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## INTRRLATIONAL GILITARY RRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR RAST

THE UNITWID STATES OF AMERICA, ot al. )

- AGAINST -

ATPIDAYT
ARAKI, SADAO, ot al.
I. Joseph W. Jallantine, having been culy sworn on oath, depose and say:

I entered the Foreign Servi ce of the United States in June 1909, and thereafter served continuousily up to date at various diplomatic and consular peats and in the Department of State. From 1909 until 1928 I sorved continuously either at the American Rmbassy at Tokyo or in consular posts in the Japanese Rrpire. From 1928 to 1930 I served in the Department of State. From 1930 to 1934 I served as Conaul General at Canton, China; from 1934 to 1936 I served as Coneul General at Mukden, Manchuria; from July to Docember 1936 I served terporarily at the American Embassy in Tokyo as First Secretary; and from March 1937 to date I have served continuousiy in the Department of Stato. Up to September 20, 1945 I was on duty in the Office of Far Rastern Affairs of the Department of State. Between December 1944 and September 1945 I was Director of that office. Since September 1945 my position has been that of Special Assistant to the Secretany of State.

The matters herein deponod to are mainly within my personal knowledge, otherifise they are matters with which I am familiar from recorde of the Department of State.

During practically all of my career in the foreign service, I have dealt with Far Restern Affairs and have followed closely the course of Japanese-American relations. Up until 1931 the relations between the United States and Iapan uere generally Irlendly and the American Government and people coasietently had an attitude of good w1ll toward the government and ceople of Japan. The Japanese ocoupation of Manchuria caused an impairment of those relations.

It is ossential to an understanding of the true significance of the conversations which took place in 1941 between the representatives of the Jenanese and American Governments looking to a peaceful eettlement of the Pacific question to have clearly in mind the baokgrand of the politienl aitruation in and politime to the Tat lent.

Almost from the outset of Japan's emergence as a modern state she had been pursuing a policy of military agerandisament. For the moet part, except during certain briof periode when forces of moderation appeared to be in the aecendancy, the intervale between one aggressive step and the next were but periode of consolidation.

In 1895, Lollowing Japan's succosaful war against China, Japan annexed Formose and tried unauocesefully to establish a foothold in Manchuria.

In 1905, after the Russo-Japanese var, Japan established herself securely in Manchuria by acquiring a lease of the Kwantung territory and ownership of the South Manchuria Railwey. At that time Japan also acquired southern Sakhalin.

In 1928, foilowing the advent of the Tanaka cabinet in 192\%, Japan adopted a so-called "positive" polici toward China under wich it marifested an increasing dioposition to intervens in China's internal affeirs.

In 1931 Japan invadod Manchuria and subsequently established there a puppet regime under the neme of "Menchukuo." By that sction, which was a flagrant v $\ddagger 01$ etion of the Nine Power Treaty, Japan broke completely away from the policy of cuoperation abreed upon in the Washington Conference treaties.

The opposition of the American Goverment to Japan's course was reflected in the identic notes which the United States Government delivered to the Japanese and the Chinese Governments, dated Jemuary 7, 1932, stating that the United Siates could not admit the legality of ary aituation de facio; that it did not intend to recogntze any treaty or agreement between China and Japan which might impair U. S. treaty righte, including those relating to Chinese sovereignty and the open door policy; and that it did not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreament brought about contrary to the Kelloge; Pact.

Although the United States was not a member of the League of Nations, it cooperated with the League in relation to the Manchurian question.

In a note addressed to the Secreiary of State dated February 21, 1934, Mr. Hirsia, Jqpanese Miniater for Foreign Affairs, stated that he beileved that no question existed between the United States and Japan "that is fundamentally incapable of anicable solution." The Secretary of Statia in his reply expressed concurrence in that view and eriphasized the belief of the American Government in adjustments of questions by pacific means. The exchange of messages in question is quoted on pp. 127-129 inclusive, Foreign Relations of the United States - Japan, 1931-1941, Volune I.

Nevertheless, on April 17, 1934, the Japanese Foreign Office spokesman gave out a tricuient official statement knewn as the "Arrau" statement. In that statenent, Japan mede clear a purpose to compel China to fcllow Japan's dictate and to permit other countries to have relations with China only as Japan allowed. A copy of that statement is annexed as Exchibit A.

On December 29, 1934, while Hirota was still Foreign Minister, Japan gave formal notice of its intention to witharaw at the end of 1936 from the liaval Iimitation Treaty nigned at Washingtion on February 6, 1922. Following the giving of that notsce, Japan procoeded onergetically to increase her armaments, oreparatory to launching her Invasion in China.

In July 1937, with Hirota again Foreign Minister, Japan deliberately took advantege of a minor incident between Chinese and Japanese forces at a point near Peiping and began Plagrantly to invade China on a huge scale. She poured into China immense armies which epread fen-like over great areas, including industrial and other key conters. These armies raped, robbed, murdered and committed all kinds of lawless acts. Particularly barbarous were the outrages in Nanking following ocmpation of that city by Japanese military on December 13, 1937. Public opinion in the United States was shocked by these outrages.
'Document No. 2215

Subsequent to the renewed Japaneso armed attack on China, beginuing on July 7, 1937, relations between the United States and Japan steadily doteriorated. The Japansse military forces completely dierogarded in their acts sugigitions made by the United States and other governments that :eanonable consideration be given by them to the safety, rights and interest; of nationala of third countries in China. Americen puilic opind in became outraged by the mathods and strategr omployed by the J. panese military and becane gradually more and more critf.cal of Japan. The United States Goverrment looked with "hor ugil Aisfasor upon the current manifestations of Japanese foroif policy add upen the methode employed by the Japanese military in pursui; of their policy.

On August 10, i93?, the United States made an offer of American good offices in the dispute oetween Japan and Chins, but the attitude of the Japanese Government was sich that nothing came of it.

On October 6, 1937, the American Govirnment protested that the action of Japan in China was insonsis:ent with the principles which should govern rolationships batwoen nations and was contrary to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and of the Briand-Kelloge Pact.

In November 1937 the United States pirticipoted with eighteon other nations in a confarence held at Brufsels to "etudy peaceable means of hastening the end of the regretteble conflict which prevails" in the Far Fast. Tre conference wes held in accordance with a provision of the Nins Power Treaty of 1922. The repeated refusals of the Japanese Govornment to paricipate in the conference effectively preventod offorts to bring about an end to the conflict by mediation and conciliation. On Novembe: 2s the conference suspended its sittings.

On December 12, 1937, Japanese aircrajt boabed and sank the U.S.S. Panay in the Yangtze River.

To gain iublic aupport in Japan for i.s progran of military expansion, slogans were used, such as "the naw order in Greajer Bast Asia" and "the Fist Ania Co-Prospority Sphere." The United States and other countries were charged wilh attempting to choke Japan's development. That charge was entirely unfounded except as it applied to Amarican and British opposition to Japan's courses of aggression.

On July 26, 1939, the Government of the United States notified the Japanese Government of its intention to terminate the Treaty of Commerce and Navigasion of 1911. It was felt that this treaty was not afforcing adequate protection to American commerce either in Japan or in Japanese occupied portions of China, while at the same time the operation of the most-favorod-nation clause of the treaty was a bar to the adoption of rotaliatory moasures againat Japanese commerce. The treaty therofore terminated on January 26, 1940.

During the entire poriod of the undeclered war between Japan and China thore was on the pari of the Japanese Government and tho Japanese authorities in Chile figgrant disragard for and violation of Amorican rights and intoreste and the jecpardizing of American lives. American property wac invared, occupied, and taken over by the Japanese military authorities. In many instances Arerican property was bonbed and imerican citizens placed in joopardy of their lives. Discriminsiory sustrictions were placed upon American onterprise and trade in Chira. Jepanese conscrship of and interference with American mail and telegrams and restrictione upan freedom of trade, residence anj irarci by Arvoricans sujjected Aherican interests to continuing sertous inconvenicaces and hirdohips. Notwitrstanding repeated represcitailuns and pecieniss by the Amcrican Government and notwithstanding rep ?aled end categne:cial assurarces by the Japanese 'Government that equality of opporbenity or the Coon Door in China would be maintained and that Amerlcan rights would be rospected, violations of American rights and inturgsts continued.

The imposition by the Japanose authoritios of restrictions upon the novement and activitien of Amuricans in China operated to place Japanose interests in a preftred position In China and was discriminetory in its offeci upon logitinate ancrican interosts. The imposition by the Japanese authorities of oxchango controls, compulsory currenci circilation, tariff revision and monopolistic promotion impliod an assumpition on the part of the Japanese authorities that the Japanese Governaent or the regimes established and maintained In China by japanese armed forces vers entitiod to act in China in a capacity such an flows from riphtes of soverelegnty and to disregard the established rights and intercists of other ccontries, inciuding the United States.

The Japanese Prime ininister, in a frabise atatement lioverbor 3, 1938, said in pae:": "tll countries of the ricrld ahould have a clear recognition regarding the new situabicn in the Far East. History shows clearily that peace and indeyondence in Cinina have been freqrent. ly monaced ac the zesuit of the stivepia for supremacy among fureign Powors which vas baced on imperialistic arbitiors. Japar sees the nocessity of effecting a fundamental revision in this situation and desires to ostabligk a new peace febric In Tar East on the basis of justice. It goes without saying that Japan will not exclude cooperation of foreign Powers. Neither sho intende to domace the legitrimate rights of the third Powers in China. If the Powers underntand the real intentions of Japan and devise a policy in accordance with the now situation in the Far Easi, Jepan does not geudre to cooporate with thom for peace in the Far Rosi." He did not, howoror, define what he meant by policies " n ac:ordance with the now situretion in the Far East.: (U. S. Foreign Relaiions - Japan - 1931-1941, Vol. II, pago 480.)

In Soptomber 1939 the Government of the United States protested to the Japanese Govornment afatnst a large-rcale propaganda carpaign againat Hestern nations, including the Unltod States, undertaken by Japanese agencies in areas of Chine under Japanese control. In pronouncements and manifestos issued by pirpot resimes at Poiping and Nanking it was sought to persuade Chinese pocple that the difficultios and burdons which the hostilities had brought upon the native population should be blamed upen the Western nations, including the United States. Strong anti-American'feelins was fosterod in various places, anti-Amorican parades wero organized, and anti-Arerican banners and posters vero displayod.

In luguat and September 1940 it came to the knowledge of the Department of state that Japan had concluded an egreement with Vichy Trance under which Jacanese troops moved into northern Indo-China. The Acting Seoretary of State on Soptember 20, 1940, Informed the Japanese Ambasmador that the Ambnesidor himoelf could be undor no misapprehension as to the vory sorious disquiet and vory open opposition which the asilion threatened by Jepan in Indo-China would create in the minds of the mombors of the Unisted States Governmont and on the part of public opinion genorally in the United States.

In Soptember 1940, Japan enterod into the Tripartito Pact with Gormany and Italy. In the viow of the Gcrernment of the United States that alliance wan almed directly at tho Uiilted States. It was designod to discournge the Unitod Statos from taking adequate measures of solf-defense until both Japan and Gormany had completed their progrem of conquost in Asia and Furope, when they could turn on tho Unitod States thon etanding alono. The Secrotary of State in commenting on September 30, 1940, to the British Ambassadior on tho aubject of that allianco obsorved that tho rolations among Gormany, Italy and Japan, each having a common objoctive of conquoring cortain sreas of the world and each pursuing identical policios of forco, dovartation, and soisura, had beon during rocunt yoars on tho "basis of corpleto understanding and of mutual cooporation ${ }^{n}$ for all practical purposer.

After the auturn of 1940 it becano cloarly spparent that tho Japanese military leadors had exbarked upon a progron for the conquest of the ontire Far Fast and Wostorn Paoific area. That progran was roforred to by euphonistic elogens such ns the "Now Ordor in Greator Fast Asia" and "tho Greator Eent Asia Co-prosperity Sphore," They wont out with forco and ontored into collaboration with Hitlor to eotablioh a now world order, arroçating to themeelvos a sphero which enbraced an apea occupiod by neariy half of the population of the worla.

During all theso yoars the Govornment of the United States coneistontly eought to renind the Japanese Government of the traditional friendship and maturily profitable rolations between the two countrie: and to keeg beforo the Japanoso Governnent in the nost tactful manner possible the principles which ahould forn the basis of worthwhile relationships betwoen nations. The Govornnent of the United Statos also sought to ulssuado Japan fron hor courses by pointing tho way to just and honorable alternativos which would have asdurod Japan what she professed to soek - national socurity and econonic prosperity.

It was also necoseary to bear in aind in ontoring upon the convorsations with the Japanese in 1941, Japan's long record of duplicity in intornational dealinge.

In 1904, Japan gunerenteed Iorea': Independence and tertitorsal integrity. In 1920, Jupan anmexed Eocea.

In 1908, Japan pledged with tho United States to support the independence and integrity of China and the principle of oqual opportunity there. In 1915, Japan presentod to China the notorious "twenty-ono domands."

In 1918, Jajan ontorodights an inter-allisd arrangonent whoreby forces, not exceocinf abo 647,000 bs any one pourcr, were to be sent to Siboria to guard rilitary atores which mifht be subsequently needed by Russian forcec, to relp the Rusisans in the organization of their own solf-defense, anc to nid the evacuntinr Czechoslovakion forcos in siboria. Tho Japaness ailitary saw in this enticrpriso an opportunity iro which they we:e oventually unauccossful, to annex nastern Siberia and sent anro than 7C,000 troojn.

In the Nino-Powor Troaty of 1922, Jauen as:eod to rospoct China's sovereignty, ind qpendence and torritorici and airinistrative integrity. Japan also agreed to uge its influancs to catiabiani tho principle of oqual opportunity thero. Japan's whole course in China aince 1931 of ailitary occupation and ecnnomic domination was in vinlation of those pledges.

On November 21, 1932, Mr. Matauoka, then Jananese dolegate to the Leazue of Nations, sain: "We uant no moro territory." By the ond of 1932 Japanose forcos hat occupied the whole of Manchuria, and in subsequent years they noved southward and wentward occupying a vast area of China.

On July 27, 1937, Prince Koncye, then Japanese Promior, sala: "In sending troops to North China, of course, the Government has no other purpose, as wan expleined in its recent atatement, than to preserve the peace of Eest, Aata." In ordor to "uroserve the peace of Part Asia," Japancse forces for four yoars had carried warfaro and suffering over the ireater part of China.

On October 28, 1937, the Japanese Fornion Office raic., "Jajan never looks upon the Chinene peonle as an onoiny . . ." Japar ahowod ite friendly feeling for Chinn by Jombin, Chinese civilian populationo, by burning Chineso citios, by maling militono of Chirose homelose and dostituto, by aistreating and killinf civijians, and by acts of horror and cruclty.

On April 15, 1940, Nr. Aritz, thon Iquances Minister for Foreten Affairs, said the "Japaneso Governmont cannot but bo deoply concorned over any developaont . . . that nay affect tiac ate.tus quo of the Nethorlands East Indies." Foliowing the occupetion of the Netherlards by Gormany that sprinf, Japan sent a Comercial Comission to the Indius which asked concessions so far roachin; that, if granted, they would have reduced the Indios practically to a Jaijanose colony.

Aftor the ronewal of 'apan's undeclared war erjajnst China in July 1937, Japanose civilian loadors tire ani arinin gave assurances that Amorican ri.jhts would be respectec. Tino and afain the Japanose nilitary acted in violation of those aspurances.

Tino and again the Jajanose gave assurancos that Arerican lives and property in ohina would bo rospoctod. Yot there were reportcd in steadily mountin; numbors cases of bonioing of Anorican property with consequent loss or entanforing of Anerican lives.

Timo and again, thn Jipaneso gave aseurancos that Amoricen treaty rights in Chine would be resjected. Unnumbercd r.oasurce infringing those rights were put into effoct in Jepanese occupied
areas. Trade monopolios vero sot up, discriminatory taxes were imposed, American properties vere occupied, and so on. In addition, American nationals were assalted, arbitrarily detained, and subjected to indignities.

In 1931-1933, while Japan was carrying forward its program of aggreneion, the American Governnent was noving steadily ahead in adrocacy of world support of sanctity of treaties and peaceful processes.

On May 16, 1931, the Secretary of State had a general conversation with Japanese Arbassador Saito, one of nany conversations In which he endeavored to convince tho Japanese that their beat intereste lay in following policies of peace.

Three days later, the Secretary of State talkod again with the Jepanese Anbassador. During the conversation, the Aribassador repeatod the formia which his Govornment had been putting forward publicly for sone veeks to the offect that Japan had a superior and apecial function in connection with the preservation of peace In Rastern 1sia. The Secretary of State trought to the Japanese Anbaseador's attention the cloar implications contained in the Japanese formula of the inteation on the part of Japan to oxercise an ovariordehip over neighborins nations and territories.

Draring the winter of 1940 and the rpring of 1941, it was apparent that the Jepanece military leaders wore starting on a miseion of conquest of the ontire Pacific area west of a few hondred miles of Hawail and extending to tho South Seas and to India. The Jepanese were out with iorice in collajoration with Aitler to establish a new world order, and ti:ey thought they had the power to corpel all peaceful nations to cono in under that new order in the hall of the world they had arrofated to thenselves.

In March 1941, Just as I was about to proceed to China to assume the poet of Counselor of Bimbssy there, I was instructed by the Secretary of State to remain in Mashington for consultation in connectidn weth a sugiestion which had been informally broupht to the attention of the President and the Secretary of State through the mediun of private Anericans and Japanese that the Japanese Government would velcore on opportunity to altor its political aligneents and modify its attitude toward China. It was represented that if an egreenent could be achieved with the U. S. which would offer Japan security, this would enable the noderate elerents in Japan to gain control of the domestic political situntion there. It wal further represented that, there was adequate eupport in the Japansie Governmeat for an agreenent with the U. S. which would provide, among other thinge, for practisal zaritifioation of Japan'a elifance with the dxis and for settlement of the confliot between China and Japan on terme which would give complete recognition by Japan of the "open door" in China, provided that Japan receivad similar treatment elsewhere in the Far Bast. It was also represented that the Japanase people were weary of the hostilities with China and that most elemonts in Japan wore prepared for a rocesting of Japan's policies along liberal and peacotul lines.

Wolcomine theae nugsestions, but also with the history as above sunnarized in nind, tic Presidert and tho Socrotary oi State durine March and April, 1941, severed times ciamasoed with the Japanese Arjassador the subjoct of effecting an ::proverient in the relations between the United Staites and Japan.

On May 12, the Japaneso Aibaseador nrosentod as undor Instructions a proposal fur a jengral eettlgmont Onineen tho two countries covering the entire Yisei:ic area. A cony of thet document is annoxad an manibit B. Th: terme when Jacan intoaded to propose to Chins were tra!!cetnad orii" thenach $\because$ efer ence to the "Konoye principlea." Inasmuch as tha "Konnys crirciplea" had becn rade the Gasis of a so-callod treaty bet, weon Jrijan aris the Vians Chinf-Wot Eepine in November 1945, which had placed Japan in a position of ovorlordahip with rospect to the Wa:k Regino, the Secretary of stato sought to induce the Japanene to siate precisely the torms which they had in nind as a basis of Japan's nocotiations with China. Lut the Jopanese Arbsosador end his ase ciatos conotnntis avot ded raleing definite comitronts by coastant -Genct to varue genoralitios. In the course of conversations vith no and with other officers of the Dopartnont, Colonel Hideo Ivakuró, the Special Nilitary Aaviser of the Japanese Aikaseador, oxplained that the aroas where stationing of Japanese troops in China was cortermintod urder a provinion for "dofense against Corvunistic activitios tiarcupt collaboration of the two countrios/China and Japany"inclncior. Inner Mongolis and the adjacent regiors of Chira prcper, capprehonding a line of commalcation to the sea as fe: south as Tsingtao which thue deant Jquanese military douination of tho fivo northorn provinces of Hopel, Shantunf, Shanil, Chahar, and Suivian, witin an aprsergato area of core tian 400,000 cguare cilies and an estianted population of usre than $80,000,000$. Ilisis ternitinry wan in acdition to Mauchiria and the province of Jetol wiilch Japan has? brou;ht under her control sone yearg oarlier. The Military idvisor dochared to wo tiant this station $\boldsymbol{o l}^{2}$ Japaneso troons in China was an absolute onndition of any sétoloment with Chtra.

Notwithotanding the vacious or jecilonaile features of the Japanose Governuent's frorosal, in viow of the worid aituntion the Government of the U. S. ceciad to eiplore thorouithly overy possible reans, sterting with the Jajenose proposals, of cominf to an arreoment. Tho Socretary of State on numorous occasions at which I was prosent oriphasized to tho Jirmese Amjassaior that this Government was aware of the difficult internal situntion orhich the japanose Government faced and was prerared to be patient and to 3 foo the Jipanese Goverment ample tire to iring Japanese public opinion into Ine in support oi a liboral brcad-gauge prograr, such as the Secretary of Stato and the Japanose Ambassador had boon discuesing in their convercations. The Japaness ruprusentatives expresesed eurprise that tinis Government should raise with them the points in resard to the terms of eettloment which Japan proposod with China as thoy regarded tho nottloment of tho Chine aifair as a mattor which concerned only China and Japan. The Secretary of State pointed out in numerous conversations that a peaceful settienent betwon Japan and China was an essential elemont in furthering tho oojective which the U. S. and Japan had in minc., namoly, the poace of tho Pacilio, and that if the U. S. should, as the Jopanose
proposed, auggest tirat Chirie enter negotiations vith Japan, thia Guvernmont couill raj divert litadif of a cortain dejres of responsibiifty with refinri to tin jeceis of the rronesed ricgotiations and the general confermity of "apen'n gropesed toras with the principlos which this Covernrient supyeris. On May 29, in reqporse to questions asked by the Secuutany of Stalie, libs Iapanese Ambancilor indicated that withdmaki of the depanesc tioops frum uhine. Pnilicwlag a sottioment with Chiue, would nct iajude Tapenesu tionse roisined in China for "ccoperitire defense axainist Commanien, " wic that he was unable to state how many truc:p Jxpan would propoce retainirg or to define
 Japaiese Ambestel, ist, in 1 giviy to further queations by the Secratary of State, seia tiant he did rot bolieve that the Far laat had yrogressed to a priat where cther arrangemonta wull be foasible. The Secretary of Staio aiso, on May 28, wade it clea; that the Japanese proposed forcuia inth rufarence to Jepan'n roleticns to the Axis did not adequaiely clardíy Japrn' ; peaceful intention teward the U. S., shouid the U. S. through acts of self-de?onse become involved in war with Germeny. He emphaoized that euch clarification was needed, especially to off-set statorents boing nado by Japaneso officials in justification of Japan's Aris obligatious and that if wo made an egreement with Japen, critics wous. unless the Japaneso Government had adequately clarified its aftitude on this point, aseert that there was no assurnnce an to Jnpan's position vis a vis the U. S.

The question of what Japan meant by "aconomic cooperation" betweon China and Japan was also discussed. As the infor:aal conversations proceeded, it was evidont that Japan intended to rotain a preferrad economic position for herself in China, while at the sane time trying to obtaix for herself in the southwestorn Facific area economic righis such as it was unwilling that a third Power should enjoy in Chin. The Secretary of State made it clear that rotention by Japan of a preierred peaition in China would be inconsistent with the principle of non-diebrimination in international comiercial rolations to which thin Government was committed, which it belierod to be essential for a lasting peace in the Pacific, and which the Japanese had said thay approved.

On June 6, the Secretary of State inforned the Japanese Anbassador that he hai received the inprossion, from the auccessive Japanese revisions of their proposal and from recent manifestations of the Japanose Governnent's attitude, that the Japanese Governnent was disposed (1) to stress Japanese allenment with the A:is; (2) to avoic giving a clear indication of an intention to place Japan's relations with China on a badis wizich would contribute to a lasting peace in the Far Eqet; and (3) to veer away from clear-out commitments in regard to policios of peese and of non-discriminatory treatment which were the fundanentals of a sound basia for peace in the Pacific.

The Japaneso pressed for a complete reply to their proposale of May 12. Accordingly, on June 21, the Ambassador was given the American Governmunt's view in the form of a tentative redraft of their proposais. A copy of that docuriont is appended as lixhibit 0 . There is arnexed as Rxhibtt $D$ a corparison in parallel columns between auch provisions of the Japanese proposal of Mey 12 and the American counterdraft of June 2l, as represented material and essential differences.

On June 22, Gernany attacked the Sovict Union, and In July the American Governnent began rocoiving reports that a large Japanese military movemont into southern Indo-China was incinent. This Japanese movement threaionod the Philippine Islands and Britioh and Dutch possessions in the wentern Facific area. It also threatened vital trade routes. Officers of the Depariment of State immediately brought these reports to the attoution of the Jajpnese Ambassador, pointed out the inconsiatency retwoon such a militars movenent and the conversations which were then proceedinf, and raquested information as to the facts. On Tuly 23, the Jananese Ambassador statud in explanation that Japar noedod to decure an uninterrupted source of supplies and to insure against encirclenent oi Japan militarily. The Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, amplied that the agreement, which was being discussad between Americnn and Japanese representatives, would give Japen far greater economic socurity than sho could gain by occupying Indo-Uhina. He pointed out that the United States policy was the opposite of an oncirclement policy. He said that the United States could only regard the action of Japan as constituting notice that Japan was traking the last step to proceeding on a policy of expanaion and conquest in the region of the South Seas. Ho told the Ambassador, under instructions from the Secretery of State, that under those circunetances, the Secretary could not see any basis for pursuing further the conversations with the Japanese Ambassador.

On July 24 Presicuent Roosevelt made a pronosnl to the Japanese Government that Indo-China be regarded as a "ncutralized" country. That proposal onvisazed Japan's beino; given tho fullest anc freest opportunity of assuring for herself a source of food supplies and other raw materials which-according to Jajanase accounts--Japan was seeking to ottrin. The Japanese Governant did not accept the President's proposal, and large Japanese forces were noved into Southorn Indo-China.

The Japanese nove into southorn Indo-China was an argravated, overt act. It created a situation in which the risk ce war became so great that the United States and other countries conserned were confronted no longer with the question of avoldins such risk but from then on with the proklem of preventing a complete undormining of their security. It was eesential that the United States make a doifinite and clear move in self-dofense.

Accordingly, on July 26, 1941, President Roosevelt issued an executive order freezing Chinese and Japanese nesets in the United States. That order brought under the control of the Government all financial and irmort and export trade transactions in willch Chinese or Japanese intorects were involvad. The 3 ritish and Netiorlands Governments took similar steps. The offect of this was to bring about very soon virtual cessation of trade belween the United States and Japan.

Thereafter, on August 8, the Japanese Ambassador inquired whether it might not be possible for the responsiole hesde of the two governments to meet with a view to discusoing means for reaching an adjustment of views. After reviexing briefly the steps which had led to a discontimance of the informal conversations, the Secretary of State said it remained to the Japaneso Governmont to decido whether it could find means of shaping its policies along lines which would make possible an adjustment of views.

On August 28 the President was giton a mesgace fron ing 'epurapi,

 Japan and tho liated Staies coyering inj arrije patisfo erea. Aorom
 several quatinuraions, of izpinta parcefol intait. Conten of tho


The Proajdent in hir roply givon on Exptanicgi 3 fogeented thet there take place inimedately in advance of the jrop.jped f:3etiat
 which agreerent was sourint and on thu may nor in whitn the estareant


It was felt by the Anerscan Government that the Frosianat

 accomplish guca. Neithor Prince Konoye nor sny of $\mathrm{I}_{\text {ituan's spoces. }}$ nen providel suithing tangiole. They held on to the threst acestat the United Staces implicit in the Iripartite filiarce. Thyy wulit not state that Japjn would refrain fron attacicing the Valted Stetos If it became involved through acta of self-defense in tas fruruprea War. The Japanese had alrsady rafused to afx 0 to any prelinicory steps lowaid yoverting to pexiatiol colisus, as for ezarpio adopting the Prosident's proposes of Jily 24 rogaratips the neentrailization of Indo-China. Inctead they steadily moved on with their program of establishing thomselvos nore pirmly in Indo-China. Irieg woild not tudge from theiv iucistences in eny peace agreement with Chlna upon terme based on principlen which wore oribnalcd $1=3$ so-cailol tresty of 1940 with the puppet Wing Chingowei rogine ati Natating aid whici included the stationd": Aut an incinfinito pericd ji large budies of Japanofie tromps in wide arens of ching axd the ceatrol by Japan of strategic industrios and economic facilities in China-tarne which vould have given Japan a nermbient strangehola over China. Inasmuch as morths of closeup convarsations with the Japanese had failed to move then on these polnts, it would have been illusory to expect that a peeting betioen the President and the Prime Minister would have resulted in Japan's giving dependabie pledges such ac would havo asaurcd a peaceful setitleaent. It was clear that unleas the proposed meeting proanced conorete and clear-cut compitmonts toward peace, the $J$ qianese would have distorted the significanca of exch a meeting in ulish a way an to have a diaccucesing effect upon the Chinese; is it had resulisat neruly in ondoruing general principles, the Japaness in the lisht of their past practice could have been axpoctod to utisize cish general princtplos in aupport of any interpretation wis.ci dapan night choose to place upon them; aui if it did not prictuce in recroemont, the Japanese laaders would rave been in position to declare that the Uníied States was responsible for the pallure of the reetine.

On Soptenber 6 the Japanesa Ambassador presented a new draft of proposals. These propisals were much marrower than the as eurances given In the stajemont comunicried to the President on August 28. A copy of thic $p$ :oposel is annezed as bhitbit $G$.

On September 25, the Japanese Goverament presented to Ambaseador Grew a complete new iraft of the Jnpenves. prupodals and urged that an exrly roply bo-made....The ne:f redralt did not indicato any modifloation of the attitude of the Japanese Covernaent or fundamental
points. A copy of this proposal is annexed as Rrhibit H. Ino Japanese Governcont had separately on Soptcmbcr 2'z commanica' ed to Ambassador Grew a statement in regard to the serns of jeaco whluh it proposed to offer China. A copy of that statement is ennexed as Thehtbit I.

On October 2, the Secrotary of State gave to the rarymene Ambaseador a menorendum of an "oral atatement" reviurt:\%; ?igatitant developnents in the convergations and explatianas in: forcricicits attitude toward various points in the Japanese pirposeale which aid not appear to this Government to be conslateci, with the priaciples to which the United States was committed. A ocpy of thai roral statoment" is annoxed as Bribit J.

The Japanose, soon after receiving this Government's menorandum of October 2, redouiled their ormhasis upon the need of haste in reaching an agreerent. Ther offored new formuge for doging with linited and specific probler:s, and they stnted that Java hai now placed all of its carcis on the table and they had gono as far as they could in the direction of making so-called "concoasions." In their new forrulas, there was not discernible any evicence that the Japanese Governnent was noving even one stup tichard conritting itself to courses of peace and that it contemplatei rcescing oven one step from insistence upon full attainment of its dociacol ohjeritreswhich werc, in offect, political, economic, and eud. urui domination of the entire westorn Pactfic area and China. Aiter the new japanese Cabinet, hended by General Tojo, came into office on Cutuber 3.7, the Japanese becan:e even more insistent in urging upon tfis Guvernment a quick decision on the Japanese Gcvernment's propsecis, titi, while pressing this Government for a decision, the Japunesu Gcvoinmont showed no willinenecs to offect any fundemertial nodisicaision of the Jepanese porition and no desire to apply practicelly ia suticait situntacing the basic principles of justice and equity essential to the building of a lasting pace in the Pacific.

Although throughout the convorsations with the Japanese xenzesentative, the Serretry of State repeatedly made it clear thar ihe American Governuent wovid consult with the Governaents of the Inited Kingdom, Austrcilia, Sinina and the Netherlande before enterites into actual nogotiaitions with the Japanese Governmert affecting the interests of those gorempente, at no tine did the Secretiay of 'tate calk any statement to Japannee representative which whid arv: warranted the Japaneso in assuming that in the informal cmirareaifons tho Secretary of State was delegated to apeak or act for itw, itanr powers nontioned.

 sations, reabini riaphipeton. Shorily thereafter, on Noveaber 20, the Japanese Arjzntaior and Mr. Kurusu presented to the Secretery of State a frejen visich, on its face, was externe. A cory at shat proposal is ems sed ant Exhibit K.

Before ani stose presenting that properal, Aimaseacor lionura and Mr. Kurusd iv liei exuhatically about the orgency of the altua-

 developments mifht bo mont unfirtunate.

Accoptance by the Arowiman Covorrnent of the Japanese preposal of Novenber 20 vouid hate neard undengment by the tiated Etrtas
 courses of combent by Jociar ir ahe fethre, evannonnent by the Trited








 China which threatcnat tiie youndity of the coubtrice to the gouth
 troops from oushern indo-Chsna to mosthora Indo.. Chine wes moaxinglose
 within a iev or trio, eni furthermore thoy placed ro limit on the number of troops tiley uirht continue to oend thero.

On Noverber 25 , the Socretary of State made a reply to the
 an outline in a tontative form of a propasid baslis for serergonit between the linited Sinies and Japail, and tion occond, an exijianatory statement in referd in it. A cupy of that cocument is anmered as Exhiblt I.

Although, it, subsequentiy appnarod, tho Jrpanose treatiod the
 nogojiating a poacetul sotilemyti coporing the Purizis area, they kept up the appaaiance of continuine negotiations right down to Decenber 7.

On Decouber 2, tho President isprocted that Inousry be modo at once of the Japanese Anbaseador and Mr. Kurusu in regard to the reasons for continued Japanese tranp movenosts into Indn-China. On Docomber 5, the Japanose Aribessad.s cailed and preeented to the under Socretary of Stato, Mr. Welles, a ropiry to tre Prest dent's inguniy of Docomber 2 containing tho spociuus statemont that Japanese retifercerantsy hac been seat to Irin-China as a preceutforemy measare. against Chjnese troups in bordering Galnose tierrytory. un Decerber 6, Proaidgh Fooserait telegrephed a persoral aposal to the Erperar ois Jupen that the litragic possibliitiea" in the esturition be avoicel. At the Fiesident's orprass direction the mersarye was gent in the "Eray" codn, a non-conifiential code which the Jepanese wou!d have no difficuity in dec: jherring. In ceider to essuro prorpt decoding and cieliyery by Aribessedor Grew of that nasseges; $z$ briof telogran was sent rim ehoitly in adrance to be roady fing a mussage to the Etporor whith was belng pit on the wirea. The silgiting meesege was dingniched on Deseinber 6 aj; 8 p . m.; the nes sago to the Mrperor at 9 p. n. mhore is unnsxed as Hatibit $M$ a cojy of the nessose to the Brperor. The prose was inforned by ths finte Hocee at about 7.40 F. a. on Dscomber 6 of the fact that a measege to the mupuror was being dikpatiched.


mutually advantapoous and accoptablo for a tornination of hostilities and rosurption of panceinl rjeations" was of courss made contingent upon Japan's onturing tito efferisral agrearent along the lines of the June 21 propusai eni whe nevas: Withdrawn. The filerican Govarnnent's propanal of Jnpanb.ay 25 ropiesented a practical application of princtplus which hed teen under discuesion daring monthe of nogotiationc, anl. weic nuthins; new; it of:?ored Janan various bonefits which would brie teon wileomos. by aivy emintry bont on purenirg poacoful coinses. Sueh deldey as ccurred in the convoreatione arose entirely fiour the fiece arhersnce of the Jarancae Goverament to its fixed policico of arsieasion. It is rot ciegr what is meant by tho Japanese cortortsca tian tiee Arerican propossl sor a multilateral non-asgecenion rait vas for t.moved from the roalities of Faut leia, unless it was tixi the proposul confileted with the Japanose plan for ostablisheng jupariose domanation of the ontize Wustorn Pacific area. The charge that the United States was achoming for en extension of the war nas, cn its fare, propostorous. Tho charge that the United Statea, in corfunction with Groat Eritain, was axercieing econouic prosedre in orajer to deal with internaíional relations refers obviously to the freczing nearuro which was resorted to an a neceseary noasure of solf-defense after Japsa had launched its largesoels forward nilitary movement into Southorn Indo-China 30 as to 1meril the security of American, British and Dutch territory. The, chargo that the United States desirad to maiatain and strer.gthen ite alleged dominant position in China is, on its face, absurd as the Unitod States novor sought nor did it orer have a dominant position in China or in the Frar Frat. With rogacd to the contention that the United Statea nought to obstrust the croation by Japen of a new order In Eact Asia, it is of course trie that the Uaited States wes consistently opposed to Japan's protensions to the arrosation to itnelf of a position of military dominance throughout the far East and the vostorn iPactfic arca.

The Secretary of State read the Japanese docunont, turned to the Japaseso Aibaseador, and said, "I muct say in all ny converser tions with you $j$ the Jepanese Ambaseador/ during the last nine months I hevo never uttered one word of untruth. This is borno out absom lutely by the record. In all ny fifty fears of public service I have never scen a cocunent that wn3 noro crowded with infancus falsehoods and distortions-infancus falsehoode and distortions on a scele so hure that I nevor inarined until today that any government on this plaiet was car:\&ble of uttering them."

The Ambaseador and Mr. Kurusu then took their leave without naking any comment.

This interviow, as later appeared, took place nore then an hour aitor the Japanese exized forces had atruck without waraing at Pearl Harbor and over tuo hours after an actual Japanebe landing in Malaya and four hours ofter they had crossed the boundary of the International Sottlement at Shanghai. These facts were not nentionod by Nomara and Kurusu.


Subscribed and eworn to before me this 24th day of June, 1946.

## 

Table sho:ting in parillol column dinference on ecsential provisions of substance between the Jeponese Government's draft proposal of May 12, 1941, a.d the cmerican Government's counter-draft of June 21, 1941.

*     *         *             *                 *                     *                         *                             *                                 * 


## Japancic Govmmont's Drift of $\quad: \quad$ American Government's 12 Counter-Draft of June 21

II. The attitude of both Goveinncinte toward the Burojeail der. :
 common aim to brive about the rorld peace; they shall therefore jointly endearour not only to prevent further extcncion of the
juropean iar jut also speciily to restore peece in Euiope.

The Gorcrnment of Japan mriatains thet ite alliance with the bxic 2omers was, and is, defencive and designec to prevent the netions wiich are not at precent directly aficcted by the Europen lar, irom encaging in it.

The Goverament of Jepan maintains that its obligations of military assist:nce under the Tripartito Pact betreen fapan, Germany and Italy oill be apolior in accordance with the stipulation of irticle 30 o. the caid Pact.

The forernment of the Jnitod States maintains thet its attitude tomard the European irar is, and zill contime to be, directer by no such agerressive mercures as to assist any one netion agcinst amother. The United Stetce maintaine that it is pledegec to the hate of arr, and accordingly, its attitude toward the Exppeen Thr is, and will continue to be, determined solely and extlucively by considcrations of the protective defensc of ite om national wel.are and security.
II. The attitude oi both Goverments towerd the Euronean Fir.

The Governmont of Jadan mintains that the purpose or the Tripartite Pact ons, and is, cefensivc and is designed to contribute to the orivention of a: unprovoked extension of the Buronean $\operatorname{\# nr}$.

The Goverument of the United States maintains that its attitule tomard the Juropean hostilities is and rill continue to be detormined :olcly end exclusitely br considerations of protection and self-defence: its netional security and the defense thereof.

Note (Thorc is apmonded a surmested draft of an exchange of lettere as a sujstitute for tine Aniex and Supplament on the port of the Govarnment of the United States on this subject Fhich constituter a part of the draft of May 31, 1941. For diccussion of fundamontal cuestion underlying this whole section, vicie the Oral St-tcment handed the Jamanese mbassador on June 21.)
(Sce alto sugeestec oxchange of letters hmex 3.)



Exhibit "DD - cont' ${ }^{\text {a }}$ ifridavit of Joseph 7. Ballartine, 24 Junc 1946

## Japanesc Gcyernment's Drait of Why 12

IV. Commerce between both nations.
(No material dif serence except for Ancex 2 contained in American proposal.)
V. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestorn Pacific arca.
Having in vien thet the Japanese expansion in the direction of the Southpestern Pacific area is declared to be of peactiful noture, imerican cooperation shall be given in the production and procurement of naturpl resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) rhich Japan needs.
***
VI. The poilicies of both zations affocting political stabilization in the Pacific area.
a. The Governments of the United States and Japan jointly guarantee the independence of the Philippine Islands on the condition that the Philipnine Islands shall maintain a status of permant neutrelity. The Japanose subjects shall not be

* $\Rightarrow \Rightarrow$
: imericen Government's Counter-Draft of June 21
IV. Commerce betmeen both nations.
V. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific arce.

On the basis of mutual plodges hereby given that Japanesc activity and -american activity in the Pacific area shell be carried on by peaceful mens and in conformity mith the principle of non-discrimination in intemational comercial relations, the Japanese Government and the Govemment of the United States agrec to cooperate each pith the other toward obtaining non-discriminatory access by Japan and by the Inited States to commerefal supplies of istural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) "hich each country needs for the sigegunding and develoment of its orm economy.

*     * 

VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific arca.

Both Governments declarc that the controlling policy underlying this understanding is peace in the Pacific area; that it is their fundamentel purpose, through cooperative offort, to contribute to the maintennce and the preservation of peace in the


American ©overnment's Counter Droft on June 21
VI. The policies of both nations affectine nolitical stabilization in the Pacific aroa. (cont'd)

Pacific arca; and that neither has territorial desisns in the nrea mentioned.
VII. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands

The Goverment of Japan dechuras its willi:ugness to enter at such time as the Gorimment of the Unitid States may desire into negotiation rith the Govemment of the Unitid States rith a vien to the conclusion of a treater, for the neutralization 80 the Philippine Islands. Faen Philippiae indejexience shall have been achieved.



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"I deeply appreciate tre courtesy of Your Excellency in delivering personally to Ambassador Nomura the reply of tre United States Government to tre proposal of the Japanese Governrient reeording a meetine between your ixcellency and myself.
"In tre face of universal warlike turmoil Jepan and tr $\in$ United States are tre last two me jor Powers who hold the ley to international peace. Trat tre two nations should fell in tre worst of relations at tris time would mean not only a disaster in itself, but also the collapse of world civilization. Japan is solicitous for the maintenance of the peace of tre Pacific and tre peace of the world and ste desires trefefore to inprove Japenese-American relations.
"Tre present deterioration of tre Japanese-Arerican reletions is lareely due, I feel, to a lack of understanding which ras led to mutual suspicions and misapprerensions, and also encouraged tre macrinations and maneuvers of Trird Powers.
"Witrout first elininating sucr causes, it is impossible to expect adjustment of Japanese-American relations. $T^{2}$ is is why I wish to meet Your Excellency personally fer e frank excrange of views.
"Tre preliminary informal conversations, disrupted July last, were cuite eppropriate both in spirit and content. But tre idee of continuing trose conversations and to rave treir conclusion confirmed by tre responsible reads of tre two Governments does not meet the need of the present situation w'ict is developing swiftly and may produce unforeseen contingencies.
"I consider it, trerefore, of urgent necessity trat tre two reads of the Governments should meet first to discuss from a broad standpoint all in:portant problems between Japan and America covering the entire Pacific area, and to explore tre possibility of saving the situation. Adjustment of minor items may, if necessary, be left to neeotiations between conpetent officials of the two countries, following the meeting.
"Suct is my aim in makine tre present proposal. I sincerely rope my views in tr is reqard are fully understood end reciprocated by Your Excellency.
"Beceuse of t'e nature of tre ceeting as stated above, I would prefer trat it will take place as scon as possible. " 4 Tok:yO_ 7 August 27, 1941.
"Statement by tre Japanese Government Hended by tre Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to President Rcosevelt on August 28, 1941.
"Tre Japanese Government ras reeeived tre corr unicetion conveyed by tre Secretory of state and t'e President of the United States to t'e Japanese Ambassacior on August 17, 1941. The Japanese Government desires to state its views as follows:

Page 2
"The Japanese Government profoundly regrets trat despite the pledge it ras given feretofore as well as its repeated explanations concerning Japan's actions and reasures in tre foreign fieid, t`e United Stetes Government continues to entertein misgivings.


#### Abstract

"Tre United Ctetes Government mentions certain situetions and measures winich it regaras as inimicel to a peeceful settlement in tre Pacific aree. In an atmosprere of world crisis and internetional confusion, it is sor:etimes difficult to ascertain wren an event is a ceuse end $w^{2} \in n$ it is a consequence.


> WWen a netion is obstructed in the pett of naturel end peaceful development or when tre meens of its existence is treatened, not only is it inperetive trat tret netion should take defensive measures, but it is also reouired to do so for the raintenence of a just peace. Tris wes tre motivating policy of the Jepenese Government.
"Hepnwrile, tre United Stetes rad taken certein meesures wrich could be interpreted in Jepen as indicative of a continuing unfriendly pressure at verisnce with tre tren current emicable conversations.
"The United Stetes Government certeinly regerds some of its actions as merely counter-measures egeinst Jepan's policy and procedures whicr were considered es conflicting witr Americen interests and principles. On the otrer rand, to tre Jeppnese Government those proceaures were determined by consideretions of self-protection for receting netionel requirements or removing environmentri and political obstacles pgainst nationel security.
"With admireble modesty of rind, tre Government of tre United Stetes hes seemed frequently uneware trat its words end policies are eutoneticelly weigrted witr the immense pöwer of America's accomplisred fects, ne turel endowment and potential might. Tre President of the United Stetes, end tre secretary of state, in treir own unquestioning edrerence to the weys of perceful procedures, misht find it difficult to believe tret otrer netions, nnywnere, could consider themselves trreatened by t'e United States.

[^0]"In consequence, tre Jepenese Government walcomes tre invitetion by trc Government of tre United Etetes to an excrange of views in regard to besic policies and attitudes as tre foundetion of an uncerstenaing thet will condition lasting end cxtensive pcece in the pecific eree. For suct peace, the Government of Jepen is reedy: for such a united effort townrd a peaceful settlement covering tre entire Pacific situation tre Government of Japen, like trc Government of tre Unitrd States, would be proud to make secrifices.
"Jepen's measure in Indo-Crine was intended to accelerete the settlericnt of the Crine Incident; ?nd at tre sor: time it was celculeted to rerove oll remece to tre peace of the preific and to secure to Jepen en equitoble supply of essentiol meterials. It was a measure of self-defense the Jepenese Government fclt obliged to take. But tre Japancse Government fas no intention of treatening trereby other countries.

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"Trerefore, tre Jepenesc Government is prepered to withdrew its troops from Indo..Crine es soon as the Crine Incident is settled or $\cap$ just pescc ls esteblished in Eest Asis.
"Furtrermore in order to remove all possible doubt in tris regerd, the fopencse Government reaffirms rerenit its reperted decileration trat its present action in Indo-Crina is not a preperetory stcp for militery edvence into neigrboring territories. Tre Japenese Government believes the above pledge will suffice to clarify also Japen's intentions towerd Trailend.
"As regnads coviet-Jopenese reletions, tre Jepenese Government decleres Iikcwise trat Jepen will teke no militery petion es long as tre Soviet Union remains faitrful to the Soviet-Japenesc neutrelity treety and does not menece Jopan or Mencroukuo or take any action contrery to tre spirit of tre seid treety. On the otrer rend, the Jepanese Government sincerely rope that the Unjted etetes Government will evoid eny ection trat might give rise to a fear of menece to Jepen trrougr colleboretion with the Sovict Union.
"In $n$ word, t'e Japenesc Government res no intention of using, witrout provocation, military force against any neigrboring netion.
"Quite properly, discussions betwecn tre Jepenese Government end tre Government of the United etates directed toward escerteining if trere existed a besis for negotietions for a peeceful settlement covering the entire situetion,-suct discussions would neturelly envisege tre working out of s progressive program, obteineble by peeceful met ods. Tre Jepenese Government shares fully trat view with the Government of tre United Stetes.
"It is elso steted by tre United States Government that no proposals or suggestions affecting the rights end privileges of $\epsilon$ itrer the United States or Jepen would br considered except es trese might be in conformity with tre basic principles to wrich tre United States res long been committed. Tre fundarentel nationel policy long cheristed by the Jopanese Government is agfin in full agreement on trat point.
"Fegerding the principles and directives sct fortr In deteil by tre Americen Government and enviseged in tre informal oonversations es constituting $\varepsilon$ progran for $\operatorname{tr} \in$ Pecific aree, tre Japenese Government wishes to stete thet it considers trese principles and tre precticel application thercof in the friendlicst menncr possible, arc the prime requisites of $e$ true peece end stould be applied not only in trc Presific ere but trroughout the entire vorld. Such a progren res long been desired end sought by Jepen itself.
"Tre Jivirnese Government now confidently ropes trat from the lortor viewpoint of $\varepsilon$ constructive world peace, and in tre liget cif tre current international situetion, pest differences rey be merged in en ogreement of principles end a cooperetive eifort besed on order and justice. Tre mecting of tre respensible riads of our respective Governments would confirm anj eive such senction to our purposes thet peace in the Pecifice vould he instituted by trat meeting." (Forcign Rei -ifone, Vol. II, p. 572-575)







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＂President Roosevelt＇s Rerlv to the Japanesc Primo Minister（Prince Konoye），Handed to the Japanese Ambassador（Noinara）on Septerbber 3． 1941.
＂I have read with appreciation Your Excellency＇s message of August 27，which was delivered to me by Admiral Nomura．


#### Abstract

＂I have noted with satisfaction the sentiments expressed by you in regard to the solioituce of Japan for the maintenance of the peace of the Pacific and Japan＇s desire to improve Japanese－American rela－ tions．


＂I fully share the desire expressed by you in these ragerds，and I wish to assure you that the fovernment of the United States，recogni－ zing the swiftly－moving chaiacter of world events，is prepared to proceed as rapidly as possible tonerd tire consummation of arrangements for a meoting at which you and $\bar{i}$ sen exchange viems and endeavor to bring about an adjustment in the relations between our two countries．
＂In the statenent winich accomranied your letter to me reference was made to the principles to whislı the Goverament of the United States has long been comuitted and it was declaren that the Japaness Government＇considers these principles and the practical application thereof，in the friendliest manner possible，are the prime requisites of a true peace and should be applied not only in the Pacific area but throughout the entire world＇and that＇such a program has loag been desirco and sought by Japan itself＇．
＂I am very desirous of collaborating with you in offorts to make these principles effective in practioc．Because of my deop interest in this matter I find it necessary that I constantly observe and take account of developments both in my om country and in Japan which have a bearing upon probleins of relations betreen our two countries．at this particular moment I cannot avoid taking cognizance of indications of the existence in some quarters in Japan of concepts which，if wide－ ly entertained，would seem capable of raising obstacies to successful collaboration between you and me along the line which $I$ am sure we both earnestly desire to follom．Under thase circunstances，I feel constrained to su⿱一𧰨丶丶⿸厂⿱二⿺卜丿． that it would seem highly desirable that mo take precaution，fomard ensuring that our proposed mosting shall prove a success，by endeavo－ ring to enter jumediately upon prelininary aiscussion of the funda－ mental and essertial questions on which we seok aereement．The questions which I have in mind for such preliminary discussions
$\square$

involve practical application of the principles fundamental to achievement and maintenanco of peaco which are meationcd with more specification in the statemont accompanying your letter. I hope that you will look fi.vorably upon. this suggestion."
(Foreign Relations, Vol. II, p. 591-592)

Brhibit "F"







V











 AdOO $I 111$



DAC. NO. 2215
EXHIBIT "G"-Afficavit of Ioseph W, Ballantine, 24 June 1946
"DRAFT ?ZOPOSAL HANDED BY THE JAPANESE ARBASSADOR (NOMURA) TO FHE SECRETAIY OF STATE ON SEPTPMBER 6, 1041.
"The Government of Japan undertakes:
"(a) that Japan is ready to express its concurrence in those matters which were alreary tentatively agreed vnon between Japan and the United States in the course of their preliminary informal conversations;
"(b) that Janan will not make any military anvancement from French Indo-China apainst any of its adjoining areas, and iltewise will not, without any justifiable reason, resort to military action apainst any regions lying south of Iapan;
"(c) that the attitudes of Japan and the linited States towards the Eurovean "lar will be decided by the concents of orotection and self-defense, and, in case the United States should Darticioate in the Euromean War, the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact. by Jaman shall be Independently recided;
"(c) that Japan will endeavor to bring about the rehabilitation of general and normal relationshio between Japan and China, upon the realization of which Japan is ready to withdraw its armed forces from China as soon as possible in accordance with the agreements between Javan and China;
"(e) that the economic activities of the United States in China will not be restricted so lone, as pursued on an equitable basis;
"(f) that Japan's activities in the Southwestern Pacific Area will be carried on by peaceful reans and in accordance with the princiole of non-discrimination in internationgl comperce, and that Japan will cooperate in the production and orocurement by the United States of natural resources in the said area which it needs.
" (g) that Jnpan will take measures necessary for the resumption of normal trade relations between Japan and the United States, and in connection with the above-mentioned, Japan is ready to discontinue immediately the application of the forefeners transactions control regulations with regard to the Tnited States on the basis of reciorocity.
"The Government of the United States undertakes:
"(a) that, in resoonse to the Jooanese Grvernment's commitment exnressed in point (d) referred to above, the United States will abstain from any measures and actions which will be orejudicial to the endeavour by Japan concerning the settlement of the China Aff'air;
(b) that the United Sta+es will reciorocate Jaman's commitment exoressed in noint (f) referred to above;

DOC. NO. 2215
Frhhbit "G" - cont'd - Iffidquit of joseph V!. Ballantine -
"(c) trat the United States will susnend any military measures in the Far riast and in the Southwestern Pacific Area;
"(d) that the United States will immediately EVoon settlement 7 recivrocate Janan's commitment expresseत in ooint (g) referred to above by discontinuing the apolication of the so-called freezing act with regard to Jzoan and further by reroving the prohibition against the nassage of Japanese vessels through the Panama Canal." (Forefipn Relations,

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DOC. NO. 2.215
" Enclosure 17
"JAPANESE PROPOSALS SUBI:T" TED TO THF: AUERICAN AKBASEADOR IN JAPAN (GEEW) ON SEPTEMBER 25, 1941

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\text { "ETokro_ } 7 \text { september } 25,1041
$$


#### Abstract

"rhe Governments of Janon and of the United States accent joint resnonsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a genaril agreement of understanding as exoressed in a ioint declaration for the resumption of traditional friendily relations.


"Without reference to snecific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the detertoration of the aricable sentiment between their countries should be prevented from recirrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.
"It is the earnest hope of both Governments that, hy a cooperative effort, Javan and the united itates may contribute effectively toward the establishment and nreservation of peace in the pactftc area and, by the rapid consummation of an aricable understancins, encourage rorld veace and arrest, if not dispel, the traple confusion that nov threatens to engulf civilization.
"For such eecisive ac'ion, protracted neqnotiations would seer ill-suited and weakentni.. Both Governments, therefore, desire that adeauate instrumentalties should be develoned for the realization of a general understanding which would bine, meanwhile, both Governments in honor and in act.
"It is the belifef of both Governments that such an understzncing shovid comorise only the nivotal issues of urgency anc not the accessory concerins which could be deliberated later at a conference.
"Both Governments nresume to anticinate that they could achieve harronious relations if certain situations and attitudes vore clarifie? or improved; to wit:
"I. The conceots of Japan and of the [inited States resnecting in ernational relations and the charicter of nations.
2. The attituces of both Governments toward the

European War.
3. Action toward a peacefil settlement between

Janan and China.
4. Commerce between both natsons.
5. Economic nroblems in the Sovthwestern Pacific area.
6. The nolicies of both nations arfecting political stabilization in the ?acific area.

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Exhibit "H" - cont'd - affidavit of Joscoh W. Bajlantine
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- "I. The conrents of Jipen and of the Inited States respect-
ing international relations and the character of nations.
"Both Governments affirm that their national policies are directec toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of reciorocal conficence and cooveration between the neonles of both countrins.
"Both Gevernments declare that it is their traditional, and present, concent and conviction that nations and races compose, 35 members of a family, one household living under the ideal of universal concord throunh fustice and equity; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsinilities with a mutuqlity of interests regulnted by deaceful processes and directed to tre pirsuit of their roral ard physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others; they further armft theis resbonsibilities to oopose the oporession or exploitation of other peoples.
"Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traititional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or feologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.


## "II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the Eurovean War.

"Both Governments maintain it their cormon aim to brino about neace in the worle, and, whon an oboortune time arrives, they mill endeaver fointly for the early restoration of world редсе.
"With regard to develomments of the situation prior to the restoration of world peace, both Governments will be gutded in their conduct by considerations of orotection and selfdefense; and, in case the rinited States should particionte in
 the matter of intermretation of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, and would likewise determine what actions might be taken by way of fulfilling the obligations in accordance with the said internretation.
"III. Action toward a peaceful set.tlement between Janan and Chinn.
"Both Governments, taking cognizance of the fact that the settlement of the China Affair has a vital bearing voon the neace of the entire Pacific rea and conseavently ryon that of the world, will endeavor to exnedite a rapic realization of the settiment of the sald Afrair.
"The Governmont of the Enited States, recogndzing the effort and the sincere desire on the onrt of the Jananese Government concerning the peaceful settlement of the China Affair, will, with the intention of facilitating the realization of the settlement, render its good offices in order that the Chungking Government may promntly enter into
1.: NO. 2215

Exhibit "H" - cont'C - Affichvit of Joseph W. Ball.antine
negotiations mith the Government of Jipan for a termination of hostilities and ? resumntion of neacefil relations, and will refrain from resorting to $n^{-1}$ meqsures and retions which right hamper the reasures and offorts of the Government of Jadan directed toward the settirment of the China dffair.
"The Government of Jionn maintains that the basic general terms of veace for the settlement of the China Affair will be in harmony with the orinctiples embodied in the Konoye statement, and those agreements between Jionn and China and those matters orhich have been put into effect in accordance with the sajd statement; that the economic cooperation between Japan and China will be carried on by reaceful means and in conformity mith the nrinciple of non-discriminntion in the international cormercial relations and also with the principle of especizlly close relationship which is natural between neighboring countries; and that the oconoric qctivities of third Powers in China will not be excluded so long as they are bursued on n equitable basis.
"Note: There is znnended a draft of the basic terms of peace between $\begin{gathered}\text { T } 20 \cap n \\ \text { and } \\ \text { China. }\end{gathered}$
"IV. Commerce between Janan and the United States.
"Both Governments zoree to take without delav measures necessary for resuming normal trade relations between the two countries.
"Both Governments guarantee each other that they will, as the first of the reasures envisaged in the oreceding paragrash, discontinue irrocizitely he measures of freezing zssets now being enforced, and that they will supply mutually such comrodities as are, respectively, avalizble and required by alther of then.
"V. Economic problems in the Southwestern Dacific area.
"Both Governments mutually pledge themselves that the econoric activities of Innnn and the Inited States in the Southwestern Picific area shall be earried on by peaceful means ind in conformity with the princiole of non-discrimination in the international commercial relations in pursuance of the dolicy stated in the oreceding oaragranh, both Governrents agree to coonerate each with the other towards the creation of conditions of international trade and international investment uncer which both countries will have a rensonable opportinity to secure through the trade process the means of acquiring those goods and commodities which ezch country needs for the safeguarding and development of its own economy.
"Both Governments mill amicably cooderate for the conclusion and execution of agreements with the powers concerned in regard to the production and stipply, on the basis of non-discrimination, of such soecific commorities as oil, rubber, nickel, and tin.
"VIn me nolicies of both nations nffecting nolitical stabilization in the Pacific area.

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Exhibit "Y" - cont'd - Affidavit of Joeemh W. Ballantine
"Both Governments, ta'ins cognizance of the fact that it is a matter of vital importance to stabilize prorntly the situation in the Southmestern ?acific area, undertake not to resor to any measures and actions which may jeodardize such stabilization. The Government of Janan wili not rake any armed advencement, lising French Indo-China as a base, to any adiacent are? trereof (excluding China), and von the establishment of an equitable nezce in the Pacific area, will withdraw its troops which are now stationer in French Indo-China.
"The Covernment of the Enitea States will nllevinte its military measures in the Southrestern Jacific area.
"Both Governments declare that they resoect the sorerefonty and territorial integrity of fhailand and Metherland Fast Indies, anc that they are prenared to conclude an agreerent concernin- the nevtralizatjon of the Philimpine Islands when its inderendence will have been achieved.
"The Government of the inited States guarantees nondiscriminatory treatment of the Japanese nationals in the Philippine Islands." (Foreign Relations; Vel. II, 0. (37-640)








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EXHIBIT "I" - Affidavit of Joseoh $V_{\text {. Ballantine, } 24 \text { June } 1046}$
"TEXT OF BASIC JADA ESE MERSS OR PEACE VITII CHINA
"IHE TADANREE KTNISTER FOR ICR"ICN MFAIRS (TOYODA)
TO THE AlERICAN AUBFSSADCR IN JADITY (GREW).
"1. Ncighborly friendskip.
"2. Respect for sovercignty and iornitorial integrity.
"3. Cooperative defense bet:een Japen and Cling.
 preventing communistic and ocher subversive activjties which may constitute ? menace to thr security of both countries and of maintaining the public ofder in China.
"Stationing of Jᄀpanesir troons and noval forces in certain areas in the Chinese territury for a nocessarv veriod for the purposes referred to above and in nccordance with the existing agreements ard usages.
"4. Whthdrawal of Janqnese ?rmed forces.
"The Japanese armed forces which have been dispatched to China for carrying out the China Affatrs will be withdrawn from China upon the settlement of the said affeire, excenting those troons which come under vo.nt 3.
"5. Eiconomic cooberatior.
"(a) There stall be cconomic cooperat*on between Jaban and China, having the devolopment nnd vtilization of essential materials for national defense in Chini as its orincipal objective.
"(b) The gnecedine yaragranh does no ${ }^{+}$mean to restrict any economic activities by third Povers in Chira so long as they are oursued on on eniitable besis.
"6. Fusion of the Ching Kat-shor regire and the "ang Chinewei Government.
17. No annexation.
"R. No indemnities.
"9. Recrogntion of inanchoukvo."
(Foreign !elations, Vol. II, 0. 633)


## EXPIBIT "J"-- Affiorvit of Joscpr w. Ballentinc, 24 June 1946

"OKAL STATEMLNE FANDED BY TYY SECKETAFY OF STATE TO TYE JAPANESE AI:BASSADOK (NOITFA) ON OCTOEER 2, 1941

## " Washington 7 October 2, 1941

"Reference is mede to the proposals of tre Japanese Government comunicated on Scptcmber 6, 1941, by the. Jrpanese Ambessedor to tre sucretery of stete, end to statements releting trcreto subsequently commuiceted to tris Governnent by tre Jepencse Governmont.
"Troughtful stuciy ras been given to tre communications te which reference is mede, and in connection witr tret study cereful review res been made of otrer communicetions previously received from tre Jrpanese Government on the seme subject. On tre besis of this study obscrvetions are offered as follows:
"Tre Government of the United States welconed, es affording e possible opportunity for furthering the broad-gruge objectives end principles of a progrem of peece, tre Irpanese Government's suegestions mede through its Ambessedor ferc in tre ecrly pert of August thet there be reld $\varepsilon$ meeting of tre responsible reeds of tre Jopenesc Goverrment end of tre Government of tle United Stretes to discuss meens for bringing about an adjustment of relrtions between the United States end Jepen end t'et t'ere bc resumed tre informal conversetions which rad been in progress between the two countries to escertein whetrer tharc existed e besis for ncgotintions reletive to a pesccful s:ttlement covering t'e entire Pecific situntion.
"Accordingly in tre reply mede by tr c Presiacnt on August 17, 1941, to the Japencse Ambessedor t'e viev wes cxpressed tret such informel conversetions would neturolly envisage the working out of a progressive progrew atteinable by peaceful meens; tret suct e procrar. would involve tre applicetion in tre entire Pecific area of the principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment, trus raking possible eccess by all countrics to rew cieterials and to ell otrer cssentiel comiodities, end trere verc arscribed tre edventeges which would flou to all countrics, including Japen, from the edoption of sucr $\varepsilon$ progrem. In conclusion, it was steted tret if the Jepenese Government werc in position to criberk upon : penceful nograin for tre preific along t're lines of the proerem and principles to w'ich tre United Stetes is committed, t'is Government yould be prepered to consider resumption of the informel exploretory discussions end vould be glid to endenvor to arrenge ? suitrble time and plece to excrenge vievis.
"In the ligrt of the broed purmoses end fundrmentel principles whict $^{2}$ tis Government roids, it reas gretifying to tre President end the Government of tri United Stetes to receive tre messege of tre Prime linistcr end tre stetement of tre Government of Jepen on August 28, 1941, conteining stetements expressing. Jnpen's desire and intent to pursue courses of pefce in rarmony with tre fundrmentel principles to winich tre people and Government of tre Unitcd stetcs are committed. In its stenterent tre Jopenese Government geve, vitr some qualifications, brord essurences of its perceful intent, including e oompréensive assurenee tret tre Jepenese Government res no intention of using witrout provocetion military force egeinst eny neighboring netion. Tre Jeppnese Government declered that it supported the progrem and
principles wrich hed been bricily outlined by the President not only as appliceble to t'e Prcific erea but olso as e progrem for tre cntirc :orld.
"Tre Government of tre United Stetes, urile desiring to procecd as ropidly rs possible with considerotion of errangenents for $\varepsilon$ mecting betwecn tre reeds of state, felt it desirgble, in order to essure tret thet meeting would accomplish the objectives in vicw, to clerify the interpretetion of certein pinciples and tre precticel epplication troreof to concrcte proklems in tre pacific arer. It hes not been tre purpose of this Government to enter into a discussion of detnils; t'is Government hes felt, rowever, trat the clerificetion sought vould afford e meens of expediting our effort to arrive at $\varepsilon$ mecting of minds.
"On September 3, 1941, t'e President in giving reply to the Jopencse Ambissador expressed the eernest desire of the Governnent of tye United States to colleborate in efforts to make effective in precticc the principles to whict the Jopenese Government mede refcrence. Tle President reitereted tre four principles regerded by tilis Government os tre foundetion upon $\mathrm{m}^{2}$ icr reletions between nations srould properly rest. Those principles ere:
II. Respect for the territoriel integrity and tre sovereignty of cent and all netions.
"2. Support of tre principle of nen-interference in the internel effeirs of otrer countrics.
"3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of corimercirl opportunity.
"4. Non-disturbence of tre strtus quo in tre Pecific except es tre stetus quo may be altered by peeceful menns.
"Tre President pointed out trat in order to bring about eny satisfactory setilcment of Prcific questions it was highly importent to reacr a cormunity oi vicw and $\varepsilon$ clesr agrecment upon certain points witr respect to yrich fundementel differences of opinion betwfen our two Governments fnd developed in the informel conversations; fnd t'e president requested an indication of the present ettitude of tre Japenese Government vith regerd to trose fundementel auestions.
"On september 6, the Prime Minister of Jepen in $\varepsilon$ conversation witr t' $\epsilon$ Amcricen Ambessador at Tokyo stetcd trat re subscribed fully to tre four principles ebove mentioned.
"Tre forcgoing developnents end essurences, togetrcr vitr other stetcments riede by the Jedencsc Government, secmed to justify $t^{\text {th }}$ is Government in concluding tret tre Jepnese Government migrt be expected to edrere to end to give practical application to a broad progressive progren covering tre entire Pecific area. It wes trercfore $\varepsilon$ source of diseppointment to tre. Govcrnment or the United States tret tre proposals of the Japenese Government presentcd by tre Jepenese Ambessador on September 6, 1941, wicr tre Jepenesc Government epperently intended should constitute e concretc besis for discussions, appeared to disclose divergence in the concepts of tre two Governments. Trat is to sey, t'ose proposels end tre subsequent explenetory stetements mede in regeró thereto serve, in tre opinion of this Government, to nerrove nai restrict not only the applicetion of tre principles upon wier our

Informel conversetions elresdy referred to red been besed but also the verious assurences given by tre Jepenese Government of its desire to move elons vith the United Stetes in putting into operetion a broad progrem looking to the establishment and meintenence or peoce and stebility in the entire Pecific arce.
"As has elrcedy becn said, tre verious broad assurences given by tre Jeponese Premier end tre Jrpencisc Government ere righly gretiiving. In putting forierd its ettitude of peeceful intent toward otrcr netions, tre Jeprncse Government qualified its essurences yith certein prreses the need for wrich is not easily understood. It is difficult to conceive of t'erc developing under prescnt circumstonces in any of the territorics neigrboring Frenc! Indo-crina, in Trailend or in the sovict Unson eny aggressive threet or provocetion to Jeprn. Tre inelieneble right of self-defense is of course well recognized by rill netions and trere could arise in sore minds $a$ question as to just wrot tre Japnonese Government res in view in circumscribing its assurances of peeceful intent witr mrat mould secm to be unnecessary quelifying prreses.
"In the informel conversetions trecre was tentetively arrived et a formule in rcgard to conomic policy (section $V$ of tre areft understending), v:ich provided thet Jepencse ectivity nnd Amoricen ectivity in tre Pecific arca srell be carried on by poaceful neens and in conformity vitr the principle of non-discriminetion in internotionel cormercial relations. In tre Jeprnese Government's proposels of Scptember 6 and in subsequent communicotions from tre Jepanesc Government the coraritments containcd in that formule: verc restricted to the countries of the © outhyest Pecific aree (not the Pecific arca es e. whole). In rcference to Chine, tre Jeprnese Government stetes trat it vill respect the principle of non-discriminetion, but tre explenetion given in regerd to tris point would seem to be open to tre irplicetion that the Jepencse Government hes in mind some limitetion upon the epplicetion of tris principle ocensioned by reasons of Jepan's geographical propincuity to crine.
"Obviously, it yould not be likely to serve tre purposes effirmed by the Jopenese Governisent or by tris Government if eitrer tre United Stetes or Jrpan vere to pursue one course or policy in certein ereas whilc at tre same tine pursuing an opposite course or policy in other arees.
"Tris Government res noted the views of the Jepenese Government in support of its desire to stetion troops for an indeterminete period in certein aress of Crina. Entirely epart from tre question of tre reasons for suct 2 proposel, the inclusion of suct e. provision in tre proposcd torms of $\varepsilon$ penceful settlement betweon Jeprn end Crine at $\varepsilon$. time wren Jepen is in military occipetion of lerge erces in Chine is open to cortain objections, For cxarple, wron $\varepsilon$ country in militery occupetion of terintory of enotrer country proposcs to the sccond country the continued stetioning of troops of tre first country in certein arces es a condition for a peaceful settlement end thus for the rithdrewal of the occupationary forces from other arees, such procedure would seem to be out of leceping with tre progressive and enlightened courses and principles wrich werc discussed in tre informal conversations and thus would not, in tre opinion of tris Government, meke for peecc or offer prospects of stebility.

Prge 4
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"It is belicved that $\varepsilon$ clearmout manifestetion of Jepen's intention in regerd to tre withdrewel of Jepenese troops from Crina and Frencr Indocrina would be most relpful in making known--in particular to trose who might be inclined to be criticol--Jopen's peaceful intentions and Jepen's desire to follow courses celculatcd to esteblish e. sound besis for future stability and progress in tre Pecific arer.
"Witr reference to the attitude of eact country toward the Europenn war, tris Government ras noted with apprecietion the further step teken by the Japanesc Government to mect tre difficulties interent in tris aspect of the reletions between tre two countries. It is believed tret it would be relpful if the Jepencse Government could give furtrer study to tre question of possible additionel clerificetion of its position.


#### Abstract

"In the excranges of views which have teken plece between tre two Governments in en effort to reect an egreement in principle upon fundementsl questions in order to preprre the ground for the proposed metting of the responsible chicfs of governrent, this Government res endervored to make clear that what it enviseges is a coxprerensive progren calling for the applicetion uniformly to the entire pecific eree of liberel and progressive principles. Fron wrat tre Jepenese Government pas so fer indicated in regara to its purposes tris Government derives tre impression tret the Jopenese Government has in mind e program which would be circumscribed by tre imposition of qualifications and exceptions to tre actucl epplicention of trose principles.


"If this impression is correct, cen the Jepencse Govermment feel trat $\varepsilon$ ncetine between tre rcsponsible rends of government under suck circumstences woula be likely to contribute to the eduencement of tre righ purposes vinich we have mutuelly red in mind?
"As alreedy stated, tris Government welcoried tre nssurances conteined in tre stetement of the Jeprnese Government which accomprnied tre Jepenese Prine Minister's messege to tre President of tre United Stetes that tre Japanese Governnent subscribed to tre principles wrich reve long been edvocated by tris Government es tre only sound besis for stable internetionel relations. Thjs Government believes tret renewed consideration of trese fundanentel. principles rey be helpful in our effort to seek n meeting of minds in regerd to tre essential questions on wricr we scek agreement and trus loy $\varepsilon$ firm foundation for a nceting between tre responsible feads of tre two Governments. Tre subject of the meeting proposed by the Prime Minister find tre objectives sought reve engeged, end continue to enge.ge, tre close end ective interest of tre President of the United stetes, and it is tre fresident's earnest rope thet discussion of the fundementel qucstions may be so developed thet such s.reeting con be reid, It is elso the President's hope trat the Jepanese coveriment stares the conviction of this Goverrment tini, if t'e Governaents of Japan and of the United Stetes are iesolved to gire trose principles practicel and corprerensive epplicetio: , tre two fovernrients can work out a fundemeniol rerrbilitation of tre rclotions between tre Unjted States and Jajan end conimikuce to the bringing about of a listing meco rith justice, equity and order in the vhole Pecifice arce." (porcign feictions, vol.tI, 3. $655^{3}-(6]$ )





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"Droft Proposal Haided by the Jopanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on November 20, 1941.
"1. Both the Governments of Japan ana the United States undortake not to mike any armed acivancenont into any of the regions in the South-castern isin wad the Wouthern Pacific arca exicpting the part of French Indo-China whero t!re Japanoso trojps are stationed at prosont.
"2. The Japanoce Cotornmon' undertakes to withira7 ita tropps now stationed in Frorech man-wino upon cither tho restoration of poaco botion Jaran and Ghim or the ostablishment of an oquitable peace in the Pacific arca.
"In the meantime the Govir:ment of Japan decloros that it is proparcd to roinove its troops now stationcd in tho southorn part of Fronch Indo-China to tho בorthern part of the said torritory upon the conclusion of the prosent aryangemont which shall later be chabodicd in the final agroomont.
"3. The Governeont of Jnpan and the United States shall cooperate with a rica to securing tho acquisition of tiose goods and commoditios which the two countrics necd in Netherlands East Indios.
4. Tho Covormments of Japan and the Unitcd States mutually undertako to restore thoir camorcial relations to those prevailing prior to the frecziag of the assets.
"The Covernnent of the Unitod States shall supply Jepan n requirod quantity of oil.
"5. The Government of the $U_{n i t e d}$ States undortnkes to refrain from such mensucos and actions as will be projudiciel to tho ondenvors for the restoration of goneral pcace betreen Japan nnd Chinn." (Foreign Relations, Vol. II, p. 755-756)















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# 3xIIRIT "L" - Affidavit of Joanoh W. Ballantine, 24 Juno 1946 

"Oral Stetement Fanded by the Secretary of Stete to the Je:zamese Ambersadur (Fomara; on Yovnmbre 26, 1941.

"Weshington, Novamber 26. 1041.


#### Abstract

"The representatives of the Government of the United Ste.ten end of the Governmint of Japan hava bern carrying on during the pest anvarel monthe informal and axploretory convarsations for the burbos of erriving at a settlament if possible of auestions reletinf to the ontire Pacific area based upon the principles of precn, lew and ordar and feir doeling emorg vations. Theso principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial intrerity and soveraignty of each end all netions: the principle of ion-intarference in the internal affairs of othrr countrirs: the principle of equality, includinf equality of commercial opportunity and troatment; and the prirciola of raliance upon internetional coopnration and concilietion for the prevention and pacific sottlamsint of controversien and for imorovement of internetional conditions hy peaceful methods and processes.


"It is balipure thet in our discussione somn proerens has bern mide in refercnce to the general princioles which constitute the besis of a pepceful settlement covrring the entirn Pacific orea. Fincently the Japareen Ambeseador has stated that the Japounse Govarnment is deeirous of continening the conversations dirnctec. towerd a comprohenaive and paacoful settlement in thr Pacific eroa; that it would be holpful toward creating $\varepsilon$ a atmosphnre favorabln to the successful outcame of the conversatione if a temporery modus vivendi could be agreed upon to be in effect while the convorsations looking to a poseful settlement in the Pecific were continuing. On Novomber 20 the Jepencor amhessedor commenicated to the Secretery of Stete provosale in regard to temporary measures to be takn respectivaly by the Government of Japan ard by thn Government of tho UיIted States, which measureg pre understood to heve bond deaigned to accomplish the purposes above indiceted.
"Thn Coverament of tise Unitnd Stetes most nernestly desires to contributn to the promotion fend maintemance of peecn aud atehility in the Pecific arra, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with thn Japanese fovernment dirncted toward working out of a broed-guege prorram of peacr. throighout the Pacific arae. The proposels which wern orasinted hy thr Jemerese Ambaseador $0:$ Novmber 20 contein some foetures which, in the opinion of tinis Goveriment, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a pert of then generel gettlemont under consideration end to wieich neech Goverumnt hes dnclared that it is committad. Thr Goverrannt of ther linited Staten beliafes thet the adoption of such proposele would not be likely to contribute to the ultimete objactivee of onsuring prece under law, order end justice in the Pacific area, end it sugeests that further rffort be mede to resolve our divergences of views in refard to the orpcticel applicetion of the fundamontal pri:zciples alresdy montioned.

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Bxhibit "L" - contld
Affidarit of Joseoh W. Bellantine, 24 Junn 1946
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Paga 2
"Hith this object in view the Government of the United States offors for the consideretion of the Japancese Gornramant a plan of a broad but aimple ofttlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical nxamolification of a program which this Government enviarges as sompthing to be worked out during our further conversetions.
"The plan therein auggested. reprisents an effort to bridge the gap between our drapt of June 21, 1941 and the Japanese dreft of Septembrr 25 by making a new approach to the nsentiel problems undrrlying a comprehensive Pecific settlement. This plen contains provisions dealing with the practical application of the fundamental principles which we have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for worthwhile international relations. We hope that in this way progress toward reaching a menting of minds between our two Governments may be expedited."
"Document Handed by the Secretary of State to the Jepenese Ambessador (Momura) on November' $26,1941$.
"Strictly Confidential
Tentative and Without
Commitment.
Weshington, November 26, 1941
"Outline of Proposed Basis for Agrement Between the United States and Japan.

[^2]
#### Abstract

"T:n Govemment of Japan and the Goverament of the United States have afrced that iowerd pilmipating chronic politicel instebilioy, proventinm recurrnit conomic collepon, and providine a basia for perce, they will actively oupport and oractically eoply the followine principles in their economic relations with ench other end with other netions and peoples:


"(1) The prirciole of non-discriminatio: in intersational commerciel roletions.
(2) The princiole of intornationel economic cooperam tion and abolition of axtromn nationalism as expressed in exconsive trace restrictions.
(3) The prifeciplo of non-diecriminatory accoss by all nations to raw meterial supplien.
(4) Tho principle of full protection of the intereste of consuming countries ard populations as regarde the operetion of interietional commodity agremonts.
(5) The principlf of establishment of such institutions a:d arrangemente of intermpitionel fimaner as may lond aid to the essential enterporisos and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade conconart with the welfare of all countries.
"Saction II
"Steps To Be Taken Byr tho Goverrmert of the United Steter and by the Govornment of Japan.
"Mhe Govemment of the United States and the Govemment of Japan propose to take steps as follows:
"1. The Govarnment of tho United States and the Government of Japa= will oudeevor to conclude a multilateral nonaggression pact among thr Britiah Mmpire, China, Japan, the Netherlende, the Soviet Urion, Thailend and the United States.
"2. Both Govemimente will endeavor to conclude emong the Americen, British, Chinese, Japa:ebe, the Netherland aid Thai Govommente an egreoment wherounder each of the Govrman te would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochiza ard, in thr event that thero should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indoohina, to erter into immediete consultation with a view to takizg such measures es may be deemed necesaary and advisable to meet the threst in question. Such agreement vould provide also that oach of the Goveramonts party to the agreement would not sopk or accept prefereritial treatmant in its trade or ocoz:omic rele.tions with Indochina ard would use itsinfluance to obtei:: for each of the sigretorien equality of treatment in trade and commerce with Fre:ch Indochina.
n(3) The Govorment of Japen will withdraw ell military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina.

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Exhibit "L" - contid
Affidavit of Joseoh K. Ballantina, 24 June 1946
"4. The Govaramn:-t of the U:ited Steter and the Government of Japan will not support-militarily, politically, economically-any govarmant or regime in Chira other than the Fational Goverument of the Republic of Chira with capital termorarily at Chungking.
"5. Both Governmente will give up all oxtraterritorial rights in Chima, including rights and iatereste in and with regard to international sottiaments and corcessions, and ripitt under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.
"Both Goverrmer.te will endeevor to obtain the agrerment of the British ar.d other governmente to give up extraterritorial righte in Chire., includinf righta in intornational settloments end in concessions frd under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.
"6. The Goverment of the United States and the Governmont of Japan will onter into negotiations for the conclueion betwee: the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-fevored-mation treatment and reduction of trade barriars by both countrias, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw ailk on the free list.
"r. The Govarument of the United States and the Government of Japa: will, reepectively, removo the fronzing restrictions on Japanese funde ir. the United States and on American furds in Jajar.
"B. Both Govnrnments will agree upon a plen for the atabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with thi allocation of furde adequate for this purpose, half to be sumplied by Japan and half by the United States.
"9. Both Governmezts will agree thet no agreement which ofther has concluded with eny third power or powers shell be intorpreted by it in sucl: a way as to conflict with the fundamentel purpose of this agreament, the establishment and preservation of peace throuphout the Pacific area.
"10. Both Governmnats will use thair influnne to canse other goviraments to adhere to and to sive practical application to the basic political and economic principles ant forth 1:! this agrommat." (Fornign Relatior.s, Vol. II, p. 766-770)













































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"President Roosevolt to Pmperor Eirohito of Jepan"<br>"LWenington, December 6, 1941


#### Abstract

Malmost a century ago the President of the United itates addresed to the frperor of Japan a mesaage extonding an offer of friendehip of the people of the United States to the people of Japan. That offer was accopted, end in the long period of unbroken peace and Iriendehip which has followed, our rempective nations, through the virtuen of their peoples and the wiadom of their rulers hare prospered and hare substantially helped humanity.

MOnly in situetions of extreordinary imoortance to our two countries need I addrese to Your Majesty messages on matters of state. I feel I ohould now so address you because of the deep and farmreaching emergency which appears to be in formation. "Developments are occuring in the Pacific aree which threaten to deprive each of our nations and all humanity of the bonesicial influence of the long peace betwoon our two colatrion. Those derelopnonte contain tragic posalbilition.


"The poople of the United States, belleving in peace and in the right of netions to live and let live, have eagerly watchod the convereations between our two Governments during these past monthe. We heve hoped for a termination of the present confliot betweon Japan and China. We have hoped that a peace of the Pacific could be consummated in such a way that nationalition of many diverse peoplea could axist side by side without fear of invasion; that unbearable burdene of armaments could be lifted for them all; and that all peoplee would resume commerce without discrimination ageinst or in fevor of any nation.
nI ain cortain that it will be clear to Your Majesty., as it is to me, that in seeking these gree.t objectives both Japan and the United States should agree to eliminate any form of military threat. This soemed essentiel to the attainment of the high objectives.
"More than e. year ago Your Majesty'e Government concluded an agreem ment with the Vichy Government by which five or six thousand Japanese troops ware peraitted to enter inte Northern French Indo-China for the orotection of Japanese troops which were operating ageingt China further north. Ane thice Spring and Sumer the Vichy Government permitted furthor Jepenese military forces to onter inte Southern French Inoo-China for the common cefense of French IndomChina. I think I am correct in aying that no attack has been made upon Indo-China, nor that ony has been contemplatec.

NDuring the past fow weeks it has becone clear to the world that Japenese military, naval and. air forces heve been sent to Southern Indo-Chine in such large numbers an to create a reasonable doubt on the part of other nations that this continuing concentration in IndoChing is not defencive in its charactor.

Hecause these continuing concentrations in Indo-Chine have reached such large proportions and because they extend now to the southee.st and the eouthwest cornere of that Poninsula, it is only reesonable that the people of the Philippines, of the hundrede of Islence of the East Indiea, of Malaya and of Thailand iteelf are abking themselves whether these forces of Japer arg, proparing or intonding to make attack in one or there of
"I am sure that Your Majosty. will uncerstand that the fear of all thene peoples is a legitimate fear in es much as it involves their peace

Page 2.
Exhibit "M"
and their national existonce. I am oure that Your Majeaty will understend why the peoole of the United States in such large numbers look askance at the eatabliohment of military, naval and air baser manned and equipped 00 greatly as to constitute ermed forces capable of measures of offense.
"It is clear that a continuance of such a situation is unthincable.
HNone of the peoplea whom I have spoken of above can elt either indefinitely or permanently on a keg of cynamite.

MThere is absolutely no thought on the pert of the United Statea of inveding Indo-China if every Japenese moldier or sailor were to be withdram therefrom.
"I think that we can obtain the same ascurance from the Goveramente of the East Indies, the Governmente of Maleya and the Government of Thailand. I would even undertake to ask for the eame aesurance on the part of the Government of China. Thus a withdraval of the Japanece forces fram IndomChina would renult in the aseurance of peace throughout the whole of the South Pacific area.
"I address mymelf to Your Majesty at this moment in the ferront hope that Your Mejesty may, an I am doing, give thought in this definite emergency to ways of diapelinge the dark clouds. I am confident that both of un, for the aake of the peoples not only of our own grept countries but for the sexe of humanity in neighboring territories, have a sacrsa duty to restore traditional amity and prevent further death and restruction in the world.
(Toreign Relations, Vo.l. II, p. 784-786)
FRANELIN D. ROOSBVHLIN




欧长田＂

























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DOC. NO. 2215

## EXHIBIT "N" - Afficavit of Joseph W, Ballantine, 24 Tune 1946

"Merorandum Handed by the Jnoanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State st 2:20 ?.i!. on Decerber 7, 1941.
"I. The Goveriment of Tapan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicaole understanding with the Government of the United States in oroder that the $t \% o$ countrins by their joint efforts may secure thepeace of the Pacific Area and thereby contribute toward the realizniten of world pence, has continued negotiations $\because i t h$ the utmest sincerity since Aoril last with the Government of the Enited States regarding the ad'ustment and odroncement of Jinanese-Arerican relations and the stabilization of tine Pasiniic lieq.
"rhe Jopanese Government his the honor to state frankly its views concerning the clatms the American Government has persistently maintained as well is the measures the Inited States and Great Britain have taken toward Jəoan dring these tight months.
"2. It is the immutable policy of the Jqoanese Covernment to insure the stability of Erst Asia and to promote world veace and thereby to enable all nations to find each its oroder nlace in the world.
"Ever since China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Janan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extention of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in Seotember last year IzDan concluded the ripartite pact with Germany 7 nc Italy.
"However, both the Linited States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general Deace between Japan and China, interfering with Janan's constructive endeqvours toward the stabilization of Fast Asia. Exerting pressure on the Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Janan's aspiration to the iceal of common nrosverity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Jocan in accordance yith its protocol with France took measures of joint defence of French IndoChina, both American and British Governments, wilfully misinteroreting it as a threat to their own nossessions, and inducing the Netherlands Government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations vith Jioan. While manifesting thus an obviovsly hostile gttitude, these countries have strengthened their military predarations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about $\mathfrak{q}$ sitvation which endangers the very existence of the Tmpire.
"Nevertheless, to facilitate a syeedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August 1ast, to meet the President of the United States'for a isccission of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, the American Government, while acceoting in principle the $\}$ apanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after in agreement of view hac been reached on fundamental and essential questions.

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EXHIBIT "N" - Afficavit of Joscnh iv. Ballantine, 24 June 1946 - cont:d -
"3. Subsequently, on Scatromber 25th the rapanese Government subritter a 万rodosil based on the formula nroposed by the American Government, taking filly into consideration Dast Amexican clains and also incorporating iq刀anese views. Repeated discussions oroved of no avall in producing reacily an agreemert of viev. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised pronosal, moderating still further the Jananese clitrs regording the princinal ooints of diffinulter in the nesctintion and andeavoured strenuously to reach a seiticmert. Evt : the Anerican Government, arherine steadfasily to its original assertions, failed to disnlay in the silohtest degree a soirit of concillation. The negotiztion made no progress.
"Therefore, the Jannese Covernment, with $z$ viow to
doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Jananese-American
relations, submitted on November 20th still znother pronos3l in
order to grrive at an equitable solvtion of the more essential
and vagent questions which, simplifying its previous oronosal,
stimulated the following potnts:
"(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excenting Irench Indo-Chin?, in the Southeastern Asia and the southern Jacific arez.
(2) Both Coverments shall cooperate with the view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands Fast Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.
(3) Both Governments mutunlly undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing nrior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the linited States shall sipnly Janan the required ariantity of oil.
(4) The Government of the Tinited Sta+es undertakes not to resort to measures and actions orejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.
(5) The Jabanese Government uncertikes to with raw troops now stationed in French Indo-China udon either the restoration of neace between Jayan and China or the establishment of an ealitable onace in the ?acjfic Area; and it is prepared to remove the Jaonnese troons in the southern part of French Indo-Ching to the nortrern oart upon the conclusion of the oresent agreerent.
"As regards China, the Jananese Government, while expressing its readiness to acceot the offer of the restident of the United Stites to act is 'introducer' of peace between dayan and China as yas oreviously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the united States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Jananese peace when the two parties have comrenced direct negotiations.


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Exhibit "N" - cont'd.
Affidavit of Joseph W. Ballentine, 24 June 1946
"Of the various orincinles put forward by the Americin Government is a basis of the JapaneseAmeric?n Agreemont, there nre some which the Japanese Government is reary to accept in orinciple, but in view of the world's actual conditions, it seems only a utopian idenl on the part of the Americin Government to attempt to force their imnedinte adoption.
"Again, the probosal to conclude a multilateral non-qggression pact between Jipan, United States, Great Britain, Ching, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands and Thailend, which is patterned after the old conceot of collective security, is fir removed from the realities of East Asin.
"2. The American pronosal contained a stipulation :phich states--'Bo'h Governments will agree that no ?greement, which either has concluded with any third nower or powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a wiy as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the pacific area'. It is oresumed that the nbove provision has been proposed with a view to restrain dapan from fulfilling its obligitions under the Tripartite Pact when the United States onrticipates in the War in Furope, and, as such, it c?nnot be accepted by the Japanese Government.
"The irerfican Government, obsessed with its own views and oninions, may be sald to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific Areq, it is engaged, on the other hand, in ilding Great Britin and propaiing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy, two ?owers that are striving to estrblish nem order in Furove. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pscific Aren through Deaceful means.
"3. Thereis the Americon Government, under the princinles it rigidiv upholds, objects to settle international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britiin and other nations nressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned is it is at times more inhumane than rilitary pressure.

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Exhibit "N" - cont'd
Affidavit of Joseph W. Ballantine, 24 June 1946
"6. The Japanese Government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, prodosed simultineously with the conclusion of the Japanese-Americnn negotiation, agreements to be signed with Great Britain and other interosted countries. The proposal was accepted by the Arerican Governrent. However, since the American Goverament has made the proposal oi Noverber 26 th is a result of srequent consultation with Great Britain, Austriliz, the N: theriands and Chungking, and oresumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime in the questions of China, it must be concluded that all these countries are at one vith the United States in ignoring Japan's position.
"7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts tomard the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Angio-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotintion. Thus, the earnest hope of the Jipanese Government to adjust JapaneseAmerican relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.
"The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreerent through further neqotiations.
" Whashington_ $^{2}$ December 7, 1941."
(Foreign Relations, Vol. II, pe 787-792.)

DOc. No. 6257
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## INTERIVATIONAL YTLITARY TRIBUAAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AVERICA


Prepased Statenent and Report by Admiral
James 0. Hicherdson, United States Navy, Retired:

1. In response to the request of the Supreme Comander for the Allied Powers, dated 31 day 1946, the Secretary of the Navy on 25 July 1946 dosignated me to appear as a witness before this Tribunal to present information in regard to documents in the custody of the Navy Department bearing on the questions at issue here.
2. I proceeded to consult official naval reports, records and doculuents made or kept by officers acting in the course of official duties and in accordance witin establisned naval procedure in investigating, recording and reporting facts which are matters of concern to the United States

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Navy. E'his statement is a report to this Tribuial of $n: y$ investigation of those records which bear upon the subject of the plans and preparations made by the jaconese Navy leading up to the naval hostilities inich Japan initiated and waged on and after 7 December 1941. This subject will be presented under four heari.igs, as follows:
(1) The plans and preparations concerned with naval construction, particularly construction of aircraft carriers.
(2) The plans and preparations concerned with the establishment of naval beses and the erection of fortifications in the randated Islands.
(3) The plans and preparations concerned with consular espionage as an aid to naval attack.
(4) The plans and preparations for secret attack by Japanese aircreift carrier task force upon the United States naval personnel and ships at Pearl Harbor, Hawai1; on 7 December 1941, without notification having been given by Japan to the united States by a previous, explicit anc reasoned warning that there would be a comnencenent of hostilities in a var by Japen against the United States.

## I.

The plans and preparations concerned with naval construction particularly contruction or aircraftcuriers.

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The aircraft carrier was recognized as early as 1934 by the Tapanese naval leaders, Admiral Isoroku YA: f.OTO and ldmiral Osemi NAGANO to be the best type of naval arm for expansion and aggression. This is show by the following records of state: ents made by them.

This official Japenese position that aircraft carriers yere essentially what they called "offensive" or aggressive noval arns was stated by Admiral YA AisOTO and by Adriral NAGA:VO at meetings connected with the London Naval Sonference of 1935. YA:ATOTO, who, seven years later, was to be the Com:ander-in-Chief of the Japanese combined Fleet in the Fearl Harbor aircraft carrier attack, took the position at a meeting of the Araerican and Japenese delegations on 29 0ctober 1934 that Japan should not be suspected of having aggressive designs in the Far $\because a s t$. In supporting this position, YA: A: OTO said that the Japanese, in fact, were villing to abolish aircrast carciers--upon terms which the Japenese rould consider satisfactory to

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themselves-mphereas, he said, "If they (the Japanese) had aggressive designs in the Far East, nothing would be nore useful than the retention of aircrart carriers." (IPS Docunent No. 6250)

Aduitral IIAGANO, the leader of the Japanese delegation in the Lonaion Sonference, who was soon to become japaneso Javy :inister and later, at the time of the Pcail fiarbor aircraft carrier attack, to be the Chief of the Japanese Naval General Staff, speaking at an official session of the London Conference on 15 January 1936, stated again the Japanese view that aircrait carriers were the principal type of aggressive naval arms. NAGANO said, "In orcier to establish as complete a state of non-aggression and non-menace as possible, Fe advocatc****the abolition of aircraft carriers," and a reduction in curtain uther slasses of naval vessels. (IPS Docunent io. 6251)
6.

The official raval lescership and the personal cocperation of agmy and iA: A.OTO are indicated not only by their joint afforts in connsetion yith

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the London Naval Jonference, but also by the fact that TAGAVO and YAira OTO for a considerable period in 1936-1937 served together as Navy Xinister and Vice rinjster, respectively, and later, in 1941-. 9 943, as Shief of the Japanese Naval General Staff and Jomander-in-chief of the Sombined Fleet, respectively, the positions in which they took the lead in roiking out the plans and in issuing the orders for the Pearl Harbor attack.

The records further show that $\operatorname{INAGANO}$ and YA"A:OTO and their associates made the construction and use of aircraft carifers a central principle of Japenese naval policy. The execution of this policy involved three steps: first, the abolition of existing treaty limitations on the construction of aircraft carriers, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and tie removal of the treaty barriers to secrecy in naval construction; second, the construction of aircraft

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carriers and supporting naval units until Japan had cerricr supremacy over the United States; and third, the use of an alrcraft carrier task force for making a secret, sudden attack to destroy before par began the men and ships of the United Jtates Pacific Fleet while the ships were lying at anchor or moorings in Pearl Harbor.

The first step, namely the abolition of existing treaty limitations on the construction of aircraft carriers, was carried out under the naval leadership of YArAIOOTO and NAGANO as Japanese naval representetives attending the meetings connected with the London Naval sonference. The Washington Treaty of 1922 had limited Japan by ratio to a total carrier tonnage of 81,000 tons. The Japanese representatives demanded the abolition of the existing treaty limitations on naval construction. The Japanese demanded in place of the existing ratio or proportional limitations a treaty limitation based on what they called "a common upper limit." The other nations considered that the adoption of the proposal would result in

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the abolition of any limitation rather than in the maintenance of any effective limitation． None of the other nations agreed with the Japanese deriands．The Japanese gave notice on 29 December 1934 of their intention to terminate the treaty under its terms to take effect 31 December 1936. On 16 Jaririry 1936，led by Admiral NAGANO，the Japanese withdrew from the conference，refusing to join the other nations in the formulation of a new treaty to limit naval construction．

Under the provisions of the ？ashington Treaty of 1922 and the London Treaty of 1930， Japen，the United States and Great Britain had been exchanging reports on their naval construc－ tion．When not bound by these treaty provisions because of her $t \in r m i n a t i o n ~ t h e r e o f, ~ J a p a n, ~ i n ~$ communications which included letters exchanged in 1938 between Foreign finister HTROTA and Alubassador Grew，rejected American，British，and French proposals for the reciprocal exchange of infornation on naval construction．Japan，however， continued to obtain extensive inforration in regard

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to naval construction in the United States by methods including the consular espionage which will be described hereafter.

As the second step in Japanosc naval policy, the Japanese Navy and Government between 1936 and 1941 proceeded rith an expanded program of aircraft construction. In 1936, Japen had four carriers, December 1741, however, only five years later, Japan had more than doubled her carrier strength, having ten carriers, with a tonnage of 178,070 tons.

In addition to increases in aircrait carrier construction, Japan, between 1931 and 1941, increesed her heavy cruiscrs from eight in 1931 to Cighteen in 1941, destroyers from fifty-two to 102, and subinerines from forty-four to seventyfour. buring the same period, the United States facing increasing naval responsibilities in two oceans brought its total number of heavy cruisers from ten to eighteen, the savie number as Jopan,

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while the number of destroyers dropped from 225 to 171, and the number of submerines increased from eighty-one to 112. By way oir comparison in aircraft carriers, in the years 1934 and 1936, when Admiral YAMAOOTO and Admiral HAGANO, respectively, made the statements at the London Conference as quotod above, the Japanese Navy and the United States Navy each had four aircraft carriers, On 7 December 1941, whereas Japan had ten aircraft carrlers, the United States had only six and only three of tham were in the pacific.
12.

The third and final step in the execution of the Japanese naval policy with regard to the sonstruction and use of alrcreft carriers was the use by Japan of an aircraft carrier task force as the attacking force in the Pearl Harbor attack. The six carricrs which the Japanese sent against Pearl Harbor, namely, iUAGA, AIFAGI, SORYU, HIRYU, SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU, prere the Japanese Navy's most powerful carriers. They constituted 75\% of the Japanese Navy's ontire carrier tonaage strength, and they sent into the attack 360 planes, constituting

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probably $75 \%$ of the total Japanese carrier plane strength. The maximum total number of carrier based planes which the United States naval forces could have mustered if the two carriers then in the Havidian area, namely the USS LEXINGTON and the USS MrTMRPRISE, had been at Pearl Harbor would have been approximately 180 planes. In other words, Japanese naval construction of aircraft carriers between 1936 and 1941 enabled Japan to send against the United States Navy's men and ships at Pearl Harbor one of the most powerful task forces ever assembled up to that time, vith overwhelming carrier air force supremacy over the naval forces attacked. Moreover, a principal target and objective of the Jepancse Navy in making the attack was to destroy the two United States carriers based at Pearl Harbor, and thereby to increase the already predominant Japanese carrier supromacy in the Pacific.
13. To sumbarize, Japanese plans and preparations concerned with naval construction between 1931 and 1941 were charactcrized by the express recognition

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by NAGANO and YiMALOTO, leading Japanese naval authorities, that aircraft carriers vere the principal type of naval construction for conducting aggressive naval warfare, and by the termination by Tapan of existing treaty limitations on the construction of carriers and other naval arms. Japanese naval plans and preparations, moreover, featured the construction of aircraft carriers until in 1941 Japan had attained decisive supremacy over the United states and other nations in aircraft carriers. And finally, as the climax of her naval policy of expansion and aggression, Japan on 7 December 1941, used an aircraft carrier task rorce to make a sudden, secret atteck designed to anninilate United States naval power ir: the Pacific before war had actually commenced.

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## II

The plens end orenaratione concerned with the estabilishment of naval bases and the orection of fortfications in the Mandated Islands:
14.

Dusluce:ia: $y$ evidence wili now be presented which Indicates that the Japanese naval. policy with respect to the Mandatod Islands ras characterized by the same objectives as those with respect to the Japanese naval policy on aircraft carriors, namely, to develop and use then for naval expansion and aggression.
15. The execution of this policy likerise was along the same lines of activity as those which vere pursued in the execution of the policy rith respect to aircraft carriers, namely, (1) the termination, or in this case, the direct violation of treaty limitations, (2) the construction of fortifications and of navel bases in the Islands, and (3) the use of the Isimas fortifteations and beses in initiating and vacing naval hostilities against the United States and her allies on and after 7 Deocmber 1941.

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16. The treaty and mandate Imitations vere established (1) by the Treaty of Verssilles (1920), (2) by the mandate of the Islands to Japan pursuant to the Treaty and (3) by the Mandates treaty betrieen the United States and Japan (1922). Those limitations are stated as folloms:
M...no military or naval bases shall be established or fortifications erected in tho territory" of the Mandated Islands.
17. - Numerous documents shor: that the Japanese Navy and Governnont established naval beses in the Mandated Islands, but for the sal:e of brevity and beceuse of its adequaoy, only one of them is presented. That document is the Japancse Navy's Combined Flect Top Secret Oporation Ordor No, 1. (IPS Document No. 17)
18. Admital Yamahofo, as Commander-in-Chief Combined Floet, issucd this ordor from his flagship, the NAGATO, on 5 November 1941. (IPS Documont No. 17, p. 2/1)

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Pago 14

It mas an ordor that "Combined Flect Operations in the var against the United Stetes, Great Britain, and the Netherlands - will be conducted in accordance aith tho soparate volume." The separate volume, in 151 pages of text, tables and charts, outlines operations irr a wer beginning with the attack on Parl Harbor (pago 2/17, 2/18). It provides for proparations for mar, comrunications, sunply, allocation of forces and other detr.ils.
19.

The Mandated Islands appear in mony places in this ordor. At pagc 2/67 the order ostablishes an allotment of supply besos. The supply beses allotted to the South Soas Force and the Advencod Expeditionary Force are the follorring Mundated Isl.ands: SAIPAI, IWAJALEIN, MOTJE, JALUIT, TAROA, TRUK, PONAPE, and PALAU. Those cight bases constitutc more than holf of the total number of naval supply basos thus allotted, namoly a total of fiftcen.
20. At pages $2 / 76$ te $2 / 78$ is an Appended Table 1, giving initial fucl allorances for supply bases. The boiler oil ellormnce to five of the cight Mandated Island bases totals 46,500 motric tons. Likerisc allotted to the Mandate bascs

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aro great quantitios of aviation fuol, bombs, machine gun ammunition, torpodoos and nines. Rations aro allotted for 36,000 persons por month at the eight Mandate beses. Lainge monthly roplonishment allorances are tabulatod at pages 2/91 to 2/94. Aircraft material for the South Scas arca is to bo replonished at TRUK, ond submarinc material at KFIJALETI.
21. No doubt Order No. I. is accurate in applying the torm "bases" to these kandatc installations. The naterials, the quantitios and the arcas involved indicate that these neval bascs and their equipmont for storage, transport, commuicetions, and guns end arsunition hed been established on a large soale and over a considerable period of time. Cther documents on this point are aveilable for presentation or examination.
22.

The liandated Islends eppear in Order No. 1 olso in tables of allocetions of forcos (pages 2.104, 105, 106). The South Scas Force, cunterine about the 4th Floct (commonly celled the Mandatics Floct) is allocated for rondezvous the South Sces or Mandated Islands. Operating from these bases it is ordered to aid in covering the rithdramal of the Pearl

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Harioor striting force, to attac!: Wake and Cruam as quicicly as possible, and to cooperate with the striking force "in the occupation of strategic areas." Also based in the Mandates is the Cormerce Destruotion Unit, apparently submarinos assigned by the Order to destroy sea trcffic. Jepanese submarines of the 6th Fleet aind of other fleets regularly used bases in the Mandates. Subiarines on route from Japan to Pearl Larbor rondezvoused at K:ajalein.
23.

It is clear, thorefore, that the Japaneso Navy before 7 December 1941 had established navol bases in the Mandated Islonds.
24. Ifkerrise many other docunents shor that the Japanese Navy and Governnent orected fortifications in the Mondated Islands. For brovity only one set consisting of throe documents is prosented here. Tro of these documents (IPS Docurnents No. 6254-A and No. 62j4-B) are aerial reconnaissance photographs of MOFJE Island taken by United States Navy photographio intelligence units in Jenuary 1942, less thain troo months aistor yrar begen. The third docunont (IPS Docur:ent No. 6254-C) is a Japancse blueprint rap of FOTJE

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dated 10 August 1940 captured by Ancrican forces landing at Kwajaloin in Fobruary 1944.
25. An examination of these photographs shows that FOTJE, boforc 31 Januarry 194?, had been fortified and equipped as a combination of an island fortross and a naval base. The bluoprint man shows that beforo 10 Aucust 1940 the Japanese Navy and Government had already created extensive fortifications. The magnitude of the Japancse naval installations at FOTJE is indicatod by the tables of numbered items attached to each documont.
26. Tho photograph C-23, MOTJE Island, North End, (IPS Documont No. 6254-A) shows the center of the Island to bo covorod by tivo intersocting paved airficld rumrays, oach 300 foot wide, one more than a mile long ( 5700 foet), the other 3900 foct long, and suitable for large land-basod bombors as woll as lessor aircraft. Two (or threc) largo hangars and tro large, shop-typo buildings arc seen west of the runvays.

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North of thesc hangars is a large seaplane ramp, with a hangar 150 feet wide by porhaps 300 feet long suitable for the largost seaplanes.
27. Kany gun positiurs aro seen, including a northern and a southern 3-gun Dual Puppose Anti-Mircraft and Ooast Defense Battory aach with adjacent power plant, munitions storage, command post and barracks area. The guns are probably 5-inch or 6-inch guns. Thmorous blockhouses aro observed along the shoro in the photographs and map.
28. Storago tanks for heavy oil and structures for anm munition storage aro indicated on the Japanose map by lettering and also on the photographs by alouds of black smoke showing where U. S. Navy aviators have locatod tho tenks and amminition storages.
29. Trenches, pillboxes, machine gun molacoments, wire ontanglements, a connecting systom of roads, plus a total of more than fifty buildings are also to be observed on tho photographs and map.

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30. In photograph C-22 (IPS Documont No. 6254-B) are shom the largc, tro-story radio transmitter buildings, Flanked by throo radio toyers, and by othor buildings and tanks.
31.

Tho toteal volunc of installations on FOTJE, as shom by this Japanese map datcd 10 August 1940 and by these aerial photographs datod 31 Jonuary 1942, is sufficiont to show that the Japanese Navy and Govornment had boen ongaged in establishing the basos and creoting the fortifications at laast prior to tho middlo of 1940 and porhaps at least during the entire year 1940 as well as 1942. I am informed that additional ovidonco on this point is to be introduced intor in another section of this case in the form of statements from residents of the Islands who worked on the construction at MOTJE for the Japanese.
32. It appoars that the documents prepared by the Japanese Navy, namely Combined Fioot.Top Secret Oporation Order No. I, and the Hap of FOTJ, arc sufiliciont to show that the Japanose Navy and Government before 7 Decenbor 1941 ostablishod naval bases and orocted fortifications.

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III

## The plans and rrenerations ooncomod yith conalinar espionage as an ald to naval attacka


#### Abstract

33.

Numerous docunerts and rocords shom that the Japanese Navy and Governmont, parti.culany the Foreign Office, betreen 1931 and 1941, were engaged in a policy of surveillance, reconnaissance and espionage with rospect to the naval establishment anc activitios of the United States Navy and Government.


34. The United Stetes Naval Oourt of Inquiry on the Pcarl Harbor Attack statod, in its findings of fact, that Japan's espionage systcr utilized her civilian, consular and diplonatio nationals throughout the rorld and onabled her to keep constentiy informod of the United Strites naval building program and of the location and movemonts of United States naval vessels.
35. An extensive continuous espionage was conducted under the dircetion of tho Japcnosc Novr and Government, partiouLarly the Foreign Office, at Honolulu, through Consul Goneral

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Pago 21

Nogno KTH: and his 200 consular agents scattered throughout the Islends.
36.

Documents minich shoy the nature and oxtent of this espionago end particularly its heavy contribution to the Pearl Harlor attack, will no: bo presented. These documents are authenticated copies of some of the messages exchengod betreen the Jepanose Consul General's office at Honolulu and the Japanese Navy and Foreign Office at Tokyo. They rrere coded messages sent via commercicl commaication companics. (IPS Docunents ifo. 6255-A $,-C,-D,-E,-F,-G,-H$ and $-I$ )
37. In order that the messages may be understood in their referonces to places and arcas at Pearl Harbor, a chart of Poarl Harior has been propared and will nort be offered.
(IPS Docunent No. S25\%)

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38. The first nossage (IPS Documont INo. 6255-A, Japanese messago \#\#33) is fron Tolyo, apparently from tine Foreign Office because it bears the nano or Admiral TOYODA, the Faroign Ministor. It reads as follows:

Tron: Tokjy (Toyoda)<br>To: Honolulu<br>September 24, 1941

403

## Strictly secret.

Henceforth, we rrould like to have you male reports concerning vesscls along the follorm ing lines insofar as possible:

1. The raters (of Poarl Harbor) are to be dividod roughly into fivo sub-areas. (We have no objections to your abbroviating as much as you like.)

Area. A. Maters betreen Ford Island and the arsenal.

Arec B. Wators adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the oppositc side of the Island from Area A.)

Arce C, Eant Loch.
Aras D. Middle Loch.
Aree E. West Loch and the communicating m.tor routos.
2. With regord to werships and aircraft carriors, to :rould lile to have you report on those

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at anchor，（thesc ere not so inportent）tied up at wharvos，buoys and in docks．（Designate types and classes brieñy．If possible we vould like to havo you mekc mention of the fact shen there are tro or more vessels along side of same vharf．）

ARMY 23260
Trans．10／9／4工（S）＂
39.

Tho next nessege（IPS Document No．6255－C，Japanese
nessage \＃111）from Tolyo，epmarently is another Foreign Office nossage as it bears the nome of Foreign Minister TOGO．It reads as follors：

| ＂Fron： | Tolyo（Tozo） |
| :--- | :--- |
| To： | Honolulu（Riyoji） |

15 November 1941

## \＃111

As relation betricen Tapan and the United States al c mosi aritical，nake your ＂ships in harbor report＂trrneular，but at a rate of trice a meel．Alito otich you alrcady are no doubt arare，pleaso tise extra oare to maintein secrooy．

JD－1： 699125044 （Y）Novs Trans．12－3－41（S）＂

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Doc. No. 6257
Page 2 :
The next message, (IPS Document No. 6255-D, Japanese message \#222) illustrates the type of information which the Japanese Consul General was sending to Tokyo less than a month before Pearl Harbor.

It reads as follows:

```
"From: HonoluJ.u (Ktta)
    TO: ricky.
    Noverba: ? ? ó, 1541
```

\#222

1. The varships at anchor in the Harbor on the l5th were as I told you in my \#219 on that day.

Area A - A battleship of the Oklahoma cless entered and one tanker left port.

Area C - 3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.
2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chinago class, one of the Pensacola class were ticd up at Doc's "KS". 4 merchant vessels werc at aictur in Area D.
3. At AC:CN a.m. on the morning of the 17th, $\mathcal{E}$ desirijrjos wele nuseived entering the Harbor. Thifr roיlyse yas as follows: In a single file at a Gistance of 7,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hurr, they moved inte Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buors in Area $C$, to which they were moored they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 degiees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered area A after pessing the water reservoir on the Eastern side.

Relayed to $\qquad$ -

Army 25817
Trans. 12/6/41 (2)"
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42.

On the same day as the date of the preceding Japanese message \#123, namely 2 December 1941, Bernard Julius Otto Kuehn, according to his recorded confession, (IPS Document No. 6256-A and B) which has been presented in evidence, delivered to Consul General KITA and his assistants at his office in Honolulu information and documents as requested by the Consul General. The confession also indicates that Kuehn was paid a considerable sum of money, apparently not less than $\$ 10,000$, for his services In providing such information to the Japanese Consul General and therefore in turn to the Japanese Navy and Foreign Office at Tokyo. The information and papers delivered by Kuehn, included full details of United States ships present, with their berthing locations in the harbor, and also a comprehensive code of signals by which such information could be communicated to Japanese submarines or other Japanese naval units then en route to Pearl Harbor.
43. The Kuehn code, repeated practically verbatim as Kuehn had delivered it to Consul General KITA, was duly transmitted by KITA to Tokyo by message dated 3

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2. Signals.

1. Lanikai Beach House will show lights during the night as follows:

|  | light between | 8 and 9 p.m. | Signal |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 11 | "11gnt between | 9 and $10 \mathrm{p} \mathrm{p}_{\text {. }} \mathrm{m}$. | $\frac{1}{2}$ |
| \% | 11 | 10 and 11 p.m. | 3 |
| 1 | " | 11 and $12 \mathrm{p} . \mathrm{m}$. | 4 |

II.

(Part 2)
III. Lanikai Bay, during daylight.

If there is a "star" on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates signals 1 , 2, 3, or 4.

If there is a "star" and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7, or 8 .
IV. Lights in the attic window of Kalama House will indicate the following:

Times 1900-2000 2000-2100 2100-2200 2200-2300 2300-2400 0000-0100

Signal 3
4
5
6
7
8
V. K.G.TR.B. Mant Ads.
A. Chincse rug, otc. for sale apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 3 or 6.

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"From: Honolulu
5 Decomber 1941 (transleted by Navy 10 Dece: ber (PA-K?)
?252
(1) During Friday morning, the 5th, the throe battleships mentioned in my message \%239 arrived here. They had been at sea for eight days.
(2) The Lexington and iive heavy cruiscrs left port on the same day.
(3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5 th:

8 battleships.
3 light cruisers. 16 destroyors.

Four ships of the Honolulu class and wore in dock."
46.

A message of 6 December from Honolulu to Tokyo provides direct information for the "surprise attack" which the message mentions, dealing with the important subjects of berrage balloons and torpedo nets. This message, (IPS Document No. 6255-H, Japanese message \#253) reads as follows:

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"From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
Decenber 6, 1941: (translated by Army 8 December 1941)

PA-K2
\#253 Re the last part of your \#123.

1. On the Americen Continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Comp Davis, Ilorth Caroline Not only have they ordered four or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the use of these belloons in the defense of Hawail and pennma. In so far as Hawail is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Poerl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor heve they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the prosent time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually mado preparations, bccouse they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford and Ewa; there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack egainst these places.
2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not hnorm. I will report the results of my investigation."

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PSE: No: 6257
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47.
48. The documents on Jopanese espionage and reconnaissance which have been prosented have been limited to a fow of those dealing with consular espionge in Honolulu, because they show that the activities of the Japanese Nevy and Foreign office in planning and conducting this consular espionage as an'aid to the Pearl Harbor attack mey be classed with their other activities in preperation for aggressive warfare.

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Dog: N8: 6257

Page 3;

Iv

The plone and praparations for secret attock bv Janancso carrier tasli forco upen the unitod States nsval personnel end ghips at Pearl Horbor. Houmil, on 7 Docomber 1241, without notification heving boon givon br Jepan to tho United Statos by a previous, oxplicit and ressoncd rimening thet thero rould bo a cormencenont of hostilitios in a mar by Japan ageinst ino United Statose
50.

The plens and preparations made by the Jepeneso Navy with rospect to construction of aircraft carriors ond of naval bascs and fortifications in tho Mandated Islands has bean prosonted. Oonsideration hes also beon givon to Japanosc naval plens and proparations concernod with consular espionagc as a preparation for surprise novel attack. The consummation of tho forogoing plans in dclivoring the attack on Pearl Harbor by the usc of the aircraft carricrs, of the fortificd Island besos and of tho ospionage reports vill nor be prosented.
51. The attack will bo considord with rospect to (1) its objootivos, (2) its plan and (3) its oxcoution.

The documents used in this analysis of tho attack will bo principally (1) the Japanose Gombined Flect Top Scerct Oporation Order No. 3 (IPS Documont No. 17); (2) Allied. Trenslator and Intompreter Soction, Suprorie Compnder for tho Alliod Povors, Roscarch Roport No. 131, Dato I Dccombor 1945, ontitlod Japan's

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Decision to Fight (IPS Dooument No. 1628); and (3) Research Roport Ho. 132, fro:: the sare source, horeinafter referred to es ATIS, entitied The Pearl Harber Operation (IPS Docurent No. 1627).
53. 1. The objectives of the Pearl Harbor attaok have been stated by Adniral NAGANO to be:
"(1) rendering impotent the United States Paeific Fleet in order to gain tine and raintain freedon of action in tine South Seas operation (inoluding the Philippine Islands), and (2) the defense of our nandated islands." (IPS Docunent No. I628, p: 66)

The Chief of starf Combined Fleet, domiral ITO said: "This Fleet (at Peary Harjor) will be utterly orushed Fith one blow at the very beginuing of hostilities... If we insure our strategio supronacy at the very outset of the conflict by attaoking and seizing rill key points at one blow rifile Arerica is still unprepared, we con swing the senles of lator operations in our favor." (IPS Pocument No. 1627, pp. 7, 8)
54. In Combined Floet Top Socret Operation Order No. 1, pages $2 / 7$, 5 (IPS Dooment No. 17), the genoral objeotivos of the entira Japaneso operaitions are atated as follows:

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II. In the east, the American Floet will be destroyed and the Anerican linos of operation and supply lines to the orient will be out.
"2. In the west, British Kolayn will be occunied and British lines of operation and supoly Iines to the Orient, as well as the Burma Road, will bo cut.
"3. Encny forces in the Orient rill be destroyod, basos oif oporation will be scizod, and arcas with natural resources will be occupied.
"4. Stratogic arcas rill be seizod and developed; defenses will be strongthened in order to establish a durable basis for operations.
"5. Encny forces will bo intorcopted and anninilated.
"6. Victorios $\pi$ III be exploited to brak the onory's will to fight."
55. 2. The plan of the Pearl. Harjor attack, according to MAGANO, was conocived by YANA'OTO the first part of January, 1941, and wes worked out by operations staff officers beginning in Septembor, 1941. (IPS Document No. 1628, p. 66) The Japanese naval personnel who lnevt of the entire plan in

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advance included MAGANO and YAMAMOTO, and those tho knew part of the plan included Adniral SHIMADA, Navy Ministor, and Admiral OKA, Chici of tho Buroau of Naval Affeirs. (Id., p. S7) Proparatory to a final Cormulation of the plan, har ganos wre held at Todyo on Soptoriber 2 to 13, 1941, with approxinately forty kcy Japanesc Navel officers participating and with NAGANO as the ranking officer in chorge acting as umpirc. (Id., pp. 4, 5, 6)
56. According to Jepanese naval officers tho took part in the preparation of the plan, among the problans to be solved werc horr to attacle nost offuctively tho United Statos Pacific Flect in the Hareilan arec. They statod: "It was decided that a torpodo attack against anchorod ships was the most effective method of putting the main strongth of the United States Pacific Fleet in tho Howcii aroa out of action... Honce, the following two obstecles yero considered:
(a) Tho fact that Pear? Herior is narror and shallow.
(b) Tho fect that Pcarl Harbor was probably equippod rith torpodo nets.
-


(o) In regard to point (a), it mas planned to attach stabilizers to the torpedoes and lounch thom from an extrenely lor altitude.
(d) In regard to point (b), since success coutd not be counted on, a bombing attack tas also omployod."
57. Additional problems vorc refueling and effecting surprise in tho attack. On these points the same officors statod (Id., p. 68): "The ability to refuel and a surprise attack rerc the keys to this operation, If either of them failed, the exocution of the operation would heve been impossible." Rofucling at sea tas doalt tith by making it a mattor for spacial training. To insuro surprise, the little trevellod northern ocean route ras to be used, sereoning destroyors rero to bo sent ehead, and complote radio silence was to bo corried out at sea mile docentive radio activity wes to be conducted in the Inland Soa and Kyushu aroas. (Id., p. 68)
58. The plan provided in detail for the organization of a solact Task Force, undor the commend of Admiral MAGUNO, and

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mado up of 6 aircroft carriors, supportod by 2 battloships, 2 hoavy cruisers, 1 light oruiser, 11 destroyers, 3 submarinos and 8 tenkors. (Id., p. 83) Additional units included submarines, both regular sizc and midget submarincs manned by specinlly trainod officors. (Id., p. 78; IPS Document No. 1627, pp. 17-23) Carrier-borno attack airplanes numberod 350, namely, 135 dive bombing planes, 104 horizontal bombing planes, 40 torpodo planos, and 81 strofing plones. Targets assignod wero principally airoraft carriers, airbases and grounded airplanes, but in exccution battlaships reccived special attention because of tho absence of carriors, (IPS Document No. 262B, p. 84)
59. Tho plan providod, also, for lesser forces to operate in various areas. (IPS Document No. 17, pp. 2/104-6).
60. Noither in this plon for the Poarl Harbor attack nor in any other Japanese doounent anong the Navy rocords have I found any indication that tho planners gave any consideration to the applicability or the non-applicability of tho Third Hague Convention requiring rarning bofore attack.

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61. 3. The exccution of the plan. On 5 Novomber 1941, Admiral NAGANO issucd on order to Admiral YAMAMOTO (IPS Docunnat No. 1628, p. 75) under :hith YaMamoro on the sane date (IPS Document No. 17, D. 2/1) issued Combinod Fleat Top Secret Onoration Orxicr $\$$ effect. on 7 Novenbor, YMPNOTO issued Ondor No. 2 (Id., p. 2/152) fixing Y-Day for 8 Decembor, in accordance with the provision in the plan for fixing Y-Day, and, later, x-Dar (Id., pp. 2, 3) .
62. On the same dato, 7 Novenber 1941, EAMMMOTO issued from his flagship, the NAGATO, an ordor mhich direoted the Task Force to asscmble at Hitokappu Bay at Etorofu Island in the Kuriles, and to take on supplies until 22 Noveriber. (IPS Document No. 1528, p. 77)
63. On 25 Novenbor, MAMMOTO ordored the Task Force to nove out on 26 Novomber and to "procecd aithout being detected to the ovening rendezvous point sot for 3 Docember. (IPS Docurent No. 1623, p. 78)
64. On 26 Noveriber 1941 at 0600 hours the Task Force moved out on ite trip of nore then 3000 milos to Pearl Harbor. (Id., p. 78)

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65. On 2 Deceriber the Task Force under way recoivod a Combinod Flcet order stating "X-Day rill bo 8 Dcconbor" (7 Deconber Poarl Harbor time). (Id., p. 78)
66. On 2 December, Admiral yimiloro fron his Magship, the ThshiO, gave the order to procecd rith the attack.
67. On the night of 6-7 Decombor (Pearl Herbor tine) the Task Force made the run-in southrard at top speed (26 knots).
68. On tho oarly norning of 7 Dcocniber (Pearl Harbor timo) the carriors, when 230 miles due north of Oohu, launched the planos of the First Attack Unit, at 0130 hours, and when 200 miles north of Oahu launchod the planes of the Second sttack Unit at 0245 hours. (IPS Document No, 1628, p. 71) The planos rendezvoused to tho south of the carriors and then flery in to the attack. Torpodo planes and dive bonbers attackod fron 7:55 to 8:25 A. M. Horizontal boribers more the principel attackers in an atteci: lasting from 8:40 to 9:15. Divo borbore attacked fron: 9:15 to 9:45, when the raid ended.

Doc. No. 6257
Pago 40
69. The Task Forge, after launching its planes withdrol at hish spood to tho northrost, whero thn planos, excopt for approxinately 28, roturnod to the carriers, betwoen 10:30 A.M. and 1:30 P. Ki. The Task Force then procecded to Kuro, arriving on 23 Decembor.
70. The attaciors killed 1,999 officers and onlistod men of the U. S. Navy. Roar Adniral Isanc Carmboll Kidd, U.S.No, cormander of battloship division \#l, was killed, presumably in the explosions aboard his ilagship, the USS $A R J Z O N A$, where he vas last seon in action. A.ll told, the ARIZONA lost 47 officors and 1056 onlisted nen. (Navy Dopartmont, Ohief Naval Porsonnol, Cortif. 15 July 1946). The U. S. Marine Corps suffored casualties of 109 killed. (Marinc Corps Directior Personnel Cortif. 7 May 1946). Tho U. S. Arry lost 234 killed. (Fer Depariment Casualty Branch Cortif. 8 July 2946). Giviliains killod in the attack numbered 54. (Har Records Burcau, Univorsity of Harmil, Rept. Spec. Agt. CIC, AFMIDPAC dated 7 June 1946).

71 Tho United Statcs lost outrieht 188 planes; Japan, 29. Tho United States suffored sevore damage to, or loss of,

a battluships, 3 lifight cmisers, 3 dostroyers, and 4 niscellancous vessels; Japan lost 5 nidget subriarines.

72. Tho disproportionate extent of losses narks the oxtont to which MMGNO aix YisMMONO and their associates In the Japanosc Navy and Goverment had succecded in raintaining scerecy and in attaining surpriso in their naval plens and proparations bot:een 1931 and 1941, raching on 7 Doconber 1941 the clinnx of their successful planning and proparing.
73. By their repoatod amphatic marnings in orders and elsomore that only by complote socrecy and comploto surprise could the Pcarl Harbor attac!: succeed, NAGANO and FAMiMOTO and thoir associatos had succeeded in achioving completo socreoy and complote surpriso in the Pearl Harbor attack.
74. I have been unable to find in the records of the United Statos Governmont any information regarding eny Jopanese docurant or cormunication by mich the Japanose Governnent gave to tro Unftod Statos a previous, explicit and reasoned

Doc. No. 6257
Page 42
rarning that Japon mas about to commenco hostilities against the United States. A notice from the Japanese Foreign Office announcing that Hthere has arisen a stite of morl betmeon Japan and the Unitcd Statos mas reocivod In tho Offico of the Scorctory of State at 2:35 A. M. on 10 Docomber 1941, sixty-six hours and forty minutes after the first torpodoes and bombs fron the Japanese oarrier plenea struck Poarl Harbor.

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Document No. 6250
Page 4.

In reply to fre Patsudaire's question as to what we woulc riscless pith the Rritish in the afternoon, Mr. Devis exploined that this would ba our first meeting since last July and that we hod no definite agendin. Ta had not cone to London ifth any plan for in entiraly new agraement on a new b?sis, but merely with the idea of continuing the Tranties or of concluding n new ons ?hich woule continue the purposes of the Wishington nnd London Treaties. "r. "atsudeira here injectad thot va har surely given the British our deteiled program last summer, sinre we had hed technical discussions at that time. Nr. Davis statac that the Rritish had given to us their viers on technicai ?יiestions but tiant re did not y ssent our tachnical views sincs we did not heve eny to prasent. Our progrsm then as no: hac simply been for a $20 \%$ reduction, the datails to be wericou out later.

The two delegations then cortinued to consicar the posiibility of technical discussions. ir. Devis sedvenced the suggestion that Admiral Stand?ey nno Aumiral Yamamoto sit dowm togather and talk the motter orar in detail. He expleined thet while he did not believe that thare was any opportunity to try to rench an ngrement on techescal questions, his idea was simply to enoble ndmiral standzy to obtain a clear undorstending of whet the Jnjarase pro:nosals mennt in proctica. Itr. Matsudairn, speaking in Jananesa to Mr. Doomsn, stated that they did not hove ary hard and fast technicel program. Their fdes mes thet as the convers?tions went forward the technical broblems on both sides would develop in such a menner as to make it possible to bring the oppoaing technicel views closer togather and to roconcile them.

Aftor further discussions it whs agraad that no decision should no" be renched on the matter of a tachnicel maeting, but that there would be another informal meating between the two dalegations at, which the auestion could be dealt with. fir. Dovis sild inst the Amprican Delegetion would like to pay ? raturn visit on the Japunase nad vould do so some time after tine meating schedunea for the nfternoon vith the British.

IITIERAATIONAT MIITARY TRIEUTAL FOR THE FAR EAST
CgRIIEICATE
I.P.S. No, 5250

Statement of source ond Authenticitr
I, Jemes O, Richerdson , hereby certify that I am oficicinliy connected with the United Stetes Government in the following capacity: _. Admircin Inited States Nowk Retired, on duty in the Office of the Chief of Naral Onerations, Navy Debartment. ——emporcrily assigned to duty rith the Supreme Commander for the Allied Poners in connection with the International Military Tribunal for the For Easte I further certify that as such oficicial I have custody of the document hereto atteched consisting of _ 7 pages, deted October 22, 1934, and described as follows: mhomorandum of Conversations betroen the Amerionn and Jananese Delegntions, Ootober 29. 1934e_at Claridges," I further certify that the attc.ched record and document is an official document of the United States Government and that it is part of the offlcial archives and files of the folloring nemed Departmont: $\qquad$ Office of the Chief of Nevil Operctions. Navy Departmente. United Ststos Government.

Titnessed this $]$ /th dey
of November 1946.
$\angle 8 /$ JAES J, ROBTHSONT
Captein, USiR \$52853

Ls/ JUES Q. RICHARDSOX

Admirol. U, S. Havy Retired
Official Copmoity
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Letter from the Secretary of State to the President

April 24, 1936
THE PRES IDERTT:
The undersigned, the Secretary of State, has the honor to submit to the President a certified copy of the Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Irmament and the Exchange of Information concerning Naval Construction and the Protocol of Signature and Additional Protocol thereto with a view to their transmission to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty if the judgment of the President approve thereof.

The Treaty and the two Protocols were signed at London on March 25, 1936, by the plenipotentiaries of the President of the United States of America, the President of the French Republic, and His liajesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India.

The Conference at which this Treaty was negotiated was held in compliance with Article 23 of the Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament signed at Fashington on the 6th February, 1922, and of Article 23 of the Treaty for the Limitation and Eeduction of Naval Armament signed in London on the 22nd April, 1930, to which Treaties the United States is a party.

I have the honor also to transmit the report of the american Delegation which participatec in this Conference, together with the Annexes to that report containing the principal documents of the Conference.

Respectfully,
COFDELL HULL
Enclosures:
Certified cony of the London Naval
Treaty, 1936, Protocol of Signature, and Additional Protocol;
Report of the Amsrican Delegation.
THE PPESIDENT,
The White House.
（Page 212）
MINUTES OF THE TENTH IEETING OF THE FIRST C0MITTEE，JINUARY 15， 1936

Present：
The Right Hoii．Viscount＂onsell，G．B．E．， First．Lord of the ：dmiralty（in the Chair）．
（Page 216，218，219）
JAP！NRSE PHOFOSAL TOR A COONT UPPFR LIIIT OF NATAL TONNAGE．
（Resumbtion of Discussion）
＊れねれまれ
Admiral NaGyNO（Translation）：I desire to state at the outset thet we．very much appreciate the opportunity that has been given us to－ray to resume examination of the Japanese proposal．s and，to save time，I shall with your per－ mission have the statiment of the Japanese Delegation read to you in translation．
＊れねれれま
lioreover，in order to establish as complete a state of non－aggression and non－menace as possible，we advocate the complete abolition or drastic reduction of offensive armaments． To explain more fully，we acvocate the abolition of aircraft－ carriers and a drastic reduction in capital ships and＂A＂class crvisers．But if there were a general sentiment in favour of the abolition of capital ships also，we should be ready to give our support thereto．
＊＊氺水氺
III．In order to bring once more to the minds of the Delegations the principal feetures of the Japanese proposal， I would now undertake to set forth the framework of our formula，somewhat as follows：－－

（2）Simultaneously with the determination of the global tonnage，there would be fixed for those categories

Document No. 6251

Whtch are generally recognised to be predominantly of fensive in character - namely, capital ships, aircraft-carriers (in the event of their non-abolition), and " $A$ " class cruisers -a common maximum tonnage and a common number of units to be allowed to each Power in respect of each of the three categories separately.


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## title page

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CONTENTE
HAVY OPERATION PLANS AND CRDERS
1941-1944
RECOVERED FROX Ci: NACHI

Full translation of files of oporation orders, ordors, memoranda and serials, dealing with Navy operation plans, recovered from CA NACHI. Issuod by Combined Fleet, 1 and 2 Diversion Attack Forces, 1 Mobile Fleet, 2 and 5 Fleots, ete; dated 1941-1944.
(MANILA Bay - 1945)
(Translation dirooted for Comnaider, Soventh Floot)

> EDITOR'S NOTE: Limited Distribution 39 will appear in soveral parts, of which this is Part VIII. The romaining parts aro now being prepared for publioation in the ordor of prioritios assignod. PART VIII: Cambinod Fleet Operation


CORTENTS

1. Oporations of tho Combined Fleet in Case War with the UNITED عLeTES; GREAT BRITAIN and tho NEMFERLANDS Bogins during tho China Oporatione.
A. Outline of operations
B. Proparations for war and tho outbreak of war

- 1. Preparations for tho outbreak of war

2. Tho outbrenk of war and tho uso of arme thorotofore
C. Ffrat Phaso (DMI ICHI DAN) Oporations
3. Opcration policy
4. Outline of operations against A (TN Ameriean.) Pleet
5. Outline of Southern Aroa oporations
6. Opuration periods
E. Allooation of forces
D. Second Phase (DAI NI DAN) Operations
7. Operation policy
8. Important points whioh must bo defended and advanoe bases in occupied territory
9. ireas expeotcd to be occupied or destroyed
10. Allocation of forors
I. Protoction of our sea traffio, dostruotion of enemy sea traffics.

2nd mino warfaro

1. Operations to protect sea trafflo

2d Operations to destroy sea traffic
3. Nine warfaro
F. Comonications
G. Supply
H. Operations nther than those of the Combined Fleet

1. Operations of forces at naval stations and auxiliary naval stationa
2. Operations of the CHINA Area Fleet
I. Juint Army-Navy Agre日ment (Separate Volume) (TN Missing.)
II. Operations of the Combinod Fleet in Caso War with RUSSIA Begins during the War with tho UNITEC STAT :S, GREAT BRITAIN, the NETHERLANDS ahd OEITA
A. Oporation policy
B. Allocation of foroos

1．This book will be handlod by staff officers，the commanding officers concorned and higher officors．

2．－For tho benefit of persons directly responsible for ocmmun－ ications，supply and related matters，these subjects have been troatod．

3．As in the case of code books，care must bo taken that the publication does not fall into cnony hands should the ship sink or bo doanngod．

## 5 Rov 41

Chief of Staff，Combined Fleet

## Pago <br> CONBINED FLEET ULTRASECRET OPERATION ORDER 1

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Flagaifip wagato（＊1），SAEKI（＊2）WAN（IN Bay．） 6 y
yamaioto，Isoroku（＊3）
Commander in Chief， Combined Fleet

145 of 700 copies

## COMBINED FLEET ORDER

Combinod Fleet Operations in the Far Against the UNITED STATES， GREAT BRITANN and the NETHERLANDS WIII be conduoted in acoordanoe inth the separate Volume．
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## 278/242/doen

Combinod Fleot VItraseorot Oporation Order 1
Soparato Volume

| Page | Combinod Fleet Oporations in the War Against the |
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COMTENTS
I. Operations of tho Combined Fleet in Case War with thic UNITED ELiTEE; GREAT BRITAIN and tho NETHERLLANDS Boging during tho China Oporatione.
A. Outline of operations
B. Proparations for war and tho outbroak of war

- 1. Proparations for tho outbroak of war

2. Tho outbrenk of war and tho uso of arme thorotofore
C. Ffret Phaso (MAI ICHI DAN) Oporations
3. Opcration polioy
4. Outline of operations against A (TN American.) Pleot
5. Outline of Southern Aroa operations
6. Opuration periods
E. illocation of forces
D. Seoond Phase (DAI NI DAN) Operations
7. Operation policy
8. Important points which must bo defended and advance bases in ocoupied territory
9. ireas expected to be ocoupied or destroyod
10. Allocation of forces
F. Protoction of our sea traffio, dostruotion of enemy sea traffios. 2nd mino wnrfaro
11. Oporations to protect sea traffio

28 Operations to destruy sea traffic
3. Mine warfaro
F. Communications
G. Supply
H. Operations nther than those of the Combined Fleet

1. Operations of forces at naval stations and auxiliary naval stations
2. Operations of the CHINA Area Fleet
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II. Oporations of the Combinud Fleet in Caso War with RUSSIA Begins during the War with tho UNITED STAT SS, GREAT BRITAIN, the NETHERLANDS and CBIEA
A. Opuration policy
B. Allocation of forcos

## 278/242/do

C. Operations othur than those of the Combinod Floot

1. Oparations of forces at naval stations and auxiliary naval staticns
2. Operations of the CHINA Area Fleot
III. Kiscollaneous Regulations

Page
$2 / 6$
A. Time to ia Used
B. Charts to be Csed
C. Identification of iriendly and enemy forocs

Page I. COMBINED FLEET OPERATIONS IN CASE WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES,
6. Victeries will be exploited to break the enemy will to will be strengthened in ordor to ostablish a duroble basio fer operations.
5. Fnemy forces will be intercopted and annihilated.
-B. Proparations for War and the Outbreak of War

1. Proparations for the outbreak of war
a. The empire is expecting war to break out with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NLTHERLANDS. When the decision is made to complete over-all prcparations for operations, orders will bo issued establishiag the approximate date (Y Day) for commencement of operations and announcing "First Preparations for Far". The various forces will act as follows:
(1) All fleots and forces, without special orders, Page. will organizo and complete battle preparations in accordanco with tho $2 / 9$ allocation of forces for First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations of First Phaso (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations. When direoted by the commanding offlcers of the various forces, they will proceed at the proper time to the pre-operation rendezrous and wait in readiness.
(2) All forces will be on strict lookout for unexpected attacks by the American, British and Netherlands forces.

## 278/242/den

(3) The commanding officers of the various forcos may carry out such secret roconnalssanoe as is espocially nocessary to tho operation.
(4) Purquant to defense plans, 4-Fleet will bogin mining the SLANN GUNTO.

Page
b. When the advanoe forces necessary for carrying out the operation have been dispatched to the area of operations, the order "Second Preparations Por War" will be lssued, and each foroo will aot in accordance with the following:
(1) Submarine forces attached to the Advaniood Expoditionary Foroo (SENKEN BUTAI), Task Force, Commerce Destruotion Unit, Southern Area Foroe and South Seas Foroe, ph orders from the ocmanding officers of the verious forcos, will proceed at the proper time to the area of operations.
(2) Remaining forces, on orders from the comnanding offacers of the various foroes, will proceéd so as to be in position for the outbreak of war.
O. After the required preparations for wat have beon madc, if the situation ohanges significantly, spooiflied forces may be returned from "Socond Preparations for War" to "First Preparations for War".
2. The outbreak of war and the use of arms thoretofore
a. The time for the outbreak of war (D Day) will be given in an Imperial General Headquartora crdor. The order will be given several days in advance. Aftor 0000 hours, D Day, a state of war will oxist. ' 'ach forco will comenco operations according to plan.

## b. If a serious enemy attack is received-before $D$ Day, the

 following measures will be takens(1) Forcos which are attacked will counterattack immediately. Bofore tho D Day orders ars issued, counterattacks by baso air forcos will depend on Imporial Geperal Headquarters Ordors.
(2) After the D Day ordcr is issuod, all foroos will onter'into' a state of war and begin operations without waiting: for apeeial orders.
(3) Prior to the issuance of the D Day order, the putbreak of war will depend on Imperial General Headquarters orders.'
c. After "Sacond Preparations for War" has been ordered, military force may be used in unavaidablo cases such as tho following:
(1) If American, British or Netherlands ships or airplanes approach the vicinity of our territorial waters and such action seems to croate a dnigor.
(2) If our forces, while on the move outside our torritorial waters, are invelved in positive cotions which appear to endanger them by forces of these countries.


4. Operation periods

Plret Phase (DaI ICHI DASt) Operations will be olassified as followe. Changos will be by special order.
a. Piret Perlod (DAI IKKI) Operations: This period will oover operations from the outhreak of war until the main body of the imvaition army has beon landed in the PHILIPPINRS.
b. Becond Periad (DAI KII KI) Operations: In genoral, operation from the Pirat Poriod (DAI IKKI) Operations until the main body of the invasion arry has been landed in British maLaya.
Q. Third Poriod (DAI SAY KI) Operations: Operations from the and of the seoond (DAI MI III) Period Oporations to the completion of the oooupation of the NETHBRLANDS EAST INDIES.
6. 422opation of foroes

Aleontion of foro.s durine the First Phaso (DAI ICHI D: in) Oporations will be sollows.
as Allooation of forees for First Period (DAI.IKKI) Operatione - Separate Tablo 1
b. Allooation of forcos for Socond Period (DAI MI KI) Operations - Separato Table 2
Q. Allpoation of forcos for Third Poriod (DAI SAN KI) operations - Separato Iable 3
d. Allocation of foroos for intorception oporations soparato Table 4

Page

$2 / 21$
D. Seoond Phase (DiI III Diss) Operations

1. Operation polioy
a. The Advanaed Expeditipnary Force (SENTKFN BUTAI) will continue to maice reconnaisaance ralds. On the Amerioan and British fleet!. These fleets will be attaoked by baso air forces, carrier eir forseng etc, at opportunc timos.
be. Amorican and British lines of operation and supply lines to the ORIEHT Will bo out in ordor to atrengthen the defenses of stratagic areas.
Q. Eniemy foyoos in the watere under our control and remnonite of the enemy in occupied areas will bo.moppod up in order to socuro repsources and protect sea traffio.
d. If the dmorican and Britich fleets attack, they

Pago
$2 / 22$ will bo doctroyod inilividually by taking advantage of inner linol of defone.
O. Oparations to dostroy Amorican and British soa traffic will bo intonsifiod.
2. Importantrpoints. whioh mast bo defended and advanoe beaes in ocoupiod torritory
a. Finportant points in opoupiod toretitory which ment be dofondod dire a foliothe:

MAITLA, DAVAO, SINGAPORTS BATAVIA, SOERABAJA,
 (In DAVAO and MEITADO emphastzad by blue potail otroies.)
(*1) etc:-
(1) kishū -8~

## 278/242/den

b. Idvanoo bases in oogupied torritory are oxpeoted to be ae follows:

KANIIA, SIMGAPORE, SOERABAJA
3. Areas expootod to ba oocupied or destrojod

Tho following ane aroas oxpooted to be oooupied or destroyed as quiokly as operational conditions permite
a. Eactorn NE GOMIRA, NIEM BRITAIM, FIJI and sAMOA
b. .alevithits and mimay
o. andman Islande
d. Stratogio points in the MUSTRALIA Area
4. Allocation of forcos

The allooation of foroos for Second Phase (DAI II DAB Operation is established in Separato Tablo 5 :-

The allooation of forces for interoeption oporationi will be based on Soparate Table 4.
E. Protootion of Soa Traffic, Dostruction of Enomy Sea Traffio and Mino inffare.

1. Oporations to protuct sca trafific

Soa traffie will bo protoctod as prescribed by forco oommanders, in cocordance wi Wartimo Comnoroo (1941), in addition to the following:

Pago 2/26

| 8ECTORS OF RÉSPONS IBILITY |  | 1. Ocatrol of ehi <br> 2. Mattors relato assignod sooto <br> 3. Gathoring and <br> 4. Contreol of 00 m within assiges <br> 5. Iseuing and $0 a$ - sootars |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Phtlippinos and Nothorlands East Indics Foree | Host of Long $136^{\circ} \mathrm{O} 2 \mathrm{E}$ (TN idd "axcluding thu deferso arca of 3 Besc Forco." $)^{1}$ South of Lat $20^{\circ} \mathrm{N}$ <br> South of a lino passing through tho northarn odgg of BRITISH BORNEO at an anglo of 315 |  |
| Malay Porco | South of a line passing through the northorn edge of BRITISH BCRINE at on anglo of $315^{\circ}$ | . - . |
| South Soas Force | East of Long $136^{\circ} 02^{2} E$ (TN Add "plus dofensc arcn of 3 Basc Forcc." $)^{1}$ Sca arca south of lat 24 OH | - |
| Northorn Foroo | Soa aren north of Lat $24^{\circ} \mathrm{N}$ Soa arca south of Lat $29^{\circ} \mathrm{N}$ |  |
| Othor Oporational Forcos | illd sectors of operation | Oomopration in <br> 1. Destruction of cporations <br> 2. Escort (Chior situation 05 <br> 3. Commonioati on |

$1_{\text {Editor's Notes }}$ Rovisod by "Errata" issucd by Flag Secretary, Combinor Flect as Combined y Part 99, datod 17 Nov 41, aboard the NUGATO, SAEKI WAN.

"Errata" issuod by Flag Secretary, Combiner Floct as Combined Fleet U2trasecret Cerial, fatod 17 Nov 11, aboard the Nagato, SAEKI WAN.

278/242/000

2. Oporations to dostroy soa traffic

## a. Policy

 soa traffio of the UIIITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLMSDS, combinod with a oheoking of onomy forcos, will aid our pripoipal oporations. Wo will ondoavor to orush tho onomy will to fight by gradually strcagthc:ai:ig our offorts aisi by reallsing our alms over a lomg pericd of time.b. Outlinc for uxocution
(1). Scizure of onomy ships at tho outbroat of wass Enomy ships will bo soizod, providod that our principal oporations ase not thoroby inpaircd. Closo liaison will bo maintainod with Imperial Copioril Hoadquartors and with homoland combat forces (BAISEN BUThI). Sootors of rosponsibility for caoh unit, in obsorvation and soizuro of onoray ships, will corrospond in genoral to scotors of responisibility in 1. "Oporations to protoot soa traffic".
(2). The Caninoroc Dostruction Unit, as prosoribod
ond of Firat Poriod (DAI IKKI) Oporations of Fixst Phaso (DiI ICBI DAIf) Oporations, will bo assignod as directed by Sc,uthorm Foroo Commandor to dostruotion of soa traffic off the south coast of JiVA and at the wostorn entranco to the MaLaCCi Straits. When southeo orn First Phaso (DAI ICHI D 2 M ) Oporations aro oonplutod, thoy will oarry out a vigorous compaign of dostruction of soa traffic in the IMDIAN Oocan and RUSTRRLII Aroas.
(5). In tho pause after First Phase (DNI ICHI DAM) Oporations or when opportunitios arise during oporations, forces for dostroying soa traffic will be strengthonod and will oporato vigorously with surfaco ships and airplanes.
3. Mino warfare

Oambinod Floot mino warfuro will be dirootod by individual foroo commandors, in addition to conformance with tho following:
$2 / 30$
a. Southorn area of operations
(1). Standard practices in offensivo minc warfaro Apponded Table 1
(2). (Standard) Sumenary of bases to be protected by mines and antisubmarine nots - Appended Tabio 2
(3). Sumary of mine and antisubmarinc supplies Appondod Tablo 3

$$
1
$$

Appanded Table 2.

STANDARD PRACTICES IN OFFENS IVE MINE WARFARE IN THE 8004LHE AREA OF OPERATIONS
a．First Period（DAI IKKI）Operations of First Phase（DAI ICHI DAN）Operations．

|  | SEA AREAS TO BE | TINE | FORCES TO BS USED | NUSER OF MIM <br> TO BE LAID |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Area outaide MAIILA Bay | $\begin{aligned} & D-1=D \\ & D+6=D+8 \end{aligned}$ | One submarine from SubRan 6 （first stage） （seoond atage） | Approximatoly 80 ； |
|  | balabac Straits | $\begin{aligned} & D-2-D-1 \\ & D+6=D+10 \end{aligned}$ | One aubmarine from SubRon 6 （firat atage） <br> One submarine from SubRon 6 （second stage） | More than 80 |
|  | SAN BRRRADINO straits | D＋8－D＋6 | Sec 1 of Mine Layer Div 17 | $300 \text { to } 600$ |
|  | surero Straits | $D+3=D+6$ | Sec 1 of Mine Layer Div 17 | 300 to＇500 |
|  | sULU Sea 8IPIT Straits | D＋10 |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Approdimately } \\ & 500 \end{aligned}$ |
|  | SULU Sea <br> palilans <br> 8traits | D＋10 | 1 or mine Layer Div 17 | $\begin{gathered} \text { Apprexaimatoly } \\ 800 \end{gathered}$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 多 } \\ & \text { 年 } \\ & \text { 安 } \end{aligned}$ | 8INGAPORS 8traits $\therefore \quad$－ | $\begin{aligned} & D-1 \text { - } D \\ & \text { about } D+12 \end{aligned}$ | Two submarines of SubRon 6 （first atage） <br> One submarine of SubRon 6 （second atage）． | Approximatoly 180 |
|  | Waters southo cast of MALAYA （betwoen TIO－ MAN and DJIMNA） | $\begin{aligned} & \text { D-1 }-D \\ & \text { about } D+10 \end{aligned}$ | One mine layer of 9 Base Fotoe | $\begin{gathered} \text { Approsimately } \\ 600 \end{gathered}$ |
| \％ | MATUIA Channel JESSELLTON corivas | $D=1-D$ <br> about D＋11 | Ship No 3 of wine Layer Div 17 |  |

sTABDARD PRACTICES IN OFFENSIVE MINE WARFARE IN THE SOUIHERN AREA OF OPGRATIONS
I) Operations of First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN)Oporations.

| 18 | FORCES TO BE USED | NUMBER OF MINES TO BE LAID | REMRKS |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| +8 | One submarine from SubRon 6 (first stage) (second stage) | hpproximately 80 | To hinder passage of enemy ressels. |
| $\frac{1}{410}$ | One submarine from SubRan 6 (first atage) <br> One submarine from SubRon 6 (second stage) | More than 80 | Io hinder passage of onery vessels. |
| $+8$ | Sec 1 of Mine Layer Dir 17 | 300 to 600 | 1. To hinder passage of enemy oruisers, deetroyers, or submarines. 2. Mooring cables will be strengthened to withstand atrong tidal ourrents. |
| 18 | Sec 1 of mine Layer Div 17 | 300 to 600 | To hinder passage of enemy oruisers, destroyers or submarines. |
|  | 8001 of Mine Layer Div 17 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Approximately } \\ & \$ 00 \\ & \text { Approximately } \\ & \$ 00 \end{aligned}$ | Mines will be laid aocording to the enemy situation and as deoided by Southern Foros Commander. |
| +12 | Two submarines of SubRon 6 (firet stage) <br> One submarine of SubRon 6 (second stage). | $\begin{gathered} \text { Approximatoly } \\ .130 \end{gathered}$ | To hinder passage of enery oruisers. destreoyers or submarines. |
| +10 | One mine layar of 9 Base Fotoe | $\begin{gathered} \text { Approximately } \\ 600 \end{gathered}$ | To hinder passage of enemy oruisers, dostroyers or submarines. |
| $+12^{*}$ | 8hip No 3 of Mine Layer Div 17 | $\begin{gathered} \text { Approximately } \\ 650 \end{gathered}$ | To hinder passage of enemy oruisers, destroyers or submarines. |

## Pago <br> 2/34 <br> 2/36 <br> Appondod Tablo 1 (Contimod)

 ARTBA OF OPZBATIOM8
b. Sooond Pariod (DAI KI KI) Oporations of First Phaso(DAI ICHI DAN) Oporations

|  | SEA LIEAS TO BE MINED | TIME | FORCES TO BE USED | $\begin{array}{r} \text { NUMGRR OF } \\ \text { TO BE L } \end{array}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Morth antrinoc to 8ORRABAJA | About D\$25 | Submarinos from SubRon 6 | $\begin{gathered} \text { Approaima } \\ 40 \end{gathered}$ |
|  | Entranoe to SINGAPORE Straits. and sea aroas south of malaya. |  | One mine layor of 9 Baso | Approuima |
| \% |  |  | Ship No 3 of Mino Layor Div 17 |  |

O. During and aftur Third Period (DiI IKKI) Operations of First Phase (D.I ICHI DAN) O

|  | $\begin{gathered} \text { 8EA } \operatorname{CREAS} \text { T } \\ \text { MNRD } \end{gathered}$ | TIXE | C FCRCES TO BE OSED | TUTBER OF TOBR L |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | PORT DARMIN | As quickely as possiblo | Mino layors of. Mine Laycr Div 17 | 300 |
|  | Importont points in AUSTRALIA | As soon as opportunities present thomsolvos | Ono or two submarines fram SubRon 6 Ono mine layer from Mino Layer Div 17 | Suitable nt |
| 苔気 | RANGOON COLOMBO BCIBiIY | As soon as possiblo after cocupation of SINGAPORE | One or two submarinos from SubRon 6 | Suitable m |

 ARBA OE OPTRATIOMS

KI) Oporations of First Phaso(DAI ICHI DNN) Oporitions

| : 1 TINE | FORCES TO BE USED | NUMEER OF MINES TO BE LAID | REMARKS |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| about D $\$ 25$ | Submarinos from SubRon 6 | $\begin{gathered} \text { Approximatoly } \\ 40 \end{gathered}$ | Aimed at light oruisors and othor vessela of similar and shallowor draughts |
|  | One mine layor of 9 Baso Forco <br> Ship No 3 of Minc Layor Div 17 | $\begin{gathered} \text { Approximately } \\ 500 \end{gathered}$ | 1. To provant onamy passago . <br> 2. To intensify mine warfaro of First; Poriod (DAI IKKI) Operations. |

Period (DAI IKKI) Operations of First Phasc.(DKI ICHI DhN) Operations

| TITE | , FORCES TO BE USGD | $\begin{aligned} & \text { NUMBER OF MINES } \\ & \text { TO BE LAID } \end{aligned}$ | Fomicks |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| As quitokly as possiblo | mino layors of Line Layor Div 17 | 300 | To hindor passage by the onomy |
| As soon as opportiunities prosent thomsolves | Ono or two submarines fram SubRon 6 Ono mine layer from Mino Layer Div 17 | Suitable numbers | 1. To hindor passago by the enemy. <br> 2. Type 88 minom will be laid. |
| As soon as possiblo after cooupation of SIICAPORB | One or two submarinos from SubRon 6 | Suitable numbers | 1. To hinder passaga by the ancmy. <br> 2. Type 88 minos. will be laid. |

## Appandod Table 2

 ANISSUBMARINE NETS

| AREAS TO BE MINED |  | OBJECT | TIME | $\begin{gathered} \text { FORCRS } 20 \mathrm{BS} \\ \text { UBED. } \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| PHILIPPINES Arca | LINGAYEN COLF | To provant entry by anomy submarines | It timo of londing | 2 Baso Poroo |
|  | RIMSON GULF | " | " | 1) Baiso Foroo |
|  | DAVio <br> (DUManquilas <br> Bay as oondi- <br> tions roquirc) | " | As quiakly as possiblo |  |
|  | ravila bay | " | . ${ }^{\text {n }}$ | One olement of 2 Besc Foroo |
|  | CAMRANH Bay | " | To bo oomploted bofore outbreak of war | 9 Baso Poroo |
|  | tarakin | n | Immodiately aftor invasion | 1 Base Foroo and 8001 of |
|  | BALIKPAPAN | " | " |  |
|  | MACASSAR | To provant entry by enomy ships | " |  |
|  | SOERABAJA |  | n |  |
|  | AIBON and KCEPANG | " | " |  |
|  | batavia | " | " | 2 Baso Foroc |
|  | Susidi Straits | To hindor passage by the ancry | " | Sec 2 of hino <br> Layer Div 17 |
|  | Area outsido sIncapore bay | To provent entry by onory submarinos | Immodiately aftor landing | 9 Base Foroe and Shap Ilo 3 of Mine Layer Div 17 |
|  | Malacca Strazts | To hinder passago by the enamy | - $n$ |  |

(STANDARD) SULAMRY OT BASES TO BE PROTEOTED BY HARES AID ANIISUBMARINE HETS

| AREAS TO BE MINED |  | OBJECT | TIIE | $\begin{gathered} \text { FORCES } 2082 \\ \text { USED. } \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| PHIUIPPITISS Arca | LINGAYEN GULF | To provant entry by anomy submarincs | It timo of liending | 2 Bano Poreo |
|  | RIMON GULF | 1 | " | i:Baso Foroo |
|  | DAVia <br> (DUMLNQUILAS <br> Bay as oondi- <br> tions roquiro) | " | As quiakly as possiblo |  |
|  | Mantu bay | " | . $n$ | One oldencat of 2 Basc Foroo |
|  | CAMRANH Bay | " | To bo comploted bofore outbreak of war | 9 Baso Porce |
|  | TARAKIN | $n$ | Immodiatoly aftor ipvasion | 1 Base Poroc and $S c o l$ of |
|  | BALIKPAPAN | n | " | Div 17 |
|  | macassur | To provont entry by enomy ships | " |  |
|  | SOERABAJA | " , | " |  |
|  | AMBON and KCSPANG | 1 | " |  |
|  | BATAVIA | . $n$ | " | 2 Baso Forco |
|  | surdi straits | To hinder passage by tho enamy | " | Suo 2 of Mino <br> Layer Div 17 |
|  | Area outside SINGAPORE BAy | To prevent ontry by onomy submarinos | Immodiatoly aftor landing | 9 Base Foroe and Ship Ho 8 of Mine. Layer Div 17 |
|  | MLACCA Strazts | To hinder passago by the enomy | ' |  |

(SIANDARD) : SUMAMRY OF BASES TO BE PROTECTED BY MINES AND aNISUBMARINE NETS

| BJECT | TIME | FORCBS TO : WSED | $\begin{aligned} & \text { NUBER OF MINES } \\ & \text { TO BE LAD } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { ANTISUBMARINE } \\ & \text { NESHS } \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| fat ontry by bymarines | At timo of landing | 2 Bawo Foroo | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Approximatoly } \\ & 900 \end{aligned}$ | As suitablo |
| " | " | 1 Reiso P'oroo | $\begin{gathered} \text { Approximately } \\ 820 \end{gathered}$ | . |
| n | As quiakly as possiblo |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { Approximatoly } \\ 500 \end{gathered}$ | $n$ |
| " | n | Ono alcimont of 2 Basc Forco | $\begin{gathered} \text { Approximatoly } \\ 900 \end{gathered}$ | " |
| n | To bo oamploted bofore outbreak of war | 9 Basc Foroo | 680 |  |
| in | Immodiately aftor ipvasion | 1 Base Forco and Soc 1 of Mine Layor Div 17 | 200 |  |
| " | " |  | 800 |  |
| cont outry by hips | " |  | 300 | As auitablo |
| $\cdots \quad 1$ | n |  | 1,00n |  |
| " | H |  | 300 |  |
| " | " | 2 Baso Foroc | 600 |  |
| dor passago chery | 1 | Seo 2 of kino Layer Div 17 | 750 |  |
| vout ontry by submarinos | Immediatoly aftor landing | 9 Base Foroe and ship No 3 of Mine Loyer Div 17 | 900 | As suitable |
| hdor passago oncum | n |  | 400 |  |

SUMARY ©F MURE AND AIMIISUBMARINE SUPPLIES

| SUPPLT RASES | SCPPLIES |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| MaK0 | ```Type 93 Mirfes - approximately 4,000 Type 88 Mines - approximatcly 220 (an additional }220\mathrm{ until about March 1942) Aptisubmarine nets for 2 Base Unit (KOsKYOCHI) - one set``` | - |
| PAIAT | Type 93 Mines - approximately 4,000 <br> Antisubmarine nets for 1 Base Unit (KONKYOCHI) - one set |  |

Appended Table 4
OUTLINE FOR ESTABLISHING YINE BARRIERS AT THE END OF SOUTHERiN FIRST PHASE (ICHI DAN) OPERATIONS
1
6
6
When the southern First Phase (ICHI DAN) Uperations end, mino barriers will be laid, as shown blow. By moking the sOUNH CHMA Sea safe, surface patrol will te facilitated. These operatioas will depend an special orders.

| SEA AREAS TO $\underset{\substack{\text { MTNED }}}{ }$ | NUMBER OF MINISS TO BE IAID | FORCES TO BE USKD | REMARKS |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CARIMATA and CASPAR Straits | 5,000 | 9 Base Force Ono element of Mine Layer Div 17 | To prevent penetration by eneury submarines |
| Sund Straits | 600 | 2 Base Force | In prevent penotration by enemy submarines First stage mine warfare will be intensified. |
| Mhutical straits | 1,000 | 9 Base Foroe | $\cdots \cdots$ |

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F. Communications

1. Polloy

Comblnod Moot operational communicatione aro based on Combinod Moot Wirolese Oommunioations Regilations and on the Joint
 In addition, thoy will conform to tho lollowing provisions.

## 2. Dispositions for commanications

## a. Dispositions at the outbronk of war

 Ship, aubmarine and airplane communioations - AppendTable 1 (baice) oosmumioations - Appended Table 2 (refer to appendod
ohavt)

These diapositions will be ohenged in the future to meot batitle oonditions: The respeotive foroe oommanders will change the diapositions for bubmarine and alrplane oommunications at noode artse.
b. Times for talding up assigmonts at the outbreak of war are ae followe:

| OLABSIFICATIOS | TIM8 | REFMRES |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Comminicetions Onit Commilsoations | $\begin{gathered} 2400 \text { hes, } \\ \mathrm{D}=0 \end{gathered}$ | Aftor 2400 hrs, D-2 and until speoially designated, 2 China Bupeditionary Feot pnd Bainan Guard District will be in the ship communications systam. |
| Bhip Communioations | 2400 hrs, |  |
| Bubmarine Communi- oationim | D $\sim 6$ |  |
| Alrpiane Communt:cations | $\begin{gathered} 2400 \mathrm{hrl}, \\ \mathrm{D}-3 \end{gathered}$ |  |
| Communioations for Speoially Designated Porcea | By speotal orders |  |

## Motan:

1. For forcos whioh muat take up thoir asaignmente before the times.set forth in this table, the respective force oommandore will determine the time and report it to the proper authorities.
2. In come oases, one elemont will take up 1ta asaignmont at a time differing from that of the remainder of the foroc.

## 8. Compunications proceduro

Page

2/48
a. Broadcasting will be the prinoipal means of communioation Within an operational force. doknowledgment will be required when there is unoertainty concerning recolpt of the meseage or when oonfirmation is required because the message is espeoiaily important.
b. Each force, at the direotion of its commanding officer, will oome into the ehortwrange oommuications system of the nearest commmications unit (TM Add Mand into its broadcast oommunications syetom."). ${ }^{1}$ (In oases of speoial nocessity, it will come into the long-range communiontions eystome) Communications doaling with transportation, supply, personnol and other communications not urgent from the atandpoint of operations usually will oome under this
Editor's Hotes Revised by "Rrrata" 1esued by Flag Saoretaryo Canbinod Floot as Combinod Fluet Ultrasocrot Sorial 1 Part 99. datur 17 Iov 41, aboard tho whenve, SARM Tillo.

$$
-17=
$$

communications aystom. The Task Porco. Commcroo Destruotion Unit and other forces operating on specici missions at great diatanose, when they set out from their rendesvous, will oome under apeoially designated communications systoms contorod around the sokyo conmunications Unit (TOTSU).
o. All communications units will relay to the proper outhoritios communioations of operational forcos within their reapeotive arean. Helay usually will be by broadoant, and aoknowledgmente will be required when confirmation of recelpt is eapeoially needed. Relaye of messages olassified urgent or highor will be broadoant immediately, other important meseages at the times indicatod in Paragraph d, below.

| Commaricarions unit | COMMUNICATIONS TO BE RELATED |
| :---: | :---: |
| Tokyo Oominimications Onit | Comunioations of Task Forcos , Cemmeree Destruotion Onit and other forcos undor apooially dosignated communications eystoms |
| Takao Communicatione Tnit | Communications of submarine and airplenes under Southern Foroe |
| 3 Communioations Unit | Communications of SubRon 5 and of adrplanes basod in PALAU within Southorn Poroo |
| 81 Communicationa Untt | Communications of airplanes and submarines operating in the SOUTH CHIHA Soa hrea: |
| 5 Communioction Onit | Communications of submariacs and airplanos under South Sece Foroe |
| 6 Commmiostions Onit | Communioations of Advanoed Bxpeditionary Poroo (8ENKEEN BUTAI) aubmarinoa |
| Hote: <br> Frequenoies to be u there is no danger of in of forces, frequencies | d in broadcasts will be as show in $d$. When orforing with the oporational communications ehips may be used. |

d. $4 l l$ oommonioatif. Foroo commandors will uso the broadoast faalitiongos as prosoribod by the farco commandors.

| COMWNICATIONS UNITS | , 1 ES |
| :---: | :---: |
| Takyo Commmications Unit (TOTSU) | -008: <br> ariginating with the Magehip originating with contral (TN ians Unit.) |
|  | cootod to advancod oxpoditionary |
|  | potod to SubRon 4 and SubRon 5 |
| Takao Communications Unit (TAKATSU) | ing with oparations diroctod $\cdot \cdots$ |
|  | ctod to submarino forces of |
| 8 Communioations Unit (TSU) | ing with operations dir octod horn Force |
| 81 Communioations Unit (2sV) | fing with oparations direotod otod to submarinos of subkon |
| 6 Communioations Unit (TSU) | oted to South Seas Force and to (SEN KEN BUTAI) |
| 5 Commonioations Onit (Tsi) | oted to south seas Force and to II SHOTO |
| Nates: <br> 1. All cammaicati <br> 2. After D-2 broad <br> 3. Aoknowlodgnont, and by the methi <br> 4. Tokyo Commonioa: at night, and bi <br> 5. As the aituatios the respeotive i <br> 6. Suitablo changei notifiod in advi | ir transmisaion has been completod <br> inits will transmit on one frequacoy des. <br> fio ors of the foroes operating in <br> lses tho proper authorities will be |
| Notes The symbol * inc |  |

## Pago <br> $2 / 46$ 2/47 2/48 2/49

d. 111 oommunications mits will brondoast important dispatohes dealing with oparations in the broadoast facilitios of the commioations units for ocumunicating within their respective ar oommanders.


Nates:

1. All commanications units will relay broadcast Tokyo Commenications Unit ahortarevo broad

- 2. After D-2 broadcast commuications will be given pormancent numbors.

3. Acknowlodgmont will be sent in cases of special necessity. (In these casos, acknowle and by the method used for exchange of strategic information.)
4. Tokyo Commanications Unit (TOTSU) and Takao Commmieations Unit (TAKATsU) will transmit at night, and between 1000 and 1600 hours, depending on circuimstanoes, they will make
5. As the situation demands, times of broadcast may be ahanged in accordance with request. the respeotive areas.
6. Suitable changos in broadoasting froquancios may be made by the commaications units in notifl od in advance.)

Note: The symbol * indioates an exact ROMAJI translitaration of the eriginal KANA.
patches dealing uith operations in accordance with the following table. Foroo coumandore will uso mioating within thir respeotive areas. Each force will reoeive messagos al prosoribod by tho farco

|  | BROADCAST. REQUENCIES | MESSATES |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\begin{array}{r} 4,175 \mathrm{Kc}\left(\begin{array}{ll} \text { YON } & 14 \\ 8,350 \mathrm{Kc} \\ 16,700 \mathrm{Kc}(\mathrm{KO} & 15 \end{array}\right) \\ 16) \end{array}$ | Diroctod to all oparating forcos: <br> 1. Important commications originating with the flagehip of CinC Combinod Floct <br> 2. Important commiontions ori ginating with catral (TN Prosumably contral Commanications Unit.) <br> 3. : Gonoral situntion |
| 38 <br> 38 | 1,744 Kc | Comnninications, as above, dirootod to advancod oxpoditionary (SENKEN) submarines |
|  |  | Commonications, as above, dirootod to SubRon 4 and SubRon 5 |
|  | $\begin{array}{r} 7,155 \mathrm{Kc}\left(\begin{array}{ll} \mathrm{SA*} & 27) \\ 24,310 \mathrm{KC} \\ \mathrm{SA*} & 28) \end{array}\right. \end{array}$ | Important commanications doaling with oparations diroctod to Southorn Force |
|  | Frequencies uned by SubRon 5 and 8ubRon 6 | Importont cormunicatians'dirootod to submarino forces of Southom Forco |
|  | $\begin{array}{r} 7,280 \mathrm{Ko} \text { (M* } 31 \text { ) } \\ 14,560 \mathrm{Kc} \text { (M* 32) } \end{array}$ | Importnnt communications dealing with operations dirctod to そastorn irca Forec of Southorn Force |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & 7,315 \mathrm{Ko} \\ & 14,630 \mathrm{KO}(\mathrm{kr} *, 78) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | Important commanications doalfing with oparations dirootod to South China Sea isca Forco. |
|  | Frequencie: used by SubRon 4 | Important conimunicaticos direoted to submarinos of subRon 4 |
|  | $\begin{array}{r} 5,950 \mathrm{Ko}(\mathrm{KA} * 12) \\ 11,900 \mathrm{Ko}(\mathrm{KA} * 12) \end{array}$ | Important oommenications direoted to South Seas Force and to idranced Expeditionary Foroc (SAN KEN BUTAI) |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & 4,860 \mathrm{Ko}(\mathrm{KA} \\ & 9,720 \mathrm{Kc} \text { (Kん 62) } \end{aligned}$ | Important communications directod to South Secs Force and to farces operating in the NinSEI SHOI' |

mannications Unit shortarvo broadoast conmunications.
nent numbers.
ssity. (In these casos, acknowledements will be sent 16 minutos after transmisaion hos been completed mation.)

Fions Unit (TAKAISV) will transmit an presoribed frequencies. Other unitswill transmit. on one frequacoy m circuinstances, they will make cambined use of their daytime frequendes.
anged in accordanoe with requests or as directed by the commencing offioers of the forces operating in
de by the commanications units in aocordanoe with neods. (In such aases tho proper authorities will be
of the eriginal KNNA.
operations in accordance with the following table. Foroc commandors will uso paling operations in accordance with the following table, forec commandors will wo

ons Unft shortanvo broadoast communications.
Prs
in the cases, ackowledenents will be sent 15 minutos after transmisaion has been completed
(TAKA WiN) will transmit an presoribed frequencies. Other units wilil transmit. on one frequanoy tances they will make cambined use of their daytime frequendes.
poocdipee with requests or as directed by the commencing offioers of the foroes operating in
commandations units in aocordanoe with noeds. (In suoh aases tho proper authorities will be
tiginal xiva. c. Whon the Main Body is in tho homoland aroe, tranamiasinn from tho flugehip of Commander in Chiof, Combined Floet will control the tramamision facilition of the Tokyo and Kuro Communiontione Onit, (TOTSD, KURESSM), or tho molyo Commanioations Unit ( $20 \mathrm{Ts} \mathrm{Ji}^{\prime}$ will ho assigned this work.

## f. Communications outaido tho fleets

Froopt in casos of apeoial urgenoy, oommuniontions will bo offooted by means of the communioations gystom through the noarost commaniontions unit.
4. Safoguarding oommunications
a. Safeguarding froquenoios

Combined Fleet Ulitraseorot Ordor 177, 8tandard Control of Frequonoios Used During Operations, will be applied.
b. Safoguarding mossagee
(1) Code tables and oall signe to bo uecd are given as followes Combined Floet Ultrasearet Order 171; Use of Codess Combined Floet Ultrasoorot Standing Order 52, Table or Combingd Floet Speoial Wartine Call signes Combined Fieot Ulitraseorot Order 109, Abbrevieted Call signs for Exohange of Stretegio Information; Combined Floot Uitrascoret Order 1/9, rable of symbols Indioating Enorgonoy Classifioctions for Speoial Comhinod Flcot Commioations.
(2) Mothode of safoguarding and distinguishing

Pago
2/61 deooptive aispatches: Combined Fheot Ultraseoret Stianding Order 49, Methods of Safoguarding and Distinguishing Deooptivo Dispatohes.
(3) Mothod of indicating detes: Combined Fleot Stunding Order 51, Table of Combinod Flect Spocial Abbreviations for Dates.
(4) Mothods for indicating plaoc names are as follows:

| WNINS METECD | ABBREVIATED MNACS | REFEREANCES |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Mothod 1 for indicating places | CHIHE* 1 | Navy Ministry Ailitary Most Soorut Sorial 167, Naval Aviation Military Placo Codo Tablue will be usod in accordance with what is presoribed in Abbreviated Codes for Opcrational Comranications and in. Codo Book $G$. |
| Mothod 2 for indicating ploces | CHIHE* 2 | Thoso proscribod in $K \overline{0}$, and orsU abbroviatod codes for naval operational ab- |
| Mothod 3 for indicating places | CHIHE* 3 |  |
| Kethod 4 for indicating places | CRIHE* 4 |  |
| Method 5 for indicating places | CHIES* 5 | Navy Military Ultrasccrot Sorial 586, Regulations for tho Uso of Pacific Occan Military Place Maps; and Navy Military Ultrascorat Sorial 347, Pacific Ocuan Military Placc Kaps. |
| Yothod 6 fre indicating pla.00s | CHIHIS* 6 | Navy Ministry Militery Most Socret Sorial 167, Natal Aviation Military Place Code Tables (Tho use of aode tables will bo as shown in tho notes.) |
| Method 7 for indicating placos | CHIHE* 7 | In accordencc with Naval Ceneral staff Vilitary Ultraseeret SGrial 123, Regulations for the Use of Paciffc ocean Special lilitary Place Map and Special Bilitary Maps. |
| Mothod 8 for indicating places | CHIHE* 8 | Navy Ministry 道litary Most Socret Sorial 165, Chart Indicating Protectod Commoroo Soctiors. |
| Mothod 9 for indicating places | CHIHE* 9 | Combinod Fleut Ultraseoret Order 175, Combinud Fleet Emergenoy Wortime Method for Indicating Placos. |
| Method 10 for indicating places | CHIHE* 10 | Naval Goncral Staff Military Most-Searet Serial 144, abbrevintod Code Table far Specially Designated Placos. |
| Mathod 11 for indicating places | CH IEE* 11 | Combined Floet Abbreviated Code Table for Finergency Military Place Hames. |

Notes Use of Navy linistry Military Most Socrot Sorial 167, Naval Aviation Military Plaoe Codd

|  | Dovicos Uscd |
| :--- | :--- |
| A | Fran the lat to the 15th of odd-numberod months |
| B | From the l6th to the end of odd-numberod nonths |
| C | From the list to the 15th of evon-numbered months |
| D | From the l6th to the end of evonanumbered months |
| E | Reserve (Depending on spocial ordors) |

[^5] - \&1 -
hoc namos are as follows:

| ABEREVIATED Mames | REFERENCES | USE |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CHIBE 1 | Navy Ministry Military Most Socrut Sorial 167, Naval Aviation Military Placo Codo Tablue will be usod in aocordance with what is presoribed in Abbreviated Codes for opcrational commenioations and in. Codo Book G. | Used for urgant ship and airplane communioations |
| UHTHI* 2 | Thoso proscribod in $K \overline{0}$, and orSU abbrcviatod oodes for naral operational abbroviations and in Codo Book G. <br> Navy Military Ultrasucrot Sorial 585, Regulations for the Uso of Pacific Oocan Military Placo Maps; and Navy Military Ultrasccrat Sorial 347, Pacific Ocuan Military Placc Maps. |  |
| CHIRE** |  |  |
| CHIEB* 4 |  |  |
| Citime 5 |  | Uaed in gamoral oporations and in ship oommunications |
| CHIBE* 6 | Navy Ministry Military Most Socrot Sorial 167, Naval Aviation Military Place Codo Tablos (Tho use of aode tables will bu as shown in the notes.) | Used in airplane comminications |
| CHILE* 7 | In aocordancc with Naval General staff Kilitary Ultraseeret Serial 123, Regulations fre the Use of Pacific Ocean Special uilitary place Lap and Special BHiltary Maps. | 1. Used in joint Army-Navy operations <br> 2. Used in inshore engage monts |
| chineor 8 | Navy Ministry 通litary Most Socret Sorial 165, Chart Indicating Protectod Commorco Socturs - | Usod in peoteoting oumeroe |
| CHIHR* 9 | Combinod Fleet Ultrasecret Order 175, Combinud Fleet Energenoy Wartime Mothod for Indicating Places. | Emergency use of CHIHE* 5; used an speoial orders |
| CHIEB* 10. | Naval Goncral Staff Military Most Seoret Serial 144, $\Lambda$ bbreviatod Code Table for Speoially Designated Placos. | Used to indicatc places in messages |
| CHitico 11 | Combined Floet Abbreviated code rable for Energency Military Place Names. | Encrgenoy use of CHIHE* 10; used on apeoial orders |

itary Most Soorot Sorial 167, Naval Aviation Military Place Codo Tables

| Dovicos Uscd |
| :--- |
| From the lat to the 15 th of odd-numberod months |
| From the l6th to the end of odd-numberod ronths |
| From the lst to the 15th of evon-numbered months |
| From the l6th to the end of evon-numbered months |
| Reserve (Depending on spocial ordors) |

n exact kOMAJI transliteration of the original KANA.
a.sbl... \are

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Paje
$2 / 53$
5. Utilising and intorforing with onomy communioations
2. Utilizing eneny communications
(1) Intercept squads attached to each fleet will
utilize enemy communiontions as diroctod by the ommanders in ohief of the rospoctive fleets. uY:
(2) Intercept squads attoched to qommunioations units if will be'assigned to utilization of enemy communications in acoordance with the following:


Appended Tablo 1
Pago 2/67

8EIIP. AIRPLAMTE AND SUBMARINE COMMUICATIOMB

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { comonications } \\ & \text { 8ysira } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { COMANICATIONS } \\ \text { DISPOSIIIOM } \end{gathered}$ | Rrabitits |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Ship Communioations | Strategio Communications 2 (2 8ETSOH4*) <br> Frequency System 3 (DRMPA SOSHIKI) (8 TEN*) <br> Communi oation Classification 2 (2 MOX*) (Fleot or force coordinated communi cations) | 1. Ilagihip eormuniostions aystom fraquenoles usod maiply by the flagehip of the commander in ohiof of each floet and by the flagship of apeoially established aquadrons. <br> 2. Ordinary short wavo is used by the Plagehip of the commanding officer of a squadron and whon especialily needed by ordinary vessols. <br> 3. Froquonoies usod in ship communioations are mainly employod by Southorn Forco and those forces alosely connected with it. Othor forcos uso them for urgent oommunioations. However, when the Combined Fleet is talding up interoeption (YOGEKI) dispositions, their main use will no longor be rostriotod to the Southern Porce. <br> 4. Southorn Foroe oommmication olaseification is Claseification 3. |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { A1tplane } \\ & \text { Communications } \end{aligned}$ | Froquonoy System (DEMPA SOSHIKI) (4 T3HT*) |  |
| Submarine Communications | Frequency Systam 5 (DEMPA SOSHIKI) (3 TEMN: | The communications of Advanood Expeditionary Force (8EAKiss BUTAI) submarines will be dotermined by the oommanding officors of the Advanoed Expeditionary Force (SEHKEN BUTAL). |

## Note:

The use of day and night frequanoies will conform with Combined Moet Firoloss Regulations, as well as with the following:

In the main, night froquoncies will be unod. If reliability of oommulaations oannot be expeoted of night frequonoies only; day frequencies also will be usod.

Hute: The aymbol indioated the exnct ROMASI transiliteration of th criginel KANA.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { COMONICATIONS } \\ \text { SYSTEEI } \end{gathered}$ | GTTACHED SEIPS AND STATIONS | COMMUNICATIONS FREQUENCIES (KC) - |  |  |  | REMCRES |
|  |  |  |  | ORDINARY | SUPELEMCNTARY | ORDIMARY | SUPPL EJIEATIARY |  |
|  |  | Communications System 1 | Takao Communications Unit (TAKATSUT) <br> Tokyo Communioations Unit (TOTTSÜ) <br> 5 Cormunications Onit | $\begin{aligned} & 6,505(\mathrm{NA} * 5 \mathrm{C}) \\ & 3,010(\mathrm{NA} * 57) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 5,550(\mathrm{RE} * 51) \\ 11,100(\mathrm{RE} * 52) \\ 7,590(\mathrm{RE} * 75) \\ 15,180(\mathrm{RE} * 76) \end{array}$ | $5,505(\mathrm{NA} * 56)$ $13,010(\mathrm{NA} * 57)$ $5,550(\mathrm{RE} * 51)$ $11,100(\mathrm{RE} * 52)$ | $\begin{array}{r} 7,590(\mathrm{RR} * 75) \\ 15,180(\mathrm{RE} * 76) \end{array}$ | : |
|  |  | Communications System 2 | 3 Cowmunications Unit Takao Coxammications Unit (TAKATSUT) <br> 81 Communications Unit | $\begin{array}{r} 6,760(\text { TA*25) } \\ 13,520(\text { TA*26) } \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 7,155(\mathrm{TA} * 27) \\ 14,310(\mathrm{TA} * 28) \\ 7,750(\mathrm{RE*77}) \\ 15,500(\mathrm{RE} * 78) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 5,760(\mathrm{TA} * 25) \\ 13,520(\mathrm{TA} * 26) \\ 7,155(\mathrm{Ti} * 27) \\ 14,310(\mathrm{~T}: 2.3) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 7,750(\mathrm{R} * * 77) \\ 15,500 \text { (RB*78) } \end{array}$ |  |
|  |  | Conmunications System 3 | ```3 Cammunications Unit Tokyo Communications Dnit (TARATSÜ) 81 Communications Onit``` | $\begin{array}{r} 4,745(T 0 * 17) \\ 18,980(T 0 * 19) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 7,855 \text { (NA*33) } \\ 15,710\left(\begin{array}{l} \text { (NA*34) } \\ 7,315(R E * 73) \\ 14,630(R E * 74) \end{array}\right. \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 4,745(\mathrm{TO} * 17) \\ 15,710(\mathrm{NA} * 34) \\ 6,610(\mathrm{RE} * 61) \\ 17,220(\mathrm{RE} * 82) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 7,315(\mathrm{RE} * 73) \\ 14,630(\mathrm{RE} * 74) \end{array}$ | 6 Conmunications Unit will enter this communioations system in accordarce with special orders. |
|  |  | Commmications Sytam 4 | 3 Comunications Unit <br> 4 Communications Unit <br> 5 Communications Unit <br> 6 Communications Unit | $\begin{array}{r} 5,180(N A * 14) \\ 10,360(\text { (N:*15) } \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 7,290\left({ }^{(N L * 31)}\right. \\ 14,580(N \Lambda * 32) \\ 7,655(N L * 18) \\ 15,310\left(\begin{array}{ll} (N L * 12) \end{array}\right. \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 5,180(\mathrm{NA} * 14) \\ 10,360(\mathrm{NA} * 15) \\ 7,290(\mathrm{NA} * 31) \\ 14,580(\mathrm{NA} * 32) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 7,655(\mathrm{~N}: * 18) \\ 15,310(\text { N: }: 19) \end{array}$ |  |
|  |  | Communications Syatem $5^{1}$ | Hoinan Communications Unit (HAINANTSUT) <br> Takso Cormunications Unit (TAKATSÜ) <br> 81 Communications Unit | $\begin{array}{r} 7,01 \mathrm{C}(\mathrm{RE} * 71) \\ 14,020(\mathrm{RE} * 72) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 6,260(\mathrm{RE} * 61) \\ 12,520(\mathrm{RE} * 62) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 7,010(\mathrm{RE} * 71) \\ 14,020(\mathrm{RE} * 72) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 6,260(\mathrm{RE} * 61) \\ 12,520(\mathrm{RE} * 62) \end{array}$ |  |
|  |  | Coumunications System 6 | Chichi Jima Cowmunications Unit (CHICHITSÜ) <br> 5 Coxmunications Unit Marcus Island | $\begin{array}{r} 5,725 \text { (RI*14) } \\ 11,450(\text { RI*15 }) \end{array}$ | $4,925(R E * 41)$ $9,850(R E * 42)$ | $\begin{array}{r} 5,725(\mathrm{RI} * 14) \\ 11,450(\mathrm{RI} * 15) \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 4,925(\mathrm{RE} * 41) \\ & 9,850(\mathrm{RE} * 42) \end{aligned}$ |  |
|  |  | Commuications System? | Óminato Communications <br> Onit ( $\overline{T S T} \overline{\text { I }}$ ) <br> Tokyo Coumunications Unit <br> (TOTSU) <br> (PARAMOSHIRO) <br> (Yokoauka Communications <br> Tnit) (yarnonsit | $\begin{array}{r} 5,925(\mathrm{YO} * 17) \\ 11,350(\mathrm{YO} * 18) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 6,300(\text { (TAN } * 23) \\ 12,600(\text { TAN* } 223) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 5,925(\mathrm{YO}+17) \\ 11,850(\mathrm{YO} * 18) \end{array}$ | $\begin{gathered} 6,300(\text { TAN } * 23) \\ 12,600(\text { TAN } * 22 \mathrm{~S}) \end{gathered}$ |  |



## Appended Tablo 2 (Continued)

Nutess:

1. The timen of communioations will be as usual unlose spooially determinod.
2. When sending and recoiving conditions betwoen shipa and stations in the same systom are poor, an intermodiate commundioations unit will be reaponsible for relay.
3. Unless otherwise ordered, Disposition 1 will' bo used. Subsequent alterations in dispositions or Proquenoies will be as presoribed by the Commancing Offioer, 1 Combined Communication Unit.
4. Communications unit (base) oommanicatione in ocoupiod territories, exoept where apeoially determinod, will be al presoribed by the commanding officer of oach foroe.
5. Roscrvo froquenoies

|  | $\begin{array}{r} 6,085 \\ 10,170 \end{array}$ | $(2 x+14$ (Tals |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 5,825 | ( T0*28) |
|  | 10,650 | (T0*24) |
|  | 5,225 | (8A*26) |
|  | 10,450 | (sa*20) |
|  | 4,205 | (H0*71) |
|  | 8,410 | ( $\mathrm{H} 0 \times 72$ ) |
|  | 16,820 | ( $\mathrm{HO*} 73$ ) |
|  | 4,030 | (R10+12) |
|  | 8,060 | (RE+12) |
|  | 16,120 | (RE*13) |
|  | 6,820 | (T0*51) |
|  | 18,040 | (T0*48) |
|  | 4,666 | ( 8 / 214 ) |
| $\therefore$. | 9,880 | (8A*15) |
|  | 18,660 | (8A*16) |
| Page | 6,180 | (20*48) |
| 2762 | 12,360 | (T0*44) |

Woter the symbol * indioates en exact RoMAJI transilitoration of the original KAMA.

## Pago 2／63

Ominato Communications

Hainat：Communioations Unit（HAINANTSU）


|  |  | （TN | Translation of |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 口 |  | р |  |
| IAF | Cincj 1 Air Fleet | 4F | Cinc 4 Fleet |
| $\frac{\text { 号 }}{\text { ¢ }}$ |  | $\frac{\rho}{5 F}$ | Cinc 5 Fleet |
| SS | Com Subrono | $\frac{P}{5 S}$ | Com Crubiv 5 |
| $\frac{\square}{\mathrm{SF}}$ | Cinc 6 Flect | $\frac{5 S}{\frac{5}{2}}$ | Cinc 2 Fleet |

278/242/otg

ICATIONS UNIT (BASE) COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

סminato Communications
Unit (OTSU)

Tolyo Communications Unit (TOTSUU)


Commmioations Unit (YOKOTSU).


System 1


Communioations System 7

## PNS UNIT (BASE) COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS


(TN Exact tracing fron the original dooument.)


## 278/242/des

Page
$2 / 65$
G. Supply

1. Supply policy
n. Generally, each ship will replenish its fuel when it falls below $60 \%$ of capacity. If battle is anticipated, however, every effort will be made to maintain capaoity.
b. Ordnance, ammuition, bombs rations and stores will be replenished to capaoity at every opportunity.
2. Outline of supply
a. The allotment of bases of operations for the inftial period of operations is established generally es follows:

4 Fleft, 5 Fleet, 6 Fleet - YOKOSUKA<br>1 Fleet, 2 Fleet, 1 Air Fleet, forces attached to Combined Fleet - KURE Page

2/66
11 Air Fleet. Southern Expeditionary Fleet, 3 Fleet SASEBO
b. The allotment of bases of opcrations and supply points to the supply vessels attached to oach force is established. generally as follows:

Main Body, Task Force, Advanced Expeditionary Foroe (SENKEN BUTAI), South Seas Force - YOKOSUKA, KURE and vicinity

Southern Force - MAKO, TAKAO, SASEBO and vioinity
Northern Force - YOKOBUKA, OMINATO and Fioindty
Commerce Destruction Unit - any suitable place
Page
$2 / 67$ enc.folinws: 0 . The allotment of supply hases is established generally
Northern Force - PAFAMUSHIRO, AKKESHI (*1), FAKKANAI CHICHI JIMA, MinRCOS Island

Soutii Seas Force
11 i
$\left.\begin{array}{l}\text { Soutii Seas Force } \\ \text { Advanceat Expeditionary }\end{array}\right\} \begin{aligned} & \text { SAIPAN, KWAJALEINT, } \\ & \text { WOTJE, JALUTT, }\end{aligned}$
Poroe (SEAKEN BUTAI) WOTJE, JALUIT. faroa, trok, ponape, palau (sseond Period (DAI NI KI) Operations and thereafter)

Southern Force - PALAT (until Firat Poriod (DAI IKKT) Operations have ended), SAIGON, CAMRANH

The initial full allowanoe for supply bases and speoial supply points is as determined in_Appended Table 1.
Page
$2 / 68$
d. As the operation develops, apecial supp? points (special stores devartanent and special air depot) will be set up in ocoupied areas. They will be under the direotion of the commanding officer of the forces in suoh areas. The following
(*) eto: -

## (1) 棌 岸

## 278/242/dos

- When tho forco commander boncerned finda it necoscary to chenge the inftial full allowance of the supply beso or apooial eupply point, he will make a report to Imperial Coneral Boadquarters and Comandor in Chiof, Combined Fleut and will notify the commanding offioer of the base of oporations. Bach month roports and notices will be submittod in this mannor concorning quantitios nocossary to roplonish stooke.
f. Commanding officors of supply bases and niff oere in - oharge of apoial supply points will maintain a ourront inventory of atocks and roquisition necosscry items from the basc of operations, taidne into oonsidorntion stocks oarried by the latter.

5. Porce commenders (or commendors in ohief of flieets) will indionto the quantitios and types of military stores which must be ourriod on tho supply ships. When supply ahips are dirootod to a basc of operations or to a aupply point in order to restock, they will notify tho onmmanding offioor of the bace (Tli Add "or supply point.") regarding time of arrival and quantities and typcs of matoriel requirod.
h. Whon storos on supply shipe have to bo replenished or supplemented, tho forco commander (or flost rummander in ohief) concernod will subanit a report inmediately to lmperial Genural Headquartors and to Commandor in Chief, Conibincd Fleat.
6. Bach foroc commandcr (or fioct ocmmancior in ohief) will sooure from the oommendine, officur of tiv: base of opcratiens the necessary information about the meruments of and the types and quantities of materiel oarried by supply ships which 2 re dispatohed as replacements of additions from the bnsc of opcretione or aupply base to the force (or fleet).
7. Repionishment of supply shipg and oupply tiasces various supply ships will not have to be restocked at ane timc. 8upply ships will be restocked one at a time rit a cupply beso or base of operations.
b. Supply bases and special supply points usually will be restooked by Imperini General Headquarters or the comannding officer of tho base of operations.

Speoial ordors will be issued to offect co-operation of supply ships of $n$ forco (or floct).

The monthly replenishment allewances for supply basos and spocial supply points are given in Appended Table 4.:
6. Proteotion of ships

When supply shipa are to be dispatehed, the force oomander (floet oonmander in chief) concorned will furnish suftablo proteotion by forming a oonvoy, charting the course and providing escort. Supply ships attaohed to the base of operations will be proteotod in like mannor.

[^6]locations have boen chosons

| (1) | davao |
| :---: | :---: |
| (2) | TARATAII |
| (8) | BALIKPAPAI |
| (4) | ManILA |
| (6) | Makassar |
| (6) | 80ERABAIL |
| (7) | SIngAPORE |
| (8) | batavila |
| (9) | pentang |

-. The various forces will be supplied by supply ships attaahod to thom.
f. If possible, supply basos will not be used to supply other than airplanes and emall vessela. In partioular, exoept in unavoidable cases, supply bases will not be used to repleniah atocks of supply ships.
g. Supplies and stores for forges which have advanced into oaptured aroas will bo unloadod and traneported by base forces (KOKKYOCHI) (TN "Base forcos" ohanged to "speoial stores departmont.") ${ }^{1}$ in oomperation with forces in the area.
time, the senior commanding offioer prosent will detormine priority. -
i. The assignment of supply ships is given in dappendod

Tablo 2.
J. The rondozvous and subsequont movemonts of suoply ohips atteohed to the Combinod Floot aro given in inppended Table 3.
3. Important supply matters
a. As shown in Appended Tablo 5, the Combined Fluet Supply Dept will diroct the over-all planning of supply for the Combined Fleet and will keop in contact with Imporial General Headquarters and each base of operations.
b. The organization of the supply departments of the (or fleot) commander. The supply departmonts of the various forcos (fleets) will supply the various.forces (floets) and will maintain contaot with Combined Floot Supply Dopt, each bese of operations and supply points.
c. When a force is suppliod by a supply ship attached to another force (fleet) or by a supply base, a roport will be sent to the commanding officer of the forco to which the ship is attaohed or to the commanding officer of the supply base.
d. When the oommandine officer of the supply base furnishes considerable quentitios and supplios to surface forces other than those for which ho is responsible, he will submit a roport on curront etooks to Imperial Genoral Bendquartors, the commanding officer of the base of operations and Commandor in Chief, Combined Fleot.

[^7]
## 278/242/dee

- When tho forco commander voncerned find it peceseary to ohpnge the initial full allowance of the supply base of
epooial supply point, he will make a roport to Irperial Coneral Hoadquarters and Commander in Chiof, Combined Fleot and will notify the commending officer of the bace of oporations. Each month roports and notices will be submittod in this manor concorning quantitioe nocossary to replonish stocke.
f. Commanding officorf of supply basee and officerit in 'aharge of apocial supply points will maintain a curront inventory of atocks and roquisition ncoossary itoms from the base of operations, taline into oonsiderntion stooke onrried by the latter.

5. Porce ommenders (or commendors in ohief of fleets) will indioeto the quantitios and types of military atores whioh met bo orrriod on tho supply ships. When supply ships are direotod to a base of operations or to a supply point in order to restook, they will notify tho onmending officor of the bace (Tli Add "or supply point.") rogarding time of arrival and quantities and types of matoriel reguirod. or supplumented, tho forco commander (or flant cummencler in ohief) concernod will submit a report inmediately to 1 mperial Genercal Beadquartors and to Commandor in ohief, Conbincd Fleat.
6. Bach force comnandcr (or fioct simmancior in ohief) will sooure from the commandine officur of ife: base of oparaticns the necessary information about the movomonts of and the types and quantities of materiel carried by supply ships which are dispatohed as replacements or additions from the basc of opcrations or aupply base to the force (or fleet).
7. Repionishment of aupply ships and aupply tizsces various supply shipe will not have to be restocked at one time. Supply ehips will be restocked one at a time Ric a cupply besc or base of operations.
b. Supply bases and speciel supply points usually will be restooked by Imperina General Heedquarters or the coianending officer of the base of operations.

Speoial orders will be issued te offect oo-operation of supply ships of $n$ forco (or floct).

The monthly replenishment allewances for supply basos and special supply points are given in Apponded Table 4.

## Page

 $2 / 75$
## 6. Proteotion of ships

When supply ships are to be dispatehed, the foroe commander (floet oommander in ohief) ooncerned will furnish suitable proteotion by forming a oonvoy, charting the course and providing escort. Supply ships attaohed to the baso of operations will be protootod in like manner.

[^8]
## Page

Appended Table 1 (gubetitutod for prorioun paro).

INITIAL FOEL ALLONANCES FOR SUPPLY BASES AND SPECLAL SUPPLY PC

| SUPPLY BASES AND 8PECIAL SUPPLY POINTS | HEAVY OIL (METRIC TONS) |  | COAL (NETRIC TONS) | AVIATION FUEL (KILOLITERS) |  | ORDIXARY BOMBS |  |  | LAND |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | ; | 201 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | BOILER OLL. | HBAVY OIL. |  | 92 | 87 | 80,50 | 25 | 6 | 80,50 |
| Paramushiro |  |  |  | 300 | 250 |  |  |  |  |
| AKKESHI | 5,000 | 5,000 |  | 1,100 | 1,000 |  |  |  |  |
| WAKKANAI | 3,000 | 3,000 | 2,000 | 100 | 200 |  |  |  |  |
| CHICHI JIMA |  | 200 | 2,00n |  | 100 |  |  |  |  |
| marcus island |  |  |  |  | 500 |  |  |  | - |
| SAIPAN | 10,000 | 2,000 | 10,000 | 4,000. | 3,500 | 30 | 200 | 160 | 0 |
| MIAJALSIM (RDOTTO*) |  |  |  | 2,500 | 100 | 27 | 140 | 1,200 | 54 |
| WOTJE ${ }^{\text {- }}$ |  |  |  | 3,000 | 1,500 | 167 | 140 | 1,300 | 70 |
| SALUIT (IMIEJI*) |  | 5,000 |  | 2,000 | 500 | 140 |  | 440 | 70 |
| taroa |  |  |  | 500 | 800 |  |  |  |  |
| TRUK |  | 2,000 | 5,000 | 1,500 | 1,200 |  | 250 | 1,000 |  |
| PONAPE |  | 2,000 | 3,000 | 800 | 100 |  |  |  |  |
| paiau | 10,000 | 1,000 | 6,000 | 4,000 | 2,000 | 126 | 240 | 1,080 | 120 |
| SAMA |  |  |  | 1,000 | 2,000 |  |  |  |  |
| SAICON and vicinity |  |  |  | 6,000 | 4,000 |  |  |  | 120 |
| CAMRANH |  |  |  | 1,000 | 1,000 |  |  |  |  |
| $X$ (maisila) |  |  |  | 500 | 500 |  |  |  |  |
| $x$ (DAVAO) |  |  |  | 1,000 | 1,000 | Part | $\begin{aligned} & \text { of } t \\ & \text { of } \end{aligned}$ | he neo Roroe: | sary res |
| X (TARAKAN) |  |  |  | 1,000 | 1,000, |  |  |  |  |
| O mako | 62,000 | 6,000 | 70,000 | 1,000 | 1,000 | Nece | sary | replen | shinents |
| ¢ TAKAO | 10,000 | 1,000 | 20,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 |  |  |  |  |

## Notes:

1. Ammunition and torpedoes are to be loaded on munition ships.
2. Mines will be handled as set for in Mining Operations, Appended Table 3 (TA Above.).
3. X indicates places where speoial supply points are to be established.

0 indicates supply points whose capacity mast be increased.
4. Expendable supplies like fuel (heavy oil, coal, aviation fuel) will be prepared.
5. At makX and WHAJALEIN one month's supply of air purifying material and oxygen will be pre 20,000, oxygen 2,800; KWAJALEDN - alr purifying mat rial 30,000 , oxygen 3,000 ).
Note: The symbol indicates an exact ROMAJI translíteration of the original KANA.

## 878/242/otg

## Lom meid

citill fusi allowasces for supply bases and special supply points

to be loaded on munition ships.
for in Mining Operations, Appended Table 3 (TA Above.).
ial supply points are to be ostablished. se oapacity must be increased.
(heavy oil, coal, aviation fuel) will be prepared.
th'a aupply of air purifying material and oxygen will be prepared (mako - air purifying matorial II - adr purifying mat rial 30,C00, oxygen 3,000 ).
ROMAJI transiliteration of the original RANA.

## Page

2/76

## Appended Table 1 (grbetitutod for provioun pari)

INITIAL FUEL ALLONANCES FOR SUPPLY BASES AND SPECLAL SUPPL

| SUPPLY BASES AND SPECIAL SUPPLY POINTS | HEAVY OIL (NETRIC TOMS) |  | COAL (METRIO TONS) | AVIATION FUEL <br> (KILOLITERS) |  | ORDINEXY BOMBS |  |  | 80,6 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | N01 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | BOILER OIL, | HESVY OIL. |  | 92 | 87 | 80,50 | - 25 | 6 |  |
| PARAMUSHIRO |  |  |  | 300 | 250 |  |  |  |  |
| AKKESHI | 5,000 | 5,000 |  | 1,100 | 2,000 |  |  |  |  |
| TAKKANA I | 3,000 | 3,000 | 2,000 | 100 | 200 |  |  |  |  |
| CHICHI JIMA |  | 200 | 2,00n |  | 100 |  |  |  |  |
| MARCUS ISIAND |  |  |  |  | 500 |  |  |  |  |
| SAIPAN | 10,000 | 2,000 | 10,000. | 4,000. | 3,500 | 30 | 200 | 250 | 0 |
| MTAJALEIN (RUOTTO*) |  |  |  | 2,500 | 100 | 27 | 140 | 1,200 | 54 |
| worss ${ }^{\text {c }}$ |  |  |  | 3,000 | 1,500 | 167 | 140 | 1,300 | 70 |
| JALUIT (IMIEJI*) |  | 5,000 |  | 2,000 | 500 | 140 |  | 440 | 70 |
| taroa |  |  |  | 500 | 800 |  |  |  |  |
| TRUK |  | 2,000 | 5,000 | 1,500 | 1,200 |  | 250 | 1,000 |  |
| PONAPE |  | 2,000 | 3,000 | 800 | 100 |  |  |  |  |
| Palaú | 10,000 | 1,300 | 6,000 | 4,000 | 2,000 | 126 | 240 | 1,080 | 120 |
| sama |  |  |  | 1,000 | 2,000 |  |  | - |  |
| SAIGON and vicinity |  |  |  | 6,000 | 4,000 | 00 |  |  |  |
| CAMRANH |  |  |  | 1,000 | 1,000 |  |  |  |  |
| $x$ (mansla) |  |  |  | 500 | 500 |  |  |  |  |
| $X$ (davao) |  |  |  | 1,000 | 1,000 | Purt | $\begin{aligned} & \text { of } t 1 \\ & \text { of atr } \end{aligned}$ | he noor | ssar |
| $x$ (TARAKAN) |  |  |  | 1.000 | 1,000, |  |  |  |  |
| 0 mako | 62,000 | 6,000 | 70,000 | 1,000 | 1,000 | Neces | ssary | repl | shm |
| ¢ TAKAO | 10,000 | 1,000 | 20,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 |  |  |  |  |

## Notes :

1. Ammunition and torpedoes are to be loaded on munition ships.
2. Kines will be handled as set for in Mining Operations, Appended Table 3 (IN Above.)
3. $X$ indicates places where speoial supply points are to be established. 0 indicates supply points whose capaoity must be increased.
4. Expendable aupplies like fucl (heavy oil, coal, aviation fuel) will be prepared.
5. At mako and KWAJALEIN one month's supply of air purifying material and oxygen will be 18,000, oxygen 1,800; KWAJALEN - air purifying mat rial 30,C00, oxygen 5,000).
[^9]
## 278/242/0tg

## Lover mos)

ITIAL FUSE ALLOWAYCES FOR SUPPLY BASES AND SPECIAL SUPPLY POINTS

| $\frac{10.2038)}{202}$ | COAL (IETRIO TONS) | AVIATION FUEL: (KILOLITERS) |  | ORDINIRY BOMBS |  |  | LAND BONBS |  |  | MACHINE CORI AMMUNITION |  | PROVISI ONS |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| AVY OLL. |  | 92 | 87 | 80,50 | -25 | 6 | 80,50 | 25 | 6 | 27 | 20 |  |
|  |  | 300 | 250 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5,000 |  | 1,100 | 1,000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3,000 | 2,000 | 100 | 200 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 200 | 2,00n |  | 100 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | - |
|  |  |  | 500 |  |  |  | - |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2,000 | 10,000 | 4,000. | 3,500 | 30 | 200 | 150 | 0 | 100 | 65.0 | 50,003 | 7,000 |  |
|  |  | 2,500 | 100 | 27 | 140 | 1,200 | 54 | 70 | 430 |  |  |  |
|  |  | 3,000 | 1,500 | 167 | 140 | 1,300 | 70 | 70 | 650 |  |  |  |
| 5,000 |  | 2,000 | 500 | 140 |  | 440 | 70 |  | 220 |  |  |  |
|  |  | 500 | 800 | . |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2,000 | 5,000 | 1,500 | 1,200 |  | 250 | 1,000 |  | 500 | 1,500 | 2,000,000 |  |  |
| 2,000 | 3,000 | 800 | 100 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1;500 | 6,000 | 4,000 | 2,000 | 126 | 240 | 1,080 | 120 | 350 | 2,300 | 550,000 |  | supply of |
|  |  | 1,000 | 2,000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | 6,000 | 4,000 | 200 |  |  | 120 |  |  |  |  |  |
| . |  | 1,000 | 1,000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | 500 | 600 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | 1,000 | 1,000 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Purt } \\ & \text { Foro } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { of } t \\ 0 \text { air } \end{gathered}$ | he nec farces | sary | regle | nishment | for Sout | 2ern |  |
|  |  | 1,000 | 1,000, |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 6,000 | 70,000 | 1,000 | 1,000 |  | 退 | repl | hm | P1 | Sout | Force |  |  |
| 1,000 | 20,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

to be loaded on munition ships.
for in Mining Operations, Appended Tablo 3 (TN Above.).
ial supply points are to be established.
ise oapacity muat be increased.
(heavy oil, coal, apiation fuel) will be prepared.
this supply of air purifying material and oxygen will be prepared (MAKO - air purifying matorial
IN - air purifying maticial 30, COO , oxygen 3,00 ).
ROMAJI translíteration of the original KANA.

