七日國務省を訪問した野村、末栖兩大使に對し

「余の日本に對する書翰に對する日本からの回答は不満である」と告げました。ヤ。

Doc 1657A

外四

◎ ニューヨーク発同盟

パナマからのニューヨークに付いた U R 電報によりまずと、  
パナマ政府はパナマ在住の日本人全部に逮捕命令を  
発しました。

ヤ

外一

◎ ルーズヴェルト大統領がアメリカ陸海軍に對し  
行動命令を発しました。

ワシントン発同盟至急報

ルーズヴェルト大統領はアメリカ陸海軍に對し、かねて  
用意された行動命令を即時実施するやうに命令  
しました。

ヤ

外二

No 9

ワシントン発同盟至急報

スタムソニアメリカ陸軍長官は、八日を期して、

アメリカ陸軍全部に總動員令を下したと七日午後  
発表しました。

ヤ

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外五

◎ ルーズヴェルト大統領が緊急閣議を召集しました。

ワシントン発同盟

ルーズヴェルト大統領は七日午後八時三十分緊急閣議を召集しました。

なほルーズヴェルト大統領は閣議終了後民主共和両党の、議會首脳と協議する筈です。

ヤ

外世七

◎ 香港に總動員令が発せられました。

ニューヨーク発同盟至急報

香港からニューヨークに達したAP電報によりますと、香港には總動員令が発せられました。

ヤ

No 10

證明書

Doc 1657A

書類番号才一六五七号取得期日一九四六年五月十日

本職シ、ノミルハ茲ニ左記事項ヲ證明ス

一 本職ハ聯合軍最高司令部國際檢察部ニ關係アルモノナルコト

二 別紙書類ハ綴込書冊ニシテ一九四一年十二月八日午前時

日本ノ公式戦争放送記録ト記載セリ、其ノ日附ハ

一九四一年十二月八日ニシテ本職ハ前記取得期日ニ

於テ前記資格ニヨリ本職ノ公職ニ服務中ノ左記ニ依リ取得シタルコト

(取得場所、<sup>記</sup>及交付者、其ノ他關係アル日本、特定記録保存所、記録、及綴込アル場合ニコレヲ含ム)

日本放送會館 日本側部

以上

聯合軍最高司令部國際檢察部

官職 調査官

氏名 シ、ヒ、ノ、ミル (自署)

No 11

Doc. 1657A

證明書

余高橋武二君に余が次の資格を以て即ち  
東京放送局報道部長 現顧問室部長と  
して東京放送局の一員であること及び添付書類  
報道部三ノ又係第一頁に掲げられたる報道は  
一九四二年十二月八日(東京時間)東京放送局より放  
送された最初の報道であること及びこの巻の  
總動員令の報道は一九四二年十二月八日午前六  
時三十分になされたことを證明します

高橋武二(自署)

公的資格東京放送局顧問室部長

證人 東京放送局連絡室副部長

神谷 卜

一九四二年十二月八日 東京に於て署名

(SEAL)  
Foreign Office

I, ROBERT LESLIE CRAIGIE, G.C.M.G., C.B., formerly His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador to Japan, make oath and say as follows :-

(1) I was British Ambassador to Japan from 3rd September, 1937 to 8th December 1941.

(2) At 0745 hours on 8th December, 1941, at which time I had received no intimation whatever of any state of war or of any attack having been made on any British or United States forces or possessions, I received a telephone message requesting me to call on Foreign Minister Togo at his official residence at 0800 hours which I did. He informed me that the Japanese Government had decided to break off negotiations with the United States Government and handed me a copy of the memorandum which is reproduced on pages 787/792 of "papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States and Japan 1931/1941" volume 11, headed "Memorandum handed by the Japanese Ambassador Nomura to the Secretary of State at 2.20 p.m. 7th December, 1941", another copy of which, he said, had just been handed to my American colleague. Hastily perusing it I discovered there was not a word in it about war.

(3) Having expressed the regret and disapproval with which I had learnt that the Japanese Government had taken so serious a step as to break off the Washington discussions, I questioned the Foreign Minister about reports which had been broadcast on the British wireless late the previous evening that Japanese warships and transports were proceeding westwards across the Gulf of Siam, adding that the report, if true, could not but carry the most serious implications. His reply was that reports had reached him of large concentrations of British and Indian troops on the frontier of Siam, disposed for purposes of attack, and that Japanese warships had accordingly been ordered to patrol off the coast of Indo-China. I reminded the Minister of a statement I had made to him on the 5th December to the general effect that there was no question whatever of any attack being made by British troops against Siamese territory so long as Siam's independence was respected by Japan. Togo answered, as he had done on the 5th instant, that he had asked urgently for a report from the Japanese Ambassador in Bangkok as to the facts about these rumoured troop movements and that he was not really in a position to discuss this matter until that report had been received. I insisted that, as a Japanese convoy was already on its way, the matter had become one of the utmost urgency; and I requested that orders should be sent immediately to ensure that no initiative was taken by the Japanese forces on the spot until we had had time to discuss the matter further, adding that I would answer for it that no initiative would be taken by the British forces. It was, I said, essential at this critical juncture that the movement of Japanese forces in the area should be fully controlled from Tokyo. The Minister replied that naturally Japanese troop movements would be so controlled. As I was leaving, Togo observed that I would know how hard he had worked to prevent a break-down of the Washington conversations and secure an amicable solution of the problem which faced all three Powers in Eastern Asia. He expressed warm appreciation of my own efforts on behalf of Anglo-Japanese relations and regretted that things should now have come to such a pass. Not a word was said about war

having/

having broken out or any attacks having already been made on any British possessions or ships.

(4) On my return to the Embassy at about 0830 hours I was informed for the first time that the Japanese wireless had announced at about 0800 hours that war-like operations against Britain and the United States had commenced. After visiting the United States Embassy I found on my return to the British Embassy an official of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs who had arrived at about 1130 hours. He delivered a communication from the Foreign Minister notifying me that, as from the 8th December, a state of war existed between Great Britain and Japan.