INITIAL FUEI ALLONANCES FOR SUPPLY BASES'AND SPECIAL SUPPLY POINTS

| SUPPLY BASES AMD SPBCIAL SUPPLY POINTS | BEAVY OIL (METRIC TONS) |  | AVIATION FUEL (KILOLITERS) |  | COAL <br> (METRIC TONS) | AMMNSITION (ROUNDS) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { BONBS } \\ & \text { (ROUNDS) } \end{aligned}$ | TORPRDOES | MTNES | PROVISIONS (RATIONS FOR .... PERSONS PER YONTH) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | NO 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | BOIIER OIL | HRAVI OIL | 92 | 87 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| PARAMUSHIRO |  |  |  | 1,500 |  |  |  |  |  | 2,000 |
| AKKESHI | 5,000 | 5,000 |  | 2,000 | 5,000 |  |  |  |  | 2,000 |
| WAKTASIAI | 3,000 | 3,000 |  | 500 | 2,000 |  |  |  |  | 2,000 |
| CHICHI JIMA | 7,000 | 3,000 |  | 100 | 2,000. |  |  |  |  | 1,000 |
| MARCUS ISLAND |  |  |  | 100 |  |  |  |  |  | 1,000 |
| SAIPAN | 10,000 | 2,000 | 2,500 | 3,000 | 5,000 | $\begin{gathered} 2,000 \\ M G=20,000 \end{gathered}$ | No 61,000 No 25700 NO $50 \quad 650$ |  |  | 5,000 |
| WHAJALEIN (RUOTTO*) |  |  | 2,000 | 1,500 |  | $\begin{gathered} 2,000 \\ M G-20,000 \end{gathered}$ | 2,000 | Air 300 |  | 5,000 |
| WOTJE |  |  | 2,500 | 800 |  | $\begin{gathered} 2,000 \\ M G-20,000 \end{gathered}$ | 1,000 |  |  | 3,000 |
| JALUIT (IMTEJI*) | 6,000 | 2,000 | 1,500 | 500 | 5,000 | $\begin{gathered} 2,000 \\ M G-20,000 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | 1,000 | - |  | \$,000 |
| TAROA |  |  | 1,000 | 300 |  |  | . 500 |  |  | 1,000 |
| TRUK | 20,000 | 1,000 | 2,500 | 1,000. | 15,000 | $\begin{gathered} 3,000 \\ y G-50,000 \end{gathered}$ | No 63,000 No 252,000 No 502,500 | $\begin{array}{lr}\text { Air } & 100 \\ \text { Ship } & 30\end{array}$ |  | 8,000 |
| PONAPE | 1,500 | 1,000 | 500 | 500 | 8,000 |  | 500 |  |  | 1,000 |
| PALAU | 10,000 | 2,000 | 2,500 | 1,500 | 10,000 | $\begin{gathered} 5,000 \\ M G=50,000 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | 4,600 | Air 50 <br> Ship 50 |  | 10,000 |
| SAMA (*1) |  |  | 2,000 | 2,000 |  |  | 1,000 |  |  | 1,000 |
| SAIGON and vicinity |  |  | 6,000 | 5,000 |  |  | 48,000 |  |  | 6,000 |
| CAMRANH and vicinity |  | - | 1,000. | 2,000 |  | $\begin{gathered} 3,000 \\ M G-20,000 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | 3,000 | Ship 30 |  | 5,000 |
| $\because \sim$ (MANILA) |  |  | 1,000 | 1,000 |  | $\begin{gathered} 1,000 \\ M G-10,000 \end{gathered}$ | 1,000 | $\cdots$ |  | 5,000 |
| $X$ (DAVAO) |  |  | 3,000 | 3,000 | - | $\begin{gathered} 2,000 \\ M G-15,000 \end{gathered}$ | 3,000 | Air 50 <br> Ship 50 |  | 10,000 |
| X (TARAKAN) | . |  | 3,000 | 3,000 |  | $\begin{gathered} 5,000 \\ M G-15,000 \end{gathered}$ | 3,000 |  |  | 10,000 |
| - MAKT | 60.000 | 10,000 | 1,000 | 1,000 | 100,000 | 10,000 | 10,000 | Mir 100 Shio | 4,000 | 10,000 |



Notes:

1. $30 \%$ of the anmunition will be $12.7-\mathrm{cm}$ dual purpose gun shells. The rest will be shells for all types of madium and small caliber guns.
2. $30 \%$ of the bombs will be No $80,25 \% \mathrm{No} 25$ and $72 \%$ No 6. At KNAJALEIN approximately equal quantities of No 80 , No 25 and No 6 Bombs will be held.
3. $X$ indicates supply points for which supplies must be prepared beforehand so that they oan be immediately forwarded to them.
4. O indicates supply points whose initially prepared allowance inust be increased.
5. At each base expendable supplies used for movement like fuel (heavi oil, coal, aviation fuel) will be prepared.
6. Air materiel will be replenished initially by reserve airplanes.
7. Submarine air purifying material will be prepared at CAMRANH (4,000) (TN Unit not stated.) and at STAJALETN (10,000). Oxygen up to $10 \%$ of these amounts will also be prepared.
8. 4,000 mines will be distributed in SOUTH SEAS Area (will be carried by each ship).
9. No depth charges will be included in the land stores in the SOUTH SEAS Area, but 1,000 can be furnished monthly.
(*1) etc:-
(1) 三 乌

Note: The symbol * indicates an exact ROMAII transliteration of the original MANA.
Paga Appended Table 2，Part 1
$2 / 19$
$2 / 80$

DISPOSITION OF SUPILY SHIF FOR FIRE」 IERL

（＊1）etct．．
（1）日朗
（2）新玉
（3）白立
（4）辰武
（5）興業
（8） 尾上
（7）辰神
（8）日春
（9）E H $_{1}^{\prime}$
（10）日咸
（11）立
（12）大宝山
（13）和洋。
（11）興安
（15）五隆
（16）朝山
（17）木曾》
（18）
（19）天洋
（20）興 亞
（21）秩父
（22）地洋
（23）北開
（24）榛名
（25）厚生
（28）験河
（27）白合
（28）北 $=$
（23）仙台
（30）畄州
（31）湊
（32）長
（33）間家
（34）尻 矢
（35）極信

（37）
（38）
（39）
（40）
（41）
（42）
（13）
（44）
（15）

Hotes \＃demotes ships which transport aviation gasoline．（TN Braskets wure parentheses in orig


（28）北上 （29）化台 （30）才皆州
（31）湊
（32）長米
（83）間客 （31）
（35）
（36）健洋
rikets wore parontheses in original．）
（46）三毎 城
（47）
（48）早 苛开
（49）袜京至
（50）
（51）
（52）日蒈
（53）天城 山
（54）学阿

rerion（Dal．tikit）oigrations，

| $\therefore$ Southern fores | Northaris． Force | Supflo Force | TCTAL |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { HIDE }(* 9) \text { luatio } \\ & \text { NINCHII }(* 10) \text { MARU } \end{aligned}$ | 10 |
| RON：（ 714 ）MNUU <br> SORYU（＊15）MART： <br> ［ASAYMNA（＊16）MARU ］$]$ <br> （Kisogana（＊17）MARU］ 7 |  |  | $\varepsilon$ |
| HOSBI（＊25）MARU，SURigáa（＊26）M RU GALUREI（＊27）MARU，KITACAMI（＊28） MARO，No 2 BANSHÜ（ $* 30$ ）MARU，NO 5 faysiivi Marto，（ 0 （ $* 78$ ）MARU）， <br> SMINATO（＊31）MARU／，SENDAI（＊29） | $\begin{aligned} & \text { CTOOKO (*32) } \\ & \text { MARO } \end{aligned}$ | MAMIYA（＊33）MARU <br> No 3 bansidu M：RU | 19 |
|  <br> ERI 10 （＊49） <br> SA CLEMANTE MARU： <br> ［TETNO（＊50）MART］ 7 <br> CTESTYO（＊51）MARU 7 ． <br> MICMEI（＊52）MARU 7 <br> FMCISAN（＊53）MARTI <br> inn（ $x: 54$ ）Maxiu <br> HORYO（＊55）MARU <br> ［ZICHIKOKU（ $\$ 56$ ）МARU 7 <br> ETio 5 HINO（＊57）MARUT |  | NARUTO（＊58） <br> TSURIMI（＊59） <br> ＊HISHI（＊60）MARTJ <br> \＃go 2 HISHI MARU | 32 <br> （including nine AG）（TN Presuma－ bly nine crarying avintion gasoline．） |
| YODOGMFA（＊66）MARU ASAKA2E（＊67）MARU COBSI（ $* 68$ ）MARU ＜KORRYT（＊69）MARŪ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { NISSAN (*70) } \\ & \text { MARU } \end{aligned}$ | SOYO（＊71）MARU | 11 |
| SEMKO（＊74）MARU <br> ITASUGA（＊75）MARUJ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { AKASHISAN (*76) } \\ & \text { MARU } \end{aligned}$ | OKITSU（＊77）MARU | 6 |
| 34 | 3 3 | 10 | 86 |
| （37）神国 <br> （38）集洋 <br> （39）東觔 <br> （40）共㷧 <br> （4i）隠户 <br> （12）東亞 <br> （is）䔰士山 <br> （44）石廊 <br> （16）宝洋 <br> （46）海 <br> （47）夫．六 <br> （48）帘 受 <br> （49）禖竕 交 <br> （50）竍 三 <br> （51）$\sum_{-1}=\ddot{F}$ <br> （52）$\exists$ 交 <br> （53）克 圤 <br> （54）辛险 | （56）革 <br> （56） 17 <br> （57） B <br> （58） 17 负 <br> （39）解角 <br> （60）場 <br> （61）Kil <br> （62）旨 <br> （53）シ | 度（64）号他 <br> （65）Ll 息 <br> （66）位）＂ <br> 布（67）并胡 国 <br> 見 <br> （58）黃 溥 <br> （69）栱 共 <br> 床（70）向 产 <br>  <br> 工（7）屏 朿 | （73）山 茞 <br> （74）千米 <br>  <br> （76）时 不 $1 山$ <br> （77）長系要 <br> （78）大＋1 |

Appended Table 2，Part＇ 2

SECOND PERIOD（DAT MI KI）OPERATIONS


Notes \＃denotes ships which transport aviation gasoline．
（＊1）etc：－
（1） $\pm 4 \geq$
（2）考 桨呆


PERIOD（DAI NI KI）OPERATIONS AMD THEREAFTEK

| South Seas Force | Southern Force | Northern <br> Force | Supply Force | TOTAL |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| UTAKE MLARU | KOTYD YNRD，ONOE KIRT， tatsokami karo SISSATM CHARTI |  | HIDE LIARU FIGEII HARU | 10 |
| MaLIA KARU DMEASO MCRU OLSill URTO ZARU | KOiN MiRU GORYU MERU ISTYMM EGRO KISOGRITS：WiRU |  |  | 8 |
|  | KOSEI MERU，SURUG： <br> EL：RU，H：KUREI IR：RU， <br> KITi．Geisi MiRU（＊l）， <br> SEND：I ITRU，No 2 <br> BREMSHU，NO 5 BRISHUU <br> KCRU，II ERRU，：THETO <br> BHRU | снокб $\pi R U$ | MENTYA MRUU <br> No 3 BiNSHŪ <br> IURU | $19$ |
| RO H：RU $M R R U$ $O$ M：RU N：RU I ILRU | HAYETOMO，ERILKO，SIN CLEMENTE LLRU，SKE－ BONO ：ERU，TUTYO I＇RU，GENYO MCRU NICHIEI MARU，YOIUYO L＇RU，\＃： FNFN：HERU，ATICHIKOKU ？RO，洮 5 HINO KRU， ＂KORYO $\because \because R O$ |  | N：RUTO <br> TSURUEAT <br> SHIRTY： <br> SHDTKOKU ILRO <br> TOXEI（＊2）$\because R \mathrm{RU}$ <br> FHISHI ERU <br> 㒕NO 2 HISHI 15：RU | 32 <br> （including nine ：G）（TN Presumably nine carrying avia－ tion gasoline．） |
| 3TOKO <br> SHINSEI ： ERU <br> tavo iI＇RO <br> ：IRO IE：RU <br> EZ．N ： 2 B | $\begin{aligned} & \text { YODOC:N: M:RU } \\ & \text { S:I:ZE MRU } \\ & \text { KOS! IM:RU } \\ & \text { KORYU M:RU } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { NISS.IN } \\ & \because R O \end{aligned}$ | SOYO O | 11 |
|  |  |  | ORITSU F ［RU | 6 |
| 22 | $3 ¢$ | 3 | 13 | 86 |

GI KI) OPERATIONS AMD THERRAFTEK

| Porce | Southern Force | Northern Force | Supply Foroe | TOTAL |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | HOGXD HARD, ONOE KURD, tatsukami kuro nTSSHEMLHABTI |  | HIDE HARU <br> MIGEII MARO | 10 |
| nu | KOiN M:RU GORYU MERU LSTYAMA MiRU RISOGNA: U'RU |  |  | 8 |
| $1$ | KOSEI IERU, SURUGI KiRU, HiKUREI IE:RU, XITGGiAI MiRU (*) , SEND:I IRTRO, No 2 BRESHÜ, NO 5 BMYSHU KERO, OI MRU, :IMNTO HARU | $\begin{aligned} & \text { снокס } \\ & : \leftrightarrows \mathrm{RU} \end{aligned}$ | THETYA MRRU No 3 binsshū ufRO | 19 |
| $\because$ | HAYETOHO, ERTMO, SEN CLEETHTE HLRU, STKEBONO M:RU, TYTYO :I'RU, GENTO MTRU NICHIEI MARU, YOKUYס LRU,\#: fNENG: MIRU, \#NICHIROLU \%RU, filo 5 HINO WRU, " |  | N.RUTO <br> TSURIRI <br> SHIRTX: <br> SHDIKOKU IEARU <br> TOTI (*2) $\because: \mathrm{RU}$ <br> \#\#HISHI ESRU <br> 湤NO 2 HISHI MRO | 32 <br> (including nine <br> $\therefore$ :G) (TN Presunably <br> bine carrying avia- <br> tion gasoline.) |
| LU. |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { NISSIN } \\ & \because R U \end{aligned}$ | SOXO | 11 |
| \% | $\begin{aligned} & \text { SENKO } \because R \mathrm{RU} \\ & \text { iis'SUGi. itepu } \end{aligned}$ | : K'SHISIN <br> ii. RU | ORITSU İARU | 6 |
|  | 36 | 3 | 13 | 86 |

## Appended Table 2

DISFOSITIOH OF SUPPLY SHIPS FOR FIRST PERIO

| PORCE | Task Force | Advanced Expeditionary Force（SENKEAN BUTAI） | South Seas Force | Southern Arta $F$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { PunITIIONS } \\ & \text { SHIPS } \end{aligned}$ | NICHIRO MLRO | ARATAMA MARU HITACHI MARU | TATSUTAKE MARU | KOGYO MARU <br> ONOE MARU <br> TATSUKAMI MARU <br> NISSHOH MARU <br> SENKO MARO，additio duty？ |
| WATER TANKERS |  |  | TA．tEYAMEA MARU No 1 AMARASU MARU DAIHOSAN MARO FAYO MARD | KOAN MARU GORYT MARU ASAYAMA MARU KISOGANA MARU |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { STOKES } \\ & \text { SHIPS } \end{aligned}$ | HOKO ：URU | NO 2 TEAYO MARU | KסA．MAPD CHICHIBU MARU CHIYO MARU HOKKAI MARU HARUNA MARU | SURUGA MARU，KOSSI A HAKUREI MARD，KITAG MARU，SENDAI MARU， MARU，MINATO MARU，I BANSHÜ MARU，NO 5 B |
| OILERS | kiokuro mard <br> YENYŌ MARU <br> NIPPDN MARU <br> （TI：Add SEITRIYL <br> MARU．$)^{1}$ ，SEIMMOKO <br> MARU，KUROSHIO（＊） <br> MARU，KOKUYD MARU， <br> JTŌHO MARU，TŌप̄ <br> （＊2）MARU，＊NO 2 <br> ：YOEI MARU | INTO <br> TOA MRUU． <br> FUJISAN MARU | SEKIRO <br> HOYO MARU <br> KAIJO MARO <br> \＃KYOEI MARU． | HAYATOMO，GENYOT MAR： ERIMO，TEIYO MRRU， CLENENTE MARU，HICH MARU，\＃AMAGISNN MAR ；FNaNA MARU，\＃\＃AGISA MARU（TN Sub3equen deleted．$)^{1}$ ，\＃KORYO． （Ty Add Nichikoiv． and \＃No 5 HINO MART |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { COLLIER- } \\ & \text { OILERS } \end{aligned}$ |  |  | IWASHIRO MARU， SANKIZAN MARU， SHIRETOKO，NO 6 SHITSEI MARU， SANKIANG MARU | KOिSEI MART，YODOGAT ASAKAZE MARU（TN A KORYV MARU．）${ }^{1}$ |
| MISCEL－ <br> ifineous <br> AUXILIA－ <br> RIES |  |  | YAMAKAZE MARU HPITO MARU | ＇SENKO MARU（double purpose），NICHIKOKI MARU and No 5 HINO MARU（TN Strboquan deleted．）${ }^{1}$ ，KASUGA． MARU |
| total | $\begin{aligned} & 11(T N)^{\text {Changed }} \\ & \text { to } 12 .)^{2} \end{aligned}$ | 6 | 21 | 34 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { RRPAIR } \\ & \text { SHIPS } \end{aligned}$ |  |  | SHOEI（＊4）MARU | AKASHI <br> ASAHI（＊5）． <br> YAMAKIKO（＊6）MARU |

Notes \＃cienotes ships whach tronsport siviation gasoline．（Tii Breatets wore parentheses in origins
$1_{\text {Editorls }}$ Notez Revised by＂Errita＂issued by Secretary to Camencior in Chief，Conbined Fleet as Gad aboard the NAGATO，REBKI WAH．
（＊）${ }^{\text {）}}$ etes－
（1）照 桒
书洋
（3）报は支山
（4）枫 㸚

OF SUPPLY SHIPS FOR FIRST PERIOD（D＇I IKKI）CPERATIONS

（is were parentheses in original．）
2 Chiof，Combined Fleet as Canibud Fleet Untrasecret Seriel，Part 99，dated 17 Nov 47，
（4）松榮
（5）朝日
（6）山 彦

278／242／hah
IRET PERIOD（D＇I IKKI）CFERRTIONS

| Pern Arba Porce | Northern Force | Conmerco <br> Destruction Uast | Supply Force | TOT：L |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | ／AKASHISAN MARU， additionel duty／ |  | NICHII MARU HIDE MARU | 10 |
|  |  |  |  | 8 |
| RO，KOBEI MARO， ROD，XITAGMMI DAI MARU，OI FTO MARO，No 2 RO，NO 5 BANSHOU | CHOLC MARU |  | MAMITA，NO 3 BANSHU MARU | 19 |
| GERYO MARJ； TYO MARO，SAN ZARU，NICHIEI MaISNS MARU， <br> t，\＃NagISAN（＊3） Subsequently <br> －\＃\＃KORYס．MARU NICEIKOKU．MARU HINO MARO．）${ }^{1}$ |  | NARUTO（with Cambined Fleet at beginning of first per－ iod（DAI IKKI） Operations） | NARUTO7（at bo－ ginning of First Period（DAI IKKI） Operations）， SHIRTYA MARU， （TN Subsequently deleted．）${ }^{1}$ ， TSURUMI，\＃HISHI MARO，\＃Ho 2 HISHI MRRU | 31，including einht AG（TN Presumably eight ships arrying avi－ ation gaso－ line．）（TN Changod to 32， including nine AG．）${ }^{1}$ |
| J，YODOGAWA．MART， ARU（TN Add ग．） | NISSAN MARU |  | SŌȲ MARU <br> KORȲ MARU <br> （TN Subsequently <br> deleted．）${ }^{1}$ | 11 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { (double } \\ & \text { NICH IKOKU } \\ & \text { No } 5 \text { HNNO } \\ & \text { S, KOquantiy } \\ & \text { H, KASUGA } \end{aligned}$ | Akashisan MARU，addi－ tional duty ${ }^{7}$ |  | OKITSU MARU | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 8. (pII Changed to } \\ & \text { 6.) } \end{aligned}$ |
| 34 | 3 | 1 | 11 （TN Changed to 9．）${ }^{1}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 87(\mathrm{TN} \text { Changed } \\ & \text { to } 86 .)^{1} \end{aligned}$ |
| $(\dot{\theta} \cdot \overline{6}) \text { MARU }$ |  |  |  | 4 |

in original．）
eot as Conbinad Fleot Ultraseoret Serial，Part 99，dated 17 Nov 41,
炎
（s）朝 日
${ }^{(8)} 山$ 山彦

## 2/86 <br> 2/86

## Appended Tablo 5

RENDEZVOUS AND SUBSEQUENT MOVFMENTS OF SUPPLY SIITPS ATTACHFD TO COMELNE:

| SHIP |  | Du'sy | MOVFMEN: |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | FIRST DUIX | SECOND DUTY . |  |
| NICHII MARU | Kunitions supply for kain Body | Munitions supply for Southern Force | Second duty will be: |
| HIDE MARU |  | Munitions supply for Southern Derne and South Soas Foroe |  |
| - mamiya | 3tores supply for Main Body | Stores supply for Southern Force and South Sens Force |  |
| Ho 5 Banshü Maru |  |  |  |
| HARUTO - | 021 supply for Main Body | $0: 1$ supply far Southern Foroe, Soutk Soas Foroe and Tabk For.se | Will lgave kure 17 N JALUIT (loads heavy 4,000; - No 1 Heavy nfter filling tanks point P (later order to $D+6$ Day. fifter aupplies at TRUK wil KURE, will reload an l'gadiness. |
| TSURUSI |  |  | Will rrooged to HA:H until 1 Doo (load: boilers - 6,000; No 1,000) |
| HISHI MARU |  |  | Will take on a full ation 87 gasoline at and arrive at palaU Aftor discharging av reload at TOKUYAMA a readiness. |
| No 2 HISHI MARU |  |  | Will take on a cull ation 87 gesoline af readiness at KURE. |
| SOYO MRU | 011 and coal supply for Main Body | $0 i 1$ and coal supply for Southerin Force and South Soas Force | seoond duty wall: be order |
| ORITSU MARU | Miscollaneous use - by Main Body | Miscellancous use by Southorn Force and South Seas Force |  |
| SHIRIXA MARU | 011 supply for Main Body (Second Period (DAI NI KI) Operations and thereafter) | Oil supply for Southern Foroo and South Seas Foree (Second Period (DAI NI KI) cperations and thereaiter) | - |
| SHITKOKD MARU |  |  |  |
| - TOBI LARD |  |  |  |

(*1) etos:
(1) $\qquad$

AND SUBSEQUENT MOVENENTS OF SUPPLY Sffrps attached to COMBLNED FLeizT

|  | Du'dy |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | SECOND DUTY . | MUVEMEN? | ReNDEZVCOUS |
| ain | Munitions supply for Southern Force | Second duty will be: by apocial order | Wcaterry pairt of inline Sua |
|  | Munitions supply for Southern Scioe and Soutin Soas Foroe |  |  |
|  | Stores supply for Southern Force and South Sozs Force |  |  |
|  |  | WIII loave Kure 17 Nov and land at JALUIT (load: hoavy oil for boilers 4,000; - No 1 Heavy 011-2,000). after filling tanks will wait at point $P$ (later orders) from $D+2$ day to $D+5$ Day. fiftor discharging supplies at TRUK will proceed to KURE, will reload and wait in readiness. |  |
|  | 011 aupply far Southern Foroe, South Soas Force | Will rroosed to HATHJIMA and wait until 1 Doo (load: leavy oil for boilers - 0,000 ; No 1 Heavy 011 1,000) | Western part or INLAND Sea |
|  |  | Will take on a full load of aviation 87 gasoline at TOKUYAMA (*1) and arrive at PALAU by 1 Dec . Aftor disoharging supplies, will. roload at TOKUYAMA and wait in readinoss. |  |
|  |  | Will take on a full load of aviation 87 gesoline and wait in readiness at KURE. | KURE |
| or | 011 and coal supply for Southern Force and South Seas Force |  | estern part of |
| $y$ | Miscellancous use by Southorn Force and South Seas Force | seoond duty will be by speoial order |  |
|  | Oil supply for Southern Foroe and South Seas Foree (Second Period (DAI XI KI) Cperations and thereafter) |  | $\square \square$ |

## Appended table 3

RENDELVOUS AND SUBSEQUENT MOVEMCNTS OF SUPPLY EHIPS ITTAGHED TO COBB

| SHIP | PRINCIPAL DUTY | movembir |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| HICHII MARU | munitions supply for Main Body | Special orders |
| HIDE MARU | Reserve munitions supply for Southern Force and South Seas Force | n |
| Mimiva | Stores supply for Main Body. Reserve storos supply for Southern Force and South Seas Force. | " |
| Ho 3 bayshio maru | rtores supply for Main Body. Reserve stores supply for Southern Force and South Spas Foroe | " |
| Mardio | Reserve oilor for 1 Air Fleet until $D+4$. Afterward will be attached to Commerce Deatruotion Unit. | At the outbreak of hostillt: in readiness at the plaoe de CinC 1 Air Rleet. <br> After $D+4$ day will move as oommanding officer of Commer onit. |
| taurusi | Reserve oiler for 1 Air Fleet until D+4 Day. Subsequently reservo oiler in PALAU Area. | At the outbreak of war will readiness at the point desi 1 Air Fleet. After D+4 will operate in on speoial orders. |
| SHIRIYA (TN Subsequently deleted.) ${ }^{1}$ | Assigned to Nidway Destruction Unit. Subsequently oiler for Main Body. | will operate a.s dirooted by in First Period (DAI IKKI) Thereafter, will operate in INLAND Sea on special order: |
| HISHI MARJ | Reserve oil aupply (aviation gasoline) for South Seas Fcroe | Speoial orders |
| NO 2 HISHI MARU | Reserve oil supply (aviation gasoline) for South Seas Foroe | n - |
| 8OYO MaRU | Reserve oil and ooal supply for Southern Foroe | " |
| KORYU MARU (IN Subspquently deleted.) | Reserve oil and eool supply for South Seas Foroe | " |
| ORITSU MARU | Reserve miscellaneous use by Southern Force | " |

$1_{\text {Bditor's }}$ Note: Revised by "Errata" Issued by Flag Seeretary, Combinod Fleot as combined Floet y
dated 17 Hor 41, aboard the NAC TO, SABKI WAN lated 17 NDP 41, aboard the NAC TO; SABKI WAN.

OUS AND SUBSEQUENT MOVEMGNTS OF SUPPLY SH IPS ATTACHED TO COMBINED FLEET

| PRIMCIPAL DUTY | MOVEMENT | RENDEZVOUS |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $y$ for Main Body | Speoial orders | Western part of INLAND Sea |
| ns aupply for Southern Seas Porce | 11 | " |
| or Main Body. Reserve storos hern Force and South Seas | " | " |
| or Main Body. Reserve atores hern Force and South Spas Force | n ( | $n$ |
| or 1 Air Fleet until D+4. be attaohed to Commerce De- | At the outbreak of hostilities will wait. in readiness at the place designated by CinC 1 Air Fleet. <br> After $D+4$ day will move as ordered by commanding officer of Commerce Destruction onit. | South Seas Area; as directed by cinc 1 Air Fleet |
| or 1 Air Fleet until D+4 tly reserve oiler in PalaU | At the outbreak of war will wait in readiness at the point desigated by Cinc 1 Air Fleet. After $D+4$ will operate in the paLAU Area on special orders. | n |
| way Destruotion Unit. ler for Main Body. | Will operate as directed by Cinc 1 Air Fleet in First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations. Thereafter, will operate in western part of INLAND Sea on special orders. | As direoted by Cinc 1 Air Fleot |
| ply (aviation gasoline) for | Spooial orders | YCKOSUKA |
| Ply (aviation gasoline) for | " - | SASEBO |
| ooal supply for Southern Force | " | 1 |
| eoal supply for South Seas | 11 | Western part of INLAND Sea |
| neous use by Southern Force | 1 | n |

Asiued by Flag Seeretary, Combinod Fleet as Combined Fleet Ultraseoret Serial 1 Part 99, SABKI WAN.

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:age Socond joriod (DAI MI KI) Oporatione and theroaftor will be the semo as Firet Period (DAI IKKI). Oporations, oxcedt for the fcllowing:

| Task. Porce | 011 supply | KYOLUTO MARO KERYYO MLRU NITHON MALKU NO . 2 KYOEI MARU | rotal 6 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| South Seas Poroe. | N | Will add TOHO MLRU | Total 22 |
| Southorn Foroe | \% | Will add KUROSHIO KhRU KOICOYO LhRU | Total 35 <br> (TH Changed to 36.) ${ }^{1}$ |
| Bupply Force | " | Will add sHinkoku MIRU, TOEI M/HU (TN Inpert SHIRIYA KARU.) ${ }^{1}$ | Total 13 (TN Changod to 12.) ${ }^{1}$ |

${ }^{1}$ gditor's Noter Rovised by "Errata" isauod by Flag-Suorctary, Combinod Floot as, Combibod Floot Ultrascorot sorial 1 Part 99, datod 17 Nov 42, aboard NAGATO, SABEI TAKF.
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| BOPPLI BASES AND APBCIAL SUPPLY PODITE | HEAVY OIL (LETRIC TODS) |  | COAL (METRIC TONS) | AVIATION FUEL <br> (KILOLILERS) |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { AnOMITIORA } \\ & \text { (ROUSDS) } \end{aligned}$ | ECIBS (ROURDS) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { BOILER } \\ & \text { OIL } \end{aligned}$ | NO 1 HEAVY OIL |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  | 87 |  |  |
| PARAKUSHIRO |  |  |  |  | 200 |  | - |
| ```AKKRSHI (in- oluding BIHORO and CHITOSE)``` | 1,000 | 1,000 |  |  | 300 |  |  |
| WAKTANAI | 1,000 | . 1,000 | 500 |  | 100 |  | - |
| CHICHIJIMa |  |  | 500 |  | 200 |  |  |
| marcus Is land |  |  |  |  | 300 |  |  |
| SAIPAN | 2,000 | 500 | 1,500 | Supply noqded | vien |  |  |
| KTAMALETN (RUOTTO*) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 150TJE |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| JALUIT <br> (INTEJI*) | - | 1,000 |  |  |  | amount | nomount usod |
| TARDA |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| TRUK |  | 1,000 |  |  |  | . |  |
| PONAPE |  | 500 |  |  |  |  |  |
| palau | 2,000 | 1,000 | 1,500 | 1,000 | -1,000 |  |  |
| SAIGON and vioinity CAMSANH |  |  | . | Supply used | amount <br> d |  | - |
| I (MANILA) |  | - | . | Supply | in part |  |  |
| $x$ (DAVAO) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| X (tarakan). | - |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 0 makO | 70,000 | 10,000 | 10,000 | 500 | 500 | Amount | Amount <br> Used by |
| 0 tarno | 10,000 | 2,000 | 3,000 | 1,500 | 1,500 | Southern Forco | 8outhorn Force |

Note
One month!s supply of air purifying material and oxygon will be bont to KniJStern and wis

Notes The symbol * indicates an exact RomajI transliteration of the original taxh.


cot ROMAJI transliteration of the original taMh.

KONTHLY REPLENISHMENT RLLONANCES FOR SUPPLY BASES AND SEECTAL SUPPLY POINTS


|  | - |  |  |  |  |  |  | 20,000 |  | Ship-20 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | SAMA |  |  | 500 | 500 |  |  |  | : |  | 500 |
|  |  | SAIGON and vicinity |  |  | 2,000 | 3,000 |  |  | 10,000 |  |  | 5,000 |
|  |  | CAMRANH and vicinity |  |  | 500 | 1,000 |  | $\begin{gathered} 1,500 \mathrm{MG} \\ 10.000 \end{gathered}$ | 2,000 | Ship-20 |  | 5,000 |
|  |  | X (KANIIA) |  | - | 1,000 | 1,000 |  | $\begin{aligned} & 500 \text { MG - } \\ & 5,000 \end{aligned}$ | 1,000 |  |  | 5,000 |
|  |  | $X$ ( $\mathrm{Di} \mathrm{V} \Lambda 0$ ) |  |  | 1,500 | 1,500. |  | $\begin{aligned} & 1,000 \mathrm{MG} \\ & 10,000 \end{aligned}$ | $2,000^{\circ}$ $\ldots$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { A } \in \text { rial- } 30 \\ & \text { Ship }-30 \end{aligned}$ |  | 10,000 |
|  |  | X (TARAKAN) |  |  | 1,500 | 1,500 |  | $\begin{gathered} 1,000 \mathrm{MG} \\ 10,000 \end{gathered}$ | 2,000 |  |  | 10,000 |
|  |  | 0 MATO | 70,000 | 10,000 | 500 | 500 | 10,000 | $\begin{gathered} 5,000{ }^{\circ K G}- \\ 50,000 \end{gathered}$ | 5,000 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Aerial-50 } \\ & \text { Ship-50 } \end{aligned}$ | 1,000 | 20,000 |
|  |  | - takho | 10,000 | 2,000 | 1,500 | 1,500 | 3,00J | $\begin{gathered} 2,000 \mathrm{MG} \\ 20,000 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | 3,000 |  |  | 50,000 |

Notes:

1. $30 \%$ of the ommonition will be 12.7 cm dual rurpose gun shells. The rest will be shells for all typcs of medium and small caliber guns.
2. Unless the type of bomb is indicated, $3 \%$ will be No $80,25 \%$ No 25 and $72 \%$ No 6.
3. I indicates a spocial supply point which will be put into operation after penetration into forward areas.
4. O indicatos a supply point tho capacity of which will be particularly increased.
5. All supply points will keep up to proscribed levels their supply of expendablc materials such as fuel (heary ofl, coal, aviation fuel).
6. Arcraft material will be roplanished at TRUK in the South Scas isca and at TiK/iO in the Southern Area.
7. Air purifying material for submarines: 2,000 (IN Unit not stated.) will be supplied to CAiRANH; 6,000 will be supplied to KNAJALBIN. In addition, oxygen, equal to $10 \%$ of the above amount, will be supplied.

Nute: The symbol * indicates an exact ROMAJI transliteration of the original KANA.


## 278/24R/dos

H. Operation Other Than Those of the Combined Moot

1. Operations of foroes at naval atations and ausillary naval itations
a. These forces will etrangthon the defonse of stratogic points, proteot sea traffic and oo-operate with the Combined Fleet or China Area Floet in operations in the area in their charge.
b. Air forces and other neoessery forces whll be moved to the nocessary places as conditions demand. Thoy will be placed undor the operationel command of the commander in ohiof of tho fleot concerned or of the commandine officer of the force at the naval etation or nuxiliary naval station in oharge of tho area oonoernod.
2. Oparations of Chind Aron Fleet
n. In gonerel, the fleet will continue operatione against CHILK with its present strongth. It will annihilate land forcos and wrest control from them.
b. Lit the outbreak of war the force of which 2 CHIRA Expeditionary Fleot is the nuclous will co-operate with the hruy to ocoupy HONGKONG and annihilate enomy foroos stationed there.
o. The defonses and socurity mersures within the ocoupied areas will be strengthoned and sea traffic along the CBIMA const will be protected. At the samc time every effort will bo mado to dony tho use of tho CHINA ooast to enemy ships and airplanes.
d. It will oo-oporete, as the occasion demands, with the Combined Fleet and Southern Army in esoorting Army eurface transporte and in defending assembly points.

 ARD CHINL
3. Oporation Policy
4. The operations against the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIM and the NETHERLANDS will be modelod generally of ter the oporation polioy set forth in I.
5. The polioy for operations against RUssIA will be as followit
a. In the ovent war breaks out during First Phase (DiII ICBI DAN) Operations
(1) Por the most part, 5 Fleet and the homeland oombat forcos (NAISEA BUTAI) will be changed with defense. They will protoct vital sea traffic along tho coast of JAPAM and will proteot strategio arvas from air attaok.
(2) Thoreafter, as quiokly as southern operations and operations against the bmerioan Fleot pormst, olements of light forces and air forces will be diverted to operations against RUBSIA.

The operations desoribed in the above paragraph thus will be etrengthened. of Pirst Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operatione.

The greater part of 5 Fleet and nne element of the light forces will be shifted to oporations against RUSSIA. The Russion fleet in the ORIENT will be immediately annikillated. Pressure will be brought to bear along the ooast of Ruesian territory in the FAR EAST. In comoperation with the Army, these forcos will destroy enemy air strength in the MARITINE Provinoe ( * $^{\text {I }}$ ) and USSURI Province (*2), and ocoupy VLADIVOSTOK and other strategio poilts in the FAR RABT.

Page<br>2/100

B. Allooation of Foroes.

Separate Table 6 (Will be sent later.) (TN Kissing.)
C. Operations Other Than Those of the Comioined Fleet

1. Operations of foroes at naval stations and auxiliary naval stations.
a. The naval stations at YOKOSUKA, KURE, RASEED and MAIZURU and the auxiliary naval stations at OIINATO, BEINKAI and Port ARTHUR will strengthen seourity measures against Ruseian aubmarines and airplanas and will aninilate theif if they appear in areas under their Jumisdiotion.
b. When the outor oombat foroes engage in aotive operations, air forces and other necessary forces will be transferred to the neoessary points and will oo-operate in these operations.

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2. Operations of the China Area. Fleet

The foroe whioh has I China Expeditionary Fleet and 3 China Expeditionary pooic as its nuoleus will cover the movements of the Army foroes which will be divertad rrum ientral and northern CHINA. It will escort these forces during transport at sea and deploy suftably.
III. MISCEMRANEOUS REGULATIONS
A. Time to be Uaed

Central atandard time
B. Charts to be Used

Charts (oharts of military plaoes) to be used.aro as
followe:
 278/242/mab

Motes
Charts for general oporations in the mariar area will be ostablishod separately. (TM Nhis noto subsequontiy has beon doloted.) ${ }^{2}$
O. Identifloation of friondly and onemy foroen

The identification of ifiendly and onemy foroes will bo based on Comblned Pleot Dootring and the following:

Identification between Havy shipa and Japanese morohant ahipping (inoluding transporte and ohips attachod to the Army) and botween the various hruy and Mavy lend installntions (including forces) will be in occordanoe with 81gnal Rogulations for Identifioation of Japanese Ships in Wartimes
(III Insert "but, in odd-numbered monthe Mothod 2 will be followedin in even-numbered monthe Mothod 2.") (TN Add "Identification

## Page

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Pego..
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Mote:
Oharte for general oporations in the Mariar Area will be ostablishod coparately: (TM Thie noto subsequently hae boen doleted.) ${ }^{2}$
C. Identifloation of friendiy and enemy forcon

The 1dentification of friendly and enemy forces will bo based on Combinod Meot Dootring and the following:

Idontification between Navy shipa and Japanese morchant shipping (inoluding tranoports and ships attached to the Army) and botweon the various druy and Mavy lend instalintions (inoluding. forces) will be in a000rdence with Signal Rogulatinns for Identification of Japanese Ships in Fartime.
(TN Insert "but, in odd-numbered monthe Yothod 2 will be among airplanes will be based on the Joint Army- Nawy agreement Conoerning Identifioation of Friendly lilitary dirplanoe." ${ }^{2}$
 Combined Fleotsas Cambined Fleet Uitrasoorot Sorial 1 Parto $99_{\text {g }}$



> 278/242/8j.

T FERIOD (DAI IKKI) OPERATIONS OF FIRST PHAGO (DAI ICHI DAN) OPERRATIUR
e main Army forcos invading the PHILIPPINBS heve landed in the PHILIPPINES - D+20)

| PRINCIPAL DUTY | OUTLINE OF OPERATION | funderyous | remarks |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| upporit entire fion. | 1. Will remain at anohor under alert in western part of thlay Sea and when necessary proceed. out to give support. <br> 2. Under operation Methad I against American fleet, will proceed out on D Day and oover withdrawal of the Task Foroe. | Western part of INLAND Sea |  |
| (i) Slo.) Methods 2 in oparation against an Fleot. <br> Will support operaof the South Seas and the Yorthern Forod Will soooperato wit: Seas Force in operbtol oocupy strategio <br> 3. <br> If conditions <br> $t$, will support opera. of Southern Foro.e. | 2. Undar Oporation Method 2 and 3 against Amerioan fleet: <br> a. Will prepare to make suitablo moros against the Anerioan Fleet in aecordanee with the enemy situation and, if nooessary, will co-operate with the South Seas Force in the oooupation of strategic areas. <br> b. on special orders one elemont of the force will partioipato in operations of Southern Force. | TANKAPPU (\$2) WAN (TN Bay) |  |
| 11 reocmnoiter and Amorican fleet in Area. <br> 11 oo- oparate with <br> 3k Force in operations <br> 11 attack air bases <br> a HAKAII and SAMOA. | 2. Will observe and attack American Fleet in HAWAII Areas Will make a surprise attade the ohamel leading into PEARL HIRBOR and attempt to olose it. If the enery moves out to ifight he will be pursusd and attaoked. | As directed by the ocumending officer of Advanced Expeditionary Foyce. | Until the end of ${ }^{5}$ the surprise attack on HAWAII by the Task Force $(D+3)$, the $\Lambda$ divanoed Expeditionery Force will bo under the command of the Task Force commander. |


) OPERATIONS OF FIRST PHAGE (DAI ICHI DAN) OPERATIUNS
invading the PHILIPPINBS heve liaded in the PHILIPPINES - D+20)

|  | OUTLINE OF OPERAFION | faitidey yous | RPMARKS |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1. Will remain at anohor under alort in western part of MIAIM sea and when neoessary proceed. out to give aupport. <br> 2. Under operation Methad 1 against American fleet, will prooeed out on D Day and oover fithdrawal of the Task Force. | Western part of INLAND Sea |  |
| 2 nat nera- Foron Fita werm gio pere | 2. Undar Oparation Method 2 and 3 against American fleet: <br> a. Will prepare to make ouitablo moros against the Amarioan Fleet in aecordanee with the enemy situation and, if pooessary, will co-operate with the South Seas Force in the ocoupation of atrategic areas. <br> b. on speoial orders one elemont of the foroe will parficipato in operations of Southern Poroe. | TANKAPPU (*2) WAN (TN Bayd |  |
| C <br> 俊 <br> tion <br> 108 <br> M. | 1. Will observe and attack Arerican Fleot in HAWAII Aref W1ll make a surprise attad ${ }^{2}$ da the ohomol leading into PEARL IEARBOR and attemet to olose it. If the enery moves out to fight he will be pursued and attaoked. 2. Operation Kethod 1 against American Floet will be as follows: <br> a. Ontil D-3, ane submarine will reconnofter cach of the following strategic arcas: important points in the ALBUTIANS, SAIMA, FIJI, and TUTUILA. <br> In order to inoroase the damage which can be inflicted by th rask Force, powerful enemy forces mill bo obsorved and reported when their wher eabouts is dise povered. <br> b. One element will olear the poute of the Task Force. The rest, patil $D_{-5}$, will surround HAWAII at extreme range while ane element rall approain and reoonnoiter fithout boing discovered. <br> d. If the Task Foroe operations suoceed, one SubDiv or less will be placed between HAWAII and TCRTH ANERICA to dostroy sua thraffic. <br> 3. In Operation Method 2 against Amorioan Fleet, one elemont will attack enemy air bases between HAMAII and SAMOA and will coo oparate in the destruction of HOWIAND by South Seas Farce. | As directed by the ocmmending officer of Advanced Fxpeditionary Foyce. | Until the ond of the surprise attaok on EAWAII by the Task Force ( $D+3$ ), the $\Lambda$ dvanced Expeditionery Force will bo under the command of the Task Force commander. |

lent Ultrasecret serial 1 Part 98, dated 17 Nor 41, aboard.the NAGlTO, off IKAKUNI.
loot Vltraseoret Serial 1 Fart 99 , dated, 17 Nor 41, aboard the MACATO, S.EKI WAN.

ALLOCATION OF FORCES POR FIRST PERIOD (DAI IKR 2/106 (From first preparations for war till the main Arwy forcos

|  | FORCE | COMMADING OFFICER |  | STRENGITH | PRİCIPAL DUTY |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | I. | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Ginc } \\ & 4 \text { Flest } \end{aligned}$ | 4 Fleet (one DesDiv of DesRon 6, two patrol boats, 5 Base Foroe loss one element) <br> CxuDiv 6 <br> 2 Unit of 1 Combinod Communiontions Unit. | 1. Will dofand and pa area in its oharge. <br> 2. Will noutralize on air bases in Hofiland $A$, 8. Will invade WAKE a GJAM. <br> 4. Will invade RabaUL conditions warrant it. |
|  | Wako <br> Invasion <br> Poroe |  |  | DesRon 6 (lees one DesDiv) <br> Tiro patrol boats <br> One ooupany of Speoial Navy Landing Party |  |
|  | Guam Invasion Forae |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 5 \text { Base Force (loss ane element) } \\ & \text { DesDiv } 23 \\ & \text { OBORO }(* 1) \end{aligned}$ |  |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Supply } \\ & \text { Unit } \end{aligned}$ |  |  | 21 Cargo ships. |  |
|  | $\frac{\text { Air }}{\text { Foroe }}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Cinc } \\ & 2 \text { Floot } \end{aligned}$ | CruDiv 4 <br> Sec 2 of BatDiv 3 <br> Car Div 4 (less Sec 2) <br> One DesDiv of DesRon 1 <br> One DesDiv of DesRon 4 <br> AKASHI <br> ASAHI MARU <br> Fivo battalions of speoial Nary <br> Landing Party <br> Some fishing boats | 1. Pill annihilate on air strength and ships the PHILIPPINES, MALAY NBTHRRIANDS EAST INDIES Arcas. <br> 2. Will provide surfac escort for and cover lo ing of Philippinps invasion force. <br> 3. Will provide surfac esoort for and cover la ings of forces invading atratogio places in British MALAYA and BORN and for Arry foroea int THAIINID. <br> 4. Will propare for cooupatim of stratogio points in the MPIHERIA? EAST IMDIES. <br> 5. Will oo-operate in operations at HONGKONG |
|  | Submarine <br> Foroe |  |  | 31 Alr Fleot (less GarDiv $22^{2} ; 36$ fightor planes) <br> Two battalions of Speoial Navy Landing Party |  |
|  | $\begin{array}{\|l} \hline \text { Philippine } \\ \text { Force } \\ \hline \end{array}$ |  |  | Subion 5 <br> SubRon 6 (lass one SubDiv) |  |
|  | Malay Forco |  |  | 3, Floet (less ona element) crubiv 6 <br> DesRon 2 (less one DesDiv) <br> DesRon 4 (less anc DesDiv) <br> AirFlot 11 <br> Ligit patrol boats <br> Southern Expecitionary Fleet |  |

1 Editeris Note: Revised by "Errata" isauod by flas Seoretary, Combined Fleit as Coninined f.
2 Rditor's Notes Revised by "Errata" issued by Flag Sooretary, Combined Floet as Combined F
(1) $\qquad$
(2) 空白
(3) kyū shü

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2／106 2／106

Separate Tablc 1 （Continued）
ALIOCATION OF FUROES FOR FIRST PERIOD（DAI IAKI）


2 Rditor＇s Note：Revised by＂Errata＂isaued by Flag Socretary，Combined Fleet as Combined Fl．
（＊1）oto：－
（1）
用垆近
（2）
空
（3）kyū̀shū

FOR FIRST PERIOD (DAI IKKI) OPERATIOSS OF FIRST PHASE (DAI ICHI DAN) OPBRATIONS

1. Will defend and patrol area in its obarge. 2. Will neutralize enemy air bases in HOTIAND Area. 3. WIll invade WAKE and GJNM.
2. Will invade RABAUL if conditions warrant it.

bined Fleèt as Conioined Fleut OItrasecret Serial 1 Part 99, dated 17 Yov 41, aboord NAGAFO, off IWAKUNI,
bined. Fleet as Combined Fl et MItraseoret"Serial 1 Paxt 99, dated 17 Nov 41, aboard MAGAJO\% SABKI FAN.

OPRRATIORS OF FIRST PHASE (DAI ICHI DAN) OPRRAYIONS

1. A major element of the air forco will attack and seize control from enemy air foroes and ships in the PHILIPPINES and MALAY areas. Eneny submarines will be destroyod 2. Before the outbreak of war submarinos and mino layers will be seoretely dispatohed to necessary aruas and will nalee observations, lay mincs and supply seaplanes. 3. Will occupy BATAN, APARRI, VIGAN (IAQAG), DAVAO, IEGASPI and Join, prepare air bases quiokly and moro one elemant of the air fores to thom.
2. Will provide surface esoart for and cover landing of Army forcos oo oupying the PHILIFPINES. 5. Will provide surface csoort for and oover landings of the Advanced Expeditionary Group (HEIDAN) ocoupying MAIA $Y$, the foroo in THAILAND, and the Army forces ocoupying strategio points in BRITISH BORNEO. One olement of the air foroe will be moved to the oaptured air bases. 6. At the beginning of the operatims tro dostroyars will oome under the oporational command of of ce cimit Axea Fleot.
3. Air foroes and forges, making surprise attacks on BATAN and APARRI will complete preparation by about $\mathrm{D}=6$.
4. Airflot 12 till roturn to its ariginal unit until
the lending of the main forcos involvad in 4 operation.
$t$ Ontrasecret Serial 1 Part 99, dated 17 Yov 41, aboord NAGATO, off IWAKUNI.
t Mitraseoret"Serial 1 Part 99, detod 17 Nov 41, aboard MAGAJO\%, SAEKI WAN.
 （From first properations for war till the main intiv foroos invading th

| FOKCE |  |  | STRETGTE | PRTMCIPSLL DUTY | OU |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Northern Fcroo <br> Guppl－： Uait |  | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { GinC } \\ 5 \text { Fluot } \end{array}$ | 5 Floot <br> シ̈ KJ（＊） <br> Chilcill JIVa Commuications <br> Lint（C．ilcia TSU <br> （TiI＂Nino lead ationk plancs <br> frox：Yowo 1 （if（＊2）＂ndd．d．）${ }^{2}$ <br> Throo cargo ships | 1．Will patrol and dufond nror：in its cirargo． <br> 2．Will patrol tho rcuto of tino Task Forcu and oovor its withdrasmal． <br> 3．Will take security moasurus against RUSSLi．e． | 1．．ill with prin 2．In Op isurioan frmm KI Ki of the Ta vithdrawn HOKMildo |
| Comeurco Dusiruotion： U゙iit |  | $\begin{aligned} & 3024 \text { Squi:d- } \\ & \text { ro: (SE:T:I) } \end{aligned}$ | 248＊＊ <br> Ons cariso ahip | ：iill destroj s．oa traffio． | ：1111＇oper tho outli Dostruoti |
| Conmaicstiu：s Force |  | CO 1 Convili－ od Cominisiom tions Unit | 1 Unit（icss CHIC：II JIMA）of <br> 1 Corivined Corizuicatiois unit | Oporational communications． Cour：unioations intollipanco | Vill opor ＂Comunic |
| ntincinsd Fcrecs |  |  | Soc 2 of CarDiv 4 <br> cilion：（＊3） <br> SETTSU（＊4）（TN Insortud i： <br> in＇s．） <br>  | ．． 111 bo specially arderod． | Will be d |
|  |  | ¢． | 11 trensports（NN Clangod to 11 tranaports．） | Till furnish supplies for operational forces． | Till ope ＂Supply＂ |

Notos：i．The assicxant of supply ships vill bo basod on ippended finilo 2 of $G$ ，＂Supply＂．
2．The petrol bumdery linc botioon fortion Foroo and Ssuth Scas Foroe rill run enstmost through
5．The copraticial boudery line botwon Southorn Forcc and Souti：Soas Force will bo the boundore－



2 Editcr＇s Notci Korisod by＂Errata＂isauod by Fleg Sccrotiry，Combinod FIcot as combinod plont Untresoor
（＊1）oto：－

## （1）大

（3）

（4）梘津





（5）
矢 風

ALLOCATION OE FURCES FUR SECCND TERIOD（DAI NI KI）OPERATIONS O （Up to about $D+40$ when the landing of the main ERITISH $H$ LAY

Paze
2／108
2／109

| FORCF： | COMMANDING OFFICER | STRENGTH | FRINCIPAL DUTY |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Main Rody |  | BatDiv 1 <br> 1 Fleot（less BatDiv 3 CruDiv 6， DesRon 1 orcept two DesDivs） One dostroyer of DesDiv 7 | Continuation of Pirst Peric |
| Task Foroe |  | 1 Air Fleet（less 4 CarDiv，des－ troyer division） <br> DesRon 1 （leas three Dealivas） <br> BatDiv 3 （less Sec 2） <br> CruDiv 8 <br> One DesDiv of DesRon 2，ariguno （＊1），Six transports． |  |
| Advansed Ex－ peditionary Foroo |  | 6 Fleet Six transports |  |
| Supply <br> Unit |  |  |  |
| South Seas Force <br> Supply Unit |  | ```4 Fleot CruDiv 6 2 Onit of 1 Cumbined Communi- ontions Thit DesRon 23 OBORO (*2) SETTSU (TN Crossed out in poncil.) 22 transports``` |  |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { CinC } \\ & 2 \text { Fleet } \end{aligned}$ | Crubiv 4 <br> Soo 2 of Batliviv 3 <br> JarDiv 4 （Jesis Sec 2） <br> One DosDiv of DesRon 1 <br> One DesDiv of Deskon 4 <br> aKAISHI ASAHI MARU <br> Five buttalions of Speeial <br> naval lancing party <br> Sone fishing boats | 1．Continuation of First Period（DAI IXKI）Oper－ ations，exploiting battl suceesses <br> 2．Conyoying at soa and landing of main Maley inveaion forces <br> 3．Invasion of koy points in METHEREANDS INDIES <br> 4．Defense of occupied koy points in tho PHILIP－ PINES |
| Air Force |  | 11 Air Fleot（leas Airflot 22 and 36 attaek planes） Two battalione of speeial naval landine party |  |
| Submarine Force |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { SubRion } 5 \\ & \text { SubRion } 6 \text { (less one SubDiv) } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Netherlands Indies Forod |  | ```Floot (less one element) Crubiv 5 DesRon 2 (loss one destroyer division) Dosion 4 (less one destroyor division)' AlrFlot 11 Elght patrol planss.``` |  |
| Philippines Force |  | One olmont of 3 Flest （ITV Crossed out in pencil．） <br> 3 Southern Bxpoditionary <br> Fleet（TN Insertod in ponoil．） |  |
| Malay Force |  | 1 Southern inpooditionery Fleet CruDiv 7 DonRon 3 <br> Asplot 12 Soc 2 of 17S＊＊（TIT Crossed out in puncil．） <br> TATSUMIYR（＊3）NART（＇TN In－ sertod in pencile） |  |
|  | 秋人要 | 風等 | 原乐 |

TERIOD (DAI MI KI) OPEKATIONS OF FIRST PHASE (DAI ICHI DAN) OFERATIQNS binding of the main BRITISH $H$ LAY invasion forces has been oompletod)



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2/109

Separate Table 2

ALLOCATION OF FGRCES FOR SECOND YERIOD (DiI NI KI) OPRRATION
(Up to abeut D 40 when the landing of tho main BRITISH MAI

| FORCE | COMMANDING OFFICER | STRENGTH | Pr |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| - |  | DesRon 5 <br> SubRon 4 <br> One SubDiv of SubRon : <br> Airflot 2? <br> 36 attack planes <br> ASAHI <br> MUROTO (*1) |  |
| Supply Unit |  | 35 transports |  |
| Northern Force <br> Supply <br> unit | Cinc <br> 5 Floet | ```5 Fleet (KIKU) (*2) CHICHI JINA Communications Unit (CHICHITSÜ) Five transports``` |  |
| Commeroe <br> Dostruotion Onit | CO 24 Squadron (SENTAI) | 24S** <br> One transpert | - - |
| Communications Furce | CO 1 Combinod Communication Unit | 1 Unit (less CHICHI JINA Comminioations Unit) of 1 combinod ©anmunications Unit. | Continuation o (DAI IKKI) Op |
| Attached Forcos |  | Sec 2 of CarDiv 4 <br> CH IYODA <br> SETTSU (TN Insorted in ink.) <br> Yakaze <br> 13 transports |  |
| Noto |  | Sane as for First Period (DAI JKKI) | Oporations |


Noto: The symbri * indioatos an exaot RGMACI transliteration of the originai RANA.

I NI KI) OPERATIONS OF FIRST PHASE (DAI ICHI DAN) OFERATIONS
ho main BRIT ISH MALAY invasion forcos hes boen omploted)

axI) Oporations
dai MMA.
allocation of forces for third period (mai sam ri)opreaftons of firist phise (dil ichi din) operations
(Op to and af Southorn Pifgt Ptoso (DiI ICHI DiNS) Oparaticnis)


:

## Separato Table 3 (Continuod)

allocation of forces for thitd period (dai ant li) aperations of pirst phase (dai icit
(Up to and of Sowtizern First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Opgrat lons)


Notes The symbol ** aftor a conventional sign or abberriation indioatos that thi reproduction of that appearing in the original dooument.
(*1) eto:-
(1) 下 保

Separato Tabl: 3 (Continuod)
allocation of forces for third period (mai ant gi) operations of first phase (dai Iche
(Up to ond of Sostifern First Phase (DAI ICBI DAN) Opgrat Onn)

| FORCE | COMMANDIM OFFICER |  | STRENOTH | PRINCIPAL DUTY |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Northern Foree |  | CLIC <br> 6 FPoot | $\begin{aligned} & 5 \text { Flout } \\ & \text { (KIKV (*1) } \\ & \text { CHICHI JIM Commai- } \\ & \text { oatiras Unit (Cis } \\ & \text { CHIT } \% \text { ) } \\ & \text { Five transports } \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Commoroc Destruotion Unit |  | CO 24 <br> Squadron <br> (SENTAI) | 24 S** One transport | , |
| Commmications Force |  | co 1 combined Communioations Unit | 1 Unit (lues CHIMEI JILM Commaications Unit. $)$ of 1 Combinod Commanioations Unit | Oontinuatich of (DAI III EI) opera |
| Attachod Forces |  |  | Sec 2 of carDiv 4 SETTSU CHIYCOA YARAZE 13 transports |  |
| Sotes |  | with First P | (DAI IIKXI) Oporatione |  |

Notes The symbol w* aftor a conventional sign or abbeepiation indioat os that th reproduction of that appearing in the original dooument.
(*1) eto:-
(土) K 复

For thitd prriod (dai mil gix aperatians of first phase (dai ichi dan)opreations ip to and of Sortidern First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) opprations)

| Mandin orpicer | Strencth | PRINCIPAL DUTY | OUTLINE Of OPERATIONS | REARKS |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { CLaC } \\ & 6 \text { FPoot } \end{aligned}$ | ```8 Floot (KINV (*1) CHICHI JINA communi- oatimas Unit (CHF CIIT(N) Five transports``` | Gontinuation of Seomd Period (DAI HI II)Operations |  |  |
| CO 24 Squadron (SEMTAI) | 24 sex. |  |  |  |
| CO 1 come bined Comamioations Unit | 1 Unit (luas chichi JIMM Commmications Unit.) of 1 come bincd Commmioations Unit |  |  |  |
|  | Sec 2 of carDiv 4 <br> SETTSU <br> CHIYODA <br> yaraze <br> 13 transports |  |  |  |

## ned with First Period (DAI TKKI) Oparathons

** aftor a oonventional sign or abbeeriation indicatos that this is an exaot
on of that appearing in the original dooument.

Page
Separate Table 4



| IOI IN PREPRRWTON CISIVE ACTION - 1 fatters will be as ibod by dootrine.) | MLLOCATION IN PREPARTTION FOR DECISIVE ACTION - 2 (Other matters will be as presoribed by dootrine.) |  | ALLOCATION IN PREPARATION FOR DECISIVE ACTION - 3 (Other matters will be as pessoribed by doctrine.) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Outline of Operations | Strength | Outline of Operations | Strength | Outlino of Operations |
| Fiot seourity will be mainuned in the western part the INLiPidD Sea and the cire operation supported. pending on the situation, bortie will be inede at an propriato tine. | BatDiv 1 <br> 1 Fleet (less BatDiv 3). <br> CHIYODA <br> :irFlot 11 | Support will be given the Task Force or Advance Forco by making a sortie at on appropriate time. | BatDiv 1 <br> 1 Fleet (less BatDiv 3) <br> CHIYODA <br> Airflot 11 | 1. Cover will bo provided for the Task Force or idvance Force. The force will try to rospond instantly to given situations and maneuver as guide for all forces. <br> 2. When destruction of eneiny air forces hat not proved complete, the greater part of the fighter planes will be concentrated on airoraft oarriers accomponying the fleet. |
| pport will be rendered the prations of South Seas rce and the aur forces by advanoe at the appropriato <br> into the onemy area. main operations. <br> bept where necescary, neuvers will be kept outde the effective range of ony base airplanes. | $\begin{aligned} & 2 \text { Fleet } \\ & \text { BatDiv } 3 \\ & \text { CarDiv } 4 \end{aligned}$ | Sane as Allocation in Preparation for Decisive Action - 1 . | 2 Fleet <br> BatDiv 3 <br> CarDiv 4 | The force will maneuver out of range of strong enerly air attacks and wait the approaoh of the enemy invasion force into the vicinity of ons of our key points. It will then move. out, locate and destroy the enemy invasion foree. It will manouver so as to decoy the enemy fleet into the area where the Main Body is located. |
| Patrol and defense will be riotly carried out. Using omarines, recomaissance aplanes, light vessels, otn, $\theta$ forces will co-operate th Mdvanced Expeditionary roe, the air forces, eto, in ashing enemy plans for seiz$s$ advance bases and building stallations. <br> The rear area foroes will Brol with airplanes and bohasers, etc, the areas in ich the idvance Forcs (Main dy) is moneuvering. They hl also be responsible for utrailizing attacks of enern marines, and when necessary by will establish and secure Crol lines for air defence tweon onemy adrance air ses and these forces. <br> The patrol forces of other sas will concentrate all rength not roguired for eir oreas in the zone of in operations. | 4 Fleet <br> SubRon 4 <br> SubRon 5 <br> 5 Floet (KIKU) | 1. Cne element will co-operate in the base air forces operations and be responsible for the security and protection of idvance Force and finin Body. It will also prepare against the attacks of eneny invasion force, and counterattack and destroy it. <br> 2. Otherwise same as Allo-pation-1. | 4 Fleet | 1. The enemy will be intercepted in the vicinity of a key point and a counterattack delivered. In addition, patrol planes will be used to co-operate with the Adranood Expeditio ary Force and oontact with the ormin Ploot maintained. <br> 2. Then it is no longer nocessary to consider the enemy invasion force, surpr raide will be made on the onemy floet with the full strongth of submarine and othor forces. <br> 3. Whon the cnemy base air forces are very cotivo, an cloment of the submarines and reconnaissanoo seaplanos will coooporate in the aotion of tho baso air forces. <br> 4. Othorwise samc as Allocations - 2 . |

The patrol forces of othor oas villl concontrate all rength not roguired for eir areas in the zone of in operations.


SLLOC.TION OF FORCES FOR IM:

| FORCE | COBMARDING OFFICER | PRINCIPAL DUTY | ILLOC:TION IN PREP.R.TION FOK DECISIVE AETION-1 (Othor mattore will to as proceribod by dcotrino.) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Strongth | Outline of Oporations |
| Idvrinood Expodition rxy Forco | $\left\|\begin{array}{l} \text { Cinc } \\ 6 \text { Floot } \end{array}\right\|$ | 1. Obscrvation of and attack on onomy floot <br> 2. Comoperation in baso rir force operations <br> 3. Deoisive notion | 6 Floct | An olamont will obsorvo th onomy floot. Tho major clomont will bo rosponsibl for provonting onomy dom ploymont to soizo advence air basos and build instol tions. |
| Garrion f.in Forso | Cinc.: <br> 1 sir? <br> Floct | 1. Support of South Sons Foree or Northorn Forco <br> 2. Scizuro of oir suporiority <br> 3. Decisive action | 1 Air Floot <br> (loss ČarDiv 4) | An cadvance will be nodo as tho approprinto tino into the onomy mifin opcrations aroa, Raidstrill bo mado on boy air points on the outor flemks of tho ourary and on airorart orrriors. The forco will be rom sponsible for roinforaing tho fightor plenes oporating cgainst tho advenco attock beses of the onomy forcos striving to soizo koy points. |
| Brise far Forcos | $\left\lvert\, \begin{aligned} & \text { cinc } \\ & 11 \text { hir } \\ & \text { Fleot } \end{aligned}\right.$ | 1. Pr.trol <br> 2. Support of South Secs Forco or Northorn Force <br> 3. Soizuro of atr suporiority <br> 4. Decisivo e.otion | 11 Nir Flcot (loss on clemont) | 1. Co-operntion will bc offootod with Idvinood Ex poditionary Forco, South Sons Foroo, oto, and attnoles mado on doploying onomy base air forcos ond on onemy forcos attrokin? koy points. In nddition, countorattrocks to tho onaryं air cttcoks wrill bd mido. <br> 2. Tho ronr base air forcos will patrol the if in which tho $\Lambda d v i n c o$ For (Hrin Body) is oporctinc. |
| Bouthern Forco | cinc 3 Flect | Southorn Area oporations | 3 Floct <br> 1 and 3 Soum thern $\mathrm{Br}-$ poditionery Flocts (TM Entorcd in pencil.) ASSHI <br> ASAHI MERO inUROTO <br> Soven bettelions of spocisl ni:vel Inding, perty | Contimuation of Southorr: Aroc. oporctions |
| (*1) | $\operatorname{etcs}-1$ | prise ralds (kishū) | kishū | 3) Kishū |

*LLOCTION OF FORCES FOR IMRHREPTION (YOGEKI)

| ILLOC:TION IM PREP R.TION FOR DECISIVE AOTINN-1 (Othor mattors will to as proseribod by dectrino.) |  | ALLOC.TION IN PREP:RITION FOR DECISIVE CTION-2 (Othor mettors will be sis proscribod by doctrino.) |  | allocition in preparation FOR DECISIVE LCTIOHE3 (Othor nettors will bo na proscribed by doctrino.) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| rongth | Outlino of Oporstions | Strongth | Outlino of Oporntions | strongth | Outilino of Oporctio |
| 1oot | An olamont will obsorve tho onony floot. Tho major olomont will bo responsiblo for proventing onony doploymont to soizo advinco air basos and build installntions. | 6 Floot | An olomont will bo rom spansiblo for observation of and ettack on onomy oir besos. The nejor olenont will be rcsponsiblo for obsorriny loceting and attacking the onony foot and invesion forco. | 6 Floot | An olanant will ondoo forco tho onory floct the aroa uhere the o battiler hes book plimex major olonont will ne punted attaoks. Wher struction of tho onor forces has not provec ploto, an olomont of sulmerinos will cooor in the baso air forec |
| ir Floct <br> s3 ČerDiv 4) | in edrance will be nedo at tho approprinte tinc into the onemy mafo opcrations aroa Roidstrill bo mado on koy oir points on tho outor flanks of tho oratity and on nirorift, orrriors. The forco will be rom sponsiblo for reinforcing tho fightor plenes oporating cgainst tho odvanco attrok breos of the onony forcos striving to soizo koy points. | $\begin{aligned} & 1 \text { nir Floot } \\ & \text { (loss CcrDiv } \\ & \text { 4) } \end{aligned}$ | IEncuvers will bo conductod outside the offootivo rengo of oncny air porror. Tho oncry invesion forco will bo c.tticked in nerrow wators; tho onory freot will bo nitt cickod att on opportimo time, | $\begin{aligned} & 1 \text { Nir Floot } \\ & \text { (loss } \\ & \text { CarDiv 4) } \end{aligned}$ | 1. Hanoutrors will be outsido tho effoctivc of onamy oir r.ttack, forco will alipait the of tho onary cerricr forco. in cdvanco wri nicdo at tho approprit The forco will pertis tho oporations of Ldr Expcditioncry Forco air foroo, and ntteck dostroy tho onorit': <br> 2. Enany ourrior air will bo ettrcckod and troyod boforo the ono ons:god. |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { hir Floct } \\ & \text { ss on clo- } \end{aligned}$ $t)$ | 1. Co-operntion will bo offootod with Advincod Expoditionary Force, South Sons Forco, ote, and attroks mado on doploying onomy base oir foroos end on onomy forcos attacking koy points. In addition, counterattecks to tho onony air c.ttc.cks will be m ${ }^{-d o}$ <br> 2. Tho ronr basc oir forces will patrol tho eroas in which tho $\Lambda$ dvenco Forco (IIcin Body) is opor r.tinf. | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 11 .ir Floot } \\ & \text { (Ioss rx } \\ & \text { olomont) } \end{aligned}$ | In cddition to contiruing tho dutios shom in Allooction in Proparation for Doolsivo Iotion-1, the forcos aro rosponsiblo for soouting, triaking omd nttroking tho onony floot end invosion force. | 21 rir <br> Floot (loss <br> cn olomont) | 1. Tho forcos rill sponsiblo for r.ttroked cncriy baso dir forcos invision forco, otc. the onory floct has orithin attacking rang will ropontodly attoc in co-oporntion with Expodition:ry Forco. <br> 2. Znony corrior air riill bo rettrakod and fad bofore tho onornv 1 gagod. |
| Floct and 3 Souharm Bruditionery lects (TN ntorcd in encil.) i/HI SAHI IEPU RROTO sven bett-luns of pocicl nc:vrl inding. perty | Continuation of Southorn nroc. oporctions | 3 Flcct <br> 1 and 3 Sou thorm Exm peditionary <br> Floct (TII <br> intorod in <br> poncil.) <br> ©SPHI <br> : E HI $\mathrm{H}: \mathrm{RU}$ <br> IUROTO <br> Scven battcla <br> ions of <br> specirl <br> nsvil 1rnde <br> ing party | Continuation of Southorn iror. opcrations | 3 Floot <br> 1 ind 3.6ean thorn Bx poditionary <br> Flcots (TN <br> Entorod in <br> poncil.) <br> LSAHI <br> SSSHI MHU <br> YUROTO <br> Sown <br> brettcilions <br> of spocial <br> nevol 1 md <br> inf perty | Continuction of 8outh fron oparations |
| shū (3) hishū |  |  |  |  |  |

$S$ FOR INMMRCEPTION (YOGEKI)


Soparate Table 4 (Continuod)

| PORCE | $\begin{aligned} & \text { COMMANDIN } \\ & \text { OFFICERR } \end{aligned}$ | FRINCIPAL DUTY | allocation In preparation FOR DECISIVE ACTION-1 (Other matters will be as prescribod by doctrine.) |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Strength | Outline of Oporations |  |
| - |  | , | Eight patrol planos Elemont of 11 Air Floot |  |  |
| Camoroc <br> Dcstruction Unit | 0024 Squadror (SENTAT | Disruption or son triffie | 24 S** | In accordance with Outlino for Sea Traffic Destruction Operations |  |
| Communicatm ions Forcos | CO 1 <br> Combinod <br> Comanumi <br> cations <br> Onit | Operational communications and communications intclligence (TSUSHIN CHOHO) | 1 Combined Communioations Unit |  |  |
| Supply <br> Forces | under Diruct Cournend | Supply | Transports |  |  |
| Notes 1. Whon ohanging to thesc allocations during First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations will be revised by spocial order. <br> 2. Outline of doployment for the bese air force: ap Doployment aross as follows: |  |  |  |  |  |

(1) Whon the enemy is attacking in the MARSHALLS Area: the major element element-MARCUS Island, SAIPAN and TRUK Areas.
(2) When the enemy is attacking in the RABACL Area: the major olomont - s element - TRUK and MARSHALLS Areas.
(3) When the enemy is attacking in watcre east of JAPAN: the major elemer olement - MARCUS Island, SAIPAN and OMINATO Areas.
b. Deploynent deponds on the swift shift of the HIKOKITAI. However airoraft $c$ shift fighter plono units.
3. The assignment of supply ships is the same as in the allocatim of forces in Fir Operctions.
4. Special orders will be issued for other forces not listed above.

Note: The symbol $* *$ after a conventional sign or abbreviation indicates that this is an exact.

## 278/242/世ар

sllocation of forces for intriception (tocesi)

| IN PREPARATION SIVIV ACTIOM-1 ters will be as a by doctrine.) | ALLOCATION IN PREYARATION FOR DECISIVE ACTION-2 (Other mattors will be as presoribed by dootrine.) |  | allocation in preparation <br> FOR DECISIVE ACTION-3 (Othor mattors will be as proscribod by doctrino.) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Outline of oporations | Strength | Outinc of Operations | Strongth | outline of Operations |
|  | Eight patrol plines Ono oloment of 11 Air Floct |  | Eight patrol planos Onc elomont of 11 Air Floot |  |
| In accordanice with Outlino For Sea Traffic Destruction pperationa | 24 S** | Same as Allocational | 24 S** | Samc as Allocationm2 |
|  | 1 Combinod Communications Unit | Same as Allocation-1 | 1 Combined Communications Unit | Same as Allocetion-2 |
|  | Transports | Same as Allooation-1 | Transport | Sane as Allocation-2 |

FHALLS Area: the major element- - the MARSHALLS Area; one
Areas.
aUL Areaz the major cloment - SAIPAN Aroa; one
fast of JAPAN: the major element - TVIKY $\bar{O}$ Aroa; one
NATO Areas.
HIKOKITAI. However airoraft carriers are used to
the allocation of forces in First Phase.(DAI ICHI DAN)
listed above.
idicates that this is an exact reproduction of that appearing in the original document.


FATION OF FORCES FOR INTERCEPTION (YOGSAI)

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { ATION } \\ & \text { CN-1 } \\ & \text { be as } \\ & \text { ino.) } \end{aligned}$ | ALLOCATION IN PREPARATION FOR DECISIVE ACTION-2 (Other mattors will be as presoribed by dootrine.) |  | allocation in preparation <br> FOR DECISIVE ACTION-3 (Othor mattors will le as prescribed by doctrino.) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| of oporations | Strength | Outline of Oporations | Strongti | Outiline of Operations |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Eight patrol } \\ & \text { plenos } \\ & \text { Ono olonent } \\ & \text { of } 11 \text { sir } \\ & \text { Flcot } \end{aligned}$ | , | Eight patrol <br> planos <br> Onc elomont <br> of 11 Air <br> Flcot |  |
| Fice oith outlino affic Destruction | 24 S** | Samc as Allocation-l | 24 S** | Sano as Allocation-2 |
|  | 1 Combinod Communications Unit | Same as Allocation-l | 1 Combined Communications Unit | Same as Allocation-2 |
|  | Transports | Same as Allocation-1 | Transport | Same as Allocation-2 |

ICHI DAN) Operations, the formation of the Task Force
a: the major element - the MARSHALLS Area; one
the major cloment - SAIPAN Aroa; one
PAN: the major element - TOKYŌ Aroa; one
s.
F. However airoraft carriers are used to
ticm of forces in First Phase. (DAI ICHI DAN)
bove.
hat this is an exact reproduction of that appearing in the original document.

## Page

ALLOCATIOI OF FORCES FOR SECOND PHRSE (DAI NI MS) OPERETIONS
(Fron the conclusion of southorn First Phaso (DAI ICHI DAN) Oporations on)

| FORCES |  | COMMHDIIG OFFICER | STRENĠTH | PRINCIPAL DUTY | $\begin{aligned} & \text { OUTLINE } \\ & \text { OF } \\ & \text { OPER'TIIONS } \end{aligned}$ | REMARKS |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Yain } \\ & \text { Body } \end{aligned}$ |  |  | ```BatDiv l I Flcot (loss BatDiv 3 rnd CruDiv 6)``` | Support of ontirc operntions. |  |  |
| /dranco Foroo |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Cinc } \\ & 2 \text { Flcot } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 2 \text { Floct } \\ & \text { BctDiv } 3 \\ & \text { CcrDIV } 4 \end{aligned}$ | 1. Support of operations of Northern, South Sons and Southern Forces |  |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Crupior } \\ & \text { iir Force } \end{aligned}$ |  | cinc <br> 1 ir <br> FIcot | 2 Air Flect (less CarDit 4) | 2. Destruation of enomy task foroc. |  |  |
| Idvanced Expoditionery Forco |  | Cind <br> 6 Flect | 6 Flect | Contimuation of First Phaso (DiI ICHI DAN) Opcrations. | - |  |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Baso Alr } \\ & \text { Forces } \end{aligned}$ |  | CinC <br> 11 Air <br> Flcot | II Lir Floct (less one olow mont) <br> Tro battilions of spocial neval landing perty. | Potrol of ncoossary aroos; bosc cir combet. |  | - |
| Southorn Forco |  <br>  <br>  <br>  <br> ¢ <br> ¢ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Cinc } \\ & 3 \text { Flect } \end{aligned}$ | 3 Floct <br> 1 Southern Expeditionsyy <br> Floct (TI Entorcd in pencil.) <br> 3 Southern Expeditioncry. <br> Floot <br> SubRon 4 <br> SubRon 5 <br> -K.ISHI <br> SS.HI M'RU <br> Eight patrol planos <br> Fivo battelions of speoial <br> nevel landing perty <br> :S:HI <br> nưROTO <br> Ono oloment of 11 irr. Flaet | - I. Kopping up of enomy remnonts in occuppied koy nrons; checking of cnomy penctration; defenso snd stcbiliz:tion of key points. <br> 2. Disruption of cnemy soc troffic off northwest const of :USTR.III: and in INDIAN 000 m . <br> 3. Depending on tho siturtion, e.ttecks on cnomy air beses in northern s.USTRILI: |  |  |
| South Sors | 宝 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { CinC } \\ & 4 \text { Floot } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 4 \text { Flcet } \\ & \text { CruDiv } 6 \end{aligned}$ | 1. Patrolling and strengthening of defenses in sulth Seos heca: |  | - |



Notc：The symbol＊＊after a conventional sign or abbreviation indicates that this is an exact reproduotion of that appearing in the original document．

8 （＊1）etc：－
（1）木空
（2）天風


Notc: The symbol ** after a conventional sign or abbreviatian indscates that this is an exact reproduotion of that appearing in the original document.

Pase 2/120 124

Bditorir N t.a: Decurint pas.s 2/120-12: inolusive.comprisu the orrite. indicatod throughout the text in translator! a notes.. Dooument pagce e/125-160 duplicate'2/61-9c (G, Supply) and are omitted. Document page 2/151 (A:pended Tablo 5, Organization of Supply Forocs of Combined Feet) follow 2/94.

Page COMBINED FLEBT ULTRISECRET OPER:TION ORDER 2
$2 / 152$

Flegship NLGATO, SATKI FANX 7 Hod $41 \quad 7$ Not 41

Yáialloto, Iboroku
Commender in Chisf, Corbinde Plest

145 of 600 copios

CONBINED FLEET ORDER
First preparationa for war
Y Day 8 Deoember

COMBINED FiLEET ULTRASECRET OPERSTION ORDER!
Page $2 / 155$

Flagohip ILAGATO, of HABHRA SHTMA (*1) 8.Doonil

Yamamoto, Iasoroku
Commander in Chiet
Crmbiabd;Eleot
(1) etosm
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柱島

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278/242/mab

## COMBINED FLEET ORDER

## Operatione to destroy sea traffio, in addition to nomforming to Combinod Fleet Ultraseoret Operation Order i, R, Will accord with tho followings

1. Prococurc against enemy shippinge
a. In submarino warfare against armed merohant shipa; onomy marthips and shipiping esoortod by airplanes, our policy will be to sink all ships without warning and without ragain to areas of operations. Unarmed merohont ships within 500 mautioal miles of enomy coasti and those operating botween BAMAII anu the wost oocst of the ONITED STATES may bo dealt with as above. In all other oases, however, ualess the situation makes suah aotion impossible
Page passenger and orew will be given time to oscapo.
b. In operations of surface ships, a basic rule will. be to comply with ostablished regulations and to conform to standard procedurc. (TN Last olause foidelined in blue pencil.) When shipa are unavoidably sunk before thoy aro boarded, all offorts will be made to save lives, insofar as oonditions permit.
c. Operations of airplenes will conform to Paragraph a.
2. (TA BiO.) Prooodure toward noutral shipping.
a. Exoopt for the shipping of the following neutral countries, estabilishod rogulations will be followed, Palikich, NORTHY, DERURK, GREECE.
b. Ships of the oountrice named above will be treated as onemy shlpa.
o. In submarine operatione within 300 nautical miles of enemy coasts, ehips whose neutrality is not olearily indicated may be sunk.
d. Operations of airplanes wdil oonform to Paragraph o.
3. Prooedure after boarding
a. - A eaptured vessel will be whenever possible taken to a prise port (YOKOsuKi, SABEBO), or if that is imposinible, to the neareat base of operations. If condition do not permit eitiver procedure, disposition of the ship will be made after suitable measures are taken for personnel and oargo.
b. Military personnel, oivilian employees, high rianking mombers of orow, teohnioiane, important government offloials. eto, of enemy countries or of the CHIANO KhI-SHEP adainiatration will be taken prisoner. The prisonets will be aent to JAPAN.




Doc. No. 17
Page 1.

INTRRNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUHAL FOR THE FAR EAST
$\left.\begin{array}{l}\text { CITY OF YASHIIGTON } \\ \text { DISTRICT OF COLUIBIA } \\ \text { UNITED STATES OF ARERICA }\end{array}\right\}$

I, Hobort =. Curts, Lieutenant, USNR, File Nunber 290080, upon osth, ralce the following statement:

1. I am on duty in the Office of Naval Intelligence, Far Eastern Section, Navy Department, noom 4623, Washington, D. C. lify residence ectress is 3626 \%indom Place, N. Y., Washineton, D. C.
2. My official duties include the obtaining, translation and custody of documents captured from Japanese sources. I have studied the Japanese language and have quelified for the performance of duties involving the reading and speaking of Japanese.
3. The Japonese cruiser NACHI was sunk in Ennila Bay 5 November 1944 by plnnes from the USS LEXIIIGTON. In the Intter Dirt of larch, 1945, reports by pilots of circraft attached to the LUXINGTON were used in obtaining a rough fix of the locstion of the NACHI. A sesrch wes mide by YP 421 which located and buoyed the wreck. A special party of officers including Lleutenant ( $j g$ ) Albert Altman, USNR, and nyself, ras sent as in Intelligence tern from the flcet Intellifence Center, Maniln, for the purpose of obtaining the ships' papers from the hull of the NACFI. On 2 April 1945, which was the third dey after the beginning of diving operctions, salvage divers brougtt up fron the NACHI a bundle wrapped in burlap which they hed found in the charthouse of the NACHI. Upon surfacinf, the divers delivered the bundle to Lieutenant Altman and me. 时e took the bundie to kianila in a crash boat and delivered it to our Intelligence Team Headquarters at 77 Delpan Street, Manila, on the night of 1. 2 April 1945. The burale mas then opened by nyself, Lieutenant ( jg ) Altran, Lieutenant ( jg ) B. R. Carlson, and Lieutenent ( jg ) G."T. Wattles. "re mede a precis of the IIACHI documents contained in the bundle. Te tren stowed the docunents in mail bags and had them taken to Tolosa by Lieutenant Lawrence F. \#bb, USNR. He then transferred the bags to Captain Arthur H. McCollum, USN, the 7th Fleet Intelligence Officer, tho caused the documents to be nicro-filned hecause they were in an advanced stage of ceterioration resulting fron prolonged

?
$\rightarrow$

I.P.S. No. 17

St turant of sourcc chal iuthentitiox
I, __ Yasuif TATiNGBE horoty cortify
that I an officinlly connectod with the Japenese Govornnont in tho follorin, capc:aty: $\qquad$ Chiof of Repatriation Soction of the $\qquad$ - Squinistratiy Hivisione Scoond Dcyobilization Burequ $\qquad$ and that as such ofricial I hed custody of the docuront horeto attachad consisting of 25E, pagar, lated 5 Novenger, 194, and described as follorrs: $\qquad$ Jepancec Conbinca Fleet Fop Socrat Oporation
 I furthor corting that tho attached rccord and docunont is part of an ofilicial. docunent of the Japanoso Governriont, and thet it mas part of tho officiel archivos and files of the following incned ninistry or depertment (spocifying also the file numbor or citation, if any, or and othor official desigmation of the rognler location of the docunont in the archives oi filcs): Jnngese Combined Fleot Hecidquartorse

HTHS Nicato Forrer Novy Ministryl.
Slgucd at $\qquad$ Tokyo on this _22 din of dugust , 1246.


Witnose: Y. whyoro $\qquad$
SRiL
The Chici of Ropatriation Sootion Orficinl Cupacity

## Stutonent of Offictol Pyocuremont

I, $\qquad$ DOUCLIS L L TMEDORF $\qquad$ , horoby cortify that I ans nanocirted with tho Gonurc.l Heudquartors of the Suprazo Cormandor for thn illlivd Porcors, and that tho abovs dusoribod cortificate tiss obtained by inc fron the abovo signod ofíici.ll of the Japmos: Govommont in the conduct of $x$ of oficial busjnoss.

Signced at Tokyo. Jopan on this
$\qquad$
30 doy of duruat, 2946.
DOUCLES Le MiLDORT Nine lat Lt., Info.



Page 3
CAPTURED M.P MA'TERIAL

|  |  |  | JICOOA |  | DATE OF | EL:DSE OF TMuE |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ITEM | NMME | PLiCE | Whicibe | D.TE OEPLAN | FIRST COVER | 9 Dec, 4.] to: |

1. Truk Islends

Dublon Island $5478 \quad 15 \mathrm{Apr} .1940$
Eten Island 8396
Eten Islend 6053
Fefan Island
Otta \& Yor
Polle Islend
Tol Islend (19,4
Uman Islend 7838
Feh. 19:40
15 inr .2410
15 - or . 2.2 .5
$\therefore 5$. $\mathrm{r}, \mathrm{s}, 340$
9 Jan. 194232 deys
4 Fob. 194426 months (US)

- Fot. 2.40

10 ing. 1940
2. Wotje Ielend $5485 \quad 10$ Aug. 194031 Jen. 194255 deys
3. Ponape Island

Jokaj Mt. $6055 \quad 10$ Lue. 1940
Nanu Sector $5483 \quad 10$ Coi. 19, 0
Napoli Sector $5 \% 74 \quad 3$ Scp. 19.97
Param Sector $8550 \quad 100 \mathrm{ct} .1940$
Tolenot Peak
Sector
5i84 $\quad 15 \mathrm{Lpr} .1940$
7 Fcb. 194426 months
4. Palau Islands

Koror Section $5481 \quad 10$ Oct. 1937
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Arumongui
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Peloliu 8271
30 IEr. 194428 months
5. Pagan Island 8273

Nov. 194025 Way 194430 monthe

ENCLOSUPE (A) TO Op-23-F-3 MEMO OF 3 July 1945.
U. S. NAVAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELIIGENCE CEMTER

RECEIVING ETATION
Washingto:1, 25, D. C.

RHOTOGRAPHIC ITTPLLTCFMCE SPECIAL REPONT NO_S-1-46

 ectual instre.ilations.

REFERENCE : (a) Cruiser pincogranhic sortie No. PH-5 dated 31 Jamuary 1942.
ENCLOSUQE : (A) Conmindar itiraref Rottio Erceo, US Pecific Flect Photom

(B) funotated obligue phurderpin of Southern end of Islend.
(c) Annotated oblique onotegraph of Contral section of Island.
(D) Capturud plan : $:$ Wctjo fitoll.

This sortie was completci.y repnrted on in july, 1942, and the repults recorded in Photogrephice Titeejigenes Repot lo, ? of tho Ineclifgence

 shown in photographs with the Pre-wri suprianc ins, (Eice?, "D").

 Nonc of the positions o: the southera eri ris the isjarre showd ieftuite
 southern DP battor: howevi, kat nut hoon ormencien ir sruil as bave



 is not choar enough to shm rindion of norereuntion is in progress,





 several gun nostiinns visitic on the phocos buit rust. situen on the maps.

For structures other than gunc, the mine zgeeos ninsuly with tho photogrephe in ell reas wherc photozruphe ric of suitcicni,? cood quelity to permit chorking. The roed rewrk is wore sonnicto then thet shown on the map, end eirficld taxireys have beor. extended fux ther souih than the mep indicates.

## DOC. NO. 6254

Page 5.
The following teblo showe the comparison in dotail:

## TABUIAR COLPARISON OF MAP AND PHOTOGRAPHS

## 昆

1. 

SHOHN ON M4D
 with adjacent peiver jiant, munitions storago uri kirracks area designated or: Map by letter "Al".
2. Southern 3 gun DP Battory With adjacent power plart, munitions storego and barracks area, dosifinated on map by letter "B".

2a. Not shom.
3. Blockhouses.
4. Minor gun positions, two on north end of island, two on south end.
5. Listening "CD".
6. Radio transmitter station.
7. Heavy oil storage
8. Power plant near oil storage
9. Jetty.

PHOTC COMFTRMATTON
Battery conemode innenre com-
 cetcr in pesidizens with re:pect to tion lottery asp shown on tho mip, but phows aro not, alcar onovin to conrira their function. Tho whole botiny focition is slifbtiv fourther south then slowin on the wep.

Battery confirmed. $A l l$ three posittions arecirr complete, two are oarontlefd yitich nod and oocupied.
 Batio:y Ga. and manrition storegt: s"runtu:ce ero crapletc and as shiemn. it is impossizile to confirn Lurrariks aros erd powor piant due to eaple of the photogrt:phe.
A. sinc? 251 diamcter revetment, empiy. arpiears sonth of Hattery B. This Iater oeceme a C.D. gan.

Confirmed.
at loast tiro confirmed on south end of inland. fihure are piobebly more ainuq trerich netomork. Two coniarmed on nertin ead.

Small position of some sort.
Confirmed.
Heavy earth revotment, probably arcuñ undererounü turk.

There are builns.age in this location. Function inconsiriled.

Confirmed.
$\mathrm{NO}_{2}$ $\qquad$
10. Sceplanc ramp.
11. Northern fuel storage.
12. Airficld.
13. Road nctwork.

PHOTO CONFIRMMSTION

## Confirm:d.

lirea cleered of brush. Two toror-iike structures above ground. No definite confirmation.

Confirmed.
All reade shown on map, including these shom in dashed iince, arc in exietance. Sevorel eddition?l roads not shown on map.
/s/ G. G. Coloman.
C. G. GCLEMLN.




## QRHED ISLAND:

I. road is visible for two or three miles parallel to and near the south beach. A numbor of very smell buildinges arc loceted along or near this road, and several othere nay be secn in emall clearings on other parts of tho islend. Thero is nothing risiblo of sufficiont sizc to suggost military instaliations, but a moderato dogrec of cemouflage would suffice to make such featurcs indistinguishable on these distant obliques. A $40^{\prime}$ boat soen near the south shorc is moving.

## ECMEDIO ISLAND:

Nothing to report. The scalc of thesc photogranhs is $\mathbf{c - 1}, \mathbf{c}-2$, too small for intorprctation. C-3.

## ENE CHERUTAKKU ISLLND:

Same ac abovo.
$\mathrm{C}-2, \mathrm{C}-4$.
HEICHFN ISLAND, IWE CROUP, \& N, E., TIP OF HETONERAKKU IS, same as above.

C-5, C-6. C-7.

\author{

- 4 - (Firal pego) <br> Enclosure (A) to Photo Officor, Airbatfor, Itr. to Comairbatfor, Conf. Ecrial (L-02) of Fcb. 9, 1942.
}
photographic reconnitcince \& intenpethtion section
F4A-3/EG60Gpe INTELLIGENCE CENTEA, PLOIFIC OCEIN ARELS Sorial 011

CONFIDENTIAL
July 7, 1942.
SUPFLFMEFT TO PHOTOGRAPHIC INTGLIGENCE REDORT NO. 3
SOTTIE: NO, PH-5
LOCGLITY. WOTJE ATOLL (IARSHLLL ISLAKDS) Lat. $9^{\circ} 25^{\prime}$. .- LONE. $170^{\circ} 15^{\prime}$ E.
Dato taken: Januery 31, 1942.
Mean Tine of photogrephy: GCT 2130.
Camara Focel Lenpth: 92". lititudns 500-1500 fect. Contret Scele: Hot known. Kap Rofcrence: K. O. Chart No. 5428. Quality: Foor obliques. Laet Cover: Honc.

SIMSAFY: (MOTJE ISLAIS)
In addition to foatires roted in Rpt. Bo. 3, the following deteile wore obecrocd: One plare, additional gun criolaccmenti, and building on verious parts of tho isiand.

## AIRCRAFT:

Ono unidentificd plenc if scen et the center of the south

Thoto
Rofercnce
$\frac{\text { Numburs }}{\text { C-22 }}$ cdge of tho landing fielci.

## DEFENSES:

Additional gun omplacoments are scin at the folloi:ing locatione: 1 crplecoment at the IW tip of the islem; 2 probablc amplacements on the beach NE of the NW turn around; 2 cmolacements in the NE scction of the islend just wost of the belt road; 2 amplacoments (probablo machino gun) south of the fivo-inch eun cmplacemonts on tho windizard boach.
$\Lambda$ Iine of berbed virc ie obscrved along the beech at the SW tip of the island.

C-20
C-20

BUILDINGS AND OTHER FACILITIES:
In the Nin corncr of tho islard aro nine well-camouflegod buildIngs of epproximetaly the same sizc, erranged on oither side of the road running through the vonded erce. Aiso in this erca, ncer the cest edge of the Foode, is another eriall building.
litjceent to the main hanger at the seaplane base ere two largo buildíge, probably shons or storagi, and nine small buildings.

A emell flat building, toppod by a towor, west of the apron and in linc with the hargars at the eirfield, is probably the operations buildirg and the control toricr.

In tho wooded area in the nerth section of the island are one large end scven small buildinge, scattercd on oither side of the belt road. The lirge buildirg is at the junction of this road and the road runnine woat to the landing fleld.

In tho mooded (disporsal) aroe south of the fiold are five buildings ir addition to the cighteon previously reported. Fest C-23 of those, near the beach, is a. largo squarc building and tioo small buildings.

Enet of the NM-SE rumay, in th: contor of the ficld, is a notiork of ilight roctanglos, which nesy posaibly be sorvicing C-23 arean.

On the third islot NTN of WOTJE is locetod a picr-liko projection, which oxtonds from the northcre shorc less then half the distence acrose the channcl. This atruoture mey bo ofthor a bridgo- c-20 hcad uncer construction, or poseibly a eubuarine fueling dock, as a fucl tank and soviral buildings are ecin on the islct.

## 


I. Charlec G. Coleran, Ji., former Lieutenant, U. S. N. R., upon onth male the Collowing etintnuent:
I. I am Kesearch Analyst, Ykoto Ir.tellipence Center, United Statea Mr.vy Receivint Stetion, hashinfton, D. C. Rasidence edidress is 2505 jurns S. H., Wesilington, D. S.
2. My cfficiel duties include the ormaretion of photo intelligence roports. I have beon mgRiged in this woric since 1942 when I gradupted from the Neval Photographic Intellagonce School, Neval Air Station, Anacostia, D. C. I sorvod in amphibious forces and frouds in the North African, Sicilian, and Norranतy Invasions and in plenning for landinse in Kyushu, Japan. My duties were principally the tudy of aeriel photoprophs end the interpretation of coastal terrain and military and naval installations. I wes hespd of amplibious Ploto Intellipence Inita in the Sicilien end Hormandy inndings, and in the Kyushu oporations.
3. I lave jxamined the Japenese installation wap of Wotje Island, JICPOA Item tij486, Nevy Loc. No. 41, end I hisve compered. with the mep the aerial photogreph of tine sime aroa as that prasented by the mep. I heve reportad tinc rcaults of this comperison in Dhotopraphic Intellifenco Canter Speciel feport No. S-l-46. I have indicated on the aerial oblique photoeraphs, marked Bnclosures (b) end (c) to ?hotcerephic Intaliligence Center Speçal Report No. S-Im4E. in rad ink tre principal instailations visible
4. In Eeport $5-2-6$, , I present thr results of my $\epsilon$ xmination of mps of the Islands indicf.te? in that Report, includine Wotie Isiand, and of my oomparinon of each of such maje with tha United Strites Kaval Photom graphic Intelilifence Reports of the semn areas for the dates indicetec.
5. I hereby cartify thit the Reports e.s signed by me are truo and pccurete to the bnet of my knowledee and belief.
/8/ CHARITSG. COHEMAN, Ir.
Subseribed ond swom to bofore me this
25 dey of ituly 1946
LOLIAMIS J. BOBIMSOH Famo
(Status indicating pathority to administer oaths!

CAPTIAEH, USIR
Sgivice ijo. 52853

## IPTMRNAMIOIAL MILIMARY TRIMUNAL FOR THE FAR ERST

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U:ITZD STATFPS Oप' AMHPICA

I, Charlec G. Coleran, J:., former Lieutenant. U. S. N. R., upon onth male the following etatnacnt:
1. I am Researck Analyst, Proto Irtellipence Center, United States Mr.vy Roceivine Station, Washinfiton, D. C. Residence eddress is 2505 huris S. E., Weshiniton, D. S.
2. My cfficiel duties include the orparetion of photo intelligence reports. I have veen angaied in this work since 1942 when I greduated from the Keval Photographic Intellagonce School, Neval Air Station, Anacostia, D. C. I servad in ampizibious forces and eroups in the yorth Aprican, Sicilian, and Normandy Invasions and in plenninp for landinge in Kyushu, Japan. My duties were principally the study of aeriel photographe end the interpretation of coastal terrain and militiry and naval installations. I wes hesd of amphibious photo Intelligence Units in the Sicilimen end Hormandy lindinga, and in the Kyubhu oporetions.
3. I have jxamined the Japenese installation aap of Wotje Islend, JICPOA Item \(\operatorname{tis} 486\), Nevy Doc. No. 41, and I hise conmered with the mep the aeriel photogreph of tine sime aroa as thet presented by the mep. I heve reportad the results of this comperison in Dhotopraphic Intellifenco Center Sneciel Feport No. S-1-46. I have indiceted on the aerial oblique photopraphe, marked Bnclosures (b) end (c) to ?hotogrephic Inteliligence Genter Specłal Report No. Solm46, in rad ink the principal instailations visiblo•
4. In Eeport S-2-46, I present the resulta of my examination of maps of the Inlands indicftec in that Report, inciudine Wotie Isiand, and of ny oomparison of each of elich mays with the United St: tes Naval Photographic Intelligence Reports of the seme areas for the dates indiceted.
5. I hereby cortify thet the Reports ese signed by me ore true and pccureto to the best of my knowledge and belief.
/B/CHARIXSG. COLPMANEXI.
Subseri \(b_{\text {ed }}\) gne syorn to bofore me this 25 dey of euly 1946
\(\frac{\text { LISAMSSJ.ROSIHSOMT }}{\text { Famo }}\)
(Stiatus indiceting pathority to administor oaths!

CAPTAEN, US:IR
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\author{
From: Op-23-E-3. \\ To : \(\quad O_{\mathrm{F}}-23 . \mathrm{Y}\). \\ Via: \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{j}}^{\mathrm{j}} \mathrm{m} \mathbf{2 j} \mathrm{j}-\mathrm{F}\).
}

Subject: Captured Japanese Bace Plars; comparison with aerial phetographic coverane and reporis.

Encl: ( \(A\) ) List of Capturod Map liaterial.
(B) P.I. Special Ropuic No. \(\varepsilon-1 \cdots 46\).
(C) P. I, ipecial Report No. S-2-46.
1. Enclosure ( \(A\) ) indicatcd that the elspsed time from beginning of hostilities to the first earial photograrhic reconnaisance over subject arcas varied from 32 days 1,030 months. The shortest clansed time ( 32 days) hewweon beginning of hostilitios and first ploto cover wa: in tre Truk Islands. However, the quality of photography was pocr and clouds obscured areas of interest referred to in plers.
2. The Island of Wotje was photocraphed 53 deys efter hostilities began. This photograrhy iadivetes that installations referred to in pians verc operative at that time (See Enclosure (B)). Attention is invited to the fect that mochanical drawing practices usualiy indicate instaliations aiready constructed in solid lines, and piemed construction in dottod lines. This being true, the power plant, tiansmittere, conmend post and block house wore comnlete us of 10 iugurt 1940, the date indicated in plans.
3. Enclosure (E) shows that planned construction indicated in captured document \(\# \mathrm{FIICPOA} 5485\) was completed at time of initiel photo cover.
4. Enclocure (C) indecates thet 41 out of 53 installations plarned before the war were coafi:med by war time photography.
S. T. Dibrell

DOc. No. 6254
Page 3
GAPIURED MEP MATERTAL
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline ITEM & NLME PLACE & JICPOR MMBER & DATE OF DIAN & \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { DATE OF } \\
\text { FIRET COVER }
\end{gathered}
\] & ELADSE OF TMAE
\(\qquad\) \\
\hline \multicolumn{6}{|l|}{1. Truk Isiands} \\
\hline & Dublon Island & 5478 & 15 Apr. 1940 & & \\
\hline & Eten IsIand & 8996 & Fob. 1940 & & \\
\hline & Eton Island & 6053 & 15 Apr. 1940 & 9 Jan. 1942 & 32 deys \\
\hline & Fcfan Island & 5476 & 15 Amr . 19140 & & 32 day \\
\hline & Otta \& Mor & 5477 & 15 hisr. 1940 & \[
4 \text { Ficb, } 1944
\] & 26 months \\
\hline & Pollo Islend & 5475 & 10 Cut. 1940 & (US) & \\
\hline & Tol Island & 0054 & 12 Fer .1940 & & \\
\hline & Uman Islend & 7838 & 10 Aug. 1940 & & \\
\hline 2. & Wotje Island & 5486 & 10 Aug. 1940 & 31 Jan. 1942 & 55 deys \\
\hline \multirow[t]{6}{*}{3.} & Ponape Island & & & & \\
\hline & Jokaj wt. & 6055 & 10 Lug. 1940 & & \\
\hline & Namu Scetor & 5/83 & 10 0et. 1940 & & \\
\hline & Nepoli Sector & 51474 & 3 Sop. 1937 & 7 Fcb. 1944 & 26 months \\
\hline & Param Soctor . & 8.550 & 10 Oct. 1940 & & \\
\hline & Tolenot Peak Sector & 5404 & 15 Apr . 1940 & & \\
\hline \multirow[t]{7}{*}{4.} & Palau Islands & & & & \\
\hline & Koror Section & 5481 & 10 Oct. 1937 & & \\
\hline & Koror Soctor & 5807 & Unicted & & \\
\hline & Arumongui & 6207 & 10 0at. 9937 & 30 Lier. 1944 & 28 months \\
\hline & Peleliu & 5482 & 20 fug. 1940 & & \\
\hline & Peleliu & 82.70 & Nov. 1940 & & \\
\hline & Pcloliu & 0271 & Nov. 1940 & & \\
\hline 5. & Pagan Islend & 8273 & Nov. 1940 & 25 May 1944 & 30 months \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

ENCLOSURE (A) TO Op-23-F-3 MEMO OF 3 July 1945.
Page 4

\section*{PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE SPECLLL REPORT NO, S-1-46}

REFERENCE : (a) Cruiser photographic sortie No. PH-5 dated 31 Jemuary 192
ENGLOSURE : (A) Sonmender Aircraft Betije Fr co, US Pacific Flect Photographic Inte?liscnen roport No. 3, and supplement.
(B) frnotated oblique photograph of Southern end of Islerd.
(C) Linotated oblique photoereph of Central section of Islend.
(D) Captured plan of Notic istoll.
This sortie was complotely reportcd on in July, 1942, and the results rocorded in Photogrophic Iatelligence Report No. 3 of the Intciligence Center, Pacific Ocesn Areas, and the supplement thercto; (Encl. " \(\mathrm{h}^{\prime \prime}\) ). The purpose of the prosent report is eimply the comourison of insta?lations shown in photographs vith the Pre-mar Jepancec Map, (Encl. "D").
Theso picturce shom dofinitely the.t all of the derensive ingtallations at lecst, shown on Encl. "B" and "C", were constructed by January 31, 1942. Non of the positions on the southern end of the island showed definite cuidunco of construction in progress. The centre. 1 revetment of the southern DP battcry, however, has not bucn ceniouslaged by sod as have the other two, and is unoccupicd, two facte which might indice.ta recent complation. The single revertmont further eouth along the seme section of coastline is also unsoddod erd cmpty, but this is a position not shorm on the 1940 defense mep. On the rorthern end of the island, photogrephy is not clear enough to show whother or not construction is in progrees, though all of the yositions appear to ba completed.
Sevcral gun positions (notably the northern thrce gun ducipurpose beticry) ere in slightly difforint locations from those shorn on the map, thue confirming the supnosition the the map shows nroposed positions, but the battory c.rrangemeats and building dispositions are sufficiently sinilar to permit chockirg the map. In addition, there arc severcl gun positions visible on the photos but not shown on the maps.
For structures othor than guns, the mep egrecs closely with tho photopraphs in e.ll arcas whore photofrephe ero of sufficiently good quelity to pereit chacking. The rocd netrork ie more completo than the.t shom on the map, end airficld taximaye heve bein extended furthir south than the mep indicetcs.


\(\square\)

\begin{abstract}
\(173^{\circ} 15^{\prime} \mathrm{E}\). Comparison of Jnpanesc Pre-Wer pleces with ectual installations.

\end{abstract}
. Theso picturces shom dofinitely thit all of the deiensive installation an all of thositions apcar to bo conlctud.

DOC. No. 6254
The following teble showe tive comparison in detesf:

\section*{TABULAR COMPABISON OF MAD AND PHOTOGBAPHS}
\(\frac{\text { SHOFN ON Wip }}{\text { Morthorn } 3 \text { gun }} \frac{\text { DO Battery }}{}\) with adjacent power plant, munitions atorago and berracke ares designatcd or: Nap by letter "A".
2. Southern 3 gun DP Battcry with adjacent power plant, munftions storego end borm recks arce, desigruted on map by lettor "B".

2a. Not shorn.
3. Blockhourcs.
4. Minor gun positions, two on north end of island, tro on south and.
5. Listening "Cru.
6. Radio transimitter station.
7. Heavy oil storage
8. Porer plent noer oil storage
9. Jotty.

\section*{PHCTO CONPTDMATTOR}

Bettery confirnod. d.ppcars complete. Adjecent builininge arc locotcd in nusitions ritil respoct to the bettcry as ehoen on the mep, but photor ere not clear enough to confirm their function. The whole battery position is allehtly further eouth then shorn on the msp.

Battery confimmed. All three positions appcar completo, tro are comouflafed with sod and occupied. The third is empty and unsodded. Battery C.F. and ammunition storase etructurcs ere completc and as shown. It is impossible to confilm Rarracks erce and porcr plant due to ergle of the whotographe.
A. Eingle \(25^{\prime}\) diamcter revetmont, empty, appears souti of Bettery B. This later beceme a C.D. gun.

Confirmed.
It least two confirmod on south end of icland. Therc arc probebly moro alone trench net-rork. Tro coritirmed or north ord.

Small position of some sort.
Confirmod.
Hcavy earth rovetment, probably arounà unacriground tank.

Thero are buildings in this location. Function unconfirmed.

Confirmed.

DOC, NO. 6254
\(\mathrm{HO}_{2}\) \(\qquad\)
10. Sceplanc remp.
11. Northern fuel storage.
12. Airfjcld.
13. Road netmork.

Page 6.

PHOTO CONFIRMATION

Confirmed.
Area cleared of brush. Two tomor-Iike structures above ground. No definite confirmetion.

Confirmed.
All roads shown on map, including theso shown in dashed lines, aro in exietance. Several additional ronds not shown on map.
/s/ C. G. Coleman.
C. G. COLEMAN.


A broce taxi track runs from the NHi turn-around \(S F\) to a large apron and seaplane ramp on the lecrard hecich. On tho SE odge of this taxi treck is a lirac hamar (1501
\[
\text { C- r, }(\ldots-76,
\] wide by porhaps 300' long), suitable for the lergest scaplance.

South of tho landing field is a conciclercible treescreenod arce with e wide clcarca approach, sugecesting

\section*{PHOTO NO.}
\[
C-1 \angle A
\]
\[
0-15, c-3
\]
\[
\mathrm{c}-20,6-i=
\]
\[
\mathrm{c}-24
\]

C-23 afrcraft dispersel space. South of this is a clearing containing cightcon sizablo buildinge suitable for her-C-22 racke and/or storchouses.

\section*{HOTJE ISLAMD - Redio Station}

Noar the Sif tiv of the island is a large tro-story building flanked by throc tall radjo towers. Moarby are a smaller building, tro tenks of \(60^{\prime}\) diameter, and a protective cmbenkment enclosing four tanks of ebout 101 diamoter.

\section*{HOTNEISLIM - iAditional Facilltics}

On the leewerd shorc just \(S E\) of the scaplane ramp is a largo pior. An cqually long but narrower pior farther south is probebly loss useful duc to ehoaling wator. At several pointe on both loeverd and windward shores

C-22 are mall docks suitable for vossels of vory light draught. Three bridges crossing three open chennels betweon islets to the NW of FOTJE ISLi ND lead to a small

C-20, c-24, C-23, \(\mathrm{c}-14\),

C-22. pior muning into a modcratoly doep chennol, which appcars accessible from tho loowerd side by an indirect route. lilong the bcech near the SE tip of the islend lics thet appears to be a section of dredge pipcline on C-22 floate, but no dredge is visible.

Noar the landing field, on a road muming NE from the NW turn-around, are trio rathcr higit tenks, probebly yator tanks. To the notth of the intersection of the runriays, and well away from the landing ficld, ere tro tro-etory buildings on eithor side of the belt road, one nodiun and one quitc large - purpose unknown.

To the cast of tho radio atation, betreen the road and the besch, is a raised circular structure some \(70^{\prime}\) in diameter, \(\mathbf{C - 2 2}\) from rhich oxtends a small structure bridging over the roed. Tro objects on top of the circuler etructure might be vchicles, and four or fivo other objucts on the beach ncarby probebly aro vohicles. Ncarby, to the NT, are threc torors, two of Which have crow's nusts largo enough to contain AA. mechinc



\section*{DOC. NO. 6254}
page 21.
PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISESNCE \& IMTERDYETATION SECTION
F44-3/EC60Gpe INTELITIGENCE CFNPFR, PLCIFIC OCEIN ARELS Serial 011

CONFIDENTIAL
July 7, 1942.
SUPPLDYEMT TO PHOTCGRENTC TNTESEIGENGE REPORT NO, 3
EORIE: NO PH-5
 Deto taken: January 31, 1942.
Mean Tinie of photogrephy: GIFI 2130.
Camera Focal Incnith: 9is.
Altitude: 500-1500 fect.
Conirct Scelo: Not knokin.
hitap Ro.erence: H. O. Chart Nc. 542e. Quality: Poor ohilques. Last Cover: Rionc.

SURARY: (KOTJE ISTAND;
In addition to features noted ir Rft. No: 3, the following details moro obscrved: One plane, additional pun cmplaecmente, and building on various parts of the island.

\section*{ATRCRSTT:}

One unidentificd plene is soen e.t the corter of the couth
Photo
Rofcrence
\(\frac{\text { Numbers }}{\mathrm{C}-22}\) cdge of the landing fiel?.

\section*{DEFENSES:}
additional gun ompleccmonts aro scen at the folloring locations:
1 cmplacoment at the 1 N tip of the isjand; 2 proopblc cmplacements on the boach NE of the Niv turn arcuind; 2 enr lacemente in the ITE soction of the islend just vest, of the belt rocd; 2 umpiecunents (probablo machino gun) scuth of the تivo-inch gur emplacerants on the windward beach.

A lino of bsibed wire fe ebscrived alorg the beach at the STIp of the islend.

BUIIDINGS \(\triangle\) ND OTHER EACCIITTE:
In the NF corncr of the s.sland ar: nine well-semouflaged buildings of epproxinetcily the sure size, \(\varepsilon\) r.znged on oither side of the road running throuph the rooded erce. illso in this eren, ncar the east odgo of the noods, is arother smelil building.
l.tjc.cent to the main hanfer at thr seaplane base are two large buildinge, probably shovs or storefc, and nino small buildings.

\section*{}

\section*{rythe semercer cirnte (omt)}

 probably the operations buijdiag ard the custrol town.

In the moonce aroe in the rorth section of the islund




In the wooced (ris secres ), ores south of the ficlid are five
 of these, necr the ocach, is a :exing suxare builaing end tiso small buildings.

Enst of the NW-SL muncy, in the contcr of the ficld, is a netiork of light roctangles, thich ray possibly be servicing C-23 erces.

On the third islct riw of 101 TH de locetcd a pice-lsw projection, thich oxtonds froni the roothom shoce aess then half the distancu ecrose the chernul. This structind riy be cithor a bridge- C-20 head uncicr construotion, or unsajbiy a subsarine fueling dock, es a fucl tank and screral buildinge are ecin on the islot.

\section*{INIKRITATIONAL RILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR TER FAR FAST}

CIMY OK WishIIcon dISIRICT OF CCLENBIA UNITED SNATRS OT AMERICA)

I, Charles G. Coleman, Jr., former Lieutenant, U. S. N. R., upon oath, make the following atatennent:
1. I am Roecarch Anclyst, Photo Intelligence Contor, United Stotes Wevy Receiving Station, Whehington, D. C. Feeidence ederess is 2505 Eurns S. J., Menhington, D C.
2. My official duties include the preparetion of photo intelligence reporte. I heve been engeged in this work aince 1942 when I graduated from the ilaval Photoeraphic Intealifnnce School, Noral Air Station, Anacostia, D. C. I served in omphibious forces and groups in the jorth Africen, Sicilian, and Normendy Invasions and in plenaine for landings in Kyushu, Japan. Hy duties were principally the atudy of acriel photographe and the interpretetion of coastel torrain and militery and naval installations. I was head of anghibious Photo Intallegence Units in the Sicilien and Normandy landings, end in the Kyushu operations.
3. I hare exninined the Japencse inotallation map of Wotje Island, JICPOA Item 46486, Navy Doc. No. 41, and I inave corpared with the map the aerial photograph of the same area as that presented by the map. I have reported the results of this compariann in Photogrt.phic Intelligence Center Special Report Ho. s-1-46. I heve indiceter on the cerial oblique photographs, marked Itrclosures (b) and (c) to Photorraphic Intellizerce Center Special Report Hio. S-lm46, in red ink the pincipal installations visible.
4. In Report S-3-46, I present the reavits of my examinetior: of mape of the Islends indioatse in that Report, inoluding \%otje Islend, end of my comparison of oech of auch mepe witin the United Statea Fivall Photogrephic Intelligence Reports of the spme arnes for the detes indicated.
D. I increby certify thet the Reports an sigapd by me exe true and eccurate to the bent of ny bnowledee and bolief.

Subscribed and sworn to before ne this
25 day of July 1946.
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\author{
CAPMAIT, USMR \\ Service No. 52953
}
















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& \text { u-1 } \cup-\cdots
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\JAMES.J.ROBINSON



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Page 4.
U. s. Naval photographic inteli igence certer RECEIVING STATION
Washington, 25, D. C.

\section*{PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENGE SPECTAL REPORT NO, S-1-46}

LOChLITY : Motje Atoll (Marshall Islands). Lat. \(9^{\circ} 28^{\prime}\) No.- Long. \(170^{\circ} 15^{\prime}\) E. Comparison of Japanese Pre-War pleces with ectual installations.

REFERENCE : (a) Cruiser photographic cortie No. PH-5 dated 31 Jenuary 194
ENCLOSURE : (A) Commender Lircraft Battle Force, US Pacific Flect Photographic Intelligence report No. 3, and supplement.
(B) Annotated oblique photograph of Southorn ond of Islend.
(c) Annotated oblique photograph of Contral section of Islend.
(D) Captured plan of Wotjo itoll.

This sortie was complctely reportcd on in July, 1942, and the results recorded in Photographic I:telligence Report lNo, 3 of the Intclligence Conter, Pacific Occan Arcas, and the supplement thercto, (Encl. lif \({ }^{n}\) ). The purpose of the present report is simfly the comoarison of insta?lations shown in photographs vith the Prewar Jepuese kiap, (Encl. "D").

These picturce shor definitely thet all of the defencive installations at least, shown on Encl. "B" and "C", were constructed by January 31, 1942. Nonc of the positions on the southern end of the island showed definite evidence of construction in progress. The central revetment of the southern DP battcry, however, has not becn canourlaged by sod as have the other tro, and is unoccupicd, two facte which might indicate rcecnt completion. The single reveftment further south along the same section of coastline is also unsodded end empty, but this is a position not shown on the 1940 defense map. On the northern ond of the island, photography is not cl.ear enough to show whether or not construction is in progress, though all of the positions appear to be completed.

Sevcral gun positions (notably the northern thrce gun duclpurpose bettery) cre in slightly different locations from those shown on the mep, thus confirming the supposition the the mep shows proposed positions, but the battery arrangements and building dispositions are sufficiently similar to permit chocking the map. In addition, there are severcl gun positions visible on the photos but not shorm on the maps.

For structures other than guns, the mep agrecs closely with the photogrephs in ell arcas where photorrephs erc of sufficiently good quelity to permit chceking. The roed netrork is morc complete than the.t shown on the map, end airficld taximays heve been extended further south than the mep indicates.

\section*{DOC. 150.6254}

The folloring teblo showe the comparison in deteil:

\section*{TABULAR COMPARISON OF MAD AND PHOTOGYAPHS}

Northern 3 gun DP Battery with adjacent powcr plant, munitions storage and barracke arce dusignated or Map by letter "A".
2. Southern 3 gun De Battcry with adjaccnt powicr plant, muntions storago and borrecks arca, dosignatad on map by letter " B ".

2a. Not shown.
3. Blockhouses.
4. Minor gun positions, two on north end of island, two on south and.
5. Listening "Cn".
6. Radio transmitter stetion.
7. Heavy oil storage
8. Power plant ncar oil storage
9. Jetty.

PHOTR COMFIPTATTON:
Battery confirmod. Appcars completo. Adjnecnt builininge arc locatcd in positions rith reepoct to the beittory as ehom on the mep, but photos err not cloar enough to confirm their function. The whole battery position is slightly further south then shown on the map.

Battery confirmed. \(12 l\) three positions appear complcte, two are camouflaced with sod and occupicd. The third is empty and unsodded. Pattery C. \(\%\). and ammunition storacce structures ere completc and as shown. It is impossible to confirm Parrucks aroa and porior plant due to argle of tho ohotographe.
f. Eincle \(25^{\prime}\) diameter revotment, empty, appoars soutl: of Battery B. This jater becenc a C.D. gun.
confirmed.
fit loest two confirmed on south end of islond. There arc prokebly more alone trench net-work. Two confirmed on north ord.

Small position of some eort.
Confirmed.
Hcavy carth rovetment, probably.. around under.eround tank.

There are buildings in this locetion. Function unconfirmed.

Confirmed.


\title{
Doc．No． 6254 F44－3／RF37－7／Gpa
}

UNITED STATE PACJF：C MTMBT
Commaner lizernet int le Foreo
sduinisirativo Or゙ュicc
（ \(1-\mathrm{M}-001\) ）
CONFIDENTIAL
page 7.

Fcbruary 9，1912．

SJMIB NU．Pii－5
SEALL SCALE OBLIQUIFS，DR＂lens from maciun altitude，taken of WCTJE ATOLL during attack of Fohius．ry 1，1942，by eimplane from U．E．f．NORTILAPTUNix．

MAP：H．O．Chart NC． 5428.

\section*{}

Whorde ISLAHD proper nontains a well deve？ned air etetion for scapinnce and large land－remi ertbers．Hewover，no atrorntit are visiola at time of photography，Disurorsier of shirping under ettock so obscruch，with einting of one sizeble vessal ard ciande ot another projubio，Sevoral fices and

 of WOTJE ATOLL phetugranted，oney ohimi ishinj shors any evidence of ectivity

SHIPPIEG
Throc froiehter－type ehins，ene nevery 2001 ，one about 3501，and one atout 30j，to eotier with preber iy invo
 the shore of HONJ 1SinkD a \(1 \pm 10\) or mo：c to tine eazt，ercont
 splash is observod as e nfar miss aioneside the 350 ！vessel．

A subsequent photograph shovs the 390 ：voes 37，\＃r．jck is white，as closer to shore，down \(e\) the sborn，and listing to port，with dank enay sncke milirg cvor bo fuerstrutsture fron the briage aft．Conel torable smoie end ghoud coucs in most of these \(p_{\infty}\) aturcs procincie furthm comilusicns as to shipping．

\section*{WOTJE ISLARD－IXNTIE FI．SA}
 width，bisceting eack nther at weble artop，with an mikr turning arcas et tho ends．One ruse wey，sox：the
 is a large consento exmint：－up area，comectci so those two turn－arciarcs ty tori traclre．

Adjacent to the tissis edige of tho eoncrete is a trench，

 gethor witk mursous suelior ftructures，ere grouped to the west of the warmirg－ip arca．

Enclosure A to P．I．Specinl Report \(\ddagger\) ：Cーラ－16．

C－23，C－12，
C－ín，
c－l！ 4 ，
\(\mathrm{C}-\mathrm{E}, \mathrm{C}-16\) ，
\(\mathrm{C}-1 \%\) ，cw 3 ，
C－2．5，C－20， \(0-2\)
C－21．
C－23．
C－23．

Dac. No. 6254
CONEIDEMTLAL
Fobruary 9. ifia


\section*{FOTSE ISLAND - Iandine Field (Cont.)}

A broed taxi track runs from tho NMi turn-around STY to a lorge apron and ceanlene ramp on the locrard hiuch: On the SE edge of this taxi treck is a lergo henger (ibci wide by norhaps 300' long), suitable for the laigest seaplancs.

South of the landing field is a coneiderable treescreenod arce with e wide clcared epproech, sugensting:

C-14A.

气-iE, \(\because \cdots\) C-20, ©-غ.う, C-24:

C-23 aircraft dispersel space. South of this is \(n\) c?caring containing oightocn sizable buildinge suitable for her-C-22 racke and/or storchouses.

\section*{HOTJE ISLAED - Redio Station}

Noar the SI: tip of the islend is a large tro-story building flanked by throc tall radio torere. Neerby aro a smallor building, two tenks of \(60^{\prime}\) diometer, and a protective cmbankment enclosing four tanks of about 101 diameter.

HOTJE ISLIID - Additional Facilitice
On the leeward shore just SE of the scaplane ramp is a largo pier. An cqually long but narrower pior farther couth is probebly less ueeful due to shoaline rater. St several points on both leovard and windward shores are small docks suitable for vessels of very light draught. Three bridges crossing three open channels betweon islets to the NW of FOTJE ISL ND lecd to a small pior running into e moderately doep chamel, which appoars accessible from the lecward side by an indiroct route, flong the beech near tho SE tip of the islend lics thet appears to be a section of dredge pibciline on floats, but no drodge is visible.

Near the landing field, on a road ruming NE from tho NW turn-around, are tro rathor high tanks, probebly watorC-20 tanke. To the notth of the intersection of the rumeys,
 buildings on eithor sido of the beit roai, se nedivin and one quitc large - purposo unknown.

To the cast of the radio station, betrenen the roed and
the basch, is a raieod circular structure some 701 in diamoter, c-22
from rhich extends a small structure bridging over the roed.
Tro objecte on top of the circuler structure might be vehicles, and four or fivo other objucts on the beach ncarby probebly are vohicles. Ncarby, to the Ne; are threc toricrs, two of which have crow's nuets largo enough to contain AL mechinc

\section*{PHOTOGPLPHC INTLLIIGEVCE REPORT NO, 3}
gune, preserico of rhich is further sugeestod by tho genoral pHoTO NO. leyout. Close by is a group of small buildings. It has not been possible to detormine the significence of this area from tocso photocraphs.

On tho SW point of the island, the presenco of tro or morc roll ccmouflaged objects, possibly fucl tanks, is indicatod.
A. belt rocd runs close to the perimetor of the island. This, plus side roads, affords accese to all tho installations mentioned above.

\section*{HOTJE TSEXD - Deicrises}

On the rincwerd beach, about a milc from the SW point of the ieland, arc a tettery of threc guns, probably \(5^{\prime \prime}\) or \(6^{\prime \prime}\), a scmi-underground magazine, and a mumber of small brilidinge. Butrecen theee eune and the beach is a fire trench of a wavy trace, supported by HGG omplacements, and uxtonding, vith occesional brcakr, sw elong the boach elmost to the point, and \(M 7\) to the larding ficld.
\(\therefore\) cut up arca on the windward buach noith of the landing ficld is rrobably a bettcry, but photography of this part of the ielend is not good onough for adequate interpretation.
c-16
C-17,
C-14. c-20.

\section*{HOTJE ISLAND - Denkge iecossment}

Tro bursts are secn over the prohablo rcady magezine and neerby smell structurcs on the cast odgo of the warm-ing-up arca. Smoke is emitting from ono of the largo hencers at the 5 cornor of the varming-up arec.

In the aree of the seciplane ramp and apron, four columne of dersc black suoke, onc having a huzo rhito flame at the basc, indicate hits on underground fucl storagc.

In the res rooded ecction inland from the bettory is a lerge: column of smoke rith intence tesc flame, the volume of smoke beinc obsorvor to dininish rapidly in succeeding nlotographe. A tit on a powder magazine ie euggested.
fifire neer the curtrel cest shore line is seen to

C-20, C-23, C-19, \(\mathrm{C}-15\).

C-20, C-15, C-19, C-18. C-16, C-17, \(\mathrm{C}-18\), C-19, \(\mathrm{C}-14 \mathrm{~h}\), C-24, C-15. rise from e groun of fucl tanks comprising an arce apnroximetely 180' square, the one tenk which is mensureable being about 60' in diamotor. A constant incrcace in amoke volume irdicetos that tilis entirc storegc hes prokably been destroyed.
'DOC. NO. 6254
nonrpt ponitet*
Pobruary 9, 194?
PHOTOGMAYHTC INTELSIGENGE REPORT MO, 3

ORGED ISLAND:
4. road is visible for tro or three milcs parallel to c-o. and near the south beach. A mumber of very small buildines C-1l. arc loceted along or ncar this rocd, and several others may be cocn ir semall clearings on other perts of the island. There is nothing visible of sufficiont size to suggost military installations, but a modorate dogroc of cifrouflage would suffice to make such fcaturee irdistinguishahle on these distant obliques. A \(40^{\prime}\) boat soun ncar the south shorc is moving.

ECMEDIO ISLATD:
Nothing to ruport. The scale of these photographs is \(\mathrm{C}-1, \mathrm{C}-2\), too small for interpretation. C-3.

ENE CHERUTAKKU ISLLND:
Sanic es ebovc. C-2, C-4.

HEICHFN ISILSD, IHE CROUP, \& N.E.e TIP OF YETO ERSKKU IS,

C-5, C-6. C-7.
- 4-(Final pagc)

Enclosuro (A) to Photo Officcr, Lirbatfor, Ltr. to Comairbutfor, Conf. Ecrial (L-02) of Fob. 9, 1942.

Doc. No. 6254 Fage 21.
PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNEIEEINCE \& IITERPSETATION SRCTION
F44-3/EC60Gpe. INTELIIGENCE CFNPFR, PACIFJC OCEIN AREIS Eorial 011

CONFIDEIUTIAL
July 7, 1942.
SUPPLENENT TO HMOGAPUTC INMFLTCENE REOCPT NO, 3
SORTIE: HO PR 5

Dato taken: Jamery 31, IS42.
Mean Tine of phutogreohys GCI 2130.
Camera Focal Inenthi 9íl. SItituac: 500-is00 fect. Contoct Scales Not knorin. Map Re.ierence: H. O. Chart No. 5428. Quality: Poor obliquer. Last Cover: Monc.

\section*{SWM ARY: (MOTJE ISLAND)}

In addition to fcaturcs noted ir Rpt. No. 3, the folloping details wore obecrved: Ono plene, additional gun cmplancments, and building on various parts of the island.

Photo Reforence Numbras
One unidentificd plano is seen et the ecritcr of the eouth C-2'2 cdge of the landing fielr.

DEFENSES:
Additional pun mplacoments aro suen at the folloring locations: 1 cmplacoment at the IW tip of the island; 2 proveblo orplacements on the boach NE of the NIF turn around; 2 enclacements in the IE soction of the islend just most of the belt road; 2 wpiecoments (probable machiro Eun) scut: of the fivo-inch gun emplaceraents on the windward beach.

A line of barbed vire is obscrved along the beach at the SW tip of the island.

BUIJDCNG AMP OTEP- FMCITTTTE:
In the Nif eract of the Ings of exproxtrotuly tine same size, er.einged on citincr side of the road running thrcigh tinc riooded erce. il]so in this erea, ncar the cast edge of the noocis, is arother sme.lil kuilding.
l.tjc.cent to the main hancer at the seaplane base are two largo buildinge, probably shovs or storage, and nine smail buildirgs.


 apror and in llac is th the hagers at the ejriteld, is

Photo
Reiference
Humbrs probably tho operatione buildiag and tho controz towor.

In the moodod aros in the :arth section of the islund
 side of the jot' ruad. The lugo tritudre is at the iunotion of this roed end the road raming west to the denoing ficld.

In tho woocot (fisecrsal) ares south of the fiold are five buildings in aditition to the ofistecn proviousis reported. Fest C-23 of these, nex the oeach, is a jesrge squarrc buidding and tioo small buildings.

Fest of the NFP-SE mumicy, in the contcr of the ficld, is a network of light roctanglos, which may possibly be sorvicing areas.

On the third is.let NW of WON.TE is locetcd a picr-like projection, which oxtonds from the northern incre less than half the distancc acroes the charnol. This structure may bo cithor a bridgo- c-20 head unácr constructjon, or pessibly a submarine fuoling dock, as a fucl tank and scveral buildinge are soin on the islot.
alan and scral buidnsearo


INTPRRNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBLIAL FOR THE FAR RAST


UNITHD STATES OF AMORTCA

I, W. A. Talbot Bielefeldt, Commander, USiri, upon oath, make the following statement:
1. I em on duty in the Washington Document Center, Office of Naval Intelligence, Mavy Dopartmont, 4th Fioor, Steuart Building, Washington, D. C. My rosidence address is 6617 Poplar Avenue, Tacoma Park, Marylend.
3. My officiel duties are: Heed of Informetion and Research Section, Wachington Document Center. My duties include eupervision of clasifying, indexing and filing of documents relating to the Far Fast and Pacific Ocasn Areas, including documenta captured from Japanese armed forces. I am a gradurite of the Japanese Language course in the Navy School of Oriental Lenguages. I have been on duty involving the interrogation cf captured Japanese personmel end the translation of Jnpanese documents since 1942 in Southwest Pacifio ereas and in Washtingtion, D. C. I was with the Allied Translation and Interpreter Section in Ausiralia end Now Guinea for a total of 15 monthe.
3. Navy Document No. 41, a bluoprint chart of Wotje Islend, dated 10 august, 2.940 , is an ifficiai document in the permenent oustody of the Waohingtion Dociment Center. It was received irom the Joint Intelilgence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas, located at Pearl Harbor, according to the uaual procedure. The standerd or ueval operating procedure under wich dccurients haro been receired after capture is as fol? would be delivered to a documant colienijion unit, wiss in turn would oxfmine the documents for immodiate intellijence purposes. The documents rould be efamped in the document colleciion urit wish the name of the place nthers captured nail an idontifytig number. The documents would then le fum:arded to JICPOA at Pnerl Hartor. diter study and any cther use ibsis, the dusuments would then be forwaried by JICPOA to the Navy Dypectilyat and the Warkingtin Document Cexter for purposes of custody ard perger use or distinionticn. It appears that havy Bocument No. 41, Rcuny iting to thtu orocociare, was captured on Ewajalein and forwarded to JICPOA. This document and other documents on Mansatid I.elands vere fomivida to the Nevy Dapartment and are kept in the custudy of the Washington Document Center.
4. According to the uaual procedure, the English translations and interpretations written on the face of the document appear to have been written ei.ther liy the document collection unit or in JICPOA. Both documart colleetion units and the JICPOA ataff normally have included milittiny or Naval personnel qualified in meking such ennotations on such documents.
5. The foregoing etetement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and beilef.
/8/ KA, T. BIRLIFILDT Commander, UENR
Sgrvice No. 167617

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
\(\qquad\) dey of \(\qquad\) , 2946
/8/ JAMES J. ROBINSON
(Status indicaing authority to administer caihg)

Captain, Usirs
Service \#52853

\section*{CERTIEICATE}

\section*{I.P.S. No. \(6254-0\)}

Statoment of Source and Authenticity
I, Hidemi YOSHIDA \(\qquad\) hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: \(\qquad\) Momber of Resoarch Division of

2nd Domobilization Buxeau
and that as such ofricial I have examined the document hereto attached consisting of 17 page, dated 10 Auge_ 1940 , and described as follows: Sectional Hap of EOTJE Ise

I further certify that to the best of my lnowledge and belief the attached record and document is an ofilicial document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following nemod ministry or depariment (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): \(\qquad\)
Yolosuka Naval Civil Enginearing Dept, of the Yokosuka Naval
Sta. (Secret lig \(\mathrm{NO}_{2}\) 852 Part_4)
Signed at Tolyo on this
10th_day of_Octe_, 1946.

Witness: Y, YAUA:OTO
Ls/ Hidemi YOSHDA Signature of Official

Nimber of Resec
Di
Division \(\frac{2 \text { nd Domob Bureau }}{\text { Oficia }}\)
Statement of Official Procurement
I, \(\qquad\) CURTIS, and Lt. \(\qquad\) hereby certify that

I am associated with the General Headquartors of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powors, and thet the abovo certification was obtainod by me from the above signed official of the Jepaneso Goverment in the conduct of my official businoss. Signod at \(\qquad\) Tohyo on this
\(\qquad\)
RICIIARD H. LARSH











Page 1

INTERNATIONAL IIT:ITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

CITY OF WASHINGTON
DISTRICT OF COLURBIA \(\quad\), \(S S:\)
CERTIFICATE UNITED STATES OF ARERICA

I, John Ford Baecher, Commander, U.S.N.R., upon oath, make the following statement:
1. I was Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and Liaison Officer to the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Congress of the United states.
2. In the course of my official duties, I aided in supervising the work of preparing the document, "Japanese wes ages Concerning Military Installations, Ship Movements, etc.", now designated as Navy 「ocument No. 73. This document was Exhibit 2 in the Joint Congressional Investigation and was introduced in evidence upon the verification of representatives of the Army and of the Navy, of which I was the latter. This document was prepared from the original messages on file in the war Department and Navy Department. I assisted in supervising the copying of the messages as presented in the mimeographed pages of the document.
3. The messages as copid in this document are true and accurate copies of the original cocuments, to the best of my information and belief.
(signed) John Ford Baecher
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of July 1946.
(signed) P. S. Mclanus, Liaut U.S.N.
(Status indicating authority to take oaths.)

\section*{GERTITIGATE}
I.P.S. HO. 6255-A

\section*{Statenent of Source and Authenticity}

I, Naga KITA hereby certify that I was officially connected with the Jeranese Govornment in the following capacity: \(\qquad\) Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, T, Hen from \(\mathcal{L}_{2}\) Larch 1941 to ahout 7 Deconior 194 and that as such oificial I had custody of the document a copy of which is attached consisting of _ pages, dated _2 September, 1941, and described as follows: \(\qquad\)
(Torode) to Honolulu \(\qquad\) -

I further certify that to the best of my information and bellef the attached record and document is a copy of an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is a copy of part of the official archives and files of the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu, T. H. All such incoming messages and outgoing messages mere recorded in log books in my office. On 7 Decenber 1941 at abcut 10:30 to 11:00 a.m. I ordered these log books and other documents to be burned. I do not know whether or not these books and docunents are in existence. They are not in my possession and they have not been in my posscssion or control since 7 December 1941. Sizned at Tokro on thes

8th day of October 1946.

 SEAL\(\frac{\text { Nagao KITA }}{\text { Signature of Official }}\)

Formor Consul General Official Capacity

\section*{Statenent of Officiol Piocurement}

I, DCUGLAS Le FALDORF , hereby cartify that I am associated with the Gencral Headquarters of the Supreme Commender for the Allied Powers, and that the abovo cortificato was obtainod by mo from the abovo signod official of the Japanose Govormment in the conduct of my officinl business.

Signod at \(\qquad\) Tokyo on this
\(\qquad\) doy of Octobor_ 2946



Page 1
Japanose Messages Concerning Military Installations, Ship Movemente, etc. (Page 13)

Froms Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu (Riyoj1)
15 Novambor 1941
\$211
As rolations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ahips in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twico a weck. Alithough you already aro no doubt avare, please take extra care to maintain socrocy.

JD1: 6991 25S44 (Y) No.ry Trans. 12-3-41 (S)

INITED STATES OF AMERTCA )

I, John Ford Baecher, Commander, U.S.N.R., upon oath, make the folluminz staiscrenc:
1. I was Spesip: Assistent to the Secretary of the Navy and Liaison \(0 \pm f i c e r\) to the Joint Corgressional Committee on the Investigation of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Congress of the United States.
2. In the course of my official cuties, I aided in supervising the work of preparing the document, "Japanese !"essages Concerning Military Installations, Ship :'ovements, etc.", now designated as Navy Document No. 73. This document was Exhebit 2 in the Joint Congressional Investigation and was introduced in evidence unon the verification of representatives of the Army and of the Navy, of which I was the latter. This document was prepared from the original massages on file in the "?r Department and Navy Departrient. I assisted in supervising the copying of the messages as presented in the mimeographed pages of the document.
3. The messages as copled in this document are true and accurate conies of tiie original documents, to tha best of my information and belief.
(signed) John Ford Baecher

Subscribec and sworn to before me this 25 th day of July 1946.
(signed) P- \(\frac{S_{0} \text { Mclianuen Lieut, U. } 5, N_{0}}{\text { Name }}\)
(Status indicating authority to take oaths.)

\section*{GERTIEICATE}
I.P.S. No. \(\qquad\)
Stetcront of Source and huthonticity
I, \(\qquad\) horoby cortify
thet I mes officicily connceted :ith the Jepnnose Governnent in the folloring cepcocitr: \(\qquad\) Jnpencso Consul Genercl ot Honolulu, T. He \(\qquad\)
from 14 Harch 1941 to siont 7 Deconber 1241 and that as such officinl I had custody of the docurant a copy of which is atteched consisting of 1 pr.ge, datcd 15 Hovomber , 1941, and described as follors: \(\qquad\) Jevenesc 1: iossege itill frora Tokyo (TOGO) to Honoluly \(\qquad\) -

I furthor cortify that to the bust of ry inforration and bcliof tho atteched rocord and docurent is a copy of an official docunent of the Jepaneso Government, end that it is a copy of pert of the officicl archives end files of the Japenose Consulate Gencrel at Honolulu, T. H. Lill such inconing nosseges and outgoing ecsseges wero recordod in loz cooks in my officc. On 7 Docoriber 1941 at about 10:30 to 11:00 a.r. I ordered thesc log books and other documents to bc burncd. I do not lonors thethor or not thoso books and cocunents are in existence. They cro not in my possossion and they hevo not been in my possossion or control since 7 Decerber 1941.

Sicnod at \(\qquad\) on this
8th dev of Octobor, 1946 .
Hage KIT:
igneturo of OfficicI

Witness: - ERIC T. FTEIS:IR, 2d Lte
SEAL
Former Consul, Gonornl
Officic. 1 Capacity

\section*{Stetencnt of Official Procurcnent}

I, DCUCILS I, WEDOPF \(\qquad\) , hercby cortiny thet I an associsted With tho Gonorel. Hendeunters of the Suprone Compnder for the Allicd Powers, and thet the abovo cortificetc wes obtelined by ne from the above simed officiel of the Japenose Governnent in the conduct of ry official business.

Signod at_Tokio, Japen on this


Chiof. Iny. Diver IPS
Orficicl Capecity

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Prge \(2^{*}\)

INTZHARTIONAL AIITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE PAR EAST
CITY OF :CSEITVGION
DISNKTCI GF COLUBAA
CERTIEIGATE


I, Toł.ri Ford Bancher, Commnder, U.S.N.R., upon oath, maks the iollowing staton:3nt:

ב. Turn Erectal. Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy ari firison Cffineer to the Joint Congressional Committoo or tha Investigation of tha Tapanese attack on Puerl rixhor, Cozeress of the United States.
2. In the course of my officinl autios, I aided in supervisin tis wark of preparing the document, "Japanose hessafes Corcoruirg ilitary Installations, Ship Lovaments, etc.", no: desteratad es Mavy Document No. ?3. This docuacrt tas extibit \(a\) in the joirt Congressionel Invostigation and was introduced in ovidence upon the verification of reprissentatives oi the firmy and of the Navy, of which I was the latter. This document wes prepored from the oricinal hessrees on filo in the War Departaent end inevy yopertment. I assistod in supervising the copyling of the messegos as prosented in the mimeoerepined paeces of the ciocument.
3. The mosseges es copied in this document aro true and accurnito copies of the originel documents, to the best of my inforretion snd beliof.
(signcd) John Forg Beecher
Subscribod ard sworn to baiore me tris 25 th diny of july 1046.
(signoc) P. S. VCinnus, Li jut. U.S.N.
(St?tus indiceting quthority to trke onths.)

I, \(\qquad\) hero'sy cortify
that I mes ofificiclly comnected with the Japaneso Govomant in the folloring copecity:_Jonnose Consul Gcnorcl at Honolulu, Te He from 14 iorch 1947 to about 7 Docorbor 1942 and thet es such officinl I had custody of the docunont a copy of rhich Is atteched consisting of _2 priges, datod 18 Novonbor , 1941, and described as follous: Jrpencso ficesege \(\# \neq 222\) fron Honolulu
\(\qquad\) (KJTi) to Tokso

I further certify that to the best of ry infometion and boliof the attached record rnd docunent is a copy of an official docuncint of tho Jopenose Govemmont, and that it is a copy of yert of the official archives and files of the Jepanose Consulete Gencrel at Honolulu, T. H. dill such incoring ressages cad outgoing nesseges pero rocordod in log books in ry offico. On 7 Docorbor 1941 at about 10:30 to 11:00 a.n. I orderad theso log books and othor docurionts to bo burnod. I do not lnor whothor or not these books end docunonts are in existence. Thoy aro not in ry possossion and they heve not been in ny possession or control stace 7 Deconber 1941.

Signed at \(\qquad\) Tolsro oin this 8th dey of October, 1946.
\(\frac{\text { Naggo KITA }}{\text { Signature of Official }}\)

SEAL Witness: \(\qquad\) EFIC 7. FIVISHER, 2d Lte Forncr Consul Gonoral Officinl Capacity

\section*{Stator:cnt of Officiol Procuranent}

I, DCUGLi.S Le RILDORF \(\qquad\) , horcby cortify that I an associated with the Geacrel Headquertors of the Suprenc Comendor for the Allicd Porers, and thet the cibve cortificate tes obtained by no from the ebove simed official of the Jepanesc Goverment in the conduct of my officicl busincss.

Signet at Tolsro, Jopan on this
\(\qquad\)

Mitncss: \(\qquad\)

Chiof, Inv, Div, IPS
Officiol Capacity
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ITTERNATTONAL STITAFY TMTPTRAL FOR TME FAR EAST

CITY OF wASHINGTON
DISTPTCT OF COLLTBIA
SS:
CERTIEICATE UNITED STITES OF ARERICA

I, John Ford Baecher, Commander, U.S.N.R., upon onth, make the following, statement:
1. I was Special issistant to the Secretary of the Navy and Liaison Officer to the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Congress of the Tinited States.
2. In the course of my official duties, I aided in supervising the work of preparing the document, "Japanese Messages Concerning "iliftary Installations, Ship Novements, etc.", now designated as Navy Document No. 73. This document was Exhibit 2 in the Joint Congressional Investigation and was introduced in evidence upon the verification of representatives of the Army and of the Navy, of which I was the latter. This document was preparad from the original messages on file in the War Department and Navy Department. I assisted in supervising the copying of the messages as presented in the mimeographed pages of the document.
3. The messages as conied in this document are true and accurate copies of the original documents, to the best of my information and belief.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25 th day of July 1946.
(signed) P, S. McManus. Lieut. U.S.N. (Status indicating authority to take oaths.)
signet official of the Jonanese Govemment in the conduct of ny official buriness.

Signed at Tokro Jinan ois this
\(\qquad\)

\(\qquad\) WIC そ FMASER \(2 d\) \(\qquad\)
ofircinl Canceity

\section*{IMTERNTTONAL MTITAFY TRTDTMAL FOR TME FAR EAST}
CITY OF WASHINGTON
DISTPTC' OF COLUTBIA \(\quad\left\{\begin{array}{ll} & \\ \end{array} \quad\right.\) SS: \(\quad\) CETIEICAXE

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Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of July 1946.
\(\frac{\text { (signed) Pe S. YíManus. Lieut. U.S.N. }}{\text { Name }}\)
(Status indiceting authority to take oaths.)
signe ofitcial of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my ofttcial buriness.

Signed at Tokro, J.inan oin this
8th diy of October , 1946.

73tness: \(\qquad\)
 \(\qquad\)
ofricinl Conecity

\section*{CERTIETGA"E}
I.P.S. No. . 6255

Stctornin of Source and Antanticity
I, - IHano KT: \(\qquad\) herely certily that I was of:icially connected rith the Japunese Government in the following conecity: JJencse Consul Ganeral oft Honolu?u, T. In - Iron 44 Unrch 1941 to nkont 7 Decgubor 1941 \(\qquad\) and that as such of ciciel. I hed custody o: the docurent a copy of :hich is attached consisting of _1 pagc, deted ._ Decorber , J. \(\%\),
 -(non) to Ilonolinu

I lurther certily that to the beat of my iniormation end belief the attached record and document is a cony of an oificial docunent of the Japanese Goverment, and that it is a copy of nart or the official archives and Riles of the Jananese Consulate Gencral at Honolnin, T. H. All such incoming ressages and outwoin; ressages more recorded i: log books in my office. On 7 Decenner 1941 at about 10:00 to 11:00 a.m. I ordered these log booles and oher docunonts to be burned. I do not lino: whether or not these boc!es and domments are in eaistence. They wre not in my possession and they have not been in my possession or control since 7 Decenben 194]. Sifined at Tokyo on this Eth dey of Octobe: 1\%6.
\(-\frac{\text { Magao KTTA }}{\text { Siguaturc of Oracial }}\) SE: J,

Witness: ETTC FTMER, \(2 \lambda\) It.
- Formar Consul General

Oft'jcial Capacity

\section*{Statenent of 0fcinis? Procirement}

I, DOMGAS I WhOMF , hereby ceriiny that I om associated ?ith the Genere]. lieadquerters of the Supreme Gommand for the Allied Powers, and tinet the above aertificato wn obtained by me from the nbove signed official of the Jopanese Governmant in the conduct of my official buriaess.

Signed at Tokyo, Jwan oin this


TItness: \(\qquad\) RIC \% FLCISHR 2d Lta

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By first contact with the Nazi Party was attendance at a meeting called by HitLigir in Kiel, Germany, in 1930. HITLER spoke at the meeting, which I attended with my son, LEDPOLD. Following the meeting, and on that same day, I enlisted as a member of the Nazi Party, and influenced my son to join the party also at the same time. I did not become active in the party until 1932, when Mr. SUNKEL, district leader of the party at Kiel, advised me to go with REINHOLD HEYDRICH to Runich and to see a persion, name unrecalled, who later became chief of police at Munich, about securing a job with the party. SUNKE brought HEYDRICH by my home, and HEYDRICH and I took the night train. together, to Munich, after my having advanced HEYDRICH about a one-hundredmark loan. Upon reaching Munich, HEYDRICH and I went to the City Hall Restaurant, to have a cup of coffee. HEYMRICH excused himself, stating he was going to see the person to whom SNNEDL had referred us, the party who later became chief of police at Munich, and it later developed he was given a position by this person, which turned out later to be chief of the German Gestapo system, working under HEINRICH HMMLER, the head of the entire Germon police. At the time sUNFEL had sent us both to meet with this individual in Munich, he had indicated one or more positions were open and it is quite pos:1ble the position given to HEDDRICH was the one I, too, was being considered for. If such a position had been offered me at that time. I would uphesitatingly have accepted it.

HEXDRICH roturned after about four hours ta the City Hall Restaurant, where I was waiting in the company of the individual, whose name I have forgotten, tho later became chief of police in Munich, and I accompanied them to HEINMICI HMIER's home, where I spoke with HMMIER for may be half an hour regarding Cormunism and the means which should be adopted in order to cradicate it from Germany, following which HEYDRICH came to me and said that HMNLER did not like me and it would be best for me to return to Berlin, which I did. Shortly after that. I received word from SNMK that I was to be assigned to work in Altona, Germany, for the party, as an investigator for the party to determine the identity of those individuals who were Communists and ascertain who was pro-Nazi in the Altona Police Department and residents of that vicinity. I engaged in this occupation for about six months, toward the end of which time I made a report on the chief of police in Altona, who was a party member, to the effect that he was inmoral in his private ilfe, and shortly thereafter, following some other minor troubles, I was advised that my services were no longer required, so I
returned to Berlin and my coffec business.
Tithile in Berlin, a Jeatich friend of mine, PaUL: isen, came to my home and some individuals notified the party of this occurrence. They then told me to leave the Nazi ?arty, and I was later arrested by the police when I went to the office of a Nazi Party official to regucst a hearinc. I mas held by the police for two weeks, then placed in a concentration comp for four trecks. During this time I was not questioned. ORTO STidisieir uns in this same concentration camp. During the time I :Nas confined to the camp, my wife, FRIEDEL, and son, LEOPOLD, and lir. BTJCTER vere vorking for me among mombers of the party and I was released. At that, time my son, LEOPOLD, was a stormtrooper in the perty and my wife was working for the Nazi iclfare Department. About three months later, I was again arrested by the police on a charge of having attended a meeting between HITLER and VON PAPEs at Cocin, and having taken pictures of this meeting and made a report of it. I was taken into the German courts and proved my alibi that I had never been in Coeln during this time, and was released. All of this occurred during the yoar 1933.

I returned to my coffec business but business mas constantly going dorm and down and it was impossible for me to obtain re-orders and additional businoss, as I mas no longer a member of the Nazi Party. and during the year 1934 I mote several articles for the newspapers and megazines on the Far East, their culture and politics. and in April, 1935, I decided to 60 to the Orient in order to study the Japanese language, I silled from Bremen, Germany, in April of 2935, on the sic SUTTGARI. I a mived in Now York, where I stayed for six days, took a train across the country to San Francisco, where I vent to the German Consulate and asked for the names of somo Gemen individuals in Honolulu whom I could contact. They cave me the name of \(D_{1}\)., sumidir HOiNu: inN. I sailed from San Francisco on the TiJUTi lidity, in company of my wife, who had been with \(12 e\) since I left Germany. The balance of my family had remained in Germany. On reaching Honolulu, I eot in touch with ir. HOERCN, and he advised that I stay at the Brookland Hotel in Honolulu. I stoycd there for three weoks, and then
 Japan, we went from Tokohana to Tokyo, to the Imperial Hotel, :there I contacted Professor SIISA:NTSU, of the Imperial Univorsity, relative to the study of the Japanese lancuage. Niy wife and I travelcd on to Changhai then, and she continued on to Gormany.

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Page

I did not start to study the Japanese language at this time, but returned to Honolulu on the CIICHEB MART.

My original idea in wanting to learn the Japanese language was so that I could return to Germany and teach in the universities there. I had originally planned that my wife and children would stay in Germany. However, when I decided to come to Honolulu to study the language, we thought it best that she and the children join me here.

When I returned to Hopolulu, I again stayed at the Brookland Hotel in 1935. until March of 1936. During this time I mas joined by my daughter, RUTH KUEFN, and son, EBEFHARD KJEHN, in December of 1935. During the tima \(!\) resided at the Brookland Hotel, I mat a Iieutenant KriNeDY, a submarine officer in the United States Navy. I also met FRANGESCO LOABARDO during this time. Lieutenant RGWNEDY introduced me to Iieutenant NEW, also a Upited States Napy submarine officer, who he stated wanted to leam to speak the Cerman language. Lieutenant NEII also introduced me to a Iieutenant Commander DURGIN. Both Ifeutenant NE:Y and DURGIN were interested in obtaining a job as Assistant Naval Attache in Berlin. Iieutenant Camender DUPGIN received the appointment. I also met SPENCER TAPNER, a Commander at the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, during 1936. In March of 1936, I rented a home at 2369 East Manoa Road, Honolulu, T.H., and moved there with my daughter, ROTH, and son, EBERHARD, and was joined by my wife, FRILDEL, and son, HANS, in April of 1936. During this time I was stuqying the Japanese language at the University of Hawail.

During May of 1936, I rented a home at Lanikai Beach from a Mr. GRNNE. About June, 1936. I made a trip to Tokyo, to continue my Japanese language studies, and during the time I was gone my family moved to' the Lanikai Beach home permanently. I returned to Honolulu from Tokyo, where I had studied at the Japanese language school for three months, about September, 1936. I continued my Japanese language studies at the Japanese language School in \(\mathrm{K}_{\mathrm{a}} \mathrm{Ilina}_{\text {, }}\) under Mr. IKINO, the principal of that school. He gave me private tutoring at his home.

During 1936 and 1937, I met a Major RODNEY ROBERTS, of the 64th Coast Artillery, and through him I met Major HAPT, of the Quartermaster's Corps. I had also met a lieutenant HARALD LINDSAY, a submarine officer of the United States Navy at the Brookland Hotel. These individuals visited me at my home on various occasions. I was also friendly with ARTHDR IWHR, a dentist in Honolulu, and Mr. VAN ORT, and Mr. ETNDHOREN. I also met CAFL


from Japan, a Japanese employee of this vessel called in person at my Kalama residence and delivered to me a package enclosed in cardboard which contained \(\$ 14,000.00\) in \(\$ 100,00\) bills. At. the time the package was delivered by this Japanese he remarked that same was from Dr. HORBEF: in Japan. The name of this Japanese is unknom to me and I had not seen him before or since. The money was aftervards given by me to my wife and I do not know where she has it hidden. Hovever, we at no time have deposited these amounts in the banks in Honolulu, except to carry a small account.

During our residence in Hawaii, my step- sor, LEOPOLD, has continued to reside and work in the Nazi Party in Berlin, Germany. He presently is employed under COEBBELS, Minister of Propaganda. There has always been a very close relationship between LEOPOLD and my wife. Therefore she has been insistent on supplying him with foods and a monthly allowance of 50 marks. In the past, shipments of food have been made through FORTRA, INC. in New York City, and the monthly allowance was sent through the Bishop National Bank until June, 1941, when the freezing order went into effect.

I talked to Mr. LO: of the Bishop National Bank several times and asked him if he would help me, if there mas any legal way he could send money to my son, so \({ }^{21}\) r. LOT wrote to New York and got an ancmer that there was no chance of sending money. Mr. Low told me the pnly chance would be to send pesos to a friend in South America and this friend could send the pesos to cermany and we found samebody in South America, whose name I have forgetten, that my \(\mathbb{T}\) ife wrote to but never received an answer in an attempt to transmit money to LEDPOLD via South America,

About the first part of November, 1941, after talking the matter over with my wife, FRIENEI, I went to the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu and asked them to send money to my son, LEOPOLD, in Germany through the Yokohama Specie Bank. They advised me at this time that they would inquire at the Yokohama Specie Bank to see if this was possible. I spoke to one of the Vice Consuls at this time, his name I do not recall. Thi's mas my first visit to the Japanese Consulate since the summer of 1940 when I had been to see a member of the Consulate staff to \(f\) ind if it would be possible to send a large package of food on a Japanese liner to my son, LEOPOLD, in Germany via Japan and Russia. I was advised at this time to make inquiry at the Japanese Chamber of Cormerce above the Yokohama Eppecie Bank, which I did and they informed me that I cos? send only a one-pound package.

About two or three days after my first vialt to the Gomsultate in November of 1941, I returned and this time I spoke to the man sitting behind the la rge desk in the back of the room, to the left of the entrance of the Consulate. \(H_{e}\) and \(I\) went aoross the hall into the second room on the right from the front of the Consulate. At that time he refused to send any money to my son and I offered to assiat him and the Consulate in obtaining information that they might be interested in. \(H_{e}\) asked me if I know how many ships were in Hawailan waters and I told him I could find out. Then I left the Consulate and went home and after three or four days returned to the Japanese Consulate, at which tims I spoke to the same man and KITA, the Consul himself, in that same room, the second one on the right from the front of the Consulate. At that time I made suggestions to them stating that \(I\) had a short-wave transmitter and could send messages for them if they so desired and I also outined a system of signalifine that could be used in order to furnish information relative to the types of ships in Pearl Harbor and those that had left. This systom of signalling contained fifteen scts of aignals. These aignals were to have been given by a light in my home at Lanakal or Kalama which could have been seen out at sea by a submarine, as followsi One light betweer 6 and 7 meant battle fleet in harbor; one light between 7 and 8 meant ecouting force in harbor; one light between \(B\) and 9 meant airoraft carriers in harbor; one light between 9 and 10 meant battle flect prepared to leave; one light betmeen 10 and 11 meant scouting force propared to leave; one light between 17 and 12 meant aircraft carriers prepared to leave; one light between 12 and 1 Ameant battle fleet loft between one and two days ago; one light betwoen 1 and 2 meant scouting force left one to two days ago; two lights between 6 and 7 p.m. meant aircraft carriers left one to two days ago; two lights between 7 and 8 p.m. meant battle fleet left three to four days ago; two lights between 8 and 9 p.m. meant scouting force left three to four days. ago; two lights between 9 and 10 pom. meant airoraft carriers left three to four days ago; two lights between 10 and 11 p.m. meant battle fleet left five to six days ago; two lights betwoen 11 and 12 midnight meant scouting force left five to aix days ago; two lights between 12 midnight and 1 a,m. meant aimoraft carriors left five to six days ago.

This same set of signala could have been sent by maans of linon on the olothes line at my Lanakal home, one sheet between 6 and 7 a.m. in daylight meaning battle floet in harbor; one aheot betwaen 7 and 8 a.m. meaning scouting force in harbors one aheot betwoon 8 and 9 a.me meaning aircraft carriors in harbori one ehoet between 9 and

10 a.m. meaning battle fleet prepared to leave; one sheet between 10 and 11 a.m. meaning scouting force prepared to leave; one sheet between 11 a.m, and 12 noon meaning aircraft carriers prepared to leave; one sheet between 12 noon and 1 p.m. meaning battle fleet laft one to two days ago; one sheet between 1 p.m. and 2 pom. meaning sqouting force left one to two days ago; two sheets on line between 6 a.m. and 7 a.m. meaning aircraft carriers left one to two days ago; two sheets on line between 7 a.m. and 8 a.m. meanine battle flpet left three to four days ado; two sheets on line between 8 a.m. and 9 arm. meaning scouting force left three to four days ago; two sheets on line betwaen 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. meaning aircraft carriers left three to four days ago; two sheets on line between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m. meaning battle fleet left five to six days age; tro sheets on line between 11 a.m. and 12 noon meaning sccutine force left five to six days ago; two sheets on line between 1R noon and 1 p.m. meaning aircraft carriers left five to six days ago.

They told me at that time that this system of communication was tou complicated and it would be necessary for me to simplify it. I went home. One or two days prior to the time I submitted this first set of sienals I had ridden by Pearl Harbor and there were very few boats in the harbor at that time. About threc days later I ment bact: to the Consulate with a simplified system of signalling, on what I think was December 2, 1941. This set of signals contained only eight combinations, as follows: No. 1 meaning battle flect prepared to leave; No. 2 meaning scouting force prepared to leave; No. 3 meaning battle fleet left one to three days ago; No. 4 meaning scouting force left one to three days ago; No. 5 meaning aircraft carriers left one to three days ago; No. 6 meaning battle fleet left four to six days ago; No. 7 meaning scouting force left four to six days ago; No. 8 meaning aircraft carriers left four to six days ago. These signals were to be given as follows from my \(L_{\text {anakai home }}\) One light between 7 and 8 p.m. meaning No.l; one light between 8 and 9 meaning No.2; one light between 9 and 10 pomo meaning No. 3; one light between 10 and 11 p.mo meaning No. 4; two Lights between 7 and 8 p.me meaning No. 5; two lights between 8 and 9 p.m. meaning No.6, etc. These lights were.to have been from a window or automobile lights. The same system could have be wi used with one piece of linen hung on the line at Lanakai between 8 and 9 a.m.. meanine No.1, one betreen 9 and 10 a.mo meaning No. \(2 ;\) one between 10 and 11 a.m. meaning No.3; one between 11 a.mo and 12 noon meaning \(N_{0.4}\); two picces between 8 and \(9 a_{0} m_{0}\) meaning No. \()\); two pieces between 9 and 10 a.momeaning \(N_{0}, 6\) and so forth. It
was also arranged that a light in the akylight at ry Kalama home betiveen 7 and 8 pom. mould mean \(N_{0} .1_{i}\) one between 8 and 9 p.m. would mean No.2; one between 9 and 10 p.m. would mean No. 3 and 6 ; one between 10 and 11 p.m. would mean No. 4 and 7; one between 11 and 12 p.m. (midnight) mould mean Nos. 5 and 8.

It was also arranged that this same system of signalling could have been used with a star boat just off the mouth of Lanakai Beach between certain hours, a star on the sall or a star and a number on the sail meaning corresponding signals as those proviously given, according to the time the boat was in that position. I do not recall the exact combinations that were to have been used to indicate each signal.

It was also arranged that on the KCMB Nant-Ads program in the morning the signal could be effected to indicate numbers 3 and 6 if a Chinese rug was advertised for sale, Nos. 4 and 7 if a beauty parlor operator was advertised for; and a third type of advertisement which I do not recall would indicate numbers 5 and 8. It was also arranged that if it was impossible to give this aystem of signals, a garbage fire on Maui in a certain locality between certaini hours would indicate the above number aignals, such as a fire between the hours of 9 and 10 p.m. would mean signals 3 and 6 , and so forth. In mentioning this latter plan I had in mind a locality previously described to me by a friend, CARL BASLER, where a number of vacant lots are located. I determined the exact locality of this area by reference to a map of mail which showed the names of the tro roads which border that locality and which names wore mentioned in my recomended plan as bordering the area wherein the fire sifnals were to be effected.

It was also arranged that this same set of signale could be given by short wave radio and arrangements were made that if the Condulate desired' to contact me they could do so by sending me a postcard signed "JMMIE", to my Box No. 1476 at Honolulu.

This aimplified set of signals was taken to the Oonsulate in an envolope by me about \(8: 30\) in the morning. At the time I went to the Consulate I was accompanied by my wife. FRIEDEI, and wile she remained in the car I went to the door and handed the onvelope containing this set of signals and another envelope containing \(\$ 500.00\), wich was to be sent to my son IEOPOLD in Germany, to the Vice Consil whose name I do not recall. I had no conversation with him at this time but went back to my car and drove on into Honolulu.

Doc. No. 6256 A
Page 11
I might point out that the plan outlined by me above and that submitted to the Japanese Consulate are probably not identical in every detail with those actually submitted, although the plans outlined above are basically the same as those submitted. Differences will probably appear in connection with the hours stated for the signals to be given.

On the same occasion that I transmitted this simplified system of signalling I had also advised the Consulate that there were seven battleships, six cruisers, twh aircraft carriers, forty destroyers and twenty-seven submerines, or some similar figure, in Hawailan waters. These figures were purely fictitious as far as I knew. This information was submitted in the saine enveloped as the one containing the latter plans.

Following the submission of these latter plans to the Consulate I have had no further contact mith any representatives of the Consulate to date, neither have I received any correspondence or telephone messages from such representatives. Apparently no effort was made by the Consulate to carry either of the proposed plans into effect through me

I have never been to the Island of haui nor have I ever seen the island nor purchased any property there. I never had a short-wave transmitter, and my Lanakai Beach house is rented to Army people. I might state that CARL BASLER had no knowledge of my plans submitted to the Japanese Consulate. As a matter of fact I have not seen him or his wife since they departed from Honolulu about September. 1941. Further, I have had no correspondence with them except for one letter received from Mrs. BASLER about October, 1941. I rented my Lanakai residence on November 1, 1941 to two couples, one an Army doctor, age about 30 , and the other am employee with the Enfineers, about the same age, both of whom had boen transferred fror:Schofield sarracks to Kaneohe. I cannot recall the names of these individuals at the present time.

The above statement consi ating of eleven pages has been read by me and I have signed each page individually and I certify the same to be true to the best of myowledge and belief, and algn the same of my own free will.
\(18 /\) Otte Kuehn
nITNESSES:
Ls George Re Millen. George E. Allon. Special Agent

Ls/ Je Sterlino Adoms
J. Sterling Adams, Speciel Agent

Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, Honolulu, T. H.



Doc. Ho. 6256 ?
Paie :
a tiuree montin risit. Eofore 1 narine Jemen intained my quote viea for permenent resicerce in the nited Strtes. Fincore re.t to the boet with me to bid me soodere ead a.t tint timo he reminded me that if he could over do a favor for me ho would he willin to do so. From the time we mirted and when I returned to Eonolulu, I heerc notinin: from rogont nor dik I commicete with him in eny wey until 1040 , with the noseible exceotion of one Christmps cprd I receives from him in 1 Cuse.

In the sprin: of 1040 my wife medo e tri) to cepan and roturnor with ebout \(\$ 6,000.00\), wich she hed ohtained from in. FilimiM HOMETRG. Followin- her return to Eonolulu and about four werks later, I received a letter from Dr. MDERG advisin: me that it. would be necessery for me to mole some arraniempnts to cat any additional funds out of Jepen; that it wos hecomine tos rifficult end danerous for him to do this. Lhout three weeks after receint of Dr. EO: 缇TG'S lettir, I wrote him aurcestine that he contect
 us in sendin:- the moner from Jabon to Fonolulu. yith this letter I sent a Duden (Germaz) remmar dictionary, similar to a "ebster dictionery. int the seme time I reteined a duplicote dictionery in my nossession. In the letter to \(\therefore\) arcerg I explained that in future communicetions I would use a number cona which would indicate the number of the nare sind the word from the top of tio pare denoting, the word intendad, such as if the word "monoy" appearod on pere 210 of the dictionery and wes the sixth word down from the top, to incicete the word "money" I vould send the numbers "210-6." This letter and its contents, the dictionery, wer sent by me from
 lnown in the past and, who had previousl" brounht orearnts from TClimR to my davehter. This messece wos sont throu-h Mr. X-I durinz July, 1940.

I roceived no further commanication from YoNerg until Soptember, 1340 , at which time Vr. Jíl telmoned me at mo Talama residence anc asked me to meet him in front of the \(\because\). Y. \(\because\). . office in ! ard he gove ne p pactare of noney contoinin: \(\$ 10,000,00\). At the seme tine ing. \(\because h I\) crace me alip of never micin instructed me not to write to \(\operatorname{Ir}\). FChema but rether to aderess my letters or commencetions to Beron :ICGOid et a nost officc hox rumber in Tolro.

Durinc Juls, 194l, shortly after the fro:ze order wont into effoct an? I wes -iven to incerctana thet epch rlion must submit a list of all of their property, I contected f. Vice Consul at the Jeprnese


 in the coded form mentioned above which in sibstance read: "Please send balance as soon as possible." f.t first the Vice Consul was suspicious and reluctant ebout ending my message but I explained as follows: I told the Vice Consul I was actini- for the Jappnese covernment and thot I hed en importent meseces to ro throurin to SARO: EYOGOKC, en immortant officiel in the Jrpences Covaramont at Tokyo. I told the Tice Consul tipet I necded the monc-r before October 20 so the.t I could make my stetement of proverty undor the Foreirn Iunds Law and so thet I could include this smount in my stetoment of proverty holdin:s es reauired by the foreten funds division in order test no questions muld be saked at a leter date roletive to my source of income pro a \(\because\) I camo into possession of those monies. I intentionally gavo him the impression that the money I was to get from Beron BYOGON was an comoensation for servicos I had reninced for the Jomanese fovernment. Whe Vice Consul egrend to send my message to RyOcond ot this time.

After two or three woeks I ceme back ane spoke to the Vice Connul end asked him if he had gotten an enswar or any moner es yrt. Fe seld no, so I acain returned about three weeks later and he atill seid no. it that time I made arrencrmente with the Fice Consul tiat when he heard from Jemen referdin.: tin moner or at an answer that he should send me a post card to my hox si ned "JIMuIT" and he said for ma not to come too often to the Consulate.' -

I cid not contact the \(C\) nsulnte parin nor did. I recnive env post cerce until onf oftornoon in the very end of Cetober, just ffter the first Japanese boat ceme to Eonolulu, a yount Japenese man came to my home in Kalama and ho told my son thet he vanted to see me. I was in the back workin; in my arden. liy son cane and advisad me ie was timere and I wint around. Ee vary brusouely asked me if I was CTHO KUTHI ane I seid "Yes, " pud he seld, "I heve somethine for you from Dr. EOMRTE, "so I took him beck to my little garden house whers he gepe mo a dackare and e letter ard abied him if he had any other information for me and he \(s\) :ia no. I oremed the letter first and in the letter wes a sheet of paper written in Thrlieh esk-in:- if I had a short-wave trensmitter and if I would bo willin: to make a test at a cortain stated time which was on a night several nicints leter, on a certein wave lenfth. ?his letter was typewritten

Doc. XTo. 6256 B
Pef̧o 4
and had no neme on 1t. He geve me a sheet of newer end er nnvolono and I wrote on the shect of peper that I wes unabla to make the test. I wes quito nervous anc but it in the envolope and ave it to him. I asked him if ho know whet wes in the packaze and he gaid no. I abked him if he wenteds receidt for tho packence and te and no, and he then left snd I oponad the sadrepend counted tho money. Thero werr \(\$ 14\), cor. 00 in tho packene, mostly in now \(\$ 100.00\) bills, some \(\$ 20.00\) bills. I thint: tint this wos e contact ryocory was tryine to mele with me throumh this letter. As soon as he loft I tore up the shect of paper abline mn to meke this racio test and burnod it up.

It wes about ofect after this, and efter thi diry hiric hac saled from Enolulu, thet I akin contactod tho japenese Gonsulate and telked to the Vice Consul and asked him to sond some money to my son, inOPOID, in Germeny. He seid that he did not think it could
'be done and I surester thet he thle it up with the Yokohama Specie Bank and I would come back two or thror dens leter.

I went back and spoke to the Vice Consul ebout three deys later, at which time he asked me what iniormetion I could ive bita about the United Statea Floet and how ming ships ware in the harbor. Fe also asked me if I know which pert of the Pecific the United Stetes Flget wouplly went in on their mannurfis and how jon, they vonld be out. I told him that I could tell him how many ships there wore in the herbor but that I could not tell him where tie flnet was or when it would be beck. Fe sucerestad that I work out fort of sicmals so that we could let tha Japnese Zleet know how many ships were in the herbor, how many were preporece to lerve and hov meny hed alreedy left for Joman. I told him that I could do all this.

I thint tint sometime between mr provious contact and this time when he asked me for informetion ebout the flent and suegested I prepare the set of sifinals thet he had contected IFOGOKU or someone in Jnpan about me. He apponred to me to be very fled to hrve me in hif office and to heve me do somethirs for him.

About tiree or four deve leter I went heok to the Jempange Consulato and showed him a set of simals contairing: fifters numbers, esch ono of which was to ineicote ecertain aituntion, ns to how meny ships were in the harhor, how many preparec to lervo, how meny hae left, whethar they wern hattle flret, scoutin." fleet or aircraft carriers, expetlo 8 s previously told by ne to Siecial Aconts Adems and Allem
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Doc. \becauseo. 6256 E
\#nm

```
in my stetemont of Jenurim l, 10s2. تn tole mn st thia time thent ther aystom watoo complicntod. Durin. this visit KITh wra nresent in the room. I did cill of my trikine with the rice Consul wo would ghent in Jepancen with XITA, the Consul, who would in turn spent in Jopanene to the Vice Consul and then the Vice 0 mnul would sponk with me in Thelish. They seld thet this aystrm wes too complionted nnd requisted me to mpe n simpler method of aimeln, which I sid I would do.

On Tuesdny, Docember 2, 1941, I went heck and took them two envolopes, one conteinin: the money to be sent to my son nnd the other coatriaini the simplifiad syratem of ai nels as described hy me in my previous statemont to Syeciol Arents ands ond in cii inted January 1, 1342 , and also i had written a.t this time asme informption ns to the number pne veryous terses of ships in rawaipin waters, ps also get forth in the.t atetement. I handed these two cnvclones to the Vice Comeul and he paked me to come in sid arid he would like to tali. with me but I told him the.t it was all written out and there we.s zo need to and turmed around and went back to my cer and went on into toma.

I leve road the ahove stotenent consistine of five ppres and certify the the some is true to the beat of my !nowledre and belief.
/a/ Otto Kuckn
Otto Wehn
MITMSSES:
Lo/J. Sterlin: Adams
J. Sterline Adamb, Specipl Aeent
/s/Geor:co Allen
Geor:e M. hllan, Syecial a ont
Tederel Bureau of Investifation
United Stetes Depertment of Justice
Yomolulu, T. H.

ITTERUAT INNAT MILITARY TRTDUUAL FC: TIIE FAR RAST

\section*{CERTIEICATE}
I.P.S. No. \(\underline{\underline{6256}}\)

Statement of Source and Authenticity
I, Janes_0, Richardson , herebr certify that I ara officially connected rith the United States Government in the following capacity: Admiral. United Stotes Nevy, Retired, on duty in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Depertment, temporarily assigned to duty Fith the Sunreme Commander for the Allied Porors in connection تith the International liilitary Tribunal for the Far Eest.

I further certify that as such official I have custody of the documenter hereto attached, namely: IPS Document No. 6256-A, consisting of 11 pages, dated Jenuary 1, 194?, and described as follors: "Affidavit of Otto Kuehn deted 1 January 1942," and IPS Docunent iHo. 6256-B, consisting of 5 pages, dated Januery 3, 1941 (1942), and described as follous: "Afridayit of Otto Kuehn deted Jonuprr 3, 1247." I further certiry that the attached reoords and documents are officiel documents of the United States Government, and that they are part of the official archives and files of the following-named Department: Office of the Chief of Taval Operations. Navy Department, United Staties Governmente

Witnessed this 14th day of November 1946.
\(/ \mathrm{s} / \frac{\text { JAiES O. DTCYARDSOII }}{\text { Signature of Official }}\)
\(\angle S \angle\) JALES J. POBTHISON
Admirol, U.S. Nevr, Retired Cantain, USNR i: \(5: 5853\) Officicl Capieity

Japanese Messages Conceraing Military
Installations，Ship Kovements，etc．（Pafe 22－24）

From：Honoluiu（Kita）．
To：Tokyo．
3 December 1941
\＃245（In 2 parte，complete）
（Military secret）
From Ichiro Ruji to the Chief of \＃3 Section of Military Staff Headquarters．

1．I wish to chence my method of communicating by signals to the following：

I．Arrange the eight signals in three colunns as follow：

Meaning
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline Meaning & & & & \multirow[t]{2}{*}{Sumat} \\
\hline Battleahip divisions & ： & \multirow[t]{4}{*}{Preparing to sortie．} & ： & \\
\hline including scouts and & ： & & ： & \multirow[t]{3}{*}{1} \\
\hline screen units & ： & & 1 & \\
\hline & 1 & & ： & \\
\hline & － & & ！ & \multirow{3}{*}{2} \\
\hline \multirow[t]{3}{*}{4 mumber of carriers} & ： & Preparing to sortio． & & \\
\hline & ： & & ： & \\
\hline & ： & \multirow{4}{*}{All doparted between 1at and 3rd} & & \multirow{4}{*}{3} \\
\hline \multirow[t]{3}{*}{Battleship divisions} & ： & & － & \\
\hline & ： & & ： & \\
\hline & \(:\) & & ： & \\
\hline \multirow{4}{*}{Carriora} & ： & \multirow{4}{*}{Several departed between 1st and 3rd} & ： & \multirow{4}{*}{4} \\
\hline & 8 & & ： & \\
\hline & ： & & ： & \\
\hline & ： & & ： & \\
\hline \multirow{4}{*}{Corrioxe \(\because\) ．\(\because . . . \quad \therefore\)} & ： & \multirow{4}{*}{All doparted between 186 and 3rt} & ： & \multirow{4}{*}{5} \\
\hline & ： & & & \\
\hline & ： & & ： & \\
\hline & ： & & ： & \\
\hline \multirow{4}{*}{Battleship divisions} & ： & \multirow{4}{*}{All departed between 4th and 6th} & ： & \multirow{4}{*}{6} \\
\hline & ： & & ： & \\
\hline & ： & & ： & \\
\hline & ： & & 8 & \\
\hline \multirow{4}{*}{Carriern} & ； & \multirow{4}{*}{Soveral departod between 4th and 6th．} & & \multirow{4}{*}{7} \\
\hline & ； & & & \\
\hline & ； & & 8 & \\
\hline & ； & & ： & \\
\hline \multirow{4}{*}{Carriers} & ： & \multirow[b]{4}{*}{All dmparted between 4th and 6th} & ！ & \multirow{4}{*}{8} \\
\hline & ： & & 1 & \\
\hline & ： & & ： & \\
\hline & ： & & 1 & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}


Page 2
2. Signala
1. Lanikai* Beach. House will show lighte during the night as follows:

II.


\section*{(Part2)}
III. Ianikai * Bay, during daylight.

If there is e. "star" on the heed of the eail of the Star Boat it indicates signals 1, 2, 3, or 4.

If there is a "star" and a Roman numerel III it indicates signal 5, 6,7, or 8 .
IV. Lights in the ettic window of Kalama House** will indicate the following:
Times
\(1900-2000\)
\(2000-2100\)
\(2100-2200\)
\(2200-2300\)
\(2300-2400\)
\(0000-0100\)
\begin{tabular}{c} 
Signal \\
\hline 3 \\
4 \\
5 \\
6 \\
7 \\
8
\end{tabular}

ケ. K. G. M. C. \({ }^{* * * ~ N a n t ~ A d s ~}\)
A. Chinese rug etc. for sale, apply P. 0. box 1476 indicatine eimal 3 or 6
B. CHIC. . CO farm utc. abply P. O. box 1476 indicatos signal 4 or 7.
C. 3eruty onareins weated etc. spply P. O. box 1476 indicutes siegnal 5 or 8
3. If the ebove listod stgrais ard wireless messages cannot be medo Prom Oahu, then on Maii lsiand, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanatorium *** at a point halfway betwoen Lover Kula Road and Haleakala Rond (latitude \(20^{\circ} 40^{\prime} \mathrm{TI}\)., loncitude \(156^{\circ} 191\) W., viaible from seawerd to the southeast and southwest of Maui Islend) the following algnel bonfire will be made deily until your gexis signel is received.

Pape 3
\[
\begin{array}{ll}
\frac{\text { Time }}{\text { From } 7-8} & \frac{\text { Signal }}{3 \text { or } 6} \\
\text { Trom } 8-9 & 4 \text { or } 7 \\
\text { From } 9-10 & 5 \text { or } 8
\end{array}
\]
- Between Wainmanelo and Kailua Beaches on east coast of Oahu.
** A beach villege on east coast of Oahu, 1 mile northwest of Lanikal
** A radio bropdcast atation in Honolulu.
**** At latitude 20-42-45 IT., Longilyade 156-20-30 W.
JD-1: 7370
(ii) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (7)
 CITY OF WLSFINGTON DISTRICT OF COLUMEIA. UNITED STATES OF AEFICh

I, John Frrd Beccher, Crmender, U.E.N.F., upon oeth, neko the fellowing stetericnts
1. I wes Speciel f.ssistent to the Secretery of the Nevy end Lieisnn Officer to the Jeint Congressicnel Corinittee on the Investigation of tre Jepancsc etteck on Poerl Ferbor, Cengress of the United etetcs.
2. In the coursc finy officiel dutics, I aided in supervising tre wrik of prepering the dccunent, "Jepenese Messeges Concerning IIlitary Instelletions, Srip Uovenonts, etc.", now designetcd e.s Nevy Document Ne. 73. This dncurient wes Exribit 2 in tre Joint Congrossionel Investigetion end wes introduced in evidence upon the verificetion of representetives of the h.my end of tre Nevy, of whict I wes the letter. Tris decument was prepered fran the original nesseges on file in the Wer Depertricnt end Nevy Departacnt. I essisted in supcrvising tre copying of the messeges es presented in the nincogrepred pages of the drcunent.
3. Tre nessages as enpied in this eccurnent ore true end ecourete copics of tre criginel decurients, to the best of my infermetion and bclicf.
Subscribed end swcrn to before nc \(\frac{/ s /}{t^{n} 1 s}\) 25 tr dey of July 1946.
/s/ R. S. HeMenus Licut USN
Name
(Stetus indiceting eutrority te tekc catrs.)

\section*{CERTIFICATE}
I.P.S. No. 6255-F

Steterent of Source end Authenticity
I, \(\qquad\) hereby certify that I was officially connected with the Jepanese Government in the folloring capacity: Jepenose Consul General at Honolulu, T, He_. from 14 Narch 1941 to about 7 Docember 1941 and that as such officic. 1 I had custody of the document a copy of which is attechod consisting of _ 3_pages, dated _ December , 1947, and described as follons: J__ Japnese hessage il 245 from Honolulu (KITA) to Tokyo

I further certify that to the best of my information and belief the attached rccord end document is a copy of an officiel document of the Japanese Govermment, and that it is a cony of part of the official : archives and filcs of the Japancse Consulate General at Honolulu, T. H. All such incoming messages and outcoing messages were recorded in \(\log\) books in ry office. On 7 Decomber 1941 at about 10:30 to 11:00 a.m. I ordercie these log books and other documents to be burned. I do not know whether or not these books and documents are in existence. They are not in my possession and they heve not beon in py possossion or control since 7 Decomber 1942.

Signod at Tokvo on this
\(\qquad\)
Signaturo of official SEAL
Witness:_EFIC W, FTETSHER,2d Lte_Former Consul Genera7 Official Cepacity

\section*{Stetoment of orficinl Procuramont}

I, \(\qquad\) , hereby cortify thet I am associated with the Genercil Hoadeucrtors of the Supreme Commendor for the Allied Povors, and that the above certificate pras obtained by mo from tho above signed officiol of the Jepenose Govormmont in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo, Jopan on this
\(\qquad\)


Fitness: EPTC T: FLEISUER, 2d Lite
Chicf, Intr Div, IPS
Officiol Gapacity

DCc. No. 6255 G

Pege 1
INTERNATIONAL MILITLRY TRIBUNLL FOR TYE FLR ELST CITY OF WASFINGTON DISTKICT OF COLU. BIL. UNITED STATES OF ALELICh

I, John Ford Beocher, Comender, U.f.N.R., upen cetr, recke the following stetcrient:
1. I wes Speciel dissistent to the Secretery of tre Nevy and Lieison Officer te tric Jint Congressienel Cornittee on tre Investier.tion of the Jepencse e.tteck on Peerl Ferbor, Cengress of the United Stetcs.
2. In tre ceursc of my cfficial duties, I eided in supervising the work of prepering the drcunent, "Jepenese Mosseges Concorning bilitary Instelletiens, Srip kicvements, etc.", now designeted as Nevy Decument No. 73. Tris docunent wes Lxribit 2 in tre Jcint Congressionel Investigetion and was intrcduced in evidence upen tre verificetion of represente.tives cf tre krive end of tre Nevy, of which I wes the letter. Tris docurient was prepercd from the criginal messeges on file in the Pier Depertiaent and Nevy Depertnent. I essistci in supervising the copying of tre nesseges as presented in the nincogrepred pagcs of the decunent.
3. Tre messages as copicd in tris decument are true and eccurate copies of tre originel documents, to the best of my informetion end belicf.

Subscribed and sworn to before me tris 25 tr dey of July 1946.
/s/R. S. licl cnus Licut USN Nene
(Stetus indiceting eutrority to trke ontrso)
CERTIFIGATE
I.P.S. No. \(\quad\) 6255-G

\section*{Statement or Source and Authenticity}

> I,
\(\qquad\) hereby certify that I was officially comected with the Japanese Government in the folloring cepacity: Japanese Consul General at Honolulu, T. He - From 14 March 1941 to about 7 December 1941 and that as such official I had custody of the document a copy of which is attached consisting of_1_ page; dated 5 December , 194], and describcd as follows:_Jepaneso Mossage 4252 from Honolulu
(KIEA) to Tolvo
I further certify that to the best of my information and belief the attached record and document is a copy of an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is a copy of part of the official archives and filles of the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu, T. H. All such incoming messages and outgoing messages were racorded in log books in my office. On 7 December 1941 at about 10:30 to 11:00 a.m. I ordered these log books and other documents to be burned. I \(^{\text {a }}\) do not know whethor or not these books and docunents are in existence. They are not in my possession and they have not been in my possession or control since 7 Decomber 1941.

Signed at \(\qquad\) Tokvo on this 8th day of October, 1946. \(\qquad\)
SEAI Witness: \(\qquad\) ERTC T. TLTISHER_2d Lte

Former Consul General Officinl Capacity

\section*{Statonent of Official Procurement}

I, DOUGLAS Le ThLDORF , hereby cortify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Porrers, and that the above certificatc was obtained by me from the above signed officiol of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokro, Japan on illis
8th day of October , 1946



Doc. No. 6255
Prgc 1

CITY OF W/SSYINGTON DISTEICT OF COLUR:BIA UNITED STATES OF ALERICA

SS: CEETIEIGLTE

I, Jorn Ford Beccher, Ccmender, U.S.N.R., upon onth, meke the following statement:
1. I was epeciel issistent to tre eccretery of the Nevy end Lieison Officer to the Jeint Congressionel Comittee on the Investigation of trc Jepenese atteck on Pearl Fe.rber, Cengress of tre United Etetcs.
2. In the course of my officiel duties, I aided in supervising the work of prepering the docur:cnt, "Jepenese Lesseges Cencerning Military Instelletions, Srip Licvenents, etc.", now designeted as Nevy D^curent No. 73. Tris decurent wes Exribit 2 in the Jeint Congressionel Investigetion end was introduced in evidence upen the verificetion of representetives of the Army end of tre Nevy, of which I was the letter. Tris document was prcparca fron the originel nesseges on file in the Wer Departnent and Nevy Depertnent. I essisted in supervising the copying of the nesseges es presented in tre mincograpred, peges of the document.
3. The nesseges as ecpied in tris document are true and eccurate copies of thc originel docunicnts, to the best of ny informetion and belicf.

Subscribed and sworn to before me tris 25 tr dey of July 1046.
\(/ \mathrm{s} / \mathrm{K}\). S. Hel H nus Lieut USN
(Stetus indiceting euthority to teke oeths.)
I.P.S. No. \(6255-11\)

\section*{fut inent of Source ind Authinticity}
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 and doseribed as followa \(\qquad\) ——_toTolyro \(\qquad\)
\(\qquad\) _.

I further cortify that to the beat of: me faformation and belief the attached racorl and dooument is a copy of on offileici documont of tho Jepmose Govorment, and that it is a cony of pert of the oficicia archives ind sillos of the Japancso Consulate Generel. at Honolulu, T. H. Ail such inconing monsiges and outronine massagos vero rocorded in log books in mofifice, on 7 Docembor 1941 at about 10:30 to 11:00 a.n. I ordorcd thuse log books and othor docuncats to be lurned. I do not tnov whether or not thogo books and decuncats ere in oxistence, Thoy are not in my possosation and thoy have not becia in my possoesion or coatrol since 7 D(oember \(10 / 4\). Sigmud at Tolyo on this s

\section*{Stetcunt of Official Procuromont}
 ansociated with tho Gonoral. Headquirtors of tho Suprome Conmandor for tho dllicd Povers, and that the abovo cortificato ras obtained by me from the above signod official of the Japanoso Govormment in the conduct of my official businose.

Sipuod at Tolsye Jaman on this
Bth dny or October, 1946
DOUGISS L H UTDORF
N.ME 1 It It., INF.

Chiotic Iny, Diven IPS . Official Capacity:

From: . Honolulu
To : Tokyo
December 6, 1941
\#254
1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were -.. and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:

9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tendars, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left).
2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.

ARMY 25874 JD-7179 Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)

Doc. No. 6255-I

Doc. No. 6255I
Prge 1
INTERNATIONLL HIILITARY TKIBUNIL FOR TTH FI.K ELST CITY OF WASPINGTON DISTKICT OF COLU:BIf.

SS: \(\quad\) CEETIEICETE UNITED STATES OF INERIC\&

I, Jorn Ford Beecher, Commendcr, U.S.N.R., upon ontr, reke tre following steterent:
1. I wes Speciel L-ssistent to the Secrctery of tre Nevy end Liaison Officer th trc Joint Congressionil Comittec on tre Investigetion of the Jepencse atteck on Peerl Perbor, Congress of tre United stetes.
2. In tre crursc of ny officiel dutics, I aided in supervising tre work of prepering the docurient, "Jepencse Liesseges Concerning liilitary Instelletions, Shiplovements, cte.", nov designeted es Nevy Docurient Nc. 73. This docurnent was Exribit 2 in trc Joint Congrcssionnl Investigetion and wes introduced in cvidence upon tre verificetion of represcntetives of tre limy end of tre Nevy, cf whicr I wes the letter. This docunent was prepered fron the original messeges on filc in tre War Depertnent and Nevy Department. I essisted in supervising the copying of the nossiges as presented in the niteogrepred peges of tre cocunent.
3. The nessefos es copici in tris docuricnt ere true end accuretc copies of the criginal docuracnts, to the best of my informetion end belief.

Subscribed end sworn to before
/s/ John Ford Brecher rie tris 25 tr dey of July 1946.
/s/F.S. Licidenus Licut USN
Neme
(Status indiceting authority to teke oatrs.)

\section*{}

\section*{I.P.S. No. 6255-I}

Stutument_of Source encl Authunticity
 that I wes ofilicjally connocted with thi: Japencisc Govornnent in tho rolloring capacity: _-_ Jananoge Consul fincral cit Honolulu, Te He_ _fron 14 Karch 1041 to about 7 Leconbor 1941 and that as such officinl I had custocy of the docuraent a cony of which is attached consisting oi _1 payo, dated 6 Peomber , 1241, and described as folloms: - Jumusu Hussera \#t254 from Honolulu
\(\qquad\) to Tol:y

I furtice cortify that to the buat of my informetion and beliof the att:echod record and documont is a copy of an officis? document of tho Japanse Government, and that it is a cony of part of the onicial archives and files of the Japanese Consulate Gensrel at Honelulu, T. H. All such inconing ressngos and outgoing nessages poro recordod in log books in ry officc. On 7 Lecor:bar 1941 at about 10:30 to 11:00 c.on. I orderad thesc log boole and other documents to bo burned. I do not ?how whether or not these books and docuacnts aro in existence. Thoy are not in my possescion and they have ant boen in my possossion or control sines 7 Deccmbor 1941. Signod at \(\qquad\) Tukro on this
\(\qquad\) day of \(\qquad\) 1346. \(\qquad\) Signeture of Ofricial SEAL
Titness: \(\qquad\)


\author{
Forrice Consul Goncral
} Cricial C:pecity

\section*{Statcmint of Officiol Procurement}

I, \(\qquad\) DOUCL:S L R RIDORE \(\qquad\) , horicby ccitify that I or cessociated rith the Gonernl Hoadquartors oi the Suprome Comandor for the Allivd Powers, and thet the above cortificate uns obtained by no fron the above signed oficielel of the Jepanese Goveminent in the conduct of ry official busincss.

Signcd at Tokgo Jenan on this
Sth diy of Octobcr , 1946.


Mitnoss: \(\qquad\) 2d Lt.
RESTRICTED

Published for the information of all concerned.
By command of General MacARTHUR :
R. K. SUTHERLAND,

Lieutenant General, United States Army, Chiof of Staff.

OFPICLAL:
C. A. WILLOUGHBY,

Major Genoral, G.S.C.,
Aset Chiof of Staff, G.2.

\section*{RESTRICTED}

Allied Tranglator and Interpreter Bextion gUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

RESEARCH REPORT
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline SUBJECT: & THE PEARI HARBOR OPERATION
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\begin{array}{ll}
\text { I.G. } & \text { No. } 6909 \\
\text { B.I.D. } & \text { No. } 01013 \\
0811.010200
\end{array}
\] \\
\hline \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{date or issue 1 December 1945 No. 132} \\
\hline SUMMARY: & \begin{tabular}{l}
1. This is the second of a series of research reports solely based on documentary evidence held at ATIS, GHQ, prior to 1 January 1945, treating of the planning and execution of the several Japanese strikes which initiated the present hostilitice. It was preceded by ATIS Rosearch Report No. 131, entitled "Japan's Decisiou To Fight." \\
2. It is the purpose of the present report to collate all evidence available at ATIS, GHQ in respect to the planning and execution of the Japanese attack on PEARL HARBOR on 8 December 1941. \\
3. All evidence adduced in this report is derived from Japanese sources. Consequently dates used are East Longitude Time, except where the coutrary is specifically stated. \\
MnB/REW/JWWHS \\
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\hline SOURCES : & \begin{tabular}{l}
Captured Documents \\
Statements by Prisoners of War \\
Intelligence Reports \\
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\section*{RESTRICTED}

\section*{allimd Tranglator and Interpreter gention SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS}

\section*{RESEARCH REPORT}
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\hline SUBJECT: THE PEARI, HARBOR OPERATION & \[
\begin{aligned}
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3. All evidence adduced in this report is derived from Japanese sources. Consequently dates used are East Longitude Time, except where the contrary is specifically stated.

HKB/RIWT/JWW/S
No. 132

\section*{SUMMARY:}

Distribution H


SOURCES: Captured Documente
Statemente by Prisoners of War
Intelligence Reports

\section*{RESTRICTED}

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" UMPIRES: NAVAL GENERAL STAFF:
\begin{tabular}{ll}
\multicolumn{1}{c}{\(\underline{c}\) RANK } & \multicolumn{1}{c}{ OFFICIAL DUTIES } \\
Admiral & \\
Rear-Admiral & \begin{tabular}{l} 
Head of First Section (War Plans and \\
Operations).
\end{tabular} \\
Captain & \begin{tabular}{l} 
Momber First Section
\end{tabular} \\
Captain & \begin{tabular}{l} 
Head of Sub-Section, First Soction \\
Commander \\
Membor Sub-Section, First Section
\end{tabular} \\
Commander & \begin{tabular}{l} 
Momber Sub-Section, First Section \\
Commander \\
Momber Sul-Section, First Section
\end{tabular} \\
Commander & \begin{tabular}{l} 
Member Sub-Section, First Section
\end{tabular}
\end{tabular}

NAVY MINIS'TRY:
TAKATA, Toshitane SHIKI, T'sunco TOIBATM, Kuric . FUJII, Shigeru

Commander
Commander
Commandor
Momber of Military Affairs Bureau
Member of Military Affairs Bureau
Member of Office of Military Supply
Private Secretary to Navy Minister
(Admiral SHIMADA, Shigetaro).

N-TEAM : COMBINED FLEET:
YAMAMOTO, Isoroku ITO, Seiichi KUROJIMA, Kamoto GO'TO, Shigeru ISOBE, Taro SUGI, Toma SASAKI, Akif WADA, Yushiro NAGA'TA, Shigoru WATANABE, Yasuji ARIMA, Taknyasu SEIMI, Iehiyoshi OTA, Kamai

Rear-Admirul Captain Commandor Commander Commander Commander Commander Commander Commander Commandor Commander Commandor

Commander in Chief Combined Floet Chiof of Staff
Deputy Chiof of Staff
Staff Adjutant
Staff Engineoring Officor
Staff Gunnery Officer
Staff Air Officer
Staff Communication Officer
Staff Nuvigation Officor
Staff Operations and Plans Officer
Staff Torpedo Officer
Staff Supply Officer
Meteorologist attached to Staff
FIRS'T COMBINED COMMUNICATIONS UNIT (RADIO INTELLIGENCE):
\(\left.\begin{array}{lll}\begin{array}{l}\text { KAKIMOTO, Gonichiro } \\ \text { ARISAWA, Naosada }\end{array} & \begin{array}{l}\text { Rear-Admiral } \\ \text { Commander }\end{array} & \begin{array}{l}\text { Commander } \\ \text { Deputy Chief of Staft }\end{array} \\ \text { E-TEAM : }\end{array}\right]\).

Section I. the planning stage

\section*{1. COMBINED FLEET SECRET OPERATION ORDER NO. 1}

The following excerpts from an account based upon the testimony of an umamod prisoner of war and published in "Weekly Intelligence" provide a fairly comprehensivo insight into the planning of the Japanese attack on PEARL HARBOR :
" When Japaneso planes struck elustored United Stater Warships and nircruft at PEARL HARBOR on 7 December 1941, the enomy was carrying into effect pinpointed plans conceived months in alvance and long cloaked in secrecy. Until recontly, little has been known of the planuing stage prior to the sneak raid on HAWAII.
"Tho first concrete intimations of early onemy intentions are revealed in the intermgation of a Japanese Chief Ycoman who worked closely with top-ranking Japaneso Navy persommel during critical months in mid-1941. The prisoner, who was captured on SAIPAN, had access to highly confidential documents as woll as bohind-the-scenes rumors while plans for PEARL HARBOR were being perfected.
"The prisoner appears both exceptionally intelligent and cooperative. Testimony capable of confirmation from othor sources checked elosely. Tactical information proved reliable.
" Most remarkablo of the prisoner of war's assets is his memory of details, as indicated in his reconstruction of the historic Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 1, of 1 November 1941. This document, reproduced outirely by momory, is believed to bo fairly accurately transeribed, and will be printed in full lator in this article.
"As a yeoman attached to the Staff of Commander in Chiof Combined Fleet (Admiral YAMAMOTO), the prisonor became
fumiliar with Japancere war games. Staffs of the various Japancse Fleets worked these out on a large game board. Games were held \({ }^{*}\) frequently, sometimes an often as twice a month.
"Prior to late August (19+1), war games wore held at such anchorages as SLIKUMO, SAEKI, KAGOSHIMA, md KANOYA. Close attention was devoted to curront experimental data, which was incorporated in tactics employed. Although the prisoner insists that enemy countries were not specifically designated during these games, the identity of possible Jnpancese foes could scarcely have been obscure.
"During this period, the prisoner added, there was a constant interchange of personnel between Commander in Chief Combined Fleet and the Naval Genoral Staff. Mon on these staffs were reportedly 'definitely much keener' than members of other fleet staffs.
"Final plamning stages were presaged lato in August, when Commander in Chiof Combined Fleet ordered all fleet commanders and their key staff members to TOKYO for further war games. Offices at the Naval General Staff at JAPAN's Capitad were found inadequate, and the games wore thereafter held in the Naval War College. 'The prisoner of war claimed that security measures at the War College were woefully inadequate. Classes at the Colloge continued as usual; ' any man with a half-official air could casily have walked in'.
"O. 2 September, the final all-important 'games' got undorway, with an introductory speech to all officers taking part. Rooms were assigned to the " N " Team, the " A " Team, and the "E" 'Term (NIPPON, AMERICA, and ENGLAND) and to the umpires. The teams, composed of virtually every top-noteh Japancse naval officer, wero made up as follows:


\section*{THE PEARI, HARBOR OPERATION}
" UMPIRES:
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline NAVAL GENERAL STAFF: & RANK & OFFICIAL DUTIES \\
\hline NAGANO, Osami & Admiral & \\
\hline FUKUTOME, Shigoru & Rear-Admiral & Head of First Section (War Plans and Operations). \\
\hline UOZUMI, Jisaku & Captain & Mombor First Section \\
\hline YAMAMOTO, Chikew & Captain & Hoad of Sub-Section, First Section \\
\hline MAYUZUMI, Harue & Commander & Membor Sub-Section, First Section \\
\hline TAMfURA, Saburo & Commander & Menber Sub-Section, First Section \\
\hline SANAGI, Tsuyorln & Commander & Membor Sub-Nection, First Section \\
\hline UOZLIMI, Yoriichi & Commander & Member Sub-Section, First Section \\
\hline \multicolumn{3}{|l|}{NAVY MINISTRY :} \\
\hline TAKATA, Torhitane & Captain & Momber of Military Affairs Bureau \\
\hline SHIKI, 'Isunco & Commander & Member of Military Affairs Bureau \\
\hline TOIBATA, Kurie . & Commauder & Member of Office of Military Supply \\
\hline FUJII, Shigeru & Commauder & Privato Secretary to Navy Minister \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

N-TEAM :
COMBINED FLLET:
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline YAMAMOTO, Isoroku & Admíral & Commander in Chief Combined Fleet \\
\hline I'TO, Seiichi & Rear-Admiral & Chief of Stuff \\
\hline KUROJIMA, Kamcto & Captain & Doputy Chief of Staff \\
\hline GO'TO, Shigeru & Commander & Staff Adjutant \\
\hline ISOBE, Taro & Commander & Staff Eugineering Officor \\
\hline SUGI, Toma & Commander & Staff Gummery Officer \\
\hline SASAKI, Akim & Commander & Staff Air Officer \\
\hline WADA, Yushiro & Commandor & Staff Communication Officer \\
\hline NAGATA, Shigeru & Commander & Staff Navigation Officer \\
\hline WA'TANABE, Yasuji & Commander & Staff Operations and Plaus Officer \\
\hline ARIMA, Taknyasil & Commander & Staff Torpedo Officer \\
\hline SEIMI, Iehiyoshi & Commander & Staff Supply Officer \\
\hline OTA, Kamai & Commander & Meteorolagist sttached to Staff \\
\hline \multicolumn{3}{|l|}{FIRST COMBINED COMMUNICATIONS UNIT (RADIO INTELLIGENCE):} \\
\hline KAKIMOTO, Gonichiro & Rear-Admiral & Commander \\
\hline ARISAWA, Nmosads & Commander & Deputy Chief of Staft \\
\hline \multicolumn{3}{|l|}{E-TEAM :} \\
\hline \multicolumn{3}{|l|}{SECOND FLEET:} \\
\hline KONDO, Nobutake & Admiral & Commander \\
\hline YaNAGIZAWA, Kuranosuke & Captain & Deputy Chiof of Staff \\
\hline OISHI, 'Tamotan & Commender & Staff Navigation Officer \\
\hline \multicolumn{3}{|l|}{FOUR'TH FLEET:} \\
\hline INOUE, St.mi & Vice-Admiral & Commandor \\
\hline \multicolumn{3}{|l|}{FIFTH FLEET:} \\
\hline HOSOGAYA, Boshiro & Vice-Admiral & Commander \\
\hline \multicolumn{3}{|l|}{ELEVENTH AIR FLEET:} \\
\hline TSUKAHARA, Nishizo & Vico-Admiral & Commander \\
\hline KUSAKA, Jinichi & Rear-Admiral & Chief of Staff \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

A-TEAM
THIRD FLEET (Anphibious forces for southern invasion):

"On 3 September, officors involved studied classifiod material. Prisoner of war was assigned to ' \(N\) ' 'Ieam (Commander in Chief Combined Fleet). That afternoon, Commander WATANABE-Admiral YAMAMOTO's hard-working, fact-finding Plans and Operations Officer-hauded the prisoner of war an outline of conditions under which the games were to bo held, and requested fifty copies. These terms, which set forth a working basis for the games, contained the heart of the forthcoming 1 November Operation Order No. 1. Extensive preliminary planning was indicated. The prisoner believed that these plaus must have been under development for several months. This was the first time that the prisoner of war realized that something of unusual significance was in the sir.
"On 5 September, the prisoner of war was attached directly to Commander SASA. KI, Commander in Chief Combined Fleet's Staff Air Officer. When he ontered the smoke-filled room at about 1000, he found PEARI HARBOR plans under discussion. The Japanese apparently expected to catch all major UNI'TED STATES Fleet units in the PACIFIC in PEARL HARBOR as well as units believed recently transferred from the ATLANTIC. The prisoner was surprised to overhear that ' \(N\) ' Team expected to lose one-third of the units participating in the attack on HAWAII; one AKAGI Class aircraft carrier and ono SORYU Class aircraft carrier were estimated as sunk.
"On 6 and 7 September, the conference of ' \(N\) ' Team debated the best means of assaulting PEARL HARBOR. (The prisoner of war, who was adept at the abacuscalculating board-was often used during these sessions to estimate fuel used by floet units at varying speeds). It was during this stage of planning that Captain KUROJIMA (Deputy Chiof of Staff) and Rear Admiral I'TO (Chiof of Staff) differed as to the practicability of conducting an amphibious assault on HAWAII. The cool and precise ITO was (surprisingly) in favor of an early landing, and YAMAMOTO wns inclined to agree, but the intuitive, temperamental KUROJIMA won the discussion by pointing out insuperable logistics problemg. The prisoner of war believes that I'TO's plan was a last-minute, improvised idea, and that -when KUROJIMA's argument succeeded -the basic plan continued as originally intended.
"These early sebsions, the pribnner of war said, seemed confined primarily to two
general problems: first, the detaily for a succeasful surprise raid on PEARI, HARBOR; and second, a carefully worked-out schedule for occupying MALAYA, BURMA, DU'TCH EAST INDIEA, the PHILIPPINES, the SOIOMONS, and Central PACIFIC Islands-including (ultimately) HAWAII. Neither AUSTRAIIA nor NEW ZEAILAND was apparently considered as an immediate military objective; the Japanese intonded simply to cut thom off from outaide help. The prisoner of war heard INDIA mentioned only once, when some senior officer remarked 'that's whore friction with GERMANY will begin.'
"The conferences (and 'games') were ended about 13 September. The prisoner helped carry the notes to KURE, and thence by launch to the NAGATIO, YAMAMOTO's Flagship, which was anchored at HASHIRAJIMA. About half of the staff were already on board.
"On 15 September, all the staff with four yeomen (not including prisoner of war) journeyed to the IWAKUNI Air Group to confer with the Army. The prisoner of war remembers TERAUCHI mentioned, but cannot recall othor names. He insists, howover, that TOJO-then still War Ministor-was not present. It was widely rumored (but never confirmed by other evidence) that the Army conferees at this meeting had not previously learned of plans to attack PEARI, HARBOR.
"The NAGATO remained at HASHIRAJIMA for about six more days. At the end of September, the main body of the Japanese Fleet moved to SAEKI. There were four revisions of Combined Fleet Operation Order No. 1 while the Flagship was at SAEKI, though no major changes were made.
"On 1 November, the final printing of the order was started, requiring almost three days to complete. Two copies were sent to the Army. Staff officers of other fleet units at SAEKI called for copies in person. In all, 300 copies were distributed. Operation Orders No. 2 and No. 3, designating Y-Day and X-Day, were issued on 5 and 10 November, respectively.
" (Commont: The enemy naturally uses East Iongitude Time in his Operation Order -i.e., the date of 8 December for the PEARL HARBOR attack is correct East Longitude Time.)
"The prisoner of war once knew the Operation Order intimately. Over a period of weeks, he has labored to reproduce on paper as much of the Order as he could
remomber. This version is obviously incomplete and not to be compared with the original document, lout in main outline it is believed to be substamtianly as printed.

Noter in parentheses in the following ordor were added by the editor.
"' Flagehip NAGATO, SAEKI BAY 1 Noveminer 1941
( COMBINED FLFET SECRET OPERATION ORDER NO. 1
'The Japmese Empire will declare war on the UNITED S'IATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS.
' War will be declared on X-Day.
'This order will become effective on Y-Day. - GENERAL SITUATION:
( \({ }^{(a)}\) Poliey townd the UNI'TED S'IATES.
' In spite of the face that the Empire has always maintained a friendly attitude toward the UNITED STATEES the UNI'TED STATES han interfored in all the measures which wo have taken in self-protection for the preservation of our interests in EAS'T ASLA. Kecently, she has blocked our speedy settlemont of the CHINA Incident by aiding the govermment of CHIANG KAI-SHEK and hat even resorted to the final outrage of hrenking off cconomic relations. While sonselessly prolonging Japmesc-Ameriem negotiations, she has continucd to strengthen her military proparations. She offers a threat to us in the form of a concentration of her Fleet in the PACIFIC Ocem, thus attempting to exert on us both economic and military pressure.
(b) Policy toward GREAT BRITAIN.
' BRITAIN is aiding the government of CHIANG KAI-SHEK and acting in concert with her Allies and the UNITED) STATES in intorfering with our program of construction in EAS'T ASIA. Recently, she has been stendily luvilding up the defenses of her bases in EAS'T ASIA in an attempt to threaten us.
( (c) Policy toward the NE'TIIERLANDS INDIES.
'Although economic negotintions of a pencefal nature have been under way with us for a number of months, the NETHERLANDS INDIES has been led by BRITAIN and the UNITEI) STATIES to reject flatly the continuasce of mutually benoficial cconomic relations. Recently, whe hat threatened the fortunes of JAPAN which havo hoen built up as as result of persevering work through long yemrs.
'(d) The ports and the vast fertile regions of the corat of CHINA have been occupied by us and most of her great cities captured. CHINA, howover, supported by BRITAIN and the UNITEI) STATES, has not yet
awakened from the deluding dream of "Fight the War and Save the Country" and is attempting total resistance to JAPAN in the form of a "scorched earth" policy for all CHINA.
- Whilo organized resistanco is gradunlly bocoming weaker, the prevalonce of guerrilla warfare has obliged us to cemmit large numbers of troops to permanent garrison duty thore. If we are to secure decisive victory, BRITTAIN and the UNITED STATES, the powers behind CHINA, must be destroyed.
(e) Policy toward the SOVIEI UNION.
'The strongth of Soviot forces on tho Soviet-Manchukuoan Bordor is formidable.
'The UNION of SOVIET SOCIALIST' REPUBLICS is maintaining a vigilant alert, awaiting developmentr. However, if the Empire does not attark tho SOVIETT UNION, it is belioved that the SOVIET UNION will not commenco hostilitios.
- OUR SITUATION :
'The Fourth Floet has largely completed proparation in the Mandated Islands, as has 11 Lir Floot (Nuval Shore-hased Air) 'at essential bases in CHINA, FRENCH INDOCHINA aid TTIAILAND. The stato of repair of our shipw and planes is generally excellent and the efficiency of their persomen has markedly improved.
- STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES:
' To drive BRITAIN and AMERICA from Greater EAST ASIA, and to hasten the settlement of the CHINA Incident. In addition, it is expected that when BRI'TAIN and AMERICA have been driven from the NETHERLANISS INDIES and the PHILIPPINES, an indopendont self-supporting ceonomic ontity may be firmly established. The vast and far-reaching fundamental principle, the spiritual guide of our nation, (the " Eight Corners of the World Under One Roof-HaKKO ICHIU "), may be domonstrated to tho world. To this end we will use all the military strength necessary.
- STRATEGY:
'The strategy to be adopted against BRITAIN, the UNITED STATES and the NETHERLANDS will be as directed in the Amexed Volume. X-Day and Y-Day will be minounced later.
'If before Y-Day the onemy is believed to have boen able to ascertain our plans, the execution of X-Day will be made the sulbject of a special order.
- If before X-Inay we should bo attacked by the onemy, his attack will be crushod with all available strongth. All commanding officors will act in conformanco with "Strategy
to be Adopted in the Case of an Enemy Attack ".
' In the came of the SOVIE'I UNION, overy effort will be made to avoid provoking hostilities. At the same time, every effort will be made to insure the secrecy of our plans. If the enemy should ascertain our plans, military operations will immediately be begun in accordance with "Monsures to be Taken in the Case of an Attack by the SOVIET' I'NION".
'Circulation of this order is limited to Fleet and Foree Commanders. These Commanders will take overy possible measure to prevent leakage of these plans prior to their being earried out.
'Precaution: Disposal of this Order:
'This Order must be burned when no longer of use. If there is any danger of ils falling into onemy hands as the result of a ship sinking or some other untoward oceurronce, the responsible Commander shall porsonally make immediate disposal of it.
' Combined Flect Secret Operation Order No. 1
- ANNEXED VOLUME
'1. Joint Ammy-Navy operations will be carried out in accordance with the "ArmyNavy Central Headquarters Agreement".
'2. A Striking Force (Carrier 'Tusk Force), having 1 Air Fleet (Camiers and Fseorts) as its main element, will depart its naval bases or operating areas about X-16 day and will set course, by way of TANKAN Bay (HITOKAPPU Bay, ETOROFi! Island, KURIJES) for PEARL IIARBOR, the base of the American Pacific Fleet, where it will deliver a surprise attack.
' \(\mathrm{X}-\mathrm{p}\) any is expected to be luring the canly or middle part of December.
'3. 'Targets for attack are airfields; air«raft curriens, battleyhips, cruisers and other warships; merchant shipping; port facilities; and land installations, in that order.
'4. Fiom the time set by the Force Commander for the Striking Force to leave port in JAPAN, strict radio silence will be olserved. Communications will be vin ordimary broadcast system. The code book to be used will be "(not cortain)". The following ermmunications abbreviations will be in effect :
"Mmy warships in PEARL HARBOR". -"The fate of the Empire".
" No warehips in PEARL HARBOR"-
"The cherry-blossoms are in all their glory".
"The wenther is clear and visibility good in the region. Suitable for an attack". -
"Climb Mount FUJI".
"The time to commence the attack is \(0: 20\) ".-"The depth of the moat of HONNOJI Temple is 0 n20".
" All forees attack".-" Climb Mount NII'TAK \(!\) !"
ete.
(i.) The course and the disposition of the attecking units will be determined by the Striking Force Commander.
'The Commander of the Striking Force will inform the proper authoritics as soon as ho determines the course and disposition of the attacking units. Care must be taken to avoid ordinary morchant shipping routes and to keop the plaps from disclosure under any circumstance whatever.
'6. Procedure to he followed in case of discovery before the attack, eithor by a ship of the nation- against which war is to be declared, or ly a ship of a neutral nation (including the SOVIET UNION):
(a) In ease of discovery within 600 miles of the objective ly a ship of a mation against which war is to be declared, make immediato preparation to attack and sink it.
(b) In case of diseovery within 600 miles of the objective by a ship of a neutral nation, the ship should immediately bo detained until it can do us no actual harm; strict surveillance should he kept of its radio transmission. In ease it should make any transmissions which might prove harmful to us or give us reason to fear that our plans might be revealed, the ship will be seized by a destroyer which will make immodiate nttack preparations.
(e) In case of diseovery by a foreign ship more than 600 miles from the oljective, the ship will be detained and radio transmission forbidden. However, if it seems highly probablo that our general intentions have been guessed, an attack should be made immediately, if between X-5 Day and X-Day. If before X-is Day, the Striking Force Commander will decide the disposition of the ship, depending on the circumstances. In the care of detention of on onemy ship, " B " method will be followed.
'7. The commander of the Surprise Attack Force (submarine Forec), having 6 Fleet (Submarine Fleet) as its main element, will hnve most of the submarines leave the westerin part of the INLAND Son on X-20 Day to attack PEARL HARBOR. Its entire strength will be disposed so as to command the harbor mouth. It will att sk any enemy warship which may have cscaped from the hatbor. It will also enry out recomaissamee

voys and the place, timo and date for landings.
' 8. Agreements on Aerial Warfare, Agreemonts on the places to be altacked by both Army and Navy planes, aud on the places, dates and times of attacks by Army or Navy planes acting independently. Agreements on the airfields to be used, such as "XX Airfield will be used primarily by the Army and socondarily by the Nawy.
'4. Supply plans.
' Plans for the supply of Army landing forces to be effected by Army shipping and for the Navy's support of same.
'5. Communications Plans.
'6. Agreement on occupied territories, cities, and resources such as," The Bandjermasin Oil Refiuery will be controlled by the Navy.'"

\section*{"، MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN CASE OF A SOVIET ATTACK}
(Prisoner of war does not remember the date exactly, but it was the end of October -and alated in effect):
' It is believed likely that we shall not be attacked by the SOVIET UNION unless we attack first, but in case JAPAN is attacked first, 5 Fleet (Northern Force) will counterattack with all its strongth and maintain local supremacy.

\section*{YAMAMOTO, Isoroku}

Commanding, Combined Fleet'"
"، Verbal explanation by the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet, of ambiguities in Combined Flect SECRET Operation Order No. 1. (Printed version of an explanation of details not covered in the order delivered to the High Commanders in an informal talk.):
-1. That the coming declaration of war against ENGLAND and the UNITED STATES will usher in a great war of survival with the two leading naval powers of the world.
'That this war is really one in which our existenco is in question, one in which we have no choice but to strike with our military powor.
'2. That our Navy, in engaging a worthy enemy, is about to realize an ambition which dates back to the foundation of the Imperial Navy many years ago.
'3. That the alliance with GERMANY was not desired by the Navy, but was a project favorod by the Army which thought it would hold the SOVIET UNION in check. (!)
'4. That the campaigns in the NETHER-

LAND INDIES and in tho PHILIPPINES will be preceded by the securing of advanced bases in THAILAND and FRENCH INDOCHINA. It is believed that these operations will come off in extremely smooth ordor.
' The Navy will be ablo to secure sources of oil supply swifly by moans of these campaigns.
' 5 . In connection with the attack on PEARL HARBOR, reports indicate that a gigantic fleet, which includes the ATLANTTC Fleet, has massod in PEARL HARBOR.
'This Floct will be uttorly crushed with one blow at tho very beginning of hostilitios. It is plamed to shift the balance of powor and thereby confuse the enomy at the outsel and deprive him of his fighting spirit.
' Our objectivo, however, lies more than threo thousand miles inway. In attacking this large flect concentration it is to be expected that countless difficulties will be encountered in preserving the absolute security of the plans. If these plans should fail at any stage, our Navy will suffer the wretched fate of never being able to rise again. The success of our surprise attack on PEARL HARBOR will prove to be the "Waterloo" of the war to follow. For this reason the Imperial Navy is massing the cream of its strongth in ships and planes to sssure success.
' All of the planes of Carrier Division 1, Carrier Division 2, and Carrior Division 5 will bo concentrated in the attack on OAHU. If there are any ships which escape, almost the entire submarine strength of the 6 Fleet will bo in command of the harbor mouth and will concentrate torpedo nttacks on them. In addition to these, the destroyer strength of (Destroyer Squadron 1) will be deployed in a screen (mainly for night attacks) and the fast battloships of Battleship Division 3 deployed in a fourth ochelon. If the main force of the enemy fleet should escape from PEARL HARBOR and make for the open sea, it will be waylaid by the main body of our floet.
'6. The midget gubmarine unit has boon studying and training at the KURE Navy Yard with the CHIYODA for a year and a half, but it is still too much to hope that it has reached a stage of perfection. In any case, the crew mombers are supremoly confidont. 6 Fleet will attempt to use them in attacks within the harbor.
' 7. It is clear that even if AMERICA's enormous heavy industry productive power is immediately converted to the manufacture of ships, planes and othor war matorials, it


\section*{Section II. ASSEMBLY AND OUTWARD PASSAGE}

\section*{2. ASSEMBLY AT TANKAN BAY(1)}
a. Striking Force Operation Order No. 1

The unnamed Prisoner of War quoted in Paragraph 1 above reproduced from memory "Striking Force Operation Order No. 1", specifying the assembly at HITOKAPPU Bay, ns follows:

Flagship AKAGI, SAEKI Bay 10 November 1941
STRIKING FORCE OPORD \#1
"1. All shipe will complete battle preparations by 20 November.
"2. The fleet will rendezvous at TANKAN Bay. (HITOKAPPU Bay, ETOROFU Island KURILES).
" 3. Inasmuch as the plans for the coming operation imust be kept absolutely seeret, strict security will be maintained in regard to them, up to the time they are explained to the crew after port of departure in JAPAN has been cleared.
"4. Break-down of attack plane units: The AKAGI 1st Attack Plane Unit

Unit Commander: Lt. Comdr XX 1st Carrier Attack Unit
Etc. (details not recalled by Prisoner of War).
"5. Fleet cruising formation
(Including retiring formations)
(1) TANKAN Bay is also referred to as HITOKAPPU Bay. The latter name representa an alternative manner of reading the ideographs. The bay is located on ETOROFU Island in the KURILES.
"6. All transmission of messages is strictly forhidden.
'fransmission and reception will both use the TOKYO \#1 broadcast communications system.

NAGUMO, Chuichi
Commanding
Striking Force"
(CINCPAC-CINCPOA "Weekly Intelligence," Vol I, No. 22, page 11)

\section*{b. Assembly of Task Force}

Prisoner of War YOKOTA, Shigeki (JA 100037), a third class seaman who participated in the attack on PEARL HARBOR as a nember of the crew of the aircraft carricr KAGA, gave the following account of the assembly of the task forco at HI'TOKAPPU Bay. Upon reintorrogation, the prisoner revised his estimates of tims in the munner set forth in Paragraph 2d below. All times are East Iongitude Time.
" Assembly of Task Force:
"Task force assembled at TANKAN (indicated by prisoner as HI'YOKAPPU Bay), ETOROFU Island in the KURILES about the middle of November 1941 under the command of Vics-Admiral NAGUMO; Chuichi. The aircraft carrior KAGA left SASEBO on 7 Novembor, proceedsd south of KYUSHU, up the east coast of JAPAN, and arrived at TANKAN on 15 Novomber 1941. The aircraft carrier SORYU, three oilers and one supply ship arrived on 17


Figure 1. Sketch showing diap sition of Japanese task force at anchor in HITOKAPPU Bay.



Figure 2. Sketch of terrain and installetions in HITOKAPPU Bay Area.
" HITOKAPPU Bay was surrounded by hills, the highest peak being about 500 meters high. Southwest const was low lying with a rocky foreshore an far as the center of bay. Low cliffs began here, rising to a maximum of about 200 meters at northenstorn side of entrance. Hills were covered with low scrul, not higher than two or three feet, and no trees could be seen. Ground was. covered with snow, but there was no ice in bay or ushore. Prisoner of War saw no signs of lakes, rivers or swamps. The coastal area appeared to be uninhabited except by fishermen who lived in three houses near pier. It was, however, impossible to see details of centor or northeastern side of bay from KAGA, and viow beyond pier was obscured by low hills and an embankment.
"Prisoner of War estimuted width of bay to be 6,000 metors and distance between
entrance and opposite shore to be 2,000 meters. He thought there was a large rock close inshore near conter of bay. Bay was deeper than most harbors, but he did not know exact depth. There was deep water right up to foreshore.
" Wind was from northwest.
"There was only one pier, situated at southwestern side of bay. It was constructed of concrete and stones, about 15 moters long, 4 meters wide, 2 to 3 meters high, and steps out at the ond. Its height was difficult to estimate as waves were fairly high alongside. There was no crane or structure on it. Depth of water at steps was about 5 metors. Prisoner of War had landed at pier on one occasion to burn rubbish, but was not allowid to leave its immediate vicinity or to speak with any local fishermen. It was high tide when ho landed.

\section*{ASBEMBLYY AT TANKAN BAY}

\begin{abstract}
" Ground inshow of pier was stony with short grass showing above snow.
"There wero threo fikhermen's houses inshore and a little to south of pier. They were not visible from KAGA's anchorage, but could be seon from pier. Behind houses earth embankments had been constructed, sbout 10 feet high. Nothing could be seen beyond embänkment except three radio masts. Prisoner of War could not see whother there was a village in vicinity, but stated there was no smoke or other sign of habitation.
"Between houses and embankment there was a narrow and very rough road, which could perhaps be used by cars. Prisoner of War did not know where rond led. He saw no cars. There were no fishing boats to be seen.
" Landing would be difficult between pier and southwestern side of entrance, as there wore a number of rocks offishore, height above water about 2 feet. Fishing stakes were placed among these rocks. Prisoner of War saw no sand or beach in this area.
"Prisoner of War considered that landing
\end{abstract} from MLC would be easy between pier and center of bay. 'There were few rocks offshore, and height of foreshore above water did not exceed about 1 meter. Water appeared to be deep up to shore, but Prisoner of War saw no beaches in immediate vicinity of pier.
"From center of bay to northeastern side of entrance landing would be impossible because of cliffe. Prisoner of War saw no beaches in this area, but was unable to observe details from KAGA's anchorage.
"A radio station was situated behind embankment near pier, but no details of building were visible. Three masts could be seen, but Prisoner of War could not estimate height or arrangement as they were partly obscured by embankment. He saw none of its personnel, but thought it was a naval radio station. He did not know any details of its organization, or number of personnel.
"Prisoner of War saw no defenses, guns, or torpedo tubes mounted ashore. There was no evidence of anti-submarine nets or boom defense. There were no indications of minefielde, either across entrauce or outside, and no buoys which might mark channels. There were no buildinge visible at either side of entrance.
" Prisoner of War saw no airplanes while at TANKAN, and did not know of existence of any airtields or seaplane bases. He could not tell from KAGA's anchorage, or from pier, whether there were muy suitable sites
for airfields; ground near southwestern side of entrance war, however, low lying.
"There were no lighthouses or shore lights visible. He thought, but was uncertain, that storm signals were displayed in vicinity of radio station.
"Prisoner saw no’ airplanes or patrol vessels while at TANKAN, except six torpedo loats which anchored southwest of entrance for about one day. Provisions were embarked in KAGA on 19 Novembor. Prisoner thought she oiled, but was not certain. No shore leave was grauted. An order was given however, that no rubbish was to be thrown overboard, but was to be collected and burnt ashore by , pier near southwestern side of entrance. Prisoner landed once, on 20 November, for this duty. Officer in charge of working party gave orders that no one was to lenve immediate vicinity of pier. Prisoner saw, but did not speak to, about three fishernen who lived in houses nearby. He saw no army or naval shore personuel nor staff of radio station further inland."
(A'TIS Interrogation Roport, Serial No. 230, pages 2-7)

\section*{c. Greatest Operation Force in History}

Prisoner of War KAWAKITA, Kataumi (JA (USA) 147987) who participated in the attack on PEARL HARBOR as a member of the crew of the destroyer KASUMI, wrote out an account of the operation. His written account has been supplemonted in respect to several details by additional interrogation:
"Farewell, many memories of the home port. After leaving YOKOSUKA Harbor on the 15th of November our crack 18 Destroyer Division progressed directly towards HI'TOKAPPU (TANKAN) Bay in the KURILE Islands with the destroyer FUCHIKA leading and followed consecutively by the KASUMI, ARARE, and the YOEN.
"In the carly dawn of the 21at we entered TANKAN Bay, our destination. Aircraft carriers, destroyers and other ships entered the bay the following day. This is where our Imperial Navy organized her greatest operation force in history.
(ATIS Interrogation Notes not proviously published)

\section*{d. State of Readiness}

Prisoner of War YOKOTA, Shigeki (JA 100037), (the same prisoner who gave the information quoted in Paragraph 2b above), upon interrogation, revised his version of the time schedule kept by the task force during the PEARL HARBOR operation as follows:


Prisoner atated that he was a little frightened on hearing this, but an a Japanese, he took war for granted.

KAGA-oiled 27 November, and again 3 Decomber. Prisoner did sot know when othor ships of Task Force oiled. Oilers and supply ship left Task Force during night of 4 December and prisoner did not see them again.
"Thuk Foree ultered course to south on 4 December."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 230, pages 3-4)

\section*{c. Approached PEARL HARBOR}

Prisoner of War KAWAKITA, Katsumi (JA (USA) 147987), who participatcd in the attack on PEARL HARBOR as a momber of the crew of the destmyer KASUMI, wrote the following account of the task force's outward passage:
"On the mornirg of the 26th the operncional commandirg officer, Vice-Admiral NAGUMO, Chuichi passed the brief order, ' Atack PEARL HARBOR.'
"Thus, we left our Fatherland behind and advanced through high waves of the PACIF. IC. Our advance was led by the destroyer OBORO consecutively followed by the 16 destroyer division; the light cruiser ABCKUMA ; the battleship, HIEI ; the aircraft carriens, AKAGI, KAGA, ZCIKAKU, SHOKAKU, SORYC, and HIRYU ; the bat-tle-sbip, KIRISHIMA; the 18 destroyer division; 2 submarines; 1 heavy oil tanker; and the heavy cruisers, TONE and CHIKUMA on both flankg.
"First the destroyers fired their ball ammunition, followed by the fire of the cruisers and then by that of tho battleships ending with the take-off and landing practice of the airplanes from the aircraft carricrs at dusk. After 10 or more days of traveling through rough wenther and sea in an castorly course on tho Northern PACIFIC, we finally approached PEARI, HARBOR, HAWAII." (ATIS Interrogation Notes not previously published)

\section*{d. Men Informed of Strike}

Prisoner of War FURUKAWA, Masaguki, who participated in the attack on PEARL HARBOR as a member of the crew of the Aircraft Carrier SHOKAKU, gave the following account of the task force's outward
presage:
"On 27/28 Novimber the fleet sailed, taking a northerly course south of the ALEUTIANS. On December 4 the Captain of the SHOKAKU informed the crow of the intesided strike, and prisoner says that ho was worried because he feared that an American counteratinck would follow. On the night of 5 December the ships turned south....
(JICPOA Preliminary Iuterrogation Report No. 7, Scrial ADM 101022, 10 Jamuary 1944, pages 5-6)

\section*{e. Method of Fueling}

The article quoted at length in Paragraph 1 above summarizas the task force's outward voyage as follows:
"The Task Furce sortied from ETOROFU Inland, in thy KURILES, on or about 27 November (Easi Longitude Time), and headed castward under a henwy front bofore turning south to the attack. The composition of the Force, which was commanded by the late Vico-Admiral NAGUMO (Commander in Chief First Air Fleet) is fairly wull established. The enemy had six carriers: KAGA, AKAGI (Carrier Division 1) SORYU, HIRYU (Currier Division 2) SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU (Carrior Division 5 less HOSHO); two battleships ; HIEL, KIRISHIMA (Battleship Division 3, less KONGO and HARUNA); three cruisers: TONE, CHIKUMA (Cruiser Division 8, plus ABUKUMA); elements of Destroyer Squadron 1; and about twenty submarines.
"One of the Japancse' chief headaches during the sortie was the fueling problom. One well informd prisoner who was a chief petty officer on fueling detail described emorgency measures required to keep the speedy SORYU and HIRYU in fuel. These two ships wore fueled daily, and drums carried as supercargo were unloadod by bucket-brigade when the fast dash to the plane-launching point was begun. At that, the SORYU arrived back at KURE with only 95 tons of oil in her tanks. Oilers coming alongaide the Tusk Force to fuel units had considerable trouble, and visibility was so bad that "towing spars" for position keoping were almost constantly in use."
(CINCPAC-CINCPOA "Weekly , Intolligence," Volume 1, No. 22, pages 13-14)

\section*{Section III. THE ATTACK}

\section*{4. THE AIR-SURFACE STRIKE}

\section*{a. Task Force Salls}

Prisoner of War YOKOTA, Shigeki, quoted in paragraph 2b above, a member of the crew of the Aircraft Carrier KAGA, described the attack on PEARI HARBOR as follows:
"During the night of 7/8 December, the throe submarines proceeded on indopendent patrols in vicinity of Task Force. They were not seen again by prisoner.
"'The same night Task Force increased to full speed of 26 knots and commenced zig. zagging. Ship's company of KAGA went to action stations and remained closed up all day. Prisoner was at 20 centimeter gun and saw nothing further. He thought Task Force remamed in formation throughout 8 December and did not scatter and that battleships were stationcd one on either beam of leading ships.
"Airplanes were flown off at 0100 hours, 8 December 1941 (JAPAN time), and returned about 0500 or 0600 . About 30 airplames failed to return, 15 of which belonged to KAGA. Prisoner of War attributed high proportion of lesses from KAGA to fact that her airplanes were last to take off."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 230, page 4).

\section*{b. Glorious Success}

Prisoner of War KAWAKITA, Katsumi, quoted in paragraph 3c above, wrote the following description of the attack on PEARL HARBOR:
"On the early dawn of December 8, we reached a point 400 kilometers off-shore of the HAWAIIAN Islands. As the sun rose the wide exparse of the sky cleared and the sea was calm. The wenther was good as if plamed for the great initial victory of YAMATO's airplance.
"As the battle flag rose on the mast of the flagship AKAGI, the carrier-borne planes left the decks one after another from each of the carriors and in a magnificent formation of approximately 300 airplanes disappearod in the direction of PEARL HARBOR. Immediately, reports of glorious
successes came in.
" Again, the second nttack unit made up of approximately 200 attack and fightor planes of the ship departed bravely to conquer.
"......another great and glorious victory. However, who would know of the remembrances of the holy sacrifices of the Imperial Army behind the glories. Approximately 15 of our planes and 5 special submarinos failed to return. Only one onemy flying boat came to attack."
(ATIS Interrogation NoteB not previously published).

\section*{c. Coneral Quarters}

Prisoner of War FURUKAWA, Masayuki, who participated in the PEARL HARBOR strike as a membor of the crew of the Aircraft Carrior SHOKAKU, stated that:
"General quarters came at 2300 hours, 7 December 1941, and the planes took off at 0200 hours, 8 December. As soon as the last plane had taken off the fleet turned northward. Planes returned between 0600 and 0900 hours. Ten planes of the SHOKAKU failed to return."
(JICPOA Preliminary Interrogation Report No. 7, Serial ADM-101022, 10 January 1944, page 6).

\section*{d. Succeed in Surprise Attack}

Commandor NAKAYA, Kenju, commandor of the leading air formation in the attack on PEARL HARBOR, wrote an account of the strike which was subsequently edited by the Naval Information Department and published by BUNGEI SHUNJU SHA. A full translation follows:

\section*{"WE SUCCEED IN THE SURPRISE A'TYACK"}
"We received the orders to attuck the Island of OAFU at sea. At the time, my ship was sailing directly eastward. The long-awaited orders finally came. Notwithstanding all, when I received theso orders, I experienced the sensation of becoming hot from excilement and deep emotion. All hands formed ranks on the deck and received these orders. At this time, the signal flag, which went up high on the masthead,
was truly the ' \(Z\) ' flag. Tho ' \(Z\) ' flag which went up 36 years ago in the JAPAN Soa, when the fate of the Empire was at stake, floated again; this time on the PACIFIC. While all hands were looking up at the ' \(Z\) ' flig waving in the strong wind of the ocean, unawares their oyos were ruming with tears. Our air unit commander intimately iseued the following order:
'Each membor of the crew make a vow to exert yourself to the utmost in carrying out your duties.' At that time, the rapture of being able to take part in an important, unique battle rose up within me.
"Soon after the ' \(Z\) ' flag was lowered, I became conscious, for the first time, of the charging speed of the aircraft carrier which was going eastward at full speed. The morale of the officers and men rose up high, verging on the point of suggesting the engulfing of the eneny.
"The weather at that time was poor and variable. However, the triumphant officers and men took no notice of it. The maintenance crew, saying that they would also fight with the aircraft crew, gave us white hend bands. The ordors to start finally came. The orders of the commander at the time were: 'Succeed in the surprise attack operation; all hands chargo.' The large waves just before dawn caused the aircraft carrier to roll and pitch sideways. The sea was still gloomy; the wind which went whistling by my ears was strong, and the weather was as bad as usual. This was to be expected, for a \(\mathbf{1 7}\)-meter northeastorly (sic) was blowing hard and strong. Yast, dark clouds hung over from an altitude between 1500 and 2000 metors. It wasn't the best situation for the large formation of airplane groups to leave the aircraft carrior to rush into that narrow PEARL HARBOR. If this had been the customary practice or training, flying would have been postpoued; but, this morning, the training of many years was continued. It made no difference whether the weather was good or bad.
"Starting time 0 hour 00 minutes. One plane after anothor left from the unsteady deck which was pitching and rolling lengthwise and sideways. As they were arranging their formation in the air, my eyes unconsciously followed the friendly planes which were going up one after the other, and looked up at them encouragingly as if they were saying: 'Go to it!' Our planes which had already organized their formation rushed, at full speed, straight for HAWAII. However, the greatest anxioty of the com-
mander was during the time it took for them to rench HAWAII. Could there have beon an error in the position of the aircraft carrier, after it had made a surprisingly longdistance journey of nearly 4000 miles to near the shores of HAWAII where the weather is bad? If there was \(n\) mistake, our airplanes would be unable to reach OAHU Island. Before long, the men in the airplanes greeted a magnificent sunrise. Unually in the South Seas area one can see over 30 miles, or even a long distance view of 60 miles when the viow is clear. But at this time, a screen of vast, dark clouds almost cut off the view. Since HAWAII is ridged by mountains of a height of 1000 meters, the island should be seen at least 20 minutes before reaching it.
"Thinking that we should soon be reaching the Hawaian Islands, I was straining my eyes through a tolescope, when suddonly the shoreline appeared distinctly before us. Now! Now was the time for all hands to atlack! The formation immediately deployed. Each unit, depending upon its duties, some at a high altitude, some at a lower altitude, changed over into a resolute attack formation. PEARL HARBOR was still asleep in the moruing mist. It was calm and serene inside the harbor, not even a trace of smoke from the ships at anchor. The orderly groups of barracks; the wrig. gling white line of the automobile road climbing up to the mountain-top; fine objectives of attack from all directions. In line with these, inside tho harbor, were capital ships of the PACIFIC Fleet, strung out and anchored two ships side by side in an orderly manner. The torpedo airplanes cut through the scattered clouds and wont charging through in a straight line. A formation torpedo attack was very difficult because PEARL HARBOR is so shallow and narrow. Theroupon, the torpedo airplanes separated individually, some flew so low they skimmed the surfnce of the waters, others approached within 200 to \(\mathbf{3 0 0}\) meters of the belly of the battleships, and discharg. ed their torpedoes when thoy thought, this is it. Instantaneously, two white streaks of the wake of the torpedoes went rushing along the surface of the water. As I was fensting my eyes upon this scene, a torrific column of water flew up into the air from the side of a capital ship. It was an excellont hit upon the capital ship's side. The column of wator went up high onough to compete with the altitude of the clouds. Columus of water continued to gush forth

\section*{the pearla harbor operation}
one after another. If it were to be timed, it was an incident of thre to four seconds. Notwithstanding this, the metisireruft dofense guns were still ablcop. Even the fighter planes did not cromo up to challenge us. The surprise atticck wats a complete success. The great auccess of the surprise attack should bo said to have been accomplishad spectacularly. A messuge-'We succeeded in the surprise attack' - was radioed to the aircruft carrier.
"Following this, the dive-bombers rushed straight on in a bee-line. Shortly after this, reddish-black flumes were flaring up, from the hangars of the encmy airidrome, and from the airplanes which were lincd up on the airdrome. When these torpedo airplanes asd dive bombers were about to deal freely their first blow and were seemingly starding on their noses about to dive, onemy antiaircraft fire began to burst around us. Next, finally came our large bombers. I was in the spearhead of the formation, and I fixed my sights on a gisut battleship below: Since the arr currents were rough, I could not fix my sights for horizontal bombing. Thinking that I could not afford to waste any bombe, I began all over again: As we circled midst the antiuircraft fire, the following formations did the eame, and circled calmly midet the antiaircraft burste. This time we suceeded. Just as we were about to rekase our bombs, our plane recejved a severe jolt. As I glanced backwards, there was a column of smoke rising into the sky 500 meters high.
"This is something which we learned later. But this was one of the sucecsses of the battle which was the result of close coordination tactics between the fighter plane formations, torpedo plane formations, dive bomber formations and sipecial submarines which carried out an extromely difficult undersea attack. The powder magazine of an enemy warship had exploded, and the bottom half of it had alrcady buist open, spreading a wide oil film on the surfuce of the water. It was definitely of the ARIZONA clase. The enemy antiaircraft fire finally became intense, and shalls burst arourd our formation in such large numbers that it secmed ess though they were throwing rucks at us. Prcsently a large hole was torn on the port side of the fusclage of the flight commander's plane. Following this, it appeared as though No. 5 plane had beon hit; fuel was leaking from its tanks. Nevertheless, it continued in the formation. It secms that he was determined to crash
his plane after fulfilling his mission. When I nignallod, 'Let me know your situation;' he calmly auswered, 'It is only the auxiliary tank.' His attitude was completely serene, which seemed to ignoro life and death.
"Next, we diracted our attention upon Target No. 2, WHEELER AIRFIELD, which was situated in the center of the Island. Ovor 200 fighter planes and bombers were lined up here, but our dive bombers and fighter planes had already bembed and strafid them. Red flames were rising from the planes which had been wheeled out on the airdrome, and dense, black anoke rose from hangars. It wat a scene of complete destruction. It was probably gasolino which was burning. Black smoko was spreading to the extent of almost sereening the sky. This situation was the reason why the enemy plances could not take off to countrantack. Since these enemy objectives were in such a condition, wo again turned our attention to the enemy capital ships.
" Two warships which were anchored side by side offered an excellent target, one which could never be repeated. While one formation aimed at the first ship, the other attacked the second ship. After the torpedouirplanes and dive bombers had attacked, our large bombors would attack; it was a continuous attack. When No. 1 bombor attacked, a column of water 100 meters in height rose up. If the succeeding planess should dive then, they would be damaged, so they calmly waited until the column of water subsided. Therefore, the perind of time during which they would be troubled by enemy antiaireraft fire would be prolonged. Nevertheless, they waited colmly in the air. Just aloout this time, the torpedo airplane attack reached its height of intensity. They boldly closed in on the enemy and dropped their torpedoes, and when they were about to level off from the dive, they were fired upon. The fuselage of one of our airplanes whe enveloped in smoke. The torpedo airplano which became a mass of fire still continued to accurately release its torpedoes, and finally charged directly into an enemy ship and blew itself into a burst of flames. I definitely witnessed this with my own eyes.
"Just about the time that we had accomplished our attack-mission and were about to return, the first rays of the morning sun had already touched upon PEARL HARBOR. As I glanced back, I saw one battleship cut in half surrounded with black

\section*{THE AIR-SURFACE STRIKE}
oil; besides that, there were two sunkon shipe with thoir ugly, red bellies showing. Then, there was anothor ship tilted at a 45 degree angle, gradually sinking, and threo ships were-burning furiously. Every enemy ship along the coast of FORD ISLAND was damaged.
"We circled over PEARL HARBOR sevoral times, as long as our fuel supply permitted. The reason for this was that, although we had clearly seen theso with our own eyes, thore was a faint hope that one of our crippled airplanes might return. When we returned safely to our aireraft carrier, the second attack formation took off. The reason for the sending of successive atteck formations was to thrust home the finial blow to the remaining strength of the enemy PACLFIC Fleot."
(ATIS Enemy Publications No. 6, pages 3-5)

\section*{c. Grand Air Rald}

Excerpt from communique issued by the Naval Section of Imperial General Headquarters at 1300 hours on 8 December 1941 reads as follows:
"1. At daybreak of the eighth, the Im'porial Navy mado a desperate, grand air raid upon the American fleet and military strength in the HAWAII Area......"

This communique was supplemented on 18 Decomber 1941 by the following estimate of damages inflicted by the strike:
"Sunk-five battleships, two A or B-class cruisers. Severely damaged-three battle ships, two light cruisers, two destroyers. Medium damages-one battleship, four B-class cruisers. Besides these, 450 enemy planes were burnt by bombing and strafing, and 14 planes were shot dowin. Morcover, it was reported this day that our special assault unit, organized with special submarines, torpedoed and sunk a battleship of the ARIZONA class. However, word that five special submarines have not yet returned, and our losses were 29 airplanes greatly impressed our peoplo".
(ATIS Enemy Publications No. 6, page 2).

\section*{f. Prepaganda Photegraphs}
- Various captured propaganda pamphlets and photograph albums have contained ঞerial photographs of damages inflicted by Japanese uir attacks on PEARL HARBOR. These were given wide circulation for publicity purposes in JAPAN. A selection of these ure reproduced us Appendix A. Translations of the captions are attached in each case.

\section*{5. SUBMARINE OPERATIONS}
a. PEARL HARBOR Scouted Before Attack
Captured book ontittod "Characteristics of Submarizos and Anti-Submarine Operations" undated, issuing authority not spic; ified, contains the following pussage.
"Recomnaisennce and Scouting:
Befone the surprise attack on HAWAII, JAPAN's best submarii.es (about thirty of them) had been ussigned to scouting and recommassance duty at PEARL HARBOR." (ATIS Document No. 1in807, not previougly published)

\section*{b. Chart of Proposed Submarine Activities}
'The Japancse plan of' operntions called for an attack on Americun naval units inside the harbor by midget submanines.
"This sulmarino beached itself the following day on the opposite side of OAHU, and one of the two crew members was taken prisoner. Little was lemmed from the prigoner but it is believed that the submarine was damaged on a reef near the entrance of PEARL HARBOR, putting sound gear out of commission and forcing retirement. Subsequent examination of this submarine's torpedo tubes indicated that an attempt had been made to fire torpedoes, but launching gear failed.
"The original chart, too frayod for reproduction, was evidently a UNITED S'TATES Navy Hydrographic Office chart, with detailed navigational data carefully translated into Japanese. Rough notes were scribbled on the chart, in some cracs too illegible to translate. On the reverse side were further notes on navigation; etc. . The submarine also carried a rough profile of the PEARL HARBOR skyline. The mission of the sulsmarino was both attack and recomnaissance. The KANA code shown on the chait is similar to codes recoverd from aircraft.
"At least threc Jupanese midget submarines were lost by our counteractions at this time. One submarine actually entered the harbor; it suffered a direct five inch shell hit, and was thereafter rammed and depth-charged beyond reengnition. The
Japancese admitted the loss of tive of these undersizo submarines."
(CINCPAC-GINCPOA " We Wkly Intelligence," Volume 1, No. 22, pugcs 14-15).

\section*{C. Special Attack Unit}

Captain HIRAIDE, Hideo, Chief of the Naval Information Section of Imperial Gener-

they had no such intentions. Some approached (within a proximity unprecedented in history) and attacked onemy ships undor tho hail of hombs and torpedoes from friendly air units; others remained concealed in the water until the moon rose. Thus, the - entire persomnel of the unit made a definito. attack upon those enomy capital ships which were slightly damaged during the daylight attack. Thoir concentration upon contributing to the success of the attack transcended beyond life and death.
"The unprecedented, peerless, sacrificial spirit of attack thoroughly demonstrated the tradition of the Imperial Navy, and should be recognized as one of the greatest achievements of the outbreak of this war.
" Furthermore, I wish to add that, as I recall the great achievements of the guardian spirit of our nation at this third month death commomoration of tho Special Attack Unit, which our population of \(100,000,000\) cannot forget even though they might try, there is another new inspiration.
"These young men were always warmly received by their officers; thoy were subjects of respect by their comrades and subordinates. They all had excellent characters. But without the thought of fame, promotion, pleasure, and even without self-interest, they cast aside the thought of 'self', and only presented their whole body and eoul to their Emperor and country; they bravely died for their country at the age of twenty some years.
"'This attack, as in the report, was concoived by Jieutenant IWASA and other officers. They elaborated a plan by themselves. Wishing to do their loyal and patriotic duty, these men planned this achievemont which was regarded as humanly impossible. Thereafter, during a period of several months, these men secretly carried out difficult training, indescribable beyond mere words, in order that there might not be any chance errors.
"Thus, as the battle began, they rushed into PEARL HARBOR and canried out the fierce attack, in which they all but threw thomselves against the bottoms of the enemy ships; after which they calmly met their deaths. I wish to give my impressious of the situation of the attack, considering the reports from the American side today. When the Special Attack Uuit attempted to slip into the entrance of. PEARL HARBOR, they found submarine nets stretched across and many mines laid there; indeed, the enemy socurity measures were very thorough.

But, this group of well trained young men of the Special Attack Unit, through calm and clover maneuvering through these obstructions, easily penetrated into the harbor.
"At the same time, I believe these young mon said, "Our mission is already complet-ed,"-and smiled at each other. The commander and his subordinates were truly of one mind, and the ships and personnel were ope. The confusion of the water route within the harbor was nothing; controlling their beating hearts, trying not to become delayed behind the others, all the ships penetrated on deeper into the harbor.
"Wasn't it the group of enemy capital ships, lined up orderly. in two rows, which was presently reflected in their periscopes? We can easily imagine the satisfaction of these young men. Each ship finally began the attack.. Some ships closed in on a large warship located in the middle of the row of ships, and inflicted the first fierce blow; other ships bored into the bellies of other ships nearby. At this time, a glimpse of the activity of friendly planes in the sky was seen in the periscope. The friendly planes appearid to be in the midst of \(a\) daring attack. The, courage of the young men had grown a hundred-fold; they clenched their teeth and stood fast, detormined not to allow even one ship to escape. It was time to begin the next attack. An enemy destroyer, probably having soen our periscope, was coming to crash into our side. There were somo submarines, not having time to resist, which dived deeper to escape disaster.
"At this time, enomy shells rained down and our air unit attack became fierce; torpedoes and bombs flying around inside the harbor caused great confusion. I believe that the underwater attack by each vossel was a gigantic success; however, it is a difficult situation to discriminate between the success of the air units and the underwator attack.
"The members of a submarine of the Special Attack Unit which awaited the sunset, restrained themselves on the bottom of the sea, while listening to the fierce daylight battle; they passed the time away by occupying themselves with jig-saw puzzles which they had brought along. This is truly something which cannot be easily done. Finally, after nightfall and waiting for the moon to rise, the situation changer over to the attack. That submarine approached within close quarters looking for enemy capital ships which might have been slightly
damaged during the daylight attack. The : large hull of an enemy ship, flooded by moonlight, became a cloar silhoutte and an excellent target of attack. At the command, "Open fire!" by 00 commander, the final attack was carried out. Thero was \(n 0\) error in the atteck which was full of the spirit of certnin death for the enomy within sight. A thunderous explosion shook the intorior of the harbor and columms of flames, several hundred meters in height, scorched the sky. Simultancously, a conning tower began to calmly appear above the surface of the water, kicking up white-crested waves. The calm and courageous commander confirmed the last mononts of the enomy ship, which sloroko in two, crumbled and began to sink.
"The long-chorished objective was now realized. What were the thoughts of these brave, young men in the moonlight? 'They were thinking about the several months of hardships which they underwent for this day ; and now, these young men stood before the glory of death. The thundorous sinking of this ouemy ship was distinctly confirmed by our units outside of the harbor; they even distantly saw, at the same time, flames shoot up asd fragments of incandescent sted fly high up into the air. The time was 8 Decomber (HAWAIIAN Time 2101, 7 December); two minutes after the moon rose.
"The battlo was over. However, the young men of the Special Attack Unit did not return. The final mossage from one of the submarines-' We succeeded in the attack.' -was at 2241 Hawaiian time. The members of the unit, surpassing life and death, devoted thomselves to the amihilation of the enemy ships to the ultimate end; they had no thoughts of neturning alive. It is confirmed that some of them were sunk, while others destroyed themselves. There were not a few instances of going into the jaws of cortain death. Howover, thay colmly attained the deep-rooted conviction of the noblest and purest region of self-offacement (non-egoism). This great spirit of complete sacrifice, which even makes the gods weep, is indeed the flower of BUSHIDO (Chivalry) and the essence of our racial (national) spirit. There isn't even one instance of such in world history. As we recall these meritorious services, we exporience a quivering of the blood throughout our bodies.
"The unequalled, pure loyalty of the daring enterprise liy tho Specinl Attack Unit has graciounly renchod His Majesty's cars. When the spirits of these young men now under the ground, who came into this
world to protect His Majesty and to bo the cornor-stone of peace of tho Fatherlund, hear about this-how they must be choked with tears of joy! Although these young men were on the threshold of death, and not life, thoy carried on calmly and self-possessed, no differently than as though they were on a march during their daily training.
"Just before the departure, thoso young men gathered together with their comrades in arms to chat. One young fellow saying, -'After the attack I will go ashore and mako this talk,'-innocently pulled out a pistol and palmed it. Another, after chauging his underclothing said,--'I should wear my uniform, but since it is hot, I shall be excused in ny fatigue clothes',-sud placidly continued to dress himself. Another young one, in reply to,-'Be careful not to be caught in any bombing and torpedo at-tack,'-by one of this comrudes, replied, ' No fear, by that time there will be a big hole in tho enemy's hull!' He carofreely engulfed them in smoke and laughce. There was even one who had enough improvisod amusement in reserve to recite a shanza, 'I heard ROOSEVELTT whimpering before the King of Holl the following day!'
"It was said that another chap who liked his liquor, in reply to an encouraging in-mark,--Let's celebrate after your return from a successful battle,- by one of his comrados, did not smilingly roply, as he usually did,-- Yes, let's drink.' 'These young men probnbly thought that they should not uttor remarks such as 'return' or 'if I should live.'
"Another young follow, it is said, tapping the shoulders of his comrados who were remaining behind, encouraged them by saying. 'Let's hold out togethor until the ultimate end ; we will meet next at YASUKUNI SHRINE!’
"Presently, it was the time of departure. It is usually the custom when leaving for ordinary battle, to report to the superior officer, 'I am leaving (with the intentions of roturning).' Howover, these young men boldly reported, 'Lieutenant So and So or Sub Lieutonant So and So, I go now! (to denth; without the intention of roturning)'. And they did not say, 'I am leaving (with the intention of returning).'
"Go to it!"
"o. K."
"Greetings were exchanged with those going to great achievements. It was a moment of deep, heroic emotion to thoes leaving, those remaining, those who were


\section*{THE PEARL HARBOR OPERATION}
from which this incomparable and infinite streugth gushes forth, lies in the Emperor, we cannot but be deeply stirred by the August Virtue of His Majesty.
"As we look back upou history over 2600 years, since Emperor JIMMU led his armies from MIMITSU HARBOR, the slalwart and heroic spirit of YAMATO has continued to this day! That which flares up and continues to burn is the fierce and high spirit which is exemplified in the following phrases. 'When we put out to sen, we do not intend to return.' 'Die only by the side of our Emperor.'
" The glory of this spirit increases with the advancement of the Japauese Empire. When the opportunity presents itself, this sparit will blossom forth in all its glory, just as in these young men.
"It is pre-destined that no mattor how long this Grealer EAST ASIA War lasts, 10 matter if additional strong enemies should appear, the moment the Fatherland should need them, these young men who have served their country will be reborn again and again to defend their country. There isn't the least bit of danger in the lack of such men.
"These young men of the Special Attack Unit are 'Gods of War,' aud, at the same time, they are 'Gods who establish Peace.' That which follows the Greater EAST ASIA War must be evorlasting peace throughout the world. Then, these 'Gods of War' will be 'Gods of Peace'. The present destruction is not destruction for the sake of destruction, but - it is destruction for the sake of construction.
" These young men who defend our nation are the children, the older brothers, and younger brothers of the Japanese people. From the standpoint of the individual who is bevildered, how encouraging it is that it has been clearly shown that such pure, loyal and incomparable blood flows through the veins of our people when the nation is faced with a national emergoncy.
"I repeat again. It is easy to become
temporarily aroused, but it is difficult to face death calmly. This is still the beginning of one phase of a long period of war: I respectfully end this report, and I pray for the repose of the souls of the nine young men."
(ATIS Encmy Publications No. 6, mages 611).

\section*{d. Photographs of Special Attack Unlt Heroes}

The Japaneso admit loss of five midget submarines and their crews in the nttack on PEARL HARBOR. From the tenor of the article quoted in Paragraph 5e above, it apperars probable that this was the total numbor involved. Each submurine carried a crew of two men, or ton in all for the five ships. Nine of these mon have been officially deified as 'military gods'. 'Their photographs, taken from a captured document, are reproduced as Figure 4. The tenth nember of the crew, whose fate has been officially ignored by the Government, is the prisoner of war referred to in Paragraph 5b above.
The mamuer in which the Japancse had learned by 6 March 1942 that only nin:e of the ten crew members had died is not clear. At that time the Navy Department officially eulogized the mine young "Gods of War," and were even able to publish their photographs, indicating that they know which of the two men manning the midget aulmarino beached on OAHU the day following the attack had survived. On the official publicity the fate of this survivor was pointedly ignored. In view of the fact that ill radio enmmunication from the midget subunurines had censed on the night of 8 December, it seems doubtful that the information could have been transmitted in this fashion. They may have gained it as a result of the normal exchange of prisoner of war information specified by the Geneva Convention. If not, however, this may represent an instance of successful espionage.


Figure 4. Pictures and names of the Special Attack Unit. Nine gods of the armed forces. (T.N.: These men were killed in action and were diefied as gods in the national shrine for war heroes, YASUKUNI SHRINE, TORYO, JAPAN.I-I. Commdr. INASA; Naoji. 2. Ll Commdr. YokOYama, Masaji. 3. Lt. Commdr FURUNO, Shigemi. 4. Lt. HIROO, Akira. S. Sub. Ll 2nd Cl. Sp. Yokoyama, Shigenori. 6. Sub. Lt. 2nd Cl. Sp. SasakI, Naokichi. 7. W. O. Kamita, Sademu. en W. O. Kata. Yama, Yothio. 9. W. O. INAGAKI, Kigoshi.

\section*{Section IV. THE RETURN VOYAGE}

\section*{6. THE RETURN VOYAGE}
a. Prisoner of War YOKOTA, Shigeki, quoted in Paragraph 2b above, described the task forco's voyage home as follows:
" \(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{n}}\) completion of attack, the task force proceeded in general direction of TRUK. The weather became very hot. Full speed of 26 knots was maintained until 10 December, when it was reduced to 18 knots. Zigzagging was carried out in vicinity of HAWAII when reports of two onemy submarinos were received, off WAKE Island, and on approaching JAPAN.
" WAKE Island was bombed by airplanes from carriers in passing, but the prisoner know no details excopt that nothing exceptional occurred. Before reaching TRUK, plans were suddenly changed, and task force altered its course northward, proceeding direct to JAPAN without calling at any. port. It arrived at KURE on 27 December 1941.
"During the return passage, continuous single airplano patrols were maintained until shortly before reaching Japanese wators. One airplane from each carrier in tum carried out patrol lasting about three hours. KAGA remained in No. 2 State of Readiness during the day and No. 3 State of Readiness (with gun crews in threo watches) at night. Special antiaircraft lockouts were not posted, this duty being carricd out by antiaircrafl ma-
chine gun crows. Thask force did not fuel while on return passage."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 230, pages 4-5)
b. Priwoner of War FURUKAWA, Masayuki, described the homeward voyage as follows:
"The fleet headed northwest for a few days and then directly for JAPAN. A few days before arrival, the SHOKAKU left formation and proceeded to OITA."
(JICPOA Preliminary Interrogation Report No. 7, Serial ADM-101022, 10 January 1944, page 6)
c. Prisoner of War KaWAKITA, Katsumi (JA (USA) 147987) quoted in Paragraph 3 e above, gave the following account of the homoward voyage.
"Thus each ship turned back simultaneously. Enroute to our home port we passed MIDWAY and WAKE safely and sighted our islands on the night of the twentieth.
"I can remember the natural tears which came to each one's eyes. It is the soul in that figure, praying for the elemal welfare of the Fatherland for which he longe, that is the Japaneso man.
"Thus to our home port on the twentyfifth and then to the KURE Naval Depot." (ATIS Interrogation Notes; not previously published)

\section*{Section V. CONOLUSIONS}
1. Available ovidence indicates that Japanese plans for the attack on PEARL HARBOR were finally formulated at the war games hold at the Naval War College in TOKYO from 2-13 September 1941. There appeurs to have been a considerable amount of preliminary and partial plaming, probably exteuding over the naval games and maneuvers of many years, but culminating in a serics of games held at various floet anchorages prior to late August 1941. It is perhaps significant to note that one source claims that the midget submarine unit had boon studying and training at the KURE Navy Yard for a year and a half prior to the attack. 2. The essence of Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 1, specifying naval activities in the opening of hostilities, was embodied in the outline of conditions under which the September 1841 naval war games were to be held. These conditions were printed on 3 September 1941.
3. From 5-7 Septamber 1941, officers participating in the naval war games discussed in concrete torms tho problems and possibilities of an attack on PEARI, HARBOR: They anticipated catching all major units of the UNITED STATES Fleet in PEARL, HARBOR.
4. The advisability of an amphibious landing on HAWAII at the time of the initial strike was discussed. The project was rojected because of the apparently insuperable problems of logistics involved. The eventual occupation of MIDWAY and HAWAII was contemplated, the former in the late spring and the latter in October \(19+2\).
5. Vicc-Admiral NAGUMO, Chuichi, who later commanded the task force makirg tho attuck on PEARL HARBOR, participated in the Suptember 1941 war games as a member of "A" Team.
6. On 15 September, 1041 naval staff members conforred with army representatives at IWAKUNI. It was rumored at the time that the Army had no previous knowledge of naval plans for mitack on PEARL HARBOR.
7. On an unknown date at the end of October 1941 the Army Department and tho Navy Department of Imprial (iencral Heal-
duartors jointly issued "Tho Army-Navy Central Headquartors Agroement." 'This seoms to have been the basic documont apecifying the relative commands, spheres of jurisdiction, lasks and responsibilitios of the two services in all cases where joint army-navy operations were onvisaged. It seems a valid presumption that the period between 15 Soptember and the end of October was occupied in large part with the working out of the details of this agreement.
8. Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 1 was dated 1 Nove mber 1941, aboand Admiral YaMAMOTO's flagehip, the Battleship NAGATO, at SAEKI Bay. Together with its annexes, this order sets forth the basic plan of all naval operations attendant upon the eemmencement of hostilities. The following aspects are noteworthy in respect to the nitack on PEARL HAlBBOR:
- a. Ships comprising the striking force were ordered to dopart from their naval bases or operating areas about X-16 Day (24 Novemher 1941).
b. Sulmarincs comprising the Surprise Attack Force were ordered to depart from the western part of the INLAND Sea on X-20 Day (20 November 1941). Sirength was to be so disposed as to command the mouth of PEARL HARBOR. American warships escaping the harbor were to be attacked.
c. If possible, midget submarines were to carry out surprise attacks on onemy warships within PEARL HARBOR after the air attacks were completed.
d. Beginning on Y-Day (23 November 1941) the Commander of the First Combined Communication Unit was ordered to send out false messages calculated to give the impression that the main strength of the Japanese Fleet was in the western part of the INLAND Sea.
9. Combined Fleet Secrot Operation Order No. 2, dated 5 November 1941, designated 23 November 1941 as Y-Day, the day upon which Combined Floet Secret Operation Order No. 1 was to become effective.
10. The date for the official declaration of war was not finally amnounced till 10 November 1941, when Combined Fleet Seeret Operation Order No. 3 stated "X-Day will

\section*{THF, PEART, HABBOR OPERATION}

\section*{be 8 December."}
11. Striking Force Operation Order No. 1 was issued by Commandor, Task Force, ViceAdmiral NAGUMO, Chuichi on 10 November 1941, aboard his flagship, the Aireraft Carrier AKAGI, at EAEKI Bay. It ordered all ships to completo battle proparations by 20 November 1941. TANKAN (HITOKAPPU)• Bay on E'IOROFU Island in the KURILES was designated as the rendezvous for the task force.
12. Botwoen 21-27 November 1941 the task force rendezvoused at TANKAN Buy.
13. Trask Force consisted of tho following unils:
Battleships-
HIEI, KIRISHIMA (Battleship Division 3, less KONGO and HARUNA).
Aircraft Carriers-
KAGA, AKAGI (Carrier Division 1) SORYU, HIRYU (Carrior Division 2) SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU (Carrier Division 5, less HOSHO).
Heavy Cruisors-
TONE, CHIKUMA (Cruisor Division 8)
Light Cruisors-ABUKUMA
Destroyers-
FUCHIKA, KASUMI, ARARE, YOFN
(Destroyer Division 18 (?)) OBORO, KAGERO, SHIRANUHI and one unspecified -destroyer (Destroyor Division 16 (?)).
Submarines--
Submarine force from Sixth Flect, prolably from 20-30 ships in all. (Submarine force, with the excoption of three I-Class shipw, procoeded independently to the aren of operations).
Oilers-
Three.
Supply ShipsOne.
14. Task force left TANKAN Bay on 27 November 1941. It sailed east until \(4 / 5\) December, then altored course to the south-

\section*{east toward IIAWAII.}
15. Upon resching a point approximately two hundred and fifty miles from HAWAII, the first wavo of planes was launched. This took place at 0100-0200 hours, JAPAN time. The weather wiss vory poor.
16. Evidence does not agres, but it seems probable that from twenty to thirty Japanese submarines of the Sixth Fleet were assigned to roconmaissance duties outside l'EARL HARBOR before the strike. They were to ongage any Americun ships escaping from the harbor.
17. Five midget submarines attempted to gain entrance to the harlor. Evidence indicates that somo succecded, lay concealed on the bottom till night and then attacked. Four seem to have been destroyed by American counter measures. Onic was beached and captured.
18. The Japanese Navy Department on 18 December 1941 claimed the following damages were inflicted by their PEARL, HARBOR Strike :

\section*{Battleships-}

5 sumk by air attacks.
1 torpedoorl and sunk by submarine attacks.
3 soverely damaged by air attacka.
1 moderately damaged by air attacks.
Light Cruisers-
2 severely damaged.
4 modorntely damaged.
Destroyers-
\({ }^{\prime} 2\) sevorely damaged.
Airplanes-
450 burnt by bombing and strafing.

\section*{14 shot down.}

The Japanese officially admitted the loss of 29 planes and 5 midget sulmarines.
19. Following the attack, task force proceeded northwest then altered course to southwest, bombing WAKE Island in passing. Shipe appear to havo concluded cruise at oither OI'AA or KURE.

\section*{Appendix A.-JAPANESE AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS OF} PEARL HARBOR STRIKE

1. Junt before the attack, 8 Dec. 1841. Naval planes on a carrier; a surprise attack on HAWAII.

2. "Black smoke rises over WHEELER Army Air Field, which is being reduced to anhes."
"Navy Investigation B No. 17 (103), Approved 13 Jauuary 1942 (Reproduction prohibited)." This data is repeated on all photugraphs save Nos. 3 and 7

\section*{}

3. "Pexinning of the Buttle of HIWW IIt. The Ansrican PACIFIS: Fleet jut lefine itw deatruction."

4. "Encentration of the encmy main liex coswering under our dewlly attack."

5. "Enemy installationy and warships "left buriel' armund FORII Island."

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7. "Northwest shore of FORD Island. Above, two heavy cruisers have been completely sunk. Hull of the training ship UTAH is visible. A special seaplane tender is trailing oil badly. Photographed by HAWAII Attack Force."

8. "Grim spectacle of PEARL HARBOR fearstricken under our silver wings."

\section*{Section V. CONCLUSIONS}
1. Available evidence indicates that Japmese plans for the attack on PEARL HARBOR were finally formulated at the war games held at the Naval War College in TOKYO from 2-13 soptember 1941. There appears to have been a considerable amount of preliminary and partial planning, probably extending over the naval games and mancuvors of many years, but culminating in a series of games held at various fleet anchorages prior to late August 1941. It is perhaps significant to note that one source claims that the midget submarine unit had beon studying and training at tho KURE Navy Yard for a year and a half prior to the attack. 2. The essence of Combined Floet Secret Operation Order No. 1, specifying naval activities in the opening of lostilitioe, was embodied in the outline of conditions under which tho Soptember 1841 naval war games were to be held. These conditions were printed on 3 September 1941.
3. From 5-7 September 1941, officers participating in the naval war games discuesed in concrete terms the problems and possibilities of an attack on PEARL, HARBOR: They anticipated catching all major units of the UNITED STATES Fleet in PEARL HARBOR.
4. The advisability of an amphibious landing on HAWAII at the time of the initial strike was discussed. The project was rejceted because of the apparently insuperable problems of logistics involved. The eventual occupation of MIDWAY and HAWAII was contemplated, the former in the late spring and the latter in October 1942.
5. Vice-Admiral NAGUMO, Chuichi, who later commanded the task force makirg tho attack on PEARL HARBOR, participated in the Septernbor 1941 war games as a member of "A" Team.
6. On 15 September, 1941 naval staff members conferred with amy representatives at IWAKUNI. It was rumored at the time that the Army had no previous knowledge of naval plans for matack on PEARI, MARBOR.
7. On an unknown date at the end of October 1941 the Arnny Department and the Navy Department of Imperial (iencral Head-
quarters jointly issued "The Army-Navy Central Headjuartors Agreement." This seoms to have been the basic document specifying the relative commands, spheres of jurisdiction, tarks and responsibilities of the two services in all cases where joint army-mavy operations were envisaged. It seems a valid presumption that the period between 15 September and the end of Octobor was occupied in large part with the working out of the details of this agreement.
8. Combined Fleet Secret Oprration Order No. 1 was dated 1 Novc mber 1941, aboard Admiral YAMAMOTO's flagelip, the Battleship NAGATO, M SAEKI Bry. Together with its amexes, this order sels forth the basic plan of all naval operations attendant upon the enmmencement of hestilities. The following aspects are noteworthy in respect to the attack on PEARL HARBOR:
- a. Ships comprising the striking force were orderd to depart from their naval bases or operating areas about X-16 Day (24 November 1941).
b. Sulmarines comprising the Surprise Attack Force were ordered to depart from the western part of the INLAND Sea on X-20 Day (20 November 1941). Strength was to be so disposed as to command the mouth of PEARL HARBOR. American warships escaping the harbor were to be nttacked.
c. If possible, midget submarines were to carry out surprise attacks on enemy warships within PEARL HARBOR after the air attacks were completed.
d. Begiming on Y-Day (23 November 1941) the Commander of the First Combined Communication Unit wis ordored to send out false messages calculated to give the impression that the main strength of the Japanese Fleet was in the western part of the INLAND Sea.
9. Combined Fleet Secret Operation Ordor No. 2, dated 5 November 1941, designated 23 November 1941 as Y-Day, the day upon which Combined Fleet Secrut Operation Order No. 1 was to become effective.
10. The date for the official declaration of war was not fimally amounced till 10 November 1941, when Combined Fleet Seeret Operation Order No. 3 stated "X-Day will

\section*{Section V. CONOLUSIONS}
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c. If possible, midget submarines were to carry out surprise attacks on enemy warships within PEARL HARBOR after the air attucks were completed.
d. Beginning on Y-Day ( 23 November 1941) the Commander of the First Combined Communication Unit was ordered to send out false messages calculated to give the impression that the main strength of the Jupnnese Fleet was in the western part of the INLAND Sea.
9. Combined Fleat Secret Operation Order No. 2, dated 5 November 1941, designated 23 November 1941 as Y-Day, the day upon which Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 1 was to become effective.
10. The date for the official declaration of war was not finally amounced till 10 Novembor 1941, when Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 3 stated "X-Day will
be 8 Decomber."
11. Striking Force Operation Order No. 1 was issued by Commundor, Thesk Force, ViceAdmiral NAGUMO, Chuichi on 10 November 1941, aloard his flagship, the Aircraft Carrier AKAGI, nt HAEKI Bay. It ordered all shipe to complete lattle preparations by 20 November 1941. 'IANKAN (III'TOKAP' PU)• Bay on EIOROFU Ialand in the KURILLES was designated as the romdezvous for the trask force.
12. Between 21-27 November 1941 the tark force rendeavoured at TANKAN Bay.
13. Thask Force consisted of the following units:
Battloships-
HIEI, KIRISHIMA (Buttleship I)ivision
3, less KONG() and IIARUNA).
Aircraft Carriern-
KAGA, AKAGI (Garriar Division 1) SORYU, HIRYU (Carrier Division 2)
SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU (Carrier Division 5, less HOSHO).
ILoavy Cruisers-
TONE, CHIKUMA (Cruiser Division 8)
Light Cruisorm-ABUKUMA
Destroyers-
FUCHIKA, KASUMI, ARARE, YOEN
(Destroyer Division 18 (?)) OBORO, KA-
GERO, SHIRANUHI and one unspecified - destroyor (Destroyor Division 16 (?)).

Submarines--
Submarine force from Sixth Flect, proiably from 20-30 shipw in all. (Submarine force, with the excoption of three 1-Class shipw, procoeded independontly to the arna of oporations).
Oilors-
Three.
Supply Ships One.
14. 'Task force loft TANKAN Bay on 27 November 1841. It suiled elast until \(4 / 5\) December, then alcered course to the south-
caht towarl IIAWAII.
15. Upon reaching a point approximately two hundred and fifty milen from IIA WAII, the first wave of planes was launched. This took place at 0100-0200 hours, JAPAN time. The weather was very poor.
16. Evidence does not agrex, but it seems probable that from twonty to thirty Japanese sulmarines of the Sixth Fleet were assigned to recommixsmee duties nutside PEARL IIARBOR before the strike. They were to ongage any Americen ships escaping from the harbor.
17. Five midget submarines attempted to gain entrance to the harloor. Evidence indicater that nome succeeded, lay concealed on tho loottom till night and thon attacked. Four seem to have been destroyed by American counter memures. Onie was beached and coptured.
18. The Jupanese Navy Jepartment on 18 December 1941 chaimed the following damages were inflicted by their PEARL, HARBOR Strike:

\section*{Battleships-}

5 sunk ly air attucks.
1 torpedooul and sunk by submarine attacks.
3 soveroly damaged by air attecke.
1 moderatoly damaged by air attacks.

\section*{Light Cruisery-}

2 нoveroly damaged.
4 modorately damaged.
Destroyers--
' 2 soverely damaged.
Airplanes-
4:0 lurnt by bombing and strafing. 14 shot down.
The Japanese officially admitted the loss of 29 phanes and 5 midget sulmarines.
19. Following the attack, task force proceeded northwest then altered course to southwest, bombing WAKE Island in passing. Ships appoar to have concluded cruise at either OIIA or KURE.
-

\section*{Appendix A.-JAPANESE AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS OF PEARL HARBOR STRIKE}

1. Just before the attack, 8 lec. 1841 . Naval planes on a carrier ; a surprise attack on HAWAII.

2. "Black smake rimes over WHEELEER Army Air Field, which is being reduced to ashes."
"Navy Investigation B No. 17 (103), Approved 13 January 1942 (Reproduction prohibited)." This data is repeated on all photugraphs save Nos. 16 and 7

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8. "Beginning of the Buttle of IIIW III. Tho Amarican PACIFIC Fleat just before its destruction."

4. "Concentration of the enemy main lleet cowering under our deadly attack."

ō. "Finemy installations and warships 'left burie:I' around FORI Island."

6. Surprise attack on PEARL ILARBSK. Min fleet burning and being destroyed near FORD Island Scatered about in the harbor are enemy ships scorrying in all directions as a result of our sudden attack. Photographed by HAWAII Attack Force.'

\section*{TIIE PEARL HAKBOR OPERATION}

7. "Northwest shore of FORD Island. Above, two heavy cruisers have been completely sunk. Hull
of the training ship UTAH is visible. A special seaplane tender is trailing oil badly. Photographed by HAWAII Attack Force."

8. "Grim spectacle of PEARL HARBOR fearstricken under our silver wing."

\section*{APIESHX .}

9. Enenty key postinns burning upi as a result of our accumate attack."

10. "Magniticent ! : PE.ARL HARBOR gasping under our fierce bombardınent."




\section*{Page 4}

Comittee Memper CBATh asiced tize rearting of the accompilsh3nt, of the war and a just Ne: Orcey Tn this inquiry Foreizn jaister TOGO answered that the accomplishmrnt of the wan would e completed by maxing paace or thoouch adealning the oistet oi ;he war, and as to a jusi kew orden, thone ma: no surirete erm. ultation on this arorig the tnree nations rat the entrolistront. if a New Order in Eest Asia would be undertaken by japan ara nvéstigations vere being carried on within the Government.

Committee Member OBAIM also asked whether there was any apjrehension that after the war there would be any disagreement vith Germany. To titis question Foreign Ninister TOGO answered 'hat the Japanese Goveriment would plan to make adjustments at in early date.

To the inquisy made by Committeo Momber ISHII about the selation of this proposal with Ita?y, Foreign Minister TOGO inswered that aithough there was no authentic report on Italy's rangement concerning the declaration of war Italy had oitien 3xpressed her decisinn that she would throw in her lot with Japan, ;o it is quite certain Italy agreed to this draft. He continued :hat the draft written in Italian would be prepared in time for ;he signatiure in "Berin."

Committea Nember IZAWA asked about the forms of the declaraion of the war \(\cap \mathrm{f}\) both Germany and Italy. To this Foreign Minister OGO answered that as to Germany, like the declaration of the war 'gainst "Russia," Germany would declare the war by "HITLER" making speech in the Reichsstadt; and as to Italy she had decided to eclare the war uoon making a previous arrangement with Germany.

After the above-mentioned questions were completed, Chairmen \(f\) the Committce SuZUKi deering that all the questions were over sked the Minister and the explainers to retire.
(Ministers and Explainers retired).
After this, the draft was discussed among the Committee, as result the Committee unanimously decided to accept it as it tood. Then the Chairman of the Comrittee declared the meeting fjourned.
(The meeting adjourned at 5:05 P.M.)

Pago 1.
CIETIEIGEIE
I. P. S: No. 1021

\section*{Suatement of Source end Autherticity}

I, M. Takatauji heroby certify that I am officially connnctod with the Japanese Government in tile following capacity: Secretary of Privy Council and that as such officisi I have custody of the documnnt hereto nttechad consistins of 14 pacies, dated \(10 \mathrm{Dec}, 1911\), and described as follows: Rocords of the meeting of the Invesidigution Committoe of the Privy Council 10 Docember 1941.
I further certify that the attached record and document is an official docurent of the Japenese Governont, and that. it is pert of the official arciivos and files of the followinf, nared minietry or department (apecifyinf pilso the file number or citation, if any, or any othor official desifmetion of the regular location of the dooument in the archives or files): Frivy Council in Palace ground Sicmed at Tokyo on this 19 day of September 1946.
*itness: T. Suzuki
\(\qquad\)
Sifneture of Official
Secretary of Privy Counctl.
Official Crpacity

\section*{Ste.tement of Officia? Procniemont}

I, Idward. P. Monafhen, herchy certify that I am associatod with the Geaeral Feadquarters of the Suyreme Commandor for the Alliod Dowers, and that the above certification was obtaingd by me from the above sirned official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of ry official business.

Sipmed p.t Tokyo on tria
19th day of Sept, 1946

Hitness: /s/R. H. Lersh


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\section*{PRITY CODNCIS MRNTHO MINUTRS}

10 December 1941
1. Matter for the conclusion of the agreement between Japan, Germany, and Italy regarding the waging of a common war against U.S.A. and the United Kingdon, nonseparate peace and collaboration for the establishment of the new order.

The meeting was opened at 5:35 P.M., December 10th, 1941 (16th year of SHOWA) (Wednesday) in the Imperial presence.

Members who were present:

> HARA, the Chairman SOZOKI, the Vice-Chairman

Ministers:
TOJO, Prime Minister, concurrently Home Minister and War Minister. No. 5
HASHIDA, Education Minister No. 6
INO, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, concurrently Overseas Minister
KOIZUMI, Welfare Minister
NO. 8
NO. 8
IWAMORA, Minister of Justice
No. 9
SHIMADA, Naval Ministor TOGO, Foreign Minister TERASHIMA, Communication Minister KAYA, Finance Minister

No. 10
NO. 11 KAYA, Finance Kinistor No. 13
KISH, Minister of Commerce and Industry No. 14 HaTta, Transportation Minister

No. 15
Councillors:
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline ISHII & No. 18 \\
\hline ARIMA & No. 19 \\
\hline KUBOTA & No. 20 \\
\hline ISHIZUKA & No. 21 \\
\hline SHIMIZU & No. 22. \\
\hline MINAMI & No. 23 \\
\hline NARA & No. 24 \\
\hline ARAKI & N0. 25 \\
\hline Matsol & No. 26 \\
\hline SUGATARA & No. 27 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\author{
matsoura \\ OSHIO \\ gayashi \\ FOKAI \\ fOTAKAMI \\ OSHIMA \\ 0bata \\ TAKEGOSHI \\ MITsUCHI \\ IZAWA \\ IKEDA
}

Absentees:
The Imperial Princes:

> YORIHITO, the Imperial Prince NOBOHITO, the Imperial Prince TARAHITO, the Imperial Prince KOTOHITO, the Imperial Prince

The Councillors:

\section*{KANEKO mano}
10. 28

NO. 29
Ho. 30
No. 31
No. 32
NO. 34
NO. 35
NO. 36
No. 37
Ho. 38
No. 39
of the Committee:
SUZUKI, the President of the Planning Board MORIYAM, the President of the Legislative Bureau SAKAMOTO, the Director of the Buropean and Asiatic Bureau in the Foreign Ministry BaTSUMOTO, the Director of the Treaty Bureau in the Foreign Ministry

Beporter:
SOZOKI, the Chief of the Inquiry Committee
The Chief Secretary:
HORIR, the Chief Secretary
The Secretaries:

\author{
MOROHASHI, the Secretary \\ TAKATSUJI, the Secretary
}

The Chairman (HARA):
The meeting will now be opened.
I will offer the subject for discussion "the matter for the conclusion of the agreement between Japan, Germany, and Italy pertaining to the waging of the common war against D.S.A. and the United Kingdom, non-separate peace and collaboration for the establishment of the new order." The first reading will be open, omitting the reading, and the Chief of the Inquiry Comaittee shall report immediately.

The Reporter (SUZUKI):
With regard to the matter for the conclusion of the agreement between Japan, Germany, and Italy pertain. ing to the waging of the common war against U.S.A. and the United Kingdom, non-separate peace and collaboration for the estabilshment of new order, which is submitted for discussion at this time, I and all the members present have been appointed members of the Inquiry Comittee today. So we opened a meeting of the Committee immediately and listened to the explanation of the ministers and the authorities concerned to investigate the matter carefully. In addition, is the matter is of urgent need, and there was no time to issue the report of the investigation, I would like to request your full understanding.

According to the explanation of the ministers concerned, as soon as the difficult situation to conclude the negotiation between Japan and the United States: was known, the Imperial Government fathomed the attitude of Germany and Italy and ascertained their intention beforehand, considering the occasion of emergency when there might be a conflict between Japan and the United States. And then when the situation between Japan and the United States became more and more threatening, the Imperial Government proposed to the German and the Italian Governments a draft of the agreement pertaining to non-separate peace between Japan, Gormany, and Italy, and opened a negotiation to conclude this agroement. But, due to the declaration of war against the United States of america and the United Kingdom on the 8th of this month, the Imperial Government notified the'German and the Italian Governments without delay, and proposed at

article. We have all unanimously decided that this bill would be passed without modification.

The result of the investigation is the above-mentioned.

Chairman (HARA):
As there's no movement, I wish to omit the second reading and so forth, and take an immediate vote. Those who support this bill please rise.
(All the members stood up.)
Chairman (HARA):
The bill has been decided unanimously.
We close today's meeting.
The Emperor retired.
(Closed at 5:42 P.M.)
Chairman Chief Secretary Secretary

HARA, Yoshimichi HORIE, SUe O MOROHASHI, Yusuru TaKatsujI, Masai

\section*{AGREEMENT BETWEEN JAPAN_}

\section*{GERMANY AND ITALY}
(Very secret)
With firm resolution not to lay down arms until the common war against the United States of America and the United Kingdom will be brought to a glorious victory, the Japanese Government, the German Government and the Italian Government have concluded the following articles:
article 1
Japan, Germany and Italy will wage common war compolled by the United States of America and the United Kingdom with all available measures, until the war will; come to complete victory.

\section*{Article 2}

Japan, Germany and Italy will agree neither to suspend hostilities nor to make peace with either the United States of America or with the United Kingdon without complete mutual understanding.

\section*{Article 3}

Japan, Germany and Italy will collaborate with utmost intimacy after the victorious termination of war for the purpose of establishing a righteous new order in the true significance of the Three-Powers-Pact conciuded on Septonber 27, 1940.

\section*{Article 4}

This agreement will come into force soon after the signature and remain in force as long as the Three-PowersPactuis valid. The Three Powers that concluded this pact Fill attain, at proper time before the term of validity will elapse, mutual understanding over the forthcoming forms of collaboration which were foreseen in Article 3 of this agreoment.

In evidence thereof, the undersigned invested from their Governments full powers have, added our signatures and seals to this agreement.

Three kinds of texts vere made in Berin in Japanese, German and Italian on December of SHOWA 16 (1941), on December of the Fascist Calendar..-20.
rconcluded on Sep. 271940 ,

















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Page 1

Entract from Entry from liarquis KIDO'S Diary, 16 December 1941.

\author{
Decomber 16th_ 1941 (Extract)
}
at 2.30 pom. Frince KONOIE visited me and expressed his feelings about his own political responsibility and I also expressed my views quite frankly. I asked him to be prudeut.



十il定

十学丑雷

识弱 \(x\)




\author{
长 以 啡 破 四 品
}


\section*{十 11要 小人四（关）}

 \(4 x\)





\section*{RETURK TO COOM COI}

\title{
EXCEIIPTS FROM COLLECTION OF ESSAYS \\ ON PFOBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAY TELATED TO THE GiEATER EAST ASIA MAR
}

\author{
A REPONT OF ETUDY CONCERNING \\ HOSTILITIES ON THE OUTBREAK OF YAF
}

\begin{abstract}
I.

Concerning the time for hostilities to open on the outbreak of war, we have to consult the Third Treaty, decided at the Second Hague Conference which prescribes that hostilities must not be nerformed vithout a preliminary notice in the form of an ultintum wherein a declaration, or conditional declaration, of war is included. In respect to our first hostilities in the areas of Hawaii, Hongkong, Singapore, etc., it is to be questioned whother they were commenced in compliance with the above mentioned treaty. Although it appears that Britain says that our first hostilitics in the Malay area were opened on the evening of Dec. 7th, we, the reporters of this study could not clarify the actual time. There seems to be grounds for entertaining doubt that hostilities were commenced earlier (in practical time) (See IV below) than past 7:30 a.m. when the U.S. Imbassador in Tokyo, being invited to the Foreign office, received the memorandun stating as regards the negotiathon with the U.S.i. "Japan recognizes that the continuance of negotiations henceforth in hope of a settloment is useless" or some time after 8 a.m., vien the British Ambassador in Tokyo was invited to the Foreign Office, and informed of what the JapU.S.A. negotiation had come to; needless to say, earlier than some tine after 11 a.m. when the Tokyo diplomatic representatives of Britain, the U.S.i., Canada and Australia wero handed notifications concerning the outbreak of war in the Hawaiian area. Thereupon, two problems must be considcred. The first problem is whether the memorandum concerning the negotiation which was handed to the U.S. Ambassador at some time after 7:30 a.m. on 8 th can be regarded as what is called a declaration of war in Hague Treaty No. III. The second problem is whether the Treaty wes violated or not, if our hostilities in either Hawail or Malay or Hongkong aroa were oponed carlicr in practical time than past 7 or 7:30 a.m. when the abovementioned memorandum was handed to the U.S. Ambassador and the fact was made known to the British Ambassador, assuming that the momorandum could be regarded as a declaration of war; or earlier than some
\end{abstract}
time after 11 a.m. when the diplomatic representatives of Britais, the U.S.A., Canada and Australia received explicit notifications of the outbreak of war, assuming that the memorandum could not be regarded as a declaration of war.

\section*{II.}

Tine first is the question of whether the memorandun concerning the Jap-U.S.A. negotiations, which was handed to the U.S. Ambassadior at some time after \(7.30 \mathrm{a} . \mathrm{m}\). on the 8th, can be regarded as the "declaration of war" referred to in Hague Treaty Ho. III. A noteworthy fact in relation to this problem concerns the notification given by our Government at the outbreak of the Russo-Japances War. In the 37 th year of Meifi (1904), Mintster KURINO in St. Petersburg, having finiehed negotiations on 6 Feb ., gave notification to the Russian Government. saying that Japan would retain the right to take independent action, and, at the same time, he declared his wish to set out with the staff of the legation. Professor Westlake recognized that this notification should be regardec. ása declaration of war. Our recent notification handed over at some time past 7.30 a.m. on the 8 th , however, can scarcely be re garded as a declaration of var, because it included no preliminary notice that independent action is being taken or that hostilities are being opened, though it states, "Japan recognizes that the continuance of negotiations henceforth in hope of a solution is useless."

\section*{III.}

The second problem is whether the Treaty was violated or not, if our hostilities in either Hawail or Malay or Hongkong area were opened earlier in practical time than some time past 7 or \(7.30 \mathrm{a} . \mathrm{m}\), when the aoove mentioned nemorandum was handed to the U.S. Ambas sador and the fact was made known to the British Ambassador, assuming that the menorandum could be regarded as a declaration of war; or earlier than some time past 11 a.m. when the diplomatic representatives of Britain, the U.S.A., Canada and Australia received explicit notification of the outbreak of war, assuming that the memorandum could not be regarded as a declaration of war. (Repeated).

Concerning this second problem, if we are to explain tiat there was no violation of the above nentioned Hague Treaty No. III, we think that the following five points ought to be considered.
(1) To take into consideration not the relation of the practical tine but of the nominal time on the day when the war broke out.
(2) To regard as hostilities all or part of the encirclenent measures taken by the A.B.C.D. group based on military proparations for economic rupture and preparedness for the outbreak of war.
(3) (Plainly Spaakin-) to pick flaws in Hague Sreaty No. ir itself, say either that the treaty itcoif ber turned out to bis g.. 9 sort of bluff or simulacrum, being uncile to attain its original eim as regards the outbreak of war, or that the prescriptions themseives in the treaty are unreasonable and hypocritical, and can clatm no ros? raison dietre, considering the nature of wars in present day irternational relations upon which the fates of nations are otaked.
(4) To explain that ad refers to cases when the rigit of self. defence or of self-preservation is exercised, Hague Troaty No. III can be disregarded in this case.

\section*{IV.}

We wist to begin wion a study of the first point, that is, whether we can explain ins nulu-violation of the Third \(\mathrm{H}_{\text {ague }}\) Treaty, by taking into considaration rot the relation of practical time but the relation of noaipal tige on tne \(d\) by when the war broke out. Now rpeaking fron the point of viow ni so called nominal time, the time is actually the same; but because the places differ the nominal time differs, and they are treated as different hours. For exanple, supposing that the difference of time betwoen Tokyo and Hawaii is 5 hours, that between Tokyo ank Singapore 2 hours, the nominal hours are \(3 \mathrm{a} . \mathrm{m}\). in Tokyo, 8 am . in hawaii and 1 a.m. at Singapore, while they are all the same in practical tine.

Suppose that we declare war at 8 a.n. in Toke and that ve want to assert, with nominal time as a standard, that we shall not violate \(\mathrm{H}_{\text {ague }}\) Treaty No. III. As we open hostilities after 8 a. F . in both Hawaii and in Singropore, we should recognize that the hostilities may be comenced in ia::an! 5 hours before the practical time of deilvering the declaration of irar, wijile in Singapore they cannot be opened until 2 hours after the deljvery.

Suppose the spot wiero hosivilities will be opened is aituated \(180 \%\) east from Tokyo, where the declaration of war is to be delivered. It is an extroordirary phenowenon for hostilities to comnence one-half day before the practical time of making the declaration of war without violating the treaty prescribing notice prior to hostilities. On the contrary, if the spot is situated \(180^{\circ}\) lonsitncio went of Tokyo, the hostilities cannot be opened before half a day has passed after the practical time of delivering the declaration of war.

\section*{A theory that it ic not a violation of the treaty to opon} hostilities either about 5 hours or about half a day in the practical tine before the time of delivering the declaration of war, if the hostilities are opened in the spot eash of Tokyo where the declaration of war is delivered, cannot be weighty enough to be an interpretation of Hacue Treaty No. III, when the ain of the Treaty lies in the prevention of hostilities opened suddenly without preliminary notice.

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Moreover，it wili be fupnarible in reality th open hostilitims ojther about 2 hours or about heilf a dar in 0 ticticai time efter tha unliresy of the declaration of waic according t，tac aioco aremple，i：t．lts hostilities are to bs sonm引nned in a epot，kest oi tas placs vite．r．she declaration of war is delivered．In view of this，it is nct．joro hy that Britain，in her declaration of war，clains that the Japaneze irnopr． tried to land on the coast of Malaya and bombarded Singapore and Eong－ kong on the evening of Dec．7th．In brief，it seems to be too hard to juatily，if we plead non－violation of Hague Treaty llo．III，by trking into consideration nominal time instead of practical tine on the \(\dot{d}\) when the war broke out．

V．

Next，let us study the second point，that is，whether we can explain the non－violation of Hague Treaty Ho．III by regarding all or part of the military encirclenent for economic rupture and preparedieess for the outbreak of war taken by the A．B．O．D．group as hostilities． All or part of the measures for military oncirclement based on eccnomic rupture and preparednese for the outbreak of war taken by the A．B．C．D． group with the U．S．A．as its centre and including Australia，may be regardod in a nomewhat tague sense as hostilities，for they were taken with enmity towards Japan．But the word＂hostilities＂has various meanings and，even in the Hapue Treaties alone，the a－called＂hostili－ ties＂in Hagtue Treaty No．III can be interpreted in a corpletely dif－ ferent manner from the so－called＂hostilities＂in the loth article of Hague Treaty No．V．

In the latter it can be understood to indicate either an act of war in state of war as prescribed in international law or a military and harmful act which should be recognized as bringing about a state of war from the viewpoint of customary international law，but in the former it is understood in a somewhat broader sense as comprehending all harm－ ful military measures，paying no heed to whether or not there is a statc of war as prescribed in international law whether or not the state of war is caused by the harmful measures themselves．A more far－reaching conception，though a little vague，allows us to regard economic rupture or large－scale proparedness wherein some incidents of international strife are involved，as hostilities，because they are harmful acts per－ formed with inimical intent．Sut hostilities in this last sense cannot be said to be the same as the so－called＂hostilities＂in Hague Treaty No．III．Supposing that they be the same，by the prescription of the Treaty，the commencement of such an act without a previous preliminary notice in the form of an ultimatum which includes a declaration，or conditional declaration，of war will prove to be a violation of Treaty No．III；but such an interpretation is practically abourd．Jor，it is quite impossible to recognize practically the stage at which the econo－ تilc measures or military preparcenc3s need preliminary notice in the form of an ultimatum which includes a declaration，or conditional declaration，of war before their／its／comencenent．Therefore，it is
difficult to arpue for the non-violation of the Trasty on our part by supjoaing that Japan appealed to arme after her enemies A.B.C.D. had openod such hostilities as violating hague Treaty No. III without prelininory notice in the forn of an ultimatum which includes a doclaration, or conditional declaration, of war, regarding economic rupture or preparedness as the eomenlled "hostilitigs" in Faguo Truaty No. III.

\section*{V.}

The third point of the above mentioned second problem is, frankly speaking, to find fault with Hague Treaty No. III, which deals with the opening of war. We wish to state this in two parts (a) and (b).
(a) Hague Treaty No. III, which concerns the opening of war, prescribes that hostilities cannot be commenced without prelininary notice in the form of an ultimatum which includes a declaration, or conditional declaration, of war. This troaty was concluded for the main purpose of preventing the other country from suffering a sudden, unoxpected action, but it could make no prescriptions concerning the tine to elapse between the preliminary notice and the first nostilities. Moreover, as it has no clear prescriptions concerning the place where, or the organ through which, the declaration of war is presented to the organ of the other country, one may say that it suffices to present it to the diplomatic reprosentative of the other country in one 1 own, regardleas of whether or not the government of the other country has notice of it before the commencement of hostilities. Thus, the original and principle aim of the Hague Treaty No. III to prevent the other country from auffering a sudden, unexpected offence has proved unattainable, leaving room for such an interpretation as one which says that it is not a violation of the treaty to open hostilities in a faroff land only some 20 or 30 minutes after the delivery of the declaration of war to the diplomatic representative of the other country in one's own oapital. Hence, it is not implausible to say that the Hague Treaty No. III is nothing but a bluff or simulacrum and that there is no need to reapect such a childish treaty at the outbreak of a war in which the fate of a nation is at stake.
(b) While the first hosti?ities in case of a war whereupon the fate of a nation is at stake will often have a grave influence on the war as the whole, Hasue Treaty No. III prohibits opening hostilition unless we give preliminary notice to the other country, thus letting her have tine to prepnre roaictpance and counter-attecke. In piew of actual international reletinns, this original purport of the Treaty is unreasonable and quixotic, .nd, nore emphatically speakinf, Hague Treaty No. III may be said to bc su imposelble and hypocritical that it is unable to claim from the firgt a \(r_{3 E l}\) raisan A:ctre in actual international relations. Sudden hostilitics aret ra a fcemsa vislation of the Treaty, but it is not implausible to explain the.t it ta not so blamaile to open hostilities ahead of the othor country when the war would break out at
any moment, both of the nations being well prepared, looking at it from the viewpoint of actual international relations.

However, we cannot overlook some great faults in these explanations which find fault with Hapue Troaty No. III. In the case of (a), the ain: of the Treaty nay not be attrined, though there be no formal violation of tha Treaty; out we cannot conclude from this that we bay disrogard the Treaty and violate it formally. Since Fague Treaty No. III remains in force, it would be difficult to say that hostilities carried out without any previous knowledge of the government of the other party are not a violation of the said treaty, altnough hostilities are usually carried out prior to the proclamation of war. But the treatic does not call it unlawful to open hostilities as soon as the proclenation of war is delivered to the eneny \(\epsilon\) overnnent either directly or through diolobatic cianneln. If I am allowed to make some comnents on paragraph (b), I should like to soy that such an action as to fail to conform with \(H_{\text {as }}\) us Treaty Wo. III, which is still in force, could not escape beine branded as a treaty violation from the point of view of actual international law even though Hague Treaty No. III be unreasonable and hypocritical and even though it mav not conforn to actual international relations. Even if I were to cite Paragrawh (A) and (B) separatoly, from the standpoint of international law, they have no power to juatify hostilities initiated in violation of Hague Treaty No. III. To find fault with Figue Treaty No. III for these reasons and sarin:; that tione reasons are in agreemont with the following discussion on paragraph IV may give some sense of satisfaction. Especially Paragraph B, with the provisions concerning the rights of self-preservation and self-defence, will provide useful supplimentary reasons, when one wants to insist that one has a right to ignore the thirc. Article of the treaty, provided that one's existence is endanfered.

\section*{VII.}

Lastly, I want to study the claim of the right of self-preservation anc self-defense, as I think I still cannot clearly indicate the nonviolation of the treaty by my above statement with regard to t'ee present war, even though there are various other points to be considered. (Reference: IV or VI Chapter).

The right of self-preservation was formerly recognizea alzost unanimously by the scholars of international law as one of the fundamental righte of a nation, but the prevailing theory at present is that a nation has no right of self-preservation, though that of self-defence is recognized. Some jurists use the tern the right of self-preservation, but they recognize that it cunles withir the scopo of self-defense (for example Oppenheim). Some ot.16: Efhol.ar3 acknowledge the right of selfpreservation, but thai which tifay recnenize as itn import is nothing nore than the right of self-defrrs:. (for exsmple wat). nowever, anong the jurists of recent times, suth in nivier, s.it i.terican Scholars such
 of the right of self-preservation. Or within the ecops of international

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Law, in addition to urgent (NOTWMHR) action in regard to self defense, Eoliar, for instance, recognizes an act of urgency (NOTSTANDHANDLUNG) which is similar to the right of aelf-preservation, based on German penal law. (Checker's note: in this case Jiko hozenken is used instead of Jiko hozanken).

The theoretical besis of recognizing the right of self-preservation jointly with the right of self-defense is to be acknowledged in present international relations. But as the two rights are not clearly considered separately in international convention. I shall refer to these points some other day. At presert in this place I shell give a short discussion of the theoretical differ aces batreen the right of self-preservation and that of self-defense. Howover, it must be noticed that not only are they scarcely considered separately in international convention, but nowadays the thought of absolutely denying the right of self-preservation is prevailing as I mentioned above.

According to the simple theory which recognizes the two rights separately, the right of self-preservation in the narrow sense takes precedence over the ordinary rights of other countries, belonging to the righte of necessity (DROIT DE NECESSITE) just like the right of selfdefense. The exercise of this right is to bo recognized only within the limits of necessity in case dangur threatens the rights or other legal interests which ere championed by this right. In the case of the right of self-defense, it shall be exeroised in order to protect its own rights and legal intereate in case of being attacked by other nation. It shall not be employed ageinst the attacking nation until the attack is actually mede or the poesibility of it impends, while the right of self-preservation in the narrow sense will be ective when the existence of a nation (or some important interests which are tentamount to its existence) are in immediate danger. It should be recognized thet this right is exercised even against a third power. In the case of the right of self-defense, interpreting it according to the tendency to place it in the same category as the right of self-defonse in domestic law, it appears that it should be recognized that it can beoome activated in case of danger threatoning rights or interesta that are not extremely trifling; without restricting necessarily to cases of danger threatening existence (or important interests of about the came degree).

When one thinks over the situetion at the outbreak of the present war (which shall be mentioned in Chepter VIII) it will be clearly understood that interests important for the existence of this country were in imminent danger. Accordingly, if the right of self-preservation in the narrow sense is recognized in international rclations we can declare that we are entitled to disregard the provisions of Hague Treaty No. III, in so far as it is necessary to protect the right of self-preservetion. From the standpoint of the right of self-defense there is a doubt as to whether we could claim a basis for saying that the oituation at the outbreak of war (to be explained in Chapter VIII) implied an attack ageinst our country. Therefore it might be aaid that our country was not responsible for the violation of the troaty even if it were a fact that we dieregarded Hague Treaty No, III, because the right of self-defenso hes priority ovor all treeties. A notem

worthy thing in this regard is that Germany justified her aggression arainst Belgium under the plea of the right of self-defense at the time of the First Great War. Her justification was that the attack was made against Germany by Belgium (Kohler) or France (Chambrun). Comparing the situation before the outbreak of this war, which I shall explain in Chapt. VIII, to the conditions before the invasion of Belgiv it goes without saying that there is more reason to recognize the existence of an attack in the former case.

\section*{IIII.}

The U.S. zuthorisies, in spite of the fact that the negotiation. with our country wury uider way. wore planning not only an economic break with our country, iuv verc also devising a scheme of zealous oppression, hand in hand with England and other satellites, and were furthering the so-called A.B.C.D. plan.

Together with the progress of her enormous naval construction progran, the U.S. was proceeding with tho gradual strenpthening of her naval and air bases in the Pacific area. In the Philippine Islands; she was making many preparations for the purpose of initiating war frora Augrast on, euch as the construction of airodromes, the sending of more troops, the sudden despatch of submarines, the importing of many planes, large quantities of aras, ammunition, and equipment, the installation of anti-aircraft guns all along the seacoast, mine laying in Manila Bay, and so on. Horeover, in the same manner, that the U.S. steaners on the Pacific line bound for the Orient had been armed, the U.S.A. was going to propose to Britain the dual use of the port of Singapore and to demand recognition from the Dutch-Indies and Australia for the use of military bases. She also intended, as concerns China, to prevent the Burma Route, tie sole line of transportation for supporting Chiang, from breaking down and declared that she would insure land transportation by sending her air forces to patrol.

The British Governor-General of Kalaya had declared a state of energency and had suddenly organized the Fast-Asia Fleet, appointing Admiral Thomas Philipps its Comander-in-Chief. He received reinforcements of artillerymen and engineors from Britain proper; more warships wers despatched from the Indian Ocean and from South Africa. By assembling tens of thousands of soldiers on the frontier of Siam and Malaya under the pretext of defonding Malaya, he showed that the tine was approaching when Britain would invade Siam. British air forces were also reinforced with the help of America. There were several military connections betweon Britain and the Chung-Xing Government in the Burma area, and the actual state of affairs was that the British, Anerican and Chinese military preparations against Japan were proceeding day by day. The A.B.C.D. federation had already added hustralia to its me: bership and Soviet Russia seemed ready to join at any time. Keeping close political, military and economic connections with one another, they were trying to check Japan's develooment to the South; and it was recognized that the blockade was being strengthened day by day, in preparation for the beginning of a war.

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V.U.C. No. \(\qquad\)
I.P.S. No. \(\qquad\)
Statement of Source and Authenticity
I, ILYASHI, Kaom, hercby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the irchives Section, Japanese Foreien Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attacied cansisting of \(22 l\) paces, dated June 1942, and described as follows Cillection of Essays on Srableme of International La: Relatec to tu Gronter East isia ilare These iesaysivere prepared by a Comittce o' irell-knorm Japanese International laryors in cooperation itith the Forcion lininistry made soon after December s. 194 L . I further certify that the attacheo record and document is an officinl document of the Japane-e Covernment, and that it is part of the o.'icial archives and iles of the followine named ministry or dejartment (specifyinf also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official desienation of the recular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreion lifinistrys.

Signed at Tokyo on this

22nd day of October 19lit.
\(/ 3 / \frac{K_{\text {. Hayashi }}}{\text { Gignnture of Official }}\)
SEAL
Mitncse: Namahnru Odo \(\langle s /\)
Chief of the drchives Section
Statement of Offici:I Procurement
I, John A. Curtis, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied ?overs, and that the above certification mas obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my of ificial busines.s.

Sifned at Tokyo on this 22 day of Oct. 1946.
\[
/ s / \frac{I_{0} \lambda_{0} \text { Curtis, 2nd } L_{t}}{\text { Name }}
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Witness: Riciarid Harsh /3/




















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e) Provions bulwerks of British imporieliam which ancrond to euprnes end rule Fest Asie, namnly hovg zong and the Malay Penineula. This arne nust be trenuformed into e bulwark for the protection of Grcater Eant Asie and must timrofore be placed under the immediate control of Japan. This principle found a practical apolication in General ISOGAI's appointment as Governor Genaral of HONGKONG, aa reported from onothor quartor.
b) Arfas, whoso indmondence shall bo proserved if thay loyally collahorate with Jepan: The Philipoinos and Eurma. According to what the Military Attacho confidentially laarned from tile Army, their independence alipill be formad according to Manchukuo's pattern.
c) Areas which ern to be conquened by foren of arms if thoy persiat in resistirg Jaoan: Nrtherlende Indins, Australia, and Ciungking Clina.

TOJO and m000's stetammets revegied that the orieinal hove of the Jirtherlend Indies' rialding without a fieht is no more, and military action is considernd assential. Both qpanchey contained a forcible eppeal for Chungking's nar to turn away from the Anglomsaxons end /comn to an/ underatanding vitt Jepar. Thry wero still especially underlined by the reported decleration of the " Prime Minister before the Budfet Comiasion on 23 Janiuary.
3) Generel prirciplen for the future organization of Grnator East Abia.

Co:cerning this, the apincics of TOJO and TCGO and thee declarations of TOJO and ? Pneral SUZUKI, Presidnnt of the Planning Board, before the Budget Commisaion on 23 January, contain \(\Omega\) frw intrresting points. Thr propram is emphaticcill- moderate. New areas are not to be exploited after the defeet of Anglo-Sexon mastery. Instnad of that economic collaboretion, no wer of recns, tolerance of religious frecdoc, no nconomic axclusion, but on the otime hend gaidance and regulation of production, and if arcessery rnstriction of individuel branches of production (Suger, alao rubber ware namod in a confidoztial conversetion) in accordance with the nends of the Graptor Splearf Ficonomy, menagra by Japan. The aim of the presenrt measires is tiep securing of rew meteriels with are incossary for waging war and the foundine of tholator autocratic Grrater Sphare Order/ autarkischer grossreumordnune/. Prosnt progrem:
a) Acquisition of important sources of raw materials.
b) Prevention of thn flow of rew materiale from the South Sea arraf to the namm pownrs.
c) Securing the gelf-gufficinncy of tire army in the arras of operetions.
d) Conperetion with capen by rxisting anterprisos in the occupied arnan.

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\section*{AFEIDAVIT}
I. W. P. Cummine, boine first duly sworn or. ceth, depose and say:
1. That I prim Atteche of the United States Depertment of State on the etaff of the United Stetes Politicel Adiviser on German Affeirs, and o.s such I ame represertative of the of the Ofisce of Nij itary Government for Germeny (U.S.). That in ay capecity as suo:e set forth, I have in miy possession, custody, and control at the Beilin Docuiuents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original ceptured German Foroign Office files end erchives.
2. Thet seid origiral Foreign Office files and erchives were ceptured and obtaincd bi military forces under the cemmend of the Supreme Comander, Allied Expeditionery Forces, and aron their seizure and csioture wore first assemoled by seid militery forces at a Military Decument Center n.t Karburg, Germeny, and wore lator moved by authorized personnel of seid. Allied forces to seid centrel d cuments center, ebove reforrod to, and known es the Berlin Documonte Center.
3. Thrit I was essigned to said document center at Marburg, Germeny, on Aufist 15, 1945; and said coptured Germen Foreign Office files and archives first ceme into my possession and control while I wes stationed at Merburg, Germany, and thet thereafter the seme heve continued in my possession end custody and under my control.
4. Thet the dociment to which tris affidevit is atteched is a true and corroct photostatic copy of an original German Foroign office document wich wes captured from said German Torelen Office files and archives, and which came into my yossession and custody and under my control in the manner abovo set forth.
5. That said orieinal cocumert, of which the ettreched is a photostatic copa, is boing held and retained by mo in order that it mey te exemined and insoectod oy verious interested afencies, and a photostatic copy of said orifinal is horeby furnished and certified. to because of the unaviliobility of baid oriçinel for tre reesons above sot fortl.
\(18 / \frac{W_{0} \text { P. Cunming }}{W_{0} \text { P. Cinting }}\)
Subscribed and suorr to before mo this 23rd dey of"April 1946.
\[
/ 8 / \frac{\text { U. E. Gerde }}{\text { U. E. GARDE }}
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It. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant Genera.
OFICE OF MILITATY GOVYRNIGMIT FOR GBivait (U.S.)



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the reorganization of Japan's inner administration, including almost all of the ministries. He likewise controls economic planning in Japan, as well as the organization of economic and administrative construction in the Southern territories. SCZUKI is at the same time an executive organ (General Secretary of the Board for the Construction of Greater East isia). On the strength of this great authority, his connections with the army and his personal relations to TOJO, SUTUKI has created a position for himself that can be labeled as a kind of a Vicechancellorship. This is also shown by SUZUKI's order of rank in the Japanese Cabinet at official events. Although he was formerly somewhat ambiguous in his attitude towards Germany, SUZTKI has especially recently supported cooperation with Germany and had an important share in the decision of Japan's entry into the war. Proposed Order: Grand Merite.
(2) Toshio SHIEATORT, born 8 June 1887 in CHIBA, formerly ambassador in ROME. Adviser of the Foreign Minister when the Tripartite Pact was concluded. For a long time he was the principal advocate of intimate cooperation with Germany. Member of the New Diet after having recovered his health SHITRATORI will probably again play an important part in forel.gn and home politics. Order: Great Cross.

On recommendation of the Military Attache:
(3) Getret General SUGIYAPA, Chief of General Staff since 3 October 1940, born 21 January 1880 in KOKZMA, former Minister of Tar. In all of his positions he has always openly advocated cooperation with Germany, wielding great influence in the conclusion of the alliance, Grade: Great Cross,
(4) Lieutenant General HEITAIO KIMTRA, Vice Minister of War, born 28 September 1888 in TOKYO Prefecture. K. was in Germany 1922-1924. In his position of Chief of the General Staff of the Kwantung Army, October 1930 to October 1940, he has especially worked in behalf of Germany. Vice Minister of War since 10 April 1941, he is one of the principal advocates of German-Japanese military cooperation. Grade: Great Cross.
(5) Lieutenant General AKIRA (TN: From context the garbled part seems to be KUTO), former Director of the militarypolitical section of the War Ministry since October 1939. born 15 November 1892 in KCMAMOTO. He has now received an inuortant field command, and an extraordinary career is predicted for him. Without regard to the vacillations of Japanese policy, ". has always advocated the conclusion of a German-Japanese alliance in a most important position. Order: Great Cross, under special consideration of his official position.
(7) Lieutenant General YIKJ. ©ASAFARA, born 6 November 1889 in TOKYO, Chief of the Europenn Section of the General Staff at the time of the Anti-Comintern Pact; until 1941 Chief of the General Staff of the Jannese Army in North China; at present field command; using his imjortant influence he has slways worked as a leader for the Anti-Comintern Pact and German-Japanese cooparation. Order: Distinguished Service Cross with Stars.

On recommendetion of Air Attache:
(8) Colonel General KENJI DOHTHARA, Chief of the Army's Airarm Burenu since 9 June 1941, born 8 August 1883 in OKIYAZa. By constant close and friencly cooperation with the Air Attache, he has in a leading position, contributed, in the true sense of the Tripartite Pact, to the extension and deepening of the military alliance. Order: Great Cross.
(9) Vice Admiral etkicui katagtin, Chief of the Navy's :irarm Bureau since 24 September 1.941 , born 10 September 1885 in YoNe? \(A^{\prime \prime h}\). Rensons as per :ara.(6). Order: Great Cross.

To the above proposals I would like to remark:
SUGTYAY h had bean recommended for the Great Cross already in 1037 because of his pro-German nttitude. As Chief of the General Staff he continued talcing a leading part in working for Military cooperation with Germany.

XIMURA has closely cooperated with Minister of War and Prime ininister TOJO already on the Kwantung ermy.0 His personal relationship to TOJO as well as his primary preoccupation in his position of Prime Ministor have enhanced his influence on the leadership of the War ?inistry, as well as his position in legnrd to the other Vice-Ministers to a marked degree.

MrTO, as head of the political section of the War Ministry since 1939 , hes of ten been mentioned in my reports. In view of the political influence wielded by the Japanese Army, his

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Page 4.
attitude was and is of great importance. The same is now true of Major General SATO who his so far cooperated in a friendly way with the Military Attache and the Embassy as MUTO's representative.

DOHIHAFA and K.TAGIFI have an equally important share in military cooperation, along with the Chiefs of the Army's and Navy's Airarm Bureaus. Because of the successes of the Japanese airarm their position among Japan's military and political leadership has especially risen. In view of their position, simultaneous bestowals of the Great Cross seem called for.

\section*{Certificate:-}

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4076 B.
/s/ Ulrich A. Straus, 2d Lt.



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\section*{Kido Diary}

Septenber lst, Tuesday, Fine./(942)
at 10 a.m. went to the offico.
From 10:20 to 11:15 audience with the Emperor.
At 1 p.m. Lord Steward HIiOHATA came to my room and told me informally that Princess Teru's wedding was to be celebrated next nutumn.

From 1:10 to 1:25 audience with the Emperor.
at 2:10 Promier TOJO came to my room, and related the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the Greater East isia Ministry /DiI TÖA SHO/.

> He said that the matter had been debated at that morning's cabinet.conference, that as Foreign Minister TOGO had objected in principle to the establishment, there had been no agreement in views. Ifter a short recess, in the afternoon the Premier had talked the matter over with the Foreign Minister, but could not persuade him. Then the Prenier had asked him to resign, but his answer being that he could not do so at once, the negotiations had come to a standstill. The Pronicr had then requested the Foreign Minister to let him know by 4 p.m. whether he would resign or not. If the Foreign Minister does not resign, the Cabinet will be forced to resign en bloc due to non-unity, the Premier concluded.

I was ereatly surprised by the news as it came so suddenly, but since the Cabinet could do nothing I let the matter ride.

From 2:30 to 3 audience with the Emperor reporting the above matters. He too was greatly surprised. He wanted by all means to avoid a resignation en bloc in view of the situation at home and abroad, and at the present stage of war, today when anerica has begun to show considerable signs of counter-offensive action. I was really impressed. Therefore, I asked the Emperor to call in Navy Minister SHIMADA as an intermediary. "Ith the Emperor's permission, I had the Chief Aide-de-Camp request the Navy Minister to appear at the Palace imriediately.





















\section*{TLE COEF HETURИ T0 ROOM 361}


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\section*{1277}

Page 1

Entry for 17 July 1944 Pron KIDO's Dicey 17 July (Monday) clear

It 12.20 A. H . Premier TOJO came to ny house and explained the Cabinet policy as is given in the separate paper. I acknowledged \(1 t\).

At 8 Mr . HIROSE celled, end I listened to informstion from all quarters.

Received in audience from 0,40 to 10.20. I ronorted to the Throne on the policy whish ?premier TOJO talked about.

Rit 10.30 Minister of State, KISHI, care to the office. He told ne the he had been requested to resign There by Premier TOJO, and he asked me for advice as to deciding tass \(n\) how he should move. He said the he had cone to me for talk advice after obtaining the Premier's consent. it 11.30 , as is Chief of the Imperial Guards, mainamura came to the office. -sven At 2 o'clock, Premier TOJO came to the office after his \(^{\text {of }}\) in tho audience with the Fineror. Talked to me about appointing epa- General UiEZU as Chief of the dry General Staff. :ito raper. Feceived in audience from 2.40 to 2.50 . Vent to the official residence at 3 orclock, end hid e talk with Mr. HIRCSE and with Prince KONOVE st 4. Care home late in the afternoon. Received "S!IT:IJIISU"/T.N. Tyne of physical culture remedy./ from mir. TiKinisinf. it 8 , "aDA carne. Had a tell with hin. Admiral OKADA came et 9.30.
it 9.30 P. M. on 17 July, 1944, Admire l Kcisuke Oisin called and talked to ne as follows:
1. i Sonior Statosnien's council wis held at Baron HIRAMUA's house today.
1. Those who attended zero Mess rs. MixaTSUKI, OUDh, hiramili, hirota, abe, koroye and yoni.
1. Mr. "AKATSUKI is made chairman, and he begins to talk first. This Cabinet has completely lost the sympathy of the public; arid he thinks the: the present situation is really serious. He asks for opinions.
1. YON.II: The matter /T.N. portion illegible/ his been under discussion since the 13th, end after careful
considerotion, I have written doclining the offer. As OKA, Chief of Neval Affairs Burenu came and talkod to me about the general opinion of the Ne.vy and all, I roplicd thet it would be ressonable for me to be returned to :ative service agsin and serve as Supreme \#fr Councillor or in any other capacity; but thet aven if I entered the Cabinet as Minister of State I could be of little service, and that it would not be the thing to do. I have no intention of joining the Cabinet.

ABE: ilthough the people ere completely out of sympethy with this Cabinct, the situation rould become nore difficult if it vere roplaced by \(\varepsilon\). still weoker Cabinet. "e rust think about such points. As Mesident of the Imperial Fule assistance Politicel Society, I must decide my attitude according to the attitude of the Imperial Fule issistance Political Society.

HIR'JUMA: Uhether the Cnbinet is overthrown or not, or vhether the next Cabinet will be a veak one or not is not the point. The point is thet ve rire really concerned sbout our country, and ve must make up our minds to do sonething.

HIROTA: I nlso wes asked to help by Kiilasint who talked about dinlometic policy vis a vis the Soviet Union, but no one has telked to me since then. Even if I were asted to, I should not join the Cnbinet.

Questions and nnswars vere exchenged betmoen OKADA and ABE over the auestion of the Nevy. Finally the following decision wes m?de and the meeting edjourned.
fecordingly, I asked hiri/T.N. OKADi/ if I night understand by the above talk the: I heve been given information concarning the gethering of the senior statesmen, the.t is, if I might take it that he had come with the intontion of keeping contact, and as he roplied in the affirnative, I acknowledged that such was the cese. I asked him because I thought that I should have to give careful consideration, if he intended to ask ne to report it to the Erperor.
"In order to find our vay through the current difficult situntion, it is necessery to renew the populer rind. ill people nust rally and cooperate to build s. porerful netional Cebinet which will surge forverd unsworvingly. f pertial reorganization of the cabinet will not be of any use."
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"In order to find our way through the current difficult situntion, it is necessery to renew the populer rifnd. ill people must rally and cooperato to build \(\varepsilon\). powerful notional Cebinet which will surge forverd unswervingly. A partial reorganization of the cabinet will not be of any use."
lit 12.20 on 17 July, 1944, Prenicr TOJO called and expleined the Cebinet policy wricr ney be surmed up as follows:
"As we ere told of the Emperor's intention regarding the trrec points to wrich tre Lord Keeper of the Privy Scal celled attention scme time ago, we heve decided to carry out tre consolidetion of tre Suprere Comend as well es a crenge of Nevy Tinisters. I had a telk with tre candidete for Nevy tonigrt, end we "agrecd."

When we decided our policy at first, we merc not thinking of tre question of tre suprenc Commend. But trings rave reacred a point urore tris pas rad to be taken into consideration bceuse of the gencrel situation, since it was fenred tret e stete night arise in which trere would be insufficient unity between lormy and Navy. From tris point of view, we rave cranged our policy on reorganizetion cf Cabinet and otrer problenis to ninimum.
"Reinforcencnt of Peedquarters. Tre Lieison Conference wrich ras been inclined to be businesslike and has not been mede use of to tre fullest cxtent, srell be renoveted and strengtrened. It srell consist of two ministers of stete of the Preficicr class (ABE and YONLI considered) besides botr Criefs of Staff and the Minister of War and Navy, lunitions, Finence end tre Foreign Minister.

\section*{Cabinet reorganization.}
"In order to strengtren the air forec, FUJIW.Fh shall serve full time as linister of munitions, end, trerefore, ve request retirement cf Mr. KISFI as linister of State. MAEDA or SHIMEDh shall be appointed Wclfere Minister in cricr to reve \(n\) rabiber of the Inperial Rul: dissistance Political Sccicty in the Cabinet. General ABE and Admirnl YONAI will be resked te join tre Cebinet as Ministers of Statc in order to reinforce the Imperial Headquarters."

In connection witr tre senior Statesrien:
"We are prepared to consider the revivel of the Cabinet duvisory system, if it is desired by the Senior Statesmen. Yereafter, the Cabinct menbers shall always keop close contact with the ecnior etatesnen and fully reflect treir intentions."



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if HIRANJMA interded to form a cabinet．I rebiteri that ine probably did not．

Then I went at once to the Senior Statesmen＇s Conference．

\section*{The Details of the Senior Statesmen＇s Conference}

Having been summoned by the Emberor former Prime Ifinister： WAKATSUKI，OKADA，HIRCTA，KONOYE，HIRANUMA，ABE and YONAI， Dresident of the Privy Council HARA and Lord Keeper of the Pris Seal KIDO met in conference，at 4 P．M，on \(1^{\circ}\) July Showa／1944／． Discussion was held as to who should be recommended to the Throne as premier of the succeecing cabinet，Premier TOJO havin tendered his resignation．The conference was closed at R：45 P．

Grand Chamberlain HYAKUTAKE，who attended the meeting in zccordance with the Emueror＇s wish，notified those present of the import of the Imperial summons．Lord Keeper of the Drivy Seal KIDO gave a detailed explanation of the circumstances whic． had led to the resignation en bloc of the TOJO Cabinet．

The members then went into a discussion．First of all， Mr．YONAI reported on how he had been asked by the cabinet to join it．His report was as follows：
（1）At about 5：3n AN．of the 13 th Secretary AKABATSU informed me that the Premier intended to visit me．He， however，did not come，tho I do not know the reason．
（2）On the 17th Finance IInister ISFIWATA called and urged me to ioin the Cabinet．Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau OKA visited me also and earnestly urged me to join the Cabinet，for the sake of the Navy．But I reolied that it was unreasonable，that it might be a different matter if，for the sake of the Navy I returned to active service in the Navy and became a member of the Supreme Var Council but I could be of no use by becoming a State linister．I wrote a note to Mr．OKA saving，＂After deep consideration I have decided to reject the oroposal，＂and thus indicated my decision．
（3）A little pist 9 P．M．on the 17th，SATO，Chief of the ailitary Affairs Bureav called on me．Navy Minister NOMURA was here ilso．They urged me by turns to join the Cabinet but in the end falled to make me change my mind．

Then the discussion began，the important questions and answers being as folloms：

WAKATSUKI：That is your opinion，Ulr．KIDO？

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KIDO: I have no definite opinion as yat, but would like to hear you all first. Isn't it a good idea. to consider the matter along lines of the agresment nade at the meeting at RARON ETRANT'A's residence?

HAPA: That moeting was that?
TAKATSUKT: The Senior Statesmen met at Baron HIRANTPA's home, out of anxiety over the national situation. No special discussion ocrurred at the time concerning a ne" Cabinet.

ABE: Let me express my views to exnedite the discussion, As a split hetween the stave afjairs and the supreme Comment uill be dangerous, it is necessary that they keep in ciose contaci. in short, \(I\) think a military man on the active listi wili ne suitable at this time. And as tine Navy plays the most importent role at the present, isn't it better that a Navy man should take ur, the premiershipf for tilis reason, what in you say to asking aimiral YOMAI to assume the duty?

YONAT: In my opinion, the military man's original duty is to devote himse?f to the particular field of strategy and comrand, and it is most nroder that the civil officials handle poiftical affairs. It is unvise to appoint no:f from the Army and now from the Navy, like GENJI and HETKF.

ABE: That's not my idea.
YONAT: If there is no suitable man among the civil officials, it will be better that an frmy man assume the pest. I would not be able to hold the position for a menth, and judging fiom my past expertence, I feel that I would cause you trouble instead.

YAKAmstIKT: For the nurnose of discussion I suggest titis as o tentative plan. I think a military man is preferable oinrong wartime. At present we must rely uvon the Navy as aiar firsi line of national defense. Hence, if any Naw man mere tn be soggested for the premiershin I wonder if he wovidn't feel seruples aknut taking it. Therefore, \(\frac{T}{}\) tisis it is better that some co:e from the Army take the post. A Prenter should have political ability. In this sense, \([\) think Generci liguKI mou?d be most competent though I. do not know the latest conditions. General ADE seemed to have an objection to the idea previously, but--.

ABE: I do not know how General TYAKT is getting along.
YONAT: I understand the fact that the Navy stands at the forefront. After all, the filitary should concentrate on varfare. The \({ }^{2 l i l i t a r y}\) men have naturally received a one-sided education, and I belleve that it is for this vary reason that they are

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strong. And for this reason also they are unsuitasne for Dolitics.

WAKATSUKI: Kr. YONAI's view is not without reason, wat ove country's practice is quite different from that of England anc America. Also, our nation is not educated according to the same custom as that of America and Britain. It would be difficult for Jaban to reach that point in one jump.

YONAI: Unless it is corrected now, our country will be done for.

KONOYE: If the military quthorities themselves do not correct this point, the civilien orficials certainly can't do it. It is an idealistic thing. Taiking the matter practically ---/original illegible/ a military person would be better. A military man with such ideas will do. The question of whether he be Army or Navy shall be deciced by narrowing down the discussion.

KIDO: In short, it is a practical problem. Our first object is to finish the war. Even if we tried to reform the political system simultaneously it would be impossible to do. To think on two planes at this time will obscure our objective.

HIRANUMA: I quite agree with Prince KONOYE. We are now at the stage where we must think of how to protect our national structure and the security of the Imperial Family. The matter of increased munitions production alone could not be handled by anybody but a military man.

WAKATSUKI: How about making it a military person, not limiting it to a man on the active list?

KONOYE: We had better gradually narrow our process of selecti,
YONAI: I have no self-confidence, judging from my past experience as a premier.

WAKATSUKI: That was peacetime.
HARA: To be sure, my official position is such that I do not know how the political situation stands. The oresent situatior is so grave that the next Cabinet will decide the fate of our country. It would be too much to place the full responsibility on a single military man alone. It should be a national cabine. influential and popular people. Accordingly, won't it be a good idea to let about five men cooperate and accept the responsibility. As the Emperor has commanded, "Organize a cabinet in cooperation," this might be all right. The Imperial commanc will fall upon the five men here and they, choosing the oremierfrom among themselves, will cooperate in administering state

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Page 5.,
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affairs. The situation is such that no one can undertake it.
KIDO: I can vell understand what Mr. HaFA means. I don't suppose that any one objects so :ar, but I believe that the practical application would be vary difficult.

TAKATSTKI: Just as the Lord Keaner of the Privy Seal says, pe shou?d indicnte one individual in replying, or His "ajesty may have trouble.

HTROTA: The situation may become such that a desperate act will become necessary. "e must also think of the security of the Imperial Family. The new Cabinet must be the hiohest and most powerful organization. at this time, should we not have a Prince of the blood at the head of the new: Cabinet? I feel that a good number of Army and Nary General Officers should closely assist the Emperor.

Prince KONOS: A Gabinet of the Imperial Family is not proper at the present st?ge.

HIFANT:A: I, too, think it is not good, though the time may come when we must consider such a thing.

TAKATSTKI: An Imperial Family cabinet is not good.
OKADA: The next Cabinet should be a strong national cabinet, whether viewed from abroad or from home. It must fight out the war, and it must mage in impossible war. The question is how to make a real national Cabinet.

HAFA: I think so too. One men cannot do it. If one individual is to be recommended, I shall keep silence.

OKADA: The next Cabinet ought not ve a cabinet of any one, but should be the Emperor's cabinet.

KIDO: I cin rell understand what you mean, but prartically speaking what do you vant to do?
H.AFA: The Cobinet should not belong to this man or that.

HIRANT:A: That is the very way \(t\) feel, but at any rate we must decide who will occupy first place. At the present stage, it must be some one from the military. It goes without saying that the Cobinet is under direct Imperini rule.

WakatsukI: That is right.

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Page 6

OKADA: As far as this point is concerned, I am of the sane opinion as YCNAI. It might be best if the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal pho has a clear idea of the Emperor's wishes and of the hone situation were to do it.

HARA: That fill do because the Ministers of War and Navy will select both Chiefs of General Staff in the field of military command.

KIDO: Judging from the domestic and foreign situations, and especially the strengthening of home defense, I believe that the next premier should be an army man.

WAKATSUKI: Our graver to the Throne should not be too vague. Mr. HARA's suggestion will need further discussion.
\(A B E:\) In plain paris then, it hs s been generally agreed that 9 military man is preferable. However, a ran who is a military man alone is not enough. Judging from the actual conditions in all-out warfare, civil officials and reified military men cannot keep satisfactory contact with military operations. Nave men would be suitable for brightening up our nation.
HIROTA: I think it is necessary at this time to form a real national Cabinet, with a member of the Imperial Family in the central post.

WAKATSCKI: It is not good to impose political responsibility upon the Imperial Family.

KIDO: That is right.
HIRANUNA: At this stage it's still not right.
Kovno The same

KIDO: The strengthening of home defense, the increase of Army strength in the homeland and that of the military police require that we choose same one from the Army.

ABE: That will rot renew the neople's maisie.
VIAKATSUKI: An army man seers better.
YONAI: Though I recommended a civilian at first, I think that
 the Lord Keeper of Privy seal. I wish to take back my previous opinion on this point.

ABE: The Army is unpopular. The nation's trust in the Navy is apparent.

Page 7

HIRANUMA: At present there are two viewpoints prevalent among the oeodle, and the Army is on the unpobular side.

HIROTA: Does the iond Keeper of orivy Seal mean martial law by his previous exnlarsition?

KIDO: No, I do not mean that. I mean the stationing of army forces all over the country.

YONAI: How goout ilarshal TERALCHI?
ABE: There is reason to think it would be difficult in practice.

HIRAMUM1: It is not good, to delay the formation of the Cabinet at this time.

KONOYE: 1 hy dic the TOJO Cabinet fall? -- Because it had declined in public favo:. Therefore, the Army must change its attitude in order to renew novular confidence.

HIRANUA: The desire in all quarters is that the Arny stop interfering with them.

KONOYE: Fhere have beer leftist thoughts among some men in the army for more than ten years. Tocay there is an atterpt to carry out a left-wing revolution through the cooveration of the illilitary, the ofícials, and the people. This is more dangerous than defeat itself, and I fear a left-wing revolution pore than defeat, for even if defeated, we can maintain the Imperial Family and the national structure, but in case of a leftist revolvtion we canrot io so. From this viemboint the selection of the liar ilinister is most important.

YONAI: Judging from that point, an srmy ran is better.
WAKATSUKI: I've entertzined doubts on that point for some time.
HIR:SN:TM: So have I.
KONOYE: Can 'jERACCHI control that?
ABE: He is a stralghtforvard man, but in the first place to call him back from the front would be difficult.

ABE: The next prenier must be some ne popular among the Army.
NAKATSUKI: I:sn't LGAKI pooular among the Army?
\(\therefore \mathrm{ABE}\) : I do not kno:r kow podular he has been recently.

YONAI: Mr. i:BE, isn't trare eryonc who is popular?
ABE: UiELZU is a men of crarecter. Trere are a few othors but trcy arc ell ait trc front end it vill be difficult to call tram bacik.

PILiNMS: USEZU is out of the question. Isn't there any othcr Nevy men?

YONAI: In vicw of wrat the Lord Kecper of Privy Serl has said, it migint be better to crose somennc from tre j.my.

FIFSNUA: Considereble cxpericnce :\%uld be necded to suppress trc leftjsm refcrred to by Prince KONOYE.

\author{
KONOYE: Trerc are sonc people who recormend lir. Kentaro SUZUKI.
}

YOMA: We red bettcr not rccommend rim.
FILuiNulA: Putting aside individuel rersons, I think it proper trat re take the post for tre sekc of the state. I know him vary rell end think he is an ronorable men.

YONAI: I said tret fror: the stendpeint of tre netion's intcrist.

HIfOTl: \(H_{e}\) secris to be a moàcratc person.
FIFANUi: : Tho te is strong te is a men who cen accept otrcr pcople's opinions.

Whe: I knov rim vcry wicll, too, eftcr working togetror with rim in tre Privy Council. hr. SUZUKI hes nlveys seid re will never toke a political scat as te is a scldicr. Fc ras even seid trat even if comended by vis liejcety \(/ T \cdot N\), to form a cebinct/ \(r\) e tould never ececpt it. Im telling ycu this for refercnes.

OKl.Di: his e rentre is e finc persen, but when I t'ink of the soldicrs at tre front, I trink en army men is better.

FIFOTA: I fecl tret wione in an inportent stege where we must refora \(t^{2} c\) hesis of the Japancse systcm. Everybody should be present at Inperiel readquerters.

PIKANUA: In prectice, tris is iripossible.
FIKOTA: hs t'e prosccution of the war is first end foremost, es long as tre four pillars of the imy and the Navy frc firm, that is cnough.

\section*{Page 9.} Reprocessed pursuant to order Court Pecord, p. 11,351.

KIDO: A min like "rnshal TMATrCt is one of them too.
"AKATSIKI: Now that we are conferring, the deopla may feel uneasy unless the Tmperial Command to form a cobinet is issued in \(a\) day or two. Therefore I think we had better choose either JGAKT or General [T. TZU.

KIDO: How obolt Marshal HATA?
KONOYE: As I have stated before, if an army man is to be recommender, it is a necessary condition thit he mike a change in the army so as to rener the public confidence and that he suppress the leftist element. If שFari can do this, he may be all right.

HIRANUMA: Politionl exnerience is necessary.
KIDO: What is the comment at the front nbout ir. UCAKI? As there is the enemy's propaganda offensive to be feared, it is no good if Mr. UGAKI's appointement cavses discontent and unrest among the soldiers st the front.

ABE: Is the iden of a Navy mon in the minority?
\(A B E\) : If an \(n\) rmy man is preferred, the next question is who?
KIDO: If circumstances permit, how about TERAUCHI or HA \({ }^{m}\) A? ABE: The order may be (1) TEFAUCHT, (2) UREZU, and (3) HATA.

KIDO: As to UTEZU, the fect that he his only recently been appointed Chief of the Army Genernl Staff and that he has had no ministerinl career should be considered.

HIRANTMA: The next is YONAT, 气 N~vy man.
KONOVE: There is also "r. Kantaro SUZUKI.
KON YE: And what about the question of Mr. UGAKT?
HIRANU'A: I don't know about him lntely.
KTDO: Wh:t other army genernls are there besides these?
ABE: Well, there are HONJO, \(\Lambda\) RAKI, KOTSO, and then there's TOJO.

KIDO: How about KOISO?
YONAI: KOTSO is a good man, capable and courageous.

KONOYE: Isn't he a man of UGhisil's typc but of smellex colibrci

ABE: Atsolutely different.
aIDO: How does le get slong with dry men of tre active list?
A.EE: Not so bedly, I bclieve. Yc is a different sort of nen from TOJO.

YIFJ.NULI: \(H \in\) is a righ colibre men and a pious one.
iIDO: Wrat arc ris idees?
WAKATSUKI: I heve no objection, although I don't know hin.
OMALA: KONOYE: We don't know rim toc well. Wrat are tre opinions of L.r. YCIN. I and LIr. YIRNUMA? Ye was e monber of cech of ycur cobinets.

FII.OTA: No cbjection.
\(\therefore \mathrm{BE}:\) NO objecticn.
OKADA: NOw wh must recxaminc the question of whetrer hoIso can crgenize a truly nationel cabinet. tyis is an extremely inportent tine and, as we neeci not cole to a finel decision in one or two rours, I went to study the metter fully.
KIDO: I rove in mind e plen to request tre Enperor to call a conference of Scnior Statesren and Winistcrs in tre Iriperial Palrce like t? conferences of Elder Statesnen and Ministers of past years. I au now studying trat rattcr.

OK.DA: Tre formation of a cebinct requircs cercful trought.
FIFOTA: Yow: sbcut a cabinct by dircct Inperial crcicr

míhitSUKI: dacturily there is a vicc-premicr in every cabinct.
KIDO: I must subiit to the Trranc ifr. FiK.'s opinion in detail.
iIDO: lirat is tre order of tre condidatcsi

FILKANU_As TER'UCUI, KOISO, YATK, and \(\varepsilon\) neval nen.
YONA.I: TERAUCHI, KOISO, FATf. By tre woy wren I reconicnaded hoISO as a cabinct l.ernber before, the Emperor esked for the reason.

Doć, No. 1632 W (713)

HIF'NUME: Speaking of LOISO I wes asked by the Emperci aocut
his conncction witt the UG.KI offoir.
KONOYE: I don't kao: any of tre trree.

ABE: TEKiUCTI, KOISO, YHM.
OL:SN: 8 I don't know eny ef tre trace.
IIIDO: I vould likc to rave e leecting of tro scnicr Statesmen and the Imperfel nonince in order trat tre fermer iney support tre lattcr.

WhW.TSUAI: If trey :"cru to renpcr the nominec, of coursc it vould be very bed, but if tre nor.ince ril:sclf trishcs it, :ic will acct witr pléesure.
 I will submit youi opinions in detail to tre trrones

Tre nectine bfing closed, I was innecietcly received In audienceri by tre Eripercr in ris study fron 8:50 to 9115. I reportcd tre results of tre conforence in detail. Ifesked the Emperor to ingilire of the imy frigh Commend wretrer tre
 fould effect tre flifitery operations os re is tro suprene Conmender of tre Soutrern freo Army. Trc ELperor repilicc that he would reve the orief Aidc-dc-Camp esk trc crief of tro Gcneral Staff TOJO (wro heppened to bc at tre pelace for the instoliation cficiony for ncw Criof of the Gcncraj Stoff UUEZU). it 9:50 ppm., I was foccivcd in sudicnce agoin. His hajosty told me as foilows:

Upon tre Exparof's asking Cricf of the Gencrel Staff TOJO as to tre effect upon tho ailitary sperations officidliarsral Tirkuchi's appointicnt, tre latter opposed the idea for the foljowiñ two recsons. The Experor troukt frem rcesoneblo end ras decided to rppeint Gencral ioISo
1) When tre enemy!s ccuntcr-cffcnsive is at itg height, it is inpossible to loave tre post of front line Surfeme Companer vacant cicn for a singlc day?
2) To allow tre doncstic political situntion to affcet the front fines if bad for morele, and is ccrtain t ceuse serious repercussions in tre Erst isia Cc-Prosperity sprerc;
as well as among neutril pewers. Trereforc, suct a step nust be avoided by all means.
fiftcr esking tre Empercr to summon tre crind Cranberlain ond to order rin to nake arranecments for surnoning Gencral IOISO, I witharci.

I was sumaned and was reccived in eudience fren \(10: 10\) tc 10:25 p.r.e Tre Enperor reveeled to me ris inprcssion tret judging fron the linc-up at tre instialation cercr ony, TOJO might resunc tre post of Wer iinnister oftcr ell and asked me if I didn't trink sc. I replicd thet I foarcd trat it sould reve en unfavoreble cffcet on tre politicel situstion.

It was pest cleven :ren I returned rape and at lest red dinncr.
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Doc. No. 1632N(114)
Pago 1
"Entry fron Marquis KIDO's Diary, 19 July 1944" 19 July, Wednestay. Fine.

At \(\mathrm{L}^{6}: 30 \mathrm{~A}, \mathrm{M} . \mathrm{Mr}\). SUZUKI, Teilchi, at 8 Mr . ABE, Gonki, and at 8:30 Mr. HIROSE visited me and each discussed the politicel situation.

At 10 the Chicf Aide-do-Camp came to my office and consulted me about the Imperial message to the Commander of the Krantung army.

From 10:20 to 11:35 I was recelved in audience by His Majosty and reported on the political situation and on other mettors.

At 1:00 Mr. KiYA visited me at my office and talked to ne about the monctary policy towners China.

At 2 the Chicf Aido-de-Camp came to my office and conforred with me regarding the Imporial messegc to Chief of Arry Genaral Steff TOJO.

At 3 Imporicil Houschold Ministor MATSUDAIRA came to my office and told mo about the circurnstences of the chenge of governnent.

At 4 Dircetor of the Police Burcau MACHILINRA came to my office end inforned ne of the conditions of peace and order, ctc.

At 6 Princo KONOYE callod on ne at ny hone and asked mo what I theught about making the noxt cabinet a coalition cnbinet co KOISO and YONAI for the purpose of forming a truc national unity cabinet, adding that Baron HIRANOK had also agroed. As I had been fooling the noed of taking scre steps to put up a united front, I agroed to the idea, nid at 6:30 called in Chiof Sccretary MiTSUDAIRA and asked hin to find out the vicus of other eldor statesmen before temorrey norning.

INOUYE, Goro came and staycd for the night.














\section*{19E W00y 01 иyחค ค \(\rightarrow\) -}

DOC. No. 1632w (115)
"TNTRY FRCM MARQUIS KIDO'S DIARY, 20 July 1944"
20 July, Thursday. Cloudy and fing.
 mo and fave me information.

Chicf Sncretary MiTSUDAITA callnd on me at 9 and ronorted the viows of nech sanior statosman. Goneral APr tolophoned me that he could not agree.

From 10:65 to 11:23 I prar rocetver iv andionce hy tho Imporor ard reported in deteil tho rlar. Ser tion custivien mith YCNAI whereufen the rian ras acen;ted. bimo anf:s at neon, Accompaniod TMIKO and CHIKAYOSHI to Tokyo Station on my way to tho Falace. Wha rocnivod in audience from 2:55 to \(3: 20\).

Conferonce of Sonior Statesmen reconvened at 4, and I fully explainsd the development regariting the coalition. Gonsral ARF also revoked his d'sappreva?.

At 4315 Governor-Cenoral KCI 30 arrivad fren Korna and imodiately came to tho Palnce. I oxplained in detail the political situntio: lrading to the resifnntion an bloc.

I mas recoivod in audionen f:or \(1: 50\) to \(4: 52\) and soported to the Throne until I askod his Najosty to summon KOIse and YONAI.

Gemonl KOISO and Admiral YONAI vore recoived in audimec at the Imperinl Study at 5:10. His Majosty pave his message, "Subjects, form a cabinnt in coopnration", tolline thom to ohsorve the text of the constitution, and to handle the affairs sc as not to irritate the Soviet in order that the (roator East Asia llar might ho accomplishod.

As it was also Genoral Koiso's wish, at 5:30 I took the Gonoral and tho adniral to a placo whare the sonior statosmen worn mentinp and hroupht them tegnthor.

I mas rocoivod in audinnco from 5:50 to 6:05. Prince KONOYE came to my offico at 6:10 and we had a talk. At 7: 30 Genaral KOISO callnd on me at ry home and tcld mo hout his dissussion with Promior TOJO and Chiof of Army Goneral Staff UMTZO


Inth. To. 1291
Dec. Io. 20381 (127)
Pase 1


\section*{4 Apeil Molmectay Inta}

Nan at 18380 A.M. Mromale frem 1 to 4980 the wee of a rathor lagge raber of the tras mat the ohereotertatie of this rall.

Ment so the osuriso /2.I. Interally "Impertal Likrary" mit it antmally meane malergromed secase ballt for aiswraid shelter / at 1810 to attend to \(m\) vost. Came hame at 8.

I ven receivod in andiemee in the Imperial bilrary sran 20 is6 to 21:85, and rac toll ing lis Majoets of shat ho told Colec in regard to the MUUPin matter. I cannot ruleratime the Prealor'e attitwio, his leck of confldemec in ilmeolf.

Visited the Orief-Alio-demonn in his reem and sold him of mintentica in cace of a politicel ahage to meot with the two Chicis of Eaff as woll as with the two Minietore / T. osart hio coed offices for 18.
 and taficul as yop the ecparate incot.
 ane to the efflec for a talk.

I ma recelved in endicmec in the Impertal moran from inet to zics. ad ropertel to the ghrum Frutor工olsol. intcutlen to reala from efflee


Deo. 10. 2089M(119)
Page 2

> /T.E. - Soparato sueot/

440 All 2045
At 2 P.M. Promier KOI80 cano to the effice and teltod to the followine affect.
/"/Ae I have previoncly disemacel with yen, I on of the epinien that, in the mar eltmation of teday the present orgenisation and charaptor of the covornimat as the highat motioanl ercan are by mo meano, coel. ghat is wiy, with the Imperer's peruisedom, I wis cinittel to Imporial Mociquatore. I have aleo civen
 the war mit to ilttie arnil. Irom now m , ro met hate, at my oost, an Imperial Imedquartors Cabliot or cablet milek aill Alicest the mar. Icemant the ond of lat math, thorofore, I tarlou with roinar met wo dimenen the matter ssen variong atempolats. Mo could thick of a raform, wat mothor wo shotill have it or mot rae a mattor of doubt as wo have novor kion of a cabluof volire atrongthanci by raforn. In faot, I informal lis majoaty of this guestion at the mal of last math. I had alee thergit at that time of
 the mlcale of the meath. Alep in view of the ver alteation in crixima. I hal bom thinkty of dealiting
 \(20 t\) andy has the secuad Greator hath Aola Conforcice oum to to marmed (a meotisg of minaccelore is mov galer ceaclloration in ite ploeo) but aloe it is 14kely that the mos in crimakimy theo ocrosal genthe mose. Meaninile it happene that in the Arop Maralias
 out as Ocmanderc-in-Onief in orler to otruarthem
 to recommen Gemeral ABAMI to the ghreen as mas Miniater and 1 hoar that the Arny raita te reall ze the above plan iny about the tik. Scoh boing the cace, it muld fot bo falpe to recegilso this ahaigo mor mel them earrgent the mase real gentiom at the out of the month/"/ Therofore, upea concritiation with Eavy Minietor YONAI teday. a realanation blec is desired foz the reasons sivem in the emparate eheot.

Thea I acked IOISO then he propesed to do this. Ho ancuarel that if it mittod the maperer. he was thinking of hovige a epeeial cabinot meoting today to cather the lettere of realphation, int I muggested that to hat refter de co temerror morning ae there would be no time for Ilis Majeaty to cencidor the quastion if 1t happanch tee meldenty. 50150 agreal wit me.
Tace 8

/R.E. Fent of Tosen'a reacme for reolgaina/
Bree tw axo campinect that at this mement then on oftuation of tho hapire is gotting more and more

 upinfinallen bitwem the battlofrrint out the home fruat
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Reprocessed pursiant to order, Court Fecord, p, 11, 351 .

\subsection*{0.4.5 /T.N. Probnbly April 5ich/}


 though it is nailed n porierful caninet, pothing in partucular could be thought of since Mavy Minister Youn i is one of the senior statiesmar /TrsinN/ \(I\) tool: thin conortunity to ask his onfaturs rocraing the sucieedint; prenter. Fe approves of Admynal Kamtanu sizzuky.

Furihermore, segndine the successol to the Vavnl "inistere he confided to re that since Vice-Admiral Seihi INoUYE mould not accept hy nll aes ns, he decided to rocommond Admiral HACEGA:IA.
 genernl, I sald the same thing I inquired of the Chief of Genersl Staff [THZU.

The Whr "inistar side that vieved from its om experience, the unification of supreme commnn and stnte affairs with one nen holding concurrently several posts, it eannct, factually, produce resulite, it is impossible, Tie persyective of var is extremely difficult as sean from the shortages in miterial and the difficultias of transportation. It could be survised thet the IT.S.S.R. may loudly make pronosal for peace after she defeats Germiny, I tilink it is necessiry for us to maka preparations beforehnnd with considerotion to the effect whether the U.S.S.F. vould attompt it independently or together with Britain and the U.S. at this opportuns moment when the fise situistion is
 moment ohen sha may attempt it indenendantiy or in combination. UTEZY is the best qualffiad person for the succeeding Premisr from the Army.

At 2:00 P.ir., T had an intervien uith Crixura, Chief of the Maval General Stuff, Zuestions T nsked kim yere about the some as that asked of UnizT, cine of the army Genernl Staff.

OIKA'A, Chief of the Maval General Btaff registered shock upon he?ring of the resignation of the gevinat and so forth, and frankey stritod that it wns frid ar such a criticnl tima. epoaking sbout the future piospect of the war, he st?ted th?t vp to obout the "AFTalia line, n?though the difference in sirengin between our forces ind that of the enamy :ins considerable, nevertneless, fe fought a regulnr wer. Yowever, it was inter continued under. guerrilla whrf?re, That it ivas a hig staka enn olso be soid.

Page 5.
Reprocessed pursuant to order, Court Pecord, p. 11, 351.

TOJO: Frequent chenging of cabinets in par time is deplorable. I think the San Francisco Conference on inril 25 is especially the most important period. The cabinet to be fornee should be the final one. "ithin the country at present, there exiets, on one hand, the opinion that ve should fight to the last to mrovide for future developments of the country and on the other hand, the opinion to accept the unconditionel surrender terms to restore peace immediately. I think it is necess?ry to decide on this first.
1. OKANA: The new cabinet to be formad must consider a great number of problems. It must be a cabinet that will shoulder the destiny of the country till the very end and a cebinet that will solidly combine the total porer of the country. Such 2 nroblem as ver or peace can be determined only at a liter stage. I believa ve must first carefully study these problems before determining this question.

HTRANTP'A: As their Excellencies heve said, the acute war situation today has given rise to various opinions which must be unified. There is no vay out but to fight to the end. That problem, I think, is simple. Irankly, I am bevildered hecause of this sudden politicnl change and it would have bean desirable not to have replied to the Throne immediately as in previous cises. Tyish we colld also have heard carefully, if possibie, the opintons of "Inisters KOTSO and YONAT but since the resignations
\(1.58 /\) have been tendered /T.N.--word "tendered" obliterated/ it is
too late. Frankly, since my opinions are being presented without any prep?rntion, I do not have sufficient grounds to back up my contentions. I suggest that we carefully discuss such problams as their Excellencies have presented.

KTDO: I am quita of the same opinion. The fact is that for a time it nppenred as if a total resignation would ocrur but \({ }^{\text {T }}\) heard therenft. r thet it yas changed to the policy of reorgonizing and both Field Pinrshals, SUGIYA'A and HATA, were to be transferred to the posts of Comranders-in-Chief of the Gensral Defence Commends. Accompanying this, it beceme necessary to change the Mar Inister, and therefore, the Army offered to the cabinat, Genersl ANII as its successor. Premiar KOISO states thet to efrect reorganizntion now and then to executa a totil resienntion a little later on would be hetriying the Army. (Personally I do not know what is mannt by this.) So that is why he made up his mind so suddenly, which is really so sudden and \(I\), myself, am much perplaxed.

KIDO: is :r. HTRANTPA says, it means that after the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal makes a recommendntion to the Emparor, he must not interfere with the organization of the cabinet. It is vary strange that if the organization of the cabinat is unsatisfactory, he who made the recommendation "ill be held responsible. Therefore, I think that as a system it is poor. Hoyever, at the present time, there is no altarnative, and therefore, we cannot help but be resizned to eccept this system.

HTRAMPT: I think that it is unreason?ble that the responsibility should be taken by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, alone, ind that we must also share the responsibility. To this end, I think that it is best that the one who organizes \(n\) cahinet should seek more advice.

OKADA: Some neople say that considernble surplus pomer still exists in our country and ask why wa do not utilize this potentinl fighting porer. Bafore amassing the total power of militnry officials, government officials, and civilians, unity aront the leaders is strongly desired. It is necessery that we study ?s to whether the procedure we have followed until todey, is right or wrong.

HTrANU: A: After the decision is made in this room and the Lord Keanar of the Privy Saal makes an informal report to the Throne, ? situation would develop where he cannot interfere. As for telling him to do ns he plenses, Imonder.

KONOM: although you nre right, the problem is in what form it should be corried out.

KIDO: There are many tho desire a firmer unity among the landsrs.

HIFANT:: Setting aside discussions from the legislntive nnd constitutionnl standpoints, I think it is better to heve closer contact in the organizetion of the cabinet sinco the responsibility must be assumed.

OKAD 1: I ngree.
SUZUKI: I think thint thera is no necessity of fixing a limit on the scope of the Rmperor's summons. I would like to nsk the opinion of the Lord Keaper of the Privy Seal. I remember to the effect that mhenever the orcesion demanded, Prince SiIONJI sought the ndvices of Count YA:I"OTO and Fleat-Admiral TOGO. After obt?ining the Emperor's consent, should we solicit the views of Count MiKINO?

Fage 11. Reprocessed pursuant to order: Court Record, p. 11,351.

HYRANTr:.: At the lanst; he must be in the first or second reserve.
' SUZUKI: it the tire of the Sino-Joponese Tar we had Pramier ITO. The Peamier nead not alinys be a soldiar.

HTridNr:s: Practically soasking, the Premier will not understand vir, unless he uns soldine ?t lonst in the first or sacond reserve. Neverthalass, tha promise is that, if it is to be ought, it rust be fought out.

OKAD: : Through the conversntions omrried until now, it seems thet the ch?racter of the Prenier, in general, is distinctive.

KONOYE: Then we may conclide that he must be a soldiar aither in the first or sscond reserve who will fight it out.

HTRANPA: \(I\) hone no one will soy that it is improper -.t this time, such as s?id by ir. Vix:TSUKT.
"IKITSUKT: Actunly, I 7 m unqualified. I fear thet I miny say somithing thoughtloss. The question is not of a man who will fight it out to ? in?l victory. If we propese peace now, it will evidently lond to unconcition: 1 surrender,

HIRANPT: From the relations betwaen supreme commend snd stote affoirs, I think, \#o noed 7 mnn from the Army or the Navy, but not necess?rily in artive sorvice.
"AKATSTKT: The fundmantel principle hos been clerifiad but how about its applic?tion?

HTRANU'1: Thnt is Prince KONrye's opinion?
KONOYE: A person thet hes had no connection hitherto should he recommended.

HIF inP:a: It must be necess?ry thet the person has had no connection and that he can be relied upon, ns seen from the public and people.
"AR:TSTKI: On the previous ocrasion, it mas decided to be from the \(\therefore\) rmy \(n n^{2}\) although \(=\) certnin person vas nemed, he was not salected. Today, it can bs oither from the irmy or Navy. ?hnt is your opinion, :Ir, OKARi?

Page 12. Ranrocessed pursunnt to order, Court Record, p. 11,351.

OK1D.i: ly mental vision is nlso nerrow but gathered here are mon from a wide field so a competent man can be selected.

WaK:TSITII: Does the Lord Keeper of Privy Sanl approve of this mensure?

KIDO: Yes.
WIKKITSKK: What is your opinion?
KIDO: In the first place, since it is my duty here to listen to your oninions, I wish you would state your unrescrved opinions. What is your opinion Mr. Stzutisi?

STMIKI: How would it be if the hith reto Sonior Stitesmen mike an effort. "fe have the responsibility and are prepared to die for the country. Tho resolution to die fighting for the Emperor is necessory. Since the Premier must be physically strong to stand the strain, I suggest Prince KONOYE who is the youngest. Aftar that, we 711 will try. How about the four trying first? I have henrd that previously President /of the Privy Council/ HARA also made this suggestion. a weak before the formar Prosident /of the Privy Council/ died, I intimetely heard him talk on this subject-and I racnil being greatlo impressed. I suggest he accopt by all means.

KONOYE: Then it differs from aforomentioned fundamental principle.

HIRANTA: The candidate should ba a military men. I also agrea with Prince KONOYE in that the new premier should bo one with no previous connections, "ith the purport of winning the confidence of the people in mind, it is my :ish to have ddmiral SUZUKI nccept the premiership. As in the past, shill we appoint him ifter consulting him? In the present situntion, is this procedure proper or is it not? I think it is propar to hive him appointed by submitting the Ministerial. Scroll to His ilajesty bithout consulting him.
"JK!TSUKI: Wasn't it so until now?
HInOTi: That is, there is no need of having the consent of the person himself.
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Doc. No. 1632W (107)
Page 1.

\section*{}

Auzuat 9th, 1945.
..... At 1.30 p.m. Premier SUZOKI called at my office and reported thet the Supreme War Guideace Council has decided to accept the Potsdem Declaration on the following conditions:
(1) Preservation of the Inperial Dynasty,
(2) Independont ovecuation of troops, (3) Hardling in our orin country of persons responsible for the war, and (4) No exarantoe occupetion.

\section*{FILE \\ T0 R00M 361}






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Hor would seek in the future any country's protection of the
Netherlands last Indies, and that the iJotherlands Government
were deteriained to refuse any offer of protection of intervention of any kind milch might be made by any country.

The Netherlands Minister at Tolvo, General J. C. Pabst called on the Foreign ininister, dr. Hachior rita, today and confirmed the above report of minister \(I_{\text {shin. }}\)


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\section*{FORBIGN OFTICS AnNOUNC. DHATS 19140}
iigy lle 19ho Statement of the Poreion Office Spokesman Concerning the Laintenance of Status Gue of the Nether Lands East Indies.

Considering the possibility of the war in Jurope spreading to the iietherlands, the Japanese Government made public on the 15 of dipril their attitude of deep concern over any development that may affect the status aue of the Netherlands Fast Indies, and subsequently they notified the Netherlands Government to that effect. In connection with this, the Netherlands Government expressed their determination not to alter their policy of maintaining the status quof the said Netherlands, colony under any circumstances.
ds the Juropean war has now spread to the Netherlands, the Foreign minister, Mr. Hachior hrita, invited the Netherlands Ministor at Tokyo, General J. C. Pabst, to the Foreign Office . this afternoon, and informad the latter that the Japanese Government carnestly hope that the Notherlands Government rill firnly maintain their said determinatisn regarding the question of the iretherlands East Indies.

The Foreign linister has also called attention of the representatives in Tokyo of belligerent countries, namely, Creat Britain, Germany and France, to Japan's concern over the said question.

The foreign minister has informed the ropresentatives of tro neutral countries, the United States and Italy, for their reference, the fact that the Japanese Government made the above notification to the Government of belligerent countries concerned.

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\section*{Locundis No. \(220 / \sqrt{1}\)}

Foreign Relations of the United+States-Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. \({ }^{\text {TI }}\), p. 285 Press Release Isaued by the Department of State on May 11, \(1940^{\circ}\)

In response to inquiries ky coiresponeests concerning press reports from Tokyo relatite to the atati:3 qu of the Netherlande East Indies, the Secrotary of Stabe mase taf foilorins statement:
"I have no full report abcu's the mat'\%er referred to in the press deapatches from Thbyo. During rocens waeks a number of governments, includine Great Britiar diapan, anc whe Initicd States, have made clear in official public uiferanise thair attifuite of continued reapect for the status ouo of the liatieriania Eant Indes. This was in harmony with definite commitments formally made in writing in 1922. This Government ausuines that each of the gorernments which has made commitments will continue to abjie w, thoue cominitmerive. On Aprii 17, 1940, in a public statement, I said \({ }^{\circ}\)
"'Intervention in the domestic affairs of the ietherlands Indies or any alteration of their statue guo by otiner then peaceful processes would be prejudicial to the cauee of atability, pease, and socurity not only in the region of the Netherlanus Indtes but in the entire Pacific area. \({ }^{1}\)
"In view of these facts, commitments and expressions of intention to respect the statua quo of tine lietierlands East Indies cannot be too of \(t \in n\) reiterated."
\({ }^{6}\) Reprinted from Department of State, Pulletin, May 11, 1940 ( 701 . II, No. 46), p. 493.

\title{
FOREIGN OFFICE AMBOMNGESEIS 19404
}

\section*{Hey 13. 19h0. Statenent of the Fareinn Office Sookesinan Concomini the ietherlands Fast Indies.}

The British injoassador, Sir Robert Craigie, at 6100 o' clock this aftemoon, callod on the Foreign minister, Hr. Hachiro Arita, at the latter's official residence with the reply of his home Goveriment to the representation made by Foreign uinister frita oin may 11 regarding the ifetherlands "ast \(I_{\text {indies. }}\) The British dmbassador told s'oreign minister srita that the British Government fully share tho Japanese Covernment's concorn over the iJetherlands iast Indies but believo that the Dutch forces in the Wetherland Jast Indies are sufficient for the inaintenaince of the atatin of those islands, whilo Great Britain has no intention Fhatever of intervening there. The British ambassador left the Foreign \(\cup\) ffice at \(6: 40\) o'clock this ovening.

> Way 15 . 19hle utaternent of the Foreion office Sopkesman Goucarnile the iNetheilands hinistar's ilotification with Bazard te the lietherlands تast Indies.

At 1080 d did. today, the Netherlands minister, General J. C. Fabst, called on the Foreien winister, wr. Hachirobrita, et the latter's official residuncs under instructions from his home Government with reference to the Foreign Winister's cowimication to the Notherlands Government made on the llth of this month, and stated that the Netherlands Government are of the belief that Great Britain, the United States and France heve no intention of intervening in the ifotherlands Sast Indies.

The Notherlands minister took lave of the Foreign Linistor at \(10: 20 \mathrm{~h} . \mathrm{co}\) 。

\section*{iay 16. 19ine Statement of the Foreien Office Spokesman Conceroing the Fronch Ambassedar's ilf tinimizion with Regard to the ivetiochands iast Indios.}

The Fronch Aimbassador, wry Charles Arseno-Honry, called on the Foreign hinister, Ur. Hachiro hrita, at the Foreign Jfice at 3430 P. M. todey under instructions fron his home Government with reference to the Foreign minister's commaication to tha French anosssador made on the lith of this month regardine the maintcnance of atatus oue of Netherlands Tast Indies, and stated thet the rirench Governmont entirely agrae with the Japaneso policy on the question.

The French 4imbassador loft at 4:00 \({ }^{3}\). \({ }^{\mathrm{m}}\).

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Fage 1
Foreign Relations' of the United States-íapan 1931-1941, Vol. II, pp. 285-288 8: 6 .01/:2
demorancium oy the Secretary of Stete
(Washinston,) kiey 16, 140.
The Ambessacior of Juan called ot his own requept. :e did not mention the Fhillopine Immigration Bill, or the reported/Japenese disturbances In Peru, or, expressiy, the Netherlands Indies; or the status of European armed forces in Chine., At the beginnins of the conversation I made reference to the increased state of war and chaos in other parts of the world sna the terriule destructive effects of it in every wey, adding thet it appeared more and more cs if no inrge country, mach less a small country, was affe from some esercseive intervention by force in one wey or ancther, anc that about the oniy thine; a nation coulc do was to arm to the teoth and be ceady for ony vericus interfcrence with its rights and interests by the use of militery force or the threat of force. I said that, fortunetely, as was shown todey in Conicress, and es was apparent all ovor the ne.tion since the more recent invesions of helpless peaceful nationa for purgoses of their dest.unction, the American people have now become thoroughly awaicened, aroused a:ci -lert in regard to any threatened injurios to American rights and inter sts, and that this was a matter of great gratification to those of us in charge of the foreign affairs of the nation.

The Ambnssador then proceedea nt great length to question and crossexamine me about the detherlands "est Incies, compriaing Curpen and Aruba. I seicic the: 0 . course, my Government and the nthcr twenty-one Anerican Republics would not consider for a moment any departure from their treditional oolicy relating to the safety of this hemisphere, and if thot wes what the Ambessedor haxi in mind, I could make that statement togethur with the further statement thet as soon as this Government learned of the fact thet Sritish and Frunch vessels patrolling the weters near Curaceo and Aruba were offerinf potentiel aic: to the wetherlands Government in preventine possible sabotage and possible armed expeditions from the mainland intended to seize the governments on one or both of these possessions, such as governments are often seized in South American countries, this Government proceeied to assemble the facts as expeditiously e.s possible in regard to the ability of Eetherlands guarós and citizens in Curaceo and aruba to protect the islands anc their governments from such dengers. I further stated thet it was my understandine that the British end irench patrols were in no sense iatcrfering vith the Nethurlaads govcrnment on thes: tuo islends, but vere recognizing the authority of these governments during the brief temporary time deemed necessary to ala in sefeguarding against the dengers olready mentioned, and that they have made it clear that thereafter their patrols will not offer any guards for additional protection in connection vith their continued petrol woris, and hence there cannot arise the eligitest question of interference with the traditional Amrican policy relating to its own protoction from possible drngers from \(\varepsilon\). inea. Furthermore, the lie therlands corernmint would be expected to senlf . broad any additional euarde that



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Page 2
with any sort of answer I macic, He ecntinued with an increasingly minute cross-examination as it wore. i sudenly and emohatically interrupted him and with rigint incuirus of him if his Government had sent him to me to ask aill ihera coseallud quistions about a matter of no importance to his Goverrmint or io eny other government, and if his Government had sent him to go into this almost interminable examination, I desircd now to know whet the notire and purpose of his Government was for doing su. 1 seid thet there would never be any friction between my Govenam.at end any other govirnment on ascount of anything unlawful or unticir that ny Government mey do, but that it would be cue to sometaine ariiaufu. that enother government mny do. I added that I har devoted modi of the past sevon yours to efforts at understanding and pascefvit redations betweon our two Goverrmente.

I then picked up tom ot three gages of matersel which hed come in via the news ticker from Toky:, in which the Japanese Govornment is reported to be duecussing evary ciay or twn some phases of the Netherlands Dast Indies and its supnesec spo: ial riein'ss in them. I stated that I had not intended to skow kim tiaje, thent it had just come to my deuk as tho Ambassador came in, but I rowerized with omphasis that it hed been thought that the Jepanese Governmeni and the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France had each and all repeated recently their prior commitment that each wes obligetod to respect the status ouo in the Netherlands East Indies and I had thourint that settlod the matter as amons our four countrics, since each country unequivocally pledged itself to respect the status quo, but I \(\varepsilon\) dacd that notwithstanding the efforts of many of us to maintain a thorough understanding with the Govornment of Japan, there was continually coning out of Tokyo additional discussions of the lietherlands Eest Incies as tooligh the commitment to rospect and preserve the status quo had not been mede. I said that these were nows reports and I myself was slow to accredit them, but thet the tenor of the reports interferea with the efforts of the imbassador end myself and others to preserve understandine and fair play and fair treatment between our two countries by causing misunderstanding and increasing hostility on the pert of the people in each courtry. I seid that I vould make no complaint now about the matter if that was \(e\) part of the newspeper policy in japan. I addea finelly that my Government strives for ponce year in and year out and it desires at all times to avoid controversy, end, thercfore, if controversy arises, the fault will not lic a.t the door of this rovernment. I seid further that in our constant desire and constant effort to promots and prescrve peace, both with other countries and among other countries, I hoped that this attitude of surs woule not be misunderstond.

The Ambassador undertook in reply to diaclaim any purpose of his Government to send bin to me to conter into the long exemination to which he wes subjecting mo when interrupted. Ye then repeated that inis Government was entirely satisfied with the situetion following the roiteration of the status quo in respect to the Netherlands Indies by each. of the four govornments interestid, and that it had no purpose to raise eny further controversy in that crnection unlese perchance the ritish or French should land troops there to protect nom. I romarired that, since my /

CUTETM, 320 Pary 3

Vovernient was interectos: I Ex. made inowiries of the British and the Fronch, and gathered the ungocivesa: u? cmotmine that they had no idon vhatover to intervenc in the ietho.laid, binst inn is in any way.

 in vain sought to point out to his Governmoni that, under the Monroc Doctrine, his country's nerchant ships hevo equal ascess to every harbor in the Western Herisphere (not includinf a efecial arraneersent between the United Stetes and Cuba), white undur ihe poijey whicin his Government is seekins to impose in the Pacific ocesil arce, the 'Jnitea Staies and other countries are to bo deniod equality of tiato and irducifuad oupor rurity in every Chinese port, and yet his Goverument sesias io j.cis witl compecency on this conflictlag situation.

I again brought to hy. Hitertion the inforaetion contrained in the news ticker report today fron fiokjo: in yhich Jupanc; newsparora, au stated, were undortaking to teee dilive ani enchicize sone supposed special interests of Jepan in the Netherauncs Beat Indics. I gaid it suemed very eurprising to observe that, after the Jnpanese Government had undertcken to spread itaelf out over the huge republic of Chisa, there was an intination in the news roports that it would not be contunt unless it extended itself three thousand miles beyond to modestly toke in the great archipelasc comprising the East Indles, presumably with a viev of shuttia; out all equality of trade opportunities enong nations, while japan would continue to demand equality of trade opportunities in evory otier part of the world; that there did not exist any selfish or other reason on the part of other nations to interfere In the least with equality of trade opportunities on the part of Japan. The Ambassador again ststed that his Government was satisfied about the Tetherlands Fast Indios situation in the ligint of the renewed promises of each of the three other sovernments interestad, and thsit they had no plans or purposes to proceed there to contact the fiftherlands East Indies. I expressed zy satisfaction with his etatement, but afain reminded hin of my difficulty to understand the policy of the Japonese Governnent or the Japanese press, whichever it was, to continue various lures of discussion indicating a claim jo some sort of special interest of japen in the :etherlanas Fest Indies situation; that in a recent statement, I had set forth rather comprehensively and succinctly the position of this Government that the status quo should be respected and preserved by each of the four governnents; that the real question presented actually related to the entire Pacific area and that no further elaboration beyond ny recent statemont on this subject would appear to add to anything I then said.

I still interpret the Ambassajor's yisit as one under instructions to develop a pretext to support Jepan in connection with its plans and purposes toward the ietherlands East Indies.
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FoRergit riliations of the United States-Japan, 1931-1941
Page I
762.94/484: Telegram

Vol. II, pp. 143-145
The Ambassador in the Sowific fictca (c) einhardt) to the Secretary of State

ihsocm, Niarch 24, 1941--3 p.m.
(Received March 25--7.30 a.m. 12 )
581. This morning I was given the opportunity' by invitation of the Japanese Ambassador, to talk with Matsuoka 13 for an hour.

Matsuoka was emohatic in statin; that under no circumstances would Japan attack Singavore or ar, of the American, British, or Dutch possessions, and he was insistent that japan has no territorial ambitions. Jajan, ne said, was ready at any moment to join the United States in a guarantee of the territoricl integrity or incependence of the Philippine Islande. As an evidence of Japen's lack of territorial ambitions, Kíatsuoka referred to the outcome of his mediation of the dispute between Thailand and Irench Indochina, He said that Javan would not go to war with the United States, and aded theit from \(\operatorname{lis}\) reading of American history it appeared that it was the Inited States which went to war with other countries; if a conflict should take plece it would come about only as the result of affirmative action by the United States.
fatsuoka said that he desired ardently to liquidete the war in Ciina at the earliest possible date. Chiang Kai-shek was relying upon American help, he saic, and any time the President of the United States wanted to bring the Sino-iapanese conflict to an end on terms satisfactory to all concernec, he was in a nosition to do it by bringing his influence to bear in this direotion upon Chiang Kai-shek.

I asked him whether he had in mind terms whick he was aure Chiang Kei-shek would be entirely willing to accept and which would meet with the Presidont's approval. He replied that instructions inad recently been eent to Nomura 14 to take the suoiect up with the Presicent and to discuss with the latter the terms on which the Sino-Japenese war could be terminated. Matsunka said that now was the time when statesmen should take decisive action and that it is the "big things, not the little things" that matter; in inis opinion the President is afforded a splendid opportunity "to clear up the entire Far Fiastern situation" by discussing with Nomura the terms on which the war in China could be brought to a close. He added that he wished the President and the Secretary of State mould trust him; on his record over tie past few years, he said, he did not blame them for not having confidence in him, but that if they would give him the opportunity he would prove to them that Japan had no territorial or economie ambition, and that if an understanding were reached regarded by us all as reasonable he woulc fight to put it through should any elements in íapan oppose it.

12 Telegram in three sections.
13 Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, on special mission to the Soviet Union.
14 Jipanese Ambasoador in the United States.

In reply to whet he hnd first seici, I merely sugeestec to Natsuoka that he instruct Nomura most explicitiy es to exactly what was in his mind as a basis for ending the var vith China, and that he leave nothing open eitier to chence or to misunderstandin. Again he wes emmatic at this point in ingisting on tho necoptrbility of the trans wich lef ind in mind.

Matsuoke characterized as "ridiculous" any fears which "ere expressed In the United States over interference with supplies of rubber and \(t\) in, as these commoditices were obviously for consumution in the only maricet thet was leree enough to sberorb them; namely, the Unitod States. It vould be folly, he oric, to interfere with the export of these commodities to the United States.

He expressed the opinion that it was to the Soviet Union's interest to encourace var between üpan and the United Statos, and he aaid that he was well arare of the harm to Japan wintch rould follo from any such conflict.

STEIINHARDT

 －1国田经























































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Page 1.

\section*{}

\section*{Preface}

Previously I have published the "Outline of the National System of A.jansing Great Japan," to which many responded asking me to give them an easier explanation. This book is my answer to them.

The present Japarieso youncmen of twenty or thirty in age are said to be pationts from liarxism. In this book I have tried to analyze liarxism to mako them well again.

If you look on Japan standing in Europe it seams as if a pillar of fire is staring, blazing toward the sky. This is what people soy when they cone back from abroad these days. However, if you look at Japan from inside, she lacks an organic system. Those vino are in governing posts possess no insight as well as the youngmen are not fully conscious of trip con thinking. On account of this fact I feel that in the national government, economy and culture there is something growing yet not active enough to grow fully in all directions.

Facing the tide of advancing Japan, rising Japan, I sincerely wish its whole Japanese youngmen to bravely stand up.

June 1937
HASHIHOTO, Kingoro

\section*{Contents}

Chapter I Fall of Laterial Civilization. p. 12 II II Destruction of the :'orle of Liberalism. p. 24 " III Liaterial Civilization and Spriitual Culture. p. 49 " IV hat is the Japanese Spirit? /Nippon Seishin, p. 74 " \(V\) Real Leonine of our Polity/Kokutai/ p. 95 " VI Advancing Economic System. p. 157 " VII Japan of the "!orle, the world of Japan p. 207 " VIII Establishment of Pure Japan.

\section*{Chapter I Fall of Liaterial Civilization.}
( p .1 ) : . 1. A dreadful worldwide big event is happening now in the dark and in silence. The February 26 th Incident tacitly: or the Spanish Civil ar is nothing but small phenomena of the big event. That big event is the fact that the modern civilization in which we are actually living has now begun to fall. (He says 150 years were spent for building up the modern civilization).

Published: July 1937
Preface dated June 1937

government. Political liberalism has shown its inferior nature at the same tine whon the party government cams to destruction. What shall \%e do then? Concerning the true and righteous national government, which shall take place of liberalistic govoinmont. I shall explain later on togother with controlled economy which shall take place of liberal economy.
(p.16) 4. Socially spoaling liberalism rosults, after all, in "the weali failing a proy to the strone." Their motto "equality" was strong enouch to tako privilege away from peers and priests in the past age but totally powerless against capitalists who colild exercise their privilege lawfully under liberaiisn and equalism. Labourers have become slaves of capitalists under liberalism. But these labourers should be liberal.
(p.20) 5. When the crisis came to the old civilization, whose Keynote was liberalism, there appoared Larxism. Marxists have ascribed all the evil to capitalism, but the evil lies in the matorial civilization itself. Capitalism is nothing but means to economically carry out matorialism. liarx's Communism may be able to strencthen libaralistic material civilization but it can not ostablish an order for a new world. Thus luarxism has been obliged to quit the stago having played its pert to increase darknes's and misery of the world in fighting.
(p.21) 6. The materialistic liberalism caused one class to exploit another within a country. Intornationally it brought forth a most cruel exploiting among difforont races. This was manifested in the Great European Viar (the first Vorld War). After all the cause of the war was fighting among imperialistic countries for robbing colonies of each other. Economically speaking it is capitalistic countries fighting for material. Since the Mar, what happoned in the past 20
( \(p .23\) ) ycars show the self-paradox and evil in the old civilization. That does the worldwide panic, which has swept over the whole Elobe, like a storm, mean? What do the rovolutions of the general public in various countries signify? "hence is the movement for building countries according to races? Thus the old civilization and world systori are driven to a corner where they must settle the whole accounts. If they postipone it indefinitely the second World :lar is unavoidable, and the crisis is approachine evory minute. Whore will the now civilization come from to govern the new age, and what kind of national systems will it oreanize in the whole world? In ordor to find these wo have to look back the world history beginning with its first pace and drive away old drearns with eyes wide open.

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Page 4.
Chapter III Material Civilization and Spiritual Culture.
( p .24 ) 1. The prosent world is under the white pocples' despotic control. They have conquered the four-fifths of the globe. Japan aloro is standing bravely against them. In places whero no Jepaneso irfluenco reaches people are supressed and oxploited by the while men under their iron whip and bewilaering gold.

Thy have the Suropeans become the controllor and the Asiatics become thoir slavos? Lord Roseberry in his locture in the Glaseon College soid that God bestowed tho white mon
(p.25) with a sacred right to control the :orld. This most frankly expresses tha white men's hearts. Thier pride is theconsciousness that they are superior races chosen by God and thiey should iook down on coloured races as not much different from cows and horses. What made the white mon so proud is their unusual erowth in the last 300 years owing to the matorial civilization in Europe and in the face of it its Asiatic spiritual civilization has completely faded amay. Doos it mean that isiatic civilization almays inferior to the European? Here we must broak off their haughty noses with the evidonces in the history.
(p.26) 2. The 3000 years' civilized history tells that Europe and Asia have shown their respective superiority each other, and the last 300 years have been their turn to show it. The fact that fron such a more incident they conclude that they are superior forever, shows their lack of intelligence. Therefore I shall give summaiy of the fighting betwean the Europoan and Asian races in the world history.
(p.27) The first fighting took place between Persia and
Greoce. The two countries ropresented the two continents
very woll. Difference betveen the two were:

Persian characteristics
Controlled country
Conservative
Synthetic
Esteemed faith and morals
Doductive in thinking Spiritual culturo

Greece characteristics
Individualistic
Progressive
Analytical
Esteemed intelligence and art
Inductive in thinking liaterial culture

After Persian conquest Grecee prospered only for a short time. The Greek civilization was cultured by the Asiatic spirit. Was the European alivays superior to the Aslatics?

Chapter III Matorial Civilization and Spiritual Culture.
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(p.27) 3. The first fighting took place between Persia and Greece. The two countries represented the two continents very woll. Difference between the two were:

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Syntinetic
Esteened faith and morals
Deductive in thinking Spiritual culture

\section*{Greece characteristics}

Individualistic
Progressive
Analytical
Esteemed intellicence and art
Inductive in thinking liaterial culture

After Persian conquest Grecce prospered only for a short time. The Greek civilization was cultured by the Asiatic spirit. Was the European alivays superior to the Asiatics?
（p．29）4．After a long submission of Europe（Greece）under Asia（Fersia），Alexander the Great stojd up．Why he yas able to malse Greece prosper was bэcavese he took in the． Asiatic spirit and culturc in his country．
（p． 30 ）
5．Rising of the Roman Erip：．re．
（p．31）6．Mongolian invasion 11 Expope．Attila is an Asiatic Caesar or Napoloon．DC yca zall one here when he makes a massacre in the scuthern arrice，and do you call another a dovili when he leads a triur：palit troop into Europe？
（p．34）7．In the 8th century cames the lichamsedans＇invasion into Gurope from Arabia．Thy molern European civilization has liostly been origiated i：tho Nohamedan civilization． It is true that white cen ar，controlling the world now， but they were for a long tim：3 stidents the Asiatics in spiritual culture and natura：sc：once which kas built the basis of the whitemen＇s worli－co：trolling today．They nake fun of the Japanese calling shem a copying people．They got their religion fros Josus christ，a Hebre：y，and their science from Lohamizedans，and h．w ca．a th y laugh at the Japanese people？

8．The Kiongolian Empire was built by Jingisukan and to this empire the European zouniries had sent contributions from time to time．Russia was uader liongolian control since then．The past 300 years we：e t．ie age of European control， but the 300 years prior to it was the Asiatics＇controlling age．：Tho dare prophesy as \(t\) ，the coming 300 years？
（p．39）
9．Why did the Europeans decidedly gain in the 17th Century．
（ p .41 ）10．What Asiatic spirit aspires for is spiritual and one wholeness，while the Europea as worked on individual branches of material research，with self－confidence that they could accomplish all the investigation in the material world from the colestial orbs tc a bacillus．They have beon successful in this and the result is their conquer over the whole world．
（ p .43 ）11．Does this rean that spiritualism is to bo always trodon ovar by materialism？No，what wes defeated in


12．Glorious Indian civilizetion and its fall．
（p．47）13．The last question is who will control the coming ąe．In order to ansmar this guestion，＂Fe must tell about a country which situates in a corner of isia．She has realiy aslatic characioristics and yet at the same time she is possessed of the strone points of the European spirit in a niraculous combination．

\section*{Chapter IV What is the Japanese Spirit?}
(p.49) 1. Conservatism of asia became a big cause of the fall of Asia because it has misicd the Asiatic Continent havine preserved what was alread; useless. Japan is a country of the profound conservatism having 3000 years' history with its polity (Kokutai) never changed. At the same time she is a country of wonderful progressivism. Every thought, every civilization with which she came across she has taken in :"illinely and made it her own constituents.
(p.53)
2. How Japan took in Confusianism and other Chinese morals, and hoi they preserved these practically in "Bushido" (knighthood), Sado (Ted raking spirit), Kado (Flower arrangement art).
(p.55) 3. How Japan adoptod Buddhism. It is after Buddhism became Japanized that it yas counted as one of the greater religions of the world. It was born in India and grew up in Japan just as Christianity originated in Judea and attained its growth in Europe.
( p .56 - \(\quad\). Japan is the leader in hsia not in her administra-
59) tive ability but also in the culture, in spite of the Europeans' calling Japan a copy-cat.
5. They blame Japan being exclusive, anti-foreigner in attitude, especially on the following:
a. Prohibition of Christianity to be promuleated in Toyotomi and Tokugava aces.
b. The national isolation policy during the Tokueawa reien of 300 years.
c. "Exclusion of foreieners" sloean with which the Leiji restoration yas undertaken.
(Here he gives coments on each item).
(p.63) 6. Japan has now come to face a great day when she is to show her grectness, by digesting all the good of foreigr countries and with profound belief in the national polity (Kokutai).
(p.66) 7. Japan adopted Chinese culture. Tenji Emperor was most welcomed it. Still it yas not blindly takon in but thoroughly dieested and the purity of Kokutai was ever kept on. Yhat wes possible 1250 years ago can't be denounced as impossible today.
8. \(f\) world leading theory is going to be born from Japan. In the past 6000 years there was no chance for the eastern and vestern civilization to unite, but time has come, for the first tirie, for the two to completely unite in Japan.

Chapter V. The Keal Principle of the Polity (Kokutai)
(p.74)

1-2. The prosent world is in the roformation age. The country that started this york was Russia, and the next was Italy and then Germariy. England and America are also now busy for it, Whether such reformation may be successful in building up new Japan or not, depends onwether this movement has footing on the Japanese Kokutai or not.
3. Why I advocate the returning of the people to the real Japanese Kokutal is because Kokutai is the life of the country.
(p. 81)
4. In founding this country Amaterasu godess lthe Sun Goddess) told her grandson that Japan shall be a land for her posterity to reign forevor. In Japan the Emperor, the land and the nation compose one body. Emperor Jimmu made declaration that he would unite the world undar himself. Emperor Weiji also stated in his educational rescript that his instructions were rikht to be observed both within and without the boundary of the country.
(p.83) 5. In Japan the Emperor is regarded as sacred being the object of the national worship, which fact is unique.
( p .86 ) 6. There is no equivalent of "Kokutai" in English, German or French. In Japan Kokutai was kept on unchangod regardless of changes in Seitai (political form), which is also historically unique.
(p.89)
7. The reason why our Kokutal is unique lies in the fact that our Kokutai stands above other countries. For the long age covering the period after the Taika Reformation until the time of the ifiji Restoration, political administrating power a:yay fron the Emperor generally, but nevertholess those who had it, had to pledge their piety to the Eaperor. Otherwise they had not been able to reign the country since peoples' heart was always with the Emperor.
( 0.90 ) 8. The Kieifi Restoration was a crisis for Japan. America was not the only one to invade Japan. Russia, Englan and France wore ready to irivede Asia with battleships on the southern China Sea. Their real aim was the Chi:na continent which had been said to contain infinite treasures. However, in order to reach it they considered it is necessary to
secure the Japanese islands. In order to get through the crisis Japanese people had to get together under the mperor and they had to return to their original form of Kokutal giving back political administrating power to the Emperor from the Tokugawa fecidal govarnment.
(p.93) 9. Since the time of the hanchurian Incident we are living in an edergent age. It is nothing to be afraid of, It is the time when we must return to the original spirit of the Japanese countiy and unificato religion, morals, thoughts, administration, economy, armament and science undor Emperor and start on a new progress.

Chapter VI. Advancine Economic Systom.
(p.95) 1. Our Kokutai is something living and is growing every moment and is to develop forover. Then hiw are we to accomplish the oternal development?

According to politics and legislation imported from Burope and America a country is made of a sovoreign, territor: and people who are subject to the sovereign because they can not be othorwise. In Japan peoplo obey the Emperor willingly. The people not only obey but also mould like to help the Emperor in any respect possible. First we must
( \(p .98\) ) consider haw we can realize our special Kokutai spirit in the cconomic life of the nation.
2. We must produce valuaile thines not for earning money but for sufficing the wants of the nation. The first duty of the national economy is to stabilize tho living of the nation. The object of the national economy is to attain the way to suffico the pooples' wants to the greatest extent.
(p.101)
3. The object of oconomy is to be fulfilled at the time when produced materials are consumed. The aim of the national cconomy is to supply what has been produced to
\((0,103)\) those who do not possess it, as ruch as possible. The population of Jaran is nearly \(100,000,000\) and those who have enough aro only one hundredth and \(900,000,000\) are left without enou \(\mathrm{c}_{\mathrm{h}}\) h to live. It means the children of the Emporor are left hungry. Do not worry over the fact that wealth is srall, but romember to distribute it among those who are poor, then the economic value of the national poalth vill Ereatly increase. In reality the situation is just opposite. Those who have enouk \(h\), have power to acquire still more, whil those who have not enough tiave no powar to get any more. Why such a wrone situation exists?
secure the Japanese islands. In order to got through the crisis Japanese people had to get together under the fmperor and they had to return to their original form of Kolutai giving back political administrating power to the Emperor from the Tokugawa feudal eovernment.
(p.93)
living in Since the time of the banchurian Incident we are living in an onergent age. It is nothing to be afraid of, It is the time when we must return to the original spirit of the Japanese countiry and unificate religion, morals, thoughts, administration, economy, armament and science undor Emperor and start on a new progress.

Chapter VI. Gdvancing Economic Systcm.
(p.95) 1. Our Kokutai is something living and is growing every moment and is to develop forever. Then hiw are we to accomplish the oternal develocment?

According to politics and legislation imported from Burope and America a country is made of a sovereign, territor: and people who are subject to the sovereign because they can not be otherwise. In Japan people obey the Emperor willingly. The people not only obey but also would like to help the Emperor in any respect possible. First we must
( p .98 ) consider how we can realize our special Kokutai spirit in the cconomic life of the nation.
2. He must produce veluaŋlo things not for earning money but for sufficine the wants of the nation. The first duty of the national economy is to stabilize tho living of the nation. The object of the national economy is to attain the way to suffico the pooples' wants to the greatest extent.
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Pagc 9.
(p.104)
4. One of the unredeemable veak points in the present economic systen is unevemess of weal.th distribution. liarx explains how this happened by his theory of exploitation. Larx's so-celled vaiue is exchange value.
(p.108) 5. The reason why Larx explained his theory on Labor value is to develop his surplus value theory, i.e. his plan to testify his preuise that capital is coriposed of exploitation of labour. (General economic discussions are fiven aftor this.)
(p.154)

He (HASEILCTO) provocates foreign trade to be put under national control so that enough co urodities shall be left "ithin the envire to more fully suffice the wants of ceneral people. Thus econony naturally should come into naticnal policy.

Chapter VII. Japan of the Vorld, the "orld of Japan.
(p.157) 1. Japan of Japan, Japan of the Forld, the Forld of Japan. This is our iada. Japan mas busy to build up real Japan if Japan in the beginnine of Leiji. She started on her way to be Japan in the world sinco the time of JapanChina War. Now Japan zust brine about the Yorld of Japan. The lanchurian incident is a heavenly instruction to Japan to fulfill her ultiaate mission.
(p.259) 2. There are four countries which we rust keep watching today. They are China, Soviet Russia, United States of America and the Enelish Enpire which presses Japan fror: the south. Thich is our friend and which is our enemy cannot be determined at once.
( p .163 ) 3. The lands on the \(\varepsilon_{\text {lobe }}\) are very unfairly distributed arone 2,000,000,000 population, one-third of which is the white ven, enother one-thid is the yellow men and the rest one-third is of various races. The 87 per cent of land is occupied by 650,000,000 white men.
(P.165- 4,5,6,7,8. Japan is iven a very snall piece of land
186) compared with the nur:ber of population, i.e. 141 persons living par one kiloweter squara while American population density is 14 persons. This results in poverty, and averace ace of death is lowar than other countrymen and that is qotting lower and lower every year. There are only three doors left to Japan to \(\varepsilon \in t\) through, the first being enileration, and our oriicrants worked hard wherever they vent, but they were coripletcily shit out after havine made wilderness fertile farms because they worked efficiently for low yeqes (America). Canade prohibited Japanese
emigrants from the beginnine. Australia. also did not let Japanese in, keeping the pelicy to leavo the land only to Erelishmen. Thus Japan has boen left to starve, and now she tried the second door for living on, and it mas sending merchanaises to worid markets, making towns and villages industrial stations. Thus Japan has become an industrial country. However this was again defeated by boycotting for tie reason that Japan sold good articles at low prices.
(p.187) 9. Now no other door is loft for Japan but to enlaree hor texritory. This does not mean occupation of other countrigs' lands, but since all the world popers suppress Japan, Jeprnose and her merchandise, she has to secure some lard outside of the sea where Japanese capital, skill and labour can work freely without whitemen's oppressio Fe shall be satisiied with it. They have closed the first two doors acainst Jeran. How can they blame Japan to run out for survival throurh the third and the last door. If they don't like it thoy should opon the first two doors. Thus the lianchurian Incident happened in September 1931. As soon as this incident happened all the powers blamed Japan. Wo never took land away from any country. Nanchukuo has beon built up as the result of the Japanese activities in lanchuria and she is now prospering. I want to ask white neen's countries who are they that sent warships and armed forces to India, South Africa, Australia, etc., and killed the natives ard declared occupation of the land and kept the possession on till today? They will say that these were lands of barbarians who did not know how to dig out treasures buried in the earth; it is heavenly will to have these treasures come to light for the benefit of human beincs. It is a convenient areument for them, but we shall accept it and at the same time we shall ask them another question. If there remain lands with natural resources abundantly buried, and yet they have not yet cultivated by white men, is it not also following the heavenly will that we Japanese EO to such lands and cultivate it for the benefit of human beings? Such lands exist quite a lot. The Zast Indies are an example.
10. Here the author \(\ddagger\) ives description of the South Sea Islands.
(p.193) 11-12. What wo demand is not nominal territory but lends where our labor, skill, merchandise and capital cen work actively. If Japan be dotermined to extond southward, she would at once meet opposition fron England who, with her enormous naval forces, is fortifying the seas and lands there, although the East Indies nominally belong to Holland.

Page 11.
(p.197) 13-14. "':o shall be succossful in organizing such lands outside of the country as we shall have the natives tatse organin systom end unify them under the Emperor, Eiving everybody the same privilege.
(p.201) 15. We, must, at this time, study the fundamental meanine of armment. "ie absolutely deny the aggressive Imperialisr. Irpcrialism is the real devil to bring the present world to destruction. Other po:ers may arn themselves for whatever causes they like. However we must not bring even one child of our Emperor to death in exercising Imperialisn. Our arry and navy are personally controlled by the Emperor and ars the means to show the dienity of our country of \(\mathcal{E}\) ods. Our future arning must be bascd on air forces. (He explains the superiority of air forces to army and navy forces).

Chapter VIII. Establishment of Pure Japan.
( \(p\).207) 1. Ve aro facing the eravest time in the world history so far, for if it is left as it is the whole world is now to be destroyed. At this momentus time a message has been Eiven to Japan, so me must purify tho country.

2-3. In order to make the country really steadfast, purity of the country rust be kept.
( p .213 ) 4. According to the original Japanese polity government of many parties must be dispelled.
(p.215) 5. Real Japanese constitutional government shall be
carried on by Eeneral national mobilization to help the
Erperor's work.
(p.219- 6 . Gerrany and Italy have been ablo to establish a 219)real strong government when organized under one authority.
7. The Dai Nihon Seinento (the Japanese youngmen's - party) has been organized to fulfill the great messace at this tire, i.e., with full kno:nlodee of the real meanine of administration, beine thoroughly fair and disinterested in spirit, pious to the Eriporor, load the nation under righteous oreanization and training, aimine at one party in a country.

Patriotic young nien, now let us start on a great advancement of our Japan!

\section*{SUPPLEMEIT}
(p.56):. 4. Thus Japan became an origin of the Asian spiritual culture. Strictly speaking, even if the other countries vanish out of the world, the Asian spiritual culture will be firmly kept in safe so far as Japan survives.
(p.61) 5. Japan had Shintoism, -Confucianism and Buddhism, so it is natural that Japan prohibited the ch1ldish Christianity because she has profound religions.
( p 83) 5. The "Ten-i.0" means a man-god in Japan. Having their Ten-no cver them, our ancestors established Japan. At the present the Europeans and Americans seem to be unable to understand that regarding our Ten-no as a god we have made him the object of worship of our racial rellgion Hereupon, we want to ask them in return. If they laugh at our faith that our lives are Ten-no's possessions, why do the British people pledge fealty to the flag of Union Jack, and why do the American people kneel and worship the flag of stars and stripes? Because they have no Ten-no, they were compelled to find the object of their national faith before the flags which is made only of cloth and paint.
( p .212 ) 4. Our administrative deeds are unified into one. The Emperor has the supreme fower of governing Japan. "hen we exercise the political power, we must follow to our Emperor's intention. There can not be two ways in the government as if there can't be two suns in the sky. The spirit that we should obey the Emperor should be terribls absolute. So there can't be two political intentions in Japan. There can't be a reason why two political parties are permitted to exist. Namely, there is only one party. Accordingly, we resolutely reject the old many political parties system and assert that mobilizing our whole nation we must form our single intention by which we can help out Emperor's task. When there is established the only one political party by the national mobilization and we accept our responsibility with our fealty to our Emperor, the pure eovernine of pure Japan can be done.



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Prep 3.
The Notherlands is the tituler owner of most of these islands, and thue they are called NEMHIRLAMDS RAST INDIES. However, whot the Dutch heve acturily doveloped is the amall island of JAVA only, the otizer islends boine leit plmost untouched. The Netherlends, even if they wishod, find their hands full with the islend of Java alone, and heve no reserve powor for the development of the other islands.
/p.191/
Lat us look at the chart of the area and population of the REPTETFLANIS FAST INDIRS.

Section
Java end Madura STMATRA
gIaUN and Lingea
BANTA ISL.
BILIITON ISE. DUTCE BCRETO
CELETES
MOLUCCAS (1)
TIMOR
BALI and LOMBOK motai

\author{
Note:
}
(1) includes DUTGH Nant GUINTMA.
Pooulation
\(41,718,335\)
\(7,661,399\)
\(, 298,329\)
205,473
73,409
\(2,194,533\)
\(4,226,586\)
893,030
\(1,656,636\)
\(1,802,146\)
\(60,729,836\)
/p.192/ The islead of Jave (inclucing Medura) has a population of 41,700,000 or ceventy percent of the total populetion of the RWITETRIANDS RAST IMDIES, in apito of the fect that it is a small islend with en area of \(51,000 \mathrm{aq}\). miles, or about one fifteenth of the totel area. It can be seen from this fact thet Java alone in the only cultivated island in the whole NETHEFIAADS RAST INDIDS and tiat, if tine other islands wnre developed to even half the extent of JAVA, they would be capable of accomodeting a populetion of over 100,0!0.000.

Furthermore, these islands contain forests in the mountains, fertile virgin lande in the plaing, fish in the eapes, and abundant petroleum, coal, iron and other underground naturel resources.

If these islands had been inhebited by superior races like the Japenese, there would here appeared a second Japan and a third Japars in these islends. Such large islends aro scattored in tho seas south of Jaoan within caliling distance. The greater part of then is left, in \(s\) complotely undrondonad ntata: If tho widorcroind renournosing boule, they would cry out ench night for some one to come and dig them out and use them for the bencfit of mankind in a bright world. and on the other hand, the Japanesa who are most skilled in developing undeveloped lands are confined ia \(s\) smell territory which has been devcloned even up the slopes of its close crowding mountains, and etrugeling under the pressure of surplus population.

Pege 4.
/p.193/ In such a cosen is it the will of God to ornd e part of this surplus population to those undevrioped hands erenly derclop \(n\) new world and contribute to minkind by devoloping their undarground rosourcos, or in it the will of God to not only lenve these ebundant resources to remein to no purpose in the earth but elso to make e. superior people like the Jepanese die on the rord, within their own tiry territory?

It is needless to wate meny words, for the snewer should be quite clear.
11. Tor this renson we demand lames ir tian north, south, epst ard west of Japhif whore the Jepanone people may froely dovelop their powers. What we aeek is not nominal territories, but \(p\) new land where Jnpanese lebour and technology and merchandise nad cenital mey freviy diepley inthout nny porsication thoir ectivition end acvolop the riches now lyine idle. Ve loudly call upon the whole world for euch lands.

However, let us turn our thourhts to the time when JAPAT mekes up her mind and starte her southward development. Fo miet be prepered to encounter a groet obstacle lying obetinstely i: our wey.Although the Netherlends owns the greater part of the SOUTIE SEA ISLiviDS, the ectual pover which protects these islende is the SRIMISH MAPIRE, which bosats of the greatest navy in the rorld.
/p.194/ FigLiND is p. netion which for mnny centuries un to this time hes maintained hor peculiar treditions e. a firm and immovable netional policy. This mational volicy is to never pllot the oxistence of any power as frest e.s herself.

It was for this reason that Britain defeated Fapoleon ir. the Battle of NAmprioo and exiled this hero to the solitary solitars island of ST. HMLMNA to die in afony, after llapolson hed appeared in France and subjugated the greater part of EHCROPE thereby raising FRAVCE'G netionel pre日tige to the levol of ETGLAND.

MiTGLAD was arpin the ring-lepder which defeated GMRMATY in "orld War \(I\), wher the nationel strength of Germany, following the enpeareace of its grent atatesman, Bismark, who constructed the Cermen Bmire, gies to such en extent os to rival tipet of niglend.

In recent times, it was mNGLAiD erain which triad to atob Italy's great undertaking by talking ovor the jeague of "etions end concentrating neval forcos in the NUDITPRRA:IAF, when Italy, under the daring hero, luesolini, attempted to extend her pover to RIMIOPIA.

Such has been the treditional netional policy of wigldid. We would te mekiry e ereet mistake if we think that this Frgimid would malre pn exceotion for Javan's southwerd advance.

Therefore, before we abpire to effect oversees development, we must make a great resolution. If we are thoughtless exough to plan this advance without this proparation, our scineme would shou e reckless failure to understend history-
/p.195/
12. Nevertheless, we call upon the world for our right to expend overseas. Ye demand this because, unless we are to atarve willy-nilly in this smell island country, the only way out of it is to effect overseas development by seeking new lands in the wide world around us.

As alreedy steted the world hes no moral right to deny us this right.

Of course, it rould be out of the question if the Japarese race were an inferior race without the ability to develop new lands and without the qualificptions to poverm. However, the uperior ability of the Japencse rece has already been tested.

What dia the white men aer twenty seven years afo when we annexed KORRA? at that time they were so self-conceited as to believe thet the white rece alone had the qualificetions to be masters of the world. And so ther siid that \(20,000,000\) alien people lived in the KOREAY PFNISSLIA, that there had been in world history not a single instance of successful rule over auch 2. great number of alien people; that althoineh India wes Inhabited by \(300,000,000\) natives, they were divided from top to bottom by races, religions and castes; that it was a difficult task even for the white men to rule an alien people of \(20,000,000\) in bloc, and that phy attemot by the Jepanese people, who belong to the colored races, to rule KOREA was bound to feil and would be given up in despair. Thus did they laugh pond smeer at us. But look at \(\operatorname{KOR} A\) as she is nov. Shere in the vorld is there an oversens lind better ruled and whose people enjoy more peace and industrial development than Zorea? whet an earthly paradise Kores isunder Japanese rule as compared with INDIA where the only method of rule the rulere know is to oppress the netive iahabitents with iron cheins and iron whips.

Let us further examine this in FORMCSA. Jadan's FORiCSA and tie Cnited Stetos' PHILIPPImas are sepernted from each other by only a narrow strip of weter. and yet our rule of Formose proved highly successful within only ten yeprs since its possession, and Formosa is now counted ns one of our richest lands. On the other hand, the Philip ines proved too much for the UIITED STaTES,

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forcinf her to throw un her hancis in despair and give consent to its inderendence.

Facts epeak most elequently. It is omly a dream of days fone by that only the white rue: ere entitled to rule the wcrld. The facts show plainly which of the two, the white men or the Javanese are bettor qualifiec to develope oversens lende. of course, we do not wholl? extol our pest rule of KOR'A and FORMOBA. There ers too many defects to enumerete here. und vet in spite of these defects we must ery that lends develoned and peoples ruled by such a superior rece pes tise Japanose are forturete compered with those under the tyranilical rule of the white men.

We ere able to atetc thosi facts to the whole vorld with r.o diffidence whateror.

\section*{Certificate}
"Address to the Young Men"
1. The date of publication.

July 12th, 1937.
2. The number of copies published.

6,500 。
3. We do not know whether the author was HASHIMOTO himself, his secretary, or some other person.
4. It is certain that it ves published by the HEIBONSHA Co., Ltd.
5. The HEIBONSHA Co., Itd. did not receive any money from anybody. The HEIBONSHA itself published and issued it in the way of business with its own money.
6. We vere asked by HASHIMOTO to publish it.
7. We do not renember whether the manuscript was brought by HASHIMOTO himself or by his messenger.
8. As for the number of conies published, we gave HASHIMOTO's nessenger a portion of them (10\%) as royalty on the books, and then sold all the rest of then through book-stores.

I certify that the above is true in every particular. November 6th, 1946.

No. 5 3-Chome, Gofukubashi, Nihonbashi-ku, Tokyo
Publisher The HEIBONSHA Co., Ltd.
President: SHIMONAKA, Yasaburō.
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 OT EAST ASIA

3 November， 1938
By the august virtuo of Hia Majeaty，the Imuorial Army and Naval forces have succeeded in occupying Canton，fuchang，Hankew，and Hauyang， and the main territory of China has been coaguered．The National Govern－ ment has been reduced to a local regime．but，as long as the regime con－ tinuos the anti－Japan and pro－Cormunist poilicy，imperial Japan will never lay down arms until the rogime is completeiy dostroyed．the ultimate aim of Imperial Japan is to estailish a New Onder winich will secure etornal peace in the Far Eisis，and this is the final purpicse of the present war．

The foundation of the New Oxder can be ectabitished through the collab－ oration of Manchukun and Uhina with capen in econcas．ce，politics and cul－ ture，based on cooparetion and mutual aid．Ma Hew Order should aim at the establiahment of international jusitico，anti－Comunist cooperetion， the now culturo and oconomic unity in the Far Eaut．This is what atabi－ lizes Hast Asia and promotes world development．What Japan expects of China is for hor to take partial charge of the duty of establisining the Now Order in the Far Eant．Imperial Japan expects the people of Cinina to understand Japan＇s e incority and roply to Japan by Eiving her cooperation． In case the National Government starts its life anew by casting away the old policies and chaneing its staff，it will not be refused entry into the camp of the New Order．

Because Imperial Japan believes that the powero will rightly underatand Japaris intentions and that they will change their attitude in order to suit the situation in Fast Asia，Japan is especialily grateful for the kindness of the Aillica Mations．

Beliering that the establishment of the New Orier in the Far East －Is originating from the epirit of the national foundetion，the completion of the task is the glorfous mission imposea on tho people of Japan． Imporial Japan should take fi：m steps to renovate the various internal systome，to devel op the fotal power of tho nation and sicould advanco to attain the ac！：itioncd purpose．

This is the uncovable principle and rosolution of the Imperial Government．

Page 1
T.D.C. No.
I.P.S. No. 1644

Statoment of Source and Authenticity
I, HAYASHI Kaoru \(\qquad\) hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief, Archives Section, Foreign Kiristry and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 2 pages; dated 3 Noverber, 1938, and described as follows: "Statement of the Inperial Japanese Government Concerning the Future of East isia" I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or departnent (snceifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Forelinn Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this 5 th day of November, 1946.
/s/ K. Hayashi Signature of Official SEAL

Titness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo \(\frac{\text { Chief. Archives Section }}{\text { Official Capacity }}\)

\section*{Statement of Official Procurement}

I, Henry Shimojima, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me fron the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 5th day of November, 1946

Mitness: /s/ I. H. Larsh

\author{
/s/ Henry Shinojima
}

Investigator
Official Capacity





















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the Japanese, that the possibility of contributirg substantially torard making situations better is within procedures which tend to prevent situations from becoming vorse. If adopted, :ie believe this procedure rould tend to turn public thought torard considere ation of peaceful and constructive processes. It rould tend to dissipate various suspicions which arparently prevall among the public and to curtail various types of inflammatory discuseion and agitation. It would take care of the particular present and future problem to :hich st would expressly relate, and, although it would in no way dispose of the many and various specific questions which have been and are the subject matter of current and past discusaion betreen our tro Governments, it might facilitate solution of some of them.

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27 June, 1940 (Tinlury.), Rairy.
Fitanco kinicice seitu oni celled end opinions were excianged on the strengtheuin; ci tio politice? strusturo and other problems.
Went to the office at \(10: 00\) wiers \(4 r\). Oraing, Chief of the Generel siffairs Section, caise to me for consultation upon the matter of tho Dmperor's vieit to TAYAMA.
Telised to Chicf Secretary, MAPSMAIRA, regaring tho procedure at the time of the cabinet change. Foreign Minister, ARITA, came to the palace and re had a tall: at follows:
Ambassador Grew recently requested a meeting, saying that he has a proposal for a treaty, wiich it is desired to conclude, between Japan ard smerica, vich will majntain the status quo in the Pacific and prevent forceful chances. Yovever, since it is an extremely delicate matter ard since it would be inedrisable at this time to have Japan's activities, including those in the setberlands, restricted and since it will probably end in sowething like e revival of the Nine Power Treaty, prompt acceren will. be dificicul.t. If it were limited to the question of zipanese and Emerioan Pacific Islands it might possibly be considerer.
At 2: 40 , went to the Akesara Deteched Pelace ond attended the interviewing ceromone of tiae Bmperor of sanchukuo. Has received in eudience at \(:\) : \(: 30\).
1. The relation betweon Mr. OGA:iA and the Emperor of Manchukuo - the Chief Bodygund's talis to the Caief Aide-de-Camp.
2. The Emperor told me tiat KOVOYE and Gereral NASiKI had lately come into closer contact. I reported to the Throne about the matter of the Shrine in accordance with Premier YOI:AI's request, and, also, at the request of Finance Minister SARUREUCEI, that trere is no need of establishing emergency regilatious, since eccount books and ether important documents were afe at the time of the recent firs.





















Doc. No. 1632 GG
Page 1
"Entry fron larmuis imo's Diery, 1 Jily lofi"
1 July 1940 Monday (fine)
SURITATE visited me at 9 a.m. Went to the office at ten. The ilde do Camp carn to sec mo. Ha told me the Army's adrocacy and viowe rogerding vorrizn Hinister ARITA's broadcast which was fentured in this mornines papers.

Audiore from 10:35 to 11:10.
Replise to the ت̈mporor's ouestions as to the actual facts about the Foraign ininistor's broadoast and other things.

At 11. 20 trilked afain with the Aida de Camp on the samo mattor. Dofors attomeire tlo lunchoon held by tho hanchukvo Imporor I had a talk with the Foreign innister ARITA and hoard from his own lips the truth about tho broadcast. After luncheon we met again and the Forsign linister discussod tro following natters:
1. The circumstances of tho ARIIA broadcast.
2. Tre tense situation in Hongkong and so forth-in regard to this the resl frets aro not yot clear.
3. Concerning the mattor of the stetus auo in the Pacific proposed by Ambassador Grev, ris idea is that the time is not appropriatc for a settlement regarding territories which wovid includo those of the helligerent nations. However if it werc linitod to matters between Japan and Amorice it could be consicered.
4. A proposal has boen roccived from Germiny requesting us, among other tings, to withdraw our represertatives from Hollard, Bolgium, Norway and Juxemboure since these nations have, in fact, lost their power, and to carry out future nerotiations (with those colntries) through our ambessador in Germeny.

In accordanco with the above our envovs will in fact be witharawn from those countriss in Europe but Nethorlands Indias aconomic problems will probably le discussed under e policy of neeotiatire pith govornments which are actually in power.
5. An oconomic mission will probenly be sont soon to irench Inco-Chira and the NEI.

Page 2

At 2:30 F.m., lir. Hatta, Chief Court Physician, came to my office and told mo about Ex-Hintstex Minister YUASA's condition.

Audienco from 3:30 to 4:05. Reported to tho Throno concerning Foraign :'inistor's talk and othor mattors.

At 4:20 had a talk with the Chief aid-de-Camp about the broadcast.
At 5 Lir. KOREI ATSU visited ne and we talked.
At 7:30 1.hTSEI and at 8:30 kr. Aino visited and talkod with me.






Japan's foroign policy, which ains ultimately at the construction of a nev order in Creater East saia, will be directed, first of ail, trard a complete settlement of the China iuffair, and the advaicoment of the national fortune by taking a farsighted view of the drastic cinanges in the international situation and formulating both constructive and flexible measures.

\section*{3. Renovation of Internal Structure.}

What is urgently required in internal adninistration is the laying of the foundation for a state structure for national defense throuth a complete renovation of the domestic administration in general, for which purpose the Government expects the realization of the following points:
is. Renovation of education thoroughly in harmony Fith the fundaneatal principles of the national polity, and also the establishment of ethioal principles of the nation stressing, above all, servica to the state and eradicating all salfish and materialistic thoughts.
B. Establishment of a porrerful new political structure and a unified osintrol of government affairs.
a. Eatablishmont of a new national structure, of which the keynote lies in the service to the state throuch the co-speration between government and peopla, every man according to the sphere of profession or business.
b. Reasvation of the Hiet as an organ for assisting the Throue, so as to adapt it to the new aational structure.
c. Funcamental renovation in the operation of administrative organs, and the reformation of the burcaucracy, aimed at the unity and efficienoy of those organs.
C. Laying the foundation of national defense soonomy, of riaich the keynote is to lie in the autonamous developmsat of the econorv of Jipan, Manchulouo and Chins rith Japan as the center.
a. Establishment of a sphere of co-operative cconomies, with the Japan-idincinouko-coina group as one of the units.
b. Inauguraiion of a planned econorit through the os-operation botween govornment and people, and especially the perfection of a unitary control system oovering the production, distribution and consumption of important cammodities.
o. Establishment of a financial schamo aid reinforcement of banking control, directod townd the development of the nation's total oconomic portur.
d. Renovation of the forolgn trade policy so as to adapt it to the now world situation.
c. Esteblishmant of the moasurcs for sclf-sufficiency in the pcopla's daily necessities eapecially in the principal foodstuffe.
f. in epoch-making expansion of the vital industities \(\rightarrow\) eapecially heavy, chamical and machine industries.
g. in epoch-making promotion of scionco, and rationalization of production.
h. Perfection and extension of the comiunication and transpartiation facilities so ss to adapt them to the now devilopments at home and abroad.
1. Jstablishment of land dovelopment plans aiming at the enhancemont of the total national strongth.
D. Inauguration of permanent nessures concorning the promotion of the stainina and physical strensth of the nation, and ospecially the iundamental neasures conceraing the security and development of agrioulture and agricultural comunitios.
E. Rectification of the inoquality in individual sacrificos incident of ational policies; full oparation \(\frac{\text { various welfaro }}{}\) moasures, and renovation of the living mode of the nation, and the mainteiance of such standard of livinis as will enable the nation to load a plain, solid and vigorous ilfe and to surmount tho national crisis by persovering truly through years of hardship.

\section*{inge 1. 1940. Statoment of Lhe Yoauke Matsuoka. Minister for Forcien iffiaira.}

I have alinays said that the mission of \(J_{\text {apan }}\) is to proclaim and demonstrate to kode throughout the world. Vieved from the standpoint of





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Doc. No. 587i
Page 1
\&FFID \(\dot{A} V I T\)
I. Yusai TiKiiHhsHI, certify that from 1933 until December 1945 I was editor-in-chief of the "Yomiuri Shinbus" and that I rocognize the attached International Prosccution Soction documont number 597h as an article written under the name of Hiroshi OSHINA appearing in the Yomiuri Shinbun of Octobor 27. 1940.

I further cortify that the above mentioned article nas published under the name of Hiroshi OSHDLi rith his conaent.
\[
\frac{\text { La/ Yusai Takahaghi }}{\text { Yusei TikijiuSHI }}
\]
\(\frac{\left\langle\mathrm{s} / \text { Hiram } E_{0} \text {, Nerbill }\right.}{\text { Hiram } \mathrm{E}_{0} \text { Newhill }}\) Hitness

Strorn bofore me this 8th day of November 1946 at Tokyo. Japan.
\begin{tabular}{|c|}
\hline 18/Eric We Fleisher \\
\hline ERIC T. FLEISHER \\
\hline 2d Lt, AUS, MI \\
\hline Invostigator, IPS \\
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\end{tabular}

2d It. AUS, MI
Invostigator, IPS



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Ex. 41300 - No. 1204 E

Page 1.
from OHTICAL ANNOUNGFMRNS CONCERNING FOREIGN RELATICNS Sixteenth Year of Showa (1941) Board of Information
(pp. 112-121)
dddress of \(u\). Yosuke Matsuoka, uinister for Foreden affairs, at the 76th Session of the Imperial Diet

January 21. 1941.


It gives me great pleasure to have this opportunity of explaining fa reopening of the 76th session of the Diet the recent course of of cuntry's foreign affairs.

Needless to say, the aim of Japan's foreign poiliay is that of "y, inㄱing all nations of the morld sach to take ite 'onm proper place, minerdance with the spirit of the Hakko Iahiu, the very ideal mioh anselred the foundation of our Rapire. The objeat of the Three-power :rix ronailuded botwean Japan, Germany and Italy on Soptember 27 last is zone otker than the realization of the same great ideal. We are, ice ond all. profoundly moved that His Majesty the Rmperor was graciously 1 aphed to grant an Imperial Roscript on the conclusion of the pact, iensily indicating to the nation the path which they should follow.

The Three-Power Pact atipulates that Germany and Italy recognize is ;espect the leaderahip of Japan in the eatablishment of a new order ri:sater Bast daia. It is our arowod purpose to bring all the people reater Bast csia to revert to their innate and proper aspect. . Wing conciliation and co-operation among them, and thereby sotting sxample of universal concond. The Pact aleo provides that Japan faizes and respects the leadership of cermany and Itely in thair
ajar endearnurs in murope. Far from antagonizing any country. iast is the ombodiment of a peaceful but powerful co-operation erted towarda the ostablishomont of a now world order. In accordance 3 the proviaions of the treaty, arrangoments have already been made
- sotting up mixed commisaions at the capitals of the three countries. \(\therefore\) Nily relations between the three nations are thus beanning evermore G. \(r_{0}\) politically, militarily, oconomically and culturally.
- 3 the month of November, last year, the Pact was ahered to by iepary. Rumania and Slovacia. It need not be ropeated that ther ite of Japan's diplomacy ia the ideal of the Hakko Ichin and that nyolves round the Three-Domer pact as its axis. In this connection, mild like to touch briefly upon ditiale Three of the Three-power That article provides that the Contracting Parties undertake to t one another with all political, econamic and military meane if of the Contracting Parties is attmoked by a power at present not
- \(\because\). NO. 12048
\(+\)
page 2.
4
aroulred in the European War or in the Sino-Japanese conflict. To eese such an attack should be made. the obligation stipulated hy tides article would of course, arise. maidentally, reforence sa. bs made to Italy's military oparations. There appear to be
Infrixs species of malicious propaganda oirculated on this head, but , anxe no doubt that our ally Italy will attain her object bofore long.

Ot the nations in Greater saat Hia, Manchoukuo hae speoiel and sasarable relations with this country. As you are aware, during the 4.an yэars mich have already elapsed since her emergence as an independent \(\cdot\).hing her national foundations have becone strong and secure while ..i: international position has been greatly onhanoed, her teoming :rons ever enjoying an increasing measure of prosperity. In.June, lesi year, the Braperor of manchoukuo paid a viait to Japan to offer His \(f\) 'uritations personally to our Imperial House on the auspicious occasion of the 2,600th anniversary of the foundation of our Pmpire. This is a arsce of genuine congratulation for the peoples of Japan and manohoukuo, \(\therefore\) : \(\lambda \%\) is a conspicuous manifestation of the unique relations subsiating :r:men the two nations, sharing, as they do, common aims and aspirations. is. The Sino-Japanese Basic: Treaty concluded with the Naticnel Covernment at Nricking, and through the Joint Declaration made by Japan, Manchoukuo and Maina, the Republic. of China reoognized Manchouksuo, with the result likat an exchange of umbasgadors has been arranged betwen them.

Tabrich as an early settlement of the china affair is desirable in the i.uter:asts of the creation of this aphere of common prosperity throughout reatar Bast asia, the present covernment aror aince their formation, intre urged the Chiang Kai-shek regime to reconsider and reverse ite attitude, winin a wiow of bringing about its amalgamation with the Nanking Government, in; it remains atill atruggling againat Japan. The Colaits regime, howerer. Tidied with internal diaruption and friction wich are rapidly growing i.po while the masses under itse dontrol are maffering. from high pricen, marith of commodities and other severe tribulations. Wile the armed atance of Chlang's regime has notably dealinod, the chinese commandat . \(\cdots\). milily oncroaching upom the aphere of influence of the Chungking armien. Th. Jsader in Chungking now seoms to be greatly harassed by the rampanoy tis comminiti forces. Despite its being in auch a miserable plight, riniang regime is atill adrocating naticnal reconstruction through
mirgued reaistance againat Japan. This is dua to its misplaced hopes azaistance fram areat Britain and the united States, eapeoielly the firp and also to past ciroumetances the offect of mich that regime \(\cdots\) not easily oscape. In June, last year, Great Britain tamposarily quaded the traffic of goods deatined for the Chiang regime by the .s.aginug and Burma routes. On Ootober 18 of laat year, however, following \(\because\) sinouncement of the Threa powor pact, that country reopened the Burma
ts and has since been trying to trapsport gooda by that route. Jurthersreat Britain recently grainted the Claiang regipe a ten million pound




Doc. NO. 1204 E


As regards Frenal Indo-China it formed the most important route of supply for Chungking since the beginning of the China dffair. Consequent. however, upon the sudden change in the European situation lest June, a ohange has occurred in the relations betreen Japan and French Indo-China, resuilting in the closure of the border betwoen Fronch Indo-China and China itself, and the entry, by agreement, of Japanese armed forces into French IndoChina. Negotiations are now in progress in Tokyo in 'tn amicable atmosphere on the basis of the Notes exchanged between the French Ambassadior and myself in august lest. It is my opinion that a realization by France of the necessity for co-operation with Japan, in the light of the now situation in the morld in general and in rast Asia in particular. is reaponsible for this development.

In oonnection with the French Indo-China question, I should like to refer to the relations betweon our country and Thailand. It may be recalled that at the General assembly of the League of Nations dealing with the Manchurian dffair, in 1933. the Thai delegate did not leave the dssembly hall but remained in his seat, and boldly announced his abstention from voting. This is still fresh in the memory of our people.

In June, last year, a Treaty of Amity and Noutrality was concluded by Japan with Thailand. With the exchange of ratifications, completed on December 230 at Bangkok, the bonds of friendship between tha two countries have been dram still closer. A movement is now stirring the Thai people for the recovery of the lost territories which are at prosent incorporated in French Indo-China. The Thai troops are confronting the French Indo-China forces across the border with frequent conflicts occuring between them. Japan the leader in past daia, cannot afford to remain indifferent to such a dispute, which she hopes will be settled at the earliest possible opportunity.
an exchange of diplomatic representatives has taken place between Japan and Australia. We expect that the two countries will make contributions toward the promotion of the peace of the pacific by further advanoing their friendly relations through cordial co-operation and the olimination or unnecessary misunderstandings.

The relations between Japan and Near Pastern Countries have recently increased in cordiality. Our ratification of the rreaty of amity with Iran is only one of many proofs that illustrate this happy state cfaffairs.

Japan and the argentine have agreed to elevate the status of their Legations in each other's country to that of Imbessies. Tith Brazil. a cultural agreement was signed in Septomber last, and it has already been sanctioned by His xajeaty the maperor. Relations between Japan and Brazil are thus growing more and more cordial. It is a matter for hearty congratulation that Japan and those Latin American countries have of recent years become increasingly closer in their political, economic and oultural relations.
page 5.

While diplomatic relations have taken auch a favourable turn, the development of the Auropean war has obliged us to suspend or temporarily withdraw some of our diplomatic eatablishments in that region. But Japan's diplomatic service abroad is being steadily strengthened on the principle of attaching special importance to specific countries. Wo are specially reinforcing our diplomatio machinary in Greater East asia.

In eatablishing a sphere of common prosperity throughout Greater Bact saia, and ensuring the peace of the orient. it is not desirable that the present diplomatic relations between Japen and the Soviot Unica should be left as they are. The utmost offorts are being made, therefore, to remove mitual misunderstandinga and, if possible, to bring about a fundamental and far-reaching ad justment of diplomatic relations.

We are pursuing negotiations at this moment upon auch questions as the frontier demarcation between sanchoukuo and outer Mongolia, the fisheries and the Japanese concessions in North Saghalien. Regarding the fisheries question in particuler, an agreement of views has already been reached concerning the establishment of a mixed commission composed of Japanese and Soviet representatives for the purpose of revising the longterm treaty and also concerning the conclusion of a modus vivendi for fishing industry for this year. On this point both Germany and Itary share Japan 's. desire. The provisions of Article \(V\) of the Three power pact also make it clear, in accordance with the above-mentioned intenticas of Japan that the pact is not directed against the Soviet Union. We earnestly hope that the Soviet Union idil understand Japan's true intentions and thatizihe two countries, actuated by the spirit of mitual concession and conciliation, will aucceed in achiering the read justment of their relations.

Japen's foreign trade, with the exception of that of th Manchoukuo and China, is conducted mostly with Great Britain, the United States and their respecti:e colonies and possessions. Since notifying Japan of the abrogation of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation in July, 1939, the united States has been onforcing in succession embargoes or restrictions on the exports of Japan of aircraft, arms and ammition, aviation gasoline. machine tools, scrap iron, iron and steel manufactures. copper, nickel and other important war materials, while the British Dominions and colonies are in various ways interfering with Japan's shipping. The Japanese Gorernment have lodged protests against auch actions on each occasion, but this tendency has recently been so greatly aggravated that Japan must meet the aituation adequately prepared. No other course is loft to Japen but to go forward with perfecting herself as a state highly organizod for national defence. not oniy in order to meet this pressure that I have referred to but also to secure an economic life of self-supply and self-suffioingness within the region of Greater Past isia.

In this connection, I should like to refer to our relations with the United States. The United States has evinced no adequate underatanding of the fact that the establishmant of a sphere of common prosperity throughout Greater Fast ania is truly a matter of vital ooneorn to Japan. She apparentiy entertains an idea that her om first line of national defence lies along the mid-atlantic to the east, but mestifard not only along the eastern pacific, but oven as far as China andithe South Seas. If the United States assumes such an attitude, it would be, to say the least. a very one sided contention on her part. to cast reflections on our superiority in the western pacific, by suggesting that'it betokens ambitious designs. \(I_{0}\) for one, believe that such a position assumpd on the part of the united States would not be calculated to contribute toward the promotion of world peace. Speaking frankly, I should extremely regret auch an attitude of the onited States for the sake of Japanese-American friendahip, for the sake of peace in the pacific and, also, for the sake of the peace of the worid in general. It is my earnest hope that a great nation ererting the influence that the United States does will realize hor responsibility for the maintenance of peace. will reflect deeply on her attitude with truly God-fearing piety, will courageously liquidate past circumstances and bend her utmost efforts to allay the impending arisis of civilization.

The prevailing confusion of the international situation shows no sign of subsiding, but on the oontrary, it tends to increase. should the united States unfortunately became involved in the suropean war, and should Japan too, be compelled to participate in the war, another great world war both in name and reality would ensue. precipitating a situation wich would defy all attempt at saving it. Should the war take its. furious course, unleashing formidable new weapons mich have not hitherto been used, no one could guarantee that it would not develop into a war spelling the domfall of modern civilization. The Three power Pact has been concluded for the purpose nut only of making sustained efforts for the establishment of a aphere of common prosperity throughout Greater East isia, but of preventing, in its course, any further oxtension of the present disturbances. We must ondearour to terminate the current war as speedily as possible and to settile the chaos in which the world is plunged. He must, meanwhile, study in advance to discover some formula for the prevention of the recurrence of any suah disturbance in the future.

With an unbroken line of mperors reigning since its foundation, our mpire constitutes a unique family-State unparallelled in the world for unity and solidarity. which grow atronger with every national amorgoney. It is reassuring, moreover, to observe that the Japanese mpire is endowed with most.favourable geographical conditions, powertul enough to influence the course of world politics. with the conviction of our race that Light radiates from the gast and with the great ideal





















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\section*{certigicare}
iV.D.C. No.
I.D.S. NO. \(\qquad\) (1) to (20), inclusive

\section*{Statement of Source and futhenticity}
 that I am officially connected with the Japanese Govermment in the following capacity:_ _ _ Chief of the Arihives.
Section - Jananese Foreignoffice _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - and trat as such official I have custody of the document hereto being ' 1) to (20), inclusive, each described as follows:
(1) Itens of Demands made on 14 Aug. 1940, in regard to the progress of General commerce and elimination of the Commercial obstacles pafes 33.
(2) Demands upon the N.E.I. paces 19. Aame det a above (1)
(3) Problems in regard to enterprise and investment. pages 37.
(4) Negotiation on Economic problems between Japan and the N.E.I. pages 10.
(5) consisting of 't pages in original Japanese, entitlẹs Telegram No. 5 from Chief of lission Kobajashi at Batavia to Foi 3ıgn Minister Liatsuoka," on September 13. 1940.
(6) consisting of 2 pages in original Japanese, entitled: "Telegram No. 9 from Chief of Mission Kobayashi at Batavia to Foicign Minister Liatsuoka," on September 13. 1940.
(7) consisting of 1 page in orifinal Japanese, entitleds "Telecram No. 66 from Chief of Mission Kobayashi at Batavia to Fo:eign Minister Matsuoka, " on October 12. 1940.
(8) consisting of 2 pages in original Japanese, entitledi "Telcgrom No. 82 from Chief of Lission Kobayashi at Batavin to Forcign Miniater Matsuoka," on October 18. 1940.
(9) Report from Chief of Mission to Netherland Indo-China, Kobayashi Ichizo, to Foreign Minister liatsuoka on November 2. 1940. pages 23.

Doc. No. 2748 A
Page 2
(10) consisting of 1 page in original Japanese, entitled "Telegram No. 35 from Chief of Mission at Batavia to Foreign Minister Matsuoka," on January 27, 1941.
consisting of 1 page in original Japanese, entitled, "Tclecram No. 24 from Foreien :'inister Matsuoka to Chief of Mission Yoshizawa at Batavia," on January 28, 1941.
(12) consisting of 2 pages in original Japanese, entitled: "Telegram No. 68 from actine Foreign Minister Konoe to Chief of Misaion Yoshiza:za at Batavia, " on harch 28, 1941.
(13) consisting of 2 pages in original Jnpanese, entitied: "Telegram No. 1117 from Foreifn Minister Mat suoka to Chief of Mission Yoshizawa at Batavia, Ambassador Shigemitsu to Great Britain, Ambassad or Nomura to the United States, on May 23, 1941.
(14) consisting of 4 pages in original Japanese, entitled: "Telegram No. 227 from Chief of Llission Yoshizawa at Batavia to Poroien Minister liatsuoka," on June 7. 1941.
(15) consisting of 3 pages in original Japanese, entitled: "Telegram No. 147 from Foreign Minister Matsuoka to Chief of Mission Yochizawa at Jatavia," on June 14, 1941.
(16) consisting of 3 pages in original Japanese, entitled: "Telegram No. 237 from Chief of Mission Yoshizamat Batavia to Foreign Minister liatsuoka," on June 15. 1941.
(17) consistine of 3 pages in oricinal Japanese, entitled: "Tolegram No. 150 from Foreion Minister hatsuoka to Chief of Mission Yoshizawa at Batavia," on June 16, 1941.
consisting of 2 paces in original Japanese, entitled: "Telegrem No. 396 from Foreign I:inister Matsuoka to Consul General Saito at Batavia," on Homomber 3, 1940. depibinker
(19) consisting of 3 pages in original Japanese, entitled: "Telegram No. 21 from Chief of Lission Kobayashi at Batavia to Foreign Sinister Matsuoka, on Hopember 18. 1940.

Syitesmbers
consisting of 2 pages in orifinal Japanese entitled: "Telegram No. 100 from Chief of Mission Saito at Batavia to Foreign Minister liat suoka," on October 25, 1940.

I further certify that the above listed documents are official documents of the Japanese Goverament, and they are part of the official archives and files of the following named miniatry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regilar location on the document in the archives or files):
_ - _ ForeignMinistry
Eipned at Tokyo on this
Lat day of Noye, 1946.


\section*{Statement of Official Procurement}
I. \(\ldots\) _ \(\quad\) _ \(\mathrm{Richara}_{\mathrm{H}} \mathrm{H}_{2}\) Larah
hereby certify
that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Suprame Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official Business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
lith day of Noy, 1946


Ls/Richard \(H_{2}\) Largh NAMT

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秘会人

















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Doc. No. \(2748^{8}\) A(11)
Telegran No. 25:4 January 28, 1941 7:00 P.M. A copy of a telogran fron Foreign Minister MATSUOKA to Delegate yOShIzawa in BATAVIA. Concerning Delege.te YOSHIZ:Wh's Statement

Cipher Conmercial Nogotiation No. 24. Strictly Secret. Very Urgent.

Concerning your tolegran, Cormorcial Negotiation No. 33. It goes without saying that you should absolutely refrain from the usage of such expressions that would deny Japan's hegomony within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphero when announcing to outsiders.

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Fagc i
Berlin, 21 2uarch, 1941.
Notes
on Gemen-Jppencse Lconoric Questions for tre Conversetion witr the Jepanese Forcign Minister.

2 (b). Gevihatcrinl Orders trrougr Jfpen. Wc srell fave to buy rav neteriels fror trird countrics trrough Jepen end get ther. into Germeny, c.g. rubber and tin fron tre Netrerlands Indics and Theilfnd; wolfren fron Scuth Crine; tin from Bolivie. For t'is purpose vee are rcedy to place forcign bills of excrenge et tre dispesel of Japen. Trus fer, in deference to Englend and Imerice, end becruse of rer own supply situetion and lack of tonnege, and so fortr, Jopen ras done little in tris direction. But cven frere suct reasons did not exist, burceucretic restrints and involved procedural reguletions reve produced difficulties end deleys. On the besis of 2 promise by Matsucke, the Worltret Delegetion should probably bc eble to obtein in:proverients.

Wc are likcrise counting on Jepencsc relp vith blockedcrunners and nuxiliery cruisers for tre transportation of such rew rieteriels to Gerrieny.

2(e). Ney Form of Econoric Reletions after the Wer.
l.ccording to the Gerrien conception, the grect possibilities virict cxist for the nev order of ceonoric relotions between tre European- \(\mathrm{S}_{\mathrm{f}} \mathrm{frican}\) econoric sprerc under tre lerderstip ef Germeny and Italy and tre Grenter dsietic conoric sphere under the leeder of Jepen cen only be fully reelized if metters ere carricd cut in e grend renner. For tris reeson tre freest possible tredc exchonge srould teke place. is a metter of principlc one shculc rcserve tc onescif preferences over trird countries. Over-centrolizetion witr its unevoidable rindrances srould be srunncd. Ratrer, Japen should be eble to cerry on busintss end lekc trede agreancnts directly witt the independent countrics in tre Gerren-Itelien Sprere, and conversciy, Gcrmeny end Itely with the independent countrics in tfe Jepencse Sprerc. On tre otrcr rend, tre Jepencse conception eccording to previcus stetements of governnent representetives in Tokyo is tret Gemeny should rave trede deelings t:ith countries, like Crine, Indochina end also tre Netrerlends Indics not dircetly, but only through

Jepan. No funcemental aggrevation of tris qucstion res yct occurred, as we reve been dependent onyway on Japenese support in ir:ports in our trede during tre wer with the countries nentioned.

Hercby offered through tre Stetc Secretary to the Germen Foreign Minister:

Signcd Wicrl

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\section*{}
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ACTING \(A D J U T A N T\) GENERAJ,




\section*{Separate Docunent 16}

\section*{Re Acceleration of Measures in the South}
"Decision of Liaison Conference."
25 June 1941/Showa 16/

\title{
Re Acceleration of Measures in the South
}

\section*{(Menorandurı)}

Decision of the Imperial Headquarters-Governnent Ilaison Conference, 25 June 1941 /Showa 16/
1. In view of the various existing conditions, the EAPIRE shall, in accordance with its fixed policy accelerate its meesures towards FFENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND. Especially, in connection with the return of the JAPANESE Delegate from the DUTCH INDIES, a nilitery union shall be established with FRENCF INDOCHINA as soon as possible for the purpose of the stability and defence of EAST ASIA.

Concerning the establishrent of joint military relations with FRENCH INDO-CHINA, the essential factors which the EMPIRE should strese upon are as follows:-
a) The establishnent or use of Air Bases and Harbour Facilities in specified areas in FRENCH INDO-CHINA, and stationing of the necessary troops in the southern part of FRENCH INDO-CHINA.
b) Furnishing of facilities in connection with the stationing of ILAPERIAL troops.
2. To open diplomatic . negotiations for the purpose of the preceding paragraph.
3. In case the FRENCH Government or the FRENCH INDO-CHINA authorities do not cormly with our demands, we shall attain our objective by force of arms.
4. In order to deal with such circunstence es mentioned in the above peragraph, preparations shall be cornenced beforehand for the despatching of troops.
－丞家蔀十


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Doo. No. 821B
CERTIFICATE
M.D.C. NO. \(\qquad\)
I.P.S. NO. _821B

\section*{Statement of Source and Authentioity}

I, Yuzo Isono, beroby certify that I am officially connooted with the Japanese Government in the following capacitys Chief of Archives Section, Foreign Office, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of \(\qquad\) pages, dated \(\qquad\) - 1935 and deseribed as follows: "The Published Foports of the Foroign Ministry," No. 14. I further certify that the attached rocord and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (apeoifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official dceignation of the rogular location of the doounent in the archives or files): drchives of Foreign office.

Signed at Takyo on this

21st day of Junc, 1946.
/s/Y. Isono
Signature of Offioial
Steal
Official Capacity

\section*{Stotamont of Offioial Erocurement}
I. William C. Prout, hereby certify that I am associated mith the Goneral Headquarters of the Supremo Commander for the Allied Povers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this 2let day of Juno, 1946.

Witnoses \(\qquad\)

\section*{Titness: Le/ Nagahamu Odo}
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Page 1

NETHERLANDS INDIES AND JAPAN

Battle on Paper, 1940-1941
By
HUBERTUS J. VAN MOOK
M.nister for the Colonies,
Netherland Government

IEN YORK


PABFACE
"Send danger fron the north unto the south So honour cross it fron the east to vest."

HISTORY should be vritten a long time after it is nade, with full access to sources and with dispassioncte criticisn. On the other hand, it may be useful to relete events thet happened, in part at lac.st beyond the public ken, as soon as circunstances pernit and rhile their recollection is still vivid in the nemory of the participents. This can prevent the growth of legends that usually crop up around semisecret proccedings of political importance and confuse our judgnent in after years. A nore procise knowledge of past occurrences can aid us in understanding the present and even in shaping our course towards the future.

The story told in this little book is such a chronicle of facts concerning the relations betwoen the Netherlends in Asia and Jepan during the last two years before the outbreak of war in the Pecific. Its scone is li:ited to political and economic affairs of which the nuthor hes a firsthand knowledge. Comrents and background sketching have been restricted to what seemed indispensable. There heve been other and more romentic descriptions, but nost of the naterial adduced herc has been inaccessible until now; it is published with the kind co-operation of the Netherlands minister of foreign affairs, Dr. Ven Kleffens. It will serve to bring several things into a truer focus.

In the first place, these relations have been far too of ten interpreted as a matter of individuel action and skill.

Pcople are ant to iclontify currents of public opinion vith the names of those who are the more or less faithrul exponents thereof; their sense of the dranatic nokes them concentrate their attention on the actors who were picked out by the limelight of publicity, while they cverlook the part played by the prodiacers end tio nudience. In a country where pubilc men are not surrounded by blackguards or detectives, where the press is uncensored, and where discussion of national and international affairs is free and searching--and all this anmiled to the Netherlands Indies as well as to the Netherlands..-internetional policy cannot be conducted, like some sort of nystery, by a few adepts. It rust be rooted in public sentiment and acceptable to public intelligence. With the Netherlands occupied by Nazi terror, the goverrment found their main strength in a practicaliy unanimous support by the citizenry of all races. in the Irdies. Not only did the better educated elements of the population--.Including many hundred thousend Indonesions and IndowChinese-approve; even the massos had become awere of the Japanese danger through four years of reports and runours spreading from China.

During the long and difficul.t negotiations with the Japanese that took place duming these years in Batavia, the government and the Nethesiand delegation ware assisted by a large advisory contt tee of Mretherland and Indonesicn experts. They iond no difficulcy in reaching generally agreed conclusions whitit coitd be based on the wollestablished and commoniy accepted principles of econonic policy. These principles sre to ke found in the nemoranda of February 3 and June 6, 1241. On this sound and solid foundrition the teamorl: of the delegations vas excellent and needed little special man?gement. The press, ineluding the vernacuine papers and tlose of the nationalisi opposition, was :rholly and explicitly behind the government in this resnect. On the timentiofifth of June the represontstive asseribly, the Volksraan, consisting of a chairman, tinirty Indonesian and twerty-five Netherland nembers and five cthors--customaridy truee Chinese and two hrabs-gave their final sppraisel of the Netherland--Jananese discussions in their corntttee report on the budzet for 1942. Henerving on the fact thet the people in the Indies had shown oreet restreint and complete corficence in the policy of the government throughout, it praiser, without a dissenting voice, the firm and reasonable attitude maintained during trese disuldssions. It said: "Although the nogotiations dic nct lead to a cutually satiefactory conclusion, the preservation of the integrity of the Indies, notwithstaning strong pressure from the othen side, and, at the sene inne, the continuation of normal relations with Japan, constitute en exceptionally favourable result, othich is further enhanced by the fain of prestige for the Netherlands Indies within and vithout."


Thi ecre roport unnfrous? paid honage to Her liajosty the queen, voicing the seneral admiration and gratitude for her inspiring; leadership. These wore no ompty words. The fact thet the queen and her governrient had retained their liberty of antion was a strong, if not 3 decisive, glenent in tho posifion of tio Indius ind their relations with Jaran, Hid zi becn othervise, although the Indies vould certainly not heve riven vay as did IndoChina, the terptetion to interfore, ooth in tho alifed and the eneny side, would have kean mach creaies, The Netherlend govarnent in Joncion remded no bitstie assistance; they conid rely as filmby on pibic opinion in the Netheriends Indies as on the linerciren resistence in the Netherlands. They we:e noly secomind by a gaeat governor genorai. The higa rharecter aw penctreging intelligence of Jonkies: trasian ven starknteren stachouwer pere a funs eunconve agulnst vacialathing ox orratic decisione and his rione eliptombere expemane gave invaluable guidance io the tastich notk of the Neinerlend Celegation, He renaired resoiate and vinsakable to the ond.

A rether widespread misconcention resulted fron one of the more consistunt lins of the Jonamese prupagnde machine. The Notherlond attiture wes concinuticty depicted in the Japanose press as one of enciless prosrastination and dupiciaty; nembaper scotes elsemhere began to credit us ith an alrost wohin:elpen cruetiness. The recder will see fon himbolf tian nöhing was iess true. We certainly mentod to eaia tine, but ve only gatioed it by a sturdy persevorenco, counied with pitienee end courteous candour. Delays wene caxsed by renenese dilatoriness and provocations. The Notberam fusticen was alweys clearly
 our point of verf night not inve becn pablisnce sticighteway; it wes tio fingnese who mented serecty, row op vious reaschis. Bernuse of this we couid seather fate propaganda lios no: correct oma fide minsatoments.

The sare applwes to the fethor wisa raniots thet arese over the oil controste, Again the reade wili sise thet the truth was ruch shmier then is aporred at the tino, Gur Gecisions hat ice re cunec by vaions considenationa, but those concomene oar mathen secanity and the corion.



If anything deserned shastr. reaise, th wes the ecrtitude
 ester. Like sil peacelul comorecies, wo wese cadit insufficiently prepared. irks be.s aces not tiees ce militery matters. Suffice it to scy tiai the consicerabie rearmants
projects, voted shortly before Morld Mar II, could not be executed because we lacked an sdequate resvy industry, and the var alnost closed the arraronts markets to our low priority. Mhat cocis be done, res done, and lititle though \(1 i\) ves, \(1 t\) ceated a concain termorary optims sr: which res still further stronethened by the trend of pilicy in the United states. These who nossessed insice knowl.. edge, hovever, reniliged the lick of concorted proprrition, due to the plapht or Eaita:n in Europe and the legal and political obstreles to miltory comitments in yeshington.

As the remoe g:ert and the woll stete of thargs begen to be nore alleci.j Eavin, the opthisn disappeared. Perhaps we ia whe fathejemds Jados vere certein of a Japenese attank act an miton cate than others koceuse we could not reiy on yir cimmijetery poage to detor the ageressor, juit the everment:s decision thet there would be no evacuatsor ye witise people rins not cven cuesilimed; it fully cerrespordee with the choice the Netheriancers in the Inaios had iong since made for theriselves. In this country, which had besome their hone, they yould stey and fight; they would not leave their Inconesien conetriots and friencis in tirie of denger.

When our wonen, with a sLight tiehtening at the throat, gezed after the thousands of Euroncan end Anerican evacuees drifting nest and through our harbours on their way to sefety; wien the jepenese ter mehine care roil. ing southrard; wher it was cortain that reinforements would not arrive in time can richi not rrito for a long tine to come, they could heve lumerted isthe "eromi-h: "As for us, our eyes as yet failed for our vain hejp; in our watching wo heve watchod for a antion the coisd art save us." They did not so Lemenc. Thy net tho tote that overtook then unelunhingly, fighing cind stajting on. had romember that they had fow ilitelons about whet wes in store for tion uader Jonarese ocupation.

The world hes cimost forgotten those tifty thouscon Netherlanders in war prisons and interreot cerps, ers the hurdred thousand wortan and enithrox, deancej.gi ari destitute, diving poorly in cramod segregetion vartors or in other concentration wards. For nectiy tweaty rosths
 have seen an fillod plane in the sly. Pat ro kemiv. cind this is no conjecture...that they co not despotr; then tion
 In ultinnte victory; that they feol tiner oidigetung jewnerds the Indies end the Intonesions rore diecrity liae sua before. To the nenory of those wion a'de whring, z ! the roderntion of thoso who aro nov, la chains, niny timis bock be dedicated.
H. J. Ven MOOK

Page 5

In the following account the principal docuronts exchenged between the fovernients end their representatives are given in their full orfeinal text--as ficr as they were in Englishwor in an accurate translation. It seened better to err on tine side of circumstantiality than to crente the impression of reticence. Errors in grammar, idion and orthe jephy are copied from the originais, which vere witien in a language foreign to both parties.
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JELATIONS betweun the Netherland Indies and Japan presented no speciel difficulties until after the world crisis of 1929. In 1899 a lev had accorded the Japanese the status of "Europeans" in the Indies; in 1912 a general trade treaty had put their sctivities in that country with regerd to trade, business, shipning, and imigration on the footing of the usual fost-rivoured-nation cicusc.

The Japanese vere lete in the business field; their particination in tropical agriculture and rining remained very limited, not beceuse of any opposition, but becnuse others had got the start on thern. In inports and exports, banking and shipping their share wes better and gradually increasing, but until about 1929 there vere no disturbing developments.

When the world econonic crisis bogan, this situation changed rapidly and raterially. Japan's share in Netherlands Indies inports rose from 11 per cent in 1929 to 30 per cent in 1935, whereas in the same period those percentages for the Netherlands, the rest of Europe, ard Anerica dropped from 20 to 13 per cent, from 28 to 23 per cent, and from 13 to 8 per cent respectively. At the sene tinest the share of Japan in Netherlands Indies exports ves only .5 per cent in 1935, as against 22 , 18 , and 15 per cent respectively for the Netherlands, Furope, and Arerica.

The earlier Jananese investrents in the Netherlands Indies nay have been of a nore privatc character, with sone occasionel spying throm in; in the thirties, penetration became definitely organized and was pusined fron behird by those senioficial gevernment-subsidized cornorations like the Nanyo Kohatsu, whose ultimate airs vere revealed by naval and military participation. The rising flood of inports carried Japanese goods fron. Jananese inportors, in Jonenese ships, financed by Japanese banks, to Jrpenese warehouses in the coastal towns of Java, to be sold directly to the consumers through Javenese retailers far in the interior. Japanese niddlemen penetratod East Java, Southeast Borneo and North Celebes to buy native products-miaize, rubber, and copra--for export to Jepan. Jepanese fisheries
started operations in the strategically iriportant seas north of Batavia and around the northern peninsula of Celebes, continually trespassing in territorial waters and causing several incidents. lising, agricultural, and lumbor rights, mostly of doubtiul eccnomic value, vore boutht or applied for in localities of wilitiny importance, edg. the cast and vest coasts of Borneo and the northern part of Now Guinea. Smell craft begen to penetrate into coastal shipping.

Note, handed by Mr. Ishil, Jananesc minister nt The Hogue io Dr. Van Kleffens, Notherland minister of foreign affairs, on the second of February, 1940.

Chief itens desired to be agreed upon between Japan and the Notherlands.

\section*{I. MATTERS RELATING TO COMERCE}
(I) Jancnese Side:
(a) Japan is to refrain, \(2 . s\) fir as círcuistances porrit, from adonting any messure, prohibiting or rostricting the cxnortetion oí its nrincipal goocis required by the Nethorlands Indies. (It is to be understood the the exportation ney soretires be difficult for econcric res.sons.)
(b) Janan is to acopt stiah ionsures as deened to be ampropriate with a viev to furthering the iriportation of gcods fron the Netherlonds Indies.
(2) Netherlands Side:
(a) The Nethorlinds Indies is likewise to refrein from adooting any zeasure nrohibiting or restricting the expcrtation of its principal goocs; the proaibitive or restrictive measures, to which the exportation of certain goods has airendy been subjected are to be so riodiziod as to render the flow on eoods ensior between Jepon ard tie Nutheriends Indies.

Page
(b) The existing neasures of import rostrictions in raspect of Japancse goods aro to be abolished or noderated.
II. MATTERS RELATING TO ENTRY
(1) Japanese Side:

Japan is, as at present, to adopt no restrictive measures in future in respect of the entry of employees of Netherlands firms in Japan.
(2) Netherlands Side:

The existing Foreigners Lebeur Ordinence in the Netherlends Indies is to be abolished or moderated.
III. MATTEIS RELATING TO ENTERDRISE APD INVESTMENT
(1) Japanese Side:
(a) Japan is to afford, within its influence and competence, reasonable protection to Netherlands interests in Manchukuo end China.
(b) Facilities sre to be afforded in respect of new Netherlands investments in Japan; its offer of investrient to Manchukuo and China is to be reconmended by Japan to be accommodeted, to the governments concorned.
(2) Metherlends Side:
(a) Further facilities are to be extended to the existing Jepanese enterprises in the Netherlands Indies.
(b) Facilities are to be granted to new enterprises, including those under joint control of Japen and the Netherlands.
IV. CONTROL OF PRESS GID OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF AMTI-JAPANESE NATUIE

The anti-Netherlands tendency, if any, of the press, negazines and other publications in Japan on one hand, and the enti-Jrpanese tendency of the press, magazines and other publications in Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies on the other are to be ploced respectively under strict control in conformity with friendiy spirit preveiling between Japan and the Netherlands.

A suitable reply wns still under consicleration when, on the tenth of May, 1940, the Netherlands vere a.ttacked and invided by Germany.

On May 18, the Japanese consul Eeniral st Batnvia visited the director of economic affairs nnd deiivered condolences, requests, and veiled threets alncst in one and the sere breath. On M.y 20, Foreien :inister Arita handed the following note to the Netherland inister in Tokyo:

> Note handed to the Niotherlanc! ninister in Japan, General J. C. Pabst, by the Japanese foreign rinister, lí. Arits, on the twentieth of lay, 1940 .

I have the honour to refer to ny conversation with Your ixcellency on the 16th liay concerning the products of the Netherlands East Indies, in the course of which you informed me the.t you had received : telegran from the GovernorGenerel of the Netheriands East Indies to the effect thet the Government-Goneral of the Netherlends Best Indies had no intention of plecing any restrictions in future on the exportation to Janen of rinercl oil, \(t i n\), rubber and other raw naterials which \(=\) ro of vital irportance to Japen, and that it wis the desire of the sare GovernientGeneral to maintain the peneral econonic relations betweon Japan end the Netherlands Bast Incies es close as evor.

Thile inforring Your Excellency that the Japanese Government fully approciate the coirunicition of the Governrent-Gencral of the Netherlands Eest Indies, I rish to point out that, in adaition to mineral oll, tin and rubber, there are many other kinds of commedities hithorto imported into Jooan fron the Notherlands East Indios willeh are of vital i:mportance to this country.

It is, therofore, requested that tho GovernmentGeneral of the Netherlands Enst Inries would give a definite assurance thet, for the time being e.t lenst, the quartitios of the irticles enumernted in the attached list shell be exported to Japan each year from the Nethorlands East Indies under any circuristancos thet ray arise in future.

In viow of the abovo-riontiond telegrayhic communic.:tion fron the Governor-General of the

Netherlands East Incies and the wide powers with which he has bcon vested since the outbreak of hostilitics between the Nothorlands and Germany (vide Your Excellency's note adresessed to me under detce of the llth May), I shall be greteful if Your Excellency will be good cnough to inform re in writing ns soon as possible thet the Governop-Genoral of the Notherlands East Indies accodes to the abovementioned request of the Japeneso Governient.
\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { 1. Tin (ineludine ore) } 3,000 \text { tons } \\
& \text { 2. Rubber } 20,000 \text { tons } \\
& \text { 3. Mineral oil } 1,000,000 \text { tons } \\
& \text { 4. Bauxite } 200,000 \text { tons } \\
& \text { 5. Nickel ore } 150,000 \text { tons } \\
& \text { 6. Mancanese ore } 50,000 \text { tons } \\
& \text { 7. Molfram, } 1,000 \text { tons } \\
& \text { 8. Serap-iren } 100,000 \text { tens } \\
& \text { 9. Chrore iron ore } 5,000 \text { tons } \\
& \text { 10. Selt } 100,000 \text { tons } \\
& \text { 11. Cestor seeds 4,000 tons } \\
& \text { 12. Muinine bark } 600 \text { tons } \\
& \text { 13. Moiybdenun } 1,000 \text { tons }
\end{aligned}
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Note addressed to Mir. H. Arita, Japonise
rinister of foreign affairs, by the
Netherlend minister in Tokyo on June 6, 1940.
(Translation fron the original in French.)
with reference to tho correspondence ketwoen the Netherland Governrient and tho Japenuse Governrent on the subjoct of the irpeoverent of the econoilic relations betweon the two countries, I hive the honour to inform Ycur Excellency the.t the Netherland Government highiy appreciate the Japanose Government's exnression of sympethy with the difficult situation in which the Netherlands find therselves as a consequence of the mer. My Governeent noreover appreciates that the nomoranduri, which uas to be presented by the Jananese hinistor at The Hacue, and which was on the 18 th of May 1940 prosentod to the Governor General of the Netherlands Indies by the Jananeso Consul Goneral at Batevia, as further amplified by Your Excellency's note
di.tec. Mny 20th 1940, No. 1006, wes clonrly actuated by concern, lest, in these difficult tiros, a leok of contact and doliboraioion should give rise to or protinct tenstors to the dotrinent of the troxitionc.l if iotady relations whiat. for thre centuries. so for cunetoly provajlod between the Netherlands ant Janan. The Netherland Government apree \#1th the Japanese Governrent on the nocesejty of corbating incorneet ronorts and misaliectod propegenda. Thus ain will bo bust furtiored by contrets rende in an atmosphere of fronleness and objectivity,

Her Majesty"s Govormment sev no cause whetsoever for serious concern obout the relations betrien the Nothorloncts and Janan and, moro particulurly, eiociat the reletions butween the Netherlands Indies and Jagan,

In this resnoct it ray servo to rocsil thet tho ccononis relations between the two countrios were setried on the 9th of April 1937 by the socallud Hart.isinizerg agrecnent. On both sices pronises were rede, and a nuinber of apportionments wore ngreed upon, whilst on other pnints and on the subject of the c.pplication of the agreoment, vorbal is vicil as wribtan negotiations were contiruonsly cirriad on. Throughout these delíberaticns a spirit of goodvill predorinated. I nay, for instanco, mention thet in 1938 the Netherime Govarnment thournt \(\approx \pm 4\) to draw the attontion of the Jananesc Coverrenent to the fact thet tho prospcets oncred iy tho Hart... agreenent in ruspect of the ecrecual sdjustrent of the bilence of trede bitwen the Netiorlands Indies and Japan and of Jopan's pro:lise to buy, whencver possible, inrear ounntitios of indigencus products like sugar, still fell far shori of thoir reaijoaizon. This sten res dictatod by the fundamenifal impertance of these exports for the native pomidiation. The fipertation of rany Jaonrese articios hes ites foundation in the nurchasing power of tinis nopulation.

Nutwithetancime tinis none too satisfectory outecme for tho Natherlands Governrent, my Governnent hero accepted the uxntanetion given by the Japanese Governnont that the China incicient had a considereble influence on coonoric conditions in Javan, as well as on che finlfiliment of this part of the Hart-Ishzzows agreonent. In fudging
the results realized thrcugh the HartIshizawa agreerent, the Netherland Government have alrays given duo consideration to those exigencies, which are the inevitable consequence of war conditions. The Netherland Governnent, therefore, are convinced thet the fact that they, too, were forcad into war will have the Japanese Governnent's consideration. This state of war rust, of necessity, have its repercussions on the econoric situation in the Netherlands Indies.

In any case, my Governnent fully understand that it is important for Japan as well as for the Netherlands Indies that the cornercial relations between the two countries dovelop without hindrance.

With satisfaction the Netherlands Government have taken notice of Your Excellency' statements concerning the irportance of maintaining the status quo of the Netherlands Indies. Repeatediy my Governmont have confirmed thet thoy wish to maintain this status quo without reserve. This matual declaration is considered the more inportant, since the naintenarce of the status quo bears closely upon the interest of their Allies as well as upon trose of other countries bordering upon the Pacific, as is clearly evidenced by the staterents made by Great Britain, France and the United States of America.

It is, in fect, of great importance for the maintenance of peace in this part of the world that the position of the Netherlands Indies remain unimpaired, and that this country be able to continue without interruption to ect its part as a world-supplier of verious rav materials and food products.

I ray now be allowed to give a reply to Your Excellency on the proposels conteined in the note of the Japanese Minister at The Hague of February 2nd 1940, and in the above-nentioned memorendurn, as further anplified by Your Excellency's note.

\section*{COMAERCIAL RELATIONS BETMEEN THE NETHERLANDS
INDIES AND JAPAN \\ '}

The Governments of the Netherlends and of the Netherlands Indies have already declared that they in no way intend to restrict the trade between the Netherlands Indies and Japan. On the contrary,
the progressive development of the commercicl relations is just as importint to the Netherlands Indies as to Jopan. The nore so, since the income derived fror export is, in these tines of changed internetional reletions, even more then previously of vital importance for the population of the Netherlancis Incies, who can only afford to buy import goods of prime necessity if the exports provide then with the reans thereto. The ricre it may prove possible to edjust the balance of trade, which these last years ins proncuncedily nogativo, the nore it will bo possible to pive added encouragenent to the inportation of Jinanesc products. Since the Netherland Governnent have in the past consistently tricd to stirmlate the cxport to Japan, they heve no objection whatsoever once nore to give the assurance, for which the Japanese Govern: ent have asked, that the Netherland Governeent as well as the Netherlind Indies Government vill rofrain fron taking measures which might honper the exportation of the 13 mentioned proructs in their equally mentioned quantities. In order to avoid .ny possible misunderstrncing concernine these quantities, Your Fxcellency will find enclosed an explanatory note on the subject.
To the proceding should be added, in conformity With previcus staterents, thet the chenge in the internetional conditions first of sell deriends thet the Netherlands Indies introduce repuletions for exchenge-control. The Irperial Gcverneent vill understand thet such mecsures s.re unavoidable, amonest cther things, in orcer to meintain the retss of exchange bith the ven and the dollar. It is furthur nacessary to take messures to prevent that the products exported by the Netherlands Indies should ultimately frill into the hands of the enemy, and to prevent that excossive exports should ceuse mant in the Netherlands Indies thenselves. In taking these ne: sures a method of execution vill be sought, colculated to rinimize hariful effects to the normal corverciel intercourse vith forcien countries. The irportation of nerchancise of Jananese origin, which formed the subject of searching deliberations, leading to icentical viewnoints in the Hart-Ishizawa agree. nent, will be continued in the normal rey, In view of the existing conditions, there is reason to expect thet the imports :ill tond to increase rother than to cininish.

country. :Ith regnrd to isolited cascs the Royal Governnent have to draw the Imperial Government's attention to the fact that the initi:.tive is left to the individund nerchant, equally so where rifed Netherlands-Jananese undortakings are concernerl. For rossons of nublic safety the Government reserve their right to exploit certain enterprises therselves.

The Royal Gevernrent flatter thensclves with the beliof that the nreceding supplies a satisfactory explanation on those points, concerning which the Japanese Governrent might entertain some doubts. It is possible, however, that specific cuestions ray occasionaliy erise concerning dofinite subjects, which heve : benring on the econoric reletions between the Netherinnds Inclies and. Japan. In such case the point et issue could be discussed snd arranged betreen the Janenese Consul Gonoral in Batevia and the uthoritias desicneter? by the Governient of the Netherlinds Indies. The Netherlend Governnent bollove thet in most coses these ouestions crn be solvec. in this manner.

\section*{APPENDIX}

Sone observations on the 13 export products, mentioned in the note from the Japanese Consul General in Batavia to the Governcr Genoral of the Netherlancls Indics, dated ley 18th, 1940, and in the note of His Excellency inf. Hachiro Arita which was handed to the Netherienos Minister sit Tokyc on May 20th, 1940.

The fieures referring to
bauxite (200,000 tons)
chrone-iron ore (5,000 tons)
nickel ore ( 150,000 tons)
tin and tin-ore ( 3,000 tons)
rubber (20,000 tons)
cinchona berk ( 600 tons)
ricinus soeds ( 4,000 tens)
cio not give rise to any observntions.
The figure for petroleum-products ( \(1,000,000\)
tons) is considerably hifiner than the rverage export fron the Netherlnnds Indies to Japan during the last three ycars. The oxport vas in
\begin{tabular}{ll}
1937 & 869,000 tons \\
1938 & 668,000 tons \\
1939 & 573,000 tons
\end{tabular}

The oil companies in the Notherlands Indies iay be able to supply the required quantities, provided the Jepenese on their part, conclude the contracts in tirie.

It is possible to proc.uce a quantity of 100,000 tons of seit, proviclec a contrect is concludod for saveral years, since it vill bo nocess?ry to put now solt-rorks into operation. The silt production in the Netherlinds Indies is intended exclusively for the hone rincket, whilst the reserves orr eimost exheusted owing to unfavoursble atmospheric conditions. Normally it will not be possible to start deliveries before Novamber 1940. It might be nossible te odvance this eate if a contract con bo concluded for several yer.rs. This would ensure the supply of the necossery rescrves.

The firure for scran-iron (100,000 tons) is in excess of the quentity :nnusily ivailable for export. In 1937 the oxport erounted to 103,700 tons, in 1938 to 60,600 tons anc in 1939 to 47,200 tons, which quantitius vere exported alriost exclusively to Janen. We are willine to guarantce thet the oxpcrt to Japen of the quantitios of scran-iron ivailsble for export will not be subject to any restrictions.

It is apnorent thet the fisure fer mangonese ore ( 50,000 tons) connct be correct. The totel exports, which represonted imost the entire outnut, smountod in 1937 to 15,700 tons, in 1938 to 11,200 tons and in 1939 to 7,300 tons. of these quintities inost nothine mes bcught by Jeysn. Ap:irt fror the mines at prasent under oxploitrtion, we io not know of the existence of any otror irportent streta. In so far as the contracts under execution permit, Japen can freely buy this product.

The figures for wolfram and for nolyrbdenun (1,000 tons) ire not in cocordance with production fieures. "lolfren is obtained only in vory sroll quantities throush the exploitation of tin. These quantitias, mountine to at most n few tons a year, wore alveys exported to Janan. There never has been ony export of rolybienur!. It is but rarely found in the Netheriands Indies.
* * * On the other hend, the first meesures to control and to linit Unitad States exports of mineral oil and oil products (perticularly of avistion spirit) to Jepan were taken curine the last deys of July. The Jepanese prenptly raised the figure of their annual oil renuiremonts fron the Netherlencis Indies to troo million tnns.

The exch inge of notes here related hod herdly resched its conclusion when the Japenese eivernrent repented their projossis for negotiation on a more comprehensive sc:ic. On the sixteenth of July they inforred the Netherland rinister in Tokyo of their intention to send a delegation to Batavia for econoric negotiations, under the chairranship of Mr. Soko, former ambassedor to Polend, and coriprisine a nutber of assistants, nilitery oxperts on wer raterials, oll experts, etc. The censul general in Batevie, ir. O. Salto, a very fagressive and expensionist character, ras to be included in the celegation \(\boldsymbol{*}_{*}\)

If the subject menter of the pronosed negotiations remined rather hezy, the question of personiel wes very ruch in the foregrounc. A chance of cabinet had led to the elinination of Mr. Seko. In his place Mr. Semert, forrer ambesse. ior to Brazil, vas named as chief delegate, to be eronped again presently for General Koiso. Genoral Kciso, however, had given an interviev te the press on the third of August, in which he had steted in rether violent terns thet the Netherland regime h.d always been mest oppressive towras the indigencus population of the Incies; he could not, in the viow of the Netherlenc qovernment, be accentable as s delcecite without at least a nublic retraction or cenial of that stetement.

While this question was still hanging fire, the Japonese governient suddenly, on the twenty-seventh of August, hancled a meroranduin to the Notherland minister at Tokyo, begeing to inform the Notherland iovern?ent that ? special envcy to the Netherlends Indies had been enpointod in the nerson of Mr . I. Kobeyoshi, rinister of coryerce and industry in the Konot cabinet. He voulc bo soconcled in his nission, to establish closer econonic reletions between the two countries, by IIr. T. Ote, chief of section in the Gail:ushe, and by Mr. O. Saito, Japenese consul general in Batavia. They were to be accor:panied by a steff of twenty-four assistants, inclucing one ariy, one :ir, and two nevel officers. This impressive company was to sail fron Kobe on august 31.

Joint statenent of the two dolege.tions, de.ted October 16, 1940.

The Japanese a.nd Netherland deloentions cane together at Selabintanah near Soekajoeri fron 14 th till l6th October 1940 under the chairmanship of their Excellencies Hinisters Kobayashi and Van Mook.

During several meetings and personal talks the general reletions between Japan and the Netherlands Indies vere discussed. In these discussions due n.ttention was given to the effect of the recent pact between Japan, Germany and Italy on the relations with the Netherlands Indies. The Japanese delegation in this respect officially expressed their oninion as follows:
"In spite of the tripartite treaty recentiy concluded among Japan, Germany and Italy, the strong desire of Japan for the maintenance and promotion of the friencly relations between Japan and the Netherlenis Incies is not affected in the lonst. All that is wished for by Jrpan is co-existonce and co-prosperity with neighbouring countries." The Netherland delegetion could appreciate this point of view.

Arongst the cther points which came into discussion the most prominent iten was the oil problen. Elaborate explanations of the oil siturtion in the Netherlends Indies were fiven by the Netherland delegation anc? the chief of the Netherlinds Indies Mining Bureau who was also present.

The delegations are to continue the negotiations in Batavia on the understanding that the complete scope of subjects will come into ?iscussion in the necr future.

The delegations were pleased that the negotiations were conducted in the nost friendly atrosphere.

The Netherland delegation took the position that, although Japan's accession to the Tripartite Pact could not but raise serious misgivinfis in a country at war with Gerranym it was prepared to continue negctirtions on the understending that Japan had no hostile intentions towards and dica not ciain leadership over the Netherlands Indies. It kept urging the submission by the Japanese of a full statement of the points to be discussed, but saw no objection to treating the matter of oil purchases seperately. These purchnses were neinly a
matter of agreement between the Japanese buyers and the oilproducing corpanies, and as both perties rere represented in Batavia, the contact--for which the Netherland delegation would be ple sed to lend its zood offices-would be easy.

In the menntiaie the Japenese dermands vith regard to the purchese of miner?l oil and oil products had eradually becone more defined. About a week oftor the opening conference, the fcllorine specification was produced, enunerating Japan's annual ninirun requirenents-over end above the regular sales made by the companies s.nd allowed by the Jopenese governrent-of Netherlencis Indies oil in tons of 2,240 pounds.
\begin{tabular}{lr} 
1. Crucle 0il & \\
(a) Aviation cruce & \(1,100,000\) tons \\
(b) Crude oil for lubricants & 100,000 tons \\
(c) Other & \(1,050,000\) tons \\
2. Avintion snirit (cver 87 octane) & 400,000 tons \\
3. Diesel oil & 500,000 tons \\
& \\
& \(3,150,000\) tons
\end{tabular}

It was, in pert erronecusly, contended thet contracts had already been acreed upon for the celivery of 120,000 tons of aviation crucle, 792,000 tons of other crudes, and 100,000 tons of cvintion spirit to be delivered per ennun. f fiveyear gucrantee of the Netherlinds Indies governrent was demanded that these ninirun requironents should be regularly fulfilled.

After a few more difficulties and hesitations, direct contact wes establisherl between Mr. Mukai, who had been put in cherge of the oil business by the Jopanese, and the companies. There were many runours, at the tire, about this natter; the clearest staterent of facts is containod in the proposals as forrulated by the cormonies and tronsmitted to Mr. Mukai on October 8. There was no chanee in the figures efterwards; the proposals vers eccepted on the eighteenth of Octcber end the contrects rere eventually drawn up on this basis. Compared with the original dernnds the net results for Janan werc the acquisition of:
1. 120,000 tons of aviation crude insteed of \(1,100,00\) tons;
2. 100,000 tnns of crude for lubricents of an extrerely doubtrul quality, but eventually to be usec as Diesel cil;
3. 540,000 tons of cther crudes instend of \(1,050,000\) tons;
4. a single spot sale of 33,000 tons of aviation spirit instead of 400,000 tons annuelly;
5. 116,500 tons of Diessl oil instead of 500,000 tons
\[
\times \times \times \times \times \times \times \times \times
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In the neantime the Netherland minister hed handed an aide nemoire, on the iffteenth of Noveriber, to Mr. Ohashi, viceminister of foreign affairs ir Tokyo, to draw the attention of the Japanese governrent to the fact that the negotiations were at a standstill for lack of subject matter, and to recomend their discontinuation. This was answered by a note verbale of Noverber 20, announcing the imminent appointment of a new specinl envoy who was to instil renewed activity into the proceedines. On Novenber 28 this successor turned out to be Mr. K. Yoshizowa, nember of the House of Peers and former minister of foreign affairs. He was due to arrive in Batavia on the twenty-third of Dacenber and would carry on with the aid of \(M\) : Ishizewa, the new consul general. * * *

\section*{Menorantum presented by the Japanese delegation on January 16, 1941.}

Most of the vast territories of the Netherlands Indies, abundant in natural resources, are very thinly populated and still remain undeveloped, vaiting for exploitation and developrent in wide fields. It is beyond question that the exploitation and the develop:ent of these areas would bring benefit not only to the Netherlends Indies but also to Jannn and, at the same time, would contribute to the welfare of the world.

As a natter of fact, Japan and the Netherlands Indies stand in the relation of econonic interdependence, the former being geographically situated mach nearer to the latter than any other Euronean or Anerican powers. Accordingly, a eqrent liportance should be stressed upon the necessity of strengthening the eccnonic relations between the two countries. Japan is earnestly desirous of participating in the exploitation of the netural resources in the Netherlands Indies, and of pronoting the trade and sther econoric relations with her. It is Japen's firn conviction that a great contribution would also be nade towards the prosperity of the Netherlands Indies herself, if the Netherlands Indies Governrent would see their way to neet Japan's desires and facilitate the economic activities in the Netherlands Indies of Japonese nationals.

In the view abovementioner, the Japanese Gcverneent wish to present the following proposals to the Netherlands Indies Governnent:

\section*{I. THE ENTRY OF JAPANESE NATIONALS AND OTHER AFEAIRS}
(1) Modification of the restriction on entry.
(a) Procedure laid down in the Foreign Labour Ordinance (Ordonnantie Vreemdelingenarbeid) be simplified in order to pernit entry of the Japenese nationals, possessing nassports issued by the Japanese Gevernment, up to the raxirum number as stipulated in the Netherlands Incios Intry Ordinance (Toelatingsbesluit)-for example, 1,633 persons in the year of 1940, with the exception of the folloring cases mentioned in (b) and (c).
(b) Perrission of entry be granted to Japanese nationals who are required for carrying on exploitation and developrent enterprises in Buiten Gevesten--especinily Suratra, Borneo and Great East, Where speedy developnent can hardly be expected without the entry of substantial number of Japanese nationcis.
(c) Japanese nationals who are permitted to enter for terporary stay, be not included in the number, rentioned in (a) above cited.
(c.) The entry tax be abolishec.
(2) Elinination of difficulties concerning explorations.
Any difficulties whetever concerning
exploretions, necessary for carrying on
enternrises and for other econonic activities, be elirinated.
(3) Freedon of nedical practice by Japanese doctors.
Restricticns inposed upon nedical practice be rodified in order that Japanese nationnls, who re qualified in Jnpon as doctors (including dentists), :ay be granted permission for their nedical practice in the Netherlands Indies.







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already in the first stafe of the conversations ensuing from the related exchargo of iercrancia, the Netherland delegation had to caution its Joponese opronents that a Jopanese occupation of southern Indo-China vould constitute a nilitary menace torrards the Natherlends Indies of such a seriousness that it would cancel any agreenent reached in the economic sphere. Between March and liay, 1941 Mr. Matsuoka nade his European tour and returned full of adriration for the Axis and with a Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact in his pocket.

As Japan installed herself ever rore firmiy in Indo-China and Thailand the notential leak in the blockade of Germeny widened. The two countries together produced 130,000 tons of rubber annually as against a Japanese consumption in past years of 50,000 tons; her need for 10,000 tons of tin per annurn mas exceeded by at least 50 per cent in the production of her new sphere of influence. \(* * *\)

\section*{itremorandun presented by the Japanese deleccition on iliay 14/22, 1941.}

In reconsiceration of the merorandum, which the Japenese delegation presentec to the Netherland delegation on the 16th. Jan. 1941, they herein present to the lietherland delegation the following new proposal. They wish to make it clear, however, that the Japanese viewpoint exnressed in the preamble of the above-nentioned nerorondur: is firmly held by the Japanese Governrent.

\section*{I. THE BNTRY OF JAPANESE NATIONALS}
(a) With regard to the entry of Japanese erployees, when erployers concerned apply for lebour pernits for their employees, the Governnent of the Netherlands Indies will give favourable consideration for speedy granting of as rany permits as possible, as far as circuristances ellow, within the limits of existing regulations, and the permits to be Eranted will be at least 1,600 ner annur!.
(b) Ermloyees, for whon their ermloyers apply for labour perits in order to replace existing erplcyees, and employees for whor! their erployers apply for the extension of labour nermits, and these whose purpose of entry is of teriporary nature, are not included in the number, cited above in the paragraph (a).
(c) In consideration of the necessity in various districts, the Government of the Netherlands Indies will pernit, as a whole, a certain number of Jepanese doctors (including dentists) to enter the Netherlands Indies, if their object is to practise medical treatment solely to Japanese residents.

It is also understood that Japanese doctors (including dentists) who are pernitted to practise redical treatrent to Jcpanese employees vorking for Japanese enternrises in outer regions, can extend their medical treatment, when necessary, to employees or servants of other nationalities working in the sare enterprises.

\section*{II. ENTERPIISE AND BUSINESS}

Thenever Japanese nationals concerned subnit concrete applications for consent or perrission for establishrient or extention etc. of various enterprises and businesses, either in own account or in joint account with Netherland enterprisers, the Governrent of the Netherlands Indies will give favourable consideration to the said applications and, es far as there are no special obstacles orins; to the reasons of national defence or to the necessity of reservation for the subjects of the Netherlands Indies, they will allow previous investigetions, which are deened necessary for the execution of their pians, and will give consent or pernission for the sale. ostabilshrient or extention etc.

When the said consent or permission has once been given, the Government of the Netherlanc s Incles will give favourable treatment and necessary facilities es ruch as possible for the engagerent of erployees, the builaing up of transportation equipnents and other needed establishments etc.

\section*{IV. TRADE AND CORMERCE}

The Governnent of the Netherlands Indies state that, in view of the circunstances that the derand of Japanese industries on the products of the Ietherlands Indies is rapidly increasing and the increasing irport of Japancse articles
will contribute towerds the promotion of the welfare of the noonle of the Netherlands Incies, they recosnize the importance of the position Japan is now occunying and vill occupy in the future in the foreign trade of the Netherlands Iniies, and will take the tollowing measures to be effectec? for one yesir encing . . . 1942.
1. (a) The quotes and or the percentages as shown in the attached tables I and II shall be allotted to articles to be imported from Japan into the Netherlands Indies.
(b) Japanese importers in the Netherlancis Indies shall be given import percentages ranging fron 10 to 30, according to the kinds of articles.
2. Unconcitional and prompt permission shall be given for the exportation to Japan of the products of the Hetherlands Indies rentioned in the a.ttoched Iist.
3. With regard to the import ciuties, export toxes, surtaxes and official prices (inolucing the prices in the Price List), not only no discriminatory treatrent sheil be given to the articles irported fron and or exported to Japan, but also favourable treatnent shall be accorded to then.

Memorandun presented by the Netherland delegation on June 6, 1941.

\section*{Prearible}

From the memoranda, presented by the Japanese economic delegation on Miy 14th and 22ne 1941, the Netherland delegation heve noticed with satisfaction that the Jananese proposals have been modified in several instances ofter the thorough discussion of the various noints at issuc in the course of the negotictions. They value these nodifications as a result of the endeavours of the Japanese delegation to adapt the Japanese proposals, es originally formalated, to the exigencies of the present abnormal circurstances, and to meet to a certain extent the objections raisec. by the Netherlanc? celegation on eccount of the incompatibility of \(a\) nurnber of those proposcls with the principles of econoric policy in the Netherlanas Indies.


To this end the views of the Netherland Government in respect to inch of these auestions s.re set forth herebelow.

\section*{1. The Entry of Jananese Nationals}
(a) The purpose of the Foreign Labour Ordinance is to reserve employment in the Netherlands Indies as far as possible for the inhsbitants of the country. Consequently labour perrits can only be eranted to foreighers if their labour is deemed necessary and no Netherland subjects are nvailable for the specific position. Furtherrore it is uncerstoo? that the erppyer concerned sholl, as for as nossible, provicie adequate practicel training for Netherland subjects to fill future vacancies. The need of foreign employment is almays estirated in a liberal way, a policy which will be continued. The Netherland Governrent aim at an expediticus handling of anplications for lebour nermits as far as is feasible in connection with the nocessity to obtain advice fror the eifferent authorities concernod and, in some cases, of locel investigation.

Bocouse of the vital interests involved the Netherlenc: Government do not see their ray to \&ive an assurance that in a number of cases labour pemits would be granted to foreigners without taking into account the basic principles of the ordinance. Therefore the unconditional puarentie of atlyission of Japanese nationals up to the full quota, os asked for in the Jopanese rerorandum, which :oreover would constitute an inadmissible discrivinstion esainst other foreign countrics, cennot be given.
(b) In this connection the cuestion, as to vhether the Granting of certsin labour nerrits shoulc or should not be included in the r.forenentioned auota, does not seen to need further discussion.
(c) The Netherland Government are willing to \(\ddot{\varepsilon}\) ive favcurable consiceration to a chance in the existing rogulations in order to perrit a strictly lirited number of Japanese dectors to enter the Netherlands Indies for medical practice, solely amongst Japanese resicents, in those nleces where the number of Japenese residents rould justify such e course. An extension of their nedic:l practice to all employees or servants working for Japanese enterprises is not appropriate, as the majority of those employees and servants consists of peonle of non-Jabanese origin.



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Uncier the present unsettled circunstances it seens imossible to enter into any corritment concerning the quantitios of certain commodities, which will be imorted fror any narticular country, even during the next twelve months. The Netherland Governrent are, however, nrenared--if such is wished for by the Jananese Government in the interest of the regulation of procuction in Joman--to state the arantities of goos.s for which durine the next six months verrits will be issued for irmortation from countries at choice, on which pernits importation from Japan will be nossible as long as prices and terns of delivery cen meet corpetition fron other countries. These quantities will have to be determiner. accorcing to the scturl needs of the Netherlands In ?ies.
(b) The Netherland Government rerain of the opinion that the position of Jonanese irnorters in the Netherlends Incles has been satisfactorily settled on the basis of the abovementioned agreements, and that they could not, without causing uncue harm to other interests concerned, enlarge tilis share.
2. The necessities of wer rencor it irmossible for the Netherland Government to enter into any ebligation to grant neriits unconi.itionally for the exportetion of verious corrorlities for as long a period as the next twelve nentrs. Any staterient of policy in this resnect, even for a ruch slorter space of time, must be subjected to the proviso that it connot be bindine rhenever, in the judgment of the lietherland. Government, the full execution woulc be of direct or indirect cadvantage to the enemy or harrful to the interests of the Kinpdon and its allies.

As, hovever, the Netherland Governrient appreciate the difficulty for the Japanese Government to adjust their internal econonic policy on a basis of cormlete uncertainty with regerd to imports frow the Netherlands Incies, the Netherland Government have no objection to state--under the express proviso rentioned heretofore-their intentions with regarc. to restrictions of exports for the year 1941 as cetermined by their view on the present situetion. Such a statement is crafted in the secor annex of this nerorandun. It need not be expressly mentioned in this connection that, although the Netherlend Government rust vindicate their right to be the sole judges of the exigencies of war with regard to exoorts, the ordinary channels of international intercourse remein anen for the consiceration of facts and corploints.

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3. With regord to the ir!nort duties, exort taxes, surtixes and official yidees the sare trentnent will be iciven to enmodities imported from and exnorted to Jopen, as to comedities imported from and exported to ail other countries, in accordance with the principle of nondiscrininatinn.
* * * * * * * *

The delegations net ance :ore, on the tenth of June, at the request of inr. Yoshizawa. It bacare quite clenr at this reetin!: that the Jepanese wished to winc. up their business. They asked only for a number of technical elucitations in order to conplete the report to their governnent.

The next norning, June 17, 1941, Mr. Yoshizawa asked for an aucience of the governor general.

After the usual complinents, itr. Yoshizarra opened the discussion by nointing out that the Japanese government had drewn un their last nronosals in an extreaely conciliatory spirit, so ruch so theit they would run treat risk of general disapprobation if the cocument were to be published. Nevertheless, the answer of the Netherlan: delegetion has been wholly unsatisfactory ons therefore could not provicle a sufficient basis for an agreerent. He wes instructed to ask the governor genersl to reconsider that answer. If that was innossible, his povernment hed clecided to discontinue the negotintions and to recall their Gelegntion. The povernor genernl realied that he anpreciated the conciliatory attitude of the Jananese government, but thet the Netherlant governnent were conticly convincod thet an agreenent could not be reached on the teris pronosed. In all sincerity he could not see his way to succest any alterntions in the stancpoint of his eovernnent as forminter in the lest Hetnerland memorancum. He adder, hovever, that it his jurgment the negotiations had not been altogether unproductive, although no agreenent hed omanoted. The respective positions har deen very searclingly and patiently analysed, and even if the narties coulc not ofree, they had at lesst been able to cone to a better understanding of each othar.

Mr. Yoshizewa nroceered to state that although the negotiations had broucht no ngreenent, the Jananese fovernnent vanted to see the general trade nol econoric relations mintained as hitherto. The governor gerioral concurred. The failure to niree was to be expected, as the liatherlands Indies could not further extend their alreody very liberal policy, in the manner reonmenced





































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"COVER"
Item 2
Separate Document IMo. 2

Decision of Liaison Conference 27 July 1940 /SHOWA 15/

Gist of Kein Points in Rearard to Dealine with the
Situation to meet the Change In
World Conditions.

Qist o: Main Points in regard to dealing with the situation to meet the change in Yorld Conditions.
1. To improve conditions at home and abroad to cope with changes in the world situation.
2. To accelerate the settlement of the China Incident by promently etrengthening policies towards CHINA for the main puroose of preventing Third Powers from ansisting thr CHIANG regime.
3. To settle the Southern Problems within the limits so as not to cause a war against a Third Pover.
4. To fulfil nopecially the followine matters es policies foro.bove timen clauses.
(1) To fostrr a strong politicel tie with GHPMARY end ITALY and to take active strps in the adjustment of diplomacy towerds the SOVIFT UNION while maintainine a firm front towards the UNITED STATES.
(2) To strangthen policies towards FRWNCH INDO-CHINA, HONGKONG and Settlements to check essistancoto the CHIAMG Reeime and root out the feeling of pumity towerd Japair.
(3) To etrengthen the diplometic policy towprin the DUTCH BAST INDIES in ordnr to ohtein important materinis.
(4) To reform the war-time organization at homn.


G. \({ }^{*} 1311\)

Page 1

(Proposal Ho. 1)
A. Froposed Princiules
1. The Imperial Governant kas previously sabmittea to the Netherlance Governnent our demands regarding the settlement of the important problems pendine between japan ank the Dutch Indies. According to the reply in official correspondence dated 6 June of this year, which was mede in this connection by the Dutch zinister in Tokyo to Foreign Minister ARImA, it is understood that the iert regarding the securing of the supply of our essential goods has been generally accepted. It is recuested that tine above security be observed in the future.

However, the Lietherlands Government still does not fully understand our true intentions in the problems concerning the entrance of Jajanese nationals into the Ditch Indies, and enterprises and investments by Janazese nationals in the Dutch Indies for the development and utilization of its rich resources, which are regarded as of the utmost irportance by the Japamese Government.

It has been fully recognized during previous negotiatio:is that the settlement of these problems has been our national dosire for many years. However, the Fietherlands Governnent, without the least friendly consideration from a general ana practical standooint, is still repeatirai its biased legal arguments and the Imperial Government cannot help but express its great disappointment ard dissatisfaction.

It is the desire of the Imperial Government, tierefore, to express frankly our opinions on tinese problevs of entry, enterprise and investment and to seets the profound consideration of the yetherlands Government.
2. In the first place trere is no question but that ti:e present world instability and friction between netions are cansed mainly by unjust distribution of resources due to urreasonaile territorial situations.

For instance, in the resent world sitieetion, there are vast undeveloped areas with abundent resources in one part, end on the other iand, there are not e few nations sufferine from lack of

> resourcea .
resources and over-population while possesting vigorous powere of existence. Such a situation is really irrational, and unless it is rationalized and put right there will be international conflict and no cause ever to hope for peace between nations.

Coneequently, in order to prevent the development of such a eituation, it will be of vital importance for countries possessing vast undevelopod territories of rioh resources to voluntarily open their resources to the vorld, ellow free entrance of other nationals, and abolieh all restrictions imposed on business enterpriees and all other economic activities.
3. The Japanese Empire willingly recognizes that the policies teken in the past by the Netherland Government toward Dutcil Indies have contributed, to some extent, to the peace and prosperity of Eest Abia by permitting comparatively free and equal economic activities to all nations alike.

However, it is regrettable that the policy taken by the Netherlands Government toward the Dutch Indies in recent years is of the nature of a closed-ioor policy. The Dutch Indies ray be under Netherlands control, but geographicelly it is situated within the Co-prosperity Sphere for the East Asia races. Accordingly, the jetherlande should first open her rich resources in the Dutch Indies to the races in East Asia and tien for the proscerity and welfare of all mankind.

In opite of this, the Netherlends Government, of late, has come down heavily on the side of the interests of the Dutch aiad other Europeans. Eerly on she gave vast rights to a few nations, geographically distant from the Dutch Indies, for important enterprises, especially mining in that country, without any desire for the prosperity and welfare of the Last Aria Co-prosperity Sphere.

In particular it is not only very unreasonable for the Netherlands to have chosen a closeci-door policy toward japan, with her great abilities for exploration and development, but it in a neglect of duty on her part as a member of the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.
inine Imperial Gover.mont kan pointed nut tinis unreasorablencess and has ropratedy asked the Netherlands Govera-ont fer rafrnajueretion, to the present we rave still been uilabie to get any reaults. The Erpire deeply regreta that this has Eiven rige to a feeling of groat disentisfection emone tie government and people of Jepan.
4. With regard to the ricws mentioned above, ans slao in consideration of the interial affairs of tine Dutch indiee cnd her reletions with third powers, the Imperial Goverament, for the time being, hereby subnits our sincere aind fronk demands. It is accoraingly requested tiset your sicue promptly egree to thine denancis in a broad-minded outlook baped on the traditioral frieady relations between Japen and the ivetherlande.

Be Priaciple Demanda.
I. The Problem of Entrence into the Dutciz Incies.

As it is the nresent Foreigners Lebour Law in the Dutch Indies that is orovir a great obstacle in hopiris for the economic development in the Dutch Indics so badiy wented by the Imperial Governine:st, and as this law is the ubject of profouid dieantiafaction amongst the Jnonaese Government and people, the Imerial Governnent wishes to propose ab follows our minimum demands regerainf the modification of the Entry Lew:

The quote for japenese entry into the Dutch I:.dies under the prese::t Dutch Indies Eutry Law in 300 on the orcinary quota and 833 on additional quota (In the event of the total number of Foreigir Imaigrants not reaching 10,000 a rear, \(10 \%\) of tho totel number oi Jepanese who entered from 1924 to 1933 shell be permitted to enter), making a total of 163z. The entry of Jepenese, withia this limit, and restricted to those havine passijorts issued by the Imperial Goverment with neoessery recozmitioa shall be permitted freely without puttine them through the troiblesome procecurc prescribed in the Foreigners Lajour Law.

Exceptions:
(a) Dersonacl necessary for the preperatory investifertions ard business mangem:nt in the new enterprises, \(\varepsilon .3\) prescriked in (1) of II O: the following, shr.ll sot be ircluded in the above entry quotr.
(b) Temporary travellers resinime in the intci Indies for a period of one jear or less ahall not be incluned in the above quote.
\(\therefore\) OCOMHNT a748A (E)
Page 4
(o) The collection of entry tax shall be abolished.
it II Tho Problem e of Enterprise 日 and Investments
(1) Lien Enterprises.

Recently, the Dutch Indies Government by the iesue or revision of various laws or through policies other thai: laws, has reserved for itself almost ell of the prospective mining districts for petroleum and other important minerals winch we regard as of the greatest importance. It has thus rot only become impossible for the Japanese to obtain these mining rights, but the transfer of existing mining rights has also been prohibited.

On the other hond, the United States and Great Britain, prior to the issue or revision of these lave or the decision: of the Government's policies, have secured prospective mining districts for petroleum and other important minerals and are mining on a large scale. Therefore, the Imperial Government at this juncture requests the Dutch Indies Government that mining of petroleum and various minerals, applications pertaining to miaing by japanese nationals, applications pertaining to the establishment of various nev enterprises, other then mining, and tie transfer of present rights held by Japeacse Rationale, all be permitted from the standpoint of equal opportunity, irrespective of the present laws and government joifcier.

Moreover, in regard to now enterprises by Japanese nationals, free carrying out of acturi investigation in ares recognized by the Japerose as being prospective shrill be permitted even before proceedings are taken for applications es prescribed in the mining laws or other laws concerned. Nev enterprises which we wish to undertake at present, ere as follows:
(a) Mini:2g

Prospecting and mining in all the petroleum mining regions in the Dutch Indies (including government reserved areas) as desired by the \(\bar{J}\) apanese. Prospecting aid mining of various minerals in ell the prospective mining regions for other minerals in the Dutch Indies (i:coludiag government reserved areas), as desired by the jopaiese. Applications for mining rights by those laving the right to prospect shill be granted without fall.
(b) Other Enterprises.

The establishment of air-routeo between Japan ana the Dutch Indies.

The establishment of new navigation routes between Japan ard the Dutch Indies. The laying of submarine cables between Javan and the Dutch Indies.

Other fishery, forestry, agriculture, manufacturing industries, etc., as desired by Japan.

In connection with the establishment of new entervisises as (a) and (b), mentioned above, the Dutch Indies Government authorities shall give all possible assistance and cooperation and render every favour to their investigations and different preparations.
(2) Expansion of Existing Enterprises.
(a) \(\qquad\) Mining.

All applications by Jepanese rationals for prospecting and mining that are now under consideration shall be granted at once. (For example:

Nickel and iron ore in the Celebes, applied for by Teubono; Mica, applied for by Haraguchi).

Expansion of mining enterprises now being managed by Japanese nationals shall be allowed to facilitate their development and rational management. for example,

Petroleum by the Batarifech 011 Miff.)
Obstacles preventing actual development of mining rights presently owed by Japanese nationals shall be removed. (For example,

Opening the Port of Patjitan for the development of the Ishihara Copper Mine in Patjiten, Java).
(3) Shaping

Restriction of navigation areas against Japanese ships, (No. 1 Tore Mary, owned by Shiobara. Fuku and Dato Marl owned by Nanyo Kohatsu, both in Soerabaye, which are permitted to engage in costal trade in the Dutch Indies shall be abolished and the increase of ships shall be recognized.

Seaports, which have been closed since 1935, shell be reopened, and the imitation on tomege of sinips entering the ports shall be abolished.

> (c) Agriculture.

Expansion of present farms shall be recognized to facilitate
their development and rational management and all restrictions and obstacles shall also be removed. (For oxarmle,

The exparsion of the cotton cultivating farms owned by Tango. Kohatsu Co. in New Guinea, and the expansion of quinine cultivation by the Trkecia Farms in Java, and permission of expiration to Jape: of the products of this farm).

\section*{(d) Fishing Industries.}

The present fishing industry shell be given a chance to develop. In other words, since almost all fishing enterprises by japanese nationals co:selst of deop-ser fishing, which involves no competition with native fishing industries, an increase in fishing boats and fishermen necessary for management shall be permitted. The restrictions pertraining to the port of import for marine products neal be abolished, and at the same time, these products sal bo exempted from import duties. Ice manufacturing and other collateral undertakings necessary for tho movement of the above fishing industry she ill be excluded from present business regulations and shall be freely permitted.

\section*{(e) _Other Enterprises}

Business regulations shell be abolished for all warehousing, pristine, weaving, ice manufacturing, rubber-amoking factories, etc., that have connections with Japanese nationals.

\section*{III}

Newspapers
(1) Heretofore, the Dutch Indies' authorities fave me. de it their policy to prevent Japanese from running Malayan and Chinese newspapers. Japanese from now on shall be granted permission to run them as well as Dutch and Chinese.
(2) In the pant the general Dutch Indies officials and people have had no knowledge of Japan and the Jejarese and there Leave been many regrettable features in their attitude towards japan, thus greatly hampering the friendly relations between tho two countries. Especially since the spreading of tie war to the wetherlends tie constant acts of violence aid insult committed by the Dutch Indies officirls and people against the Japanese living there, were caused by the lack of understanding of the intentions of our country and by the extremely precautionary measures they adopted toward the Japanese whit instigated the general fooling. On the other hard, the principal cause cen be attributed to the Ar.ti-jayancse attitude of the Dutch Indian newspapers;

\section*{'DOCUMENT 2748A (2)}
which had given rise to the people's general illwill toward the Japanese. The Imperial Government thus demences the thorough supervision of these newspapers as follows:
(a) Newspapers run by the Dutch.

The anti-Jrpenese attitude is strongest in the Dutch :awspapers, and in spite of the fact that the Dutch papers are in a position to lead Chinese and Malayan newspapers, they were hardly ever supervised. They shall be thoroughly supervised from now 0:2.
(b) Nowsyapors run by the Chinese.

Supervision of the Chinese :uppers is still lukewarm. Furthermore, the papers run by the Chines io not always represent the general public opinion of the Canines living in the Dutch Indies. They are forcibly implanting antimiapanese feeling and loading tine antimapanese movement aid the boycott of Japanese cods. It is no exaggeration to say that the attitude of the Dutch Indies authorities has been to. overlook these facts, On the other hand, the Dutch Indies authorities banned the publication of a Jajnnese : peeper when it printed an article In support of Waring Chirg-wei, on the grounds that it instigated the feeling of time Chinese in the Dutch Indies; and they also prohibited any import of now spoors published in our occupied territories in China, on the grounds that they were of an anti-Chiane tendency. This discriminating attitude of the Dutch Indics authorities can be said to be pro-Chinese and anti-Jepanese. Therefore, wo domend a stricter supervision from now on over newspapers run br the Chinese and iso demand revision of the biased attitude toward our own newryepors.

DOCUMENT 2748A, (2)


(The Second Proposal)
A._Pronosed Principles
1. In the present condition of the world, there ere some countries which leave large areas undeveloped because of insufficient developing capacities in spite of their occupying vest lands, which are rich in resources, and on the other hand there exist some countries which are suffering from population pressure and from lack of resources though they have very active productive capesities. This condition is well called unreasoneblo indeed, and the present European war itself is, after all, nothing but the outbreak of disaetiafaction on the part of the newly risen nations egrimest the old order based on tho unreasonable and unjust distribution of territories and resources.
2. Well, let us look ait the present conditions in East Asia: Two or three powerful Buropean rations have occupied vast areas in Fast Asia as colonies and have left the greater part undeveloped with only the mailer parts dovoloped. In spite of this fact, these nations adhere to policies of oxclusion against the nations that are building their countries in East Asia. However, the /Japaneso/Empire ias a confined territory and poor resources, eves though it has a big population with a high rate of increase and excellent expansion powers. On the other hand, besides Japan, the territories of the nations of Fast Asia, except Thailand, ard now, all utilized as colonies, chiefly for the neceseltios end interests of the sovereign European nations, and no opportunities for sufficient advancement and development either politically or economically are given by the european nations to the original people who are kent in the position of conquered. This is extremely unfair.
3. The /Japanese/ Empire is now devoting itself to the mission of establishing; a nev: order in Eat Asia, and it is the desire of the Japanese Empire to contribute for the firm establishment of eternal peace of the whole world by creating a reciprocel relationship of supply between the new order sphere, which is to be organized in Europe and America, and the \(:\) self-sufficient East Asia Comprosperity Sphere centered around Japan, Manchuria and China, and including the South Pacific.
4. Well, as the Dutcin Indies is a vast area with rich resources within the East Asia Co-jrospority Sphere it is quite reaso:able that its resources should be quickly developed for the sake of the prosperity and welfare, first of the people of Bast Asia, and then of the people of the world.

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Doc. No. 2748A(6)

SHOMA 15 /1940/
Received A.M. 14th Sept. Foreign Ministry Despatched P. M. 13th Sept. Batavia
/To:/ Foreign Minister MATSUOKA
/From:/ Representative KOBAYASHI
Conference No. 9 (Top Secret)
At my interview with the Governor-General already referred to in telegram re conference No. 5, I gained the impression that he was concerned with diplomatic formulas only.

When I hinted at the existence of discriminatory treatment toward Japan, he argued strongly that this had not been the fact in the past, and stated that in the future they would as before treat each country on a fair basis, and had no intention of practicing discriminatory treatment. The Governor-General does not realize that the prosent situation is so serious that if he remains so old fashioned as to be concerned with diplomatic formulas only, the existence of the Dutch East. Indies will be in danger, and he can not keep pace with the changing situation. He openly tried to do his utmost to evade political problems. He envinced not the slightest sign of fervor to try to sound out the true intention of the Japanese Government towards the Dutch East Indies. Inasmuch as he does not understand our real idea of friendly relations between the two countries, it is of no use for us to continue the negotiations further with such a GovernorGeneral. It has made me feel that I have come all this. way in vain.
(The following matters deal wh th telegrams)
Request you to change the numbers of telegrams despatched from here from conferences No. 1 to No. 3 to No. 5, No. 6 and No. 7.


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Doc. No. 2748A (8)
No. 8/In Japanese Ink/ SHOW 15/1940/

31616 (Code)
Dispatched: BhThVIS, October 18, P.N. Arrived: This Office, October 18, night.

To Foreign Minister NaTSUOKh
From Delegate KOB/Y/SSHI
Parley No. 82 (Wire of Request)
To the Vice-Minister of the Department of Oversea Affairs, from Khravoto
1. In establishing the Greater East J.sia Co-Prosperity Sphere under the leadership of the Empire when viewed from every possible angle, the need of placing the NEIIERLINDS INDIES within the sphere, is very urgent. Envoy KOBL.Y/SHT, his staff, and those JATLNECE who went there and observed the said place are all of the same opinion. However, in order to accomplish this, it is necessary to administer a policy in such a way as to deeply implant our economic powers in the NETHIRI, NDS JNLIES. In carrying out this policy, the Departmeat of overseas. Affairs mast at least plan the materialization of various items requested for in the budget for the next fiscal year.

Especially such items as the complete equipment of overseas organizations, the establishment of ThKUNiNJWKU/T.N. probably it is a sort of training center for the knowledge of Southern legion /. the cultivation of facilities for enlightening both Japanese subjects and /T.N. people of/ the Dutch Indics, (includes secret funds; are, we consider, matters of urgency which can not be reglected \(\in\) ven for \(a\) day. In this regard, it is requested that you kindly give your special consideration in regard to fullfilling these requirements. It is furthermore considered that matters in connection with other expenditures too can be executed within the next fiscal year.
2. is regards the above, please refer to Telegram No. 66 which ias sent by Epyoy acslyishI to the Foreign. minister.
3. Opinions regarding details will be reported to you by letter.



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No 2

Loc. No. 2748』 (20)
page 1
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1940 /Showa 15/ 32206 (cipher)
BATAVIA to FCREION OFFICE
Dispatched: 25 Oct. PN.
Received: \(250 c t\). Night
MISU" - MO"
From: Delegate SAIFO
TO : Foreign Minister NATSWKA

Commercial Negotiction No. 100
From SaITO and Ors
Feferring to our Telegram No. 96 (from MUKAI to Chief of Fucl Affairs Bureau) We think that although from the standpoint of an industrialist, it is most reasonable, it is necessary that further consideration be given on this matter from the stretegical standpoint.

Namely, From the entire submission of apilication for prosect\(\therefore\) in connection with their incicated areas, as well as from the numbers of our technical experts, we presume that we will all the more amuse their suspicion, but on our pert we think it necessary that re carry on inveatigation in regard to all the areas and have a creat number of planes and plain clothes /TN: BEN-I/ troops enter into these areas, thereby enabling it to become some sort of strategical base from the point of view of military geerations againet
the UUTCh. For this reason, unless the vast investigation area is secured, the foregoing program will seem a flimsy excuse to the DUTCi, and in view of the difference being only from 150 to 200 thoueand guilders, we deam it necessary that the prospecting rights at least be acquired over the whole areas proposed by them. Therefore, please guide the respective offices concerned keaping the above in mind.
For instance, even when me are to decide on obtaining the prospecting and mining rights for two or threc districts in each area as sugsested in the NUKSI plan, it is our desire that our strategical standpoint be given consideration in the selection of those districts and guidance be given accordingly. (end)
















等些分

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Seperate Document 14
"Cebinct Decisicn, 25 October 1940 /Stcwa 15/"
"Ke lieesures for Leconcric Developnent of N.J.I."
The inevitability \(n f\) cocurrences in econonic effairs ettencent on the procress of the Nev World Order anc tre prinrity of cur Empire in tre Netrorlends Eest Indics bescd cn tre Tripertite Pect betwecn Japen, Germeny onc. Itely necessitates rekine tre N.E.I. e link in tre Grcater Eest disie econoric sprere uncler tre leaderstip of our Enpire by esteblishine irmceiately closc conomic reletions and cleveioping enc utilizing treir rict natural resources fron the eeneral stendpoint of ce-existence end ce-prosperity in conncetion witr wrick tre followine neesures nust now be tekens
1. To stop tre N.E.I. fron relying on the EurnpeanAmerican Eernoric Blec, ene to mokc it take the standpoint as being a menber of the Greater East Asie Econcay.
2. Te raseve or ritigete verious restrictions wifict at present obstruct the conncric ectivities of Jepenese Eiving then prefercnce ond frecion in coonenic activities ebnve others
3. To propese a joint cevelonnent of tre N.E.I. sn as tc secure in tre Grcater East lasie Sprere tre supply of necessery war retcrial nccéce by tre mpire as fer as pessible, trus becomine incepencent fron British/T.N. Second Chinese creracter unreadable./ resources. If necossery, to leesc or purcresc suiteblci islends or territoric 9
4. intrough ve rave elready receivec a euarentec from the N.F.I. es to the supply of major items wift arc necessery to sur Expire, we nust furtremore obtain tre N.I. I.'s agreement with rcgarc to en incressc in vericty enc quentitics of tresc netcriels. Furtrer, to neke cvery effert for the resilzation of instituting under the Inpire's guidance tre trede contrel of inportent nercrencise especinily tin, rubber, quinine ence ethers, over which tric N.Ei.I. rave a wcrl¿ nonopoly.
5. To purcrasc as fer es jossiblc those agricultural products prociuced in tre N.E.I., whict bring profits to the natives and to stinulete treir purchasine power in order to translate co-cxistcnce en: co-prosperity into reelity. For tris purposc tre N.E.I. stould on their part eccece to our cienend es fer es pessible ence enccurace egriculturc.
 to an incrersc in tre export of Japenese nacrehandise to tran.
7. Witr a vicw to tre futurc csteblishment of a groat Lionetary sphere vithin tre Greeter Eest Asie erca under Japancsc leederstip, cfforts srell be nede to meke the N.E.I. \(\varepsilon\) link of the sprcre alsc in regarc to the establishrient of

Doc. No. 2137-G
Pegc 2
Itc!. 9
ne: monetery relations witr then, but it shell not be aimed to incluce tre N.E.I. itself in tre "YIN" bloc. To strive tn plece tre sxcrenge Contrcl in tre N.E.EI. uncer cur guidence. For tre tinc being, cvery advantege sºuld be enccorded to tre Jnpanese witr regard to the applicetion of Exchange Control in tre N.F.I. and at tre same tinc N.E.I. benks srould establish "credit" to the Jepanese, as well as exert utnost efforts to give otrer financial fecilities to tre Japencsc.
8. Las a reans to sccure the leacing position for tre whole of Grcater Eest Lsia witr regerd to traffic end comrmications, efforts shall bc rade in establishing the following specinl rights and interests.
(a) The right of coastal trede, tre rigrt of entering unopencd ports and tre right of administering and using port facilitics.
(b) The lending and operating right of subrierine cablcs, tre right of participating in tre ranegement of inland cormunicetion enterpriscs, end otrer communication rights.
(c) Tre inauguration of regular eir serviecs end the rigrt of instituting air safety equipient.
9. In order to build a steble fistory position in tre Soutr we must strive towerds increesing tre nur:ber of fishing boets, reioval of rcstrictions at ports of inport of fist, cstablishment of fishery beses, ond ecquisition of otrer rierts enci interests pertaining to tre concucting of the nerinc. product incustry.
10. To propibit tre establishment of nev: rights end interests of Trird Powers in the NoE.I. and to endeavour to oust those alrcady in existence likcly to obstruct the cxpension of our Empire.
11. To make the N.E.I. Institute en Econonic Constructionel Comrission and otrer suitable organs in wrict Jepenese will be included and perticipatc in forming tre N.E.I. doncstic and foreign economic policies end treir cnforcement, with e view towards guiding and strengtrening cononic collaboretion with tre kipire.

Tre N.E.I. stall te required to consult the abovementioned organs witr regerd to trade, finance, texation, custons duties, econonic eerecuents with thire ccuntries, enterprises, traffic end cormunications, etco

For tre time being, Joponese importers in tre N.E.I. will be vade to participate in tre Consultativc Conmittee in tre Ministry of Econor:ics.

12. To demend tre strict control of anti-Jepenese commentaries by newspepers and otrer periodicels, ot tre seme tine cnsuring freetron to Japencse in regare' to tre publication of newspepers.
13. To demend tre Nor.I. eutroritics to exercise rigid control over crinese residents assuming pro-Criang-KıiShek end enti-Jepenese attitudes. On tre otrer rand, fron a brcec viewpoint, to plan tre use of treir orgnization and rescurces in consiatration of treir econonic position.
14. In order to ensure the economic developnent of the Enpire, various reasures stall be rcsortca to, suct as inviting influcntial natives to tre Eripire, or by propagancizing the true aspect of tre einpire and creating a proper understanding trcreof.
15. Tre Economic Pclicy stell bc besed upon tre broed viewpoint of esteblishment of the Greater Eest hasia Coprosperity Sprere end efforts srall be made towards expending tre intercsts of tre Empire in ramony with the natives.
















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Doc. No, 2748A(IJ)


Commercial Negotiation \#35
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Despatched from Delegate YOSHIZAWA in BATAVIA to Foreign minister MATsuOKA

Attention: The Vice-Minister of War and the Vice-Chief of the General Staff.

HARADA's Despatch No. 8
Since then, the tendency of the NETHERLAND EAST INDIES to rely on GREAT BiIITAIN and the UNITED STATES has been increasing more and more. The defeat of the ITALIAN Amy in the Mediterranean theatre, and AMERICAN aid to GREAT BRITAIN and hor firm attitude towards JAPAN have oncouraged the NETHERLAND EAST INDIES. She is taking the optimistic viewpoint that the objectivo situation is developing favorably for the NETHERLAND EAST INDIES. Furthermore, the strengthening and development of her home defences have intensified the self-confidence of the NETHERLAND EAST INDIES. Thus, not only is she completely disregarding the Empire's East Asia CoProsperity Sphere, but she is further expressing her spirit of opposition on every raatter. Therefore it can be considered that unless our Errpire adopts determined resolutions or measures not only the progress of the Japanese-Netherland negotiations, but aiso the development of Japanese-Notherland relation would be extromely difficult.

As to the details, Lt. Col. NAKAYAMA tho is returning to JAPAN shortly shall make a report.


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As tho result, the countor-proposal to be submitted by the Netherlpide authoritios on Janurery 23, wes submitted only on February 3. And in tho intervicw of Ota and Iehizawe with the Dutch authorities, though they had egroed to the drawing up of the reenda as proposod by us, they rofusod further discussions on the ground that they could not procoed until thoy have obtained a clcar statement of the Japanose Govornment regerding the status of their government in London.

That the Dutch suthoritios should be workod up over press roports sooms to me childish. Neverthcless, if it is tho desiro of the Imperial I Govornmont to bring tho economic negotiation to a succesaful conclusion, then in tho light of tho fact that it first roougnized the Dutch Minister in Tokyo as poprosentativo of the Dutch Government in Iondon and on that basis conducted negotiations for tho conforence hero, I think it will be portinent to the occasion if your Excellency or Vico Ministor will verbelly notify the Dutch Minister that Japen recognizes the Dutch Governmont in London as both de juro and de fncto government, or let a Dict meribor pose a quostion, and reply to that effect, or, to tako any othor step thet will givo satiafaction to the Dutch.
E.

D2e. No. 2631
Page 3
CERTIFICATE

> W.D.C. No. \(\quad\).
> I.P.S. NO. 2631

Statement of Source and Authenticity
I,_ PAYASFI Kaoru hereby certify
that I'am officieliy connected witr tre Japancse Govermment in tre following capacity: Crief of Arctives section Japanese Foreign office and trat as such of ficial I have custody of the document rereto attached consisting of 4 pages, dated Febmary 44 1946, and described es follows 16 th years of shown, 3021 (cone) despatered from Betayia, Feb 6 A Me arrived Forejan Office Fch 6 P 1 Mnister Matsuokas
I further certify trat tre attacred record and document is an official document of the Japenese Government, and tret it is part of the official arcrives and files of tre following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foretin Office

Signed at Tokyo on this /7th ent day of turestolek 1946.

Witness / /s/ Negehamu Odo


\section*{Statement of Official Procurement}

I, Richord F. Larsh , hereby certify trat I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allicd Powers, end trat t. \(\epsilon\) above described document wes obtained by me from the above signed official re. tre Japanesc Government in the conduct of my official businces.

Signed at Tokyo \(\qquad\) on this 30th day of Auge, 1946

Witnessi/s/ J. \(\frac{A_{0}}{2 d}\) Curtis
- \(\operatorname{s} /\) RIchard \(H\) Larst.
NAME

Investigator: IPS
Official Capacity
















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EXHIBIT NO． \(1322^{-1}\)


Page 2
matters, also requesting him to promptly cable to hie Home Governmont. to which the Ambasaedor replied by eaying that he would couply with my request by trying to dispatch a telegram at once.

\section*{Destination of this telegram:}

Delegate YOSHIZAMA, Great Britain and the United States.


























Page 1.
Doc. No. 2748A(14)
No. 14 /T.N. In Chinese Ink/
1941 /Showa 16/ 15593 (cipher telegram)
Despatched from BATAVIA - June 7, P.M.
Recelved at this /T.N. Foreign/ Office - June 8, A.M.
From Delegate YOSIIIZAWA to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA
Parley No. 227 (omission) (per Embassy's code, Foreign -
Top Secret)
Referring to Outgoing Cable No. 222
1. Although, as you will be able to observe from the foregolng cable, the DUTCH reply shows that there are some points where they have agreed to our wishes, nevertheless the prospocts are not very bright in regard to problems such as entry into the country, enterprises and comerce due to their adhering to their former contentions; in addition to which, in regard to the question of resources, such as rubber and tin, as well as regarding (not clear) among other important commodities to which the government /T.N. JAPANESE/ attaches the greatest importance at present, they /T.N. the DUTCH' are stubbornly persisting in their conditions. Moreover, they /T.N. the DUICH/ have in fact at the sane time docreased the quantities compared with the informal figuros subuitted hitherto by them /T.N. the DUTCH authorities/.

Now that Your Excellency and the Vice-ilinister havo lodged a strong protest against the BRITISH Ambassador and the DU'CCH Minister, and the Publicity Dopartrent as well as the newspapers havo been carrying out an active press campaign, it is absolutcly impossible to accept the DUTCH roply just as it is.

Even if we should, at this juncture, dennd the concession of the DUTCH and try to continve on with the negotiations, incsmuch as the DU'CH reply I have just received uas, in addition to having inet with the special consideration of the Plenary Sescion by studying same themselves repeatcdiy by inviting "Mo" aftor having submitted same to the IMDIAN Ccuncii for deliboration also approved of by the DFiCH govern:ent in LONDON, it is evident that they rouid no longar accept any such demand in view of tile DUTCH side manifesting a firm attitudo as regards their un!viliingness to discuss matters any further.

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Page 2

\section*{\(\ell\)}

Consequently, although it is considercd that tho only option left as regards the attitude to be adopted by us would be to have our Delcgation leave after announcing the rupture of the pariey, on the ground that the DUTUII reply was unsatisfactory, in such ax case it is evident that, cit of respect towards its pirpple, the JAPANESE goveximent would have to assume a strong attitude towards ife Dutch, and the press would denounce the DUTCH attitude in a vehoment tone.

However; as has been duly proved by what has occurred in the past, the DJTCH would by no means yield to such a threatening gesture. On the contrary,
(a) No new potrolcum concessions whatsoever would be sanctioned.
(b) No "moral support" vould be given towards the reneval of the contract re sale of oil next November.
(c) No promise whetsoever would be given also on materials other than, petroleum and the supply thereof would be nore and more restricted.
(d) Copra and palm oil would be set back to 12.000 kilo tons and 960 tons respectively, and it would be nade impossiolc for the JAPAIESE farms and merchants to export their products and stocks to JAPAN.
(e) JAPANESE doctors would, obviously, be mrohibited from establishing their pravtice, and the restrictions regardiag eatry into the country would be still further streng thened.
(f) No advance notice would be given regarding the importation of JAPAIIESE goods.
(g) Various methods movld be resortod to in order to increase the pressure upon the businass and living of the JAPAMESE residents.
(h) The attitude of dependence on GRLAT BRITAIN and the UINITES STATES wouid be strengthened in a still more outspoken nenner.

We mast conscouently be prepared for the fact that the situation after the rupture woin becone very givave. Not only waid it be untavimabie from the standpoint of our prestlge at home ard akroad to auteant any neasures for prolonging the stay of cur Delegation, but as, in such a case, the DUTCH authoritios wouid most probably demand

Pro, No: 2748(A斿4
Page 3
the withdrawai of the pelegation, and as the MRPRE's prestige would becone coripletcly lost in the ovont of the Delegation beang theroby forced to leave, please, after giving the matter your epreful ahd due consideration, send ne your urgent teleglaphld repiy as regards tho attitude that \(\frac{I}{1}\) should assuned

Moroovers piease noto that; if possible, I intend to.. return to JAPAN by the first available opportunity after the 20th inst.

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Doc. No. 27484 (15)

Telegram No. 22296
Copy of the Telegram despetchod to Delegate YOSBIzaWA at Satavia by Foreign Minister Marsuoka, at 8.15 p.m., 14 June 1941.

Subject: Breaking off of negotiations with the Netherlande Indies.
(Cipher) Urgent No. 147 (Eencled in same manner as director's code)

In connection with your telegram "conference" No. 227: the reply of the Notherland Indies this time is so unwarrantable that it is not only beyond our acceptence, but it is also meaningless for us to continue the nogotietion on the basis of their reply. Therefore, the Government in accordence with your opinion has decided to break off the conference and to withdraw you, the delegate, and your whole ataffe. It is requested that you meke the best of the situetion bearing the following points in mind:
1) In order to teke f. ceputious orocedure, you will meet with the Governor-General at any rate to explain thet we hpve made concessions to an intolereble extent in consideration for the future relations between Jepen and the Netherland Indies though enticipating that our Cabinet will be attracked by public opinion no find itself in a very difficult position if we publish our last proposal, and you will urge him to seriously reconsider his attitude frow the general standpoint. If the Governor-General decleres that there is no room for reconsideration, you will immedietely notify him of the breaking off of the conference fac of the withdraval of your delegetion.
2) It is ceairable to make it clear thet general comercial and econoaic relations between Japen and the Netherland Indies chould be maintained. as before, but whether cuch e positive propospl should be mode or iot will be left to your diveretion.
3) You will make it cleer thet if they wish, Consul-General ISNIZAma may continue the negotiatione. Therefore, you will meke it clear that although the delegetion will avid giving the impreasion that the relations between Jappn end the Netherland Indies have been rupturnd, your delegetion will withdraw upon the brepk-up of the present conference.
4) With the same noirit, it is our policy to evoid es much as possible giving the imoresoion abroad of a complete rupture, thus wo may prevent exciting public opinion. Therefore it is reauented thet your delegation keep in touch with us, fnd as we went the announcement of our decision to be made inmedietely ofter your notificption to them of the breaking off of the conference, it is requested that you despetch

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Page 2.
an ordinery telegram telling us you "hove notified" them. As for the Sorm of announcement it is planned thet a aimple statement be made by the Information Eureau (the gist to be wash in the telegram "conference" No. 146) in regard to the breaking off of the conference, with the addition of a. talk by ISHII, the chief of the Seotion (the giat to be seen in the Telegram "Conference" No. 144). He hope the announcement you will mpke on your departure will be arranged to be in accordance with the Government's announcement.
5) The date of the withdrawal of your delegation will be left to your diecretion but it is requested that you make arrangemente so that the parties ooncerned with petroleum cen separate from your. delegation end remein to continue the negotiations.



\section*{Stc.terent of iutienticity}
I. Shibetc. Koscburo hereby certify thet I on officially connecter. :ith the Jeranese Government in the followinj oepacity: Secone Class derninistretive Officer of the Investizetion Burceu of the Horie Inistry in Charze of the Home Ministry I ibrarys end thet es such officiel I heve custody of en orisinal copy of the cocusent of wich the ettechec Cocurent consisting of 1099 inges, datce 1943-44. and ciescribed es follows: "Jepencé Year Beok 1943-19he" end republ ishei by the Intercencrtmentsit comitte.e for the icsuisition of Foroign Fublicetions, ence. irintec by the United Stetes Printing Officc, is an exect copy.
I further certify thet the oricinal copy of the atteched recore and Locurent is an official docurent of the Japeneso Governnent, end thet it is fert of the officiel crehives and files of the Home Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this
3 Tst cay of Oct.. 1946.
Ls/ Koseburo Shibete
Sicneture of Officiel
SELL
Witness: Yoshivuki Kureteni \(\quad 2 n \subset\) cless d.cministrative offioer of the Investicetion Burecu of the Horm Ministry

Officiel Capacity
Stetc.:ert of officiel Procurcront
I. Benry Shipoifza
, hereby ccrtify that I er:
essocicte with the Generel Hee? quartcrs of the Suprere Correne.er for tho illice Powors, and thet the above certificetion ras obteinciby re fror: the above aizned official of the zuenese Gevernment in the concuct of my official business.

Simned et Tokyo on this
3lat Ey of Oct. 1946 .
/i/ Henry Shirojima NaE

Investication Division IFS Official Copacity


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Organization of the Japanese Intelifgence Service for the Netherlands Indies

After conplotion of the survey of Japanese espionage and anti-Dutch activities in the Netherlands Indies (yide: our Merorandum of 30 November 1940, No. 1080 \(/ 40\) ), wherein after citing many examples, the adoption of a number of moasures - now being effectively applied - is advocated to counteract thesc activitios, the neod is felt for a systematic survey of the organization end mode of operation of the Japanese Intelifgence Service in this country.

In the above nontioned Menorandum, emphasis is laid on the complicated nature of the Japanese espionage or intelligence systen, in which the entire Japanese commulty in this country is cooperating.

No satisfactorily clear picture could be obtained of the systematic organization of the Japanese Intelligence Service, as the latter accomplished its tasks in the Nethorlands Indies, owing to the large number of collaborators in the form of consular porsonnel, big companies, conmercial firns, socicties and organizations, small shopkcepers, etc. further confused and complicated by numerous emissaries and nembers of economic missions.

In spite of the fact that indications and data pointed in a certein direction, there vere a nurber of nissing links, preventing a clear understanding of the organization.

Although always to some extent present, the speculative element can, according to indications since nede available, be regarded as having been sufficiontly oliminated to allow the prosent systomatic survey to be considered as a key to the Iabyrinth of the Japancse Intelligence Service in this country, the sphere of action and phenomena of which have already been described in the said Memorandum concerning Japanese espionage and anti-Dutch activities in the Netherlands Indies.

The Japanese Intellicence Service for the Netherlands Indies consists of four organizations horoinafter referred to by the lotters: F.O.O., P.N.O., F.A.O., and O.C.O. These
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four organizations will be systematically dealt with in turn hereunder:

\section*{F.0.0.}

The most important and extensive organization is the Foreign Offico Organization, the composition of which is shown in maps F.0.0. 1 and 2.

The central points of this organization within the Netherlands Indies are the Japanese Consulates at Manado (42), Mekassar (39), Socrabaja (22), Batavia (11) and Medan (2). The lines indicate the system whereby inteligence is passed on fron places where there are no Consulates. The numbers refer to places where Japanese reside, who are known to supply the Consulates with intelligence (in the widest sonse). . . . . . . . . . . Intelligence is collected by means of journeys by infornants to places where there are Consulates, and on official journeys by Consular Officials. Censorship has completely elininated the passing on of intelligence by mail, which has never been very widely used.

The red Ilnes \(A\) and \(B\) mark the route of the diplonatic couriers, who travel through the Notherlands Indies at regular intervals. It is noticeable that these couriers generally travel in pairs, and always remain together. They arrive regularly each month. Prior to the recent rostrictions on their movements, they used also to travel on other than the reproduced route, which is limited to the places where there are consulates, inter alia, to East-Borneo and tho Palembang region. These couriers collect all the intelligence that has been brought to the Consulatos. They are of ton (non-commissioned) officers of the Army, Navy, or stato Policc Forces, which indicates the nature of the intelligence collected. Nevertheless, for considerations of expediency, they are incorporated into the \(F \cdot 0.0\). as being the safest organization.

Map F.O.O. (2) is complementary to Map F.O.O. (1). The red ine \(A / B\) again indicates the courier's route, which generally runs from Tokyo over Fornosa, Indo-China, Thailand, Singapore, Consulates in the Netherlands Indies, and Palao, or vice versa. In addition to the regular couriers' service the Consulates have at their disposal telegraphic code communication for conveying intelligence to Tokyo, narked as C-lines on map F.O.0. (2). The numbers on this map refer to the attached list of Consular Oficials, who are particularly antrusted with espionage and the supplying of intelligence.

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Furthornore, crews (captains) of Japanese mail steamers, tankers, otc., serve as supplementary couriers. In order not to impair the clarity of nap F.O.O. (2), these have not beon indicatod thercon.

\section*{P.N.O.}

The Palao Naval Organization operates for the Naval Information Service at Tokyo, more or less independently from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The inportant central point of this organization is Palao, from there instruc tions aro recoived, and where intellizence is collected. There are indications that important infornation is passed on to the military authorities in Formosa through the Intelligence Scrvice at Tokyo. Map P.N.O. is a diagrarmatic representation of this oreanization. The numbers refer to known agents. Some of these infornants, who are paid from Palao, are regularly recalled to Tokyo and Palao. In Tokyo they always reside at the Tokyo Hotel, above the Central Station. Most of these agents have permits to reside in the Nethorlands Indies and spend part of the year abroad, either at Palao or in Japan.

In considering map P.N.O., it should be notod that it is not. imperativo for the intelligenco collected to go through palao. It often reaches Tokyo direct and is passed on fron there to Palao.

\section*{F.A.O.}

The third organization is referred to as the Formosa Army Organization becauso the important central point and collecting center lies in Formosa, and the organization is under military direction. The linos of communcation are shown on map F.A.O., in which connection it is noticeable that these are nainly concentrated on the rostern soction of the Notherlands Indies Archipelago, as contrasted with the P.N.O. organization dominated by the Japanose Navy, which generaliy pays more attontion to corrunications in the cast of the Netherlands Indies.

The rule that when circunstances require, intelligence can be sent to Tokyo direct, also applios to the F.A.D.


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Page 6 *
This diagran would seem to call for little explanation in view of what has been said. The structure of the F.0.0. (arrow 6) has been dealt with in detail in our Memorandum of 30 November 1940. No \(1080^{x} / 40\), and this has been diagramatically represented in Map F.0.0. (1).

The arrows 5 and \(5 a\) indicate the cooperation and contact between the informants of P.N.O., F.A.O., O.C.O., and the Consulates. The numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4 refer to the previous maps, F.O.O. (2), P.N.O., F.A.O., and O.C.O. The diagram brings out the central position of the Japanese Consulates, At the top of the diagram the term The Contral Intelligence Services of the Army and Navy is used on purpose, since it is doubtful whether these could be said to be a C.I.S. of Headquarters. It is more probable that intelifgence is exchanged between the Army and Navy, but that the intellizence services are organically separate. Although the upward lines in the previous diagram also very lareely serve as lines along which instructions are passed from the central organizations, for the sake of completenoss, a diagran has been hereby added to indicate how things operate downards.


With reference to the foregoing, this diagran also goes to show the contral position occupiod by the F.0.0. (Consulates).

The number "l" indicates the line of communication via Palao, fron where P.N.O. agents receive instructions through visits to Palao and shipping comrunications, while on the other hand, instructions are received direct fror Tokyo via the Consulates (letter A).

The F.O.O. maintains its systom of commications through couriers, code-telegrams, ships' captains, etc. (number 2). The O.C.O. follows arrow 3. Chinese propagandaists and Wang Ching Wei agents are sent from the China Coast (Aroy, Canton, Hainan) to the Notherlands Indies for which purpose there are adequate shipping facilities, (not only Japanese), as well as the overland route. Sone instructions reach the O.C.O. via the Consulates (letter B).

The same system applies to the F.A.O. (number 4) as for the P.N.O. (number 1), since shipping connections and travellers (Japanese and Formosan) are numerous, whereas part of the instructions are passcd on through the F.O.O. (1etter C).

It must be mentioned with regard to the forepoing, that under present day conditions, some of the lines of communication in the form of frequent rail connections, naval and commercial tankers, etc., have been elinineted. The P.N.O. and F.A.O. have, accordinely, suffered most. The F.O.O.'s lines of commication are boing maintained by couriers and codes.

The O.C.O. remains provided with commanications owing to the busy Chinese traffic between the China Coast and \(S\). E. Asia (the Netherlands Indies).

The result of present conditions is, however, undoubtedly a nove towards the safe and regular lines of commanication of the F.O.0., whose position in regard to the passing on of intelligence is beconing nore and more important.
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A) Gouriers جute.
1. NONOIIIRA Mas.ak.
2. TAKARC Sas,ke
\(C: C\) Cote telegrams
3. iAKACrl itabjing
\(\rightarrow\) Manadc (rions.l)

4 TrYostinA Ataru - - whitaad (vice-consul)

 guand lauguaje
 stincent) \(\therefore\) Snstio




\section*{i. FEID. VIT}
 rekc retr eni stote as folle:

1'. Frnal Jenungy 1936 until Fubrunry 1942 I frs Hcre cif the Jrprncsc Scetion of tre Bururu for irst i.sirtic iffeirs ef tre lietlealnais inst Incics Governacnt in Bntovic:
 revular enc comperonsive rennits fror: militery ane civil cutreritics concernine the netivitils ef Jopnncsc netionnls in toc Netrerlencis In iics.
3. Tre nttrerce ranry chtitlce "Orernisntic Jnpnnscre
 of the Jeprnisc Intilliecnec Scrvice fer tre Netrerlenes Ineics) ?ntc: 27 Octrbcr \(1<41\) is an rfficiel repert rifich ves preperci by toc Jeprncsc Scetion of tic Burceu fer Enst 6.sirtic!-ffrirs of tre Netturlencis Ifest Incics Grvernricnt, ence is besci upen tre reprats cescribuc in Forecropt 2 rerurf.
4. Tre rricinel intcrinl reforrce tr in Frrerropr 2 rercef, togetrcr uitr rll tic rcerris nnc filcs of Eurcnu fer inst disintic i.ffeirs ff tre Netrerlincis Incics Grvernriont, tr the best rf ay knivle?ge, rave been costrryci. or lest es e result of tre wer.
\(1 \mathrm{~s}-\mathrm{L}\) 的
-Lcenert F.N.I. i..

Subscriber: anc seren t-buferc ric this 22 iry of irvorbcr, 1946.
\(\angle s \angle\) Turncr D. 1.7 itc
Copt., iUS
Surmery Court Officer



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日.N.O.





































\(5\)





































No. 6


















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/ LIMPER/



/TURNER D. WHITE/




Accompanyine lettor, May 30th: 3rd Section of the Buroje-Asia Bureau, From Kotani Tanun to Nr. Kaneko Keizo.

I send hereby the original of the scheme and wish you success.
Plan for the Eublication of a Daily Paper in the Nalay Language by Japarese in the ietherlands Indies
1. Schem of jublication
a. Saeroen to be ayointed Chief Editor. Saeroen wio used to be eciator of the Femandanian, wio is known amongst the East Inilan intellectuals pa prowananese and whone dismissal sas therofore brought about by the wealithy overseas Crinest, is now connectad with the "Aneta" gress bureau.

Ife has close relations with the elected nembers of the Pcorle's Council, Themrin and Soe:rardje, who are tite leacers of tar native indenonionce movement. ie colleborates closely with Mr. Kubo Tatsuji.
b. Flan adviser, Mr. Kubo Tatsuif. the former rirector of tie Nichiran Shogyo, Kr. Kubo has beon in the :iftherlands Incies for the last 30 years anc is well acquaintid with the political rad economic worlu in the \(N\) therlends Indies. He fas fri:ndly relations vith influential natives and has a clear view of national policy. He vould stand behind Saeroen as the leading force.
c. Br. Mominoki tateuo would look after the jajen se news. İe is a young men who has been in the jetherlands Indies for more tivan ten years and has profoundly stucied the lifilay language. He usca to be cditor of t. e Nichiron Shogyo Shimbun and is now a contributor to the Malay daily yayer Soeara Oemoen ani three other oapers. Jie is in tive center of the strug;ic for the purpose of convincing the yast Indians of the true situation of the Chinese conflict and enjoys an testablishi, reputation amone the intelligentia es biing the most oroficient expert of the lialay lenguage amone the japancse.
iie is to work under Saeroen for the translation of tio japenesc news.
a. Daily paiser.
E. Flace of publication: Satavia, the joliticel center of the ivetiorlanas indies.
f. Number of pages: 8 to 10.
g. Subscription: 50 to 75 cents per month. Postage extra. Up to ten pages the postage is 1 cent per copy. This subscription may be thought too low but in view of the state of income of the East Indian intcilectuals the subscription, incluaing postage, should not be more than one milder per month.
2. BUDGIN for the Publication

\section*{Section Expenses}
a. Paper: for a circulation of 5,000 copies fach, e pages daily, ton rolls required 6f1. 4.00 ger roll mates per day \(f 1.40 .00\) or at 2 conies

\section*{DOCUMEITT HO. \(2612 A\)}

Page 3.
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makes per month (fl. = guilder)
b. Postage.
25 x 500% copies zer month . . . . . . . . . . . . . fl. 1250.00
c. -rintin enc Niisc llane ole Explns: s per month
f1. 250.0
d. Staff prr month . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . fl. 15c0.00
e. House rent, water and lieht per month
f1. 300.00
Tiue above estimate of ex:enses
f1. 4300.00
Receipta
a. Subscriptions « 50 cents per copy per month . . . . . . . fl. 2500.00
b. Refunced postages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . fl. 1250.00
c. Advertisemints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . fl. 500.00
The above cetimate of receipts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . fl. 4250.00
Deficit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .fl. 50.00

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This budget can be accioted as defined-after an erpririmental piriod of sir montis--for an indep, adent circulation of this daily paper according to normal calculation.

\section*{3. Froparatory Exuenses}
a. Furchase of the rights and name of an existing paver.

Amount of purchase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .fil 10,000.00
If the lialay ten pafe paper winch Saeroen and Zubo publis:ed tofether until
June 1937, be coutinued ind changed into a daily paper with changu of name anc be registered with the Government, alinost no purchese moncy will be requirec.
b. Founátion expenses: Frintiug presses, etc. . . . . . . fl. 10,000.00
c. Er, enses until beginaing of publication . . . . . . . . f1. 1,000.00
a. Provision for iñufficient receipts during the first \(S\) montis
f1. \(10,000.00\)
Total
11. 31,000.00

The Japause newepapers in the lietherlancis Indies are read by only a very smell portion of the Jawenese and never come under the eyce of the Chinese, üaranose, etc.

When the paper is orinted in Malay and the situation.in Jacan is made known, a regult of inestimable extent can be expected.

When this paver inserts Japanese advertisements, erplains Jawnense Comerce, and furthermore introduces touristic and industrial jepan, not only vould same serve to foster amicable relations, but would Elso save the \(60,000,000\) Fast Indian pcoulace frem the false rejorts sic characteristic of the Ghinese. 'ihis plan for a Malay ciaily payer las already been considerod for throe years without being realized. However of ten the front wes formed
.DOCUMBITT 2612A
Page 4
and however frequer.tly discussions took place, publication aid not matorinlize The Japanese living in Java couli hordy counteract Chinese iows durimg tie Manchurien conflict and they experionced grent hards:-ipe through this adverse propacianda.

Now that the Sino-japanese Incident has become more majnified and complicated, tiio home country of the Overseas Chinese in the Metherlande Indios is on the roree of becoming the scene of werfare.

The entiro Lietierlaids Indian prese is boostinf; China in order to
curry favor with the Chinese who heve the real economic po:er.
In tize inotiserlands Iacies the Chinese publish. more then ten papers in the Kalay languaze alone and over ten in Chinese.

For our compatriots tizere vere only two Jaynese papers whion through the intermedingy of the Consulate vere furec. into one and this containe oily news alonä the line providea by the nows service of the li:astry of Foref:n Affairs.

Of a Malny daily paper there is vader those circuastances, of course, no question. Fie hope of tio japanese inhabitants is the.t a halay paper will insert Jeqanese proparanda and comercind ners. But not only this; otiners nave to be ned. acquaintad vith Imperial Jepen's love of justice.

The intellectual Zast Iadiane of Java, Sumatra, etc., expect Japan to publish e Malay paper undor inpenese manacement and the "ishes of jaman and jave coincido renarkably. This opoortunity, whicin is no" tature, ias been lons anc eagerliv awnited, but if publication is not now borsun it will never be realized.

In order to thoroninly study the proapects and the budset I have returied for the thira time to tine fatierland soas to anke a last effort. I request, dear Geatlerien, that jou will acree to this for tic sake of our country's rarch to the South.
page 1

\section*{AETIEAVIT}

I, IEENERT KAMPER, Lt. COl., Anyal Netherlands Indies Army, make oath and state as follows:

From January 1736 until Feoruary 194 ? I was Head nf the Japanese Section of the Burcau for East Asiatic Affirs of the Netherlands East Indies Government in Batavia.

The attached "Official Report of the Netherlands East Tndies Government on Japanese subversive Activities in the Archipelago Durins the Last Decade", which was published in 1942 , vias prenarod in the Japanese Section of the Bureau for East Asiatic Affaire of the Netherlands East Indies Government while \(I\) was in charge thereof.

The photoctat copies of Japnese and Chinese documents that form a part af this report are true and correct reproauctions of documents that vere then a pert of the official files of my office, end which have since been lost or ciestroyed es a result of the war. The letter identified as Locument No. JI (I.F.S. Dcc. 2612B) in this report, end deted 24 Leccmber, fas written in the yekr 1938. The letter icentificd as Locument Nc. V (I.F.S. Doc. 2612C) in thie rejort, and dated 20 lay, was iritten in tize year 1939.
/s/ L. Kamper
Lecndert Kaiper, Lt. Col. R.I.I.I.A.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22 day of November, 1946.
\(/ \mathrm{s} / \frac{\text { Turner D. Minite }}{\text { Cart }}\)
Car,t. AUS
Swimary Court Officer

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page 1

\section*{ATEIEAVIT}
I. IEENDERN KAMPER, It. COL., Royal Netherlando Indies Army, make oath and state as follows:

Fram January 1936 until February 1942 I was Head of the Jananese Section of the Burcau for East Asiatic Affeirs of the Netherlands East Indies Government in Batavia.

The attached Official Report of the Netherlands East Indies Government on Japanese Eubversive Activities in the Archipelago During the Last Decade", which vas publiched in 1942, pas prenarod in the Japanese Section of the Bureau for East Asiatic Affaire of the Netherlands East Indies Government risile I was in charge thereof.

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/s/ \(\frac{\text { L. Kamper }}{\substack{\text { Lecndert Kariper. It. Col. } \\ \text { R.N.I.A. }}}\)

Subscribed and storn to before mo this 22 day of November, 1946.
/s/ Turner D. Minite
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DOCOTHIT 26120
Pace I


Foremen Outward No, 20, from President liatsue at Tokro, also sealed by Míguno end Salto Buaya, (Oversees Section), addressed to Mr. Kosugi Michinari at Komi Office.
Subject: "Foundation of tie Dutch Few Guinea Oil Company."
I have tho honor to trenenit herewith for your reforance the reports received from the Laval Staff and from the Consulate General at Batavia, both: dated February lith, concerning tile conditions regerdiae: the atertinc: of enterprises in Dutch territory.

Our company would also like to apply for the permission to co expertmental drilling in the territory wi on hes been colored red on the enclosed map.

In this connection thorough study of the riethorlende Indian minim; legislation is neccsery: I enclose a copy of "fining in the Netherlands Best Indies end the Mining Law," and request you to noise preparations for the future.

In vie" of tie opinion of the local authorities it is to be expected of course that they may not be well disposed towards tills mpolicrition. I request you, therefore, to bear this in mind and in rent secrecy to make investigations reerrdine the red colored territory which las an anta of about 1.7 million hectares and also to inquire about the procedure, etc. for akin; cpplicetions, Also, you will please submit some sort of a definite plan.



\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
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Doc. No. 2612
page 1

\section*{AFFIEAVIT}

I, IEMNDERT KAMPER, Lt. Col., Royal Netherlands Indies Army, make oath and state as follows:

From January 1936 until February 1942 I was Head of the Japanese Section of the Bureau for East Asiatic Affeirs of the Netherlands East Indies Government in Batavia.

The attached "Official Report of the Netherlands Eest Tndies Government on Japanese Subversive Activities in the Archipelago During the Last Decade". which was published in 1942, was prenerod in the Japanese Section of the Bureau for East Asiatic Affaire of the Netherlands East Indies Government while I was in charge thereof.

The photostat copies of Japnese and Chinese documents that form a part of this report are true and correct reproouctions of documents that were then a pert of the officjal files of my office, and which have since been lest or ciectroyed as a result of the war. The létter identified as Lecument No. II (I.F.S. Dcc. 2612B) in this. report, and dated 24 December, vas witten in the year 1938. The letter icientificd as Locument No. V (I.F.S. Doc. 2612C) in this rejort, and dated 20 May , mas iritten in the year 1999.
\[
/ \mathrm{s} / \frac{\text { L. Kamer }}{\substack{\text { Lecndert Kaimer, Lt. Col. } \\ \text { R.N.I.A. }}}
\]

Subscribed and sworn to before mo this 22 day of November, 1946.
/s/ Turner D. lihite
Capt. AUS
Surmary Court Officer

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Pa;0 I
Outaide on ti:e envelone: HAYASHI, Ryufiro, Presicient Director of the inpenese South-Sees Associf.tion. Batavia
from Cluaig, from Britisi Penemf; . . . . . Stroot 167.
Inside the eavelope: Addrossed to President Taukihnra
Dear Presiaent Tsukihnra:
It is e lone time since \(I\) snw you last, but I inve been feeliné an irresistible ycornime ofter you end ieve been always wonderine ns to how
 emocthler with you both in your official anc privrite lifo.

Tou were so kinci at the tine to oneare me for the Oyersors Intcliferco Buronu, but I feel ashnnea thet I have as yot boen able to do so little, wiicil I belicve is lue to ny not bcing faroured yet with the riciat opportunity.

Roceatly when the eituation in Eurode ias becone tcinse, end with tho prospect of the colleope of this Europeon Empire, your Bureau hre vith redoubled onery workei townrds renlizing the erent plan for the dominntion of Eest Asia, 'hich is ac itantic schome unparalleled in history. Ifeol indeed oxtremely heppy at the honour of beini made a member. In the evont of this purpose beinc; achieved in future by renderin: maritorious sorvicos, it would probably become impossible to fuily describe our delight on seein: the blue-oyod pcople tho oppressod us in the past reving to bane their deads low benceth the knecs of the inopnesc pooole.

In accordence with your instructions to intensify my ectivities, I have macie contect with riy courados in Shin enc five of then inve elroedy ertored that country in dis;uise. As objcets of espionffe it is our duty to obtain confcioratos, to comit eabotege, to incite the natives to hostility, end to sproai alarmin: rumors. In this rospect I entiroly follou your instructions. Thces five esionts oech rork aeperately. You proviously "rote me that a iifen officiel would cone to the South and tiat we should recoivo instructions from inim on eocrocy items. This has now hepponcd, judising from the report in tho prose that Kyujiro Haynahi, on important diplonat and alon hoed of the Intolligence Bureau has arrived asfely at Batavia by a Royel Dutch. Company's plens at 4830 P.M. of the 23 rd inst. It is obvious that our work hercafter will incroase in seriousness etill more and that ve shall bo receivine: definite instructions more and more. It sieds a creat light upon us.
i: From whet I have hoard, Britain has no more military stren"th to firint backoberiatiati Imparinilam hns latoly ouffered disastrous defonts in the Buropean Var, and will before lont: euffor the sed plicht of netionel ruin and a dooned racc. To oover their shame, the local autiorition unve oxprusbly stationed mixed troogs, consistina of old and fooble soldiors, at important points of communication, such tes railwer bridise for defonec purposes, enci stratagic points like eirmbeses aro nlso in tho list of places to be patrollea.

Mais crazy bmall nation has tive fency that the stationing of troops in this memor rould scrve to inspire confideace non: tho peoplo, quite fifnorant of the fect that, by so doinf, they are only cutting a still more
! 11 more
ridiculoue



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slight chaince of auccess. I personally cannot condone Japan's effort to beguile the Chinesa masses from Cilhig Iai.. Sitik through the establisimont of the Nanking Governmint made up of sacoud-rete or vorse inciivanueis. There is no more logical course for Japan tc fillow in the seithumest of the Ohina incident than to reach a compromise vith CHLANO Kil..STlik. This is my firm bolief.
(b) "Thoueh it is said that there are practically no Chinese living here in the Notherlands Test Indiss who support the Nanking Government, this is actually no exagecration. Ali Chinese here give their suppert to CIILANG KAIm-Fitix. Furthermort, the Duteh Government recognizos the CHIANG regims, and becausu she dops not recogrize the ivaniing regime, it can be clearly ssen that the iNethaslands Covernment entertains the same convictions,
(c) WLNG CiIIIG-YE, who hiads the Nanking Trvermont, is sold on the Asia doctrine. Ho advocater Sino-Japanese peace. His fundonontal policy is the oxpulsion of the whito man from Bast Asia. It is but natural that the ietherlands Zast Indies Government should oppose this thoory. Therefore, the consequant reaction here is the decision to foilow a course of seeine to it that tha Chinesc on these islands are not swept off their feet.
(d) "At the present tine, martial law has been put into effoct on these islands, and evarythinc is an a wartime footing. The poople are united, and in ordor that the ietherlands home governmont might be restored, they are ready to fight. The \(1,500,000\) Cininese residint here on these islends are an important and integral part of the socicty of the Netherlands Indics. Their well-beine greatly affects the peace, order, and economic livellhood of all living 0 these islands. Tharsfore, the Notherlands Indies authorities hav's definitcly docided to follow a policy of unsquivocally crushing sut political scheines from abroad directed toward the Chinese resident here."
3. Having said all this, I sadzavorsa to rorute him with all the strength that I could cowmind. RO, koNorar, Fould not be coirincod and adamantly stuck to his aíaimnants Wot only is tha aituation liife this, but raceutly the fast that tine police atreneth on theae islaris hes been greatly augmentod has maza it extrembly difiticule for us io wariy on our schemes ternard the Chinese rosidarto hicen As a consequence, the situation
 to have our organs here for the neliyulaticr af wiofo optrinn as well as those who work in the deveiapmenc of var schemes renain pasifive for a iittle while. For the tine bsing: we are coneentraiing our enforts in the collection of intelligences having to do witil the activitics of Chinese here as well as othar things.
4. Therefore, in the meantime, until we heve socurely brought French Indo-China and Thai within sur sphere or influonce, I think that it would be most propitious for us to strengthon our schames with regard to the Chinese here. For this purpose I would like to have sont to these islands



















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Document No． 1585 A
Page 3

Navs．
1．Defense power of England increased by Soviet－Gorman mar－ protracted war．

2．England lays cmphasis on ths Suez and Singapore．
3．Amorica is stelining witil sin becomes fully prepared（until the latter helis of next yeari，

4．Thus，aid to Russin will be cominusd．
5．Stalin＇s regime is striving for racial society．


\section*{CERTIFICATE}
W. D. C. No,
I. P. S. No.

Stetoment of Source and Gutrenticity
I,_HAYSYI_Knoru hereby centify trat I em officially connected wan تne Japerese Goverwent in the foliowing
 as suer officizi broe cusedy of Ere courie tereio ettacnod consigtirg of _3_ pages, whened, ard derscrijed
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 Is an official docunent of tre Jopencac (ioverman and that it is part of the offtien arertres am fijes cs ure following named ministry or coparinent rocifying at so the file surber or citation, if ary, or ary oiser offecial decignetion of tre regular iccariten o tre document in tre aze sues or files): Jap. Fo:cisn_pifice

SiEned at Tokyo on this 6th day of \(\underset{N G}{ }\)
/s/K. Hayeshi
Sigratue of Cricial
(SESL)
Witness: /S/M. Emura
SESL

\section*{Crief Arerives Section Oficicial Capacity}

\section*{Statement of officigl procurenent}

 Suprenc Comander for the allisel yowers, and that the ahove described dociment wes obtained by me from tire anove signed ofrisual or the Japanesc Governmert in tre conduct: of ny official business.

Signed at \(\qquad\) on this
______ day of \(\qquad\) . 1946

Witness: \(\qquad\) Ls Enic W Flashon 2d Lt. diJSMI

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\section*{Page 1}

\section*{FOIEIGN OFFICE SECRET}

1 ihat is the prospect of the European tar?
(Foreign Office)
Great piobability of a prolonged war.
It appaars that the Cerrian urmy has alreaciy appioached to the vicinity of Hoscow and with the success of the present Gorman operations it appans that most of the Soviet Forces in Europenn Russia will be destroyed. However, we can not exject the imnediate collapse of the Stalin administration. ifith defeats in itar, it appears that the unrest of the Soviet people is gredually growing, but in vier of the fact that the fusso-German war is showing the appearance of a race war, we con not think that the Soviet people's spirit to resist Germany will rapidly :yane in the future. ie believe that the Stalin regime, while gradualiy drauing beck to the east, :illl raske its utnost offort, during severo winter, to consoilidata its preparation ior raxt spring, rolying on the resources east of the Volga and on the materials suiplied by Britain and Amorica. It is believed thit the Russian passive resistuce will continue heroaftor.

As the German authorities have of ten confidantially informed us, the German forces nre expectad wo secure tha line linking through Leningrad, koscow, Kharkov and lastov, leave a number of units, and yithdraw the greater part of the arry and air forces. Tho attack on tho Caucasus is expected to continue, but it is believed thet, aside from North Caucasus, the nttack on South Caucasus will be extrenoly Gifficult unless it is mode through the Bl:ck So:.

Britain is unable to concerl h.jr confusion at the sigit of the Russian forces in danger of collapse by Gerrany's violent att ack. Though Britain is oncournging the Stolin regime together with Aneric? by supplying materinls, it is doubtful to what axiant the 3ritisi and American aid to fussia will ba oifsactive.

The ru:or circuinting in ons part that Germany and Russia may suspend hostilitios is not mithout possibility, but it sams hardly possible that tha Stalin administretion, which has :ritidrawn to the oast and which is in such ? condition to be able to look forward to - recovary, will conclude n. hunilinting pasco treaty rith Gormeny. Nor can we think thet Gurmany ::ill trke such ? stop in visw of its policy to overthrow Bolshovism.

Since tha Fusso-Germn far broks out Britain heo hed four months of rest ind hes incressud her powse and confiduncu to dafond hor homelend. .fter the completion of ? phesa of tho Soviot wra, Gormany will probably bugin to attack the Nan Enst.

Anticipnting German invasion of that aroa, Britain is roinforcing her troops in the aron linking Irnn, Ir iq nd Syrin in the lioar Enst, and nlso busy in :rinning Turisay to hor side. On thu other hand, is the supremacy of the ieditarranuen Son is still in the hands of Brit?in, tho German and Italim axpedition rey forcas in North Africa, with thoir supply routes thruntoned, appar to ba in a difficuit situntion.
infer the outbrank of the Russomarman inr, some parts of the German occupied rons (Norway, France, Yugoslavis, Bulgaria, Crontia, otc.) and tho Czochoslovaki? Protectoreto have seen uprisings such as sabot.go by the Conmunist undarground, but is they hava bean suppressad by her savare opprassivo nonsures, axcullent polica powor, ind clevar administrntion of tho occupied aruns, etc., it appours thay will not interforo with Gormeny's prosscution of tho war.

In short, Gormany will probably attnin hor objactive of annihilating tho Ruasian fijeld-army in Europunn Russin, but it appears that Russia will horepftor rutront to tha unst of the Volga to continue her passive rusistanca. Aftor ettncking the Near Enst, Gurmany may attempt to brouk through tho British anti-Gormen ancirclamunt formod through Iran, Irari, Syrin, Egypt and ioorth ifricn; but inding operations on tha British homolend may bo postponod until nuxt spriug. On the othor inend, in viow of the fact that diarica will grodually propars hursulf to join the viar and that while British fightin spirit \(^{\text {ramais.s high, it will bu difficult to defoat Britain }}\) cuickly. Germany, howevar, seems dotarmined to completuly defoat Britain, and in spite of tho rupantod rusior of tha axpoctod punco butwoun Girmany and Britain, thers is yet no tardancy for such a aova, and for the time being the Europion in.r doos not apporr to come to in and.
3. Supposing w.r bruaks out in tho South this autumn, what a rulative phonomonon :ill :- onsuo in tho lorth? (Foruign Ministry)

\section*{1. Gropt probability of hestening wnr botwoen Jqpin and fussia.}

Tha Rod irny in Europann Pussin suffarod n crushing blo:I bocause of
 25 por cont buc?use of tho loss of the ?ion west of the Volg2. Sincs this spring tho Far Enst Rod army has sont nes roinforcoments far mors than two hundred thousand soldiors, 450 tanks and 1000 planes to 3 aropern lansia. Though the strongth his increased by mobilization, tho prosont Far East Red irmy which hes incransed by 23 pur cent in peisonnal is 1 uss 37 per cont in the numbur of tinks, and 36 par cont in planas \(3 s\) comprored with the strengtil thay had in warch of this yenr. Thorufors, thoy aro no longor abla to attack ianchuiriz. In c'su Jnpan communcas hor southword advance tho Russo-British militiry :lliance will bs oxtondod to thi Fir East, and also a closo cooporation will bo mide botwoon morica and lussia. Britain

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nd inuric. ney instigati joussia to teik thu offunsive gainst Japan. But as long as the Kurntung ..rmy is in full forca inussi? aill novar ánri to invado but wili only try to check us by such stratogems as dustructive offorts and idoolo.ical propagndn. Of courss, thers is the probability that imurica nieht occupy ninost forcofully soins part of kussian territory in tha Fir E2st a.s ? northern stronghold to s.tteck Jap?n.

So wo cennot syy thars is no dnnger of war botwoon Jyp:n and fussia unsuine from such ? thing, nd again :ren not sy thuro is no possibility that tho Soviut Enr Enst i.rmy micht coopurnto wit dumricn to attack us if thu imorican offunsivu aginst Japan from the north should be found powarful. Espocirlly, wu cen uxpuct the raconstruction of the Stalin rogime with \(n\) contor in Siburin in tho jonsidernbly near future. So if our attack on the south will bi protractud, wast tale into considoration tho possibility that tho For Enst Red rriay ilighe graiunily nssume an offonsive attitude.

In tho Russo-J?panusu nugotintions nftur the outbreak of the fussoGurmen dir, the fussinn Govurnment mado clanr the foilowins itims:
1. The fusso-J?p:nusa Nutrility Pact shall bu rispected;
2. No military allinnco against Jnpan shell be concludod;
3. No militery bases shall bo ellowed to third powors in the Far East, ?nd so on.

But thoso must bo rogerded as a Russien diplomntic policy to must the situntion nftur tho outbraak of thu russo-Giaran air, and in caso Japan advances to ths south tite situation will undergo a ramarkeblo chango. Then wo con not but think th't in such n e-so Fussi? vill tnlio such diplometic mesturus as respondent to the forucast pointud out before.
\[
\ddot{*} * * * *
\]
7. In case of outbrak of ar 2 g .inst Britain, inuricn and the Nuthuilands, how much cooparation can wo maku Gurany and Italy proaise?
d. It is i:possiblu to expact a breat den.
3. In case war brinks out this zuturin:

Ger any his hitherto givan us the improssion that sha would attack imarica in coss a ar broaks out butwoun J?pon ind imurica. In view of tha obligations arising from tia Triportito Truaty, wa can expoct Garmany and Italy to bagin w?r agninst imuric? doponding on our attitude. But in this ciss, Gurman (:nd Itnlion)dacinration of wn against imorica would only moan that thay sould tika further staps in their prosont rolntions against

and Amarica provided that Jepan ndvences by force to the South, namely Thailand, Burma, Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, we have cortainly not yet hoard of any military alliance nor any settlomont concerning cooparation among Britain, imerica and the Netherlonds (or the Changlina regime). But it is almost of no doukt that they have mutual understanding concuming this joint defonse in case Japan corries out an armed advence to any one of these countries. The attituds of Britain and cmarica will also be affectad to a freat degrae by the time and manner of our military advance to the south, the internetional situstion it the time, and the internal situation of both Britain and imerica. It is necessary to take into consideration all probable cases which may take place in this connection, but at any rate we cannot rustrict cur opponents only to the Netherlands or to Britain and the Nethorlands in case of our southward adv-nce, and we must also be ready for fussie's entering the war.

Now we have made tho following general forecnst concorning onch country, judging from the present situation.
1. Britgin (inciuding custrilin, Canado, etc.). When wo advance to the Dutch East Indies wo might jxpact Britain to carry out, first of 2ll, a diplomatic campsign ragarding us and the Dutch Indies, but we can expect that she probably will make up har mind to take up arms for har self-defense. (ihether she will taka up orrs imnediately or not will dopend on the situation thereof.) Judging from Britain's reports and behavior until the present, we are considorably sure of this view.
2. imarica. In a cass zs pointed out above, Britnin may at once ask for imurican assistance. Therefore, even if lmerica does not participate in the war immediately, she will of course acceleratodiy strenthen her military prepareti.ns. Than we cen suppose that in such a situation she will take the following steps:
a. Divarsionary measures against us by way of diplomacy.
b. Close har consulatas.
c. Recall suabassadors.
d. Severancs of her diplomatic relations
e. Damonstrations by her navy and air forces.

But it is dangerous to form such 3 viow that imerica would take gradual stops toward us, judging from har attitude towards Ger.nany. For we cannot but oxpect america to twie much more prompt steps in case we advance to the south, compared with the case when Germany swopt over the Europoan countries. imerica would presunably be unatle to ovurlook the Japanese southward advance as "another's business" baczuse of the following reasons:


\section*{b. Disadvantiges}
1. Ne think that our oconomic difficulties will rather increase by March of next year.
2. Wiliterily there may be dangar in also giving the opponents time for proparation.

\section*{CaHTFIC.TE}
in.D.C. No. \(\qquad\)
I.P.S. Nu. 1559is

\section*{Statumant of Source and Juthunticity}

\begin{abstract}
I, Hayashi Kroru, hersby cortify that I am officially connected with the Japnnose Government in the following capacity: Chief, irchives Section, Japnnuse Foreign Office, and that as such officiol I heve custody of the ciocument heretio nttachod consisting of 20 pages, describad as follows: Uustions concuming the Foreign Policy of Japan (or what Is the Frospoct of the European iar). I further certify that the attached record and document is in officinl document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of tho official archives and fales of the following namid ministry or dopartmant (specifying 3lso tha file numbor or citation, if any, or any other official designetion of the regular location of the aocunent in the archives or filos): Foreign dinistry.
\end{abstract}

Signed nt Tokyo on this
6 th day of Nov., 1946.
(s). K. Hayashi Saill
ditnoss: (s) لugehsrm Odo
Chicf, \({ }^{\text {rehives Suction }}\)
Officicl Capncity

\section*{Statument of Official Frocuroment}

I, Henry Shimojima, heroby cartify that I am associnted with the Gonaral Headicuartors of the Supreme Commander for the illied Powers, and that the abova described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Jupinese Governmont in the conduct of my official business.

SiEned at Tokyo on this 6 th day of Nov., 1946
(s) Hanry Shimojima
H. Liv

Witness: (s) Eric il. Fleishar, 2nd Lt. Investigator, IPS
1. What is the prospect of the European war?
3. Supposing war broaks out in the South this sutumn, what a relative phunomenon will ensue in the North? (Foraign Office)
7. In case of outbreek of war against Britaing duarica and the Natherlands, how much cooporation can we make Germeny and Italy promisa?
8. Can our opponents in war be restricted to only the Notherlands, or both to Britain and the Notheriands?
9. idvantages and disadvantages of our foreign relations in case war breaks out in liarch of next yuer.

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 At


Dispetched: Howember 29, 1941.
Arrived: November 30, 1941.
Sent by: Consul General Iskizawn.
To: Consul Nonomura.
Subject: Re investigatins and reporting of the movements of forcign ships (to be kept secret for "foreisn").

Code No, of signal 344.
Telegram from the Minister, signal lio. 2431.
Urgent telegram.
As from December lst, please investigate and telegraph in each instance: rationelity, name, port of arrival or departure, date of arrival or departure, port of dostination, etc, of forcign norchantmen or warships operatine in the Pacific, the Indian Ocean and tise South China Sea zonos.


Page 1.

\section*{heculations of the sixth commitree}
-ayproved by the Yrime Minioter
Dorevirex znd: 194.1
--Aincuieil Jenivary 2 osd, 1942.
Artiale I. The Sixth Committea chall be ostailliehad in the Cabinet for the purpose of discuseing and jreftixg wisters nomening ecoroulc plans and control centerine around the acquisilion and jovilopment of the resources In the Southern areas (Frouch Indo-China, Thailand end other Southern areab).

Artiele II. It sheil consist of e chairman and five committcomen. It may appoint temporary committaemen if deemed teaporerily necessery.

Articie III. The oresident of the Planning Board shall be its chaizman.
Artiole IV. Committeemen end temoorary Committeemen ahail be nppointed or requested by tha Finims Nindotor fram anons the higher civil saiviee officiala of the Plenuing bionid and other goveriment officos concerned.

Irticle V. The Chairman shall preside over the busiunse of the Committee.
Atifcle VI. The Committeo shall have a chisef sectrotary and secretaries. It may aloo appoint temporary secretaries if deemec tumor,ay: ly nocousary. The vice-president of rhe-Plenning Eoprd shall be tha chiof secretery pad he shall mancgo the bretress of the comittee under the direction of the Chairmen of the Committee.

Socretaries and temporary secretaries ahall be aprointod or requested by the Prime Ministier from among tha hiphe: civil oervice officials of tho Planning Bozrd and other government offices ecncornud. They eball handle the businuse of the Committee under the diraction of suporior officials.

Article VII. The general affeire of the committee shell be hardled by the Planning Board.

Articlo VIII. The esteblisbment of the committee and othor matters pertaining to it shell be kert secret.

\section*{Matterc Prrtrining to tho Eotablighment of the Sixth Compittee Decided ot the Cabingt Conferenco; November 30th, 1941.}

The Sixth Committee, organized with the ocrsonnel of the goveriment offices concerned (the Planning Bnerd, the Foroign Ministry, the Fiuance Ministry, the War Ministry and the Navy Ministry) shall be esteblished in the Cabinet for the purpose of didcuasing and drafting matters

Page 2.
pertaining to the economic plans and control centering around the acquisition and development of the resources in the Southern Areas (Fronch IndowChina, Thailand and other southern areas).

The general affaire of this committee shall be handled by the Planning Boerd.

Accompanying the eatablishment of this committoe, the Fifth Committee of the Planning Board shall be abolished.

\section*{EXPLATATION}

The reason is that although economic problems pertaining to the Southern Areas hereto have been disposed of by the Fifth Committee of the Planning Boardi it has become necessary in order to cope with the present aituation and carry out the oconomic plans and control centering around the equieltion and development of the resources in the Southern Areas (French Indo-China, Thailand and other southern areas) through a controlled activation of the composite national power under a united political and strategical policy and thereby contribute toward the establiehment of our powerful national defense etate, to set up in the cabinet a committee to disucsa and draft matters pertaining to this in particular.
socompanyiue the establishment of this committee, the Fifth Committee of the Planning Board is to be aboliahed.

\section*{ATEIDEVITI}
-
I, Rei Ori, certify that I am Chief of the Southern Area Section of the Economic Diviaion of the Control Burenu of the Foreign Office and thet the atteched document, consisting of four (4) peres submitted to the Internetional Prosecution Seotion by me on 13 Septomber 1986, entitled "Regulations of the Sixth Committee" and "Matters Pertaining to the Establishment of the Sixth Committee" is a copy of the original document at present in the files of the Foreign office. I further certify this document to be a true copy prepared by my section.
\[
/ \mathrm{B} / \mathrm{Rel} \text { Ori }
\]

Witness: /8/Henry Shime,ime_

Sworn before me this 8th day of November 1946 at Tokyo, Japan
/s/Eric W. Fleiaher
KRIC H. FLEISHER
2d It, AUS, MI
Investigator, IPS

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リ志小準留く。


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Prge 1

Outline of the Economic Counter-F1rns for the Southern Area

Top Secret 22
16. 12. 24

Top (No. 219) Sacret Chiof Official
Commerce and Industry
Mi:istry

12 Dec. 1941

12 Dec. 1941 The Government and Supreme Comurnd Lirison Committee Roport.

16 Dec. 1941 Cabinet Meeting Report
/TN: Stamp/'

The Sixth Comittee.
Contents
Chapter I Policy
Chapter II The Essentials of the Countermplan for irea A.
The First Counter-Flan
The Socond Counter-Plan.
Chapter III. The Essentials of the Counter-Pian for srea B.

\section*{Chaptor I. Policy}
I. The principal aim of the policy is to fill the demand for important natural resourcos and thereby contribute to the execution of the present warfere, and at the same time, to establish a syster of autarchy for the Greater Mast Acia Co-Prospority Sohere, and sposdily find menns of strengtheniag and repleting the Impurial sconomic strength.
II. The arers which become the object of thio counter-plan shall be: the Dutch Jast Indien, British Valava and Dorue a, Philippines (the above shall be area A) ; Frendh Indo-Chine and Thailand (the above shall be Arca B).
III. In rogerd to Arca \(A\), the mensures shall be divided into two: the first counter-plan and the eecond countcr-plan. Each ehall be besod on the following policy.
1. The Firat Counter-plan
(a) The emphasis shall be leid on tho acquiaition of neturai resourses; and in the execution of thisse mensures, the securing of ncessary zedisurces for carrying out the war ahall be the nain objective.
(b) Every means sholl be adopted to prevent outflow of opecial resources of the Southern areas to enemy countries.
(c) In the ecquisition of resources, emphasis shall be laid so that existing enteroriefs can be profitably led to oooperation and that efforts chall be made to lighten to the minimum the burdens on our Imperial economic strength.
2. The Second Counter-plan

The complotion of an autarchy system in the Greater Fest Abia ComProsperity Sphere shall be the objective, and permanent arrangements for it shall be made.
IV. In rogard to Area B, steps will be taken to oroduce promptly effective measures besed upen our jremerrenged policy, and with the utilization of our prestipe jTN: ccersjve povier/, which shail be increased as a result of the development of cituations in Area A, measures ahall be adopted to realize our àmenis for importart resources; eapecially in the securing of frod resources, and others. Furthermore, should the situation change sudienly, anothor policy shall be decided.

\section*{Chapter II \\ The Egoontials of the Counter-Plan \\ for Area A}

The First Counter-plan.
I. General Rules.
1. All acquired or exploited materials shall be included in the material mobilizetion plan.

At the begirning of a military operation, all existent important meterifis ahnil be collected and secured in accordence with the deciaicna of our army and navy. In regard to the disposal of the aforementioned materials, it shell be in accordance with the preceding clnuвe.
2. The ordor for exploiting materials shall be deciced by the Central euthoritios efter consideration is given to the chenpes in var situations and the degree of necorsity for resources.

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Paze 3.
3. The standard for the acquisition of resources for the fiscal year of 1942, and the estimated acouisition for the fiscal year of 1944 are pa indiceted ir oftechud nhoot woे. 1 and No. 2.
4. Personnel finds (paid out of the budget et present), materials, etc. necessary for the development of locel petrcleum and other minerc 1 resources shall io allotted, for the time being, to the army and navy.
5. Deficient resources of each district sholl be supplied as follows:
a. Self-sufficioncy shall be planned as much as possible for necesaitios of life.
b. Mutuel interchanee of products between Southern arens ohall be mede as mucr as possible.
c. Jayan shall be relied upon only for such materiels as cannot be found /TN: in this aree/.
6. Nutual intorchanfe of southern sroducts besed on the pbove clauses shall be mrie in accordance with negotietions cerried on between the army and nevy authorities in the area end at home, nad thet under e:ov rrment refulation.
II. Developpent.

\section*{1. Petroleum}
(1) Development of res.urces shall be concentrated on petroleum. Priority for procurement of funds, meterials, and all other eensures which are necessary shall be provided.
(2) at the outset the petroleum industry shall be maraged by the armed forces and as soon as conditions permit, it shall be speudily trensferred to private enterprise.
(3) Considerine the difficultice in acquisition and transportation, aporopriate areas sinall be developed, and efforts shall je directed especie.lly toward the pcquisition of euitable oil for aviation gasoline.
(4) In referd to locel refining of oil, needed facilities shall be restored proportionfte to the conditions of the existing facilitios and upon reference to Japanese and Manchurian productive ceopacity.
2. Other Mineral Resources
(1) In the mining industry, the expluitative power shall be concentrated on key points, end the principal aim is to exploit

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Prge 4.
the masimum quantity of resources by minimum number of exterprises with excellent efficiency.
(a) Fecilities, as of current operating conditions, shall bu rostored as speesily as possible, and a siep forvard sineil bo taken to promote exploitative enterprisos in new areas, for instance: nickel ore, corver ore, bauxite, chx cmaun ore, manfanese ore, rica, phosi ihate rock or other ores for speciul stesl, and non-ferrous metal (tin ercented).
(b) Those exploitative enterprises in new arene that are to be temporarily suspended shall be: Tin ore and Iron ore.
2. The selection of enterorenours to take charge of new exploitation of izportant; minexal rasourcsa sheli be, for the roat oart, in principlo, in accoriance with the purport of the followinf items.
(a) that the exploitation of rosources in one place shall be left es much ac pcosible solely to one enterpreneur.
(b) That the enterproneur must possess excellent end sound e:perience in tris type of industry in the area concerned or elsewhere.
(c) Thet the entercreseur must poosecs ability nocessary in the explsitation of resources.
(d) Throughout the Southerm area, the same variety of resources shell be divided and shered by two or more enterfreneurs, Bo as to avoid the evil of having ore firm monopolize one variety. Scecial resources, howover, are not restricted to this rule.
3. Agriculture, forestry and marine products industry.
1. In africulture, forestry end marino products enterprises, the advance of rei Japancse enterprereurs shall be checked for the present, excent in some urgenily necessary cases.
2. Fact rogion should endeavor to attain self-sufficiency in rost of its fo d resuurces.
4. Manufacturine Industry.

Menufacturine industrise shell not ve set up in the area es a rule, except epecial ones (o.g. sinipbuilínf, repair shops for equiment for neiural resource development). This rule is not appliceble to indusiry kaving equibment alrerdy in tho area, and cen contribute to reduction of the ohipping load.

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Pake 5.
III. Currency
although we should endeevor to meke the best use of the local currency,
1. at first,
(a) we shell use military currency, which is to be expressed in the local currency of each erea.
(b) Militery currency shall circulato on a par with local currency. Comi:ulsory measures shall bs pdopted for that purpose.
(c) Both at home and in the area a we?l oraenized structuro should be cunsidered for manoging military currency.
(d) Any expenses required for acquiring and develoring principal natural resources in the area shall be drewn from the wer budget at present.
2. In accordance with the steps of controlling the occupied areas,
(a) :'e should endcavor to contril its local syetem of curreacy issue g.s fast as possibje, and to adjust its function vith the military currency system in order to advanco eradually towaris a unification of both. In lino with this, the already issued military currency should bo withdrawn in exchange for the iocal currency.
(b) The liquidation as a result of the unification or withorasal aentioned above shall be cerried out as follows:
1. To use means such as borrowing minuy irom, and floating loanc throufh, the nots-issuing banks.
2. To adoropriate cenfiscated enemy proverty.
3. To order lccal ecvernmente or public corforations to bear a shars of the nationel defence exponditure.
(c) Measures to raise funds for accuirirg and developing principal netural resources shall be decided later on.
3. Fuchange control in the erea siould be comsleiely orfanizad to control movement of funds.
remarks.
(a) In order to promote the circulation at present of military currency on e per with local currency, mentioned in clause (1) (b), acorjuriato muesures should be teken for purchesing goods smoothily with militery currency.
(b) Althouch in the budret the ratio of military currency to Japanese yen should be 1 to 1 , special consideration should be given to actual locel prices in drawinf up bucgets and: accounts. ist the seme time a orogram for each area should be formod in cerrying out the budqet to avoid miscarriages in e::ecuting verious policies.
(c) In order to reduce the issue of militery currency as far as possicle, Desices the collection of goods in Eeneral, enem: oroperty such as mines, farms, etc, should bo confiscated and enemy uroperty (except Chinose, under the reprisal systen for ench country) should be brought under control (or confiscated, if of onemy character). Thus, EOods cen be acquired.
(d) In opcordince with the currency oolicy, we should meke efforts to control end. lepa locnl governnentsisfinancial policy.
(e) Althoush the standard of shering in the metionnl defence excenditures akould ve fixed on the amount neid besides tredo, such as the former national defonce oxeenditure, officials' jensions, interest on caoital invested, and other vorious cherges hitherto paid to the home lend, we should endeevor to meke each aree bear e eraseter siars then thet, if cossible.
IV. Collection, Distribution end Exchanfe of Goods.
1. Collection of foods for supplyine Japen should be made at EOvermental \(\theta:\) yense for the time being. The same rule shall be applicd in cese of exporting soods to the area /TN: Southern Arse/. As a mattor of orinciole e close connection shall be maintained between the control orgenizations of our country and this import end oxport.
2. In intermediate collection and dietribution of important comodities in the area, the crodit end tredirag systems of both Chinese and netive merchonts in the locelity shell be utilized to the fullest extent, end tho principle of free trade shall ba adoptud.
3. Wren Japenese nationals are permitted to work es intermediate collectors and distributors, they shall be plrced systemetically in eccordence with the eforemontioned principlo, end their gi: dual expension shall be fostored.
4. as to distribution of goods in the arva, we should make the most of local intormediato structures, and should distributo those eoode preferontially and systematically to the worknrs who enfere in mines, ferms or other work shops, where export soode for iepen ere produced.
5. In exchanginz eovds betwoun two occupied areas the above clauses ohell jo apolied.
V. Tresigcortation.
1. Freight soace available for transcortation to and from Southern areas shall be allotted bach month to the army and navy.
2. Requisitioned sorec sk:ell je used for tranoportation of natural resources.
3. Shios of aore than 50C tons, seizod in the aroa, shall be trensferrad to tine central puthorities for disposal, but ehips under 500 tons shall be used in the area under the direction of the centrel eutrofities.
4. Tho order and quantity of shippine of soutrern arve resources roouirinf shippins shell do decided pccording to their importance.
VI. Investieation nnd İesoarch of iletural Resources.
1. Investifation and resererch. of nfiturel resources shall bo carried out accordine to the docisiose of both the army and nevy.
2. Inportent notural resources to be investieeted ere as follows:
(1) Nickol, cooper, cobelt, molybdenum, tuni:ston, venedium lead.
(2) Zinc, mercury, mangenese, chromius, aice.
(3) beuxito, iron ore containine nickel, petroloum.
(4) Tannic mnterials, cowhide.
3. Principal suijjects of reseorches are as follows:

Cultivetion of cotton (ain is an annual production of aoout 3 aillion piculs), jute and wattle, skeup raisinf.
VII. Bccnomic pressure on the U. S. and Sritain.

Natural resources, which are expected to be useful in cconomic warfare with merice and oritain, are as follows:

Fubber, tin, petroletw, quinive, tuncsten, Manila kemp, cocra, palm oil.


\section*{ORRITEIOATE}
w.D.C. ג̇o. \(\qquad\) I.P.S. No. 1492

\section*{Statogunt of Source and duthenticity}

I, Kekuichi Kiuchi, horeby cortify thet I am officially connccted with the Jeprncse Govornment in tho followine ceppecity: Cormerco end Miriatry, Gonsel affeirs burosu, Gencral affirirs Soction, Chief, pad thet as euch official I have custody of the document hereto attrched consisting of 14 orgoo fad two attrehed charts cated 12 Deconber 1941, and dobcribod as follown: "natlino of the Economic Counter-Plens for tho Southorn aror" by Siath Comaittoc.

I furthor certify thipt the attpched rocord pad document is an officiel docurient of the ippenose Governmont, ond that it is part of the official erchives and filcs of the following nemed ainistry or dopertnont (opacifyine elso the filc number or citation, if eny, or pay othor officipl deoignetion of the regulpr locetion of the documont in the archivos or files): Co:morco and Industry Ministry

Signod at Tokyo on this 18th dey of Hiov, 1946.
8) Kekjuchi Kiuchi

Witnoss: Einstburo Suzuiki /s/

\section*{Chiof, Gonere 1 Affeirs Section Officipi Capecity}

\section*{Stetument of Official Procuronont}

I, 2nd Lt. Jrich :0. Fleisher, 0-935000, hercby certify that I an assuciatod with tho Gonoral Ficpiquerters of tho Supreme Contwender for tho Allied Powers, and that the ebove described document was obtained by ne fron the above signed official of the Japanese Governrent in the conduct of my official business.

Signod at Tokyo on this 18th day of Nov. 1946.

Invostigator, IPS
Officipl Cappeity


be Transported br Cargo. Boats wag Passenger-cargo Boats)
(2ec.18.1941)

 Ion Goal tor \(19 * 2]\) Goal

ra PASSENGEK - CARGO BUA TS:

chírt II Products to be Transported by Tankers (including deer tanks)


REMARK: The goal for development (and of 184a) is set by provisional presumption. Effor, will be made to increase the production goal by 5,000,000 to 6,500,00 kilo-liters, depending upon the degree of destruction of the equipment. the areas conerned.

Pratt II Products to be Transported by
(including deer tanks)


SEMARK : The goal for development (end of 1844 ) is set by provisional presumption. Efforts will be made to increase the production goal by 5,000,000 to 6,500,000 kila-liters, depending upon the degree of destruction of the equipment in the areas conerned.


Remark:

Products to be Transported by Tankers (including deer tanks)


Fi=MARK: The goal for development (ind of 198a) is ser provisional presumption Erivan will be made to increase the production 9 i by 5,000,000 to 6,50000.0. kila-liters, depending upon the degree of extruction of the equifulle.. the areas conerned.




Remark (I) Cargo Capacity of ships (Actual tonnage)
(1) for 1942




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Government-Generel (provisionel nefine).
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Solomon archipelcgo, Spntf. Crue archijelego, sllice archijelfgo, Fiji archipelego lletr rebricies archipelego, fiev Celecionif, and other islencis, ioyflty archijelego, Chesterfield archi zelego.
frking comosimetely \(180^{\circ}\) If \(f\) s the ofstern boundray and north of the Eroaic of Cepricorn.
4. he regions to be under the juriediction of the Enst Fecific iovern-ment-wenerni.
F.aveiian Islfnd, folmire Ielenc, forlenc, Fiker and other islenés, rhoenix Is., iue Is., Apin Is., itrouese is., iupmotu Is., Lociety Is., iook enc custrel Is., sraioe Is., "onge Is. (those smell islenus and legoon islende lying betyeen cionge fad Fiji belonging to region 3 (ebove) ne not to this Government-Eenerel).

These islrncis are bounced pororimetely. by \(180^{\circ}\) i. and fre north of the Irovic of Cepricorn.
5. The region to be under the jurisciaction of the nustralifn vovernmentGenerfl (provisional neming).

6. :he regions to be under the jurisciiction of the ieve Zeflend Governfentwenerel (provisionel naming).
iorth and south. Islend of .ew Eerlend, focquerie Is.
The entire sep up to the south Fole region, south of the Trosic of Cepricorn rnd ifest of mong. \(160^{\circ}\) E. (except enst of Long. \(120^{\circ}\)..)
7. She region to be under the jurisciction of ieylon Government-Generel.

A demprkftion line starting from the efst boundryy north of Portum guese - of on the west coest of Indie pessing through the north of the southeest Londe divide end north of wherwel, north of iellery and north of the Guntakal divide, and then turning a little to the southerst passing along the north sice of erailroai e short distrace

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Page 4
(10 or 20 kilometers) holding the right side oi Pennon rigor, after joining tho river about the point of Let. \(15^{\circ} \mathrm{N}\). , and then roach tho coast at Noiloro--the section south of the above region, that is, Coyion Is., Lacecdive Is., Maldive Is.. Chagos Is. Soyetelics Is. and 2 stands bolongiag to this group of islcads, and tho Mauritius Is., and islands belonging to this group.
8. The regions to be under tho jurisdiction of the Alaska GoverningGeneral.

Tho whole of Alaska, the Yukon district of British Canada (from tho middle course of the Mnckonzis River norms Groat Boar lake and then up the Groat Slave Lake to the border lino of the province of Alberta), tho province of Alberta, the province of British Columbic, and tho State of Weshington of tho United States.
9. GOVERNMENT-GENERISL OP CENTRAL MERICis (To bo Netily Established.)

Guatomala, Honduras, British Honduras, Nicaragua, Salvador, Costa. Rica, Panama, Colombia, of Venezuela, this region northioost of the oblique Lino running in a soutireosterly direction from tho Point Lat. \(10^{\circ} 30^{\prime} \mathrm{N}\). and Long. \(68^{\circ} \mathrm{W}\). to Lat. \(6^{0} 50^{\prime} \mathrm{N}\). and Long. \(72^{\circ}\) F. (this territory ombraces tho largo Maracaibo oil-fiel do). Ecuador, the British Island of Jamie, Cube, British Bahama Isles, Haiti, San Domingo, Puerto Rico (the British aid French Possessions in tho Leotard Islands cs nell as Trinidad shall bo decided by agrocmont betroon Japan and Gorme.ny as a result of the Poco Conferonoe. This applies cleo to British and Dutch Guan).
10. In the event of the Mozicen Govarmont declaring bar on our Empire and resorting to obstructive mensures, it shall, as punishment, bo mudo to code tho territory roughly cast of \(95^{\circ} 30^{\prime}\) Long. . including tho Tehuantepec Isthmus Railing rest of tho said Isthmus. Should the Poruvinn Government likely commit unlawful acts town is the Empire by joining the mar on tho dmorican and British side, it shall, as punishment, be mads to cade the territory north of roughly southern Litituio \(10^{\circ}\), and if it should be the same erse with the Chilean Covornmont, it shall bo made to cede the Nitre Zone north of \(24^{\circ}\) south Latitude, as will is the Saraigome (phorotics) Island and Filo (phonotics) Island (also lenora is East Island).


> ة-1987 . 0. .

\section*{II.}
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Al Jutch Zosseseions.
iritish :orneo, ifoupn Islenc, sfretok
£runei Cons Islond, Chrietme Islend, anopmen Aulencis, ificobrr Islancis, Fortugues fimor (so be bought up in the future).

The thole of sritibh تurme, a.bspm تrovince (India), the portion of eengel Frovince from the left benk of the liver inenges to the epstern part of the ihabadjur Cenal from the confluence of the River =rahmpoutra, with ihailend the bounderies atell be eatablishea seperrtely.

The bounderiee of the Eepuilic of china shell be left es they are it precent, and shril ve suitebly determined later on when pence becomes established.
3. 杫

Iedere 1 Stftes of Oritiah leilay and Lerritory under oritish Control.
.ith Thailcac the boundrifies ehall be estrjifehed separetely.

The -erritory ahpll be seppretely demerceted.

The present territor: of Cembodis and Erench Cochin-Chine.

The present ierritory of annem find the region of the Leos Kingdom AB well at French Fiongking Iegion.

Items i.0s. 5 and 6 shall be determined efter seeing the future of the Vichy Government.



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Pago 5

Chajter I
Ge:eral Policy
The nicissafyurber of Hoinobiong must be sooedily secured to firmly ostablish e. Idng-term ondurance atiituse; by practical application of the nilianco, the war ageinst the United States of - merica, Britain and China will be cerried out. The promarations for war egainst Rusaia will be completed a:d we will oromote the Erowth of Jiew China, thoreby offecting the first stop towards tino establishme:t of the Greatcr Yest isia Co-prosperity Suhere. If it is unavoidable, wo shall wage war againat Russia. However, our ci:ief objoct in pursuing the war to its end lies in the existence and dovelopment of our national powor and special care should be token to grasp the right time for war so as atot to leave any rogrets.

On the termination of tine present war, we must endeavour to firmly ostablish the foundation of the Groater Eest isia Co-prospority Sphero. We vill make it our minirum reruiremont to provont another war with Chira and wo shell equip ourselves at the very least with conditions for the cefence of our rationel independonce in that direction.

\section*{Ciapter II Strategy}

\section*{Section I Dirocting of the Har}
1. In our resolution to carry out a lons poriod ver, strategic points In the defonco circle will be occupied, end while we prosecute the war o:: one hand, our essontial povers of self-sufficiency will be strengthoned and secured on the other.

In carryize out tic war, Engla: will be our meia objoct, a:ad in order to meintain our position of indenondence and initiative by every meaizs possible we will give special efforts to the dostruction of the smorican eac. Zalisi flect. We will further strongtien tine prohibitio: of intorcourso between the territories under our powor end the United States or \(\neq n\) gla:d, and will deatroy the tra:sportation on the west coast of inerica as mach as poosible.

Ye will tako atrict precautions in narticulry egainst the egress of ational defence materials for wich the United States and Eiglerd rely on East lsie.
a. Our eittitud tovaris Chi:a will bo to securo the ocouviod territorice accoraine to the policy proviously arranged a:a to provide for the dovolopment of :cocossary materials. Wo will promote the growth of theso so as to make them contributc tovards the establishment of a Hew China, and in the meanwhile ve vill endeavour to crush a:d destroy the ininterland ( \(T . \therefore\). i.c. Chungking) by oxhausting their ermod forces, thoir ceomomic ebilitice nid every othor mossure.
3. We will try to utilizo materiels wifcl. can be procured in the war zones, thes striving to meintain aid promote our nationel power, and at the senc time wo will complote our military powars so as to be able to ofortirov tho revivad smorican and Biziliah attacke that will follow tio lapea of time, essccially eny chaige in tise European front.
4. "e expoct food results from the German end Italian dominatio:a in tise ieditorranean, tiv countor-blockede on England propor and the destruction of transportation on the east coart of the United States.

With tho derelopmert of the aituation we will do our best to ostablisi contact in (T.IT. probably with Germeny and Italy) the Indiai Ocean.
5. It caso of ais ecturl German lanaine in Tingland proper, ve "ill turn the rosultins shock to our own accourt and further strongthon our powor in the api:ere of our influnce.
6. We hold it es our gereral policr to aroid war with Russie at prescit, and rill stri"e for this ond. Howcror, proparations must be mado to the utmost, to orcjare for any change in the situation.

If the unevoidable rappo:a, euch as joint operations by the U.S.A. a:d Russia ageinst Japan within our dofence aphere, then wo all soize the opportunity to rosort to military methode against Ruseia.
7. If ti:c Chinese hintorland proposes poace, we are rondy to accopt it. Wic vill settle Sino-jopanese problens accorai: f to our policy previously arranged, aid if jossiblo ve voula like to advance a:a coopurato with India.
8. Hc will comply with ti:e request to coop rate in tho amistice betwoun Gorme:y and Rusaic, ad ve men proposc it ourselves according to circumataicos. If tisis is put into practicc, our eecurity in the hanchuriankussian border will be established; if possible, we further /
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jocurat
\(P_{\varepsilon \lll 0} 7\)
dosiro the eivence and cooporation of Zussin in India enci Iran.
In this ovent, wenticipatc a Gcrman lemein: on British soil mad slso her comi:ation in ifrice.
9. Wis cossatio: of zostilitics botwor, our country and tio jnitoc Statos end Eatiand will be sutticd at the afec sins ne tiat botwou Gomeny and Byinaw. (T:o Y.S....)


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Scc, II Tic cian of tion Or:azizetion of

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 U.S.i. anc. Sritain, mai ospecially in complatia; our acvel proprretions so as to be able to samsh tirir ettreks wan they rocein toir strunth.

2. The trex of zilitary orcuerntions of the diffurent oners ie es set
 duriag the next five years acorally is estirntee es follows: -

Table of the Great Powers' estimatod capacity for Regressive warfarc egainst Eapt isia curing tie next 5 years.
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline Clessificatio: & Frort-line Troop strensth (in thousands) & \begin{tabular}{l}
First-line \\
Air streneth \\
(in thousands)
\end{tabular} & Naval craft \\
\hline Chungking & 2000-3000 & Some & none \\
\hline \multirow[t]{5}{*}{The Unitea States of imerica} & \multirow{4}{*}{-700-1300} & \multirow[t]{4}{*}{\[
7-13
\]} & Bettlcslips 28 \\
\hline & & & Cerriers 18 \\
\hline & & & Cruiecrs 91 \\
\hline & & & Destropers 365 Sub-arines 200 \\
\hline & \multirow{5}{*}{500-700} & & \begin{tabular}{ll} 
Sub arinas \\
Battloships & 800 \\
\hline
\end{tabular} \\
\hline \multirow[t]{4}{*}{Britain} & & & Cerriors 8 \\
\hline & & & Cruisers 55 \\
\hline & & & Destroucrs 100 \\
\hline & & & Submrines 100 \\
\hline \multirow{4}{*}{Soviot Uaion} & \multirow{4}{*}{2000-3000} & \multirow{4}{*}{4-6} & Cruisers 2 \\
\hline & & & Subaarircs \\
\hline & & & over 100 \\
\hline & & & Destrovers 11 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Rempriks?. Frent-line ailitaxy stronsth includes, army, naval ad air forces. Hiltary strenetio at home is estinated at aluost the seme number. 2. Saval forces will change considerebly, dependine on how meny naval bettles are fouglt end with what results.

Accorainn:ly, the countries' besic capecity for operations in Fest Anie curi:ar; the first zoriod will be as follows on an avcrage besis, ti:e nilitary streagth of tho United States, Britain and Russia beins estinated to fluctuate up to one tinird of its total according to the teasion or slackening of tice Furopean front.
(1) Britain giad America combined:

Froitt-liac militery sireakth
First-lino air strongth
Naval craft: Battleahifs
1,600,000 men
10,020 plancs
Cruisors
36
Carriors
150
Deatroyrers
26
Subearince
300
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İiret-liac cir etren-t:?
\(2,503,000 \mathrm{~min}\)
\(5,0 \% 0\) wlemes
EArel creft: f. melous of over lio euberizes.
 :ront-lino ailitory strinith: First-11:-0 air atruat: Yevel creft 3ettlise:ips Cruisers 4,000,000 =en 15,007 plemos Cerricrs 150
..estroyurs
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(4) Chuaitian

Froat-li.ce:ilitery stren.t:
sir atresti:-
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somo nu:iber
 nust oriailzo tie rconisito illitery etruatiz for tin ain of urblin:


If our nif: is roclenice? orrity wo wolli raquire:

Iro:t-11:0 militery stren th
 first-lino eir strun.eth \(\therefore\) nerl creft:
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline & 15, noc plente \\
\hline Battleshins & 36 \\
\hline Cruisura & 150 \\
\hline Carricrs & 26 \\
\hline Distrojors & 480 \\
\hline Subrersias & 450 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
3. Eowover, t orc "ould bo co siacrabls elfficulty i briaci:



 minimus cseoitirls constauri" all tio rerious circrestencos, but

 volu:c of essontirl :ationel riouiroments considerc. on the besis of tho ailitery roceliceantr, vill be ae followe:-
(thentor

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{DOCUMINT 1621 C} & Perice 10 \\
\hline & Military & 'rotel \\
\hline & Reoulirenents & iiationsl Rocuirements \\
\hline Metorials for orainary gteel & 4,850,000 tons & 11,700,000 tons \\
\hline liaterials for suscial steul & 1,180, 700 tons & 1,400,000 tons \\
\hline Alumimu: & 355,000 tons & 378,000 tons \\
\hline Coel 1 & 9,896,000 tons & 140,508,000 tons \\
\hline Bonziac for ariation & \(?, 500,000\) Iitres & 2,520,000 litros \\
\hline Be:zino for motor cars & 1,24\%,000 1itres & 3,150,000 litros \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Refcr Tablo II for doteils.
Such is the outline of the expansion we eim at for our netional industrial zovar as boin: necessary for the roper orfealzetion of our military power in order to corry out the proscht warfere.


Onepter II Section III Occupive ireas (anticipetc: occuojed arcas) and Mr ir Stratcic Points
1. She chief noject of the territorics to be ocexulici in the ercester Deet Asie Wer is to securo the conditions nocessery for the recnmplishzent of the wras in eccordance with that follows. The territorios will bo arcined upon in accordance "ith the proaress of the roerationa, and on consicaretio: of how best to fracivally solidify the founciction for cstablishinf; a mucleus aroup rad a ginll Co-prosperity Sphore. (1) We nust sccure strate eically vitel arcas which would assist our offonsivo ojoratinne, sud at tho senc tine cajture tho otroni-onints wilch would efford a stroziold for tho encry countorattacks.
(2) To eccuro territorice wish prociuce aetcrials necessary for the osteblishount of solf-sufficiency in oraor to complate nur ceponcity for prosecutine the ver.
(3) To control tise arere noccesery for the bloclonic of oncidy esuntrios ia sesentifl peturiels and tie irtorcontion of their comerco end conrunication.
2. Erory cerc mat be tricon to wrocure natorials essentiel th us in tho Southarn Rufions eni et the seno time ve rust contrnl and enash the oncay's military end connomic counterattecks. We nust tiorouchly enforco
 rusidet of stretoce and urcently riccioi untoricla. Who essuntial points tint wo must : ey ottcation to in the courso fine necuphtir.u arc ;ivon in inpo:dirn io. 1.
3. In Chi:ze, wo net ororthrow the Counckin: raciac and solip the srowth of a rop Chins, ti:ercby socurin e nuclcus roup, and ensure thet all is well rith our orecurowont of notorifls seontiel to us. Ti:O ossontial points that wo wast pey attontion to in tho course of tio occupetion ero iiven in Apposilx zin. II.
4. In the iorthorn Recions, wo zust dn our best to securo a besic spione cf antinnel dofonco enc neintei: nur sugeriority in etretciaic position. Lt tis seace tiro, wo must onsuro tic.e.t all is voll with vur procurcaciat of atratofic asterials. The casenticl points tc wich wo must jay attention in the courso if tia recupation are res eiven in Appendix 5 .O. III.

Chepter II


Chroter II Section V
Part II Conditions if Socurity
Th anin point of tho conditions to bo scoured at the torninetion nf hostilitios is te mprecci: es neer es poseible to the concrete idael of esteblishine tho Grcetcr Tiest isie Co-prosperity Sphero, but the oatunt to wish it con bo realizoc. douncis on our netional powor at tho tinc, cspocielly on tho oxtunt te waich wo infoce secured the sunils of nur Fictory, end will els aiffor eccorcin: to the lon:th of the wer and tioo fenorel asject of tho morld wes aituntion it the timo in zarticuler, tiso josition of tho countrios on our side end the extont of tho oxhaustion of the countrios nkainat us. iny definitc proinesticntion is therofore difficult, caci tho altuntion will beat be not by rilience on circurm stancos at the tinc, and by amidazco of inoraincto aribitinns.

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- \(\quad\).
 enumarate the thro basic iprinciples.

I Whon this wer is acon nyor with cnomy countrice loft with a yargin of atroncitr.

Our axim. will be the sccurin of cur oxistonce and self-sufficiency in the dircotion of the estebliahnent of tio jest isia Co-prosperity Sphero.
(a) Wi sijell teke as our stendard for Chine the policy proviously arranica, tivouill if neccesery there is still sone senjo for mitication.
(b) In the Southern Roiiions, wo will securc a nuiber of the nost irportent militery bases, and establish e. proforontici holl on cesontial metcrials such as putrolcua, iron, nctels other then izon, and foodstuffe.
(c) (In thic oorthorn Rocions, wo will actulc the problens of thi Constal rcifions.)

II When tin: war is brouctit to an ond by e sinalo oncigy defcot.
Our nexitr. Will be tho coteblishnent of \(n\) basis for the buildin; of the Dest disie. Co-groejority Sphoro.
(a) Wo ohell teke es nur stenderd far Chine the policy proviously arranioc.
(b) In the Scuthern Reciicns, we will socule the nocusenry military babse. Wo eheil lit the philippincs enjoy ind cipendence undor our arntoction and ruideace and shall put British kelcyr end Corth Bornco undor our turisdiction. \#c ebril csteblish a ajocirl cosnonic zono in the liotherlends Jeat ludies end scuurc a proforcintinl hold on aeteriels cesonticl for our country with F.I.C., eli centributi:e to tho founde.tion of a sacill scelc self-uufísctioncy sphore.
(c) In the inorthorn Re;inne, wo chall takc aonsuros to sever Enst Siboria fron the Seviot Union.

III When the war is terpinated by an onony surrender with iepan still loft with a forcin of strinith.

Wo shali plan the cotebilishuent of the smollcr O-prospority Sphoro e.t a binclo strokc.
(a) Wo shall tekc as our standarí for China the policy proviously arrancod.
(b) In the Southorn Rogion we aboll socuro in toto ell militery besos in tho anollor Conpospority Sphors; tho Philippines and Burma

Fothorlands Enst Inilios mac Fronch Inco-China, solf-zcuornncat will bo roalizod and sepocinl zoncs ossentinl for nilitery and ocnnonic puriossos will be osteblished there. British licleya and finrth Bernoo will bo anncroí as Jopanese torritory and will bocoac tisc basis of a anall scalo sclf-sufficioncy aphero. Fry dustralia axp. India wo asell proscribe the necessary ocononic union.
( (c) In the Liorthorn Recions we shall corplete the aimporel of Best Siboria.)

Chapter III
T:c Establiahrioat of Oncraticiel ircas

Che:oter III Section II
Mio Sutiorn Re:inns
Part I Military offeirs
1. Policy

The fi:2s of tho fundamentel policy of the military usteblishncent in tho South rn Roaitions wer znnc erc:
(1) In rrier to Recrmplish the eine of thu oresent wer, stratoeic stron:; points of the nost ureint necessity nust be sccured ead coatrollicd.
(2) Lllthouith the fulfilment of tho der:ands of the groscze rigertinns conc ifirst, caro nust bo taken to cheure that ovoryti. in tonds in tho direction of the osteblishmont of Enst issia.

Theso ains shell bo realized in proforence to the other policios for the Scuthorn Rceions.

In ailitary ostablishnont, pravisions nocessary for npurctions and ailitery ectivitios will bo first comoletcd, and aftor thet, conetruction work nocoseary far the resintcinsice of public ordar in the district, fonoral trensportation, and the control of encmunicaticne.

Military administratinn will be establiahcd in the ncoupiod territorios durin: tho necossary period of operative ectivitios, to control all the difforent construction work.
11. Outiinc.
(1)


Prio 14
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(1) Tho smay and the weve will bear particl rogizonsibility in
 the cinractoristics of tiv nrise in quostinn, and rtior factnrs.
(2) Militery fininistration must, anso the arinciole if the incal edministretion enc. triviel intcrocntions must bo evoided es far no posaible. It will try to mekc usc nf the existin: machinery.
(3) The public yeace and reder in the recupicd torritorise will be socured as far ea posaible by the erininry police syrstom ond tho netive erray, with the aseistance sme suppnrt of the cercisitionery forces.
(1) Only these of the native arnics that have ebanuoned their hestility and arc \%insitivoly ennperetinc; with our tr-npe will bo pornittec to oxist in the cocpica torriterics. Their nrcenization, cnd military establiahnent will be directed by nur arry. Their chiof puryosc is to contributo to the ostrblishmont of East isie eas morbors of the joace zolice. Ne mast in our utanst to use then to the bost advantaf:
(5) Tho stendard numbor if the armed forces of the nativo armies will bo abcut isplf of thoir prewnr nuabor, and will bo docidod upon accoriing to circunatancos.

The type if troops will bo limited th lend trooss, it beinf our jertiodijle niot to lot than kave nay nevol forcos for the time bofnc. Tho Imperial Novy will annoic thoir shipe.

Life firces will not oxist enc all assocteted ostablishriaita ond armonents will be confiscated nnd diaposad uf by the expeditichary forcos.

(6) The Theilend arny will be stren thened en condition of its

 \(\because\) (y) Netive cirnios will bo widely alsporscd; and put undor the cuthority of tho expuitionary forco to facilitate their oupervision.
 : Tho necossery ems adill be distributed to them, ecoscin: to circumstances; therouit the expeditionary forces.
(8). is a senoral ruIE, exceditimnory firces will be statinnod in places nocossary for the princuronent of articles.required by the amod forces, and: the erntrol of the arons pronucin; essential materialis, but our. Porices : bhnulate en noentrated as far as dies motintorfore with the forowishi; and thoroby meintein the oleisticity of the army and adjust. ail the varictice ce. its oquisnent in eis tr" cnsure its ingtantanientis meration.
 will bo dofraied in fistuse, whoravor zossible, by the niroae concorned: 1
(10) For crilitary oquipr.ent nucossary for operational beses and tho
uardin: of public ridor rofittod eneny oquipment will bo uscd for the time bcini: so e. tc oxpoditö and axocuto ailitery ank ;uarcine noesures.
No sherll ect nec rein; to our provicusly docided zolicy in Fronch Indo-Chine end Treilend.
(11) Durin: the prosent war, if tisoro is cny acenaion for our forces to oporato in the senc district es the Thri army for tho eerno nbjoct, tho commandin: officor of the Ineorini exjoditionery forces will nesurne conmand by mutual understendin: if both countries.
This will also mply to the Fronch InajoChins army.
(12) The tine for militery nduinistrotion tr ci:entic to erdinnsy adninistretion will bo seneraily at the end of the wry, eftor ornsidore.tion of the cectuci situation in tho areces onncornia, theuith thoro may be casos when nainnry edrainistration is intracucod beforo the torainntion of tho prosont wer, or the nilitary adrinistration still continuch evon aftor the end of the war, ecenrdin: to circunstancos.

\section*{Pryt II Politics}
No. I
1. The most irportent object of enlitical construction in the Southorn Ro:ions at present is to comply with the donsads if the gresent wor, in considoration of the idonl of tho setrebliahnont of the Greater East isia Co-irneperity Sphere (cf. Dreft Plen of the Esteblishraent of
 of coursc, wo must crush the tendoncy in the Sruthorn Rcsions to rojly on the United Statos and Britein and :uido then int: \(r\). bilief in oursclvos es the londin: netion, wo must lry strese on fecilitatin: the aroourenunt end selivary rif tie neccesery allitnry meterisis, and on cerryine: out opereticns.
2. The forta fad-inistration in the sccu:ied aroas will thus be military ndinisistrition durini: the wer. is for ite orfanization, a uilitary ceanandina officer or a : ovornar-aencrel will bl expointcd to tivis ficc, with o numbor of eblo nfficiale ond civilinns unior hin, celled upon to fully edrinister the ncousioc torritorios.
It is nceessary to choosc fron the very first the most ablo military officers enc nthers for all whe are to eremicinato in the nilitory edministrition, net th nontion ti:c avernoriencral hiasolf.
The inlitexy ecininistration will utilize the jresent edninistretivo syston as for es josaiblo, and seocial cors must be tekn to rastore and utilizo the locel gyotor.
Concernin:
.3. Concorniale the tranecount of tho netives of tho cocugiud torritorics, it is bottic not to force eseinilativo mesurce even in ercas
 netiral obilitice of tio sifforont reces. It will bo the golicy of militery edalaistratin \(n\) to wercise otrict control ovor the nativos in all sccupiea ercas wio save jrevinusly shown hestile feolinas towerds us, and redurily sleckon it. It will be sur orincinle to treat the Eurojenis ani tice dr:oricens in the nccurided territorics e.s we the the netives.
4. The Ci:incse in the ccupicd torritorice will slso be tronted in the seac wey. Strict supirviaion will be exorcisod ver these who hevo revinusly shown hostility, but the ethers will cen, rally be trontod Justlif witio no seeciel nos.surus teken to nuprese thon. Wo will teke sto \(s\) th neke thon conpernto in tha ncconjlishment \(f\) the urcent war, and esaceially to usc their essistance in tho sottlicnent of the Chins. Inciaent. Furthernore, our rulo will bo to onntrol tico southward edvance \(f\) the eriinary Chincso curin: the ver.
5. The soutivnrd edvonce of the éezanesc will ain at tho fulfinent f ur wertime domnds of a nilitery and connoric neture, and as ar rulc, it will bc rostrictod to cesential jersonncl for tho ncourio. torritarios, srent cere boint: teken of their sclection and educetion.

In the rexiculturel field, the rule will be to linat the advance \(f\) the Jeyencso to technical instructore.

The roturn of Jamanesc who have livod in the Southorn Ro.ions to the areas concorned will bo pormitted on a preforential basis only to thoso who aro elli:ible as recujation nembors, but they mat bo selected end trained before returnine: Aduquate solection end trainin: must elso bo :Avon to :1llitary mon ilachersed ovarseas and the officirls who retire abr \(\cap\) ă.

Furtionmiro, wion conin: in enntect with difforent races, afficiele ond civilians must not feel that they are suecrior th thon er treat then with coatcant. On the nther hand, they must be cexeful not to ajonil tio anetives by bein: too anxinus to win their hoarte.
Nin. II

Roijinned Divininns

\section*{1. Theileng}

We ohril resyoct tho indezontence of mexiland, our olly. to the utnost, eilive sil nocessery assistence such es wnuld enatribute to stron; thenine the iceition of the zresent rerime, and arild all interforcnce with doneatic affeirs. Wo ehell ednpt neneurcs to nake tho /
orvornment
government of midland comply fully of her on free will with our military and economic demands.

The military forces of nianlend will give comeration necessary for the accomplishment of the common rim. S ecirl precautions will be taken to intercept the enemy intention to soprrate \(\overline{\text { Finn }}\) and Thailand.

Vo will mako tie government of Thailand obliterate all satiJeprnose tendencies amon the ininese residents of Mixilend. Fe friendly relations between our govern ont ind Thailand should be meintrined, and it would be better for the national government not to tale ring direct measures against the Chinese in Thrilend.

\section*{3. French Indo-China}

For the present, necessary supervision will be exercised over French IndoChina to ensure that she faithfully fulfils the trocty for joint defence and economy, and that the present government of Z.I.C. Adopts measures of increasingly positive cooperation with us.

Wo shall keep r. close watch on German- French relations in Europe and as long 0.5 there is no change in the attitude of the Trench Governmont, we shall res:ect French sovereignty, though we shall do our best to bring homo to the officials and population of French Indo-Chins. 8 . thorough understanding of the new situation in Europe and isis, and to plant and promote our power in both military and economic fields.
dilthough the self government or the participation in politics of the Annemites will have to be recognized to some extent on some ?rover occesion in the future, for the present we shell not permit their independence movements, though we givell ask France to improve the position and welfare of the natives in general.

\section*{3. Hongkone}

We shell enforce \(e\) policy of dieporsinc the population under the military administration of the govemor-genoral of tile occupied rene, end we shell consider compulsory migration to simply the labour demands in neinan Island. at present, reconstruction worics will be limited to those of military necessity.

\section*{4. The Philippines}

Military administration will be enfo ea for the present and a central political organ will be established under the governor-generel, which the Filipinos will gredianily be made to run themselves es fer as poseible. Tie indopendeace of the Fhilippines will be eccelorated ea fast ns possible without waiting for the termination of the war; as

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Government of minailand comply fully of her on free will width our military and economic demands.

The military forces of Thailand "ill give cojocration necessary for the accomplishment of the common sim. S ecirl precautions will be taken to intercept the enemy intention to operate incan and Thailand.

We will mako tine government of Theilend obliterate all antiJapanese tendencies among the Chinese rosidents of Mirilend. Fie friendly relations between our goverasont and thailand should be mpintrined, and it would be better for the national government not to take n ny direct measures egringt the Chinese in Thrilend.

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\section*{4. The Philippines}

Military edministretion will be info oed for the present and a central political organ will be established under the governor-generel, lihioh the Filipinos will gradinily be made to run tiomselves es fer as possible. This indopendeace of the Fhilippines will be ncceloratod se fat ns possible without waiting for the termination of the war, as
it would be a merns to instigete the desire for inderendence emong the other nitives of the Co-pros?erity Sphere, and ne te consider it a good oxamile for the cotrblishment of the No-aros crity Syhera. It is neelless to scy the.t in this case too thoy will leve to coopercta positively in the wer agninst Britein and the United States, and w. ahell hold onto our righte to strition crmies and to use certein pleces necessery as military beses even after the uar.

\section*{5. Kalayn me British Borneo}

Military naministration vill be enforced for the pres nt under the governor-general of the occupetion territories; Singapore and Penang will be placed under his cirect jurisdiction. The governor-generel will be in direct control of the netive rulers cin dispetch the requisite controllers to their dominions to direct them. The edministration of these dominions and of areas smaller thrn rovinces will be carried on as far as \(20 s s i b l e\) on the lines of the existiag machincry, tisrough efforts must be mede to oblitornte British influence which hes permeated ell administrativo organs, so thrit measures to roform the British wey of muling sho?la be teken. We shill rcspect the native rulers' political measures and holj to reise the (m. . Woliticel) strnderd of the Mnleyens. Furthermore, as regards the effect of economic reforms we \(\cdots i l l\) crrry out \(\varepsilon\) number of mensurfs, giring the most consin zation to the minterence of prblic neace end nrdar.

\section*{6. Metherlends Erot Indies}

Militery acministration will be esteblishod uncier the goveriorgeneral and the existing ndministrative orgens will be used to the utmost for minor or locel administretion. On the principle of dethorlnads equality, some of the Jutch officicls and Indonesic:as uill bo employed indifferently. The most importent object in the "ethorlends linst Indies will be to fulfil our economic deme:de or those necesensy to criry out the operctions (especinlly petroloum), es this aren will be adjecent to the front for some time, and strict military daministration will be esteblished. Nicasures to aid the promotion of the position of the Incionesinns and to raise the standerd of civilization must be ndonted, to mrike the Indonesians gradu-lly chenge tiveir nttitude towards the Dutch and give thom the hoze thrtithe certrin period after the termination of hostilities, thoy will be ermitted to enjoy indepondence.

\section*{7. Burme}

Strict militery administration will be esteblishod in Burme es it is expoctod to be adjecent to the front for quite a long perioci. owever, the existence of the purmescl own edministrative orgen will be recognized and this under our guidancs will beoome the nuclous of on indopendent government in the future.

7
Hendling:


Eowever, greatcr importance is attechod to the ITotherlands Enst Indis, Malaya and the Philiperines in the rerl construction, as grent qunntities of materials cre expected to be srocurod in these arces.
(5) as for the method of construction, a notionel orgeniention will be established to i:aclude the Southorn Regions end unify anc regulate the construction, and under the overoll jurisdiction of this body, cortain persons responsible for the develonment of \(a\) certain material in a cortsin aree. will be selected to undertake the incressc of production.
(6) The production of such materials es ould orove superfluous, such as rubber and tin, will bo reduced to the nmount necessery for our deinende, and the margin of construetion pewer will both bo directed toverde the more urgent ciemands. Towever, in order to avoid confusion in the oconomy of the aree concerned, end to meintrin/powerful wonpon in the armoury of oconomic werfere by the metcricl concornea, a certein rmount of vroduction may atill be meintained ineofer ne it does not rove a neary burden on materiele and lebour.


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\section*{Prxt IV Idone end CuIture}
1. Worts in the idere rnd culturo of the souti:ern reces must be carrioa out on tho lines of genern :olicy for the develojment of ideps and culture sot out in Chepter \(V\), and in consideration of the fact thet these reces hevo been Jut recently e.ttfohed to us, that their sterdard of civilization is very 10 w , tinet their raci-l cherccteristice cre ones of mild behaviour and tiey hold ao nnti-icuencese feolings.
2. Instruction by reason
(1) Fropagnnda
ds the knowledge of jemon ield by the southern racos is insufficie:it. overy method and occesion must be turnod th account for oroprgating the
 througi \(\because:\) blicetions and the esteblishrent of orgenizations to oprecd 1:formntion cbout Jopail. Lectrres, exhibitions, moviae :icturos end musicel concorts should be given rad rill other specinl methode edojted.
(2) It is necessary to comply "ith the chrreotoristics and the oivilizetion of eaci race when ocrrying out gropagende, which thus ias \(\varepsilon\). grenter influence; further, the results of this propagende inest be thoroughly investigeted, and the selection of tiae jolicy to follow elso considared, so ns to necord with the ecticl situr.tion.
(3) The jrojegende systom in the Southern pegio:as must be extended nend atrongtioned, and the nein outline of the proyrgondr. end eseciatiol jerte of its orgenization must be deld by the uroneso.
(4) intilough the object of the progngand is tho controlling or intellocturl cless in eack district, sijecial methois of proyegende rmong the ignorrnt will riso be edopted.
(5) It is necesscry to think of \(\varepsilon\). wry to utilizo the secret Chinese essocintions in the south for our propegndr.
(6) When the situation permite, it "ould be a good idea to mako the controlining or intellectusl cless travel in jrinn and introduce them to the renl situction in joinn, thus wring them aiscerd their idea of relying oi Burope and tho J.S.i.

\section*{II Fducetion:}
(1) Tho existing nothod and yolicise should be reinvostigntod and those besec on the influonce of Britein, tho United States and the kethurlands siould bo abolishec. ilthough chrsges in direction will be mado rccording to the Eunornl \%olicy, there will bo no grent changes in educetionil institutions during this jeriod, and oaro will be trisen to utilize existing institutions.
(2)

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\(\because\) Drati of Basic FJan for Zstablishnent of Grester East AsLi: Co-Prosperity Sphere

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\section*{Bosic Plon fon Estabishinntof Crenter Pastasia \\  \\ Gorterts.}

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Port I

\section*{Outline of Construction}
(1)

The Plan
The Irperial country is a manifestation of morality the pronagation of the Imper lal influence being its original duty and the ideal of Holiko ichiü /the eight corners under one roof/being the spinit of the nationnl founding. The Irperinl country will not nove unless for the cause of justice.

The nropagation of the Imperial influence begins with the practise of morelity in East Asia grounded on the orifinal spirit of the Imperial influence supported by the vhole nation and ains at the proriotion of Esst Asiatic culture by means of the unification of East Asic. in a moral manner. Ficr this purpose it is necessary to foster the increasec power of the Imperinl country, to cause Erst Asia to return to its original form of indenendence and coprosperity by shaking off the yoke of Europe and America, and to let its countries and neoples develop their respective abilities in peaceful cooperation and secure Iivelihond.

\section*{(2) The Form of Enst Asiatic Independence and Co-Prosperity:- \\ The states, their citizens and resources, comprised in those areas pertaining to the Pocific Central Asia and the Indian Ocean formed ints one general union are to be established c.s an cutonomous zone of pecceful living and cormon properity on behalf of the peoples of the notions of East Asia.y The area includinis Japan, Hanchuria, North China, lover dangtze River and the Russian Mritime Province, forms the nucleus of the East Asiatic Union. The Imperial country possesses a duty as the leader of the East Asiatic Union.}

The above nuryose presupposes the inevitable emancipation or indemendence of Eastern Siberia, China, Indo-China, the South Sers, Austrolia, and Indis.
(3) Recional Dirision in the Eost isintic Union nnd the iNetran Deiense Evhere iol tho Imperisi country.

In the Union of Enst Asin, the Jmperial Country is at once the stribilising power and the leading influence to encble the Irmeriol Country sotunlly to becone the central influence in Bost Asic, the first necessity is the consolidation of the inrer belt of Enst Asia; and the Bast Asiatic Snhere sholl be civided as follows for this purnose:

The Inner Srhere -- It is the vital sphere for the Imperisl Country; it includes Jo.?on, Manchuric, North China, the lower Yangtze Ares and the iussion Mr.ritine area.

The Smoller Co-Prosnerity Snhere -- This is the smaller self-supplying snhere of irst isis and includes the inner sphere plus Eastern Siberic, Chine, Indo-Chine and the South Seas.

The Grenter Co-Prosperity Sphere -- This is the leryor self-supplying sohere of East dsia, and includes the smailer co-prosvority sphere, plus Australia, Indic and islende grcuns in the Pacific. Parollel with the divisions shown cbove and ot the same time the foliowing spheres of national defense for the Imperial fountry shell be set un, and those spheres sholl be mede the basis \(f \cap r\) the derense of East dsia.

Bnsic Snhere -- It covers nnproxinntely the inner sphere and is the \(z^{-n}\) ne wich requires abs lute sofety.

Dofense Suhere -- Covering anoroximetely the smeller co-prosperity shere, it is tho zono which must be perfectly defonded acoinst ney invosion from Eusone ar Ancrica.

Sphere \(\sim_{f}\) Influance -- Genorally corcesponding to the size of the Grintor Co-Frosncrity Snhore, it is this zone in which a suncrior position should be maintained egainst attecks from Euione or inerica.

For the nrosent, the smaller co-prosperity sphere (the defense sphere) shell be the zone in which the construction of East isis and the strbiiization of notional defense are to be nimed s.t. After their completion there shall be a gradual expansion towerd the construction of the Gres.ter Co-Prosperity Sphere (the sphere of influence).
- The above purpose presupposes the inevitable enancipaLion or independence of Eastern Siberia, Chins, Indo-China, the South Sens, Australia, and India.
(3) Regional Division in the Est asiatic Union nad
the in ions Deicasc sEvere for th i Inperiol country.
In the Union of Erst Asian, the Imperial Country is at once the stabilising power and the leading influence to enable the In:nerial Country actually to become the central influence in Bast Asia, the first necessity is the consolidation of the inner belt of East Asia; and the East Asiatic Sphere shell be divided as fallows for this purpose:

The Inner Sphere -- It is the vital sphere for the Imperial Country; it includes John, Manchuria, North China, the lower Yangtze Ares and the fusion Maritime area.

The Smaller Co-Prosnerity Sphere -- This is the smaller self-supplying where of inst isis and includes the inner sphere plus Eastern Siberia, Chins, Indo-Chine and the South Seas.

The Greater C=-Prosperity Sphere -- This is the lnreor self-supplying share of East isis, ard includes the smaller co-prosnerity sphere, plus australia, India and islands Ercuns in the Pacific. Parallel with the divisions shown above and ot the same time the following spheres of notional defense for the Imperial Guntry shell be set un, and those spheres shell be mede the oasis for the defense of East asia.

Basic Sphere -- It covers approximately the inner sphere and is the zane which requires absolute safety.

Defense Sphere -- Covering ajoroximetely the smaller co-presperity shore, it is the zone which rust be perfectly defended against ny invasion from wu: one er Ancrica.

Sphere \(\sim\) Influence -- Generally corresponding to the size of the Grunter Co-Fecsperity Sphere, it is this zone in which a sumoriar position should be maintained against attacks from Europe or incrica.

For the nrosent, the smaller co-prosperity sphere (the defense sphere) shall be tho zone in which the construction of East asia. and the stabilization of national defense are to bo fined et. After their completion there shall be a gradual expansion toward the construction of the Greeter Co-Prosperity Sphere (the sphere of influence).
(4) Outiino of East Asiatic administration.

It is intended then tho unification of Jomen, lianohiakuo and Chine in neighbourly friendship be roolizod by the settlement of Sino-Japanese problems by the crushing of hostile influences in the Chinese interior, and by the bringing up of a nor China in tune with the rapid construction of the Inner Sphere. Aggressive American and British influences in 3 inst isis shall bo driven out of the area of Indo-China and the south Seas, and this seen shell be brought into our defense sphere. The war with Britain and america shall be prosecuted fer that purpose.

The Fiussien aggressive influence in East Asia shall be driven cut. Erstern Siberia shall be cut off from the Soviet regime and be included in our defense sphere. For this purpose, a var with the Soviets is oxnocted. It is considered possible that this Northern problem may break out before the general settlement of the present Sino-Jopanese and the Southern problems if the situation renders this unevoideble. Next the independence of australia, Indic, ste. shell gradually be brought about. Fer this purpose, a recurrence of yer with Britain and her allies is expected. The contraction of 2 Greeter foncolian State is expected during the above phase. The construction of the Snifur Co-Prosperity Sphere is expected to require at least 20 years from the present tine.

\section*{(5) The Building of tho Noti-nal Strength.}

Since the Imperial Country is the center and pioneer of Oriental neral and cultural reconstruction, tho officials and people of this country must return to the spirit of the Orient and acquire a thorough undorstancilng of the spirit of the notional moral character.

In the economic construction if the country, Japanese and Manchurian national power shall first be cons:ildnted; then the unification of Janan, Nenchoukun and China, shall be effected (and especially the forging of Japan, ilancheukuo and North China into a tight union). Thus a central industry will be constructed in East Asia; and the necessary relations established "fth the Southern Seas.

The standard for the construction of the national power and its military Acre, so as to meet various situations that night affect the stages of Est Asiatic administration end the national defense sphere shell be so set as to be capable of driving off any British, american, Soviet or Chinese counter-influences in the future.

Part II

\section*{dirn of Construction}

\section*{Chapter 1. Spirit of Construction.}

The Emperor is augustly the center of the universc and the origin of morality. The Irnorinl Country is, therefore the manifestation of morality and the criterion of the world. With those facts as their creed and spiritual rule, the subjects of the Irmorial country intend to fuifil the dynenic and historic mission if establishing a vorld moral order.

However, in recont yoars, the notions of Europe and America, taking adventage of their meterial civilization, have penetrated the Esst and nrey unon it; and the moralistic \(\sim\) East has consequently been changed into a "Eurcnaaized Asia". And it is none cthor than Jopen, the divine country, that has epposed and rejected that invasion.

Now things have come to such e. pess thit the extortions of Anericc, Britain and sther powers threcten the existence of the Inperinl Country. This is intclerable to God and man alike. N=w the Inperial Country has determined to consolidate the national foundation by crushing their influence with divine military power to seve Enst Asic and cuuse it to return to its original nature, and to bring a renaissance upon East Asia by its unification under this grand and righteous ideal. By this means East Asia will be made a peaceful and securc place to live in in confornity vith the will of Heaven. The gist af the ain is to builc up the moral culture of the orient. In other mords, under the Greater East asia Unicn, the construction of morality, the fostering of original abilities and the fusion of cuitures shall be the cormon ideal; neiehbourly friendship and cooperative peace, jrint defense, and eccnenic cooperation shall be the rule of inter-States relationships; and the revival of huinanty shall be the sniritual principle of naticnal life. The Imperial country is the seurce of all the above.

Once the moral order of Enst Asia is thus accormplished, it con be expected thet the countries of Europe and America will be se influenced by it that they will look up to it as a fine example and, eventually cast of \(f\) their sclfish iffe view of materialism and establish a noral new order.


Page 7
(4) The frllowing are comanicition lines whose cefense mast be specinaliy seoired:
1. Land, sec. and air reutes in the Inner Sphere.
2. Sce ne cir trunk rrutes fren the Inner snhere to the Dutch East Indies.
(5) In the Sohoro of Influence, orciunl expension of basus she bo nede to imartant strotgeic stranfholsin int shere.

Chopter 2. Defensive Powr:

Given bolow in the table is en ostinnto \(\sim f\) the pevers' Capacity for future ageressive oncrotirns ocoinst East asia 20 years horae:
 afainst East isic 20 yenrs Hence
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The following are the numirical strencths of the Povers foi militery operotjons in East isin. The militery forces ovailable to Britein, America and Seviet Russia for East asintic onerntions rili vary about ono third of their respuctive forcus, in confimity with chonces in the situation in Eurone and Ancrica.
1. In the case of imerice and Britain camined:

\section*{Frental strength First Line iir Forces}

Novel Vessels
2. S:viet Union:

Frontal stren:-th
First Line Air Firces
Naval Vesseis

3 million men
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100 - edd theusand plones
More thon \(4,800,000\) tras

4 million men 20,000--50,000 plinnes Over 500,000 tons
3. Arerica, Britain and Scviet Combincd:

Frontri strength
First Line dir Forces

Naval vussels
4. China

Frantel Strenieth

First Linc dir Forees
Naval vessles

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rlancs
Over 5,300,000 tnns

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Prfic 9

It is nocessery for the ciefensc of the Inperisi Country fre it \(t\) builc \(u_{i}\) its :ertirc rilitery pover on tho besis of icstroying the ifrri-r cntirnec rilitery forees of the pevers. f luctranicri colculetinn is besce on tre eferc-
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& 5,300,000 \text { tens }
\end{aligned}
\]

First Linc iir Ferecs

Novnl Vcssels

\section*{Cheptcr.3. Feliticel Crnstructicn}

\section*{(1) Basic Plinn}

Tre ronlizetion ef the ercet licnl of constructins: Grestcr Iestasin C-Friserity requires net only tre conplctic prescoution : f"trc current Grenter Enst asic current wer but nise presuppescs anetror grent wer in tro

* tre nimery stritin: prints frx tro prificel constriction of Eest asir 'urine tre ciursc \(: f\) the noxt twenty ycers.
1. Propaieti:n fer :ar :ith tre rthcr sprores of the vrrla.
2. Unificrti:n ani c astructin \(n f\) tre Irst isis Sraller Co-Prospcrity Spherc.

The filluirr arc tre basic principles fir tre politicel constructicn of Enst dsie, wen the abevo two peints are teken inte censic.cretion:

ع. Tre riliticelly erminnt influcnce ef Lur ocen enc. frecicen ceuntrics in the Srinllcir C-Prosperity Sprerc sioll be eradunlly driven cut nnd tho nren sholl enjny its liberetion fron tro strekles pitrerto fercec uirn it.

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b. Tre dosires of tre pooples in tre sprere for treir independence stoll be respectcd nad endcevors srall be nedc for trair fulfilment, but proper enc suiteble ferms of Envernnent shell be decicace for tren in consideration of rilitary enc. cocnoiic requircrents enc. of the ristoricel, politicel sne culturel elcnents perticuler to cech eree.

It rust also bc notce trat tre incependence of varicus peoples of Enst asin stoule be basce upon tre icen of constructing Ifstiosis as "incependent countries existing within the New Ordcr of Eipst issie" enc thet this conception differs freri an incependonce besca on the idea of liberelism anc nationel sclf-dcterminetinn.
c. Durine toe course \(f\) censtruction, nilitary unification is decriec. porticulerly inportent, enc. the military zoncs nnd key prints necessery fer defense shell bc ciroctly or incircctiy uncer the enntrel of cur country.
d. Tre pecples of the sprere shell obtein treir proper positions, tre unity of tre people's nincis sreil be effected and tre unificotion of the sphcre shell be renlized with the Inperiel cruntry ns its center.
e. Trc eutcnoncus position of tre sphere srall be strenetrence. by nuturl sunplyine of neecis. Ln cutilne of tre cistribution of the Eest fietic penples nond treir cherecter is eiven in the Teble \(6 / T\). N. rissing/.
(2) Tre Gliticrl fernef.the Eest isintic arces after trenty ycers.

The icenl politjerl forms 20 yeers rence fer the aress of Eest isia, wirn crenizce upen the principle nenticned abeve may be eiven as fillcws: (Thoy erc tre ultinate ferns, anci tre tine enc? renns of their rcalization will very focercine: th tro situaticn. military affeirs witrin the Cc-Pr^sperity Sphcre will be teken up by tre Inperial Country in vicy -f tre necessity fer cefonse. Trc deteils of tris cicfense ore, rowover, rerc oxclucicd.)
1. lisncruluo

An incrcesinely steecey erowth of Menchulkuc is ainca at elent tre lines rif tre irienls on wifer it wes frundcd -- tc cffcct Jepnnesc-linnchulucen unification. blso it srell be rede a full-flccefec bese for rillitary cperations eefinst tre Scvicts. Inigretion plens sheil be furtraren in nreer to ragiize reciel cocperation anc perce.


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But, ecnerelly spenkine, the level of tre pecple is lov as a rece, enc. treir priliticel crpebility is sc \#acek thet trey cennot be seice to heve tre conecity for full-fledece selfEcvernnent. Th crefere, trruct trcy stell be incepencent fror the stenipeint of reciel libcretion, trey rey nece cur protcetion fer riny yeniso
7. Thailend

Theilend will setisfy her croristce cesirc to recever her lost lencs enc. strenetren her cooperetion with cur country. Ste will also be rcerenized as an inuepencent country forrine cnc unit of tre Eest \(\downarrow\) sietic Unicn.

In vicw of rer reciel, histericel enc perticulerly positicnel invortance, Trailsnc mill csteblish a specially intirmate coneretive reletionship witr Jr.pen in tre militery, political, ccenolic end cultursi ficies.
8. Burna

Bumin will be ecorrcec a rich eceroc of suton ony ns secn \(n\) p possiblu, in eccorcinnce with the cesires of the people. As sern es possible trercoftcr it will bocene en inderenent stete.

Tris arce is ncteble for its cni peretively intense enti-British iovencnt wich tes fonc on for soric time before end, it is elso reeseneblc fron tre culturel end historicel paints of view th let burre bcenac en inderiendent country. He:vever, cue te rer ncoilc's eenerelly lof stencerc of livinz, rer irpertonce frem tre vicwnoint of Eest ísietic rescurces, and olse becnusc of rer ley pnsition fron the politicel stencpeint (bcenuse of tre presence of nany influentiel Iniiens), in eny screncs toverc' Incie, Burre will nicessitete siic jretective interfercnce.
9. Britist Ifleya anc North Branco
e. Sincenore anc suct of its neerby eress
(inclucing tr Dutch East Inlics) es arc of military injortencc shell be resec perts of cur torritery ett on appropriate tine.
b. In the nt-er refions, sultens or locel lorcis shell be allowed to exist, and, efter treir unificaticn, trey srall be cur pretectcratc, trcir autcnosy bcine ellowec.

Tre focple of tris are? ere tice low in living stendards enc? prifitical cepecity to stecc any reciel novenonts. Trercfore it is nceessery tc brine up tre netive reces in confornity with tre uilitary and econenic requircnents.


6. Friferntion of eblc-brcier. Jepencse ovcrsces shell be cncrurafec.
7. Tre universel ciffusinn of tro Jenencsc lencuece ence tri intcr-ctenge rf culturc stall be crrried eut.

Crontcr 4.... Thought en: Culturel Construction

\section*{Croptcr 1. Gencral fin in Trouirt}

Tre ultiontc ini. in trourrt censtruction in Enst i.sia is to renec Enst asintic norples revere the Inperial influcnec by frepenetine; tre Inperipl Vioy besed en tre spirit of c-nstructinn, anc to csteblish tre belicf trat unitine snlcly uncer tris influence is tre onc end only wey te tre ctcrnel Erowtr anc. cicvelopacnt of Erst lisie.

Ance curine the noxt 20 yeers (the perice curine rerict the above iciofl is t- bc reachod) it is neccssery tr neke the netions oñ perplis rf Eest isin reelize the werlc?ristericel sienificrnce \(f\) tre csterlishrient rif tre New Order in Efest isin, ind in the commen conscicusness of Enst isintic unity, te likcretc Eest isie fren tre sheckles of Eurenc no incrice nn? to cstetish the corren crnvic-
 rerelity.

Occicentel incivicunliss: nnc qeterialism stoll be

 Tre ultinetc ebject te be ecricvec is not exploitetien but comprsncrity onc mutiri rclo, net consctitive conflict cut ruturl assistrneo enc. ril: recce, net fermil viev ef cquelity but \(n\) vicw fercicr besce in ris htccus clessificetinn, nct an lece of rifts but on lica of service, end nct severri wirl:' vicws but anc unifice werle viev.

Grenter 2. Gencral iinin culture
Trcesscnse of the troitionel cuilure of the Orient shell bu ecvelopec. ane nenifestoc. dinc, costin: off tre nefertive anc conservetive cultursi cherectcristics of the centincnts (Incie enc chine) on cac rond, and teking in tra erco prints of :icstern culture on tre ntrer, en orientel culture of recrality, on arnce scolc on: subtly refinec., srell be creetcr.
\(\square\)

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\section*{Port III. Plens for Canstruction}

Crepter 1. Constructive Preirer:
(1) Steges of censtruction
1. The ecministretion of Grenter Enst isir must be nrimerily besce upen the rcvivel of the wh-le of Crine es well \(\varepsilon\) as on the ciclusion of iuropenn and imericon influcnce from Eest bsie. Troreforc, it is necessery for us to cxrect continurus wer or ascrics of wers from now on, including the crine Incicicnt and the rrescnt wer aeninst Britein enc? :rerice.

Howner, win nust \(n \times t\) jun to the conclusinn that construction of the Grietcr Enst disie Co-ide sicrity Spherc cen be atteiner. sirply by exclu'ing efere 3eive influcnces by neens of ier. fin cnommus cffert will le required for a lone tinc fer tre construction itscif, r? in vicw of the fact tret pert of suct censtruction \(1:\) incispenseble for the piesceution rif tre mer, we will he te to cepend on continuce cfferts tc firrt rnc. buile at the senc tine.
2. Neriely, frui the vicwurint of war ind construction, wo conterinletc sore such steces is the threc followine, enc. vic ney be sure trat encr ref then will cover e rether lone perice.
```