Sworn by the said Robert Leslie )  
Craigie at Wikfield in the )  
County of Sussex this twenty )  
first day of May, One thousand )  
nine hundred and forty six. )

R. L. Craigie (signed)

Before me

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I BELIEVE  
THE SIGNATURE

H. Basil Harrison (signed)  
A Commissioner for Oaths.

"H. Basil Harrison",

HERETO APPENDED, TO BE IN THE  
TRUE HANDWRITING OF H. Basil  
Harrison, Commissioner for  
Oaths, Wikfield, Sussex

CERTIFIED AT THE FOREIGN  
OFFICE FOR LEGALITION  
OF THE FOREIGN  
(SEAL) FOREIGN OFFICE  
LONDON

(SEAL)  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
HOME DEPARTMENT

L. M. Baker  
(signed)

WHITEHALL  
for Assistant Secretary  
23rd May, 1946 Home Department

Vans Scotz (signed)

23 MAY 1946  
For the Secretary of State for  
Foreign Affairs.



余前日本駐劄莫大使にトシテリ。ウシギシニケルニ  
等勲章ハ三等勲章ニ宣擢ニテ次ノ如ク陳述ス。

Doc. 2/75

(1) 九三〇年九月三日ヨリ九四一年十二月八日迄余ハ日本駐劄莫大使中  
リニシ。

(2) 九四一年十二月八日午前七時四十分トシテ刻ニ莫大並ニ赤軍隊  
或ハ領土對テ戦争状態且攻撃ガ行ハシテ居タリトシテ事實  
報告ヲ受テ居ラタカリ。ソレ刻ニ余ハ東郷外務大臣ヨリ午前八  
時彼ノ官邸ヲ訪問ス様トノ要請、電話ヲ受ケテシテテ答リニシ。  
彼莫政府トノ交渉ヲ打ツ切ルニ決定ニシトシテシ。而シテ  
九四一年十二月七日午後二時三十分日本ノ野村大使ヨリ赤外務大  
臣ニ手交シタル覚書ト題シタルモノハ九三年九四年日赤外交  
關係圖スル文書才十二卷、六六頁、七九頁中ニ再録セシテ居ル  
覚書、字部ヲ余ニ手交シニシ。更ニノ字、部、余ハ赤自條ヲ渡  
シ彼ノ言ヒニ急ニ熟讀ニシテ戦争ニ関シテ一書編シテ居ラズ  
ヲ察見ニシ。

Ex 1236

(3) 余ハ赤政府ガフニトシテ交渉ヲ中止スル如キ由ニテ方法ヲ取ラシタル事  
固ク遺憾且不満ニシテ呈述セマシ。而シテ日本軍艦並ニ運送船ガ  
シテハ湾ヲ越テ西方航行中ナリト前報モ莫無線電信ガ放送  
タ件付テ余ハ外務大臣ニ所見ニシテ更ニ語ヲ續ケテ在テ予實ニラバ報  
導官取テ無名敷閣連性ヲ持ツテ居ル可キ事ナルト言ヒニシ。ソレ對テ彼  
莫大印兵、多數陸軍部隊ガ市ニ攻テ攻撃ヲ目的トシテ配置直  
セリ。ソレハ日本軍艦並ニ政ニ印度支那海岸沖ヲ巡視スル様命令ナリ  
タト言フ報告ヲ接シテ尾ハ口答ニシ。日本ガシテハ他ニ軍艦重スル限リ  
莫軍ハシテ領土對テ攻撃スル様ナシト絶対ニアリ得テイト言フ  
事ニ因シテ余ハ十二月五日彼ニ言明シテ件ニ付テ大臣ノ注意ヲ喚起シテ  
東郷ハ同日五日答ニシ。如クコノ噂ナシテ居ル軍艦ノ行動ニ関シテハ  
ソレ駐劄日本大使對テ至急報告スル様請求シタカフソノ報告、到  
着スル迄ニ件ニ付テ論議不可能ナリト、答テアリニシ。

Doc. 2175

余、日本、護送船が已ニ航空中ニアルカラ問題、最モ急ヲ要スル旨主  
 張シタ。又余、該問題ニ付テ更ニ審議ニ付ル迄、現地於テ日本軍  
 カラ獨斷的行動ヲ始メスナラヌ旨至急嚴命ヲ發スル様要請シタ。余、  
 更ニ附言シテ英國軍カラ先制的行動ニ許ル如キ事ハナイト答ヘタコ  
 ノ危局ニ當リ右領域ニ於テ、日本軍ノ行動ハ東京、完全統制下ニアル可キ  
 要ヲ説キマシタ。大臣、日本軍隊ノ行動ハ勿論左様ニ統制サレタラウ  
 ト返答サレマシタ。余カ別レテ出カケル時東郷ハワニトシ會議ノ破滅  
 ヲ防止シ又東亞細亞ニ於テ三國カ直面シタ問題ヲ友交的ニ解決セト  
 如何ニ懸念ニ努メカシタカ余ニ解ラウト言ツタ。彼、日英關係ニ對シ  
 余ノ努力ニ深ク感謝ノ意ヲ表シテ居リ又凡テカ斯ル方途ヲ辿ラネバナラヌ  
 様ニナツタ事ヲ遺憾ニ思ツテ居リマシタ。開始サレタ戰爭又英國領土並ニ船  
 ニ對シ已ニ加ヘラレタル攻撃ニ関テハ一言モ觸レセシテシタ

(4) 午前八時半頃大使館ニ歸ルト余ハ初メテ日本、無電ガ午前八時頃英米  
 西國ニ對スル戦闘開始ヲ發表ニ付テ聞キマシタ。米國大使館ヲ訪問シ後英  
 國大使館ハ度ツラ午前十一時半頃到着シタト言フ日本外務省、一官吏ヲ發見  
 シマシタ。彼ハ十一月八日ヲ期シ以後日本ト英國トハ戰爭状態ニ入リト言フ外務  
 大臣カラ余ニ宛テシテ通告書ヲ余ニ手交シマシタ。

アール・エル・クレギー

一九四六年五月二十日 「セクス」郡「ウヅクキールド」ニ於テ右「ボニー・シグ」

クレギー、本官、面前ニテ宣誓セリ

宣誓委員 エチ・バニル・ハリソン

No. 2

「セクス」ウヅクキールド、宣誓委員「エチ・バニル・ハリソン」ノ手書ニ依ル右  
 署名「エチ・バニル・ハリソン」ハ彼、署名ナル事ヲ確信シ以テ茲ニ證明ス

一九四六年五月二十三日

英國内務省副秘書官代理  
 エル・エム・ベーカ

Doc. 2175

上記署名「エル・エム・ブーカー」は法律上効力を附與せし居事ヲ外  
務省ニ於テ證明ス

一九四五年五月二十三日

英國外務大臣代理

デビッド・スコット

10.3

E #11100  
Q #1237 9

City of Tokyo, )  
                  )  
Japan.          )

PHILIP ERLE SAUNDERS, Chief Boatwain's Mate of the United States Navy, now attached to the International Prosecution Section of S.C.A.P., being first sworn according to law, deposes and says:-

I am a Chief Boatwain's Mate, United States Navy, and was so employed on December 8, 1941, when I was detailed as Commanding Officer of U.S.S. Y.P. 15 at Guam.