\varepsilon. Pcrifi nf ifrr (Porinc. :: Urfcint Construction)
b. Perimi! rf Post-per linna;joment

```

Page 1;
(Period of Adjustment and Construction)
c. Period oin Prenaration for the Next Mar.
(Ferioi of Expansion and Construction)
a. Period of V ar.

This is the period of the accomplishnent of the current Greater East Asia :Jar, and the winning of the wer shovid be considered before anything else. Accordinely, the urgent part of the construction indispensable for the present should be resolutely carried out, and fullfledged construction should be carried out by means of pover not needed for the prosecution of the :!ar. This is the quickening period of East ssiatic administration.

\section*{b. Fost-mar Nanagement Feriod.}

Thile re are adjusing the fighting power of the Empire, taking advantage of any temiorary otabilization of the international situation, ve will reqlife post-war menagament against hostile remaining influences. Fle shall carry out i: a positive manner a palicy excluding or assinilating such iniluences. hind we must grasp and satter togather various peoplos and races within the area, thus gaining the rosult of economic coprosperity, and cradu:lly realizing the zreat step of constructing East isia. This stage will not be storter, in any event, than the period of war.
c. Period of Expansion.

First importance should he attached to the development and replenishment of Japan's national strength. The main point rill be to establish the foundations of the Crouter East isia Co-prosperity Sphere to the ex-
 policies which vill lead to the emancipation or independence of dustralia and India, while trying simultaneously to strengthen our preparations for total viar in anticipation of a second var with Britain and hor Nlies.

It the end of this stage wich moy be tentatively set as some trenty years afte: the end of the present sar, we shall hive oor prith Eritain (imerica).

\section*{(2) Cardinal Points of construction.}
1. The chief object of est\%blishing the Greater Fnst lisia Co-prosperity Sphore lise first in the stimulation of the complation of the defensive strength of 玉ast isic. \(B\). the building of such c sphere, we vill exclude European and imerican fetters from Eest isi', ind ive must lead the various nations witiain \(t: i s\) sphere to unite materially and spiritually iith Japan as the center. For this puryose, re must corry out an epoch-mnking extansion of Japan's national strength, especially of her war properations, and fully achieve the econcmic construition. These should go along side by
(Period of Adjustment and Construction)
c. Period oi Preparation for the Next Mar.
(Ferrol of Expansion and Construction)
a. Period of War.

This is the period of the accomplishment of the current Greater East Asia Uar, and the winning of the wen should be considered before anything else. Accordingly, the urgent part of the construction indiapensable for the present should be resolutely carried out, and fullfledged construction should be carried out by means of power not needed for the prosecution of the :ar. This is the quickening period of East Asiatic administration.
b. Fost-war Management Period.

While re are adjusting's the fighting power of the Empire, taking ad- vantage of any temporary stabilization of the international situation, re will require post-mar management against hostile remaining influences. He shall carry out i: a positive manner a policy excluding ar assimilating, such influences. ind we must grasp and cater together various peoples and races within the area, thus gaining the result of economic coprosperity, and radu:lly realizing the great step of constructing East Maia. This stage will not be sorter, in en y event, than the period of var.
c. Period of Expansion.

First importance should be attached to the development and replenishmont of Japan's national strength. The main point rill be to establish the foundations of the OrBiter East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere to the extent of \(a^{*}\) small self-supportin's nr sa. In the maytime, is e :ill adopt policies which will lead to the emancipation or independence of australia and India, mile trying simultaneously to strengthen our preparations for total var in anticipation of a second tar with Britinin and hor Allies.
at the end of this stage ranch may be tentatively set as some trent years after: the end of the present :ar, we shall hove var with Britain (America).

\section*{(2) Cardinal Points of Construction.}
1. The chief object of establishing the Greater Fist isis Co-prosperity Sphere iss first in the stimulation of the completion of the defensive strength of Bast sic. B the building's of such \(c\) sphere, we will exclude European and !american fetters from Erst isis, ind we must lend the various nations witiain \(t: i s\) sphere to unite materially and spiritually with Japan as the center. For this purpose, re must carry out an epoch-mnking extension of Japan's national strength, especially of her ian preparations, and fully achieve the econcmic construction. These should go along side by
siáo nith politicel and idenlogicel, as reill ns cultural, construction.
2. i. militiary po:ror so atrong is to ba capable of subduine and crushing verious influances inside or outside of the Sihere shnll ba fostered end put in rafidiness. and in ordir to meke this power sorve us the pivot of eost isiatic unific tion, and to sscure the key points and conmunicetion lines for the construction and defense of Enst asia, the soonest possible ercsp of importani arcas, ani the establishment of military stroneholds such is \(\therefore\) in:
3. Econonic construction ifill incronse defonsivo porior, nd at the seme tine serve as the kasis for the unification of tho pooplos and nitions of the Siphere. The Inner Sohero ospocially shill be the conter of construction for henvy industry and chemicel industry in Tast isia, and shall thereby serve as the coro for the eccnomic unification of East isin. in effort shell also bo made, in the construction, to est blish the necessery transport poicr, and particullrly, to strengthen martime transport, and also, to set up a sphare currency and a trade oystem which rill conter rround Japan.
4. The primary significance of the political construction lies in oducuting Chinr in the direction of her coopsration wita Jepan, ensuring the consolidation of the Innor Syhore countrios, respecting the desires of the peoples and netions to the moximum cxtent, and in plicine then all in such positions thet thoy inill bo blo to onjoy thoir rospective national existences.

Proper guidaners shall be furnished to wery nation and peoplo of Zast laic according to its standerd of living and coptibility. By this means the necossary strongtioning of politicel poror in its rol.tion to our country and for the construction of Tast isia \(\overline{\text { ill }}\) be carricd out.

In thcught and ciltural constiuction, jvery antion and poople shall be frocd from its Europan ind imoric:n colonial characteristics. The Impori:il Country aill, as tho leader, take up their guidance, promote the original spirit of the ㅍast, and a thorough understending of oriontnl culture, take in the grod points of Nestirn culture end crocts the moral culture of Enst isis.

The lecal traditions and cultures in West isin sholl bo resooctod and maintained to the oxtint that thcy do not hinder the construction of tho Co-Prosperity Spliers; thay shall bo enconreyed to derolop and improze, so thet they miy servo for the groith of tho \(c \cdot l\) lure of. Wa.st isin.




从lidititar 2
shonk tinc
\(y\)
(1) Gidanse in line.
1. The currant mix shnil bo rosolutoly prosocutiod, nad tho basias of tho oonstruction of tho Inn \(r S_{2} h\) hero and the Sranllor Co-Prosperity Spicro siall bo ostablishod,
2. Iftor the tormination of the :nr, tho censtruction of the Innor Sphere shall bo porfoctod by othar moens than military povor, and at the same timo the coistruction of the Smalli.r Co-Frosperity Sphere wh:ll be expedited and sujplementiod. For this purposo a part of our military po:or maly be empieyod to such an extent as not to lead to largo-scalo marfaro.
3. Noxt, while mecurrence of wer with Chinn is boing cevoided, the ageressive influance of tho Soviets, Eritain, and isoorion against East ioia shall at the yropir times (and eradually, if possiblo) bo crushod, ind together :Ath tho porfocting of tho Smellur Co-Prosparity Sphers, the construction of the Geocter Co-isrospority Sphore ahell bo expodited. Tho advantagus of our country shall be utilizod for this purposo, und in particular sooporition :ith Gormany and Italy shall bo maintnined so re to rum strain hostilo countri:s in Durope.
4. is for Ohinn, an effort shill be mado to cduonto the nery oountry tomald cooporation with Japan as proviously planned. Oaro shall bo tnkon to woid rocurronce of riar botroen Japan and Chine. ind, if possiblo, Ohinose aotivo cooparation tith Japan shall bo oxpoditod.
5. is for the Sovicts, our efneril plan is to avoid win with them for tho prosent, Hovover, if and whon a good opportunity arrivos during the prosont inor, or if aigns of imorican-Soviot unifioetion againat Jnian appoar, stops may bo trikon ui.thin tho Dofense Sphore,

As lorg as a monaco oxists in Tinstorn Siburin, a mar rith tho Soviots is inevitablo. Therofors, if possiblo, a good cpportunity shall be takon advantago of in tho futuro for crushing this throat prior to tho next war :ith incrica and Beitain. From t:is point of vir:i, Soviet approachos to imorica and Britain shall bo closoly jatchod.
6. Ls for Britain mad Amorica, althoug thoir alliance azainst Japan is in gonoral to be cxpoctea, the nllienoc shall bo blocked as much is possiblo, Britain boing tho principal targit of tho Japaneso campaign for that purposo.

Recurranco of : mr rith imoricn and iritnin 13 unnvoidable for the completion of tho construction of Groatior Eact isia. Caro must, thereforo, b) takon to adjust tho spoed and ordor of our construction in such a may that the next mar will not be onused prematuroly. During such times, if the Soviets nro firm and poicurful, ze must berare of an alliance botroon them and demarica and pritain.

b. Thus a position which vill anablo us to hold out for a long time vill bo ostablishod. In tho attompt to dostroy the British Enpiro, oporations to destroy hor trade lines shall bc intonsificd. Nlso tho supply routes for food from India and lustralia shall bo cut.
c. The constituont parts of tho British Empirc, shall bo separatod psychologically by taking advantage of tho differoncos of intercsts among thom.

\section*{3. To: ard the Sovicts.}
\(\therefore\) docisivo military oper tion is possible in East isia. But for the collapse of the Soviot ncinland, a cooperntive operation :ill bo nocensary with countrios friondly to us in Europo.
a. In nllinnce botricon the U.S.S.R. and Amorica end Britain against Japan shall bo closcly guardod against, tut as soon os mr broaks out, her militery porior in Enst isia must first of all bo dostroycd.
b. In cooporation with our comrado countrios, hor intornal collnpso shall be airnd at. Hor reak points reo her social frictions, and tho difforonces of ideologios betrieon the rulors and the ruled.

\section*{4. Toriard China.}
First of all hostile elements shall bo dostroyud by military por:or; once the koy points are takon, the intorior area shall bs ponotreted by our influance by oither milittry po:or or economic means.
In short, tho total \(\begin{gathered}\text { ror strength of the Imporial Country is chiofly }\end{gathered}\) composed of its militory power; and the first requisito is to cloor enst isin of tho influenco and nggressive porior of hostile netions. For this purpose, the menificstation and promotion of the traditional spirit of militarism is nocessicy.
Ne:rt, to copo \#ith a lengthy 'nr, it is nocessory to positively occupy importent croes, to ostebiish a position of self-supply, end to corry out oconomic zarfaro gainst Bitt-in and Amorica by placing the Southarn aroas under our control end possossion. Furthrrmore, thy internel collwso and perticularly coloninl collapso of hostile countries shell be cimed at, by our dovoloping a varfirc of propagenda. ind for tho purpose of geining a favorable situntion in general, diplometic stratagoms shall also be conducted to rostrict the number of hostile countrics and to securo allios.
ill the plans montionod nbove can hardly be cechicrod in a short poriod of timo. Theroforo, inth for sight into tho futuro ind corofully-planned proprations, tho foundations of tho schome must be laid dom on a large scalo bogiming in poreo-time.

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Pege 22

Doc, 2402B
Tho significnnce of total war originetos from the idoel of our country's foumation and is based on the noral nationsl plen. Our ultimate ain and object is none othor then thet. Te must benr in mind, thorofore, So:" difforont our cin is from that of Juropen and imoricen countries.
(ii) Sjucifl institutes shell be esteblished for tiae sciecting, treinims ne aispetcinin; of eiritunl and culturel lecders. in other words, flens sinil be divised on nenetionel scale and enforced for tho aclecticn, caluention an.: stetioning of talented nen, who arc qualifiod to
 norel consolicintion of tice Eest isintic Recos. These \%orsons must be nole to come into close contect with the ecturl life of the netives as s:iritunily cultured persons without utilizin; nyy \%ow or cuthority ce - becciround, ank rust be.cunlifind to becone toechors es well as
 cultur:l livine. It is nleo thoir duty to investigeta tho returl conditions of tioir rusectivo districts end to enther informention. These loders shill bo sulactod ned erpointed froal the broed fiold of civilizetion, fron caom: the telented roli ioniste, ertists, oducetors, scicatists, tociniciens, ccononists, enc socinl workors.

VI Tio oustini; of thos co:sticerce e.s injurious to the Establishacnt of tho Enst isic. Co-rioserity Sphore.
 activitics by tho Soviot Jnion, ard estrict control shell bo onforced ovor Conimilistic rovenonts.
(Ii) ilthough it sianll bo ande the arincipli to convort ony entiJouracse movenents by jositive oducntion, those of an obstinate and anlicious acturo sholl be crushod.
(III) \(\dot{\alpha}\) it is enticianted thet the countor-propafanda of Britain the United States and the Sovict Union will bc intensoly cotivo, strict restrictions shnil be imoued on the listoning in to broadenets, nowegnoars and fubliacticns shinll be subjected to strict consorshiy.
(IV) as rcentis chriationity, the miesionery work of hostile Eneilish rad ancicen litasimejog ohein ba rohibitod, end they aholl be substituted by mitive mossionarics, foreover, it ehril bo ;ilemed to

(V) Litorny vorms of est and zublications tadine: to frply the ndoration of Surow ene iserice. rne wish ore obstructive to the csteblishnont of tio Er.st disiti Cu-rinse:ority Sphere sierll bo strictly benned, ani a clom swen shall be nade of thinkers end culturnl persons vosscseing no intentio: of sbendonins their Euroiern rnd facricen hostile feoliness.

VII Fisoclis:acous:
The gremetory \(\operatorname{llen}\) for trie Jatablishnont of Enat isictic Culture and the pleme for the Interchnatine of Culture shall bo based on Part I.



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gove rnments of Manchukuo and China have fully understood our intentions in the prosecution of the war since its outbreak and have cooperated with a positive zeal. French Indo-China has also cooperated with Japan. Thailand has discerned the aim of this war and has also cooperated with Japan. She has been determined to eliminate dmerican and British influencos, which have been the roots of evil in East Aida. On December 21 last year, she concluded the alliance with Japan. (Applause.) The Japanese Goverment will pay respects to the excellent views of the leaders of Thailand and give full support to their constructive efforts. Actually cooperation between the two has increased. And thus, our diplomailic orgainzation has been steadily canpleted. The spipit of cooperation uetween Japan and these friendly countries has made the carrying out of the war and control of the South easy.
"As you know, the connection between Japan, Germany and Italy has become ever increasingly tight, and the close cooperation has been embodied. step by step in military affairs, economy, diplomacy, and all the other matters. Whatever America and Britain may do to attempt to separate Japan. Germany, Italy, and other Priendly countries from each other, there must be no room allowed them to accomplish this aim. The iron combination of the Axis Powers stands as firm as a rock, which will become more and more dense. Of course, the Axis Powers are quite different from the soncalled group of Allied Powers who gathered many exiled goveruments. (Applause.) The Neutrelity Pact between Japan and the Soviet Union has still been kept and remains unchanged."(Applause,)
"ife are going to keep the good relations between Japan and the neutral countries in South America and Europe from now on to as long as possible. If the countries in South America are not tempted by America and do not show their hostile and unfriendly attitudes toward Japan, we will fully respect their positions. So we will gaze with keen interest at the present Rio de Janeiro Conference. Our true encmies are the American and British ambitions to control the world. In order to gain their advantages, they make a puppet of a third country and secrifice her in cold blood. The world knoms that such doings by them are too numerous to mention. whatever plot they may lay, we ought not to be tempted.(Applause.)
"ire have never been hostile to the inhabitants of the Dutch East Indies and, therefore, we hove never expected that they sink into the depths of misory on account of America and Britain. (Applause.) However, America, Britain, Holland and Churgi-ing have been united lately and made Dutch East Indies their strategic bese. Lioreover, the act of hostility of the Dutch East Indies has become evident and so we have been compelled to commence fighting against the Dutch East Indies.

The a are still the bigoted people in Chungking who depend on America and Br:tain, but I believe that in the near future, these unamakened people will deeply think over our common tasks in all East Asia, return to the: roper honor, and cooperate in the construction of the new order in \(\mathrm{E}_{\mathrm{i}}\), t Asia.
"The ajm of this war is the establishment of the Greater East \(\Lambda\) sia Co-Prosperity which is based on the spirit of the foundation of Japan; at the same time it decides the joint destiny of all races in East Asia; so it is natural that the areas absolutely necessary for the defense of East Asia must be grasped by Japan. (Applause.) It is also natural, in view of the justification of this war, that the areas which have been Anerican and British territories, be given their proper standings in accordance with the traditions and cultures of their races.
"It is truly evident that this war, the aim of which is the establishment of the Greater East Asia-Co-Prosperity Sphere, based on such fundamental principles, is quite different from the soncalled invasive war. The leaders of America and Britain, who want to explain this war with the word "invasive", have only proved that they kept to that idea and style in accordance with their doings. (Applause.) we did not expect the fighting of races which has been propacated by our enemies, so we have not admitted any necessity for it. (Applause.) Japan also does not fight with a narrow-minded exclusive intention. The idea of the Greater Bast dela Co-Prosperity Sphere has not the nature of exclusiveness. Accordingly, it is evident that the relation of economy and communication will be dense between the countries in this sphere and the other friendly countries as the establishment of this sphere makes progress.
- In order to carry out the construction of the Greater Best asia CoProsperity Sphere, Japan, who has had the leadership of all races in East Asia, must have her grand view and conception and clear cognition in regard to the principle of co-prosperity. Moreover, she must show her positive attitude according to the construction of the East Asia CoProsperity Sphere in her various organizations and fully meet the expectations of the races in East Asia. Consequently, our duty has been more and more grave, and we, the Japanese nation, must conquer various difficulties with the connection of all Japanese, accomplish the glorious undertaking, and reward to the honor that we live in the Holy era when our country is rising." (Applause.)
I.F.S. Nc. 1038

Stete: ont af fource and fythenticity
I, Shichiro Nurei _ . . . . . . hereby certify
thet I re officieily connected mith the Joy ancse onvernment in the fallorirs cepcoity: _Cabinet_Secretery


 af the Housc_of Feareseltetives I further certify that the niticenea recore end cocurent is en officieldocurent of the Jezenese Gnvernent, and thet it is art of the official archives and ifiles af the folloring nered rinistry or deirrement (siceifying als, the file nu:jer ar citction, if any, or cny other officiel c.esisnction of the rejujar lieatiod of the zocument in the erchives or filss): _Hicuse_of Rejrcsentcives

Signed e.t Toky: an this
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\(\qquad\) cey af \(\qquad\) . 1946 \(\qquad\)
Siznature of Official
Fitness: K. Hijorctsu
- Cebinot Secretary

Cfriciel Cajacity

\section*{Stctownt of official Fxourcment}

I,_Henry_Shinojizn_ _ _ . . . . . , hercby cestify thrt I en assucietcd rith the General Heedquarters of the Surrere corrander for the sillied Foricrs, end thet the abnve cicserthed decurent mas obtcined by me tram the abnve oigned officicl of the Jemanese Governrent in the coneuct of ay official Dusiness.

Sienor at Tokyo on this
5 th Cey Of Mov. 1946
"itness:
R. A. Lrrsh
/s/ Henry Shirsiima
NWE
Investizator T.?.S.
Cfficicil Corenity

Loc. No. \(1038^{\circ}\)

\section*{GERTIEIG安TE}
I.F.S. Nc. 1038.

\section*{Steter:ent of fource and buthenticity}

I, Shichiro Murei_ _ _ . . . . hereby certify
that I pe officiaily connected with the Jne encse Government in the follcrirs cerceity: _Cabinet_Seoretery
end thet es such nfficiel I hrve custocy of the coocument hereto ctteched deseribed es follo:zs: ranlection of the Frocecrincs of the
 af the Housc of Fereselitetives \(\bar{I}\) further certity that the abruched record snd cocurnent is en officieldocurent of the Jey.arese Governeent, and thet it is rart of \(t\) he officiel erchives and ifiles of the follorinaz nemea Einistry or ceirertment (sfecifying als, the file nu:ljer ar citciion, if any, or cny other officiel cesifnction of the reinjar lreation of the zocuncnt in the nrchives or fllss): _house_of Rerrcsentatives

Sisnee e.t Toky: nn this


Fitneas: K. Hijnrctsu -
_ sf S. Mureit
Signature of Official
- Cipbinot Secretery

Cfficiel Cajacity

Stctexnt af Official Fracurement
I,_HEnry_Shifoliza_ . . . . . . , hercby certify thet I en associutcd rith the Generel Eendquarters of the Surrer:e Cormander for the inllied Foricrs, and thet the above ceser thed decurent mes obtcined by me frasi the abnve aigned officicl of the Jacenese Govern-:-ent in the conciuct of my official busincss.

Signace at Tokyo on this 5 th Cey of Phov. 1946
/s/ Ecnry Shirgitmo \(12 \sqrt{15}\)

Witness: \(\qquad\) Investizctor In? S.
Officicl Co: anity


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Doc. No. 1038B
"Refercinf the Prili-rines, tre renor ef inatencence
 our true intention erce coeperetc es renbers of the establistment of tre Greater Enst hsie Co-prcisperity cprere. (fprlausc.) Our intention for Burme is the sone es frr tre Fhilinpincs.

MWen Duter Jast Imejes enc fustrolye continuc thetr beering to, rcsist Jajen \%e will cruer them witrout resitetirn。
 truc intiention and croncrate vitt lis, :ie will rive suppert to treir ceevcloprient anci \(\quad i \in l f e r e\) with nur fuli understencine. (Appleusc.)
"It is very regrotelic tef to e \(C^{2}\) iene ki-stek refirc continues to resist Jepin, enc wo will crust tren to the lest. (l.ppleuse) I heresy arrresize trere is now e erence for trem to reze corrcestiy at tre worin? situations, to abendon old reiaticas wit treng, imerice end brite in, anc te take pert in tre greet uncititeliln of constructine tre

"It is orattcr for encratuletion trat all the perple of liencrufuo, Crina, enc Treilend reve redc ecnstent effrits tofetrer vith Japen far tre esteblistreent of tre Greater East Lasie Co-prnsperity Sprore and test French Incinocrine. res elso comoperoteci in it. (i.ppleusco)
"It is a mattor for mutuil confratulntion thet our frienily countrics, especieliy Geminny enc Italy, are steacily obtrinine ver results with Jepen for the estejulistment of the new world orcier. (bipleuse:) ve will tightly unite with tren in military, ciplniatie, ant eacnoric reletiens, and nal:e proeress to reconplist nur joint sins. Tre situation viser ie intenc to effect is trat at tre becinning of tre wer we will estnblish rilifery ecministration, set c.bcut tre irrecinte tasks necessery for tre resecution of war, prepere for tye greet construction if tic futurc anc. neke expend tre jindts of perticinetion in the rejenistration of tre inhabitents, witt tre este blisl:acnt of rublic perce, orcer, enc ecfense in Erst heiro In view of tre frect trat
 is fersif hted, it is necessexy to prepere trorcufinly so es to telfe care of the estetishtient ree te obe in toe coprera-
 noblitzec. (f.priause。)
"In necrirdinee vitt tre heforemenijenea situntions, end in order to expect tre divelornent of our country, tre present irinediate duty is to crush our enceics rore enc nere, strenetren our figrtine poiver, ene estakilis tre oreenization for the certein vactorye Trcreforc sil naticred systcres nust be conecritroted upen theno
"Consequently, all cierertionts of the roverrrient will establish the policies ncoessery for the prosecution of war, enc cerry tre: nut pronotily Nencly, in orcior to maintein anc incressc tre rroancing ofpecity in wer.t.ire,
 funds chiefly into the icading criterprises vitch ace roore luportant tran otrers, ene molre tre rioss of tre equiprent wrict we rave now, anc at the sonc tinc, ve will take into consicicration turc expension of roduction of inportant industries neossserf f'cr tro neitionei defense, once tre counter-plen for tre ver-tine focis necessery fer tre security of tre ietionol life. at tre present tre nost important problan is trans:ortation fecilities iatrel tran the shorteec of rescurees, so we will moke specfol cfforts to construct s! irs, tivecoby finprovin: and strcal treining coimunicntions anc trensportrtions. (Ampzuss.) hesin in orcer to nrosecioc the netional policies, the eccunuletion of people:s funces is ebsclutely necessery focordinfly, it is tre Govermment's intencion to exert further eifforts in the future for the rrenotion of yeonde's sevineso
"Since tre outioncek of tis war the rence of tre netionol ectivitics reve been rcrarkebiy expanced end their respansibilities reve becone nore ani rore importent. Now tre inprovenent of tre netioncl crareoter and tre increese of population pave been necessery for tre presecution of vins and for the conpletion of tre construction. He nust reform all the ecucationel orenjzations, senitery equipnent for tre people anc' a systen of nedicel treetrent. (hryinuse.)
"In eccorcence viti tre otove-mifntioned statenents, the
foverninent ras presentec? tre cirffts of law enci budiet to
tre Imperiel Dicto I rope we will pronetly cintain tre rprovel of botr Heuscs of tre Dict.
"In conclusion, I wist to cxpress decp apprecietion for tre eno? will which our frienily powe rs nave catended to our ccuntry eni also to exnress heartfelt respect for the patrictic spirit of cur ncople wicc arc comoperetine with eact other in renaerin servicc tracere treir respective occupationso" (l.mpeuser)
I.F.S. Nc. 1038

\section*{Steteront of fourse and huthenticity}

I, Shichiro Murei
hereby certify
that I on afficielly connected Bith the Jni ancse Governiment in the fallorinc cercoity: _Cebinet_Sectetery and thet es such officiel \(\bar{I} \bar{h} r v o\) cuctopey of the cocument hereto etteched cesoribed es fnllows: "Cillecting of the Procece ings of the
 of the Housc_of perresertctives \(\bar{I}\) furthce certify that the aifuned recorr cne document is en officini-.. cocurent of the Jerarese Governrent, and thet it is rart nf the officicl erehives end files of the folloring ner:ed ministry or ceirrinent (erecifying ale, the file nutyer or citcilen, if any, or cny other officiel cesienction if the reoujar lnatio: if the zooument in the archivea or filss): _Heuse_of Rercsentajucs

Sizner e.t Tokye an this


Fitness: \(\qquad\)
sijnature of Officiel
- rebinet Secretary

Cfficiel Cajacity

\section*{Stcteant of Cfficina Encurcizent}
I._Henry_Shimojice
, hercby certify thet I em associatcd with the Generc.l Headquarters of the Surrere Corander for the illijed Pniars, end thet the abnve acsuriticd decurent ras obtcined by me trate the above olfned ofilicicl of the Jamese Governzent in the concuct of \(y\) official bueincss.

Siznad at Tokyo on this 5 th ces of Nov: : 1946
"1tness: . R. A. Irrsh /s/ Hobry Shicojima

Inrestizctor Tor.
Cfficicl Ce:city


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DCUSARSTI NO. 2624
Page I

\section*{RECORD OF EVIDENCE}

Today, Saturday July 13, 1946, appeared before me M. MASMOBIN, LL.D. Commissioner of Police 2nd Class with the Municipal Police at Soerabaja, attached to the office of the Judge divocate of the Temporary Court Nartial et Soerabaja, in charge of investigation of war crimes, a person who stated to be

\section*{REIMDBRHOFF, Gerard, Leonerd,}
born at mine ratue on June 12, 1c04, Ma,jor of the F.N.I.A. Infantry, residing at Socrabaja. wi:01e
Are you prepared to swear that you w:ll tell the/truth and nothing but the truth?

Yes.
Whersupon the witness is duly sworn eccordin to his religious convictions to tell the truth and nothing but the truth.
Q.: Wiat onn you relate concorniné ell you know about the war crimes committed at the occupation of BJIIKPAPAN by the Japanese?
1. I only know about the above mentioned war crimes on account of my work
- With the N.E.F.I.S. (ot thet time at BRISBA: \({ }^{\text {E }}\) ), from interrogations, inter elia, of the javanese sergeant SABBINI and the Javanese rifleman Bli'OH; later on, after contact in Batavia in 1945 with personnel oricinating from Balilppapan. All this is recordec with \(\operatorname{ligFIS}\).
2. as for the threatened prospect of murder at BALIK:APLE and TARiKin I kow the following:-....-

In Uenuary 1942, whilet still prisoners of war, together "ith Lieut. Col. S. DE WAAL, Reserve Captain VAN DMR VEGT and Reserve Gfptain COLIJS on board the jaunnese Staff ship, the following vas communicated to Cant. CoLIS and mveelf:--
that we were to be tranaported by motor launch to BALIKP:PAN;
that if the uestruction of the oilworks at BALIKPAPAN should be effected, in the event of imminent Japanese landings - as we hari stated would be the case - further, if BALIKPiPAN were to be defended, or even if the Dutch garrison were to resist such landing, then all PONs and :ll other European residents of both sexes at TARAKN would be killed, as well as all soldiers and Iuropean residents of both sexes who migit fell into the hande nf the jajanese at BALIKPsAii..-...
This statement is recordedi in a inoument mede out in Jepanese chrracters and underalgned vith name stamps, with Enfilish tranolation attached. Contents were read out by the Chiof of Staff, a major, with the help of en interpreter, in the presence of the commanding genernl, a Major-General. Division Comiander, plus five other japeneso officors. This sccurred in the long room of the sitip on which we were prisnners.

When leter on, we menagei to leave the Dutch motorboat used by Jepaneee on the way, and to reach bilizeapai by a Dutch diapy plene, the /
above

\author{
DOCUMENT 2624A
}

\section*{\(\because \cdots\) \\ CERTITICATE}

The undersignad CIARIES JOiGGiteri, Captain R.F.I, A., head of the
 (iEnIS), being first dul.y aworn on oath deposes and states thet tho annexed re:jort is an English translation of the originel Dutch document, entitled:

Affidavit of Gerard, Leonard Reinderhoff, ma,jor R.N.I.A., dated Sourabaja July 13, 1946, concerning the Balikpapan - ultimetum, HO. 75EO/R.
wich document is a part of the official records of the infis, a certified copy thereof being attached hereto.

\section*{SIGIIATURE:}
/8/ Ch. Jongeneel

BATAVIA; July 3lst 1946.
Subscribed and sworn to before me, K. A. de WEHRD, WI.,D., first Iieutenant R. .I. A. Senior Official attached to the Office of the Attorney - General ir.E.I.

\author{
/s/ K. A. de Weerd
}

DOCUNiEATM 30, 2624A
Paed 2
above nontinnod dncument with its Enilish translation wes :anded over to the Troop Comander, Iicut. Col. VAN DEF HOOGENBEDD. W'en Capt. COIIJN aid I were sent on by planc to BANDOENG, tisesc dincurants werc dolivered to General ت̈eadquarters tiere.

After readine out and shovinf; this statement to the witnese, he pursistid in adherine to the statoment nade by inm, aid the prosent record of ericerce was si;ined by witniss and myself.
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Tise witness:
siテnaturg: REINDERIHOFF

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sifnaturg: REINDERHOFF

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\section*{un}

This official r.cord of eridence ans been draw/in pursuarce of ny oatio of office, sioncd and completod on July 13, 1946, at Socrebaja!

Tre ricorder,
sienaturet MASMOEIA?
For true cony. The Comilesioner of Polico 2nd Clase, sienatural MASMOEIY.

Today, Monday May 20, 1946, appeared before myself, Meester Jan Daniel VAN PELT, official attached to the offioo of the Attorney-Genoral and at tho same time an honorary Police Officor, charged with the investigation of war crimes, a person who on enquiry states himself to be:
living.at Batavia, Watorloopluin 13.
Future address: Tho Netherlands. Ministry for Ovorsoas Territorics, Dept. of Hilitary Affairs.
Age: 51 m-
Occupation: Colonel Goneral Staff.

Aro you prepared to take the oath that you will tell the wholc truth and nothing but the truth?

Horoupon the witnoss takes tho oath according to his religious convictions to toll the whol's truti and nothins but the truth.

What can you tell inc about any war crimes exporionoed by yourself, whother as viotim or witness?

On January 20, 1942 an ultimatum from the Japanose Commander of tho troops at Tarekan vms hendeä to me, in my oapacity as commandor of the troops at Bilikpapan, by Captain of the Resorve COLIJN, Administrator of Tarakan, Captain of tho Infantry REMTUERHOK - (both of whom had succecded in oscaping from captivity as Prisonors of War) - in the presonce of Ciptain of the Roscrve K. SCHOLTENE Lanagor of the B.P.M. at Balikpapan, and Navaj. Cosmandor van istiwneniourzen. The ultimatum was draftud in Japancso, an English trunslation bcing attached. It statcd that ovcrwholning Japancse forces wore advancing on Balikpapan and that, in view of thoir superiority, I was roquested to surrender Balikpapan to them in its sntirety and undestroyod. If I did not coniply with this request, sill Europeans would be murderud.

3
 the Europenns to bo nurderad would inoludo the Europeans, amongst phom wore worion and children, wino wore alroady in Japanese hands at Tarakan. hir. COLIJN was of opinion that thesc would be inolucicd, and roquestoic ne to accopt the ultiantui: in order thoroby perhaps to alloviatc tio fato of the Juropeans in Turakan. The roply was dr:uftod in Enelish, whorcin I statci that I had receivod the nocussary oruors ns rogiris destruction, which therofors had to be orrried out.

I had the roply sont thrcugh Naval Lioutcnant K.M.R. van BRiKKL, since doccasod, wio, as I heard lnter frof othcrs, harded over this letter te the orcw of the Japanose vosscl from which licesris. COLIJN and RoINDPMOFF had escaped, which vosscl he found ncar the lakehori-ciolta.

I ray ade to this, that I whs informed that in Tarakan no murdore tock place, but they did occur at Balikpapen on Fobruary 20, 1942. I was not presont at Balikpapan on that dato, as on January 24 th I hed fouchit her way te the airpert of Sajarinda II, and thonco on Fobruary 8th I had bcen uvacuatod to Bancoeng.

Why in recare to tho two cen who brought you the ultiantum, did. you spoak of ascapo froll cajtivity as Prisonors of Vers

Mossrs. COLIJN and RNINDERHOFF woro officially appointed as boarcrs of the ultiretuin and werc thorofure on thoir way in a bout with sone Joparcis. On the way thoy hailea a Dutch plano, which rickec thore us and orcusht thom to mo. The acoonpanying Japancso werc persuaded to agreo to this.

What hepponod furthur to the ultiratum?
I handod ovor the ultirituin to Messrs. COI,IJN and RHINDFRHOFH who loft by aerojlcne for Java ch January 20th, with instruotions to hand this ducur.ent to tho ccidiander-in-Chicf.

Can you contion aunce of other Jipunese ani inllied personnel who worc dircctiy cencurrod with this?
if

The Japincsi noines aro nct kiacwn to wo. Cil. ic Whas was thon Cormanker at Tarakan (now Divisicn Ccmander at Batavia). COLIJN is cead. Mr. REIND REONT, now c. Lt.Coloncl, w.rks with IJ....F.I.S., probably e.t Sucrabayc.

After runaing out this documeat to the witness, tu coclaica it to bo a true report of his staturents, ani tho prosent ricurd of evide:.0c was sifnca by tho witnocs ani by aysulf.

Witiess: signcd/C.val. den Huogonbani.

Intorrceatirg Officur: signed/J.van Pclt.

This report dus boun indo, competci, and signed at Batavia on 2ind Mcy 1946, in pursicnoc of the oath I twok ow assuring office.

The intorrcgating officer: sieroe/ J.vail Fclt.

\section*{CETMTICAME}

The underuignod, CFARLES JONGENEDL, Cantain RNIA, Head of War Srimes Section of NWMHRLANS FORCE IWMLIIG NCE SERTICE (fifis), being firstauly sworn on nath daposes and statos that the annexad Dutch original document entitlod:

Sucrn atatemgit of \(C\). van den HOOGE:BAID, Colinel RiIA, drawn up by J.D. van PETI, LL.I., dated Batavia 20th May, 1946, No. 014.11675/R, 4675/K,
ha been taken from the official recorde of the NTFIS.
Sigrature:

> /si Charlo Jongeneol
> SEAL
> Butavia, 23th Auguet 1346.

Subscribed ard sworn to befcre me K.A. de WERRD, LL.D., Ma.jor Artillery R"IA, Sunior Orficor, attached to the Office of the Attorney-Gmeral, li...I.

\section*{Signeature:}
/s/K.A. ds wrod
SEHL


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 \＆古・ロ・ハ：「



Toduv, Wednesdey April 10, 1946, appeared before me, Gerrit Jen SIP, Inspector of Police lst cless, charged with the investigetion of war crimes, a person who stetes to be:-

Name: Joseoh Theodoor VAM AlsSTMY---
Location: Neval Department.
Age: 26
Occupation: militia sailor 6619/D.
Hereupon witness takes the oath according to his religious convictions to tell the full truth and nothing but the truth.

In January, 1942, I was serving on a treneportehip, under the command of Lieut. RNGIWS R. XT.- At gea near Tarakan we were attacked by and shot at from a Japanese plane. The plane also dropped bombs which did not hit the marls. I was shot in my right celf. A neval flying boe traneported me to Balikpapan, where I was accomodated in an emergency hobpital. This was on January 11, 1942.-

The Japanese invaded Balikpapan on Januery 24, 1942, Around February 20 a rumour circulated in the hoapital, which was aspecially spread around by native male nurees, that on February 24, 1942, all Europeans were to be slaughtered. On February 23, 1942, all white people, totalling eight, all patiente, were fetched from the hospital end taicen away. They left me alone, probably because I heve a rather dark skin.

In the night of Frbruary 23/24, 1942, I escaped from the hoapital and mingled with the population of DAM kampong near there. I dressed \(v\) as a native. On Febriary 24, 1942, the inhabitants of that kampong were celled tofnther by the Jopanese, I was among those peopln. Ye wero taken to a place on the beach, the old fort KLANDASSAN, where I saw thet the Buropnens, white coople, were already etanding together. I was at ahout 50 meters distence from the group of Huropeans.-

I recoenized in the group Dr. APPS, doctor of the \(\mathrm{B}_{\mathrm{o}} \mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{P}} . \mathrm{M}_{\mathrm{H}}\), Dr. DICK STAAL, Captain doctor, vicar KRUISBERG, and one of the eight pationta who had been taken from the hospital the day before, callod ROSINBERG. I also saw three catholic priests dresend in white. I saw o district-officer in uniform and a Police Inspnctor in uniform. a Jape. rese officer started a conversation with that district-officer of which

I could not understand o. thing, but I saw that during that conversetio the t oficer was illtreating the district-officer by blows in his face with the hand, and further with the scabbard over his body. There was a lot of shouting by Japencen atendine near, so that I could not understand enythine. The Jep. officer who had sterted the telk with the (Dutch) district-officer, drew his oword and hewed off both the distric officnrs' arms, pelittle ehove his albows, and then his two ligs at the height of the kners, The district-officer wes elso taken to a cose nut-tree, bound to it and stabbrd to dop.th with a bayonnt. The body rameined hanging on that trec. After this, the seme officer want over to the Policcman in uriform; I heard leater that his name was KARSEBOO: ho we.s kicked pnd beaten with the hand and with the sword in the scabbard. After this, thet (Jap.) officor hewed off his arms under the nlbow ead his leps near the knens: I heerd him shout once more "God gava the guren". Fith hayonct thrusts and kicks the Policemen was made to atend up and, standing on his leg atumps, he was stabbed to death with a bayonet. One of thn Boman Catholic priests. I do not know his neme but it we.s a grey-haired men, atmpped forward and atertad e conversation with the Jepanese officer which I did not understand, but which may heve bean a request to prey. I sew at least thet ho kneeled down neer the bodies and preyed. He thon blessed both bodi: and the whola group of Buropeans. The Buroppans wore then formed int groups of 10 to 15 each, and their hands ware tied on their backs. The group wa driven into the sea by ohouting, kicking and hitting Japeneme, until they wera in the weter up to about thair braasta; thon they wore shot et one after the other, slowly, by Japanese soldiers, until all had died. --

It wer impossible to float away into the see beceuse at about 30 matcrs from the beach thrre wes a berbod wire entanglement. Thus ell tine Maroveens were driven into the sea, grouo by group, and mloughtored off in the same menner. Among the lest group were thn three catholic priasts. Agrin I saw the old one emong them otart \(e\) conversation with the Jap, officer, I eaw him blessing the flontiug bodins, pifter which that group alao wes driven into the sea and killod off. Thr rntire grouo of Buropeans killed thus must heve numbered from 80 to 100 men . The natives were forced to look on, those who wanted to go awpy worr brought back with beatinge and violnnce..- I also sav some netive women faint....

Across the bay of RALIKPapary there is a plecn called RIKO. Therp was \(e\) military occupation therc. I heard from some soldiers and militarized B. P. M. nmploynes, who hed naceond from thorn in the diraction of Balikapan, tiat the milltary farrison of RIKO, after having surrendered, had bcen killed by bnyonet atab!, in and on the edge of pite thry hed been forend to dig themselvas. It may be

Doc. No. 2620 A
Pege 3
difficult to find witnesses of this, bncause the poople who told me this have bern killed in the sea on Frbruary 24. 1942.-

I cennot eive ovidence ebout the strength of that earrison at RIKO.--
After reading out and showing this statpment to the witness, wherounon ho persisted in edhering to the statements mede by him, this official record hes benn undersigned by witnoss and by myscif.

The witnass: Tho Recorder,
(signod:) J.T. VAN AllSTEL (signed) G. J. SIP.
This officiel record of ovidnnen bes benn drawn up in pursuance of my oath of office, aiened and completed at Batavia on April 10, 1946.

The Recorder,
( Bifned:) G. J. SIP.
-

\section*{CERTIFICATE.}

The undersigned CEARHES JOMGENBEL, first lieutenant R.N.I.A., heed of the liar Crimes Section of IETHERLANDS TORCES IMEHLIGRNCE SERVICE (NEFIS) being first duly sworn on oath deposes and states that the annexed Dutch original document (with English translation) of the Report, entitled:

Hofficiel Record of interrogation, drawn up by G. J. SIP, inspector of police first class, dated 10th Aril, 1946, containing a sworn statement of J. Th. ven AldSRL, concerning the mass murder at Balikpapan."
hes been taken from the official records of the NEFIS.
Signature:
(Seal)
Charles Jongeneel
at Batavia, 7th fine, 1946
Subscribed and sworn to before ire K. W. de WHERD, first Lieutenant R.N.I.A. Higher Cfficiel attached to the office of the AttorneyGeneral, N.E.I.

> /s/ K. A. de Herd


Document No. 2622-A
"uge
of the Far East. Dates of apnointment: 102? language student at Leyden C'niversity, Holland, 1931 language student in China and Japan, 1935 staff member, 1940 reader in cultural history, 1941 lecturer-extrsordinnry.

On Eebruary 22, 1942, as a naval ratings, second reserve, untrained, I was called up for service with the Royal Navy, with orders to report to the Navy Departrent at Bandoeng. I reported there on 23 February and was attached to a section of the War Office, under the direct orders of Commander L. Brouver, F.N. (at present in Tolryo, Japan). On 2 EIarch I was commissioned as sub-lieutenent, Royal Naval Reserve, Special Service Branch.

On 6th Varch at approx. 22.00 hrs. I was summoned by my colleague of the Bureau for Fast Asiatic Affnirs, H. HAGENAAR (at present in Holland) to attach myself immediately to the suite of His Excellency the Governor General of the N.E.I., where I duly reported. The next morning I informed the War Office.

On 7th larch at approx. 15.30 hrs . the Governor General and his suite moved from the Resident's house to a villa on a hillside on the outskirts of Bandoeng, after a Japanese bombing attack, during which bombs had fallen on all sides of the Resident's house.

During the early part of the morning of 8 larch there were several Japanese plines continuously over Bandoeng. Bernuse of the danger of air attack - I do not remember whether any bombs were artually dropped; in any case not in our vicinity - the Governor General and most of his suite ( I amongst them) were in the very large and comodious airraid shelter built deep into the hillside. The shelter was connected by telephone. I presume at that time I mist have learned that during the night talks had been started between the Nethorlands Indies forces holding Fandoeng and the Japanese, who had broken through at Lembang; these talles were at that morent proceeding at Tilla Isola, on the road to Lembang. Shortly before 10.00 hrs the Governor General was required on the telephone and from his remarks we understood that his presence had been demanded by the Japinese at the abovementioned tal's. The Governor General refused, stating that his presence whs definitely not needed in talks concerning the surrender of a single locality such as the Bandoeng area. Soon afterwards the Governor General was goain wanted on the telephone and this time he was informed


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The tolks must have started about \(16.30 \mathrm{hrs}\). . I have ar clear recollection of the exact sequence of the questions ani ?nswers, nor of course of their complete contents. Eowever, this mas ry first attembt at interoreting and I found it uncommonly difficult, particularly as Lt. Ģon. TFATTRA persistod in cuoting a draft, written in the usunl high flown styla, rore easily read than understood. The rasult was thet fifter obout ten minutss \(\tau\) was floundering so badiy that \(?\) Jannese left the ranks behind the Gonaral's rhairs and offered to toke over and wns parmitted to do so: he wns T. VIYOSHI, formerly of the Japanese Consulnte General at Bntavin.

The first question was, whether the Governor General as O-in-C of the N.E.I. sna, land and air forces hed come to subnit the surrender of these forces. The answer took some time, as it gnve rise to sevaral new questions. The short of it was: no, he had come because he had baen summoned to be present at taiks roncerning the surrendor of Bundoeng, with the throat that this town was to be destroved by nerial bombing in case he did not appe~r. Iurthermore ine wns unable - willingness npart to hand in any surrender torms, as his ronstitutional powsrs as commander-in-chief of the N.E.I. Forces hed been expressly enncelled by the retherlands Government a few days oreviously. The reply to these stataments wis, that the Japanese were not going to let thomselves be tricked by a piece of political skull-duggery and thent in their eyes the Governor General still wns the C-in-C of the N.E.T. Forces.

The next point was: surrender of the N.E.I. Forcos. The Governor Gener 1 mintoined thret he had been summoned in connection with the surrendar of Bandoeng only. This question was entered into nt some length. The Japinese made two points: 1. Bendoeng wes only of smell importance, it was theirs for the taking, \(s\) the outer defances had 1 lready been srinshed; two or three d?ys more would see them in the town. 2. The G.O.C. Airforces insisted that the surrender of Bindoeng - town or ar:a - would be uscless, is oir reconnissince hid shomn consic ernble bodies of N.E.T. troons withdrowing into the difficult mountin aren around the Bardoung plateau.

The upshot of these discussions was the renewed demand of the Topanasc C-in-C that the Governor General tender the unconditional surronder of n \(11 \mathrm{M} . \mathrm{E} . \mathrm{I}\). forces, the derand now accompanied by the threat that unless he complied, Bandoeng wes to be bombed filet.


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(POPOMDETMA - 19 ITV 142)
/s/ Sidacy F. Mashbir
SID:EY F, MASHBIR, Cnlonol, S.C., Comordiaator.

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Pa:a 2
attack continuously. Your comdrs will roturn to Bindung imeriiatoly. You will be rotocted by our tronps up to tho sontry lin-, but if you ste, over the seatry lire, wo rill attack BANDUSG with our aircraft which are on the aerodroce londoc with boibs. Lowever, I will :ive ynu this lest chaice to consicier. I will five you ten rinutes from now to adse the finel deciaion," aid sayizg he arose. When the ten minutes time
 referrith; to the aduiaistration. You do not sech to havo suprone authority, so honceforth I will prohibit you from gpeakine. I will gyeak ouly to the Comdr in Chief of the Aryy from now." Next the Ccmar in Chiof wos asced to roply but the man res:nnalble for the entire NEI Armi withered and nireod to surrender tho eatire aroa. Goverior Goneral
 arasc end left ti:e roin. It tho ertra-ce he arnin requested "Will you Ferenve tion photogrepherp" Althuch the are the enemy I carnot holy but aditre thoir attitude. Envornor General Sheldon STARKPnBERG is 54 this yeer, iowaver, ise arpers as yount as 44 nr 45 , bifing tall, mediun built,
 lore of the RAST IRDIES aidi 70,000,000 inlubitarts in kis fortios so cie is without a coubt one of ti:e most cai.able mer. of HOLLATD. Althnuih he was fecine, a: imposiole situatior se raintained ais dicnity as a Gnvernor Go:cral viile knowine that he will not return alive if anythiat goes wrone and tiat the entire SiSF rispisis area was dofeated. His splendid attitiude conmet be compared "ith tiat nf PERCIVAL whom I saw in SIiGGiPORE. Thore is no race in the world the. bargain as the D:JHCH co . Fion todey, at this very moment tiog cenc te aefotieto o bargain. Iis this nanner they robebly postered tive oconomic ission of a yoar a\%. This is unlike the tine we ero in SIEGMORE. The bettlefield of the DUTCH INDIES oxtendod east and west several thousands km . Altinurh we orderod the forces in the eatiro arca to cease fishtiag immediately we kno that tile camnot be tranainttea casily. The army Ho Comdr asked various questions in reegard to surronderin: to tho amy Oo:dr. after obtainina the simaturo on thie, he said, "rhe domande wich I reve yoi, aust be brnadcast by the Co:dr iinabulf tr tise hish INDIES forces of the ontire EASI IMDIES area tomorrow norning, the ith. When that broacicest is heerd in the eest, you rust coafime your bona fide surrender. Tonorrow, the 9th, you will cone here asain at 1600 rre and will re:ort on the conditions visicis our aryy denaide." The Governor Goneral, Condr and his Staff Officers dialiked this odious idea of surrenderine but they completed all tine itcms of surrenderins and departed. They will recoive siocial kindiess by beling pernitted to mass thrnuigh the scntry line without beins blindfolded. At 1030 ars on the eth, I heard a brnacicast ade by the dray Contr at the Army Condr TaI. Fis voice shork. He bronicasted to ris entire army tiee surrender in a much rooc: civil way then tho derands indicated. They nuat cave been in a bad situntion. In tie evonine the Condr cane as ordored.

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DOCUMENT 2674A

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iereby certify that the ettacied International Prosecution Section D،cufant No. 2674, a pretion of ATiS Enemy Publication No. 32, belas: a tramelation of loose bound hancuritten notes of a Lt. Col. dated Pob and barch 1942, is an Encilish trerslation of a captured Jejamiaso docuizent rendered into Enliah by a corpietent Alls tramalator.

I furthor cortify that tie crisinal capances dncument wes forwarded to the Yeahinetor Dccurert Canter, Washisfitrn, D.C.

\author{
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/ \mathrm{s} / \frac{\text { Jerell A, Blankenshin }}{\text { Igt It. Inf. }}
\]
}

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1. Prior th ti:e outbreak af Norle fiar II various oatinations werc
 of political cointrol and reversina of the soutiorn cocipied areas, includitw the Dutch Incies. Fron the nutset, horever, the Foreion Miniotry lad ettaci:od imortanoe to the independence of the Dutch I:adies.
 Iadios the Gencral Heedquarti re of the Southern Amy, in order to fecilitate onlitical adminiatration after the oporatines and nocuretinn, had irea publicity tr the indopendence for the Indenesian race by tho use of the zodif facilities in Saisen and banckok. At the sano tirc, tho ietherlends Governent hed nont back to Jeva, Soekar.an and Hatta, both loeders of tie Indocesian racial movenent, who were tho: 1.: ixilc, and :ed. urfed tien th oreanize tice Indoncsia: militia in rosistanon to ti:e Jomarese hrmy. is a rovard fir tifie,
 seen th seav both. rofusca tizis yro:onel. Aftor the occupatin: of tion Dutci: Indics by the Japenase Army, tiee ax:y authoriti: on tho spot allowed thesc racialiats to tale tho lead, es in Burna and tioo Philipinos, whero incernindo:ace was latur declered, end invited thon to estallish tho Java Piblic Service Associetion (the Jova Hoirnkei),
 infabitaits. They pressed their edmiaistrativo nolicies towards atronetionise: racialist tenioncies. Oia the othor nad, tho Goneral Hoedquartors of the Scutiorn Army the: in Siremoro, najatained a policy or auppresine t:is tocascy. T:c envorwient at home, tno, hod
 under Ja;a.'s direct control aed cl cokine tha jonlicer of racial liboretirn, is ordor tr securi the rosources nocisany for the oxecutio: \(f^{f}\) the war. For tisis reasoin, the Suprome Comand empasized its strous opposition to the irdemendonce of the best Indics.

Corsuquontly, the plea for the revorsion of occupiod areas, deciciod at tho Linison Conferonce ef tho getoriant aid Imperial

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Doc. No. 2754

\section*{CEKTIFICATE}

Stater.ent of Identification

I, "eyreshi Kaoru, rereby certify t'et I er. officielly connected with t'e Jrpenese Government in the cepecity of Crief, Arcrives Section, Foreien Office, and trat es such official on Nover ber 14, 1946, I exectitec certificates of source end aut'enticity witr respect to I.P.e. docur ents Nos. 2754 (entitled "Course of Ivents Leading up to Decisions on Political Control and Fevel sion of t'e East Indies in
 to the lifasures for \(t^{2}\) e Indevendence of tre N.I.I. Proposed by Hembers of tre Verious linistries Concernea"), 2758 (entitled "Measures for the N.E.I. Independence, Data for Foreign I.inister's Explenation, 17 July, 1945') end 2759 (entitled "Suprerie 'ar J)irective Councii Decision No. 27, 17 July 1945, l.atters Concerning s.teps for E.I. Independence").

I furtrer certify, that I.For. docurents Nos. 2755 : 2758 and 2759 are the annexes, respectively \(I\), III and iv, referred to in I.P.S. docur ent 2754.

Digned et Tokro
on tris 3rd dey of Decer.ber \(1 \S 46\) Signed: K. Kavas 1.
Foreign office Jepenese Governs.ent
Witness:. \(\mathrm{S} / \mathrm{llegat} \mathrm{gra}\) Odo. (SEAL)

Steter:ent of Official Procurement:
I, hicrard F. Lers \({ }^{2}\), hereby certify that I er: associeted witr the General J'eedquerters of tre Suprere Corrrander for the Allied Powers, and trat the above certification was obtained by me fror tre ahove sjgned official of tre Japanese Government in tre conduct of ry officiel business.
Signed at 'Iol:yo on tris
3 dey of Lecember 1546
Signed: \(\frac{\text { Richard re Lers }}{\text { Investipetor }} \frac{\text { I. }}{\text { I.r. }}\).

Witness is/Wn:C. Prout
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Dec. No. 2339 C

In the center of the chamber mere tables laid out in the shape of a squared horseshoe and a hove the blue woolen cloth covering the tables were the flags of each of the notions spread beneath a plate of glass, designating the cats of the Representatives lined up in the order of the Japanese alphabe:.

The conference was opened at 10 a.m. with an address delivered by Prime Minister General Hideki Tojo, the Representative of Javan. Nominations for Chairman mere begun and, through a motion by Prince inn 治thayakon, the The Thai Representative, Prime Minister Tojo was unanimously elected to the chair.

Pith Prime l:inister Tojo, as Chairman of the Assembly, seated at 're head of the squared horseshoe, to his right were Representative of China, President Yang Ching-woi, Prime E:inister Chang Ching-hui, the Manchoukuo Representative and \({ }^{2}\) rime lininister Ba Liam, the Burmese Representative. To Prime minister Tojo's left were His Royal Highness Prince dan :faithayakon, the Thai Representative; President Jose P. Laurel, the Representative from the Philippines; and Subhas Chandra Bose, Head of the Provisional Government of sad Hind and Observer to the Assembly. Behind each of the Representatives pere the Associates.

The conference concentrated on the statement of active opinions concerning fundamental measures for the successful prosecution of the Jar of Greater East Asia and the construction of Greater East Asia. Only the Representatives were given voice and it was decided that the Re'resentatives mould speak in Japanese alphabetical order.

During the morning session, only Prime minister Tojo and President Tang were scheduled to speak, but the proceedings progressed so rapidly that Prince lan Jaithayakon, the Thai delegate's speech, originally scheduled for the afternoon, was finished during the forenoon and that the noon recess came 40 minutes earlier.

The afternoon session opened at 1 pom. The first speaker was Prime Minister Chang Ching-hui of Manchoukuo. He urged the need for Greater East Asia's unity as it was felt by lianchoukuo, the senior state in the Co-Prospority Sphere.

The next speaker vas Dr. Jose 2. Laurel, the Philippine delegate, who exhibited his brilliant elocuence.

The session came to a recess at \(3 \mathrm{y} . \mathrm{m}\). and was resumed 20 minutes later. Prime I.inister Ba liam, the Burmese Representative, expressed the unflinching resolve of the newborn State.

This completed the speeches by the delegates of the six gartioi... nations and the session adjourned at \(4: 30\) pom.

The second day session began at 10 arm. November 6 , in the name chamber, attended by all the representatives, associates and observer:. It began with a proposal being mach by Prime linister General Tojo, the Japanese Representative, inter an earnest exchange of opinions amon: the Representatives, a recess was called at 11:50 arm.

for the construction of Greater Fast Asia, to hold an Assembly of Greater East-Asiatic Nations in Tokyo.

The names of the representatives, associates and observers are as follows:

Japan
Representative:
His Excellency General Hideki Tojo Prime Minister
Associates:
His Excellency Admiral Shigetaro Shimada, Minister of the Navy, His Excellency Mr. Kazuo Loki, Minister of Greater Hast Asiatic Affairs
His Excellency Mr. Mamore Shigemitsu, Minister of Foreign Affaire
His Excellency Mr. Naoki Hoshino, Chief Secretary of the Cabinet
His Excellency Mr. Eiji Amau, President of the Board of Information
His Excellency Mr. Shun-ichi Matsumoto, Vice_Minister of Foreign affairs
His Excellency Lir Kumaichi Yamamoto, Vice-Minicter of Greater Fast Asiatic affairs
His Excellency Mr. Shin-ichi Kamimura, Director of the Bureau of Political affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
His Excellency Major-General Kenryo Sate, Director of the Bureau of Military Affairs, Ministry of the Army
His Excellency Vice-Admiral Takazui Oka, Director of the Bureau of Naval Affairs, Ministry of the Navy
His Excellency Mr. Shimpel Takeuohi, Director of the Bureau of General Affairs, Ministry of Greater East Asiatic Affairs

Loc. No. 2339
I.F.S. No._233

\section*{Steter:ent of iuthenticity}

I, Shibetc. Koscburo hereby certify thet I on officially conneoted with the Japanese Government in the followin copacity: Secone Cless i. ininistretive officer of the Investizetion Burcey of the Hone Niniatry in Cherge of the Home Ministry I ibrary, end thet as such officici I heve custody of en orizinel cony of the docurent of thich the e.ttechod Cocument consisting of 1099 1036s, datce 1943-44, and cicscribed as follows: "Jepencec Year Book 1943-1914," . and republished by the Intercencrtmentel Cormittee for the icsuisition of Forelfn Fublicetions, end printeद by the United Stetes Printing office, is an oxect copy.
I further certify thet the orifinal copy of the atteched recore and Cocurent is en official Gocurient of the Japenesc Goverment, end that it is fart of the official archives rnd files of the Home Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this 31st Lay of Oct.. 1946.


\section*{SELI}

Fitness: Yoshinuki Kureteni
2nc. Cless decministrative offioer of the Investicetion Burenu of the Hore Ministry

Officiel Capacity

\section*{Statement of officiel Procureriont}
I. Henry Shimojiza \(\qquad\) , hereby ecrtify that I ar: associetce with the Gencrel Heel.quarters of the Euprece Corrend.er for the dollicd Powers, end thet the above certificetion ras obtainei by ne from the ebove sizned official of the Jpenese Governizent in the conciuct of my officiel business.
sirnea at Tokyo on this
31st ex of Oct. 1946.
/s/ Henry Shirojire NAE
Witness: Eric 'H. Fleisher
2ne. Lt. LUSNI
Investigation Division IFS official Copacity


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page. 2
fair namp of education and culture. Thus, they have to this day throatened constantly the existence of the nations and peoples of dsia, disturbed their stability, and auppressed their natural and proper development. It is because of their notion to regard gast asia as a colony that they harp upon the principles of the open door and equal opportunity eimply as a convenient means of pursuing their sinister designa of aggreasion. mille constantly keeping their own territories closed to us, the peoplen of deia, thus denying us the equality of opportunitios and impeding our trade, they so ught solely their own prosperity. The Anglo-american ambition of world hegemony is indeed a acourge of mankind and the root of the world's evils.

Wovementa for emancipation have occurred from time to time among the nations and peoples of rast dsia, but due to the ruthless and tyrannical armod oppression by America and Britain, or due to their malicious old trick of division and alienation for ruling other races, these patriotic offorte onded largely in failure. Meanuhile, Japan's rise in power and prostige was looked upon by america and Britain with increasing dislike. They made it the cardinal point of their East asia policy, on the one hand, to restrain Japan at every turn and, on the other, to alienate her from the other countries of Past Asia. It was obviously unwise for them to permit either the rise of any one country as a great power or the banding together of the various nations and peoples. These dmerican and British methods became more and more sinister and high-handed, especiaily in the last several years.

For example, they made a tool of the Chiang Kai-shek regime and so aggravated Sino-Japanese relations as to lead to the unfortunate China dffair. Furthermore, they resorted to every possible means to obstruct a settlement. Following the outbreak of the present war in Burope, they interfored with free commerce under the pretext of wartime necessity and even resorted to the severance of economic relations wth Japan, an act tantamount to war. At the same time, they augmented their military proparations in tast dsia in an effort to force Japan's submission. Despite such an attitude on the part of the United States and Britain. Japan, in her desire to prevent war from spreading into East Asia, endeavoured to the last to find a solution by peaceful negotiation. However, the United States and Britain, not only failing completely to manifest an attitude of reflection and mutual concession, but intensifying instead their threats and pressure, endangered the very existence of our nation. Japan at last was compelled to rise in self-defense and to fight for her existence, and thus she accopted the ahallenge that was huried against East asia. Staking her national fortunes, Japan marched forth to battle in order that permanent peace might be established in East asia.

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With the outbreak of the War of Greeter East Asia, the Imperial army and Navy fought with heroic courage under carefully-laid plans and within less than half a year expelled america and Britain from the entire region of East dsia. The various countries of Greater East dsia have either declared war to fight with us, or are closely co-operating for the prosecution of the war to a successful conclusion. Today, the ardour and enthusiasm of the peoples of Greater Eagt Asia have apread throughout our region. With mutual truet and harinony among our nations, we are valiantly marching forward together to seoure our existence and to establish permanent stability in Greater East asia by crushing the counteroffensives of America and Britain.

It is my belief that for all the pecyles of Greater Fast dsia the present war is a decisive atruggle upon whose outcome depends their rise or falil. It is only by winning through this war that they may ensure forever their existence in their Greater East-asian home and enjoy common prosperity and happiness. Indeed, a successful conclusion of this war means the completion of the very task of constructing the new order of Greater East Usia.

The United States and Britain may naturally repeat their counteroffensives against Greater East isia with all their material might upon which they rely, but wen the nations of Greater East dsia, mat summon up our total strength to repel these attacks. Je must deal out orushing blows to our enemy and thereby finish the war victoriously and secure to Fast dsia an enduring peace and stability.
at this moment. Japan is sarrying out extensive operations from her position of strat agical advantage acquired by her early victories in the war. On the home fronto the internal structure \(\theta_{0}\). In parallel with these operations, has been steadily improved. Espeoially through the recent re-organization it has been so adjusted as to meet fully the needs of decisive marfare. Her one hundred mililion people with but a sintgle mind, with a firm conviction in sure victory and with an inflexible fighting apirit are marching forward to triumph in this great rar. I firmy believe that the other Greater gast-dsiatic nations, whom you represent here, are also grimly resolved to shatter the countercoffensives of their agemold enemies, America and Britain, by throwing their full weight into the field in concert with the Japanese nation and thereby to secure lasting stability for Greater East Aaia.

Next \({ }_{0}\) it is my desire to express to you the fundamental \(\nabla\) iews of the Japanese Government regarding the construction of Greater East Asia.

It is my belief that to enable all nations each to have its proper place and to enjoy the blessings of common prosperity by mutual efforts and mutual help is the fundamental condition for the establishment of



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world peace. and I mast furthermore say that to practise mutual help among olosely related nations in one region, fostering one another's national growth and establishing a relationship of common prosperity and well-being, and, at the same time, to cultivate relations of harmony and concord with'nations of other regions is the most effective and the most practical method of securing morld peace.

It is an incontrovertible fact that the nations of Greater East Lsia are bound, in every respect, by ties of an inseparable relationship. I firmly believe that such being the case, it is their common mission to secure the stability of Greater East dsia and to construct a new ordor of common prosperity and well-being.

This nen order of Greater Bast disia is to rest upon the spirit of justice which is inherent in Greater East Asia. In this respect it is fundamentally different from the old order designed to serve the interests of the United States and Britain who do not hesitate to practise injustice, deception and exploitation in order to promote their own prosperity.

The nations of Greater Bast Asia, while mutually recognizing their autonony and independence, must, as a mole, establish among themselves relations of brotherly amity. Such relations cannot be created if one country should utilize another as a means to an end. I believe that they come into being only when there is mitual respeot for one another's autonomy and independence, when one prospers through another's prosperity and all countries give expression to their true selves.

4 superior order of culture has existed in Greater East dsia from the very beginning. Especially is the spiritual essence of the culture of Greater East asia the most sublime in the world. It is my belief that in the wide diffusion throughout the world of this culture of Greater East Asia by its further cultivation and refinement lies the salvation of mankind from the curse of materialistic civilization and our contribution to the welfare of all humanity. It is incumbent upon us all mutually to respect one another's glorious traditions and to develop the creative spirit and genius of our peoples and thereby to enhance even more the culture of Greater fenst daia.

Furthermore, I believe that in order to promote the welfare of the people and to replenish the national power, the neivions of Greater Bast dsia mast carry on olose economic collaboration on the basis of reoiprocity and jointly promote the prosperity of Greater East asia. Hitherto, for many years. Greater East dsia has been the object of angloamerican exploitation; henceforth, we must be autonomous and independent in the economic field to gain prosperity by mutually depending on and helping one another.
page. 5

The new order of Greater Bast asia which we are building is not oxclusive unto itself. Rather it seeks positively to enter into co-operative relations with the nations of the world, politically, economioally and also culturally, and thus contribute to the world's advancement. How oompletely differen \({ }^{4}\) is this from the way of the United States and Britain which, while advocating freedom and equality, oppross and disariminate against other nations and other peoples; and which, while imposing the open door on others, monopolize vast territories and natural resources, threaten the existence of others without compunction and retard the general advancement of the ontire world.

The construction of Greater East dsia is being realized with grim steadiness in the midst of war. In contrast, what are America and Britain doing in Indiar Britain's oppression of India grows in soverity with every passing day. More recently, America's ambition there has asserted itself and discord and friction between Britain and dmerica on the one hand and the Indian masses on the other are being aggravated; and the Indian peopie are being subjected to indescribable hardships and tribulations.

The famine of unprecedented magnitude, which auch a situation has recently brought about in India, has even been admitted by Britain and America. all patriots of India are imprisoned, while the innocent masses are starving. This is a world tragedy-an calamity of all mankind. The peoples of Greater East asia could never let it go unattended. Happily, Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose responded to the call of the hour and with him rose the Indian patriots both within and without their country. Thus was the Provisional Government of Free India created and the foundation of Indian independence laid. The Japanese Government have already declared to the world that they will extend overy co-operation and assistance for the independence of India. I am confident that the other nations of Greater East asia will also give whole-hearted support for the realization of Indian independence.

By no logic and reason could America and Britain possibly reconcile what they adrocate under the so-called atlantic Charter with what they are actually doing in India. But we are not even surprised at the contradictions between the beautiful signboards which they put up and the evil designs which they harbour within. We know too well that deception and camouflage constitute their very nature. However, regardless of what the onemy may do, Japan is determined to follow, together with the other nations of Greater East Asia, the path of justice, to deliver Greater East waia from the fetters of amorica and Britain and, in co-operation with her neighbour nations, to strive toward the reconstruction and development of Greater sast dsia.
page. 6

Today, the unity of the oountries and peoples of Greater Rast Asia has been achieved and they have embarked upon the gigantic onterprise of constructing Greater East Asia for the common prosperity of all nations. This surely mat be regarded as the grandest spectacle of human offort in modern times.
\(2 s\) regards the situation in gurope, we are very glad that our ally, Germany, has still further solidified her national unity and, with conviction in sure victory, is aavancing to crush the United States and Britain and to oonstruct a new Europe.

The War of Greater Past dsia is truly a war to destroy evil and to make justice manifest. Ours is a righteous cause. Justice knows no enery and we are fully convinced of our ultimate viotory.

Japan is grateful to the nations of Greater East dsia for the wholehearted co-operation which they are rendering in this war. Jepan is firmly determined, by co-operating with them and by strengthening her collaboration with her allies in Burope, to carry on with indefatigable apirit and with conviction in sure victory this war, the intensity of which is expected to mount from day to day. Japan, by overcoming all difficulties. Will do her full share to complete the construction of Greater Fast asia and contribute to the establishment of world peace which is the common mission of us all.

ro Policy in regard to the Independence of the East Indies (proposed by the compctent officials of tho Ministrics concorne

\section*{1. Policy}

To announce that the East Indics shall bo made indopendent in tho future in order to win the sonfidence of the peopla, and simultancounly to elucidato the GREiTTER EiST iSIA policy to the world.

\section*{2. outline}
1. It shall be announced in a special Diet sossion that the East Indies shall bo made independent in the future.
2. The former Notherlands Indios (oxiluding Ner Guinca) shall to the schedulod territory to be aado independent. (The Nevy's approval resorvid).
3. The Form of Independence and the relations aith the Empire/Tht Jepan/ shall bo determined seperately, Horcevor, steps sinall bo teken so that the Eapire's requests shall be fully attained.
4. The Tiwe of Independonce shall te determined separatoly by tahing into account the condition of progress in the political ability of tho pooplo, but a too premuture onforcement of Indepondenco shall bo avoided. Moreover, the quustion as to whether the ontire territory shall be mede independent at the seme time or be made indepundent ky degrees shall be decidcd upon according to the couditions at the time.
5. In Java measuroa shell be taken in accordance aith the following, Thilc respooting the initiative of the poople:
a. In conformity uith the Declaration of the Imporial /TN: Jepaneso/ Goverument, offorts shall be medu promptly torards the consistoncy of the purport of same.
b. Fiadical changes in the present status of the milivery adminis. tration shall bo evoided, but the participetion in pelitice by the peoplo shall be itill surther strongthened and exparded, and thoy shall be given political treining.
c. To rucognize as speedily as possible the invectigating and studying by the inhabitants on the spot of matters nocessary for Indopendenco.
d. The Indonesian soacs and the use of Indonesian flags, hitherto prohibited, shall bo pormitted.

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Page 2
6. Los for the various other territories, mensures corrosponding to the foregoing Paragraph shall be adopted as far as possible so as to conform to their respoctive actual conditionc. (The liavy's approval resorved.)
/TN: The Chinese oharacters in Red at the bottom end of the pages of the original reant "Gi.IMUSHO," meaning the Foreign Office./


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Pase 1

\section*{"Moabures for the Fie EeIe Independenco". Data for Foreifn Miniater's Explanation, 17 Julve 1945.}
1. In the last Indies, there have becn fierce Indeand; noe movemente ever eince tie tire of the Dutcin nccupatinn. "Indonesiaifor the Indonesiang" was tine eamest ceeire of the separatiete, pon as our army cocupied the List I:dies after tie nutbreak of tie Greater Dast Asia War, the above fioneers all renciered whole rearted oooperation to us in the expectation that tive filcen opiortunity for Inderendence had offered itself. They have achieved auccessful reaulta in their activities es no:bere of the Chuo Sanzi-In (Contral Advisory Council) and as officials or nembers of local administrative orajizations. On the other haid, the Greater East Asia Joint lleclaration was iseued in November of tho year befnre last olerifyin; the Errire's areat jolicy to reapect the Indeperdence of evcry country in Greator biast Asia. Sir:ultaneously, with the establishrient of Indozeadence in Burma and tie Plailipyizes and of the Free India Termorary Govern ent, the deaire of ti:e leaders of Indepadence Moveraents in the Tiast Indes also was freatly cacouregec..

Ti:e fapire, on leer jart, regaried it yrojer to carry thrours the sirit of the Greater East Asia Declaration aid to rake sone kind of sesture in rcgard to tins jroblem if Indonendeace for the Bast Indied as a revard for the coneration and expectation of the native iriabitants.
-iccordinily, after deliberation at the Suprene War Sunervibory
Confureace of Sept. 5th, last year, firrer Prine Ministor Zoiso, in his declaration of the eovernient's policies at the e5th jixtreorainery Session if ti:e Diet on Se: t. 9th, made a statonent that, "The Tmoire is ready to recognize Indeyendence for the East Indies in ordor to secure overlanting welfaro for her neonle", thereby clarifyinf the frpire's intertio:s on this problem.

Of courde, at the Suprome var Surervishry Conference of Se:t. 5th, It was \(u\) erely deoided that the obove statenont was to be rado at the Diot Session; and in regara to tive arcas to whioh Independonce was to be rraiated, tiere was no quostion to Java and Suratre, but notining definite was docided on tire rest of the areas. Only it was decided to pernit ti: use of the Indonesiai sone: and the Iodonesian flaf, wich lad icretofore been prohibited, and to noourare and increase tise yartioifation in politics by iniabitants to :ive the rative inhabitarite a ciance to investifate and study matters necessary for the Inde:osidence.

II In remonse to tine above atatement by the Inverial Governnont, an Indepencence Investication Comittec was ostablibiod in Java: while in Sunatra and Celobes alen, neasures ind been taken to encourafe ;artici, ation in jolitics by rative iniabitants. Necessary yrojarations lad been

\section*{Pege 2}
under way, whou in the statercit if Sost. 7th, last rear, it wes lerel" etated " her Ince:e:cience shall be recoomized in the futurc" and no tine for it had boen indicated. To promise the Indonesians their Incependenco and save its realizntion i:I a state of uncertainty for a loir: ti:se, will, it is fearcd, i:ive rise to doubts as to the sisoerity of our Eripire.

Liejecielly, at this anment when the enenyls oourter-offensive is alreacy about to extend to a corner of the Last Indies, it will be iminent, fror the neccesity of seokine a moro positive ocoperation fron the native finhabitants, to further materialige the staterent made last year ain to cecide clearly the time for the Inde. endence and announce it at home and abroad, thereby clarifyinf; the impire's true intontions towards tise completo adjustrient of Inderordonce for Grester East Asia.

Pron: this tendooint, it is desired at this ncoesion to come to a Aecision as in the efgarate jlan.

III boxt, a few explamatinn will be made on tho plan for dacision.
(1) Regardine Point I.

The standards of tie East Irdies peole are not the sane ir various areas. Java, of course, has tho btehent standard and in reality, has the qualificatione for Inderpendonco. The rost of the areas are int recornized as bein:; necessarily qualified for Indenemience immediately.

Therefore, some may entertain the npinion that at this occasion java, only shoulc be aranted Independence first of all, and wait for tise substantial perfection of nther areas to grant then thoir Indoyondonce. But the so-called sonaratists, who have advocatod Indojondezoe for the East Indies in the past, refarded the Dutcin Bast Indics as one boay and dearred th ret Independence for the whole area.

To wrant Inder, ondenco only th Java, eqjarately, at this tine, will disappoint the Indonesians aind we regret that it will not only racuce the offuct by ralf, but it is foarec that it may give rise to surgicion that tiae Erifire atsht harbour territorial ambitions in the rest of tioe areas. So it is reciarded best to neke it clear that the aree to bo granted Indeneadenco is the fnrmer Dutch Indios entirely.

Furthormare, this means that the aron to be cranted Indenendence is tho former Dutch Indies, not inoludine: British Maleya and For th Bornen. These areas are reorranhically adjacent to the former Dutch Indios, but thoy havc a:i entiroly scparate existence in their hiatorical traditions.

It is regarded 1:zeppropriate and un:eceseary to grant tisose arcas their Indegendence together witi: the forizer Dutch Indies, and so they have been exclucoc.
(2) Rofarding Point II.

Article No (1) shall rean that when reraration for Inco? o:caeace will have boen completed in the princinal arean, that in Java and Suratra, Inderandence for a now nation shall be declared in the ontire area of tie former Dutch Indies, which has been decided as the erea to be aranted Incerendencc. Or a nethod aay be considered by wich the areas havinc completed yrogarations will be Erantod I:tojendence first, then the rest of the areas will be included in the new ration successively after corjiletion of tiseir res:ective reparations. However, it is feared that such a rethod will invite misunderstandine enone the on-called Indonesian sciaratigte who reiard ti:e former Dutch Indies entiroly as one body.

There is also tine difficulty in the legal explavation in incoryoratiar the rest of the ereas into the new country as sooia as their \(\mathrm{Hr} \mathrm{c}_{\mathrm{j}}\) arations will have been 00 mpleted . Rether, it is considered projer to declare Indegendence simultaneously for the entire aree as soon ae jremaratiors will have been corileted in the yriccipal areas.

It is, therefors, our desire to consider the arees, in whicit Ire:arations have not yet been completed, as territorios of the nev aation, for the tine being; but our military edministration will continue to rule theso areas until their yregarations will have been corpleted, when they will be traneferred to the nev nation, (drticle No. II).

Tie somealled Inde;endence Prenaration Cominttee, mationed In Article III, is a comittee for the preparation of Incientifeace coverin: the entire aren, but the center of tho aev ration is, after all, Java; and Java is, at rrosent, the fartinest aioad in the state if yrozrese in uroparation. So, for enverid nce sake, it is our dosire to establish tise Inderee:derce Pre: aration Comittee in Java. Of course, it will be projer to jrnnte \(\quad\) reparations for Indecendence In areas cotior than تave accordin: to the state of arnerose in the reinaratione made by the Inde endence Pronaration Comittee.

Noriovor, the Inde, en ence Preanration Commattee to be establiaied in Java will be to repare for Inde:ordenco in the eatire aroa, so it is, of course, expected that representatives from varioue areas will jartioijate in it. Howevor, unior the resent comunim cation situetion. it is coasidered difficult to dis.atch regresein-


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\section*{CERTIEICAEE}
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a:d that as buoh officinI I have custocy of tie docuneat iorcto attached consisti:s rf 8 pacjes, dated 17 July, 1945, enc. describec as follows: jeckures ficr tie Indevendence of the N. EeI. Data frr Yor ín Minister's Exilainatione I further certify that the atteciea record and document is a co.y of an oficicial document if the ja:enose Governicit, and that it is zart if the official archires and files of the followine named ainistry or de:artnent (syocifyim: also the file numbor cr: citation, if any, or any otion official debismation of the recular location of tise Gocurent in tie archives or filss): Foreien Office

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Investifator, IPS
Officiel Cayecity
Docision of the Surrome :"ar Flat:s Council, Nin. 27
Juls 17, \(18 \Delta 5\) / Showa 20/ re Neasures for the
Iagt Inaice Irderiendence.
I. Folicy
I: ordor to contribute tnwards tio comieterrosecution of the Gruater East isie "ar, tie frivire shall reconize as sinn as
 rojaratinns fir tie Incie entonce siall be :astered fad reinforced 1ri:odiately.

\section*{II Outline}
(1) \(\because\) arca to be made indewencent \(\theta\) ell be the for:ar : Fetherlancis Last Indies.
(2) Fre, arations for tio findo oace:ce s:all bo pusiea tixourhout the oatire territory and as soon as roparations are cormletes: in the ori-cijal arsas, tha Indeyendence of a lew nation arall bo jroclained thrountout the entire territory. Liovever, as resarcis the edministratio: of eraas where preparations are not conjleted, tope yill bo teken to tranefor tinse arens by degrece under the jurisdiction of the new antion ia accordence with the state of tise iproress of reparatious.
For tilis purinse, a: Indezondence Prevaratory Comittea atall be seedily orfanized in Java, and be made to mrepare various aatters zecsesary in cerrying out the Inüpoaderce.
(3) The sce odulod date af Iade endence shall bo routily fixed as soon as aossiblo and shall be ennounced br the Inde erdonce Prevaratorir Coraittcic, theiother with the areas desienated as the domei:: of the new :atic:.
(4) Whe yolity, political sorster, name of the country end the geo:e if tio oitize:z sleall be established by public niaion.
(5) Throuth tise oolicy en:corned with the Indenendunce, efforts atoll be made th rromete the racemennecinus:ess of the jeo\%le, and to rake them coitribute tinwara the corrlete resecutin: of the var. Nioasurce
 end reparations (T.N. arcaue:te, wer rearations).

(6) The execution of this ;olicy at the acturl ylace si:all be ontrusted oatirely to the jands of the army tiorc.
 roed "Gai:uoko", 1wlyi:: the "Eorei Y Ofrice."

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W.D.C. \(\qquad\)
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\section*{Statement of Source anc Authintionty}
I. Eavasi 1 Kapru \(\qquad\) Lereby certify that I an officirll:r connected with the ua; alese Goverunot in the followin: oanecity: Chief of the Archivas Section. Foretin Office and tirat as such ofificial I havi custody of the document rereto attacioci consistin: of _ 2 yaicos, datod July 17 , 1945 , and described as follows: Deciation Yo. ar by tie Supreme war Council.

I furtion certify that the attac:-e? recori end docuinat is a copy of an official docurent of tie Jowanen Goverameat, and that it is =art of the official arcinven eni files of ticc follnuins nezed miniatry or hepart:ent (secifyine also the file nusbor or citation, if any, or aily otier official desionatin: of the rocular location of the documeat in the archives or files): Forelimi Office

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14th day of \(\mathrm{N} \cdot \mathrm{V}_{2}\). 1546

Wit:2ese: \(/ \mathrm{s} /\) Tre Sat.)
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\section*{Statemcat nf Cfficiel Procuronent}
I. 2id Lte Jric W. Fleishor \(\qquad\) - hereby certify that I an associated with the Gearral Feadquarters of the Suprom Comrander for the dilied Povers, anci thet the above cortifiontion wae obtained by ne from the above sinned official of the jainese Government in the comact of my official businese.

8tened at \(\qquad\) on this 14tr. \(\qquad\) nthi
day of lioven 1946

> /s/ Pric V. Fleiahere_2id It. NHE AUSKI

Witness: /8/ Hirem I. Yevbill
\(\frac{\text { Invostigetor IpS }}{\text { Official Cajacity }}\)

My name is Klans A. de "lord. I am a Major in the Artillery of the reserve of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army.

I wis born in Rocrmond, Limburg, the Netherlands, on 6 April 1904. I 1 m of Netherlands nationality.

After having studied low at the University of Leiden (the Netherlands) I entered a lawyers' office nt Surabaya (Java) on 28 august 1909 and practised in the Law courts of East-Java, Ball and the South East of Bornean until the middle pr 1937.

In 1938, after having been on lu eve in the Netherlands, I was employed for nearly a year in the Labour office (Labour Legislation Section) of the Department of Justice of the Netherlands Indies Governmayt at Batavia. From the beginning of 1939 I entered into partnership in a lawyers' office at Medan (Sumatra)
en the lath of December 1941 I was mobilized as an pfizer of the reserve of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army and served as such with the Staff of the First Division in West-Java.

After the capitulation of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army, I became a prisoner of war of the Jopinese and was confined in several amps in :'est-Java until the middle of September 1945. From the beginning of this period I acted as Camp translator of the Java nelspopers in the !hay language. The Japanese aam authorities allowed may language newspapers to be brought the amps until the end of January 1944.

As the situation in the islands interested me in particu an I spent much time in transinting these items extensively into Dutch and, together with several friends, I indexed these data according to personalities and to subjects.

Our intention wis to prepare several studies concerning the Japanese occupation, treating subjects such as Administration Propaganda, Civil Affairs, Central Government, Labour, Policy, etc. as well as to gather personal data about Japanese authorities
and ix

I had already prepared notes for severnl of these studies when it became incressingly difficult to keen this work secret from the Japanese gunrds. hs in Janunry 1944 it became clear that we would shortly be moved to another camp wa soldered eopies of our compilations and indexes in tins and buried thom in various places in the camp grounds.

Fnom February 1944 until September 1945 I kept abreast of actual developments in the Netherlands East Indies by reading Malay or (translated) Japanase language newspapers occasionally smuggled in, and by listoning-in secretly te the Japanese local broadeasts in Malay. : During that period I oontinually exchanged jnformation and observations with new arrivals and through every other channal evailable.

Aftar 15 : ugust 1945 I once more rogularly reoeived Malay newspapers and in the boginning of Soptomber 1945 I recovered one complete copy of my compilations and indexes frem their hiding place. In the middle of the same month I was released from the.. prison camp and :ms assigned to the Politicil Section pf the Ohief Commanding Officer of the N.T.C.A. (Netherlands Indies Qivil :dministration), later called the llliod Military Administratipl Civil Affairs Branch, for Java, in order to complete my work follecting data about the Japonese oocupation. A special seat for vith a staff of twenty was created for this purpose ufder my direction; this section became a specinl branch of
Netherlands Forces Int 3I2igumen sarvioo (Hzadquators at Batavia) ix: Januery 1946.

In ciqse cooperation with the Japanese \(\Lambda\) ffairs Section of said N.E.F.I.S., with S.E.A.T.I.C. (South Enst isia Translators and Interpreters' Corps) and other offices and bureaus í collected such datn regarding the Japarrose uccupatinn as were available. Thesc doto were contained in, inter alla, the practically completo norspapers and the complete Official Gazette "Osamu Kan Po" of the F 6th Nrmy in Java, and a fairly complete
set of the official gazettes of the other islands, edited during the occupation period, further raports and surveys by Japanese, Dutch, Indonesinn and othar military and civilinn authorities and private parsors, seized Japnesa and Malay officinl and nenofficial documents, interrogetions of Japenese and Indonasian nuthorities, etc.

In lay 1946 I fojned the Office of the Attornay Goneral, Nethorlands Easi Indics, witi the spccial tasio of colleoting suoh documents as would be nevded for th: preparation of the Prosecutipf of suspectad Japaneso Niajor Nar Criminals before the Internatibnal Military Tribunal at Tokyo.and in this capnoity \(I\) aontinued my york of sollecting dita af the Japanese osoupaticn of the Eaft Indics.

In the middle of Scptember 1946 I arrived at Tokyc as a reprosentative of the Attorncy Generil, Netherlands East Indies, to continue my search foi fuxther data here.

From this collected informotion \(I\) heve prepared the attiched report, entitled: lithe Japanese occupation of the Netherlands Indies".

\title{
PREPARED STATETRST
}

\author{
of \\ K.A. de weERD, attornoy-nt-Lam, \\ Mijor f.P. T.A.
}

Subject: The Japaness Occupation of the Netherlands Indies.

International Prosecution Section Nethorlands Division Novembar 1946.

THE JAPARESE OCCUPATION OF THE NTTEIELAKADS IKDIES INTHODUCTION

The Japanese occupation of the INetherlands East Indies for convenience has been chronologically divided into five phases,
I. The period from iarch to ducust 1042, which can be designated the transition period.
II. The second Dhase, which is cheracterized by the consolidation of Japanese rule, lasting from August 1942 to July 1943.
III. The period from July 1943 to September 1944, which is governed by an attempt at. winning over the population by promises. IV. The period from Soptember 1944 to the beginning of fugust 1945, involving further development of the policy of promises.
V. The period from the beginning of fugust 1945 to the end oi September 1945, involving at tize last moment an attempt to create a state, friendly to Jaran, in the South.

The phases mentioned above have been more and less arbitrarily divided into periodsand consequently these limits must be treated as being aporoxinate. Occasionally for a better understanding a certain subject has been exhaustively treated in one of the phases, even if the events in question extended beyond a particular phase.

Japan's policy in regard to the Southern ilegions was broadly laid down in Tokyo for all regions ailke, so that only insignifizant, local modifications were made, and then solely in the apolication and not in the prisciple itself. Therefore, whei happened in Java is treated as basic and mention will mily be made of rodifications in other regions of the Netheriands Indies which reveal important deviations from events in Java.
I. THE TKANSITION PHiSE

Beginnine of 1942 to approximetely August 1942. Throughout the Eest Indies, the entire Occidental eroup of influential persons in the carinistration end in commerce, industry etc., was immediately and systmatically interned in prisons and camps hastily prepared for that purpose.

Exceptions vere provisionally made in the case of those Occidentals, who could not as yet be replaced by Japanese. As soon as the Japan se roplacing them arrived, this group was also interned. A small remaining group of workers vas also confined in separate camps, and their contact with the outer vorld was as much as possible restricted.

In addition a large eroup of prominent Chinese, mainly trois jest suppert of on the ground of/the Chiang Kai-shek regime, and on suspicion of their anti-Japanese attitude, was interned.

The policy of internment became stricter in the course of time and from July 1942 these measures :vero, moreover, eradually applicd to cecidontal romon.

By the end of 1943 the position had become nore or less stable, so that it may be said that all Occidentels not born in the Nethcrlands Indies, both male and female, had been interned, with a few locel exceptions in the case of men and women above 65 or 70 ycars of ai:c. Morcover, all Oceidentals ع.ppen'cnt born in the retherlands Indics who still showed/efilinity with the Occideniol uricic urre internca, and those Asiatics, too, who were "si:Epacted" of inving Ocoicental sympathics were confined in cames. Ascoraing to official Jopanose returns as
 females and approxime"*iy 13,687 children) vere interned in Java. Bosicees, all Oscidental military porsonnel were made prisoners of var; tris invo?vod 45,000 men who, with the exception of 6,107 man vere \(3 r a f t e d\) from Java for slave labour elsoviero.

Of the former "estern community, only three groups vere still "free"; namely, the group of fxis subjects (who vere not interned until aftor the defeat of their fatherland), few neutrals and a catogory of non-interncd Eurasians. These groups were rigidly spiad upon, and provented from the oxcreisc of their "frecdom" in many other vays.

This non-intorned Occidental comrrunity was subjected to very heavy pressure: Besides being spicd upon by the Japanese ifllitary Police (Kompei) and its henchmen, they were intimidated by continuous wholesale arrests and trials involving hundreds of victims, and by the fact that interrogation by the Kempci as rell as the treatment accorded by Jopanese Courts :iartial wero such that the victims riere deprived of all rights, and abandoned to arbitrary maltreatment and starvation methods.

Occidentals :Jre, whenever possible, disnissed from their official and privato positions and appointments, thus dopriving the greater part of this scetion of the community of its means of livelihood. fll bank balances werc immediately frozen, Occidental banks were liquidated, and the percentage payable in respect of liquidation was withheld from Occidentals. The fer non-interned Occidentals were faced with practically no altornative than eradually to sell all their possessions. They were further handicapped by the fact that the Japanese requisitioned whatever took their fancy, generally without payment of any compensation. By introducing compulscry registration and the payment of registration fees - (150 guilders for Europeans; 75 guilders for Chinese and other non-Indonesian Asiatics) - the Japanese military authorities made the position still more difficult for these commanities.

Along mith this, the use of western langueges wes soon frebidden in public and business communications, and in certain places the speaking of Vestern langueges was fromijolted cven within the home. Those who spoke a Festern language at home, were suspected by the Kempei, and subjected to mothods omploycd by that organization.

Of the former "lostern community, only throc groups tere still "free"; namely, the group of Axis subjects (who vere not interned until aftor the defeat of their fatherland), few noutrals and a catogory of non-interncd Eurasians. Theso Groups werc rigidly spied upon, and provented from the oxorcisc of their "frecdom" in many other mays.

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The first to be dissolved riss the Pcoples' Council, ustablished in 1918, which exercised legislative and budgutnry functions.

Next, in Jove, the Provinciel, itunicipal and Reconcy Councils, which similerly had legisletivo and budetary porters, :wrc abollshed.

In rogions outside Jeva, too, the various concils which had beon establishad on a derocrectic basis to elve the poople an opportunity of participation in the administration of their country, wire liquideted.

By Ordinence No. 14 of the Japanese Commander-in-Chicf, Jeva, dated 29 april 1942, all oxisting lew courts vere abolished; and in their stead Japanese "Laty Courts of the liflitary Governnent" (Gunsei Hooin) vere osteblished. This new judiciery vas nrovisional and ros later replaced by a definitive organization.

There was no provision for appeals. The decisions in all pendine enses of the lower courts wero declered to be deened to heve beon effirned by the appell:te Court.

By Ordinances Nos. 2 and 3 of the Japenese Comander-inChiuf, Java, dated 8 and 20 liarch 1942 respectively, sll muetings, essociations ctc. verc forbidden. By Ordinance No. 23 of 15 July 1942 this prohibition was not only cxplicitly maintaincd, but also all chairmen were ordered to dissolve their respective associe.tions.

The only associstions excented were those concerned \%ith sports and recreation, and scientific, cultural, charitable and distributing organizations.

Even associations not prohibited were restricted in their activitios; they were subjocted to polico suporvision, and could only resume their activities after obtaining pormission from the police, and registration. lioetings had to be authorized by the police.

In prectice, activities wore perritted only those associations, which eccented Jananese loadcrship and which could be used for propaganda purposes, as, c.g., tha Ikatan Sport Indonesia (I.S.I., Indonesian Sport Leaguc).

From the outset, the Japanusc authorities built up a very extensive propaeanda nachine.

Along with the first troops to land on Javn, came the vanguard.

Theso Japanose propafendists, organized in the Propaganda Section ("Barisan Propaganda") of the Japanese 16th Army (Osamu Butai), tried to establish immodiate contact with Indonesian and Chinese politicians, !nomn to be disaffected. "Fith the assistence of these dissatisfied porsons, in April 1942 the somcalled "IIga \(\mathrm{a}^{\prime \prime}\) moverent vas established. Local comittees of Indonesians were sat un to carry on the activities of this movement; but such committees had no function other than to cerry out activities planned by the local Japanese propagandists.

These propegandists inmediately seized control of all means of nublic expression. All public and private radio broadcasts and cinematographic activities as well as the entire Pross vere immdiately pleced undor their control. For about two months after the occupation, these broadcasts and newspapers vere still permitted to be transmittod and to appear in Dutch. ds soon as the propagande machine had been sufficiently organized, all newspanors trerc forbidden, and In their stead new papers were introduced in the Malay language under the direction of Indonesian and Chinese pressmen carefully chosen by the Japanese propeganda service. On the Emperor's birthday (29th April 1042), the first new "falay language daily paper in Jave, the "Asia Maye" (Greater Asia) wes established, and continued to eppear regulerly until 9 September 1945, as the most important orgen for voicing Japanese propagande. At first it was under Japanese direction;
but after the Indonosian steff hed proved themsilves "metured" the direction uns officially handud over to then; but in reality, the diruction reminced in Japencso hends.

Other nlacus in Java soon foilored suit, so that ultimetely - Japanese controlled nouspapors in inley more issued in five places in Java.

In addition a Jeranese lanuege poncer, tho Java Shimbun, vas published in Betavia.

In her projagande. Japan refirrod to hursolf as the "IIberator", come to establish a"Mev Order". It stated, thet "New-Java" lias to be educitud to becone a worthy member of the Groater Dast asia Co-Drosparity Snhere under tho leadership of Japan.

The Jopancse instituted a rigid consorship, which not only affected all postel-, telorraphic- and telenhoniccommunication, but slso extended to nll photoerarhs eiven to professional photographurs for developient.

Furthermore, all public utterances tere subject to censorshin. This did not slone extena to all radio broadcasts and the press, but also to the theater, sermons, etc. Graduclly theatrical comanies, etc. rer s takun over by the propeganda service.

The publication of books wes also subjcet to censorhip, and only vorks emanating from the propagande service anneared during the period of oceupation. By these methods the Junese hed control of all exmressions of rublic opinion.

Durine the period now being treated Jepanization of the Southern iegions vas bocun. For instence, the use of Japanesa words mas imredintely introduced fer designeting official services, offices, etc. s.nd this usece fredually became prevalent durine the occupetion, so thet ultinetely the reading of \(\varepsilon\) malay language ne:rspaper wns scarcely possible without knowledee of the offices, sarvices, institutions, organizations, ideas, etc., referred to by Japonese words.

The Jenancs authoritices introduced the Jeyenese systen of dating yenrs, the Japanese tine system and the Japanese budectary yesr.

The police vore the Jenanese flef for can badees. Emperor yorshiy - offensive to Lohamedans - wis introduccd. fll nublic eathcrings and meetings began rith the oblicatory bow in the diruction of the Tolsyo palace. lost reetings ended with the words: "Ponno Heika - benzai". ill Janonese days of celebration were introduced. The display of any flag other than the Jopenese wos forbidden. On the Japanese days of celebration the Japanese flog had to be flom on all official and privato buildincs under strictly prescribed rules.

Portraits of nomburs of the Dutch and lilliod Governments were forbidden. These hed to be handod over and were burned.

The possession of portraits and cther pictures of the Jajancse Imperial family was governed by rules aimed at ensuring thet there should be no "lesc-me.jesty".

Postage- and revenue- stams werc merked "Dai Mipron", and later new stamp were issued with texts in lialay and Jananese reading "Dai Nippon".

The Japencse at once beigen to establish schools which taught only the Japanese language. "Then later schools for Indonesians gere reonened the curriculurn vas rovised to muet Jopanese requirements and important subjects in the nery schedule were Japanese language and Japanese songs and dances, etc.

In the fields of finence and economics the proerams apnlied in the East Indies werg similar despite the fect thet some areas were administered by the Arry, and some by the Navy.

Java and Sumetra wore occupied by different Japancse armics and Celabcs, Bornco, the Holuccas, Timor, etc., were occupied by the Jepanese Navy, with practically no contact with each other. Nevortheless the basic principles unon which these regions pere administored were entirely similer in reality.

res chereed rith the "custody" of enomy property. This
Institution liquidoted ncarly all confiscatud property, and cruiited in its books the owners thereof, when known, with the proceeds in Japanose naner moncy.

Later, aftor liny 1945, this Ilquidc.tion wes hastoned. In Batavia the Kompoi and its memburs :roro frequently the purchesers at so-celled public euctions, and the proceeds in Japaneso occupation money bore no reasonable relation to the roal price for the same article in the same peper money in the open market.
ill stocks of Occidental inoorters, as well as private possessions in the form of movebles and claims for payment (when capable of realisation) owned by Occicentels were translated into claims in Janenese peper moncy on the abovenamed Tekisan K̃anribu. Possession of "enemy pronerty" constituted a punishable offence snd the holdor was obliged to hand it over. Even non-interned Euresions were considered enemy netionels, so thet rents, due then, had to be naid to the Japanese. Unsold proparty was duliverod uipon request to Jananese officials and indivicuals, and their proteges.

Before tho war, in the Netherlancis Indies, bie capital, chicfly contributed by Occicontals, hed been invosted in agricultural entorpriscs anc. industries. The agricultural unterprises (excepting sugar-factorias, which were oryanized in the "Java Togyo Zengo Kai") were brought by the Japanese under the "Saibai Kigyoo Kanrikoodan". This organization had chnrge of tho administration of "enemy" agricultural concerns under the Tekisan Kanribu and the control over all other agricultural enterprises including those operated with Indonesien or Chinese canital. Little attention was paid to the interests of owners. This body executed a nolicy directod towards carrying out a. riforous uar effort and to the maintenance of production required by the Great Enst Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Enteryrises and industries which vere of no importance
to the immediate var uffort, vore whencver possible switehed ovor to other nrociuction, or when thet eres not feasible, wero retained if such retontion wore de mod worthwhile from the point of vick of the enticincted requirements of the Great East isia Co-Prosperity Sphere a.t the end of the wer. Teaand rubber-plentations sufferod scriously, beceuse tho Jenanese, during the later staecs of tho occupation, enve proccdence to foodcrops. Tea-plents and rubbertrces wore chopped and used for firelrood, the estetes beine percelled out amongst local farmers to increase areas for foolcrons.

A large part of the "ostern-owned aericultural onterprises was liquidated. Tho entire sugar incustry mas allotted in 6 or 7 blocks to the large Japancse sugar companies, and was exploited by then under the continued direction and control of the abovementioned body.

Sugar production was reduced considerably and the machinery beloneing to the unrorled suear-factories was partly scrapped or carritd off, when the facterics were not switched over to procuce other commoditios more important for the mar effort, such as alcohol, butanol, etc.

The nossession of imovable proncrty bcionging to Occicentals or governmental institutions, wes trensferred by the Jepanese to the "Hudoosan Sanrikoodan" esteblished by ther, which handed over the pronerty as requirod to the Japenese nilitary or civil authoritics for business and for porsonal purposcs.

Ownership of imnovable property was drasticelly cheneod by the Japanesc.

The so-callod "private estates" were appropriated b:y the Military Government without the payment of any compense.tion to the owners, under Ordinance No. 17 of the Japanese Commander-in-Ch1ef, Java, dated 1 June 1942.

In the other islands too, such expronriations took plece, as for instance in the Celebes, by virtuc of an Ordiriance No. 11 of the Minseifu (the Civil fdministration), dated 20 Mrch

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1943.
\(\because \cdots s=\quad\) rimpte]y owned, were suized by the İilitary acministration anc wore onorsted without compensation, and in some cases vore allottod to arivate Jopanese commanis.

Privato railway, trormy and bus comanios were nmaleamatec with the Stete inilvays. The equimment of private railmay companius :os for a lnere nort shiŋoed to trle Burma Siam railmay. Direction of ralmars yas unifica under the iifkuyu Sookyolu (.nilvoy Head Office), and nll trace of forner incependent operation by rrivate comanies :as obliterated. The norsonnel of these companies was pooled nond Jonenese rank designetions end terrinolegy vere introcuced.

Private or scif-covornmental yes- ard po::cr- compnies as well as privatily ounce minine concens were taich over and operated by eithor the militriry Government or Jamenese cormanies.

The policy of cxpluitation of netural rescurces of the W:
Fost Incies/serried on nertly by the Military idministration itself, pertly through mononolies eranted to cortain big Jananese business concorns and nertly hy Janenose "netionnl policy comanies".

The Southern Devolopment Eank (Nanjco Naihatu Ginko), an entirely covernment ownec and oporated benk hac as its chief function the financing of the dovelopment anc exploitation of netural resources in the Southern ficgions and the control of circulation snc finence in thosearcas. This benk wes directed by the Ministry for Grunter East asia and it acted in the Southorn iopions as enshicr to the Japanose irmy.

The Jananose Gevernment also divided up netural reseurces In the Southern Roeions between the various Jepenesc apylicents ance allotted each of therl part of tioso areas, usuelly scoording them monopolies.

Donei ras erantuc e nows sorvicc monopoly although a local aeency hed started first,

Press monomolios in the Southern Regions vore divided amone various big Janoncse nevspaper concerns.

In tho field of banking, the Yoleohnma Specie Bank and the Tairian Banic parc chertered to operate in Java, and took over the functions of private Occicental banks.

The liquidation of those banks anc. the introduction of Japanuse banks ras cffecter, intor alia, by compelling the bank debtors whoso debts vere declarod to be claimable on 25th November 1942 to apsily to the Jananese benks for new credits backec: by tho securitios ploceod to the lestern banks.



\section*{II. TIE: SCOCD PتAS\% \\ sui:ust 1943 to Julv 1943}

 of Jown wis concurrontly chirf of tin lilitery :ornrancat ('unsallon) end







 ber a raculor sceninistr-tion.
 wos naxt divelonne. into n. gnpernts bor".

Mrn elst of its furctions wa 1-id down in Crdi:nonen o. 1 of tho

 militory =dmi:istr-tion (Gunsci) wes divicec into nine Dryprtronts under thec

 (?i:nence): Si:200bu (J:sticr), Krimub ("olicri; "ootubu (Public iforks);
 (Propa~のnde).

Ir. f.Cifion frin time to timn o, :umbry of Furonus, ne other ropr ruaritel bodies, withont the stondi:g of the Draretmonts bit uncor the Guneriken nre oquoliy focmoncont, wero cratod to hand.e vorious mottere,

 Rnmeoo foi (Sufer Procucrel Comporntion) atc. Trow timr to time some chenges


The structure of thr orrmer Control acministration wen chrined

 Intermel affrirs Drortmont, viailo Juhlic Ierlth, Educ tion nenc Irbour (now unciar : تnimbuu) werc honaloa hy senorete Denortreats or Burenus in
 and Relifion Dosretricit.

The fov rame: Secreteriote, tion Council of Stete for ti:3 I:adins
 Dronetmants of for ral adrinistration, corrasoondire in unmo with the
 Jomemeso linos.
- All Inodinf noaitions in tion Donnrtmonts varc occunied by Jrperieso. According to officinl J-pranan irformstion, \(0 \because 1\) Soptombrr 1945 23,242 Jopanagn nationnls wero amployad by the ifilitary Goverament in Jrya, emounting to kelf the mumbr of survico personincl proper stetioned there.

Ineislntive powers wern excrcised by tio ImonrinJ. Government nt mokyo, the Suprome Comp:*iar in the Southorr. arep., the Commonde-1:-Chief of Java, and the Chiof of Militery Administrption (Guneaiken). The lowe and ordinances of the first two bodine worc not published locelly, slthoufh
 of tha two last meitioned orames were publiehod in Jour, in tho Osemu Ken Po, the officiel bi-montiny Gezotte, orintrd in Jojnneso snd linley. Some encret ordinnscos ppopred only in tho Jnonnrae edition.

The inatitutio: of advisory Councils nt \(\therefore\) lotor stofe aid not pffoct
the lofisl-tivo position in pny why.
 5 Aufust 1942 lnid down en natiroly now gystom of locel sidministretion. Undor trie Jave was diviach iato 17 "Syuu", comospoble ecogrephicelly to tho former "Resiconcies" and ono "Tokubetu Si" ("Special City iros:") comprising Batevia. The four Sultarntes in Crntroi-Jovn were ndministored by two "Yooti Zirn Tyolu" (Sultoratos' Murcous).

The former "Provi:ncon" of "ent-, Contrnl- rad Finst-Jave woro allminntid. In oprl: 1945, tho Commancr-in-Chiof. Jove, inetituted threc "Chascieibu". coincidar roornilicnily with the former Froviacoo but retircly difforing in kind, r.s tier comander-1.moliof pointed out in sin official atetement.
till theoc locnl bodics sumplnted the former docontrnlined rna sutonomous locel adainistrotion; aid wero olfend dirnctly under tho
 meationed in tho Ordiarace, ond populn participntio: \(1: 1\) locnl pdrinistretion crma to mand.

The Syuu wiro subeividod iato s-nller units in mecorenee with tro Jepracen pfttorn. Mnese wore rivon Joponase nomos auck es Ten, Gun, Son, Iu, Si ond Siku. Jurine tilis sacond period the orzonic lows coverning the functions of ndriaistrntivn bodine under the old systin wore sholished, sid ropleced by Japrineso romentions, on witicit the cortrnilzed now edainistrotion mes besod.

The position of the Syutyoo (comprable to ti:n former naesidant") and of other locri officials wes, on on bund, considorebly stronfthoned,
 Tho Tuchror-pri:ciplo whe introduced. Thnen officiels, rosponsible only to thoir suporiors, had a lfres moseuro of liborty in the exccution of thnir dutios; thoy hed powers of dismiesnl pand mopointront, and


They woro croowerce to issue regulstions to irplanent ordinances promulgatod by hichor authority pad also roguletion concorning metters not yet covorca by such orainencos. Howevor, thoy were suhjoct to tho authority of their superiors and wrer resporsiblo to them in ell ceses. accordinf to stntemente by Japfacse Syutyoo and sinilpr authoritios, tho objoct tho dapazesc had in mind wns to build up an meinistrition which in ite fingl form should bo on the some linne 0 g those follown in their colonios in Tormose s.nd Kores.

Tha four ruline Sultans were mainteinca, not, fo having horoditary title to thoir positions, but as nowly invostod Rulers collod "Yo" owinf allegiance

hll iecr-positions in the now astrblielim-nt werc occupind by Jmameno. Jrom the Guaccikn:l cions to the Syuu Officn, the staff was elmost chtiroly

 by Jryancec mívisors.

The composition oi tin: acministrotive Corps wn nodifice lator pursunt
 tha brids of Jopnacse nnd if nin Inconcsion fold an imortnit post thero whes elwoys pe Jnyficic who wes the ronl oxccutivo.

It wns not uatil the end of duçust 1945 tiret Jnigninese officinls handed over ectupl nutionity to thoir Indonesinn collonenos.
sccording to tiae biocraphiss of tho Jmponeso officin.ls, bublishcd by the propefnida sorvica, this coms wo.s assomblec. chiofly in colonial Formosp, nad :Orop, nse some hed boen ongeped in ndministrotive functions in Jepar proper.

The nsto.blis:anant of new odministretive systen in islends other then Jown eoveloyse alone the srme linos.

In tho isitiel stage, Sumatrp sione with Nalpur formed on adniaistrotivo unit under on aray Conspader pet Sinsppore, but leter Surntre wos placed uncer a sopprete Guiseiknibu.

The 16 th pinc. 25 ti irmios (Jpra pod Sumptre respactivcly) cenc under tho 7 th iron army rith Hopdquartcrs e.t Singeporo, commpacied in the finel stopes by Itasoki, Seis'airo. This 7th ires irmy conc undor the Southorn Than \({ }^{\text {Wix }}\) commandeh by Field isprehal Terpuchi.

The Kilitary agmiaistretion opnrstad pursupnt to both orders issuod through the ordinery channols of commnd anc. issuod dircctly from the Mindstry of ifer.

In the Cclebes, Borino and .11 islends cost of r. line running north and south through Beli enc ifecnasor Straits the Joppiceso irsory wres in powor. 'Hile the terminology verind, the syetom wos not substnintirily difforont. The snac principles of contrrized edrinistration woro eppliod and reletions between Jfpancise -iic. Iicionosien officials worn the same.
.C-inistretion in territory uncior :eval Cocroption (linsoi) uan e:ceutod. br the lizuoime (Eeadquarters) at Kacasear (Celehes).
 tho Seconc. Southern Squedron, whose Beenquartere was ot Sourphoya. This Uondquertors fell weror ti:- Officer Corrpndine the 7th Southerr. Squadron nt Sincepore.

Pprallel with raorepaizetion of the derinistretion, the Judiciel Syetnom was ontirely rurised. In adecition to tho cunsoi fooin (Courts of the filitasy derinistretion), sot up in tho first period to romaon the forrer Courts, thero wne tise Gun Inief, f Court l'netiel proper, to trep Jnpancs. sarvico jorsomnel and othrre subjoct to Court lartial, ned tho Gunritu Felei, a Court liertiel to try fioletions of the arry Oreinerces.

Tho Gurnci gooi: iteolf he? juriatiction to try piolations of Military
 force by the Military Government. Mhis juriadiction we.e sherod with the cunritu taigi.

Ordirance \(\because 0.14\), of tho Cor:pader-in-Chiaf, Jemp, detoc 26 Senterbor, 1942, zave the Gunsoi Jooin their final forr.

Fizht twon of courts were set up, ell boaring Japenoso nerob, one
 (Internediar:; Courte of Appal), the porsoriol of hoth of which at first wes ontiroly Jaypiosc. The Lowr courts corprised the Police Court, the District Court eide othor locel courte correaponeine to the locel administrative subdivisions, and two spocial relizious courts, all ranned by Incomnaipns and diroctly controlled hy thn Internodiary Courts of hnpeal.

To eechcourt a :Zonsp.tu-kyok (prosocution Saction) wes ettachod. This avaton was otromily cratralized undre tho Justice Dopartnent. At a later stefc it wes deteched fror tho Justice Demertront, end combined with tho polico force uncer tho Folico Denertreat which was ronenod fublic Sccurity Dcparticent (Tianbu).

In. ifininel courts with InConosipn menbers a. reproentotiva of the
 Kensatu-kyohu.

\section*{Doc. 10. 2750}

 fourdetions tix, Jronneg introduced n, now ?nol Code \(1: 1944\), \(1:\) winch cri:inol acts wro defined in vpan tor-g, larime wide scoje for interprotation. Eigh rinime of punishenct wero irtroduced for spccinl offonses.

Durina the Jrminese occunntion intorfaronce bry tho Jrparesa ac-i:istretion occurred srequectiy ir trials by Inconosinin courts. In proctice it wis tho "arpei roprosontritive, nttondine criminal sessions, who determinat the sortones in crimirnl cases.

Durine the session only Jeumose rna Kaley lensunces wrer ollowed.
Trinis by tho Courts inrtinl proper wers conexctec i: Jopainoen and propor interprotetio: res solcor: oveilnhle.

In then otrer islande of the Jest I:?des judiciel powers were preinistrod ia the s-rie reninor Zorrer courts ware polishod mat rew Jepnnesc courts estr.hlishod.
nt the outsct of tho occupntior. the Jepnnces sutionitic: took over the Folice Sciool nt Sukeburi, Jovn. Also in the copitels of the verious Ssuu, pormsnent courecs for the troinimes of policn porsonel, lod by Jopennso, wero esteblishcd. Finplly propanmene courses for person?el nilropidy in the service wren conductoc. recularly, in which the iecols of Groptor Jost asin nud Jrpen's mizht worn truitht. is griston of corporal mpltrentment, pi-inistered on the snot or ot the police stetion, for tho scttlo:ont of rinor infroctions wes introcuced. ifoltreatnent as a purishonet for insigzificrat offonces wrs goen deily in the stroots. a cortrin scetion of the Inconobing. Police Forco echopted the tectics of tho Torpai.
s soprrate Folice Deportrent, lp.ter the Puilic Socurity Dopertront, wp, esteblishod glonr crntrolized lines snd all executivo functions wero teken over by tho Joxeineso.

Tho oxistinf: Forco wes folt to bo ingufīicient by the Jppeiese suthoritics. Verious wrys to remedy this situption were attermted.

The Knmpainoc, en Inconosian oxtonsion of the Kompel, treined by Kerpei porsoneal in Kimpoi mathods, was orgnilzod. It was both ficared and hated by the people.

Doc. \(\because 0.2750\)
モャாด 21 *
In Abril 1043, e. Enibooden (e sort of Villefo Gueris) whe orgenizod as an suxiliary policn force in oll villegos and manicipalities. This roinforcod the roguln police by enproximetely \(1,300,000\).

The Ref:oodra hed n vexicty of dutins. It hace to eo into action in case of fire or otiacr colpritics, it hos to pesist the roculer police in apprehonsions of creshed allicd eir crews, paretroopers ond others, did 24-hour guard alutice in tts erea, turnor out in forco during publid propagande roctings otc. Its repin duty consisted of spyine, chiofly in a zenerel cerpaicu arpingt oncry spics.

In 1945, thesc "eiboodeir were used to trein tho population in guerille action, such es cutting lince of comunicetion, drestruction of amell onory detechr:cnts, etc., with wholly inedequate weopons such as bamboospors: This treinilig tounht the simple ferner feer of foreigners and heto for Occidentels and led to bérharous display of cruelty to those foreigners.

A third force puxiliary to tho police, wes sot un exrly in 1945, end called : \(:\) eibootai, wich oporetod only in town and sorvod the seme purposes as the Teiboodail. Its nombers were recruited chiofly from among tho Chinese.

The :erpel-F.00 we.s part of the Yermei, while both the Foihooden end the Moibootai althougk Jepancoe-led, ene troined, forriec 20 part of the official Army orgeilzition. Then nerbers of tho two letter were "volunteers", if the required numers wcre not filled, the remainder were drofted:

The prison syster wes similarly rcorgenized under Jappnsse instructions: Coursce were held for the treining of newly recruitec porsonnal es well as for the "irprovoment" of personnel with previous service. Japenese deeignations ane. Jepaicsc narkings werc introduced. Tho treatment of prisoners was inhumaire.

The Kilitery Government proceodod to lay down a rovised educationel progren with e view to reoponing schools for Indonesiens.

Slemontary ocucation in the Pcoplo's Schools wo.s rovised. Instruction In tho Japenesc lenguego, songs end dancos, and the Jemanose typo of physical treining was introduced. Instruction in repding end mathometics, wes substentially reduced and the rompinder of the curriculun abolished.


Ina Gollnee wis supplontad by one yerr coursos for that treining of

 Jajnn. Snmo rosimontntion of atudente uns i:i forco. Inatruction in the


Pripato ducation remined thoo for se lon: tinc. In 1943 and 1944, cortein forror priveto schools for Inconesiarn pad for Chirnse wero pllowed to roormilizo but th:o curriculun hne. to conforr: to the officini nrorme.

Wostcre toncilinf nad oducetion to Occicontels wore prohibiter throuphout the occupation. This proinibition wos etrictly onforcen, and tho noro suspicion of haviny thurat Occifontels wes sufficiont to involve the suepoct with the ㅍomoi.

Considerahle mubora of Indonceien Colloco studnenta ns well as groduates and prominont persomalitics from the Indonosian commity woro mont to Jempa. A perty of journalists fron pil the islends ware triken to Jepone to attend the Gre ter \({ }^{3} \mathrm{~s}, \mathrm{st}\) isif. Joumnilsts' Conference.

All sections of socinty woro orymized into coryorf.tions nlones fescist linos.

The oremization nale political cooreination of socict.7 wes corrica out pmong all racinl and political roups as woll a.a aronf precticelly all professions ane tredes, practicelly all ccoronic soctions of socicty, All culturn 1 groups, all roligious groups, the pouncor ecmeration, eports orfenizetions, pac. womon's notoments. Tho Jeppreso authoritios kopt a close grip on eparticular sociel croup through these orepaizations and used thom to command ala mald support from its nombore for the hrry or the kilitery Government. Fixe corporstions wero roquired rorulnrly to turn out in forco curing anss moetinfs. Thoy worc utilized for diseominatins properande arong the monbers. The Jepanciso used these corporations to keop abronat of public opinion nere to concuct ospionore.

The Froppranda Dopertmant rainteined close roletions with theso orgenizations. didiressem by Indonowian officiala in these organizetione wero not only pre-consorcd, but wire usunily ovon drafted br the Propagendes

amprovnl from tha Gunaikn.
Hirticle 21.: The Izi Yookookpi is supnerised by the Gurecikar. The work of the breanch officors is superpised by tho Syulutyooken (Japannso Loce. 1 Governor)."

The lewfors, nowapaporion, ex.e most, if not all, other profeasions woro sinilarly ormalized into fincilo corporptions.

In all ficles of oconomic activity then wes the smo picturo of oblicntory mabcrehip, uilletorally bindime remultions, undform objacte prei Jepences oxocutivos.
dil axtists ane acholara wno orrmized in tho Peimin Bunka Sinobye.
The irportr:ice of \(n\) truly Oriontal nrtistic oxprossion was orphensized
- and secidontal influonces wore conaidoree inimical. -nirtines and other nrtistic oxpressions wern to be and wore adjudzed, not on thoir ertistic veluo, but solely on thoir morits in roletion to the froptor Sest isia Co-prospority Syiore. This oreprizetion, este.blialned in inch 1943, showor. tho amn characteristice ns the other comorntions: Jopancse oxecutives, oblicntory suphort to the arry end the Kilitery Gomeramert, cte.

The Jeponosc ettechod much irportano to the spirituri moulding of youtk pand thoy took tho nettor into thoir own bindes corplotily. Tho Irconesien Youth Kovenent, which et tho outset had boon euthorized, wes prohibited in tio :icicile of 1943.

As onrly e.s Decomber 1942 the Japonese Compacior-in-Chief in Jeve declered thet the treisize of the youncor ecraretion to be rood citizens of the Grontor Jabt abie Co-proppority Sphore wes of auch paramount importanco tiret the best Jeman hred to of "or was not considored cood nnough. Tron mettor of auldenco end trairing of youth wes kopt an oxclusivaly Japenceso concern. The oremi of cortrol wes e日toblishad by tho croption in April 1943 of the Jewa Scinonden (Java Youth Corps).

Its aims werc laid down es follows:
"In ordor to conrince tho youth of Jeve so that they will
chorgeticelly cooporato with the Military Goveriment and render
pseistanco in the buileine up of the Co-progerity Sohore in Gropter
West insie, it is necosary that tiny bo aivon puidence and training."

 uni.or the diroction of Jeprnosc.

Intor, a Scinaildez wis orfrizized in wory Ton nee Si, onch approximotoly at bettalion strcugth. Sorer frctorics bre their own Srinondnn. Those wro orfanizod into tho Jewn Rearoo Soincedan, (United Youth Corps of Jnva) on rilitery lizes arf compaded by Japnnose officers of the drmy nic the Kilitery ropominont.

Are licita mare set it 14 to 25 rese if ingufficient volurtoors wore fortheomine :oro werc eirnfted. onlo tho physicelly fit woro admittod and those woro testod ns to thoir ontlusiasn for the Grentor Epst haia

Co-prospority Syicro.
The ofelciel treinin: corprisoci instruction in tho Jepanose laneungo orsi rad written, mirituni me rilitary troininf, Jeponose ohysicel troinine, air rife proceutiona, Jepmesc masic anc lipacos, ote.

Tho rempowor for tier Boool Giyn Gun (Dofonce Voluntrors Corps), which whe orenized in Septoriber 1943, lercoly conn from tho youth corpe. Soon after its ostrblishent fll other youth oremeizetione wern prohibited. Eports wry elso brouiht in line. On 21 Aurust 1943 tho Trif Iku Kai wre orgenizod. The Thi Ihu Fif providos the sfme picture ns othor corporations. In the officiel explenetion of the epplicable Oriinance it seid: "Tho Jewe trif Ihu ifi will enver the morts-worle of all Greeter Reat Asiatic mationals in Jeve, from offico-omplovecs to sciool-childron, and elso thet of tho Koiboocan an? the Sninorden. Coneliorine how irmortent sporta fe for our opiriturl and corporal trainine, for learnine end devoloping disciplize, end for stroncthonine the girit ond tho hetormizetion to work, this Mr.i Iku Pri is of arect importpace to tho Mry of Grepter Frat Aain."

In overy iea nuld 81 f brench was cateblished; thosc brenchos waro organized in thoir respective Syuu ene these agrin ware all eubordinated to the Jawa Iku Mai.

The Inconesian women of Jeva were orfrnizod in the Zuzin Sel, foundoc in Aurust 1943.

Its objects s：ec．C．utios waro l．id．（own n．s followe：
＂Thn pumose of tini oxchrizetion is to holp the Dei IPppon Lrug elti offorts bofittim：the position of tho wonn of tho orieinal inhroitnelts n：xe alao to raisc tho wonon＇a rirtua．

In orear to \(2.8 s i a t\) in the conduct of tho Militery Govermment，tho Zimpote（Yor！ine S．ction），is crontod within tho zuzin Kni；this hody hes to crrry out work recasenry for tho imorovemnnt of conditions bohind tho fro：at－linn and in tho fiele．of sovings，educretion，public srefoty and public horlth．

In ordor to deern the conviction of womn in their dutios townede tho afforts of tha dnfonce of the couitry in wartino，in the firat plrec to ：ivo instruction in first eid tho Bujin Irai shell bo filowod to orranizo lecturo meotings par courscs and to estehlish \(n\) elose contect witin tiac Soinondan pise acibooism in conductine oxercisos wo thet in future when thers is en chory ettack tho work epr he done 5.8 woll กs－30esiblo．＂

Dovelopments in tho other islonds，woro rourkly parallol to
thoso in Jave．：̈owover，tha Jnpencse livine axon：lese acivrnced pooplos， with \(\cap\) lower striderc．of cfficiency man：thoir own Japaneso porsomnal，and Rt the snfe time lose dourncont on tho cooperstior of tho local population than thoy woro 1：Jeva，thoir chiof rempry and supply brec，they teekled the process of politicel coordinetion moro sketchily．
III. THE MY:IRD PH.iSE

Fron Jul.y 1943 until Ssptombar 1944.
As oarly as in the first poriod, thero was some activity by Japanese authoritios in tha political field, but the policy adoptod locally was charactorizad by the Naval Liaison Officer at Batavia as a policy of Mwait and ses."

Immediately aftur the occupation a prohibition was laid down in Art. 2 of Ordinance Ho. 2 of the Commander-in-Chiof, Java, dated 8 March 1942, which ruad as follows:
"Until furthor notice it shall be strictly prohibited to commit the following acts:
"a. participation in any orymization; attending any meetings; conducting propagnida in fevour of the enomy; the posting of printed or illustrated placards."

By Ordinance No. 3, dated 20 March 1942, it was further prohibited to "discuss, engage in activities, encourage, or maka propaganda concerning the oreanization and structure of the Government."

By virtue of thesa prohibitions certain Indonesian nationalist leaders wure arrested by thu Kempai in April 1942, some of whon were only rem leased much linter.

In Decumber 1942 to January 1943 a large scale round-up was conducted of Indonesians who had engaged in any underground activitios of a kind that might possibly be construed as being anti-Japanose. They ware - except for those who had been sentenced to death or had died in prisons - not reluased . until Septamber 1945. Even after January 1943, the Kempei scrupulously continued to guard against and spy upon all underground activity, which cost a very largo number of victims.

In 1942 the Japanose initiated the "difil" Kovement. This name was announcod on big placards displaying the following slogans:

Nippon Polindung isia (Japan the Protector of Asia)
Nippon Pemimpin Asia (Japan the Leader of dsia)
Nippon Chahaya isis (Japan the Light of isia)
Tho . Ah for dsia wore printed larger and in a more striking colour than the othar letters. The thomes which this novament elaborated were nasia for


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and ten Indonesians, including the"Four-leaved Clovar" and cortain former Chiefs of Dopartments, formur professors and members of the former People! s Council, sat on this Committea. It never played an important role and was abolished by the Japaneso in November 1943.

The first reruest to the Japanese authorities made by the wour Serangkill was to be allowod to form a party. This roquast mes considerad w: until 8 December 1942, when at the commomoration of Pearl Minbious; a big propaganda meating was hold in Batavia, nnd the Conmander-in-Chief publicly promised that a singlo party for Indonasians only vould be permitted. The fulfillment of this promise had to wait for a decision from Tokyo.

On 9 March 1943 the "Putera" Hovement wis crentad, deriving its name from a symbolic abbreviation of "Pusat Tenaga Rayat" denoting "Centar of the People's Spiritual Power," while "Puters" means "knight's son." , :

Its aims and policy ware approximately sinillar to those of the previously discussed corporations, except that the name of this people's novemont was not Japanose, butimalay. The Putera was not a party, but only a "movanent" with laaders and advisory councils.
:\%;: The leaders were appointed by the Commander-in-Chief and wore nssisted by the advisory council in which there were approximately ociual numbers of Japancies and Indonesians, the latter being nominated by the luzder with the approval of the Gunsaikan. Locil laaders were appointad by the Lander, with Japanese approvil.

The orginization of the Putera was governed by rules laid down by the Commandor-in-Chiaf, and its aims were officially doscribed by the Japanese \(2 s\) follows:
"The object in arousing tho strangth and efforts of the peopla is "no other than to support all masures for winning fincl victory In nthe Groater East Asia Whr. Since the work of this Movoment is veiry "closily linkud with the policy of the Dai Nippon Military Govern"ment, all loadors must bear in mind that they should have a Hprofound knowledge of, and faith' in, the aims and obfeativas "of the Dai Nippon inny."

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In this addross the Futera laaders were further urged:
"Do your utmost always to be fully awnere of the existing limitations "in the present situntion, and nover lead the common poople nstray. "I hopo you will do your best to fulfill the nims and objectives "of this Movement, and that you will cooperate in the establish"ment of the Co-prosparity Sphore in Greater East isia and tuild "a Ne:r Juva to be a member in the fumily of nations within the "Co-prospurity Sphere in Gruater Frst isia." The functions of the Futora were officially set out in the following ton points:
1. To Lapress upon the Indonesian populntion their duties and rosponsibilitios in regerd to tho establishment of a "New Java."
2. To eliminnte Occidental iniluences.
3. To participate in the dofence of Greator East isia.
4. To foster solf-discipline in benring all mental and physical privations necessary for winning liltimate victory.
5. To decpen mutunl understending betweun the Jopeness and Indonestians.
6. To encourage the study of the Japenese lingunge.
7. To raise the stendards of tho Indonesian population and develop their capacities and character.
8. To encourage the care of health and sport in order to improve the physifue of the populution.
9. To encourage thrift and savings.
10. To uncourage higner production in every field and to develop a love of :rork.

The Putera was only for Indonesi:ns. The new socinl hiararchy introduced by the J.tnnese cor.prised the following grades: 1. Japanese; 2. Indonesians: 3. ctiaer asiatics; 4. mixtures of Indonesions with othur groups; 5. Euiopaans. Thureby, Indonesions, being the "original inhabitants", were treated 33 n privilugad cotegory, thile groups 3 to 5 were tranted ns forriguter, with tho Luropenns and curasiens receiving the worst truatment.
about the sama time n.s the institution of the Putera, the restrictions on trevel by so-cilled "foreigners" were strengthened. Moroover, it was ordarad that everyone must immdiataly inform the police when lodging someone from outside the place of his rusidence. "Forbiddon zonus" were introduced, covaring the entire South const and the two Eestorn and destorn extramities of Jave, whure no "foreignors" yere :llowed to enter and for which oven Indonesinns nuedud ? pass.

The first great onthusian for the Hutern dirindlad whan it becamo apparent thet the activitios of this body, to which the population had looked forw:rd, wuro to be entiraly rustricted to the basic principles laid down by the Jnprnese propigendi survice. There was grant disappointment when the originally planned Youth Lovemont of tho Putera wes forbidden, and the Jipuness nuthoritios set up instead thoir own youth movement.

Munwhila, outsido thu E:st Indios gront changes had taken placo. Japan had buen forced from an offensive into a dafansive position and linos of communication ware sariously threntenod.
adeinst this backgrouid, on 16 Juno 1943, Frime lainister Tojo made a spuech in the Diat wheroin, inter alia, he stated that in viur of the fact thet tha people of Jave had shown thuir rendiness to cooporate with the Government. Jap nese kilitiary dedministration, thuy should be given pariticipation in the / On this uccasion Tojo :lso promised so-crlled indepandonce to Burina and to the Fhilippinos.

In pursuance of this !romise, Prime Dinistor Tojo visited the Southern Regions in person.

Enrouto to Jav?, Tojo called at Manile and Singapore, repanting the proniso of "indepondonce" for the Philippines and Burma. In Java no "indepundencell was pronised, but only participation in the govornment. The promise was coupled with the conditions that there should be complete cooperation with the J!panose Militry Administration in order to win ultimate victory.

Following this promise, in iugust 1943, an Indonesian was appointed Chiof of tho Syummbu (Dop:rthont of foligious iffairs), but setual control re.r.inad in tha huds of Japaness saction heads; and two others were appointad Syutyoo (Chiof of a Residency) in tho two smillest Residencios of

Java, with actual power in the hands of the Japanose Vice-Chiof6: Further-


The "Snn-yo Soido" (idviser Systen) wns introduced, and Indonesinns ware nominated to be adviser to sovan Departments. Tha San-yo only acted

In oll Residencies and 1 lso in the Specinl Runicipaljty of Betevia an advisory body, the Sangi Kni, was ostablished to advise the Resident in minters of local govarnment, by Ordinance ivo. 37 of the Comender-in-Chiaf, dated 5 September 1943. This Ordinance prescribed the numbers of nembers of each Sangi Koi to be appointed and ielected, respectivoly. The "elections" were indirect with nominntion of the cardidntos not public and tha ballot not secret. The function of the Songi hai was to nnswer cuustions concerning loc?l govarminnt put to it by the syuutyoo with the right to m?ke suggestions on the reforrad subjact. It oould only meat on ordars fron the Syuutyoo, and sittings wero opened and closed on his ordars. Officials of the Syuutyoo office could attend and participeto.

The sessions wors only public for the opening nddress, which was drafted and censored beforehand, and for the closing session. Tha sessions propar were held buhind closed doors. it the fin?l sossion motions, discussed and settled ciuring the closed neetinos, were put to nanck vote and :Iways passed unanimously. Sessions scarculy evar lasted longer than four to five days. The Chairmen was appointed from anongst the members on nomination by the Syuutyoo. Every Sengi Kni sent reprosontatives to the Tyuuoo Sangi-In, tha Centrnl idvisory Council of Jnva.

This was establishod on 5 September 1943, by Ordinance No. 36, "for the speedy and efficient execution of the measures of the isilitary Government." Twenty-throe out of forty-three manbers were nomineted in :dvance by the Comnendor-in-Chiaf. Of the ramaindor, dighteen were "elacted" by the various Sangi Kai, and tivo were nonin?ted by the Sultanates. The procedure wis the sarie as that of tho locnl Singi kid. They were only empowered to offor advice in respect to questions put by the Comender-in-Chiof

of offaring sone ruturn for Tojo's promise; and by Ordinance No. 44, dated 3 October 1943, he institutud the Kjodo Booui Giyu Gun (dirmy of Volunteurs for the Dafence of the Homelnal). The aim of the Corps whe "to c.ll upon the original inhabitints (i.e., Indonesizns) for the dofence of Java, bised upon the principla of the joint defence of Grentor fist lisin."
int. 4 lisid dom:
"The Voluntedr Corps should be thoroughly convinced of the ideals
"ind importance of the task of dofending the homolend, and it is
"its duty to prortake in the dufence of the home country in the
"ruspactivo Syuu against the illies under the leadorship of the "Dai Nippon army."

By virtue of this Ordinance, the Giyu Gun was commanded by the Comnendor-in-Chiof of Javn. It was emphatically stated thạt this Corps was not to form part of tho japmese irmy and would have its own officers, but it would be trainod by Japanuse instructors. It would not be used outside Java and would consist of voluntaers.

Rocruiting for the first levy started immedintely, but with the following levies it appearad that thoro was insufficient enthusiasm, so that with each naw levy each hegency was told how many "voluntears" were required in order to bring formations up to strongth. Ono of tho chief activitios of Japanese propaganda was to encourage enlistniunt in this corps. In October 1943 the training of the "officers" was started and lasted throe months.

The objact was to form one or more bittalions of 3 bout 1000 men por Syuu (Rasidancy) which would together mako up a unit for the defonce of tho Syuu. l.t the tima of Japan's capitulation tris objoct hnd beon sechievod. In the defence of the Syuu, the task of the Giyu Gun was aninly one of guarding rond junctions, bridges and other strategically important points. derpons were only supplied to these "volunteers" for the duration of the drills, and trining mostly took place with wooden guns. The Beppan, a specinl section of the Headrcurters of the l6th Jnp?neso aray, an intelligonce organization, was charged with training, and nt the same time made use of it both for spying upon the a.ew voluntaers s.s well n.s using them as spius.

Prior to this, the Joprness had mado use of Indonesians as auxiliary forces. Shortly after the occupation many Indonesion soldiers ware partly racruitid and partly compalled to serva as a "Hoiho" (nuxiliary soldier). These units formed part of the Jipunese irmy and wure issuad a Japanose uniform. Thuy ware gener?lly used in the Ordn nce Corps, and to gunrd canps occupied by women and civilinn internase. Heiho were sent off the isl.und.

Tha Japanosa Navy similnrly mado use of Indonesion Hoiho.
Both the Giyu Gun and the Huiho rarc trught to spank Japanosa. Commands wors issuod in Japanese, and the ragulntions were writtian in Japanese. They wore Jopunssa insignia. in important part of tho training was instruction in "Seisin" (Spirit).

One of the important aims of Japanese propagnda was tha incruase of farming crops and their dalivary to tho Japenose Hilitary idministration. The islund of Jav: had to provide large quantitios of food for the Jopanese occupation troops and troops fighting in the Esst. Busides the Japanese army of occupation was laying up linge stocks of suijplius. Java, which bufore the war had barely been able to maet the essential food requiremante of its own population, wis expectod to produce more. This increase in production whs obstructad by the lack of propar supervision over irrigation works, due to the ruplicemont of interned Dutch oxports by insufficiently trainud Jopaness, and by h?phazrrd muthods adoptad by the Japanuse in the pursunnce of thit onds in forcing the production of desired egriculturnl commodities unsuitabla to the climete ind goographic conditions. this furthur reduced tho area nviilable for food crops.

It becme less and less adv.ntagoous for the sinplo foraer to hend over his produce to the Jepnesa euthorities. Fron the cutsat, the Japaneso adopted the policy of the Netherlands Indios Government to stabilize
 creased in its purchasing value, the official price for rice soon fall far belor its formar value rolntiva to othor commodities. irticlus that the farmer used to buy with iha proceeds of his rics became virtually unobtainable.

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The Japenuse authorities ordored that \(60 \%\) of the hervist of food produce \(h\).d to be delivered to tinan. They took far-reaching minsurus to combat the black merket in rice and other food products, such ns the imposing of closed rogional aconomic nress, anforcod by chockpoints on the highways. The throshing of ricu - oxcupt for individunl consumption - in other then "coordinnted" mills wes prohibited.

The propagnala service exertod all its powers to porsunde the fermers to cultivnte wider reas in crder to obtain more produca. It also triad to pursuade the inhabitants to vicld thair crops to the Japonose dilitary didministr \(\operatorname{tit}\).

Not only in J?v:, but tiroughout tha Southern Regions, Jnpan usod lobour averywhers, for the building of military fortifications, nirfields, strategic railwys, utc. Jeva was a source for such libour. From the vary commenconent, Jipanese propaganda want -11 out, to encourage the voluntary unlistmunt of these coolius. In this at first the Jrpinesu are successful. Whon the inhabitants loarnud how these coolies were being treated by the Japanese, their dosire to work for them practiceliy disappenred. This becamo worsa when the coolius sent out of Javn did not ruturn, and no news whatever was received from thun.

The Japanesu thorenfter adopted conseription, whoroby asch Kegency wns informad is to how many coolies hed to be drafted, both for the work in Javi itsalf, nend for libour outside that island.

In 1943 thes propagande. sarvice sterted a vigorous campaign in which the "Prajurit Ekonomi" (the economic warrior) was rapresantad as fulfilling 7 sacred task by working for the Jupanese drmy. It was no longar pormissible to spask of coolies; tho coolic wis slso a soldier, ?nd his contribution to the war affort had to be grontly appreciatad. The recruiting of the coolies was undertaken by every possible means; one of these wes that the houses of rillativos loft bohind wore providod with a sign "Prpjurit Pokerjal", and it was pointed out to the public thnt one should honour such houses ind their occupants, whilst this sign was said henceforth to guarantee spocial protaction. Furthermory, thorotically thesa relatives enjoyed cortsin privilegus in the distribution of scarco commodities, such
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ns clothing, - ? Friviluge anjoyed only after 11 government officials had recuived thair sharo.

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Thuse liboururs recoived less cirs then the prisoners of war and intorneos, and their condition was ageravated by thoir ignorancs of hygianic procautions and medical cars. thila the corroct figures of those who ware transportad outside Jnva as Romushns ro not known, tha officinl ustimates of the Jopanosi aftor ths capitulation indicnto a figuro of \(270,000 \mathrm{non}\) of whom not more than 70,000 have been recovorod since the war's end. Most of tho returnees suffored inhumno naltrontment. iccommodntion, food, medical cnre ware not only thoroughly inadoquate, but in many casas absont iltogether. During cert?in periods, "romushas" who hid died from strrv".tion and contaEious disonsus were dnily carried way by ths cartlond from certin cumps.

In relicious mattars the prop?g.ndz service mado on affort to obtain conplete cooperation from tho population.

Thase sctivitios wore aspocinlly diracted it influoncing the Mohammudns, who formed the lirge majority of the population, wile propagande among othur religions whe of far luss importince. Priests and praachers of n "ancmy race" wors forbidden to conduct sarvicus except for paople of an "oremy race". If an "onsmy" priost or praachar noticed an Indonosinn ariong tha congregation he was to sea to it that the latter left on punalty of vary sevore punishmont.

From the very outsat the Jnpmesa made an effort to ustablish ons orginization for the Islmites to convey tha Japanose ains to the poople and to induce a maximun war offort through voluntary cooparation. Soveral attempts in thet direction by tha dapnese filed at first becnuse of discord in Islamic circlos in regrd to religious principlos. In November 1943 the Jnp:nese succeoded in uniting tho loslom unions into ono mother orgenization, tho "Kishuri" (n.bbrovintion for "Majolis Shura Muslimin Indonusia" - Consultative Council of Indonesinn Islaraites).

This coordinnted the iohomodin intellectunls. In addition thore was a L'irgs number of \(0: 31\) mins (expoundors of tho Koran) and Kiais (taschers on ruligious metturs), not closely connoctod witi Islemic intollactuals, but who exurcised a considernblo influence in the villages.

From tha vary baginning tha Syummbu triad to obtain influence amongat tho population tinrough thase kiais and oolumas. is fir bick is July 1942 tho thon Japanoso Hand of the Syummubu bogan to tr?vol about Javn and hold nuotings in ench Syuu (Rosidancy) for about 500 or 600 kiais and oulams who had buon ordured to attend by the local administration in anch place. Ho spoks on Jnpansso viuws and aims in tho usunl voin and then tried to sound the opinion of his udionce. Ho was assistod by fivo Jnpunose in orbinn dress bonring tho titlo of Hadji in combination with Arabian and thair own Jnpenusu namus. Following this tour thore was n gront mosting of reprusantativas of all scholars and tuachers on roligion from ill rusiduncias at Betnvi? on 7 Documbor 1942. Tho Gunsoiken mude a specoch in which thu Jopanose policy in rugard to the Islamitas in Java was axplained:

This policy ambodiud three principless First, the Japanese arry doclnrod itself to bo the protoctor of Islan and thit the Mohumodan raligion rould bis rispactud.

For the second point tho Gunseikan doclared that religious associations would soon be nuthorized to carry on thair activities and that they had tha noble task of propegnting the idesls of Gront East isia and the support of the \(k\) ilitary idministration.

For the third point, the Gunsoiknn declared that the cooparation of tho Islomic commanity in respect to oducation was accoptable in so far ns it wns diroctud it full support to tho Jnpanase irmy ind imbued with the idonls of thu Gruater Enst 'sin ComProsperity Sphare. With this rustriction ruligious uducation would be pormitted and officially supported with books and othur facilitios.

Tho Syummbu established a purmanont training contro in Batavin whero coursos listing thruo wecks in Jipaness idoology wore givan to groups of sixty kiais and oulama uach.

Thuse courses were also usod to tast whether Japanase propiganda had sny offoct, and affordod a moans of sulacting suitable collaboratorse Those accomplices carried tho propagands to the simple rural population, and wore rusponsiblu for the production and delivory of sufficiant rice for 2 sufficient supply of laboururs and for onlistments ns "volunteer" or heino.

The Jnpanoso adoptad the old davice of working on the fan-ticism of Islnmites, and thoy triod to parsuads the kiais and oelnmas to doclnre tho Grantur Enst issil wap as a "sabil" (holy) war ag?inst tho knif (unbeliuvar). then tha poir.t thet th.a \(J\) penaso woro thansulvas unbuliovars wis raisad, the :common nesstry;" tho "common race" and the "dastiny common to tho \(J\) :panese end the Indonssins: wors pointed out.

In tha byinnina of 1044 roligious distarb ncus occurrsd in the Indrsmeyu district and at Gerut. The Japensse held the Ir.donesian londer of the Syuunubu (fuligious .ffnirs Dap?rtmont) rasponsibla, nd ho wos repleced by one of the oldast and most ponular ki>is of Jav?. Ho accontor this post and spunt one dse in Bet:vi:, but indasdintaly ruturned to his ruligious institution, lunvine thi diriction of the Syumubu to the J?pness honds of sections.

Fron Novamb.r 194.3 the shumi buc mo tha orgenization through ahich the Jnpuns, futhoritjus ruled the Isl:inc intilluctunl irorld, -rid through it carriud on propng.nd. for Japanasa idsnls, suandad public opinion and uxucutoa: uspionagu.

Tha rulationship butiven tha irshumi and thu syu:rubu ines constantly stronethaned until ot 1 :st the :7shunii :res for all purposus diructud by the Syuarnubu.
 Suctions) in svary Syuu undur locelly prorlinuit Kj?is. Thuy had tho dety of moking Hilitury dminisurntion policy undorstocd in tho villuess. Those Эöncius :aure gr:dualy extondud avan to the srinllest local subdivisions under : locn. Kini.

Thu Syunabu issusd ? putlicition called "ashh'l.h:" sditcod in tilay, J.v?nese ind Sundnisse, but printed in rab script, the only script the orthodox kinis cuuld rund. This puriodic?l ins distributed fres of cherge anongst ! 11 Ki:is in Jnv?.
 although conprativaly fuw in numbr, fors the minstry of tho middle class. Tho inpencse first tried to induce lundne oficinels of themen Chinase asso-
 tion, but the offort complut. 3 ly filled.

The Jup ness dacided in usust 1943 to establish thi K"kyoo Sook:i with thu supfort of : fop proninent preminkine. Chinusu.

Tha Knlyoc Sooki wers orinized nlone the custom?ri linus, with its İ durs appointud by the \(J\) ?p:nusu nuthuritius, nd close coupuration with
 tikun on thuir orn inftintive and the oiennis:tion wes usud to dissaninatu Jาp nicsu propagnit? and as an aspionaga orgeniz"tiun.
 nission for linitud Chinusa privete school oduchtion, anc for sunding s.all ramittancos to their familius in \(J\) penaso-occupiad prorts of Chinn. This lattar pormission w?s not kupt.

Thu Jurasions, who occupied minly tho middla str ta of technical and ndrinistrntive occup tions, wurs it first ostracizod. J^panuss reiplecod tham in the hichur ranks, but not nungly unough irers ivailabls for the moro mumurous intersedinte ranks, and trined Indonssinns wers insufficient in numbirs.

The first uffort to sucurs tha cooparation of tha Euresinn group whs modo in Septurbur 1943. The Eurnsins who had beon rognrdud ns "nlions," gradunlly bugn to ke trunted as bolonging to thu indiconnus population nuxt to the Indonesi \(n_{\text {group. The Jupnose sipipinted, howover, thet the }}\) Eurisians had to realiz; that from then on they :lore to fool nad act as riomburs of tho Gruntur fist asia coin.unity undur the ludorship of Jopan, and had to renounco cthiir .,ustern incustry.

Thu Jopenuse pronisad tinu duresiens to ndait nubor of thoir childron to villega schouls :hich had so fur boun rasurved for Indonesion children. Sup?r:te schools for Marnsinn childrun runined forbiddon,

In tios buginnine of 194 the Jיp:ness dacidud to aissolve tho futur? and to ruplico it by an organization in mich ?ll .ailites :woula coribine eiferts to achiove ultinnto victory in the Holy inr.

 powar for may and libor sirvicos and thi production of food crops for the Jnponoss. The movamunt bucras too stronily netion?listic.

The nem orgnization followad ? p ttorn usad in J?pan and combinsa tho propend? mechinury aith the orgnization for the distribution of isssintinl supplias. Startine in Jnnuery 1744, the whols of J.ev whs dividod Intu sa:ll comanitise of nbout 20 houses sach, colled Tonari Gumi (Naighbours' .ssjcintions). Thoss Tonnri Guri iru orgnizod on centralized lines. Thuy wars hudud by a lumityou, he ins arpointed from bove and who ras rusponsiblu fur tho uxucution of thu urdurs given to him. Il axisting ?ssocintions: socinl, firs pruc?ution ?ry, ngricultural, atc., wru absorbed by thi Tonari Gu.j.

Thu dutios of this institution iwre vory uxtonsjve. Mat only distri-
 Wure its rusponsibility. Furthuriors, thu had of the comunit: had to lacturu at lust oncu a wouk to his puopia on Jap nesu idsology und the practicnl npplication thuruof. At \(t\) asu moutings thu Jepnness ains in rugra to tho population waro oxtollad occordinis to instructions from tha J!panes propai.ndn survicu. This inns dono mostly by Indonssinns, s!ucinlly troined by the J?panuss :ho reminud behind thu'scana.

Uthar mutines ::ara hold for larger unjits (c:llad . \(z:\); ? vill ge was divided into two or nors \(z^{2}\).) onco ? month. Ara namber of osch familh had to -ttond thas mutings.
 Eurnsinns, had to bu mumbirs of the orianizition. Only mumarship giva distribution facilitiss.
un Eirch 9, 194i, when tha Ionari Guis wrs workin \({ }_{6}\) sutisfoctorily, the
 Comilun:l Survicas in J:v?), cumprising :ll asintic groups was offici:lly inst.Ilsd. This curpuration rum inud s the instrumant of \(J\) prness control until ..ugust 3l, 1945, when it :ns dissolvod.


 :'srimaly coopuration' with ill inhobitants. It irs the orennizntion's duty tu seu thent thuss instructions ranched oll tha nujpla and it ins to :ork in closs riletionship arith tho Tonari Guif, Its lodors wro rosponsibls for
 .dministration. ..ccording to this explenntion the J:wa loukoo Kai was in fect \(n\) suscutive body, besud on the principle of complate coordination of ?ll inhobitunts nd wh, thorofurs, \(n\) organiz?tion of the intirs populco.

Tha cuntrel dirudtion of tha \(J\) ?wa iookou Kai in s ?ppointed by the
 Burinu under tha suparvision of tha contral direction had sevaral Indonasiens, Branchos :vore estabiished in 111 lac?litios. The Ku Houkoo Kni, tho smallast union, supervised one or more \(\mathrm{z}^{2}\). which in turn supervisad a numbor of Tonari Gumi.

Thu lundar of these loc?l Hookoo kei whe the hand of the local administretion, nssistad by ? cou cil (KniEi), ?ppointod by hin, : seesion of the
 motine nssistence to the "ilitrer' Governaent had to be discussed.

The Toneri Gumi foriaed the lo:nest bodies in the Nwa Yookoo Iri. Their task wาs:
=. active suppurt to poiics and Keibcodur (villeg guards) in the du-
 chutists, enumy espion?ga, natural colvitios, fire and crisic,
b. to me ke the inh?bit?nts undurstand the inns of laws, regulations, ctc., of thi wilitrory . duinistrntion.
c. stimulation of incrunsud food prcaucti, \(n\); uncournement of dolivary of theso products to the ?uthorities; the distribation of drily nucussitius.
d. Ennur?l sunport to the :ilitory .fministrotion, :.E., by protucting marburs of familias of Haiho (nuxilingy troops), volunturs nd romushn's (coolios) who hrd loft their villeges.
s. mutual help and issistinco.
 rug:rdluss of nationnlit:', including the Jupnesi。 The Huzin Kai (.omens \({ }^{\prime}\) Corporation), tik unshwii (the Islmic Curpur tion), the Knkyoo Sookni (Curporation of Chiness), the Til Tku ki (Surts Corporation), the Kuimin Bunlin Sidusy? (Culturna Curporatiun), atc،, lumtionad bofurs, wurs all incorpur ted in the Jnom huukvo Kil.

Tha activitios by tha Eurnsins for thair mutunl support brought on systanatic prosucution by the Kumnui-tni. Dozans of thuir landars diud in prison during tico occupation \(\operatorname{sis}\) ? rusult of ill-trintmont, starvation, cont?eious dis. :sus (c usud by c:owdod prisons aithut sufficiont gnitation) or sunteaicas by cuurts a•rtil.
.nyone who unco sttractad suspicion ins tortured in such \(q\) wiy that filsu confuesions wers : diily occurrencu; nd thess in turn oftan brought frush victias aithin the clutches of tho nompui-tri. . tipicnl ox mple of this happoned in 1944 in Pontimek on the wist cu st of Bornse, ifhors moro then 1200 pruminunt Incunosian and Chinusu, includinio the lucal nubility, wore exscuted on nn intirely unfounded suspicion of conspirncy. . Iso in J.ve the Indunusians wars in const nt farr of tho inmosi. Grantest crirs had to be thenn in spanding since spius iore arourd ovaryahors. Thara ars hundrads of c sus :inary puopla of 1 ll pacas wors inost cruilly torturad on the strongth of ruports of - usurlly untiruly innocunt convorsntion, ky mans of the "watur-cura", ulectrification, haneing by limbs, uss of bon constrictors, otc.

Uutsid: J?v, ti. © sanu policy w?s ndherud to in rugrd to political and rulicius actj.vitius. Hare agin, folloring̈ Tofo's proaiss, : nuribur of prorinunt coopur tivi Indunesians sura appointad to pusts in tha .dministr?-
 lishod but this prucoss w:s considurably slowior th \(n\) in dav?. Tivritorius adrinistored by the wivy in turn fioro slowar to follow inn thuss under army vecupation. In tho l.av?l arons (Gula us, Bornvo, oto.) thu siaga whors Tyuuoo Sugimia (Cuntral .dvisury Council) : 1 as formed ans nuvar ruachad. In Sumatr^, howovar, ? Tyuco Sanimin ior that islend wis inst:llad at fort do Kock in Fubrurs: 1945. No orgnization similer to tho Putura wis purnittod in spito of re uests 5 rem Indunosian intelluctu lis.
 trated on thu younger gunurition.
"Volunteurs Carps" siriliner to tha Giju Gun word astoblishod.
Tha four basic airs of Jop:nisu propegncin wro tiven full play during the courso of 2944. Using the slog n of "isia for the ..siaties" and tazehing
religious hetred, the japenesc worlsed unor all sections of society by holdine courses of instruction. Ians first group to be dcalt with wa. the.t of school teachers, followed later by olicemen, hoeds of Fillajes, ginor officiels of the civil service, higher officials, doctore, pharmecists, laryers end oersonnel of ell gevernment officos. Even the smallest group wes given attention in turn.

This propngande, however crude, was to some extent successful, partly due to claotic conditions and the distress enc bardenips suffered by the population.

Tho Japenese clearly realized the jotential dangers of this situation. It was the task of the jropagandf. service to bend these sentiments in somi other airection by wey of distrection fron éapan's occupetion, There wes a constantiy increasing onaraign of hatred ageinst the Occident, cspecielly acianst the United States and Britein, which countries, togethor with gollend were hold responsible for all the sufferings of the powaletion.

DOC. NO. 2750

\section*{IV. FOURTH PHISE}

Septombor 1944 - dugust 1945.

The strategic situation outside Java meanvhile had considorcbly clinngod. Tho bronk-through at Saipan had occurred and violontly showk the very foundations of the Jupanese dofonso. The TOJO cabinot was sucosodod by the KOISO cabinot, which rocngnizod that it had to face the isolation of the Southorn Ragions, and the nocossity for tho Japaneso troops there to stand by thomsclvos, and that it mens more and more important to eain populire cooperation.

Then tho way in rhich TOJO's promiso mas going to be roalized bocomo knomin sugust 1943, disappointmont nas coxprossed rathor clearly oraong thoso prominont Indonesians, who still placod confidonce in Japan's promises. The Japaneso wore marned thet they had to accelerate satisfying nationnist aspiratiens in the Southorn Rogions if they woro to rotain tho full cooporation from this group.

On 7 Soptomber 1944, in the Dist, Prime Minister KOISO, aftor hoving promisod Eoron and Formosi oqunlity of rights onjoyod by tho Jnpnneso. mado n promiso of indepondonce for tho Enst Indios. (Brhibit No. 277).

In this spooch it wis not medo clear exnctly mant region rould gein indepondonco when granted.

Tho promiso of indopondonco mis conditionod on tho poople dofonding their own torritory for the support of tho Grontor Enst lisin Co-Irosperity Sphorc. The oxtent of this somenlled indepondence wns only dofined by reforenco to menbership in tho Grontor Jnst isin Oc-Frosperity Sphore ns on application of the Hakloo Ichiu 1doal.
i'roviously, tomards tho ond of Auguat 1944, tho 16th Army Hondquarter; in Jeva hrd boon informod confidontially of the contonts of this stntemont, nnd issuod cortair searot ordars to vrrious Jnpanose orgnnizations. Thoso orders, irosecution documents Nos, 2756 nnd 2757, vere rocoverod in tho building, usod by the Gunssikanbu during tho Japanese occupatinn of Betavy

Doo. No. 2750
at the sano timw, leth larmy Healquartors mure instructod to adviso the Ministry of Mer as to what area should be doclared "indopondent" thi dete on rifoh it was to talic place, and tho form of the new governmont and stato.

Tho wilitary Corornment of Java in rosly submittod a rejort ontitled "Gist of Monsuris for Guiding Indopondence", in which it tyes proposed to mako Jeva incopondent first. Lonsuros sugicstod to strongthon the national consciousnoss woro tho croation of the Kon Ko: u Gakuin (iondory for the building oi the Stato), and increasod participation in the administiation.

Only tro practical stops mare teken at first to carry out Koiso's promisc. \(O_{2} 8\) Saptomber 1914 the population vas allo:od hienceformard to fly the Indoiosian alongsido the Jepaness flag but only on cortain specifiod holidays, subjoct to strict rogulations as to placo and aize. On Cotirnmint buildings of tho diministretion tha Japanose flag only ras to bo flom. On then samo date pormission ros givon to sing the "Indonosia Rafa"-soiag (Sone of Groat Indonosic) is the national anthon.

On 11 Suptember 194; the Ocmandur-in-Chiof convolod a sulecial sossioa of this Tyuuoo Sangi-In (Cuntral /Avisory Council), in ordor to ansyor tho qucstion of hor tho Iidonesians could shori to Japan and hor army thoir intanse eratituda for the promise of futuro indopondonce, and hor tho sill o: the poople "to fight to trinz bout tice destruction of imorion and hegland couli still fu thor be onhanced."
inotiwn ex:raordianry sossion oith Tyuuoo Sangi-In was licld on 17 Normber 1944, and fr motion :ns ndopted to lay do:n fe somenilud "Irineine Dherme" (Fivo Ruids forthe Conduct of Lifo) as a "compess" for the Indonolic:n populetion.

This "iancha Dharme" rads as follor:3:
-For tho Indonesian poonls, to rit:
1. W, along :itil othrs nations in Greater East soia, are in this uar one ia lifo and hutis iath Dai Nippon, end will contributio our ciforts in all siaco:ity bocaus thie prosent rar stonds up for justico and riahtoousnose.
2. Mo found an Indonosion Stato thet is indopondont, unffiod, sovarcim. just, and prosporous and that al:nys will valus the suiriturl morito of Dai-Nripon, and that :illl live as a truc menbor in the fnmily-sphero of Griator Enst Isia.
3. I7c rill sincersly ondervour to achiove a glorious grontnoss by ay of \(k\) ching \(m\) and olovnting our om aivilization and culture, by holping to duvolop tho isiatic culturs and by benutifying tio morld's culturo.
4. Thilo meintainingstiong and lasting friondly rolctions With the netions of Groator Enst isia, we sarve our country ind pooplo with all our h:art and with :n unnavering mind thile to zill -lrays boliove in God dimighty.
5. Fith a united and burning losiro wo strive for tho achiovomint of an ever-listing Forld Face basod on the family-concoption of tho whole mankind according to tho principlo of Hakko Ichiu."

Cn 1 Dcoumbr 1944 participation in tho idninistration ms oxtended to tho appointiment of Indonosian "Huku-Syuutyokan" (Vico Govornors) in sov ral Syuu, and of moro Indonosion Sanyo (idvisors) to the various Dapartmonts of tho Gunsoikanbu. : Sanyo-Kaigi (Board of San-yo) was establishod to mout regularly to advise the Gunsoikanbu in tho poriods when tho Tyuuoo Sragi-In (Oontrnl divisory Council) ins not in sesaion.

Mcanthilo tho propagnnda sorvichad introduced a nor slogan for the "Bonteng Lor juangan Jara" (Java One Fortrese). Tho object ins to bring the population to tho maximum :ar offort in víve of tho thront of an idilod landing, nor opolly raticipnted. dir Faid Dof once and Firo Brigade drills roca daily routino but bosides, the poyulation reas workod upon by the poriarful propeganda machinory and trainod in guarilla fighting. They wor instructad in the mathods of destroying small cnomy formations with primitive neapons (bamboo sponrs hardonod infire) and by mass action. rlags acre priatod on tie roals and tramplod upou by procossions during a propagende do:monstration, Religious propaganada urzod the Mohnmmedans to doclnro Holy i:'rr on tho Occidental formers.

Throe nofi soni-militray organizntions toro estnblished during this puriod, and the Tonari cuoni, finnlly, rore used as a roinforcoment for the Keiboodanin the dufence of tho villago. On no onension woro tiose simple villagors over told that such action on their part in zar tire mould constituto a violntion of the Rulus of Ind Marfore and nould force the or posing party to treat than as 'franctirours'.

This training had an unintended rosult. Cne night in Februcry 19,5 , a detenbexint of the Voluntorr Dofonco Corms nit Blitior (East-Java) mida a surprise attack on tho Japnnose guriding the armory, oapturod the arms as woll as koy-points in tho torn, e.g., Kolquil H2, the Tolograph and Tolophono Txchango, ote. Subsoquantly, an orgy of murder and robhory onsuod, tho victias boing nil non-Indonesians and includod Japnnose. In the course of tho nuxt days the nov: whant :as partly sottled by compronise, partly stampod out by violenco ant bloodshod.

Them :ias aliso inciensing rosistince ezeinst Jnponoso regulations in tho oconomic field, ospecinlly ancinst the solivery of ngriculturn produce and the rccruiting of nativo 1 nbor.

In order to oroleom: this rosistnnes, strong mensures nere adoptod ajaiast Indonosian oivilian officinls :ho moro hold responsible for tho poor rosults in recruiting, Moñ nore dismissed ad substituted by nationalist and ocensiomally by Islimito politicians. Theso nor officials hed cono to the fore throug: the Java Hookoo Kal, ar through the religious coursos. The non arrivals in this Indoncsian administiative corps. nere not fully compotent, and thoy alvays had Japanese ndvisors. Approximately one-third of the corns ms staffed :. Ith netionalists favourably disposed to:iards tho Jepanoso. Requirud Solivory of rondstuff and racruitnont of ecolios and voluntozrs vero not aciloved by many Kon.

Tho Japnneso roalizod thet thoy ricre fincroasingly depondont upon the cooperetion oftho poople nad thet they reuld hevo to brar the consequonces oif their ozil proprgandn.

In Soptambar 1942 alroady, Count Hidoo Kodama, thon advisor to the Commendor-ia-Chicf of Jeva visitod Tokyo to try to urouso intorost ir local vious concorning tho wist Indios. In No: riber 1443 Sukrano :as sent to Jopan ind prossed irorior Tojo to grant indoponjonco, but obtainod no dofinito enswor. At the ond of 19 l , Hayeshi, the then highest civil edviser to the Jeva Militery Govornmont :ent to Tokyo with tho consent of the Commador-In-Chiof in Jiva to try and percuado Japon to support puppet-indonondenco for the fest Indios,

A Kon Koku Gokuin (icadony for tiso Building of the Stnto) was institutca on 29 iquil 1945 7ith the object of influoncing the minds of the future "lenders" of the "indopendent" stnto and of imbuing then with idocis of the Groctor Bast isi: Co-prosperity Sphere lnd by Jonn, rnd with : corroot co"coption of this leadership.

Mcanthile, Java Headquertors pressed highor aut!:orities for anoody solution. On 30 dipil 1945, a conicronco took placo nt Singoporc, attended by Ohicfs of Goneral Arfairs Depertments of cill aroas uncor the comend of the 7th irea dryy, comprising Jnva and Sumetra and cormind by Itagaki. it this confarence the Soomubutyoo of Jave oxplinnod to that oxtent the netional consciousness of the Indoncesians iand nor: broil fully awakened and omphasizud the fact thet thero was no other my to regain the confidonco of the population but by cerryine out the promico of independence.

Fiold Marshnl Ternuchi's Headquarters it Saigon on 15 :ry 1945 roquosted vicr:s of locel Hocdquartors on "indo endonce." Java promptly reaponded aith a proposition to docline the tholo of the N-tr. rlends Tast Irdios indopeadeat riathin a yerr. Singeporo dodged tise issuo and said that it wes not yet tine to initiatc indcpondence.

Subsoquontly, on 20: Macy 1945, at the instigation of Itagaki, a mooting ras called of nil Chiofs of Staff at Singriporo. The conforenco rocognizod that tho :ar :as turnine neainst Jayan. Java mas allowed to convono a "Dokuritsu Chosa Junbi Iin" (Comittoo for the Study of Jroparations for Indopozdence). This comitteo wis installed on 2? May 1945,
and took a solemn onth of loynlty to live end to dio with Japan.
"Naval" territorios (Hornoo, the Colokes, the Losscr Sunda Islos, etc.) were not ropresonted it this conforonco, and measures discussed only related to"erry" arcos which narroned down to Jr.va. In Surntra, political developments lagesd be'hind tint of Java, and it vas not until February 1945 that a Contral idvisory Council for Sumatra was installed.

The Comaittee for tio Study of ireparations for Indejonience consistod of approxitittely 60 merbers, including four Chiness, ons Indo-Arab and one Eurasian. a Jnpanese :as Doputy Chairman, anil seven otiacrs trere "spociel nembers". The Cormittec had an idministrative Bursau witin a Jepancse Doputy Chiof.

The Crdinance found: ag this Comrittse requirod thet its findings had to ba ronorted to the Gunsciknn. Lntor, a new "Comittce for tho irepnration of Indopendence" rould be formed. It mas clorrly stipuleted the:t tho "Comittee for Study" ins to confinc itself to stuiy nen men not mporored to ziku any decision.

Tho comittce not trice, from 29 May to 2 Juno and from 10 to 16 July 1945. These moetings nore not opon to the jublic. imone othor things, a constitution resumbling thet of the ihiliwpinc pupot-state ms draftod.

Thore ras disqpointmoat whor it wes learnod thet the Comritteo hed no pover to make docisions and had to restrict itsolf to Jova,

On 17 July 1945, tho Suprone War Dir:ction Council docided to adoyt the jolicy of granting"indopendence" to tho Enst Indies as soon as possiblo. (Mros. Doc. No. 2759, Court \({ }^{3}\) whibit Ne. \(\qquad\) ).

Tris decision roached Jiva on 21 July 1945. According to diructivos fror Tokyo, the territory of the now state ma to compriss the whole of tho Nothorlands East Indies, filio e "Oomitteo for the Zroparation for Independonce" wes to be set \(u_{j}\) in the noar futuro.

Inphasis tris laid upon tho necossity for safeguarding tho roquiremonts for militery ojorations. The Headquertors of the Southorm isruy at Saigon, Wiicin hed subnitted in Juns 1945 that tho ostablishownt of tho puppet stato should not take placo bofore the riadlo of 1946 , and thet tho abovenared Comittoc should at tho sarliost bo sot up tomards the
end of 1945, was ordered to work out the details.
Consequently, on 30 July 1945 at Itagaki's Headquarters in Singapore a conference was held of the Sonmbutyoo (Hoade of General Affairs . Departments of the Gunseikanbu) of the regions concerned. At this Oonference a sohane was drawn \(u\) ? for guiding preparations for socalled independence, wherein the date wua set for the spring of 1946.

\section*{V. THE FIFTH EHLSE}

August-Septenber 1245.
In the beginning of Aucust 1945, Field Marshal Terauchi received telegraphic orders from Tolyo to hasten preparations for the Indonesian puppet-state as much as possible, and to crsate this state in Septomber 1945. In pursunnce of this order, on 7 August 1945 Terauchi decreed the establishment of the Dokuritsu Junbi In (Committee for the Preparation for Inuependence).

This was effected by proolamation of the same jate, reading as follows: *Proclamation of the Nanpoo-Gun (Japunese Southern irmy).
"Concerning the 'Oommittee for the Preparation for Iudependence of Indonesia'.
"Based on the proclamation of the Jnpanese Goverament of 7, September last year, the Nanyoo-Gun has consistently been taking measures to guide the Indonesinns. Owing to the spiritual awakening of the people up to this moment, they \(h \cdot v e\) all succeeded in achievinc much and fast progress in their training for epvernment and for the deience of the country with burning enthusiasm.
"In response to the nctivity and the wholshearted efforts of the people, the Nenpoo-Gun expresses its approval of the installation towards the middia of sugust of a Conmittoe for the Prepaintion for Independence of Indonesia; that Committee shall accelerate all measuros concerning tie final preprations for the installation of the Government of an independent Indonesia.

12 o'clook, 7. VIII. 1945."
On the same day on which the proclamation of Marshal Terauchi was published in Java, tho Saikoo Sikiken (Commender-in-Chizf) of Java also
issued a proolamation, wherein, inter alia, it was stetod
"The desire to become an independent \(n\) tion his now reached \(n\) high point and is floring up ald over Indonosia. It wns in response to the expression of this desire that the Dai Nijpon Toikoku solemnly promised to grant her independence, in accordence with the basic principle of the Dai Nippon Teikoku, (Jnpanese Empire), i.e., the idcals of Haklo Ichiu. Since that promiso the viole population has exortad itself to its utmost to honour the national obligetions and the stronger became their detormination to bring the rer to \(n\) successful oonclusion, so thet the foundations for their independence could be built up fully and speodily. And now, \(\varepsilon 3\) an independent nation, constituting a link in the chain of the Co-prosperity Sphore of Greator East fisia, she will join and inke her place in the battle-line for tho common derence of Greator Enst isic."

Tho Gunseikan, (Chief Militnry Govarnment) on \(t\) is ocer:sion statud the following:
"The independence of Indonesia as a member of the Co-prosperity Sphure of Gr.sater Exct isia, is besed upon hum:niteriun principlos so :s to contribute in thu formetion of 1 nor world order. Therafore, the lofty ideals of the Indonesirns and thoir intense onthusiasm conform with the besic idstis of the Dei Niopon Thikoku, i.e. the spirit of Hakl:o Ichiu.
"A nev n"tion will heve to moet some essenti.. 1 requirements: it must have sufficient strength, Thile its dainistrative machinery should be orgnized in a smoot: and simple wy. Ther fore, the first luty is to bring the \(77 n \mathrm{n}\) nor being faoed by the Indenosians to a succossful comolusion. To this ond the Indonosinn netion ruat devslop its merpotontial to its full oxtent, and togather :ith Dei Rippon Pight uncoasingly to achiove final victory in this Greator Enst Asia War."
d. for drys of silence on the subject of indopondence follorrod; Jopanese proprigenda continued to elnborato upon tho common tios of dostiny butricon Jepun :nd Indonesitil "To livo or die nith Jr.pen".

Boanchile on 9 dugust 1945 , a delogation of throe lerding Indonesicn n.tionaliste, including Sukerio, :ns florn to Torfuchi's Hendquarters at Jaigon, and rocoivad by the Fiold Lurshel on 11 iuguat. They ware told by the lattor thit it wis oricincily iniondad to sond the dolegation to Tokyo to receivo tho Impirial Deoreo diroct from the Japnncso Govornmont. On acoount of difficultios cad dangers of commuications and pressure of timo, the Fiold Nisisil had bon instructed to trensmit tho contientis of tho Dooree to tho dologntion on behalf of the Imporinl Government.

Tho mein points voro:
a. The Japnacss Govornment bnd boon ploased to instituto a Committco for tho Preprantion for Independenco.
b. The torritory of tho No: State :ould inolude the ontire Nother. lands Bast Indios.
c. Tho dito :hen indopendone: sould bo proclaimed in eny torritory ins to be determinod the discrotion of tho Imperins Governmont. es soon ne prep retion's roro completod.
d. The indopondont Governmont :xuld bo installed first in the 1slend ithera preperitions hed boen first complieted. Subsequently this Government rould bo gradurlly oxtondad to inoluds areas There propnrations had buon complitod.
c. All Jepnnese domends in connection with tho militnry siturtion sore to bo complied 7ith.
f. Sukerno mes appointad Ch~irmen of the Conmittice, तhich furthor consisted of thirtien roprosententivos from Javr.; throe from Sumatra and fivo from torritorios undor naval oocupation. Those mombors poro appointed on nomination by local Japanose military comas:ndors.

On 14 iugust 1945 tho nomenopers in Jrva raportod tho nors of Sukarno's return, and ho reas nolcomod as the not leridor of Indonesin by the Commnndor-
in-Chiof and meny of the military and Indonesinn authoritios, Moanthilo. the Committoc niont urs from Sunctra, Bornso, the Celcbes, and Bali, thoso namos tre not publishod, :oro ilo:m to Jeva, afitar heving rocoimd thoir instructions from the milit ury or neval authoritics of \(t\) tosc arons.

Originally the first meoting of tho Committeo inns fixod fCr 19 iugust. On 15 bugust, honvor, nembers of the Comnitten wore socrotly informad of Japan's capitulation.

During tho night of 16 to 17 iugust 1945, th, Committio, nugmentod by nationalists and youth laadors, promincnt during that pariod, met et the residonco of the Japanose Navel Lieison Officor Maeda. Sukarno hed, prior to this mucting, conferred ith th: Somubutyoo (Chicf Gonoral iffairs Department) and Mosda. It mas decided to proclnin indopcndonco tho noxt morining.

The constitution draftod by thi Lokuritsu, Chosa Junbi In (tho Committee sot up in Mny for thi, Study of Froprations for Independenco) mas hastily altored, and on the following morning the Independenco re:s brocidecst by Sukarno through a microphono, installed by the Jppenos: propagenda sorvice on the verrndah of his house.

The population of Jave nas still uninformod, excont through rumour, cbout tho empitulation of Japan, Radio recoiving s.ts had bcen unfitted to pick up foroizn brondecists, evon from Tokyo. On instructions from the Commendur-in-Chief, the Japanese propegenda service kept Japrn's dof int sucret.

The norrsyt:pors, controlled by the Japansso propagindu survica, and the local broeccasting stations botrsen 17 and 21 Lugust 1945 mado no montion of aiything but tho cnnouncomint of indenendenco and the proclanation of tho constitution.
 Fing aror's brondecst of 14 dugust on the surionior, e proclanation by the Courtnder-in-Chiof of Jnva, oontaining, intor alia, the follo:ing vords:
noi Nippon is and "rill alrays bo a friond to Indonosin, im-
mutably and forovar. No niver will forgit our orth; united, in
lifs and in doath."
Until 21 duguet 1945 the Jopanese authoritios hod kopt Jnonn's defoat socrat; this poriod has boen callod tho "stolon mook".









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Doc: No. 2756
Copy Pecici
 fron the Proclanation of batrission of the Independence of the East-Indics.

Fror: Cricf of Staff Osenu Amy Corps

\section*{7 September 194}

We rereby netify you that, basec on tre Prime lininister's proclan:ation reeerdins the grenting of the incependence of the East-Indies at tre 85 th Spcciel Scssion of the Dict today, tre 7 tr of Scptcribcr, it is decided that the army will nect tre situation properly generally in accordance with the following stipuiations:
1. Tre purport of tre erenting of independence srell be troroueriy unicrstcicd (besed on the Prime Minister's spcech):
2. It is nct permitted to touch upon the tine T.N. of tre crenting of independence/ tre sprcre of tre Last-Indies nor the form of goverment until thesc ere finelly decided.
3. Nationel conscicusncss must be reised to tre riehest degree; especially curing the exccution of tye wer this rust be utilized to strengtren defence, co-operation with Military Governrent, end to reqe Jepen enc. Jeve. one rnd inseparable.
4. There shall be ne ercat alterations in the oncrations and tre busincss structure of tre liilitary Governnent: Fovever, participetion in tre Governsecnt s'pli be enlarged end strenetrened, enc politicel treinine shall bc cerricel out.

5: Netionalistic speechos and activitics shall bc ectivcly ellowed; for tret nurnose the following nesesurcs stell be telecn:
e. Porrission to sing the netional entrem enc. to usc the neticnel flae;
b. Tre usc of netionelistic terms suct es "tre Indoncsion perplc" shell not be restrictce:
c. Tre eppointucnt of nationalists.
connectac witr cxist.
d. Trose edvocetcs of independence who are

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6．Invcstigntion and study nccessary for independence executca by tre locel inhabitants under the euidence of leilitary Governicnt shall bc rccoenized．

7．Troroueh nensurcs stell be trken for tre spreading of the Japenesc language，the adoption of Jepencse institutions and tre infusion of tre Japanese culturea

8．Trere shell bc no cistinction between tre netives end other reces，especirlly trose yro are to be treetcd es locel inrebitents；but trey must be rade to understand the clanentel point that trey must perticipetc in tre construction of a nev scciety，and nust co－opcrate with all treir right．

9．All Jepancsc lust reolize and put into practice tre nission of tris new ere in wrich tre divinc work of Hekko－in（T．N．Senc as＂ictiw＂）（TiNe the whole world onc fanily）is to be cerrica out．Especis．lly the 1cee of colonial subjugetion ras to be bannce；end townrds tre natives we must be like percnts and clder brotrers end sistcrs，approechine then with effceticnete fcelings while instructing and cuiding then sternly．Haughty end arrogent specer or berovior shell not be ellowed under any circum－ stences．

10．In guicing the public opinion stress shell be leid on tre raising of netional conscicusness，the intonsificetion of wer－inindedncss，confidence in end reliance upon Jrpen ence tre desperete detcruinetion to win corplete victory ensuing trerefron，end on the manifestrtion of icecicrspif in cerrying out thesc thines．

11．Leokine at the other side of the joy on the erenting of independence ve neturelly enticipete tre confusion accorpenying shifts end chenecs of poycrs，but it is absolutcly forbidden to neddic in trese；we riust cuide tran alveys standing elocif．

12．filtrouer tre insatiability whicr sprines fror the Inconesien crerecter nay soictires prevoke cur rescnt－ rient，we nust not be rositile，but euide tron，sternly indicoting the estoblisted policy；\(\varepsilon\) so－celled flettcring attitucic is not allcwec．

13．As for the instruction of tre Voluntccr Defence Corps，on this occesion perticulerly wc nust scrutinize tre attitude of officcrs end nen towarcis ther：， and tre rein points of tre instruction in order to decpen the fccline of unity；ond vic rust not lct trar：ect tre fecilng that they ferm on incependent amy．






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Document No. 2757
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Basic Outline of Propaganda and Enlightenment attendant on the Proclamation re Recognition of the Tndenendence of the EAST-TNDES.

> GUMS IKN!BU (Insoectorate of
> Mintary Administration).
> Sentomber 7 (Shewa 1944.

\section*{Policy.}

Based upon the statement of the Commander-in-Chief, to promote the racial consciousness of the INDONESTANS and to incite this into a hostile feeling for the complete prosecution of the Har to exterminate the U.S.A. and BKITAIN.

\section*{outlins.}
1. The piomotion of the racial consciousness of the TNDONGSIAN Race by the establishment of racial ideals shall be planned.
2. The responsibility and efforts of the race shall be stressed, in adition to which they shall he made to realize thejr aggravated mission for the complete prosecution of the "ar, and the inspiration which may be aroused shall be incited into a hostile feeling for the complete prosecution of the :iar to exterminate the I!.S.A. and BFImATN.
3. "Peasures necessary for the Indenenderce shall be left entirely to the \(1 \Gamma^{r} \mathrm{Y}\), and they ( \(\mathrm{T} . \mathrm{N}\). the people) shall be made to understand the necessity of offering themselves entirely for defense and services to the Military drministration during the :Var.
4. They shall be made to look back upon the process of the glorious spreading of crced of "Hakko-iv" (T.N. same as ICHI-T, i.e. making the whole world as one family) and the realization of the national policy of the EMPIRE (T.N. JAPAN) by means of the indenendence and participation in the government of \(B U^{\prime P A}\) and the Phillpnines; in this way they shall be indused to inerease their nonfidence in and reliance upen the ETPTFE \{?.N. TAPAN) and also
to manifest their deep emotion for the August Virtue of His Majesty and the sincerity of their devotion to the Emperor.
5. Those who have blamed persons cooperating with the Army or those who have been negative in their cooperation with JAPAN while maintaining a dubious attitude, shall be ostracised, and the fact that co-cperation with the military Administration implies the prosperity of INDONESIA shall be clarified, thereby forcing out and checking all critical speech and actions.
6. By emphasizing (T.N. the significance of) the GREAT EAST ASIA Conference and the Joint Declaration of GREAT EAST ASIA, and by the process of realization (T.N. of the ideals) thereof, they shall be made to become conscious of a feeling of certainty regarding the construction.
7. In order to check the enemies' counterpropaganda beforehand, they shall be reminded of the past when they groaned for ages in misery under Jewish oppression under the external appearance of dazzling splendour, by tracing back the history of the at ocities of the TT.S.A., BFITTATN and HOLLAND.
8. The cooperation of the CHINESE Residents, HALF-CASTES and \(1 F\) ABS is also worthy of attention. It shall be emphasized that the se people too, while basking in the new glory similar to the IMDONESTINS, must, together with the latter, exert themselves towards the construction of a new society; and the policy of concord of \(9 l l\) the peoples with the IMDONESIAN Race as the nucleus shall be adhered to.
O. The new policy shall be glorified by utilizing the actual results and the present condition of the co-cperation of the people, the poling of the organization of the Volunteer Defence Corns and the participation in the Government as the background.

Eeasures.
1. Every kind of information-organization and primitive method shall he utilized.
2. Newspapers shall issue extra-bulletins; there shall be no suspension of publication on Sundays; and on the first and second days four page newspapers shall be issued.


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I, Alva C. Carpenter, Chief, Legal Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, do hereby certify that immediately after the liberation of the Philippines roving teams, comprised of military personnel from the Judge Advocate Service of the United States Army, were sent out to conduct investigations throughout the Philippines on reported and known cases of atrocities committed by the Japanese Army and Navy personnel; that many of those cases have been thoroughly investigated in the immediate vicinity of their occurrence; that witnesses who had first-hand knowledge of the atrocities were interrogated and their affidavits taken and ocular inspection of the place where the crimes were committed were invariably made; that reports have been submitted regarding those atrocities investigated and are now on file in our office and that the attached document, consisting of twenty-one pages, is a list of reports submitted so far regarding these investigations, together with their report number, title and number of pages each contain.


Witness: \(/ \mathrm{s} /\) John Re Pritchard
Sworn to before me this 28th
day of October 1946, Tokyo, Japan.
/s/ Johıs R. Pritchard Captein, Infantry Summary Court
























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Page 1.

SCHEDTIE OF PUBI-ICATTOMS OF TKE TOTAL HAR RESEARCH INSTITUTE.

I, KOLT STEINER Second Lieutenart, Army of the United States and Gssistant Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section do hereby certify as follows:
1.__This Scheảule is submitted in acco:dance with directions given by the Tribunal. The Tribunal is respectfully referred to pages 8871, 8872, 8875, 8876, 8877, 8909 and 8910 of the Transcript of the Proceedings of the Tribunal held on Vednesday 30th October, 1946.
2. ___ Full enquiries have been made by me from the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (ATIS) and from other sources and the Schedule comprises a list of all the publications of the Total Var Research Institute of which I have been able to obtain information. 3.___All those publications (a total of 71) which are shown in the first column of the Schedule as having an International Prisecution Section Document number are held by the Section (excepting those which are indicated as having been produced to the Tribunal as exhibits) and will be made available to the Defendants on request being made.
4.___Those publications (a total of 27) which are not shown as having an International Prosecution Section Document Mumber were sent by ATIS to the Document Centre at Washington some time ago, it being considered that they would not be required for the purDoses of these proceedings.

Signed at Tokyo by the said KURT STEINER ) this 22 day of Novemher 1946

Kurt Steiner, 2d It. (Signed)

SCIEDULE OF PUBLICATIONS OF THE total tai fesearch institute.
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\end{tabular} & Title \(\begin{gathered}\text { Date } \\ \text { by }\end{gathered}\) & of Compllation Total War Research itute. \\
\hline & (1) & \begin{tabular}{l}
"Policy on Imperial Total \\
"ar" (Classification \\
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\hline 1355* & (2) & "Reports on 1942 Total Re- 194 search" (Classification "Secret"). & \\
\hline \(690-A\) & (3) & "Total Nar on Imperial Trans- May portation" (Classification "Śecret"). & \[
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\hline 1660* & (4) & "Oninion of Research Items" (Classification "Top Secret") & \\
\hline 1583 & (5) & "Reports on 1943's Total Research" (Classification "Top Secret"). & \\
\hline 1548* & (6) & "Data Pertaining to Petroleum" (Classification "Top Secret") & 1942 \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{1524 *} & (7) & "Summary on Total War" (Classification : "nSecret"). & July 1941 \\
\hline & (8) & "Guide on Wartime Trade". (Classificetion "Top Secret"). & 1941 \\
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\end{tabular} & Januery 1944 \\
\hline & (10) & "Research on Important Matters from the Standpoint of Total "Iar". (Classification "Top Secret"). & Tarch 1944 \\
\hline & (11) & "Fesources, :"anpower and Transportation from the Standyoint of National Defense" (Classification "Secret"). & 1941 \\
\hline 1401 * & (12) & ```
"Fundamental Investigating Re-
    ports on Vartime Industry"
    (Classification "Part Military
    Resources Confidentiai").
``` & March 1943 \\
\hline & (13) & "Table of 1943 Steel Production Plan" (Classification "Specific as General "obilization Top Secret"). & April 1943 \\
\hline 1604 & (14) & "Summary on Adjusting Japan and China's New Relationship" (Classification "Top Secret"). & November 1938 \\
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\end{tabular}

> Date of Compilation by Total War Research Institute.








* Indicates TPS Documents introduced into Evidence as follows: 1522 (Exhibit 842); 1622 (Exhibit 686i) ; 1356 (Exhibit 8701); 2228 (Exhibit 871).
* Indicites documents listed in Exhibit "E", IPS Document No. 2548 (Exhibit 869).

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SUPREME COMISANDFR FOR ALIIED PONERS LEGAL SECTION, MANTLA

APO 500
13 May 1946

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27 Massacre of Fortymone Civilians; At-
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28 - Murder of Fifteen Filipino Civilians In the Singalong District, Manila, P. I., on 12 February 1945.

29 Killed by Shfapnel, when Japs Fired on Civilians.

6
Two boys saw Below-named vidtims and 3 Filipinos tied up and shot. VENSIMAK, Kimatrai; POKARDAS, Vassanmal; PARAMANAND Lachmandas; HASSARAM, Hotchand.

31 Beaten \& kicked-fatal, injuries-determined no war crime.
32. Killed, by shrapnel when running from burning home.

33 Made to kneel before a common graveshot, in back bayonetted \& burled. Chinese Cemetery, Manila, P. I.

34 News item with Manila date iine submitted by Cinc India, Burma theater under date of 16, Mar 45., 334.Tennesseè St.; Malàte, Manila
35. 36. Chinese \& F Fillpinos, herded toge-
ther at the house, of Ang Kal, Later 28 of these were, taken to a neighbor-1 ing barrio \& bayonetted". All but two of ; them dying.
Shot by Jap snipers while running, from
burning home. Manila, 55 F. Roman St., San Juan.

Mrs. Enriquez raped in presence of husband. 1163 Dart St., Paco, Manila, P. I.

Neighbors told witness that they saw victim beheaded by the Japanese. Agno Street, Manila, P. I.

Burned to death when Japs burned her home. ABRAMOFF killed by shrapnel.

Mother and son found dead in area that had been under heavy shell fire. No evidence of the commission of an atrocity.

Victims after escaping from the St. Paul's College massacre, (rept 53) hid in an attic room, into which a grenade was deliberately thrown severely burning them. Angel Cajo died as a result, the others survived. Feb. 45.

Report of Investigation of Alleged Atrocities by members of the Japanese Imperial Forces in Manila and other parts of Luzon, Philippine Islands, dtd 9 Apr 45, by Emil Krause, Col., I.G.D., Hqs, XIV Corps.
BARROS and his family on 9 Feb 45 took refuge in a shell hole. Barros Went away from the group, passing a Mr. Tan on the way. Tan heard two shots shortly after, and saw 3 armed members of the Jap Imperial Navy go by. Later, Barros' body was found, mouth gagged and hands tied behind back, and a bullet thru his head.

44 Extract of letter from E.E. Sollosi, Swedish Consul at Manila to Mons. G. Sochard, Paris, France, dated 2 March 1945, as submitted by Civil Censorship Det, under date of 24 Mar 45.

Victims were with others in house
near Paco Church. Constant shelling was in progress. Victims hit by shrapnel and died of wounds. No atrocity.

46 Col. Guido and his 3 sons were executed \(\varepsilon\) t the paper factory, Pennsylvania Ave.

Massecre in home of Iuhrse in Pax
Court on 12 Feb 45.
Transmitiol letter G-? on state.
ment of Jirs. Grido anc: David Day.
49 PWs herded into air raid shelters, and then gasoline end tore ies thromn on thom. As the IWs atterpted to flee the explosion end fire, they were shot by machine gun fire or izayonetted. Also individua). atrocit:.es.

50 Result of Invertigation. Children of family taken f:om home ar:d not seen again. Others killed in home on a subsequent visit, by bayonetting and burning.

51 Japariese Naval Forces, compelled 15 civilians to leave house at \(i\) bove address and assembled in the gardent where they were massacred by gunfire. Survivors were bayonetted.

52 Civilians took refuge under e porch during period were under she.ll fire. Eight Japanese ordered them sut, separated the men and shot theri. All killed except Jesus Quintero.

250 civilians herded into a dining room the doors shut and barred. Frood and candy were placed in center of room to concentrate the people there and then grenade bombs in chandeliers were set off. St. Paul's College, : falate, Manila, P. I.

Tacloban, Leyte Beaten, hung up by the arms tied behind them, imprison 30 days.

Iloilo City, Iloilo Province, Panay.
Dr. Cullen was beaten with club, toenail pulled out with pliers, hung by \(21 s\) thumbs, and his ankles.

Menila, P. I. (Mistreatment and lurder of Genrych, Jerry Rubak, Carlos Infante, and Vicente (Vic) Concepcion.)
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\hline 158 & liurder of 5 Filipino civilians by Kom-pei-tai at Iloilo Garrison, Panay, P.I., on 23 Fub 44. & 11 \\
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\hline 160 & Murder of sixteen civilians at La Costellan, Occidental Provincc, Negros, P. I., on 22 August 1942 and 24 August 1942. & 20 \\
\hline 161 & Additional torture and murder by Kompeitai sirtioned at Bacolod, Occidental Province, Negros, P.I., in February and March 1945. & 24 \\
\hline 162 & Mu:de: of sixteen (16) Filipino nixilions anc toreure of otiens at Bawond, Negros Occidertri on 7 Decenber \(19+4\) crid co Jnnuary 1945. & 18 \\
\hline 163 & Yuider of 4 Filipino citizens of Ilang, Davas City, Mindenao: P. I., and looting on & 29 \\
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\hline 160 & Murder of sixteen civilians at La Cestellan, Occidental Province, Negros, P. Io, on 22 August 1942 and 24 August 1942 . & 20 \\
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\hline 163 & Pluider of 4 Filipino citizens of Ilang, Davas City, M!indenao; P. I., and lorting on & 29 \\
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164 \begin{tabular}{l} 
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165 Torture of fifteen Filipino citizens ly Kemoci-Tai at Aparri: Cagayan, Luzon, P. I., in September 1944.

166 Murder of approximately 89 Filipino\(\cdot 16\) citizens near Tugbok, Davao City Mindaneo, P. I., on 14 May 1945.

167 Torture of Penfilo W. ALPUERTO, at Dumanjug and Cebu City, Cebu, P. I. in March 1944.
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\(170 \quad\) Murder of 3 American POWs and 1 Fili- 22 pino by mombers of the Iloilo KcmpeiTai neer Randurriao, Penay Island, P. I.
171 \begin{tabular}{l} 
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pino citizens nt Buenavista, Guimaras \\
Islands, P. I., betwe An August 1943 and \\
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January 1945 .
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\(172 \begin{aligned} & \text { Murder of six Filipino civiliens ot } \\ & \text { linnuel Plentetion, Guinnga, Mindanao, }\end{aligned}\) lianuel Plentction, Guianga, Mindanao, P. I., on 30 Fay 1945 and 1 June 1945.

173 Torture and probable murder of Demetrio 5 FORNILLOS at Palo, Leyte, P. I., in March 1943.

174 Execations at Calbayog, Samar, P. I., on 10 July 1943.

175 Murder of 82 identified Filipino resi- 12 dents of L on, Iloilo Province, Panay, P. I., in August 1943 and Apri1 1944.

176 Murders beating, and imprisonment under 58 improper conditions of American nrisoncrs of war at Bontoc, Mountain Province, Luzon, P. I., in May - June 1942.

177 Nurder of ten Filipino civilians in 10 August 1943 at Leon, Iloilo Province, Panay, P. I.

178
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\hline 180 & Torture and murder of Filioino civilinns et Dumnjug, Ccbu, P. I., August, 1944. & 17 \\
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\hline 182 & Murder of 1 Filipino, attempted murder of another and burning of home at Dumanjug, Cebu, P. I., 1 September 1944. & 10 \\
\hline 183 & Torture and murder at Hilongos, Leyte, P. I., in July, 1944. & 9 \\
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Torture of two civilians at Hilongos, Leyte, P. \({ }^{\text {. }}\)

Torture of civilians at Lucena, Tayabas
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201 Nassacre of two hundred civilians at
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202 Mistreatment of two Filipino civilians
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206 Torture of Olimpio PANSEPANSE at Carcar,7 Cebu, P. I., on 20 May 1944.

Feaths of thirty-seven American prisoners of war at Gapan, Nueva Ecija Province, Luzon, P. I., in May end June 1942.

208 Murder of three Filipinos near Manuel
Plantation, Tagakpan, Davao City, Mindanao, P. I., on 18 May 1945.

209 Bataan General Hospital Nos. 1 and 2.
210 Transportation of prisoners of war under
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211 Torture and Murder of Pres!dential
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212 Baguio Kempei.-Tai - Torture on 30
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213 Torture and murder of Filipino civilians at Pargil and Siniloan, Laguna Province, Luzon, P. I., in 1943 and 1944. (Case Nos. Q-33 and G-64)

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215 Killing and Looting of Joaquin NACUA, a resident of Carcar, Cebu, P. I., on or about 14 March 1944. (Unnumbered case)

216 Killing of Amando SATORRE in Carcar, Cebu, P. I., on 15 April 1944. (Unnumbered case)

217 Severe torture of Roberto E. SATO on 25 April 1944 in Carcar, Cebu, P. I., (Unnumbered case).

218 Killing of 5 Filipino men, looting and burning of-the FLORETA home, and the torture of another in October 1944 at Carcar, Cebu, P. I. (Unnumbered case)
219 Murder of Filipino civilians in Sitio Sococ, Barrio Santiago Sur, San Fernando, La Union Luzon, P. I., on 22 February 1945. (H-17)

220 Murder of Macun PANONDIONGAN on 15 July 1942 at Barrio Dimayon, Dansalan, Lanao, Mindanao, P. I. (Unnumbered case)

221 Lapoy Plantation murders, Davao, Mindanao, P. I. (Case No. P-63)

222 Murder of approximately 30 Filipino civilians at Biao, Davao Province, Mindana, P. I., on the 17 th of May, 1945. (Case No. L-97)

223 Murder and attempted murder at Lipata, Minglanilla, Cebu, P. I. (Case unnumbered)

224 Sagay atrocities, Negros Occidental,
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225 Murder of Chinese in Davao City, Davao, Mindanao P. I., May 1945. (Case No. P-77).

226 Murder of nine civilians at Davao City, Davao, P. I., on 21 Mey 1945. (Case No. P-79)

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244 liurders near Tigato, Davao City, Dindanao, P. I. (Case No. M-15)
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246 Murder of four Filipino civilians at 8 Manay, Davao P. I.; on 2 November 1942. (Case No. P-81).
247 Camp Murphy and Zablan Airfield. (Case 92
No. G-66)
248 Torture, attempted murder of three and murder of approximately 35 Filipinos, including a woman and eight children at Ayungon, Negros Oriental, P.I., on 5 May 1944.
249 Murder of Mrs. Agustina Gadoatan CONNI-
LLY and torture of Antero JAMORA at
Silay, Negros Occidental, P.I.g on 8
October 1944. (Unnumbered Case)
250 Mistreatment of American and Filipino
Murder of two Filipinos and attempted

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284 Disappearance of three American prisoners of war in Camp Keithley, Lanao, Mindaneo, P.I., between 1 June and 4 July 1942.

285 Dcath march of prisoners of war from Camp Keithley to Iligan, Lanao, Mindanao, P.I., 4 July 1942.

286 Disappearance of Brig. Gen. Guy 0. FORT.

287 Arson, rape ard robbery at
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288 Murder and mistreatment at Valencia and Garcia Hernandez, Bohol, P.I., April 1945 - August 1945.

289 Inurder of Chinese and Bagobo civilians and arsion in Catalunan Grande, Davao, Mindaneo, P.I., 5 May 1945.

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291 Murder and rape neer Jagna, Bohol, P.I., April - October 1945.

292 Murder of two unidentified American fliers at Sarmi, Dutch New Guinea, October 1944.

293 Murder and rape near Sicrra Bullones,
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294 Rape of two Filipino women at Barrio Kewit, town of Piler, Ponson Island, Camotes Islands, Cebu, P.I., 30 November 1944.

295 lurder of the Mayor and torture of the Chief of Police of Asingan, Pangasinan, P.I., in August 1943.

296 Killing and torturing of Filipino civi-
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297 Atrocities at Mandawe, Cebu, P.I.,68 August 1944 - March 1945.

298 Kassacres in Camotes Islands, Cebu, P.I. 89 December 1944.

299 Execution of Capt. TODD and Sgt. GOURGET at Sta. Cruz, Laguna, P.I., 11 August 1943.

300 lurder of thirty-five and attempted



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\section*{}

I, T. R. C. King, Major, Inf. (TD), Executive Officer, Legal Section, General Headquarters, Sunreme Commander for the Allied Powers, do hereby certify thet the attached document is a true copy of a crhlegram sent by Legal Section to the War Depertment in Washington, besed in part on the results of investigations conducted in the field.
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W1tness: /s/John R. Pritcherd
Sworn to before me this 29th day
of November 1946, Tokyo, Japan.
/s/ John R. Pritcherd Captain, Infantry Summary Court

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\section*{LIDADCUARTSES}

UNITED STATES ARMI FORCES IN TAT FAR EAST OFEIC: O: mbe Starf JUDGE ATVOCAME \(\therefore\) AR CRTKES BRAMCH

APO 501
FEJA 000.5
8 June 1945
SUBJECT: Report of War Crimes Branch on atrocitios.
TO: The Judge Adrocate Generel
rashington 25, D. C.

\section*{II. SUMESRY OF BVIDEAC.5:}

Briatily sumriarized, the ovilissce adduced by the Investigatormeminors is to the offect that:

The headquarters of the Philippine Red Cross at the intersaction of Isanc Faral and General Luna strecte noar Taft dvame in Manila during the early part of 1945 and many years prior was located in a building prominant both as to place and size and on all dates referred to harein, boro largo Red Cross mblems on 1 ts wells and roof and in overy window of the building ( \(\mathrm{R} 2,14,45\) ). To its south and west lay the campus and buildings of the University of the Failippines, a police station, and a hich school, ell of which were occupiod during the early part of Zebruary 1945 by Japanese Forced, most of whom were marinas (Exinibit A; \(21,5,6,15,21,27\) ).

As a result of the opening of the American bombardment of South banila, Mr. Modesto Faroian, former lianila newspaparman who had sorved as ganoral menager for the nowspaper's published ty General Rolidio, found it necossary on 5 Tebrunry, as acting manager of the Philippine Red Cross, to convert the buildine into an amergoncy hospital and sanctum for reîugase. This was not ilscussed with any Jabaneso officials boforehand but they wero acquainted with this instite ion and when, at noon on 10 February, a non-commiseioned officer with .. squad of six or eifht Japancsin come to the headquarters, they rofused to permit the hamoing of an "3mergancy "ospital" sign on tha front of the building and a Red Cross fling on the flag poln, and appeared diapleasod with tha errangemint, inquired pes to the numbir and idiontity of the rafugees thera and looked about the building while Mr. FAioluid explained through Miss Corazon fBryirif, a Filipino girl yho could speak Japanase, tha purpose and necossity of caring for the injurod and hoveloss ( \(\mathrm{R} 2,3,27\) ).

Latar in tha same dry, at about 1800, whon approximately soventy parsons, including eevon pationts, Siva members of the staff a, id the romaining rofugeas, ware in the builiing, Mies Glicorie A: Diti, an nurse, and somo others, unidentified, ware at the rear of the promiser preparing to aat their evoning morl :han they hoard shots at the beck gate and en unknown toman ontered scromming that es child had been shot and behind her came four morines, one of whom wes on officer who bagan firing his revolvar it the chiliran in the building. Miss Acimila ordered everyone to lis flat on this floor ont almost everyone oboyed excast one unidentifiable crying child who was silanced when tires bullets wer: firad directly into its mouth (R 47). Through the
 A. Dízí was a Red Cross nurse and thet thoy ware in a Rad Crose building and were asked what they wantad. They angworad by pointing a gun at her and she got bohind the marse who was then bayonsted in the chest, ceuring bor to fall on the floor. Sho did not faint untll aftir she had sean
thom unter the uthor room and beyores eni shoot the patients lying on the cots (Bx. B; R 45, 46, 47, 59).

The commotion end than ohrill crer given by Mise ג J. JA as she was bnyonoted vere hoerd by Mr. Fencuili who had been at his desk on the other gice of the partition e carating thom, talking with Dr.
 FinROLAi hid untor his cosis just bofore one of the marians ontored the room and killed Dr. Jrictics \(v\) ith two cinots frora his rifle. A volunteer ettendant known only n: wann, ziticmoted to protect the doctor bi saying, "Ho is our Doctor; plesco awe him: "and the narine thrust his bnyonst at her, missod, and she finczed depth. The nasalinut continued, bayoneting six other petaenta who woro lying on or hiding under cots in thet room, amone whom wore Mrs. Juni F. Juhl, ker daughtor Failina
 the lone marino loft the room rwid covid bs heard going through thar parts of the hospitel killirg en bnyoneting the victims ( \(\mathrm{I}_{4}\) ). When Mrs. Zabnini's husband found the bodios iw's deve lator, thet of his wife ehoved that she hei been bryoneted tia the mouth on? abdomen and shot through the cheat, while the condition end pusition of the child'o body indicsted thet he hait bean bayoneted in the right arm and hed bled to death or suffoceted under his mother's bodir (R 39).

Petrocinio \(\mathrm{ABAD}, \mathrm{e}\) movie nctress, whose scrann name wres Corazon SOBLE and who had takan refuge et the headquarters, wrs in the dovinsteire corridor along with some twonty-five or thirty othors when the Japanese cpme, and attompted to hido brhina fo madicine caicinet with her ton monthe old habir, farta lourded Verpa. The cover was inouffioinnt na she was shot in the rieht eibow, foll ani liy prone with her behy undir her. The marine wes not satiefied nad stribod her With his bayonct nino times on hir side and back (ixc. \(B, C, I ; R 11\), 16). Latar sho give the child to har brothor to telee to a dector but it died as a rebult of three beyonet wounls.

Nine German Jows, refugees from Germany and evamuses of devastated Menila areas, took eholtir at this time in the 总d Cross building at the diraction of e Japonesa sintry jostod nearby ( \(\mathrm{R}_{6} 6\) ) end oight of them wara killed in the gearral massacro. The womon's latrizo had boud convarted into living quarters for this group and one of them, John K. Lifry, bad just startad on a porsonnl errond whon he saw the Jappiass enter who began shooting and followeci him. Encouse of mast experiences ho turael to whrn the others, but two of these enlisted mon and one officer, despito pleps for morc: by the fermens, ofter seying "Escusi" ( R 45 ), legen shooting and beyonotine them as thay loy prostrate on the floor of the latrine. tifery also droppod to the floor anl wis bayomated at least twice (ix. 6). Apperentiy the merinas thougit ilim doed but before he frinted he sen his fellow citizems killod ( K 63 ).
 of the latrine was nut harmed. The peseports of Kr. and Krs. GRinty had boen examined by the squad wintin come to the hoadquarters that morning ( \(R\) 64), anà thay apaeared to be satisfiod ( \(R\) 79). Tise documents aid not indicate their raligious background and when asked \(b_{i}\) the Japanese vinich thoy proferrad, Japen or America, the: paswarad "Jeprnese, tomodoti (Japezese friend), Hoil iittler" ( \(R\) 69).

The carnage covered the ontire ground floor end continued for twenty or thiry minutes, fifter vinich the Japasese departed (R 42). Gursory examination of the promises that nipht reveniod numerous bodios and pfter the building was burned 13 February, rakes, bones, nad bodies wore found pilod in corrers, aloise, the corridors and in the latrine, identifiable only becnuse some survivora wara able to point out the locations whers various victims had covered for protaction (3x. E; R 31,

40）；aimilarly，rocord files nind safes togother vith their contente were destroyed by firo before thny could ba examinnd（it 7）．

The astimatas as to the rumber killad vary considerably， two of the nurses plecing it at twonty（a 5\％，56，59）；snotier，ot approximately thirter（ R 3 ）；the surviving German at oighty（ A 64）； the mancger，fifiy（ \(R\)（ ）；while another gurviver thinks thero were thirty or noro（ R 7 i ）；and a witness whe onterad the building the night of the massacre enid hos saw twent：bodies in the hallwey ant aid nut look into the roome（ A 3 C ）．

Live confuetion pravalis as to tha ilontity of the pirpetrators， some witnossen sfitige the：woro soidiors，others that thoy were seilors， and atill others that they were marinos，but tho uriform and insignip． described in anch instance most closelif rosombla thosa of the Jap nese Imporial Marines（ \(\mathrm{R} 6,15,52,75\) ）some of uhom wore quartered in tho ouildings of the Uaivorsity of the Philippines，Eagh filson Hell， Bordner High Schcol Annex，the YMC．h，the Department of ighiculture and Commorce Bullding，Department of Finance Building，the Legisletive
 47）．

None of the witnessos could inontify ens of the individuals by name and attempted descriptions of personel chnepeteristics ero
 －was five feat thres inchos toil，and thought to be on efficar，wore on his loft chest＂some kind of insigaia，silver ard red，＂carried a sword，a pistol，pan had leathor boots（ 65,78 ）nnd it is possiblo that he was the offacar who antared the zets at about 1800 hours firirg his revolvor at the children thre（ R 46 ）．Ono of the privates is described maraly as to eporoximate height and woight nrd none appears to have had ony paculiarly distinguishing features（ \(\mathrm{A} 5,78,79,82\) ）．












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RETURG TO ROOM 361



Basilio Umagap, 518 Lebores, Pandacan District, Manila, P. In, being first duly sworn by lat Lt. Lymn \(B\), Griffith, JAGD, and lst Lt, Fred M. Blaok, JAGD, Investigators-Examiners, testifiod in English as follops:

Q State your name, age and occupation.
4 Basilio Omagap, 18 years old, a tent boy at the 5th Fiold Hospital.
Q What is your residonce?
A I used to Iive with mu parents at 518 Labores St., Pandacan District, Manila, but I stay now at the 5th Pield Hospital where I am employed as tent boy.

Q On February 7, 1945, did you work in the household of Bartolome Pons?
4 Ies sir, as a houseboy.
Q How long have you worked for the Pons family?
A About three months,
Q In what capacityrp
A As houseboy, but my specific dut; ras to pasture the two shoep and one corr of the Pons family.

Q Had you seon any Japanose soldicrs at tho Pons housc prior to February 7, 19458
4 Ies sir, beceuse the Japanese used to pass through the Pons yard.
( Had these Japanese tried to buy ohickens and ducks from the Pons family before February 7, 1045 ?
A Yes, they tried to buy.
Q How many timos had thoy triod to buy from them?
A Every morning and afternoon for two days.
Q Did the Japanese come in the moriing of Fobruary 7, 1945 and tried to burs chicken, ducks and egg?
4. Thoy tried to got oggs and at one instanco I was pusiod bj a Japanose just to got oggs.

Q How many Japanese wero prosent that morning?
A I sam tiro Japanese soldiors roaming around and looking over the Pons yard.

I Did tho Pons family sell the chicken, ducks and eggs?
d. No, they did not.

Q' Did the Japancse thon loave the pramises?
4 They left, but one of the Japanose was pecping through the wall into the yard rhere the chickons, ducks and eges nore,

Q What timc of the day did they loave?
\(\Lambda\) lround noon.
Q Did any Japaneso soldiors return to the Pons family that day?
4 Many Japanese soldiers returned at about dusk that day.
Q About how many?
4 I estimated it at about fistion soldiors.
Q What did they do?
4 Two Japanose soldiers, ane with a rope and the other with a rifle with a bayonet on it, came direct to the main gate philo the others enterad the yard over the wall. The two Japanose soldiers who enterod the

\section*{Pago 2}

DOCUNENT 2845
main gato motionod us, cll the Pons family including the servants, to group togothor, while some Japanesc soldiors went upstairs,

Then toll that happened. There more tables inside the ground floor, so the Japanese moved them to the sido, and wo were placed in the middle of tho room. Then the Japanese having a gun placed cmmunition and began to shoot us. Tho flist one shot vas Mr. Pons; socond, Isanc; third, Mrs. Pons; fourth, Era; fifth, Pcoita; sixth, Gandida; eight, Delfin; ninth, Virginia; and the last was tho baby. The baby ras shot last boccusc the Japenese was about to leave the house whon they hoard the ery of tho baby. The Japenose returnod and shot the beiby. While ree are movod into the ground floor, I was trying to untie the knot in my hands. I was ablo to teka off the knot on one of my hands and when Iseace res shot and droppod to the floor all of us ras pulled dow, thus all of us dropped to the pavement. By this way, the lmot on wy othor arm ras unticd automaticnlly. I then slippod und crapled to a nearby cornor thoro on armehair ras locatod. I Idy flat with my face dormirard and with my troo palms covering my face.

Did the Japanose tie your hands with one rope? Yos sir.

Q Fhen Mr. Pons and Isaac woro siact, did thoy fall and pull all of you to the pavement?
Yos, that is right.
Q Fero you shot\%
A No, sir. It socmed to me the Japancse didn't soo me as the room then mas vory darit.

Q Did you feign doc.thr?
A I did not, but I did not move from position.
Q When did the Jurareso shoot the baby?
4 It mas tho last one to be shot. The Japaneso nore going out when thoy heard the ory \(0_{4}\) a baby. They roturned and gave the baby one suro shot.

Q Do you romumbor hor many shots roro fircd?
A I don't knor:, but I knory Mr. Pone mas shot tro times,
Q Did eny of tho men and momon soroam?
We all screamed.
Q How many Japonosc did the shooting?
A Only one Japanose,
Q Did you sec any saber or suord on any of the Japeneso at that times
Thoy had bayroncts and spears.
Q Hor many of those did you see?
\& With the oxecption of one soldior who had a gun vith a fixed bayonet and a scbor on his side, all nore armed with spears.

Q Did the Japancse bring the rope with thom whon thoy seme that afternoon?

8 Fas this the rope that thoy used to tile the Pons family with?
A
\(Q\)

A Did you 800 or hear the Japanose go upatairs after tho shooting?
A havo heard roisc upstairs, but \(I\) didn't pay attontion to it as \(I\) ran array.

Q Did you hoar whethor or not thoy noro broaking up furnituro and glassm raro?
A I hoard a torrible noisc like the bracking of glessware, and I euppose they moro the deors and windous of tho house.
n Hov long after tho shooting was it beforo you voro able to run aray? Throc (3) minutes.

Q Where did you go then?
A I ran direct to cur housc and toll the shooting to the neighbors, and they told me to go aray as the Japenesc may come aftor mo,
2 "Did you over roturn back to tho Pons residonco?
A No sir, I gont to tho houso of Mr, Noman, the master of my father.
8 Did you soo the bodies of tho Pons fanily aiftor you loft that day? No.

7 On the day whon tho Pons fanily mas shot did Mr. and lirs, Pons or any monbers of his fanily or scrvant attcmpt to harm or throaton tho Japancso?
A No, 70 did not harm or throaton then.
Q Fere the Japenese soldiors from tho Army, Navy or Marines? Navs.

Q What color of uniform did thoy havo?
\(A\) They wore using groon colorod uniform.
\(Q\) Did any of thom carry a sabor?
I sarl one who was with a gun.

Q Do you knorr if ho rass an officor?
A I don't knor;, bocausc I knort thero pore Japenose soldiors who wero having sabors but rocro not officors.
g The Pons residonco was locnted at 521 San Antonio and 503 Figueron St.? 4 Yos.
Q Do you have anything else to statc about this killing?
\(\Lambda\) None.

\author{
/s/ Basilio Umagap
}

BhSILIO UMLGAP
518 Laboros St., Pandc.can Manila

COMONTHELITI OF THE PHICIPPIIES
CITY OF NATII
SS

I, Basilio Dragap, 518 Leborac, Pandacan District, Manila, P. I., of larful age, being duly smorn on outh, state that I have read tho foregoing transoription of ry intorrogation and all answors containcd therein aro truo to the best of my kaoviodge and beliof.

> /s/ Basilio Uragep
> BLSILIO UKiLGiP

518 Labores St., Pandacan
Llanila
Subscribod and s:rorn to boforc me this_19th_day of Mcy, 1945.

\author{
/s/ Iynn B. Griffith \\ LINN B. CRIFFITH \\ lst Lt. J:GD
}

\section*{© ERTIEICGTE}

Me, Ward W. Kelloy, Oantain, 0-297408, JLGD, and Lynn B, Griffith, lst Lt., 02052196, JhGD, cortify that on 19th. liay, 1945, porsonally eppoarod beforo us Basilio Omagap of 518 Laboros St., Pandacon, Menila, and gave tho forogoing anstrers to tho sevoral quostions sct forth; that aftor his testimony had boon transcribod the said Basilio Une.gap road the sano and affixed his signature thoroto in our prosenoc.
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline Placos & Uanilc, P.I. & \[
\frac{/ \mathrm{s} / \mathrm{Th} / \mathrm{RD}, \mathrm{KET} . \mathrm{LEY}}{\text { (signature) }}
\] & \[
\frac{/ s / \text { LYNN B. GRIFFITH }}{\text { (Signaturc) }}
\] \\
\hline Dates & Mcy 1945 & \begin{tabular}{l}
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DOCUMENT 2845

\section*{CERTIEICATE}

I, T. R. C. King, Major, Inf. (TD), Executive Officer, Legal Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, do hereby certify that the attached mimeographed copy of the affidavit of BASILIO UMAGAP is a true and correct reproduction of the original affidavit; and that a signed and sworn copy of said affidavit is presently on file with this Section.

> /s/ Th Re Ce King
> T. R. C. King, Major, Inf. (TD)
"itness: /s/ John Re. Pritchard
Sworn to before me this 14th day of
November 1946, Tokyo, Japan.
/s/ John R. Pritchard Capt. Inf.
Summary Court




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50: Tha Judga Aivocate Gmiral
:ashington 25, D. C.

\section*{II. SUM:ARY OF JVIDENCH:}

Briefler summarizod, tho avidance adduced by tho IivostigatorBexmirurs is to the offect that:

The Da \(L_{a}\) Sallo Colloge, 1501 Taft Avonuo, Lianila, Philippina Islands, is a Cathilic aducational institution but duo to war conditions was not in active operation, and vas tomporarily used by the Japnose as a hospitel ( \(\mathrm{R} 1,59\) ) until Jenuary 1945 when the familios of Jou Enrique VidSiUEZ PRiDi, the reletod famili:s of Judgo Joas R, CARLOS, Dr. Aisto:in COJUANGCO and Dr. Clemsate UYCFUICO (UYCZICO) together with their sirvints, took residence thorain ( \(R\) 6, 26, 45) with sevonteon lay (Ciristian) Brothers (R 2) who were faculty membors, Buvon airvaits aid emploiuss of the school, and a refugue priest, Fathar ireincis \(J\). COSGRLTA, who wore elreariy liring thore, making a total of sixty-eight pecple residing in tio institution. Scortly thorepftar an unidonatified iumbar of Jepeiese Marines or Lavy man eccupiod a portion of tho firgt floor (R 20, 33, 59).