Just before 0800 hours, Guam time, I received information by radio of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, and at precisely 0800 hours I reported to the Beach Master for orders.

At about 0802 hours a formation of eight Japanese war planes came through the clouds and levelled off as for a bombing run. The first bombs dropped at approximately 0805 hours in the vicinity of the Cable Station and Pan-American compound. Several men were wounded by shrapnel and machine gun fire.

Subscribed and sworn to before me,  
this 9th day of August, 1946.

/s/ PHILIP E. SANDERS  
C.B.M. U.S.N.

/s/ HARRYMAN DORSEY  
HARRYMAN DORSEY,  
CAPTAIN, JAGD.

E. 41240  
E# 1238 91

(SEAL)

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT AT  
THE TRIAL OF MAJOR JAPANESE WAR CRIMINALS

A F F I D A V I T

I, Major General Christopher Michael MALTBY, M.C. of Greenacre, Shoreditch Taunton, in the County of Somerset, make oath and say as follows:-

1. In December 1941 I was the General Officer Commanding British troops in China, and was stationed at HONGKONG.
2. At about 0445 hours on the 8th December 1941 Intelligence sources reported hearing on a TOKIO broadcast code instructions to their nationals that war with Great Britain and the United States was imminent at any moment.
3. By about 0645 hours the garrison had been informed that the British Empire and Japan were at war.
4. Command Headquarters moved into underground battle Headquarters.
5. At 0800 hours Japanese aircraft dive attacked the KAI TAK airfield coming down to 60 feet and showing first class standard.
6. This attack destroyed or damaged the following grounded aircraft:
 

R.A.F.	3 destroyed
	1 seriously damaged
	1 slightly damaged
 CIVIL	 Clipper and 7 others
	(D.C. 23's) Condors and others.
7. SHANSHUIPO barracks were also attacked and bombed from the air. But few casualties were caused through the maximum deployment.
8. The approximate casualties suffered during the attack on HONG KONG were:-

Doc. No. 1530

Page 2 \*

Killed or died of wounds.	British Officers	74
	British Other Ranks	595
	Indian Other Ranks	376
	Total	1045

/s/ C. M. Maltby, Major Gen.  
late G.O.C. Br. Troops in  
China

SWORN by the above said Christopher Michael Maltby  
at Taunton in the County of Somerset  
this 19th day of July 1946.

BEFORE ME

/s/ F. Wormersley Clarke

A Commissioner for Oaths

I hereby certify that I believe the signature  
"F. Wormersley Clarke," hereto appended to be  
in the true handwriting of Francis Wormersley  
Clarke, Esquire, Commissioner for Oaths, Taunton,  
Somerset.

(SEAL) /s/ F. J. Dodd

WHITEHALL

29th July, 1946 for Assistant Secretary  
Home Department

Certified at the Foreign Office  
(SEAL) For Legalization  
of the foregoing  
signature  
LONDON "F. J. Dodd"

30 Jul 1946 /s/ Scott  
For the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

主ナル日本人戦争犯罪人ノ審問ニ於  
ケル原案法廷ニ關スル件

口 供 在

1530 - /

余、ソマセット州シヨウナツチ・トントン・グリ  
ンエーカ出身陸軍少將十字勳章佩用者クリストフハ  
マイクル・モルトビハ宣誓ノ上次ノ如ク陳述ス。

一、一九四一年（昭和十六年）十二月、私ハ中國  
ニ於ケル英島竄ヲ指揮セシ將官ニシテ、香港ニ駐在  
セリ。

二、一九四一年十二月八日午前四時四十五分頃、  
情報局筋ニテハ東京放送ニテ、大英領及ビ合衆國ニ  
對スル戦争ガ何時勃發スルヤモ知レザル旨ノ日本人  
ニ對スル電信訓令ヲ聞キタリト報告セリ。

三、午前六時四十五分、守備隊ハ、英領領及ビ日  
本ハ戦争状態ニ在リトノ報告ヲ受ケタリ。

四、司令部ハ地下城閣本營ニ移轉セリ。

五、午前八時、日本急降下機ハ六十呎マテ降下、  
カイタク飛行場ヲ攻撃シ、一流標準ヲ示シタリ。

六、此ノ攻撃ニヨリ次ノ地上機ハ、破壊又ハ破損  
セリ。

英航空隊飛行機 三台 破壊  
                  一台 重大ナル損傷

EX 1238

1530 - 2

七、シャムシユイがノ兵舎モ亦型中ヨリノ攻撃及  
 ビ爆撃ヲ受ク。  
 但、最大限ニ戻射セルホメニ死傷者僅少ナリ。

八、香港攻撃中ニ受ケタル死傷者概數ハ  
 概死又ハ負傷死者 英國士官 七四  
 英國兵(將校以下) 五九五  
 印度兵(將校以下) 三七六

計 一〇四五

在中國英軍指揮將官

(署名、クリストファ・エム・モルトビ少將)

一九四六年七月十九日ソマセツト州トイントンニテ、  
 上記クリストファ・マイクル・モルトビハ、余ハ  
 エフ・ウツマスリ・クランク、軍管官ノ面前ニ於テ  
 宣誓セルモノナリ。  
 余ハ、此處ニ附記サレタル「エフ・ウツマスリ・ク  
 ラーク」ナル署名ガ、ソマセツト州トイントン軍管  
 官フランシス・ウツマスリ・クランク氏ノ真正ノ筆  
 蹟ナルコトヲ證明ス。



1530-3



信 証 白

エフ・ヂェー・ダッド  
内務次官 補  
一九四六年七月二十九日

上記署名「エフ・ヂェー・ダッド」ノ合港ナルコト  
ヲ外務省ニテ證明セラル。



シンドロ

一九四六年七月三十日

外務大臣 ダンド・スコット

Ex. # 1239

"Extract from Entry from Marquis KIDO's  
Diary, 8 December 1941"

At 12.40 a.m. Foreign Minister TOGO telephoned me to consult about the treatment of the personal telegram from President Roosevelt to the Emperor, which had been brought by Ambassador Grew. I advised him to consult the Premier as regards its diplomatic effect and procedure. I said that as for a visit to the throne, there would be no need of hesitation to make one for the Emperor would not mind granting an audience even at midnight.