On 31 Jamarer a Narino Captain oriorod the civilians to move es tha Collega was emilitary objoctiv. and for tho safoty of tho lib Aabitants tho: should find ancthar lncation (R 10, 15) but the Ractor (Diroctor) Brotror Xavidi (ㅇ 82, 97) could not find a bettor air-raid sheltor so be docided that thoy should rumain ( A 10 ). Botwein 7 aind 10 Fobruery ( R 1, 9, 27, 77) n Jrpaneso officer accompaniod by twanty merinos, soldiers or Militery Folice ( 9 9) stationod at the Nippon (Jepan:se) Club (R 5) mmediataly south of the Collego on tho same stroot, together with some of the Japanese Iivilig in tha builaing, came tc tha south ring and saarchod the rofucions aid thoir rcome and askod for Juds: OARLOS and Brother SAVIER (R \(1,9,15,21,27,45,59,60,66\), \(73,86,97\) ) and bafore leaving, the Japanesa wernod thosi remaining baiind not to leave the promises, look through the wi:ldows or entar the yard (R1, 0, 15, 60, 73). Brother KAVIMR and Judge CsiRLOS wers thea tiod ant taken to the Iippon Club and botwean 1700 nnd 1800 hours wero removed from thore to the Rizal Memorial Stadium (R 9, 21, 82) where about an hour lator shots were haprd (R 83). Naithor Judgo chajos ner Srotior KAVIRR han been seon or haard from since ( \(R\) 9, 15, 27, 45, 60, 66, 77, 86).

Marti:i C. HiIK, Jr., secrotary af the institution, osceped \(0: 10\) Fobruary ( B 16) befora the Jananose returined and took Dr. Clomonts UICRIICO (UYCEICO) to operpte on aid treat a wounded soldier. The doctor riturned two days leter ( R 6, 46) and botwoan 1100 and 1200 hours a Javinese officar !ith approxim?tel: twonty ?nlisted mon (R 66, 78) came inside the building eesrching for throu guerrilles whom thoy aileged wire firing from tha sacond flcor ( \(\mathrm{R} 2,10,21,67,74\) ). The officer iaspoctod the pramas, than ran dmastaire and tock Pamfilo aimulin


Carlos antipalí as hustages ( \(\mathrm{R} 2,10,21,39,61,87,97\) ). One of the brothars eaid to the Japanese, "You can't do this. Thes have boon our servante," whereupon the Japanese officar hecame angry and hit him ( R 10). The prisoners were than takon outside the docr and shots were heard from that direction ( R 21, 61). Matso ESTRERA although badly wounded, returned ( \(\mathrm{R} 2,39,79,87\) ) but was killed during the massacre which ensued ( \(\mathrm{R} 2 \mathrm{2}, 78,79\) ).

Shortly aftar the shote were heard, the officer went to the Nippon Club but returned to tho Colloge ani instructed tho soldiers to murder all the prople ( \(\mathrm{R} 10,11,22\) ): they began shootinf; and bayoneting those who were downstairs in the corridor (kx. Ai; R 2, 79). Many hid in an improvised air-raid shelter on the first floor and when the Japanese heard the cries of the women and children and the pravers of tise Brothnrs, it attracted their attontion and one of the soldiers carrying a lamp came into the sheltor, ordered them out and as they left the Japanese struck them with the butte of thoir guns. Thoy. were thon forced to face the wall and the officer come down from upstairs and geve instructions to atart killing, wheroupon thoy were shot aid bayoneted ( \(\mathrm{R} 7,60,79\) ). A few parsoris had taken rofugo in a small room under the
 ontured, shot one or two and after the others had started out the door. ordored them killed ( \(R 22\) ). Some of the people started dotinstairs and instructions were givan to bayonet all tho so who attempted to leave and many were killed on the stair-way (Ex. G). Tho Japanese then weat to the second floor ( \(\mathrm{Fx}, \mathrm{Z} ; \mathrm{R} 10\) ) and told the porsons there to form a line with thair hands above th:Ir haads, after which they were killed or wounded ( \(\mathrm{R} 48,52\) ).

One of the victima, Antonio COJUiNigCO, Jr., who was 111 with tiphoid fever wes in a room with four othere into which tho soldiers fired, then ontered, searchod the victims and ordered thom to turn around, at wish time thoy wero bayoneted (Ex. 2; R 65, 67). Antonio was dragged to the entrance of the chepel where he wes stabbud twice whils lying on the floor (R 31). Soverel of the Brothers, including -irTHOMY, were in the chapel when the bodies of sone of the victims were discovered with bloodstains plainly visible on the wall (R 3, 89, 93, 94; Ix, I). The massacre lasted approximately twenty minutes but the Jepnese remainod about an hour thereafter searching for fircarms, ransacking the place, and taking food and parsonal property of the victime (R 11, 31). During the soarch they discovered Teofilo Cilivari hidden in the toilet and attacked him infilicting thirty-three wounds including ono in the stomach which caused his intestines to protrude about six inches and then left him for dead but he concealed himbelf until rescued (R 83).
(Mra.) Holen VASMUSZ PRADA was literally butchered and loft to die as her left shoulder was hacked and large pieces of flesh were out from her arms and hips ( \(\mathrm{R} 3,33,62,74\) ). One of the victims who had buan bayoneted twice in the back and once in the chest foigned doath when a Japanese sat on hor thigh and tried to break her legs ( \(\mathrm{R}_{5}\) ) while from time to time the Japanese would make renarks and laugh at these who were wounded and suffertiag ( R 3 ).

There is evidonco that an attumpt was made to repe some of the vietims ( \(R\) 4) and the body of \(A s i l a\) CARLOS was discovarod on dishabille and in such a position as to indicate she had been violated (R 17). On the 13th the Japrnese returned and when they saw the body of fourtoon-year old Fortunate. SALO.IGA lying in an exposed condition, ottempted to have intercoures with her pilthough she had beon doad from eight to ten hours and rigor mortis had ant in ( R 32 ). An enlisted man attempted to violate Miss loserio CARIOS but left when an officer saw him ( \(\mathrm{R} 32,53\) ). Serrillano ACUINO and Dionisia CARLOS statod they saw a Japaneso soldier rade Iabel LAMBAN (DUPA) ( \(\mathrm{R} 33,50\) ) but she donies


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Doc. No. 2849

NENA ALBAN
called as a witness on behalf of the Prosection, being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXA:IINA?ION
Q (By Colonel Lim) Please state your name.
A I am Mrs. Nena Alban.
Q Your age?
A Forty years old.
Q Ycur nationality?
A Filioino, sir.
Q What is your profession?
A A nurse, sir.
Q Were you working in 1941?
A Yes, sir.
Q As what?
A As a social worker.
Q For what organization?
A The American and Philippine Red Cross.
Q In 1942, during the months of June and July, where were you living?

A I was in Sampaioc, at the Modern Maternity and Childrens ' Hospital.

Q As what?
A The supervising nurse.
Q Showing you this Prosecution's Exhibit 372, can you state whether or not you can identify the specific place where your hospital was located at the time?

A Yes.
Q Will you indicate the place?
A This is the hospital (indicating).
COLONEL LIK: The witness indicated a square on the north side of the sketoh, Prosecution's Exhibit No. 372, the Sampaloc Maternity and Childrens Hospital.
Q (By Colonel Lim) During the months of June and july, 1942, did you know that the Japanese Army was occupying the grounds of the San Beda College?

A Yes, sir.



Q Do you remember of the case of the filipinos whose eyes were bayoneted?

A Yes.
Q There were nine or more tied up right almost near the corner of Mendiola and Tuberias Street, and they were bayoneted right through the eyes, side by side.

Q Who did this bayoneting?
A The Japanese soldiers.
Q Did you ever witness the use of pliers by the Japanese?
A Yes, sir.
Q In what instance?
A The victims, the Filipino victims, were tied up and made to kneel right in front of the San Beda College building --
Q How many Filipinos?
A More or less seven.
Q Seven Filipinos?
A And their tongues were pulled out by the help of the pliers, and I saw the tongues hanging up to the chest.

Q Did you see these Filipinos alive grain?
A No, sir.
COLONEL LIM: That is all with the witness. CROSS EXAMINATION

Q (By Captain Coder) Where do you live?
A At present, sir?
Q Where did you live?
A I was in Samnaloc Modern Maternity during those months and year.

Q This is in June and July of 1942?
A I was in Sampaloc Modern Maternity, Childrens Hospital.
Q Did you live there all the time?
A Yes, sir.
Q What were your hours of work at the hospital?
A I beg you: pardon?
Q What were your hours of work?
A Well, I did nat have any fixed hours, because I stayed there all the times, and I worked most of the times, because I was supervising nurse, had to supervise day and night.

Doc. No. 2849
CAPTAIN CODER: I don't believe I get ati cir tant. GENERAL DONOVAN: Read the answer. (Answer read.)

Q (By Captain Coder) What did your duties consist of, as supervising nurse? Just what did you do?

A Well, I had to go around in the hospital, around the buildings, and supervise the cleaning, supervise that the work of the hospital had been done correctly, and neatness, and see if the patients were taken good care by the attendants, and those people who work under me.

Q Did you also do paper work, that is, administrative work there at the hospital?

A Yes, sir; and I had an assistant to do the work for me.
Q You had an assistant?
A While I was going around.
Q You had an assistant while you were away?
A Yes, sir; while I was sunervising around the building I had an assistant to do the office work for me.

Q About how much time did you spend sleeping?
A Beg pardon?
Q About how much time did you spend sleening?
A Sometimes, when we had many patients, especially when we had delivery cases, I slept just very few hours.

Q All the rest of the time you had to work?
A Yes, because I was the only graduate nurse in that hospital.

Q About how often did you go out of the hospitgl?
A Oh, sometimes just once a week, sometimes nothing.
Q Sometimes just once a week, and sometimes not at all?
A Yes, sir. That was in June, sir. In July I used to go around -- I mean to say, I used to go out just to have a chance of air, because we didn't have many patients in July, so I had to go arcund out of the hospital.
Q How many nurses or how many employees did you have under you?

A I beg your pardon?
Q How many employees or nurses did you have working for you?
A I wns tiry coly nurse in that hospital. I think there were others: J had other attendants working for me, but not nurses: '1hore were 17.


Doc. No. 284.9
Page 8

Q I thought you testified you didn't talk this over with anyone.

A I didn't tell them about the atrocities; I just told them, "Let me do the work in the back; let me do the work at the back. Don't try to step out."

Q All right, go ahead. You are on the back porch now.
A I was on the back porch at the first time I saw the atrocity, and since that time I used to go at the back, because \(I\) was the only one taking care of the back porch and the back of the hospital, and I saw these things happening.

Q Now, we have the second week of June. Now, the third time that you saw anything unusual happen was when?

A I was still on the back porch when I saw these Filipinos standing in the yit, because I pulled the mattress on the back porch that was used in the delivery case, to be aired out, and I saw that atrocity.
Q Now, how long did. you stay at the back porch watching this?

A When I saw those things, I kept myself in the bathroom and watched the happenings.

Q Now, how long a period of time did you stay there and watch?

A ibout a half-hour, sir, or more.
Q Now, the next one, what time did the next one take place, the next execution? .
\(\therefore\) That was about after lunch, something like that.
Q After what?
A In the middle of the day.
Q In the middle of August?
A In the middie of the day, in the part of July.
Q In the middle part of July?
A Part of July, sir, not in the middle. About the first week of July.
Q All right. I understand. Now, tell me all about that one.
A In the month of July I used to go out of the hospital, because we had only, sometimes ve had only one, two, or three patients, and I could do the work, and I used to go out especially in the afternoon and to po in the calesa. and go around from Sampaloc Maternity on Legarda, and go around Mendiola, and I saw the atrocities in front of the San Beda building.

Q Exactly what did you sec on that occasion? Just relate that again.

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Page 9

A I saw four Filipiacs torturec ard kayonoted pight, ky tiae side on the ground, by the side of the San Beda College.

Q Now, will you indicate on this sketch, if you can de so, that is, if it is on the sketch, where you were standing when you saw this?
A Right here is the hospital. This is the back of the hospital, and this is the back part here. This is the bathroom (indicating).

Q Now, we are down to the atrocity in July. And where were you standing when you saw that?

A I used to go around here in the calesa, in here, and just as a passerby, go there, go this way and this way (indicating)。

Q What I want you to indicate on this sketch is just where you were standing when you saw these people executed.
A I was here when I saw Filipino victims were bayoneted here, and then passing here with the calesa. Just going very slowly, because they prevented the horse from running fast, so I could see these things very well (indicating).

Q You did not stop there and look; you just kept passing by, is that correct?

A No, sir, because the Japanese ordered not to let the horse go very fast, and not to stop, either.

Q Were you riding on this occasion?
A I was riding in the calesa, sir.
Q In a what?
A In the calesa.
Q That is one of these two-wheeled carts, or carretelas?
A No; carrettela is different from a calesa. A calesa is Just enough for three or two persons.

Q Did you ride in the back of this? Was the driver up in front?

A Yes.
Q Was there anybody else in there with you?
A Nobody, sir, but myself.
Q All right, proceed with what you saw. Go ahead and tell me what you saw.

A When I was there I saw Filipinos were tor tured until they were killed.

Q How many Filipinos did you see tortured?
A Four Filipinos, and the next one I saw was two.

Q Let's go into this in detail. Were the Filipinos standing there, or what were they doing?

A They were standing, and when they were beaten they were flat on the ground and the Japanese grabbed them and let them stand up again, and then knocked them again, and then they fell. When they were helpless and they were not able to stand up again they were killed.

Q What happened after that?
A They were bayoneted; that is all I saw, sir.
Q That is all you saw?
A Yes.
Q Now, let's go to the next incident. About what part of the month was this, and what month?

A That was the third, almost the end of June or the first week of July, something like that.

Q Now, you mean theone you have just related was the first week in July, or the one you are about to relate was the first week in July?

A I beg your pardon, sir?
Q The next incident which you observed, when did it occur, what month and what day, if you can think of it?

A That was the first week of July, two bayoneting cases, and the next one I saw whalilipino victim was hanging from the tree.

Q This happened the first week in July?
A Yes; that is the second week of July; that hanging from the tree.

Q The second week of July?
A Yes.
Q Go ahead.
A The Filipino victim was hanging from the tree, tied by the legs with the chains, and every Japanese that passed by beat the victims, boxed all the parts of the stomach, especially in the stomach.

Q Where were you when you saw this? In the hospital?
A No, sir; I was standing on the bridge.
Q And where was the Filipino at the tree? Here is the hospital, and here are some trees, d own here (indicating). Where were you?

A I was here on the bridge. There were so many people here, and the tree was right here. This is the gate, because the tree was standing right near the gate, and every Japanese that passed by, going inside to torture the Filipino victims (indicating).

COLONEL LIM: Will the record show, sir, the witness indicated in Prosecution's Exhibit 372, a portion indiczted by tho word "Bridge" and another figure meaning a tree, near the fence of the San Beda College, indicated by the letter "G", for gatc.

Q (By Captain Coder) Now, are there other trees situated along this roadway?

A Yes, sir.
Q There are trees along through there?
A Yes; but I saw the hanging victims on the last tree from the bridge near the gate, the first gate of San Beda from the bridge.

Q About how far away from where the Filipino was hanging were you standing? How many meters?

A More or less five yards; I think something like that.
Q Five yards?
A Yes, because the bridge is very near to the gate of San Beda, more or less.

Q Well, I believe I misunderstood you. You say it is only five yards from the place where you were standing to the place where the Filipino is hanging?

A Yes, because here is the bridge (indicating).
Q And here is the gate (indicating)?
A Yes. I wns right here, because there were so many people here (indicating), and had seen what the Japanese were doing to the hanging Filipinos, and some of the people who were looking were crying, and they wanted to scream.

Q Let's procecd to the next one that you witnessed.
A I saw some Filipinos held in the stock, by the neck, right in front of the San Beda Building, facing the barbed wire. They werc naked. They were tortured, slapped, burned with the burning tips of cigarettes, slapped and kicked and boxed right on the top of the head until the prisoners were so helpless they could not even lift up their heads.

Q Well, where were you when you saw this occur?
A I was passing by, sir. I was in the calesa.
Q Where were the Filipinos?
A Right here, sir; right here between the two gates, right here (indicating). I saw the Japanese.torturing these victims, since \(I\) was here (indicating) and when I reached here (indjcating), I turned here, ind they were still doing the work.

0 About how many, how many Filipinos did you see?
A There were 20 Filipinos tied up against the fence there.

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Q Against the fence?
A Yes.
Q How many Japanese?
A fore or less 14 or 12, something like that.
Q Twelve or fourteen?
A Yes, sir. Of course, I did not count them all.
Q Now, did you witness anything further, my other extraordinary events?

A There were six Filipinos who were tied up under the sun right in front of San Beda Building, almost it the side, right almost by the side of the street, under the hot sun. They were tortured; they were --

Q Now, let us see if we can get where they were standing. GENERAL DONOVAN: We will take a ten-minute recess. (Short recess.)

GENERAL DONOVAN: The Commission is in session.
COLONEL MEEK: Sir, all members of the Commission are present. The Accused is present with three members of Defense Counsel. Prosecution is present and' is ready to proceed.

Q (By Captain Coder) Now, I want to call your attention to the seven Filipinos who you testified you had seen bayoneted about the eyes.

A Yes, sir.
Q I want you to point out on this sketch where they were when this was occurring.

A The Filipinos bayoneted through the eyes, you mean to say, sir?

I You must speak louder.
GENERAL DONOVAN: Read that last answer, please. (Answer read.)

Q (By Captain Coder) That was my understanding of your testimony 。

A Yes, sir. More or less nine Filipinos, victims, were tied up right almost near the corner of Mendiola and Tuberias Street, and bayoneted right in the eyes, side by side.

Q Is that on this sketch here?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where is that?

A Right here (indicating). This is Mendiola (indicating), and this is Tuberias (indicating); right at Tuberias near the corner of Hendiola.

Q Where were you --
COLONEL LIM: Kay the record show, sir, that --
GENERAL DONOVAN: Yes; the record will show --
COLONEL LIM (continuing): -- that she indicated --
GENERAL DONOVAN: Just a minute.
Will you just follow that as she indicates on the sketch, so we won't have to go through this every time?

Q (By Captain Coder) Now, where were you standing at the time you saw this?

A I was in a calesan I was passing right on Mondiola Street, and when I reached here (indicating), there was a Japanese sentry here, and I ordered the cochero to let the horse go very slowly crossing Tuberias, so the cochero obeyed the order, and so we were going this'way (indicating), we continued this way, and I look at the prisoners, because the sentry was not looking at us. And up to this place here (indicating) I could still see very well the victims.

Q Now, you say there were more or less nine Filipinos?
A Yes, sir.
Q Were they standing in line? Were they lined up?
A Yes; they were fall in line, were tied up at the hands behind them, and they were bayoncted right in the eyes through, side by side.

Q Just a minute. Were they lined up alorg Tuberias Street?
A Yes, sir.
Q Parallel with Tuberias Street?
A From here (indicating), from near the corner, up to this part here (indicating), this way.

Q Are there trees along Tuberias Street there?
A No, sir.
Q Is there a wall behind the --
A Yes, sir, there is a concrete wall.
\(Q\) Were they lined up against the wall?
A Not very much near the wall; about hilf a yard from the wall.

Q Now, exactly what did you see -- first, how long would you say that it took you, when you first came in sight of them, until you could no longer see them?

A More or less 20 minutes.
Q Twenty minutes from this corner, right here (indicating)?
A From here (indicating), from this place, because when you are in this place you can see everything here, because the wall is going that way (indicating).

Q From right there to about what spot?
A Up to here (indicating), up to this place, here (indicating).
Q About how many meters?
A Because this is very clear, here (indicating); no trees here. You can sec everything here.

Q Well, about how many meters is it from here (indicating), to here (indicating)?

A That is what I don't know.
Q You don't know how many meters?
A No, sir, but it is about 20 minutes or less, because the horse was just walking.

Q You think it took 2 C minutes to go past there? .
A Twenty minutes or less.
Q Now, exactly what did you see? Now, explain exactly what you saw as you went past there.
A I saw nine or more Filipinos tied up --
Q Were they standing or were they sitting?
A They were standing in line, they were fall in line, and their hands were tied up behind them, and they were bayoneted right in the eyes, through, side by side.
Q They were standine side by side. Was there any space between them?

A No, sir.
Q They were real close together?
A Yes, sir.
Q How many Jananese performed this bayoneting?
A I saw two Japanese doing the pork.
Q How many more were standing around there?
A More or less eight Japanese.
Q About eight Japanese?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, what did you see aftcr you saw the bayoneting about the eyes?

A That is all I saw, sir.

Q Didn't you testify about their tongues being cut, or something like that?

A That is another --
Q That is another incident?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you know the names of any of those Filipinos that were kyyoneted?

A No, sir.
Q Do you know if any of them are living or if they are all dead?

A I saw two of the victims who were burned by the tips of the cigarettes. The names. are --

Q Now, I am talking only about the nine who were bayoneted.
A No, sir, I do not know any of them.
- Q You do not know if they are living or dead?

A No, sir.
Q Now, let's proceed to the matter of the tongues being cut.
A Seven Filipino victims were tied up --
Q About what date was this?
A That was the second week of July, 1942.
Q All right, go ahend.
A They were ticd up, made to kneel.
Q Now, where did this occur?
A Right in front of the San Beda Building.
Q Will you indicate that here on the map?
A Right here, this place here (indicating).
Q Where were you hen you saw this?
A I was in the calcsa, passing by.
Q Go ahead.
A They were tied up and they were made to kneel down on the ground and their tongues were pulled out by the help of pliers.

Q Did this occur on the sidewalk, along Mendiola Street?
A This is the ground, right here (indicating).
Q In front of the collego?
A Yes, noar the fence; this one here (indicating).
Q Wasit outside the fence or inside the fence?

A Outsidc of the fence.
Q Go ahead.
A Their tongues were pulled out by the help of the pliers, up to their chest, and when the victims tried to gurgle or tricd to scream -- I mean to say they were boxed, and the Japanese soldiers uttered Japanese words which I did not want to hear. Shall I say the words?

Q Well, it will not be necessary as far as I am concerned. Just go ahead and tell what hapnened after that.

A And I saw the tongues hanging right on their chests, and that is all I could see -- bleeding.

Q Do you mean they pulled their tongues completely out?
A Yes, up to the chest, and they were bleeding.
Q Do you know if any of these Filipinos are still living?
A No, sir.
Q You do not know?
A No, sir, I don't.
? Do you know the names of any of them?
A No, sir, I don't know.
Q About how many Japanese were concerned in this?
A Thore were 12 or more.
Q Twelve or more?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did this occur on the inside of this row of trees, or on the outside towards Mendiola Street?

A That is outside of the fence before you step onto Mendiola Street.

Q Are there trees next to the street?
A Yes, sir.
2 And they were between the trees and the fence?
A Yes, sir.
0 And the trees were between you?
A No, sir; it is like this: The trees go this way (indicating), and they were on the ground betwoen the two trees.
\(Q\) Between the two trees?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, will you indicate on this sketch when you first noticed the Japanese and Filipinos? Were you riding along here in a carretela?

A No, in a calesi.

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Q Will you show what point you were at when you inmost say fl
A I was going this way, and then the cochero allied ry attention \(n_{r}\) was near to the place where the torturing was and I was looking another way, and the cochero called my attention. He said, "Look; look what the Japanese are doing to the Filipinos," and I took a look, when \(I\) saw the atrocities.

Q Where were you when he told you to look?
A I was very near to the victims. The victims were here, and I was right here, and then up to here I turned my back and I saw them doing it (indicating).

Q About how long a period of time elapsed from the time you first saw them, or until you saw them?

A Fifteen minutes or less, because every time we passed in front of San Beda, the horse could not go fast, because it is the order of the Japanese sentries.

Q Do you know how to distinguish between a Japanese officer and an enlisted man? Could you tell the difference between them?

A Yes.
Q How did you distinguish?
A As to my knowledge, the Japanese officers wore boots.
Q Wore what?
A Boots, and are having swords.
Q Wear boots and have swords?
A Yes, sir.
Q Is there any other way to tell, that you know of?
A That is all I could tell, sir. CAPTAIN CODER: No further questions. COLONEL LIM: No questions.

GENERAL DONOVAN: Any questions by the Commission?
(No response.)
GENERAL DONOVAR: The witness is excused.
(Witness excused).

1

\section*{CERTIFICATE}

I, T. R. C. King, Major, Inf. (TD), Executive Officer, Legal Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, do hereby certify that Document 2849 is a true and correct copy of the transcript of the testimony offered by NENA ALBAN in the trial of the case against Hasaharu HOMA, Lieutenant General, Imperial - Japanese Army, before a Military Commission in Manila; and that the whole record of the case, including the transcript of all testimonies taken, as well as the affidavits admitted in evidence, are now on file with this section.
\(/ \mathrm{s} / \frac{\mathrm{T}, \mathrm{R}, \mathrm{C}, \text { King }}{\substack{\text { T. Re. King } \\ \text { Major, Inf. (ID) }}}\)
Witness s /s/ John Re Pritchard
Sworn to before me this 14th day
of November 1946, Tokyo, Japan.
/s/ John R. Pritchard
Capt. Inf. Summary Court








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\section*{No． 3}

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\section*{MEPORANDTY TOs Prosectinn Section (Report \#66)}

THRTI:
SUBJECT:

Execitive Officer, War Crimes Brarch
German Club Yassacre

\section*{- II. SUMTARV OF EVIDENCE:}

The German Club, the scene of the atrocity, is located on San Li-is Streat: near its intersec "Ion whth Can Narcelino Street, Empith, "anila, P.I. The billdre is adjacent to the San Marcelino Chirch and compound where twenty-six civilians were murdered on 9 and 10 Febrrarv 1045, and the perpetrators of both a \({ }^{+}\)rocities are und:ubbtedlv the sare. The German Club was managed br a Mr. 2 ar Mrs. OHAr'SS (first names unknown), Who were German citizzens ( R 2 ) . On 6 Febrvary 1945 all the houses in the vicinitv of the Germon Clinb were surrounded by Japenese, prescmably memhers of the Imperial Naval Ground Forces. This district was then inder heavy tonhardment and shell fire. From 7 to 10 Febriarv 1.945 at leas \({ }^{+}\)five hundred civilian residents in the vicinity of the cerrar Clur took shelter underneath the clut aron the bombicireat and sholl fire. These peonle were crowded and inomed in a four foor +1 gh space between the concrete fiour or the dric ard tins found. They remained there until 10 Febricary l'子r:゙, ieavine only on occasional secret trips to seek food ind to po to the latrine in the club (R2). Between 7 and 10 February 1945 the Jansmese set. fire to the Reu Cross bulding at the corner cif General Luna and Isaac Peral Streets and to all the yrivate houses in the reiohborhood (a 3). At anproximately joco hours, 10 Febriary 1g4j, the j;parese surrownded the germen oub and forbade anyone to lewe weir shelter bereatn the ciob. while the victims undernearh the clut worr puneden with almed rifles, the Japanese bujlt an inflemmable barricase out of the victim's clothing and personat ocssescions mhien they had stored in the club. Ti.is barricade completnly surr cunced the club, clusely hemming in the ifocirs adernerth, we san nese then nijed the furniture inside the club, norred gascline over the pile and ignited it. Thev then poired :asoline over the barricade surrounding the club and ignited it. As the heat from the flames mountec, many men and women ron out from underneath the club and attempted to icar over the flamirg berricede. Nost of these were bayoretted sad shut by arfiting Japanise. Some of the women were raped ara their irıfants bayonetied in their arms. After raping the women the Japanese poured gascifne on their hair and ignited it. The breasts of some of tine women were cut off by Japanese soláiers ( \(\mathrm{R} 3,4\) ). Bernardino (AI-iB, the house boy of the surviving eje-witness Franclise folit, was tied to a pillar of the LOPE \(Z\) garage. Ihe Juprnese then proseeded to cut ofs his genitals and thrist his seremed prots in inis nouth (R 3). out of all the peopile tap were juaner acocirseiti the German cive, only

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MEMORANDIT TO: Prosecttinn Section (Report \#66)
THRTT:
Execitive Officer, War Crimes Brarch
SUBJECT:
Germen Club Massacre

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\section*{YiaRIGNO D J ROSARIO}
celled as a witness on behalf of the Prosecution, having been first duly sworn; was exerined and testified as follows:

EIRECT EXAJ INETION
© (By Captain webster) :ill you state your name, please?
A Neriano del Roserio.
Q Your age?
f. 38 years old.
Q. Nationelity?

A Filipino.
Q What is your occupation?
A I am the city undertaker for the City of Nanila.
Q :iere you so acting on the first part of February and curing Febreary of this year?

A Yes: sir, I was.
\(Q\) Tid you have occanion to go to the home known as the Campos home, on Taft ivenue?
\& Yes, sir.
\& "'hen did you go there?
A. After the fighting was diminished to a certain extent around that area, h'ajor Devid Binkley, Division Sanitery Inspector, of the 37 th Division, and myself went to the Canpos residence to remove the dead bodies in thet locality.
© Do you recall the date; sir?
\(\therefore\) I could not definitely say the date, sir.
© Can you give the month?
6. It was in February, sir.

Q How many dead bocies did you find within the Cempos yard?
A Approxinately about a hundred, sir.
Q Cen you state the condition of those bocies?
is lis we entered the driveway to the Campos residence, we
found a stack of dead bodies sprawled on the concrete driveway. l.s ve went farther on, we found in some sort of a garden inside the Cempos residence, dead bodies all around the compound, sir.
c: "ere those bodies civilians"
f. They were all civiliens; beceuse they were all dressed in civilian clothes, sir.

Q Can you state how many of them were women and chilcren?
G There were many women and children, and I could not positively exactly say the number, sir, but there were ebout 100, sir.

Q Did you hevenccasion to observe the wounds, if any, on any of the Gead bocies?

A Yes, sir. Fore particularly so in that crowd or in thet pile thet we found on the driveway. ile noticed most particularly a ledy wiose breast had been completely chopped off, and also we found a ledy whose genital organs hed apparently been rippec off.with a bayonct

Q Did you observe any wounds on the bodies of any of the others?

A They were all bayonct wounds and shots, revolver shots, sir. They were all mechine gunned, I presume, the way they were piled one on top of the other. lajor Binkley and myself were inclined to belisve they were just over there and they were just mowed down.

CliphaIN REEL: If your Xonor please, may that go out?
GENERAL RTYYOLSS: That remerk will be stricken from the record.

ChPTAIN WRBSTER: I hand you whet has been merked for identification as Prosecution Exhibit 77, and esk you if you cen identify thet.

A Yes, sir.
Q het is it?
A This is a picture of a lady who was found in the Campos residence, end several bodies are sprawled on the ground, sir.
\(r\) : Is that the women w'rom you referred to as heving her genital organs injured wj.th a bayonet?
f. Yes, sir.

SAPTAIN !EBSTER: lt this time I would like to offer in evidence Exhibit 77, sir.

GENERAL REYNOLSS: There being no objection, it is accepted in evidence.
(Prosccution Exhibit No. 77 for identification wes received in evidence.)
Ci.PTATN WBSTPR: You mey cross cxemine.

\section*{CROSS EXA: INATION}

Q (By Coptain Reel) Mr. del Rosario, did you keep records of the number of people that you sew dead at various placcs?
\(\therefore\) Of verious pleces? No, sir.
Q So you have no record, no written record, anywhere, of the number of dead thet you saw in the Campos yard?
\(\therefore\) ivell; if I may say so, sir, the only record that we heve in conncction rith our work was the number of bodies we removed for burial on a certain day.
Q I see. And I think you said you were engaged by
officers of the 37 th Division to remove dead bodics, is that right?

A Yes, sir.
Q And that covered the whole city of Panila, didn't its
: Yes, sir.
Q And ynu did hire some persons and engagc in burying dead bodics in the City of Manila, is that right?
\(\therefore\) Yes, sir.
Q And over what dates did you bury these bodies? over what poriod of time?
t. I was engaged as city undertaker to remove enemy troops and civilian dicad during the combat of renila, from the 3rd of February until the 31st of March, 1945, sir.
\(\cap\) And all in all, ell told, how meny bodics did you bury?
4 Around in the neighborhond of 8000 dead bodies, sir.
Japenese thet wes about cyenly divided wes it, between Japanese soldiers end Filipins civilians?
A vore so on the civilion side, sir.
Q Hom many more civilions then soldicrs?
\(\therefore\) :bout onc-third more, sir.
Q ind in the burial of these bodies, isn't it truc thet large pits :Iere dug with army bulldozers end the bodies put into the pits?
E. There worc only three big pits that wore dug with army bulldozers; sir.
right ind there were some smaller pits thet were dug, is thet \(i\) They werc not dug; they were just big shell holes that vere oroduced fron shell fire.

Q I sec. So thet they vere cither pits that werc dug or shell hoics into which the bodies were put, is that correct?
is Yes, sir.
Q \(N\), w, there was some understanding thet you were going to be paid for this work, is thet right?

NHJOR KFRR: If the Commission please, if counsel for the Defonse is going to be technical I, too, cen be technical, ind I nbject th this ouestion as boing wholiy incompetent, irrclovent and immatorial.

GENFRiLL REYNOLDS: The objection is not sustaincd. The Defense mey procecd.

CAPRiIN REPL: Yill you reed the question?
(Qucstion reed.)
A Shell I ans:fer, sir? Yes, sir.
r. (By Captein Reel) ind you were to be paid by the boay, so thet the more bodics you could show you buricd, the more money you would get from the Government, is that right?
d. I should lire to roply, sir, that before any bodies perc rcroved for burial Mojor Devid Binkley, who wes rapresenting the Tinited Stetos irmy mede a personel ece unt of each and every cead body rorived by our buriel squad,sir.

CAPT〔.II REBL: "!ill vou just enswcr my ouestion, please?
illl you pleese rcad the questinn, and sec if we can get on answor thet is responsive?
(rucstin reed.)
i. I suppose so, sir. I was only paid by the number of dead bodies.

Q (Ceptain Reel) That is right; you know that is correct.
It isn't e question of "supposing"; it is corrcct, isn't it?
\(\therefore\) Yes, sir.
O ind you have made a clain egainst the United States Government, is thet correct?
\(\therefore\) Yes, sir.
Q In the amount of how much?
i. Over 120,000 pesos, sir, -- which I heve not yet been peid, sir.

Capt!in ReEL: That is all, \(\mathrm{Hr} . \mathrm{d} \epsilon \mathrm{l}\) Risarin.
Captain mibster: That is all. Thenk you.
(?itness excuscd)

\section*{CERTIFICETE}

I, T. R. C. KING, Najor, Inf. (TD) Executive Officer, Legel Sectinn, General Headquarters, Supreme Comrander for the lilicd Powers, \(d\) h hereby certify thet Decument 2876 is a true and correct copy of the transcript of the testimnny offered by RARIANO DEL ROSARIO in the trial of the cose against \(T\) moyuki Yal'tshita, Gencral, Imperinl Japancse frmy, beforc a Filitary Commission in Manila; and that the whole record of the case, including the transcript of all testimnnies teken, as well as the affidevits admitted in evidencc, are now on filo vith this Section.
T. R. C. King,

Major, Tnf. (TD)
Witness: \(\qquad\)
Sworn to before me this 20th dey of
November, 1946, Tokyn, Japan.
Doc. : \(\because 0.3873\)
Pnge 1

crilnd na owit:an on brhelif of tir Pronecution, b-ing firat duly
nuord, wes rami:urd rad t•ntifi~d an follown tirough Ir.tnrorntar Gojuncgo:
DIRECT XX UIT: MIO
MHJOR OPIEIOiT: Do sou b-Iinve in God?
TH NITTSS: Y•ค.
MWTOR OPIEIC.T: Do yOU CO::f~na?
Miv "ITーSS: Y~A.
MaIOR OPI:IOA: Do rou know then to thll n lin is \(n\) sin rind it
if puninhed by our Lord tixet you rare bn arnt to jeil?
TH: \(\because I T=S S: Y\) YA.
Q (By Hfjor Ool:10:1) Thet in your man?

itrme of tre sill of Pnrticulars thin tontimons in to br offer-d
Kinder OPI:TIO.': 53, Bir.

MZJOR OPI:-TOIT: YnB, air.

2 (By infjor Opi:nio:1) Your :name?
a Mor rome in Zoanlindn aindoy.
\(Q \quad 45^{\circ ?}\)
in 11 .
Q Prern Co you ratidn?
* Torran Znfugar Eoma.

ム I wna in our homn.
Q Whrr: wen tiort?
A 53 Vmgrillanas Strent.
Q Intrimuros?
a \(\quad\) I~ \(A, \mathrm{Al}\).
\(Q\) Vinen dic you lrave your houna on 53 Kagellonos?
4 I connot rampmbrr.
Q Kef it in the nft-r:100 or in the morning?
\& In thr oftry:-00 .

\(Q\) Nay? Thern whe your fother?

(The wit:aces begen to weop.)


Q From wharo we ha triment
\& at ti:e c:urch, tire Mrailo Crtiedr-1.
Q Thas yo: wore nssembled witi: vour mothor ue wits in the Mandin Cntiactr-1?

A Yrs.

a Yos.
2 Winre wro gou trizen?
A In wore thlen to Sombr Rese Cnllore.

a Yes.
Q intere were you thenc:?
A Wr wors orerare th gn to Snitr Daningo
Q rin orecred youp
4. T:O Jopncse.

Q How wrav were these Joprese?
A I could -ot count trom.
Q How ariv of you worc tolec: to Srento Doat:ro?


A Our hoees were buened.

 collere -ita hea in Saxio Imimer



\(Q\) Ey whom?


4 sniln.
Q ione you sey tipt you heyn susteirnd 38 wnuma. on what parts of your bocy were you wou-dnd?

4 In difforcat perte of gr bndy.
Q on your loft erm e.ic you sustein mery wourd?
4 Yes, mir.
Q Will you plosec whow to the Commisaion that laft nim nate tril the Comisesion hov mry wounds tinare arn?
a (Seisibitire loft nym) Tce wourds.
\(Q\) And how r.bout your right p.rri, cid you austain pry wousd at thrt timo?
a You, nir.
Q Do you inve nily sorrs on tizet nem?
a Tob, eir.
\(q\) How rajy?
A Four.
Q aill you plesse show tho Gonnisesion tipet richt ermp
(The witaces oxhibitne hnr rifkt era.)
Q Unre you wourdod in tho chest?
A Yes, eir.
Q Will you plonsa whow the Comissins tile scors on your chost?
(Thn wit-ass miace hor drase ane. arhibitace portions of her body.)
Q Did you count how many scers there arn?
4 I op:not romnmbry now.
Q All rifht, On your abromnn dic you suffor sey wourd?
A Yos, sir.
Q fill you plofso s:20w th the Comalesins. then scer of youtwound on the abdominal portions, romion?
(The witacese nchibitnd ecars or. :ner abdoncr.)
\(Q\) As \(n\) rceult of thnt wounc in ynur obdomisol reetion, did your intestinas protrude, or cone out?

4 Yos, my in:tostirn como ont.
Q Did ynu suffor pny wound in your bfeck?
4 Iob.
Q How ming whurde ware theral
A Only one, sir.

(T:ac witwess oxilbited har bncl..)
Q knd your loce, how nney wounds dic you suatrin?
a Five, sir.
Q Bofors your mother diod did ahe tell you arythine?
a Yes, sir.
\(z\) Fine the whe tell ynu?
4 She onutionad ne to be elvays rond.
\(\imath\) Dice she toll you thet sho wos dying then?
a Yea, sir.
Q Wher: die you alonp thet airhtp
a lit Srrito Deriviro.
? By the alco of your noticer?
a Besiec ny notion.
Q Fins sho dood nirondy thes, when you slept with hery
a Yes, sir.
Q Sinw, whe: cite you wit out fram the S-ritn Dend:em Church?
a Alroedy i: the morrine.
\(q\) Palle you wore inside Sento Domixen Churcil ene by the sidn of your mother, ade you san zny offile tesend up in the air no. recelvod with the bavonot ris it crace down
a Yob, alr.
Q Did you kenw who the.t boy or beby we.a?
A Ton, els.
Q inht wa.s tic snemo of the baby?
\& Totoy.
Q How ole whe the beby?
A About tirce monthe, eir.
Q :Mo toseoc. him up in tho Rir?
A The Jepnices.
Q Tho recolvol him with then beyonot?
a Thn Jepnnese also.
Q The onnc Jepanine who threw hin up?
4 Yoe, gir.
Q Wr.a the boy woundod?
A Yos, air.
MAJOR OPI:ION: Thet is e.ll
GuPThI: RESL: to questions
(Witaces excusoc)

\section*{}

I, T. ㅁ. C. KI:TG, Mrjor, Inf. (TD), -xecution Officor, Lefal Section, Gen:rol Henaquarters, Sunreme Commeder for tho dilind Powres, do dinchy cortify tion Documret 2873 is m. true nend corroct copy of tiac trenscript of the teetimony offeree by posillith aidoy
 Imoorinl Jnpanese Army, before n. Militnyy Comiseinn ir. Varile;
 of pll teatimo:ing trker, as woll. ris the sfficupits anditted in soidence, ro ow on file with this Scctinn.
T. Z. C. Kine
riono Inf. (m)
Yit:nes: /8/ Joh: R. Pritchrre Swor:: th befor: ac trin 20th dey of Soramber, 1946, Tokyn, Jepar.

John R. Pritchore
Capt., Inf.
Sumary Court.

DOCUFEITT 2798

GEVITHAL HMADGARTMRA
UIITRJ STATES ARMI JORCES, PACIFIC
OF:ICD OE THE MHEATER JיDGE ADVOCATE
WAZ CAIECS DRAich
APO 500
संG 000.5 (28 Aug 45)JA
8 August 1945
SUBJECT: Roport of :iar Crimes Branch on Atrocities.
TO:
The Juige Advocate Gencral
Vashington, ग. C.
II. SUCGARY OI RUIDA:CA:

3riofly summarized, the ovidetice adduced by the IavestigatorExamizers is to the effect that:

St. Paul's Colloge te a Cetholic oducational institution boused, orior to thoir destruction, in thre buildinge locatod in a aquaro bounded by Lierran, Tonnesson, Goorgia and Floride Streots in the Melato District of Manila, Philippine Ialands (Bx. H. In September of 1944 these buildings wero trken over by the Japenese and used as quarters and storarooms, the mans bein? forced to movo to such residences as thoy could find and thoy war. yarned to rempve all relletous objects and articlas because "averything will be blown up" (R 28). No intimeticn wag give: as to when this dostruction whald take place but the Jqup nose wore then becoming very conecious of the fact that a reckoning with tha Americans was close at hand (R 88).

Jepenese occupied these and cther buildings in the vicinity from that time and early in the morning of 9 February, lootere broke into ons \(f\) the buildinge and took a quentity of rice and other atoros w ich were kept there ( \(\mathrm{R} 16,22,83,204\) ). The persons rosponeible ware not idartifiet, so far as appears, although thoy mey heve come from a slum district p.t the end of Florida Street (R 118 ). Almost immodiately thereafter, patrole of Japnnesu went through the area from kianila Bay inlend to Dart Streat, as far north as Horran and California Streets, and south to San indres Street, gathering all civilians, men, women and childran, sevine that it was nacessery thus to protect thim from shollfire, end that the whele Manile area was to bo burnod and herded thom to St. Paul's Collegi. To one was tmmune, pajple boing tikea half-clothod from their homes end oven doctors on their way to visit petiente boing roquirod to accompany the guard. Some were told that this ovecuation wnis at the order of the high compand and for their protection againat combat activity ( \(\mathrm{Ex} . \mathrm{H}\); R 1, 12, 52, 164, 252).

At the ontrance to the main gato, and elso ineide, miney, jowalry, watchos end such bagizata es a fev carrios were taken from them (R 219, 133, 213). Inside the gite, some of tho groups winch were brausht in etgadily throughout the afternoon wore told to knoel and pray before a statue of Christ which wes enshrined thore ( \(4 x . x^{\prime}\); \(R 5,60\) ) and then all writed in the garden or compound outaide the main building. It beean to rain and a portion of thoso present wera thiken to a small room fror: which, as cthere ceme in to crovd it unboarablig, they ware romovad to a alightly larger room. Finally, the crowd thero bucame on groat and tho atnnch and hat oo torrible, they ware again moved, this time to a dining-ronm approximntely sixty-six feat long and twenty-nine foet wide ( \(3 \mathrm{k} . \mathrm{F}_{\mathrm{i}} \mathrm{R} 13\) ). At a consorvative estimate, apuroximatsly tw hundred fifty poople were placed thmre end the doors and wiudows solidily shat and barred. Thile so confined, witneseos noticed that the throe hanging chandaliars ware wrapped in black-out prper rind that strings or
light wires ran from ingide the "package" through the transoms to the sutside. At about 1730 hours, five Japanese brought in biscuits, candy and Ifquor of aone sort, placod thom in the conter of the room and, through oomn Indians who ware amon; the captive group, told the crowd that they would be sefe in this room, that thnir hcuses ware to bo burned and that they might eat and drink, thon theso Jnpanise left. A rugh for tho candy and biscuits followed, and within a matter of momonts, threa oxplosions proved that the covered chandeliers were nothins less than grenade traps. Pnndnmonium ensued; many were thrown to the flior by the blast, others milled about in panic, and Japanese outside began machinesunining and throwing grenades into the room through the windows and also into the crowds in the corridors. Tha force of the explesions broke out the windows of tho building and a section of the compound well and through thes holes those who were able began to oscape ( \(\mathrm{BX}, \mathrm{B}, \mathrm{C}-1, \mathrm{C}-3\) ). In the hail of machinemgun and riflo fire, many of these persons were killed, some to lie grotesquely sorewled acrose the compound wall wharo they had been stopped in their filisht by tho bullets of the guards; others got to Florida Stroet whore they wore beyoneted and machinegunied, while still cthers fled to tho neariny homes of Mr. GLORIA, Mr . MARASIGAJ and Dr. VDLARDA (IX. E) but many of them were tracked down and beyonoted or shot to donth although they hed hiaden in every conceivable plece (R 3, 8, 14, 10, 39, 45, 53, 64, 70, 75, 172, 333).

A recital of each rarticular incidnnt, besides being encyclopeodic in aizo, would sarve no useful murpose, hence the following are presented as exprolee wilch, with the preceding general backeround Aescription, illustrete tho awful onormity of the nassacre which took place:

Insids the clasbroom at the collerg after the explosions, gasolins which had been stending in opin drums about the gardens, was sprinkled ovar the deat and wounded and set afire ( \(\mathrm{R} 8,277\) ).

Swinging nor uprigint by har hair, a Japaneso anlisted man paused, with his sword in mid-air, to attrect the laughing attention of his comratas baiore bringing it down on the nock of a young eirl who hed tried to hide in the rari of a neorby h,use ( R 18 ).

With the mothar screamin \(n_{5}\) hor wish that she and not her baby be killed, a Jap took the child from her, sivung it high in the oir, and caught it on his bajonet as it fell. He and his comrades then began the wholesala execution of eoproximataly sixty yoopl, caucht aftar ascaping from St. Paul's (R 148).

Curfously kind in this atmosphere of cruelty, one Jopenese told a twelve year old bo who had cacaped that iae must hide, than lot him go, warnin.? that he :ould be shot if seen ( R 293 ).

More in character wis the Japarese officor whe, catching up in the street with an aged man who hed escaped, drew his pistol sni shot poiatblank, then struck him aftir he had failen ( \(R 14\) ).
in air-raid sheltor at the Marasigan home in which some of the oscapees hai taken sheltor was grenadnd by the Japaness without avon p prior axamination to ascertain the idnatity of the occupants; thirtyseven bodies were found thore ( \(\mathrm{R} 18,41\) ).

A froup of verhaps fifty escapees were lined up in the colloge earden, forced to knesl, and wors then machine-bunnsd and beycneted to death (R 134).

\section*{DOCURENI 2798}

Dranness broupht a ceseation of tho butchery and the crias of the wounded finally sumaned such aid was was available (a 18). Such burial of the dead as cuuld be mede was accomplished haphazerdly during lulls of sholl-firo ond ne senitation nocessitated ( \(\mathrm{A} 23,84\) ); thirtytwo ware not buriod on the college grounde until 28 Fobruary by the undertakor for the city of Mpintla and lue tos the burning end the edvanced state of putrefaction, identification was seldom possible ( \(\mathrm{Ix}_{\mathrm{x}}, \mathrm{D}, \mathrm{D}-\mathrm{l}\); R 28, 37).

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PAGE 1

\author{
GENELAL TH:CDOTARTEIS \\ UETTED SCATES GRAT IOECSS, PACTITC OIFICE Or THE THEDTY JUDGE ADVOCATE

}

21 September 1945

SUBJECT: Report of Yar Crimes Mranch on itrocities.
T0: The Judge Advocate General
Weshington 25, D. C.

\section*{II. SUPTARY OI FVIDE:CE:}

Briefly summarized, the evidence adduced by the Investi-gator-Examiners is to the effect that:

In February of 1945 Dona Concepcion DOBLADOF CAMPOS, widow of the 1ate pedro J. CIIPOS, resided at her house No. 1462 Toft Avenue, Pasay, Fizal, with her daughter Pilar and her san; Antonio. Directly behind this house, Irs. CirPOS orned another house, No. 1435 Pennsylvania hvenue, in which lived Nena Pacheco de FEXEK, cousin of the lite Peqro \(\}\). CAPPOS, Ir. Faria CAMPOS LOPEZ, stster-in-17w of :irs. Pearo J. CaxPOS, and her son Joseling and nephew, Salvador J. Carpos (Ex. A; R1, 2).

At about 1130 hours on 7 Iebruary 1945 , four monerers of the Japanese Navy came to the home of Mrs. CAMPOS, enoryaft Avenue, and while two of them pointed tileir rifles at all of the above mentionec neoyle, the other two senrched the house. They took five thousand pesos, jevels, watcines, ind a revolver belong-! ing to Mrs. CAPOS. Thev then took Salvador and Antonio CAPPOS, their hands tied behind their bociss, to the pipyon Club, saying thet they would bring thom back in helf an hour. Neither salvador nor ntonio \(\mathrm{C}:\) pos ras ever seen a zain (it 2).

At about 1300 hours on 10 jebruary, several Jananese Wavy enlisted nen appenred at 1435 Pennsylvanis Avenue and orderod its occupants to leave the house within on hour. Thev did so, taking refuge in the other house of lirs. Pedro J. Cí:Pos, 1462' Tift Avenue ( P 2) .

On 11 rebruary at about 1700 hours, the family of Judge Arsenio LOCSTN 7 lso fled from their wooden house which was endangered by heavy shelling, and went to 1462 Taft avenue ( \(R 2\), The next day, othor nefghboring families streamed into 1462 Taft Avenue for refuge, their own houses haring been burned by the Jemnese, and rrs, Carpos' house being of concrete construction ( \(B x_{0} D ; F_{1} 2,11\) ). At about 1600 hours, 12 February, four members of the Jananese lievy ordered all the occupents of 1462 Taft dvenue to leave the house and zo out into the garden. There the men and women were seoprated and searched, the women being subjected to gross indignities to their persons during the search. The Japanese took five thousand pesos and 3 ;atch from Judge LOCSIN and many valuables from other members of the group ( \(\mathrm{R} 2,3\) ). E-rly that evening the Japanese burned Judge LOC'In's housa and the fire spread to many of tha nejghboring houses (Ex. \(A ; F_{i} 3\) ).

Betiveen 0800 and 0830,13 Fobruary, members of the Japanese Navy ontersd the main gats of the C.ifPOS house on Tart Avenue, disehnrging their rifies as they cams. SEVERINO, the gardener, oyened tho outer gite and was immediatoly shot. When they appronchod the front door of the CAFOS house, Pilar CaiPPOS poned it, and as she did so; she receivod a shot in the right groin ( P 3). Subseqiuntly, tho called for help and was found lying on the pround by Carmen LOCSIN. Fer dross hed been eüu or torn off just balo:v tho waist, and the zipper on the upper part of her dress was onen, liortilly :rounded, she told Carmen LCCSIN that she had been rapid by thi Japaneso ( \(R\) 25). an officer of the Sanitery Corps and the undertaker who removed about one hundred bodies from the housョ and garden after tho Americans had come, were of the opinion that the women had been raped prior th their death. Thoir vaginas had boen slashed open with bayonets (Ex. H; H33).

Monnohile, outside the house, rifles and machine guns were doing their dendly work, their r \(\quad\) ports intermingled with cries of womon and children zhich gradually diminished in volume as the victims perished ( R 3) . The Japanese methodicnlly searched the bodics of men, women nnd childrcn, cutting off the haads of any that showed shins of life ( R 17). The Jnpanese then piled several mattrasses in the hall beteeen the living reom and the front door, poured gasoline ovor the furniture, and set them on fire (R 3, 16).

Seven survivors escaved by crossing the fence between the CaxpOS house mud Judge LOCSIN's house, and hiding under tha concrate floor of the LOCSIN house, from whence on the maring of 14 February they procseded to the BarikeDOS lot adjecent to the LOCiIN house and hid in a smill jodega. They wera rescued by American soldiers that evening (R 4). Eight or ton others esceped to an air-raid shelter on Taft Avenue, where they were later rescued by the Americons ( F 12).

There wore from one hundred to one hundred and fifty people in the CAPPOS house when the massacre took place ( \(\mathrm{R} 5,8\), 13, 16, 19, 21, 29). Of these, one hundred ware killed, their bodies having subscquentiy becn rocovered and buriod ( \(R 33\) ). These one hundred pəople vhose bodies vere recovered had been shot and bayonctted to death ( K 33 ). Gome of the survivors wore seriously wounded and still beer their horrible senrs (Ex. E, F', G).
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\section*{GENERAI HEADCTIARTERS \\ ITITSD STATFS ARNY FORCES, PACIFIC TAR CRIAES PRANCH}

\author{
APO 500 \\ 2 January 1946
}

MENORANDUM TO: THRU:

SUBJECT:

Prosecution Section (Report No. 142)

\section*{Execiuive Oificer, "ar Crimes Branch}

The mixder of eloven Amerlonn Baptist teathens of the facuity of tine Contral Fox siz other ancitens at Gamp Hcperale nex: Tepez, (aple facrince, Jamays P.I., or 20 Decumber 174 .

\section*{II. SURMADE OF MTDPGCE:}

Japanese officers and erlisted mon uncer the comamd of


 The next morning, they rearhed Camp rirpe:ae ansi rapaz,

 Americans along with thaco obrexs wo had bcen dapaica peeviously, were pleced wan gura winomt tood or water (R 1). In the afternoon of 20 Desention 274 , one of ti:o hinerdean

 fonored in ploas and dow bis Samarit swoid: in hour inter, daside a bouse that was ajacaty In fianes, were discoveroc tweive borites and there was a gtarag odor of insaing flesh, Shine of the victima had been bivonotted and s me had been
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 were iaerifified in ilj, T\%o of the bedies were nut burred and

 were menipers of tha facuity of the Central Pnilippine College at Iloilo City, Panay (R 1).




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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
OFFICE OF THF: TFEATER JUDGE ADVOCATE
WAR CRIMES BRANCH

APO 500
6 December 1945
MENORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 117)
THRU:
Executive Officer, War Crimes Branch
SUBJECT:
Massacre of more than one thousand civilians et Lipa, Betangas Province, Luzon, P. I.

\section*{II. SUMTARY OF EVIDENCE:}

At about 2100 hours on 5 Narch 1945, ebout one thousand Filipino men, women, and children were required by the Japanese to assemble in the Barrio of Bulihan, Lipa, Batenges, Luzon, P.I. The men wore separated from the women and children and led away in small groups, to the edge of a cliff. Here they were blindfolded and tied and then bayonctted to death. Their bodies were pushed over the cliff into a stream which ran at the foot of the embonkmonThe Japanesc thon disposed of the women and children in the same manner ( \(\mathrm{R} 1,4,7,10,26,27\) ). The slaughter continued for four hours ( \(R\) 4) . Five or six hundred dead bodies were scen later along the edge of the river ( \(\mathrm{R} 18,22\) ).

On the same night five or six hundred Filipino men, women, and children were assembled in the barrio of Suloc, Eanto Tomas, Batangas, Luzon, P.I. Suloc is about two kilometers from Bulihan. About two hundred of them werc released but the remaining three hundred were taken in small groups to the edge of a nearby stream and bayonctted to death, after which their bodies were throw, into or along the bank of the stream ( \(\mathrm{R} 13,21,22,31\) ).

Nineteen other male Filipino civilians were murdered in a similar manner on a mountain side near Suloc ( R 17, 18) .





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DOCUMENT 2720

APOLINARIf NAVARRO, after having been duly sworn, testified at Sabang, Lipa, Batangas Province, P. I., on 1 November, 1945 as follows:

Q Please state your full name, age, address and nationality. A Apolinaria Navarro, 32 ycars old, Sabang, Lipa; Batangas Province, P. I., Filipino.

Q What is your occupation?
i. Housokecper.

Q Do you intend to remain at your present address, and if not, how can your whercabouts in the future be ascertained?
A I intend to stay herc for some time.
Q Where did you reside during the Japanese occupation?
A We stayed at the barrio of Sulao, Sto. ,Tomas, Batangas Province, P. I.
Q Did you obscrve any cascs of mistreatment to Filipino civilians by the Japanese?
A Yes.
Q W111 you describe fully what you observed?
A We were living at that time on the outskirts of the barrio of Sulac. ADout the end of February 1945, we were ordered by the Barrio Lieutenant to concentrate inside the barrio of Sulac. The reason for this was that all those to be found on the outskirts of the barrio vill be killed by the Japanese. Around a thousand of us were concentrated in the center of the barrio, in shacks we built for our own shelter.fas soon as Wehave been concentrated, all men were gathered and taken on forced labor in the Malarayat Mountains, telling us that they will be returned in a week.

Afterwards, all the people were allowed to go back to their homes, but again on about the end of the first week of March, 1945, we were gathered for the second time in the barrio. About 500 of us, together with a few men, were taken to a school housc. Out of this 500 people, 15 families grouping about 200 people were selected and placed in a different place. I was left behind with the remaining 300 people. Our group was then takon to the front of the house of Primo Quinto, a Jap collaborator. Arriving there, we were separated into farilies again. Each family were takon by four Japanese soldiers to the Moro river, a part of the Tehero river. I always tried to be in the farthest end of the group, so that we could be the last to be executed. Finally our turn ceme, and we were taken and conducted to the river. It was five o'clock in the afternoon when we were led to the river and on the way therc, I saw about one hundred Japanese soldiers scattered near the river and I also saw some men with their hands tied at their backs.

As soon as we arrived at the place of execution, I saw a whole family - Meximo Mangubat, age 60; his wife, Maria, age 50; Aquilina Javier, age 30 , and her two sons, ages 6 and 4, and two daughters, ages 12 and four months bayoneted to death. I saw it actually with my own eyes end I also saw that the four months baby of hquilina was thrown up into the air and landed into two bayonets



Q Did you recognize any of the dead bodies that you have mentioned?
A Besides my twochildren and the Nangubat family that I have mentioned, the other dead bodies that I can remember are the following: my sister in law, Maria Rueafor, age 30, her daughter, Conchita Hernandez, age 6, and her son, Antonio Hernandez, age 3; my sister in law Juliana Rucafor Magsino, age 50; my nephew and nieces, Proferio Magsino, age 25, Presento Magsino, age 30 ; Conc'ita Magsino, age 13, Aurelia Másino, age 6; my brother Agaton Navarro, age 33, his wife Maria Villanueva, age 28; my cousin Bibensio Navarro, age 50; my sister in law Cresenciana Rucafor, age 40; my nephews, Lazaro Navarro, age 12, Mena Navarro, age 10, Alejandro Navarro, age 4, Jose Navarro, age 2; my brother in law Eleno Rucafor, age 40; Juana Navarro, age 30; Tamasa de Leon, age 60; Sixto Kamintano; Eulogia Rucafor, age 26; Benjamin Rucafor, age 4; Carolito Dimafeles, age 2; Pastor Rucafor, age 30.

Q Do you know of any of the Japanese?
A I only know of Yamashita. It was common rumor in nur town then that the Japanese General, Yamashita has ordered the killing of all Filipinos in the Philippines.

Q What happened to your husband?
A My husband, Maximo Rucafor, 50 years old, was one of those men who were taken by the Japanese on forced labor in the Malarayat Mountain. He was taken by 2 Japanese soldiers and 2 Makapili members - Primo Quintos and Dalmacio Bueno, in the morning and allowed to return at about 6 o'clock \(^{\prime}\) in the afternoon of the same day. His job was to carry boxes of ammunition from the church where the Japanese had previously stored them to the foot of the Malarayat Mountain. This went on for almost two weeks. At the end of the second week, the same mer!ers of the Makapij.is informed my husband to take the following day as a day of rest. But early the next morning the flakapilis returned and took my husband with them. Since then my husband never returned and I never heard news of him. An-ious to learn tine whereabouts of my husband, I inauired from Mr. Quintos. He told me that my husbard had some work to firisin and will return soon. But after 3 days Mr . Quintos told me to pray for him because he will never return.
Q. Can you tell us the number of Japanese soldiers present at the time of the execution?
A There were 20 officers and 100 soldiers.
Can you describe any of them?
A No sir, but I can tell you that the officers wore leather leggings and carried sabers, while the soldiers wore short-sleeved khaki uniforms and carried rifles and bayonets.

Q Do you know to what unit the Japanese soldiers belonged?
A No sir, I do not know to what unit the Japanese belong. We never talked with the Japanese soldiers as we were afraid of them. We always iried to stay away from them when we see them.

\section*{LOCUAENT 2720}

Q • I hand you Exhibit G, will you describe it to me?
A It is a picture of myself showing the bayonet wounds I received on my back.

Q I now hand you Exhibit G-1, will you describe it to me?
A It is a picture of myself showing four bayonet wounds I received on the right side of my body.
© Do you have enything further to add to your statement?
\(A\) No sir, that is all.

\section*{/s/ Apolinaria Navarro}

COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES
PROVINCE OF BATAIJGAS
TOWN OF LIPA

I, APOLINARIA NAVARRO, being duly sworn on oath, state that \(I\) have read to me and understood the translation of the foregoing transcription of my interrogation and all answers contained thereir, consisting of three pages, are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

\section*{/s/ Avolinaria Navarro APOLINARIA NAVARRO}

COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHIT,IPPINES PROVINCE OF BATANGAS

TOWN OF LIPA

I, GUILLERMO F. LARIANO, residing at 96 Loreto, Sampaloc, Manila, being duly sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the cuestions and answers given from English to Tagalog and from Tagalog to Enelish respectively, and that after being transcribed, I truly translated the foregoing deposition containing three pages, to the witness; that the witness thereupon in my presence affixed her signature thereto.

\section*{/s/ Guillermo F. Meriano GUILLERMO F. MARIANO}

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 2lst day of November, 1945.

> /s/ Herbert Ce I,iking
> HFRBERT C. LIKINS, Capt \({ }_{p}\) TC,
> Investigating officer, War Crimes Investigating Detachment.

\section*{CERTITICATE}

We，HEREERT C．LIKINS，Capt．，ASN 0297351，TC，Inves－ tigating reficur，Nar Crimes investigating Detachment，and NEIL OLIVER，WR Lt．，Inf．，Asin 01328736，Investigating Of－ ficer，War crimes Invesiigeting Detachment，certify that on the lst day cir November，こ．ヶラ；personally appeared before us APOLINAI：PA NAVARRO，aia according to GUILJERMO F．MARIANO， gave the roregoing ansra＇s to the several ouestions set forth thereja；that ay ier her testimony had been transcribed， the sald Arumivila Nijherse bad read to her by the said interpreter line same and aifixed her signature thereto in our presence．

Sabang，Lipa，Batangas Province，P．I．
\(\qquad\) November， 1945

／s／Neil Oliver
WEIL OIIVER，2nd Lí．，inf．， Investigating officer，War Crimes Investigating Detachment



Yr/ALYAC, CARPENTER/, APOLINARIA NAVARRO/



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GIMNTRAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC OFFICE OF THE THEATER JUDOE ADVOCATE WAR CRIMES BRANCH

\author{
\(\therefore 500\) \\ 19 Noveisber 1945
}

MEMORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Heport No. 106)
THRU : Bxecutive Officer, War Crimes Branch
SUBJSCT: Massacre of One Hundred and Ninety-four Filipino Civilians at Santo Tomas, Batangas, Luzon, P.I., and the Unnecessary Burning of yart of the Town of Santo Tomas. Batangas, Luzon, P.I.

\section*{II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:}

In the early part of February 1945, the inhabitants of Santo Tomas learned that the Mayor and the Provincial Governor were no longer living in tow ( R 1, 39). Upon learning this the townspeople bocame alarmed and began to evacuate their homes, some going to the mountains, and others gathered in groups in a few homes ( R 1, 39). At about 2000 hours on 9 February 1945, a truckload of Japanese soldiers arrived in tow and set fire to the house of the governor's brother in law ( K 1). The next evening other Japanese soldiers came to the town ostensibly to learn where and why the inhabitants had fled (R 1, 2). On 11 February 1945, other homes were burned ( R 35 ).

At 0500 hours on 11 February 1945, Japancse came to Santo Tomas and procecded from place to place where civilians had gathered, taking their jowelry, money, and other valuables ( \(\mathrm{R} 7,13\) ), then killed many of the inhebitants, poured gasoline on the bodies of the wounded and dead and set them afire ( \(R\) 17, 21). Men, women, children, and babies were murdered ( \(R 8,18,22,26\) ). There is evidence that three of the victims wore probably subjected to attempted or actual rape ( R 8 ). Approximately one hundred and ninety-four residents of Santo Tomas were murdered on this date (Exhibit G). \(\int\) Some of the victims wore able to escape and tell of the brutal and barbaric treatment received at the hands of the Japancse and the three Filipinos who wore accompanying them.

At one home between sixty-five and seventy nen, women, and children had coneregated. About twenty-five were ordered out of the house and taken to a cemetery. Three men of this group were taken tn a.pitithat had been used as a latrine by the Japanese soldiers, weile bayo, than an frant into therit one man who fell into the
 place of hidivig all, fice bquonet tied fand iatabbets, chnown into a pile, saturated with gasoline, and then sct affire ( \(R\) IV) The only survivor of this group describos how she was bayonetted four times in the back and three times in the front; one of the thrusts killing her five monthe old son that she was holdine ( \(\mathrm{A} 17,18\) ).

Another grour of fifty wore tied and lec to a field whore they saw the bodites of twontr men, women, and children who had been stabbed to death ( A 21.) This Grnup was stabbed and other groups were led to the same spot and alao stabbed. Afterwards gassline was poured Lon the bodies ara set afire (A 21). One woman suffercd three bayonet wounde on her back, nee on the lef't chest, one on the right chest. two on hor thigh, two on her left arm, and one on her breast ( \(R 21,22\), Fxhibits \(J, K\) and \(L)\).

The Japancse bayonetted the fiftenn year old daughtor of one woman, who, while holding her one year old daughter, received six bayonet wounds herself. The Japanese were chattering and laughing as the pile of bodies on top of her were burning ( \(R 25,26\) ).

From one group two Japanese soldiers with blond on their bayonets took three girls, the oldest of which was seventeen, into the bushes wherc the girls begeed for mercy and pleaded not to be abused (R B).

Another group was stabbed, tirown into a dup-out and covered with dirt. ( f 31, Exhibit P).


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1324

8 January 1946
MEMORANDUN TO: Fsu.3ECUËさn Section (Report No. 151)
THRU:
SUBJECT:
Executive Officer, Whir Crimes Branch
Murder and attempted murder of Filipino civilians and the went on destruction of privet property in various Barrios of Palvai, Batangas Province, Luzon, J.I. 2 during January, February and leech 1945.

\section*{II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:}

Early on the morning of 26 January 1945, Japanese soldiers entered Barrio Jon Andres, Malvar, Batangas Province. They rounded up the inhabitants in small groups end took them toward the school building: About fifty blood-covered bodies were scattered over the area, and three Filipinos, whose hands were tied behind their backs, were bayonetted to death. One of a group of five Filipinos ran away as he was being led towards the school, and though wounded when the Japanese shot at him, managed to escape ( \(\mathrm{R} 7,8\) ). Two other Pilipinos sought shelter in a dugout, but were discovered by Javanese soldiers who fired a machine gun at them. The two men feigned death and later sought shelter elsewhere, but were again discovered by fifteen Janenese soldiers. One of the men was beheaded, but the other ran away and escaped is the Japanese fired at him ( R 11, 12). Another Filinino while attempting to escepe, was bayone'ted by five Japanese soldiers, one of whom shot him in the hid it a pistol. One of the other soldiers bayoneted the wounded man through the chest and left him for dead, but the victim managed to survive and recover. The Japanese then burned about ninety houses in the barrio ( \(\mathrm{R} 15,16\) ).

On 19 February 1945, about thirty Japanese soldiers and Makapilis approached the house of Santiago de in PENA in Barrio Begone Pock, Helver. The Japanese furraunded the house which contained six persons and one of the Japanese entered the home. After a little while ne came out, and the soldiers then took torches and burned the house down. The bodies of the six occrpents were found in the charred ruins of the house ( \(R\) IR).


DOCUMENT 2790

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LPO 500
9 October 1945
MITSORANDUM TO, Prosecution Section (Repart No. 69).
THRU,
Executive Officer, War Orimes Branch.
Massacre of non-combatant civilians at Bauan, Batangas.
SUBJEOT:

On the morning of 28 February 1945, members of the Japanese Aruy stationed at Bauan, Batanges Province, notifi ed all rasidents of the town there would be a mase meoting at the Bauan Roman Catholic Church, end that everyone ahould aesemble there forthwith ( \(\mathrm{R} 3,8,11\) ). In order to prevent escape, guards were placed on all roade leading from the town (R 3). By 1000 on the marning in question, practioally everyone in the viliage had congregated at the ohurah, at which time the wamen and ohildsen ware coparated from the men, and taken to the Bauan Elementary sohool Building ( \(\mathrm{R}_{3}, 8\) ). The men, foroed to remain in the ohuroh,

 enind dicolomed total ef g\% precont (ll 8). No farther action was taken until approximately \(\left\{P_{0} \mathcal{N}_{0}\right.\), at which time the men were marched in groups of 100, Into the besement of the house of Severino BhUITSR4, about 100 yards liortheast of the churoh ( \(\mathrm{R} 3 ; 4,8\) ). The doors of the basament were closed and a short time thareafter Japanese soldier a were heard moving around on the floor above. is hissing sound was then heard, folLowed by the sound of Japanese soldiers running away. Immediately thereafter there was a deafening explosicn which of ther killed or wounded most of those in the basement ( \(84,8,11,14\) ). Most of those not killed by the explosicn were shot or bayonetted as thoy attempted to escape from the building, but a fer managed to slip amay ( \(R 9,14\) ).

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On 16 Tebruary 1945, at approximately 1530 the Japanese killed about forty men and one hundred and ton women and children who had hidden in a ravine between Luntal and i.unlawin. The Japanese used machine guns, hand grenades and bayonets. The victims were all tied together with a long rope prior to their slaughter (Im35).

Approximately one hundred bodies of murdered Filipino civilians were discovered in the berrio of Inantal (in-44). More than one hundred bodies in a pile about five meters lone, t \(\cdots\) meters wide and ono meter kigh were discovered in a place betwcen the barrios of Cultihan, Maabuc and Luntal on 10 February 1945. These victims had reen killed by machine guns, tifles, bavanets and hand grensdes. Their hands were tied behind their backs ( \(\mathrm{m}-47\) ).

At about C8CC, 18 Tebruary 1945 approximately one hundred Filipins civilians tojk refuce in end around the hut of Severs NiNDOZA, approximately ten paces away from the augar mill of Mr. BADILIO in the barris of Iuntal. Approximately sixt:: Japenese jpened fire on the hut with machine guni and rifles and then set it on fire. Only five penple survived this massacre (R-57, 58).












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}


\section*{II. SUMAAY OF EVIDRNCE:}

This investigation covers the murder of more than three mundred civilian Filipino men, women, and children of various barrion in Guenca, Batangas, P. I., durizg February and March 1945. The official ilist of those massacred was prepared by the acting mayor of Cuenca at the request of the gevernor of Patangas Province ( R I; Ex. A). Typical of the methodi by which theae murders were committed by the Japanepe are the foljowng expmples:

About 1930 hours on 3 February 1945, the Japanese herded twen-ty-ope male civilians into a cave near the barrio of Tanqup, prqered them out ope at a time, and tied them together, with their hande behind their backg; They were then telken to an open field and in croups of three were led fo the edge of a ravine, where they were shot and bayonetted and then rolled into the ravine. The Japaneso then examined the bodies and ary that ehowed signs of \(119 e\) were again bayonetted. Only two of the twentyone epcaped (R 7, 8, 11).

On 6 February 1945, approximately one hundred and seventy-fiv! civilian Filipino men, women and children were aspambled in the house of Gacieno CASTITIO in the karrio of Mambuc. The Japanese fook the men out if groups of five and pone of them were seen qgain. Liater they took thyef, women out but they were returned shortly stating that the cigrave wap nipt yet finished. One voman and her child eacaped from the house duffec darkness, but the rest of the one hundred and seventyifive wore novery seen again ( \(R\) 14, 15). Screams and groans were heard from the CAST\$LO house and the next day the house was ailent ( R 4 ).

On 13 February 1945, approximately fifty-two civilian Fillpinos including tiwo women were crowded under a house in the gitio of San Juan by the Japancse. One group of thirty was takun to Mateo PalMal Sịhouse nearty and forced to admit they wero guarfillas. They were then.tied to tyece and the posts of the house. At about. 1900 hours they were laken if groups of three to the edge of a well, their hands tied bghite their backfe; and made to step up singly to the well. : Dach victim. was held by gnestaranese while three others bayonatted him. The victims were.then throup into the well. Only tws escaped out.of this group and one of them was pounded ( \(\mathbb{I} 18,19,21,22\) ). The remaining twenty civiliana'were marofigd to another house near a well and never seen again apd it is believed ther suffered the same fate ( \(\mathbb{R}\) 18).

On 19 February 1945, eleven men, women and children of Eilisa vagpaitay's family were bayonetted ic death in the back yard of their home in the barrio of: San Felipe by Japanese soldiors ( A 34), The same nieht, the mother and. nephew of Aguatin Lulian were bayonettod to death in theit home in San Felipe by Japanese soldiers and their họug burned

 on the ame evering oight men, women and child an of Btill opother family veracoimilarly mafdered by the Jacanese end th, hope burped gip gh),

Early in Karch 1945, Irenes HOCDNA was wounded with bryonets on a trail near Poblecion iy the Japanese for no apparent reason (n 36 ).

On 7 Narch 1945, eighteen male civilian Tilipinos were brought to the barrio of Dita by the Japanese. Five roung men were talken from the group and the other thirteer were given passes to return to their homes. En route home they wore arrested by Japanese sentries, marched to a ravinn and their hands tied behind their backs. They were then bayonetted by the Jarcinese and the bodies thrnwn into the ravine. Eleven were never seen agoin and only two escaptd ( \(\mathrm{R} 4,39,40\); Ex. \(\mathrm{H}, \mathrm{I}\) ).

On 11 Narch 1945, nineteen civijian Filipino men, women and children were tuken by the Japanese from a skelter in the barrio of Sablay and imprisoned in a tunnel for abrut a week. On 19 March the tunnel was sponed and the civilions were ordered out in small groups. As they left the tunnel the Jaranese bayonetted and shot them. Only about aix of the victims escaped ( \(\mathrm{R} 42,43,48\); \(\mathrm{Ex} .3, \mathrm{C}, \mathrm{D}, \mathrm{I}\) ). One little girl about five years old was baronctted through the neck as she ran from the tunnel and was lifted from the ground while impaled on the bayonet ( \(\mathrm{R}_{4} 4\) ).

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\section*{DOCUNENT 2810}

APO 500
17 October 1945
METORAI DIM TO: Prosecution Section (Report \# 74)
THRU:
SUBJECT:
Executive Officer, "er Crires Branch
Murder of Thirty-ninc Non-combatent Filipino Civili\&ns.

\section*{II. SIMMARY OF EVIDENCES:}

Between seven and eight o'clock on the morning of 13 March 1945 , anproximateiy 15 Japenese soldiers enpearcd in the Town of Rosario, Bataneas, P.I., and apparently without reason commenced snooting and bayonetting ell of the people who could be found ( \(\mathrm{R} 1,3,5,7\) ). No effort was made to distinguish between men, momen, end children, and due to the fact that many of the men were able to run away, most of the vietirs wore women and children.


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FII E COPY RETURK TO ROOM 361
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Peke 1

JOSE HABANA
celled es a witness on behalf of the Prosecution, being first duly sworn, was exnnineci and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION
Q (By Captain frill) Will you state your name?
A Jose Fabann.
Q Where co you reside?
A Calamba, Lacuna.
Q Whet is your netionelity?
A. Filipino.

Q Pow old are you?
A Trirty-five years.
Q Were you residing in Celeraba, Laguna Province, during February of this year?
h Yes, sir.
Q Do you reel going to the Catholic Crunch in Celembe on 12 Februery 1945?
\(\therefore \quad\) Yes, sir.
G Will you tell the Commission the occasion for you going to the place?
f. Well, it we in the morning of February 12, --

Q Speak a little louder.
A. (Continuing) -- 1945, when a Jepencse, four of then, went to our place -- our house I hern. They tolled with my father end soy that these will be onceting in the church. And we ware around six that were taken -

G Did this Jopenese speak Tagalog?
A Well, they spent a little.
4 Enough so that you could understand whet re vented you to do?

A Yes.
* Did he tell you wiry?
f. Trey soy there will be e meeting, end the ceptein rants to next us there.

Q Did trey take both the men and women of your rouschold?
A No.
Q To the church?



4 No, becnuse wh wert taken one by one, end we cen't sec what is going on.

Q And where dici they take you to tren?
A. Tren I wes teken in the house, farther from the plece we vore; we stopped. I wes brought out by a Japnnesc to the stairs of the rouse, and tren from the stairs therc ere Japrnesc trat neet ne there.

Q Werc you tekon upstairs to the house?
f. Yes, I was taken upstairs of tre house.

Q What did trey do to you upsteirs?
A. Wren I was teken upstairs, then trey let ne seated in a bench, and trat is what Ifeel: it is a bench. And trore trey began to stab me, bayonet nc.

Q How many tines did trey bayonet you?
A Soveral tines.
Q. How nany?
\(\Lambda\) Well, after I have been messecred, about seven wounds.
Q And tell tre Comission wrerc those wounds are on your body.

4 Tre principal thing is in the chost, near the reart.
C How meny?
4. Here is about two (indicating), and one here near to ny scxual (indiceting), and one in tre shoulder (indicating), two here.

Q Well, after you were beyoncted did you retein your consciousncss?

A Yes.
8 Did you fall to the floor?
A I fell on sonc bodics.
Q On some bodies?
a Yes.
Q Well, eftcr trat were you able to ect tre blindfold off your eycs end remove the rope fron your arms?
\& Yes, it was after.
Q How long efterwards?
A It is about a half-hour.
Q And wren you renoved the blindfold, tell the Comnission what you saw trare in tris roon.

A When I renovec my hands ance the cloth tict ines \(t: .\). folded me, I sav five feet, erounc? five flet c \(f\) bocics. Sonc werc still عilivc.
f You ricen bocics steckec five foct hieh in the roon? is Five fect hier in the ron.
© How lerge a roon wes tris?
A It is around nbout 15 netcrs lone, about trrec to four ricters wide.

Q A very larec roon?
d. It is e rouse; trerc is no-roon, whet trey cell. It is the whole fron the sela up to tre kitcten is one roone

G Con you give tre Comission en estimate of about row meny bociles you think verc in that room?
1. Well, to ny estirate it is arcund 500, becausc of the heaps of tre bocies that are there.

G What ild you cio tren, aftcr you were able to frce your hends anc renove your blindfolc?
A. I have to -- when I stcod up soncbociy celled me, and it is ny brotrcr, riy youngest brotrer, and re is already loosing his tic, and I told rin to keep low, beceuse trere is still Jepencse around tre rousc.
6. How long dic you remein trere in that rouse tren?
\(\therefore\) Well, we rave to remein erounc ebout 15 minutcs.
g. What dic you do thon?
i. I reve to weit for tre fire to be big enougr so tret we will not be detcctec in jumpine fron tre house.

Q You neen tre housc was on fire whon you left?
4 Yes.
\& Do you know how tre rousc crught fire?
A Wcll, whet I heve heerd is only the shot, and then the fire sterted.

Q You dicin't sce tre housc set afirc?
\(\therefore\) Yes.
C. Well, then, you were ablc to escape from the rousc?
A. Ycs. The firc wins eround about onc and a helf moters fron wherc I jur.ped, when ny brother and ne. junped fron tre house.

Q Did you jurnp out of tre unstairs wincow, you neenf
A Nc, in tre beck. We rave to turn down tre walls of tre kitchen so thet wh could pass therc undetected.

6 How meny of yur relatives wcre killca by the Jepancesc thore at Calenbe that iey, if you knovi?
\& Trerc mere four.
* Wrat are treir nencsi
\(\therefore \quad\) Trexc is my fatrer, Dector Habena; my brotrcr Merinno
Escucta; Beilbino dilcjer; my ycunger brother, Yoracio.
Now, of trose 2,000 pcople, or about 2,000 pcople
that you saw there in tre church, werc they civilians?
\(\therefore \quad Y(s)\)
\(G\) licre they arnoci in any vacy?
\(\therefore\) Not cven a single belo.
\& Werc they offcrinc any resistance to the Jopanesc?
an No.
6. And the Jrpancse trat you say trare in Calanba thet uny, end trese that tock you cut to tre Bririo Lieel, to which branch of tre Jopanesc arnca forces ida trey beione?
the regular thet is wet I con't know, but trcy arc with the regular sters.
\& Sters?
\(\therefore\) Ycs, with stars.
ChPTAIN HILL: Take the mitness.
CROSS EXAMINATION
G (By Captain Recl) Thesc 2,000 civilinns -. Cc you know whetrer any of tron werc eucrrillas?
b No.
© You don't know?
i. I cion't know.
(S Do you know whether eny of tren relped the eucrrillas?
\(\therefore \quad\) Help\%
G You con't rnow whothor eny of them rolpoc the eucrrilles?
d. I cion't kncw.

G Sc you don't know thet they vicrc nonconbatant civiliens?
d. I Con't lencri

Coirtion plivis trat is all.
CoPN'.IN PILL: Tret is all.
(VItncss cxcused)

 for the ellicd Ecwers, \(\mathfrak{c}\) © hercby certify thet Docurient 2884 is a true anc corrcet copy of the trenscidpt of tre testinony offirec by JOSE FABN:NA in the trici of the casc eecinst Tonoyuki Yamssfita, Gencral, Inpericl Japenesc forny, bcfore a Ifilitary Coryission in Irenila; ani trat tre whole rccorc of the cesc, inclucinï the trenscript of cll testinonics teken, es well es tre efficevits acrittci in evicence, arc now on filc with tris Scction.
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FOCUMFNT 2823
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARNY FCRCES, PACIFIC
WAR CRITES BRANCH

4 April 1946

MEN:ORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 267)
THRU: Executive Officer, Nar Crimes Branch.
SUBJECT: Execution by machine-gun fire and burning of twenty-one Filipinos at Barrio Angad, Bangued, Abra, P. I., on 16 November 1944.

\section*{II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:}

A number of Filipino paroled prisoners of war were summoned to a meeting at the Municipal building where the names of twenty-seven prisoners of war wore read from a roster. These men were then grouped and marched to the Japanese garrison where they were ouestioned, after which six of them were released. The remaining twenty-one were tied, placed on a truck, and taken to a nearby barrio. Within a short time, machine-gun fire and soreams Were heard, and later flames and smoke were seen (R1,4, 7, 11, \(14,17,20\). Charred bodies were later scen by some civilians inside a burned house at the same barrio ( \(\mathrm{R} 7,11,14,17\) ).



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called es a witncss on beraif of tre Prosecution, being; first duly sworn, wes cxalintci end tcstifice es follcos: DIMICT IXX::IMI.TION

Q (By Ceptein Whastcr) Y/ret is your nemc?
A. Meriano Beyaras.

Q Your écc?
4. 39.

Q Your netienelity?
\(\therefore\) Filipino.
0 L.re you fron Besco, Bitencs Islenci?
i. Ycs, sir.

Q Lurc you tre Ifeyor of Basce, Daten Islenci?
\(\therefore \quad\) Yus, sir.
© How lone reve you becn neyors
\(\therefore \quad\) Since Jenuery of 1941.
Q Vare you Esven \(\varepsilon\). 1 ist by tre Japancsc of persons
leilled by.then ec Besco's
- Ycs, sir.

Q ' How meny verc on tret list?
\(\therefore \quad 34\).
Q Vare \(\varepsilon l l\) of trosc poplc killci?
d No, ell of ther: ware not.
c. How meny verc killcar
\(\therefore \quad 74\).
Q Fow co you know thay :ecre killcc?
\(\therefore\) Beceusc it wes pronounced, tre proclametion ries given to me enc the list of trosc persons :!erc in iret procleration.

8 Heve you scen trose persons whon erc listce os killce. since trat tirnc?
\(\therefore \quad\) Parcion re?
C.FT:IN WUBSTiEs Will you rcéd the qucstion, flersc?
(gucstic.n resc..)
THE VI'NESS: YCs, sir.
© (By Crptein Vobstor) \(\because\) incri dic. \(y\) ve scc thc:i?
d. I ser: then in tre huse ?rer tocy recre lecnt prisonces.
c: Trot is bifore tre preclr:xticn wn arcicg fis tret rierts
\(\therefore \quad Y c s\), sir.

\(\therefore \quad Y c s\), sir.



\(؟\) Shet actres you triale trets
i. Becousc I sevtro: :itt treir rancs tic. kerinc.
 beceusc trey colile. nit use their roncs, seice of tror:
 cf tra:, onc of thet, hod ne morc cyc.

Q Oin his cyic out?
\& Yes, sir.

lillcci?
is docercinc to tre preclourtion it strate thet scic

bceruse of ner-cnepcretinn :ith t'
Ci.PTi.IN VITESTEF; Y u rey errss cxrilinco

CIOSS DXinim.TIOH
 in inclist?
\(\therefore \quad B C E\) ycur arreñ?
© Wis tret proclerntion you rofur to :rittcr in Enclisr?
\(\therefore \quad Y c s\).
\& Vicre trose the oxect :.rris tret :Uuc usceis
\(\therefore \quad\) No, sir.
f. Cen yru five us the carct :uris?

Q Dice the jroclenction rcfer to iucrrill:s?
s whets
\& Dic. tre errclenntion rcfer to eucrillnsí
f. Ni: sir.
\(G\) Do you len eq Coptein Vracrest
\& Aftcr - long efter tre cxccution thet I refre tic neme of Veilones, it wes lone aftcr.

Q Anc is Ceptein Velones the leececr of the euerrilles on Beten Islenc?

A Thet is whet trey seid, but I don't know in resility.
GiPTAIN S: NDBERG: Trat is s.ll. Gafraill didequf: Tret is all.
(iiftacss cxcusca.)

\section*{}

I, T. R. C. KING, is \(j \geqslant r\), Inf. (TD) Exceutive Officer, Legel Scetion, Gencrel FeqGequrters, Supraic Comender for tre fllifa Pcwers, do rercby ecrtify thet Docuncnt is a truc and corrcet copy of the trenscript of tre tostinony offcrce by inkinvo blyirhs in tre triel of the casc egeinst Toroyuki Yeitasfiti, Gencral, Inpurial Jepenesc hrmy, bcforc a Militery Comission in Ifnile; enc tret the wrole record of the consc, inclucing the trenscript of ell testinenics teken, es well as the afficovits ecnittce in cviacnce, arc now on file with tris Soction.


Witncss:_/ / / John R Dritchard - Syorn to bofore ne tris 20tr dey of Novcribcr, 1946, Tokyo, Jepen

John Re Pritchard
Capt., Inf.
Summary Court

Dop, No, 2RR3
Pagc 3
d After - lone rfter tic cxccution thet I resre tro neme of Veloncs, it wes lone after.

Q Anc is Ceptein Velones the leacicr of the guerrilles on Beten Islene?

A Thet is whet trey seid, but I don't know in resily.
CiPTAIN SANDBERG: Tret is s.ll. GAFTALI MOJSTEF: Trat is all.
(iititncss cxcuscu.)

\section*{}

I, T. R. C. KING, IN jor, Inf. (TD) Excevtive Officcr, Legel Scetion, Gencril Fezcouerters, Suprciac Comender for tre Allicu Pcwers, co rorcby cortify that Docunent is a truc anc corrcet copy of the transcript of tre tostinony
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Witncss:-/s/ John R. Dritchard
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of Novar:bcr, 1946, Tokyo, Jepen
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\section*{FILE COPY \\ RETURИ TO ROOM 361}

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9 ispril 1945
SUBJ:Ci's Report of War Crincs Branch on the Investigation of the oliceod murder of Filipino Civilians at Dapdap, Fonson Island, Cawotea, Islands, Cebu Province, Philippine Islands, by the Imperial Japanese cumy on 29 Lecember 1944 .

TO : Tho Judge iaivocata Goneral, War Crimes Office, Washingtoa 25, D. C.

\section*{11. SVIDTMC:}

Briofly sumarized, the evidence adduced by the InvestigatorExaminer is to the effoct that
at approximately 9800 o'olock December 29, 1944, a patrol of about 50 Japancse salditers, facluding two officers, entered the barrio of Dapdap, Ponson Island, Camotes Islanas, Philippinc Islauds. On arrival, the soldieris, witis the aid of two faterpretars, Fanilio ingos and Sofio Itaas, who rise later killed by the Japanese ( \(\mathrm{R} \cdot \mathrm{4}, 16\) ), went throughout the village commending all fumilies to gather at the to an plaza inmeliately. It pas explained that the purpose of the meeting was to issurs passos to the inhabitants so they could be identificd and Fould not bo molested by other Japai eee soldiers passing through. at first the pooplo were raluctant to exccute the order; however, fitar bsing told thoy rould be shot for non-campliance, they recaily obeyod. (R. \(1,3,5,13,22,24,28,3 n, 32,35,37,38,40,41,45,47,48,50\) )

Shortly aftor arriving at the plazn, the poople, numbering about four or five hundrod, wor, ordered to group themselves in farailies and coincragate in tho ohurch so they rould be unobserved from a plano Thich wie heard in the vicinity. The oxcuse givan ras that they night be strafed. The people follored out the instructions whout dilay. \(0_{i 2 c}\) Jepanose officer sat asar the altar while the socond stationed himsclf at the door. (R. 26) The former then called them to order, and through the interpreters, askod if unyone had seon or know tho zhoreabouts of throe obucricais soldiers tho nore supposed to have landed on the ial and that unrainge ..ll raplied in the acgativo. He thon directed all. froa Cobu to raise their haids. is few haids, probably not more tian five or six, zere shoma. Likerise, he inquired tho was from Loyte and no bands vere raised. Finally, ie asked tho wes from dapdap and practically cil signified they mere. (R. \(2,5,15,23,25,28,32,35,38,40,42,50\) )

By this time it was almost \(12.000^{\prime}\) clock so, at tho roquest of the peoplo, the interpreters asked pormission from tho officer in charge to return to their ames for food. He oonsented but directed them to depart one family at a time, accomponied by soldior guards who rould search their homes. Fach family was then told to form in line. ( \(\mathrm{R}, 2,3,5,6,30,32,38,39,42,45,47\) )

The Fortunato fainily (last new unknom) fron Cobu, mas the first to leave. It ras first ois a rocilatration list of civilian residents proviously preparod by tho Japnicso. iss soon as thoy pessed outsids, their hands vere tied and thoy acro led aray. (R.1,2,6) Only one soin, Forfidio, survived. ( \(A, 7\) ) Bhortly thercafter, the Japanese soldiers returned and led another fomily group aimy. (R. 3)

\section*{LOCURENT 2807}
mirs, Fabiana Horslos and her throc ohildren folloriod, and about three hundred yards from the church, thoir hands mero tiod behiad them, except ilss. morelos' whose hands vere tied in front beoauso she was holdiag hor nursiug ahild. Proceeding a littio furthor, two Japoncse guards bogan bayojetting them ono oftor tho other, one bayonet tiruat passing ompletoly through the baby's body into ins. morelos' side, she boing the only merber of thio family to escape alive. ( \(\mathrm{R}_{\mathbf{\prime}}\) 32)

Tivo Japanese soldiers then took out the Candido Rollo fomily of eicht. ibout five hundred yards from the church thoy aere tied and baypuctted, four boiag killed and the remaining four receiving ineny serious multiple zounds. The wife, ublores, rcceived nine wounds. Sho ma holding in her arms her daughtor, baxina, age threc years, when one Jap soldior thrust a bayonet tirough tho child into the nother's left breast. ( \(\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{P}}\) 40-43)

Basilio Gocela's ismily of seven wes conducted to a place about one half kilmeter awoy fhore thoy were tied and bayonetted by the Japanose guards. \(H 11\) wero killod, except the sixteen year old daughtor Perpotua, who :73s rounded in four differert places. (R. 47)

Because the churcin was filled when seven menbers of the luconas fruily rrived at the plaza they were taken to n nearby house by aix Japaneso soldiors, aid later to a banana grove, zhere all rere tied add six were lilled by bayonst stabs. While theotiers wore being bound the daughter, Paulita, broko a;ray nad esceped but mas shot at several times. ( \(\mathrm{R}, 37.38\) )
dafter several femilies hrid beeia disposed of by individutil units, groups of threo or more families wera ordered from the church collectivaly. (R. 6,7)
it about ono o'slock in the aftarnoon the Teofila Gocela family of nine nembers, aiad three othar families, all liviag in the hills adjacoat to the tom, wero brought dorn and placed in the ohurch, at uhich tims it was half-filleu. They zere accorded tiae surue treatmont as the others thoy joined. Shortiy thereafter the fomily was taken therefrom, their hands tied behind thoir backs, and led to a shed in tho ncar vicinity, where all rere tied to one post and niue Japanese soldiers began their wark of carnage by bayonetting tine victims in their backs. The mother saw her oighteon monthe old daughter killed by a bayonet tirust :hich disemboweled hor. The saत thom kill her son Doulnador, aged four. They also bayonetted the remainiag seveia, after which the ropes tying them to the post wero cut and lifes. Goccla foll to the ground unconscious. ( \(R, 8,9\) ) Latar, one of the soldiers placed a lighted cigaretto on her rifht temple to deterane if she were still alive. She did not move and feligned deatic. The guards then riped their bloody bayonets on the victims' olothes, covercd the bouifes with baiana and soconut leaves, and departed. Her son Francisco, seventeen ycers old, hito ras تounded in eleveir places, roused hirisalf and untied the hands of the six who vere liviag, hid thail in the thick grass, and vent in search of a houce, but upon returning fouid that tro had died. The renailaing four vent with him to a nipn hut whero they subsisted for four days ou unripe bananas and without watcr. Francisco died two days later, the others raminiag two days longer when the stench of his decoriposing body forced them to move. ( R . 9) The survivors rent to Babay, Leyte, and were hospitalizad. "rs. Gocela also sat the baynotting of her brother's fanily of seven, naned Lucenas, all of whan tere killod except the soven yoar old daughter Victoria. (R.9)

The Lacson fanily of six menbars and three other fandies were formed lints a group of about treaty, whose hainds were tied together, and lod to a house in the barrio. arriviag there the Jap soldiers fixed their bnyoncts. The victing knclt oin the floor
pleading for maroy, the fither ovon begging to be a sarvant for the Jepanose, but tileir supplications zorc ienored and thoy aere set upon and beymetted, of this fanily only the thirteon your old daughter ivorin and her brothor licolad, go of ght, survivod. The father was sevoroly moundod and died oight drys later. ( \(\mathrm{H}_{\mathrm{o}} 6,7,1 \mathrm{c}-12\) )

The Comalis Tanzo family group of tranty-five, iacluding several nursing babies, ims conducticd to a bushy area end bayonotted. Of this antire group oialy four survived, cach of whom suffered nuricrous wouncis. Comelio cramled into a cocsaut grove, and because of his weakencd condition was forcod to stay for four days subsisting sia water alane. (R. 30,31; I', 2, 3x. 6 of \(2 x_{0}\) i.)

The third group of approximntely tizenty, including the Jorge mari fariily of four, wos led ints the roods about ono huadred yards array to a house where the soldiors orderod the nen to croo formard and be tied. Likeriso, wonen and chilùreia rore then brought formard and the entire group mis baysnetted. Only tro secaped al ive, Jorgo mari and an old lady by the nane of Corinelia, last namo not kuown, and they too had beon bayonettec and ecvorely injured. he. Wir.ri witacesod the killing of als wifo anc tion childron, the latter aged 3 years and 2 moaths respectivoly. ( \(R, 23\) )
magdalens Jabalia and four of his childran wero in a group, all of thax: were ticd a short distance from the church and then takon about throe hundred yarde furthor There they rore halted and bayonetted. Tro of those children werc killad and mothor died later of his munds, thile four of his other childron, apparently in another group, were killod on the sarie day. iagadilens roceived oleven wounde. ( \(\mathrm{R}, 38,4 \mathrm{n}\) )

Then tho church was about half exptied ( \(\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{o}}\) 13.45) the rciaining poople became apprehenaive of their lives. Some san blood runuine out of a nearby shack ( R .2 ), a few noticod the soldiors weshing their bloody bcyonots at the artesion fell nearky ( \(\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{c}} 25\) ), and othors observed that as som as the fornilios wore takel outside they zero shacklod with ropes: Matiquio Lacenas thon urged thoso reraining to fight for their lives and attany an oscape phareupon he pioked up a rock, burled it at the \(\bar{C} O r\) guard, hitting hin on the head, and knooking hirn to the eround. Ha also rushod another ouara but nos killed in his bid for frecdon. Many then mado a bronk for the coor and were machine-gunned indiscrininstely or siabbed with bayonets. (R.25) Soveral pleaded and begged for nercy, but to no avail. The church resounded trith the weils and crics of the wounded and thoso who feared death was iraineat. (R. 45) Saric escnped and waro killod by rifle and machine gun fire while runuing tomid the boach. is vary small nuriber esonped unseathed and found safoty in the soa and swaups. (R. 49) most of the victins shomed numersus stab pounds, sonc babies in thoir nothers' ams were run throuich and tho blados passed ints the bodies of the nothers. One moran was found wo had given promature birth to a baby and its doad boay ans beside hor. (R. 49-51) isnother victin, while pleading for anery frou the Jap oficicer at the altar, was struck by a sabre wielded by hili, sevoring his shoulder and resulting in ivroodiato death. (R. 13-16, 27-29, 46-51)

Bach time the soldicers returned frou escorting a fornily to its dom they talked with the officors and all laughod as if it were a gila socasion. The officer at tho oltar kopt anokine mile the masaore wes going on and gave orders fron time to tive. One officer participated in the bayonetting. ( \(\mathrm{A}, 3,6,23,27: 31,46 ; \mathrm{Ex}_{\mathrm{X}}\). 13 of Ex. is)
sabout three or four \(D^{\prime}\) clock in the aftomoon, after covering thoir victiris with bannna and osconut leaves, the Japs doparted.

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pleading for meroy, the fither ovon begging to be a acrvant for the Jepanose, but tiseir supplications acre ignored and they aere set upon and brymettod, Of this failily nly the thirteon yoar ald daughter ivarin and har brothor Nicolas, ge oight, survived. The fathor was sevoroly mounded and died ofght dnys later. (R. 6,7,1C-12)

The Cornalis Tanzo fanily group of tronty-five, including sevarnl nursing babies, ims conducticd to a bushy area end bayonottcd. Of this entire group oilly four survived, cach of whom suffered numerous wouncis. Comelio arafled into a cocomut grove, and because of his roakened condition was forcod to stay for four days subsisting \(5 i\) water ciace. (R. 30,\(31 ;\) I, 2, 3x. 6 of Zx . i.)

The third group of approximntely tranty, includiug the Jorge mari farilly of four, wos led ints the woods about ono huidred yards aray to a house sihere the soldions orderod the nen to erne formard and be tied. Likeriso, wonen and cailùrea pore then brought formard and the eatire group mas bayonetted. Only tro eacaped al ive, Jorgs mari and an sld lady by the name of Corinelia, last namo not known, and they too had beon bayonetted and ceverely injured. br. Wir.ri uitacesed the killing of ilis rifo ung tiro childron, the latter aged 3 years and 2 months rospectivoly. ( \(R, 23\) )
magdalens Jabalia and four of his childron werc in a group, all of rina: wero tiod a short distianoo from the church and then takon about three hundred yards furthor where they rore halted and bayonetted. Tro of these children werc killad and mothor died later of his mounde, thile four of his other childron, apparently in anothor group, wers killod on the sarie dey. imagdelens roceived oleven rounde. ( \(\mathrm{R}, 38,40\) )

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isbout three or four \(o^{\prime}\) olock in the aftomoon, after covering thoir victins with baman and osoonut leaves, the Japs doparted.


The wounded, both frow tho church and family groups, after recovering sone strength, mont to the surrounding swaps and jungles. Sone wore so rook they had to crawl. They contacted friends and reldatives sid by various and devious inns crossed the sea individually and in groups to Babay, Leyte, Philippine I \(\begin{aligned} & \text { lads, where they mere }\end{aligned}\) hospitalized. Later, sons of the wounded died. (R. 2,3,5-9,11,13,16, \(23,26,28,31,32,36,39,49,42,45,47,49,51\) )

On \(3 n\) December 1944 Ciricico Labiate and ais brother, Sergio, were at San Juan, Filar, Ponson Island, nd e haring of the massacre, proceeded iتciodiately to Dapdap to look for their faidily. On the ray they not their father, two sisters, aid three brothers. Ono sister vas in such pain caused by two bullet pounds in her back. Proceeding alone to the barrio, Ciriaco saw any cienci bodies in the church piled on top of each other and the reining of approximately onehundred lying outside, wins mich were the bios of his mother and one brother. (R. 43. 44)

On 16 January 2945, Captain Gonzalo R. Sievert, Executive Officer of the 94 th Regiment, \(92 n d\) Division, Po do, accompanied by major Pete W. Scott, XCiv Io. 15 Dotachixant, Captain Henry L. Guire, Fth sir Force, and a Sergeant William Young, photographer of the Fth Infantry Division, were ordered by a task force canimader, Colonel Walker, 182nd Infantry, Fth Division, U. S. dolly, to proceed to Lapiap, rake an investigution, aid dispose of the dead bodies. Before arriving at the tom they met three survivors of the debacle, all of whom gave evidence of nixersus wounds. approaching the town the foul odor of dead bodies filled the air. They looked in tars huts and saw approximately 30 to 50 and 25 to 2 n bodies respectively in a bad state of decaposition. Doge and other animals had eaton amy large portions of the bodies making it difficult to ascertain whothor they pore men, women or children however, the presence of long hair and aril skulls indicated that there pere axe of the latter in the groups. Procooding further into torn they liaspeated buts en route and thurs siadiar conditions existing. driving at the church they san about 100 bodies scattered on tho gey ind in end around the building, about half of which more inside, and visible from the doorway. Here too the dogs, hogs and other animals had devoured parts of the bodies. About 5 Co yards north of the church they a scrod approxLately 50 to 60 dead bodies under an acacia tree, all in an advanced state of decomposition. Several dogs and pies were eating the romains, and chickens picking the bones. They counted 230 dead midestin: ted there wore 500 dead bodice in and around the barrio. (R 17-19) The photographer took various pictures, one of a shock whore dead could be.soen in the doorway, others shoving the conditions inst de andoutside the church, one of
 posed body tied to the trunk of a tree and identified as went in diorolos. ( \(\mathrm{R}, 9,20,21\); Bx, 2,3.4 of Ex. is)

On s of the bodice show in Exhibit 19-1 of Exhibit it was identified as that of a nim known as "Mason"; in Exhibit 19-7 of Exhibit \(\triangle\) another body res that of a rim varied "Pecong". ( \(R_{2} 4,6\) )

Bxinibit 1 of Exhibit a is a translation of on undated company pricier captured on Ponson Island on or about 18 January 1945, which directs thirst the tom of Filar be extorislnated at 24CO, and sub-paragraph 5, paragraph IV recites the platoon formations, Opposite the and Platoon appears the na nc "Kurazara." This exhibit al so contains a translation of a dingy, belonging to either on officer or sorgoant major, 4 th Company, organization not stated, snowing the following entry' "29 Doc 44 - Dapdap 900 Lion. Esperanza 150 don. Completion of subjugation. Dopartod San Isidro."
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\section*{DOCUMENI 2807}

The wounded, both frow tho church and family groups, aftor rocovering sane 3 trength, ront to the surrounding grouips and jungles. Sonco wore so moak they had to crawl. They contactod friends and rolatives nid by various and devious hoans crossod the soa individually and in groups to Babay, Loyte, Philipptise Islade, where thay wicre hospitalized. Later, some of the wouinded died. (R. 2,3,5-9,11,13,16, \(23,26,28,31,32,36,39,43,42,45,47,49,51\) )

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Witnosses tostifiod that there :roro tipo officors iath the Jopaneso solaiors at the church. Tho one at tho nltar ins tall, large, rith a loag face, heavily bearcod, clipped hed \(r\) nnd about 40 yoars of age. \(H_{e}\) irore spactrolos, a lonis sabre, revolvor aid a unifoms rith a patch on each breast aith atars set upon a backer ruila of reci lines. ( \(\mathrm{R}, 27,33\) ) The other, a Captnin Cruza;pa or huraza;a, :as of rejular hoight, beardless and woro a onp aith flapping back, cainon to tho Japaneso solciers; a sabre and stars upoiz his uniforil. (R. 26) Oilo oficicer ma killed by a civilian at tin clurch. ( \(R, 7\) )

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GENERAL HTADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
WAR CRIMTIS BRANCH

APO 500
24 December 1945

\begin{abstract}
MEMORANTUM TO: Fruseeution Duttion (Report No. 137)
THRU: Fxecutive Officer, War Crimes Branch
SUBJECT: The murder of five civilians and subsequent cannibalism in Sitio Lilong, Barrio Dinwiddie, Cervantes, Ilccos Sur, Iuzon, P.I., during August 1945, and the killing of three civilians in Sitio Penidet, Presidencia Bakun, Mountain Province, Luzon, P. I., on 6 August 1945.
\end{abstract}

\section*{II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:}

In the early part of August 1945 ( \(\mathrm{R} 1,8\) ), six Japenese soldiers were seen going to the home of PITLUNGAY in sitio Lilong ( R 2, 10). Two men fled and hid nearby as the Japanese approached but the Japanese bayonetted to death all five occupants of the house one of whom was a three-year old girl ( \(\mathrm{R} 1,5\) ). The six Japanese ate the flesh from some of the bodies of their victims during the two-day period that they stayed at the house ( \(\mathrm{R} 1,3,10\) ). The first evening, the flesh of the little girl was cut into small pieces, put on the ends of sticks and roasted over an open fire ( R 3 ). The next morning, the filesh of another victim was roasted or boiled with native vegetables ( R 3). The flesh of three of the victims was consumed in this manner ( \(R 3\) ). The body of one of the victims was later thrown into the river that ran in front of the house ( R 4 ). The bodies of the two other victims were not touched. After the Japanese left, the two observers went into the house and saw a piece of human flesh inside of a bag left by one of the Japanese and also inside of one of the kettles that had been used by the Japanese ( \(R\) 4, 8, 11). Two days later, the remains of the victims were buried on the order of the barrio lieutenant ( \(R 8\) ).

On 29 July 1945, the organization of a Japanese soldier, ASADA, Kameichi, vas practically annihilated by American forces ( R 15). ASALA and four other Japanese apparently began to roam the country side ( R 16 ). On 6 August 1945, they came upon three houses near a small stream at dusk and attempted to obtain food at one of these houses. When one of the Japanese approached the door, the man of the house killed the soldier with a knife (R16, 23). Two of the Jepanese then beyonetted to death the man who had killed their companion, and took his body outside ( \(\mathrm{R} 16,23\) ). There were eight persons inside the house and a woman and a girl about ten years old were shouting. The Japanese, fearing that the commotion would rouse the neighbors, covered the mouth of the woman with her clothes and two of the Japanese bayonetted her in the stomach and in back simultaneously, killing her instantly. The little girl was tied by her feet and was killed with bayonets (R16, 17, 23). . The Japanese then left ( R 16).


DOCUMENT 2725
patrol?
A At about \(90^{\prime}\) clock in the evening of August 19, 1944, we left Cebu for Mactan Island. :Then we arrived there, we landed at Opon and from there we went by truck to Cordova. As soon as we arrived at Cordova, the Japanese soldiers began to gather all of the civilians and brought them to the central school house. There they took the clothes of all the women naked and made them stand all night. They severely beat many of the men with clubs, baseball bats and rifle butts. The Japanese took all of the money, jewelry and valuables from the civilians. The next morning, I saw three men tied and beaten and then taken about three kilometers in the southwestern part of Cordova and there beheaded by three Japanese soldiers.

Q Do you remember the names of these Japanese soldiers who beheaded these three men?
A Cpl. Iwao ISHIZAKA, Cpl. MURAKI and another member of the Kempei Tai, I do not remember the name; each of them borrowed a sword and killed one of the men.

Q Do you know the names of the three men that were beheaded?
A I do not know any of them but the reason that they were killed was they were suspected of being guerrillas.

0 Were these men given a trial?
A No.
0 Did you see any other mistreatment of civilians?
A I saw Sgt. TANIYAMA take a lighted match and burn the hair of the womb of a young woman.

Q Do you know the name of that young woman?
A No, I can't remember her name.
Q Did you see any other mistreatment?
A I saw many of the men with their hands tied behind their backs hanging from a rafter and severely beaten with clubs as J described before.

Q Do you know the names of any of those that were beaten?
A The only one I know is the mayor of Cordova by the name of Martin FRANCISCO.

Q What cid they do to Martin FRANCISCO?
A T. YOSHIDA personally man-handled and beat the mayor with a baseball bat until his body and face was bleeding and swollen and black and blue.

Q Did you see anything other than what you have told me?
A That is all I can remember of the incident.
Q How far were you standing from the place where the beheading took place?
A We were all on a truck about two hundred (200) meters away, but we could see what was going on.
Q Handing you the photograph marked Fxhibit "B", I ask you if you recognize any of the men on this photograph as the men you have described in the foregoing statement?
A Yes. Capt. TSURUYAMA is the man wearing white shirt who is second from the left in the front row.

Q Handing you the photograph marked Exhibit "C", I ask
you if you recognize any men in this photograph as the same men you have described in the foregoing statement?
A Yes. T. YOSHIDA appears on the extreme right-hand side of the photograph; T/Sgt. WATANABE is the center man on the photograph.

Q Handing you the photograph marked Exhibit "D", I ask you if you recognize this man?
A Yes. This is a picture of the Corporal Iwao ISHIZAKA whom I have named in this statement.
© Do you have anything else to add to this statement? A That is all I know.

\section*{/s/ Isjdro Cabusas ISIDRO CABUSAS}

COM ONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES )
PROVINCE OF CEBU
CITY OF CEBU \(\quad\left\{\begin{array}{l}\text { SS }\end{array}\right.\)

I, ISIDRO CABUSAS, being duly sworn on oath, state that I have read and understood the foregoing transcription of my interrogation, and all answers contained therein consisting of three (3) pages, are true to the best of my knowledge and bellef.

> /s/ Isidro Cabusas

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12 day of November 1945.
/s/ Henry F. Marshalı, 2nd Lt. Inf.
HENRY F. MARSHAII, 2d. Lt. INF
Investigating Officer, War Crim
Investigating Detachment

\section*{GERTIFICATE}

We, CLAYTON L. NELSON, lst Lt, 02052600, JAGD and HENRY F. MARSHALL, 2d Lt, 01332183 , INF, Investigating officer, War Crimes Investigating Detachment, certify that on 12 November 1945, personally appeared before us ISIDRO CABUSAS and gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth; that after his testimony had been transcribed, the said ISIDRO CABUSAS read the same and affixed his signature thereto in our presence.

City of Cebu, Cebu, P. I. /s/ Clayton L, Nelson, 1st Lt. JAGD
12 November 1945.


\section*{DOCUMENT 2725}
you if you recognize any men in this photograph as the same men you have described in the foregoing statement? A Yes. T. YOSHIDA appears on the extreme right-hand side of the photograph; T/Sgt. WATANABE is the center man on the photograph.

Q Handing you the photograph marked Exhibit "D", I ask you if you recognize this man?
A Yes. This is a picture of the Corporal Iwao ISHIZAKA whom I have named in this stetement.
\& Do you have anything else to add to this statement?
A That is all I know.

> /s/ Isjaro Cabusas

SOMGONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES )
PROVINCE OF CEBU
CITY OF CEBU \(\quad\left\{\begin{array}{l}\text { SS }\end{array}\right.\)
I, ISIDRO CABUSAS, being duly sworn on oath, state that I have read and understood the foregoing transcription of my interrogation, and all answers contained therein consisting of three (3) pages, are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
\[
/ \mathrm{s} / \frac{\text { Isidro Cabusas }}{\text { ISIDRO CABUSAS }}
\]

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12 day of November 1945.

\section*{/s/ Henry F. Marshal1, 2nd Lt. Inf. HENRY F. MARSHALL, 2d. It., INF Investigating Officer, War Crim Investigating Detachment}

\section*{G ERTIE•CATE}

We, CLAYTON L. NELSON, Ist Lt, 02052600, JAGD and HENRY F. MARSHALL, 2d Lt, O1332183, INF, Investigating Officer, War Crimes Investigating Detachment, certify that on 12 November 1945, personally appeared before us ISIDRO CABUSAS and gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth; that after his testimony had been transcribed, the said ISIDRO CABUSAS read the same and affixed his signature thereto in our presence.

City of Cebu, Cebu, P. I. /s/ Clayton Le Nelson, 1st Lt. JAGD CLAYTON L. NELSON, lst Lt, JAGD

12 November 1945.

\author{
\(/ \mathrm{s} /\) Henry \(F\). Marshall, 2nd Lte Inf. HTNRY F. MARSHALL, \(2 \hat{d}\) It, INF Investigating officer, far Crimes Investigating Detachment.
}

- DOCGMENT 2725

\section*{CERTIELCATE}

I, Alva C. Carpenter, Chief, Legal Section, General Headauarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, do herely certify that the attached photostatic cony of the affidnvit of ISIDRO CABUSAS is a true and correst reprcduction of the original affidavit; and that a signed and sworn copy of said affidavit is presentiy on file with this Section.
/s/ Alya_C. Carpenter E]vf C, Garyeriex
Chief, Lagaí Secion.

Witness: /s/ John R. Pritchard
Sworn to before me this 2gri
day of Octoher, 1946, Tiיyro: Japan.
/s/ John R.'Pritorimd
Captain, Irfianery
Summary Court

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Guinal furitroniauio
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
WAR CRINES BRANCH

21 Niarch 1946

MEMORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 253)
THRU: Executive Officer, War Crimes Branch
SUBJECT: Atrocities at Bogo, Ccbu, P.I., August - November 1944.

\section*{II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:}

During August, September, October and November 1944 Japanese military forces maintained the garrison at the Medcilin Sugar Central near Bogo, Cebu, P.I. In these four months civilians in this vicindty were beaten, shot, bayonetted and raped.
on 17 August 1944 a Filipino fisherman was shot and killed because he refused to work at the sugar mill ( R 23).

In September 1944 a suspected guerrilla in custody at the garrison was shot and wounded. As he ran outside the guardhouse in an cffort to escape, he fell and was bayonetted to death ( R 23). Three Filipino girls who had been seized by the Japanese and apparently raped repeatedly were led away from the garrison, after which, shots were heard. Six days later their dead bodies were found near the wharf ( \(R\) 33).

On 12 October 1944 two women were bayonetted to death in their home ( R 22 ) and a third was severely beaten ( R 52). Two other Filipino girls were raped, one of them by several Japanese soldiers ( \(\mathrm{R} 25,28,29\) ). One of the victims then was forced to live with a Japanese corporal as his mistress for three weeks (R 29).

On 17 October 1944 Japanese soldiers burned houses and a' warchouse ( R 2). The same day twenty-five persons were bayonetted to death, apparently in revenge for sabotage and guerrilla activitios (R 17, 18).

During Novomber 1944 two prisoners were bayonetted to death by some twenty Japanese soldiers apparently for having worn khaki clothing (R 10).





























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Document 2818

GENERAL FEADQTARTERS
UNITED STATTS ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
TAR CRIRTS BRENCH

28 Jenuary 1946

MENORANLUN TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 180)

THEU:
SUBJTCT:

Executive Offscer, Var Crimes Branch
Torture and murder of Dumanjue civilians in A.ugust 1944.
II. SUMAAR CF EVIIPNGE:

On 74 Angust 1944, mombers of the Japenese garrison
 Filipino civiliais in Iarrio Cancoe, abcut five kiloneters from Dumanjug wnere iticy were oeaten, stapped, kicired and burned, This treatment was apparently designed to force them to confess giving aid to the guerrilias ( \(\mathrm{R} 2,6\), i. \(0, \mathrm{j} .4\). One of the victir's was also shashed across the thront with a bayonet ( R 2). After tro days of vits sort of treatment, the Japencse fook some of the viotms to fadaicng cliff by the seadf Here, the child into the sea. One of the wiren was killed but the other, by feigning death until the Javanese departed, monaged to escape (R 3). Two men were also repcrited to heve been thrown into the ocean at the same place ( R 3).


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Doc. No. 2P59

\section*{RESTRICTED}

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMAENCRE FUR THE ALIIED PONERS IEGAL SECIION, MENILA

APO 500
1 May 1946

MEIVORANDUM TO:
THRU:
SUBJECT:

Prosecution Section (Report No. 298)
Executive Officer, Legal Section, Manila
Massacres in Camotes Islands, Cebu, P.I., Decembeł 1944.

\section*{II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENGE:}

On 8 December 19.4f, Japanese soldsers rounded up about fortyfive Filipino men, vomein and children in Sticio Canugkey, PiJ.ar, Camotes Islands. The prisoners vere tied together by the nands and vere led to the seasijre in Sitio Toong where they were separated into four gecups and then beycne ited. Thirty-seven of the victims were kilici while the resr surveyed despire severe bayonet wounds ( \(\mathrm{R} 57,58,60,61,64,65,66\) ).

On 27 December 1944, eight Japanese soldiers took eleven men, women and ciniliren from a house in sitio Cabahit, Pilar; tied seven of them to banana trees and bayonetted them to deeth, A young man who we's 31.0 in leaving the house died immedistely after being bayonetted in the chest. Two victims were severely beaten until they fiell on the ground unconscious and a Japanorse soldier jumped on the bociy and neck of one of them several times. A three-year widi shild was hurled by a Japanese soldier at a horse and fell to the ground unconscious ( \(R 44,45,46\) ).

On 29 December 1944, the slaughter of men, women and children In Camotes Isiands reached its frenzied height. Ir Barrio Dapdap, Pilar, between eigit hiunured anc one thousand civjliars: mere assemhled in the cnurch, numbered and led ut to tite focids, coconut plantations and other seclucied places where they were bayonetted by Japanese soldiers. Others who were lefi; in the church were bayonettied and shot and then covered with ary banana leaves, coconut leaves and mats. At least seventy-three persons were identified as islied, twenty were wounded, while the rest were also probably kilied ( \(\mathrm{R} 1,2,5,6,7,10,11,12,15,16\), 19, 20,21 ). In Barrio Esperanza, Pilar, more then three hundred people were assembled in the plaza. They were first soaked with water and then Japanese soldicrs rushed upon them with fixed bayoncts until all the victims fell to the ground. Thirty-seven persons were identified as kijled and only about five survived the bayonetting ( \(R 24,25,26,29,30,31,34,37\) ). And in Sitio Opao, Barrio Lanao, Pilar, about thirty-eight civilians were taken to the mountains and bayonetted. Twentyeight of these civiliens were killed and ten were wounded ( R 40, \(41,48,49\) ).


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DOCUMENT 2816
GENERAL JIEADCTTARTERS
UNITOD STATES ARPY FORCES, PiCIFIC YAR CRIMES BRANCH

AFO 500
2 January 1946
MEMORANDUN TO: Prosecution Eection (Report NO. 142)
THRU: Execative Officer, "ar Crimes Branch
SUBJECT:
The murder of eleven American Baptist teachers of the raculty of the Central Philipoine Cclicpe and the mazder of siz other Amosicans at Camp Hepevale near Tepaz, Caplz Province, Panay, P.I., on 20 December 1.74.3.

\section*{II. SUP'ARY OF SIDEF'CE:}

Japanese officers and erlisted men under the command of a Captain watanjep, engaged in one of the sevencl pirfitive expeditions in Painy İiani, left the townehip of Livecion, Capiz Province, on i\& Deceribe: IO42 for Iloilo City (R 1). The next morning, they reached Cerp hopevale near Tapez, Capiz Province, whien was first sur:ouidded; and then Ceptain WATAMABE and his coidiles ent red the Ganp proper. Sixteen Americans along with three others who tiod been captured previously, were pleced liodor guard whinout focd or water (i 1). In the aftermon of 20 Decenber 793 , one of the American women was seen kneeling with har baics tied behind her back
 femored hor pleas and drew hls semarei sword. An hour inter, inside a house that wes aiready in flames, were discoverod tweive bodies and there was a strong odor of lurning flesh, Some of the victims had been bnyonetted and same had been beheader ( R 2) . Three recks latcr, enother witness who was fainiliar with the names of most of the A cricans visited the scene and was eble to identiry the remains of the victims from teeth, bits of burned cinthing, haif, identification tagsy and a truss. The renains were tainen fron two burned dweilings end buried in the cinuch at Katipunan (R 5, 9), On the day of the exccution, ne Filipino who was in hiaing reported that ho had seen biood on the tiousers of one of the Japanese guards ( \(\mathrm{R} 5,6\) ) and that one of the Japanese told Filifinos that the Americars whom they hed foared wore now gone and that the Flliti os shouid obey the Jadanese (R 6). Arotion witices verifyed that sion saw smoke coming from the Heperoie arca on tha dote of the massacre (F8) and that her buother and a coulin sow the rodies in tinee burnea honses (II 9, -?). Some of the rameins of the Americans weremidentified ( \(R\) l! ). Tho of the bodics were not burned and wers. founc cutsioe (íh 11). All of the victins ex=ent Nra, Rounds, her sin, Doufies, the Clerdy family and Aloert King were..members of the facuity of the Ce:.tral Philippine College at Ilo110 City, Panay (R 1).


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\title{
GENERAL HEADCUARTERS UNITED STATES ARNY FORCES, PACIFIC WAR CRITS BRANCH
}

\section*{APO 500}

30 Decemher 1945
IFDORANDtA TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 140)
THRU: Trecutive Officer, lar Crimes Branch
STBJECT: Punitive expeditions on Pansy Island by Japanese forces against civilians in ceptember 1943 and October 1943.

\section*{IId SURTARY OF EVIDEPCE:}

Thder the \(=0 m m a n d\) of Colonel MATANABE ( \(R\) ll) a group of Japanese were stationed et Iloilo City, Panay, and from time to time smaller groups, commended by himself or other officers, wculd be formed to go on punitive expeditions throughout the island (RI). One such group wes under a Ceptein HATAIABE, end his principal subordinates were IIoutenant OTSIKA, Sergent SIF\&TA, :arrant Officer SHIN, Sergeant MATEUZAKI (R 1). Tיis group left Iloilo City on 10 September 1943 and vent to Passi by truck (R 1). A patrol brought back two Filipino boys and ane girl who were cuestioned all night while tied to \(\varepsilon\) stake. The next morning they were beheaded, after which the Japenese left ( R I). Tro of the Filipino "cargadors" were beheaded by Sergeent HIRAT/ because they could no longer carry the beggage of the Japanese officers to whom they were assignad (R 1). In Barrio Lungao, Passi, many Filipino civilian men, women and children were questioned by the Japanese then killed and their bodies thrown into a fire. The whole berrio was burned ( R 1) . Many other civilians were killed in other berrios. The Japancse known to have perticipated in the beheadings are Ceptain U!TANABF, "arrant officer SHIN, and Sergeant HIRATA (R 1) and I, ieuterant OTSUKA (R 2). SHIN and OTSUKA exccuted the family of Marianc LJM in barrio Jinomonua, Nueva Invencion, consisting of the man, his wife, and three chiliren ( \(R\) 10) In the same barrio the civilians were questioned and asked if they wore any relation to the BAJ ! EZA iamily. Many of those auestioned enswered thet they were because BAITPEA was prominent family in the community. All of this group were shot and their bodies thrown into a fire (R 2). From the remeining civilians a women and her six children, eged one to twelve, yere ruestinacd and denied being related to a certain ran who had previously atterpted to escape. Her youngest child wes torn from her arms by Eaptain ngoinst the ropd, the blood splattering onto the clothes of the wi.tnesses ( R 3 ). Other soldiers seized the other children by the feet rnd used them as clubs to beat the man and the woman. Then all of them were dragged into a fire, though the mother was still alive at that time (R 3). At enother plece two girls, one of whom wes pregnant, were ceught by the Japnnese enc mede to dance naked until they were exhausted. The next morning Capiain WiTANABE ordered the girls bayonetted to death ( R 3 ). This group of Jrapanese killed six hundred and fifty people ( \(R\) 3). Another group traveled to the towns of \(A\) juy and Sara killing many civilians on the vay ( \(R 5,6\) ). Atrocities comritted in these two cities by some of the same Japanese mentioned in this report is the subject of report number 131. Lieutenant OTSUKA was seen to have killed one person in Ajuy ( \(R 11\) ) nnd two others on the way to Sara (R 11). In Sare the Japanese sent a message to guerrillas to surrender with the promise that nothing would be done to them. Two guerrillas did surrender, but after questioning them, Sergeant heTSYZAKI beheaded them ( \(R\) 6). The group of

\section*{DOCUMENT 2836 \\ a 1}

Japanese continued their travels and beheaded bodies of mrny men, women, and children still gusinting blood were obscryed along the way ( R 6). In one barwio at lcest che hundred men, vomen, and children were beheaded by cinptain MaTAN:BE, Sergennt NATSTZAKI and others (R 6). Others ticre beneaded by shy ( R 6, 7). At one barrio Licutenont OTZUKA aro two cthers behcadod thir in people ( R 10), and fift. more were executed at anoth:er Iocation (i 21).

On 17 October 1943 enothor punitive expecition of Jepanese started from Ilulio Cizy by notor launch and arrived at the town of Batan on the norch coest of Fanay Island on 18 October 1943 (R 14) All the civilitars fin the tiow were investigated by the light of a bonfire and during the investigation were ieaten with ciubs and made to walk through the rire (P 14). About three o'clock in the morning the Japancse received orders to prosced and opproximately one hundrec and forty civizians including two pries s were beheaded by OTSUKA, KUWANO and other Japanese soidiers ( \(\mathrm{R} 14,15,19\) ). Other offioers or the expedition vere Lisuterest ciolonel rozerA, the Island commender, Captain \#ATANABE, who was second in command of the expedition and twc Jepanese named KMMI and KAI ( \(\mathrm{R} 14,15\) ). The expedition lasted for sixty-four deys and went to many town among them being New washington, Balete, Libasac, Bange, nnd sevcrèl torms on Trblas Island off the northwest coasi of Poney Island. Part of the expedition then came back to Now "qashingion, wert through sevezal smell vilileges along mountain trails, and arrived in Banga on 1 December 2943, From there they vent to Pendar and left Pandan on 1.8 December by motor launch for Iloilo city arriging on 19 Docembar 194.3. While in the town of flevas, KUwano and orsukn kilied between thiry and forty old men, women, and children (R16), and in Balete thirty men were killed by these two men (R 16). Oth r people were tortured and killed in verious places ( \(R\) 16). Lieutenant Colonel TOZUKA headed one patrol of Japanese ( F is, 20) , The Japunese reasoning was thet an old men was likely to be toe fether of a son or have a son-13 law in the Philippinc Army, the woinen cither iad ? husband or brother or son in the army end cherefore eli were nonsiocred euinty of gucrrilla activities (a \(i 6\) ). While on the island of Tablas the Japanese ceme across two peoje ilvirg in small huts in the mountain. They were investigated but did rot give the proper answers, and the man, who was about sevency years uld, wâs st.nbed in the back rith a bolo upon Lieutenant KUMAlis ordes (R 17). A blind women, who had been urable to flee frem the Japances, wes discovored the next day, takon from ief touise; and her cluthes vere stripped from her body. Soine of tibe Jajuaege manhequice ner privete partis. She screamed and ewed, wut lieuterant kimat had Joponose soldiers tie her hands benind her tavii, tincs the i:ee legs ve aser hends and suspend the yoman from a tece with hir tead hargurg dinn. The Japanese
 hundrods of pecple in Bnom, Aluaras, Bolete, Luabay and other

 (R 21).


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DOCUMENT 2829

\author{
GENTMIL LHELOUAPTERS \\ SUPREME CCRCANDEE FVR THE ALLIED POWERS LEGAL SECTION, MANILA
}

APO 500
15 May 1946
MEMORANDUA TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 303)
THRU: Executive Officer, Legal Section, Manila
SUBJECT: Murder of thirty and attempted murder of six Filipinos at Bairlo Calupa-an (Quezon), San Carios, Neg:os Occilental, P.I.g on 29 Alugust 1943 and 10-12 February 1944.

\section*{II. SUMARY OF EVIDENCE:}
a. On 29 August 1943, a Japanese force of about one. hundred men went over the San Carlos mountain to the area around Barrio Cudcud, Calupa-an and Malaiba, for the purpose of suppressing guerrilla activities. In the ccurse of this expedition, one civilian was killed with a sword ( \(R\) 2) and four others Were summarily shot on sight ( \(R 4,7,10,12\) ).
b. On 10-12 February 1944, another punitive expedition was organized in San Carlos, Negros Occidental, and dispatched to the area designated by the Japanese Force as "bandit zone". They combed the Darrios of Linothangan, Malaiba, Calupa-an (Quezon), Balabag and then returned to San Carlos. Twenty-six prisoners, some of whom were volunteer guards, were taken at Lalaiba, questioned, beaten up, tortured and then brought into the woods where they were bayonetted. Four survived from bayonet wounds inflicted upon them. The next day, twenty-two bodies were identified and buried by the families and friends of the victims (R 109).
c. During this same period, another Filipino civilian was captured by some Japanese troops in Sitio Villa Iowa, San Carlos, Negros Occidental and brought to a house which was then burned (R 49). Another victim was captured in Barrio Pula, tortured, beaten up and then bayonetted to death (R 80). In Barrio Tutuboy, a Filipino volunteer guard was shot to death by members of the Japanese raiding party while fleeing from them ( R 152).



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\(?\) Mere you included in this groun?
No, because I wes hoiding my year-old ohile in my arms. The Jopaness let me En.

Q Cen you give un any of the names of the oeople that were killed at this time as many as you know, and their approximate anesp

 Ango TRIGTEZA, 25, mind Mrs. diojampo FYILA, 22, and baby: all Fillpinca.

Q San you give lis any of the mames of the Jepamese tho vere in chargo of the eroups whioh oonduetad chis lavestigation nnd ki:line?
A Yes, Ceptein VATANABE was in oompand of sho epemp. Sorgeant l'atsizaki wan in oharge of the sorturins of IRISTEZA and was also respunalble for the roumilat up of all the oivilians. It was saptain nafacais who eeve the cormand to exeoutn these aiviliane.
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Were the bodies of the killed civillene buriat twope ot the ilte of the kililine?
A only one that I kinm of he wan puried by hia pelotivas. others wero burlad ot psaces 1 do met mane. Inciaimed bodies were orapated by some of the ofvi. liens who petupned two daye letep.
© After the killing, what mopjeaca"
- The past of lis were confinod in the zumeenerotlen comp for three deye. Dupling this sime we mepe tet given wator or food, and at the e:y of the smiph tay wo wore poleosed ard inld to guppender the palifales dey. The tum surientered the pisilamind day, tret of Ala not roturn to the town.
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\section*{[0ctrams 2727}

NONITO IImUNOAAINA, artar havirig boun Aly sworn, tentirlad at No. 99, I. do la liama Bt., 110110 City, Pinny Iainnc, on 2 Novamber 1945, os rolicwia:

A Stato your nama, npe, nddracin, notionsilts and sorsu, ation.
A Nonito Tubunabanwn, 3a yenra old, Nante Xesinol jt., Jnro, IJoilo City, Filipino, oooupntion painter.

Q Do you expeot to romr in nt your pramant ad irasa, or do you nxpeot to movn"
A. Yes. I expeot, to ralinin nt my nyanent, aidroes.

Q We understand ehat you may know of atrooltifin ormmi":tod by the Japanarn l'Ps whila thay wara in pminy. "ill youl kinaly explain u!: your essnciation with the Jopaniag at, thu time that the nirociticen wnen sommittiont
A Ve were prinonorn of the Jnphnazg itia in tis provinulal Jo11, Iloilo City, from July 5, 1943, until Boptombir 9, 1943. On 8eptomber 9, 1942, wo wrise inad up by ige, MANAIM, the wardon, and thoso phyajomlig fit warm ford id into alirvioe as "cargadors", to ohrry tha annipmailt of sha Japencige in a punitive expedition.

Q di.11 you kindly describe the Aatalin wifreinding tis nerooities of which ymi have krowledeon
 trucks, togethor with the inunlina thats, we liare to of mpy.
 ment we ware to onrry. I wan namigniA to jito. dratika, who worked uniar inptain liataitableg whan we apyifad at Imanit the Jopanese sont init antrol and hrounht tagk thren Filia pino civiliens; two hoyn and ona elmi. APMer tilestinting these thrto ali nient, while thay ware tiel to a atake, the
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\section*{CERTIEICATE}

I, Alva C. Carpenter, Chief, Legal Section, General Headquorters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, do hereby certify that the attached photostatic cony of the affidarit of NONITO TUBUNGBANWA is a true and correct reproduction of the original affidavit; and that a signed and sworn copy of said affidavit is presently on file with this Section.
/s/ Alva \(\frac{C}{\text { Cripentcr }}\) Carpenter Cnief, Legei scction.

Witness: /s/ John R. Pritchard
Sworn to before me this 29th day
of October, 1946, Tokyo, Japen.
/s/ John R. Pritchard Captain, Infantiry Summary Court


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\section*{DOCIMENT 2724}

Q How many Japanese soldjers were responsible for this atrccity and what were their names?
A The:e were five Jopanese soldiers, but I do not know their names, neither can I cescribe them now.

Q Did you personally witness any other atrocity after the one you just mentioned?
A Yes. On this same day, and in the same barrio, I saw two other Filipino civilians killed by the same group of Japanese soldiers. They were Aurelio ARTACHO, 38 years old, and Lucas DOCTOLERO, 40. The former was chopped in the neck with a sword and thrown into a house which later on was set afire by the Japanese. The latter was crucified to the ground with three six-inch nails; one on each wrist, and the third driven thru the base of ris skull. I was standing only two meters from where this occurred.

Q Did you witness any other atrocity?
A Yes. That same afternoon at about two P.M.g just upon our arrival at Barrio Batoinsay, I personally witnessed the killing of two Filipino male civilians and one woman. Colonel WATANABE conducted a personal investigation of the woman regarding the whereabouts of her husband. She answered that her husband had died before the outbreak of the war. Not satisfied with the answer, Colonel WATANABE made her squat on the ground and ordered one of his men to behead her. The woman was instantly killed. The two Filipino men were bayonetted to death by other Japanese soldlers upon orders of colonel WATANABE. I was an eye wi.tness to all this.
? Do you know the names of these three victims:
\(A\) The name of the woman was Nening NAVARPO, 38 years old. I do not know the names of the two men.

Q Do you know the names of the Japanese soldiers who killed these three people?
A No.
Q Do you remember what they looked like?
A No. I have forgotten their features.
"hat happened after thisn
A At about 3 P.M. of the same afternoon, eight more male civi.ians were apprehenade, and á 4 Sof. triree women were captured. The next morning, September 19th, these victims were taken one by one into a nearby nipa shack which had no walls. I could see all that happened because I was right underneath this same house. Some of them were beheaded and some were bayonetted to death by the same group of Japanese responsible for the other atrocities I have mentioned. The victims of this atrocity whose names I know were: Cresencio TUPAZ, 19; JUAN (KIKI), 55; Jose VILLAMOR, 22; Teodonico VILLAMOR 15; Felix ARIEGO, 35; Aiberto NARTE, 25; Milagras TUPAS, 17; Magdalena cfRRILLO, 20; Natividad MARITSADO, 27; and Bonifacio TUPAZ, 35.



\section*{CERTITICATE}

I, A: Va C. Carpenter, Chief, Legal Section, General Feadquarters. Supieme Commander for the Allied Piswers, do hereby c:ertify that the attached photostetic copy of 'he af'fidavit of CAYETANO' NARRA is a true and correc: reproduction of the original affidavit; and that a signed and sworn copy of said affidevit is presently on ille with this Section.

> /s/ Alvace Carpenter Alvac. Carperter, Chief, Legai Section.

Witness: /s/ JornR. Pritchata Sworn to before me this 29th day of October, 1946, Tokyo, Japı n.
/s/ John R. Pritchard Captein, Infantry Summe:-'y Court

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\section*{DOCUN NT 2721}

LORENZO POLITO, being duly sworn, testified at Inopacan, Leyte, P. I., on 10 January 1946, as follows:

Q State your full name, age, nationality, occupation and home address.
! LORE \(\mathrm{i} Z \mathrm{ZO}\) POLITO, 18 years old, Filipino, student, and a resident of Inopacan, Leyte, P. I.

Q Tell all that you saw when you were picked to accompany the Japanese patrol in the vicinity of Inopacan, Leyte.
A On or about 6 March 1944 at the compuls \({ }^{\text {fry }}\) morning exercases which civilians were forced to attend by the Japanise garrison at Inopacan, Anono Alporaue Dedace, Gil Picon and myself were selected by the Japanese to carry their provisions on a mopping up patrol. The members of the patrol were from the Japanese garrison at Tacloban; therefore I do not know the names of the officers, noncommissioned officers or soldiers in the patrol. About eight olclock in the morning, right after breakfast, the patrol left Inopacan and proceeded thru the surrounding barrios. About four o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, we came through the sitio of Ginabay, Barrio of Mofao, Town of Inopacan. The sitio had been vacated by the people except for a woman, Anatalia Matinao, and her newly born child; a man, Santiago Humok about 70 years old, and two small children whose names I do not know, all of whom were found by the Japanese soldiers when they searched the houses in the sitio. They tied the hands of these five prisoners behind their backs and tied them to separate posts in a nipa house. Then the house was set afire by the Japanese and these prisoners were burned alive. After the house was set afire and was burning, the patrol left the area. It was nom night and the patrol proceeded to Ginabay and from Ginabay they proceeded along the river to Daugdog. Between these two sitios, the patrol caught a boy about seventeen years old whose name I do not know, and bayonetted him. The second day of the patrol, we reached Canangay, at about two o'clock in the afternoon. A young woman, Eufresina Payot, about 24 years old, was caught hiding in the grass. The officer in charge of the entire patrol tore off her clothes, while two soldiers held her. He then had her taken to a small nipa' hut, without walls, about fifteen feet away from where she was caught and there the officer in charge of the patrol used his sabre to cut her breasts and womb. Soldiers held her while the officer did this. At first, the girl was screaming. She finally lay still and silent. The Japanese then set fire to the nipa hut. When the girl was caught and her clothes were torn off by the officer, I was about a hundred meters away. The nipa hut they took her to was only about eighty or eighty-five meters away from where I stood. I had a clear unobstructed view of all this because there pas nothing between myself and the place where she was caught and the hut in which she was mutilated and killed. These were the only killings I saw on the patrol, which lasted a week in all before we got back to Inopacan.
Q Can you describe or name any of the Japanese in the patrol?
A I do not recall their names, but the officer in charge of the patrol had a scar on his breast which was horse-shoe shaped. The sear ran from shoulder to shoulder and down below the collar bones. I could see this scar because the officer would take his shirt off when he was hot. He was about 35 years old; about 5'8" tall; slender build; erect; straight legged; head was shaved; no moustache, no glasses; a yellowish complexion, slanted eyes; no missing or gold teeth. I did not notice any scars or amputations on him. He vire a kaki uniform With cloth leggins; a cloth cap with neck protectors; he was armed with a sword and a pistol.

Q Do vou have anything further to add to this statement?
A No.

> Lorenzo Polito
> LORFNZO POLITO

COM ONVEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES )
PROVINCE OF LEYTE
TOWN OF INOPACAN
SS

I, LORENZO POLTTKO, being duly sworn on oath, state that I have read and understood the faregoing transcription of my interrogation and all answers contained therein, consisting of two (2) pages, are trise to thie best of my knowledge and bellef.

> /s/ Lorenzo Polito
> LORENZO POLITO

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of January, 1946.
/s/Villiam M. Moorhead WILLIAM M. MOORHEAD, 2d Lt,Or:
Investigating Officer, Nar Crimes Investigating Detachment.

CERTIFICATE
We, WILIIAM M. MOORHEAD, 2d Lt, 01559953, Ord, and GUILLERMO J. REYES, 2d Lt, F-45814, Inf, certify that on 10th day of January, 1946, personally appeared before us LORENZO POLITO, and gave the foregoing answers to the several auestions set forth; that after his testimony had been transcribed, the said LORFNZO POLITO read the same affixed his signature thereto in our presence.

Inopacan, Leytc, P. I.
\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { /s/ William M. M: orhead } \\
& \text { WILLIAM M. MOORHEAD, 2d Lt,Ord } \\
& \text { Investigating Officer, War Crires } \\
& \text { Investigating Detachment. } \\
& \text { /s/ Guillermo J. Revcs } \\
& \text { GUILLERMO J. REYES, 2nd Lt, In: } \\
& \text { Investigatins Officer, War } \\
& \text { Crimes Investigating Detachems }
\end{aligned}
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10 J: vilegry 1946

\section*{CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:}

> /8/ M111am-M, Moophead

DOCUMENT 2721

\section*{CERTIFIGATE}

I, Alva C. Carpenter, Chief, Legal Section, General Headquarters: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, do hereby certify that the attached photostatic copy of the affidavit of LORENZO POLITO is a true and correct reproduction of the original affidavit which was taken at Inopacan, Leyte, P. I. and subsequentiy accidentally destroyed. This true copy was made from the shorthand notes by the reporter.

> /s/ Alva C. Carpenter    Chief, Legal Section.

Witness: /s/ John Re Pritchard Sworn to before me this 29th day of October 1946, Tokyo, Japan.

\author{
/s/ John R. Pritchard Captain, Infantry Summary Court
}

























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/LORENzo politol





(GRN) /LORENzO POLITO/

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 /IWILLIAM M. MOORHEAD / 2ad dt. and.

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\]







 /JOHN R. PRITCHARD/


 /JOHNR. PRITCHAD/ 1.

DOCUMENT 2729
- RADIAMODA, (Moro), after heving been duly sworn, testified at the Municipal Building, Dansalan City, Lanao, Mindenao, Philippines, on 5 February 1946, as follows:
- Please state your name, age, civil status, permancnt address, religion, and nationality.
A RADIAMODA, 35 years old, married, resident of Barrio Rayah, Municipal District of WATO, Lanao Province, Mindanao, P. I., Hohammedan, and a Filipino.

Q Do you intend to change your address and if so, will you please give us the names and addresses of the persons who would likely know your future whereabouts?
A I do not intend to change my address as that is my home.
Q what was your occupation in 1042 and what is now your present occupation?
A In 1942 I was a farmer while prescntly I am a merchant.
Q Do you know of anything unusual that happened in the year 1942 in Barrio Rayah, Municipal District of WATO, Lanao Province, Mindanao, Philippines?
A Yes, sir.
Q will you please state in your own words just what happened indicating as accurate as possible the cetails of the incident if any, the date whon it occurred and the perpetrators if any, as well as the victims?
A It was one early dawn in August 1942 when sone Japenesc soldiers from the garrison stationed at fansalan City, Lana 0 , about hundred of them and under the command of four Japanese officers, one of whom was Ceptein NAKAMURA (FNU) raided our barrio (Rayah). Our barrio had a population of about 2,500. He were taken by surprise. When the Japanese arrived they imrediatcly begen bayoneting the people including those whom they found fishing in the lake. After a while they burned the barrio, completely razing down to the ground about eight houses. It was only when the houses were set on fire that the population ceme to know just whet was happening. In the commotion that ensued some four Japenese soldiers were killed. The Japanese kept on firing and bayoncting the people and they had completely gained control of the barrio, they took me end three others as prisoners. They brought us with them to their gerrison at Dansolan, Loneo, where Col. TANAKA questioned us about the whereebouts of the allcged rifles and other erms supposedly being kopt by us in our barrio. To this I answered that there are no rifles or arms in our barrio for if there were any either they should have been used by the jeople cgeinst the Japanese during the raid or that they should have been captured and taken by the Jopenese after the raid. They, howevers did not maltreat us, during our stay of one day in the garrison in the course of their questioning. Ne were finally released on the gunrantec of cur then lunicipal Mayor appointed by the Japancse by the name of MORO SOMACOP. I understend that our release was also expedited by the quarrel thet ensued between a cortain Captain TAKEUCHI who initinlly opposed the staging of the raid in our barrio, end Cepte in NAKARMPA. I was present during the whole raid and ell in all there wore 24 Moros killed and about ten were wounded. liosi cf those killed died of bayo:et wourds on the stomeci: with thejr intestines buiging cowards the ground, while others died from gunshot wounấs cri zac head and heart.

Q Could you please give us the names and ages of the victims of this atrocity?
A Yes, sir. After the incident we kept a record of the names and ages of those thet werc killed as far is they could then be identified. Those that wicre vounded we do not keep the record of their names. The following Moros were killed: MAKALANDONG, Male, over 60 yenrs old, married: dangkogan, Male, 35 yerrs old, married; Rataban, Mrle, 40 years old, married; SUMAGINA, Male, 45 years old, merried; aKAR, Male, 28 years oid, married; OLAAT, Fenale, over 60 yoars old, widow; DIGAYAN Melo, 50 years old, married; OMANTA, Female, wife of Digayan, 42 yenrs old; DATU MANGODOH, Male, 55 years old, married; MACAONDAS, tale, 39 ycars old, widower; MOLIIN, Female, 25 years old widow; BENSEKAN Female, 28 yerrs old, widow; PALAW, Male, 60 years old, married; BANTOC, Female, 48 years old, vidow; PANT,OOPAN, Fe . male, 30 vears old, single; SALILANGAN, Female, 32 years olv single; hor sister, NAPUYONG, Female, 30 years old, single; PANAW, female, 49 yeers old, widow; MAKAANDAL, Male, 27 years old, single; \(n\) nd MAKAPUDI, Male, 46 years old, marrie All of these victims are residents of barrio Reyah, Municipal District of Wato, Lanfo Province, Mindanao, Philippines The other four colld not be identified then.

Q Who were the three others you mentioned thet were taken prisoners by the Japanese together with you?
A They were RinBang, male, 39 years old, married; TOGAYA, male, 35 years old, married; and mangóndatu, male, 36 years old, married; ell Moros end residents of Rayah Wato, Lanao, MIndanao, Philippines.
Q Could you please describe to us this Captoin NAKAMIRA you mentioned as the leader of the Japancse party thet committed tis atrocity?
A Yes, sir. He was tall, stout and handsome. He had no musteche, hed two gold teeth on his left ard right incissors, well shaved hend.

Q Anything else you could tell us about this atrocity?
A Nothing else.
/s/ Rndia
\begin{tabular}{l} 
RADIA \\
COMMONWEALTH OF T:IE PHILIPPINES \\
PROVINCE OF LANAO \\
CITY OF DANSALAN
\end{tabular}
SS

I, RADIAMODA, being duly sworn on oath, state that \(I\) had read to me and understood the foregoing transcription of my in terrogation and all answers contained therein, consisting of two (2) pages, are true to the best of my knowledge and bellef

> /s/ Radiamuda

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th dey of February 1946.

\author{
/s/ JUAN F. ECHIVERRI, \\ JUAN F: ECMIVERRI, 2d Lt., InT.F Investigating officer, War Crime Investigating Detachment
}

\section*{COMR ONGEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES ) PROVINCE OF LANAO CITY OF DAIISALAN}

I, ADOC BAGUMBARAN, resioing at Dansalan City, Lanao, Mindanao, Philippines, being duly sworn on onth, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Maranaw and from Maranaw to English respectively, and thet after being transcribed, I truly translated the foregoing deposition contrining two (2) prges, to the witness; that the witness thereupon in my presence affixed his signature: thereto.

\section*{/s/ ADOC BAGUMBARAN
}

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of Februnry, 1946.

> /s/ Juen F. Fchiverri
> Jün fo ECrIñRI, 2d Lt., Inf. (PA)Investigring Officer, 沙 Crimes Investigating Detachment

\section*{CERTIFICATE}

WE: JUGN F. ECHIVERRI, 2d Lt.4 0-32720, Inf., (PA), and HERBERT L. NYERS, 2d Lt., 01334002 , Ini., certify that on 5 th day of February, 1946 persontily appearcd before us RADIAMOND and according to ADOC BAGUNABARAN, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein; that after his testimony had been transcribed, the said RADIAMONDA had read to him by the said interpreter the same and affixed his signature thereto in our presence.

Densalan City, Leneo Mindaneo, Philippines.
/s/ Juan Fe Echiverri
JUAN F. EGEVEARI, 2 d It., Inf. (PA)
Investigating Officor, War Crimes
Investigating Letachment

5th February 1946
/s/ Herbert Myers
 Invesiigating Oificer, Mar Crime Invostigating Detacinment

\section*{CERTIEICATE}
I. Alva C. Carpenter, Chief, Legal Seotion, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, do hereby certify that the attached photostatic copy of the affidavit of RADIAMODA (Moro) is a true and correct reproduction of the originad affidavit; and that a signed and sworn copy of said affidavit is presently on file with this Section.
/s/ Alvac. Carventer
Chief, Legal section.

Witness: /s/ John R. Pritchard
Sworn to before me this 29th
day of October 1946, Tokyo, Japan.

> /s/ John R. Pritchard
> Captain, Infantry Summary Court

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7 March 1946
MENORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 233)
IHRU : Executive Officer, War Crimes Branch
SUBJECT, : Davao Penal Colony and Davao City Civilian Internment Camp.

\section*{II. SUNMARY OF EVIDENCE:}
\(a_{r}\) The Davao Penal Colony, in Davao, Mindanao, Pris, was operaiea by tho Cominons?alth doveriment as an insular penitentiary. The evidence is conflicting as to when the Japanese took over the Colony, but it appears that it was first occupied by a unit of the Japanese Navy under the command of Captain Yaifada sometime in January 1942 (R 73, 79, 87) and then elements of the army under Major MABDA, Kazuo, took it over sometime in February (R 87) or September ( K 74 ) 1942. When the Japanese occupied the Colony, they took full control of the entire camp including about one thousand civilian evacuees ( F 87 ), about five hundred insular prisoners, and an unknown number of guerrilla detainees in the area ( R 88 ). There is no evidence as to when the Japanese began to operate the Colony as a prisoner of war camp, but in October 1942, a large group of Japanese soldiers arrived with American military prisoners ( \(R\) 74). Nost of the Americans came from Drisoner of war camps in Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Mindanao, \(p\). I., and Cabanatuan, Mueva Eicija, Luzon, 3. In Eetween October 1942 and Júne 1944, there were from two thousand to two thousand two hundred American prisoners of war in the camp (A 57, 64, 79, 151)。 This number gradually decreased due to deaths, escapes and transfers. On 14 Jarch 1944, over five hundred guerrilla prisoners were also brought to the Davao Penal Colony ( \(R\) 67) 。 The Filipino civilian evacuees were housed in the Guards ' and Employees' Quarters (R 73), the insular prisoners in the warehouse (i 88), and the American orisoners, in the barracks and in the compound formerly occupied by the insular prisoners ( \(\mathrm{R} 78,88\), Ex 2, 3).

From the time the Japanese army took over the Davao Penal Colony until 10 April 1944 , MAEDA, Kazuo, was the commanding officer of the camp ( \(R 3,21,27,31,35,40,49,55,74,87\), 129 , 133 ) He was succeeded by TAKASAKI, Iku, who remained commanding officer of the camp until June 1944 ( A 133 ) Thereafter the camp was placed under the control of Captain KUNNO's, Jiro unit ( R 83), the HAYASHI Unit, the SAKAMOTO Unit, and the Field Depot Company under Captain UYEMURA until finally evacuated in September 1944 ( R 84).

During the first three months, fod in the camp was satisfactory ( \(\mathrm{R} 10,31\) ) . However, throughout the entire period from warch 1943 to September 1944; food furnished the prisoners of war was inadequate, consisting of from three hundred to
five hundred and fifty grams of rice per day, weed ("kangkongi) soup, and camotes, improperly prevared. For want of oroper and adequate food, one-third of the more than two thousand prisoners were at all times suffering from beri-beri, scurvy, pellagra, and various other skin diseases. About seventy-five prisoners actually died of starvation or malnutrition ( \(R\) 67). Inadequate feeding of the prisoners was not due to lack of food for there was plenty which was merely allowed to rot, some of which were raised by the prisoners themselves ( \(\mathrm{R} 10,12\), \(31,37,38,39,50,57,64,67,71,74,75,76,105,109)\).

No medical supplies were issued to the prisoners until some were received from the Red Crosse Littie or no medical care was provided (i 2, 12, 75, 89, 90). No clothing was issued and most of the time the prisoners wore nothing but G-strings ( \(\mathrm{R} 68,74,75,94,100,108\) ) . They were not even allowed to wear shoes received from the Red Cross ( \(R\) 33) , and many of the Red Cross packages were not distributed to the prisoners ( \(R\) 89).

Eousing accommodations were inadequate. One hundred fifty to two hundred prisoners being housed in quarters intended for only fifty to sixty men ( \(R 39,50,64,148\) ). The buildings were infested with bedbugs, iice and rats ( R 39) .

There is no evidence concerning the sanitary facilities in the camp except the statement of the Japanese medical officer, YOSHIMURA, Osamu, to the effect that there were two latrines which could accommodate forty men each located fifty meters from the barracks ( R 148) 。

Prisoners were forced, over their protests, to construct airfields ( \(\mathrm{K} 4,45,46,105,108,149\) ).

Collective punishment of prisoners was frequently resorted to for individual infraction of rules. For the escape of ten prisoners, all the prisoners were transferred to a detention compound, their food rations cut in half for several weeks and they were forced to perform hard labor ( \(113,39,40,50,52,55,104\) ); the entire camp went without food for three whole days because one nrisoner escaped (R 12): six hundred fifty prisoners were forced to line up, nude, and the penis of each burned with lighted cigarettes because two tin.shears were discovered in the barracks (R 32); fifteen men on a basket-making detail were punished, forced to sit upright at attention and beaten for the risdeed of one (R 57); and eight men were placed in the guardhouse for two weeks, tortured and beaten because seven prisoners escaped ( R 62).

For flimsy reasons or none at all, prisoners were confined in the guardhouse for long periods or otherwise punished rithout trial (R 4, 23, 24, 27, 32, 38, 39, 50, 57, 59, 62, \(64,66,67,69,75,89,91,93,94,95,104)\).

There were innumerable beatings ( \(R\) 27) by fists ( \(R 34\), 66), rifles ( \(\mathrm{R} 21,38,66,75,89\) ), bayonets ( \(R\) 21), revolvers ( R 24) sabers ( R 34 ), bamboo noles ( \(\mathrm{R} 21,66\) ), sticks ( R 38), clubs ( \(R\) 88), rubber shoes ( \(R\) 10), shovels ( \(R\) 94), kicking ( R 68 ), and slapping ( F 89).

Aside from beatings, prisoners were tortured in several different inhuman ways: kept in a kneeling position for periods extending to threc days ( \(\mathrm{R} 12,62\) ); forced to kneel
on cinders ano rocks, with arms extended, and to carry boards and bricks with the body leaning backwards so that the entire weight would fall to the rear ( K 27 ); compelled to stand or kneel in water or warm tea while live electric wires were applied to the bcdy ( \(\mathrm{R} 57,59\), 104) ; tied to 9 barbedawire fence with arms outstretched wile burning boards or sticks were applied to his body or facc (R 69). Prisoners were forced to hit each other until they bled ( R 94)

American prisoners of war werc used as targets in bayonei practice resulting in death or serious iniury to many (R 71).

During bombing raids, prisoners werc not alloived to seek shelter, thus exposing them to bombings and gunfire (R 69).

Prisoners wero forced to work from ten to fourteen hours a day (A 10, 108).

Filipino civilians and insular prisoners :ere qlso subjected to these torturese Personal belongings food and utensils of the civilians mere confiscated. Incy vere slapped, kicked and beaten ( \(R\) 74). Insular prisoners were clubbed, kicked, s lapped, shot, bayonetted, tortured, exposed to bombings, starved, divested of money, clothes and other personal belongings, denicd medical ald and forced to perform hard labor in quarrics \({ }^{7}\) irdromes and other military projects for long hours ( \(\mathrm{R} 68,69,70,89,93\), 94, 96).
b. Also included in the record is cvidence of atrocities comnitted by the Jananese at the Amcrican civilian internment camp in Davao City during the period fron 20 December 1941 to 25 Deccmber 1943 ( K 112-128) On 20 Dccembcr 1941, the Japancsc found the American residents of Davao City in the Davao Club Building whore they had previously congregated in anticioation of the coming of the Japanese ( \(F_{113}\) ). Another American resident, who was 2nrehended on his way from a convent to his hotel and who was previously detained in prison in the Davao constabulary barracks after having been beaten and looted of his money, watch and other personal bclongings, was brought to the Davao Club Building, bringing the total number of internees to thirteen ( \(R 122\), 123, 124, 126). These internees werc moved from one building to another until finally, in August 1942, they werc quartcred in a dance hall at the outskirts of the city. The number of internees grew to two hundred and fifty-four (R 113) . on 21 August 1942, two hundred and eighty other American civilians from Zamboanga arrived in Davao City and were internod in the same dance hall ( R 119). Fihis dance hall vas 7 one-story building, about sixty feet lons and thirty feet wide, which had only one room where the internees were placed without regard to sex or age. It had neither furniture nor beds and the internees slept on the wooden floor which ras wet most of the time because the roof leaked, and it raincd alnost every day. There was only a few fect of yard space where the internces dug a trench for cooking their food and two latrines, one for vomen and the other for men. The internees had to buy their own food because no food was furnished by the Jaoznese. Their diet consisted only of a spall arount of rice and grass soup, and four internees died of malnutrition. They were not given medical supplies nor medical treatment. The Japanese guards constantly beat and mistreated the internees (R 119). On 25 December 1943, the internees were shipped to Monila ( R 113, 118, 122).

divicintiary Doculicnt No. 5052B.

\section*{2.}
traceay otier tian inforization civan by a Ji.panesc officer mhovisited the dospitila on honăay, february l6th, He was a Licutcnont. He said it was the ILperfal Guards rho entored the Hospital first. Ho spoke very cooi anglishn Thesc troops were decessci in tropical Green uniforis, steel holinets and usual wilitary equirrant. Their uniforms wore carsoufleged Fith branches of trces and trige. lany of thel. rare like walling shrubs, Thoso ricn fiore all about 6 foct tall. liost of the Jupanese seon latcr reace short in stature, about the 5 foot riack. The Cormending officer of the hospital, 8 otier ofeicers and ryoujf cscaped doath and injury. The C.O. Coloncl J. \(\because\). Craven, contuctud the mory after the raid but could not Got any sitisfaction fron thcies He pointed to the Rcd Cross brassurcis and burkinge but l:e bas brushed uriay und no notice taten of hia.. There did not appear to be any officecr in cliarge of the japuncse.
 the ground floor, wiso a fev sucifi' and wreicd then off to the roar of the hospital. They nubtured 183. huny of the patients wert in pyjaras, iany bithout footwear, sonc on crutches, othcrsuith linbs in plister, hoacs
bandaced, etc. only two of these nen were seen again. Thcy csecped froi custody during an artillery bor:bardrent, and returned to the hoapital. These ien reported the terrible sercai.s of the \(2.0 n\). They were evicicntly bajonetted on sundiy, Fcbruary 15th, ane Japanese ras seen wipine the blood off his baycnct. Inter on, cnquirics rere tuide as to the velfare of the Lun, but tho Jupenesc roplied that they did not have any prisomers of wer. afick dius lejer e: Jap nesc officer told the C.O. that our veen had becn burici in slecll holes, with japanese dead, about half a aile to the rcar of the hospital. Tie totel killed and believed cieci is a rcsult of the raid is 323, of riho. \(2 j 0\) verc puticnto. The fo......C. lost \(47 \%\) of the Ledical persomel and \(55 \%\) of the officers or. thic staff.

Inte on sunday, February 15th, and on Iorduy, February 16th, a different type of Japincse cnterid the hospit. 1 . Itiis cror:a foroibly looted evcrybociy of anythilic of vilue, such as :atchos, fountain pens, rines, ciegrette cases, trinkcts, woncy, etc. Thcse articles tore nevor returned. The storc rooiss tier urcelicd und food carricd off by the case. The puci: store hinere putiontel parsonal belones are stored ras entercd clotitine, footretir, etc, vas carrica off. Thicy civer usea this store, which was in tice centre of the hospital, as a liutrinc, coipletely fouling it. -

I whs a prisoner of rar for thrce and a half ycars in four caips on simporc Island. I san plonty of facc slappine and hittine with sticks, picces of vood und iron, but no actual killines durint the whole period. I lost four stonc over the three and a half ycars. fio recognition rhatevor ras accorded to as representative of the Red cross Socicty.

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Evidentiary Docurent NO. 5052B.
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ipplicution reas inde repcatcdly for sole consideration to Red cross porsomel, but this rius refused on cach occasion.]

STORN at inglbournc in the Stutc of victoriu ti:is tho 27ti: duy of supteiber 1946
(Sicnedi) F.C. SIU.RT.

Before i:e
(SiEnEa) FLORIMCE B. SUHR, J.P. central Bailitick.
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MIGUEL ESTIMADA, after having been duly sworn, testified at the War Crimes Office, Davao City, Davao, P. I., on 17 November 1945, as follows:
1. Q. Please state your full name, age, address and nationality.

A Miguel ESTIMADA, 20 years old, Bahada, Lavao City, Davao, and Filipino.
2. Q What is your occupation?

A I am helping at present my brother on his farm.
3. Q Explain everything in detail what happened to you and your family during the time of the Japanese occupation.
A When the American planes began to bomb Davao City in September 1944, the Japanese appeared to be very friendly. I often used to go to their camp which was near my house and exchange bananas and other fruits for Japanese cigarettes.

About May 2, 1945, ten Japanese officers with a group of Japanese soldiers came to our house in Bacaca, Davao City. I can only remember six of them. They are Captain SHIMAMTRA, MASAO, OIDE, HIROSEI, MOSUKAWA and MORI.

These Japanese gathered the people from all the neighboring houses and said that due to the American bombings they will take them to Lapoy for protection. After all the people were gathered together the Japanese marched us to their camp and from there to an air raid shelter which was located about onehalf kilometer west of my house.

I saw here thirty-four people in all which was made up of twenty-two men and twelve women. It was about 5:30 o \(0^{\text {i clock }}\) in the afternoon when the Japanese made us go into the air raid shelter. Ten Japanese soldiers guarded the shelter. I recognized four of them. They were MOSUKAVA, HIROSHI, OIDE and MORI.

I remember that MOSUKAWA came into the air raid shelter and dragged out Encarnacion LINES, about 17 years of age, and the Japanese soldiers held her outside on the front of the air raic shelter.

MOSTKAWA came back again and pulled out a girl named Pilar, I do not remember her last name. She was about 21 years of age. She was taken up the ladder of the air raid shelter and forced her to go somewhere from the air raid shelter with some Japanese soldiers. I do not know where they took her.

MOSIKKAWA then came back to the platform in front of the air raid shelter and grabbed Encarnacion LINES from the soldiers who were holding her and tore off her dress and all the clothes that she wore until. she was completely naked. Encarnacion was shouting and crying and tried to fight but the other three soldiers grabbed her and held her down on the ground. They placed her down on her back and two soldiers held her feet and another soldier held her arms. The names of those soldiers were Private MORI, Private HIROSHI and Private OIDE.

I then saw MOSUKAWA removed his pants and laid on top of Encarnacion LINES. He remained there about five minutes. I saw his body moving up and down and doing "pompom" (sexual intercourse) When he was finished he put on his pants and walked away.

Next, Private HIROSHI took off his pants z.nd did the same thing while the other two soldiers held the feet of Encarnacion and

DOCUNENT 2728
the other soldier, her arms. After that the Japanese soldiers, MORI and OIDE, did the same thing. People in the air raid shelter were crying because of how they saw these soldiers rapes Encarnacion LINES.

MOSUKAWA later returned, a short time after the soldiers had raped Encarnacion LINES, and carried her completely naked into the air raid shelter. My brother, Donato had a towel around hi: neck which he gaved to Encarnacion to cover her body. A few minutes later, Pilar was brought back into the shelter. I saw that her dress was also torn off. She was crying and told her mother that the three Japanese who took her away had abused her and raped her. MOSUKANA then gave some water and biscuits to the two girls who were raped.

All the people and myself were very thirsty but the Japanese dic not give us any water or food. It was very hot in the air raid shelter. MOSUKAWA then told the people in the air raid shelter, after the girls were brought in, that all will be killed by hanc grenades and that nobody will be able to leave the air raid shel ter. The Japanese soldiers surrounded the entrance with their rifles with fixed bayonets and will kill anybody who tried to leave the air raid shelter.

Around 10:00 \(0^{\text {i clock }}\) in the nig't, I was able to see Capts. SHIMAMURA and MASAO standing on the platform leading to the entranc of the air raid shelter. Although it was dark I was able to sef them because of the reflection from the electric light which we had inside the air raid shelter. SHIMAMURA and MASAO were talk ing in Japanese for a few minutes. Then MOSUKAlia came down the stairs to the entrance of the air raid shelter while SHIMAMURA and MASAO welked away.

MOSUKAWA took out a hand grenade from his side pocket, tapped it rgainst his helmet and threm it into the air raid shelter. In quick slccession he threw abcut six or sevent hand grenades into the shelter. Sucidenly, the hand grenades exploded among us and the neonle began to scream, shout, anc cry. Shrapnels hit my two hands. Those few who were able to rove could not go outside the shelter because the Japanese soldiers were still there with fixed bayonets. When the people inside the air raid shelter stopped shouting, screaming, crying and moaning, the Juase soldiers placed pieces of wood and iron roofing to block the entrance ? the air raid shelter. It became very dark inside but I could still hear a few voices of some people.

The next morning, when it was daylight MASAO and SHIMAMURA returned to the air raid shelter and removed the wood and iron roofing from the entrance and looked inside. When MASAO saw Catalina BUTAY still alive he chopped off her head with his saber. SHIMAMTEA saw me still alive, so he took his pistol and shot me and the bullet hit my left leg. Then he struck me twice on my upper right leg with his saber.

I can only remember a few names of the victims, all of them were Filipinos from Dacaca. The names who I remember are:

NAPE
ACE
SEX
RELATION
Donato ESTIMADA
Marcelino ESTIMADA
Catalino BUTAY
Numeriano DEL FOSARIO

24
28
35
29

M My brother
M My brother
F No relation
M No relation


AGE
21
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Jesusa LTMFs

Domingo ESTIMAT:A
Goria IIINES
Pascual regona
Pilar Regona
Encarnasion tims

2
23
24

SEX

\section*{RELATION}

F No relation, neighb.
\(F\) Sister-in-19w of my brother, Donato
F My sister-in-law, wife of my brother, Denato
il Son cf inv brother, Donato
F Sistermin-law of my brother, Donato
if Brother of Pilar

I am the only verson who is alive. I stayed in the air raid shelter among the dead peopie for three days and three nights without any food. About one olclock of the third nighi I creeped out of the air raid shelter on my hends end knees and crossed the river whicir was nearby. After crossing the river I met Dr. ZAMORA and a group of pecple. He treated my wounds. I remalied with Dr. ZAMOFA hidirg in the hills for seventeen days.
4. Q When MOSTKAWA threw the hand grenede into the air raid shelte did you see any officers nearby?
A Yes, sir. I saw Captain MÁSAO near the entrance about seven meters away.
5. Q Wes Captain MASAO there men the soldiers raped Encarnacion LINES?
A Yes, sir. He was stan ig at the entrance of the air raid sheiter and did nothing to stop the soldiers from attacking Encarnacion LINES.
6. Q Wis Captain MASAO there when Private MOSUKAWA threw the hand grenade into the air raid shelter?
A Yes, sir, he was right near the erirance and he did not stop the soidiers from throwing it.
hear
7. Q Did you/Captain MASAO gave en order to MOSUKAiWA to throw the hond grenade
A I do not know whether he gave him the order , While the three soldiers were triking together, Gaptair MASAO went over to Private MOSUKAWA and telked Jayanese which seemed to say that he should kill the people in the cir maid sieclter because immedinteiy after he stopped talking, MOSUKANA took out the hand grenades and began to throw them into the air raid shelter.
8. 0 Have you ever seen any of these Japanese since that time?

A I recognized these Japanese when I was at the priscners of war stockade nt Daliao, Darao City with two War irimes Investigators; Coptain KLASE and Lt. ZMLRGEL. I was able to pick out from around 800 Japenese officers in the stockede, Warrant Officer, Norisada MASAD of tine Navv; Yutaka FASFIIRO, Ensign of the Navy; and Capt. Katsuji SHIdendura, Navy. That was the first time I learned all their full names.
9. Q Do you have anything else that you would like to add to this statement?
A No, sir.

CITY OF DAVAO
 had read to re and undsiscood tne transjation of the foregoing transcriftion cf my iniorrozaiion and nil anvers contoined there in consisting of titree pages, are tiue to the best of my knowledgr and beliff.

> /a/ Intmez Entimana
> \(\therefore\) M MTEL EGTITMA

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 29 day of Noy. 1945
\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { /s/ cinnel nove }
\end{aligned}
\]
favestigating Oifiger, War
Crines Investigating Detach-
ment.

COMOMFEALTH OF THE, FHEIMFPIHFS )
SITY OF DAVAO \(\}\) SS

I, PICARLO DE CASTPO, residing at 72 Valenzuela Strect, Sant Mesa, Menila, P. I., being duly siorn on oath, stete thet I truly translated the cuestions and answers given from English to Tagalo, and from Tagalog to English respectively, and that after being transcribed, J. truly translated the foregoing deposition conteining three pages, to the witness; thet the witress thereupon in my presence affixed his signature thereto.

Subscribed nnd sworn to before me this 29 dey of Noy. 1945

> /s/ Samicl Pokie
> SAMTL KUG, COptain, QMC" Investisaiting officer, War Crifes I.vvestigeting Detachment

\section*{CERTIFICATE}

We, SAKTFL ROVE, COptein, \(0-382543\), GMC, and VERNON V IILRRI; JR., 2nd It., \(0-113 j_{j}{ }^{\prime} 7 \dot{D}\), FA, Investigating officers, War Crimes Investigating Detocnrent, certify chat on \(17 \mathrm{H}_{\mathrm{i}}\) day of November, 1945, personaliy apneared before us MIGUEL ESTINADA, and according to RICARTO LE UASTRI, gove the foregoing answers to the several quesifions set forth therein, thit after his testimony hed been transcribed, the said MIGUEL ESTIMADC, had read 10 nim by the said intcrpreter the same and affized his signature thereto in our presence.

Davao City, Devoo
/s/ Somuev Rowe
SAMUEL ROIE, Ceptein, DiKC Investigating officer, War Crimes Investigoting Detachment

29 Nov. 1945
/s/ Vernon V. Horris. Jre.
VRNUN V. FiREIS, JR., 2nd Lt.
lnjestigaiing officer, War
Crimes Investigating Detachmen

\section*{DOCUMENT 2728}

\section*{CERTIFICATE}

I, Alva C. Carpenter, Chief, Legal Section, General Headouarters, Suprome Commander for the Allied Dowers, do hereby certify that the attached photostatic copy of the affidavit of MIGUEL ESTIMADA is a true and correct reproduction of the original affidavit; and thet a signed and sworn copy of said affidavit is presently on file with this Section.
\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { /s/ Alva C. Carpenter } \\
& \frac{\text { Chva C. Carpenter, }}{\text { Chief, Legal Section. }}
\end{aligned}
\]

Vitness: /s/ John R, Pnitchard
Sworn to before me this 29tr day
of October 1046, Tokyo, Japan.
/s/ John R. Priticherd Captain, Infantry Summary Court

Ey 1407

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三 简 简

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Ior tho purposa if ruview tel separato raprets havo boon cumbinod and considurad togother inemuch as tho atrucitios were npoarontly comitted bir the snne military unit vithin twe weeks of sach ,ther and at approzimatel; the eame locelity. In order to avoid confusi: \(n\), the pages of the racord of the atrocity ;ccurring last will be proceded by "I".

On cr about 8 Karch 1945, some forty priacnars from San Zamen Panal C. 1risy, Zamboenga Citr:, who had boon wroins under Japrnese military suporpiation, wars baine: escorted back by Japanosa fuards (a 8). Thon thoy reached Barrio San in que, mambers of the Japenese navel forces tied thom and placed them in three air-raid sholtors of tho Japanoso navy cermp neer the Sen Ruque liver ( \(22, \mathrm{Zx} \dot{\mathrm{i}}\) ). One by one the prisoners were takon from tho sholtors and apperently wore killed an their crios of pain could be heard by thise romaininc; under guard in the shelters ( \(\mathbb{A} 9\) ). dbout ten prisoners succeader in oscaping and one of this group doclares that he witnessed the exccution of the :ther :rcup from the top of a coconut troe whore he remained for some two hours (219, 20).

On ur abrut 23 Narch 1945, Japaneso military parsonnel rcunded uo civiliains at Sitio Situto, Barric Pas:nenca, Zambeanfa City, and confiscetad all bolos. Tho prisonors were thon tied and acme of them taken individually to a nearby atroan whero Japanese slaghed thom on tho head and back uith sebors, bole,, and picks ( A 1-2, 16). snother victim who attomptod to escape was baynnettod (ill), while P Filipinc woman states thet she was raped by a Jappnose ( 2 I-26).



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等会其悲吾刺り，屋无り地官元證


Doc． 282.5
題荳聖
旦
于八殺牲埋此害者
爰虎通等 せ刑知聞

此日餘交第笑


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Doc. No. 2857
RSSTRICTED
GEMTMI HEADCUARTHRS
SUERTME COMMLINDR FOR TYR AJ工I:DD PO:IFRS LIEGL S:CTIOM, MANILA

MEMORANDUM TO: Prosecutinn Section (Roport No. 3C2)
THRU : Axecutive Officer, Legel Soction, Menila
SUBJECT : Atrocitios in and around Vipan, Ilocns Sur, P. I., 10 December 1941 to 3 April 1945.

\section*{II. SUMMARY OF EYIDENCE:}

During the perind from 10 Doceaber 1941 to 3 April 1945, Japanese soldiers stationed at and around Vizan, Ilocos Sur, P. I., following their usual pattern of operation against innucent civilians, raided and locted private homes, killed and mistreated a number of porsons.

On 10 Decombor 1941, upon ontoring the town of Vigen, the Japanese fired upon a ceuple killing the vifo ( \(R\) 58).

On 13 Soptomber 1942, thirtoun porsons were arrested and tortured and later two of the prisoners were killed by shooting ( \(\mathrm{R} 22,25\) ).

On 10 april 1944, six Japnnese drepreed a woman into a house in San Viconte. The woman triod to pot away from the Japanose by jumping out of the window, but she was ovortiken and found dead with bayonet wrunds a few momants afterwards ( \(R\) 42).

In 27 August 1944, Japanese soidiars fired upon poople tion oongrogated in the cockpit in Sante Catelina, woundin; one and probably killing several persons ( \(\mathrm{R} 9,12\) ). On 20 October 1944, thirty persons wore arrested and brcupht to the Bentey azriison where the prisoners were tortured. One of the prisonsurs wes never relcased (R13). On 15 November 1044, threo prisoners wers behonded in Vican (R 20). On 27 Socombor 1944, sovoral porenne were roundod up in Jarrine San Julinn and Capanspangan, Vizen, after thoir hnuses were lootod. Tho prisoners wore tortured, and on 7 Jamagry 1945, nine of the prisoners were boheaded ( \(\mathrm{R} 1-9,15,19\) ).

In March 1945, elght persone ware bayunetted to death and thres othere were probnbly killed in Dentay and Viznn (R 45, 48, 52).

On 2 April 2945, four man wore behopdod in Vigan ( R 27 ), and on 3 april 1945, the Jap-ncse looted the houses in Barrio Lansuanseo, Caosyan, and then killed at least aix persons ( R 34 ).


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\section*{II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:}

The record in this case, consisting of four hundred and sixty-one pages; conteins innumerable instances of the brutal and barbaric treatment of many persons taken to Fort Santiago for cuestioning. The practice of inhuman treatment prevailed from the time of the Japanese occupation in January 1942 to February 1945. When the Japanese realized that fienila was lost they engaged in a final orgy of mass murder by shooting, bayonetting and burning alive of all prisoners remaining inside the fort. It is impractical to detail the treatment received by each individual, but in generel the forms of torture summarized below were imposed in whole or in part upon the prisoners. Some of the victims were American prisoners of war and American nationals. The treatment given specific individuals may be learned by referring to the record citation opposite their names in the list of victims herein.

Upon arrival at Fort Santiago for "investigation", a person was placed in a cell approximately sixteen feet long and thirteen and one half feet wide in which had been placed many other people so that there was not sufficient room for all of them to iie down (R13, 19, 39, 239). Talking was prohibited (R 14, 20, 32, 65). The diet was entirely inadequate and consisted of a small amount of rice, and occasionally some native vegetables or greens ( \(\mathrm{R} 9,14,38\) ). Practically oll of the witnesses suffered a loss of weight ranging from twenty-five to seventy-five pounds during the time they were held ( \(\mathrm{R} 15,45,197,301\) ). One person was incarcerated for thirty-three days and lost thirty-two pounds ( R 266). Sanitary conditions werc alrost unbearable, the only tollet facility being an opening in the floor at one end of the cell ( \(\mathrm{R} 75,92,324,340\) ) which was never cleancd more than once a day, ond the receptacles were entirely inadecuate ( R 14, 251). There was not sufficient water prov!ded, though apparently in each cell was a faucet from which a few drops of water was obtainable ( \(\mathrm{R} 14,32,154\) ). The prisoners were not issued soap ( \(R 32,65,240,251\) ). Generally, bathing was infrequent and sometimes less than once a week ( \(\mathrm{R} 14,21,92\) ). Usuelly ell in a cell, sometimes numbering eighteen or twenty, were allowed five or ten minutes for the entire group to bathe ( \(\mathrm{R} 14,33,261\) ). Mon were forced to bathe in view of women prisoners ( R 351). The only ventilation in the cells were small windows high at one end, and the stench of human waste and dirty bodies was over-powering. The cells were infested with lice and vermin ( \(\mathrm{R} 21,240,286\) ). Persons who had been tortured wore returned to the cell in a wounded condition, some were helpless ( \(\mathrm{R} 20,53,98,106,122\), 146,241 ), and some died in the cell ( \(\mathrm{R} 126,146,300,312,350\) ). There is only one instance of rape ( R 334 ).
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Of the various forms of torture administored by the person nel at Fort Sentiago the following are typical:

Some prisoners werc kicked and slapped across the face, beaten with the fiat of a sheathed sword across the back, shoulders and kidneys ( \(\mathrm{R} 13,74,135\) ). Others were beaten with iron rods ( R 30, 84), or with baseball bats, clubs, poles, ropes, and telephone wires ( \(R 2,66,92,104,132,250,306,316\), and some were thrown by Jiu Jitsu methods (R \(45 ; 74,104,134,316\) ). The water cure was frequently employed. This consisted of tying the victim to a bench, putting a cloth over the face and inserting a water hose in the mouth or nostrils. Water was forced into his stomach until he became unconscious, and then the Japanese pressed and jumped on his stomach to force the water out ( \(\mathrm{R} 45,104,132,139,163,175,249,279\) ). Prisoners had their arms tied behind their backs, a pole inserted through the arms at the elbows, and then were ralsed and suspended from the 1100 . Others were hung for hours by the arms ( \(\mathrm{R} 92,134\), 149, 163, 175, 250, 279). Some had sticks inserted in the opening of the penis or vaginn (R 127, 133, 175), and others were burned about the body "ith lighted cigarettes or cigars ( \(\mathrm{R} 133,162 ; 252,307\) ). Ammunition would be placed between the fingers and then the fingers were saueezed until the bones would break ( R 175). Small bamboo slits, or other instruments were placed under toe nails and finger nails ( \(\mathrm{R} 81,133\) ) and finger and toe nails were pulled out with pliers (R 195, 307). Electricity was used to shock or burn the victims ( \(\mathrm{R} 81,175,229,329\) ). A pieco of skin ves sliced from the back of ono man's hand and hc was forced to eat it. The skin on his face and arm was twisted with a pair of wooden pilers ( R 81 ), and he was hit in the testicles ( \(\mathrm{R} 81,170\) ). The Jepanese guards ground the prisoner's toes under their hob-neiled boots ( A 81 ). Three fmerican pilots who had been shot down during the bombing of Manila received a s'vord thrust through the shoulder or wore burned by lighted cigarette: Holes whe made in their fingers, wirc insertcd through them, end the prisonirs were then suspended by the wircs. One pilot's whole body was burned, another ras paralyzed end they wore taken to a hospitel ( R 197). fmoricen soldiers wire shot ( R 2, 111). Many prisoners from Fort Sentiago were executed at the Chinese Cometery ( R 203, 212, 217) or buried there ( \(R 212,21 \%\). 222). As a form of intimidation prisoners were shown headess mea and men whose faces were so swollen and bloody as a result of batings they could not be recognized. Intestines of some men were removed while they ware still alive in the presence of other prisoners in 280). Onv Filipino prisoncr wes forced to bchead two other Filipmes ( R 281). Iced bodies with their hands tied behind their backs wiere thrown into the Pasig River which flows at the rear of Fort Santiago ( \(\mathrm{R} 312,347\) ). Torture as describrd above was administerod not only to men but to women ( \(R 31\), \(66,67,114,115,133,146,198,255,267,288\) ). Some of the women were nuns ( \(\mathrm{R} 178,271,297\) ). Some of the men were priests ( R 107 , \(135,170,192\) ). Some victims died after being relcased es a resuit of thoir treatment at Fort Sentiago ( \(\mathrm{R} 343,345\) to 347,361 ). In February of 1945 the cells in Fort Santiago vere packed with people who resided within the Walled City. Doors were berricaded, gasoiline was poured around, set afire and hundreds were burned to death ( R \(369,378,380,396\) ). Others wore executed (R 273,395 ). Hundreds of bodies wore discovered by Amorican troops whon Fort Santiago was taken ( R 406 to \(435,441,447\) ). Many of the civilians were eble to oscape the burning buildings only to be shot by Jopaneso guards os they escaped or when attempting to swim across the Pasig River ( R 369 , \(379,387,388,396\) ). Some however, survived and lived to relate the horror to which they had been subjected.



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加名人


Doc. No. 2877

Q What happened? How hat they been killed?
A They strike with their bayonets.
\(Q\) All of your fanily had been bayoneted?
A Yes.
Q then you sey all of \(y\) our femily, do you mean that all 34 of the:a died?

A Yes, 19 children and 15 older people.
Q 19 children?
A Yes.
Q What were their c.ges?
A Their pges, the youngent is 2 years, and the oldest is 10 years old.
Q What else did you see?
A One of my eisters is pregnent pad they slashed her stnmach open and when the baby come out they cut its head off (Weeping).

CAPTAIN PACE: You may crosemexamine.
C ROSS-EXAIHATION
Q (By Captain Sandberg) Do I undorstand m
GEERAL REYNOLDS: Is Cross-examination of this witness considered essential?

CAPTAIN SANDBERG: We will waive the crose-examination. CAFTAIN PACE: Thank you vory much.
(Vitness exzused).

1 I, T. R. C. King, hiajor, Inf. (TD), Executive Officer, Legal Section, General Headquerters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Porers, do hereby certify that Document 2877 is a true and correct copy of the transcript of the testimony offered by JUSTLIA LhidISIK in the trial of the case against Tomoyuki IAbiASHITA, General, Inperial Japanesg army, before a military Commission in Wanila; and that the whole record of the case, iacludiag the transcript of all testinonies taken, as well as the aficidavits admitted in evidence, are now on file with this Section.
/s/ T. R. C. King
T. R. C. King,
a jor, \(I_{n f .}\) (TD)

Witness: /s/John H. Iritchard
Sworn to before me this 20th day
of November, 1946, T'okyo, Japan.
John R. Pritchard
Capt., Inf.
Summary Court.


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\section*{DOCUMENT 2804}
found on his pe-son two raports in DMMLAO's hendwriting end signed "Poison". These reports gave the location of Japanese militsry establishments, companies, names of commanding officers and their approxirete strength. DUNLAO heid been the attorney for the Japanese Taiwan Branch Bank 15 Bacolod and by comperison his handuriting was recognized ( R 23). He was arrested and pleced in prison by the Japanese (R7). Oive of the first men arrested eifter DUMLEO was Agustin SEGOVIA, Sccretary to the Provincial Governor, who was released of espionege charges when in fact he was one of the members of the rine. He warned the others, hut they were afraid to flee, ferring the Japanese would retaliate against their familes ( R 21 ). Five of the twelve arrested were released after being interrogatad. They and others were tortured. One could hardly stand or lie down as his entire body was swollen. Another was maneled and black and blue, Still snother wes beaten sever ly with a police club and thrown by Ju-jitsu. One man was beaten with a club, hrown across the floor and the next night was forced to jump from ? window eighteen or twenty feet above asphelt pavement, which disloceted his his causing him to lose his power of locomotion for about four month. Another man was thrown from a staircose nbout twelve feet high (R 13, 14, 17). Some of the men wers released through the influence of the Provincial Governor ( R 17 ), and ne was relensed because a fricndly interpreter substituted answers that were satisfactory to the Japanese ( \(\mathrm{R} 2,22\) ). Scven of the twelve men arrested have never been seen since. Lit least one was in the jail on 9 Merch 1945. All prisoners in the jail were released by American forces on 30 Merch 1945. The seven men ware not among those liberated (i \(2,5,8,17\) ). One of the perpetrators admits that two of the victims were executed by his order. Ho stated that he wes carrying out the order of Gonerrl kono ( \(\mathrm{R} 3,6,8,10\), Ex 6). No trial wrs given these men ( \(R\) 3).

While confined by the Japanese, the following method of torture wes observed, though it is not known who these victims were. It is possible they were other members of the espionage ring. One man was beaten until he wes a mass of blood another man wns strnoped to a teble and his wrists burned with an alcohol flome until the odor of burning flesh fllled the room. i third man had ? bayonet thrust through his arm nt the wrist, and es he was beine questioned, the hayonet was gradunlly forced down his arm ( R 14 ).

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IOC UITH 2723
still present. Fidel was hung again and beaten unmercifully by the Jnpenese and his cyes were swollen and shut, he spit blood and his body was covered with bruises. I had been releesed on liondey morning after the torturo of my brothers. On Tuesday morning I was teken by the Jrpanesc soldiers to the municipal building. The Jepenese removed all my clothing and as I stood there naked the Jepenesc soldiers beet me with e switch. The Joponose soldiers tonk my clothes and dressed me and gave me a little woter. I spent three days in jail without any medical treatment and could hardly move becruse my body wes so stiff end sore from the trentment I hed receiveat while I was in prison for this 3-day period the Jopanese gave me some food and water but in no way molested me.

Q Did any other mombers of your femily suffer beatings at the hands of the Japanese?
A No. They were released on Sundey and sent home.
Q Do you know who wes responsible for the beating administered to your brothers and to yourself?
A Ceptein Humejara. He was about \(5^{\prime \prime} 9^{\prime \prime}, 160\) pounds, did not wear glesses, spoke no English or Visoyan, no scars thet were visible, no emputations, no gold teeth, light brown complexion, hed a mustache, short heir, ebout 35 yeers old. sgt. Estani, white complexion, 5 feet tall, about 110 pounds, wore glasses, no scors and marks on his face, no amputations, spoke English nnd little Visayan, no mustache, no gold teeth, about 26 yeers old, very close cropped hair. These are the only two Japanese that I remember.

Q Have you enything further to edd to this statement?
A None.

\section*{/s/ Leonore Palacio Villas \\ LEONORA PALACIO VILLAS}

COMMONWEALTH OF THF PHILIPPINES )
PROVINCE OF IRYTE
SS
TOWN OF PALO

I, LEONORA PALACIO VITLAS, being duly sworn on oath, state thet I have read and understood the foregoing transcription of my interrogation and all onswers contained therein, consisting of two (2) peges, are true to the best of my knowledge end belief.

\section*{/s/ Leonorn Palacio Villes LIONORA PALACIO VIT LAS}

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 19th day of October, 1945.

\author{
/s/ John J. Rullahy JOHiN J. MULIAMY, Ist Lt., C.M.I Investigating officer, Wer Crimes Investigating Detachmeni
}


\section*{CERTIFICATE}

I, Alva C. Cerpenter, Chief, Legal Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allicd Fowers, do hercby certify that the attached photostatic copy of the affidavit of LEONORA PALACIO VILLAS is a true and correct reproduction of the original affidavit; and thet a signed and sworn copy of said affidavit is presently on file with this Section.
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\begin{aligned}
\text { /s/ } & \frac{\text { Alva } \mathrm{C}, \text { Carpenter }}{\text { AIva C. Carpenter, }} \\
& \text { Chief, Legal Section. } .
\end{aligned}
\]

Witness: /s/ John Re Pritchard Sworn to before me this 29th day of October, 1946, Tokyo, Japan. /s/ John R. Pritchard Captain, Infantry Summary Court
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DOCUMENT 2726
TAYAMBONG CIAAGSA, efter having been duly sworn, testified at La Trinidad, Benguet, Mountain Province, P. I., on 8 October, 1945, as follows:

Q What is your full name?
A Tayambong Chagsa.
Q How old are you?
A I am not sure, maybe about 60.
Q What is your nationality?
A Filipino-Igorot.
Q Where do you live?
A Kabayo, Atok; Mountain Province, P. I.
Q In cese you should move who would always know where to locate you?
A My neighbor, Kitayong Esdad, who also lives at the same address.

Q What is your wife's name and nationality?
A Yagyag. Igorot-Filipino:
Q How old is she?
A About 34 yerrs old.
Q How long have you lived at your present address?
A Over five yenrs.
Q While the Jopanese were in the Mountain Province were you abused in any manner by the Jrpanese?
A Yes, I have been maltreated.
Q Will you tellius when that happened and all the circumstances surrounding its
A On the morning of Merch 13,1943 , a little before noon the Japenese arrived in our sitio. They asked us where the Americans and the Filipino soldiers and Major Dengwa were. When I answered them that I have not seen any and I don't know the Japanese tied me up in my house. They tied my hands behind my back until about one o'clock in the afternoon. Then they untied me and asked me again where were the Americans and Major Dangwa. Phen I enswered I don't know they made me lie on the floor and gave me much water. When I did not reveal any to the Japanese, they tied me and burned my buttocks and legs and hit my mouth and I lost two teeth. They hit my mouth with a piece of wood, about as long and about as big as a man's arm. I was hung up inside my house and my hands were tied behind my bsack with a rope and the rope wns tied to the center of the house and I was raised from the floor about four feet. While I was hanging up the interpreter Kawasime got a match and lighted the candle and held the candle close to my G-string neer my right hip. The G-string caught fire and kept burning until ebout only two feet of it was left. When the lnst two feet of my G-string was not burned, Kawasima took it and put it around my head and burned it with the crndle until all of the piece of cloth was burned, together with my hair. The Japanese untied me at about one o'clock in the afternoon.

Q Then what did they do?

\section*{Bocuaent 2726}

A They laid me down on the floor and made me drink a petroleum can of water. I don't know how much water the can held but they made me drink all I could. Then they asked the same questions over agein and they bent me with their fists and hands and with the piece of wood. Four Japanese soldiers held me. One, who was neer my head twisted my eers. He held my ears rith his hands and twisted them around. One stepped up and down on my breast on top of ne so the water that I drank would then come out of my mouth. One of the soldiers wes sitting on my stomech, just sitting and holding me down. One held the rope which was tied around my legs. After a short while they all stood up and one of them started to hit me all over my body with a piece of wood asking the same questions over again and esking me to tell the truth ebout the American end Filipino soldiers. After that they untied my legs leaving the rope in my hands tied behind my back and brought me to the forcst. They took me about one hundred meters away from my house to the forest, and when we got there one of the Japanese picked up a stone about the size of my fist and hit me and then they tied me there. After dark my neighbors went to look for me. They found me in the forest and untied me. After beinf untied I went home. The Japenese did not bother me again.
Q Did this all occur on March 13, 1943?
A Yes, it all happened on the same day.
Q Do you heve any scars as a result of the burning and beating given you by the Japenese?
A Yes, I have a scar on my right hip. I heve \(\varepsilon\) very bad scer yet today.

Q How many Japenese came to your home on March 13, 1943?
A About seventy, including two officers.
Q Where did these Japonese came from?
A They came from Baguio.
\(c\) That were the namcs of the officers?
A I don't know the names of the officers but \(I\) heve heard that they were Lt. Teramoto and Captain Ono.

Q Were there any interpreters with them?
A Yes, there was one and his name was Kawasima, also called Yamesita.
\(r\) Did these Japenese meltreated anyone else in your barrio at the same time they meltreated and abused you?
A. Yes, they got ell the men in the barrio.

Q Did you see them take these men?
A Yes.
Q Did you see them being meltrented by the Jepanese?
A I heard them crying when they were maltreated and after they were loosened I saw them that dey and the next day with bruises showing thet they heve been beaten.

0 Do you know the names of any of the Japanese soldiers that were with these officers and the interpreter?
A No, I don't know any of them.
Q Mill you describe these Japanese officers?

\section*{Boccurnt 2726}

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UNIMED STATES ARMY FORCSS, PACIFIC OFF TCE OF TIEE TYE:TEF JUDGE ADVOCATE WAR CRITES BFANCH
}

APO 500
AG 000.5 (3 Sep 45)JA
3 September 1945

SUBJECT: Rejort of War Crimes Branch on Atrocities.
TO:
The Juc.ge Acvocate General
Washington 25, D. C.

\section*{IT. SIMEATY OF DYTDENCE:}

Briefly summarized, the evidence adduced by the Investiga-tor-Ixaminers is to the ef eet that:

Dr. Gilbert Isham CCILLEN, an American citizen, age 68 years, was District Fiealth Inspector and !uarantine Officerin charge of the United States Public Health Service at Iloilo City, Iloile Province, Panay, Philionine Islands, and resided in that city. He had lived in Iloilo Province for thirty years prior to the Japanese capture of Panay Island on 16 April 1042, and during that period, in addition to his official duties, coroucted the private practice of medicine among the inhabitants, including the Japanese population ( \(F_{1} 1,2,3\) ). About two or three days after the Japanese army entered the city, Dr, CULLEN was taken with others to a small house where he was held a prisoner by the Japanese until 20 April 1042. Then he was removed by the Jayanese to the Provincial Prison of Iloilo City, where he remained until about 1 January 1043 ( \(R\) 3).

Until 16 "ay 1942 he ras well treated and subiected to nothing more than routine questioning, probably due to the fact that the employees and ruards at the Provincial Prison were local Jayanese who had known him previously. On 16 "ay 1042, hovever, another Jananese officer assumed command of this mrison and Dr. CCLTEN was taken for questioning before an examiner, a reporter, an interpreter, and two soldsers, all of whom were unknown to Dr. CTVres (R 4). The questioning took place in the warden's office vhere, for a period of several hours, Dr. CULTEN was struck in the abcomen with a club, kicked while iying on the floor, slapned repeatedly with the heel of the iands of his inquisitors. They then took a pair of pliers and slowly pulled the toe-rail from Dr. CTLEN's great toe on his left joot. He wes clubbed about the body, head and face and then suspended from a cross bear by his thumbs with his feet off the floor, and gain later was hung by his ankles until his legs were bady cut by the ropes. The fingers of his left hand were bent and twisted until some of them were brolcen and dislocated.

As a result of the treatment above described, Dr. NULLEN suffered a broken nose, several cracked ribs, a broken right leg, loss of his great toe-nail, broken and dislocated fingers and an injury to his jaw which impaired fits function ( \(\mathrm{R} 5,6,17\) ). The injuries were inflicted umon Dr. CTIJEN in an effort to make him reveal the names of local citizens who were sending radio messages hand to force him to reveal information concerning various military prbjects such as location and number of American trooos ( \(\mathrm{R} 5,6\), NF \(^{5}\) ) The torture lasted from morn!ng until late in the afternoon 7, 14) and Dr. CULLEN still bears the marks of his torture, more then three years after their infliction (Ex. A-T).

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- DOCUMENT 2735
\(\downarrow\)
could recognize as bayonet wounds and some were saber cuts. Othersi: were very emaciated, starved, skin just honging to their arms. There weren't enough litters to go around.

I met a Lieuterant who said "Come along to the St. Augustine Convent if you really want to see something". So I followed him and some Chinese litter bearers upon a narrow street which was heavily mined. The Lieutenent stepped backward and forward carefully and we stepped through the mines and then I went into the courtyard of the St. Augustine Convent. There was a statue -I forget what statue it was, but there was a statue that had been battered and around it built up on chairs and other pieces of furniture were some crezy shelters made roughly of corrugated iron. They were about waist-high. I knelt down and I lcoked inside and the first thing I saw was a dead girl. One of her feet was crushed to pulp and her mouth was broken and a lot of blood had come from it.

From there I went over behind the statue into the column veranda of the convent, and on my right I saw a body of a little boy in a kneeling, crouching position with a bullet hole through the base of the skuli. It was quite derinitelj a builet hole. Then I looked to the left and it took me some tine to realize what it was, but it was a pile of bodies just thrown carelessly together, more or less, I suppose, to get them out of the way and in one place. And they were covered with a finc gray ash and a lot of dust.

Some of these I saw were covered with -- bore bayonct wounds. Others had other weunds which I did not recoerize but which I I assumed might have been caused by grenade os shell-fire or something like that.

Then a little bit begond that I saw two other people; two women. They were just zyince there Iike animajs; o:io woman lying back, her eyes wide and starey, she was alive but no movement. And the other was lying uncier a blanket and she was looking at us, but no movement either.

Then furtner beyond tha likere was son in . . . .. \({ }^{\circ}\) sticking out of it I suddenly sav a hand, just the hand, rove and I drew the actuntion or some nedics or soldiers who we there to it.

Then I followed the Lieutenant inside the convent to another hallway running behind the veranda and there was another Lieutenant kneeling against a girl whose mouth had been shattered by blows with something, I don't know what. It could have been a rifle butt, but it was certainly something solid. And she bore other wounds on hor body and was barely breathing. The Lieutonant gently patted her lips and was dropping wator into her mouth.

You see, there weren't enough medics or anybody around with any experience to do anything for these people other than to givc them what a little rellef was possible with virtually nothing. © Excuse me. Was that an American Lieutenant? l. Yes. They were all Emericens.

Then a littlc bit to the right of her there was another doorway and I went inside there. It scemed like a room which might have been a mecting room or a living room. It was in a pretty bad shape. And just to the left of the there seemed to be a kitchen, but in this living room section wes a beeutiful Filiping girl lying on her back and a soldier called me over and he said "Look at this!" He said "She told us that a Jap hacked her feet off", and he lifted a blanket thrt was lying over her fect. Her feet hed been cut off and the stumps tied with what I took to be handkerchiefs.

I didn't fecl very good at that and I didn't look very long. And lying almost fect to fect with her was a Japenese soldier. He was the only decent, whole plece of humanity in the place; the only clean plece of humanity. He was dressed in a white singlet on the shirt and some pants. He was lying there like an animal and I wes told that he had been there some weeks, having been brought in when he was 111 and cared for by the nuns.

Then furtnor beyond una lidere was sen ............ sticking out of it I suddenly sav a hand, just the hand, rove and I drew the actintion or some medics or soldiers wion re there to it.

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You see, there weren't enough medics or anybody around with any experience to do anything for these people other than to give them what a little relief was possible with virtually nothing. 0 Excuse me. Was that an American Lieutenant?
1. Yes. They were all Americens.

Then a littlc bit to the right of her there was another doorway and I went inside there. It scemed like a room which might have been a meeting room or a living room. It was in a pretty bad shape. And just to the left of the there seemed to be a kitchen, but in this living room section wes a beautiful Filipine girl lying on her back and a soldier called me over and he said "Look at this!" He said "She told us that a Jap hacked her feet off", and he lifted a blanket thet was lying over her fect. Her feet hed been cut off and the stumps tied with what I took to be handkerchiefs.

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DUCULDM: \(-\therefore\),
My foelintis, of course, were very mised and I don't suppose it mattered. But from there there were other women there, tico, some of them bearing wounds of one kind and another. I walked back out into the corridor and the Lieutenont said "Come here! This is alive!" And there crouched in some rubble and mortar was a girl very emaciated, very thin, and you could hardly recognize it as a human being or that it lived. And only every so often, minutes perhaps, the whole body would convulstvely shudder.

Well, the flics were all over her as they werc all over all these other wounded and dead. We brushed them away and didn't know just what to do to move her, but we went away looking for some medics to try and assist her.

Well, that was practically all that I recall vividly of the St. Augustine Convent except that when I went out to the gate I saw some Chinese litter bearers and I asked them to go into the convent and get this girl with her feet cut off. They did. And they passed me at the gatc, and as they carried her out head first on the litter, shoulder high, she lifted her left hand with a "V" sign -- a very effectivo sightb

After that, at the request of the Licutenant, I crossed the river. I found a Colonel in cherge of the medical detachment and told him of the serious plight that there was over the plaza of Intramuros, with all the dead and wounded, and asked for more litters. He sent more litters over.

Q I belleve you stated that many of the bodies which you saw bore bayonet wounds; is the \(t\) correot?

A That is correct.
Q And were these bodies which you referred to those of civilians? A They were all civilians. And I might mention that I only sav one man in this particular convent courtyard. There may have been others, but I didn't expect to see others. I was surprised to see h1m.

MAJOR KERR: Your witness.

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MAJOR KERR: Your vitness.

\section*{CROSS EXAMINATION}

Q (By Coptain Reel) Did you see the bodies of any Japanese militer men in that area?

A Not in the convent. Outside, yes.
Q And were there quite a few dead Japancse bodies outside?
A No, there were not.
Q Did you anywhere in the Intramuros area see a large number of dead. Japanese?
A. No. I didn't see a large number of Japanese, no.
\& Of those Japs that you did see dead were they in uniform?
A. I think they were. My recollection is not clear on that.
\(Q\) Could you tell us to the best of your recollection whether they wore Navy uniforms?

A Nö. I don't know whether they were Army or Navy.
Q I see. There were you during the battle for Intramuros?
A Well, I watched it for a couple of weeks from the National city Bank Building while we were shelling the place. Wo didn't bomb it for fear of indiscriminate dropping of bombs, but we were shelling what we belicved to be militery objectives where Jepanese had guns, and so on, in an effort not to hit more civilians tham we could help.

Q And you say this shelling lastcd about two wecks?
A Something likc two weeks. It may have been a little more than that.
Q And would you describe it as "point-blank" artillery fire?
A Nell, not "point-blank." The guns were quite a way back, most of them up in Grace Park several miles back.
Q So that it wasn't "point-blank" but normal artillery fire several miles away?
6. Normal artillery fire several miles away with the O.P. in the National City Bank Building.
D Do you know what other weapons were used to reduco Intramuros?
A The guns, as much as 240 millimeter guns. They were used on the second last days against the wall to break tho wall from the
,DOCUNENT 2735
mint to the public market.
Q How many guns were used altogether, if you know?
A No. I couldn't say the number of guns, but I can tell you that on the day on which we bombarded the wall we pumped in something like ten thousand rounds.

Q That was in one day?
A Thet was in an hour.
Q Ten thousand in an hour?
A Yes, sir.
© Do you know of any other weapons besides the artillery guns that were used?

A There were some mortars. The Japanese used a lot of mortars in and jut of Intramuros then we wer approaching it and also inside.

While I was in there they wore using some mortar and rifles.
Q And we used morters, too?
1. Yes. We were using mortars from outside.
? And what other weapons were used?
A Rifles, carbines, and so on.
Q Any flame throwers?
A I didn't see any flame throvers.
Q Any machinie guns?
A Oh, yes; machine guns.
Q And you say this lasted about two wecks?
A About two weeks.
Q Pretty fierce battic
A I beg your pardons
Pretty fierce battle, yes. It was pretty fierce.
CAPTAIN FEEL: That's all.

REDIRFCT EXA: INK.TION
? (By Major Kerr) One further question, sir. When you
entered the Intiamuros erea you did so as a war correspondont,
did you not?

MAJOR KERR: Thank you very much, Mr. Keys :

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APO 500
AG 000.5 (12 Sep 45)JA
12 September 1345
SUBJECT: Roport of 'iar Crimes Branch on Atricities.
TO: The Julze Advocato Gonsral
Frashington 25, D. C.

\section*{II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:}

Briefly \(\varepsilon\) minarized, the avidance adduced by the InvesticatorZxaminers is to the offect thet:

On 9 February 1945 Amaricen troops were clesing in on Manila and the bombing and shalling were contimucus. Fires had brokan out, water nad ford hei become extrencly difficult to ubtain, and safe shelter was sought by countless mumbers of rafugees thrcughrut the city ( \(R 1,5\), 29). During the afterno on of 9 Fobruary and into the evening Japnenese patrole scoured tho Fimita Jistrist, routian; from thile homes and places of bubiness averyone in that aree and bringing them to Plaza Fertubon (kx. C, D; R 15). These poople wor. told that beceuse of the bombs and shollfire it was the dosire of the Jepaness to essemble them in protected ereas and since the statemint seemed \(x \in a s o n a b l e ~ u i z d e r ~ t h e ~ c i r c u m s t a n c e s, ~\) most of the civilians went voluntrifily (R 79, 282).

By approxinately 1700 hours som 2,000 men, women and children, all civilians and of mized nettonalitios, hed boin brought to tho Plazz end at thet time a Japencee officor who aponarod to bo in charge came and ordared that the mon and older male children be soparatod from the
 and the women aid childron to the Bay View Hotel, with the excoption of a amall group of approximataly twenty gilile who ware telen to a nearby restaurant called "The Coffec Pot", a lounge or club for Japeneso officers and enlisted men. Those in this group were giren food and liquor and from there they wont to the Bey View Hotol where they ware put on one of the upper floors (R 80, 81, 129). Tho romaindor of the captives rpperar to have been kept on the io:fer flnors of the hotel (R 287).

Between the hours of 1800 and 0430 the following morning the Japansese romoved any doubt the:- might have had as to the "protection" which thoy were to roceive. In tos and threos, onlistad men and officers came to the varioun rong in which these woman had beon quartered, solected these they wishod by tho light of candien and fleahlights, took them to other rooms and raped then (a 70-76, 111, 133).

Similar scenes ware enactod at tho nearby Boulevard Alhambra and Miremar Apartments where the Filipinc women in the group were taken during the following day. Throughout the aifhts of confinement in all thres places yrung airla vere forced, some a.t bavonet point, to po with those Japanese for thatr plassuras ( \(\mathrm{A} 53,70,235,515,553\) ).

The reason for this sagregation was givon early in the afternzon of 10 Fobruary when one of the women inquired of an officer as to the reason the Filipines ware leaving the hotol. Bolloring her to be white, he answered "We hate white women..... Thnro are ordrre that we are to kill all of you, but wo are waiting because we may decide to use all of the white women as our frontilno to keap the Americans from coming in on ua" (R 528).

Only seven of the victims would aimit hoving beon raped (R 72, 113, 132, 150, 551, 731, 743), although the proof is claar that at loast forty ware violated, the same baing indicated by thair roturn to their rucms in nervous condition with hatr and dress disarranged and frequently with blood showing upon thair sarmenta. Thirty six atate that attempts :ere made to rape them and the evidance indtcates that, notwithetanding their denial of the accomplishment of the act, these attacks cemo suspicicusly close to fruition ( \(R\) 82, 84, 130, 174, 255, 397, 575).

This treatment contimed for varying poriods, the versons cunfined at the Bry View Hotel beins released or escaping on 12 February 1945 and those at the Bnulevard Alhambra and Miramar Apartments beine released or escaping on 13 February, all of which relsases, with some exceptions to be commented upon later, were necessitated by bombing and shelling and racultant fire ( \(\mathrm{R} 25,586\) ).

Darin; these three deye, the following incidents excmplify the torroriatic dobeuchery that took place:

In cne nicht, a twenty-four year old Filipino woman was raped betwoen twelve and fifteon times. Notwithatanding thet she bacame so dazed and weak after the first few attacks thet she fell to the floor half-consci"us, Jepanese contimed until 0400 to onter the room and dras her away for further ravishmont (R 134).

One Japnnese, in a apirit of drunken brapgadocio, ahrwod the sharpness of his bayonet by ripping a girl's skirt open from its bottom to har hips with a slash (R 209).

Kicking girls as thoy ley proctrate on the floor was a common occurrence and there were instrnces where a girl was drafged away, her e.ttecker grasping her log and pullin; her glong on her back ( \(\mathrm{R} 70,207\) ).

A few were able to esconpe the common fato by claining thoy were menstruatine, Although demenstrative proof was usually required. and was somotimes followed by a blow with a rifle butt ( \(\mathrm{R} 59,116,254\) ).

Ono isirl accompanied a particular Jabnese quite willingly, eaying thet he was her sweetheart and she "hai already promisod him that" while some thers acquieaces without rosistance sele? \({ }^{\text {a }}\) becpuse of fear end thoir capiors' promises of freedom if they would submit quietly ( \(\mathrm{R} 116,120\) ).

A fourtenn year old British girl was taken with her sister, pushad and kicked alone the corritior to encther room and raped at least four times, was ellowed finilly to return to her ;wn rocm, blaeding and torn ( a 72). Havine a lipht complexion, she was favored and, in fact, the whito girls were searchod sut ond segrogeted (R 70).

A Turkiah woman, forty yoars of acio, auccossfully and resourcofully disauaied a would ba attecker by cinimin? she was too old end romoving pad ahoving her false teath to prove it. She than kept her dauphtor safe by hidine hor undernenth her skirt ( \(R\) 396, 398).

In the face of printed weapons, the eheer determination of an olderly friend protected a youn: mother \(y\) ith a child in her arms from being taken (i 300).

Three prostitutes told their fellow captives that they weuld submit to the Jup nofe añ thus etre:pt to protect the yrunger sirls and married women (: R órs), Some of the victims clearly felt erateful for the prctoction thus affirded ( \(R 406,489\) ).

At the Mramar, an officer took ififteen yeer old Filipino girl to his room, asked har to \({ }^{30}\) to bed and when she refused, he proposed that she marry him. This she nlon rofused, whereupon ho told her she was no good and sent her hack to the Bay View Entel (R 588, 591).

No such incidents soem to heve occurred during tho deytime, elthough thirst nad hanier kept these victims in acute disconfort. On the secund dey, ono group wore brought a pail of dirty weter which wes partially apilied on the floor in their heste to drink. Such spillod drops wore eagerly licked off the flocr. The drinking wator supply was aleo supplemented by water from the toilo's, end for foul thoy received a fow biscuits (which were thrown on the floor), e small can of fish and some \(\nabla\) itamin pills. This wes to corve ficty people ( \(\mathrm{R} 235,237\) ). inethor group, twelve in mumber, recoived a pail of water, a box of crackers, a kettio of hot tea, some suger end some vitamin pills. Also zivon to them were some tennis shoes. Excopt for the molestaticns, these women felt they hed been comparatively well troatod, and ejparently it was because ono of the Jepanese had previously failon in love with a sirl in that roum ( R 23-25). Old biscuits and selity water were the lot of a loss fortunnte party of tronty ( R 57 ).

In the main dining rom on the first floor of the hotel, two or thres ladies of tho Rod Crios set un an aid station for tha sick and wounded on 10 Fobruary and during tho aftornoon of that day, from two hundred to two huadrod fifty women and children were brcught there from the rooms upetaire ( \(R 21,76,561\) ). This refule was but temporary, howovor, and during the following ni,jhts of ceptivity, girle were not only taken from the dining rocm but scme wero raped there emong their fellow captives (R 414, 562).

As if nonce with tho steadily mounting battlo outside, the attecks and terrorism in the hotel rose to a creocendo during tha third night and furth mrining of cnptioity. A Japanese ifficer known as TERAMOTO told one lady, carly in the morning of 13 February, that he was gitne away to, fight the amoricans and to die, and the before he left he wished to have intercsurso with hor deuphter as his last wrildly pleasure; others statad that they constituted a "sulcile detail" and behavod oven more brutally than before ( R 11, 412, 4j4).

Firs, which broko sut in the Baij Viow \#t,tel on the 12th, and at the diremar and Alhamira on the 13ti, proved the galvation for thean victims. Some were ratier unwillingir relaased, and others oscaped in the resultine confusion ( \(\mathrm{R} 25,526,562,570\) ).

Ono firl is known t: hove contractud sonorriee as a result of tils experience and neerly all of thom obtained wedical expminetions whon the Americans cans ( \(R\) 160, 183, 352). in prograni:ive and no deathe having a direct counection with the airocity appear to have foilnwed it, althiugi at least twe ledias ised to be trunted for shock and genoraller weakened condition (R188, 240).




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1.


1.

ESTHER GARCIA RORAS，after having been duly sworn，testified on 25 June 1945 as follows：

Q Please state your full nare，age，nationality，present address，occupation，and marital status．
A FSTUER GARCIA lORAS， 24 years old，Filipino，Ramon Roces Building，Calero Street，lanila，housewife，rarried，no children．

Q Where and with whom did you live on 9 February \(1945 ?\)
A At 220 Alharibea itrect，Errata，lanila，with my mother， Mrs．PACTI＇jA Cwiths Gitictis ry sister＇s，PRISCILLA COSTAS GARCIA，EVMNGLIME OCOTAS GRRGIA，CAROLA COSTAS GARCIA， my father FTDEA：CO G！filis and my brothers FREDDIE SOS－ TAS GARCIA and JÜC！MM（QUL：JET）COSTAS GARCIf．

Q Where vas your rushond at that tire？
A He was in the hande or the rapanese in the island of Cebu．He is norf with the frericon Arny at Leyte．
© How long have you been marriedn
A Six years，the 19th of June 1945.
Q The Japs forced you to leave your home on 9 February 1945 ？
A Yes．
Q Where did they take you？
A They took us all to Fergusson plaza which was about ton meters north of our home．
\(Q\) Besides your immediate family，were any other civilians taken to the Ferfusion Flasa that day？
A Yes，approxirately 1500 ，more or less，men，women，and children were brought to Plaza Fergusson that day by the Japanese．

C．That time of day did you arrive at Fergusson Plaza？
A 8 o＇clock in the evening．
Q What happened then？
A The ren were sepsiated into one group，and the woren and children into another group．The group of women and chil－ dren，which numberen epproxirately four or it：ve hundred persons，was fuirtho：divilled，and fror that group of wonen and chiluren apprexirately 25 younger girls were placed in one separate group．

Q How rany Jrpanese were present in anc about the Plaza Fergusson et the tir：e you were first rarshaied and then segregetad into groups？
A．Approximately thirit．
0 Of this nurber，how rany，if any，were officers？
A I only noticed one．
© Do＇you know the nsres，ranks，units，or branches of ser－ vice of any of these japanese？
A I only know that thoy wefe ma；ines，sorebody told re． I personally coujd not tell the difference．

Q Can you give us a description of the Japanese officer？
A Vlell，he were a caber，was abjut 5 reet 8 inches tall， medium built，and di．d not wear giasses．I could not notice anything further abcut nis appenronce．I was too scared．

\& \(\because \dot{\sim}\) If Rnown \({ }^{+\prime o c c u p a t i o n s, ~ a n d ~ r a r t u a l ~ s t a t u s ~ o f ~ t h e ~ r e e r b e r s ~}\) of your group of 25 girls.
A PRISCILLA COSTAS GARCIA, 15 Filipino, Raron Roces Building, Calero Street, Hanila, schoolgirl, single; EVANGELINE (Evan or Ivan) COSTAS G!RCIA, 14 Filipins, Ramon Roces Building, Calero Street, Lanila, schoolgirl, sirgle; PILAR NIRAPDA UBAGO, about 30 years old, Filipino, 55 alejandro VI, Sarpaloc, Kenila, hore girl, single; LUCY TANI, 25, Filipino, 78 Lourdes Street, Pasay, Rizal, secretery to Captain Tenny, singie; GLORIA CHEZI, 15, JULIA GHEZI, 20, MARGOT GHEZI, 26, all of rhor rre Italian..Filipinos, unrarried, home girls, resicing on Tanduay Streat, Nenila; VICKY GADOL, 17, Bistish subject, 131 A"e!r. Cruz, Tabon, Pasay, Rizal, hore girl, single; FANMY GATUL, 14 , having the sare address, occupation, and marital status as her sister VICKY; l'ARCIA LUISA SOTTELO, 32, SDenish, address unknown, hore girl, single. The rest of the girls, approximately twelve in number, vere of various nationalities including Chinese and Filipinos, and I don't know their nares and addresses. They varied in ages from 18 to 24.

Q How long did your group of 25 stay at Plaza Fergusson? A About half an hour.
\(\because\) Then what happened?
A Under guard of two or rore Japanese soldiors, vee were rarched to whet had been formerly known as the Coffee Pot Cafe located on Dewey Boulevard irriediately south of the Bay View Hotel.

6 What time did you reach the Coffee Pot Cafe?
A About 9 o'clock in the evening.
Q Upon your entering the Coffee Pot, who was present in addition to your group of girls?
\(f\). There was a Japanese officer who was sitting at a desk in the rear corner.

0 Did any \(0^{+}\)her Japanese enter?
A Yes, severel Jrpanese were coring in and out all the tire.

6 D1d you recognize ony of the Jopanese?
A No.
C. You know eny of ther by nare?
f. No.

0 You know their rank, unit, or branch of service?
A. No, except that they were all rarines. They had greenish uniforms, and I noticed anchor insignias on several of their caps and arris.

C That hoppened then?
They directed us to sit on the floor and rade signs for us to go to sleep and thet there vas ncthing to ke afraid of.

Q Did you act accordingly?
f. No. They breven an Dirtles of whisky ind packs of cigarettes and suite eruoktis.
© Did you and the e.t. ot the gerls yertake of the food and refresinest, otitered ycu?
A. I sroked the cjogne etta buti I did not duirk or eat. Some
 nervous, and soma, ine ry siscar Friscilla, took a drink because they were thilsty.

\& Then what happened?
A In about another five rinutes, three Japs car.e in ind grabbed ny two sisters Priscilia and Fivengeline zy cheir arrs and forcibly pulled theri frem the rcom. Both ni ny sisters pulled back anc resisted sticinupusiy and cried out in anguish to be left alone, but they were taken any.way.
\(\because\) Did you see your sisters egein after thet?
A Yes, in about half an hour Evangeline (Even) care back to the room alone crying and shaking all over and sobbing and fell in ry arrs. She was crying like her heert would break. I tried to soothe her and esk her what had happened? She said the Japs were doing things to Priscilia. I then asked her what heppened to her. She said, "Nothing happened to re becouse \(I\) ar. menstruating."
\(\because\) Did you ask her for particulerso
A No, there was so ruch turneil. in the roon with all the girls crying and praying and ry sister was so upset the t I just held her close and we waited.

Q When did you see Priscilla agein?
A She care into the roor about 20 minutes after Evangeline had come back the first tire.

Q Thet was her appearance?
\(\therefore\) She was perspiring, her hair wes awry, and her dress was solled and mussed.
© Did she say anything to you?
\(\dot{A}\) She said she wanted to die.
\(n\) Did you question her?
A No, I knew what hed happened.
Q Did she say anything further other than that she wanted to die?
C. No.
© Before your sister Priscilla returned to the roor: as you have just rclated, hed the Japenese corc bick and bother anyone?
A. Yes, about five minutes after ry sister Evangeline had returned, three Japs entered end took hold of ry sister Evangeline again and Fanny Gedol and dragged them across the floor and out of the roor:. All the while, Evengeline end Fanny were struggling and screaming.

Q Did you say or do anything?
\(\hat{A}_{1}\) I tried to hold Evan back, but I was not strong enough. Everyone in the room was crying and trying to hide under
\& mettresses and nets.
\(\therefore\) Did Evengeline return to the room?
\(E\) No, I did not see her agnin that night until the next morning when she was with ry rother.
\(r\) Did you see Fanny Godol again thet night?
. No, I did not see her until the next morning, downstairs.
Q Did any rore Jappnese core in the roor?
a Yes, about ten rinutes after Priscilla had core beok in the roor, fojat far Japs, I think; entered the roor and took re ent some of the other girls who I was too distreught to ios?rッe.
rocurens 2;09
\& I'Id you resist?
1. Yus, I told ther I was sick and thet I had a headache, but thet rade no differen:se to ther. They juat nulled re by the shoulders ard iorced ree ont of the roor? and pulled re down the hali to anotiner roor.

Q How rany Japs actunlly took you to this other roor?
A Three of ther.
Q Can you describe eny of these three Japonese or any of the Joppenese who hed entered the roon prior to your re-
A No.
Do you know their rank?
\(i_{1}\), No, they were just rerines; no officcrs.
Whot happened when you reached this roor?
i They rede rie lie down on the floor.
Q 'Tho wes present?
t. Just I end the three narines.

Q Did you notice how the roor wes furnished?
\(\hat{i}\) There was nothing in 1t. I was forsed to lie down on the bare floor. They lifted ny dress up to ry waist nad tore off riy pents.
Q How reny of the Japs actuelly pulled up your dress and tore your panties off?
A One.
0 That did the other two Japenese do at this tire?
\(i\) Just stending there, looking and laughing.
? What were you doing?
\(\therefore\) I was strugging, kicking, and striking out sith my arns, but the one who was holding me down slapped ne nil about ry face with his bere hands.
Q Did you lose consciousness?
is No, but I becare dared from the slapping and when I finelly got exhausted, I lay on the floor like a log.
o ind then what happened?
\(\therefore\) While the rarine held re pinned to the floor with one hend, he unbuttoned his tiousers with the other hand and then forced his sexuel organ into re.
\(\uparrow\) Hov long did he engege in his cernel embrace with you?
1. Cbout two or three minutes.
\(n\) Before, during, or irrediately after this act, did he kiss or fondle you in eny ronner?
:. He tried to kiss re, but I held ry arrs both folded over ry face, and he could not reach ry lips.
\(r\) Did he heve en emission in you?
l. Yes.

O Did you heve en erission?
\(\therefore\) No.
\(\hat{i}\) Did his act of ravishrent ceuse you eny physicel pain?
i. Yes, a little pain.
a Did he atterpt any other forr of physical relations with you of en unnaturel feshion?
\(\therefore\) No.

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* When he had corpleted his orgasnl, what happened?
\(\dot{A}\) He stood up, and one of the others got down on re. He had his trousers unibuttoned and his organ was out and he - forced it into re.

Q How long did he violate you?
A Just a few rinutes.
C. Did you resist hir?
\(i\) I tried to resist hin but \(I\) kncw all was over and \(I\) was lost.
r. Did he have en erission"
\(\therefore\) Yes.
\(\because\) Wos he wearing any preventive?
A No.
? Did you heve on erission
\(A\) No.
( Did his rapacious act cause rou any physical pein?
E No.
? Did he atterpt to caress or fondle you?
i No.
Q Then whet hoppened?
When he hed finished, he got up and the third one attecked \(r e\) in the sare ranner and he likemise corpleted the sexual act. I did not core, and I continued to cover ry face cnd protect r:yself the best \(I\) could.

Q Did these three Japanese hurt you as a result of the act?
\(\therefore\) No.
? Dideny of the Jepencse offer you eny payment of any kind?
\(\therefore\) No.
? Did any of th: Jepanese prorise you any special favor or word of protection if you vould acquiesce in their desires?
i. They did not telle. They just had re down, the three darned brutes, and then vent out of the roor: while I was still in a dazed and bewildercd condition.

0 Dic any of the three Jnpanese you have fust rentioned possess ony weepons?
A. Yes, one of them hed a gun with bayonet fixed, and the other two had just their beyonets.
? Did they threston you in any way with their veapons?
\(i\) No.
\(\because\) Then what heppened?
C. I crawled on ry hands and knees, struggled to r:y feet, and sorehow raneged to get back to the roon where I had been taken fror the other girls.
© About how long had you been gone fron the roor and the girls?
\(\therefore\) ibout 20 rinutes.
© About what tire was it whon you returned to the room rejoining the girlsi?
A. It wes neorly ridnight.
\(r\) after your return to the roon, whet did you observe?
A I did not obscrve nnything. I just fell on the floor and sobbed.

C. Then what hoppened?
\(\dot{A}\) I was in a rientel heze all the rest of the night. The Jeps kept coring in end out of the roor, dragging out girls individuelly and in srall groups of two or three. After I hed been lying on the flocr about two or tiree minutes, one Jep rerine carne and dragged me to a room in which there was : bed and which was corpletely furnished.

Q "Es t'is an officer"
\(\dot{f}\) No, he was not officer. He wis just a rarine.
C Who else was present
A Nobody.
© That hoppened?
A He took me in this roor?, lighted the candle, fixed the bed end put \(a\) sheet and pillow on. He reroved all my clothes and then he carried res to the bed and placed re gently thereon. He sterted to caress rie, er:bracing me and kissing me all over ry body, my legs, my stomach and about the breasts, but he could not touch ny face because I held a pillow tightly over my face with ry arrs.
? How long did this continue?
A After sbout ten rinutes he got on top of ne.
Q How long did he engage in his carnal act?
A Nenrly thirty rinutes.
© Did he have en erission?
A Yes.
\(C\) Did you?
\& No.
\(\because\) Did this raping hurt you?
A Yes, it did.
Q Describe the hurt.
A It burned re and I felt very sore inside of re.
? Did he say anything to you during the entire tirie you were in the room?
C. No.

Q Cen you describe the appenrance of this rorine?
A He hed no heir, he had a two-dey growth of beard, he had severel prominent upper gold teeth, he was about five feet 2 inches tall, weighed around 130 pounds, did not wear glesses, had \(\varepsilon\) scar about two inches long just above his right eye, and had no tattooes.

0 You have any idea as to his narie, unit, rank, or organization?
A. No, except thet he was a marine, not an officer.
© Did he offet you any reward or any payment?
A. No.

Did you resist his efforts?
\(\dot{A}\) Yes, certeinly, but \(I\) wes afraid and he, wes too strong.
© Then what heppened?
P He put on \(h i s\) ciothes, told re to put on rine, which I ranaged to dis, and then rotioned re to leeve, which \(I\) did. I returned to the room where the other girls were.
? "hat tire did you get back to your roor-n
A It wes about \(10^{\prime}\) clock in the norning, 10 Februrry 1945.
O Vere you rolostod eg? in that night?
A Yes, I was raped betiveon 12 end 15 tires during thet night. I connot rereriner exoctly how rany tir:cs. I so so tircd anc holror stricken thet it bcenme e living nightrare. The Jops vorld come singly and in groups, cirag re from the roor herdiy before \(J\) had fallen to the floor fror: \(n\) preceding rapling, and would agein take r:e and do it to me over and over. I er: not sure becouse I wes trying to evoid looking ot their foces, but I do not thinik any one of the Jrps used re rore then once. None of ther were officers thet I can recnil. on each occesion I did t :y best o prevent the ettrcks; but es \(I\) grew weakor end meaker and ry private parts becar:s rore inflired nnd painful, I gave up all hope of living nnd expected ther to continue until they killed re. I cannot repent deteil for deteil aftur the first few asseults, but finelly, ft about 4 o'ciock in the morning, I was raped by a rarine whose organ was so large that it'tore ry insides and I bled frore ry private perts. Only then did they lerve re alone utterly exhausted, in great pain and bleeding bedly.
C. Did you observe during any of your short steys in the roor with the giris whether or not any of the other girls were being token or revishod by the Japs?
A No, not et. the tire pertisuleriy, but I doknow other girls were coring and going under the corpulsion of the Jnps. I lerrned afterwerds thet nearly all the girls in the roor.y with the exception oi two or three who were renstruating or othervise unnble to satisfy their derends, were raped by the Jeps.

C "'cre you given nny food or water during thet night?
A Yes, \(f\) few crockers and some woter nbout ridnight. They just brought crackers and threw it on the fioor.

Q On the first occasion that night when the three Jopencse took you and violated you consecutively, wes the roor: lighted by a candle or flashilight?
: No, it wns very derk.
© Did any of the attackers wear any preventives?
A No.
0 Tere nny of tho atteckers under the infiuence of ilquor or drugs?
A Yes, precticelly all of ther: were vory drunk.
\(n\) During the night, did they force you to take any rore Itounr?
\&. No, I :ins sober. Their breaths were terrible and the ocior of their bodies wes indescribably terrible.
\(n\) During the course of the night, did you becoro nauseated and vorit?
A Yes, I wes sick to ny storach, but I held on without throming up sorehow.

Q Did eny of the Jeps other then the first one you described as having slapped you bent, strike, or otherwise bruise you in any manner?
A No, only the netural rarks or black and blue spots coused by their grosping ree tightiy by tne arr.
? After this lest incident which you hod at about \(40^{\prime}\) clock in the rorning when you began to have a slight henorrhage, what hepponed?
A After thet the Japs did not cor'e beck again. We ell lay there trying to rest oursclves.
r. How long were you kept in that room?

A Until about 6 o'clock in the morning. We left the room and triod to find our folks. I found my mother, ry sisters Evengeline and Caroln, and ry brotiner puinet together in a corridor. They had been lookirg far re too. Then the five of us went to another rcom on the sare floor where there were severrl ferily groups, end we stayed with then.

0 ild you recognize ny of these other people?
A Ies, Mrs. Trinidra Liamas Gercia, Teresita L. Garcie, their cook Rose (I don't know her last nare), His. Eric Stern and her son Jerry, lins. Stern's servants, Rosario and Motildc (I con't knory their linst nares), Nes. Lozraine Quirino, her deughter Nancy, and her two sons (I don't know their nares), Liaris Ghezi Galatas, Mrs. Sarah B. Gadol and her son David and servant Genoveva Trinidad. There were a few others whor? I do not rerember or know.
\(r\) Did the Japanese rolest you or any one in your presence subscauent to your departure fror. the roon where you spent the first night?
A No, rost of us were able, on the rorning of 10 February 1945, to go to the rein dining roor where the Red Cross peopie protected us during the subseouent nights.
n When did you escepe fror thc Bay View Hotel?
A On the afternocn of 12 Fobruary 1945. The buj.lding was burning furiousily, biat the Japanese rarines would not let us go out. However, an order was finally given to let us flee fror the burning building, and we did.
? Aftir. you got out of the building until you were rescued by Arcricen soldiers, were you subjected to eny other cruel or unusunl punishricnt by the Jepanese?
A. No, tre only underyent the terror and denger of shelling custornary in warfare. However, at one tire, where nnd yhen I don't recell, n hend grenade wes thrown in the room in which wo were hiding and ry brother Joaquin (Duinet) wes killec. I don't know whether or not the Japancse threv the grenade.

Q Were you at eny tire after your escape fror the Bay View Hotel exarined by a doctor?
A Yes.
\(r\) Uhen wes thint?
A On 28 March 1945 I was excrinced by a United States Army doctor, Captrin Robert R. Jones of the 119th Bettelion, Ledicai Detachrient of the 37th Division, APO 37.
? ?Thet whs the result of this examination as to the auestion of venereal discase?
A It was nogetive.
? Did you becore pregnent es a result of your expcrience?
A No.
Q Do you know of anyone else thet was in the Bay Vier: Hotel or In the Boulevard Alhar:bre Apartrents during the period from 9 Februfry to 13 Februnry 1945 who was rolested by the Jnpenese besides those you heve nored as being in the room with you?
A No, I know of no one.

Q Do you know the nemes or can you describe any officers or perines of the Japanese Imperiel Forces who were present during any of the afore-mentioned periods of time?
A No, I don't.
C. Other than these 12 to 15 rapings and the slappings and the force used upon you in connection therewith, did the Japanese injure you in any manner?
A No.
Q Heve you anything additional that you can think of which you should or can testify about this atrocity?
A That is all I cen say.

\section*{/s/ Esther Garcia Moras ESTITRA GARCIA KORAS}

\section*{Cormonwealth of the Philippines) City of Manila}

I, ESTHFR GARCIA MORAS, of lawful age, being duly sworn on oath, state that \(I\) have rend the foregoing transcription of my interrogation and all answers contained therein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

\section*{/s/ Esther Garcia Moras} ESTHER GARCIA MORAS

Bubscribed and sworn to before me this 27 day of June 1945.
\[
\begin{array}{ll}
\text { /s/ Dayid } T_{c} \text { Sweet } \\
& \frac{\text { DAVID T. SWEET }}{} \\
\text { lst Lt., J.A.G.D. }
\end{array}
\]

CERTIFICATE,
We, FRANK H. MORRISON II, lst Lt., 0-1797858, JAGD, and DAVID T. SWEET, lst Lt., \(0-2052561\), JAGD, certify thet on 27 June 1945 personnliy appeared before us ESTHER GARCIA MORAS end gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth; that after her testimony had been transcribed, the said ESTHER GARCIA KORAS read the same and affixed her signature thereto in our presence.

Place: Roces Building
Calero Street, Manila

Date: 27 June 1945.
/s/ Erank He Norrison 2
FRANK H. MORRISON II ist Lt., J.A.G.D.

Devid T. Sweot DAVID T. SWEEI 1st Lt., J.A.G.D.

\section*{CERTIFICATE}

I, Alva C. Carpenter, Chief, Legal Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, do hercby cortify that the attached photostatic copy of the affidavit of ESTHER GARCIA MORAS is a true and correct reproduction of the original affidavit; and that a signed and sworn copy of said affidavit is presently on file with this Section.


Witness: /s/ John R. Pritchard
Sworn to before me this 2.9 th
day of October, 1946, Tokyo, Japan.
/s/ John R. Pritshard Captain, Infantry Suminary Court

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NENA ALBAN
called as a witness on behalf of the Prosecution, bsing first duly sworn, was exemined and testified as fellows:

\section*{DIREOT BXAMINATION}

Q (By Colonel Lim) Please state your name, age and nationality.
A I am Mrs. Nena Alban, 40 years cld. I lize et 338 Racn, Santa Cruz, Manila. I am a Filipina.

Q You testified before, a counle of days ago?
A Yes.
Q You said that you vere a social workjri
A Yes, sir.
Q You were employed in 1541 iy the Amerisen and Philippine Red Cross 8
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, Mrs. Alban, I wou", I I Lke you to relate to the Commission in a few vords whether or not ynu nave witnessed, personally, any crimes of rape in the City of Manila?
A Yes, sir.
Q If so, when?
A On the first morning of the Jepanese in Menila, thrt vas on the 3rd day of Jenuary, 1942, I reposter to the office of the Red Cross about 7:3C in the moraing, and paseing, through the Quezon Bridge, I went thet way - when I reached the Quezon 3 riligc. I met six Jepancse sentries. They stopped me. They inspected me by toiching all the parts of my body, and they squeezed my breasts - (vitness (iry!ng)

Q Take your time.
GINLRAL DONOVAIT: I understood the other day, whon this uitness was on the stend, that she was wroking in a hospital out there, or as a nurse or a social worker.

COLOMFL LIM: She Baid she started working as a supervising nurse at the hospital after Mey of \(\mathbf{2} 942\), and now she is talking ob out January of 1942.

THE VITNESS: lihen, the Jepenese sentry equeezed my breast I'stepped backwards. I showed lheem that I am not afraid to die, and they were trying f. pull my dress u. It 2 s herd to tell this (crying).
\(Q\) Let's forget that incident.
GFANERAL DONOFAN: Just teke your time.
COLONEL LIM: \(:\) will not esk ycu to proceed with that.
THE WITNESS: \(i\) pulled my dress down and I explained to them, I said, "I am a Red Cross werkor. Do you see my uniformil Ther they stopped doing it, and they took ajl my jewolry that I had, and they agked for my handeze, end they inspected the inside of my handbeg and they found 350 pesos casir and they took it eway frem me.

Q (By Colenel IIm) Hnve you soen any repe cases in the cityp
A Then efter they \(t\) ook everything they sleoped me and then let me go, so I had to proceed to the fied Cross. Then when I reached in front of the Metropolitan Theatre \(=\) saw six Jepenese officers sitting on the stairs right in frint of the theotre, and I already ppssed --

LIEUTLNANT PE;A: Where ues that in front of
COLONLU LII: The Metropoliten Theatre.





Document 2886

CERTIEICATE

I, T. R. C. King; Mejor, Inf. (TD), Fxecutive Officer, Legol Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commender for the Allied Powers, do hereby certffy that Document 2886 is a true and correct cony of the transcript of the testimony offered by NENA ALBAN in the triol of the case ngainst Masaharu HOMMA, Lieutenant Generel, Imperial Japanese Army, before a Military Commission in Manile; and that the whole record of the case, fncluding the trenscript of ell testimonies taken, as well as the affidavits admitted in evidence, are now on file with this Section.


Witness: /s/ John R. Pritchard
Sworn to before me this 22th day of Novemer 1946, Tokyo, Japan.

\author{
/s/ John R. Pritchord Ceptrin, Infantry Summnry Court
}


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DOCUMENT 2847
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APOLINaRIA DUE TUAZON
calléd as a 71 tness on bohalf of the prosecution, being first duly akorn, was examined and testified as follows through Interpreter Rodas:

DIRECT EXAHLMATION
? (By Colonel Lim) T?ill you state your name, age, and nationality? GMNERAL DONOVAN: That spacification?

COLONBL LIMs This is in connection with Specification 4, Paragraph 1, sir,
? (By Colonel Lim) Will you state your name?
A Apolinaria Due Tuazon.
Q Your age?
A Thirty-two years old.
Q Your nationality?
A Filipina.
Q In January or February of 1942 where were you, Ars. Due Tuazon?
A I was in Santa Ana, Pampanga.
0 As an evacuee from the City of Manila?
A Yes.
Q Are you married or single?
A Married.
Q Then you went to Pampanga did you bring your husband along with you?
A Yes.
( Did you have eny children?
A Four children.
Q Here they with you also in Pampanga?
A They were with me, all of them.
Q Do you remember of any incident that happened to you in the month of Pebruary, 1942, which was not musual?
i Yes , sir, there was.
Q Will you state that to the Commission, please, in your own words?
A On February 2, 1942, at about 12:00 p.m., or midnight, 11 Japanese came to our house.

Q What Japanese?
A They were Japanese soldiers.
Q Please proceed.
A They were carrying with them guns, and they fired shots around the house. Fhey wont into the house and went directly into the room. As soon as they went up to the house a Japanese took hold of my husband and held him by the neck,
\(A\) This was inside the room.
\(Q\) Was this cone by the Japancse one after the other?
A les, one after the other.
Q What happened after that?
A Aftorwards they stripped me nakod they didn't leave any piece of clothing on my body. Then they held me by the hair and they dragged me domstaira. When

I arrived domstairs the other Japanese werc waiting, and thoy also abused me.
Q How many Japanese abused you dornsteirs?
A I cannot remember the exact number; maybe it is around four or five, because there were times when I was unconscious.

Q Do you remember phere your husband was all this time?
A They blindfolded him and they throw him out of the windor. They boat him.
I don't know where he was taken.
Q Had you seon your husband while you mere dormatairs?
A He sam each other, yes. Then ze sav each other I tilkod to him and no of tho Japanese sho sarr me got angry. He lifted the butt of his gun and he was about to strike him on the nape of the neck. Then I sar this I lifted my body and I thrust my body towards him to prevent the blor7, and the gun, or the butt of the gun, struck my knee.
d Did you receive any mound by that action of the Japanese?
is Yes, here (indicating).
\(Q\) Do you have any scar of that round?
A Ies, because this was operatod on by the doctor, because if the doctor did not operate on this I will have my knee straight and I cannot bend it.

COLONGL LIMs will the record shom, sir, that the ritness is pointing to a scar on her pight knoe?

TEE IIINESS: And the doctor did his best to see to it that my knee mould not be rendered useless.
Q (By Colonel Lim) During all this time, Mrs. Due Tuason, you have been using the phrase that you had boen abused by the Jepanese. What do you mean exactly by tho word "abueod" by the Japanese?

A They committed all the abuses imaginable. One was still using me, and he is not finished, and the other Japanese, he is so impatient that he would kick this ono who tas using me so ho can also uso me. Sometimos they pould oven kick my feot and pull my logs, and thoy did all the abuses; they did that, they did things that ovon my husband and nyself never did.

\section*{DOCUMENT 2847}
- i Did thoy have sexual intercourso with you?

A Yes, sir.
Q How many of these Japanese used you that way?
A Maybe sevon or eight Japanese.
Q And all this happened on 2 Fobruary 19428
A Yes, sir, on February 2, 1942, betireon 12:00 midnight to 3:00 o'clock in the morning.

Q Did you havo a maid at the time?
A Ies, I had a maid.
7 'het vas her name?
A Juanita Sigra; 17 years old.
Q Where is this maid of yours at the present time?
A Sho is marriod, and I don't know whero sho is right now.
Q Do you know if anything happened to this maid of yours?
A Yes, I know very woll that somothing happened to her. She was abused, bocause tho Japanese had a knife and threatened her.

Q What was that knife used for?
A The maid told me that because his organ can't get in the knife was used to open up hor sexual organ.
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GEMERAL DONOVANs Who was it that told that?
THE INTERPRETTR: The maid, Juanita Sigwa, told hor that the Japanese -GERERAL DONOVANs Woll, we havo heard the rest of it.

```
? (By Colonol Lim) Hov many used Juanita Sigva?
A I do not know how many Japanesc used her, only the next morning she told me of the happening, and she was blcoding profuscly, and she tras so weak. COLONEL LIMs Thet is all of the mitness.

\section*{CROSS EXAMINATION}

Q (By Licutonant Pels) Did you report this incident on the following day?
A Wo do not have anjone to roport this to.
Q Wore there no Filipino Police authorities in Santa fina?
A We were in the barrio that time and there wore no Pilipino policomon.
Q In othor words, this incidont was never reported to anyone?
4 Hepasp.
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\section*{DOCUMFNT 2847}

\section*{EXAMINATION BY THE COMIISSION}

12 (By Gonoral Valdos) What happonod to you after all those Japanoso abused you?

A Thoy loft mo zithout clothes and very woak.
Q Foro you ablo to return to tho house?
A I was ablo to go upstaira using my tioo arms, bocauso my knco was painful and I could not uso it.

Q What happonod to your husband?
A At about tro o'clock somobody camc. I thought it was somo Jnpanesc.
I found out that it ras my husband. Bofore this I thought ho was doad already.

Q Tivo o'clock in tho morning or tro o'clock in tho afternoon?
A In tho morning.
GENERAL VALDES: I have nothing furthor.
GENERRLL DONOVAN: Anything furthor.
LIEUTENGNT PELZ: No, sir.
GENER:L DONOVAN: The Itnces is excusod.
(Pitncss oxcusod.)

\section*{-}

DOCUMENT 2847

\section*{CERTIEICATE}

I, T. R. C. King, Major, Inf. (ID), Executive Officer, Legal Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the fllied Powers, do hereby certify that Document 2847 is a true and correct copy of the transcript of the testimony offered by APOLINARIA DUR TUAZON in the trial of the case against Masaharu HOMA, Lieutenant General, Imperial Japanese Army, before a Military Commission in Manila; and that the whole record of the case, including the transcript of all testimonies taken, as well as the affidavits admitted in evidence, are now on file with this Section.


Witness: /s/ John Re. Pritchard Sworn to before me this 14th day of November 1946, Tokyo, Japen.
/s/ John R. Pritchard Capt. Inf. Summary Court

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 JOHN R.PRIICHARD

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recalled as a witness on behalf of the Prosecution, having been previously sworn, was examined end testified as follows:

DIRBCT EXAMINATION (Cont'd)
Q (By Colonel LIm) State your name, please?
A Celestina de la Rosa,
Q Are you a Tilipino?
A I•am a Tilipino
Q In Jenuary 1942 where were you living?
A I lived in a smell house in Bensic.
GWTRAL DONOVAR: Wheregbouts? Ask her whereabouts?
She didn't state the neme.
THTN WITTSS: I livad in a little house in Bansic, Hermosa, Bataan.
GES:THAL DONOVAN: That is all right.
Q (By Golonel Iim) Do you remomber in January 1942 you have seen Japannse soldiers?

A Yre, I ramember.
Q Will you tell the Commission what happened on that dey when you met this Japaneser soldier?

A The Japanese soldiers came up to the house, and the boys wron told to get down in the housn.

Q How many women wren in the house at this time?
A Thero worn 14 girla.
Q How many men were there?
4 Ther. wore four boys.
Q How many soldiers came into the house?
A Four Japanesn soldinfs cemn up to the house.
Q Will you rnlate to the Commission what hapuonnd while these four soldiers werc upstairs?

GIFITRAL DONOVAN: Change the.t qunstion. Just ask what did the Jepenes soldiors do?

Q (By Colomel Lim) That did thr Jaopnes soldirrs do?
A When they got up to the place we wnre up in the house.
GHITHRAL DONOVAI: What did they do?
THE: :ITMSS: Thry forond the men to go down the house and they told Romens Rodrigurz to gnt into thr small room.
recalled as a witness on behalf of the Prosecution, having been praviously sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
dIRECT RXAMINATION (Cont'd)
Q (By Colonel Lim) State your name, please?
A Celestina de la Rosa,
Q Are you a Tilipino?
A I'am a Tilipino
Q In Jenuary 1942 where were you living?
A I lived in a amell house in Bensic.
GIITHRAL DOMOVAT: Whereabouts? Abk her whercabouts?
She didin't state the neme.
TWT WITTSS: I livad in a little house in Bansic, Hermosa, Bataan.
GETHRAL DONOVAN: That is all right.
Q (By Colonel Lim) Do you remember in Jenuery 1942 you have geen Japaines soldiers?

A Yes, I ramember.
Q Will you tell thr Commission what hepponed on that day when you met this Japaneser soldier?

A The Japancer soldiers camr: up to the house, and the boys worn told to get down in the house.

Q How many women were in the house at this time?
A There were 14 girls.
Q How many men were there?
A Thrr. wrre four boys.
Q How many soldiers came into the house?
A Four Japanesn soldifrs ceme up to the house.
Q Will you rolate to the Commission what hapuoned while these four soldiers werc upatairs?

G3FIERAL DONOVAN: Change thet qunstion. Juat ask what did the Japenesn soldiors dop

Q (By Colonnl Lim) What did thr Japenesn soldinrs do?
1 Whon thry got up to the place wn wnre up in the house.
GETHRAL DONOVAir: What did they do?
THE :ITMSS: Thny forond the men to go down the housn and thny told Romena Hodrigurz to gnt into thr small room.

Q (By Colonel Lim) What room?
A The smellest room in the house.
GETHRAL DOTOVA': Let har go ahnad end tell the story. Don't interrupt hry. If you do I don't think wo will eret it.

Q (By Colonel Lim) Go ahced with your atcry.
A The Japanrse soldirrs took th- girl down and wes trying to manhandle har. Thr Japenren soldirr wer trying to manhandlo the girl, but she obposed him. The Jepenner soldine who went into thr room, took Romana Rodrigunz with him, got har out of thr room and took mr.

Q What hepprned to youp Go aheed, plrasn.
A I trind to struggln. Then I trind to strugeln hr acared me with fixed beyonot. Bnceusn I wes trying to atruggle he gave me a rough puah. \(H \quad\) usad mr, and then I wes wreken brcause of the foren, so I se.t dom and he laft me. The other Jap who came in did the seme thing to \(m\) and \(I\) we.s down on the floor. Aftrr ualing me he linft the room end I got out of the room.

Q Go ahcrd.
A Aftrr mpananding \(m\) ohr took the jowels on me and he took the shirts of thr men. After toking my jnwols he annt me out of tho room pend he took one of the girls nemnd Maria Roncel.

Q Go ahred.
A Whan thry had Marin ting took Virginie. Mindoza.
LIBUWinas PELZ: If th-Commission plapac, shr tretified that sha left thr room end after she lift thus and so heponned. I rom quist thet br stricken.

GIF RAL DOMOVA: Find out is she sew this.
\(\ell\) (By Colonnl iim) You rentioned the neme of Maria Roncal. Do you know what haponned to hrr prraonilly?
of I dida't sin whet they did to her brceuse they sent me out of the room.

Q (By Colonel Lim) Fou dic you know whet hoppened to those others?
IIEUMNATT PSLZ: If thr Commisaion pleper, baforr -
THE :ITMSS: All I sew is thet they took tiom insid. the room.
GInchi DOMOVAN: All thermerks with refranen to thosn twowhat war those names -Marin Roncel and Virginia Mendoze will bn stricken nxeopt the fact the.t thry took tham in thr room.
q (By Colonal Lim) Do you know if eny other girl wer takn ingido thr room bnsides Roncal and Nencoze.?
th Romene Rodrigeuz was tnken into the room.
Q Anybody clant

Doc. "o. 2972
A Honorata de le Rosa was teknn into the room.
\(Q\) Did you know thren Jepaneser?
A I don't know the Jaranese soldings brceuse I wes ofraid; I did'nt look at thrir feces.

Q What heppened to you eftrr all of this personally? GRTRin DOPOVAr: Is it something thet you hevn to bring out? COLONHL LIM: Yes, sif. LIECTHTATT PELZ: I will stipulato that tir girl had a child as a result of this.

COLOML LIM: She becamn pregnent end drlivered her child.
GINGRLI DCNOVAF: Anything further?
COLONEL LIM: liothing furthor.

CROSS RXCAKINATIOAT
Q (By Lirutcnant Polz) Did anyono in your femily tall the polico about whet heppened?

GETHAL DOMOVAT: Ask har if shn known thet.
THE ;ITINWS: Nohody reported it to the police about thet hepprning.

LITUTHETM PHEZ: Whet is thet?
GMERAL DCMOVAir: Nobody raported that.
LIPUTHATI PILZ: Notheng furthar.

\section*{CBRTIBICATI}

I, T. R. C. Kirg, Wejor, Inf. (MD), Exncutiv Officer, Legnl Snction, Gan-rel Hepdquartare, Supreme Commandry for tirn Allind Powne, do hernby errify the.t Document 2872 is a true and corrnct copy of the trenacript of the thatimony offer d by CBLISSMINA DE Ih MOSi in the trial of the cabo against Masaharu HOMMA, Gencrel, Imperial Jepanese army, beforo n Military Commiasion in Menila; and thet the whole record of the carn, including thr trenscript of all tostimonics taken, as wall es the affidevits admitted in avidonce, are now on fils with this Snction.
/s/ T. R. C. King,
T. R. C. King,

Mejor, Inf. (TD)
Fitnabs: /s/John R. Pritehard
Sworn to befors me this 20th dey of Yov:mbr r, 1946, Tokyo, Japen.
/s/ John R. Pritchard
Cept. Inf.
Summrie Court



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- DOCUMENT 2848

AMADEO CABE
called as a witness onbehalf of the Prosecution, being first duly arorn, was examined and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION
Q (By Colonel Lim) Will you state your name?
1 Imadeo Cabe.
Q Age?
A 40 years of age.
Q Nationality?
A Pilipino.
Q Where are you stationed?
A At the Provost Marshal office in criminal investigation laboratory.
Q In January 1942 were you occupying a government position?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was your position then?
A I was assigned as assistant chief of police of Quezon City.
Q Who assigned you as assistant chief of police?
A By order of the chief of constabulary, Genersl Francisco, through the chief of the police of Manila.

Q In January 1942, as assistant chief of police of Quezon City, did you personal know of any cases of rape or atrocities?

LIEUTENANT PELZ: I object to that question, sir. If he asks about complaints, yes.

GENERAL DONOVAN: The question will be rephrased.
Q (By Colonel Lim) Had you received any complaints in connection with rape case in January of 1942?

A Yes, sir.
Q What have you in connection with this complaint?
A He received a report from the family of Mrs. Webb that her two daughters had been raped by Japanese.

Q What have you done in connection with these complaints?
A I sent an officer under me to \(g \circ\) in and investigate the case.
Q How many cases ware tinere?
A There were twe cases that I know of.
- DOCMISNT 2848
,
Q In both cases an officer mas sent to investigate?
A Yes, sir; the second case I went myself personally.
Q Did the officer whom you sent out to investigate the first casc filo an official report?

A Yes, air. It mas placed in the polico blotior, and it gas also sent to the chief of polico, Greater Manila.

Q Where is this pclice blotter at this time?
A That police blotter oscaped by the desk sergeant of the 气uczon City Police Department.
\(Q\) And this repert?
A The original was sent to the chief of police of Manila.
Q Do you still have this police blotter and these official reports on these rape cases?

A I"don't havo them, no, sir.
Q Where are they norl?
A I don't know where they ore now, sir.
Q Do they still exist as far as you know?
A I have not seen them.
Q Will you tell the Commission vihat was the nature of this complaint recoived by you?
d A man was in the office of the police department on January 7th and reported that the two daughters of Mrs. Webb had bocn raped by three Japanese soldiers, whe went in the evening to their house on 6 January 1942 to look for chickens to eat and egge. While they were in the premises of the housc they peoped into one of the rooms and thoy saw the t:zo girls there, ard instead of going to got the chickens --

LIEUTENANT PELZ: If the Ccmrission please, this is not cloar whethor this wes the complaint of tis poesen whe rim a'.leges tis le rarcec or ocro othor mon. I submit the only person .-.

COLONEL LIM: It is that, sir.
LIEUTENANT FELZ: He said a man came in. It is not claar to me who this man was.

Q (By Colonel Lin! ?
A He was sent \(b_{j}\) ti:e iamily of the Felbs, iko wcro the big things of the rape case.

Q In both cases an officer vas sent to investigate?
A Yes, sir; the second case I ment mybelf personally.
Q Did the officer whom you sent out to investigate the first case filo an official report?

A Yos, sir. It mas placed in the police blotior, and it mas also sent to the chief of police, Greater lianila.

Q Where is this pclice blotter at this time?
A That police blotter oscaped by the desk sergeant of the ?uczon City Police Department.

Q And this repert?
A The original was sent to the chief of police of Manila.
Q Do you still have this police blotter and these official ruports on these rape casea?'

A I"don't havo them, no, sir.
Q Where are they nor?
A I don't know where they are nom, sir.
Q Do they still exist as far as you know?
A I have not seen them.
Q Will you tell the Commiseion vhat was the nature of this complaint recoived by you?
d A man was in the office of tho polive department on January 7th and reported that the two daughters of Ners. Webb had becn raped by three Japanese soldiers, whe went in the evening to their house on 6 January 1942 to look for chickens to eat and eggs. While they were in the promises of tho housc they peoped into ono of the rooms and thoy saw the tio girls there, ard instead of going to got the chickens --

LIEUTENANT PELZ: If the Comrission please, this is not cloar whethor this
 I submit the only person ...

COLONEL LIM: lic is that, sir.
LIEUPENANT ritu: He sasd a man caire in. It is rwt clear to me who this man सas.

Q (By Colonel Lisin wio wis this men who came to you?
A He was sent \(b_{j}\) tiee ionily of the Robbs, who wcro tho big things of the rape case.

\section*{- DOCUMENT 2848}

Q Was an official investigation made of tho rape case?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was the assignnent of the official?
A. The man who I sont --

GENERAL DONONAN: The man you spcak of is the complainant?
A He is a man sont by the victim, sir.
GENERAL DONCVLAN: Sont ky the pouplo who wore raped?
A Yes, sir.
Q (By Colonel Lim) What was the rosult of the invostigation mado by the officer whom you sent to investigate this me.tter?

A The report sukmidted by this officur stated two daughters of Mrs. Weib had boos. forced by the Japanese who went to their house and beat thom with their bayonsts if thoy would not accode to their wishos; in which case lirs. Webb had boen also threatened not to shout to the neighbors.

GENERAL DONOVAN: What does he moen by Wobb or Mrif?
COLONEL LII: That is the family name.
GENERLI DONOVAN: Spcll it.
THE MITNESS: W-o-b--b.
LIEUTENSNT PEIZ: Sir, I objcet to this roport. I submit that it should be the porsons who werc complaining of this act, this alleged rape. I think the report of some police officor as to whet he heard to this lieutonent --

GENERAL DOiNOVAN: The objection is not susteined,
Q (By Colonol Lim) Pleaso procecd.
A The roport further stated that the girls had been forcod bocauso they moro threatoned by the soldiers and if they do not give them what they wantod they woule be killed. And in this case the girls wore brought in to the medical officers of the Philippine Gencral Hespsta? and cxamirod for the complaint. The rosult of
 by me to the chiof o! ino notropolitan police ataling all tho facts as was contained in the ropost it the orsen.

GENERAL DONCHA: "x: y, hevo other mitnossos on this particular ceso?
COLONEL LIMz KO. gir,
LIEUTENANP PGTij: fo: : Ast githt the dontor said be stricken.
GENERAL DONOTAN: It atil bo steiexcr,

DOCIMENT 2848
, Q (By Colonol Lim) Did you say you made this roport officially?
A Yes, sir.
Q To चhom?
\(\triangle\) The chief of tho motropolitan policc.
Q llas any action taken on that roport by any Filipino or Japancse?
A I have not kno:m any action on that casc. I know only the girls had boen treated in the Philippino Gonoral Hospital for the lacorations they had. \& Do you know of any other case which you have officially and porsonally investigatod?

A Yes, sir.
Q Will you relate that to the Commission?
A At noontime on the loth of January, 1942, a car came to the police department, and inside this car waro two womon and a drivor. Ono of the womon was in a scmiunconscious condition, and tho other voman was also in a scmi-unconscious condition, and roported to us that they had been raped by several Japancse soldiers while thoy werc on the way from Santolan to N. Domingo Strect.

Q Go ahoad, please. What did you do then.
A Tho statements of the women werc taken and placed in the police blottor, and thoy were sent to tho Philippine Gencral Hospital for treatmont, and I made a report to the chicf of the metropolitan police of the incident, which mas roported to us.

Q Go ahcad, plcase.
A I mont mysolf to the office of Secrotary Vargas, where I was entertainod by Colonel Netividad and later on brought to the officc of Scerctary Vargas, whoro I rolatod tho incident and submittod my roport. Q You roferrod to Vargas, the chairman of tho Philippinc Commission?

A Ios, sir.
2 Go ahoad, pleasc.
A By learning the incident Sccrot:ry Verges sacid he zill do his bost on the casc. Then I roturned to my station. The following morning a man camo to our office and told us that a roman and a small child mere found doad near the house of Mr. Kitajima within the vicinity of Quczon City. I went there mysolf with the chiof of police, Mr. de Leon, and thore I sav: a body of a child, a small child, about the age of two or throo doad and burnod noar the garage of Mr. Kitajima.

\section*{工OCOITNT 2848}
- Tho hoad was broken and apparontly hit by a blunt instrumont. The body of a doad woman was found about ten yards of this placo naked and burned, but I noticed a stab on the broast just below the nipple of the yoman. The woman mas also oozing some fluid.

Q Indicating what as far as you know?
A Indicating apparently rape comaittod on this woman, as it vas roported to us the this roman had beon the companion of these two nomon tho came previously to our office to roport.

LIRUTENANT PELZ: If it please the Comnission, I object to tho statoment that it was roportod, not tolling by whom and giving a conclusion that this other woman had boen rapod, too.

GENERAL DONOV:N: I nould like to find out who roported this. A This report was givon by one of the tio victims, the ti:0 70 mon tho reported to our"office provious to that time whon I nont to tho scono of the crimos.

GENERAL DONOVAN: The hooring as to tho had been rapod will be strickon. Q (By Colonol Lim) Go ahoad, pleasc. What have you done aftor thets A I returnod to the station with Mr. de Leon and mado a roport again to the chief of tho motropolitan polino. Whon they recelvod thine report I wes called out in our office to make the roport. I nent thore and then I was wiker to Milacenang to state again what I have seen at tha sceno of the crime.

Q Fere you invostigated by eny Ieppinoso in connocsior, with thts last reporui
A The day aftor that, sir, a Japanese jitnoy with sovoral Jnpaneso civilians camo to tho police department and nskod us whero are the bodios of tho dead porsons. I told them that thoy are locatod noar the :10u3e of Mr. Kitajima in the vicinity of Quezon City. The Japanuse civilion tho was speaking the dialect was well informed, and he stated that these victims had becn victimized by Japanese soldicrs. I told him that was the report of tho porson tho came to our office. I was meroly rolating the report as it was told to the police dopartment. Then ho took me to the scenc of the orime. I sent there in the jitnoy with them. They sar the bodics of the doad child and tho roman. They poured some gasolinc on thom and lighted them up. Later on they wore picked up with shovols and put inside the jitney, and from there ve proceoded to tho police dopartmont. While we were in the police department the Japenose in chargo of the cror took the bodies of the Fiotims and wernod mo not to mention anything about the ceso thent had beon committod by Japanose soldiors, but I should say that they had boen comnitted by the Filipinos.

Q Did you see again thoso roports at any timo prior to 5 August 1942, and if so, when?

A I have not scen those reports, but I havo soen the polico blottor in Fort Santiago whon I was taken in thore.

Q Whon Dere you takon into Fort Santiage?
A I was taken into Fort Santiago on tho 19th of July, 1945.
Q Did you havo occasion then to spoak about this pol.ico blottor and thoso reports?

1 Yos, air, becauso one of tho questions propounded to me by the Japunose invostigator insice Santiago ras on tho subject portaining to tho rapo cases that had boon investigatod by tho polico dopartmont of Quezon City, Q Fill you rolato to tho Comission tie nature of this inveatigation about thoëe roports?

GENERLL DONOVAN: It was about the some thing, pasn't it?
COLONEL LIM: It is tho same thing, sir.
GENERLL DONOUAN: DO 70 need it?
COLONEL LIM: Just to show tho fact that oven tho military polico more trying to cover up theso casos of rape.

GENERIL DONOVIN: Ho indicated the military police investigated it. Q (By Colonel Lim) Woro you roporiod with respect to those reporis?

LIEUTENANT PELZ: I rill objoct to it. Wo are not intercsted in his tortures.

GENERAL DCNOVAN: That nay bo answcrod.
THE WITNisS: I was punishod, tortired and given all sorts of third dogree methods to extort from ine information that thos would liko to knor which I was not able to anemor.

COLONEL LIM: Your witnoss.
CRCSS EX:MLARTEN
Q (By Lioutonant Polz) Did tho tiro daughtors of Mrs. Webb identify the Japanesc soldiors who allugjciny raped then?

A They identifiea ihom in the form of wearing the Japenozo uniform and so forth,
Q Did your roport which yoli handed to the motropolitan police eiro the namos of the Japaneso soldiorsi

A Thoy did not give the nanes, and I mas not able to mention the names.

Q Did you attompt to investigato in any way tho individual Japanese who vero rosponsible for thoso alleged rapos?

A Fo could not get any Japanose by that tinc.
Q In other words, the roport neroly said a numbor of Japanose soldiors are accused or raping tryo romon, is that correct?

A Thoso wore the facts.
Q What action did you oxpoct that tho Japancse nilitary polico could take in this casof

A As an organizod nilitary organization they should heve investigated the case and sec if thore is any thought about that, and then to the satisfaction of the victims and to the people thuro should have boon propor investigation and pumishment of thoso culprits.

Q-Do you knori that the Japancse military polico did not attompt to find out who committed these alleged rapos?
i I don't know anything about that.
Q Iou testified that the tro woncon who cane to you voro both in a sem1unconscious stato on 10 January, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.
\(Q\) Did you tako the etatomonts from thom at a later dato?
A Fo did, yee.
\(Q\) Did they give any clue as to the oronts thet took placo bofore this allagod rape?
\(\Delta\) Yos, sir, thoy said that thoy have identificd the car phich pas usod as one of those Japanesc automobiles used by the soldiors and tho soldiers wore the Japanese uniform and thoy talkod nothing but Japanoso.

Q Did they identify the soldiors by namo?
A They did not knor thoir names.
Q Did any roport that you sont formand identify the Jrpanesc soldiers by anything othor than the fact that they woro Je.panose?

A I think so because the jitnoy that como in on the folloring day had Jnpaneso in it who woro quite informed of tho incidont. In that cese I think the military authoritios kne:7 about the incident.
\(Q\) When you say wore quite well informod, did they know noro than what was in your report?

A They practically know :hat has bem stated in tho report.

\section*{DOCUMENT 2848}

Q In other words, thay might have road your roport, is that corroct?
A Thoy might have road it or night havo boon informed.
Q Do you know whothor Secrotary Varges fomparded your complaint to the Japanes authoritios?
i. Bog your pardon?
n Do you know if Secretary Vargas formarded your complaint to the Japencec authoritios?

A I did not understand the middlo word.
? Forwarded tho complaint?
i I do not know.
Q What was Mr. Vargas' position on Jenuary 10, \(1942 ?\)
I Ho was the mayor of the groator City of Manila.
Q What action did Vargas suggest he rould try and have taken?
is Beg your pardon?
Q That action did Mayor Vargas suggest ho would havo teken?
\(\therefore\) I do not knoz what action he did tako; he didn't toll me.
Q What information wore tho Japaneso military polico torturing you for, and what wor thoy trying to obtain?

A dmong other things, thoy qucstionod no about ny activities ahile 1 was assistant chief of police of Ruezon, and also my connection with tho Philippine Arnỵ.

Q You testifiod thoy tortured you with regard to thesc rape incidents. What did thoy ask you nbout those rapo incidents?
is That the roports I have made point to thom, that I was hostile to the Japaneso Imperial Forces and that I could havo said in another :7ay, in another language, instead of stating this rape was comnitted by Japanese soldiers I could have stated thet it was dono by bad Filipinos.

Q Thoy wanted you to admit that?
i. Thoy :ranted to show that I mas hostile and against them, and for that reason

I receivod the tortures. The other thing was that I das in the Philippine irmy. LIEUTENNNT PELZ: I havo no further questions.

GRENERiL DONOVAN: I want to be sure, Colonel Lim, that you undcratood my quostion. Aro thore any more uitnessos on this particular specification? COLONEL LIM: NO, sir.

\section*{DOCUMENT 2848}

GENERAL DONOVAN: There are the people who woro involvod? COLONGL LIM: Ho cannot find then, sir. Of ccurse, I ras referring to paragraph 11, sir.

GENERTL DONOVIN: all right.

\section*{EXIMINATION BY THE COMMTSSION}

Q (By Gonoral Valdos) As assistant chief of polico of Quozon City, did you keop in your file coples of all reports submittod to the chief of the netropoli, \(\tan\) polico of Grontor Manile?

A I kopt thom in the police dopartmont of Quozon City.
Q That happonod to those reports?
\(\Delta\) I don't know whet happoned to thon whon I mas rolievod from that placo.
Q You knew that you wore going to be a witnoss in this case, didn't you?
is I didn't knor.
Q Didn't you know quito some tine boforo?
A I didn't know.
Q Whon did thoy notify you to appoar bofore this Commission?
4 I was notifiod yostorday aftornoon by Captain Williams.
Q You Ynew the suiject of your teatimony?
A Yos, bocauso cbout a wook beforo that I pas invostigated by the War Crimes Comaission.
? Did you make any offort to locate the original copios of your reports about theso repos?
\& I did tiry to holp tho officer.
Q You were unable to got coplos of those roports?
i Thoy were no longer in tho Malacanang or in tho polico dopartment of Quezon City.

GENERiL DONOVAN: I would like to ask the Prosecution ihat offort they mado to get tho reports?

COLONEL LIM: Ne wont to Malacanang for the formor rocords of the Philippin Exocutivo Comisaion, and wo mero informod that thore wore nono available. 8 (By Gencral Trudcau) Did your invostigator got the testimony or information diroctly from the thebb girla?
\& Yos.
Q Ho contactod thon directiy?
4 Ies, sir.

\section*{- DOCIMENT 2848}

Q Didn't the Japonose have an liaison officer at tho hoadquartors, Quozon City?
a Lt that tine thore was none yot.
Q Where was your chiof of polico at that timo?
A My chief of polico?
Q You seen to have been running the show at that tinos
A The chiof of police was sick during that time, and he had boen absent some tine and so I was assistod by the former chiof, Mr. de Leon.
8 Why didn't you colloct the bodios of the monan and childron instoad of leavin thom out there for anothor 24 hours?

A Thore was no transportation available at the disposal of the police departmen; In fact, wo vent thoro walking.

GMNERAL TRUDEAU: That is all.
GENERLLL DONOVLN: That about the modical roport from the Philippine Genoral Hospital? Wes any effort made to got that?

COLOLIEL LIN: All theso records, sir, wore destroyod during tho liberation of Manila.

GENER:L DONOV:N: If there is nothing further the witnoss is excused. ( Fiitness excused.) \(^{\text {) }}\)

DOCUMENT 2848

\section*{CIㅛITEICITE}

I, T. R. C. King, Major, Inf. (ID), Executive Officer, Legal section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, do hereby certify that Document 2848 is a true and correct copy of the transcript of the testimony offered by AMADEO CABE in the trial of the case against Masaharu HOMMA, Lieutenant General, Imperial . Japanese Army, before a Military Commission in Manila; and that the whole record of the case, including the transcript of all testimonies taken, as well as the affidavits admitted in evidence, are now on file with this Section.


Witness: /s/ Jchin. Pritchard
Sworn to before me this 14th day of
November 1946, Tokyo, Japan.
/s/ John R. Piitchard Capt. Irif. Summary Court.

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 ／JOKN R．PRITCHARD／




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\section*{JUAN ETUIJERA}
called as a witness on behalf of the Prosecution, being first duly sworn through Interpreter Rodas, was examined and testified through Interpreter Rodas as follows, with Interpreter Gojunco acting as "oheck" Interpreters

DIPECT EXAUINATION
Q. (By Captain Calyer) What is your name'p
A. Juan Etuijera.
Q. Where do you live?
A. Obando, Katangelan.
Q. How old are your
A. 60 years.

Q On the 7th of February, 1945. did you see some Japanese at Panghulo?
A Yes, in the place where me were.
Q How many did you see?
A. Eight.
Q. Do you know what branch of service they were from?
A. According to rhat I knon, they are army men.
Q. Hori do you know that?
A. Because of the uniform that they rore, khaki shirt and khaki pants.
Q. Did you see any marks on the uniform?
A. I knor there is an officer, because he brings mith him a stord.
Q. Did you see any stars on the uniform?

Where we kept our things.
Q. Did they take the men, women and children from the town?
A. No. :Je ::ere there in that hut, 40 of us altogether.
?. Was that ..en, Jomen and children?
4. Yes.
Q. No:i, what did the Japanese do to the people in that hut?
d. They tied all of us, all men and the old romen rere tied together. The children and the young girls were not tied, and they nere separated from our rroup.
Q. Norr, That happened to the men?
A. Lofter men and the old :ramen rere tied, one by one zere taken downstairs and ซere killed, and bayoneted. I sav one pho was bayoneted and pas throrn Into the ditch.
Q. Dia you see niore than one killed?
i. I did not see, because as soon as they rere taken dorn the doors nere closed, but afterwards I found all my companions in that ditch, because I was the last one that rias killed .- that ras supposed to be killed.
8. No::, r:hat did they do to your
A. I :as taken downstairs, my hands mere tied at my back, and I fas asked --

I was pushed to the fish pond.
Q. What happened there?
d. Ho held the gun, and ith full strength he hit me right here on my neck.
Q. What part of the gun did he hit you with?
4. The hendle, the point.
Q. 7ill you show the Commission the mark of that blor?
d. Yus, sir.
(The ritness exhibited the back of his neck to the commission.)
Q. No:: what happened to you after that?
is. They threr me into the fish pond, face do:n.
8. Mare you siruck ataing
A. I cannot tell whether they hurt me again. dill that I felt pas they stepped on we to sco whother I zas dead or alive.
8. Weren't you struck on the shoulder also?
A. Yos, I ras struck once more on my shoulder with the butt of the gun. And I rill shor: the Comaission.
Q. Till you shor its
(The r:itness exhibited his shoulder to the Conmission.)
Q. While you vere lying in the fish pond did you see anyone else?
A. Yes.
8. Who?
4. My nieco, tho is single, tho happened to have fallen beside me on my right side.
8. What rias her condition when you sa: her there?
4. Sho called to me. She did not have any .... she ras not ticd, and then I told her to untie me and that we are going to leave.


I, I, A. C. King; Majrit, Inf. (TD), Exedutive Officer, Legal Section, gencral Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the dillied Powors, do hereby certify that Document 2876 is a true and correct copy of the transcript of the testimony offered by JUAN ETUIJERS in the trial of the caso against Tomoyuki Yaikshita, General, Imperial Japaneso dargy, before a Military

Commission in Manila; and that the phole recond of the case, inoluding the transcript of all testimonies taken, as rell as the affidavits admittod in evidence, are nor on file with this Section.
T.R.C. King,

Major, Inf. (TD)

Witnesss_/s/ John R. Pritchard
Starn to beforo me this 20th day
of November, 1946, Tokyo, Japan.
/s/ John R. Pritchard
Capt. Inf.
Summary Court




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REST：3ごつ つ
GRINTRAL HRADQUJARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIMD POIERS LEGAL SECTION，SANILA

MRMORANDN TO：Prósecution Section（Report Ño．287）
ThRU ：Executive Officer，Lesal Section，Manila
SUBJECT ：Arson，rape and robbery at falilihan and Sikatuna， Bohol，P．I．，after 2 Soptember 1945.

II．SUMMARY OF EVIDHNCE：
After their defeat by American forces about 19 April 1945，the Jepanese on Bohol fled to the hills．Here，they separeted into smell groups and lived in the forest and caves（R 2）．One of these groups consisted of six mon under tho leadorship of Sergeant IdiokU（R 1）． From tine to time，this band made raids upon the civilians in order to obtain foud（ R 2），but they also stole personal property and raped younf women on several nccesions（ \(R 8,11,22,26,29,33\) ）．

Oncu，when the occupants of a huse whers they sought food failed to admit them，Sergeant THAOKU＇s mon surrounded the house and sot firo to \(i t\) ，but the residents wore able to oscepe after the Japanose had fled in fear of euerrillas（ R 1，36）．

On another occasion，a group of six Japanese looted a home and forced the son and deughter of tho househild tc accompany thom as fuides（R 14，18）．The son was later bayonetted and loft for dead（R 18）． while the body of the daughter wes found ebout a month later near the tent whers the Jepanese hed camped．Six front teeth were miasing and her legs had been severed from the bidy（R 14）．Her hands were still tied bohind her back（R 15）．

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FRANCISCA BERNARDO DE LUNA
called as a witness on behalf of the Prosecution, being first duly sworn, Has osamined and testified as follons through Interpreter hodas:

\section*{DIRECT EXABIIN:TTON}

Q (By Colonel Lim) Please give your name?
A Francisca Bernardo.
Q What is your married name?
A De Luna.
Q That is your nationality?
A Filipina.
Q On 10 January 1942, do you remember having seen some Japanose soldiers in the barrio of Sampaloc, Municipality of Talavera, Nueva Ecija? A Yes, sir, on the 10th of January, 1942. Yes, it wes on January 10th, 1942, and the Japanese went thore and searched and arrested people, and I was threatened with a bayonet, and at that time I was pregnant. I was pregnant and about to deliver.

COLONEL LIM: Incidentally, sir, this is in connection with paragraph number 5.

Q (By Colonel Lim) What happened next?
A They boxed me on the face, both sides of my face, both arms, and also on my thigh, and when I laid prostrate on the ground I vas raped.

Q Who raped you?
i I cannot remembor his name, but he is a Japanese.
Q A Japanese soldier?
A A captain. He had a sword, a very long sword, and that is the sword that he was threatening me with.

COLONEL I.IM: You may cross examine.
CROSS EXAMINATION
Q (By Lieutenant Pelz) Do you know the name of this captain, or did you know the name of the captain at that time?
A Due to my fright I do not remember.
Q Did you report the incident to the Japanese authorities?
A Yes, sir, we reported the incident to the Japanese authorities, and the one who reported it was threatened to be shot.

Q By whom was he threatened to be shot?
A The one who raped ne.
Q You reported to the one who raped yrou?
A I said that after I was raped, two days after, we went to town to report the matter, and we reported the matter to the same captain who raped me.

LIEUTENANT PELZ: I have nothing further, sir.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
Q. (By Colonel Lim) Was this captain the commander of the forces in the place?

A Ies, sir.
COLONEL LIM: That is all.
GENERAL DONOVAN: Anything further?
LIEUTENANT PBLZ: Nothing further, sir. GENERAL DONOVAN: Any questions by the Commission? (No response.)

The witness is excused.


DOCUMENT 2862

\section*{GERTIEIGATE}

I, T. R. C. King, Major, Inf. (TD), Executive Officer, Legal Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, do hereby certify that Document 2862 is a true and correct copy of the transcript of the testimony offered by FRANCISCA BERNARDO DE LUNA in the trial of the case against Masaharu HOMMA, Lieutenant General, Imperial Japanese Army, before a Military Commission in Manila; and that the whole record of the case, including the transcript of all testimonies taken, as well as the affidavits admitted in evidence, are now on file with this Section.


Witness: /s/ John R. Pritchard
Sworn to before me this 15 th day of
November 1946, Tokyo, Japan.
/s/ John R. Pritchard Capt. Inf. Summary Court

























\section*{VICENTE ARIAS}
called as a witness on behalf of the Prosecution, being first duly sworn through Interpreter Gojunco, was examined and testified as follows through the Interpreter:

\section*{DIRECT EKAMINATION}

Q (By Csptain Pace) Give your name, please.
A Vicente Arias.
Q You will have to speak louder than that. Where do you live?
A (Through the Interproter) 211 Carriecio Street.
Q Are you the owner of the Aries Building?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you look at Prosecution's Exhibit 193 and point out where your building is located?
(The witness indicated on Prosecution's Exhibit No. 193.)
CAPTAIN PACE: Let the record show that the witness is indicating the building -- or the block south of Rizal Avenue, and just to the east of the foot of Rizal Avenue, on Carriedo Street.

Q (By Captain Pace) On the morning of February 5, 1945, did you see anything unusual?
A Yes.
Q What was it?
A On about eleven o'clock in the morning a group of Army men set fire to the north of Carriedo Street.

Q What Army did they belong to?
A The Japanese Army.
Q Will you indicate on Exhibit 193 where you saw the Japanese setting fires? A The fire was set on the corner of Carriedo Street and Escolta, thereanter at the corner of Escoita and Rizel Street. From there they set fire to the building occupied by tise Romanach music firm. The rext building they set fire to was the one ccuipied by the Misic Associations at the corner of Estero Cegado and Carriedo. The next was the Roces Building at the corner of Rizal Avenue and Carriedo.

CAPTAIN PACE: Will the record show that the witness has indicated the buildings on the north side of Carriedo Street, beginning with the unnamed street north and south at the extreme right of the photograph, and he pointed all the way along on Carriedo Street on the north side until he reached Rizal Avenue, to the point marked "L".
\(Q\) (By Captain Pe.ce) Will you point out on this exhibit where the Roces Building la?
\(A\) It is where the letter "A" is shown.
Q You have mentioned the Romanach Music Store; is that correctly indicated by the letter "Mal on this sketch?
A No, sir; it is in iront.
Q You mean it is on the north side of the street, ing tead of on the south side as it is ahown hare?
A Yes, sir, it is in the north.
Q Now, will you describe how the Japanese set the fires in these five bloaks that you have described?
A They started by breaking dom the doors of the buildings at the corner of Carriedo, and they poured gasoline and set fire. And they continued with the same procedure, with the other buildings,

Q Will you look at Proseoution's Exhibit No. 196 and tell what pages 1 and : show?
A The photograph I have before me shows the building on the corner of Esterc Cogado and Carriedo, where the Romanach business was. The second photograph is of the same building.

Q What are those shacks that appear in the picture?
A One of the buildings is the one occupied by the night club, and the other buildings were occupied by other busineases.

Q Kore the shacks that appear on pages 1 and 2 on the exhibit there after th fire, or have they been built since?
A It is after the fire that they were built.
Q And immediately after the fire were any buildings left in the area which you have described?
A The northern part of the night club building.
CAPTAIN PACE: The witneas is indicating a concrete structure in the background of the second page of the exhibit.

Q (By Captain Pace) Look at pages 3, 4, 5, and 6, and tell what they are; A They show part of the building of Roces and the other buildings that were right by the fire.

CAPRAIN PACE: I offer this, Exhibit 196 for Identification, in Evidence.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: There being no objection, it is accopted in evidence.
(Prosecution Exhibit No. 196 for Identification was received in Evidence and so marked.)
* (By Captain Pace) The buildings which you have described were all on the north side of the street, is that right?
A Yes, sir.
Q Your building is on the south side of the street; right?
i Yes, sir.
2 Did anything happen to your building?
A Yes, sir. It has been partially set on fire.
Q During the hours which you observed the Japanese doing this, was any artillery being fired into the aroa which you described?
A No, sir.
CAPT:IN PACE: You may inquire.

\section*{CROSS EXAMINATION}

Q (By Captain Reel) Did your building catch fire from the others? A A part of the building --. A part of the fire that burned my building was through the flames on the other buildings.
Q Yes. Nobody set fire to the building you were in? Nobody deliberately set fire to the building that you were in?
A Yes, sir. The lower part of the building was set on fire.
Q Was that deliberately set on fire by somebody, or was that fire started by flames coming from the other buildings?
A It was deliberately set on fire.

Q How many floors did the building have that you were in?
A Four floors.
2 And was the Japanese Navy using some of that space?
A Those that set a military outpost at the corner of Rizal and Carriedo Strsets were the ones who occupied the building.

Q Were these other buildings that you sam destroyed also occupied by military forces?
A The Roces Building was occupied by the Navy, and the other buildings were not.

Q Do you know what the other buildings were used for?
A The other buildings were not occupied by the Japanese military, but were occupied by their owners and some leases.

Q Anc wer'e the other buildings warehouses?
A No, sir, they were not warehouses.
Q Did they have storage space in them?
A I don't believe they had warehouse space.
Q What floor of your building were you on when all this occurred?
A On the third floor.
Q And did you stay there and watch all those fires being set?
A Fe stayed until about three o'clock in the afternoon when we were only able to go out.

Q Did you leave your building before it started burning?
A No, sir.
Q So you were in the building when it was on fire?
A Yes, sir.
Q And was there pretty heavy fighting going on in the vicinity of these burning buildings at that time?
A There was no fire.
© Didn't you hear any machine guns?
A No, sir, I didn't hear anything of a machine gun sound, but there was a machine gun at the lower part of my building, but I believe it was not used.

Q Did you see the American forces that day?
A Yes, sir. I sam only an imerican soldier at the comer of Plaza Goiti and Rizal after about ten o'clock in the morning.

Q And that was before these fires were set?
i Yes, sir.
\(Q\) Didn't you see some more American soldiers after ton o'clock in that area? a No, sir. It was until after three o'clock in the afternoon at when we sam in the middle of Rizal ivenue some more Americans.
? Yes. And by 3:30 in the afternoon that area was pretty well in the hands of the americans, wasn't it?
A I don't belleve the area was well controlled by American forces at that time, and there was no fire.

Q So that whatever imerican soldiers got there got there without a battle, is that right?

INTERPRETER GOJUNCO: Nould you please repeat that?
CAPTAIN REEL: So that whatever fmerican soldiers got there got there withou a battle, is that correct?
a Ies, sir; without any resistance.
CAPTALN Rickif: That's all.
CAPTAIN PACE: Thank you, Mr. Arias.

DOCUMENT 2868

\section*{CERTIEICATE}

I, T. R. C. King, Major, Inf. (TD), Executive Officer, Legal Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, do hereby certify that Document 2868 is a true and correct copy of the transcript of the testimony offered by VICENIE ARIAS in the trial of the case against Tomoyuki YAMASHITA, General, Imperial Japanese Army, before a Military Commission in Manila; and that the whole record of the case, including the transcript of all testimonies taken, as well as the affidavits admitted in evidence, are now on file with this Section.
/s/ T. R. C. King Major, \({ }^{\text {T }}\) Inf. (ID)

Witness: /s/ John Re. Pritchard Sworn to before me this 15th day of November 1946, Tokyo, Japan.
/s/ John R. Pritchard Capt. Inf Summary Court

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DOMINADOR S.ATTOS
called as a witnoss on behelf of the Prosecution, hoving been first duly sworn, mis examinod and teotified as follows:

DIRECT EXAM:INATION
2 (By Ceptain Pace) Give your name, please.
\& Dominador Santos.
Q You will have to speak louder.
A Dominador Santos.
Q Where do you live?
A No. 5 Cuesta, Hanila.
Q What is your occupation?
A I am the deputy chief of the Detective Bureau, Manila Police Department.
D In the early part of Februnry, 1945, what was your occupstion?
A I was the erecutive officer of the North Sector, Man:la Police Department,
Q Did you see anything unusual hanpen on the morning of February 4, 1945 ?
A Yes, sir.
(C) Will you describe it?

A Between 9 and 10 deM. on February 4th phile I was going to the office and the police station I saw a truci on Reina Regente Street, near Solcr, stop in front of a building. Six Japanese soldiers left the truck and entered the building. Being suspicious that somothing may happon, I stopped and make observation for about 20 minutes. There was a sudden explosion and a fire. I did not proceed to my office anymore and I returned home.

Q I show you Prosecution's Exhibit No. 193 for identification and ask you if you can tell whet that is?
A This is the place (indicating).
Q What is the whole paper?
A This is a map, sir.
Q Are you familiar with the area which thit represonts?
A I an faniliar with the area, sir.
Q Does that accurately represent that arca?
A Tes, sir.
CAPTAIN PACE: I offer it in evidence.
GENERAL REMNOLDS: There being no objection, it is accepted in evidence.
(Prosecution Exhibit No, 193 for identification wis received in ovidence)

Q (By Cciptain Pace) will you point out on there the Singer Building about which you are talking?
A Right there, sir (indicating).
CSPTAIN PACE: Let the record shor thet the witness is indicating the letter "A".

Q (By Captain Pace) How long after the Japanese went into the Singer Building did you see and hear the explosion?
A About 20 minutes, sir, I heard the explosion.

Q Had the Japs left?
A Before the explosion the Japanese left.
Q What happoned efter the explosion?
A There fas a firo, sir.
Q Did you return to that building after that?
a I was alrendy -- Tho following day, Monday, February 5th.
Q What was the condition oi that building and tho othor buildinge in that block?
A They ware all burnod.
Q I show you Prosecution's Exhibit No, 194 for identification and ask you to tell me what oach of these four pages is.
A This is a picture of the building bohind the Singer Building.
Q It is a rear Fien of the Singer Building?
A Yes, sir.
Q Is that the way it looked after the fire?
A After the fire this is the may it lookod.
Q Look at the next picture. What is that?
A This shows the picture of the Co Poe Building.
Q Is that the way it looked after tho fire?
A Yes, sir.
Q Look at page 3.
A This is the picture of the Singer Building as it appears after some remodoling.

0 What remodeling has boon dono that shows in that picture that wes not present after the fire?
A The roof and these windors, 'sir. They were not in that position when the fire ruinod the place.

Q Look at page 4.
A This is the remodelod picture, also.
CAPTAIN PACE: I offer Exhibit 194 in evidence, sir.
GENERAL REXNOLDS: There boing no objection, ihis is accepted in evidence.
(Four photographs of Singer Building and block were recoived in evidence and marked Prosecution Exhilit No. 194).

Q (By Captain Pace) Was there any military fire that landed in that aroa at the time you saw the Japanese carrying something into the Singor Building? A There was no artillery fire, sir.

CAPTAIN PACE: You may inquire.
C.IPTAIN REDL: Could I have that last question read back, ploase?
(Question read)
CAPTAIN REEL: And the ingwer.
(Answer read)
CLPTAIN RBEL: I will ask that thet bo strickun, sir. Thore was no testimony by this witness that he savi tno Japaneso carry anything into the building. It is a deliberately-framed question. We object to it and wo ask that the question and answer bo strickon.

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-
CAPTAIN PACE: If Counsel were right I will agree with kim. To makc certain I will be sure to get something, in the record et this time which I thought was already there.

GEMERTL REDHOLDS: There seems to be agreement that the question and answer be stricken.

Q (By Captain Pace) What did the Japs do when thoy drove up in front of the Singer Building in a truck?
A They were bringing dynamites.
Q There did they bring tho dynamite?
A They took the dynamites insido the building.
Q And did they come out then?
A They came out.
Q Did they bring the dynamite out with them?
A They did not bring anything when thoy went out.
Q Fore any artillory projectiles landing in that vicinity at the timo you sall the Japanose do this?
\& There was not.

\section*{CKPTAIN PACE: You may cross-examine.}

\section*{CROSS-EXUMIMATION}
? (By Captain Reel) Had there been artillery fire during that dny?
A I beg your pardon?
Question read)
is There was no artillery fire, sir.
Q (By Captain Reol) No artillery fire in the crea in the vicinity of the Singer Building shom as "A" on tilis plan, Exhibit 193, on the 4 th day of February, 1945 ? Is that your answer?
A Yes, sir. That is no lie. There mas no artillery fire.
Q Were there some airplanes flying above the area?
A I did not observe airplanes flying during that tirae.
Q I guter you the socond picture of Prosecution's set of pictures on
Exhibit 194, and ask you if this is not the danaged fusolage of an airplane in the lower lefthand corner.
A That is not.
8 Answer loud so he can hear.
It seoms to me that that is not an airplane fuselage.
\(Q\) And what do you think it is?
A That might be somo -a some nilitary -military objects that are boing loft by the Japanese.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: Will you point out to the Commission that which you refer to

CAPTAIN REBL: This instrument hers, sir, on the second picture in the lower lefthand corner.

Q (By Captain Reel) How far away from tho Japanese were you standing when you saw then go in tho building?
A I was approximately at a distance of ebout 50 meters.
Q 50 meters, And at a distance of 50 neters, you saw ho:7 many Jepenese go ins 4 Six Japanese.

Q And what did they carry? What was the shape of the article they carried?
A They were oarrying somewhat round objects.
Q And from 50 meters away you identified that round object being carried by aix Japanese as dynamite, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you know what the Japanese were using the Singer Building for? A I don't know what they are using that for, but that is the time that -Before that time there was a Jepanese sentinel in front of the building.

Q There was a Japanese sentinel in front of the building. Do you know whether they hed naval stores in that bullding?

THí WITNESS: I beg your pardon?
(Question read.).
A I don't know.
Q (By Captain Reel) What branch of the service were these Japanese in that went in there, if you know?
A They are infantry men.
Q And how did you know 50 meters away?
A Because they were wearing leggings and puttees.
Q And because they were wearing leggings, you assumed that they were infantry men; is that right?
A Yes, sir.
\(\square\) And that was the only way you identify them, because of the legginga?
A Because of the leggings and the uniform that they are wearing.
Q Leggings and the uniform. Did you see the "anchors" on the uniform?
THE WITNESS: What is that?
(Question read.)
A I see the uniform.
CAPTAIN RERL: Repeat the question.
(Question again read.)
A (Continuing) Anchors? I san the uniform of the Japanese soldiers.
Q (By Captain Reel) Could you see any insignia of an "anchor" on that uniform?
A (No response.)
Q Do you know what an "anchor"is?
A Oh! I did not see any "anchor."
CAPTAIN REELL No further questions.
CAPTAIN PACE: Thank you very much.
(Witneas excused.)

\section*{CERTIFIGATE}

\begin{abstract}
I, T. R. C. King, Majorı Inf. (TD), Executive Officer, Legal Section, General Headquarters, Suprene Commander for the Allied Powers, do hereby certify that Document 2866 f.s a true and correct copy of the transcript of the testimony offered by DOMINADOR SANTOS in the trial of the case against Tomoyuki YAMASHITí, General, Imperial Japanese Army, before a Military Commission in Manila; and that the whole record of the case, including the transcript of all testimonies taken, as well as the affidavits admitted in evidence, are now on file with this Section.
\end{abstract}


Nitness: /s/ John Re Pritchard Sworn to before me this 15th day of November 1946, Tokyo, Japan.
/s/ John R. Pritchard Capt. Inf. Summary Court




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\section*{ARMANDO ALVAREZ}
called as a witness on behalf of the Prosecution, being first duly snorn, thro:igh Interpreter Villa-Real, was examined and testified as follows through the Interpreter:

\section*{DIRECT EXAMINATION}

Q (By Captain Pace) Give your name, please.
A Armando Alvarez.
Q Where do you live?
A (Through the Interpreter) 2296 Juan Luna, Tondo.
n Where did you work in February, 1945?
A At the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
2 What did you do on February 5, \(1945 ?\)
A Between four and five o'clock on the afternoon of that day we were all ordered out by the sfards, \(I\), my companions, my wife and two children.

2 Ordered out of the Bank of the Philippines Building?
A Yes.
Q Pihere did you go then?
A Opposite the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
Q Did you see anything unusual happen?
A During the whole midnight nothing unusual happened except we heerd shots being fired. The following morning, four o'clock, we were ordered out of the Bank of the Philippine Islands.

If What did you see then?
A When we were ordered out, I first evacuated my two children, and with me we a guard, and we went to the opposite sids. I took my children to Dasmarinas Street and stopped at the corner of Rosario and Dasmarinas, and left my children there under the care of my companions; also the guard.
© Did you see anything happen?
A When I returned to take my wife, I say that all our property was scattered, and I saw on the other side a group of Jepanese soldiers. Because I went to find out what this Jepanese soldiers will do, I tried to recover my property and the articles they had scattered, slo:sly.

Q What did the Japs do?
A The Japanese were trying to break down door, but when they could not, they break down the glass windows.

Q The door of what building?
A The door of the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
d iill you point out the location of the Bank of the Philippines Building on Exhibit \(193 ?\)
(The witness indicated on Prosecution's Exhibit No. 193.)
CAPTAIN PACE: Let the record show the witness indicated the letter "G".
Q (By Captain Pace) What did they do after they broke the window?
4 They were trying to break down the door again, but they could not because there is iron bar. I heard a voice order, give command, and I saw a soldier scurry away in the direction of Dasmarinas. He came back carrying rags. The soldier laid the rags in front of two cans of gasoline. One soldier pour gasoline on the rags, and with the help of the other soldiers they began throwing the rags inside the edifice. When they finished throwing the rags inside the edifice, one soldier ran away carrying a long pole. At the tip of the

\section*{DOCUMENT 2867}
pole seemed to be rags tied, and it smelled with gasoline. He vent efrect'y to an eflifice adjacent to the bank, winich is burning; he dipper. it: ti: ui ine pole where is the fire that was lit, and he came back to the edirise of ins Bank of the Philippine Islands and threw that pole with the burndn? ti., insj.ds, and suddenly fire spurted out as far as the door where the Javancse stond, so the Japanese ran array. I ran away to help quickly my wife, gather those things we had left, went back to the place where my two children mere, took them, and we went aray.

Q Was there anything on the end of the pole that he took across the stroet to set fire to?
A Yes, a white -- looks white. It is considered rags.
Q Was the Bank of the Philippine Islands burning when you left?
\& Yes, the whole down part ras burning.
Q Did you return in about a week?
A The following morning I tried to return, but I was prevented by the guards. I went back after one week and I found out the whole place was scorched, burnt down.
(A photograph was marked
Prosecution Exhibit No. 195 for
Identification.)

\footnotetext{
Q I show you Prosecution's Exhibit 195 for Identification and ask if you can describe what the first page of that exhibit shows. A Yes. This part is burned (indicating).

Q What is that a picture of?
A Picture of the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
}

Q Is that the way it looked when you returned and saw it?
I Exactly the appearance, after one week.
Q Will you look at page 2 and state what that is?
A. This is the remains of the Bank of the Philippine Islands,
C.IPTAIN PACE: I offer Exhibit 195 for Identification in Evidence, if it please the Commission.

GANERLL REYNOLDS: There being no objection, it is accepted in evidence.
(Prosecution's Exhibit No, 195 for
Identification was received in Evidence and so marked.)

CiPTAIN PACE: You may inquire,

\section*{cross exhbination}

Q (By Captain Reel) How many floors did the Bank of the Philippine Islands have?
A Two stories: one down- and one upstairs.
Q And was the entire building occupied by the bank?
A Yes.
Q And do sou know whether the Japanese kept their funds, or any of their funds, in that bank?
A No.
GENERAL RETNOLDS: I don't undorstand --

DOCJLKNT 2867
2 (By Captain Reel) Were there some vaults in the basement of that bank? GENKRAL REYNOLDS: I don't understand --

A Yes, there are iron vaults.
GENERAL REYNOLDS: You asked if the Japanese kept funds in that bank. I did not understand whother the witness meant to answer he did not know, or that they had no funds in the bank. Will you oloar that up?

CAPTALN REEL: I will straighten that out, sir.
Q (By Captain Reel) When you ansmered the question reletive to funds in the bank, did you mean by your answer that you don't know whether they have funds in there?
A Yes. But what I know is the Jepanese Mickey Mouse money.
GENERAL REYNOLDS: Well, is it correct, then, when he said the Japanese did have --

CiPTAIN REBLL: Did have funds in that bank.
GENERAL REYNOLDS: They did have. Very well.
Q (By Captain Reel) One more question: Did you see vhether these Japanese were Army or Navy soldiers?
A I cannot tell exactly, but what I knor, they are Japanese soldiers with caps.

7 Dic you see any insignia of anchors on them?
A. At that time it was very dark. I cannot tell.
C.SPTAIN RERL: That is all.

CAPTAIN PACE: Thank you very much.
(Witness excused.)

DOCUMENT 2867

CERTITICATE

I, T. R. C. King, Major, Inf. (ID), Executive Officer, Legal Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, do hereby certify that Document 2867 is a true and correct copy of the transcript of the testimony offered by ARMANDO ALVAREZ in the trial of the case against Tomoyuki YAMASHITA, General, Imperial Japanese Army, before a Military Commission in Manila; and that the whole record of the case, including the transcript of all testimonies taken, as well as the affidavits admitted in evidence, are now on file with this Section.


Witness: /s/ John Re Pritchard
Sworn to before me this 15th day
of November 1946, Tokyo, Japan.
/s/ John R. Pritchard Capt. Inf Summary Court

DOCUMDENT 2861
rosa calaiong
called as a witness on behalf of the Prosecution, being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as folloris:

\section*{DIRECT EXAMINATION}

Q (By Captain Hill) Will you state your name; please?
A Hy name is Rosa Celalong.
Q Can you speak a little louder?
A Rosa Calalong.
Q Phere do you reside?
A 2642 Tinaldo, Manila.
Q Where were you residing the first part of February of this year?
A In Intramuros.
Q Where in Intramuros?
A Anda Street.
\(Q\) Were you residing there with the other members of your family?
A Yes, sir.
Q That were their names?
A Jeaus Carugtos, my husband; Victorina Alban, my mother; my children, who are Aurora Carugtos, Angelita Carugtos and Basilio Carugtos.

Q On the 5th of February of this year did you, together
with the other members of your family, have occasion to leave your home and
seek refuge?
A Yes, sir.
Q And where did you go at that time?
A In the Cathedral Church.
Q To the Manila Cathedral Church?
A Ies.
Q Where was the Menila Cathedral located?
A Located at Calbildo and Postiago.
Q Was that at Intramuros?
A Ies, that is inside of Intramuros.
Q At what time of the day or night did you and the other members of your family go to the Menila Cathedral?
A At about 5:30 in the afternoon of tebruary 5th.
Q When you arrived there did you find any other people in the cathedrall
A There were plenty thore.
Q Can you state to the Commission the approximate number of persons that you sam there in the cathedral?
diere was lots of people; it is a very big church, and it was very, very
Q Would you say that there were 500 or 1000 or 1500 people there?
A Maybe around 4000 or 5000 ; it is plenty. There are very many.
Q Did you and the members of your family remain there in the oathedral that night?
A Yes, sir.
Q All night?
A, Yes.
Q Now, during the night did you see any Japanese come into the cathedral buil 48 Yes, sir.

Q And for what purpose did they come ir.to the building?
A I don't knum, sir, jut they wenc ins..e the cathedral and they were going around, and tnen afterwards they have heen pulling girls outside of the cathedral, and I saw two Jepanese reping tiose momen right thers in the cathedral, and one by my side she is pregmant five months.

Q What part of the cathedral were you and your family located in that evening?
A ile are in the midale of the cathedral. Suppose this is the church; we are there tit tnat place (indicating), and this is the door.

Q Were you in the rear, to the rear of the cathedral?
A Yes, sic.
Q And how many Japanese did you see take women out of the cathedral during the night?
A There are many, but I have seen two, they are very, very near me, in front of me, in front of our place those Japanese are raping her, and I have seen plenty of girls that they are taking outside of the cathedral, those Matista girls, they are very young. They are telling, "No, don't; mama, don't let them take me." Those girls are shouting like that.
- Did the Japanese take these girls by force?

A Yos, by force.
Q Did you \(\mathrm{s}^{e 9}\) any girls killed by the Japanese in attemping to escape?
A No, I dićc not \(\varepsilon\) ge tnem.
Q The next igy did you ses any girls killed by the Japanese when they attemptsi to uscape?
A I heve sain, yes, in front of that well. There were girls there that were shot by the Japanese.

Q When they et tompted to escape?
A Tes.
Q. How many did you see shot by the Japanese?

A I don't knor; there are many there.

\section*{2 Several?}

A Yes, several.
Q How long did you remain in the Manila Cathedral?
A Fle stoyed there for two days,
Q Did ail the memions of ycu: fomily stay there during that time?
A My mother and ary niece wers tinere in the St. Augustine Church. We were separatsd because tio very afiesucon they told us to leave the house, you see I told my motrer I would be going to St. Auguatine, and he toid ine, he said, "You can't go inco St. Augustine, because there are already pleainy there." He told me that I go to the Cathedral. So I and my two children and husband were separated, and my mother and niece were separated.

They told me I colildn't go there. There was plenty there, that I botter go to the Cathedral Church.
Q Were you and your husband separated aftor you got to the Cathedral?
a The next morning they took all our men; tligy took my hisbaur.
Q You mean tho Japaneso took all the men?
A Yes, the next morning.
Q Do you know what they did with them?
A No, but I seen them.

\section*{DOCUIEXIT 2861}

Q Have you seen your husband or heard from him aince he was taken from you at the Manila Cathedral?
A That is the last time I have seen myusband.
Q How many men did you see the Japanese take from the Manila Cathedral on that day?
A There are many; there are two very long lines.
Q Fell, when you say "many" can you give the Commission a little more definite ansmer on that? Would it be 50 or 100 or more than that?
A It would be more than two or one thousand, something like that.
Q Do you know if any of those men ever returned or not?
A Yes.
\(Q\) Did thoy return?
A Mr. Sanchez Andriguez, he roturned.
Q Did any of the others that you saw taken away from the Cathedral evor return?
4 No, I have not seen them.
Q And you have never heard of them since that time?
a I have not heard of them, no.
Q Now, after you left the Cathedral, what did you see, if anything, relative to the dectruction of the Manila Cathedral?
A I see the Cathedral; I soe it burning.
Q You saw it burning?
A Yos.
Q Do you know what caused the fire that burned the Manila Cathedral?
A There is some explosion, plenty of explosion inside the Cathedral.
Q Are you suro those axplosions were coming from the inside of the Cathedral?
A They are inside the Cathedral, yes. We are here and the Cathodral is onls on the next street.

Q Were there any fmerican bombings or shells hitting in that area at that time?
A Thore was no shelling yet.
Q And no bombing yet?
A No bombing yet.
Q When you were in the cathedral did you see any signs of explosives being placed around inside the building?
A I just see those drums there, and supposing this is the church here, the convent, there are plenty of gesoline drums there.
Q. Around the church?

A Yes.
CAPTAIN HILL: You may have the witness.
CROSS EXARINATION
Q (By Captain Reel) These Japanese soldiers you saw, were they army or navy or marines?
A They are wearing green suits.
Q Did jpun see any insignia on their green suit?
A No, I don't. I don't look at the Japanese.
Q You could not tell whethor they had little anchors on their green suits or not?
A No, I don't pay any attention to that.
Q You did not pay any attention to that?
\[
\text { - } 3-
\]

DOCMIENT 2861
Q You did not pay any attention to that?
A No, I don't pay attention to that.
CAPTAIN REEL: That is all.
CAPTAIN HILL: I will ask to have these two photographs marked for identification.
(Two photographs were marked Prosecution Exhibits No. 308 and 309 for Identification respectively.)

\section*{REDIRECT EXAMINATION}

Q (By Captain Hill) I will hand you Prosecution's Exhibit No. 308, and ask you to state whet it is, if you know.
A Yes, this place here, this is the Cathedral Church.
Q Is that the ruins of the church as it looks todey?
A. It is not like this today.

Q I will hand you Prosecution's Exhibit No. 309, and ask you to state what it is, if you know.
A Yes, this is the Cathodral Church.
Q ind is that as the church looks today after it was destroyed?
A Yes.
CapTAIN IIILL: We will offor into evidence Prosecution's Exhibite 308 and 309, sir.

GENERAL REYNOLDS: There being no objection, they are accepted into evidenco.
(Prosecution Exhibts No. 308 and 309 for identification were received in evidence.)
CapTaIN HILL: That is all we have.
CAPT IN RELL: No further questions.
(initness oxcused.)

\section*{CERTIFICATE}

I, T. R. C. King, Major, Inf. (TD), Executive Officer, Legal Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied. Powers, do hereby certify that Document 2861 is a true and correct copy of the transcript of the testimony offered by ROSA CALALONG in the trial of the case against Tomoyuki YAMASHITA, General, Imperial Japanese Army, before a Military Commission in Manila; and that the whole record of the case, including the transcript of all testimonies taken, as well as the affidavits admitted in evidence, are now on file with this Section.


Witness: /s/ John R. Pritchard Sworn to before me this 15th day of Nouember 1946, Tokyo, Japan.
/s/ John R. Pritchard Capt. Inf. Summary Court

\section*{Ex．1434}


过 要


















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JUSP. JUAN
called as a witness on behalf of the Prosecution, being first duly aworn, was examined and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXMITMTIOM
Q (By Captain Hill) Please state your name.
A Ny name is Juan P. Juan.
Q Where do you resido, !'r. Juan?
A I reside at 1312 General Luna Street.
Q There is that with reference to the former Philippine Red Cross Headquarters Building?

A It is just next door, hack of the former Philippine Red Cross Building.

Q The building that pas used for that purpose on 10 February \(1945 ?\)
b. (No response.)

Q You are next Coor to the building that was used as the Philippine Red Cross Headquarters in early February of this year?
b Yes, sir.
- Q How old are you?
A. I am 47 years old.

Q What is your business or profession?
A I em not in any profession, but i have been eneaged in business,
in the Educational Alliance, since 1935.
Q On 10 February, 1945, did you have occasion to go to the Red Sross building adjacent to your home?

A Yes. I mas practically there the whole day on February 10th.
Q Tell the Commission the occasion for your going to that ruilding that day.

A is my house was just beside the Red Cross building, and the other house of mine was just 50 meters away from the place, on February 9th, in the evening, we had no other plree to go than the house that belongs to me at the beck of the Philippine Red Cross. So we slept there on the night of February 9th. On February 10th intense shelling pras going on. Shells were dropping around my yard and my buildine was already hit. So we were in commotion, and my wife and I decided to go to the Philippinc Red Cross Building, espeoially when me eccepted an invitation from Mr. Farolan, then in charge of the Philippine Red Cross. So after treakfast on February 10th I brought my whole family inside the Philippine Red Cross, beounse it wes being used as an emergency hospital. My daughter then needed the doctor's assistance, so I toek the opportunity to bring the family inside the Red Cress Building, especially when my daughter had just delivered and needed doctor's assistance because she was veak due to hemorrhage and exheustion while running aray from the other building that \(I\) have which we.s burned the night before.

Q Now, just a minute. Let me interrupt you. Tell the Colmmiooion how many mambere of your family wont to the Red Cross Building that day.

A Fifteen altogether.
Q Fifteen?
A. Yes.

Q And did all of the 15 remain in the building throughout the doy and evening?

A A few of us happened to step outside late in the evening of that day, when it was almost dinner time, before drark, because our food bas prepared outside of the Ked Cross, inside my yard.

Q And how many members of your family remained in the building when the few of you went back to your yard?

A Ten of them remained inside the Red Cross juilding.
Q Give the Commission the names of those ten members of your family that remained there in the building.

A There were my wifo, Lucia Santos de Juan; my daughter, Feulina Juan Zabala, who had tho baky; ay older doughter, Juanita Juen Marcelo, with four children; and my daughter-in-law, Nenita Recio de Santos, with two children.

Q Efter you returned to your yard to prepare the food did you hear any noise or anything unusual from the direction of the Red Cross Fuilding?

A Yes. Ibout almost less than an hour aftor I left the Red Cross Building I wes standing at the back yard supervising the cooking. Sudderly I heard shots from inside the Red Cross and simultaneously with the screaming of women. Then more shots followed and more screaming wes heard.

My reaction was that the Japanese were killing the German refugees -- German-Jow refugees -- whom I saw inside the building when I left. My recction vas that the German-Jows were being killed, because I remember a statement of one of the Japanese officers the.t the Orient should be for the Orientals, and that there should be no mixed blood.

Q Now, just a minute. Did you know the neme of that Japanese who made that statement to you?
is The second name is Captain Watasaki.
Q And when did he mako that statement to you?
A That gas more or less tro or three months before the massacre.
Q Did you know this Japancse captain personallys
4. I happened to know him several months before that when he was introduced to me by a certain friend of mine in Paranaque.

Q Just what were the circumstances under which you hid the conversation with this Japanese captain?

A hs he used to visit me in the house time and again, we happened to mention about the last rar, the var that was going on then, and in the course of our conversation he said that eventually the war will soon ond; that the Japanese --
,
COLONEL HENDRIX: If it please the Commiesion, at this time we nould like to interpose an objection to this particular ansv:er, and any line of questioning, on the ground of hearsay, as to whet this particular witness heard another mitness state; and further, that it is violative, and not in accordance with Article of Wcr 38 in the Manual for Courts Martial and the rules of evidence in criminal ceses in the District Courts of the United States. This witneas is ate tempting to state what a captain in the Japanese iruy has told him. That is hearsay. The captain should be here before this coramission to testify as to whatever he did sey.

MAJOR KERR: If the Commission please, this is a very important question. During the course of this trial the Commission will receive, or at least we will offer to the Commisaion, a considerable quantity of hearsay evidence. I advert once again to the regulations which provide that this Commission shell receive such evidence as it believes to have probative value.

The Commission is not a jury to te insulated mentally against every possible suggestion. You gentlemen are certainly in a position to evaluate hearsay, or any other type of evidence that may be of value to you. The olosest analogy on this question to an executive body such as this, a military commission, is afforded by an administrative tribunal. I believe counsel will grant thet under Amerioan practice the administrative tribunals have been held by our courts to have a very broad leenay as to the receipt of evidence of this sort, and that they may receive hearsay evidence if they believe it will help them in the determination of the issues before them.

If that is true as to an American administrative tribunal under the statutes applicable to those tribunals, certainly it is true as to this Commission. find I most earnestiy subait, sir, that the Commisaion will deny itself some extremely illuminating, trustmorthy, and helpful evidence, which certainly would have probative value, I am sure, in the mind of any reasonable man.

I certainly objoct to any effort by counsel to prevent the introduction of somealled hearsay evidence in this proceeding. Furthermore, there are about 57 different varieties of exceptions to the so-called heargay rule, and if the Comission has to get into that maze of legal technicalities as to what is and what is not admissible as hearsay, we will be here for months.

COLONEL HENDRIX: If it please the Commission, it is not the purpose of the Defense to delay the case or to drag it out, but we do want the case to be tried ulong the rules of ovidence as have been approved by the District Courts of the United States. We base that on thiss

Article of War 38 states: "The President may, by regulations which he may modify irom time to time, prescribe the procedure, including: modes of proof, in cases before courts-nartial, courts of inquiry, military commissions and other military tribunals, which regulation shall, in so far as he shall deem practicable, apply the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal ceses in the District Courts of the United States, provided that nothing contrary to or inconsistent with these Articles shall be so prescribed; providod, further, that all rules made in pursuance of this irticle, shall be laid tefore the Congress annually."

I do not concur with the Prosecution as to his contentions of administrative practice and procedure in the United States. In one breath the Prosecutor states, "We do not have any rules and regulations". Then in another breath he attempts to write in the Massachusetts law, and certain rules and regulations of adminis" trative procedure.

We take this positions Congress, by virtue pf the Constitution of the United States, passed certain laws called the Articles of Har. Article 38 is one of the statutes thet is a part of the Articles of War. That particular Article of War gave the President of the United States the power to do two thingsi One was to prescribe rules of procedure and make rules of evidence for courtsmartial; and the other fcr military commissions.

This Manual pertains largely to courts martial. The President of the United States hes so aoted, 80 far as courts martial are concerned, but from the record in this case, from what has been brought before this Military Commission, there is nothing on this subjeot as to the actions of the President of the United States for prescribing rules and regulations as to ovidence.

In the abeence of action from the President of the United States it surely was the intent of Congress that if the President did not do anything about prescribing such rules, the rules of evidenae generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the District Courts of the United States must apply. Let us assume thut the President did act on this subject. If he had, he mould have to go by the rules in the Federal Court, so far as possiblo.

There has been presented to this Commission a letter that the Prosecution has mentioned on numberous instances and no doubt will, throughout this trial, which letter is dated the 24 th of September, 1945, concerning the regulations governing the trial of war criminals, and so forth. Fe contend that this partioular letter setting out the procedure auch as evidence, bringing in hearsay, bringing in affidavits, bringirg in what witnesses heard from other people, is absolutely null and void; that this entire letter is null end void; that General MacArthur, in preparing this letter, did not have authority from Congress to make any rules or procedures of a military commission. The only man in the morld that hes such pover from Congress is the Prosident, and he has not done anything about presoribing any rules, as far cs the record in this case shows.

Fe insist that any hearsay as to this witness, or any other witnesses, must be ruled out and should not be allowed in evidence. Furthermore, we contend that as far as the rules are concorned, they should not go by this letter issued by General ifacArthur, but by the rules of procedure of the Congress of the United Statcs.

It comes dow to this: Congress has mede frticle 38. Apparently the Commission will have to deoido mhether we are going to decide the evidence on what Congress has passod, or whether we will go by a letter that has been prepared by General MacArthur and which has directed General Styer to carry on this trial. We contend thet the hearsay should be stracken and not allowed.

GENEREL REYNOLDS: Subject to objeotion by any member of the Commission, the objection of counsel for the Defense is not sustained.

COLONEL HENDRIX: Ne except to that, sir.
GENERAL REYNOLDS is to the stating of exceptions, the proceedinge of this iommiseion, unlike that of civil courts, are automatically subject to review. All rulings and decisions and findings are subjeat to review of the appointing authority. fccordingly, the statement of exceptions from counsel is not' in order and will not be recognised by this Comission.

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Page 4

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COLONEL CLARKE: If the Court pleese, thet is new to me. If that is the contention of the Prosecution, if he can show us the authority, we are willing to abide thereby.

GEMERAL REYNOLDS: The Prosecution will continue.
Q (By Captain Hill) Mr. Juan, I believe my last question ves that I asked you to tell the Commission the circumstanses under which you had the conversation with the Japanese captain which you related to the Commission.

A On several occasions the Japinese captain which I mentioned used to visit my family. I don't remember exactly what particular visit was that when he mentioned to me that the Orient should be for the orientals, and that tiere should be no mixed blood. But we happened to talk about what would be the outcome of the war, and he said that it is not far when the war will end and people in the Orient will live in peace without being disturbod.
\(Q\) And what position, if you know, did this Japenese oaptain hold in your particular neighborhood with the Japanese Imperial Army?
6. The last time thet I know of his outpost nas in Santa Mesa, and I think he wes connected with the construction of railroads.

Q Lid he say arything to you about where he hed gotten his authority for the making of such a statement?

A He didn't say anything about it.
Q Continue with your story of what happened there at the Red Cross Euilding and in your yard after you heard the shots und screams about phich you have testified.

L hs I heard more shots and more screaming of people I told the rest of my children who were outside the building with me to get inside the building and not to come out. A few of us men outside posted oursclves around the building so we could see whether the Japanese were coming or not. One by the name of Romano fbad, who is a brother to Patrocinio Abad, one of the victims in the Red Cross, he stayed near the Red Cross Building, and when he saw a certain Japanese with fixed bayonet climb up the fence he ran to us and told us what he saw.

Q Did this Japanese come on over into your yard over the wall?
b He did not continue to get into my yard because he didn't see anything there. We were all hiding.

Q When did you first loarn what hed actually happened over in the Red Cross Building?

A At about dark time that evening one of our meids, Leticia by name, came into the air raid shelter, and she was pale and looked very much afraid end could hardly talk. And so we ask her, "What happen?"

Q Just let me intesr-pt you. Where had she come to the shelter from?
A From inside the Red Cross Building.
Q Go aherd.
i. And then she burst, cried, and could hardly get her words, end told us that the Japanese killed everybody inside the Red Cross Building, including my wife and all wy grandchildren. That was the first time I learned about the tragedy that happened to ky family.

\section*{Q Did you go to the Red Cross Building later?}
4. I attempted to go that evening, February 10 th, about midnight, but the rest of my children who vere with me inside the air raid sholter prevented me from gettingout of the air raid shelter, esw peoially when one of the survivors told us that there were still Japanese soldiers in front of the Red Cross Building. So J. did not go any more and waited the following day.
\(Q\) Did you go there the following day?
4 On the following day the sholling was very intense. Fe could hardly get out of the air raid shelter, and besides, the buildings a.ll around us vere on fire.

Q Did you go to the building later?
\& On the following day, on the evening of the 12th, \(I\), with my son-in-law, Jose Zebala, whose wife was killed, vent inside the Red Cross Building then, after trio days, ofter the messacre.

Q Fins it light or dark whon you went to the building?
A It was not exactly dark yet. There wes still plenty of light. But it was getting dark.

Q When you rent into the building did you see any dead bodies there?
4 I sav plenty of dead bodies on the corridor as I proceeded to the room where I though my wife and childron were.

Q Can you give the commission an estimate of how many dead bodies you think you san in the corridor and in the room where you thought your wife's body would be?
is My approximate estimate is about 20 bodies.
\(\psi\) In those two places?
^ Yes.
Q Wcre you able to identify and recover the body of your wife or any other members of your family?
is On that evening of February 10th I only sem the bodies of ny daughter, Paulina. I tried to look in the seme room where my daughter was for the rest of my family, but \(I\) could not find them.

Q Fere you able to recover eny budies there and take- then out of the building?

A Ne were able to recover the 10 -day baby of my daughter.
Q finy other bodies?
i I could not reoover any more excepting the bones of the rest of the family.

Q Do you know whein's any other bodies mere identified and recovered from the building?

4 The daughter, the 10 -month daughter of Corazon Noble mas also recovered and brought into my yard.

Q Mr. Juan, how long did you remain at your home adjacent to the Rod Crose Building ofter the 10th?
is Four days, as we left the premises on the 14 th - February 14 th.

Q Here you present in your home when the Red Cross Euilding was destroyed?
is Yes, I wes.
Q Will you tell the Commission how that building was destroyods
A On the early morning of February 14th, or when I was at the back yard of my building, I saw flickering lights inside the room where the manager, or Mr. Faralon, was, as I was actually in that room there. I had been observing what was going on, whether there was somebody inside the building, but I didn't notice anybody. And for several minutes, approximately less than half an hour, I noticed that very suddenly the flickering light kurst into flames, and that part of the buileing where my daughter ras then enveloping in flames.

Q Yere any members of the Japanese forces in your neighborhood at the time the builcing burned?
s. I did not notice any, but I noticed several soldiers on that street in front of the Red Gross Building.

Q On that day:
\& On that day.
Q Do you know whether or not the Red Cross Building wes hit by any shells prior to the time that you saw it burn?

4 I didn't notice any.
Cl.PTITN HILL: I will ask that this bo markod Prosecution's Exhibit No. 15 for Icentification.

> (The photograph of the Philippine Red Gross Building vas marked Presecution's Exhibit No. 15 for I'entification).

Q (By Ceptain Hill) I will hand you Prosecution's Exhibit 15 and ask you to state to the Compission what it is, if you know?
is This is the former Philippine Rod Cross Suilding as it stends now, efter it hed been burned.

CAPTLIN HILL: We offer Exhibit 15 in Evidence.
GENERAL REYNOLDS: Is there any objection by the Defense?
COLONEL CLHRKE: None, sir.
GEMERAL REYNOLDS: There being no objection, it is accepted as evidence.
(Prosecution's Exhibit No. 15 for Identification was raceived in evidenco and so marked).

\footnotetext{
* (By Captaj.n Hill) On the 14th, the day thet you sam the building burned, were those persons that you sim in front of the headquarters building Japanese soldiers?

4 They were Japanese soldiers, because they had the unifom of the Japanese, and no other civilians cculd roam eround that building there.

Q They wore the uniform of a Japanese soldier?
A Soldier.
}

CAPTAIN HILL: I esk thet this be merked Proseoution's Exhibit No. 16.
(The photograph of ruins inside Philippine Red Cross Building was marked Prosecition's Exhibit No. 16 for identification).

Q (By Captain Hill) I will herd you Piosocution's Exhibit No. 16 and ask you to state what it is, if you know?

4 This is part of the ruins of the Phi?ipnine Red Cross inside the building. I think this must be a portion of the toilet.

CAPTAIN HILL: We offer in evidence Prosecution's Exhibit No. 16, sir. GENLRAL REYMOTDS: Is there objection by the Defonse?

COLONEL CLARKE: None, sir.
GENERAL REYNOLDS: There beingno objection, it is accepted in evidence.
(Prosecution's Exhibit No. 16 for Identification was received in evidence and so marked.)

CKPTAIN HILL: I ask that this be marked Prosecution Exhibit Mo. 17 for Identification.
(The photograph of grave of 10 -day baby wias mark \({ }^{2}\) Prosecution's Exhibit No. 17 for Identification.)

Q (By Captain Hill) I hand you Prosecution's Exhibit No, 17 for Identification and ask you to state what it is, if you know, Mr. Juani
d. This is the photograph of the grave of the 10 - 1 ay baky of my daughter, including the 10 -month baty of Corazon. Ncble, inside my yard at the back of my house.

CAPThIN HILL: We offer in evidence Prosecution's Exhibit No. 17, sir.
GENERAL REYNOLDS: Is there objection by the Defense?
COLONEL CL/RKE: If the Court please, on these various exhibits, unless we state an objection, if the Court is satisfied, it will be admitted vithout any objeation.

GETEREL REYNOLDS: I didn't clearly understand.
COLONEL CLARKE: On these exhibits that are now read, unless we state an objection, will the Court understand that we have no objection, without having to go through it each time?

GENERSL REYNOLDS: Vory vell.
(Prosecution's Exhibit No. 17 for Identifi-
cation was received in evidence and so
marked.)
Q (By Captain Hill) Mr. Juan, you were in yourhome edjacent to the Philipping Red Cross Headquartors Building from the time the fighting in Manila between the Americans and the Japanese began, until February 14 th , is that correct?
f. Yes, sir.

Q I.nd during that time, and up until the 10th of February, the night of 10 February 1945, was the Red Cross Headquarters Builc'ing used for any military purpose by the Filipinos or by the imericans?
i. It wes not used for military purpose because it pres then usec as an emergency hospital.
\(Q\) Did you cbserve, on the 10th of February, whether or not the Red Cross insignia or conventional sign appeared upon the outside of the Red Cross Building there?
1. Yes. I noticed that even at the back of the kuilding thare was the Red Cross sign.

2 Did that sign eppear on other sides of the building?
a Yes, that appeared.
Q When you went into the Red Cross building on the 10th were any of the people in the kuilding thet you s6w armed in any may?
is No. There was no arm whatsoever.
Q Fere all of the people in the building nen-combatant civilians?
S. Yes. They were all non-combatant; mostly children, refugees, and patients, who were then being treated by nurses and doctors.

Q From yourknowledge and observation, after the murders had taken place, can you give the Commission an estimate of how many persons lost their lives there in the Red Cross Building at the hands of the Japanese on the 10th of February, 1945 ?
h. I cannot exnctly tell the number, because I didn't get inside the other rocms.

Q Can you make an estimate?
i. I figure it to be approximately around 30 to 40 .

CiPTi.IN HILL: Cross Examine.
CROSS EXA:INLTITIN
Q (By Captain Reel) Then did the fighting in Manila begin?
a Only in cur place I can state whon, because we couldn't gc outside of cur yard.

Q पell, you told us a moment ago that you pere at home from the beginning of the fighting until the 14 th of February. ill I want to know is what you mean by "beginning of fighting." "hen dic it t:egin?
\(\therefore\) I only learned that the imerican forces mere already on the north side of the River on ase 3rd.

Q Yes. Did you see any smerican soldiers between Februsry 3rd and February 10th?
A. The first time I saw the Ainerican soldier pas on February l3th, when they came around wy yard.

Q here there any Filipino soldiers in your neighborhood at that time?
A I didn't see any Filipino soldiers.

8 Was there aorial bombardment going on efter the 3rd of February?
4 I didn't notice. Mostly artillery shells.
Q Lartillery shells. ind when you say you rent to the air raid shelter, that was for protection against artillery shells?
i. Yes.
\(Q\) inc when did tiis artillery shelling begin, approximately?
a In our neighborhood the shelling began on February 9th, in the morning.

7 In other words, the day before this incident at the Red Cross Building the shelling began'
\(\therefore\) Yes.
Q and your home building, I belleve you scid, wcs hit by a shell that cay?
a. To. The first building where I used tu live before was burned by the Japinese on that same night,
? That was the 9th of February?
A Thet was the 9th of February.
Q Didn't you say that the building was hit by shells?
A The other building at the back of the led Cross was hit by shells on February 10th.

Q Februery 10th. I see. l.t the time you saw the flames in the Red Cross Building … I think you said a "flicker" -- did you seo any porsons in that room where the light mas flickering?

A I didn't see any.
8 Did you see anyone in the Red Cross Building at all after the flames starter coming out of it?
C. I didn't see any.

Q You told us that you saw some Japenese scldiers in front of the building. Just when, with relation to the fire, did you see them in front of the building?
s. I sam the Japanese soldiers before the fire took place.

Q How long before the fire took place?
a On February 12th, when I went inside the building, I looked at some soldiers in front of the building.

4 find what day dit the fire oocur?
i. The fire occurred in the eorly morning of Fobruary 14th.

Q So that it was two days before the fire that you saw the Japanese soldiers in front of the building?

A Yes. But we notice continuous movenent of Japenese soldiers on the street fust in front of the building continuously after the fire.

Q Did you see Japinese soldiers in front of the buileing after the 12th of February?
a. Not exactly in front of the buileing.

Q You mean they were active in the City?
is Yes.
Q They tere active in the area?
A Yes.
Q illl right. Will you describe for us the Japanese soldier's uniform?
\(\therefore\) I cnly noticed that the soleiers were dressed in olive green.
Q iny insignia that you remember?
is I didn't notice any nore:
Q Hill you describe for us the uniform of the Japinese sajlor?
- Japanese?

Q Sailor. One who is on a boat; a sailor.
\& I didn't see any Japanese sailor.
Q Let me ask you this: Do you knov what the uniform of a Japenese sailor looks like?
\(\dot{s}\) I am not familiar with the unfform of the Japanese sailor.
Q If I tcld you that the Japenese sajlors wore the same colored green as the Japanese soldiers, would you then express some doubt as to whether or not those persons you saw were soldiers or sailors?
it I could only identify they are sailors when they show thair cap with the anchor sign on it.

Q ih, fine! So that you do know that a Japenese sailor has an anchor on his cap?

A Theat is my identification.
Q And whet does a Japanese soldier have on his cap?
h. \(S_{t a r}\).

Q ind did you see the enps of these men who were in front of the Red Cross Building on the 12th of February \({ }^{6}\)
A I didn't notice any more the ce.ps.
GAPTAIN REEL: That's all.
Cl.PTain HILL: That's all.
(7itness excused.)

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d. Damage to agriculture - The following table reflects the damaces to farm cropa, livestocks and poultry and farm implements.

TOTAL GUANIITY OF MAR DMMAGES TO AGRICULTURAL CROPS, LIVESTOCK and poultry and raril miplement in the PHILIPRINRES BY ITEM DDCEMBER 8, 1941 TO JULY 4, 1945, DUE TO LOOTING, REQJISITION, TIRE, CORFISCATION, EECC.


\section*{2. Brief summary of the effects of the rar on porulation and manpo:er.-}

The occupation of the rhili pines by the eaemy brought untold hardship and suffering upon the people. FCr about three yerrs the inhabitents vere on the verge of starvation. Food supply ras forcibly aprropricted by the enemy, food production rias hamperca ind the livtlthood of the people disrupted by war operations. The inevitable derorelization of the population resulting from the savage fioht for existence ranifested itself rerkedly even after liberation in increcsed crimes and social unrest. War acrtelity vas enormous. Based on available fisures, it may be estimated at around half a million.

The estinated labor supply for the 2hilirpires, including all persons 10 years old and over tho are eble to rork, follors: \(\quad\)
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline 1939 (Census yecr) & 7,304,300 \\
\hline 1941 & 7.720.200 \\
\hline 1946 & 8,672.900 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

These estimates are besed on the essumptimn thet existing labor supply bears the same retio to population as the labor supply in 1939. The casualties resultinc from massacres by the Jepanese, the bettle for liberction end other iier causes may reduce the estinntes for 2946 by from 2 to 4 per cunt.

\section*{3. Effect of rer on rete of progrese of incustriclizetion end economic} devejopment.-

The deetruction wrought by icr ccused \(\varepsilon\) serious setbeck to the progress of industrialization and cconomic development. Before the :ar, Venila and comnerciel centers were tecming with lerge fectorics and industricil plants With all the modern equipmont and facilitics for turning cut high-grede sanufectures in comercial quentitiee. However, the sugar eillls, rope fectorics, cigar and cigerettc factories, coconut oil mills, etc.. cure leid prostrate in the i.cke of the liberction and uncible to rroduce sorely needed gonds. It :ill take considerable time before production con cetch up :ith the demend ooth for local concumption and for exort. licny of the pre:cr operatord depend Lostly on rar derage peyments for the rebuilding of their bucincss but ac fer no peydente have been rede so that the prosjects of ecrly recovery of the preref rate of industriclization and economio ieveloprent is very derk. Fehebilitetion is grectly hendicajpeà by leck of cocl end notivo poreer, heavy mechinery and perhaps technicel suidence.

Tith 41 out of the 43 suger centrels acstroyed end 73 out of the 148 ser. wille totally destrcyed, production of suefer ead lumber is very insinnifieant, as comperod to premer production. The scme is true rith the rining industry. Only copre. is recovering reaidly with 45,000 tons chirped to the U.S. in Junc as comperea to 33,000 preficr menthly everege. The evercze for the eix months ending June, 19146, wes hotiever 23,600 tons.

\section*{1. Consumption level of foodstuffe nd other ecnsurers goods.-}

Rice. -Doncstic consurytion of rice before the rer wae 350 erers daily per cenite, or a yerrly per cenita consurretion of 2.28 cevenes of clerncd. rice ( 56 silos to \(r\) crven) on the bees is of an estiretec popuirtion of 18,480 , 000 in 1946 , out of wich 69.5 ner cent constitute the rice-ce.ting poruletion, c. totel of \(29,283,400\) ecvenes of cleencd ricc rould be necdec to eupport the pepulation, es ageinst tho 1945-1946 cron of \(17.067,140\) cevencs of cleencd rice or e deficiency of \(12,216,260\) cevence, thich heve to be surplied pertly from imperts end eertly from ricc substitutcs, such es corn, cesseve., gebc, tugui and other root crons.

Suecr, -Prewrr consumption of suger is estiarted et 7 kilos or 15.4
 short tons. The estimeted 1946-47 cutrut of the 5 eufer centrals in overc-. tion is 66,000 short tons. There is; thus, \(c\) shortese of 76,000 short tons, ;hich heve to be wholly supilica from imports.

\section*{Doc. No. 2880}

\section*{Page 4}

Aieat. - Meat consumption in Manila before the war was 16 kilos or 35.2 pounds per capita. Because of the excessive postwar price of meat which is practicaliy eight times that of prewar, a large portion of the population has shifted to canned foodstuffs, mostly imported from the United States. In vier of present difficulties of collecting statistics on slaughtered animals in the provinces, however, there are now no means of ascertaining actual consumption data. It may be stated that the war had a most disastrous effect on the Iivestock industry.

Imports for consumption of the following articles may throw more light on consumption levels of various other commoditiest (a)
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline Iteme & \multicolumn{3}{|l|}{1941 Per capita imports 1945 (Kilos) (Kilos) (Kilos)} & capita im-
ports(Ki10s) \\
\hline Grains and preparations & 139,330.412 & 8.30 & 65.823 .548 & 3.57 \\
\hline Meat and dairy products & 20,824,766 & 1.83 & 12.480.576 & . 67 \\
\hline Vegetables and preparations & 28,986,842 & 1.72 & 6,800,886 & - 37 \\
\hline & \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{(so. yards} & (Sac_ rands) & (sac_yards) \\
\hline Textiles and manufactures .............. & 167,568,210 & 9.99 & 835,108 & . 045 \\
\hline \multicolumn{5}{|l|}{NOTE: (a) 1941 estimated population .......16,771,900 1945 " " .......18,425,100} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

The present level of production as compared with significant prewar years is as follows:
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline \multirow[b]{2}{*}{Items} & & \multicolumn{2}{|r|}{PRODOCTION} \\
\hline & Unit of measure & \[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { Pre-war } \\
& 19 / 0
\end{aligned}
\] & \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { Present } \\
1946 \\
\hline
\end{gathered}
\] \\
\hline Sugar, centrifugal & Short tons & 1,044,000 & 13,000 \\
\hline Lumber .......... & Board feet & 340.400,000 & 150,000,000 \\
\hline Abaca & Bales & 1,342,000 & 237,000 \\
\hline Copra ........ & Tons & 738,000 & 200,000 \\
\hline Coconut oil. & Tons & 243,000 & (Nil) \\
\hline Cigars ........ & Thousand & 331,600 & 50,000 \\
\hline Electricity ..... & Kwh (thousand) & 175,400 & 50,000 \\
\hline Mines, gold ...... & Pesus & 62,700,000 & 1,000,000 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\section*{5. Present lovol of agricultural production compared with premare-}

Ricen- The area planted for the crop year ending June 30. 1946 was \(1,653,820\) hectares, or about 21 per cent less than the prewar average of \(2,096,720\) hectares. The production was \(36,134,280\) cavanes ( 44 kilos ) of palay (rough rice) or about 30 per cent below the prewar average of \(51,401,660\) cavan

Corne- The arca planted for the crop year end ing June 30,1946 was 522,570 hectares or about 43 per cent less than the prewar average of 911.140 hectares. The production was \(5,178,000\) cavanes of 58 kilos or about 45 per cen' below the prowar average of \(9,421,740\) cavanes.

Surar (centrifugal).- The present production is about \(11,646,000 \mathrm{kilos}\), or about 98.82 per cent less than the prewar average of about \(990,000,000 \mathrm{kilol}\) There were 5 centrals that started operation out of 42 before the war. About ? more are ready to operate this coming milling season. There are at least tme more sugar centrals ready to operate but they lack sugar cane to mill.
sbecer.- The production wes ebout \(30,000,000\) xilos for the cron very andinis June 30 , 1946 , or ebout 83 per cent less than the prover civercec of 177.730.00 kilos.

Conre.- The production for the crop yeer ending June 30, 1946 :ns ebout \(200,000,000\) kilos or ebout 70 per cent less than the preirer everege of cbout \(675,000,000 \mathrm{kilns}\).
6. Fresent scrvicecble quentity of reilroed rolling stock, trucke, cir ond inter transort equireent (ocean-zoink end inlend), es compered with e significant preficr period.-

The totel rolling stock of the Linile Reilrord Compeny is 1.905 , incluaing 73 lecomotivis, 67 peseenjer corchos. I rcil motor cor, 36 exprces, bacgece and ocboose cers, end 1,728 freight cers end service cirs. as conperea rith the serviceable rolling atock in 1941, there is \(n\) decrense of 29 per cent in the rend totel, end of the folloning percentrgee in the different types of rolline stock: labout 49 per cent for locomotives; rbout 68 per cent for pessenger cocchee; over 98 per cent for reil rotor cers; 100 per cent for reil rator cer treilere (in 1941 therc liere 100 of them); ebout 62 per cent for exress, begeege and cabooee cers; end about 17 per cent for frcisint cers and service care.

The Fhili islends heve not ces yet eubritted fieurce. diveileble pre:er fieures for this corpeny give a total rolling stock of 388 , consistine of 16 loconotives, 56 pessenger cors end 266 frelight cers. The Cities of Iloilo end cebu riere burued by the Jejanese and it is morc then likely thet r. large percentege of the rollins stock of the Fhilippine Reilrey Compeny misht heve bcen destroyed there.

The tranimy trensportation systen in Menile, an frexicen enterprise that before the rer hed nround 150 electric ocrs end 300 buses, rees cntirely wired out. The only visible eesete in linnile ere the tremiey lines not removed or destroycd by the Jepeneso.

Before the ricr, there rere trio corpenies that opereted scheculed eirlines. They erc the Fhilippine hir Trensrort Compeny and the Iloilo-Negros bir Expess Comeny.. side from the forcgoing echeduled operctors, there ticre six non-schcculed operetors. ill of the above scheduled and non-scheduled operctore had durine the fiecel yeer 1939-1940 a total of over 20 serviceable neseonger and freight planee thet cerricd 16,209 revenuo peseengere end a totel freight of \(3.098,271.50\) rounds in eir min end eir cxpress. as of June 1946, ticre vere a totel of 37 comerciel rimplanes operctod by the Fer restcra dir Trensportation Compeny anditho Fhiliprine dir Lincs for peesenger and freisht service and both heve rejortce e totel revanue pessenjer of 107,367 and frcight consisting of rail and exprees totelling 7.727,258.30 pouncs for. the first helf of the current yorr. The ete.tistics indicate considereble progress over preiry cornorciel eirplene operetions.
avcilcble premer ste.tistics on reter trensportetion ere those for 1940 whon 730 occen-Going veseels with e total net tonncfe of \(2,755,606\) and 3.547 inter-island and bey and river crefts of different cetegories (eteamers. 62; stean leunches, 28; motor ships end cuxiliery schooners. 98; leunches, boets, beinces "-ith notor, 820; score, lightors, bergec, censcos, and bences. 960; end seiling vcesels, 1,515 ), with \(\varepsilon\) tote.l net tonnege of \(154,613.20\) rere engesed in foreign end interislend end bey end rivcr trede during that yerr. Posti:er statistics on this subject arc still being gathered, although it is of corsion knoriledge and observatinn the.t reter trensportation fecilitiee ::ero erons the riorst hit curing the rer. The ocern-goine vessels :hich mostly belonfed to the bellijerents ticre precticelly ell riped out, and present oceengoing stcamers coming to the Islends ere the fer. survivors and several ne:-luncrican-orned steersers. Nincty (90) per cent of the steerecs belone to the Unitca States; the rcst belong to the British, Nor: \(\epsilon \in i c n s\), Dutch, Denish and Chinese. frecticelly all the interislend stearmers serc sunk during the rar. h fori of the renter-crefts of leseer cetceories, rostly seiling vesecls, ricre eble to curvive.

As regards motor vehicle transportation, there were registered in 1940 (only complete avallable record) a total of 20,236 motor trucks and 33.818 automobiles, or a total of 54,134 motor cars and trucks. In 1945, the yreifminary registration figures give a total of 8,996 for motor trucks and 3,824 for automobiles, Dlanila and Rizal excluded, or a total of 12,820 . Addins the registration of 12, C13 trucks and 6,476 automobiles for hianila and Rizal for the first part of 1946, we get a full total of 31,909 motor car registration in 1945-1946. This full total compared with that of 1940 shows a decrease of over 41 per cent.

\section*{7. Estimated attainable lerel. as compared with premar outpute or industrial and aoricultural rroductione-}
a. Damace to agricultural industry during the war may be conservatively estimated at about \(33-1 / 3\) per cent of the total value.
(a) Sugar inductry - 43 per cent of sucar centrals and refineries.
(b) Tobacce industry - 60 per cent of prewar production.
(c) Abaca industry - 30 per cent of the plantations, excluding damages to stripping machines, sheds, etc., worth more than 33,000,000.
(d) Coconut industry - 50 per cent of the coconut oil and desiccated coconut factories, 40 per cent of copra driers, warehouses and other establishnents and 5 per cent of coconut trees.
b. Attainable level of agricultural and industrial production assuming an adequate supply of ram materials and energy, compared with the prewar.
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline Products & Unit \\
\hline \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{Rice ...............Cavanes} \\
\hline Corn'...... & \\
\hline \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{Sugar -} \\
\hline Centrifugal & Kilos \\
\hline Abaca ..... & " \\
\hline Tobacco & " \\
\hline Copra . & \\
\hline Coconut oil & Tons \\
\hline Lumber ....... & Board fect \\
\hline Embroideries & \\
\hline Cigars ...... & Thousand \\
\hline Cigarettes ... & \\
\hline \multicolumn{2}{|l|}{Cordage ............} \\
\hline Shoes ........ & Pairs \\
\hline Electricity . & Kiwh \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline Prewar & Attainable leval \\
\hline production & of production \\
\hline 51,401,660 & 40,000,000 \\
\hline 9,421,740 & 6,000,000 \\
\hline 990,000,000 & 350,000,000 \\
\hline 41,000,000 & 20,000,000 \\
\hline 177,730,000 & 100,000,000 \\
\hline 42,000,000 & 20,000,000 \\
\hline 675,000,000 & 500,000,000 \\
\hline 343,000 & 10,000 \\
\hline 340,400,000 & 100,000,000 \\
\hline p1),755,000 & 2 1,000,000 \\
\hline 331,600 & 50,000 \\
\hline 3,292,900 & 1,000,000 \\
\hline - 3,300,000 & P 1,000,000 \\
\hline 2.455.600 & 500,000 \\
\hline 175.400 & 75,000 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
8. To what extent has the lack of agricultural and industrial equinment impairel impediate recovery"

In the case of the sugar and tobacco industry, the lack of agricultural and ...Custrial equipment will retard 60 per cent of their inmadiate recovery. In the case of lowland rice, about 10 per cent and for upland rice and comn. about 30 per cent. In the case of abaca, it 1111 be around 40 per cent. for copra, 20 per cent, and for coconut oil, 50 per cent.

\section*{9. To what extent has the lack of ram materiala impaired impediate recoveraf}

The lack of rav miterials has not seriously impaired the inmediate recovery of industries, with the exception of the sucar industry and to some extent of the abaca industry as almost all the sugar plantations were destroyed and some of the big abaca plantations were partly damaged due to war operations The scarcity of hides for the shoe and slipper industry and for cannisters for the canning industry also handicaps the rapid recovery of these industries.

Honever, the key to irricaicte rccovery is the restoretion of the - ients, henvy zachincry end buildings to stert aizecble rroauction. The Fhiliraincs is cndowed rith rlenty of rex reteriels so thet leck of it is not so much e frobicr.
10. To whet extent hes leck of transrort fecilitics ingeircd irrecicte recovery?

Iriediate rocovery is being injeãed grcetly by c. leck of sufficient transjortation facilitics end this is particularly true in the cese of interisland transportation rinich hes been crizplod almost 100 per cent by the war end has affected seriously the shiment of lumber and other building netericle as rell as of foodstuffs and other necescitiee of life to the devesteted ereas. The ride ¿isperity bet:ieen the livin; cost in lenile and distant provinces is due lergely to the leck of trensjortation fecilities that hinder the flow of comerce to and from the motropolis. But even in overseas cormerce, the leck of shizing lines th Europe and parts of disia has left only the United stetes as the f:erket for Pailipine producte which before the wer hed a rauch fider outlet, perticulerly for leaf tobacco, conre, Fenile herip, Menila rope, hides and skins, \(\epsilon\) tc.
11. To that extent hes the lack of finencial reans imeircd imodiate recovery?

Beceuse of the incufficiency of government revenues, the Government hes not been able to une.ertake any wieemscale reconstruction nork. Demaged public buldings, rocis, briages, portiorks, railroads, etc., ere not e.e yet repeired Dending the receipt of the \(8240,000,000\) shere of the Government fron the Things Far Dersepe Componsation het.,
 tobacco fectories, rice mills, lumber mills, coconut oil mills, desiccated coconut fectories, ropo factories, distilleries, shoe factories, rining rorks, etc., ere atill out of operation pending the receirt of cubstential cepital to rehabilite.te them or to supply the much needed capitel equipment elnost totally destroyed by the war.

\section*{II. ANST:IRS TO QUECTIONS OONGERNING LONG RUNGE RECOVEFY IND LEVEIODNENT IRCGEAS.}

11e. What is the level of consumtion of foodstuffe end other coneumers goods snd strnderas of housingi, enticincted euring the noxt 18 months, five ycers or tore.
(Sce enstior to quastion No. 4 concernins the leval of consurmtion of foodstuffe and other consureers goods.) With the enormous cestruction of drelling eseecially in urben centers, thousends upon thousends of people are houscd in teworery structures devoid of the necessary sanitation facilitics. It rey teke 10 to 15 years before promar stenderds of housing is restored.
12. Does the rroiuction pattern rroposed in the country's develonment prcerom aiffer antorielly from the nrewer rettorn and in what resnects? The jroduction pattern projosed in the country's development rill not Ciffor raterially from the premar pettern except in the sugar industry where production may be reduced as a rcsult of the destruction of machinery which was extonsively used in this induetry before the wor. owing to the destruction of rork enimals, the use of ferm machinery is contermieted in the proGuction of rice, corn, tobacco, root crops and vegetables besides suger cenc.
13. To rhat extent io the chanacs irorosed in the prever procuction pettern take into account the zodificctions in the econorics of other countrics

The prociuction pattern ropoece for rice is besed on the rethods of production in the United states. For this zur-oge, an ofriculturel nission ine sent to the United Stetcs a year aco to study the possibility of rechenizing our ricc industry in a maner similer to thet of the United stentes.
14. To what extent ore such chenfes the result of a nocissity to increase exforts?

Our princijal export crops before the rex recre suger, corra, coconut oil. desiccated coconut, ebecc, and tobecco. Before the wicr (1940), rie exported
\(40,517,893\) kilos of ciesicertrà coconut; \(177,453,853 \mathrm{kilos}\) of tnedible coconut oil; \(8,44 \sim, 294\) lilos of ecible coconut oif; \(341,930.371 \mathrm{kilcs}\) of corre; \(9 \approx 3,542,586 \mathrm{kilos}\) of centisifugel suecr: \(52,931,188 \mathrm{kilos}\) of refined eugar;
 and ebouts \(1: 402,750\) bele.s ( 126.5 kinos), of marainafucturei eivese, or about 177,400,000 кil_s.

In 1945 ree exicried only about \(3,000,000\) kilos of ecrer and ebout 2,400,000 kilos ut abnce, ena dixi ing she first half of 19,6, ie exiorted only eround \(141,783,000\) kiles of corre and about \(20,000,000\) kilos of abcer. We have not exported siger end touicco. To increase, therefore, our rroduction botil of the revi wenricils ard of the menuteotured procucte end thereby increasinc our exprrif, we neoc ajricultural and irfustrial rachinery to rcpilece those destroyed curine tha riar.
15. To rinct extent ere such chenges the rosult of en necesity to jocresse ingorts?

Our rice \(\because\) roatuction before the nar nes eboüt \(51,400,0 \% \pi\) venes of jeley (rough rice) end oui yeeriy evesee rice imprtation from 1937 to \(194 i\), excluainc about 15,000 cebenes exportad et the seme ti.ee nes 756,250 cevancs of 56 kilos, or equavilent to about \(1,532,500\) cevenes of yeley. The yearly consurition of :illea rice ark in the Fhilimines is cbout \(30,0 c r, 00 \mathrm{~J}\) oevenes, or about \(60,000,000\) cavenos of relny. jur prodiuction ves only ejout 18,0c0, oco cevenes ( 36,000 , oun cevenes of jeley). Hense, a deficit of about l2,00c, 000 covenes of 56 kilos, or \(24,000,000\) cevenes ( 14 kilos ) of reley rilich th heve th imort from other countries. Hence, the need for the use of ferm :acilinery for tie irmediete recovery of the industry to rinimize our rice import.

Develonaent of vest rotentigl resources and iniustrielizetion of our country, through the introduction of modern cquirment enc ti:e training of the necessary personnel, muld help docrocse imorts. Such im orted itars as "raer, textiles, fish, vegetebles, cocoa, cofifec, suzer, edibie veectible oils, etc. could be casily produced or processed locelly.
16. To what extent aro such chenges dciencent uron the iraortrtion of ce:ital equi rent?

In the renufacturing inciustries, such chenges ere ly rgely deencent on the izi.ortetion of ecipitel equi;ment.

\section*{17. To whet extent are fuek chenes cenendent on imortes rav witericis?}
 Philizpines abounds in ram meteriels, excert indusirial crericels. Conversion of ran reterinls int: finishei rroducts throuih the use of in orted cajitel equiraent is one of our distinct need.s, if industrislizetion is to be encouraced.
18. What excition to the existing stock of trucks. reilrocd mater end eir trans;ort equijent are - eguired, in order to meet the forle sct by the lonzer rence rscovery and develorrent rrorrorre? To rhet extent con these gdaitions be met out of dor:estic rroduction?

Inforration celled for by this question cen be furnished only by higher authorities -. those tiat share the basic rolicies of the government. However it can be assured the.t it is a besic rolicy to restore the rublic utilities to their rever atatus to inmrove the living eoncitions of the rass of the reople; in wich case the much needed equiprent must heve to be imported as they are not ranufactured locally. The Dhilinnines is as yot in an ecriculturel strce of develorment, end it will take yerrs before heevy industries can be successfully esteblishec. here.

18 a. That additions are contemplated in construction of roadse bridgese cailroads, and Fateryars and airfields for economic develonment.

The primary otjoctive of the Republic is to repair prewar damaged roads and bridges, portmorks, public buildings (including schools and hospitals), airways, lighthouses, and the government operated railways; that is to say, restorc them to their serviceable status before the war. However, in reconstructing devasted Manila, there is a project to build a national capitol with an outlay of some \(\mathrm{P}_{4} 5,000,000\). There is also a project to build a military road connectine San Pernando, La Union province and Batangas, Batangas province, and another project to repair present piers and warehouses in Manila and to build several new ones on the north side of the harbor to provide for future expansion of the volume of trade passing through the port of Manila.

All the foregoing projects will be built from the sum of \(9240,000,000\) to be set aside for said government projects in the Tyding's Mar Damage Act. The sum of \(8150,000,000\) has already been made available for the military road, the repair of the University of the Philippines, the construction and repair of portworks, construction of the proposed national capitol, and the repair of public schools and hospitals.

New projects of similar magnitude may also be undertaken in naval and military reservations of the United Etates in the islands, including the construction, improvement and expansion of airways for military use within those bases. It is the United States Government that will finance them.

\section*{19. Stanificant data on the trend of birth and death rates, population shifts and related factorge}

The birth rate in the Philippines appears to have registered no appreciable change, the rate per thousand population in 1940 being 32.28 as compared with 32.83 in 1931. In years between these two periods the variation in the birth rate is insignificant. On the other hand, the death rate per thousand population indicated an appreciable improvement, as the rate dropped from 17.97 per thousand in 1931 to 16.50 in 1940. It is estimated that about 350,000 persons are added annually to the population. (Population as of the Census of 1939 was \(16,000,303\); estimated as of January \(1_{0} 1946\) it was \(18,846,000\)

Prior to the war, there were two classes of population movements in the Philippines; namely, (a) natural current and (b) artificial movement, the latter representing persons transferine to scarcely populatei areas 'nder Goverment auspices for the purpose of settling lands of the public domain. For the period 1931-1939 the average number of homeseekers sent under Government assistance was 2,520. The natural current may be divided into two kinds migration from rural to rural commuities and the drift of rural population toward the cities. No data are available regarding these movements.

The following table shows the occupational distribution of gainful morkers in the Philippines:

GAINEUL KORKERS TEN YEARE OLD AND OVER, BY GENERAL OCCUPATION
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{Oc cupation Group} & \multicolumn{3}{|c|}{NOMBER} & Per cent distribution \\
\hline & lale & 1 Female & : Both sexesi & Both sexes \\
\hline TOTAL & 4.219 .278 & 4.2472215 & \(8.466,4193\) & 100.0 \\
\hline b iculture ..................... & 2,981.551 & 4740819 & 3.456.370 & 40.8 \\
\hline \(x\) restic and personal service. & 123.508 & 3,354.576 & 3.478,084 & 41.1 \\
\hline 'rofessional service .......... & 65.438 & 37,977 & 103.415 & 1.2 \\
\hline -ublic service (not elsewhere classified).. & 48,984 & 636 & 49.620 & 0.6 \\
\hline Fishing ........................ & 175,841 & 4.728 & 180,569 & 2.1 \\
\hline Forestry and hunting .......... & 24.903 & 1,917 & 26,820 & 0.3 \\
\hline lifining and quarrying .......... & 46.625 & 394 & 47.019 & 0.6 \\
\hline Manufacturing \& mech. Industries & 333.976 & 267.359 & 601.335 & 7.1 \\
\hline Trans. and communication ..... & 202.449 & 1,14? & 203.596 & 2.4 \\
\hline Clertesi ....................... & 44.904 & 3,995 & 48.899 & 0.6 \\
\hline  & 171.099 & 99.667 & 270.766 & 3.2 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\section*{}

In view of the unsatisfectory conditions in agricultural employments, there is \(s\) tendercy for rurel people to seak work in urben centers. As a result, a considerahle propoition of thoso formerly enfeged in risrisuliural ectivities mey now be found either in trede or in U. S. Aray employnent.


 supply is more tina: siequitus thout tho donfacis of hoth frricultura and industry for mand jestr so cerne.
21. To what stsrt An guch chalges require tho transfer of lebour botween


Expansion in fardejtire end induatry will ret bu handicecped es far co lebor reairement is curcersed. Prior to the war, it wrat tha practice of big enterprises to bend capressntaitives te recruit labornrs in aroas wiere labor ves plentiful. Fith frecred sisten of iabor zecruitroit sind better conditione of omoloyment, the labor reecis of both ngricuiture and induptry can be oesily met.
22. To wint extent mill ruct tranfers requira the increased mechenization of epriculture?

The neud for incrensed mechnaization of ugriculture is ant no mivh due to leck of munoover on the fince as we heve eroveh of them, hut we lack work
 per cent of which were careopos. The rumber of corebeos loit is ubout 40 per cent helow the premer ci erout \(2,4 C C, C C\); ene our cettle is ebout 70 por cent below the prewar of abcut \(1,40 c, 000\) hceds. Tho numbur of :mris enicaic left aftor the war io probnuly eruund 40 pur cent bulow the prevar population. The transer of lebor betwesn agriculture and irductr: will not incres.so very much the need for mechanizetion of pericuiturc.

\section*{23. To whet extent will the aevelooment oroxnmur routre ar ircrose of certain cotercrice of workers or of wanererial or soientific perscingli}
as Philippino economs is essorticlly acriculturel, the ereat bulk of the voris ng poople are engeged in egricultural purehite. at pregent urakilled lebor predominates es mechanization ir apriculture in negliexible. In 1939 there were 247, 146 :killed linborers, wost of y.fom vere employod in industriel and comercinl enterprises aid othur nor.-ferriaf occupticns. Tre number of akilled laborers mey have increarea sirca liberation os porebult of the training they geined while in the emplog of the U. S. arry. In Greater kanila area alone, the U.S. Ariny wes emplowire some \(7 C, \because C^{\prime}\) :kiaicl werinors in august 1945. A large prcuortion of thene probeoly belonged to the ungililed clans beíore the war, wien the tetal number of akilled workoxe ir ionila vee 35,94l only. To meet prosont ond future domends, the necersity of trising menpeevial and sciortific persorinal, wist the courtre' sraly lecirs, feporers in order. The

21. Io whet extont is a sumpun of livor enticingted ovir the next fow yeare, end in wht cptcgo: ies of wrkere? Is aierption of such le rour contempleted, sna to wist exivent?
 the unckilled clese will bo revil ble to weet future expencion in agriculture ard in industry. I: 1939, the total number cfecrinfully employed persuins 10 reers old crid over wes \(5,320,730\), excluding hounewives, frd the lebor supply wes \(7,3 C 4,300\), or a surplus of \(1,983,580\), or 37.33 cer cunt. Prior to the wer, the mobility of lebor from islend to islend nresented nome difficulties although in centers of populetici. like lazon, labor anobility wes frcilitated by the network of good roede nnd choep menns of transportntion. The wigretion of laborors irow one pree to arother vill depord upor the demands of emploving anterorises.

(Part or Answer to question No. 25, page 11.)
table a -Values of philimitnt infortsi 1946, 1941 and 1940

29. What rinimur: a: ounts of forcicin crecits will be requime annelily in 1946-1948 ena, if rossiolo, for e lonser veriou, to cover rny efficit in tho belance of interneticnal yeyrents?

With a zovernment reserve of \(p 670,00 c, 000\) in round nurbers, the bulk of wich is \(\mathrm{Ce}_{\mathrm{i}}\) osited in the United Stetes, and with the Chiliraine jeso Fowed to the coller, the Fhilippines arey not ex ect eny deficit in the belence of internetional payments this year or even in next fiscel yeer, roviced, of course, that the Fhilipine Rerublic does not dram from seid reserves to meet huge buéctary ceficits estiretce to be eround r250,000,000 in the netional buhbet for the fiscel yeer 1s46-1947. The Reiublic, however, is not usine its reserves for the purpose, and instead hes pessed scveral texpetion चeesures celculeted to cut down the reported deficit by ebout =50,000,000 thus, lecvins e yossible net deficit of eround paco,000,000. It is to meet this exiccted net deficit that the Governcent hes been rressing its analication for lian in the United States, end indications are that the Fresident ray even go to the United Sietes to negotiate such leans.

In the 1947-1948 fiscel year, e similer situation rey occur, elthough the sevcral new texction zeasures :ey orercte to cut dorn further the expectec ceficits es business wey be sti-u!rited by mar ierage neyrente re\%orted to comence about the letter rert of this yeer. Not until the eestroyed infuctries are restored --suicr, rining, coconut oil, rore, ciecr, etc.. will such throet to the ebility of the Pailimines to reet belrnces of internetional peyments ecainst her ceese to be a serious rroblen to the new Requblic.

In the reentine, es ebove indiceter, a rinimur: lonn of paor,oco,0co should be grented annuelly to the Fhilignines for the next tio yeers.

Menile, Se: terber 27, 1946
(SELL)
true copy;
\(/ s / \frac{\text { Leon Mc. Gonzeles }}{\text { IEON Mit. GONVIES }}\)
Director of the Consue end Statistics


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\section*{Republic of the Prilippines}

Orfice of the President
buraau of the cknsus and siatistics, Mainila

November 19, 1946

TO W:OM IT BAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the atteched reoprt dated September 27, 1946 is a true copy of the statement of informaticn furnished by the Iureau of the Census and Statistics, thru the Office of the President, in answer to a questionnaire referred tc this Office by the Deyartment of Foreign Affairs, bearing, among other things, on war demages, fopulation, and economic conditions of the Philippines.
(SEAL)
/8/ Leor. Ma. Gonzales Director

Rncl.

Office of the Presidont of tha Philipoines
Repuolic of the )
Philippines ) SS
City of Manila
I, EMillo abmilo, Crief of the ixecutive Cffice
(SEAL) do hereby certify that Leon Nia. Gonzales, whose nawe appeers aigned to the atteched certificate, was at the time oi signirg the said certificate, Director, Eureau of the Census and Statistics, Manila, Philipoines, duly eppointed end queslified and wes, as such, Director, duly authorized by the laws of the Fhilippines to sign, the same, and that the full faith and credit are and ought to be given to his official rets; and I further certify that I am vell acouninted with hie handwriting pnd verily believe the signature and seal affixed to the seid certificate are genuine.

In witness whoreof, I heve kereunto set my hand at hanila, Philipoines, this ath de.y of hovember, A. D., 1946.

\section*{/8/ MVILIO AOBLLO}

Chief of the Executive Office


\section*{\(2 \times 1436\)}


















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GENZRAL HEADCUARTSRS
UNITED STATES \&RIVY FOLiCES, P\&CIFIC TAR CRIMES BRANCH
\& January 1946
MEMORANDUN TO: Piojecutinas Saction (Report No, 151)
THRU:
Execptive Officer, Wror Crimes Branch
SUBJECT:
Nurder and atterpted murder of Filipino civiliens end the wenten destruction of privete property in various Ba_rios of Malvar, faterikas Province, Luzon, Jis during January, February and lierch 1945.

\section*{II. SUMTARY OF EVIDENCE:}

Early on the mointing of 2.6 January 1945, Japonese soldiors entered Berrio Son Andies, Malyar, Batangnc Province. They rounded up the jritabitarse in small ryoups and took them toward the school beilaing: ADNut fifty blood-covered bodies were scattered oven the aren, and threc Filipinos, whose hands were tiod beniad thoar bauks, were bayonetted to doath. One of a group of fiye filipinos ran eway es he was being led towards the school, and though vourided when the Japancse shot at him, managed to ascape ( R ?, 8). Two other Filipinos sought shelter in a dugout, but were discovered by Jazanose soldiers who fired a machinc eun at them. The two men feigned death and later sought shelter elsowhere, but were ngain discovered by fifteen Jananese soldiers. One of the men was beherded, but the other ran away and cscaped as the Japaneso fired at him (R 11, 12). Another Filinino while attompting to escepe, was beyone ted by five Japanese soldiers, one of whom shot him in the befd vifth a pistol. One of the other solaiers boyozetted the woinded man through the chest and loft him for dead, but the rectim managed to survive and recover, The Jananese then burned abrut ninety houses in the barrio ( \(\mathrm{R} 15,15\) ).

On 19 Februasy 1945, about thirty Japanese soldjors and Makapilis approached the house of Santiago de ln PENA in Barrio Eegong Pock, Mriver. The Japaneso rirrrunded the house which contained six pirsons and one of the Japanese entered the hoinc, After a ilttle while ho ceme out, and the soldiars then toon torches and burned the house down. The bodies of the six ocerpents were found in the charred ruins of the house (R 18).

On 25 Narch 1945, at Barrio San Pedro, one man was intorcepted by Japanese soldiors end bayonetted fivo times when he was unable to tell them where all the inhabitants were. Thorgh scriously wounded, he survived ( \(R 21,22\), Fixs B, C). On the same day in the sane bairio, four other fllipino mon whose hands wise tied behilid their backs were thrown intn a deep well by Jopanere soiciars and Growned (R 24, 25; Ex D). Two other mail were drownod by the jananeso in the same manner at Barrio ©in Pedro on 27 Narch 1945 ( R 28, 29; Ex E).

On another day in Mazch 1945 at Bernio S:n Isidro, Bulshen, lifivar, Batangaz Province, threc Filininos were captured by Japanese soidiers. Thair hands were tied behind their becks and they were pushed into a deep woll. Two of them were drowned but one menaged to get his hands untied and held on to a piece of b?mboo until he wes rescucd ( \(\mathrm{R} 32,33 ;\) Ex F).

On 29 March 1945, at Duhat near Barrio San Juan, Japanese soldiers approached the home of a Filinino family of six who fled in an offort to escepo. One pregnint woran wes overtaken by the parsuing Japanese and shot with a rifle. Though seriousiy woinded, she survived, The other members of the family escadod unhermed. Ons othor man was wounded by the Japanose at the same time and place and died later in a hospital ( R 36, 37).

About 1000 hours on 28 March 1945, two hundred Japanesc soldiers ontered Barrio San Isidro, Buliban, Melvar. Tho rosidents scattered for safety, but one man, his child, and two women were ceptured. Aftor being threatened, the man agreed to serve as a guide for the Jabmese, nnd his compenions apperently rojeased. As he was guiding the Jaymese towards Lipa, the Janenese were ot taiket, probably by guerrillas, and one of the Japanese soldiors bayonetted the guide six times and left hir. Though seriously wounded, he recovered ( \(\mathrm{R} 41,42\); Exs. H; I).








































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\author{
/s/ Sidney F. Mashbir Sidney F. Mashbir Colonel, S.C. Co-Ordinator
}

\section*{Okada Unit}

\section*{BATTALION EMERGENCY ORDER 1200}
1. No. 1 Bn. is fighting desperately under enemy fire and is defending Paco station to the last. Our stronghold near the tobacco factory has been broken through.
2. Nn. 4 Coy and No. 5 Coy will send their reserve forces (including the reinforcements from the Okada Unit) and post them at important points around Daitea Road to meet enemy frontal attack. from the east.
3. Secure important points along the different roads east of the Daitoa Road. There is no knowing from which road the enemy may attack. Keep this in mind when posting troops.
4. Be careful to make no mistakes in the time of exploding and burning :ohen the enemy invades.
5. Beware of guerrilla firing, etc. from behind.
6. When killing Filipinos, assemble them together in one place as far as possible, thereby saving ammunition and labour.

Disposal of the dead bodies will be troublesome, so either assemble them in houses scheduled to be burned or blown up or push them into the river.

Doc. No. \(27 C 7\)
Page 1
SECPET
AILIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA RESEAFICH REPORT

SUBJFECT: JAPANESE VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR
I.G. No, 6050
B.I.D. NO. 3134

DATE OF ISSUE 23 June 1045
No. 72 (Supnl 2)
SUTITARY:
SUDLT:AENT NUBBER 2 to COIPILATION PAFPARED FOR,
AND SUBMIMPED UMTNR OATH TO "COMISSTCN REOARD-
ING BREACHES OF THE RULES OF Y:ARFARE BY THE
JAPANESE FCRCES" (CO:i ONHEALTH OF AUSJRALIA), 12 JaRCH 1944.
1. . Ihis renort sumplements ArIs Research Report No. 72 (previously ATIS Information Bulletin No. 10), and Supnl 1, and comorises a further record of violations of the lavs of war noted in cocunents on file at ATIS, GHQ. It contains information which has become available from 12 October 1944 to \(2 R\) March 1345.
2. Fhotolithograohic conies of pertinent sections of such original documents as are available wi.th relevant, identifying data are reproduced as anoendices to this reoort.
3. It has not been possible in all cases to establish definitely the existence of a violation of the laws of war, but where data indscates the orobability of such a violation the incident has been included.
4. Penort adduces evidence of one hundred and ninetyfour executions in South West pacific Area; burning of guerrillas in the Frifimpine Islands; the destruction of nroperty; official Jananese admission of cannibalism; jill-treatment of prisoners of war.

GC/CLR/mf
Distribution H
/s/ Signey F. Uashbir Sidney F. Mashbir Colonel, S.C. Co-Ordinator

SOURCES:
Cantured Documents. Statements by Prisoners of War. Intellizence Reports.

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Doc. No. 2707-K
Page 2

The infantry usit will go into action at 2400 hours tonight and is expected to surround the enemy by 0100 hours on the second.

The moonlight is bright and it is light as day. The infantry will find it difficult to advance as there is great danger of being detected by the enemy. May God grant them success.

As we are to attack the headquarters of three thousand American and Filipino soldiers under the command of Major Mackinsey, we fcel animated and encouraged.

Rizal, which lies directly in front of our company, is where the families of the imerican and Philippine soldiers reside, and where the activities of the native bandits are very active.

Our eim is to kill or wound all the men and collect information. Women who attempt to escape are to be killed. All in all, our aim is extinction of personnel.

I shall sleep in high spirit tonight and shall perhaps dream of home.


\section*{SECPET}

\section*{AILIED GRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SFCTION SOUIHWEST PACIFIC AREA RESEAFCH RePORT}

SUBJFCT: JAPANESE VIOLATIONS OF THE LSTWS OF WAR

\author{
I.G. No. 6950 \\ 6051
}
B.I.D. No. 3134

DATP OF ISSUE 23 June 1045
No. 72 (Supnl 2)
SWI.TARY:
SUPLTAENT NU:BER 2 to COIMPILATION PRFPARED FOR,
AND SIBNITTMED UNTER OATY TO "COMISSICN REGARD-
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JAPANESE FCRCES" (COA CNTRALTH OF AUSTPALIA),
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\(\mathrm{GC} / \mathrm{CHR} / \mathrm{nf}\)
/s/ Eigney F. ijashbir Sidney F. Mashbir
Colonel, S.C.
Co-Ordinator

SOURCES: Cantured Documents.
Statements by Prisoners of Var. Intellizence Feports.
(INFORhATION SHOULD BE ASSESSED ACCORDINGLY)


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\section*{田昆蛒}

\author{
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\section*{CERTIFICATE}

I, Jewell A. Blankenship, lst Lt, OIC R\&I Files hereby certify that the attached International Prosecution Section Document No. 415, a portion of ADVATIS BuIletin No. 653 (Item 12-605074), being a translation of an extract from a bcund handwritten notebook, dated 19 December 1944 . 27 March 1945, is an English translation of a captured Japanese document rendered into English by a competent ATIS translator.

I further certify that the original Japanese document was forvarded to the Washington Document Center, Washington, D. C.

\author{
/s/ Jewell A. Blankenship
}

















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Extract from Item 1-18892-A from ATIS \(\mathrm{S} / \mathrm{w}\) Pacific Area Bulletin 2065, dated 4 June 1945.

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TIAONG, TAYABAS Pine. LUZON - 3 May 45 . Recd Sixth Ampy ATIS Ad Rch - 9 May 45 _ Recd_ATIS SIPA - 19 May 45 ع

IIPM1 Diary dated 24 Apr 44-23 Jan 45. Owner not stated but pre- Mr sumably a member of an airfield company. 50 pp . (Partially translated by Sixth Army ATIS Adv Ech 0490, Item I.)

\section*{Extractg:}
: Kov \(44^{\circ}\) - (PN Day not stated.) I cannot remember the date. but we received information from Lipa uP Squad that approximately 30 guerrillas attaaked Lipa Air Depot with hand grenades and other explosives, and 11 of them were captured. The MP Bquad requested that the OIGO Force dispose of the captured guerrillas. During the night we dug holes here and there in the coconut grove near the graveyard and bayoneted and killed them. I noticed that some of them were small like children. Thes had no strength at all aince they had not eaten for the last three days since their capture by the \(\mathbb{X P}\) unit. Their hands were tied behind their backs, and they stood in front of the holes with their heads bent slightiy do mward. It seemed that their minds were already made up that they would be killed, and they said nothing. Their hair was very bushy. I was irritated. Later, one by one the members of the section bayoneted the puerrillas. The first one was bayoneted by SUZUKI, Yukimatsu. My turn was the second one. The moment I bayoneted the victim he cried "Ah" and fell into the hole behind him. He was suffering but I had no emotion at all. That may be because I was so excited. After bayoneting them, we covered them with soil and laid coconut leaves on top. He returned to the company singing a military song at 2200 hours.


Doc. No. 426

CEnTIFICATE
 hereby certify that the attached International Prosecution Section Document No. 426, a portion of ATIS Bulletin No. 2065 (Item l-18892-A), being a translation of an extrac from a diary, dated 24 July 1944-23 January 1945, owner not stated but presumably a member of an Airfield Company, is an English translation of a captured Japanese document rendered into Enclish by a competent ATIS translator.

I further aertify that the original Japanese document was forwarded to the \#ashington Document Center, Toshington, D. C.
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DOCUMENT 2776

\section*{CERTIFICATE}

\section*{12 November 1946}

I, Jewell A. Blankenship, lst Lt. OIC R\&I•Files, ATIS hereby certify that the atteched International Prosecution Section Document No. 2776 is an ATIS document, \#1941, XIV Corps, ATIS, Adv. Ech., being English translations of captured enemy documents rendered into English by a competent ATIS translator.

I further certify that the original Japanese document was forwarded to the Washington Document Center: Jashington, 25, D. C.
/s/ Jewell A. Blankenship
JEVELL A B BLANKENSHIP

KANILA, LUZON - 24 Feb 45. Recd XIV Corps ATIS Ady Ech - 27 Feb 45. Recd ADVGTIS - 14 Mer 45.

Notebook-diary presumably belonging to member of
AKATSUKI 16709 Force (TN 9 Shipping Engr Regt,
Repl Unit.), covering period 31 Jui 44-21 Feb 45. (Partly translated in XIVCAE Translation 0082, Batch 719, Item 13).


9 Feb - Burned 1,000 guerrillas tonight.
10 Feb
13 Feb

8 Feb
- Guarded over 1,164 guerrillas which were newly brought in today.


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Doc. IN. 428
Parje 1
15-1
Extract fror: iDV.iTIS Bulletin No. 710, Ite:! 605588 , fran ATIS S/" Pacific Aron Bulletin 2089, dater? 28 June 1945.

SDVITIS BULIETIN \(10 \quad 110\)

\section*{
}

ITE115 605588

Losse henivritten sheet containine battle rerert, Cotec 13 Anril, गresu:ably 1945. Issuve. by Corronein: Officer of IJICHI (*17) Unit. Seel reens IJICHI anc HIRAiOO (*18). (Pertly translater. in ICinT 0194, Be.tch 236, Ite". 4).
4. Iurber of roun's of ermunition exnoncer? 28 reune?s. (ror killing netives).
5. ist 1200 hours today, 22 natives massec. ir the vicinity \(=f\) cormany positions. ill vere cither staboec. or shet to dee.th by the re"ninin:: personnel (thise rhe returne? fro: suici ?e assault rission, loc by Suporior Pvt fivesEI of headquerters).

I, Jerrell d. Blonkenshic, lst Lt. OIC OBL Filos hèreby certify thret the attache? Internatinn ?rasecuti-n Suctin Decu:cint if\%. 428, c حortirn of iDVi:TIS Bulletin Ir. 710 (Iter: 5-605588), being a translation ff losse haniwritten slecet contsining battle revert, ci.te: 13 srril, orcsu'obly 1945, is an Jngilsh translation of a capturel Jonanose lecurent ren'ered inte inelish by a cormetent ATIS translater.

I further certify thot the ririnal Jo:anese racurent vas forvorce" to the "ashineton \(D\) curent Center, "eshineton, D. C.
/s/ Jurol. \(\therefore\) Blenkenshin


Doc. \(420^{\circ}\)




\section*{DOCUNENT 2749}

\section*{CERTIFICATE}

12 November 1946
I, Jewell A. Blankenship, lst It. OIC R\&I Files, ATIS hereby certify that the attached International Prosecution Section Document No. 2749 is an ATIS document, ATIS, SWPA Bulletin \#1862, being English translation of captured enemy documents rendered into English by a competent AIIS translator.

I further certify that the original Japanese document was forwarded to the Washington Document Center, Washington, 25, D. C.

\author{
/s/ Jewell A. Blankenship \\ JEWELL \(\Lambda_{\text {. BLANKENSHIP }}\) lst It., Infantry
}

\section*{}

\section*{\(2 \times 1443\)}
\(x^{\prime \prime}\)







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DOCUMFNT 2777

\section*{CERTIEICATE}

12 November 1946
I, Jewell A. Blankenship, lst Lt. OIC R\&I Files, ATIS hereby certify that the attached International Prosecution Section Document No. 2777 is a true and correct copy of an ATIS document, ADVATIS Bulletin No. 701, beine. English translations of captured enemy documents rendered into English by competent ATIS translators.

I further certify that the original Japanese Cocuments were forwarded to the dashington Document Center, Nashington, 25, D. C.

\author{
/s/ Jewell As Blankenship JEFELL A BLANKENSHIP 1st Lt., Infantry
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- Nreminuturs
\(\therefore /\) LUZON/ LAGUNA/ MDGGMEANGOMI










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JEWELL A. BLANKENSHIP

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\text { No } 2
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Page 2

\section*{CERTITIGATE}
 hereby certify that the attached Interaational Prosecution Section Document No. 425, a portion of arIS Bullotin No. 2071 (Item 12-605849-A), being extracts from a bound diary-notebook dated July 1944-22 May 1945, is an English translation of a captured Japanese document rendered into English by a competent ATIS translator.

I further certify that the original Japanese document was forwarded to the Washington Document Center, Waehington, D. C.
/8/_Jewell A. Blankenehip






\section*{SECRET}

\section*{AILIED TRANSLATOR AND INEERPRETER SECSION SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA RESEAFCH REPORT}
\(\begin{array}{ll}\text { SUBJECT: } & \text { JAPANESE VIOLATIONS OF THE } \\ & \text { LAWS OF WAR }\end{array}\)

DATE OF ISSUE 23 June 1945
I.G. No. \(\begin{array}{r}6950 \\ 6951\end{array}\)
B.I.D. No. 3134

No. 72 (Supnl 2)

SU洞TARY:
SUDIPTNT NUBBR 2 to COIAPILATION PRFPARED FOR, AND SUBMITMED UNLER OATE TO "COFITSSICN TEGARDING BREACHES OR TYE RULES OF שARFARE BY THL JAPANESE FCRCES" (CO:i GNFTALTH OF AISTPALIA), 12 ISARCH 1944.
1. Chis report supolements AnIs Research Report No. 72 (previously ATIS Information Bujletin No. 1C), and Supnl 1 , and comprisec a further record of violations of the laws of war noted in cocuments on file at ATIS, GHQ. It contains information mich has become quailable from 12 october 1944 to 28 iarch 1945.
2. Fhotolithogranhic conies of pertinent sections of such original documents as are availnb? \(\begin{aligned} & \text { vith }\end{aligned}\) relevant iden \(\div\) ifyine data are rebroduced as anpendices to this report.
3. It has not been possible in oll cases to establish definitely the existence of a violation of the laws of war, but where data indicates the orobability of such a violation the incident has been included.
4. Renort adduces evidence of one hundred and ninetyfour exccutions in south West pacific Area; burning of guerrillas in the Rhflipnine Islands; the destrvetion of property; official Jananese admission of cannibalism; 11l-treatment of prisoners of war.

GC/CLR/mf
Distribution H
/s/ Signey F. iashbir Sidney F. Mashbir Colonel, S.C. Co-Ordinator

SOURCES:
Contured Documents. Statements by Prisoners of Var. Intellifence Feports.

Prisoner YANAGIZAWA Eifi; Australian No JA 162002, a leading private of 9 Company, 3 Battalion, 239 Infantry Regiment, 111 with beriberi was captured by Australian troops at MARASUPE, near AITAPE, 25 Dec 44.

Cannibai1sm
On 1 Nov 44 in a speech to his troops, Maj Gen AOTU, 41 Division Infantry Group commander, steted that troops must fight the Allies even to the extent of eating them.

On 10 Dec 44 an order was issued from 18 Army Headquarters that troops were permitted to eat the flesh of Allied dead but must not eat their own dead. At the time rumors were prevalent that troops were eating their own dead. 15 Dec 44 four men were executed by order of Naj KORIMOTO, commanding officer of 2 Battalion for disobeying this order.

While wandering in the jungle prisoner came across four men of his unit whose bodies had been stripped of flesh. As there were no troops other than Japanese in the area he presumed the flesh was eaten by them.

In mid Dec 44 prisoner was shorn some meat by his commanding officer who said it was humen flesin and that anything thet looked like it was not to be eaten.

On 21 Dec 44 at MARUJIPPU, Maj NORIMOTO, 2 Battalion commander, shared out to his troops the flesh of two Austialian soldiers who had been killed in action and joined them in eating 1t. As prisoner was ill he was unable to obtain a share.

DOCUMENT 2850

CERTIEICATE

12 November 1946

I, Jewell A. Blankenship, 1st Lt. OIC R\&I Files, ATIS hereby certify that the attached Internetional Prosecution Section Document is a true and correct copy of an ATIS document, ATIS, SUPA Interrogation Report No. 692, a portion of which includes the interrogation of POW Yanagizawa Eifi, Australian No. JA 162002, a leading private of 9 Company, 3 Battalion, 239 Infantry Regiment. The brief of this interrogation was prepared by a ATIS student interrogator and only that information which appeared reasonable and accurate to Examiners checking the work has been reproduced.

\author{
/s/ Jewel1 A. Blankenship JEVELL A. BLANKENSHIP 1st Lt., Infantry
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\section*{For The WAR CRIMES OFFICE}

Judge Advocate General's Department -- War Department
United States of America /7 9 armamy /946

In the matter of the surrender Perpetuation of Testimony of of American Forces on Bataan on 2 April. 1942.

Edward P. King, Jr., Laior Genera A.U.S. - 02442.

Taken at: \(\quad\) Room 2225 Munitions Building, \(\quad\) War Nepartrent, Iashington, D. C.
Eate:
14 January, 1046
In the Presence oin: Cr.ptain F. J. Connully, JAGD, and Captaiia Uhilip L. Smith, Captain, JAGD.

Reporter: Arthur C. Hendrix, Civilian, Office of The Judge Advocate General, War Crimes Office.

Questions bys Captain E. J. Connolly, JAGD.
Q Will you please give your name and serial number, sir?
A Edward P. King, Jr., 02442, Major General, A.U.S.
Q ifere you the Commanding General of the American forces on Botean in April 2942.
- 1 Hes.

Q At what time did your forcas surrender to the Japanese?
A At about 2 A.M., April 9, 1942, I sent forward with a flag of truce Col. E. C. Williams, Colonel J. K. Collier, my G-3, and Major Marshall Hurt, my Assistant G-3, to make an appointment for me to meet the Japanese Commander of their forces on Bataar with a view to surrendering. Colonel Williams was to make the appointment. Colonel Collier and Major Hurt were to get word back to me of the appointment. Colonel Collier and Major Hurt returned shortiy after daylight and I started forvard with my two sides, Maior Cothran and Captain Achille C. Tisdelle, Jr. Colonel Collier and Major Hurt accompanied us in another car. On the way forward, although carrying large white flags on our cars, we were attacked repeatediy by light boml and machine gur. fire from low-flying Japanese planes so that we were compelled often to stop and take cover. It must have been close to 10 o'clock when I reached Lamao, the plece to which Colonel Collit had directed me. At that place I was received by a Japanese Major General irho informed me, through a very poor interpreter: that he commanded one division of the Japanese forces; that he, - had reported my coming to Japanese headauarters in the Philippines and that he had no authority to treat with me; that another officer would be sent from Japanese headauarters to treat with me and that he would make no further advance for thirty minutes while I decided what to do.
© Do you know the Japanese General's name?
( I do not know the name of the Japanese General. After some time, no Japanese officer having arrived from Japanese headauarters: Colonel Williams called my attention to the fact tha the Japanese troops had resumed their advance, and I immediate. sent Colonel Collier and Major Hurt back with instructions to


\section*{DOCUMENT 2713}
direct my units in the line of the Japanese advance to display the white flag and to surrender and to go to my Command Post and direct General Funk, my Chief of Staff, to order all units to display the white flag and to give themselves up to the first Japanese who approached them. Shortly after, an officer with an interpreter arrived and I was told that the officer was a Colonel and that he was General Homma's Chief of Staff, and that he had come to discuss my surrender with me, as General Homma's representative. I was concerned only with the treatmen that my men would receive and whether they would be treated as, prisoners of war. The Japanese officer demanded my uncondition al surrender. I attempted to secure from him an assurance that my men would be treated as prisoners of war. He accused me of : declining to surrender unconditionally and of trying to make a condition. We talked back and forth in this vein for some time
-- I should guess about a half hour. Finally, he said to me, through the interpreter, "The Imperial Japanese Army are not barbarians". With that assurance I had to content myself and surrender.

In destroying arms and equipment in preparation for surrender, I had reserved enough motor transportation and gasoline to transport all of my troops out of Bataan. I endeavored prior to surrender, to secure on assurance that this might be ; done. I plead, after my surrender, that this be done, offering to furnish personnel as might be required by the Japanese for this purpose or to assist in any way that they might require. The Japanese told me that they would handle the movement of the prisoners as they desired; that I would have nothing to do witt it, and that my wishes in that connection would not be consider ed.

Q Did your men on Bataan, at that time, have any rations?
A For some time we had been on one-fourth rations in Bataan. At the time of my surrender, I had remaining two days of issue on that limited basis, that is, one-half a ration per man.
Q Did you at any time, General, consult with General Homma during these negotiations?

A I have never seen him in my life so far as I know.
Q Did the Japanese to whom you surrendered agree to accept the surrender of your whole command?
A They would not trest. with me at all until after some time and effort I convinced them that I vouid continue to insist that I was surrendering wfthout, Generai wainwrig!!t's knowledge or authority. Then the Japanese said i could surrender myself and send my staff officers, Colonel Collier and Major Hurt back to direct my units to surrender in which case they would discontinue their attack.
\(Q\) Did the Japanese agree to treat your men as prisoners of war?
A I was able to get nothing from them except the assurance, "The Imperial Japanese Army are not barbarians".
\(?\)
©DOCUMENT 2713
Q General, what happened after your negotiations of surrender with the Japanese were completed?

A I was taken to Balanga where I was held all afternoon, and just before dark I was carried to Orani where I was kept until Sunday evening, April 12th, when I was carried by motor car to Camp 0'Donneli.

City of Washington
District of Columbia \(\left\{\begin{array}{l}\text { SS }\end{array}\right.\)

I, Edward P. King, Jr., of lawful age, being duly sworn on oath, state that I have read the foregoing transcription of my interrogation, and all answers contained therein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
/s/ E P King, Jr. Edward P. King, Jr.. Major General, A.U.Ś.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15 th day of January 1946.
\[
\text { /s/ } \frac{\text { Edward Je Connollye Jr. }}{\text { Edward J. Connolly, JAGD. }}
\]

\section*{DOCIMENT 2713}

\section*{CERTIEICATE}

I, ARTHUR A. SANDISKY, hereby certify:
1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP, and as such have possession, custody and control of original or copies of all documents obtained by the said Section.
2. That the attached photostat copy of Document 2713, consisting of a 3-page affidavit of EDWARD P. KING, Jr., Major General, A.U.S..g was procured by the International Prosecution section from the War Crimes Branch, Civil Affairs Division, Office of the Chief of Staff, War Department.

\section*{/s/ Arthur f. Sandusky \\ ARTHUR A. SANDUSKY}




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Q (By Lieutenant Raff) Will you state ycur name, grade, organization, and your precent assignment?

A Basilio Hernandez, Major, AGA; presently Chief of Cabualty Diviaicn, AGO.

Q Where do you live?
A In Menila; 949 Senavides, Santa Cruz, Manila.
Q Major,were you with the American and Filipine forces at the time of the surrender in April, 1942, on Bataan?

1 Yes, I wes.
Q Now, based on the records presently in the A. G. Office, and from your knowledge, having been on Bataan at the time of the surrender, can you tell the Commission the number of Filipinos, Philippine Army forces, in Bataan at the time of the surrender?

A Approximately 53,000.
Q Will you repeat that?
A Approximately 53,000.
Q Can you estimate the number of Philippine Sconta that were in Bataan at that time?

A I quite remomber there were 12,000 Philippine Scouts before the outbreak of the war. I understand they were all comanitted to Bataan et the date of surrender, but I can't tell the exact number at the date of surrender. I know they ware comitted bafore the date of surrender.
Q. Can you give us on estimate?

A Around six or seven thousend.
LIEMJITMANAN RAFF: You mey cross exemine.
CAPMAIN OIT: No eross examinption,
GENEREL DONOTANs Any questions by the Commission?
(No response.)
GINTERAL DOMOTAN: The witness is excused.
(Witness excused).
\(\qquad\)

Page 2

CERTITICATE

I, Alva C. Carpenter, Chief, Legal Section, General Headquarters,Supreme Commander for the Allied Poners, do hereby certify that Document 2870 is a true and correct cony of the transcript of the testimony offered by BASILIO HERNANDEZ in the trial of the case against Nasaharu KO:NA, General, Imperial Japanese Army, before a dilitary Commission in Manila; and that the whole record of the case, incliding the transcrint of all testimonies taken, as well as the affidavits admitted in evidence, are now on file with this Section.

\author{
Ls/Alva Ce_Carpenter Alva C. Carventer
Chief, Legal Section
}

Witness:_/s/John R. Sritchard _
Sworn to before me this 2lst day
of November 1046, Tokyo, Japan.

John R. Pritchard
Capt., Inf.
Summary Court.
\(2 \times 1449\)





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DOCUMFNT 2809
GEMERAL HEADGUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMI FORCES, PACIFIC
OFFICE OF TVE MHEATFR JUDGE ¿DVOCATE
WAR CRIMES RRA:CH

PETORANDIM : 0: Prosecution Section (Report \# 75)
TTRU:
Executive Officer, Jar Crimes Branch
SITRJECT:
Offenses Compltted by the Jadenese at Camp \(0^{\prime}\) Donnell.
II. SUMCARY OF EVIDENCE:

Over nine thousand Ar:-rican end about forty-seven thousand Filinino prisoners of war were iro isoned in Camp \(0^{\prime}\) Donnell, and all had surrendered on 94 pril 1942 upon the capitulation of the Ar:erican Forces on Bataan ( R 6 , 39). Many of them had made the so-called "Death March" from Bataan to San Fernando and thence on to Camp O'Donnell ( \(\mathrm{R} 20,88,192\) ). As a result of this trip and the privations they had endured just prior to their surronder, 311 of the prisoners reached Camp o'Donnell in a state of exhaustion ( \(R\) \& , 38). Upon arrival at the camp, the prisoners were searched, and some were killed by the japanese when found to possess Japanese money or souvenirs ( \(21,37,38\), 105, 112, 161, 163). Other groups of Arierican and Filipino prisoners of war were executed ( \(\mathrm{R} 24,129,196\) ) or taken from camp under guard and never heard of again ( \(R 7\) ).

Most of the deaths in Camp O'Donnell were due to dysentery and malaria coupled ith malnutrition, and many of these deaths could have been prevented had the Japanese furnished adequate food, shelter, clothing, water sanitation facilities, and medicine and hospital care ( \(\mathrm{R} 1,7,8,17,27\), 91, 117, 155, 181). The quarters provided for the prisoners wore overcrowded and inadequate to protect them from the weather ( \(\mathrm{R} 27,109,142,173\) ). Only onen latrines of the "straddle trench" trne were available, but many of the prisoners were too weak from illness to use them, and flies and filth were everywhere ( \(\mathrm{R} 54,81\) ). No screens were provided for the kitchen and food was contaminated by flles from the open latrines ( \(\mathrm{R} 54,134\) ). Food was inadequate, consisting only of a bowl of rice sprinkled with salt, camotes, with occasionally a iittie watery soup made from greens (R1, 109), but this was later increased until the men began to gain a little weight ( R 17). The death rate mounted to
nearly sixty per day during the first two months of imprisonment ( R 27) . Diring the first few months at Camp \(O^{\prime}\) Donnell the orisoners were not ellowed to use water for bathing, and conditions in the hospitel were most unsanitary due to the inability of the pationts to move to the latrines. There were no beds nor bedding, and the patients werc crowded on the floor and under the building, with no protection from insects, flies, and the weather ( \(\mathrm{R} 54,96,99,109,110,134\), 158). Repeated requests for medicine and hospital equipment were refused (R 38, 133). More than fifteen hundred American prisoners or wor died in Camp \(0^{\prime}\) Donnell between the period 18 April 1942 to December 1942 (Ex. D) ; and : nproximately twenty-six thousand Filinino prisoners died during that period ( R 9, 209).

American and Filipino prisoners were forced to stand in the hot sun without hats for many hours for minor violations of prison regulations ( R 3 ). Others wire beaten with rifles, scabbards, and bamboo doles when they fell, exhausted, while at work ( \(k \varepsilon \varepsilon, 119\) ). Beatings of the prisoners on work details by the Jnpanese guards, with bayonets, clubs, and pick handles were common oc-urrences ( \(\mathrm{R} 100,121\) ).

Many of the prisoners were forced to biry the dead, build fences, and dig latrines, though they were physically unfit to perform such lebor because of illness and malnutrition (R 89, 91, 119, 129, 181).

Tpon arrival at Camp 0'Donnell, the prisoners were forced to place all their personal belongings on their blankets, and the Japanese confiscated all money, jewelry, watches, and equipment including medical supplies, although some of the officers were allowed to kenp a blanket (R 36, 91, 114, 133, 195).

The prisoners were required to bury their own dead in graves containing treive to sixty bodies each, without regard to proper identification of the graves or positions of the bodies (R \(3,4,8.4,14 \ell\) ). Sixty-five who died were 1isted as unknown (Ex. D). On some occesions they were forced to bury men who were still alive ( \(\mathrm{R} 24,129\) ). Frequently the Japanese would not grant permission to bury the dead, and bodies were left expos:d to the sun for two or three days at a time before permission was granted to bury them ( R 3 , 54, 78).

On seversl occasions representatives of the Red Cross and other charitable organizations at empted to bring medicine and supnlies to alleviate the condition of thi? orisoners, but they were turned away at the entrance to the camp ( \(R\) ' 9 , 27, 38,55 ). When sunplies mere allowed to be brought in by charitable organizations, the Japanese confiscated much of it for their oinn use and only allowed the prisoners to have what was lef't (R 8, 39, 39).
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GENERAL ETADQUARTERS
UNITED

\author{
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Wair Crimis branch
19 February 1946
MEMORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 209)
THRU: Executive Officer, War Crimes Branch
SUBJECT:
Bataan Gerieral Hospital Nos. 1 and 2

\section*{II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCES}

On 9 April 1942, the American forces at Bataan Peninsula surrendered to the Japanese, but it was not until about six wecks fater that Corregidor and Fort Drum capitulated. During this interval, Japanese artillery on Bataan was continually duelling with the American guns on Corregidor and Fort Drum.

The chief complaint against the Japanese seems to be that they placed field pleces and tanks in close proximity to the Bataan hospital where approximately seventy-five hundred American and seven thousand Filipino patients were being treated (R 14, 93). The artillery was piaced so close to the hospital that it was obvious tha: the Japanese intended to use the hospital as a sinield ugainst answering fire from the American guns ( R 19, 25), particulawly since the patients could have been evacuated ( \(R 96\) ). One patient saw twentythree Japanose gizns from his place in the hospital ( R 34). When complaints were made to the Japanose about the proximity of their artillery, Japancse officers repiied that the guns would not be moved until Corregidor surrendered to the Japanese (R 34). As a result of placing tnose guns so near the hospital, at least five American pstients in the hespital were killed and many others woundec by gunfire from the Americans on Corregidor and Fort Drum ( R 19, 25) .
- After the American forces on Bataan surrendered, Japanese confiscated medical supplies and almost all of the food at the hospital, leaving only scme fruit juices, carned mi.lic, and dirty, wormy, mouldy rice ( \(\mathrm{P} 23,53,85\) ). While the prisoners and patients were forced to live on this meager diet, the japanese soldiers were eating meals which included vegetables and meat (R 53).

An American nurse was raped by Japanese soldiers and apparently no disciplinary action whatever was taken against the offenders ( \(\mathrm{R} 1,2,1 \%\).

American prisoners were forced to haul Japanese field pieces to various iocations on Batadn for use against the American forces on Corregidor (R Sj).

Filipino patients who were barely able to walk, were forced to leave the hospital and join the "death march" ( R 158 , 166).

Prisoners' personal effects were looted by Japanese ( R 85, 86)


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\section*{DOCUMENT 2870}

\section*{For the WAR C:IIMES OFPICE}

Judge Advocate General's Departisent -- War Denartrient
United States of Anerica

In the matter of torture methods employed by the Japanese i.t Pasay and Nichols Field, P.I., betrieen 8 Septenber 1942 and 14 July 1944.

Perpetuation of Testimony of James Ecward Stremhorn, SEt., ASN 6398 230, CAC (Unassigned)
\begin{tabular}{ll} 
Taken at: & \begin{tabular}{l} 
Greenville Arny Air Base, Greenville, S.C. \\
(Base Intelligence Office) \\
Date:
\end{tabular} \\
I6 July 1945
\end{tabular}

Q State your name, rank, serial number and permanent home address.
A Janes Edward Strawhorn, Sgt., ASN 6398 230. Hore address is RFD \(5^{\prime \prime} 3\), \(\mathrm{c} / 0\) J. M. Strawhorn, Pelzer, South Carolina.

Q Are you married?
A No, I am single.
Q Where were you born and on what date?
A New Bedford, Mass., May 1, 1916.
Q What education did you have?
A I finished High School -- eleven grades.
Q. What did you do before entering the Arry?
\(A^{-}\)I was just out of school when I enlisted in the Arny.
Q Have you recently been returned to the United Statcs fron overseas?
A Yes.
Q Wore you a prisoner of war?
A Yes.
Q At what plices wore you hold and state the approxinate dites.
A We surrenderec on May hs IS42. There is a gap from tiat cate to isey 26 , 1942 when we rero sent to \(\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{s}} \mathrm{janatuan}\). In the meantine we were, I believe, at Waw ilaw, Batangas Provir.ce. We stayed at Cabaiaturn inisil September 8, 1942 on which date we werts mured to Pasay and rematned tlect, until July 14, 1944 when we were sent to Eilibld where we remained unti.. fubruary 4, 1945, on which date we were Iiberatied ly troops of the lst Cavelry Division, Company \(C\), 148th Infantry Regiment of che 37 th Infantry Division.
\(Q\) Did you witness any atrositias or mistreatment of Ansmian citizens at any time?
A Yes. I moulc like to tell ynu about ile torture methods emplojed by the Japanese at Nichola Field, P,I., between 8 September \(19{ }^{2} 2\) and 14 July 1944.
\(Q\) State what you know of your own knowlodge about those incidents.
A The men were alloted a certain amount of work to be done each day. Due to physical conditions of the men and to weather conditions, it was in most

DOCUMENT 2870
instances impossible to perform the required amount of work in the time alloted. If the assigned teaks were not completed rithin tho time linit, the nen would be lined up and flogged by Japanese armed with pick handles, rifle butte, etc. In such instances, many arms, legs and backs were broken and if a man fell to the ground, the Japanese mould beat him over the head until he vas unconscious This was a comnon occurrence. It was amazing to ine how men could take such punishnent and still survive. I personally have been beaten unconscious,

Another form of torture was to nake a person stand at attention in the hot sun with a bucket full of wator on his head. If any of the water vas spilled, the man was beaten as indicatod above.

Another comnon practice was to tie a man to a board with his head lower than his feet and then pour salty water into his mouth. In that position, he had to swallor and the brine solution rould cause his stonach to swell. The Japanese would then junp on his stonach with their feet. In like manner the Japanese often forced a water hose dowm a prisoner's throat and thus filled his stomach with water until he became peinfully swollen and then they would jump on his stomach.

Still another form of punichment was to tie a man's hands behind his back and draw his hands up betwoen his shoulders tith a rope susponded over the limb of a tree and let him hang with his foct just off the ground. This usually pulled both arms out of socket. While at this camp, I personally hung as long as 24 hours in that position. ilo food or water ras given during that time and I was under no shelter, exposed to the secring sun all day and to a heavy downpour of rain during the night. During this time, I was beaten with plaited rope and hit about the face and head with a pistol butt. This occurred in September 1943

On one occasion, ny hands wore tied behind my back and I was forced to kneel on the ground. A plece of timber was placed behind my knees and I was made to squat on that piece of timbor. This resulted, as a rule, in dislocation of the knee joints and cut off all circulation. I was forced to remain in thet position for about three hours.

It was common pructice for any and all Japanese to abuse prisonors of war by hitting them over the head with tent stakes, pistol butts etc., for any and all minor offenses and quite ofton for no offonco whatsoever.

The above recounted torture methods vere adninistercd by W/O Kajuki and several of his aides. The aides are recollod orily by the names of "Pistol Peten, "Saki Sam" and "Cherry Rlosson". There was also a harrant Officer at this prison camp who was known only as "llarvard" because he was a graduate of Hirrvard University. He spoke, roed, and wrote Englisì exceptionally woll. He, too, participated in administoring the above described punishments. The above torture methods, it is bolieved, nere committed and witnessed by higher authority, including the Admiral in charge of Pasay Camps, pithout any interference.
/s/ Janes E Strawhorn
\(/ t /\) JAMAS EDAILD STR
ASN - 6398230, CAC (unassigned)
State of:
County of: \(\quad\{\) SS
I, Janes Edvard Strawhorn, of lawful age, being duly sworn on oath, state that I have read the forcgoing transcription of ny interrogation and all answers contained therein are true to the best of my knowledge and belicf.
\[
\begin{aligned}
& / \mathrm{s} / \mathrm{Jamas} \text { F Stitarinorn } \\
& \text { /t/ dames Sdrard Stramhorn, Sgt. } \\
& \text { ASN - 6398230, CAC (unassigned) }
\end{aligned}
\]

Subscribed and strorn to tefore me this 31st day of July 1945.
/s/ Eugene J Thindien. Capt MA Notary Puiblic, Sumizary Court

DOCUKENT 2870

I, William A. Allen, Jr., Special Agent, Security Intelligence Corpe, Credentials No. 920 (PuGO), cortify that on 16 July 1945, personally appeared before me James Edward Strawhorm, Sgt., ASN - 6398230, and gave the foregoing answers to the several queations set forth; after his testimony had boen transcribed, the said James Edward Strawhorn read the same and affixed his signature theroto.

Place: Pelred, S. C .
Date: 19 July \(19 / 5\)
/s/ milliam Ac Allene Jre_ Signature
Special Arent, S.I.C. (Rank and Organization)

CERTIFIRD A TRUE COPI:
Jamas Pe Healey, Ires lat Itte JaCD
JANIS P. HEALEY, JR., lst Lt., JAGD

DOCUMENT 2870

\section*{CERTIEICATE}

I, T. R. C. King, Major, Inf. (TD), Executive Officer, Legal Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, do hereby certify that the attached mimeographed copy of the affidavit of JAMES EDWARD STRAWHORN is a true and correct reproduction of the original affidavit; and that a signed and sworn copy of said affidavit is presently on file with this Section.
/s/T.R. C. King
Major, C . Kinf. (TD)

Witness: /s/ John Re Pritchard Sworn to before me this 15 th day of November 1946, Tokyo, Japan.
/s/ John R. Pritchard
Capt. Inf. Summary Court

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DOCUMFNT 2826

\title{
GFIER T. "ADOTHRTER: \\ SITRRDIE COTFANDE: MAR ALLIED POMERS \\ LEGAL BLGT ION, MANILA
}

APO 500
17 April 1946

MEMORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 285)
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THRO: Executive Officer, Lecal Section, Nanila
SUBJECT:
Death march of wisoncrs of war from Camp Keithley to Iligan, Lanao, Nindenao, P. I., 4 July 1942.

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II. SUMMARY OF EVTTESYCE:

The Filipiso and American forces which surrendered to the Japanese in the Lanao area on 27 Ifay 1942 were concentrated in Camp Keithley (Report No. 284). On 4 July 1942, the prisuners were made to march from Carp Keithley to Iligan, Lanao, a distance of about thirty-six kilometers, for tile purpose of laking them from there to Malaybalay, Budicion ( P . .). During the merex, a prisoner who was sick and urablc to keep pace with the rost was shot. No food or water was ejron the prisoners. As a conseaucnce, one died from drinking dirty waier which he tried to purify with iodine ( R 2;

For the WAR CAIMES OPFICE
Judge Advocate General's Departnent -- War Denartnent
United States of America

In the matter of torture methods employed by the Japanese s.t Pasay and Nichols Field, P.I., betireen 8 September 1942 and 14 July 1944.

Perpetuation of Testimony of
James Eciward Strewhorn, Sgt.,
ASN 6398 230, CAC (Unassigned)
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline Taken at:
Dateri & Greenville Army Air Base, Greenville, S.C. (Base Intelligence Office) 16 July 1945 \\
\hline In the oresence of: & William A. Allen, Jr., Special Agent, Security Intelligence Corps, Credentials No. 720 (PMGO) \\
\hline Reporter: & Mrs. Hartha H. Cochrane, Secretary, Base Intelligence Officer, Greenville Arny Air Base, Greenville, S.C. \\
\hline Questions by: & William A, Allen, Jr., Special Agent, Security Intelligence Corps, Credentials No. 920 (PMCO) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Q State your name, rank, serial number and permanent home address.
A Janes Edward Strawhorn, Sgt., ASN 6398 230. Honte address is RFD \#; 3, c/o J. M. Strawhorn, Pelzer, South Carolina.

Q Are you married?
A No, I am single.
Q Where were you born and on what date?
A New Bedford, Mass., May 1, 1916.
Q What education did you have?
A I finished High School -- eleven grades.
Q What did you do before entering the Arcy?
A I was just out of achool when I enlisted in the Arny.
Q Have you recently been returned to the United Statcs fron overseas?
4 Yes.
Q Were you a prisoner of war?
A Yes.
Q At what placsa wara you hold and state the approximate d::tes.
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Q Did you witness any atrocitios or mistreatment of Amsrivar citizens at any time?
A Yes. I would like to tell ynu about the torture methods emplojed by the Japanese at Nichols Field, P,1., between 8 September 1912 and 14 July 1944.

Q State what you know of your own knowledge about those incidents.
A The men were alloted a certain amount of work to be done each day. Due to phyaical conditions of the men and to weather conditions, it was in most

DOCUMENT 2870
For the MAR CIIMES OFTGTE
Judge Advocete General's Departnent -- War Denartnent
United States of America

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Perpetuation of Testimony of James Ecward Strawhorn, Set. ASN 6398 230, CAC (Unassigned)

Taken_ats
Dates:
In the presence of;

Greenville Army Air Base, Greenville, S.C. (Base Intelligence Office) 16 July 1945

William A. Allen, Jr., Special Agent, Security Intelligence Corps, Credentials No. 920 (PMGO)

Reporter: Mirs. Martha F . Cochrane, Secretary, Base Intelligence Officer, Greenville Arny Air Base, Greenville, S.C.

William A. Allen, Jr., Special Agent, Security Intelligence Corps, Credentials No. 920 (PMGO)

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\section*{DOCUMENT 2870}
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Another common practice was to tie a man to a board with his head lower than his feet and then pour salty water into his mouth. In that position, he had to swallow and the brine solution rould cause his stomach to swell. The Japanese would then junp on his stomach with their feet. In like manner the Japanese often forced a water hose down a prisoner's throat and thus filled his stomach with water until he became painfully swollen and then they would jump on his stomach.

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The above recounted torture methods were acininistercd by W/O Kajuki and several of his aides. The aidos are recelled only by the nomes of "Pistol Pete", "Saki Sam" and "Cherry Blosson". There was also a Karrant Officer at this prison camp who wea knomn only as "Harvard" because he mas a graduate of Hirvard University. He spoke, read, and wrote English exceptionally well. He, too, participated in administoring the above described punishments. The above torture methods, it is bolieved, vere committed and witnessed by higher authority, including the Admiral in charge of Pasay Camps, without any inter-- ference.
/s/ James_EStramborn
/t/ JANAS EDMAFD STRAHFORN, Sgt.
ASN - 6398230, CAC (unassigned)
State of:
\(\{\operatorname{SS}\)
County of:
s.

I, Janos Edvard Strawhorn, of lawful age, being duly sworn on oath, state that I have read the foregoing transcription of ny interrogation and all answers contained therein are true to the best of my knowledge and beliof.
\(/ s /\) Jamps \(E_{1}\) stravinom
/t/ Diamos Bdrerd Stramhorn, Sgt.
AEN - 6398230, CAC (unassigned)
Subscribed and srorn to before me this 31st day of July 1945.
/s/Eugene I Trindlane Gapt MA
Notary Pucilic, Sumiary Court
Koore Gen Hosp, Suannanna, NC

I, William A. Allon, Jr., Special Agent, Security Intelligence Corpe, Credentials No. 920 (PIMGO), certify that on 16 July 1945, porsonally appearod before me Jajes Edirard Stravhorn, Sgt., iSN - 6398230, and gave the foregoing answers to the sevoral questions set forth; after his testimony had been transcribed, the said James Edward Strawhorn read the same and affixed his aignature thereto.

Place: Pelzed_S_C.
Date: 19 July 1945

CERTIFIED A TRUE COPY:
Jamea Pe_Healey Inerelst Ithe JAGD
JAKIG P. HEALEY, JR., lst Lt.,JjGD

\section*{/s/ Ifilliam Ac Allen. Jr. Signature \\ Spectal Agent, S.I.C. \\ (Rank and Organization)}

CERTIEICATE

I, T. R. C. King, Major, Inf. (TD), Executive Officer, Legal Section, General Headauarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, do hereby certify that the attached mimeographed copy of the affidavit of JAMES EDWARD STRAWHORN is a true and correct reproduction of the original affidavit; and that a signed and sworn copy of said affidevit is presently on file with this Section.


Witness: /s/ John Re Pritcherd
Sworn to before me this 15th day
of Noyember 1946, Tokyo, Japan.
/s/ John R. Pritchard Capt. Inf.
Summary Court

DOCUMENT 2 R26

\title{
GENERAL HEADOUARTERS \\ SUPRELE COIMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS LEGAL SECTION, MANILA
}

APO 500
1? April 1946

MEMORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 285)
THRU:
SUBJECT:
Executive Officer, Legal Section, Manila
Death march of prisoncrs of war from Camp Keithley to Iligan, Lanao, Mindenao, P. I., 4 July 1942.

\section*{II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:}

The Filipino and American forces which surrendered to the Japanese in the Lanau area on 27 May 1942 were concentrated in Camp Keithley (Report No. 284). On 4 July 1942, the prisoners were made to march from 末arp Keithley to Iligan, Lanao, a distance of about thirty-six kilometers, for the purpose of taking them from there to Malaybalay, Budidnon ( R 1). During the march, a prisoner who was sick and unablc to keep pace with the rest was shot. No food or water was given the prisoners. As a conseounce, one died from drinking dirty water which he tried to purify with iodine ( R 2)









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\title{
GENERAL HEADQLiARTERS \\ UNITED STATES AFIMY FORCES, PACIFIC OFFICE OF THE TIDATER JUDGE ADVOCAI'E WAR CRI潕S BRANCII
}
AG 000.5 (18 Aug 45) JA \(\quad 18\) August 1945

SUBJECT: Report of War Crimes Branch on Atrocities
The Judge Advocate General Washineton 25, D. C.

\section*{IV. SUMTARY OF THP TASTIKOII:}

On 1 August 1942, Barta, Bogue, and \#icDole arrived at Puerto Princesa, Philippine Islands (ppo 3, 5, Ex. B; p. 6, Ex. C) and presumably, Balchus, Koblos, Neilcen, Pacheco and Smith arrived at the same time (par. 10, p. 2, Ex. A) while Petry arrived sometime after 16 August 1943 (par. 25, p. 4, Ex. A). All prisoners present were put to work on an airfield ( \(p 0_{0}, 2,5,8\), Exe B) in the scorching sun, with inadequate food, water, clothing and the simplest of tools (p. 6, Fix. C). On 9 or 11 August 1942, six men, viz Buddy Henderson, USMC, Sidney Wright, USitC, Davies, US:UC, Bobby Hodges, USN, Elilot, USN and the sixth unknown, attemnted an escape, whereupon all prisoncrs were olaced on one-third rations for three days, enclosures reinforced, sentrics increased, and movements restricted. (Par. 27, p. 4, Ex. A; P. 5, Ex. B; 0. 6, Ex. C).

Two prisoners sustained broken arms for picking a papaya from a tree within the compound, the punishment being inflicted by a cook named Nishitani (p. 6, Ex. C) , Staff Sergeant wullin's arm was broken because he refused to admit defcat and was forced to prork with his arm in 3 sling ( \(\mathrm{pe}_{\mathrm{c}}\) 7, Ex. C)

Another escape on 29 August 1942 by Joo Paul Little, USN, and Charlie Watkins, USN, resulted in a similer reduction of rations ( \(\mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{e}}\) 5, Ex. B; p. 7, Ex. C) . For possessing a small portion of corned beef and talking to a Filinino, six men, Jimmy Barna, USNC, Laidlaw, USN, Jack Taylor, USiXC, Yoder, USN, Kobert Brown, USif, the sixth unknown, were tied to a coconut tree in the center of the compound and were beaten with a small wire whip and a pole \(3^{\prime \prime}\) or \(4^{\prime \prime}\) in diameter until loss of consciousness, whereupon they were revived with water and the torture continued. The six ivere thon retarned to Manila ( \(\mathrm{g}_{\mathrm{c}}\) 7, Ex. C; \(\mathrm{pe}_{\mathrm{c}}\) 5, Ex. B) . The brisoners had no access to medical supplies, one or two men were beaten every day and an appendectomy was performed on licDole witheut anaesthetic (0. 5, Ex. B).

In February, 1943, Sergegnt Swift, USiC, •Robert Pryor,逝: le, Private Sloat, wC, U.S. Army and Hanscn U.S. Army escaped during the night and were missed the following morning, but a search resulted in the capture of Sloat and Hansen, who vere placed in a Kempei (Jap Uilitary Police) dungeon. It was later larned that pryor was decapitated in
northern Palawan and his head placed on exhibition．（p．7， Ex．C）．On 28 June 1943，Pfce Seldon T．Winite，USilC， and Wilson，USN，temporarily escapcd but were recaptured on 4 July 1943，and severely beaten before being turned over to the Japancsc ifilitary Police，who put them on a truck which drove offe They did not riturn，and the Filipinos and Japanese stated that they were shot（pp．7， 8，Ex．C）。

One afternoon Charles Street was missing from muster and ten men were immediately locked in the brig and subjected to severe beatings．Jack Ward was beaten with a section of an iron piper Stroct had not tricd to escape but had lost his way back to camp and when he returned the prisoners were released from the brig and Strcet incarcerated and beaten（ \(\mathrm{P} .2, \mathrm{Ex} . \mathrm{B}\) ）。

John M．Stanlev，for no reason at all，was struck over the head with a pick handle，cqusing a gash three inches long（ \(p_{n} 3\) ，Ex．B）．Men were required to work on the air－ strip during raids（p．2，Ex．B）．

In September 1943 Jim Flynn，Boatswain 11 Ic USN，was accidentally killcd by \(i\) landing dive bomber，and he was denied a decent burial（ D .8 ，Ex．C）．

A rule was imposed providing for the execution of ten prisoners for each one that escaped（po．2，R，Ex．B；pr 8， Ex．C）．

Following raids by \(17 \mathrm{~B}-24\)＇s on 19 and 28 October 1944， the prisoners were ordered to build air－raid shelters consisting of three trenches，five feet deep，four feet wide，and of sufficient length to accommodate 50 men．There was to be an overhead covering with only one entrance but due to American officers＇continual suggestions，tro entrances were permitted，one at each end．Some men had individual fox－holes in the small cnclosures surrounded by double barbed－wire strands two meters high and closcly interwoven． （Par．30，Dr 4，Ex．A；DD．1，3，9，Ex．B；Dr 0 ，Ex．C）． The Special Company shelter was near the fence in the rear of the compound，from which a dassageway led into the one for ＂B＂Comoany，about one reter away．The third for the use of ＂A＂Company was near the side fence of the compound（p．3， Ex．B；pp．10，11，Ex．C）。

After each raid the Japs seemed to take the attitude that the prisoners were the cause of the bombings and treatment became worse（par．29，par 4，Ex．A）．The number of prisoners varied from time to time as new prisoners arrived and replace－ ments were sent to Manilaf However，on 14 December 1944 there were 150 in prison（par．29，p．4，Ex．A；pp．1，9，Ex．B）． About 020014 December 1944 two Jap officers informed the men while in barracks that they were going to work early the next morning．So，they begin at dawn but werc called back at noon， which caused the Americans to sense something strange．There were two air raids during lunch and extra guards were placed around the compound．Diring the early afternoon another air raid warning was sounded and the men were forced into their shelters（par．29，p．4，Ex．A；p．10，Ex．C）and required to remain under cover，the Jans saving that there were hundreds of American planes appronching（p．5，Ex．B；Dp．9，11，Ex．C）． When everyone was securely below the ground，between 50 and \(60^{\circ}\) Jap soldiers，armed with light machine－guns，rifles，and
carrying buckets of gasoline, attacked the unsuspecting, defenseless prisoners in the first shelter where there were approximately 40 of "A" Comonny. They first threw a lighted torch into the entrance and follovied it with a bucket or two of gasoline (par. 29, p. 4 Ex. A; D. 3, Ex. B) which exploded, setting everyone within on fire (pp. 5, 9, Fx. B; p. 10, Ex. C). As screaming men ran from the shelter, they were mowed down by machine guns and rifles (no. 1, 6, 9, Ex. B; pr 10, Ex. C) while others, realizing they were trapped, ran to the Japs and asked to be shot in the head, but the Japs laughingly would shoot or bayonet them in the stomach. Wihen the men cried out for another bullet to put them out of their misery the Japs continued to make merry and left the mon to suffer, twelve men being killed in this manner (oar. 31, o. 5, Ex. A). Captain Sato, commander of the Jap garrison at the camp, wilked over to C. C. Smith, Signal 2c, USN, and split his head open with his sabcr (Dar. \(29, \mathrm{p}, 4\), Ex. A). The Japs started shooting everything in sifht, poked guns into the foxholes and fired ther, threw hand prenades, phile throughout Sato was lughing and shouting, urging the men to greater effort (par. 29, p. 5, Ex. A). Dion \(w \in r e\) thrown into holes while still ailve and covered with coconut husks (por. 31, \(\mathrm{D}_{0} 5\), Ex. A). Some escaped through a hole in their dugout, while 30 or 40 others successfully tore barehanded through barbed wire fences and ran to the water's cdge (par. 29 pe \({ }^{4}\) Zx. A; pe 9, Ex. B; p. 10 , Ex. C). Those who attempted to swim the bay were shot in the water from the shore or from a bargc moving just off shore (par. 30 , p. 4, Ex, A). Still others who sought refuge in crevices wore hunted down and dynamited (op. 1 , 9, Ex. B; pr 10, Ex. C) Bogue located Birta, Petry Pacheco, and Martyn, and about 2100 hours they swam the bay to safety. For five days and nights, witheut food or water excopt rain, Bogue tramped through the, jungle until rescued by Filioino prisoners at Iwahig cinal Colory where he met incDole. They were taken further south to Aborlan where Barta joined them, whereupon the thrce proceeded to Brooke's Point and were picked up 21 January 1045 by a PBY from Leyte (p. 10, Ex. C).

Neilsen reached the beach ind covercd himself with coconut husks for three hours. He wרs discovered but feigned death and was left by the Japs and crawled into a cove, finding 15 Americans, eight of whom were subsequently killed from a barge, When a groun of Japs approachcd the cove Neilscn dived into the water, was struck in the leg, head, and ribs by bullets, hut novertheless kept on swimming as the Jans continued shooting, was washed seamard by a strong current, finally reached the other side of the five-mile bay at 3:00 \(0 . \mathrm{m}_{\mathrm{e}}\) and remained in a mangrove swamp until noon the nuxt day when he moved into a coconut grove where he was found by a Filipino who led him to Petry and Dacheco, nnd was lator joined by Balchus (par. 31, D. 5, Ex. A). The lattcr had been hiding in the underbrush with Deal, while the Japs werc firing at Noilsen. They moved along the beach and picked up Williams and Danicis. Bnichus and Deal separated from the others when an argument arose as to the best plan for an escape, and decided to aporoach the top of the cliff, giving up the idea of swimming the bay as Deal had a shoulder wound (par. 32, po 5, Ex. 4). Five, Japs heard them and started to investignto; two of the Jips moved furthor down the cliff but the three others came directly towards the two men. It was quite dark at this time nind the Japs were
carrying buckets of gasoline, attacked the unsuspecting, defenseless prisoners in the first shelter where there were approximately 40 of "A" Comnany. They first threw a lighted torch into the entrance and folloved it with a bucket or two of gasoline (par. 29, p. 4, Ex. A; De 3, Ex. B) which exploded, setting everyone within on firc (pp. 5, 9, Fx. B; p. 10, Ex. C) . As screaming men ran from the shelter, they were mowed down by machinc guns and rifles (po. i, 6, 9, Ex. B; p. 10, Ex. C) while others, realizing they mere trapped, ran to the Japs and asked to be shot in the head, but the Japs laughingly would shoot or bayonet them in the stomach. Vihen the men cried out for ansther bullet to put them out of their misery the Japs continued to make merry and left the men to suffer, twelve men being killed in this manner (oar. 31, p. 5, Ex. A). Captain Sato, commander of the Jap garrison at the camp, walked over to C. C. Smith, Signal 2c, USN, and split his head open with his sabcr (nar. 29, p. 4, Ex. A). The Japs started shooting everything in sipht, poked guns into the foxholes and fired them, threw hand grenades, while throughout Sato was liughing and shouting, urging the men to greater effort (par. 29, p. 5, Ex. A). jien werc thrown into holes while still ailve and covered with coconut husks (pir. \(31, \mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{C}} 5,7 \mathrm{X}_{\mathrm{r}} \mathrm{A}\) ) Some escaped through a hole in their dugout, while 30 or 40 others successfully tore barehanded through barbed wire fences and \(r\) an to the
 Ex. C) Chose vho attempted to swim the bay were shot in the water from the shore or from a barge moving just off shore (par. \(30, \mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{A}} 4, \mathrm{Ex} . \mathrm{A}\) ). Still others who sought refuge in crevices vore hunted down and dynamited (pp. 1 , 9, Ex. B; pr 10, Ex. C) Bogue located Bhrtz, Petry, Pachoco, and Martyn, and about 2100 hours they swam the bay to safety. For five days and nights, without food or water except rain, Bogue tramped through the jungle until rescued by Filipino prisoners at Iwahig Penzl Colory where he met MeDole. They were taken further south to aborlan where Barta joined them, whereupon the thrce proceeded to Brooke's Point and were pickud up 21 January 1045 by a PBY from Leyte ( \(p_{\mathrm{C}} 10\), Ex. C).

Neilsen reached the beach ind covercd hiuself with coconut husks for threa hours. He whs discovered but feigned death and was left by the Japs and crawled into a cove, finding 15 Americans, eight of whom were subsequently killed from a barge, When a groun of Japs approached the cove Neilscn dived into the witer, was struck in the \(1 \mathrm{\varepsilon g}\), head, and ribs by bullets, hut novertheless kept on swimming as the Jans continucd shooting, was washed seavard by a strong current, finally reached the other side of the five-mile bay at \(3: 00 \mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{i}} \mathrm{m}_{\mathrm{e}}\) and remained in a mangrove swamp until noon the noxt day when he moved into a coconut grove where he was found by a Filipino who led him to Petry and Dacheco, and was litcr joined by Balchus (par. 31, \(\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{c}}\) 5, Ex. A). The Inttcr had been hiding in the underbrush with Deal, while the Japs were firing at Neilsen. They moved alone the beach and picked up Williams and Danicis. Bnlchus and Deal separated from the others when an argument arose ns to the best plan for an escape, and decided to aporoach the top of the cliff, giving up the idea of swimming the bay as Deal had a shoulder wound (par. 32, po 5, Tix. A) Five. Jans heard them and started to investignti; two of the Jnps moved furthor down the cliff but the three others came directly towards the two men. It was quite dark at this time s.nd the Japs were
using torches. As one of ther cane within a few feet of the twa men, Balchus hit him on the head with a bis piece of coral and they then jumped the other two. These Japs were killed but reinforcements started moving towards the vicinity of the row. Balchus and Deal moved a short distance from each other and when some Japs got in between them, Deal ran over the cilff and Balchus ran down the beach, dived into the water and swam the bay. Hearing gunfire back on the beach he assumed that the Japs had killed Daniels and Williams (par. 32, p. 5, rix.A).
he Filioinos had the four men change to civilian clothing and took them to Brooke's Point, yicking up Smith at the southern Fenal Colony and Koblos at Aborlan. They stayed at Brooke's Doint until 6 January 1945 when they were oicked up by the "Catalina" (parn 33, D. 5, Ex.A).

Barta with four others, inciuding 'acheco, Jetry and Bogue started to swim the bay between 2000 and 2100. He became unconscious about half-way across ind when he regained his senses he was floating out of the mouth of the bay but only gbout 50 yards from the shore which he managed to reach about sunrise the next morning. After being in the fungle 10 days he reached the Philippine Penal Colony from which he was taken to Aborlan, where he met cDole and Bogue and all were then taken to Brooke's Point (pp. 4, 6, 10, Ex. B; pp. 10, 11, 12, Ex, C).

Bogue, after being in the jungle five days and nights was also rescued by the Filipino orisoners at Iwahig ?enal Colony ( p . 10, Ex. B).

ZcDole saw six Japs torturing one American with bayonets when another Jap joined the group with a bucket and torch. While the American screamed to be shot, the Japs poured burning gasoline on one foot, then on the other until he collapsed, whereupon they poured gasoline over his body and ignited it ( 0.6 , 5x. B).

McDole stayed with Hamrick, whom he found on the beach, until the latter died of gangrene on 18 December 1944 from a bullet wound in the arm. Covering the body, McDole swam the bay to Iwahig Penal Colony shortly after dawn and in the late afternoon started out again but because of exhaustion had to remain on efish trap all night, from which he was rescued by Iwahig prisoners gathering their fish, and he, with Bogue, was sent to Brooke's ?oint on 7 Janvary 1945, from whence the PBY picked them un 21 January 1945 (op. 6, 7, Ex. B; pr 12, Ex. C). Martyn swam the bay but did not contact the others ( \(\mathrm{D}, 13\), \(\mathrm{ix}, \mathrm{C}\) ).

That night the Kojima "ai officers, in company with personnel from the Rempei Tai and the Obayashi Tai, held a celebration to commemorate the incident ( \(\mathrm{D}_{\mathrm{a}} 2, \mathrm{Zx}, \mathrm{E}\) ).

Following the landing by Arerican Forces at Puerto Princesa, Palawan, on 28 Febrvary 1945 a search of the 'OW enclosure was made and identification tags, certain personal 1tems, and fragmentary records concerning American Dersonnel were obtained (b. 1, fx. D).

Between the 15 and 23 of wiarch 1.945 , seventy-nine individual s?eletons were buried by the 3rd Platoon,

601st QM Cor (GR). Twenty-six of these skeletons were found piled four and five high in one excavation. Bullets had pierced the skulls and they had been crushed with blunt instruments. Nine dugouts were inspected and the supporting planks were charred near the openings indicating a flash fire of intense heat but of short iuration, resembling the results of a gasoline fire.

The smallest number of bodies were found in the largest dugouts which were closest to the cliff and furthest away from the prison buildings. liost of the bodies were huddled together at a place furthest away from the entrance where twenty-six bodies were taken from one hole which was not a dugovt. In two dugouts (closest to the clif \(\mathrm{t}^{\circ}\) ) bodies were in orone positions, arms extonded with small conical holes in the fingertips showing that these men were trying to dig their way to freedom (po. 1, 2, Ex. 2 of Ex. D).







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Unitod Statos if imorice

In the metter of the fatiure of tho Jepancso to provico adoçuto riciical troatment and adoquato rodicril supplios and fond at Tyyabas, Luzon, resulting in the doath of unkno:/n nurbors of inorican soldiors.

Tckon at: District Intelligenco Officc, Een intonis, Toxes. Date:
In the Presonce of: Speciel igont Jmos C. Fitzgurele, Sucurity and Intolliganco Division, Hoarguartors Eighth Sarvice Cormand., iSF. Mexine B. Stitt, Clerk-Stengraphor, District Inteliligonc. Office, Snn intonin, Toxes
?ucsti ns by:
Janos C. Fitzgorale., Spocinl igent, SIC.
f Stcto your namc, rank, sorial numbor and ncr:anont honc addross.
 ardrcess is 311? Blucbonnet Boulcvarc, San intonio, Toxes.

Q Havo you rucently been roturnoer to the Uniter Statos from ovcrisuas?
\(\therefore\) Yos, I roturnoe to Lettormen Gonoral Hospital, San Francisc., California, ra 16 innrch 1945.

Q Foro y^u a prisonor of war?
\(\therefore\) Yos, a prisonor of the Japenoso.
If itt what placos wore you hold and stite thi appreximato datos?
\(\therefore\) I mac copturor an 10 ipril 1942, at Merivolos on Batane. I rom:inced on Bataan at Ficle hisspitial in. 1 , until 18 Juno 1942. On the.t dato
 cetail to Tnynbos and romaince therc until 10 July 1942. On ti:is dato I was returnee to Bilibic! Prison :nd roneino thero until 4 Fobrunry 1945, whon I :ese liboriter by tho ircricen Frreos.
\(\square\) iro you a practicing plasician?
\(\therefore\) Yes, I en.
\(?\) Gutisno your rodicol onucntion and your provi-us practiced
is I sttoncuc Baylor Univarsity, Schonl 1 f indicino, it Dilliss, Toxas, and recoived ay h.D. dugrac in 1932. Upon gracuation I bcgan my inturnsnip at Robort B. Grcon Hor orinil Hospital San intonis, Toxea, ani renilinod thoro far rno yrar. I bogen private practico in nodicino in 1933, at Sun ilfress, Toxen, und aftor practicing for no
 and I havo rorainod in cocivo duty es in nfficer in the irny Mocicil Corps sinco that tine.



\section*{CERTIEICATE}

\author{
I, T. R. C. King, Major, Inf. (TD), Executive
} Officer, Legal Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, do hereby certify that the attacied photostatic copy of the affidavit of MAJOR CHARLES THOMAS BROWN is a true and correct reproduction of the original affidavit; and that a signed and sworn copy of said affidavit is presently on flle with this Section.


Witness: /s/ John Re Pritcherd
Sworn to before me this 14th day of Noyember 1946, Tokyo, Jopan.
/s/ John R. Pijitchard Copt. Inf. Summary Court








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19 Fobruary 19 ي 6
MBMOZiNDOM TO: Prosecutic.n Section (Roport ist. 2l0)
THRU : Executivo Officer, 角 Crimos Branch.
SUBJICT : Tranaportation of priseners of war under impropor conditions from Davar. Penal Colony, Kindanao, P.I. to Kamila, P.I. from June 6 to June 26, 1944.
II. SUMMRIT OE ZVIDELCE:

Sc,metime durin: tho first wook in Juno, 1914 betwoon 1,200 and 1,500 am.rican prisonirs of war wero transportod by truck from the Davan Fosal Colony to Davno City. Tho men woro tied tcgother by rope arsund their waists and crowded into trucks. Thoy were blindfolded and roquired to kaep thoir hande in yiow. Meny of the sick prisoners and evan amputees on crutches wero requirod to stand durin the \(25-\operatorname{mile}\)-trip. If it wos thua, that any of the men were peoking, they wore struck with clubs or rifla butts by ths suards. Many woro sufforine, from beri-beri and durin: the rough trin thoir flosh yas rubbod raw againgt the sideo of tho trucks. Some mon faintod and woro hold up only by the ropo, tying the prisoners tnzethor, and this in turn, cut off tha circulation of bl 20 d hen they arrived in the portal Davao, the man were laded into two holds of a amall umarked froint ship that had not beon cleaned since carryins a cargo of coel. The ship staved in the harbar a fow days and then sailad with of compy. The moro serinusly ill were in one hold where tharo wes room for tham to lie down in a crowded condition. Tho ship travolod close to the shore duriner the day and cnahored at \(\mathrm{mi}_{\mathrm{g}} \mathrm{h}\) t. The prisonore were allowed e fres run of the ohip until they yors near Lamboalize :here a Lt. Colonel John Kigin and a Lt. ILIS oscapod over the side of the shlp. For the remainine daye of the trip the prisonere were woqurrat entay in the hold. Thura was not onourh rom for them to lie iown and it was nocessary for thom to sleep in shifts. The only latrine facilitios wore a few 5 -ieplion cans that yore lowored into the hold. is man of the men were oufforing from dysintery and diarrhea they often wore forced to ralieva thameslves before these latrino cane became available. The hatches were kapt almost completely covorod. The men never had oncuich wator to drink and what was provided was ant complotaly distilled. The tomperature if the hold was estimated at 120 to 125 deisreos Fahrowhoit and many suffored from heat prostraticn. Tho fond consisted of small amount of rice pad thin scup. Soma of the scup had been made frcm apoiled moet which probably ancravated tho sickoned cordition of tho mon. aftor the escape of the two officors, the rations were decreased so that it was eatimatad thet the dmoricens rocoived about one-sixth of the amount recoived by tho Japanese (in 2, 7, 11, 12, 13, 17, 20, 23, 27, 30, \(33,37,4 \overline{5}, 45,47,51,54)\).
arcund 12 or \(1:\) Juns \(195^{\circ}\), tho ship arrived at Cebu where the man wore all put aehire. ikany of them had to be carried because of thoir weakenod condition. The suricusly ill wore crowdod ints a barracke and tho jthers were put into a amall opon area inside an ild Spanish fort belleved to have beon called Fort San Pedro. It rained part of the timo and tho prisonare ware :iven nc sheltor aither day ar nizht. There were

after two or throc days at Cabu, the prisonors vare lcaded into the holds of another larger unmarked former coal ship. It was infested with rate and mice. Thouth this ship was largor, they wore crowded worse than before. Tho physical condition of the mon was worse as they were weak am sick from malnutrition. Some of the mon were unable to stand, their nerves wore shattered and thoir rations were so small that fist-fights occurred cver a spoonful cf rice. The men were not allowod on deck. The sanitary facilities acain consiatod of tefeilon cans and because of illness many of tho men were unable to control thair bowela. The vontilation, fond and sanitary conditions on this ship were in goneral the same as on the provious ship. Howevor, some medical supplies were finally givon to imorican modical officurs. about 24 June 194s. thoy arrived in Manila Bay. On 26 June 194.4, Lt. !illiam mpin of Minneapolis, Minnosota, died. Mhis is the only death recorded during the voyago. The men disombarked at Pier 7. The littor pationts ware takon by truck to Old Bilibid Prison in Manila, while the others were compelled to walk throurh the streats to Bilibid (R 2, 3, 7, 14, 17, 20, \(27,30,37,54,55\) ). Later, most of the men were sent to the Cabanatuan Prison Camp. Bilibid and Cabanatuan are the aubjacts of separato roports.

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No. 4

\section*{I8 October 1945}

\section*{GENERAL HET.DPTMRTYRS} TNITED STATES ARRY FORCRS
PACIFIC OFFICE OF THE "HEATC" JUDGY ADVOCATE WAR CRIMES BRANCH

Bin'ORA"DTM T0:
THRU:
SIEJECT:

Prosecution Section (Report \#76)
Executive Officer, War Crimes Branch
Crimes Agoinst A?lied Prisoners of Mar et Billbid Prison, IFanila, Luzon, P.I., from Nay 1042 to February 1945.

\section*{II. SIMNARY OF EVIDENCE:}
A detailed summery of the evidence cortained in the attached fifty-three sworn staterents of witnesses and fortysix unsworn staterents or memorandums would serve no rseful purpose. Suffice it to say that these statements contain ample evidence to srove that from May 1942 until its fall to American forces in February 1945, the conditions at 01d Bilibid Prison, Manila, P.I., were atrocious.
a. The cells ware prossly over-crovded and sanitation facilities were non-existent or extremely crude (Exhibits 1-11). The regular diet consisted of 2 maximum of seren hundred to eight hundred calories a day end during the worst periods, the prisoners receiv-d only two meels a day consisting of one-half and three-fourths of a canteen cup of rice respectively ( \(\mathrm{R} 15-21\) ).
b. The littile food actually issued to the prisoners was often contaminated, resulting in many cases of dysentery and diarrhea. Beri-beri was also prevalent (R 11-14). On one occasion eight persons died from dysentery, no hospitalization having been provided ( \(R 24\) ).
c. American prisoners of war frequently resorted to eating garbage from the scrap cans and pig troughs. Captain NOGI, Medical Director; was apnerently responsible for these conditions ( \(\mathrm{R} 2,113-115\) ).
d. Acerican prisoners were beaten with sticks and baseball bats, often to insensibility, Almaior R. B. PRLGER, 26th Cevalry, wes hanged bv the wrists for sixty hours and a Major Thomas \(S\). JONES of the same unit for eighteen hours in \(s c p^{+}\)er ber and 0 ctober 1943 ( \(p\) 89, 90).
e. About three thousend prisoners slept on concrete floors withrut bedding ar mosquitonnets. There were three showers for their usz ( R 36).
g. In 1942 a prisoner escaped from 01d Bilibid. Fiftcen hundred prisoners wrire pleced on a diet of straight rice for three months as punishment ( R 141-143).
h. On 11 or 12 October 1944 twelve hundred orisoners were evacuated from Bilibid Prison to the dock area in Manila Bey which was then subjected to an Allied borbing raid (R 129-131).
1. On ahout 19 June 1942, Japanese army personnel at 01d Bilibid Prison ennfiscated all quinine and medical supplies brought by prisoners of war from the hospital at "Lit.tlo Baguio" (R 15, 16).
j. Confiscated Red Cross supplies originally destined for Allied prisoners of war were stored in General Yamashita's Headquarters in Manila. The number of these boxes wes estimated to be more than e thousand ( R 151-152).

The above mentioned incidents are mercly representative examples of the uniformly brutal treatment accorded to prisoners of war at old Bilibid by the Japanese.
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Tg Though the prisoners were so weakened by malnutrition and
"inadequate medical treatment that thev were physically unable to perform ordinary labor, they were forced to do heavy work and beaten if they collapsed (II 38, 132).

Prisoners of war were forced to work on military installam tions ouch as building runways and digeing foxholes ( R 89, 84).

The prisoners were al 80 forced to submit to medical experiments at the hands of Dr. NOMI (R 184).

In November 1942 American prisoners of war were l:aded into steel fraight cars, one hundred and fifty \(t\) a car, at Capas, Tarlac, and transported to Cabanatuan Prison Camps. The cars were so crowded that the men could not sleep or lie down; the only way they could rest was for half of the car to kneej. at a time. The men were kept in the cars in this way during the entire trip which lasted fifteen hours. No latrine facilities whatever were providod (R175, 176).

In order to prevent attempted escape by the prisoners, the Jasanese forced them to sign pledges not to escape ( \(R\) 108). The squad system of punishment was employed. ( \(n 17,18,21,108,128\) ). Under this aystem the prisoners were diviced into squads of ten. The Japaliese announced that if any prisoner escaped and was not apprehended, the remaining men in his squad would be executed. If he were apprehended, he would be executed (R108).

There were innumerable beatings and tortures for minjr miotakes or infractions of the rules ( \(\mathrm{R} 25,41,69,76\) ). A prisoner who joined the wrong group at the noon bell was slapped on the face with a bambjo stick and then twenty-six American prisoners were forced to pass by the prisoner and slap him in the face. Mary of the blows were not sufficiently hard to satisfy the Japenese guard who was supervising the procedure, and he required the slapping to be repeated after first having demonstrated how it should be done ( R 44 ). At otrer times the prisoners were paired off and firced to slap each other ( \(R\) 15, 30, 33).

At least four prisoners of war were executed for attempted escape ( \(54,5,119,155\) ). Lt. Colonel F.E.C. EINITHiG, Lt. Colonel BIGGS and Lt. GIIBERT had attempted to escape. A Japanese who was jiu fitau expert threw the prisoners into the air and on to the ground, kicked them, beat them with a club, and otherwise badly mistreated them for an hour and a half. A Japarese Lt. alss beat these men with his hands, an iron pipe, and an encased saber. After the beating, It. Colonel BREITUAG had one oye hanging out on his cheek, one ear was almost torn off; his jaw was broken in several places, and his arms and legs appeared useless. Following the beating these officers were tied to fence posts along the roac and left there overnight during a typhoon. All Filipinja and Japanese who passed. by were required to beat them. The next morninc the three prisoners were taisen away in a truck with an execution squad of oight Japanesp soldiers and four Japanese equipped witr piciss and shovel.a. Shortly thereafter shots were heard and the Japanese later returned without the prisoners. The Japanese Lieutenant boasted that he had beheaded Lt. Colonel BIGGS and rad the other tws shot (R 5). The Commanding Officer at the camp issued a certificate of execution of the three men ( \(R 4,5,117\) ).

Also three Filipino prismers of war were beheaded for alleged attempted escape ( \(\mathbb{1}\) 149). Many other prisoners were executed on the charge of attempted escape, although there was no evidence of any auch attempt (R 102, 104, 106, 107, 132, 152, 153). Filipinos threw food to the prisoners, and when one of the Americans reached over to get the food, he anc: three others with whom he ahared it were shot (II 202). Four other prisoners, accused of attempting to escape, were led through the camp with their hands tied behind their back. The rest of the prisoners were called out to witness the execution. The four prisoners were made to loneel at the edge of a trench and the Japauese shot them and buried them in the trench
- (A 106, 167). As a further deterrent to escaoe, the beaten and mutilated bodies of those who had attempted to escape were placed on display. The body of one of these prisoners showod severe beating and torture. There were compound fractures of his left arm and leg, a bullet hole in his ohest, and one eye had been gouced out. The body was terribly mangled ard had a horrible beyonet wound extending from the left thigh up into the solar plexuap The ribs were broken and the facs was mashed in, apparantly by risle butts ( E 119-155).
during the period covered by this report one thousand and elxty-six prisnners of wer died ( I 87 ).

A town near Cabanatuan Prison Camp was raided and burned hy the Japanose who returned exhibiting head of Filipinos stuck on the ends of bambon poles ( R 161, 164, 166, 167).


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\author{
CONRAL HRMOUATFRS \\ UNITED STATES'ATMY FCREZS, PACIFIC \\ WAR GRIDES BRANCH
}

\section*{18 February 1946}

MEMORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 207)

THRU:
SUBJECT:

Executive Officer, War Crimes Branch
Deaths of thirty-seven American prisoners of war at Gapan, Nueva Ecija Province, Luzon, P.I., in May and June 1942.

\section*{II. SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:}

In Ma.v LOT2, about two hundred American prisoners of war were brought is Cajan and stayed for a period of approximately two months. Durinis tris uine, tifirir-seven if them died and were buried in the cemetery of Capan ( \(\mathrm{R} 4,6\) ). The fmericans were sickly when they arrised ( \(\mathrm{R} 19,23\); and continued to suffer from dysentery, diarrhea, ina!dria, beri-beri and mainutrition (R 5, 9, 16, 20). The Japanese berame alomnei at the high jeath rate and called in a Filipino dostor. The Taprnese told the accior not to
 he treated them with medicine of his own. The americons oegan to improve and he was preventex from givir:g furtuer atio (R 5, 6). The prisoners were poorly cietred, most of them only having an undershirt, drawers, and somectaes overalls (R 2, =3;. They were underfed, part of the time reneliing "iranglicng" jeaves, pigskin, squash, a little drieci risis and an insufficient amount of rice ( \(\mathrm{R} 9,13,17,20\) ). lint nutives were prevented from aiding the prisoners and were purisheil then caught giving them food or cigarettes ( \(\mathrm{R} 10,14,11,21\) ). Ine evidence shows that the Japanese had eggs and meat to eat and gave the Americans only what was left ( R 20 ).

Some of the prisoners worked at the Japanese garrison and were mistreater if tilej rested on cix fin more food (R 8, 9) Others workel at. the Gajan Pridge at dities dicricult to perform because of thoir riny.irsi condicion (F S). Fuliy or fifty men a day hauled gra"c!? Stcrie and sand in serks ror ored and rridge
 ( \(R\) 13). The prisonars were whipped, slapped and kicked when they were unable to do the work required (R 13, 14). All of the witnesses agree that the work required was too strenuous for men in their condition ( \(\mathrm{R} 9,14,16\) ). The Japanese even refused to allow a priest to visit the dying prisoners ( R 15).







 \({ }_{\sim}^{\circ}\)



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC OFFICE OF THE THEATER JUDGE ADVOCATE WAR CRIMES BRANCH

\author{
APO 500 \\ 16 October 1945
}

MEMORANDUM to: Prosecution Section (Report \#72)
THRU:
SUBJECT:
Executive Officer, War Crimes Branch
Murder of two American PW's at Cebu City.

\section*{II: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE:}

On 21 March 1945, American planes bombed the vicinity of Cebu City, P.I., and an American flyer by the name of Paul MANSELLA parachuted into the water from a damaged fmerican plane ( \(\mathrm{R} 1,4\) ). The American was burned on both arms and legs, and either waiked or was: carried to the Summer House of the Sisters of The Immaculate Concepcion, about five and one-half kilometers north of Cebu City. He was given first aid by one of the Sisters and a short time later a Jap-; anese member of the Kempei Tai, accompanied by a Filipino undercover agent, appeared at the house and took him away, with his hands tied: behind his back ( R 2). Between 21 March and 25 March, 1945, the Japanese Kempei Tai at Cebu City captured another American flyer by the name of SCOTT. filthough it is not clear from the evidence, it is probable he was a member of the same plane orew as MANSELLA ( \(R\) 6; 9). Both men were confined at the Cebu Normal School and on the morning of 26 March 1945 were taken to a point approximately one hundred and fifty (150) feet directly East of the Southeast corner of the school building, where a foxhole had been dug ( \(\mathrm{R} 9,10,15\), 17). They were forced to kneel by the edge of the foxhole with heads bent forward while a Japanose sergeant took a saber in both hands, and struck each of them across the back of the neck. The Americans fell forward into the foxhole and a Japancse officer stepped up and fired a number of shots into their bodies ( R 10, 15, 17, 24).

On the same morning, and shortly prior to the execution of the Americans, five (5) Filipino civilians were killed by the same Japanese, in the same method, and their bodies left in a foxhole on the Normal School grounds, a short distance from where the Americans were executed ( \(\mathrm{R} 12,13,15,17,19\) ).
f.round noon on 27 March the Japanese piled wood on top of the bodies of the Americans in the foxhole, poured gasoline on the wood, and lighted it ( \(R\) 18). Between the time of the execution and the burning of the bodies it appears that one of the Americans managed to crawl out of the foxhole and was seen sitting on the ground attempting to wave to an American plane overhead; but he was thrown back into the foxhole, either dead or alive, before the fire was started ( \(\mathrm{R} 17,18,19\) ).

On the morning of 28 March, 1945, when American forces arrived in Cebu City, an officer and two enlisted men of the 110th Quartermaster Company, Graves Registration Platoon, found three open foxholes with dead bodies in them on the grounds of the Cebu Normis School. One of the foxholes contained the bodies of two Filininos and another the bodies of three more Filipinos. All five of these bodies had their hands tied behind their backs. The bodies ware not mutilated or covered, and although no examination was made to determine the cause of death or the nature of the vounds, it was observed that each of them had numerous stab wounds, apparently made by bayonets or sabers ( \(R 28\) ). In the third foxhole, located approximately onc hundred (100) feet northeast of the other two holes, the charred bodies of two men were found. The lower body was lying face upward with the upper body directly on top of it and lying face downward. The hands of both corpses were tied behind their backs with ropes. Fire had consumed most of the clothing on the upper
body, and only a ferr small shreds of what appeared to be underwear remained; clothing on the lower body had not been entirely consumed by the fire and it was ascortained that it had been dressed in a pair of regulation army issue khaki trousers vorn underneath blue fatigue trousers similar to those 1ssued by the navy ( R 28 , 29). The bodies were examined for items of identification but the only thing found was a metal belt buckle in the ashes at the bottom of the foxhole ( R 29). On the face of this belt buckle appears the emblem of a spread eagle and the figures 1942 (Exhibit D). Pictures were taken of the two bodies (Exhibits E, F, G) and they were then buried as unidentified dead ( \(R 29,30\) ).
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troops responsible for clearing the mines in their way, In such cases it would be well to send on ahead a unit? commanded by an officer or a mine disposal unit (patrol):

It would be advantageous if prisoners of war, natives or animals could be sent ahead as a precautionary measure, along the route of advance.

No. 8. Even when there is a unit ahead responsible for dealing with mines, it will stili. be essential for each unit advencing from the rear to search and clear mines for themselves as far as possible. This is espenially necessary in places easy of approach, strong points, and places suitable for headquarters.

Doc. No. 2707
Page 1
SECRET
ALLIED SRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SFCMION SOUTHWEST PACIFIC .AREA RESEAFCH PEPORT

\section*{SUBJFCT: JAPANESE VIOLATIONS OF THE} LAWS OF WAR
I.G. No. 6950

6951
B.I.D. No. 3134

DATE OF TESUE 2.3 June 1945
No. 72 (Supnl 2)
SUR TARY:
SUDLY:NT NUBBER 2 to CCITPILATION PEFPARED FOR, AND SUBSITNED UNTER OATU TO "CORTISSICN REGARDING BREACHES OF THE RULES OF UARFARE BY THE JAPANESE FCRCES" (CO: ONFIALTA OF ALSFPALIA), 12 NAFCH 1944.
1. Ihis report supplements ATTS Research Report No. 72 (previously ATIS Information Bulletin No. 1C), and Supnl 1 , and comprises a further record of violations of the laws of war noted in cocuments on file at ATIS, GHQ. It contains information vhich has become available from 12 October 1944 to 28 Karch 1945.
2. Photolithogranhic conies of pertinent sections of such original documents as are avoilab? e vith relevant identifyine data are reoroduced as anoendices to this report.
3. It has not been possible in all cases to establish definitaly the existence of a violation of the laws of war, but where data indicates the orobability of such a vfolation the incident has heen included.
4. Renort adduces evidence of one hundred and ninetyfour exccutions in Gouth West Pacific Area; burning of guerrillas in the riflimpine Islands; the destruction of property; official Jananese admisston of cannibalism; ill-treatment of prisoners of war.

GC/CLR/mf
Distribution F
/s/ Eigney F. Washbir
Sidney \(\overline{\mathrm{F}}\). Nashbir Colonel, S.C. Co-nrdinator

SOURCES:
Canture Documents.
Statements by Prisoners of Var. Intellicence Feports.



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: 4-11 November 1944
: 14 November 1944
: 30 January 1945
: WOJG YAMASHIRO, KIYoshi, GUS
: 1st Lt KADANI, Tsuneo Ge, AUS
: 25 Apri1 1945

> Sidney F. Mashbir Sidney F. Mashbir Colonel, S.C. Co-Ordinator

We shall wait for instructions from our superior officers on the investigation and its disposal and I feel it proper to send this to our senior commanders.
1. Prisoners of war will be \(\qquad\) ed on the battle-field; those who surrender, who are of bad character, will be resolutely ed in secret and counted as abandoned corpses.
\(\overline{B y}\) "Prisoners of war" we mean soldiers and bandits captured on the battle-field; by "surrender" we mean those who surrender or submit prior to the battle. Prisoners of War will be interrogated on the battle-field and should be immediately \(\qquad\) ed excepting those who require further detailed interrogation for intelligence purposes.

In the event of \(\qquad\) , it must be carried out cautiously and circumspectly, with no policemen or civilians to witness the scene, and care must be taken to do it in a remote place and leave no evidence.

Malicious surrenderers will be taken into custody for the time being and after observance of public sentiments will be \(\qquad\) ed secretly when the inhabitants have forgoten about them, or secretily under pretext of removal to some distant locality, thus avoiding methods likely to excite public reciing.

Other surrenderers will be set free under the Filipino guarantee after admonition and instruction. In the event 0 : any men surrendering to the Filipinos, our troops are to be informed about it immediately, and we shall require them to be set free after thorough".aamonition and instruction by thi Filipinos.
Thieves caught in the act will be dealt with in the same wa: as malicious surrenderars.

\section*{ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SFCHION SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA RESEARCH REPORT}

\section*{SUBJFCT: JAPANESE VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR}

DATF, OF ISSUE 23 June 1045
I.G. No. 6050

6951
B.I.D. No. 3.234

No. 72 (Suppl 2)

SURTARY:
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1. This report supplements ATIS Research Report No. 72 (previously ATIS Information Bulletin No. 10), and Supnl 1 , and comprises a further record of violations of the laws of war noted in cocuments on file at ATIS, GHQ. It contains information :inich has become available from 12 0ctober 1944 to 28 liarch 1945.
2. Fhotolithogranhic conies of pertinent sections of such original documents as are available with relevant identifying data are reproduced as anperdices to this report.
3. It has not been possible in all cases to establish definitely the existience of \(z\) violation of the laws of war, but where data indicates the probability of such a violation the incident has been included.
4. Renort adduces evidence of one hundred and ninetyfour executions in South West Dacific Area; burning of guerrillas in the ryilimpine Islands; the destruction of mroperty; offictal Jananese admission of cannibalism; ill-treatment of prisoners of war.

GC/CHR/mf
Distribution H
/s/ Signey F. iiashbir Sidney \(F\). Mashbir
Colonel, S.C. Co-Ordinator

SOURCES:
Cantured Documents.
Statements by Prisoners of War. Intellifence Keports.















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: 2 November 1944
: 9 November 1944
: Lt (jg) COFFIN, David D., USNR
: Ist It KADANI, Tsuneo G., AUS
: 25 April 1945
/s/ Sidney F. Mashbir Sidney F. Mashbir Ccionel, S.C. Co-Ordinator

No. 6. The treatment of Surrenders.
25. When prisoners are taken, those who are not worth utilizing shall be disposed of immediately except those who require further detailed interrogation for intelligence purposes, according to No. 126 of Part I of the orders concerning important operational matters.
26. Proper investigation shall be made of those who are to be interned in reformatories before the internment, and only those who really need education will be interned and admonished.
27. Surrenderers found to be malicious after the interrogations performed on them according to No. 126 of Part I of the orcers concerning important operational matters will be immediately killed in secret and will be disposed of so as not to excite public feeling.

The rest of the surrenderers shall be set free under the guerantee of the Philippine authorities after admonition and instruction.

\section*{SECRET}

\section*{AILIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA RESEARCH REPORT}

SUBJECT: JAPANESE VIOLATIONS OF TH: LAWS OF YIAR

\author{
I.G. No. 6950
}
B.I.D. No. 3.134

DATE OF ISSUE 2.3 June 1945
No. 72 (Supnl 2)
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SIDOLTASNI NUBBR 2 to CCIMPILATICN PGFPARED FOR,
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12 NAFICH 1944.
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\(\mathrm{GC} / \mathrm{CLR} / \mathrm{mf}\)
Distribution H
/s/ Signey F. iiashbir
Sidney F. Mashbir Colonel, S.C. Co-Ordinator

SOURCES: Cantureत Documents. Statements by Priscners of War. Intellifence Keports.


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\section*{AILIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECFION SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA RESEAFCA REPORT}

SUBJFET: JAPANESE VIOLATIONS OF THE L!!VS OF WAR
I.G. No. 6050

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B.I.D. No. 3.234

DATP OF ISSUE 23 June 1945
No. 72 (Suppl 2)
SUS \(\mathrm{SARY}:\)
SUDOLAENT NUBER 2 to COMPILATION PEFFARED FOR, AND STBMIMTED UNTER OATY TO "COMTISSICN REGARDING BREACHES OF THE RULES OF MARFARE BY THE JAPANESE FORCES" (COZ: ONTBALTH OF AUSTMALIA). 12 MARCH 1944.
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\section*{SOURCES:}

Cantured Documents. Statements by Prisoners of Var. Intelifzence keports.


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DOCUMENT 2718

\section*{MANILA - 21 Feb 45. Recd XIV Corps ATIS Adv Ech 23 Feb 45. Recd ATIS SWPA - 6 Mar 45.}

Loose handwritten sheet containing an account of a visit to Muntinglupa Prison, kept by unspecified member of TORII (*8) Unit. Dated 24 October, year not stated. 1 p .

\section*{Eull translation:}

On the 24th of Dctober, I isited luntinglupa Prison with the commender of TORII (*9) Unity as a guide, The prison is guarded by 2d It TAKESHIBA (10) and 20 men of the TORII Unit. Aocording to the btory of 2d it TAKESHIBA, there are 2,200 prisoners including doctors, ministers and constables. The food consists of thick rich gruel and one or two slices of papaya. Because of lack of foody deathy aterage 10 per day.

I entered with the unit commander into No 3 Barracks whioh had a foul odor. We entered by using the guard's key. The heavy iron lattice door was opened by a prisonet. The prisoners near us, upon hearing the command to salute, saluted us. 17 or 18 year old youths to 60 year old meth were all ill-smelling.

Because the prisoners were emaciated, their thighs and ankles Were the same size. Even walking appeared to be an ordeal for them. I have never seen such thin people. It was truly pitiful. Some lay on narrow double deck beds covered with mats. These I learned were dead bodies. On the way out, we met the corpse carriers. 10 prisoners were seen carrying the stretchers.

The prison is surrounded with three barbed wire fences; the center fence is charged with electricity. The guard towers are placed at various points. I sct prisoners who were Forking inside with iron chains around their legs. The construction of the entrance to the prison camp is like an old castle. The flag of the PHII,IPPINES is hoisted on the look-out tower. It is surprising to notice the great contrast between outside and inside.

Visiting is permitted at certain hours. The visitors are mothers or wives. They carry a straw sack-which appears heavy with presents. The anxiety with which a family awaits the release of their loved ones is apparent. I wondered hor the families feel when they see the pitiful state of their loved ones. For those who have no visitors or receive no presents, there is only death waiting. Even though they are foreigners, my heart goes out to them. The prisoners are Filipinos and Chinese. There are also a few westerners.

We, who are at war, must not lose to the Allied or our fate will be worse. Certain victory!

\section*{DOCUMENT 2718}

\section*{CERTIFICATE}

I, JEWELL A. BLANKENSHIP, 1st Lt. Inf., of the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, Tokyo, Japan, do hereby certify that the attached document is a true and correct copy of the translation of a captured Japanese Document, the original of which has been forwarded to the Washington Document Center, Washington, D. C.
/s/ Jewell A. Blankenship
Witness: /s/ Henry Shimeiima
Sworn before me this 31 day of October 1946, Tokyo, Japan.




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PLAIN
Bern
Dated February 4, 1942
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\section*{Socretary of State}

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\section*{MIURRIGN IITERESTS, JAPAN}

Reference Department's 331, December 18. Siaiss Minister, Tokyo, telegraphs January 30 as follows nJapanese Government has informed me: 'first. Japan is strictly observing Geneva Red Cross Convention as a signatory state. Second. Although not bound by the Convention relative treatment prisoners of war Japan will apply mutatis mutandis provisions of that Conventicn to Amerioan prisoners of war in its power.' \({ }^{17}\)
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DOCUMENTI 10-D
TELBGRAM SENT
MEV
PLATN
February 14, 1942
AMERICAN LEACHTION,
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446, fourteenth.
Please request the Swiss Government to inform the Japanese Govermient (1) that this Govermment has received disquieting reports that there is being imposed upon American civilians in areas in the Philippines cocupied by the Japanese forces an extreanly rigid and harsh rogine involving abuse and humilation; (2) that this Government desires to receive from the Japanese Government assurances wither that a thorough invostigation by the appropriate Japanese authorites has disclosed the incorreotness of these reports or that immediate and effective steps have been taken to remedy the situation and to accord to Amerioans in the Philippines moderate treatment similar to that being extended by this Government to Japanese nationals in its territory; (3) that this Government expects that the same general principles with regard to the treatment of enarg aliens, both detained and at liberty, which are set forth in its telegrams no. 331 nccember 18th and no. 219, January 26th, and which this Government is applying in its treatment of Japanese nationals on dinerican termitory, will be applied by the Japanese to American nationals on Jepanese and Japanose-ocoupied territory; (4) that if assurances cannot be given by the Japanese Government that these principles

Serial \#7 Pages 16-18

\section*{DOCUMENT 10-D}

2-446, Febiuary 14, to Bern.

Will be applied jn the treatnent of American nationals, not only on Japanese occupied territory in the Philippines but throughout Japanese and Japanese-ocoupied territories, it nay be necessary for this Government to reconsider its polioy of according to Japanese nationals on its territory the most liberal treatment consistent with the national safety.

Please ask the Swiss Government if it is in a position to send a representative to the Philippines or has a representative available in the Philippines, to request perraission for a Swise representative to visit Japanesemoccupied territory in the Philippines in order to investigate the situation of American nationals there.

Please inform the International Committee of the Red Cross of the reports which this covernment has received regarding the barsh treatment of American civilians in Japanese-occupied Philippine territory and request it to endeavor to investigate the situation in that territory. Mr. Maro Peter, representative in washington of the International Comittee of the Red Cross, has been informed of this matter and has stated his intention of communicating with the Committee by cable with regard to it.

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Swiss Foreign Office note Fobrueny 19 advises it called attontion Swiss Minister Tokyo to contradictions existing in reports of treatment accorded sulericans in Jajanese occupied torritory (soe Legation's 514, Fobruary 11) and Minister replied by telogram Februairy 17.

Ministor states that he consulted with Swiss clarge disffaires Shinghai regarding other representations to be made to Japanese Govermment. He than says mainistay of Foreign siffairs sont mo now note declaring J̌pan will apply on condition of ruciprocity Genova Convention for treatmont prisoncrs of war and civilian interneos in so far as convontion shall bo applicable, and thit thoy shall not bo forced to perform labor against their will. smerican civilians detrinod in all Japancso territorios number 134. conditions appliod to thom arc nore favorable then contamplatod by \(f\) convontion. Thoir provisioning in bread, butter, aggs, incat, hoating oil, coal add fats assurod by Jepan. Thoy can reccive fram outside gifts of food and clothing. Dospite inconvonionce which arranganont presents Japen thoy are specially dotained in vicinity of residenco of thoir fanilios in ordor that lattor can see thom moro easily. Internoos arc visitod from tiras to timo by doctar and sick persons can consult doctor from outside and obtain admission subscqucntly to hospital. Thoy aro permittod to rond papers, books,
and liston to Japanosc radio and to go out subject to certain restrictions if thoy submit valid roasons."

Minister continues that such statomente must be veririfed on spot but thet he has not yot bcon able obtain roquested pormission for reguler visits by his special ropresontative at Tokyo and at Yokohana. Promises are continually mado. Upon two visits which wore made to rokyo and one to Yokohnma internees did not complain but gave rather improssion of mental sufforing. Ministor finally adds nas for roports from othcr citics in Japan I have again insisted that luy dolegates bo nllowed to verify intcrnoes living conditions. Until now I bave had no particular information. I do not see necessarily any contradiction botweon this situation and that reported in China where the inturnees may be zorse treated. Foreign Ministry assures me Japan vill co all in its powor to extend god treatmont but is not in a position to offer standard of living equal to thet of imorican for conditions between two countries are so differont. Japanose peoplo are poor and contented with little fram which facts arise difficultios concorning troatment of foreign internees. Regarding nonintcrned imericans situation good according to their orm statements. Lissure inerican Governmont that I am attontivoly following question both with Foreign Office and with my reprosentatives."

HUDDLE

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DOCURANT 10-FF

Secretary of State,
Washington.
848, Ninth.
ANERICAN INTERESTS, JAPRN, TREATHAENT AMERICANS.
Legation's, 514, Pebruary 12 and 733, Pebruary 24,
Swiss Legation Tokyo telegraphs Narch 2: "Referring to informetion comunicated my telegram Pebruary 17 (see Legation's 733) Japanese Government denies that American citizens are submitted to unfavorable treatment. I reprod uce in substance following letter addressed to me by kinister Togo: 'American citizens whom you are endeavoring to protect enjoy proper treatnent as you have been able to judge from your visits. The Government is not in possession of complets details for all occupied territories but an official of Japanese Conoulate General Hong Kong has taken over fmerican Consulate General aifter fall of that colony and has done his best obtain as many facilities as possible for American officials. Accordance their desire all American personnel (consisting 23 persons) and 7 members imerican Embsssy Were put together January 9 in two buildings chosen by imerican Consul himself. They have expressed their thanks for treatment accorded. They are authorized go out twice weekly escorted by Japanese official. Their food sufficiently assured by Japanese Aruy and all in good health. Adequate protection likewise accorded other fimerican citizens. In addition 26 members imerican consulate General Manila benefit same treatment as consuls all othor countries;

Serial \#10
Pages 23-25

DOCUMANT 10-F
2-943, March .9, from Bern
they live in building belonging American citizen in Pasaynang Howrood in suburbs Nanila. They have also thanked Japaness Consulate General for indulgent treatment given them and have told us that they sufier no privation. Treatment given other American citizens by Japanese military authorities no less indulgent in principle. old people, nothers of young children, the sick and prognant women are not detained by inilitary authorities. Apprehensions Araericen Government based on fnformation from unknown source and citing no exact facts are therefore without foundation. Japanese authrities will continue accord facilities to Swiss kinister for his visits to internment corapis'n. 1

Swiss Minister adds that concerping last point binister Togo's letter authorities still create nevertheless difficulties for visiting intermment camps, in particular causing delays for Visits of Swiss special representatives. Swiss Minister hopes eventually obtain all necessary facilities.
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fresh fruits and borries, 0.15 ; driod fruits, 0.08; miscellmeous food adjuncts, 0.015 ; spices, relishte and sauces, 0.10 ; Jnpane se food, 0.06032; Interned in the custody of the "ar Departments Weight in ounces per day per individual: meat, 18.0; freah aggs, one cach; ary vegetables and cereals, 2.6; fresh vegetables, 21.0; fruit, 4.7; bevorages, coffoo, 2.0; cocoa, 0.3; toa, 0.05; lard and cooking fats, \(1.28 ;\) butter, 2.0 ; mills, ovaporated, 1.0 ; fresh, 8.0; flour (wheat) 12.0 ; sugar and syrup, 5.5; sacaroni, 0.25 ; cheese, 0.25; spices, relishos and saucos, 0.984; allowance is made in the preparation of frood for Japanese national and racial preferances, (five) that detainoes and intirnces are perraittod to roceive visits from their frionds and rolatives, aro rogularly visitod by doctors and ore :obpitalized should thoir hoclth require it, are permitted to reud noispyapors and books, and aro held in gonoral under conditions no less favorable then those which the Japanese Government statos are applied to Amorican internees in its hands; (six) that tinis Government has informod the Spanish Embassy as tho protecting Poror for Jspanosc interests in the United States, tho Smodish Legation as tho nrotecting Power for Japoneso intorosts in Hawail, and the Delegate in tho United Stetee of the Intermational Rod Cross that it welconcs visits by representatives of their offices to all of the places of detention of detained or internod Japen so nationals In Anorican hands and that reprosentatives of the Spanish mabassy have olreciay begun to visit such places in tho United States.

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\section*{TEIEGRNI SENT}

PLAIN
April 3, 1942

BEFRN
853, Third.
Your 2031, thirtsonth and 1231 twonty-sixth.
ANGRICAN MITERESTS - PHILIPFIIES - Treatmont American citizens.
Pleasc roquest the Swiss Government to inform tho Japanose Government.
(one) That the funorican Govermment has taken note of the statements of the Japenese Govormnent rogarding the treatment accordod Imerican nationals in the Philippinos,
(tro) That the amorican Governmont obteinod the information referred to in the Dopartmont's 446 of Fobruexy fourteanth from various sources,
(throe) Thit the principal source of aisquiet in connection with those reports is the apparont reluctance of the Jnpanese Govornmant to permit the appointment by the International Red Cross Comittee of an appropricte noutrel obsorver to act as the Comalttoe's delegate in the Philippinos and
(four) That the apparent reluctance of the Japanese covormaent to pernit the eppointment of a neutral Red Cross dolegate in Hong Kong is . c.180 \(\dot{a}\) source of considercbio \(\alpha\) isquiet in connection with reporte receivod from verious sourees rogarding the condition of smoricon citizens at that placo.

Pleaso inform the Intcmational Rcd Cross Cormittoe thet you are requesting the S:riss Government to reko this communication to the Japanose Govermnent, convoy to tho Conmitteo this qovernient's thanks for its efforts in connection with tho appointment of a dolegate in the Philippines, and ask it to furnish you for transaisaion to the Dapartiment

Serial \#13
Pages 31, 32

DOCUMGNI 10-H
- 2-
information regarding the presont status of the recuest which
tilis Governanint understands it has nade for \(J\) panese permission to appoint a delegate in Hong Kong.

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(BL)
740.00115/: Pccific War/52

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Siricl 13
P.gos 31,32

DOCUMENT 10-I
TETEGRAM SEMTI
FLAIN
May 21, 1942

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ALERICAN IEGATION,
BERN (SWITEERIAND).
RUSH
1314
AMERICAN DITETHSTS - SHANGHAI.
Your 2193, May 20, 5 poln.
Departinent is pleased that Legation has expressed to
Foreign Office appreciation for proupt action taken and desires you add this Government's thanks and its hope that Swiss Minister at Tokyo may be able prevail upon Japanese Government promptly to give effect to its commitments under Geneva convention and in adaition to according proper treatnent fulfill its obligations under Article 86 to pernit visits of inspeotion by Smiss representatives. This Governnient must insist on a basis of reciprocity that Japanese Goverminent take all necessary steps to insure that military conmanders and other Japanese authorities in outlying areas under Japanese control understand Japanese Goverment's comaitinents respecting Geneva Prisoners of War Convention and apply its provisions to prisoners of war and civilian internees.

Swiss representative Shanghai should be requested to report by telegraph names of arrested civilians and obtain assurances that all of them will be included on first exchange vessel in accordance with exchange agreement with Japanese Governinent.

HJLL
(BL)
SD:JEK:OB A-I/B
Sorial \#14
Pages 33, 34
















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\section*{THELEGRAM SEATI}

\section*{MEM}

November 17, 1942
This telegram must be paraphrased. before being camunicated to anyone other than a Govermmental agency. (BR)

9 p.m.

\section*{AMTRICAN IEGATION,}

BEIRN.
A-2567
There follows typical accounts of atrocities perpetrated by Jepenese.
1. Two nuns of Marist Catholic mission at Gi:ädaloanal, Solonon Islands, report that in August Japanese killed two Catholic sisters and two priests, Arthur Duhemol, American, and another of Dutch nationality. The priests were killed by bayonetting through the throat after being held prisoner for three weeks.
2. Jepacese refused request of Father Loo J. Peloquin, American, to be iospitalized at Hoijo, Koroa, for serious heart ailnant and forcod him to leave without medical care though hospital and doctors available. Ho died at Kubo. His doctor states that his heart would have yiclded to troatment had it been pemaitted at Hiljo.
3. Wifc of repatriated official reports that an Anerican woman 'at Cebu wes raped by Japanese soldier in full view of husband and ohildran who were held powerless by other soldiers.
4. Repatriated respousible person states that two belgian priests described to him scenes that they had witnessed in Philippine villages occupied by Japanese Aray where Tilipino women and girls were being openly violated in streets by troops.
5. Repatriated Anoricans havo doscribed in detail inhuman conditions existing in Gendarmerie prison known as Bridge House in Shanghai and fary Prison in Poiping whore they wore imprisomed.

Pages 68-71

DOCUIMNT 10-J
-2 Norember 17, 9 p.m., to Bern.
State they were forcod to sit in craupod position on Ploor, without taliking, throughout day in vermin-infosted, unheated and overcrowded cells; at night thoy stretched out on floor and were fortunate if they had a aingle thin blanket for covering; open bucket or hole in floor only sanitary facility in cell; their food was regular prison ration given caraion criminals and was far below standard necessary to maintain health. Oine, Mar. J. B. Powell, will be, permanent oripple in consequence of mistroatuent pocelved in Bridge House and Flangman Military Prison. Due to extreme cold both his feet frozen and gangrens developed as result of lack of medical care, necessitating amputation front half both feet. W-en imprisoned in Docember ho woighed 160 pounds but owing to malnutrition and condition of feet he weighed only 70 , bunds when roleased for ropatriation in June.
6. Thrce American missionaries repatriated from Korea have furniehod details of torture, inflicted upon each of them, shich Jàpanese called "pater cure". is unny as thirty gallons of water wore poured through opening at top of box shich fitted tighty ovier head and neck until victim becane unconscious. Aftervards victim beaten until he regeingd sences. Of these three Americans, all over sixty yoars of age, one who suffored this' tar'ture six' times' collapsed during a beating and wile lying unconscious on floor was kiclied by gendanne with such force that rib was broken. When he Jater requested medical care ganderme stiuck him violent blon with fist in same place. His vorst beating included fifty to sixty lashes with leather belting resulting in gashes on body half-inch deep. Dutails supplied by other tifo substantially the same.

With regard to the authenticity of the accounts here recitod, this Government has raedical and physical evidence of the injuries suffored by Mr. Powell and the othar accounte are based on reports received fram persons mose good faith this Govormment has no reason to doubt. HOLT
Sorial ifo
Pages 88-71
(BL)

DOCUMENT 10-K
-10 \#2314, Decomber 12, to Bom.
intereste, as vell as of the Intcimetional Red Cross Committes, whose representatives are admitted to all places in Anericen territory where Japanese subjocts are held. The lifinister should further point sut that tilis Government has always been and continues to be' villing to investigate all complaints received by it from Jajanese subjects held by it or from the Japanese Government and that it has molooned end continues to welcome the cooperation of the Protecting Power for Japanese interests in such investigatious.

Ask that in this comection the Minister be authorized to request on behalf of the Sriss Government, as the Protecting Power for Amorican interests in Japan aná Japanese controlled territory, like cooperation from the Japanese Governnent.

DOCTMENT 10-K
-9 ifiol4, Decenber 12, 1942 to Bern
were subjected to harsh treatment and indiknities fron their Japanese glards.

This Covernment must insist that the treatment of these prisoners be in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Couvention, that their nanes bo rejorted and that representatives of the Frotecting Power be peraittod access to thera.
II. Shangian:

Tiis Covermaent again most enjlatically protesta the illogal sentences irgosod by a nilitary court at Shanghai on commader W. S. Cunningham, U.S.N., Lieutenant Comander D. D. Smith, USMR., and iti. N. J. lieeters for an atteimted escape from Hoosung camp.

Tils Govginmont also protests the mistreatrient of four united States ldarines, Corporals Stewart, Gerald Story, Brinmer ana Battles, who after an unsuccessiul attempt to oscape fron the Woosung war prisoner camp wore imprisoned in the Bridge Iouse at Shanciai and later transferred to gendamerie Western instrict suisstation rison, 94 Jessefigle Road, mherf they were subjected to tine so-called "olectric treatment" in violation of the provisions of tine Geneva Convantion regeraing aumissable punisiments.

This Goveriment insists tiat the sentences imposed on these prisoners bo canceled, titet their punishment be in accordance with the Prisoners of War Convention end that thedr treatment be in accordarce rith thoir rank.

In prescinting the foregoing textually to the Japanese Govermant, it is requestod the the Swiss Minister in rokyo be asied to point out that the Angrican Government has ondoavored to iulrill in every respect its undertakings undor its reciprocal agreenent with Japan to apply the principles of the Goneva Convention to prisoiners of war and civilian intarnces and that in evidence of its acsire to do so, it has welcuned and continuos to welcome the cooperstion of the Protucting Ponor Ior Japanese

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Pages 86~99

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& \text { FitN } \\
& \text { December 12, } 1942
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ANERTCAN ILCATION,
BERRN,
2814, Twelfth
Request the Sviss Government to have its Miniater in Tokyo coranunicate the following to the Japanese Govemment:

From American citizens repatriated from Japan and Japanesecontrolled territories, the Government of the United States has learned of instances of gross mistreatment suffered by American civilians anc prisoners of war in the power of the Japanese Government in viulation of the undertaking of that Government to apply the provisions of the Geneva Frisoners of var Convention of 1929 to imerican prisonels of war taken by Japanese forces and, in so far as they may be adaptable to civilians, to Anerican civilain internees in Japan and Japanesecontrolled territories. It is evident that the Japainese Government has failed to fulfill its undertaking in this regand and that some officers and agencies of that Government have violated the principles of the Geneva Convention in their treatment of certain Alerican nationals not only by positive :isistreatment but by failure to provide for these Anaerican nationals necessities of life that should, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, be fumished by the bolding authorities. The Government of the United States therefore, lodges with the Japanese Government a nost emphatic protest and expects that the inhumane ani uncivilized treatment accorded Airerican nationals, both civilians and prisoners of war, will be nade a natter of imediate investigation anc that the Japanese Governnent will give assurances that treatnent inconsistent with the provisions and spirit of the Geneva Convention is not now

\section*{DOGUMENT 10-K}
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-2 \#2814, Decomber 12, to BMN

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and rill not in the future be inflicted upon dimerican nationals detained, interned, or hold as prisonors of war in Japan or Japanese controlled territory. The American Govornmont also expects the Japanese Government to take necossary disciplinary action with regard to agents or officers of that Governmont who have inflicted mistreatment upon ineerican nationals or who havo neglected thoir obligations to supply to fuerican nationals in thoir care the necessitios of life, which the Geneva Convention provides shall be supplied.

There follons a statement citing cases of mistreatmont of Anertion nationals in Japanese hands:

\section*{A Civilians}
1. Conditions in prisons and intermment oamps.
imericans incarcorated in jails were furnished unhoalthful and inadequate rations of common criminals. Those intorned were supplied a meager diet for which they were sometimes compelled to pay, or they were given no food and had to provide their sustenance under difficulties. This situation apparently still exists in cortain areas. It is in direct contrast to the treatment accorded Japanese subjeots in United States who are provided hygienio quarters with adequate space for individual needs, sufficient wholesome food, in proparation of rhich allowance is nade for national difforonces in taste, and in addition allorances of money or tobacoo, arreets and toilotries.

\section*{1. Bridee House, Shanghai.}

More than fifty-three imericans havo been impriscned for varying periods up to over six months in Gendarmarie prison, Bridge House, where they more arowded into varmin-infested celle aith comion criminals, some of inom suffored from loathsome contagious diseases. Sanitary facilities were mimitive and inadequate, food
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Pagos 86m99

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DOCUMENT 10-K

# \#8814, Decamber 12, to Born.

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was far below standurd necossary to maintain health, no hoat Tas supplied from Decamber to June and mecical care was virtually nonexistent. americans vore compolled to sit by day and to sleop by night, provided only bith filthy and inadequate blankots, on cold floor. They were not allorred to converse with each other or snoke at any time. in outstanding examplo of effeots incarceration this prison is conaition J. B. Powell, who through lack nedical attontion developed gangrene and lost front half or both foet.

\section*{2. inny Prison, Poiping-}

Floyd F. Spielman, R. E. MeCann, C. J. Eskeline, J. B. Sherwood, E. X. Mills and P. H. Benodiot vere taken in handcuffs from tientain on March 11 to aryy Prison at Pbiping, where oonditions were as bad as those at Bridge House. During 89 deys imprisonment their first exercise was for five minutes after 37 days in colls. at one time they went without bathing for 23 deys and as rosult of unhoaltheul food and harsh treatmont thoy lost an average of forty pounds in woight.

\section*{3. Tringtao}

Frank G. Keefe, Grady Cooper, Frank R. Halling, Charlos Liobgold, C. J. Moyer, iN. H. Mills and H. J. Zirmerman were oonfined in unhoated common jail Tsingtao for period three weoks. They wero forced to sleep on rioors or benches without covering in coldest minter months.

\section*{4. Fort Santiago, Marila.}

Roy Bannett, Robert isbbott, end other dmericans are reported to be imprisoned under barbarous conditions in Fort Santingo. They yere reported practically unrocognizable in Juno as rosult hardships and mistreatinant suffered. T T is Govermment insists that thoy be reloused iumediately and recoive medical caro.

\section*{DOCUMENT 10-K}
7. -4 \#8814, Decomber 12, to Berm.
5. (Camp Stanley, Hongkong (Fort Stanley, Hongeong)
draericans Hougkong wore taken on January 4th and received no food and very little water during first forty-eight hours. on Jenuary 21 thoy fore placod in Fort Stanley, where thoy were forced to profide nost of their bedding and othar nocessitios. Food given them ras insuffioiont, amounting to nino hundred calories deily per porson. They nore subjected to indignitiss and insuits by gendarmerie, and their facos vore frequently slapped. Result malnutrition evorage loss neight among these intorneos yes thirty pounds.

\section*{6. Santo Tomas, Manila}
imericuns at Santo Tomas because of lack of proparation were forced to sleep on floors without mosquito nets or covering for at loast throo nights bofore they mero permitted to obtain necessitios from thoir houses. They were offered .choice of boing fed by holding authoritias at cost of tmenty-five contavos per day or of feeding thamselves pith funds american Red Cross had in Philippino National Bank. They wore refused permission to use Red oross funds for aupplamenting food which holding authoritios should have supplied and not boing able to exist on twonty-five contavos mero obliged to depend ontirely on Red Cross funds to foed thenselves. These funds may be exhausted and this Covernment is gravely concernod regarding the welfare of these internees.
7. Davao and other internment camps in the Philippines.

In Davao intorned imericans vere forood to perform hard labor during rirst six peeks of internment. They were at first provided with an inadequate ration of cormmeal and fish. In fopril thoy were informed that they rould have to provide for their orn sustenance and would have to reimburse Jepanese authorities for the food previously furnished.

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Pagos 86-99

\section*{Docurant 20-K}
-4 \#2014, December 12, to Bern. 5. (Camp Stanloy, Hongkong (Fort Stanloy, Hongkong)
dinericans Hoiagkong vere takon on January 4th and reoeived no food and very little water during first forty-eight hours. on Janwiry 21 thoy wore placed in Fort Stanloy, whore they were forcod to prozide nost of their bedding and othar nocessitios. Food given them ras insufficiont, anounting to nino hundred calories deily per person. They pore subjected to indignitics and insults by gendarmorie, and their facos more frequently slapped. Result malnutrition average loss meight among thoso internees vas thirty pounds.
6. Santo Tomse, Manila
imoricans at Santo tomas bocause of lack of proparation were foroed to sloep on floors without mosquito nets or covering for at loast threo nights bofore they rearo permitted to obtain necessities from thoir houses. They wore offered choicu of boing fed by holding authorities at cost of twenty-five contavos per day or of foeding thomselves aith funds americon Red Cross had in Philippino National Bank. They were refused permission to use Rod Cross funds for supplamenting food which holding authorities should have supplied and not being able to exist on tionty-five contavos vero obliged to depend entirely on Red Cross funds to food themselvce. These funds may be exhausted and this Government is gravely concornod regarding the welfare of tinese internees.

\section*{7. Davao and other internment oamps in the philippines.}

In Davao intorned imericans nere forood to porform haxd labor during first six weeks of internoent. They were at first provided with an inadoquate ration of cormmeal and fish. In fipril they were hiformed that they bould have to provide for their orn austenance and would have to reimburse Jepanese authorities for the food proviously furnished.

\section*{DOCURENT 10-K}
-5 \#2814, Deoamber 12, to Bern

From information recoived conditions other intornnont camps in Philippinos appear equally bad.

The anerican Goverunout expects that the Japanese Government will take imodinto stops to fulfill its undortaking to furnish imerican nationals hold by it with suitable and adoquate housing and sustemnce under humane and hygionic conditions.

\section*{II. Mimtreatnent and Torturo.}
1. Torture and physioal violence.

Japanese authoritics have resortod to physical torturc of smerioan nationals and numorous of thom nere subjected to great nental torture by being constantly threatenod with treatment far worse then that they were clready suffering.
(a) Three ixierican missionarias in Korea nore subjocted to "rater cure" and brutal beatings. In Keijo, R. O. Reiner, aged fiftymine, suffercd this torturo six times during period lay 1 to Kay 16. In one instance he collapsed from effect of blows and while lyinf unconscious on floor mas kicked by gendarmerie employoe named Syo with such forco thet his rib was broken. Then he requested medical attention and pointed to brokon rib gendarmerie anployee named Kim struck hin vicious blos directly over broken rib. on ono occasion Reinor gas given fifty or sixty lashos with rubber hose and pulley belting roaking half inch doop cuts on his aras and legs. Bdwin W. Koons, aged sixty-tro, suffered same torture Ryuzan Polico Station as did F. H. Miller, aged sixty nize, Yongsan Folice Station.
(b) In J.chang, Elsie W. Ricbe and Walt or P. Morse were takon aithout explanation to Japanese incadquartors whore she mas struck many tines with bauboo pol.o and he was beaton for tro hours with iron rod ono-inalf inch thick. Thoso acts of cruolty rere committed in prosence of conimaning officer of Japanese police in Ichang.
-6 \#2814, Docomber 12, to Born
(c) Joseph L. IncSparren was arrestod on Deoomber 8th at Yokohana, bound with a rope and taken to Yokohama prison. During his fruprisonment in dark unfurnished coll he had three hemorrhagos from duodenal ulcers, but was denied sedical attention despite nunorous requests. While uniorgoing questioning he collapsed iron internal havorriago and was unablo to stand or walk without assistance, yot ho tras handcuffod as usual when retumed to his coll.

\section*{2. Solitary Confinoment.}

Many innorican citizens woro kopt in solitary confinoment for poriods ranging from a for: days to many woeks in cells, unhoatod rooms or other oqually unhoalthful placos, in som cascs deprived of all roading nattor, and subjocted to indignitios from their guards. The following exo typical casos:
1. H. W. Meyors, agod 70, missionary in Jtpan since 1897, artor harsh troatment during nearly five months in prison at Kobe, mas deprived of all books, and on may 1 put in solitery confinemont at Osaka until his release for ropatriation on June 7.
2. William Macke日y, solitary confinement in one room of his house at Tsu, Mie-ken, Japan, from December 10, to March 30, 1942.
3. Mrs. Lilice C. Grube, solitery confinement from Decembor 25, 1941, to 4 pril 8, 1942 in unhortod room of Osaka prison.
4. J. B. N. Talnaige, acod 57, solitary confinement in common jail Koshu Docembor 8, 1941, to ijpril 9, 1942.
5. Edvard idans, in a comnon jail at Taikyu from Docember 8 to 28.

III Deaths due to Mistroatnent and Negluot:
1. Sirthur Duhamel missionary priost on Guadaloanal is reliably roported to have beon bayoncttod through throat by Japanese soluifors aftor being held prisonor for three reoks.
2. Leo Peloquin, agod fifty, requostod hospitalization Curistien Fiospital, Roijo, because of serious hoart allnont, but Sorial 倣3
Pages 86-99

DOCUMONT 10-K
-7 \#2814, Dooomber 12, wo EOM.

Japanese authorities rofusod perinission and forood his ruvurn to Kengai rithout treationt. He died at Kobe as result of tinis neglect.
3. Charles Liebgold, aged sixty-sevon, inprisoned in unhoated jail at Tsingtao contracted cold bhich developed into fatal attack of pneumonia.
4. George B. MaFarlund, agod seventy, Bangkok, Thail land, succumbed after an oparation at Chulalongkorn Hospital in May 1942. Orders issuod by Japanese nilitary authorities Bongkok to police guards at this residence fatally delayed emergency operation necessary to save his life.

The imerican Government expects that the Japonese Government will take imediate steps to punish the persons guilty of these crimes against inerican nationals.
IV. Violation of Exchenge i.greenent:
1. Transportation.
sherican nationals Tsingtio and Chofoo were required to pay for passage to Shanghai. Internees iho were forcod to pay their fare to Yokohama from Nagasaki were reimbursed only part of sum expended. iccomodations provided on local vessels trere in some cases riorse then those furnished deck passongors.
2. Baggage inmitation and soarch

Japanese authorities some aroas ruled that imericans being repatriated might take only as much as thoy could carry thomselves, forcing many in Koroa, Menchuria, Hongkong, and Thailand to leave behind necessary clothing end offocts. Aizericans nore forced in somo cases to carry orm baggage oven wherc the re mere available porters whom they were provented from omploying. This troatment is in controst to that accorded Japanese subjocts repatriated from the United States who were pemittod to take alinost unlinitod amounts baggago with them.

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Pages 86-99



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\section*{TELEGRAM SENT}

PIADN
April 5, 1943

\section*{AMERICANS IEGATION.}

BEITN.
889
Please request the Sulss Government to have its Minister at Tokyo deliver verbatim the following statement to the Japanese Govermment from the covernment of the United States.

The Government of the United States has received the reply of the Japanese Government conveyed under date of February 17, 1943, to the Swiss Minister at poicyo to the inquiry made by the Minister on behulf of the Government of the United States concerning the correctness of reports broadcast by Japenese radio stations that the Japanese cutionities intended to try before nilitary tribunals Arierican prisoners of war, for military operations, and to impose unon them severe penalties including even the death penalty.

The Japanese Government atates that it has tried the members of the crews of Anerican planes tho fell into Japanese hands after the raid on Japen on dpril 18 last, that they vere sentenced to death and that, following coumutation of the sentence for the larger number of them, the sentence of death ras applied to certain of the accused.

The Government of the United Stetes has subsequently been informed of the refusal of tho Japencse Goverment to treat the remaining Americon aviators as prisoners of war, to dirulge their names, to state the sontences imposed upon them or to permit visits to them by the Swiss Minister as representative of the protecting Power for Anericon intereste.
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DOCUMENT 10-L -2 \#889, April 5, to Bern.

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The Japanese Government alleges that it has subjected the Amorican aviators to this treatment because they intentionully boubed non-military installations and deliberately fired on civilions, and that the afiators admitted these acts.

The Government of the United States informs the Jinpanese Governnent that instructions to Amoricen armod forces have always ordered those forces to direct their e.ttacks upon militiry ob jectives. The american forces participating in the attack on Japan had such instructions and it is known that they did not deviate therefrom. The Govornment of the United States brande as false the charge that Aiterican aviators intentionally have attacked non-combatants anywhere.

With regard to the allegation of the Japanese covernmont that the Araerican aviators admitted the acts of which the Japanese Government accuses then, the re are numerous know instuncos in which Japanese official agencies have omployed brutal and bestial methods in extorting allegod confessions from persons in their power. It is customary for those agencies to use statomonts obtained under torture, or alleged statemonts, in proceedings against the victims.

If tho admissions alloged by tho Japanese Governmont to have buen made by the American aviators mere in fact made, they could only have been extorted fabrications.

Moroover, the Jipanese Governinent entered into a solemn obligation by agreenent zith the Government of the United States to obsarve the terns of tho Geneva Pris oners of Yar Convention. Articie \(l\) of that convontion provides for treatment as prisoners of var' of nembers of amies and of persons capturod in the courso of military operations at sea or in the air. Article 60 provides that upon the

\section*{DOCUMENT 10-L}

\section*{-3 \#\#889, April 5, to Berm.}
opaning of a judicial proceeding dirocted against a prisonor of war, the representetive of the protecting Power shall be given notice thore of at least throe weeks prior to the trial and of the names end charges against the prisoners who are to be trisde Article 61 provides that no prisonors may be obliged to admit himself guilty of the act of rinich he is accusod. Article 62 provides that the accused shull have the assistance of quelified counsel of his choice and tirt a representative of the protecting power shall bo permitted to attond the tric.l. Article 65 provides that sentonce pronouncod against the prisoncrs shall be compunicated to the protecting Powor immedictely. Articie 66 provides, in the event the.t tho death penalty is pronounced, that the details as to the nature and circuinstances of the offense shall be communicated to the protecting Power, for transmission to the Power in whose forces the prisoner sorved, and that the sentence shall not be executed before the expiration of a period of at least three months after such comranicetion. The Japanese Government has not complied with any of inuse jrivioic:s of the Convention in its treataent of the capturod difi=ivean aviators.

The Govermsont of the Unitad States calls again unon tho Jupanese Government to carry out its agreamont to obsorve the provisions of the Convention by communicating to the Sriss Minister at Tokyo the chargos and sontences imposed upon the Arerican aviators by permitting the Swiss ropresentative to visit those no: held in prison, by restoring to those aviators the full rights to which they are ontitlod undor the Prisoners of Par Convontion, and by informing the Ministor of the nomes and disposition or place of burial of the bodics of any of the aviators against whom sentenco of death has boen carriod out.

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DOCTMENT 10-L
-4. ;889, April 5, to Bern.

If, as rould appenr from its cormunicetion under reforence, the Japanese Government hes descended to such acts of barbarity and manifestations of depravity as to murder in cold blood uniformed members of the Amoricion amed forces made prisoners as an incideut of varfare, the Anerican Government will hold personally and officially responsible for those deliborate crimes all of those officers of the Japanese Govermment who have participeted in their commitment and will in due course bring those officers to justice.

The Anerican Covernment elso solemnly warns the Japanese Government that for any other violations of its undertakings as rogards Anericon prisoners of war or for any other acts of crininal barbarity inflictod upon Anerican prisoners in violation of the rules of warfare accopted and practiced by civilized nations as ailitary oporations now in progress dran to their inexorable and inovitable conclusion, the Anerican Governmont pill visit upon the officers of tho Jepunose Govermmont responsible for such uncivilized and inhumane acts tine punishment they deacrio.

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DOCUMENT 10-As

Department
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AMRRICAMI LEGATIONS,
BRAN.
275, Twenty-seventh.
AMERICAN INTERESTS - JAPAN
There are recited in the Aloin null ad cations, the numberema itch co respond to he ny rediairges in the Depart-

 node by fit agana the Japanese Government in the telegram under reference. Tile specific incidents have been selected from the numerous ones that have been reported from many reliable sources to this Government. Ask the Swiss Government to forward this statement textually to its Minister in Tokyo m fth the request that he present it to the Japanese Government simaltaneaurly with the F \(\%\) telegram under reference and that penal upon' the japanese cavernmont promptly to rect ar all exiditing doreliosione and take such

 fives to visit such place without exception where American nationals are detained and request of the Japanese Government the amelioration of any improper conditions that he may find to exist.

The Swiss Minister in Tokyo should be particularly asked to report promptly and fully all stops takin by the Japanese govemmont in conformity with the foregoing.

Charges I and II. Prisoner of war and civilian intorniont camps in the Philippines, French Indochina, Thailand, Manchuria, Burma,

DOCUMANT 10- M

Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies, and prisoner of war camp no. 1 in Formosa have nevor been visitod by Swiss representatives although they have repeatediy requested permission to mako such visits. None of these camps except the ono at mukdon are known to have boan visited by International Red Cross roprosentatives. In recent monthe visits have not been allowed to the prisoner of war camps noar Tokyo anc Yokohama, and the prisoner of war camps in and noar Hong Kong, although the Swiss representativos have requested permisaion to nake such visits.

The value of such fer visits as have boon pormitted to somo camps has beon minimized by restrictions. Swiss represontatives at Shanghal have been closely oscorted by several represontatives of the Japancse Consulate General at'Shanghai during thoir visits to camps and have not been allowod to see all parts of camps or to have free disoussion with the internees. Similar situations prevail with respect to the civilian internment canps and prisonor of war camps in notropolitan Japan and Formosa.

By contrast, all of the camps, stations and centers whore Japances nationals are held by the United States havo boen ropectedly \(\nabla\) isited and fully inspoctod by representatives of Spain and Swoden who have spoken at longth without witnesses with the inmatos, and International Red Cross representativos havo boon and are being allowed ireely to visit the oamps in the United States and Hawail whore Japanese nationals are held.

Charge III. Cormunications addressed by the persons hold to the protooting Powor concerning oanditions of captivity in soveral of tho civilian oamps near Shanghai, among them Ash Camp and Chapoi, remain undelivored. Tho sam situation oxists with rospect to tho civilian intornmont carp in Baguio, and in most if not all of tho

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DOCUMENT 10-4

\section*{- 4 -}

At Corregioiar a Jepancse soldior mas soen by Licutenant Commander Molvyn H. leocoy with one arm coverod from olbow to urist and the other arm half covered with wrist watchos takon fram amorioan and pilipino prisoncrs of tar.

Charge VII. Anorican prisoners of war in hanila nerc forcod by Jajanose soldiers to allorr themsclvos to be photographod operating captured amorican military equipment in conneotion with the production of the Japanose propaganda fila "Rip down the Stars and Stripos."

Prisoners of war from Corregidor being taken to Manila were not lamed at the port of kanila but were unloaded outside the city and mere forced to march through the entire city to Bilibid Prison about May \(23,1942\).

Japanese school ohildren, soldiers, ana oivilians have been admitted to internment oemps and encouraged to satiafy curiosity reganding the persons held. Such tours were conducted at Baguio, Hong Kong and Tsingtao.

Oharge VIII. Deficiency diseases such as beriberi, pellagra, scurvy, sprue, et cetera, are comnon throughout Japanese interment camps. These diseases are least common in the civilian intermment camps (called assembly centers) at Shanghai and in some other camps where the persons held have but recently been taken into custody or where trade by the internees themselves with outside private suppliers is allowed. It appears therefore that the great prevalence of deficiency diseases in prisoner of war camps where internees have been solely dependent upon the Japarese authorities for their food supply over an extended period is directly due to the oallous failure of these authorities to utilize the possibilities for a health sustaining diet afforded by available local products. The responsibility for much of the suffering and many of the deaths

Sarial iff 6
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\section*{DOCUMENT 10-in}

The first shipmont of medicines from the philippino Rod Cross mas hold up by the comp authorities on the pretoxt thet thoy must mako an inventory of the shipment. This they wore so dilatory in doing that ungy doaths occurred bofore the medicino was rolcased. Booause of lack of modicines and food, scurvy broke out in the camp in the Fall of 1942. Sinco tho prisonors had boon at tho carm for some months boforo this disease bocome prevalent tho rosponsibility for it rests upon the detaining authorities.

It is roported that in the auturn of 1943 fifty per oent of the Ainerican prisonors of ucr at Davco had a poor chance to live and thet the detaining authorities had agein cut the prisoner's food ration and had withdrawn all modical attention.

Though the modical care provided for civilian intermees by the Japanese carap authorities appoars to havo been better than that providod for prisoners of war, it atill does not moet the obligations placed on tho holding authorities by their Government 'a orn free undertaking and by the laiss of humanity. At the civilian internment camp Camp John Hay, childbirth took place on the floor of a swall storeroon. At the samo conm a female internee who yas insano and whose presonce was a dangor to the other internoes was not removed from the carp. A dentist who was internod at the camp was not perraitted to bring his orm equiproent. The Los Banos Camp r:es astablishod at a recognizod endemic contor of malaria, yot quining whs not provided, and tho internees rere not alloned to go outside of the fonce to take anti-malarial noasures.

The Japanese authorities have not provided sufficient modial care for the Amerioan civilions held in comps in and near Shanghal and the internees have themselves hed to pay for hospitalization and medical troatment. Deaths directly traceable to inadequate care have occurred.

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DOCUIARNT 10-3!

Eveu in metropolitan Japan, the J.pancose authorities have failed to provide medical treatnent for civilien internees, and it has bean necessary for Anericans held at liNoshi, Yemakita, and Sumire to pay for their orm medical and dental care.

Charge KIV. For example the internoes at Camp John Hay were zot allo:zed to hola religious services during the first several months of the camp's opuration, and priests have not boen allowed to minister to prisoners held by the Japanose in Fronch Indochina.

Charge XV. No copy of an E:Bliah translation of the toxt of the Goneva Prisonors of war Convontion has boon available to civilian intornecs or prisonors of war nor have the Japanose authorities takon other steps to inform the persons held of their rights under the terus of the Coavention. Risorts havo boen roceivod of the \(J\) paneso authoritios informing prisonors of war that thoy were captives having no rights under international law or treaty.

Cherge XVI. At Comp 0'Donnell many of the men had to live without shelter during 1942. In ono caso trenty throo officers Fere assigned to a shack, fourtoon by trenty foet in size. Drinking Fator mes uxtromoly scarce, it boing necessary to stand in lino six to ten hours to get a drink. officors hed no bath for tho first thirty five dnys in tho comp and had but onc gallon of water oach in firich to have their first baths after that dolay. Tho kitchon equipment consistod of cauldrons and a fifty five gallon drum. Cennotos iere cookod in the cauldrons, mashed with a piece of timber, and each man ras served one spoonful as his ration.

In late October 1942, approxinatoly 970 prisonurs of mar were transferred from the Manila area to tho Davao Ponal colony on a transport vessol providing only twanty inchos por man of
docurans 10-a
sleeping space. Conaitions on the vossel wore so bad that two deaths occurred, end subsequently because of woaknoss some fifty percent of tho prisoners foll by the rondsido on tho march from the liater front at Lasang, Davao to the Punal Colony.

Tho places used by tho Japanese authoritios for the intornment of American civilians in tho Pinilippine Islands wore inadequate for the number of porsons interned. At the Brent School at Baguio, trenty to thirty civilions tere assignod sleoping accormodations in a room ridich had been intanded for the use or one person.

At the Columbia Country Club at Shanghai the internoes were obliged to spend CRB \(\$ 10,000\) of their orn funds to have a building deloused so that they might use it for a needed domitary. At Weihsien no (repeat no) refrigeration equipment was furnished by the Japanese authoritics and some of the few household refrigerators of the intoriees were takon from them and were used by the Japanese guards, with the result that food spoiled during the summer of 1943. The lack of sanitary facilities is reported from all of these camps.

Charge XVII. American personnel have suffered death and fraprisonnont for participation in military oporations. Doath nnd long-tom imprisonant have been imposed for attompts to oscapo for Thich the maximum peralty under tho Genova Convention is thirty days arrest. Noither the American Governmont nor its protocting Porer has been informed in the mannor provided by the Convent ion of these cusca or of many other instances when Anoricans were subjected to illegal punishment. Speciric instances are cited under the next charge.

Charge XVIII. Prisoncrs of war who wero marched from Bataon to San Fermando in April 1942 woro britally treated by Japanese guards. The euards clubbed prisoners who tried to get wator, and one prisoner was hit on the head rith a club for helping a fellor

\footnotetext{
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}
prisoner tho had boen knockod down by a Japaneso army truck. A colonel who pointed to a cen of salmon by the sido of the roed and askod for food for the prisonurs was struck on tho side of his head With the con by a Japancse officer. The colnnel's face wes out open. Ansther colonel tho had found a sympathotic Filipino :-ith a cart was horsewipped in the face for trying to give transportation to persons unable to walk. it Lubao a Filipino who had beon run through ana gutted by tho Japanese was hung over a brirbeà-riro foncr. An furioicar Ligutenant Colongl was killed by a Japanese as ho brcie ronks to got a arink at a stream。

Japenese sentries used rifle bujts and bayonots indiscriminately in forcing exhoustod prisoners of trar to keep noving on the march from tho Cabanatuan railroad station to Cornp No. 2 in late leay 1942.
st Cabanaruan Lioutonent Colonels Jloyd Biggs and Iovard Breitung and Lieutenont R. \(\dot{\text {. }}\). Wilbart, attaupting to escape during Soptambor 1942 wore severely bocton abcut the legs and foet ma then taken out of the camp and tiod to posts, mere strippod and rore kopt tied up for two deys, Thoir hands vere tied behind their backs to tho posts so that they coule not sit doas. Passing Filipinos waro forcod to beat then in the face with clubs. No food or water mas given thom. after tro days of thriuro they pere talien array and, according to the statementa of Jupanese guards, thuy zere killed, one of them by decouitation. Otior juericens :eve sindiarly tortured and shot without tisial at Cabanatuan in June or July 1942 because they oidecvorod to bring food into the carp. After being tied to a fence post inside the canp for tro days they were shot.

At Cabanatuan during tho sumor of 1942 tice folloring incideats occurred: A Japanesg sentry beet a private so brutaliy :-ith a shovol across the back and the thigh that it we.s necessery to sond him to the Lospital. inothor inuricen ras crippled for months after his
anklo wae struck by a stono throim by a Japaneso. Ono Japanese soutry used the oleaft of a golf club to boat inericen prisonors, and two ancricans, caught :山ile obtaining food from Pilipinos, were beaten unnercifully on tho faco and body. An officor ;as struck bohind the enr with a riding crop by a Japenoso interpreter. The souno officor was again bonton at Davao Ponal colony nnd is now sufforing fron pertial peirilysis of tho loft side as the result of theso bciatings. Fnlistod mon aho attamptod to escope were boaten and put to hard labor in ohains.
ist tho Davao Ponal Colony, about April 1, 1943, Sergeant MoFee :7as shot and killed by a Japaiesc guard after catcining a cantean full of water which had been thro:m to him by another prisoner on tho opposite side of a fence. The Japaneso euthorities attempted to explain this shooting as an effort to prevent escape. Horrever, the guard shot tho sorgoant several tines and, in addition, slot into the barrack on the opposite side of the fonce torard the prisoner sho had thrown the canteen. at about the same timo am place an officor returming fron a work detail triod to bring sone sugarcane for the men in the hospital. For this he :ecs tied to a steke for ti:enty-four hours anà severely beaten.

In the internment camp a.t Baguio a boy of sixteon was knocked dom by a Japaneso guard for talking to an intorneo girl, and an oldorly interneo was struck vith a chip when he failed to riso rapidly from his chair et the approach of a Japanose officer. ifr. R. Gray died at Baguio on 1rrch 14, 1942 after being beaten and given the nater cure by police authorities.
ist Santo Toms, Mr. Liogstadt died in a military prison after being corporelly punished for his attempted escape.

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DOCULENT 10-N

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The Govomment of the Unitod, ,ttetes is obligod to inform Its citizons oi tio concition or its nationals in onoms oustody. The continued rafusals of the Ji:prineso Governnont to permit Visits by representetivos of the Protecting powor to comps in Jnjoneso-occupicd toinitorics lcads me turally to tho conclusion that conditions in theso ureas continue to ramin unsatisfectory and such as to make Jopen ashened to have thim observed by noutrals. In giving ronility to its nuncrous professions of its intent to appiy humanitarinn considoretions in its trertment of prisonors of war and civilien intcmoos and in making the inprovenonts prounisod by shigomitsu, the Juncineso Govornient has at its comanend tho nost effoctive method of removing the causes of unfavornblo repoits and thereby provanting the future publicetion of such roports. Finon the Jepnnoso Governmont eccoris to dinorican nationals the hunauitarien truatlunt it has promisud and whin it pomits ropresuintatives of the Suiss Govcrancant to visit all places where duonionn netioinils are held ana to vorify aur confimn tinat thoir troatiant is in accordence with tho promises of the Japanese Govginnoint, tho Unitad Stetos Government will be in a position to reessuit the rilatives sine priends of Aruricen netionals leld by Japan sith ragard to thair oondition and troutsont. JThe Uilitod St.tos Govesment vont inues to hope that the \(J \because \mathrm{H} . \mathrm{n} 日 8 \mathrm{G}\) Govemmont will bo porsuaded without further dolay to onable tho Smiss repiosantativos to visit all dotennod untiowals of the Ui.itod Stitces wherever aotained. Thare would goum to bo no rouson ihy tho \(J_{3}\) pancso Govormmont should not pormit such visits rithout projuaice to tho furdaical position tajen by japan on tho quostion of represoritstion of onory intorosts. Soe Dopartmintis 2050. Juno 14.

FOUL


DOCOMRNT 10-P

\author{
PIAIN \\ SEPT. 11, 1944
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AMLEGATIOH,
BERN.
US URGENT
3133

AMERICAN INTERESTS - PHILIPFINES.
Request Swiss Government to coumunicato following message to Gorge to be delivored textually to the Japancso Goverment:

The Govornment of the United States hes received fram reliable sources that certain Anerican civilion intornees in the Philippine Islances have been removed from the Los Banos Camp to Fort MeKinley phere a major araunition dump for central Iuzon is maintained.

As Article 9 of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention provides that no prisonor ney, at any tine, be sent into a region Where he might be exposed to the fire of the combat zono, nor usod to give protection from bombardment to certain points or cortain regions by his presence, the action taken by the Jepanese authorities constitutes a flagrant violation of the obligation undortaken by it to apply to cipilian internees in so far as thoy are adaptable, the provisions of the Geneva Convention and of its commituont at all tines to accord protection and humane treatment to the araerioon nationals in its oustody. The united States Governnent expects that the Japanese Govermment will at once remove the Amorican nationals at Fort MoKinlay to a rogion far onough from railitary installations for thom to be out of dangor, and thet the Japanese Government will exercise overy care to forestall a repetition of the viol.tion of the laws of war in oxposing civilian intornees or prisoners of .ar to bombardment by housing tham in areas in the vicinity of military objoctives.



BERR.
1022, TWMII
AHERICAN INTHRESTS - JAPAN
Request Swiss Government to communicate the following textually to the Japanese Govermant:

QUOTS American prisoners of war who survived the sinking on September 7, 1944, of a Japanese freighter on which they were being transported off the coast of ldindanao, Philippine Islands, have mado comprehensive reports to the United States Government of the conditions under which Anerican prisoners were held in the Philipoines. These reports further corroborate the reports made earlier that the treatnent accorded to prisouers of war in the Philippines has been consistently cruel and inhumane.

In the present instance, the United States Governnont protests Vigorously with regard to the conditions of captivity under which 650 prisoners were held at the Lasang Air Fiela and the abuses to which they were systematically subjected. The United States corermant oharges that the Japanese authorities have violated the Japanese Government's comidtment to apply to prisoners of war the provisions of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention, and to observe the basic principles of the Hague Convention:
(1) 650 American prisoners of war were conpelled to work on the Lasang Air Field, a known militany installation.
(2) Officer prisoners were forced to perform labor and noncomissioned officers were co:pelled to perform labor other than of a supervisory nature.
(3) Oficer prisoners were forced to perform nenial and degrading tasks. In an effort to humiliate them they were forced to wash the clothes of the enlisted aen.
(4) Corporal punishment of utnost severity wes inflioted upou the slightest provocation. Upon ine occasion Lieutenant Hosica forced prisoners to kneel for a long period pith their

DOCUMPNT 10-S
- 2 -
shinbones on the sharp edge of railroad tracks in such a position that most of the weight of their bodies was carried by their shinbones. Afterwards, the men were compelled to run bare-footed on sharp coral gravel for several kiloneters. On other occasions, individual prisoners returned to camp covered with blood as a result of having been beaten and kicked by Iloutenant Hosimoto.
(5) The prisoners were forced to subsist on starvation rations. Food furnished to the prisoners was noither equal in quantity or quality to that given Japanese soldiers. Half the votictablo issue was usually delivored spoiled and unfit for hunaiu consunption. Nat anc fish were rarely furnishod. at tinces a carabao was butchered, but only the head and ribs were supplied to the 650 prisoners, the meat being retained by the 200 Japanese guarais.
(6) Tho latrines provided for the prisonors of war defied all established rules of sanitation. as the original placeaent of the latrines behind the prisoners' barracks proved offensive to the Jupanese officers, the latrines were moved to a position close to and between the prisoners' barracks where they polluted the wells from which the prisoners' drinking water was drewn.
(7) Prisoners were deprived of their shoce. On March 2, 1944, new shocs were issued to the prisoners from Red Cross supplies furnished by this Government. On or about April 8, 1944, the Japanese authorities compelled the prisoners to surrender their shoes anaj diã not return them until Auguat 20, 1944. Although the mon repeatodly requested that their shoes be roturnod or thit at least sandals be issued, the ir requests were ignored with the result thet their feet beoame severely lacerated fron the sharp corml on which they wore forced to work.

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The abusivo, cruel, and inhumane treatment which has charaoterized the administration of prisoner of war camps in the Philippines is affirmod unanimously by prisoners who have csoaped from those camps.

The United States Govornment dewands that, in fulfillmont of the obligations assumed by the Japanese Govornment \(\#\) ith rogard to Americans takon prisoner of war by Jopan, that Govornment take steps effoctively to provent the contimuation in all Japanese prisouer of war camps of tho inhumane practicos that mave diagraced Japan in its adrainistration of prisonor of war camps in tho Philippines. UNQUOTE

\author{
GRITH \\ heting
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\footnotetext{
Serial tio8
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Pages 326-329

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DOCUIENTI 10-T
PL:IN
spril 6, 1945
ALELEG:TION,
BERRIS.
1371, Sixth

Roqucst Swiss Goverment to conmuncete the folloring mossage to Gorgo to be delivered toxtually to the Jepancise Govemmont:

QUOTE The Unitod Statos Governient has received evidence of the murdor by the Japnose suthoritios of four smericon citizens, Carcoll. Colkins Grinnoll, ilirod Francis Duggleby, Ernont Erail Johnson, and Clifford Lavrenco Larsen, civilian internees in Spato Tonas Interment Carp, Manilf: Mr. Grinnell Thas tho spokosmin of tho Santo Tonis Intermont comp.

These four anorican natiocale vere arrestod and inprisoned Within the Santo Fomes intermsont Canp by tho Japaneso Military Folice on Decelibor 23 , 1944. No information wes ever given to the conp uthorities zith rospect to the chargos for rinich these mon :ere held. Wr. Johnson tas recovod fron the carip on or about December 24, 1944. Messrs. Grinuoll, Duggleby and Larson more removed fron tho caip on Jenuary 5, 1945. On Decombor 31, 1944, Mer. Johnson :c.s acon at the Militery Polico Station at the corner of Corbabitarto and de Mabini Stroots. The other thrue nen gere nevor again soen alive. Their bodies together :ith ten unidentified corpsos were found buried in a fiold near the hecdquartors of the Japanose military police. The fourtean bodies were rirod togothor in groups of a feis oach. a medical ommination of the bodios determined that death had occurred on or c.bout January 15, 1945.

In viess of tho fact that tho Jepenose Govorment undertook to apply tho provisions of the Geneva Prisonors of Fer convontion to civilian internocs in so far as those provisions aro adaptable, the nurder of these inorican citizons constitutes e. flagrant violation of

DOCUNANT 10-T
\(\ddot{\pi} 1371\)
tho oblieations undertakon by tho Jepanoso Goveruriont.
Tho United States Covormant derands that the unvarrantod anf dospotic action of the Japmose authoritios concornod be incediutely investigatod, the.t those who ordorod and cormittod the acts heroin roportod siall be brought to full account for tivir arimes, and that the firdings of the investigation and the dato of the puiskmonta shall be sant to this Governrant. The United Stutes Governront furtior dem:nds that the Japanese Govornnont shall take all steps necessary to prevent in ony territory under Jepanesc control a ropotition of such barbarous and arbitrary deeds thich arc in utter disregard of the J:panese Govermant's comatriont to apply tho humanitarinn stenderds of the Gonova Prisoners of Fer Convention to interned anorican nationals in its custody.
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\section*{PL:IN}

M: 19, 1945

\section*{ANGECATION:}

ITEFN
185\%, Nineteunth
alaricin mityrasti - Japin
P?ease request Saiss Logation to transmit following textually to Japancse Goverymant:

QUOTE The Unitod States Guvemment cherges the \(J\) pancse Guvernment with the ranton muider of George J. Louis at the Los Banos Interment Cernp, Philippine Islanc s, on Jeruary 28, 1985.

Mr. Louls, woving left the care to purchase fooa fas shot, but not (repeat not) fate.lly, ct \(6: 55\) acm. on January 28 as he \%ns returning to cang. in appcal by internees to remove mar. Louis to the Comp Hospital mes denied by the Japanose authorities. it 7!10 a.mo, three intornoes vere surmonod to tho orfice of injur Imanska, the Canp Comendent, and informod by him thet me. Louis' execution must be completed, since he iad orierod that the guards shoot SUBQUOTE until they kill FAD SUBCVOIE eny person violating tho canip boundaries.

A Comittee of internees intorceded with the camp comrandant to stay the exocution of irs. Louis but the Cominndent was adamant. 1tr. Louis, still alivo, yas carriod by gur.roc on an improvised stretcher to a clump of ocmboo outisidc the camp grounds and shot through the head.

The United States Goverminent most vigorously protests the arbitrary action of Major Imanske in carrying out the execution of Mr. Louis as boing in dircet violation of irticlos 47, 50, 51, 52 and 60 throuch 67 of tho Gonova Pisisoners of jar Convention and a repudiation of the hunanitarian 3 tenderds phich the Japanese Govornmont has professod it is maintaining in its treatment of inerican nationals in its custody.

Sorial \#ll7
Pages 347-348
-2 \#1857, May 19, 1945, Borm.

In the early darm it might be conceivable that the gucrd could not discorn thet ins. Louis mes returning to the camp and that the guard fired tho first shot belioving he was preveiting a possible cacapa. There is no justification, kowcrer, for the sumnory and cold-blooded execution of \(18 r\). Louis an hour and a half lator.

The United States Govornment dernends that major Imonska be brought to full account for tilis crirs and expects that the Japanese Governuont aill notify it of the punishumentinflicted upon him, UNQUOTE

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(iicting)







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DOCUMaint 10-V

\section*{Ptian}

Nay 19, 1945

ANABCATION:
BERELI.
1856
AMERICAI ITTHERSSTS - JAPAI
Please zequest Swiss to transmit verbatim to Jajanese Goveimment following message:

QUOTE: The brutal massecre on Decernber 24 , 1944 of one hundred and fifty Ainerican prisoners of war at Puerto princese, Palawan, Philippire Islands, by the personnel of the Ogawa Tai Construotion Corps has profoundly shccised the Government and the paople of the United States.

At noon of thet day tho prisoners who had beer detailed to work on a nearly aifiol. were recsiled to carp. Following upon a series of air raic alartu the Japanese guards forced the prisoners into air raid shelters within the cain compound. The shelters were turmels somo seventy-five feet loke with openings at each erd. Atout two o'clock in the aftemoon fifty to sixty Japonese guards armed with rifles and machine guns and carrying buckets of gasoline and lighted torches, approcched the shelters. They emptled the gasoline into the oponings of the tunnels and huiled tide blazing torches after it. Violent explosions followed. Thc victims, envelopod in flames anc screumicg in agony, swarmod from the shelters only to be mowed down by reachine guns or attacked with bayonets. Four officers who had sought shelter elseirhore suiferod a similar pate. One of thom, emorging in flames from his retreat, approachod a \(J\)-panese officer and pled that the carnage be stopped. Ho vasicuthlessly shot down. In ordor to insure that
no living prisoners renained in the shelters, the grards fired the tunnels with dynamite charges.

A:out forty prisoners eucceeded in escaping fron the compound by throwing themselvos over a firty-feet oliff onto the beach bolow. Iaiking jarges ratrolling the bay and sontries on the shoze fired ufon them. linny mocnitg in agony, were buried alive by their captors. One, who had reached the rator and struck out to sua, was recaptured and brought back to land where Japanese zoldiers, prodaing him rith bcyonets, forced hin to walk along tho beach. A Japmeso guard poured gesolino uron the priconurs foot and set fire to it. Ienorinc his ontreaties that be be shot the Japenese soldiers doliberatily set fire to his other foot and to both his hands. They mocked and deridcd him in his surfering and then bayonetted hin until he collapsed. Thereupon thoy poured gasoline ovor his body and watched tho flames deveur it.

Such barbaric bchaviour on the part of the Japanese axined forces is an offense to all civilized peorle. The Jajancse Govermbent cannot escape responsibility for this crime. Thes United Etates Governmort demands tiet appropriate punisacai. be inflicted on all thoso vio directed or participetec in it. It expects to roceive frora the Japaness Govermmint notification tiat such punishmert has boon infilicted. The United States Governmont further demanis that the Japenese - Govomwent take such action as hay be necessamy to forestall the repetition of offenses of so hainous a rature and assure the United Statos Goverment that auch outrages will not again be inflicted upon Anerican prisoners of mar in Japanese custody.
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GREW
(Acting)

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\section*{\(3\)}


DOCUITHNT 10-W
-2 2992, Juno 8 to B.an
civilicn intoracios ani prisoners of arar in its custody. By its rofusal to pormit tho rcpetricition of dnorionn nationals it has furthor obligitod itsolf to safogurd than frad storvotion and doath.

T:o Gutornment of the Uisited states ccils again upoin tie Japeneso Govolimont to eniry out its agrecnant to observo the human stendardu of tio Gobiva Coivention and to give offect to its many public end solem declerations to the nations and pooples of the rorld thest it is nccording humane treatacnt to the civilian interneos and Pisoncrs of :itr in its custody.

Tho United Stites Government demands that the Japangso Goveraneat ifitiout deley put forth gresptiomal efforts to remedy tho ercivo food situation in thi civilina assoubly corters at Shinghai ond in any othor civilion or prisower of and comps where those coiditioas may pruvail, e.t prosont uiknorn to this Govommont. The Unitod States Govermiont demands the Jepanosc Govemmentis solemn assarance that tilis has boen done.

Should iho Jipeneso Govemmont oont inuc to deprive civilion interneos and prisoners of rar in its custody of the food nocoserfy to safoguad them from starvation aid inintain tham im honith, tho Juitod Statce Govarnuent harody solumily declerao that it gill hold persour lly and of iticially responsible for this crime all of tio officiuls of the Jepeneso Governmont, rogardless of position or status, tho heve participated therein either through nogloct
 It solomaly daclaros thet it :ill visit upon all such individuals the punisimnont :hich is thoir due. UNGOOTR

> GREW
> (ficting)

\footnotetext{
Sorial \#126
Pages 365-367
}















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\section*{PLIIN}

July 31, 1945

\section*{. Waldection,}

BERRN.
2432, Thirty first.
Request Stiss to inform Jap covt as follors: QUOTE he of July 4, 1945, Japangse civilion internoes held in the Onitod States recoived daily 4.831 pounds of food reprosenting 4100 calorios. Tho foods aro is follors, giving first tho woight in pounds and socond tho caloric contint.
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline Monts \& Fish & . 4425 & 442.00 \\
\hline Eggs & . 10725 & 64.00 \\
\hline Wilk \& Checse & . 56744 & 302.00 \\
\hline 14rgarine & . 036 & 1211.00 \\
\hline Fats, othur & . 05625 & 230.00 \\
\hline Sugars & . 2255 & 351.00 \\
\hline Ceroals & 1.234 & 1888.00 \\
\hline Legurivis & . 044 & 73.00 \\
\hline Vegotablos & . 548 & 55.00 \\
\hline Toin tocs & . 05104 & 5.00 \\
\hline Citrus fruits & . 18 & 36.00 \\
\hline Potatocs & . 70 & 350.00 \\
\hline Vugutnblos, othor & . 33526 & 67.00 \\
\hline Fruits, othor & . 147 & 44.00 \\
\hline Fruits, driod & . 045 & 72.00 \\
\hline Bevorages & . 069 & - \\
\hline Miscollancous & . 04517 & - \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Tho Japaneso Govorument vill obsorve that the foregoing diet is well balanced.

Jopanose pows hold in the US as of May 3, 1945, wero rooulving similarly balnnoed diots. Typical daily menus for pors are as follors:

Broakfast: Storrod firuit, :hert coronl, rilk, ono ogg, broad, nargarino, coffoo. Dinmer: Fish, rice, vegetable, vegotablo saled, broad. Suppor: Soup, mont, macaroni, potatoos, bread, tea. Break'ast: Frosh fruit, haniny grite, milk, broad, margarine, coffoo. Dinner: Kont, rico, vegotable, vegoteble salad, bread. Suppar: Soup, soy beans, potatoos, vegutsible, bread, toa.

Sorial if134
Pagos 380-383

DOCULENT 10-X

Tho IS Govt is becouing incirasingly concermod about tho food Fhick tho Japanese Govt provides for dioricen pome and aivilian intornoes in Japanose occupiod torritory as roll 8.8 in Japan propor. Reports road in the US indicato that at unny canps tho food situation is deterioratine. The condition of inearican nationals liborcted from Japenose imprisonnent in the pisilippino Islands ras suoh that tho US Govt knois that its concern for the lecith of inerioan notionals hald by the Jopnuese is not (ropoat not) unfouided.

The US Govt has frou tho ourlicst days of tho war beon concerned because of tho deleterious oifect of Jupa:lese diet upon suerican nationals unaccustoned to oriental foods. It has felt not only thet oriental focis right be difficult for morican nationals to beconio accustomed to but also thut the nutritive value of the food rould bo less than that to riaich the inericans wore accustoned. The food supplied imorican pows and internees bas been a subject of continuous ropresontations by the US GOVt (Seo Dept's 2934, dug 25, 2944 and Dept's 1992, Jan. 8, 1945). The Japanese covt has not (repeat not) taken adequato stops to furnisil adequatg food for fincricans in its hands.

Since the begiming of the mar tine cuerican authorities in contrast to the Japancse cuthorities, have supnlied food to Japcnese civilicn intemoos cnd prisonors of war which wis not only sufficient in quantity but uns in accordance ::ith the national tastes of tice prisonors and internees. To the knoriodgo of the Uaitod States Governmunt no complaints have bean rado about the food Eivon to Japanese nationals held by the inerican authoritieg.

The recont ection of the Jep Govt in stopping all financial asaistence for inoricon nationals in prisoner of war an aivilian

DCCU:IENT 10-X
- 3 -
internee campe operated by the Jajainese (your 3393, July 2), indicates that tho Japanese Govcinuent :aill not (repont not) porait the US Gort to uso the only nethod which has thus far been open to it to provido sustonence on a regular besis for ineriouns hold by the Japencse. Unloss the Japnnese Government permits neutral reprosentatives to purchase rolief supplics for the use of sinerican nationals or unluss the Japancse Government supports prisoners of rar and civilina internecs in accordance with its obligetions, tie United Statos Govcrmment can ouly assumo that the Jap Govt sanctions the starvation of sucrican pors and civilian intermocs in its custody.

The US Govt oxpects the Jap Govt prongotly to give assurances that diericans in its hands will bo protected from starvation. The US GOVt also expects the Japanese Govornilent to indicate the steps which it proposes to take to assure the it inericons in its hanals will not starvc.

The US Govt cuphasizes to tho Jap Govt the seriousness with riaich it viows reports that anericans in Japanese hands aro on starvation rations. Tho US Govt doclared that tho Jap Govt and its officers :zill not bo able to avoid rosponsibility for the starvation of inoricons in Japanose custody . UNQUOTE.

GREW
(..CTIIG)
740.00115 P.W./7-645

Sorial \#134
Pagos 380-383


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\title{
WASHINGTON: DISCLOSES JAPINESE ATKCCIVY BECALSE RELIEF NOT PERAITTED
}

\author{
IWID Jane 29, 1944 18:00
}

White House Secretary Stemhen Early made the disclosure today that the Jaoanese Government will not oermit the United States Government to send food, material aid, or supplies to United States and Filinino soldiers now Japan's prisoners of war.

This, said Early, is the reason the United States sovernment last night authorized the nublications of accounts of Jadanese atrocities against prisoners of war. He said this information has been known for some time by this government, but it had been withheld while there was any hove of transmitting relief to the prisoners in Jaman's hands.

Early said, "The time has come for releasing the factual reports which have been carefully investigated and authenticated because we cannot exnect to get further relief to our prisoners of war now in the hands of the Japanese。"

Secretary in the Public Relations Office of the Foreign Office

\title{
S:N ت゙RANCISCO KVID Janr 29, 1944 7:00 \\ PRISONERS OF WAK: JAPANESE ILL-TREAT PKJSONERS OF NAR
}

The Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Full, released a statement of the treatment of prisoners of war in Jananese hands. A great many of them died of starvation on two Japanese prison carps in Octcber of 1942. We wrote the statement by Secretary of State.
"According to the revorts of cruelty and inhumanity it would be necessary to sumron the rebresentatives of all the demons available anywhere and combine the fiendishness with all that is (bloody) in order to describe the conduct of those who inflicted these unthinkable (atrocities) on the Americans and Filinjnose"

The escaped American offfecers in their statement indicated several instances of Jabanese atrocities. They said that the Jananese forces sonetimes r!antonly murdered thoussnds of Arerican and Filipino soldiers captured in Bataan and Corregidor in the Dhiliopines.

They stated that at least 5,200 American soldiers died mostly of starvation at two prison carps in Cctober 1942. 36,000 American and F'ilinino soldiers have been captured in those campaigns said Colonel Vihite, former Domestic Director of the Office of War Information and that most of the prisoners have been murdered.

PFISCNER OF YAR: FDEN REPORTS TO HOUSE OF COV ONS ON PRISONTRS OF YAR

In London, British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, told the Fouse of Commons, that some thousands of British, Chinese, Burmese and Indian war prisoners and internees also have died in Japanese orison camps. He sald that specific atrocities have been told by escapees.

Fiden said that British orotests have drawn unsatisfactory results fror: Japan. He said that the Japanese were violating not only International Law but all human, decent civilized conduct. . He warned the Japanese government that in time to come the record of their military atrocities in this war will not be forgotten.

ISf Yasunira vara sighature of gificial

SEAL
Secretary in the Public Relations Cffice of the Foreign Office

Offictal Csoacity

KWID Jan. 29, 1944 8:00

Here are some of inem, factuaily based unon the nersonal experfences and obscrvations of the three escaped officers.

Trisoners recticed in weight from 200 nounes to 0 pounds in sore cises.. Soue of then found with inganere money or souvenirs on trein nersons \%ere beheaded on bayonetted. \(i_{-}\)fey Ar arican and yitoino men were buried plive. Numercus prisoners yere beaten, whined, and shot when they berced for food and water

Lany were forced to stipip naked for hours in the hot sun. "any of then were fozced on long marches without food or water and mado to do labor wher they were not ohysically able to do so. Some bocijes of the soldiers were run over by Jananesc trucke.

Secretary of state Cordell hull made the following formal statement:
"According to the rejorts of cruclty and inhumanity, it will be necessary to sumpon to asserble together all the -- avallable from any kere and combine the fiendishness which all of them embody in order to describe the conduct of those who inflicted those unthineable tortures on americans and Filininos:"

Ir Bull saic that reneated protests heve beon lodged with eokyo but to no apparent avail.

He said that it is not known what haynened to the food and supplies previousiy sent to the prisoners oboard the liner, "Srinsholme"
ire saic that efrorts, nonetheless, will be continued to obtain release of rar prisoncrse

He said this government is assembling all nossible facts concerning Jananese treatmont of y:ar prisoners, and it intends to seek full ounishment of the reronsible Jopanese authorities.
oct. 23, 1944
ACAPTUGS MITING
Army News Service
IMACARTYCR'S GHP, October 22r--General MacArthur issued a rearning to the Jaranese military leaders that as commander-in-chief of the Arerican invasion forces, he will hold the enemy leaders immediately responsible for any fallure to accord prisoners and internees prover treatment. bachrthur addressed his warning to the Japanese Field inarshal, Count Terauchi, who is commander-in-chief of the japanese military forces in the Philimpines.

The General said, the surrender of the United States and ?hilippines forces in previous campaigns uas mace with the belief that they rould rece ve the dignity and honor and protection of military prisoners as' provided by the rules and customs of war. Since then unimpeachable evidence has been received of the degradation and even brutality to which these prisoners have been subjected in violztion of the most sacred code of martial honor.

\section*{}

I, Seishiro OGAM, hereky certify that I was cfficially connected with the Japarese Government in the following capacity: Acting Chiet or Fourth Section of Research Burean from Nowember 1 1942 to Jure \(3 \mathrm{C}_{2} 1943\); that during the war e nemy radjo station broadeasts vere regularly recorded in the Japanese Foreign Office; that transcripts were regulaily mode of those recordings and the transcripts distributad regularly tr, all sections of the Foreign Office and siss to the Eoard of Information, the Navy Kinistry and the War ixinisiry; that transcrints of those recoraings have been on file with our office.

Ss/ Seishiro Ogawa
SEAL
Acting Chief of Fourth Section of Research Bureau from
Noverber 11942 to Tune 30,1943 Official Cangcity

\section*{CERTIEICATE}

I, Yasuhiso NARA, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Jananese Government in my canacity as Secretary in the Public Relations office of the Foreign Office; that the five documents hereto attached are transcripts of recordings of enemy radio broadcasts regarding treatn:ent of allied orisoners of war recorded during the neriod from January 24, 1044 to Decerber 19, 1944, which are described as follows:
p.1) BBC Jar. 24, 1944, 17:CC - U.S.s. Government: Issues Revort on Tapanese Atrocity
Dr2) San Francisco KWID Jan. 29, 1944, 7:00 Prisoners of
far: Jananese Ill-treat nrisoners of var
\(\mathrm{O}_{\mathrm{r}} 3\) KVID, Jan. 20, 8:00 Japanese Atrocities: Descrintion Given
p.4) KWID, Janc 29, 1944 18:00, Washington: D* scloses

Japanese Atrocity because relief not permitted.
p.5) Oct. 23, 1944e MacArthur's Jarning.
/s/ Gquhira Nara Slgnature of cificial

SEAL
Secretary in the Public Relations Office of the Forelgn Office

Official Capacity
Witness:
(s/ Hidely ligat
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\section*{DOCUMENT 2782}

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST
the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al \}
- AGAINST -

ARAKI, SADAO, et al.
AFFIDAVIT

I, SUZUKI, Tadakatsu, make oath and say as follows:
Q State your name, age, and residence.
A SUZUKI, Tadakatsu, 51 years of age, residing at Yokohama.
Q When war broke out what position did you hold with the government of Japan?
A I was Minister Plenipotentiary in Egypt since 1940. I came home to Japan on an exchange ship in August of 1942 and in December of 1942 I was made chief of the Foreign National Section of the Foreign Office.

Q Until what time did you hold that office?
A Until July of 1945.
Q During your incumbency were you familiar with American notes protesting against mistreatments of American prisoners of war and civilians in the Philippines which were coursed through the Swiss Legation?
A
les.
Q Throughout your incumbency what was the practice of your office once those protests were received?
A The notes were received either in French or English and were translated into Japanese. A copy of the note with its Japanese translation was sometimes addressed to the Minister of War, the Vice Minister of War, the Military Affairs Bureau, or the Prisoner of War Information Bureau, depending on the importance and also the contents of the note. Nevertheless we furnished copies, together with their translations, to the other sections concerned of the Mar Ministry (the Vice Minister of War, the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, and the Chief of the Prisoner of War Information Bureau). In sending those notes, together with their translation, we accompanied them with a covering note which was either a simple note in itself, or accompanied by our own comments or recommendations.

Q Please examine these U. S. State Department notes marked as IPS Documents 10-B through 10-X, inclusive (excepting 10-0), and tell us if they have been received by the Foreign Office in Japan through the intervention of the Swiss Legation.
A Yes, they were received by the Foreign Office in the routine procedure of forwarding them to the different departments of our government.

\author{
/s/ T. Suzuki \\ SUZUKI, Tadakatsu
}

Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned officer by the above-named SUZUKI, Tadakatsu, at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan, this Ieth day of November, 1946.

Witness:
/s/ Eric V. Fleisher
ERICW. FLEISHER M.I.
2nd Lt. A.U.S., M.I.
/s/ Richard H. Larsh
RICHARD H. LARSH

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／ERIC W．FILEMSHER／ 2 nal＜A．A．U．S．M．
朝会

Docuemtn No. 1469D
Page 1

The Gaimucho
Tokyo
29 January 1942
Mranslation
Ho. 22/T3

To the Minister:
Following my letter of 20th inst., No. 11/T3, I have the honour to inform Your Excellency of the views of the Imperial Government on the treatment of prisoners of war:
(1) Japan strictiy oboerves the Gencra Convention of July 27, 1929 relative to the Red Cross, as a signatory of that Convention.
(2) The Imperial Government has not yet ratified the Convention relating to treatment of prisoners of war of 27 July 1929. It is therefore not bound by the said Convention. Nevertheless it will apply mutatis mutandis the provisions of that Convention to American prisoners of war in its power.

I would be obliged to Your Excellency if you would forward the aoove to the Government of the United States of America.
(L. S.) Minister of Foreign Affairs

.age 2

ITAISIT A

Document To. Descrintion

1469-F Cony of letter dated 27 iecember 1941 from the Sי.iss sinister to Shisenori 7000 , Foreign minister.

Letter dated \(2^{n}\) Janusyy 1942 from the Jenanese inistry of coreign Affairs to the Swiss innister (io. 11/T3).

1453-D
Letter dated 29 Jaruary 1942 from the Jeyenese inister of Foreign Affairs to the Swiss . inister (Ko. 22/T3).

1469-C

1469-E

1469-A
Cony of letter dated 20 February 1042 from the Swiss a:inister to Shigenori mcco,
Japanese ioreign :inister (EN.7.1.-ce).

Eetter datrd 13 February 1342 from Jepanese Ministri of Fcreigr Affeirs to the Swiss uinister (ifo. 46/T3).

Iftter deted 2 siarch \(134 \%\) from the Jenanese dinistry of Fereign Affairs to the Swise i.inister (No. 71/T3).
I.P.s. เio. 1:69-A-I

Statement of Scurce grd Autherticity
I, _ Yalter Eogsi_ _ hereby cerilif thet I an officially connected with the i-orernment of Switzerland in tise fcllowing capacity: Swiss Diploratic_Feoresentetive _ , and as such ofificial I have custody of the decuments, consisting of six letters and notes, as listed on Exhibit, A attached rereto and doscribed as follcws: _True _copy af letterg and rotes in Frerch from_the_inister of Switzerland_addrecsed to tho Japanese ministevof Eorelgn Affairg and the orizinal_repites thereto of the Jaranese inistev_of Zoreign Affeirg acaressel to the -保inister of switzerland.

I further certif, that the attached letters and notes are cfficial records of the 5 wiss Legation in Japan and that, they are a part of the official archives ard files thercof.

Signed at Tokyo on this
Sth day of December, 194s.
Witness:_/s/_ Liax R._Ton_
Staterent of Cfficia? Erocurement ated with the Generel eadquerters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the atove certification was ottained by me from the abote siened official of the Swiss Sover ment in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at _ Tokyo_ on this
5th da: of_December, 1946.
!itness:_/e/_ J._A.. Gurtis_ _ .

\section*{- \(/\) sicnature of cinicial -}

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Official Capacity
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Injegtifator IPS Oîficial Ca ;acity

(L، S.) Minister of Foreign Affairs



\section*{CEngIEICAEE}
I.P.S. No. 1469-A-Z

Strivncic Fincy pris Autionticity
I. _ Faltor Eogei _ , herebi ceriffy thet I an officially connected with the forernment of Switzerlerid in tise followint cappeity: Swiss Elplcmatic_Peresentetive _ , and re suc: official I heve custody of the decuments, consisting of six letters and notes, as listed on Exhibit, A attached herebot and described as follcws: _Frie conpy af letters and notes in Trexch frornthe .inister of Switzerlend addressed to the Japanese Ninistry of Zoreign Affant end the orizinal replies - thereto of the Janarese inistry_of Zorcien iffairy gicressed io. the _
 \(\qquad\) I further certif., that the attached letters and notes are cfficial records of the 5 wiss Legation in Jupan and that they are a parts of the official archives ard files thereof.

Signed at Tokyo on this 5th day of December, 134E.
\[
-/ \mathrm{s} / \mathrm{Si} \text { Snature of Cfficial }-
\]

SWiss_Dioloratic Eepresentetime Officiel Canecity Uitness:_/s/ Rax R._Ton_

Staterent of Cficial =rocurement.
 ated with tie Genertil eadquerters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the atcie certification was ottained by we from the abore signed official of the Swiss :over ment in the couduct of my official business.

Signed at _ Tobyo _ on this 5th da:- of_December, 1045.
litness:_/s/. J._A. Curtis_ _
 HAL:

Investra:or IPS Oificial Canacity

Tokio, 20 February 1942

\section*{E.E. 7. 1. - ce}
M. le Ministre,

Referring to your letter of 29 January, No. 22/T3, in which Your Excellency informed me that the Imperial Government would apply mutatis mutandis to American prisoners of war the Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929, on the treatment of prisoners of war, I have the honour to bring the following matter to Your Excellency's notice:

The Government of the United States of Anerica has been informed that, the Japonese Government had agreed as far the treatment to ise accorded to British prisoners of war to take into constderation as to food, and clothing, the national and racial customs of the prisoners.

The Government of the United States of America has requested my Government to bring to the notice of the Japaneso Government tinat it will be bound by the same principle for prisoners of war as for Japanese civil. internees in confomity with Articles 11 and 12 of the Geneva Convention.

It expects in consequence that the Imperial Government will equally conform to the above-mentiamed provisions of the treatment of Alnerican prisoners of war and civilian internees.

I shal: be grateful to Ycur Excellency for keeping me informed oi the views of your Government in this respect.

SWISS MINISTER
To H.E.M. Shigenori TOGO
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Tokyo



冬湖火明










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这《配的（NO．22\T3）


 （ED．7．1－CE）








Cony of letter dated 27 jecember 19.1 from
 Foreign minieter.

1469-5 Jetter dated \(2^{n}\) Janunry 1042 from the Juyanese inistry of coreizn Affairs to the Swiss :inister (io. 11/T3).

1463-D
Letter deted 29 Jarunry \(194 \%\) from the Jevenese inister of Foreign iffairs to the Swiss ..inister (No. 22/T3).

1469-C

1463-E

1463-A
Sony of letter dated \(2 C\) February 1342 from the Ewiss :inister to Shigenori TrGO, Japanese -oreign .inister (Fir.7.1.-ce).

تetter Catra 13 Fetruary 1042 from Jrpanese winistry of Fcreign Affai::s to the Swiss unister (Ho. 46/T3).

Dftter deted 2 .arch 134 an from the Jemanese \(^{2}\) dinistry of Fcreign Affai:-s to the Swies ::Inister (iNc. 71/TZ).

\section*{CEETIEICATE}
I.2.5. :io. 구여-A-I

Statement of Seurce ers Authenticity
I, _Yalter Fogsi _ , hereby certify thet I an officielly connected with the forernment of Switzerlend in the following capecity: Swiss Diplomatic_Reoresentetive _ and as such official I neve custody of the documents, consisting of six letters and notes, as listed on Exhibit, A attached rereto and described es follcwa: Hrue _copy nf. letterg and notes in_Treych fror_the_inister of Switzerland_addrogsed
 thereto of the Jaicarese inuistrv_of Zorcign Affeirs aciaressed tio. the _ Minister_of Ewitgerland. \(\qquad\)
I further certif that the attached letters and notes are cfficial records of the Swiss Legation in Japan and that, they are a part of tie cfficial archires and files thereof.

Signed at Tokyo on this
Sth day of December, 134三.
Nitness:_/g/ Ligax R. Tion_

\section*{Statement of official Erocuremert}
 ated with the General eadourters of the Sunreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the atove certification was ottained by me from the abore signed official of the Swiss =over mert in the conduct of my officiul business.
 5th da: of_December, 1346.
litness:_/B/_ J._A.: Curtis_ _
Tnyast:gaior jPS
OÁficial Cajacity










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 （EE．7．1－CE）

盟䈍钧（NO．46\T3）





K.D.C. Z O. \(\qquad\)
Statement of Source and Authenticity
I. HAYASHI Kanzu, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following cepacity: Chief of the Aro2ives Section, Japanese foreign offloo, and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of I page. dated 3 January, 1942, and described es follows: Copy of letter in Jepanmen from Argentine Charge diafialrs in Tokyo to Forcing ilinister poco in roger to treatment of Prisoner of War.
I further certify the tho attached record and document is an official Cocument of the Japanese Gofer rent, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (apecifrying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular incation of the dnoument in the archives or files): _Corelen kintetry

Signed at. Tokyo on this
Fth day of Norombere 1946.
\(\frac{L B / \mathrm{K}_{e} \text { HAYASHI }}{\text { Signature of Official }}\)

Signature of Official

Fitness: / \(/\) / iegahar: 0 od n
\(\qquad\)

Statement of Official Procurement
I. Richard \(H_{\text {. }}\) Larch, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander inc the Allied Powers. and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Jenanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
12th_day of Jnyembere 1946.
"itunes: Le/ irduard Pekinnoghen
\(\frac{\text { Le l ELChand H. Lergh }}{\text { HAME }}\)
"those Leland Pekngenan
Investigator, IPS Official Capacity
（2）


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Rinoasey of the Argentine republic Tokyo

5 January 1842
H. le iinistre,
is an addition to my note of tie ard instant, in which I had the honor to inform Your Excellency of the proposal of the Governments of Great. Eritein, Canada, Australia and Jew Zealand to observe towards Javan the terms of the International Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war signed at Genera on 27th July, 1929, I have the honor to bring to the knowledge of our -xcellenct that the British Government proposes that, in the annlication of Articles 11 and 1 : of the said Convention, relative to the provision of food and clothing to prisoners of both parties, it will consider the national and racial customs of the prisoners.

In thanking Your Excellency in advance for pour kind attention to this letter, I beg you to accent, ri. le :ainistre, the renewed assurances of my highest esteem.

His Excellency M. Shigenori 30 O minister for Foreign Affairs, Tokyo.

CERTIEIGATE
W.D.C. NTO. \(\qquad\)
\[
\text { I.P.S. No. } 847-9
\]

Stetement of Source end Autioenticity
I, Odo Xegaharu, herely certify thet I am officially onn- ? nected with the Japanese Government in the following capecity: Assistant Chief of the irchives Sectinn, Japenere rinreign Office. and that es such official I have custody of the dncument hereto attacher consisting of 1 page, deted 5 Januery, 1942, end describnd es finllows: Letter in French frnm Argoniine Chyge d'Affairs in Tokyo to Fireign rinister TOGO deted 5 Jaruarw 1942.

I further certify that the atteched recnrd and document is an officiel document of the Jananese Government, and thet it is peri of the nfficial arckives end files of the fnllowing nemed ministry or department (spocifying elso the file number or citation, if any, \(n\) any other officiel designation of the regular location of the dncument in the archives or files:) Foreign Kinistry

Signed at Tokyo on this
8th day of November, 1946.

Witness: \(\qquad\) /s/S. Kcyama

Statoment of Official Sracurement
I, Pichard je Lersh, hereby certify that I am assoniated with the General Heedquarters of the Supreme Commender for tho Allied Powers, and that the abnve certification was nbtained by mo from the ebove eigned officiel of tho Jepanese Government in the conduct of \(m y\) officiel business.

Signed at_Tokyo on this
/B/ Richard H. Largh

8th dev of inov.. 1946.

Witness:/s/Edverd P. Minnegen











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 Sdurard P．Inonaghan


Document Iso. 1465-C
Page 1

29 January 1942

\section*{honorable Charge d'Affaires:}

I: following in my letter of the lgth of this month, I have line hon ur to inform you of the visit of the Imperial Goreinuarit on the treatment of prisoners of war:
1. The Invert is foctorment has not ratified the ae:evient irenvotimen ard therefore it would not be bouse tic any critent by the said agreemend, but would supply nutatis mutandis the
~ provisions of the said agreement toward the British, Canadian: Ausiraiiian and New Zealand prisoners of were under Japenese control.
2. The Imperial Government would consider the national and racial manners and customs under reciprocal conditions when sunpiving clothing and provisions to prisoners of war.

I should be grateful if you would bring the foregoing to the knowledge of the Govern meats of Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

Please accept, ir. Charge d'Affaires, the repouted assurance of \(д y\) highest regards.
/ Signature of Minister /

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Document 3 Yo. 1465-C


Page 1
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\text { Inaction } 12=20
\]

Honorable Charge d'Affaires:
In following up my letter of the 19th of this month, I have the honor to inform you of the virus of the Imperial Government on the treatment of prisoners of war:
1. The Imperti. Government has not ratified the \(\qquad\) crucesuce: the agreement \(\sqrt{\text { tn }}\) quation and therefore it would not be bound to any catent by the said agreemeat, but would apply mutatis mutandis the provisions of the said agreement toward the British, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand prisoners of war under Japenese control.
2. The Imperial Government would consider the national and racial manners and customs under reciprocal conditions when supplying clothing and provisions to prisoners of war.

I should be grateful if you would bring the foregoing to the knowledge of the Cover meats of Great Britain, Canada, Australia and Now Zealand.

Please accept, ir. Charge d'Affaires, the repeated assurance of my highest regards.
/ Signature of Minister /


\section*{}
W. D. C. No.
I. P. S. No. \(\overline{1465-G}\)

\section*{Statement of Source and Authenticity}

I, K. Hayashi hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Jepanese Governmant in the followinh cappcity: Chief of the Archive Section Foroign Office and that as such officiel I heve cuatody of the document hereto atteched consisting of 1 pafios, de.ted 29 January 1942 and described as follows: Cooy or letter in French from Japanose Foroisn Minister to Argentine Chrrëe d'Afíairos dated January 29, 1942, in regard to treatment of priscnaice of war.
I further certify thet the atteohed zasorif ead docunent is en official document of the Jepenese Government, and that it is part of the official archives end files of tho following reme? ministry or department (apecifiving also the file numer or cicntion, if sny, or any other official designetion of the reguler locntion of the document in the archives or files): The Kinistry of Foroign Affeirs

Sisned at Tokyo on this
\(\qquad\) dry of Sept., 1346

Witness: /s/ Nageharu Odo
K. Hayashi

Sisnature of Official
STAL
Chief of hrchives Section Official Capacity

\section*{Stetement of Officiel Procurerent}

I, John Curtis, hereby certify tiat I am c.jeociated with the Generel Headquarters of the Supreme Commader for the Allied Powers, end thet the above describsu document was obtained by me from the ahove sicnet official of the Japanese Govgrrmert in the conduct of my official bueiness.
Signed at Tokyo on this 5 day of Sept., 1946

Witnese:s/William C Prout


NAMS
Investifetor
Official Capacity.
1.
(a) rosecution document numbered 5129, the declaration of :TON SIN JOON, is now of fered for identification and the mar:red excerot offered in evidence. This declaration states that on 19 February 1942 the pitness and other members of the Chinese rolunteer Torce, surrencere? themselves voluntarily in viem of Jabsnese assuraces as to their safety. They rere marched to the Drill fall and nexi day all seventy men rere taken in trucks to Chan;i where they vere stripoed of their possessions and led to the beach.

They rere lined up in tro rovs of 25 men each, facins bren uuns, machine juns and tomy guns. The Japanese opened fire and the witness fell domn into the sea. :inntes later rhen he raised his head, the sea Fater had turned red and the bodies of his comnanions were lyin; around hin, riddled 7 ith bullets. The \(\boldsymbol{r i t n e s s}\) and three other rounded men manased to dras thenselves away.
(b) Trosecution document mmbered 5374, beins the srorn affidavit of A.F. Ball, is offered for identification and the mar'sed excerpt is offered in evidence. Frosecution document numbered 5051, beins the smorn affidavit of C.\% Perry, is offered for identification and the marked excerpt is offered in evidence. Tosecution document numbered 5047-B, being the sroorn affidavit of Rev. G. Volain, is offered for identification and the marked excernt is offered in evidence. These affidevits state that:-
(i) Wajor Ball, on or about 22 February 1942, when ordered by the Japanese to bury a number of bodies, found about 140 dead Chinese by the rater's edze. Some vare boys and some old men and they had been dead, on estimation, betmeen one to four days.
(Ii) Ite. Serry, hearing machine oun fire at Changi, went to see That was happening and was ordered bac': by a Japanese ouard. Later the Fitness sam the dead bodies of some 40 Chinese and inalays on the beach, and on examination, found they had been shot.
(iii) The Rev. Folain in April 1942 saw 43 Ninese bodies lying dead. They had been shot.
(c) Frosecution document 5047-B also states that the चitness Rev. polain sar six dustralians lying dead near Bukit Timah. The men formed a seotion of the \#itnesa's om Battalion and had been shot some time earlier. They were lying alongside an open rave, their hands tied ofith tope and cloth, fith bandazed eyes.

2. Troseoution Jocument numbered 5044 bein; the affidavit of L.T. :RIG:IT is nop offered for identification and the marled excerpt offerea in evidence. This aff tavit states that the pitness about 25 Jamary 1942 say a British amolance convoy bombed fram a lom heijht in Johore, by Japanese bombers. Tisibility mas excellent and the attack was deliberate. Four or fire of the vehicles mhich contained wounded men were hit, and three of them 7ere left burninc. The vehicies rere plainly mariced with the Red cross on the sides and roof and there mas no military target nearby, In the :luar Ziver finhting a party of prisoners peas roped tojether with about 10 or 12 prisoners and 7as marched for some days. Sne of the party had been ill and could not wal.s. It ras officially reported to him by the survivors that he ras talcen off the strin of prisoners into the junile and shortly after that a couple of shots mere heard. The Japanese juard returned Jrinninj and the march was resumed. The guard later told the survivors that the sic! man had been shot becausehe could not keen un with them.
3. (a) Irosecution Document numbered 5052-B is offered for identification and the marked e:ceryt tendered in evidence. It is the affidavit of F.C. STULRT who in January 1942 gas Senior Fepresantative of the Australian Red Cross Society attached to the !1 exandra Hospital, Singapore. This affidavit states that on 3aturday, Tebruary 14, 1942, the hospital was stomed by Japanese troops, who raced through the buildin; bayonetting and shootin; all who came in their path, leavin; behind them a path of death and destruction. The medical staff vas mearing the Red Cross brassard, beds had Red Sross counterpanes and the conventional markings were on the outside and inside of the building. \& huze Red Cross approximately 40 feet square mas on the sround immediately in front of the building. The witness saw two Rritish soldiers of the :ianchester Rejiment bayonetted. After the raid he sam 46 dead bodies whigl had been bayonetted or shot; several had been rounded. At this time an operation aas in projress on a British soldier and he was under an anaesthetic. Tro doctors and two medical orderlies rere in attendance. is Japanese thrust his bayonet throu;jh the body of the patient. Other Japanese turned upon the medical staff and killed one doctor and one orderly and weuaded theother t 70 . Dozens of dead bodies gere picked up in the hospital rounds at nijhtfall. Towards evenin; the Japanese mustered 133 patients and staff. Some of the patients were without footrear, some zereon crutches, others with limbs in plaster. They rere marched away and only trio of the men were ever seen ajain. These men reported the terrible sureams of their companions who were evidently bayonetted on Sunday, February 25th, On Japanese was seen wionin: the blood off his bayonet. Later on, enquiries vere made as to the welfare of themen, but the Japanese replied that they did not have eny prisoners of war. A fer days later a Japanese officer told the C.O. that our mer had been buried in shell holes with Japanese dead, about half a mile to the rear of the hospital. The total killed ras 323, of whom 230 vere patients. The R.Ad.C. lost 47 percent of the medical personnel and 55 percent of the officers on the staff.

\section*{Doc. \(54 ; 30\).}
4.

Later a cromd of Japanese entered the hospital and forcibly looted everythin; of value, such as matcies, fountain pens, rinjs, cigarette cases, trinkets, money; etc. The witness was never recognised as a representativeof the Rec ©ross Society althourh application vas repeatedly made.
(b) Trosecution Document numbered 5373 bein the solemn declaration of J.\%. CRAV in is offecta for identirication and the merked excerpt offered In evidence. In January 1942; the deponent commanded the Alexandra Fospital, Sinjapere; and he confirms the events related by F.C. Jtuart. The declaration further stiateas-
"Tuesday; 17 Febriary \(194 ?\).
"The Japanese G.O.C. csiled at the hospital at 3 p.m..... He expressed rejret for the hard time the hospital had had and assured me that the Japanese were hard fithters but kindly captors and that ve had nothinf to fear ..... Before leavin; he risited part of the hosoital and finally I mastold that I ras to rejara his risit asbein; that of a direct representative of the Ja;pazese Finus.or: and that no hi;her honour could be paid us."

Evidentiary Document N-. 5430.
SYOASIS OF ODDVNC.
S.ING/2'OR:.

\section*{B. Exisoners of \(\operatorname{Mar}\) in Interument.}
1. (a) Trosecution Document numbered 5053 being effidavit of D.R. Jilin is no: offered for identifleation and the marked excerot offered in evidence, and Prosecution voounent numbered 50ij. beinj the affidavit of Lieut. F. RAisBuriti is siffred ior identirication and the marked excerot offered in \(\in v i d e n c e\).

These offidavitis state that in the Great ur ud Samp and on morking parties, prisoners pers beatez and ossailited risinusiy and regularly, They were lideke"̈, beaten with any convenient instument, whipped, locked into unventilated cim confized spaces, timom into boilins caths, and generally at the rill of thear captors.
(b) - rosecui:inn Docurnent nuabered 5030, the affidavit of Lt, Col. C.I. HEATK, D.3.0., is offered for identification and the marked excerpt offered in evidence. This atifiaavit stai:es that in July 1942, at Havelock Road Camp, prisoners from that camp and from the adjoinins River Valley Samp were paraded. The 400 men,mostly sick and bare-footed, rere then forced to run round in a large circle, for thirty five minutes. The Japanese Commandant in addressin: the men, said: "I have proved to you that you can dance in bare feet; therefore you can work in bare feet."

This ras the only action taken on repeated requests for adequate footmear to be provided for the prisoners.

Food and medical stores rerealimays in short supply.
(c) Frosecution Document numbered 5130, bein the affidavit of SJt. G.V.A. ZICOZZI, is nom offered for identification and the marked excerpt offered in evidence. This affidavit rejates to the inhuman conditions existing in the :IIlitary Gaol, "earls fill wrison,

Sen were beaten and tortured to death 7ith little provocation. Chinese and urasians, to: sick to walk or craml, mere carried out on stretchers to be executed.
"Then Hatifield wes condemned to die, he ras kept in an empty cell for six days prior to his execution .... Te had a horror of beheading and the juards never lost on opportunity of tormentin; him with reminders of what gas to come. His mental anjuish must have been almost unbearable. From a 16 stone man he had become a 7 stone mreck and was executed on 6 Deceraber 1943."
ien were driven mad by constant 111-treatment and a Chinese killed himself by beatin; his head ajainst the wall of his cell.

\section*{päe 6}
videntiary Document シo. 5430.

\section*{2.}

The orisaners "ere hopelessly undernourished and covercd in scabrous sores. When they were thou;ht to be about to die; they yere sent to Sinn:i xa.i. Tosoital, so that the orison death rate sid not annear too reat.
2. (a) Tosecution docunent numbered 5423, the affidavit of Lieut. A.G. : :IS, is offered for inentification and the narked excerot offered in evidence. This document refers to the many instances of maltreatment of prisoners of rar in nutrain 7oad raol.
(b) Tosecution Docunent numbered 5.395, the affidavit of Lieut. \(\therefore 7\). D.N is offered for didentification and the merked ercerpt offered in evirence4
"1. T ras a Lieutenant in the \(2 / 4\) :achine zun Battalion, \(\therefore\).I.F., and risis taken orisoner on 15 February 1942 at in;apore.
2. I mas taken to jelaranj "risoner of "ar Cany, from "hich I escaved on 17 arch, with an Australian Corporal. e crossed the Straits of Johore in a small prau and as ve approached a small fishinz villase, our iminediate destination, were captured by mails and alays, tho handed us over to the empel Fai on 6 April 1942. I spent 4 days "ith the eandei ?ai, tho tortured me by burnin; ci;arettes on iny chest and hands and by beatin; me on the head with banboos, to force a confission that I ras a spy.
3. T. ras transferred to Curran canp, rhich was the sith 3uard carn fer Cha: 1 , and held there until 17 Aoril, when \(I\) was sent bacir to the "empei mai. I was held there until 24 April, durine vinich tine I ras asked to si;in a statenent, which I refused. ifter four days of beating, burnin; with cijarettes and electrical shoc'ss, which on one occasion knocked ne unconscious, \(T\) mas handed a statement in Tapanese rith no -njlish translation, which I was ordered to si;n under threats of further torture. I asked for a translation of the document uhich was refused and erentually I si;ned the Japanese docunent. T ras then sent to nutren Foad 3aol on 24 ioril.
4. On 10 itay 1942 T mas brou;ht for trial before a Jadanese Court fartial in 3 ir apore. All the proceedinjs mere in Japanese and there ras no translation. I eventually learned that \(T\) had received two years solitary confinement. I ras then removed to nutra: qoad faol in Which jaol I remained until 13 ras 1944.
5. The cells in outran road were 6 feet by in fect, normally one man per cell. Later two or three men rere put into each cell. In the cell were three boards to serve as a bed, tojether with a hard wooden pillor. There res a latrine bucket, thich mas normally cleared twice a reek. There was one blanket. Durin; the two years I was in the jaol, approximately 2,400 military and non-Japanese personnel passed throu;h the jaol. Of those 110 were military, 150 British and

Fidentiar Docuatint ro. 5430 .

\section*{3.}
urasian, The raiainder were Chinese, alays and taills, of those, aoproxinately 1,000 peoole died in all. Jurin; the saine period, 3,070 Javanese nassed throu;h the ;iol, of thom only one died. The most the faol held at any one period of tiae, of non-Tapanese personnel, was 233.
6. The conditions in Sutram Boad were annallin;. The ration consisted of threc meals ocr day, in all 6 oz . of rice and lid pints of watery soup. There ras no Japanese dector in the prison cams and the one Tn-lish doctor, a orisoner for a shoric time in the carny, was ;iven no facilities oith :hich to deal aith the sicis. He was not even allored to visit thea. The ;anl was 250 yards away froa Sin;apore graeral losyital, the nain hosoital of Sin epore, but no prisoner mas ever sent there, excent for one Chinese who tries to cominit suicite before trial. "e was taken to tiellossital where his head was semn up, and brou;ht bacir to the ;aol for trial.

There mere no swomers, no towels, no toilet articles of any nature. In order to wash ourselves we wire sanetis.s iven a buciset of teater to throw ovcr ourselves. For the first six veeles 1 never left ay cell and never ad a wash.
7. The first arrived in the jaol it was li:se bedlan. eovle Tere acreanin; all äaj from pain froin their wounts and their beatin;s. The jaol Coinandant used to co:ae and watch us, nalse no cominent and leave. The juards,both "oreen and Japanese, had complete control over the prisoners. I sam nany prisoners beaten and I saw many people die. xambles are as folloys:-

On 10 itay 1943, 4 Thinese arrived in the prison, They were handcuffed and ciained dorn in: their cell. They vere in oood physical condition. whey yere dead in six ree'rs of malnutrition and beatiajs. I sa, then of ten beeten by sticks and sword soabbards.

Zavies, an 'mjilshmen, very bi.jly built, arrived at annroximately the saje tine as I did in Anril, \(1 \geqslant 42\), he contracted beri beri and \(b_{i}^{\prime}\) Au.;ust his testicies were two feet in diameter. His only method of realiin; pas to oarcy them in front of hia. The Jamenese used to brin; their friends in to ratch him and never did anythin: to hel, him, nor verait
 bcaton nany tinesmis he died sovered in his onn excreta and urine, For five days before his death he had been unable to lsave his cell and re \(\cdots e r e\) not allore? to heln.
G... Barter died on 13 February 1943, as a result of beating. Shortly before he died, he was very weal:, sufferin; fron beri beri and dysentery end on 12 Feoruary, the juard cane into inis cell and forced hin to his feet to carry his latrine bucicet oat to enpty it. \(t\) tiais tine Darter fas aerely skin and bene. Te vas unails te lift the bucket and tried to dra; it glon; the jround. He mas unable to do this, ho ever, and fell dom. The juard beat hin and kicifed hin for nearly five ninutes. The next aoraidj; he wes dead.



Fidentiary Jocument 10. 5430.

\section*{6.}
the hands they had used to dry their rounis. Tiles of scaly sitin lay in the corners. There yere bed bugs in the boards of the bed. -e ere never shaved and had to cut our nails by scrapin'; them on the concrete floors. All the juards more masks when they 'ere on duty in our bloc: of cells. They never touched anythin; in our cells rith their harts, only with their srords or with ;loves. nur cells pere cleaned to iny knorled;e, only trice in the tro years. on the other hand the block in yiaich the Japanese prisoners were housed was beautifully clean.
12. -very uard ras a law unto hinself and ane evenin; a juard rould beat us for not bein; asleen; the next on duty pould beat us for bein; aslec:.
13. Thare were wor::in; oarties in the jaol which bejen in nctober 1042, Fien soae of us ment out cleanin; drains. 3y "ay 1943 other parties had been formed.
14. It was inoossible to seen notesor a diary since cells were searched daily. Outran Tand ;aol ras the sentral caol for the Japanese Southern dr'ay, so that when a cell pas enoty 're :-nery either the man had difed or had been executed, or was about to be executed.
15. 'hen I first arrived in the jaol I sar in the open buildinjs Thich vere around, siz fully stociced with cases of tinned mil':。 I estimate there were between 20 and 30 thousand cases. "e .ot a little for the first month; after that we had mil:s trice on the mperar's birthday in 1942 and 1943. The milk was used by the Javanese for thenselves in the jaol and as presents to visitors. It was not distributed to other units. There was enough ailik in the gaol to sumply every orisoner with ailk until the end of the rap gith a ;ood deal to s rare, and Vitainin B was, of course, our reatest need.
16. On one occasion a menber of the zoyal fanily mall:ed throu;h the jaol at the end of 1942. Te never looked into the cells, he merely walkd into the passa.je. \(n_{n}\) several occasions hi;h rankin; officers paid visits to the jaol. They must have seen sone of the prisoners at their work or carryin; their latrine buckets to be emptied. rior to such visits, the cell steps rould be scrubbed with soap. joan was never issued to the orisoners for the purpose of vashin; their bodies.
17. On the 13 Way 1944, I left cutran Yoad gaol and went back to Chan;i jaol and was put in the tover. I ras asiced to si;jn a non-escape form, which I did eventually under compulsion. I was then released and beoane an interpreter, join; to Jukit ;anjans sith 379 officers and anen, to diJ Japanese fortifications. The iustralian Tann Connandant protested to the Japanese serseant in charge of the camp, and to hish inspecting officers who visited, as to the nature of the worl, but to no avail. In June 1945, an iustralian, rivate ?ilson, ras killed in a fall of earth ontin; to insufficient precautions bein; taken, durin; the tunnellin; of the hole.
videntiary Docunent 10. 5430.
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The morle partise bejan at 3 a.m. and narbed four or five inil each norninj. For tlis :ust part, men ied no beois. Jone used henemade rubber shoes or closs, cithers had bare fect. nfificers ere not oerinitted to leave the cand, nor allozed to \(; 0\) pith the workin; parties, which norically returned \(\varepsilon t 6.30\) n.m. Towards June 1945 , the men bejan to return foom wor's parties at \(10 \mathrm{p} . \mathrm{m}\); in the evening, after wo-king 20 to 30 feet inio the side of a hill by candlelifint, and not hevin; ea;en since midaay. They of'tan came kack ret through. No lijhts Fore allo that it was often very difficult to provide a hot aeal at nijht.

Clothin; was very short in the camp and in about july 1945, 50 pairs of Chinese romnn's blooners were issued to the great anusement of the villa.jers as some of the mon ralked throujh the strets in them. Te had very little medical stores in the canp and although 200 yards away ras a nedical store distribution centre, we were unable to obtain any nevertheless. A jood ceal of beatin; \(u\) ) by the Guards took place, one order that all men had to selute sentries, privided ample excuse for many beatinus.

The raticn for working men yas 10 oz , of rice daily, 3 oz . of va;etables and cccasionally tinned food, जhich anpeared to be Rad Gross supolies, since I sar: 7ed rooss parcels in the stores. The ration for a sick man was about 30 percat less. This affecter the cam basio ration, as about 50 percent of the cann were sick."

Trosecution Document numbered 5397, the affidavit of Lieut. \(\mathrm{A} . \mathrm{G}\). 'eynton, is now offered for identification and the inarked excerpt offered in evidence. This affidavit confirms the conditions of living in cutraa poad gacl and makes reference to the beatings and mur? er of prisoners, and to the execution without trial of Allied airnen and civilians.
(c) Trosecutisn Docunent murbered 5977, bein; the affidavit of miajor J...D. BULL is nort offered for identification and the marked excernt offered in evidence. Trosecution Document numberea 5064-3, bein; the affidavit of lajor 3.L.i. CLARLE is offered for identification and the marked excerpt tendercd in evidence. These documents refer to the zross inadequacy of foed supplied to the prisoners in qoberts Barracks and -RANII Canp, resulti 3 in deficiency and other liseases; no attenpt ras made hy the Japanese to control the incidence of malaria. .hen men came to hospital from work on the Jurna-siam railway, in eppalling physical condition, the 2.0. \(\overline{0}\). Doctors were ifiven no holp or facilities to deal with then. There was a shortaje of esscntial drujs and stores. iscomnodation for the sick was jreatly inedequate.

Fitentiary רocument No. 5430.

\section*{3.}
ister the currencer, the Tajanese sent in enornous quantities of food to tie hositals. "ru;s, instrurents and othcr jreatly needed articles :yere sent in, Thesc hed been in Jinjapore since 1942, yet requests for food and cince to save life had always durins interment been refused.
3. rosocution docunent mumbered 505?, bein; the affiderit of aris. \({ }^{7 \prime \prime}\). Gill gis.N, ie not oifered Por identification and the narked excerot offered in evidence. This affidavit states thati-
(i) Ta jentenber 1942, four prisoners of mai wore executed eith out trial by the Jejonese for an attempted escape tiaree menths earlier. They rere shot in the presence of the 71tness. ifter the execution the Jananese Cownsnier jave the \(\therefore 0 . \therefore\) spectators a homily remindin:: them that disobedience of orders acant death.
(ii) Owin; to the rorusal to si;n non-escese forms voluntarily, the 16,000 nrisoners of war under the scmmand of the witness were ordered to move into the squarest selareng ramacks by 1800 hours, 2 jeptenber 1942. The nornal accomnodation of the barraciss was for roughly 450 men. The prisoners of war remained thus until 4 Septonbor, when an arrecant ras arranjed. Durin; this pariod no rations were supplied to the prisoners of war, and there was a lar;e increase in the number of dysentery and diphtheria cases. vacuation of the sicis fron the squere into tie hospital was not pernitted.
(1ii) In Changi camp, food mas alvays inadecuate. One nan of 16 stone meljht dropjed to 4 stone and zenerally peoole 7ere at least one third underweifint. Doficiency and sicin diseases yere rife. Fedical supplies terc jrossly inadequate.
(iv) Frisoners were enjajed on buildin; airfields, hours were lonsi clothinc was insufficient and representations to the Comandinz Jajonese General of nis avail. Japanese aeroplanes used the airficid after its construction.
(v) Demands made by the Tayanesc for moriline parties 7ere inpossible to fulfil using only healthy men. Sic's inen mere forcec to ror's and repsated compleints rere useless.
(vi) There vere no visits by any Fed Sross Reoresentative, Cospite freçuent requests.
(vii) There tere inspections of shanzi ta to by aigh rankins officers. scunt Terauchi trico inepected the Cam?. General ITAGA:I inspected the caup and walked throujh it. Jeneral fojo wien in Singapore did not visit the camp.
4. Trosecution Document numbered 5057-7, the affidavit of ت.T.C. QU:ST is now offered for identifioarion and the marised excerpt offered in

Page 13
\(\nabla\) identiary Document No. 5430.

\section*{9.}
evidence. Mhis affidavit states that the pitness, the ped moss Fioresentativein !elaya, interned as a prisoner of gar in piver valley Carlo, was hripes ei am frusurated in evary effort he made to use the facilitios of his sociecy for the icenefit of wheriscners of rar. Termission pas refused to enable the witress to ma're necessary purchases and help crisoners of war in the hands of the "enpei mai.

The witiess broxint the ped ross sonventions and pules to the notioe of various Jajanese officers in a fruitless endeavour to obtain proper facilities.

Red Gross parcels \(7 e r e\) inisused and no supervision in their distribution was perinitited.

Pate 1:
Evicantiery Document Nio. 5430.


C: IfTEXZ正
A) Frosecution Document numbered 5078 being the Affidavit of \(J\), \(I_{n}\) ILSOiv, the i.ight i.everend Lord Eishop of. Singapore together with the report of tioe Sime sood Commission in re?ation to "The Duble Tenth" raid, is now offered for ldentification and the marked excerpts offered in evidence. This Aocument states that:-
"On 10/10/43, all internees in Chang1 Prison were paraded soon after davm in the kicin Yard as if for a routine roll-call......A numiver of the internees were called out by' name, labelled and segregated.......The investigation. fininhed after dusk and internees were allowed to retura inside the Frison. iany of them had hed no food since \(6 \mathrm{p} . \mathrm{m}\). (T.T.) on : the previous day, and soma suffering distrese aid even collapse owing to the day-long exposure to the sun without food. \(\because\)

In consequence of this investigation, 57 internees were removed from Changi Pijson by the liflitary Police on or after 10/10/43......the Japanese vere trying to establish that there was a sfy organisation in Changi Prison which received and transmitted by radio telephony, which had esteblished contacts in the town for the purpose of sabotage and stirring up of anti-Japanese feeling, and which collected money from outside for this purpose. In fact, there was no spy organisation, no radia transmission and no attempt to promote antiJapanase activities outside the Camp....

The conditions under which Internces were detained by the liliftary Police were rigorous in the extreme. They were crowded, irrespective of race, sex, or state of health, in small cells or cages. They were so cramped thet they could not lie down in comfort. No bedding or coveringsof any kind wer \(\epsilon\) provided and bright lights were kept burning overhead all night: From 8 a.h. to \(10 \mathrm{p}, \mathrm{m}_{\mathrm{f}}\) inmates had to sit up straight on the bare floor with their knees up and were not allowed to relax or put their hands on the floor, or talk, or move, except to \(\varepsilon \circ\) to the lavatory. Any infraction of the rigid discipiine involved a beating by the sentries. There was one pedestal water-closet in each cell or cage, and tie water flushing into the pan provided the only water supply for all purposes, including drinking. It should be recorded here that nearly all of the inmates suffered from enteritis or dysentery. No soap, towel, toilet articles or handkerchiefs were permitted and inmates had no clothing other than those they were wearing. \(\because\)

The rood supplied.....Was insusificiert to support iife over a long period and led to serious deficiency diseases

Page 15
Evidentiary Document No. 5430.
Pape 2.
In all cases of ling detention.
Nedicel facilities....were for all rractical purposes non-eyd steni.,..sa Japanese doctor, who was called to see an Internee suffering from a fractured pelvis and possibly ruptured kidney, remarked that the man was not sick enough......

The buildings occupied by the Japanese Military Folice resounded all day and all night with blows, the bellowing of the inquisitors, and the shrieks of the tortured. From time to time, victims from the torture chamber would stagger back or, if unconscious, would be drageed back to their cells with marks of their ill-treatment on their bodies. In one such case, an unconscious victim so returned died during the night, without receiving any medical attention, and his rody was not removed until the afternoon. In these conditions, and this atmosphere of terror, these rien and women waited, sometimes for months, their summons to interrogation which might come at any hour of the day or night.

Usually interrogations started quietly and would so continue as long as the inquisitors got the expected answers. If, for any reason, such answers were not forthcoming, physical violence was immediately employed. The methods used pere:-
(1) water Torture. There were two forms of water torture. In the first, the victim was tied or held down on his back and a cloth placed over his nose and mouth. Water was tien poured on the cloth. Interrogation proceeded and the victim was beaten if he did not reply. As he opened his mouth to breathe or to answer questions, water went down his throat until he could hold no more. Sometimes, he was then beaten over his distended stomach, sometimes a Japanese jumped on his stomach, or sometimes pressed on it with his foot.

In the second, the victim was tied lengthways on a ladder, fece upwards, with a rung of the ladder across his throat and his head below the ladder. In this position, he was slid first into a tub of water and kept there until almost drowned. After being revived, interrogation proceeded and he would be re-immersed.
(2)

Beating with iron bars, brass rods, sticks, bamboos, wet knotted ropes, belts with buckle's, or revolver butts, all over tine body. whilst these beatings were being inflicted, the victims were sometimes suspended by the wrists from a rope passed over a beam. Sometimes their hands were tied behind their backs and they were forced to kneel on sharp pieces of wood or ir on, while sharp-edged pieces of wood or metal were placed rehind their knees so as to cut into the flesh as they linelt. binle they were so kneeling the Japanese would

Page 16
Lvidentiary Locurentio. 5430 .
Fege 3
Jump on their thighs or on the projecting ends of the kar or wood kehind their knees; scmetimes to increase the pressure on the wood or bar behind the keees, a Japanese would perch himseif on the cioulcers of the vjetim, or the victim, with hands untied, would te sompelied to hofd heavy weights above his head. They were oiten forced to remain in this position without intermission for 9 to 10 hours, during which period interrogation would go on remorselessly, punctuated by blows. At times, the viciin wuld be tied to a table and flogged until he lost cunsciciisness. In cne case, the man so floged counted over 200 blows defore losing conscicusness. Tinis treetment, was in some cases, carried on daily for 4 to 5 days consecutively. In one case, a Europeen who died later, izas interrogated with the usual kea:ing, fer \(5 \%\) hours at a stretch and another -uropean since dead, underwent 144 hours of beatings in all, accordirg to the estimate of his cell mates
(3) During interrogaticn the inquisitor, in many cases, burnt the victim with cigarette and cheroot ends, even on the most sensitive parts of the body, e.g. arm-rits, between the toes, on the scrotum end penis. Several Asiatics had petrol poured on their bellies and ignited, and another Asiatic had his hands tied together and immersed in a bowl of methylatec spirit which was ignited.
(4) Electric Torture. There were two forms of this. In the first, an induction coil was used, one electrode being attached to the hand or foot and the other bare wire was applied to various perts of the hody. One victim reports that he was thrown across the room by the violece of the shock. The effect has been described as one of physical and mental disintegration. The second form apparently more severe, was called the electric table or electric cap. There is evidence that this was used but not on any of our witnesses.
(5) In addition to these forms of torture, the inquisitor, often employed other methods; such as ju-jitsu, twisting of limbs, bending back of fingers, twisting of sharpedged wood between fingers, punching, repeated klows on the sare spot, and so on. These methods, in mant cases resulted in dislocations and permanent damage to limbs and joints. In one case, the inquisitor punctuated his questions by flicking off, with the frayed end of a bamboo, flesh briused in a previous beating. This left a permanent scar, six inches by three inches on the victim's thigh.
(6)

In several cases, victims were lad to belleve that their execution either by beheading or shooting, was inminent. They were advised to wrice a letter of iarencli. Preparations for execution were carried out, up to the evnultimate stage, with such realism that, in two cases, the vicizms fainted.

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Evidentiary Document No. 5430 .
Eare 4.
(7) . \(\therefore . . \quad: \quad\). \(: ~ T h r e a t s\) to families. Threa were also made to take action against the family of the victim (the wives of some Internees were believed to be in Japanese custody in other parts of Asia). Torture was car=jed out to the limit of human endurance. One Internee attempteci to commi suicide by jumping over the verandah. In his fall he fracture: ins peivis, but, despits his condition, his interxogation under tortiure was continued until just before he di.ed. In another casa, the Interies anked inis Ingulsitions firi the means to comitit suicide, a pistol was produced and was snatehed awas only winen the man wes about to carny out his declured intentior
B)

Prosecution Document numbered 5131, being the Affidavit of C. E, iillimbihinis is now produced for identificatic and the marked excerpt offered in evidence. Prosecution document numbered 5205 bejng the affidavit of Dr. B. N. JOHNS is offered for identification and the marked excerpt offered in evidence.

These fificavits confirm the evidence of the Lord Bishop of Singapore and describe the tortures they observed inflicted by the hempel Tai on civilians.

The ritness Filtermann states that "on one occavion I saw the Bishop of Singapore who hed been maltreated terribly. iis legs from his hips to his ankles had been beaten to pulp. They were iltaraily like raw meat.... \(i\) ie was just about able to crawl."

Evcry refinement of torture, every conceivable humiliation, every possible degradation, was inflicted upon the internees as these documents testify.









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\section*{Duidonticry Doculiont ! 5129}
(tcla in his orn roriss).
I tios in the ssfr under cupt. Yup Theris cock, until the stirronder und disbundriont uncicr orders., I :\%oni to live mith fricnds at Imvendcr strect Corner Bur.

On the 17th fob 1942 cet 12 orolock ve vere told by the Rerpei-tai (Jap Military poilivo) thit ru smet fo to jalen Beane to be inturncaliand re
 4 olclock ad found tho pinco full of popples, (quato a for thousands of thom

 pircs arcund, and no onc stouid cross ozer thesc mirus, if thoy do they will be shot. ill the heusos; strcct corrars, five.foct voy, and Siong Ifin sar kills arc packid like serdincs, and coald hurdiy valk irecly. Cooking is very ciffficulit: : tatice is sjur3c, and thuse pluces nore very dirty, still more people irt cousing ine inll sould nardly sicop ithen night conce, bcemase of shorit of spuco, and the only wisy to slocp is to sit cionn and crossed our logs.

Fe ataycd thero for tro deys ! and woro lator told by the japs - that all the fomily can roturn to thcir howos on the worning of the 19th, and men and boys obovo sixticon yeurs uro not ullorici to gos oarly in the corning of the 29th all of the: (the fanlilice) fero lined up in a long queue roady to louve the curp. The japs caro e.t cbout 8 o'cleck and told thori that thoy can go nop. hon iy vifc and childron had left an that day, I went back to the house unxiously arraiting to to beck hous.
it 2 pai:. 19th Fcb rich Jlek yones told we that the Japs have callod out for 2 ni B.tn. Chinosc yoluntcors to surrendor. I got out and sary a croizd of chinese uround a vihitc buniocr tith Chincso chcractors on it, und c Chincse standing uncicr this burncer esking hiss unybody socn we Tan Kuh rices ucbody ansiorcd. IC then toid the won that the Japuncso runtod all the Chinose yoluntcors to surroncicr; if thoy dc, they will bo given a pass to \(g 0\) back hewo and a job is a poilourer: if riacy do net surrander and if cought rithin therco days thoy wi.li bo shot to iesuth. I left tho mob of listonors and wout in scaroh of \(1 . y\) voliant:ur fricnis, and thers I found cpl. Chia Tiung Bco, ople Koh jiak yorg call foit othur volunicors. I askod thow
 yot as thoy wish to fitiad cuto io ingon milkud to tinc gato and thoro wo
 nomos ind addrcsscs, and the one the is tilize dom the ruccrds aro ono of our "E" Coy, zan, ind iurthorncro no gaty at tho gate near the cxit uro Liout. sch sice 100 ind ing yug tin Chyo.

Scise of the civiliurs let locse aftor boing qucstioncd, and wore given an identification stavy on the puing of their hinds, our turn corxis ncxt aith Cpl. ricing bce luading, as soon tis bo passed the gute \(I\) hoora

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somebody say, here they ano. Cpl. Tiund Bec vore balns rocognize. a and he was tcid to bring us to zapur. wo we ma in charge on ta: lefi, Iieit.


 while, and Lieut. Gok cale cuit ani tol us again as ho rished to hive cll rocooils of us, witor thas he lcitt us and no never sali hins cgain.
then morning cente abcuï 9 or 10 olchook throo lerries and one private cor cane to our plece: onc lecry wis in' of frips, they swrounded our'placo and cara anto cur hall; they wore armed rish aren cinns, and told us to atcnd up in ime rows of 35 eath, tren simply tioc. oux hands bchind oux

 Groove Ro:d and then to chargi. \(\because e\) vare expuctirg the icary to stop at the Changi jail, but to cur sicprise they kept on moving, then wo knew of our fate, thet we cro geing to bo shot.
iffor aevorul ininutes tho first lorry stopped somerhore near the custon houso, riac prieonors vere bold to got dom, and wore takon to the house and scorehid ind zeliovet of ain their possessions, such as gold ringe, cosin, geld muthes and ofinor arioicies, the lorry which I wis in came next; it sropg jo mit we wion nct searehci, gho Jups told us to join the others. : \(\because \mathrm{c}\) wrin thon loia ju go dowa to the beuch. (Just like a flock
 firing squad. Sonc of us erted, ance sal.ing firs insir purents. is ragarde to myeclf I cricd tico oint couid shat no teans, my linios werc as cold as ice ohen I lcoked arcund and sad tin fixine suiad in their pesition. I
 gunnors in lying postion. pronguns right in the contre and the firing squad bofore us. (This was on the 205h sob, 29'42)

Despito all the crying and accining to found ourselves on the becch facing uhc squej with our isants tacu behind our backs, e wore then lincd up in troo revis of 3.5 cach, as scen cs we rexo in linc the Japs caught us in a cecss fire cocr and cver again, and inc: for winutes no ware all dom, \(x\) foil facc domparas, shet, bity still alivc. I daro not racve, juet protorid io bo foci. Fs inis the tho tide was coming in, and the Japs had ccaecd flice, cnl I thougat tho aips ned luft us. I oculd hold out no leres. \(x\) what d ic liranits ond the witor got inte ray noso and
 rattling os the guns ngoin, ind \(\perp\) foli the berning pain just at wy loft sido of wy brciy ant erth a shotit. "Ci., wiv Gile" I'm finisioud. thcugh

 and I only hesecd tho beatiting of a dran.

I vaited for a while but ncthing happonoci so I slcrily raised ny head and locked arcund, hilf auzed and is. torribl: pain; and rhat a ghastly sighe mit mer sigs. fithe sea ratci hac rurned red instead of greon, and only a foot uray vero the bociss of my mitcs cipl. Chia tiang Beo and

Evidentiary Docurnent \# 5129.

\section*{3.}
ptc. John fetcr Tun ridāici vitl bullots. at the sisc tinc I heard a low voico calling for help just tizc brdios amay frcm Cpl. Tiung Ecc and Jchn potcr Tan. I did not kncid what to de, I durod nct got up fer fear thet sonc Japs zight bo arcurd, bu's I just, relled coor the bcdios of ny frionds and get te the rian whe hed callod out. He teld wo that wo hed bettor get out of the place quick. I asked hin tery we culd escapc inhen our hands werc tied bohind cur backs. Ho tcid ne te put ry wists in betveon his tecth; I did so and he rançea to relucso ado; thon he tcld dio that he hed got a pun-knife in his pceket; I tock the knife out and rolcased hirs, and told hin to wait. I turnod to ry laft this tinc and to
 them and relewsod theis. rese of thali hed nesty mounds in their left shculders they were twe nea frol: "E* Coy. onc of thin is named Pto. Tan Chung Cher. incthcr one was sinct through the thigh and ho belcnged to the Fcrt Curnirif Stanis,
iftcr rulousing than I tcld thor to got aray quickly. I Ect beck to the cne whe had released nec, and I found that he mas alroacy dead :Ith a blef round in the ccritro cf his trircet, causcd by 45 bullct. I Fuated no time but jeined the otter tioc and ect out of the place. :e cculd hordiy stanc up, but \(\quad\) o cramled to scmg lalling bushcs whore ro rostod. :ic askuc ecoh other i.hore te GC after this, and cne of then said that wo rust kcep ecing to the left. \(\because \mathrm{Zc}\) crarrlod scric distance thon hed ancther rost ind rust have fillion aslocp, as reo rerc sc tirod and hungry duc to hcavy less of blecd. (This ticas in the cocning of tho 20th Feb 1942.) I ricke up at the break of darm, and ect to the enc noarest to ne, but I cculd nct find tho cthor tre i:ith the breken shculdors. They had gone thile I vics islecp.

IN fricnd scid that re Lust kcep on geing, ac be kept on craviling for about 200 yards there te found sere blocd stains alcng cur pathe, on and on wo fellorici the trail of the blcodstains till wo rcached scroo palcy villigges, thore tic sair sche rell-drcased Neliys, but wo darai net GC to thein fir fear thet we Lieht oncountcr sonc Jcps, but ro called to ther and they tiarnci reund anc sare us, and askod us whit wo wantod. They rofuscd to assist us, but oventucilly wo ect ams. Litor :ro ecn-
 cur wounùs recrc troutcd.]
(Signed) :.ONG SNI Joorr.
Statuicent mide to ne at s'pcro \(12 \mathrm{Fcb}, 1946\).
(signcd) \(\because\). Tomin, Majcr.
O.C. Civil ifficirs ar crines Investigation Secticn singapore.

Exainined by no with orifinal afficinvit and cortificd to be a true cepy.
17 i.pril 46.
(Siencí) R.S. Lel.BE, It.Ccloncl.


Novik




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Evidentiary Docucnt NO. 5374.

19. 1

T:E UNITID STAT:S OF ATETIC., AND ORS
- iGanISST -

URLSI, S.D.O, WD ORS.
 -siy as follous:
1. I ras NXl2309 M jor L.lbert Friuik Beill, 2/15 .ustrialian Field pectucnt when I tias taken prisoner by the Jnpanose c.t singapore on 15 Fcbrucury 1942 and pliced in Biràrood Cui-p.
2. i.pproxinately ose rouk uftcr ny arrival thero I bus detailed to talie charge of a porty to bury a nurbber of bodics on the boach.
3. I tool: the purty consioting of four offieers and approxinatcly 60 other ranks to the bcach and after sole difficulty I locatcd the boailes to be burica.
4. There l:cre approxidatcly 140 ancud chinese alonc the mater's odec over a distance of about :00 yerde. They fere of all ceod runging from boys to old icn. Soick reore dresscd in chincse clothes and sowe in zuropecn ciothes. Thoy had bcon killca by arall arris fire minly about the uppar part of the body and houd and fron behind. Cupt. H. Tucker Thio ras a reaical officor and was oric of the p.rty, estirated that sore had boon doad for is lone as 4 days, and others approxiantely 24 hours,
5. The todics norc ticd tocether in bitci.es of 6 to 8 with their hends belind their buclis by acans of sicnal wirco; ;
\[
\begin{aligned}
& \text { Taken and sprorn at sydncy } \\
& \text { this sovinteonth dcy of } \\
& \text { Scptciber 1946. } \\
& \text { Boforére. } \\
& \text { (Signcd) } \\
& \text { (SiGned) d.F. B.LL. } \\
& \text { ? , J.P. }
\end{aligned}
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 \& \(\quad \alpha+\lambda \%=/\) CAMPBELL WESTOW PERRY/: <.q.C.U.













Evidentinary Decurcnt No．5047B．

\section*{}

NO． 1
TITE UITHED SRLTHES OF SSERTCA dND ORS．
－acainet－
SRITI，SiD． 0 h \(\operatorname{ADP}\) ORS．
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If GEORGE POLin＇，：who oct：and saij as folloris，
1．I Tis ci．ailain goorso folain，NX70175，of $2 / 26$ Battalion．I beculs a jirisonor of win at Sincajore on 15 February 1942.
2．Ti．e cilly C：incese I ant oxecutoci rooro 43 bocies，soietin after