I was informed that Foreign Minister TOGO had proceeded to the palace, so I went to the office at 2.40 a.m. to see him. When I was going up the Akasaka slope, I saw the rising sun above a building there. I thought it was symbolic of the destiny of this country now that we had entered the war against the U.S.A. and England, the two greatest powers in the world. I closed my eyes and prayed for the success of our Navy planes making an attack upon Pearl Harbour at that time.

At 7.30 a.m. I met the Premier, the Chief of the Army General Staff, and the Chief of the Navy General Staff. I heard from them great news relative to the success of the surprise attack upon Hawaii and felt that the Gods had come to our aid. I saw the Emperor at 11.40 a.m. and talked with him until 12 noon. I was very much impressed by the self-possessed attitude of the Emperor on this day. The Imperial Proclamation of War was issued.

1. GA 1239

Dec 1632 W (90)

木 戸 侯 館 日 記  
昭和十六年十二月八日分

十二月八日(月)晴

午前十二時四十分東京外相ヨリ電話ニテ米國大統領

ヨリ天皇陛下へノ親覽ヲグル一大使持参セル趣ニテ

之ヲ取扱ヒニツキ相談アリ候ツテ外交上ノ效果ノ手

續等ニツイテハ首相ト篤ト相談セラレタキ旨ヲ述ベ

陛下ハ深夜ニテモ拜謁ノ御許シハアルヲ以テソレ等

ノ點ヲ願慮スルノ點ナキ旨ヲ述テ

一時半松山下宮相ヨリ電話アリ同上ノ件ナリ意見ヲ述

東京外相参内ストノ通知アリ余モ亦二時四十分参内

ス宮中ニ於テ外相ト面談三時半歸宅ス

七時十五分出勤、今日ハ珍ラシク好晴ナリ赤坂見附

ノ坂ヲ上リ三宅坂ニ向テ折柄太陽ノ影々ト彼方ノヒ

ルチイソクノ上ニ昇ルヲ等ス思ヘバ愈々今日ヲ期シ

我國ハ米英ノ二大國ヲ對手トシテ大戦等ニ入ルナリ

今頃既に等程ノ航空隊ハ大彗布陸ヲ迎撃セルナリ之

ヲ知ル余ハ其ノ成否ノ程モ氣ツカハレ思ハズ太陽ヲ

拜シ曛目新願ス

七時半首相ト兩總長ニ面會布陸奇蹟大成功ノ吉報ヲ

耳ニシ拜助ノ有難サヲツクツク感ジタリ

Dec 1632 W (96)

十一時四十分ヨリ十二時迄拜謁ス四週ヲ陪シテノ殿  
 辱ニ入ルニ學ヲテモ愛レナガラ聖上ノ御節度ハ誠ニ  
 宜差トシテ聖ノ御勅格ヲ拜セザリシハ良ニ有難キ極  
 ナリキ  
 聖恩ノ大詔<sup>ノ</sup>蒙<sup>ル</sup>テ<sup>ハ</sup>タリ  
 十二時半迄<sup>ニ</sup>御茶<sup>ヲ</sup>拜<sup>シ</sup>可<sup>ク</sup>談  
 三時五分ヨリ同二十三分迄拜謁ス  
 六時<sup>ヨリ</sup>同<sup>ノ</sup>時<sup>迄</sup>大<sup>ニ</sup>給<sup>ル</sup>由<sup>ニ</sup>按<sup>テ</sup>聖<sup>ノ</sup>實<sup>ニ</sup>出<sup>ル</sup>席<sup>ス</sup>

Ex. #1240

IMPERIAL RESCRIPT

WE, by grace of heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on the Throne of the line unbroken for ages eternal, enjoin upon ye, Our loyal and brave subjects:

We hereby declare war on the United States of America and the British Empire. The men and officers of Our army and navy shall do their utmost in prosecuting the war, Our public servants of various departments shall perform faithfully and diligently their appointed tasks, and all other subjects of Ours shall pursue their respective duties; the entire nation with a united will shall mobilize their total strength so that nothing will miscarry in the attainment of our war aims.

To insure the stability of East Asia and to contribute to world peace is the far-sighted policy which was formulated by Our Great Illustrious Imperial Grand sire and Our Great Imperial Sire succeeding Him, and which We lay constantly to heart. To cultivate friendship among nations and to enjoy prosperity in common with all nations has always been the guiding principle of Our Empire's foreign policy. It has been truly unavoidable and far from Our wishes that Our Empire has now been brought to cross swords with America and Britain. More than four years have passed since the government of the Chinese Republic, failing to comprehend the true intentions of Our Empire, and recklessly courting trouble, disturbed the peace of East Asia and compelled Our Empire to take up arms. Although there has been re-established the National Government of China, with which Japan has effected neighbourly intercourse and co-operation, the regime which has survived at Chungking, relying upon American and British protection, still continues its fractricidal opposition. Eager for the realization of their inordinate ambition to dominate the Orient, both America and Britain, giving support to the remaining /T.N. Chungking/ regime, have, under the false name of peace, aggravated the disturbances in East Asia. Moreover, these two Powers, inducing other countries to follow suit, increased military preparations on all sides of Our Empire to challenge us. They have obstructed by every means our peaceful commerce, and finally resorted to a direct severance of economic relations, menacing gravely the existence of Our Empire.

Patiently have We waited and long have We endured, in the hope that Our Government might retrieve the situation in peace. But our adversaries, showing not the least spirit of conciliation, have unduly delayed a settlement; and in the meantime, they have intensified the economic and military pressure to compel thereby Our Empire to

submission. This trend of affairs would, if left unchecked, not only nullify Our Empire's efforts of many years for the sake of the stabilization of East Asia, but also endanger the very existence of Our nation. The situation being such as it is, Our Empire for its existence and self-defence has no other recourse but to appeal to arms and to crush every obstacle in its path.

The hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors guarding Us from above, We rely upon the loyalty and courage of Our subjects in Our confident expectation that the task bequeathed by Our Forefathers will be carried forward, and that the sources of evil will be speedily eradicated and an enduring peace irrevocably established in East Asia, preserving thereby the glory of Our Empire.

The 8th day of the 12th month of the 16th year of Showa.

HIROHITO  
(Imperial Sign Manual. Imperial Seal)

December 8th, SHOWA 16, /1941/

Hideki TOJO, Prime Minister, and Concurrently Minister  
of Home Affairs and War Minister

Kunihiko KASHIDA, Minister of Education

Teiichi SUZUKI, Minister without Portfolio

Hiroya INO, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry and  
Concurrently Minister of Overseas Affairs

Chikahiko KOIZUMI, Minister of Welfare

Kichiyo ITAMURA, Minister of Justice

Shigetaro SHIMADA, Minister of the Navy

Shigenori TOGO, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Ken TERASHIMA, Minister of Communications

Okinori KAYA, Minister of Finance


Nobusuke KISHI, Minister of Commerce and Industry

Yoshiaki HATTA, Minister of Railways

Doc. 2362A

**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

No. 1 Ex 1260



詔書

4

天祐ヲ保有シ萬世一系ノ皇祚ヲ踐メル  
 大日本帝國天皇ハ昭ニ忠誠勇武ナル汝有  
 眾ニ示ス  
 朕茲ニ米國及英國ニ對シテ戰ヲ宣ス朕カ陸  
 海將兵ハ全力ヲ奮テ交戰ニ從事シ朕カ百  
 僚有司ハ勵精職務ヲ奉行シ朕カ眾庶ハ各  
 其ノ本分ヲ盡シ億兆一心國家ノ總力ヲ擧ゲテ  
 征戰ノ目的ヲ達成スルニ遺算ナカラムコト  
 ヲ期セヨ  
 抑、東亞ノ安定ヲ確保シ以テ世界ノ平和ニ



Doc. 2362A

No. 3

寄與スルハ至顯ナル皇祖考丕承ナル皇考、  
作述セル遠猷ニシテ朕カ拳々措カサル所而  
ニテ列國ト、交誼ヲ篤クシ萬邦共榮ノ  
樂ヲ倍ニスルハ之亦帝國カ常ニ國交要  
義ト爲ス所ナリ今ヤ不幸ニシテ米英兩  
國ト齟齬端ヲ開クニ至ル洵ニ巴ムヲ得サルモ、  
アリ豈朕カ志ナラムヤ中華民國政府曩ニ  
帝國ノ真意ヲ解セズ濫ニ事ヲ構ヘテ東  
亞ノ平和ヲ攪亂シ遂ニ帝國ヲシテ干戈ヲ執  
ルニ至ラシメ茲ニ四年有餘ヲ經タリ幸ニ國


Doc. 2362A

No. 4

民政府更新スルアリ帝國ハ之ト善隣、誼ヲ結ヒ相提攜スルニ至ルモ重慶ニ殘存スル政權ハ米英、庇蔭ヲ恃ミテ兄弟尚未ク牆ニ相閱クヲ悛マス米英兩國ハ殘存政權ヲ支援シテ東亞、禍亂ヲ助長シ平和ノ美名ニ匿シテ東洋制覇、非望ヲ逞ウセムトス刺ハ與國ヲ誘ヒ帝國ノ周邊ニ於テ武備ヲ增強シテ我ニ挑戰シ更ニ帝國ノ平和的通商ニ有ラユル妨害ヲ與ハ遂ニ經濟斷交ヲ敢テシ帝國ノ生存ニ重大ナル脅威ヲ加フ朕ハ政府ヲシテ事態ヲ平和ノ


裡ニ回復セシメムトシ隱忍久キニ彌リタルモ彼ハ毫モ交讓ノ精神ナク徒ニ時局ノ解決ヲ遷延セシメテ此ノ間却ツテ益々經濟上軍事上ノ脅威ヲ増大シ以テ我ヲ屈從セシムトス斯ノ如クニシテ推移セムカ東亞安定ニ關スル帝國積年ノ努力ハ悉ク水泡ニ歸リ帝國ノ存立亦正ニ危殆ニ瀕セリ事既ニ此ニ至ル帝國ハ今ヤ自存自衛、為蹶然起ツテ一切ノ障礙ヲ破碎スル、外ナキナリ  
皇祖皇宗、神靈上ニ在リ朕ハ汝有眾、

No. 5



封印圖

Doc 2362A.




Doc. 2362A

No. 6

忠誠勇武ニ信倚シ祖宗ノ遺業ヲ恢弘シ  
速ニ禍根ヲ芟除シテ東亞永遠ノ平和ヲ  
期立シ以テ帝國ノ光榮ヲ保全セムコトヲ

裕仁



司  
限

昭和十六年十二月八日

内閣總理大臣兼  
文部大臣陸軍大臣

文部大臣

國務大臣

農林大臣兼  
拓務大臣

厚生大臣

司法大臣

海軍大臣

外務大臣

逓信大臣

東條英機

橋田邦彦

鈴木貞一

小井野碩哉

小泉親彦

岩村通玄

嶋田繁太郎

東郷茂徳

寺島健

No. 7

Doc. 2362A

鐵道大臣	八田嘉明
商工大臣	岸信介
大藏大臣	賀屋興宣

Doc. 2362 Cont.

證明書

國際檢察部 中二三六二號  
典據必公正二國不此證明

余佐藤朝生余等下記實錄於三即午內閣事務官上十日奉啟  
府上之關係在毛十比上並該官更上三余等並附言已此  
拾員一成一千九百四拾壹年/昭和拾六年/拾貳月拾日附下記證  
部少初書簡(對國之證書)之言:保證三任之是日之證書  
係使附記錄是言其且政府公之是日之證書下記名稱者  
及部局公式書類及名錄(部上之證明) (卷中六號書号及引用  
其他公式書類及名錄於此證明) 正現所附公式名稱可无特記(三)

一 內閣

一千九百四十六年/昭和貳拾壹年/拾月貳拾五日

東京二於了署名

當該官吏署名欄

石、者、公的資格

證人

佐藤朝生

內閣總務長

胡井七郎

佐藤

公式入号二関此證明

余/RICHARD H. DASH  
氏身一三八係聯合國軍中指揮官總司令部關係上比上並  
下記姓名及其公的資格上其政府(二)署名官者(三)人等之九比上比  
上之證明。

一千九百四十六年/昭和貳拾壹年/拾月貳拾日

東京二於了署名

九名 署名欄

石、者、公的資格

證人

Richard H. Dash

國際檢察部調查官

二一、二二、二三

E. 1241

Records of the Meeting of the  
Inquiry Committee of the Privy Council on Dec. 8, 1941

Inquiry Committee Meeting  
Concerning Declaration of  
War against America and  
England.

Dec. 8, 1941 (Monday) 7:30 a.m. all the councillors of the Privy Council (except Councillor KANEKO) meet in the East Third Waiting Hall in the Imperial Palace. Naval Minister SFIMADA reports on the starting aspect of the war opened against America and England. While he is reporting the Council receives the Emperor's reference bill for their deliberation pertaining to the above subject. President FARA announces the general committee meeting and the meeting opens at once.

Members present:

President FARA

Chairman of Inquiry Committee: Vice President SUZUKI

Inquiry Committee members:

Councillor	ARIMA	Councillor	ISFII
"	ISFIZUKA	"	KUBOTA
"	MINAMI	"	SFIMIZU
"	ARAKI	"	NARA
"	SUGAFARA	"	MATSUI
"	USFIO	"	MATSUURA
"	FUKAI	"	HAYASFI
"	MANO	"	FUTAGAMI
"	OBATA	"	OSHIMA
"	MITSUCFI	"	TAKEGOSFI
"	IKEDA	"	IZAWA

A member absent: Councillor KANEKO

Government members;

Premier	)	
Home Minister	)	TOJO
Army Minister	)	
Education Minister		PASFIDA
Agriculture and Forestry Minister	)	INO
Overseas Minister	)	
Welfare Minister		KOIZUMI
Justice Minister		IWAMURA
Navy Minister		SFIMADA
Foreign Minister		TOGO
Communication Minister		TERASFIMA
Finance Minister		KAYA
Commerce and Industry		KISFI
Railway Minister		HATTA

Explaining members:

Chief Secretary of the Cabinet FOSFINO  
Chief of the Legislative Bureau MORIYAMA  
Chairman of the Cabinet Planning Board SUZUKI  
Chief of the Intelligence Bureau TANI  
Chief of the East Asia Bureau, Foreign Ministry YAMAMOTO  
Chief of the Europe and Asia Foreign Ministry SAKAMOTO  
Chief of the Treaty Bureau, Foreign Ministry MATSUMOTO  
Chief of the Army Affairs Bureau, Army Ministry MUTO  
Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry OKA  
Chief Secretary HORIE  
Secretary MOROZASPI  
Secretary TAKESUJI

(Meeting opened at 7:45 a.m.)

Chairman SUZUKI declared that the meeting come to order.

Premier TOJO explains the reason why, at last, they have been obliged to deal with this bill.

Comm. member ISFII asks in regard to the time of declaration of war.

TOJO answers that it shall be done as soon as the Imperial sanction is obtained on this subject.

KUBOTA questions regarding the relationship between negotiations with America and treatment of this subject. To this Premier TOJO answers that at their meeting in the Emperor's presence on Dec. 1st, war against America, England and Holland was decided on. Therefore those negotiations were continued only for the sake of strategy.

SFIMIZU asks whether or not war is to be declared against Holland; also he asks what will be the attitude of Siam. TOJO replies that Japan will not declare war against Holland in view of future strategic convenience. As for Siam the Japanese Government is in the course of negotiations with her for concluding an Alliance Pact.

MINAI asks what attitude Germany will assume in relation to the Tripartite Alliance, following the disposition of this subject. To this TOJO and SAKAMOTO, Chief of the Europe and Asia Bureau, reply that, as far as the German Government is concerned, as soon as Japan declares war against America and England, Germany and Italy will also assume the same attitude as Japan, and they will not make a separate peace. In fact they are preparing the draft of an agreement therefor.

NARA asks what will be the attitude of Soviet Russia. TOJO replies that relationship between Japan and Soviet Russia



at present stands on the basis of the Neutrality Pact, but as to the treatment of the same he expects special care to be taken. As to the general situation, Soviet Russia is now fighting against Germany, so she will not avail herself of the Japanese southward advance. Also she will not make any ready move following America's plotting which is naturally expected. Further, if Soviet Russia grants America use of her territory in the East, that means Russia makes Japan her enemy; therefore she cannot easily make such a decision. In the future Japan shall never fail to keep an increasingly close watch over Russian activities.

SUGAHARA asks about the budget distribution of expenses incurred in connection with this proposition. Finance Minister KAWA explains that it will be drawn upon a special account of Emergency War Expense just as in the case of the China Incident.

Comm. member FUKAI debated on the fact that, under the present currency system disposition of required funds will be easily made for the time being, but in regard to materials required thoughtful planning is necessary; so he inquires the Government's opinion regarding it. TOJO replies that, in conclusion based on views from all angles it is not necessary to have much anxiety so far as material supplies are concerned and as for financing and money circulation they shall be treated with most careful attention to their bearing on materials.

Comm. member FUTAGAMI says that according to the draft for an Imperial edict which is accompanying this project for reference, it seems as though action of war is started from our side and so, he asks, if it does not give America an excuse for her declaring war. To this Premier TOJO answers that action of war may have been started from our side, the cause of the war is really nothing but the fact that America gave various economic pressures to Japan. FUTAGAMI further asks if accuracy is lacking in using the words, "America" and "England" in the draft for the Imperial edict. Foreign Minister TOGO and Chief of the Treaty Bureau MATSUMOTO answer that there are precedents that they used such words as, "China," "Russia," and "Germany" in edicts of declaration of war. In the announcement documents to enemy countries the government will use regular names of the countries involved, and there is no fear of arising misunderstanding.

Comm. member TAKEGOSHI expresses hope that there will be no lack of attention regarding food plans. Comm. member IZAWA expresses hope that they will do their best to try to bring about an effective unification of the national mind.

Comm. member IKEDA and Comm. member KUBOTA say that it will not be good to leave any doubtful point in the Imperial edict and so it will be better to avoid using the word, "America." To this Foreign Minister TOGO replies that it is known all over the world and it is clear that America means the United States of North America.