``` the cajitulation of singapore．Their iunde ：ere tied boilind their backs －nd rais verg still around their iecids．Sci．e of thet hed been ahot throuch the heac．They rere tiod tocether in fours．That rould be just aftor pister 1942，sceme：llero about insil．The nctives in the cary noarby said the juyanese dad executeci the：．ill I sari ras the bodies－the sholetons．

3．The only otl：er peojile I suart like that mas a section of our orm gattalion at what looked to bo a Japanese Conany HQ，near Bukitian． The sit．was Sit．Fat olreill．iujor racicy rill knor：the naries of the other weri，ris body，tocictier rith five others，was lyinï thero， his haicis rere tiod behind his back and he had been shotthrouk the headithat rould be about Junc or July 1942．It lookod to 2 ．as though thoy had been liakin；their tiay buck when \(\mathrm{cc}_{\mathrm{i}}\) ：tured by the Japanese，taken to this company Ho，and there the whole of then rere shot．

4．They had been siot sore consideruble tixe beforo the capitulatio． Tiselr hands vore tied aitl roje anc cloti．e There were otill pieces of raikad cloth around their eyes．They hac thoir icentification discs and soles of thoin also had pay books und rarks of identification．They
 Crave．Tliey rere jrobably lined \(u_{j}\) beside the trench and killed there， jrobubly qith the iaea of puttin \({ }_{i}\) ，the boiifes in the trencl，but they rero not buried．
（SiLned）GIORGE IOLIIN．
strarn before ne at sydney on tho ）
Ninti day of sopteuber 1946 ．）
（si，ned）i．J．TinNsfrivid．
Judi，e of suyrolse court of queenaland．

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pointed out their house but said they could not help me, saying thit they were leaving on acrount of the Japanese, but would return when the Japs had gone. I stayed there two days, seeing no-one.
9. From this time on I am uncertain of times and days anc cates, For about eight days I moved unmolested towards Singapore] and finally came to what appeared to be that part of Singanore known as 'Chinatom' and eventually collapsed. A young sink policeran brought me coffee and hailed a rickshaw and at my request sent me to the Singanore General Hospital. A sentry tried to prevent me entering the building, but I got in through a hole in the blasted wall and lay cown in a passage. a dental assistant found me and hici me in a rioset and brought a man named Professor TI 17 AN ?ho was carrying on as a dentist under Jepanese orders. I met him again later interned in CHANGI. He took me to his curgery and dressed my wounds. I did not divulge their cause. He and his assistant shel.tered me in their rooms. Their position was very difficult and later a Jep Dr had me movad to the main vard under the clock tower and I came under Jan medical people. The Professor cane with me and gave me ten collars, he said he knew I vas an 4ustralian soldier and if I had any reason to fear Ja jane se enquiry regarding my yound to feign mental shock. I was attended by a Eurasian orderly for about a week and not questioned by the Japs, my treatment was good. By 15 ;'ay IC42 I was able to walk ane was taken out to a motor car and was asked by a Jap civilian what I did in Singapore. I renlied that \(I\) was a driver in the 4 IF. I was then driven to Changi Gaol and handed over to the British Gaol \(\because\) : Administration. I have them my full particulars and they told the Japs that I should be taken to Telarang Barracks where the Australian soliners vere interned. Nevertheless the Japanese seit? that this Dr had ordered that I remain at Changi Gaol uniti fit. I remained there until 12 Oct 1942 when I was muved to Selarang Sariacks and rejoined my unit.
10. "hile I was in the Singajore General Eospital, I ascertainer the name of a wounced Japanese soldier in the bed next to mine as TATSOU INACHI, whose address was 1102 CHIBAKOO, Tolio. I mention this fart as it may be of assistance in the identification of both persons and units responsible for these atrocties.

STOFN RY TFE SAID Leslie "illiam UcCANN) at PEPTH in the State of 'eestern
(sgd)
Australia on this 27th day of larch, 1946.

Before me George ㄲ. Gwynne.
1 Comrissioner of the Supreme Court of Western sustralia for taking afficavits.

Exilibit "C" - This is the document marked उxhibit "C" referred to in the affidevit of Major J. K. Lloyd s:rorn before me this twenty-seventh day of :lay 1946 as being procuced and sho:m to him at the time of his swearing his saic affidavit.
/s/R. D. Crompton, Capt. An officer of the Austrailan Fililtary Forces.

I, rx390rs :faior John Kevtn LLOYD of Irmy Heacquarters make oath and say;
1. I am an officer of the iustralinn rilitary Forces.
2. Innexed hereto and may ked "C" is a true copy of an afjicavit sworn by Leslie iillam "conN on 27 "ar. 1946 which T h:ve in my custory in the course of' my ruties.
?. The originel afitervit cannot be made availeble immedtately as it is recuirer for trials of minor mar criminals.

swon before me at this 27 iay of "ny l.s46. ) /s/ J. J.loyd
:ajor
_/s/F.D. Crompton ...Capt
an ofitcer of the
sustralian "1litary Forces

IN THE \(2 A T T E R\) of "ar Crimes
and
IN TEE PATPR of N17E37 Private
 .

T, Leslie 'illinm "cCann of 159 Onslow Road, SHENTON PARK, in the State of estern iustralia, civilian, formerly "X17is37 Private Leslie Tilliam FicCATI of \(2 / 4\) ! Iachine Gun Battalion (STF), being duly sworn make oath and say:-
1. On ilednesday 4 February 1942 during action SOTTH IEST of BU:IT TEATI Village I was wounded by "ortar fragments in the right leg and remained with other wounded in a native house. The party included British officers whose names I now know to be Capt thnmas anc LIEIT ALDFTCH, both of Leister Kegt. During the next day the others moved out bu.t I remained.
2. On Triday the 13 February 42 I was joined by :xi6675 Private E. J. ILIHNUSE of my own unit who had received four machine gun bullets in the right leg. "ie moved out in the evening towards the TEST Coast Road and received medical treatment at a Mohammedan Institution. I was still armed and had fired on two enemy soldiers on the way. -
3. We were informed on suncay the 15 February by the Mohamodenas in the evening that the battle of Singapore was over and we could proceed to Stgnapore itself. In the morne, ing we moved towards singapore along the, Hest coast hioad. and about 1100 hrs met three other, Australian soldiers near PASIR PANJANG Village. The names of these ustrallan soldiers I cannot recall with certainty. "e hadepreviously disnosed of our arms and when we informed these men that fighting hac finished they disposed of theirs. Carrying ritichutse we moved... on to Pasifi panjing. Here Japanese... sentries stopjed usj at the entrance to a house, later known to be a Japanese He. I presumed this to be a Ja uanese \(H \mathrm{~F}\) in view of the fact that guards. were posted around it. I cannot say what ing this would be but from the situation on Jinganore Islanc at that time it appeared to be the H2s of that Jonanese force which landed on the Hest Coast of the Island. Te were ordered inside, our jack-knives were taken from us and we were led to. the Asiatic quarters at the rear of the house and locked in a small room with two barred windows, about 1300 hours. we were fed by an English-speaking-Japanese. Later, about 1800 hrs , we were taken out and (put on to a motor truck and informed we were to be taken to where Australfan tronps were being concentrated: At the gate we met another party of ten ustralianstonifoot under one guard. These included rX13977 WO I., G. F. TTREY and YX7336 Pte H. B. oCEERBY both of my own unit. The remainder were all \(2 / 18\) Bn. . This party had been taken by the Japanese to drive carriers that morning.

The driver apparently did not know his destination, he drove to a place behind the. Ford Motor Yorks; then North along BUKIT TELAH Road, where he remained until dark, then returned to the house from whence we had come. During this time none of us had been taken off the truck. We had been subjected to hostile demonstrations and an attempt had been made to deprive \(W 0\) I AIREY of his haversack.

WO T 1 TPEY resisted this attempt, explaining his rank. On our return we were locked in the sane room and given a meal by the same English-speaking Javanese. Iie said "Don't be afraid, you are quite safe. "e are now your friends." Ifter the meal a Japanese Ofy icer came in and another Ja anese crowded round the windows inquisitively. Ne were warned to answer truthful'y and the sentor man called for HO I ATPEY who stood un and declared his rank. He yas questioned regarding military movements in Australia and overseas, the number of fustralian troops in ralaya, and American troons in sustralia. He evaded the questions and the officer said he thought the replies were not truthful. He then incuired if we would like to go home to iustralia and laughed cynically when we reolied "Yes". He then asked our Units anc yo I ATrBy said we were macine Gunners, the eleven soldiers not of my linit then sooke up and said they were drivers. After an animated discussion the officer and interpreter left the room. A little later we were told we rould stay the night and that he would endeavour to arrange for bedcing.
4. The officer who subjected us to interrogation yer medium of an intervreter anneared to me to be of high rank. ile wore coloured tabs and a distinctive braid on his left shoulder which hung lkie a lanyard. He was about 5'2" in height, portly and inclined to be chubby in the face. I don't know whether he had a moustache or wore glasses. Fis hair was much lighter than tine average Japanese, cut short but not close..cronner. \#e did not see this officer agein and I think there is a distinct nossibility that I might be able to recognise him again if I saw him in person. I would say definitely that this officer was senior in rank to any other officer contacted by us at the time these events took nlece.

The interpreter was tall and slim, \(6^{1}\) in height and particularly dark. He wore glasses. He appeared to be quite good-natured and even-temperec for a Jap.
5. Te received adequate food and vater and smokes, were not molested and were permitted latrine facil:ties on 17 February. No bediding was supplied but some clothes, bandages and dressings were given us for wounded men. \(\cdot 6\) 6. On 18 Iebruary we again received adequate fond etc.
7. From Sawn the Japanese appeared very unfriendly, except one man who pushed food quickly through the window and then ran away. It appeared to me that overnight there hat been a complete change in Japanese personnel, in the form of another unit taking over. I could not identify the incoming unit nor can I give any information tiat might assist in establishing its identity. The change in atmosphere was most marked, and our requests for water were ignored or answered with ieers. I noted all the names of our party in my paybook which I later lost after my attempted execution. This being so, the only names of our party which I can furnish with certainty are ATREY, OCESRBY, "ILLHOMSE and one \(2 / 18\) driver named SHEFIDAN and known as "Muscles". At about 1730 hrs we were taken out singly and our hands tied behind our backs with strins torn from a bag? 10 I AIREY still wore his haversack.

We were marched dow the road in file, led by a Jananese whom It thought at the time to be an of ificer but now realise that he vas jrobably a senior sergeant. Py reason for this is that I noticed at the time that he was wearing leggings as onnosec to the officers equipment of high topyed hoots. He was about \(5^{\prime} 2^{\prime \prime}\) in height and wore glasses, had a moustache and was thickset in build. He was robably in his thirties. "'e had a Jipanese soldier as a cuard at the reai. Mostile demonstrations were made by tananese soldiers lining the roac and look-
 rd, and warched about four hundred yarcis. I was in the
 out to him to find out whether the nace was too fist, I was shorted at absuively by the Jopanese in charge. .7e; turned of \(f\) to the left of the road and continved for about one hundred yards, haltar, and were formed into single rank with our bacirs to a creelc. I was the right hand man, MILTH TVS the left hand man, yith ATEGY and OCESPBY near him. Seven Jayanese soldiers then appearec. a: med with British rifles with bayonets fixed, and lined up in single rank facing us at abou:t thirty feet eistance. The Japanese in command then adriessed his troons from my flank, then ordered us to turn round and face the creek. He then gave an order and I heard the sounce of rifle bolts being worked. I then considered they might shoot us but was not convinced that this would happen. I leant forvard to say to my neighbours something like "This doesn't look too good" and as I was straightening up the Japanese in commans gave another order and the firing squar fired. I was struck by a bullet which entered below my left shoulder blade and emerged between my third and fourth ribs, smashing them. I was quite conscious and could heve remained standing, but fell down the fatrly steep banis into the creek facing the opnosite bank. Another man fell with his head against my wounded right leg, he was not killed and kept talking. I have no idea in what order the men were shot, but when all had fallen into the creek the Joonnese a yoroacher, anr? fired many more shots into the bodies shouting all the time they were firing. The man resting on my leg continued shouting at the Japanese and about a dozen shots were fired into him, one shot just missing my heac.

From the other enc of the line another voice kept shouting at the Japs. Ifring continued until all was quiet. After about five minutes T looked around. lovement was a"kwarc as I was bound and encumbered by the next man. I finally sat up and spoke but recelved no answer nor did anyone move, I was now feeling dazed and brought up blond when I spoke. I managed to free my hands quite easily and removed my boots and then moved 'Testerly down the Creek towards the iess Coast Rdi but collapsed after a short distance. At this time it was still light, probably about 1830 hrs.
8. Before dewn I recovered consciousness but fainted again recovering at first ilght. I washed my wound and removed the bandage from my leg to my chest. I was unable to dress my back. I moved back towards the place of shooting but could only see that a rubber tree had been felled across the bodies. I then took shelter in a native building; two Chinese, a man and a woman came in and asked if I was one of the men shot the day before. I admitted I was and they said that they had seen the shootin?. They

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Evidentiary Documcnt \# \(\$ 5045\).

\section*{2.}
was in a rubber plantation, I rent to sloep and never noke till darn. I stortcd off and started to get boakcr axa reakor and I ras gotting bushod. I did not know then that capitulation kat takon place the night before and satives I met rould not havo anychiac to do zith me. Then !I discovored I could not apcak. 1

I nandered rousd and round and finally came to a place phere portugesc people, a man and his aife and a far chilicen, lived. The zoman wantcd to pash iis as aoon as sio sals me. They spoke ingilish, but this chap told her not to interfore witin me as it migelt do mo more harn than good. They gave me a cup of coffee and jit ran out tins si.3e of my neck. He took me dorn tho road and put mo cu the twak ithrougn the bush loading to the hospital. is lityte chincso giri ren ainal to the hospital and trio ordorlies cave out and met me. They pers ahistralian orjarlies from tho A.G.i. and they took me into the hospitial from ticice. I was six months in hospital.

I coule not identify the men tho fired on the ambulance and later did the shooting, but most of them :zore big busly beards; they were in uniform.

I have difficulty in spoaking. I get a cold easily and cannot arallow food correctly. If I get anything hot I slobber and I also get bad cramps from the side of any face dorm to the throat. The bullet cut the back of my tonque. [I nevor spolie from February to November \(]\) and I had to be fed through a tubc: I spenc the rost of the period in changi as a prisoner of :!ar. I ras in charge of the boormaking branch and had 32 bootm kers under me. I was servicinu everyone's boots - Italion, Dutch, British, hustralian, Japanese and Koreans.
rion the Jupanese sont their boots to be mended in most cases they sont materiul ifith them. \(7 \in\) had 4 Korean quarterrmster at the atore all the time and they had thoir orn waterial locked up in a locker. Then Fo mantod to mend Austricilian :nd English boots ne used motor tyre and also had some stuff manufuctured out of raf latex. They clso supplied us with a bit of yukla which ras not zuluch good. Old kit bidga vere cut up for uppers. \(\because \theta\) did \(70,80,100\) repairs \(\varepsilon\). day and had ti:0 shifts running for a long Fiale. 9 used to work from 8 or 9 in the morning to \(5 \mathrm{p} . \mathrm{m}\). and then tho other shift nould come on and tiork to 10.30 at night. I bore moodicn clogs which I made for myself or any old pair of boots at all.

I had no trouble rith the japenese as ragards bashings.
zuito a fcr Japancse officers caive in and Llso japunese and Korean soldiers. I spent quite a lot of time making stord belts for them also. The Koroan quartermister pas Oyama Debushi, whe ras a good type as they go.
:ie had no boot repairine equipment. In the later stages, ufter we had atrugeled alons for about tizo yours, they brought out from town about a dozen pairs of pinchers, phich tere usoliss.

The Japancese had thu'r oum army koot shop at singapore but I nover sar it. Thoy hal muchinc.ry thero. The reason they took their boots to us instoad of taring them where ras that they zore getting a botter job from us than from their orm people. The chinese did cn excellent job but they wero also getiting an exieliont prise at that time and they were getting it áone from us for notiaing.

I mas in the solerang soucre incidont. I knorl a chap rho has photos of it and I will try to ger nome for the Commission.

I certify that this cridenco is trie and correst.
Taken before mo at widnay
on Friday 16 th November 1944)
(Signed) A.J, MMNSFITID.
Comalssioncr.
(signcd) G.h. CROFT.
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Evicontiary Docurant \#5081.
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5.
 necr BETING IUS. wherc he reiuined aith the cer thile GRIFFITH, :iinTSON and ryself ralked 50 cr 60 ycris dotm to the boach. The throe Gunners were ordcrud cut of the lorry and I now sem that their hands were ticd behind their becks anci cttachici to a length of cori held by their euards. is Japeneso interprcter caric to us and said the ren roro geing to be shot c.nd showec. us :herc we verc to vitncss it frce:.
6. ifter yo thrice officers heid spoken to the Gunners, they rero led to the sitc of tho cxceution :where a single arave hed been cue. They werc blindfelcace and wace to kncol cocen besicic the grave at intervals of about ono and a hilf yards. The Jipunese firine party of three stood about thirty yards array :s.d firci a volley on an order fron the Japanese rearent officer cr N.C.O. in charge of thel: ill three cen fell ainost siaiultenecusly but, obvicusly, not all of ther: were doad. pre firing party \(s\) ne the \(\mathrm{N}, \mathrm{C} .0\). then malked up to the erave anc, under the latter's direction, finishce off the prisoners still alive by firing at least 3 sore shots.
7. Iftcr tho eravo hed boon fillod in the Japenose cererncniously sciluted the ereve and cuecrated it with shrubs fron the undergrowth. The Japanoso interpreter told ieg I had seen prisoners ahct because they had attomptod to cseipe cnd he had beon instructed that I vas te zorn all others thet their fate rould be the saine if any of ther rero caught trying tc cace.pe. -
8. Tc:iards the ond of February 1942 it bocano cormon knorledge in the catp thet a nuriber of Chincse acribors of tho Straits Settlenent volunteer force hid been convcyed by the Japeneso to the beach cast cf CRiNGI folloring their copturel and thece raraored by wachinc-gun firo. This wes uncorsticu to have taken place a few days after the sapitulation. i. buricl party wis proviaci by british infontry frcis the scutherri arod of tho es.p.
9. Durine \(2 y\) stey in the cowp conditions eencrally ccipared fovcurably with these in cther Jepenesc prisoncr of ver cenps \(\begin{gathered}\text { ith } \\ \text { the notable }\end{gathered}\) excopticn of the feci. This wis inforicr in beti quantity and quality.
10. Ls in othcr Jepancse conps any prisonors were orployod on constructing military verks; in CiANGI on building an :ir-ficld noer the carip.
11. I have read the afficavit of Lieutenant-Colonel G.I.C. ROSSiLL, siacrn at :IESTMINSTAR on 13 Decciber 1945 and I consider it represonts a true eeneral picture of the ration pesition i.t the cal.p.
S: ORN by the aforesaid CZzRLLSS PHILLIP :EETH ) at 6 Sprinc gercions in the city of ::cstivinster)
 Buforo 1:0,
(SCd.) R.D.L. KHLIY, Captain Logal Staff.
ifilitory Departwent, office of the Juage divcente Gencral, London.








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zoidentiary Document No. 5052B.
The Intcrnational
silitary tribunal for
the fir fult.
The infted statcs of ficrina und others
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ARELSADo and othcis.
AFIIDGV,
 the state of 7icıorii: jakco oi th cad eay:-

On 26th Junusry 1942 I fias Sci:ior Representative of tine iustralian fed cross socicty and ras afjached to the british Buse Hospital at alexanàra, sinfupore.

On suturday, february luti 1942 ct approxilately 4.30 p. Z . the hospital tas storred by Jupancse troops. Entering the cain eround floor corricior froin the south cact end anci over the buck bulcony, these troops racca throufh the building, bryonetiong und shootinc all rho cwic in their path, leaving bulind thei. a puth of ceath and deatruction. Thero could not be any ristaliinis the nature of the building. Ail the iedictil staff rece ncurine RCa C=oss Erussaris, the beis had RCd Cross counterpanes and tieconventionki izarlinge icre on tio outsicic and tie inside of the builainc. A huce rod cross epproximatcly 40 fect squarc mas on the eround izwodiately in front of the buildinet therc fias no hostile act matover from the hospite.l to provole this uttack. With 16 patients and tro izedical officcrs I rotircd to No. 2 operating mioatrc or the eround floor curing the raid. I sar: two british boys bayonettice. The: werc we .bers of the manchester pocinent. ifter the ruiá I sav quitc is nuiber dead stio had beon bayoncttcd or si:ot. I ussisted brincine into the rurds severul who hed becia :oundad. fitier the raid 46 áad bodics rerc ling in the corridor. Thicse bodics ucre collceted una buricd on lionajay l6th. The raid lissted about 30 ininutcs.

These troops entored No. 1 Ciperating Thcatre on the opposito side of tiec ind corridor to where I was locuted. an operation was in progress on a lad froi. the Loyals Rubiceri. he tias uncer the waosthetic. qwo doctors and tioo acdicul ordoslits were in attcndurice. ore of the japunese thrust his baycnet tiarough the body of the paticrit. Pithout any provocation or rarnine the othor Japanese turned upon the ledicul staff wno killed one doctor und cne orderly ind roundin, the other tio. I sar: t:is scene ofter the ruid had ended. I ussisted ir. bringine the wounded doctor and orderly into the surcical vari. I obtained the above details fron theme Dozens of deca bodics rere pickec up in the inospital eounde at nightfull and fore pleicod in slit trencics for buriul. I

I do not knor: what unit of the japancse wes rcsponsible for this

Evic̀entiary Docuzicnt No. 5052B.

\section*{2.}
tragedy other than inforiation civen by a Japanesc officer whoveited the l:ospitcil on Moncioy, Fobruary 16th. He was a fioutcnont. He said it was the Ilperial cuards tho entercd the hospital first. He spoke very Lood anglish, Theso troops were aressca in tropical ereen uniforisa, steel holinots and usual misitary equiprant. Their uniforns wore carbouflaged with brunches of trces and trigs. Ihiny of theri race like roulting shrubs. Theso r.cn v:ore ill about 6 fect tall. lost of the Jupanese seon later norc short in stature, uhout the 5 foot rack. The conmandibe officer of the hospital, 8 ot:ier ofescers and ryecif cscaped doath and injury. The C.O. coloncl J.". Craven, contucted the onsy after the raid but could not Got any sitisfaction fron thece, He pcinted to the Red Cross brassurcis and Lurkings but ice ras brushed aray wid no notice takon of hili. There did not appear to be uny offecer in charge of the Japancese.
T. For:urds evenin, thic juphoso i.unterca all pationts tho merc on tho eround floor, also a fev suaff and murciod then off to the roar of the hospital. They numbured 183. luny of the patients wers in pyjaras, Lany pithout footrese, some on crutclies, othcrerith lizibs in plister, heacs bendofed, etc. Only two of these ben were soen again. Thcy csccped fro custody during an artiliery bor:bardincnt, and returned to the hospital. These aen roported the terrible sercais of the won. They fere evicicntly bayonetted on sunday, Fubruary 15th, one Japunese ras seen ripiace the blood off his baycnct. Later on, onquirics mere zicie as to the \(\begin{aligned} \\ \text { elf }\end{aligned}\) any prisoners of wir. a fat ditys lajer c: Jep. nese officer tojd the C.O. that our cen had becn burici in slecll heles, with Japanese dead, about half a idile to the rear of the kospital. rie toral killed and believed cieca us a rcsult of the raid is 323, of rhoi. 230 terc putiente. The fo....:.C. lost \(47 \%\) of the Lidical persomel and \(55 \%\) of the officors on ticc staff.

Ijite on sunday, February 15th, and on londay, februery 16th, a different typo of Jupuncse cnterid the hospit.l. This croria foroibly looted evcryboay of anythinc of vilue, such as :antches, fountain pens, rines, cienrette cusos, trinkcts, ::oncy, etc. Thcee articles r:ere nevor returned. The storc rooiss tecri truclicd und food carriod off by the case. The puci: store there putionts' personal belones aro stored ras entercd clotiaine, footrear, etc. vas carricd off. Tlicy ever used this store, which wias in tiac contre of the hospital, as a lutrinc, coi.pletely fouling it. j ;

I tis c prisoner of war for thrge and a lalf ycars in four calps on singporc Isliand. I sab plenty of facc sluppius and hitting with sticks, picces of nood and iron, but no actukil killines durinc the wholo period. I lost four stonc over tho thrce end a half years. Ho recognition matever mas accoriled do c:s represontative of the Red cross socicty.
.pplicution thas wie repeatcdly for sol.o consideration to Red Cross porsomel, but this ris rcfusca on cach occasion.]

St:ORN at likibournc in tho stutc of victoriu tisis tho 27 th day of scptei. ber 1946
(Sienta) F.C. SIU.RT. Before ise
(Signedi) FLORLTCE B. SUHR, J.P. Central Builipick.


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GENGRAL HEADQUTARTERS
UNITED STATES ARNY FORCES, PACIFIC
OFFICE OF THE THFATER JUDGE ADVOCATE WAR CRINFS BRANCH

APO 500
27 November 1945
MFMORANLUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 109)
THRU8 Executive Officer, Har Crimes Branch
©UBJFCT: Atrocities committed at Fort Santiago, Intramuros Manila, P. I.

\section*{II. SIMMMARY OF EVIDENCE:}

The record in this case, consisting of four hundred and sixtymone pages; contains innumereble instances of the brutal and barbaric treatment of many persons taken to Fort Sentiago for cuestioning. The practice of inhuman treatment prevailed from the time of the Japanese occupation in January 1942 to February 1945. When the Japanese realized that lienila was lost theyengaged in a finel orgy of mass murder by shooting, bayonetting and burning alive of all prisoners remaining inside the fort. It is impractical to detail the treatment received by each individual, but in general the forms of torture summarized below were imposed in whole or in part upon the prisoners. Some of the victims were Americen prisoners of war and American nationals. The treatment given specific individuals may be learned by referring to the record citation opposite their names in the list of victims herein.

Upon arrival at Fort Santiago for "investigation", a person was placed in a cell approximately sixteen feet long and thirteen and one half feet wide in which had been placed many other people so that there was not sufficient room for all of thern to ile down ( \(\mathrm{R} 13,19,39,239\) ). Talking was prohibited ( \(R 14,20,32\), 65). The diet was entirely inadequate and consisted of a small amount of rice, and occasionally some native vegetables or greens ( \(\mathrm{R} 9,14,38\) ). Practically all of the witnesses suffered a loss of weight ranging from twenty-five to seventy-five pounds during the time they were held ( \(\mathrm{R} 15,45,197,301\) ). One person was incarcerated for thirty-three days and lost thirty-two pounds ( R 266). Sanitary conditions werc alrost unbearable, the only toilet facility being an opening in the floor at one end of the cell ( \(R 75,92,324,340\) ) which was never cleaned more than once a day, and the receptacles were entirely inadecuate ( P 14, .251). There was not sufficient water provided, though apparently in each cell was a faucet from which a few drops of water was obtainable ( \(\mathrm{R} \mathrm{14}, \mathrm{32}, \mathrm{154)}\). ( \(R 32,65,240,251\) ). Generally, bathing was infreguent and sometimes less than once a week ( \(\mathrm{R} 14,21,92\) ). Usually all in a cell, sometimes numbering eighteen or twenty, were allowed five or ten minutes for the entire group to bathe ( \(\mathrm{R} 14,33,261\) ). Mon were forced to bathe in view of women prisoners (R 351). The only ventilation in the cells were small windows high at one end, and the stench of human waste and dirty bodies was over-powering. The cells were infested with lice and vermin ( \(\mathrm{R} 21,240,286\) ). Persons who had been tortured wore returned to the cell in a wounded condition, some were helpless ( \(\mathrm{R} 20,53,98,106,122\), 146,241 ), and some died in the cell ( \(\mathrm{R} 126,146,300,312,350\) ). There is only one instance of rape ( R 334 ).

Of the various forms of torture administered by the persol nel at Fort Sentiago the following are typicals

Some prisoners were kicked and slapped across the face, beaten with the fiat of \(\theta\) sheathed sword across the back, shoulders and kidneys ( \(\mathrm{R} 13,74,135\) ). Others werc beaten with iron rods ( \(R\) 30, 84), or with baseball bats, clubs, poles, ropes, and telephone wires ( \(R 2,66,92,104,132,250,306,316\), and some were thrown by Jiu Jitsu methods ( \(\mathrm{R} 45 ; 74,104,134,316\) ). The water cure was frequently employed. This consisted of tying the victim to a bench, putting a cloth over the face and inserting a water hose in the mouth or nostrils. Water was forced into his stomach until he became unconscious, and then the Japanese pressed and jumped on his stomach to force the water out ( \(\mathrm{R} 45,104,132,139,163,175,249,279\) ) Prisoners had their arms tied behind their backs, a poie inserted through the arms at the elbows, and then were raised and suspended from the finot. others were hung for hours by the arms ( R 92, 134, 149, 163, 175, 250, 279). Some had sticks inserted in the opening of the penis or vagina ( \(\mathrm{R} 127,133,175\) ), and others were burned about the body vith lighted cigarettes or cigars (R 133, 162; 252, 307). Ammunition would be placed between the fingers and then the fingers were squeezed until the bones would break (R 175). Small bamboo sifts, or other instruments were placed under toe nails and finger nails ( \(\mathrm{R} 81,133\) ) and finger and toe nails were pulled out with pliers ( \(\mathrm{R} 195,307\) ). Electricity was used to shock or burn the victims ( \(R\) 81, 175, 229, 329). A piece of skin wes sliced from the back of ono man's hand and hc was forced to eat it. The skin on his face and arm was twisted with a pair of rooden pliers ( \(R\) 81) , and he was hit in the testiclos ( \(\mathrm{R} 81, .170\) ). The Japanese guards ground the prisoner's toes under their hob-neiled boots (R 81). Three fimerican pilots who had been shot down during the bombing of Manila received a sword thrust through the shoulder or were burned by lighted cigarette: Holes were made in their fingers, wire inserted through them, and the prisonors were then suspended by the wircs. One pilot's whole body was burned, another was paralyzed end they ware taken to a hospital ( R 197). American soldiers wire shot (R 2, 111). Kany prisoners from Fort Sentiago were executed at the Chinesc Cometory ( \(R\) 203, 212, 217) or buried there ( \(\mathrm{R} 212,2 \overline{2}, 222\) ). As \(n\) form of intimidation prisonors were shown headless men and men whose faces were so swollen and bloody as a result of \(b\) atings they could not be recognized. Intestines of some men were removed while they were still alive in the presence of other prisoners ir 280). Onc Filipino prisoncr wes forced to bchcad two other Filipmos ( \(R\) 281). Fead bodies with their hands tied behind their backs wore thrown into the pasig Rivor which flows at the rear of Fort Santiago ( \(R\) 312, 347). Torture as described above wes administered not only to men but to women ( \(R 31\), \(66,67,114,115,133,146,198,255,267,288\) ). Some of the women werc nuns ( \(R 178,271\), 297). Some of the men were priests ( \(R 107\), 135, 170, 192). Some victims died after being relcascd es a resuit of thair treatment at Fort Santiago ( \(R\) 343, 345 to 347, 361). In February of 1945 the cells in Fort Santiago wore packed with people who resided within the Walled City. Doors were berricaded, gasoline Was poured around, sct afire and hundreds vere burned to deeth ( \(R\) \(369,378,380,396)\). Others wore executed ( \(R 273,395\) ). Hundreds of bodics were discovered by American troops when Fort Santiago was teken ( R 406 to \(435,441,447\) ). Many of the civilians were able to oscape the burning buildings only to be shot by Jopanesc guards os they escaped or when attempting to swim across the pasig River ( \(R\) 369, \(379,387,388,396\) ). Some however, survived and lived to relate the horror to which they had been subjected.

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Doc. No. 2857
RASTMICTHD
GE.TMAI HEADCYARTHRS
SUFRTME COMM
LEGAL SCTIOM, RANILA
EPF
\(1 P 0500\)
14 Ifav 1946
MEMORANDUM TO: Prosecution Section (Report No. 302)
THRU : Inecutive Officar, Legel Saction; Menila
Subject : Atrocitios in and arjund Vigan, Ilocos Sur, P. I., 10 December 1941 to 3 April 1945.
II. SUMMARY OF EVIDMNCE:

During the perind from 10 Docember 1941 to 3 April 1945, Jepanose soldiers stationed at and around Vizan, Ilocos Sur, P. I., following their unal pattern of operation against innucent civilians, raided and locted private homes, killed and mistreated e number of poreons.

On 10 Decombar 1941, upon ontering tho town of Vigan, the Japaneso fired upon a ceuple killing the vifo ( 8 58).

On 13 Soptomber 1942, thirtoon parsons were arrested and tortured and later two of the prisoners were killed by shooting ( \(R 22,25\) ).

On 10 April 1944, six Japnese drasized a woman into a house in San Viconte. The woman triod to get away from the Japnnese by jumping out of the window, but she was ovort iken and found dead with bayonet wounds a few momants afterwards ( \(R\) 42).

In 37 August 1944, Jappnese soldiers fired upon poople tion ocngragated in the cockpit in Santa Catelina, woundin; one and probably killing several persons ( \(\mathrm{R} 9,12\) ). On 20 October 1944, thirty parsons wore arrested and brcught to the Bentey exariison where tho prisoners were tortured. One of the prisozers wes never relcased (R13). On 15 November 1944, three prisoners wera behended in Vichn (R 20). On 27 Decembor 1944, sovoral porsons were rounded up in Jarrios San Julien and Capangpangan, Vizen, aftor their houses were lootod. Tho prisonere were tortured, and on 7 Jamery 1945, nine of the prisoners wero boheaded (R 1-9, 15, 19).

In March 1945, eight persons ware bayonetted to death and threo othere vero probnbly killed in Ppatey and Vizen (R 45, 48, 52).

On 2 April 1945, four men wore behopdod in Vigan ( R 27 ), and on 3 spril 1945, the Jap nese looted the houses in Barrio Lansunarao, Caoayan, and then killed at loast oix porsons ( R 34 ).


蔵迎目○○

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TEitu : Brocutiva Offic.r, Lernl Suction, Manila
SiBJiCT : sitr citine at Barric Son ioquo and Sitic Bituto, Zamb nnon City, Mindonar. P. I., harch 1945.

\section*{II. SUNATE OR TVITICI:}

For tho purpeso if roview the soparate roprrts havo boon cumbinod and cinsidurad tergother inesmuch as tho atrucitios woro apoprontly comattod bi the sneme military unit vithin twe weeks of anch ther and at approximately tho sama locality. In order to avoid confusicn, the pages of tho recerd of the atrocity iccurring last will be proceded by "I".

On cr about 8 Harch 2945, acmo forty priscnors from San hancn Panal C lray, Znmbeaner City, whe had boon warking under Jeppanese military suparvision, ware baine esenrted back by Japanosa puards (a 8). Thon thoy reached Barrio San Inque, mambors of the Japenese navel forces tied thom and placed then in threo air-raid sholtors of tho Japanose navy carm neer the Sen Ruque Ziver ( \(\mathrm{I} 2, \exists \mathrm{Z} \dot{\mathrm{i}}\) ). One by ono tho prieoners wero taken from the sioltors and apperently wore killed as their crios of pain could be heard by those romainine under ruard in the ohelters ( \(\Omega\) 9). about ten prisonors succeeder in oscepinz and one of this srcup doclares that he witnessed tha excuticn of the uther :rcup frem the top of a coconut troe whore he remained for some two hours ( \(\mathcal{I} 19,20\) ).

On ur abrut 23 Karch 1945, Japaneso military parsonnel rcunded up civiliains at Sitio Situto, Barric Pasinanca, Zambeanga City, and confiscetod all bolos. Tho prisozors werc then tied and some of them taken indivijually ts a nearby stroen where Japanese alashed thom on tho head and back with gabars, boles, and picks ( A I-2, 16). another victim who attomptod to escape uas bayonntted ( 1 I-7), while e Eilipinc woman states thet she was reped by a Jadonose (a i-26).














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蝶く小米＂井っか。









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DOCUNENT 2728
the other soldier, her arms. After that the Japonese soldiers, MORI and OIDE, did the sane thing. People in the air raid shelter were crying because of how they saw these soldiers raper Encarnacion LINES.

MOSUKAWA later returned, a short time after the soldiers had raped Encarnacion LINES, and carried her completely naked into the air raid shelter. My brother, Donato had a towel around hi: neck which he gaved to Encarnacion to cover her body. A few minutes later, Pijar was brought back into the shelter. I saw that her dress was also torn off. She was crying and told her mother that the three Japanese who took her away had abused her and raped her. MOSUKAVA then gave some water and biscuits to the two girls who were raped.

All the people and myself were very thirsty but the Japanese dic not give us eny water or food. It was very hot in the air raid shelter. MOSUKAWA then told the people in the air raid shelter, after the girls were brought in, that all will be killed by hanc grenades and that nobody will be able to leave the air raid she ter. The Japanese soldiers surrounded the entrance with their rifles with fixed bayonets end will kill anybody who tried to leave the air raid shelter.

Around 10:00 \({ }^{\prime}\) clock in the nig't, I was able to see Capts. SHIMAMIRA and MASAO standing on the platform leading to the entranc of the air raid shelter. Although it vas derk I was able to sef them because of the refiection from the electric light which we had inside the air raid shelter. SHIMAMURA and MASAO were talk ing in Japanese for a few minutes. Then MOSUKAli came down the stairs to the entrance of the air raid shelter while SHIMAMURA and MASAO welked away.

MOSUKAVF took out a hard grenade from his side pocket, tapned it igainst his helmet and threm it into the air raid shelter. In quick stccession he threw abcut six or sever hand grenades into the shelter. Surienly, the hand grenades exploded among us end the neonle began to scream, shout, anc cry. Shrepnels hit my two hands. Those few who were able to ove could not go outside the shelter beceuse the Japanese soldiers were still there with fixed bayonets. When the people inside the air raid shelter stopped shouting, screaming, crying and moaning, the J \(\cdots \cdots\) cse soldiers placed pieces of wood and iron roofing to block the entrance " the air raid shelter. It became very dark inside but I could still hear a few voices of some people.
The next morning, when it was daylight MASAO And SHIMAMURA returned to the air raid shelter and removed the wood and iron roofing from the entrence and looked inside. When MASAO saw Catalina BUTAY still alive he chopped off her head with his saber. SHIMAMTHA saw me still alive, so he took his pistol and shot me and the builet hit my left leg. Then he struck me twice on my upper right leg with his saber.

I can only rementer a fev names of the victims, all of them wore Filipinos from Dacaca. The names who I remember are:

NAHE
ACE
SEX
RELATION
Donato ESTIMALA
24
28
35
29
Cataline butay
Numeriano DEL FOSARIO
\begin{tabular}{ll}
\(M\) & My brother \\
\(M\) & My brother \\
\(M\) & No relation \\
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 had rend to we and whuscood taz tranzintion of the foregoing
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\section*{/s/ Minde Entamad}

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 29 day of Noy. 1945

\title{
/s/ Smmel Rovie
}

SGUEL RÓE, Captain, QMC' Investigating Uifiger, War Crjues Livestigating Detachment.

COMONWEALTH OF TEE, FHTIIPPIIFS )
CITY OF DAVAO ) SS
I, FICARDO DE CASTPO, resiaing at 72 Valenzuela Strect, Sant Mose, Monila, P. I., being duly sworn on oath, stete thet I truly translated the cuestions and answers given from English to Tagalo. and from Tagalog to English respectively, and that ofter beine transeribed, J. truly trinslated the foregoing deposition contrining three pages, to the witness; that the witress therempon in my presence affixed his signature thercto.

\section*{/s/ Rieordo_ee Costro RIChitio if CAsTRO}

Subscribed and sworn to before re this 29 dey of Nov. 1945
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline /s/ & Samucl Powe \\
\hline & SAMEL JUE, Captein, QMC \\
\hline & Investisating officer, War \\
\hline & Crifine IAvestigating Detachment \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\section*{CERTIFICATE}
 JR., 2nd It., \(0-1131095, F A\), Investigeting officers, War Crimes Investigating Detecnment, cerijfy chat on 17 ili \(^{\text {day }}\) of November, 1945, personalily apncered before us MISUEL ESEINADA, and according to RICARDU LE URASR2, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein, thit after his testimony hed been trenscribed, the said MIGUEL EGMIMDC, had read 10 nim by the said intcrpreter the same and offixed his signature thereto in our presence.

Davao City, Davno

29 Nov. 1945
/s/ Smmuel Roye
SAMUEL ROVG, Unptoin, DiMC Investigating Officer, War Crimes Investigating Detachment

Yernon \(V\) Herris, Jr
VIRNU V. hiRT:IS, JRe, 2nd Lt. Investigaiing officer, War Crimes Investigating Detachmen


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\section*{CERTIFICATION}
- I certify that the microgrophs appearing in this reel of film are true copies of the original records described above.
Date: 30 Mny 1989
Signature of Camero Operator: \(\qquad\)









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[^0]:    "Yet, es long es there is lecking the assuagement of thet possible thrent, there will be some less favorebly endowed ( cspecially in essential resources) wio vill fecl corpelled to consider defensively their reletions witr the United Stetes.

[^1]:    "Accordingly, the Government of Jnyan and the Government of the United States have come to the followine rutual understanding and declaration of nol tey:

[^2]:    "Snction I
    "Dreft Mutual Declaration of Policy
    "The Government of the United States and the Government of Jepan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their rational policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pecific area, that they have 10 territorial deaigns in that erea, thet they heve no intention of threatenine other countrins or of usine military forco aggressively ageinat any neifhboring nation, and that, accordingly, in the national policies thoy will actively apport and give practical applicetion to the following fundamentel principles upon which their relations with eech other and with all other governments are besed:
    "(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and ell nations.
    (2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of othry countries.
    (3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.
    (4) The principle of reliance upon intornetionel cooperstion and conciliation for the provention and pacific enttioment of controversies end for improvement of internationai conditions by peaceful methode and prooesses.

[^3]:    "4r It is impossible not to rench the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in conlition with Great Brition nnd other Powers, its dominant Dosition it has hitherto occuoied not only in China but in

[^4]:    Doc. No. 6257
    Page 10

[^5]:    Noto: The symbol * indicatos an exact ROMMJI transliteration of the original RANA.

[^6]:    1-altor's Motes Revisod by "Brrata" 1ssued by Fing Seoretary, Combined Floet as Combinod fleet Ultraseerer Sorial 1 Part 99, dotod 17 Hov 42, aboard tho NAdAKO, SAEKI WAN.

[^7]:    1rditor's Notes Revised by "Brrata" 1ssued by Flag Soorotary. Combined Floot as Combinod Fleet Ultriasocret Serial 1 Part 99. dated 17 yiov.41, aboard the NAGATO, SNEXI WAI.

[^8]:    1-attor's Motes Revised by "Errata" 1soued by Fing Seoretary, Combined Floct as Combinod Fleet Ultraseeret Serial 1 Part 99, datod 17 Hov 41, woord the NACAYO, SAEKI WAN.

[^9]:    Note: The symbol * indicates an exact ROMAJI transliteration of the original KANA.