Chairman SUZUKI considers that questioning has been finished by the above discussion and he asks the Government Ministers and Explaining Members to leave.

(Ministers and Explaining Members leave.)

Then as the result of conference among the committed members it was unanimously decided to approve this proposition as it is.

Thereupon Chairman SUZUKI declared the adjournment of the meeting.

(Meeting adjourned at 9:55 a.m.)

General Outline of the Privy Council  
Attending to Business at the Time of  
Declaration of War against America  
and England

The international situation surrounding the China Incident had become tense and diplomatic negotiations with England and America had been driven close to the breaking point. The Cabinet anticipated that it might happen that war would be declared at the same time with the opening of hostilities. Concerning procedures to be taken at such a time MORIYAMA, Chief of Legislative Bureau privately had conferred with FORIE, Chief Secretary of Privy Council. On Dec. 7 (Sunday) at 4 p.m. MORIYAMA phoned to FORIE saying that he wanted to have a talk with FORIE concerning an urgent treatment of affairs to face the tense situation at hand, and asked him to come and have a meeting in the official residence of Premier at 7:30 p.m. FORIE at once notified Secretary MOROFUSHI by phone and MOROFUSHI notified Secretary TAKI-TSUJI accordingly. Further, Procurator HOTA and Commissioner NODA were notified of the meeting by a messenger. So at 7:30 p.m. everyone came to meet in the Premier's official residence. At 8 p.m. in the office room of Chief of the Legislative Bureau they were informed of details of the matter by MORIYAMA, Chief of the Legislative Bureau. Owing to the disruption of Japan-America conference a critical situation was brought about and Japanese Army and Navy were to begin action early in the morning, next day, and the government would present, during the next day, declaration of war against America and England for Imperial sanction. Therefore they had Procurator HOTA, etc. go on to prepare a bill pertaining to this matter and at the same time Chief Secretary FORIE informed FUSA, President of Privy Council, and SUZUKI, Vice-President of Privy Council, by phone of the above fact, receiving instructions from them, he made arrangements for holding a meeting of the Privy Council, and then they went home at 11 p.m. After that the two Secretaries MOROFUSHI and TAKI-TSUJI moved to the official residence of the Cabinet Chief Secretary and in a room there they set on preparing an inquiry and report draft on the matter of declaration of war

against America and England. They finished writing after and had a nap.

It was a fairly cold day and was not clear either.

A little after 4 a.m. Dec. 8 (Monday) Cabinet Secretary INADA informed the two secretaries of the fact that it had been decided to ask for Imperial sanction for declaration of war against America and England. The two Secretaries at once passed this information on to the Chief Secretary. Further they sent telephone message to the President, Vice-President and each Councillor asking them to come and meet in the East Third Hall of the Imperial Palace to consider an urgent matter at 7:30 a.m. By the appointed time all the members of Privy Council (except Councillor KANEKO) and the Chief Secretary and others of Privy Council got together there, when Navy Minister SPIMADA reported on the outbreak of war against America and England at Hawaii and Malay. While he was reporting they received a draft of the Imperial ratification pertaining to the declaration of war against America and England. President HARA announced the General Committee Meeting. At once the meeting opened. Since the bill was an extremely urgent one it was discussed in a hurry, the Committee Meeting adjourning at 9:55 a.m. Following this at 10:50 with the Emperor's presence a plenary meeting was held and it was unanimously approved. At once the resolution was presented to the Emperor. The time was exactly 11 a.m. The sun was shining brilliantly and the weather was very clear.

against America and England. They finished writing after 12 p.m. and had a nap.

It was a fairly cold day and was not clear either.

A little after 4 a.m. Dec. 8 (Monday) Cabinet Secretary INADA informed the two secretaries of the fact that it had been decided to ask for Imperial sanction for declaration of war against America and England. The two Secretaries at once passed this information on to the Chief Secretary. Further they sent telephone message to the President, Vice-President and each Councillor asking them to come and meet in the East Third Hall of the Imperial Palace to consider an urgent matter at 7:30 a.m. By the appointed time all the members of Privy Council (except Councillor KANEKO) and the Chief Secretary and others of Privy Council got together there, when Navy Minister SPIMADA reported on the outbreak of war against America and England at Hawaii and Malay. While he was reporting they received a draft of the Imperial ratification pertaining to the declaration of war against America and England. President HARA announced the General Committee Meeting. At once the meeting opened. Since the bill was an extremely urgent one it was discussed in a hurry, the Committee Meeting adjourning at 9:55 a.m. Following this at 10:50 with the Emperor's presence a plenary meeting was held and it was unanimously approved. At once the resolution was presented to the Emperor. The time was exactly 11 a.m. The sun was shining brilliantly and the weather was very clear.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W. D. C. No. \_\_\_\_\_  
I. P. S. No. 1078

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, M. Takatsuji hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Privy Council and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 14 pages, dated 8 Dec, 1941, and described as follows: Records of the meeting of the Investigation Committee, Privy Council, concerning Declaration of War against America and England. Dated 8 December 1941.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Privy Council, Imperial Palace ground.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
17th day of Sept., 1946.

/s/ M. Takatsuji  
Signature of Official

Witness: s/ T. Swzuki

SEAL

\_\_\_\_\_  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business. Signed at Tokyo on this  
17th day of Sept., 1946

Witness: /s/ Eric W. Fleisher 2d Lt.

/s/ Edward P. Monaghan  
NAME

\_\_\_\_\_  
Investigator, IFS  
Official Capacity

Doc. No. 2593-D (40)

page 1

Item 43

SECRET

From: Berlin  
To: Tokyo  
December 8, 1941  
Purple. (Priority)

#1437. Limited distribution. Re my #143(9?).<sup>a</sup>

At 1:00 p.m. today (8th) I called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and told him our wish was to have Germany and Italy issue formal declarations of war on America at once. Ribbentrop replied that Hitler was then in the midst of a conference at general headquarters discussing how the formalities of declaring war could be carried out so as to make a good impression on the German people, and that he would transmit your wish to him at once and do whatever he was able to have it carried out promptly. At that time Ribbentrop told me that on the morning of the 8th Hitler issued orders to the entire German navy to attack American ships whenever and wherever they may meet them.

It goes without saying that this is only for your secret information.

a - Not available

25978

ARMY

SECRET

Doc. No. 2593 (Certificate)

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

24 JULY 1946

I hereby certify that the attached photostats of Japanese messages have been intercepted by electric or physical means, decrypted, and translated by trained personnel of the War and Navy Departments, and are accurate and authentic to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as it is humanly possible for an occidental accurately to translate Japanese script.

/s/ Carter W. Clarke

CARTER W. CLARKE  
Colonel, G.S.C.

2593D (40)  
Item 43

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 309

本日 (八月一日) 午後一時 外務大臣リットン

一線

第一四三七號 制限配布降電第一四三九

第一四三九

一九四一年 / 昭和十六年 / 十二月八日

東京宛

伯林發

秘密



ト言ツク。當時「ツツトラーカハ日ノ新全題

カ行ヲ打置ラセラレハ練ラハコトハ何シチモス

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ラ「印ナル直布告ノ手續ヲ禁ルニツテ」

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Doc

1.

2.

Doc 2593D (40)  
Item 43

透海軍ニ取米利加ノ艦船ニ接觸スレバ暁ト場所ト  
ヲ機ハズ之レヲ攻撃セヨトノ司令ヲ發シタト「リ  
ベントロツプ」ニ私ニ語ツタ。  
申ヌ迄モ無ク此レハ、只實取ノミハノ秘密情報  
テアル。

甲 1 線益

海軍三五九七八

秘密

Doc 2593 cert.

陸軍省

陸軍省参謀本部

情報局

一九四六年七月二十四日

予ハ茲ニ左ノ通り説明ス。即チ、  
 添附敷通ノ日本文電報ノ複寫寫眞ハ陸海軍兩省ノ熟  
 練セル職員ニ依リ電氣的或ハ物理的方法ニ依ツテ傍  
 受サレ、解讀セラレ而シテ翻譯セラレシモノニシテ  
 予ノ知り且信ズル限り正確ニ日本文字ヲ翻譯スル爲  
 メ西洋人ニトリ人力ノ可能ナル限度ニ於テ正確且ツ  
 典據ノアルモノナリ。

参謀本部付大佐

CARTER. W. CLARKE

カーター・ダブリウー・クラーク

Ex. #1243

Doc. 2499 A

Page 1

Extract from interrogation of  
Hideki Tojo, 7 February 1946  
P. 5

Q So that you realize that you are the one primarily responsible for the December 1941 attacks on Pearl Harbor and American and British possessions ?

A Yes, I am responsible.

Q And the other parties whom you have mentioned are responsible, along with you, for those attacks?

A From the standpoint of assistance to the Throne /hō hitsu/, the Cabinet is jointly responsible and, hence, the other cabinet members bear responsibility; however, I, as Senior Member, am the one chiefly responsible. The Army Chief of Staff and the Navy Chief of Staff also bear responsibility.

Ex 1243-A

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

2499 A

同、ソレデハ展覧會ニ來、我ノ領土ニ歸スル  
 和十六年十二月ノ政令ニ關シテハ貴方が主ト  
 シテ責任ヲ負フベキデハナイカ  
 答、ハイ、私ハ責任ガアリマス  
 同、貴方が言ハレタカノ人々モ貴方ト共ニ我ノ政  
 策ニ責任ガアリマスカ  
 答、陛下ニ對スル編輯ノ點カラ内閣ニ共同ノ責任  
 ガアリマス故ニ他ノ大臣モ責任ヲ負ヒマス然  
 シ作ラ私ハ首班トシテ重ナル責任ヲ負ヒアリマ  
 ス  
 參謀總長、軍令部長モ亦責任ヲ負ヒマス

五頁

東條英機ニ對スル訪問談話  
一九四六年二月七日

511244

Q# 1244

Document No. 2508A

Page 1

Extract from Interrogation of Hideki TOJO, 1 March 1946, pp. 7, 8

"Q Did you not know of any of the other attacks which were going to be made on December 8th simultaneously with the Pearl Harbor attack?

"A The Pearl Harbor attack was a Navy operation and I know only that if the attack went smoothly that it would begin at such and such a time. The Malaya, Hongkong, and Phillipines attacks were joint operations and, hence, as War Minister, I knew about them.

"Q How early did you know about each of them, that is Pearl Harbor and the others?

"A I knew about the Pearl Harbor attack from the time of the Liaison Conference just preceding the Imperial Conference of 1 December 1941. I knew about the other attacks some five or six days before the Liaison Conference met."

-----

"Q Did you not, as Premier, know of and approve the attacks which were made on Pearl Harbor, Hong Kong, Malaya and the Phillipines on or about 7 or 8 December 1941?

"A Of course. I did know about them and approve."

Document No. 2508A  
Page 1

2508A-1

一九四六年三月一日  
第七、八頁

「第七頁」

京條突機ニ對スル訊問ヨリノ抄本

問、十二月八日ニ眞珠灣攻撃ト同時ニ別ノ攻撃ガ爲  
サレ様トシテサイルノヲ知リマセシタカ

答、眞珠灣攻撃ハ海軍ノ作戦ヲ了リ私ハ唯ソノ攻撃  
ガ真前ニ遣ムトシタナラバコレノ時間ニ關  
シテサレルテアツコトヲ知ツテ居ツタ丈  
ナス。馬來、香港、及比魯賓攻撃ハ共同作戦ヲ  
アリソレ故陸軍大臣トシテソレ等ニ曉イテハ知  
ツテ居リマシタ。

問、貴方ハドノ位早クカラソノ攻撃ノ各々ニ付イテ  
知ツテ居リマシタカ、即チ眞珠灣及ソノ他ノ諸  
攻撃ニ曉イテス。

答、私ハ眞珠灣攻撃ニ曉イテハ昭和十六年十二月一  
日ノ御前會議ノ直前ノ連絡會議ノ時カラ知ツテ  
居リマシタ。他ノ諸攻撃ニ曉イテハソノ連絡會  
議ガ開カレル五、六日直前カラ知ツテ居リマシ  
タ。

FILE COPY  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

2508A-2

「第八頁」

閣、貴方ハ總理大臣トシテ、昭和十六年十二月七日  
、八日又ハソノ以長孫也、香港、馬來及比律賓  
ニ對シ行ハレタ詔政學ニ就イテ知ツテ居ラズ且  
之ヲ承認シマセシテシタカ。  
卷、勿論私ハソレ等ヲ知ツテ居リ且承認シマシタ。

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

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



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
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


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


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


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